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The justification of compulsory education 1982

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THE JUSTIFICATION OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION by ROLAND CASE B. Comm., Concordia University, 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF EDUCATION Department of Social and Educational Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1982 (c) Roland Case, 1982 In presenting this thesis i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of the require- ments for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t fr e e l y a v a i l - able for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of this thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL STUDIES The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date: October 5, 1982 ABSTRACT Proponents of compulsory education have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to j u s t i f y i n f r i n g i n g upon, what i s argued to be, children's basic r i g h t to l i b e r t y . This thesis i s an attempt to s p e l l out the c r i t e r i a for and provide a description,of a j u s t i f i e d compulsory education. The preliminary stage i n this v i n d i c a t i o n of compulsory education i s an a r t i c u l a t i o n and defense of the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions, for the moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n of interference i n general. The rationale for this approach i s simple. P r i o r to . tac k l i n g the derivative issues of compulsory schooling and compulsory c u r r i c u l a e , i t i s well advised to f i r s t sort out the grounds upon which any and a l l compulsion i s j u s t i f i a b l e . Coming to a-n\ understanding about, this fundamental issue helps to: un- tangle, i f not s u b s t a n t i a l l y resolve, the educational polemics. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n then turns d i r e c t l y to current educational theory. The l i b e r a l arts curriculum, as the p r e v a i l - ing emphasis i n the e x i s t i n g educational system, i s reviewed c r i t i c a l l y i n l i g h t of these c r i t e r i a . The l i b e r a l arts i d e a l s , although commendable, are shown to exceed what i s permissible to require i n a mandatory curriculum. An account of a new, ' l i b e r a l ' , curriculum which f u l f i l l s the c r i t e r i a f o r moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s presented. As well,, the constituent objectives and areas of study of this curriculum are defended as being legitimate educational pursuits. In other words, this new, ' l i b e r a l 1 curriculum i s shown to be both consistent with the grounds for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of compulsory education and compatible with the ideals of a l i b e r a l arts education. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Introduction 1 Chapter One: The Logical and Conceptual T e r r i t o r y 3 I. F i e l d of J u s t i f i c a t i o n 3 II. Conceptual Groundwork 5 A. Liberty vs Interference 5 B. Harm vs Benefit 15 Chapter Two: Other-Regarding Considerations 28 I. The Well-Being of Others 29 II. Proviso Conditions . .. 34 Chapter Three: Self-Regarding Considerations 42 I. Proper Guardian Challenge 43 A. Categorical Exclusion 45 B. Conditional Exclusion 56 II. Circumstances Challenge 68 A. Is Harm Necessary? 69 B. Is Consent Suf f i c i e n t ? 74 III. Reasonableness of the Interference 88 IV. Summary: The Theory of J u s t i f i e d Interference 90 Chapter Four: The Case For Compulsory Education 94 I. J u s t i f i a b l y Compulsory A c t i v i t i e s 95 A. Basic Moral Education 96 B. Primary Educational Goods 97 C. Undiminished Agential Capacity 98 II. J u s t i f i a b l y Educational A c t i v i t i e s 101 A. Autarchy vs , Autonomy.... 102 B. LCM vs HCF .106 B i b l i o g r a p h y =111 INTRODUCTION I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h , what I h o l d t o be, a b a s i c r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . A consequence of t h i s p o s i t i o n i s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , on the p a r t of proponents of compulsory e d u c a t i o n , t o p r o v i d e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s i n f r i n g e m e n t . Not o n l y have e d u c a t o r s f a i l e d t o do so, they have g e n e r a l l y f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i z e the need f o r a v i n d i - c a t i o n of t h i s s o r t . The p r e v a i l i n g attempts a t e d u c a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n have h i n g e d on the v a l u e of p u r s u i n g what i s h e l d t o be ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' good o r i d e a l . I n my mind t h i s l e a v e s the q u e s t i o n f u n d a m e n t a l l y unanswered. They have n e g l e c t e d t o c o n s i d e r the e x t e n t t o which we are j u s t i f i e d i n r e q u i r i n g t h a t c h i l d r e n pursue these aims, however good o r i d e a l . T h i s t h e s i s responds t o t h i s u n r e s o l v e d q u e s t i o n by (1) e x p l i c a t i n g the moral grounds f o r j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e ; and (2) o f f e r i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of a compulsory c u r r i c u l u m which s a t i s f i e s the r e q u i s i t e moral c r i t e r i a and accommodates o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l l y i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r - a t i o n s . The f i r s t t h r e e c h a p t e r s address the c r i t i c a l t a s k of i d e n t i f y i n g the n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f any and a l l l i b e r t y - l i m i t i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . Chapter One maps out the l o g i c a l and c o n c e p t u a l t e r r i t o r y upon which a t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e i s t o be b u i l t . Chapter Two addresses the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which must be met i f i n t e r f e r e n c e - 1 - -2- w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l i s t o be j u s t i f i e d by an ap p e a l f o r the w e l l - b e i n g of o t h e r persons. Whereas, Chapter Three l o o k s a t the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d i f the appeal i s t o be based on a concern f o r the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l h i m / h e r s e l f . F i n a l l y , Chapter Four employs the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e t o make a case f o r compulsory e d u c a t i o n . T h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o n s i s t s of the a r t i c u l a t i o n of a c u r r i c u l u m which i s shown t o be j u s t i f i a b l y compulsory. The c o n s t i t u e n t o b j e c t i v e s and a r e a s o f study of t h i s c u r r i c u l u m a re th e n shown t o be d e s i r a b l e from an e d u c a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . The upshot i s a v i n d i c a t i o n of a new ' l i b e r a l ' compulsory e d u c a t i o n . CHAPTER ONE THE LOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL TERRITORY T h i s c h a p t e r i s devoted t o the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of a number of moral and c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t a re c r i t i c a l t o a t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n the s e c t i o n t i t l e d ' F i e l d of J u s t i f i c a t i o n ' s e v e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s about the n a t u r e of m o r a l i t y w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d . I t i s these fundamental under- s t a n d i n g s t h a t determine the l o g i c a l parameters of moral j u s t i - f i c a t i o n . I n the s e c t i o n 'Conceptual Groundwork' a number of key concepts w i l l be e x p l a i n e d . Some of the e x p l a n a t i o n s are merely s t i p u l a t e d d e f i n i t i o n s o f f e r e d as a convenience t o f a c i l i t a t e d i s c u s s i o n . Other e x p l a n a t i o n s , l i k e t hose of the c o n c e p t i o n s of harm and b e n e f i t a r e ' p r e c i s i n g ' d e f i n i t i o n s and w i l l r e q u i r e e x t e n s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A c h i e v i n g g r e a t e r c l a r i t y about t h e s e c e n t r a l concepts w i l l r e s o l v e a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s muddied i n the l i t e r a t u r e and w i l l e x p e d i t e the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e . I . F i e l d of J u s t i f i c a t i o n There are two w i d e l y - h e l d t h e o r i e s o f the n a t u r e o f m o r a l i t y . The d e o n t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n views m o r a l i t y as the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of those d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s which an i n d i v i d u a l ought t o f u l f i l l . A c t i o n s a re r i g h t o r wrong because they - 3 - conform, o r f a i l t o conform, t o these moral i m p e r a t i v e s . On the o t h e r hand, the t e l e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n l o o k s upon m o r a l i t y as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of those g o a l s o r ends which an i n d i v i d u a l ought t o pursue. A c t i o n s a re r i g h t o r wrong depending on whether o r not they a re d i r e c t e d towards the achievement of these ends. A l t h o u g h the s u b s t a n t i v e moral codes o f each t h e o r y need not d i f f e r , the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r them i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t . I t would be an a m b i t i o u s t a s k t o attempt t o defend the s e l e c t i o n of one t h e o r y over the o t h e r . L e t me merely announce t h a t I espouse the t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y and share w i t h Warnock the view t h a t the p o i n t of m o r a l i t y i s t o " a m e l i o r a t e the human pr e d i c a m e n t " (Hamm & D a n i e l s 1979, p. 21). T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r a j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e i n g a moral one i s t h a t the reasons o f f e r e d must d i s t i n g u i s h a b l y r e l a t e t o the w e l l - b e i n g of i n d i v i d u a l s ( i . e . harm o r b e n e f i t t o i n d i v i d u a l s ) . There i s a f u r t h e r moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n which w a r r a n t s c l a r i f i c a t i o n and t h a t concerns the meaning o f h a v i n g a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . The r i g h t t o l i b e r t y i s p r e d i c a t e d on what Benn c a l l s the " p r i n c i p l e of n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e " . He d e s c r i b e s t h i s as the m i n i m a l o r f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t no one may l e g i t i m a t e l y f r u s t r a t e a person's a c t i n g w i t h o u t some r e a s o n (Benn 1976, p. 109). Acceptance of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i m p l i e s two t h i n g s : (a) t h a t the onus of j u s t i f i c a t i o n l i e s w i t h the pers o n who wishes t o i n t e r - f e r e ; and (b) t h a t s i n c e i t i s b e i n g o f f e r e d as a moral p r i n c i p l e , the reasons o f f e r e d must be moral ones. H a r t shares t h i s second fundamental i n t u i t i o n : I t i s , I hope, c l e a r t h a t u n l e s s i t i s r e c o g n i z e d -5- t h a t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a n o t h e r ' s freedom r e q u i r e s a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n the n o t i o n of a r i g h t c o u l d have no p l a c e i n m orals ( H a r t 1955, pp. 188-9). There i s one f i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t has had moral s i g n i f i c a n c e e v e r s i n c e M i l l drew a t t e n t i o n t o i t . There are p o t e n t i a l l y i m p o r t a n t moral d i f f e r e n c e s between the concepts of ' o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g ' and ' s e l f - r e g a r d i n g ' . An ' o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g ' moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i d e n t i f i e s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n which makes app e a l t o the w e l l - b e i n g of persons o t h e r than the i n d i v i d u a l h i m / h e r s e l f . A ' s e l f - r e g a r d i n g ' moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i d e n t i f i e s a j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h ich makes a p p e a l s o l e l y t o the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l . We can now i d e n t i f y the f i e l d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n upon which our t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e i s p r e d i c a t e d : I f a p e r s o n has a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y , t hen i n t e r - f e r e n c e w i t h t h a t p e r s o n i s m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f the i n t e r f e r e n c e improves or s a f e g u a r d s o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g and/or s e l f - r e g a r d i n g w e l l - b e i n g . I I . C o n c e p t u a l Groundwork Much of the s u b s t a n t i v e disagreement about the j u s t i f i - c a t o r y grounds f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e can be t r a c e d t o c o n c e p t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . F e i n b e r g ' s c o n c e p t i o n of ' l e g a l moralism'''" and 2 Hodson's n o t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e are cases i n p o i n t . Because of t h i s , c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t w i l l be expended i n an attempt t o c l a r i f y , what a r e u n d e n i a b l y , the key p a i r s of dichotomous c o n c e p t s : a) l i b e r t y vs i n t e r f e r e n c e b) harm vs b e n e f i t A. L i b e r t y vs I n t e r f e r e n c e The c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r s i n a l i b e r t y - l i m i t i n g r e l a t i o n - s h i p a r e t h e : Agent: the human b e i n g whose l i b e r t y i s a t r i s k of b e i n g i n t e r f e r e d w i t h ; C l a i m a n t : the human b e i n g on whose b e h a l f the l i b e r t y of the agent i s b e i n g i n t e r f e r e d w i t h ; I n t e r v e n o r : the human b e i n g o r i n s t i t u t i o n who w i l l e f f e c t the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the agent's l i b e r t y on b e h a l f of the c l a i m a n t . I n the s i t u a t i o n s t h a t w i l l c o n c e r n us l i b e r t y - l i m i t i n g 3 i n t e r f e r e n c e i s e i t h e r a d y a d i c o r a t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p / . The d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s o c c u r when: a) an I n t e r v e n o r i n t e r f e r e s w i t h an Agent f o r the Agent's own good ( i . e . the Agent i s a l s o the C l a i m a n t ) ; o r b) an I n t e r v e n o r i n t e r f e r e s w i t h an Agent f o r the I n t e r v e n e r ' s own good ( i . e . the I n t e r v e n o r i s a l s o the C l a i m a n t ) . A t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p o c c u r s when: c) an I n t e r v e n o r i n t e r f e r e s w i t h an Agent f o r the good of a t h i r d p a r t y , the C l a i m a n t . I n an e d u c a t i o n a l c o n t e x t t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t r a n s l a t e as f o l l o w s . E d u c a t o r s , p a r e n t s and l e g a l a u t h o r i t i e s f o r c e a c h i l d t o a t t e n d s c h o o l f o r a) the c h i l d ' s own w e l l - b e i n g ; and/or b) t h e i r own w e l l - b e i n g ; and/or c) the w e l l - b e i n g of o t h e r s and s o c i e t y . Enough has been w r i t t e n about the p o t e n t i a l s e l f - s e r v i n g m o t i v - a t i o n s f o r compulsory e d u c a t i o n t o make us s u s p i c i o u s of the second j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C l e a r l y , the most e a s i l y d e f e n s i b l e grounds ar e those where compulsory e d u c a t i o n promotes the w e l l - b e i n g o f the c h i l d h i m / h e r s e l f or the w e l l - b e i n g of ' i m p a r t i a l ' o t h e r s . Our account of the c r i t e r i a f o r the l e g i t i m a c y of t h i s j u s t i f i - c a t i o n a w a i t s our d i s c u s s i o n s i n Chapters Two and Three. What remains t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d p r e s e n t l y i s an e x p l i c a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the p r o p e r a s c r i p t i o n o f the concept ' i n t e r f e r e n c e ' and t h a t w i l l r e q u i r e a d i s c u s s i o n of the concept ' l i b e r t y ' . I s a i a h B e r l i n , i n h i s a r t i c l e "Two Concepts of L i b e r t y " , i d e n t i f i e s two c e n t r a l f e a t u r e s t h a t any account of l i b e r t y must i n c o r p o r a t e . L i b e r t y has a n e g a t i v e component i n d i c a t i n g the absence of impediments t o a c t i n g i n the way one wants. T h i s i s r e f l e c t e d i n B e r l i n ' s c l a i m t h a t I am n o r m a l l y s a i d t o be f r e e t o the degree t o w hich no man o r body of men i n t e r f e r e s w i t h my a c t i v i t y ( B e r l i n 1970, p. 122). The o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t r e f e r s t o the more p o s i t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t what the i n d i v i d u a l wants t o do stems from a c h o i c e t h a t he has made and has not been e f f e c t e d by o t h e r s . B e r l i n c a l l s t h i s " t o be d i r e c t e d by one's ' t r u e ' s e l f " ( B e r l i n 1970, p. 134). There may not be, as Loenen (1976) a r g u e s , two concepts of l i b e r t y but c l e a r l y t h e r e are two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e components embedded i n the concept. A f o r m u l a t i o n of l i b e r t y t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s B e r l i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n s and escapes h i s c o n c e p t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i s the view p r e s e n t e d by MacCullum (Benn & W e i n s t e i n 1971, p. 194). T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n can be e x p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s A i s f r e e from I t o do ( o r choose) X where - 8 - A i s an agent; I i s an impeding a c t i o n o r c o n d i t i o n ; X i s an a c t i o n o r c o n d i t i o n A would want t o b r i n g about, The types of f a c t o r s which would r e n d e r A u n f r e e t o do X are g e n e r a l l y p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s . These can range from h a v i n g one l e g : "A i s not f r e e t o r u n " ; o r p r i s o n : "A i s not f r e e t o wander". The types of f a c t o r s which would r e n d e r A u n f r e e t o choose X are those impediments which a f f e c t the d e l i b e r a t i v e p r o c e s s . R e s t r a i n t s i n t h i s a r e a o p e r a t e i n two ways. One, the i n t e r v e n t i o n may make the c h o i c e of X an un r e a s o n a b l e o p t i o n f o r A. These r e s t r a i n t s c o u l d be i n the form o f t h r e a t s , peremptory 4 commands, o r , even, the w i t h h o l d i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n . Or two, the i n t e r v e n t i o n may d i r e c t l y m a n i p u l a t e the mechanism of c h o i c e . T h i s may be brought about by h y p n o s i s , b r a i n w a s h i n g , c o n d i t i o n i n g , or s u b l i m i n a l s e d u c t i o n . We can now make use of t h i s account of the n o t i o n of freedom t o s p e c i f y the c o n d i t i o n s which must be p r e s e n t b e f o r e we can p r o p e r l y say t h a t A has been i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . We can s t a r t w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n : where (1) "A would n a t u r a l l y have X'ed i f I d i d n ' t Y'; a) ' A and I are a g e n t s ; b) X i s an a c t i o n o r a c h o i c e ; c) Y i s a v e r b a l o r p h y s i c a l a c t i o n o r o m i s s i o n open to I ; d) and ' n a t u r a l l y ' i s used t o ( i ) e l i m i n a t e a l l c o n s t r a i n t s of a non-human k i n d ( i . e . n a t u r a l p h y s i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) and ( i i ) i d e n t i f y what -9- X would o t h e r w i s e have done. S i n c e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s a type of i n f l u e n c e which a f f e c t s a c t i o n o r c h o i c e we can i m m e d i a t e l y add t h a t : (2) " I does Y"; and (3) "A doesn't X". Our account i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o w a r r a n t a p p l i c a t i o n of the term i n t e r f e r e n c e s i n c e I may s i m p l y have i n f o r m e d A t h a t A would be l a t e f o r the movie i f he c o n t i n u e d t o c h a t . Some q u a l i f i c a t i o n about the n a t u r e of I's i n f l u e n c e on A i s n e c e s s a r y . We must d i s t i n g u i s h I a f f e c t i n g A's c h o i c e from t h a t of. I e f f e c t i n g A's c h o i c e . (4) "Y i s r e a s o n a b l y s u f f i c i e n t t o cause A not t o X"; where ' r e a s o n a b l y s u f f i c i e n t t o cause' i n c l u d e s p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n t as w e l l as what has been c a l l e d "the l o a d i n g of c h o i c e s " ( i . e . making i t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o choose X ) . I t s h o u l d be obvi o u s t h a t t h r e a t e n i n g someone w i t h severe r e p e r c u s s i o n s i s e f f e c t i v e l y as c o n f i n i n g as p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n t . I n f a c t most l e g a l i n t e r f e r e n c e t a k e s the form of the t h r e a t of punishment t o d e t e r non- • c o n f o r m i t y . T h i s p o i n t has been made g e n e r a l l y about p e n a l t i e s , i n t h a t they make the p r o h i b i t e d c o u r s e so u n a t t r a c t i v e t h a t , by o r d i n a r y s t a n d a r d s of prudence and i n t e r e s t , i t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d c l o s e d (Benn & W e i n s t e i n 1971, p. 205). Elsewhere Benn has s u c c e s s f u l l y argued t h a t t h r e a t s and b r i b e s are i n h i b i t i o n s t o freedom . where they are i r r e s i s t i b l e . A t h r e a t o r b r i b e would be i r r e s i s t i b l e i f a man c o u l d not r e a s o n a b l y be expected t o r e s i s t i t even though o t h e r s might have r e s i s t e d i n the p a s t (Benn 1967, p. 245). -10- Thus "A i s not f r e e t o break the law" s i g n i f i e s not t h a t he i s unable t o do so but t h a t i t would g e n e r a l l y be thought t o be an un r e a s o n a b l e c h o i c e f o r him t o make. The l e g a l s a n c t i o n s l i k e l y t o ensue a r e thought t o d e t e r , i n as much as they make i t un r e a s o n a b l e t o a c t c o n t r a r y t o the law. There remains one f i n a l c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o complete the account of i n t e r f e r e n c e . I t r e f l e c t s a d i s t i n c t i o n made between b e i n g f o r c e d by "the l o g i c of the s i t u a t i o n " and b e i n g c o e r c e d (Pennock 1972, p. 3 ) . The change i n A's course of a c t i o n cannot be a v o l u n t a r y one, but must be e f f e c t e d a g a i n s t h i s w i s h e s . I n o t h e r words, A must not choose t h a t he be f o r c e d t o change. T h i s w i l l d i s t i n g u i s h the man who a l l o w s h i m s e l f t o be b r i b e d from the man who ca n ' t h e l p h i m s e l f . (5) "A d i d not choose, had n o t , o r , had he been aware, would not have chosen t h a t I do Y"; where a) 'A d i d not choose' s p e c i f i e s t h a t , a t the ti m e , A d i d not i n t e n t i o n a l l y and v o l u n t a r i l y choose t h a t I do Y; b) 'A had not chosen' s p e c i f i e s t h a t , a t an e a r l i e r p o i n t , A d i d not i n t e n t i o n a l l y and v o l u n t a r i l y choose t h a t under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s I do Y o r , i f he had, t h a t the i n t e n t i o n a l and v o l u n t a r i l y c h o i c e had been r e s c i n d e d ; and c) 'A, had he been aware, would not have chosen' s p e c i f i e s t h a t , i f t h e r e had been time t o i n f o r m A of the r e l e v a n t f a c t s o r i f A had thought of i t A would not have i n t e n t i o n a l l y and v o l u n t a r i l y chosen -11- t h a t I do Y. An example of the f a i l u r e of (a) t o o b t a i n would be the p r e d i c a - ment of a man who, a t the time of b e i n g o f f e r e d a b r i b e , wishes t h a t he had not been tempted because he i s too weak t o r e s i s t the o p p o r t u n i t y t o make easy money. The man d i d not choose t o have the o f f e r extended and was unable t o r e s i s t i t . C o n v e r s e l y , a c l a s s i c i l l u s t r a t i o n of the f a i l u r e of (b) t o o b t a i n i s Odysseus's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t h i s men t i e him t o the s h i p ' s mast and i g n o r e any subsequent o r d e r s t o s e t him f r e e w h i l e p a s s i n g t h r o u g h the d i s t r i c t of the S i r e n s . Odysseus's crew were not i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h h i s r i g h t t o l i b e r t y because they were a c t i n g i n a c c o r d w i t h h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s . An i n s t a n c e of a f a i l u r e of (c) t o o b t a i n i s the case of the man unknowingly about t o s t e p i n t o the p a t h of an oncoming c a r but i s stopped by a b y s t a n d e r . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i f he had known, he would not have stepped i n t o the p a t h of the c a r . T h e r e f o r e the b y s t a n d e r has not i n t e r f e r e d w i t h h i s w i s h e s . S i m i l a r l y , the husband who, i f he had thought b e f o r e hand t h a t he might become i n t o x i c a t e d , would have r e q u e s t e d t h a t h i s w i f e i n s i s t t h a t she d r i v e home has not had h i s r i g h t t o l i b e r t y v i o l a t e d . C o n d i t i o n (5) has the e f f e c t o f making i n t e r f e r e n c e a moral c o n c e r n . The concept of i n t e r f e r e n c e does o p e r a t e o u t s i d e the moral domain. I t i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t 'the b l o c k i n g back r a n i n t e r f e r e n c e f o r the q u a r t e r b a c k ' o r t h a t ' t e l e v i s i o n i n t e r f e r e s w i t h my s t u d y i n g ' . I n these cases o n l y c o n d i t i o n s one th r o u g h f o u r o b t a i n . But, the absence of a q u a l i f i c a t i o n about i n t e r - f e r e n c e b e i n g c o n t r a r y t o the i n t e n t i o n s o r ' r e a l ' wishes of the agent o b v i a t e s the need f o r moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Where A -12- g i v e s I p e r m i s s i o n t o do something i n v o l v i n g A's freedom (and A i s presumed competent t o e x t e n d t h a t approval),- the g r a n t i n g o f p e r m i s s i o n a c t s as a w a i v e r of A's r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . Any i n t e r - v e n t i o n w i t h o u t t h a t a p p r o v a l must be shown t o be d e f e n s i b l e on grounds t h a t o v e r r i d e A's prima f a c i e r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . Attempts t o defend p a t e r n a l i s m on a t h e o r y o f subsequent consent r e l y on the i n t u i t i v e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of an i n d i v i d u a l w a i v i n g h i s r i g h t r a t h e r than h a v i n g t o j u s t i f y why the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t need not be r e s p e c t e d . My p o i n t i s t h a t i f the r i g h t has been waived by t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e n i t cannot be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . I t i s c o n d i t i o n (5) which s p e c i f i e s the ways i n which one can c l e a r l y be presumed t o have waived t h e i r r i g h t . These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s must be i n t e r p r e t e d n a r r o w l y . The p r i o r p e r m i s s i o n must a u t h o r i z e the i n t e r v e n o r t o a c t i n , and o n l y i n , a c e r t a i n manner i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of e v e n t u a l i t i e s . T h i s i m p l i e d p e r m i s s i o n h o l d s o n l y where the agent would c e r t a i n l y be known to w i s h a p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n . When t h a t c e r t a i n t y i s not p r e s e n t ( i . e . i t i s merely assumed t h a t the agent might choose i t ) i t s h o u l d not be presumed t h a t he has waived h i s r i g h t . More w i l l be s a i d i n Chapter Three about the p r o b l e m a t i c n a t u r e o f presumed w a i v e r s i n our d i s c u s s i o n of c o n s e n t . To a n t i c i p a t e a s t i l l l a t e r p o i n t , c o n d i t i o n (5) c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y be employed i n an e d u c a t i o n a l s e t t i n g . Suppose t h a t s c h o o l i n g i s not compulsory, but i n o r d e r t o o p e r a t e e f f e c t i v e l y , c h i l d r e n are e x p e c ted t o p a r t i c i p a t e on a r e g u l a r b a s i s f o r s e t l e n g t h s o f t i m e . I f c h i l d r e n were i n f o r m e d t h a t t h i s was a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e i r agreement t o r e g i s t e r f o r s c h o o l , then p e n a l t i e s f o r a bsenteeism would be j u s t i f i e d w i t h o u t i t -13- b e i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . Of c o u r s e , t h i s c o n d i t i o n would o n l y a p p l y i f t h e i r non-attendance was the r e s u l t of a temporary s o f t e n i n g i n t h e i r r e s o l v e and not i n d i c a t i v e of a more permanent change of h e a r t . J u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n might then hinge on o b l i g a t i o n s t o keep promises - but i t would be, by my e x p l i c a t i o n , i n t e r f e r e n c e . Another e d u c a t i o n a l l y r e l e v a n t i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s account of i n t e r f e r e n c e concerns the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of cons e n t . I f a c h i l d agrees t o a t t e n d s c h o o l l a r g e l y because o f "undue i n f l u e n c e " (eg. g u i l t and f e a r of p a r e n t a l d i s a p p r o v a l ) and the c h i l d can not r e a s o n a b l y be expected t o r e s i s t t h i s p r e s s u r e , t hen the c h i l d ' s freedom has been i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . More g e n e r a l l y , i f c h i l d r e n a re p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y more s u s c e p t i b l e t o d o m i n a t i o n t h a n a d u l t s , t h e n c h i l d r e n a r e more v u l n e r a b l e t o i n t e r f e r e n c e . And i f we are committed t o a r e s p e c t f o r the r i g h t s of o t h e r s t h e n we s h o u l d t a k e s t e p s t o r e p a i r t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y r a t h e r t h a n r e i n f o r c e i t . That c h i l d r e n can be in d u c e d t o comply more e a s i l y t h a n a d u l t s s h o u l d not l u l l us i n t o a f a l s e sense of e a s i n e s s about the e x t e n t of our i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c h i l d r e n ' s r i g h t s t o l i b e r t y . I n c o n c l u s i o n , a l t h o u g h we have, as y e t , not e l a b o r a t e d on the grounds f o r j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e we have uncovered the c o n d i t i o n s under which i n t e r f e r e n c e r e q u i r e s a moral j u s t i f i - c a t i o n : I has i n t e r f e r e d w i t h A's r i g h t t o do o r choose X, i f and o n l y i f : (1) A would n a t u r a l l y have X'ed i f I d i d n ' t Y; and (2) I does Y; and -14- (3) A doesn't X; and (4) Y i s r e a s o n a b l y s u f f i c i e n t t o cause A not t o X; and (5) A d i d not choose, had n o t , . o r i f he had been aware, would not have chosen t h a t I do Y. A l s o we have i d e n t i f i e d t h a t i n t e r f e r e n c e can be e f f e c t e d i n t h r e e g e n e r a l ways: a) I p h y s i c a l l y r e s t r a i n t s A; b) I makes X an u n r e a s o n a b l e o p t i o n f o r A; c) I m a n i p u l a t e s A's mechanism f o r c h o i c e . At t h i s j u n c t u r e i t may be u s e f u l t o o f f e r a few comments about the n a t u r e of i n t e r f e r e n c e i n v o l v e d i n compulsory e d u c a t i o n . There a r e a c t u a l l y two ways i n which e d u c a t i o n i f i t i s compulsory i s p o t e n t i a l l y an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h - t h e l i b e r t y of c h i l d r e n : (1) i f a t t e n d a n c e i s mandatory; or (2) i f t h e r e i s a p r e s c r i b e d c u r r i c u l u m . The former r e q u i r e s t h a t proponents j u s t i f y why i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r c h i l d r e n t o a t t e n d an i n s t i t u t i o n f o r a s e t number of hours each day. The moves i n support of t h i s c o m p u l s i o n might be t o argue t h a t mandatory a t t e n d a n c e a t ' s c h o o l ' i s n e c e s s a r y t o keep c h i l d r e n o f f the s t r e e t s and out of t r o u b l e , o r t o p r e v e n t c h i l d l a b o u r abuses. However, these would s t i l l not j u s t i f y i n s i s t i n g t h a t c h i l d r e n pursue a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , l e t a l o n e a p r e s c r i b e d c o u r s e of s t u d y . R e g a r d i n g the l a t t e r , i f i t can o n l y be j u s t i f i e d t h a t c h i l d r e n pursue a pared down c u r r i c u l u m , t h e n i t - would c a s t s e r i o u s doubts about the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of mandatory f u l l - t i m e a t t e n d a n c e . -15- B. Harm v s , B e n e f i t The l i t e r a t u r e and common usage abounds w i t h d i v e r s e c o n c e p t i o n s of what i t means t o harm someone. I n the most d e f e n s i b l e account o f the t o p i c , John K l e i n i g (1978) has i d e n t i f i e d f o u r g e n e r a l " t r a d i t i o n s " i n the h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p - ment of the co n c e p t . I have c a t e g o r i z e d them as: (1) harm as an event; (2) harm as a v i o l a t i o n of a l e g a l i n t e r e s t ; (3) harm' as an i n f r i n g e m e n t of a moral r i g h t ; (4) harm as impairment o f w e l l - b e i n g . A l t h o u g h h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s l a r g e l y c o r r e c t my t r e a t m e n t and c o n c l u s i o n s a r e d i f f e r e n t . My approach i s not h i s t o r i c a l , but r e p o r t i v e of the f o u r g e n e r a l c a t e g o r i e s of the term's usage. I n the end, I s e t t l e on a p r e c i s i n g c o n c e p t i o n of harm as impairment of w e l l - b e i n g r a t h e r t h a n opt f o r a more c o n v e n t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . , (1) Harm as an Event The d i s t i n c t i o n o p e r a t i n g i n t h i s use of the term c o n t r a s t s harm as an event as opposed t o harm as an e f f e c t . I n K l e i n i g ' s words i t means t h a t "Harm" thus came t o r e f e r not o n l y t o the g r i e f o r sorrow, but a l s o t o the l o s s w hich o c c a s i o n e d i t . T y p i c a l l y , t h a t l o s s was f e l t but as the second t r a d i t i o n d e v e l o p e d t h i s no l o n g e r became n e c e s s a r y ( K l e i n i g 1978, p. 27). C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , when c e r t a i n events o c c u r r e d ( e g . , damaged r e p u t a t i o n , t h e f t , d e a t h of a f a m i l y member, e t c . ) h a r m f u l r e s u l t s ensued (eg., s u f f e r i n g , d e p r i v a t i o n , g r i e f , e t c . ) . These events became l a b e l l e d as "harms". However, these "harms" are not i n t r i n s i c a l l y h a r m f u l - b e i n g robbed may t u r n out t o be -16- a b l e s s i n g i n d i s g u i s e , a damaged r e p u t a t i o n need not r e s u l t i n any d i s a d v a n t a g e , and not a l l mourn the l o s s o f a r e l a t i o n . I n s h o r t i f we f o r g e t t h a t c l a s s i f y i n g an event as a harm i s c o n t i n g e n t upon i t h a v i n g a h a r m f u l r e s u l t we r i s k the paradox of a harmless harm. Harm, p r o p e r l y . u n d e r s t o o d , must a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t the i n d i v i d u a l . To c l e a r up a r e l a t e d m a t t e r , i t i s worth m e n t i o n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between harm and the r i s k o f harm. S i n c e the p o i n t of our a n a l y s i s of the concept i s t o i d e n t i f y what c o n s t i t u t e s harm so t h a t we may p r e v e n t i t s o c c u r r e n c e , t h e n o t i o n o f the r i s k of harm i s the o p e r a t i v e c o n c e r n . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t the r i s k of harm i s , i t s e l f , a harm.^ C l e a r l y , harm must i n v o l v e d e l e t e r i o u s consequences and not merely pose the p o s s i b i l i t y . T a k i n g t h i s p o i n t one s t e p f u r t h e r , harm i s n e c e s s a r i l y an e x p e r i e n c e d e f f e c t . W r i t e r s , such as K l e i n i g , have suggested t h a t : A p e r s o n c o u l d s u f f e r harms of which-he had no knowledge, e i t h e r a t the time he s u f f e r e d them, o r e v e r . Thus, w h i l e i t remained t r u e t h a t what one doesn't know c o u l d n ' t h u r t , i t may harm ( K l e i n i g 1978, p. 27). I t i s one t h i n g t o s u f f e r and not know t h a t i t i s because someone had done something damaging. I t i s q u i t e a n o t h e r t h i n g never t o s u f f e r even though someone had done something damaging.^ At t h i s stage i n the d i s c u s s i o n we can a t l e a s t c o n c l u d e t h a t harm i s not an event but must n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e adverse e f f e c t s t h a t a r e e x p e r i e n c e d o r f e l t . (2) Harm as V i o l a t i o n of L e g a l I n t e r e s t An o b v i o u s h i s t o r i c a l o f f s h o o t of the p r e v i o u s -17- t r a d i t i o n i s the view t h a t harm i s the " v i o l a t i o n of some l e g a l l y p r o t e c t e d i n t e r e s t " ( E s e r 1966, p. 345). F e i n b e r g argues t h a t the crime of b u r g l a r y c o n s i s t s i n i n f l i c t i n g a f o r b i d d e n harm whether o r not i t w i l l be d i s c o v e r e d o r w i l l h u r t ( F e i n b e r g 1973B, p. 2 7 ) . The comments made i n the p r i o r s e c t i o n o b v i o u s l y have r e l e v a n c e h e r e . But, because F e i n b e r g employs a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t defense and because t h i s c o n c e p t i o n has wide c u r r e n c y i n the l i t e r a t u r e , h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g d e s e r v e s a s p e c i f i c r e f u t a t i o n . He s t a r t s w i t h the t e n a b l e premise t h a t t o v i o l a t e an i n t e r e s t i s t o harm. The problems a r i s e the moment he conf u s e s a person's i n t e r e s t s w i t h a person's l e g a l l y p r o t e c t e d i n t e r e s t s . I f I have an i n t e r e s t i n something and am d e p r i v e d of i t I w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i f one agrees t h a t " i n t e r e s t s a r e not j u s t a r b i t r a r y w i s h e s , f l e e t i n g f a n c i e s o r c a p r i c i o u s demands", but concerns which have a " c e r t a i n permanence and s t a b i l i t y " . ( R e e s 1966, p. 101). However, an i n d i - v i d u a l need have no such i n t e r e s t i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n f r a c t i o n of h i s ' l e g a l i n t e r e s t s ' . I t i s not an improbable c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a r i c h man who had been robbed of a s m a l l sum of money might not m i s s , be upset by, or o t h e r w i s e a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by the few d o l l a r s l o s t . He would have no i n t e r e s t i n t h a t money and p o s s i b l y an e q u a l l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s v i o l a t i o n of h i s l e g a l l y p r o t e c t e d i n t e r e s t . As such, he has not been harmed. The a p p e a l t h a t i s l u r k i n g beneath F e i n b e r g ' s " f o r b i d d e n harm" i s t h a t l e g a l v i o l a t i o n s a f f e c t the a b i l i t y of s o c i e t y t o f u n c t i o n and, as such, we can be presumed t o have a p r u d e n t i a l i n t e r e s t i n u p h o l d i n g the p u b l i c o r d e r . I t h i n k i t i s i r r e l e v a n t whether the harm i s done t o s p e c i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s o r t o unspecified individuals. The important concern i s whether or not persons are actually affected adversely. Clearly our interest i n the v i o l a t i o n of public ordinances ought to be contingent upon whether or not harm to persons ensues. 7 It should be s u f f i c i e n t to conclude this discussion of harm as a v i o l a t i o n of a legal interest by offering the following counterintuitive d i f f i c u l t i e s : a) this conception includes what K l e i n i g c a l l s 'legal f i c t i o n s ' ( i . e . v i o l a t i o n s which are i l l e g a l but not harmful); and b) i t excludes genuine harms which are not l e g a l l y recognized ( i . e . the mistreatment of blacks before i t became i l l e g a l , the use of the strap). (3) Harm as Infringement of a Moral Right A t h i r d interpretation of the concept casts harm as an infringement of a moral r i g h t . Although this conception avoids the above mentioned objections, i t does so at the price of being an excessively narrow a r t i c u l a t i o n . For example, Rees'claims that harm requires that there has been v i o l a t i o n of a d i s t i n c t and assignable obligation leads him to exclude from the concept of harm being "very seriously affected by the action of another merely because I have an extraordinarily sensitive nature" (Rees 1966, pp. 94-6). Another writer claims that "I am not harmed i f I am deprived of goods that I have stolen" because a necessary condition of harm i s "some claim or reasonable expectation" (Honderick 1967, p. 293). The confusion that gives r i s e to these counterintuitive c l a i m s can be s o r t e d out i f we examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s of two d i f f e r e n t cognates of harm. C o n s i d e r : (1) 'X has harmed Y'; and (2 ) 'the consequences of X's a c t i o n have been h a r m f u l t o Y' . For the former statement t o o b t a i n i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t t h a t X's a c t i o n has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d Y. I m p l i c i t i n the statement i s some c u l p a b i l i t y on X's p a r t . However, i n the l a t t e r statement i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t Y be d e t r i m e n t a l l y a f f e c t e d by X's a c t i o n . I t i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h a t we would r e s i s t d e s c r i b i n g the e x e c u t i o n of a c o n v i c t e d murder as ' S o c i e t y harmed the i n d i v i d u a l But s u r e l y we would be hard put t o suggest t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l had not e x p e r i e n c e d g r i e v i o u s l y h a r m f u l consequences. When we use 'harm' i n I t s v e r b cognates we i d e n t i f y a p e r p e t r a t o r and a s s i g n moral c e n s u r e . Harm i n i t s nounal and a d j e c t i v a l cognates s i m p l y r e q u i r e s adverse e f f e c t s . I n s h o r t , a l t h o u g h I am i n c l i n e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t harm i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r d e s c r i b i n g something as m o r a l l y wrong, I am c e r t a i n t h a t i m m o r a l i t y i s not a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r harm. (4) Harm as Impairment of W e i l - B e i n g The most d e f e n s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ' t h e concept of harm i n v o l v e s d e f i n i n g harm i n terms of impairment of w e l l - b e i n g . B e f o r e d e f e n d i n g t h i s c l a i m I need t o o f f e r a ' p r e c i s i n g ' c o n c e p t i o n o f the h a r m / b e n e f i t n o t i o n . C o n s i d e r the concept of ' w e l l - b e i n g ' d e f i n e d as the s a t i s f a c t o r y f u n c t i o n i n g o f an i n d i v i d u a l ( p h y s i c a l l y , e m o t i o n a l l y , and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ) . Now -20- picture two domains: one of supra-satisfactory or supra well- being, and one of sub-satisfactory or sub well-being. We w i l l c a l l the dividing zone between these two domains minimal well- being. The epitomy of an individual with physical supra well- being i s the disease-free athlete with perfect muscle tone, excellent cardio-vascular output, 20/20 v i s i o n , acute hearing and so on. More frequently found, and a clear case of an individual experiencing physical sub well-being i s the stress-ridden, flabby, hypo-glycemic, s l i g h t l y jaundiced smoker. An individual i n what I have termed the minimal state of physical well-being i s one who approximates the norm of what Ausubel c a l l s 'functional and structural i n t e g r i t y ' (Brown 1977, p. 20). This individual may have the odd pains, ailments and other minor physiological disruptions but, by and large, the body does i t s job s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Admittedly this norm or minimal state of well-being i s subjective and somewhat amorphous, but i t serves our purposes by allowing us to distinguish among what I want to i s o l a t e as four l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t terms: Harm: the lowering of the well-being of an individual below the minimal state of well-being; Benefit: the r a i s i n g of the well-being of an individual above the minimal state of well-being; A l l e v i a t i o n of Harm: the r a i s i n g of the well-being of an individual up to the minimal state of well-being; Loss of Benefit: the lowering of the well-being of an individual that does not cause i t to go below the minimal state of well- -21- b e i n g . These l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be diagrammed as f o l l o w s : SUPRA WELL-BEING T BENEFIT 1 LOSS OF i BENEFIT MINIMAL WELL-BEING SUB WELL-BEING 1 HARM I ALLEVIATION OF HARM The consequences of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , which I admit does not r e f l e c t c o n v e n t i o n a l usage, i s t h a t harm ( c a u s i n g o r a l l e v i a t i n g ) o p e r a t e s s o l e l y i n the domain of sub w e l l - b e i n g and t h a t b e n e f i t (promoting o r d i m i n i s h i n g ) i s l i m i t e d t o the domain of supra w e l l - b e i n g . T h i s means t h a t the a s c r i p t i o n of ' l o s s of b e n e f i t ' be r e s t r i c t e d t o s i t u a t i o n s where the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l was l e s s e n e d but not t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t i m p a i r e d the s a t i s f a c t o r y f u n c t i o n i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l . Examples of t h i s would be a f a i r l y w e a l t h y p e r s o n i n c u r r i n g the l o s s of s e v e r a l hundred d o l l a r s on the s t o c k market, o r i n an e d u c a t i o n a l s e t t i n g , a s t u d e n t not b e i n g exposed t o , say, d i v i s i o n o f f r a c t i o n s o r not p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a l a r g e number of supposed ' c r e a t i v e ' w r i t i n g a s s i g n m e n t s . The common f e a t u r e b e i n g t h a t i n none of these cases has the min i m a l norm of w e l l - b e i n g been i m p a i r e d ( i . e . they a r e s i m p l y l e s s w e l l o f f ) . I now w i s h t o o f f e r a number o f comments i n support of the d e f i n i t i o n of harm i n terms of w e l l - b e i n g and i n p a r t i c u l a r i n terms o f a min i m a l norm of w e l l - b e i n g . At t h i s stage I hope t h a t i t i s c l e a r t h a t a t the h e a r t of the concept of harm i s the -22- n o t i o n of adverse e f f e c t s . The o t h e r t h r e e t r a d i t i o n a l concep- t i o n s o f harm (which I b e l i e v e a re e x h a u s t i v e i f i t s o t h e r uses) have been shown t o be e x t e n s i o n s o f t h i s f e a t u r e . Making the c o n n e c t i o n between impairment t o w e l l - b e i n g and harm i s su p p o r t e d by the f a c t t h a t the o l d e s t sense of the word, one which d a t e s t o 1000 A.D., i s t h a t of " g r i e f , sorrow, p a i n , t r o u b l e , d i s t r e s s , a f f l i c t i o n , " ( O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 1933). There a r e a number o f w r i t e r s who agree t h a t harm i s damage t o w e l l - b e i n g but who would r e s i s t t h a t i t be d e f i n e d i n terms o f a l o w e r i n g below a norm of min i m a l w e l l - b e i n g . I n s t e a d they have suggested a l t e r n a t i v e : s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s such as a) t h a t the pers o n i s merely m i l d l y worse o f f ; o r t h a t b) the p e r s o n e x p e r i e n c e s r e s i d u a l impairment.. 9 I see the former as an u n d e s i r a b l y l a x i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the l a t t e r an u n a c c e p t a b l y s t r i n g e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " * " ^ of the concept. I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s v i e w , t h a t a n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n of harm i s impairment of w e l l - b e i n g , l e t us t u r n t o the concept of h e a l t h . The concepts o f h e a l t h and w e l l - b e i n g a re i n an i m p o r t a n t way l o g i c a l l y a n alogous. Both a re n o r m a t i v e ' d e p r i - v a t i o n ' c o ncepts which means they a re d e f i n e d l a r g e l y i n terms of d e v i a t i o n s from a s t a n d a r d . H e a l t h has been d e f i n e d as " f u n c t i o n a l n o r m a l i t y " (Boorse 1975, p. 50). 'Unhealthy' d e v i a t i o n s from t h i s ' n o r m a l i t y ' a r e n o r m a t i v e and not s t a t - i s t i c a l i n n a t u r e . F o r example, t h e r e a r e many d i f f e r e n c e s i n pers o n s ' p h y s i o l o g y t h a t are not u n h e a l t h y (eg. c e r t a i n eye c o l o u r s , b l o o d t y p e s , number of t o e s ) and c o n v e r s e l y t h e r e a re many ' n o n - d e v i a t i o n s ' t h a t are u n h e a l t h y (eg. t o o t h decay, minor l u n g i r r i t a t i o n ) . T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e a re s t a n d a r d s o r m i n i m a l norms of o p e r a t i n g e f f i c i e n c y below which someone i s s a i d t o e x p e r i e n c e some degree of d y s f u n c t i o n . We can i d e n t i f y a h o s t of c o n d i t i o n s which i n t h e i r m i l d s t a t e s are not d e b i l i t a t i n g but when i n an a g g r a v a t e d s t a t e are c l e a r l y d i s r u p t i v e . The f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s , which c u r i o u s l y have p h y s i o l o g i c a l as w e l l as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l c u r r e n c y , a r e r e f l e c t i v e o f the range: i r r i t a t e d , annoyed, b r u i s e d , s o r e , s e n s i t i v e , i t c h y , and t e n d e r . A l t h o u g h we may not be a b l e t o d e l i n e a t e s t r i c t l y the f u n c t i o n a l norm we c o u l d i n t u i t i v e l y imagine the range a t which i t o c c u r s . And i t i s t h i s s u b j e c t i v e zone of m i n i m a l f u n c t i o n a l n o r m a l i t y and a n a l o g o u s l y the m i n i m a l s t a t e of w e l l - b e i n g which I o f f e r as the s t a n d a r d f o r d i s - t i n g u i s h i n g the concepts of harm and b e n e f i t . A l t h o u g h t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not c o n v e n t i o n a l ( i . e . the term harm i s o f t e n used t o i n c l u d e what I have c a l l e d ' l o s s of b e n e f i t ' and s i m i l a r l y b e n e f i t commonly r e f e r s t o the ' a l l e v i a t i o n of harm 1) i t i s more p r e c i s e . By e s t a b l i s h i n g mutual e x c l u s i v e n e s s among the terms we can a v o i d some of the c o n f u s i o n t h a t c l o u d s the debate on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f i n t e r f e r e n c e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , I have i n mind arguments i n s u pport of the view t h a t b e n e f i t enhancement i s a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e when, i n f a c t , what s u p p l i e s the arguments w i t h t h e i r s u r f a c e c r e d i b i l i t y i s a d i s g u i s e d c l a i m f o r harm a v o i d a n c e . Notes t o Chapter One L e g a l M o r a l i s m , F e i n b e r g ' s l a b e l f o r a c l a s s of harmless y e t immoral b e h a v i o u r , has been o f f e r e d as grounds f o r l e g a l i n t e r f e r e n c e , most n o t a b l y by L o r d P a t r i c k D e v l i n . A paradigm of t h i s type of conduct i s the ' i m m o r a l i t y ' of homosexual a c t s committed by c o n s e n t i n g a d u l t s i n p r i v a t e where the o n l y harm done i s the i m m o r a l i t y of the a c t . I f we a c c e p t the t e l e o - l o g i c a l t h e o r y of m o r a l i t y , i t i s a l o g i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o i d e n t i f y an a c t as b o t h harmless and immoral. T h i s f a c t has been p o i n t e d out about L o r d D e v l i n ' s p o s i t i o n : a second m i s t a k e embodied i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n i s the f a i l u r e t o i n s i s t t h a t some such r e a s o n l i k e h a r m f u l n e s s must be a v a i l a b l e t o j u s t i f y our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of an a c t i o n as immoral (D y b i k o w s k i 1975, p. 9 1 ) . C o i n c i d e n t l y , F e i n b e r g i s s u s p i c i o u s of D e v l i n ' s c a t e g o r y and e v e n t u a l l y r e j e c t s i t as grounds f o r j u s t i f i e d l e g a l i n t e r f e r e n c e ( F e i n b e r g 1973A, p. 8 3 ) . 2 Hodson's c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n about the concept of i n t e r - f e r e n c e causes him t o c l a i m t h a t avoidance of a minor i n c o n - v e n i e n c e i s a l e g i t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p a t e r n a l i s m . He succumbs t o t h i s p o s i t i o n because he c o n s i d e r s g e t t i n g someone's a t t e n t i o n a t a p a r t y and i n f o r m i n g them t h a t the l i q u o r they are about t o d r i n k i s f o u l - t a s t i n g c o n s t i t u t e s an i n s t a n c e of i n t e r f e r e n c e . 3 There i s an anomalous s i t u a t i o n (eg.,the p u n i s h i n g o f i n n o c e n t p e o p l e ) where the r e l a t i o n i s c o n c e i v a b l y f o u r - p a r t i e d . T h i s would i n v o l v e the i n n o c e n t Agent who i s i n t e r f e r e d w i t h , the C l a i m a n t who i s b e i n g p r o t e c t e d , the I n t e r v e n o r who i s e f f e c t i n g the i n t e r f e r e n c e , and the p a r t y who i s t h r e a t e n i n g the C l a i m a n t s h o u l d the Agent not be p unished (eg. an e x t o r - t i o n i s t ) . These ty p e s of s i t u a t i o n s w i l l not be i n c l u d e d s i n c e they r e p r e s e n t an i n c r e d i b l y c o n t e n t i o u s moral dilemma r e q u i r i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l l y more complex j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Nor are c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s n a t u r e l i k e l y , much l e s s c e n t r a l , c a n d i d a t e s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the e d u c a t i o n a l i s s u e t h a t i s b e i n g a d d r e s s e d . And f i n a l l y t h e r e are two cases which, a l t h o u g h more p r o p e r l y viewed as i n s t a n c e s of s e l f - c o n t r o l o r s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e , may s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g be cases of i n t e r f e r e n c e . These o c c u r when we would be tempted t o c a s t e i t h e r the Agent and the I n t e r v e n o r -24- -25- as one ( i . e . the Agent should prevent himself from doing something for the benefit of someone else) or the Agent, Intervenor and Claimant as one ( i . e . the Agent should prevent himself from doing something for his own good). I do not wish, nor need to pursue the p o s s i b i l i t y of self-interference. Our concern i s not whether a person ought to force himself to go to school but whether a party other than the Agent has moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n to require that the Agent attend school. 4 In an a r t i c l e "Medical Paternalism" Buchanan makes a case with regards to patients that the withholding of information i s an interference i n that i t deprives the individual of the opportunity to make his own choice (Buchanan 1978, p. 371). ^Knowles suggests that to place someone i n jeopardy i s to harm them (Knowles 1978, p. 214). He defends this view by reference to the insecurity that ensues when people are exposed to p o t e n t i a l l y harmful situations. I have no d i f f i c u l t y understanding that creating insecurity i n people can be harmful. But not a l l persons i n jeopardy of being harmed experience d e b i l i t a t i n g insecurity. Consider the following situation: At b i r t h a doctor errs i n the delivery and because of that the c h i l d has an unnoticeable deformity i n one leg. The only negative resu l t of this damage i s that the c h i l d never develops proficiency i n f o o t b a l l - an a c t i v i t y that he would have been accomplished at and consequently enjoyed immensely. Instead, because the c h i l d never spent time playing f o o t b a l l , he devoted the time to chess. Suppose that the s a t i s f a c t i o n he actually enjoyed i n playing chess was i d e n t i c a l to that which, had he not been deformed, he would have experienced with f o o t b a l l . Has the c h i l d been harmed? I contend not on the grounds that he never suffered from the damage and therefore was not harmed by the event. A more d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n occurs i f we hypothesize that the c h i l d did not derive an equivalent amount of s a t i s f a c t i o n from playing chess as he would have were he able to play f o o t b a l l . Has the c h i l d now been harmed? Again I suggest not. Although, ex hypothesi, there has been a loss of benefit the c h i l d may s t i l l have enjoyed a s a t i s f y i n g youth. For reasons that w i l l be elaborated upon i n part (4), the loss of opportunity for enjoyment need not harm the i n d i v i d u a l . It i s c e r t a i n l y the case that developing a child's c a p a b i l i t i e s i s c r u c i a l for his chances of enjoying a s a t i s f y i n g l i f e . However, f a i l i n g to maximize a child's opportunities i s not harmful i f the c h i l d has a s u f f i c i e n t number of developed options to actualize his interests and goals. If a person would be f u l f i l l e d i f he were a farmer, one has not harmed him by f a i l i n g to turn him into a philosopher. -26- This point i s the subject of a lengthy and interesting discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l evolution of the legal concept of harm (Eser 1966). Eser's thesis i s that a s h i f t has occurred: In t r a d i t i o n a l common law crimes which dealt with the basic impairment of human rights and inter e s t s , the presence of harm was so apparent that there was no need for special emphasis of i t s requirements. In contradistinction, the objects of modern welfare offenses are usually so highly technical i n nature that they are often scarcely recognizable (Eser 1966, p. 347). To compensate for this h i s t o r i c a l d i s t o r t i o n , Eser separates harm as the 'formal' wrong ( i . e . the mere breach of a law) from the 'material' wrong ( i . e . the actual injury done) (Eser 1966, p. 348). The l a t t e r i s the primary concern since harm i s e s s e n t i a l l y a f e l t injury. g Well-being i s , on occasion, used interchangeably with welfare (Peffer 1978, p. 65; Oxford English Dictionary 1933); but generally the l a t t e r has the connotation of being a narrower concept with a d i f f e r e n t emphasis - largely that of s o c i a l resources (eg. income, health, service, education). So I s h a l l choose the more "global" well-being (Rescher 1972, p. 4). Usage of the phrase 'social welfare' as opposed to 'social well- being' has the following d i s t i n c t i o n . The l a t t e r indicates a f e l t state which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a r e s u l t of the former ( i . e . an array of s o c i a l 'goods' and resources). I am not l e g i s l a t i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , but merely reporting an emphasis that seems to underlie common usage. 9 "Mildly worse o f f " is a phrase used by one writer to i d e n t i f y the lower range of the concept of harm (Van De Deer 1979A, p. 1978). He claims that a person i s harmed i f someone steps on his toe. Feinberg offers for " c l a r i t y and convenience" a comparable d e f i n i t i o n - "a change i n one's condition i n a harmful d i r e c t i o n " (Feinberg 1973B, pp. 30-1). An i n i t i a l reaction to this suggestion i s that they have stretched the notion of harm beyond the l i m i t s even of conventional usage. I suspect that recognition of this fact i s what motivated Feinberg's excuse that the d e f i n i t i o n was being offered for " c l a r i t y and convenience". I am not convinced that this s t i p u l a t i o n c l a r i f i e s the issue. If Feinberg wishes to include minor disturbances as grounds for intervention then he ought to do so but not: pretend that they constitute harming. Consider the scenario of a young athlete. Suppose that two months ago he was i n excellent shape but because of f a i l i n g to exercise has l o s t some of his muscle tone and becomes s l i g h t l y flabby. It would not properly be said that he was unhealthy, merely that he was less healthy. We would r e f r a i n from stating that his health was harmed u n t i l such time as there was detectable dysfunction (eg. shortness of breath, poor -27- c i r c u l a t i o n , pains) 1 0 K l e i n i g defines harm as a lingering impairment that inter- feres with welfare interests: Impairment i s thus an interference which has substantial deleterious e f f e c t s . This i s not to imply that what i s impaired cannot be restored, any more than that which i s damaged cannot be repaired. But restoration i s not constituted solely by the removal of the i n t e r - ference^ A stab wound does not disappear when the knife i s withdrawn. When harm i s done, there i s always a wound, or at least a weal, and there i s often a scar. It may go with time, but take time i t w i l l . (Kleinig 1978, pp. 32-3) I concur that impairment i s central to a proper a s c r i p t i o n of harm. And that impaired states usually require a recuperative period or at least leave their mark. However i t i s not a necessary feature of harm that the impairment be residual. Two examples should i l l u s t r a t e this point: ' (i) A man has a brain tumour which i s applying pressure on the brain r e s u l t i n g i n distress and incapacitation., A drug i s administered which completely dissolves the tumour. The tumour while present impaired the man's well-being and even threatened death and yet i t s removal resulted i n immediate cessation of the problem and l e f t no residual scar. ( i i ) An American hostage i s held captive i n Iran. During his confinement he i s miserable and a f r a i d for his l i f e . His reaction upon release i s one of immediate r e l i e f and he suffers no psychological scarring. CHAPTER TWO OTHER REGARDING CONSIDERATIONS The l o g i c a l and conceptual p r e l i m i n a r i e s to the t h e s i s have been completed. We have generated a c o n d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the concept of i n t e r f e r e n c e which r e q u i r e s t h a t : An i n t e r v e n o r must act or f a i l to act i n such a way, not chosen by the agent, which i s s u f f i c i e n t to cause the agent not to do or choose to do what he would otherwise have done. We have seen that i n t e r f e r e n c e with an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be j u s t i f i e d only i f i t promotes or p r o t e c t s the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l and/or of o t h e r s . Because the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r - ference on s e l f - r e g a r d i n g grounds i s d i f f e r e n t from the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e on o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g grounds, each appeal w i l l be considered s e p a r a t e l y . In the c u r r e n t chapter we w i l l address the o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . We w i l l i d e n t i f y one set of necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n by examining the ways i n which the w e l l - b e i n g of others can be promoted or p r o t e c t e d . From our ' p r e c i s i n g ' c onception of harm and b e n e f i t we can see t h a t there are f o u r l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t and c o l l e c t i v e l y exhaustive ways i n which t h i s can occur: harm: (I) may i n t e r f e r e with (A) to prevent harm; a l l e v i a t i o n of harm: (I) may i n t e r f e r e with (A) to a l l e v i a t e harm; l o s s of b e n e f i t : (I) may i n t e r f e r e with (A) to prevent -28 - -29- l o s s of b e n e f i t ; b e n e f i t : ( I ) may i n t e r f e r e w i t h (A) t o promote b e n e f i t . We s h a l l t hen o f f e r a number of p r o v i s o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h , w i t h the w e l l - b e i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , are c o l l e c t i v e l y n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s t o j u s t i f y o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . A. The W e l l - B e i n g o f Others There i s a p r e v a l e n t p r e s u m p t i o n i n m o r a l i t y t h a t the m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm i s m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d w h i l e the m a x i m i z a t i o n o f b e n e f i t i s merely m o r a l l y d e s i r e d . I n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s w i d e l y h e l d and, I t h i n k , d e f e n s i b l e d e l i n e a t i o n o f moral o b l i g a t i o n I propose t h a t p r e v e n t i o n and/or a l l e v i a t i o n o f harm ( t o o t h e r s ) a r e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e . And on the grounds t h a t we are not n o r m a l l y o b l i g e d t o promote and/or a v o i d l o s s of b e n e f i t t o o t h e r s , I s h a l l argue t h a t one ought not be f o r c e d t o do so. The defense of t h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l t a k e the form of the r e f u t a t i o n of a number of p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r c l a i m s . Proponents of c l a s s i c a l u t i l i t a r i a n i s m h o l d t h a t the good of o t h e r s i s a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n f a c t , i n i t s s t r i c t e s t form, an o b s e s s i v e l y a l t r u i s t i c a c t u t i l i t a r i a n would h o l d t h a t one i s always m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d t o i n t e r v e n e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r whenever d o i n g so w i l l r e s u l t i n the h i g h e s t t o t a l u t i l i t y . Our i n t u i t i o n s about s u p e r e r o g a t i o n ought t o be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i n c e us of the i n d e f e n s i b i l i t y of t h i s view. I n f a c t , i t i s t h i s o b j e c t i o n t o c l a s s i c a l u t i l i - t a r i a n i s m t h a t has prompted a t h e o r y o f n e g a t i v e u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . T h i s r e v i s e d view argues t h a t our o n l y o b l i g a t i o n t o o t h e r s i s - 3 0 - t o m i n i m i z e the harm t o them. C l e a r l y t h i s t h e o r y i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the p o s i t i o n I h o l d . A nother o b j e c t i o n might be t h a t the domain o f moral o b l i g a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d t o a v o i d i n g h u r t i n g o t h e r s and does not extend t o h e l p i n g o t h e r s . T h i s would r e q u i r e a v o i d i n g l o s s of b e n e f i t but e x c l u d e an o b l i g a t i o n t o a l l e v i a t e harm. M i l l , a t l e a s t a c c o r d i n g t o t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , has been h e r a l d e d as a s t a u n c h s u p p o r t e r o f t h i s view. However, r e c e n t w r i t e r s have p o i n t e d out t h a t M i l l s t r e t c h e s the n o t i o n of 'not h u r t i n g ' o t h e r s t o i n c l u d e s i t u a t i o n s where a s m a l l s a c r i f i c e on one's p a r t would r e s u l t i n s i g n i f i c a n t h e l p t o a pers o n i n a h a r m f u l s t a t e . I t has been argued t h a t M i l l had i n c l u d e d i n h i s "harm p r i n c i p l e " a g r e a t many i n s t a n c e s which cannot be c l a s s e d as harming o t h e r s , but o n l y as f a i l i n g t o h e l p them and the l i k e (Brown 1972, p. 158). Brown i s s y m p a t h e t i c t o the p o s i t i o n I h o l d and i s s i m p l y p o i n t i n g out the i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n M i l l ' s a r t i c u l a t i o n . D a v i d Lyons recommends a l e s s r e s t r i c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M i l l ' s "harm p r i n c i p l e " : t h e r e may be c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which one may j u s t i f i a b l y be r e q u i r e d t o come t o o t h e r ' s a i d , even though one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s (Lyons 1975, p. 6 ) . Whether M i l l i s a c t u a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t o r n o t , i s of secondary i m p o r t a n c e . What i s c l e a r i s t h a t a l l e v i a t i o n of harm i s r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e grounds f o r moral o b l i g a t i o n . However, I do not a c c e p t t h a t our o b l i g a t i o n s t o o t h e r s i n c l u d e r e f r a i n i n g from c a u s i n g a l o s s o f b e n e f i t . A l t h o u g h a c t i o n s which cause a l o s s of b e n e f i t t o o t h e r s a r e u n d e s i r a b l e , they a re not m o r a l l y forbidden and therefore do not warrant interference. Feinberg expresses this view when he discusses what he c a l l s the 'Offense P r i n c i p l e ' . Although he overstates the case on the potential for offenses to cause harm,^ he i s correct when he states that actions which are "merely unpleasant, uncomfortable or d i s l i k e d " do not counterbalance the harm caused by coercion (Feinberg 1973B, pp. 28-9). It i s my view that situations which precipitate solely a loss of benefit are more commensurately dealt with through reproach, disapproval and persuasion. Any action that was more than a minor offense, or threatened noticeable disadvantage, would run the r i s k of harming others, and, as such, could legitimately be interfered with. There may be those who would suggest that the promotion of the benefit of others i s , i n p a r t i c u l a r situations, an obligation. They might, for instance, wish to argue that i t i s morally j u s t i f i e d to require parents to promote the 'good' of the i r children. To the extent that this i s true i s the extent to which a parent has a duty to care for his c h i l d . This duty i s . necessarily a c o r r e l a t i v e of a right of the c h i l d to certain treatments. As Sutton remarks, these treatments or welfare rights are closely i d e n t i f i e d with 'basic' needs: Our reason for endorsing welfare-rights, then, i s that they protect and insure those minimal goods which we a l l need i n order to l i v e s a t i s f y i n g human l i v e s (Sutton 1975, p. 106). Clearly these welfare rights are importantly ti e d to minimal well- being. We may c e r t a i n l y have immense d i f f i c u l t y drawing a c r i s p demarcation between those needs and interests which a parent has a duty to provide for and those which are merely desirable to provide for. Nevertheless, they provide guidelines which explain - 3 2 - why p a r e n t s are expected t o f e e d c h i l d r e n a d e q u a t e l y , bathe and c l o t h e them, i n s u r e p r o p e r m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n , but a r e not r e q u i r e d t o p r o v i d e p i a n o l e s s o n s o r e x p e n s i v e t o y s . I n s h o r t , the j u s t i f i e d f o r c i n g of p a r e n t s t o c a r e f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n demands the p r o v i s i o n of o n l y those s e r v i c e s and goods w i t h o u t which the c h i l d would be deemed t o be harmed. Others might p o i n t t o government t a x a t i o n and l e g i s l a t i o n as an example o f c i t i z e n s l e g i t i m a t e l y b e i n g r e q u i r e d t o promote the good of o t h e r s . A p o t e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e f o r t h i s c l a i m i s the i n d i v i d u a l t a x p a y e r who n e i t h e r makes use of nor approves of the symphony,yet i s r e q u i r e d t o f i n a n c e t h i s v e n t u r e f o r the b e n e f i t of o t h e r s . I t s h o u l d not be i n f e r r e d t h a t I am here i n s i s t i n g t h a t s u p p o r t i n g the symphony i s s o l e l y a m a t t e r of b e n e f i t . There are l i k e l y many p e o p l e , b o t h p e r f o r m e r s and o b s e r v e r s , whose w e l l - b e i n g would be d e t r i m e n t a l l y a f f e c t e d . However, t h a t i s an e m p i r i c a l c l a i m t h a t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s u b s t a n t i a t e and o u t s i d e the r e a l m of t h i s paper. What I propose t o p r o v i d e a r e a number of p h i l o s o p h i c a l responses t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n . B e f o r e examining t h r e e h y p o t h e t i c a l s c e n a r i o s i t w i l l be w o r t h w h i l e a d v a n c i n g a s i m p l i f i e d account o f s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . L e t us a c c e p t t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the v o t i n g p r o cedures and the payment of t a x e s i s i m p l i c i t consent t o the f o l l o w i n g : t h a t the c i t i z e n w i l l a b i d e by the d e c i s i o n s of the government p r o v i d e d the governmental d e c i s i o n s a re c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and not m o r a l l y wrong. Now l e t us c o n s i d e r case one of a t a x p a y e r who i s an a v i d b a s e b a l l f a n and a f a n a t i c l o a t h e r of c l a s s i c a l music. He -33- adamantly r e f u s e s t o support the symphony, (he wants a new base- b a l l diamond b u i l t ) , and c l a i m s t h a t he i s b e i n g u n j u s t i f i a b l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h f o r the b e n e f i t of o t h e r s . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n he approves i n p r i n c i p l e of money b e i n g spent on r e c r e a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s (and i n f a c t u t i l i z e s many of the b e n e f i t s of p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g ) but d i s a p p r o v e s of a p a r t i c u l a r e x p e n d i t u r e . H i s consent t o the p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g o f the symphony i s extended by v i r t u e of h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n o t h e r p u b l i c l y f i n a n c e d r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . I t has been argued t h a t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r i m p l i e d consent i s the f a c t t h a t the p e r s o n w i l l f u l l y d e r i v e s b e n e f i t s from a scheme (Simmons 1976, p. 287). A l s o i t would be u n r e a s o n a b l e of him t o expect o t h e r t a x p a y e r s t o f i n a n c e h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i f they c o u l d not expect a r e c i p r o c a l b e n e f i t . Case two r e p r e s e n t s a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , the t a x p a y e r ' s r e f u s a l t o support the symphony i s m o t i v a t e d by the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t m e d i c a l , p o l i c e , and w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s a r e g r o s s l y i n a d e q u a t e . Because t h e s e s e r v i c e s a r e c e n t r a l t o the i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c , he b e l i e v e s t h a t the government i s r e m i s s i n the e x e c u t i o n of i t s duty by s u p p o r t i n g a symphony. T h i s m i s a l l o c a t i o n of f u n d s , because i t i n v o l v e s harm t o the p u b l i c w e l f a r e , i s something t o which he has not g i v e n p r i o r t a c i t consent and h i s freedom i s b e i n g i n t e r f e r e d w i t h u n j u s t i f i a b l y . However the o b j e c t i o n here i s not t h a t he i s b e i n g r e q u i r e d t o b e n e f i t o t h e r s but t h a t harm i s b e i n g done. The f i n a l case borrows from a p o s i t i o n espoused by Robert N o z i c k (Sampson 1978; Danley 1979). The u n d e r l y i n g view i s t h a t a n y t h i n g beyond m i n i m a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n a l i b e r a l -34- s o c i e t y i s u n j u s t i f i e d . A l l ' c o s t s ' t o the t a x p a y e r must be compensated f o r by p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s t h a t t h e t a x p a y e r d e s i r e s o r by some o t h e r method of reimbursement. Now, suppose t h a t a t a x p a y e r does not want p u b l i c f i n a n c i n g of r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i - t i e s , b e l i e v e s i n a u s e r pay p h i l o s o p h y , and i f he does a v a i l h i m s e l f of p u b l i c f a c i l i t i e s , i t i s o n l y because he has been f o r c e d a g a i n s t h i s w i l l t o s u b s i d i z e them. I am s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n and b e l i e v e t h a t where p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e i n s i t u a t i o n s t h a t a re s u b s t a n t i a l l y t hose of b e n e f i t m a x i m i z a t i o n , as opposed t o harm p r e v e n t i o n , e f f o r t s must be made t o compensate f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . I t c o u l d o n l y be c o n j e c t u r e on my p a r t as t o the e x t e n t o f the need f o r s p e c i a l compensation over and above the i n b u i l t compensatory b e n e f i t s . However, i n p r i n c i p l e , r e d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the b e n e f i t of o t h e r s w i t h o u t compensation i s u n j u s t i f i e d . I I . P r o v i s o C o n d i t i o n s , Thus f a r we have i s o l a t e d the n e c e s s a r y w e l l - b e i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . They are not s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n s i t u a t i o n s where the avo i d a n c e of harm imposed g r e a t h a r d s h i p s t o the agent o r where the c l a i m a n t was u n r e a s o n a b l y a f f e c t e d we would be h e s i t a n t t o impose r e s t r a i n t s . I n s h o r t , c e r t a i n p r o v i s o s must be met b e f o r e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d . F e i n b e r g p r o v i d e s a key t o the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of these p r o v i s o s when he suggests t h e f o l l o w i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o h i s Of f e n s e P r i n c i p l e : ( i ) the s t a n d a r d o f u n i v e r s a l i t y - i . e . b e f o r e an -35- offensive act can j u s t i f i a b l y be interfered with i t must be contrary to the fundamental moral b e l i e f s of most of the persons i n a society; and ( i i ) the standard of reasonable a v o i d a b i l i t y - i . e . that the offensive s i t u a t i o n could not be averted without unreasonable e f f o r t or inconvenience (Feinberg I973B, p. 44). There are unacceptable d i f f i c u l t i e s with Feinberg's a r t i c u l a t i o n but the s p i r i t of the c r i t e r i a i s well placed. Michael Bayles rejects Feinberg's f i r s t standard i n that i t disallows many "reasonable" acts (eg. homosexuality, f l a g burning) merely because they are universally disapproved of; and allows the continuance of many "unreasonable" acts (eg. r a c i s t abuse) that are unive r s a l l y shared. Clearly value judgements about which offenses should be permitted are not to be settled by empirical resolution (Bayles 1973). In response to this pressure from Bayles, Feinberg concedes that the Offense P r i n c i p l e must be weighed i n l i g h t of the "worthiness" or "importance" of the interests at stake (Feinberg 1973C, p. 128). Regarding the second standard, merely that an act i s not ea s i l y avoidable ,. i s not by i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t grounds to exempt i t from prohibition. It may be s u f f i c i e n t l y offensive to j u s t i f y imposing considerable inconvenience to the persons who would otherwise perform i t . Feinberg's account does suggest that two factors must be accommodated when assessing the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of interference: (a) that the individual's claim for protection i s j u s t i f i e d ; and - 3 6 - (b) t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e i s r e a s o n a b l e . T h e r e f o r e I propose the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s o c o n d i t i o n s t h a t must be met b e f o r e i n t e r f e r e n c e i s c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d : (1) Soundness of the C l a i m - i . e . t h a t the C l a i m a n t has a d e f e n s i b l e c l a i m a g a i n s t the Agent t o be p r o t e c t e d from harm; and (2) Reasonableness o f the I n t e r f e r e n c e - i . e . t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e proposed i s a c c e p t a b l e . The 'Soundness of the C l a i m ' c o n d i t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t the C l a i m a n t ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n be a l o g i c a l l y sound moral argument. Coombs (1971) has i d e n t i f i e d two c r i t e r i a t h a t must be met b e f o r e a moral judgement i s d e f e n s i b l e . F i r s t , the f a c t s s u p p o r t i n g the judgement must be (a) t r u e o r w e l l c o n f i r m e d ; (b) g e n u i n e l y r e l e v a n t ; and (c) must encompass a s u f f i c i e n t l y broad range of the f a c t s about which the judgement i s b e i n g made. Second, the v a l u e p r i n c i p l e s i m p l i e d by the judgement must be a c c e p t a b l e . Four t e s t s have been a r t i c u l a t e d t o a s s e s s the a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f v a l u e p r i n c i p l e s : (a) Subsumption T e s t : the p r i n c i p l e s from which the v a l u e c l a i m d e r i v e s a re them- s e l v e s d e f e n s i b l e ; - (b) R o l e Exchange T e s t : o c c u p y i n g the r o l e of o t h e r s i n v o l v e d i n the s i t u a t i o n doesn't a f f e c t the c o n s i s t e n c y of the judgement; -37- (c) U n i v e r s a l Consequences T e s t : the consequences o f everyone a d o p t i n g and a c t i n g on the judgement are not u n d e s i r a b l e ; (d) New Cases T e s t : i m a g i n a t i v e l y c o n s t r u c t i n g s i m i l a r cases doesn't f o r c e one i n t o c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e p o s i t i o n s . The 'Reasonableness of the I n t e r f e r e n c e ' r e q u i r e s t h a t the proposed i n t e r f e r e n c e be a c c e p t a b l e . The f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a a r e the r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n a r r i v i n g a t t h i s assessment: (a) the pre s u m p t i o n of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm; (b) the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e . The 'presumption o f m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm' i s a prima f a c i e i n t u i t i o n t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e ought not cause o r r i s k c a u s i n g g r e a t e r harm than the harm i t p r e v e n t s o r a v o i d s . The ' l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e ' i s a p r i n c i p l e advanced by Dworkin (1971) r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e r e be no a l t e r n a t i v e which would p r e v e n t the harm t o the C l a i m a n t and r e s u l t i n l e s s d i s a d v a n t a g e t o the Agent and o t h e r s . The former i s d i s t i n c t from the l a t t e r i n t h a t an a l t e r n a t i v e might be the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e and s t i l l cause g r e a t e r harm t h a n i t p r e v e n t s . I n a c l e a r case o f j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e b o t h the 'soundness' and the ' r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ' c o n d i t i o n s must be met. However, t h e r e i s l i k e l y t o a r i s e cases where one or the o t h e r won't c l e a r l y be met and we s t i l l might w i s h t o c l a i m t h a t i n t e r - f e r e n c e was j u s t i f i e d . Because j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s o f t e n a m a t t e r - 3 8 - of d e g r e e s , the e x t e n t t o which one c o n d i t i o n was met must be weighed a g a i n s t the degree t o which the o t h e r wasn't. I n s i t u a t i o n s where n e i t h e r c o n d i t i o n o b t a i n e d , the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s n e ver j u s t i f i e d . A q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t these p r o v i s o s be met on b a l a n c e i s n e c e s s a r y t o a l l o w f o r the f o l l o w i n g types of s i t u a t i o n s : a) Suppose an i n d i v i d u a l has an u n d e n i a b l y s t r o n g c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n and t h a t the c o s t ( i n human s u f f e r i n g and/or d o l l a r s ) of such p r o t e c t i o n exceeds the harm p r e v e n t e d , but not t o any s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t . We might f e e l , by v i r t u e of the s t r e n g t h of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o p r o t e c - t i o n , t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e was j u s t i f i e d even though by d o i n g so we f a i l e d t o m i n i m i z e harm; or b) Suppose an i n d i v i d u a l has what we might c a l l a ' f a i r l y l e g i t i m a t e ' c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n but t h a t the c o s t t o o t h e r s t o p r o v i d e t h i s p r o t e c t i o n f a r exceeds the p o t e n t i a l i n j u r y t o the i n d i v i d u a l . We might f e e l t h a t we would not be j u s t i f i e d i n i n t e r f e r i n g i n l i g h t of the e x c e s s i v e c o s t s of d o i n g so; o r c) Suppose an i n d i v i d u a l does not have a l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n but t h a t the c o s t t o the i n d i v i d u a l s h o u l d we f a i l t o p r o v i d e t h i s p r o t e c t i o n would be c o n s i d e r a b l e ; and f u r t h e r , t h a t i t would be p o s s i b l e t o p r o v i d e t h i s p r o t e c t i o n a t v e r y l i t t l e c o s t t o o t h e r s . We might be i n c l i n e d t o p r o v i d e t h i s p r o t e c t i o n by v i r t u e of the c o n s i d e r a b l e n e s s by which harm i s m i n i m i z e d . I n o t h e r words t h e r e are l i k e l y t o be s i t u a t i o n s where t r a d e s - o f f between the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the i n t e r f e r e n c e and the soundness of the c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e t h a t these p r o v i s o s be a s s e s s e d on b a l a n c e . B e f o r e c l o s i n g our account of the n e c e s s a r y and p r o v i s o c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e i t i s worth r e s p o n d i n g t o a c h a l l e n g e t h a t F e i n b e r g o f f e r s w i t h r e g a r d s t o j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s : the b e s t way t o defend one's s e l e c t i o n of -39- p r i n c i p l e s i s t o show wh i c h p o s i t i o n t h ey commit one on such i s s u e s as c e n s o r s h i p o f l i t e r a t u r e , 'moral o f f e n c e ' , and compulsory s o c i a l s e c u r i t y ( F e i n b e r g 1973B, p. 34). I n t h i s v e i n we s h a l l o u t l i n e the l i k e l y p o s i t i o n t h a t would be p r e s c r i b e d i n the f o l l o w i n g c a s e s : (1) pornography (2) p u b l i c c o p u l a t i o n (3) u n i v e r s a l compulsory p e n s i o n p l a n s . (1) Pornography I t can be presumed t h a t persons have a j u s t i f i a b l e c l a i m not t o be a s s a u l t e d as they walk down the s t r e e t o r t o have t h e i r c h i l d r e n c o n s t a n t l y exposed t o ' i n d e c e n t ' s e x u a l l i t e r a t u r e . However, s h o u l d i t be banned, the a b i l i t y of many t o e a r n t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d o r t o g a i n s a t i s f a c t i o n from the l i t e r a t u r e would be d e p r i v e d . I n s h o r t , t h e C l a i m a n t ' s r i g h t s a re r o u g h l y " b a l a n c e d by the Agent's r i g h t s . The o p e r a t i v e f a c t o r i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n would appear t o be the a v o i d a b i l i t y o f the harm. C e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s such as l o c a l i z a t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a r areas of the c i t y and/or confinement t o e n c l o s e d areas of the s t o r e would e f f e c t i v e - l y a l l o w persons t o a v o i d the harm a t m i n i m a l i n c o n v e n i e n c e and, by and l a r g e , a l l o w p u b l i s h e r s and s u b s c r i b e r s t o s a t i s f y t h e i r needs. (The l i n e o f argument p r e s e n t e d here and i n the f o l l o w i n g case have been suggested by B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s ) . (2) P u b l i c C o p u l a t i o n The t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n of p u b l i c c o p u l a t i o n would p r e v e n t c o n s i d e r a b l e shock t o the u n w i t t i n g w i t n e s s and would pose o n l y minor i n c o n v e n i e n c e t o the would be p e r p e t r a t o r s . I t -40- would t h e r e f o r e seem on a l l counts j u s t i f i e d t o ban p u b l i c c o p u l a t i o n whenever t h e r e was a r i s k of i n n o c e n t exposure. (3) U n i v e r s a l Compulsory P e n s i o n P l a n s : I f the absence of a compulsory p l a n caused s u f f i c i e n t l y g r e a t e r harm t h a n v o l u n t a r y o r p r i v a t e p l a n s , and, i f u n i v e r s a l s u b s c r i p t i o n was n e c e s s a r y t o ensure the plan's s u c c e s s , then i t would be j u s t i f i e d . However, i f the p u b l i c p l a n was i n e f f e c t i v e i n p r e v e n t i n g harm, or i f i t was not n e c e s s a r y t o i n c l u d e a l l income groups, t h e n c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s on the m a n d i t o r i n e s s and u n i v e r s a l i t y o f the p l a n would be i n o r d e r . The upshot of the d i s c u s s i o n thus f a r i s t h a t the n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e a r e : I . I n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t p r e v e n t s o r a l l e v i a t e s harm t o o t h e r s ; and I I . On b a l a n c e the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s o s a re met: i . the c l a i m f o r p r o t e c t i o n i s sound: a) the f a c t s a re t r u e , r e l e v a n t and s u f f i c i e n t l y b r o a d , b) the v a l u e p r i n c i p l e s i m p l i e d a re a c c e p t a b l e ; and i i . the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s r e a s o n a b l e : a) the pre s u m p t i o n of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm, and b) the p r i n c i p l e of the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e . Notes to Chapter Two """Feinberg' s Offense P r i n c i p l e proposes that we agree that offensiveness as such i s s t r i c t l y speaking a harm ( i . e . violates an interest i n not-being offended or hurt) but harm of such a t r i v i a l kind that i t cannot by i t s e l f ever counterbalance the dire c t and immediate harm caused by coercion (Feinberg 1973B, p. 28). He ci t e s as indicative reactions to offenses the following l i s t : "disgust, shocked moral s e n s i b i l i t i e s , shameful embarrassment"; and characterizes their effect on the individual as "merely unpleasant, uncomfortable or d i s l i k e d " (Feinberg 1973B, p. 29). His account of offense i s mistaken i n two ways: i f offenses are merely unpleasant then, as I have argued, they do not j u s t i f y interference but merely reproach; but since offenses can be very damaging, they are i n fact actually harmful to well-being. Consider the instances of the 'moralistic' parents who walk i n on their daughter i n the act of copulation, or the parents who discover that their son i s a homosexual. In each case the i r "shocked moral s e n s i b i l i t i e s " are l i k e l y to be painful and d e b i l i t a t i n g . CHAPTER THREE SELF-REGARDING CONSIDERATIONS Our a t t e n t i o n s now t u r n t o the t a s k of i d e n t i f y i n g the n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d s e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . S e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e , u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d t o as p a t e r n a l i s m , o c c u r s whenever an I n t e r v e n o r ( I ) i n t e r f e r e s w i t h Agent (A) on b e h a l f of A's w e l l - b e i n g . ( I ) a c t i n g p a t e r n a l - i s t i c a l l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o (A) i s a narrower concept than ( I ) a c t i n g p a t e r n a l l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o ( A ) . The former s p e c i f i e s t h a t the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s done a g a i n s t A's wishes w h i l e the l a t t e r need not i m p l y t h a t . Our c o n c e r n i s c l e a r l y w i t h t h i s narrower domain, s i n c e a c t i n g i n a c c o r d w i t h the wishes o f an i n d i v i d u a l does n o t , as I have sugg e s t e d , r e q u i r e a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , i n o r d e r t o u n f o l d w h i c h o f the p o t e n t i a l grounds a r e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r s e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e , i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o examine i n d e t a i l the r a t i o n a l e s f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t e r n a l i s m p r e s e n t e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e . As a p i l l a r o f modern s o c i a l and e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , and because he addresses the i s s u e head on, M i l l i s wort h q u o t i n g : Each i s the p r o p e r g u a r d i a n of h i s own h e a l t h , whether b o d i l y , o r mental and s p i r i t u a l . Mankind a r e g r e a t e r g a i n e r s by s u f f e r i n g each o t h e r t o l i v e as seems good t o t h e m s e l v e s , than by c o m p e l l i n g each t o l i v e as seems good to the r e s t . ( M i l l 1975, p. 18) The key assumptions i n M i l l ' s p o s i t i o n i d e n t i f y the two s e m i n a l -42- -43- i s s u e s i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m : (1) Each i s always the 'proper g u a r d i a n ' of h i s w e l f a r e . (2) There are no c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which we g a i n by i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n t u i t i v e l y we know t h a t M i l l i s wrong on each a c c o u n t ; but t h e r e i s enough substance t o h i s p o s i t i o n t o w a r r a n t u s i n g t h e s e two c l a i m s as v e h i c l e s t o a n a l y s e the debate on p a t e r n a l i s m . The f i r s t , w h ich I s h a l l l a b e l the 'proper g u a r d i a n ' c h a l l e n g e , are p u r p o r t e d s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r d i s q u a l i f y i n g i n d i v i d u a l s from the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r own b e l l - b e i n g . The second, the ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' c h a l l e n g e , a r e attempts a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n w hich f o c u s on c o n c o m i t a n t s of the proposed i n t e r v e n t i o n . I n t h i s c h a p t e r , by examining each of the p r o f f e r e d d e f e n s e s f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e , we s h a l l u n e a r t h the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r s e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n we s h a l l a r t i c u l a t e an a d d i t i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n on the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f i n t e r f e r e n c e . Together these w i l l complete our account of the n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d s e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . I . P r o p e r G u a r d i a n C h a l l e n g e As we have j u s t mentioned, one l i n e of support f o r p a t e r n a l i s m h i n g e s on a c h a l l e n g e t h a t the Agent i s not the p r o p e r g u a r d i a n of h i s w e l l - b e i n g . The r a t i o n a l e s f o r t h i s c l a i m f a l l i n t o two broad c l a s s e s . The f i r s t approach, which I have c a l l e d ' c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n ' , c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i s q u a l i f i e s persons from the p r i v i l e g e o f d i r e c t i n g t h e i r a f f a i r s by v i r t u e of t h e i r membership i n a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s o f p e r s o n s . Membership i n t h e s e -44- groups i s considered s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n for denial of r i g h t s . It i s usually argued that since they are i n some way d e f i c i e n t , they are not f u l l persons, therefore they do not have a claim to the f u l l rights of persons. McMurtry documents that, at least l e g a l l y , children are regarded as chattels: i t i s a criminal offense punishable by ten years i n prison "to deprive a parent or guardian or any other person who has lawful possession of a c h i l d " ; not withstanding the fact that the c h i l d may be leaving of his or her own v o l i t i o n , or indeed escaping from someone who beats and imprisons him or her to someone who does not - Criminal Code of Canada Section 249-250 (McMurtry 1980B, p. 35); Section 42 of the Criminal Code e x p l i c i t l y exempts parents and teachers from prosecution for physically assaulting children i n their custody ... i f the assault may not "result i n permanent inj u r y " (McMurtry 1980B, p. 37). Our investigation of a number of attempts to j u s t i f y paternalism on the grounds of categorical exclusion reveals that this approach i s u n f a i r l y discriminatory. The second and more defensible l i n e of argument for d i s q u a l i f y i n g persons as the proper guardian of their well-being i s what I have lab e l l e d 'conditional exclusion'. Proponents argue that the presence, at given times or i n given situations, of ' v i t i a t i n g ' factors, requires that the person not be presumed to be the best judge of his well-being. The i n s p i r a t i o n for this approach stems from what the English Homicide Act of 1957 has c a l l e d "diminished agency". This plea allows a defendant to claim that he ought not be held responsible for an act committed because of the absence at the time of f u l l v o l i t i o n on the part of the agent (Glover 1970, pp. 127-128). Since this tack i s -45- c l e a r l y more t e n a b l e than the c a t e g o r i c a l approach, a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of e f f o r t w i l l be expended i n e s t a b l i s h i n g d e f e n s i b l e c r i t e r i a f o r c o n d i t i o n a l e x c l u s i o n . A. C a t e g o r i c a l E x c l u s i o n C.L. Ten proposes the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s , each s u f f i c i e n t , t o w a r r a n t p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n : e i t h e r a) the agent's d e c i s i o n i s c l e a r l y and s e r i o u s l y i m p a i r e d , o r b) the harm i n f l i c t e d on the agent i s of a severe and permanent ty p e . (Teh 1971, p. 65) A l t h o u g h I p r e f e r t o c o n c e n t r a t e a t t h i s stage of the paper on the " p r o p e r g u a r d i a n " c a n d i d a t e s , i t i s w o r t h w h i l e d e a l i n g b r i e f l y w i t h Ten's c l a i m t h a t " s e v e r e and permanent" harm i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . I f t h i s were so i t would mean t h a t i t would never be j u s t i f i a b l e t o a l l o w even the most " u n i m p a i r e d " agent t o commit s u i c i d e even i f i t was the most r a t i o n a l c o u r s e of a c t i o n f o r him., I n a d d i t i o n , t h i s would p r o h i b i t the p u r s u i t o f a v e r y l a r g e number of a c t i v i t i e s such as mountain c l i m b i n g , space t r a v e l , motor r a c i n g , s i n c e a l l o f these i n v o l v e the r i s k o f s e v e r e and permanent harm. F o r anyone who o b j e c t s t o the i n c l u s i o n of the word " r i s k " o f harm they s h o u l d be reminded t h a t s i n c e p a t e r n a l i s m i s i n t e n d e d t o p r e v e n t harm from o c c u r r i n g , one can o n l y t a l k i n terms of the r i s k of harm. C l e a r l y , t h e n , harm i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n . More w i l l be s a i d l a t e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r as t o why i t i s a n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e . R e g a r d i n g the 'proper g u a r d i a n ' c o n d i t i o n , Ten l i s t s -46- four sufficiency c r i t e r i a for determination of clear and serious impairment. He suggests that at least one of the following be present: 1) the individual belongs to a special class of persons; (eg. children, mentally insane, mental! retardants) 2) the individual lacks knowledge; • (eg. of conse- quences or of the nature of the act) 3) the individual lacks control; (eg. emotional imbalance, drugged) 4) the individual i s subject to undue influence - (eg. coercion, pressure or custom) (Ten 1971, pp. 60-3). The l a s t three conditions f a l l into the 'diminished agency' appeal and w i l l be dealt with i n the succeeding section on conditional exclusion. However, what i s prominent about Ten's account i s his f i r s t condition. It i s the assumption that by virtue of being a member of a s p e c i f i c category of persons one i s almost automatically subject to any form of p a t e r n a l i s t i c intervention deemed desired. This attitude i s prevalent and i s a legacy attributed to Locke: the child's good i s the same as the parents'. Parental benevolence i s s u f f i c i e n t to ensure the f u l f i l l m e n t of children's rights (Worsfold 1974, p. 145). The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for this categorical indifference to the rights of children c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y has been assumed rather than defended.''" The only explanation offered for the alienation of the rights of these groups i s that they do not have the same -47- c a p a c i t i e s as "normal" a d u l t s and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r d e c i s i o n s a re g e n e r a l l y s u b j e c t t o " v i t i a t i n g " f a c t o r s (Ten 1971, p. 6 0 ) . T h i s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s c l e a r l y i n a d e q u a t e : a) E x a c t l y what c a p a c i t i e s i s i t t h a t each member of these groups l a c k and a l l "normal" a d u l t s possess? b) I f t h e i r d e c i s i o n s a re o n l y " g e n e r a l l y " s u b j e c t t o " v i t i a t i n g " f a c t o r s why th e n a re the r e m a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s not exempt from i n t e r v e n t i o n ? c) I f the " v i t i a t i n g " f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g c h i l d r e n and o t h e r s a re not d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d from those a f f e c t i n g a d u l t s (eg. l a c k of c o n t r o l , l a c k of knowledge, and undue i n f l u e n c e ) why ar e c h i l d r e n c a t e g o r i c a l l y s u b j e c t t o p a t e r n a l i s m and a d u l t s o n l y c o n d i t i o n a l l y ? A f u r t h e r a p p e a l t h a t i s o f t e n used a g a i n s t c h i l d r e n t o j u s t i f y i n t e r f e r e n c e s such as compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s t h a t t h e i r " d i s a b i l i t i e s a c u t e l y t h r e a t e n the adequate development of those c a p a c i t i e s we deem n e c e s s a r y t o f u l l human l i f e " ( S u t t o n 1978, p. 107). There are t h r e e g e n e r a l c a u t i o n s t h a t s h o u l d be made about the pres u m p t i o n t h a t c h i l d r e n s h o u l d be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h i n o r d e r t o f o s t e r t h e i r development as r e s p o n s i b l e , f u l f i l l e d a d u l t s . One, we s h o u l d be m i n d f u l of the f a c t t h a t t r e a t i n g c h i l d h o o d s u b s t a n t i a l l y as a means t o a d u l t - hood i s not t o t r e a t c h i l d r e n w i t h r e s p e c t . D a v i d Wardle reminds us t h a t c h i l d h o o d i s a stage h a v i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c needs and i n t e r e s t s w hich have a v a l u e of t h e i r own r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r r o l e i n p r e p a r i n g f o r a d u l t l i f e ( K l e i n i n g 1976, p. 5 ) . We seem too e a s i l y t o d i s r e g a r d the i n t e r e s t s of c h i l d r e n . Two, -48- why do we not operate on the presumption that children learn best when allowed to learn from th e i r own mistakes? Treating children as though they are autonomous aids them i n developing into genuinely autonomous persons; treating them as responsible persons aids them i n becoming responsible persons (Murphy 1977, p. 237). Others have s p e c i f i c a l l y claimed that for these reasons paternal- i s t i c treatment i s "not conducive to the i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral development of the i n d i v i d u a l " (Ten 1971, p. 64). Three, the danger of investing expansive powers over children i s that much of what occurs i s l i k e l y to be for the "self-convenience" of adults and not out of regard for the children (McMurty 1980, p. 16). One f i n a l argument for the categorical exclusion of . certain groups from the right to be guardians of the i r well-being i s an appeal to expediency. The claim asserts that for p r a c t i c a l purposes, since the incidence of l i k e l y harm i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y large among a pa r t i c u l a r category of persons, and since i t may be impossible or at least extremely costly to i d e n t i f y exceptions, then the most reasonable approach i s to categorically exclude the group as a whole. Magsino uses a version of this l i n e of argument as an excuse for the exclusion of children from option ri g h t s . He acknowledges that deprivation of such fundamental freedoms requires "demonstrable incapacity to make acceptable use of one's l i b e r t i e s " (Magsino 1979, p. 183). Unfortunately he assumes, rather than proves, that children have a 'demonstrable incapacity' that leads to 'unacceptable' use of their l i b e r t i e s . Clearly, the p r i n c i p l e of non-interference places the onus on the i n t e r - venor. As well, this argument from expediency does not hold i n _49 - cases of i n t e r p e r s o n a l p a t e r n a l i s m . Having f i r s t - h a n d knowledge of the agent and b e i n g a b l e t o s u p e r v i s e i n d i v i d u a l l y r e n d e r s the c l a i m f o r the c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n o f c h i l d r e n from any prima f a c i e r i g h t s t o l i b e r t y e s p e c i a l l y u n t e n a b l e . Where t h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g i s more a p p r o p r i a t e i s i n the a r e a which C a r t e r c a l l s " l e g i s l a t i v e p a t e r n a l i s m " . I n such cases i t may o f t e n be n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a l e g a l age o r m i n i m a l I.Q. upon which l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t i s o f f i c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d . However, i t must be remembered t h a t age-based and I.Q.-based r e s t r i c t i o n s are o n l y e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . C h r o n o l o g i c a l age, by i t s e l f , i s not a m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e d i s - c r i m i n a t o r y c r i t e r i o n . Arguments a g a i n s t mandatory r e t i r e m e n t and job d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on the b a s i s of age have fo u g h t t h i s p o i n t . I n cases where p r a c t i c a l o r l e g a l c o n s t r a i n t s d i c t a t e the use o f age, or o t h e r s t a t i s t i c a l norms, t h e r e are a number of l i m i t a t i o n s t h a t must be p l a c e d on the c a t e g o r i c a l n e s s of the l e g i s l a t i o n b e f o r e i t i s j u s t i f i e d . (1) The d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t s h o u l d be based on s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a . T h i s means t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d be " c a r e f u l l y s p e c i f i e d , l i m i t e d , c o n t r o l l e d and e x p l i c i t e d l y t a i l o r e d t o the k i n d of incompetence m a n i f e s t e d " (Murphy 1974, p. 479). I n o t h e r words, i n t e r f e r e n c e s h o u l d be l o c a l i z e d t o c r i t e r i a of the a c t i v i t y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n r e f e r t o the o v e r a l l c a p a c i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l . F o r example, f i f t e e n y e a r o l d s a r e not a l l o w e d t o d r i v e c a r s , not because they are c a t e g o r i c a l l y incompetent, but because s t a t i s t i c a l l y t hey make bad c h o i c e s w h i l e d r i v i n g . The same p r i n c i p l e now a p p l i e s t o r e p e a t e d drunken d r i v e r s . T h i s approach a l l o w s -50- t h a t groups o f persons who may have i n the p a s t been d i s - m issed as c a t e g o r i c a l l y 'incompetent' ( c h i l d r e n , mental r e t a r d a t e s , e t c . , ) would be l e g a l l y r e c o g n i z e d t o have the o p t i o n t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n i n m a t t e r s which a re not s p e c i f i c a l l y l e g a l l y p r o h i b i t e d . The a s c e r t a i n m e n t of the nor m a t i v e ' c u t - o f f p o i n t s h o u l d be c a r e f u l l y s c r u t i n i z e d . I t must be demonstrated t h a t s t a t i s t i c a l l y few persons below the ' c u t - o f f - p o i n t meet the c r i t e r i a and most persons above the ' c u t - o f f s a t i s f y the mini m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . P r o v i s i o n s h o u l d be made f o r e x e p t i o n s t o the r e s t r i c t i o n based on an a b i l i t y t o demonstrate competence. T h i s may i n v o l v e d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers t o a l l o w f o r i n d i v i d u a l c i r c u m - s t a n c e s , o r a f o r m a l t e s t i n g procedure t o a s c e r t a i n the d e f e n s i b i l i t y of the a p p e a l f o r exemption. I n a d i s c u s s i o n on the f a i r n e s s of a d u l t s u f f e r a g e Schrag c i t e s a study which r e p o r t s t h a t i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s s i x p e r c e n t of the e i g h t h g r a d e r s make the k i n d s of statements made by the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d 51 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n (Schrag 1975, p. 450). T h i s s uggests t h a t an age-based c r i t e r i o n was u n f a i r l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . I n l i e u of an age c r i t e r i o n , Schrag t e n t a - t i v e l y proposes a ' v o t e r f i t n e s s t e s t ' based on what he c a l l the 'minimal f o r m u l a t i o n ' of v o t e r competence. A l t h o u g h he l a t e r r e j e c t s t h i s i d e a because o f the p o t e n t i a l dangers, he admits the reasons f o r t h i s abandonment have not been c o n c l u s i v e l y demonstrated t o be p e r s u a s i v e (Schrag 1975, p. 454). H i s h e s i t a n c y t o base the f r a n c h i s e t o t a l l y on a f i t n e s s t e s t may be w e l l - a d v i s e d ; however, I f i n d c o n s i d e r - -51- a b l e a p p e a l i n a compromise. Young persons below the l e g a l age of s u f f e r a g e ought t o be a l l o w e d t a k e a f i t n e s s t e s t which would g r a n t s u f f e r a g e t o those who passed. (4) A n d ; f i n a l l y , as Dworkin (1971) a r g u e s , l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d impose o n l y the m i n i m a l i n t e r f e r e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t the w e l l - b e i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l s (eg. p a r t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s r a t h e r than g e n e r a l p r o h i b i t i o n s ; temporary bans r a t h e r t h a n permanent o u t l a w i n g ) . T h i s view echos a d i s t r u s t t h a t M i l l had f o r l e g i s l a t i v e p a t e r n a l i s m : The i n t e r f e r e n c e s of s o c i e t y t o o v e r r u l e h i s judgement and purposes i n what o n l y r e g a r d s h i m s e l f must be grounded on g e n e r a l p r e s u m p t i o n s ; which may be a l t o g e t h e r wrong, and even i f r i g h t are as l i k e l y as not t o be m i s a p p l i e d t o i n d i v i d u a l c a s e s . (DwOrkln 1971, p. 114) These l i m i t a t i o n s on l e g a l p a t e r n a l i s m s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r the n o t i o n of c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n . I suggest t h a t a l t h o u g h age-based r e s t r i c t i o n s may l o o k l i k e c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n s , they are not j u s t i f i e d u n l e s s they have the e f f e c t of g e n e r a l i z e d c o n d i t i o n a l e x c l u s i o n s . Thus f a r the argument a g a i n s t the c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n of c h i l d r e n from a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y has l a r g e l y been one of d e f a u l t . The t a c k has been t o d i s c l a i m t h a t t h e r e are d e f e n s i b l e grounds f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t c h i l d r e n . I propose t o b e g i n t o l a y the groundwork f o r a more p o s i t i v e defense of t h i s p o s i t i o n , b y i d e n t i f y i n g the b a s i s f o r a s c r i p t i o n of a n a t u r a l r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . I s h a l l endeavour t o demonstrate on t h e s e grounds t h a t c h i l d r e n q u a l i f y f o r t h i s e n t i t l e m e n t . C h i l d r e n are not s i m p l y b e i n g accused of b e i n g s t a t i s t i - c a l l y more l i k e l y t o make m i s t a k e s . I f they were, then the -52- c r i t e r i a f o r a s s e s s i n g impairment would be the same f o r a d u l t s and c h i l d r e n . F u r t h e r m o r e , b e i n g a c h i l d would not by i t s e l f be l o g i c a l l y s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r p a t e r n a l i s m . A f t e r a l l , not a l l c h i l d r e n a c t " c h i l d i s h l y " ; i n f a c t , few c h i l d r e n always a c t " c h i l d i s h l y " and, perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , many "normal" a d u l t s o f t e n a c t " c h i l d i s h l y " . D a n i e l W i k l e r r a i s e s a r e l a t e d o b j e c t i o n r e g a r d i n g the c a t e g o r i c a l d e n i a l o f r i g h t s t o the m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d : I want t o examine the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e two p o s s i b l e s t a t u s e s : one of i m p a i r e d and one o f u n i m p a i r e d i n t e l l e c t , the one l a c k i n g a r i g h t t o s e l f - d i r e c t i o n , the o t h e r p o s s e s s i n g i t ( W i k l e r 1979, p. 379). He suggests t h a t impairment i s r e l a t i v e - the m o d e r a t e l y r e t a r d e d i s - , r e l a t i v e t o the average i n t e l l e c t j u s t as the average i n t e l l e c t i s r e l a t i v e t o the g i f t e d . H i s p r o b i n g q u e s t i o n i s then why i s " o r d i n a r y " i n t e l l e c t enough t o secure r i g h t s t o s e l f - d i r e c t i o n ? S u r e l y t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t r i n s i c t o the s t a t u s of average i n t e l l e c t (which i s i t s e l f a s t a t i s t i c a l norm) t h a t e s t a b l i s h e s i t as the j u s t i f y i n g c r i t e r i a f o r freedom from pa- t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e . W i k l e r suggests t h a t the o p e r a t i v e c r i t e r i o n i s the a b i l i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l t o d e a l w i t h the s i t u a t i o n . He recommends t h a t p a t e r n a l i s t i c p o l i c y be based on " s e l e c t i v e competence" where a r e t a r d e d p e r s o n would be judged incompetent w i t h r e s p e c t t o s p e c i f i c t a s k s and (perhaps) competent i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s " ( W i k l e r 1979, p. 385). For s i m i l a r r e a s o n s , D.G. Brown (1971) i n an a r t i c l e , "The R i g h t s of C h i l d r e n " , c h a l l e n g e s the presumptions be h i n d our r e f u s a l t o r e c o g n i z e the e n t i t l e m e n t of c h i l d r e n t o a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . He argues t h a t c o n d i t i o n a l freedoms ought t o be g r a n t e d t o c h i l d r e n by i n s t i - -53- t u t i o n s such as s c h o o l s i n r e c o g n i t i o n of the e x t e n t t o which c h i l d r e n a re c a p a b l e o f the competent conduct of t h e i r a f f a i r s . I contend t h i s same p r i n c i p l e ( i . e . the e x t e n t t o which an i n d i v i d u a l i s c a p a b l e o f 'competent' c h o i c e i s the e x t e n t t o which he i s e n t i t l e d t o e x e r c i s e h i s r i g h t ) ought t o be a p p l i e d e q u a l l y t o a l l p e r s o n s . H a r t suggests t h a t i n o r d e r f o r sense t o be made of the n o t i o n o f moral r i g h t , i n g e n e r a l , t h e r e need be a t l e a s t one n a t u r a l r i g h t , namely an e q u a l r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . He a s s e r t s t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t t o " t h i s r i g h t i s one which a l l men have i f they a re c a p a b l e of c h o i c e ; they have i t qua men" (Ha r t 1955, p. 1975). I f c h i l d r e n possess t h i s r e q u i s i t e ' c a p a c i t y t o choose' then qua chooser they have a n a t u r a l e n t i t l e m e n t t o l i b e r t y . I t s h o u l d be c l e a r why s c h o o l - a g e d c h i l d r e n q u a l i f y f o r t h i s e n t i t l e m e n t when we compare them w i t h i n f a n t s . I agree, as Ha r t i s r e p o r t e d t o c l a i m , t h a t young c h i l d r e n ( i n f a n t s ) don't possess t h i s b a s i c r i g h t t o l i b e r t y ( K l e i n i g 1976, p. 1 0 ) . T h i s i s so f o r the r e a s o n A . I . Melden s u g g e s t s . He c l a i m s t h a t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of c h o o s i n g i s t h a t one have i n t e r e s t s as opposed t o merely h a v i n g wants and d e s i r e s . Only w i t h the advent o f i n t e r e s t s i s the i n d i v i d u a l " a b l e t o c a r r y on w i t h a program o f h i s own" (Melden 1977, p. 147). The r e q u i s i t e c o n c e p t u a l framework and the mechanism f o r agency are not s u f f i c i e n t l y d e v e l o p e d t o war r a n t the c l a i m t h a t the young i n f a n t i s i n t e r e s t e d i n , o r has an i n t e r e s t i n , something. The volumes of l i t e r a t u r e u r g i n g edu- . c a t o r s t o ap p e a l t o s t u d e n t s ' i n t e r e s t s a t t e s t t o the f a c t t h a t we c o n s i d e r c h i l d r e n i n p o s s e s s i o n of i n t e r e s t s . D a n i e l P e k a r s k y shares a s i m i l a r view. He argues t h a t -54- the concept of personhood i s dependent on "the capacity to act i n the l i g h t of understandings and valuations emanating from the s e l f " . He further states: It i s a consequence of this interpretation of personhood that children do count as persons; although i t i s true that their s k i l l s are only rudimentary, their behaviour i s already mediated by thought and intention (Pekarsky 1977, p. 360). Even Thomas Sutton, a strong opponent to the notion of children's right to l i b e r t y , accepts the 'capacity to choose' as the basis for entitlement. Sutton argues that welfare rights are importantly t i e d to basic needs and i n this regard children are relevantly similar to adults ( i . e . they have the same basic entitlement). He also recognizes that option rights (of which a basic right to l i b e r t y i s one) are t i e d to pursuit of interests (Sutton 1978, p. 102). However he claims that because children lack "mature i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s " they are i n this regard relevantly d i s s i m i l a r . As he points out, " i t i s at the very . least confused to accord a being, incapable of r a t i o n a l i t y , rights of r a t i o n a l choice" (p. 109). Unfortunately for Sutton, i t i s he who i s at the very least confused to assume that children are incapable of the necessary degree of r a t i o n a l i t y to qualify for rights of r a t i o n a l choice. This should be clearer i f we examine how Sutton's formulation of r a t i o n a l i t y i s inadequate to provide a l o g i c a l l y relevant d i s t i n c t i o n between adults and children. Sutton suggests that r a t i o n a l i t y be characterized as the a b i l i t y and the d i s p o s i t i o n to act not merely from impulse or desire or habit, but rather from the blending of desire with the i n - t e l l i g e n t a n t i c i p a t i o n of the consequences that res u l t from acting on desire (Sutton 1978, p. 108). -55- R e g a r d l e s s of whether the r a t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e m e n t i s . i n t e r p r e t e d weakly o r s t r o n g l y , i t i s i n c a p a b l e of s u s t a i n i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t S u t t o n r e q u i r e s . Viewed i n i t s m i n i m a l sense ( i . e . mere c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l i t y ) i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y not a t a l l c o n v i n c i n g t h a t c h i l d r e n l a c k t h i s c a p a c i t y . As D.G. Brown reminds us: Even a f i v e - y e a r o l d i s master of a complex language, has a p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e and an awareness of h i s own i d e n t i t y , and i s q u i t e c a p a b l e of i m p l i c i t l y i n v o k i n g a g e n e r a l i s - a t i o n p r i n c i p l e t o p r o t e s t u n f a i r t r e a t m e n t by a p a r e n t o r t e a c h e r (Brown 1971, p. 15). I n a s i m i l a r v e i n Robert Young c l a i m s t h a t C h i l d r e n a r e f a r from always b e i n g too immature o r i r r a t i o n a l t o know, and be a b l e t o e x p r e s s o p i n i o n s , when t h e i r i n t e r e s t s are a f f e c t e d (Young 1976, p. 29). I n s h o r t , i f the c l a i m i s t h a t the grounds f o r e n t i t l e m e n t are s i m p l y a c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l c h o i c e t h e n c h i l d r e n q u a l i f y as t i t l e h o l d e r s . I f a s t r o n g e r c l a i m i s i m p l i e d then S u t t o n runs the d i f f i c u l t y of c a t e g o r i c a l l y e x c l u d i n g many a d u l t s from a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . To a l a r g e e x t e n t the c h o i c e s of many 'average' a d u l t s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a d i s p o s i t i o n t o a c t on i m p u l s e , h a b i t and c o m p u l s i v e n e s s . I can t h i n k o f c o u n t l e s s a c t i v i t i e s (eg. smoking, o v e r e a t i n g , g e t t i n g drunk, w a s t i n g money, p r o c r a s t i n a t i n g , w h i m s i c a l r i s k t a k i n g ) t h a t are ' i r r a t i o n a l ' f o r most of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , and y e t we do not c o n s i d e r t h a t s u f f i c i e n t grounds t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h an a d u l t ' s d e c i s i o n t o do so. Put s i m p l y , the problem w i t h S u t t o n ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t e i t h e r the 'average' c h i l d i s not i r r a t i o n a l enough o r the 'average' a d u l t i s not r a t i o n a l enough t o u p h o l d the d i s t i n c t i o n he a s s e r t s . There i s , h o w e v e r , a sense i n which r a t i o n a l i t y i s a t the h e a r t of an e n t i t l e m e n t t o a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y and t h a t i n v o l v e s -56- the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n between c h o i c e and h a v i n g a r e a s o n . As R e g i n a l d J a c k s o n p o i n t s out: I t i s p o s s i b l e no doubt t o a c t w i t h o u t a r e a s o n . But i t i s j u s t here t h a t d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n d i f f e r s from i m p u l s i v e a c t i o n . Only where what i s done i s done f o r a r e a s o n , whether sound o r unsound, does the agent choose. Choice not o n l y can, c h o i c e must be reasoned ( J a c k s o n 1942, p. 362). T h i s sense of 'having r e a s o n s ' does not r e f e r t o the v a l u a t i o n t h a t one's c h o i c e i s ' r a t i o n a l ' o r r e a s o n a b l e , merely t h a t one has chosen. Thus f a r i n the d i s c u s s i o n , a l l t h a t has been shown i s t h a t persons who are c a p a b l e of c h o i c e have a prima f a c i e r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . T h i s i m p l i e d t h a t c h i l d r e n b e i n g persons c a p a b l e of c h o i c e have a n a t u r a l r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . N a t u r a l l y , c h i l d r e n who f a i l t o r e s p e c t the w e l l - b e i n g o f o t h e r s or who f l a g r a n t l y d i s - r e g a r d t h e i r own w e l l - b e i n g are j u s t i f i e d i n h a v i n g t h e i r r i g h t s o v e r r i d d e n . To use H a r t ' s words, n a t u r a l r i g h t s are not " a b s o l - u t e , i n d e f e a s i b l e o r i m p r e s c r i p t i b l e " and can o n l y be e x e r c i s e d under c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s ( Hart 1955, p. 1976). However, the s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e i s t h a t t h i s would be a c o n d i t i o n a l , not a c a t e g o r i c a l , f o r f e i t u r e of l i b e r t y and i t would not be on any grounds save those which a l l t i t l e - h o l d e r s are l i a b l e . B. C o n d i t i o n a l E x c l u s i o n F o r a l l i t s i n i t i a l a p p e a l , the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t r a t i o n - a l i t y p r o v i d e the c r i t e r i o n f o r the j u s t i f i e d s u s p e n s i o n of r i g h t s t o l i b e r t y i s u n a c c e p t a b l e r e g a r d l e s s of which c o n c e p t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y i s used. Whether r a t i o n a l i t y i s u n d e r s t o o d as p e r - f e c t l y r a t i o n a l ( i . e . what a l l r a t i o n a l men t o agree to) or -57- m i n i m a l l y r a t i o n a l ( i . e . " c o n s i s t e n c y o r coherence of one's v a l u e judgements w i t h each o t h e r and w i t h one's o t h e r b e l i e f s " - Buchanan 1975, p. 399); the nagging q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : Must one do the r a t i o n a l t h i n g ? The former always commits one t o d o i n g the b e s t p o s s i b l e t h i n g w h i l e the l a t t e r r e q u i r e s t h a t i t a t l e a s t be a r e a s o n a b l e t h i n g t o do. J o e l F e i n b e r g o f f e r s the most i l l u m i n a t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e t o the ' r a t i o n a l ' c r i t e r i o n . R a t h e r than e v a l u a t i n g the "wisdom o r w o r t h i n e s s of a person's c h o i c e " , l e t us determine whether "the c h o i c e r e a l l y i s h i s " . ( F e i n b e r g 1971, p. 113). F e i n b e r g (1971) i n t r o d u c e s what he terms "the s t a n d a r d of v o l u n t a r i n e s s " . To be f u l l y v o l u n t a r y would r e q u i r e : 1) the p r o p e r a p p r a i s a l of the f a c t s - i . e . the agent be " f u l l y i n f o r m e d of a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s and c o n t i n g e n c i e s , w i t h one's eyes wide open, so t o speak"; and 2) f u l l use of r e f l e c t i v e f a c u l t y - i . e . "the absence of a l l c o e r c i v e p r e s s u r e of c o m p u l s i o n " such as derangement, i l l n e s s , s evere d e p r e s s i o n , u n s e t t l i n g e x c i t a t i o n , i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r s (eg. a l c o h o l ) and not i n v o l v e immature o r d e f e c t i v e f a c u l t i e s o f r e a s o n i n g . To the e x t e n t t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s f a i l t o o b t a i n i s the e x t e n t t o w h ich one has f a i l e d t o choose i n a ' f u l l - b o d i e d ' sense. We can r e f e r t o M i l l ' s c l a i m t h a t man i s the p r o p e r g u a r d i a n of h i s w e l f a r e and agree w i t h him t h a t t h i s s i g n i f i e s t h a t we are not e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the l i b e r t y of a n o t h e r i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g m a t t e r s j u s t because we d i s a p p r o v e of h i s c h o i c e . How- e v e r , i t does not p r o h i b i t us from a r g u i n g t h a t the e x t e n t t o which an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n s are not " h i s own" i s the e x t e n t t o w h ich he i s not the p r o p e r g u a r d i a n of h i s w e l f a r e . F e i n b e r g , - 5 8 - commenting on M i l l ' s view t h a t p r e v e n t i o n of harm t o o t h e r s i s the o n l y r e a s o n f o r impeding l i b e r t y c o n c l u d e s : "The harm t o o t h e r s " p r i n c i p l e a f t e r a l l , p e r m i t s us t o p r o t e c t a man from the c h o i c e s o f o t h e r people ... " n o n - v o l u n t a r y c h o i c e s " w h i c h , b e i n g the c h o i c e s of no one a t a l l , a r e no l e s s f o r e i g n t o him. ( F e i n b e r g 1971, p. 124). F e i n b e r g admits t h a t h i s e x p l i c a t i o n o f the c o n d i t i o n s of v o l u n - t a r i n e s s i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r the k i n d o f ' s t a n d a r d ' he has i n mind. He compares h i s c o n c e p t i o n t o what A r i s t o t l e c a l l s " d e l i b e r a t e c h o i c e " . F e i n b e r g understands t h i s t o mean t h a t one's a c t s have t h e i r o r i g i n " i n the agent", r e p r e s e n t him " f a i t h f u l l y i n some i m p o r t a n t way" and are t h e r e f o r e a c t s f o r which one can t a k e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r " i n the f u l l e s t sense". ( F e i n b e r g 1971, p. 113). C o v a l and S m i t h , i n an a r t i c l e c a l l e d "The Concept of A c t i o n " , p r o v i d e a more adequate account of t h i s c r i t e r i a . As a t o o l t o a n a l y z e the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of the concept of a c t i o n , t hey c o n s i d e r the types o f ways i n which i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e v i a t e from the s t a n d a r d , " f u l l - b o d i e d " sense of a c t i n g . By so d o i n g they have g e n e r a t e d a l i s t of the ways i n which agency i s a t t e n u a t e d . S i n c e t h e i r account w i l l form the n u c l e u s o f the c r i t e r i a f o r d i m i n i s h e d agency, i t d e s e r v e s d e t a i l e d e l a b o r a t i o n . F o r c l a r i t y I have l a b e l l e d the types of a t t e n u a t i n g f a c t o r s i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : 1) i n t e n t i o n c r i t e r i a — t h e agent must choose the o u t - come 2) v o l i t i o n c r i t e r i a — t h e agent not o n l y must choose the outcome but the c h o i c e must be w i l l f u l l y s e l e c t e d . 3) commission c r i t e r i o n — t h e b e h a v i o r of the agent's -59- body must s t a n d i n a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n w i t h the outcome. A c c o r d i n g t o C o v a l and Smith, an a c t i o n i s a t t e n u a t e d whenever any of the c r i t e r i a a re not met. F a i l u r e t o meet the i n t e n t i o n c r i t e r i o n o c c u r s when "agent X performs a c t i o n Y" and i t i s done: a) A c c i d e n t a l l y - Y i s caused by m e d i a t i n g c i r c u m - s t a n c e s t h a t were u n f o r e s e e n by X; b) M i s t a k e n l y - Y i s the r e s u l t of r e l e v a n t u n t r u e b e l i e f s h e l d by X; 2 c) I n a d v e r t e n t l y - Y i s the r e s u l t of concomitant consequences u n f o r e s e e n by X; 3 d) C a r e l e s s l y - Y i s the r e s u l t of X's improper c a r e and a t t e n t i o n t o how the a c t was e x e c u t e d . A l t h o u g h a c t i o n may be i n t e n t i o n a l i t may s t i l l be i n v o l u n t a r y . I t would be i n v o l u n t a r y whenever the c h o i c e was not based on a "normal s e l e c t i o n o f g o a l s from among the a r r a y n o r m a l l y i n t e g r a l t o him" ( C o v a l & Smith, p. 8). To e x p l a i n t h i s the a u t h o r s e n v i s i o n the f o l l o w i n g mechanism of c h o i c e : 1) a s e t of o r d e r e d g o a l s (eg. d e s i r e s and needs) 2) a means of s e l e c t i n g which g o a l s t o a c t u a t e , i n v o l v i n g : a) an a b i l i t y t o a s s e s s the consequences of one's c h o i c e s ; b) an a b i l i t y t o r e l a t e t h a t assessment t o the remainder o f one's needs and d e s i r e s . The ways i n which v o l i t i o n i s a f f e c t e d a r e : 1) abnormal g o a l s - i t was not one's normal g o a l s but ones f o r e i g n t o him - eg. i f one was drugged w i t h an a p h r o d i s i a c , o r p r e s s u r e d by peer a p p r o v a l or the t h r e a t o f harm, b r a i n w a s h i n g ; 2) pre-empted - i t was the r e s u l t of one's normal s e t o f . g o a l s b e i n g r e a r r a n g e d i n o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y because of events o u t s i d e one's c o n t r o l - e g . i f one was f o r c e d t o choose between two a l t e r n a t i v e s , b o t h of which the i n d i v i d u a l wanted; 3) i m p a i r e d mechanism - the means of s e l e c t i n g and -60- comparing g o a l s i s s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d and l e a d s t o d i s t o r t i o n - eg. any mania, s t r e s s , o r g e n e r a l i n t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n . The commission c r i t e r i o n r e f e r s o n l y t o the n e c e s s i t y of b e i n g a b l e t o say "X was the p e r s o n who d i d a c t i o n Y." - i . e . t h a t a c e r t a i n r e l e v a n t b e h a v i o r of X's body was i n e f f e c t . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r making the t r a n s i t i o n from a t t e n u - a t i o n of a c t i o n t o a t t e n u a t i o n of c h o i c e t a k e s i t s l e a d from Brown's account of a c t i o n . He d e f i n e s the p o i n t of view of the agent as " t h a t of the p e r s o n f o r whom the q u e s t i o n of what t o do a r i s e s " (Brown 1968, p. 3 ) . The " s e t t l i n g of the q u e s t i o n " o f what t o do can e i t h e r be a t h e o r e t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t or a p r a c t i c a l r e s o l u t i o n . A t h e o r e t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t would s i g n i f y t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l had made a c h o i c e or d e c i d e d . A p r a c t i c a l r e s o l u t i o n would be the performance of the a c t . While C o v a l and Smith a r e concerned w i t h a t t r i b u t i n g the a c t t o the agent our i n t e r e s t i s i n a t t r i b u t i n g the c h o i c e t o the agent. N e v e r t h e l e s s , b o t h are a " s e t t l i n g of the q u e s t i o n " of what t o do. T h i s s w i t c h i n f o c u s s i m p l y r e q u i r e s a number of adjustments t o the a r t i c u l a t e d c r i t e r i a . The i n t e n t i o n c r i t e r i a can now be t r a n s l a t e d : "the agent approaches the q u e s t i o n of what t o do w i t h h i s own d e s i r e s and p r e f e r e n c e but e r r o r s i n the d e l i b e r a t i o n r e s u l t i n a c h o i c e w hich w i l l not secure what the agent had r e a l l y wanted t o choose". T u r n i n g t o the s p e c i f i c ways i n which t h i s u n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a r i s e s we can t r a n s c r i b e C o v a l and Smith's accounts i n t o the language of c h o i c e . T h e i r account of ' a c c i d e n t a l , ; can be summarized: "X i n t e n d s D but because of u n f o r e s e e n causes does A". The c r u x of t h i s excuse l i e s i n the f a i l u r e of X t o f o r e s e e m e d i a t i n g events -61^- that w i l l prevent X from getting what he intends. In other words: "X's choice of course of action C w i l l not secure desired results D because of unforeseen event Y". Because of the change i n the context, the label 'accidental' would be better replaced by the phrase ' f a i l u r e to predict mediating events'. An i l l u s t r a t i o n of this category i s : X takes only $50.00 from the bank for the .weekend (C), but runs into a friend whom he owes and must repay $40.00 (Y). This leaves X without enough money to go out to dinner (D). The f a i l u r e to predict the need to repay the debt (Y) prevents X from getting what he wants (D). The decision to take out only $50.00 was i n this regard not f u l l y i n t e n t i o n a l . (Choosing C but f a i l i n g to predict Y prevents act u a l i z i n g D). Their 'mistaken' condition can be stated: "X intends D but because of f a l s e b e l i e f s does C','• The attenuation occurs because: "X's choice of action C w i l l not secure desired results D because the selection of C arises out of certain fa l s e b e l i e f s Y". An example of this would be: X desires to pass his math test. He calculates that two days w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t time to study so as to guarantee passing the test. X studies only for the two days and ends up f a i l i n g his test because he hadn't recalled enough. 'Inadvertence'can be restated: "X's choice of course of action C w i l l secure desired r e s u l t D but w i l l also have a con- comittant consequence A','. The occurrence of A i s the unintentional res u l t of X's f a i l u r e to predict the consequences of C. Inadver- tence i s better l a b e l l e d ' f a i l u r e to predict consequences of the choice'. A s i t u a t i o n which exemplifies this species of uninten- t i o n a l choice i s as follows: X does not r e a l i z e that i f he goes out to buy his newspaper at this moment he w i l l come i n contact w i t h a p e r s o n who has the measles. X chooses t o buy h i s paper (C) and c o n t r a c t s the measles ( A ) . ' C a r e l e s s l y ' i d e n t i f i e s t h a t : "X i n t e n d s D but because of i n a t t e n t i o n or r e c k l e s s n e s s i n the commission of D does A, and may or may not a l s o do D". P r i o r t o p r o c e e d i n g w i t h the t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s a t t e n u a t i o n a few comments are i n o r d e r . F i r s t o f a l l , i t i s a c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e t o i n c l u d e c a r e l e s s w i t h the o t h e r p l e a s . C a r e l e s s i s a r e l a t i v e term - what counts as c a r e l e s s w i t h dynamite does not w i t h r o c k s - w h i l e the o t h e r s are n o t . More i m p o r t a n t l y , c a r e l e s s i s never v a l u e n e u t r a l w h i l e the r e m a i n i n g o f t e n are v a l u e f r e e . The o t h e r s can be used as excuses t o reduce o r a v o i d c u l p a b i l i t y ; c a r e l e s s n e s s does not d i m i n i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , even i f i t d i m i n i s h e s agency. What C o v a l and Smith w i s h t o i d e n t i f y i n t h i s c a t e g o r y i s the n o t i o n t h a t i n a t t e n d a n c e t o the a c t r e s u l t s i n u n i n t e n d e d r e s u l t s . The u n i n t e n d e d r e s u l t s are not a t t r i b u t a b l e t o m i s t a k e n b e l i e f s o r a l a c k of f o r e s i g h t but are the consequence of not a t t e n d i n g t o the a c t ( o r , i n our c a s e , of not a t t e n d i n g t o the d e l i b e r a t i o n ) . I n i t s t r a n s l a t e d format: "X's c h o i c e of a c t i o n C w i l l r e s u l t i n A (and p o s s i b l y i n D which i s i n t e n d e d ) because X f a i l e d t o d e l i b e r a t e o r a t t e n d t o h i s c h o i c e of CV.. An extreme case of t h i s l a c k of d e l i b e r a t i o n , and one t h a t s t r e t c h e s the concept of c h o i c e such t h a t i t i s p r o b l e m a t i c , i s the r a s h o r i m p u l s i v e d e c i s i o n . T h i s p l e a which I s h a l l c a l l ' u n d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e ' i s d i s - . t i n g u i s h e d from the o t h e r s i n t h a t a l t h o u g h f l a w e d they a r e a l l d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e s . To r e c a p , we have i d e n t i f i e d the f o l l o w i n g grounds f o r d i m i n i s h e d i n t e n t i o n a l agency: Agent X v o l u n t a r i l y chooses C but -63- C i s n o t . f u l l y i n t e n t i o n a l s i n c e i t s s e l e c t i o n (1) arose out of a d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e which (a) f a i l e d t o p r e d i c t ( i ) m e d i a t i n g e v e n t s ; o r ( i i ) consequences; or (b) was based on m i s t a k e n b e l i e f s ; o r (2) was an u n d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e . S i n c e the v o l i t i o n c r i t e r i a i n C o v a l and Smith's account are t i e d c l o s e l y t o c h o i c e , they can be d i r e c t l y i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h c e r t a i n a d d i t i o n s i n t o the c o n c e p t i o n of d i m i n i s h e d agency. The most n o t a b l e a d d i t i o n s i n v o l v e t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n of the p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the normal s e l e c t i o n of g o a l s . T h e i r account o f the mechanism f o r c h o i c e i s p r e d i c a t e d on the agent h a v i n g a s e t of o r d e r e d g o a l s which are " n o r m a l l y i n t e g r a l t o him". Yet they s t i p u l a t e no c r i t e r i a which accommodates a f a i l u r e i n t h i s p r e c o n d i t i o n . F e i n b e r g o f f e r s a d e s c r i p t i o n of an agent who would be a c a n d i d a t e f o r t h i s c a t e o g r y of m a l f u n c t i o n i n g : The u n d i s c i p l i n e d p e r s o n , p e r p e t u a l l y l i a b l e t o i n t e r n a l c o l l i s i o n s , jams and r e v o l t s i s u n f r e e even though u n r e s t r a i n e d by e i t h e r the o u t s i d e w o r l d o r an i n t e r n a l g o v e r n o r . To v a r y the image, he i s a p e r s o n f r e e of e x t e r n a l s h a c k l e s , but t i e d i n k n o t s by the s t r a n d s of h i s own wants. I n the apt c u r r e n t i d i o m he i s s u b j e c t t o "hang ups". When he may "do a n y t h i n g he wants" h i s o p t i o n s w i l l overwhelm h i s c a p a c i t y t o o r d e r them i n h i e r a r c h i e s o f p r e f e r e n c e ! ( F e i n b e r g 1973B, pp. 14-15). T h i s d e f i c i e n c y w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d as an i n a b i l i t y t o o r d e r g o a l s . A f u r t h e r way i n which an agent might f a i l t o have a p r o p e r l y s t r u c t u r e d s e t o f normal g o a l s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the case o f s e l f - d e c e p t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o one a c c o u n t , genuine s e l f - d e c e p t i o n o c c u r s i f an i n d i v i d u a l d e c e i v e s h i m s e l f i n t o a d o p t i n g -64- a s e t of s t a n d a r d s t h a t are not those t h a t he ought t o l i v e by. The v a l u e s by which he a c t s and l i v e s a re not h i s v a l u e s ; he has not made them h i s own ... Such a man can c a l l n o t h i n g h i s own - n e i t h e r h i s v a l u e s , nor the emotions he d i s p l a y s , the d e s i r e s he seeks t o s a t i s f y , the i n t e r e s t s he p u r s u e s , the a c t i o n s he p e r f o r m s , the a c t i v i t i e s i n which he engages (Dilman & P h i l l i p s 1971, p. 127). The p e r s o n c o u l d be s a i d t o have a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o be l u r e d i n t o l i v i n g by a s e t o f v a l u e s w h i c h he c a n ' t l i v e w i t h . The r e s u l t i s an a r t i f i c i a l o r d e r i n g of h i s p r i o r i t i e s - a l t h o u g h they are n o r m a l l y h i s g o a l s , they a r e not p r o p e r l y h i s . . A t h i r d f a i l u r e t o meet t h i s r e q u i s i t e would be the p e r s o n whose o r d e r i n g o f g o a l s i s i n a c o n s t a n t f l u x o r i s f i c k l e . The s h o r t c o m i n g here i s d i s t i n c t from the p r e v i o u s two - h i s g o a l s are not unordered or...improperly o r d e r e d , but are u n s t a b l y o r d e r e d . A second assumption b u i l t i n t o t h e i r h y p o t h e t i c a l mechanism of c h o i c e i s "a means of s e l e c t i n g w h i c h of t h e s e g o a l s t o a c t u a t e " ( C o v a l and Smith, p. 8 ) . T h i s i s u n d e r s t o o d t o i n c l u d e "an a b i l i t y t o r e c k o n the consequences of one c h o i c e and t o r e l a t e the e f f e c t of t h a t back t o the remainder of one's needs and d e s i r e s " . D e f i c i e n c i e s of t h i s k i n d are c o v e r e d by the c r i t e r i o n they i d e n t i f y as " i m p a i r e d mechanism". I n a d d i t i o n t o the l i s t p r o v i d e d by C o v a l and Smith (mania, s t r e s s , i n t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n such as k l e p t o m a n i a ) t h e r e are two o t h e r s which deserve emphasis. " U n a l t e r a b l e i n t e n t i o n " i s a term used by G l o v e r (1970, p. 136) t o i d e n t i f y a p e r s o n who i s not moved when c o n f r o n t e d by r e a s o n s . He i s n o n - r a t i o n a l i n the sense t h a t reasons (whether sound o r not) do not a c t as s t r o n g m o t i v e s . A second s p e c i e s o f i n t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n i s the a r r a y of c o n d i t i o n s which have been -65- c a l l e d " p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r s " and i n c l u d e a l c o h o l i s m and a d d i c t i o n . They are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an i n a b i l i t y t o d e f e r immediate g r a t i f i c a t i o n - "an i n a b i l i t y ever t o r e s i s t the i m p u l s e or t e m p t a t i o n of the moment" ( G l o v e r 1970, p. 137). The r e m a i n i n g c r i t e r i a f o r d i m i n i s h e d v o l i t i o n a l agency ar e a t t e n u a t i o n because of. "abnormal g o a l s " (e.g. h y p n o s i s , b r a i n - washing) and "pre-empted g o a l s " (eg. t h r e a t s ) . They s t a n d as e x p l i c a t e d by C o v a l and Smith. I t i s worthy of note t h a t t h e s e a r e b o t h ways i n which an agent has been i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . We can summarize the c r i t e r i a f o r the d i m i n i s h e d v o l - i t i o n a l agency as: (1) m a l - p r i o r i z e d g o a l s a) unordered b) i m p r o p e r l y o r d e r e d c) u n s t a b l y o r d e r e d (2) i m p a i r e d mechanism of c h o i c e (3) i n t e r f e r e d mechanism of c h o i c e a) abnormal g o a l s b) pre-empted g o a l s . The analogue of the commission c r i t e r i o n i n the l o g i c of c h o i c e i s r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the q u e s t i o n of what t o do i s not s e t t l e d ; namely, no c h o i c e i s made. T h i s would be t y p i f i e d by the h e s i t a n t o r i n d e c i s i v e p e r s o n , o r p o s s i b l y by the p e r s o n about whom i t i s s a i d 'he j u s t doesn't know what he wants'. I n the paradigmatic f a i l u r e t o meet t h i s c o n d i t i o n the agent s i m p l y f a i l s t o make a c h o i c e . As C o v a l and Smith say: I n the absence of t h i s i n g r e d i e n t the concept of an a c t i o n c u t s out e n t i r e l y ( C o v a l & Smith, p. 13). -66- I n c i r c u m s t a n c e s where the need f o r a d e c i s i o n was d i c t a t e d by the immediacy of the danger or i t s g r a v i t y i t would be a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t the d e c i s i o n be made f o r the agent. S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , cases of t h i s type f a i l t o q u a l i f y as i n t e r f e r e n c e . R a t h e r , i t would more a c c u r a t e l y be s a i d t h a t someone merely took charge of the s i t u a t i o n . There i s the i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s commission c r i t e r i o n may o n l y be p a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l e d - when perhaps the i n d i v i d u a l had o n l y an uneasy p r e f e r e n c e or was a m b i v a l e n t about the c h o i c e . I n t e r f e r e n c e i n cases of t h i s s o r t would be of an a t t e n u a t e d n a t u r e . The weakness of the agent's r e s o l v e abates the moral u n e a s i n e s s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n t e r f e r e n c e . B oth f u l l and p a r t i a l f a i l u r e t o choose c o n s t i t u t e c r i t e r i a f o r d i m i n i s h e d c o m m i s s i o n a l agency. The concept of d i m i n i s h e d agency can now be summarized: The agency of a c h o i c e i s d i m i n i s h e d whenever any of the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n : - I . A t t e n u a t i o n o f I n t e n t i o n of Choice (A) f l a w e d d e l i b e r a t e c h o i c e !(.i) f a i l u r e t o p r e d i c t (a) m e d i a t i n g events (b) consequences ( i i ) m i s t a k e n b e l i e f s (B) u n d e l i b e r a t e d c h o i c e I I . A t t e n u a t i o n o f V o l i t i o n of Choice (A) m a l - p r i o r i z e d g o a l s ( i ) u nordered ( i i ) i m p r o p e r l y o r d e r e d ( i i i ) u n s t a b l y o r d e r e d (B) i m p a i r e d mechanism of c h o i c e -67 - (C) i n t e r f e r e d mechanism of c h o i c e ( i ) abnormal g o a l s ( i i ) pre-empted g o a l s III...! A t t e n u a t i o n of Commission of Choice (A) f a i l u r e t o choose (B) i n c o n c l u s i v e c h o i c e I t s h o u l d not be assumed t h a t t h i s account of d i m i n i s h e d agency i s u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l , o r t h a t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a t t e n u - a t i o n s i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . T h e s e . d i f f i c u l t i e s o c c u r p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the a t t e n u a t i o n of v o l i t i o n and commission. T h i s i s due, among o t h e r t h i n g s , t o f a c t t h a t our command of the c o m p l e x i t i e s of human p s y c h o l o g y i s r e l a t i v e l y p r i m i t i v e . I do 1 w i s h t o a s s e r t t h a t i n cases where none of the c r i t e r i a f o r d i m i n i s h e d agency can demonstrably be shown t o be p r e s e n t the i n d i v i d u a l must be presumed t o be the prop e r agent o r g u a r d i a n of h i s w e l l - b e i n g . As i n our l e g a l system, p r e s u m p t i o n i s i n the f a v o u r of the i n d i v i d u a l and the onus i s on o t h e r s t o prove the case . T h i s stands w i t h one q u a l i f i c a t i o n . A q u a l i f i c a t i o n which o r i g i n a t e s from a p o i n t t h a t Ten r a i s e s : There i s a g e n e r a l p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t men do not l i k e t o have severe p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d on them. (Ten 1971, p. 6 5 ) . There may l i k e l y be o c c a s i o n s where i n t e r v e n t i o n must be i n i t i a t e d b e f o r e an assessment of agency i s p o s s i b l e . O p e r a t i n g on Ten's pr e s u m p t i o n g i v e s us good grounds t o presume d i m i n i s h e d agency i n s i t u a t i o n s : (1) which a re emergencies and r e q u i r e immediate a c t i o n t o p r e v e n t harm (eg. , p u s h i n g someone out of the way o f a speeding c a r ) ; -68 - (2) where i t i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o a s s e s s d i m i n i s h e d agency and, a l t h o u g h not s t r i c t l y an emergency, n e v e r t h e l e s s demands a c t i o n . Compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s , I take i t , an i n s t a n c e of t h i s l a t t e r c i r c u m s t a n c e . T h i s i s g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n a s s e s s i n g the e x t e n t o f " d i m i n i s h e d agency" i n v o l v e d i n a c h i l d ' s d e c i s i o n s about s c h o o l , e s p e c i a l l y i f the c h i l d has had l i m i t e d c o n t a c t w i t h i t . I t would be p e r m i s s i b l e t o presume the " d i m i n i s h e d agency", send the c h i l d t o s c h o o l and t h e n a s s e s s the n a t u r e of any r e s i s t e n c e t o the c o m p u l s i o n . However, any c h i l d who p e r s i s t s i n r e s i s t i n g the i n t e r f e r e n c e and cannot be shown t o meet the c r i - ^ t e r i a must be r e l e a s e d from mandatory a t t e n d a n c e . F a i l u r e t o a l l o w the p r e s u m p t i o n i n cases of compulsory e d u c a t i o n may mean t h a t c h i l d r e n w i l l be d i s a d v a n t a g e d i n t h e i r e d u c a t i o n a l c a r e e r o n l y because a s s e s s i n g agency on such an i s s u e would be a complex p r o c e s s . I t might be suggested t h a t the same pr e s u m p t i o n of d i m i n i s h e d agency a p p l y i n s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e b e n e f i t . I n the n e x t s e c t i o n I s h a l l argue t h a t harm i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r s e l f - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r f e r e n c e . I I . C i r c u m s t a n c e s C h a l l e n g e The second c r u c i a l i s s u e i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m i s what we have c a l l e d the " c i r c u m s t a n c e s c h a l l e n g e " . T h i s a p p e a l does not d e a l w i t h impairment or a u t h e n t i c i t y of the c h o i c e d i r e c t l y but w i t h c oncomitant ' f e a t u r e s of the i n t e r - v e n t i o n . S u r v e y i n g the l i t e r a t u r e , the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s have been o f f e r e d : a) i n t e r v e n t i o n would be i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s ; b) i n t e r v e n t i o n would p r e v e n t harm t o the i n d i v i d u a l ; c) i n t e r v e n t i o n would, a t some p o i n t , be consented t o . These condense i n t o two e s s e n t i a l q u e s t i o n s : 1) I s harm a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n ? and 2) I s consent a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n ? A. ', I s Harm Necessary? A paradigm example of i n t e r f e r e n c e which i s merely b e n e f i c i a l would be t h a t of the c h i l d who i s r e q u i r e d t o take p i a n o l e s s o n s . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e i n g t h a t t h i s i s i n the b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f the c h i l d and he i s i n c a p a b l e of r e a l i z i n g what i s good f o r him. F i r s t l y , from what has a l r e a d y been argued, i t s h o u l d h o l d t h a t i f i t was,.in f a c t , good f o r an a d u l t t o take music l e s s o n s then he too s h o u l d be i n no way l e s s immune from c o m p u l s i o n than the c h i l d . I f t h a t i s not the c a s e , and i f we a r e t o be f a i r , w e must p r o v i d e a r e l e v a n t r e a s o n why a d u l t s a r e exempt from i n t e r v e n t i o n and c h i l d r e n n o t . A l t h o u g h i t i s l i k e l y t r u e t h a t s t a t i s t i c a l l y c h i l d r e n more o f t e n q u a l i f y f o r i n c l u s i o n under the ' d i m i n i s h e d agency' c o n d i t i o n than a d u l t s , i t does not l i c e n s e the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h 4 c h i l d r e n merely f o r t h e i r own good. U n l e s s , o f c o u r s e , we a r e p r e p a r e d t o extend the same i m p o s i t i o n on any 'normal' a d u l t who o p e r a t e s under ' d i m i n i s h e d agency'. The consensus seems t o be t h a t a d u l t s ought not t o be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h merely f o r t h e i r own b e n e f i t . M i l l ' s c l a i m t h a t a p o l i c y o f t h i s s o r t would l i k e l y r e s u l t i n more harm than good i s one r e a s o n f o r our i n t u i t i o n s a g a i n s t f o r c i n g a d u l t s t o do what i s merely b e n e f i c i a l . -70- I t might be argued t h a t t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r - f e r i n g i n p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g b e n e f i t s i t u a t i o n s stems from a problem which i s almost e x c l u s i v e l y p r e s e n t i n c h i l d r e n . The c l a i m might be t h a t s i n c e a d u l t s a r e more s t a b l e and t h e i r aims and a s p i r a t i o n s more permanent, they are i n a p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r - mine what i s i n t h e i r own b e s t i n t e r e s t s . W h i l e c h i l d r e n , s i n c e t h e i r d e s i r e s and the o r d e r i n g o f t h e i r g o a l s change d r a s t i c a l l y o v e r t i m e , are not a b l e t o d e c i d e what i s f o r t h e i r own good. T h i s i s not an a p p e a l t o ' d i m i n i s h e d agency' s i n c e the i n s t a b i l i t y c a p t u r e d here i s not the same as those problems i d e n t i f i e d under m a l - p r i o r i z e d normal g o a l s . The i m p l i c a t i o n here i s t h a t the normal o r d e r i n g of g o a l s i n c h i l d r e n i s l i k e l y t o change c o n s i d e r a b l y as he proceeds from young c h i l d t o young a d u l t . The g o a l s a r e impermanent, not u n s t a b l e . I n o t h e r words, i t might be c l a i m e d t h a t a c h i l d cannot be presumed t o know what h i s i n t e r e s t s a r e u n t i l h i s d e s i r e s have developed the c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t o n l y comes w i t h the m a t u r i t y of a d u l t h o o d . There are a number of o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s c l a i m . E m p i r i c a l l y , i t i s not c l e a r t h a t i t i s an adequate account of the average a d u l t o r the t y p i c a l c h i l d . One of H a r t ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o M i l l ' s p o s i t i o n i s t h a t he a t t r i b u t e s normal a d u l t s w i t h t h e : p s y c h o l o g y of a middle-aged man whose d e s i r e s are r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d , not l i a b l e t o be a r t i - f i c i a l l y s t i m u l a t e d by e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s ; who knows what he wants and what g i v e s him s a t i s f a c t i o n o r h a p p i n e s s ; and who pursues these t h i n g s when he can. (Hart 1969, p. 33). T h i s same type of i n c o n s i s t e n c y c o u l d be l e v e l e d a g a i n s t a l l a d u l t s who d i d n o t have the s e t t l e d permanency of middle-age. As w e l l , the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a d u l t ' s a s p i r a t i o n s are l e s s prone t o -71- change than c h i l d r e n ' s i s not a r e l e v a n t r e a s o n f o r d e n y i n g c h i l d r e n the r i g h t t o pursue t h e i r c u r r e n t d e s i r e s and p r e f e r e n c e s where no harm, whether s h o r t o r l o n g term, i s i n q u e s t i o n . B r i a n B a r r y (1970) p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l i n s i g h t i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f i n t e r f e r e n c e on the b a s i s o f a c t i n g " i n one's i n t e r e s t s " . He d i s t i n g u i s h e s between 'want-regardi n g ' i n t e r e s t s ( i . e . what an i n d i v i d u a l a c t u a l l y wants) and ' i d e a l - r e g a r d i n g ' i n t e r e s t s ( i . e . what an i n d i v i d u a l ought o r c o u l d p o s s i b l y want) ( B a r r y 1970, chp. 3.) . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e on the b a s i s of want- r e g a r d i n g b e s t i n t e r e s t s l i m i t s one t o f o s t e r those t h i n g s which Rawls has i d e n t i f i e d as " p r i m a r y goods". E s s e n t i a l l y they are those means which are u n i v e r s a l l y d e s i r e a b l e no m a t t e r what one's i n d i v i d u a l t a s t e s o r g o a l s a r e , because they a re n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e any p a r t i c u l a r a s p i r a t i o n s . Examples of these p r i m a r y goods o r p r e r e q u i s i t e s a re s e l f - r e s p e c t , i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a b i l i t y , s ource of revenue, s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e , power, and h e a l t h . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n l u r k i n g underneath i n t e r f e r e n c e on the s e grounds i s the r i s k of impairment of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y t o pursue h i s wants whatever they may be. T h i s , t h e n , i s j u s t i f i a b l e on the grounds o f t h e av o i d a n c e o f harm. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f i n t e r - f e r e n c e beyond what c o u l d be c a l l e d 'primary goods' becomes q u e s t i o n a b l e p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e we a r e w o r k i n g on the assumption t h a t a c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t s w i l l change s i g n i f i c a n t l y over the co u r s e o f h i s young l i f e . On the o t h e r hand, the i d e a l - r e g a r d i n g s t a n c e i s p r e d i c a t e d on a view t h a t t h e r e a re c e r t a i n wants t h a t a c h i l d ought i d e a l l y t o have and w i l l o n l y come t o i f i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . -72- T h i s a p p e a l i s s u s p e c t when i t does not i n v o l v e the r i s k of harm e s p e c i a l l y when the c h i l d does not even want t h a t which i s ex p e c t e d t o be of b e n e f i t . As has been p o i n t e d o u t : There i s a k i n d of s o p h i s t r y i n the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t one's d e s i r e s w i l l be s a t i s f i e d by a c e r t a i n k i n d o f l i f e - i f one changes one's d e s i r e s (Benson 1976, p. 191). We are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the a s s e r t i o n t h a t a t some l a t e r date the c h i l d w i l l be g r a t e f u l , o r e n r i c h e d , i f we f o r c e him, f o r example, t o l e a r n t o p l a y the p i a n o . T h i s type of s p e c u l a t i o n i s u n a c c e p t - a b l e , o r a t l e a s t h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c f o r a number of r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , i t i s o f t e n c o n j e c t u r e t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i l l s u c c e s s f u l l y a l t e r the i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d . S e c o n d l y , even among tho s e who l a t e r a r e e n r i c h e d , t h e r e a r e those who may not have been worse o f f w i t h o u t the i n t e r f e r e n c e . F o r i n s t a n c e , they might have come t o t h i s new i n t e r e s t on t h e i r own, o r devel o p e d s i m i l a r l y s a t i s f y i n g i n t e r e s t s . And t h i s would have been a c c o m p l i s h e d / w i t h o u t the - d i s p l e a s u r e and f r u s t r a t i o n of b e i n g f o r c e d t o d e v e l o p them a t a time when they had no d e s i r e f o r the a c t i v i t y . T h i r d l y , we s h o u l d o p e r a t e on the premise t h a t o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , p r e s e n t h a r m / b e n e f i t counts more th a n f u t u r e h a r m / b e n e f i t . F u t u r e o r i e n t a t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a re o f t e n h i g h l y c o n t i n g e n t whereas immediate consequences a r e more c e r t a i n . The f i n a l , and perhaps c o n c l u s i v e r e a s o n f o r i n t e r f e r i n g o n l y where harm i s concerned i s t h a t i t appears t o be a f a c t of human p s y c h o l o g y t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o b e n e f i t a p e r s o n when they don't want i t . I t i s o f t e n c l e a r what w i l l harm a p e r s o n , and o f t e n p o s s i b l e t o p r e v e n t t h a t harm even a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l . The same does not h o l d w i t h near comparable f r e q u e n c y i n areas of -73- b e n e f i t . S t o p p i n g someone from d r i n k i n g a poisonous l i q u i d p r e v e n t s harm even i f i t i s a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l ; r e q u i r i n g t h a t a p e r s o n take L a t i n so t h a t i t w i l l improve h i s v o c a b u l a r y r a r e l y , I s u s p e c t , b e n e f i t s anyone but those who would have t a k e n i t anyway. B e f o r e l e a v i n g the t o p i c I w i s h t o c l o s e one f u r t h e r avenue of defense f o r the i d e a l - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n . S t r o n g support f o r the development of ' s e l f - b e n e f i t i n g ' i n t e r e s t s i n c h i l d r e n i s d e r i v e d from Rawls' " A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e " : o t h e r t h i n g s e q u a l , human bei n g s enjoy the e x e r c i s e of t h e i r r e a l i z e d c a p a c i t i e s / t h e i r i n n a t e and t r a i n e d a b i l i t i e s ' a n d t h i s e n j o y - ment i n c r e a s e s the more the c a p a c i t y i s r e a l i z e d , o r the g r e a t e r the c o m p l e x i t y . The i n t u i t i v e i d e a here i s t h a t human b e i n g s t a k e more p l e a s u r e i n d o i n g something as they become more p r o f i c i e n t a t i t , and of two a c t i v i t i e s they do e q u a l l y w e l l , they p r e f e r the one c a l l i n g on a . l a r g e r r e p e r t o i r e of more i n t r i c a t e and s u b t l e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s (Rawls 1971, p. 426). However, P e k a r s k y , i n h i s a r t i c l e , "The A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e and E d u c a t i o n " , g o e s some d i s t a n c e i n weakening the e x t e n t t o w hich t h i s p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f i e s i m p o s i t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r edu-. c a t i o n a l p u r s u i t s . He suggests t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s based on e m p i r i c a l f a c t s which may or may not be t r u e , and even i f they a r e t r u e p r o v i d e e d u c a t o r s w i t h an " i m p o r t a n t m o t i v a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e " and not a j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e ( P e k a r s k y 1980, p. 290). I f the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e were a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e , i t would mean t h a t t h e r e was i n some way a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o maximize b e n e f i t t o o u r s e l v e s . C. O l i v e r i n an a r t i c l e " S e l f - R e s p e c t and P r i v a t e M o r a l i t y " suggests t h a t the -74- consequences of t h i s are c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e . I f we have a moral o b l i g a t i o n t o d e v e l o p our i n t e r e s t s and t a l e n t s , as P e t e r s a r g u e s , then a p e r s o n who 'ought' t o have been a plumber, or 'ought' t o have t a k e n up b r i d g e , and who has f a i l e d t o do so, would l e g i t i m a t e l y be s u b j e c t t o blame, c e n s u r e , or even p u n i s h - ment. ( O l i v e r 1979, p. 2 ) . I t i s more d e f e n s i b l e t o c l a i m t h a t a n e c e s s a r y , a l t h o u g h not s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n f o r i n v o k i n g p a t e r n a l i s m i s t h a t t h e r e was a b r e a c h of moral s t a n d a r d and t h a t r e q u i r e s some harm be done. (Teh 1971, p. 6 3 ) . The response t o the q u e s t i o n 'Is harm n e c e s s a r y ? ' has h i n g e d on the r i g h t of p e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g c h i l d r e n , t o pursue t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . The c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t u n l e s s d e t e c t a b l e harm i s l i k e l y t o ensue i n d i v i d u a l s are e n t i t l e d t o freedom of c h o i c e , even i f they would b e n e f i t from i n t e r f e r e n c e . We a r e g e n e r a l l y l o a t h e , out of our fundamental r e s p e c t f o r freedom, t o recommend f o r c i n g a d u l t s t o do t h i n g s t h a t are s o l e l y a m a t t e r of b e n e f i t enhancement. And I contend t h a t c h i l d r e n as persons and t i t l e h o l d e r s t o the same n a t u r a l r i g h t t o l i b e r t y ought t o be t r e a t e d s i m i l a r l y . B. Is. Consent S u f f i c i e n t ? The most p o p u l a r r i v a l account t o the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s which have been o f f e r e d so f a r i s the view t h a t the consent of the agent i s s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m . T h i s b r o a d l y shared view has t h r e e v e r s i o n s : 1) h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i o r consent - the Agent can be presumed t o have extended h y p o t h e t i c a l consent t o the i n t e r f e r e n c e , a t l e a s t , i n p r i n c i p l e ; -75- 2) c o n c u r r e n t h y p o t h e t i c a l consent - the Agent can be presumed t o have extended h y p o t h e t i c a l consent a t the time of the i n t e r f e r e n c e ; 3) subsequent s u b j e c t i v e consent - the Agent can l i k e l y be expected t o extend consent t o the i n t e r - f e r e n c e a t some l a t e r d a t e . 1) H y p o t h e t i c a l P r i o r Consent G e r a l d Dworkin argues t h a t because of the presence i n everyone of " i r r a t i o n a l p r o p e n s i t i e s " , " c o g n i t i v e d e f i c i e n c i e s " and " e m o t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s " i t would be prudent t o agree, a t l e a s t h y p o t h e t i c a l l y , t o a s e t of p a t e r n a l i s t i c measures t h a t would p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t o n e s e l f . I t would be, as he c a l l s i t , a s o c i a l i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y (Dworkin 1971, p. 120). Dworkin does not suggest t h a t s p e c i f i c measures be agreed t o but uses the metaphor of "a m o r e - o r - l e s s b l a n k cheque" w i t h c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d l i m i t s . H i s ' s o - c a l l e d ' c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d l i m i t s a r e a c t u a l l y a g e n e r a l l i s t of c o n d i t i o n s which he supposes r a t i o n a l men c o u l d a c c e p t . B r i e f l y , they a r e s i t u a t i o n s which i n v o l v e any of the f o l l o w i n g : 1) the promotion of c e r t a i n 'goods' 2) i r r a t i o n a l w e i g h i n g of v a l u e s 3) f a i l u r e t o a c t i n accordance w i t h a c t u a l p r e f e r e n c e s 4) where harm i s i r r e v e r s i b l e 5) when d e c i s i o n s a re made under p r e s s u r e o r s t r e s s 6) i n a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e consequences 7) i n a b i l i t y t o r a t i o n a l l y c a r r y out own d e c i s i o n s What i s o v e r l o o k e d i n t h i s account i s t h a t the prima -76- f a c i e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of consent as a j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t i t i s f e l t t o be the c r i t e r i o n most c o n s i s t e n t w i t h r e s p e c t f o r i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . When an i n d i v i d u a l agrees t o the i n t e r - v e n t i o n whether p r i o r t o , c o n c u r r e n t l y o r even s u b s e q u e n t l y , he has p e r s o n a l l y extended p e r m i s s i o n and/or a b s o l u t i o n f o r the i n t e r f e r e n c e . Dworkin's account o f h y p o t h e t i c a l consent does not meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f i m p l i c i t consent and t h e r e f o r e does not v i n d i c a t e the i n t e r f e r e n c e . No i n d i v i d u a l approves of the i n t e r - v e n t i o n ; i t i s o n l y a metaphor about what " f u l l y r a t i o n a l " f i c t i o n a l persons would a c c e p t . To put i t b l u n t l y , the b a s i c problem w i t h Dworkin's account i s t h a t i t i s not i n any a c c e p t a b l e way c o n s e n t . What remains o f t h e account i s a l i s t of c o n d i t i o n s w hich are p a r a l l e l , y e t i n f e r i o r t o the c r i t e r i a o f f e r e d i n t h i s t h e s i s f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m . A b r i e f e x a m i n a t i o n of h i s l i s t o f grounds s h o u l d i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r inadequacy: (1) A l t h o u g h I have argued t h a t the p r o m o t i o n o f R a w l s i a n 'primary goods' i s l i k e l y t o a v o i d harm, I have a l s o t r i e d t o argue t h a t i t i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . (2) I do not b e l i e v e t h a t the ' i r r a t i o n a l ' w e i g h i n g of v a l u e s i s grounds f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n - I i n s i s t I r e t a i n the r i g h t t o d e c i d e t o smoke a l t h o u g h I don't b e l i e v e smoking i s r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d . (4) I r r e v i s i b i l i t y i s not a s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n . ( 3 , 5, 6, 7) Are a l l c o v e r e d by my concept of d i m i n - i s h e d agency and a r e not on t h e i r own s u f f i c i e n t . I n s h o r t , r a t h e r t h a n l e a v e a " m o r e - o r - l e s s " b l a n k cheque t o be -77- f i l l e d i n a t the d i s c r e t i o n of the s t a t e and p r e t e n d t o c a l l t h a t consent as Dworkin would have u s , I p r e f e r and have proposed a s t r i c t e r d e l i n e a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e . 2) C o n c u r r e n t H y p o t h e t i c a l Consent The c o n c u r r e n t h y p o t h e t i c a l v e r s i o n of consent i s p r e d i c a t e d on the p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l a t the time of i n t e r v e n t i o n i m p l i c i t l y o f f e r s c o n s e n t . Van De Veer c l a i m s : I f the r e c i p i e n t of p a t e r n a l i s t i c t r e a t m e n t were i n a c o n d i t i o n t o c a l m l y and s o b e r l y choose and was " i n t o u c h w i t h " h i s deepest i n t e r e s t s and were a p p r a i s e d o r ( s i c ) r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n he would not choose t o p e r f o r m a c e r t a i n a c t (e.g. s t e p p i n g i n t o an e l e v a t o r - l e s s e l e v a t o r s h a f t ) and would hence approve of b e i n g p a t e r n a l i s t i c a l l y p r e v e n t e d from d o i n g so (hence, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , such p a t e r n a l i s m would be j u s t i f i e d ) (Van De Veer 1979B, pp. 640-641. T h i s argument can be summarized as f o l l o w s : i f (1) an agent was not i n a s t a t e of d i m i n i s h e d agency he would not have chosen t o p e r f o r m a c e r t a i n a c t ; t h e n (2) he would approve of b e i n g p r e v e n t e d from d o i n g t h a t a c t . T h i s v e r s i o n o f consent has i n i t i a l a p p e a l over D w o r k i n 1 s account i n t h a t i t a t t e m p t s t o e s t a b l i s h a l i n k t o what an i n d i v i d u a l might a c t u a l l y consent t o . However t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s f l a w e d i n two ways. F i r s t of a l l , i t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t statement (2) does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w from statement ( 1 ) . For i n s t a n c e , a l t h o u g h I might choose not t o do something, i t does not i m p l y t h a t I approve of b e i n g p r e v e n t e d from d o i n g so. I may, i f I was not under abnormal s t r e s s , choose not t o smoke h e a v i l y . -78- However, I would l i k e l y d i s a p p r o v e of someone a t t e m p t i n g t o pr e v e n t me from h a v i n g a c i g a r e t t e . The second problem, which i s even more c r i p p l i n g , d e r i v e s from the f a c t t h a t the a p p r o v a l a c c o r d e d i n statement ( 2 ) i s a p p r o v a l i n p r i n c i p l e of b e i n g p r e v e n t e d . I t i s not a p p r o v a l o f any p a r t i c u l a r p a t e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n . And i t i s the l a t t e r w hich any a c c e p t a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m must a d d r e s s . The examples t h a t Van De Veer c i t e s c o n v e n i e n t l y i g n o r e t h i s p o t e n t i a l d i s c r e p a n c y . C o n s i d e r h i s model example of the p r e v e n t i o n of someone from s t e p p i n g i n t o an e l e v a t o r l e s s e l e v a t o r s h a f t . There a re d i f f e r e n t ways of s t o p p i n g someone from d o i n g t h a t (eg. h i t t i n g them over the head o r s i m p l y c a l l i n g t h e i r name). We cannot presume t h a t a p p r o v a l i n p r i n c i p l e o f b e i n g p r e v e n t e d j u s t i f i e s any p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r v e n t i o n . The p e r s o n must be expected t o consent t o the method of p r e v e n t i o n . However, the c o s t o f making t h i s move preempts the c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of h i s account ( i . e . t h a t the d i m i n i s h e d agency of the c h o i c e i s s u f f i c i e n t grounds from assuming the l i k e l i h o o d of c o n s e n t ) . T h i s b i n d i s e x a c e r b a t e d i f we c o n s i d e r more d i f f i c u l t cases of p a t e r n a l i s m , such as s c h o o l i n g o r p s y c h i a t r i c c a r e . The pre s u m p t i o n o f c o n c u r r e n t consent t o an e x t e n s i v e and p o s s i b l y t a x i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n becomes p r o b l e m a t i c . The i m p l a u s i b i l i t y o f i n f e r r i n g c o n c u r r e n t consent t o a p a r t i c u l a r mode of i n t e r f e r e n c e from the d i m i n i s h e d agency o f a p a r t i c u l a r c h o i c e d r a i n s Van De ' Veer's account of any semblance of ' r e a l ' c onsent. 3) Subsequent S u b j e c t i v e Consent Rosemary C a r t e r i n an u n p u b l i s h e d M.A. t h e s i s "A -79- J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f P a t e r n a l i s m " and i n a s h o r t e r p u b l i s h e d v e r s i o n " J u s t i f y i n g P a t e r n a l i s m " o f f e r s a d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n o f consent: Consent, o r the d i s p o s i t i o n t o consent upon r e q u e s t o r upon the r e c e i p t of c e r t a i n i n f o r - m a t i o n , i s n e c e s s a r y and i f none of a, b, or c, h o l d s u f f i c i e n t f o r the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l i s m : • a) the a c t r e q u i r i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n by consent i s c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h a t c o n s e n t ; b) the consent would have been w i t h h e l d o r would be withdrawn i f the s u b j e c t ' s d e s i r e s , p r e f e r e n c e s o r b e l i e f s had not been d i s t o r t e d ; c) the consent would have been w i t h h e l d o r would be withdrawn upon the r e c e i p t of r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n ( C a r t e r 1977, pp. 137- 8) . C a r t e r c l a i m s t h a t consent can be g i v e n t o p a t e r n a l i s m i n two ways: p r i o r o r subsequent. As we i d e n t i f i e d i n our c o n d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of i n t e r f e r e n c e , the concept does not a p p l y i f p r i o r p e r m i s s i o n i s g r a n t e d . C l e a r l y , the c r i t i c a l i s s u e i s t h a t of the n a t u r e of subsequent co n s e n t . C a r t e r suggests t h a t subsequent consent can be ' j u s t i f i e d ' e i t h e r , s u b j e c t i v e l y o r o b j e c t i v e l y . The l a t t e r means t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l i s j u s t i f i e d i f s u b s e q u e n t l y i t a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e s the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a p p r o v a l . The problem w i t h o b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t i t always o c c u r s a f t e r the f a c t . Because we can never know a t the t i m e . We must r e l y on s u b j e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . P a t e r n a l i s m i s j u s t i f i e d s u b j e c t i v e l y i f t h e agent judges t h a t i t i s " a t l e a s t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y " t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e w i l l meet w i t h the subsequent consent of the i n d i v i d u a l . ( C a r t e r 1974, p. 54). I s h a l l endeavour t o show t h a t C a r t e r ' s account of -80- subsequent consent i s u n t e n a b l e as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of p a t e r n a l - ism on the grounds t h a t : ( i ) s u b j e c t i v e consent i s not a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e ; ( i i ) where i t i s s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n , I t i s most l i k e l y u n n e c e s s a r y ; ( i i i ) i n i t s p r e s e n t form i t i s an u n a c c e p t a b l e c r i - . t e r i o n f o r a s s e s s i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C a r t e r c l a i m s t h a t consent i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m . She a v e r s t h a t i n t e r f e r e n c e i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g s i t u a t i o n s i s j u s t i f i e d o n l y "when the p o s s e s s o r of the prima f a c i e r i g h t a l i e n a t e s i t " ( C a r t e r 1974, p. 4 8 ) . She then suggests t h a t the o n l y manner i n which a r i g h t can be a l i e n a t e d i s by consent. A b a s i c o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s p o s i t i o n i s t h a t subsequent consent cannot serve t o d i s p o s s e s s one of a r i g h t h e l d e a r l i e r where i t was n o t , a t the t i m e , a l i e n a t e d i n any manner (Van De Veer 1979B, pp. 638-9). I t i s in d e e d an o d d i t y t h a t one c o u l d p r e s e n t l y a l i e n a t e a r i g h t by some f u t u r e a c t i o n . A more p l a u s i b l e c l a i m i s t h a t the r i g h t had a l r e a d y been a l i e n a t e d by some c o n d i t i o n p r e s e n t a t the tim e . C a r t e r s h o u l d o n l y c l a i m t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of f u t u r e p e r m i s s i o n or a p p r o v a l i s one j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r i n g i n the p r e s e n t . There i s a n o t h e r way i n which prima f a c i e r i g h t s can be waived i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g s i t u a t i o n s . I r e f e r t o V l a s t o s ' p r i n c i p l e f o r " j u s t i f i e d e x c e p t i o n s t o n a t u r a l r i g h t s " . The p r i n c i p l e h o l d s t h a t the o n l y d e f e n s i b l e reasons f o r e x c e p t i o n s t o human r i g h t s -81- must be the v e r y reasons we have f o r a s c r i b i n g the r i g h t i n the f i r s t p l a c e ( S u t t o n 1978, pp. 105-6). I f , as H a r t s u g g e s t s , persons qua c h o o s e r s , a c q u i r e a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y , t hen j u s t i f i - ^ c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e must make an ap p e a l t o the agent's c h o i c e . I t was argued i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n t h a t the e x t e n t t o which a p e r s o n f a i l s t o choose i n a f u l l - b o d i e d sense ( i . e . o p e r a t e s under d i m i n i s h e d agency) i s the e x t e n t t o which he has a l i e n a t e d h i s r i g h t . I t suggests c o n t r a r y t o C a r t e r ' s c l a i m t h a t a l i e n a t i o n of the r i g h t can o c c u r w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . I f the a l i e n a t i o n of the r i g h t can o c c u r w i t h o u t e v e n t u a l c o n s e n t , t h e n presumably the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the i n t e r - f e r e n c e may a l s o be p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t consent. S u r e l y i t s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t harm i s l i k e l y , t h a t the agent's c h o i c e i s d i m i n i s h e d , and t h a t the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s r e a s o n a b l e and p r e v e n t s the harm. I t would be u n r e a s o n a b l y dogmatic t o i n s i s t t h a t consent be e v e n t u a l l y f o r t h c o m i n g b e f o r e the a c t i o n i s v i n d i c a t e d . On th e s e grounds consent i s not a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m . A l t h o u g h i t may be a d m i t t e d t h a t subsequent consent i s not a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n , i t might s t i l l be r e c o g n i z e d as a s u f f i c i e n t one. I would agree t h a t where s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e forms of i n t e r f e r e n c e were a v a i l a b l e the most d e f e n s i b l e one, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , would be the one of which the agent i s most l i k e l y t o approve. However ;where subsequent consent i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n i t would r e q u i r e t h a t , a t the time of the proposed i n t e r f e r e n c e t h e r e be a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the s u b j e c t w i l l e v e n t u a l l y consent. The r a m i f i c a t i o n s of t h i s 'high p r o b a b i l i t y ' r e q u i r e - -82- ment are c r i p p l i n g . The e a r l i e r paper, y e t not the l a t e r one, s t a t e s t h a t i t s h o u l d be " a t l e a s t r e a s o n a b l y l i k e l y " t h a t consent be f o r t h c o m i n g . I can o n l y c o n j e c t u r e as t o the r e a s o n f o r the d e l e t i o n from the l a t e r v e r s i o n . I su s p e c t t h a t i t has much t o do w i t h the problems which a r i s e s h o u l d she propose a l e s s vague a r t i c u l a t i o n about the degree of c e r t a i n t y n e c e s s a r y . I s h a l l now e x p l a i n why t h e r e need be a 'high p r o b a b i l i t y ' of f o r t h c o m i n g c o n s e n t . The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of the n o t i o n o f subsequent consent i s c o n t i n g e n t on the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t the s u b j e c t w i l l e x o n e r ate the i n t e r v e n o r by a c t u a l l y o f f e r i n g c onsent. As C a r t e r says: I b e l i e v e t h a t consent p l a y s the c e n t r a l r o l e i n j u s t i f y i n g p a t e r n a l i s m , and in d e e d no o t h e r concepts a re r e l e v a n t ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 1350. I f t h e r e was o n l y a f i f t y p e r c e n t chance of subsequent a p p r o v a l , i t would mean t h a t h a l f of the time i n t e r f e r e n c e would be u n j u s t i f i e d . Even s e v e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t would be low. Suppose a c e r t a i n p a t e r n a l i s t i c t r e a t m e n t (say compulsory s c h o o l i n g ) was to meet w i t h the a p p r o v a l of t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the s t u d e n t s , i t would s t i l l mean t h a t v e r y l a r g e numbers of persons have an u n j u s t i f i e d i m p o s i t i o n f o r c e d upon them. The grounds f o r a s s e s s i n g the l i k e l i h o o d of subsequent consent t o s c h o o l i n g would have t o be made more s t r i n g e n t so t h a t c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l s would be h i g h . S i n c e C a r t e r i n s i s t s t h a t i t c o u l d never be j u s t i f i e d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h o u t consent she c o u l d presumably t o l e r a t e o n l y a v e r y s m a l l numbers of u n a v o i d a b l e v i c t i m s . O t h e r w i s e , the tr e a t m e n t i n t o t o would be u n j u s t i f i a b l e . The i n s t a n c e s o f p a t e r n a l i s m which would f u l f i l l t h i s - 8 3 - requirement are only a small subset of the t o t a l situations i n which j u s t i f i c a t i o n would be sought. Long-term and universally- based treatment would inevitably be beyond the minimal l i m i t s of required certainty. Consider the case of compulsory education. If Carter would want to claim that i t could be j u s t i f i e d on paternal grounds then i t would be incumbent on the intervenor to .predict the values, preferences and aspirations that an i n d i - vidual who i s now.only a c h i l d , would have i n the future. The future may be as far down the road as twenty-five years when we consider that many only come to acknowledge the import of their education years after i t s completion. As well the intervenor must be able to predict the success or f a i l u r e that a student i s l i k e l y to encounter i n the course of his schooling. Persons who don't do well i n school are understandably not nearly as l i k e l y to approve of the compulsion as those who succeed. In short, there i s l i t t l e certainty of the l i k e l i h o o d of consent i n any si t u a t i o n predicated on the individual changing his desires from those which he now holds. The only cases where the probability would be suf- •. . f i c i e n t l y high would be those where imminent consent was merely contingent on being informed of relevant information or upon abatement of a passing influence. Yet under these conditions i t i s highly doubtful whether interference has actually occurred. . A condition of our concept of interference required that i f the agent was aware of the situation, he would have or had intended that the intervenor i n t e r f e r e . This implies that stopping someone from stepping into an oncoming car, or helping someone to r e s i s t temptation when they did not wish to succumb, are not i n t e r - . -84- f e r e n c e s i n the p r o p e r sense. I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, C a r t e r c i t e s M i l l ' s w e l l known example of s e i z i n g the man who i s about t o c r o s s a b r i d g e w h i c h , unknown t o him, i s l i k e l y t o c o l l a p s e . A c c o r d i n g t o M i l l t h i s a c t i o n i s e f f e c t e d w i t h o u t any r e a l i n f r i n g e m e n t of h i s l i b e r t y ; f o r l i b e r t y c o n s i s t s i n d o i n g what one d e s i r e s , and he does not d e s i r e t o f a l l i n t o the r i v e r (quoted by C a r t e r 1977, p. 138). C a r t e r r e j e c t s t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the grounds t h a t M i l l i s i g n o r i n g the f a c t t h a t the s u b j e c t does want to c r o s s the b r i d g e , and t h a t we are p r e v e n t i n g him from a t t e m p t i n g t o s a t i s f y t h a t d e s i r e ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 138). I am sympathetic w i t h C a r t e r ' s need t o r e s i s t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f i n t e r f e r e n c e . Otherwise she i s robbed of her c l e a r , and p o s s i b l y o n l y , cases of j u s t i f i e d p a t e r n a l i s m . However, she i s m i s t a k e n . A l t h o u g h i t i s t r u e t h a t the p e r s o n c o n s c i o u s l y d e s i r e s t o c r o s s the b r i d g e , i t i s a l s o t r u e ( o t h e r w i s e consent won't be imminent) t h a t the p e r s o n has a g r e a t e r d e s i r e t o get a c r o s s the b r i d g e s a f e l y . The p e r s o n i s not c o n s c i o u s of t h i s s t r o n g e r d e s i r e , e s s e n t i a l l y because he has no r e a s o n t o s u s p e c t t h a t a c t i n g on the former i s not s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the l a t t e r . We can r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f u s i o n between what an i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s l y wants and what, on balance,he r e a l l y wants by s u g g e s t i n g I n t e r f e r e n c e i s o n l y apparent i n t e r f e r e n c e when i t i s a g a i n s t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s c i o u s w i s h e s , and a c t u a l i n t e r f e r e n c e when i t i s a g a i n s t the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a l w i s h e s . The upshot of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t where consent i s h i g h l y p r o b a b l y i t would o n l y be i n cases where the ' i n t e r - f e r e n c e ' was o n l y a p parent. I n cases of a c t u a l i n t e r f e r e n c e - 8 5 - where j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s most needed, consent would be a t b e s t educated c o n j e c t u r e . There i s then the paradox t h a t where the a s s u r a n c e s of subsequent consent are s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g t o j u s t i f y i n t e r f e r e n c e , the c i r c u m s t a n c e s would be such t h a t the concept of i n t e r f e r e n c e doesn't h o l d ; c o n v e r s e l y the cases where the l i k e l i h o o d of subsequent consent i s u n r e l i a b l e are the times we most r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Thus f a r the d i s c u s s i o n has not touched upon C a r t e r ' s c r i t e r i a f o r j u d g i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of consent. She o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : 1. whether the p a t e r n a l i s t i c a c t i o n i s i n accordance w i t h the permanent aims and p r e f e r e n c e s of the s u b j e c t ; 2. whether the proposed s u b j e c t i s i n a temporary s t a t e o f r e l a t i v e incompetence; 3. whether the s u b j e c t l a c k s r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h he w i l l , i n the normal c o u r s e o f e v e n t s , come t o p o s s e s s ; 4. the s i z e of the u t i l i t i e s promoted o r the d i s - u t i l i t i e s p r e v e n t e d ; 5. Whether the a c t i o n has h a r m f u l consequences w h i c h are i r r e v e r s i b l e ; 6. whether c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n s o b t a i n . ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 139). O v e r a l l , the most d i s t u r b i n g inadequacy i n C a r t e r ' s account i s t h a t she f a i l s where i t most c o u n t s . The i n t e g r i t y o f h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r l i k e l y consent e v a p o r a t e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h c h i l d r e n , the m e n t a l l y i l l and the m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d . These groups r e p r e s e n t the h a r d cases as w e l l as the most f r e q u e n t cases f o r p a t e r n a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . E s s e n t i a l l y she argues t h a t permanent i n c o m p e t e n t s , such as the m e n t a l l y r e t a r d e d , - 8 6 - e i t h e r have few r i g h t s or have r i g h t s t h a t a r e e a s i l y o v e r r i d e n ( C a r t e r 1977, pp. 143-4). She i s committed t o t h i s p o s i t i o n l a r g e l y because of the i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f presuming t h a t they c o u l d e v er o f f e r l e g i t i m a t i z i n g consent. C h i l d r e n are d i s q u a l i - f i e d because t h e i r a b i l i t i e s ( t o a s s e s s and a p p r e c i a t e ) a r e i n f e r i o r t o , and v a l u e s o f t e n d i f f e r e n t from, what they w i l l be when they become a d u l t s ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 141). I t i s a p p a l l i n g l y ingenuous on her p a r t t o presume t h a t because of the ' r e l a t i v e incompetence' of c h i l d r e n p a t e r n a l i s m towards the c h i l d has a good chance of meeting w i t h the subsequent a p p r o v a l o f h i s a d u l t s e l f , s i n c e w i t h the development of h i s a b i l i t i e s and judgement he w i l l p r o b a b l y see the wisdom of our i n t e r f e r e n c e ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 141). I t s h o u l d be u n n e c e s s a r y t o r e h e a r s e the arguments a g a i n s t the c a t e g o r i c a l e x c l u s i o n of c h i l d r e n from a r i g h t t o l i b e r t y . That a c h i l d i s r e l a t i v e l y i n f e r i o r i n a b i l i t y o r possess d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s t h a n t h a t which he w i l l have as an a d u l t are u n a c c e p t a b l e grounds f o r d i s c o u n t i n g h i s c u r r e n t w i s h e s . A f i n a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h C a r t e r ' s account are the c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e p o s i t i o n s a t f o r c e s her t o a c c e p t . C o n s i d e r a s i t u a t i o n where a person's "temporary" incompetence (eg. a d i s t u r b e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t r e s s ) becomes a permanent t r a i t . Suppose t h a t a widower has f o r the twenty y e a r s s i n c e h i s w i f e ' s d e a t h l o s t a l l d e s i r e t o l i v e . He would never on h i s own consent t o t r e a t m e n t . F u r t h e r suppose t h a t the o n l y way t o c u r e t h i s man's d e b i l i t a t i n g moroseness i s t h r o u g h h y p n o s i s and s u b l i m i n a l s u g g e s t i o n . I n o t h e r words, the t r e a t m e n t i s c a u s a l l y n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t f o r the e v e n t u a l c o n s e n t . A c c o r d i n g t o C a r t e r ' s -87- a r t i c u l a t i o n t h a t t r e a t m e n t i s u n j u s t i f i e d ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 136). C a r t e r c a n ' t a v o i d ' t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by i n c o r p o r a t i n g a p r o v i s o t h a t i n cases of d i m i n i s h e d agency, consent c a u s a l l y r e s u l t i n g from t r e a t m e n t i s a d m i s s i b l e . T h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n would l e g i t i m i z e f o r c i b l y i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s who had minor c o m p u l s i v e e c c e n t r i c i t i e s as l o n g as the t r e a t m e n t guaranteed t h a t the p e r s o n would a f t e r w a r d s consent. The dangers of opening the doors t o the l e g i t i m a t i z i n g of such i n t e r f e r e n c e s as s u b l i m i n a l s u g g e s t i o n would make the r e f i n e m e n t d i s a s t r o u s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , C a r t e r i s f o r c e d t o concede t h a t even though s i g n i f i c a n t harm i s a v o i d e d , the agent's c h o i c e i s d i m i n i s h e d and the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s r e a s o n a b l e ; the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s u n j u s t i f i e d because the i n t e r - f e r e n c e i s c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r the c o n s e n t . C a r t e r ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s do not s t o p w i t h b l a t a n t c a s e s . o f b r a i n w a s h i n g and c o n d i t i o n i n g . There a r i s e s a s e r i o u s p r a c t i c a l problem i n d e c i d i n g whether more s u b t l e forms of p e r s u a s i o n would c l a s s i f y as d i s t o r t i n g . W right o f f e r s an i n t e r e s t i n g i n s t a n c e of t h i s dilemma, c a l l i n g i t " normative p r e s s u r e " (Wright 1980, pp. 44-7). I t r e f e r s t o an e l a b o r a t e s e t o f rewards, s a n c t i o n s , p r e s s u r e s and t h r e a t s which are employed t o c r e a t e an i n t e r n a l " m o t i v a t i o n a l mechanism" used by s o c i e t y t o r e g u l a t e b e h a v i o u r . The s o c i o l o g i s t Goffman has documented, the p e r v a s i v e and i n e s c a p a b l e e f f e c t s of i n s t i t u t i o n s on the p e r c e p t i o n s , s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n s and v a l u e s of the inmates. R.S. P e t e r s f r e q u e n t l y t a l k s of e d u c a t i o n as an i n i t i a t i o n - of " b e i n g on the i n s i d e of a way of l i f e " . The s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t i t i s u n a v o i d a b l e and perhaps even d e s i r a b l e t h a t some forms of i n t e r v e n t i o n have p e r v a s i v e p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s on the i n d i v i d u a l . The problem -88- f o r C a r t e r becomes how t o d e c i d e i f the v i n d i c a t i n g consent has been ' d i s t o r t e d ' by p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . C a r t e r i n a c u r i o u s l y worded apology begs t h i s q u e s t i o n : A d m i t t e d l y I r e l y on a p r e - t h e o r e t i c i n t u i t i o n as t o what counts as d i s t o r t i o n , so I cannot o f f e r any p r i n c i p l e s w i t h which t o determine whether a person's p r e f e r e n c e s , d e s i r e s o r b e l i e f s have been d i s t o r t e d . I do t h i n k , though, t h a t the concept can be brought under t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t r o l , i n a way s u i t e d t o the use I make o f i t . ( C a r t e r 1977, p. 137) I am not i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h i s problem i s u n r e s o l v a b l e . S imply t h a t u n t i l t he i s s u e i s s e t t l e d the n o t i o n of subsequent consent i n many c r i t i c a l a reas of p a t e r n a l i s m i s an i m p r a c t i c a l measure of a s s e s s i n g j u s t i f i c a b l y . Our e x a m i n a t i o n of C a r t e r ' s subsequent s u b j e c t i v e c o n s e n t , and the e a r l i e r v e r s i o n s of h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i o r and c o n c u r r e n t consent have shown a l l t h r e e t o be w a n t i n g . My se n t i m e n t s a re s t r o n g l y t h a t no e x p l i c a t i o n o f consent w i l l s t a n d s c r u t i n y . I l l . Reasonableness of the I n t e r f e r e n c e Thus f a r our account of p a t e r n a l i s m has i d e n t i f i e d two n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n ( i . e . the i n d i v i d u a l must be o p e r a t i n g under d i m i n i s h e d agency, and i n t e r f e r e n c e must be r e q u i r e d t o p r e v e n t o r a l l e v i a t e harm). These are not s u f f i c i e n t s i n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o imagine cases where harm was b e i n g p r e v e n t e d , and i t was the r e s u l t o f d i m i n i s h e d agency, y e t we would not approve of the i n t e r v e n t i o n ( a t l e a s t not any i n t e r - v e n t i o n w h a t s o e v e r ) . C o n d i t i o n s must be a t t a c h e d t o the s e l e c t i o n of the method of p a t e r n a l i s t i c t r e a t m e n t , not merely t h a t the -89 - p a t e r n a l i s m i n p r i n c i p l e i s w a r r a n t e d . We can borrow from our d i s c u s s i o n of the p r o v i s o s a t t a c h e d t o o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r i n s i g h t . The f i r s t o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n , the 'soundness of the c l a i m ' has a l r e a d y been d e a l t w i t h . I n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g s i t u a t i o n s , s i n c e the c l a i m a n t i s the agent, the soundness o f the agent's r e s i s t e n c e must r e f e r t o the a u t h e n t i c i t y of h i s c h o i c e . The n o t i o n of d i m i n i s h e d agency p r o v i d e s us w i t h the c r i t e r i a f o r t h a t a s s e s s - ment. The second o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n , the ' r e a s o n a b l e - ness of the i n t e r f e r e n c e ' i n v o l v e d two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : 1) the 'presumption of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm'; 2) the ' p r i n c i p l e o f the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e 1 . T h e . f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n suggested t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e not cause g r e a t e r harm t h a n the harm i t a v o i d e d . W h i l e i n o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g s i t u a t i o n s i t was argued t h a t t h e r e may be grounds f o r w a i v i n g t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , c l e a r l y i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g s i t u a t i o n s t h e r e c o u l d be no such e x c e p t i o n s . No one would agree t h a t i t c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d on p a t e r n a l grounds t o cause more harm than was p r e v e n t e d . Thus we can i n s e l f - r e g a r d i n g cases i n s i s t on the ' p r i n c i p l e of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm'. The second c o n s i d e r a t i o n a l s o needs r e v i s i o n t o accommodate the change i n c o n t e x t . Rawls' account o f permanent aims p r o v i d e s g u i d e l i n e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r f e r e n c e . B o r r o w i n g l o o s e l y from h i s account (Rawls 1971, p. 249) we can o f f e r the f o l l o w i n g g u i d e l i n e s f o r the ' p r i n c i p l e of the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r - n a t i v e ' : (a) the i n t e r f e r e n c e must t a i l o r e d as much as p o s s i b l e and p r a c t i c a l t o the i n t e r e s t s and p r e f e r e n c e s of - 9 0 - the individual i n so far as acting on them i s not harmful; or (b) where knowledge of the individual's interests and preferences i s uncertain,or where acting on them i s harmful,interference must be limited to the theory of primary goods - i . e . what i s necessary no matter what interests a person may have. These can be summarized as follows: the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions for the reasonableness of self-regarding interference are: (1) the p r i n c i p l e of minimization of harm; and (2) the p r i n c i p l e of the least r e s t r i c t i v e alternative: (a) i d e n t i f i a b l e non-harmful interests, or (b) theory of primary goods. IV. Summary: The Theory of J u s t i f i e d Interference The explication of the grounds for j u s t i f i e d i n t e r - ference i s now complete. The necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions for interference with the l i b e r t y of an individual are: (1) Other-Regarding Considerations: ( 1 . 1 ) Interference i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t prevents or a l l e v i a t e s harm to others; and ( 1 . 2 ) On balance the following provisos are met: ( 1 . 2 1 ) the claim for interference i s sound: ( 1 . 2 1 a ) the facts are true, relevant and s u f f i c i e n t l y broad, and (1.21b) the value principles implied are acceptable; •. - 9 1 - and (1.22) the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s r e a s o n a b l e : (1.22a) the presumption of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm, and (1.22b) the p r i n c i p l e of l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e , and/or (2) S e l f - R e g a r d i n g C o n s i d e r a t i o n s : (2.1) I n t e r f e r e n c e i s j u s t i f i e d i f i t p r e v e n t s o r a l l e v i a t e s harm t o the agent; and (2.2) The i n t e r f e r e n c e i s r e a s o n a b l e : (2.21) the p r i n c i p l e of m i n i m i z a t i o n of harm; and (2.22) the p r i n c i p l e of the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e : (2.22a) i d e n t i f i a b l e non-harmful i n t e r e s t s , and (2.22b) the t h e o r y of p r i m a r y goods, and (2.3) The agent's c h o i c e i s a r e s u l t of d i m i n i s h e d agency: (2.31) a t t e n u a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n of c h o i c e , and/or (2.32) a t t e n u a t i o n o f v o l i t i o n of c h o i c e , and/or (2.33) a t t e n u a t i o n of commission of c h o i c e ; or (2.4) The pr e s u m p t i o n of d i m i n i s h e d agency i s r e a s o n a b l e and r e q u i r e d t o p r e v e n t s e r i o u s harm t o the agent. Notes t o Chapter Three A most a p p a l l i n g i n s t a n c e of t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , and one t h a t b o r d e r s on a double s t a n d a r d , comes from an a r t i c l e d e f e n d i n g the e x c l u s i o n of c h i l d r e n from the r i g h t t o v o t e . The many, s t u p i d , f o o l i s h c i t i z e n s must have t h e i r r i g h t t o v o t e p r o t e c t e d ; the r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y presupposed by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s t h e i r s . The case o f c h i l d r e n i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t . Some y o u n g s t e r s , as we a l l know v e r y w e l l , e x h i b i t r e markable m a t u r i t y a t 15, o r 12, o r 10 y e a r s of age. But human m a t u r a t i o n i s slow, the young do not have, i n the e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e i r growth, the r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y t h a t democracy presupposes (Cohen 1975, p. 461). 2 An a c c i d e n t i s d i s t i n c t from an i n a d v e r t a n c e , i n t h a t the former i m p l i e s an u n f o r e s e e n i n t e r f e r i n g e v e n t , the l a t t e r m erely an u n f o r e s e e n r e s u l t of the normal commission of the a c t . F o r i n s t a n c e : I change my s t a n c e w h i l e s t a n d i n g i n a queue i n o r d e r t o r e l i e v e a cramp. I n h a v i n g done so I s t e p on your f o o t . I have i n a d v e r t e n t l y stepped on your f o o t . ( C o v a l & Smith, pp. 5-6) 3 C a r e l e s s i s d i f f e r e n t from i n a d v e r t e n t i n t h a t the former p e r t a i n s t o the manner i n which the a c t i o n i s performed w h i l e the l a t t e r r e f e r s t o the consequence of p e r f o r m i n g the a c t i o n . I f i n p a s s i n g you the s a l t a c r o s s the t a b l e I s p i l l the m i l k , I c o u l d be s a i d t o have passed the s a l t c a r e l e s s l y . ( C o v a l & Smith, p. 6) 4 I n the f i e l d of mental i l l n e s s , where t h e r e i s a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t p a t i e n t s are " i n need of t r e a t m e n t " s e v e r a l w r i t e r s have r a i s e d doubts about the i n v o l u n t a r y confinement of persons where t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t degree of r i s k of harm t o s e l f o r o t h e r s . They c i t e the A r i z o n a T e r r i t o r y S t a t u t e s of 1901 t h a t , even t h e n , would p e r m i t confinement i n an i n s a n e asylum o n l y i f by r e a s o n of h i s or her i n s a n i t y he o r she be i n danger, i f a t l i b e r t y , of i n j u r y i n g h i m s e l f o r h e r s e l f , o r the p e r s o n o r p r o p e r t y of -92- -93- o t h e r s (Shuman, Hegland & Wexler 1977, p. 337). CHAPTER FOUR THE CASE FOR EDUCATION I f compulsory e d u c a t i o n i s to be j u s t i f i e d i t must • be v i n d i c a t e d i n two ways. I t must be shown t o be j u s t i f i e d as a compulsory a c t i v i t y and i t must be shown t o be j u s t i f i e d as an e d u c a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y . I n o t h e r words, we must i d e n t i f y a s e t o f c u r r i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s and areas of study t h a t a r e : 1) p e r m i s s i b l e under the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r - f e r e n c e ; and 2) a c c e p t a b l e as a p p r o p r i a t e l y e d u c a t i o n a l p u r s u i t s . The former w i l l be a c h i e v e d by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t the proposed a c t i v i t i e s a r e : a) ' r e a s o n a b l e ' s t r a t e g i e s t o secure the 'sound' c l a i m of o t h e r s f o r p r o t e c t i o n from harm; and/or b) ' r e a s o n a b l e ' s t r a t e g i e s t o p r e v e n t harm t o the i n d i v i d u a l r e s u l t i n g from, o r presumed t o r e s u l t from, h i s / h e r own d i m i n i s h e d agency. The l a t t e r w i l l be a c h i e v e d by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t the proposed a c t i v i t i e s d e v e l o p a t t a i n m e n t s r e q u i s i t e t o the l i b e r a l a r t s i d e e of the educated man. I n s h o r t , the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of compulsory e d u c a t i o n i n v o l v e s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a 'new' l i b e r a l c u r r i c u l u m which i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i d e a l s of a l i b e r a l a r t s e d u c a t i o n . -94- -95- I . J u s t i f i a b l y Compulsory A c t i v i t i e s R.F. Dearden p r o v i d e s the l e a d i n i d e n t i f y i n g the c u r r i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s p e r m i s s i b l e under the O t h e r - R e g a r d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e . He s uggests t h a t a s o c i e t y has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n how c h i l d r e n a r e t a u g h t , q u i t e s i m p l y , because c h i l d r e n , as members of t h a t s o c i e t y , a f f e c t the s o c i e t y . He c l a i m s t h a t At the v e r y l e a s t t h i s i n t e r e s t extends t o a b a s i c moral e d u c a t i o n and t o the a c q u i s i t i o n of such competencies as w i l l not make the a d u l t t h a t the c h i l d w i l l become n e e d l e s s l y e c o n o m i c a l l y dependent on the r e s t of t h a t s o c i e t y (Dearden 1976, p. 18). The c u r r i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s p e r m i s s i b l e under the S e l f - R e g a r d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e those which would m i n i m i z e harm t o the i n d i v i d u a l and/or m i n i m i z e the o c c a s i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g under d i m i n i s h e d agency. To c o i n a phrase from Rawls, the former would i n v o l v e the p r o v i s i o n of 'primary e d u c a t i o n a l goods'. Theymight be d e s c r i b e d as b a s i c s k i l l s and knowledge n e c e s s a r y f o r m i n i m a l w e l l - b e i n g . ( I see t h i s as subsuming Dearden's mi n i m a l economic competencies.) The m i n i m i z a t i o n of d i m i n i s h e d agency would i n v o l v e f o s t e r i n g the d i s p o s i t i o n s and s k i l l s i n v o l v e d i n a c t i n g and c h o o s i n g i n an u n a t t e n u a t e d manner. To summarize, the components of a new ' l i b e r a l ' c u r r i c u l u m p e r m i s s - i b l e under the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e i n c l u d e : (1) a b a s i c moral e d u c a t i o n (2) p r o v i s i o n of 'primary e d u c a t i o n a l goods' (3) development of u n a t t e n u a t e d a g e n t i a l c a p a c i t y . B e f o r e p r o v i d i n g an o u t l i n e of the c o n s t i t u e n t s of t h i s new ' l i b e r a l ' c u r r i c u l u m , i t i s c r u c i a l t o remember t h a t t h e s e - 9 6 - a t t a i n m e n t s and areas of study must be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a minimal sense. The p r i n c i p l e o f 'the l e a s t r e s t r i c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e ' d i c t a t e s t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s t r a t e g i e s must not exceed what i s merely s u f f i c i e n t t o secure p r o t e c t i o n from harm. F o r example a ' b a s i c ' moral e d u c a t i o n ought t o be i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t h a t which i s m i n i m a l l y n e c e s s a r y ( y e t not i n i t s e l f immoral) t o f o s t e r a c c e p t a b l e moral b e h a v i o u r ( i . e . the development of d i s p o s i t i o n s t o a c t w i t h c o n c e r n f o r o t h e r s ) . T h i s i s c o n t r a s t e d w i t h what i s more t r a d i t i o n a l l y h e l d t o be the aim of moral e d u c a t i o n ( i . e . f o s t e r the 'autonomous' moral a g e n t ) . More p r e c i s e c r i t e r i a f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l be a r t i c u l a t e d i n the s e c t i o n on ' J u s t i f i a b l y E d u c a t i o n a l A c t i v i t i e s ' . A. B a s i c M o r a l E d u c a t i o n Coombs i n an, as y e t , u n p u b l i s h e d a r t i c l e " A t t a i n m e n t s of the M o r a l l y Educated" p r o v i d e s the f o l l o w i n g l i s t of o b j e c - t i v e s i n t e n d e d t o " t e a c h s t u d e n t s t o make and a c t on r a t i o n a l l y grounded d e c i s i o n s about moral i s s u e s V . 1. Knowing t h a t moral r e a s o n i n g i s gu i d e d by two p r i n c i p l e s : a) I t cannot be r i g h t f o r me t o do X u n l e s s i t i s r i g h t f o r any p e r s o n i n the same s o r t of c i r c u m s t a n c e t o do X. b) I f the consequences of everyone's d o i n g X i n a g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e would be u n a c c e p t a b l e , then i t i s not r i g h t f o r anyone t o do X i n t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e . 2 . B e i n g s e n s i t i v e t o m o r a l l y hazardous a c t i o n s , t h a t i s , a c t i o n s which r e q u i r e assessment from the moral p o i n t of view. M o r a l l y hazardous a c t i o n s a re of two b a s i c k i n d s ; those which may have consequences f o r o t h e r s which one c o u l d not a c c e p t i f they were t o b e f a l l him, and those which may have u n a c c e p t - a b l e consequences were everyone t o engage i n them. Such s e n s i t i v i t y i s based, a t l e a s t i n p a r t , on the f o l l o w i n g : a) Knowledge of such moral r u l e s as: Don't k i l l . Don't d e p r i v e of freedom. - 9 7 - Don't cause p a i n . Don't d i s a b l e . Don_t d e c e i v e . Don't break p r o m i s e s . Don't c h e a t . Don't break the law. b) Knowledge of what t h i n g s g e n e r a l l y harm human bei n g s . e i t h e r e m o t i o n a l l y o r p h y s i c a l l y . c) P o s s e s s i o n of a wide range of moral concepts such as i n d o c t r i n a t i n g , c h e a t i n g , s t e a l i n g , l y i n g , b u l l y i n g , demeaning, b e l i t t l i n g , e t c . 3. A b i l i t y and d i s p o s i t i o n t o seek out a l l of the m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t s about a c t i o n s which a re m o r a l l y hazardous. 4. A b i l i t y and i n c l i n a t i o n t o imagine, when c o n t e m p l a t i n g a m o r a l l y hazardous a c t i o n , the consequences t h a t would ensue i f everyone i n your c i r c u m s t a n c e were to engage i n the a c t i o n . 5. A b i l i t y and i n c l i n a t i o n t o put o n e s e l f i m a g i n a t i v e l y i n t o the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of an o t h e r p e r s o n and thus come t o know and a p p r e c i a t e the consequences of a proposed m o r a l l y hazardous a c t i o n f o r the o t h e r p e r s o n . 6. A b i l i t y and d i s p o s i t i o n t o seek a d v i c e and c o u n s e l from o t h e r s about moral d e c i s i o n s one i s making. 7. A b i l i t y and d i s p o s i t i o n t o check the v a l i d i t y of moral arguments and t o r e j e c t i n v a l i d arguments. 8 . D i s p o s i t i o n t o r e q u i r e j u s t i f y i n g argument from o t h e r s who propose m o r a l l y hazardous a c t i o n s . 9. R e s o l u t i o n t o do what one has d e c i d e d i s r i g h t and t o r e f r a i n from d o i n g what one has d e c i d e d i s wrong. .10. A sense of s e l f - w o r t h i n c l u d i n g the b e l i e f t h a t a c h i e v i n g one's p l a n s , p u r s u i n g one's i n t e r e s t s , and so on, i s i m p o r t a n t . 11. Knowledge of any way i n which a person's p e r c e p t i o n of t h i n g s h a r m f u l t o h i m s e l f d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from t h a t of people i n g e n e r a l . B. P r i m a r y E d u c a t i o n Goods are f e l t t o be v i r t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y f o r a l l t o have any chance t o s u s t a i n a m i n i m a l l e v e l of w e l l - b e i n g . They are c o n s i d e r e d t o be so e s s e n t i a l t h a t anyone who d i d not d e s i r e t o a t t a i n them c o u l d be presumed t o be a c t i n g i n a d i m i n i s h e d c a p a c i t y . B r i e f l y they These 'goods' r e p r e s e n t a l i s t of achievements which -98- would i n c l u d e : a) a r e a d i n g , l i s t e n i n g , s p e a k i n g and w r i t i n g vocabu- l a r y and f l u e n c y e q u i v a l e n t t o the l e v e l of p u b l i c media; b) an e l e m e n t a l c o m p u t a t i o n competence i n a d d i t i o n s u b s t r a c t i o n , d i v i s i o n and m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f whole numbers and money; c) a c u r s o r y g e n e r a l knowledge of some h i s t o r y , geography, s c i e n c e and p s y c h o l o g y ; d) knowledge about and the i n c l i n a t i o n t o keep p h y s i c a l l y h e a l t h y ; e) a deve l o p e d i n t e r e s t i n s e v e r a l p u r s u i t s of s u f - . f i c i e n t c o m p l e x i t y t o c h a l l e n g e and g r a t i f y the i n d i v i d u a l . Of the above, the o n l y a t t a i n m e n t t h a t i s not s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y and s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t o r y , i s the l a s t one. The m o t i v a t i o n f o r i n c l u s i o n of t h i s o b j e c t i v e comes from Dewey's remarks on the n e c e s s i t y of p l a y and the a r t s [(Dewey] S e c t i o n 4 ) . Very b r i e f l y , h i s : t h e o r y employs a F r e u d i a n account of the need t o channel impulses i n t e l l i g e n t l y towards the c r e a t i o n and sustenance of e n d u r i n g i n t e r e s t s (Dewey 1957, p. 156). A c c o r d i n g t o Dewey, the p u r s u i t o f these d e v e l o p e d i n t e r e s t s have moral s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h a t they " s u b l i m a t e " a g g r e s s i o n i n a harmless way (160) and they " f o r e - s t a l l and remedy" e m o t i o n a l imbalances which o t h e r w i s e c o u l d l e a d t o mental imbalance (164). The c l a i m i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t the development of some degree of competence i n a few non-harmful i n t e r e s t s i s c e n t r a l t o sustenance o f mental h e a l t h . The c h o i c e of which i n t e r e s t s were t o be pursued ought t o come, as much as i s f e a s i b l e , from the s t u d e n t , a l t h o u g h , i t would be mandatory t h a t they pursue and de v e l o p some i n t e r e s t s . C. U n d i m i n i s h e d A g e n t i a l C a p a c i t y B o r r o w i n g from our e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n of the c r i t e r i a of -99- d i m i n i s h e d agency, we can suggest t h a t the e d u c a t i o n a l l y r e l e v a n t a t t a i n m e n t s would be those which were n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t the a t t e n u a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l , v o l i t i o n a l o r c o m m i s s i o n a l agency. The most o b v i o u s e d u c a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y t o s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t d i m i n i s h e d i n t e n t i o n a l agency i s t o d e v e l o p the a b i l i t y and d i s p o s i t i o n t o base one's c h o i c e s on c a r e f u l and c r i t i c a l a s s e s s - ment of the s i t u a t i o n . The work of E n n i s (1967) on the e m p i r i c a l and c o n c e p t u a l components of c r i t i c a l t h i n k i n g and of the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r V a l u e s E d u c a t i o n and Research (AVER 1978) on v a l u e r e a s o n i n g p r o v i d e a g e n e r a l account of what may be i n c l u d e d i n t hese a t t a i n m e n t s . Ennis- i d e n t i f i e s t w e l v e a s p e c t s : 1. G r a s p i n g the meaning of a statement. 2. J u d g i n g whether t h e r e i s a m b i g u i t y i n a l i n e of r e a s o n i n g . 3. J u d g i n g whether c e r t a i n statements c o n t r a d i c t each o t h e r . 4. J u d g i n g whether a c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s n e c e s s a r i l y . 5. J u d g i n g whether a statement i s s p e c i f i c enough. 6. J u d g i n g whether a statement i s a c t u a l l y the a p p l i c a t i o n of a c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e . 7. J u d g i n g whether an o b s e r v a t i o n statement i s r e l i a b l e . 8. J u d g i n g whether an i n d u c t i v e c o n c l u s i o n i s w a r r a n t e d . 9. J u d g i n g whether the problem has been i d e n t i f i e d . 10. J u d g i n g whether something i s an assumption. 11. J u d g i n g whether a d e f i n i t i o n i s adequate. 12. J u d g i n g whether a statement made by an a l l e g e d a u t h o r i t y i s a c c e p t a b l e . ( E n n i s 1967, p. 117) AVER i d e n t i f i e s f o u r o b j e c t i v e s : - B e i n g a b l e t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e v a l u e judgments, c l a i m s , o r i s s u e s from o t h e r s o r t s o f judgments, c l a i m s , o r i s s u e s . - U n d e r s t a n d i n g the s t r u c t u r e o r l o g i c of v a l u e r e a s o n i n g such t h a t one can t e l l whether one's own and o t h e r s ' v a l u e arguments are sound. - U n d e r s t a n d i n g the s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of v a l u e judgments a p e r s o n can make. -100- - B e i n g a b l e t o t e s t the adequacy of the st a n d a r d s o r r u l e s one uses i n making v a l u e judgments. (AVER 1978, p. 6) D i m i n i s h e d v o l i t i o n a l and co m m i s s i o n a l agency i n v o l v e an i n t e r - r e l a t e d group of c o g n i t i v e and p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . The problem of v o l i t i o n i s o b v i o u s l y complex. A l l t h a t w i l l be attempted i s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a few e d u c a t i o n a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g i e s t o address t h i s problem. One approach t o m i n i m i z e the l i k e l i h o o d of m a l p r i o r i z e d g o a l s would be t o promote s e l f - k n o w l e d g e . The v a l u e s c l a r i f i c a t i o n approach (Raths 1 9 6 6 ) i d e n t i f i e s seven s t r a t e g i e s f o r h e l p i n g c h i l d r e n d e v e l o p v a l u e c l a r i t y . 1. Encourage c h i l d r e n t o make c h o i c e s , and t o make them f r e e l y . 2. H e lp them d i s c o v e r and examine a v a i l a b l e a l t e r - n a t i v e s when f a c e d w i t h c h o i c e s . 3. Help c h i l d r e n weigh a l t e r n a t i v e s t h o u g h t f u l l y , r e f l e c t i n g on the consequences of each. 4. Encourage c h i l d r e n t o c o n s i d e r what i t i s t h a t they p r i z e and c h e r i s h . 5. G i v e them o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o make p u b l i c a f f i r - mations of t h e i r c h o i c e s . 6. Encourage them t o a c t , behave, l i v e i n accordance w i t h t h e i r c h o i c e s . 7. Help them t o examine r e p e a t e d b e h a v i o r s o r p a t t e r n s i n t h e i r l i f e . (Raths 1966, pp. 38-9) S.I. Benn's a r t i c l e on the ' a u t a r c h i c ' agent p r o v i d e s a p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l l i s t of the a t t a i n m e n t s t h a t a re n e c e s s a r y t o be f r e e from " i n n e r - i m p u l s i o n " - i . e . i m p a i r e d mechanism of c h o i c e . a) i t must be p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y a s i n g l e p e r s o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g o v e r t i m e t o a p h y s i c a l l y a c t i n g s u b j e c t ; ( p s y c h i c c o n t i n u i t y ) -101- b) he must r e c o g n i z e canons f o r e v i d e n c e and i n f e r e n c e s w a r r a n t i n g changes i n h i s b e l i e f ; c) he must have the c a p a c i t y f o r making d e c i s i o n s when c o n f r o n t e d by o p t i o n s , and f o r a c t i n g on them; d) changes of b e l i e f must be ca p a b l e of making a p p r o p r i a t e d i f f e r e n c e s t o d e c i s i o n s and p o l i c i e s ; e) he must be c a p a b l e of d e c i d i n g i n the l i g h t of p r e f e r e n c e s ; f ) he must be c a p a b l e of f o r m u l a t i n g a p r o j e c t o r a p o l i c y so t h a t a d e c i s i o n can be t a k e n now f o r the sake of a p r e f e r r e d f u t u r e s t a t e , (Benn 1976, p. 116). T h i s l i s t e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i f i e s t hose c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i s i t e t o the a s c r i p t i o n of the min i m a l r a t i o n a l i t y n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e the concept of c h o i c e can be i n v o k e d . , S c h o o l s ought t o diagnose d e f i c i e n c i e s i n mi n i m a l r a t i o n a l i t y . S t r a t e g i e s t o s t r e n g t h e n r e s i s t e n c e and t o overcome d e f e c t s i n the a b i l i t y t o a c t on the b a s i s of r e a s o n ought t o be dev e l o p e d . A l s o , s i n c e i n t e r f e r e d mechanism of c h o i c e and d i m i n i s h e d c o m m i s s i o n a l agency a r e l i k e l y t o o c c u r when the agent i s not c o n f i d e n t o f h i s a b i l i t y t o a c t f o r h i m s e l f , o r secure about the p r o s p e c t s of a c c e p t a n c e , s t e p s s h o u l d be t a k e n t o remediate these f a c t o r s . A s o c i a l i n s t i - t u t i o n w hich was p e r p e t u a l l y m i n d f u l o f c r e a t i n g a s u p p o r t i v e environment where i t was p o s s i b l e t o a c q u i r e e x p e r i e n c e and g a i n c o n f i d e n c e would go a l o n g way i n a l l e v i a t i n g t h i s a g e n t i a l d e f i c i e n c y . I I . J u s t i f i a b l y E d u c a t i o n a l P u r s u i t s The second s t e p i n the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of compulsory e d u c a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s e ' p e r m i s s i b l y compulsory' o b j e c t i v e s be shown t o be desirable e d u c a t i o n a l p u r s u i t s . T h i s c o n n e c t i o n w i l l be made by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of the new ' l i b e r a l ' -102- c u r r i c u l u m are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what are w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as the i d e a l s of the educated p e r s o n . I n f a c t , i t w i l l be argued t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of the former are minimal f o r m u l a t i o n s of the g o a l s of the l a t t e r . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the concepts of 'autarchy' and 'autonomy' (Benn 1976) w i l l be the v e h i c l e t o j u s t i f y t h i s c l a i m w i t h r e g a r d t o moral e d u c a t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the n o t i o n s of 'lowest common m u l t i p l e s ' (LCM) of human d e v e l o p - ment and ' h i g h e s t common f a c t o r s ' (HCF) of human development ( H i r s t and P e t e r s 1970) w i l l s e r v e as the barometer t o j u s t i f y the e d u c a t i o n a l d e s i r a b i l i t y of the p r o v i s i o n of 'primary e d u c a t i o n a l goods' and the development of ' u n d i m i n i s h e d a g e n t i a l c a p a c i t y ' . A. A u t a r c h y v s . Autonomy D.C. P h i l l i p s , i n v e r y g e n e r a l terms, i d e n t i f i e s two k i n d s ( o r perhaps more a c c u r a t e l y two degrees) of autonomy: "Autonomy #1": the few i n d i v i d u a l s i n each g e n e r a t i o n who get t o c h a l l e n g e the framework of b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s of t h e i r s o c i e t y . "Autonomy #2": the r e s t of us who a c c e p t a framework but work autonomously w i t h i n i t ( r a t h e r l i k e Thomas S. Kuhn's "normal s c i e n t i s t s " ) ( P h i l l i p s 1975, p. 11). Benn i n a s h a r p e r c o n t r a s t , and one t h a t matches w i t h our purposes e x a c t l y , d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between an ' a u t a r c h i c agent' and an 'autonomous agent': I have used the term 'autarchy' r a t h e r than the more u s u a l 'autonomy' because I want t o d i s t i n g u i s h the former, as the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a normal chooser from a p a r t i c u l a r -103- p e r s o n a l i t y i d e a l w hich by no means a l l choosers i n s t a n t i a t e (Benn 1976, p. 123) The f a i l u r e t o a c t " a u t a r c h i c l y " would c o n s t i t u t e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n as a chooser and i s d e f i n e d i n n o r m a t i v e terms as the absence of i n n e r and o u t e r i m p u l s i o n (Benn 1971, pp. 112-3). A c t i n g 'autonomously' r e q u i r e s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l p r e s c r i b e f o r h i m s e l f , as opposed t o merely adopt, the norms o r r u l e s by which he l i v e s . The former i s a m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d by which r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an a c t i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the a g e n t , i . e . he must not o p e r a t e under " d i m i n i s h e d agency". The l a t t e r i s , i n a maximal sense, an i d e a l . I n P e t e r s ' t e r m i n o l o g y i t i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between ' s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n ' and ' s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' . I now want t o defend the c l a i m s t h a t (1) the development of an ' a u t a r c h i c ' moral agent i s the g o a l of the proposed ' b a s i c ' moral e d u c a t i o n , and (2) t h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , i n f a c t , r e q u i s i t e t o , the l i b e r a l a r t s i d e a l o f the 'autonomous' moral agent. A c c o r d i n g t o the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e i t would be s u f f i c i e n t i f an i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r n a l i z e d a moral code, even i f i t was more by exposure than by c r i t i c a l assessment. The s a l i e n t r e q u i r e m e n t i s t h a t the agent a c t i n a m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e manner ( i . e . r e f r a i n from harming o t h e r s ) . The o n l y o t h e r r e m a i n i n g c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t the method of t h i s moral i n i t i a t i o n be r e a s o n a b l e ( i . e . i n i t s e l f not be h a r m f u l or e x c e s s i v e l y r e s t r i c t i v e ) . I n K o h l b e r g i a n terms, development t o the conven- t i o n a l s t age ( i . e . c o n f o r m i t y o r a p p r o v a l ) . a n d perhaps even the p r e - c o n v e n t i o n a l stage ( i . e . p r u d e n t i a l o r a u t h o r i t y ) would be s u f f i c i e n t . As l o n g as the moral code i s i n t e r n a l i z e d , and not -104- the r e s u l t o f m a n i p u l a t i o n of the mechanism of c h o i c e (eg. h y p n o s i s , b r a i n w a s h i n g ) , the i n d i v i d u a l would meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s of an ' a u t a r c h i c ' moral agent. A c c o r d i n g t o s e v e r a l accounts ( P a r t r i d g e 1976) 'autonomous' moral agency r e q u i r e s the development of the e q u i v a l e n t of K o h l b e r g i a n p o s t - c o n v e n t i o n a l moral r e a s o n i n g . The c r i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g ' a u t a r c h i c ' agency merely r e q u i r e s ' s e l f - r e g u l a t e d ' reasons f o r a c t i n g w h i l e 'autonomous' agency r e q u i r e s ' s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d ' reasons f o r a c t i n g . I t s h o u l d be c l e a r t h a t i n c r e a s i n g the i n c i d e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g i n a m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e manner ought t o be the fundamental c o n c e r n i n moral e d u c a t i o n ( a l t h o u g h i t need not be the s o l e c o n c e r n ) . I am not c o n v i n c e d t h a t e l e v a t i n g everyone t o the s t a t u s of 'autonomous' moral agent i s r e q u i r e d . That i n v o l v e s e d u c a t i n g everyone t o be e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , and even t h e n , t h a t i s no guarantee of moral b e h a v i o u r . I n s t e a d , i n compulsory moral e d u c a t i o n , We ought t o emphasize the ' t r a i n i n g of c h a r a c t e r ' . As P e t e r s s a y s , the c a l l f o r t r a i n i n g of t h i s s o r t o c c u r s when we w i s h t o ensure r e l i a b i l i t y o f response i n accordance w i t h a code ( P e t e r s 1963, p. 28). T h i s t r a i n i n g need not be r i g i d a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o n d i t i o n i n g but r a t h e r be d e s i g n e d t o produce a c c e p t a b l e moral h a b i t s . I n Dewey's words: the essence of h a b i t i s an a c q u i r e d p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o ways of modes of r e s p o n s e , not t o p a r t i c u l a r a c t s except as under s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s these e x p r e s s a way o f b e h a v i n g . H a b i t means s p e c i a l s e n s i t i v e n e s s o r a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of s t i m u l i , s t a n d i n g p r e d i l e c t i o n and a v e r s i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n bare r e c u r r e n c e of s p e c i f i c a c t s . I t means w i l l . (Dewey 1957, p. 4 2 ) . -105- The t e l l i n g r e a s o n f o r t h i s emphasis on t r a i n i n g i s acceptance of P e t e r s ' c l a i m t h a t the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of concepts and h a b i t s o f a c c e p t a b l e moral b e h a v i o u r are a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the development of moral autonomy ( P e t e r s 1966, p. 259). T h i s p o i n t i s emphasized elsewhere i n a c r i t i q u e of K o h l b e r g : He does not t a k e "good-^boy'.' m o r a l i t y s e r i o u s l y enough e i t h e r from a p r a c t i c a l o r from a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of view. P r a c t i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , s i n c e few are l i k e l y t o emerge beyond K o h l b e r g ' s Stages 3 and 4, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t our f e l l o w c i t i z e n s s h o u l d be w e l l bedded down a t one or the o t h e r of these s t a g e s . The p o l i c e m a n cannot always be p r e s e n t , and i f I am l y i n g i n the g u t t e r a f t e r b e i n g robbed i t i s somewhat o t i o s e t o s p e c u l a t e a t what stage the mugger i s . My r e g r e t must s u r e l y be t h a t he had not a t l e a s t got a c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y w e l l i n s t i l l e d i n him. T h e o r e t i c a l l y , t o o , the good-boy stage i s c r u c i a l ; f o r a t t h i s stage the c h i l d l e a r n s from the i n s i d e , as i t were, what i t i s t o f o l l o w a r u l e . U n l e s s he has l e a r n e d t h i s w e l l (whatever i t means!), the n o t i o n of f o l l o w i n g h i s own r u l e s a t the autonomous stage i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . ( P e t e r s 1975B, p. 678). There may be those who would a c c e p t the v a l i d i t y of d e v e l o p i n g ' a u t a r c h i c ' agency, and r e j e c t the a t t a i n m e n t s i d e n t - i f i e d as components of a ' b a s i c ' moral e d u c a t i o n . I t might be suggested t h a t t h e s e a t t a i n m e n t s a r e more s t r i n g e n t than what i s n e c e s s a r y f o r ' a u t a r c h i c ' moral agency. I have suggested t h a t the c r i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between a u t a r c h y and autonomy i s the degree t o which the s t a n d a r d s have been r a t i o n a l l y chosen as opposed t o b e i n g merely adopted o r a c c e p t e d . . For example, a m o r a l l y autonomous agent must f u l f i l l Coombs' knowledge a t t a i n - ments i n the s t r o n g sense ( i . e . a t r u e b e l i e f h e l d on the b a s i s of good e v i d e n c e ) whereas the a u t a r c h i c agent merely r e q u i r e s knowledge i n the m i n i m a l sense ( i . e . a t r u e b e l i e f ) . I n the -106- case of Coombs' a t t a i n m e n t #1, i t would be s u f f i c i e n t t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e v e d the two p r i n c i p l e s . He need not prove o r be a b l e t o e x p l a i n why i t i s t h a t they c o u l d d e f e n s i b l y be s a i d t o be the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s f o r moral r e a s o n i n g . B e f o r e l e a v i n g t h i s t o p i c o f the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of moral b e l i e f s , I w i s h t o c l a r i f y one a r e a of p o t e n t i a l misunder- s t a n d i n g - namely, the m o r a l i t y of c h a r a c t e r t r a i n i n g . I f the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of the h a b i t s of moral b e h a v i o u r p r e c l u d e d the l i k e l i h o o d of t h e i r b e i n g q u e s t i o n e d o r e v e n t u a l l y r a t i o n a l l y a s s e s s e d , t h e n the p r a c t i c e would be u n e d u c a t i o n a l and p r o b a b l y immoral. But i f moral t r a i n i n g i s , as P e t e r s has suggested, n e c e s s a r y f o r i n i t i a t i o n i n t o a r a t i o n a l moral way of l i f e , and i f i t i s done c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y , then i t cannot be immoral. As R y l e p o i n t s out c o n d i t i o n i n g , i n the e a r l y stages of most e n t e r - p r i s e s , i s the " s i n e qua non" of l e a r n i n g ( R y l e 1975, p. 56). B. . LCM vs HCF H i r s t and P e t e r s p r o v i d e a s u c c i n c t p h r a s e o l o g y f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between the min i m a l o b j e c t i v e s which the t h e o r y of j u s t i f i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e w i l l a l l o w and the e x c e l l e n c e s which non- compulsory e d u c a t i o n ought i d e a l l y t o f o s t e r . I n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n o f p e r s o n a l development they i d e n t i f y the H i g h e s t Common F a c t o r s (HCF) of "human e x c e l l e n c e s " ; and the Lowest Common M u l t i p l e s (LCM) o f "mental h e a l t h " ( i . e . "a c e r t a i n minimum l e v e l of f u n c t i o n i n g t h a t i s expected of anyone") ( H i r s t and P e t e r s 1970, p. 56). The degree of r a t i o n a l development i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n : -107- The l a t t e r c o n s i s t s i n m a i n t a i n i n g the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of man as a r a t i o n a l a n i m a l ; the former c o n s i s t s i n d e v e l o p i n g these r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s t o the f u l l ( P e t e r 1975, p. 125). The f o l l o w i n g i s a l i s t of a number of the components t h a t P e t e r s i n c l u d e s i n h i s n o t i o n o f the LCM o f p e r s o n a l development: (1) "an a b i l i t y t o use h i s r e a s o n i n the sense of p l a n n i n g means t o ends and r e g u l a t i n g h i s d e s i r e s " i n c l u d i n g d e l a y of g r a t i f i c a t i o n ; (2) the a b i l i t y " t o c a r r y out t a s k s connected w i t h the h ousehold and h i s o c c u p a t i o n s " ; (3) "some minimum l e v e l of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s environment a t o t h e r p e o p l e " ; (4) has the " b a s i c c a p a c i t i e s of man as a r a t i o n a l animalV ( P e t e r s 1975A, pp. 124-5). I n a more compact d e s c r i p t i o n , the L.C.M. of p e r s o n a l development would i n e d u c a t i o n a l terms i n v o l v e the t e a c h a b l e a s p e c t s of the m i n i m a l needs and nominal d e s i d e r a t a w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a man's w e l l - b e i n g , (Rescher 1972, p. 8 ) . I t i s an e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e s e m i n i m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s which have been i d e n t i f i e d as c o n s t i t u t i v e of the p r o v i s i o n of 'primary e d u c a t i o n a l goods' and the development of ' u n d i m i n i s h e d a g e n t i a l c a p a c i t y ' . I t s h o u l d be apparent t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s , embodying the LCM of p e r s o n a l development, a r e c e n t r a l t o the development of the i d e a l s o f the educated p e r s o n . A l t h o u g h P e t e r s would p r e f e r t h a t these m i n i m a l p u r s u i t s be c a l l e d i n s t r u c t i o n a l , r a t h e r t h a n educational,"'" they are none the l e s s the e n t e r p r i s e of l e g i t i m a t e components of the e n t e r p r i s e of e d u c a t i o n . I n f a c t , he admits t h a t the LCM a r e r e q u i s i t e s t o the p u r s u i t of the ' e x c e l l e n c e s ' embodied i n 2 the educated p e r s o n . I n a d d i t i o n the o b j e c t i v e s of the ' l i b e r a l ' c u r r i c u l u m c l e a r l y s a t i s f y P e t e r s ' c r i t e r i a of -108- e d u c a t i o n : ( i ) t h a t e d u c a t i o n i m p l i e s the t r a n s m i s s i o n of what i s w o r t h w h i l e t o those who become committed t o i t ; ( i i ) t h a t ' e d u c a t i o n ' must i n v o l v e knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g and some k i n d of c o g n i t i v e p e r s - p e c t i v e which are not i n e r t ; ( i i i ) the ' e d u c a t i o n ' a t l e a s t r u l e s out some procedures of t r a n s m i s s i o n on the grounds t h a t they l a c k the w i l l i n g n e s s and v o l u n t a r i n e s s on the p a r t o f the l e a r n e r " ( M c C l e l l a n , . 1976, p. 2 0 ) . B e f o r e c l o s i n g , I w i s h t o a f f i r m one f i n a l p o i n t . T h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of compulsory e d u c a t i o n ought not t o be c o n s t r u e d as an a t t a c k on the v a l u e of the l i b e r a l a r t s e d u c a t i o n . The s t a t u s of the educated autonomous persons ( i n the f u l l sense) as an i d e a l o f e d u c a t i o n i s not a t i s s u e . R a t h e r , what i s a t i s s u e , i s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h i s i d e a l be pursued. We s h o u l d encourage and attempt t o i n s p i r e a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the v a l u e of t h i s i d e a l , however, we cannot j u s t i f y f o r c i n g persons t o pursue i t . On t h i s p o i n t I concur w i t h G l o v e r : "Respect f o r your autonomy i n v o l v e s g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o the d e c i s i o n you make about your f u t u r e i n l i g h t of your p r e s e n t o u t l o o k even i f i t i s p r e d i c t a b l e t h a t your f u t u r e o u t l o o k w i l l be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . " ( G l o v e r 1977, p. 78) T h i s would suggest t h a t e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d c o n s i s t of two components ( a t l e a s t ) : 1) a compulsory ' l i b e r a l ' e d u c a t i o n l i m i t e d t o the p r o v i s i o n of -109- a) b a s i c moral e d u c a t i o n b) p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n a l goods i ) language a r t s f a c i l i t y i i ) a r i t h m e t i c competence i i i ) g e n e r a l knowledge i v ) h e a l t h c a r e s k i l l s v) developed i n t e r e s t s c) u n d i m i n i s h e d a g e n t i a l c a p a c i t y i ) c r i t i c a l t h i n k i n g i i ) v a l u e s c l a r i f i c a t i o n i i i ) m i n imal r a t i o n a l i t y i v ) c o n f i d e n c e as a chooser and 2) a non-compulsory ' l i b e r a l a r t s ' e d u c a t i o n devoted t o the development of a) autonomous moral agency b) the " e x c e l l e n c e s " of human development and achievement. Notes t o Chapter Four P e t e r s , f o r reasons of p r e c i s i o n , p r e f e r s , t o equate edu^ c a t i o n w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f i d e a l s , and i n s t r u c t i o n o r t r a i n i n g w i t h l e s s e r l o f t y o b j e c t i v e s . To draw a t t e n t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , t o the c o n n e c t i o n between ' e d u c a t i o n and the i d e a l of an 'educated man, and t o m a i n t a i n t h a t we ought t o use words l i k e ' t r a i n i n g ' o r ' i n s t r u c t i o n ' when we do not connect what we are d o i n g w i t h such an i d e a l i s an a i d t o communication i n the s e r v i c e of an o v e r - a l l i d e a l ( P e t e r s 1970, p. 1 9 ) . 2 R e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s e v i d e n c e d i n the f o l l o w - i n g : "A s t r o n g case can t h e r e f o r e be made f o r s a y i n g t h a t any concept of p e r s o n a l development must i n c l u d e some r e f e r e n c e t o the r a t i o n a l i t y o f man d e f i n e d i n a minimum sense. T h i s p r o v i d e s the b a s i c form of human e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t which any more i d i o s y n c r a t i c forms of development c o u l d not be s u s t a i n e d . " ( P e t e r s 1975A, p. 125). -110- B i b l i o g r a p h y A s s o c i a t i o n f o r V a l u e s E d u c a t i o n and Research. 1978. P r e j u d i c e : Teacher's Manual. Toronto: O n t a r i o I n s t i t u t e f o r S t u d i e s i n E d u c a t i o n . B a r r y , B r i a n . 1970. P o l i t i c a l Argument. London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l . B a y l e s , M i c h a e l D. 1972. "A Concept o f C o e r c i o n " . i n C o e r c i o n , (ed.) J . Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, pp. Ib-lW. Chicago: A l d i n e - A t h e r l o n I n c . B a y l e s , M i c h a e l D. 1973. "Comments: O f f e n s e , Conduct and the Law" i n I s s u e s i n Law and M o r a l i t y , (ed.) Norman S. Cane & Thomas K~ T r e l o g a n , pp. 111-126. C l e v e l a n d : Case Western Reserve U n i v e r s i t y . B e n d i t t , T.M. 1976. " D i s c u s s i o n : B e n e f i t and Harm". P h i l o s o p h y and Phenomenological R e s e a r c h . 37:116-120. Benn, S . I . 1976. 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