THE REPRESENTATIVE ONE-PARTY STATE:
MUGABE'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE

By

ROBERT WILLIAM DAWSON

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1987

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
March 1989
© Robert William Dawson, 1989
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date April 24, 1989
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze Robert Mugabe's move to one-party rule in Zimbabwe and to investigate how the emerging political system functions to maintain ethnoregional stability. This thesis examines Mugabe's political strategies since independence in 1980 and follows the course of events in Zimbabwe which led to the introduction of one-party rule. It also focuses directly on the features of Zimbabwe's one-party state and compares Zimbabwe's political system with other similar single party systems in Africa.

The general argument of this thesis is that Robert Mugabe has managed to strengthen the security of his regime and rebuild political order in Zimbabwe by constructing a political compact which significantly reduces the rivalry between the country's two main tribal groups. The key features of this compact include the appointment of prominent ethnoregional leaders to positions in the cabinet, changes in the ethnic composition of the bureaucracy, and the reinstatement of Parliament as a representative institution. Although there is no evidence that the tribal groups receive authentic political power from the compact, the incorporation of their leaders into the government is successful in restoring tribal dignity and reducing the threat of insurgency. The research is based on available government documents, newspaper articles, African research reports, and articles and books related to the subject.

The information and analysis presented in this thesis contributes to the limited body of academic research on Zimbabwe's one-party state and provides a useful starting point for understanding tribal representation in African one-party regimes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ii
List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
Acknowledgments vi

Introduction 1
Notes 9

Chapter 1: The Road to One-Party Rule 11
The Unity Compact and the Move to One-Party Rule 25
Notes 34

Chapter 2: Mugabe's Search for Political Stability: Conceptual Approaches 38
Robert Mugabe and the Mechanisms of Control 39
The Unity Compact and the Move to Political Representation 43
Notes 50

Chapter 3: The Representative One-Party State in Zimbabwe 52
The Features of the Representative One-Party State 52
The Cabinet 54
The Bureaucracy 60
The Parliament 65
Notes 69

Conclusion 73

Bibliography 76
iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe 13
Table 2: 1980 Election Results 18
Table 3: 1985 Election Results 23
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe 13
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In writing this study I have benefited from the help and advice of many individuals. I would particularly like to thank Robert Jackson, Diane Mauzy and John Wood who stimulated and assisted my research in the field of comparative non-western politics. My appreciation extends to Betty Greig for her efficient and accurate typing of numerous drafts, and to my friends (Tony, Dave, Hugh, Kirsten, et al.) for their encouragement and companionship. Finally, I owe much to the patience of my parents who have supported me throughout my rather lengthy university career.
INTRODUCTION

During the month of December, 1987, two major political events took place in Zimbabwe. On December 22, Robert Mugabe, leader of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), signed an agreement whereby the two parties would merge under the title of ZANU-Patriotic Front. The unity agreement paved the way for an event which fundamentally changed the structure of government in Zimbabwe. On December 31, Parliament passed a bill that replaced the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution with a new constitution which dismantled the British system of parliamentary government. Under the terms of the new constitution, provisions were made for the establishment of an executive presidency, a unicameral parliament and a common voter's role. The basic aim of the constitution was to establish the rules and regulations which prohibit the existence of political organizations other than ZANU, and to lay down the legal framework for de jure one-party rule.

The creation of a single party state in Zimbabwe has been justified by Robert Mugabe on three grounds. First, he contends that one-party rule closely resembles the politics of consensus practiced in traditional African societies. According to this argument, the multi-party system of parliamentary government undermines stability because it is alien to the traditional "psychic structure" and "communal spirit" of Zimbabweans.

[The one-party state] stems from our tradition that we had only one society in any particular geographical area, coming under a single chief. Under the political leadership that was offered . . . our people were given the opportunity in their various areas to assemble, to express their views on fundamental issues before decisions were implemented.
The second argument put forth by Mugabe is the capability of a single party system to unify and strengthen Zimbabwean society. He believes that with "one society" organized and contained under "one political umbrella," Zimbabwe can become more unified:

As a newly independent country, Zimbabwe requires above all national unity, stability and economic development. We believe that the one-party state is the most effective mode of unity to give the necessary conditions for stability and economic development. Inter-party bickering only undermines the ability of the nation to organize the supreme effort required to give the economic necessities of life to all our people.  

The final justification for one-party rule is the argument that the single party state is actually more democratic than the British system of parliamentary government:

[In a one-party state] there would be only one party, but various viewpoints can be entertained—the rightists, the leftists, the center people. They can express their views but at the end of the day, the view of the majority becomes the view of the party and the view of the state. I don't see why that should be said to spell doom for our democracy. In fact, it enhances democracy in my view.  

It is interesting to note that African nationalist leaders articulated the same arguments to justify the move to one-party rule 30 years ago. Charismatic independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Felix Houphouet-Boigney in the Ivory Coast and Ahmed Sekou Toure in Guinea were attracted to the single party structure and justified its establishment on the grounds of tradition, nation-building and democracy. The rationale offered for one-party rule was tied to the dominant themes of the African independence movement. The ability of nationalist leaders to successfully link the one-party state to the broad principles of Pan-Africanism, racial equality, Negritude, socialism and neutralism inspired a large portion of newly independent states to adopt a one-party system.
The rationale for African one-party rule in the early 1960s attracted the attention of many political observers. Thomas Hodgkin, who conducted the first and most intensive review of African political parties, concluded in 1961 that there is a tendency towards one-party rule "where the dominant party is a powerful mass party, ideologically committed to the doctrine that 'democracy' means the control of the state by a party which effectively expresses the popular will." The notion that a single party state could sustain an important measure of democracy stimulated an academic debate over the prospects of effective opposition and participation within the framework of a single party system. Immanuel Wallerstein—who represented the views of many early writers on African politics—argued that "the one-party system in the African context is often a significant step toward the liberal state, not a first step away from it":

Political debate is a commonplace of African life. Opposition to government policies exists, is heard, is even listened to. Policies change; the composition of governments changes. There is an enormous amount of give and take in almost every independent African state.

Other scholars however, such as Martin Kilson, held a more sceptical view of the democratic character of single party systems and questioned their capacity to tolerate genuine opposition: "What are the limits of opposition politics in these situations; that is, what is meant by 'opposition' within a single party when there is no assumption of a right to carry it to its logical conclusion (to organize one's opposition) when one's demands are not satisfied?"

The debate over democracy and one-party rule which dominated the dialogue between political scientists interested in Africa during the
early 1960s was superseded as the number of authoritarian single party systems in Africa continued to rise. By the end of the 1960s, it was clear to most observers that opposition organizations, voluntary associations and ethnic groups within one-party states could not function in the political sphere without being branded as subversive, and it became more and more evident that the democratic character of one-party rule was not the most meaningful measurement for appraising African states. Eventually, academics studying Africa began to search for a link between the growth of one-party rule to the study of political modernization more generally. In his seminal work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington suggested that the disruptive effects of social and economic modernization on politics and political institutions forced developing states to construct party systems which provided political stability.

Writers on politics have spent much time and many words arguing about the relative merits of one-party systems and competitive party systems for modernizing countries. In terms of political development, however, what counts is not the number of parties but rather the strength and adaptability of the party system... In modernizing states one-party systems tend to be more stable than pluralistic party systems.

From this perspective, the one-party state was viewed not as an alternative model of democracy, but rather as a necessary form of government to deal with the exigencies of modernization. Some political observers went so far as to argue that it did not matter if African governments were not democratic, "since democracy was inherent in the characteristics of mass parties and since the policies carried out by some regimes would have eventual democratic consequences." Huntington's arguments that modernizing states with multi-party systems were less
stable and much more prone to military intervention than modernizing states with one party influenced many Africanists to reconsider their views on one-party rule. One-party sceptics such as Kilson and Rivkin began to recognize the lack of available choices open to African leaders to carry through their modernizing policies and gradually accepted the notion of the one-party state as an effective political framework for short-term stability.  

The single party state literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s conceived African one-party rule as a stage in the process towards political modernization. There is an implicit assumption in most of the work of this period that authoritarian one-party rule was a necessary political stage to manage the destabilizing transition from traditional to modern society; thus leading writers such as Wallerstein to conclude, "the one-party structure is an interim system of African states which they are maintaining for the present." However, independent Africa has not evolved over the last twenty years as many modernization theorists had predicted (or hoped). Today, 40 of the 51 African states can be described as having either a civilian or military one-party regime.  

So far, the goal of modernity—frequently measured in terms of the socio-economic levels achieved in western industrialized states—has been virtually unattainable for almost all of Africa. The "political gap" between the traditional, familial, and ethnic authorities of the African political world and the single, secular and national authorities of the "modern" political world has not been significantly narrowed, nor has there been any indications that it will narrow in the near future. As Howard Wiarda observes:
We have learned that in much of the Third World, [the] so-called traditional institutions have, . . ., proved remarkably resilient, persistent, and long-lasting; rather than fading away or being crushed under the impact of change, they have instead proved flexible, accommodative, and adaptive, bending to the currents of modernization without necessarily being replaced by them.19

Moreover, the deplorable authoritarian features of some African one-party states have not provided a political environment of enduring stability. States such as Benin, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zaire have suffered numerous violent military coups and counter-coups. These factors, prima facie, appear to warrant a re-examination of the nature of one-party rule in Africa. Perhaps instead of viewing the African one-party state as an interim stage of political development, it would be a more useful endeavor for political scientists to come to grips with the one-party state, as it exists in and of itself, and focus directly on one-party rule in terms of the way politics are conducted in Africa. "Scholars need now for the first time to begin to take non-Western areas and their oftentimes peculiar institutions seriously, in their own context and traditions rather than from the slanted perspective of the Western social sciences."20 It is exactly this type of approach to one-party rule that this study pursues. Instead of assessing the value of Mugabe's arguments for one-party rule in Zimbabwe (tradition, nation-building and democracy) or examining the one-party state in Zimbabwe from the perspective of political development, this study focuses on the one-party state in Zimbabwe as an indigenous form of government which is designed to address particular political problems which have emerged since independence.21
Mugabe's decision to construct the unity agreement between the Ndebele-based ZAPU party and the Shona-based ZANU party and to transform the structure of government in Zimbabwe from a multi-party system to a one-party system was designed to settle the conflict and violence which has seized Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. Although this decision did not resolve the deep-seated and long-standing enmity between the Shona and the Ndebele, it did bring political order and stability to Zimbabwe and since the signing of the compact, Zimbabwe has enjoyed 15 months of peace. Essentially, the hypothesis of this study is that the recent period of stability in Zimbabwe came about through a political arrangement created by Robert Mugabe which significantly reduced the alienation of the Ndebele from the central government. The objective of this arrangement was not to grant the Ndebele, as a group, genuine political power. Rather, Mugabe's strategy was designed to end the violent dissident movement in Matabeleland by changing the political system in ways which made the Ndebele feel as though they were partners in the government. The first feature of this arrangement involved the appointment of prominent Ndebele leaders to positions in the cabinet, the second feature involved changes in the institutions of the state so as to give the Ndebele community a greater sense of representation in the government. The political arrangement created by Mugabe serves as an impressive example of shrewd political engineering in modern Africa. Not only has Mugabe constructed a one-party framework which balances tribal rivalry and maintains order, but he has also managed to protect his own personal power within the political system and strengthen the security of his regime.
The first chapter of this study will provide the background to the political and ethnic situation in Zimbabwe and examine the ways in which the country's two main rival political organizations managed to reach a unity agreement. The second chapter attempts to explain why Mugabe decided to construct the unity compact and move to a one-party system by analyzing his political strategies since independence through two theoretical models: control and consociationalism. The third chapter focuses directly on the two key features of Mugabe's new political arrangement and attempts to explain how politics are conducted in Zimbabwe's political system. One of the difficulties for political scientists studying current Zimbabwean politics is the newness of Mugabe's one-party state. The unity compact is only 15 months old and the patterns of ethnic representation which reduce tribal rivalry are still emerging. These factors, however, should not prevent observers from investigating the important political changes taking place in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the third chapter looks at the features of two other African one-party states (Kenya and Zambia) which appear to bear more resemblance to the informal practices and procedures conducted in Zimbabwe than any other states in Africa. The aim of this undertaking is not to suggest that the political system emerging in Zimbabwe is the same as those already in place in Kenya and Zambia. Rather, this chapter explores the features of the one-party states in Kenya and Zambia only so far as to advance our knowledge and understanding of how African leaders can balance the ruling elite and change state institutions in a manner which gives disaffected tribal groups a greater sense of representation in the central government.
NOTES: INTRODUCTION


5 Mugabe, "Interview," pp. 7-8.

6 In 1965, one-party systems existed in 19 of the 32 independent states of Africa.


13 Ibid., pp. 420, 422.

Zolberg's introduction to the revised edition of his book where he states his wish to change the title of his book to: Integration and Conflict in a Modernizing Polity: A Study of the Ivory Coast, see p. xi.

15 See Rivkin, Nation-Building in Africa, pp. 226-27.

16 Wallerstein, Africa, p. 166.


18 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 1-35, passim.


20 Ibid., p. 144.

CHAPTER 1

THE ROAD TO ONE-PARTY RULE

ZANU has had to walk a tight rope between ZAPU and the white settler government both of which, though for different reasons, have been determined to kill it in the cradle. But we are happy that our party which began as a toothless baby now has teeth. It can bite and bite hard . . . ZANU is destined to liberate this country because it acts from a deep and sacred sense of devotion, dedication and humanity, unlike ZAPU which has thoroughly antagonized the people because of their intimidation and thuggery--the alpha and omega of ZAPU leadership.

ZANU: Presidential address at the ZANU inaugural congress, May 1964.

We still abide by our stand that the Committee of Nine has either to recognize us as the sole liberatory movement in Zimbabwe or have nothing to do with us. We are sick and tired of being told to make a united front with a party that was rejected by the people right on the day it was launched. The people in ZANU, a handful of misguided and power-hungry so-called intellectuals, are the ones who must come back to the people and not us to make a united front with such a discredited group. The Committee of Nine has either to recognize us, the people's party or ZANU, which stinks to the ordinary man and woman, boy and girl in Zimbabwe. There can be no two ways about it.

ZAPU: Statement to the Committee of Nine, June 1964.

Relations Between ZANU and ZAPU Before the Unity Compact

For twenty-five years, the relationship between ZANU and ZAPU has been hostile and antagonistic. The animosity between these two groups began in 1964 when a group of ZAPU executive deputies challenged Joshua Nkomo's leadership and broke away from ZAPU--which was then the largest African nationalist party in Zimbabwe--to form ZANU. On the surface, the split was political. Robert Mugabe, one of the men who created ZANU, argued that Nkomo lacked the leadership qualities to lead Zimbabwe
against colonial rule and questioned ZAPU's commitment to the principles of socialism. As the progress towards majority rule began to fade and the settler government of Southern Rhodesia grew stronger, Mugabe and his allies established ZANU to inject new energy into the nationalist movement. Yet ZANU's success was marginal. The ideology and aims of the two nationalist leaders were indistinguishable and, in spite of Mugabe's criticism of Nkomo's strategy, "ZANU in practice did not immediately devise any radically new or more successful methods of applying pressure on the government." To a great extent the division of the nationalist movement was related to ethnicity. Like most black African states, the boundaries of Zimbabwe correspond to no pre-colonial reality and there are a multitude of different tribal groups that make up the country's African population. Most of Zimbabwe's tribal groups can be divided into two distinct ethno-linguistic categories. First, there is the dominant Shona-speaking peoples—which include the Karanga, Zezwa, Manyika, Korekore, Rozi, and Ndau—and second there is Ndebele (or Sindebele)-speaking peoples—which include the Ndebele and Kalanga. (The proportional strength of these two ethno-linguistic groups in relation to the total African population and to each other is shown in Table 1.) Relations between these two groups have been antagonistic for centuries. Long before the British colonized south-central Africa, the Ndebele settled the territory now known as Zimbabwe. The Ndebele—which were a martial faction of the Zulu kingdom—conquered surrounding tribes and established their dominance in the region. One of the many tribal groups to come under the command of the Ndebele were the Shona, which had prospered as an agrarian kingdom for several hundred years before the arrival of the Ndebele.
Figure 1. Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe

![Map of Zimbabwe showing distribution of ethnic groups]

TABLE 1. Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Shona-oriented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanga</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zezuru</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manyika</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korekore</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rozwi</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndau</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Shona</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Ndebele-oriented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndebele</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalanga</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ndebele</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sena</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

supremacy in the region continued until the early 1890s when Mashonaland and Matabeleland became part of the British protectorate known as Southern Rhodesia.

When ZAPU divided in 1963, it was the well-established Shona leaders who left to form ZANU. Mugabe centered his party's operations in Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland where the majority of Shona-speaking peoples reside, while ZAPU continued to concentrate its activity in Matabeleland (See Figure 1). Although Nkomo retained broad popular support for several years after the split based on his image as the original anticolonialist, the ideological similarities between ZANU and ZAPU led many Africans—especially youths—to make their choice for party allegiance based on ethnic membership. The result was the development of two rival nationalist movements divided along tribal and regional lines: Shona-speaking groups aligning with ZANU in the north-eastern portion of the country and Ndebele-speaking groups in the south-western corner backing the Ndebele leadership of ZAPU.5

The bifurcation of Zimbabwe along ethnogeographical lines was heightened during the 15-year liberation struggle against Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Both parties competed for the control of the independent state, launching guerrilla activities from within their separate regiona. As Andrew Astrow explains, the regionally-based guerrilla war had the effect of strengthening the attachments between the tribal groups and their local political parties:

ZANU . . . won the support of the Shona-speaking people, not simply because its Executive was largely dominated by Shona but also for practical, geographic reasons. ZANU was operating from the north-east and east, so that inevitably Shona-speaking Africans who wanted to be involved in the armed struggle joined ZANU.6
The guerrillas were, therefore, the ideological and military spearhead of ZANU's "revolution," the rural people in the war zones were integrated into the war that ZANU was waging on their behalf. Through politicization ZANU created an extensive network of military and ideological bases throughout the north-eastern territory of the country. ZAPU did not adopt a policy of politicization as early as ZANU, but by the end of the war "ZAPU had achieved a similarly close relationship with the people in the western areas where its guerrillas operated as ZANU had in its more extensive eastern war zone." Thus any attempt to evaluate the significance of ethnicity in the relations between ZANU and ZAPU must be placed in the context of the liberation struggle. Tribal membership and geography were key factors in establishing the boundaries between the two parties, but the politicization and co-optation of rural Africans during the guerrilla war by soldiers played a major role in winning and maintaining the loyalty of the various ethnic groups.

By the mid-1970s, both ZANU and ZAPU had amassed large, well-trained armies, and the liberation struggle quickly escalated into a bloody civil war. Challenged on every front, the UDI regime agreed upon a plan to transfer power to a moderate black government and in 1978, Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the temporary Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Muzorewa, however, failed to achieve peace or international legitimacy because he appeared to function as a political pawn of the Smith government. Finally, in 1979, a constitutional conference was held at Lancaster House, London, under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, to resolve the continuing conflict in Rhodesia. The conference was attended by a Salisbury delegation, which included Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith, and a Patriotic Front delegation led by
Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. After several months of talks, the conference eventually resulted in an agreement that contained ceasefire provisions to end the conflict, transitional arrangements to guide the country through a period of British interim administration, and a constitution for the independent state of Zimbabwe.

Under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, the country resumed its legal status as a dependent territory and a British interim administration (with the assistance of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force) monitored the ceasefire and provided stable government for a peaceful and brief transition to majority rule. For the first several months, the violence in the countryside continued as ZANU, ZAPU and Rhodesian military troops fought amongst each other for position and territory. Eventually a ceasefire was negotiated, and in 1980 the groundwork was laid for Zimbabwe's first national independent elections.

The four representatives at Lancaster House were the main contestants in the 1980 general elections. Confident in his party's ability to attract Shona votes and emerge with an overall parliamentary majority, Robert Mugabe rejected Joshua Nkomo's proposal of running the Patriotic Front as a unified party. Instead, Mugabe ran separately as the leader of the ZANU-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Nkomo ran as the leader of the Patriotic Front-ZAPU (PF-ZAPU). Abel Muzorewa, the leader of the short-lived Zimbabwean-Rhodesian government, led the "moderate" United African National Council (UANC). Ian Smith, formerly of the Rhodesian Front, ran as the leader of the all-white Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ).

Polling took place on February 14, 1980 for the 20 parliamentary seats on the reserved white voter's roll and on February 17, 1980 for the 80 seats on the common (black voter's) roll. The technical efficiency with which
the elections were organized was impressive. Only two percent of ballot forms were spoilt—a very low figure considering the high level of illiteracy in the country and the electorate's lack of familiarity with the process of voting—and representatives from the 11-nation Commonwealth Observer Group judged the elections to be free and fair.

In the white roll elections, Ian Smith's CAZ defeated the pro-Mugabe Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG), drawing most of its support from middle-income whites whose jobs were threatened by Africanization. In the black roll elections, the competition was primarily confined to ZANU and ZAPU. Muzorewa was able to secure only his riding and two others for his party. The other African parties, such as Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-Sithole) and James Chickerema's Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP), all failed to win a single seat. ZANU and ZAPU were the clear front runners in the 1980 elections because they had established themselves in the minds of the electorate as the champions of the armed struggle and the legitimate successors to the UDI regime. Both parties relied on their existing network of supporters and party organizers to influence voters but they each had difficulty winning votes outside their ethno-regional constituencies. The outcome of the election revealed the extent to which ZANU and ZAPU had organized effective grassroots political structures within their regions of influence. Mugabe's ZANU-PF captured 57 of the 80 African seats, drawing most of its support from the three Mashonaland provinces, Manicaland, and Victoria (now Masvingo), while Nkomo's PF-ZAPU won almost all twenty of its seats from Matabeleland. Table 2 demonstrates the identification of party with language and region in the 1980 independence election.
Table 2

1980 Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Estimate of Speakers</th>
<th>ZANU</th>
<th>ZAPU</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shona (%)</td>
<td>Ndebele (%)</td>
<td>% votes</td>
<td>seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria/Masvingo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to providing the framework for the transitional period and the procedures for the national elections, the Lancaster House Agreement outlined the constitutional arrangement for the independent state of Zimbabwe. In order to ensure that a settlement for majority rule was reached at Lancaster House, the Patriotic Front reluctantly agreed to two key provisions. One was the provision reserving the twenty seats in the House of Assembly for whites (who comprise under three percent of the population) and the other was the formula for amending the constitution. Section 52 stated that for seven years from the date of independence, entrenched clauses could only be amended with the unanimous approval of Parliament. When the seven-year period expired, a bill to amend the constitution required the votes of not less than 70 percent of the members of the House of Assembly and the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Senate. In the eyes of Mugabe and Nkomo, these provisions were designed to "safeguard" the political power of the white Zimbabweans. When the Union Jack was lowered on April 18, 1980, and the country was formally granted independence from Great Britain, Robert Mugabe held the executive monopoly over state power. If he wished, Mugabe could have ignored the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Lancaster House Agreement because there were no substantive mechanisms binding Mugabe to the terms of the Agreement. But, in fact, this did not happen and the Lancaster House document remained largely intact until December 1987.

Following independence, the Mugabe government sought to demonstrate adherence to the Lancaster House Constitution not only to rebuild order and certainty into the country, but also "as a means of maintaining support of the economically critical domestic white community and of those
Western governments and international agencies that have supplied high
levels of financial assistance. And in an attempt to reduce the political
divisions created during the years of warfare, Mugabe invited whites, such as David Smith from the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, into his cabinet as well as several ZAPU MPs. Joshua Nkomo became the Minister of Home Affairs and Canaan Banana, a Ndebele, was appointed state President. "We have been preaching from the mountain a sermon on national reconciliation," stated Mugabe in an interview in 1982, "and we went about it by establishing a government of national unity, by inviting ZAPU to join in government and also appointing two or so whites in government so as to make the population see that we no longer were living in the past. We no longer were at war with each other."

In the first three years of independence, Mugabe's administration of the country was quite effective. His adherence to the Lancaster House Constitution reassured white settlers and international investors of the government's commitment to the maintenance of order, and his overtures to Nkomo to join the Cabinet temporarily eased tensions between ZANU and ZAPU. This environment of stability translated into a tremendous expansion in Zimbabwe's economy. During the period from 1980 to 1982, the Zambabwean economy grew in real terms by 21 percent, the greatest growth margin in Southern Africa. Even South Africa's economy, which is the strongest on the continent, achieved a real growth rate of only nine percent during the same period.

However, by 1982 the post-independence mood of optimism began to deteriorate. Mugabe moved away from his policy of reconciliation and ZANU's relations with opposition groups took on a decidedly hostile character. Members of the United African National Council and the
Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe were detained and harassed for unproven "subversive activity." The Mugabe government accused both parties of having links to South Africa. In 1982, arms caches were discovered on several farms owned by Nitram, a ZAPU company. Mugabe reacted bitterly to this discovery, accusing ZAPU of plotting a military coup: "They joined us to string along while planning for an eventual takeover of the government." The regime's special North Korean trained police force, the Fifth Brigade, began a series of periodic raids in Matabeleland on the offices, businesses and homes of ZAPU loyalists, searching for more evidence connecting the party to anti-government dissidents. ZAPU officials were arbitrarily detained, party meetings were prohibited and party property was expropriated. As the number of raids increased, the violence in Matabeleland heightened and the Fifth Brigade acquired a reputation for cruelty and corruption. The "government of national unity" officially came to an end when Mugabe supplemented his military campaign against ZAPU with political attacks and dismissed Nkomo and all other ZAPU MPs from the Cabinet.

ZANU's alliance with the opposition was tenuous from the beginning. The ruling party made no secret of its intention of ultimately implementing a one-party state system in Zimbabwe and Mugabe was consistently under pressure by party deputies to smother opposition groups and secure ZANU's position of hegemony. Enos Nkala, ZANU's first Minister of Finance, for example, publicly objected to the idea of incorporating ZAPU into the ruling elite in 1980 and stated that it was his party's task to "crush Joshua Nkomo and forget about him." The possibility that the opposition parties were involved in instigating dissidence provided
Mugabe with an excuse to crack down on their activity and thereby take steps towards the establishment of *de facto* one-party rule.

During the election year of 1985, Mugabe nearly achieved his goal of *de facto* one-party rule. His aggressive policy against organized opposition was successful in accelerating the decline of the UANC and the CAZ. Five members of the UANC were mysteriously assassinated and "scores of other party functionaries simply disappeared during the first six months of 1985." Muzorewa, fearing for his own life, withdrew from politics altogether and went into voluntary exile overseas. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, many white MPs abandoned the CAZ and went into retirement or joined ZANU. The gradual dissolution of the all-white political party allowed Mugabe to abolish constitutionally the 20 parliamentary seats reserved for whites. (On September 21, 1987, Zimbabwe's House of Assembly passed a bill that formally eliminated the provisions for white representation in the constitution by 78 votes to none, with 10 white MPs abstaining and eight supporting the bill.)

In the national elections, ZANU increased its overall percentage of the vote and won every seat in the country outside Matabeleland. (See Table 3.) ZANU's overwhelming majority broadened Mugabe's power base and made his grip on the government seem almost impregnable.

The geographical pattern of support for ZANU and ZAPU in the 1985 general election served to confirm the identification of party with language and region. Despite the efforts of the Harare government to discredit the ZAPU leadership and mobilize popular support for ZANU, the Ndebele remained solidly united behind Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU. ZAPU's foothold in Matabeleland soon became a serious problem for Mugabe. Following the 1985 national elections, the instability within
### TABLE 3

**1985 ELECTION RESULTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ZANU-Sithole 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria/Masingo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Matabeleland intensified as large numbers of ex-ZAPU guerrillas deserted the Zimbabwe National Army and returned to the bush. The ZAPU rebels spread their violence throughout Matabeleland, using the same guerrilla strategy of warfare as they had during the UDI liberation struggle. Teams of armed Ndebele roamed the countryside, attacking villages and destroying property. One of the most violent and barbarous guerrilla attacks occurred in December 1987 when 16 people were slaughtered at a mission near Bulawayo, the provincial capital of Matabeleland. Adding to Mugabe's worries was the evidence of South African involvement with the anti-government movement. The pro-dissident Radio Truth was broadcasted from South Africa and rebel ammunition was traced back to arms dealers in Johannesburg. In May 1986, South African commandos exploded a car bomb in Bulawayo and circulated anti-government literature, thus demonstrating Zimbabwe's vulnerability to South African penetration. The level of South African involvement in Matabeleland appeared to be reaching new heights in late 1987 when a South African journalist, Patricia Hanekon, released documents obtained from the South African Defense Forces (SADF) which detailed monthly payments and airlifts of supplies and arms from the South African military to rebel groups in Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

The government responded to the growing dissidence by intensifying its military campaign and strong-armed tactics against ZAPU and the Ndebele. The Fifth Brigade stepped up its raids and attacks on Ndebele villages, forcing thousands of homeless communities to seek refuge in Botswana. The government also continued its harassment of ZAPU leaders by restricting their movement within the country and detaining them for extended periods of time without charge. Hence, by the end of
1987, the political divisions between ZANU and ZAPU were as deep as they had ever been. The efforts at reconciliation had failed, and the rivalry and distrust which characterized the relationship between these two parties in 1963 had resurfaced. It is against this background of antagonism and violence that the discussions for a party merger took place.

The Unity Compact and the Move to One-Party Rule

This occasion fills me with emotion. The younger and elder brothers who have been separated by circumstances have now come back together. We can now move into the future hand in hand, knowing that we leave behind us a united country, instead of going to our graves separately, leaving behind us a divided country.


The most curious aspect regarding the ZANU-ZAPU merger is how—given the deep-seated and long-standing animosity between these two political organizations—did Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo ultimately agree upon a unity compact? Part of the answer rests on the fact that both leaders had compelling reasons to reach an agreement. For Nkomo, the arguments for a party merger were persuasive. Under the terms of the Lancaster House Constitution, ZAPU needed a majority in the House of Assembly to form a government. Yet because the two general elections had confirmed ZAPU as a Matabeleland party in terms of parliamentary representation, Nkomo could be assured of achieving not more than 20 percent of the national vote. Therefore, it was unlikely that Nkomo would ever supplant Mugabe in an open and free electoral contest. Nkomo, 70 years old and unwell, was faced with the reality that his channels to political power were limited and his bargaining position declining as each year
passed. Without a cabinet post, he could not affect the policy-making process, and without the ability to challenge the numerous government restrictions placed on ZAPU, his party was as good as banned. Furthermore, Nkomo, who had gone into voluntary exile in Botswana to avoid detainment, was losing control of the resistance movement in Matabeleland. One loosely organized group, which called itself Super-ZAPU, conducted its violent opposition independently of Nkomo's leadership "with South African encouragement." The option to sign a unity agreement offered Nkomo a chance to secure a position in the ruling elite and guarantee Ndebele access to political power.

For Mugabe, the decision to join the unity compact is less clear. It is interesting to note that he did not need the support of ZAPU to push through the 1987 constitutional amendments abolishing the post of Prime Minister and establishing a strong executive presidential form of government. According to the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, constitutional amendments required only a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly after seven years of independence. The 20 white parliamentary seats, eliminated in September, 1987, were filled by ZANU supporters, subsequently giving Mugabe 84 of the 100 seats in Parliament. Yet there was a more important reason for Mugabe to reach an agreement with Nkomo. For the first time since coming to power, Mugabe found himself at the end of 1987 faced with a serious threat to the security of his regime. The connections between the SADF and the dissident elements in Matabeleland appeared to be strengthening and Mugabe was confronted with the possibility of ZAPU developing into a powerful, destabilizing South African-backed guerrilla unit such as the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) or the National Movement for the
Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA). The problem for Mugabe was determining precisely who the enemy was. The lines distinguishing ZAPU from Super-ZAPU were vague and it was unclear as to the exact role of Nkomo's leadership in the anti-government struggle. Moreover, Mugabe began to realize in 1987 the limits of the governmental apparatus in Zimbabwe. Despite his efforts to crush ZAPU and conquer the resistance movement, Mugabe could not establish control over Matabeleland. The formal powers of the state seemed unable to penetrate the peripheries and defeat anti-government activity. After five years of suppression, the government had not broken ZAPU's hold over Matabeleland and the Ndebele still viewed Joshua Nkomo as the "true father of Zimbabwe." In addition, the violence and instability in Matabeleland were becoming too costly for Zimbabwe's fragile economy to bear. Not only was the Mugabe regime forced to direct an enormous proportion of its financial resources to its military presence in Matabeleland, but the conflict itself was crippling the country's infrastructure through the destruction of roads, bridges, factories and railways. The impact of the conflict was also driving international corporations and skilled personnel out of the country. A party merger was an alternative method of solving the "Matabeleland problem." By absorbing ZAPU's identity into ZANU and bringing Nkomo back into the government, Mugabe could peacefully eliminate organized opposition while at the same time, attract more support from the Ndebele rank-and-file. Those ZAPU members who did not endorse the merger could be identified as insurgents, thereby making the war against the rebels easier to conduct. The reasons behind Mugabe's change in political strategy at the end of 1987 will be examined more closely in Chapter Two, but it is sufficient to conclude that Mugabe
perceived the merger as an avenue towards ending the conflict in Matabeleland and securing the domestic security of his regime.

The unity negotiations between Mugabe and Nkomo began in July 1987 and continued on and off for five months. Talks between the two parties had been held before but efforts to combine them had always faltered because ZAPU refused to accept a junior partner position and top ZANU members "did not like the idea of having to share any cabinet and party positions with ZAPU." However, the 1987 unity talks were different from earlier negotiation rounds because the talks in 1987 were held in secrecy. Although there was some speculation that negotiations were taking place, it was difficult for outside observers to be sure as the violence and atrocities in Matabeleland went on, culminating in the December massacre at the mission. During the negotiations, Mugabe made a number of cabinet changes to counterbalance certain "diehard elements" within ZANU who opposed the prospect of a unity compact with ZAPU. Outspoken merger opponents Herbert Ushwokunze and Eddison Zvobgo were shuffled out of the cabinet and replaced with strong merger advocates Maurice Nyagambo, Bernard Chidzero and Emmerson Munangawa. Mugabe's decisions as to who he removed from the cabinet were done with political tact and precision. Ushwokunze was the leader of the Zezuru faction within ZANU, whereas Zvobgo was a figurehead of the rival Karanga faction (see Table 1 on page 13). If Mugabe had dropped one without the other he would have been accused of favoring a particular faction within the party. Mugabe was also careful not to be seen as a weak leader, willing to construct any arrangement which would result in a party merger. Mugabe upgraded the defence portfolio to a full ministry and appointed Enos Nkala, the well-respected former home affairs minister,
to head the post. Nkala was a shrewd appointment because he was Nkomo's arch-enemy and a long-standing proponent of ZANU one-party rule, but he was also a Ndebele. This appointment made Mugabe look firm against Nkomo and ZAPU while at the same time appearing non-tribal.

Joshua Nkomo made similar moves to surround himself with loyal supporters, but his bargaining position during the negotiations was not equal to that of Mugabe's. While he was confident that he represented the interests of a majority of the Ndebele, he was also aware that the military campaign in Matabeleland was heavily weighed on the side of the government forces. ZAPU rebels were effective at destabilizing Matabeleland, but they were no match for the powerful, well-trained and ruthless Fifth Brigade in a conventional war. The dissident movement in Matabeleland had the potential of disrupting political activity for a long period of time, yet it was unlikely that the conflict would ever result in bringing down the government. To this point, Nkomo could not expect to be treated by ZANU negotiators as an equal to Mugabe. Nevertheless, Nkomo was interested in the prospects of a new system of government. During the unity talks, Nkomo made it clear that he would not agree to a unity compact without a steadfast guarantee that key ZAPU officials were also granted cabinet posts. By taking this position, Nkomo was assured the support of his deputies because they too would be included in the ruling elite and enjoy the benefits of a party merger. He did not need to placate the demands of the militant party members who favored the secession of Matabeleland (Super-ZANU) because their "ties to the official ZAPU rank and file were tenuous at best."

On December 22, 1987, Mugabe and Nkomo abruptly convened the domestic and international press to attend the signing of a unity
agreement between ZANU and ZAPU. "The spirit was jovial and festive," wrote Andrew Meldrum of the London *Guardian* who witnessed the event, "as longtime archfoes . . . warmly embraced after signing the document. The normally abstemious Mugabe even sipped a glass of champagne in a celebratory toast." For the ZAPU leadership, the unity compact provided political rewards that previously were unattainable. Joshua Nkomo came away from the agreement as one of four vice-presidents with the title of Senior Minister in the President's Office Without Portfolio. This position gave Nkomo direct access to Robert Mugabe and placed him on a par with Nyagambo, Chidzero, and long-time ZANU commissar, Simon Muzenda. In addition, several top ZAPU deputies were granted cabinet posts and ministerial appointments. David Kwindini became the Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture, Witness Mangwende became the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Callistus Ndolvu became the Minister of Industry and Technology, John Nkomo--no relation to Joshua Nkomo--became the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, and Joseph Msika became the Minister of Public Construction and National Housing. These ZAPU appointments gave the Ndebele six ministers in the new twenty-six member cabinet.

Although there were hopes among many critics that the cabinet changes following the unity compact "would also see Mugabe clearing out any creeping corruption," Mugabe did not eliminate one ZANU position in the merger. Instead of dropping ZANU ministers completely, Mugabe opted to demote them to minor positions (as he did with Ushewokunze and Zuogbe) or reappoint them to new and restructured portfolios. For instance, the Ministry of Education was divided into two full portfolios --Higher Education and Primary and Secondary Education--in order to keep
Mugabe's decision to retain "less-than-satisfactory" members of his old administration in the government reflects, according to local observers:

a wish to avoid exacerbating already worrying factional splits within the majority Shona. Keeping them on the official payroll and under supervision is ... seen as a lesser evil than sending them to their home areas--possibly to build up competing power bases.

Thus, in the end the issue of a party merger reduced itself to a question of patronage. Joshua Nkomo, conscious of the fact that ZAPU could not achieve power as long as Mugabe and the Shona remained in control of the state, looked for an agreement which would give Ndebele the maximum number of positions in government. Robert Mugabe made the deal palatable to the ZANU elite by making arrangements that did not result in Shona leaders losing plum government positions to Ndebele leaders. The solution was costly for the economy in that it resulted in a pro rata increase in the number of government posts, yet for Mugabe it seemed to be the only viable way of concluding a unity agreement between ZANU and ZAPU.

Nine days after the unity compact was signed, the Speaker of the House officially declared Mugabe as the Executive President of Zimbabwe "in a quick and festive parliamentary ceremony." ZAPU's formal endorsement of the agreement at its seventh party congress in April 1988 also proceeded without complications. At the congress, Nkomo urged his followers "not to look at who has gained and who has not gained," but instead to take pride in a newly unified nation. "Our vital role is to form the broadest national mobilization to defend Zimbabwe and to strengthen our common resolve to bring an end to apartheid." Although the members of Zimbabwe's oldest nationalist party were meeting for the
last time, "the convention of more than 5000 ZAPU faithful was festive and high-spirited, as party members celebrated their return to active participation in the political life of Zimbabwe." In the months that followed, the leaders of the amalgamated parties worked together to promote the unity compact and encouraged villagers in Matabeleland to divorce themselves from Super-ZAPU and all forms of dissident activity.

Absent for years from newspaper and television reports, the massive figure of Joshua Nkomo was featured making impassioned appeals for his followers to support the Harare government and to end all cooperation with the dissident rebels. At his side were top ZANU ministers, who just a year earlier described Nkomo himself as a dissident.

Concerned that the agreement alone was not sufficient to resolve the sense of persecution among the Ndebele and end the dissident activity, Mugabe supplemented the merger with a six-week amnesty period. On April 20, 1988, Mugabe announced an official pardon for all Ndebele rebels and political offenders who had fought against the government. The initial response to the amnesty was slow as political opponents questioned the sincerity of Mugabe's offer, but by the time the amnesty period ran out, 114 guerrillas had laid down their arms and reported themselves in to government check-points. The most renowned rebels to take advantage of the government amnesty were John Lantern Mikhwanazi and Tenson Ndlovu, the suspects who led the brutal 1987 missionary killings. Mugabe honoured his commitment of amnesty and allowed Ndebele rebels to return with dignity. When Mikhwanazi turned himself in, Mugabe permitted local Ndebele papers to print his comments on the resistance movement: "We were not defeated in battle, we are the liberators of the people. Our actions came out of serious crimes committed by the government, it is not just us who must be forgiven by the
amnesty . . . long live unity in Zimbabwe, long life and peace to all."

For Robert Mugabe, the unity compact was a great political victory. As Zimbabwe's new Executive President, Mugabe now holds more constitutional power than ever before, with authority over the state, government and party. Moreover, Mugabe has accomplished his goal of strengthening the security of his regime. By reaching a rapprochement with the ZAPU leadership, Mugabe has managed to pre-empt the possibility of the conflict in Matabeleland from generating into a full scale civil war with South African intervention. The document has also paved the way for regional stability. The appointment of Ndebele leaders into the cabinet and the extension of a general amnesty to rebels, has signalled to the Ndebele that the government is committed to reconciliation, and has brought about a new atmosphere of peace and stability.

The threat of dissident violence in the Matabeleland countryside has subsided . . . Throughout the country, and especially in Matabeleland, Zimbabweans have voiced optimistic views and praise for Mugabe's political skills that have not been heard since the euphoria of the early days of independence in 1980 and 1981.
NOTES: Chapter 1


3 The term "ethnicity" as used in this paper refers to what Glazer and Moynihan defined as "all groups of a society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent." Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 4. The term "tribalism" is essentially the expression of ethnicity in a form specific to Africa.


17 Zimbabwe's economy was expected to grow in 1980 when the international economic sanctions were removed, but many economists were surprised by the magnitude and duration of the economic growth period in Zimbabwe. See: Roger Riddell, "Zimbabwe: The Economy Four Years After Independence," *African Affairs* 83, 333 (October 1984), p. 463.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid.


25 Ibid.


30 *Africa Research Bulletin* 24, 11 (December 15, 1987), p. 8680. Hanekon, who obtained the documents from a sympathetic corporal in the SADF, served a prison term for attempting to publish the material in South Africa. She was released after four years when her lawyers made a deal with the South African government that Hanekon would leave the country and not publicize the issue. Following her release, Hanekon moved to Zimbabwe and published her report.


Hull, "Overcoming Zimbabwe's Vulnerabilities," p. 198. Prior to the abolition of the 20 white parliamentary seats, ZANU-PF held 64 seats, PF-ZAPU held 15, CAZ held 20, and ZANU-Sithole held 1.


Meldrum, "United We Stand," p. 68.


Ibid.


This included a number of leading ZAPU figures who were detained in prison. Keesing's Record of World Events 33 (February 1987), p. 34917.


As a point of clarification, the Ndebele members of the Cabinet are Mangwende, Ndolvu, (John) Nkomo, Msika, Nkala and Joshua Nkomo--Kwindini is from ZAPU but he is from the Venda Tribe. Surnames are generally accepted as good indicators of tribal membership.


Ibid.


Meldrum, "United We Stand," p. 68.


*The Times* (London), September 2, 1988, p. 28. The deadline for the amnesty was not strictly enforced and several rebels did not report in, preferring to return to their villages on their own. The amnesty also extended to the Ndebele refugees in northern Botswana, but the response in the refugee camps has been surprisingly poor.


CHAPTER 2
MUGABE'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL STABILITY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES

The first priority of a government like Zimbabwe under the circumstances we find ourselves is order. If we fail to maintain order then we have no law to talk about... I could go so far as to say it is possible, especially in a socialist state, to survive for a time without laws because people will be basically in equal circumstances. But it would be impossible to survive without order.

Enos Nkala, Minister of Home Affairs, 1983.

As noted in Chapter One, Mugabe began his administration by incorporating Zimbabwe's opposition groups into a ruling coalition. However, the political record of Mugabe's rule indicates that the "government of national reconciliation" was only a temporary political arrangement aimed at generating immediate internal legitimacy and international acceptance at a time when the government was extremely vulnerable. As soon as Mugabe perceived his Shona-based government to be in solid standing, he discontinued his political alliance with the Ndebele and sought to fortify his regime through the mechanisms of control. Mugabe pursued this strategy of domination until 1987 when the intensity of regional conflict reached unmanageable levels, forcing him to seek an alternative political solution based on representation. This chapter attempts to trace Mugabe's approach to regime stability by connecting his political strategies to two theoretical models: control and consociationalism. By doing this, we can explain more accurately why Mugabe decided to change his political strategy in 1987, and take the first steps towards understanding how the unity compact functions.
Robert Mugabe and the Mechanisms of Control

After the first three years of independence, Mugabe's government found itself in an unprecedented position of strength. ZANU held an enormous majority in Parliament and its popularity was growing, the economy was reviving, and Mugabe had the recognition and support of the international community. By 1982, there were no political incentives to remain in a partnership with the opposition parties. After all, opposition parties represented many problems for the Mugabe regime. Not only did they provide the organizational structure for dissident activity, but their continued existence prevented ZANU from achieving its ideological goal of constitutionally establishing a one-party state. Consequently, when the opposition parties appeared to be working against the government and became regarded by ZANU officials as "subversive organizations," Mugabe--confident that he could effectively govern the country in the absence of a national consensus--moved to destabilize them through coercion, sabotage, and armed attacks.

We can use the general concepts of the control model to interpret Mugabe's political strategy between 1982 and 1987. A control model concentrates "on the emergence and maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment or segments."¹ A multi-ethnic society whose stability is accounted for by the mechanisms of control, functions on the "efforts of the state to repress, isolate, or dissipate ethnic demands through political administrative, or military coercion."² The essential characteristic of a control situation is the ability of the superordinate societal group to effectively govern the state without the consent of other sub-national
groups. The effectiveness and duration of a "non-negotiating" situation depends on the state's capacity to establish itself as the dominant authority throughout the regional levels of the country at an acceptable cost, enabling state institutions to wield substantive control over ethno-regional groupings and local level political structures.

Or in the words of James S. Coleman, "the political-administrative-juridical centre" of the state must establish "an effective and authoritarian central presence throughout its geographic and sectoral peripheries."

In Zimbabwe, Mugabe adopted a policy of control when he perceived the effects of ethnic political action to be troublesome and destabilizing. Through the use of the state's formal repressive powers—the police, military and bureaucracy—Mugabe applied official coercion to dismantle and abolish ethnic-based opposition. Similar to the authoritarian practices of the Rhodesian regime, the Mugabe government undermined opposition parties by passing laws which firmly established ZANU as the dominant political organization in the country. Powers not provided to ZANU under various draconian statutes were made available in the form of emergency decrees. For instance, the renewal of the Emergency Powers Act of August 5, 1983 (first introduced by the Smith regime in 1965) gave the Fifth Brigade carte blanche to act as they pleased in their war against ZAPU guerrillas and rural Ndebele citizens.

Ronald Weitzer, in his analysis of Zimbabwean politics in 1984, comments on the similarities between Mugabe's strategy of control and the system of control used by Smith's UDE regime:

In addition to the concern with order and control, the politics of security in Zimbabwe have been shaped by the regime's interests in centralizing its power and unifying the state apparatus to secure ZANU's position of hegemony in the face of countervailing power centres.
both inside and outside the state. Zimbabwe's peculiar constitutional inheritance and the balance of forces at independence . . . have provided fertile ground for the growth of these kinds of official strategies.7

Yet (as Robert Mugabe eventually discovered) the long-term maintenance of political stability within a framework of control does not merely involve the continual use or threat of force. Rather, it depends upon well-developed, capable and committed state structures that can impel ethnoregional groups to function within a centrally operated politico-administrative system. The implementation of a policy of control requires what Max Weber referred to as "imperative control": the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.8 For example, the Afrikaner-dominated government in South Africa relies upon a sophisticated and dedicated military-policy force and a competent, specialized and loyal state bureaucracy to preserve its structure of white domination. The ability of the state to impose itself in every region of the country allows the white community to govern South Africa without sharing power with the African majority, and forces anti-government groups to organize their activities beyond the state's territorial boundaries. In essence, "the monopoly of repressive force in their hands enables governmental authorities to keep the African opposition disorganized, and therefore relatively ineffective."9

Mugabe's government lacked imperative control. Mugabe could command the enforcement of order from Harare, but he could not secure the probability that his commands would receive prompt and effective results in the peripheries. The inability of the Mugabe regime to apply and establish a successful system of control is part of a larger problem
that affects almost all of independent Africa: state marginality. While African leaders have to some extent secured the juridical attributes of statehood from the international community, they remain vulnerable to the structural weaknesses within their state. Essentially, the state structures in Africa—which are the tools for a successfully implemented system of control—are weak and unreliable. Institutions, leaders and officials are so inextricably tied to the influence of social forces (such as tribal membership) that they are incapable of acting and making decisions independently of private interests. Rather than obediently enforcing a specific order, African military and police forces will make a judgment of the power of the government to sanction them in the event they reject a command and act autonomously.

The police [in Africa] are not a disinterested group carrying out commands that come to them without fail or without thought. They will attempt to interpret what they are asked to do in the light of their professional and utilitarian interests and the social relations that tie them as individuals to groups in society.

The government's penetration and control of the peripheries can also be obstructed by incompetent and undisciplined African public bureaucracies. As one writer with long experience in post-colonial administration observes:

In much of rural Africa . . . the bureaucracy itself has become a caricature, and its performance a drama which would be tragiomic of the substance of the issues were not so important. In these settings, everyone . . . understands the underlying hopelessness of the situation. All but the most routine administrative actions become a charade: performed only when superiors are expected.

Without the capacity of imperative control to force complete compliance with official rules, regulations and decrees, Mugabe's political strategy of domination failed to keep stability and ensure the security
of his regime. His policy of control was capable of disassembling opposition parties with weak support bases such as the UANC, but it was unable to dismantle ZAPU and unlock its hold over Matabeleland. By 1987, the recurrent battle against the dissidents in Matabeleland showed no signs of ending and the continuing regional conflict was seriously disrupting the Zimbabwean economy. In addition, the government found itself forced to deploy more troops along Zimbabwe's western border with Mozambique to respond to the new round of attacks from the South African-backed RENAMO rebels. The growing security threat to his regime convinced Mugabe to search for an alternative political strategy that could solve the Matabele problem while at the same time protect his position in power. This search led Mugabe to reopen unity negotiations with Joshua Nkomo.

The Unity Compact and the Move to Political Representation

Despite the long-standing rivalry and mutual distrust between ZANU and ZAPU, the decision to reopen unity talks with Joshua Nkomo seemed to be an unavoidable course of action for Mugabe. The inability of his government to penetrate and defeat the dissident element in Matabeleland made his quest for complete political control between 1982 and 1987 frustratingly elusive. It eventually became clear to Mugabe that in order to reduce Zimbabwe's ethnic and political divisions, a political arrangement would have to be created which signalled to the Ndebele that they were a part of the national government. By inviting the Ndebele into the ruling elite, Mugabe could restore their sense of dignity and hopefully reverse Ndebele resentment and bitterness to his rule.
Mugabe's engineering of the 1987 unity compact indicated a clear change in his political strategy. After a long period of repressive policies designed to fortify ZANU hegemony, Mugabe modified his political style and initiated new steps at rebuilding political order with the consent of the country's main ethnoregional opposition party. The unity compact, which marked the entrance and willing participation of Ndebele leaders in the national government established a new dimension to the way politics are conducted in Zimbabwe. To adequately interpret the recent changes in Zimbabwean politics, we need to find a more appropriate theoretical framework which links the maintenance of stability in societies characterized by deep vertical cleavages to the concepts of representation.

Arend Lijphart has made valuable contributions towards the search for alternative theories linking stability with representation in heterogeneous societies:

A plural society can be either democratic but unstable or relatively stable but not or not fully democratic. These are not the only two alternatives, however. In my research on what I have called 'consociational' democracies, I have found a third alternative: a culturally divided democracy which is stabilized by an agreement among the leaders of the different subcultures to join in the government of the country.

At first glance, the notion of "an agreement among the leaders of the different subcultures to join in the government of the country" appears to reflect the type of political arrangement constructed in Zimbabwe. In order to assess the applicability of consociationalism to the Zimbabwean case, a brief review of the theory is required.

The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement or governmental apparatus
as patterns of group elite behavior. At the core of almost all consociational approaches is an image of a coalition of elites who share an overarching commitment to conflict regulation "and who seek to negotiate among themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises." It is a model whereby the leaders of societal groups work together to preserve the political system within which their groups compete by negotiating with each other and striking political bargains. "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." For Lijphart, the concept of overarching cooperation has four requirements which must be fulfilled if consociational democracy is to be successful. The elites must first of all be able to recognize and understand the dangers of political fragmentation; secondly, they must have a commitment to the maintenance of the political system and the improvement of its cohesion and stability; thirdly, they must have the ability to transcend group cleavages and to join in a common effort with elites of rival groups; and finally, they must be able to forge solutions that will accommodate the interests and demands of all groups. According to this approach, the role of leadership is crucial. Clearly, the skill, goodwill and dedication of the group leaders will determine the outcome of a consociational pattern of elite behavior.

Lijphart's concept of a grand coalition of political leaders is complemented by three secondary instruments: mutual veto, segmental autonomy and proportionality. A mutual veto gives each group represented in the grand coalition the power of defeating a decision reached by majority vote that affects its vital interests. Segmental autonomy
allows each group to operate as self-contained blocs, with the power to run its own internal affairs. The principle of proportionality is designed to offset the "winner take all" principle of majority rule. In a majoritarian system, public goods can be divided among as small a number of participants as possible, whereas proportionality is a method of guaranteeing the allocation of "civil service appointments and scarce financial resources . . . among the different segments."\textsuperscript{19} Proportionality is particularly relevant to African countries where the idea of one ethnic group "winning" the spoils of government and prevailing over another has the effect of intensifying ethnic hostility.\textsuperscript{20} As June Kronholz explains, "Tribal loyalties run deep in Africa . . . the government owns the land, the crops, the industry . . . and the winner takes it all. There isn't any second place in African politics."\textsuperscript{21} To be in opposition means to be without power, and without power a minority group holds no political guarantees to protect its future. The adversarial nature of majoritarian rule has had the effect of intensifying tribal rivalry in Zimbabwe. As one respected Zimbabwean commentator of African political affairs points out, the words "opponent" and "enemy" are synonomous in both Shona and Ndebele languages, thus making the concept of an opposition party not only alien, but confrontational.\textsuperscript{22}

The consociational model offers us a partial explanation of how the unity compact functions. One aspect of the new political arrangement is proportionality. Unlike the situation prior to the agreement where the Shona occupied all of the positions in the ruling elite, the Ndebele now have representation in the cabinet roughly proportional to their national population. Proportional representation significantly reduces Ndebele alienation from the central government. The ZAPU members of
the cabinet (Joshua Nkomo, Callistus Ndolvu, John Nkomo, Joseph Msika and Witness Mangwende) are viewed by the Ndebele as leaders of their community and their presence in the ruling elite signals to the Ndebele that their group interests are being represented in the government. Also, the five Ndebele leaders join a new cabinet which includes political leaders from other significant segments of society, such as one white MP (Chris Anderson, Minister of State for the Public Service), one Asian MP (Fay Chung, Minister of Primary and Secondary Education) and one Tonga MP (Felix Muchemwa, Minister of Health), thereby raising the possibility of the emergence of some form of grand coalition. Unfortunately, the lack of available information on the nature of the relationships between cabinet ministers prevents this study from determining if a consociational pattern of elite behavior exists in Zimbabwe. Yet the ability of the cabinet to govern since January 1988 without any public resignations or open displays of conflict between Ndebele and Shona MPs suggests the possibility of a new willingness among the leaders of the two largest tribal groups to compromise. Perhaps Shona and Ndebele leaders are prepared to reach settlements on certain political issues given the likelihood that the failure to negotiate will precipitate more tribal violence.

There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the unity compact provides genuine power sharing. The terms of the agreement delivered ZAPU leaders ministerial appointments, but these positions did not give the Ndebele, as a group, authentic political power, nor did they provide any formal mechanisms for Ndebele MPs to protect the political future of the Ndebele community. But it was not Mugabe's intent to give the Ndebele political power in the compact. His objectives were to
strengthen the security of his regime and rebuild political order. To do this required changes in the political system which made the Ndebele feel as though they were partners in the government, yet these changes did not entail giving them political power. Rather, Mugabe's strategy involved offering leading Ndebele politicians prestigious (and rather lucrative) positions in the government to gain their support for the party merger and in the process, take the first steps towards restoring Ndebele pride and dignity. Power in Zimbabwe revolves around individuals. At the peak of the power structure is Robert Mugabe, who controls every avenue of governmental responsibility. Next to him are two Shona "super ministers"--Maurice Nyagumbo, who will be responsible for "the practical and legal aspects of completing the merger and formalizing the one-party state," and Bernard Chidzero, who manages the economy and supervises the industry, trade and commerce, mines and lands, agriculture and rural settlements ministers. For all intents and purposes, these three men "run" the country. Joshua Nkomo, who holds the position of Senior Minister in the President's office without Portfolio, has responsibility for supervising ministries involved in rural development, yet it is unclear as to exactly how much "power" he has in the political system. Other individuals such as Joseph Msika, the former Ndebele ZAPU vice-president, and Nathan Shamuyarira, the former Shona ZANU secretary, have been appointed to posts with large budgets but they seem to have only marginal influence in the decision-making process. Hence, the real power in Zimbabwe is concentrated into the hands of Mugabe and shared by a few of his loyal political colleagues; power for tribal groups is more or less a matter of perception.
In conclusion, we can identify several key ingredients of a consociational arrangement present in the Zimbabwe unity compact, namely, proportional representation, the acquiescence of followers and, to a certain extent, elite agreement. The puzzling aspect of the unity compact is the indication that it functions without devolving any genuine power to the Ndebele. The absence of authentic power-sharing raises the question of how the unity compact has survived so long. After all, the Ndebele and the Shona have been fighting each other in a struggle for power for many years. In order to answer this question and understand more clearly how politics are conducted in Zimbabwe, we must move beyond the conceptual boundaries of consociationalism and focus directly on the principal features of Mugabe's new one-party state.
NOTES: Chapter 2


7 Ibid., p. 540.


13 The conflict along Zimbabwe's western border began in June 1987 and by December there had been more than 100 violent incidents between


17 Ibid., p. 79.


19 Ibid., p. 38.


25 Ibid., p. 8751.


27 Msika is the Minister of Public Construction and National Housing and Shamuyarira is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
CHAPTER 3

THE REPRESENTATIVE ONE-PARTY STATE IN ZIMBABWE

I am no expert on African politics but, after serving for many years in different countries of the Middle East, I know something about ineradicable hatred, and I have become adept at assessing political tension. Both appear to be absent in Zimbabwe . . . the rift between ZANU and ZAPU [has] at last been healed.


The Features of the Representative One-Party State

In the interests of political stability and regime security, Robert Mugabe has attempted to reduce tribal rivalry by constructing a political compact which reverses the perception among the Ndebele that they are a subordinate group in society. As we noticed in Chapter Two, this compact is based on ethnic representation and reflects some of the key characteristics of a consociational arrangement. In this chapter, we probe deeper into the representative features of Zimbabwe's one-party state and explore the ways in which Mugabe is changing the ruling elite and the institutions of the state so as to give the Ndebele a greater sense of representation without granting them genuine political power. As we mentioned in the introduction, the newness of Mugabe's one-party state poses some problems for this study. Because the unity compact is only 15 months old and the patterns of ethnic representation which reduce tribal rivalry are still emerging, it is difficult for the outside observer to obtain a firm grip on the changes taking place within the system. Therefore, to learn more about the features of Zimbabwe's one-party state, this chapter also draws upon the features of other African one-party states which exhibit patterns of tribal representation.
similar to those developing in Zimbabwe, but which have been in place for a greater length of time.

There are very few one-party states in Africa which can help us acquire more knowledge about Zimbabwe. The practice of changing the political system to make a minority group feel more represented in the government is unusual and rare in African politics. In countries such as Malawi, The Ivory Coast, and Tanzania, there are so many small and loosely structured tribal groups that the rulers do not have to compete against one or more powerful ethnoregional actors, and they can govern the state in a patriarchal manner. In Tanzania, for example, boundaries between the numerous tribal groups are difficult to determine and most of the 18 million inhabitants speak or understand a single language, Kiswahili.\(^1\) As a result, Julius Nyerere was able to portray himself as the father of independent Tanzania and establish his party, the Tanaka-ika African National Union (TANU), as a national party. "Nyerere was more of a mass politician than a machine or party politician: for him politics entailed guiding the people rather than politicking with other leaders."\(^2\) By way of contrast, in countries where there is a large ethnoregional group, such as Zaire, Burundi and the Sudan, the trend is towards tyrannical one-party rule. In the Sudan, for example, Jaafar Nimeiry ruled over the Nuba in southern Sudan through a violent and oppressive military regime.

The two states which bear more resemblance to the Zimbabwean one-party system than any other countries in Africa are Kenya and Zambia. The leaders in both of these states have attempted to overcome the destabilizing effects of ethnic political action by constructing political arrangements which give a large ethnoregional minority more
representation in the central government. Broadly speaking, the political systems in Kenya and Zambia can be described as containing the following features: a ruling elite personally selected by the ruler composed of individuals from the party in power and leaders of the second largest ethnoregional group; an expansive, decentralized public service staffed by the country's main tribal groups; and a semi-competitive electoral system for parliamentary posts. These features—which distinguish the one-party systems in Kenya and Zambia from the paternal one-party systems in countries such as Tanzania and from the despotic one-party systems in countries such as the Sudan—appear to be unfolding in Zimbabwe. While it is still possible to identify Zimbabwe as a one-party state presided over by a personal ruler, it is critical to recognize the representative nature of the cabinet and the state institutions (primarily the bureaucracy and the Parliament) in maintaining order and stability within the political system.

The Cabinet

The first feature of Mugabe's new political arrangement involves the appointment of Ndebele leaders to positions in the cabinet. In order to see how the ruler can use his power of appointment as a method of reducing tribal rivalry, it is worthwhile to briefly review the development of ethnic representation in the ruling elites of Kenya and Zambia. In Kenya, there are two main tribal groups—the Kikuyu and the Luo. The Kikuyu comprise approximately one quarter of the total population, whereas the Luo—which are concentrated in an area bordering on Lake Nyanza, Tanzania and Uganda in western Kenya known as Luoland—constitute approximately 14 percent of the population. Following
independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta formed a government with his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Although Kenyatta was from the dominant Kikuyu tribe, he managed to bring the Luo and the other tribal groups into the party. For the first few years of independence, Kenyatta ruled under a "KANU coalition of the most politicized segments of Kenya's population." Kenyatta's de facto one-party rule fell apart in 1966 when 29 Members of Parliament left KANU to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). The defection was led by the former Vice-President of KANU and Luo leader, Oginga Odinga, and included MPs from Luoland and a group of backbench MPs from scattered districts who were dissatisfied with Kenyatta's government. In an effort to eliminate the KPU, Kenyatta passed a constitutional amendment requiring all defecting MPs to stand for re-election. The outcome of Kenya's "little general election" demonstrated a substantial decline in KANU's popularity among the Luo people. Although it won 20 of the 29 electoral contests, KANU lost all of its seats in Luoland to the KPU. Following the election, Kenyatta prevented the KPU from registering its branch offices and prohibited Odinga from holding public rallies. However, his attempts at suppressing the KPU did not stifle Luo hostility. During a 1969 visit to Kisamo, the Luo capital, Kenyatta was confronted with violent anti-government demonstrations where seven people were killed and 75 seriously injured. Tribal conflict reached crisis proportions later in the year when Tom Myboya, a popular Luo Member of Parliament, was assassinated by a Kikuyu. This event was followed by rumours about oath-taking among the Kikuyu (oaths to ensure that the Kikuyu would hold on to the presidency of the country), which sparked widespread "ethnic paranoia" throughout the countryside.
To prevent further splits within the country, Kenyatta changed his style of government. In addition to introducing a one-party system, he worked to bring non-Kikuyu leaders into the ruling elite. (Since independence, the positions in Kenyatta's cabinet had been occupied only by Kikuyu.) By allowing more ethnic leaders into senior positions in the party and government, Kenyatta hoped to reconcile ethnic discontent, particularly among the Luo, and to dispel his image as a tribal leader. For the most part, Kenyatta was successful. The informal practice of including well-known ethnoregional leaders in the top ranks of the regime reduced tribal hostility and Kenyatta gradually developed a network of personal relationships with various tribal leaders. He even managed to bring both Odinga and other prominent KPU leaders back to the KANU fold. The capacity of an ethnically-balanced ruling elite to maintain stability became abundantly clear to Kenyatta's successor, Daniel Arap Moi. Moi, who discontinued Kenyatta's pattern of tribal appointment after he came to power in 1978, ran into serious political troubles in 1982. Victoria Brittain explains the mistakes made by the new President:

Within two years President Moi had demonstrated that he intended to control Kenya through his own proteges rather than by the alliances with the acknowledged popular leaders of the various key areas so Oginga Odinga, still preeminent in Luoland in Western Kenya, was prevented from standing in the 1979 election. Other [Luo leaders] such as Masinde Muliro and Jean Marie Seroney in the Rift Valley and Paul Ngei in Kambaland were soon acknowledged in Kenya's highly politicized society to be on the outside of the ruling group. Moi's altering of the ethnic balance in government heightened political tensions which culminated in an attempted coup in August 1982. Although Moi's position is not as solid as his predecessor's, he "is a man of
enormous political experience . . . , a master of backroom coalition-building and has an engineer's understanding of the country's political machine.  There is evidence to suggest Moi is trying to rebuild Kenyatta's structure of ethnic representation in the ruling elite through a series of cabinet reshuffles and political appointments involving Luo leaders. Notable Luo members in the present cabinet include Robert Ouko (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation), P. H. Okondo (Minister of Labour), D. Mboya (Minister of Regional Development and Zachary Onyonka (Minister of Planning and National Development), and the KANU party chief in Luoland, Oloot Aringo, is also a Luo.

The politics of ethnicity displayed in Kenya is also evident in Zambia. Since Zambia became independent of British rule in 1964, there has been a bitter political feud between the Bemba, which comprise slightly more than one-third of the national population, and the Lozi, which are concentrated in a region in the south west corner of the country known as Barotseland and make up approximately 15 percent of the population. Kenneth Kaunda, the articulate and charismatic leader of Zambia, tried to ameliorate tribal rivalry by presenting his party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), as a pan-tribal nationalist movement. However, the UNIP quickly became dominated by Bemba politicians and less dominant tribes, notably the Lozi, felt that Kaunda only represented Bemba interests. During the country's first general election in 1968, Lozi leaders pulled their support away from the UNIP and formed their own United Party (UP). The outcome of the election mirrored the results of Kenya's "little general election." The UNIP won the most seats but the UP held a convincing majority in Barotseland.
Following the election, Kaunda remodeled the UNIP to change its image as a Bemba-based party. He dissolved the Central Committee of the UNIP, which was dominated by Bemba politicians, and effectively removed the Bemba from direct policy-making. However, Simon Kapwepwe complained that the Bemba were being sidelined in the organization that they helped to form. After it became clear that Kaunda was not going to concede to Bemba demands, the Bemba leaders broke away from the UNIP and created their own political party, the United Progressive Party (UPP). The formation of the UPP attracted Bemba from the UNIP and presented Kaunda with his most difficult political challenge since independence. He knew that if he lost a majority of the Bemba to the UPP, he could not win the next election. Kaunda reacted by ordering the arrest of the entire UPP leadership and banning the party altogether.

The early 1970s was a difficult period for Kaunda. Both the UP and the UPP represented tribal factions that had split away from the UNIP. Indeed, "far from being the main agent for unity, UNIP itself was becoming a threat to the political stability of Zambia." As violent anti-government demonstrations continued in Barotseland and the Copperbelt Bemba region, Kaunda made the decision to introduce a one-party system. The first few years of one-party rule were unsteady. The results of the 1973 general election "revealed profound weaknesses and divisions in [the] UNIP and called into question its organizational capacity." Yet the UNIP's capacity to contain ethnic hostility has improved over the last ten years. Voter turnout has substantially increased since 1978 and tribal tensions have dramatically declined. The most noticeable trend in conflict reduction has been Kaunda's effort to bring ethnic-based factions into the ruling elite. Simon Kapwepwe was reconciled
and appointed to the Office of Vice-President and Nalumino Mundia, the former Lozi UP leader, is the present Prime Minister. Not only has Kaunda made the conscious effort to fill significant (and highly visible) positions in the government with opposition leaders, but he has also developed the practice of replacing these key positions with men of the same tribal group. For example, when Simon Kapwepwe died in 1980, the new Bemba "strongman," Frederick Chiluba, succeeded him.23

In Zimbabwe, the unity compact brought Joshua Nkomo and the ZAPU leadership into the upper echelons of the government and there now exists a greater balance between the Shona and the Ndebele. Given the Bemba backlash to Lozi patronage in Zambia, one might question if the allocation of lucrative positions to the Ndebele will result in a negative Shona reaction. While a Shona backlash is possible, it is important to keep in mind that the Shona MPs have not lost any positions in the ruling elite to the Ndebele through the unity compact. Also, Kaunda (who is not a member of the Bemba tribal group) was portrayed by the Bemba as being sympathetic to Lozi interests, whereas Mugabe is unlikely to be labelled as a weak leader in light of his five-year military campaign against the Ndebele. Despite the variations in circumstances from one country to another, the emergence of ethnically-balanced ruling elites in Kenya and Zambia demonstrate how rulers can allocate patronage as a means of reducing tribal rivalry. In both Kenya and Zambia, the incorporation of ethnoregional actors into the cabinet signalled to the disaffected tribal groups that their interests were being represented in the central government. Although there is no evidence that the tribal groups received authentic political power from the appointments, the symbolic recognition that their community had previously been treated
unfairly was the necessary first step towards reducing tribal discontent and enhancing regional stability. As we shall see in the next two sections, cabinet appointments in these states were supplemented by changes in the bureaucracy and the Parliament in order to secure "top-down" contact between the government and ethnoregional minorities.

The Bureaucracy

The underlying function of an ethnically-balanced ruling elite is to generate popular support and legitimacy from the government without actually taking away substantive power from the leadership. This logic extends to the staffing of the government bureaucracy. Positions in the public service are important not only because they carry with them social standing and rank, but also because they provide material goods. Civil servants have access to resources which a majority of the population are unable to obtain. The allocations of these positions to groups and regions is another strategy of mollifying tribal rivalry and strengthening government loyalty, without significantly weakening executive power.

Following independence, African leaders committed themselves to a national policy of Africanization which involved important modifications in the staffing of the colonial civil service. The demand for Africanization began as a part of a larger nationalist drive for racial equality. As Ali Mazrui noted, "black people are the most aggrieved of all races in moral terms." Yet when the politicization of ethnicity took place, as it did in Kenya and Zambia, demands for racial equity fell to demands for tribal equity. It became clear to minority groups that Africanization did not entail universal African recruitment, but rather it meant
the recruitment of individuals from a particular tribe. In Kenya, the Kikuyu, who held an educational advantage over all other groups, benefited the most from the Africanization programs. Their dominance became so pervasive in the public service that members of other tribes found it impossible to enjoy a career or mobility in the bureaucracy. In Zambia the trend was similar: Bemba occupied all the senior ranks of the civil service and held a firm grip over the bureaucracy. An insightful example of the charge of tribal domination in the public service can be discovered in a Lozi-based publication just prior to the introduction of one-party rule in Zambia:

There are 73 tribes in Zambia and their interests must be balanced. But look at this arrangement: The President, the Vice-President, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission . . . , Teaching Service Commission Council of Zambia and Judiciary Service Commission belong to one tribe [the Bemba]. These are the people governing the country and all other ministries and departments are merely branches of some form or other of the above. . . . It is also estimated that the same tribe has nearly 150 people in the executive and higher positions of office in the Public Service. The Tongas, the Ngonis, and the Lozi next range between 30 and 50 people each in similar positions. Can anybody explain why?

The overwhelming evidence of tribal domination in the public service developed into a source of instability for both Jomo Kenyatta and Kenneth Kaunda. Kikuyu and Bemba control of the bureaucracy sparked accusations that public policy benefited the largest tribe and neglected or sacrificed the needs of other groups. Charges that the allocation of resources, such as the construction of wells, schools, railways, and factories, disproportionately favored the regions of one tribe, led minority tribal groups to view the government as partisan and unfair. It eventually became clear to Kenyatta and Kaunda that if they wanted to secure national unity and stability, positions in the bureaucracy
would have to be opened up to key minority groups. This view prompted changes under one-party rule towards a representative bureaucracy.

The changes in the civil service under a representative one-party state are gradual: first, the merit principle for staffing new positions in the government is exchanged for ethnicity; then, the civil service is decentralized through regional administration and the state greatly expands its role as an employer; and finally, the President's Office grows in size and becomes one of the primary sources of policy-making in the state.

In general, Western governments establish fixed, objective rules for the selection, appointment, promotion, and discipline of civil servants. This ensures the attraction of qualified individuals and the efficiency as well as the stability of the government bureaucracy. "Individual merit and public interest should at all times prevail and external influence, patronage, and nepotism, should be eliminated."²⁸ Western conceptions of the merit principle have never fully applied to African bureaucracies. This is largely due to the absence of a skilled and specialized labour force large enough to fill all the offices of government. However, two separate studies of the Kenyan and Zambian bureaucracies reveal that the evidence of tribal domination did not always carry with it a charge that unqualified people were filling the positions; members of the dominant tribe were generally the best trained and educated individuals in the country.²⁹ As Henry Bienen notes, "while Kikuyu appointments were frequently made to the civil service, there is no evidence that Kikuyus have been vastly over-represented in it if their educational advantages are taken into account."³⁰ Under a representative one-party state, the standard of recruitment to the civil
service shifts from one of individual merit to one of ethnic membership. Therefore, when new openings in the civil service need to be filled, there is a conscious effort to keep shares of positions open to key minority groups; much in the same way the principle of proportionality operates in consociational democracies. The purpose of a representative bureaucracy is to open up points of contact between the government and disaffected tribal groups. For example, by offering positions in the civil service to the Luo, the Nairobi government can build stronger links to communities which feel alienated from the state. Once people in the peripheries have access to goods and services which accompany government employment, it is hoped that attachments to the central government will increase. The results of tribal personnel selection have some secondary effects. For instance, any vestige of the merit principle in an African state eventually disappears. Hiring practices become localized as individuals are chosen on tribal membership, kinship systems and personal connections, and the civil service itself grows more parochial and corrupt.

The other change in the civil service under representative one-party rule is geographic decentralization. Decentralization is another technique of strengthening the ties between the central government and ethnoregional groups while at the same time enhancing the leader's control over the peripheries. By relocating government offices in the capital city to provincial towns, the government can open itself up to regions it previously ignored. For example, in Zambia, the inability of the Lusaka government to penetrate Barotseland meant that Lozi concerns were often overlooked. Yet this trend was gradually reversed when Kaunda moved more government offices to outlying regions to
"ensure recognition of local interests." Geographic decentralization is also a fundamental feature of Kenya's political system. Chiefs, who are the grassroots agents of the provincial administration in Kenya, hold community meetings or barazas—"which are probably the main point of contact between the rural population and the regime, even taking KANU meetings into account." At the baraza, chiefs explain government policies and listen to the complaints of their constituency. This exchange not only provides an outlet for regional demands but it also facilitates greater political participation.

Geographic decentralization does not necessarily entail a decentralization of power and authority. Essentially, it involves the movement of bureaucratic posts from the capital city to provincial towns without actually transferring substantive decision-making authority. Low-ranking bureaucratic positions are generally staffed by individuals from the tribal group in order to facilitate cordial contact between the government and the public. In both Kenya and Zambia, provincial administration is under the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. This gives the ruler direct access to the offices in the peripheries: he can receive information from field offices and direct policy outputs without going through party channels. The subtle separation between the civil service and the party is important because it turns the administrative apparatus into an arm of the executive and allows the ruler to "personalize" the bureaucracy. Joel Barkan provides a useful example of the way leaders can maintain their authority over the state through the civil service in his description of government during the Kenyatta years:
From the Office of the President, he governed by maintaining daily contact with his eight provincial commissioners, and via them forty district commissioners, their staffs, and their subordinates at the division, location, and sublocation levels.37

We can expect the bureaucracy to play a key role in strengthening government loyalty in Zimbabwe. Mugabe has already demonstrated an effort to balance tribal representation in the civil service and since the unity compact was signed there has been a dramatic increase in public spending (on schools, roads, railways, etc.) in Matabeleland.38 The military is also likely to undergo the same tribal recruitment patterns as the civil service in order to reduce Ndebele resentment to Zimbabwe's armed forces. In addition, more government offices will be moved from Harare to Bulawayo and staffed by Ndebele in an effort to establish the central government's presence in that region of the country. The development of a representative bureaucracy in Zimbabwe will contribute to the maintenance of stability, but it could also paralyze the national economy: "the need to accommodate ZAPU could make for an unwieldy [bureaucratic] structure as Mugabe tries to buy support with jobs."39

The Parliament

One might wonder about the need for a Parliament in a political system where executive power and party domination is so pervasive, but the Parliament is a critical component of the one-party states in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. On one level, a Parliament gives an impression of institutional presence and provides symbolic formality to the passage of legislation, thereby heightening a regime's legitimacy—especially in the eyes of the international community. On another level, Parliament serves as an effective bridge between the tribal groups and the executive.
Members of Parliament occupy a special position in the representative one-party state. In addition to their official role as a legislator, MPs, like provincial administrators, provide a point of contact between the government and the people. The relationship between the MP and his constituency is comparable to patterns of patrimonial rule found in pre-industrial European societies and large parts of Asia. This patron-client relationship, characterized by personal contact and mutual exchanges, usually involves the negotiation of economic benefits from the MP (such as patronage, development projects, and personal payments) in return for political support from the people. An illustration of the patrimonial links between the MP and his constituency can be found in Gertzel and Szeftel's discussion of Zambia's first general election under one-party rule:

"Ethnicity was without any doubt exploited by a number of candidates and their followers as a method of organizing patronage and manipulating support. . . . Given the nature of patronage and its links with the extended family structure, combatants often had a number of strategic options open to them. In seeking political or economic power, individuals tended to find ethnic appeals valuable as a rapid and simple way of aggregating support and preserving patronage networks."

The significant role of the MP as a "broker" of goods is supplemented by a semi-competitive system of parliamentary elections. In both Kenya and Zambia, regular parliamentary elections are held in which voters choose between contending party candidates. The purpose of this system is two-fold. First, the frequency of elections forces MPs to keep continuous contact with their constituency and sustain reciprocal relationships, thus solidifying the links between government and society. And second, the number of candidates prevent MPs from treating the electorate with indifference: if an MP fails to deliver economic
benefits to his supporters and ignores their concerns, he can be replaced by another person. For example, Mwai Kibaki, a long-time leading Kikuyu politician in Kenya, "lost his grip on his local constituency in the face of the growing discontent of the landless poor." The competitive nature of parliamentary elections allows people from ethnoregional constituencies to get to know the candidates and encourages voters to participate in electing their representative in Parliament.

Basically, elections can be viewed as a series of "local games" played without interference from the ruler. The candidates will occasionally criticize the regime in order to attract votes and portray themselves as the champion of their constituency, although this is uncommon and campaigns tend to be a war of words between candidates. Mild criticism of government policies (for example, prices and wages policy) is generally permitted provided it is not directly aimed at the leadership. The ruler endorses this semi-open electoral style because it purges the least popular MPs from the government and replaces them "with new troops who would be more effective in carrying out supportive roles," while at the same time it deflects responsibility for policy failures away from the executive and places it on the MP. Hence, the MP becomes a buffer for the regime: ethnoregional discontent is discharged onto the MP and not onto the ruler.

It is important to keep in mind that the ruler remains extremely powerful within the framework of a representative one-party state. The parliamentary elections are competitive at the grass roots level but they do not provide an opportunity to choose a new political leader. The President's position in power is protected and if he decides a
re-election is necessary, he will run unopposed in a party election. Furthermore, the ruler holds the right of appointment, which means he can circulate elected and non-elected elites into (and out of) positions of power. Loyal MPs who emphasize constituency service are rewarded by the leader and usually promoted to cabinet positions. "With each step up, one's direct access to state resources increases as well as one's informal access to both public and private resources at the centre."47

Although Mugabe has yet to hold a national election since the conclusion of the unity compact, there is a strong likelihood that next year's parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe will be as competitive at the grass roots level as those held in Kenya and Zambia. The belief among ethnoregional groups that they can choose a member of their community to represent their interests in Parliament is an integral component of stabilization in a representative single party framework. If Mugabe actively intervenes in the nomination process and only allows one candidate to run in each constituency, the Ndebele will reject the election results. Therefore, in order to avoid the violent popular rejection of electoral outcomes so striking in other African countries, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone,48 Mugabe will be inclined to permit relatively open local electoral contests. Competitive parliamentary elections in 1990 will not mean an influx of MPs into the government openly hostile to Mugabe's rule. On the contrary, not only will all candidates be required to be a member of ZANU-PF, but Mugabe will utilize his power of appointment to reward loyal MPs and his monopoly of authority to punish outspoken antagonists.
NOTES: Chapter 3


2 Ibid., p. 206.


6 The KPU received 90 percent of the vote in Luoland. Ibid., p. 59.


9 Ibid., p. 529.


It is interesting to note that Kaunda was born in Nyasaland (now Malawi) and does not claim membership to either the Bemba nor the Lozi.


Voter turnout in Barotseland and the Copperbelt was the lowest on record causing one UNIP official to comment, "The one-party system is destroying the party. We are no longer united and are campaigning tri-bally against each other." Morris Szeftel, "The Role of the Copperbelt" in Cherry Gertzel, ed., The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 119, 144.

Cherry Gertzel, "Dissent and Authority in the Zambian One-Party State," in Ibid., p. 79-80.


Dresang, "The Zambian Case," p. 1611.


Bienen, Kenya, and Dresang, "The Zambian Case."

Bienen, Kenya, p. 134.


47 Ibid., p. 231.

CONCLUSION

I think some people in Government were surprised at what a popular move unity was. I think there's more to be optimistic about in Zimbabwe now, probably, than any other time.

Harare Government Official, 1988

There are still major hurdles ahead, but I think people down here are just so frustrated with what's been going on in Matabeleland that they really are determined to make it work.


Robert Mugabe has constructed a stable, constitutional one-party regime that entrenches ZANU hegemony and will likely keep him in power until his death or resignation. He has also made political arrangements, through the unity compact, to ensure that leaders from key tribal groups (namely the Ndebele) are incorporated into the cabinet. These preliminary political changes suggest that Zimbabwe is moving towards a political system similar to the type that exists in Kenya and Zambia: a political system which combines the elements of control with the features of representation.

The emergence of one-party states which involve tribal representation reflect a particular practice of post-independence African politics in multi-ethnic states. As we have seen in the cases of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Kenya, certain African rulers change the composition of the ruling elite and the institutions of the state so as to give disaffected tribal groups a greater sense of representation in the central government. The general factor that drives these states in the same direction is the pursuit of political order and stability. In addition to revenue generation and economic development, political stability is intimately associated with a regime's objective of staying in power. The
logic is that if the political system can be stabilized, then the threat of insurgency will be reduced. For the Zimbabwean, Zambian and Kenyan regimes, the threat of insurgency comes from discontented tribal groups centered in the outlying regions of the country. Therefore, in the interests of preserving the security and stability of their regimes, Robert Mugabe, Kenneth Kaunda and Jomo Kenyatta (and now Daniel Arap Moi) have created informal political arrangements which minimize tribal alienation and generate greater popular acceptance of the central government. These arrangements primarily involve issues of patronage. Rulers distribute government positions and resources in a manner which raises the prestige and rank of influential ethnoregional leaders and groups. While the allocation of patronage as a method of maintaining regime stability does have some political and economic costs, the rulers of these states seem to prefer this type of politics because the possession of power entails political skill and mastery, rather than political coercion and force.

In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has temporarily resolved a violent anti-government struggle in Matabeleland by appointing prominent Ndebele leaders to positions in his cabinet. The move has been successful because the entrance of Ndebele leaders into the ruling elite signals to the Ndebele that they are now a part of the national government, thereby restoring Ndebele honour and dignity. Presuming Mugabe wishes to extend the period of stability he has achieved since January 1988, he will be inclined to pursue other political practices pioneered by Kaunda and Kenyatta. These will include further steps towards decentralizing an ethnically-balanced bureaucracy, permitting a relatively open competition in next year's parliamentary elections and steadily increasing
public expenditure throughout the peripheries (principally in Matabeleland). In the long term, the costs of inflating the government bureaucracy, financing regional development projects and co-opting communities for political support will restrict the growth of the Zimbabwean economy. However, it is likely that Robert Mugabe will continue to move in the direction of representative one-party rule, and view the costs as the price of political stability and personal power in modern Africa.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Articles


Bratton, Michael. "The Public Service in Zimbabwe," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, 3 (Fall 1980), pp. 441-64.


**Theses and Unpublished Papers**


Research Reports and Newspapers


Keesing's Contemporary Archives. 26 (July 25, 1980).


