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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Kenya from Mau Mau to independence Farquhar, Michael Ernest 1965

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KENYA FROM MAU MAU TO INDEPENDENCE by MICHAEL ERNEST FARQUHAR B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1963 A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standards THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1965 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y , I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r -m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t , c o p y i n g or p u b l i -c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n , 'Department of Internatio,y/1 Studies The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada Date April, I965 i i ABSTRACT The outbreak of Mau Mau h o s t i l i t i e s i n Kenya was the culmination of a series of grievances which had devel-oped among the more p o l i t i c a l l y conscious Afr i c a n s , The lack of p o l i t i c a l opportunities and the i n a b i l i t y to prom-ote economic and s o c i a l integration fomented f r u s t r a t i o n and antagonism among these Africans. Yet, the violence and the imposition of the Emergency r e s t r i c t i o n s f a i l e d to d i s -rupt the country's p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l develop-ment of the post-World War Two period. The struggle between the Colonial Office, the European settler, and the African n a t i o n a l i s t i n the nineteen-f i f t i e s , won p o l i t i c a l concessions f o r the Africans, divided the European p o l i t i c a l movement, and created a dilemma f o r the Colonial O f f i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y following the independence of Ghana. Throughout the Emergency i t was apparent that the Colonial Office had ser i o u s l y underestimated the rapid growth and strength of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n East A f r i c a . By 1959, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advancement i n Tanganyika f o r e t o l d a change i n B r i t i s h policy i n Kenya. As a conse-quence, A f r i c a n nationalism triumphed and the European hope f o r a 'white man's country' was dashed forever. While the p o l i t i c a l evolution of the African con-tinued, Kenya enjoyed i t s greatest economic development during the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . S o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s also ex-perienced a s i m i l a r period of expansion. By the nineteen-s i x t i e s , owing to adverse weather conditions, poor world mar-kets, and a l o s s of investment c a p i t a l a r i s i n g out of the growth of African nationalism, the country's economy collapsed. At the same time, the p o l i t i c a l disruption of the early nine-t e e n - s i x t i e s brought a sharp r i s e i n unemployment, and a short-age of educators and medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s , which hampered the t r a n s i t i o n of the African from his t r a d i t i o n a l society to the modern world. With independence came some economic recovery, but continued recovery w i l l be dependent on the maintenance of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and national unity. For Kenya's leaders the need to create a new unifying force to replace the old nationalism, b u i l t on a common anti-white h o s t i l i t y , i s t h e i r most urgent task. V ACKNOWLEDGMENT The writ e r wishes to express h i s sincere gratitude to Professor John S. Gonway of the Department of History and International Studies, at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r h i s kind assistance i n the preparation of t h i s t h e s i s . His many he l p f u l suggestions and the use of his newspaper f i l e were greatly appreciated. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter One: The Road to Mau Mau 1 Chapter Two: P o l i t i c s and Personalities 1953-1959 39 Chapter Three: Debate and Decision 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 3 . . . . 1 0 7 Chapter Four: The Economic Pendulum 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 6 3. .18.0 Chapter Five: Social Advances 1953-1963 232 Chapter Six: Conclusion . . 2 7 2 Appendices: 280 Bibliography: 286 Maps and Tables: Map of Kenya to fo l l o w page v Map of Regions and Location of the Tribes to follow page 159 Table I - External and Inter-t e r r i t o r i a l Trade, 1957-1963 to fo l l o w page 210 Table I I - Gross Capital Forma-t i o n , 1954-1963 to f o l l o w page 215 Table I I I - Buildings Completed and Nairobi Plans Approved, 1957-1963 to follow page 217 Table IV - Reported Employment and Earnings, 1954-1963 to follow page 221 I i i? OP' ISEYA 1 CHAPTER ONE THE ROAD TO MAU MAU The emergence of Kenya on December 1 2 , 1 9 6 3 , as an independent nation under African rule ended a decade marked by violence, rapid p o l i t i c a l developments, economic i n s t a b i l i t y , and s o c i a l unrest. Indeed, i t was a period which saw the dream of many European s e t t l e r s for a s e l f -governing 'white man's country'—a v i s i o n which had been c r y s t a l l i z e d over a half century only to be blurred by the Mau Mau uprisings and the growth of black nati o n a l i s m — t u r n instead to the hope f o r a m u l t i - r a c i a l partnership, and u l -timately to a reluctant acceptance of the r e a l i t y of an i n -dependent Kenya governed by the African. Commenting to a Joint Select Committee on Closer Union i n East A f r i c a i n 1 9 3 1 , the former Governor of Kenya, S i r Edward Grigg, l a t e r Lord Altrincham, declared: "So f a r as the African i s con-cerned, of course he has no views whatever on the subject of closer union." Yet thirty-two years l a t e r the African i s master of hi s own destiny. Kenya extends over an area of 2 2 4 , 9 6 0 square miles i n what was formerly known as B r i t i s h East A f r i c a . The sec-ond highest peak i n A f r i c a , Mount Kenya ( 1 7 , 0 4 0 f t . ) , gave the country i t s name. Snowcapped the year round, t h i s tow-ering mountain i s the mythological home of the God Ngai, and 2 serves as a s p i r i t u a l i n s p i r a t i o n to many of the Kikuyu tribesmen l i v i n g beneath i t s slopes. The western part of the country i s dominated by that geographical freak, the Great R i f t V alley, and f o r t h i s reason alone one might . accurately describe t h i s east African country as a land of contrasts. More than hal f the t o t a l area, mainly i n the north and northeast, i s a r i d and waterless and gener-a l l y unsuitable f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . The southern part of the country, inland from the coastal p l a i n , r i s e s gradually to perhaps the best a g r i c u l t u r a l lands i n a l l A f r i c a — the f e r t i l e highlands. I t i s t h i s area which distinguishes Kenya from other East African countries and which has played such a v i t a l r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l , economic, and 2 s o c i a l development of the t e r r i t o r y . The White Highlands, as t h i s plateau area came to be known, was i d e a l f o r European settlement, f o r not only did i t o f f e r excellent a g r i c u l t u r a l lands, but also i t was very conducive to a healthy and vigorous l i f e f o r Europeans. S i r Harry Johnston, i n an early report to the B r i t i s h Government shortly a f t e r his appointment as H.M. Commissioner i n the Uganda Protectorate (which at that time extended to within 100 miles of N a i r o b i ) , said i n 1900: In the eastern part of the Uganda Protectorate there i s a t r a c t of country almost without p a r a l l e l i n t r o p i c a l A f r i c a : a region of perhaps 12,000 square miles, admirably w e l l watered, with a f e r t i l e s o i l , cool and perfectly healthy climate, covered with noble f o r e s t s , and, to a very great extent, unin-habited by any native race. This area l i e s at an a l t i t u d e not l e s s than 6,000 f e e t , and not more than 10,000 feet. I t i s as healthy f o r Europeans 3 as the United Kingdom, Brit i s h Columbia, or temper-ate South Africa....I am able to say decidedly that here we have a territory (now that the Uganda Rail-way i s built) admirably suited for a white man's country,3 In 1895 the B r i t i s h Government accepted the trans-fer of Kenya from the Imperial British East Africa Company and the territory became known as the Br i t i s h East Africa Protectorate. In this same year, the construction of the Kenya and Uganda Railway began, bringing with i t an influx of Indian labourers. By 1900 this recruitment had reached the peak figure of 19,742, thereby laying a firm foundation for an Indian community in the Protectorate. With Sir Harry Johnston's optimistic report together with other attractions 4 the territory offered, the B r i t i s h Government decided to en-courage European settlement and designated the highlands as a specific reserve for white settlers. Foreign elements, therefore, were introduced into the t r i b a l l i f e of the A f r i -can, as the B r i t i s h East Africa Protectorate entered the twentieth century. Coincidental with the a r r i v a l of the Euro-pean was the emergence of suspicions and misunderstandings, which were to haunt and hamper the development of the country during the next sixty years. On April 1, 1905, the administration of the Protec-torate came under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, and on August 16, 1907, the f i r s t Legislative Council meeting was convened. Comprised of s i x o f f i c i a l and two unofficial members, a l l of whom were European, the legislature at this time granted no representation to the Indian community or to 4 the native population* From the beginning, the develop-ment of land by the immigrant s e t t l e r s was held to be the key to a l l future progress for the country. I t alone could bring i n the revenue required to open up the area and sup-ply funds for the new means of communication i n t h i s region. In 1908 the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies, Lord E l g i n , 5 issued his famous pledge which gave o f f i c i a l recognition to the supreme po s i t i o n of the Europeans i n the White Highlands. A further Land Ordinance of 1915 approved the leasing of land to Europeans f o r a period of 999 years, and to encour-age increased European settlement a Soldier Settlement Scheme was promoted whereby soldiers returning from the war were to be granted land i n defined areas i n holdings varying from 160 to 5,000 acres. Thus, by 1920 when the status of the t e r r i t o r y was advanced to that of Crown Colony, the future was envisaged as dependent upon a t t r a c t i n g white s e t t l e r s and white c a p i t a l . The p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t s were equally ob-6 vious. Lord Delamere, the :temperamental leader of the 7 s e t t l e r s , was determined that Kenya should become a t r u l y B r i t i s h colony and the Highlands a white manTs country. To h i s c redit Delamere devoted h i s entire wealth to the search f o r p r o f i t a b l e crops and healthy c a t t l e which could be raised i n the t e r r i t o r y , and through his experimentation many of the diseases and pests which ruined the native's c a t t l e and crops were eradicated. His research was i n s t r u -mental i n establishing an agrarian economy i n Kenya. In 5 supporting the Government's land and labour p o l i c i e s , how-ever, Delamere c l e a r l y looked upon the native as a c h i l d who was incapable of achieving any measure of responsib-i l i t y f o r many years. Such ideas were, however, quite unacceptable to the Kikuyu, the t r i b e which had l o s t the most land to the s e t t l e r . For them the land had f a r greater significance. Explaining the Kikuyu position Jomo Kenyatta has written that: The harmony and s t a b i l i t y of the African's mode of l i f e , i n p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , r e l i g i o u s and economic organizations, was based on the land which was, and s t i l l i s , the soul of the people....The annexation of the ancestral lands by the Europeans has robbed the Africans of the use of the productive asset on which his e n t i r e economic l i f e depended. I t has also interfered with the whole t r i b a l organization whose genuine co-operation i s based on constant communion with the ancestral s p i r i t s through which t r i b a l law and custom, morality, and r e l i g i o n are maintained.8 The importance of the land to the Kikuyu both i n custom and i n value became the greatest source of discontent against the s e t t l e r . When the f i r s t s e t t l e r s arrived i n the White Highlands they believed, with j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that much of the country's land was v i r t u a l l y unoccupied, and they moved into these apparently uninhabited Highlands to e s t a b l i s h a white settlement on the choicest land i n a l l East A f r i c a . Owing to accidents of nature, t r i b a l warfare, and customary land tenure, much of t h i s land had become 9 unoccupied at the time of the s e t t l e r ' s a r r i v a l i n Kenya. The actual area taken over by the Europeans was not, i n f a c t , great but to the Kikuyu i t became a source of much 6 b i t t e r n e s s , Fears that the s e t t l e r s might, at some time i n the future, take more native land aroused the Kikuyu. These p o l i t i c a l apprehensions were only r e i n -forced by the actual state of land holdings amongst the Kikuyu t r i b e . Most t r i b a l areas had a population density of about 250 per square mile, while the North Kavirondo region had the f a n t a s t i c population density figure of 10 1,100 per square mile. In contrast to t h i s condition was that i n the European areas where i n some cases very small 11 areas of huge land holdings were under c u l t i v a t i o n . The s e t t l e r s , claiming l e g a l ownership to t h e i r land, were un-w i l l i n g to give i t up to the native, who they claimed had 12 adequate Land which was poorly c u l t i v a t e d . The Africans believed that t h i s land was r i g h t f u l l y t h e i r s and the Kikuyu, i n p a r t i c u l a r , continually used the land issue as a r a l l y i n g cry i n t h e i r h o s t i l e statements against the Euro-peans. The land question received an exhaustive study by 13 S i r Morris Carter i n 1934$ which reaffirmed the White High-lands as a European reserve, and f a i l e d to examine the future needs of the native, or t o make d e f i n i t e recommenda-tion s to ease the land hunger among the Kikuyu. Thus, the deep sense of grievance among the Kikuyu over the land which the report had hoped to remove, remained. As the land s i t u a t i o n among the Kikuyu became more acute, t h e i r h o s t i l i t y toward the s e t t l e r community increased. Mr. L.S.B. Leakey commented on t h i s matter when 7 he said: "I think that i t i s f a i r to say that as a whole the s e t t l e r community i s d i s l i k e d and cer t a i n l y distrusted 14 by the A f r i c a n . " One Kikuyu l a t e r remarked, that as f a r as his people were concerned the Carter Report " w i l l f o r -15 ever remain nothing more than a s e t t l e r s ' rubber stamp." The land question, therefore, was a source of concern to most Kikuyu and i t was f o r t h i s reason that the Mau Mau movement seized upon the land grievance as i t s most impor-tant r a l l y i n g point f o r support• Thus, when the s e t t l e r f i r s t a r rived i n Kenya the African l o s t certain areas of 16 land "mainly through ignorance fcather than malice." Yet, out of t h i s i n i t i a l mistake developed the greatest source of r a c i a l bitterness i n Kenya and a p r i n c i p a l cause of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n . While h o s t i l i t y developed between the African and the s e t t l e r over the land issue, the labour problem i n the country also created much discussion. With the increased railway construction and the d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s of fam= ine and influenza, there developed a large demand f o r labour and i t soon became government policy to put the native to work. I t was to be B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Kenya gradually to bring the natives into contact with the Europeans, thereby helping them to advance both t h e i r economic and t h e i r s o c i a l p o s i t i o n . This p o l i c y , however, was not so easy t o implement. The a g r i c u l t u r a l t r i b e s of Kenya were often reluctant to 17 leave t h e i r v i l l a g e s and come to work f o r the white man. The white s e t t l e r s , f o r t h e i r part, were reluctant to use t h i s p o l icy as a means f o r advancing the status and educa-t i o n of the Afric a n . As a means of f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e i r p o l i c y , the Gov-ernment created and appointed chiefs i n the hope that the natives would obey them and they i n turn would carry out the requests of the D i s t r i c t Commissioner. The imposition of a chief, however, was something a l i e n to the Kikuyu and some other t r i b e s , which i n l a t e r years was to be construed by some Kikuyu as an example of mistreatment of the Afr i c a n 18 by the white man. Although some headmen did become sudden-l y wealthy and aroused suspicions among the tribesmen, most performed t h e i r duties very e f f i c i e n t l y . From the point of view of the Colonial o f f i c i a l s i t was necessary to encourage the native to work i n order to f a c i l i t a t e the development of the country. A g r i c u l t u r a l production had to be increased to supply the railway with f r e i g h t , and branch l i n e s had to be b u i l t to reach the farmers. Thus, to make the country support i t s e l f , the Gov-ernment believed i t was necessary to get the native out of the reserve and to work for the European. I t cannot be denied, however, that a minority of s e t t l e r s did abuse the use of native labour f o r t h e i r own s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s and 19 subsequently aroused some native b i t t e r n e s s . The dilemma of the need to make the t e r r i t o r y self-supporting, however, was a continuing one. Where work was needed by the Government for the general development of 9 20 the country, compulsory labour was used. In many instances t h i s disrupted the African's t r i b a l l i f e and discouraged him 21 from engaging i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n the reserve, i n favour of a s s i s t i n g the Government and the s e t t l e r s i n developing the economy of the Colony. Discontent against the coercion of native labour l e d to the f i r s t r e a l awakening of African p o l i t i c a l consciousness, which appeared i n 1921 among a group of natives known as the Young Kikuyu Associa-22 t i o n . Under the leadership of an educated Kikuyu, Harry Thuku, t h i s group mounted a protest against the European 23 community and was hopeful that many of i t s grievances would be dealt with, but i n vain. The native labour s i t u a t i o n , which was not helped by post-war slumps, was only made worse by the antagonism between the immigrant Indian community. The Indians also re-sented t h e i r second-class status, as was seen i n smouldering unrest as early as 1 9 2 1 . Not only were the Asians discon-tented with t h e i r lack of p o l i t i c a l representation commen-surate with t h e i r numbers, but also they f e l t slighted by the terms of the E l g i n pledge of 1908 prohibiting them from obtaining land i n the highlands. In addition, many mission-ari e s complained that the unhealthy conditions existing i n the Asian community were not b e n e f i c i a l to the welfare of the A f r i c a n . They also considered the Indian to be a threat to the progress of the native, f o r he was taking away many of the jobs Africans were capable of holding, although at t h i s point, there had been l i t t l e i n t e r e s t shown by the 10 native i n the various s k i l l e d and serai-skilled enterprises undertaken by the Indian. The A s i a t i c s , f o r t h e i r part, were claiming representation on the grounds not only of t h e i r large numbers, but also on account of the p a r t i c i p a -t i o n of t h e i r homeland i n war on the side of B r i t a i n and the desire f o r c e r t a i n benefits i n return. The Indian a g i t a t i o n soon developed into a f u l l debate on the future of the Kenya Colony. Following a v i s i t to London i n 1921 of a two man delegation headed by Lord Delamere, the Colonial Secretary, Winston C h u r c h i l l , outlined i n general the future course of Kenya's develop-ment: We do not contemplate any settlement or system which w i l l prevent B r i t i s h East Africa—Kenya as i t i s now known—from becoming a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y and d i s -t i n c t i v e l y B r i t i s h colony, looking forward i n the 24 f u l l f r u i t i o n of time to responsible self-government. However, any attempts at making the country's administration m u l t i - r a c i a l were steadfastly refused by the European 25 s e t t l e r s . Thus, the constant r e f u s a l of the Europeans i n Kenya to agree to increased representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Indian community, le d to the publication of a White Paper i n 1923• This document, while dealing with the Indian question, l a i d down f o r the f i r s t time the policy of the Imperial Government i n regards to the place of the native i n Kenya. The s i g n i f i c a n t paragraph i n the paper declared: P r i m a r i l y , Kenya i s an African t e r r i t o r y , and His Majesty's Government think i t necessary to ; def-i n i t e l y record t h e i r considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that i f , and when, those i n t e r e s t s and the i n t -11 erests of the immigrant races should c o n f l i c t , the former should p r e v a i l . Obviously the int e r e s t s of the other communities, European, Indian or Arab, must severally be safeguarded....But i n the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a t r u s t on behalf of the Afr i c a n pop-u l a t i o n and they are unable to delegate or share t h i s t r u s t , the object of which may be defined as 26 the protection and advancement of the native races. In asserting that the native was to receive attention more equal t o his r i g h t f u l place i n Kenya, the White Paper shrewdly put the immigrant communities i n t h e i r place by declaring that the role of safeguarding the i n t e r -ests of the Africans belonged to the Imperial Government, and to i t alone. Such views as those expressed i n the White Paper were hard to implement. Lord Altrincham, when he be-came Governor of the Colony i n 1925, commented: "I might be Governor of the Colony, but when I arrived i n 1925 hefjLord 27 Delamere j was i t s uncrowned king....'* The pressure that the p o l i t i c i a n s of the s e t t l e r community were able to exert on various government o f f i c i a l s from the Governor on down was such that the question of paramountcy of native i n t e r -ests would often be viewed i n the l i g h t of what would best s u i t the European i n t e r e s t s . Yet, the s e t t l e r group could not be fault e d e n t i r e l y , f o r except f o r the interest d i s -played by humanitarians i n B r i t a i n , East A f r i c a was of 28 l i t t l e concern to Government o f f i c i a l s at Whitehall. Suc-cessive Governors soon found t h e i r own inte r e s t s i n e x t r i c a b -l y l i n k e d with those of the s e t t l e r s . For t h i s reason, the welfare of the native suffered and p o l i c i e s outlined i n the 12 1923 Memorandum were only half-heartedly adhered to i n Kenya. On the other hand, native administrators who made a career of service i n Africa...and had the needs of the African at heart, could do l i t t l e to enact any p o l i c y of 29 native paramountcy. Following the publication of the 1923 White Paper, a series of reports were issued which tended to 30 modify the 1923 statement. A new concept known as the dual policy was introduced which suggested that "...native i n t e r e s t s are not intended to p r e v a i l to the extent of destroying the in t e r e s t s of immigrant communities already established, and that t h e i r 'paramountcy* must be subject 31 to t h i s l i m i t i n g condition." With the election of a Labour Government i n 1929, however, the dominant po s i t i o n of the European i n Kenya was again to be challenged. With the noted member of the Fabian Society, Sidney Webb,in the Colonial O f f i c e , the doctrine of native paramountcy as outlined by the Duke of Devonshire i n 1923, was reaffirmed. In two White Papers often referred to as "Black 1* Papers, the Colonial Secretary stressed the fact that "the r e l a t i o n of His Majesty's Government to the native population i n East A f r i c a i s one of trusteeship which cannot be devolved, and from which they cannot be re l i e v e d . The ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the exercise of 32 t h i s trusteeship must accordingly rest with them alone." In recommending better l i v i n g conditions and wages f o r the native, and a native taxation more i n accordance with the 13 33 African's a b i l i t y to pay, Sidney Webb explained: . . . i t i s incumbent upon the Government to ensure that Government expenditure on native services i n the annual budget should bear a proper r e l a -t i o n to the revenue raised from the natives, and p a r t i c u l a r l y that the natives should receive, d i r e c t l y and v i s i b l y , a f a i r return f o r the d i r -ect taxation which they are c a l l e d upon to pay.34 In a second paper the Colonial Secretary c r i t i -cized the p o l i t i c a l climate i n Kenya i n 1 9 3 0 . While urging increased authority be given to the native councils, Sidney Webb suggested that self-government "cannot be reached at an early date i n a community where i t has so f a r been prac-t i c a b l e to enfranchise l e s s than one per cent of the popu-l a t i o n , and where the idea of any substantial extension of 35 the franchise finds l i t t l e general support." The Colonial Secretary's support f o r the eventual implementation of a common r o l l , was greeted with h o s t i l i t y by the European community. In a l e t t e r to the East A f r i c a n Standard, the Kenya Branch of the B r i t i s h Legion declared: Government White Papers, June 2 0 , jeopardize whole future of White Colonization i n East A f r i c a , s e t t i n g up a new black dominion i n place of B r i t i s h Colony, placing white settlement on a l e v e l with Indian immigration and making both subservient to Afr i c a n native p o l i t i c s . Every B r i t i s h ex-service s e t t l e r 36 considers such changes of policy a deliberate betrayal. In the end t h i s Paper was never submitted to Parliament and the doctrine of native paramountcy f a i l e d to have any r e a l effect i n Kenya. The high sounding sentiments expres-sed i n both the 1923 and the 1931 declarations were never followed by actual plans or implementation. Where the rac-i a l issue was concerned, no l e g i s l a t i o n could suddenly alter 14 human feelings of suspicion and mistrust. C l e a r l y , the Colonial Office was preparing to devote more attention to the i n t e r e s t s of the native, but t h i s could only be accom-plished gradually with the l i m i t e d funds av a i l a b l e to the Kenya administration and through an improvement i n the economic climate of the Colony which had deteriorated owing to the effects of the depression. The immediate significance of t h i s series of White Papers published between 1923 and 1932 has been out-l i n e d above, However, i n one respect these papers had f a r -reaching e f f e c t s , f o r they too played t h e i r part i n foment-ing antagonism among the Africans, which ultimately came to a head i n the guise of Mau Mau. The policy statements i n d i -cated an inconsistency i n government thinking. Those state-ments that supported a genuine e f f o r t to a s s i s t the w e l l -being of the native were openly rejected by the Europeans i n Kenya• The general lack of interest displayed by the Secretaries of States together with the pressure exerted on 37 the Governor by the powerful s e t t l e r group assured the v i c -tory of the white point of view. In most instances native opinion was never sought despite the fact that there was a growing number of educated Africans (e.g. Kenyatta, Mockerie, Thuku) who could adequately represent the native viewpoint, i f not i n Legco, c e r t a i n l y before commissions and o f f i c i a l 38 committees. Mr. Mockerie has suggested that the African "has been handicapped i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , and the a c t i v i t i e s 15 of s o c i a l organizations have been r e s t r i c t e d by the B r i t -i s h administration, who do not allow the freedom of speech and of association which the people used to enjoy before 39 i t s advent." Because of t h i s f e e l i n g the Kikuyu writer believed that h i s people l o s t a l l i n i t i a t i v e owing to the disruption of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l way of l i f e and they dev-eloped a f e e l i n g of i n f e r i o r i t y . In r e a l i t y , what was oocurring among the outspoken and well educated Africans was a growing sense of p o l i t i c a l consciousness. Spokesmen for the Kikuyu, the t r i b e most closely associated with the European and his mode of l i f e , were becoming more conscious of the benefits accrued to many Europeans, and they were, i n turn, r e f l e c t i n g on t h e i r own people's pr i m i t i v e way of l i f e . Thus, the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic f r u s t r a t i o n s which they experienced originated i n many cases from a com-parison of the two standards of l i v i n g . The more the African experienced the European environment, the more i t appealed to him, and, therefore, the greater the a g i t a t i o n for change. Education was a p a r t i c u l a r source of a g i t a t i o n among the Africans and i t too played i t s part i n fomenting unrest i n the country. Before 1952, the missionary organiz-ations took on the major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for educating the native. At the outset t h i s education was generally l i t e r a r y 40 i n character, and "many boys and g i r l s thus grew up into young men and women, having some l i t t l e book-learning, but 16 without any r e a l t r a i n i n g i n how to behave as adults i n 41 the l i f e of the community." The character building features of the old t r i b a l education were lacking i n t h i s new form of education and a certain disrespect f o r i l l i t e r a t e elders and for authority was created. Native education before 1925 was of l i t t l e immediate concern to 42 the Government and the 1925 budget showed only 537,000 43 of a t o t a l expenditure of fc 2,000,000 being devoted to native education i n the form of grants to the missionary s o c i e t i e s . The Report of the East A f r i c a Commission of 1925 suggested that: "The time i s overdue when the Gov-44 ernment should take a hand i n the task." The report was perhaps r e f l e c t i n g the findings of the 1922 Phelps-Stokes Commission which urged that a greater emphasis be placed on the te c h n i c a l and p r a c t i c a l side of education i n order that the native might improve his wages and r a i s e his standard of l i v i n g . A r i s i n g out of t h i s recommendation was the founding o f the Jeanes school to t r a i n Africans as leaders i n the l i f e of t h e i r community and not just as leaders i n the academic side of education. Owing to the shortage of revenue i n the Colony, p a r t i c u l a r l y following the depression, the educational 45 needs of the African could not be f u l l y met. In spite of these f i n a n c i a l l i m i t a t i o n s , the native c l e a r l y displayed his keen interest i n education. Between 1926 and 1931, Local Native Councils out of t h e i r own revenues voted 17 E 33,3^1 f o r the provision of school buildings. In 1931 the natives from t h e i r t o t a l assets of £ 62,500 provided 46 £ 17,000 d i r e c t l y f o r t h e i r own education. This educa-t i o n , however, did not place enough emphasis either on tec h n i c a l education or character-training. The educa-t i o n that the African was receiving was not preparing him f o r the new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the changing society i n 47 which he was a part. The African's continuing desire f o r education did res u l t i n the establishment of African operated Independent Schools i n the Kikuyu reserve. At the outset these schools contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the educational opportunities of the Kikuyu, and the f i r s t native to receive a degree at the East A f r i c a n University i n Uganda received his early tr a i n i n g at an independent school. These schools, however, became cl o s e l y linked with the Kikuyu Central Association and became vehicles f o r the spreading of anti-white propa-ganda. Out of many native schools emerged p a r t i a l l y educa-ted Africans who had received l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g which would be applicable to t h e i r r u r a l society. Rather, i n some cases, much of t h e i r t r a i n i n g was directed towards an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society which did not exist i n Kenya. Thus, t h i s type of education combined with the l i m i t e d opportunities f o r education created f r u s t r a t i o n among the Africans making many of them an easy prey for Mau Mau. In many ways s i m i l a r to the problems of A f r i c a n 18 education were those a r i s i n g out of r e l i g i o n . The A f r i c a n , and the Kikuyu i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s recognised as being a deeply r e l i g i o u s and superstitious people. The missions offered a new and to some a superior r e l i g i o n than the old t r i b a l one and many Kikuyu became good and f a i t h f u l C h r i s t -ians. However, others accepted the teachings of the mission-a r i e s only because they were part of the education f o r which they so d i l i g e n t l y strove. These Africans, according to L.S.B. Leakey, one of the foremost a u t h o r i t i e s on the Kikuyu t r i b e , half-heartedly studied C h r i s t i a n i t y only so they could receive some education. As more and more turned to C h r i s t i a n i t y the missions were unable to cope e f f e c t i v e l y with the large numbers. In addition, the complex nature of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the twentieth century together with the various d i f f e r e n t sects a c t i v e i n Kenya brought confusion to the African who found i t d i f f i c u l t to reconcile the simple words of the Bible with the interpretations placed on i t by the Missions. For t h i s reason, many Kikuyu l o s t f a i t h i n t h e i r old t r i b a l r e l i g i o n , yet had not r e a l l y accepted anything to take i t s place. To meet t h i s r e l i g i o u s need the Kikuyu established t h e i r own independent churches 48 and adapted C h r i s t i a n i t y to meet t h e i r need. From the teachings of these churches emerged an anti-white doctrin.e which gathered adherents who found i t f u l f i l l e d the need f o r a f a i t h . Out of these churches, therefore, the Mau Mau r e l -i g i o n was created which was adapted to the needs of the K i -kuyu and thereby was a t t r a c t i v e to them. Mr. F.D. C o r f i e l d 1 9 i n h i s survey of the o r i g i n s and growth of Mau Mau stressed the importance of r e l i g i o n i n the l i f e of the Kikuyu when he suggested that "without the l i g h t of some basic r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f to replace the darkness of witchcraft, there-would appear to be no r e a l future f o r 4 9 the African state." Added to the f r u s t r a t i o n created by the edu-cation and r e l i g i o u s problems was that of the colour bar. In t h e i r association with the Europeans Africans were often treated as outcasts and as i n f e r i o r beings. Barred from "white" hotels, restaurants and clubs, prevented from buying or drinking hard l i q u o r , r e s t r i c t e d from growing coffee or s i s a l , and discouraged from putting on t h e i r own dances, the African became b i t t e r and fr u s t r a t e d . The Asian monopoly on small business enterprises made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the African to achieve commercial advance-ment, while the t h r e e - f i f t h s r u l e under which Africans i n the c i v i l - s e r v i c e received only t h r e e - f i f t h s of the pay of the whites f o r the same work, aroused both economic and s o c i a l f r u s t r a t i o n s . Thus, the natural desire of the African to forge the best possible future for himself with or without the help of a l i e n races brought about the emergence of black nationalism. The growth of p o l i t i c a l consciousness among many Africans aroused by t h e i r association with the European both i n Kenya and elsewhere during the Second World War, increased i n i n t e n s i t y i n the l a t e f o r t i e s . The emergence 20 of India and Pakistan as independent countries within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth i n 1947 gave hope to the more en-lightened Africans i n Kenya and spurred on the development of t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l movements. On t h e i r own continent too, the natives i n Kenya saw the tremendous advances made 50 i n West A f r i c a as w e l l as what they considered to be a deteriorating s i t u a t i o n i n South A f r i c a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the formation of Dr. Malan's Government i n 1948. These developments w i t h i n the African continent sparked the growth of black nationalism i n Kenya. T r a g i c a l l y , the n a t i o n a l i s t movement became dominated by a secret society which preached anti-Suropean and a n t i - C h r i s t i a n doctrines and urged ruthless and bizarre acts to be conducted by i t s followers. A b r i e f study of the A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l move-ments i n Kenya i n the decades before the outbreak of Mau Mau a t r o c i t i e s w i l l shed some l i g h t on how the n a t i o n a l i s t movement took the form i t did. The f i r s t rumblings of politically-minded Africans i n Kenya appeared i n 1921 when Harry Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association appeared. Afte r the deportation of Harry Thuku his organization remained i n a c t i v e u n t i l 1 9 2 5 , when i t re-emerged under the name of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). The main b a t t l e cry of t h i s p o l i t i c a l organization 51 was "to get back the land" and t h i s point alone was suf-f i c i e n t to arouse the f e e l i n g s of many Kikuyu, p a r t i c u l a r l y those who found themselves landless. In 1 9 2 8 , Jomo Kenyatta 21 became the General Secretary of KCA. In 1929, the KCA harshly c r i t i c i z e d the stand against female circumcision adopted by the Church of Scotland Mission and shortly afterwards the African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association came into being as the Kikuyu displayed t h e i r contempt for the corresponding European i n s t i t u t i o n s . Kenyatta, following his f r u i t l e s s e f f o r t s to give evidence to the Joint Select Committee on African Union i n London i n 1931, remained abroad for f i f -teen years where he continued to represent the African viewpoint i n B r i t a i n . In 1932, Harry Thuku, following his release from prison two years e a r l i e r , became president of the KCA. In 1935 the KCA s p l i t and Thuku withdrew to form a more moderate group ca l l e d the Kikuyu P r o v i n c i a l Assoc-i a t i o n (KP/A). In 1937, Kenyatta, while s t i l l abroad, outlined what lie considered to be the main grievance which had to be remedied: Land i s the key to the peoples' l i f e ; i t secures f o r them that peaceful t i l l a g e of the s o i l which supplies t h e i r material needs and enables them to perform t h e i r magic and t r a d i t i o n a l ceremonies i n undisturbed seren-i t y , facing Mount Kenya.52 This fee l i n g c e r t a i n l y corresponded w i t h that of the KPA which sought to ameliorate the land grievances and promote the welfare of the Kikuyu through c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means. When the war broke out i n 1939 the KCA, now apparently i n f i l t r a t e d by a f a n a t i c a l group, became openly subversive and opposed the Government, As a consequence, on May 3 0 , 1940, the KCA 22 53 was declared to be an i l l e g a l society. The remainder of the war years saw l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n Kenya, a l -though the more extreme elements of the KCA were rumoured to have gone underground. I t must be noted that during t h i s period when the KCA s p l i t into two f a c t i o n s , i t s General Secretary Jomo Kenyatta, was out of the country and not d i r e c t l y connected with the a c t i v i t i e s of the African organization. In 1944, E l i u d Mathu became the f i r s t African to take a seat i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council i n Kenya, and immediately African p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s were revived. He sought a p o l i t i c a l organization to support him and shortly afterwards he formed the Kenya African Study Union with i t s avowed purposes to unite the Af r i c a n people towards an A f r i -can nation, and to fo s t e r the s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l 54 i n t e r e s t s of the A f r i c a n . In 1946, t h i s group changed i t s name to the Kenya African Union (KAU) and became a national p o l i t i c a l party. In 1946, Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya a f t e r f i f -teen years absence and soon became the foremost fi g u r e i n KAU. In an interview with Negley Farson, Kenyatta outlined his aims i n t h i s manner: ...I am cutting the dead wood out of a l o t of our old African b e l i e f s , and I am re i n f o r c i n g what I think are some of the best things of our African way of l i f e . I am sending them out with something that I hope i s going to work. I want them to be proud of being A f r i -cans I I don't want to make a l o t of Black Englishmen P5 23 At the outset KAU embraced Africans of a l l t r i b e s and became the f i r s t t r u l y national p o l i t i c a l organization of Kenya Africans. Regional branches were established throughout the Colony which discussed native grievances, and then informed Mr. Mathu, who i n turn conveyed them to the Government. On June 1, 1947, KAU issued the following declaration: 1. That the p o l i t i c a l objective of the Africans of Kenya must be self-government by Africans f o r Africans, the rights of a l l r a c i a l minorities being safeguarded. 2. That more African seats should be provided immed-i a t e l y i n the Kenya L e g i s l a t i v e Council, and that the inequities of r a c i a l representation i n the i n t e r - T e r r i t o r -i a l East A f r i c a n Central Assembly must be condemned. 3 . That more land must be made avai l a b l e both i n the Crown lands and i n the Highlands f o r settlement by Africans. 4. That free compulsory education f o r Africans, as i s given to the children of other races, i s overdue. 5. That the Kipande, with a l l i t s humiliating rules and regulations, must be abolished immediately. 6. That the deplorable wages, housing and other con-d i t i o n s of African labourers must be s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved and that the p r i n c i p l e of 'equal pay for equal work' be rec-ognized. 56 This therefore, became the platform of the f i r s t r e a l nation-a l i s t movement i n Kenya. The issues outlined by the KAU c e r t a i n l y were assured of popular African support and the European body known as the Kenya Electors' Union recognized the potential power of Kenyatta and the KAU when i t asked the Government to deport Kenyatta f o r i n s t i g a t i n g unrest i n the colony. A growing s p l i t was developing between Government, s e t t l e r , and A f r i c a n , and i n 1947 the East African Workers' Federation, an A f r i c a n body, expressed t h e i r predominant fear, when they said: "Our nightmare i s a break from Whitehall and the handing 24 of power to the s e t t l e r s , whose avowed intention i s to create another South A f r i c a i n Kenya. The s e t t l e r s ' nightmare i s a conference table of any description where the African has an 57 equal say." I t was clear that the A f r i c a n would be highly sympathetic with any organization that attempted to meet his grievances. By the l a t e f o r t i e s the KAU was being i n f i l t r a t e d by the r a d i c a l elements of the KCA. In addition, the "Forty" group, the 1940 circumcision age-group, also became an active part of the organization and Negley Farson has suggested that t h i s body was responsible f o r the r i s e of hooliganism 58 and burglary p r i o r to the a t r o c i t i e s of 1952-1953. These two elements, therefore, began to dominate the KAU, and i n -deed, at the outset, gained no mean support f o r what they advocated meant a hastier achievement of the goals set out i n 1947. Reports to Governor P h i l i p M i t c h e l l of a growing threat i n the country l e d to the outlawing of the secret or-ganization known as Mau Mau, as an " i l l e g a l s o c i e t y " . i n August of 1950. Two years l a t e r a State of Emergency was declared i n the Colony and Jomo Kenyatta was arrested and charged with managing Mau Mau. The fact that the Kikuyu was the dominant t r i b e i n the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was of l i t t l e r e a l surprise, f o r they were the most p o l i t i c a l l y active t r i b e i n Kenya, as w e l l as the most advanced. They ^occupied contiguous t e r r i t o r y to t hat of the European and came more i n contact with the modern l i f e of the white man than did other t r i b e s . The growth 25 of a p o l i t i c a l consciousness among the educated Kikuyu, therefore, was a natural outcome of t h i s association. Further-more, i t was natural that Jomo Kenyatta should become the dominant African Figure i n Kenya, f o r he was the most capable i n d i v i d u a l to r a l l y the native behind a n a t i o n a l i s t movement. That he was either unable or unwilling to control the fanat-i c a l movement which had apparently seeped into the KAU i s a matter of much controversy. However, i t would appear that at the outset he supported the aims of Mau Mau to give the A f r i -can greater control of his own country. On the other hand, 59 from the evidence produced at h i s t r i a l together with h i s own statements i t would seem that Kenyatta did not advocate or encourage the v i l e a t r o c i t i e s committed i n the early f i f -60 t i e s . That the most vicious and cruel oaths and acts a t t r i -buted to the Mau Mau rebels occurred f o r months a f t e r the arrest of Kenyatta lends support to t h i s argument. Susan Wood has succinctly explained the p o l i t i c a l developments of 1952 as "a t r a g i c revulsion against the new, and a reversion to the o l d , confused with the ambitions f o r 61 r a c i a l independence growing i n A f r i c a . " Mau Mau r e l i e d on witchcraft and superstitious fears to gain a hold on the Kikuyu. The movement grew from a p o l i t i c a l f i g h t against European domination to a r e l i g i o u s crusade which used oathing ceremonies and stark t e r r o r to lure people into i t s midst. I t s most ardent followers were Kikuyu with some education who were unable to apply t h i s knowledge to suitable," jobs. Their 26 desire f o r a role i n the newly emerging Kenya dominated by the European was frustrated by discriminatory wage laws and r e s t r i c t i o n s which prevented s o c i a l intercourse with the European. Their hopes f o r personal power, p a r t i c u l a r l y held by the younger Kikuyu, were thwarted by regulations and human sentiments not of t h e i r own making. This f r u s t r a t i o n therefore, found an outlet i n a reversion back to t h e i r o l d — but not e n t i r e l y l o s t — c u l t u r e with i t s oaths and super-s t i t i o n s . Dr. J.C. Carothers i n his study of the psychology of Mau Mau, has commented that i n the circumstances discussed above, "men tend to turn from the ways of God to those of Satan and to f i n d perverted pleasure i n a reversal of the 62 righteous r i t u a l s . " By 1 9 5 2 , therefore, the African was en-gaged i n a great struggle between past and future. The Europeans were confident that Jomo Kenyatta was the f i g u r e looming behind Mau Mau. Although the rebel-l i o u s Mau Mau used the name of Kenyatta i n t h e i r songs and oathing ceremonies, he consistently denied any d i r e c t assoc-i a t i o n with the aggressive Kikuyu. In a speech to the KAU on July 2 6 , 1 9 5 2 , Kenyatta declared: I f we unite now, each and every one of us, and each t r i b e to another, we w i l l cause the implementation i n t h i s country of that which the European c a l l s dem-ocracy. True democracy has no colour d i s t i n c t i o n . I t does not choose between black and white....God said t h i s i s our land. Land i n which we are to f l o u r i s h as a people. .We are not worried that other races are here with us i n our country, but we i n s i s t that we are the leaders here, and what we want we i n s i s t we get.... He who c a l l s us the Mau Mau i s not t r u t h f u l . We do not know t h i s thing c a l l e d Mau Mau. 63 27 These were not perhaps the words of a man a c t i v e l y engaged i n bizarre and bloody massacres on the l i v e s of helpless natives, nor were they the words of a man f a n a t i c a l l y i n -tent on ridding his country of the white man. Yet, i n spite of h i s f i n e oratory and with l i t t l e substantiated evidence, Jomo Kenyatta was arrested and charged with un-dermining the peace and order of the Colony by managing the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n . At his t r i a l Kenyatta continued to deny any d i r -ect association with Mau Mau, although he was c l e a r l y sym-pathetic to some of i t s aims. He recognized Mau Mau as a s o c i a l disease which had emerged from the p o l i t i c a l con-f l i c t between Asian, A f r i c a n and European as to how they could l i v e harmoniously together i n a m u l t i - r a c i a l society. In his defence, Jomo Kenyatta expressed the sentiments not only of his own t r i b e , but also of other t r i b e s , and indeed, of a l l A frican natives. "What we have done, and what we s h a l l continue to do," he sa i d , " i s to demand the rights of the African people as human beings....We are humans and we have families...we stand f o r the r i g h t s of the African people, 64 that Africans may f i n d a place among the nations." The African had suddenly come a l i v e to the new world about him and he d i s l i k e d his place i n society as an i n f e r i o r being to the white man. His p o l i t i c a l consciousness had been aroused and he was determined to r i s e above t h i s white supremacy. During the eight years prior to the imposition of the emergency regulations i n Kenya some constitutional pro-23 gress had been made i n the Colony and two important pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n had been introduced i n the Legis-l a t i v e Council. In 1944, the f i r s t A frican, E l i u d Mathu was appointed to Legco. In addition, an African c i v i l ser-vice had been developed and although i t was responsible to the Government, i t had considerable autonomy i n governing the a f f a i r s of the natives. The report of the C i v i l Service Commissioner i n Nairobi i n 1945 declared that "an encour-aging st a r t with l o c a l government has been made i n Kenya, 65 and further development i s foreshadowed." The year a f t e r t h i s report was published a second African was ap-pointed to the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, and i n 1948 t h i s rep-resentation was increased to four. At the same time, the Colony was achieving greater autonomy, f o r v/i&.-fch the re-organization of Legco, a Speaker was appointed, and i n addition to the Governor, there were sixteen o f f i c i a l and twenty-two u n o f f i c i a l members i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, giving the Colony an u n o f f i c i a l majority f o r the f i r s t time. Constitutional developments continued r a p i d l y and aft e r the elections i n May,1952, member-ship i n Legco jumpied to f i f t y - f o u r — t w e n t y - s i x o f f i c i a l and twenty-eight u n o f f i c i a l members. The non-Government members included fourteen elected Europeans, s i x repre-sentative Africans, s i x elected Asians, and two Arabs. The Executive Council, f o r the f i r s t time included an African to replace the European to represent native i n t e r e s t s . These new measures were c l e a r l y only temporary, f o r the Colony was w e l l on the road to becoming f u l l y self-governing. 29 However, co n s t i t u t i o n a l progress was suddenly halted with the outbreak of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n and the road to eventual independence wa;s temporarily blocked by r a c i a l s t r i f e . The outbreak of Mau Mau i n a l l i t s b e s t i a l i t y came, therefore, as the climax to a series of grievances, many of which had festered i n the Colony during a half cen-tury, some which were legitimate and some which had been twisted to conform to the w i l l of an extreme n a t i o n a l i s t movement. However, the objectives proclaimed by KAU were shared by most of the African population. Mau Mau symbolized a l l the f r u s t r a t i o n s and suspicions of the A f r i c a n , many of which had been aroused by a r a p i d l y developing p o l i t i c a l consciousness among the more educated Kikuyu. Yet, for a l l the harm i t d i d , Mau Mau created a greater awareness of the unhappy s i t u a t i o n i n Kenya and brought increased attention and hope to the m i l l i o n s of poverty-stricken Africans i n the Colony. Out of the violence which swept over the country i n the next two years were to emerge the progressive strides of the next decade, which marked the beginning of cooperation i n which r a c i a l b a r r i e r s eventually were removed, i n which the African increased h i s s k i l l s and knowledge, i n which the economy of the country continued to develop, and i n which Af r i c a n nationalism triumphed. 30 NOTES 1 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Joint Committee on Closer Union i n East A f r i c a , 1931, Vol. 2 , p.62 2 The source material f o r the pre-Mau Mau period i n Kenya's history i s l i m i t e d , f o r the most part, to secondary sources. The attitudes of the Colonial Office are best re-f l e c t e d i n the many White Papers that were published p a r t i c -u l a r l y during the twenties. The views of the white s e t t l e r community have received a sympathetic hearing from Mrs. Aldous Huxley i n her many novels and her major work on the l i f e of Lord Delamere. Lord Altrincham i n his autobiography has pointed up the close association which existed between him as Governor and the s e t t l e r s . The native point of view has received close scrutiny from W. McGregor Ross, one time member of Legco and a Director of Public Works i n Kenya. L i t t l e has been written on the t r i b e s of Kenya other than the Kikuyu. MrJUS.B. Leakey i n several works has c l e a r l y r elated the nature of the Kikuyu t r i b e and gives an excel-l e n t discussion of the customs and attitudes of t h i s t r i b e during the years leading up to Mau Mau. A handful of edu-cated Kikuyu have defended the a t t i t u d e of the A f r i c a n , a l -though most of these studies r e f l e c t the view of the p o l i t -i c a l l y conscious Kikuyu which i s more vehement i n i t s a t t i -tude to the European than i s that of the more pr i m i t i v e native who had s t i l l not experienced much of the benefits of the modern world. Dr. Norman Leys has written a useful history of the f i r s t t h i r t y years of B r i t i s h rule i n A f r i c a , sympathizing with the d i f f i c u l t i e s of both r a c i a l groups. The rol e of the Asian i n Kenya recently has been reviewed i n short accounts by L.W.Hollingsworth and George Delf. 3 W. McGregor Ross, Kenya from Within, London, George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., 1927, pp. 46-47 . 4 The t e r r i t o r y had s t r a t e g i c importance f o r the port of Mombasa acted as a counterpoise between Germans at Dar-es-Salaam and French at Diego Luarez i n Madagascar. B r i t i s h occupation of the region would give her stra t e g i c control of the headwaters of the N i l e . By encouraging European settlement, B r i t a i n would not only give Uganda access to the coast, but also a s s i s t the railway to pay f o r i t s e l f . 5 The great issue which the land d i s t r i b u t i o n was to become found i t s o r i g i n i n the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, which established the White Highlands as a European reserve. 31 6 In 1910 the growing white community had organized i t s e l f into an active group known as the European Convention of Associations, Government o f f i c i a l s i n Kenya kept i n close eontact with t h i s s e t t l e r organization, f o r they were f u l l y cognizant of the importance of the s e t t l e r and h i s land. S i r Edward Grigg, former Governor of Kenya, has commented that the Government has depended on the European community for the greater part of i t s revenue. For t h i s reason, he was opposed to heavy taxation being imposed on the r i c h , f o r fear they might become ext i n c t , " . . . i n Kenya i n any case i t would s p e l l collapse for the whole economy, and no Govern-ment there can ignore the fact or press too hard upon the European farmer." Lord Altrincham, Kenya's Opportunity, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1 9 5 5 , p. 116. 7 Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country, London, Macmillan and Co., 1 9 3 5 , v o l . 1 , p. 17. Mrs. Huxley has pointed out one instance of LordDelamere's flamboyant character when she des-cribed his d i s l i k e of English country l i f e . She writes that he had "to resort to such desperate measures for creating excitement as creeping into Whitegate church i n the middle of the night and ringing a v i o l e n t peal on the b e l l s i n order to see what the s t a r t l e d inhabitants would do." 8 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, London, Mercury Books, 1934 (republished 1961), p. 2 1 3 . 9 The pastoral Masai t r i b e , a group of proud and tough natives, had overrun several t r i b e s including the Kikuyu and had held vast land areas i n t h e i r control, although much of these remained unoccupied. See Ross, o p . c i t . , p.42. In 1902 the Kikuyu lands on the edge of the highlands were depopulated considerably (between 20% and 50%) owing to a smallpox epid-emic, a rinderpest outbreak, drought and famine, and a locust invasion which ravaged the land. This however, did not affect the ownership of the land. I t should also be noted that the idea of absolute ownership of land was unknown to a l l the t r i b e s of Kenya making i t d i f f i c u l t to determine the right of occupancy of the land. Native custom determined that land could not be alienated to anyone outside* one's family. Thus, when the Kikuyu land became unoccupied at the turn of the century, the ownership of the land was not altered and the land i t s e l f was not permanently abandoned. See Norman £eys, Kenya., London, The Hogarth Press, 1 9 2 6 , p. 51. 10 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report of the East  A f r i c a Commision. 1 9 2 5 , Cmd. 2 3 8 7 , p. 1 4 9 . 11 W. McGregor Ross c i t e s cases of 2 , 0 0 0 acres of land with only 20 acres under c u l t i v a t i o n ; 9 , 0 0 0 acres of land with only 25 acres under c u l t i v a t i o n ; and 1 2 , 0 0 0 acres of land with just 3 0 0 acres being f u l l y u t i l i z e d . In addition, Mr. Ross t e l l s of one estate of 3 , 9 0 0 acres employing only 3 2 nine natives, and another farm of 350 ,000 acres employing only 250 natives to c u l t i v a t e i t . See Ross, op. c i t . , pp. 9 6 - 9 7 . 12 The Masai t r i b e occupied large areas of land on which they l i v e d as nomads. This land was of poor q u a l i t y suitable only for grazing. However, t h i s land was considerably over-stocked, f o r a l o t : of animals were required to support a Masai family on a diet of milk and blood. Thus, the problem i n the Masai reserve was not one of improving c u l t i v a t i o n , but, as the survey of Dr. Pole Evans, a South African a g r i -c u l t u r a l expert found, one which resulted from "confining these t r i b e s to Reserves without any r e s t r i c t i o n on the stock population...has resulted i n the destruction of grazing r e s u l t i n g i n famine...." Elspeth Huxley, and Margery Perham, Race and P o l i t i c s i n Kenya, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1 9 5 6 , p. 5 2 . 13 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report of the Kenya  Land Commission, 1 9 3 4 , Cmd. 4 5 4 6 , p. 5 2 0 . Some 1 ,474 square miles were added to the native reserves as compensation for land alienated to the Europeans. I t i s reported that the Carter Report stimulated considerable i n t e r e s t among the Kikuyu. "...these people were always reading the Carter Report—they knew i t almost by heart." Huxley and Perham, op.c i t . , p. 3 7 . 14 L.S.B. Leakey, Kenya—Contrasts and Problems, London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1936, p. 1 0 2 . 15 Muga Giearu, Land of Sunshine, London, Lawrence and Wishart L t d . , 1 9 5 8 , p. 7 4 . 16 Huxley and Perham, op . c i t . , p. 6 1 . 17 Often t h i s was a t t r i b u t e d to la z i n e s s but i n many cases could more accurately be attr i b u t e d to a desire to remain on the reserve where the African's family and plots of land were more a t t r a c t i v e to him. See Leys, op.cit ., pp. 2 0 4 - 2 0 6 . 18 Giearu, o p . c i t . , p. 17 . 19 Ross, op . c i t . , pp.92-98. 20 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya-Compulsory  Labour f o r Government Purposes, 1 9 2 5 , Cmd. 2 4 6 4 . 21 For the view of one o f f i c i a l sympathetic to the native point of view, see F.H. Goldsmith, ed., John Ainsworth, Pioneer Kenya Administrator 1864-1.9A6, London, Macmillan and Co., 1 9 5 9 . 33 22 Many Africans served side by side with Europeans during World War One. They gained a greater insight into the modern world and on t h e i r return to Kenya and to t h e i r Reserves they were anxious to gain many of the benefits common to modern society. This p a r t i a l l y explains the emergence of some p o l i t i c a l consciousness i n the African community. 23 Two grievances included the burden of taxation and the Kipande. The burden of taxation i n the Colony i n 1923 was: European t 1 6 2 , 7 7 5 ; Indian £ 4 6 , 7 9 0 ; African t 5 0 1 , 6 1 5 . The figure f o r the Af r i c a n i s the sum paid i n hut and p o l l tax. i'he European paid about L 9 P 0 0 i n p o l l tax. The remain-der of his tax was derived from such items as harbour fees, r e g i s t r a t i o n fees, game licences, l i q u o r licences, stamp duties ( t 3 6 , 0 0 0 ) , court fees and f i n e s (L 3 3 , 0 0 0 ) , h o s p i t a l fees (L 7 , 0 0 0 ) , school fees (t 5 , 2 0 0 ) , and interest on loans (t 5 5 , 0 0 0 ) . With the European exempt from an income tax burden i t was clear that the African was bearing the greater tax burden, and that the poor rather than the r i c h i n the Colony were carrying the heavier tax load. See Leys, o p . c i t . , pp. 3 5 2 - 3 6 0 . The Kipande was a native r e g i s t r a t i o n c e r t i -f i c a t e containing the f i n g e r p r i n t s of the native labourer. I t was placed i n a metal container and worn around the neck. With the tr a n s i t o r y nature of many of the Africans, i t served as a useful means of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n f o r the European employers i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to keep tab of. t h e i r workers. 24 Huxley, White Man's Country, v o l . 2 , pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 . 25 Proposals under the Wood-Winterton agreement of September, 1 9 2 2 , which would enfranchise about 10$ of the Indian population i n Kenya, and would maintain unrestricted immigration, were e n t i r e l y unacceptable to the Europeans. They believed that t h i s would not assure development of Kenya as a " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y and d i s t i n c t i v e l y B r i t i s h colony." The s e t t l e r s threatened to kidnap the Governor to draw attention to the s i t u a t i o n i n the Colony, i f the proposals were not withdrawn. 26 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Indians i n Kenya-Memorandum, 1 9 2 3 , Cmd. 1 9 2 2 , p. 10 27 Altrincham, op.cit., p. 203 28 S i r Edward Grigg on becoming governor described Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin as having l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l or c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s and though "he had appointed me to Kenya, I found i t useless to t a l k to him about the Colony's a f f a i r s . " I b i d . , p. 2 1 1 . See also Win-ston C h u r c h i l l , Memoirs of the Second World War, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1 9 5 9 , p. 1 0 4 . 34 29 Joint Committee on Closer Union i n East A f r i c a , p.284. 30 Robert Gregory, Sidney Webb and East A f r i c a , Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1962. See also Cmd. 2 3 8 7 , and Cmd. 2 9 0 4 . 31 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report of the Com-mission on Closer Union of the Dependencies i n Eastern and  Central A f r i c a . 1 9 2 9 , Cmd. 3 2 3 4 , p. 4 0 . 32 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Memorandum on Native  Policy i n East A f r i c a , 1 9 3 0 , Cmd. 3 5 7 3 , p. 4 . 33 An example of the ine q u i t i e s i n the tax structure may be seen from the following figures: Net National Income for 1930* L M i l l i o n L per Head Afri c a n 3 . 2 0 1 .1 Indian 0 . 7 5 1 8 . 8 European 3 . 5 4 2 0 8 . 2 * S. and K. Aaronovitch, C r i s i s i n Kenya, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1 9 4 7 , p. 1 5 1 . Revenue Collected i n 1 9 3 1 * European African Direct Tax t 4 2 , 5 9 6 t 5 3 0 , 8 7 7 Indirect Tax 3 3 4 , 4 7 7 1 9 9 , 1 8 1 Other Tax Revenue 1 0 9 , 1 1 3 11,446 Other Revenue (Not Tax) 1 7 9 , 5 9 5 49,596 Total 6 6 5 , 7 8 1 7 9 1 , 0 0 0 * Aaronovitch, op. c i t . , p. 161. 34 Cmd. 3573, op. c i t . , p. 14. 35 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Statement of His  Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as Regards Closer  Union i n East A f r i c a , 1930. Cmd. 3574. P. 7. 36 East African Standard, July 19, 1930, c i t e d i n Gregory, op . c i t . , p. 119. 35 37 Richard K.P. Pankhmrst, Kenya: The History  of Two Nations, London, Independent Publishing Co., 1955, pp.68-69. See Also Huxley and Perham, op.cit ., pp, 110-111. 38 Several African witnesses did appear before the Carter Land Commission:: i n 1932 i n London. 39 Parmenas Githendu Mockerie, An African Speaks f o r His People, London, Hogarth Press, 1934, p. 42. 40 Around the turn of the century the mission-a r i e s attempted to teach the African a trade or new methods of agri c u l t u r e to a s s i s t him i n meeting h i s expenses. Roland Oli v e r has written: "What l i t t l e evidence there i s suggests that i n d u s t r i a l education too often l i f t e d Africans out of t h e i r own society only to enmeshthem i n the web of European economic enterprise . Certainly technical education did not, l i k e l i t e r a r y education, develop into a mass move-ment, i n which the pupils of the European missionary themselves became teachers, supporting themselves d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y on indigenous contributions." This quotation also points up the shortage of i n -structors for l i t e r a r y education. See Roland O l i v e r , The Missionary Factor i n East A f r i c a . London, New York, and Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952, pp. 213-215, 265. 41 L.S.B. Leakey, D ef eat i n g Mau Mau. London, Methuen and Co.Ltd., 1954, pp. 132-133. See also L.S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952, pp.77. 42 The draft estimates f o r the Colony i n 1923 showed a d e f i c i t of fe 381,000. As a consequence the expenditure on education was reduced from fe 69,320 to fe 53,175 out of a t o t a l budget of fe 1,823,909. The r a c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of the education funds was: European t 21^140 or about fe 22 per c h i l d of school age; Indian fe 8,720 or about fe 2 5 sh per c h i l d of school age; African fe 22,680 or about 1 sh per c h i l d of school age. Because thetcosts of education were so pr o h i b i t i v e missions assumed t h i s task because they could hire people at much le s s expense than could the Government. At the same time, however, the low wages did not always a t t r a c t the best q u a l i f i e d i n s t r u c t o r s . 3 6 43 Cmd. 2387, o p . c i t . . p. 175. 44 I b i d . , p. 50. 45 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report by  the F i n a n c i a l Commissioner (Lord Moyne) on Certain  Questions i n Kenya. 1932, Cmd. 4093, p. 30. 4 6 I b i d . . pp. 30-31. 47 Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. pp.112-113. 48 Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau. pp.41-52. See also Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu. pp.60-62; Canon T.F.C. Bewes, "Kikuyu R e l i g i o n , Old and New," African  A f f a i r s . Vol. 52 (1953), p. 208. 49 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , H i s t o r i c a l  Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, I960. Cmd. 1030, p. 285. 50 In West A f r i c a the natives had been i n con-tact with the white man f o r more than three hundred years, a sharp contrast to the s i t u a t i o n i n Kenya. Also, there were few s e t t l e r s i n West A f r i c a com-pared to the number i n Kenya. In the Gold Coast (Ghana) in1949 an a l l - A f r i c a n committee of f o r t y was appointed to write a new constitution f o r the country. In Nigeria a new constitution i n 1946 es-tablished a central l e g i s l a t u r e for the f i r s t time. In 1952 another constitution made substantial con-cessions to n a t i o n a l i s t pressure and greatly extended Nigerian poxirer i n the regional assemblies and central l e g i s l a t u r e . In Tanganyika and Uganda, unlike Kenya, there i s no o f f i c i a l colour bar, nor i s there con-fusion over the. ownership of the land. In Tanganyika only about 1.3% of the l a r d i n 1950 was white-owned. For t h i s reason there was not the r a c i a l problem which existed i n Kenya. Gradual progress toward s e l f -government occurred i n both countries with substantial increases i n African representation i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Councils. In Tanganyika i n 1949 a committee on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development of the country was estab-l i s h e d . In 1952, equal representation of the three races was granted on the u n o f f i c i a l side of an en-larged council with Africans having seven members (increase of three). In Uganda i n 1950 the compo-s i t i o n of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council was expanded to i n -clude sixteen o f f i c i a l members and sixteen u n o f f i c i a l s including eight Africans (an increase of four) , four Europeans, and four Asians. One B r i t i s h remark i n Tanganyika perhaps ref l e c t e d the different climate of 37 opinion there as compared with that i n Kenya: "We're more than eager to l e t the people here have responsible government—if only to show them how d i f f i c u l t i t i s to make i t work." John Gunther, Inside A f r i c a . New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955, p. 411. 51 Cmd. 1030, op.cit.. p. 40. 52 George Delf, Jomo Kenyatta: Towards Truth  about "The Light of Kenya". New York, Doubleday and Co., 1961, p. 23. 53 Cmd. 1030, o p . c i t . , pp. 47-48. 54 I b i d . , p. 49. 55 Negley Parson, Last Chance i n A f r i c a . New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950, p. 127. 56 Pankhurst, o p . c i t . . pp. 80, 81. 57 Giearu, o p . c i t . . p. 155. 53 Farson, o p . c i t . , p. 114. 59 Delf, o p . c i t . , pp. 182-187. 60 See Montagu S l a t e r , The T r i a l of Jomo  Kenyatta. London, Seeker and Warburg, 1955. 61 Susan Wood, Kenya: The Tensions of Progress. London, New York, and Nairobi, Oxford University Press, I960, p. 32. 62 Dr. J.C. Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau. Nair o b i , Government P r i n t e r , 1955, p. 17. 38 63 Cmd. 1 0 3 0 , op.cit., p.302. 64 Delf, o p . c i t . . p. I 8 5 . 65 Report of the C i v i l Service Commissioner. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1 9 4 5 , p. 1 6 . 39 CHAPTER TWO POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES 1953-1959 The outbreak of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n t r a g i c a l l y underlined the growing i n t e n s i t y of African nationalism i n Kenya. At the same time, i t introduced a new and d i f f i c u l t period i n the co n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l development of the Colony. The f i n a l years of co l o n i a l rule possessed two d i s t i n c t i v e phases each one of which was generally charac-t e r i s t i c of a much broader movement involving most of the African continent. The thrust of African ;nationalism i n the post-Mau Mau decade i n B r i t i s h colonies i n both East and West A f r i c a was i n f l u e n t i a l i n determining the attitudes and reactions of those active i n the a f f a i r s of Kenya. The f i r s t period between 1953 and 1959 was characterized i n Kenya by a continuation of the old policy of partnership as d i s t i n c t from the p o l i t i c a l paramountcy of the Afric a n . The second phase introduced formally by the 'wind of change' speech delivered by the B r i t i s h Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, i n South A f r i c a i n February, I960, gave o f f i c i a l recognition to the changing p o l i t i c a l climate i n the continent. In addition, t h i s speech f o r e t o l d the end of B r i t i s h colonialism i n Kenya and the triumph of African nationalism. During t h i s f i n a l period i n the struggle f o r African independence, the African leaders c l e a r l y heeded the words of the champion of African 40 nationalism, Kwame Nkrumah, when he declared: "Seek ye f i r s t the p o l i t i c a l kingdom and everything else s h a l l be added i unto you." During the Mau Mau Emergency between 1953 and 1959 the p o l i t i c a l and co n s t i t u t i o n a l development of Kenya was characterized by a three-pronged struggle f o r power and i n -fluence i n the Colony. The c o n f l i c t i n g motives of the Col-o n i a l O f f i c e , the European s e t t l e r s , and the African nation-a l i s t s , were a l l involved i n t h i s clash of personalities and p o l i c i e s . The dilemma faced by each of these participants can be c l e a r l y shown i n t h e i r response to the challenge of Afri c a n nationalism. For each one a fear of what the future held coloured h i s a t t i t u d e . In the end, however, there could be l i t t l e doubt that the t i d e of African nationalism could not be turned back. Kenya too, would be caught up by the wave of nationalism sweeping throughout the African con-ti n e n t . In 1947 the b i r t h of Pakistan and the granting of independence to India marked the culmination of the t r a d i -t i o n a l policy of B r i t i s h colonialism. The gradual evolution i n the delegation of p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the i n d i -genous populations had been the foundation on which Common-wealth nations had been b u i l t . This p o l i c y had been followed i n the Indian sub-continent. S i m i l a r l y , the Colonial O f f i c e believed, i t should be adopted i n A f r i c a . Following the Second World War signs of a p o l i t i c a l awakening i n A f r i c a 41 c l e a r l y emerged and the Colonial Office recognized that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and representation i n government must now be gradually given to the A f r i c a n . Kenya was to be no exception. I t followed, therefore, that the f i r s t A f r i c a n , E l i u d % t h u y entered the L e g i s l a t i v e Council i n 1944. So, too, i n Tanganyika and Uganda Africans entered the p o l i t -i c a l arena. In West A f r i c a where educational and economic developments were considerably more advanced than i n East A f r i c a , the p o l i t i c a l f r u s t r a t i o n of the African was met by the granting of responsible government to the Gold Coast i n 1951. The r e a l i t y of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n West A f r i c a was recognized by the Colonial Office which super-vised the t r a n s i t i o n a l period between Colonial r u l e and African rule.3h East A f r i c a , however, the Europeans had exercised authority and influence f o r only a r e l a t i v e l y short period. A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l development was i n i t s i n -fancy and although there were s t i r r i n g s of black n a t i o n a l -ism, the Colonial Office d i d not consider them to be a potent force. In the eyes of the Colonial O f f i c e , the prospects f o r African self-government remained remote, for A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were s t i l l i n a primitive stage. In Kenya the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l policy was being followed but the events of 1952 upset the calcu-l a t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. The primary concern of the Colonial Office i n the years immed-4-2 i a t e l y following Mau iv*au was to restore order and protect the country's people: With t h i s objective i n mind, the Colonial Secretaries s t i l l faced a dilemma a r i s i n g out of the c o n f l i c t i n g desires of the s e t t l e r s and the national-i s t s . B r i t a i n could not deny the contribution the s e t t l e r s had made to the economic development of Kenya and, as a r e s u l t , the demands for continued s e t t l e r predominance i n the p o l i t i c s of the country could not be ignored. At the same time, however, the increasing n a t i o n a l i s t i c fervour among the Africans was a direct challenge to the prominent role of the s e t t l e r s . I f the Colonial Office supported f u l l y the views of the s e t t l e r s the threat of renewed v i o -lence by the Africans would be seriously increased*. If,how-ever, the demands of the n a t i o n a l i s t s were to be met, many European s e t t l e r s , i t was feared, would f l e e the country leaving i t i n p o l i t i c a l and economic chaos. Owing to t h i s i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t , throughout the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s Colonial policy r e f l e c t e d an uncertainty about the future d i r e c t i o n of developments i n Kenya. The growth of Afr i c a n nationalism was not peculiar to Kenya alone. In B r i t a i n ' s African colonies nationalism had f i r s t appeared i n West A f r i c a , where educational and economic advancement of the African was ahead of that i n East A f r i c a . For these reasons the Colonial Office granted increased power to the African i n preparation f o r the grad-ual t r a n s i t i o n from c o l o n i a l rule to self-government and eventually to independence. Africans i n East A f r i c a were 43 not unaware of constitutional developments i n West A f r i c a , and the surge of African nationalism soon grew into a potent force i n East A f r i c a . As a r e s u l t , Africans i n Tanganyika and Uganda gained increased p o l i t i c a l respon-s i b i l i t y . In Kenya, however, p o l i t i c a l evolution, of the African by 1952 already was lagging behind that of his neighbours, owing p a r t i c u l a r l y to the entrenched p o l i t i c -a l power of the European s e t t l e r s . African nationalism, however, was growing i n Kenya and demands fo r increased r e s p o n s i b i l i t y were beooming more vocal. From the point of view of the Colonial O f f i c e , i t was clear that Kenya was but one of several areas, each one progressing at a d i f f e r e n t rate towards independence. As increased power was extended to the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Tanganyika during the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s , the Colonial Office found i t necessary to extend certain c o n s t i t u t i o n a l concessions to Kenya Africans i n spite of the Emergency. The rate at which p o l i t i c a l power was being extended to theAfrican i n East A f r i c a , however, indicated that the Colonial Office did not recognize the tremendous force that African nationalism had become i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . While the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n and the sudden r i s e of African nationalism upset the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h colon-i a l p o l i c y , i t also created tremendous fears among the European s e t t l e r community. P o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l and economically prosperous, the s e t t l e r s were i n a favoured p o s i t i o n i n Kenya. By 1950 t h e i r long established goal of 44 self-government was almost a r e a l i t y . Yet, with the abrupt outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1952 the entire future of the European s e t t l e r i n Kenya was placed i n jeopardy. Fear of physical violence and economic disaster was the immediate reaction of the European s e t t l e r s to the n a t i o n a l i s t up-r i s i n g . For some Europeans Mau Mau imbued within them an awareness of the growing p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the African and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of African r u l e i n the country, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t of developments i n Ghana. For others i t strengthened t h e i r sense of superiority over the African , not so much from a r a c i a l standpoint as from a f e e l i n g of c u l t u r a l and economic superiority. In the nine-t e e n - f i f t i e s , the a t t i t u d e of many Europeans i n Kenya tended to confirm the b e l i e f that "many emotionally, c u l t u r a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s react to a sojourn abroad ...with a f a r stronger assertion of nationalism and of 2 allegiance to t h e i r own language, culture and people." Pride i n the contribution they had made to the development of Kenya was r e f l e c t e d i n the a t t i t u d e of many conservative s e t t l e r s . Their e f f o r t s to create a viable 'white man's country' i n t r o p i c a l A f r i c a had a l l but come true. The emergence of a number of vocal and p o l i t i c a l l y conscious A f r i c a n s , however, upset the dynamic prospects envisaged by the European s e t t l e r s . To grant leadership to a group of p o l i t i c a l l y immature and economically impover-ished Africans was a decision which many Europeans were un-w i l l i n g to face i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . Not only concerned 45 about t h e i r own personal future, these Europeans were anxious about the future of Kenya should a group of inex-perienced and unqualified Africans assume control over the country's administration. These Europeans, while not nec-e s s a r i l y opposed to some Africans achieving responsible positions i n the country, d i d , however, believe that they themselves were far more capable of running Kenya. They f a i l e d to appreciate the changing ti d e of events that was remoulding the face of A f r i c a , and instead looked forward to many more years of European domination i n the a f f a i r s of Kenya. Thus, i n the post-Mau Mau decade when African nationalism began to gain momentum i n East A f r i c a , the European s e t t l e r s attempted to c l i n g to the status quo. Few were immediately w i l l i n g to accept African p o l i t i c a l domin-ati o n , although some were w i l l i n g to make d e f i n i t e contrib-utions to r a c i a l harmony. This l a t t e r group,however, was branded as t r a i t o r s by t h e i r fellow s e t t l e r s . Clearly the dilemma which faced the European s e t t l e r s was one which challenged t h e i r basic security. In attempting to side-track the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the conservative s e t t l e r s were not r e a l l y exercising r a c i a l bigotry, but were instead, reacting to a threat to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l way of l i f e , and to Sthe: future of the Kenya which they envisaged. S e l f - i n t e r -est and security on the one hand were challenged on the other by p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of change. Many of the s e t t l e r s , therefore, continued to grasp at the 46 l a s t vestige of p o l i t i c a l predominance. Out of t h i s attitude emerged increased suspicions and fears among the Africans. For the African the period between 1953 and 1959 was marked by a great surge of nationalism stimu-lated both by the Mau Mau uprising and by const i t u t i o n a l progress made elsewhere i n A f r i c a . Despite the l i m i t a -tions imposed by the Emergency regulations, the drive f o r African independence received the whole attention of A f r i -can n a t i o n a l i s t s . Progress towards responsible government made i n Ghana was a vigourous force standing behind the African a a t i o n a l i s t s . In addition, the almost crusading nature of Mau Mau aroused the p o l i t i c a l consciousness of numerous Africans and drove them to seek as much p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and representation as possible. The essential cause f o r which Mau Mau was f i g h t i n g gained popular support i n the Colony, and despite the f a c t that i t s leaders were imprisoned, many of the goals of Mau Mau continued to be sought by the new generation of African n a t i o n a l i s t s . In s t r i v i n g f or independence .the African was faced with a dilemma over the degree to which he should push f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Stimulated by Mau Mau the Africans urged t h e i r leaders to press f o r every possible gain. The l i b e r a l Europeans advised the African to seek greater i n f l u -ence through cooperation and the process of co n s t i t u t i o n a l evolution. The Colonial Office with an eye on the rest of the continent granted the African concessions to meet his 47 immediate demands, yet would not give any i n d i c a t i o n of what the ultimate destiny of the country was to be. With these pressures upon him the African faced a d i f f i c u l t period i n his p o l i t i c a l development i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . The successful African leaders had to r i s e above t r i b a l l o y a l t i e s and gain popularity through a national appeal. Independence provided the vehicle for success. For t h i s reason, African p o l i t i c i a n s were forced to make almost impossible demands of the Colonial Office i n order to s a t i s f y t h e i r people and maintain t h e i r p o s ition of leadership. Should they lose control of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement a return to the violence of Mau Mau remained a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . Moderate Africans would be threatened, Europeans would be forced out of the country and with them would go the wealth and technol-ogical knowledge so necessary f o r the future of the country. Thus, the dilemma facing the African was to what extremes he could go i n his demands for power. The more responsible African leaders were cognizant of the f a c t that independence was not enough to bring about improved l i v i n g standards for. the native peoples. Yet, because of the pressure from below which i d e n t i f i e d independence with the good l i f e African leaders had t o demand from the Colonial Office f a r more than most of them knew was possible. In so doing they could main-t a i n t h e i r leadership and yet prevent the powerful national-i s t sentiments from overwhelming them. A f i n a l feature exercising influence over the as-pir a t i o n s of African n a t i o n a l i s t s was the f i g u r e of Jomo 48" Kenyatta. Absent from his country for nearly f i f t e e n years, Kenyatta returned to spark a crusade for independence. He successfully rose above t r i b a l allegiances and gained pop-u l a r support throughout Kenya. With his imprisonment his popularity increased, for he had only one commitment to the Africans of Kenya, and that was to achieve independence. I t was for t h i s reason that he became the powerful figure of the independence movement and the ominous shadow looming over the heads of those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l negotiations. Intertwined tortoo«gn the three participants i n t h i s struggle f o r power were the Governor and the Kenya Gov-ernment. Their role e s s e n t i a l l y , was to maintain law and order i n the Colony, prevent the reemergence of Mau Mau, and promote economic and s o c i a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i n the country. In a d d i t i o n , as new constitutions were introduced i n the Colony the Governor and his Government were faced with the d i f f i c u l t task of seeking agreement and cooper-ation among Africans and Europeans i n the implementation of new p o l i c i e s . The L e g i s l a t i v e Council thus became the proving platform for the experimental p o l i c i e s of the Col-o n i a l O f f i c e . As the events following Mau Mau unfolded i n Kenya the t r i a n g u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p involving the Colonial O f f i c e , the European s e t t l e r s , and the African n a t i o n a l i s t s became clear. Their c o n f l i c t i n g motives and the dilemmas which each faced were c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r reactions to the 49 p o l i t i c a l and co n s t i t u t i o n a l developments i n Kenya, The immediate effect of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n became clear when S i r Evelyn Baring a r r i v e d i n the Colony and proclaimed a State of Emergency. African p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was quickly halted. The r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the Governor were, as might be expected, directed primarily at the Kikuyu, but the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of other Kenya t r i b e s also were consid-erably l i m i t e d . Members of the Kikuyu t r i b e were debarred from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n any p o l i t i c a l organizations, and indeed, tens of thousands were sent to various detention camps through-out the northern regions of the Colony for much of the duration of the emergency. No p o l i t i c a l organizations such as the pro-scribed Kenya African Union were to be tolerated, as a l l national groupings were prohibited. In addition, not u n t i l 1955, were l o c a l or regional African p o l i t i c a l parties per-mitted. This r u l e i n i t i a l l y served to accent the t r i b a l d i f f -erences i n Kenya and f o r t h i s reason delayed the development of a t r u l y colony-wide n a t i o n a l i s t movement. When t r i b a l p o l i t i c a l parties were again permitted, severe r e s t r i c t i o n s were s t i l l imposed. No p o l i t i c a l meetings were to be held i n public without police permission, and even then they were l i m i t e d i n the size of the gathering. At the outset no p o l i t i c a l organization was permitted to have more than forty-nine percent of i t s membership from the Afr i c a n race. These restrictions,; while undoubtedly discouraging the b i r t h of other subversive movements i n the Colony, did create 50 more f r u s t r a t i o n s and suspicions among the African people. The Emergency regulations at f i r s t slowed down the nation-a l i s t movement which had been growing since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, they removed the Kikuyu from t h e i r dominant position and encouraged other Kenya t r i b e s to become increasingly p o l i t i c a l l y conscious by o f f e r -ing greater opportunities f o r them i n Nairobi. One such t r i b e was the Luo. The Luo, the second largest t r i b e i n Kenya, was f o r the most part, unscathed by the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n . Be-cause Mau Mau was under Kikuyu leadership, the greatest im-pact was f e l t by that t r i b e — a t r i b e which the Luo strongly d i s l i k e d , and whose leadership they were un w i l l i n g to accept. With the a c t i v i t i e s of the Kikuyu, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Nairobi, c u r t a i l e d by the Emergency regulations, the members of the Luo t r i b e moved into Nairobi to f i l l the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Kikuyu. Many gained employment in the c i t y while others entered the p o l i t i c a l forum, with the re-s u l t that the Luo t r i b e emerged i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s as the dominant Af r i c a n group i n Kenya. One of the most b r i l l -i ant of African n a t i o n a l i s t s , Tom Mboya, rose to p o l i t i c a l prominence during t h i s period and has been a powerful force on the Kenya p o l i t i c a l stage ever since. Often described as "the angry young man of A f r i c a " , Mboya became conscious of the i n j u s t i c e s suffered by some Africans when he worked as a sanitary inspector i n Nairobi. "Very quickly I came to see 51 how unjust i t was, that I should receive ten pounds a month f o r my work," said Mboya, "while my colleagues, the white inspectors, received f i v e times that much f o r doing no more 3 and no l e s s than I d i d . " Mboya, therefore, joined the KAU shortly before i t was proscribed, but he never became involved i n Mau Mau, and at twenty-three he remained the only promin-ent n a t i o n a l i s t s t i l l at l i b e r t y i n Kenya. He f e l t extremely b i t t e r over the fact that thousands of blameless Africans were held i n detention camps, victims of the actions of the f a n a t i c Mau Mau. Mboya soon rose to prominence as General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, which he desribed as being "so vigorous i n fact that i t was able to play, during that Emergency, a p o l i t i c a l role r a r e l y demanded of trade unions and t h e i r leaders." Thus, Mboya's trade union helped f i l l the vacuum i n African p o l i t i c a l organization, and i n spite of the Emergency he was able to maintain much of the momentum of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, and to develop and ex-tend i t . Even h i s p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s , who d i s l i k e d Mboya's arrogant ways, could not deny h i s b r i l l i a n t a b i l i t i e s . Michael B l u n d e l l , the p r i n c i p a l European figure during the pre-indep-endence decade, declared i n l a t e 1 9 6 3 : "Measured i n terms of ambition, a b i l i t y and general demagogic power, he should to-5 day be the undisputed leader of Kenya...." During the period between 1 9 5 3 and 1 9 5 9 Mboya d i r -ected his attacks at the B r i t i s h Colonial Office and what he 52 considered to be a policy of d r i f t and delay. Throughout the early n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s the B r i t i s h and Kenya Governments directed t h e i r attention towards f i g h t i n g the Mau Mau rebel-l i o n and by 1956 the back of the t e r r o r i s t organization had been broken with the c i v i l o f f i c i a l s taking over authority from the m i l i t a r y i n combatting the rebels. From 1956 to 1959 pockets of Mau Mau adherents continued to reappear, causing anxiety among o f f i c i a l sources who feared a f u l l scale renewal of the a t r o c i t i e s of 1952-1953* For t h i s reason, government o f f i c i a l s i n Kenya and B r i t a i n were cautious i n promoting the p o l i t i c a l and co n s t i t u t i o n a l dev-elopment of the African. During the early years of the Emergency the old dual p o l i c y was, i n essence, being carried on by the Kenya and B r i t i s h Governments disguised as a ' m u l t i - r a c i a l partner- ^ ship' ih.which a l l segments of the r a c i a l l y divided country were to receive more equal representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t appeared to the leaders of the Af r i c a n community that the •m u l t i - r a c i a l partnership' policy merely guaranteed a con-tinuation of the dominant p o s i t i o n of the European i n Kenya a f f a i r s . Omitted from the negotiations over future c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l developments i n the Colony, and lacking t h e i r nation-wide p o l i t i c a l organization, the Africans turned to the Leg-i s l a t i v e Council as a sounding-board for t h e i r grievances over ladk of greater representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In,, the Legco debates i n July, 1953, the leading African delegate E l i u d Mathu, pointed up the need for a coordinating voluntary 53 p o l i t i c a l organization for the A f r i c a n people to take the place of the proscribed KAU. Mr. Mathu was w i l l i n g to con-cede that such an organization should adhere to the re-quired emergency regulations. "Our intention i s that we should cooperate with anybody who i s interested i n t h i s matter to produce a c o n s t i t u t i o n , " said Mr. Mathu, "which w i l l enable the African people to express t h e i r p o l i t i c a l aspirations i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l manner and i n the most 6 ef f e c t i v e way possible." Most of the A f r i c a n and Asian representatives quite correctly advanced the b e l i e f that the Mau Mau uprising had increased i n i n t e n s i t y since the declaration of the Emergency and they attributed t h i s to the f a c t that there was no natural outlet for African p o l -i t i c a l consciousness. The African community had, at the outset, been w i l l i n g to accept armult'i—racial p o l i c y i n Kenya provided that there was a true opportunity t o share ideas and res-p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Mr. Mathu and h i s colleagues c l e a r l y looked on m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m as being a p o l i c y of equality i n the ad-ministration of the Colony. This, however, was a f a r cry from the meaning of the term as accepted by many Europeans. Commenting on t h i s Tnew' p o l i c y , Mr. Mathu remarked: . . . i n order to carry that policy of partnership f o r -ward, the European Elected Members, the Indian Con-gress and the African organization should co-operate on a p o l i t i c a l plane together. That partnership i s not possible now because we have not got such an organization when the other communities, the non-Afri-can communities, have t h e i r organizations carrying on almost as usual.7 54 The reaction of the European members to t h i s demand f o r a national A f r i c a n organization, was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r attitude throughout the m i d - f i f t i e s * — " the present time i s 8 not opportune." This at t i t u d e r e f l e c t e d the concern for t h e i r future security i n the Colony, and pointed up the s e t t l e r s ' f e a r of physical violence at the hands of Mau Mau adherents. In addition, a reluctance to recognize Mau Mau as nothing but a bizarre t r i b a l u p r i s i n g , rather than as a movement f i l l e d with elements of nationalism, influenced t h e i r views. At t h i s point few Europeans were w i l l i n g to acknowledge that African nationalism had become a potent force i n the Colony. Mr. B l u n d e l l , considered, to be a mod-erate among the Europeans, suggested that the time f o r re-forming A f r i c a n organizations was poor owing to the serious-ness of the Mau Mau c r i s i s , but as was his way, he l e f t the door to future discussions on the matter s l i g h t l y a j a r , when he added: "I am quite certain that we are unwise to stop the free expansion of Afr i c a n p o l i t i c a l opinion...we...should make i t p e r f e c t l y clear that we have no objection to the 9 proper growth of an Afr i c a n p o l i t i c a l organization." The general cloudiness of the issue was perhaps best expressed by the capable Asian member of Legco, Mr. A.B.Patel, when he expressed his view on the matter: We are again and again t o l d , 'Mr. Speaker, i n t h i s Council and outside t h i s Council that people of t h i s country should develop an all-Kenya outlook and behave as Kenyans. In spite of that, i n practice we are being put i n the position o f developing t r i b a l , r e l i g i o u s and r a c i a l outlooks and we act as small groups as 55 10 t r i b e s or races and r e l i g i o n s . This exchange of views f i n a l l y saw a moderation i n the Europeans' view and they agreed to discussions on what form such an organization should take. Mr. Mathu, a Kik-uyu himself, suggested that t r i b e s other than the Kikuyu should not be penalized for the Mau Mau a t r o c i t i e s and he agreed that a Colony-wide African p o l i t i c a l organization could exclude the Kikuyu f o r a period of time. As a con-sequence, a l l groups agreed to immediate consultation on the matter, with the actual formation of an African p o l -i t i c a l movement "when the time i s opportune." Thus, t h i s subtle change i n wording served to pacify f o r a time the demands of the Africans. Both the Africans and the u n o f f i c i a l European representatives were a g i t a t i n g f o r a greater share i n the conduct of the A f f a i r s of the Colony. The Emergency had disrupted the working of the Government and Mr. Blundell i n a l e t t e r to Governor Baring recorded his anxiety i n t h i s manner: "What I do wish to record i s that I am cer-t a i n that our p o l i t i c a l structure w i l l hot survive the s t r a i n of the Emergency and i t s tensions, etc. unless we make i t more f l e x i b l e and more representative of U n o f f i c i a l 11 opinion, and especially European opinion.?' Clearly, the s e t t l e r community feared for t h e i r very l i v e s at the hands of the Mau Mau t e r r o r i s t s , and were w i l l i n g to take things 12 into t h e i r own hands by gaining control of Legco. F a i l i n g 56 to achieve a share i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of Government when the Emergency was imposed, the Opposition l e d by Mr. Blundell dispatched a delegation to London i n March,1953, to have conversations with Secretary of State S i r Oliver L y t t e l t o n . Through interviews on t e l e v i s i o n and i n the newspapers Mr. B l u n d e l l was able to t e l l the B r i t i s h pub-l i c of the chaotic s i t u a t i o n i n Kenya. The savage L a r i Massacre on March 26, 1953, i n which dozens of helpless men, women and children were v i c i o u s l y attacked, maimed, and murdered, both helped and hindered Mr. B l u n d e l l 1 s cause i n the United Kingdom. The b r u t a l i t y displayed by the L a r i attack l a r g e l y eliminated what sympathy there was f o r the Mau Mau, but at the same time i t tended to consolidate the opinion of the Colonial O f f i c e that i t would be too dangerous to give the "unofficials"too large a say i n the administration of Kenya. By l a t e 1953 the distance between the views of the African and the European i n Kenya had become wider. Hopelessness f o r the future together with an obvious un-willingness to cooperate and compromise with the Africans on an equal footing characterized much of the European opinion. Michael Blundell•commenting on discussions within the U n o f f i c i a l ^embers Organization, declared that the "African ideas as to the future p o l i t i c a l advance f o r t h e i r people seemed so unreal i n the l i g h t of the modest place which a number of the Europeans were prepared to offer that 57 14 no r e a l acco»wsdation between our views seemed possible." Blundell advocated a m u l t i - r a c i a l executive to combat the threat of Mau Mau and f e l t that t h i s would be the best weapon with which to f i g h t the t e r r o r i s t s . Although Blundell championed a m u l t i - r a c i a l government i t was Mr. J.S. Patel who perhaps best defined what t h i s phrase meant to Kenya: M u l t i - r a c i a l Government i s , I think, that which w i l l give Kenya a leadership throughout the whole w o r l d — by proving the id e a l that a l l three races can l i v e together peacefully and w i l l , provided that p r i n c i p l e i s backed up without undue bickering and without un-necessary r a c i a l prejudices and working i t from an angle of the good of the people and the good of the This policy of partnership, however, became a d i v i s i v e force rather than a unifying one and r a c i a l groupings drew further apart while deep d i v i s i o n s of opinion arose among the Euro-pea n s — d i v i s i o n s which were never to be f u l l y mended. Blun-d e l l , one of the few Europeans who sensed the increasing n a t i o n a l i s t i c sentiments among the Africans, saw at t h i s time that m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m might provide a means of appeasing the A f r i c a n s , yet, at the same time, slowing down t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t movement. In making these f i r s t hesitant steps to improve the r a c i a l climate i n Kenya, Blundell was looked at with suspicion by Afr i c a n leaders, and with contempt by his more conservative f e l l o w s e t t l e r s . The former saw his ideas as a means to maintain European domination by granting the Africans some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y while at the same time i n -creasing u n o f f i c i a l European influence i n the government of country 53 the country. The l a t t e r saw i n Blundell's proposals the f i r s t steps leading to the disi n t e g r a t i o n of the dream fo r a white dominion i n t r o p i c a l A f r i c a . In the March 1954 session of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, Mr. Awori had a motion accepted to provide fac-i l i t i e s f o r responsible African leaders to hold public meetings i n Nairobi to influence the African public to work for law and order i n the community. On t h i s same day, March 3, the Asian member, Mr. P a t e l , i n i t i a t e d new demands f o r increased representation whenhe sought enlarged Asian, Af r i c a n , and Arab u n o f f i c i a l membership i n Legco and i n the Executive Council. "Circumstances have a l t e r e d , " he declared, "and as the other communities make progress i n education, sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and other things, the case must be examined f o r the purpose of increase of t h e i r 16 representation." Mr. ^at e l ' s statement, however, was i l l - t i m e d f o r at t h i s moment the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies, S i r O l i v e r L y t t e l t o n , was i n the Colony to make arrangements f o r the introduction of a new constitution f o r Kenya. During e f f o r t s to create a war cabinet of both o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l members of Legco to coordinate more eff e c t i v e government operations against the Mau Mau, great s t r a i n and tension was presents The most disturbing feature Of the ./deteriorating s i t u a t i o n i n Kenya was the attitude of the Colonial Secretary. In the t a l k s concerning the war 59 cabinet i n early 1954, the f r u s t r a t i o n of S i r O l i v e r Lyttelton and the great d i f f i c u l t y of the task facing him, were indicated when he pleaded to Michael Blund e l l : "Look here, I can't go on l i k e t h i s ; I s h a l l go mad, i t ' s l i k e a juggler t r y i n g to keep a l l three coloured b a l l s i n the a i r at once; r e a l l y we must come to some 17 agreement." Unfortunately, the Colonial Secretary achieved l i t t l e success i n his juggling act, f o r the constitution he was to impose on the Colony received b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m from a l l sides. Heading a parliamentary delegation to Kenya, the Colonial Secretary made several proposals for a reconstruc-t i o n of the Government. The most important feature of the new constitution was the creation of a m u l t i - r a c i a l Coun-c i l of Ministers composed of one Afr i c a n , two Asians and three Europeans, chosen from the elected representatives i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. This new body was to become the " p r i n c i p a l instrument of Government i n the Colony... and w i l l exercise a c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r dec i -18 sions on Government p o l i c y . " Besides-, the u n o f f i c i a l s i n the Council there were to be two nominated members, s i x o f f i c i a l s , the Deputy Governor, and the Governor. The African was to get the post of Minister f o r Com-munity Development — a p o r t f o l i o of l i t t l e d i r e c t concern to the European Community, and hence a suitable post to be held by the country's f i r s t African Minister. A l l members of the Council of Ministers were expected to subscribe to a j o i n t statement of policy:"To promote r a c i a l 60 harmony and f r i e n d l i n e s s and to develop opportunities f o r a l l l o y a l subjects, i r r e s p e c t i v e of race or r e l i g i o n , to advance i n accordance with character and a b i l i t y . To secure that i n -19 d i v i d u a l r i g h t s of private property are respected." These arrangements while granting some recognition to the Africans did l i t t l e to meet the wishes of the leaders of the indigen-ous population. Rather, what gains the African did make were common to other East African countries. In Kenya, how-ever, the presence of a powerful s e t t l e r group and the rec-ognition by the Colonial Office of i t s v i t a l role was appar-ent i n the con s t i t u t i o n a l proposals. Negotiations p r i o r to the formulation of the new constitution did not include A f r i c a n representatives, and as a r e s u l t , the proposals c l e a r l y indicated that power i n the country s t i l l rested f i r m l y i n the hands of the Europeans. This factor resulted i n the f a i l u r e of the mission and caused the constitution to become unworkable soon a f t e r i t s inception. The new constitution did not propose any change i n the composition of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l — a factor p a r t i c u l a r l y annoying to Mr. Mathu and h i s African colleagues. In addition, the r i g i d i t y of the cons t i t u t i o n was a blow to the more farsighted people i n the Colony. No changes before I960 were proposed i n the proportion of representation i n Legco or i n the Council of Ministers, and no changes were advocated i n the communal basis of the franchise. Only i f the Secretary of State believed the constitution to be un-61 workable, would the s i t u a t i o n revert back to what i t was before the Emergency was declared. Although Europeans and Asians ultimately accepted the new proposals, the Africans rejected them. That Oliver L y t t e l t o n foresaw no need to review the co n s t i t u t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n for at leas t s i x years c l e a r l y indicated that the Colonial Office had not grasped the nature of the rapidly changing atmosphere not only i n Kenya but elsewhere i n A f r i c a . In addition, the new con-s t i t u t i o n indicated that the Colonial Office intended to follo w old p o l i c i e s which would maintain the p o l i t i c a l pre-dominance of the s e t t l e r . With the Africans o u t r i g h t l y re-jec t i n g the new proposals i t was obvious that such a con-s t i t u t i o n would enjoya.very l i m i t e d existence. The new constitution was geared primarily towards af f e c t i n g a greater d i r e c t i o n against Mau Mau and to strength-en the Government during the time of c r i s i s . I t made no e f f o r t to outline what future p o l i t i c a l development might take place i n the Colony. However, i t d i d bring members of the Oppo-s i t i o n into the Government and i n the view of Mr. Bl u n d e l l , "undoubtedly arrested a tendency towards the evolution of what we might c a l l a white Mau Mau movement, bringing major-i t y moderate opinion behind the Government and reducing the 20 more extreme to a small minority." The f a c t that the new constitution favoured a s t a n d s t i l l u n t i l I 9 6 0 i n the const i -t u t i o n a l development of the Colony was the greatest source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among the Africans, Asians and some mod-62 erate Europeans. E.A. Vassey, European member of Legco, commented on the L y t t e l t o n Plan i n t h i s manner: I know that that s t a n d s t i l l was an essential part of obtaining agreement to the Plan but we surely cannot claim that the present numbers of A f r i c a n Members of L e g i s l a t i v e Council on the non-Govern-ment side are adeguate representation f o r the African peoples.21 The creation of a m u l t i - r a c i a l Council of Min-i s t e r s rather than improve r a c i a l harmony i n the Colony, aggravated i t i f o r the Africans became suspicious of the Europeans' motives and f e l t that the white man was merely trying to protect his own p o s i t i o n . The Asians supported the African view, although they accepted the constitution i n spite of the s t a n d s t i l l clause. The correspondent f o r The New Statesman and % t i o n commented that "Kenya's so-ca l l e d m u l t i - r a c i a l Government i s a clumsy a f f a i r , 22 launching out into l i f e on the wrong foot." Not only did i t antagonize Africans, the new plan also divided European s e t t l e r opinion i n Kenya and marked the begin-ning of h o s t i l i t y which was to break European unity f o r years to come. Although the Africans had demanded f a r more re-s p o n s i b i l i t y than many of t h e i r leaders recognized was possible at t h i s stage of t h e i r development, the new con-s t i t u t i o n did mark a l i m i t e d v i c t o r y f o r the African people. For the f i r s t time they had gained a voice on the executive side of government, breaking the lengthy period i n which only s e t t l e r s participated i n representing the u n o f f i c i a l 63 side of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. In addition, the f a i l u r e of the European leaders to achieve self-government i n the new co n s t i t u t i o n , while not bringing about a s h i f t i n power to the African side, did give some encouragement to African n a t i o n a l i s t s . Highly suspicious of the s e t t l e r s , the African saw some hope f o r his own p o l i t i c a l future i n the decision not to give ultimate authority to the European s e t t l e r s . Edwin S. Munger, a member of the American Univ-e r s i t i e s F i e l d S t a f f i n A f r i c a , has commented: "Nearly a l l the leaders I've talked with acknowledge a decided s h i f t i n the center of p o l i t i c a l gravity away from Nairobi and 23 toward Whitehall." While pleasing A f r i c a n leaders, t h i s s h i f t annoyed many European leaders, who s t i l l hoped f o r self-government f o r Kenya under t h e i r control. The new constitution brought about the emergence of i n d i v i d u a l European p o l i t i c a l parties characterized by membership either f o r or against m u l t i - r a c i a l government. The older European p o l i t i c a l leaders remained adamant i n t h e i r position i n favour of a white dominion of Kenya. S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, one of the more conser-vative members of t h i s l a t t e r group, b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i z e d B l undell f o r his part i n the formation of the m u l t i - r a c i a l Government. "As f o r you," declared Cavendish-Bentinck, "you have destroyed everything f o r which I have worked a l l my l i f e , " As a consequence, the Kenya Empire Party was launched i n order to continue the struggle to maintain white supremacy i n the Colony. To counteract t h i s measure Blun-64 d e l l formed his own p o l i t i c a l party, the United Country Party, dominated by l i b e r a l aims and supporting a p o l i c y of multi-racialism. The moderates, although supporting Blundell's aims, rejected the idea of forming a party with s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s , f o r they had become accustomed to winning elections i n the past purely on the basis of personalities rather than p o l i c i e s . As a r e s u l t , they opposed Blundell's party and with some members sympathetic with Cavendish-Bentinck, they formed themselves into a group as Independents with a non-racial p o l i c y . In the opinion of Mr. B l u n d e l l , "non-racialism seemed largely designed to maintain the European po s i t i o n at t h i s stage 25 of the development of the other races." Michael Blun-d e l l 's own views were becoming c r y s t a l l i z e d at t h i s time and were taking on a national rather than a r a c i a l outlook. He was c r i t i c a l of the European conservatives who, while approving small advances i n p o l i t i c a l power for the A f r i -can, coupled t h i s with the demand for increased p o l i t i c a l 26 power f o r the u n o f f i c i a l European representatives. Perhaps the biggest obstacle i n the path of Mr. Blundell's proposals was the need to g a i n the acceptance and cooperation of the African members of Legco. When Africans l a t e r received an additional m i n i s t e r i a l post and one more representative, E l i u d Mathu t o l d B l u n d e l l : "What's the good now, Michael, i t has taken so long and our requests were r e a l l y so small that the majority of my people have 65 l o s t f a i t h i n your s i n c e r i t y when you say you want to t r y 27 and work with us." I t was apparent to Blundell and other moderate Europeans that had both Africans and Europeans approached the p r i n c i p l e of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m i n a bold manner, given the African increased representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and recognized the growing African p o l i t -i c a l consciousness, m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m might have achieved greater success i n Kenya. However, the delay i n bringing about changes i n both the system of selecting African rep-resentatives and i n the number of members, spelled f a i l u r e of m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m i n A f r i c a n eyes. For the Europeans, Blundell b.elieved that the great majority of Europeans would accept a m u l t i - r a c i a l form of Government although he believed a m u l t i - r a c i a l form of society was a long way o f f . Thus, the f a i l u r e to bring the African members of Legco i n t t a l k s p r i o r to the announcement of the m u l t i - r a c i a l govern-ment together with the f a i l u r e to accede to the just de-mands of the A f r i c a n , (and not just to balance them o f f with increased European power) fo r e t o l d the hopelessness of such a form of government. Although the African request f o r increased rep-resentation received l i t t l e o f f i c i a l support, the claims f o r an opportunity to elect rather than have the Governor appoint t h e i r representatives were agreed t o , and i n 1955 s i g n i f i c a n t steps i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n were taken. In February W.F. Coutts, formerly the Administrator of St. Vincent i n 66 the Windward Islands, a r r i v e d i n Kenya to investigate the best system to be adopted i n choosing A f r i c a n members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. Under the terms of his i n q u i r y , Mr. Coutts was to be i n contact with D i s t r i c t and Prov-i n c i a l Commissioners and was to be accompanied by African ^embers of Legco f o r each p a r t i c u l a r area as well as by two leading Africans of that area as selected by the Prov-29 i n c i a l Commissioner. Not only was the purpose of the Coutts investigation important but so was the manner i n which i t was to be carried out, f o r Africans were given every opportunity to express t h e i r views on the subject and to r e l a t e the feelings of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r t r i b e or 30 community. The Coutts Report favoured a q u a l i t a t i v e f r a n -chise coupled with a system of multiple voting. The Com-missioner was not i n favour of universal adult suffrage f o r the A f r i c a n , although he did support the use of the secret b a l l o t . Among the ten d i f f e r e n t voting q u a l i f i -cations that the report o r i g i n a l l y proposed, were i n -cluded those based on age (twenty-one years), education, income or property, and long and e f f i c i e n t public service. Thus the age q u a l i f i c a t i o n plus two other •points' would q u a l i f y a person f o r one vote while each additional point over the f i r s t three would mean a further vote. The number of q u a l i f y i n g points was l a t e r reduced by a Kenya White Paper to seven and the franchise r e s t r i c t i o n s eased. Age 67 and one ad d i t i o n a l point were a l l that were needed f o r one vote and a maximum of three votes was permitted under the multiple voting system. The date of March, 1957, was set as the time of the f i r s t elections under t h i s new system. The African while agreeing to the p r i n c i p l e of elect i v e representation, sought universal suffrage—one man, one vote. In Legco, E l i u d Mathu commented on t h i s matter when he stated: ...the Commissioner himself mentions i n his report that every witness that came before him did demand that they wanted adult suffrage. I think he recog-nized that, and i f there i s an almost unanimous demand i n t h i s case, I think i t would be ri g h t and proper for the Commission and the Government to concede to t h i s request, so that we may once and fo r a l l remove any ,f eeling of f r u s t r a t i o n among the African community i n achieving the r i g h t of citizenship.31 The Africans, recognizing the significance of these measures, c e r t a i n l y did not reject the Report, however, fo r Mr. Arap Moi, said that "I attach great importance to t h i s B i l l , because i t opens the way to a healthier p o l i t -32 i c a l destiny of the African people i n Kenya." Indicative perhaps of a slowly changing attitude of some o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l Europeans was the view expressed by Chief Sec-retary Turnbull, who declared: "As f o r the ele c t i o n of men who are Informed and responsible we should, I think, allow the electorate credit f o r some discrimination i n t h i s 33 matter." In June, 1955, following the approval of the Coutts Report, Africans again were allowed to form p o l i t i c a l organizations, although only on a d i s t r i c t basis. Thus, the 6 3 events of 1 9 5 5 offered prospects f o r increased African p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , although Mr. Mathu said, "from our point of view we look at i t as only a temporary measure, 34 and that i t w i l l have to be put r i g h t i n due course." While the Colonial Office did not introduce any long range p o l i c i e s f o r the Colony, certain steps had been taken which granted greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to Africans. At the same time, t h i s p o l i c y was gradually breaking down the powerful p o l i t i c a l position of the s e t t l e r s . In October, 1 9 5 6 , elections were held f o r Europeans and the sharp differences i n opinion within the European community became apparent. Three d i s t i n c t European p o l i t -i c a l groups contested the e l e c t i o n , each with d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l p o l i c i e s . The Kenya Empire Party which had changed i t s name to the Federal Independence Party strongly favoured t o t a l European control of the country. I t supported a p a r t h e i d — p a r t i t i o n into white and black communities—despite the fa c t that such a policy of i s o -l a t i o n would only further stimulate African nationalism. Michael B l u n d e l l 1 s United Country Party contested the elec t i o n on a platform of mu l t i - r a c i a l i s m based on assoc-i a t i o n rather than actual integration. Responsible A f r i -can opinion was p a r t i c u l a r l y interested to see how Blun-d e l l would fare and how mul t i - r a c i a l i s m would be implemented. The t h i r d group, Independent Group headed by Group Captain L.R. Briggs, adopted the slogan Merit and A b i l i t y , shunted aside any form of r a c i a l cooperation, and f a i l e d to 69 formulate any policy to implement i t s p r i n c i p l e s . Mr. Briggs, i n s p l i t t i n g with Michael B l u n d e l l , was highly c r i t i c a l of the Lyttelton Constitution f o r he consid-ered t h a t i t had been 'f o i s t e d ' upon Kenya. That the European settlement i n Kenya was not yet prepared to accept r a c i a l cooperation i n government was indicated by the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . . The Independent Group won eight seats i n the new l e g i s l a t u r e while the United Country Party gained s i x representatives. The Kenya Fed-e r a l Independence Party f a i l e d to win a seat. Following the European elections, Africans f o r the f i r s t time i n East A f r i c a , were elected d i r e c t l y to the Kenya l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1957. This was a d i r e c t out-come of the p r i n c i p l e expounded i n the Coutts Report which recognized the existence of three races i n Kenya, and suggested that "any t h e s i s that one of those races must be e n t i r e l y dominant or that the future of East A f r i c a l i e s i n Apartheid would render my proposals f u t i l e 35 since they are based on the concept of partnership." Thus, under the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s outlined by the Coutts Re-port more than 100,000 African voters cast b a l l o t s . The main issues expounded by the candidates included a demand for increased education, greater representation i n Legco, permitting the entry of only those immigrants who were going to help Africans, and assistance f o r the African through loans. The main theme of most of the candidates 70 and p a r t i c u l a r l y of Tom Mboya, was: "I w i l l aim at the creation of democracy on the p r i n c i p l e of one man one vote, 36 and a majority r u l e . " The influence of nationalism else-where i n A f r i c a had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the campaign, f o r only three days before b a l l o t o i n g commenced i n Nairobi, Ghana gained i t s independence.This event greatly sparked the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s t outcries by the candidates and increased the h o s t i l i t y both to the L y t t e l t o n c o n s t i -t u t i o n and to the white man. At the same time i f f o r e t o l d an increase i n a g i t a t i o n f o r greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y along the l i n e s of that achieved by the African i n Ghana. The r e s u l t s of the African elections i n which there were only 610 rejected b a l l o t s , saw a l l but two of the s i t t i n g members rejected by the electorate. This was a repudiation of t h e i r association with the Government and i t s . p o l i c y of partnership. The preeminence amongst the t r i b e s switched from the Kikuyu to the Luo,(See Appendix II) and brought to the forefront Tom Mboya as the spokesman for African nationalism i n Kenya with his continued demand f o r 'undiluted democracy'. While Africans were a c t i v e l y engaging i n p o l i t i c a l campaigning for the f i r s t time, the European community did not remain i n a c t i v e . In January, 1 9 5 7 , a parliamentary dele-gation from the United Kingdon, l e d by S i r Thomas Dugdale arrived i n Kenya. This group was highly c r i t i c a l of the system of r a c i a l and communal voting i n Kenya. In a memo to 71 Mr. Dugdale, Michael Blundell r e i t e r a t e d just how f a r he was w i l l i n g to go i n promoting a policy of multi-racialism: I must emphasize to you that African nationalism i n a country such as t h i s i s a disruptive and not a cohesive force, because onoe i t has achieved i t s ob-j e c t i v e , which i s the seizing of power, i t would disintegrate into t r i b a l forces, which are s t i l l a strong feature i n our country's l i f e . I therefore believe that we have got to educate the European community to the concept of a qu a l i t a t i v e and s e l -ective common franchise based on standards and ed-ucation, so that p o l i t i c a l problems begin to move away from the r a c i a l angle, on to those of common interests whatever the race may be.37 B l u n d e l l c l e a r l y recognized the danger of granting 'u n d i l -uted democracy' to the African at t h i s time. At the same time, he foresaw the need to bring more and more Africans into responsible positions to prepare them f o r eventual independence. His p o s i t i o n , however, offended both Euro-pean conservatives and African n a t i o n a l i s t s . Thus, shortly before the African elections, the United Country Party died a natural death and some unity was reestablished within the European community. At the same time, European t a c t i c s and thinking tended to switch from a positon favouring the main-tenance of white supremacy to one intent on fi n d i n g safe-guards for minorities within the co n s t i t u t i o n i n the changing p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of the country. The more n a t i o n a l i s t i c Africans refused to consider safeguards and refused to j o i n the Government or cooperate with the Lyttelton c o n s t i t u t i o n . They wanted increased representation together with more m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and fo r t h i s reason an impasse was reached. 72 By May, 1957, increased African a g i t a t i o n caused some concern i n the Colony and aroused fears that a renew-a l of Mau Mau terrorism might occur. Speeches by Tom Mboya and other n a t i o n a l i s t s became more and more inflammatory and threatened to lead to violence. For t h i s reason, the Government decided to maintain s t r i c t e r control i n the Col-ony and keep a watchful eye on African p o l i t i c a l meetings. The Colonial O f f i c e outlined i t s p o l i c y when the Secretary of State declared that "the Government wish t o make i t clear that they are resolved and prepared to deal promptly and f i r m l y with any sign of incitement to undermine or defy au-38 t h o r i t y or to threaten security." Africans were by t h i s stage claiming twenty-three seats i n Legco and were r e f -using to accept m i n i s t e r i a l appointments u n t i l t h i s demand was met. I t had become apparent that the L y t t e l t o n consti-t u t i o n without African cooperation was a f a i l u r e . F i n a l l y , European and Asian ministers, recognizing the hopelessness of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l deadlock, resigned from the Govern-ment to give the Secretary of State a free hand to return to the co n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n p r i o r to the Emergency. The new Secretary of State, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, therefore, agreed to t r a v e l to the Colony i n the f a l l of 1957 to attempt to resolve the deadlock. On his a r r i v a l he remarked that "I have reached the disappointing conclusion 39 that l o c a l agreement i s not i n sight . " He re l u c t a n t l y declared that the Ly t t e l t o n constitution was unworkable and 73 that he was now free to create a new plan f o r the government of the country. He recognized that "on merits the A f r i c a n population i s under-represented, i n terms of members re-turned by a communal electorate, i n r e l a t i o n to the other 40 groups." This statement of course completely contradicted the findings of his predecessor who had declared that no change i n the composition of Legco was to be considered un-t i l I960. This points up the fact that i n 1954, the Colonial Office e n t i r e l y underestimated the growth and strength of African nationalism i n the Colony. Six additional seats were created for A f r i c a n members as a r e s u l t of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals, while two African Ministers were to be selected to hold the P o r t f o l i o s of Housing, and of Adult education and Community Development. The new L e g i s l a t i v e Council, therefore, was to consist of t h i r t y - s i x constituency-elected members comprised of fourteen Africans, fourteen Europeans, s i x Asians and two Arabs. In addition, between three and s i x undersecretaries were to be appointed of which at lea s t two would be A f r i c a n , with one Asian and one Arab. A unique feature of Lennox-Boyd 1 s plan was the creation of twelve new seats to be known as Specially Elected Seats. These were to include four Euro-peans, four Africans, One Arab, and three Asians (one Muslim, and two non-Muslims). The twelve S p e c i a l l y Elected Seats were to be f i l l e d through an election by the whole membership of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. The method of nomination was l a i d 74 41 down i n a separate White Paper which stated that the prop-oser and seconder must be members of Legco and be supported by three other members. E x i s t i n g members of Legco would be e l i g i b l e f o r nomination, and voting would be by free and secret b a l l o t . The Secretary of State believed that these newly created seats would add considerably to the non-government side of the house. "Provision w i l l be made," he added, "to ensure that His Excellency w i l l at a l l times be able to appoint such numbers of nominated members as w i l l 42 secure an adequate Government majority.?! In an e f f o r t to make mul t i - r a c i a l i s m work i n the country the Secretary of State proposed the establishment of a Council of State "to protect any one community against 43 discriminatory l e g i s l a t i o n harmful to i t s i n t e r e s t s . " In announcing t h i s proposal Mr. Lennox-Boyd asserted: I believe that these arrangements should command the support of responsible people of a l l communities; I pray that they w i l l give to the people of Kenya of a l l races an opportunity f o r constructive and co-op-erative endeavour and a long period of s t a b i l i t y and peace.4 This Council of State did net, however, mean that a bi-cameral system had been established i n Kenya. The Council had the power to examine any b i l l introduced i n Legco and could o f f e r an amendment to i t but the Secretary of State ultimately made the decision as to whether or not the l e g i s l a t i o n might be annulled. The Council of State was to be comprised of ten members nominated by the Governor and a l l decisions were to be by majority vote. In an Order-in-Council further defining 75 the new body i t was stated: In t h i s Part of t h i s Order the expression 'differen-t i a t i n g measure' means any B i l l or instrument any of the provisions of which are, or are l i k e l y i n t h e i r p r a c t i c a l application to be, disadvantageous to per-sons of any r a c i a l or r e l i g i o u s community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of other such communities, either d i r e c t l y , by prejudicing persons of that community, or i n d i r e c t l y , by g i v i n g an advan-tage to persons of anothercommunity.45 The new constitution revealed some changes i n European thinking both at Whitehall and at Nairobi. The Colonial O f f i c e i n granting increased r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the African was c l e a r l y influenced i n i t s actions by the recent change i n Ghana. The growing strength and increased demands of J u l i u s Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union also pointed up the n a t i o n a l i s t fervour that was sweeping the country. I t was apparent that the Colonial Office was not en t i r e l y aloof from the growing momentum of the independence movement. At the same time, however, the peculiar p o l i t i c a l climate i n Kenya was r e f l e c t e d i n the new proposals. The s e t t l e r group s t i l l maintained considerable power i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, p a r t i c u l a r l y since they had a strong voice i n the elections f o r the Specially Elected seats. With the cloud of Mau Mau s t i l l hanging over the Colony the new constitution indicated a continuing uncertainty as to how fa s t and i n what d i r e c t i o n the co n s t i t u t i o n a l development of the country should go. For t h i s reason, a l l the demands of the Af r i c a n leaders were not met. The Europeans, there-for e , recognizing that the con s t i t u t i o n s t i l l assured them of p o l i t i c a l predominance accepted the new arrangement but 76 the A f r i c a n representatives rejected i t . As i n 1954, the Africans were b i t t e r over the fa c t that the constitution was imposed upon them without giving them the opportunity of reaching a common s e t t l e -ment. Tom Mboya commented on the new constitution: "In opposing his JjYIr. Lennox-Boyd's]policy, we have not attempted to impose our views on anybody; a l l we have sought are roundtable t a l k s to t r y to reach agreement between a l l the communities — Hinduso, Muslims, Arabs, Europeans and A f r i c a n s . . . . A l l we demanded was the right 46 to negotiate." The attitudes and actions of Tom Mboya, the dominant Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t , became more vociferous at t h i s stage as a r e s u l t of a t r i p to Ghana i n March, 1958, to attend that country's independence celebrations. There could be l i t t l e doubt that the momentum of Kenya's nation-a l i s t movement increased considerably i n tempo at t h i s time. The success of Kwame Nkrumah i n Ghana s i g n i f i c a n t l y 47 affected Mboya's own p o l i c i e s . I t became cle a r that the Kenya independence movement was not divorced from s i m i l a r movements elsewhere i n Africa. The success achieved i n Ghana encouraged Kenya leaders and caused them to push f o r greater p o l i t i c a l gains while minimizing the concessions they had won from the Colonial O f f i c e . As more and more re-s p o n s i b i l i t y was granted to the Africans, the stakes f o r A f r i c a n cooperation i n the Government were r a i s e d . This attitude not only caused p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n Kenya, but 77 also created a controversial issue i n the B r i t i s h House of Commons, The r e f u s a l of the Africans to accept the Lennox-Boyd plan was used by the Opposition i n the House of Com-mons to c r i t i c i z e Government policy..The Secretary of State, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, declared that "the settlement I have announced w i l l commend i t s e l f to men of good w i l l of a l l races, and I am content to wait to see how the pattern un-48 f o l d s . " The former Secretary of State i n the Labour Gov-ernment, Mr. Creech-Hones, asked "would i t not ease the sit u a t i o n i f Her Majesty's Government could make a declar-a t i o n that t h e i r ultimate purpose i s the establishment of a p o l i t i c a l democracy i n Kenya, with safeguards f o r the minorities so that we do not shelter behind ambiguous 49 words l i k e ' m u l t i - r a c i a l ' and 'partnership communities'?" Mr. Lennox=Boyd r e p l i e d that "I do not foresee a date, at t h i s moment when i t would be possible f o r the Colonial 50 Office to r e l i n q u i s h c o n t r o l . " The issue of what the ultimate status was to toe fo r Kenya was to be a source of much controversy during the next two years. In September, 1 9 5 8 , increased pressure was mounted on both the Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t movement and the Col-o n i a l Office p o l i c y . Under the i n i t i a t i v e , 1 , of J u l i u s Nyerere of Tanganyika, a three day conference was held at Mwanza, Tanganyika, with twenty-one African p o l i t i c a l leaders from Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Nyasa-land. As a r e s u l t of t h i s meeting the Pan-African Freedom 7 8 Movement of East and Central A f r i c a was formed. The object of the gathering, dominated by Tom Mboya, and Nyerere, was to coordinate n a t i o n a l i s t programmes and to speed up ' l i b e r -a t i o n ' i n East and Central A f r i c a . The delegates asserted that i n t h i s process they were against white r a c i a l i s m and black chauvinism and they proposed to work f o r "true p a r l i a -mentary democracy". In the meantime, the p o l i c i e s of the Secretary of State pointed up the empirical nature of the Colonial Office i n respect to Kenya, f o r the new proposals were to be i n s t i t u t e d on a wait and see basis. In Kenya, elections to the Specially Elected Seats took place on A p r i l 2 2 , 1 9 5 8 . Consistent with t h e i r oppo-s i t i o n to the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the African constituency elected members refused to p a r t i c i p a t e . In spite of t h i s a t t i t u d e eight Africans appeared as candidates, although Mr. Mboya and h i s associates denounced them as "stooges, quislings 5 1 and black Europeans...traitors to the African cause." To further t h e i r h o s t i l i t y to the c o n s t i t u t i o n Mboya and other African members boycotted Legco and were fi n e d f o r defamation although acquitted on a charge of conspiracy. These charges only increased A f r i c a n f e e l i n g against the Lennox-Boyd arrangements. Commenting on t h i s case, The Times remarked: "The regrettable feature of the case i s the p o l i t i c a l t a i n t that i t i n e v i t a b l y acquired. Sections of African opinion. have hardened against the Lennox-Boyd constitution because of the c r i e s of ' v i c t i m i z a t i o n ' that have been associated 5 2 with t h i s prosecution." 79 Towards the end of the year the Secretary of State declared that "he could not contemplate r a d i c a l changes i n 53 the c o n s t i t u t i o n . " When Legco reopened i n November the Governor declared i n his opening remarks,to the new session that "as i t i s now constituted, the Government can, and i f necessary w i l l , carry on the administration of the country: the basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l position of the colony remains un-54 changed." With t h i s statement which the Africans consid-ered v i r t u a l l y ignored t h e i r demands, a l l the native: rep-resentatives walked out of the council chambers. The Times, i n d i c a t i n g growing concern over the deteriorating s i t u a t i o n i n Kenya, commented that the boycott " i t s e l f might have serious p o l i t i c a l consequences, i n that i t would deprive the A f r i c a n community o f co n s t i t u t i o n a l means of expressing 55 opposition to proposals they do not l i k e . . . . " Mr. Mboya defended the African action when he said that "the B r i t i s h Government refuses to define t h i s ultimate objective c l e a r l y because i t refuses to accept the implication that a democrat i c society w i l l i n e vitably r e f l e c t the overwhelming prepon-56 derance of African members." Co l i n Legum, the African correspondent f o r The Observer, agreed with Mr. Mboya when he wrote e a r l y i n 1959 that "the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l deadlock has been precipitated by the B r i t i s h Government's refusal to define Kenya's ultimate status i n the same fo r t h r i g h t 57 terms as for Uganda and Tanganyika." Group Captain Briggs outlined his party's p o l i c y towards the African boycott when he declared i n the Kenya 80 Weekly News that: I am convinced that, unless the Europeans rouse them-selves and once again make themselves f e l t as a p o l -i t i c a l force, conditions w i l l become increasingly i n -tolerable for us a l l . There i s no need for alarm, there i s no need for despondency, but there i s a great need for our community to assert t h e i r leadership once again. 58 By the end of 1958 i t was quite obvious that the Lennox-Boyd constitution was unworkable and that again an impasse had been reached between the European and African communities. Clearly t h i s arrangement was t r a n s i t i o n a l , but i t f a i l e d to a l t e r the basic power relationships within the country. The r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Emergency hampered the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development of a country-wide African n a t i o n a l i s t movement and tended to reinforce t r i b a l f e e l i n g s . In t h i s respect the Luo had come to dominate African p o l i t i c s with the formation of the Luo Union i n 1958, the largest t r i b a l union i n East A f r i c a . In addition, i t was the Luo t r i b e s -men such as Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga who were at the forefront of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Kenya. At the same time, a greater-fissure, had developed within the European community as a r e s u l t of the m u l t i -r a c i a l p o l i c i e s of the Colonial O f f i c e . Both the European moderates and conservatives by 1958 were becoming increas-i n g l y conscious of the r e a l i t y of African nationalism i n Kenya. The younger s e t t l e r s began to recognize the f a c t that a f t e r Ghana had become independent, African r u l e throughout the continent south of the Sahara was an Inev-81 i t a b i l i t y . In mul t i - r a c i a l i s m they saw a suitable means of maintaining some influence i n the government without arous-ing the overt h o s t i l i t y of the African leaders. To the pioneer s e t t l e r s i n Kenya, however, the slowly evolving p o l i c i e s of the Colonial Office c l e a r l y threatened both t h e i r physical and economic security i n the Colony. The conservatives were unw i l l i n g to accept the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of black rul e i n Kenya and looked on any increase i n African power as a danger to the s t a b i l i t y of the country. Their pride i n the achievements they had made over several decades and a desire to see t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d position maintained ob-scured t h e i r v i s i o n of the momentous changes that were taking place within the African continent. Thus, the m u l t i -r a c i a l constitution rather than easing tensions among A f r i -cans and Europeans, merely aggravated them. The Colonial Secretary had f a i l e d to take into account the rapid growth i n African p o l i t i c a l consciousness, and the vigour of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. In attempting to reconcile a l l the c o n f l i c t i n g interests of the r a c i a l groups within a mul t i -r a c i a l c onstitution, Mr. Lennox-Boyd rejected any increase i n actual power f o r the Africans. The d i v i s i o n within the European community had made the Colonial Secretary's task that much more d i f f i c u l t . While weakening the European cause, t h i s s p l i t also increased the reluctance of the Imperial Government to r e l i n q u i s h control to a divided European com-munity. Mr. Rosberg has commented that t h i s fact "demonstrates 8 2 that no c l e a r l y defined community of interests has existed between the Imperial Power and the European s e t t l e r group, and r e f l e c t s the ess e n t i a l l y empirical character of B r i t -i s h c o l o n i a l policy i n Kenya.' The f a i l u r e of the B r i t i s h Government to estab-l i s h some d e f i n i t e plans as to the ultimate future of the Colony caused concern and suspicions i n a l l parts of the community. Both European and African expressed fear and doubt about the unknown future which lay ahead as the country slowly evolved towards a self-governing state. Owing to the r a c i a l a g i t a t i o n within the country and the maintenance of the Emergency regulations i t was obvious that the Imperial Government could not yet abandon i t s ultimate authority. A view expressed i n The Times i n A p r i l , 1959, indicated the f e e l i n g that was growing throughout Kenya and B r i t a i n . "The time i s coming," i t declared, 60 "when a detailed policy statement ought to be made." The year 1959, therefore, was to be one of t r a n s i t i o n and change i n the Colonial Office as w e l l as i n Kenya Colony. I t was the l a s t year of the Emergency, the period which saw the b i r t h of vigorous new p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and the time when the name of Jomo Kenyatta was once again to be heard and invoked to spark the n a t i o n a l i s t drive i n Kenya. During 195$ and 1959 several new p o l i t i c a l parties emerged i n Kenya f u l l of confidence and ambition but most were lack i n g i n any r e a l national appeal. Perhaps the most 83 i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l organization was that formed by Tom Mboya i n Nairobi i n 1958. The establishment of the Nairobi 61 Peoples' Convention Party with i t s slogan of 'Forward ever, backward never', marked the r e a l beginning of a con-certed e f f o r t by Tom Mboya to become the best known A f r i -can nationalist;: i n Kenya. Using a l l the organizational methods of any modern p o l i t i c a l party and following the model of Nkrumah's party i n Ghana, the NPCP became the forerunner of a n a t i o n a l i s t country-wide p o l i t i c a l party. Organized around the basic c e l l u n i t , Mboya's party formed both women and youth wings. In a d d i t i o n , to handle pub-l i c i t y and propaganda, the party established i t s own news-paper with the appealing name of 'Uhuru' or freedom. A l -though l e g a l l y a d i s t r i c t association based i n Nairobi^ the NPCP c e l l s spread to the Central Province, Nyanza, and the Coast Province, and i t began to a t t r a c t a country-wide following. I t gained considerable strength and p u b l i c i t y through i t s attitude towards the S p e c i a l l y Elected Seats and i t s c r i t i c i s m of the eight Africans who stood f o r e l -ection f o r these seats. The t r i a l and subsequent a c q u i t t a l on the charge of conspiracy i n May, 1958, increased Mboya's own p o l i t i c a l position and established him as the dominant voice of Kenya African nationalism. In Central Nyanza another powerful Luo, Oginga-Odinga, b u i l t up a p o l i t i c a l organization called the African D i s t r i c t Association. Odinga, perhaps Mboya's greatest p o l -84 i t i c a l r i v a l , i s a shrewd and p o l i t i c a l l y able i n d i v i d u a l who uses bizarre and gaudy methods to a t t r a c t what Michael Blundell considers to be the uninhibited, flamboyant streak 62 which l i e s i n many Africans. Like Mboya, Odinga was an African n a t i o n a l i s t who saw independence under African rule as the ultimate and inevitable goal i n Kenya. Both Mboya and Odinga aimed f o r the leadership of an independent Kenya and they r e a l i z e d that perhaps the most ef f e c t i v e r a l l y i n g cry of African nationalism was to evoke the name of Jomo Kenyatta. I t was therefore, at a most opportune moment i n the independence movement that certain events occurred i n the detention camps, which s t i l l stood as reminders of the t r a g i c uprisings i n 1952. In the spring of 1958 some eleven Mau Mau detainees at the Hola Camp died under myst-erious circumstances. Their deaths were o r i g i n a l l y a t t r i b -uted to contaminated drinking .water but t h i s was l a t e r proved to be untrue. Owing to the tremendous uproar i n Great B r i t a i n that was created by t h i s tragedy, a f u l l i n -vestigation was launched and a White Paper was issued doc-63 umenting the events. Mr. W.H. Goudie, Senior Resident Magistrate i n Mombasa reported to the investigating comm-i t t e e , that "there was a very considerable amount of beating of detainees by warders with batons solely for the purpose of compelling them to work or punishing them f o r 64 refusing to work." The magistrate considered t h i s action 65 to be " e n t i r e l y yngustified and i l l e g a l . " The committee 85 in i t s findings declared that Mr. Sullivan, Superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service "acted with gross dereliction in the performance of... fhisl duties as Officer in charge 6 6 of Hola Special Detention Camp." The assistant Superin-tendent , Mr. Coutts, was found to have "failed to prevent members of the said service under... \his} orders from unlawfully assaulting i n . . . [hi§) presence some or a l l of 67 the said detainees." Similar mistreatment of detainees has been related by Joseph Mwangi Kariuki, a Mau Mau de-tainee for more than six years. In his recently published book he recalls the words of his Camp Commandant, a Mr. Buxton, who declared to the detainees: You people—I want you to realize once and for a l l that I am the Camp Officer and Rehabilitation Officer. I am the Governor and District Commissioner of Lodwar. I am the God of Lodwar. I am absolutely ready to deal with you a l l in any way I think f i t u n t i l you obey orders.°8 Several other incidents involving personal experiences of Mr. Kariuki indicated that considerable mistreatment of detainees had in fact occurred in camps where the so-called 'hard core' Mau Mau were being held. Seized upon by the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the Hola Camp incident was used as an effective lever with which to pry the Government into altering i t s Colonial policy with regardst o Kenya. As a result, much publicity was given to the case of the mistreatment of the detainees, and public opinion was aroused in the country. Such incidents did l i t t l e to encourage support 36 f o r the maintenance of white p o l i t i c a l supremacy i n Kenya, and contributed to a changing climate of opinion i n the House of Commons. While the Labour Party was c a l l i n g f or the resignation of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, over the Hola incident, African p o l i t i c a l leaders did not remain i d l e . In June, 1 9 5 8 , Oginga Odinga, the member of Legco for Central Nyanza, referred to the men held i n the detention camps as respected leaders, and he mentioned 6 9 the name of Kenyatta i n p a r t i c u l a r . The power of the Kenyatta name was soon seized upon by Arwings-Kodhek, 7 0 leader of the N a i r o b i - D i s t r i c t African Congress, and by Tom Mboya's People's Convention Party. The campaign launched by Mboya f o r the release of Kenyatta; resulted i n the People's Convention Party's newspaper being banned and th i r t y - n i n e party members being arrested i n 1 9 5 9 . I t was clear that the cult of Kenyatta was developing, and the man convicted of managing Mau Mau was being hailed as a freedom f i g h t e r of 7 1 the calibre of Nkrumah. In the eyes of many Kenya Africans Kenyatta was looked upon with considerable favour and admiration. The r e a l violence of Mau Mau did not occur u n t i l a f t e r he was imprisoned, and f o r t h i s reason he did not become assoc-iated so closely with the ugly side of Mau Mau. His commit-ment to the Africans of Kenya was simply to gain indepen-dence and the benefits that many Africans wrongly assoc-iated with ' l i b e r a t i o n ' . Because of th i s favourable image, 87 i n the eyes of the A f r i c a n , that surrounded Kenyatta, i t became imperative for Mboya and other n a t i o n a l i s t s to openly praise Kenyatta a n d urge his release. I t was e v i -dent that f o r most prominent n a t i o n a l i s t s i t would be p o l i t i c a l suicide to d u l l the aura surrounding Jomo Ken-yatta. The leading Kikuyu p o l i t i c i a n and member of Legco was Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, who received h i s higher edu-cation at the University of C a l i f o r n i a i n Berkeley.Like Mboya, Dr. Kiano praised Kenyatta as the r e a l African leader of Kenya. Although vigorously i n favour of African independence, Dr. Kiano was convinced that proposals had to be presented to protect Asian and European minorities. On the other hand, he recognized his own vulnerable pol-i t i c a l p o s i t i o n , and opposed Michael Blundell's p o l i c i e s for a m u l t i - r a c i a l government, for i n 1959 he said Kenya must be l e d by Africans within four or f i v e years. In h i s p o l i t i c a l speeches: "He attacks Europeans who have one foot i n Kenya and one foot i n B r i t a i n , and Indians who keep one foot i n India. Kiano i s antagonistic toward 72 Indians who, he says, send t h e i r money to India...." To t h i s end he agreed with Michael Blundell i n the need to create a common Kenya c i t i z e n s h i p f o r a l l permanent r e s i -dents of the country. The encouragement of such a measure by the Europeans c l e a r l y was a gesture of s i n c e r i t y i n e f f o r t s to create greater understanding and cooperation with the Africans. I t would not, however, upset any pockets 88 of prestige or p o l i t i c a l power. By r a i s i n g the name of Kenyatta with such praise-worthy remarks, the African leaders only increased the Europeans' fear for the future. To many Europeans i n the Colony and p a r t i c u l a r l y the more conservative s e t t l e r s , the name of Jomo Kenyatta embodied a l l that was vicious,bizarre and anti-European. Concern f o r t h e i r future security i n the Colony was t h e i r immediate reaction to any t a l k of re-leasing Kenyatta. To the A f r i c a n , however, t h i s question aroused an opposite reaction. In January, 1959 the Africans boycotted the L e g i s l a t i v e Council, refusing to return u n t i l they had received a guarantee that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a l k s and a consideration of the release of Kenyatta would be held i n the near future. I t was at t h i s point that Michael Blundell played his hand. Having resigned i n 1958 from h i s constituency to take one of the Specially Elected Seats, he declared i n March, 1959, that i t would be "unwise" to 73 reject a conference on the con s t i t u t i o n a l question. Hoping to gain increased support from the African electorate by supporting Mboya's demands for a conference, Blundell re-signed from his post as Min i s t e r of Agriculture i n the Kenya Government on A p r i l 2,1959. He then proceeded to form a new party l a b e l l e d the New Kenya Group which was comprised of a l l the Sp e c i a l l y Elected Members, the nominated members, and ten European representatives. The p o l i c i e s of the new group were based on the recognition that Africans would ultimately govern Kenya. To t h i s end Blundell favoured the opening up 89 of the White Highlands, the creation of a common r o l l on a selecti v e franchise, and the ending of a l l r a c i a l b a r r i e r s The b i r t h of the New Kenya Group once again created a sharp d i v i s i o n among the Europeans and aroused b i t t e r f e e l i n g s . African reaction to Blundell's l i b e r a l i s m was more sympathetic but Africans saw Blundell as standing only mid-way between white supremecy and African nationalism. Com-menting on the New Kenya Group, Tom Mboya remarked: "They were courageous enough to recognize the coming change, but 74 not brave enough to acknowledge i t s f u l l impact." By 1959, the r a d i c a l difference i n opinion between the Euro-pean and the A f r i c a n , c l e a r l y indicated that m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m had no hope of success i n the governmental process i n Kenya. Blundell's group had l i t t l e support outside b egco, f o r the African mistrusted i t , and supported the n a t i o n a l i s t move-ments under African leaders while most of the Europeans favoured the more conservative p o l i c i e s of Mr. Briggs. As one European farmer put i t to Mr. Blundell: "I am quite sure that what you are t r y i n g to do i s the best hope f o r the future, but there i s a very d e f i n i t e l i m i t t o t h e extent to which even the most l i b e r a l l y minded people are w i l l i n g to 75 f o l l o w you, and I do hope you w i l l recognize i t . " I t be-came even clearer that m u l t i - r a c i a l i s m was dead when no Afr i c a n or Asian constituency members signed the New Kenya Group's policy statement. The Asians saw that i t was i n t h e i r best int e r e s t s to support f u l l African independence 90 i n the hope that the Africans would accept such support i n return f o r the continuation of the v i t a l role of the Asian i n the Kenya economy. At the same time, the Asians did not wish to be accused of hindering the African i n -dependence movement• Those Europeans b i t t e r l y opposed to Blundell's p o l i c i e s formed a new party under the leadership of Group Captain Briggs. This group was composed of the old inde-pendent group as wel l as former members of the Federal In-dependence Party and became known as the United Party. This organization favoured the ending of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council and i t s replacement by an advisory council of a l l races to discuss l e g i s l a t i o n with the Government. ^hiis, i n les s than a decade many i n the European community had switched from demands f o r f u l l self-government to a p o s i t i o n quite opposed to self-government. The sprouting of p o l i t i c a l p arties i n the Colony continued i n July, 1959> when the Kenya National Party was formed. Backed by a group of ten African Elected Members led my Masinde Muliro, t h i s new party was supported by s i x Asian members of Legco and one European representative, the independently minded Mr. S.V. Cooke. As a m u l t i - r a c i a l party, the Kenya National Party favoured immediate indepen-. dence as opposed to the New Kenya Group which believed i n -dependence was at least ten years away. Sodn a f t e r another and f a r more important p o l i t i c a l organization came into being. 91 The prominent leaders of both the Luo and Kikuyu t r i b e s , representing about f o r t y - f i v e percent of a l l A f r i c a n s , joined" together i n August to form the Kenya Independence Movement (KIM). With the slogan of 'uhuru' the party ad-opted a platform which sought a common r o l l on a universal franchise with reserved seats for minorities, and a def-i n i t e date for Kenya's independence. With Odinga as i t s president and Mboya as i t s secretary the KIM wanted the White Highlands to be immediately opened for African settlement, and i t urged the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. Limited to African membership only, the KIM was the immediate predecessor of the n a t i o n a l i s t party which was to bring Kenya independence l i t t l e more than four years l a t e r . In November the Kenya National Party r e s t r i c -ted i t s membership to Africans and i t became the fore-runner of a n a t i o n a l i s t party which was to att r a c t the smaller t r i b e s of Kenya i n opposition to the union of the two largest t r i b e s i n the country. With the formation of these two Af r i c a n independence movements i t became ever clearer that African p o l i t i c a l leaders wanted no part i n m u l t i - r a c i a l government. While p o l i t i c a l parties were springing up l i k e weeds, diplomatic and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l negotiations were taking place both i n Nairobi and London. In Kenya demands were being made by African leaders f o r a round-table con-ference to outline the country's ultimate status. Greater 92 impetus was added t o t h i s demand i n January , 1 9 5 9 , when a meeting of the Governors of the East African t e r r i t o r -ies was held at Chequers. The Governor of Tanganyika, S i r Richard Turnbull, was mounting increased pressure on the Colonial Office f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance i n his country. I t followed that should such advance be granted conditions i n Kenya would be affected. The B r i t i s h Government s t i l l had no f i r m plans as to the future status of the East African t e r r i t o r i e s . I t was suggested, however, that Tan-ganyika could look forward to independence, about 1970 and Uganda soon a f t e r . Independence f o r Kenya was not foreseen 77 before 1975 at the e a r l i e s t . To f r u s t r a t e further African demands the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, r e i t e r a t e d his stand that no conference would be held to deal with the co n s t i t u t i o n a l deadlock i n the Colony. In the Congo, Belgian policy had made a sudden reversal which was to lead to independence i n that country within l i t t l e more than a year. At the same time, the United States reaffirmed i t s support of the aspirations of the African n a t i o n a l i s t movements i n t h e i r struggle f o r independence. In the B r i t i s h press, pressure was mounting f o r greater autonomy f o r the Kenya Af r i c a n . The Telegraph at the end of January accepted the, fact that "no one d i s -putes now that before very long the Africans w i l l predom-inate and that eventual universal suffrage w i l l be achieved. Labour Member of Parliament Mr. Dingle Foot, held s i m i l a r 93 views which he expressed i n t h i s manner: There must at some stage be a declaration of the ultimate aim of B r i t i s h rule i n Kenya. This w i l l never be acceptable to the overwhelming African majority unless i t consists of self-government on the basis of universal suffrage.'" That some change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Kenya was slowly taking place was perhaps foreshadowed i n March when The Times commented on the future of Kenya: I t i s c e r t a i n l y high time that Kenya faced up to the introduction of some form of common r o l l i n the constituencies. In t h i s matter Kenya i s rapid-l y becoming anachronistic....Very big concessions have been made to the Africans, yet the blame f o r t h e i r h o s t i l i t y to the present constitution cannot be l a i d exclusively at t h e i r door.30 C l e a r l y , B r i t i s h policy i n Kenya was rapidly reaching a c r i t i c a l point and i t was inevitable that a change i n di r e c t i o n was soon to take place. In Parliament the f i r s t of two debates on Kenya within a month occurred i n March, 1959, i n d i c a t i n g the increased tempo of events i n Kenya and the growing concern i n B r i t a i n . Commenting again on the question of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies while maintaining his opposition to i t did i n d i -cate that certain negotiations might be possible. Such t a l k s , he added, could be held "only i f preliminary consul tations between a l l concerned showed that such a course seemed the best way to carry things further towards an agreement within the general ambit of the present consti-t u t i o n on those elements i n i t which are susceptible to 94 81 a l t e r a t i o n . 0 Mr. Lennox-Boyd, however, continued i n f l e x -i b l e i n his stand against discussions on a new constitu-t i o n i n spite of growing support for such a settlement. Mr. Dingle Foot expressed a r e a l i s t i c opinion when he t o l d Parliament that: "To believe that we can preserve the pres-ent position of r a c i a l groups i n Kenya f o r a number of 82 years to come i s , I suggest, a complete i l l u s i o n . " Delegations of B r i t i s h Members of Parliament v i s i t e d Kenya i n increasing numbers while Kenyans expressed t h e i r points of view i n v i s i t s to London. In most instances i t was recommended that the Secretary of State e s t a b l i s h a timetable f o r the future status of Kenya i n order to reduce 83 the growing tensions i n the Colony. Oginga Odinga headed a delegation to London i n March, 1959. In a l e t t e r written just p r i o r to the a r r i v a l of his delegation, Odinga out-l i n e d the objectives, of the Africans when he declared that "we need a d e f i n i t e statement that Kenya should now be set 84 on the shortest fcoad to f u l l undiluted democracy." Within a month Mr. Lennox-Boyd outlined i n the House of Commons the o f f i c i a l policy of his Government with regards to Kenya. In A p r i l , 1959, Mr. Lennox-Boyd declared to the House of Commons that: The aim of Her Majesty's Government i n Kenya as i n other dependent t e r r i t o r i e s , i s to b u i l d a nation based on parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s and enjoying responsible:''.self government i n conditions which secure f o r i t s people a f a i r standard of l i v i n g and freedom from oppression from any quarter.... The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Her Majesty's Government i s to a l l the inhabitants of Kenya of a l l races and 95 communities, both backward and advanced. I t would be a betrayal of that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i f we were to abandon our ultimate authority prematurely. At t h i s stage i n Kenya's history our duty i s to re-t a i n that authority but, i n the exercise of i t , to do everything we can to help the people of Kenya to create the conditions i n which we s h a l l even-t u a l l y be able to hand i t over with a good con-science. °5 The conditions under which self-government would be granted to Kenya were outlined by the Secretary of State. These i n -cluded r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n public a f f a i r s and an under-standing of parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s , s u f f i c i e n t under-standing and cooperation between races, a competent and ex-perienced c i v i l service, and an independent government which must ensure i t s people a f a i r standard of l i v i n g i n an expanding economy. Mr. Lennox-Boyd concluded his speech by promising to convene a round-table c o n s t i t u t i o n a l con-ference before the I960 Kenya general elections. C l e a r l y , theColonial Office foresaw many more years of exercising control over a m u l t i - r a c i a l Kenya gov-ernment. In e f f e c t , Mr. Lennox-Boyd was voicing support f o r the p o l i c i e s advocated by Michael Blundell although the B r i t i s h Government s t i l l was not w i l l i n g to grant increased authority to the A f r i c a n . To t h i s end Mr. Blundell remarked "I must issue a warning, that anything that i s designed to shut out the African people from t h e i r reasonable expec-tations of taking a f u l l e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n our a f f a i r s as the country expands and develops must be doomed to f a i l u r e . The decision to hold a conference was a s i g n i f i c a n t step forward and was a v i c t o r y f o r the African p o l i t i c i a n s . For 96 the f i r s t time they were to s i t around the conference table as equals, with the opportunity of expressing t h e i r views i n a responsible manner. Indeed, i t was important f o r the future of the country and quelled the e a r l i e r suspicions voiced i n an e d i t o r i a l i n the East African Standard which had declared: The case against a round-table conference i n Kenya has been based s o l e l y on i t s chances of success, and, therefore, i t s timing; not on the ultimate usefulness of a formal session....The prudent w i l l remember the word 'never* has no meaning i n pol-i t i c s , with i t s impossible ring of f i n a l i t y , f o r nothing i n l i f e i t s e l f i s immutable. Mr. Lennox-Boyd would do well to think again, or, i f the wrong impression of what he meant has got around, immediately issue a reassuring statement.87 I t was with optimism, therefore, that most Kenyans greeted the Secretary's decision to hold the much-needed conference. The tone that such a conference might take became apparent during the summer and autumn of 1959. That Mr. Blundell's p o l i c i e s had l i t t l e support from the African leaders was made very clear from the comments of Tom Mboya following a meeting with Michael B l u n d e l l . On t h i s matter Mboya declared: "My meeting with Mr. Blundell convinced.me that there was no common ground between us, and there w i l l be none u n t i l Mr. Blundell can p u b l i c l y say that we are to est a b l i s h i n Kenya a parliamentary democracy based on common voters' r o l l — o n e man one vote franchise....Kenya's European community needs to face a complete revolution i n t h e i r thinking...." For Michael Blundell t h i s was i n im-possible p o s i t i o n to adopt i f he hoped to maintain a t r u l y 97 m u l t i - r a c i a l group. Many Europeans would not accept uni-versal suffrage for the A f r i c a n , nor would they agree to open up the White Highlands to African settlement. Yet, Blundell was equally f r u s t r a t e d i n his e f f o r t s to gain African support, for he had subscribed to both the 1954 and 1957 constitutions which African leaders had rejected. As The Observer commented: "One danger i s that his bid for an i n t e r - r a c i a l front of moderates w i l l i n t e n s i f y the f r u s -t r a t i o n s of the African n a t i o n a l i s t s . He c l e a r l y stands l i t t l e chance of winning t h e i r support." The p o s i t i o n . f i r m l y held by the Kenya Indepen-dence Movement was succinctly explained by i t s president Oginga Odinga, when he declared i n the f a l l of 1959: "That Kenya w i l l be ruled by the Afr i c a n majority i s inevitable and i t w i l l be to the advantage of the immigrants to accept 90 t h i s now and not l a t e r . " Thus, the battle l i n e s had been drawn i n preparation for the v i t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l confer-ence that was to be held i n early I960. A new order i n Kenya a f f a i r s was being formed which was to bring indepen-dence to the East African country within four years. The gradual change i n B r i t i s h policy i n Kenya and the willingness to hold a co n s t i t u t i o n a l conference with Africans included as o f f i c i a l delegates could be attrib u t e d i n large part to developments i n Tanganyika, which had aroused great anxiety among the extreme conser-vative Europeans i n Kenya. Under the able leadership of 98 J u l i u s Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union, formed i n 1954> Tanganyika was promised i n the summer of 1959 responsible government immediately following the I960 general e l e c t i o n which had been previously scheduled for 1962. The new L e g i s l a t i v e Council was to have seventy-one elected members; f i f t y of these seats to be open to members of any race; eleven seats reserved f o r Asians; and ten seats reserved f o r Europeans; as well as a small number of nomin-ated seats. Voting q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r both men and women were to be: a b i l i t y to read and write i n English or Swahili; possession of an annual income of at least L 75; or a pres-ent or past holder of a prescribed o f f i c e . A promise was given that the Executive Government would be re-formed a f t e r the general election on the basis of an u n o f f i c i a l majority. In London, Lord Perth, Minister of State for Col-o n i a l A f f a i r s , commented: "Sooner or l a t e r we have to take the plunge with a l l our t e r r i t o r i e s i n Africa....We believe 91 t h i s w i l l set a pattern f o r others." This s i g n i f i c a n t development i n Tanganyika c l e a r l y i n t e n s i f i e d pressure mounted i n Kenya Africans on the Col-o n i a l Office. The Colonial Office had c l a r i f i e d i t s v i s i o n of the future f o r i t s colonies i n A f r i c a and Kenya was to follow the general pattern adopted i n Tanganyika. The mo-mentum of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement combined with the new B r i t i s h policy i n Tanganyika meant that Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t s would vigorously renew the i r demands and not relax them 99 u n t i l independence had been proclaimed. For the conserva-t i v e Europeans the v i c t o r y f o r J u l i u s Nyerere was a b i t t e r defeat for t h e i r own aspirations i n Kenya. I t forced them to adopt new t a c t i c s to meet the change—a change which they r e l u c t a n t l y admitted was now i n e v i t a b l e . As the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s drew to a close i t was clear that the Africans had won a number of concessions from the B r i t i s h Government. Their concerted drive t o gain a more equitable share i n government had indeed met with considerable success. This was due i n part to the a b i l i t i e s of Tom Mboya. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, con-s t i t u t i o n a l progress was due to the v i c t o r i e s of nation-a l i s t movements i n other parts of A f r i c a . Tom Mboya re-ceived his i n s p i r a t i o n from Kwame Nkrumah. The Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t s as a whole were encouraged by African success i n achieving p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo, and Tanganyika. These changes perhaps had the greatest influence both on the African n a t i o n a l i s t s i n Kenya and on Colonial Office policy as i t affected Kenya. To a l e s s e r extent, moderate Europeans such as Michael Blundell and Ernest Vassey aided t h i s progress by contrib-uting to the creation of a new climate of opinion i n the Colony. They recognized the force which African national-ism represented and i t was owing to t h e i r foresight that the majority of Kenya Europeans by 1959 were w i l l i n g to accept the f a c t that the African must i n e v i t a b l y govern 100 Kenya. Mistrusted by both African and European, B l u n d e l l , nevertheless, was instrumental, not i n winning supporters to his party, but i n s t i r r i n g new thoughts i n the minds of Europeans who were unsure of t h e i r future role i n Kenya. The Colonial Office throughout the nineteen-f i f t i e s was w i l l i n g to grant concessions to the Africans i n an ef f o r t to pacify t h e i r growing p o l i t i c a l conscious-ness. In so doing, however, the B r i t i s h Government had been reluctant to a l t e r the basic power relationship with-i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. That the two Secretaries of State as well as the Governor recognized the tremendous force of Kenya African nationalism, however, was not f u l l y apparent during t h i s period. No c l e a r l y defined programme for increasing African r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was introduced. Instead, steps were adopted which were born out of the events occurring elsewhere i n A f r i c a rather than out of any f£irsighted p o l i c y . l e t , i n spite of the uncertain p o l i c i e s of the Colonial O f f i c e , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l pro-gress was made i n Kenya. By 1959 new attitudes were em-erging which were to result i n responsible discussions by a l l races on the future of Kenya. With t h i s prospect the f i n a l phase i n Kenya's struggle for independence was about to unfold. 1 0 1 NOTES 1 Tom Mboya, Freedom and A f t e r , London, Andre Deutsch, 1963, p. 6~b~. " 2 Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of P o l i t i c a l and Social Integration", World P o l i t i c s , v o l . 5 ,(January, 1953) , p. 185. 3 Rolf I t a l i a a n d e r , The New Leaders of A f r i c a , Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, p.67. 4 Mboya, op. c i t . , p. 19 . 5 S i r Michael B l u n d e l l , So Rough a Wind, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 2 2 9 . 6 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, July 30 , 1953, v o l . 5 6 , c o l . 271. 7. I b i d . , c o l . 276. 8 I b i d . , c o l . 282. 9 I b i d . . cols. 283-284. 10 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. July 31 , 1 9 5 3 , v o l . 5 6 , c o l . 305. 11 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , p. 123. 12 " I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that when the s e t t l e r s of Kenya were about to indulge i n some desperate action to demonstrate t h e i r contempt f o r Colonial Office r u l e , they i n v a r i a b l y prefaced i t by singing 'God Save the Queen' or 'King', i n order at the same time to show t h e i r l o y a l t y . " B l u n d e l l , op.cit.. p. 124 13 The U n o f f i c i a l Members Organization was formed i n 1948 to bring t ogether representatives of a l l races i n the Opposition. 14 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , p. 145 15 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, October 14 , 1954, v o l . 6 3 , col.1 2 5 . : — : 102 16 I b i d . , March 3, 1954, vol.59, col.4 6 6 17 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , pp. 155-156 18 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya-Proposals f o r a Reconstruction of the Government. 1954, Cmd. 9103,p.2. 19 I b i d . , p. 4. 20 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , p. I65. 21 E.A. Vassey, "Economic and S o c i a l Trends i n Kenya", African A f f a i r s , vol.55 ( A p r i l , 1956), pp.107-108. 22 "Kenya-Failure of a Mission", The New Statesman and Nation, v o l . 47 (March 27, 1954), p. 391. 23 Edwin S. Munger, African F i e l d Reports, 1952-1961, Cape Town, C. Struik, Publisher, 1961, p. 248. 24 B l u n d e l l , op.cit. p. 178. 25 I b i d . , p. 181. 26 Edwin S. Munger reported from Kenya i n March, 1955, on the s p l i t i n the European f r o n t . "About 20$ of the Euro-peans appear to support the apartheid-minded Federal Inde-pendence Party, although the noise i t makes would suggest more backing. Another 30$ of the Europeans are behind Blundell and h i s United Country Party, r e s t r i c t e d t o Euro-peans but dedicated to r a c i a l cooperation i n government. There remain 55$ of the European electorate who are not apathetic to party p o l i t i c s but simply deplore that they have arisen. They would l i k e to see one large amorphous European party with as few f u l l - t i m e p o l i t i c i a n s as possible, but are now i n c l i n e d to support Blundell i n a showdown a l -though they c r i t i c i z e him the rest of the time." Munger, op. c i t . , p. 249. 27 B l u n d e l l , op.cit. p. 214 28 Michael B l u n d e l l , "The Present Situation i n Kenya", African A f f a i r s , vol.54, (April,1955), p. 105. 29 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , The Colonial  T e r r i t o r i e s 1954-1955} Cmd. 9489. 30 The form of s e l e c t i o n of African representatives i n the past was based on delegates being despatched from l o c a t i o n a l councils to form d i s t r i c t advisory nomination committees. Each of these committees sent up to f i v e of t h e i r numbers to form an advisory nominational college f o r 103 the e l e c t o r a l area and then the college voted by secret b a l l o t on the candidates. From t h i s f i n a l l i s t of names presented to him,, the Governor then appointed the members to Legco. I t was, therefore, a form of ind i r e c t e l e c t i o n . 31 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, February 24, 1956, vol.68, col.211. 32 I b i d . . col.220. 33 I b i d . , col.2 3 6 . 34 I b i d . , col. 2 1 3 . 35 Coutts Report, p. 23, cited i n W.J.M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson, eds., Five Elections i n A f r i c a , Oxford, The Clarendon Press, I960, p. 404. 36 I b i d . , p. 448. 37 S i r Michael B l u n d e l l , So Rough a Wind, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, pp.234-236. 38 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, May 29, 1957, vol.571,col.30. 39 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya-Proposals  f o r Mew Constitutional Arrangements, 1957, Cmnd.309,p.2. 40 I b i d . , p. 3 • 41 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya-Despatch  on the New Constitutional Arrangements, 1958, Cmnd.369. 42 Cmnd. 309, o p . c i t . , p. 3. 43 I b i d . , p.4. 44 L o c . c i t . 45 Cmnd. 3 6 9 , o p . c i t . , p. 4 . 46 The Observer, December 4,1958. 47 Alan Rake, Tom Mboya (Young Man of Mew A f r i c a ) , New York, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962, pp. 148-152. 4 8 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, November 14,1957, v o l . 5 7 7 , col.1114. 104 49 Loc.Git., 50 I b i d . , col.1115. 51 Kenya Weekly News, A p r i l 4> 1958, c i t e d i n George Bennett, Kenya a P o l i t i c a l History, London, Ibadan, Nairobi, and Accra, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 142. 5-2 The Times, June 12, 1958. 53 Great B r i t a i n . Colonial O f f i c e , The Colonial T e r r i -t o r i e s , 1958-1959. 1959, Cmnd. 780, p.13. 54 A f r i c a Digest, vol.6 (November-December,1958), p.91. 55 The Times. November 7, 1958 56 The Observer, December 4, 1958 57 I b i d . . January 25, 1959. c.f. p.23 58 Kenya Weekly News, May 2 3 , 1958, c i t e d i n A f r i c a  Digest, vol.6(January, 1958), p.11. 59 Gwendolen M. Carter and William 0. Brown, eds., Transition i n A f r i c a : Studies i n P o l i t i c a l Adaptation, Boston, Boston University Press, 1958, p. 108. 60 The Times Weekly Review, A p r i l 16, 1959. 61 Mboya chose t h i s name f o r h i s party because i t was so s i m i l a r to that name used by Kwame Nkrumah. In Ghana i t was the Convention People's Party which ultimately achieved Af r i c a n independence. 62 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , p.232. 63 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Documents r e l a t i n g  to the death of eleven Mau Mau detainees at Hola Camp i n  Kenya, 1959, Cmnd. 778. 64 I b i d . , p. 1 4 . 65 I b i d . , p. 15 66 I b i d . , p. 3 1 . 67 Loc. c i t . 68 Josiah Mwangi K a r i u k i , 'Mau Mau Detainee,London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 106. 105 69 Bennett, o p . c i t . , p. 144 70 After a s p l i t i n the Nairobi D i s t r i c t A f r ican Congress leadership, Argwings-Kodhek was defeated by Tom Mboya i n the 1957 elections. 71 The prominent Kikuyu member of Legco, Dr. Kikonyo Kiano, mentioned t h i s at the A l l African Peoples Conference i n Accra i n December, 1958. See Bennett, op.cit., p. 144. 72 Munger, o p . c i t . r p. 281. 73 The Times, March 16, 1959. 74 Mboya, op.cit., p. 107. 75 The farmer who commented was the chairman of the Government constituted Board of Agriculture. B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . , p. 252. 76 Bennett, op.cit., p. 145. 77 B l u n d e l l , op.cit. , p. 262. 78 The Observer, February 1, 1959 79 The Observer, February 15, 1959. 80 The Times Weekly Review, March 19, 1959. £l Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, March 26, 1959, vol.602, col.1552. 82 I b i d . , Col.1553. 83 Small pockets of t e r r o r i s t s had reappeared which were si m i l a r to Mau Mau. Such groups included the Kiama Kia Mwingi and the Land Freedom Army. Quick Government action prevented these organizations from developing, and by 1963, more than 1500 persons had been convicted of i l l e g a l and subversive a c t i v i t i e s . 84 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, March 26, 1959, v61.602,col.1558. 85 I b i d . , A p r i l 22, 1959, vol . 6 0 4 , c o l . 563-564. 86 Michael B l u n d e l l , "Making a Nation i n Kenya", African A f f a i r s , v o l . 58 (July, 1959), p. 225. 106 87 East African Standard, January 23, 1959, cited i n A f r i c a Digest, v o l . 6[March-April, 1959), p. 178. A f r i c a Digest, vol.7 (September,1959), p. 15. 89 The Observer, May 24, 1959. 90 A f r i c a Digest, vol.7 (November, 1959), p. 50. 91 J. Clagett Taylor, The P o l i t i c a l Development of  Tanganyika, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 188. 107 CHAPTER THREE DEBATE AND DECISION I960 - 1963 The pace of p o l i t i c a l and co n s t i t u t i o n a l dev-elopment i n Kenya became greatly accelerated following the winning of self-government i n Tanganyika, i n I 9 6 0 . This s i g n i f i c a n t decision i n i t i a t e d a new B r i t i s h pol-i c y i n East A f r i c a and greatly influenced the f i n a l phase i n Kenya's struggle f o r independence. Where the B r i t i s h Government did not lead i n the encouragement of the growth of Af r i c a n p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the nine-teen f i f t i e s , i t did assume a prominent part i n the move-ment towards independence i n Kenya i n the early s i x t i e s . B r i t i s h Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, gave formal acknowledgement to the new policy when he addressed the House of Assembly i n CapecTown, South A f r i c a , on February 3, I9 6 0 . In t h i s memorable speech, he declared: The most s t r i k i n g of a l l the impressions I have formed since I l e f t London a month ago i s of the strength of t h i s African national consciousness. In d i f f e r e n t places i t may take different forms, but i t i s happening everywhere. The wind of change i s blowing through the continent. Whether we l i k e i t or not, t h i s growth of national consciousness i s a p o l i t i c a l f a c t . We must a l l accept i t as a f a c t . Our national p o l i c i e s must take account of i t . . . . For as time passes and one generation y i e l d s to another, human problems change and fade. Let us remember these tru t h s . Let us resolve to b u i l d not to destroy. And l e t us remember always that weak- , ness comes from d i v i s i o n , and strength from unity. 108 That the Prime Minister was touring the African continent c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d the growing concern of the B r i t i s h Gov-ernment i n the a f f a i r s of i t s possessions i n A f r i c a . Mr. Macmillan's address recognized that a new A f r i c a was em-erging and that any attempt to f r u s t r a t e the growth of t h i s giant would not only be f u t i l e but t r a g i c . By i t s attitude towards African nationalism i n t h e m i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s i t was clear that the Colonial Office was unaware that a wind of change had been blowing i n A f r i c a f o r more than a decade before Mr. Macmillan's speech. However, the consistent demands of Af r i c a n leaders i n Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanganyika, f i n a l l y won acknowledgement by the Colonial O f f i c e . As a r e s u l t , i n I960 o f f i c i a l p o l i c y caught up with existing r e a l i t y . The sudden change i n B r i t i s h policy c l e a r l y influenced con-s t i t u t i o n a l development i n Kenya. S i m i l a r l y the reaction of European s e t t l e r s and African n a t i o n a l i s t s r e f l e c t e d the change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Colonial p o l i c y i n Kenya i n the early nineteen-s i x t i e s was again c l e a r l y conditioned by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments elsewhere i n A f r i c a . The granting of inde-pendence to the Congo and the adoption of self-government i n Tanganyika i n I960 necessitated a change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Kenya. As a consequence, d i r e c t negotiations with the Africans on the future status of the Colony were i n s t i t u t e d at the Lancaster House Conference early i n 109 I 9 6 0 . This marked B r i t i s h recognition of the equality of status of the Afr i c a n and helped to create a new attitude of cooperation between the African leaders and the Colonial Office. The new B r i t i s h p o l i c y was able to be e f f e c t i v e l y i n s t i t u t e d i n Kenya without the hindrances of the Mau Mau Emergency. With the l i f t i n g of the Emergency regulations the a f f a i r s of the Colony could once again be conducted without r e s t r i c t i o n s . No longer were there p o l i t i c a l b a r r i e r s to antagonize the African n a t i o n a l i s t s , nor was the threat of violence so great as i t had been i n the mid-n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s , This p o l i t i c a l freedom created a much healthier atmosphere f o r negotiations between the races, while giving the Africans a chance to orient t h e i r p o l -i t i c a l movements on a national basis. With the acceptance of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of African r u l e i n Kenya, the Colonial Office adjusted i t s p o l i c i e s to meet i t s changing role i n the East African country. No longer was i t a question of defining the ultimate status for Kenya. Rather i t was a matter of determining when self-government and independence were to be granted to the Kenya Africans. I t was a challenge to the Colonial Secretaries i n the years 1960-1963 to prevent the independence movement from attaining i t s goals too h a s t i l y . In I960 African leaders had l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l experience with which to support t h e i r demands 110 f o r immediate independence. Yet the taste of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which they had enjoyed during and following the 1957 campaign rekindled t h e i r i n s a t i a b l e appetite fo r complete p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Kenya. Re-flecting: on the t r a g i c developments i n the Congo following the hasty granting of f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the A f r i c a n , the Colonial Office negotiated strenuously with the African to prevent a sim i l a r occurrence i n Kenya. This was a d i f f i c u l t task, f o r the African expected a rate of advancement s i m i l a r to that i n Tanganyika and the Congo despite the fact that fewer p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s had been experienced by Tanganyikans. While attempting to cooperate with the Af r i c a n , the Colonial Office found i t s sudden change i n po l i c y unacceptable to a small but s t i l l vocal s e t t l e r group. In t h i s respect, public opinion i n the United Kingdom had grown increasingly impatient with the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d demands of the conservative s e t t l e r s who steadfastly re-fused to acknowledge t h e i r changed position i n the Colony. Demands f o r special p o l i t i c a l p r i v i l e g e s continued to hamper the gradual transfer of power to the African. Public opinion i n B r i t a i n , however, demanded that no ba r r i e r s be placed i n the way of Kenya independence. The decision of the Colonial Office to accede to the demands of the A f r i -cans rather than those of the Europeans was, therefore^ the r e s u l t of a combination of p o l i t i c a l expediency and an I l l acceptance of the r e a l i t y of African nationalism. The withdrawal of support f o r the p o l i t i c a l supremacy of the European i n Kenya marked the end of the experiments i n mult i - r a c i a l i s m and the end of European dominance i n Kenya. The sudden reversal i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n A f r i c a caught most Europeans i n Kenya by surprise. The moderate Europeans such as Michael B l u n d e l l recognized the need for a reappraisal of B r i t i s h policy i n the African c o l -ony but at the same time questioned the haste with which the t r a n s i t i o n i n government was to take place. The con-servative Europeans headed by S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck were outspokenly b i t t e r over the decision of the B r i t i s h Government. To them the new policy was a be-t r a y a l of a decision made a half century e a r l i e r to make Kenya a 'white man's country'. As l a t e as I960 the old European s e t t l e r s s t i l l hoped f o r the maintenance of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o l i t i c a l position i n a country where they were overwhelmingly out-numbered. Steadfast sup-porters of parliamentary democracy with one man one vote, these Europeans continued t h e i r f i g h t to deprive the African those same democratic r i g h t s . Cavendish-Bentinck, however, i n his f i n a l e f f o r t s to salvage some minority ri g h t s i n the Colony reversed h i s t a c t i c s i n the f i n a l years preceding independence. Instead of d i r e c t i n g his f i g h t against the African he l e v e l l e d harsh c r i t i c i s m at Blundell and the ' l i b e r a l ' Europeans. In doing t h i s Caven-112 dish-Bentinck was i n d i r e c t l y acknowledging the inevitab-i l i t y of African rule i n Kenya. Cl e a r l y , he saw that no sa t i s f a c t i o n could be garnered from c r i t i c i z i n g the A f r i -can. Rather, he could blame the emergence of the new Kenya on the f l e x i b l e position adopted by B l u n d e l l . These attacks tended to provide an outlet f o r the Europeans' f r u s t r a t i o n , i n s e c u r i t y , and fear. I t was not d i f f i c u l t f o r some to sympathize with the conservative Europeans i n Kenya, f o r they had worked hard to achieve the favourable position many of them now enjoyed. Yet t h e i r antagonism towards t h e i r f e l l o w Europeans only made more d i f f i c u l t the period of t r a n s i t i o n to independence. Their consideration of the future s t a b i l i t y of Kenya seemed to stop with t h e i r own in t e r e s t s , rather than those of the whole country. Their reaction t o the co n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals of the Colonial Office indicated a refusal to adopt a national outlook or to consider themselves as Kenyans. Their f i n a l e f f o r t to r e t a i n some vestige of the old Kenya was embodied i n t h e i r reaction to the re-lease of Jomo Kenyatta. To those few stubborn Europeans the imprisonment of Kenyatta symbolized the l a s t contact with the old p o l i t i c a l structure of Kenya. As long as Kenyatta remained r e s t r i c t e d Cavendish-Bentinck and his followers f e l t a certain sense of s e c u r i t y — a f e e l i n g of power over the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of the A f r i c a n . Yet, 113 with the release of Kenyatta the l a s t dim hope f o r some prominent r o l e i n the p o l i t i c s of Kenya faded f o r the old s e t t l e r s . An unwillingness to adapt to the r e a l i t i e s of a new black A f r i c a forced many of these Europeans to lose t h e i r d i g n i t y and sense of r e a l i t y . Instead, t h e i r attitude blinded them and prevented them from looking on the post-independence period of Kenya's development with any sense of optimism. In t h e i r reactions to Colonial policy between 1960-1963 they were guided by f e a r — f e a r of what lay beyond independence. While fear motivated the conservative Euro-peans to react with h o s t i l i t y to the B r i t i s h p o l i c y , the African a t t i t u d e during 1960-1963 was strengthened by the r a p i d events i n neighbouring countries. The nation-a l i s t movement i n Kenya received much of i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from the successful e f f o r t s of Kwame Nkrumah and J u l i u s Nyerere. Out of t h i s association, however, the demands for independence tended to take on a new urgency. Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t s sought independence at the same time as Tanganyika despite the fact that p o l i t i c a l experience was considerably greater i n Tanganyika. The goal of indepen-dence continued to be the Africans only objective and l i t t l e consideration was given to the problems of post-independence. Responsible African leaders, although rec-ognizing the fa c t that independence would not solve a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s of th e i r people, had to bow to pressure 114 from below. With the l i f t i n g of the Emergency regulations African national p o l i t i c a l parties once again could be formed. I n i t i a l l y t h i s might have been a unifying force. - By I960, however, independence was within the grasp of the Africans and the benefits of one united country-wide party were considerably lessened. Instead with the approach of independence the African suddenly r e a l i z e d that he would be the master of his own a f f a i r s . Out of t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n emerged old t r i b a l animosities based on a fear for t r i b a l security. Traditional fear ofthe powerful Kikuyu, reinforced by the Mau Mau a t r o c i t i e s , created d i v i s i o n within the n a t i o n a l i s t movement. No longer could the common goal of independence serve as a unifying mechanism among the African t r i b e s . A common h o s t i l i t y to the European had served a useful purpose i n uniting the African i n a common cause. With the Euro-pean divorced from p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a new scape-goat was needed for the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Africans. For the smaller t r i b e s the Luo-Kikuyu union served t h i s purpose. S i m i l a r l y , f o r the la r g e r t r i b e s i t was the un-cooperative attitude of the smaller t r i b a l groupings which threatened the future p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . T r i b a l -ism, the basic foundation of African society, emerged i n the nineteen-sixties as the r e a l threat to the future p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Kenya. 115 The c r i s i s created over the question of the release of Jomo Kenyatta created among the Africans, as i t had done among the conservative Europeans, a tremen-dous emotional impact. To the Af r i c a n , Kenyatta had come to symbolize freedom and independence. His continued im-prisonment represented to the A f r i c a n , a l a s t attempt by white supremacists to re t a i n control over the p o l i t i c a l destiny of the Af r i c a n . This explains why the release of Kenyatta became such a motivating factor i n the f i n a l drive f o r independence. The A f r i c a n reaction to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l con-ferences i n the nineteen-sixties was characterized by the emergence of t r i b a l i s m and a continued suspicion of the European s e t t l e r s . At the same time, however, the change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Tanganyika, was i n s t r u -mental i n creating some degree of cooperation between Afr i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s and the Colonial Office. Concrete r e s u l t s of the new policy quickly emerged i n Tanganyika and as a resu l t tended to lessen A f r i c a n suspicions of the s i n c e r i t y of the Colonial O f f i c e . The convening of the v i t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference i n London i n I960 gave another example of the sincere desires of the B r i t -i s h Government to cooperate with the n a t i o n a l i s t elements i n Kenya. By I960 i t was apparent that the African had emerged as the most potent force i n the three-pronged struggle f o r authority i n the new Kenya. 116 Four main groups t r a v e l l e d to London i n I960 to participate i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t a l k s , including the United Party led by Group Captain Briggs, the New Kenya Group l e d by Michael B l u n d e l l , the Asian and Arab Group headed by Dr. Hassan, and the African Constituency 2 Elected Members l e d by Mr. Ronald Ngala. Mr. Ngala, a Giriama. tribesman, appealed to men and women of the smaller Kenya t r i b e s and he became the chief opponent of the Luo-Kikuyu Union. Described by Mr. Blundell as 3 a strong constructive n a t i o n a l i s t , Ngala was a modest leader opposed to a one-party system and i n favour of a democratic society based on i n d i v i d u a l freedom. Of a l l the African leaders, he perhaps presented the most favourable and r a t i o n a l image. At the conference the Africans were able to present a united f r o n t , a sharp contrast to the great divergence i n views c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the European representatives. This created a d i s t i n c t advantage to the African p o s i t i o n . The conference almost broke up i n disarray even before i t had held i t s opening session. The African delegates refused to attend the opening of the confer-ence unless Mbui Koinange, a former Mau Mau and member of the KAU, was included i n the o f f i c i a l African dele-gation. The a t t i t u d e adopted by the Africans indicated an attempt to display l o y a l t y to the Kikuyu, the founders of the independence movement, i n Kenya. In add i t i o n , the 117 two African groups at the conference used t h i s matter to indicate t h e i r unity on the question of independence, p a r t i c u l a r l y at t h i s c r u c i a l stage i n t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n -4 a l development. Michael B l u n d e l l , and other European representatives protested b i t t e r l y , despite the f a c t that the Emergency regulations had been l i f t e d . This stand r e f l e c t e d the attitude of many Europeans i n Kenya who continued to i d e n t i f y African nationalism i n Kenya with Mau Mau terrorism. In t h i s instance Koinange symbolized the e v i l s of Mau Mau. Thus, at the outset Secretary of State, I a i n Macleod, was faced with a c r i t -i c a l decision which would ultimately determine the suc-cess or f a i l u r e of the conference. After a f i v e day boycott by the Africans, the Colonial Secretary reached a settlement which was i n d i c -a t i v e of the new B r i t i s h p o l i c y . A blank pass f o r entry to Lancaster House was granted to Mr. Koinange although none was issued to the conference chambers. The European delegates r e l u c t a n t l y accepted the compromise a f t e r Macleod had threatened to continue the conference alone with the Africans i f the other groups did not accept h i s 5 decision. C l e a r l y , a new atmosphere f o r negotiation was created which was to promote greater cooperation between the Colonial Office and the African n a t i o n a l i s t s . Applauding the decision of Macleod, an a r t i c l e i n The Spectator com-mented that the Co l o n i a l Secretary "broke his predecessor's 118 6 habit of pandering to European prejudice." With the pre-conference dilemma resolved, Mr. Macleod set the tone f o r the negotiations i n h i s opening statement, when he declared: Independence—'I hope within the Commonwealth, i s the ultimate objective, but i t i s not the task of t h i s conference. Our task i s to plan the next step i n Kenya's cons t i t u t i o n a l evolution. To set at what pace Kenya can assume greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the conduct of her own a f f a i r s . . . . ? The Colonial Secretary went on to state three main p r i n -ciples under which future development i n the Colony would take place: (a) Kenya would eventually be independent ofUnited Kingdom c o n t r o l , provided that Africans, as w e l l as other communities i n Kenya, took a share i n the government of the country; (b) Independence could not take place u n t i l the gov-ernment was responsible to a l e g i s l a t u r e f u l l y r e f l e c t i n g the d i f f e r i n g views of a l l the people expressed through the medium of a wide franchise; (c) Individuals of every community should have f u l l opportunity to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the administration of t h e i r country i n a s p i r i t of mutual tolerance, though f o r a time the interests of minorities might have to be secured through c o n s t i t u t i o n a l safeguards. 8 To meet the changing needs of the Colony: "In the United Kingdom Government's view the interests of Kenya would be best served at the present stage i f Africans were to take . . 9 a greater share i n the government of the country...." This positive statement contrasted rather sharply with those of Macleod's two predecessors, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the manner i n which i t spelled out the ultimate goal f o r the Colony. Macleod of course, had the advantage of working 119 without the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the Emergency regula-tions or the overhanging threat of Mau Mau violence. Nonetheless, his.policy was c l e a r l y based on the necessity and the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of greatly increased African p a r t i c -i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of the government of Kenya. This statement too, re f l e c t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change which had been i n i t i a t e d i n Tanganyika. The new proposals for the Colony included an enlarged L e g i s l a t i v e Council of s i x t y - f i v e elected mem-bers. Of these seats, f i f t y - t h r e e were to be elected on a common r o l l basis while twelve were to be National Members. In an e f f o r t to maintain representation for min-o r i t y groups twenty of the f i f t y - t h r e e seats would be reserved i n the following proportions: ten Europeans, eight Asians, and two Arabs. Those contesting the reserved seats were required to gain the confidence of t h e i r own r a c i a l community by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n communal primary e l -ections. The National Members, a carry-over from the Specially Elected Seats of the previous c o n s t i t u t i o n , were to include four Africans, four Europeans, three Asians (two non-Muslims, one Muslim), and one Arab. As before, the National Members were to be elected by members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Council. The franchise f o r the common r o l l seats closely resembled that adopted i n Tanganyika, and was to include an a b i l i t y to read or write i n one's own language, persons over forty years of age, an o f f i c e 120 holder i n a wide range of scheduled posts, or an annual income of t 75. At the same time, the new constitution retained the r i g h t of the Governor to nominate members to Legco. The Council of Ministers was to consist of an u n o f f i c i a l majority. With twelve members plus one Arab, the executive was to have eight u n o f f i c i a l s including four Africans, three Europeans, and one Asian. The Gov-ernor maintained the ri g h t to appoint the Ministers and to d i s t r i b u t e the p o r t f o l i o s . For the f i r s t time the Africans held a greater share of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Council of Ministers than did the u n o f f i c i a l Euro-peans. The new constitution i n i t s obvious attempt to increase African experience i n government advocated i n -creased recruitment of Africans into the c i v i l service. At the same time, i t recommended that the additional African members be brought into the Council of Ministers even before the new constitution actually came in t o force. This was an in d i c a t i o n of the B r i t i s h Government's con-cern over the lack of administrative experience among the African people as w e l l as a decided e f f o r t to pacify the growing p o l i t i c a l unrest among the African leaders. F i n a l l y , the Macleod proposals included a section f o r the protection of human and property r i g h t s . "There should be no expropriation of property except to f u l f i l l contractual or other l e g a l obligations upon the owner...." In the 121 event of expropriation of land the owner was to receive f u l l and f a i r compensation. "Only by t h i s means w i l l i t be possible to maintain confidence, and to encourage development and investment, including the a t t r a c t i o n of overseas c a p i t a l , not only i n the immediate future but 10 also i n the long term." This l a s t measure was an attempt to restore a sense of security among the con-servative European s e t t l e r s who feared they would lose everything for which they had worked once independence came to Kenya. The United Party was .entirely oopposed to the terms of the new constitution; the Asian,' and Arab group expressed displeasure at t h e i r small representation an the Council of M i n i s t e r s , but agreed t o accept the prop-osals; the New Kenya Group accepted without serious q u a l i f i c a t i o n the agreement; and the African delegation, while unhappy about the l e v e l of the franchise, the proportion of African representation on the Council of M i n i s t e r s , and the position of the National Members, agreed to accept the new constitution as a p o s i t i v e step towards African independence i n Kenya. From the African point of view a greater confidence i n the Colonial Office emerged from these t a l k s . Commenting on the work of the conference, Tom Mboya delcared: "Macleod was a master i n the t a c t i c s of running a conference, and i t was a pleasure to watch hi s s k i l l . " " ^ A l l the delegates l e f t the Lancaster 122 House Conference with a better understanding of the prob-lems and desires of each other. For the f i r s t time i n the con s t i t u t i o n a l development of the country, a l l races i n Kenya had met around the conference table each en-joying equal status with the others. This was a decided change from the e a r l i e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l gatherings of the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . C l e a r l y , the s e t t l e r community was l o s i n g i t s dominant p o l i t i c a l p o s i tion i n the government of the country, indicating perhaps the general lack of concern about i t s future f e l t by most B r i t i s h people. One young Tory Member of Parliament might have expressed the new mood pre v a i l i n g i n B r i t a i n when he declared to Michael B l u n d e l l : "What do I care about the . . . s e t t l e r s , 12 l e t them bloody w e l l look a f t e r themselves." Outside the conference room the comments of the delegates were considerably more diplomatic i n tone but no l e s s b i t i n g than that of the young Member of Par-liament. Group Captain L.R. Briggs was "shocked" while Major B.P. Roberts could a l l but contain h i s anger when 13 he declared that "I might blow up." Mr. Briggs l a t e r elaborated on his e a r l i e r comment when he suggested: "This i s the greatest setback the European settlement 14 has had since i t s inauguration." Yet, the old s e t t l e r f a i l e d to appreciate that t h i s was the greatest forward step experienced by the vast majority of the Kenya pop-ul a t i o n . Perhaps better r e f l e c t i n g the majority of Euro-123 peans i n Kenya were the comments of Michael Blundell on his return to Nairobi: "The conference was a v i c t o r y f o r moderation and, as moderates, we i n our party are pleased with the results....One of the great things that emerged from the meetings was that we have rea l i z e d that many African elected members are sincere and moder-ate men working f o r the same aims as ourselves..When the Africans get t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , they w i l l f i n d that they need our energy, our enterprise, and our 15 economic assistance." The bitterness and the sense of betrayal that the New Kenya Group aroused i n the United Party was considerable. As a r e s u l t , Group.Captain Briggs issued a statement on behalf of his party c r i t i c i s i n g Blundell's group. They "entered the conference having, from the point of view of the European, already conceded so much that no room f o r reasonable compromised remained. This c l e a r l y led to surrender a f t e r surrender to meet the views either of the Secretary of State or of the 16 African elected Members." This statement was not en-t i r e l y true, f o r Blundell had bargained with the Secre-tary of State both on the Koinange issue and on the franchise q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . On t h i s l a t t e r point Blundell had attempted to l i m i t the number of voters on the com-17 mon r o l l so that no one community could dominate another. The bitterness of. white supremacists i n East A f r i c a towards Blundell was further expressed i n an e d i t -124 o r i a l on March 10, I960, i n the East A f r i c a and Rhodesia: "What H.M. Government has i n f l i c t e d upon Kenya deserves to be c a l l e d the MacBlundell Constitution, for that terra places the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the unprincipled and irrem-ediable surrender to clamour upon the p o l i t i c i a n s primar-18 i l y responsible." On the other hand, Tom Mboya, s t i l l e x h i b i t i n g a mistrust of the motives of the 1moderates', was c r i t i c a l of Blundell f o r t r y i n g to r e t a i n "pockets of p r i v i l e g e . " The Manchester Guardian Weekly probably best summarized the meaning of the outcome of the con-ference when i t commented: " I t i s , of course, an interim measure." The newspaper suggested that the new agree-ment would give Africans a chance to gain valuable ex-perience, and concluded that a compromise had been reached 19 on a l l sides. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference reaffirmed the great d i v i s i o n within the European community and marked a decided defeat for those who s t i l l envisaged Kenya as a 'white man's country'. The conservative Europeans were intent on taking out t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n s on t h e i r more moderate countrymen, despite the f a c t that the Colonial O f f i c e was t o t a l l y responsible f o r the new policy i n Kenya. C l e a r l y , the prime motivating factor i n the B r i t i s h deci-sion to extend considerably more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to Kenya Africans, was the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development elsewhere i n A f r i c a , and not the l i b e r a l views adopted by the New Kenya 125 Group. The r e s u l t s of the negotiations, the implications of which most Europeans i n the Colony had foreseen, never-theless, came as a surprise, f o r the abrupt s h i f t i n the power structure saw t h e i r dominant position upset. P r i o r to the conference the conservative s e t t l e r s had been confident that they would s t i l l have a large share i n the government of the country. But no longer did the Europeans have an exclusive voice i n the selection of t h e i r representatives. This measure aroused t h e i r sense of f a i r play, despite the f a c t that the new voting reg-ulations were the most democratic that Kenya had ever had. S i r Stephen King H a l l , w r i t i n g i n the Spectator, made a cutting remark on the sudden switch i n Tory p o l -icy when he declared:"It has come as a grievous shock to Kenya Europeans to discover that, although the S o c i a l i s t s are by d e f i n i t i o n either cads or woolly i d e a l i s t s , they are honest i n t h e i r foolishness, whereas the Tories, being gentlemen, w i l l always put on a white t i e before the dinner party at which the guest w i l l have his throat cut when t h e brandy (vintage Macleod) begins to c i r c u -20 l a t e . " For the European, therefore, the conference o f f i c i a l l y confirmed the inevitable fact that Kenya was an African country destined to be governed by the African. The dream of Lord Belamere for a great white dominion of Kenya had been destroyed at Lancaster House. 126 For the Asian, the conference reaffirmed that he was not a p o l i t i c a l force i n the country, nor was he destined to play any s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the future con-s t i t u t i o n a l development i n the colony. Within two years the Kenya Indian Congress was to accept formally t h i s p o s i t i o n , f o r i t was to withdraw from d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . In making t h i s decision i t declared: "Let us now as Africans, as c i t i z e n s of Kenya, have confidence i n the African leaders. To continue i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d 21 even on a non-racial abasis, i s wrong." By supporting adult suffrage and a common r o l l at the conference, the Asian had not hindered nor did he intend to hinder, the growth of African independence i n Kenya. The Africans not only achieved much increased representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a result of the MacLeod co n s t i t u t i o n , but they also received assurance that independence was ultimately to be t h e i r s . The greatest fear of the A f r i c a n , that self-government would be granted to a European majority i n Legco, had been re-moved by the conference. In i t s place the B r i t i s h Govern-ment asserted that Kenya, i n time, was to become indepen-dent under an African government. However, the momentum of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement was not to be slowed down by v i c t o r i e s won at Lancaster House, f o r as the Africans showed i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s , undiluted democracy was the one goal f o r which they were s t r i v i n g . The African d e l -egates refused to accept m i n i s t r i e s , f o r they wanted the r i g h t 127 to make recommendations to the Governor, rather than have the Governor choose the ministers on his own. Gov-ernor Renison interpreted t h i s a t t i t u d e i n t h i s manner: "These people are p o l i t i c i a n s and are a b i t frightened i n public speeches of saying they love us too much. They are a f r a i d that other p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l come up s t i l l carrying out the old abusive ideas and w i l l be more pop-22 ular with the crowd." That t h i s was true was soon borne out by the increased pressure f o r f u l l independence. The Africans, however, were not just r e f l e c t i n g t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; they were also reacting to the changes around them. In a l e t t e r to Roy Welensky, the dominant figure i n Central A f r i c a , Michael Blundell exhibited his national outlook and appreciation of the African a t t i t u d e : 7 I t has come as a tremendous shock to European opinion i n Kenya. We have got to accept that 60,000 Europeans aren't r e a l l y a f i r m base f o r self-government i f that government i s to be larg e l y directed over the 6 m i l l i o n Africans. Secondly, the developments around us i n Tanganyika, the Congo, Uganda and B r i t i s h Som-a l i a make i t almost impossible f o r us to hold back. As i t i s we s h a l l be the least advanced c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y of a l l these t e r r i t o r i e s . 23 For the European the only r e a l i s t i c oo urse to follow was to seek the goodwill of the A f r i c a n , and cooperate i n the A f r i c a n i z a t i o n of the government and the c i v i l ser-v i c e . To do t h i s , however, i t would require some e f f o r t s to reunify the European community i n Kenya. 128 While European unity continued to d i s i n t e g r a t e , the f i r m foundation of African nationalism as a u n i f i e d movement i n Kenya began tocrunble. With t h i s came the r e b i r t h of t r i b a l i s m — a r e s u l t foreshadowed by African n a t i o n a l i s t s as early as 1953. Without the burdens of the Emergency regulations African national p o l i t i c a l p arties onee again were formed. Two national parties were organized bringing with them the appearance of p o l -i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the I960 constitu-t i o n a l conference. In March, I960, a meeting of the A f r i c a n elected members was planned at Kiambu, near Nai r o b i , to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of organizing an African p o l i t i c a l party. However, two days before the meeting was to be held a breach appeared i n the unity of the African Members of Legco. The former leader of KAU, James Gichuru, recently released from r e s t r i c t i o n , had been asked by some African n a t i o n a l i s t s to lead a new p o l i t i c a l party, the Uhuru Party. These e f f o r t s were unsuccessful. On Mareh 25, the new party led by Oginga Odinga was formed but i t t r i e d to exclude Tom Mboya from i t s ranks. I t appeared that t h i s action was motivated by the increasingly prominent position Mboya was taking as the leading Kenya spokesman both i n B r i t a i n and i n the 24 United States. Added to t h i s d i s t r u s t of Mboya was his r e f u s a l to accept a ministry owing to h i s work load both 25 i n the labour movement and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . Odinga re-129 sented Mboya1s decision and commented: " I f he knew that he was not going to take a M i n i s t r y , why didn't he say so before? This change of mind can only be said to have been influenced by the h o s t i l e atmosphere at the Kiambu leaders' conference. This i s an unfortunate and most 26 misleading public game." From Odinga's remarks i t was quite apparent that the game of p o l i t i e s was fast be-coming a part of the African n a t i o n a l i s t movement. In spite of t h i s growing r i v a l r y between Odinga and Mboya, the Uhuru Party was disbanded two days l a t e r . On March 27, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), deriving i t s name from the Tanganyika A f r i c a n National Union (TANU), was organized, becoming the f i r s t nation-wide party i n Kenya since the KAU was proscribed i n 1953• Two months a f t e r i t s inception the KANU chose i t s o f f i c e r s with Odinga as vice-president and Mboya as secretary. James Gichuru was appointed acting president, although i t was agreed that upon the release of Jomo Kenyatta, he would step aside and allow Kenyatta to assume the leader-ship of the party. Ronald Ngala was elected treasurer and Arap Moi was elected assistant treasurer, although both men were absent i n the United States at the time of t h e i r e l e c t i o n . When they returned to Kenya they refused to accept these posts and i n June they spear-headed the formation of the Kenya African Democratic Union, (KADU). 1 3 0 Tom Mboya was p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l of t h i s new party, f o r he believed i t only aggravated t r i b a l differences. He had dissolved a l l branches of h i s Peoples' Congress Party and had made the Nairobi branch part of the KANU i n an e f f o r t to s o l i d i f y the na t i o n a l -i s t movement into one strong organization. The smaller t r i b e s , f e a r f u l of t h i s Luo-Kikuyu union, were forming numerous t r i b a l groups throughout the country. Arap Moi organized the Kalenjin P o l i t i c a l A l l i a n c e , the Masai United Front came into existence i n the spring of I960, Ronald Ngala formed the Coast African People's Union, and Masinde Muliro maintained h i s Kenya African People's Party. In June a l l these groups joined together t o form KADU as an e f f e c t i v e r i v a l t o KANU. Stressing the pro-t e c t i o n of minority r i g h t s , KADU, according to Tom Mboya, borrowed from those who had urged the preservation of the White Highlands as a European reserve, and "from the statements of the l a t e Group Captain Briggs when he led 27 the United Party right-wingers at Lancaster House." With the formation of both these parties r a c i a l i s m de-clined as the major issue among Africans and was re-placed by the emergence of b i t t e r t r i b a l r i v a l r i e s which were to be a dominant feature of future c o n s t i t u t i o n a l negotiations. E l e c t i o n s to the new L e g i s l a t i v e Council were planned f o r March, 1 9 6 1 . The dominant fi g u r e throughout 131 the campaigning was that of Jomo Kenyatta, who was s t i l l r e s t r i c t e d i n his a c t i v i t i e s i n the Colony. A g i t a t i o n f o r his release was taken up by the Kenya African National Union, with the:.result that i n May, I960, Secretary of State I a i n Macleod found i t necessary to declare his Gov-ernment's po s i t i o n on t h i s matter. "I am f i r m l y convinced," said Mr. Macleod, "that h i s return to normal l i f e i n Kenya would i n present circumstances bring a d i r e c t threat to the maintenance of law and order and thereby prejudice the f u l f i l l m e n t of our recent decisions f o r orderly ad-28" vance i n that t e r r i t o r y . " The dilemma over the question of releasing Kenyatta developed into a f i n a l e f f o r t by conservative Europeans to maintain a major r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of Kenya. For the Africans t h i s issue was useful i n maintaining the momentum of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, and as a lever with which t o prod the Colonial Office f o r immediate independence. The conservative Kenya Sunday Post, highly c r i t i c a l of the A f r i c a n a g i t a -t i o n f o r Kenyatta's release, nevertheless r i g h t l y pointed out the' unwillingness of the African leaders to look be-yond independence to the great challenges and reponsib-i l i t i e s which would face them as Kenya's new leaders. In an e d i t o r i a l the publication commented: "The Kenyatta issue i s the l a s t s t i c k with which the N a t i o n a l i s t s can beat the other races i n t h i s country and to blame others for t h e i r troubles, they are i n c l i n e d to make too much of i t . Take away the Kenyatta issue and they w i l l r e a l i z e 132 that they have no a l t e r n a t i v e but to start working on long awaited progressive p o l i c i e s f o r the future welfare 2 9 of t h i s country." Without doubt, the Kenyatta issue symbolized the l a s t attempt by European conservatives to maintain t h e i r p o l i t i c a l predominance i n Kenya, and the f i n a l thrust by African n a t i o n a l i s t s to a t t a i n com-plete p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Colony. In the summer of I960 African Ministers and elected members threatened to resign t h e i r positions i f they were preventedf rom v i s i t i n g Kenyatta. Bowing to t h i s pressure the Governor granted permission to the Af r i c a n leaders to v i s i t Kenyatta at his place of re-s t r i c t i o n . Colin Legum, w r i t i n g i n The Observer, correctly pinpointed the significance of the issue when he remarked about Kenyatta: "He i s to-day both a myth and a martyr. He has become a legend i n h i s own l i f e t i m e ; above a l l , he i s the symbol of A f r i c a n independence. Yet so long as that vacuum remains i t i s impossible f o r the colony to advance along the road to independence charted by the 30 Macleod Constitution." The Times Weekly Review, at the time of the Kenyatta controversy, included an a r t i c l e by former Governor Baring, now Lord Howick, i n which the author urged that there should be f u l l cooperation between European and African i n Kenya. Perhaps i n an e f f o r t to r a l l y European opinion behind Michael Blundell and his l i b e r a l b e l i e f s towards the A f r i c a n , Lord Howick wrote: 133 "Mr. Blundell i s that unusual phenomenon, a European p o l i t i c a l leader based in Africa who cam address a large African meeting in an African language and get a good reception. Europeans would do well to show imagination and to realize that they cannot survive and prosper as 31 an isolated community." The former Governor, having divorced himself from the narrow confines of his old position, had come to realize that Africa was indeed changing, and that the European had to adjust his views to meet the challenge of the new Africa. In the meantime the Kenyatta issue continued to foment antagonism .in the Colony, particularly following the remarks of the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, on May 10, I960, when he said: Here was an African leader to darkness and death.... From the security viewpoint I think that Jomo Ken-y a t t a ^ return to p o l i t i c a l l i f e in Kenya at the present time would be a disaster. We are not yet far enough away from a l l the tragedies, the hatreds and the passions of Mau Mau....32 The Governor's statement was issued immediately after the release of the Corfield Report on the origins and growth of Mau Mau. The findings of this report pointed up Jomo Kenyatta's apparent implication in Mau Mau and suggested that Kenyatta was indeed the manager of the movement. Together, the release of the Report and the Governor's statement aroused considerable indignation among Kenya Africans who had been agitating for the r elease of Kenyatta since 1959. The attitude of the majority of Kenya .nation-1 3 4 a l i s t s was r e f l e c t e d i n the comments of Tom Mboya. "No Government," declared Mr. Mboya, " i n which Africans have an ef f e c t i v e voice can consider the continuation of Ken-yatta' s detention. He w i l l have to be released to be 3 3 Prime Minister of Kenya." From the point of view of Mboya's own p o l i t i c a l future i t was imperative that he advocate the release of Kenyatta. His ambitions could e a s i l y be thwarted i f he came out i n opposition to the release of Kenyatta, f o r his dominant position not only among the Luo, but more p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Kikuyu would be i n jeopardy. Kikuyu numerical strength and con-tact with the modern world dictated that no African i n Kenya could become a prominent national figure without the support of the Kikuyu. In l a t e August, Governor Renison delivered an important speech concerning the unrest building up i n the Colony over the Kenyatta issue, and he asserted: The eagerness of p o l i t i c i a n s to f i n d short cuts i s understandable but, I think, a r e a l danger to our future....In my judgement, the people know that they are on the right path now, and they do not want further disturbances and a l l the r e s t r i c t i o n s and other security action which must go with them. They know that African leaders now have the f u l l e s t say i n a l l Government decisions. Any leader seeking short cuts through rashly lowered standards or st r i k e s and c i v i l distrubances would have to con-sider very c a r e f u l l y whether the great mass of his countrymen, as d i s t i n c t from a few hot-heads, would r e a l l y be i n favour of such methods, would r e a l l y be helped to more than temporary excitement i f they succeeded. The Government, of course, has plans and resources to deal with c i v i l disobedience. I t w i l l have the power, i f necessary, to carry on i n d e f i n i t e l y an e f f i c i e n t i£ undemocratic government of o f f i c i a l s 135 without one or more of the groups of elected members. I do not think anyone w i l l doubt my determination to use such plans and powers i f I think that the s t a b i l i t y and economy are threatened on which must rest t he s ound and peaceful evolution of the people of Kenya to speedy and worthwhile independence.34 This declaration of course delighted the conservative Europeans i n Kenya. S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, leader of the Kenya G o a l i t i o n , suggested that: " I t was an unequivocal declaration of policy long overdue, and i t should help restore confidence i n the colony. We are c e r t a i n l y facing the biggest c r i s i s i n our short but 35 eventful h i s t o r y . " Michael Blundell approved of the speech as an honest e f f o r t to calm tension and maintain s t a b i l i t y i n the Colony. The Kenya African Democratic Union also supported the Governor's statement, motivated perhaps by the opportunity to make p o l i t i c a l gain and achieve European sympathy at the expense of the 'extreme' Luo-Kikuyu n a t i o n a l i s t s . KANU, inte r p r e t i n g the Governor's statement as a threat to t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance, issued the following remarks, declaring the speech " i l l -conceived, uncalled f o r and dangerous. Tough t a l k , intim-idation and the l i k e w i l l not create harmony nor ensure s t a b i l i t y i n Kenya. The Governor has completely misread 36 the people's mood and the p o l i t i c a l climate of the country." Thus with the problem of the release of Kenyatta sparking a major controversy i n the Colony, with the European com-munity disunited, and with the African n a t i o n a l i s t move-136 ment developing into two d i s t i n c t groups, the campaign f o r the March, 1961., election began. During the e l e c t i o n campaign members of Michael Blundell's New Kenya Group faced s t i f f opposition i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to win the primary elections. The Kenya Co a l i t i o n under Cavendish-Bentinck waged a p a r t i c u l a r l y h o s t i l e campaign against B l u n d e l l . One tense, but humour-ous incident i n the campaign occurred during a speech by Bl u n d e l l , i t ref l e c t e d the emotionalism of the p o l i t i c a l contest: Late i n the campaign I spoke i n the l o c a l hotel at Londiani, a small up-country farming d i s t r i c t . A f t e r my speech, a medium-sized man, with a sallow face and dark moustache got up and questioned me. "Mr. B l u n d e l l , don't you agree that you are a t r a i t o r to the European community?" He repeated with emphasis, "a t r a i t o r , s i r , to the European community," and.glanced along the row of chairs i n which he was standing. Immediately, about t h i r t y feet away, twelve men and women arose, including a b e a u t i f u l blonde, and bombarded the chairman and myself with eggs and tomatoes. There was nothing we could do, so I folded my arms and bore the onslaught with as much fo r t i t u d e as I could muster.37 Without a doubt the heat of party p o l i t i c s and e l e c t i o n -eering had a r r i v e d i n Kenya. A minority group of Europeans s t i l l held out the f u t i l e hope that i t would govern Kenya. No longer did they vent t h e i r h o s t i l i t y on the African but took t h e i r anger out on the progressive and r a t i o n a l members of the European community who had recognized the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of African r u l e and were intent on bringing about i t s smooth inception. Michael Blundell won a bare twenty-five percent of the vote ( t h i s was required i n the 137 primary i n order to advance to the general election) i n the European primary, r e f l e c t i n g European voters.*; d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n with his contribution to the Macleod c o n s t i -t u t i o n . However, when he contested the general election i n the R i f t Valley constituency he received overwhelming African support and gained a majority of 20,000 votes over his r i v a l S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck. His a b i l i t y to address the African constituents i n Swahili and his comparatively pro-African p o l i c i e s assured him of v i c t o r y . His middle-of-the-road a t t i t u d e between ex-treme African nationalism and European conservatism was reflected i n the New Kenya Group's election manifesto which declared: I t i s u n r e a l i s t i c to suppose that universal adult suffrage—one man, one v o t e — w i l l not be the basis of the franchise i n the future. But whatever the eventual pattern of the franchise may be, we believe that i n the foreseeable future, the r e s e r -vation of seats f o r minority interests must be retained, u n t i l such time as r a c i a l prejudice disappears.3o Although Africans might not have agreed with Blundell's position i n favour of reserved seats, they did display an interest i n what he had to say. To his surprise and delight, B l u n d e l l found that the queries raised by the Africans showed that: "On a dif f e r e n t scale t h e i r prob-lems and desires proved to be just the same as those of my old European co n s t i t u e n t s — b e t t e r houses/ piped water supplies and r u r a l education, the fear of l o s i n g t h e i r jobs and the inhumanity of being thrown out on to the road 138 39 with a l l t h e i r family at a moment's notice." This, i n -deed, was a testimonial to the growth of African p o l i t i c a l consciousness and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , pointing up the fact that there was slowly emerging among Africans a greater understanding of t h e i r own problems. The d i f f i c u l t i e s of meeting these problems, however, were beyond the compre-hension of most Africans. The campaign between KANU and KADU candidates was a vigorous one. Both parties had s i m i l a r aims, a l -though KADU displayed a fear of the consequences of Luo-Kikuyu domination. James Gichuru i n the KANU election manifesto declared: The very f i r s t aim of the Kenya African National Union i s to f i g h t r e l e n t l e s s l y to achieve and maintain independence f o r the people of Kenya. On t h i s hinges a l l the other aims and objects of the union; f o r without freedom and independence from i m p e r i a l i s t rule and e x p l o i t a t i o n , our i d e a l to reconstruct Kenya into a country free from oppres-sion, and a home free from hunger, sickness and ignorance w i l l never be re a l i z e d . The welfare of our people, t h e i r standard of l i v i n g , wealth, health, education and culture cannot be treated with p r i o r i t y by the imperialists...."4© C l e a r l y , the leaders of KANU were exploiting f o r t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l p r o f i t the naive b e l i e f of many Africans that a high standard of l i v i n g was a natural concomitant of independence. In the campaign the contest i n Nairobi East developed into a most dramatic and inte r e s t i n g a f f a i r . In t h i s d i s t r i c t more than s i x t y percent of the registered electors were from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru t r i b e s , while 139 l i t t l e more than ten percent came from the Luo t r i b e . KANU selected Tom Mboya to contest the election under i t s banner. Shortly before the e l e c t i o n , rumours spread that Mboya was not sincere i n his speeches advocating the release of Jomo Kenyatta, with the r e s u l t that an anti-Mboya candidate was chosen. With the open support of Oginga Odinga, Dr. Waiyaki, KANU's Nairobi branch chairman, was chosen to run against Mboya as an inde-pendent. Odinga was subsequently suspended from KANU f o r his action, thereby creating an unfortunate breach i n the national party. In supporting Dr. Waiyaki and the formation of the Kenya Action Group, Odinga j u s t i f i e d his action by saying "even i f i t means the end of KANU's existence...we s h a l l not tolerate the behaviour of men 41 l i k e Mboya." The outcome of the contest between f i v e candidates was an overwhelming vi c t o r y f o r Tom Mboya. The Luo n a t i o n a l i s t received ninety percent of the vote, 42 with a l l the other candidates losi n g t h e i r deposits. The margin of Mboya1s v i c t o r y was both s u r p r i s -ing and s i g n i f i c a n t . I t reaffirmed his p o s i t i o n as the dominant Af r i c a n p o l i t i c i a n ) i n Kenya and cl e a r l y pointed nip his a b i l i t y and p o l i t i c a l shrewdness. He had captured the majority of votes of a l l t r i b e s i n his r i d i n g and had shown that i n t h i s constituency a national rather than a t r i b a l outlook prevailed. C l e a r l y , i t was a per-sonal triumph f o r Mboya and a b i t t e r defeat f o r his r i v a l 140 Oginga Odinga. On the national scene, the leadership of Mboya won nineteen seats f o r KANU, while KADU gained eleven. S i x Europeans contesting the reserved seats were v i c t o r i o u s with KANU support, while four v i c t o r i o u s Asians had received the support of KANU. The great v i c -tory f o r the Kenya African National Union brought with i t the seeds of c r i s i s i n the Colony. The central figure i n the new c o n f l i c t and the man who had hung l i k e an ominous shadow over the a f f a i r s of the Colony f o r nearly f i f t e e n years, was "the burning spear", Jomo Kenyatta. I t was perhaps i r o n i c that at the very moment when A f r i -can unity threatened to collapse, t h i s man should become the embodiment of a u n i f i e d independence movement i n the Colony. The elections, conducted i n a responsible manner, gave KANU the opportunity to form a government. However, just a f t e r the re s u l t s of the election were known, Gover-nor Renison announced that Kenyatta would not be released u n t i l a government had been formed and found workable. In a radio broadcast i n May, 1961, Governor Renison declared: I care f o r Kenya too much to contemplate his stepping from r e s t r i c t i o n to a pos i t i o n of auth-o r i t y . I ask you to read again my statement of l a s t May. Nothing has happened since to make me wish I had worded the statement or any part of i t differently.4 3 This statement was both poorly timed and i l l - a d v i s e d f o r the very strength of African unity and the f o c a l point of 141 both KaNlPs and KADU's campaign, rested on the release of Jomo Kenyatta. The p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the country was i n jeopardy owing to the decision of the Governor. Consequently, KANU refused to cooperate i n the formation of any Government u n t i l Kenyatta was freed. At t h i s time KADU members le d by Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro, were unwilling to form a government either. To give cr e d u l i t y to t h e i r demand f o r the release of JKenyatta, KADU leaders v i s i t e d Kenyatta i n mid-March. Further pressure was placed on the Governor, when oh March 2 3 , 1 9 6 1 , a j o i n t KANU-KADU delegation v i s i t e d Kenyatta to seek his advice on t he form-ation of a government. For the f i r s t time i n more than eight years Kenyatta was becoming involved i n the a f f a i r s of the Colony. Although both parties conversed together with Kenyatta, t h e i r p o l i c i e s on the Kenyatta issue d i f -fered sharply. KADU, unlike KANU, had made i t clear that i t d i d not consider the issues of forming a government and of gaining the release of Kenyatta as being i n e x t r i c -ably linked together. KANU, on the other hand, had com-mitted i t s e l f to the release of Kenyatta before i t would form any government. In A p r i l Kenyatta, after being moved to a heal t h i e r place of r e s t r i c t i o n at Maralal, held his f i r s t press conference since his arrest i n 1 9 5 2 . The Governor of Kenya, while issuing statements suggesting that i t was unwise to release Kenyatta, had never v i s i t e d the impris-oned man nor had he considered that K e n y a t t a might be 142 able to contribute to the smooth t r a n s i t i o n from colon-i a l r u l e . In spite of the apprehensions of the Governor the reaction of those that did interview Kenyatta was one of pleasant surprise. Michael B l u n d e l l , when he ev-entually met Kenyatta, described his as "one of the 44 ablest and most i n t e l l i g e n t Africans whom I had met." Clyde Sanger, the African correspondent f o r the Manches-te r Guardian Weekly, was impressed by Kenyatta at t h e press conference and wrote: "Benevolence and dedication were also the foremost impressions which he succeeded 45 i n g i v i n g , a f t e r the f i r s t shyness had gone." The  Times correspondent was s i m i l a r l y impressed and com-mented on Kenyatta's part i n Mau Mau when he said that his " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r these h o r r i b l e aberrations was at most i n d i r e c t . Kenyatta undoubtedly ought to be re-46 leased." In urging p o l i t i c a l advancement by means of another round table conference to plan the next step towards independence, Kenyatta displayed his general benevolence towards Europeans i n the country when he declared}. "Those who w i l l accept c i t i z e n s h i p of Kenya w i l l have equal rights , equal protection i n a l l spheres. Therefore no one should have any fear as long as he does 47 not want to hold on to old p r i v i l e g e s . " C l e a r l y , pub-l i c opinion outside the Colony was becoming united i n i t s opposition to the continued detention of Kenyatta. Within the Colony, however, some Europeans s t i l l rejected 143 the release of Kenyatta as w e l l as his proposals for a new co n s t i t u t i o n a l conference. The Governor, displaying a lack of understanding of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Kenyatta issue, disagreed with both Kenyatta and the leaders of KANU, who believed that the f i r s t Lancaster House Conference had served i t s pur-pose, when he issued the following statement on A p r i l 14: The Lancaster House constitution was devised to provide an agreed f i r s t step towards independence. Subsequent steps are responsible government, i n -t e r n a l self-government, and f i n a l l y f u l l s e l f -government. I t i s possible to pass through these states quickly, but the Governor believes that to pass on to a second stage before the f i r s t stage i s working would endanger the whole method of the planned approach which l e d other t e r r i t o r i e s i n the Commonwealth to stable independence. The abandonment of such a planned approach could lead to a landslide i n which the human r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , minority t r i b e s and communities, together with thee administrative and economic structure of Kenya, would be i n danger of being overwhelmed.4° To the Governor the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l policy s t i l l remained i n ef f e c t i n Kenya. G o v e r n o r Renison tended to overlook the strength of n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment i n Kenya and the added influence of the r a p i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l devel-opment taking place elsewhere i n A f r i c a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Tanganyika. To the African the demand f o r increased power and a new conference arose over his f r u s t r a t i o n over the Kenyatta dilemma. To many n a t i o n a l i s t s t h i s issue was r e -garded as a l a s t effort, to thwart the objectives of the African independence movement. At the same time, the A f r i -144 can's growing impatience, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the leaders of KANU, grew out of p o l i t i c a l confusion be-tween the two African p a r t i e s , KANU was committed to the release of Jomo Kenyatta before i t could form a government, whereas KADU, although not committed to his release, saw i t s p o l i t i c a l future resting on a benevolent attitude towards Kenyatta. Thiis i n order to overcome t h i s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , the A f r i -can leaders looked to renewed demands f o r immediate independence as a means of overcoming the Governor's decision and t h e i r own disuni t y . Gn A p r i l 18, a f t e r Ronald Ngala had returned from a meeting i n London with Colonial Secretary I a i n Macleod, KADU announced that i t would be w i l l i n g to participate i n the formation of a government. In return Ngala was able to obtain the promise that the government would b u i l d a house f o r Kenyatta i n Kiambu i n prepara-t i o n f o r his eventual release. This decision of KADU created a c r i s i s i n KANU, fo r i t was a blow to some memfeers who had hoped to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the country's f i r s t A f r i c an government. Such members as the four Kamba representatives saw i n KADU an opportunity not only to effect the release of Kenyatta, but also the p o s s i b i l i t y of moving quickly towards independence. In addition, any suspicions about KANU being a Luo-Kikuyu party would be i n t e n s i f i e d should KANU object strenuously 145 49 to Ngala's decision. With the cooperation of the New Kenya Group, Ngala was able to form a government and be-come leader of Government Business. Michael Blundell once again assumed the post of Mini s t e r of Agriculture. His decision to cooperate with KADU l o s t Blundell his e a r l i e r KAMU support, but i t was clear that the leader of the New Kenya Group saw that h i s f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to work f o r a national government. At the same time, Blundell rec-ognized that the African was emerging as the r e a l p o l i t -i c a l leader of the country and f o r t h i s reason Ngala be-came the main spokesman for the c o a l i t i o n with Blundell gradually withdrawing from the limelight which he had held for a decade. The cooperation of KADU and the New Kenya Group led to the withdrawal of Bruce McKenzie, former Minister of Agriculture i n the Colony, from Blundell's party. McKenzie recognized that minority government was a bad thing especially at t h i s c r u c i a l stage i n Kenya's con-s t i t u t i o n a l development. He also considered KANU to be the r e a l voice of Kenya nationalism, and f o r t h i s reason he vigorously supported i t s p o l i c i e s from the opposition benches i n Legco. Overshadowing the d i f f i c u l t position of KADU was the f a c t that i t was not t r u l y representative of the w i l l of the majority of the people. I t did not ad-vocate immediate independence i n 1961, as did the leaders of KANU, and for t h i s reason i t found i t s e l f better able to associate with the p o l i c i e s of the Colonial Secretary. 146 In refusing to consider the demands for immediate i n -dependence, Mr. Macleod had declared i n the House of Gommons: "In.dealing with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advances i n the t e r r i t o r y , I have always resolutely refused t o agree 50 to timetables." Commenting r e a l i s t i c a l l y on the new Kenya Government, The Times' correspondent wrote: "The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), backed by Mr. Michael B l u n d e l l ! s New Kenya Party, i s s t i l l c l i n g i n g to i t s rather naive b e l i e f that by helping the B r i t i s h Government from an awkward s i t u a t i o n i t has earned a 51 right to lead Kenya to independence." I t appeared that Mr. Macleod had no intentions of supporting p o l i t i c a l parties which did not represent the w i l l of the people. Rather, h i s comments on the question of timetables were merely an e f f o r t to keep the pace of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l dev-elopment from becoming unreasonably hectic. The question of the release of Kenyatta and his possible effect on the future of Kenya continued to be foremost i n the minds of those interested i n devel-opments i n the East African country. The Economist suggested that "Mr. Kenyatta...may yet provide the cem-52 ent to bind the parties together." This a t t i t u d e was gaining more and more adherents both i n Kenya and i n B r i t a i n , for i t was apparent that the p o l i t i c a l instab-i l i t y could not be resolved u n t i l the Kenyatta issue was s e t t l e d . Conservative opinion among a minority of Euro-147 pean s e t t l e r s continued to express a fear of the ultimate consequences should Kenyatta become a free man. The chaos which followed the declaration of independence i n the Gongo on June 30, I960, served only to strengthen t h e i r fear and uncertainty of t h e i r own fate i f Kenya should become independent under African r u l e . The majority of the people i n Kenya recognized that Kenyatta created a greater danger to s t a b i l i t y by remaining i n detention than i f he were set free. I t was, therefore, under mounting pressure i n both Kenya and B r i t a i n that Secretary of State f o r the Colonies, I a i n Macleod, announced to the House of Commons on August 1, 1961, that Jomo Kenyatta would be re-leased. "I believe that t h i s decision," declared Mr. Macleod, " d i f f i c u l t though i t i s , i s i n the best i n t e r e s t s of a l l the peoples of Kenya and that i t should be taken 53 now." In succinct terms the Secretary of State pointed out the dilemma of the decision when he asserted that "equally there i s a r i s k attached to action and a r i s k 54 attached to ina c t i o n i n t h i s matter." This decision was not taken without thorough discussion and inquiry. I t was the outcome of t a l k s between the Governor, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Council of Mi n i s t e r s , sen-i o r members of the Police and Administration, and the l o y a l Kikuyus—with a l l groups voicing t h e i r f u l l support f o r the decision that was ultimately taken. 148 On August 14, 1961, Jomo Kenyatta was released from restriction after nine years of being shut off from events which had shaped the new Kenya. The news of his release was generally greeted with r e l i e f throughout the Colony. His f i r s t words as a free man were dominated by moderation. In his statement, Kenyatta described the i n -habitants of his country as Kenyans rather than Africans, Europeans, or Asians, and he added: Let me say today that a l l people of Kenya, black, white or brown, are Kenyans. Let me say that i f Europeans and Asians who have their home here want to stay and to become Africans with us, they have nothing to fear.55 The release of Kenyatta was claimed by both KANU and KADU as a victory for their partyir«-the former claiming victory through propaganda and a lack of cooperation; the latter attributing his release to their cooperation in govern-ment. Though both parties could claim victory, i t was the recognition by the Colonial Secretary of the neces-sity to release Kenyatta in order that p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y might be achieved in the Colony, that ultimately brought about Kenyatta's liberation. Upon his release Kenyatta chaired a gathering of the leaders of both parties in an effort to reunify the nationalist movement and to renew the cry for immed-iate independence. A memorandum distributed following the meeting called for a constitutional conference for September, 1961, the establishment of a coalition govern-149 ment of both African p a r t i e s , and the demand for indepen-dence on February 1 , 1 9 6 2 . The Governor accepted the need fo r t a l k s but declared that independence was an impossib-i l i t y f o r the date chosen by the Africans. For t h i s reason, KANU members walked out of the subsequent t a l k s with the Governor and on September 3 0 , KADU repudiated the leader-ship of Kenyatta. The seemingly irreparable s p l i t between the two parties reached a peak at the end of October when 56 Jomo Kenyatta assumed the presidency of KANU. Clearly, a new phase i n Kenya p o l i t i c a l development was emerging, for KADU, recognizing the r e a l authority enjoyed by Ken-y a t t a — h a i l e d as "the father of Kenya's n a t i o n a l i s m " — saw i t s e l f as a minority and i t , therefore, began to press the claim f o r a federal constitution for the Colony to protect i t s 'minority' r i g h t s . In making demands fo r independence i n early 1 9 6 2 , the leaders of KANU displayed a certain degree of immaturity, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t of recent c o n s t i t -u t i o n a l progress made i n the Colony. This attitude con-trasted considerably with that of J u l i u s Nyerere i n Tan-ganyika. The success of his Tanganyika African National Union, which had s i x years more p o l i t i c a l experience than KANU, was instrumental i n bringing p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r i e s to him. Speaking i n the summer of 1 9 5 9 , he remarked: "We are impatient f o r responsible government. We are not impatient about independence. We want to handle the education of our 150 people, economic development, improvement of communica-t i o n s , and so on. When we are doing the job independence 57 can take care of i t s e l f . " Such r a t i o n a l thinking was not apparent i n Kenya before independence came. Indeed, the Kenya independence movement overshadowed any thoughts about the:post-independence period i n Kenya's development. Cle a r l y , the goal of independence blinded Kenya nation-a l i s t s from any considerations of how to meet the economic and s o c i a l problems which would remain a f t e r independence. •: Nonetheless, the changed t a c t i c s of KADU renewed demands for another c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference, and the way was made clear f o r Kenyatta to take a leading part i n i t . A provision which d i s q u a l i f i e d any person who had spent more than two years i n prison from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n pol-i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the Colony, was rescinded i n November by the new Secretary of State f o r the Colonies, Reginald Maudling. In making t h i s announcement, which received the support of the leaders of KADU as well as that of KANU, Mr. Maudling declared that "our main objective i n Kenya... i s to achieve c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance on l i n e s generally 58 acceptable to the people of the country" Less than a month l a t e r , f o l l o w i n g a v i s i t to Kenya, Secretary of State, Mr. Maudling, issued a f u l l statement i n Parliament on the future of Kenya: The p o l i t i c a l problems that face Kenya must be solved and solved soon i f Kenya's economy, already sadly strained by natural disasters and flagging confidence, i s not to be irreparably damaged. 151 The great danger I see i s fear; fear of discrim-i n a t i o n , fear of in t i m i d a t i o n , fear of ex p l o i t a t i o n ....What Kenya needs i s confidence, calm and common sense, an end to inflammatory speeches, and above a l l an end to intimidation and violence. Kenya needs the brains, devotion, and c a p i t a l of a l l i t s peoples. This c a l l s f o r a society and an economy without discrimination of race, creed or colour where i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s are f i r m l y recognized and maintained.59 Individual r i g h t s , rather than minority r i g h t s based on r a c i a l differences, were to become the keynote i n future con s t i t u t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . An opportunity to redirect Kenya 1s development along the l i n e s proclaimed by Mr. Maudling was presented i n February, 1962, when a new cons t i t u t i o n a l conference was convened i n London at Lancaster House. The most outstanding difference between t h i s conference and the one two years e a r l i e r was the presence of Jomo Kenyatta. To the vast majority of Kikuyu as w e l l as to many other Kenyans, Kenyatta represented a great father figure destined to lead Kenya to indepen-dence. I'helimpact of Kenyatta on one Kikuyu, Josiah Mwangi K a r i u k i , was expressed i n t h i s manner: No" African who loves his country can ever forget t h i s man who has shown us the way to freedom and who has undergone so much f o r us....He i s our chosen leader and he alone w i l l lead us out of the past, out of the deep p i t s of dark memories to the bright future of our country....Kenyatta i s greater than any Kikuyu, he i s greater than any Luo or Nandi or Masai or Kiriama, he i s greater than any Kenyan, he i s the greatest African of them a l l . He knows no tribe,no race, he bears no hatred or malice f or the past; he i s human and yet wiser than any other human being I have ever known. They are a l l his people, his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and his children; a l l f e l l o w human beings to love and to cherish, to correct i f they do wrong, to praise i f they do right.60 152 The influence on the general populace "of his voice and personality was immediate and magnetic so that even the 61 smallest children became s t i l l and quiet." The naivete of Kariuki and undoubtedly of the large majority of A f r i -cans i n Kenya was indicated by the suggestion that Kenyatta and independence would automatically basing a bright future to Kenya. A further i n d i c a t i o n of the growing popularity of Jomo Kenyatta, p a r t i c u l a r l y as a result of the a g i -t a t i o n f o r his release during the 1961 election campaign, 62 was seen i n the following public opinion p o l l : Kenyatta Mboya Ngala Odinga Kiano June, I960 24$ 41$ 7$ 3$ 11$ Sept. I960 32$ 42$ 11$ 2$ Jan. 1961 33$ 28$ 7$ 7$ <0 <o <c$ t> 5$ This p o l l also pointed out the overwhelming popularity of Tom Mboya over other n a t i o n a l i s t leaders and showed the comparatively weak position of Oginga Odinga. There could be l i t t l e doubt that the two figures to watch at the con-s t i t u t i o n a l conference were Mboya and Kenyatta, for both i n d i v i d u a l s represent ed well over half the African pop-ula t i o n i n Kenya. In February the s t a r t of the longest c o n s t i t -u t i o n a l conference i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l history ( f i f t y days) began at Lancaster House. The dominant feature of t h i s lengthy conference was the demand of Ronald Ngala and the representatives of KADU fo r a form of government embodying regionalism or a means of protecting t r i b a l 153 r i g h t s . According t o Tom Mboya: "The difference be-tween KANU and KADU over t r i b a l i s m i s t h i s : KANU con-cedes that t r i b a l f eelings exist but say they can beeel-iminated by wise leadership and p o s i t i v e action; KADU 63 i s exaggerating these f e e l i n g s to entrench t r i b a l i s m . " E s s e n t i a l l y Mboya was correct, f o r the idea of region-alism appealed to the smaller t r i b e s of Kenya i n which they would obtain primary control over such issues as land, education, p o l i c e , and the composition of the regions. This p o l i c y , however, was a direct threat t o African cooperation i n the country at a time when national unity was essential i f the country was t o achieve s t a b i l i t y . A statement by Mboya during the 1961 election campaign was beginning to be proven cor-r e c t . At that time he had declared that: "I am con-vinced that envy, jealousy, personal ambition, and 64 t r i b a l i s m are our greatest e v i l s today." In t h i s con-f l i c t between Africans, i t was nearly two months be-fore Colonial Secretary, ReginaldMaudling, was able to reach a settlement. Throughout the duration of the conference, KADU voiced the fear of an emergence of authoritarian r u l e and personality c u l t s such as dev-65 eloped i n Ghana. Regardless of KADU objections i t was apparent that i n the eyes of a large number of Africans the c u l t of personality had already surrounded Jomo Kenyatta. 154 A f t e r weeks of debate a eompromise c o n s t i t -ution was eventually reached i n which a type of feder-alism was introduced i n Kenya. The new parliament was to consist of an Upper and Lower House. The Lower House or House of Representatives waa to be based on approx-imately equal single-member constituencies elected on the basis of universal suffrage. The Upper House or Senate was to include one member from each d i s t r i c t and non-voting members representing special i n t e r e s t s . Six regional assemblies were to be created and elected by the d i s t r i c t s . The Council of Ministers was to i n -clude two o f f i c i a l s (Minister of Legal A f f a i r s and the Minister of Defense) and fourteen elected members of the l e g i s l a t u r e equally divided between KADU and KANU. The f u l l d e t a i l s of the proposed constitution were to be worked out by t h i s new c o a l i t i o n government i n Kenya. The outcome of the conference was e s s e n t i a l l y a comprom-is e plan which saw the i n s t i t u t i o n of regionalism with the maintenance of a strong central government. The  Times, commenting on the langthy and at times hopeless t a l k s , commended Mr, Maudling, who i t said "has timed h i s i n i t i a t i v e with shrewd understanding of the mood of despair and self-disgust to which the conference delegates have been reduced a f t e r f i v e weeks of f r u i t -l e s s talk-a.ifeeling mixed with bitterness and dismay among the backbenchers as they have observed the incom-66 petence or r i g i d i t y of t h e i r leaders." 155 Perhaps the greatest success the Colonial Sec-retary achieved at the conference was i n getting KANU to hold off on i t s demand f o r immediate independence. This provided the African a l i t t l e more time to g ain p r a c t i c a l experience i n the administration of the gov-ernment. Both leaders of the African parties expressed cautious optimism with the eventual outcome of the t a l k s . Jomo Kenyatta declared: "This i s c e r t a i n l y the basis f o r discussion. I am now more o p t i m i s t i c . I would not say t h i s i s what we want, but i t does go a long way 67 towards i t . " Ronald Ngala commented: "We require to examine the Colonial Secretary's ideas i n much greater d e t a i l , but at f i r s t sight they seem to represent a 68 sound basis f o r discussion." Opposition members i n the House of Commons praised Mr. Maudling for his patience and tact i n making the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference an eventual success. Clearly, the Secretary of State was to be commended i n h i s e f f o r t s which brought about some rapprochement between the two African parties at t h i s c r i t i c a l stage i n Kenya's cons t i t u t i o n a l evolution. The Secretary of State made the long-awaited announcement that self-government would be proclaimed i n the Colony aft e r the next general e l e c t i o n , t'^ he question of a date f o r independence," Mr. Maudling said, "was not on the agenda of the recent conference. We made i t clear that i t would be f o r the Government which was elected 156 under the new cons t i t u t i o n to discuss the question of 69 independence with Her Majesty's Government." The f u l l d e t a i l s of the proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n , however, were not f u l l y expressed u n t i l March, 1963. Although a c o a l i t i o n government was formed i n the country, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n among the dissident African groups was not immediately achieved. A rundown economy i n Kenya together with r i s i n g unemployment contributed to the mounting p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , with the result that s t r i k e s occurred and the threat of violence be-came very r e a l . A r i f t i n KANU began to develop i n August when the commissions to delimit the regional boundaries i n Kenya a r r i v e d . T r i b a l l o y a l t i e s came to the forefront as some members of KANU gave evidence which con f l i c t e d with KANU's p o l i c y of seeking no change i n the pro v i n c i a l boundaries. A l a r g e l y Luo meeting of Trade Unionists i n Nairobi c r i t i c i z e d Kenyatta and formed a Luo P o l i t i c a l Movement. Only Tom Mboya's l o y a l t y to Kenyatta and h i s concern for his own p o l i t i c a l future prevented an open break i n KANU. The Kamba members of the L e g i s l a -t i v e Council i n KANU desired to be i n a separate Region from either the Kikuyu or the Masai. As a consequence, under the leadership of Paul Ngei they broke with KANU i n November, 1962, and formed t h e i r own t r i b a l organiz-70 a t i o n , the African People's Party. Ngei, who had ex-perienced a long period of antipathy to Kenyatta, was 157 unable to come to terms with KADU which was also being faced with t r i b a l differences which were seriously to hurt i t s chances i n the 1963 election. In November S i r Patrick Renison resigned as Governor and was replaced by Malcolm Macdonald, a p o l -i t i c i a n and a diplomat rather than an administrator. This i n i t s e l f was a s i g n i f i c a n t change and indicated the declining role of the Governor i n the actual admin-i s t r a t i o n of the Colony. Clyde Sanger, w r i t i n g i n The  Manchester Guardian Weekly, c r i t i c i z e d the resigning Governor i n t h i s manner: The sad truth i s that S i r Patrick i s more of a kindly squire than the astute sort of Governor Kenya needed i n the post emergency period. His lack of p o l i t i c a l foresight has meant that his three years' regime has been a disastrous time f o r Kenya. The inept handling of the release from detention of Mr. Jomo Kenyatta l e d Kenya f i r s t into the period of a minority Government and then, because he could f i n d no f u l l escape from the e a r l i e r blunder, into an awkward coa-l i t i o n of the two African parties.71 I t was clear that the Kenyatta issue was a disaster f o r Governor Renison, but regardless of who the chief exec-utive had been, a decision either way would have been met by serious c r i t i c i s m . The Governor's f a i l u r e to meet the issue before i t developed into a major c r i s i s , however, caused immense p o l i t i c a l chaos i n the Colony. This made i t impossible f o r the majority party to assume the reins of government and gain some measure of admin-i s t r a t i v e experience before independence was proclaimed. As i t was, KANU experienced l e s s than s i x months of gov-158 erning Kenya before independence came. In March, 1963, a summary of the proposed constitution for Kenya was presented i n a White Paper. The Central Legislature was to include 41 members i n the Senate, 117 persons i n the House of Representatives, and 12 S p e c i a l l y Elected Members to be elected by Legco. The only q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were that " a l l members of the National Assembly must be B r i t i s h Subjects or B r i t i s h protected persons who are at lea s t 21 years old and are 72 l i t e r a t e i n English." An E l e c t o r a l Commission was to be c a l l e d upon to review boundaries of the constituen-cies every eight to ten years. The Senate was to have the power to delay b i l l s f o r up to one year; however, no money b i l l s could be delayed i n the Senate. The Gov-ernor was to have the power* to appoint ministers to the Executive on the advice of the Prime Minister. "Except i n respect of those matters i n which the Governor i s e x p l i c i t l y empowered to act i n his descretion [defence, external a f f a i r s , and i n t e r n a l security^) , the Governor must obtain, and act i n accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. The new constitution provided f o r seven regional assemblies plus one f o r the Nairobi area. These assemblies were to have elected and s p e c i a l l y elected members with each D i s t r i c t i n the Region having the same number of members. Each Regional Assembly was t o elect i t s own pres-159 ident who could be delegated executive functions from the Central Government. A l l l e g i s l a t i o n enacted i n the Regions was to "ensure compliance with Central Government l e g i s -74 l a t i o n . " The Central Government and the Regional Assem-b l i e s were each to have t h e i r own public services and " a l l such a u t h o r i t i e s should endeavour to maintain reas-onably uniform rates of pay and conditions of service 75 throughout a l l the public services." Local government was reserved exclusively to the Regional Assemblies with the re s u l t that "the whole of Kenya must be comprised within the area of some l o c a l government authority, of which there w i l l be two basic upper t i e r s , m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and county councils, and four types of lower t i e r s ; urban councils and township councils, and, i n the r u r a l areas, 76 area councils and l o c a l councils." These proposals f o r various l e v e l s of govern-ment i n Kenya were c l e a r l y the r e s u l t s of the e f f o r t s of KADU negotiators at Lancaster House. The expense to the Colony to maintain eight separate services as well as a multitude of governments would be a tremendous burden on the precarious finances of the country. Nevertheless, the i n s t i t u t i o n of these proposals i n the new const i t u -t i o n was the price for a compromise solution. The accept-ance of these terms by KANU was a s i g n i f i c a n t compromise on i t s part. I t was apparent, however, that the wide degree of autonomy given t o l o c a l areas together with H i ? OP TSB BECIOBS 0 / 100 200 mi. TIME Mop by J. Donovan 160 the establishment of regional councils, stimulated the maintenance of t r i b a l i s m . The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Duncan Sandys, commenting on his t r i p to Kenya, reported to the House of Commons i n March,1963, that "unhappily the whole p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n Kenya today 77 i s permeated by i n t e r - t r i b a l r i v a l r y and suspicion." In spite of the dangers of t r i b a l i s m , Mr. Sandys made the i n e v i t a b l e announcement that on May 26, 1963, f u l l i n t e r n a l self-government would be granted to Kenya. This date immediately followed the spring general election i n Kenya. The election of May, 1963 was the f i n a l step before African .rule was to be established i n Kenya Col-ony. Fought on emotional issues the election was between 78 African and A f r i c a n , with the main issue being the question of unitary government versus federalism. In essence, i t was a campaign of the weak against-the strong i n which KANU enjoyed a large measure of support through-out the country. For the f i r s t time Africans were d i s -cussing the problems of nation building and of restoring confidence i n the country's future a f t e r several years of p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t a b i l i t y . While KADU was urging the protection of minority or t r i b a l r i g h t s , KANU was looking beyond the ele c t i o n to the future of the country. In i t s A p r i l e l e c t i o n manifesto, KANU outlined i t s objectives i n t h i s manner: 161 The Marxist theory of class warfare has no r e l e -vance to Kenya's s i t u a t i o n . Attitudes which were appropriate when we were f i g h t i n g f o r independence have to be revised...The KANU government w i l l wel-come those non-Africans who choose to j o i n t with us i n the noble task of bu i l d i n g a Kenya nation. Their t r a i n i n g , s k i l l s , and knowledge w i l l be of the greatest value to us. We are confident that those who show confidence i n us w i l l appreciate the need to pass on to the nation what they can teach the people. They w i l l be f u l l y accepted by 79 us, not only through l e g a l forms, but i n our hearts. With self-government won and the fr u s t r a t i o n s of colonialism removed, the responsible African leaders at l a s t were looking on t h e i r country i n a new l i g h t . And although the problems of independence were beyond the comprehension of many of the voters, the confidence i n the future of Kenya as expressed by Kenyatta, Mboya, and others, was convincing enough to give KANU a decisive v i c t o r y . In the Senate KANU emerged as the majority party while i n the House of Representatives KANU captured eighty-two seats, KADU gained forty-two members, and f i v e remained vacant. In the Regional Assemblies, t r i b a l l o y -a l t i e s were more evident as KANU won a. .majority i n the Eastern, Central and Nyanza Regions, while KADU gained v i c t o r i e s i n the R i f t V a l l e y , Coast, and Western Regions. With the vi c t o r y of the Kenya African National Union, Jomo Kenyatta became the f i r s t Prime Minister of Kenya. In June a Kenya m i n i s t e r i a l delegation headed by Tom Mboya met with Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, to discuss steps to be taken f o r the t r a n s f e r of power to the Kenya Government. At t h i s meeting the question of 162 the formation of an East African Federation was exam= ined with both sides supporting i t s formation. Owing to African i n i t i a t i v e i n the matter, the B r i t i s h Government pressed for quick transfer of power, declaring: n I t was agreed that i t was desirable that Kenya should become independent shortly before the inauguration of the Fed-eration, which i t was hoped would take place before the 80 end of the year." The African representatives also ob-tained the guarantee that no B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y base would remain i n Kenya, although B r i t i s h forces would be allowed twelve months a f t e r independence to leave. Soon a f t e r t h i s meeting Duncan Sandys announced i n the House of Com-mons on July 2 , 1 9 6 3 , that Kenya would become an indepen-dent country on December 1 2 , 1 9 6 3 . With t h i s long-awaited announcement preparations were made for a f i n a l conference to complete the arrangements f o r independence. Once again African leaders t r a v e l l e d to London to meet with the Sec-retary of State, but t h i s was to be the f i n a l chapter i n the series of co n s t i t u t i o n a l conferences which i n less than four years had propelled Kenya to independence. The conference, which sat between September 25 and October 1 9 , 1 9 6 3 , included Ministers of the Kenya government (KANU) and a delegation from the o f f i c i a l op-position (KADU). The Secretary of State suggested that the problem facing the conference was how to reconcile the need f o r national unity with the desire f o r minority 163 safeguards. Mr. Sandys reaffirmed the objective declared i n 1962 as a "united Kenya nation, capable of s o c i a l and economic progress i n the modern w o r l d — a Kenya i n which men and women have confidence i n the sanctity of in d i v -i d u a l r i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s , and i n the proper safe-31 guarding of the interests of the mi n o r i t i e s . " The main issues at the conference were certain amendments proposed by the Kenya Government but objected to by the KADU Op-position. Under the proposed constitution a National Sec-u r i t y Council, composed of a Minister of the Central Gov-ernment and a representative of each of the seven Regions, was to have the power to determine the maximum strength of each regional force. Under the accepted amendment the National Security Council was to be charged with f i x i n g the actual establishment, as well as the maximum strength of the Central and Regional police contingents. A second change gave the Inspector General (who was to be i n over-a l l command of the police) the power to post a l l ranks of the Police Force into any Regional contingent without requiring the consent of the Regional Commissioners of Police concerned. At the same time, there were to be no r e s t r i c t i o n s on the movement of police reinforcements from one part of the country to another. These new prov-i s i o n s c l e a r l y were an e f f o r t by the Central Government to maintain greater authority over the p o l i c i n g of the country and thereby achieve a greater degree of unity and cooperation throughout the country. ±64 A second major change concerned the public ser-vice i n which there was a change from eight to a single public service commission f o r the country, composed of seven independent members appointed on the advice of the J u d i c i a l Services Commission. This new provision en-sured that there would be common q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and stan-dards throughout Kenya. "The Region should not be e n t i t l e d to i n s i s t on t r i b a l connections as a qua l i f i c a t i o n . . . t h e Commission should be required, as at present, to endeavour to secure that, so f a r as i s practicable, the s t a f f on the Central Government establishment should include a reas-onable number of persons from each Region, and that the s t a f f of a Region should include a substantial proportion 82 of persons drawn from that Region." With a clear man-date from the people of Kenya, the KANU Government was able to introduce t h i s proposal i n an ef f o r t to create a national public service divorced from t r i b a l a f f i l i a t i o n s . This, the Government hoped, would prevent the growth of autonomous c i v i l services from a foundation of t r i b a l l o y -a l t y . The t h i r d s i g n i f i c a n t amendment, to the Frame-work of 1962 dealt with amendments to the co n s t i t u t i o n . Changes aff e c t i n g the "entrenched r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l s , Regions, T r i b a l Authorities or D i s t r i c t s " would require the support of a 75$ vote i n the House of Representatives and a 90$ vote i n the Senate, while a l l other amendements 165 to the constitution necessitated a 75$ vote i n each House of Parliament. As an alternative procedure for obtaining a 75$ vote i n both Houses for a constitu-t i o n a l amendment, the Secretary of State offered the proposal of a two-thirds majority i n a nation-wide referendum. The categories of rights to which the high percentage requirements f o r amendment pertained were more closely defined to include: — t h e rights of the i n d i v i d u a l , (including the ju d i c i a r y and c i t i z e n s h i p ; , - - t r i b a l a uthorities (including the all-important t r i b a l land r i g h t s ) , — d i s t r i c t s (including the Senate f o r which the 83 D i s t r i c t s form the el e c t o r a l constituencies) In addition, t h i s requirement would apply to the struc-ture of the Regions with regard to t he provisions gov-erning Regional boundaries and the composition of the Regional Assemblies. I t would not, however, apply to the sections of the constitution defining the actual powers of the Regional Assemblies. Mr. Sandys pointed out that the "unique con-s t i t u t i o n , which i s neither federal nor unitary, has raised problems on which there are no exact precedents or experience to guide us, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the a l l o c a t i o n of functions between the Centre and the Regions." For t h i s reason the cons t i t u t i o n a l amendment changes were made i n order to provide "some element of f l e x i b i l i t y " i n the cons t i t u t i o n "so that i t can be 84 corrected i n the ol i g h t of experience." In a l e t t e r to 166 Mr. Sandys dated October 19, 1963, Jomo Kenyatta on be-half of the Government of Kenya accepted the proposed amendments and added: " I t i s not our intention to seek to make further amendments to the constitution except i n so f a r as subsequent experience shows that to be absol-85 utely necessary." The Opposition party i n Kenya, how-ever, refused to accept the changes and did not attend the f i n a l plenary session d? the conference. C l e a r l y , the conference was a v i c t o r y f o r KANU, f o r i t indicated a trend towards the consolidation of power and authority i n the centre and away from the Regions. With the con-clusion of the conference a l l that remained before indep-endence could be proclaimed was the o f f i c i a l passage of the Kenya Independence B i l l i n the House of Commons. In November the B i l l was introduced and passed i n the B r i t i s h Parliament after a lengthy debate i n the Commons. Mr. Sandys reassured Parliament about the cap-a b i l i t y of Kenyatta as leader, when he declared: "In recent months Mr. Kenyatta's wise and generous-minded speeches have won him much respect among a l l races i n 86 Kenya and here i n B r i t a i n . " At the same time, Ronald Ngala, as leader of the Kenya opposition, declared that "K.A.D.U. now look forward to f u l l and mutual cooperation with the Government i n establishing confidence and effec-87 t v e administration f o r the good of a l l peopl i n K nya." This was a reassuring statement, for i t had become quite 167 apparent that the success of the Kenya nation i n the future would depend primarily on the a b i l i t y of a l l the ttribes of Kenya to work together for the good of the entire country. Writing on t h i s matter Tom Mboya has suggested that: This i s only possible where you have popular leadership and a strong party machine. I t i s im-possible where you have a multi-party system with the opposition party waiting for the day i t can replace the government. We cannot over-emphasize the importance of national unity i n t h i s c r u c i a l stage of post-independence development.88 With t h i s hope Kenyans set out to 'Harambee'—Pull To-gether. On November 26, 1963, Under Secretary of State f o r the Colonies, Mr. R.P. Hornby, t o l d the House of Commons: The passing of t h i s B i l l w i l l not tear out the pages of history that have been wr i t t e n by B r i t a i n and by Kenya during the l a s t 70 years or so. We wish Kenya prosperity and u n i t y , strength and t o l -erance, and i n wishing her well f o r the future we t r u s t that the l i n k s and the friendship between her and t h i s country w i l l continue to grow with the years.89 On December 12, 1963, the seventy-three year old Jomo Kenyatta, convicted manager of Mau Mau, watched as the black, red, green and white f l a g of independent Kenya climbed the f l a g s t a f f i n Nairobi, and the Prime Minister spoke to the people of Kenya, declaring: Only we can save ourselves. Nobody else can save us. In the past we have blamed the Englishman when anything went wrong. We said he was sucking our blood. Now the government i s ours, and now you w i l l blame Kenyatta. But you should know that Kenyatta, by himself, cannot give you anything. I urge you to 168 work hard so that our 'Uhuru' w i l l be meaningful. From today on, our motto w i l l be 'Uhuru na Kazi', (Freedom and Work].90 The f e e l i n g of confidence i n the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta brought p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y to Kenya f o r the f i r s t time since the country became a Colony. The inclus i o n i n the administration of European, Asian and Arab members as ministers gave hope that Kenya would be a t r u l y non-racial society. Tom Mboya, i n January,I964 suggested that: "In the l a s t four months we have been able to create the most c o r d i a l , f r i e n d l y and harmonious relatio n s between the races as have never existed at 91 any time before." Whether such an atmosphere w i l l l a s t , however, only time w i l l determine. The f i n a l stages i n Kenya's co n s t i t u t i o n a l development were reached during the autumn of 1 9 6 4 . Soon a f t e r independence had been declared many members of the KADU opposition party crossed the f l o o r of the House of Representatives to j o i n KANU. On November 1 0 , 1964 the l a s t member of the Opposition, Ronald Ngala, l e f t his seat and joined KANU, thereby making Kenya a one-party state. On December 1 2 , 1 9 6 4 , the f i r s t anniversary of Kenya's independence was cele-brated with the announcement that Kenya would become a republic within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. Kenyatta, "the burning spear", became the f i r s t president of Kenya, and his f i r s t act was to appoint Oginga Odinga as hi s vice-president. This undoubtedly was a blow to the as p i r -ations of Tom Mboya, and perhaps has l a i d the seeds for 169 a bitter campaign to determine Kenyatta's successor when that time arrives. In the meantime, however, i t i s to Kenyatta that Kenya must look for leadership in the struggle to achieve p o l i t i c a l , economic and social s t a b i l i t y • The rapid pace with which Kenya reached i n -dependence and the p o l i t i c a l chaos that emerged during the f i n a l four years before independence was conferred may be attributed to a number of factors. The f i n a l stage in Kenya's evolution to independence was a most d i f f i c u l t one. The effect of the Mau Mau rebellion both retarded and hastened the transitional period. While Mau Mau destroyed the old Kenya dominated by the settler, i t led to a p o l i t i c a l awakening of Africans throughout the country as well as a changed attitude among Kenya Europeans. For these reasons, Mau Mau greatly stimulated the nationalistic fervour which had already begun to be f e l t in the Colony. At the same time, however, the Emer-gency regulations i n i t i a l l y retarded the development of a single national party appealing to Africans, of a l l tribes. Instead the formation of national p o l i t i c a l parties was prevented until I960, encouraging in the meantime the growth of regional African p o l i t i c a l bodies which appealed to t r i b a l loyalties. With the formation of African p o l i t i c a l parties on a nationwide basis, there were only four years in 170 which experience i n party p o l i t i c s and government could be gained by a s u f f i c i e n t number of Africans. Here, how-ever, the effects of the Emergency played t h e i r part i n creating a chaotic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . The concentration on the single goal of independence was the primary concern of both the Kenya Af r i c a n National Union and the Kenya African Democr a t i c Union. Few thoughts were directed t o -wards the future problems and prospects of Kenya. The gradual t r a n s i t i o n to self-government and independence i n Tanganyika contrasted markedly with that of Kenya. Under the moderate leadership of J u l i u s Nyerere the Tanganyika Afr i c a n National Union was able to appeal e f f e c t i v e l y f o r independence over a longer period of time than was KANU i n Kenya. As i t was, when self-government came to Tanganyika the country already was united behind a single leader with the r e s u l t that a more u n i f i e d and responsible attitu d e towards the f i n a l objective of independence could be taken. The success of Tanganyika's independence move-ment n a t u r a l l y had i t s effect on the Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t movement and created demands for s i m i l a r status as that of Tanganyika. In t h i s respect, however, the p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n both countries had been different and i t was clear that p o l i t i c a l experience i n Kenya was not as great as that i n Tanganyika. Nevertheless, Kenya Africans sought a s i m i l a r rate of advance as that 171 taking place i n t h e i r neighbouring country. For t h i s reason, the B r i t i s h Government found i t s e l f i n a pos-i t i o n where i t found i t necessary to accede to the n a t i o n a l i s t demands. The role of the B r i t i s h Government during t h i s f i n a l phase i n the p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l develop-ment of Kenya was both understanding and decisive. A r e a l i z a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l awakening i n Kenya among the indigenous population marked B r i t i s h p o l i cy there a f t e r I960. An acceptance of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of A f r i -can r u l e i n Kenya Colony was foremost i n the minds of B r i t i s h negotiators during the f i n a l years of Colonial r u l e . Out of t h i s changed attitude developed a growing t r u s t of the Colonial O f f i c e on the part of African p o l i t i c i a n s , and t h i s new cooperation greatly assisted the negotiations at the Lancaster House Conferences. Although many may c r i t i c i z e the haste with which B r i t a i n l e f t Kenya, African nationalism could not be deterred or delayed without more bloodshed. Cl e a r l y , Kenya could not be i s o l a t e d from the developments which were taking place i n the rest of A f r i c a . The decision to remain i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth once independence was declared i l l u s trated the acceptance of the important rol e B r i t a i n had played i n Kenya's development and the acknowledgement of 92 the necessity f o r B r i t i s h cooperation i n the future. 172 While greater understanding was reached be-tween the Colonial Office and the A f r i c a n , suspicion continued to s t r a i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the A f r i -can and the conservative European s e t t l e r . The contin-ued i n f l e x i b l e stand adopted by men such as Group Cap-t a i n Briggs and S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck hin-ered the t r a n s i t i o n from European to African r u l e i n the country. The d i s t r u s t of the p o l i t i c a l l y active s e t t l e r s had been nurtured over a hal f centuryy and most stands adopted by the European p o l i t i c a l parties were considered by the African leaders to be attempts to hang on to the l a s t vestige of white supremacy i n the country. Even the p o l i c i e s of Michael Blundell were viewed with some suspicions despite the import-ant r o l e he had played i n bringing about a greater un-derstanding between the white and black points of view. Of these European l i b e r a l s Tom Mboya has written: "They came forward to t r y to create a halfway-house between white supremacy and what they c a l l e d 'extreme national-ism'. They could not be accepted f u l l y by any n a t i o n a l -i s t , but they serve .a purpose i n helping t h e i r own people face the r e a l i t i e s of the change which was taking place around them....So the European ' l i b e r a l ' i s often mistrusted, because he w i l l not completely accept the new order. I t was t h i s mistrust which l e d to the f a i l u r e of S i r Michael B l u n d e l l . " 9 3 173 The r o l e of the Asian i n the f i n a l years be-fore independence came to Kenya was small. The i n i t i a -t i v e was taken by the African to achieve c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance i n the Colony and to t h i s end the Asian :contrib-uted l i t t l e . Throughout the post-Mau Mau period the Asian had been i n the middle of the p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e 94 between white and black. L i t t l e close association had been developed between African and Asian because the European power and culture was f a r more a t t r a c t i v e to the African than was the Asian trading community. In addit i o n , economic r i v a l r y and jealousy had developed between Asian and A f r i c a n , f o r the African by the l a t e n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s was no longer e n t i r e l y dependent on the small Asian traders. In the f i n a l years of Colonial r u l e the Asian c l e a r l y recognized that Kenya's p o l i t i c a l future was going to rest i n the hands of the Afric a n . To t h i s end Asians i n Legco supported most African demands for increased representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and were careful not to hinder the African drive f o r independence. Thus when independence came the Asians gained some min-i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and Chanan Singh, Parliamentary Secretary t o Prime Minister Kenyatta i n 1962, was able to say: "I cannot believe t h a t there w i l l be i n future as bad discrimination as there was i n the past....I think we w i l l be able to get over the d i f f i c u l t i e s that sometimes frighten people i n the same way as we have got 174 over d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the past....The leaders of Kenya Africans do not give me the impression that they want 295 to discriminate against us." With the achievment of independent status i n Kenya, the problem of rac i a l i s m lessened as some har-mony between the races emerged as Kenyans attempted to cooperate with each other f o r the betterment of t h e i r country. Yet, i t i s i r o n i c that one of the greatest problems which European occupation of Kenya at the turn of the twentieth century was able to reduce markedly— that of t r i b a l animosity--reemerges today as perhaps the greatest danger to the future p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the country. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya, during i t s f i r s t year of independence, has been able to maintain p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . For Kenya, how-ever, p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s only the foundation on which economic and s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y must be b u i l t . 175 NOTES 1 The Times. February 4, I960 2 The African elected members delegation con-tained two groups—The Kenya Independence Movement (Mboya) and the Kenya National Party (Muliro). Although united over independence, these groups diff e r e d over domestic issues. 3 S i r Michael B l u n d e l l , So Rough A Wind. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 234. 4 The Spectator. January 29, I960. 5 The Observer, January 24, I960. 6 The Observer, January 29, I960. 7 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report of the  Kenya Constitutional Conference I960, I960, Cmnd.960, p.5. 8 I b i d . , p. 8. 9 I b i d . . p. 7. 10 I b i d . , p. 10. 11 Tom Mboya, Freedom and A f t e r . London, Andre Deutsch, 1963, pp.116-117. 12 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . . p. 266. 13 The Times Weekly Review. February 2, I960. 14 The Times Weekly Review. February 25, I960. 15 The Manchester Guardian Weekly. February 25,1960. 16 L o c . c i t . 17 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . . p. 274. 18 East African and Rhodesia. March 10, I960,cited i n A f r i c a Digest, A p r i l . I960. 19 Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 25, I960. 20 The Spectator, March 25, I960. 176 21 George Delf, Asians i n East A f r i c a , London, New York, and Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 3,p . 4 L 22 The Spectator. March 2 5 , I 9 6 0 . 23 B l u n d e l l , op.cit.. p. 279. 24 Mboya, op.cit.. p.83 25 The Times. March 30, I960. 26 Manchester Guardian. A p r i l 1 , 1 9 6 0 . 27 Mboya, op.cit..p.85 28" Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i rial Report of Debates, May 5, I960, vol.622, col.1234. 29 Kenya Sunday Post, October 23, I960, ci t e d i n A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (December. I960), p.91. 30 The Observer. May 15, I960. 31 The Times Weekly Review. August 18, I960. 32 Mboya, op.cit., p.45. 33 The Times, October 21,1960. See also Mboya, op.cit., pp.54-55, 74. 34 The Times. September 1,1960. 35 The Times. September 2,1960. 36 A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (October, I960), p.56. 37 Bl u n d e l l , o p . c i t . . p. 289. 38 A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (February,1961), pp.139-140. 3 9 B l u n d e l l . op.cit.. p.291. 40 A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (February,1960), p. 140. 41 Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 2,1961. 42 George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, The Kenyatta  E l e c t i o n : Kenya 1960-1961, London, New York, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp.176-181. 43 Mboya, o p . c i t . , p. 4 5 . 177 44 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . . p. 2 9 7 . 45 Manchester Guardian Weekly. A p r i l 13, 1961. 46 The -Times. A p r i l 13, 1 9 6 1 . 47 Manchester Guardian Weekly. A p r i l 13, 1961. 48 Bennett and Rosberg, op.cit.. pp.196-197. 49 I b i d . . pp. 198-199. 50 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House ofCommons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. May 30, 1961, vol.641,col.17. 51 The Tjmes. August 9 , 1961. 52 The Economist. A p r i l 22, 1961. 53 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. August 1,1961, vol.645,col.1151. 54 I b i d . . cols.1153-1154. 55 The Economist. August 5, 1961. 56 George Bennett, Kenya:A P o l i t i c a l History. London, Ibadan,Nairobi and Accra, Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 3 , pp.155-156. 57 J. Clagett Taylor, The P o l i t i c a l Development of Tanganyika. London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p.185. 58 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of C o m m o n s > O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, November 23,1961, v o l . 6 4 9 , col.1544. 59 I b i d . . December 19,1961, vol.651,colsJ112-ILT3. 60 Josiah Mwangi K a r i u k i , 'Mau Mau* Detainee. London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 179. 61 I b i d . . p. 11. 62 Alan Rake, Tom Mboya-Young Man of New A f r i c a . New York, Doubleday and Co., 1962, p. 223. 63 Mboya, o p . c i t . . p. 72. 64 Rake, o p . c i t . . p. 211. 178 65 B l u n d e l l , o p . c i t . . p. 302. 66 The Tjmes. March 29, 1962. 67 L o c . c i t . 68 L o c . c i t . 69 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. A p r i l 10, 1962, vol.657,col. 1142. 70 Bennett, op.cit.. pp. 157-158. 71 Manchester Guardian Weekly. November 22,1962. 72 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya Constitu-tion-Summary of the Proposed Constitution f o r Internal  Self-Government, 1963. Cmnd. 1970. P. 2. 73 I b i d . . p. 5. 74 I b i d . . p. 6. 75 I b i d . , p. 9. 76 I b i d . . pp.9-10 77 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. March 12, 1963, vol.673,col. 1176. 78 Only one of seven hundred candidates was Euro-pean. 79 "African Government i n Kenya", A f r i c a Report. v o l . 8 (June, 1963), p. 16. 80 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya-Prepara-tions f o r Independence. 1963, Cmnd. 2082. 81 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Kenya Indepen-dence Conference, 1963. 1963, Cmnd. 2156, p . l . 82 I b i d . . p. 7. 83 L o c . c i t . , 84 I b i d . . pp.8-9. 85 I b i d . . p. 10. 179 86 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. November 22,1963, vol . 6 8 4 , c o l . 1396. 87 I b i d . , c o l . 1399. 88" Mboya, op . c i t . . p. 87. 89 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. November 26, 1963, vol . 6 8 5 , c o l . 232. 90 "Kenya," Time. December 20, 1963, p.25. 91 Tom Mboya, "The Future of Kenya," African  A f f a i r s , v o l . 6 3 , (January, 1964) , p. 7 . 92 In early 1964 Kenya c a l l e d on B r i t i s h troops to meet the uprising of Somali tribesmen on Kenya's north-eastern border. 93 Tom Mboya, Freedom and Af t e r , London, Andre Deutsch, 1963, p. 107. 94 I b i d . , p. 113. The Asians were involved with t h e i r own r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n s which overshadowed any inte r e s t they might have had i n the p o l i t i c a l develop-ment s. 95 Delf, o p . c i t . , p. 70. 180 CHAPTER FOUR THE ECONOMIC PENDULUM 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 6 3 Throughout the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s African n a t i o n a l i s t s agitated f o r p o l i t i c a l advancement i n the b e l i e f that economic benefits would automatically come to t h e i r people once c o n s t i t u t i o n a l recognition was granted. For t h i s reason, African leaders i n Kenya channelled a l l t h e i r energies along the p o l i t i c a l path and l e f t the considerations of the economic needs of the Colony f o r the most part to the di s c r e t i o n of the United Kingdom and Kenya Governments. During the period i n which Emergency regulations were imposed on Kenya, the economic burden of f i g h t i n g the Mau Mau t e r r o r i s t s was overwhelming (See Appendix I ) . l e t through generous and frequent loans and grants from the United Kingdom, Kenya was able to meet the f i n a n c i a l exigencies created by Mau Mau. At the same time, the Colony was able to enjoy i t s greatest period of economic prosperity. I t i s quite apparent that i n spite of the devastation and i n -s t a b i l i t y created by Mau Mau, the economic development of Kenya was not retarded and, i n f a c t , expanded owing to a determined e f f o r t on the part of both the Kenya and the B r i t i s h Governments to maintain the rate of economic growth of the post-World War I I period. During the f i r s t four years of the Emergency, o f f i c i a l statements i n Kenya's L e g i s l a t i v e Council con-s i s t e n t l y r e f l e c t e d the buoyant economic conditions i n the colony. In July 1954, Kenya's Finance Mi n i s t e r , Mr. Ernest Vassey, was able to declare i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Council that "our revenue was being maintained and was, indeed, coming i n at a rate s l i g h t l y higher than a n t i -1 cipated". Governor Baring on October 18,1955, i n h i s Speech from the Chair, t o l d the members of Legco that " i n spite of Kenya's troubles the continued flow of new c a p i t a l investment i s further and encouraging e v i -dence of the confidence of investors i n the Colony's future. Since the beginning of 1955, nearly I> 2 m i l l i o n of new ca p i t a l has been committed i n the establishment of new commercial and i n d u s t r i a l enterprises and i n the 2 expansion of those already e x i s t i n g . " The generally opt i m i s t i c outlook r e f l e c t e d i n Legco during these f i r s t post-Mau Mau years was evident i n a speech d e l -ivered during the budget debate i n May, 1956, by Mr. W.E. G r o s s k i l l , a European elected member. He declared: I c e r t a i n l y think that few countries i n the world have weathered the storm of r e b e l l i o n with l e s s effect on t h e i r economy than our country has during the l a s t three years....The State of Em-ergency continues but undoubtedly the enemy i s t i r e d and s i c k , and our economy i s s t i l l ex-panding. . .the country's economy i s sound....^ Again i n the Governor's speech i n l a t e 1956, i t was stated very confidently that: "The economic recovery of 4 Kenya i s proceeding at remarkable speed." And f i n a l l y , 182 the International Bank f o r Reconstruction and Develop-ment i n i t s survey of the economic development of Kenya commented that: "Since World War I I , i t appears that Kenya has enjoyed a period of considerable econ-omic expansion despite the effects of the Mau Mau Emergency and the changing prospects f o r i t s main ex-5 port commodities i n world markets." This v i r t u a l l y uninterrupted growth of the economy was primarily i n the European a g r i c u l t u r a l areas, although African contributions to the economy increased as w e l l . The p r i n c i p a l reasons f o r the rapid increase i n the European sector's productivity may be at t r i b u t e d to good cli m a t i c • conditions and healthy world markets f o r Kenya's commodities. In addition, the determination displayed by the B r i t i s h and Kenya Governments to defeat the Mau Mau movement, and per-haps the lack of a d e f i n i t i v e statement on the u l t i m -ate status of the Colony, .helped to maintain a reason-able degree of confidence among investors. Europeans within Kenya, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the f i r s t years of the Emergency s t i l l maintained a predominant p o l i t i c a l r o l e i n the country's administration and were s t i l l quite optimistic about t h e i r future status i n the Col-ony. Apart from the m u l t i - r a c i a l aspects of the L y t t e l -ton Constitution i n 1954 and the voting procedures out-l i n e d i n the Coutts Report i n 1955, the predominant r o l e 1 8 3 of Kenya Europeans had not seriously been altered as a result of Mau Mau. For t h i s reason they were confident that t h e i r economic contribution to the economy would continue to reap rewards both for the country and f o r themselves. While the European sector was continuing to enjoy economic prosperity, the African sector i n Kenya, par t l y as a result of the Emergency, came to receive greater attention. Several o f f i c i a l commissions invest-igated the economic conditions of Africans and many of t h e i r recommendations were accepted. However, i t would be wrong to suggest that these investigations were so l e l y a result of Mau Mau uprising. Already i n 1946 a ten year development plan had been in s t i g a t e d . By 1952 the country's economy was expanding s u f f i c i e n t l y to f u l f i l l the planned objective of increasing a g r i c u l -t u r a l productivity. In spite of Mau Mau, economic dev-elopment continued to progress i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s and much-needed land reform and examination of wage structures were able to take place with an eye to im-proving the standard of l i v i n g of the A f r i c a n . The East African Royal Commission made an exhaustive study of the economic and s o c i a l conditions i n East A f r i c a during a two year period from 1953 to 1955. The need f o r such a study, however, had beenrecognized by the B r i t i s h Government before the outbreak of violence i n Kenya. 1 8 4 Certainly Mau Mau stimulated plans to improve African welfare but i t was not the sole cause f o r such reforms. The steady progress i n the economy i n the post-World War I I period provided the much-needed finances to implement the recommendations of such reports. Perhaps the most important and c e r t a i n l y the longest overdue report was that of the committee on African Wages which was submitted to the Kenya Govern-ment i n 1954. The economic l e v e l of the A f r i c a n had lagged f a r behind that of the European. I t was, there-f o r e , to study the wage structure of Africans i n Kenya, that the Carpenter committee was appointed. The findings of t h i s committee c l e a r l y pointed out the need f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n of some permanence i n the employ-ment of African urban workers. Throughout the f i r s t f i f t y years of urbanization i n Kenya African labourers maintained a f i r m foothold i n t h e i r native reserves, showing a reluctance to abandon t h e i r subsistence econ-omy. The t i e s of Kenya's t r a d i t i o n a l culture continued to disrupt the e f f e c t i v e functioning of African labour-ers outside the reserves. Family l i f e was disrupted and i n Nairobi there had been a r a t i o of f i v e men to every one woman. African workers would remain only short periods i n urban areas and then would return to t h e i r f a m i l i e s i n the reserves. The Carpenter Report stressed the importance of t h i s imbalance when i t declared: "We 185 consider that the basic condition f o r the emergence of an e f f e c t i v e African labour fo r c e i s the removal of the African from the enervating and retarding influences of his economic and c u l t u r a l background, and h i s permanent 6 resettlement outside the reserves." More than one-half of the adult African male labour force was found to be of the migrant type, which to employers represented an easy source of cheap labour. "Few employers," the Report suggested, "are prepared to expend time and labour on the 'training' of workers un-l e s s there i s a reasonable prospect of such workers re-maining permanently with them; t h i s undoubtedly pro-vides one explanation of why so few Kenya Africans ever 7 advance to the stage of becoming s k i l l e d workers." Thus from the findings of t h i s Report i t WAS clear that the temporary nature of his employment outside the native reserves, and the re s u l t i n g continuation of the effects of his t r a d i t i o n a l subsistence economy and c u l -t u r a l background, prevented the African from becoming a s i g n i f i c a n t f actor i n the labour market i n the urban areas. This i n s t a b i l i t y of native labour, i t was sugges-ted, could be overcome i f a s u f f i c i e n t wage was provided so that the African could support the essential needs of himself and h i s family, guarantee regular employment, and provide a home i n which his family could l i v e t o -gether. Yet, at the time of the Report's findings, one-186 half of African urban workers i n private industry and one-quarter of those i n the public services were found to be receiving wages i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r the basic needs of health, decency, and working e f f i c i e n c y . The Report found that three-quarters of the contract workers i n non-plantation agriculture received inadequate wages t o support a minimum standard. Those i n plantation agriculture were somewhat better o f f . The low wages, therefore, were not encouraging a greater African contribution to the economy or improving the sub-sistence l e v e l of African existence. In order t o improve the s t a b i l i t y of urban native employment and at the same time u p l i f t the poor standard of l i v i n g of the vast majority of the indigenous population, the Carpenter Re-port urged the introduction of a new minimum wage. The new minimum wage formula as i t would oper-ate i n Nairobi, c a l l e d f o r an increase i n the basic minimum wage f o r urban workers of sixteen s h i l l i n g s , f i f t y cents per month with an allowance for houses of f i v e s h i l l i n g s per month. These new measures would be-come ef f e c t i v e on January 1, 1955* An interim measure, i n recognition of the urgency of the matter, called for the immediate granting of a f l a t increase of ten s h i l l i n g s on a l l e x i s t i n g minimum rates together with the prescribing of a new housing allowance based on the average economic rent of a bed-space i n l o c a l authority 187 9 housing locations. The most s i g n i f i c a n t feature of the new minimum wage proposals was that the basis for the statutory minimum wage was to be changed from one which took into account only the needs of a single man ('bach-el o r ' minimum wage), to one based on the needs of a family u n i t . The 'family' minimum was to be two and one-half times the 'bachelor' minimum. The regulations c a l l e d for t h i s new measure to be implemented over a ten year period with f i f t e e n percent per year being added to the 'bachelor' minimum with a s i m i l a r increase i n the housing allowance. Thus, the new proposals c a l l e d f o r a dual minimum wage linked to an age q u a l i f i c a t i o n , with those over twenty-one years of age and a service q u a l i -f i c a t i o n of t h i r t y - s i x months continuous employment out-side the native land units receiving the 'family' mini-mum wage. Throughout the Report the investigating commit-tee made i t quite clear that they believed that low wages were a cause rather than an effect of the low product-i v i t y of African labour, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the urban areas. The majority report, supported by committee members Harry Thuku and Solomon Adagala, c l e a r l y c a l l e d f o r an immed-i a t e increase i n A f r i c a n wages i n Kenya. However, a minority report submitted by F.T. Holder, disagreed with the conclusions of the Report. "In my view," declared Mr. Holder, "the re l a t i o n s h i p between wages and productivity 188 i s a matter of fundamental importance to the Colony's economy and a proposal which takes no account of prod-u c t i v i t y , and therefore of the capacity of the country to support the standard of l i v i n g proposed, i s l i k e l y 10 to lead to economic bankruptcy." The minority report called f o r a r a i s i n g of the l e v e l of production before one could consider u p l i f t i n g the standard of l i v i n g . Yet, the economy, under the circumstances of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n , was quite buoyant, and capable of meeting a higher wage b i l l . The investigating committee apparent-l y recognized that the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n was i n -evitable i n many facets of Kenya l i f e , both p o l i t i c a l and economic. I f Africans were to enter successfully into a l l spheres of Kenya's administration and develop-ment, i t was necessary f o r them to quickly adapt to an exchange economy. For the Africans to par t i c i p a t e ef-f e c t i v e l y i n a cash economy, i t was e s s e n t i a l , for con-tentment and s t a b i l i t y , that they share i n the econom-i c benefits of prosperity. One year a f t e r the Carpenter Report on A f r i -can Wages had been issued, a second and equally import-ant report was published. The East A f r i c a Royal Commis-sion, headed by S i r High Dow, presented a detailed re= port on the economic problems and prospects i n East A f r i c a with p a r t i c u l a r reference to Kenya. The Commis-sioners summarized t h e i r findings i n t h i s manner: 189 .•.more profoundly perhaps than any educational d i s a b i l i t y , the African has...been handicapped by h i s t r a d i t i o n a l form of society which has sought i t s security and s t a b i l i t y i n a mode of l i f e which has had l i t t l e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n on the side of production, few opportunities f o r the exchange of goods, and few human contacts with the outside world. Fear of the unknown rather than a c u r i o s i t y about what i t contains i s not an attitu d e of mind which makes f o r human pro-gress, whatever the l e v e l may be at which that progress i s sought. For the African i t was a dilemma to choose between t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l security and the unfamiliar exchange economy. The elimination of t r i b a l warfare, the d i s -ruption of t r a d i t i o n a l methods of b i r t h control, the improvement i n medical f a c i l i t i e s , and the disruption of the t r a d i t i o n a l old age security within the family u n i t , contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the economic d i l -emma which faced the African. The rapid growth of population as a re s u l t of many of these factors made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the land to support the population even at a f i x e d standard of l i v i n g . For t h i s reason, i t was essential f o r the African to enter into the cash econ-omy, f o r the old idea of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y was ra p i d l y becoming i n e f f e c t u a l and impractical. The East African Report suggested that the customary a g r i c u l t u r a l system together with the increas-ing population was untenable i n crowded areas. By i n -creasing a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n the native areas both bthe African and the Kenyan economy could be greatly stimulated. C l e a r l y , the system of unrestricted owner-190 ship df land i n the A f r i c a n a r e a s was incompatible with productive a g r i c u l t u r e . For t h i s reason, the Report recommended i n d i v i d u a l land tenure through purchase and sale rather than through customary law. Under t h i s sys-tem the fragmentation of land holdings could be ended. Fears over the f a i l u r e of customary tenure to meet the land shortage might be eliminated through a land tenure law. To t h i s end the Report urged the formation of t e r -r i t o r i a l Land Development Boards to ensure a t e r r i t o r i a l rather than a d i s t r i c t approach to land development. The Land Development Board should not be represen-t a t i v e of any sectional or r a c i a l interests nor should i t be precluded from considering any land i n the t e r r i t o r y . I t should be a committee s p e c i a l -i z i n g , on behalf of the whole community, i n the execution of the main aim outlined i n t h i s Report: the encouragement of production from the land i n a way that i s economically and s o c i a l l y satisfactory. 1 This was a s i g n i f i c a n t statement, f o r i t introduced a non-r a c i a l concept i n regard to the usage of land and f o r e -t o l d the eventual opening up of the White Highlands on a non-racial basis. This new p r i n c i p l e also suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i m i t i n g land holdings to a certain size i n specified areas. The Commissioners stated i n dec-i s i v e terms that: "In so f a r as b a r r i e r s to free land ex-change are not removed, to that extent w i l l the prosperity of the people s of East A f r i c a be retarded....The t r a d i -t i o n a l policy of 'land reservation' and of safeguarding sectional i n t e r e s t s , whether of Africans or non-Africans, 191 must be abandoned i n the interests of the community as 13 a whole." The recommendations of S i r Hugh Dow were re-affirmed i n the important report of R.J.W. Swynnerton on African a g r i c u l t u r e . His f i v e year plan stressed the need f o r private African ownership of land through sur-veys and demarcation, and also the consolidation of various fragmented land holdings c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the African's t r a d i t i o n a l land holding system. The Swynnerton Plan also proposed the a c q u i s i t i o n of ten-acre p l o t s of land for landless Africans. Land f o r t h i s project was to be obtained through i r r i g a t i o n schemes and other land reclamation schemes such as the eradication of the tsetse f l y and the draining of swamps. By providing t h i s land i t was hoped that African agriculture could be i n t e n s i -f i e d through education and technological assistance i n order that production could be increased to such a l e v e l 14 where the A f r i c a n could enter the cash economy. Com-menting on these recommendations Governor Baring declared: "The task i s thus not only to give the African a sense of economic security i n the new system, but to reor i e n t -ate his concepts away from the t r i b a l i s m which has meant so much to him f o r so many hundreds of years towards a 15 wider soc i a l system." These three reports dealing with the economic climate of Kenya—and more p a r t i c u l a r l y the African econ-192 omic s e c t o r — l a i d the foundations for the transfer of the African economy from a t r a d i t i o n a l subsistence econ-omy to a cash economy. The emphasis on agriculture re-affirmed the fact that agriculture would continue to be the 'bread and butter' of Kenya's economy f o r some years 16 to come, and the need f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l research and land consolidation which had l a r g e l y featured the ten year Development Plan of 1946. As the African corres-pondent f o r the Times Weekly Review suggested: "Already before the Emergency there was a spontaneous tendency to switch over from communal farming on the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l pattern to private ownership. Now t h i s movement has become o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and i s wedded to that of 17 land consolidation." The demands voiced by African n a t i o n a l i s t s a f t e r the Second World War and the even-t u a l outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1952 underlined the fact that a much greater e f f o r t was necessary i f A f r i -can a g r i c u l t u r e , and similarly, i f the African economy were to advance beyond the subsistence l e v e l . For t h i s reason, the Swynnerton Plan was launched with a g i f t 18 of £ 5 m i l l i o n from the United Kingdom Government. I t was i n the implementation of the Swynner-ton Plan that the Emergency had perhaps i t s greatest effect on the country's economy. The area most closely affected by the a g r i c u l t u r a l proposals was that held by the Kikuyu. With several thousand members of t h i s t r i b e 193 i n detention camps at various places throughout the Col-ony, i t became considerably easier to achieve closer administration and technical development. Whereas p r i o r to the Emergency Jomo Kenyatta and other Kikuyu leaders were highly suspicious of any ef f o r t s at land reclam-ation or consolidation, with these leaders r e s t r i c t e d the members of the t r i b e became more receptive to Euro-pean e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . Explanations could be given i n greater d e t a i l and the advantages of l e g a l land tenure could be more e a s i l y explained. With a r e l a t i v e calm i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the m i d - f i f t i e s a r i s i n g out of the Emergency regulations, Kenya's Department of Agriculture was anxious to demarcate new holdings and hedge them,as well as to es t a b l i s h f i r m land tenure. By 1957, Mr. Swynnerton was able t o point out that "we have achieved enormous success, amazing success I should say, i n the Central Province with the Kikuyu t r i b e which has given so much trouble i n the Emergency. The people themselves, at bottom r e a l i z e the advantage of land con-s o l i d a t i o n but they have a stratum of p o l i t i c a l agitators on top which s t i r r e d up t h e i r fears and suspicions. The effects of the Emergency has (sicj been to-remove t h i s 19 source of obstruction." Mr. Swynnerton also pointed out that Africans were agreeing to stock l i m i t a t i o n , s o i l conservation and a f f o r e s t a t i o n . Many Kikuyu a f t e r the Second World War had already indicated a willingness 1 9 4 20 to accept land reform, but i t was f o r o f f i c i a l p o l i c y to give a r e a l impetus to a g r i c u l t u r a l reform. Finance Minister Ernest Vassey was i n com-plete agreement with the findings of these o f f i c i a l reports, f o r he believed that the growth potential i n African agriculture at t h i s time was one of the great-21 -est potentials that Kenya had. These reports indicated determined government e f f o r t s to expand the African econ-omy. Yet, the effect of t h e i r recommendations would take timft to become operative. In the meantime, the country's economy continued to develop. Ernest Vassey has suggested reasons why economic development i n Kenya during the mid-f i f t i e s was v i r t u a l l y uninterrupted by the Emergency, when he wrote: Surely i t i s the recognition of these f a c t s , of the fact that the Government's economic and f i n a n c i a l p o l i cy i s directed, as f a r as possible, to a s s i s t i n g development, and of the determination of the United Kingdom Government to help Kenya through the interim period of f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y , that has kept the inflow of c a p i t a l into the country running at a reasonable l e v e l , despite Emergency troubles. 2 2 That the United Kingdom recognized the urgent need tto i n -t e n s i f y a g r i c u l t u r a l development i n Kenya was apparent from the remarks of Colonial Secretary Oliver L y t t e l t o n when he declared: "As the House i s aware, the need for i n t e n s i f i e d a g r i c u l t u r a l development i s greater i n Kenya than i n other African t e r r i t o r i e s because i t i s i n Kenya that pressure on the land i s greatest; and there are also special resettlement problems a r i s i n g out of the 195 23 movement of population during the emergency." The B r i t i s h Government's desire to maintain the post-war economic growth was equally evident, f o r Mr. Lyttelton t o l d the Commons that "we have a l l along, throughout the emergency, t r i e d to retard as l i t t l e as possible a l l the s o c i a l and economic schemes which, as the sec-u r i t y of the Colony advances, we hope to be able to 24 push forward more quickly." Clearly, the large f i n -a ncial grants made to Kenya were intended not only to restore law and order i n the Colony but also to promote the economic development programmes already launched i n Kenya. While the B r i t i s h Government was providing funds to meet the costs of the Emergency the l e v e l of wages i n Kenya showed an increase as a re s u l t of the 25 Carpenter Report, P r i o r to the Emergency there had existed an abundance of cheap labour. However, with many thousands of Kikuyu removed from the labour force a temporary shortage of cheap labour also stimulated an increase i n both urban and r u r a l wages. Thus, by 1956 the statutory minimum emolument had been raised over the previous two years from 59.50 sh to 100 sh per month f o r adult workers (an increase of 68%) and from 26 50.50 sh to 88 sh for other workers. With t h i s i n -crease i n wages better l i v i n g and working conditions gradually became available for Africans and t h i s had 196 i t s effect on African output. By 1957 land consolida-t i o n under African survey teams was progressing at a rapid pace while African production of cash crops such as coffee, tea, wattle, pyrethrum, and pineapple was increasing. African production of coffee i n p a r t i c u l a r played a large part i n the development of the African cash economy. In the decade or two p r i o r to the Em-ergency a great reluctance on the part of European farmers to encourage African coffee production had been apparent. Indeed, European farmers considered that African production would seriously threaten t h e i r mar-27 kets. In the early years of l i m i t e d A f r i c a n coffee production, growers often received more trees than they could e f f e c t i v e l y handle. However, government controls were introduced which maintained the high quality of Kenya coffee while at the same time created a firm foundation f o r African production. Mr. G.M. Roddan, Kenya's Director of Agriculture declared i n 1953 that: We have, i n coffee, l a i d the foundations of a very promising industry f o r the Africans. We f e e l that i t i s being developed on much sounder l i n e s than i n our neighbouring t e r r i t o r i e s , and we propose to b u i l d as quickly as we can on these foundations i n the knowledge that we have an industry that w i l l stand competition i n the world's markets, and i s e f f i c i e n t by any standards. 2 8 The Director's confidence was rewarded, f o r the acreage f o r coffee production was greatly increased as land con-197 s o l i d a t i o n was introduced. By 1958, three new African coffee f a c t o r i e s were opened. A year or so l a t e r African-produced coffee was awarded a prize at the annual a g r i c u l t u r a l show for being judged the best coffee produced i n the Colony. As Africans entered the cash economy tea and sugar production by Africans stimulated the country's economy. Farmers' t r a i n i n g centres were b u i l t i n Nyanza province to t r a i n African farmers i n the promotion of improved crop and animal husbandry. This helped to i n -crease African production, although le s s than twenty percent of European output, and to bring the African into the cash economy. Commenting on the progress i n Kenya's economic development Marion Forrester has written: Many of the b a r r i e r s to achieving t h i s goal are based on the fact that the c a r r i e r s of economic progress to Kenya upset t r a d i t i o n a l society i n favor of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l or group i n t e r e s t s , which were not i d e n t i c a l with those of the native population. This s i t u a t i o n brought about an exchange economy juxtaposed with the t r a d i t i o n a l economy, and created most of the obstacles. For instance, the p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e , the r a c i a l tension, the r e s t r i c t i v e labour and land p o l i c i e s , the r e s t r i c t i o n s of A frican prod-uction and sales i n a g r i c u l t u r e , the small dom-e s t i c market, the export d e f i c i t , and the low per capita income of the African. The net re-s u l t of these b a r r i e r s has created an atmos-phere i n the Colony which dampens the i n i t i a -t i o n of an o v e r - a l l economic development pro-gram. 29 With the new atmosphere of cooperation between African and European i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l development of Kenya, 198 the two sectors gradually became more and more i n t e r -twined. An increase i n road construction and i r r i g a -t i o n schemes made the African areas more accessible. This f a c t o r combined with the land consolidation schemes greatly speeded up the process of bringing the A f r i c a n farmer into the cash economy. The f i n a l important step taken during the Emergency to stimulate African production occurred i n 1959 with the opening of the White Highlands on a non-r a c i a l basis. Michael Blundell was the f i r s t European p o l i t i c i a n to recognize the importance of opening up the White Highlands to a l l races, and he incorporated such a proposal i n his party platform. Not only did he recognize the economic importance of making land i n the Highlands more f u l l y u t i l i z e d and more produc-t i v e , but he also saw the p o l i t i c a l significance of such a measure. Ever since the immigrant races s e t t l e d i n Kenya the question of land tenure i n the f e r t i l e highlands was a tense issue. At the turn of the century t h i s area was guaranteed exc l u s i v e l y to the Europeans and remained that way u n t i l 1959. The Carter Land Com-mission i n i t s investigations i n the early t h i r t i e s re-affirmed the status of the White Highlands. In f a c t at that time the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies d i r -ected the Commissioners to the effect that persons of European descent were to continue to enjoy a pr i v i l e g e d 199 30 position i n the Highlands. Since 1934 the occupation of the White High-lands has remained a tense emotional issue p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Kikuyu. C l e a r l y , t h i s was a major grievance which played i t s part i n fomenting antagonism which eventually found an outlet i n Mau Mau. The Dow Commis-sion Report of 1955, while not a c t u a l l y advocating the opening up of the Highlands, did i n f a c t , urge the creation of a climate of opinion which would eventually support such a plan without increasing r a c i a l h o s t i l i t y . The Report said: But two f a c t s stand out as r e s u l t i n g from the policy of the exclusive tenure of land i n the Highlands by Europeans. F i r s t l y , the b i t t e r -ness which has persisted over the extinguishing of African r i g h t s i n the area, and secondly, the sense of i n j u s t i c e caused i n A f r i c a n eyes by broad acres reserved f o r a few in d i v i d u a l s alongside an African reserve i n which land hunger e x i s t s . . . . I t was seldom that any African suggested t o us that any European who was using h i s land f u l l y should be deprived of that land, but our attention was constantly being directed to the fact of unused or p a r t i a l l y used land i n the Highlands.31 32 Approximate figures showed that about 4,000 Europeans were engaged i n ag r i c u l t u r e on 16,500 square miles. This area was about 30% of the arable land which was suitable f o r productive a g r i c u l t u r e . Yet, some 250,000 non-Euro-peans l i v e d and worked i n the White Highlands but with-out any r i g h t s of tenure. These i n d i v i d u a l s could not help but develop a sense of f r u s t r a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y 200 since t h e i r t r i b a l leaders had suggested numerous times that t h i s land r i g h t f u l l y belonged to them. In 1958 figures given i n the House of Commons suggested that less than 2% of a g r i c u l t u r a l land i n the Highlands was unleased and that some 997 square miles 33 were not being used properly. Mr. John Stonehouse, a Labour Member of Parliament acquainted with East A f r i c a , urged the Government to open up the Highlands to a l l races. At t h i s time, however, the Colonial Office was unwilling to follow such a course. In Kenya European conservative p o l i t i c i a n s continued to be i n f l e x i b l e i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e on the Highlands question. Group Captain Briggs asserted: In my opinion, once the p r i n c i p l e s of the res-ervation of the Highlands f o r European use and settlement i s broken what might w e l l s t a r t as a mere t r i c k l e would, i n no time^ become a floo d . That would be the end of European s e t t l e -ment and of the European community—and, ultim-a t e l y , a disaster f o r Kenya and p a r t i c u l a r l y the African masses, who would be abandoned to what could only be some form of t o t a l i t a r i a n regime.34 These comments, however, were c l e a r l y motivated by p o l i t i c a l considerations as w e l l as economic ones. Comments i n a l e t t e r appearing i n the Kenya Weekly News were more outspoken than those of Group Captain Briggs, f o r they suggested: ". . . f o r the foreseeable future, 'one w e l l within the l i f e t i m e of everyone under f i f t y ' , we ce r t a i n l y ought to be the 'Dominant Race'—by senior-i t y of 1,000 years or so and by right of achievement and 201 endeavour. Not because we are white or European, but 35 because of what we have done and are doing...." The conservative Europeans s t i l l foresaw, as did the 36 Governor, the complementary development of African and European a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y . The emotionalism surrounding the Highlands question did l i t t l e to advance cooperation between the two races or to en-courage any confidence either inside or outside the country. In spite of these f e e l i n g s , the p o l i t i c a l implications a r i s i n g out of the maintenance of the status quo i n the Highlands, especially with the l i f t i n g of the Emergency regulations appearing to be imminent, prevailed i n the thinking of Kenya Govern-ment o f f i c i a l s . In the f a l l of 1959, a sessional paper on "Land Tenure and Control Outside the Native Lands" was issued with i t s aims "to ensure that the basis of tenure and management of a g r i c u l t u r a l land w i l l be the same throughout Kenya, regardless of race 37 or t r i b e . " A Central Land Advisory Board with equal representation from the three races i n Kenya was to be established. The c r i t e r i o n f o r granting leases i n the Highlands was to be the farming c a p a b i l i t i e s of the proposed tenants and not t h e i r race. Under the new scheme an application was to be refused i f : 202 1. The applicant already has s u f f i c i e n t land or interest i n the area. 2. The area of land i s l i k e l y to prove uneconomic for the intended purpose. 3. The terms and conditions of the proposed trans-action are onerous; or 4. The information before the boards suggests that the proposed transferee i s u n l i k e l y , for any A reason, to be a good farmer of the holding. 3° Commenting on the significance of t h i s decision, Mr. Wilfred Havelock, Minister f o r Local Government and Lands i n Kenya, declared: "No longer w i l l our a g r i c u l t u r a l land be subjected to r a c i a l a l l o c a t i o n but i t w i l l be available fo r proper and intensive development by farmers of any race, provided that such i n d i v i d u a l s have the capacity and the means to f u l f i l t h i s great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 39 Thus, what has often been referred to as "a s e l f i s h c l i q u e " was i n law removed from i t s autonomous position i n Kenya's richest land. At the same time, the new scheme opened the way f o r European purchase of native reserves. The rapid change i n Kenya's p o l i t i c a l climate, however, discouraged large European purchases i n t h i s area. The opening up of the White Highlands was highly s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the future development of Kenya, fo r i t created a s i t u a t i o n where a l l land i n Kenya was to be obtained through i n d i v i d u a l rather than r a c i a l or t r i b a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . With agriculture as the basic industry of Kenya, an opportunity to administer a single p o l i c y of agri c u l t u r e became possible. No longer would i t be necessary to develop African and European 203 agriculture along complementary l i n e s . The opening of the White Highlands together with the a g r i c u l t u r a l revolution which had been occurring i n African areas helped greatly to stimulate African production. At the same time, pressure on the land was reduced with the resettlement of thousands of Africans i n the Highlands. P o l i t i c a l l y , a grievance which had festered i n the minds of Kikuyu leaders f o r half a century, was at l a s t re-moved. While important steps were taken to promote a g r i c u l t u r a l development i n the African sector, the problem of i n d u s t r i a l development also, received consid-eration during the Emergency. In 1954 the I n d u s t r i a l Development Corporation was set up to give l e g a l and corporate status to an organization already operating in Kenya as the I n d u s t r i a l Managment Corporation. The body was i n s t i t u t e d to coordinate more e f f e c t i v e l y the i n d u s t r i a l development of the Colony. At the same time, more than 299 African cooperative s o c i e t i e s had been established to encourage and promote progress i n African producer s o c i e t i e s . The confidence of small investors i n the future of Kenya was indicated when such secondary industries as the manufacture of f l o o r poli6J>>, patent medicines and cosmetics, and stationery, were established i n the Colony. In 1955 alone new commercial and i n d u s t r i a l enterprises 204 begun i n Kenya included: manufacturing of margarine, soap manufacturing, manufacturing of cotton-wool, and surgica l dressings, crown corks and seals, nuts, b o l t s , and r i v e t s . Indeed, by 1956, the continued inflow of c a p i t a l i n t o Kenya together with increased a g r i c u l t u r a l production, created a buoyant economy i n which only L10 m i l l i o n of a t o t a l of L14 m i l l i o n offered by the United Kingdom f o r the period 1955-1956, was needed. Invest-ment funds were available to expand the tea-industry, and f or the d i s t r i b u t i o n of petroleum products, as well as for mining exploration. This l a t t e r enterprise did not, however, prove to be too encouraging. The following table gives an in d i c a t i o n of the continuing confidence of Kenya investors, a condition a r i s i n g p a r t l y from the determined e f f o r t s of the Kenya Government to ad-vance African agriculture and African education, and partly from the success of the war against the Mau Mau 40 insurgents: GROSS CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN L MILLIONS 1951 1954 1956 1957 Private 17.5 18.0 31.2 30.4 Public 8.0 16.1 14.0 15.5 The growth i n the per capita domestic income i n pounds, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the period 1953-1955, gives further evidence of the healthy economic conditions i n Kenya 41 during the f i r s t years of the Emergency; 205 PER CAPITA DOMESTIC INCOME IN POUNDS mi mk mi mk mi A f r i c a n 7.9 8.7 10.0 9.9 9.8 Asian 157.0 155.0 179.0 170.0 166.0 European 680.0 64-6.0 731.0 656.0 556.0 I t might be noted that the downward trend apparent i n 1957 r e f l e c t e d the growing p o l i t i c a l unrest i n the Col-ony and fore t o l d the economic collapse which was to occur within a very few years. Marion Forrester has commented on the trend indicated i n the above tables, i n t h i s manner: "...the d i s p a r i t y i n income l e v e l s among the three races i s such that, i n f a c t , the bulk of the annual improvement goes to the non-African segments of the population, while the Africans remain l a r g e l y outside the b e n e f i c i a l 42 flow of economic progress." She has suggested t h a t at t h i s time some two-thirds of investments i n Kenya went to the European sector. For t h i s reason, i t was apparent that there was a need for c a p i t a l formation i n the A f r i -can sector i n order to hasten the African's adaptation to an exchange economy. The establishment of industries i n A f r i can areas would improve the region's economic position as well as break down the stagnant effects of the t r a d i t i o n a l subsistence l i v i n g . Thus, the est a b l i s h -ment of new fa c t o r i e s i n Nairobi and Mombasa and the growth of the National Income from L107 m i l l i o n i n 1952 43 to L170 m i l l i o n i n 1957, wer e tempered by the fact that 206 investment was not yet reaching into the African areas. During the Emergency, therefore, while the economy generally expanded,the need f o r the African to acquire special s k i l l s to meet the challenge of modern industry became increasingly apparent. For t h i s reason the Colony s t i l l remained c r i t i c a l l y dependent on an i n f l u x of c a p i t a l , enterprise, and managerial a b i l i t y to meet the requirements of Kenya's economy while A f r i -cans were being trained and educated to assume a major ro l e i n the country's i n d u s t r i a l development. While i n d u s t r i a l development was e s s e n t i a l f o r the future economic growth of Kenya, a g r i c u l t u r e would remain the major source of income.In recognizing t h i s f a c t , the Kenya Government pointed out that " a g r i c u l t u r a l prod-uction i s the backbone of economic development and the expansion of i n d u s t r i a l production i s to a large extent integrated with i t . Development therefore must depend on ensuring a high income from agricul t u r e , port and commercial services, and also on increasing the tempo of geological survey and the rapid development of d i s -44 covered mineral resources." During the years of the Emergency, invest-ment i n Kenya increased at a healthy rate although primarily i n the European sector. A g r i c u l t u r a l prod-uction received considerable attention with Africans p a r t i c i p a t i n g to a much greater extent i n the production 20tf of cash crops. During the m i d - f i f t i e s the Colony was blessed with good world markets and suitable weather conditions as well as a r e l a t i v e l y stable p o l i t i c a l slimate. In 1 9 5 9 continued progress was made i n land consolidation, with the r e s u l t that production rose. Tea, pyrethrum, and arabica coffee exports showed healthy increases, although market conditions i n d i c -ated the s t a r t of a downward trend. During t h i s same year there was the enactment of the I n d u s t r i a l Training Ordinance to promote apprenticeship and other forms of t r a i n i n g i n industry, This was an important step f o r -ward i n the programme to increase the number of s k i l l e d A fricans. By I960, however, the encouraging s t a r t made to the introduction of the African to the exchange econ-4 5 omy received a severe setback, which was to disrupt the rate of economic development which had occurred i n the early years of the Emergency. As early as 1 9 5 7 there were signs that the tremendous development i n the country's ec-onomy, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the years 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 , was slowing down.At t h i s time, one could perhaps look to the indepen-dence of Ghana, the f i r s t A f r i can elections i n Kenya,and the increased tempo i n the demands f o r greater African representation and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Kenya a f f a i r s , as fac-tors contributing to the economic slowdown. The decline i n investment i n the country, indicated a growing lack of con-fidence among investors i n the future p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y 208 of Kenya. Their concern was soon to be j u s t i f i e d . With the l i f t i n g of the Emergency r e s t r i c t i o n s early i n I960, and the beginning of a series of important c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conferences at Lancaster House, p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n Kenya became heated. The outspoken demands of African n a t i o n a l i s t s together with the u n r e a l i s t i c ambitions of a group of conservative Europeans served to create an explosive p o l i t i c a l climate i n the Colony. By the time of the second Lancaster House Conference i n 1962 both European and African p o l i t i c a l groups were divided. L i t t l e attention was being devoted to economic and s o c i a l mat-t e r s , as the game of p o l i t i c s dominated discussions i n the Colony. As a r e s u l t , during the years immediately preceding independence p o l i t i c a l uncertainty and instab-i l i t y were prevalent throughout the country. This adverse-l y affected what confidence investors had e a r l i e r displayed i n Kenya. Tom Mboya, speaking at a press conference i n London i n October I960, recognized the importance of p o l -i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and i t s effect on investment, when he declared: The question of confidence and the need f o r us to reassure investors i n order to promote a continu-ous flow of c a p i t a l while at the same time achieving the maximum p o l i t i c a l development has been recog-nized since the Lancaster House Conference i n Feb-ruary. .. .K.A.N.U. w i l l do what i t can to ensure that conditions are created and maintained which w i l l i n s t i l confidence and guarantee security f o r investors, and f o r the persons whom we need i n these developments. We are as much interested i n s t a b i l i t y 209 and the maintenance of law and order as are Euro-peans or other people i n Kenya.46 Mr. Mboya, master p o l i t i c i a n that he was, was well aware of the fact that p o l i t i c a l considerations must predomin-ate i f he was to maintain his i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n Kenya's independence movement. In spite of Mboya's attempts to reassure invest-ors, and i n spite of the e f f o r t s of Kenya cabinetNminis-t e r s Mr. Havelock and Mr. Bruce McKenzie to encourage i n -47 creased investment by European countries, investment c a p i t a l declined at a rapid rate. An examination of the i n d u s t r i a l index shows the rate of decline and c l e a r l y 48 r e f l e c t s the r i s e i n A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l aspirations: INDUSTRIAL INDEX January 1955 100 December 1955 136.4 December 1956 127.8 December 1957 116 December 1958 98.2 December 1959 96.2 December I960 61.3 I n d u s t r i a l shares a f t e r the I960 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l confer-ence f e l l from fe 35,154,555 to fe 23,725,917, or a f a l l of 3 2 . 5 % . The market value of gilt-edged stocks of the Kenya Government and of the East A f r i c a High Commission slumped from fe 84,377,000 to fe 69,023,971, or a f a l l of 18.1%. Together these f i g u r e s represented a decline of f a i t h i n Kenya's s t a b i l i t y and economic po t e n t i a l of fe 26,781,663 or 22.4>. This c r i s i s i n confidence was explained by Finance Minister K.W.S. MacKenzie i n t h i s manner: 21G This recession i s a c l a s s i c example of one which a country has talked i t s e l f i n t o . The year I960 was a year of record exports and should have been a boom year. This trouble i s e n t i r e l y psychological. I believe i t i s s t i l l within the power of the people of Kenya to get themselves out of t h i s mess. I t i s i n the same b e l i e f that the B r i t i s h Government i s prepared to stand by us and see us through.50 Despite the o p t i m i s t i c tone apparent i n Mr. MacKenzie's statement i t was clear that both Europeans and Africans i n Kenya were intent on maintaining or extending t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l positions with l i t t l e concern about the economic consequences. While these p o l i t i c a l disruptions severely retarded the inflow of investment c a p i t a l , a series of natural disasters created havoc i n the country's a g r i -c u l t u r a l production. The great advances made i n a g r i -culture during the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s , received a devas-t a t i n g blow i n 1960-1961. U n t i l October, I960, acute drought caused irreparable damage to the country's a g r i c u l t u r a l p o s i t i o n . Added to t h i s was a plague of 51 army worm, and an excessive r a i n f a l l at the end of 1961 which resulted i n devastating floods. The f i n a l c r i p p l i n g blow dealt to Kenya's economy was a steep f a l l i n the world prices of most of her primary prod-ucts i n the l a t t e r half of I960. Although interrupted s l i g h t l y i n early 1961, t h i s trend continued w e l l i n t o 1962. As a r e s u l t , Kenya's economy, v i t a l l y dependent on healthy world markets and good cl i m a t i c conditions, suffered considerably i n the early s i x t i e s . TABLE I * 211 The fl o o d and famine conditions of 1961 not only ruined many crops but also led to bad road condi-tions and poor communications', throughout the Colony. In the European sector the atmosphere of p o l i t i c a l un-certainty hindered development with the r e s u l t that cash crops receded. In the African areas the weather conditions created a fe e l i n g of apathy among many farmers which did l i t t l e to improve the deteriorating a g r i c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n . On the po s i t i v e side, however, i n a g r i c u l t u r a l administration the process of l o c a l -i z a t i o n was carrying on at a b r i s k pace. The Depart-ment's annual report f o r 1962 declared. I t has been recognized f o r some time that unless the African farmer i s encouraged to take an ac-t i v e part i n the policy-making process i t i s un-l i k e l y that he w i l l develop a sense of responsib-i l i t y i n a g r i c u l t u r a l and other matters. The De-partment's p o l i c y i s to encourage t h i s process i n every possible way and i t s implementation i s al= ready improving our extension e f f o r t and helping considerably i n instances where l e g i s l a t i o n has to be invoked. I t i s a l l part of the process of taking the people with us and our r e l a t i o n s with farmers generally can confidently be stated to be excellent at the present time.52 In the Central Province, for example, some f i f t y - s i x percent of Senior F i e l d O f f i c e r s were q u a l i f i e d Africans. In preparing Africans to meet the challenge of modern a g r i c u l t u r a l techniques, a g r i c u l t u r a l education by 1963 was available at Egerton College, S i r i b a College, Embu Training Centre, and thirteen Farmers' Training Centres throughout the country. 212 While improvements i n the t r a i n i n g of Africans i n modern a g r i c u l t u r a l methods were occurring, Europeans engaged i n agriculture were becoming increasingly rest-l e s s . Hhe effect of the p o l i t i c a l and cli m a t i c conditions was well summarized by Marion E. Doro, when she wrote: Loss of confidence i n t h e i r economic future resulted i n l i m i t e d planting by white farmers, widespread African unemployment, a drop i n the sales of a g r i -c u l t u r a l equipment, reduced construction a c t i v i t i e s , and t i g h t e r credit r e s t r i c t i o n s . Money flowed out of the country at the rate of t 1 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 a month during I 9 6 0 , and the normal land market became p r a c t i c a l l y non-existent.53 For the Europeans i n Kenya who were unwilling to adapt to the A f r i c a n i z a t i o n of Kenya, the B r i t i s h Government i n mid I 9 6 0 , introduced a plan to buy European land and re-s e l l i t to Africans f or resettlement purposes. This not only would r e l i e v e African land pressures, but also would create a land market f o r Europeans who wanted to leave Kenya. Under a land development loan fund, t 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 was to be alloca t e d f o r the purchase of land. Through government purchases Europeans were to get one-half the purchase price on sale and the balance i n three yearly instalments at 5% i n t e r e s t . The Convention of Associations, however, advo-cated a scorched earth p o l i c y unless the B r i t i s h Govern-ment bought them out at t h e i r prices; they sought a guar-antee of land t i t l e s or compensation f o r t h e i r property which they valued at £ 7 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . "...a Convention p o l l i n December...revealed that up to 60 percent of the farmers 213 would leave i f the African government could not secure 54 property r i g h t s and maintain law and order." The more broad-minded farmers i n the Kenya National Farmers Union sought t i t l e security and a system of compensation to restore confidence i n the economy. This group supported the government land scheme as a means to promote African land ownership and win national sympathy f o r land t i t l e s . The Kenya C o a l i t i o n under S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck pointed out that the European s e t t l e r s had" large c a p i t a l holdings but the B r i t i s h Governing nt refused to finance a f u l l compensation plan. The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Fraser, was against t h i s l a s t proposal. "I believe," he s a i d , "that there i s l i t t l e future either for Kenya or for the European farmer i n what I might term the negative approach—the organized withdrawal of s k i l l and c a p i t a l . The policy of Her Majesty's Government i s precisely the reverse of t h i s , and r i g h t l y so. In stable Government and i n expanding economy l i e s the greatest hope 55 f o r a l l i n Kenya...." Thus, the demands of some European s e t t l e r s f o r safeguards against any form of expropriation were not met, with the r e s u l t that c a p i t a l f l e d the country, imports were reduced, and customs revenue declined. The p o l i t i c a l implications of the I960 Lancaster House Conference together with the fears of a r e p e t i t i o n of the violence i n the Congo, discouraged new investment from entering the country and encouraged the withdrawal 214 of l o c a l finances. Added to the effects of t h i s loss of c a p i t a l were the finding s of two Commissions i n 1961. The Flemming Commission was appointed to inquire into c i v i l servants' s a l a r i e s . I t s findings came as a shock to l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , f o r i t found that the wage b i l l 56 should be increased by L6,000,000 per year. Half of t h i s amount was to be paid by the B r i t i s h Government, but the remaining L 3,000,000 was to be the f i n a n c i a l burden of the Kenya Government. A second commission, headed by the chairman of Lloyd's Bank, S i r Jeremy Raisman, was asked to examine the common market struc-ture i n East A f r i c a . The commissioner recommended ad-justments whereby Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would work as one f i s c a l unit. In the past Kenya had gained f a r more than the other countries from the common mar-57 ket set up. Under the.:proposed scheme Kenya was to con-tr i b u t e about L 640,000. Thus the recommendations of these two schemes would severely aggravate Kenya's econ-omic d i f f i c u l t i e s . I t seems that Kenyans w i l l either have to tighten t h e i r belts and face up to increased taxation, or put into cold storage the many plans for develop-ment including African education and the s e t t l e -ment of African farmers. The newly-elected African p o l i t i c i a n s who have been returned on grandiose promises to r e l a t i v e l y unsophisticated voters w i l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to explain the hard economic fact s of l i f e . 5 8 While these economic d i f f i c u l t i e s continued to mount i n 1962, a new problem faced Kenya. 215 Between June, 1961, and June, 1962, employment f e l l 8,000 or 1.4%, reaching the lowest l e v e l since 1954. The nega-t i v e attitude of some Europeans farmers had i t s e f f e c t , f o r employment i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector f e l l 2.6%. The greatest decline i n employment came i n the bu i l d i n g i n -dustry, a useful barometer of the p r e v a i l i n g economic climate, where employment f e l l 30%. The non-African com-munities were r e l a t i v e l y the hardest h i t , however, f o r European employment f e l l 10.6%, Asian employment was down „ 5 9 4.6%, and African employment f e l l l e s s than 1%. With a f a l l i n employment the wage b i l l also declined, p a r t i c -u l a r l y among Europeans. The European wage b i l l , owing p a r t i c u l a r l y to increased emigration, decreased by 8.5%. For the Africans t h e i r cost of l i v i n g rose 3% and t h e i r wages rose 5%. "This upward trend towards higher average earnings f o r Africans i s , of course, bound to continue as more and more Africans assume positions of greater r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i n response to the continued pressure 60 for higher wages by the trade unions." A f i n a l i n d i c a t i o n of the weakened economic conditions i n the Colony i n 1962 was the f a l l i n the number of firms that were conducting business i n Kenya. Some 8.8% of a l l firms, or 1,005 firms, went out of business. This decline was p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i -dent i n small firms of from one to four persons* The year independence was declared i n Kenya, was one i n which some economic recovery was recorded. Indeed, 216 t h i s year proved to be the best for economic growth since 1957. •'•'his was due p a r t l y to good climatic and market conditions, and partly to a lessening of p o l i t i c a l tension. The economic recovery was due also to a 50$ increase i n the price of s i s a l , which brought about a 12$ r i s e i n the value of the country's a g r i c u l t u r a l product. However, the 1 5«5 m i l l i o n increase i n the value of exports was not spread very widely. The great increase i n s i s a l was counteracted by low coffee prices (although these did show a marked recovery toward the end of 1 9 6 3 ) , and mar-keting d i f f i c u l t i e s with pyrethrum. Tourism showed rapid advances and displayed indications of becoming the country's best source of revenue next to a g r i c u l t u r e . While these advances were being made in the ec-onomy, investment s t i l l was lagging. Kenya's annual econ-omic survey commented that the "present l e v e l of invest-ment i s almost c e r t a i n l y too low to keep the economy moving f a s t e r than the 3 per cent annual increase i n the 61 population." The following table c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s 62 the gravity of the investment l a g : LEVEL OF INVESTMENT 1958 t 40,000,000 1959 L 40,300,000 1960 L 41,400,000 1961 L 31,900,000 1962 L 33,300,000 1963 L 29,000,000 The Nairobi Stock Exchange as an indicator of investment confidence plummetted sharply a f t e r the I960 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 217 conference and did not l e v e l o f f u n t i l i t halved i n 1 9 6 2 . Since t h a t time i t rose from $ 2 . 1 i n A p r i l , 1962 63 to 9 5 . 1 shortly a f t e r independence was proclaimed. A further barometer of confidence i n Kenya i s the value of construction. The value of plans approved i n the construc-t i o n industry i n 1963 was le s s than one-quarter that of 64 the 1958-1959 average. An i n d i c a t i o n of the economic consequences of the country's p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y during the early nineteen-sixties can be seen from the 65 following figures f o r the construction i n the Colony. Contrasted to the dismal picture i n the construction i n -dustry were the prospects of the t o u r i s t and transport industries. The 1964 Economic Survey reported that "trans-port has i n recent years been one of the most r a p i d l y 66 growing sectors of the economy." p r o f i t s was a 23$ r i s e i n tourism i n 1 9 6 3 . In recent years the t o u r i s t industry had recorded a healthy average rate of expansion of 15$. The following table shows the rapid 67 increase i n the number of t o u r i s t s v i s i t i n g i n Kenya: LEVEL OF CONSTRUCTION I 9 6 0 1961 1962 1963 L 1 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 £ 9 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 L 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 L 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 Clearly r e f l e c t i n g t h i s boom i n transportation TABLE I I I V A L U E I I N D E X ( f 9 5 8 / 5 9 = J O O ) 140 i i i i t » v RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS COMPLETED \ ^ A CALL KENYA; IOO. \\ / \ N°N-RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS \ \ ' \ ^ COMPLETED CALL KENYA) BO. i 6 0 . PLANS APPROVED ( N A I R O B I ) \ X 4 0 . V N - .' 20_ " o I I i i i i 19571958.1959 5960S961 1962 1963 1964 B u i l d i n g s Completed and Nai r o b i Plans Approved, 1957-1963 ' (Index of Value 1953/9 = 100) 218 VISITORS TO KENYA 1954 29,500 1957 38,100 1958 40,500 1961 42,000 1962 49,900 1963 61,400 As a source of foreign exchange, tourism ranks second only to the coffee and s i s a l industries. In I 9 6 0 v i s i -t o r s i n Kenya spent about L 4 . 6 m i l l i o n while i n 1963 i t was estimated that the d o l l a r s flowing into Kenya 68 from t o u r i s t s t o t a l l e d about L 7.2 m i l l i o n . While 1963 was a year i n which Kenya halted the downward trend i n her economy, d i f f i c u l t i e s s t i l l remained. The cost of l i v i n g index, owing p a r t i c u l a r l y to higher food p r i c e s , showed a steady r i s e . In i 9 6 0 i t was 292, i n December 1962 i t was 315, by December 1963 i t had risen to 3 1 7 , and i n A p r i l 1964 i t had 69 reached 321. On the cr e d i t side t h i s r i s e was accom-panied by an increase i n earnings. However, the l e v e l of employment continued to f a l l and had reached a c r i t -i c a l l e v e l . The following figures c l e a r l y point out the 70 serious nature of the employment problem: LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT I960 1963 Agriculture and Forestry 271,800 219,700 Private Industry and Commerce 189,000 158,500 Public Service 161,400 157,300 TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 1954 542,600 I960 622,200 1963 535,100 219 The 1963 l e v e l of employment was 7.9$ below the 1962 l e v e l . These figures point up the fact that the economy, while showing signs of expanding i n monetary value,was not at the same time creating employment. The sharp de-cl i n e i n investment i n agriculture and industry might be pinpointed as the p r i n c i p a l cause. Both bui l d i n g con-struction and a g r i c u l t u r a l ventures such as the devel-opment of tea plantations require much labour. In addi-t i o n , the purchase of farms for settlement and the cut-back i n pyrethrum-growing also reduced the number of farm labourers. The 1964 Economic Survey has suggested that "wage increases have exceeded productivity increases with the consequence that employers have had to econ-omise i n the use of labour and have been encouraged to adopt more c a p i t a l intensive methods of production 71 when possible." The following table i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s 72 point: EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 1962 Africans 525,351 L 42,135,000 Asians 36,086 L 19,074,000 Europeans 19,937 L 27,720,000 581,274 L 88,929,000 1963 Africans 480,734 t 45,382,000 Asians 36,705 £ 20,580,000 Europeans 17,707 £ 25,712,000 535,146 t 91,674,000 Not only do the above figures show the f a l l i n employ-ment, but they also c l e a r l y show the large contribution 220 that the non-African communities have continued to make to the economy of the country. The need f o r the contin-uation of the large role played by expatriates i n the economy of Kenya, of necessity, must continue. With t h i s objective i n mind, the International Bank f o r Reconstruc-t i o n and Development i n i t s survey of Kenya 1s economy, stressed the problem of human l i m i t a t i o n s i n the advance-ment of the country's economy. "The a v a i l a b i l i t y of an adequate supply of human s k i l l s i n Kenya," the Report declared, " w i l l depend on the presence of non-Africans 73 both i n the c i v i l service and i n private a c t i v i t y . " For t h i s reason Kenya's Development Plan for 1964-1970 emphasizes the need to devote the highest p r i -o r i t y to education and a g r i c u l t u r a l development. At the same time the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development stresses throughout i t s report the need f o r economy and increased e f f i c i e n c y i n a l l phases of the economy. A c r i t i c a l budgetary s i t u a t i o n emerged i n Kenya i n I960, and i t i s for t h i s reason that f i n a n c i a l pru-dence i n spending i s e s s e n t i a l . The International Bank's study suggested that improvement i n the budgetary s i t -uation and continuing p o l i c i e s of f i n a n c i a l prudence were required to provide a foundation f o r successful develop-ment and prevent serious cutbacks. These conditions were necessary f o r : 221 a. encouraging l o c a l Asians and Europeans to i n -vest t h e i r savings i n Kenya and to repatriate the large sums transferred abroad during the recent period of uncertainty; b. encouraging these people to stay i n Kenya and to contribute t h e i r c r i t i c a l l y needed s k i l l s to Kenya's growth; e. a t t r a c t i n g from foreign sources public and private funds f o r expanding production.74 The forecast budget d e f i c i t f o r 1964-1965 was L 10,000,000, in d i c a t i n g the alarming proportions to which the budgetary c r i s i s had grown. The prospect of holding the l i n e on expendi-tures i s one which cannot be cherished by African p o l i t -i c i a n s . Having campaigned f o r independence with the prom-ise of improved economic conditions for the African people, these leaders w i l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y to t h e i r l e s s aware followers the necessary slowdown i n economic development. Not only does t h i s become an economic prob-lem, i t also enters the p o l i t i c a l sphere. Should the A f r i -can leaders not make good on t h e i r broad promises of the pre-independence days, the prospect f o r p o l i t i c a l instab-i l i t y might once again become very r e a l . Should such a condition occur the opportunity f o r restoring investment confidence i n the country would be a l l but doomed. I t i s therefore, a d i f f i c u l t problem which faces Kenya's new leaders. Despite these d i f f i c u l t i e s Kenya's African leaders have launched t h e i r country boldly on i t s course of independence. Their aim has been described as "the Reported Employment and Earnings;, 1954-1963 222 75 creation of a democratic African s o c i a l i s t Kenya: 'dem-ocr a t i c ' because i t w i l l be a free society i n which there w i l l be no place f o r discrimination by race, t r i b e , b e l i e f or otherwise; 'African' because the nation must grow from indigenous roots, adapting the best from other c u l t u r a l systems; ' s o c i a l i s t ' because a l l people have the right to be free from economic exp l o i t a t i o n and s o c i a l inequal-76 i t y . " The major p o l i c i e s which w i l l guide Kenya's econ-omic development during i t s f i r s t seven years of indepen-dence, include: 1. a s o c i a l p o l i c y which seeks to preserve the t r a d i -t i o n a l s p i r i t of mutual s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y while adapting i t t o the needs and circumstances of the modern state; 2. an educational p o l i c y that recognizes s o c i a l a s p i r -ations and the need for s k i l l e d manpower as w e l l as li m i t e d f i n a n c i a l means and the burden of rapid popu-l a t i o n growth; 3. a manpower p o l i c y which i s aimed at a l l e v i a t i n g un-employment and developing a s k i l l e d labour force; 4. a wage p o l i c y which i s designed to eliminate ex-p l o i t a t i o n and discrimination, but i s c l e a r l y related to productivity and conditions of supply and demand; 5. a pol i c y to ensure the equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of the benefits of economic growth among the people of the various regions; 6. an investment p o l i c y which i s designed to stimulate private c a p i t a l formation and employment opportunities f o r labour; 7. a policy to secure greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n economic a f f a i r s by the Government and people of Kenya; 8. a policy towards the external suppliers of funds containing assurance against n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and designed to encourage a net flow of foreign c a p i t a l ; 9. a.policy to develop new and e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r promoting domestic savings and t h e i r productive u t i l -i z a t i o n . 10. a policy emphasizing s e l f - h e l p , schemes, which w i l l involve the people of Kenya i n planning and working f or t h e i r own development. 11. i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s which recognize t h e i r mutual interdependence and the dominant 223 role of ag r i c u l t u r e ; 1 2 . a trade policy designed to conserve foreign ex-change resources i n order to finance c a p i t a l imports; 1 3 . a tax policy which considers incentives, income d i s t r i b u t i o n , a b i l i t y to pay, the responsiveness of tax revenues, to economic growth, r e l a t i v e needs of central and regional governments, the impact of a central bank on f i s c a l policy and the need f o r synchronization with tax p o l i c i e s of the other countries i n East Africa. 7 7 There i s l i t t l e doubt that Kenya's leaders having attained p o l i t i c a l independence f o r Kenya, are anxious to gain t h e i r economic independence. There i s a wish to produce i n Kenya many of the goods which that country now imports. However, Kenya's leaders appear to be r e a l i s t i c enough to recog-nize the f a c t that f o r some years to come the finances, s k i l l s , and technical knowledge of Kenya's non-Africans must remain a v i t a l cog i n the country's economic machinery. With independence the prospects f o r a return of confidence i n the country's economy brightened somewhat. L i t t l e more than a year a f t e r her independence, Kenya's opportunities f o r receiving investment c a p i t a l seem to be steadily improving. Only Kenyans, however, can deter-mine whether cap i t a l w i l l flow into the country. The pol -i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y which has been maintained i n the country since December 1 9 6 3 , 'suggests that Kenyans of a l l t r i b e s and races are determined to 'Harambee' P u l l t ogether— to assure a promising future for the country's ra p i d l y . expanding population. 224 An a d d i t i o n a l factor influencing Kenya's econ-omic development i s not peculiar to Kenya alone. Like a l l newly emerged underdeveloped nations, Kenya i s highly vulnerable to influences growing out of the Cold War. President Kenyatta has repeated on numerous occa-sions, both before and following independence, that: "Ideological labels are of no concern to us; the only c r i t e r i o n w i l l be the effectiveness of the i n s t i t u t i o n 78 i n achieving greater welfare for a l l our people." Caught i n the middle of the struggle f o r influence be-tween the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Re-0 public of China, Kenya has become involved i n t h i s struggle. Her Vice-President, Mr. Oginga Odinga, has f o r some years maintained a close relationship with the Republic of China. Her Minister f o r Economic Planning 79 and Development, Mr. Tom Mboya, has over a number of years been associated w i t h the United States. His i n f l u -e n t i a l r o l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y during the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s , i n the International Labour Movement brought him into close contact with world leaders. In a d d i t i o n , the f l i r t a t i o n s of J u l i u s Nyerere of Tanzania with the Re-public of China, are also of no mean interest t o Kenya leaders. F i n a l l y , the recent American a i r l i f t of mis-sionaries from the s t r i f e - t o r n Congo aroused strong 80 feelings among many Kenyans. Clearly, i t i s d i f f i -cult f o r Kenya to remain e n t i r e l y aloof from the ideo-225 l o g i c a l power struggle. Yet, i n spite of the p o l i t i c a l i n t r i c a c i e s involved, Kenya i s able to benefit economically from the East-West animosity. The most i n f l u e n t i a l weapon with which to gain favour i n underdeveloped countries i s the advancement of economic rewards. For t h i s rea-son, Kenya has succeeded considerably, following her i independence, i n restoring confidence among i n v e s t o r s — both from economic and p o l i t i c a l motives. Large grants of f i n a n c i a l assistance and technical a i d have flowed i n from the United States, Japan and Sweden, West Ger-many and the Commonwealth countries. In addition, the Soviet Union, i n July 1964, announced that i t would as s i s t i n the construction of a t e x t i l e m i l l , a radio s t a t i o n , a f i s h cannery, a food processing factory, a sugar factory, and a paper m i l l . The Republic of China offered Kenya an interest free loan i n the form of equipment and technical assistance of $15,000,000 and a grant of #2,500,000. The United Kingdom extended a new grant and loan to Kenya f o r c i v i l and defence pur-poses t o t a l l i n g #78,400,000 i n the form of g i f t s and services, and $70,000,000 i n long term loans. This brought the t o t a l amount of B r i t i s h aid to Kenya since the second world war to $280,000,000. Only B r i t a i n ' s 81 aid to India has exceeded t h i s amount. Commenting on the continued generosity of the United Kingdom, Kenya's 2 2 6 Minister of Finance, Mr. James Gicharu, declared: "We f e e l i t i s only B r i t a i n which could be so generous because of the contact we have had a l l these l a s t 82 seventy years." I t would seem clear that the economic pros-pects for Kenya, provided the country i s able to main-t a i n p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , are quite good; Although rec-overy from the effects of p o l i t i c a l unrest, poor c l i m a t i c conditions, and poor world markets, between I960 and 1962, has been slow, Kenya's new leaders appear determined to chart t h e i r country's course along l i n e s which they are confident w i l l assure healthy economic development. By increasing education at a l l l e v e l s and i n a l l f i e l d s , by maintaining p o l i t i c a l harmony and thereby encouraging investment confidence, and by u t i l i z i n g the vast human resources of the expatriates an the country, Kenya can achieve economic expansion during the course of her new development plan. Once the economically advanced nations of the world , together with non-Africans within Kenya, have become accustomed to independent nations under A f r i -can leadership, such as Kenya, v i t a l l y needed investment w i l l flow into the country. With increased funds Kenya w i l l be able to continue to expand, not only her economy but also her s o c i a l services to provide a better l i f e for a l l Kenyans. 227 NOTES 1 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, July 14, 1954, v o l . 6 l , col.3 . 2. I b i d . , October 18, 1955, vol . 6 7 , col.10. 3 I b i d . , May 16, 1956, v o l . 6 9 , cols. 391-392. 4 I b i d . . November 13, 1956, vol.71, col.35 5 The International Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya, B a l t i -more, The John Hopkins Press, 1963, p.20. 6 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Committee on African Wages. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1954, p. 138. 7 I b i d . . p. 12. & I b i d . , p. 139. 9 In 1953 69% made between 65/ and 199/ a month; 5% made over 200/ a month; and 26% made under 6 5 / a month. In r u r a l areas 83% received between 35/ and 69/ a month including house and rat i o n s . G.M. Kournossoff, The  Underlying Causes of the 1953 Emergency i n Kenya, Van-couver, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1959, p. 108ff. 10 Report of the Committee on African Wages, p.168. 11 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , East A f r i c a  Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, 1955, Cmd.9475,p.390. 12 I b i d . , p. 427. 13 I b i d . . pp. 429-430. 14 See R.J.W. A Plan to Intensify the Development  of African Agriculture i n Kenya, Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1954. 15 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Despatches  from the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and  from the Administrator, East A f r i c a High Commission, commenting on the East A f r i c a Royal Commission 1953- 1955 Report, 1956, Cmd. 9801, p. 17. 228 16 About 90% of Kenya's population was engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e . 17 Tjmes Weekly Review. December 4, 1958. 18 At the same time, the Troup Report was tabled with a p a r a l l e l plan to that of Mr. Swynnerton f o r the development of European a g r i c u l t u r e . 19 J.R.M. Swynnerton, "Kenya's A g r i c u l t u r a l Planning," African A f f a i r s , vol.56 (July,1957) pp.212-213. 20 I b i d . , p. 211. 21 E.A. Vassey, "Economic and Social Trends i n Kenya," African A f f a i r s , vo. 55(April, 1956), p. 108. 22 I b i d . , pp. 106-107. 23 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. December 9,1953, vol.521, col.1977. 24 I b i d . . October 28,1953, vol.518, col.2804. 25 Kenya's labour unions also played a rol e i n gaining wage increases. Their association with the i n t e r -national labour movement afforded them considerable support and assistance. By associating with the Kenya n a t i o n a l i s t movement the trade unions were able to achieve considerable success, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the period when p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was r e s t r i c t e d . The work of Tom Mboya and his Kenya Federation of Labour was quite successful i n the 1955 Mombasa dock s t r i k e where wages and working conditions were soon improved. 26 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , The Colonial  T e r r i t o r i e s 1955-1956, 1956, Cmd. 9769. 27 European farmers expressed anxiety that African grown coffee would flood the world market with an i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y of coffee. This they f e l t would lower the world market price. 28 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, November 29,1953, vol.58, c o l s . 300-301. 29 Marion Wallace Forrester, Kenya To-day; So c i a l Prerequisites f or Economic Development, 'S-Gravenhage, Mouton and Col,1962, p. 133. 229 3 0 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, October 3 0 , 1958,vol.594, c o l . 465. 31 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , East A f r i c a Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, 1955, Cmd. 9475. 32 This figure represents about one percent of the t o t a l population. 33 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. October 30,1958, vol.594, col.469. 34 Kenya Weekly Mews. May 23, 1958, c i t e d i n A f r i c a Digest, vol.6 (July-August.1958) p. 11. 35 Kenya Weekly News. May 30,1958, c i t e d i n A f r i c a Digest. vol.6(July-August,1958). p.11. 36 See I b i d . , p. 1 3 . 37 Manchester Guardian, October 15, 1959. 38. L o c . c i t . 39 A f r i c a Digest, vol.8(October,1960) p.58. 40 Forrester, o p . c i t . , p.45. 41 I b i d . , pp.47-48. 42 I b i d . , p. 48. 43 A f r i c a Digest, vol.6 (November-December,19585, section on Kenya. 44 Cmd., o p . c i t . , p. 34* 45 The sale of Afriean produced crops i n 1956 was & 6 m i l l i o n . In I960 t h i s t o t a l had r i s e n to L 10 m i l l i o n . 46 East A f r i c a and Rhodesia, October 6,1960, cited i n A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (December,1960), p.92. 47 See A f r i c a Digest, vol.8(December,1960),p. 9 2 . 48 Kenya Weekly News. March 31,1961, c i t e d i n A f r i c a Digest, vol.8 (June,1961), p. 2 3 0 . 230 49 L o c . c i t . 50 Manchester Guardian Weekly f January 19,1961. 51 The army worm refers to the larva of a moth, which spreads over an area s t r i p p i n g the land of green leaves. 52 Government of Kenya, Department of A g r i c u l -ture Annual Report 1962 vol.1 f Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1963,-p. 1. 53 Marion E. Doro, "Changing S e t t l e r Attitudes Toward the Kenya Land Question," A f r i c a Report, vol.7 (June, 1962), p. 6. 54 Loc. c i t . 55 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. March 30, 1961, vol.637, c o l . 1615 ~ 56 The largest portion of t h i s increase i n wages was to go to expatriate c i v i l service o f f i c e r s . 57 Because Kenya was the commercial and trans-portation centre of the East African area, she bene-f i t t e d considerably more than did the other t e r r i t o r i e s . 58 A f r i c a Digest, vol.8(April,1961), p.193/ 59 Government of Kenya, Reported Employment and  Earnings i n Kenya 1962. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1963, p.3. 60 I b i d . , p.6. 61 Government of Kenya. Economic Survey 1964. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, p. 10. 62 I b i d . . p.52. 63 The b r i e f army mutiny i n January 1964, caused a s l i g h t pause i n the recovery but now the market i s standing up well at about 91. 64 Economic Survey 1964. p. 35. 65 I b i d . , p.33. 66 I b i d . . p.36. 67 I b i d , 68 I b i d . 69 I b i d . 7 0 I b i d . 71 I b i d . p. 37. p. 38. p. 4 4 . P. 39. p. 4 0 . 72 L o c . c i t . 73 The International Bank fo r Reconstruction and Development, o p . c i t . , p. 32. 74 I b i d . , p. 283. 75 T r a d i t i o n a l l y African s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l structure i s communal by nature. I t had a b u i l t - i n s o c i a l security system i n the past. Thus,a form of socialism i s natural f o r Kenya, and her goal, therefore, i s a classless society based on 'Ujamaa'—the extended f a m i l y — a n d a United States of A f r i c a . 76 Government of Kenya, Development Plan 1964- 1970. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, p . l . 77 I b i d . , pp.2-3. 78 I b i d . , p . i . See also Tom Mboya, Freedom and  A f t e r . London, Andre Deutsch, 1963, p. 167 f f . 79 The appointment of the very capable Tom Mboya to t h i s post, indicates the importance of economics to the future of Kenya. 80 President Kenyatta had the d i s t i n c t i o n of heading an African committee to seek an end to the c i v i l war i n the Congo. Kenya's President i s also head of the Organization of African Union. 81 A f r i c a Digest, vol.12(July,1964), section on Kenya. 82 A f r i c a Digest, vol.12(August,1964), p. 14. 232 CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL ADVANCES 1953-1963 The growth of Kenya's economy i n the mid-ni n e t e e n - f i f t i e s was re f l e c t e d i n many respects i n so c i a l advances i n the Colony. Social integration and the spread of medical, educational and housing f a c i l i t i e s f o r Africans, can be at t r i b u t e d i n part to a new mode of thought emerging out of the troubles of 1952. At the same time, however, the economic advancement during the mid-f i f t i e s played a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n meeting many of the African grievances a r i s i n g out of s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s and a lack of adequate f a c i l i t i e s . During the pre-World War I I period the Colonial O f f i ce devoted l i t t l e concentrated e f f o r t towards the s o c i a l needs of the indigenous popu-l a t i o n . This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the f i e l d of edu-cation. However, as economic prospects i n the Colony steadily rose i n the l a t e f o r t i e s and early f i f t i e s , funds became available to provide f o r many of the medi-cal and educational needs of the African people. The outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s temporarily interrupted t h i s growth but i t did not halt i t . Indeed, once the major m i l i t a r y c r i s i s was met, the Colonial O f f i c e devoted large sums of money towards making up f o r l o s t time i n the s o c i a l services. The force of African nationalism demanded great haste i n providing for increased s o c i a l 233 f a c i l i t i e s f o r the African people. Thus, with funds ava i l a b l e , a concentrated e f f o r t was launched against the retarded position of s o c i a l services i n Kenya. Cl e a r l y , the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n did not adversely a f f e c t the o v e r a l l development of the s o c i a l services, and i n -deed, stimulated t h i s growth. The most l a s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t effect of the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n was i t s contribution to the breaking down of t r a d i t i o n a l b a r r i e r s and the disruption, p a r t i c -u l a r l y among the Kikuyu, of the t r i b a l way of l i f e . A most revolutionary concept was introduced into the trad-i t i o n a l mode of l i f e under the name of "y i l l a g i z a t i o r i " . ' The o r i g i n a l aim of t h i s p o l i c y was t o increase security f o r l o y a l Kikuyu against the Mau Mau rebels. With i s o -lated homesteads throughout Kikuyuland, i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r these l o y a l Kikuyu to protect themselves, f o r t h e i r position was r e l a t i v e l y indefensible. Dr. J.C. Carothers, i n his study of the psychology of Mau Mau saw great p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n the p o l i c y of "v i l l a g i z a t i o n " . ; He has written: As f a r as long-term issues are concerned, and apart from several other advantages which are no concern of t h i s report i t would seem that there are great psychological advantages to be gained from i t by the Kikuyu. Their i s o l a t i o n , suspicion and long-standing s o c i a l i n s e c u r i t y need a dev-elopment of t h i s s o r t . And now that t h e i r t r a d i -t i o n a l occasions of association have l a r g e l y broken down, they badly need more opportunities f o r social l i v i n g . One can envisage such v i l l a g e s developing t h e i r l o c a l i n d u s t r i e s , t h e i r shops, t h e i r churches, and health centres, schools and 234 clubs; and developing opportunities for employ-ment of young men who too often now d r i f t o f f , to townships and return with strange and often f a l s e ideas with which to reinfect t h e i r credu-lous country cousins. Such v i l l a g e s could also meet the needs of squatters on European farms where a chief complaint has been of ins e c u r i t y of tenure. Perhaps above a l l , and to anticipate a subject which w i l l a r i s e again i n t h i s report, i t would help to solve the problem of family disruption and f l a t t e n out the c u l t u r a l d i v e r -s i t y between the men and women which seems to have played such a part i n giving r i s e to 'Mau Mau'.1 Certainly the i d e a l envisaged by Dr. Carothers was one which many Kenyans would l i k e to achieve. " V i l l a g i z a t i o n " was f a r from popular with the Kikuyu, f o r i t was "quite contrary to a l l t h e i r customs and t h e i r normal mode of l i f e , and, i n f a c t , cuts across everything that they ever thought about i n t h e i r way of 2 l i f e . " Yet, i n many cases, these v i l l a g e s offered superior medical f a c i l i t i e s than did the i s o l a t e d home-steads. Kenya's Minister for Local Government, Health and Housing, outlined the basic health features of the new v i l l a g e s . These include: 1. A proper standard of layout of house construction. 2. The provision of p i t l a t r i n e s . 3. The provision of safe water supplies, which includes the protection of springs. 4. The erection of c a t t l e 'boma'. 5. The buil d i n g of rat-proofed grain stores t o prevent plague and the general destruction of food stocks. 6. The composting of refuse adjacent to the c a t t l e 'boma' and the consequent production of supplies of manure. 7. The spraying of houses with i n s e c t i c i d e to pre-vent vermin infestation.3 235 Although these provisions were quite primitive by mod-ern standards, they were apparently e f f e c t i v e , for Dr. Anderson, Kenya's di r e c t o r of medical services, was able to t e l l the L e g i s l a t i v e Council: "I was astonished at the high standard of hygiene-, and t i d i n e s s that these 4 v i l l a g e s had achieved." The establishment of these v i l l a g e s proceeded at a rapid rate. By the end of 1954, 50-70% of the pop-ul a t i o n of Nyere and Fort H a l l d i s t r i c t s were being accomodated i n such v i l l a g e s . At the same time urban housing was not being overlooked by the Government. Cement block homes were constructed just outside Nairobi to absorb the fringe population and r e l i e v e some of the slum conditions i n the c i t y . In the Governor's speech from the chair on October 14, 1954, i t was disclosed that i t was "the continued intention of the Government to take every opportunity to encourage the building of s u f f i c i e n t houses and the provision of adequate a n c i l -l a r y services i n the urban areas to accomodate our urban populations and thereby to develop a s t a b i l i z e d and con-5 tented community." By providing better housing f a c i l i t i e s f o r the African population, s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s were evident. The preponderance of women i n the v i l l a g e s and of men i n the urban areas had created an imbalanced society, which was bringing about the breakdown of t r i b a l l i f e and native 2 3 6 authority. " V i l l a g i z a t i o n " was a step towards rebuilding the family unit. Teams of two Africans and two Europeans were sent into the v i l l a g e s to learn what the needs of the people were and to a s s i s t i n the t r a i n i n g of v i l l a g e leaders. Increased s o c i a l welfare was provided, security against Mau Mau t e r r o r i s t s was strengthened, and the consolidation of scattered plots was spurred on. The new hut v i l l a g e s were created by taking one-quarter acre from each owner to provide s i t e s f or the new v i l l a g e s . With " v i l l a g i z a t i o n " , Government influence was greater and o f f i c i a l s were able to receive more ef f e c t i v e coop-eration from the Africans i n t h e i r programmes of land reclamation and consolidation. As a measure a r i s i n g d i r e c t l y out of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of Mau Mau, " v i l l a g i z a -t i o n " had long range effects i n the breaking down of the t r a d i t i o n a l society and rebuilding i t along more contemporary l i n e s . While r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the Kikuyu was being carried on through the process of " v i l l a g i z a t i o n " , and 6 detention an attempt to lessen l e g a l discrimination was promoted i n the Colony. The Royal Commission on East A f r i c a commented on t h i s matter i n t h i s manner: East A f r i c a cannot afford customs or vested i n t -erests which continue to lead to the waste of resources through i l l - u s e d land or useless cattle through conspicuous consumption based on p r i v i l e g e or status, through i l l - t r a i n e d and badly directed labour, or through outworn r e s t r i c -tions on employment of members of p a r t i c u l a r races, 237 through a g r i c u l t u r a l production protected by mono-p o l i s t i c devices or state regulation, through re-s t r i c t i o n s on the use of land f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l and urban purposes....Race or colour cannot be regarded as a ground for any discrimination or r e s t r i c t i o n which the community i s not prepared to accept on other grounds....The goal of s o c i a l action i n East A f r i c a should be based on the r e a l i z a t i o n that t h i s r e l a t i v e l y extremely under-developed region has so fa r f a i l e d to grasp i t s undoubted opportunities, and that i t has been r e s t r i c t i v e i n major p o l i c i e s , ranging from unwillingness to share i t s potential wealth with new-comers able to a s s i s t development to unwillingness to j o i n i n co-operative e f f o r t even between the t r i b e s and races of which i t s people are composed.7 On December 3,1953, a resolution was passed i n Legco "that Government be requested to compile a l i s t of laws and subsidiary l e g i s l a t i o n which discriminate between persons on the ground of race and to report thereon." This res o l u t i o n , born out of the violence of Mau Mau, resulted i n a survey of a l l Ordinances and Orders i n Council which were of a discriminatory nature. In 1954, some p o s i t i v e action was taken towards eliminating d i s -crimination, when the findings of the Lidbury Report were published. As a r e s u l t of the recommendations of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the country's c i v i l service received a complete overhaul. The recommendations included the introduction of a new salary structure not based on any r a c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , approval of government posts being opened to candidates of a l l races, the setting up of t r a i n i n g grades for l o c a l candidates, and the formu-l a t i o n of the C i v i l Service Commission. Not only was t h i s a s i g n i f i c a n t step i n the removal of discriminatory l e g i s -238* l a t i o n , but i t was also a f i r s t major step toward A f r i c a n i z a t i o n of government positions. Although Asians too might have benefited from the non-racial terms of employment outlined i n the Lidbury Report, the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n l a r g e l y eliminated any major benefits Asians might have derived from such l e g i s l a t i o n . A second step i n the elimination of discrim-inat i o n on r a c i a l grounds i n Kenya was introduced i n 1957. A motion was introduced i n Legco c a l l i n g f o r the progressive elimination of a l l forms of discrimination i n hotels, restaurants, and public places. The question arose despite a statement of the Kenya Hotelkeepers' Association i n 1956, which intimated that a l l t h e i r hotels were non-racial. There could be l i t t l e doubt that the removal of dicriminatory practices would be a slow process indeed. Commenting on the pace of t h i s p o l i c y , Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, declared-i n the House of Commons: However, while being anxious to secure further improvement by every form of persuasion and guid-ance, the Kenya Government does not consider that there i s scope at the present time for hastening the process by l e g i s l a t i o n . I agree with the Kenya' Government's view. 9 The Emergency regulations were s t i l l i n force and pockets of Mau Mau rebels continued to reappear. For t h i s reason, such r a c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s as those imposed on p o l i t i c a l gatherings could not immediately be removed. In addition, i t was a d i f f i c u l t task to l e g i s l a t e against personal 239 feelings held by individuals—many of which were not bred of inherent r a c i a l biases but rather of a f e e l i n g of c u l t u r a l s uperiority. Nonetheless, the gradual removal of the colour bar continued and by I960 Asians and Africans could f r e e l y enter hotels and other public places without fear of i n -sult or r a c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s . Asians, f o r example could enjoy i n t e r - r a c i a l s o c i a l gatherings such as those held at the United Kenya Club i n Nairobi. However, s o c i a l intercourse might occur frequently, yet the feelings deeply f e l t by some ind i v i d u a l s towards others were d i f f -i c u l t and i n some instances impossible to remove. No amount of l e g i s l a t i o n could a l t e r the way these i n d i v i d -uals f e l t . Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t piece of l e g i s -l a t i o n passed was that dealing with land. The opening up of the White Highlands removed perhaps the greatest source of r a c i a l antagonism i n Kenya. The a c q u i s i t i o n of land i n Kenya on the basis of i n d i v i d u a l merit was of immeasurable importance i n fo s t e r i n g more c o r d i a l re-lat i o n s between the races. P o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l grievances attached to the reservation of the White High-lands were l e g a l l y removed! By t h i s action 'de jure' d i s -crimination was largely removed from Kenya. Although 'de facto' discrimination s t i l l e x i s ts i n Kenya, c e r t a i n l y up u n t i l independence, r a c i a l i s m no longer i s a major 240 problem i n Kenya. With Africans taking over the country's public administration as a r e s u l t of the series of Lancaster House Conferences, discrimination against the African has v i r t u a l l y ended. In education, one of the l a s t strongholds of segregation, steps were taken following the co n s t i t u t i o n -a l conference i n I 9 6 0 , to integrate the school system, In January, 1961, the Limuru G i r l s ' School was opened to a l l races. Although previous to this announcement, higher education had been available on a non-racial basis to a l l with the academic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , the dec-i s i o n i n January was a landmark i n Kenya's s o c i a l evol-ution. Writing i n the Kenya Weekly News, Alan Moor has commented that: The Limuru G i r l s ' School i s to pioneer an experi-ment of great significance t o the New Kenya. Other European schools i n the country are expected to follow s u i t . There has been considerable emotional rea-ction to t h i s revolutionary change of outlook, and not unnaturally so, but the time i s here to make an unemotional assessment of the implications i n -volved. Some educational integration of Kenya's polyglot society i s c l e a r l y i m p l i c i t i n the Lan-caster House settlement, which signposts our future l i n e of advance. The only question i s how t h i s can best be accomplished.1° Closely following t h i s announcement was a statement declaring that a l l races would be admitted to Kenya's European secondary and grammar schools i n Janu-ary, 1962. The East African Standard r e f l e c t e d the. a t t i -tude which was becoming prevalent among most Europeans 241 i n Kenya when i t e d i t o r i a l i z e d the question of school integration: . . . i t w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y be accepted without the acrimony and heat which could have been ex-pected only a year ago, so much has the country changed since the Lancaster House Conference. Any c r i t i c should be faced squarely with the question: What i s the alternative?...To face r e a l i t y , t h i s i s only the f i r s t step towards opening schools of the future to children of a l l races, providing they can pass the examin-ations on a broader and competitive scale. Those parents who c l i n g to the mono-racial concept forever must be convinced they can accept the economic l i a b i l i t y , f o r they cannot expect the Government's f i n a n c i a l support.H Shortly a f t e r the November 25 announcement, the Delamere Boys' ^igh School i n Nairobi became the f i r s t European secondary school to be integrated. After half a century of segregation i n many facets of Kenya's l i f e , s o c i a l integration was rapidly becoming a r e a l i t y . There can be l i t t l e doubt that the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n stimulated t h i s development, f o r i t focused attention on the problem which i n the past many had accepted without question. The p o l i t i c a l devel-opments i n the f i v e years before independence, however, provided the r e a l catalyst i n the process of integrating Kenya. The ultimate decision that Kenya was an African country destined to be r u l e d by Africans made i t inev-12 i t a b l e that segregation would end. The economic c o l -lapse associated with the p o l i t i c a l advances created f i n a n c i a l burdens which made i t imperative to achieve the f u l l e s t use out of a l l educational f a c i l i t i e s , there-242 by hastening school integration. In independent Kenya, therefore, r a c i a l i s m no longer i s the major problem or source of unrest that i t was i n the pre-independence period. While the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n provided consid-erable opportunities f o r reorientation of the t r a d i t i o n a l African way of l i f e , i t did at the same time create prob-lems. The disruption of the t r a d i t i o n a l family unit created great hardships among the elderly Africans. In the past there had been two d i s t i n c t age groups among A f r i c a n s — t h e younger generation, p a r t i c u l a r l y those under the age of i n i t i a t i o n , and t h e i r elders. The 'age group' type of society prevalent among the Kikuyu and some other Kenya t r i b e s , made i t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the younger people to care f o r t h e i r elders. Under t h e i r natural laws of population control i n the past, there had been s u f f i c i e n t land to support the family unit including the aged members. However, as t r i b a l war-fare was eliminated, medical f a c i l i t i e s improved, trad-i t i o n a l methods of population control disrupted, unem-ployment increased, and population rapidly expanded, i t became increasingly d i f f i c u l t f o r the younger genera-t i o n to care e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e i r aged r e l a t i v e s . In addition, the gradual disruption of the t r a d i t i o n a l society with the advent of the white man, caused the younger generation to shirk t h i s customary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 243 A r i s i n g out of the t r a n s i t i o n from an old to a new c i v i l i z a t i o n , was the need to provide some system of s o c i a l security. With the economically buoyant con-ditions prevalent i n the country during the mid-nine-t e e n - f i f t i e s , i t became economically feasible to consider a solution to t h i s problem of old-age security. In 1957, therefore, the country's s o c i a l security committee i s -sued a report with s p e c i f i c recommendations to meet the growing needs of Kenya's older c i t i z e n s . This committee concluded that there was an urgent need to provide state insurance schemes for s o c i a l security i n old age. The only prohibiting f a c t o r was the cost of such a scheme. The Report, which considered several d i f f e r e n t plans, decided upon an "assessment method" contributory pension plan. They described t h i s as "a method by which contributions are so determined that the income from them over a short period i s approximately s u f f i c i e n t to meet the expenditure over the same period....Its chief advantage i s that i t allows f o r automatic adjustment on account of increased expectation of l i f e , depreciation of money, increased wages, increased cost of l i v i n g and 13 other f a c t o r s . " Both Africans and non-Africans were to be included i n the scheme, although the need of the A f r -can was considerably greater. Two features of t h i s scheme were that i t was to be non-transferable and that a l l con-t r i b u t i o n s were to be income-tax deductible. The cost-244 bearing formula was to see equal contributions paid by the employer and the employee, with the Central Govern-ment bearing the whole cost of the administration of the scheme. The Report suggested that the administration costs would range between L 35,000 and £• 40,000 per 14 annum. At the outset the scheme would oover approx-15 imately one-third of the t o t a l number of employees. 1 6 The formula f or contributions was to be the following: PENSION SCHEME Monthly Salary of Contributors Basis Up to Sh. 499 Supplemental A Sh.500 to Sh.999 Contributions per month Pensions (50% each payable by per month employer and employee) Supplemental B Sh. 1 , 0 0 0 & over Basic Supplemental A Total Basic Supplemental A Supplemental B Total Sh. 4 4 5 4 5 1 2 21 Sh. 60 Basic 60 Supple-mental A 60  120 Basic 60 Supp.A 60 Supp.B 120 240 Under t h i s scheme during the f i r s t few years of i t s oper-ation the t o t a l annual cost i n employer and employee con-t r i b u t i o n s would amount to t 4 3 3 , 0 0 0 . This would be di v -17 ided i n the following manner: FINANCIAL BREAKDOWN OF PENSION SCHEME  Total Contributions Employers Share Employees Public Services j, 108,000 L 6 5 , 0 0 0 i/^UOO Private Industry j, 3 2 5 , 0 0 0 L 1 9 5 , 0 0 0 L13o',000 245 The report suggested that the new pension scheme would also act as an inducement to a greater pride i n work, l e s s absenteeism and better output. In addition i t would create greater security and give r i s e to more permanence i n employment. "The feel i n g of i n s e c u r i t y , " the Report added, "which i s commonly f e l t by people l i v i n g close to the subsistence l e v e l becomes a neurotic 18 fear which consumes much energy and wastes much e f f o r t . " Thus, the pension scheme, born out of the new demands created by the t r a n s i t i o n i n African society, and stimu-lated by the Mau Mau uprising, became an important piece of l e g i s l a t i o n i n easing the burden faced by the African i n his adjustment to his fast-changing environment. The conditions which brought about the i n t r o -duction of the pension scheme also were instrumental i n creating another problem which l e g i s l a t i o n could not adequately solve. The problem of unemployment became acute by the early nineteen-sixties and today i s perhaps Kenya's greatest s o c i a l problem. This question was con-sidered i n chapter four where i t was shown that the l e v e l of employment i n 1963 was l e s s than that recorded i n 1954« C l e a r l y , the s o c i a l implications of t h i s condition are obvious. However, two fac t o r s which are adding to the gravity of the problem are the emigration of non-Africans and a rapi d l y expanding population. The f i r s t f a c t o r has caused a large outflow of c a p i t a l and with i t employment 246 opportunities from Kenya. The gravity of the unemploy-19 ment problem can be seen from the following table: UNEMPLOYMENT REPORTED IN 1963 January 6,467 July 8,874 February 6,352 August 8,617 March 6,877 September 9,457 A p r i l 6,883 October 10,444 May 7,284 November 10,458 June 6,528 December 11,695 This i s an alarming r i s e which only an inflow of invest-ment c a p i t a l , an acceptance of African leadership by Europeans, and the maintenance of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , can curb. The p o l i t i c a l developments i n Kenya Colony be-ginning with the I960 Lancaster House Conference caused a tremendous outflow of expatriates from the Colony. Not only did t h i s disrupt the country's economy but i t also caused a severe shortage of q u a l i f i e d people i n the s o c i a l services. Both i n the f i e l d of medicine and that of education d i d the emigration of expatriates cause harmful e f f e c t s , to the future s o c i a l growth of the country. A fear of the future under African leader-ship together with an unwillingness of some to adjust to and accept the New Kenya stimulated t h i s exodus. The following s t a t i s t i c s give an indi c a t i o n of the enormity 2Q of t h i s s i t u a t i o n : 247 EMIGRATION European Asian and Arab 1959 I960 1961 1962 3,394 3,813 6,052 8,379 2,196 2,130 2,529 1,922 1963 1st Qr. 2nd Qr. 3 r d Qr. 4th Qr. 1,721 1 ,747 2,181 2,458 a, 107 379 392 356 548 1,675 1964 1st Qr. 2nd Qr. 1,961 1,683 741 979 While the number of permanent emigrants has stea d i l y r i s e n , the number of immigrants to Kenya has f a l l e n from 1 4 , 7 8 5 i n 1955 to 6 , 3 4 0 i n 1 9 6 3 . A second f a c t o r which i s beginning to af f e c t seriously Kenya's economic and s o c i a l position i s her rapid r i s e i n population. O f f i c i a l s have estimated that Kenya's population i s increasing at the rate of more than yfo annually and i s doubling every twenty-five years. This represents one of the highest rates of population increase i n the world. The following table c l e a r l y i l l u s -21 t r a t e s the population explosion i n Kenya: POPULATION 1948 5 , 4 0 5 , 9 6 6 ( O f f i c i a l census year) 1960 8 , 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 1961 8 , 3 5 2 , 0 0 0 1962 8 , 6 3 6 , 2 6 3 ( O f f i c i a l census year) 1963 8 , 8 4 7 , 0 0 0 1964 9 , 3 7 6 , 0 0 0 The population explosion has created serious s o c i a l prob-lems i n Kenya and has led to the advocation of b i r t h con-248 t r o l methods to reduce the b i r t h rate. Only with a rapid upswing i n the building and construction industry to-gether with continued a g r i c u l t u r a l expansion, can Kenya hope to cope with the growth i n population and i t s assoc-iated problem of unemployment. Despite t h i s rapid increase i n population, the country s t i l l i s not suffering from overcrowding i n the urban areas. Densities of population i n Kenya, as a re-s u l t of resettlement schemes, vary from f i v e to 690 per 22 square mile. In addition, the process of urbanization and the growth of towns has not yet become unmanageable, f o r Kenya, with l e s s than 8% of the population l i v i n g i n towns, compares with 23% for Ghana and 43% for South A f r i c a . The s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of Kenya's l e v e l of ur-ban population i s the f a c t that the country has gradu-a l l y been overcoming i t s e a r l i e r d i f f i c u l t i e s which ac-companied urbanization and the t r a n s i t i o n from the trad-i t i o n a l way of l i f e . In the l a t e nineteen-thirties and the nineteen-forties, the gradual disruption of the t r a d i t i o n a l society, r e s u l t i n g from the pressures of employment and higher wages, and the attractions of European l i f e , forced many African males into the urban centres. This caused a disruption of the family unit leading to a s t a r t l i n g imbalance of 295 males per 100 23 females. Dr. J.C. Carothers has considered t h i s devel-opment as one of the major causes of the Mau Mau rebel-249 l i o n . He has pointed out the gross d i s p a r i t y i n the l e v e l s of educational advancement of the men and women, with the l a t t e r lagging f a r behind. Dr. Carothers states: Tb the present writer's mind, the extreme diver-s i t y of advancement i n d i f f e r e n t sectors of Kik-uyu society, and e s p e c i a l l y the d i v e r s i t y between the men and women, i s the most s t r i k i n g and un-fortunate feature of t r a n s i t i o n i n Kikuyuland. Where a l l move on together, t r a n s i t i o n could be easier; but here the problem of t r a n s i t i o n i t -s e l f becomes a d i f f e r e n t one for men and women, and one has to ask what psychological effects are l i k e l y to accrue f o r each.24 The women have remained i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l s e t t i n g ex-periencing l i t t l e change i n t h e i r way of l i f e . Kikuyu women, accustomed to do as t h e i r menfolk d i r e c t , re-mained i n the reserve receiving l i t t l e opportunity for formal education, while t h e i r men were l i v i n g i n the towns adjusting to a new way of l i f e . The children i n many instances were raised on the reserve without a f u l l - t i m e father and were taught the t r a d i t i o n a l l e s -sons of l i f e by the mother. Yet, as the c h i l d grew up he came more i n contact with the a l i e n l i f e and a con-f l i c t developed within him. Thus, t h i s often sudden contact with modern c i v i l i z a t i o n created new problems 25 f o r the A f r i c a n . These then were the d i f f i c u l t i e s caused by urbanization. However, the process of " v i l l a g i z a t i o n " and improved urban housing as outlined e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, have met with considerable success i n coping with t h i s problem. At the same time, increased wages, 250 the implementation of the Lidbury Commission proposals, educational opportunities f o r women, and an increase i n p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the Af r i c a n , have helped to recreate the family unit i n the urban areas, and arouse a p o l i t i c a l consciousness among the female pop-u l a t i o n . By 1962, the imbalance i n the sex d i s t r i b u -t i o n was considerably reduced, f o r the r a t i o was down 26 to 163 males per 100 females, i n d i c a t i n g a consider-able immigration of women and children into the towns. Yet, as i n any large urban area where unemployment i s high, the problem of the slum remains. Describing Nairobi, Peter Ritner has written: "And these native towns keep swelling and writhing, l i k e b l i n d blobs of insensate protoplasm that mean to devour the world. I t i s not East A f r i c a any more; i t i s Harlem with g i g -27 antism." Only as the country's economy improves and housing f a c i l i t i e s are b u i l t at a l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t to meet the population's needs, can Kenya hope to ease t h i s s o c i a l i l l , common to a l l urban centres. The exodus from Kenya of expatriates has not only added to the bat t l e against poverty, but i t has magnified the danger of two other enemies—disease and ignorance. The outbreak of Mau Mau had perhaps i t s most harmful effects on the country's health services. The r e s t r i c t i o n and detention of many thousands of Kikuyu withdrew a number of 'trained' medical aids from active 251 practice. In addition, the creation of detention camps and v i l l a g e settlements c a l l e d for increased medical a t t e n t i o n , f o r the health demands of com-munal l i v i n g were considerable. The po l i c y of " v i l l a g i z a t i o n " created greater opportunities for more intensive health administration and t h i s had :. the effect of putting f a r greater s t r a i n on the hos-p i t a l s to which more people were now seeking admit-tance. The increased demands on the medical profes-sion were reached p a r t l y by the implementation of mobile dispensaries mounted on Land Rovers which were introduced i n the new v i l l a g e settlements i n Central Province i n 1956. Thus, with the growing population and increased urbanization the need to provide greater medical f a c i l i t i e s f o r the popula-t i o n increased. S i m i l a r l y , the demands for education con-tinued to increase i n Kenya as a greater p o l i t i c a l awareness arose.. The association of education with power and money-making may be considered the source of a major African grievance leading to Mau Mau. Tom Mboya, perhaps best r e f l e c t e d the African sentiments concerning education when he wrote that "no c o l o n i a l power had d e l i b e r a t e l y set about the task of educating the mass of the people for the day of Independence." 252 The reasons f o r t h i s , of course, were f i r s t l y that the finances for such a major undertaking were not a v a i l -able before World War Two; and secondly that the day of independence arrived at such a rapid pace that the Colonial Office had f a i l e d to prepare f o r i t u n t i l i t was too l a t e . In spite of t h i s , Government e f f o r t s i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s were considerable i n making up for l o s t time. The f i r s t major confrontation with the prob-lem of education came with the Bishop Beecher Report 29 i n 1946. By I960, the goals set down i n the Beecher Report had been reached and i n many cases doubled. A comparison of the growth i n education over the ten years between 1946-1955, points up the rate of expan-sion which occurred. In 1946 there were 326 Africans at secondary schools and 16 passed the School C e r t i -f i c a t e s ; by 1955 t h i s figure had reached 3,060 with 233 receiving the School C e r t i f i c a t e . In 1946 there were 738 primary and intermediate teachers i n t r a i n i n g i n Kenya; by 1956 t h i s number had quadrupled to 2,951. There were 4,944 teachers at work i n 1946 including 49 trained graduates; by 1955 t h i s number had almost doubled to 9,431, with 162 being tra i n e d graduates. F i n a l l y , i n 1946 there were 2,291 schools with 205,580 Africans i n attendance. In 1956 t h i s number had ex-panded to 3,488 schools with 439,646 A f r i c a n children 253 30 receiving an education. Yet, while education developed at a rapid rate i n the post-World War Two period, t h i s policy of expansion did not escape unscathed from the Mau Mau r e b e l l i o n . The African independent schools, considered to be a major source of Mau Mau propaganda, suffered severely from the r e b e l l i o n . Some 188 independent schools were closed, although shortly a f t e r the declar-ation of the Emergency twenty reopened under mission-a r i e s and38 reopened under D i s t r i c t Education Boards. As a result of the practices of the hard-core Mau Mau i n Central Province alone, some 112 schools were des-troyed. Before the programme of " v i l l a g i z a t i o n " could be f u l l y implemented, intimidation by Mau Mau t e r r o r -i s t s hampered progress i n education. Owing to the threat of r e t a l i a t i o n from the Mau Mau many parents at f i r s t were reluctant to send t h e i r children to the former independent schools which had been reopened under new management. The post-World War Two period witnessed a concerted e f f o r t to expand the primary education sys-tem i n Kenya. However, o f f i c i a l s by the mid-nineteen-f i f t i e s became increasingly aware of the need for ex-panding higher education. For t h i s reason a detailed report on higher education i n East A f r i c a was made i n 1957. The Report declared: 2 5 4 The Government are anxious to expand the f a c -i l i t i e s f o r higher education i n East A f r i c a , but l i m i t e d funds dictate the scale on which progress can be made and i t i s important to ensure that a l l branches of education devel-op i n proportion to one another and i n prop-ortion to the other s o c i a l services f o r the community as a whole.31 At the same time, the Report recognized that: "Edu-cation i s the key to progress i n agriculture and i n -dustry, i n public health and curative medicine, and i n the sciences and the a r t s ; and no less i n govern-ment and p o l i t i c a l l i f e , f o r without i t democratic 3 2 i n s t i t u t i o n s become unworkable or pernicious." At t h i s time the two major i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r higher learning available to Kenya students were the Makerere College i n Uganda and the Royal Technical College i n Nairobi. The l a t t e r college established i n 1 9 5 6 pro-vided f a c i l i t i e s for higher technological t r a i n i n g , professional t r a i n i n g , research, vocational t r a i n i n g i n science, a r t s , and engineering. In addition, the Mombasa I n s t i t u t e of Muslim Education provided technical educa-t i o n f o r the people of the coast of Kenya as w e l l as for some of the residents of Zanzibar. This emphasis on providing increased f a c i l i t i e s f o r creating more s k i l l e d workers i n Kenya was a concrete step forward i n the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n and i n meeting the growing ihev-ita b i l i t y . o f African independence. An additional impetus to the provision of opportunities for higher education was created by Tom 255 Mboya on his v i s i t to the United States i n 1959. Here he was able to make arrangements f o r Africans i n Kenya to study at American u n i v e r s i t i e s . This was the beginning of an a i r l i f t of students to many foreign countries f o r the purpose of obtaining advanced t r a i n i n g i n many f i e l d s of study. Since t h i s time the programme has expanded considerably. On the other hand, the flow of educators into Kenya has not received the same sup-port, although one wonders whether t h i s method of pro-viding Africans with an opportunity to receive higher education might not be the more pro f i t a b l e i n the long run. Those that t r a v e l abroad to not always return to t h e i r home country and even i f they do they do not always extend the benefits of t h e i r learning to t h e i r f e l l o w countrymen. In addition, the number of students going abroad cannot hope to f u l l y meet Kenya's need. On his return from the United States, Mr. Mboya and other n a t i o n a l i s t leaders devoted t h e i r f u l l attention to the struggle for independence. l e t , i n spite of t h i s concentration on p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s i t created i n the early nineteen-sixties, Kenya's government expenditure rose 33 r a p i d l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y following independence. The Central Government expenditure rose from L 46,370,000 i n 1959/60 to L 56,480,000 i n 1962/63 to an estimated L 65,190,000 i n 1963/64.3^ Of t h i s amount s o c i a l ser-vices accounted for approximately 20$. The following 256 table i l l u s t r a t e s the f i n a n c i a l allotment to s o c i a l services: EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SERVICES 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 fe fc fe L fe Edu-cation 7,120,000 8,100,000 8,590,000 8,350,000 8,950,000 Health 3,030,000 3,430,000 3,420,000 3,410,000 3,240,000 Other 1,640,000 1,670,000 1,920,000 1,500,000 1,370,000 Total 11,790,000 13,200,000 13,940,000 13,260,000 13,460,000 The f a l l i n education expenditures by the Central Govern-ment during 1962-1963 may be attri b u t e d to the transfer of former Government Schools to Boards of Governors. In the past the Government met the expenditure of these schools and received the fees as revenue. Under the new system a grant was made but the Government did not re-ceive the revenue from the fees. The s l i g h t decline i n expenditure for health services by the Central Govern-ment can be accounted f o r by the fact that a substantial part of the health services, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r January 1,1964, were transferred to l o c a l A u t h o r i t i e s . The over-a l l p i cture, however, would indicate that the growth of health services has been maintained and i n some instances expanded. I t i s i n the bat t l e against disease and ignor-ance that the consequences of p o l i t i c a l evolution have been most disturbing. The fear of the unknown future forced many competent educators and medical p r a c t i t i o n e r s to f l e e Kenya. This has occurred despite the statements 257 of President Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya to the effect that such departments of government as the medical, l e g a l , and works departments should not be immediately subject to the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n . Kenya leaders are only too well aware of the necessity of encouraging expatriates to remain i n Kenya a f t e r independence. In 1963 only 50 of 811 doctors practicing i n the country were Africans. Not only does t h i s indicate the urgent need to t r a i n l o c a l people, i t also i l l u s t r a t e s that on an o v e r a l l basis Kenya has only one doctor for every 10,000 people. Added to the shortage of human resources i s that of a l i m i t a t i o n of physical resources. The In-ternational Bank i n i t s survey of Kenya's economy re-marked that "Kenya ranks among the less developed coun-36 t r i e s i n the supply of hospital beds." Throughout the country there i s only one hosp i t a l bed per 1,000 popu-l a t i o n . Yet, there i s a great d i s p a r i t y i n the l e v e l s of service provided i n the various regions, f o r Nairobi 37 boasts a r a t i o of 5.1 beds per 1,000 population. At the present time f i v e p r o v i n c i a l hospitals, thirty-two d i s t r i c t h o s pitals, twenty-one subordinate centres, t h i r t y f i v e mission hospitals and a few private 38 hospitals serve Kenya's needs. I t i s a major task which faces Kenya's new leaders to provide reasonable health f a c i l i t i e s f o r the r a p i d l y expanding population. Not only must a better bed to population r a t i o be achieved 25$ to meet the present needs but also increased f a c i l i t i e s w i l l be required to take care of the growing popula-tion, 350 beds per year w i l l have to be provided at a cost of L 1,050 per bed. The country's development plan calls for a doubling of this bed ratio in twenty years. Certain steps have been taken and more are planned for the future to meet some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of providing proper health care to a l l the people."The linchpin of Kenya's health policy i s the rural health centre, in which curative medicine i s coordinated with 39 preventive and promotive medicine." This policy brings health services closer to the people particularly in the poorly serviced rural areas. To date there are 141 of these health centres and by 1970 the country hopes to add another 106 centres. Even in this programme d i f f i -culties are being faced which have accrued as a result of the African p o l i t i c a l advancement. A shortage of trained staff and a lack of adequate finances continues to hamper the programme. The improvement of the financial resources clearly depends on a sharp improvement in the country's economic climate. The provision of qualified staff, however, w i l l depend for some time to come on the expatriate medical practitioners who have remained in Kenya. In 1963 fifty-seven medical students were en-40 rolled at Makerere University College. This number far from meets the requirements of Kenya's health services. Many African medical students study abroad, but this i s 259 not always a t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y arrangement. The International Bank suggests that: "There are recognized disadvantages to r e l y i n g on overseas t r a i n i n g : the studies may not be appropriate to Kenya's needs and -A there may be delays i n students returning to the country 41 immediately." Some steps to encourage l o c a l t r a i n i n g have already been taken i n Kenya. In 1959 the King George VI Hospital Medical Training School i n Nairobi was r e b u i l t . I t now of f e r s courses for t r a i n i n g for most grades of a u x i l i a r y medical s t a f f with the intention of integrating teaching where possible and coordinating curative and 42 preventative i n t e r e s t . In addition, the .1964-1970 Dev-elopment Plan c a l l s f or the provision of a post-graduate medical centre at the Kenyatta National Hospital. I t i s hoped that t h i s scheme w i l l provide increased s t a f f through the employment of students at the h o s p i t a l . Also i t i s f e l t that l o c a l t r a i n i n g w i l l mean a saving 43 of about L 2 , 5 0 0 per year per student. Although the future i s not overly bright f o r Kenya's medical services, the increase i n l o c a l medical t r a i n i n g , greater a s s i s -tance from United Nations organizations, and increased foreign a i d w i l l go a long way i n meeting the problem. The outlook ,for combatting ignorance i s per-haps somewhat brighter than the struggle to provide health services for the entire population. The Kenya Government has c l e a r l y stated that during the period of 260 Kenya's current development plan, education must have the highest p r i o r i t y . The plan outlines the following objectives f o r which Kenya's new government must s t r i v e i n the f i e l d of education: 1. to provide universal education through primary school. 2. to ensure enough places at the secondary and higher l e v e l s to educate those with recognized a b i l i t i e s , and 3. to organize the educational system to meet the manpower need of the country.44 The plan focuses i t s main emphasis on the need to expand rap i d l y the number of secondary schools. I t also wants to develop an increased number of African teachers to replace the large number of expatriates. The following tables indicate the nature of Kenya's education expen-ditures: RECURRENT EXPENDITURE 1961/62 African fe 3,369,305 Arab 82,818 Asian 1,125,614 European 489,386 Trade and Technical 197,362 Higher Education 762,091 Administrative and General (including Miscellaneous services) 500,348 fe 6,526,924 CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE 1960/63 African fe 889,478 Arab 29,836 Asian 380,646 European 143,818 Trade and Technical 200,063 Special Schemes 5 , 9 9 2 fe 1,649,833 261 The provision of primary education has expanded to such an extent that 90% of African boys and 50% of African g i r l s entered into the seven year primary educa-46 t i o n programme i n 1 9 6 2 . These percentages c l e a r l y i n d i -cate that t he provision of primary education has almost caught up to the needs of the African children. I t i s i n the provision of f a c i l i t i e s for secondary education where Kenya lags. The International Bank tackled t h i s issue, when i t commented: "In the mission's opinion, i t would not make good economic sense to invest scarce •. resources i n pursuing a primary school goal of 'seven years of schooling f o r a l l ' during a period when there i s a c r i t i c a l need for a good share of these scarce 47 resources at the post-primary l e v e l . " The challenge, however, i s not one of just providing the f i n a n c i a l means to meet the costs of adequate secondary education f a c i l i t i e s . I t i s also one of findin g enough q u a l i f i e d teachers. The shortage has become acute owing to the loss of expatriate s t a f f which followed the r i s e i n African p o l i t i c a l fortunes. Between 1964 and 1967 at least 400 additional secondary teachers w i l l be required i n Kenya. This number cannot yet be met sol e l y by q u a l i -f i e d A f r ican teachers and a l i e n s w i l l continue to be needed. The number of Africans entering secondary schools doubled between 1957 and 1961 and rose from 6 , 4 2 2 262 48 i n 1961 to 10,155 i n 1963. At the same time, i n 1962 alone some f i f t e e n new aided secondary schools were opened, despite the economic s i t u a t i o n . Throughout Kenya there are t h i r t y - e i g h t teacher t r a i n i n g i n s t i -tutions which are t r y i n g to meet the non-financial challenge of providing education to Kenyans. To meet the teaching needs of the country, both primary and secondary, there were 4,300 students i n 1963 i n these teacher t r a i n i n g colleges. Although t h i s represented a considerable r i s e over the number a decade ago, i t s t i l l w i l l not provide enough q u a l i f i e d teachers, par-t i c u l a r l y secondary teachers, to meet the needs of the country's rapidly expanding education programme. In the f i e l d of technical and trade schools the Kenya Government i s making impressive st r i d e s f o r -ward. In the seven technical and trade schools through-out the country students are provided with a complete set of t o o l s appropriate to the trade f o r which they are t r a i n i n g . After they have successfully passed through t h e i r t r a i n i n g course these tools become th e i r personal 49 property. In 1963 there were 938 students enrolled i n these seven schools where they were receiving training as carpenters, builders, painters, plumbers and elec-t r i c i a n s , etc. In the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n which i s taking place i n a l l f i e l d s of employment, the tech-n i c a l schools are t r a i n i n g Africans to assume much of 50 the work which f o r many years was dominated by Asians. 263 Considerable expansion i s planned over the next few years i n the f i e l d of technical secondary education. In 1963 Kenya had four such schools which offered general education with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the special s c i e n t i f i c and technical interests and 51 aptitudes of i t s selected pupils. In 1961 the Kenya Polytechnic i n Nairobi was opened offe r i n g c i v i l , mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l engineering, telecommunica-t i o n s , science, domestic science, b u i l d i n g , surveying, pri n t i n g and tec h n i c a l teacher t r a i n i n g . In 1963 the enrollment at th i s school was 965, more than double that of 1961, i t s f i r s t year of operation. The costs of providing adequate technical t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s f o r Kenya's needs are overbearing, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the present economic uncertainty. For t h i s reason, the International Bank i n i t s Report recommended that "the programs of the m i n i s t r i e s , plus on-the-job tr a i n i n g program of statutory boards and commissions, combined with those of private firms, should continue to form 52 the major part of vocational t r a i n i n g . " The expansion of f a c i l i t i e s f o r higher edu-cation i n East A f r i c a continued, when on June 28,1963, the University of East A f r i c a , bringing together the Makerere University College of Uganda, the Royal Col-lege i n Nairobi, and the University College of Tangan-y i k a , was opened i n Nairobi with Dr. J u l i u s Nyerere as 264 i t s f i r s t Chancellor. This step brought about the i n i -t i a t i o n of East African degrees, thereby severing a l l r e l a t i o n s with the University of London. In 1962 more than 3,700 Kenya students were awarded bursaries to study abroad, giving hope for the future of the young country should these trained students return to spread 53 t h e i r knowledge throughout Kenya. With the continued flow of bursaries and scholarships the number of trained u n i v e r s i t y students i n Kenya i s expanding at a healthy rate. This gives hope for Kenya's future educational and technological development, p a r t i c u l a r l y as A f r i c a n -i z a t i o n speeds up throughout the country. Closely a l l i e d to the expansion of formal education i n recent years has been the growth of adult education. This i s a f i e l d of considerable importance i f the great educational imbalance between the younger and older generations i s to be even p a r t i a l l y overcome. Under the country's new development programme a Board of Adult Education i s to be established to coordinate 54 a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s concerned with education. This plan w i l l not only give better d i r e c t i o n to the programme but i t w i l l also introduce some economy by preventing duplication and overlapping of services. A f i n a l feature of Kenya's expanding s o c i a l services i s concerned with the country's youth. With the r i s i n g rate of unemployment, together with continuing 2 6 5 economic stagnation up u n t i l independence, many of Kenya's young people have found themselves fr u s t r a t e d and i n a c t i v e . For t h i s reason, the new government has decided to create a National Youth Service. I t s pur-pose w i l l be to create useful work, education, t r a i n i n g , and promote a sense of national unity, f o r i t w i l l "draw young men from a l l r a c i a l and t r i b a l groups and weld them into harmonious units which w i l l devote t h e i r ener-55 gies to projects of national importance." The aim f o r the year 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 5 i s to have 7 , 0 0 0 young people p a r t i c -i p a t i n g i n the s e r v i c e . This i s a very v i t a l part of Kenya's determined e f f o r t to make i t s e l f independent i n every way. Many young people w i l l receive more advanced t r a i n i n g and education who might otherwise have not been so fortunate. Part of the education programme envisaged w i l l impart standards of good c i t i z e n s h i p to the young people, i n an e f f o r t to complete the t r a n s i t i o n from a t r a d i t i o n a l to a modern society. Also by appointing junior f i e l d unit leaders the Kenya Government w i l l be able to develop experienced and responsible leaders f o r the country's future years. The National Youth Service programme i s also an e f f o r t to overcome perhaps Kenya's greatest problem i n i t s future development—tribalism. By integrating the young people of many t r i b e s the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t r i b a l i s m should gradually be reduced. The introduction 266 of i n d i v i d u a l land tenure together with an increase i n urbanization w i l l also tend to reduce the effects of t r i b a l i s m . With a gradual increase i n s o c i a l service f a c i l i t i e s and the introduction of national programmes of cooperation and education, t r i b a l i s m as i t a f f e c t s the s o c i a l and economic development of Kenya w i l l grad-u a l l y wither away. The s o c i a l advances made by the A f r i -can i n Kenya since 1953 have gone a long way to reduce poverty, disease, and ignorance;,; and i n the process they have f a c i l i t a t e d the African's t r a n s i t i o n from the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i b a l way of l i f e to that of the modern world. This t r a n s i t i o n , however, has just begun and i t w i l l be several generations before the t r a d i t i o n a l society has been remodelled along modern l i n e s . 267 NOTES 1 Dr. J.C. Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau, Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1955, p.22. 2 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, L e g i s l a t i v e Council, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. May 12 , 1 9 5 5 , v o l . 6 5 , col.482. 3 I b i d . , October 18, 1955, v o l . 6 7 , col.128. 4 Ibid. , June 5 , 1956, v o l . 6 9 , col.1088. 5 I b i d . , October 14, 1954, v o l . 6 3 , col. 1 4 . 6 Many of those Africans held i n detention camps received t r a i n i n g as carpenters, metal workers, mech-anics i n a g r i c u l t u r e , etc. 7 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , East A f r i c a  Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report. 1955, Cmd. 9475, pp. 415-416. " 8 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament,House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. February 15,1955, vol.537, col.39. 9 I b i d . . July 9 , 1957, vol.573, col.186. 10 Kenya Weekly News, November 11,1960, c i t e d i n Af r i c a Digest, Vol.8(December.I960). p. 9 3 . 11 East African Standard. November 25, I960, c i t e d i n A f r i c a Digest, vol."8"(February,1961) , p. 142. 12 The decision t o hold a round table constitu-t i o n a l conference with representatives of a l l races i n Kenya attending was a si g n i f i c a n t step i n the growing recognition that Kenya was, a f t e r a l l , an African country. 13 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of  the S o c i a l Security Committee, Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r s , 1957, p.30. 14 I b i d . , p. 14. 15 At the outset, owing to administrative d i f f i -c u l t i e s , a g r i c u l t u r a l workers were not to be included i n the s o c i a l security plan. 268 16 Report of the Social Security Committee, p.21. 17 I b i d . , p. 27. 18 I b i d . , p. 6. 19 S t a t i s t i c s on population, migration, and em-ployment furnished by the Government of Kenya, October, 1964« Government source—the Labour Department. 20 I b i d . , Government Source—The Directorate of Planning. 21 Loc.Cit. See also Governmient of Kenya, S t a t i s -t i c a l Abstract 1964. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, p. 7. 22 Great B r i t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , Report on the  Colony and Protectorate of Kenya f o r the Year 1962, London, H.M. Stationery Of f i c e , 1963, p. 11. 23 S t a t i s t i c s . Government source—the Directorate of Planning. 24 Carothers, op.cit., p. 9. 25 I b i d . , p. 10. 26 S t a t i s t i c s . Government source—the Directorate of Planning. 27 Peter Ritner, The Death of A f r i c a , New York, The Macmillan Co., I960, p. 179. 28 Tom Mboya, Freedom and A f t e r , London, Andre Deutsh, 1963, p. 149. 29 The recommendations of t h i s report, published i n September 1949 [with implementation beginning i n January, 1952), may be summarized as follows: 1. that a u n i f i e d teachers' service be estab-l i s h e d with salary scales linked to those of Government servants and that a super-annuation scheme be started; 2. that the Education Department should have an adequate s t a f f to control and supervise e f f e c t i v e l y ; 3. that as a temporary measure supervisory teams be formed to allow the voluntary agencies to supervise e f f e c t i v e l y the primary and i n t e r -mediate schools. 2 6 9 4. that D i s t r i c t Education Boards should be responsible f o r primary and intermediate edu-cation i n t h e i r areas and that the costs be met from fees and grants from Central and l o c a l governments; 5. that Regional Education Boards be estab-l i s h e d f o r primary and day intermediate schools not covered by D i s t r i c t Education Boards, for boarding i n s t i t u t i o n s and secondary schools and teacher-training; 6. that by 1961 there should be 2,000 primary schools, providing 4,000 Standards I and I I and 2,000 Standards I I I and IV, with 340 intermed-i a t e schools and 12 secondary schools providing 26 classes i n Forms 1 and 2 and 16 Forms 3 and 4, and 7. that i n addition, a new grade of teacher (a KTl), with minimum q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of School C e r t i f i c a t e plus two years' t r a i n i n g , should be introduced, and a t o t a l of f i f t y t r a i n i n g centres, including e x i s t i n g ones, be established. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Education  T r i e n n i a l Survey 1961-1963. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, pp. 5-6. 30 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. A p r i l 15, 1957, v o l . 5 6 8 , col.1716. : 31 Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Higher Edu-cation i n East A f r i c a , N a irobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1957, p. 18. 32 I b i d . , p. 72. 33 Increased costs arose from the pension scheme, the operation of the army, the reorganization of the government and the establishment of embassies, and an increase i n public debt obligations. 34 Government of Kenya, Economic Survey 1964. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, p. 46. 1 35 I b i d . , p. 47. 36 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Kenya. B a l t i -more, The John Hopkins Press, 19&3, p. 241. 37 Government of Kenya, Development Plan 1964- 1970. Nairobi, Government P r i n t e r , 1964, p. 1.• 270 38 In 1963 Kenya had a t o t a l of 11 ,344 beds. 39 Development Plan 1964-1970, p. 108. 40 M i n i s t r y of Education T r i e n n i a l Survey 1961- 1963, p. 2B~. 41 The Economic Development of Kenya, p. 2 4 6 . 42 Great B r i a t a i n , Colonial O f f i c e , The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s , 1958-1959, 1 9 5 9 , Cmnd. 780. 43 The saving would be made because l o c a l t r a i n i n g costs l e s s than overseas t r a i n i n g and students would be able to perform services at the h o s p i t a l , which i n the past were handled by substitute s t a f f who had to be paid. 44 Development Plan 1964-1970. p. 101. 45 M i n i s t r y of Education T r i e n n i a l Survey 1961- 1963. pp. 1-2. 46 There was a f a l l i n the percentages entering primary schools owing to an increase i n fees i n 1963. At the same time, however, the intermediate course— l e v e l 5 to 8—showed a marked r i s e . In I960 2 9 . 5 $ of children completing the primary course entered the intermediate course. In 1963 t h i s number had risen to 80$. In the intermediate courses English i s the language of i n s t r u c t i o n . 47 The Economic Development of Kenya, p. 225. 48 Ministry of Education T r i e n n i a l Survey, 1961- 1 9 6 3, p. 22 49 I b i d . , p. 26. 50 The fees at the technical and trade schools were about Sh.150 for the f i r s t year, and Sh.l80 for the second year. 51 The subjects taught included English, Math-ematics, Physics, Chemistry, History, Geography; choice of Mechanical Engineering, Metalwork, Wood-work, Masonry, and Br i c k l a y i n g , Engineering Science or Building Science, and Technical Drawing. The fees were Sh.400 per annum. 52 The Economic Development of Kenya, p.235 271 53 In 1963 i t was estimated that there were about 7,000 Kenya students studying abroad. 54 The various i n s t i t u t i o n s to be coordinated included l i t e r a c y education, formal evening classes, and correspondence courses, occupational education, i n agriculture and industry, and l i b e r a l education geared to general knowledge and c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . 55 Development Plan 1964-1970, p. 115. 272 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION From Mau Mau to independence Kenya has experienced revolutionary changes i n her p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , despite the v i o -lence and the Emergency regulations. The African struggle f o r independence has not been an easy one and the consequences of that struggle have not been e n t i r e l y desirable. The post-independence period i s not the Utopia of many Africans' dreams. For many Africans the achievement of independence has brought about a sense of disillusionment f or economic rewards have not followed hand i n hand with independence. There has been a reluctance on the part of some Kenyans to accept the f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of independence. This newly won independence has made the A f r i -can u l t r a - s e n s i t i v e to any e f f o r t s to c r i t i c i z e the administration of his country. In spite of the contin-ued presence of Europeans and Asians, Kenya i s an African country. M u l t i - r a c i a l i s m i s not present and i t i s only a matter of time before A f r i c a n i z a t i o n elimin-ates most Europeans and Asians from positions of i n -fluence. Europeans and Asians are finding i t necessary to conform to African rule or face expulsion from the country. Both f o r the expatriates and for the Africans 273 themselves the problems of independence have been shown to be just as d i f f i c u l t and just as challenging as those which were faced and overcome i n the pre-independence era. In the struggle f o r independence the unity of Kenya's n a t i o n a l i s t movement was quite remarkable. However, such unanimity of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement dif f e r e d l i t t l e from s i m i l a r movements i n Ghana, Tan-ganyika, and most other newly emerged A f r i c a n nations. But can national unity be maintained i n Kenya? Nation-alism i n A f r i c a was nurtured primarily by one d e s i r e — to r i d the continent of the white man. I t was a simple matter for the African i n Kenya to blame the white man for holding him back and preventing him from achieving economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l advancement. The white man made a convenient scapegoat f o r the natural short-comings of Kenya, and was a useful f o c a l point with which to channel a l l the African's grievances. In 1963, however, the white man no longer controlled the admin-i s t r a t i v e reins of the government. No longer did he practise l e g a l segregation. No longer did the white man control the riche s t land i n a l l A f r i c a f o r his ex-clusive use. No longer d i d the white man enjoy exclu-sive benefits of superior s o c i a l services. On December 12, 1963, the African became master of his destiny. He recognized that the economic c a p a b i l i t i e s and technical 274 superiority of the white man was essential for some years to come i f Kenya was to survive. Yet, there would seem to be l i t t l e doubt that Kenya's leaders are determined that p o l i t i c a l independence w i l l be maintained regardless of the economic and s o c i a l consequences. For t h i s reason, i t would appear that the European i s l i v i n g i n Kenya on borrowed time. He must conform to the w i l l of his African leaders or be forced out of the country regardless of his economic or technological contributions to the country. For Kenya, therefore, the future rests on the strength of a thi n thread of s t a b i l i t y . S t a b i l i t y can only be maintained through national unity. Yet, i n Kenya four races and many dozens of t r i b e s , speaking almost as many languages, joined together i n a common cause to remove t h e i r white overlords. This has been accomplished i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . What can hold these people together i n a common unit i n the future? A common culture and common language do not e x i s t . There i s no common history to unite them. Their national borders are a r b i t r a r y . No common r e l i g i o u s t i e s e x i s t . What then can mould Kenyans i n -to a cohesive group to press forward together on the road to p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l advancement? 275 While many areas of Kenya, p a r t i c u l a r l y the urban centres, are developing ra p i d l y along modern l i n e s , many of the r u r a l areas s t i l l remain trapped i n the t r a d i t i o n a l environment. For the f u l l and ef f e c t i v e development of the country the cooperation of a l l c i t i z e n s i s e s s e n t i a l . Yet, i t i s no easy task to unite these people, f o r the eff e c t i v e unifying element i s no longer present. H o s t i l i t y to neo-colonialism, although being i n -voked more and more as an e f f e c t i v e unifying force, s t i l l i s not strong enough to create national unity i n Kenya. For t h i s reason the country has reached another t r a n s i t i o n period, one i n which the'-old h o s t i l i t y for colonialism i s gradually being replaced by the new antipathy for the neo- c o l o n i a l i s t s . To the present time, however, t h i s .new cry does not have the at t r a c t i v e ring of the old anti-white sentiment which was so effective i n building a n a t i o n a l i s t movement. One alternative f o r creating national unity i s the common hope that Kenya w i l l grow and mature with i t s African neighbours :into a strong and prosper-ous continent. A sense of pride i n the accomplishments of working together i n cooperative self-help schemes for self-improvement i s an important f i r s t step i n the d i r e c t i o n of national unity. Community development committees have already been established i n Kenya, 276 which cut across t r i b a l b a r r i e r s . This scheme, i t i s hoped, w i l l help to bring the people to support the Government's e f f o r t s to develop the country. A coop-erative e f f o r t f o r the betterment of t h e i r own country, therefore, i s one course which might be f o l -lowed i n Kenya i n order to create a new nationalism. Closely a l l i e d to t h i s objective i s that of creating a united A f r i c a . This i s an i d e a l to which many A f r i -can leaders subscribe, yet i t appears to be f a r i n the future. The plans for an East African Federation, promised immediately following Kenya's independence, have not yet come to f r u i t i o n nor do the prospects appear to be wholly o p t i m i s t i c . The d i f f i c u l t i e s of uniting an area as large as the African continent, with so many divergent races, languages, and t r i b e s , are very considerable. The goal of a united A f r i c a , perhaps based on a common desire to oppose the neo-c o l o n i a l i s t s , could make an ef f e c t i v e f o c a l point with which African leaders could bring together t h e i r people. This objective, however, has many obstacles to overcome, for i t must r i s e above the vigorous drive for personal power so prevalent among A f r i c a ' s new leaders. This scheme, therefore, i n the long run would tend to disrupt what sense of unity already exists. on the continent. 277 One alternative remains and that i s to force national unity through one-party authoritar-ianism. One-party rule i n many African states ap-peared to be a natural outcome of independence. Cer-t a i n l y , i n the immediate post-independence months i n most African countries there was no r e a l basis f o r opposition parties to emerge. As J u l i u s Nyerere has suggested, there no longer was the d i s t i n c t i o n be-tween the "ruler'* and the "ruled". One-party r u l e , however, has vested considerable power i n the hands of one person—Kwame Nkrumah i n Ghana, Sekou Toure i n Guinea, J u l i u s Nyerere i n Tanzania—which has l e d i n some cases to rather ruthless dictatorships. Any oppo-s i t i o n which might emerge t c challenge t h e i r i n d i v i d -ual leadership can e a s i l y be suppressed through decis-ive authoritarian measures. Many p o l i t i c a l opponents of Kwame Nkrumah have found themselves imprisoned f o r f a i l i n g to support his leadership. J u l i u s Nyerere has expelled Europeans f o r f a i l i n g to acknowledge a v i s i t i n g A f r i c an dignitary. Deportations as a rule are not fre-quent but the process of A f r i c a n i z a t i o n often has the same r e s u l t . C l e a r l y , therefore, one-party rule with the timely implementation of authoritarian t a c t i c s , has proved to be an e f f e c t i v e method of maintaining national unity. 278 In Kenya, too, one-party rule has emerged less than a year a f t e r independence. W i l l authoritar-ianism be the inevitable outcome of t h i s form of rule? The p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of Kenya during i t s f i r s t s i x -teen months of independence has been maintained. The tremendous following which Jomo Kenyatta s t i l l enjoys, both i n Kenya and elsewhere i n A f r i c a , has contributed i n a large way to t h i s unity. Yet signs of c r i s i s appeared soon af t e r independence. The desire of Kenya's Somali tribesmen i n the north-eastern region of the country, to unite with the Somali Republic, has caused considerable bloodshed already. This f e s t e r i n g war i s a constant threat to the country's p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y despite the determination of President Kenyatta to employ force against the 250,000 Kenya Somalis should they attempt to secede from Kenya. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, owing both to his age and his continuing popularity, i t would seem that Kenya, f o r the present time, w i l l es-cape the need to resort to authoritarian r u l e . However, the future p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of the country does not appear to be quite so bright. The scramble f o r power, once Kenyatta has departed from the p o l i t i c a l stage, i s bound to rekindle animosities, not just between the large t r i b e s and the small, but between the Luo and the Kikuyu. The recognition of the role of the Kikuyu as the fathers of Kenya's n a t i o n a l i s t movement can-279 not be e a s i l y overlooked i n any power struggle. With t h i s prospect i n mind, i t would seem that whoever succeeds Jomo Kenyatta, w i l l be forced to engage i n authoritarian rule to r e t a i n his control over the people and maintain national unity. Econ-omic and s o c i a l development are v i t a l l y dependent on p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , and Kenya cannot afford the luxury of engaging i n b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l power struggles. l e t , national unity i n A f r i c a appears to be predicated on strong personal leadership. One can only hope that authoritarianism w i l l not enter i nto Kenya on the coat t a i l s of the successor to Jomo Kenyatta. 280 APPENDIX I * EMERGENCY STATISTICS UP TO THE END OF 1956 T e r r o r i s t Cas-u a l t i e s k i l l e d Captured Captured Sur-wounded i n actiai Arrested rendered 1 1 , 5 0 3 1 , 0 3 5 1 , 5 5 0 2 6 , 6 2 5 2 , 7 1 4 Seeurity Forces Casualties European Asian African K i l l e d r. 63 • < 3 101 Wounded 101 12 1 , 4 6 9 Loyal C i v i l i a n s European 3 2 Asian 26 African 1 , 8 1 9 26 36 916 COST OF THE EMERGENCY UP TO JUNE 30. 1959: Grants from Her Majesty's Government L 2 4 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 Interest free loans from Her Majesty's Government L 5 , 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 Borne by the Kenya Government L 2 6 , 0 8 5 , 4 2 4 Total Cost L 5 5 , 5 8 5 , 4 2 4 * C o r f i e l d Report Cmd.1030, I960, Appendix H p.316 281 APPENDIX I I * AFRICAN ELECTION RESULTS. MARCH 1957 Nyanza North Nyanza Central Nyanza South R i f t Valley Central Akamba Coast M. Muliro (Luo) 6 , 7 2 8 W.W.W. Awori ( S i t t i n g Member) 6 , 0 7 1 C. N.W. Siganga 4 , 4 3 9 J.D. Otiende 1 ,753 W.B. Akatsa 1 , 6 4 6 J.G.W. Kadima 1 , 3 4 6 A. O. Odinga (Luo) 9 , 3 1 6 B. A. Ohanga(Sitting Mbr) 3 , 3 6 0 H.D. Odaba 872 G.N. Onyolo 642 E. P. Oranga 402 L.G. Oguda (Luo) 1 3 , 8 8 2 J.K. Kebaso 8 , 2 0 0 T.arap Towett 6 , 3 0 8 J . J . Bonga 3 , 2 3 5 G. Orinda Okun 1 , 2 9 9 F. K.arap Chumah ( S i t t i n g Member) 721 D. T. arap Moi (Tugan-S i t t i n g Member) 4 , 7 7 3 J.K. T i p i s 1 , 3 4 0 J.M. ole Tameno 527 B. Mate (Meru) 2 4 , 7 5 8 E. Mathu ( S i t t i n g Mbr) 1 4 , 7 7 4 J.Nyagah 5 , 6 8 4 D.Waruhiu 2 , 0 2 6 S. Kioni 1 , 3 6 5 J.N. Muimi (Akamba-S i t t i n g Member) 8 , 8 5 1 D.N. Mumu 7 , 0 2 7 M.J. Makilya 3 , 1 1 9 R.G. Ngala (Giriama) 3 , 4 0 6 D. Mwanyumba 2,-539 F. J. Khamisi 2 , 2 6 7 CM. Mwashumbe 712 J. Jeremiah ( S i t t i n g Mbr) 488 282 APPENDIX I I * Nairobi T.J. Mboya (Luo) 2,138 C.M.G. Argwings-Kadhek 1,743 M.Gikonyo ( S i t t i n g Member) 238 J.M. Kasyoka 133 * W.J.M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson, Five Elections  i n A f r i c a . Oxford, Clarendon Press, I960, pp.459-461 283 APPENDIX I I I A COMPENDIUM OF CONFLICTING COMMENTS ON KENYA Let us rather refuse to discuss t h i s great question of paramountcy, except i n the sense of our own inherent right to r u l e i n the future. — L o r d Delamere, 1930 Quite a number of African t r i b e s , and more espec i a l l y the Kikuyu and the Kavirondo, are becoming p o l i t i c a l l y minded, and although a good many years must elapse before they can make any claim to be as well educated as the white man, they are certain to claim p o l i t i c a l equality before very long. —L.S.B. Leakey, 1936 We intend...to remain the dominant race and the r u l i n g factor i n East A f r i c a . — C o l . Durham (farmer) 1930 Every big plan that i s conceived i n Europe for the 'development' of A f r i c a only adds to i t s g r a v i t y . I have said once, and I stress i t : i t requires no e f f o r t to prove that these plans are f i r s t and foremost f o r the European's benefit and tend to help the A f r i c a n , i f at a l l , only i n t h e i r s t r i d e . As I have said before, t h i s knowledge i s seeping through A f r i c a . I t comes on the top of older fears and d i s i l l u s i o n s . — Negley Farson, 1950 I f the Europeans i n Kenya cannot reside and prosper there with the good w i l l of the Africans, they are i m p e r i l l i n g 'now' the future good w i l l of Black A f r i c a towards Great B r i t a i n . — W. McGregor Ross,1927 We have established the f a c t that we have ri g h t s i n the area known as the Highlands, and we have not...the s l i g h t e s t intention of giving up those r i g h t s or having them interfered with, and I think i t i s a r e a l waste of time f o r minorities i n . t h i s Council to keep on questioning them. — S i r Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, 1944. 284 In another ten years we s h a l l have a black race managing i t s own l o c a l a f f a i r s almost completely and accustomed to honesty and j u s t i c e and therefore not prepared to stand e i t h e r dishonesty or oppression. — S i r P h i l i p M i t c h e l l , 1954 I submit...that i t should be obvious to every-one who i s thinking of the re a l future and progress and development of East A f r i c a that what the African requires i s not r e s t r i c t e d but continuing, increasing European settlement. — F r e d e r i c k Harris (MP) 1952 In A f r i c a , irresponsible people, black and white, have d r i f t e d about the country poisoning the minds of the primitive African who cannot think for him-s e l f ... .Instead of recognizing the inherent differences between black and white, we preach equality t o them, and put strong temptations i n t h e i r way. — l o n e Leigh, 1954. ...one thing I am sure of i s that the assump-t i o n that p r i m i t i v e s are i n f e r i o r as human beings, to dwellers i n more highly developed s o c i e t i e s , i s based not on science but on ignorance. — C o l i n W i l l s , 1953. ...we, the representatives of the older c i v i l -i z a t i o n , i n curing t h i s problem may have to accept re-s t r i c t i o n s on our l i b e r t y and r e s t r i c t i o n s on our stan-dards i n order that we can promote here a healthy com-munity. — S i r Michael Blundell,1952 ...the chief thing to say about Mr. Blundell . . . i s that...he w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y be Kenya 1s f i r s t Prime Minister..I am as sure about t h i s as about any prophecy I have ever made i n my l i f e — w h e n the colony a r r i v e s at independent government. —John Gunther, 1955 ...I am i n c l i n e d to predict that he [Kenyatta] w i l l be b u i l t into a legendary f i g u r e , whose destiny i t i s to overthrow the European intruders and t o lead h i s people to freedom,independence, and national greatness. — K i n g s l e y Martin, 1952 285 APPENDIX III Both inside and outside detention camps, one constantly hears a naive insistence that a l l w i l l be well 'when Kenyatta comes back'. — S i r Edward Grigg,1955 Time w i l l also do the new Kenya j u s t i c e i n the eyes of the world. — S i r Michael Blu n d e l l , 1963. 286 BIBLIOGRAPHY I . 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O f f i c i a l Report of Debates v o l . 482--1951 v o l . 602--1959 vol.503 --1952 v o l . 604--1959 v o l . 505--1952 v o l . 613--1959 v o l . 507--1953 v o l . 622--I960 v o l . 518--1953 v o l . 632--I960 v o l . 521- -1953 v o l . 637--1961 v o l . 530--1954 v o l . 641- -1961 v o l . 537 --1955 v o l . 645--1961 v o l . 558--1956 v o l . 649--1962 v o l . 564--1957 v o l . 651- -1962 v o l . 563--1957 v o l . 657--1962 v o l . 571- -1957 v o l . 673--1963 v o l . 573--1957 v o l . 680--1963 vol.577 --1958 v o l . 684--1964 v o l . 594--1958 v o l . 685--1964 Great B r i t a i n Colonial O f f i c e , London, H.M.Station-ery O f f i c e , 1922, 1. East Africa-Papers Relating to Native Disturbances i n Kenya. 1922. Cmd. 1691. 2. Indians i n Kenya-Memorandum, 1923, Cmd. 1922. 3. Report of the East A f r i c a Commission. 1925,Cmd.2387. 4. Kenya-Compulsory Labour f o r Government Purposes. 1925, Cmd. 2464. 5. Kenya-Tours i n the Native Reserves and Native Development i n Kenya. 1926, Cmd. 2573. 6. Future P o l i c y i n Regard to Eastern Africa,1927. Cmd. 2904. 7. Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies i n Eastern and Central A f r i c a . 1929, Cmd. 3234. 8. Report of S i r Samuel Wilson on His V i s i t to East A f r i c a , 1929, Cmd. 3378. ~*~ 9. Memorandum on Native Policy i n East A f r i c a . 1930, Cmd. 3573. 10. Statement of His Majesty's Government i n the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union i n  East A f r i c a , 1930, Cmd. 3574. 288 11• Report by the Financial Commissioner (Lord Moyne) on Certain Questions i n Kenya, 1932, Cmd. 4093. 12. Correspondence (1931-1932) A r i s i n g from the Report of the Joint Select Committee  on Closer Union i n East A f r i c a , 1932, Cmd. 4141. 13. Report of the Kenya Land Commission, 1934, Cmd. 4546. ~ 14. The B r i t i s h T e r r i t o r i e s i n East and Central A f r i c a 1945-1950. 1950. Cmd.7987. 15. Report to the Secretary of State f o r the Colonies by the Parliamentary Delegation  To Kenya January. 1954, 1954, Cmd.9081. 16. Kenya-Proposals f o r a Reconstruction of the Government. 1954, Cmd. 9103. 17. East A f r i c a Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, 1955, Cmd. 9475. 18. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1954-1955. 1955, Cmd. 9489. 19. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1955-1956. 1956, Cmd. 9769. 20. Despatches from the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and from the"Admin-i s t r a t o r , East A f r i c a High Commission"! commenting on the East A f r i c a Royal  Commission 1953-1955 Report, 1956,Cmd.9801. 21. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1956-57. 1957,Cmnd.195. 22. Kenya-Proposals f o r New Constitutional Arrange-ments, 1957, Cmnd. 309. 23• Kenya-Despatch on the New Constitutional  Arrangements, 1958, Cmnd. 369. ~~" " 24. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1957-58, 1958,Cmnd.451. 25. Documents r e l a t i n g to the death of eleven ~ Mau Mau detainees at Hola Camp i n Kenya, 1959, cmnd. 778. : — 289 26. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1958-59, 1959, Cmnd. 780. 27. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Con-ference I960-. 1960. Cmnd. 960. 28. H i s t o r i c a l Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau. 1960, Cmnd. 1030. 29. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1959-1960, 1960, Cmnd. 1065. 30. The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1960-1961, 1961, Cmnd. 1407. 31. Report of the Kenya Constitutional Con-ference, 1962, 1962. Cmnd. 1700. 3 2 . The Colonial T e r r i t o r i e s 1961-1962, 1962, Cmnd. 1751. 3 3 . Kenya Constitution-Summary of the Prop-osed Constitution f o r Internal S e l f -Government, 1963, Cmnd. 1970. 3 4 . Kenya-Preparations f o r Independence.1963. Cmnd. 2082. 35. Kenya Independence Conference,1963, 1963, Cmnd. 2156. 3 6 . iloint Committee on Closer Union i n East A f r i c a . 1931, 2. vo l s . 3 7 . Report on the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya f o r the Year 1962, 1963 United Nations, African and Ad.iacent T e r r i t o r i e s - Kenya , Information from non-self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s , Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, A p r i l 30,1962 Aaronovitch, S. and K., C r i s i s i n Kenya. Lon-don, Lawrence and Wishart, 1 9 4 7 . A well documented s t a t i s t i c a l survey of the plight of the Afr i c a n . The authors, supporters of socialism, urge immediate African independence. I I . General Works 1. Books 290 Adam, Thomas R., Government and P o l i t i c s i n , A f r i c a South of the Sahara, New York, Random House, 1962. A b r i e f survey of recent developments i n the co n s t i t u t i o n a l development of Kenya. Includes a helpful discussion of the major economic and s o c i a l problems facing the East African country. Altrincham, Lord, Kenya's Opportunity. London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955. Written by a former Governor of Kenya from 1925-1931, t h i s book sympathizes with the s e t t l e r community i n East A f r i c a . Against the introduction of a . common r o l l f o r voting i n the Colony. Bennett, George, Kenya, A P o l i t i c a l History. London, Ibadan, Nairobi, and Accra, Oxford University Press, 1963. A clear objective account of Kenya's con-, s t i t u t i o n a l development, p a r t i c u l a r l y during 1960-1963. Helpful discussion of KANU-KADU controversy i n 1962 and 1963. Bennett, George, and Carl G. Roseberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-19ol. London, New Yorkm Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1961. The authors have provided t h e i r readers with a detailed analysis of the I960 elec-t i o n s , devoting p a r t i c u l a r attention to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development p r i o r to the ele c t i o n . The book c a r e f u l l y points out the important r o l e Kenyatta played i n Kenya p o l i t i c s i n 1960-1961 even though he was s t i l l i n ' e x i l e ' . B l u n d e l l , S i r Michael, So Rough A Wind. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964. A very good discussion of p o l i t i c a l trans-i t i o n i n Kenya from 1954-1962. The author was a prominent participant i n con s t i t u t i o n -a l conferences during t h i s period. Blundell only discusses b r i e f l y his work as Minister of Agriculture i n Kenya. 291 Carter, Gwendolen M., Independence f o r A f r i c a , London, Thames and Hudson, 1961. A short chapter points out the problems i n Kenya w i l l have to face beyond independence. The author points out the wish of African leaders to keep the Cold War out of t h e i r continent. Carter, Gwendolen M. and Brown, William 0., eds., Transition i n A f r i c a : Studies i n P o l i t i c a l  Adaptation, Boston, Boston University Press, 1958": Includes a chapter by Carl Rosberg which gives a f i n e analysis of the p o l i t i c a l con-f l i c t and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change taking place i n Kenya i n the n i n e t e e n - f i f t i e s . The editors have included an extensive bibliography. C h u r c h i l l , Winston Spencer, My African Journey, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1908. Some in t e r e s t i n g comments on the early con-t r i b u t i o n s of the Asian to the development of East A f r i c a . Cohen, S i r Andrew, B r i t i s h Policy i n Changing A f r i c a . , London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959. A personal r e f l e c t i o n on the p o l i t i c a l ev-olution of East A f r i c a . S i r Andrew Chhen, former Governor of Uganda, stresses the various economics, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l problems facing the emerging nations of East A f r i c a . Davidson, B a s i l , Which Way Africa?Baltimore, Penguin Books Inc., 1964. A f i n e analysis of what the future w i l l toe i n the newly independent African countries. Useful comments on pan-Africanism, the one-party state, and neo-colonialism. Good bibliography of recent publications on A f r i c a . Delf, George, Asians i n East A f r i c a , London, New York, and Nairobi, Oxford University Pres^ 1963. A short objective study of the role of the 292 Asian i n East A f r i c a . Concludes that the Asians must reinforce the best intentions of the African leaders. Delf, George, Jomo Kenyatta:Towards Truth about  "the Light of Kenya", New York, Doubleday and"Co., 1961. An i n t e r e s t i n g and colourful biography of Jomo Kenyatta written just before his re-lease, from custody. The author i s p a r t i c -u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n pointing out the r e l -igious force of Kenyatta and the magnetism of h i s personality. D i l l e y , Marjorie Ruth, B r i t i s h Policy i n Kenya  Colony, New York, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937. .  The author discusses the role of the B r i t -i s h i n Kenya and gives a useful concluding chapter o u t l i n i n g the 'dual policy' opera-t i v e i n Kenya i n the nine t e e n - t h i r t i e s . Farson, Negley, Last Chance i n A f r i c a , New York, Harcourt, Brace and Col, 1950. P a r t i c u l a r l y useful comments on African education and land. The author presents comments on the p o l i t i c a l background to Mau Mau. Sympathetic to the A f r i c a n . Forrester, Marion Wallace, Kenya To-day; S o c i a l  Prerequisites f o r Economic Development, 'S-Gravenhage, Mouton and Co., 1962. The author, an American negro, examines closely the problems a r i s i n g out of the separate development of the African and European economies. Suggests that money motivates the African to labour\and recom-mends that loans be made more available to Africans. Gicaru, Muga, Land of Sunshine, London, Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1958 The African point of view stressing the African's need for education and land. Presents useful background to Mau Mau, and blames'European Mau Mau' f o r troubles of 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 4 . 293 Goldsmith, F.H., ed. John Ainsworth, Pioneer  Kenya Administrator 1864-1946, London, Macmilland Co., 1959. Discusses the contribution of a former Chief Native Commissioner i n Kenya, to the early development of the country. Emphasizes Ainsworth's e f f o r t s to encourage African labour i n the reserves and the opposition he met from the European s e t t l e r s . Gregory, Robert G., Sidney Webb and East A f r i c a , Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1962. An excellent discussion of the significance of the White Papers of 1923-1931 with par-t i c u l a r emphasis on those introduced by Sidney Webb. Fine documentation. Gunther, John, Inside A f r i c a , New York, Harper and Bros., 1955* A useful discussion of the emerging countries of A f r i c a . One of the f i r s t attempts at examining each African country as i t struggles to achieve i t s independence. A useful guide to the various n a t i o n a l i s t movements based on the personal tr a v e l s of the author. Hailey, Lprd, An African Survey, London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1938 (republished 1957) The standard work on the early B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n A f r i c a . Provides helpful background on the early p o l i t i c a l development of the B r i t i s h East A f r i c a Protectorate. Henderson, i a n , The Hunt f o r Kimathi, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1958. A colourful account of the use of pseudo-gang operations to capture a hard-core Mau Mau leader. The author was recently expelled from Kenya. Herbertson, A.J. and Howarth, O.J.R., eds. The Oxford Survey of the B r i t i s h E mpire—Africa, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1914, vol.3. Some useful comments of earl y development i n East A f r i c a , including a b r i e f discussion on Kenya t r i b e s . 294 Hollingsworth, L.W.,. The Asians of East A f r i c a , London, Macmilland and Co., Ltd., I960. A short objective study of the Indian i n East A f r i c a , emphasizing his early c o n t r i -bution to the area's economic development. Suggests the Asian became is o l a t e d from other races, owing to his own petty r e l i g i o u s r i v a l r i e s . Hughes, John, The New Face of A f r i c a South of the Sahara, New York, London, and Toronto, Long-mans, Green and Co., 1961. The author, the A f r i c a correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, gives a colourful chapter on big game i n East A f r i c a . Also a useful summary of Africa's place i n the Cold War. Huxley, Elspeth, The Flame Trees of Thika, London, Chatto and Windus, 1959* An i n t e r e s t i n g book on the author's early l i f e and experiences i n Kenya. Useful comments on African culture. As a member of the European s e t t l e r community. Mrs. Huxley has a pro-European point of view. Huxley, Elspeth, White Man's Country, London, Macmillan and Co., 1935, 2 vols . Elspeth Huxley has given her readers a colourful account of the growth of Kenya Colony. Based on fi n e documentation, her book follows the l i f e and experiences of Lord Delamere and i s , indeed, sympathetic to the white s e t t l e r s . Huxley, Elspeth, and Margery Perham, Race and  P o l i t i c s i n Kenya, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1956. A fascinating approach to the history of Kenya based on the private correspondence of the two authors during a lengthy written debate on the problems and prospects of Kenya. An additional section at the end of the book gives the authors' views of the Mau Mau up-r i s i n g . 2 9 5 Ingham, Kenneth. A History of East A f r i c a T London, Longmans, 19o2. One of the more recent works on East A f r i c a , Ingham's account gives a b r i e f summary of events during the Mau Mau emergency i n Kenya. Unfortunately, the author does not attempt to discuss i n any d e t a i l the important constitu-t i o n a l developments of 1960-1961. Ingham, Kenneth, The Making of Modern Uganda. London, George Al l e n & Unwin Ltd., 1958. An objective account of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l devel-opments i n Uganda up to 1958. Includes a d i s -cussion of the d i f f i c u l t i e s createc by the Kingdom of Buganda. Italiaander, R o l f , The New Leaders of A f r i c a . Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. The author, who l i v e d and worked i n A f r i c a f o r over t h i r t y years, devotes a chapter to Tom Mboya. He points out the good and bad features of Mboya's personality and discusses his n a t i o n a l i s t attitude. K a r i u k i , Josiah Mwangi, 'Mau Mau' Detainee. Londfen, Oxford University Press, 1963. An African's view of detention camps pointing up the b r u t a l i t y which the author himself experienced. Introduction by Marjory Perham. The author says he holds no bitterness to the Europeans; he praises Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya» London, Mercury Books, 1934 (republished 1961) Excellent background on the Kikuyu customs and culture. The author c l e a r l y i s attracted to many of the ancient customs of his t r i b e . Useful comments on Kikuyu's a t t i t u d e to land. Kournossoff, G.M., The Underlying Causes of the 1953 Emergency i n Kenya. Vancouver, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1959. A h e l p f u l discussion of the s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l background of Mau Mau. Does not point up the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which con-stantly faced the Colony before World War Two. 296 Leakey, L.S.B., Defeating Mau Mau. London, Methuen and. Co. Ltd., 1954. A good account of Mau Mau which offers useful recommendations. C r i t i c a l of Mau Mau but sym-pathetic with many of the African