EVOLUTION AND IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE
CHANGING CANADIAN INNER CITY:
CASE STUDY OF SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-90

by

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We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April 1993

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ABSTRACT

The inner city has seen significant social and economic changes in the post-war period. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the evolution of public policy and its impacts on the changing Canadian inner city, between 1960 and 1990, by using a case study, that of Southwest Montreal. Southwest Montreal was Canada's first and longtime most important industrial area, and has suffered substantial decline since the 1950s. In order to set the context for the case study, it is necessary to outline the variety of the Canadian inner city, the socio-economic changes facing it, as well as the policy responses to these changes. The case study will trace the evolution of transportation, housing and economic/industrial policies between 1960 and 1990, and ascertain the impacts of these policies according to the theories of inner-city change (policy as factors of decline, stability, and revitalization). The policy input of the three levels of government (local, provincial and federal) will be covered. The case study will also be compared to other Canadian inner cities. It was found that public policy is an important, though not decisive, factor in inner-city change, and that policy has evolved significantly in the last thirty years.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Definitions

The concept of the inner city has traditionally been difficult to explain, much less define. Thus, the use of the term is largely implicit (Bourne 1978). Despite this ambiguity, certain areas that are understood as 'inner city' have frequently been the focus of significant social and economic change, as well as concerted planning efforts, public policy strategies and other types of government intervention. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution and impact of public policy in the context of the changing Canadian inner city, using a case study. It is hoped that a greater understanding of the inner city's place within the field of urban policy will result.

The difficult task of defining the inner city has long been a point of contention among academics. Many authors, such as Bourne (1978) and Ley (1991), argue that no reliable and absolute method with which to delineate the inner city exists. Despite these reservations, urban geographers and policymakers have attempted to conceptualize the inner city in both geographical and functional terms. Bourne's (1978) geographical concept of the inner city includes a central location, excluding the central business district (CBD). Johnston (1986) points to the inner city as the modern equivalent of the zone in transition put forth by the Chicago School of urban sociology: "a mixed area of industry, commerce and overcrowded, subdivided, dilapidated dwellings. Proximity to the [dynamic] centre makes the area attractive to business, reduces residential desirability, with a resulting influx of poor groups..." (530). Bunting and Filion (1988) conceive the inner city as including the CBD, as well as the medium to high density central city neighbourhoods which surround the core. The federal government in 1975 defined the location of the inner city as contiguous census tracts "between the central business
district and the suburbs" (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 2). In 1989, the government referred to the inner city as being "the core of the metropolitan area, which includes the site of the earliest development of the city, the ‘CBD’, and the surrounding areas of mixed land uses, with high density residential development" (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 10).

For the purposes of this thesis, the geographic definition of the inner city will include those built-up areas surrounding the CBD but not the CBD itself; that is, areas which are contiguous and/or in close proximity to the borders of the CBD. The CBD is the "nucleus of the urban area...[and] is associated with both the most accessible point in the city and its peak land value, with the densest land use" (Johnston 1986, 47). Many cities, including Montreal, delineate the CBD in their master plans. In order to fully define the inner city, however, it is also useful to give a functional definition.

Functionally, Bourne (1978) attempted to describe the inner city through the process and problem approaches. The process approach outlined the various innate characteristics of the inner city: older built environment, the aging of housing, obsolete infrastructure and industrial base, land use encroachment by CBD and transportation uses, and demographic transition to fewer family households (Ibid., 6). The problem approach emphasized the conditions of inner cities, such as declining economic base, high unemployment, loss of manufacturing jobs, loss of population, absolute poverty, and physical deterioration (Ibid., 9-10). He argued that the combination of the two approaches is what makes the inner city distinct, although each is different according to its particular social and political context (Ibid., 13).

The federal government in 1975 used housing stock age to functionally define the inner city: "a convenient definition of the inner city is then all census tracts where the percentage built before 1946 is more than double the metropolitan figure [based on the 1971 census]"
(McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 3). In addition, census tracts surrounded by such inner-city tracts were also included in the definition, even if they did not have old housing, while isolated inner-city tracts were excluded (Ley 1991, 313). Four types of inner cities were put forth according to their existing conditions: declining, stable, revitalizing, and massive redevelopment (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 5). In 1989, the federal government reverted to an older operational definition, in which the inner cities were compared between 1951 and 1986 using boundaries fixed in 1951 and based on the geographic definition described earlier (Ley 1991, 314). It was the opinion of some academics that the Ram, Norris and Skof (1989) definition was perhaps too narrow to be entirely useful (Ibid.).

For the purposes of this thesis, the functional definition of the inner city will include all contiguous areas to the CBD which had an earlier initial development than the metropolitan and city average. Initial development refers to the inclusion of the area into the urban fabric, not the original (rural) settlement. Inner-city census tracts and neighbourhoods which experienced important revitalization in the past thirty years, such as Petite Bourgogne in Montreal, will not be excluded using this definition. Moreover, all areas which are not necessarily contiguous to the CBD but which are in close proximity and fall under the initial development parameter will also be included. It is realized that the inner city can refer to declining areas surrounding the CBD, as put forth by Bourne (1978). Although this thesis will concentrate on such an area, it is not a defining characteristic of the inner city for purposes of this discussion. This concept will be discussed further in chapter 2.
Policy is defined as "a set of decisions and actions designed to achieve a desired state of affairs" (Leung 1985, 1). This definition has three elements:

1. there has to be a desired state of affairs;
2. there must be a conscious and purposeful undertaking of decisions and actions; and
3. there must be some sort of recognizable causal relationship between the desired state of affairs and the decisions and actions taken. (Ibid.)

A policy has objectives, strategies, and outcomes (Ibid., 29-31). Policies involve a course of action, a web of decisions (Ham & Hill 1984, 12). Public policy refers to actions which are taken by governments in the public realm, in order to provide a public good, foster competition, or alleviate negative externalities. Urban public policy is more difficult to characterize. Lithwick (1970) notes that despite the plethora of government policies which affect cities but are not specific to them, he concluded that "[urban policy] is [ideally] a broad concept distinguished by a comprehensive bundle of integrated policies that together constitute a full statement of goals for urban development" (173). Policies are included if they significantly affect the inner city.

1.2 Formal Problem Statement

Within the definitional framework of the inner city and public policy, the thesis question may be posed as such: What has been the evolution and impacts of public policy on the changing Canadian inner city between 1960 and 1990, and how does public policy relate to inner-city change? The first objective is to analyze the historical evolution of inner-city public policy and planning initiatives since 1960, using the case study of Southwest Montreal, and to ascertain the objectives, strategies and outcomes of these policies. A second objective is to evaluate the role of public policy in influencing recent inner-city change. Policy will include governmental actions which are significant to the inner city. The ultimate purpose of the thesis is to shed more light on the role and evolution that policy has taken in affecting the present-day Canadian inner city.
1.3 Methodology

In order to address the problem statement, six steps will be followed in sequential order:

1. Review the theoretical basis for policy initiatives in the inner city, specifically in the context of Canada, Quebec and Montreal. Provide a review of the theory of inner-city change and the conditions of inner cities. Outline an evolutionary study of public policy in the Canadian inner city. List the apparent gaps within both the theory and the empirical examples given, and explain how the case study will fill the gaps. Sources will include academic theory, policy documents and data.

2. Use the case study of Southwest Montreal as an inner-city area, outline its changes and current situation, and describe significant public policy trends between 1960 and 1990 according to the following fields of intervention: transportation, housing, and industrial and economic strategies (which include zoning). Each field will be dealt with separately and chronologically, and each field will have its political framework established. Sources will include planning documents, academic material, and interviews.

3. Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the policies on the case study area, according to the theories of inner-city change (policies as factors of decline, stability, or revitalization), as well as Leung's (1985) measure of policy consistency.

4. Provide an historical summary of the policies over the thirty-year period, and attempt to divide the case study into distinct periods.

5. Relate the case study to the theory presented in 2., and provide the policy implications of the case study.

6. Conclude with a summary of the thesis, speculate on future trends in both the case study and inner cities in general, and propose ideas for further research.

1.4 Scope and Organization

The scope of the thesis encompasses the evolution of public policy, its implementation, and its effects on change in the inner city. Public policy will be limited to what is reasonably significant to the inner city; an expressway causing expropriations and demolitions, public housing and renewal, important changes in zoning, and economic revitalization plans are all examples of important policies, while minor allocational policies (Peterson 1981), including 'housekeeping services' such as police, fire protection and sanitation, are clearly not. The
differentiation among the three fields of intervention will not always be clear-cut. For example, zoning and housing policies are frequently interrelated. In addition, it is understood that policy interventions and regulations and market forces are impossible to disentangle; "Regulations and markets, in effect, grew up together" (Logan & Molotch 1987, 28). Thus, public policy is sometimes difficult to discern. There exists an inherent limitation on the power of public policy to affect many business and household choices, especially in fields dominated by market forces, such as housing and employment creation.

The relevance of this thesis to planning and policy studies falls within three areas. The first is the relative paucity of historical studies on policy and planning in Canada. It would be relevant to specifically examine the evolution and impacts of public policy on the inner city, so that the historical basis of current policies are better understood. Second, inner cities, as distinct entities, may arguably "provide the fullest expression of the transition towards post-industrialism. Global trends become more apparent as the focus moves towards the...inner city" (Filion & Bunting 1988, 81). Given this potential significance, it is important to see how policy has dealt with the structural changes of the inner city. The third area of relevance focuses on the role of policy for inner-city change: Bunting and Filion (1988) claim that policy cannot "launch or arrest...[societal change] within the inner city as a whole" (20), but can only accelerate, steer or decelerate such changes. Societal change includes household size, employment structure, and other macro-societal variables. The case study of Southwest Montreal will be useful in evaluating this contention.

The organization of the thesis follows roughly the methodology outlined in 1.3. Chapter 2 will concentrate on public policy and the inner city in Canada, review the theory and examples of inner-city change from both centripetal and centrifugal perspectives, and provide the evolution
of public policy on the Canadian inner city. The chapter will be concluded with the apparent theoretical and empirical gaps.

Chapter 3 is the case study: following the establishment of Southwest Montreal as an inner-city area, a brief history will outline its founding, development and decline, as well as the current situation as of 1990. There will then be a short introduction to the policy context of Montreal during the study years (1960-1990), followed by each of the three fields (transportation, housing, and economic and industrial strategies, which include zoning) and their respective evolutions. Chapter 4 will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the policies on Southwest Montreal between 1960 and 1990 according to the theories of inner-city change, and present the historical evolution of these policies.

Chapter 5 is the conclusion. A summary of the findings of the thesis, followed by speculation of future trends for the case study and ideas for further research comprise the bulk of this chapter. The first of two appendices will provide a chronology of important events in the Southwest, particularly in the field of policy evolution. The second appendix will outline current socio-economic information.
CHAPTER TWO: THE CHANGING INNER CITY AND PUBLIC POLICY

2.1 The Inner City in the Canadian Context

The Canadian inner city has frequently been the subject of academic and government studies (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975; Filion 1987; Bunting & Filion 1988; Dansereau 1988; Ram, Norris & Skof 1989; Ley 1991). These works attempted to increase the social, political and economic understanding of the Canadian inner city. The purpose of this section is to describe the definitional context of the Canadian inner city, with a view to explore inner-city change and the role and evolution of inner-city public policy.

McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975), working for the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, outlined the first of three federal government definitions. The purpose of the definition was to better inform the federal government of the extent and conditions of the Canadian inner city (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 1). A further purpose was to gather information for the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), begun in 1973, and which was a fundamental shift in federal urban renewal (Ibid.). The definition included four characteristics: age of housing stock, (urban) form, location, and societal functions (Ibid., 2).

Typically, the Canadian inner city so defined had the oldest housing stock, the densest and most mixed land uses, was located between the core and the suburbs, and tended to be the first area of settlement for immigrant groups (Ibid., 4). As outlined in chapter 1, an inner-city census tract from the 1971 census had to contain double the percentage of dwellings built before 1946 than the metropolitan figure (Ibid., 3). For example, a Halifax inner-city tract would have to contain 70% of dwellings built before 1946, which was twice the metropolitan average (Ibid.). Overall, "these districts had populations ranging from 18 000 (St.John's) to 644 000 (Montreal), and accounting for between 10% and 24% of the metropolitan total" (Ley 1991, 314).
In 1979, Brown and Burke provided for a more flexible federal definition:

The task of identifying inner-city districts in the twenty-three census metropolitan areas (CMAs)...was delegated to local field officers, who were asked to employ the criterion of residential age but qualify it according to local considerations and perceptions. Overall, the inner city so defined comprised some 30% of the metropolitan population in 1971 and 25% in 1976. But with a less standardized classification, there was considerable departures from the mean and in 1976 the inner city, as defined....ranged from only 7% of the metropolitan population in Victoria to 40% in Montreal, a somewhat disturbing range. (Ibid.)

In 1989, the federal government turned to a narrower geographical classification of the inner city. The inner city included the core of the metropolitan area, that is the CBD and "the surrounding areas of mixed land uses" (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 10). Twelve metropolitan areas had their inner-city boundaries frozen and then compared between 1951 and 1986 (Ibid.).

These exercises in federal definition-making helped to uncover the remarkable diversity of the Canadian inner city. Although the various conditions of the inner city, as per McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975), are outlined in 2.2, it is important to understand how varied the Canadian inner city is. For example, it may be wealthy and exclusive in nature (Westmount in Montreal, Rosedale in Toronto), racially defined (Halifax’s North End), a settlement area for new immigrants (Strathcona in Vancouver), an ethnic neighbourhood (Park Extension in Montreal), ‘Skid Row’ (Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside), a destination for migrating aboriginals (Winnipeg’s inner city), upscale and gentrified (Cabbagetown in Toronto), as well as traditional working-class (Hochelaga in Montreal). There is no typical Canadian inner city, as there is no absolute method with which to delineate it.

Recent nationwide studies, however, have pointed to certain pandemic trends. The 1989 study, despite its limitations, noted the first increase in inner-city population (1981-86) since 1951. Data pointed to a concentration of the unmarried, the elderly, immigrants, a labour force in managerial and professional occupations, and childless couples in the inner city (Ram, Norris
& Skof 1989, 7-8). Moreover, in 1971, 17% of the inner-city population had some university education, compared to 14% in outlying areas, while in 1986 the figures were 36% and 23% respectively (Ibid., 7). Despite the changes to the inner city in terms of education and job skills, there remained a gap in income: "in 1970, the median income of inner-city families was 70% of that of families in the outlying areas....by 1985, it had dropped to 62%" (Ibid., 8), although inner-city income did rise absolutely in those years (Ley 1991, 318). Typically, older cities with declining populations and those particularly affected by economic restructuring had the poorest inner cities, including St.John, Quebec City, Montreal, and Winnipeg (Ibid., 327). These cities also suffered the most significant population losses (Ram, Norris & Skof 1989, 18).

To further characterize the Canadian inner city, it is useful to compare it to differences in the American inner city. Two variables are immediately apparent in contrast, poverty and race. In 1980, the U.S. average central city per capita income "represented 93.1% of that of the metropolitan areas, whereas in Canada (1981) the central city average represented 99.7%" (Mercer 1991, 54). The proportion of non-whites in U.S. cities "has been of an order of magnitude of six or greater than the corresponding level in urban Canada" (Ibid.). These two variables manifest themselves as the so-called urban underclass, as evidenced in cities such as Detroit, St.Louis, Philadelphia and Los Angeles¹. White flight, and the relative lack of medium or high-income residents in the core, accompanied by a devaluation of inner-city locations by industry and commerce, have produced inner cities different from those in Canada (Ibid.). Canadian inner cities are generally less polarized towards the outlying areas, due in large part to different urban policies, attitudes, ethnicity and historical development (Dansereau 1988, 99).

Ley (1991) pointed to the difficulty in explaining the crucial concept of inner-city diversity,

¹ For an extensive list of American urban pathologies, see M. Macdonald's *American Cities* (1984).
regardless of its location. The Canadian inner city is no exception: "a confusing mix of wealth and poverty...extremes of half-a-million dollar condominiums and renovated housing against the homelessness of at least 130 000 urban Canadians" (Ley 1991, 342). Section 2.2 will outline various inner-city conditions and examples across Canada in an effort to further describe this diversity.
2.2 Conditions of the Inner City

McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975) outlined four conditions of the Canadian inner city. The categories were "meant to reflect not just physical realities, but social and economic ones as well" (5). The table below sets the parameters of the four types:

Table 1: Dimensions of the Four Types of Inner Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Decline</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Revitalization</th>
<th>Massive Redevelopment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>continuing loss</td>
<td>no important losses or gains</td>
<td>little change</td>
<td>gain in population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
<td>decreasing</td>
<td>stable</td>
<td>increasing</td>
<td>increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td>increasing non-family &amp; elderly</td>
<td>maintaining population mix</td>
<td>maintaining population mix</td>
<td>loss of families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community organizations</td>
<td>poorly organized</td>
<td>varies</td>
<td>increase organized</td>
<td>usually not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Conditions</td>
<td>worsening</td>
<td>stable</td>
<td>improving</td>
<td>improved housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Land Costs</td>
<td>increasing less than metro average</td>
<td>increasing at same rate as metro average</td>
<td>increasing more rapidly metro average</td>
<td>increasing more rapidly metro average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>increasing tenancy</td>
<td>varies but often high ownership</td>
<td>little change</td>
<td>tenancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure for redevelopment</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>strong but controlled</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Each of the four conditions will now be examined, and current and past examples in Canada provided. The first condition is that of decline. The factors leading to inner-city decline are
numerous, and will be expanded in section 2.3; weak economic base, poor original construction and threats of redevelopment are typical of these factors. The first example is the Winnipeg inner city:

The city’s core area (covering ten square miles and housing nearly 100,000 people) had been suffering from a litany of problems common to many other North American cities. Although declining in absolute terms, Winnipeg’s core area population contained ever-increasing numbers of disadvantaged and special-needs residents. The core area’s unemployment rate was double the city-wide average, and its incidence of families below the poverty line was five times the average. Moreover, in recent years, the core area had absorbed a substantial number of native and other ethnic immigrants, many of whom lacked the educational and vocational skills required to compete effectively in the urban job market. (Kiernan 1987, 25)

The decline and level of deprivation in the inner city was to be addressed by the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative in 1981; details of the policies are provided in section 2.6. The second example is that of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, in Montreal. Located to the east of the CBD, along the St. Lawrence River, the former industrial sector lost both people (35% drop between 1971 and 1986) and jobs due to deindustrialization (Simard 1991, 27). Household revenue is 60% of that of the Montreal Region, unemployment hovers near 20%, and 86% of households are renters, compared to 55% for the region (Ibid., 26-9).

The second type of inner city is the stable one, "usually areas with a basically sound housing stock" (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 8). Several types exist, such as the stable working class (Ville Emard in Montreal), the upwardly mobile middle-class (Kitsilano in Vancouver) and the exclusive enclave, notably Westmount and Rosedale. These two neighbourhoods, although geographically inner city, managed to exclude industry and set up rigorous zoning restrictions designed to ensure the exclusive nature of the area (Ibid.). The end result has been wealthy and stable communities near CBDs. For example, Westmount, four kilometres away from the CBD, lost only 15% of its population between 1961 and 1991, and remained remarkably stable in
terms of income, housing prices, and tenure.

Revitalizing areas are those most associated with upgrading and up-filtering. Two examples of revitalized neighbourhoods may be given. First, extensive up-filtering occurred in Cabbagetown-Don Vale in Toronto, one of the first privately-revitalized neighbourhoods in Canada, which caused substantial increases in ownership, house prices and a displacement of lower-income residents (Kary 1988, 53). In Vancouver, Fairview Slopes is a prime example of revitalization. The area was up-zoned in the mid-1970s, partly due to its access to highly-valued amenities, such as proximity to the CBD (Mills 1989, 198). The neighbourhood underwent a significant transformation, from a relatively poor and unstable zone in transition to a denser, wealthier, and more white-collar neighbourhood known for its expensive and architecturally impressive dwellings (Ibid.).

Areas undergoing massive redevelopment, although similar to the preceding type, are differentiated by the rapid construction of significantly higher-density dwellings (McLemore, Aass & Keilhofer 1975, 9). Factors which increase the likelihood of massive redevelopment are several: degree of access to the CBD; existence of neighbourhood amenities; high-density zoning; and ease with which land can be assembled (size of lots, small vs. large land-holders etc.) (Ibid.). The West End exemplifies an area which was massively redeveloped in Vancouver. Originally an upper-class Victorian residential neighbourhood in the 1890s, the area was converted to rooming houses and finally zoned for high-rise apartments in the 1960s (McAfee 1972, 168). With an increased demand for inner-city housing based partly on shrinking household size, the West End became a logical choice for densification:
The West End has, since 1958, accounted for the majority of the metropolitan area's high-rise construction. The West End accounts for more than forty percent of Vancouver apartments [in 1972]. Today [1972] six percent of the city's population resides in the West End...the provision of housing for more than 35,000 people makes the West End the most densely populated square mile in Canada. (Ibid., 169)

Although no longer the densest area in Canada in 1993, the West End remains densely populated. Inhabitants are predominantly singles, childless couples and those who require or prefer a central location (McGahan 1986, 205).

Of the four types of inner cities, the declining and the revitalizing are of particular importance to this thesis. The former will be further described in 2.3, and has been the nature of the case study inner city since the 1950s. The latter type is covered in more detail in 2.4, and has recently been a condition of growing importance in the case study.

2.3 Changes to the Inner City: Centrifugal Forces

Filion (1987) refers to the push and pull factors between the core and suburbs which affect the inner city as either centrifugal and centripetal. He explains that if the suburb is more attractive to capital and people than the core, centrifugal forces are at work, leading to probable decentralization; conversely, if the core is more attractive, then the centripetal model applies, leading to an appreciation of the inner city. Despite the theoretical simplifications of this model, it does hold some usefulness for explaining urban change in Canada. This section will discuss the effects of the centrifugal model, while section 2.4 will discuss the centripetal.

It is generally understood that "the economic and urban landscape is increasingly shaped by forces operating at a global rather than a national scale" (Daniels 1991, 1). There are several global forces which are important to the city. These forces became more apparent after the 1973 recession, which "shook the capitalist world...and set in motion a whole set of processes that undermined the Fordist [mass-production] compromise. The 1970s and 1980s have consequently
been a troubled period of economic restructuring and social and political adjustment" (Harvey 1989, 145). In broad terms, much of the labour-intensive manufacturing production in the advanced economies moved to the global periphery, where inputs were cheaper, thereby producing the so-called new international division of labour (Scott 1986, 31).

A second force, apart from the 'footloose' aspect of worldwide capitalism, was the technological changes which emphasized knowledge and service industries (Daniels 1991, 12). Consequently, there has been a shift in advanced economies away from manufacturing (Ibid.). For example, the manufacturing component (construction, manufacturing employment) decreased from 28.2% to 23.1% of all employment in the United States between 1973 and 1984 (Ibid.). The service sector, which includes a wide field of employment ranging from professionals to tourism, has been increasing its share of total employment. In Canada, 33.2% of workers were engaged in the manufacturing sector in 1960, and 53.5% in the service sector; in 1981, manufacturing dropped to 28.3% and service rose to 66.2% (Harvey 1989, 210).

These two factors have led some analysts to speak of a post-industrial trend within the advanced economies, characterized by the change from a goods-producing society to a service economy, the increasing importance of knowledge and technology, and the ascendancy of the professional class (Filion & Bunting 1988, 79). Scott argues that the postindustrial hypothesis, although an important shift, is not representative "of a fundamental shift away from the structure and logic of industrial capitalism" (Scott 1988, 7). Rather, he uses the term "late capitalist industrialization".

The effect of these global changes is significant on metropolitan areas, as the latter represent the locus of production in advanced capitalist societies (Daniels, O'Connar & Hutton 1991, 3). The transmission of these global trends to urban areas occurs through shifts in labour (less
manufacturing, more service sector growth) and changes in technology (which tend to emphasize information) (Polèse 1988, 19). These trends led to decreases in manufacturing employment and increases in the service sector: between 1971 and 1986, in the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), manufacturing employment declined from 30.65% to 20.6%, and the service sector rose from 63.09% to 75% (Ibid., 13). These figures translated into an absolute loss of 70000 manufacturing jobs, predominantly in the inner city (Levine 1989, 142).

In terms of intra-urban zones, the CBD has been the focus in the last decade of the explosive growth of the service sector (Polèse 1988, 21). In almost every North American city, the CBD has seen significant high-rise development combined with an increase in the tertiarization of employment (Ibid., 17). This employment growth also produced increased polarization within the urban labour market (Marcuse 1986; Castells 1988).

In the postwar period, the suburbs witnessed an in-migration of industry seeking cheaper, more accessible and more abundant land than in the congested core (Polèse 1988, 17). This decentralization referred to the physical migration of industrial plants from the core to the suburbs, and new in situ suburban growth, resulting in relative and absolute inner-city decline (Scott 1988, 25). Population followed employment opportunities; Bourne’s (1989) empirical measurement of population trends of urban Canadian between 1971 and 1981 resulted in a positive, though not conclusive, confirmation of decentralization.

The inner city bore the brunt of industrial restructuring and its effects. Global trends, transmitted through societal and metropolitan change, have impacted on the inner city in three distinct phases (Bunting & Filion 1988, 11). The first, being the industrial and production-oriented phase prior to the Second World War, was characterized by high density urban areas with the role of the inner city being the cumulation of all urban functions (Ibid.). The second
phase, during the post-war era of mass consumption, included urban decentralization, which implied a mass exodus of industries and the middle-class from the inner city (Ibid.). The post-industrial phase, beginning in the 1960s, witnessed the explosive growth of CBD employment coupled with increasing inner-city revitalization (Ibid.).

The second phase is most associated with centrifugal forces. Four effects were readily apparent. First, deindustrialization occurred in the inner city, as traditional core industries, such as steel and shipbuilding, closed and/or moved to the metropolitan or world periphery (Scott 1988, 206). Second, as manufacturing jobs either disappeared or moved elsewhere, those who remained typically became unemployed or took service sector jobs in the CBD, thus leading to increased labour and social polarization (Marcuse 1986, 212). Third, the inner city became the disproportionate location for poverty, even in Canada, as the local economic structure crumbled (Broadway 1992, 196). Fourth, vacancy and blight overtook declining inner cities as former industries and residents fled to more amenable locations (Ley 1983, 253). These four effects were all present in Southwest Montreal, the case study area. Centrifugal forces and inner-city decline in the 1980s, however, became more differentiated among inner-city areas.

There is no single explanation for inner-city decline. Bourne’s (1978) first hypothesis is the pull factor. Locational preferences, such as increased amenities and new housing, shift population from the inner city to the suburbs, thereby leading to abandonment (Ibid., 32-3). The obsolescence hypothesis explains that the inner city is functionally, physically and socially obsolete; of particular importance is the role of technology in rendering redundant inner-city infrastructure (Ibid., 35). The unintended policy hypothesis emphasizes the role of government in indirectly devaluing the inner city, primarily through highway construction to the suburbs and programs which support home-ownership in the suburbs (Ibid., 36-7). The exploitation
hypothesis concerns the lack of decision-making capabilities of inner-city residents, which is a result of political and economic imbalances. The inner city "becomes one of the spatial and social scrap heaps of modern capitalism", a "zone of discard" (Ibid., 42). Finally, the structural change hypothesis: "the basic argument is that the national space-economy, the integrated urban-industrial complex and its appended institutions, has shifted in structure in recent years to the detriment of particular inner-city areas" (Ibid., 43). The importance of each factor varies according to particular urban and temporal settings (Ibid., 51).

Further explanations include location-dependent problems such as inner-city traffic congestion and the infringement and bypassing of the inner city by regional highway construction (Cowell 1977, 42). Zoning-related problems include the former downzoning of inner cities to industrial uses, which enabled the gradual erosion of residential neighbourhoods, and more recently the loss of industrial land to residential uses (Ibid., 44). Technologically-based problems explain "that functional obsolescence is proceeding at a faster rate than physical deterioration...as a result, functionally blighted areas are being created more quickly than their buildings can be economically renewed or modified for other uses" (Nader 1975, 342).

Decline, based in the inner city and caused primarily by centrifugal forces, led to terms such as "cities in stress" (Gottdeiner 1989), "cities in distress" (Stewart 1993), and "urban conditions" (Banfield, in Waste 1989). Decline will continue in those cities which are not "in a position to stop population decline, reduce unemployment, and secure financial stability" (Stewart 1993, 33). The severity of this decline, however, can be ameliorated by various processes, including that of gentrification.
2.4 Changes to the Inner City: Centripetal Forces

Centripetal forces emphasize the pull factor of the core, as opposed to the pull factor of the suburbs (Filion 1987, 223). These forces have increasingly been explained through the process(es) of gentrification. The basic assumption of gentrification is that people of a wealthier class will move into a poorer neighbourhood and subsequently improve the housing stock through renovation (Johnston 1988, 172). The concept of the "return to the city" by educated portions of the population is misleading; most of the gentrifiers arrive from within the city itself, not the suburbs (Dansereau 1987, 19). Gentrification does tend to appreciate certain inner-city locations, and "is [an] expression in the urban landscape of deeper social processes and social change" (Smith & Williams 1986, 11).

Traditionally, two theories have been used to explain gentrification in the inner city. The first is the demographic/ecological demand-side explanation within the context of explosive CBD employment growth. Proponents of this theory point to gentrification arising from lifestyle, cultural and demographic changes in society. The past twenty years have seen significant demographic shifts, such as the increase in childless couples, who desire to live close to their tertiary and quaternary jobs in the CBD (Ley 1986, 522). Moreover, core amenities attract certain segments of the population, as does the location of alternative lifestyles (Ibid., 524). Gentrification is therefore understood as a reflection of consumer demand for inner-city location (Dansereau 1987).

The second explanation is that of the political/economic supply-side. Smith and Williams (1986) looks to two reasons for inner-city gentrification: the rent gap, where core areas fall to such low rents that outside investment is attracted, and public policy, which tends to downzone, stabilize or renew inner cities and by that process attract wealthier outsiders. Filion and Bunting
(1988) further point to the unintentional effect of policy-driven CBD development as a source for potential gentrification. Industrial restructuring, which has resulted in inner-city decline and CBD growth, also promoted gentrification: "a growing downtown labour market oriented toward office employment in advanced services in the public and private sectors is essential for the restructuring of the inner-city housing market" (Ley 1988, 32). Either or both explanations of gentrification may be suitable depending on the particular city and temporal period.

The attributes of gentrifying (inner-city) neighbourhoods may include the following: location and proximity to work; favourable socio-economic status of adjacent districts; the quality and quantity of nearby environmental amenities; certain alternative lifestyle attributes; distinctive and pleasant housing stock; and proximity to existing elite areas (Ley 1992, 238). The recent situation in major Canadian cities has been extensively studied by David Ley (1986; 1988; 1992). In the period between 1971 and 1981, it was found that gentrification was mainly occurring through young urban professionals in areas containing houses of architectural significance and close to urban amenities and elite areas (Ley 1986; 1988). The period between 1981 and 1986, however, offered less predictability in terms of gentrifiable neighbourhoods and a more complex and diverse set of spatial expressions (Ley 1992, 245). The "geography of gentrification has become more complex because, as a social process, it has become more chaotic" (Ibid., 230). Gentrification also spread between 1981 and 1986, despite the national recession, due to the resiliency and even growth of the CBD service sector (Ibid.).

Finally, it is useful to illustrate the effects of gentrification on the inner city with an example. Fairview Slopes, in Vancouver, is located to the south of the CBD, and was in the early 1970s "one of the least favoured neighbourhoods in the city. On average, the population was relatively poor, and of low socioeconomic status" (Mills 1989, 242). Redevelopment, primarily due to the
highly-valued amenity of proximity to the core, as well as the 1970s rezoning which favoured higher densities and multiple dwellings, proceeded rapidly between 1976 and 1982 (Ibid.). Smaller dwellings were replaced by condominiums and townhouses; 7% of the pre-1976 stock was owner-occupied, compared to 27% of the new stock (Ibid.). A remarkable turnover in population occurred: less than 20% of the residents in 1981 lived in the same dwelling in 1976 (Ibid.). Average monthly rent increased, unemployment fell, from close to 20% in 1971 to 7% in 1981, and by 1980 "a new class with senior white collar occupations [had become] dominant" (Ibid., 243).

As a result of the two forces, manufacturing is now primarily in the suburbs instead of the core, while the service sector has grown in the CBD\(^2\). These phenomena have left the inner city as a battleground between those stranded by centrifugal forces (blue collar or the unemployed) and those favouring such locations due to centripetal forces (white collar and others) (Scott 1988, 222). The next two sections will outline urban public policy and how it has evolved to deal with inner-city change.

\(^2\) For further study of this phenomenon ("spatial mismatch"), see Peter Hall’s "Managing Growth in the World’s Cities" in Berkeley Planning Journal Volume 6, 1991, pp.19-35.
2.5 Public Policy and the Inner City

This section outlines the policy-making capabilities of each level of government as they pertain to the Canadian inner city. An important distinction to be drawn is that of deliberate policy versus the passive role of governments, as demonstrated by the dual role of the federal government:

One is a policy role, entailing the conduct of public policy that has either a direct or an indirect impact on urban Canada. Policies with direct impact include such areas as housing, where explicit urban programs -such as urban renewal, public housing, land assembly, and sewer treatment programs- are part of the arsenal. The indirect effect arises as a result of the fundamental interdependence of urban units and the economy. With primary responsibility for economic affairs...the Federal Government has a massive influence...on the urban system. The second federal role is a completely passive one. It is based on the fact that to carry out its own duties, the Federal Government occupies a substantial amount of space. As a result, the use made of that space, the taxes paid, the urban demands created...all combine to have an important influence on urban areas. (Lithwick 1970, 201)

The thesis concentrates on the first role, the more deliberate and direct policies of government.

The division of powers of the two sovereign levels of government in Canada are outlined in The Constitution Act, 1867. Section 91 outlines federal responsibilities, while Section 92 does the same for the provinces. Municipalities are deemed "creatures" of the provinces, as all local power emanates from and is delegated by the province to the municipality.

The federal government, although limited in its constitutional contact with municipalities, is by no means unimportant to urban areas. As mentioned above, federal economic policies play a central role in urban economies. In addition, federal jurisdiction "over railways, ports [a very uneasy interface, however], and airports is of crucial importance to many aspects of urban development, as is the fact that the...government is the biggest single landowner in urban Canada" (Sancton 1991, 466). As well, federal housing policies have particularly shaped inner-city Canada.
Provincial policies impact in several ways. First, municipalities derive all of their power from the province. Second, provincial highways are crucial to urban centres, and frequently affect inner cities (Ibid.). Third, provinces subsidize housing, sewage treatment, employment creation, and public transit (Ibid.).

Municipalities have focused their responsibilities primarily on land use and the regulation of the height and densities of buildings (Kiernan 1990, 11). Some larger cities and regional boards enjoy a wider set of powers, but Canadian provinces have generally delegated the following to municipalities: "fire protection; local roads and streets; the collection and disposal of residential solid waste; sewage systems; the taxation of land and buildings; and the regulation of local land use" (Sancton 1991, 467). Since the 1980s, however, the local level has been increasingly involved in economic development (Gertler 1990, 35).

There are four primary fields of public policy which have deliberate and important impacts on the inner city: transportation; housing; land use; and economic development. The field of transportation includes major arterial roads running through organized areas (provincial), public transit (provincial and municipal) and local roads (municipal) (Kitchen 1990, 108). Housing policy includes subsidies to homeowners, urban renewal, public housing and renovation, all of which have tended to be directly or indirectly federal responsibilities; the private market, however, remains the most important supplier of housing (Carroll 1990, 98). Land use is primarily a local responsibility, although issues such as heritage designation, inner-city revitalization, and urban waterfront development are frequently assumed by all three levels of government (Kiernan 1990, 16). Fourth, economic development includes economic policies of federal and provincial governments, local economic development strategies (which may be ultra vires), and employment creation by the province or the federal government (Stewart 1993, 108).
2.6  \textit{Evolution of Policy for the Canadian Inner City}

The historical evolution of the four primary policy fields and their effects on the Canadian inner city will now be described. Three periods will be covered: 1945-1968; 1969-1978; and 1979 to 1990. Examples of transportation, housing, land use and economic polices will illustrate each period.

\textbf{2.6.1 Period 1: 1945-1968.} The first period was characterized by "unprecedented economic growth and enormous demographic change" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 33). By 1968, Canada had become metropolitan-centred, urban and multicultural (Ibid.). The policy trend of this period was to increase government intervention, focusing first on housing the returning veterans (Carroll 1990, 40). The inner city was generally planned to as a zone in transition.

Transportation policy was first characterized by planning for expressways to serve the increasing number of automobiles (Leo 1977, 4). Under the impact of the automobile, densities of cities fell: in 1941, Montreal had 15000 people per square mile, while in 1961 it was only 9300 (Ibid.). Inner-city densities fell even more drastically during that time (Quebec 1990, 77). Transit demand also fell in most major cities (Kitchen 1990, 110).

The first set of transportation plans, complete in most cities by the mid-1960s, "clearly bore the mark...of the belief that urban service delivery is an administrative and technical matter and not a suitable field for political conflict and compromise" (Leo 1977, 17). The plans for Toronto and Vancouver, created by technocrats, would prove to be politically and even fiscally deficient once specific projects were to be implemented (Ibid.). The proposed 1961 Spadina Expressway, in Toronto, was stopped by public opposition (Ibid.). In Vancouver, the 1967 East-West freeway proposal to run through the inner-city areas of historic Gastown and culturally unique Chinatown was bitterly opposed by citizen groups and academics, and was also rejected (Pendakur 1972).
Housing was of particular concern to the inner city, as construction and renovation had been put on hold by the Great Depression and the Second World War (Linteau 1992, 513). In terms of federal legislation, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1944 authorized joint lending by the federal government and the lending institutions to homeowners and buyers; in 1946, the Central (later Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was set up to administer the Act (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 37). Moreover, the Act "encouraged the redevelopment of old residential areas through the provision of grants for the acquisition and clearing of land suitable for low-cost housing" (Nader 1975, 349). The 1954 NHA included a provision for federal-provincial cooperation in the acquisition of land for public housing (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 53). In 1956, the Act was amended to include federal aid to municipalities for the clearance of slum areas for purposes other than housing; this amendment increased the demand for urban renewal, especially for blighted inner-city areas which could be converted to other uses (Ibid., 55).

Major cities reacted to these provisions by planning for the comprehensive renewal of their inner cities. In 1948, the City of Toronto decided to renew an blighted inner-city slum and build public housing upon it (Ibid., 42). The project was known as Regent’s Park, and it was Canada’s first major undertaking of urban renewal and public housing (Gunton 1981, 295). Between 1948 and 1959, sixty-eight acres were redeveloped to house 9000 people; the project was subsequently condemned as a "ghetto for the poor" (Nader 1975, 350). The Regent Park project received funding under the 1954 NHA provision (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 54). As well, the city hall of Toronto was built on renewed land (Carrol 1990, 91). In Vancouver, a 1957 study called for the clearance of 713 acres in the inner city (Melliship 1985, 113). In Montreal’s inner city, 15000 dwellings were demolished between 1958 and 1968, while only 800 units of public housing
were built (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984, 30).

In 1964, further amendments to the NHA afforded the most "substantial support to urban renewal in the history of Canadian housing legislation" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 57). Federal aid was increased, and provinces and municipalities could now enter the public housing field without Ottawa's involvement while still receiving federal aid (Ibid.). The immediate effect was a further increase in urban renewal proposals in 1965 and 1966 (Ibid., 58).

The overall effect of these housing policies was to contribute to the deterioration of the inner city, as people moved out to the suburbs for new and federally-supported housing (Carroll 1990, 91). Urban renewal was partly used to counteract this deterioration, but ultimately produced far fewer dwellings than in the suburbs, displaced poorer residents, and enabled non-residential uses to replace former neighbourhoods (Ibid.). For example, the 1963 Radio-Canada renewal project in Centre-Sud, in Montreal, displaced over 2000 inhabitants and most of the land became parking lots (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984, 33). The city halls of Calgary and Winnipeg were built on renewed land (Carroll 1990, 91). In 1968, Strathcona-Chinatown was menaced with extensive urban renewal which would have razed fifteen blocks and displaced 3000 people; fortunately, the proposals were blocked by the same techniques used in the 1967 freeway debate (Lai 1988, 167).

Land use and economic development policies for the inner city were few during the period, as most of the attention was focused on the suburbs. Zoning, however, became a tool to limit or densify inner-city housing: in Vancouver, the area between 3rd Avenue and Broadway, Cambie and Main was rezoned industrial in 1961 to limit residential growth (MPCPC 1989, 93). Conversely, up-zoning in the West End enabled significant densification of development (McAfee 1972).
2.6.2 Period 2: 1969-1978. This period was characterized by economic and social turbulence, and changing trends in household formation which impacted on urban areas (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 69). Substantial federal interest in urban affairs, increased provincial intervention, and the reform movement at the local level were all features of this period (Carroll 1990, 92).

Transportation policy shifted from expressway construction to an increased concern with mass transit (Kitchen 1990, 117). The second Spadina Expressway was turned down by citizen groups and the province of Ontario in 1969, thereby inducing the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review to study alternatives (Leo 1977, 21). In 1974, the study proposed an increased coordination of urban development with transportation, including transit (Ibid.). In Vancouver, the rejection of the East-West expressway led to the 1970 Rapid Transit Study (Pendakur 1972). This increased interest in mass transit necessitated provincial funding (Kitchen 1990, 118).

In 1968 and 1969, urban renewal produced confrontation between citizens and city administrations in Toronto and Vancouver. In Toronto, response to the Trefann Court project was highly negative, which led to delays and modifications (Filion 1988, 92). In Vancouver, the proposed Scheme 3 to significantly redevelop and densify Strathcona was met with opposition and an appeal to the federal government by the Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association (Melliship 1985, 122).

The federal government, concerned by this public opposition, formed the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development in 1968, under Paul Hellyer; public input was collected and presented in the January 1969 report (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 86). The Hellyer report "proposed that large scale [public housing] projects be stopped until a full review could take place" (Ibid., 87). The reason behind this recommendation was the view that "the larger public housing projects were 'ghettos of the poor; people who lived in them were stigmatized in the
eyes of the rest of the community; social and recreational facilities were inadequate; privacy was lacking and vandalism present." (Ibid., 89).

The federal government accepted the Task Force's view. The desire for further information led to Lithwick's *Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects* (1970), which provided the background for the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs in 1971 (Ibid.). This ministry was an attempt at tri-level coordination of urban issues, as opposed to unilateral federal decisions, but faced jurisdictional problems with certain provinces and other federal departments (Carroll 1990, 94). Moreover, the provinces began to set up their own housing authorities at this time (Ibid.).

Alternatives to urban renewal were presented in the 1973 amendments to the National Housing Act. Two programs specifically aimed at the inner city were introduced: the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP) and the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP). The emphasis of NIP and RRAP was to address the particular needs of the inner city in decline. Several criteria were set forth for eligibility:

1. over 50% of its land use had to be residential;
2. over 25% of its dwellings had to be in need of repair;
3. its physical environment had to be deficient or deteriorated;
4. its social or recreational facilities had to be deficient or deteriorated;
5. its mean household income had to be below that of the municipality; and
6. it had to be potentially stable. (Filion 1988, 90)

Under NIP, CMHC could "supply municipalities with 50% of the cost of acquiring and clearing land for open space and community facilities in a given neighbourhood with low and moderate-income housing" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 124). RRAP focused on the provision of loans targeted for residential renovation; low-income owners could also take advantage of certain loan forgiveness (Ibid.).

NIP and RRAP were designed to avoid the "messy" process of urban renewal, to minimize
neighbourhood disruption, and to provide the opportunity for public input (Filion 1988, 87). NIP appeared in most major Canadian cities until its termination in 1978. NIP and RRAP marked a more tailored approach to inner-city issues. In Vancouver, several inner-city neighbourhoods used NIP and RRAP, including the Mount Pleasant area, which benefited from park, traffic, street amenity, and community facility improvement (MPCPC 1989, 99).

Land use was characterized by several trends. First, increased neighbourhood participation and organization implied a different approach to land-use planning in the inner city (Kiernan 1990, 17). For example, Toronto inner-city neighbourhood groups played a large role in NIP (Filion 1988, 105). Second, conversion of industrial land was also occurring. Granville Island, in Vancouver, was converted from industrial to mixed-use/commercial through CMHC in 1972. Heritage conservation of the inner city also became relevant. In 1971, the Province of British Columbia designated the inner-city areas of Gastown and Chinatown as heritage areas.

Public policy was crucial in further stabilizing and appreciating inner cities through zoning changes and density bonuses; the redevelopment of Fairview Slopes is a case in point (Mills 1989). Improvements in transit service and nearby amenities, and large-scale CBD projects also led to an appreciation of inner cities (Bourne 1992, 71). Appreciation took the form of intensification of existing residential areas, the extension of residential uses into formerly non-residential areas, and the conversion in situ of older non-residential buildings, such as warehouses, into higher-end dwelling units (Ibid., 72). As a result, in Toronto, the central core began gaining population in 1974, and by 1990 was at the same level as in the early 1950s (Ibid., 77).

2.6.3 Period 3: 1979-1990. This period featured the retrenchment of the federal government in urban affairs: "MSUA's termination [in 1978] paralleled a declining commitment by Ottawa
to increasing financial resources for addressing urban issues" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 130). This occurred because of pressing economic concerns in the late 1970s taking precedent over urban affairs (Ibid.). Moreover, provincial and municipal governments also began to cut back on programs, and an emphasis was increasingly placed on public-private endeavours for inner-city redevelopment (Kiernan 1990, 16).

Housing policy was characterized by a general decline in government involvement. In 1978 and 1979, the "federal government pursued its goal of 'disentangling' programs to promote greater provincial participation and to reduce administrative overlaps" (Oberlander & Fallick 1992, 148). Financial restraint in the housing field was emphasized (Carroll 1990, 95). By 1986, only the Non-Profit and Cooperative Housing Program remained as a federal function with some influence on the inner city; later that year, this responsibility was mostly turned over to the provinces (Ibid.). By 1990, the federal government had essentially withdrawn from the field of housing policy, "an area it had dominated for forty years" (Ibid.). The vacuum left by the withdrawal of the federal government promoted a new variety of governmental intervention. For example, land use and economic development became more important and more coordinated in the 1979-1990 period. Cities, instead of merely competing for business with one another, began to deliberately seek new methods with which to improve the local economy (Gertler 1990). Two interrelated processes which were to affect the inner city gained prominence during the 1980s: core redevelopment and economic revitalization plans.

Core redevelopment usually consisted of physically altering inner-city and waterfront industrial lands for residential and other uses. Inner-city and downtown deterioration was to be reversed by large-scale projects designed to increase the tax base of the city (Kiernan 1990, 16). From the mid-1970s onwards, arm's-length special purpose corporations have provided the funding
for these projects, as was the case for the federal Crown corporation Harbourfront of Toronto and Le Vieux-Port in Montreal (Artibise & Kiernan 1988).

Economic revitalization focused less on the physical characteristics of the (declining) inner city and looked more at the social and economic development of the inhabitants. At the macro-level, government involvement has been restrained, save for the example of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiatives I and II. The Core Area Initiatives (CAI) combined three levels of government in order to deal with the increasing inner-city problems of Winnipeg, as described in section 2.2.

The purpose of CAI I and II was to reverse Winnipeg's economic woes, which tended to concentrate in the inner city (Stewart 1993, 118). The City of Winnipeg, the Province of Manitoba, and the federal government came together in 1981 to sign the first Initiative. Three objectives were to be pursued in 1981:

1. Economic Development, or the stimulation of substantial economic development. This is accomplished principally through the focusing of public resources on a number of strategic sites throughout the downtown and inner city, where private sector investment could be catalyzed;

2. Employment and Training, or the provision of employment and training opportunities for inner-city residents - particularly those from the special needs targeted population; and

3. Neighbourhood Renewal, or the physical, social, and economic revitalization of Winnipeg's declining inner-city neighbourhoods. (Kiernan 1987, 25)

CAI I, between 1981 and 1986, implemented programs in a broad and unprecedented scope, covering industrial and entrepreneurial support, redevelopment of vacant land, heritage conservation, employment and training, housing, community services, and neighbourhood improvement (Ibid.). Specific accomplishments included:

1. the creation of over 3000 jobs and training opportunities for disadvantaged core area residents;
2. the rehabilitation of over 5000 older homes;
3. the recycling of thirty privately owned heritage buildings;
4. 260 new houses in four separate projects;
5. the planning and development of 330 units of cooperative and non-profit housing;
6. the creation of an industrial development program which assisted with the establishment or modernization of fifteen inner-city industries;
7. the completion of 140 community facilities and services projects worth over $40 million;
8. the formation and capitalization of six community development corporations;
9. the completion of a $3 million inner-city education program; and
10. the completion of land assembly, site planning and preliminary negotiations towards the redevelopment of 80 acres of downtown railway lands. (Ibid., 25-6)

The three levels of government invested an equal share of funds to the budget of $96 million, and private investment was also substantial (Ibid.).

In 1986, a subsidiary agreement (CAI II) provided an additional $100 million for a further five-year initiative with similar goals and objectives to the 1981-1986 Agreement (Stewart 1993, 164). There was more emphasis on strong central coordination among projects (Ibid.).

The overall effect of the two Agreements was to assist 630 individual projects, provide $87.5 million in cost-shared funds, coordinate projects which stimulated approximately $400 million, leverage approximately $242 million from the private sector, and create 2250 permanent jobs (Ibid.). The CAI's "two greatest sources of strength...[were] direct tri-governmental participation and an extraordinarily broad program mandate..." (Artibise & Kiernan 1988, 75). Drawbacks included the lack of permanent jobs to core residents and the failure to attract manufacturing and high-tech industries (Stewart 1993, 170).
2.7 Prognosis and Conclusion: Gaps in the Overview

The previous section gave a broad overview of how public policy has evolved on the Canadian inner city, from early interventions (expressways, urban renewal, public housing) to later ones (neighbourhood planning, redevelopment and revitalization). In terms of historical trends, federal government involvement has dwindled since the 1970s, the provincial level has increased its power, especially over housing, while the local level, by Period 3, was increasingly involving itself in inner-city policy, particularly with the use of arm’s-length corporations.

Two types of gaps, however, remain. The first gap is empirical. The review of policy between 1945 and 1990 is general and ignores significant exceptions to the trends. As well, the majority of academic studies cited in 2.3 and 2.4 focus on a number of Canadian inner cities but not one in particular. For example, Ley’s (1988; 1992) articles on gentrification cover all of the inner-city areas in six Canadian CMAs. Second, there have been acknowledged differences between the urban systems of Quebec and the rest of Canada (Mercer 1991, 61). An inner city in Quebec may prove dissimilar to the overall Canadian trends. Third, there is a particular need to empirically study the impacts of public policies on a changing inner city. Fourth, the impacts of a city’s relative and absolute economic decline on its inner-city areas is a subject requiring further research.

The second gap is theoretical. The focus of most studies has been on inner-city change in economic or social terms, and the causes and effects of restructuring on the inner city. The focus on public policy as an agent of inner-city change is a relatively underdeveloped area of study warranting further exploration. Few studies have focused exclusively on the role of policy in inner-city change; fewer still on one inner city in particular. Public policy may therefore be studied as one factor among several which influence inner-city change.
The two gaps may be closed by introducing a case study, that of Southwest Montreal. This inner city was chosen for several reasons: it was the birthplace of Canadian industry, and one of its worst slums (Ley 1992, 241); it is located in Montreal, which provides an example to compare with the rest of Canada; public policy intervention was substantial in the past thirty years; and both decline and gentrification have occurred to significant degrees. In effect, Southwest Montreal has experienced the full cycle, from Victorian-era industrialism to 1990s' post-industrialism.

Policy evolution of the case study will begin in 1960, the year Mayor Drapeau was elected, and the start of his twenty-six year reign. The study will end in 1990, when the Southwest revitalization plan was introduced and Mayor Doré won his second consecutive term. The thirty-year study will attempt to reveal the evolution and impacts of public policy on the inner city, with an evaluation according to the theories of inner-city change in chapter 4.
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL CASE STUDY
SOUTHWEST MONTREAL 1960-1990

3.1 Location and Delimitation of Case Study

Southwest Montreal’s borders are shown on Map 1 (following page). The Southwest, excluding Griffintown, makes up one of nine planning districts (arrondissements) of the city; the others are Notre Dame de Grace/Cote des Neiges, Ville-Marie (CBD), Ahuntsic, Villeray/St. Michel, Petite Patrie/Rosemont, Mercier/Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, Plateau/Centre-Sud, and Rivière des Prairies. Within the Southwest District there are five planning sectors: Ville Emard, Cote St. Paul, St. Henri, Little Burgundy (Petite Bourgogne) and Point St. Charles. These sectors correspond exactly to the neighbourhoods (quartiers) found on Map 1. Griffintown is part of the Ville-Marie District, within the Ville-Marie Sector; it is delineated in the 1990 Downtown Master Plan, and includes the Bonaventure area as well. The Southwest is located close to the CBD and the Port of Montreal, and is bordered by several highways. The proximity of this infrastructure has been crucial factors in the Southwest’s development and current situation.

Parts of the Southwest have traditionally been considered as inner-city areas. In 1975, the federal government’s definition of the inner city included all the Southwest neighbourhoods except Ville Emard and Cote St. Paul. In 1989, only Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown were considered as inner cities. Based on the geographical and operational definitions in chapter 1, five neighbourhoods can be included as inner city: Griffintown, Point St. Charles, Petite Bourgogne, St. Henri and Cote St. Paul. Each of these neighbourhoods either developed within Montreal or were annexed by it, as we shall see in Section 3.2, by 1910. All five neighbourhoods had experienced significant development by 1910, at which point Montreal had only a quarter of its present population and the region was still largely rural (Linteau 1992,
of the five neighbourhoods, St.Henri, Cote St.Paul, Point St.Charles, and Petite Bourgogne lie in close proximity to the CBD (defined in the 1990 Downtown Master Plan as Mountain to Bleury, Notre Dame to Sherbrooke). Griffintown is contiguous to the CBD.

Ville Emard did not fully develop until after the Second World War and does not lie in close proximity to the CBD. The middle of Ville Emard is at least six kilometres from the centre of the CBD (Peel and St.Catherine), while Cote St.Paul is four kilometres away, and the other neighbourhoods all lie within three.

Thus far, the term Southwest has had two separate meanings: that of the district, which excludes Griffintown, and the Southwest as inner city, which is only the five neighbourhoods compatible with the definition. Since the case study deals with the inner city, Ville Emard will not be examined in any detail unless the entire Southwest District is being considered. The remainder of the chapter will use the term ‘Southwest’ as meaning only the five inner-city neighbourhoods therein, and Southwest District as excluding Griffintown but including Ville Emard.

3.2 Origins and History of the Southwest to 1959

3.2.1 Period 1: 1642-1859. The Southwest was originally marshland and woods before the first European colonizers arrived (Sijpkes 1990, 178). Between 1663 and 1825 various landowners established themselves in the Southwest, notably the order of the Sulpicians (Ibid.). In 1821, work began on a canal linking the port to Lachine so as to avoid the rapids on the St.Lawrence; finished in 1825, the canal was 13.2 kilometres long and an average 1.4 metres deep (Legault 1991, 17). The construction was done by companies tendered by the government of Lower Canada, and the canal was initially designed for small craft (Ibid.). The 1848 enlargement of the canal resulted in transportation and energy-producing advantages which attracted large
amounts of industries (Ibid., 19).

The second important transportation improvement was the construction of the Victoria Bridge and the arrival of the Grand Trunk Railway (GTR) to the Southwest. Between 1853 and 1859, railway lines were built on the Victoria Bridge, the first significant link across the St. Lawrence River (CREESOM 1989, 16). The GTR established immense shops on the Montreal side of the bridge, in Point St. Charles. In 1857, the first large-scale multi-storey worker housing in Canada was built near the shops on Sébastopol Street (Hanna & Remiggi 1981, 109). On the eastern side of the shops, Victoriatown was also founded as a worker settlement (City 1962, 11). Nearer to Old Montreal, Griffintown was a magnet for incoming Irish immigrants fleeing famine in their homeland in the 1840s (Marvin 1975, 5).

3.2.2 Period 2: 1860-1909. By 1860, the two determining factors of the Southwest’s development, the Lachine Canal and the railways, were already in place. The next fifty years would see both rapid industrialization and residential development, and annexations of most of the district into the City of Montreal. St. Henri, originally a village of tanners, subsequently developed into an industrial town, bankrupted itself with tax holidays to industries, and was annexed in 1905 (Linteau 1992, 194). St. Cunégonde, which today forms part of Petite Bourgogne, shared a similar history and was also annexed in 1905 (Ibid.). St. Gabriel, which formed the western half of Point St. Charles, developed along the canal and was annexed in 1887 (Ibid.). Cote St. Paul was annexed in 1910 after extensive development, while the village of Ville Emard, annexed in 1910, developed as a working-class suburb, similar to neighbouring Verdun, and filled in only after the Second World War (CREESOM 1989, 21). Victoriatown, Griffintown and eastern Point St. Charles were already part of Montreal in 1860.
During these fifty years, the Southwest developed in an *ad hoc* manner, with worker housing jumbled alongside industry (Sijpkes 1990, 183). Poverty and crowding were extreme: William Ames, in 1897, called the area "the city below the hill", and documented the poor living conditions of the working class, including an overall death rate 70% higher than on the hill (Linteau 1992, 127). Workers typically lived close to employment, such as in the case of the GTR shops (Ley 1991, 322).

3.2.3 Period 3: 1910-1959. The years between 1910 and 1959 was a period of maturity, consolidation and initial decline for the Southwest. By the late 1940s, the Southwest held the most important concentration of manufacturing industry in Canada with over 30000 jobs (Legault 1991, 22). The canal, CN (replacing the GTR) and CP, as well as the proximity to the port, all ensured the continued success of the Southwest. French, Irish, and English inhabitants made the Southwest the first multi-ethnic working-class area in Canada.

There were soon signs, however, of decline and ageing. The majority of the housing in the older neighbourhoods was inadequate for the petite bourgeoisie, who began to leave in numbers (CREESOM 1989, 22). In addition, industry along the canal was facing competition from suburban industrial parks, and was handicapped by an older and less sophisticated infrastructure, the product of an entirely different technological era (Ibid., 23). Highways to the suburbs heralded the initial decentralization of Montreal, which would particularly affect the Southwest. In 1951, the Southwest peaked at 112000 people; by 1961 it was 107011, and this decline would steadily continue into the mid-1980s (Hoffmann 1990, 13). The final factor of this decline was the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, which would render the Lachine Canal redundant and ultimately left the Southwest obsolete within the Montreal region. Section 3.3 offers a more in-depth explanation and description of the Southwest's decline.
3.3 Decline of the Southwest

The final blow to the Southwest’s economy came from the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The effect of the project, a joint venture between Canada and the United States, made the canal irrelevant, as one could use the Seaway instead to bypass the rapids. The competition from the Seaway would lead to the closing of the canal to traffic in 1968 (Canada 1979, 54). The Seaway, combined with changes in technology and increased competition from Halifax and Vancouver, also caused a reduction of traffic for the Port of Montreal; in 1961 Montreal held 38% of all maritime traffic in Canada, while by 1977 it was 18% and by 1985 only 6% (Linteau 1992, 437).

The other key factor in the development of the Southwest, the railway, also declined after 1959. Faced with increasing competition from trucking, as well as decentralization of industry to the suburbs, trains lost their long-standing advantage in the movement of goods in urban areas. Inner-city industries, including those of the Southwest, were not as accessible to trucks as suburban ones. Consequently, many nascent industries chose to locate in the suburbs (CREESOM 1989, 25). The Southwest had also been a centre of the rail industry, with the shops in Point St. Charles handling most of the repair work for CN (Ibid., 207). The relative decline of this industry led to significant layoffs for the Southwest after 1959.

The replacement of the Lachine Canal with the Seaway, and of railways with highways, were two factors in the deindustrialization of the Southwest. Decline was also caused by obsolescence: lack of space for expansion, ageing infrastructure, and new manufacturing techniques which de-emphasized multi-storey buildings forced many manufacturers to move to larger and more outlying locations (Ibid., 23). Paralleling these changes, there was a 38.3% drop in manufacturing employment in the Southwest between 1959 and 1973, from 26325 to
17575 jobs, with a fairly even ratio between closures and relocations (Ibid., 24).

The effects of this deindustrialization on the Southwest are striking: between 1951 and 1973, there was an absolute loss of 10900 jobs, and between 1973 and 1988 a further 10428 jobs were lost in absolute numbers (Ibid., 186). For an area which was once Canada’s centre of industry, the results were catastrophic, as most of the lost jobs had been in the manufacturing sector. Unemployment rose to unprecedented numbers, well above figures for the Montreal region as a whole:

Table 2: Unemployment Rate for Southwest and Montreal Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Montreal Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Not unlike other inner-city areas of Montreal, such as Centre-Sud and Hochelaga-Maisonnette, the industrial decline of the Southwest was accompanied by massive layoffs, large-scale disinvestment and crippling unemployment rates. Many companies closed their plants in the area and/or moved, among them Northern Telecom (1974), Redpath Sugar (1976), Sherwin-Williams (1984), Stelco (1985), and Coleco (1986) (Ibid., 191). Between 1980 and 1988 alone, 5000 layoffs hit the area (Ibid., 190). Economically, the Southwest was showing definite signs of being an inner city in decline, as per McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer (1975): weak economic base, poor original construction leading to vacancies along the Lachine Canal, physical deterioration, and a loss of business establishments.
The massive deindustrialization suffered by the Southwest translated into depopulation, as those with jobs moved with industry to newer areas, leaving behind an increasingly smaller (and poorer) population, as shown by the table below:

Table 3: Inner-City Population and 30-year Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Point St.Charles Vic'town</th>
<th>St.Henri</th>
<th>Petite Bourgogne Griff'town</th>
<th>Cote St.Paul</th>
<th>INNER CITY</th>
<th>City of Montreal³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>25 478</td>
<td>30 291</td>
<td>22 989</td>
<td>28 253</td>
<td>107 011</td>
<td>1 191 062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22 472</td>
<td>26 700</td>
<td>18 470</td>
<td>26 925</td>
<td>94 567</td>
<td>1 222 255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19 713</td>
<td>22 358</td>
<td>11 364</td>
<td>24 469</td>
<td>77 904</td>
<td>1 214 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>16 021</td>
<td>17 291</td>
<td>7 354</td>
<td>21 832</td>
<td>62 498</td>
<td>1 080 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>14 048</td>
<td>15 215</td>
<td>6 668</td>
<td>18 818</td>
<td>54 749</td>
<td>1 018 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>13 351</td>
<td>14 993</td>
<td>8 114</td>
<td>17 640</td>
<td>54 098</td>
<td>1 015 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>13 111</td>
<td>14 401</td>
<td>10 276</td>
<td>17 038</td>
<td>54 826</td>
<td>1 017 666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1991</td>
<td>-48.5%</td>
<td>-52.4%</td>
<td>-55.3%</td>
<td>-39.6%</td>
<td>-48.8%</td>
<td>-14.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table clearly shows the important population losses in the Southwest; the five neighbourhoods suffered over three times the depopulation of Montreal. Depopulation was caused by secular economic decline and dislocations due to policy interventions; in Petite Bourgogne, large-scale renewal between 1966 and 1980 effectively dispersed large portions of the population. The depopulation between 1981 and 1986 was substantially slower than in preceding five-year periods: the entire district lost only 1.0% of its population, and the inner city lost 1.1%, with nominal increases in Griffintown and Petite Bourgogne. The 1986-91 period featured an overall 1.3% increase. This increase concentrated in Petite Bourgogne/Griffintown

³ These figures include four annexations by the City of Montreal between 1961 and 1982.
(20% growth between 1986-91), thereby pointing to increasingly differentiated conditions among neighbourhoods due to gentrification and effects of stabilizing and revitalizing policies. Nonetheless, the Southwest as an inner city lost half of its population in twenty-five years.

The cumulative effects of depopulation and industrial restructuring transformed the Southwest into a distressed area in the Montreal Region. The decline of the Southwest of the past thirty years has left it with rampant deindustrialization, an impoverished population, and deteriorating infrastructure (Hoffmann 1990, 11). This decline is paralleled somewhat by Montreal’s economic difficulties. The decentralization of employment and people has produced the so-called ‘doughnut hole’ effect in the city, where poor citizens are left behind in the core areas while the more affluent move to the suburbs (Quebec 1990, 76). Manufacturing employment dropped 36% between 1971 and 1986 (Ibid., 5), while unemployment is among the highest of any major North American city (Picard & Gibbon 1993).

3.4 Current Situation of the Southwest

The Southwest is currently in a state of flux: there is some evidence of revitalization combined with significant poverty. This condition was described by Filion (1987) as "gentrification among decline". The 1986 Census reveals these trends: although the Southwest contained higher percentages of single-parent families, unemployed adults, low-income households and those with less than grade nine education than the City of Montreal (City 1990b, 29), there has been an increase in income, average rent and population in the census tracts bordering the CBD, in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown (Canada 1988). Ley (1988) also found that gentrification had occurred along the Lachine Canal and near the CBD, in part due to city policies which emphasized ownership of centrally-located houses with Opération 20000 Logements (37). Petite Bourgogne saw a 200% increase in administrators and professionals between 1981 and 1986,
compared to a 39% increase in St. Henri and a 16% increase in Cote St. Paul (CREESOM 1989, 81). Duplex and triplex property assessments in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown rose absolutely 90-125% between 1976 and 1986, the highest increase in the metropolitan area (Ley 1992, 241). The 1991 Census (100% data) revealed that repopulation, directly associated with new, up-scale housing, is continuing in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown - one census tract in Griffintown (#69), grew 114% between 1986 and 1991 (Canada 1992). Renter levels fell by over 10% in both neighbourhoods. A majority of census tracts along the Lachine Canal (seven of eleven) also gained population, mostly through the appearance of high-priced lofts in industrial buildings (Ibid.). Gentrification and revitalization are therefore an issue in the Southwest, albeit primarily in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown.

The majority of the population, however, remains in the grips of poverty. It is estimated that of the 54098 people of the Southwest in 1986, close to 35% received unemployment benefits and/or welfare, 60% of the households made less than $20000, and the Southwest’s median revenue was 20% lower than that of the Island of Montreal (City 1990b, 29). At the neighbourhood level, 64% of all households in Petite Bourgogne are below the poverty line, 40% of Point St. Charles adults have not reached grade nine, and 40% of all St. Henri households spend more than a third of their income on rent (Ibid.). If one disaggregates the Southwest into its twenty-two census tracts, the results are even more convincing: eighteen tracts had higher unemployment rates than the city average (Canada 1988).

The high levels of poverty result in a difficult housing situation: in 1986, 49% of the dwellings were built before 1946, 6500 of the 21870 units still require repairs, and 78% of the households are renters, levels which are all above city averages (City 1990b, 29). In 1989, 15% of all housing in the inner city is public in nature, compared to only 3% for the city.
In 1990, the Southwest remains a victim of restructuring and deindustrialization: the neighbourhoods of St.Henri, Cote St.Paul, Point St.Charles, Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown continue to be characterized by low incomes, high unemployment and an under-educated population. Additional socio-economic information may be found in appendix 2. Let us now examine how government has proceeded during the decline of the Southwest, and how their policies have evolved between 1960 and 1990.

3.5 Introduction to the Policy Context of Montreal

There can be no study of policy evolution on the Southwest without first describing the unique institutional context of Montreal. The City of Montreal, between 1960 and 1990, had only two mayors, Jean Drapeau (1960-1986) and Jean Doré (1986- ). This lack of political change was very significant for urban policy. Due to Drapeau’s lengthy stay as mayor (seven consecutive terms), there was an enforced continuity in the policies of the city; unfortunately, those policies were not greatly beneficial to the Southwest.

Drapeau had very specific ideas for the city. His views may be summed up in this quote: "The ugliness of slums in which people live doesn’t matter if we can make them stand wide-eyed in admiration of works of art they don’t understand" (Ley 1983, 136). Drapeau, especially between 1960 and 1978, concentrated on the grands projets which were supposed to make his city internationally renown and modern, drive the economy through spinoffs, and promote a strong CBD (Kaplan 1982, 423). Examples of the grands projets include: Expo ’67 and its accompanying infrastructure improvements (subways, highways); the 1976 Olympic Games; and large-scale core area public buildings, such as Complexe Guy-Favreau, Radio-Canada, and Complexe Desjardins (Léveillé & Whelan 1987, 155). The grands projets took precedence over
all other policy matters, such as housing, economic development, zoning and neighbourhood planning (Kaplan 1982, 421).

Calls for comprehensive plans were consistently ignored by Drapeau. It was only in 1990 did the first master plan appear, for the downtown Ville-Marie District (Corral 1990, 48). This lack of planning went together with Drapeau's reluctance to intervene in zoning and neighbourhood issues and a belief in the predominance of market forces (Sancton 1983, 54). Drapeau thought in the long-term, and would not be bothered by short-term sacrifices and complaints from neighbourhoods: "Everything that was partial, short-run, and small-minded, anything that involved less than the entire community's long-term interest, must stand aside" (Ibid., 422).

The aftermath of the 1976 Olympics, the 1978 municipal elections, and the 1981 recession led to a change in Montreal's urban policy. The excesses of the grands projets forced the city to emphasize less grandiose affairs and greater intervention in local economic issues. Aimé Desautels, Director of the City Planning Department, said in 1978 that "the grand adventure of the last fifteen years has come to an end. We are now defining clearer and simpler objectives, while we are beginning to listen to citizens" (Barcelo 1988, 27). New programs were specifically set up to stop the outward flow of people and capital to the suburbs.

In 1986, the Civic Party lost its twenty-six year monopoly on power in Montreal to Jean Doré and the reformist Montreal Citizens Movement (MCM). The new mayor continued some of the post-1978 programs, and placed a new emphasis on planning, public consultation and an open policy process (Léveillé & Léonard 1988, 12).

3.6 Policy Evolution: Transportation

The evolution of transportation policy on the Southwest will concentrate on three areas of intervention: the Lachine Canal, expressways, and transportation improvements. Each area of
intervention will be chronologically described. Map 2 shows the location of these interventions.

### 3.6.1 Lachine Canal

The opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway enabled ships to bypass the canal, thereby accelerating the Southwest's manufacturing decline. Between 1960 and 1965, the easternmost section of the canal was filled in by the federal government, which closed the canal to the port (Canada 1979, 54). The construction of the Bonaventure Autoroute in 1966 and 1967 created an additional barrier across the canal (Ibid.). In 1968, the canal was closed to all navigation by the Administration of the St. Lawrence Seaway (Ibid.). In 1974, the canal and its locks were transferred from Transport Canada to Public Works Canada (Ibid.). In the same year, Parks Canada took jurisdictional control of the canal from Public Works and made it a National Historic Park (Ibid.).

Parks Canada presented a master plan for the redevelopment of the canal in 1979. The land corridor along the canal was to be reserved for non-motorized uses, especially bicycles. This decision reflected the times:

> The bikeway idea came along at just the right moment, as recreation patterns in North America swung away from active, team-oriented sports towards informal, fitness-oriented activities in the 1970s. These new forms of recreation are often "linear" in nature—cycling, jogging, cross-country skiing—and the recreation corridor offered by the canal proved ideal for their enjoyment. (Williams 1990, 67)

The canal also had to be modernized (raise bridge heights, renovate locks) before any navigation could be realized (Canada 1979, 29). Functionally, the St. Henri/Point St. Charles sector (from Autoroute 15 to Autoroute 10) was to have an urban vocation, with an emphasis on preserving the locks and the industries along the canal (Ibid., 30). The Bonaventure sector, from Autoroute 10 to the Port, was to be the primary entrance to the canal, and the converging point for bike paths from the port and Man and His World on Ile St. Hélène (Ibid.).

In terms of site planning for the St. Henri/Point St. Charles sector, the following was proposed:
1. there would be an attempt to link several large parks near the canal to the bike path along it;

2. the Atwater Market would be renovated and parking spaces provided;

3. a pedestrian bridge would also be built between the Market and Point St. Charles;

4. the desSeigneurs Bridge and locks would become an historical interpretation centre for industrial heritage, as well as another pedestrian crossing; and

5. the parks around the Wellington railway bridge, in Griffintown, would be refurbished. (Ibid., 43)

The Bonaventure sector was to be planned in the following manner:

1. the canal would be accessible from the Old Port by a bridge linking Mill Street and delaCommune;

2. the second stage would be to prepare the canal for a possible link-up with the Old Port, based on the latter's renovation schedule; and

3. the reopening of the canal to the port, while preserving the original locks. (Ibid., 46)

Work began in 1980 on these projects, and continued to the present. In 1990, the following objectives had been attained: a twelve kilometre bike path along the canal; path link-ups with Verdun, neighbourhood parks, and the Old Port; pedestrian bridges; and renovation of some locks. The canal became a popular recreational facility: in 1988, more than 364000 people visited the canal (Lessard 1989, 23). Work in process in 1990 included the refurbishing of the Old Port locks, the digging of the canal to join the Old Port, and improvements in the bike paths (Williams 1990, 69). Unforeseen problems with the redevelopment of the canal were also being dealt with in 1990, specifically the industrial contamination of both water and soils of the canal (Ibid.). Work which had yet to start in 1990 included the historical interpretation centres, de-contamination of soils along the canal, and renovations to the Atwater Market (Canada 1990). The 1990 plan for the revitalization of the Southwest included some mention of the canal. The
particular objectives are covered in the Transportation Improvements section. It is expected that most of the work on the canal, including its reopening, will be completed by 1994 (Paré 1990b).

3.6.2 Expressways. In 1960, Montreal had no expressways and only a few major boulevards; by 1976, there would be seven expressways in the city, most built through dense urban areas. Drapeau found that large and catalytic projects, such as Expo '67, were perfect vehicles for an expressway expansion policy: "If the city were to succeed in its bids for major, international projects, it would have to demonstrate an improved capacity to move...cars" (Kaplan 1982, 423). This view reflected a common belief of North America at the time. The expressway (autoroute) program was therefore a priority in sustaining the grands projets, promoting economic health and being a powerful element of urban planning (Barcelo 1988, 31).

Expo '67 was successfully acquired by the city in 1964. Drapeau consequently embarked on a crash program to build expressways and improve the city's major roads (Ibid.). Drapeau, in order to secure funds to pay for the upcoming Expo '67 and its accompanying expressways, entered into negotiations with both the federal and provincial governments (Kaplan 1982, 426). Beginning in 1964, the two senior levels of government "gradually assumed responsibility for implementing a stripped-down version of the highway plan" (Ibid.).

The plan called for six expressways. Two were to affect the Southwest: the Bonaventure (Autoroute 10), which was to run along the waterfront from downtown to Autoroute 15, and Autoroute 15, which was to connect the Decarie Expressway with the Champlain Bridge. Map 2 shows the location of these expressways. The funding from Ottawa and Quebec City enabled Drapeau to spend more on the subway, his other project of interest (Ibid.).

The first of the expressways to affect the Southwest was Autoroute 15. Completed in November 1966, Autoroute 15 ran a total of 4.4 kilometres, effectively splitting Cote St.Paul
into two sections, and creating a barrier between Verdun and Point St.Charles (Quebec 1983; Auger 1992, 5).

The second expressway was the Bonaventure Autoroute, completed in March 1967. Its construction created a visual barrier across the canal, split Griffintown from Old Montreal, and was also one of the reasons for the 1964 demolition of Victoriatown, at the foot of Bridge Street: Drapeau was afraid that tourists visiting Expo '67 would get wrong ideas of the city if they saw such a ‘slum’ from an expressway (Kaplan 1982, 451). Although more detail of the Victoriatown renewal will be discussed in the evolution of housing policy, suffice it to say that Expo '67 and the Bonaventure Autoroute were important factors in the decision to demolish the neighbourhood.

The extensive expressway construction in the mid-1960s convinced Drapeau that no new highways would be needed in the 1970s (Ibid., 427). There was one expressway planned for the 1960s, however, which did not begin construction until 1970: the east-west Ville-Marie (the 720).

The Planning Department, in 1964, had announced plans for the expressway, and tentative expropriations in St.Henri and Petite Bourgogne were begun. In 1966, during the renewal of Petite Bourgogne, it was mentioned that demolitions would have to occur in order to accommodate a new east-west expressway (City 1966, 97). The 1966 conceptual plan extended Autoroute 20 from Decarie across the CBD to Autoroute 25, in the east end (Carlos & Lavigne 1975). By 1970, however, Drapeau had lost interest in the project (Kaplan 1982, 427). That same year, the provincial government decided to announce its own plan for the expressway, without contacting the city: "jamais la ville de Montréal et ses services professionels n’ont été consultés par Québec dans les mois précédant l’annonce du projet" (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 33).
In effect, the province was ignoring the city and going ahead with its own plans. The Liberal government reasoned that the expressway was needed to increase accessibility to the CBD, provide jobs, and balance government spending on private infrastructure compared to public infrastructure, such as subways (Quebec 1972, 26-28).

The construction of the first section of the 720 autoroute, between Decarie Autoroute and Guy Street, was completed in November 1972 at the cost of $148 million (Quebec 1973, 103). The expressway had led to the eviction of 1160 households and the demolition of several hundred dwellings in the Southwest, exclusively along the northern edges of St. Henri and Petite Bourgogne (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 38). The demolitions in the Southwest, as well as in Centre-Sud, created the impetus for strong opposition from community groups and the city administration, but Drapeau seemed powerless to block the project, which was strongly supported by then Premier Robert Bourassa (Ibid.).

3.6.3 Transportation Improvements. The construction of expressways had effectively cut the Southwest from the rest of the city, so that in the late 1970s there was talk of improving accessibility.

In 1977, the Planning Department issued a document on the Southwest District which addressed inaccessibility and other transportation problems. The issue of truck traffic was raised; due to the increasing dependency of industry on trucks and not rail, traffic was becoming too heavy for the roads in the Southwest (City 1977, 24). It was proposed that a bridge link up Guy Street with Bridge Street, over the Lachine Canal, in order to take pressure off the Wellington Tunnel, which had not been designed for heavy traffic (Ibid., 26). Moreover, there were proposals to replace the Wellington Tunnel with a bridge, as well as to provide more access ramps to Autoroute 15 (Ibid., 24).
Discussion of prolonging the subway through the Southwest was also prominent in the late 1970s. The Métro, under the regional board of the Montreal Urban Community, had initially been built to service the CBD; it was opened in 1966. In 1975, $1.6 billion was lent to the MUC to build stations in the southwestern, western and eastern sections of Montreal (MUC 1983, 66). In 1982, eight new stations appeared in the Southwest and Verdun on an 8.4 kilometre extension from the CBD line (Ibid.). Within the inner city, new stations included Place St.Henri, Lionel Groulx (also in St.Henri), Charlevoix in Point St.Charles, Georges Vanier in Petite Bourgogne, and Jolicoeur in Cote St.Paul (Ibid.).

In March 1990, a plan to revitalize the Southwest was put forth by the City of Montreal. Most of the plan concentrated on economic amelioration and is covered in that section of policy evolution, but there was some mention of transportation improvements. The plan's fifth objective was to improve the road network by increasing accessibility to the CBD, lessening isolation among neighbourhoods, and channelling trucks onto specified routes (City 1990c, 10). Specifically, the Wellington Tunnel would be made into a bridge and the Guy-Bridge link was to be studied (Ibid., 19). The renovation of the Atwater Market and a study of the shores of the Lachine Canal were also included under this objective (Ibid.).

The funding for these improvements from the city came in March 1990 and from the federal government in May of 1990. The city would spend $26.5 million between 1990 and 1995 on infrastructure and transportation improvements in the Southwest, and $5.9 million on renovating the Atwater Market (Paré 1990b). There was an expectation that Ottawa would pay for the Lachine Canal and the bridges to be built over it (Ibid.). In May, the federal government outlined its share of the costs: a total of $10 million will be spent on de-contamination of the canal, but no funding for the needed replacement of the Wellington tunnel and the Guy-Bridge
study (Paré 1990d).

The evolution of transportation policy on the Southwest ends with the March 1990 plan. Since 1960, the Southwest had been the location of several significant transportation projects: the Lachine Canal revitalization, the construction of expressways, and the building of Metro stations.

3.7 Policy Evolution: Housing

The evolution of housing policy, which includes all significant interventions (Housing Code, renewal, renovation, public housing, housing policies), will be presented in roughly chronological order. Map 3 locates these interventions.

3.7.1 Origins of Housing Policy in Montreal. Housing policy in Montreal in the 1950s was poorly developed and to a large extent followed federal policy, as outlined in the 1954 Housing Act: Articles 23 and 35 set forth how land could be termed a renewal zone, acquired, renovated and subsidized through the help of Ottawa, while Article 16 described the framework for the provision of public housing (Arsenault 1967, 50). The Dozois Plan of 1954 was the first of two important policy documents of this era; it called for renewal in the east section of the downtown core (Kaplan 1982, 379). Despite opposition between 1954 and 1957 by the incumbent mayor Jean Drapeau, the project became the Habitations Jeanne-Mance in 1958 with 796 units (Melamed 1981, 166). Drapeau’s reluctance was due to his belief in the provision of housing through the market. The city administration at the time did not include a housing authority (Sheppard 1990, 200).

In 1961, a second important document was released; under the title Comprehensive Urban Renewal Study, consultants had outlined an ambitious nineteen-year schedule which was to ‘renew’ over 48600 dwelling units deemed obsolete in seventeen city neighbourhoods, including 70% of the Southwest (Keklikian 1978, 65). Urban renewal was to be "the only tool by which
the City can rejuvenate Montreal" (Ibid., 68). Drapeau was again reluctant to invest public money into renewal, and in order to placate the increasing demand for municipal action, he decided to renew an "isolated, dilapidated residential area at the foot of the Victoria Bridge" (Ibid., 57), which was Victoriatown.

3.7.2 Victoriatown. Victoriatown, or Goose Village, was a small neighbourhood along Bridge St., between Mill St. and the river. It was entirely surrounded by industry and railway lines. A renewal study was undertaken by the City Planning Department in 1962 to explore the potential of redeveloping the site. The study first reported on the existing conditions: only 11.5% of the 330 dwellings were considered habitable, and 84.7% were over seventy years old (Laneuville 1964, 113). Moreover, there was insufficient green space, no community facilities, no police/fire stations, and no doctor's office (City 1962, 33). Finally, obnoxious industrial uses surrounding the site (slaughterhouses, tanneries, asphalt plant) led to the conclusion that "this area is absolutely unsuitable for habitation, and deprives the inhabitants of any comfort or ease" (Ibid., 35).

Despite the apparent incompatibility of the site with habitation, the planners admitted several conditions which pointed to the existence of a strong community: "in spite of these facts, this is not an area where there is much evidence of juvenile delinquency, lawlessness, sickness, or those other problems so often associated with slum areas" (Ibid., 5). In addition, many of the inhabitants were Italian immigrants who were willing to own and improve their properties; despite low incomes, 26% of the households were owners, above the 18% average of the city at the time (Ibid., 40). There were few roomers in the area, as 94.1% of all households were two-parent families with children (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, the planners recommended the following:
1. municipal authorities proceed without delay to redevelop "Victoriatown", by the acquisition and clearance of all properties of the area, [and] the relocation of the entire population living there;

2. re-use the land according to industrial needs and possibly for the upcoming Expo '67; and

3. take advantage of the provisions of the N.H.A. to obtain financial assistance of the Federal government, re: Article 23. (Ibid., 8)

The city denied that the upcoming Expo '67 motivated the recommendations: "the redevelopment is made necessary by the existing conditions found in the community and the surrounding areas. The same recommendation would have been made whether or not the World's Fair had entered the picture" (Ibid., 4).

On June 30th, 1963, City Council approved the acquisition of the properties; expropriation began in November, and the neighbourhood was demolished in May 1964 (Laneuville 1964, 115). The city did not help in the relocation of the 1500 evicted people (Kaplan 1982, 452). The site was cut in half by the Bonaventure Autoroute in 1966, and in 1967 a stadium (the Autostade) was built. In the 1970s the Autostade was torn down, and today the site is mostly vacant (Melamed 1981, 169).

3.7.3 Petite Bourgogne Renewal. The demolition of Victoriatown did not satisfy those calling for more renewal, such as the construction industry and community groups (Kaplan 1982, 452). The adoption of the first City Housing Code, in 1962, was a step forward, although it was not sufficient to eradicate slums which covered one-fifth of the city and 60% of the Southwest (Barcelo 1988, 34). What was needed was a dramatic example of renewal.

On Christmas Eve 1964, parish priests in St.Cunégonde and St.Joseph wards made a public statement deploring the poverty of their neighbourhoods amidst the downtown boom (Ibid., 35). Drapeau, sensing a political opportunity, called for a study of the area, which was renamed
Petite Bourgogne. The 1965 report noted the obvious: 92% of the housing was built before 1920, suggesting that many were in poor condition; 94.6% of households were tenants, a number which had increased in the last five years; and population had declined by 35% in the last fifteen years (City 1965, 37). All of these conditions pointed to a worsening situation which demanded action on the part of the city. The report recommended that Petite Bourgogne be deemed an urban renewal area, and to establish eligibility for federal funding (Ibid., 3).

In 1966, the City Planning Department outlined its urban renewal program, with the support of City Council. Two overall objectives were put forth: "the systematic and progressive improvement of the social, physical and economic conditions for the area...[and] to divide the area into residential and industrial sectors distinct from one another" (City 1966, 69).

Specific objectives included the following:

1. removal of the railway tracks;
2. preservation of the environment's social identity;
3. conservation of the greatest possible number of dwellings;
4. increase in greenery and open space areas;
5. erection of dwellings with rental levels which the present residents could afford;
6. development of a network of sufficiently large streets;
7. separation of through-traffic and local traffic;
8. regrouping of commercial and community services; and
9. structure the district so that open spaces and building volumes clearly indicate the functions of each type of use. (Ibid., 70)

The development plan, which was to encourage the proper location and pattern of open spaces, transportation and housing, was administered by the City of Montreal (Ibid., 71). Specifically, the city was responsible for negotiations with higher levels of government, coordinating the redevelopment, and taking care of relocating tenants (Ibid., 113). The 258 acres of Petite Bourgogne was to be renewed in stages, at a cost of $77 million (Ibid.). The federal government would contribute 42% of the costs, with the city paying the rest (Ibid., 121).
The period between the 1966 report and 1969, the year the first public housing was built in Petite Bourgogne, was characterized by two important initiatives. In 1967, both Montreal and the Province of Quebec created their own housing authorities. The Montreal Bureau of Housing and Urban Development came first, and was responsible of both construction of low-rent housing and the application of the Housing Code under the Quebec Housing Act (Robert & Racicot 1972, 187). The Société d’Habitation du Québec (SHQ) was to enforce the provincial Housing Act and synchronize funding with CMHC (Ibid.). The two new bodies signalled the entry of the province and the city into housing matters, specifically the Petite Bourgogne renewal, even though a significant portion of the funding came from the federal government (Kaplan 1982, 453).

The 1966 Petite Bourgogne plan, which initially emphasized large apartments connected to townhouses, changed in several ways. First, the director of the program, M.Legault, wanted to expand the city’s role to include social issues, which ran contrary to the minimalist views of Drapeau (Ibid.). More importance was thus attached to renovation, relocation and the maintenance of the social and physical fabric than was evident with the Victoriatown renewal. This approach was quite innovative at the time. Second, the federal government began curtailing funds for urban renewal as early as 1970, when the program was just in its initial stages (Barcelo 1988, 35). Third, the railway tracks which cut through the neighbourhood were not removed until 1982, at a point when public housing had been replaced by a new program, the Opération 20000 Logements, which emphasized ownership (Ibid., 36). The latter two changes led to a lengthy and incomplete renewal process; even in 1980 a third of the area still had to be redeveloped, and the amount of public housing built never reached the levels intended in 1966 (Ibid.).
3.7.4 Public Housing. The renewal of Petite Bourgogne was an ongoing affair. Demolitions followed by public housing began in 1969 and continued until 1978. Private redevelopment continued until 1990. The administrative body which took care of public housing was called l'Office Municipal d'Habitation de Montréal (OMHM), a para-public not-for-profit organization subsidized jointly by the City (15%) and the SHQ and CMHC (Melamed 1981, 175). Petite Bourgogne was the focus of public housing or H.L.M. (habitations à loyer modique, or low-rental housing) activity in the Southwest. The other neighbourhoods would soon receive their share as well to replace obsolete housing, although not to the same extent as Petite Bourgogne, as shown in Table 4:

Table 4: Public Housing in the Southwest as of 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th># of Dwellings</th>
<th>Cost at time of construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Point St.Charles</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>$18 714 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote St.Paul</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>$9 435 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.Henri</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>$14 089 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petite Bourgogne</td>
<td>1 441</td>
<td>$27 568 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 203</strong></td>
<td><strong>$69 816 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Petite Bourgogne had close to half of all public housing in the Southwest, although its continuously declining population was never more than 15% of the inner city; in 1989, 51% of all housing in Petite Bourgogne was public, compared to 10% for St.Henri, 4% for Cote St.Paul and 14% for Point St.Charles (CREESOM 1989, 272). Moreover, 20% of all public housing in Montreal was in the Southwest by 1988, although the five neighbourhoods comprised only 5.4% of the total population of the city (Ibid.).
In 1969, the federal government, based on the Hellyer Report, decided to end their involvement with urban renewal. In 1973, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs initiated the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), followed by the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP). NIP was implemented in St. Henri North, between 1974 and 1977 (City 1976). This particular intervention concentrated on housing (317 houses were built or restored), green space, beautification and recreational facilities (Ibid., 36-7). The total amount spent on St. Henri North was $2 716 000, of which 45% was federally-funded (Filion 1988, 101). Unlike other Canadian cities, however, NIP in Montreal was characterized by a lack of public participation: little occurred because of the city's gradual approach, as well as a neighbourhood characterized by a mobile population and high tenancy rates (Ibid., 105). Moreover, the city had been involved in renovation subsidization since 1968, and the NIP was merely adopted and adapted into this framework (Ibid.).

3.7.5 Opération 20000 Logements. The post-Olympic Games era produced numerous programs designed to halt the flight to the suburbs of people and capital. Laissez-faire was replaced with intervention, supposedly on behalf of the poor and the business community (Léveillé & Whelan 1987, 159). The initial result of this policy shift was a renewed interest in residential renovation in place of public housing and/or demolitions. Between 1968 and 1987, the city oversaw, under the Housing Code, the renovation of 3200 dwellings in the Southwest, 21% of all government supported renovations in that period (CREESOM 1989, 273). The funding was for the most part acquired through the Canada-Quebec Renovation Assistance Program (City 1989a, 19).

The large number of demolitions in the Southwest, mostly in Petite Bourgogne, had produced an absolute housing shortage: between 1965 and 1974, 4750 dwellings were demolished, 25% of the Montreal total, while only 2900 dwellings, mostly public in nature, had been built (City
The precipitous drop in population in Petite Bourgogne during those years (60% between 1966 and 1976) had to a large extent been caused by the slowness of public housing construction (Melamed 1981, 171). Partly due to this housing gap, the city decided in 1979 to implement its Opération 10000 Logements (Homes). The program had two objectives: to attract families back to the city by providing houses on vacant land, and to more affordably house the Montreal middle class (Lacroix 1989, 28). The city would sell off its vacant lands to developers, upon which houses could be built within certain cost and design specifications (City 1979, 7). In 1982, the program was expanded to 20000 homes, and more emphasis was placed on regenerating inner cities, areas which had been most affected by the flight to the suburbs (City 1986, 4).

Together, Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown were one of the four poles of the operation, due to the fact they had considerable vacant land to offer. A total of 3247 units were built in this manner in the Southwest, with 1814 in Petite Bourgogne and Griffintown (Ibid., 33). Once again, the Southwest contained a disproportionate amount of units; 16.5% of the 19634 units were found in the Southwest in 1988 (Ibid.). It should be noted that this program generally attracted a clientele whose income was higher than the existing population (CREESOM 1989, 276).

From 1980 onwards, the city began to prefer co-ops over public housing. Community groups and not-for-profit organizations, with the help of para-municipal organizations (such as the OMHM), constructed or converted dwellings into co-ops. By 1988, 1689 dwellings or 8% of all housing in the Southwest was co-operative, most built or converted after 1984 (Ibid., 274). Institutional buildings were also being converted: in Point St.Charles, Lorne High School became a co-op and Alexandra Hospital was transformed into family housing (Sévigny 1992).
3.7.6 Habiter Montréal and the 1990 Plan. Jean Doré, elected in 1986, continued many of Drapeau’s housing policies, such as the 20000 Logements (Habiter Montréal) and the co-ops. There was a marked slowdown, however, in the construction of public housing, due to the penury of federal funding and a further shift towards co-ops (Léveillé & Léonard 1988, 11). In February 1989, the city put forth its first comprehensive policy statement on housing, to set priorities for the next ten years. Five strategies were included:

1. encourage individual and collective home ownership;
2. support the growth of the housing stock;
3. increase the social housing stock;
4. preserve and improve existing housing; and
5. promote measures to maintain residents in their community. (City 1989a, 18)

The Southwest’s main concern lay in the area of social housing. Despite, or because of, the slowdown in construction, there was a waiting list of 14000 for public housing in Montreal, and a further 8000 for co-ops in 1989 (Ibid., 58). These waiting lists are significant to the Southwest because of its difficult housing situation: increasing gentrification in combination with 37% of the population spending more than a 30% of their income on rent, 57% of all households living below the poverty line, and 30% of the housing needing major repairs (CREESOM 1989, 97).

The 1990 plan, which emphasizes economic regeneration, does not overlook the Southwest’s housing problems: an important objective is to ensure affordability of housing and the maintenance and expansion of the housing stock (City 1990c, 12). Specifically, the city is to spend $28 million over five years to support co-ops, renovate older houses, demolish sheds, buy rooming houses, and decontaminate soil on vacant land so that public housing may be built (Ibid.). Ottawa is to spend $6.5 million on subsidized housing (Legault 1991, 12).
The 1990 plan is the last step in the evolution of housing policy; there has been significant shifts from the non-interventionist attitudes in the early 1960s to renewal and demolition, followed by public housing, co-ops and private ownership.

3.8 Policy Evolution: Industrial and Economic Strategies

Economic and industrial policy evolution will cover the governmental strategies which deliberately served to expand, shrink or otherwise manipulate the economic health of the Southwest, including land-use zoning. Map 4 locates the relevant interventions.

3.8.1 Zoning. Drapeau tended to ignore regulatory mechanisms, such as zoning, in favour of a laissez-faire system:

The Drapeau administration placed few obstacles in the way of any development, big or small. A recent paper for the Economic Council of Canada has documented the relative absence of planning controls during the 1960s and 1970s. While other cities developed elaborate official plans and mechanisms for public involvement in planning, Montreal continued to make zoning decisions on an apparently ad hoc basis. Requests for zoning changes were channelled directly to the politicians on the executive committee before even being considered by the technical experts in the city’s planning and legal departments. Zoning laws were considered to be more a reflection of demands for the use of real estate in a given area than part of a system to shape and regulate such demands. (Sancton 1983, 71)

In 1963, the City adopted its zoning by-law (#2875) for the Southwest District (CREESOM 1989, 257). The bylaw’s intent was to better separate and compartmentalize land uses. Industry, which was an important user of land in the inner city, was zoned into three cumulative and exclusive classes: Class 1 was the least obnoxious and consisted of small manufacturers; Class 2 was warehouses and printing shops; Class 3 was heavy industry, found mostly along the Lachine Canal (Ibid.).
The effects of the 1963 zoning by-law was particularly felt in Griffintown. Griffintown as defined was re-zoned industrial, even though there were at least 3500 inhabitants at that time (Gabeline, Lanken & Pape 1974, 79). The decision reflected the belief that zoning should follow land use. Griffintown had always been mixed industrial in nature, and the city put this fact into law. The long-term effect of the new zoning was the replacement of housing with parking lots, print shops, bus depots and other uses which serviced the nearby CBD (Marvin 1975, 8). Griffintown became abandoned; it lost its parish status, the last school and church were torn down in 1970, and its population dropped to barely 800 in 1981 (Ibid.). By 1990, the area was being revitalized by 20000 Logements and private development (through spot rezonings), but much of the land remains vacant or is used for industrial incubation. As an example of the latter, more jobs were created in Griffintown between 1981 and 1988 than any of the other four neighbourhoods (CREESOM 1989, 228).

Conversely, Drapeau’s administration began to re-zone industrial space along the canal for residential purposes. Between 1981 and 1986, the city adopted eight spot modifications to the #2875 bylaw which ultimately transformed some vacant industrial land along the canal into condominiums (CREESOM 1989, 258). Jean Doré’s administration ended these conversions in favour of retaining industry, but the zoning modifications "ont contribuées à restreindre, de façon notable, l’offre d’espace pour les activités industrielles dans le Sud-Ouest, en favorisant ouvertement la conversion d’espaces industriels en espaces résidentiels" (Ibid., 261). Despite the re-zonings, massive restructuring has rendered irrelevant much of the industrial zoning along the Lachine Canal (City 1991a, 19).

3.8.2 Post-Olympic Strategies. The Olympic debacle convinced Drapeau that the grands projets could no longer be the basis for Montreal’s economic growth; what was needed was more
intervention at the neighbourhood level in order to keep business and people in the city (Léveillée & Whelan 1987, 159). In 1979, the city initiated CIDEM, or the Commission d'Initiative et de Développement Economique de Montréal. Its mission was to promote and coordinate economic development through and for the city (Macor 1982, 77). CIDEM managed two programs of importance to the Southwest: PRAIMONT (Programme de Rénovation des Aires Industrielles de Montréal) and the High-Technology Parks Programme.

PRAIMONT was to lend financial assistance to defray the costs of renovating old industrial sites through demolition, infrastructure improvement and the acquisition of buildings (Côté & Lachapelle 1989, G1). The industrial decline of Montreal, particularly in the Southwest, was a prime motivator for the program. Officially set up in 1983, the four objectives were as follows:

1. to stabilize the level of industrial activity and employment;
2. to respond to the needs of manufacturers, present and future;
3. to give old sites a new look; and
4. to favour a better integration of industry with the process and efforts of urban renovation. (Ibid., G4)

Four areas were initially chosen for the PRAIMONT. In the Southwest, the fifty hectare Bridge-Wellington site in the eastern section of Point St. Charles was first chosen for intervention. The cost of renovation was estimated at $25 million in 1985; in 1990, $8 million had been spent by the city, with another $10 million forthcoming from the Federal Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Technology (CREESOM 1989, 266). Thus far, 13.8 hectares of land along Bridge Street have been acquired, and infrastructure has been replaced along the site's streets, although work has been slowed by a lack of funds as well as soil decontamination (Ibid., 265). The fifty-hectare Cabot PRAIMONT, in Cote St. Paul, was initiated in 1985, and $4.3 million had been spent by 1990 out of an estimated $15 million cost (Ibid., 267).

The High-Technology Park Programme was initiated in 1987 as a result of the
recommendations of the Picard Report, which outlined Montreal’s seven economic development priorities: international activities; high technology; international finance and commerce; design; culture; tourism; and transportation (Quebec 1990, 119). In the Southwest, the unused short take-off and landing (STOL) runway (l’Adacport) site along the Bonaventure Autoroute was sold to CIDEM by the provincial and federal governments for $1 million (City 1991b, 1). The objective was to create an attractive location for high-tech companies that was only ten minutes from downtown and the Champlain Bridge, and to provide the catalyst for industrial incubation along the canal (St.Cyr 1992). Initial plans for the site, called the Technoparc, were drawn up in 1989, but the only occupant in 1990 was Teleglobe Canada (City 1991b, 6). Investments of $100 million are anticipated until 1996 (St.Cyr 1992).

There were several other programs which emphasized economic revitalization, most notably PIQA (Programme d’Intervention dans les Quartiers Anciens). In older neighbourhoods, PIQA was supposed to preserve and increase neighbourhood quality, consolidate the housing stock, and maintain existing population levels (Côté & Lachapelle 1989, N1). Inspired by the example of NIP, PIQA was created by the city in 1979 (Ibid.). The program was completely funded by the city. Later, 20000 Logements took over a large portion of PIQA’s resources (Ibid., N5). There were eleven PIQA interventions in Montreal, of which five were in the Southwest: one in St.Henri, three in Point St.Charles and one in Cote St.Paul (Macor 1982, 112). Each intervention was different, but all concentrated on urban physical amelioration, public services improvement, and community development (Ibid.).

SODIM (Société de Développement Industriel de Montréal) was created in 1981 as a not-for-profit para-municipal corporation to develop industrial and commercial real estate (City 1990a, 1). SODIM implemented two significant programs. The first was Revi-Centre, a city operation
subsidized by the province; it was designed to revitalize commercial activity in older neighbourhoods through tax incentives, direct subsidies for renovations, and commercial artery improvements (Côté & Lachapelle 1989, D1). The objectives of this program included the consolidation of the urban fabric and the rehabilitation of economic activity along commercial routes near the CBD (Ibid.). Four streets in the Southwest were chosen because of their central locations, levels of commercial activity and deterioration: Notre Dame in St.Henri, De l’Eglise in Cote St.Paul, and Charlevoix and Centre in Point St.Charles (Ibid., D3). A total sum of $29 million, of which 65% was provincial money, was spent on Revi-Centre until its termination in 1986 (City 1990a, 5). The second program, PROCIM (Programme de Coopération Industrielle de Montréal), was created in 1982 to provide municipal subsidies for the renovation of industrial buildings, and was partly designed to complement the infrastructure improvements of the PRAIMONT (CREESOM 1989, 261). A total of $4.1 million was spent in the Southwest by 1989 (Ibid., 262).

Given the high levels of unemployment in the Southwest, there has been a perceptible yet slow policy shift towards employment creation. CREESOM estimated in 1989 that $65 million is spent every year in the Southwest District by provincial and federal governments on welfare, unemployment and other forms of social security, but very little on job creation (Ibid., 133). Several national and provincial job creation programs existed for the district, but it was not until the 1990 plan that the issue of employment creation was specifically addressed by policymakers. The only important exception was the creation by the City of Montreal, Job Creation of Canada, and IMASCO of two "enterprise zones" in 1986 to serve as industrial incubators (Ibid., 220).

3.8.3 1990 Plan: Economic Aspects. On March 9th 1990, the City of Montreal unveiled its long-awaited revitalization plan for the Southwest District. The plan was the culmination of
several studies, notably the CREESOM report of 1989 and the city’s overview of the Southwest District in 1989. The latter had proposed specific action in the following areas:

1. consolidate and develop industrial spaces;
2. ameliorate industrial and transportation infrastructure;
3. support local commercial activity;
4. help the unemployed to find work;
5. diversify affordable housing opportunities for low-income households;
6. preserve and improve the ageing housing stock;
7. improve access to downtown and industrial zones;
8. redefine truck and transit routes;
9. improve links among the neighbourhoods;
10. establish among governments a decontamination policy;
11. improve all aspects of the canal vis-à-vis its surrounding neighbourhoods.

(Ibid., 28)

The majority of these recommendations had already been put forth in the 1977 Planning Department study. The March 1990 plan would incorporate these points, take into account the 1989 CREESOM Report, and place further emphasis on economic revitalization.

The March 1990 plan, titled Plan d’Action de la Ville de Montréal pour la relance économique du Sud-Ouest, was the responsibility of CIDEM. The plan was to address the overall economic decline of the Southwest District, especially the five inner-city neighbourhoods. The approach was to emphasize an intensification of current efforts with consultation from community organizations (City 1990c, 1). There were four areas of importance in the plan: revitalization of the local economy and employment, improvements in the road network, development of the canal, and accessibility to affordable housing and quality of environment (Ibid., 4). Map 5 shows the location of the expected interventions. The city would take part, over seven years, in the following actions:

1) Consolidation of land use and accessibility. This area of intervention would include:

1. continue to support the two PRAIMONT, and develop a new one along the canal, called Georges-Vanier ($27.9 million);
2. develop, through SODIM, an enterprise park along the canal, in order to create up to 8000 jobs and act as an incubator for industries ($330 million);
3. continue the PROCIM program of renovating industrial buildings ($3.6 million);
4. study the shores of the canal ($700 000); and
5. improve accessibility, by studying the Wellington and Guy-Bridge links, and improve transit service ($26 million). (Ibid., 10)

The Canal Enterprise Park was the most significant of the five interventions; SODIM would act as promoter, developer and constructor of a medium-density industrial and commercial park along the canal in Point St. Charles, which is to attract light industry, offices and workshops which need proximity to the CBD (City 1990a, 8). The sixty hectares will encompass close to 2 million square feet of office space. As the first step, SODIM acquired the Nordelec Building (the former Northern Telecom, it is the largest brick building in North America) and its 1.2 million square feet (Ibid.). SODIM teamed up with a private developer, Berma-Lalco, in order to leverage funds for the five-year project (Paré 1990a).

2) Consolidation of economic activity. This area would focus on two improvements: $5.9 million on the Atwater Market renovation and the $7.1 million revival of the Revi-Centre program for the commercial arteries of Notre Dame, De l'Église, Centre and Charlevoix (Ibid.).

3) Unemployment relief and socio-economic improvement. The two areas of importance included the maintenance of the housing stock through co-ops, renovation, shed demolition, and the decontamination of soils for housing purposes ($28 million), and secondly the creation of an enterprise-school to retrain the unemployed ($300 000) (City 1990c, 18).

4) Community development. $1.5 million will also go to RESO (Regroupement pour la relance Economique du Sud-Ouest), CREESOM's replacement, so that the CIDEM and SODIM could work with an umbrella community group in order to better suit the plan to local needs (Ibid., 13).
Complementing and expanding the city’s investments, the federal government, over five years, is to concentrate on soil decontamination ($10 million), loans to industry and enterprises ($63 million), housing ($6.5 million) and retraining ($32 million). The provincial government, also over five years, is to spend money on loans to manufacturers ($9 million), retraining ($5.4 million), PRAIMONT Georges-Vanier ($10 million), and RESO ($1.4 million). Table 5 shows the total investments of all governments, from 1990 to 1997.

**Table 5: 1990 Plan and investments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City of Montreal</th>
<th>PRAIMONT, PROCIM, canal study, infrastructure improvements, Atwater Market, Revi-Centre, housing, enterpriseschool, RESO</th>
<th>100 million dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SODIM and private sector</td>
<td>Canal Enterprise Park Inc.</td>
<td>330 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>Loans, retraining, PRAIMONT Georges-Vanier, RESO</td>
<td>26.5 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Decontamination, loans, housing, retraining</td>
<td>112 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$569 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that not all of the funding is necessarily new; several of the ongoing projects, such as PROCIM, Bridge-Wellington and Cabot PRAIMONT, retraining and soil decontamination were already earmarked for money before the 1990 plan, and were merely incorporated into it (Paré 1990c). Moreover, 55% of the total funding consisted of private investments to be managed by SODIM. Last, investments in infrastructure improvements and soil decontamination were long overdue, and there was a sense that their funding was postponed so that they could be included in the plan.
The evolution of the three policy fields ends with the 1990 plan. Community input through CREESOM played an important role in the fruition of the plan, as did Mayor Doré’s preference for holistic solutions to economic problems (Harris 1990). The plan was heralded by city officials, who said that "[the Canal Enterprise Park] will attract up to 8000 workers to the area when companies move into the new buildings" (Ibid.). Community organizations were more reserved, and expressed concern whether the new jobs would go to the inhabitants; there was praise, however, for the investments in housing, infrastructure and decontamination (Paré 1990c). At the very least, thirty years of piecemeal efforts had now been joined into one master plan for redevelopment.

The next chapter will look at the strengths and weaknesses of the policies, their impacts on the Southwest, as well as their evolution, relations to theory, and implications.
CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION, EVOLUTION AND SYNTHESIS OF POLICY

4.1 *Introduction to the Policy Analysis*

This chapter will evaluate the impacts and evolution of urban policies on Southwest Montreal. Policy, as defined in chapter 1, is a dynamic process, a course of action. Policy also includes the inaction of decision-makers, as Ham and Hill (1984) explain: "the concept of nondecision-making has become increasingly important in recent years, and it has been argued that much political activity is concerned with maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to the existing allocation of values" (12). Moreover, policy may serve a purely symbolic role, as rhetoric as opposed to action (Ibid., 16).

Policy analysis is difficult to define. Dye (1976) puts forth that "policy analysis is finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what differences it makes" (1). Policy analysis is not political science, because the latter explores the structures and institutions of government and the former is concerned with what government do (Ham & Hill 1984, 5). Policy analysis is interdisciplinary in its scope (Ibid., 11).

Policy analysis may be divided into two categories: analysis of policy and for policy (Ibid., 4). The analysis of policy is more an academic endeavour, while analysis for policy is an applied exercise to deal with issues of current importance (Ibid.). Ham and Hill (1984) provide seven varieties of policy analysis, the first three which deal exclusively with analysis of policy: studies of policy content, process and outputs (8). The evolution of policy on the Southwest (section 4.3) is a study of policy content, which traces the development of policies and their results (Ibid.). The fourth typology is evaluation studies or impact studies, and is the method of analysis used in section 4.2 (Strengths and Weaknesses of Policies). These studies "evaluate the impact policies have on the population" (Ibid.). The remaining three varieties analyze for policy, and
include information for policy making, process advocacy, and policy advocacy (Ibid.).

Analysis will be at the macro-level, examining the role of the state (at three levels) in affecting the Southwest. It is assumed that the analysis is not value-free. Three types of government intervention will be analyzed: intended and deliberate policies with direct impacts; unintended policies with direct impacts; and the lack of policies, the inaction of governments. The purpose of the evaluation will be to explicitly link the case study policies with the theories of inner-city change and conditions.

The impacts of the policies will be evaluated according to a number of criteria. The criteria are linked to the theories of inner-city change presented in chapter 2 and to McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer’s (1975) four types of inner cities (see page 12). The first criterion is whether the policy was a factor of decline (loss of population, decreasing socio-economic status, worsening physical conditions, increasing tenancy). For example, the Victoriatown renewal led to a decline in the housing stock and population. The second is whether the policy was a factor of stability (stable population, socio-economic status, physical conditions etc.). Stabilizing policies aimed at stopping decline or consolidating a revitalized area. For example, the late 1970s programmes (PIQA, PRAIMONT etc.) were designed to stabilize the declining inner cities both in economic and demographic terms. The third is whether the policy was a factor of revitalization (increasing socio-economic status, improving physical conditions). For example, several of the policies within the 1990 plan aim at re-industrializing the Southwest. Since several policy impacts do not clearly fall into these categories, the criteria are organized along a continuum. For example, expressway construction is clearly a factor of decline, but the Petite Bourgogne renewal would be in some ways be a factor of decline (loss of population, influx of public housing etc.) and stability (renewed housing stock). The 1990 plan falls between stabilization and revitalization.
It is assumed that impacts will be evaluated in terms of the majority of the population, which has always been predominantly poor and working-class. Thus, policies which promote revitalization may potentially be harmful to large segments of the population. The consistency of the policies (Leung 1985, 68-80) will also be a factor in the evaluation. For instance, policies may be inconsistent in their internal logic, including inconsistent assumptions and concepts, values, information and point of view.

4.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Policies

This section evaluates important policies (transportation, housing, economic/industrial in that order) which impacted upon the Southwest. The three factors (decline, stability, revitalization) will be covered first. The conclusion will provide an overview of the roles the three levels of government played in policy intervention.

4.2.1 Factors of Decline. The purpose here is to link theory of inner-city decline with the case study. Centrifugal forces in the form of deindustrialization were certainly present in the Southwest. The decline of the Southwest, from a centre of Canadian industry to an inner city in distress, occurred over a few decades (1940s to 1970s). The economic forces which led to this decline are well-known: decentralization of industry, obsolescence, and changes in manufacturing processes. Bourne’s (1978) pull factor, structural change and obsolescence explanations for inner-city decline all conform with the Southwest’s experience.

Policy furthered decline in several instances. The construction of expressways led to demographic, physical and socio-economic decline in the Southwest. The intention of the autoroutes was to provide CBD access and to "clean up" the city; the Victoriatown renewal is a case in point. The first two expressways, the Bonaventure (10) and Autoroute 15, caused some damage to the urban fabric of the neighbourhoods, notably the latter’s infringement through Cote
St. Paul. Since the 1966 construction, De l’Eglise street has suffered noise and atmospheric pollution, which has lowered property values (Auger et al. 1992, 13). Moreover, the section to the east of the autoroute became more difficult to access (Ibid.). Last, there are few means with which to access the two expressways from the Southwest: there are two ramps to the 15, and only one to the 10. The overall effect has been to further isolate the inner city.

The Ville-Marie Autoroute (720) was particularly negative in its effects, as numerous demolitions occurred before and during construction. The autoroute’s right of way crossed residential areas for the most part. If the other two expressways were somewhat justified given the upcoming Expo ’67, the 720 was less so because it expressly involved the destruction of housing and the disruption of the inner-city fabric (Carlos & Lavigne 1975, 33). The demolition of housing in poor neighbourhoods, in itself negative, also implied that those who had to relocate were the least equipped to do so (Ibid., 39). The 720 cut through some of the densest and poorest neighbourhoods in Montreal, reduced the stock of affordable housing in these neighbourhoods, and again served to isolate the inner city. Top-down planning and a thorough lack of public input were common themes to all three expressways. Commercial activity along Notre Dame street in St. Henri never recovered from the disruptive effect of the 720 on its clients, so that the Revi-Centre intervention became necessary.

Bourne’s (1978) unintended policy hypothesis is somewhat useful in explaining the Southwest’s decline, especially with regard to the expressway policies. These unintended policies "were designed to achieve other results and objectives, such as transportation improvements, but when combined have had the side-effect of creating or accelerating many of the traditional inner-city problems" (36). The construction of highways in the Montreal CMA, between 1955 and 1975, totalled 400 kilometres, and between 1966 and 1979 24 000 hectares of land were
developed (Quebec 1990, 77). The industrial and demographic decentralization of Montreal
could not have occurred without the highway construction. The unintended effects of this policy
was urban sprawl and the diminution of the City of Montreal’s importance: in 1951, the city had
67.8% of the CMA’s population, and in 1986 the proportion had dropped to 35.1% (Ibid.). The
specific impacts on the inner city are impossible to measure, but they were certainly direct. For
example, many of the industries which left the Southwest moved to locations along suburban
highways (CREESOM 1989, 31). Moreover, by neglecting the inner city and supporting
suburban housing, public policy unintentionally disfavoured inner-city locations (Quebec 1990).

A large measure of policy intervention in the Southwest between 1963 and 1972 consisted of
urban renewal. Urban renewal was supposed to improve the physical and social conditions of
inner-city residents, and to provide them with affordable housing (CREESOM 1989, 271). The
reverse occurred in the Victoriatown renewal: the city destroyed an affordable and safe
neighbourhood, and did not build housing elsewhere to replace it.

The destruction of Victoriatown was relatively easy, because its location was isolated and
evidently undesirable. The displacement of the residents was difficult, as apparent in a 1966 City
of Montreal report on the fate of relocated inhabitants. It was found that former residents of
Victoriatown paid 27% higher rent and 50% higher room rent, 46% found that the new housing
was worse, and 59% said that the new rents were too high (Melamed, Schaecter & Emo 1984,
31). Residents were bitter about the forced relocation: one inhabitant of 33 years said that "it
will be difficult for me to try to adapt to adapt to another district. Why couldn’t they just let us
live in peace instead of forcing us to move out and disperse ourselves throughout the city?"
(Ibid., 35). The irony is that the project did not attain one of its objectives, which was to placate
lobby groups calling for renewal; ironic as well is the current state of the land, vacant for the
past fifteen years, and worth less in 1981 than in 1962, according to CMHC (Melamed 1981, 169).

The Petite Bourgogne renewal project, although far broader in scope and more well-intentioned, produced similar negative impacts. Two negative impacts were readily apparent. The first was the impoverishment of the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood: in 1961, 10% of the population was on social assistance, while in 1971 the proportion had increased to 40% (CREESOM 1989, 277). This was due partly to the introduction of public housing, but more importantly to the numerous demolitions which led to an out-migration of the economically-mobile inhabitants, who could afford to house themselves in other areas of the city (Ibid.). These wealthier inhabitants could not return to Petite Bourgogne after the demolitions because their earnings were too high for purposes of public housing (Ibid.).

The second impact was the massive tear in the fabric of the neighbourhood, both physical and social, between 1966 and the early 1980s. In effect, population dropped by half between 1966 and 1981, as did the housing stock (Melamed 1981, 171). Older housing almost disappeared: only 20% of the 1991 housing stock had "survived" the renewal period (built pre-1960) (Canada 1992). In particular, Drapeau's opposition to public housing created a lag in the years 1966 to 1969, when demolitions were occurring without any subsequent construction of low-rental housing, thereby displacing poor residents to other neighbourhoods (Melamed 1981, 167). This process did not improve greatly in the 1970s, due to federal restraint, and the renewal area had the look of a "perpetual building site" (Barcelo 1988, 36).

Zoning policy was detrimental in demographic terms to the Southwest. The rezoning of Griffintown, from residential to industrial, displayed a lack of respect for the existing neighbourhoods, and illustrated the powerlessness of the neighbourhood vis-à-vis the top-down
and centralized authority of the Drapeau administration. The rezoning was, however, consistent
with the rational planning model of the 1960s which enabled other uses to encroach upon the so-
called "zone in transition". As previously noted, industrial uses encroached on residential uses
to the detriment of the existing population. One Griffintowner related that "maybe the place was
kind of falling apart, but it wasn't a bad place to live. When you were born there and you go
back and see all the parking lots, it hurts" (Gabeline, Lanken & Pape 1974, 74). Several of the
houses which currently exist in the industrial zones are non-conforming, which means it is
difficult to replace, upgrade or add to the housing stock. There have been recent spot rezonings
in Griffintown which allow for residential uses, but the new dwellings are exclusively upscale
housing for CBD workers (Sévigny 1992).

It should also be realized that both St.Henri and Point St.Charles are characterized by non-
conforming residential and industrial uses, conflicts in land use which the city has yet to resolve.
Moreover, current zoning along the canal is outdated by thirty years: "la réglementation actuelle
en matière d'industrie souffre de l'absence totale de contrôle de la forme du développement; on
ne retrouve aucune norme en termes de hauteur, de densité ou d'implantation. Il va sans dire
qu'en l'absence de normes élémentaires, on ne retrouve aucune exigence en termes de qualité
des constructions" (City 1991b, 19). As well, the 1980s rezonings along the canal to enable
housing (condominiums) angered many community groups who wanted the area to remain
industrial and non-speculatory (Sévigny 1992).

Bourne's (1978) exploitation hypothesis is useful in explaining part of the Southwest's decline.
The city is "manipulated" to suit certain groups, while those who are less powerful have less
input. As Bourne notes, "everyone knows that the problem with the central cities is that
decisions made on their behalf are not made by people who live there" (40). In Drapeau's
Montreal, the inner city had no voice at all, given autocratic rule and a declining population.

Any study of the policies of decline must also include the fiscal poverty of Montreal over the 1970s, when overspending on the Olympic Games was a significant drain on the (decreasing) revenues. In particular, infrastructure was ignored (Picard & Gibbon 1993). In the 1980s, faced with increasing inter-urban competition, Montreal tried to cut back on programs and services, which could only be detrimental to the Southwest (St.Cyr 1992).

The policies of neglect and decline may be construed by many inner-city inhabitants as being purposeful and willful. One Point St.Charles resident in the 1970s had this opinion: "I think there’s somebody up in City Hall who’s decided to keep this area poor" (Gableine, Lanken & Pape 1974, 75). In a sense, some governmental action may have additionally burdened the Southwest. Many of the 1960-1979 policies worsened the overall decline, by demolishing housing, displacing significant amounts of residents and isolating by way of expressway. It was not until the 1980s did policy begin to consistently benefit the Southwest.

It may be argued that the Southwest’s decline was caused to a not insignificant extent by neglectful and negative governmental policies. The decline may also have been partly caused by the direct but unintended impacts of housing and transportation policies which encouraged sprawl to the detriment of the inner city (Bourne 1978, 70). It should not be assumed, therefore, that the Southwest’s decline was natural and inevitable, and that it had to have occurred at the time it did.

4.2.2. Factors of Stability. Factors of stability contribute to the improvement in living conditions of the inhabitants. Policies which maintained population levels and population mix, and which stabilized physical conditions and socio-economic status are included. Policies served mainly to stop the decline in situ and to stop decline from spreading.
Transportation improvements, which were needed in part to counter the isolating effect of the expressways, were slow in implementation. Accessibility was markedly improved by the advent of the Metro stations (Sijpkes 1990, 187). Truck traffic remains a problem, however, as is the access to the CBD and between neighbourhoods (Sévigny 1992). It is of note that some improvements came directly from local community action, such as the #59 bus, which links the southern half of Point St. Charles (below the tracks) with the upper half along the canal.

A stabilizing factor in the Petite Bourgogne renewal was the large quantity of public housing which was constructed between 1969 and 1980. No other neighbourhood in Montreal contains such a high proportion of housing protected from market forces, with 51% of the 1986 stock low-rental in nature and a further amount as cooperatives. The drawback to this situation is that Petite Bourgogne has become somewhat a ghetto for the poor, exactly the opposite of what was intended in 1966 (Melamed 1981, 173).

The policies of public housing, as well as subsidized housing renovation and NIP, were beneficial in that the housing stock was renewed, improved and stabilized. NIP was not open to public input, however, and had more the characteristics of the housing renovation program. Though insufficient to completely allay the housing problems of the inner city, the programs were instrumental in ameliorating the living conditions of the inhabitants (Linteau 1992, 518). One negative impact of the renovation policy was the rise in value of the improved housing, as well as a rise in rents. This impact had the effect of displacing the poorest from the neighbourhoods while attracting more affluent outsiders (Dansereau 1987, 63).

Cooperative housing was also beneficial to the Southwest, as it enabled community groups to control a portion of the overall housing policy. Specifically, co-ops ensured protection from the worst excesses of the market, and allowed former residents of the neighbourhoods to return in
an affordable manner (Sévigny 1992). The 1990 plan was applauded by many community
groups, because the investments in the housing stock would further improve the living conditions
of the inhabitants (Ibid.). By promoting cooperatives, the plan took into account the fact that
many successful inhabitants had to leave the Southwest because they could no longer qualify for
public housing (Ibid.). To a large extent, housing policy has improved since the 1960s period
of renewal. The continuous upgrading of the housing stock, however, through renovations, NIP
and Opération 20000 Logements, has made it difficult for some inhabitants to remain in their
neighbourhoods, unless they live in the 25% of the housing stock which is protected from market
forces.

The post-Olympic shift to neighbourhood stabilization was a welcome change from the
intrusive and non-specific planning of the 1960s and 1970s. Physical amelioration, a common
policy response to decline among city governments, was aimed at improving the commercial,
industrial and residential qualities of inner-city neighbourhoods. Decline was slowed by much-
needed infusions of public funds. The impacts of several of the programs, such as Revi-Centre
and PIQA, were beneficial in terms of physical infrastructure; of course, in the late 1970s, any
support from the city was considered helpful. Both programs featured little public input. For
example, Point St.Charles residents tried to prevent the rebuilding of a non-conforming industrial
building within the confines of a PIQA zone, but were denied by CIDEM (Macor 1982, 123-4).

The PRAIMONT program, supported by PROCIM, aimed at refurbishing old industrial sites,
is another example of physical amelioration. The program reflected the city’s belief that some
inner-city industrial land should be retained as well as improved. The effects of PRAIMONT
on the land market are not entirely known. It is understood that this governmental intervention,
occurring due to a lack of private investment in the inner city, tends to inflate land prices and
distort the real worth of the land, because the city needs to recoup its spendings (St.Cyr 1992). Finally, given the footloose nature of modern capitalism, it will take more than physical improvement to lure industry into the inner city (CREESOM 1989, 268).

Stabilization policies have been disproportionately used in the Southwest. If there are many who feel the Southwest has been neglected, there has still been significant policy interventions: with 5.4% of Montreal’s population, the Southwest has 12% of cooperative housing, 21% of government-supported housing renovations, 20% of the public housing, 16.5% of the 20000 Logements, two of four PRAIMONTs, five of eleven PIQAs, and four of twenty Revi-Centre interventions. Public policy has evidently followed the strategy of enriching existing areas in need, a common policy initiative in North America since the 1960s (Ley 1983, 359). Although difficult to measure the effects of stabilizing policies, there were no significant population losses in the Southwest in the 1980s.

4.2.3 Factors of Revitalization. Theories on gentrification and economic revitalization will be linked to policies. Policies which increased the socio-economic status and improved physical conditions are considered as revitalizing.

The impacts of the revitalization of the Lachine Canal have generally been positive. Despite the difficulties encountered with issues of water quality and industrial abandonment, the "Lachine Canal is already Montreal’s classic example of how an abandoned, underused environment can be recycled for positive urban use" (Williams 1990, 69). The industrial heritage along the canal, certainly the most extensive in Canada, has not been sufficiently protected from redevelopment or demolition, but has survived to this day due to the low demand for its sites (Legault 1991, 10). This situation is changing, however, as rezonings and city-supported industrial redevelopment put pressure on the land.
The Opération 20000 Logements produced less beneficial impacts to the majority of the inhabitants of the Southwest. It should be noted that the program was consistent with its objectives, which were to promote housing in the city, repopulate inner-city areas, and focus attention on the private market as a means of urban redevelopment. The program built a total of 19634 dwellings, developed 700 vacant lots, and 40% of those attracted were non-residents of Montreal (Quebec 1990, 79). Further, between 1976 and 1981, for every new household in the city two were created in the suburbs, while between 1981 and 1986 the ratio was more even (Ibid.). In the Southwest, many vacant lots were developed, and repopulation occurred in all the five neighbourhoods. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the clientele were generally wealthier, and the new housing raised property values (CREESOM 1989, 276). By enticing middle-class (and mostly empty-nester) households to locate in the inner city, the city was in effect subsidizing gentrification, or at least supplying the conditions for it. Land which could have been used for public housing was taken up by the program. In Petite Bourgogne, a third of the land originally entitled for public housing was instead used for the program, a decision which contradicted the 1966 plan, with its objective to preserve the social milieu of the neighbourhood (Melamed 1981, 173). The "back to the city" approach of the program was evidently short on social equality (Barcelo 1988, 38).

The supply-side explanation of gentrification acknowledges that government policy may create the conditions for upgrading to occur. Four policies are relevant: the Opération 20000 Logements, CBD development, the Lachine Canal revitalization, and zoning changes along the canal. Only the first and fourth policies were deliberately implemented to supply the conditions for gentrification. CBD development, heavily promoted by Drapeau in the 1950s and 1960s, was a key factor in the explosive growth of core employment, which increased the demand for inner-
city housing. The Lachine Canal revitalization unintentionally promoted gentrification: "the canal has...received park designation and the creation of bicycle trails and open space offer a positive externality to the new middle class" (Ley 1992, 241). Demand for this upgraded space made the 1980s zoning changes along the canal necessary. It is evidently difficult to separate market forces from policy initiatives, but it should be understood that the two were interrelated in some of the upgrading of the Southwest.

The 1990 plan is expected to have several beneficial impacts. First, the Southwest’s unique characteristics have been respected in terms of housing, transportation and commercial policies. The physical improvement of the canal will continue, and the problem of decontamination will be addressed. Re-training and community development has been emphasized. Sufficient evidence of public support, including initial physical improvements, has attracted some private sector funding, an almost impossible feat since extensive disinvesting began in the 1950s. Loans have been provided for industries in situ. Community groups have received funding so that the plan may more closely follow the desires of the residents. Ultimately, the decline of the Southwest is being addressed by all levels of government at the same time.

The Technoparc, a high-technology industrial park along the Bonaventure Autoroute, is still in its early stage. There has already been extensive praise and criticism. The location of the Technoparc is excellent, being in close proximity to the CBD, the Champlain Bridge, several Montreal universities, and to middle upper-class Nun’s Island. The site is completely new, having never been intensively used, so that problems of decontamination and obsolete buildings are few. Drawbacks include the lack of potential for significant employment creation, especially for the residents of the Southwest: "the City of Montreal has hitched its wagon of economic development to the high-tech horse despite its lack of promise for real, long-term job creation"
The policy of investing significant public funds into a project which is risky at best (most high-tech industries prefer to locate near the airport) is inconsistent in such a depressed area; there is little chance that unemployed and untrained workers from the Southwest will benefit (Duhamel 1992, 30). Given inter-urban competition, however, the City of Montreal felt it was necessary to attract high-technology firms as a priority (St.Cyr 1992).

Job creation is another policy which is rather ambiguous in its impacts. The 1989 CREESOM Report noted that close to 85% of all workers in the Southwest District did not live there (117). Labour is mobile, and few people live and work in the same neighbourhood (Duhamel 1992, 34). Job creation programs in the Southwest could conceivably lead to an exodus of qualified workers who no longer wish to live in substandard neighbourhoods (Sévigny 1992). Moreover, job creation tends to create employability and not jobs (CREESOM 1989, 144). The entire quality of life of the Southwest must be addressed if qualified people are to be retained.

Potential impacts also focus on the Canal Enterprise Park. The governmental efforts to attract new industries to the area may prove difficult, despite governmental subsidies and loans, because of the costs of decontamination, the lack of space available, and the monopolistic control of the industrial land market by SODIM (Duhamel 1992, 34). Land prices for the Canal Enterprise Park, together with decontamination costs, remain above many suburban industrial parks (Ibid.). Given these constraints and the lack of space for expansion, it is likely that only high-tech companies and those seeking incubation sites will desire to locate in the Enterprise Park (St.Cyr 1992). Unfortunately, Griffintown is both cheaper and closer to the CBD. As well, if high-tech industry is actually attracted, it is difficult to conceive it will provide jobs to the neighbourhoods: the city is promoting a high-prestige, high-tech industrial park in low-income inner cities where the local labour pool is insufficiently trained (Duhamel 1992, 34). The city...
may indeed be dreaming if they expect a surge of industries to return to Point St. Charles or St. Henri, given the current recession and a glut of developable industrial land on the Island of Montreal (Ibid.). Perhaps the city should, before spending public funds on industrial subsidization, remember the lesson of St. Henri, which went bankrupt in 1905 in its attempts to attract industry.

The case study does not contradict the contention of Filion and Bunting (1988), that policy cannot initiate societal changes in the inner city. Policy can, however, have significant impacts, both deliberate and unintentional, on the changing inner city. Policy can create the conditions for inner-city decline, stability and revitalization. The inaction of governments to address the Southwest’s decline was also significant.

4.2.4 Levels of Government. The federal government, over the thirty year period, has played a largely behind-the-scenes role in impacting upon the Southwest. Few interventions were exclusively undertaken by the federal government, save for the Lachine Canal revitalization. Instead, Ottawa tended to legally enable and financially support policies, such as urban renewal, NIP, expressways and housing renovation. This support was given either directly to the city or through the Province of Quebec. The 1990 plan was further evidence that the federal government is willing to support urban regeneration in the Southwest in a partnership capacity.

Federal policy has been, however, uncoordinated, implicit and fractured, not surprising given the historic state of Canadian urban policy (Artibise & Kiernan 1988, 11). For most of the period, federal policy was entirely passive and non-specific to the Southwest. Pro-active policies, such as job creation programs tailored for the Southwest, were not implemented until the 1990 plan.
The provincial government was also relatively absent from policy implementation of a specific nature on the Southwest. Apart from the expressway construction, the province did not undertake any direct policies until the 1990 plan. Implicitly, however, the province supported peripheral development (to the detriment of the inner city) in the 1960s and 1970s through highway construction, while in the 1980s a more centralizing policy was followed (for example, support for the 20000 Logements). The provincial government tended to allow Montreal a free hand in much of urban policy matters, particularly before the Olympic Games debacle (Barcelo 1988, 37). In the 1960-76 period, the provincial government supported Drapeau in order to "demonstrate the Liberals' pro-urban, pro-Montreal leanings, to provide some tangible monuments for both the city and provincial new orders, and to bolster Drapeau in his battle with the old guard and the local remnants of Duplessis' army" (Kaplan 1982, 414).

Overall, the provincial government, as well as the federal government, ignored Montreal's decline in the 1970s. Despite the warnings of the Higgins-Martin-Raynauld report of 1970, which pointed to the fragility of Montreal as a development pole in Quebec and Canada, "both governments have, since 1970, concentrated their regional development policies on the rest of the province. What little attention was paid to Montreal was in an irregular fashion" (Canada 1986, 15). Moreover, "governments have failed to recognize the role played by Montreal, particularly in the economy of Quebec. Montreal is the only city in the province that could lay claim to the role of development hub" (Ibid., 29). Large-scale infrastructure tended to be located outside of the city, such as Mirabel Airport, while the province concentrated on peripheral development. Marcel Sévigny, current councillor for Point St.Charles-Petite Bourgogne,

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4 The "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec, beginning in 1960 with the Liberal government of Jean Lesage, was a movement against the stifling reign of Premier Duplessis (1944-59). At the urban level, Drapeau initially symbolized the forces of this reform (see Barcelo 1988 for further discussion on urban politics in post-1960 Montreal).
corroborated this evidence by complaining of the lack of federal and provincial leadership in urban affairs by those elected from the Southwest. The city lacks a clear voice in the higher levels of government and is hampered by a disjointed regional system (Picard & Gibbon 1993).

The local level, and specifically the City of Montreal, has played an active role in policymaking on the Southwest. Despite Drapeau's non-interventionist stance prior to 1978, the city was unafraid to infringe upon the inner city, through renewal projects, public housing and rezonings. These interventions were usually for some ulterior motive, such as CBD development or the upcoming Expo '67. After 1978, the city implemented programs which were specific to declining inner cities, such as PRAIMONT, PIQA, Revi-Centre, Opération 20000 Logements and others. The city was financially supported by higher levels of government but was given freedom of policy formulation and implementation. At the neighbourhood level, input was extremely limited until Doré's entry in 1986. Drapeau was against local interests and parochial interests running city policy, and as a consequence local elected officials were consistently unable to express the wishes of their constituencies (Kaplan 1982, 408).

In conclusion, local government played the most important policy role, although higher levels of government could take precedence and did on several occasions (Lachine Canal, Ville-Marie Autoroute). Local autonomy in policymaking was significant but was of little benefit to inner-city neighbourhoods. Strengths and weaknesses of policies ran the spectrum from highly negative (expressways) to fairly positive (1990 plan).

### 4.3 Evolution of Policies

This section will outline, characterize and delineate four distinct periods of policymaking on the Southwest.
4.3.1 1960-1972: Period of Infringement. This period was characterized by rationalist top-down planning from the city, province and the federal government. In particular, Drapeau was at his most powerful, winning every municipal election (1960, 1962, 1966, 1970) by large margins. Drapeau focused most of his attention on CBD development and the World’s Fair. Interventions in the inner city were of secondary importance, unless they contributed to the abovementioned priorities. Policy in the inner city concentrated on expressway construction and urban renewal. The declining Southwest economy received scant attention, as Drapeau fully expected the grands projets to sustain the city. This approach evidently "ignored the concerns of ordinary citizens, especially the poor. There was no large program of housing construction, and there was little attention to employment, retraining, and other programs for the unemployed" (Léveillé & Whelan 1987, 157).

Montreal had a ward system during this period, but despite its existence neighbourhood concerns were rarely met. Drapeau insisted on party solidarity and discipline; the city was essentially run by two men, Drapeau and Lucien Saulnier, President of the Executive Committee (Sancton 1983). Drapeau had been elected in 1960 on a wave of reform but instead instituted highly-centralized control. Given continued electoral support, Drapeau saw no reason shift his policies. The single-minded urban policies of this period were more than just neglectful; their implementation "was unnecessarily and willingly ruthless for the lower-income groups, particularly in the Central Area and its peripheral districts" (Barcelo 1988, 38). The 1960-72 period may be summed up by this quote:
En investissant autant dans les grands projets, l'administration Drapeau est amenée à négliger certains besoins importants des citoyens et c'est la critique qui lui est le plus fréquemment adressé. Elle ne porte pas suffisamment d'attention à la gestion du développement interne de la ville et au contrôle de son aménagement. Les nombreuses démolitions qu'entraînent les interventions publiques et celles des promoteurs privés contribuent au déperissement des zones anciennes. L'administration tarde à s'intéresser au développement des espaces verts et aux problèmes de l'habitation. Elle n'est pas suffisamment sensibilisée au déclin économique de Montréal et au chômage qu'il engendre et n'a d'autres solutions à proposer que les grands projets de prestige. (Linteau 1992, 539)

4.3.2 1973-1978: Period of Neglect. This period was characterized by its paucity of policy interventions. Notwithstanding the NIP in St.Henri North and the continued construction of public housing (1200 units between 1973 and 1977), public policy was mostly passive in nature. Neglect on the part of Drapeau may be attributed to the 1976 Olympic Games: it is estimated that 120 000 units of low-rental housing could have been built for the cost of the Games, in the city with the worst slums in Canada (Ley 1983, 300). Quebec City remained aloof, while the federal government began to express interest in the Lachine Canal. The canal, which had fallen into disrepair after its closing in 1968, was deemed a National Historic Park in 1974 and Ottawa began a process of planning for its revitalization. As well, federal interest and support in urban affairs and the inner city reached a high-water mark with NIP, RRAP, MSUA and the 1975 McLemore, Aass and Keilhofer report.

4.3.3 1979-85: Period of Stabilization. The combined effects of the Olympic overspending, the 1978 challenge to Drapeau's mayorship, and the early 1980s recession persuaded the City of Montreal to shift its policy focus. In effect, after being "badly burned by the cost overruns and corruption surrounding Drapeau's last development extravaganza -the 1976 Olympics- the city shifted its redevelopment focus towards local concertation: the bringing together of community actors to develop strategic, locally based revitalization plans" (Levine 1989, 144). The city
implemented Opération 20000 Logements, PIQA, Revi-Centre, PRAIMONT and PROCIM. CIDEM and SODIM were created. It should be noted that these programs did not offer substantial public input, but were certainly an improvement from the diktats of the 1960-72 period. Population losses were consolidated. In addition, the regional transit authority installed five metro stations in the Southwest, thereby increasing accessibility and stability.

The provincial government began to strengthen existing built-up areas as opposed to peripheral development, by subsidizing stabilizing city programmes. The federal government began in earnest the revitalization of the Lachine Canal with the 1979 Master Plan. The mandate was given to Parks Canada to redevelop the shores and the waters of the canal.

4.3.4 1986-1990: Period of Concerted Revitalization. The election of Jean Doré in November 1986 represented a shift in inner-city policymaking in Montreal (Léveillé & Léonard 1988). Planning, public input and an open policy process became priorities. Although Doré continued many of the post-Olympic programs, he tailored policies to better suit inner cities in distress (Ibid., 145). In the East End of Montreal, suffering as well from economic decline, the city implemented a revitalization plan in conjunction with the Comité pour la relance de l’économie et de l’emploi de l’Est de Montréal (CREEEM); in 1988, the city committed $90 million to the plan, and had persuaded Quebec City and Ottawa to spend a further $150 million (Ibid.). The 1990 plan for the Southwest is similar in scope and is typical of Doré’s support for public input and concerted policy. It remains to be seen, however, if the 1990 plan can fulfil its loftier goals of economic regeneration.

Municipal and regional officials also set out to prioritize Montreal’s economic strengths and weaknesses, in the Picard Report (1987) and the Regional Strategy for Employment Creation (1990) (Quebec 1990, 120). The 1990 plan reflected this shift by ensuring that the majority of
the funds would be spent on economic regeneration. The higher levels of government were more involved in this period, as exemplified by the 1990 plan.

In conclusion, policies on the Southwest have evolved significantly, from "zone in transition" infringement to comprehensive revitalization plans. The common thread throughout the thirty-year period was a general lack of direct federal and provincial intervention, significant local policymaking, and a neglect of neighbourhood input by the city. The next section discusses how the case study is similar and different to the other inner cities in Canada.

4.4 Comparisons

The experience of the Southwest in inner-city Canada is both typical and unique. The decline of the Southwest was similar to other inner cities in Canada, such as the Winnipeg core area. The decline was perhaps more precipitous than elsewhere in Canada, however: a 50% population drop in twenty-five years, extensive disinvestment, and the absolute loss of 28000 jobs between 1959 and 1988. Gentrification, pandemic across urban Canada, also occurred in the Southwest. Renewal in Strathcona in Vancouver (Lai 1988) may provide a counterpart to the Southwest. The 1990 plan was similar in many respects to the Core Area Initiative in Winnipeg, especially in the field of economic revitalization. The evolution of policy on the Southwest followed to an extent the national (federal) trend, which meant top-down renewal and "zone in transition" policies in the 1960s, NIP and RRAP in the 1970s (although lacking in public input), and large-scale revitalization in the 1980s. The rationalist planning method dominated the 1960s in the Southwest no less than it did elsewhere in Canada.

In comparing the Southwest to other Canadian inner cities, it was put forth that public input and opposition was minimal. This is not to say that neighbourhoods in the Southwest did not
organize themselves when governmental action was lacking. The Southwest is one of the more institutionally complete inner cities in Canada, with a myriad of community groups (CREESOM 1989). In the late 1960s, under community pressure, the first non-profit housing cooperative in Canada to be subsidized by the state appeared in Point St.Charles (Sijpkes 1990, 187). In 1985, the first community economic development project in Montreal was initiated in Point St.Charles. The project's main success "has been as a strong voice to pressure the municipal and provincial governments to inject money into the local economy" (Shragge 1991, 31). The project developed into a district-wide organization called RESO (Regroupement Economique Sud-Ouest) and became, for the purpose of developing the 1989 report, CREESOM (Ibid.).

The role of community development has been strongly supported by Marcel Sévigny, city councillor for Point St.Charles-Petite Bourgogne since 1986. He related in a 1992 interview that the Southwest must still lobby forcefully to receive public housing, cooperatives and infrastructure improvements despite the openness of the Montreal policy field since 1986. In addition, the 1990 plan, formulated largely by local organizations, does not attempt to solve all of the Southwest's problems. Sévigny warned that the Southwest cannot depend on government for its recovery, but rather on the strength of its community organizations. Policy on the Southwest, Sévigny explained, must be formulated in the community and then lobbied to the government, and no longer the opposite. He concluded by saying that the political power of the Southwest has declined with its population, so that there must be community solidarity in order to obtain governmental action.

There are several factors which made the Southwest experience quite different from the rest of Canada, although fairly similar to other Montreal inner cities. First, unlike many inner cities, such as Strathcona and the Winnipeg core area, few ethnic or racial groups populate the
Southwest. The clear majority of the population is either French or English (British Isles) in origin, with a concentration of Italians in Cote St.Paul and blacks in Petite Bourgogne. The ethnic stability of the Southwest has changed little despite economic restructuring, massive depopulation and extensive renewal. Few recent immigrants have made the Southwest their home. Second, the construction of expressways was more extensive and destructive than in probably any other Canadian inner city. Third, the level of public input into planning and policy formulation was extremely limited, in direct contrast to the citizen movements in Strathcona (Melliship 1985) or the NIP experience in Toronto (Filion 1988). In particular, it was only in Montreal that NIP became an exercise in top-down planning. Fourth, this era of top-down planning lasted much longer in Montreal, due to the influence of Drapeau.

The Southwest may well have more in common with American inner cities, in terms of decline, neglect and highway construction, but is more Canadian in terms of crime rates and racial composition. The policies of decline which impacted on the Southwest were in many ways stronger and more negative than elsewhere in Canada. Southwest Montreal is unique as Canada’s first industrial neighbourhood and one of its worst slums; its "revitalization would provide the Canadian counterpoint to the gentrification of Harlem" (Ley 1992, 241).

In conclusion, this chapter has evaluated the impacts of intended and unintended policies, traced their evolution, assessed the performance of the three levels of government, related the case study to theories of inner-city change, compared the Southwest to other inner cities, and outlined several policy implications. The final chapter will summarize the major findings of the thesis, speculate on future trends, and propose further areas of study.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications

The study of inner-city public policy in Canada, using the case study of Southwest Montreal, has resulted in a number of findings. These findings deal with the evolution and impacts of public policy on the changing Canadian inner city, as well as the specific lessons which may be derived from the Southwest Montreal experience.

The case study brought out the following findings regarding the evolution and impacts of public policy on the inner city:

1) The changes in public policy on the inner city have been significant, from 1960s top-down planning to 1990s public participation, as evidenced by renewal and expressway construction in the 1960s to more participatory and holistic revitalization plans in the 1980s and 1990s.

2) The evolution of public policy is affected by many factors, including a powerful local authority, differing policy responses to restructuring, and provincial-municipal relations which may make one city's evolution quite distinct from another.

3) The direct and indirect but unintended impacts of policies cannot be ignored, as they may have far-reaching effects on the inner city (decentralization and gentrification in particular).

4) The inaction and neglect of governments can be just as important as the action and attention of governments, especially to an inner city in decline.

5) The effects and effectiveness of government are varied. Faced with urban structural changes, governments have been relatively ineffective, suggesting a dominant role of market forces in shaping the inner city. It is also difficult to revitalize distressed areas without dislocating residents. Decline may be a wicked problem to solve—it is easier to ameliorate the worst effects of decline. Governments are arguably, however, the single most important actor in the development of the inner city.

6) Despite the fact that municipalities are creatures of the province, the local level of government may play the most important role in inner-city public policy.
7) Government action is not enough to initiate macro-societal change (household size, shifts in employment structures etc.) in the inner city, but is enough to promote decline, stabilization and revitalization in varying degrees. Government action may also serve to differentiate conditions at the neighbourhood level: the generic decline of the Southwest in the 1960s became highly differentiated in the 1980s, with increasing revitalization in Petite Bourgogne, Griffintown and along the Lachine Canal, with stability/slow decline in the other neighbourhoods. Policy may in part explain these differences, especially the 20000 Logements and the rezonings along the canal.

8) Upgrading has occurred in the Southwest, despite decline, which tends to support Ley’s (1992) thesis of pervasive and chaotic gentrification. Similarly, decline has become differentiated among the neighbourhoods, compared to the more generic experiences of the 1960s and 1970s.

9) The nexus between policy and inner-city change, and the impact of policy, is not always clear-cut.

10) The inner city performs specialized and changing functions within the city. These functions have frequently been ignored by policymakers, who have traditionally put forth policies which treat the inner city as a zone in transition.

To conclude the analysis, it is important to understand both the role of public policy in the inner city, as well as the inner-city’s place within the field of urban policy. Two general lessons of the Southwest Montreal experience (1960-1990) may in part be summarized as follows: public input, if lacking, may prove disastrous to the locale, and that the failure of governments to address the real problems of the inner city in the post-industrial era (economic development, employment training and income maintenance) only furthers decline. The post-industrial shift is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the traditional inner city, and planning must somehow deal with these new sets of economic and social parameters. The case study suggested that policy has lagged behind the structural changes, and has not been capable of steering them in ways beneficial to the inner city.

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Three general recommendations for future policy on Southwest Montreal are as follows:

1) more public input is needed, especially in terms of economic revitalization.

2) more attention should be paid to policies which stabilize the overall living conditions of the inhabitants. Councillor Sévigny was emphatic on this recommendation, stating that the majority of the beneficial policies on the Southwest consisted of stabilization measures aimed at retaining residents in their neighbourhoods. Most inhabitants, according to Sévigny, do not want to leave the Southwest. Stabilization, at least to community groups and local politicians, is a means to an end in itself.

A caveat may be offered to the second recommendation. Long-term change behooves policymakers to not necessarily target "inordinate amounts of government economic assistance [stabilizing policies] -especially, capital improvements, housing rehabilitation, and new construction funds -to accommodate low- and moderate-income household needs in central cities...[because] it may be short-sighted and a misallocation of funds" (Gale 1984, 165). This caveat is based on an economic rationale; inordinate amounts of social assistance, for the purposes of stability, would not be a misallocation of funds to neighbourhoods in distress.

3) more attention should also be paid to policies which aim at economic regeneration, which was obviously lacking for much of the Southwest's decline. Specifically tailored employment programs are a priority for an inner city in decline. Stable and healthy living conditions (recommendation 2) will ensure that those who do become employed need not leave the community.

5.2 Speculation on Future Trends

The Southwest plan of 1990 concluded the study of policy evolution. There have been several important policy documents which have appeared since the summer of 1990. In June 1991, Le Plan des Abords du Canal de Lachine (Plan of the Lachine Canal Lands) was put forth by the City Planning Department. It was the first specific plan for an area outside of the CBD, and had been called for by community groups worried about the future of the canal (Sévigny 1992). The mandate of the plan was to explore and propose solutions to the stubborn problems of the canal and its neighbouring lands, such as zoning inconsistencies and industrial heritage sites, among others (City 1991a).

The 1990 plan has been slow in proceeding, especially the Canal Enterprise Park. This torpor may be attributed to the recession and the high costs of soil decontamination (Ibid.). Moreover,
several private developers working with SODIM have dropped out, including Berma-Lalco (Ibid.).

In the summer of 1992, the City of Montreal released its initial master plan for the city as well as the eight districts, including the Southwest. The Southwest master plan to a large extent follows the 1990 plan in terms of objectives and methods. Zoning controls were, however, much improved, and several problematic sites in the Southwest were specifically addressed, including the CN yards in Point St. Charles, the Atwater Market, the junction of Atwater St. with Autoroute 15, and several sites of industrial heritage (City 1992).

Future trends in population are more difficult to ascertain, but tend to suggest an end to depopulation and a slow but steady increase in population in some, but not all, of the neighbourhoods. The economic makeup, however, of this increased population is uncertain but will probably reflect gentrification in the neighbourhoods (Sévigny 1992). Social polarization, between protected housing and increasingly expensive rental accommodations, will probably continue and increase in Petite Bourgogne, Griffintown, and along the Lachine Canal. The economic future of the Southwest is also unsure, given the present recession. Revitalization among decline, and increasing social polarization, may well be the future of the Southwest.

5.3 Areas for Further Study

The case study of Southwest Montreal may be useful in a comparative context. Potential areas for further study include the following:

1) a comparison between the 1990 Southwest plan and the 1981 and 1986 Winnipeg Core Area Initiatives, focusing on the nexus between physical amelioration and social development;

2) a comparison between the revitalization of the Lachine Canal, as a former industrial site, with others in Canada, including Granville Island in Vancouver;
3) a comparison of how declining inner cities in Montreal (Centre-Sud, Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, and even the City of Verdun) have been affected by public policy;

4) a pan-Canadian description of how the decline of a city or a shift in the national urban hierarchy affects the inner city; and

5) to compare Southwest Montreal to an American inner city, or even a British one, to understand national differences in policies which address economic decline.

In terms of non-comparative studies, the following may have been the focus of the case study: gentrification, industrial heritage planning, community economic development and input, and the role of the inner-city politician, among others. The 1987 OECD Report, entitled *New Roles for Cities and Towns*, may also have offered an area for further study, to see if policymaking on the Southwest has followed any of the Report's recommendations.

In conclusion, the thesis has added to the understanding of public policy on the changing Canadian inner city. In particular, the impacts and evolution of public policy has been closely examined in the case study. Further study is needed in a comparative and non-comparative sense. The case study has shown that the inner city is a distinct entity, not a "zone in transition", and must be treated as such by policymakers; to paraphrase, "it would be depressing if inner cities [cities] flourished only because someone or something endowed them with work" (*The Economist* 1986). The inner city is the nexus of many forces and changes, both political and economic in nature, and policy should reflect this characteristic.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDIX 1: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1825-1959
1825 Lachine Canal opens
1859 Victoria Bridge opens
1887 St. Gabriel is annexed to Montreal
1905 St. Henri and St. Cunégonde are annexed to Montreal
1910 Cote St. Paul and Ville Emard are annexed to Montreal
1951 Inner-city population peaks at 112 000
1954 Dozois Plan
1959 St. Lawrence Seaway is opened

1960-1972 Period of Infringement
1960 Drapeau is re-elected
1961 "Comprehensive Urban Renewal Study" presented to city
1962 (November) Victoriatown Urban Renewal Study
1962 Adoption of first municipal Housing Code
1963 Zoning by-law #2875 adopted
1963 (June) City Council approves acquisition of Victoriatown
1964 (May) Victoriatown demolished
1964 Montreal acquires Expo '67; highway plan approved
1964 (December 24) Calls for action in Petite Bourgogne
1965 Petite Bourgogne study
1965 Lachine Canal filled in
1966 Petite Bourgogne Renewal Report; renewal begins
1966 First Métro stations open
1966 (November) Autoroute 15 opens
1967 (March) Bonaventure Autoroute opens
1967 Montreal forms its own housing authority
1967 Province of Quebec forms own housing authority (SHQ)
1967 (April) Expo '67 opens
1968 Renovation programme set up by City of Montreal
1968 Lachine Canal closed to navigation
1969 First public housing in Petite Bourgogne
1970 Federal government begins to curtail renewal funding
1970 Province goes ahead with Ville-Marie Autoroute
1972 (November) Ville-Marie from Decarie to Guy completed
1973-1978 Period of Neglect
1973  Federal government announces NIP and RRAP
1974  NIP begun in St.Henri North, until 1977
1974  Lachine Canal transferred to Parks Canada, becomes National Historic Park
1976  Olympic Games
1977  Planning Department document on Southwest
1978  Public housing construction in Petite Bourgogne ends

1979-1985 Period of Stabilization
1979  City initiates CIDEM
1979  City initiates 10000 Logements
1979  City initiates PIQA
1979  Federal government unveils Lachine Canal master plan
1981  City initiates SODIM
1982  City initiates 20000 Logements
1982  SODIM initiates PROCIM
1982  Five new Métro stations open in the Southwest
1982  Tracks removed from Petite Bourgogne
1983  CIDEM initiates PRAIMONT
1984  Co-op programme accelerated
1985  PRAIMONT Bridge-Wellington and Cabot initiated

1986-1990 Period of Concerted Revitalization
1986  Inner-city population bottoms out at 54 098
1986  Doré elected
1986  Two enterprise zones initiated in the Southwest
1987  Picard Report on Montreal’s economic priorities
1989  Initial plans for Technoparc
1989  City overview of Southwest District
1989  CREESOM Report delivered to city
1990  (March 9) Revitalization plan unveiled by city
1990  (May) Federal and provincial funding revealed
1990  (November) Ville-Marie District Plan passed by City Council
## APPENDIX 2: SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFORMATION ON SOUTHWEST

### Household (Taken from 1986 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>St. Henri</th>
<th>Point</th>
<th>P.B.</th>
<th>Cote St.P.</th>
<th>Griff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>6 255</td>
<td>5 340</td>
<td>2 850</td>
<td>7 025</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average size of household (persons)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of families</td>
<td>3 750</td>
<td>3 345</td>
<td>1 535</td>
<td>4 515</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% families with both parents</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% single-parent</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median total revenue</td>
<td>$11500</td>
<td>$11100</td>
<td>$10500</td>
<td>$14500</td>
<td>$18700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% households below poverty line</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-86 % change in median total revenue</td>
<td>+19%</td>
<td>+16%</td>
<td>+30%</td>
<td>+22%</td>
<td>+45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households earning less than $15000</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households earning more than $35000</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population above 15 without grade nine education</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population with university education</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Tongue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. French</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. English</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Others</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Housing** (Taken from 1991 Census)

<table>
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<th>Point St. Charles</th>
<th>P.B.</th>
<th>Cote St. Paul</th>
<th>Griff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Renters</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of housing built before 1946</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of housing built 1946-1960</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of housing built between 1961 and 1991</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 1971</td>
<td>6385</td>
<td>5410</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>6810</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1976</td>
<td>5720</td>
<td>5090</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6875</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1981</td>
<td>5775</td>
<td>5225</td>
<td>2060</td>
<td>6800</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1986</td>
<td>6275</td>
<td>5345</td>
<td>2840</td>
<td>6910</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1991</td>
<td>6495</td>
<td>5760</td>
<td>3670</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>930</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Employment (Taken from 1989 CREESOM Report)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>St. Henri</th>
<th>Point</th>
<th>P.B.</th>
<th>Cote St.P.</th>
<th>Griff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of jobs</strong></td>
<td>7980</td>
<td>8763</td>
<td>3570</td>
<td>3843</td>
<td>11778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Manufacturing</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Tertiary/others</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Transportation</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate %</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Drop in manufacturing employment 1981-1986</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New employment 1981-88</td>
<td>1 845</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>3 112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>