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Evolution and impacts of public policy on the changing Canadian inner city : case study of Southwest… DeVerteuil, Geoffrey Paul 1993

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EVOLUTION AND IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THECHANGING CANADIAN INNER CITY:CASE STUDY OF SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-90byGEOFFREY PAUL DeVERTEUILB.A., McGill University, 1991A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTS (PLANNING)inTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril 1993© Geoffrey Paul DeVerteuil, 1993In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) Se/1u.)--tikeertment of ^Cokpoll,,,,ty ai)ci 12eii004,  I 1'The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate ^f',1^)9Y3DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTThe inner city has seen significant social and economic changes in the post-war period. Thepurpose of this thesis is to explore the evolution of public policy and its impacts on the changingCanadian inner city, between 1960 and 1990, by using a case study, that of Southwest Montreal.Southwest Montreal was Canada's first and longtime most important industrial area, and hassuffered substantial decline since the 1950s. In order to set the context for the case study, it isnecessary to outline the variety of the Canadian inner city, the socio-economic changes facingit, as well as the policy responses to these changes. The case study will trace the evolution oftransportation, housing and economic/industrial policies between 1960 and 1990, and ascertainthe impacts of these policies according to the theories of inner-city change (policy as factors ofdecline, stability, and revitalization). The policy input of the three levels of government (local,provincial and federal) will be covered. The case study will also be compared to other Canadianinner cities. It was found that public policy is an important, though not decisive, factor in inner-city change, and that policy has evolved significantly in the last thirty years.iiTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT^ iiTABLE OF CONTENTS^ iiiLIST OF TABLESLIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS^ viACKNOWLEDGEMENT^ viiCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION^ 11.1^Introduction and Definitions^ 11.2^Formal Problem Statement 41.3^Methodology^ 51.4^Scope and Organization^ 5CHAPTER 2. THE CHANGING INNER CITY AND PUBLIC POLICY^82.1^The Inner City in the Canadian Context^ 82.2^Conditions of the Inner City^ 122.3^Changes to the Inner City: Centrifugal Forces 152.4^Changes to the Inner City: Centripetal Forces^ 202.5^Public Policy and the Inner City^ 232.6^Evolution of Policy for the Canadian Inner City 252.6.1 Period 1: 1945-1968 252.6.2 Period 2: 1969-1978^ 282.6.3 Period 3: 1979-1990 312.7^Prognosis and Conclusion: Gaps in the Overview^34CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDY: SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-90^363.1^Location and Delimitation of Case Study^ 363.2^Origins and History of the Southwest to 1959 383.2.1 Period 1: 1642-1859^ 383.2.2 Period 2: 1860-1909 393.2.3 Period 3: 1910-1959 403.3^Decline of the Southwest^ 413.4^Current Situation 443.5^Intro to the Policy Context of Montreal^ 46iii3.6^Policy Evolution: Transportation^ 473.6.1 Lachine Canal^ 483.6.2 Expressways 513.6.3 Transportation Improvements^ 533.7^Policy Evolution: Housing^ 553.7.1 Origins of Housing Policy in Montreal^ 553.7.2 Victoriatown 573.7.3 Petite Bourgogne Renewal^ 583.7.4 Public Housing^ 613.7.5 Operation 20000 Logements 623.7.6 Habiter Montreal and 1990 Plan^ 643.8^Policy Evolution: Industrial and Economic Strategies^653.8.1 Zoning^ 653.8.2 Post-Olympic Strategies^ 683.8.3 1990 Plan: Economic Aspects 70CHAPTER 4. EVALUATION, EVOLUTION AND SYNTHESIS OF POLICY^764.1^Introduction to the Policy Analysis^ 764.2^Strengths and Weaknesses of the Policies 784.2.1 Factors of Decline^ 784.2.2 Factors of Stability 834.2.3 Factors of Revitalization 864.2.4 Levels of Government^ 904.3^Evolution of Policies^ 924.3.1 1960-1972 Period of Infringement^ 934.3.2 1973-1978 Period of Neglect 944.3.3 1979-1985 Period of Stabilization 944.3.4 1986-1990 Period of Concerted Revitalization^954.4^Comparisons^ 96CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION^ 995.1^Summary of Findings and Policy Implications^ 995.2^Speculation on Future Trends^ 1015.3^Areas for Further Study 102BIBLIOGRAPHY^ 104APPENDIX 1: Chronology of Significant Events^ 115APPENDIX 2: Socio-Economic Information Southwest Montreal^117ivLIST OF TABLESTable 1^Dimensions of the Four Types of Inner Cities^12Table 2^Unemployment Rate for Southwest and MontrealRegion^ 42Table 3^Inner-City Population and 30-year Variance^43Table 4^Public Housing in the Southwest 1969-1988 61Table 5^1990 Plan and Investments^ 74LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONSMap 1^Location of Southwest Montreal^ 37Map 2^Transportation Policy Southwest Montreal 1960-90^49Map 3^Housing Policy Southwest Montreal 1960-90 56Map 4^Economic and Industrial Policies Southwest Montreal1960-90^ 66Map 5^1990 Southwest Plan^ 72viACKNOWLEDGEMENTI wish to acknowledge the following people for their input and help along the way.Geographically, I will start with Montreal. I wish to thank Nancy Dunton and Dinu Bumbaruat Heritage Montreal for their support and interest, Pierre Saint-Cyr at CIDEM and MarcelSevigny for their valuable and practical insights, David Hanna at UQAM for his comments onthe Southwest's historical development, and Chris Wayland and Jeff Simpson for their wittyinputs on style. Moving west, I would like to thank Pierre Filion at Waterloo for his expertadvice on policy analysis in the inner city. In Vancouver, I would like to thank Alan Artibiseand Tom Hutton for being supportive as readers and making good points, David Ley for takingtime off his sabbatical to be my external examiner, Craig Davis for being the DepartmentalExaminer, David Spira for the excellent maps, and all the students at SCARP who said itcouldn't be done. Last, but not least, I thank my parents for having faith in me, and a finalthanks to Becker and Fagen.vii1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION1.1 Introduction and DefinitionsThe concept of the inner city has traditionally been difficult to explain, much less define.Thus, the use of the term is largely implicit (Bourne 1978). Despite this ambiguity, certain areasthat are understood as 'inner city' have frequently been the focus of significant social andeconomic change, as well as concerted planning efforts, public policy strategies and other typesof government intervention. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution and impactof public policy in the context of the changing Canadian inner city, using a case study. It ishoped that a greater understanding of the inner city's place within the field of urban policy willresult.The difficult task of defining the inner city has long been a point of contention amongacademics. Many authors, such as Bourne (1978) and Ley (1991), argue that no reliable andabsolute method with which to delineate the inner city exists. Despite these reservations, urbangeographers and policymakers have attempted to conceptualize the inner city in bothgeographical and functional terms. Bourne's (1978) geographical concept of the inner cityincludes a central location, excluding the central business district (CBD). Johnston (1986) pointsto the inner city as the modern equivalent of the zone in transition put forth by the ChicagoSchool of urban sociology: "a mixed area of industry, commerce and overcrowded, subdivided,dilapidated dwellings. Proximity to the [dynamic] centre makes the area attractive to business,reduces residential desirability, with a resulting influx of poor groups..." (530). Bunting andFilion (1988) conceive the inner city as including the CBD, as well as the medium to highdensity central city neighbourhoods which surround the core. The federal government in 1975defined the location of the inner city as contiguous census tracts "between the central business2district and the suburbs" (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 2). In 1989, the governmentreferred to the inner city as being "the core of the metropolitan area, which includes the site ofthe earliest development of the city, the `CBD', and the surrounding areas of mixed land uses,with high density residential development" (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 10).For the purposes of this thesis, the geographic definition of the inner city will include thosebuilt-up areas surrounding the CBD but not the CBD itself; that is, areas which are contiguousand/or in close proximity to the borders of the CBD. The CBD is the "nucleus of the urbanarea... [and] is associated with both the most accessible point in the city and its peak land value,with the densest land use" (Johnston 1986, 47). Many cities, including Montreal, delineate theCBD in their master plans. In order to fully define the inner city, however, it is also useful togive a functional definition.Functionally, Bourne (1978) attempted to describe the inner city through the process andproblem approaches. The process approach outlined the various innate characteristics of the innercity: older built environment, the aging of housing, obsolete infrastructure and industrial base,land use encroachment by CBD and transportation uses, and demographic transition to fewerfamily households (Ibid., 6). The problem approach emphasized the conditions of inner cities,such as declining economic base, high unemployment, loss of manufacturing jobs, loss ofpopulation, absolute poverty, and physical deterioration (Ibid., 9-10). He argued that thecombination of the two approaches is what makes the inner city distinct, although each isdifferent according to its particular social and political context (Ibid., 13).The federal government in 1975 used housing stock age to functionally define the inner city:"a convenient definition of the inner city is then all census tracts where the percentage builtbefore 1946 is more than double the metropolitan figure [based on the 1971 census]"3(McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 3). In addition, census tracts surrounded by such inner-citytracts were also included in the definition, even if they did not have old housing, while isolatedinner-city tracts were excluded (Ley 1991, 313). Four types of inner cities were put forthaccording to their existing conditions: declining, stable, revitalizing, and massive redevelopment(McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 5). In 1989, the federal government reverted to an olderoperational definition, in which the inner cities were compared between 1951 and 1986 usingboundaries fixed in 1951 and based on the geographic definition described earlier (Ley 1991,314). It was the opinion of some academics that the Ram, Norris and Skof (1989) definition wasperhaps too narrow to be entirely useful (Ibid.).For the purposes of this thesis, the functional definition of the inner city will include allcontiguous areas to the CBD which had an earlier initial development than the metropolitan andcity average. Initial development refers to the inclusion of the area into the urban fabric, not theoriginal (rural) settlement. Inner-city census tracts and neighbourhoods which experiencedimportant revitalization in the past thirty years, such as Petite Bourgogne in Montreal, will notbe excluded using this definition. Moreover, all areas which are not necessarily contiguous tothe CBD but which are in close proximity and fall under the initial development parameter willalso be included. It is realized that the inner city can refer to declining areas surrounding theCBD, as put forth by Bourne (1978). Although this thesis will concentrate on such an area, itis not a defining characteristic of the inner city for purposes of this discussion. This concept willbe discussed further in chapter 2.4Policy is defined as "a set of decisions and actions designed to achieve a desired state ofaffairs" (Leung 1985, 1). This definition has three elements:1. there has to be a desired state of affairs;2. there must be a conscious and purposeful undertaking of decisions and actions;and3. there must be some sort of recognizable causal relationship between the desiredstate of affairs and the decisions and actions taken. (Ibid.)A policy has objectives, strategies, and outcomes (Ibid., 29-31). Policies involve a course ofaction, a web of decisions (Ham & Hill 1984, 12). Public policy refers to actions which aretaken by governments in the public realm, in order to provide a public good, foster competition,or alleviate negative externalities. Urban public policy is more difficult to characterize. Lithwick(1970) notes that despite the plethora of government policies which affect cities but are notspecific to them, he concluded that "[urban policy] is [ideally] a broad concept distinguished bya comprehensive bundle of integrated policies that together constitute a full statement of goalsfor urban development" (173). Policies are included if they significantly affect the inner city.1.2 Formal Problem StatementWithin the definitional framework of the inner city and public policy, the thesis question maybe posed as such: What has been the evolution and impacts of public policy on the changingCanadian inner city between 1960 and 1990, and how does public policy relate to inner-citychange? The first objective is to analyze the historical evolution of inner-city public policy andplanning initiatives since 1960, using the case study of Southwest Montreal, and to ascertain theobjectives, strategies and outcomes of these policies. A second objective is to evaluate the roleof public policy in influencing recent inner-city change. Policy will include governmental actionswhich are significant to the inner city. The ultimate purpose of the thesis is to shed more lighton the role and evolution that policy has taken in affecting the present-day Canadian inner city.51.3 MethodologyIn order to address the problem statement, six steps will be followed in sequential order:1. Review the theoretical basis for policy initiatives in the inner city, specifically in the contextof Canada, Quebec and Montreal. Provide a review of the theory of inner-city change and theconditions of inner cities. Outline an evolutionary study of public policy in the Canadian innercity. List the apparent gaps within both the theory and the empirical examples given, and explainhow the case study will fill the gaps. Sources will include academic theory, policy documentsand data.2. Use the case study of Southwest Montreal as an inner-city area, outline its changes andcurrent situation, and describe significant public policy trends between 1960 and 1990 accordingto the following fields of intervention: transportation, housing, and industrial and economicstrategies (which include zoning). Each field will be dealt with separately and chronologically,and each field will have its political framework established. Sources will include planningdocuments, academic material, and interviews.3. Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the policies on the case study area, according to thetheories of inner-city change (policies as factors of decline, stability, or revitalization), as wellas Leung's (1985) measure of policy consistency.4. Provide an historical summary of the policies over the thirty-year period, and attempt todivide the case study into distinct periods.5. Relate the case study to the theory presented in 2., and provide the policy implications of thecase study.6. Conclude with a summary of the thesis, speculate on future trends in both the case study andinner cities in general, and propose ideas for further research.1.4 Scope and OrganizationThe scope of the thesis encompasses the evolution of public policy, its implementation, andits effects on change in the inner city. Public policy will be limited to what is reasonablysignificant to the inner city; an expressway causing expropriations and demolitions, publichousing and renewal, important changes in zoning, and economic revitalization plans are allexamples of important policies, while minor allocational policies (Peterson 1981), including`housekeeping services' such as police, fire protection and sanitation, are clearly not. The6differentiation among the three fields of intervention will not always be clear-cut. For example,zoning and housing policies are frequently interrelated. In addition, it is understood that policyinterventions and regulations and market forces are impossible to disentangle; "Regulations andmarkets, in effect, grew up together" (Logan & Molotch 1987, 28). Thus, public policy issometimes difficult to discern. There exists an inherent limitation on the power of public policyto affect many business and household choices, especially in fields dominated by market forces,such as housing and employment creation.The relevance of this thesis to planning and policy studies falls within three areas. The firstis the relative paucity of historical studies on policy and planning in Canada. It would berelevant to specifically examine the evolution and impacts of public policy on the inner city, sothat the historical basis of current policies are better understood. Second, inner cities, as distinctentities, may arguably "provide the fullest expression of the transition towards post-industrialism.Global trends become more apparent as the focus moves towards the... inner city" (Filion &Bunting 1988, 81). Given this potential significance, it is important to see how policy has dealtwith the structural changes of the inner city. The third area of relevance focuses on the role ofpolicy for inner-city change . Bunting and Filion (1988) claim that policy cannot "launch orarrest...[societal change] within the inner city as a whole" (20), but can only accelerate, steeror decelerate such changes. Societal change includes household size, employment structure, andother macro-societal variables. The case study of Southwest Montreal will be useful in evaluatingthis contention.The organization of the thesis follows roughly the methodology outlined in 1.3. Chapter 2 willconcentrate on public policy and the inner city in Canada, review the theory and examples ofinner-city change from both centripetal and centrifugal perspectives, and provide the evolution7of public policy on the Canadian inner city. The chapter will be concluded with the apparenttheoretical and empirical gaps.Chapter 3 is the case study: following the establishment of Southwest Montreal as an inner-city area, a brief history will outline its founding, development and decline, as well as thecurrent situation as of 1990. There will then be a short introduction to the policy context ofMontreal during the study years (1960-1990), followed by each of the three fields(transportation, housing, and economic and industrial strategies, which include zoning) and theirrespective evolutions. Chapter 4 will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the policies onSouthwest Montreal between 1960 and 1990 according to the theories of inner-city change, andpresent the historical evolution of these policies.Chapter 5 is the conclusion. A summary of the findings of the thesis, followed by speculationof future trends for the case study and ideas for further research comprise the bulk of thischapter. The first of two appendices will provide a chronology of important events in theSouthwest, particularly in the field of policy evolution. The second appendix will outline currentsocio-economic information.8CHAPTER TWO: THE CHANGING INNER CITY AND PUBLIC POLICY2.1^The Inner City in the Canadian ContextThe Canadian inner city has frequently been the subject of academic and government studies(McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975; Filion 1987; Bunting & Filion 1988; Dansereau 1988;Ram, Norris & Skof 1989; Ley 1991). These works attempted to increase the social, politicaland economic understanding of the Canadian inner city. The purpose of this section is todescribe the definitional context of the Canadian inner city, with a view to explore inner-citychange and the role and evolution of inner-city public policy.McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975), working for the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs,outlined the first of three federal government definitions. The purpose of the definition was tobetter inform the federal government of the extent and conditions of the Canadian inner city(McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 1). A further purpose was to gather information for theNeighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), begun in 1973, and which was a fundamental shiftin federal urban renewal (Ibid.). The definition included four characteristics: age of housingstock, (urban) form, location, and societal functions (Ibid., 2).Typically, the Canadian inner city so defined had the oldest housing stock, the densest andmost mixed land uses, was located between the core and the suburbs, and tended to be the firstarea of settlement for immigrant groups (Ibid., 4). As outlined in chapter 1, an inner-city censustract from the 1971 census had to contain double the percentage of dwellings built before 1946than the metropolitan figure (Ibid., 3). For example, a Halifax inner-city tract would have tocontain 70% of dwellings built before 1946, which was twice the metropolitan average (Ibid.).Overall, "these districts had populations ranging from 18 000 (St.John's) to 644 000 (Montreal),and accounting for between 10% and 24% of the metropolitan total" (Ley 1991, 314).9In 1979, Brown and Burke provided for a more flexible federal definition:The task of identifying inner-city districts in the twenty-three census metropolitan areas(CMAs)...was delegated to local field officers, who were asked to employ the criterionof residential age but qualify it according to local considerations and perceptions.Overall, the inner city so defined comprised some 30% of the metropolitan populationin 1971 and 25 % in 1976. But with a less standardized classification, there wasconsiderable departures from the mean and in 1976 the inner city, as defined... ,rangedfrom only 7% of the metropolitan population in Victoria to 40% in Montreal, asomewhat disturbing range. (Ibid.)In 1989, the federal government turned to a narrower geographical classification of the innercity. The inner city included the core of the metropolitan area, that is the CBD and "thesurrounding areas of mixed land uses" (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 10). Twelve metropolitanareas had their inner-city boundaries frozen and then compared between 1951 and 1986 (Ibid.).These exercises in federal definition-making helped to uncover the remarkable diversity of theCanadian inner city. Although the various conditions of the inner city, as per McLemore, Aassand Keilhofer (1975), are outlined in 2.2, it is important to understand how varied the Canadianinner city is. For example, it may be wealthy and exclusive in nature (Westmount in Montreal,Rosedale in Toronto), racially defined (Halifax's North End), a settlement area for newimmigrants (Strathcona in Vancouver), an ethnic neighbourhood (Park Extension in Montreal),`Skid Row' (Vancouver's Downtown Eastside), a destination for migrating aboriginals(Winnipeg's inner city), upscale and gentrified (Cabbagetown in Toronto), as well as traditionalworking-class (Hochelaga in Montreal). There is no typical Canadian inner city, as there is noabsolute method with which to delineate it.Recent nationwide studies, however, have pointed to certain pandemic trends. The 1989 study,despite its limitations, noted the first increase in inner-city population (1981-86) since 1951. Datapointed to a concentration of the unmarried, the elderly, immigrants, a labour force inmanagerial and professional occupations, and childless couples in the inner city (Ram, Norris10& Skof 1989, 7-8). Moreover, in 1971, 17% of the inner-city population had some universityeducation, compared to 14 % in outlying areas, while in 1986 the figures were 36% and 23 %respectively (Ibid., 7). Despite the changes to the inner city in terms of education and job skills,there remained a gap in income: "in 1970, the median income of inner-city families was 70%of that of families in the outlying 1985, it had dropped to 62 % " (Ibid., 8), althoughinner-city income did rise absolutely in those years (Ley 1991, 318). Typically, older cities withdeclining populations and those particularly affected by economic restructuring had the poorestinner cities, including St.John, Quebec City, Montreal, and Winnipeg (Ibid., 327). These citiesalso suffered the most significant population losses (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 18).To further characterize the Canadian inner city, it is useful to compare it to differences in theAmerican inner city. Two variables are immediately apparent in contrast, poverty and race. In1980, the U.S. average central city per capita income "represented 93.1 % of that of themetropolitan areas, whereas in Canada (1981) the central city average represented 99.7%"(Mercer 1991, 54). The proportion of non-whites in U.S. cities "has been of an order ofmagnitude of six or greater than the corresponding level in urban Canada" (Ibid.). These twovariables manifest themselves as the so-called urban underclass, as evidenced in cities such asDetroit, St.Louis, Philadelphia and Los Angeles'. White flight, and the relative lack of mediumor high-income residents in the core, accompanied by a devaluation of inner-city locations byindustry and commerce, have produced inner cities different from those in Canada (Ibid.).Canadian inner cities are generally less polarized towards the outlying areas, due in large partto different urban policies, attitudes, ethnicity and historical development (Dansereau 1988, 99).Ley (1991) pointed to the difficulty in explaining the crucial concept of inner-city diversity,For an extensive list of American urban pathologies, see M. Macdonald's American Cities (1984).11regardless of its location. The Canadian inner city is no exception: "a confusing mix of wealthand poverty...extremes of half-a-million dollar condominiums and renovated housing against thehomelessness of at least 130 000 urban Canadians" (Ley 1991, 342). Section 2.2 will outlinevarious inner-city conditions and examples across Canada in an effort to further describe thisdiversity.122.2^Conditions of the Inner CityMcLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975) outlined four conditions of the Canadian inner city.The categories were "meant to reflect not just physical realities, but social and economic onesas well" (5). The table below sets the parameters of the four types:Table 1: Dimensions of the Four Types of Inner CitiesDecline Stability Revitalization MassiveRedevelopmentPopulation continuinglossnoimportantlosses or gainslittlechangegain inpopulationSocio-economicstatusdecreasing stable increasing increasingFamily status increasingnon-family &elderlymaintainingpopulationmixmaintainingpopulationmixloss of familiesCommunityorganizationspoorlyorganizedvaries increaseorganizedusually notPhysicalConditionsworsening stable improving improvedhousingHousing and LandCostsincreasing lessthan metroaverageincreasing^atsame rate asmetro averageincreasingmorerapidlymetro averageincreasingmore rapidlymetro averageTenure increasingtenancyvaries butoften highownershiplittlechangetenancyPressure forredevelopmentlow low strong butcontrolledhighSOURCE: McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer. 1975. The Changing Canadian Inner City. Page 9.Each of the four conditions will now be examined, and current and past examples in Canadaprovided. The first condition is that of decline. The factors leading to inner-city decline are13numerous, and will be expanded in section 2.3; weak economic base, poor original constructionand threats of redevelopment are typical of these factors. The first example is the Winnipeginner city:The city's core area (covering ten square miles and housing nearly 100 000 people) hadbeen suffering from a litany of problems common to many other North American cities.Although declining in absolute terms, Winnipeg's core area population contained ever-increasing numbers of disadvantaged and special-needs residents. The core area'sunemployment rate was double the city-wide average, and its incidence of families belowthe poverty line was five times the average. Moreover, in recent years, the core area hadabsorbed a substantial number of native and other ethnic immigrants, many of whomlacked the educational and vocational skills required to compete effectively in the urbanjob market. (Kiernan 1987, 25)The decline and level of deprivation in the inner city was to be addressed by the Winnipeg CoreArea Initiative in 1981; details of the policies are provided in section 2.6. The second exampleis that of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, in Montreal. Located to the east of the CBD, along theSt.Lawrence River, the former industrial sector lost both people (35 % drop between 1971 and1986) and jobs due to deindustrialization (Simard 1991, 27). Household revenue is 60% of thatof the Montreal Region, unemployment hovers near 20%, and 86% of households are renters,compared to 55 % for the region (Ibid., 26-9).The second type of inner city is the stable one, "usually areas with a basically sound housingstock" (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 8). Several types exist, such as the stable workingclass (Ville Emard in Montreal), the upwardly mobile middle-class (Kitsilano in Vancouver) andthe exclusive enclave, notably Westmount and Rosedale. These two neighbourhoods, althoughgeographically inner city, managed to exclude industry and set up rigorous zoning restrictionsdesigned to ensure the exclusive nature of the area (Ibid.). The end result has been wealthy andstable communities near CBDs. For example, Westmount, four kilometres away from the CBD,lost only 15 % of its population between 1961 and 1991, and remained remarkably stable in14terms of income, housing prices, and tenure.Revitalizing areas are those most associated with upgrading and up-filtering. Two examplesof revitalized neighbourhoods may be given. First, extensive up-filtering occurred inCabbagetown-Don Vale in Toronto, one of the first privately-revitalized neighbourhoods inCanada, which caused substantial increases in ownership, house prices and a displacement oflower-income residents (Kary 1988, 53). In Vancouver, Fairview Slopes is a prime example ofrevitalization. The area was up-zoned in the mid-1970s, partly due to its access to highly-valuedamenities, such as proximity to the CBD (Mills 1989, 198). The neighbourhood underwent asignificant transformation, from a relatively poor and unstable zone in transition to a denser,wealthier, and more white- collar neighbourhood known for its expensive and architecturallyimpressive dwellings (Ibid.).Areas undergoing massive redevelopment, although similar to the preceding type, aredifferentiated by the rapid construction of significantly higher-density dwellings (McLemore,Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 9). Factors which increase the likelihood of massive redevelopment areseveral: degree of access to the CBD; existence of neighbourhood amenities; high-densityzoning; and ease with which land can be assembled (size of lots, small vs. large land-holdersetc.) (Ibid.). The West End exemplifies an area which was massively redeveloped in Vancouver.Originally an upper-class Victorian residential neighbourhood in the 1890s, the area wasconverted to rooming houses and finally zoned for high-rise apartments in the 1960s (McAfee1972, 168). With an increased demand for inner-city housing based partly on shrinkinghousehold size, the West End became a logical choice for densification:15The West End has, since 1958, accounted for the majority of the metropolitan area'shigh-rise construction. The West End accounts for more than forty percent of Vancouverapartments [in 1972]. Today [1972] six percent of the city's population resides in theWest End...the provision of housing for more than 35 000 people makes the West Endthe most densely populated square mile in Canada. (Ibid., 169)Although no longer the densest area in Canada in 1993, the West End remains denselypopulated. Inhabitants are predominantly singles, childless couples and those who require orprefer a central location (McGahan 1986, 205).Of the four types of inner cities, the declining and the revitalizing are of particular importanceto this thesis. The former will be further described in 2.3, and has been the nature of the casestudy inner city since the 1950s. The latter type is covered in more detail in 2.4, and hasrecently been a condition of growing importance in the case study.2.3 Changes to the Inner City: Centrifugal ForcesFilion (1987) refers to the push and pull factors between the core and suburbs which affectthe inner city as either centrifugal and centripetal. He explains that if the suburb is moreattractive to capital and people than the core, centrifugal forces are at work, leading to probabledecentralization; conversely, if the core is more attractive, then the centripetal model applies,leading to an appreciation of the inner city. Despite the theoretical simplifications of this model,it does hold some usefulness for explaining urban change in Canada. This section will discussthe effects of the centrifugal model, while section 2.4 will discuss the centripetal.It is generally understood that "the economic and urban landscape is increasingly shaped byforces operating at a global rather than a national scale" (Daniels 1991, 1). There are severalglobal forces which are important to the city. These forces became more apparent after the 1973recession, which "shook the capitalist world...and set in motion a whole set of processes thatundermined the Fordist [mass-production] compromise. The 1970s and 1980s have consequently16been a troubled period of economic restructuring and social and political adjustment" (Harvey1989, 145). In broad terms, much of the labour-intensive manufacturing production in theadvanced economies moved to the global periphery, where inputs were cheaper, therebyproducing the so-called new international division of labour (Scott 1986, 31).A second force, apart from the 'footloose' aspect of worldwide capitalism, was thetechnological changes which emphasized knowledge and service industries (Daniels 1991, 12).Consequently, there has been a shift in advanced economies away from manufacturing (Ibid.).For example, the manufacturing component (construction, manufacturing employment) decreasedfrom 28.2 % to 23.1 % of all employment in the United States between 1973 and 1984 (Ibid.).The service sector, which includes a wide field of employment ranging from professionals totourism, has been increasing its share of total employment. In Canada, 33.2% of workers wereengaged in the manufacturing sector in 1960, and 53.5% in the service sector; in 1981,manufacturing dropped to 28.3% and service rose to 66.2% (Harvey 1989, 210).These two factors have led some analysts to speak of a post-industrial trend within theadvanced economies, characterized by the change from a goods-producing society to a serviceeconomy, the increasing importance of knowledge and technology, and the ascendancy of theprofessional class (Filion & Bunting 1988, 79). Scott argues that the postindustrial hypothesis,although an important shift, is not representative "of a fundamental shift away from the structureand logic of industrial capitalism" (Scott 1988, 7). Rather, he uses the term "late capitalistindustrialization" .The effect of these global changes is significant on metropolitan areas, as the latter representthe locus of production in advanced capitalist societies (Daniels, O'Connor & Hutton 1991, 3).The transmission of these global trends to urban areas occurs through shifts in labour (less17manufacturing, more service sector growth) and changes in technology (which tend to emphasizeinformation) (Polêse 1988, 19). These trends led to decreases in manufacturing employment andincreases in the service sector: between 1971 and 1986, in the Montreal Census MetropolitanArea (CMA), manufacturing employment declined from 30.65% to 20.6%, and the servicesector rose from 63.09% to 75% (Ibid., 13). These figures translated into an absolute loss of70000 manufacturing jobs, predominantly in the inner city (Levine 1989, 142).In terms of infra-urban zones, the CBD has been the focus in the last decade of the explosivegrowth of the service sector (Polese 1988, 21). In almost every North American city, the CBDhas seen significant high-rise development combined with an increase in the tertiarization ofemployment (Ibid., 17). This employment growth also produced increased polarization withinthe urban labour market (Marcuse 1986; Castells 1988).In the postwar period, the suburbs witnessed an in-migration of industry seeking cheaper,more accessible and more abundant land than in the congested core (Polêse 1988, 17). Thisdecentralization referred to the physical migration of industrial plants from the core to thesuburbs, and new in situ suburban growth, resulting in relative and absolute inner-city decline(Scott 1988, 25). Population followed employment opportunities; Bourne's (1989) empiricalmeasurement of population trends of urban Canadian between 1971 and 1981 resulted in apositive, though not conclusive, confirmation of decentralization.The inner city bore the brunt of industrial restructuring and its effects. Global trends,transmitted through societal and metropolitan change, have impacted on the inner city in threedistinct phases (Bunting & Filion 1988, 11). The first, being the industrial and production-oriented phase prior to the Second World War, was characterized by high density urban areaswith the role of the inner city being the cumulation of all urban functions (Ibid.). The second18phase, during the post-war era of mass consumption, included urban decentralization, whichimplied a mass exodus of industries and the middle-class from the inner city (Ibid.). The post-industrial phase, beginning in the 1960s, witnessed the explosive growth of CBD employmentcoupled with increasing inner-city revitalization (Ibid.).The second phase is most associated with centrifugal forces. Four effects were readilyapparent. First, deindustrialization occurred in the inner city, as traditional core industries, suchas steel and shipbuilding, closed and/or moved to the metropolitan or world periphery (Scott1988, 206). Second, as manufacturing jobs either disappeared or moved elsewhere, those whoremained typically became unemployed or took service sector jobs in the CBD, thus leading toincreased labour and social polarization (Marcuse 1986, 212). Third, the inner city became thedisproportionate location for poverty, even in Canada, as the local economic structure crumbled(Broadway 1992, 196). Fourth, vacancy and blight overtook declining inner cities as formerindustries and residents fled to more amenable locations (Ley 1983, 253). These four effectswere all present in Southwest Montreal, the case study area. Centrifugal forces and inner-citydecline in the 1980s, however, became more differentiated among inner-city areas.There is no single explanation for inner-city decline. Bourne's (1978) first hypothesis is thepull factor. Locational preferences, such as increased amenities and new housing, shiftpopulation from the inner city to the suburbs, thereby leading to abandonment (Ibid., 32-3). Theobsolescence hypothesis explains that the inner city is functionally, physically and sociallyobsolete; of particular importance is the role of technology in rendering redundant inner-cityinfrastructure (Ibid., 35). The unintended policy hypothesis emphasizes the role of governmentin indirectly devaluing the inner city, primarily through highway construction to the suburbs andprograms which support home-ownership in the suburbs (Ibid., 36-7). The exploitation19hypothesis concerns the lack of decision-making capabilities of inner-city residents, which is aresult of political and economic imbalances. The inner city "becomes one of the spatial andsocial scrap heaps of modern capitalism", a "zone of discard" (Ibid., 42). Finally, the structuralchange hypothesis: "the basic argument is that the national space-economy, the integrated urban-industrial complex and its appended institutions, has shifted in structure in recent years to thedetriment of particular inner-city areas" (Ibid., 43). The importance of each factor variesaccording to particular urban and temporal settings (Ibid., 51).Further explanations include location-dependent problems such as inner-city traffic congestionand the infringement and bypassing of the inner city by regional highway construction(Cowell 1977, 42). Zoning-related problems include the former downzoning of inner cities toindustrial uses, which enabled the gradual erosion of residential neighbourhoods, and morerecently the loss of industrial land to residential uses (Ibid., 44). Technologically-based problemsexplain "that functional obsolescence is proceeding at a faster rate than physical deterioration...asa result, functionally blighted areas are being created more quickly than their buildings can beeconomically renewed or modified for other uses" (Nader 1975, 342).Decline, based in the inner city and caused primarily by centrifugal forces, led to terms suchas "cities in stress" (Gottdeiner 1989), "cities in distress" (Stewart 1993), and "urbanconditions" (Banfield, in Waste 1989). Decline will continue in those cities which are not "ina position to stop population decline, reduce unemployment, and secure financial stability"(Stewart 1993, 33). The severity of this decline, however, can be ameliorated by variousprocesses, including that of gentrification.202.4 Changes to the Inner City: Centripetal ForcesCentripetal forces emphasize the pull factor of the core, as opposed to the pull factor of thesuburbs (Filion 1987, 223). These forces have increasingly been explained through theprocess(es) of gentrification. The basic assumption of gentrification is that people of a wealthierclass will move into a poorer neighbourhood and subsequently improve the housing stockthrough renovation (Johnston 1988, 172). The concept of the "return to the city" by educatedportions of the population is misleading; most of the gentrifiers arrive from within the city itself,not the suburbs (Dansereau 1987, 19). Gentrification does tend to appreciate certain inner-citylocations, and "is [an] expression in the urban landscape of deeper social processes and socialchange" (Smith & Williams 1986, 11).Traditionally, two theories have been used to explain gentrification in the inner city. The firstis the demographic/ecological demand-side explanation within the context of explosive CBDemployment growth. Proponents of this theory point to gentrification arising from lifestyle,cultural and demographic changes in society. The past twenty years have seen significantdemographic shifts, such as the increase in childless couples, who desire to live close to theirtertiary and quaternary jobs in the CBD (Ley 1986, 522). Moreover, core amenities attractcertain segments of the population, as does the location of alternative lifestyles (Ibid., 524).Gentrification is therefore understood as a reflection of consumer demand for inner-city location(Dansereau 1987).The second explanation is that of the political/economic supply-side. Smith and Williams(1986) looks to two reasons for inner-city gentrification: the rent gap, where core areas fall tosuch low rents that outside investment is attracted, and public policy, which tends to downzone,stabilize or renew inner cities and by that process attract wealthier outsiders. Filion and Bunting21(1988) further point to the unintentional effect of policy-driven CBD development as a sourcefor potential gentrification. Industrial restructuring, which has resulted in inner-city decline andCBD growth, also promoted gentrification: "a growing downtown labour market oriented towardoffice employment in advanced services in the public and private sectors is essential for therestructuring of the inner-city housing market" (Ley 1988, 32). Either or both explanations ofgentrification may be suitable depending on the particular city and temporal period.The attributes of gentrifying (inner-city) neighbourhoods may include the following: locationand proximity to work; favourable socio-economic status of adjacent districts; the quality andquantity of nearby environmental amenities; certain alternative lifestyle attributes; distinctive andpleasant housing stock; and proximity to existing elite areas (Ley 1992, 238). The recentsituation in major Canadian cities has been extensively studied by David Ley (1986; 1988;1992). In the period between 1971 and 1981, it was found that gentrification was mainlyoccurring through young urban professionals in areas containing houses of architecturalsignificance and close to urban amenities and elite areas (Ley 1986; 1988). The period between1981 and 1986, however, offered less predictability in terms of gentrifiable neighbourhoods anda more complex and diverse set of spatial expressions (Ley 1992, 245). The "geography ofgentrification has become more complex because, as a social process, it has become morechaotic" (Ibid., 230). Gentrification also spread between 1981 and 1986, despite the nationalrecession, due to the resiliency and even growth of the CBD service sector (Ibid.).Finally, it is useful to illustrate the effects of gentrification on the inner city with an example.Fairview Slopes, in Vancouver, is located to the south of the CBD, and was in the early 1970s"one of the least favoured neighbourhoods in the city. On average, the population was relativelypoor, and of low socioeconomic status" (Mills 1989, 242). Redevelopment, primarily due to the22highly-valued amenity of proximity to the core, as well as the 1970s rezoning which favouredhigher densities and multiple dwellings, proceeded rapidly between 1976 and 1982 (Ibid.).Smaller dwellings were replaced by condominiums and townhouses; 7% of the pre-1976 stockwas owner-occupied, compared to 27% of the new stock (Ibid.). A remarkable turnover inpopulation occurred: less than 20% of the residents in 1981 lived in the same dwelling in 1976(Ibid.). Average monthly rent increased, unemployment fell, from close to 20% in 1971 to 7%in 1981, and by 1980 "a new class with senior white collar occupations [had become] dominant"(Ibid., 243).As a result of the two forces, manufacturing is now primarily in the suburbs instead of thecore, while the service sector has grown in the CBD 2 . These phenomena have left the inner cityas a battleground between those stranded by centrifugal forces (blue collar or the unemployed)and those favouring such locations due to centripetal forces (white collar and others) (Scott 1988,222). The next two sections will outline urban public policy and how it has evolved to deal withinner-city change.2 For further study of this phenomenon ("spatial mismatch"), see Peter Hall's "Managing Growth in theWorld's Cities" in Berkeley Planning Journal Volume 6, 1991, pp.19-35.232.5 Public Policy and the Inner CityThis section outlines the policy-making capabilities of each level of government as they pertainto the Canadian inner city. An important distinction to be drawn is that of deliberate policyversus the passive role of governments, as demonstrated by the dual role of the federalgovernment:One is a policy role, entailing the conduct of public policy that has either a direct or anindirect impact on urban Canada. Policies with direct impact include such areas ashousing, where explicit urban programs -such as urban renewal, public housing, landassembly, and sewer treatment programs- are part of the arsenal. The indirect effectarises as a result of the fundamental interdependence of urban units and the economy.With primary responsibility for economic affairs...the Federal Government has a massiveinfluence...on the urban system. The second federal role is a completely passive one. Itis based on the fact that to carry out its own duties, the Federal Government occupies asubstantial amount of space. As a result, the use made of that space, the taxes paid, theurban demands created...all combine to have an important influence on urban areas.(Lithwick 1970, 201)The thesis concentrates on the first role, the more deliberate and direct policies of government.The division of powers of the two sovereign levels of government in Canada are outlined in TheConstitution Act, 1867. Section 91 outlines federal responsibilities, while Section 92 does thesame for the provinces. Municipalities are deemed "creatures" of the provinces, as all localpower emanates from and is delegated by the province to the municipality.The federal government, although limited in its constitutional contact with municipalities, isby no means unimportant to urban areas. As mentioned above, federal economic policies playa central role in urban economies. In addition, federal jurisdiction "over railways, ports [a veryuneasy interface, however], and airports is of crucial importance to many aspects of urbandevelopment, as is the fact that the...government is the biggest single landowner in urbanCanada" (Sancton 1991, 466). As well, federal housing policies have particularly shaped inner-city Canada.24Provincial policies impact in several ways. First, municipalities derive all of their power fromthe province. Second, provincial highways are crucial to urban centres, and frequently affectinner cities (Ibid.). Third, provinces subsidize housing, sewage treatment, employment creation,and public transit (Ibid.).Municipalities have focused their responsibilities primarily on land use and the regulation ofthe height and densities of buildings (Kiernan 1990, 11). Some larger cities and regional boardsenjoy a wider set of powers, but Canadian provinces have generally delegated the following tomunicipalities: "fire protection; local roads and streets; the collection and disposal of residentialsolid waste; sewage systems; the taxation of land and buildings; and the regulation of local landuse" (Sancton 1991, 467). Since the 1980s, however, the local level has been increasinglyinvolved in economic development (Gertler 1990, 35).There are four primary fields of public policy which have deliberate and important impactson the inner city: transportation; housing; land use; and economic development. The field oftransportation includes major arterial roads running through organized areas (provincial), publictransit (provincial and municipal) and local roads (municipal) (Kitchen 1990, 108). Housingpolicy includes subsidies to homeowners, urban renewal, public housing and renovation, all ofwhich have tended to be directly or indirectly federal responsibilities; the private market,however, remains the most important supplier of housing (Carroll 1990, 98). Land use isprimarily a local responsibility, although issues such as heritage designation, inner-cityrevitalization, and urban waterfront development are frequently assumed by all three levels ofgovernment (Kiernan 1990, 16). Fourth, economic development includes economic policies offederal and provincial governments, local economic development strategies (which may be ultravires), and employment creation by the province or the federal government (Stewart 1993, 108).252.6 Evolution of Policy for the Canadian Inner CityThe historical evolution of the four primary policy fields and their effects on the Canadianinner city will now be described. Three periods will be covered: 1945-1968; 1969-1978; and1979 to 1990. Examples of transportation, housing, land use and economic polices will illustrateeach period.2.6.1 Period 1: 1945-1968. The first period was characterized by "unprecedented economicgrowth and enormous demographic change" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 33). By 1968, Canadahad become metropolitan-centred, urban and multicultural (Ibid.). The policy trend of this periodwas to increase government intervention, focusing first on housing the returning veterans(Carroll 1990, 40). The inner city was generally planned to as a zone in transition.Transportation policy was first characterized by planning for expressways to serve theincreasing number of automobiles (Leo 1977, 4). Under the impact of the automobile, densitiesof cities fell: in 1941, Montreal had 15000 people per square mile, while in 1961 it was only9300 (Ibid.). Inner-city densities fell even more drastically during that time (Quebec 1990, 77).Transit demand also fell in most major cities (Kitchen 1990, 110).The first set of transportation plans, complete in most cities by the mid-1960s, "clearly borethe mark...of the belief that urban service delivery is an administrative and technical matter andnot a suitable field for political conflict and compromise" (Leo 1977, 17). The plans for Torontoand Vancouver, created by technocrats, would prove to be politically and even fiscally deficientonce specific projects were to be implemented (Ibid.). The proposed 1961 Spadina Expressway,in Toronto, was stopped by public opposition (Ibid.). In Vancouver, the 1967 East-West freewayproposal to run through the inner-city areas of historic Gastown and culturally unique Chinatownwas bitterly opposed by citizen groups and academics, and was also rejected (Pendakur 1972).26Housing was of particular concern to the inner city, as construction and renovation had beenput on hold by the Great Depression and the Second World War (Linteau 1992, 513). In termsof federal legislation, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1944 authorized joint lending by thefederal government and the lending institutions to homeowners and buyers; in 1946, the Central(later Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was set up to administer the Act(Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 37). Moreover, the Act "encouraged the redevelopment of oldresidential areas through the provision of grants for the acquisition and clearing of land suitablefor low-cost housing" (Nader 1975, 349). The 1954 NHA included a provision for federal-provincial cooperation in the acquisition of land for public housing (Oberlander & Fallick 1992,53). In 1956, the Act was amended to include federal aid to municipalities for the clearance ofslum areas for purposes other than housing; this amendment increased the demand for urbanrenewal, especially for blighted inner-city areas which could be converted to other uses (Ibid.,55).Major cities reacted to these provisions by planning for the comprehensive renewal of theirinner cities. In 1948, the City of Toronto decided to renew an blighted inner-city slum and buildpublic housing upon it (Ibid., 42). The project was known as Regent's Park, and it was Canada'sfirst major undertaking of urban renewal and public housing (Gunton 1981, 295). Between 1948and 1959, sixty-eight acres were redeveloped to house 9000 people; the project was subsequentlycondemned as a "ghetto for the poor" (Nader 1975, 350). The Regent Park project receivedfunding under the 1954 NHA provision (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 54). As well, the city hallof Toronto was built on renewed land (Carrol 1990, 91). In Vancouver, a 1957 study called forthe clearance of 713 acres in the inner city (Melliship 1985, 113). In Montreal's inner city, 15000 dwellings were demolished between 1958 and 1968, while only 800 units of public housing27were built (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984, 30).In 1964, further amendments to the NHA afforded the most "substantial support to urbanrenewal in the history of Canadian housing legislation" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 57). Federalaid was increased, and provinces and municipalities could now enter the public housing fieldwithout Ottawa's involvement while still receiving federal aid (Ibid.). The immediate effect wasa further increase in urban renewal proposals in 1965 and 1966 (Ibid., 58).The overall effect of these housing policies was to contribute to the deterioration of the innercity, as people moved out to the suburbs for new and federally-supported housing (Carroll 1990,91). Urban renewal was partly used to counteract this deterioration, but ultimately produced farfewer dwellings than in the suburbs, displaced poorer residents, and enabled non-residential usesto replace former neighbourhoods (Ibid.). For example, the 1963 Radio-Canada renewal projectin Centre-Sud, in Montreal, displaced over 2000 inhabitants and most of the land becameparking lots (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984, 33). The city halls of Calgary and Winnipegwere built on renewed land (Carroll 1990, 91). In 1968, Strathcona-Chinatown was menacedwith extensive urban renewal which would have razed fifteen blocks and displaced 3000 people;fortunately, the proposals were blocked by the same techniques used in the 1967 freeway debate(Lai 1988, 167).Land use and economic development policies for the inner city were few during the period,as most of the attention was focused on the suburbs. Zoning, however, became a tool to limitor densify inner-city housing: in Vancouver, the area between 3rd Avenue and Broadway,Cambie and Main was rezoned industrial in 1961 to limit residential growth (MPCPC 1989, 93).Conversely, up-zoning in the West End enabled significant densification of development(McAfee 1972).282.6.2 Period 2: 1969-1978. This period was characterized by economic and social turbulence,and changing trends in household formation which impacted on urban areas (Oberlander &Fallick 1992, 69). Substantial federal interest in urban affairs, increased provincial intervention,and the reform movement at the local level were all features of this period (Carroll 1990, 92).Transportation policy shifted from expressway construction to an increased concern with masstransit (Kitchen 1990, 117). The second Spadina Expressway was turned down by citizen groupsand the province of Ontario in 1969, thereby inducing the Metropolitan Toronto TransportationPlan Review to study alternatives (Leo 1977, 21). In 1974, the study proposed an increasedcoordination of urban development with transportation, including transit (Ibid.). In Vancouver,the rejection of the East-West expressway led to the 1970 Rapid Transit Study (Pendakur 1972).This increased interest in mass transit necessitated provincial funding (Kitchen 1990, 118).In 1968 and 1969, urban renewal produced confrontation between citizens and cityadministrations in Toronto and Vancouver. In Toronto, response to the Trefann Court projectwas highly negative, which led to delays and modifications (Filion 1988, 92). In Vancouver, theproposed Scheme 3 to significantly redevelop and densify Strathcona was met with oppositionand an appeal to the federal government by the Strathcona Property Owners and TenantsAssociation (Melliship 1985, 122).The federal government, concerned by this public opposition, formed the Task Force onHousing and Urban Development in 1968, under Paul Hellyer; public input was collected andpresented in the January 1969 report (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 86). The Hellyer report"proposed that large scale [public housing] projects be stopped until a full review could takeplace" (Ibid., 87). The reason behind this recommendation was the view that "the larger publichousing projects were 'ghettos of the poor; people who lived in them were stigmatized in the29eyes of the rest of the community; social and recreational facilities were inadequate; privacy waslacking and vandalism present" (Ibid., 89).The federal government accepted the Task Force's view. The desire for further informationled to Lithwick's Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects (1970), which provided thebackground for the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in 1971 (Ibid.). Thisministry was an attempt at tri-level coordination of urban issues, as opposed to unilateral federaldecisions, but faced jurisdictional problems with certain provinces and other federal departments(Carroll 1990, 94). Moreover, the provinces began to set up their own housing authorities at thistime (Ibid.).Alternatives to urban renewal were presented in the 1973 amendments to the National I-lousingAct. Two programs specifically aimed at the inner city were introduced: the NeighbourhoodImprovement Program (NIP) and the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP).The emphasis of NIP and RRAP was to address the particular needs of the inner city in decline.Several criteria were set forth for eligibility:1. over 50% of its land use had to residential;2. over 25 % of its dwellings had to be in need of repair;3. its physical environment had to be deficient or deteriorated;4. its social or recreational facilities had to be deficient or deteriorated;5. its mean household income had to be below that of the municipality; and6. it had to be potentially stable. (Filion 1988, 90)Under NIP, CMHC could "supply municipalities with 50% of the cost of acquiring and clearingland for open space and community facilities in a given neighbourhood with low and moderate-income housing" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 124). RRAP focused on the provision of loanstargeted for residential renovation; low-income owners could also take advantage of certain loanforgiveness (Ibid.).NIP and RRAP were designed to avoid the "messy" process of urban renewal, to minimize30neighbourhood disruption, and to provide the opportunity for public input (Filion 1988, 87). NIPappeared in most major Canadian cities until its termination in 1978. NIP and RRAP markeda more tailored approach to inner-city issues. In Vancouver, several inner-city neighbourhoodsused NIP and RRAP, including the Mount Pleasant area, which benefited from park, traffic,street amenity, and community facility improvement (MPCPC 1989, 99).Land use was characterized by several trends. First, increased neighbourhood participationand organization implied a different approach to land-use planning in the inner city (Kiernan1990, 17). For example, Toronto inner-city neighbourhood groups played a large role in NIP(Filion 1988, 105). Second, conversion of industrial land was also occurring. Granville Island,in Vancouver, was converted from industrial to mixed-use/commercial through CMHC in 1972.Heritage conservation of the inner city also became relevant. In 1971, the Province of BritishColumbia designated the inner-city areas of Gastown and Chinatown as heritage areas.Public policy was crucial in further stabilizing and appreciating inner cities through zoningchanges and density bonuses; the redevelopment of Fairview Slopes is a case in point (Mills1989). Improvements in transit service and nearby amenities, and large-scale CBD projects alsoled to an appreciation of inner cities (Bourne 1992, 71). Appreciation took the form ofintensification of existing residential areas, the extension of residential uses into formerly non-residential areas, and the conversion in situ of older non-residential buildings, such aswarehouses, into higher-end dwelling units (Ibid., 72). As a result, in Toronto, the central corebegan gaining population in 1974, and by 1990 was at the same level as in the early 1950s(Ibid., 77).2.6.3 Period 3: 1979-1990. This period featured the retrenchment of the federal governmentin urban affairs: "MSUA's termination [in 1978] paralleled a declining commitment by Ottawa31to increasing financial resources for addressing urban issues" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 130).This occurred because of pressing economic concerns in the late 1970s taking precedent overurban affairs (Ibid.). Moreover, provincial and municipal governments also began to cut backon programs, and an emphasis was increasingly placed on public-private endeavours for inner-city redevelopment (Kiernan 1990, 16).Housing policy was characterized by a general decline in government involvement. In 1978and 1979, the "federal government pursued its goal of 'disentangling' programs to promotegreater provincial participation and to reduce administrative overlaps" (Oberlander & Fallick1992, 148) Financial restraint in the housing field was emphasized (Carroll 1990, 95). By 1986,only the Non-Profit and Cooperative Housing Program remained as a federal function with someinfluence on the inner city; later that year, this responsibility was mostly turned over to theprovinces (Ibid.). By 1990, the federal government had essentially withdrawn from the field ofhousing policy, "an area it had dominated for forty years" (Ibid.). The vacuum left by thewithdrawal of the federal government promoted a new variety of governmental intervention. Forexample, land use and economic development became more important and more coordinated inthe 1979-1990 period. Cities, instead of merely competing for business with one another, beganto deliberately seek new methods with which to improve the local economy (Gertler 1990). Twointerrelated processes which were to affect the inner city gained prominence during the 1980s:core redevelopment and economic revitalization plans.Core redevelopment usually consisted of physically altering inner-city and waterfront industriallands for residential and other uses. Inner-city and downtown deterioration was to be reversedby large-scale projects designed to increase the tax base of the city (Kiernan 1990, 16). Fromthe mid-1970s onwards, arm's-length special purpose corporations have provided the funding32for these projects, as was the case for the federal Crown corporation Harbourfront of Torontoand Le Vieux-Port in Montreal (Artibise & Kiernan 1988).Economic revitalization focused less on the physical characteristics of the (declining) inner cityand looked more at the social and economic development of the inhabitants. At the macro-level,government involvement has been restrained, save for the example of the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiatives I and H. The Core Area Initiatives (CAI) combined three levels of government inorder to deal with the increasing inner-city problems of Winnipeg, as described in section 2.2.The purpose of CAI I and II was to reverse Winnipeg's economic woes, which tended toconcentrate in the inner city (Stewart 1993, 118). The City of Winnipeg, the Province ofManitoba, and the federal government came together in 1981 to sign the first Initiative. Threeobjectives were to be pursued in 1981:1. Economic Development, or the stimulation of substantial economic development. Thisis accomplished principally through the focusing of public resources on a number ofstrategic sites throughout the downtown and inner city, where private sector investmentcould be catalyzed;2. Employment and Training, or the provision of employment and training opportunitiesfor inner-city residents -particularly those from the special needs targeted population; and3. Neighbourhood Renewal, or the physical, social, and economic revitalization ofWinnipeg's declining inner-city neighbourhoods. (Kiernan 1987, 25)CAI I, between 1981 and 1986, implemented programs in a broad and unprecedented scope,covering industrial and entrepreneurial support, redevelopment of vacant land, heritageconservation, employment and training, housing, community services, and neighbourhoodimprovement (Ibid.). Specific accomplishments included:1. the creation of over 3000 jobs and training opportunities for disadvantaged core arearesidents;2. the rehabilitation of over 5000 older homes;3. the recycling of thirty privately owned heritage buildings;4. 260 new houses in four separate projects;335. the planning and development of 330 units of cooperativeand non-profit housing;6. the creation of an industrial development program whichassisted with the establishment or modernization offifteen inner-city industries;7. the completion of 140 community facilities and servicesprojects worth over $40 million;8. the formation and capitalization of six communitydevelopment corporations;9. the completion of a $3 million inner-city educationprogram; and10.the completion of land assembly, site planning and preliminary negotiations towardsthe redevelopment of 80 acres of downtown railway lands. (Ibid., 25-6)The three levels of government invested an equal share of funds to the budget of $96 million,and private investment was also substantial (Ibid.).In 1986, a subsidiary agreement (CAI II) provided an additional $100 million for a furtherfive-year initiative with similar goals and objectives to the 1981-1986 Agreement (Stewart 1993,164). There was more emphasis on strong central coordination among projects (Ibid.).The overall effect of the two Agreements was to assist 630 individual projects, provide $87.5million in cost-shared funds, coordinate projects which stimulated approximately $400 million,leverage approximately $242 million from the private sector, and create 2250 permanent jobs(Ibid.). The CAI's "two greatest sources of strength... [were] direct tri-governmental participationand an extraordinarily broad program mandate..." (Artibise & Kiernan 1988, 75). Drawbacksincluded the lack of permanent jobs to core residents and the failure to attract manufacturing andhigh-tech industries (Stewart 1993, 170).342.7 Prognosis and Conclusion: Gaps in the OverviewThe previous section gave a broad overview of how public policy has evolved on the Canadianinner city, from early interventions (expressways, urban renewal, public housing) to later ones(neighbourhood planning, redevelopment and revitalization). In terms of historical trends, federalgovernment involvement has dwindled since the 1970s, the provincial level has increased itspower, especially over housing, while the local level, by Period 3, was increasingly involvingitself in inner-city policy, particularly with the use of arm's-length corporations.Two types of gaps, however, remain. The first gap is empirical. The review of policy between1945 and 1990 is general and ignores significant exceptions to the trends. As well, the majorityof academic studies cited in 2.3 and 2.4 focus on a number of Canadian inner cities but not onein particular. For example, Ley's (1988; 1992) articles on gentrification cover all of the inner-city areas in six Canadian CMAs. Second, there have been acknowledged differences betweenthe urban systems of Quebec and the rest of Canada (Mercer 1991, 61). An inner city in Quebecmay prove dissimilar to the overall Canadian trends. Third, there is a particular need toempirically study the impacts of public policies on a changing inner city. Fourth, the impactsof a city's relative and absolute economic decline on its inner-city areas is a subject requiringfurther research.The second gap is theoretical. The focus of most studies has been on inner-city change ineconomic or social terms, and the causes and effects of restructuring on the inner city. The focuson public policy as an agent of inner-city change is a relatively underdeveloped area of studywarranting further exploration. Few studies have focused exclusively on the role of policy ininner-city change; fewer still on one inner city in particular. Public policy may therefore bestudied as one factor among several which influence inner-city change.35The two gaps may be closed by introducing a case study, that of Southwest Montreal. Thisinner city was chosen for several reasons: it was the birthplace of Canadian industry, and oneof its worst slums (Ley 1992, 241); it is located in Montreal, which provides an example tocompare with the rest of Canada; public policy intervention was substantial in the past thirtyyears; and both decline and gentrification have occurred to significant degrees. In effect,Southwest Montreal has experienced the full cycle, from Victorian-era industrialism to 1990s'post-industrialism.Policy evolution of the case study will begin in 1960, the year Mayor Drapeau was elected,and the start of his twenty-six year reign. The study will end in 1990, when the Southwestrevitalization plan was introduced and Mayor Dore won his second consecutive term. The thirty-year study will attempt to reveal the evolution and impacts of public policy on the inner city,with an evaluation according to the theories of inner-city change in chapter 4.36CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL CASE STUDYSOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-19903.1 11.,oudoga game Beaman:gam of Case SgaadySouthwest Montreal's borders are shown on Map 1 (following page). The Southwest,excluding Griffintown, makes up one of nine planning districts (arrondissements) of the city; theothers are Notre Dame de Grace/Cote des Neiges, Ville-Marie (CBD), Ahuntsic,Villeray/St.Michel, Petite Patrie/Rosemont, Mercier/Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, Plateau/Centre-Sud, and Riviêre des Prairies. Within the Southwest District there are five planning sectors:Ville Emard, Cote.St.Paul, St.Henri, Little Burgundy (Petite Bourgogne) and Point St.Charles.These sectors correspond exactly to the neighbourhoods (quartiers) found on Map 1. Griffintownis part of the Ville-Marie District, within the Ville-Marie Sector; it is delineated in the 1990Downtown Master Plan, and includes the Bonaventure area as well. The Southwest is locatedclose to the CBD and the Port of Montreal, and is bordered by several highways. The proximityof this infrastructure has been crucial factors in the Southwest's development and currentsituation.Parts of the Southwest have traditionally been considered as inner-city areas. In 1975, thefederal government's definition of the inner city included all the Southwest neighbourhoodsexcept Ville Emard and Cote St.Paul. In 1989, only Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown wereconsidered as inner cities. Based on the geographical and operational definitions in chapter 1,five neighbourhoods can be included as inner city: Griffintown, Point St.Charles, PetiteBourgogne, St.Henri and Cote St.Paul. Each of these neighbourhoods either developed withinMontreal or were annexed by it, as we shall see in Section 3.2, by 1910. All fiveneighbourhoods had experienced significant development by 1910, at which point Montreal hadonly a quarter of its present population and the region was still largely rural (Linteau 1992,37MAP 1 - LOCATION OF SOUTHWEST MONTREAL38194). Four of the five neighbourhoods, St.Henri, Cote St.Paul, Point St.Charles, and PetiteBourgogne lie in close proximity to the CBD (defined in the 1990 Downtown Master Plan asMountain to Bleury, Notre Dame to Sherbrooke). Griffintown is contiguous to the CBD.Ville Emard did not fully develop until after the Second World War and does not lie in closeproximity to the CBD. The middle of Ville Emard is at least six kilometres from the centre ofthe CBD (Peel and St.Catherine), while Cote St.Paul is four kilometres away, and the otherneighbourhoods all lie within three.Thus far, the term Southwest has had two separate meanings: that of the district, whichexcludes Griffintown, and the Southwest as inner city, which is only the five neighbourhoodscompatible with the definition. Since the case study deals with the inner city, Ville Emard willnot be examined in any detail unless the entire Southwest District is being considered. Theremainder of the chapter will use the term 'Southwest' as meaning only the five inner-cityneighbourhoods therein, and Southwest District as excluding Griffintown but including VilleEmard.3.2 Origins and History of the Southwest to 19593.2.1 Period 1: 1642-1859. The Southwest was originally marshland and woods before the firstEuropean colonizers arrived (Sijpkes 1990, 178). Between 1663 and 1825 various landownersestablished themselves in the Southwest, notably the order of the Sulpicians (Ibid.). In 1821,work began on a canal linking the port to Lachine so as to avoid the rapids on the St.Lawrence;finished in 1825, the canal was 13.2 kilometres long and an average 1.4 metres deep (Legault1991, 17). The construction was done by companies tendered by the government of LowerCanada, and the canal was initially designed for small craft (Ibid.). The 1848 enlargement ofthe canal resulted in transportation and energy-producing advantages which attracted large39amounts of industries (Ibid., 19).The second important transportation improvement was the construction of the Victoria Bridgeand the arrival of the Grand Trunk Railway (GTR) to the Southwest. Between 1853 and 1859,railway lines were built on the Victoria Bridge, the first significant link across the St.LawrenceRiver (CREESOM 1989, 16). The GTR established immense shops on the Montreal side of thebridge, in Point St.Charles. In 1857, the first large-scale multi-storey worker housing in Canadawas built near the shops on Sebastopol Street (Hanna & Remiggi 1981, 109). On the eastern sideof the shops, Victoriatown was also founded as a worker settlement (City 1962, 11). Nearer toOld Montreal, Griffintown was a magnet for incoming Irish immigrants fleeing famine in theirhomeland in the 1840s (Marvin 1975, 5).3.2.2 Period 2: 1860-1909. By 1860, the two determining factors of the Southwest'sdevelopment, the Lachine Canal and the railways, were already in place. The next fifty yearswould see both rapid industrialization and residential development, and annexations of most ofthe district into the City of Montreal. St.Henri, originally a village of tanners, subsequentlydeveloped into an industrial town, bankrupted itself with tax holidays to industries, and wasannexed in 1905 (Linteau 1992, 194). St.Cunegonde, which today forms part of PetiteBourgogne, shared a similar history and was also annexed in 1905 (Ibid.). St.Gabriel, whichformed the western half of Point St. Charles, developed along the canal and was annexed in 1887(Ibid.). Cote St.Paul was annexed in 1910 after extensive development, while the village of VilleEmard, annexed in 1910, developed as a working-class suburb, similar to neighbouring Verdun,and filled in only after the Second World War (CREESOM 1989, 21). Victoriatown, Giffintownand eastern Point St.Charles were already part of Montreal in 1860.40During these fifty years, the Southwest developed in an ad hoc manner, with worker housingjumbled alongside industry (Sijpkes 1990, 183). Poverty and crowding were extreme: WilliamAmes, in 1897, called the area "the city below the hill", and documented the poor livingconditions of the working class, including an overall death rate 70% higher than on the hill(Linteau 1992, 127). Workers typically lived close to employment, such as in the case of theGTR shops (Ley 1991, 322).3.2.3 Period 3: 1910-1959. The years between 1910 and 1959 was a period of maturity,consolidation and initial decline for the Southwest. By the late 1940s, the Southwest held themost important concentration of manufacturing industry in Canada with over 30000 jobs (Legault1991, 22). The canal, CN (replacing the GTR) and CP, as well as the proximity to the port, allensured the continued success of the Southwest. French, Irish, and English inhabitants made theSouthwest the first multi-ethnic working-class area in Canada.There were soon signs, however, of decline and ageing. The majority of the housing in theolder neighbourhoods was inadequate for the petite bourgeoisie, who began to leave in numbers(CREESOM 1989, 22). In addition, industry along the canal was facing competition fromsuburban industrial parks, and was handicapped by an older and less sophisticated infrastructure,the product of an entirely different technological era (Ibid., 23). Highways to the suburbsheralded the initial decentralization of Montreal, which would particularly affect the Southwest.In 1951, the Southwest peaked at 112000 people; by 1961 it was 107011, and this decline wouldsteadily continue into the mid-1980s (Hoffmann 1990, 13). The final factor of this decline wasthe opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, which would render the Lachine Canalredundant and ultimately left the Southwest obsolete within the Montreal region. Section 3.3offers a more in-depth explanation and description of the Southwest's decline.413.3 Decline of the SouthwestThe final blow to the Southwest's economy came from the opening of the St. LawrenceSeaway. The effect of the project, a joint venture between Canada and the United States, madethe canal irrelevant, as one could use the Seaway instead to bypass the rapids. The competitionfrom the Seaway would lead to the closing of the canal to traffic in 1968 (Canada 1979, 54).The Seaway, combined with changes in technology and increased competition from Halifax andVancouver, also caused a reduction of traffic for the Port of Montreal; in 1961 Montreal held38 % of all maritime traffic in Canada, while by 1977 it was 18 % and by 1985 only 6% (Linteau1992, 437).The other key factor in the development of the Southwest, the railway, also declined after1959. Faced with increasing competition from trucking, as well as decentralization of industryto the suburbs, trains lost their long-standing advantage in the movement of goods in urbanareas. Inner-city industries, including those of the Southwest, were not as accessible to trucksas suburban ones. Consequently, many nascent industries chose to locate in the suburbs(CREESOM 1989, 25). The Southwest had also been a centre of the rail industry, with the shopsin Point St.Charles handling most of the repair work for CN (Ibid., 207). The relative declineof this industry led to significant layoffs for the Southwest after 1959.The replacement of the Lachine Canal with the Seaway, and of railways with highways, weretwo factors in the deindustrialization of the Southwest. Decline was also caused byobsolescence: lack of space for expansion, ageing infrastructure, and new manufacturingtechniques which de-emphasized multi-storey buildings forced many manufacturers to move tolarger and more outlying locations (Ibid., 23). Paralleling these changes, there was a 38.3 %drop in manufacturing employment in the Southwest between 1959 and 1973, from 26325 to4217575 jobs, with a fairly even ratio between closures and relocations (Ibid., 24).The effects of this deindustrialization on the Southwest are striking: between 1951 and 1973,there was an absolute loss of 10900 jobs, and between 1973 and 1988 a further 10428 jobs werelost in absolute numbers (Ibid., 186). For an area which was once Canada's centre of industry,the results were catastrophic, as most of the lost jobs had been in the manufacturing sector.Unemployment rose to unprecedented numbers, well above figures for the Montreal region asa whole:Table 2: Unemployment Rate for Southwest and Montreal RegionSOUTHWEST MONTREAL REGION1961 5.1% 3.0%1971 16.4% 9.3%1981 14.7% 8.7%1986 19.6% 11.3%SOURCE: CREESOM. 1989. -Quest Diagnostic. Page 100.Not unlike other inner-city areas of Montreal, such as Centre-Sud and Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, the industrial decline of the Southwest was accompanied by massive layoffs, large-scale disinvestment and crippling unemployment rates. Many companies closed their plants inthe area and/or moved, among them Northern Telecom (1974), Redpath Sugar (1976), Sherwin-Williams (1984), Stelco (1985), and Coleco (1986) (Ibid., 191). Between 1980 and 1988 alone,5000 layoffs hit the area (Ibid., 190). Economically, the Southwest was showing definite signsof being an inner city in decline, as per McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975): weak economicbase, poor original construction leading to vacancies along the Lachine Canal, physicaldeterioration, and a loss of business establishments.43The massive deindustrialization suffered by the Southwest translated into depopulation, asthose with jobs moved with industry to newer areas, leaving behind an increasingly smaller (andpoorer) population, as shown by the table below:Table 3: Inner-City Population and 30-year VariancePointSt.CharlesVic'townSt.Henri PetiteBourgogneGriff townCoteSt.PaulINNERCITYCity ofMontreal'1961 25 478 30 291 22 989 28 253 107 011 1 191 0621966 22 472 26 700 18 470 26 925 94 567 1 222 2551971 19 713 22 358 11 364 24 469 77 904 1 214 3521976 16 021 17 291 7 354 21 832 62 498 1 080 0001981 14 048 15 215 6 668 18 818 54 749 1 018 6091986 13 351 14 993 8 114 17 640 54 098 1 015 4201991 13 111 14 401 10 276 17 038 54 826 1 017 6661961-1991-48.5% -52.4% -55.3% -39.6% -48.8% -14.5%SOURCE Hoffmann,A. 1990. Arrondissement Sud-Ouest. Page 13.The table clearly shows the important population losses in the Southwest; the fiveneighbourhoods suffered over three times the depopulation of Montreal. Depopulation wascaused by secular economic decline and dislocations due to policy interventions; in PetiteBourgogne, large-scale renewal between 1966 and 1980 effectively dispersed large portions ofthe population. The depopulation between 1981 and 1986 was substantially slower than inpreceding five-year periods: the entire district lost only 1.0% of its population, and the inner citylost 1.1 %, with nominal increases in Griffintown and Petite Bourgogne. The 1986-91 periodfeatured an overall 1.3 % increase. This increase concentrated in Petite Bourgogne/Griffintown3 These figures include four annexations by the City of Montreal between 1961 and 1982.44(20 % growth between 1986-91), thereby pointing to increasingly differentiated conditions amongneighbourhoods due to gentrification and effects of stabilizing and revitalizing policies.Nonetheless, the Southwest as an inner city lost half of its population in twenty-five years.The cumulative effects of depopulation and industrial restructuring transformed the Southwestinto a distressed area in the Montreal Region. The decline of the Southwest of the past thirtyyears has left it with rampant deindustrialization, an impoverished population, and deterioratinginfrastructure (Hoffmann 1990, 11). This decline is paralleled somewhat by Montreal's economicdifficulties. The decentralization of employment and people has produced the so-called 'doughnuthole' effect in the city, where poor citizens are left behind in the core areas while the moreaffluent move to the suburbs (Quebec 1990, 76). Manufacturing employment dropped 36%between 1971 and 1986 (Ibid., 5), while unemployment is among the highest of any major NorthAmerican city (Picard & Gibbon 1993).3.4 Current Situation of the SouthwestThe Southwest is currently in a state of flux: there is some evidence of revitalization combinedwith significant poverty. This condition was described by Filion (1987) as "gentrification amongdecline". The 1986 Census reveals these trends: although the Southwest contained higherpercentages of single-parent families, unemployed adults, low-income households and those withless than grade nine education than the City of Montreal (City 1990b, 29), there has been anincrease in income, average rent and population in the census tracts bordering the CBD, in PetiteBourgogne and Griffintown (Canada 1988). Ley (1988) also found that gentrification hadoccurred along the Lachine Canal and near the CBD, in part due to city policies whichemphasized ownership of centrally-located houses with Operation 20000 Logements (37). PetiteBourgogne saw a 200 % increase in administrators and professionals between 1981 and 1986,45compared to a 39% increase in St. Henri and a 16% increase in Cote St. Paul (CREESOM 1989,81). Duplex and triplex property assessments in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown roseabsolutely 90-125 % between 1976 and 1986, the highest increase in the metropolitan area (Ley1992, 241). The 1991 Census (100% data) revealed that repopulation, directly associated withnew, up-scale housing, is continuing in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown -one census tract inGriffintown (#69), grew 114% between 1986 and 1991 (Canada 1992). Renter levels fell by over10% in both neighbourhoods. A majority of census tracts along the Lachine Canal (seven ofeleven) also gained population, mostly through the appearance of high-priced lofts in industrialbuildings (Ibid.). Gentrification and revitalization are therefore an issue in the Southwest, albeitprimarily in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown.The majority of the population, however, remains in the grips of poverty. It is estimated thatof the 54098 people of the Southwest in 1986, close to 35 % received unemployment benefitsand/or welfare, 60% of the households made less than $20000, and the Southwest's medianrevenue was 20% lower than that of the Island of Montreal (City 1990b, 29). At theneighbourhood level, 64% of all households in Petite Bourgogne are below the poverty line,40% of Point St. Charles adults have not reached grade nine, and 40% of all St. Henri householdsspend more than a third of their income on rent (Ibid.). If one disaggregates the Southwest intoits twenty-two census tracts, the results are even more convincing: eighteen tracts had higherunemployment rates than the city average (Canada 1988).The high levels of poverty result in a difficult housing situation: in 1986, 49% of thedwellings were built before 1946, 6500 of the 21870 units still, require repairs, and 78% of thehouseholds are renters, levels which are all above city averages (City 1990b, 29). In 1989, 15 %of all housing in the inner city is public in nature, compared to only 3% for the city.46In 1990, the Southwest remains a victim of restructuring and deindustrialization: theneighbourhoods of St.Henri, Cote St.Paul, Point St.Charles, Petite Bourgogne and Griffintowncontinue to be characterized by low incomes, high unemployment and an under-educatedpopulation. Additional socio-economic information may be found in appendix 2. Let us nowexamine how government has proceeded during the decline of the Southwest, and how theirpolicies have evolved between 1960 and 1990.3.5 Introduction to the Policy Context of MontrealThere can be no study of policy evolution on the Southwest without first describing the uniqueinstitutional context of Montreal. The City of Montreal, between 1960 and 1990, had only twomayors, Jean Drapeau (1960-1986) and Jean Dore (1986- ). This lack of political change wasvery significant for urban policy. Due to Drapeau's lengthy stay as mayor (seven consecutiveterms), there was an enforced continuity in the policies of the city; unfortunately, those policieswere not greatly beneficial to the Southwest.Drapeau had very specific ideas for the city. His views may be summed up in this quote: "Theugliness of slums in which people live doesn't matter if we can make them stand wide-eyed inadmiration of works of art they don't understand" (Ley 1983, 136). Drapeau, especially between1960 and 1978, concentrated on the grands projets which were supposed to make his cityinternationally renown and modern, drive the economy through spinoffs, and promote a strongCBD (Kaplan 1982, 423). Examples of the grands projets include: Expo '67 and itsaccompanying infrastructure improvements (subways, highways); the 1976 Olympic Games; andlarge-scale core area public buildings, such as Complexe Guy-Favreau, Radio-Canada, andComplexe Desjardins (Leveillee & Whelan 1987, 155). The grands projets took precedence over47all other policy matters, such as housing, economic development, zoning and neighbourhoodplanning (Kaplan 1982, 421).Calls for comprehensive plans were consistently ignored by Drapeau. It was only in 1990 didthe first master plan appear, for the downtown Ville-Marie District (Corral 1990, 48). This lackof planning went together with Drapeau's reluctance to intervene in zoning and neighbourhoodissues and a belief in the predominance of market forces (Sancton 1983, 54). Drapeau thoughtin the long-term, and would not be bothered by short-term sacrifices and complaints fromneighbourhoods: "Everything that was partial, short-run, and small-minded, anything thatinvolved less than the entire community's long-term interest, must stand aside" (Ibid., 422).The aftermath of the 1976 Olympics, the 1978 municipal elections, and the 1981 recessionled to a change in Montreal's urban policy. The excesses of the grands projets forced the cityto emphasize less grandiose affairs and greater intervention in local economic issues. AlineDesautels, Director of the City Planning Department, said in 1978 that "the grand adventure ofthe last fifteen years has come to an end. We are now defining clearer and simpler objectives,while we are beginning to listen to citizens" (Barcelo 1988, 27). New programs were specificallyset up to stop the outward flow of people and capital to the suburbs.In 1986, the Civic Party lost its twenty-six year monopoly on power in Montreal to Jean Doreand the reformist Montreal Citizens Movement (MCM). The new mayor continued some of thepost-1978 programs, and placed a new emphasis on planning, public consultation and an openpolicy process (I,eveillee & Leonard 1988, 12).3.6 Policy Evolution: TransportationThe evolution of transportation policy on the Southwest will concentrate on three areas ofintervention: the Lachine Canal, expressways, and transportation improvements. Each area of48intervention will be chronologically described. Map 2 shows the location of these interventions.3.6.1 Lachine Canal. The opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway enabled ships to bypass thecanal, thereby accelerating the Southwest's manufacturing decline. Between 1960 and 1965, theeasternmost section of the canal was filled in by the federal government, which closed the canalto the port (Canada 1979, 54). The construction of the Bonaventure Autoroute in 1966 and 1967created an additional barrier across the canal (Ibid.). In 1968, the canal was closed to allnavigation by the Administration of the St.Lawrence Seaway (Ibid.). In 1974, the canal and itslocks were transferred from Transport Canada to Public Works Canada (Ibid.). In the same year,Parks Canada took jurisdictional control of the canal from Public Works and made it a NationalHistoric Park (Ibid.).Parks Canada presented a master plan for the redevelopment of the canal in 1979. The landcorridor along the canal was to be reserved for non-motorized uses, especially bicycles. Thisdecision reflected the times:The bikeway idea came along at just the right moment, as recreation patterns inNorth America swung away from active, team-oriented sports towards informal,fitness-oriented activities in the 1970s. These new forms of recreation are often "linear"in nature- cycling, jogging, cross-country skiing- and the recreation corridor offered bythe canal proved ideal for their enjoyment. (Williams 1990, 67)The canal also had to be modernized (raise bridge heights, renovate locks) before any navigationcould be realized (Canada 1979, 29). Functionally, the St.Henri/Point St.Charles sector (fromAutoroute 15 to Autoroute 10) was to have an urban vocation, with an emphasis on preservingthe locks and the industries along the canal (Ibid., 30). The Bonaventure sector, from Autoroute10 to the Port, was to be the primary entrance to the canal, and the converging point for bikepaths from the port and Man and His World on Ile St.Helêne (Ibid.).In terms of site planning for the St. Henri/Point St. Charles sector, the following was proposed:49Lionel-GroubtKfBonaventureAutoroute 1967LEGEND• Metro Station^ AutorouteEt DemolitionMAP 2 - TRANSPORTATION POLICY SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-90501. there would be an attempt to link several large parks near the canal to the bike pathalong it;2. the Atwater Market would be renovated and parking spaces provided;3. a pedestrian bridge would also be built between the Market and Point St. Charles;4. the desSeigneurs Bridge and locks would become an historical interpretation centre forindustrial heritage, as well as another pedestrian crossing; and5. the parks around the Wellington railway bridge, in Griffintown, would be refurbished.(Ibid., 43)The Bonaventure sector was to be planned in the following manner:1. the canal would be accessible from the Old Port by a bridge linking Mill Street anddelaCommune;2. the second stage would be to prepare the canal for a possible link-up with the OldPort, based on the latter's renovation schedule; and3. the reopening of the canal to the port, while preserving the original locks. (Ibid., 46)Work began in 1980 on these projects, and continued to the present. In 1990, the followingobjectives had been attained: a twelve kilometre bike path along the canal; path link-ups withVerdun, neighbourhood parks, and the Old Port; pedestrian bridges; and renovation of somelocks. The canal became a popular recreational facility: in 1988, more than 364000 peoplevisited the canal (Lessard 1989, 23). Work in process in 1990 included the refurbishing of theOld Port locks, the digging of the canal to join the Old Port, and improvements in the bike paths(Williams 1990, 69). Unforeseen problems with the redevelopment of the canal were also beingdealt with in 1990, specifically the industrial contamination of both water and soils of the canal(Ibid.). Work which had yet to start in 1990 included the historical interpretation centres, de-contamination of soils along the canal, and renovations to the Atwater Market (Canada 1990).The 1990 plan for the revitalization of the Southwest included some mention of the canal. The51particular objectives are covered in the Transportation Improvements section. It is expected thatmost of the work on the canal, including its reopening, will be completed by 1994 (Pare 1990b).3.6.2 Expressways. In 1960, Montreal had no expressways and only a few major boulevards;by 1976, there would be seven expressways in the city, most built through dense urban areas.Drapeau found that large and catalytic projects, such as Expo '67, were perfect vehicles for anexpressway expansion policy: "If the city were to succeed in its bids for major, internationalprojects, it would have to demonstrate an improved capacity to" (Kaplan 1982,423). This view reflected a common belief of North America at the time. The expressway(autoroute) program was therefore a priority in sustaining the grands projets, promotingeconomic health and being a powerful element of urban planning (Barcelo 1988, 31).Expo '67 was successfully acquired by the city in 1964. Drapeau consequently embarked ona crash program to build expressways and improve the city's major roads (Ibid.). Drapeau, inorder to secure funds to pay for the upcoming Expo '67 and its accompanying expressways,entered into negotiations with both the federal and provincial governments (Kaplan 1982, 426).Beginning in 1964, the two senior levels of government "gradually assumed responsibility forimplementing a stripped-down version of the highway plan" (Ibid.).The plan called for six expressways. Two were to affect the Southwest: the Bonaventure(Autoroute 10), which was to run along the waterfront from downtown to Autoroute 15, andAutoroute 15, which was to connect the Decarie Expressway with the Champlain Bridge. Map2 shows the location of these expressways. The funding from Ottawa and Quebec City enabledDrapeau to spend more on the subway, his other project of interest (Ibid.).The first of the expressways to affect the Southwest was Autoroute 15. Completed inNovember 1966, Autoroute 15 ran a total of 4.4 kilometres, effectively splitting Cote St.Paul52into two sections, and creating a barrier between Verdun and Point St. Charles (Quebec 1983;Auger 1992, 5).The second expressway was the Bonaventure Autoroute, completed in March 1967. Itsconstruction created a visual barrier across the canal, split Griffintown from Old Montreal, andwas also one of the reasons for the 1964 demolition of Victoriatown, at the foot of Bridge Street:Drapeau was afraid that tourists visiting Expo '67 would get wrong ideas of the city if they sawsuch a 'slum' from an expressway (Kaplan 1982, 451). Although more detail of the Victoriatownrenewal will be discussed in the evolution of housing policy, suffice it to say that Expo '67 andthe Bonaventure Autoroute were important factors in the decision to demolish theneighbourhood.The extensive expressway construction in the mid-1960s convinced Drapeau that no newhighways would be needed in the 1970s (Ibid., 427). There was one expressway planned for the1960s, however, which did not begin construction until 1970: the east-west Ville-Marie (the720).The Planning Department, in 1964, had announced plans for the expressway, and tentativeexpropriations in St.Henri and Petite Bourgogne were begun. In 1966, during the renewal ofPetite Bourgogne, it was mentioned that demolitions would have to occur in order toaccommodate a new east-west expressway (City 1966, 97). The 1966 conceptual plan extendedAutoroute 20 from Decarie across the CBD to Autoroute 25, in the east end (Carlos & Lavigne1975). By 1970, however, Drapeau had lost interest in the project (Kaplan 1982, 427). Thatsame year, the provincial government decided to announce its own plan for the expressway,without contacting the city: "jamais la ville de Montreal et ses services professionels n'ont eteconsultes par Quebec dans les mois precedant l'annonce du projet" (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 33).53In effect, the province was ignoring the city and going ahead with its own plans. The Liberalgovernment reasoned that the expressway was needed to increase accessibility to the CBD,provide jobs, and balance government spending on private infrastructure compared to publicinfrastructure, such as subways (Quebec 1972, 26-28).The construction of the first section of the 720 autoroute, between Decarie Autoroute and GuyStreet, was completed in November 1972 at the cost of $148 million (Quebec 1973, 103). Theexpressway had led to the eviction of 1160 households and the demolition of several hundreddwellings in the Southwest, exclusively along the northern edges of St.Henri and PetiteBourgogne (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 38). The demolitions in the Southwest, as well as inCentre-Sud, created the impetus for strong opposition from community groups and the cityadministration, but Drapeau seemed powerless to block the project, which was stronglysupported by then Premier Robert Bourassa (Ibid.).3.6.3 Transportation Improvements.  The construction of expressways had effectively cut theSouthwest from the rest of the city, so that in the late 1970s there was talk of improvingaccessibility.In 1977, the Planning Department issued a document on the Southwest District whichaddressed inaccessibility and other transportation problems. The issue of truck traffic was raised;due to the increasing dependency of industry on trucks and not rail, traffic was becoming tooheavy for the roads in the Southwest (City 1977, 24). It was proposed that a bridge link up GuyStreet with Bridge Street, over the Lachine Canal, in order to take pressure off the WellingtonTunnel, which had not been designed for heavy traffic (Ibid., 26). Moreover, there wereproposals to replace the Wellington Tunnel with a bridge, as well as to provide more accessramps to Autoroute 15 (Ibid., 24).54Discussion of prolonging the subway through the Southwest was also prominent in the late1970s. The Metro, under the regional board of the Montreal Urban Community, had initiallybeen built to service the CBD; it was opened in 1966. In 1975, $1.6 billion was lent to the MUCto build stations in the southwestern, western and eastern sections of Montreal (MUC 1983, 66).In 1982, eight new stations appeared in the Southwest and Verdun on an 8.4 kilometre extensionfrom the CBD line (Ibid.). Within the inner city, new stations included Place St.Henri, LionelGroulx (also in St.Henri), Charlevoix in Point St.Charles, Georges Vanier in Petite Bourgogne,and Jolicoeur in Cote St.Paul (Ibid.).In March 1990, a plan to revitalize the Southwest was put forth by the City of Montreal. Mostof the plan concentrated on economic amelioration and is covered in that section of policyevolution, but there was some mention of transportation improvements. The plan's fifth objectivewas to improve the road network by increasing accessibility to the CBD, lessening isolationamong neighbourhoods, and channelling trucks onto specified routes (City 1990c, 10).Specifically, the Wellington Tunnel would be made into a bridge and the Guy-Bridge link wasto be studied (Ibid., 19). The renovation of the Atwater Market and a study of the shores of theLachine Canal were also included under this objective (Ibid.).The funding for these improvements from the city came in March 1990 and from the federalgovernment in May of 1990. The city would spend $26.5 million between 1990 and 1995 oninfrastructure and transportation improvements in the Southwest, and $5.9 million on renovatingthe Atwater Market (Pare 1990b). There was an expectation that Ottawa would pay for theLachine Canal and the bridges to be built over it (Ibid.). In May, the federal governmentoutlined its share of the costs: a total of $10 million will be spent on de-contamination of thecanal, but no funding for the needed replacement of the Wellington tunnel and the Guy-Bridge55study (Pare 1990d).The evolution of transportation policy on the Southwest ends with the March 1990 plan. Since1960, the Southwest had been the location of several significant transportation projects: theLachine Canal revitalization, the construction of expressways, and the building of Metro stations.3.7 Policy Evolution: HousingThe evolution of housing policy, which includes all significant interventions (Housing Code,renewal, renovation, public housing, housing policies), will be presented in roughlychronological order. Map 3 locates these interventions.3.7.1 Origins of Housing Policy in Montreal. Housing policy in Montreal in the 1950s waspoorly developed and to a large extent followed federal policy, as outlined in the 1954 HousingAct: Articles 23 and 35 set forth how land could be termed a renewal zone, acquired, renovatedand subsidized through the help of Ottawa, while Article 16 described the framework for theprovision of public housing (Arsenault 1967, 50). The Dozois Plan of 1954 was the first of twoimportant policy documents of this era; it called for renewal in the east section of the downtowncore (Kaplan 1982, 379). Despite opposition between 1954 and 1957 by the incumbent mayorJean Drapeau, the project became the Habitations Jeanne-Mance in 1958 with 796 units(Melamed 1981, 166). Drapeau's reluctance was due to his belief in the provision of housingthrough the market. The city administration at the time did not include a housing authority(Sheppard 1990, 200).In 1961, a second important document was released; under the title Comprehensive UrbanRenewal Study, consultants had outlined an ambitious nineteen-year schedule which was to`renew' over 48600 dwelling units deemed obsolete in seventeen city neighbourhoods, including70 % of the Southwest (Keklikian 1978, 65). Urban renewal was to be "the only tool by whichKm10.50VictoriatownRenewal 1964— Petite BourgogneRenewal 1966-78 /MAP 3 - HOUSING POLICY SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-90LEGEND50 + UnitsPublic HousingRenewal Zone1111 NIP Zonea5 657the City can rejuvenate Montreal" (Ibid., 68). Drapeau was again reluctant to invest publicmoney into renewal, and in order to placate the increasing demand for municipal action, hedecided to renew an "isolated, dilapidated residential area at the foot of the Victoria Bridge"(Ibid., 57), which was Victoriatown.3.7.2 Victoriatown. Victoriatown, or Goose Village, was a small neighbourhood along BridgeSt., between Mill St. and the river. It was entirely surrounded by industry and railway lines. Arenewal study was undertaken by the City Planning Department in 1962 to explore the potentialof redeveloping the site. The study first reported on the existing conditions: only 11.5 % of the330 dwellings were considered habitable, and 84.7% were over seventy years old (Laneuville1964, 113). Moreover, there was insufficient green space, no community facilities, no police/firestations, and no doctor's office (City 1962, 33). Finally, obnoxious industrial uses surroundingthe site (slaughterhouses, tanneries, asphalt plant) led to the conclusion that "this area isabsolutely unsuitable for habitation, and deprives the inhabitants of any comfort or ease" (Ibid.,35).Despite the apparent incompatibility of the site with habitation, the planners admitted severalconditions which pointed to the existence of a strong community: "in spite of these facts, thisis not an area where there is much evidence of juvenile delinquency, lawlessness, sickness, orthose other problems so often associated with slum areas" (Ibid., 5). In addition, many of theinhabitants were Italian immigrants who were willing to own and improve their properties;despite low incomes, 26% of the households were owners, above the 18 % average of the cityat the time (Ibid., 40). There were few roomers in the area, as 94.1 % of all households weretwo-parent families with children (Ibid.).Nonetheless, the planners recommended the following:581. municipal authorities proceed without delay to redevelop "Victoriatown", bythe acquisition and clearance of all properties of the area, [and] the relocation ofthe entire population living there;2. re-use the land according to industrial needs and possibly for the upcomingExpo '67; and3. take advantage of the provisions of the N.H.A. to obtain financial assistanceof the Federal government, re: Article 23. (Ibid., 8)The city denied that the upcoming Expo '67 motivated the recommendations: "the redevelopmentis made necessary by the existing conditions found in the community and the surrounding areas.The same recommendation would have been made whether or not the World's Fair had enteredthe picture" (Ibid., 4).On June 30th, 1963, City Council approved the acquisition of the properties; expropriationbegan in November, and the neighbourhood was demolished in May 1964 (Laneuville 1964,115). The city did not help in the relocation of the 1500 evicted people (Kaplan 1982, 452). Thesite was cut in half by the Bonaventure Autoroute in 1966, and in 1967 a stadium (theAutostade) was built. In the 1970s the Autostade was torn down, and today the site is mostlyvacant (Melamed 1981, 169).3.7.3 Petite Bourgogne Renewal. The demolition of Victoriatown did not satisfy those callingfor more renewal, such as the construction industry and community groups (Kaplan 1982, 452).The adoption of the first City Housing Code, in 1962, was a step forward, although it was notsufficient to eradicate slums which covered one-fifth of the city and 60% of the Southwest(Barcelo 1988, 34). What was needed was a dramatic example of renewal.On Christmas Eve 1964, parish priests in St.Cunegonde and St.Joseph wards made a publicstatement deploring the poverty of their neighbourhoods amidst the downtown boom (Ibid., 35).Drapeau, sensing a political opportunity, called for a study of the area, which was renamed59Petite Bourgogne. The 1965 report noted the obvious: 92% of the housing was built before1920, suggesting that many were in poor condition; 94.6% of households were tenants, anumber which had increased in the last five years; and population had declined by 35 % in thelast fifteen years (City 1965, 37). All of these conditions pointed to a worsening situation whichdemanded action on the part of the city. The report recommended that Petite Bourgogne bedeemed an urban renewal area, and to establish eligibility for federal funding (Ibid., 3).In 1966, the City Planning Department outlined its urban renewal program, with the supportof City Council. Two overall objectives were put forth: "the systematic and progressiveimprovement of the social, physical and economic conditions for the area... [and) to divide thearea into residential and industrial sectors distinct from one another" (City 1966, 69).Specific objectives included the following:1. removal of the railway tracks;2. preservation of the environment's social identity;3. conservation of the greatest possible number of dwellings;4. increase in greenery and open space areas;5. erection of dwellings with rental levels which the present residents couldafford;6. development of a network of sufficiently large streets;7. separation of through-traffic and local traffic;8. regrouping of commercial and community services; and9. structure the district so that open spaces and building volumes clearly indicatethe functions of each type of use. (Ibid., 70)The development plan, which was to encourage the proper location and pattern of open spaces,transportation and housing, was administered by the City of Montreal (Ibid., 71). Specifically,the city was responsible for negotiations with higher levels of government, coordinating theredevelopment, and taking care of relocating tenants (Ibid., 113). The 258 acres of PetiteBourgogne was to be renewed in stages, at a cost of $77 million (Ibid.). The federal governmentwould contribute 42% of the costs, with the city paying the rest (Ibid., 121).60The period between the 1966 report and 1969, the year the first public housing was built inPetite Bourgogne, was characterized by two important initiatives. In 1967, both Montreal andthe Province of Quebec created their own housing authorities. The Montreal Bureau of Housingand Urban Development came first, and was responsible of both construction of low-rent housingand the application of the Housing Code under the Quebec Housing Act (Robert & Racicot 1972,187). The Societe d'Habitation du Quebec (SHQ) was to enforce the provincial Housing Act andsynchronize funding with CMHC (Ibid.). The two new bodies signalled the entry of the provinceand the city into housing matters, specifically the Petite Bourgogne renewal, even though asignificant portion of the funding came from the federal government (Kaplan 1982, 453).The 1966 Petite Bourgogne plan, which initially emphasized large apartments connected totownhouses, changed in several ways. First, the director of the program, M.Legault, wanted toexpand the city's role to include social issues, which ran contrary to the minimalist views ofDrapeau (Ibid.). More importance was thus attached to renovation, relocation and themaintenance of the social and physical fabric than was evident with the Victoriatown renewal.This approach was quite innovative at the time. Second, the federal government began curtailingfunds for urban renewal as early as 1970, when the program was just in its initial stages(Barcelo 1988, 35). Third, the railway tracks which cut through the neighbourhood were notremoved until 1982, at a point when public housing had been replaced by a new program, theOperation 20000 Logements, which emphasized ownership (Ibid., 36). The latter two changesled to a lengthy and incomplete renewal process; even in 1980 a third of the area still had to beredeveloped, and the amount of public housing built never reached the levels intended in 1966(Ibid.).613.7.4 Public Housing. The renewal of Petite Bourgogne was an ongoing affair. Demolitionsfollowed by public housing began in 1969 and continued until 1978. Private redevelopmentcontinued until 1990. The administrative body which took care of public housing was calledl'Office Municipal d'Habitation de Montreal (OMHM), a para-public not-for-profit organizationsubsidized jointly by the City (15 %) and the SHQ and CMHC (Melamed 1981, 175). PetiteBourgogne was the focus of public housing or H.L.M. (habitations a loyer modique, or low-rental housing) activity in the Southwest. The other neighbourhoods would soon receive theirshare as well to replace obsolete housing, although not to the same extent as Petite Bourgogne,as shown in Table 4:Table 4: Public Housing in the Southwest as of 1988# of Dwellings Cost at time ofconstructionPoint St.Charles 800 $18 714 000Cote St. Paul 335 $9 435 000St.Henri 627 $14 089 000Petite Bourgogne 1 441 $27 568 000TOTALS 3 203 $69 816 000SOURCE: City of Montreal. 1989. Repertoire des HLM. Page 36.Petite Bourgogne had close to half of all public housing in the Southwest, although itscontinuously declining population was never more than 15 % of the inner city; in 1989, 51 % ofall housing in Petite Bourgogne was public, compared to 10% for St. Henri, 4% for Cote St. Pauland 14% for Point St.Charles (CREESOM 1989, 272). Moreover, 20% of all public housingin Montreal was in the Southwest by 1988, although the five neighbourhoods comprised only5.4% of the total population of the city (Ibid.).62In 1969, the federal government, based on the Hellyer Report, decided to end theirinvolvement with urban renewal. In 1973, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs initiated theNeighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), followed by the Residential RehabilitationAssistance Program (RRAP). NIP was implemented in St.Henri North, between 1974 and 1977(City 1976). This particular intervention concentrated on housing (317 houses were built orrestored), green space, beautification and recreational facilities (Ibid., 36-7). The total amountspent on St.Henri North was $2 716 000, of which 45% was federally-funded (Filion 1988,101). Unlike other Canadian cities, however, NIP in Montreal was characterized by a lack ofpublic participation: little occurred because of the city's gradual approach, as well as aneighbourhood characterized by a mobile population and high tenancy rates (Ibid., 105).Moreover, the city had been involved in renovation subsidization since 1968, and the NIP wasmerely adopted and adapted into this framework (Ibid.).3.7.5 Operation 20000 Logements.  The post-Olympic Games era produced numerous programsdesigned to halt the flight to the suburbs of people and capital. Laissez-faire was replaced withintervention, supposedly on behalf of the poor and the business community (Uveillee & Whelan1987, 159). The initial result of this policy shift was a renewed interest in residential renovationin place of public housing and/or demolitions. Between 1968 and 1987, the city oversaw, underthe Housing Code, the renovation of 3200 dwellings in the Southwest, 21 % of all governmentsupported renovations in that period (CREESOM 1989, 273). The funding was for the most partacquired through the Canada-Quebec Renovation Assistance Program (City 1989a, 19).The large number of demolitions in the Southwest, mostly in Petite Bourgogne, had producedan absolute housing shortage: between 1965 and 1974, 4750 dwellings were demolished, 25 %of the Montreal total, while only 2900 dwellings, mostly public in nature, had been built (City631977, 14). The precipitous drop in population in Petite Bourgogne during those years (60%between 1966 and 1976) had to a large extent been caused by the slowness of public housingconstruction (Melamed 1981, 171). Partly due to this housing gap, the city decided in 1979 toimplement its Operation 10000 Logements (Homes). The program had two objectives: to attractfamilies back to the city by providing houses on vacant land, and to more affordably house theMontreal middle class (Lacroix 1989, 28). The city would sell off its vacant lands to developers,upon which houses could be built within certain cost and design specifications (City 1979, 7).In 1982, the program was expanded to 20000 homes, and more emphasis was placed onregenerating inner cities, areas which had been most affected by the flight to the suburbs (City1986, 4).Together, Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown were one of the four poles of the operation, dueto the fact they had considerable vacant land to offer. A total of 3247 units were built in thismanner in the Southwest, with 1814 in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown (Ibid., 33). Onceagain, the Southwest contained a disproportionate amount of units; 16.5 % of the 19634 unitswere found in the Southwest in 1988 (Ibid.). It should be noted that this program generallyattracted a clientele whose income was higher than the existing population (CREESOM 1989,276).From 1980 onwards, the city began to prefer co-ops over public housing. Community groupsand not-for-profit organizations, with the help of para-municipal organizations (such as theOMHM), constructed or converted dwellings into co-ops. By 1988, 1689 dwellings or 8% ofall housing in the Southwest was co-operative, most built or converted after 1984 (Ibid., 274).Institutional buildings were also being converted: in Point St.Charles, Lorne High Schoolbecame a co-op and Alexandra Hospital was transformed into family housing (Sevigny 1992).643.7.6 Habiter Montreal and the 1990 Plan. Jean Dore, elected in 1986, continued many ofDrapeau's housing policies, such as the 20000 Logements (Habiter Montreal) and the co-ops.There was a marked slowdown, however, in the construction of public housing, due to thepenury of federal funding and a further shift towards co-ops (Uveillee & Leonard 1988, 11).In February 1989, the city put forth its first comprehensive policy statement on housing, to setpriorities for the next ten years. Five strategies were included:1. encourage individual and collective home ownership;2. support the growth of the housing stock;3. increase the social housing stock;4. preserve and improve existing housing; and5. promote measures to maintain residents in their community. (City 1989a, 18)The Southwest's main concern lay in the area of social housing. Despite, or because of, theslowdown in construction, there was a waiting list of 14000 for public housing in Montreal, anda further 8000 for co-ops in 1989 (Ibid., 58). These waiting lists are significant to the Southwestbecause of its difficult housing situation: increasing gentrification in combination with 37% ofthe population spending more than a 30% of their income on rent, 57% of all households livingbelow the poverty line, and 30% of the housing needing major repairs (CREESOM 1989, 97).The 1990 plan, which emphasizes economic regeneration, does not overlook the Southwest'shousing problems: an important objective is to ensure affordability of housing and themaintenance and expansion of the housing stock (City 1990c, 12). Specifically, the city is tospend $28 million over five years to support co-ops, renovate older houses, demolish sheds, buyrooming houses, and decontaminate soil on vacant land so that public housing may be built(Ibid.). Ottawa is to spend $6.5 million on subsidized housing (Legault 1991, 12).65The 1990 plan is the last step in the evolution of housing policy; there has been significantshifts from the non-interventionist attitudes in the early 1960s to renewal and demolition,followed by public housing, co-ops and private ownership.3.8 Policy Evolution: Industrial and Economic StrategiesEconomic and industrial policy evolution will cover the governmental strategies whichdeliberately served to expand, shrink or otherwise manipulate the economic health of theSouthwest, including land-use zoning. Map 4 locates the relevant interventions.3.8.1 Zoning. Drapeau tended to ignore regulatory mechanisms, such as zoning, in favour ofa laissez-faire system:The Drapeau administration placed few obstacles in the way of any development,big or small. A recent paper for the Economic Council of Canada has documentedthe relative absence of planning controls during the 1960s and 1970s. While othercities developed elaborate official plans and mechanisms for public involvementin planning, Montreal continued to make zoning decisions on an apparently adhoc basis. Requests for zoning changes were channelled directly to the politicianson the executive committee before even being considered by the technical expertsin the city's planning and legal departments. Zoning laws were considered to bemore a reflection of demands for the use of real estate in a given area than partof a system to shape and regulate such demands. (Sancton 1983, 71)In 1963, the City adopted its zoning by-law (#2875) for the Southwest District (CREESOM1989, 257). The bylaw's intent was to better separate and compartmentalize land uses. Industry,which was an important user of land in the inner city, was zoned into three cumulative andexclusive classes: Class 1 was the least obnoxious and consisted of small manufacturers; Class2 was warehouses and printing shops; Class 3 was heavy industry, found mostly along theLachine Canal (Ibid.).••LEGENDRevi-CentrePRAIMONTPIQATechnoparc0 0.5Technoparc Site66MAP 4 - ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL POLICIES SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-9067The effects of the 1963 zoning by-law was particularly felt in Griffintown. Griffintown asdefined was re-zoned industrial, even though there were at least 3500 inhabitants at that time(Gabeline, Lanken & Pape 1974, 79). The decision reflected the belief that zoning should followland use. Griffintown had always been mixed industrial in nature, and the city put this fact intolaw. The long-term effect of the new zoning was the replacement of housing with parking lots,print shops, bus depots and other uses which serviced the nearby CBD (Marvin 1975, 8).Griffintown became abandoned; it lost its parish status, the last school and church were torndown in 1970, and its population dropped to barely 800 in 1981 (Ibid.). By 1990, the area wasbeing revitalized by 20000 Logements and private development (through spot rezonings), butmuch of the land remains vacant or is used for industrial incubation. As an example of the latter,more jobs were created in Griffintown between 1981 and 1988 than any of the other fourneighbourhoods (CREESOM 1989, 228).Conversely, Drapeau's administration began to re-zone industrial space along the canal forresidential purposes. Between 1981 and 1986, the city adopted eight spot modifications to the#2875 bylaw which ultimately transformed some vacant industrial land along the canal intocondominiums (CREESOM 1989, 258). Jean Dore's administration ended these conversions infavour of retaining industry, but the zoning modifications "ont contribuees a restreindre, defagon notable, l'offre d'espace pour les activites industrielles dans le Sud-Ouest, en favorisantouvertement la conversion d'espaces industriels en espaces residentiels" (Ibid., 261). Despite there-zonings, massive restructuring has rendered irrelevant much of the industrial zoning along theLachine Canal (City 1991a, 19).3.8.2 Post-Olympic Strategies. The Olympic debacle convinced Drapeau that the grands projetscould no longer be the basis for Montreal's economic growth; what was needed was more68intervention at the neighbourhood level in order to keep business and people in the city(Levenlee & Whelan 1987, 159). In 1979, the city initiated CIDEM, or the Commissiond'Initiative et de Developpement Economique de Montreal. Its mission was to promote andcoordinate economic development through and for the city (Macor 1982, 77). CIDEM managedtwo programs of importance to the Southwest: PRAIMONT (Programme de Renovation desAires Industrielles de Montreal) and the High-Technology Parks ProgrammePRAIMONT was to lend financial assistance to defray the costs of renovating old industrialsites through demolition, infrastructure improvement and the acquisition of buildings (Cote &Lachapelle 1989, G1). The industrial decline of Montreal, particularly in the Southwest, was aprime motivator for the program. Officially set up in 1983, the four objectives were as follows:1. to stabilize the level of industrial activity and employment;2. to respond to the needs of manufacturers, present and future;3. to give old sites a new look; and4. to favour a better integration of industry with the process and efforts of urbanrenovation. (Ibid., G4)Four areas were initially chosen for the PRAIMONT. In the Southwest, the fifty hectare Bridge-Wellington site in the eastern section of Point St. Charles was first chosen for intervention. Thecost of renovation was estimated at $25 million in 1985; in 1990, $8 million had been spent bythe city, with another $10 million forthcoming from the Federal Ministry of Industry, Commerceand Technology (CREESOM 1989, 266). Thus far, 13.8 hectares of land along Bridge Streethave been acquired, and infrastructure has been replaced along the site's streets, although workhas been slowed by a lack of funds as well as soil decontamination (Ibid., 265). The fifty-hectareCabot PRAIMONT, in Cote St.Paul, was initiated in 1985, and $4.3 million had been spent by1990 out of an estimated $15 million cost (Ibid., 267).The High-Technology Park Programme was initiated in 1987 as a result of the69recommendations of the Picard Report, which outlined Montreal's seven economic developmentpriorities: international activities; high technology; international finance and commerce; design;culture; tourism; and transportation (Quebec 1990, 119). In the Southwest, the unused shorttake-off and landing (STOL) runway (l'Adacport) site along the Bonaventure Autoroute was soldto CIDEM by the provincial and federal governments for $1 million (City 1991b, 1). Theobjective was to create an attractive location for high-tech companies that was only ten minutesfrom downtown and the Champlain Bridge, and to provide the catalyst for industrial incubationalong the canal (St.Cyr 1992). Initial plans for the site, called the Technoparc, were drawn upin 1989, but the only occupant in 1990 was Teleglobe Canada (City 1991b, 6). Investments of$100 million are anticipated until 1996 (St.Cyr 1992).There were several other programs which emphasized economic revitalization, most notablyPIQA (Programme d'Intervention dans les Quartiers Anciens). In older neighbourhoods, PIQAwas supposed to preserve and increase neighbourhood quality, consolidate the housing stock, andmaintain existing population levels (Cote & Lachapelle 1989, N1). Inspired by the example ofNIP, PIQA was created by the city in 1979 (Ibid.). The program was completely funded by thecity. Later, 20000 Logements took over a large portion of PIQA's resources (Ibid., N5). Therewere eleven PIQA interventions in Montreal, of which five were in the Southwest: one inSt.Henri, three in Point St.Charles and one in Cote St.Paul (Macor 1982, 112). Eachintervention was different, but all concentrated on urban physical amelioration, public servicesimprovement, and community development (Ibid.).SODIM (Societe de Developpement Industriel de Montreal) was created in 1981 as a not-for-profit para-municipal corporation to develop industrial and commercial real estate (City 1990a,1). SODIM implemented two significant programs. The first was Revi-Centre, a city operation70subsidized by the province; it was designed to revitalize commercial activity in olderneighbourhoods through tax incentives, direct subsidies for renovations, and commercial arteryimprovements (Cote & Lachapelle 1989, D1). The objectives of this program included theconsolidation of the urban fabric and the rehabilitation of economic activity along commercialroutes near the CBD (Ibid.). Four streets in the Southwest were chosen because of their centrallocations, levels of commercial activity and deterioration: Notre Dame in St.Henri, De l'Eglisein Cote St. Paul, and Charlevoix and Centre in Point St.Charles (Ibid., D3). A total sum of $29million, of which 65 % was provincial money, was spent on Revi-Centre until its termination in1986 (City 1990a, 5). The second program, PROCIM (Programme de Cooperation Industriellede Montreal), was created in 1982 to provide municipal subsidies for the renovation of industrialbuildings, and was partly designed to complement the infrastructure improvements of thePRAIMONT (CREESOM 1989, 261). A total of $4.1 million was spent in the Southwest by1989 (Ibid., 262).Given the high levels of unemployment in the Southwest, there has been a perceptible yet slowpolicy shift towards employment creation. CREESOM estimated in 1989 that $65 million isspent every year in the Southwest District by provincial and federal governments on welfare,unemployment and other forms of social security, but very little on job creation (Ibid., 133).Several national and provincial job creation programs existed for the district, but it was not untilthe 1990 plan that the issue of employment creation was specifically addressed by policymakers.The only important exception was the creation by the City of Montreal, Job Creation of Canada,and IMASCO of two "enterprise zones" in 1986 to serve as industrial incubators (Ibid., 220).3.8.3 1990 Plan: Economic Aspects. On March 9th 1990, the City of Montreal unveiled itslong-awaited revitalization plan for the Southwest District. The plan was the culmination of71several studies, notably the CREESOM report of 1989 and the city's overview of the SouthwestDistrict in 1989. The latter had proposed specific action in the following areas:1. consolidate and develop industrial spaces;2. ameliorate industrial and transportation infrastructure;3. support local commercial activity;4. help the unemployed to find work;5. diversify affordable housing opportunities for low-income households;6. preserve and improve the ageing housing stock;7. improve access to downtown and industrial zones;8. redefine truck and transit routes;9. improve links among the neighbourhoods;10. establish among governments a decontamination policy;11. improve all aspects of the canal vis-à-vis its surrounding neighbourhoods.(Ibid., 28)The majority of these recommendations had already been put forth in the 1977 PlanningDepartment study. The March 1990 plan would incorporate these points, take into account the1989 CREESOM Report, and place further emphasis on economic revitalization.The March 1990 plan, titled Plan d'Action de la Ville de Montreal pour la relance economiquedu Sud-Ouest, was the responsibility of CIDEM. The plan was to address the overall economicdecline of the Southwest District, especially the five inner-city neighbourhoods. The approachwas to emphasize an intensification of current efforts with consultation from communityorganizations (City 1990c, 1). There were four areas of importance in the plan: revitalizationof the local economy and employment, improvements in the road network, development of thecanal, and accessibility to affordable housing and quality of environment (Ibid., 4). Map 5 showsthe location of the expected interventions. The city would take part, over seven years, in thefollowing actions:1) Consolidation of land use and accessibility. This area of intervention would include:1. continue to support the two PRAIMONT, and develop a new one along thecanal, called Georges-Vanier ($27.9 million);MAP 5 - 1990 SOUTHWEST PLANLEGENDGuy-Bridge StIlnk study-411—* WellingtonIlnk studyRevi-Centre• PRAIMONTCanalEnterpriseParkKm0 0.5 172732. develop, through SODIM, an enterprise park along the canal, in order to createup to 8000 jobs and act as an incubator for industries ($330 million);3. continue the PROCIM program of renovating industrial buildings ($3.6million);4. study the shores of the canal ($700 000); and5. improve accessibility, by studying the Wellington and Guy-Bridge links, andimprove transit service ($26 million). (Ibid., 10)The Canal Enterprise Park was the most significant of the five interventions; SODIM would actas promoter, developer and constructer of a medium-density industrial and commercial parkalong the canal in Point St.Charles, which is to attract light industry, offices and workshopswhich need proximity to the CBD (City 1990a, 8). The sixty hectares will encompass close to2 million square feet of office space. As the first step, SODIM acquired the Nordelec Building(the former Northern Telecom, it is the largest brick building in North America) and its 1.2million square feet (Ibid.). SODIM teamed up with a private developer, Berma-Lalco, in orderto leverage funds for the five-year project (Pare 1990a).2) Consolidation of economic activity. This area would focus on two improvements: $5.9 millionon the Atwater Market renovation and the $7.1 million revival of the Revi-Centre program forthe commercial arteries of Notre Dame, De l'Eglise, Centre and Charlevoix (Ibid.).3) Unemployment relief and socio-economic improvement. The two areas of importance includedthe maintenance of the housing stock through co-ops, renovation, shed demolition, and thedecontamination of soils for housing purposes ($28 million), and secondly the creation of anenterprise-school to retrain the unemployed ($300 000) (City 1990c, 18).4) Community development. $1.5 million will also go to RESO (Regroupement pour la relanceEconomique du Sud-Ouest), CREESOM's replacement, so that the CIDEM and SODIM couldwork with an umbrella community group in order to better suit the plan to local needs (Ibid.,13).74Complementing and expanding the city's investments, the federal government, over five years,is to concentrate on soil decontamination ($10 million), loans to industry and enterprises ($63million), housing ($6.5 million) and retraining ($32 million). The provincial government, alsoover five years, is to spend money on loans to manufacturers ($9 million), retraining ($5.4million), PRAIMONT Georges-Vanier ($10 million), and RESO ($1.4 million). Table 5 showsthe total investments of all governments, from 1990 to 1997.Table 5: 1990 Plan and investmentsCity ofMontrealPRAIMONT, PROCIM, canal study,infrastructure improvements, AtwaterMarket, Revi-Centre, housing, enterprise-school, RESO100 milliondollarsSODIM andprivate sectorCanal Enterprise Park Inc. 330 milliondollarsProvincial Loans, retraining, PRAIMONTGeorges-Vanier, RESO26.5 milliondollarsFederal Decontamination, loans, housing,retraining112 milliondollarsTOTAL $569 millionSOURCE: Legault,D. 1991. Du recyclage a l'Ecomusee. Page 12.It should be noted that not all of the funding is necessarily new; several of the ongoing projects,such as PROCIM, Bridge-Wellington and Cabot PRAIMONT, retraining and soildecontamination were already earmarked for money before the 1990 plan, and were merelyincorporated into it (Pare 1990c). Moreover, 55 % of the total funding consisted of privateinvestments to be managed by SODIM. Last, investments in infrastructure improvements andsoil decontamination were long overdue, and there was a sense that their funding was postponedso that they could be included in the plan.75The evolution of the three policy fields ends with the 1990 plan. Community input throughCREESOM played an important role in the fruition of the plan, as did Mayor Dore's preferencefor holistic solutions to economic problems (Harris 1990). The plan was heralded by cityofficials, who said that "[the Canal Enterprise Park] will attract up to 8000 workers to the areawhen companies move into the new buildings" (Ibid.). Community organizations were morereserved, and expressed concern whether the new jobs would go to the inhabitants; there waspraise, however, for the investments in housing, infrastructure and decontamination (Pare1990c). At the very least, thirty years of piecemeal efforts had now been joined into one masterplan for redevelopment.The next chapter will look at the strengths and weaknesses of the policies, their impacts onthe Southwest, as well as their evolution, relations to theory, and implications.76CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION, EVOLUTION AND SYNTHESISOF POLICY4.1^Introduction to the Policy AnalysisThis chapter will evaluate the impacts and evolution of urban policies on Southwest Montreal.Policy, as defined in chapter 1, is a dynamic process, a course of action. Policy also includesthe inaction of decision-makers, as Ham and Hill (1984) explain: "the concept of nondecision-making has become increasingly important in recent years, and it has been argued that muchpolitical activity is concerned with maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to theexisting allocation of values" (12). Moreover, policy may serve a purely symbolic role, asrhetoric as opposed to action (Ibid., 16).Policy analysis is difficult to define. Dye (1976) puts forth that "policy analysis is finding outwhat governments do, why they do it, and what differences it makes" (1). Policy analysis is notpolitical science, because the latter explores the structures and institutions of government andthe former is concerned with what government do (Ham & Hill 1984, 5). Policy analysis isinterdisciplinary in its scope (Ibid., 11).Policy analysis may be divided into two categories: analysis of policy and for policy (Ibid.,4). The analysis of policy is more an academic endeavour, while analysis for policy is an appliedexercise to deal with issues of current importance (Ibid.). Ham and Hill (1984) provide sevenvarieties of policy analysis, the first three which deal exclusively with analysis of policy: studiesof policy content, process and outputs (8). The evolution of policy on the Southwest (section 4.3)is a study of policy content, which traces the development of policies and their results (Ibid.).The fourth typology is evaluation studies or impact studies, and is the method of analysis usedin section 4.2 (Strengths and Weaknesses of Policies). These studies "evaluate the impactpolicies have on the population" (Ibid.). The remaining three varieties analyze for policy, and77include information for policy making, process advocacy, and policy advocacy (Ibid.).Analysis will be at the macro-level, examining the role of the state (at three levels) inaffecting the Southwest. It is assumed that the analysis is not value-free. Three types ofgovernment intervention will be analyzed: intended and deliberate policies with direct impacts;unintended policies with direct impacts; and the lack of policies, the inaction of governments.The purpose of the evaluation will be to explicitly link the case study policies with the theoriesof inner-city change and conditions.The impacts of the policies will be evaluated according to a number of criteria. The criteriaare linked to the theories of inner-city change presented in chapter 2 and to McLemore, Aassand Keilhofer's (1975) four types of inner cities (see page 12). The first criterion is whether thepolicy was a factor of decline (loss of population, decreasing socio-economic status, worseningphysical conditions, increasing tenancy). For example, the Victoriatown renewal led to a declinein the housing stock and population. The second is whether the policy was a factor of stability(stable population, socio-economic status, physical conditions etc.). Stabilizing policies aimedat stoping decline or consolidating a revitalized area. For example, the late 1970s programmes(PIQA, PRAIMONT etc.) were designed to stabilize the declining inner cities both in economicand demographic terms. The third is whether the policy was a factor of revitalization (increasingsocio-economic status, improving physical conditions). For example, several of the policieswithin the 1990 plan aim at re-industrializing the Southwest. Since several policy impacts do notclearly fall into these categories, the criteria are organized along a continuum. For example,expressway construction is clearly a factor of decline, but the Petite Bourgogne renewal wouldbe in some ways be a factor of decline (loss of population, influx of public housing etc.) andstability (renewed housing stock). The 1990 plan falls between stabilization and revitalization.78It is assumed that impacts will be evaluated in terms of the majority of the population, whichhas always been predominantly poor and working-class. Thus, policies which promoterevitalization may potentially be harmful to large segments of the population. The consistencyof the policies (Leung 1985, 68-80) will also be a factor in the evaluation. For instance, policiesmay be inconsistent in their internal logic, including inconsistent assumptions and concepts,values, information and point of view.4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the PoliciesThis section evaluates important policies (transportation, housing, economic/industrial in thatorder) which impacted upon the Southwest. The three factors (decline, stability, revitalization)will be covered first. The conclusion will provide an overview of the roles the three levels ofgovernment played in policy intervention.4.2.1 Factors of Decline. The purpose here is to link theory of inner-city decline with the casestudy. Centrifugal forces in the form of deindustrialization were certainly present in theSouthwest. The decline of the Southwest, from a centre of Canadian industry to an inner cityin distress, occurred over a few decades (1940s to 1970s). The economic forces which led to thisdecline are well-known: decentralization of industry, obsolescence, and changes in manufacturingprocesses. Bourne's (1978) pull factor, structural change and obsolescence explanations forinner-city decline all conform with the Southwest's experience.Policy furthered decline in several instances. The construction of expressways led todemographic, physical and socio-economic decline in the Southwest. The intention of theautoroutes was to provide CBD access and to "clean up" the city; the Victoriatown renewal isa case in point. The first two expressways, the Bonaventure (10) and Autoroute 15, caused somedamage to the urban fabric of the neighbourhoods, notably the latter's infringement through Cote79St.Paul. Since the 1966 construction, De l'Eglise street has suffered noise and atmosphericpollution, which has lowered property values (Auger et al. 1992, 13). Moreover, the section tothe east of the autoroute became more difficult to access (Ibid.). Last, there are few means withwhich to access the two expressways from the Southwest: there are two ramps to the 15, andonly one to the 10. The overall effect has been to further isolate the inner city.The Ville-Marie Autoroute (720) was particularly negative in its effects, as numerousdemolitions occurred before and during construction. The autoroute's right of way crossedresidential areas for the most part. If the other two expressways were somewhat justified giventhe upcoming Expo '67, the 720 was less so because it expressly involved the destruction ofhousing and the disruption of the inner-city fabric (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 33). The demolitionof housing in poor neighbourhoods, in itself negative, also implied that those who had to relocatewere the least equipped to do so (Ibid., 39). The 720 cut through some of the densest andpoorest neighbourhoods in Montreal, reduced the stock of affordable housing in theseneighbourhoods, and again served to isolate the inner city. Top-down planning and a thoroughlack of public input were common themes to all three expressways. Commercial activity alongNotre Dame street in St. Henri never recovered from the disruptive effect of the 720 on itsclients, so that the Revi-Centre intervention became necessary.Bourne's (1978) unintended policy hypothesis is somewhat useful in explaining theSouthwest's decline, especially with regard to the expressway policies. These unintended policies"were designed to achieve other results and objectives, such as transportation improvements, butwhen combined have had the side-effect of creating or accelerating many of the traditional inner-city problems" (36). The construction of highways in the Montreal CMA, between 1955 and1975, totalled 400 kilometres, and between 1966 and 1979 24 000 hectares of land were80developed (Quebec 1990, 77). The industrial and demographic decentralization of Montrealcould not have occurred without the highway construction. The unintended effects of this policywas urban sprawl and the diminution of the City of Montreal's importance: in 1951, the city had67.8% of the CMA's population, and in 1986 the proportion had dropped to 35.1 % (Ibid.). Thespecific impacts on the inner city are impossible to measure, but they were certainly direct. Forexample, many of the industries which left the Southwest moved to locations along suburbanhighways (CREESOM 1989, 31). Moreover, by neglecting the inner city and supportingsuburban housing, public policy unintentionally disfavoured inner-city locations (Quebec 1990).A large measure of policy intervention in the Southwest between 1963 and 1972 consisted ofurban renewal. Urban renewal was supposed to improve the physical and social conditions ofinner-city residents, and to provide them with affordable housing (CREESOM 1989, 271). Thereverse occurred in the Victoriatown renewal: the city destroyed an affordable and safeneighbourhood, and did not build housing elsewhere to replace it.The destruction of Victoriatown was relatively easy, because its location was isolated andevidently undesirable. The displacement of the residents was difficult, as apparent in a 1966 Cityof Montreal report on the fate of relocated inhabitants. It was found that former residents ofVictoriatown paid 27% higher rent and 50% higher room rent, 46% found that the new housingwas worse, and 59% said that the new rents were too high (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984,31). Residents were bitter about the forced relocation: one inhabitant of 33 years said that "itwill be difficult for me to try to adapt to adapt to another district. Why couldn't they just let uslive in peace instead of forcing us to move out and disperse ourselves throughout the city?"(Ibid., 35). The irony is that the project did not attain one of its objectives, which was to placatelobby groups calling for renewal; ironic as well is the current state of the land, vacant for the81past fifteen years, and worth less in 1981 than in 1962, according to CMHC (Melamed 1981,169).The Petite Bourgogne renewal project, although far broader in scope and more well-intentioned, produced similar negative impacts. Two negative impacts were readily apparent.The first was the impoverishment of the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood: in 1961,10% of the population was on social assistance, while in 1971 the proportion had increased to40% (CREESOM 1989, 277). This was due partly to the introduction of public housing, butmore importantly to the numerous demolitions which led to an out-migration of theeconomically-mobile inhabitants, who could afford to house themselves in other areas of the city(Ibid.). These wealthier inhabitants could not return to Petite Bourgogne after the demolitionsbecause their earnings were too high for purposes of public housing (Ibid.).The second impact was the massive tear in the fabric of the neighbourhood, both physical andsocial, between 1966 and the early 1980s. In effect, population dropped by half between 1966and 1981, as did the housing stock (Melamed 1981, 171). Older housing almost disappeared:only 20% of the 1991 housing stock had "survived" the renewal period (built pre-1960) (Canada1992). In particular, Drapeau's opposition to public housing created a lag in the years 1966 to1969, when demolitions were occurring without any subsequent construction of low-rentalhousing, thereby displacing poor residents to other neighbourhoods (Melamed 1981, 167). Thisprocess did not improve greatly in the 1970s, due to federal restraint, and the renewal area hadthe look of a "perpetual building site" (Barcelo 1988, 36).Zoning policy was detrimental in demographic terms to the Southwest. The rezoning ofGriffintown, from residential to industrial, displayed a lack of respect for the existingneighbourhoods, and illustrated the powerlessness of the neighbourhood vis-a-vis the top-down82and centralized authority of the Drapeau administration. The rezoning was, however, consistentwith the rational planning model of the 1960s which enabled other uses to encroach upon the so-called "zone in transition". As previously noted, industrial uses encroached on residential usesto the detriment of the existing population. One Griffintowner related that "maybe the place waskind of falling apart, but it wasn't a bad place to live. When you were born there and you goback and see all the parking lots, it hurts" (Gabeline, Lanken & Pape 1974, 74). Several of thehouses which currently exist in the industrial zones are non-conforming, which means it isdifficult to replace, upgrade or add to the housing stock. There have been recent spot rezoningsin Griffintown which allow for residential uses, but the new dwellings are exclusively upscalehousing for CBD workers (Sevigny 1992).It should also be realized that both St.Henri and Point St.Charles are characterized by non-conforming residential and industrial uses, conflicts in land use which the city has yet to resolve.Moreover, current zoning along the canal is outdated by thirty years: "la reglementation actuelleen matiêre d'industrie souffre de l'absence totale de controle de la forme du developpement; onne retrouve aucune norme en termes de hauteur, de densite ou d'implantation. Il va sans direqu'en l'absence de normes elementaires, on ne retrouve aucune exigence en termes de qualitedes constructions" (City 1991b, 19). As well, the 1980s rezonings along the canal to enablehousing (condominiums) angered many community groups who wanted the area to remainindustrial and non-speculatory (Sevigny 1992).Bourne's (1978) exploitation hypothesis is useful in explaining part of the Southwest's decline.The city is "manipulated" to suit certain groups, while those who are less powerful have lessinput. As Bourne notes, "everyone knows that the problem with the central cities is thatdecisions made on their behalf are not made by people who live there" (40). In Drapeau's83Montreal, the inner city had no voice at all, given autocratic rule and a declining population.Any study of the policies of decline must also include the fiscal poverty of Montreal over the1970s, when overspending on the Olympic Games was a significant drain on the (decreasing)revenues. In particular, infrastructure was ignored (Picard & Gibbon 1993). In the 1980s, facedwith increasing inter-urban competition, Montreal tried to cut back on programs and services,which could only be detrimental to the Southwest (St.Cyr 1992).The policies of neglect and decline may be construed by many inner-city inhabitants as beingpurposeful and willful. One Point St.Charles resident in the 1970s had this opinion: "I thinkthere's somebody up in City Hall who's decided to keep this area poor" (Gabeline, Lanken &Pape 1974, 75). In a sense, some governmental action may have additionally burdened theSouthwest. Many of the 1960-1979 policies worsened the overall decline, by demolishinghousing, displacing significant amounts of residents and isolating by way of expressway. It wasnot until the 1980s did policy begin to consistently benefit the Southwest.It may be argued that the Southwest's decline was caused to a not insignificant extent byneglectful and negative governmental policies. The decline may also have been partly caused bythe direct but unintended impacts of housing and transportation policies which encouraged sprawlto the detriment of the inner city (Bourne 1978, 70). It should not be assumed, therefore, thatthe Southwest's decline was natural and inevitable, and that it had to have occurred at the timeit did.4.2.2. Factors of Stability. Factors of stability contribute to the improvement in livingconditions of the inhabitants. Policies which maintained population levels and population mix,and which stabilized physical conditions and socio-economic status are included. Policies servedmainly to stop the decline in situ and to stop decline from spreading.84Transportation improvements, which were needed in part to counter the isolating effect of theexpressways, were slow in implementation. Accessibility was markedly improved by the adventof the Metro stations (Sijpkes 1990, 187). Truck traffic remains a problem, however, as is theaccess to the CBD and between neighbourhoods (Sevigny 1992). It is of note that someimprovements came directly from local community action, such as the #59 bus, which links thesouthern half of Point St. Charles (below the tracks) with the upper half along the canal.A stabilizing factor in the Petite Bourgogne renewal was the large quantity of public housingwhich was constructed between 1969 and 1980. No other neighbourhood in Montreal containssuch a high proportion of housing protected from market forces, with 51 % of the 1986 stocklow-rental in nature and a further amount as cooperatives. The drawback to this situation is thatPetite Bourgogne has become somewhat a ghetto for the poor, exactly the opposite of what wasintended in 1966 (Melamed 1981, 173).The policies of public housing, as well as subsidized housing renovation and NIP, werebeneficial in that the housing stock was renewed, improved and stabilized. NIP was not opento public input, however, and had more the characteristics of the housing renovation program.Though insufficient to completely allay the housing problems of the inner city, the programswere instrumental in ameliorating the living conditions of the inhabitants (Linteau 1992, 518).One negative impact of the renovation policy was the rise in value of the improved housing, aswell as a rise in rents. This impact had the effect of displacing the poorest from theneighbourhoods while attracting more affluent outsiders (Dansereau 1987, 63).Cooperative housing was also beneficial to the Southwest, as it enabled community groups tocontrol a portion of the overall housing policy. Specifically, co-ops ensured protection from theworst excesses of the market, and allowed former residents of the neighbourhoods to return in85an affordable manner (Sevigny 1992). The 1990 plan was applauded by many communitygroups, because the investments in the housing stock would further improve the living conditionsof the inhabitants (Ibid.). By promoting cooperatives, the plan took into account the fact thatmany successful inhabitants had to leave the Southwest because they could no longer qualify forpublic housing (Ibid.). To a large extent, housing policy has improved since the 1960s periodof renewal. The continuous upgrading of the housing stock, however, through renovations, NIPand Operation 20000 Logements, has made it difficult for some inhabitants to remain in theirneighbourhoods, unless they live in the 25 % of the housing stock which is protected from marketforces.The post-Olympic shift to neighbourhood stabilization was a welcome change from theintrusive and non-specific planning of the 1960s and 1970s. Physical amelioration, a commonpolicy response to decline among city governments, was aimed at improving the commercial,industrial and residential qualities of inner-city neighbourhoods. Decline was slowed by much-needed infusions of public funds. The impacts of several of the programs, such as Revi-Centreand PIQA, were beneficial in terms of physical infrastructure; of course, in the late 1970s, anysupport from the city was considered helpful. Both programs featured little public input. Forexample, Point St.Charles residents tried to prevent the rebuilding of a non-conforming industrialbuilding within the confines of a PIQA zone, but were denied by CIDEM (Macor 1982, 123-4).The PRAIMONT program, supported by PROCIM, aimed at refurbishing old industrial sites,is another example of physical amelioration. The program reflected the city's belief that someinner-city industrial land should be retained as well as improved. The effects of PRAIMONTon the land market are not entirely known. It is understood that this governmental intervention,occurring due to a lack of private investment in the inner city, tends to inflate land prices and86distort the real worth of the land, because the city needs to recoup its spendings (St.Cyr 1992).Finally, given the footloose nature of modern capitalism, it will take more than physicalimprovement to lure industry into the inner city (CREESOM 1989, 268).Stabilization policies have been disproportionately used in the Southwest. If there are manywho feel the Southwest has been neglected, there has still been significant policy interventions:with 5.4% of Montreal's population, the Southwest has 12% of cooperative housing, 21 % ofgovernment-supported housing renovations, 20% of the public housing, 16.5% of the 20000Logements, two of four PRAIMONTs, five of eleven PIQAs, and four of twenty Revi-Centreinterventions. Public policy has evidently followed the strategy of enriching existing areas inneed, a common policy initiative in North America since the 1960s (Ley 1983, 359). Althoughdifficult to measure the effects of stabilizing policies, there were no significant population lossesin the Southwest in the 1980s.4.2.3 Factors of Revitalization. Theories on gentrification and economic revitalization will belinked to policies. Policies which increased the socio-economic status and improved physicalconditions are considered as revitalizing.The impacts of the revitalization of the Lachine Canal have generally been positive. Despitethe difficulties encountered with issues of water quality and industrial abandonment, the "LachineCanal is already Montreal's classic example of how an abandoned, underused environment canbe recycled for positive urban use" (Williams 1990, 69). The industrial heritage along the canal,certainly the most extensive in Canada, has not been sufficiently protected from redevelopmentor demolition, but has survived to this day due to the low demand for its sites (Legault 1991,10). This situation is changing, however, as rezonings and city-supported industrialredevelopment put pressure on the land.87The Operation 20000 Logements produced less beneficial impacts to the majority of theinhabitants of the Southwest. It should be noted that the program was consistent with itsobjectives, which were to promote housing in the city, repopulate inner-city areas, and focusattention on the private market as a means of urban redevelopment. The program built a totalof 19634 dwellings, developed 700 vacant lots, and 40% of those attracted were non-residentsof Montreal (Quebec 1990, 79). Further, between 1976 and 1981, for every new household inthe city two were created in the suburbs, while between 1981 and 1986 the ratio was more even(Ibid.). In the Southwest, many vacant lots were developed, and repopulation occurred in all thefive neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the clientele were generallywealthier, and the new housing raised property values (CREESOM 1989, 276). By enticingmiddle-class (and mostly empty-nester) households to locate in the inner city, the city was ineffect subsidizing gentrification, or at least supplying the conditions for it. Land which couldhave been used for public housing was taken up by the program. In Petite Bourgogne, a thirdof the land originally entitled for public housing was instead used for the program, a decisionwhich contradicted the 1966 plan, with its objective to preserve the social milieu of theneighbourhood (Melamed 1981, 173). The "back to the city" approach of the program wasevidently short on social equality (Barcelo 1988, 38).The supply-side explanation of gentrification acknowledges that government policy may createthe conditions for upgrading to occur. Four policies are relevant: the Operation 20000Logements, CBD development, the Lachine Canal revitalization, and zoning changes along thecanal. Only the first and fourth policies were deliberately implemented to supply the conditionsfor gentrification. CBD development, heavily promoted by Drapeau in the 1950s and 1960s, wasa key factor in the explosive growth of core employment, which increased the demand for inner-88city housing. The Lachine Canal revitalization unintentionally promoted gentrification: "the canalhas...received park designation and the creation of bicycle trails and open space offer a positiveexternality to the new middle class" (Ley 1992, 241). Demand for this upgraded space made the1980s zoning changes along the canal necessary. It is evidently difficult to separate market forcesfrom policy initiatives, but it should be understood that the two were interrelated in some of theupgrading of the Southwest.The 1990 plan is expected to have several beneficial impacts. First, the Southwest's uniquecharacteristics have been respected in terms of housing, transportation and commercial policies.The physical improvement of the canal will continue, and the problem of decontamination willbe addressed. Re-training and community development has been emphasized. Sufficient evidenceof public support, including initial physical improvements, has attracted some private sectorfunding, an almost impossible feat since extensive disinvesting began in the 1950s. Loans havebeen provided for industries in situ. Community groups have received funding so that the planmay more closely follow the desires of the residents. Ultimately, the decline of the Southwestis being addressed by all levels of government at the same time.The Technoparc, a high-technology industrial park along the Bonaventure Autoroute, is stillin its early stage. There has already been extensive praise and criticism. The location of theTechnoparc is excellent, being in close proximity to the CBD, the Champlain Bridge, severalMontreal universities, and to middle upper-class Nun's Island. The site is completely new,having never been intensively used, so that problems of decontamination and obsolete buildingsare few. Drawbacks include the lack of potential for significant employment creation, especiallyfor the residents of the Southwest: "the City of Montreal has hitched its wagon of economicdevelopment to the high-tech horse despite its lack of promise for real, long-term job creation"89(Shragge 1991, 32). The policy of investing significant public funds into a project which is riskyat best (most high-tech industries prefer to locate near the airport) is inconsistent in such adepressed area; there is little chance that unemployed and untrained workers from the Southwestwill benefit (Duhamel 1992, 30). Given inter-urban competition, however, the City of Montrealfelt it was necessary to attract high-technology firms as a priority (St.Cyr 1992).Job creation is another policy which is rather ambiguous in its impacts. The 1989 CREESOMReport noted that close to 85 % of all workers in the Southwest District did not live there (117).Labour is mobile, and few people live and work in the same neighbourhood (Duhamel 1992,34). Job creation programs in the Southwest could conceivably lead to an exodus of qualifiedworkers who no longer wish to live in substandard neighbourhoods (Sevigny 1992). Moreover,job creation tends to create employability and not jobs (CREESOM 1989, 144). The entirequality of life of the Southwest must be addressed if qualified people are to be retained.Potential impacts also focus on the Canal Enterprise Park. The governmental efforts to attractnew industries to the area may prove difficult, despite governmental subsidies and loans, becauseof the costs of decontamination, the lack of space available, and the monopolistic control of theindustrial land market by SODIM (Duhamel 1992, 34). Land prices for the Canal EnterprisePark, together with decontamination costs, remain above many suburban industrial parks (Ibid.).Given these constraints and the lack of space for expansion, it is likely that only high-techcompanies and those seeking incubation sites will desire to locate in the Enterprise Park (St.Cyr1992). Unfortunately, Griffintown is both cheaper and closer to the CBD. As well, if high-techindustry is actually attracted, it is difficult to conceive it will provide jobs to theneighbourhoods: the city is promoting a high-prestige, high-tech industrial park in low-incomeinner cities where the local labour pool is insufficiently trained (Duhamel 1992, 34). The city90may indeed be dreaming if they expect a surge of industries to return to Point St.Charles orSt.Henri, given the current recession and a glut of developable industrial land on the Island ofMontreal (Ibid.). Perhaps the city should, before spending public funds on industrialsubsidization, remember the lesson of St.Henri, which went bankrupt in 1905 in its attempts toattract industry.The case study does not contradict the contention of Filion and Bunting (1988), that policycannot initiate societal changes in the inner city. Policy can, however, have significant impacts,both deliberate and unintentional, on the changing inner city. Policy can create the conditionsfor inner-city decline, stability and revitalization. The inaction of governments to address theSouthwest's decline was also significant.4.2.4 Levels of Government. The federal government, over the thirty year period, has playeda largely behind-the-scenes role in impacting upon the Southwest. Few interventions wereexclusively undertaken by the federal government, save for the Lachine Canal revitalization.Instead, Ottawa tended to legally enable and financially support policies, such as urban renewal,NIP, expressways and housing renovation. This support was given either directly to the city orthrough the Province of Quebec. The 1990 plan was further evidence that the federal governmentis willing to support urban regeneration in the Southwest in a partnership capacity.Federal policy has been, however, uncoordinated, implicit and fractured, not surprising giventhe historic state of Canadian urban policy (Artibise & Kiernan 1988, 11). For most of theperiod, federal policy was entirely passive and non-specific to the Southwest. Pro-active policies,such as job creation programs tailored for the Southwest, were not implemented until the 1990plan.91The provincial government was also relatively absent from policy implementation of a specificnature on the Southwest. Apart from the expressway construction, the province did not undertakeany direct policies until the 1990 plan. Implicitly, however, the province supported peripheraldevelopment (to the detriment of the inner city) in the 1960s and 1970s through highwayconstruction, while in the 1980s a more centralizing policy was followed (for example, supportfor the 20000 Logements). The provincial government tended to allow Montreal a free hand inmuch of urban policy matters, particularly before the Olympic Games debacle (Barcelo 1988,37). In the 1960-76 period, the provincial government supported Drapeau in order to"demonstrate the Liberals' pro-urban, pro-Montreal leanings, to provide some tangiblemonuments for both the city and provincial new orders, and to bolster Drapeau in his battle withthe old guard and the local remnants of Duplessis' army" (Kaplan 1982, 414) 4 .Overall, the provincial government, as well as the federal government, ignored Montreal'sdecline in the 1970s. Despite the warnings of the Higgins-Martin-Raynauld report of 1970,which pointed to the fragility of Montreal as a development pole in Quebec and Canada, "bothgovernments have, since 1970, concentrated their regional development policies on the rest ofthe province. What little attention was paid to Montreal was in an irregular fashion" (Canada1986, 15). Moreover, "governments have failed to recognize the role played by Montreal,particularly in the economy of Quebec. Montreal is the only city in the province that could layclaim to the role of development hub" (Ibid., 29). Large-scale infrastructure tended to be locatedoutside of the city, such as Mirabel Airport, while the province concentrated on peripheraldevelopment. Marcel Sêvigny, current councillor for Point St.Charles-Petite Bourgogne,4 The "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec, beginning in 1960 with the Liberal government of Jean Lesage, wasa movement against the stifling reign of Premier Duplessis (1944-59). At the urban level,Drapeau initially symbolized the forces of this reform (see Barcelo 1988 for further discussion on urban politicsin post-1960 Montreal).92corroborated this evidence by complaining of the lack of federal and provincial leadership inurban affairs by those elected from the Southwest. The city lacks a clear voice in the higherlevels of government and is hampered by a disjointed regional system (Picard & Gibbon 1993).The local level, and specifically the City of Montreal, has played an active role inpolicymaking on the Southwest. Despite Drapeau's non-interventionist stance prior to 1978, thecity was unafraid to infringe upon the inner city, through renewal projects, public housing andrezonings. These interventions were usually for some ulterior motive, such as CBD developmentor the upcoming Expo '67. After 1978, the city implemented programs which were specific todeclining inner cities, such as PRAIMONT, PIQA, Revi-Centre, Operation 20000 Logementsand others. The city was financially supported by higher levels of government but was givenfreedom of policy formulation and implementation. At the neighbourhood level, input wasextremely limited until Dore's entry in 1986. Drapeau was against local interests and parochialinterests running city policy, and as a consequence local elected officials were consistentlyunable to express the wishes of their constituencies (Kaplan 1982, 408).In conclusion, local government played the most important policy role, although higher levelsof government could take precedence and did on several occasions (Lachine Canal, Ville-MarieAutoroute). Local autonomy in policymaking was significant but was of little benefit to inner-cityneighbourhoods. Strengths and weaknesses of policies ran the spectrum from highly negative(expressways) to fairly positive (1990 plan).4.3 Evolution of PoliciesThis section will outline, characterize and delineate four distinct periods of policymaking onthe Southwest.934.3.1 1960-1972: Period of Infringement.  This period was characterized by rationalist top-downplanning from the city, province and the federal government. In particular, Drapeau was at hismost powerful, winning every municipal election (1960, 1962, 1966, 1970) by large margins.Drapeau focused most of his attention on CBD development and the World's Fair. Interventionsin the inner city were of secondary importance, unless they contributed to the abovementionedpriorities. Policy in the inner city concentrated on expressway construction and urban renewal.The declining Southwest economy received scant attention, as Drapeau fully expected the grandsprojets to sustain the city. This approach evidently "ignored the concerns of ordinary citizens,especially the poor. There was no large program of housing construction, and there was littleattention to employment, retraining, and other programs for the unemployed" (_,eveillee &Whelan 1987, 157).Montreal had a ward system during this period, but despite its existence neighbourhoodconcerns were rarely met. Drapeau insisted on party solidarity and discipline; the city wasessentially run by two men, Drapeau and Lucien Saulnier, President of the Executive Committee(Sancton 1983). Drapeau had been elected in 1960 on a wave of reform but instead institutedhighly-centralized control. Given continued electoral support, Drapeau saw no reason shift hispolicies. The single-minded urban policies of this period were more than just neglectful; theirimplementation "was unnecessarily and willingly ruthless for the lower-income groups,particularly in the Central Area and its peripheral districts" (Barcelo 1988, 38). The 1960-72period may be summed up by this quote:94En investissant autant dans les grands projets, l'administration Drapeau est amen& anegliger certains besoins importants des citoyens et c'est la critique qui lui est le plusfrequemment adresse. Elle ne porte pas suffisamment d'attention a la gestion dudeveloppement interne de la ville et au controle de son amenagement. Les nombreusesdemolitions qu'entrainent les interventions publiques et celles des promoteurs privescontribuent au deperissement des zones anciennes. L'administration tarde a s'interesserau developpement des espaces verts et aux problemes de l'habitation. Elle n'est passuffisamment sensibilisee au declin economique de Montreal et au chomage qu'ilengendre et n'a d'autres solutions a proposer que les grands projets de prestige. (Linteau1992, 539)4.3.2 1973-1978: Period of Neglect.  This period was characterized by its paucity of policyinterventions. Notwithstanding the NIP in St.Henri North and the continued construction ofpublic housing (1200 units between 1973 and 1977), public policy was mostly passive in nature.Neglect on the part of Drapeau may be attributed to the 1976 Olympic Games: it is estimatedthat 120 000 units of low-rental housing could have been built for the cost of the Games, in thecity with the worst slums in Canada (Ley 1983, 300). Quebec City remained aloof, while thefederal government began to express interest in the Lachine Canal. The canal, which had falleninto disrepair after its closing in 1968, was deemed a National Historic Park in 1974 and Ottawabegan a process of planning for its revitalization. As well, federal interest and support in urbanaffairs and the inner city reached a high-water mark with NIP, RRAP, MSUA and the 1975McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer report.4.3.3 1979-85: Period of Stabilization.  The combined effects of the Olympic overspending, the1978 challenge to Drapeau's mayorship, and the early 1980s recession persuaded the City ofMontreal to shift its policy focus. In effect, after being "badly burned by the cost overruns andcorruption surrounding Drapeau's last development extravaganza -the 1976 Olympics- the cityshifted its redevelopment focus towards local concertation: the bringing together of communityactors to develop strategic, locally based revitalization plans" (Levine 1989, 144). The city95implemented Operation 20000 Logements, PIQA, Revi-Centre, PRAIMONT and PROCIM.CIDEM and SODIM were created. It should be noted that these programs did not offersubstantial public input, but were certainly an improvement from the diktats of the 1960-72period. Population losses were consolidated. In addition, the regional transit authority installedfive metro stations in the Southwest, thereby increasing accessibility and stability.The provincial government began to strengthen existing built-up areas as opposed to peripheraldevelopment, by subsidizing stabilizing city programmes. The federal government began inearnest the revitalization of the Lachine Canal with the 1979 Master Plan. The mandate wasgiven to Parks Canada to redevelop the shores and the waters of the canal.4.3.4 1986-1990: Period of Concerted Revitalization. The election of Jean Dore in November1986 represented a shift in inner-city policymaking in Montreal (Leveillee & Leonard 1988).Planning, public input and an open policy process became priorities. Although Dore continuedmany of the post-Olympic programs, he tailored policies to better suit inner cities in distress(Ibid., 145). In the East End of Montreal, suffering as well from economic decline, the cityimplemented a revitalization plan in conjunction with the Comitie pour la relance de reconomieet de l'emploi de l'Est de Montreal (CREEEM); in 1988, the city committed $90 million to theplan, and had persuaded Quebec City and Ottawa to spend a further $150 million (Ibid.). The1990 plan for the Southwest is similar in scope and is typical of Dore's support for public inputand concerted policy. It remains to be seen, however, if the 1990 plan can fulfil its loftier goalsof economic regeneration.Municipal and regional officials also set out to prioritize Montreal's economic strengths andweaknesses, in the Picard Report (1987) and the Regional Strategy for Employment Creation(1990) (Quebec 1990, 120). The 1990 plan reflected this shift by ensuring that the majority of96the funds would be spent on economic regeneration. The higher levels of government were moreinvolved in this period, as exemplified by the 1990 plan.In conclusion, policies on the Southwest have evolved significantly, from "zone in transition"infringement to comprehensive revitalization plans. The common thread throughout the thirty-year period was a general lack of direct federal and provincial intervention, significant localpolicymaking, and a neglect of neighbourhood input by the city. The next section discusses howthe case study is similar and different to the other inner cities in Canada.4.4 ComparisonsThe experience of the Southwest in inner-city Canada is both typical and unique. The declineof the Southwest was similar to other inner cities in Canada, such as the Winnipeg core area.The decline was perhaps more precipitous than elsewhere in Canada, however: a 50% populationdrop in twenty-five years, extensive disinvestment, and the absolute loss of 28000 jobs between1959 and 1988. Gentrification, pandemic across urban Canada, also occurred in the Southwest.Renewal in Strathcona in Vancouver (Lai 1988) may provide a counterpart to the Southwest. The1990 plan was similar in many respects to the Core Area Initiative in Winnipeg, especially inthe field of economic revitalization. The evolution of policy on the Southwest followed to anextent the national (federal) trend, which meant top-down renewal and "zone in transition"policies in the 1960s, NIP and RRAP in the 1970s (although lacking in public input), and large-scale revitalization in the 1980s. The rationalist planning method dominated the 1960s in theSouthwest no less than it did elsewhere in Canada.In comparing the Southwest to other Canadian inner cities, it was put forth that public inputand opposition was minimal. This is not to say that neighbourhoods in the Southwest did not97organize themselves when governmental action was lacking. The Southwest is one of the moreinstitutionally complete inner cities in Canada, with a myriad of community groups (CREESOM1989). In the late 1960s, under community pressure, the first non-profit housing cooperative inCanada to be subsidized by the state appeared in Point St.Charles (Sijpkes 1990, 187). In 1985,the first community economic development project in Montreal was initiated in Point St.Charles.The projects's main success "has been as a strong voice to pressure the municipal and provincialgovernments to inject money into the local economy" (Shragge 1991, 31). The project developedinto a district-wide organization called RESO (Regroupement Economique Sud-Ouest) andbecame, for the purpose of developing the 1989 report, CREESOM (Ibid.).The role of community development has been strongly supported by Marcel Sevigny, citycouncillor for Point St.Charles-Petite Bourgogne since 1986. He related in a 1992 interview thatthe Southwest must still lobby forcefully to receive public housing, cooperatives andinfrastructure improvements despite the openness of the Montreal policy field since 1986. Inaddition, the 1990 plan, formulated largely by local organizations, does not attempt to solve allof the Southwest's problems. Sevigny warned that the Southwest cannot depend on governmentfor its recovery, but rather on the strength of its community organizations. Policy on theSouthwest, Sevigny explained, must be formulated in the community and then lobbied to thegovernment, and no longer the opposite. He concluded by saying that the political power of theSouthwest has declined with its population, so that there must be community solidarity in orderto obtain governmental action.There are several factors which made the Southwest experience quite different from the restof Canada, although fairly similar to other Montreal inner cities. First, unlike many inner cities,such as Strathcona and the Winnipeg core area, few ethnic or racial groups populate the98Southwest. The clear majority of the population is either French or English (British Isles) inorigin, with a concentration of Italians in Cote St.Paul and blacks in Petite Bourgogne. Theethnic stability of the Southwest has changed little despite economic restructuring, massivedepopulation and extensive renewal. Few recent immigrants have made the Southwest theirhome. Second, the construction of expressways was more extensive and destructive than inprobably any other Canadian inner city. Third, the level of public input into planning and policyformulation was extremely limited, in direct contrast to the citizen movements in Strathcona(Melliship 1985) or the NIP experience in Toronto (Filion 1988). In particular, it was only inMontreal that NIP became an exercise in top-down planning. Fourth, this era of top-downplanning lasted much longer in Montreal, due to the influence of Drapeau.The Southwest may well have more in common with American inner cities, in terms ofdecline, neglect and highway construction, but is more Canadian in terms of crime rates andracial composition. The policies of decline which impacted on the Southwest were in many waysstronger and more negative than elsewhere in Canada. Southwest Montreal is unique as Canada'sfirst industrial neighbourhood and one of its worst slums; its "revitalization would provide theCanadian counterpoint to the gentrification of Harlem" (Ley 1992, 241).In conclusion, this chapter has evaluated the impacts of intended and unintended policies,traced their evolution, assessed the performance of the three levels of government, related thecase study to theories of inner-city change, compared the Southwest to other inner cities, andoutlined several policy implications. The final chapter will summarize the major findings of thethesis, speculate on future trends, and propose further areas of study.99CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION5.1 Summary of Findings and Policy ImplicationsThe study of inner-city public policy in Canada, using the case study of Southwest Montreal,has resulted in a number of findings. These findings deal with the evolution and impacts ofpublic policy on the changing Canadian inner city, as well as the specific lessons which may bederived from the Southwest Montreal experience.The case study brought out the following findings regarding the evolution and impacts ofpublic policy on the inner city:1) The changes in public policy on the inner city have been significant, from 1960s top-down planning to 1990s public participation, as evidenced by renewal and expresswayconstruction in the 1960s to more participatory and holistic revitalization plans in the1980s and 1990s.2) The evolution of public policy is affected by many factors, including a powerful localauthority, differing policy responses to restructuring, and provincial-municipal relationswhich may make one city's evolution quite distinct from another.3) The direct and indirect but unintended impacts of policies cannot be ignored, as theymay have far-reaching effects on the inner city (decentralization and gentrification inparticular).4) The inaction and neglect of governments can be just as important as the action andattention of governments, especially to an inner city in decline.5) The effects and effectivenes of government are varied. Faced with urban structuralchanges, governments have been relatively ineffective, suggesting a dominant role ofmarket forces in shaping the inner city. It is also difficult to revitalize distressed areaswithout dislocating residents. Decline may be a wicked problem to solve -it is easier toameliorate the worst effects of decline. Governments are arguably, however, the singlemost important actor in the development of the inner city.6) Despite the fact that municipalities are creatures of the province, the local level ofgovernment may play the most important role in inner-city public policy.1007) Government action is not enough to initiate macro-societal change (household size,shifts in employment structures etc.) in the inner city, but is enough to promote decline,stabilization and revitalization in varying degrees. Government action may also serve todifferentiate conditions at the neighbourhood level: the generic decline of the Southwestin the 1960s became highly differentiated in the 1980s, with increasing revitalization inPetite Bourgogne, Griffintown and along the Lachine Canal, with stability/slow declinein the other neighbourhoods. Policy may in part explain these differences, especially the20000 Logements and the rezonings along the canal.8) Upgrading has occurred in the Southwest, despite decline, which tends to supportLey's (1992) thesis of pervasive and chaotic gentrification. Similarly, decline has becomedifferentiated among the neighbourhoods, compared to the more generic experiences ofthe 1960s and 1970s.9) The nexus between policy and inner-city change, and the impact of policy, is notalways clear-cut.10) The inner city performs specialized and changing functions within the city. Thesefunctions have frequently been ignored by policymakers, who have traditionally put forthpolicies which treat the inner city as a zone in transition.To conclude the analysis, it is important to understand both the role of public policy in theinner city, as well as the inner-city's place within the field of urban policy. Two general lessonsof the Southwest Montreal experience (1960-1990) may in part be summarized as follows: publicinput, if lacking, may prove disastrous to the locale, and that the failure of governments toaddress the real problems of the inner city in the post-industrial era (economic development,employment training and income maintenance) only furthers decline'. The post-industrial shiftis perhaps the greatest challenge facing the traditional inner city, and planning must somehowdeal with these new sets of economic and social parameters. The case study suggested that policyhas lagged behind the structural changes, and has not been capable of steering them in waysbeneficial to the inner city.5 See Gale ,D. 1984. Neighborhood Revitalization and the Post-Industrial City. A Multinational Perspective, chapter8 in particular.101Three general recommendations for future policy on Southwest Montreal are as follows:1) more public input is needed, especially in terms of economic revitalization.2) more attention should be paid to policies which stabilize the overall living conditions of theinhabitants. Councillor Sevigny was emphatic on this recommendation, stating that the majorityof the beneficial policies on the Southwest consisted of stabilization measures aimed at retainingresidents in their neighbourhoods. Most inhabitants, according to Sevigny, do not want to leavethe Southwest. Stabilization, at least to community groups and local politicians, is a means toan end in itself.A caveat may be offered to the second recommendation. Long-term change behoovespolicymakers to not necessarily target "inordinate amounts of government economic assistance[stabilizing policies] -especially, capital improvements, housing rehabilitation, and newconstruction funds -to accommodate low- and moderate-income household needs in centralcities... [because] it may be short-sighted and a misallocation of funds" (Gale 1984, 165). Thiscaveat is based on an economic rationale; inordinate amounts of social assistance, for thepurposes of stability, would not be a misallocation of funds to neighbourhoods in distress.3) more attention should also be paid to policies which aim at economic regeneration, which wasobviously lacking for much of the Southwest's decline. Specifically tailored employmentprograms are a priority for an inner city in decline. Stable and healthy living conditions(recommendation 2) will ensure that those who do become employed need not leave thecommunity.5.2 Speculation on Future TrendsThe Southwest plan of 1990 concluded the study of policy evolution. There have been severalimportant policy documents which have appeared since the summer of 1990. In June 1991, LePlan des Abords du Canal de Lachine (Plan of the Lachine Canal Lands) was put forth by theCity Planning Department. It was the first specific plan for an area outside of the CBD, and hadbeen called for by community groups worried about the future of the canal (Sevigny 1992). Themandate of the plan was to explore and propose solutions to the stubborn problems of the canaland its neighbouring lands, such as zoning inconsistencies and industrial heritage sites, amongothers (City 1991a).The 1990 plan has been slow in proceeding, especially the Canal Enterprise Park. This torpormay be attributed to the recession and the high costs of soil decontamination (Ibid.). Moreover,102several private developers working with SODIM have dropped out, including Berma-Lalco(Ibid.).In the summer of 1992, the City of Montreal released its initial master plan for the city aswell as the eight districts, including the Southwest. The Southwest master plan to a large extentfollows the 1990 plan in terms of objectives and methods. Zoning controls were, however, muchimproved, and several problematic sites in the Southwest were specifically addressed, includingthe CN yards in Point St.Charles, the Atwater Market, the junction of Atwater St. withAutoroute 15, and several sites of industrial heritage (City 1992).Future trends in population are more difficult to ascertain, but tend to suggest an end todepopulation and a slow but steady increase in population in some, but not all, of theneighbourhoods. The economic makeup, however, of this increased population is uncertain butwill probably reflect gentrification in the neighbourhoods (Sevigny 1992). Social polarization,between protected housing and increasingly expensive rental accommodations, will probablycontinue and increase in Petite Bourgogne, Griffintown, and along the Lachine Canal. Theeconomic future of the Southwest is also unsure, given the present recession. Revitalizationamong decline, and increasing social polarization, may well be the future of the Southwest.5.3 Areas for Further StudyThe case study of Southwest Montreal may be useful in a comparative context. Potential areasfor further study include the following:1) a comparison between the 1990 Southwest plan and the 1981 and 1986 Winnipeg CoreArea Initiatives, focusing on the nexus between physical amelioration and socialdevelopment;2) a comparison between the revitalization of the Lachine Canal, as a former industrialsite, with others in Canada, including Granville Island in Vancouver;1033) a comparison of how declining inner cities in Montreal (Centre-Sud, Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, and even the City of Verdun) have been affected by public policy;4) a pan-Canadian description of how the decline of a city or a shift in the national urbanhierarchy affects the inner city; and5) to compare Southwest Montreal to an American inner city, or even a British one, tounderstand national differences in policies which address economic decline.In terms of non-comparative studies, the following may have been the focus of the case study:gentrification, industrial heritage planning, community economic development and input, and therole of the inner-city politician, among others. The 1987 OECD Report, entitled New Roles forCities and Towns, may also have offered an area for further study, to see if policymaking on theSouthwest has followed any of the Report's recommendations.In conclusion, the thesis has added to the understanding of public policy on the changingCanadian inner city. In particular, the impacts and evolution of public policy has been closelyexamined in the case study. Further study is needed in a comparative and non-comparativesense. The case study has shown that the inner city is a distinct entity, not a "zone in transition",and must be treated as such by policymakers; to paraphrase, "it would be depressing if innercities [cities] flourished only because someone or something endowed them with work" (TheEconomist 1986). The inner city is the nexus of many forces and changes, both political andeconomic in nature, and policy should reflect this characteristic.104BIBLIOGRAPHYArsenault, J.P. 1967. La Renovation Urbaine. 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CityMagazine 13: 30-34.Sijpkes,P. 1990. "The Four Lives of Point St.Charles." In Grassroots, Greystones and GlassTowers, ed. I. Demchinsky, 176-188. Montreal: Vehicule Press.Simard,M. 1991. La Revitalisation Urbaine dans Hochelaga -Maisonneuve. Master's thesis,McGill University.Smith,N. and P. Williams 1986. Gentrification of the City. London: Blackwell Press.Introduction.Stewart,D. 1993. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Case Study in Urban Regeneration.Ph.D. dissertation, University of B.C..The anatomy of cities: Huddling through. 1986. The Economist December 20: 69-81.Waste,R. 1989. The Ecology of City Policymaking. New York: Oxford University Press.Williams,R. 1990. "Recycling the Expo Lands and the Lachine Canal." In Grassroots,Greystones and Glass Towers, ed. I.Demchinsky, 61-69. Montreal: Vehicule Press.APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS1825-19591825^Lachine Canal opens1859^Victoria Bridge opens1887^St.Gabriel is annexed to Montreal1905^St.Henri and St.Cunegonde are annexed to Montreal1910^Cote St.Paul and Ville Emard are annexed to Montreal1951^Inner-city population peaks at 112 0001954^Dozois Plan1959^St.Lawrence Seaway is opened1960-1972 Period of Infringement 1960^Drapeau is re-elected1961^"Comprehensive Urban Renewal Study" presented to city1962^(November) Victoriatown Urban Renewal Study1962^Adoption of first municipal Housing Code1963^Zoning by-law #2875 adopted1963^(June) City Council approves acquisition of Victoriatown1964^(May) Victoriatown demolished1964^Montreal acquires Expo '67; highway plan approved1964^(December 24) Calls for action in Petite Bourgogne1965^Petite Bourgogne study1965^Lachine Canal filled in1966^Petite Bourgogne Renewal Report; renewal begins1966^First Metro stations open1966^(November) Autoroute 15 opens1967^(March) Bonaventure Autoroute opens1967^Montreal forms its own housing authority1967^Province of Quebec forms own housing authority (SHQ)1967^(April) Expo '67 opens1968^Renovation programme set up by City of Montreal1968^Lachine Canal closed to navigation1969^First public housing in Petite Bourgogne1970^Federal government begins to curtail renewal funding1970^Province goes ahead with Ville-Marie Autoroute1972^(November) Ville-Marie from Decarie to Guy completed1151973-1978 Period of Neglect1973^Federal government announces NIP and RRAP1974^NIP begun in St.Henri North, until 19771974^Lachine Canal transferred to Parks Canada, becomes National Historic Park1976^Olympic Games1977^Planning Department document on Southwest1978^Public housing construction in Petite Bourgogne ends1979-1985 Period of Stabilization1979^City initiates CIDEM1979^City initiates 10000 Logements1979^City initiates PIQA1979^Federal government unveils Lachine Canal master plan1981^City initiates SODIM1982^City initiates 20000 Logements1982^SODIM initiates PROCIM1982^Five new Metro stations open in the Southwest1982^Tracks removed from Petite Bourgogne1983^CIDEM initiates PRAIMONT1984^Co-op programme accelerated1985^PRAIMONT Bridge-Wellington and Cabot initiated1986-1990 Period of Concerted Revitalization1986^Inner-city population bottoms out at 54 0981986^Dore elected1986^Two enterprise zones initiated in the Southwest1987^Picard Report on Montreal's economic priorities1989^Initial plans for Technoparc1989^City overview of Southwest District1989^CREESOM Report delivered to city1990^(March 9) Revitalization plan unveiled by city1990^(May) Federal and provincial funding revealed1990^(November) Ville-Marie District Planpassed by City Council116117APPENDIX 2: SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON SOUTHWESTHousehold (Taken from 1986 Census)St.HenriPoint P.B. CoteSt. P.Griff.Number of households 6 255 5 340 2 850 7 025 505Average size of household(persons)2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9# of families 3 750 3 345 1 535 4 515 200% families with bothparents71.1% 67.5% 58.0% 79.0% 80.0%% single-parent 28.9% 32.6% 42.0% 21.0% 20.0%median total revenue $11500 $11100 $10500 $14500 $18700% households belowpoverty line62% 64% 64% 47% 48 %1981-86 % change in mediantotal revenue+19% +16% +30% +22% +45%% of households earning lessthan $1500061.0% 63.1 % 62.0% 52.0% 41.5 %% of households earningmore than $350006.0% 5.0% 10.7% 9.0% 19.8 %% of population above 15without grade nine education38.5% 40.9% 34.3% 35.8% 11.1%% of population withuniversity education10.7% 6.9% 19.4% 9.5% 41.5%Mother Tongue1. French2. English3. Others89%7%4%60%36%4%51%36%13%81%9%10%50.9%41.5%7.6%118Housing (Taken from 1991 Census)St.HenriPointSt.CharlesP.B. CoteSt.PaulGriff% Renters 87.5% 81% 71.5% 71% 54%% of housing built before 68.5% 57.5% 16.2% 36.1 % 22%1946% of housing built 1946- 8% 12.5% 3.8% 36.5% 8%1960% of housing built between 23.6% 30% 80% 27.4% 70%1961 and 1991Housing stock1. 1971 6385 5410 2510 6810 5752. 1976 5720 5090 1940 6875 4303. 1981 5775 5225 2060 6800 3504. 1986 6275 5345 2840 6910 5005. 1991 6495 5760 3670 7500 930Employment (Taken from 1989 CREESOM Report)St.HenriPoint P.B. CoteSt.P. GriffNumber of jobs 7980 8763 3570 3843 11778% Manufacturing 30.5% 32.5% 12.9% 26% 31.3%% Tertiary/others 55.6% 32.5 % 70.5 % 72 % 51.5 %% Transportation 12.9% 34.1% 16.6% 2% 17.7%Unemployment rate % 18.5 % 20.6% 20.3 % 13.1 % 17.3 %% Drop in manufacturingemployment 1981-198626.9% 24.5% 18.5% 31.0% 44.5%New employment 1981-88 1 845 795 846 559 3 112119


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