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The representative one-party state : Mugabe's search for political control in Zimbabwe Dawson, Robert William 1989

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THE REPRESENTATIVE ONE-PARTY STATE: MUGABE'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE By ROBERT WILLIAM DAWSON B.A. , The University of Br i t ish Columbia, 1987 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Pol i t ica l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March 1989 © Robert William Dawson, 1989 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of f o l t t t c q l 3ciencc The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date Apri l 2.% I ^ g l  DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze Robert Mugabe's move to one-party rule in Zimbabwe and to investigate how the emerging pol i t ica l system functions to maintain ethnoregional s tab i l i t y . This thesis examines Mugabe's pol i t ica l strategies since indepen-dence in 1980 and follows the course of events in Zimbabwe which led to the introduction of one-party rule. It also focuses directly on the features of Zimbabwe's one-party state and compares Zimbabwe's pol i t ica l system with other similar single party systems in Afr ica . The general argument of this thesis is that Robert Mugabe has man-aged to strengthen the security of his regime and rebuild po l i t ica l order in Zimbabwe by constructing a pol i t ica l compact which s i g n i f i -cantly reduces the r ivalry between the country's two main tr ibal groups. The key features of this compact include the appointment of prominent ethnoregional leaders to positions in the cabinet, changes in the ethnic composition of the bureaucracy, and the reinstatement of Parliament as a representative inst i tut ion. Although there is no evidence that the tr ibal groups receive authentic po l i t ica l power from the compact, the incorporation of their leaders into the government is successful in restoring tr ibal dignity and reducing the threat of insurgency. The research is based on available government documents, newspaper a r t i c les , African research reports, and art ic les and books related to the subject. The information and analysis presented in this thesis contributes to the limited body of academic research on Zimbabwe's one-party state and provides a useful starting point for understanding tr ibal represen-tation in African one-party regimes. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i L is t of Tables iv L is t of Figures v Acknowledgments vi Introduction 1 Notes 9 Chapter 1: The Road to One-Party Rule 11 The Unity Compact and the Move to One-Party Rule 25 Notes 34 Chapter 2: Mugabe's Search for Pol i t ica l S tab i l i ty : Conceptual Approaches 38 Robert Mugabe and the Mechanisms of Control 39 The Unity Compact and the Move to Pol i t ica l Representation 43 Notes 50 Chapter 3: The Representative One-Party State in Zimbabwe 52 The Features of the Representative One-Party State 52 The Cabinet 54 The Bureaucracy 60 The Parliament 65 Notes 69 Conclusion 73 Bibliography 76 i v LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe 13 Table 2: 1980 Election Results 18 Table 3: 1985 Election Results 23 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe 13 vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In writing this study I have benefited from the help and advice of many individuals. I would particu--lar ly l ike to thank Robert Jackson, Diane Mauzy and John Wood who stimulated and assisted my research in the f i e ld of comparative non-western p o l i t i c s . My appreciation extends to Betty Greig for her e f f ic ient and accurate typing of numerous drafts, and to my friends (Tony, Dave, Hugh, Kirsten, et.al.) for their encouragement and companionship. F ina l ly , I owe much to the patience of my parents who have supported me throughout my rather lengthy university career. - 1 -INTRODUCTION During the month of December, 1987, two major pol i t ica l events took place in Zimbabwe. On December 22, Robert Mugabe, leader of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), signed an agreement whereby the two parties would merge under the t i t l e of ZANU-Patriotic Front. The unity agreement paved the way for an event which fundamentally changed the structure of government in Zimbabwe. On December 31, Parliament passed a b i l l that replaced the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution with a new constitution which dismantled the Bri t ish system of parliamentary government. Under the terms of the new consti tut ion, provisions were made for the establishment of an executive presidency, a unicameral parliament and a common voter's role. The basic aim of the constitution was to establish the rules and regulations which prohibit the existence of po l i t ica l organizations other than ZANU, and to lay down the legal framework for de jure one-party rule. The creation of a single party state in Zimbabwe has been jus t i f ied by Robert Mugabe on three grounds. F i rs t , he contends that one-party rule closely resembles the pol i t ics of consensus practiced in traditional African soc ie t ies . * According to this argument, the multi-party system of parliamentary government undermines s tab i l i ty because i t is alien to the traditional "psychic structure" and "communal sp i r i t " of Zimbabweans: [The one-party state] stems from our tradition that we had only one society in any particular geographical area, coming under a single chief. Under the po l i t ica l leadership that was offered . . . our people were given the opportunity in their various areas to assemble, to express their views on fundamental issues before decisions were implemented.3 - 2 -The second argument put forth by Mugabe is the capabil ity of a single party system to unify and strengthen Zimbabwean society. He believes that with "one society" organized and contained under "one pol i t ica l umbrella," Zimbabwe can become more unif ied: As a newly independent country, Zimbabwe requires above a l l national unity, s tab i l i ty and economic development. We believe that the one-party state is the most effec-tive mode of unity to give the necessary conditions for s tab i l i ty and economic development. Inter-party bickering only undermines the ab i l i ty of the nation to organize the supreme effort required to give the economic necessities of l i f e to a l l our people. The final just i f icat ion for one-party rule is the argument that the single party state is actually more democratic than the Bri t ish system of parliamentary government: [In a one-party state] there would be only one party, but various viewpoints can be entertained--the right-i s t s , the l e f t i s t s , the center people. They can express their views but at the end of the day, the view of the majority becomes the view of the party and the view of the state. I don't see why that should be said to spell doom for our democracy. In fact , i t enhances democracy in my view. It is interesting to note that African nationalist leaders ar t icu-lated the same arguments to just i fy the move to one-party rule 30 years ago. Charismatic independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Felix Houphouet-Boigney in the Ivory Coast and Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinea were attracted to the single party structure and jus t i f ied i ts establishment on the grounds of t radi t ion, nation-building and democracy. The rationale offered for one-party rule was tied to the dominant themes of the African independence movement. The ab i l i ty of nationalist leaders to successfully l ink the one-party state to the broad principles of Pan-Africanism, racial equality, Negritude, socialism and neutralism inspired g a large portion of newly independent states to adopt a one-party system. - 3 -The rationale for African one-party rule in the early 1960s attracted the attention of many po l i t ica l observers. Thomas Hodgkin, who conducted the f i r s t and most intensive review of African pol i t ica l part ies, concluded in 1961 that there is a tendency towards one-party rule "where the dominant party is a powerful mass party, ideological ly committed to the doctrine that 'democracy' means the control of the state by a party which effectively expresses the popular w i l l . " ' ' The notion that a single party state could sustain an important measure of democracy stimulated an academic debate over the prospects of effective opposition and participation within the framework of a single party system. Immanuel Wallerstein—who represented the views of many early writers on African pol i t ics--argued that "the one-party system in the African context is often a signif icant step toward the l iberal state, g not a f i r s t step away from i t" : Pol i t ica l debate is a commonplace of African l i f e . Opposition to government pol icies exists , is heard, is even listened to. Policies change; the composi-tion of governments changes. There is an enormous amount of give and take in almost every independent African state." Other scholars however, such as Martin Ki lson, held a more sceptical view of the democractic character of single party systems and questioned their capacity to tolerate genuine opposition: "What are the l imits of opposition pol i t ics in these si tuat ions; that i s , what is meant by 'opposition' within a single party when there is no assumption of a right to carry i t to i ts logical conclusion (to organize one's opposi-tion) when one's demands are not s a t i s f i e d ? " ^ The debate over democracy and one-party rule which dominated the dialogue between pol i t ica l scientists interested in Africa during the - 4 -early 1960s was superseded as the number of authoritarian single party systems in Afr ica continued to r i se . By the end of the 1960s, i t was clear to most observers that opposition organizations, voluntary associations and ethnic groups within one-party states could not function in the po l i t ica l sphere without being branded as subversive, and i t became more and more evident that the democratic character of one-party rule was not the most meaningful measurement for appraising 11 African states. Eventually, academics studying Africa began to search for a link between the growth of one-party rule to the study of po l i t ica l modernization more generally. In his seminal work, Pol i t ica l  Order in Changing Societ ies, Samuel Huntington suggested that the dis-ruptive effects of social and economic modernization on pol i t ics and pol i t ica l institutions forced developing states to construct party 12 systems which provided pol i t ica l s tab i l i t y . Writers on pol i t ics have spent much time and many words arguing about the relative merits of one-party systems and competitive party systems for modernizing countries. In terms of po l i t ica l development, however, what counts is not the number of parties but rather the strength and adaptability of the party system . . . In modern-izing states one-party systems tend to be more stable than p lura l i s t i c party systems.13 From this perspective, the one-party state was viewed not as an al ter-native model of democracy, but rather as a necessary form of government to deal with the exigencies of modernization. Some pol i t ica l observers went so far as to argue that i t did not matter i f African governments were not democratic, "since democracy was inherent in the character-is t ics of mass parties and since the policies carried out by some 14 regimes would have eventual democratic consequences." Huntington s arguments that modernizing states with multi-party systems were less - 5 -stable and much more prone to mil i tary intervention than modernizing states with one party influenced many Africanists to reconsider their views on one-party rule. One-party sceptics such as Kilson and Rivkin began to recognize the lack of available choices open to African leaders to carry through their modernizing pol icies and gradually accepted the notion of the one-party state as an effective pol i t ica l framework for 15 short-term s tab i l i t y . The single party state l i terature of the late 1960s and early 1970s conceived African one-party rule as a stage in the process towards po l i t ica l modernization. There is an impl ic i t assumption in most of the work of this period that authoritarian one-party rule was a necessary po l i t ica l stage to manage the destabil izing transition from traditional to modern society; thus leading writers such as Wallerstein to conclude, "the one-party structure is an interim system of African states which they are maintaining for the present." However, independent Africa has not evolved over the last twenty years as many modernization theorists had predicted (or hoped). Today, 40 of the 51 African states can be described as having either a c iv i l i an or mil itary one-party regime.^ So far , the goal of modernity—frequently measured in terms of the socio-economic levels achieved in western industrial ized states—has been 18 vir tual ly unattainable for almost a l l of A f r ica . The "pol i t ica l gap" between the t radi t ional , f ami l i a l , and ethnic authorities of the African pol i t ica l world and the single, secular and national authorities of the "modern" po l i t ica l world has not been signi f icant ly narrowed, nor has there been any indications that i t wi l l narrow in the near future. As Howard Wiarda observes: - 6 -We have learned that in much of the Third World, [the] so-cal led traditional institutions have, . . . , proved remarkably res i l i en t , persistent, and long-last ing; rather than fading away or being crushed under the impact of change, they have instead proved f l ex ib le , accommodative, and adaptive, bending to the currents of modernization without necessarily being replaced by them.19 Moreover, the deplorable authoritarian features of some African one-party states have not provided a po l i t ica l environment of enduring s tab i l i t y . States such as Benin, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali , Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zaire have suffered numerous violent mil itary coups and counter-coups. These factors, prima fac ie , appear to warrant a re-examination of the nature of one-party rule in Af r ica . Perhaps instead of viewing the African one-party state as an interim stage of po l i t ica l development, i t would be a more useful endeavor for po l i t ica l scientists to come to grips with the one-party state, as i t exists in and of i t s e l f , and focus direct ly on one-party rule in terms of the way pol i t ics are conducted in Af r ica . "Scholars need now for the f i r s t time to begin to take non-Western areas and their ofttimes peculiar institutions ser iously, in their own context and traditions rather than 20 from the slanted perspective of the Western social sciences." It is exactly this type of approach to one-party rule that this study pursues. Instead of assessing the value of Mugabe's arguments for one-party rule in Zimbabwe ( t radi t ion, nation-building and democracy) or examining the one-party state in Zimbabwe from the perspective of po l i t ica l develop-ment, this study focuses on the one-party state in Zimbabwe as an indigenous form of government which is designed to address particular po l i t ica l problems which have emerged since independence. 1 - 7 -Mugabe's decision to construct the unity agreement between the Ndebele-based ZAPU party and the Shona-based ZANU party and to transform the structure of government in Zimbabwe from a multi-party system to a one-party system was designed to sett le the conf l ic t and violence which has seized Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Although this decision did not resolve the deep-seated and long-standing enmity between the Shona and the Ndebele, i t did bring pol i t ica l order and s tab i l i ty to Zimbabwe and since the signing of the compact, Zimbabwe has enjoyed 15 months of peace. Essent ia l ly , the hypothesis of this study is that the recent period of s tab i l i ty in Zimbabwe came about through a pol i t ica l arrangement created by Robert Mugabe which signi f icant ly reduced the alienation of the Ndebele from the central government. The objective of this arrangement was not to grant the Ndebele, as a group, genuine p o l i -t ica l power. Rather, Mugabe's strategy was designed to end the violent dissident movement in Matabeleland by changing the pol i t ica l system in ways which made the Ndebele feel as though they were partners in the government. The f i r s t feature of this arrangement involved the appoint-ment of prominent Ndebele leaders to positions in the cabinet, the second feature involved changes in the institutions of the state so as to give the Ndebele community a greater sense of representation in the government. The po l i t ica l arrangement created by Mugabe serves as an impressive example of shrewd pol i t ica l engineering in modern Af r ica . Not only has Mugabe constructed a one-party framework which balances tr ibal r ivalry and maintains order, but he has also managed to protect his own personal power within the po l i t ica l system and strengthen the security of his regime. - 8 -The f i r s t chapter of this study wil l provide the background to the pol i t ica l and ethnic situation in Zimbabwe and examine the ways in which the country's two main rival po l i t ica l organizations managed to reach a unity agreement. The second chapter attempts to explain why Mugabe decided to construct the unity compact and move to a one-party system by analyzing his po l i t ica l strategies since independence through two theoretical models: control and consociationalism. The third chapter focuses direct ly on the two key features of Mugabe's new pol i t ica l arrangement and attempts to explain how pol i t ics are conducted in Zimbabwe's po l i t ica l system. One of the d i f f i cu l t i es for po l i t ica l scient ists studying current Zimbabwean po l i t ics is the newness of Mugabe's one-party state. The unity compact is only 15 months old and the patterns of ethnic representation which reduce tr ibal r ivalry are s t i l l emerging. These factors, however, should not prevent observers from investigating the important po l i t ica l changes taking place in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the third chapter looks at the features of two other African one-party states (Kenya and Zambia) which appear to bear more resemblance to the informal practices and procedures conducted in Zimbabwe than any other states in Af r ica . The aim of this undertaking is not to suggest that the po l i t ica l system emerging in Zimbabwe is the same as those already in place in Kenya and Zambia. Rather, this chap-ter explores the features of the one-party states in Kenya and Zambia only so far as to advance our knowledge and understanding of how African leaders can balance the ruling e l i te and change state institutions in a manner which gives disaffected tr ibal groups a greater sense of repre-sentation in the central government. - 9 -NOTES: INTRODUCTION *For a more detailed discussion of traditional African po l i t ics see: George B.N. Ayit tey, "Democracy, Afr ican-Style," Globe and Mail (October 6, 1987), p. 6. 2 William H. Shaw, "Towards the One-Party State in Zimbabwe: A Study in African Pol i t ica l Thought," Journal of Modern African Studies 24, 3 (September 1986), p. 377. 3 Robert Mugabe, "Interview," in Afr ica Report 27, 5 (September-October 1982), p. 7. 4 Robert Mugabe, "The Parliament of Zimbabwe and Some Aspects of the Constitution," The Parliamentarian 65, 1 (January 1984), p. 6. 5 Mugabe, "Interview," pp. 7-8. I^n 1965, one-party systems existed in 19 of the 32 independent states of Af r ica . ^Thomas Hodgkin, African Pol i t ica l Parties (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Publications, 1971), p. 168. o Immanuel Wallerstein, Af r ica : The Pol i t ics of Independence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 163. g Ib id . , p. 159. Wallerstein's views on the prospects for democracy in African one-party states was also shared by Ruth Schacter. Cf. Ruth Schacter, "Single Party Systems in West Af r ica , " American Pol i t ica l  Science Review 60 (June 1961), 304-11, passim. ^Martin Ki lson, "Authoritarian and Single Party Tendencies in African P o l i t i c s , " World Pol i t ics 15, 2 (January 1963), p. 293. Similar views can be found in K. A. Busia, Afr ica in Search of Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 123-43, passim; and Arnold Rivkin, Nation- Building in Africa (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), pp. 205-58, passim. ^David E. Apter, "Ghana" in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds . , Pol i t ica l Parties and National Integration in Tropical Afr ica (Los Angeles: University of Cali fornia Press, 1964), p. 260. This theme is repeated in the concluding chapter of the volume, see pp. 656-59. 12 Samuel P. Huntington, Pol i t ica l Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 34, 41. 1 3 I b i d . , pp. 420, 422. Aristide Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. v i i i . The impact of the modernization l i terature on the academic community is noticeable in 10 Zolberg's introduction to the revised edition of his book where he states his wish to change the t i t l e of his book to: Integration and  Confl ict in a Modernizing Pol i ty: A Study of the Ivory Coast, see p. x i . 15 See Rivkin, Nation-Building in A f r i ca , pp. 226-27. 16 Wallerstein, A f r i ca , p. 166. 1 7Crawford Young, "Pol i t ics in Af r ica , " in Gabriel Almond and G. •Bingham Powell, eds . , Comparative Pol i t ics Today, 3rd edition (Toronto: L i t t le Brown and Company, 1984), pp. 470-71. 18 Huntington, Pol i t ica l Order in Changing Societ ies, pp. 1-35, passim. 19 Howard J . Wiarda, "Toward a Non-Ethnocentric Theory of Develop-ment" in Howard J . Wiarda, e d . , New Directions in Comparative Pol i t ics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 131. 2 0 I b i d . , p. 144. 21 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The Marginality of African States," in Gwendolyn M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds . , African Independence: The First 25 Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 45-70. See also: Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Afr ica 's Weak States Persist ," World Pol i t ics 35, 1 (October 1982), pp. 16-24. 11 CHAPTER 1 THE ROAD TO ONE-PARTY RULE ZANU has had to walk a tight rope between ZAPU and the white sett ler government both of which, though for d i f -ferent reasons, have been determined to k i l l i t in the cradle. But we are happy that our party which began as a toothless baby now has teeth. It can bite and bite hard . . . ZANU is destined to liberate this country because i t acts from a deep and sacred sense of devo-t ion , dedication and humanity, unlike ZAPU which has thoroughly antagonized the people because of their intimidation and thuggery--the alpha and omega of ZAPU leadership. ZANU: Presidential address at the ZANU inaugural congress, May 1964. We s t i l l abide by our stand that the Committee of Nine has either to recognize us as the sole liberatory movement in Zimbabwe or have nothing to do with us. We are sick and t i red of being told to make a united front with a party that was rejected by the people right on the day i t was launched. The people in ZANU, a handful of midguided and power-hungry so-cal led in te l lec tua ls , are the ones who must come back to the people and not us to make a united front with such a discredited group. The Committee of Nine has either to recognize us, the people's party or ZANU, which stinks to the ordinary man and woman, boy and gi r l in Zimbabwe. There can be no two ways about i t . ZAPU: Statement to the Committee of Nine, June 1964. Relations Between ZANU and ZAPU Before the Unity Compact For twenty-five years, the relationship between ZANU and ZAPU has been hostile and antagonistic. The animosity between these two groups began in 1964 when a group of ZAPU executive deputies challenged Joshua Nkomo's leadership and broke away from ZAPU--which was then the largest African nationalist party in Zimbabwe—to form ZANU. On the surface, the sp l i t was p o l i t i c a l . Robert Mugabe, one of the men who created ZANU, argued that Nkomo lacked the leadership qualit ies to lead Zimbabwe - 12 -against colonial rule and questioned ZAPU's commitment to the principles of socialism."'' As the progress towards majority rule began to fade and the sett ler government of Southern Rhodesia grew stronger, Mugabe and his a l l ies established ZANU to inject new energy into the nationalist move-ment. Yet ZANU's success was marginal. The ideology and aims of the two nationalist leaders were indistinguishable and, in spite of Mugabe's cr i t ic ism of Nkomo's strategy, "ZANU in practice did not immediately devise any radical ly new or more successful methods of applying pressure 2 on the government." To a great extent the division of the nationalist movement was 3 related to ethnici ty. Like most black African states, the boundaries of Zimbabwe correspond to no pre-colonial real i ty and there are a multitude of different tr ibal groups that make up the country's African population. Most of Zimbabwe's tr ibal groups can be divided into two dist inct ethno-l inguis t ic categories. F i rs t , there is the dominant Shona-speaking peoples—which include the Karanga, Zezwra, Manyika, Korekore, Rozi, and Ndau—and second there is Ndebele (or Sindebele)-speaking peoples—which include the Ndebele and Kalanga. (The proportional strength of these two ethno-l inguistic groups in relation to the total African population and to each other is shown in Table 1.) Relations between these two groups have been antagonistic for centuries. Long before the Bri t ish colonized south-central A f r i ca , the Ndebele settled the terr i tory now known as Zimbabwe. The Ndebele--which were a martial faction of the Zulu king-dom—conquered surrounding tribes and established their dominance in the region. One of the many tribal groups to come under the command of the Ndebele were the Shona, which had prospered as an agrarian kingdom for 4 several hundred years before the arrival of the Ndebele. Ndebele 13 Figure 1. Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe 1 Ndebele 2 Kalanga 3 Rozwi 4 Korekore 5 Zezuru 6 Manyika 7 Karanga 8 Ndau 9 Tonga 10 Venda 11 Hlengwe/ Shangaan 12 Sotho Beit Bridge 100 200 _ _ l Kilometres TABLE 1. Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe Ethnic Group Karanga Zezuru Manyika Korekore Rozwi Ndau Ndebele Kalanga Tonga Sena Venda Sotho A. Shona-oriented B. Ndebele-oriented C. Other Percentage 22 18 13 12 9 3 77% 14 5 19% 4% Source: Masipula Sithole, "Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwe Nation-a l i s t P o l i t i c s , " Ethnic and Racial Studies 3, 1 (January 1980), p. 26. - 14 -supremacy in the region continued until the early 1890s when Mashonaland and Matabeleland became part of the Br i t ish protectorate known as Southern Rhodesia. When ZAPU divided in 1963, i t was the well-established Shona leaders who le f t to form ZANU. Mugabe centered his party's operations in Mas-vingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland where the majority of Shona-speaking peoples reside, while ZAPU continued to concentrate i ts act iv i ty in Matabeleland (See Figure 1). Although Nkomo retained broad popular support for several years after the s p l i t based on his image as the original ant ico lon ia l is t , the ideological s imi lar i t ies between ZANU and ZAPU led many Africans—especial ly youths—to make their choice for party allegiance based on ethnic membership. The result was the development of two rival nationalist movements divided along tr ibal and regional l ines: Shona-speaking groups aligning with ZANU in the north-eastern portion of the country and Ndebele-speaking groups in the south-western corner 5 backing the Ndebele leadership of ZAPU. The bifurcation of Zimbabwe along ethnogeographical lines was heigh-tened during the 15-year l iberation struggle against Ian Smith's Uni-lateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Both parties competed for the control of the independent state, launching guerr i l la act iv i t ies from within their separate regiona. As Andrew Astrow explains, the region-ally-based guerr i l la war had the effect of strengthening the attachments between the tr ibal groups and their local po l i t ica l parties: ZANU . . . won the support of the Shona-speaking people, not simply because i ts Executive was largely dominated by Shona but also for pract ica l , geographic reasons. ZANU was operating from the north-east and east, so that inevitably Shona-speaking Africans who wanted to be involved in the armed struggle joined ZANU.6 - 15 -The guerri l las were, therefore, the ideological and mil itary spearhead of ZANU's "revolution," the rural people in the war zones were integrated into the war that ZANU was waging on their behalf.^ Through p o l i t i c i z a -tion ZANU created an extensive network of mil i tary and ideological bases throughout the north-eastern terr i tory of the country. ZAPU did not adopt a policy of pol i t ic izat ion as early as ZANU, but by the end of the war "ZAPU had achieved a similar ly close relationship with the people in the western areas where i ts guerri l las operated as ZANU had in i ts more Q extensive eastern war zone." Thus any attempt to evaluate the s i g n i f i -cance of ethnicity in the relations between ZANU and ZAPU must be placed in the context of the l iberation struggle. Tribal membership and geo-graphy were key factors in establishing the boundaries between the two part ies, but the pol i t ic izat ion and co-optation of rural Africans during the guerr i l la war by soldiers played a major role in winning and maintaining the loyalty of the various ethnic groups. By the mid-1970s, both ZANU and ZAPU had amassed large, well-trained armies, and the l iberation struggle quickly escalated into a bloody c i v i l war. Challenged on every front, the UDI regime agreed upon a plan to transfer power to a moderate black government and in 1978, Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the temporary Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Muzorewa, however, fa i led to achieve peace or international legitimacy because he appeared to function as a pol i t ica l pawn of the Smith govern-9 ment. F ina l ly , in 1979, a constitutional conference was held at Lancaster House, London, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the Bri t ish Foreign Secretary, to resolve the continuing conf l ic t in Rhodesia. The conference was attended by a Salisbury delegation, which included Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith, and a Patr iot ic Front delegation led by - 16 -Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. After several months of ta lks, the conference eventually resulted in an agreement that contained ceasefire provisions to end the con f l i c t , transitional arrangements to guide the country through a period of Br i t ish interim administration, and a constitution for the independent state of Zimbabwe. Under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, the country resumed i ts legal status as a dependent terr i tory and a Br i t ish interim administration (with the assistance of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force) monitored the ceasefire and provided stable government for a peaceful and brief transition to majority rule. For the f i r s t several months, the violence in the countryside continued as ZANU, ZAPU and Rhodesian mil itary troops fought amongst each other for position and terr i tory. Eventually a ceasefire was negotiated, and in 1980 the groundwork was la id for Zimbabwe's f i r s t national independent elections. The four representatives at Lancaster House were the main contes-tants in the 1980 general elections. Confident in his party's ab i l i ty to attract Shona votes and emerge with an overall parliamentary majority, Robert Mugabe rejected Joshua Nkomo's proposal of running the Patr iot ic Front as a unified p a r t y . ^ Instead, Mugabe ran separately as the leader of the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Nkomo ran as the leader of the Patr iot ic Front-ZAPU (PF-ZAPU). Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the short-l ived Zimbabwean-Rhodesian government, led the "moderate" United African National Council (UANC). Ian Smith, formerly of the Rhodesian Front, ran as the leader of the all-white Conservative All iance of Zimbabwe (CAZ). Polling took place on February 14, 1980 for the 20 parliamentary seats on the reserved white voter's ro l l and on February 17, 1980 for the 80 seats on the common (black v o t e r ' s ) . r o l l . The technical eff iciency with which - 17 -the elections were organized was impressive. Only two percent of ballot forms were spo i l t - -a very low figure considering the high level of i l l i t e racy in the country and the electorate's lack of famil iar i ty with the process of voting"''"''—and representatives from the 11-nation Common-12 wealth Observer Group judged the elections to be free and fa i r . In the white rol l e lect ions, Ian Smith's CAZ defeated the pro-Mugabe Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG), drawing most of i ts support from middle-income whites whose jobs were threatened by Afr icanizat ion. In the black rol l e lect ions, the competition was primarily confined to ZANU and ZAPU. Muzorewa was able to secure only his riding and two others for his party. The other African part ies, such as Ndabaningi Si thole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-Sithole) and James Chickerema's Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP), a l l fa i led to win a single seat. ZANU and ZAPU were the clear front runners in the 1980 elections because they had established themselves in the minds of the electorate as the cham-pions of the armed struggle and the legitimate successors to the UDI regime. Both parties rel ied on their existing network of supporters and party organizers to influence voters but they each had d i f f icu l ty winning votes outside their ethno-regional constituencies. The outcome of the election revealed the extent to which ZANU and ZAPU had organized effec-tive grassroots po l i t ica l structures within their regions of influence. Mugabe's ZANU-PF captured 57 of the 80 African seats, drawing most of i ts support from the three Mashonaland provinces, Manicaland, and Victoria (now Masvingo), while Nkomo's PF-ZAPU won almost a l l twenty of i ts seats from Matabeleland. Table 2 demonstrates the ident i f icat ion of party with language and region in the 1980 independence elect ion. TABLE 2 1980 ELECTION RESULTS Province Seats Estimate of Speakers Shona (%) Ndebele (%) ZANU % votes seats ZAPU % votes seats Other Manicaland 11 92.4 0.3 84.1 11 1.6 0 Victoria/Masvingo 11 89.7 1.1 87.3 11 1.9 0 Mashonaland Central 6 77.4 0.2 83.8 6 2.3 0 Mashonaland East 16 85.3 0.7 80.5 14 4.6 0 UANC 2 Mashonaland West 8 69.6 1.2 71.9 6 13.4 1 UANC 1 Midlands 12 78.3 16.5 59.7 8 27.1 4 Matabeleland North 10 14.6 64.8 10.0 1 79.0 9 Matabeleland South 6 19.5 59.8 6.8 _0 86.4 _6 Total 57 20 3 Sources: Richard Hodder-Williams, "Conflict in Zimbabwe," Confl ict Studies 1, 154 (1983), p. 13; Martin Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative  Pol i t ics 1, 19 (March 1981), pp. 64-65. - 19 -In addition to providing the framework for the transitional period and the procedures for the national elect ions, the Lancaster House Agree-ment outlined the constitutional arrangement for the independent state of Zimbabwe. In order to ensure that a settlement for majority rule was reached at Lancaster House, the Patr iot ic Front reluctantly agreed to two key provisions. One was the provision reserving the twenty seats in the House of Assembly for whites (who comprise under three percent of the population) and the other was the formula for amending the constitution. Section 52 stated that for seven years from the date of independence, entrenched clauses could only be amended with the unanimous approval of Parliament. When the seven-year period expired, a b i l l to amend the con-st i tut ion required the votes of not less than 70 percent of the members of the House of Assembly and the votes of not less than two-thirds of 13 the members of the Senate. In the eyes of Mugabe and Nkomo, these provisions were designed to "safeguard" the pol i t ica l power of the white 14 Zimbabweans. When the Union Jack was lowered on April 18, 1980, and the country was formally granted independence from Great Br i ta in , Robert Mugabe held the executive monopoly over state power. If he wished, Mugabe could have ignored the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement because there were no substantive mechan-isms binding Mugabe to the terms of the Agreement. But, in fact , this did not happen and the Lancaster House document remained largely intact until December 1987. Following independence, the Mugabe government sought to demonstrate adherence to the Lancaster House Constitution not only to rebuild order and certainty into the country, but also "as a means of maintaining sup-port of the economically c r i t i ca l domestic white community and of those - 20 -Western governments and international agencies that have supplied high 15 levels of financial assistance." And in an attempt to reduce the po l i -t ical divisions created during the years of warfare, Mugabe invited whites, such as David Smith from the Conservative All iance of Zimbabwe, into his cabinet as well as several ZAPU MPs. Joshua Nkomo became the Minister of Home Affairs and Canaan Banana, a Ndebele, was appointed state President. "We have been preaching from the mountain a sermon on national reconci l iat ion," stated Mugabe in an interview in 1982, "and we went about i t by establishing a government of national unity, by invit ing ZAPU to join in government and also appointing two or so whites in government so as to make the population see that we no longer were l iv ing in the past. We no longer were at war with each other." In the f i r s t three years of independence, Mugabe's administration of the country was quite effect ive. His adherence to the Lancaster House Constitution reassured white sett lers and international investors of the government's commitment to the maintenance of order, and his overtures to Nkomo to join the Cabinet temporarily eased tensions between ZANU and ZAPU. This environment of s tab i l i ty translated into a tremendous expan-sion in Zimbabwe's economy. During the period from 1980 to 1982, the Zimbabwean economy grew in real terms by 21 percent, the greatest growth margin in Southern A f r i c a . * 7 Even South Af r ica 's economy, which is the strongest on the continent, achieved a real growth rate of only nine 18 percent during the same period. However, by 1982 the post-independence mood of optimism began to deteriorate. Mugabe moved away from his policy of reconcil iation and ZANU's relations with opposition groups took on a decidedly hostile character. Members of the United African National Council and the - 21 -Conservative All iance of Zimbabwe were detained and harassed for unproven 19 "subversive act iv i ty ." The Mugabe government accused both parties of 20 having links to South Af r ica . In 1982, arms caches were discovered on several farms owned by Nitram, a ZAPU company. Mugabe reacted bi t ter ly to this discovery, accusing ZAPU of plotting a mil itary coup: "They joined us to string along while planning for an eventual takeover of the 21 government." The regime's special North Korean trained police force, the Fifth Brigade, began a series of periodic raids in Matabeleland on the o f f i ces , businesses and homes of ZAPU loya l i s ts , searching for more evidence connecting the party to anti-government dissidents. ZAPU o f f i -c ia ls were arb i t rar i ly detained, party meetings were prohibited and party property was expropriated. As the number of raids increased, the violence in Matabeleland heightened and the Fifth Brigade acquired a reputation for cruelty and corruption. The "government of national unity" o f f i c i a l l y came to an end when Mugabe supplemented his mil i tary campaign against ZAPU with po l i t ica l attacks and dismissed Nkomo and a l l other ZAPU MPs from the Cabinet. ZANU's al l iance with the opposition was tenuous from the beginning. The ruling party made no secret of i ts intention of ultimately implemen-ting a one-party state system in Zimbabwe and mugabe was consistently under pressure by party deputies to smother opposition groups and secure 22 ZANU's position of hegemony. Enos Nkala, ZANU's f i r s t Minister of Finance, for example, publicly objected to the idea of incorporating ZAPU into the ruling e l i te in 1980 and stated that i t was his party's task to 23 "crush Joshua Nkomo and forget about him." The possib i l i ty that the opposition parties were involved in instigating dissidence provided - 22 -Mugabe with an excuse to crack down on their act iv i ty and thereby take steps towards the establishment of de facto one-party rule. During the election year of 1985, Mugabe nearly achieved his goal of de facto one-party rule. His aggressive policy against organized opposition was successful in accelerating the decline of the UANC and the CAZ. Five members of the UANC were mysteriously assassinated and "scores of other party functionaries simply disappeared during the f i r s t 24 six months of 1985." Muzorewa, fearing for his own l i f e , withdrew 25 from pol i t ics altogether and went into voluntary exile overseas. Seeing the handwriting on the wal l , many white MPs abandoned the CAZ and went into retirement or joined ZANU. The gradual dissolution of the all-white po l i t ica l party allowed Mugabe to abolish constitutionally the 20 parliamentary seats reserved for whites. (On September 21, 1987, Zimbabwe's House of Assembly passed a b i l l that formally eliminated the provisions for white representation in the constitution by 78 votes to 27 none, with 10 white MPs abstaining and eight supporting the b i l l . ) In the national elect ions, ZANU increased i ts overall percentage of the vote and won every seat in the country outside Matabeleland. (See Table 3.) ZANU's overwhelming majority broadened Mugabe's power base and made his grip on the government seem almost impregnable. The geographical pattern of support for ZANU and ZAPU in the 1985 general election served to confirm the identi f icat ion of party with language and region. Despite the efforts of the Harare government to discredit the ZAPU leadership and mobilize popular support for ZANU, the Ndebele remained sol id ly united behind Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU. ZAPU's foothold in Matabeleland soon became a serious problem for Mugabe. Following the 1985 national e lect ions, the instabi l i ty within TABLE 3 1985 ELECTION RESULTS ZANU ZAPU Province Seats % of Votes Seats % of Votes Seats Other Manicaland 11 88.6 10 1.4 0 ZANU-Sithole Victoria/Masingo 11 97.9 11 1.7 0 1 Mashonaland Central 6 98.3 6 0.8 0 Mashonaland East 18 91.8 18 2.9 0 Mashonaland West 7 94.4 7 3.4 0 Midlands 12 82.9 12 13.8 0 Matabeleland North 9 15.1 0 82.5 9 Matabeleland South 6 12.9 0 86.6 6 Total 64 15 1 Sources: Anthony Lemon, "The Zimbabwe General Election of 1985," Journal of  Commonwealth and Comparative Pol i t ics 26, 1 (March 1988), pp. 13-16; Christine Sylvester, "Zimbabwe's 1985 Elections: A Search of National Mythology," Journal of Modern African Studies 24, 1 (1986), pp. 229-55. - 24 -Matabeleland intensif ied as large numbers of ex-ZAPU guerri l las deserted the Zimbabwe National Army and returned to the bush. The ZAPU rebels spread their violence throughout Matabeleland, using the same guerr i l la strategy of warfare as they had during the UDI l iberation struggle. Teams of armed Ndebele roamed the countryside, attacking vil lages and destroying property. One of the most violent and barbarous guerr i l la attacks occurred in December 1987 when 16 people were slaughtered at a no mission near Bulawayo, the provincial capital of Matabeleland. Adding to Mugabe's worries was the evidence of South African involvement with the anti-government movement. The pro-dissident Radio Truth was broad-casted from South Afr ica and rebel ammunition was traced back to arms 29 dealers in Johannesburg. In May 1986, South African commandos explo-ded a car bomb in Bulawayo and circulated anti-government l i terature , thus demonstrating Zimbabwe's vulnerabil i ty to South African penetration. The level of South African involvement in Matabeleland appeared to be reaching new.heights in late 1987 when a South African journal is t , Patricia Hanekon, released documents obtained from the South African Defense Forces (SADF) which detailed monthly payments and a i r l i f t s of supplies and arms from the South African mil i tary to rebel groups in 30 Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. The government responded to the growing dissidence by intensifying i ts mil itary campaign and strong-armed tactics against ZAPU and the Ndebele. The Fifth Brigade stepped up i ts raids and attacks on Ndebele v i l lages, forcing thousands of homeless communities to seek refuge in 31 Botswana. The government also continued i ts harassment of ZAPU lead-ers by restr ict ing their movement within the country and detaining them 32 for extended periods of time without charge. Hence, by the end of - 25 -1987, the pol i t ica l divisions between ZANU and ZAPU were as deep as they had ever been. The efforts at reconcil iation had fa i l ed , and the r ivalry and distrust which characterized the relationship between these two parties in 1963 had resurfaced. It is against this background of antagonism and violence that the discussions for a party merger took place. The Unity Compact and the Move.to One-Party Rule This occasion f i l l s me with emotion. The younger and elder brothers who have been separated by circumstances have now come back together. We can now move into the future hand in hand, knowing that we leave behind us a united country, instead of going to our graves separately, leaving behind us a divided country. Statement by Robert Mugabe after signing the unity compact with Joshua Nkomo. December 1987. The most curious aspect regarding the ZANU-ZAPU merger is how--given the deep-seated and long-standing animosity between these two pol i t ica l organizations—did Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo ultimately agree upon a unity compact? Part of the answer rests on the fact that both leaders had compelling reasons to reach an agreement. For Nkomo, the arguments for a party merger were persuasive. Under the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution, ZAPU needed a majority in the House of Assembly to form a government. Yet because the two general elections had confirmed ZAPU as a Matabeleland party in terms of parliamentary representation, Nkomo could be assured of achieving not more than 20 percent of the national vote. Therefore, i t was unlikely that Nkomo would ever sup-plant Mugabe in an open and free electoral contest. Nkomo, 70 years old and unwell, was faced with the real i ty that his channels to po l i t ica l power were limited and his bargaining position declining as each year - 26 -passed. Without a cabinet post, he could not affect the policy-making process, and without the ab i l i ty to challenge the numerous government restr ict ions placed on ZAPU, his party was as good as banned. Further-more, Nkomo, who had gone into voluntary exile in Botswana to avoid detainment, was losing control of the resistance movement in Matabele-land. One loosely organized group, which called i t s e l f Super-ZAPU, conducted i ts violent opposition independently of Nkomo's leadership 33 "with South African encouragement." The option to sign a unity agree-ment offered Nkomo a chance to secure a position in the ruling e l i te and guarantee Ndebele access to pol i t ica l power. For Mugabe, the decision to join the unity compact is less clear. It is interesting to note that he did not need the support of ZAPU to push through the 1987 constitutional amendments abolishing the post of Prime Minister and establishing a strong executive presidential form of government. According to the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, constitutional amendments required only a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly after seven years of independence. The 20 white par-liamentary seats, eliminated in September, 1987, were f i l l e d by ZANU supporters, subsequently giving Mugabe 84 of the 100 seats in Par l ia-34 ment. Yet there was a more important reason for Mugabe to reach an agreement with Nkomo. For the f i r s t time since coming to power, Mugabe found himself at the end of 1987 faced with a serious threat to the security of his regime. The connections between the SADF and the dissident elements in Matabeleland appeared to be strengthening and Mugabe was confronted with the possib i l i ty of ZAPU developing into a powerful, destabil izing South African-backed guerr i l la unit such as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) or the National Movement for the - 27 -Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). The problem for Mugabe was deter-mining precisely who the enemy was. The lines distinguishing ZAPU from Super-ZAPU were vague and i t was unclear as to the exact role of Nkomo's leadership in the anti-government struggle. Moreover, Mugabe began to realize in 1987 the l imits of the governmental apparatus in Zimbabwe. Despite his efforts to crush ZAPU and conquer the resistance movement, Mugabe could not establish control over Matabeleland. The formal powers of the state seemed unable to penetrate the peripheries and defeat ant i -government act iv i ty . After five years of suppression, the government had not broken ZAPU's hold over Matabeleland and the Ndebele s t i l l 35 viewed Joshua Nkomo as the "true father of Zimbabwe." In addition, the violence and instab i l i ty in Matabeleland were becoming too costly for Zimbabwe's fragi le economy to bear. Not only was the Mugabe regime forced to direct an enormous proportion of i ts financial resources to i ts mil itary presence in Matabeleland, but the conf l ic t i t s e l f was cr ip-pling the country's infrastructure through the destruction of roads, bridges, factories and railways. The impact of the conf l ic t was also driving international corporations and sk i l led personnel out of the country. A party merger was an alternative method of solving the "Matabeleland problem." By absorbing ZAPU's identity into ZANU and bringing Nkomo back into the government, Mugabe could peacefully elimin-ate organized opposition while at the same time, attract more support from the Ndebele rank-and-fi le. Those ZAPU members who did not endorse the merger could be ident i f ied as insurgents, thereby making the war against the rebels easier to conduct. The reasons behind Mugabe's change in po l i t ica l strategy at the end of 1987 wil l be examined more closely in Chapter Two, but i t is suff ic ient to conclude that Mugabe - 28 -perceived the merger as an avenue towards ending the conf l ic t in Matabeleland and securing the domestic security of his regime. The unity negotiations between Mugabe and Nkomo began in July 1987 and continued on and off for five months. Talks between the two parties had been held before but efforts to combine them had always faltered because ZAPU refused to accept a junior partner position and top ZANU members "did not l ike the idea of having to share any cabinet and party positions with ZAPU." However, the 1987 unity talks were different from ear l ier negotiation rounds because the talks in 1987 were held in secrecy. Although there was some speculation that negotiations were taking place, i t was d i f f i c u l t for outside observers to be sure as the violence and atrocit ies in Matabeleland went on, culminating in the 37 December massacre at the mission. During the negotiations, Mugabe made a number of cabinet changes to counterbalance certain "diehard elements" within ZANU who opposed the prospect of a unity compact with ZAPU. Outspoken merger opponents Herbert Ushwokunze and Eddison Zvobgo were shuffled out of the cabinet and replaced with strong merger advo-38 cates Maurice Nyagambo, Bernard Chidzero and Emmerson Munangawa. Mugabe's decisions as to who he removed from the cabinet were done with pol i t ica l tact and precision. Ushwokunze was the leader of the Zezuru faction within ZANU, whereas Zvobgo was a figurehead of the rival Karanga faction (see Table 1 on page 13). If Mugabe had dropped one without the other he would have been accused of favoring a particular faction within 39 the party. Mugabe was also careful not to be seen as a weak leader, wi l l ing to construct any arrangement which would result in a party mer-ger. Mugabe upgraded the defence portfol io to a fu l l ministry and appointed Enos Nkala, the well-respected former home affairs minister, - 29 -to head the post. Nkala was a shrewd appointment because he was Nkomo's arch-enemy and a long-standing proponent of ZANU one-party ru le , but he 40 was also a Ndebele. This appointment made Mugabe look firm against Nkomo and ZAPU while at the same time appearing non-tr ibal . Joshua Nkomo made similar moves to surround himself with loyal supporters, but his bargaining position during the negotiations was not equal to that of Mugabe's. While he was confident that he represented the interests of a majority of the Ndebele, he was also aware that the military campaign in Matabeleland was heavily weighed on the side of the 41 government forces. ZAPU rebels were effective at destabil izing Mata-beleland, but they were no match for the powerful, well-trained and ruthless Fifth Brigade in a conventional war. The dissident movement in Matabeleland had the potential of disrupting pol i t ica l act iv i ty for a long period of time, yet i t was unlikely that the conf l ic t would ever result in bringing down the government. To this point, Nkomo could not expect to be treated by ZANU negotiators as an equal to Mugabe. Never-theless, Nkomo was interested in the prospects of a new system of government. During the unity ta lks, Nkomo made i t clear that he would not agree to a unity compact without a steadfast guarantee that key ZAPU 42 o f f i c i a l s were also granted cabinet posts. By taking this posit ion, Nkomo was assured the support of his deputies because they too would be included in the ruling e l i te and enjoy the benefits of a party merger. He did not need to placate the demands of the militant party members who favored the secession of Matabeleland (Super-ZANU) because their "ties 43 to the o f f i c i a l ZAPU rank and f i l e were tenuous at best." On December 22, 1987, Mugabe and Nkomo abruptly convened the domestic and international press to attend the signing of a unity - 30 -agreement between ZANU and ZAPU. "The s p i r i t was jovial and fest ive," wrote Andrew Mel drum of the London Guardian who witnessed the event, "as longtime archfoes . . . warmly embraced after signing the document. The normally abstemious Mugabe even sipped a glass of champagne in a 44 celebratory toast. For the ZAPU leadership, the unity compact pro-vided po l i t ica l rewards that previously were unattainable. Joshua Nkomo came away from the agreement as one of four vice-presidents with the t i t l e of Senior Minister in the President's Office Without Port fo l io . This position gave Nkomo direct access to Robert Mugabe and placed him on a par with Nyagambo, Chidzero, and long-time ZANU commissar, Simon Muzenda. In addit ion, several top ZAPU deputies were granted cabinet posts and ministerial appointments. David Kwindini became the Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture, Witness Mangwende became the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Cal l istus Ndolvu became the Minister of Industry and Technology, John Nkomo--no relation to Joshua Nkomo--became the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, and Joseph Msika became the Minister of Public Construction and 45 National Housing. These ZAPU appointments gave the Ndebele six 46 ministers in the new twenty-six member cabinet. Although there were hopes among many c r i t i c s that the cabinet changes following the unity compact "would also see Mugabe clearing out any creeping corruption," Mugabe did not eliminate one ZANU position in 47 the merger. Instead of dropping ZANU ministers completely, Mugabe opted to demote them to minor positions (as he did with Ushewokunze and Zuogbe) or reappoint them to new and restructured port fol ios. For instance, the Ministry of Education was divided into two fu l l portfolios --Higher Education and Primary and Secondary Education—in order to keep - 31 -48 Dzingai Mutumbuka in the cabinet. Mugabe's decision to retain " less-than-satisfactory" members of his old administration in the government re f lec ts , according to local observers: a wish to avoid exacerbating already worrying factional sp l i ts within the majority Shona. Keeping them on the o f f i c i a l payroll and under supervision is . . . seen as a lesser evi l than sending them to their home areas—possibly to build up competing power bases. Thus, in the end the issue of a party merger reduced i t s e l f to a question of patronage. Joshua Nkomo, conscious of the fact that ZAPU could not achieve power as long as Mugabe and the Shona remained in control of the state, looked for an agreement which would give Ndebele the maximum num-ber of positions in government. Robert Mugabe made the deal palatable to the ZANU e l i te by making arrangements that did not result in Shona leaders losing plum government positions to Ndebele leaders. The solu-tion was costly for the economy in that i t resulted in a pro rata increase in the number of government posts, yet for Mugabe i t seemed to be the only viable way of concluding a unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU. Nine days after the unity compact was signed, the Speaker of the House o f f i c i a l l y declared Mugabe as the Executive President of Zimbabwe 50 "in a quick and festive parliamentary ceremony." ZAPU's formal endorsement of the agreement at i ts seventh party congress in April 1988 also proceeded without complications. At the congress, Nkomo urged his followers "not to look at who has gained and who has not gained," but 51 instead to take pride in a newly unified nation. "Our vital role is to form the broadest national mobilization to defend Zimbabwe and to 52 strengthen our common resolve to bring an end to apartheid." Although the members of Zimbabwe's oldest nationalist party were meeting for the - 32 -last time, "the convention of more than 5000 ZAPU faithful was festive and high-spir i ted, as party members celebrated their return to active 53 participation in the pol i t ica l l i f e of Zimbabwe." In the months that followed, the leaders of the amalgamated parties worked together to promote the unity compact and encouraged vi l lagers in Matabeleland to 5 divorce themselves from Super-ZAPU and al l forms of dissident act iv i ty . Absent for years from newspaper and television reports, the massive figure of Joshua Nkomo was featured making impassioned appeals for his followers to support the Harare government and to end a l l cooperation with the dissident rebels. At his side were top ZANU ministers, who just a year ear l ier described Nkomo himself as a d i s s i d e n t . " Concerned that the agreement alone was not suff ic ient to resolve the sense of persecution among the Ndebele and end the dissident act iv-i t y , Mugabe supplemented the merger with a six-week amnesty period. On April 20, 1988, Mugabe announced an o f f i c i a l pardon for a l l Ndebele 56 rebels and po l i t ica l offenders who had fought against the government. The i n i t i a l response to the amnesty was slow as po l i t ica l opponents questioned the sincerity of Mugabe's of fer , but by the time the amnesty period ran out, 114 guerri l las had la id down their arms and reported 57 themselves in to government check-points. The most renowned rebels to take advantage of the government amnesty were John Lantern Mikhwanazi and Tenson Ndlovu, the suspects who led the brutal 1987 missionary k i l l i n g s . ^ Mugabe honoured his commitment of amnesty and allowed Ndebele rebels to return with dignity. When Mikhwanazi turned himself i n , Mugabe permitted local Ndebele papers to print his comments on the resistance movement: "We were not defeated in batt le , we are the l iber -ators of the people. Our actions came out of serious crimes committed by the government, i t is not just us who must be forgiven by the - 33 -amnesty . . . long l ive unity in Zimbabwe, long l i f e and peace to a l l . " 5 9 For Robert Mugabe, the unity compact was a great pol i t ica l victory. As Zimbabwe's new Executive President, Mugabe now holds more constitu-tional power than ever before, with authority over the state, government and party. Moreover, Mugabe has accomplished his goal of strengthening the security of his regime. By reaching a rapprochement with the ZAPU leadership, Mugabe has managed to pre-empt the possib i l i ty of the conf l ic t in Matabeleland from generating into a fu l l scale c i v i l war with South African intervention. The document has also paved the way for regional s tab i l i t y . The appointment of Ndebele leaders into the cabinet and the extension of a general amnesty to rebels, has signalled to the Ndebele that the government is committed to reconci l iat ion, and has brought about a new atmosphere of peace and s tab i l i t y . The threat of dissident violence in the Matabeleland countryside has subsided . . . Throughout the country, and especially in Matabeleland, Zimbabweans have voiced optimistic views and praise for Mugabe's po l i t ica l s k i l l s that have not been heard since the euphoria of the early days of independence in 1980 and 1981. 6 0 - 34 -NOTES: Chapter 1 *John Day, "Continuity and Change in the African Parties of Zimbabwe During the Struggle For Majority Rule," in Peter Lyon and James Manor, eds . , Transfer and Transformation: Pol i t ica l Institutions  in the New Commonwealth (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), pp. 170-71. 2 John Day, "The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Pol i t ics of Zimbabwe," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Pol i t ics 18, 1 (March 1980), pp. 88-90. 3 The term "ethnicity" as used in this paper refers to what Glazer and Moynihan defined as "all groups of a society characterized by a dist inct sense of difference owing to culture and descent." Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cam-bridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 4. The term "tribalism" is essential ly the expression of ethnicity in a form speci f ic to Af r ica . 4 P. S. Garlake, "Prehistory and Ideology in Zimbabwe," in J.D.Y. Peel and T. 0. Ranger, eds . , Past and Present in Zimbabwe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), pp. 16-19. 5 David Martin and Phyll is Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), pp. 70-71. Andre Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way? (London: Zed Press, 1983), p. 80. ^Day, "Continuity and Change," p. 178. See also: Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Pol i t ic izat ion Through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Pol i t ics 19, 1 (1981), pp. 71-75. Day, "Continuity and Change," p. 178. g L. H. Gann, "Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe" in Peter Duigan and Robert H. Jackson, eds . , Pol i t ics and Government in African States  1960-1985 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 207. ^Je f fe ry Davidow, A Peace in Southern Af r ica : The Lancaster House  Conference on Rhodesia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 93. U Gregory , "Zimbabwe 1980," p. 89. 1 2Keesings Contemporary Archives 26 (July 25, 1980), p. 30365. 13 The Constitution of Zimbabwe, ch. V, sec. 52 in Albert P. Blaustein and Gilbert Flang, eds . , Constitutions of the Countries of  the World (New York: Oceana Pub., 1987). Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 194. - 35 -15 Jeffery Davidow, A Peace in Southern A f r i ca , p. 94. 16 Interview with Robert Mugabe by Margaret Noviki. Afr ica Report 27, 5 (September-October 1982), p. 5. ^Zimbabwe's economy was expected to grow in 1980 when the inter-national economic sanctions were removed, but many economists were sur-prised by the magnitude and duration of the economic growth period in Zimbabwe. See: Roger Riddel! , "Zimbabwe: The Economy Four Years After Independence," African Affairs 83, 333 (October 1984), p. 463. 1 8 I b i d . 19 Ronald Weitzer, "In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe Since Independence," Journal of Modern African Studies 22, 4 (1984), p. 542. 2 0 I b i d . 21 The Guardian (London), February 8, 1982, p. 6. 22 Richard Hul l , "Zimbabwe's Elusive Quest for Unity," Current  History 87, 529 (May 1988), p. 197. 2 3 The Times (London), July 8, 1980, p. 8. ?4 Hu l l , "Zimbabwe's Elusive Quest For Unity," p. 209. 2 5 I b i d . 26 Richard Hul l , "Overcoming Zimbabwe's Vulnerabi l i t ies," Current  History 87, 529 (May 1988), p. 198. 2 7 Keesing's Record of World Events 34 (January 1988), p. 35627. po Africa Research Bullet in 24, 12 (January 15, 1988), p. 8710. 29 Andrew Meldrum, "United We Stand," Afr ica Report 33, 2 (March-April 1988), p. 68. "Afr ica Research Bullet in 24, 11 (December 15, 1987), p. 8680. Hanekon, who obtained the documents from a sympathetic corporal in the SADF, served a prison term for attempting to publish the material in South Af r ica . She was released after four years when her lawyers made a deal with the South African government that Hanekon would leave the country and not publicize the issue. Following her release, Hanekon moved to Zimbabwe and published her report. 31 "Bulawayo Tries to Forget the Era of Brutal i ty," The Times (London), June 2 y 1988, p. 9. Amnesty International and the American Lawyers Commission for Human Rights both estimate heavy c i v i l i a n casual-t ies during the battles between government forces and rebel groups. 3 2 A f r i c a Research Bullet in 24, 12 (January 15, 1988), p. 8728. - 36 -33 "One Party, One State," Manchester Guardian Meekly (London), January 3, 1988, p. 6. 34 Hu l l , "Overcoming Zimbabwe's Vulnerabi l i t ies," p. 198. Prior to the abolit ion of the 20 white parliamentary seats, ZANU-PF held 64 seats, PF-ZAPU held 15, CAZ held 20, and ZANU-Sithole held 1. 35 Nkomo in New Cabinet," Manchester Guardian Weekly (London), January 10, 1988, p. 8. 3 6Meldrum, "United We Stand," p. 68. 37 Manchester Guardian Weekly (London), January 3, 1988, p. 6. African Confidential 29, 1 (January 22, 1988), p. 3. 3 9Ibid. 40 "Rumbling of Dissent as Zimbabwe Nears One Party State," The  Times (London), August 12, 1988, p. 7; Afr ica Research Bullet in 25, 1 (February 15, 1988), p. 8751. 4 1 A f r i c a Research Bullet in 24, 12 (January 15, 1988), p. 8727. 42 This included a number of leading ZAPU figures who were detained in prison. Keesinq's Record of World Events 33 (February 1987), p. 34917. 43 Hul l , "Overcoming Zimbabwe's Vulnerabi l i t ies," p. 199. 44 "Harare Leaders Unite," The Guardian (London), December 23, 1987, pp. 1, 26. 45 "Nkomo Takes Up Senior Cabinet Post," The Times (London), January 4, 1988, p. 6; Afr ica Research Bullet in 25, 1 (February 15, 1988), p. 8751. 46 As a point of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , the Ndebele members of the Cabinet are Mangwende, Ndolvu, (John) Nkomo, Msika, Nkala and Joshua Nkomo--Kwindini is from ZAPU but he is from the Venda Tribe. Surnames are generally accepted as good indicators of tr ibal membership. 47 Manchester Guardian Weekly (London), January 10, 1988, p. 8. 48 Keesinq's Record of World Events 34 (January 1988), p. 35627; see also: "Dancing MP's Hail President Mugabe," The Guardian (London), December 31, 1987, p. 7. 49 Taken from Africa Research Bullet in 25, 1 (February 15, 1988), p. 8751. 50 The Guardian (London), December 31, 1987, p. 7. - 37 -51 "Opposition Party Backs Deal With Mugabe," Financial Times (London), April 5, 1988, p. 6; see also: Meldrum, "United We Stand," p. 67. CO "Zimbabwe On Brink of One-Party Rule," The Guardian (London), April 5, 1988, p. 8. 5 3 I b i d . c4 Keesing's Record of World Events 34 (January 1980), p. 35626; Afr ica Report 33, 2, p. 69. °°Meldrum, "United We Stand," p. 68. 5 6 The Times (London), April 20, 1988, p. 8. The Times (London), September 2, 1988, p. 28. The deadline for the amnesty was not s t r i c t l y enforced and several rebels did not report i n , preferring to return to their vi l lages on their own. The amnesty also extended to the Ndebele refugees in northern Botswana, but the response in the refugee camps has been surprisingly poor. CO A reporter for the London Times commented on the irony of spotting Ndlovu--the axeman in the missionary ki11ings--sporting a new government-supplied suit in a beerhall near the Bulawayo police station. The Times (London), June 2, 1988, p. 9. 59 "Zimbabwe's Dissidents Unbowed as They Lay Down Arms," The Times (London), June 1, 1988, p. 1. Andrew Meldrum, "The Corruption Controversy," Africa Report 34, 1 (January-February 1989), p. 36. - 38 -CHAPTER 2 MUGABE'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL STABILITY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES The f i r s t pr ior i ty of a government l ike Zimbabwe under the circumstances we find ourselves is order. If we fa i l to maintain order then we have no law to talk about . . . I could go so far as to say i t is possible, especially in a soc ia l is t state, to survive for a time without laws because people wil l be basical ly in equal circumstances. But i t would be impossible to survive without order. Enos Nkala, Minister of Home Af fa i rs , 1983. As noted in Chapter One, Mugabe began his administration by incor-porating Zimbabwe's opposition groups into a ruling coal i t ion . However, the po l i t ica l record of Mugabe's rule indicates that the "government of national reconcil iat ion" was only a temporary pol i t ica l arrangement aimed at generating immediate internal legitimacy and international acceptance at a time when the government was extremely vulnerable. As soon as Mugabe perceived his Shona-based government to be in sol id standing, he discontinued his po l i t ica l al l iance with the Ndebele and sought to for t i fy his regime through the mechanisms of control . Mugabe pursued this strategy of domination until 1987 when the intensity of regional conf l ic t reached unmanageable leve ls , forcing him to seek an alternative po l i t ica l solution based on representation. This chapter attempts to trace Mugabe's approach to regime s tab i l i ty by connecting his pol i t ica l strategies to two theoretical models: control and con-sociationalism. By doing th is , we can explain more accurately why Mugabe decided to change his po l i t ica l strategy in 1987, and take the f i r s t steps towards understanding how the unity compact functions. - 39 -Robert Mugabe and the Mechanisms of Control After the f i r s t three years of independence, Mugabe's government found i t s e l f in an unprecedented position of strength. ZANU held an enormous majority in Parliament and i ts popularity was growing, the economy was reviving, and Mugabe had the recognition and support of the international community. By 1982, there were no po l i t ica l incentives to remain in a partnership with the opposition parties. After a l l , opposi-tion parties represented many problems for the Mugabe regime. Not only did they provide the organizational structure for dissident ac t iv i ty , but their continued existence prevented ZANU from achieving i ts ideo-logical goal of constitutionally establishing a one-party state. Consequently, when the opposition parties appeared to be working against the government and became regarded by ZANU o f f i c i a l s as "subversive organizations," Mugabe--confident that he could effect ively govern the country in the absence of a national consensus—moved to destabilize them through coercion, sabotage, and armed attacks. We can use the general concepts of the control model to interpret Mugabe's po l i t ica l strategy between 1982 and 1987. A control model con-centrates "on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce s tab i l i ty by constraining the po l i t ica l actions and opportunities of another segment or segments."''' A multi-ethnic society whose s tab i l i ty is accounted for by the mechanisms of control , functions on the "efforts of the state to repress, iso la te , or dissipate ethnic demands through pol i t ica l admin-is t ra t ive , or mil i tary coercion." The essential characteristic of a control situation is the ab i l i ty of the superordinate societal group to effect ively govern the state without the consent of other sub-national - 40 -3 groups. The effectiveness and duration of a "non-negotiating" si tua-tion depends on the state's capacity to establish i t s e l f as the dominant authority throughout the regional levels of the country at an acceptable cost, enabling state institutions to wield substantive control over 4 ethno-regional groupings and local level po l i t ica l structures. Or in the words of James S. Coleman, "the pol i t ical -administrat ive- jur idical centre" of the state must establish "an effective and authoritarian 5 central presence throughout i ts geographic and sectoral peripheries." In Zimbabwe, Mugabe adopted a policy of control when he perceived the effects of ethnic pol i t ica l action to be troublesome and destabil -iz ing. Through the use of the state's formal repressive powers—the pol ice, mil i tary and bureaucracy—Mugabe applied o f f i c i a l coercion to dismantle and abolish ethnic-based opposition. Similar to the authori-tarian practices of the Rhodesian regime, the Mugabe government under-mined opposition parties by passing laws which firmly established ZANU as the dominant pol i t ica l organization in the country. Powers not provided to ZANU under various draconian statutes were made available in the form of emergency decrees. For instance, the renewal of the Emergency Powers Act of August 5, 1983 ( f i rs t introduced by the Smith regime in 1965) gave the Fifth Brigade carte blanche to act as they pleased in their war against ZAPU guerri l las and rural Ndebele c i t izens. Ronald Weitzer, in his analysis of Zimbabwean pol i t ics in 1984, comments on the s imi lar i t ies between Mugabe's strategy of control and the system of control used by Smith's UDE regime: In addition to the concern with order and control , the po l i t ics of security in Zimbabwe have been shaped by the regime's interests in centralizing i ts power and unifying the state apparatus to secure ZANU's position of hegemony in the face of countervailing power centres - 41 -both inside and outside the state. Zimbabwe's pecu-l i a r constitutional inheritance and the balance of forces at independence . . . have provided fe r t i l e ground for the growth of these kinds of o f f i c i a l strategies.^ Yet (as Robert Mugabe eventually discovered) the long-term mainten-ance of po l i t ica l s tab i l i ty within a framework of control does not merely involve the continual use or threat of force. Rather, i t depends upon well-developed, capable and committed state structures that can impel . ethnoregional groups to function within a centrally operated polit ico-administrative system. The implementation of a policy of control requires what Max Weber referred to as "imperative control": the probability that a command with a given specif ic content wi l l be Q obeyed by a given group of persons. For example, the Afrikaner-dominated government in South Afr ica rel ies upon a sophisticated and dedicated mi l i tary-pol icy force and a competent, specialized and loyal state bureaucracy to preserve i ts structure of white domination. The ab i l i ty of the state to impose i t s e l f in every region of the country allows the white community to govern South Africa without sharing power with the African majority, and forces anti-government groups to organize their ac t iv i t ies beyond the state's ter r i tor ia l boundaries. In essence, "the monopoly of repressive force in their hands enables governmental authorities to keep the African opposition disorganized, and therefore g relat ively ineffect ive." Mugabe's government lacked imperative control . Mugabe could com-mand the enforcement of order from Harare, but he could not secure the probability that his commands would receive prompt and effective results in the peripheries. The inabi l i ty of the Mugabe regime to apply and establish a successful system of control is part of a larger problem - 42 -that affects almost a l l of independent Af r ica : state marginal i ty ."^ While African leaders have to some extent secured the jur id ical a t t r i -butes of statehood from the international community, they remain vulnerable to the structural weaknesses within their state. Essent ia l ly , the state structures in Africa—which are the tools for a successfully implemented system of control—are weak and unreliable. Insti tut ions, leaders and o f f i c i a l s are so inextricably tied to the influence of social forces (such as tribal membership) that they are incapable of acting and making decisions independently of private interests. Rather than obediently enforcing a speci f ic order, African mil i tary and police forces wil l make a judgment of the power of the government to sanction them in the event they reject a command and act autonomously. The police [in Afr ica] are not a disinterested group carrying out commands that come to them without fa i l or without thought. They wil l attempt to interpret what they are asked to do in the l ight of their professional and ut i l i ta r ian interests and the social re lat ions, , that t ie them as individuals to groups in society. The government's penetration and control of the peripheries can also be obstructed by incompetent and undisciplined African public bureaucra-c ies. As one writer with long experience in post-colonial administra-tion observes: In much of rural Afr ica . . . the bureaucracy i t s e l f has become a caricature, and i ts performance a drama which would be tragicomic of the substance of the issues were not so important. In these sett ings, everyone . . . understands the underlying hopeless-ness of the si tuat ion. Al l but the most routine administrative actions become a charade: ,£ performed only when superiors are expected. Without the capacity of imperative control to force complete com-pliance with o f f i c i a l rules, regulations and decrees, Mugabe's pol i t ica l strategy of domination fai led to keep s tab i l i ty and ensure the security - 43 -of his regime. His policy of control was capable of disassembling opposition parties with weak support bases such as the UANC, but i t was unable to dismantle ZAPU and unlock i ts hold over Matabeleland. By 1987, the recurrent battle against the dissidents in Matabeleland showed no signs of ending and the continuing regional conf l ic t was seriously disrupting the Zimbabwean economy. In addit ion, the govern-ment found i t s e l f forced to deploy more troops along Zimbabwe's western border with Mozambique to respond to the new round of attacks from the 13 South African-backed RENAMO rebels. The growing security threat to his regime convinced Mugabe to search for an alternative po l i t ica l strategy that could solve the Matabele problem while at the same time protect his position in power. This search led Mugabe to reopen unity negotiations with Joshua Nkomo. The Unity Compact and the Move to Pol i t ica l Representation Despite the long-standing r ivalry and mutual distrust between ZANU and ZAPU, the decision to reopen unity talks with Joshua Nkomo seemed to be an unavoidable course of action for Mugabe. The inabi l i ty of his government to penetrate and defeat the dissident element in Matabeleland made his quest for complete po l i t ica l control between 1982 and 1987 frustratingly elusive. It eventually became clear to Mugabe that in order to reduce Zimbabwe's ethnic and pol i t ica l d i v i -sions, a po l i t ica l arrangement would have to be created which signalled to the Ndebele that they were a part of the national government. By invit ing the Ndebele into the ruling e l i t e , Mugabe could restore their sense of dignity and hopefully reverse Ndebele resentment and bi t ter -ness to his rule. - 44 -Mugabe's engineering of the 1987 unity compact indicated a clear change in his pol i t ica l strategy. After a long period of repressive policies designed to for t i fy ZANU hegemony, Mugabe modified his p o l i t i -cal style and in i t ia ted new steps at rebuilding pol i t ica l order with the consent of the country's main ethnoregional opposition party. The unity compact, which marked the entrance and wi l l ing participation of Ndebele leaders in the national government established a new dimension to the way pol i t ics are conducted in Zimbabwe. To adequately interpret the recent changes in Zimbabwean p o l i t i c s , we need to find a more appropri-ate theoretical framework which links the maintenance of s tab i l i ty in societies characterized by deep vertical cleavages to the concepts of representation. Arend Lijphart has made valuable contributions towards the search for alternative theories l inking s tab i l i ty with representation in heterogeneous societ ies: A plural society can be either democratic but unstable or relat ively stable but not or not fu l ly democratic. These are not the only two alternatives, however. In my research on what I have cal led 'consociational' democracies, I have found a third alternative: a cul tural ly divided democracy which is stabi l ized by an agreement among the leaders of the different ^ sub-cultures to join in the government of the country. At f i r s t glance, the notion of "an agreement among the leaders of the different subcultures to join in the government of the country" appears to ref lect the type of po l i t ica l arrangement constructed in Zimbabwe. In order to assess the appl icabi l i ty of consociationalism to the Zim-babwean case, a brief review of the theory is required. The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular insti tut ional arrangement or governmental apparatus - 45 -as patterns of group e l i te behavior. At the core of almost al l con-sociational approaches is an image of a coal i t ion of e l i tes who share an overarching commitment to conf l ic t regulation "and who seek to negotiate among themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually 15 acceptable compromises." It is a model whereby the leaders of socie-tal groups work together to preserve the pol i t ica l system within which their groups compete by negotiating with each other and str iking p o l i -t ica l bargains. "Consociational democracy means government by e l i te cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented po l i t ica l culture into a stable democracy." For Li jphart , the concept of overarching cooperation has four requirements which must be f u l f i l l e d i f consocia-tional democracy is to be successful. The el i tes must f i r s t of a l l be able to recognize and understand the dangers of po l i t ica l fragmentation; secondly, they must have a commitment to the maintenance of the p o l i t i -cal system and the improvement of i ts cohesion and s t a b i l i t y ; th i rd ly , they must have the ab i l i ty to transcend group cleavages and to join in a common effort with e l i tes of rival groups; and f i n a l l y , they must be able to forge solutions that wil l accommodate the interests and demands 17 of a l l groups. According to this approach, the role of leadership is c ruc ia l . Clearly, the s k i l l , goodwill and dedication of the group leaders wi l l determine the outcome of a consociational pattern of e l i te behavior. Li jphart 's concept of a grand coal i t ion of po l i t ica l leaders is complemented by three secondary instruments: mutual veto, segmental 18 autonomy and proportionality. A mutual veto gives each group repre-sented in the grand coal i t ion the power of defeating a decision reached by majority vote that affects i ts vital interests. Segmental autonomy - 46 -allows each group to operate as self-contained blocs, with the power to run i ts own internal a f fa i rs . The principle of proportionality is designed to offset the "winner take a l l " principle of majority rule. In a majoritarian system, public goods can be divided among as small a number of participants as possible, whereas proportionality is a method of guaranteeing the allocation of "c iv i l service appointments and scarce 19 financial resources . . . among the different segments." Proportion-a l i ty is part icularly relevant to African countries where the idea of one ethnic group "winning" the spoils of government and prevailing over 20 another has the effect of intensifying ethnic hos t i l i t y . As June Kronholz explains, "Tribal loyalt ies run deep in Africa . . . the govern-ment owns the land, the crops, the industry . . . and the winner takes 21 i t a l l . There i sn ' t any second place in African p o l i t i c s . " To be in opposition means to be without power, and without power a minority group holds no pol i t ica l guarantees to protect i ts future. The adversarial nature of majoritarian rule has had the effect of intensifying tr ibal r ivalry in Zimbabwe. As one respected Zimbabwean commentator of African pol i t ica l af fa irs points out, the words "opponent" and "enemy" are synonomous in both Shona and Ndebele languages, thus making the concept 22 of an opposition party not only a l ien , but confrontational. The consociational model offers us a partial explanation of how the unity compact functions. One aspect of the new pol i t ica l arrangement is proportionality. Unlike the situation prior to the agreement where the Shona occupied a l l of the positions in the ruling e l i t e , the Ndebele now have representation in the cabinet roughly proportional to their nation-al population. Proportional representation s igni f icant ly reduces Ndebele alienation from the central government. The ZAPU members of - 47 -the cabinet (Joshua Nkomo, Cal l istus Ndolvu, John Nkomo, Joseph Msika and Witness Mangwende) are viewed by the Ndebele as leaders of their community and their presence in the ruling e l i te signals to the Ndebele that their group interests are being represented in the government. Also, the f ive Ndebele leaders join a new cabinet which includes p o l i t i -cal leaders from other signif icant segments of society,such as one white MP (Chris Anderson, Minister of State for the Public Service), one Asian MP (Fay Chung, Minister of Primary and Secondary Education) and one 23 Tonga MP (Felix Muchemwa, Minister of Health), thereby raising the possib i l i ty of the emergence of some form of grand coal i t ion . Unfortun-ately, the lack of available information on the nature of the relat ion-ships between cabinet ministers prevents this study from determining i f a consociational pattern of e l i te behavior exists in Zimbabwe. Yet the ab i l i ty of the cabinet to govern since January 1988 without any public resignations or open displays of conf l ic t between Ndebele and Shona MPs suggests the possib i l i ty of a new willingness among the leaders of the two largest tr ibal groups to compromise. Perhaps Shona and Ndebele leaders are prepared to reach settlements on certain pol i t ica l issues given the l ikelihood that the fai lure to negotiate wil l precipitate more tr ibal violence. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the unity compact provides genuine power sharing. The terms of the agreement delivered ZAPU leaders ministerial appointments, but these positions did not give the Ndebele, as a group, authentic po l i t ica l power, nor did they provide any formal mechanisms for Ndebele MPs to protect the po l i t ica l future of the Ndebele community. But i t was not Mugabe's intent to give the Ndebele po l i t ica l power in the compact. His objectives were to - 48 -strengthen the security of his regime and rebuild po l i t ica l order. To do this required changes in the po l i t ica l system which made the Ndebele feel as though they were partners in the government, yet these changes did not entail giving them po l i t ica l power. Rather, Mugabe's strategy involved offering leading Ndebele pol i t ic ians prestigious (and rather lucrative) positions in the government to gain their support for the party merger and in the process, take the f i r s t steps towards restoring Ndebele pride and dignity. Power in Zimbabwe revolves around ind iv i -duals. At the peak of the power structure is Robert Mugabe, who con-trols every avenue of governmental responsibi l i ty . Next to him are two Shona "super ministers"--Maurice Nyagumbo, who wil l be responsible for "the practical and legal aspects of completing the merger and formaliz-24 ing the one-party state," and Bernard Chidzero, who manages the economy and supervises the industry, trade and commerce, mines and 25 lands, agriculture and rural settlements ministers. For a l l intents and purposes, these three men "run" the country. Joshua Nkomo, who holds the position of Senior Minister in the President's off ice without Port fo l io , has responsibi l i ty for supervising ministries involved in rural development,yet i t is unclear as to exactly how much "power" he p£ has- in the po l i t ica l system. Other individuals such as Joseph Msika, the former Ndebele ZAPU vice-president, and Nathan Shamuyarira, the former Shona ZANU secretary, have been appointed to posts with large budgets but they seem to have only marginal influence in the decision-27 making process. Hence, the real power in Zimbabwe is concentrated into the hands of Mugabe and shared by a few of his loyal po l i t ica l colleagues; power for tr ibal groups is more or less a matter of perception. - 49 -In conclusion, we can identify several key ingredients of a consociational arrangement present in the Zimbabwe unity compact, namely, proportional representation, the acquiescence of followers and, to a certain extent, e l i te agreement. The puzzling aspect of the unity compact is the indication that i t functions without devolving any genuine power to the Ndebele. The absence of authentic power-sharing raises the question of how the unity compact has survived so long. After a l l , the Ndebele and the Shona have been fighting each other in a struggle for power for many years. In order to answer this question and understand more clearly how pol i t ics are conducted in Zimbabwe, we must move beyond the conceptual boundaries of consociationalism and focus directly on the principal features of Mugabe's new one-party state. 50 NOTES: Chapter 2 "4an Lustick, "Stabi l i ty in Deeply Divided Societ ies: Consocia-tionalism versus Control," World Pol i t ics 31, 3 (April 1979), p. 327. 2 Donald Rothchild, "State-Ethnic Relations in Middle Af r ica , " in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds. , African Independence: The First 25  Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 71. 3 Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Confl ict Resolution," World  Pol i t ics 22, 4 (July 1970), p. 607. 4 Joshua B. Forrest, The Quest For State Hardness in A f r i c a , Comparative Pol i t ics 20, 4 (July 1988), p. 427. 5 James S. Coleman, "The Concept of Pol i t ica l Penetration, in L. C l i f f e , J . S. Coleman and M. R. Doornbos, eds. , Government and Rural  Development in East Africa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 3. Coleman's concept of po l i t ica l penetration reflects Max Weber's def in i -tion of an "imperatively coordinated corporate group" where "the enforcement of order. is carried out continually within a given t e r r i -torial area by the application and threat of physical force on the part of the administrative staf f ." See: Max Weber, The Theory of Social  and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 154. ^Ronald Weitzer, "In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe Since Independence," Journal of Modern African Studies 27, 4 (1984), pp. 532-33. 7 I b i d . , p. 540. \ e b e r , Social and Economic Organization, p. 152. g Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Confl ict Resolution," p. 607. ^See : Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The Marginality of African States," in Gwendolyn M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds. , African Independence: The First 25 Years (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-s i ty Press, 1985), pp. 45-70; Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Afr ica 's Weak States Persist ," World Pol i t ics 35, 1 (October 1982), pp. 16-24. ^Otwin Marenin, "Policing African States," Comparative Pol i t ics 14, 4 (July 1982), p. 392. 12 J . Morris, "The Transferabil i ty of the Western Management Tradi-tion into the Public Service Sectors: An East African Perspective," Taamuli 6, 1 (1976), p. 60. Reprinted in : Richard Sandbrook, The  Pol i t ics of Basic Needs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 98. The conf l ic t along Zimbabwe's western border began in June 1987 and by December there had been more than 100 violent incidents between - 51 -RENAMO rebels and Zimbabweans. Afr ica Report 33, 1 (March-April 1988), p. 68. 14 Arend Li jphart , "Review Ar t i c l e : The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and Solutions," Br i t ish Journal of Pol i t ica l Science 5, 1 (January 1975), p. 99. 15 Lustick, "Consociationalism versus Control," p. 328. Arend Li jphart , "Consociational Democracy," World Pol i t ics 21, 1 (1969). Reprinted in Kenneth McRae, e d . , Consociational Democracy: Pol i t ica l Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 71. 1 7 I b i d . , p. 79. 18 Arend Li jphart , Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 36. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 38. 20 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Democracy in Tropical A f r ica , " Journal of International Affairs 22, 197 (1985), p. 297. 21 June Kronholz, "Dashed Dreams: Af r ica 's Pol i t ica l Map," Wall  Street Journal 31 (October 1983), p. 1. 22 Wil l ie Masarurwa, as reported in "One-Party Rule Dominates in Af r ica , " Christian Science Monitor (March 29, 1989), p. 6. 2 3 Keesing's Record of World Events 34 (January 1988), pp. 35626-27. 24 Africa Research Bulletin 25, 1 (February 15, 1988), p. 8751. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 8751. Keesing's Record of World Events 34 (January 1988), p. 35627. 27 Msika is the Minister of Public Construction and National Housing and Shamuyarira is the Minister of Foreign Af fa i rs . - 52 -CHAPTER 3 THE REPRESENTATIVE ONE-PARTY STATE IN ZIMBABWE I am no expert on African pol i t ics but, after serving for many years in different countries of the Middle East, I know something about ineradicable hatred, and I have become adept at assessing pol i t ica l tension. Both appear to be absent in Zimbabwe . . . the r i f t between ZANU and ZAPU [has] at last been healed. S i r Anthony Parsons, former Br i t ish Ambassador to the United Nations, The. Times:.(London), Feburary 20, 1988. The Features of the Representative One-Party State In the interests of po l i t ica l s tab i l i ty and regime security, Robert Mugabe has attempted to reduce tr ibal r ivalry by constructing a p o l i t i -cal compact which reverses the perception among the Ndebele that they are a subordinate group in society. As we noticed in Chapter Two, this compact is based on ethnic representation and reflects some of the key characteristics of a consociational arrangement. In this chapter, we probe deeper into the representative features of Zimbabwe's one-party state and explore the ways in which Mugabe is changing the ruling e l i te and the institutions of the state so as to give the Ndebele a greater sense of representation without granting them genuine pol i t ica l power. As we mentioned in the introduction, the newness of Mugabe's one-party state poses some problems for this study. Because the unity compact is only 15 months old and the patterns of ethnic representation which reduce tr ibal r ivalry are s t i l l emerging, i t is d i f f i c u l t for the out-side observer to obtain a firm grip on the changes taking place within the system. Therefore, to learn more about the features of Zimbabwe's one-party state, this chapter also draws upon the features of other African one-party states which exhibit patterns of tr ibal representation - 53 -similar to those developing in Zimbabwe, but which have been in place for a greater length of time. There are very few one-party states in Africa which can help us acquire more knowledge about Zimbabwe. The practice of changing the pol i t ica l system to make a minority group feel more represented in the government is unusual and rare in African p o l i t i c s . In countries such as Malawi, The Ivory Coast, and Tanzania, there are so many small and loosely structured tr ibal groups that the rulers do not have to compete against one or more powerful ethnoregional actors, and they can govern the state in a patriarchal manner. In Tanzania, for example, boundaries between the numerous tr ibal groups are d i f f i c u l t to determine and most of the 18 mi l l ioninhabi tants speak or understand a single language, Kiswahi l i . * As a resul t , Julius Nyerere was able to portray himself as the father of independent Tanzania and establish his party, the Tankan-ika African National Union (TANU), as a national party. "Nyerere was more of a mass pol i t ic ian than a machine or party po l i t i c ian : for him pol i t ics entailed guiding the people rather than pol i t icking with other 2 leaders." By way of contrast, in countries where there is a large ethnoregional group, such as Zaire, Burundi and the Sudan, the trend is towards tyrannical one-party rule. In the Sudan, for example, Jaafar Nimeiry ruled over the Nuba in southern Sudan through a violent and oppressive mil i tary regime. The two states which bear more resemblance to the Zimbabwean one-party system than any other countries in Africa are Kenya and Zambia. The leaders in both of these states have attempted to overcome the destabil izing effects of ethnic po l i t ica l action by constructing p o l i t i -cal arrangements which give a large ethnoregional minority more - 54 -representation in the central government. Broadly speaking, the p o l i t i -cal systems in Kenya and Zambia can be described as containing the following features: a ruling e l i te personally selected by the ruler composed of individuals from the party in power and leaders of the second largest ethnoregional group; an expansive, decentralized public service staffed by the country's main tr ibal groups; and a semi-competitive electoral system for parliamentary posts. These features— which distinguish the one-party systems in Kenya and Zambia from the paternal one-party systems in countries such as Tanzania and from the despotic one-party systems in countries such as the Sudan—appear to be unfolding in Zimbabwe. While i t is s t i l l possible to identify Zimbabwe as a one-party state presided over by a personal ruler , i t is c r i t i ca l to recognize the representative nature of the cabinet and the state institutions (primarily the bureaucracy and the Parliament) in maintain-ing order and s tab i l i ty within the po l i t ica l system. The Cabinet The f i r s t feature of Mugabe's new pol i t ica l arrangement involves the appointment of Ndebele leaders to positions in the cabinet. In order to see how the ruler can use his power of appointment as a method of reducing tr ibal r iva l ry , i t is worthwhile to br ief ly review the development of ethnic representation in the ruling el i tes of Kenya and Zambia. In Kenya, there are two main tr ibal groups—the Kikuyu and the Luo. The Kikuyu comprise approximately one quarter of the total popula-t ion, whereas the Luo--which are concentrated in an area bordering on Lake Nyanza, Tanzania and Uganda in western Kenya known as Luoland— 3 constitute approximately 14 percent of the population. Following - 55 -independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta formed a government with his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Although Kenyatta was from the dominant Kikuyu t r ibe , he managed to bring the Luo and the other tr ibal groups into the party. For the f i r s t few years of independence, Kenyatta ruled under a "KANU coal i t ion of the most po l i t ic ized segments 4 of Kenya's population." Kenyatta's de facto one-party rule f e l l apart in 1966 when 29 Members of Parliament l e f t KANU to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). The defection was led by the former Vice-President of KANU and Luo leader, Oginga Odinga, and included MPs from Luoland and a group of backbench MPs from scattered d is t r ic ts who were dissat isf ied with Kenyatta's government. In an effort to eliminate the KPU, Kenyatta passed a constitutional amendment requiring a l l defecting MPs to stand for re-elect ion. The outcome of Kenya's " l i t t l e general election" demonstrated a substantial decline in KANU's popularity among 5 the Luo people. Although i t won 20 of the 29 electoral contests, KANU lost a l l of i ts seats in Luoland to the KPU. Following the e lect ion, Kenyatta prevented the KPU from registering i ts branch off ices and pro-hibited Odinga from holding public r a l l i e s . 7 However, his attempts at suppressing the KPU did not s t i f l e Luo host i l i t y . During a 1969 v i s i t to Kisamo, the Luo cap i ta l , Kenyatta was confronted with violent ant i -government demonstrations where seven people were k i l l ed and 75 s e r i -Q ously injured. Tribal conf l ic t reached c r i s i s proportions later in the year when Tom Myboya, a popular Luo Member of Parliament, was assassin-ated by a Kikuyu. This event was followed by rumours about oath-taking among the Kikuyu (oaths to ensure that the Kikuyu would hold on to the presidency of the country), which sparked widespread "ethnic paranoia" g throughout the countryside. - 56 -To prevent further sp l i ts within the country, Kenyatta changed his style of government. In addition to introducing a one-party system, he worked to bring non-Kikuyu leaders into the ruling e l i t e . (Since independence, the positions in Kenyatta's cabinet had been occupied only by Kikuyu.)*^ By allowing more ethnic leaders into senior posi-tions in the party and government, Kenyatta hoped to reconcile ethnic discontent, part icularly among the Luo, and to dispel his image as a tr ibal leader. For the most part, Kenyatta was successful. The informal practice of including well-known ethnoregional leaders in the top ranks of the regime reduced tr ibal host i l i ty and Kenyatta gradually developed a network of personal relationships with various tr ibal leaders. He even managed to bring both Odinga and other prominent KPU leaders back to the KANU f o l d . * * The capacity of an ethnically-balanced ruling e l i te to maintain s tabi l i ty became abundantly clear to Kenyatta's successor, Daniel Arap Moi. Moi, who discontinued Kenyatta's pattern of tr ibal appointment after he came to power in 1978, ran into serious pol-i t i ca l troubles in 1982. Victoria Bri t tain explains the mistakes made by the new President: Within two years President Moi had demonstrated that he intended to control Kenya through his own proteges rather than by the all iances with the acknowledged popular leaders of the various key areas so Oginga Odinga, s t i l l preeminent in Luoland in Western Kenya, was prevented from standing in the 1979 elect ion. Other [Luo leaders] such as Masinde Muliro and Jean Marie Seroney in the Rift Valley and Paul Ngei in Kam-baland were soon acknowledged in Kenya's highly p o l i t i - , ? cized society to be on the outside of the ruling group. Moi's altering of the ethnic balance in government heightened pol i t ica l tensions which culminated in an attempted coup in August 1982. Although Moi's position is not as sol id as his predecessor's, he "is a man of - 57 -enormous pol i t ica l experience . . . , a master of backroom coal i t ion-building and has an engineer's understanding of the country's po l i t ica l 13 machine." There is evidence to suggest Moi is trying to rebuild Ken-yatta's structure of ethnic representation in the ruling e l i te through a serious of cabinet reshuffles and po l i t ica l appointments involving Luo leaders. Notable Luo members in the present cabinet include Robert Ouko (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation), P. H. Okondo (Minister of Labour), D. Mboya (Minister of Regional Development and Zachary Onyonka (Minister of Planning and National Development), and the KANU party chief in Luoland, 01oo Aringo, is also a L u o . 1 4 The po l i t ics of ethnicity displayed in Kenya is also evident in Zambia. Since Zambia became independent of Br i t ish rule in 1964, there has been a b i t ter po l i t ica l feud between the Bemba, which comprise s l ight ly more than one-third of the national population, and the Loz i , which are concentrated in a region in the south west corner of the country known as Barotseland and make up approximately 15 percent of the 15 population. Kenneth Kaunda, the articulate and charismatic leader of Zambia, tr ied to ameliorate tr ibal r ivalry by presenting his party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), as a pan-tribal nationalist 16 movement. However, the UNIP quickly became dominated by Bemba p o l i t i -cians and less dominant t r ibes, notably the Loz i , fe l t that Kaunda only represented Bemba i n t e r e s t s . 1 7 During the country's f i r s t general elec-tion in 1968, Lozi leaders pulled their support away from the UNIP and formed their own United Party (UP). The outcome of the election mir-rored the results of Kenya's " l i t t l e general e lect ion." The UNIP won 18 the most seats but the UP held a convincing majority in Barotseland. - 58 -Following the e lect ion, Kaunda remodeled the UNIP to change i ts image as a Bemba-based party. He dissolved the Central Committee of the UNIP, which was dominated by Bemba po l i t i c ians , and effect ively removed the 19 Bemba from direct policy-making. However, Simon Kapwepwe complained that the Bemba were being sidelined in the organization that they helped to form. After i t became clear that Kaunda was not going to concede to Bemba demands, the Bemba leaders broke away from the UNIP and created their own po l i t ica l party, the United Progressive Party (UPP). The formation of the UPP attracted Bemba from the UNIP and presented Kaunda with his most d i f f i c u l t po l i t ica l challenge since independence. He knew that i f he lost a majority of the Bemba to the UPP, he could not win the next e lect ion. Kaunda reacted by ordering the arrest of the entire UPP leadership and banning the party altogether. The early 1970s was a d i f f i c u l t period for Kaunda. Both the UP and the UPP represented tr ibal factions that had s p l i t away from the UNIP. Indeed, "far from being the main agent for unity, UNIP i t s e l f was becom-20 ing a threat to the pol i t ica l s tab i l i ty of Zambia." As violent ant i -government demonstrations continued in Barotseland and the Copperbelt Bemba region, Kaunda made the decision to introduce a one-party system. The f i r s t few years of one-party rule were unsteady. The results of the 1973 general election "revealed profound weaknesses and divisions in 21 [the] UNIP and cal led into question i ts organizational capacity." Yet the UNIP's capacity to contain ethnic host i l i ty has improved over the last ten years. Voter turnout has substantially increased since 1978 22 and tr ibal tensions have dramatically declined. The most noticeable trend in conf l ic t reduction has been Kaunda's effort to bring ethnic-based factions into the ruling e l i t e . Simon Kapwepwe was reconciled - 59 -and appointed to the Office of Vice-President and Nalumino Mundia, the former Lozi UP leader, is the present Prime Minister. Not only has Kaunda made the conscious effort to f i l l s ignif icant (and highly visible) positions in the government with opposition leaders, but he has also developed the practice of replacing these key positions with men of the same tr ibal group. For example, when Simon Kapwepwe died in 1980, 23 the new Bemba "strongman," Frederick Chiluba, succeeded him. In Zimbabwe, the unity compact brought Joshua Nkomo and the ZAPU leadership into the upper echelons of the government and there now exists a greater balance between the Shona and the Ndebele. Given the Bemba backlash to Lozi patronage in Zambia, one might question i f the allocation of lucrative positions to the Ndebele wil l result in a nega-tive Shona reaction. While a Shona backlash is possible, i t is impor-tant to keep in mind that the Shona MPs have not lost any positions in the ruling e l i te to the Ndebele through the unity compact. Also, Kaunda (who is not a member of the Bemba tr ibal group) was portrayed by the Bemba as being sympathetic to Lozi interests, whereas Mugabe is unlikely to be labelled as a weak leader in l ight of his five-year mil i tary cam-paign against the Ndebele. Despite the variations in circumstances from one country to another, the emergence of ethnically-balanced ruling el i tes in Kenya and Zambia demonstrate how rulers can allocate patronage as a means of reducing tr ibal r iva l ry . In both Kenya and Zambia, the incorporation of ethnoregional actors into the cabinet signalled to the disaffected tr ibal groups that their interests were being represented in the central government. Although there is no evidence that the tr ibal groups received authentic pol i t ica l power from the appointments, the symbolic recognition that their community had previously been treated - 60 -unfairly was the necessary f i r s t step towards reducing tr ibal discontent and enhancing regional s tab i l i t y . As we shall see in the next two sec-t ions, cabinet appointments in these states were supplemented by changes in the bureaucracy and the Parliament in order to secure "top-down" contact between the government and ethnoregional minorit ies. The Bureaucracy The underlying function of an ethnically-balanced ruling e l i te is to generate popular support and legitimacy from the government without actually taking away substantive power from the leadership. This logic extends to the staff ing of the government bureaucracy. Positions in the public service are important not only because they carry with them social standing and rank, but also because they provide material goods. Civ i l servants have access to resources which a majority of the popula-tion are unable to obtain. The allocations of these positions to groups and regions is another strategy of mollifying tr ibal r ivalry and streng-thening government loyal ty , without s igni f icant ly weakening executive power. Following independence, African leaders committed themselves to a national policy of Africanization which involved important modifications in the staff ing of the colonial c i v i l service. The demand for Afr icani -zation began as a part of a larger nationalist drive for racial equality As Al i Mazrui noted, "black people are the most aggrieved of a l l races 24 in moral terms." Yet when the pol i t ic izat ion of ethnicity took place, as i t did in Kenya and Zambia, demands for racial equity fe l l to demands for tr ibal equity. It became clear to minority groups that Afr icaniza-tion did not entail universal African recruitment, but rather i t meant - 61 -the recruitment of individuals from a particular t r ibe. In Kenya, the Kikuyu, who held an educational advantage over a l l other groups, bene-f i ted the most from the Africanization programs. Their dominance became so pervasive in the public service that members of other tribes found i t 25 impossible to enjoy a career or mobility in the bureaucracy. In Zambia the trend was similar: Bemba occupied a l l the senior ranks of the c i v i l service and held a firm grip over the bureaucracy. An insightful example of the charge of tr ibal domination in the public service can be discovered in a Lozi-based publication just prior to the introduction of one-party rule in Zambia: There are 73 tribes in Zambia and their interests must be balanced. But look at this arrangement: The President, the Vice-President, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission . . . , Teaching Service Commission Council of Zambia and Judiciary Service Commission belong to one tribe [the Bemba]. These are the people governing the country and a l l other ministries and departments are merely branches of some form or other of the above . . . . It is also estimated that the same tribe has nearly 150 people in the executive and higher positions of of f ice in the Public Service. The Tongas, the Ngonis, and the Lozi next range between 30 and 50 people each in similar positions. Can anybody explain why?*-6 The overwhelming evidence of tr ibal domination in the public service developed into a source of instab i l i ty for both Jomo Kenyatta and Kenneth Kaunda. Kikuyu and Bemba control of the bureaucracy sparked accusations that public policy benefited the largest tribe and neglected or sacr i -27 ficed the needs of other groups. Charges that the allocation of resources, such as the construction of wel ls, schools, railways, and factor ies, disproportionately favored the regions of one t r ibe , led minority tr ibal groups to view the government as partisan and unfair. It eventually became clear to Kenyatta and Kaunda that i f they wanted to secure national unity and s t a b i l i t y , positions in the bureaucracy - 62 -would have to be opened up to key minority groups. This view prompted changes under one-party rule towards a representative bureaucracy. The changes in the c i v i l service under a representative one-party state are gradual: f i r s t , the merit principle for staff ing new posi-tions in the government is exchanged for ethnici ty; then, the c i v i l service is decentralized through regional administration and the state greatly expands i ts role as an employer; and f i n a l l y , the President's Office grows in size and becomes one of the primary sources of pol icy-making in the state. In general, Western governments establish f ixed, objective rules for the select ion, appointment, promotion, and discipl ine of c i v i l ser-vants. This ensures the attraction of qual i f ied individuals and the eff iciency as well as the s tab i l i ty of the government bureaucracy. "Individual merit and public interest should at a l l times prevail and 28 external influence, patronage, and nepotism, should be eliminated." Western conceptions of the merit principle have never fu l ly applied to African bureaucracies. This is largely due to the absence of a sk i l l ed and specialized labour force large enough to f i l l a l l the off ices of government. However, two separate studies of the Kenyan and Zambian bureaucracies reveal that the evidence of tr ibal domination did not always carry with i t a charge that unqualified people were f i l l i n g the posit ions; members of the dominant tribe were generally the best trained 29 and educated individuals in the country. As Henry Bienen notes, "while Kikuyu appointments were frequently made to the c i v i l service, there is no evidence that Kikuyus have been vastly over-represented in 30 i t i f their educational advantages are taken into account." Under a representative one-party state, the standard of recruitment to the c i v i l - 63 -service shifts from one of individual merit to one of ethnic membership. Therefore, when new openings in the c i v i l service need to be f i l l e d , there is a conscious effort to keep shares of positions open to key minority groups; much in the same way the principle of proportionality 31 operates in consociational democracies. The purpose of a representa-tive bureaucracy is to open up points of contact between the government and disaffected tr ibal groups. For example, by offering positions in the c i v i l service to the Luo, the Nairobi government can build stronger 32 links to communities which feel alienated from the state. Once people in the peripheries have access to goods and services which accompany government employment, i t is hoped that attachments to the central government wil l increase. The results of tr ibal personnel selection have some secondary ef fects . For instance, any vestige of the merit principle in an African state eventually disappears. Hiring practices become local ized as individuals are chosen on tr ibal membership, kinship systems and personal connections, and the c i v i l service i t s e l f grows more parochial and corrupt. The other change in the c i v i l service under representative one-party rule is geographic decentralization. Decentralization is another technique of strengthening the ties between the central government and ethnoregional groups while at the same time enhancing the leader's con-trol over the peripheries. By relocating government off ices in the capital c i ty to provincial towns, the government can open i t s e l f up to regions i t previously ignored. For example, in Zambia, the inabi l i ty of the Lusaka government to penetrate Barotseland meant that Lozi con-cerns were often overlooked. Yet this trend was gradually reversed when Kaunda moved more government off ices to outlying regions to - 64 -33 "ensure recognition of local interests. Geographic decentralization is also a fundamental feature of Kenya's pol i t ica l system. Chiefs, who are the grassroots agents of the provincial administration in Kenya, hold community meetings or barazas--"which are probably the main point of contact between the rural population and the regime, even taking KANU 34 meetings into account." At the baraza, chiefs explain government policies and l is ten to the complaints of their constituency. This exchange not only provides an outlet for regional demands but i t also fac i l i ta tes greater po l i t ica l part ic ipat ion. Geographic decentralization does not necessarily entail a decen-tra l izat ion of power and authority. Essent ia l ly , i t involves the move-ment of bureaucratic posts from the capital ci ty to provincial towns without actually transferring substantive decision-making authority. Low-ranking bureaucratic positions are generally staffed by individuals from the tr ibal group in order to fac i l i ta te cordial contact between the 35 government and the public. In both Kenya and Zambia, provincial administration is under the jur isdict ion of the Office of the President. This gives the ruler direct access to the off ices in the peripheries: he can receive information from f i e ld off ices and direct policy outputs without going through party channels. The subtle separation between the c i v i l service and the party is important because i t turns the adminis-trative apparatus into an arm of the executive and allows the ruler to 3fi "personalize" the bureaucracy." Joel Barkan provides a useful example of the way leaders can maintain their authority over the state through the c i v i l service in his description of government during the Kenyatta years: - 65 -From the Office of the President, he governed by maintaining daily contact with his eight provincial commissioners, and via them forty d i s t r i c t commis-sioners, their s ta f fs , and their subordinates at the d iv is ion , locat ion, and sublocation levels. We can expect the bureaucracy to play a key role in strengthening government loyalty in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has already demonstrated an effort to balance tr ibal representation in the c i v i l service and since the unity compact was signed there has been a dramatic increase in pub-is l i e spending (on schools, roads, railways, etc.) in Matabeleland. The mil itary is also l ike ly to undergo the same tr ibal recruitment patterns as the c i v i l service in order to reduce Ndebele resentment to Zimbabwe's armed forces. In addit ion, more government off ices wil l be moved from Harare to Bulawayo and staffed by Ndebele in an effort to establish the central government's presence in that region of the country. The devel-opment of a representative bureaucracy in Zimbabwe wil l contribute to the maintenance of s t a b i l i t y , but i t could also paralyze the national economy: "the need to accommodate ZAPU could make for an unwieldy 39 [bureaucratic] structure as Mugabe tr ies to buy support with jobs." The Pariiament One might wonder about the need for a Parliament in a pol i t ica l system where executive power and party domination i f so pervasive, but the Parliament is a c r i t i ca l component of the one-party states in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On one leve l , a Parliament gives an impression of insti tut ional presence and provides symbolic formality to the passage of leg is la t ion , thereby heightening a regime's legitimacy—especially in the eyes of the international community. On another leve l , Par l ia -ment serves as an effective bridge between the tr ibal groups and the executive. - 66 -Members of Parliament occupy a special position in the representa-tive one-party state. In addition to their o f f i c i a l role as a leg is -lator , MPs, l ike provincial administrators, provide a point of contact between the government and the people. The relationship between the MP and his constituency is comparable to patterns of patrimonial rule found in pre-industrial European societies and large parts of A s i a . 4 ^ This patron-client relat ionship, characterized by personal contact and mutual exchanges, usually involves the negotiation of economic benefits from the MP (such as patronage, development projects, and personal pay-ments) in return for po l i t ica l support from the people. An i l lust ra t ion of the patrimonial l inks between the MP and his constituency can be found in Gertzel and Szeftel 's discussion of Zambia's f i r s t general election under one-party rule: [E]thnicity was without any doubt exploited by a number of candidates and their followers as a method of organ-izing patronage and manipulating support . . . . Given the nature of patronage and i ts links with the extended family structure, combatants often had a number of strategic options open to them. In seeking pol i t ica l or economic power, individuals tended to f ind ethnic appeals valuable as a rapid and simple way of aggre-gating support and preserving patronage networks.41 The signif icant role of the MP as a "broker" of goods is supple-mented by a semi-competitive system of parliamentary elections. In both Kenya and Zambia, regular parliamentary elections are held in which 42 voters choose between contending party candidates. The purpose of this system is two-fold. F i rs t , the frequency of elections forces MPs to keep continuous contact with their constituency and sustain recipro-cal relat ionships, thus sol id i fy ing the links between government and society. And second, the number of candidates prevent MPs from treating the electorate with indifference: i f an MP fa i l s to deliver economic - 67 -benefits to his supporters and ignores their concerns, he can be replaced by another person. For example, Mwai Kibaki, a long-time leading Kikuyu pol i t ic ian in Kenya, "lost his grip on his local const i -43 tuency in the face of the growing discontent of the landless poor." The competitive nature of parliamentary elections allows people from ethnoregional constituencies to get to know the candidates and encour-ages voters to participate in electing their representative in Parliament. Basica l ly , elections can be viewed as a series of "local games" 44 played without interference from the ruler . The candidates wil l occasionally c r i t i c i z e the regime in order to attract votes and portray themselves as the champion of their constituency, although this is uncommon and campaigns tend to be a war of words between candidates. Mild cr i t ic ism of government pol icies (for example, prices and wages policy) is generally permitted provided i t is not direct ly aimed at the 45 leadership. The ruler endorses this semi-open electoral style because i t purges the least popular MPs from the government and replaces them "with new troops who would be more effective in carrying out supportive 46 roles," while at the same time i t deflects responsibi l i ty for policy fai lures away from the executive and places i t on the MP. Hence, the MP becomes a buffer for the regime: ethnoregional discontent is discharged onto the MP and not onto the ruler . It is important to keep in mind that the ruler remains extremely powerful within the framework of a representative one-party state. The parliamentary elections are competitive at the grass roots level but they do not provide an opportunity to choose a new pol i t ica l leader. The President's position in power is protected and i f he decides a - 68 -re-election is necessary, he wil l run unopposed in a party elect ion. Furthermore, the ruler holds the right of appointment, which means he can circulate elected and non-elected e l i tes into (and out of) positions of power. Loyal MPs who emphasize constituency service are rewarded by the leader and usually promoted to cabinet posit ions. "With each step up, one's direct access to state resources increases as well as one's informal access to both public and private resources at the c e n t r e . " 4 7 Although Mugabe has yet to hold a national election since the conclusion of the unity compact, there is a strong l ikel ihood that next year's parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe wil l be as competitive at the grass roots level as those held in Kenya and Zambia. The bel ief among ethnoregional groups that they can choose a member of their community to represent their interests in Parliament is an integral component of stabi l izat ion in a representative single party framework. If Mugabe actively intervenes in the nomination process and only allows one candi-date to run in each constituency, the Ndebele wil l reject the election results. Therefore, in order to avoid the violent popular rejection of electoral outcomes so str iking in other African countries, such as 48 Nigeria and Sierra Leone, Mugabe wil l be inclined to permit relat ively open local electoral contests. Competitive parliamentary elections in 1990 wil l not mean an influx of MPs into the government openly hostile to Mugabe's rule. On the contrary, not only wil l a l l candidates be required to be a member of ZANU-PF, but Mugabe wil l u t i l i ze his power of appointment to reward loyal MPs and his monopoly of authority to punish outspoken antagonists. - 69 -NOTES: Chapter 3 '''Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The States of East A f r ica , " in Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson, eds . , Pol i t ics and  Government in African States 1960-1985 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 207. 2 I b i d . , p. 206. 3 Numbers for the Kikuyu vary. Some observers add the closely related Bantu-speaking tr ibal groups Luhya and Kamba to the Kikuyu population which elevates the Kikuyu to about 50 percent of the popula-t ion. Harold D. Nelson, e d . , Kenya: A Country Study (Washington: United States Government Printing Of f ice , 1981), pp. 90-96. 4 Joel D. Barkan, "The Electoral Process and Peasant-State Rela-tions in Kenya," in Fred M. Hayward, e d . , Elections in Independent  Afr ica (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 220. 5 David Koff, "Kenya's L i t t l e General Elect ion," Afr ica Report, pp. 57-60. c The KPU received 90 percent of the vote in Luoland. Ib id . , p. 59. 7Suzanne D. Mueller, "Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1966-1969," Journal of Modern African Studies 22, 3 (September 1984), p. 408. g After the demonstrations, Kenyatta responded by banning the KPU and imprisoning Odinga. Donald C. Savage, "Kenyatta and the Development of African. National ism in Kenya," International Journal 25, 3 (Summer 1970), p. 531. 9 I b i d . , p. 529. •^H. Bienen, Kenya: The Pol i t ics of Participation and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 76. 11 Barkan, The Electoral Process in Kenya," p. 225. 12 Victoria Br i t ta in , "Five Months That Took Kenya to the Brink," Manchester Guardian Weekly 127, 6 (April 8, 1987), p. 7. Reprinted in Ib id . , p. 81. 1 3 "Kenya: Moi and the Others," African Confidential 29, 10 (May 13, 1988), p. 2. 1 4 Af r ican Research Bullet in 25, 3 (April 15, 1988), p. 8807 and African Confidential 29, 10 (May 13, 1988), pp. 3-4. 15 Irving Kaplan, e d . , Zambia: A Country Study (Washington: United States Government Printing Off ice, 1977), pp. 78-79. - 70 -16 It is interesting to note that Kaunda was born in Nyasaland (now Malawi) and does not claim membership to either the Bemba nor the Loz i . 1 7 Gerald Caplan, "Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia," Journal of Modern African Studies 6, 3 (October 1968), pp. 343-44. 18 The UP actually ran as the ANC, which was a small Tonga-based party, because the UP was o f f i c i a l l y banned by Kaunda. See: Ian Scott and Robert Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections," Afr ica Report 14, 1 (January 1969), pp. 43-46 and Thomas Rasmussen, "Pol i t ica l Competition and One Party Dominance in Zambia," Journal of Modern African Studies 7, 3 (April 1969), pp. 407-24. 19 "Out of A f r i ca , " Afr ica Report 15, 5 (May 1970), p. 5. 20 Jan Pettman, "Zambia's Second Republic—the Establishment of a One-Party State," Journal of Modern African Studies (June 1974), p. 233., 21 Voter turnout in Barotseland and the Copperbelt was the lowest on record causing one UNIP o f f i c i a l to comment, "The one-party system is destroying the party. We are no longer united and are campaigning t r i -bally against each other." Morris Szef te l , "The Role of the Copperbelt" in Cherry Gertzel , e d . , The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 119, 144. 22 Cherry Gertzel, "Dissent and Authority in the Zambian One-Party State," in Ib id . , p. 79-80. 23 Donald Rothchild, "State-Ethnic Relations," p. 77; see also: African Confidential 29, 10 (May 13, 1988), pp. 6-7. 24 Al i A. Mazrui, On Heroes and Uhru-Worship (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1967), p. 242. 25 Bienen, Kenya, pp. 133-36. See also: Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies 7, 4 (December 1969), pp. 689-711. 26 "Tribalism in Zambia, Who Are Encouraging It?", The Mirror (Lusaka) March 1, 1968, p. 3. Reprinted in Dennis L. Dresang, "Ethnic P o l i t i c s , Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case," American Pol i t ica l Science Review 68, 4 (December 1974), p. 1610. 27 Dresang, "The Zambian Case," p. 1611. 28 Bereket H. Selassie, The Executive in African Governments (London: Heinemann,~i974)~, p. 199. 29 Bienen, Kenya, and Dresang, "The Zambian Case." Bienen, Kenya, p. 134. 31 See: Li jphart , Democracy in Plural Societ ies, pp. 50-51. 32 Peter Blunt, "Bureaucracy and Ethnicity in Kenya: Some Conjec-tures for the Eighties," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 16, 3 (July-August-September 1980), pp. 345-51. 33 It is interesting to note that the Bemba i n i t i a l l y resisted Kaunda's policy of decentralization because they fe l t their influence in the government would decrease. Cherry Gertzel, "Confl ict in the One-Party State," in Gertzel , e d . , Dynaminics, pp. 237-39. 34 Bienen, Kenya, p. 40. 35 Staffing bureaucratic positions which had direct contact with the public with local individuals was f i r s t practiced by colonial authori-ties to reduce African perceptions of control . See: Patr icia Stump, "Local Government in Kenya: Ideology and Pol i t ica l Practice 1875-1974," African Studies Review 29, 4 (December 1986), pp. 17-42. passim. John Spencer, "Kenyatta's Kenya," Afr ica Report 11, 5 (May 1966), p. 6. 37 Barkan, "Electoral Process in Kenya," p. 226. Keesing's Record of World Events 35, 1 (January 1988), p. 35627, and "Zimbabwe: Jobs For Everyone," African Confidential 29, 2 (January 22, 1988), pp. 3-4. 39 Zimbabwe: Jobs For Everyone," p. 4. 40 Dirk Berg-Schlosser, "Modes and Meaning of Pol i t ica l Part icipa-tion in Kenya," Comparative Pol i t ics 14, 4 (July 1982), p. 408. 4 1 Gertze l and Szef te l , "The Role of the Copperbelt," pp. 147-48. 42 Kenya's 1969 general election is an insightful example of elec-toral competition where 700 candidates were produced to contest 158 seats in Parliament. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "The States of East A f r ica , " in Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson, eds. , Pol i t ics  and Government in African States 1960-1985 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 232. 43 "Kenya, Moi and the Others," African Confidential 29, 20 (May 13, 1988), p. 3. 44 Barkan, "Electoral Process in Kenya," p. 238., 45 Gatian F. Lungu, "The Church, Labour, and the Press in Zambia: The Role of Cr i t ica l Observers in a One-Party State," African Affairs 85, 340 (July 1986), pp. 400-403. Barkan, "Electoral Process in Kenya," p. 228. 72 ^ ' Ib id . , p. 231. 48 Fred M. Hayward and Siba N. Grovogui, "Persistence and Chance in Senegalese Electoral Processes" in Hayward, e d . , Elections in Indepen- dent A f r i ca , p. 252. - 73 -CONCLUSION I think some people in Government were surprised at what a popular move unity was. I think there's more to be optimistic about in Zimbabwe now, probably, than any other time. Harare Government O f f i c i a l , 1988 There are s t i l l major hurdles ahead, but I think people down here are just so frustrated with what's been going on in Matabeleland that they real ly are determined to make i t work. Bulawayo Lawyer, 1988. Robert Mugabe has constructed a stable, constitutional one-party regime that entrenches ZANU hegemony and wil l l i ke ly keep him in power until his death or resignation. He has also made pol i t ica l arrange-ments, through the unity compact, to ensure that leaders from key tr ibal groups (namely the Ndebele) are incorporated into the cabinet. These preliminary pol i t ica l changes suggest that Zimbabwe is moving towards a pol i t ica l system similar to the type that exists in Kenya and Zambia: a pol i t ica l system which combines the elements of control with the features of representation. The emergence of one-party states which involve tr ibal representa-tion ref lect a particular practice of post-independence African pol i t ics in multi-ethnic states. As we have seen in the cases of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya, certain African rulers change the composition of the ruling e l i te and the insti tut ions of the state so as to give disaffected tr ibal groups a greater sense of representation in the central govern-ment. The general factor that drives these states in the same direction is the pursuit of po l i t ica l order and s tab i l i t y . In addition to rev-enue generation and economic development, po l i t ica l s tab i l i ty is i n t i -mately associated with a regime's objective of staying in power. The - 74 -logic is that i f the pol i t ica l system can be s tabi l i zed , then the threat of insurgency wil l be reduced. For the Zimbabwean, Zambian and Kenyan regimes, the threat of insurgency comes from discontented tr ibal groups centered in the outlying regions of the country. Therefore, in the interests of preserving the security and s tab i l i ty of their regimes, Robert Mugabe, Kenneth Kaunda and Jomo Kenyatta (and now Daniel Arap Moi) have created informal po l i t ica l arrangements which minimize tr ibal alienation and generate greater popular acceptance of the central gov-ernment. These arrangements primarily involve issues of patronage. Rulers distribute government positions and resources in a manner which raises the prestige and rank of inf luential ethnoregional leaders and groups. While the allocation of patronage as a method of maintaining regime s tab i l i ty does have some pol i t ica l and economic costs, the rulers of these states seem to prefer this type of pol i t ics because the posses-sion of power entails po l i t ica l s k i l l and mastery, rather than po l i t ica l coercion and force. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has temporarily resolved a violent ant i -government struggle in Matabeleland by appointing prominent Ndebele leaders to positions in his cabinet. The move has been successful because the entrance of Ndebele leaders into the ruling e l i te signals to the Ndebele that they are now a part of the national government, thereby restoring Ndebele honour and dignity. Presuming Mugabe wishes to extend the period of s tab i l i ty he has achieved since January 1988, he wi l l be inclined to pursue other pol i t ica l practices pioneered by Kaunda and Kenyatta. These wil l include further steps towards decentralizing an ethnically-balanced bureaucracy, permitting a relat ively open competi-tion in next year's parliamentary elections and steadily increasing - 75 -public expenditure throughout the peripheries (principally in Matabele-land). In the long term, the costs of inf lat ing the government bureau-cracy, financing regional development projects and co-opting communities for pol i t ica l support wil l rest r ic t the growth of the Zimbabwean economy. However, i t is l ike ly that Robert Mugabe wil l continue to move in the direction of representative one-party rule, and view the costs as the price of po l i t ica l s tab i l i ty and personal power in modern Afr i ca. - 76 -BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Ashford, Douglas E. The Elusiveness of Power: The African Single Party  State. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Astrow, Andre. Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way? London: Zed Press, 1983. Bienen, Henry. Kenya: The Pol i t ics of Participation and Control Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Blaustein, Albert P. and Gilbert Flang (eds.). Constitutions of the  Countries of the World. New York: Oceana Publishers, 1987. Busia, K. A. Afr ica in Search of Democracy. New York: Praeger, 1967. 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