KENYA FROM MAU MAU TO INDEPENDENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

The outbreak of Mau Mau hostilities in Kenya was the culmination of a series of grievances which had developed among the more politically conscious Africans. The lack of political opportunities and the inability to promote economic and social integration fomented frustration and antagonism among these Africans. Yet, the violence and the imposition of the Emergency restrictions failed to disrupt the country's political, economic, and social development of the post-World War Two period.

The struggle between the Colonial Office, the European settler, and the African nationalist in the nineteen-fifties, won political concessions for the Africans, divided the European political movement, and created a dilemma for the Colonial Office, particularly following the independence of Ghana. Throughout the Emergency it was apparent that the Colonial Office had seriously underestimated the rapid growth and strength of the nationalist movement in East Africa. By 1959, constitutional advancement in Tanganyika foretold a change in British policy in Kenya. As a consequence, African nationalism triumphed and the European hope for a 'white man's country' was dashed forever.

While the political evolution of the African continued, Kenya enjoyed its greatest economic development during the nineteen-fifties. Social institutions also experienced a similar period of expansion. By the nineteen-
sixties, owing to adverse weather conditions, poor world markets, and a loss of investment capital arising out of the growth of African nationalism, the country's economy collapsed. At the same time, the political disruption of the early nineteen-sixties brought a sharp rise in unemployment, and a shortage of educators and medical practitioners, which hampered the transition of the African from his traditional society to the modern world.

With independence came some economic recovery, but continued recovery will be dependent on the maintenance of political stability and national unity. For Kenya's leaders the need to create a new unifying force to replace the old nationalism, built on a common anti-white hostility, is their most urgent task.
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CHAPTER ONE

THE ROAD TO MAU MAU

The emergence of Kenya on December 12, 1963, as an independent nation under African rule ended a decade marked by violence, rapid political developments, economic instability, and social unrest. Indeed, it was a period which saw the dream of many European settlers for a self-governing 'white man's country'—a vision which had been crystallized over a half century only to be blurred by the Mau Mau uprisings and the growth of black nationalism—turn instead to the hope for a multi-racial partnership, and ultimately to a reluctant acceptance of the reality of an independent Kenya governed by the African. Commenting to a Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa in 1931, the former Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, later Lord Altrincham, declared: "So far as the African is concerned, of course he has no views whatever on the subject of closer union." Yet thirty-two years later the African is master of his own destiny.

Kenya extends over an area of 224,960 square miles in what was formerly known as British East Africa. The second highest peak in Africa, Mount Kenya (17,040 ft.), gave the country its name. Snowcapped the year round, this towering mountain is the mythological home of the God Ngai, and
serves as a spiritual inspiration to many of the Kikuyu tribesmen living beneath its slopes. The western part of the country is dominated by that geographical freak, the Great Rift Valley, and for this reason alone one might accurately describe this east African country as a land of contrasts. More than half the total area, mainly in the north and northeast, is arid and waterless and generally unsuitable for agriculture. The southern part of the country, inland from the coastal plain, rises gradually to perhaps the best agricultural lands in all Africa--the fertile highlands. It is this area which distinguishes Kenya from other East African countries and which has played such a vital role in the political, economic, and social development of the territory.

The White Highlands, as this plateau area came to be known, was ideal for European settlement, for not only did it offer excellent agricultural lands, but also it was very conducive to a healthy and vigorous life for Europeans. Sir Harry Johnston, in an early report to the British Government shortly after his appointment as H.M. Commissioner in the Uganda Protectorate (which at that time extended to within 100 miles of Nairobi), said in 1900:

In the eastern part of the Uganda Protectorate there is a tract of country almost without parallel in tropical Africa: a region of perhaps 12,000 square miles, admirably well watered, with a fertile soil, cool and perfectly healthy climate, covered with noble forests, and, to a very great extent, uninhabited by any native race. This area lies at an altitude not less than 6,000 feet, and not more than 10,000 feet. It is as healthy for Europeans
as the United Kingdom, British Columbia, or temperate South Africa.... I am able to say decidedly that here we have a territory (now that the Uganda Railway is built) admirably suited for a white man's country.3

In 1895 the British Government accepted the transfer of Kenya from the Imperial British East Africa Company and the territory became known as the British East Africa Protectorate. In this same year, the construction of the Kenya and Uganda Railway began, bringing with it an influx of Indian labourers. By 1900 this recruitment had reached the peak figure of 19,742, thereby laying a firm foundation for an Indian community in the Protectorate. With Sir Harry Johnston's optimistic report together with other attractions the territory offered, the British Government decided to encourage European settlement and designated the highlands as a specific reserve for white settlers. Foreign elements, therefore, were introduced into the tribal life of the African, as the British East Africa Protectorate entered the twentieth century. Coincidental with the arrival of the European was the emergence of suspicions and misunderstandings, which were to haunt and hamper the development of the country during the next sixty years.

On April 1, 1905, the administration of the Protectorate came under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, and on August 16, 1907, the first Legislative Council meeting was convened. Comprised of six official and two unofficial members, all of whom were European, the legislature at this time granted no representation to the Indian community or to
the native population. From the beginning, the development of land by the immigrant settlers was held to be the key to all future progress for the country. It alone could bring in the revenue required to open up the area and supply funds for the new means of communication in this region. In 1908 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, issued his famous pledge which gave official recognition to the supreme position of the Europeans in the White Highlands. A further Land Ordinance of 1915 approved the leasing of land to Europeans for a period of 999 years, and to encourage increased European settlement a Soldier Settlement Scheme was promoted whereby soldiers returning from the war were to be granted land in defined areas in holdings varying from 160 to 5,000 acres. Thus, by 1920 when the status of the territory was advanced to that of Crown Colony, the future was envisaged as dependent upon attracting white settlers and white capital. The political results were equally obvious.

Lord Delamere, the temperamental leader of the settlers, was determined that Kenya should become a truly British colony and the Highlands a white man's country. To his credit Delamere devoted his entire wealth to the search for profitable crops and healthy cattle which could be raised in the territory, and through his experimentation many of the diseases and pests which ruined the native's cattle and crops were eradicated. His research was instrumental in establishing an agrarian economy in Kenya. In
supporting the Government's land and labour policies, however, Delamere clearly looked upon the native as a child who was incapable of achieving any measure of responsibility for many years.

Such ideas were, however, quite unacceptable to the Kikuyu, the tribe which had lost the most land to the settler. For them the land had far greater significance. Explaining the Kikuyu position Jomo Kenyatta has written that:

The harmony and stability of the African's mode of life, in political, social, religious and economic organizations, was based on the land which was, and still is, the soul of the people....The annexation of the ancestral lands by the Europeans has robbed the Africans of the use of the productive asset on which his entire economic life depended. It has also interfered with the whole tribal organization whose genuine co-operation is based on constant communion with the ancestral spirits through which tribal law and custom, morality, and religion are maintained.8

The importance of the land to the Kikuyu both in custom and in value became the greatest source of discontent against the settler. When the first settlers arrived in the White Highlands they believed, with justification, that much of the country's land was virtually unoccupied, and they moved into these apparently uninhabited Highlands to establish a white settlement on the choicest land in all East Africa. Owing to accidents of nature, tribal warfare, and customary land tenure, much of this land had become unoccupied at the time of the settler's arrival in Kenya. The actual area taken over by the Europeans was not, in fact, great but to the Kikuyu it became a source of much
bitterness, Fears that the settlers might, at some time in the future, take more native land aroused the Kikuyu.

These political apprehensions were only reinforced by the actual state of land holdings amongst the Kikuyu tribe. Most tribal areas had a population density of about 250 per square mile, while the North Kavirondo region had the fantastic population density figure of 1,100 per square mile. In contrast to this condition was that in the European areas where in some cases very small areas of huge land holdings were under cultivation. The settlers, claiming legal ownership to their land, were unwilling to give it up to the native, who they claimed had adequate land which was poorly cultivated. The Africans believed that this land was rightfully theirs and the Kikuyu, in particular, continually used the land issue as a rallying cry in their hostile statements against the Europeans.

The land question received an exhaustive study by Sir Morris Carter in 1934, which reaffirmed the White Highlands as a European reserve, and failed to examine the future needs of the native, or to make definite recommendations to ease the land hunger among the Kikuyu. Thus, the deep sense of grievance among the Kikuyu over the land which the report had hoped to remove, remained.

As the land situation among the Kikuyu became more acute, their hostility toward the settler community increased. Mr. L.S.B. Leakey commented on this matter when
he said: "I think that it is fair to say that as a whole the settler community is disliked and certainly distrusted by the African." One Kikuyu later remarked, that as far as his people were concerned the Carter Report "will forever remain nothing more than a settlers' rubber stamp."

The land question, therefore, was a source of concern to most Kikuyu and it was for this reason that the Mau Mau movement seized upon the land grievance as its most important rallying point for support. Thus, when the settler first arrived in Kenya the African lost certain areas of land "mainly through ignorance rather than malice." Yet, out of this initial mistake developed the greatest source of racial bitterness in Kenya and a principal cause of the Mau Mau rebellion.

While hostility developed between the African and the settler over the land issue, the labour problem in the country also created much discussion. With the increased railway construction and the debilitating effects of famine and influenza, there developed a large demand for labour and it soon became government policy to put the native to work. It was to be British policy in Kenya gradually to bring the natives into contact with the Europeans, thereby helping them to advance both their economic and their social position. This policy, however, was not so easy to implement. The agricultural tribes of Kenya were often reluctant to leave their villages and come to work for the white man. The white settlers, for their part, were reluctant to use
this policy as a means for advancing the status and education of the African.

As a means of facilitating their policy, the Government created and appointed chiefs in the hope that the natives would obey them and they in turn would carry out the requests of the District Commissioner. The imposition of a chief, however, was something alien to the Kikuyu and some other tribes, which in later years was to be construed by some Kikuyu as an example of mistreatment of the African by the white man. Although some headmen did become suddenly wealthy and aroused suspicions among the tribesmen, most performed their duties very efficiently.

From the point of view of the Colonial officials it was necessary to encourage the native to work in order to facilitate the development of the country. Agricultural production had to be increased to supply the railway with freight, and branch lines had to be built to reach the farmers. Thus, to make the country support itself, the Government believed it was necessary to get the native out of the reserve and to work for the European. It cannot be denied, however, that a minority of settlers did abuse the use of native labour for their own selfish interests and subsequently aroused some native bitterness.

The dilemma of the need to make the territory self-supporting, however, was a continuing one. Where work was needed by the Government for the general development of
the country, compulsory labour was used. In many instances this disrupted the African's tribal life and discouraged him from engaging in agricultural production in the reserve, in favour of assisting the Government and the settlers in developing the economy of the Colony. Discontent against the coercion of native labour led to the first real awakening of African political consciousness, which appeared in 1921 among a group of natives known as the Young Kikuyu Association. Under the leadership of an educated Kikuyu, Harry Thuku, this group mounted a protest against the European community and was hopeful that many of its grievances would be dealt with, but in vain.

The native labour situation, which was not helped by post-war slumps, was only made worse by the antagonism between the immigrant Indian community. The Indians also resented their second-class status, as was seen in smouldering unrest as early as 1921. Not only were the Asians discontented with their lack of political representation commensurate with their numbers, but also they felt slighted by the terms of the Elgin pledge of 1908 prohibiting them from obtaining land in the highlands. In addition, many missionaries complained that the unhealthy conditions existing in the Asian community were not beneficial to the welfare of the African. They also considered the Indian to be a threat to the progress of the native, for he was taking away many of the jobs Africans were capable of holding, although at this point, there had been little interest shown by the
native in the various skilled and semi-skilled enterprises undertaken by the Indian. The Asiatics, for their part, were claiming representation on the grounds not only of their large numbers, but also on account of the participation of their homeland in war on the side of Britain and the desire for certain benefits in return.

The Indian agitation soon developed into a full debate on the future of the Kenya Colony. Following a visit to London in 1921 of a two man delegation headed by Lord Delamere, the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, outlined in general the future course of Kenya's development:

We do not contemplate any settlement or system which will prevent British East Africa—Kenya as it is now known—from becoming a characteristically and distinctively British colony, looking forward in the full fruition of time to responsible self-government.

However, any attempts at making the country's administration multi-racial were steadfastly refused by the European settlers. Thus, the constant refusal of the Europeans in Kenya to agree to increased representation and responsibility for the Indian community, led to the publication of a White Paper in 1923. This document, while dealing with the Indian question, laid down for the first time the policy of the Imperial Government in regards to the place of the native in Kenya. The significant paragraph in the paper declared:

Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary to definitely record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the int-
ereests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail. Obviously the interests of the other communities, European, Indian or Arab, must severally be safeguarded. But in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races.

In asserting that the native was to receive attention more equal to his rightful place in Kenya, the White Paper shrewdly put the immigrant communities in their place by declaring that the role of safeguarding the interests of the Africans belonged to the Imperial Government, and to it alone. Such views as those expressed in the White Paper were hard to implement. Lord Altrincham, when he became Governor of the Colony in 1925, commented: "I might be Governor of the Colony, but when I arrived in 1925 he[Lord Delamere] was its uncrowned king...." The pressure that the politicians of the settler community were able to exert on various government officials from the Governor on down was such that the question of paramountcy of native interests would often be viewed in the light of what would best suit the European interests. Yet, the settler group could not be faulted entirely, for except for the interest displayed by humanitarians in Britain, East Africa was of little concern to Government officials at Whitehall. Successive Governors soon found their own interests inextricably linked with those of the settlers. For this reason, the welfare of the native suffered and policies outlined in the
1923 Memorandum were only half-heartedly adhered to in Kenya. On the other hand, native administrators who made a career of service in Africa and had the needs of the African at heart, could do little to enact any policy of native paramountcy.

Following the publication of the 1923 White Paper, a series of reports were issued which tended to modify the 1923 statement. A new concept known as the dual policy was introduced which suggested that "...native interests are not intended to prevail to the extent of destroying the interests of immigrant communities already established, and that their 'paramountcy' must be subject to this limiting condition." With the election of a Labour Government in 1929, however, the dominant position of the European in Kenya was again to be challenged.

With the noted member of the Fabian Society, Sidney Webb, in the Colonial Office, the doctrine of native paramountcy as outlined by the Duke of Devonshire in 1923, was reaffirmed. In two White Papers often referred to as "Black" Papers, the Colonial Secretary stressed the fact that "the relation of His Majesty's Government to the native population in East Africa is one of trusteeship which cannot be devolved, and from which they cannot be relieved. The ultimate responsibility for the exercise of this trusteeship must accordingly rest with them alone." In recommending better living conditions and wages for the native, and a native taxation more in accordance with the
African's ability to pay, Sidney Webb explained:

...it is incumbent upon the Government to ensure that Government expenditure on native services in the annual budget should bear a proper relation to the revenue raised from the natives, and particularly that the natives should receive, directly and visibly, a fair return for the direct taxation which they are called upon to pay.\(^{34}\)

In a second paper the Colonial Secretary criticized the political climate in Kenya in 1930. While urging increased authority be given to the native councils, Sidney Webb suggested that self-government "cannot be reached at an early date in a community where it has so far been practicable to enfranchise less than one per cent of the population, and where the idea of any substantial extension of the franchise finds little general support."\(^{35}\) The Colonial Secretary's support for the eventual implementation of a common roll, was greeted with hostility by the European community. In a letter to the *East African Standard*, the Kenya Branch of the British Legion declared:

Government White Papers, June 20, jeopardize whole future of White Colonization in East Africa, setting up a new black dominion in place of British Colony, placing white settlement on a level with Indian immigration and making both subservient to African native politics. Every British ex-service settler\(^{36}\) considers such changes of policy a deliberate betrayal.

In the end this Paper was never submitted to Parliament and the doctrine of native paramountcy failed to have any real effect in Kenya. The high sounding sentiments expressed in both the 1923 and the 1931 declarations were never followed by actual plans or implementation. Where the racial issue was concerned, no legislation could suddenly alter
human feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Clearly, the Colonial Office was preparing to devote more attention to the interests of the native, but this could only be accomplished gradually with the limited funds available to the Kenya administration and through an improvement in the economic climate of the Colony which had deteriorated owing to the effects of the depression.

The immediate significance of this series of White Papers published between 1923 and 1932 has been outlined above. However, in one respect these papers had far-reaching effects, for they too played their part in fomenting antagonism among the Africans, which ultimately came to a head in the guise of Mau Mau. The policy statements indicated an inconsistency in government thinking. Those statements that supported a genuine effort to assist the well-being of the native were openly rejected by the Europeans in Kenya. The general lack of interest displayed by the Secretaries of States together with the pressure exerted on the Governor by the powerful settler group assured the victory of the white point of view. In most instances native opinion was never sought despite the fact that there was a growing number of educated Africans (e.g. Kenyatta, Mockerie, Thuku) who could adequately represent the native viewpoint, if not in Legco, certainly before commissions and official committees. Mr. Mockerie has suggested that the African "has been handicapped in all directions, and the activities
of social organizations have been restricted by the British administration, who do not allow the freedom of speech and of association which the people used to enjoy before its advent.\textsuperscript{39} Because of this feeling the Kikuyu writer believed that his people lost all initiative owing to the disruption of their traditional way of life and they developed a feeling of inferiority. In reality, what was occurring among the outspoken and well educated Africans was a growing sense of political consciousness. Spokesmen for the Kikuyu, the tribe most closely associated with the European and his mode of life, were becoming more conscious of the benefits accrued to many Europeans, and they were, in turn, reflecting on their own people's primitive way of life. Thus, the social, political and economic frustrations which they experienced originated in many cases from a comparison of the two standards of living. The more the African experienced the European environment, the more it appealed to him, and, therefore, the greater the agitation for change.

Education was a particular source of agitation among the Africans and it too played its part in fomenting unrest in the country. Before 1952, the missionary organizations took on the major responsibility for educating the native. At the outset this education was generally literary in character, and "many boys and girls thus grew up into young men and women, having some little book-learning, but
without any real training in how to behave as adults in the life of the community." The character building features of the old tribal education were lacking in this new form of education and a certain disrespect for illiterate elders and for authority was created. Native education before 1925 was of little immediate concern to the Government and the 1925 budget showed only £37,000 of a total expenditure of £2,000,000 being devoted to native education in the form of grants to the missionary societies. The Report of the East Africa Commission of 1925 suggested that: "The time is overdue when the Government should take a hand in the task." The report was perhaps reflecting the findings of the 1922 Phelps-Stokes Commission which urged that a greater emphasis be placed on the technical and practical side of education in order that the native might improve his wages and raise his standard of living. Arising out of this recommendation was the founding of the Jeanes school to train Africans as leaders in the life of their community and not just as leaders in the academic side of education.

Owing to the shortage of revenue in the Colony, particularly following the depression, the educational needs of the African could not be fully met. In spite of these financial limitations, the native clearly displayed his keen interest in education. Between 1926 and 1931, Local Native Councils out of their own revenues voted
\(33,381\) for the provision of school buildings. In 1931 the natives from their total assets of \(62,500\) provided \(17,000\) directly for their own education. This education, however, did not place enough emphasis either on technical education or character-training. The education that the African was receiving was not preparing him for the new responsibilities of the changing society in which he was a part.

The African's continuing desire for education did result in the establishment of African operated Independent Schools in the Kikuyu reserve. At the outset these schools contributed significantly to the educational opportunities of the Kikuyu, and the first native to receive a degree at the East African University in Uganda received his early training at an independent school. These schools, however, became closely linked with the Kikuyu Central Association and became vehicles for the spreading of anti-white propaganda. Out of many native schools emerged partially educated Africans who had received little practical training which would be applicable to their rural society. Rather, in some cases, much of their training was directed towards an industrialized society which did not exist in Kenya. Thus, this type of education combined with the limited opportunities for education created frustration among the Africans making many of them an easy prey for Mau Mau.

In many ways similar to the problems of African
education were those arising out of religion. The African, and the Kikuyu in particular, is recognised as being a deeply religious and superstitious people. The missions offered a new and to some a superior religion than the old tribal one and many Kikuyu became good and faithful Christians. However, others accepted the teachings of the missionaries only because they were part of the education for which they so diligently strove. These Africans, according to L.S.B. Leakey, one of the foremost authorities on the Kikuyu tribe, half-heartedly studied Christianity only so they could receive some education. As more and more turned to Christianity the missions were unable to cope effectively with the large numbers. In addition, the complex nature of Christianity in the twentieth century together with the various different sects active in Kenya brought confusion to the African who found it difficult to reconcile the simple words of the Bible with the interpretations placed on it by the Missions. For this reason, many Kikuyu lost faith in their old tribal religion, yet had not really accepted anything to take its place. To meet this religious need the Kikuyu established their own independent churches and adapted Christianity to meet their need. From the teachings of these churches emerged an anti-white doctrine which gathered adherents who found it fulfilled the need for a faith. Out of these churches, therefore, the Mau Mau religion was created which was adapted to the needs of the Kikuyu and thereby was attractive to them. Mr. F.D. Corfield
in his survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau stressed the importance of religion in the life of the Kikuyu when he suggested that "without the light of some basic religious belief to replace the darkness of witchcraft, there would appear to be no real future for the African state."

Added to the frustration created by the education and religious problems was that of the colour bar. In their association with the Europeans Africans were often treated as outcasts and as inferior beings. Barred from "white" hotels, restaurants and clubs, prevented from buying or drinking hard liquor, restricted from growing coffee or sisal, and discouraged from putting on their own dances, the African became bitter and frustrated. The Asian monopoly on small business enterprises made it difficult for the African to achieve commercial advancement, while the three-fifths rule under which Africans in the civil-service received only three-fifths of the pay of the whites for the same work, aroused both economic and social frustrations. Thus, the natural desire of the African to forge the best possible future for himself with or without the help of alien races brought about the emergence of black nationalism.

The growth of political consciousness among many Africans aroused by their association with the European both in Kenya and elsewhere during the Second World War, increased in intensity in the late forties. The emergence
of India and Pakistan as independent countries within the British Commonwealth in 1947 gave hope to the more enlightened Africans in Kenya and spurred on the development of their own political movements. On their own continent too, the natives in Kenya saw the tremendous advances made in West Africa as well as what they considered to be a deteriorating situation in South Africa, particularly in view of the formation of Dr. Malan's Government in 1948. These developments within the African continent sparked the growth of black nationalism in Kenya. Tragically, the nationalist movement became dominated by a secret society which preached anti-European and anti-Christian doctrines and urged ruthless and bizarre acts to be conducted by its followers. A brief study of the African political movements in Kenya in the decades before the outbreak of Mau Mau atrocities will shed some light on how the nationalist movement took the form it did.

The first rumblings of politically-minded Africans in Kenya appeared in 1921 when Harry Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association appeared. After the deportation of Harry Thuku his organization remained inactive until 1925, when it re-emerged under the name of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). The main battle cry of this political organization was "to get back the land" and this point alone was sufficient to arouse the feelings of many Kikuyu, particularly those who found themselves landless. In 1928, Jomo Kenyatta
became the General Secretary of KCA. In 1929, the KCA harshly criticized the stand against female circumcision adopted by the Church of Scotland Mission and shortly afterwards the African Orthodox Church and the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association came into being as the Kikuyu displayed their contempt for the corresponding European institutions. Kenyatta, following his fruitless efforts to give evidence to the Joint Select Committee on African Union in London in 1931, remained abroad for fifteen years where he continued to represent the African viewpoint in Britain. In 1932, Harry Thuku, following his release from prison two years earlier, became president of the KCA. In 1935 the KCA split and Thuku withdrew to form a more moderate group called the Kikuyu Provincial Association (KPA).

In 1937, Kenyatta, while still abroad, outlined what he considered to be the main grievance which had to be remedied:

Land is the key to the peoples' life; it secures for them that peaceful tillage of the soil which supplies their material needs and enables them to perform their magic and traditional ceremonies in undisturbed serenity, facing Mount Kenya.52

This feeling certainly corresponded with that of the KPA which sought to ameliorate the land grievances and promote the welfare of the Kikuyu through constitutional means. When the war broke out in 1939 the KCA, now apparently infiltrated by a fanatical group, became openly subversive and opposed the Government. As a consequence, on May 30, 1940, the KCA
was declared to be an illegal society. The remainder of the war years saw little political activity in Kenya, although the more extreme elements of the KCA were rumoured to have gone underground. It must be noted that during this period when the KCA split into two factions, its General Secretary Jomo Kenyatta, was out of the country and not directly connected with the activities of the African organization.

In 1944, Eliud Mathu became the first African to take a seat in the Legislative Council in Kenya, and immediately African political activities were revived. He sought a political organization to support him and shortly afterwards he formed the Kenya African Study Union with its avowed purposes to unite the African people towards an African nation, and to foster the social, economic and political interests of the African. In 1946, this group changed its name to the Kenya African Union (KAU) and became a national political party.

In 1946, Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya after fifteen years absence and soon became the foremost figure in KAU. In an interview with Negley Farson, Kenyatta outlined his aims in this manner:

...I am cutting the dead wood out of a lot of our old African beliefs, and I am reinforcing what I think are some of the best things of our African way of life. I am sending them out with something that I hope is going to work. I want them to be proud of being Africans! I don't want to make a lot of Black Englishmen.
At the outset KAU embraced Africans of all tribes and became the first truly national political organization of Kenya Africans. Regional branches were established throughout the Colony which discussed native grievances, and then informed Mr. Mathu, who in turn conveyed them to the Government. On June 1, 1947, KAU issued the following declaration:

1. That the political objective of the Africans of Kenya must be self-government by Africans for Africans, the rights of all racial minorities being safeguarded.
2. That more African seats should be provided immediately in the Kenya Legislative Council, and that the inequities of racial representation in the inter-Territorial East African Central Assembly must be condemned.
3. That more land must be made available both in the Crown lands and in the Highlands for settlement by Africans.
4. That free compulsory education for Africans, as is given to the children of other races, is overdue.
5. That the Kipande, with all its humiliating rules and regulations, must be abolished immediately.
6. That the deplorable wages, housing and other conditions of African labourers must be substantially improved and that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' be recognized.

This therefore, became the platform of the first real nationalist movement in Kenya.

The issues outlined by the KAU certainly were assured of popular African support and the European body known as the Kenya Electors' Union recognized the potential power of Kenyatta and the KAU when it asked the Government to deport Kenyatta for instigating unrest in the colony. A growing split was developing between Government, settler, and African, and in 1947 the East African Workers' Federation, an African body, expressed their predominant fear, when they said: "Our nightmare is a break from Whitehall and the handing
of power to the settlers, whose avowed intention is to create another South Africa in Kenya. The settlers' nightmare is a conference table of any description where the African has an equal say."

It was clear that the African would be highly sympathetic with any organization that attempted to meet his grievances.

By the late forties the KAU was being infiltrated by the radical elements of the KCA. In addition, the "Forty" group, the 1940 circumcision age-group, also became an active part of the organization and Negley Farson has suggested that this body was responsible for the rise of hooliganism and burglary prior to the atrocities of 1952-1953. These two elements, therefore, began to dominate the KAU, and indeed, at the outset, gained no mean support for what they advocated meant a hastier achievement of the goals set out in 1947. Reports to Governor Philip Mitchell of a growing threat in the country led to the outlawing of the secret organization known as Mau Mau, as an "illegal society" in August of 1950. Two years later a State of Emergency was declared in the Colony and Jomo Kenyatta was arrested and charged with managing Mau Mau.

The fact that the Kikuyu was the dominant tribe in the nationalist movement was of little real surprise, for they were the most politically active tribe in Kenya, as well as the most advanced. They occupied contiguous territory to that of the European and came more in contact with the modern life of the white man than did other tribes. The growth
of a political consciousness among the educated Kikuyu, therefore, was a natural outcome of this association. Furthermore, it was natural that Jomo Kenyatta should become the dominant African Figure in Kenya, for he was the most capable individual to rally the native behind a nationalist movement. That he was either unable or unwilling to control the fanatical movement which had apparently seeped into the KAU is a matter of much controversy. However, it would appear that at the outset he supported the aims of Mau Mau to give the African greater control of his own country. On the other hand, from the evidence produced at his trial together with his own statements it would seem that Kenyatta did not advocate or encourage the vile atrocities committed in the early fifties. That the most vicious and cruel oaths and acts attributed to the Mau Mau rebels occurred for months after the arrest of Kenyatta lends support to this argument.

Susan Wood has succinctly explained the political developments of 1952 as "a tragic revulsion against the new, and a reversion to the old, confused with the ambitions for racial independence growing in Africa." Mau Mau relied on witchcraft and superstitious fears to gain a hold on the Kikuyu. The movement grew from a political fight against European domination to a religious crusade which used oathing ceremonies and stark terror to lure people into its midst. Its most ardent followers were Kikuyu with some education who were unable to apply this knowledge to suitable jobs. Their
desire for a role in the newly emerging Kenya dominated by the European was frustrated by discriminatory wage laws and restrictions which prevented social intercourse with the European. Their hopes for personal power, particularly held by the younger Kikuyu, were thwarted by regulations and human sentiments not of their own making. This frustration therefore, found an outlet in a reversion back to their old—but not entirely lost—culture with its oaths and superstitions. Dr. J.C. Carothers in his study of the psychology of Mau Mau, has commented that in the circumstances discussed above, "men tend to turn from the ways of God to those of Satan and to find perverted pleasure in a reversal of the righteous rituals." By 1952, therefore, the African was engaged in a great struggle between past and future.

The Europeans were confident that Jomo Kenyatta was the figure looming behind Mau Mau. Although the rebellious Mau Mau used the name of Kenyatta in their songs and oathing ceremonies, he consistently denied any direct association with the aggressive Kikuyu. In a speech to the KAU on July 26, 1952, Kenyatta declared:

If we unite now, each and every one of us, and each tribe to another, we will cause the implementation in this country of that which the European calls democracy. True democracy has no colour distinction. It does not choose between black and white....God said this is our land. Land in which we are to flourish as a people. We are not worried that other races are here with us in our country, but we insist that we are the leaders here, and what we want we insist we get.... He who calls us the Mau Mau is not truthful. We do not know this thing called Mau Mau. 63
These were not perhaps the words of a man actively engaged in bizarre and bloody massacres on the lives of helpless natives, nor were they the words of a man fanatically intent on ridding his country of the white man. Yet, in spite of his fine oratory and with little substantiated evidence, Jomo Kenyatta was arrested and charged with undermining the peace and order of the Colony by managing the Mau Mau rebellion.

At his trial Kenyatta continued to deny any direct association with Mau Mau, although he was clearly sympathetic to some of its aims. He recognized Mau Mau as a social disease which had emerged from the political conflict between Asian, African and European as to how they could live harmoniously together in a multi-racial society. In his defence, Jomo Kenyatta expressed the sentiments not only of his own tribe, but also of other tribes, and indeed, of all African natives. "What we have done, and what we shall continue to do," he said, "is to demand the rights of the African people as human beings....We are humans and we have families...we stand for the rights of the African people, that Africans may find a place among the nations." The African had suddenly come alive to the new world about him and he disliked his place in society as an inferior being to the white man. His political consciousness had been aroused and he was determined to rise above this white supremacy.

During the eight years prior to the imposition of the emergency regulations in Kenya some constitutional pro-
gress had been made in the Colony and two important pieces of legislation had been introduced in the Legislative Council. In 1944, the first African, Eliud Mathu was appointed to Legco. In addition, an African civil service had been developed and although it was responsible to the Government, it had considerable autonomy in governing the affairs of the natives. The report of the Civil Service Commissioner in Nairobi in 1945 declared that "an encouraging start with local government has been made in Kenya, and further development is foreshadowed." The year after this report was published a second African was appointed to the Legislative Council, and in 1948 this representation was increased to four. At the same time, the Colony was achieving greater autonomy, for with the reorganization of Legco, a Speaker was appointed, and in addition to the Governor, there were sixteen official and twenty-two unofficial members in the Legislative Council, giving the Colony an unofficial majority for the first time. Constitutional developments continued rapidly and after the elections in May, 1952, membership in Legco jumped to fifty-four—twenty-six official and twenty-eight unofficial members. The non-Government members included fourteen elected Europeans, six representative Africans, six elected Asians, and two Arabs. The Executive Council, for the first time included an African to replace the European to represent native interests. These new measures were clearly only temporary, for the Colony was well on the road to becoming fully self-governing.
However, constitutional progress was suddenly halted with the outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion and the road to eventual independence was temporarily blocked by racial strife.

The outbreak of Mau Mau in all its bestiality came, therefore, as the climax to a series of grievances, many of which had festered in the Colony during a half century, some which were legitimate and some which had been twisted to conform to the will of an extreme nationalist movement. However, the objectives proclaimed by KAU were shared by most of the African population. Mau Mau symbolized all the frustrations and suspicions of the African, many of which had been aroused by a rapidly developing political consciousness among the more educated Kikuyu. Yet, for all the harm it did, Mau Mau created a greater awareness of the unhappy situation in Kenya and brought increased attention and hope to the millions of poverty-stricken Africans in the Colony. Out of the violence which swept over the country in the next two years were to emerge the progressive strides of the next decade, which marked the beginning of cooperation in which racial barriers eventually were removed, in which the African increased his skills and knowledge, in which the economy of the country continued to develop, and in which African nationalism triumphed.
1 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, 1931, Vol.2, p.62

2 The source material for the pre-Mau Mau period in Kenya's history is limited, for the most part, to secondary sources. The attitudes of the Colonial Office are best reflected in the many White Papers that were published particularly during the twenties. The views of the white settler community have received a sympathetic hearing from Mrs. Aldous Huxley in her many novels and her major work on the life of Lord Delamere. Lord Altrincham in his autobiography has pointed up the close association which existed between him as Governor and the settlers. The native point of view has received close scrutiny from W. McGregor Ross, one time member of Legco and a Director of Public Works in Kenya. Little has been written on the tribes of Kenya other than the Kikuyu. Mr. J.S.B. Leakey in several works has clearly related the nature of the Kikuyu tribe and gives an excellent discussion of the customs and attitudes of this tribe during the years leading up to Mau Mau. A handful of educated Kikuyu have defended the attitude of the African, although most of these studies reflect the view of the politically conscious Kikuyu which is more vehement in its attitude to the European than is that of the more primitive native who had still not experienced much of the benefits of the modern world. Dr. Norman Leys has written a useful history of the first thirty years of British rule in Africa, sympathizing with the difficulties of both racial groups. The role of the Asian in Kenya recently has been reviewed in short accounts by L.W. Hollingsworth and George Delf.


4 The territory had strategic importance for the port of Mombasa acted as a counterpoise between Germans at Dar-es-Salaam and French at Diego Luarez in Madagascar. British occupation of the region would give her strategic control of the headwaters of the Nile. By encouraging European settlement, Britain would not only give Uganda access to the coast, but also assist the railway to pay for itself.

5 The great issue which the land distribution was to become found its origin in the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, which established the White Highlands as a European reserve.
6 In 1910 the growing white community had organized itself into an active group known as the European Convention of Associations. Government officials in Kenya kept in close contact with this settler organization, for they were fully cognizant of the importance of the settler and his land. Sir Edward Grigg, former Governor of Kenya, has commented that the Government has depended on the European community for the greater part of its revenue. For this reason, he was opposed to heavy taxation being imposed on the rich, for fear they might become extinct. "...in Kenya in any case it would spell collapse for the whole economy, and no Government there can ignore the fact or press too hard upon the European farmer." Lord Altrincham, *Kenya's Opportunity*, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1955, p. 116.

7 Elspeth Huxley, *White Man's Country*, London, Macmillan and Co., 1935, vol.1, p. 17. Mrs. Huxley has pointed out one instance of Lord Delamere's flamboyant character when she described his dislike of English country life. She writes that he had "to resort to such desperate measures for creating excitement as creeping into Whitegate church in the middle of the night and ringing a violent peal on the bells in order to see what the startled inhabitants would do."


9 The pastoral Masai tribe, a group of proud and tough natives, had overrun several tribes including the Kikuyu and had held vast land areas in their control, although much of these remained unoccupied. See Ross, *op.cit.*, p.42. In 1902 the Kikuyu lands on the edge of the highlands were depopulated considerably (between 20% and 50%) owing to a smallpox epidemic, a rinderpest outbreak, drought and famine, and a locust invasion which ravaged the land. This however, did not affect the ownership of the land. It should also be noted that the idea of absolute ownership of land was unknown to all the tribes of Kenya making it difficult to determine the right of occupancy of the land. Native custom determined that land could not be alienated to anyone outside one's family. Thus, when the Kikuyu land became unoccupied at the turn of the century, the ownership of the land was not altered and the land itself was not permanently abandoned. See Norman Beys, *Kenya*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1926, p. 51.


11 W. McGregor Ross cites cases of 2,000 acres of land with only 20 acres under cultivation; 9,000 acres of land with only 25 acres under cultivation; and 12,000 acres of land with just 300 acres being fully utilized. In addition, Mr. Ross tells of one estate of 3,900 acres employing only
nine natives, and another farm of 350,000 acres employing only 250 natives to cultivate it. See Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.

12 The Masai tribe occupied large areas of land on which they lived as nomads. This land was of poor quality suitable only for grazing. However, this land was considerably overstocked, for a lot of animals were required to support a Masai family on a diet of milk and blood. Thus, the problem in the Masai reserve was not one of improving cultivation, but, as the survey of Dr. Pole Evans, a South African agricultural expert found, one which resulted from "confining these tribes to Reserves without any restriction on the stock population...has resulted in the destruction of grazing resulting in famine...." Elspeth Huxley, and Margery Perham, *Race and Politics in Kenya*, London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1956, p. 52.

13 Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report of the Kenya Land Commission*, 1934, Cmd. 4546, p. 520. Some 1,474 square miles were added to the native reserves as compensation for land alienated to the Europeans. It is reported that the Carter Report stimulated considerable interest among the Kikuyu. "...these people were always reading the Carter Report--they knew it almost by heart." Huxley and Perham, *op.cit.*, p. 37.


17 Often this was attributed to laziness but in many cases could more accurately be attributed to a desire to remain on the reserve where the African's family and plots of land were more attractive to him. See Leys, *op.cit.*, pp. 204-206.


19 Ross, *op.cit.*, pp.92-98.


Many Africans served side by side with Europeans during World War One. They gained a greater insight into the modern world and on their return to Kenya and to their Reserves they were anxious to gain many of the benefits common to modern society. This partially explains the emergence of some political consciousness in the African community.

Two grievances included the burden of taxation and the Kipande. The burden of taxation in the Colony in 1923 was: European £162,775; Indian £46,790; African £501,615. The figure for the African is the sum paid in hut and poll tax. The European paid about £9,000 in poll tax. The remainder of his tax was derived from such items as harbour fees, registration fees, game licences, liquor licences, stamp duties (£36,000), court fees and fines (£33,000), hospital fees (£7,000), school fees (£5,200), and interest on loans (£55,000). With the European exempt from an income tax burden it was clear that the African was bearing the greater tax burden, and that the poor rather than the rich in the Colony were carrying the heavier tax load. See Leys, op.cit., pp. 352-360. The Kipande was a native registration certificate containing the finger prints of the native labourer. It was placed in a metal container and worn around the neck. With the transitory nature of many of the Africans, it served as a useful means of identification for the European employers in their efforts to keep tab of their workers.

Proposals under the Wood-Winterton agreement of September, 1922, which would enfranchise about 10% of the Indian population in Kenya, and would maintain unrestricted immigration, were entirely unacceptable to the Europeans. They believed that this would not assure development of Kenya as a "characteristically and distinctively British colony." The settlers threatened to kidnap the Governor to draw attention to the situation in the Colony, if the proposals were not withdrawn.

Sir Edward Grigg on becoming governor described Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin as having little interest in international or colonial affairs and though "he had appointed me to Kenya, I found it useless to talk to him about the Colony's affairs." Ibid., p. 211. See also Winston Churchill, Memoirs of the Second World War, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1959, p. 104.
Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, p. 284.


An example of the inequities in the tax structure may be seen from the following figures:

Net National Income for 1930*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£ Million</th>
<th>£ per Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>208.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Revenue Collected in 1931*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>African</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Tax</td>
<td>£ 42,596</td>
<td>£ 530,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Tax</td>
<td>334,477</td>
<td>199,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Tax Revenue</td>
<td>109,113</td>
<td>11,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Revenue (Not Tax)</td>
<td>179,595</td>
<td>49,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>665,781</td>
<td>791,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


38 Several African witnesses did appear before the Carter Land Commission in 1932 in London.


40 Around the turn of the century the missionaries attempted to teach the African a trade or new methods of agriculture to assist him in meeting his expenses. Roland Oliver has written: "What little evidence there is suggests that industrial education too often lifted Africans out of their own society only to enmesh them in the web of European economic enterprise. Certainly technical education did not, like literary education, develop into a mass movement, in which the pupils of the European missionary themselves became teachers, supporting themselves directly or indirectly on indigenous contributions." This quotation also points up the shortage of instructors for literary education. See Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London, New York, and Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952, pp. 213-215, 265.


42 The draft estimates for the Colony in 1923 showed a deficit of £381,000. As a consequence the expenditure on education was reduced from £69,320 to £53,175 out of a total budget of £1,823,909. The racial distribution of the education funds was: European £21,140 or about £22 per child of school age; Indian £8,720 or about £2.5 sh per child of school age; African £22,680 or about 1 sh per child of school age. Because the costs of education were so prohibitive missions assumed this task because they could hire people at much less expense than could the Government. At the same time, however, the low wages did not always attract the best qualified instructors.
In West Africa the natives had been in contact with the white man for more than three hundred years, a sharp contrast to the situation in Kenya. Also, there were few settlers in West Africa compared to the number in Kenya. In the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1949 an all-African committee of forty was appointed to write a new constitution for the country. In Nigeria a new constitution in 1946 established a central legislature for the first time. In 1952 another constitution made substantial concessions to nationalist pressure and greatly extended Nigerian power in the regional assemblies and central legislature. In Tanganyika and Uganda, unlike Kenya, there is no official colour bar, nor is there confusion over the ownership of the land. In Tanganyika only about 1.3% of the land in 1950 was white-owned. For this reason there was not the racial problem which existed in Kenya. Gradual progress toward self-government occurred in both countries with substantial increases in African representation in the Legislative Councils. In Tanganyika in 1949 a committee on the constitutional development of the country was established. In 1952, equal representation of the three races was granted on the unofficial side of an enlarged council with Africans having seven members (increase of three). In Uganda in 1950 the composition of the Legislative Council was expanded to include sixteen official members and sixteen unofficals including eight Africans (an increase of four), four Europeans, and four Asians. One British remark in Tanganyika perhaps reflected the different climate of...
opinion there as compared with that in Kenya: "We're more than eager to let the people here have responsible government—if only to show them how difficult it is to make it work."

51 Cmd. 1030, op.cit., p. 40.


54 Ibid., p. 49.


56 Pankhurst, op.cit., pp. 80, 81.

57 Gicaru, op.cit., p. 155.

58 Farson, op.cit., p. 114.


64 Delf, *op.cit.*, p. 185.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES 1953-1959

The outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion tragically underlined the growing intensity of African nationalism in Kenya. At the same time, it introduced a new and difficult period in the constitutional and political development of the Colony. The final years of colonial rule possessed two distinctive phases each one of which was generally characteristic of a much broader movement involving most of the African continent. The thrust of African nationalism in the post-Mau Mau decade in British colonies in both East and West Africa was influential in determining the attitudes and reactions of those active in the affairs of Kenya. The first period between 1953 and 1959 was characterized in Kenya by a continuation of the old policy of partnership as distinct from the political paramountcy of the African. The second phase introduced formally by the 'wind of change' speech delivered by the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in South Africa in February, 1960, gave official recognition to the changing political climate in the continent. In addition, this speech foretold the end of British colonialism in Kenya and the triumph of African nationalism. During this final period in the struggle for African independence, the African leaders clearly heeded the words of the champion of African
nationalism, Kwame Nkrumah, when he declared: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and everything else shall be added unto you."¹

During the Mau Mau Emergency between 1953 and 1959 the political and constitutional development of Kenya was characterized by a three-pronged struggle for power and influence in the Colony. The conflicting motives of the Colonial Office, the European settlers, and the African nationalists, were all involved in this clash of personalities and policies. The dilemma faced by each of these participants can be clearly shown in their response to the challenge of African nationalism. For each one a fear of what the future held coloured his attitude. In the end, however, there could be little doubt that the tide of African nationalism could not be turned back. Kenya too, would be caught up by the wave of nationalism sweeping throughout the African continent.

In 1947 the birth of Pakistan and the granting of independence to India marked the culmination of the traditional policy of British colonialism. The gradual evolution in the delegation of political responsibility to the indigenous populations had been the foundation on which Commonwealth nations had been built. This policy had been followed in the Indian sub-continent. Similarly, the Colonial Office believed, it should be adopted in Africa. Following the Second World War signs of a political awakening in Africa
clearly emerged and the Colonial Office recognized that responsibility and representation in government must now be gradually given to the African. Kenya was to be no exception. It followed, therefore, that the first African, Eliud Mathu, entered the Legislative Council in 1944. So, too, in Tanganyika and Uganda Africans entered the political arena. In West Africa where educational and economic developments were considerably more advanced than in East Africa, the political frustration of the African was met by the granting of responsible government to the Gold Coast in 1951. The reality of the nationalist movement in West Africa was recognized by the Colonial Office which supervised the transitional period between Colonial rule and African rule. In East Africa, however, the Europeans had exercised authority and influence for only a relatively short period. African political development was in its infancy and although there were stirrings of black nationalism, the Colonial Office did not consider them to be a potent force. In the eyes of the Colonial Office, the prospects for African self-government remained remote, for African political, economic, and social institutions were still in a primitive stage.

In Kenya the traditional British colonial policy was being followed but the events of 1952 upset the calculations for political and constitutional development. The primary concern of the Colonial Office in the years immed-
iately following Mau Mau was to restore order and protect the country's people. With this objective in mind, the Colonial Secretaries still faced a dilemma arising out of the conflicting desires of the settlers and the nationalists. Britain could not deny the contribution the settlers had made to the economic development of Kenya and, as a result, the demands for continued settler predominance in the politics of the country could not be ignored. At the same time, however, the increasing nationalistic fervour among the Africans was a direct challenge to the prominent role of the settlers. If the Colonial Office supported fully the views of the settlers the threat of renewed violence by the Africans would be seriously increased. If, however, the demands of the nationalists were to be met, many European settlers, it was feared, would flee the country leaving it in political and economic chaos. Owing to this internal conflict, throughout the nineteen-fifties Colonial policy reflected an uncertainty about the future direction of developments in Kenya.

The growth of African nationalism was not peculiar to Kenya alone. In Britain's African colonies nationalism had first appeared in West Africa, where educational and economic advancement of the African was ahead of that in East Africa. For these reasons the Colonial Office granted increased power to the African in preparation for the gradual transition from colonial rule to self-government and eventually to independence. Africans in East Africa were
not unaware of constitutional developments in West Africa, and the surge of African nationalism soon grew into a potent force in East Africa. As a result, Africans in Tanganyika and Uganda gained increased political responsibility. In Kenya, however, political evolution, of the African by 1952 already was lagging behind that of his neighbours, owing particularly to the entrenched political power of the European settlers. African nationalism, however, was growing in Kenya and demands for increased responsibility were becoming more vocal. From the point of view of the Colonial Office, it was clear that Kenya was but one of several areas, each one progressing at a different rate towards independence. As increased power was extended to the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Tanganyika during the nineteen-fifties, the Colonial Office found it necessary to extend certain constitutional concessions to Kenya Africans in spite of the Emergency. The rate at which political power was being extended to the African in East Africa, however, indicated that the Colonial Office did not recognize the tremendous force that African nationalism had become in the nineteen-fifties.

While the Mau Mau rebellion and the sudden rise of African nationalism upset the traditional British colonial policy, it also created tremendous fears among the European settler community. Politically influential and economically prosperous, the settlers were in a favoured position in Kenya. By 1950 their long established goal of
self-government was almost a reality. Yet, with the abrupt outbreak of hostilities in 1952 the entire future of the European settler in Kenya was placed in jeopardy. Fear of physical violence and economic disaster was the immediate reaction of the European settlers to the nationalist uprising. For some Europeans Mau Mau imbued within them an awareness of the growing political consciousness of the African and the inevitability of African rule in the country, particularly in the light of developments in Ghana. For others it strengthened their sense of superiority over the African, not so much from a racial standpoint as from a feeling of cultural and economic superiority. In the nineteen-fifties, the attitude of many Europeans in Kenya tended to confirm the belief that "many emotionally, culturally and politically sensitive individuals react to a sojourn abroad ...with a far stronger assertion of nationalism and of allegiance to their own language, culture and people."²

Pride in the contribution they had made to the development of Kenya was reflected in the attitude of many conservative settlers. Their efforts to create a viable 'white man's country' in tropical Africa had all but come true. The emergence of a number of vocal and politically conscious Africans, however, upset the dynamic prospects envisaged by the European settlers. To grant leadership to a group of politically immature and economically impoverished Africans was a decision which many Europeans were unwilling to face in the nineteen-fifties. Not only concerned
about their own personal future, these Europeans were anxious about the future of Kenya should a group of inexperienced and unqualified Africans assume control over the country's administration. These Europeans, while not necessarily opposed to some Africans achieving responsible positions in the country, did, however, believe that they themselves were far more capable of running Kenya. They failed to appreciate the changing tide of events that was remoulding the face of Africa, and instead looked forward to many more years of European domination in the affairs of Kenya.

Thus, in the post-Mau Mau decade when African nationalism began to gain momentum in East Africa, the European settlers attempted to cling to the status quo. Few were immediately willing to accept African political domination, although some were willing to make definite contributions to racial harmony. This latter group, however, was branded as traitors by their fellow settlers. Clearly the dilemma which faced the European settlers was one which challenged their basic security. In attempting to side-track the nationalist movement, the conservative settlers were not really exercising racial bigotry, but were instead, reacting to a threat to their traditional way of life, and to the future of the Kenya which they envisaged. Self-interest and security on the one hand were challenged on the other by political reality and the inevitability of change. Many of the settlers, therefore, continued to grasp at the
last vestige of political predominance. Out of this attitude emerged increased suspicions and fears among the Africans.

For the African the period between 1953 and 1959 was marked by a great surge of nationalism stimulated both by the Mau Mau uprising and by constitutional progress made elsewhere in Africa. Despite the limitations imposed by the Emergency regulations, the drive for African independence received the whole attention of African nationalists. Progress towards responsible government made in Ghana was a vigorous force standing behind the African nationalists. In addition, the almost crusading nature of Mau Mau aroused the political consciousness of numerous Africans and drove them to seek as much political responsibility and representation as possible. The essential cause for which Mau Mau was fighting gained popular support in the Colony, and despite the fact that its leaders were imprisoned, many of the goals of Mau Mau continued to be sought by the new generation of African nationalists.

In striving for independence the African was faced with a dilemma over the degree to which he should push for responsibility. Stimulated by Mau Mau the Africans urged their leaders to press for every possible gain. The liberal Europeans advised the African to seek greater influence through cooperation and the process of constitutional evolution. The Colonial Office with an eye on the rest of the continent granted the African concessions to meet his
immediate demands, yet would not give any indication of what the ultimate destiny of the country was to be. With these pressures upon him the African faced a difficult period in his political development in the nineteen-fifties.

The successful African leaders had to rise above tribal loyalties and gain popularity through a national appeal. Independence provided the vehicle for success. For this reason, African politicians were forced to make almost impossible demands of the Colonial Office in order to satisfy their people and maintain their position of leadership. Should they lose control of the nationalist movement a return to the violence of Mau Mau remained a real possibility. Moderate Africans would be threatened, Europeans would be forced out of the country and with them would go the wealth and technological knowledge so necessary for the future of the country. Thus, the dilemma facing the African was to what extremes he could go in his demands for power. The more responsible African leaders were cognizant of the fact that independence was not enough to bring about improved living standards for the native peoples. Yet, because of the pressure from below which identified independence with the good life African leaders had to demand from the Colonial Office far more than most of them knew was possible. In so doing they could maintain their leadership and yet prevent the powerful nationalist sentiments from overwhelming them.

A final feature exercising influence over the aspirations of African nationalists was the figure of Jomo
Kenyatta. Absent from his country for nearly fifteen years, Kenyatta returned to spark a crusade for independence. He successfully rose above tribal allegiances and gained popular support throughout Kenya. With his imprisonment his popularity increased, for he had only one commitment to the Africans of Kenya, and that was to achieve independence. It was for this reason that he became the powerful figure of the independence movement and the ominous shadow looming over the heads of those participating in constitutional negotiations.

Intertwined among the three participants in this struggle for power were the Governor and the Kenya Government. Their role essentially, was to maintain law and order in the Colony, prevent the reemergence of Mau Mau, and promote economic and social rehabilitation in the country. In addition, as new constitutions were introduced in the Colony the Governor and his Government were faced with the difficult task of seeking agreement and cooperation among Africans and Europeans in the implementation of new policies. The Legislative Council thus became the proving platform for the experimental policies of the Colonial Office.

As the events following Mau Mau unfolded in Kenya the triangular relationship involving the Colonial Office, the European settlers, and the African nationalists became clear. Their conflicting motives and the dilemmas which each faced were clearly reflected in their reactions to the
political and constitutional developments in Kenya. The immediate effect of the Mau Mau rebellion became clear when Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in the Colony and proclaimed a State of Emergency. African political activity was quickly halted. The restrictions imposed by the Governor were, as might be expected, directed primarily at the Kikuyu, but the political activities of other Kenya tribes also were considerably limited. Members of the Kikuyu tribe were debarred from participation in any political organizations, and indeed, tens of thousands were sent to various detention camps throughout the northern regions of the Colony for much of the duration of the emergency. No political organizations such as the proscribed Kenya African Union were to be tolerated, as all national groupings were prohibited. In addition, not until 1955, were local or regional African political parties permitted. This rule initially served to accent the tribal differences in Kenya and for this reason delayed the development of a truly colony-wide nationalist movement.

When tribal political parties were again permitted, severe restrictions were still imposed. No political meetings were to be held in public without police permission, and even then they were limited in the size of the gathering. At the outset no political organization was permitted to have more than forty-nine percent of its membership from the African race. These restrictions, while undoubtedly discouraging the birth of other subversive movements in the Colony, did create
more frustrations and suspicions among the African people. The Emergency regulations at first slowed down the nationalist movement which had been growing since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, they removed the Kikuyu from their dominant position and encouraged other Kenya tribes to become increasingly politically conscious by offering greater opportunities for them in Nairobi. One such tribe was the Luo.

The Luo, the second largest tribe in Kenya, was for the most part, unscathed by the Mau Mau rebellion. Because Mau Mau was under Kikuyu leadership, the greatest impact was felt by that tribe—a tribe which the Luo strongly disliked, and whose leadership they were unwilling to accept. With the activities of the Kikuyu, particularly in Nairobi, curtailed by the Emergency regulations, the members of the Luo tribe moved into Nairobi to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Kikuyu. Many gained employment in the city while others entered the political forum, with the result that the Luo tribe emerged in the nineteen-fifties as the dominant African group in Kenya. One of the most brilliant of African nationalists, Tom Mboya, rose to political prominence during this period and has been a powerful force on the Kenya political stage ever since. Often described as "the angry young man of Africa", Mboya became conscious of the injustices suffered by some Africans when he worked as a sanitary inspector in Nairobi. "Very quickly I came to see
how unjust it was, that I should receive ten pounds a month for my work," said Mboya, "while my colleagues, the white inspectors, received five times that much for doing no more and no less than I did." Mboya, therefore, joined the KAU shortly before it was proscribed, but he never became involved in Mau Mau, and at twenty-three he remained the only prominent nationalist still at liberty in Kenya. He felt extremely bitter over the fact that thousands of blameless Africans were held in detention camps, victims of the actions of the fanatic Mau Mau.

Mboya soon rose to prominence as General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, which he described as being "so vigorous in fact that it was able to play, during that Emergency, a political role rarely demanded of trade unions and their leaders." Thus, Mboya's trade union helped fill the vacuum in African political organization, and in spite of the Emergency he was able to maintain much of the momentum of the nationalist movement, and to develop and extend it. Even his political rivals, who disliked Mboya's arrogant ways, could not deny his brilliant abilities. Michael Blundell, the principal European figure during the pre-independence decade, declared in late 1963: "Measured in terms of ambition, ability and general demagogic power, he should today be the undisputed leader of Kenya...."

During the period between 1953 and 1959 Mboya directed his attacks at the British Colonial Office and what he
considered to be a policy of drift and delay. Throughout
the early nineteen-fifties the British and Kenya Governments
directed their attention towards fighting the Mau Mau rebellion
and by 1956 the back of the terrorist organization had
been broken with the civil officials taking over authority
from the military in combatting the rebels. From 1956 to
1959 pockets of Mau Mau adherents continued to reappear,
causing anxiety among official sources who feared a full
scale renewal of the atrocities of 1952-1953. For this
reason, government officials in Kenya and Britain were
cautious in promoting the political and constitutional de-
velopment of the African.

During the early years of the Emergency the old
dual policy was, in essence, being carried on by the Kenya
and British Governments disguised as a 'multi-racial partner-
ship' in which all segments of the racially divided country
were to receive more equal representation and responsibility.
It appeared to the leaders of the African community that the
'multi-racial partnership' policy merely guaranteed a con-
tinuation of the dominant position of the European in Kenya
affairs. Omitted from the negotiations over future consti-
tutional developments in the Colony, and lacking their nation-
wide political organization, the Africans turned to the Leg-
islative Council as a sounding-board for their grievances
over lack of greater representation and responsibility. In
the Legco debates in July, 1953, the leading African delegate
Eliud Mathu, pointed up the need for a coordinating voluntary
political organization for the African people to take the place of the proscribed KAU. Mr. Mathu was willing to concede that such an organization should adhere to the required emergency regulations. "Our intention is that we should cooperate with anybody who is interested in this matter to produce a constitution," said Mr. Mathu, "which will enable the African people to express their political aspirations in a constitutional manner and in the most effective way possible." Most of the African and Asian representatives quite correctly advanced the belief that the Mau Mau uprising had increased in intensity since the declaration of the Emergency and they attributed this to the fact that there was no natural outlet for African political consciousness.

The African community had, at the outset, been willing to accept a multi-racial policy in Kenya provided that there was a true opportunity to share ideas and responsibilities. Mr. Mathu and his colleagues clearly looked on multi-racialism as being a policy of equality in the administration of the Colony. This, however, was a far cry from the meaning of the term as accepted by many Europeans. Commenting on this 'new' policy, Mr. Mathu remarked:

...in order to carry that policy of partnership forward, the European Elected Members, the Indian Congress and the African organization should co-operate on a political plane together. That partnership is not possible now because we have not got such an organization when the other communities, the non-African communities, have their organizations carrying on almost as usual.
The reaction of the European members to this demand for a national African organization, was characteristic of their attitude throughout the mid-fifties—"the present time is not opportune." This attitude reflected the concern for their future security in the Colony, and pointed up the settlers' fear of physical violence at the hands of Mau Mau adherents. In addition, a reluctance to recognize Mau Mau as nothing but a bizarre tribal uprising, rather than as a movement filled with elements of nationalism, influenced their views. At this point few Europeans were willing to acknowledge that African nationalism had become a potent force in the Colony. Mr. Blundell, considered to be a moderate among the Europeans, suggested that the time for reforming African organizations was poor owing to the seriousness of the Mau Mau crisis, but as was his way, he left the door to future discussions on the matter slightly ajar, when he added: "I am quite certain that we are unwise to stop the free expansion of African political opinion...we...should make it perfectly clear that we have no objection to the proper growth of an African political organization." The general cloudiness of the issue was perhaps best expressed by the capable Asian member of Legco, Mr. A.B. Patel, when he expressed his view on the matter:

We are again and again told, Mr. Speaker, in this Council and outside this Council that people of this country should develop an all-Kenya outlook and behave as Kenyans. In spite of that, in practice we are being put in the position of developing tribal, religious and racial outlooks and we act as small groups as
tribes or races and religions.

This exchange of views finally saw a moderation in the Europeans' view and they agreed to discussions on what form such an organization should take. Mr. Mathu, a Kikuyu himself, suggested that tribes other than the Kikuyu should not be penalized for the Mau Mau atrocities and he agreed that a Colony-wide African political organization could exclude the Kikuyu for a period of time. As a consequence, all groups agreed to immediate consultation on the matter, with the actual formation of an African political movement "when the time is opportune." Thus, this subtle change in wording served to pacify for a time the demands of the Africans.

Both the Africans and the unofficial European representatives were agitating for a greater share in the conduct of the Affairs of the Colony. The Emergency had disrupted the working of the Government and Mr. Blundell in a letter to Governor Baring recorded his anxiety in this manner: "What I do wish to record is that I am certain that our political structure will not survive the strain of the Emergency and its tensions, etc. unless we make it more flexible and more representative of Unofficial opinion, and especially European opinion." Clearly, the settler community feared for their very lives at the hands of the Mau Mau terrorists, and were willing to take things into their own hands by gaining control of Legco.
to achieve a share in the responsibilities of Government when the Emergency was imposed, the Opposition led by Mr. Blundell dispatched a delegation to London in March, 1953, to have conversations with Secretary of State Sir Oliver Lyttelton. Through interviews on television and in the newspapers Mr. Blundell was able to tell the British public of the chaotic situation in Kenya. The savage Lari Massacre on March 26, 1953, in which dozens of helpless men, women and children were viciously attacked, maimed, and murdered, both helped and hindered Mr. Blundell's cause in the United Kingdom. The brutality displayed by the Lari attack largely eliminated what sympathy there was for the Mau Mau, but at the same time it tended to consolidate the opinion of the Colonial Office that it would be too dangerous to give the "unofficials" too large a say in the administration of Kenya.

By late 1953 the distance between the views of the African and the European in Kenya had become wider. Hopelessness for the future together with an obvious unwillingness to cooperate and compromise with the Africans on an equal footing characterized much of the European opinion. Michael Blundell commenting on discussions within the Unofficial Members Organization, declared that the "African ideas as to the future political advance for their people seemed so unreal in the light of the modest place which a number of the Europeans were prepared to offer that
no real accommodation between our views seemed possible." Blundell advocated a multi-racial executive to combat the threat of Mau Mau and felt that this would be the best weapon with which to fight the terrorists. Although Blundell championed a multi-racial government it was Mr. J.S. Patel who perhaps best defined what this phrase meant to Kenya:

Multi-racial Government is, I think, that which will give Kenya a leadership throughout the whole world—by proving the ideal that all three races can live together peacefully and will, provided that principle is backed up without undue bickering and without unnecessary racial prejudices and working it from an angle of the good of the people and the good of the country by all concerned.  

This policy of partnership, however, became a divisive force rather than a unifying one and racial groupings drew further apart while deep divisions of opinion arose among the Europeans—divisions which were never to be fully mended. Blundell, one of the few Europeans who sensed the increasing nationalistic sentiments among the Africans, saw at this time that multi-racialism might provide a means of appeasing the Africans, yet, at the same time, slowing down their nationalist movement. In making these first hesitant steps to improve the racial climate in Kenya, Blundell was looked at with suspicion by African leaders, and with contempt by his more conservative fellow settlers. The former saw his ideas as a means to maintain European domination by granting the Africans some responsibility while at the same time increasing unofficial European influence in the government of
the country. The latter saw in Blundell’s proposals the first steps leading to the disintegration of the dream for a white dominion in tropical Africa.

In the March 1954 session of the Legislative Council, Mr. Awori had a motion accepted to provide facilities for responsible African leaders to hold public meetings in Nairobi to influence the African public to work for law and order in the community. On this same day, March 3, the Asian member, Mr. Patel, initiated new demands for increased representation when he sought enlarged Asian, African, and Arab unofficial membership in Legco and in the Executive Council. "Circumstances have altered," he declared, "and as the other communities make progress in education, sense of responsibility and other things, the case must be examined for the purpose of increase of their representation." Mr. Patel’s statement, however, was ill-timed for at this moment the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Oliver Lyttelton, was in the Colony to make arrangements for the introduction of a new constitution for Kenya.

During efforts to create a war cabinet of both official and unofficial members of Legco to coordinate more effective government operations against the Mau Mau, great strain and tension was present. The most disturbing feature of the deteriorating situation in Kenya was the attitude of the Colonial Secretary. In the talks concerning the war
cabinet in early 1954, the frustration of Sir Oliver Lyttelton and the great difficulty of the task facing him, were indicated when he pleaded to Michael Blundell: "Look here, I can't go on like this; I shall go mad, it's like a juggler trying to keep all three coloured balls in the air at once; really we must come to some agreement." Unfortunately, the Colonial Secretary achieved little success in his juggling act, for the constitution he was to impose on the Colony received bitter criticism from all sides.

Heading a parliamentary delegation to Kenya, the Colonial Secretary made several proposals for a reconstruction of the Government. The most important feature of the new constitution was the creation of a multi-racial Council of Ministers composed of one African, two Asians and three Europeans, chosen from the elected representatives in the Legislative Council. This new body was to become the "principal instrument of Government in the Colony... and will exercise a collective responsibility for decisions on Government policy." Besides, the unofficials in the Council there were to be two nominated members, six officials, the Deputy Governor, and the Governor. The African was to get the post of Minister for Community Development -- a portfolio of little direct concern to the European Community, and hence a suitable post to be held by the country's first African Minister. All members of the Council of Ministers were expected to subscribe to a joint statement of policy: "To promote racial
harmony and friendliness and to develop opportunities for all loyal subjects, irrespective of race or religion, to advance in accordance with character and ability. To secure that individual rights of private property are respected." These arrangements while granting some recognition to the Africans did little to meet the wishes of the leaders of the indigenous population. Rather, what gains the African did make were common to other East African countries. In Kenya, however, the presence of a powerful settler group and the recognition by the Colonial Office of its vital role was apparent in the constitutional proposals. Negotiations prior to the formulation of the new constitution did not include African representatives, and as a result, the proposals clearly indicated that power in the country still rested firmly in the hands of the Europeans. This factor resulted in the failure of the mission and caused the constitution to become unworkable soon after its inception.

The new constitution did not propose any change in the composition of the Legislative Council—a factor particularly annoying to Mr. Mathu and his African colleagues. In addition, the rigidity of the constitution was a blow to the more farsighted people in the Colony. No changes before 1960 were proposed in the proportion of representation in Legco or in the Council of Ministers, and no changes were advocated in the communal basis of the franchise. Only if the Secretary of State believed the constitution to be un-
workable, would the situation revert back to what it was before the Emergency was declared. Although Europeans and Asians ultimately accepted the new proposals, the Africans rejected them. That Oliver Lyttelton foresaw no need to review the constitutional situation for at least six years clearly indicated that the Colonial Office had not grasped the nature of the rapidly changing atmosphere not only in Kenya but elsewhere in Africa. In addition, the new constitution indicated that the Colonial Office intended to follow old policies which would maintain the political predominance of the settler. With the Africans outrightly rejecting the new proposals it was obvious that such a constitution would enjoy a very limited existence.

The new constitution was geared primarily towards affecting a greater direction against Mau Mau and to strengthen the Government during the time of crisis. It made no effort to outline what future political development might take place in the Colony. However, it did bring members of the Opposition into the Government and in the view of Mr. Blundell, "undoubtedly arrested a tendency towards the evolution of what we might call a white Mau Mau movement, bringing majority moderate opinion behind the Government and reducing the more extreme to a small minority." The fact that the new constitution favoured a standstill until 1960 in the constitutional development of the Colony was the greatest source of dissatisfaction among the Africans, Asians and some mod-
erate Europeans. E.A. Vassey, European member of Legco, commented on the Lyttelton Plan in this manner:

I know that that standstill was an essential part of obtaining agreement to the Plan but we surely cannot claim that the present numbers of African Members of Legislative Council on the non-Government side are adequate representation for the African peoples.\(^2^1\)

The creation of a multi-racial Council of Ministers rather than improve racial harmony in the Colony, aggravated it, for the Africans became suspicious of the Europeans' motives and felt that the white man was merely trying to protect his own position. The Asians supported the African view, although they accepted the constitution in spite of the standstill clause. The correspondent for The New Statesman and Nation commented that "Kenya's so-called multi-racial Government is a clumsy affair, launching out into life on the wrong foot." Not only did it antagonize Africans, the new plan also divided European settler opinion in Kenya and marked the beginning of hostility which was to break European unity for years to come.

Although the Africans had demanded far more responsibility than many of their leaders recognized was possible at this stage of their development, the new constitution did mark a limited victory for the African people. For the first time they had gained a voice on the executive side of government, breaking the lengthy period in which only settlers participated in representing the unofficial
side of the Legislative Council. In addition, the failure of the European leaders to achieve self-government in the new constitution, while not bringing about a shift in power to the African side, did give some encouragement to African nationalists. Highly suspicious of the settlers, the African saw some hope for his own political future in the decision not to give ultimate authority to the European settlers. Edwin S. Munger, a member of the American Universities Field Staff in Africa, has commented: "Nearly all the leaders I've talked with acknowledge a decided shift in the center of political gravity away from Nairobi and toward Whitehall." While pleasing African leaders, this shift annoyed many European leaders, who still hoped for self-government for Kenya under their control.

The new constitution brought about the emergence of individual European political parties characterized by membership either for or against multi-racial government. The older European political leaders remained adamant in their position in favour of a white dominion of Kenya. Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, one of the more conservative members of this latter group, bitterly criticized Blundell for his part in the formation of the multi-racial Government. "As for you," declared Cavendish-Bentinck, "you have destroyed everything for which I have worked all my life." As a consequence, the Kenya Empire Party was launched in order to continue the struggle to maintain white supremacy in the Colony. To counteract this measure Blun-
dell formed his own political party, the United Country Party, dominated by liberal aims and supporting a policy of multi-racialism. The moderates, although supporting Blundell's aims, rejected the idea of forming a party with specific policies, for they had become accustomed to winning elections in the past purely on the basis of personalities rather than policies. As a result, they opposed Blundell's party and with some members sympathetic with Cavendish-Bentinck, they formed themselves into a group as Independents with a non-racial policy. In the opinion of Mr. Blundell, "non-racialism seemed largely designed to maintain the European position at this stage of the development of the other races." Michael Blundell's own views were becoming crystallized at this time and were taking on a national rather than a racial outlook. He was critical of the European conservatives who, while approving small advances in political power for the African, coupled this with the demand for increased political power for the unofficial European representatives.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle in the path of Mr. Blundell's proposals was the need to gain the acceptance and cooperation of the African members of Legco. When Africans later received an additional ministerial post and one more representative, Eliud Mathu told Blundell: "What's the good now, Michael, it has taken so long and our requests were really so small that the majority of my people have
lost faith in your sincerity when you say you want to try and work with us." It was apparent to Blundell and other moderate Europeans that had both Africans and Europeans approached the principle of multi-racialism in a bold manner, given the African increased representation and responsibility, and recognized the growing African political consciousness, multi-racialism might have achieved greater success in Kenya. However, the delay in bringing about changes in both the system of selecting African representatives and in the number of members, spelled failure of multi-racialism in African eyes. For the Europeans, Blundell believed that the great majority of Europeans would accept a multi-racial form of Government although he believed a multi-racial form of society was a long way off. Thus, the failure to bring the African members of Legco into talks prior to the announcement of the multi-racial government together with the failure to accede to the just demands of the African, (and not just to balance them off with increased European power) foretold the hopelessness of such a form of government.

Although the African request for increased representation received little official support, the claims for an opportunity to elect rather than have the Governor appoint their representatives were agreed to, and in 1955 significant steps in this direction were taken. In February, W.F. Coutts, formerly the Administrator of St. Vincent in
the Windward Islands, arrived in Kenya to investigate the best system to be adopted in choosing African members of the Legislative Council. Under the terms of his inquiry, Mr. Coutts was to be in contact with District and Provincial Commissioners and was to be accompanied by African members of Legco for each particular area as well as by two leading Africans of that area as selected by the Provincial Commissioner. Not only was the purpose of the Coutts investigation important but so was the manner in which it was to be carried out, for Africans were given every opportunity to express their views on the subject and to relate the feelings of their particular tribe or community.

The Coutts Report favoured a qualitative franchise coupled with a system of multiple voting. The Commissioner was not in favour of universal adult suffrage for the African, although he did support the use of the secret ballot. Among the ten different voting qualifications that the report originally proposed, were included those based on age (twenty-one years), education, income or property, and long and efficient public service. Thus the age qualification plus two other 'points' would qualify a person for one vote while each additional point over the first three would mean a further vote. The number of qualifying points was later reduced by a Kenya White Paper to seven and the franchise restrictions eased. Age
and one additional point were all that were needed for one vote and a maximum of three votes was permitted under the multiple voting system. The date of March, 1957, was set as the time of the first elections under this new system.

The African while agreeing to the principle of elective representation, sought universal suffrage—man, one vote. In Legco, Eliud Mathu commented on this matter when he stated:

...the Commissioner himself mentions in his report that every witness that came before him did demand that they wanted adult suffrage. I think he recognized that, and if there is an almost unanimous demand in this case, I think it would be right and proper for the Commission and the Government to concede to this request, so that we may once and for all remove any feeling of frustration among the African community in achieving the right of citizenship.31

The Africans, recognizing the significance of these measures, certainly did not reject the Report, however, for Mr. Arap Moi, said that "I attach great importance to this Bill, because it opens the way to a healthier political destiny of the African people in Kenya."32 Indicative perhaps of a slowly changing attitude of some official and unofficial Europeans was the view expressed by Chief Secretary Turnbull, who declared: "As for the election of men who are informed and responsible we should, I think, allow the electorate credit for some discrimination in this matter."33 In June, 1955, following the approval of the Coutts Report, Africans again were allowed to form political organizations, although only on a district basis. Thus, the
events of 1955 offered prospects for increased African political activity, although Mr. Mathu said, "from our point of view we look at it as only a temporary measure, and that it will have to be put right in due course." While the Colonial Office did not introduce any long range policies for the Colony, certain steps had been taken which granted greater responsibility to Africans. At the same time, this policy was gradually breaking down the powerful political position of the settlers.

In October, 1956, elections were held for Europeans and the sharp differences in opinion within the European community became apparent. Three distinct European political groups contested the election, each with different racial policies. The Kenya Empire Party which had changed its name to the Federal Independence Party strongly favoured total European control of the country. It supported apartheid—partition into white and black communities—despite the fact that such a policy of isolation would only further stimulate African nationalism. Michael Blundell's United Country Party contested the election on a platform of multi-racialism based on association rather than actual integration. Responsible African opinion was particularly interested to see how Blundell would fare and how multi-racialism would be implemented. The third group, Independent Group headed by Group Captain L.R. Briggs, adopted the slogan Merit and Ability, shunted aside any form of racial cooperation, and failed to
formulate any policy to implement its principles. Mr. Briggs, in splitting with Michael Blundell, was highly critical of the Lyttelton Constitution for he considered that it had been 'foisted' upon Kenya. That the European settlement in Kenya was not yet prepared to accept racial cooperation in government was indicated by the election results. The Independent Group won eight seats in the new legislature while the United Country Party gained six representatives. The Kenya Federal Independence Party failed to win a seat.

Following the European elections, Africans for the first time in East Africa, were elected directly to the Kenya legislature in 1957. This was a direct outcome of the principle expounded in the Coutts Report which recognized the existence of three races in Kenya, and suggested that "any thesis that one of those races must be entirely dominant or that the future of East Africa lies in Apartheid would render my proposals futile since they are based on the concept of partnership." Thus, under the qualifications outlined by the Coutts Report more than 100,000 African voters cast ballots. The main issues expounded by the candidates included a demand for increased education, greater representation in Legco, permitting the entry of only those immigrants who were going to help Africans, and assistance for the African through loans. The main theme of most of the candidates
and particularly of Tom Mboya, was: "I will aim at the creation of democracy on the principle of one man one vote, and a majority rule." The influence of nationalism elsewhere in Africa had a significant effect on the campaign, for only three days before balloting commenced in Nairobi, Ghana gained its independence. This event greatly sparked the intensification of nationalist outcries by the candidates and increased the hostility both to the Lyttelton constitution and to the white man. At the same time it foretold an increase in agitation for greater responsibility along the lines of that achieved by the African in Ghana.

The results of the African elections in which there were only 610 rejected ballots, saw all but two of the sitting members rejected by the electorate. This was a repudiation of their association with the Government and its policy of partnership. The preeminence amongst the tribes switched from the Kikuyu to the Luo, (See Appendix II) and brought to the forefront Tom Mboya as the spokesman for African nationalism in Kenya with his continued demand for 'undiluted democracy'.

While Africans were actively engaging in political campaigning for the first time, the European community did not remain inactive. In January, 1957, a parliamentary delegation from the United Kingdom, led by Sir Thomas Dugdale arrived in Kenya. This group was highly critical of the system of racial and communal voting in Kenya. In a memo to
Mr. Dugdale, Michael Blundell reiterated just how far he was willing to go in promoting a policy of multi-racialism:

I must emphasize to you that African nationalism in a country such as this is a disruptive and not a cohesive force, because once it has achieved its objective, which is the seizing of power, it would disintegrate into tribal forces, which are still a strong feature in our country's life. I therefore believe that we have got to educate the European community to the concept of a qualitative and selective common franchise based on standards and education, so that political problems begin to move away from the racial angle, on to those of common interests whatever the race may be.37

Blundell clearly recognized the danger of granting 'undiluted democracy' to the African at this time. At the same time, he foresaw the need to bring more and more Africans into responsible positions to prepare them for eventual independence. His position, however, offended both European conservatives and African nationalists. Thus, shortly before the African elections, the United Country Party died a natural death and some unity was reestablished within the European community. At the same time, European tactics and thinking tended to switch from a position favouring the maintenance of white supremacy to one intent on finding safeguards for minorities within the constitution in the changing political atmosphere of the country. The more nationalistic Africans refused to consider safeguards and refused to join the Government or cooperate with the Lyttelton constitution. They wanted increased representation together with more ministerial responsibility and for this reason an impasse was reached.
By May, 1957, increased African agitation caused some concern in the Colony and aroused fears that a renewal of Mau Mau terrorism might occur. Speeches by Tom Mboya and other nationalists became more and more inflammatory and threatened to lead to violence. For this reason, the Government decided to maintain stricter control in the Colony and keep a watchful eye on African political meetings. The Colonial Office outlined its policy when the Secretary of State declared that "the Government wish to make it clear that they are resolved and prepared to deal promptly and firmly with any sign of incitement to undermine or defy authority or to threaten security." Africans were by this stage claiming twenty-three seats in Legco and were refusing to accept ministerial appointments until this demand was met. It had become apparent that the Lyttelton constitution without African cooperation was a failure. Finally, European and Asian ministers, recognizing the hopelessness of the constitutional deadlock, resigned from the Government to give the Secretary of State a free hand to return to the constitutional position prior to the Emergency.

The new Secretary of State, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, therefore, agreed to travel to the Colony in the fall of 1957 to attempt to resolve the deadlock. On his arrival he remarked that "I have reached the disappointing conclusion that local agreement is not in sight." He reluctantly declared that the Lyttelton constitution was unworkable and
that he was now free to create a new plan for the government of the country. He recognized that "on merits the African population is under-represented, in terms of members returned by a communal electorate, in relation to the other groups." This statement of course completely contradicted the findings of his predecessor who had declared that no change in the composition of Legco was to be considered until 1960. This points up the fact that in 1954, the Colonial Office entirely underestimated the growth and strength of African nationalism in the Colony.

Six additional seats were created for African members as a result of the new constitutional proposals, while two African Ministers were to be selected to hold the Portfolios of Housing, and of Adult education and Community Development. The new Legislative Council, therefore, was to consist of thirty-six constituency-elected members comprised of fourteen Africans, fourteen Europeans, six Asians and two Arabs. In addition, between three and six undersecretaries were to be appointed of which at least two would be African, with one Asian and one Arab. A unique feature of Lennox-Boyd's plan was the creation of twelve new seats to be known as Specially Elected Seats. These were to include four Europeans, four Africans, One Arab, and three Asians (one Muslim, and two non-Muslims). The twelve Specially Elected Seats were to be filled through an election by the whole membership of the Legislative Council. The method of nomination was laid
down in a separate White Paper which stated that the proposer and seconder must be members of Legco and be supported by three other members. Existing members of Legco would be eligible for nomination, and voting would be by free and secret ballot. The Secretary of State believed that these newly created seats would add considerably to the non-government side of the house. "Provision will be made," he added, "to ensure that His Excellency will at all times be able to appoint such numbers of nominated members as will secure an adequate Government majority."

In an effort to make multi-racialism work in the country the Secretary of State proposed the establishment of a Council of State "to protect any one community against discriminatory legislation harmful to its interests." In announcing this proposal Mr. Lennox-Boyd asserted:

I believe that these arrangements should command the support of responsible people of all communities; I pray that they will give to the people of Kenya of all races an opportunity for constructive and co-operative endeavour and a long period of stability and peace.

This Council of State did not, however, mean that a bi-cameral system had been established in Kenya. The Council had the power to examine any bill introduced in Legco and could offer an amendment to it but the Secretary of State ultimately made the decision as to whether or not the legislation might be annulled. The Council of State was to be comprised of ten members nominated by the Governor and all decisions were to be by majority vote. In an Order-in-Council further defining
In this Part of this Order the expression 'differentiating measure' means any Bill or instrument any of the provisions of which are, or are likely in their practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of other such communities, either directly, by prejudicing persons of that community, or indirectly, by giving an advantage to persons of another community.45

The new constitution revealed some changes in European thinking both at Whitehall and at Nairobi. The Colonial Office in granting increased responsibility to the African was clearly influenced in its actions by the recent change in Ghana. The growing strength and increased demands of Julius Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union also pointed up the nationalist fervour that was sweeping the country. It was apparent that the Colonial Office was not entirely aloof from the growing momentum of the independence movement. At the same time, however, the peculiar political climate in Kenya was reflected in the new proposals. The settler group still maintained considerable power in the Legislative Council, particularly since they had a strong voice in the elections for the Specially Elected seats. With the cloud of Mau Mau still hanging over the Colony the new constitution indicated a continuing uncertainty as to how fast and in what direction the constitutional development of the country should go. For this reason, all the demands of the African leaders were not met. The Europeans, therefore, recognizing that the constitution still assured them of political predominance accepted the new arrangement but
the African representatives rejected it.

As in 1954, the Africans were bitter over the fact that the constitution was imposed upon them without giving them the opportunity of reaching a common settlement. Tom Mboya commented on the new constitution: "In opposing his [Mr. Lennox-Boyd's] policy, we have not attempted to impose our views on anybody; all we have sought are roundtable talks to try to reach agreement between all the communities -- Hindus, Muslims, Arabs, Europeans and Africans....All we demanded was the right to negotiate." The attitudes and actions of Tom Mboya, the dominant Kenya nationalist, became more vociferous at this stage as a result of a trip to Ghana in March, 1958, to attend that country's independence celebrations. There could be little doubt that the momentum of Kenya's nationalist movement increased considerably in tempo at this time. The success of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana significantly affected Mboya's own policies. It became clear that the Kenya independence movement was not divorced from similar movements elsewhere in Africa. The success achieved in Ghana encouraged Kenya leaders and caused them to push for greater political gains while minimizing the concessions they had won from the Colonial Office. As more and more responsibility was granted to the Africans, the stakes for African cooperation in the Government were raised. This attitude not only caused political instability in Kenya, but
also created a controversial issue in the British House of Commons.

The refusal of the Africans to accept the Lennox-Boyd plan was used by the Opposition in the House of Commons to criticize Government policy. The Secretary of State, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, declared that "the settlement I have announced will commend itself to men of good will of all races, and I am content to wait to see how the pattern unfolds." The former Secretary of State in the Labour Government, Mr. Creech-Jones, asked "would it not ease the situation if Her Majesty's Government could make a declaration that their ultimate purpose is the establishment of a political democracy in Kenya, with safeguards for the minorities so that we do not shelter behind ambiguous words like 'multi-racial' and 'partnership communities'?" Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that "I do not foresee a date at this moment when it would be possible for the Colonial Office to relinquish control."

The issue of what the ultimate status was to be for Kenya was to be a source of much controversy during the next two years. In September, 1958, increased pressure was mounted on both the Kenya nationalist movement and the Colonial Office policy. Under the initiative of Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, a three day conference was held at Mwanza, Tanganyika, with twenty-one African political leaders from Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Nyasaland. As a result of this meeting the Pan-African Freedom
Movement of East and Central Africa was formed. The object of the gathering, dominated by Tom Mboya, and Nyerere, was to coordinate nationalist programmes and to speed up 'liberation' in East and Central Africa. The delegates asserted that in this process they were against white racialism and black chauvinism and they proposed to work for "true parliamentary democracy". In the meantime, the policies of the Secretary of State pointed up the empirical nature of the Colonial Office in respect to Kenya, for the new proposals were to be instituted on a wait and see basis.

In Kenya, elections to the Specially Elected Seats took place on April 22, 1958. Consistent with their opposition to the constitution, the African constituency elected members refused to participate. In spite of this attitude eight Africans appeared as candidates, although Mr. Mboya and his associates denounced them as "stooges, quislings and black Europeans...traitors to the African cause." To further their hostility to the constitution Mboya and other African members boycotted Legco and were fined for defamation although acquitted on a charge of conspiracy. These charges only increased African feeling against the Lennox-Boyd arrangements. Commenting on this case, The Times remarked: "The regrettable feature of the case is the political taint that it inevitably acquired. Sections of African opinion have hardened against the Lennox-Boyd constitution because of the cries of 'victimization' that have been associated with this prosecution."
Towards the end of the year the Secretary of State declared that "he could not contemplate radical changes in the constitution." When Legco reopened in November the Governor declared in his opening remarks to the new session that "as it is now constituted, the Government can, and if necessary will, carry on the administration of the country: the basic constitutional position of the colony remains unchanged." With this statement which the Africans considered virtually ignored their demands, all the native representatives walked out of the council chambers. The Times, indicating growing concern over the deteriorating situation in Kenya, commented that the boycott "itself might have serious political consequences, in that it would deprive the African community of constitutional means of expressing opposition to proposals they do not like...." Mr. Mboya defended the African action when he said that "the British Government refuses to define this ultimate objective clearly because it refuses to accept the implication that a democratic society will inevitably reflect the overwhelming preponderance of African members." Colin Legum, the African correspondent for The Observer, agreed with Mr. Mboya when he wrote early in 1959 that "the constitutional deadlock has been precipitated by the British Government's refusal to define Kenya's ultimate status in the same forthright terms as for Uganda and Tanganyika." Group Captain Briggs outlined his party's policy towards the African boycott when he declared in the Kenya
Weekly News that:

I am convinced that, unless the Europeans rouse themselves and once again make themselves felt as a political force, conditions will become increasingly intolerable for us all. There is no need for alarm, there is no need for despondency, but there is a great need for our community to assert their leadership once again. 58

By the end of 1958 it was quite obvious that the Lennox-Boyd constitution was unworkable and that again an impasse had been reached between the European and African communities. Clearly this arrangement was transitional, but it failed to alter the basic power relationships within the country. The restrictions of the Emergency hampered the constitutional development of a country-wide African nationalist movement and tended to reinforce tribal feelings. In this respect the Luo had come to dominate African politics with the formation of the Luo Union in 1958, the largest tribal union in East Africa. In addition, it was the Luo tribesmen such as Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga who were at the forefront of the nationalist movement in Kenya.

At the same time, a greater fissure had developed within the European community as a result of the multi-racial policies of the Colonial Office. Both the European moderates and conservatives by 1958 were becoming increasingly conscious of the reality of African nationalism in Kenya. The younger settlers began to recognize the fact that after Ghana had become independent, African rule throughout the continent south of the Sahara was an inevi-
itability. In multi-racialism they saw a suitable means of maintaining some influence in the government without arousing the overt hostility of the African leaders. To the pioneer settlers in Kenya, however, the slowly evolving policies of the Colonial Office clearly threatened both their physical and economic security in the Colony. The conservatives were unwilling to accept the inevitability of black rule in Kenya and looked on any increase in African power as a danger to the stability of the country. Their pride in the achievements they had made over several decades and a desire to see their privileged position maintained obscured their vision of the momentous changes that were taking place within the African continent. Thus, the multi-racial constitution rather than easing tensions among Africans and Europeans, merely aggravated them. The Colonial Secretary had failed to take into account the rapid growth in African political consciousness, and the vigour of the nationalist movement. In attempting to reconcile all the conflicting interests of the racial groups within a multi-racial constitution, Mr. Lennox-Boyd rejected any increase in actual power for the Africans. The division within the European community had made the Colonial Secretary's task that much more difficult. While weakening the European cause, this split also increased the reluctance of the Imperial Government to relinquish control to a divided European community. Mr. Rosberg has commented that this fact "demonstrates
that no clearly defined community of interests has existed between the Imperial Power and the European settler group, and reflects the essentially empirical character of British colonial policy in Kenya.°

The failure of the British Government to establish some definite plans as to the ultimate future of the Colony caused concern and suspicions in all parts of the community. Both European and African expressed fear and doubt about the unknown future which lay ahead as the country slowly evolved towards a self-governing state. Owing to the racial agitation within the country and the maintenance of the Emergency regulations it was obvious that the Imperial Government could not yet abandon its ultimate authority. A view expressed in The Times in April, 1959, indicated the feeling that was growing throughout Kenya and Britain. "The time is coming," it declared, "when a detailed policy statement ought to be made." The year 1959, therefore, was to be one of transition and change in the Colonial Office as well as in Kenya Colony. It was the last year of the Emergency, the period which saw the birth of vigorous new political parties, and the time when the name of Jomo Kenyatta was once again to be heard and invoked to spark the nationalist drive in Kenya.

During 1958 and 1959 several new political parties emerged in Kenya full of confidence and ambition but most were lacking in any real national appeal. Perhaps the most
Influential political organization was that formed by Tom Mboya in Nairobi in 1958. The establishment of the Nairobi 61 Peoples' Convention Party with its slogan of 'Forward ever, backward never', marked the real beginning of a concerted effort by Tom Mboya to become the best known African nationalist in Kenya. Using all the organizational methods of any modern political party and following the model of Nkrumah's party in Ghana, the NPCP became the forerunner of a nationalist country-wide political party. Organized around the basic cell unit, Mboya's party formed both women and youth wings. In addition, to handle publicity and propaganda, the party established its own newspaper with the appealing name of 'Uhuru' or freedom. Although legally a district association based in Nairobi, the NPCP cells spread to the Central Province, Nyanza, and the Coast Province, and it began to attract a country-wide following. It gained considerable strength and publicity through its attitude towards the Specially Elected Seats and its criticism of the eight Africans who stood for election for these seats. The trial and subsequent acquittal on the charge of conspiracy in May, 1958, increased Mboya's own political position and established him as the dominant voice of Kenya African nationalism.

In Central Nyanza another powerful Luo, Oginga-Odinga, built up a political organization called the African District Association. Odinga, perhaps Mboya's greatest pol-
itical rival, is a shrewd and politically able individual who uses bizarre and gaudy methods to attract what Michael Blundell considers to be the uninhibited, flamboyant streak which lies in many Africans. Like Mboya, Odinga was an African nationalist who saw independence under African rule as the ultimate and inevitable goal in Kenya. Both Mboya and Odinga aimed for the leadership of an independent Kenya and they realized that perhaps the most effective rallying cry of African nationalism was to evoke the name of Jomo Kenyatta.

It was therefore, at a most opportune moment in the independence movement that certain events occurred in the detention camps, which still stood as reminders of the tragic uprisings in 1952. In the spring of 1958 some eleven Mau Mau detainees at the Hola Camp died under mysterious circumstances. Their deaths were originally attributed to contaminated drinking water but this was later proved to be untrue. Owing to the tremendous uproar in Great Britain that was created by this tragedy, a full investigation was launched and a White Paper was issued documenting the events. Mr. W.H. Goudie, Senior Resident Magistrate in Mombasa reported to the investigating committee, that "there was a very considerable amount of beating of detainees by warders with batons solely for the purpose of compelling them to work or punishing them for refusing to work." The magistrate considered this action to be "entirely unjustified and illegal." The committee
in its findings declared that Mr. Sullivan, Superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service "acted with gross dereliction in the performance of... [his] duties as Officer in charge of Hola Special Detention Camp." The assistant Superintendent, Mr. Coutts, was found to have "failed to prevent members of the said service under... [his] orders from unlawfully assaulting in... [his] presence some or all of the said detainees." Similar mistreatment of detainees has been related by Joseph Mwangi Kariuki, a Mau Mau detainee for more than six years. In his recently published book he recalls the words of his Camp Commandant, a Mr. Buxton, who declared to the detainees:

You people--I want you to realize once and for all that I am the Camp Officer and Rehabilitation Officer. I am the Governor and District Commissioner of Lodwar. I am the God of Lodwar. I am absolutely ready to deal with you all in any way I think fit until you obey orders.

Several other incidents involving personal experiences of Mr. Kariuki indicated that considerable mistreatment of detainees had in fact occurred in camps where the so-called 'hard core' Mau Mau were being held.

Seized upon by the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the Hola Camp incident was used as an effective lever with which to pry the Government into altering its Colonial policy with regards to Kenya. As a result, much publicity was given to the case of the mistreatment of the detainees, and public opinion was aroused in the country. Such incidents did little to encourage support
for the maintenance of white political supremacy in Kenya, and contributed to a changing climate of opinion in the House of Commons. While the Labour Party was calling for the resignation of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, over the Hola incident, African political leaders did not remain idle. In June, 1958, Oginga Odinga, the member of Legco for Central Nyanza, referred to the men held in the detention camps as respected leaders, and he mentioned the name of Kenyatta in particular. The power of the Kenyatta name was soon seized upon by Arwings-Kodhek, leader of the Nairobi District African Congress, and by Tom Mboya's People's Convention Party. The campaign launched by Mboya for the release of Kenyatta resulted in the People's Convention Party's newspaper being banned and thirty-nine party members being arrested in 1959. It was clear that the cult of Kenyatta was developing, and the man convicted of managing Mau Mau was being hailed as a freedom fighter of the calibre of Nkrumah.

In the eyes of many Kenya Africans Kenyatta was looked upon with considerable favour and admiration. The real violence of Mau Mau did not occur until after he was imprisoned, and for this reason he did not become associated so closely with the ugly side of Mau Mau. His commitment to the Africans of Kenya was simply to gain independence and the benefits that many Africans wrongly associated with 'liberation'. Because of this favourable image,
in the eyes of the African, that surrounded Kenyatta, it became imperative for Mboya and other nationalists to openly praise Kenyatta and urge his release. It was evident that for most prominent nationalists it would be political suicide to dull the aura surrounding Jomo Kenyatta.

The leading Kikuyu politician and member of Legco was Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, who received his higher education at the University of California in Berkeley. Like Mboya, Dr. Kiano praised Kenyatta as the real African leader of Kenya. Although vigorously in favour of African independence, Dr. Kiano was convinced that proposals had to be presented to protect Asian and European minorities. On the other hand, he recognized his own vulnerable political position, and opposed Michael Blundell's policies for a multi-racial government, for in 1959 he said Kenya must be led by Africans within four or five years. In his political speeches: "He attacks Europeans who have one foot in Kenya and one foot in Britain, and Indians who keep one foot in India. Kiano is antagonistic toward Indians who, he says, send their money to India...." To this end he agreed with Michael Blundell in the need to create a common Kenya citizenship for all permanent residents of the country. The encouragement of such a measure by the Europeans clearly was a gesture of sincerity in efforts to create greater understanding and cooperation with the Africans. It would not, however, upset any pockets
of prestige or political power.

By raising the name of Kenyatta with such praiseworthy remarks, the African leaders only increased the Europeans' fear for the future. To many Europeans in the Colony and particularly the more conservative settlers, the name of Jomo Kenyatta embodied all that was vicious, bizarre and anti-European. Concern for their future security in the Colony was their immediate reaction to any talk of releasing Kenyatta. To the African, however, this question aroused an opposite reaction. In January, 1959 the Africans boycotted the Legislative Council, refusing to return until they had received a guarantee that constitutional talks and a consideration of the release of Kenyatta would be held in the near future. It was at this point that Michael Blundell played his hand. Having resigned in 1958 from his constituency to take one of the Specially Elected Seats, he declared in March, 1959, that it would be "unwise" to reject a conference on the constitutional question. Hoping to gain increased support from the African electorate by supporting Mboya's demands for a conference, Blundell resigned from his post as Minister of Agriculture in the Kenya Government on April 2, 1959. He then proceeded to form a new party labelled the New Kenya Group which was comprised of all the Specially Elected Members, the nominated members, and ten European representatives. The policies of the new group were based on the recognition that Africans would ultimately govern Kenya. To this end Blundell favoured the opening up
of the White Highlands, the creation of a common roll on a selective franchise, and the ending of all racial barriers.

The birth of the New Kenya Group once again created a sharp division among the Europeans and aroused bitter feelings. African reaction to Blundell's liberalism was more sympathetic but Africans saw Blundell as standing only midway between white supremacy and African nationalism. Commenting on the New Kenya Group, Tom Mboya remarked: "They were courageous enough to recognize the coming change, but not brave enough to acknowledge its full impact." By 1959, the radical difference in opinion between the European and the African, clearly indicated that multi-racialism had no hope of success in the governmental process in Kenya. Blundell's group had little support outside Legco, for the African mistrusted it, and supported the nationalist movements under African leaders while most of the Europeans favoured the more conservative policies of Mr. Briggs. As one European farmer put it to Mr. Blundell: "I am quite sure that what you are trying to do is the best hope for the future, but there is a very definite limit to the extent to which even the most liberally minded people are willing to follow you, and I do hope you will recognize it." It became even clearer that multi-racialism was dead when no African or Asian constituency members signed the New Kenya Group's policy statement. The Asians saw that it was in their best interests to support full African independence.
in the hope that the Africans would accept such support in return for the continuation of the vital role of the Asian in the Kenya economy. At the same time, the Asians did not wish to be accused of hindering the African independence movement.

Those Europeans bitterly opposed to Blundell's policies formed a new party under the leadership of Group Captain Briggs. This group was composed of the old independent group as well as former members of the Federal Independence Party and became known as the United Party. This organization favoured the ending of the Legislative Council and its replacement by an advisory council of all races to discuss legislation with the Government. Thus, in less than a decade many in the European community had switched from demands for full self-government to a position quite opposed to self-government.

The sprouting of political parties in the Colony continued in July, 1959, when the Kenya National Party was formed. Backed by a group of ten African Elected Members led by Masinde Muliro, this new party was supported by six Asian members of Legco and one European representative, the independently minded Mr. S.V. Cooke. As a multi-racial party, the Kenya National Party favoured immediate independence as opposed to the New Kenya Group which believed independence was at least ten years away. Soon after another and far more important political organization came into being.
The prominent leaders of both the Luo and Kikuyu tribes, representing about forty-five percent of all Africans, joined together in August to form the Kenya Independence Movement (KIM). With the slogan of 'uhuru' the party adopted a platform which sought a common roll on a universal franchise with reserved seats for minorities, and a definite date for Kenya's independence. With Odinga as its president and Mboya as its secretary the KIM wanted the White Highlands to be immediately opened for African settlement, and it urged the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. Limited to African membership only, the KIM was the immediate predecessor of the nationalist party which was to bring Kenya independence little more than four years later. In November the Kenya National Party restricted its membership to Africans and it became the forerunner of a nationalist party which was to attract the smaller tribes of Kenya in opposition to the union of the two largest tribes in the country. With the formation of these two African independence movements it became ever clearer that African political leaders wanted no part in multi-racial government.

While political parties were springing up like weeds, diplomatic and constitutional negotiations were taking place both in Nairobi and London. In Kenya demands were being made by African leaders for a round-table conference to outline the country's ultimate status. Greater
impetus was added to this demand in January, 1959, when a meeting of the Governors of the East African territories was held at Chequers. The Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Richard Turnbull, was mounting increased pressure on the Colonial Office for constitutional advance in his country. It followed that should such advance be granted conditions in Kenya would be affected. The British Government still had no firm plans as to the future status of the East African territories. It was suggested, however, that Tanganyika could look forward to independence, about 1970 and Uganda soon after. Independence for Kenya was not foreseen before 1975 at the earliest. To frustrate further African demands the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, reiterated his stand that no conference would be held to deal with the constitutional deadlock in the Colony.

In the Congo, Belgian policy had made a sudden reversal which was to lead to independence in that country within little more than a year. At the same time, the United States reaffirmed its support of the aspirations of the African nationalist movements in their struggle for independence. In the British press, pressure was mounting for greater autonomy for the Kenya African. The Telegraph at the end of January accepted the fact that "no one disputes now that before very long the Africans will predominate and that eventual universal suffrage will be achieved." Labour Member of Parliament Mr. Dingle Foot, held similar
views which he expressed in this manner:

There must at some stage be a declaration of the ultimate aim of British rule in Kenya. This will never be acceptable to the overwhelming African majority unless it consists of self-government on the basis of universal suffrage.\textsuperscript{79}

That some change in British policy in Kenya was slowly taking place was perhaps foreshadowed in March when The Times commented on the future of Kenya:

It is certainly high time that Kenya faced up to the introduction of some form of common roll in the constituencies. In this matter Kenya is rapidly becoming anachronistic....Very big concessions have been made to the Africans, yet the blame for their hostility to the present constitution cannot be laid exclusively at their door.\textsuperscript{30}

Clearly, British policy in Kenya was rapidly reaching a critical point and it was inevitable that a change in direction was soon to take place.

In Parliament the first of two debates on Kenya within a month occurred in March, 1959, indicating the increased tempo of events in Kenya and the growing concern in Britain. Commenting again on the question of a constitutional conference the Secretary of State for the Colonies while maintaining his opposition to it did indicate that certain negotiations might be possible. Such talks, he added, could be held "only if preliminary consultations between all concerned showed that such a course seemed the best way to carry things further towards an agreement within the general ambit of the present constitution on those elements in it which are susceptible to
alteration." Mr. Lennox-Boyd, however, continued inflexible in his stand against discussions on a new constitution in spite of growing support for such a settlement. Mr. Dingle Foot expressed a realistic opinion when he told Parliament that: "To believe that we can preserve the present position of racial groups in Kenya for a number of years to come is, I suggest, a complete illusion."

Delegations of British Members of Parliament visited Kenya in increasing numbers while Kenyans expressed their points of view in visits to London. In most instances it was recommended that the Secretary of State establish a timetable for the future status of Kenya in order to reduce the growing tensions in the Colony. Oginga Odinga headed a delegation to London in March, 1959. In a letter written just prior to the arrival of his delegation, Odinga outlined the objectives of the Africans when he declared that "we need a definite statement that Kenya should now be set on the shortest road to full undiluted democracy." Within a month Mr. Lennox-Boyd outlined in the House of Commons the official policy of his Government with regards to Kenya.

In April, 1959, Mr. Lennox-Boyd declared to the House of Commons that:

The aim of Her Majesty's Government in Kenya as in other dependent territories, is to build a nation based on parliamentary institutions and enjoying responsible self government in conditions which secure for its people a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.... The responsibility of Her Majesty's Government is to all the inhabitants of Kenya of all races and
communities, both backward and advanced. It would be a betrayal of that responsibility if we were to abandon our ultimate authority prematurely. At this stage in Kenya's history our duty is to retain that authority but, in the exercise of it, to do everything we can to help the people of Kenya to create the conditions in which we shall eventually be able to hand it over with a good conscience.85

The conditions under which self-government would be granted to Kenya were outlined by the Secretary of State. These included responsibility in public affairs and an understanding of parliamentary institutions, sufficient understanding and cooperation between races, a competent and experienced civil service, and an independent government which must ensure its people a fair standard of living in an expanding economy. Mr. Lennox-Boyd concluded his speech by promising to convene a round-table constitutional conference before the 1960 Kenya general elections.

Clearly, the Colonial Office foresaw many more years of exercising control over a multi-racial Kenya government. In effect, Mr. Lennox-Boyd was voicing support for the policies advocated by Michael Blundell although the British Government still was not willing to grant increased authority to the African. To this end Mr. Blundell remarked: "I must issue a warning, that anything that is designed to shut out the African people from their reasonable expectations of taking a fuller responsibility in our affairs as the country expands and develops must be doomed to failure." The decision to hold a conference was a significant step forward and was a victory for the African politicians. For
the first time they were to sit around the conference table as equals, with the opportunity of expressing their views in a responsible manner. Indeed, it was important for the future of the country and quelled the earlier suspicions voiced in an editorial in the *East African Standard* which had declared:

The case against a round-table conference in Kenya has been based solely on its chances of success, and, therefore, its timing; not on the ultimate usefulness of a formal session....The prudent will remember the word 'never' has no meaning in politics, with its impossible ring of finality, for nothing in life itself is immutable. Mr. Lennox-Boyd would do well to think again, or, if the wrong impression of what he meant has got around, immediately issue a reassuring statement.87

It was with optimism, therefore, that most Kenyans greeted the Secretary's decision to hold the much-needed conference.

The tone that such a conference might take became apparent during the summer and autumn of 1959. That Mr. Blundell's policies had little support from the African leaders was made very clear from the comments of Tom Mboya following a meeting with Michael Blundell. On this matter Mboya declared: "My meeting with Mr. Blundell convinced me that there was no common ground between us, and there will be none until Mr. Blundell can publicly say that we are to establish in Kenya a parliamentary democracy based on common voters' roll—one man one vote franchise....Kenya's European community needs to face a complete revolution in their thinking...." For Michael Blundell this was in impossible position to adopt if he hoped to maintain a truly
multi-racial group. Many Europeans would not accept universal suffrage for the African, nor would they agree to open up the White Highlands to African settlement. Yet, Blundell was equally frustrated in his efforts to gain African support, for he had subscribed to both the 1954 and 1957 constitutions which African leaders had rejected. As The Observer commented: "One danger is that his bid for an inter-racial front of moderates will intensify the frustrations of the African nationalists. He clearly stands little chance of winning their support."

The position firmly held by the Kenya Independence Movement was succinctly explained by its president Oginga Odinga, when he declared in the fall of 1959: "That Kenya will be ruled by the African majority is inevitable and it will be to the advantage of the immigrants to accept this now and not later." Thus, the battle lines had been drawn in preparation for the vital constitutional conference that was to be held in early 1960. A new order in Kenya affairs was being formed which was to bring independence to the East African country within four years.

The gradual change in British policy in Kenya and the willingness to hold a constitutional conference with Africans included as official delegates could be attributed in large part to developments in Tanganyika, which had aroused great anxiety among the extreme conservative Europeans in Kenya. Under the able leadership of
Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union, formed in 1954, Tanganyika was promised in the summer of 1959 responsible government immediately following the 1960 general election which had been previously scheduled for 1962. The new Legislative Council was to have seventy-one elected members; fifty of these seats to be open to members of any race; eleven seats reserved for Asians; and ten seats reserved for Europeans; as well as a small number of nominated seats. Voting qualifications for both men and women were to be: ability to read and write in English or Swahili; possession of an annual income of at least £75; or a present or past holder of a prescribed office. A promise was given that the Executive Government would be re-formed after the general election on the basis of an unofficial majority. In London, Lord Perth, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, commented: "Sooner or later we have to take the plunge with all our territories in Africa....We believe this will set a pattern for others."

This significant development in Tanganyika clearly intensified pressure mounted in Kenya Africans on the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office had clarified its vision of the future for its colonies in Africa and Kenya was to follow the general pattern adopted in Tanganyika. The momentum of the nationalist movement combined with the new British policy in Tanganyika meant that Kenya nationalists would vigorously renew their demands and not relax them
until independence had been proclaimed. For the conservative Europeans the victory for Julius Nyerere was a bitter defeat for their own aspirations in Kenya. It forced them to adopt new tactics to meet the change—a change which they reluctantly admitted was now inevitable.

As the nineteen-fifties drew to a close it was clear that the Africans had won a number of concessions from the British Government. Their concerted drive to gain a more equitable share in government had indeed met with considerable success. This was due in part to the abilities of Tom Mboya. More significantly, however, constitutional progress was due to the victories of nationalist movements in other parts of Africa. Tom Mboya received his inspiration from Kwame Nkrumah. The Kenya nationalists as a whole were encouraged by African success in achieving political responsibility in Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo, and Tanganyika. These changes perhaps had the greatest influence both on the African nationalists in Kenya and on Colonial Office policy as it affected Kenya. To a lesser extent, moderate Europeans such as Michael Blundell and Ernest Vassey aided this progress by contributing to the creation of a new climate of opinion in the Colony. They recognized the force which African nationalism represented and it was owing to their foresight that the majority of Kenya Europeans by 1959 were willing to accept the fact that the African must inevitably govern
Kenya. Mistrusted by both African and European, Blundell, nevertheless, was instrumental, not in winning supporters to his party, but in stirring new thoughts in the minds of Europeans who were unsure of their future role in Kenya.

The Colonial Office throughout the nineteen-fifties was willing to grant concessions to the Africans in an effort to pacify their growing political consciousness. In so doing, however, the British Government had been reluctant to alter the basic power relationship within the Legislative Council. That the two Secretaries of State as well as the Governor recognized the tremendous force of Kenya African nationalism, however, was not fully apparent during this period. No clearly defined programme for increasing African responsibility was introduced. Instead, steps were adopted which were born out of the events occurring elsewhere in Africa rather than out of any farsighted policy. Yet, in spite of the uncertain policies of the Colonial Office, constitutional and political progress was made in Kenya. By 1959 new attitudes were emerging which were to result in responsible discussions by all races on the future of Kenya. With this prospect the final phase in Kenya's struggle for independence was about to unfold.
NOTES


4 Mboya, op.cit., p. 19.


7 Ibid., col. 276.

8 Ibid., col. 282.

9 Ibid., cols. 283-284.


11 Blundell, op.cit., p. 123.

12 "It is interesting to note that when the settlers of Kenya were about to indulge in some desperate action to demonstrate their contempt for Colonial Office rule, they invariably prefaced it by singing 'God Save the Queen' or 'King', in order at the same time to show their loyalty." Blundell, op.cit., p. 124

13 The Unofficial Members Organization was formed in 1948 to bring together representatives of all races in the Opposition.

14 Blundell, op.cit., p. 145

16 Ibid., March 3, 1954, vol. 59, col. 466
17 Blundell, op. cit., pp. 155-156
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 Blundell, op. cit., p. 165.
24 Blundell, op. cit., p. 178.
25 Ibid., p. 181.
26 Edwin S. Munger reported from Kenya in March, 1955, on the split in the European front. "About 20% of the Europeans appear to support the apartheid-minded Federal Independence Party, although the noise it makes would suggest more backing. Another 30% of the Europeans are behind Blundell and his United Country Party, restricted to Europeans but dedicated to racial cooperation in government. There remain 55% of the European electorate who are not apathetic to party politics but simply deplore that they have arisen. They would like to see one large amorphous European party with as few full-time politicians as possible, but are now inclined to support Blundell in a showdown although they criticize him the rest of the time." Munger, op. cit., p. 249.
27 Blundell, op. cit., p. 214
30 The form of selection of African representatives in the past was based on delegates being despatched from locational councils to form district advisory nomination committees. Each of these committees sent up to five of their numbers to form an advisory nominational college for
the electoral area and then the college voted by secret ballot on the candidates. From this final list of names presented to him, the Governor then appointed the members to Legco. It was, therefore, a form of indirect election.


32 Ibid., col. 220.

33 Ibid., col. 236.

34 Ibid., col. 213.


36 Ibid., p. 448.


40 Ibid., p. 3.


42 Cmnd. 309, op. cit., p. 3.

43 Ibid., p. 4.

44 Loc. cit.

45 Cmnd. 369, op. cit., p. 4.

46 The Observer, December 4, 1958.


49 Loc. cit.,
50 Ibid., col. 1115.


52 The Times, June 12, 1958.


54 Africa Digest, vol. 6 (November-December, 1958), p. 91.

55 The Times, November 7, 1958.

56 The Observer, December 4, 1958.


60 The Times Weekly Review, April 16, 1959.

61 Mboya chose this name for his party because it was so similar to that name used by Kwame Nkrumah. In Ghana it was the Convention People's Party which ultimately achieved African independence.


64 Ibid., p. 14.

65 Ibid., p. 15.

66 Ibid., p. 31.

67 Loc. cit.

69 Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 144

70 After a split in the Nairobi District African Congress leadership, Argwings-Kodhek was defeated by Tom Mboya in the 1957 elections.

71 The prominent Kikuyu member of Legco, Dr. Kikonyo Kiano, mentioned this at the All African Peoples Conference in Accra in December, 1958. See Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 144.


73 *The Times*, March 16, 1959.


75 The farmer who commented was the chairman of the Government constituted Board of Agriculture. Blundell, *op.cit.*, p. 252.

76 Bennett, *op.cit.*, p. 145.

77 Blundell, *op.cit.*, p. 262.

78 *The Observer*, February 1, 1959


83 Small pockets of terrorists had reappeared which were similar to Mau Mau. Such groups included the Kiama Kia Mwingi and the Land Freedom Army. Quick Government action prevented these organizations from developing, and by 1963, more than 1500 persons had been convicted of illegal and subversive activities.


88 Africa Digest, vol. 7 (September, 1959), p. 15.

89 The Observer, May 24, 1959.


CHAPTER THREE
DEBATE AND DECISION 1960 - 1963

The pace of political and constitutional development in Kenya became greatly accelerated following the winning of self-government in Tanganyika, in 1960. This significant decision initiated a new British policy in East Africa and greatly influenced the final phase in Kenya's struggle for independence. Where the British Government did not lead in the encouragement of the growth of African political responsibility in the nineteen fifties, it did assume a prominent part in the movement towards independence in Kenya in the early sixties. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, gave formal acknowledgement to the new policy when he addressed the House of Assembly in Cape Town, South Africa, on February 3, 1960. In this memorable speech, he declared:

The most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness. In different places it may take different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through the continent.

Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it....

For as time passes and one generation yields to another, human problems change and fade. Let us remember these truths. Let us resolve to build not to destroy. And let us remember always that weakness comes from division, and strength from unity.
That the Prime Minister was touring the African continent clearly reflected the growing concern of the British Government in the affairs of its possessions in Africa. Mr. Macmillan's address recognized that a new Africa was emerging and that any attempt to frustrate the growth of this giant would not only be futile but tragic.

By its attitude towards African nationalism in the nineteen-fifties it was clear that the Colonial Office was unaware that a wind of change had been blowing in Africa for more than a decade before Mr. Macmillan's speech. However, the consistent demands of African leaders in Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanganyika, finally won acknowledgement by the Colonial Office. As a result, in 1960 official policy caught up with existing reality. The sudden change in British policy clearly influenced constitutional development in Kenya. Similarly the reaction of European settlers and African nationalists reflected the change in British policy.

Colonial policy in Kenya in the early nineteen-sixties was again clearly conditioned by constitutional developments elsewhere in Africa. The granting of independence to the Congo and the adoption of self-government in Tanganyika in 1960 necessitated a change in British policy in Kenya. As a consequence, direct negotiations with the Africans on the future status of the Colony were instituted at the Lancaster House Conference early in
1960. This marked British recognition of the equality of status of the African and helped to create a new attitude of cooperation between the African leaders and the Colonial Office.

The new British policy was able to be effectively instituted in Kenya without the hindrances of the Mau Mau Emergency. With the lifting of the Emergency regulations the affairs of the Colony could once again be conducted without restrictions. No longer were there political barriers to antagonize the African nationalists, nor was the threat of violence so great as it had been in the mid-nineteen-fifties, This political freedom created a much healthier atmosphere for negotiations between the races, while giving the Africans a chance to orient their political movements on a national basis.

With the acceptance of the inevitability of African rule in Kenya, the Colonial Office adjusted its policies to meet its changing role in the East African country. No longer was it a question of defining the ultimate status for Kenya. Rather it was a matter of determining when self-government and independence were to be granted to the Kenya Africans. It was a challenge to the Colonial Secretaries in the years 1960-1963 to prevent the independence movement from attaining its goals too hastily. In 1960 African leaders had little practical experience with which to support their demands
for immediate independence. Yet the taste of political activity which they had enjoyed during and following the 1957 campaign rekindled their insatiable appetite for complete political responsibility in Kenya. Reflecting on the tragic developments in the Congo following the hasty granting of full responsibility to the African, the Colonial Office negotiated strenuously with the African to prevent a similar occurrence in Kenya. This was a difficult task, for the African expected a rate of advancement similar to that in Tanganyika and the Congo despite the fact that fewer political difficulties had been experienced by Tanganyikans.

While attempting to cooperate with the African, the Colonial Office found its sudden change in policy unacceptable to a small but still vocal settler group. In this respect, public opinion in the United Kingdom had grown increasingly impatient with the self-interested demands of the conservative settlers who steadfastly refused to acknowledge their changed position in the Colony. Demands for special political privileges continued to hamper the gradual transfer of power to the African. Public opinion in Britain, however, demanded that no barriers be placed in the way of Kenya independence. The decision of the Colonial Office to accede to the demands of the Africans rather than those of the Europeans was, therefore, the result of a combination of political expediency and an
acceptance of the reality of African nationalism. The withdrawal of support for the political supremacy of the European in Kenya marked the end of the experiments in multi-racialism and the end of European dominance in Kenya.

The sudden reversal in British policy in Africa caught most Europeans in Kenya by surprise. The moderate Europeans such as Michael Blundell recognized the need for a reappraisal of British policy in the African colony but at the same time questioned the haste with which the transition in government was to take place. The conservative Europeans headed by Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck were outspokenly bitter over the decision of the British Government. To them the new policy was a betrayal of a decision made a half century earlier to make Kenya a 'white man's country'. As late as 1960 the old European settlers still hoped for the maintenance of their privileged political position in a country where they were overwhelmingly outnumbered. Steadfast supporters of parliamentary democracy with one man one vote, these Europeans continued their fight to deprive the African those same democratic rights. Cavendish-Bentinck, however, in his final efforts to salvage some minority rights in the Colony reversed his tactics in the final years preceding independence. Instead of directing his fight against the African he levelled harsh criticism at Blundell and the 'liberal' Europeans. In doing this Caven-
dish-Bentinck was indirectly acknowledging the inevitability of African rule in Kenya. Clearly, he saw that no satisfaction could be garnered from criticizing the African. Rather, he could blame the emergence of the new Kenya on the flexible position adopted by Blundell. These attacks tended to provide an outlet for the Europeans' frustration, insecurity, and fear.

It was not difficult for some to sympathize with the conservative Europeans in Kenya, for they had worked hard to achieve the favourable position many of them now enjoyed. Yet their antagonism towards their fellow Europeans only made more difficult the period of transition to independence. Their consideration of the future stability of Kenya seemed to stop with their own interests, rather than those of the whole country. Their reaction to the constitutional proposals of the Colonial Office indicated a refusal to adopt a national outlook or to consider themselves as Kenyans.

Their final effort to retain some vestige of the old Kenya was embodied in their reaction to the release of Jomo Kenyatta. To those few stubborn Europeans the imprisonment of Kenyatta symbolized the last contact with the old political structure of Kenya. As long as Kenyatta remained restricted Cavendish-Bentinck and his followers felt a certain sense of security--a feeling of power over the political affairs of the African. Yet,
with the release of Kenyatta the last dim hope for some prominent role in the politics of Kenya faded for the old settlers. An unwillingness to adapt to the realities of a new black Africa forced many of these Europeans to lose their dignity and sense of reality. Instead, their attitude blinded them and prevented them from looking on the post-independence period of Kenya's development with any sense of optimism. In their reactions to Colonial policy between 1960-1963 they were guided by fear--fear of what lay beyond independence.

While fear motivated the conservative Europeans to react with hostility to the British policy, the African attitude during 1960-1963 was strengthened by the rapid events in neighbouring countries. The nationalist movement in Kenya received much of its inspiration from the successful efforts of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Out of this association, however, the demands for independence tended to take on a new urgency. Kenya nationalists sought independence at the same time as Tanganyika despite the fact that political experience was considerably greater in Tanganyika. The goal of independence continued to be the African's only objective and little consideration was given to the problems of post-independence. Responsible African leaders, although recognizing the fact that independence would not solve all the difficulties of their people, had to bow to pressure
from below.

With the lifting of the Emergency regulations African national political parties once again could be formed. Initially this might have been a unifying force. By 1960, however, independence was within the grasp of the Africans and the benefits of one united country-wide party were considerably lessened. Instead with the approach of independence the African suddenly realized that he would be the master of his own affairs. Out of this realization emerged old tribal animosities based on a fear for tribal security. Traditional fear of the powerful Kikuyu, reinforced by the Mau Mau atrocities, created division within the nationalist movement. No longer could the common goal of independence serve as a unifying mechanism among the African tribes. A common hostility to the European had served a useful purpose in uniting the African in a common cause. With the European divorced from political responsibility a new scapegoat was needed for the difficulties of the Africans. For the smaller tribes the Luo-Kikuyu union served this purpose. Similarly, for the larger tribes it was the uncooperative attitude of the smaller tribal groupings which threatened the future political stability. Tribalism, the basic foundation of African society, emerged in the nineteen-sixties as the real threat to the future political stability of Kenya.
The crisis created over the question of the release of Jomo Kenyatta created among the Africans, as it had done among the conservative Europeans, a tremendous emotional impact. To the African, Kenyatta had come to symbolize freedom and independence. His continued imprisonment represented to the African, a last attempt by white supremacists to retain control over the political destiny of the African. This explains why the release of Kenyatta became such a motivating factor in the final drive for independence.

The African reaction to the constitutional conferences in the nineteen-sixties was characterized by the emergence of tribalism and a continued suspicion of the European settlers. At the same time, however, the change in British policy, particularly in Tanganyika, was instrumental in creating some degree of cooperation between African nationalists and the Colonial Office. Concrete results of the new policy quickly emerged in Tanganyika and as a result tended to lessen African suspicions of the sincerity of the Colonial Office. The convening of the vital constitutional conference in London in 1960 gave another example of the sincere desires of the British Government to cooperate with the nationalist elements in Kenya. By 1960 it was apparent that the African had emerged as the most potent force in the three-pronged struggle for authority in the new Kenya.
Four main groups travelled to London in 1960 to participate in the constitutional talks, including the United Party led by Group Captain Briggs, the New Kenya Group led by Michael Blundell, the Asian and Arab Group headed by Dr. Hassan, and the African Constituency Elected Members led by Mr. Ronald Ngala. Mr. Ngala, a Giriama tribesman, appealed to men and women of the smaller Kenya tribes and he became the chief opponent of the Luo-Kikuyu Union. Described by Mr. Blundell as a strong constructive nationalist, Ngala was a modest leader opposed to a one-party system and in favour of a democratic society based on individual freedom. Of all the African leaders, he perhaps presented the most favourable and rational image. At the conference the Africans were able to present a united front, a sharp contrast to the great divergence in views characteristic of the European representatives. This created a distinct advantage to the African position.

The conference almost broke up in disarray even before it had held its opening session. The African delegates refused to attend the opening of the conference unless Mbu Koinange, a former Mau Mau and member of the KAU, was included in the official African delegation. The attitude adopted by the Africans indicated an attempt to display loyalty to the Kikuyu, the founders of the independence movement in Kenya. In addition, the
two African groups at the conference used this matter to indicate their unity on the question of independence, particularly at this crucial stage in their constitutional development. Michael Blundell, and other European representatives protested bitterly, despite the fact that the Emergency regulations had been lifted. This stand reflected the attitude of many Europeans in Kenya who continued to identify African nationalism in Kenya with Mau Mau terrorism. In this instance Koinange symbolized the evils of Mau Mau. Thus, at the outset Secretary of State, Iain Macleod, was faced with a critical decision which would ultimately determine the success or failure of the conference.

After a five day boycott by the Africans, the Colonial Secretary reached a settlement which was indicative of the new British policy. A blank pass for entry to Lancaster House was granted to Mr. Koinange although none was issued to the conference chambers. The European delegates reluctantly accepted the compromise after Macleod had threatened to continue the conference alone with the Africans if the other groups did not accept his decision. Clearly, a new atmosphere for negotiation was created which was to promote greater cooperation between the Colonial Office and the African nationalists. Applauding the decision of Macleod, an article in The Spectator commented that the Colonial Secretary "broke his predecessor's
habit of pandering to European prejudice."

With the pre-conference dilemma resolved, Mr. Macleod set the tone for the negotiations in his opening statement, when he declared:

Independence—I hope within the Commonwealth, is the ultimate objective, but it is not the task of this conference. Our task is to plan the next step in Kenya's constitutional evolution. To set at what pace Kenya can assume greater responsibility for the conduct of her own affairs....

The Colonial Secretary went on to state three main principles under which future development in the Colony would take place:

(a) Kenya would eventually be independent of United Kingdom control, provided that Africans, as well as other communities in Kenya, took a share in the government of the country;
(b) Independence could not take place until the government was responsible to a legislature fully reflecting the differing views of all the people expressed through the medium of a wide franchise;
(c) Individuals of every community should have full opportunity to participate in the administration of their country in a spirit of mutual tolerance, though for a time the interests of minorities might have to be secured through constitutional safeguards.

To meet the changing needs of the Colony: "In the United Kingdom Government's view the interests of Kenya would be best served at the present stage if Africans were to take a greater share in the government of the country...."

This positive statement contrasted rather sharply with those of Macleod's two predecessors, particularly in the manner in which it spelled out the ultimate goal for the Colony. Macleod of course, had the advantage of working
without the limitations imposed by the Emergency regulations or the overhanging threat of Mau Mau violence. Nonetheless, his policy was clearly based on the necessity and the inevitability of greatly increased African participation in the affairs of the government of Kenya. This statement too, reflected the constitutional change which had been initiated in Tanganyika.

The new proposals for the Colony included an enlarged Legislative Council of sixty-five elected members. Of these seats, fifty-three were to be elected on a common roll basis while twelve were to be National Members. In an effort to maintain representation for minority groups twenty of the fifty-three seats would be reserved in the following proportions: ten Europeans, eight Asians, and two Arabs. Those contesting the reserved seats were required to gain the confidence of their own racial community by participating in communal primary elections. The National Members, a carry-over from the Specially Elected Seats of the previous constitution, were to include four Africans, four Europeans, three Asians (two non-Muslims, one Muslim), and one Arab. As before, the National Members were to be elected by members of the Legislative Council. The franchise for the common roll seats closely resembled that adopted in Tanganyika, and was to include an ability to read or write in one's own language, persons over forty years of age, an office
holder in a wide range of scheduled posts, or an annual income of £75. At the same time, the new constitution retained the right of the Governor to nominate members to Legco.

The Council of Ministers was to consist of an unofficial majority. With twelve members plus one Arab, the executive was to have eight officials including four Africans, three Europeans, and one Asian. The Governor maintained the right to appoint the Ministers and to distribute the portfolios. For the first time the Africans held a greater share of the responsibility in the Council of Ministers than did the unofficial Europeans. The new constitution in its obvious attempt to increase African experience in government advocated increased recruitment of Africans into the civil service. At the same time, it recommended that the additional African members be brought into the Council of Ministers even before the new constitution actually came into force. This was an indication of the British Government's concern over the lack of administrative experience among the African people as well as a decided effort to pacify the growing political unrest among the African leaders.

Finally, the Macleod proposals included a section for the protection of human and property rights. "There should be no expropriation of property except to fulfill contractual or other legal obligations upon the owner...." In the
event of expropriation of land the owner was to receive full and fair compensation. "Only by this means will it be possible to maintain confidence, and to encourage development and investment, including the attraction of overseas capital, not only in the immediate future but also in the long term." This last measure was an attempt to restore a sense of security among the conservative European settlers who feared they would lose everything for which they had worked once independence came to Kenya.

The United Party was entirely opposed to the terms of the new constitution; the Asian and Arab group expressed displeasure at their small representation on the Council of Ministers, but agreed to accept the proposals; the New Kenya Group accepted without serious qualification the agreement; and the African delegation, while unhappy about the level of the franchise, the proportion of African representation on the Council of Ministers, and the position of the National Members, agreed to accept the new constitution as a positive step towards African independence in Kenya. From the African point of view a greater confidence in the Colonial Office emerged from these talks. Commenting on the work of the conference, Tom Mboya declared: "Macleod was a master in the tactics of running a conference, and it was a pleasure to watch his skill." All the delegates left the Lancaster
House Conference with a better understanding of the problems and desires of each other. For the first time in the constitutional development of the country, all races in Kenya had met around the conference table each enjoying equal status with the others. This was a decided change from the earlier constitutional gatherings of the nineteen-fifties. Clearly, the settler community was losing its dominant political position in the government of the country, indicating perhaps the general lack of concern about its future felt by most British people. One young Tory Member of Parliament might have expressed the new mood prevailing in Britain when he declared to Michael Blundell: "What do I care about the...settlers, let them bloody well look after themselves."

Outside the conference room the comments of the delegates were considerably more diplomatic in tone but no less biting than that of the young Member of Parliament. Group Captain L.R. Briggs was "shocked" while Major B.P. Roberts could all but contain his anger when he declared that "I might blow up." Mr. Briggs later elaborated on his earlier comment when he suggested: "This is the greatest setback the European settlement has had since its inauguration." Yet, the old settler failed to appreciate that this was the greatest forward step experienced by the vast majority of the Kenya population. Perhaps better reflecting the majority of Euro-
peans in Kenya were the comments of Michael Blundell on his return to Nairobi: "The conference was a victory for moderation and, as moderates, we in our party are pleased with the results....One of the great things that emerged from the meetings was that we have realized that many African elected members are sincere and moderate men working for the same aims as ourselves....When the Africans get their responsibility, they will find that they need our energy, our enterprise, and our economic assistance." The bitterness and the sense of betrayal that the New Kenya Group aroused in the United Party was considerable. As a result, Group Captain Briggs issued a statement on behalf of his party criticising Blundell's group. They "entered the conference having, from the point of view of the European, already conceded so much that no room for reasonable compromised remained. This clearly led to surrender after surrender to meet the views either of the Secretary of State or of the African elected Members." This statement was not entirely true, for Blundell had bargained with the Secretary of State both on the Koinange issue and on the franchise qualifications. On this latter point Blundell had attempted to limit the number of voters on the common roll so that no one community could dominate another.

The bitterness of white supremacists in East Africa towards Blundell was further expressed in an edit-
orial on March 10, 1960, in the East Africa and Rhodesia: "What H.M. Government has inflicted upon Kenya deserves to be called the MacBlundell Constitution, for that term places the responsibility for the unprincipled and irremediable surrender to clamour upon the politicians primarily responsible." On the other hand, Tom Mboya, still exhibiting a mistrust of the motives of the 'moderates', was critical of Blundell for trying to retain "pockets of privilege." The Manchester Guardian Weekly probably best summarized the meaning of the outcome of the conference when it commented: "It is, of course, an interim measure." The newspaper suggested that the new agreement would give Africans a chance to gain valuable experience, and concluded that a compromise had been reached on all sides.

The constitutional conference reaffirmed the great division within the European community and marked a decided defeat for those who still envisaged Kenya as a 'white man's country'. The conservative Europeans were intent on taking out their frustrations on their more moderate countrymen, despite the fact that the Colonial Office was totally responsible for the new policy in Kenya. Clearly, the prime motivating factor in the British decision to extend considerably more responsibility to Kenya Africans, was the constitutional development elsewhere in Africa, and not the liberal views adopted by the New Kenya
Group. The results of the negotiations, the implications of which most Europeans in the Colony had foreseen, nevertheless, came as a surprise, for the abrupt shift in the power structure saw their dominant position upset. Prior to the conference the conservative settlers had been confident that they would still have a large share in the government of the country. But no longer did the Europeans have an exclusive voice in the selection of their representatives. This measure aroused their sense of fair play, despite the fact that the new voting regulations were the most democratic that Kenya had ever had. Sir Stephen King Hall, writing in the Spectator, made a cutting remark on the sudden switch in Tory policy when he declared: "It has come as a grievous shock to Kenya Europeans to discover that, although the Socialists are by definition either cads or woolly idealists, they are honest in their foolishness, whereas the Tories, being gentlemen, will always put on a white tie before the dinner party at which the guest will have his throat cut when the brandy (vintage Macleod) begins to circulate." For the European, therefore, the conference officially confirmed the inevitable fact that Kenya was an African country destined to be governed by the African. The dream of Lord Delamere for a great white dominion of Kenya had been destroyed at Lancaster House.
For the Asian, the conference reaffirmed that he was not a political force in the country, nor was he destined to play any significant role in the future constitutional development in the colony. Within two years the Kenya Indian Congress was to accept formally this position, for it was to withdraw from direct political action. In making this decision it declared: "Let us now as Africans, as citizens of Kenya, have confidence in the African leaders. To continue in the political field even on a non-racial basis, is wrong." By supporting adult suffrage and a common roll at the conference, the Asian had not hindered nor did he intend to hinder, the growth of African independence in Kenya.

The Africans not only achieved much increased representation and responsibility as a result of the MacLeod constitution, but they also received assurance that independence was ultimately to be theirs. The greatest fear of the African, that self-government would be granted to a European majority in Legco, had been removed by the conference. In its place the British Government asserted that Kenya, in time, was to become independent under an African government. However, the momentum of the nationalist movement was not to be slowed down by victories won at Lancaster House, for as the Africans showed in the nineteen-fifties, undiluted democracy was the one goal for which they were striving. The African delegates refused to accept ministries, for they wanted the right
to make recommendations to the Governor, rather than have the Governor choose the ministers on his own. Governor Renison interpreted this attitude in this manner: "These people are politicians and are a bit frightened in public speeches of saying they love us too much. They are afraid that other politicians will come up still carrying out the old abusive ideas and will be more popular with the crowd." That this was true was soon borne out by the increased pressure for full independence.

The Africans, however, were not just reflecting their own political self-interest; they were also reacting to the changes around them. In a letter to Roy Welensky, the dominant figure in Central Africa, Michael Blundell exhibited his national outlook and appreciation of the African attitude:

'It has come as a tremendous shock to European opinion in Kenya. We have got to accept that 60,000 Europeans aren't really a firm base for self-government if that government is to be largely directed over the 6 million Africans. Secondly, the developments around us in Tanganyika, the Congo, Uganda and British Somalia make it almost impossible for us to hold back. As it is we shall be the least advanced constitutionally of all these territories.'

For the European the only realistic course to follow was to seek the goodwill of the African, and cooperate in the Africanization of the government and the civil service. To do this, however, it would require some efforts to reunify the European community in Kenya.
While European unity continued to disintegrate, the firm foundation of African nationalism as a unified movement in Kenya began to crumble. With this came the rebirth of tribalism—a result foreshadowed by African nationalists as early as 1953. Without the burdens of the Emergency regulations African national political parties once again were formed. Two national parties were organized bringing with them the appearance of political rivalries, particularly after the 1960 constitutional conference. In March, 1960, a meeting of the African elected members was planned at Kiambu, near Nairobi, to discuss the possibility of organizing an African political party. However, two days before the meeting was to be held a breach appeared in the unity of the African Members of Legco. The former leader of KAU, James Gichuru, recently released from restriction, had been asked by some African nationalists to lead a new political party, the Uhuru Party. These efforts were unsuccessful. On March 25, the new party led by Oginga Odinga was formed but it tried to exclude Tom Mboya from its ranks. It appeared that this action was motivated by the increasingly prominent position Mboya was taking as the leading Kenya spokesman both in Britain and in the United States. Added to this distrust of Mboya was his refusal to accept a ministry owing to his work load both in the labour movement and internationally. Odinga re-
sented Mboya's decision and commented: "If he knew that he was not going to take a Ministry, why didn't he say so before? This change of mind can only be said to have been influenced by the hostile atmosphere at the Kiambu leaders' conference. This is an unfortunate and most misleading public game." From Odinga's remarks it was quite apparent that the game of politics was fast becoming a part of the African nationalist movement.

In spite of this growing rivalry between Odinga and Mboya, the Uhuru Party was disbanded two days later. On March 27, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), deriving its name from the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), was organized, becoming the first nationwide party in Kenya since the KAU was proscribed in 1953. Two months after its inception the KANU chose its officers with Odinga as vice-president and Mboya as secretary. James Gichuru was appointed acting president, although it was agreed that upon the release of Jomo Kenyatta, he would step aside and allow Kenyatta to assume the leadership of the party. Ronald Ngala was elected treasurer and Arap Moi was elected assistant treasurer, although both men were absent in the United States at the time of their election. When they returned to Kenya they refused to accept these posts and in June they spear-headed the formation of the Kenya African Democratic Union, (KADU).
Tom Mboya was particularly critical of this new party, for he believed it only aggravated tribal differences. He had dissolved all branches of his Peoples' Congress Party and had made the Nairobi branch part of the KANU in an effort to solidify the nationalist movement into one strong organization. The smaller tribes, fearful of this Luo-Kikuyu union, were forming numerous tribal groups throughout the country. Arap Moi organized the Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masai United Front came into existence in the spring of 1960, Ronald Ngala formed the Coast African People's Union, and Masinde Muliro maintained his Kenya African People's Party. In June all these groups joined together to form KADU as an effective rival to KANU. Stressing the protection of minority rights, KADU, according to Tom Mboya, borrowed from those who had urged the preservation of the White Highlands as a European reserve, and "from the statements of the late Group Captain Briggs when he led the United Party right-wingers at Lancaster House." With the formation of both these parties racialism declined as the major issue among Africans and was replaced by the emergence of bitter tribal rivalries which were to be a dominant feature of future constitutional negotiations.

Elections to the new Legislative Council were planned for March, 1961. The dominant figure throughout
the campaigning was that of Jomo Kenyatta, who was still restricted in his activities in the Colony. Agitation for his release was taken up by the Kenya African National Union, with the result that in May, 1960, Secretary of State Iain Macleod found it necessary to declare his Government's position on this matter. "I am firmly convinced," said Mr. Macleod, "that his return to normal life in Kenya would in present circumstances bring a direct threat to the maintenance of law and order and thereby prejudice the fulfillment of our recent decisions for orderly advance in that territory." The dilemma over the question of releasing Kenyatta developed into a final effort by conservative Europeans to maintain a major role in the political affairs of Kenya. For the Africans this issue was useful in maintaining the momentum of the nationalist movement, and as a lever with which to prod the Colonial Office for immediate independence. The conservative *Kenya Sunday Post*, highly critical of the African agitation for Kenyatta's release, nevertheless rightly pointed out the unwillingness of the African leaders to look beyond independence to the great challenges and responsibilities which would face them as Kenya's new leaders. In an editorial the publication commented: "The Kenyatta issue is the last stick with which the Nationalists can beat the other races in this country and to blame others for their troubles, they are inclined to make too much of it. Take away the Kenyatta issue and they will realize
that they have no alternative but to start working on
long awaited progressive policies for the future welfare
of this country." Without doubt, the Kenyatta issue
symbolized the last attempt by European conservatives
to maintain their political predominance in Kenya, and
the final thrust by African nationalists to attain com-
plete political responsibility in the Colony.

In the summer of 1960 African Ministers and
elected members threatened to resign their positions if
they were prevented from visiting Kenyatta. Bowing to
this pressure the Governor granted permission to the
African leaders to visit Kenyatta at his place of re-
striction. Colin Legum, writing in The Observer, correctly
pinpointed the significance of the issue when he remarked
about Kenyatta: "He is to-day both a myth and a martyr.
He has become a legend in his own lifetime; above all,
he is the symbol of African independence. Yet so long as
that vacuum remains it is impossible for the colony to
advance along the road to independence charted by the
Macleod Constitution." The Times Weekly Review, at the
time of the Kenyatta controversy, included an article by
former Governor Baring, now Lord Howick, in which the
author urged that there should be full cooperation between
European and African in Kenya. Perhaps in an effort to
rally European opinion behind Michael Blundell and his
liberal beliefs towards the African, Lord Howick wrote:
"Mr. Blundell is that unusual phenomenon, a European political leader based in Africa who can address a large African meeting in an African language and get a good reception. Europeans would do well to show imagination and to realize that they cannot survive and prosper as an isolated community." The former Governor, having divorced himself from the narrow confines of his old position, had come to realize that Africa was indeed changing, and that the European had to adjust his views to meet the challenge of the new Africa.

In the meantime the Kenyatta issue continued to foment antagonism in the Colony, particularly following the remarks of the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, on May 10, 1960, when he said:

Here was an African leader to darkness and death.... From the security viewpoint I think that Jomo Kenyatta's return to political life in Kenya at the present time would be a disaster. We are not yet far enough away from all the tragedies, the hatreds and the passions of Mau Mau....

The Governor's statement was issued immediately after the release of the Corfield Report on the origins and growth of Mau Mau. The findings of this report pointed up Jomo Kenyatta's apparent implication in Mau Mau and suggested that Kenyatta was indeed the manager of the movement. Together, the release of the Report and the Governor's statement aroused considerable indignation among Kenya Africans who had been agitating for the release of Kenyatta since 1959. The attitude of the majority of Kenya nation-
alists was reflected in the comments of Tom Mboya. "No Government," declared Mr. Mboya, "in which Africans have an effective voice can consider the continuation of Kenyatta's detention. He will have to be released to be Prime Minister of Kenya." From the point of view of Mboya's own political future it was imperative that he advocate the release of Kenyatta. His ambitions could easily be thwarted if he came out in opposition to the release of Kenyatta, for his dominant position not only among the Luo, but more particularly among the Kikuyu would be in jeopardy. Kikuyu numerical strength and contact with the modern world dictated that no African in Kenya could become a prominent national figure without the support of the Kikuyu.

In late August, Governor Renison delivered an important speech concerning the unrest building up in the Colony over the Kenyatta issue, and he asserted:

The eagerness of politicians to find short cuts is understandable but, I think, a real danger to our future....In my judgement, the people know that they are on the right path now, and they do not want further disturbances and all the restrictions and other security action which must go with them. They know that African leaders now have the fullest say in all Government decisions. Any leader seeking short cuts through rashly lowered standards or strikes and civil disturabances would have to consider very carefully whether the great mass of his countrymen, as distinct from a few hot-heads, would really be in favour of such methods, would really be helped to more than temporary excitement if they succeeded. The Government, of course, has plans and resources to deal with civil disobedience. It will have the power, if necessary, to carry on indefinitely an efficient if undemocratic government of officials
without one or more of the groups of elected members. I do not think anyone will doubt my determination to use such plans and powers if I think that the stability and economy are threatened on which must rest the sound and peaceful evolution of the people of Kenya to speedy and worthwhile independence. 34

This declaration of course delighted the conservative Europeans in Kenya. Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, leader of the Kenya Coalition, suggested that: "It was an unequivocal declaration of policy long overdue, and it should help restore confidence in the colony. We are certainly facing the biggest crisis in our short but eventful history." 35 Michael Blundell approved of the speech as an honest effort to calm tension and maintain stability in the Colony. The Kenya African Democratic Union also supported the Governor's statement, motivated perhaps by the opportunity to make political gain and achieve European sympathy at the expense of the 'extreme' Luo-Kikuyu nationalists. KANU, interpreting the Governor's statement as a threat to their constitutional advance, issued the following remarks, declaring the speech "ill-conceived, uncalled for and dangerous. Tough talk, intimidation and the like will not create harmony nor ensure stability in Kenya. The Governor has completely misread the people's mood and the political climate of the country." 36

Thus with the problem of the release of Kenyatta sparking a major controversy in the Colony, with the European community disunited, and with the African nationalist move-
ment developing into two distinct groups, the campaign for the March, 1961, election began.

During the election campaign members of Michael Blundell's New Kenya Group faced stiff opposition in their efforts to win the primary elections. The Kenya Coalition under Cavendish-Bentinck waged a particularly hostile campaign against Blundell. One tense, but humorous incident in the campaign occurred during a speech by Blundell, it reflected the emotionalism of the political contest:

Late in the campaign I spoke in the local hotel at Londiani, a small up-country farming district. After my speech, a medium-sized man, with a sallow face and dark moustache got up and questioned me. "Mr. Blundell, don't you agree that you are a traitor to the European community?" He repeated with emphasis, "a traitor, sir, to the European community," and glanced along the row of chairs in which he was standing. Immediately, about thirty feet away, twelve men and women arose, including a beautiful blonde, and bombarded the chairman and myself with eggs and tomatoes. There was nothing we could do, so I folded my arms and bore the onslaught with as much fortitude as I could muster.37

Without a doubt the heat of party politics and electioneering had arrived in Kenya. A minority group of Europeans still held out the futile hope that it would govern Kenya. No longer did they vent their hostility on the African but took their anger out on the progressive and rational members of the European community who had recognized the inevitability of African rule and were intent on bringing about its smooth inception. Michael Blundell won a bare twenty-five percent of the vote (this was required in the
primary in order to advance to the general election) in the European primary, reflecting European voters' dissatisfaction with his contribution to the Macleod constitution. However, when he contested the general election in the Rift Valley constituency he received overwhelming African support and gained a majority of 20,000 votes over his rival Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck. His ability to address the African constituents in Swahili and his comparatively pro-African policies assured him of victory. His middle-of-the-road attitude between extreme African nationalism and European conservatism was reflected in the New Kenya Group's election manifesto which declared:

It is unrealistic to suppose that universal adult suffrage—one man, one vote—will not be the basis of the franchise in the future. But whatever the eventual pattern of the franchise may be, we believe that in the foreseeable future, the reservation of seats for minority interests must be retained, until such time as racial prejudice disappears.

Although Africans might not have agreed with Blundell's position in favour of reserved seats, they did display an interest in what he had to say. To his surprise and delight, Blundell found that the queries raised by the Africans showed that: "On a different scale their problems and desires proved to be just the same as those of my old European constituents—better houses, piped water supplies and rural education, the fear of losing their jobs and the inhumanity of being thrown out on to the road
with all their family at a moment’s notice." This, indeed, was a testimonial to the growth of African political consciousness and responsibility, pointing up the fact that there was slowly emerging among Africans a greater understanding of their own problems. The difficulties of meeting these problems, however, were beyond the comprehension of most Africans.

The campaign between KANU and KADU candidates was a vigorous one. Both parties had similar aims, although KADU displayed a fear of the consequences of Luo-Kikuyu domination. James Gichuru in the KANU election manifesto declared:

The very first aim of the Kenya African National Union is to fight relentlessly to achieve and maintain independence for the people of Kenya. On this hinges all the other aims and objects of the union; for without freedom and independence from imperialist rule and exploitation, our ideal to reconstruct Kenya into a country free from oppression, and a home free from hunger, sickness and ignorance will never be realized. The welfare of our people, their standard of living, wealth, health, education and culture cannot be treated with priority by the imperialists...."40

Clearly, the leaders of KANU were exploiting for their own political profit the naive belief of many Africans that a high standard of living was a natural concomitant of independence.

In the campaign the contest in Nairobi East developed into a most dramatic and interesting affair. In this district more than sixty percent of the registered electors were from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru tribes, while
little more than ten percent came from the Luo tribe. KANU selected Tom Mboya to contest the election under its banner. Shortly before the election, rumours spread that Mboya was not sincere in his speeches advocating the release of Jomo Kenyatta, with the result that an anti-Mboya candidate was chosen. With the open support of Oginga Odinga, Dr. Waiyaki, KANU's Nairobi branch chairman, was chosen to run against Mboya as an independent. Odinga was subsequently suspended from KANU for his action, thereby creating an unfortunate breach in the national party. In supporting Dr. Waiyaki and the formation of the Kenya Action Group, Odinga justified his action by saying "even if it means the end of KANU's existence...we shall not tolerate the behaviour of men like Mboya." The outcome of the contest between five candidates was an overwhelming victory for Tom Mboya. The Luo nationalist received ninety percent of the vote, with all the other candidates losing their deposits.

The margin of Mboya's victory was both surprising and significant. It reaffirmed his position as the dominant African politician in Kenya and clearly pointed up his ability and political shrewdness. He had captured the majority of votes of all tribes in his riding and had shown that in this constituency a national rather than a tribal outlook prevailed. Clearly, it was a personal triumph for Mboya and a bitter defeat for his rival
Oginga Odinga. On the national scene, the leadership of Mboya won nineteen seats for KANU, while KADU gained eleven. Six Europeans contesting the reserved seats were victorious with KANU support, while four victorious Asians had received the support of KANU. The great victory for the Kenya African National Union brought with it the seeds of crisis in the Colony. The central figure in the new conflict and the man who had hung like an ominous shadow over the affairs of the Colony for nearly fifteen years, was "the burning spear", Jomo Kenyatta. It was perhaps ironic that at the very moment when African unity threatened to collapse, this man should become the embodiment of a unified independence movement in the Colony.

The elections, conducted in a responsible manner, gave KANU the opportunity to form a government. However, just after the results of the election were known, Governor Renison announced that Kenyatta would not be released until a government had been formed and found workable. In a radio broadcast in May, 1961, Governor Renison declared:

I care for Kenya too much to contemplate his stepping from restriction to a position of authority. I ask you to read again my statement of last May. Nothing has happened since to make me wish I had worded the statement or any part of it differently.43

This statement was both poorly timed and ill-advised for the very strength of African unity and the focal point of
both KANU's and KADU's campaign, rested on the release of Jomo Kenyatta. The political stability of the country was in jeopardy owing to the decision of the Governor. Consequently, KANU refused to cooperate in the formation of any Government until Kenyatta was freed. At this time KADU members led by Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro, were unwilling to form a government either. To give credulity to their demand for the release of Kenyatta, KADU leaders visited Kenyatta in mid-March. Further pressure was placed on the Governor, when on March 23, 1961, a joint KANU-KADU delegation visited Kenyatta to seek his advice on the formation of a government. For the first time in more than eight years Kenyatta was becoming involved in the affairs of the Colony. Although both parties conversed together with Kenyatta, their policies on the Kenyatta issue differed sharply. KADU, unlike KANU, had made it clear that it did not consider the issues of forming a government and of gaining the release of Kenyatta as being inextricably linked together. KANU, on the other hand, had committed itself to the release of Kenyatta before it would form any government.

In April Kenyatta, after being moved to a healthier place of restriction at Maralal, held his first press conference since his arrest in 1952. The Governor of Kenya, while issuing statements suggesting that it was unwise to release Kenyatta, had never visited the imprisoned man nor had he considered that Kenyatta might be
able to contribute to the smooth transition from colonial rule. In spite of the apprehensions of the Governor the reaction of those that did interview Kenyatta was one of pleasant surprise. Michael Blundell, when he eventually met Kenyatta, described his as "one of the ablest and most intelligent Africans whom I had met." Clyde Sanger, the African correspondent for the Manchester Guardian Weekly, was impressed by Kenyatta at the press conference and wrote: "Benevolence and dedication were also the foremost impressions which he succeeded in giving, after the first shyness had gone." The Times correspondent was similarly impressed and commented on Kenyatta's part in Mau Mau when he said that his "responsibility for these horrible aberrations was at most indirect. Kenyatta undoubtedly ought to be released." In urging political advancement by means of another round table conference to plan the next step towards independence, Kenyatta displayed his general benevolence towards Europeans in the country when he declared: "Those who will accept citizenship of Kenya will have equal rights, equal protection in all spheres. Therefore no one should have any fear as long as he does not want to hold on to old privileges." Clearly, public opinion outside the Colony was becoming united in its opposition to the continued detention of Kenyatta. Within the Colony, however, some Europeans still rejected
the release of Kenyatta as well as his proposals for a new constitutional conference.

The Governor, displaying a lack of understanding of the significance of the Kenyatta issue, disagreed with both Kenyatta and the leaders of KANU, who believed that the first Lancaster House Conference had served its purpose, when he issued the following statement on April 14:

The Lancaster House constitution was devised to provide an agreed first step towards independence. Subsequent steps are responsible government, internal self-government, and finally full self-government.

It is possible to pass through these states quickly, but the Governor believes that to pass on to a second stage before the first stage is working would endanger the whole method of the planned approach which led other territories in the Commonwealth to stable independence.

The abandonment of such a planned approach could lead to a landslide in which the human rights of individuals, minority tribes and communities, together with the administrative and economic structure of Kenya, would be in danger of being overwhelmed.

To the Governor the traditional British colonial policy still remained in effect in Kenya. Governor Renison tended to overlook the strength of nationalist sentiment in Kenya and the added influence of the rapid constitutional development taking place elsewhere in Africa, particularly in Tanganyika. To the African the demand for increased power and a new conference arose over his frustration over the Kenyatta dilemma. To many nationalists this issue was regarded as a last effort to thwart the objectives of the African independence movement. At the same time, the Afri-
can's growing impatience, particularly that of the leaders of KANU, grew out of political confusion between the two African parties, KANU was committed to the release of Jomo Kenyatta before it could form a government, whereas KADU, although not committed to his release, saw its political future resting on a benevolent attitude towards Kenyatta. Thus in order to overcome this internal political crisis, the African leaders looked to renewed demands for immediate independence as a means of overcoming the Governor's decision and their own disunity.

On April 18, after Ronald Ngala had returned from a meeting in London with Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod, KADU announced that it would be willing to participate in the formation of a government. In return Ngala was able to obtain the promise that the government would build a house for Kenyatta in Kiambu in preparation for his eventual release. This decision of KADU created a crisis in KANU, for it was a blow to some members who had hoped to participate in the country's first African government. Such members as the four Kamba representatives saw in KADU an opportunity not only to effect the release of Kenyatta, but also the possibility of moving quickly towards independence. In addition, any suspicions about KANU being a Luo-Kikuyu party would be intensified should KANU object strenuously
to Ngala's decision. With the cooperation of the New Kenya Group, Ngala was able to form a government and become leader of Government Business. Michael Blundell once again assumed the post of Minister of Agriculture. His decision to cooperate with KADU lost Blundell his earlier KANU support, but it was clear that the leader of the New Kenya Group saw that his first responsibility was to work for a national government. At the same time, Blundell recognized that the African was emerging as the real political leader of the country and for this reason Ngala became the main spokesman for the coalition with Blundell gradually withdrawing from the limelight which he had held for a decade.

The cooperation of KADU and the New Kenya Group led to the withdrawal of Bruce McKenzie, former Minister of Agriculture in the Colony, from Blundell's party. McKenzie recognized that minority government was a bad thing especially at this crucial stage in Kenya's constitutional development. He also considered KANU to be the real voice of Kenya nationalism, and for this reason he vigorously supported its policies from the opposition benches in Legco. Overshadowing the difficult position of KADU was the fact that it was not truly representative of the will of the majority of the people. It did not advocate immediate independence in 1961, as did the leaders of KANU, and for this reason it found itself better able to associate with the policies of the Colonial Secretary.
In refusing to consider the demands for immediate independence, Mr. Macleod had declared in the House of Commons: "In dealing with constitutional advances in the territory, I have always resolutely refused to agree to timetables." Commenting realistically on the new Kenya Government, The Times' correspondent wrote: "The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), backed by Mr. Michael Blundell's New Kenya Party, is still clinging to its rather naive belief that by helping the British Government from an awkward situation it has earned a right to lead Kenya to independence." It appeared that Mr. Macleod had no intentions of supporting political parties which did not represent the will of the people. Rather, his comments on the question of timetables were merely an effort to keep the pace of constitutional development from becoming unreasonably hectic.

The question of the release of Kenyatta and his possible effect on the future of Kenya continued to be foremost in the minds of those interested in developments in the East African country. The Economist suggested that "Mr. Kenyatta...may yet provide the cement to bind the parties together." This attitude was gaining more and more adherents both in Kenya and in Britain, for it was apparent that the political instability could not be resolved until the Kenyatta issue was settled. Conservative opinion among a minority of Euro-
pean settlers continued to express a fear of the ultimate consequences should Kenyatta become a free man. The chaos which followed the declaration of independence in the Congo on June 30, 1960, served only to strengthen their fear and uncertainty of their own fate if Kenya should become independent under African rule. The majority of the people in Kenya recognized that Kenyatta created a greater danger to stability by remaining in detention than if he were set free. It was, therefore, under mounting pressure in both Kenya and Britain that Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, announced to the House of Commons on August 1, 1961, that Jomo Kenyatta would be released. "I believe that this decision," declared Mr. Macleod, "difficult though it is, is in the best interests of all the peoples of Kenya and that it should be taken now." In succinct terms the Secretary of State pointed out the dilemma of the decision when he asserted that "equally there is a risk attached to action and a risk attached to inaction in this matter." This decision was not taken without thorough discussion and inquiry. It was the outcome of talks between the Governor, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Council of Ministers, senior members of the Police and Administration, and the loyal Kikuyus—with all groups voicing their full support for the decision that was ultimately taken.
On August 14, 1961, Jomo Kenyatta was released from restriction after nine years of being shut off from events which had shaped the new Kenya. The news of his release was generally greeted with relief throughout the Colony. His first words as a free man were dominated by moderation. In his statement, Kenyatta described the inhabitants of his country as Kenyans rather than Africans, Europeans, or Asians, and he added:

Let me say today that all people of Kenya, black, white or brown, are Kenyans. Let me say that if Europeans and Asians who have their home here want to stay and to become Africans with us, they have nothing to fear.55

The release of Kenyatta was claimed by both KANU and KADU as a victory for their party—the former claiming victory through propaganda and a lack of cooperation; the latter attributing his release to their cooperation in government. Though both parties could claim victory, it was the recognition by the Colonial Secretary of the necessity to release Kenyatta in order that political stability might be achieved in the Colony, that ultimately brought about Kenyatta's liberation.

Upon his release Kenyatta chaired a gathering of the leaders of both parties in an effort to reunify the nationalist movement and to renew the cry for immediate independence. A memorandum distributed following the meeting called for a constitutional conference for September, 1961, the establishment of a coalition govern-
ment of both African parties, and the demand for independence on February 1, 1962. The Governor accepted the need for talks but declared that independence was an impossibility for the date chosen by the Africans. For this reason, KANU members walked out of the subsequent talks with the Governor and on September 30, KADU repudiated the leadership of Kenyatta. The seemingly irreparable split between the two parties reached a peak at the end of October when Jomo Kenyatta assumed the presidency of KANU. Clearly, a new phase in Kenya political development was emerging, for KADU, recognizing the real authority enjoyed by Kenyatta—hailed as "the father of Kenya's nationalism"—saw itself as a minority and it, therefore, began to press the claim for a federal constitution for the Colony to protect its 'minority' rights.

In making demands for independence in early 1962, the leaders of KANU displayed a certain degree of immaturity, particularly in the light of recent constitutional progress made in the Colony. This attitude contrasted considerably with that of Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. The success of his Tanganyika African National Union, which had six years more political experience than KANU, was instrumental in bringing political victories to him. Speaking in the summer of 1959, he remarked: "We are impatient for responsible government. We are not impatient about independence. We want to handle the education of our
people, economic development, improvement of communications, and so on. When we are doing the job independence can take care of itself." Such rational thinking was not apparent in Kenya before independence came. Indeed, the Kenya independence movement overshadowed any thoughts about the post-independence period in Kenya's development. Clearly, the goal of independence blinded Kenya nationalists from any considerations of how to meet the economic and social problems which would remain after independence.

Nonetheless, the changed tactics of KADU renewed demands for another constitutional conference, and the way was made clear for Kenyatta to take a leading part in it. A provision which disqualified any person who had spent more than two years in prison from participating in political activity in the Colony, was rescinded in November by the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Reginald Maudling. In making this announcement, which received the support of the leaders of KADU as well as that of KANU, Mr. Maudling declared that "our main objective in Kenya... is to achieve constitutional advance on lines generally acceptable to the people of the country." Less than a month later, following a visit to Kenya, Secretary of State, Mr. Maudling, issued a full statement in Parliament on the future of Kenya:

The political problems that face Kenya must be solved and solved soon if Kenya's economy, already sadly strained by natural disasters and flagging confidence, is not to be irreparably damaged.
The great danger I see is fear; fear of discrimination, fear of intimidation, fear of exploitation....What Kenya needs is confidence, calm and common sense, an end to inflammatory speeches, and above all an end to intimidation and violence.

Kenya needs the brains, devotion, and capital of all its peoples. This calls for a society and an economy without discrimination of race, creed or colour where individual rights are firmly recognized and maintained.59

Individual rights, rather than minority rights based on racial differences, were to become the keynote in future constitutional negotiations. An opportunity to redirect Kenya's development along the lines proclaimed by Mr. Maudling was presented in February, 1962, when a new constitutional conference was convened in London at Lancaster House. The most outstanding difference between this conference and the one two years earlier was the presence of Jomo Kenyatta. To the vast majority of Kikuyu as well as to many other Kenyans, Kenyatta represented a great father figure destined to lead Kenya to independence. The impact of Kenyatta on one Kikuyu, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, was expressed in this manner:

No African who loves his country can ever forget this man who has shown us the way to freedom and who has undergone so much for us....He is our chosen leader and he alone will lead us out of the past, out of the deep pits of dark memories to the bright future of our country....Kenyatta is greater than any Kikuyu, he is greater than any Luo or Nandi or Masai or Kiriam, he is greater than any Kenyan, he is the greatest African of them all. He knows no tribe, no race, he bears no hatred or malice for the past; he is human and yet wiser than any other human being I have ever known. They are all his people, his responsibility and his children; all fellow human beings to love and to cherish, to correct if they do wrong, to praise if they do right.60
The influence on the general populace "of his voice and personality was immediate and magnetic so that even the smallest children became still and quiet." The naivete of Kariuki and undoubtedly of the large majority of Africans in Kenya was indicated by the suggestion that Kenyatta and independence would automatically bring a bright future to Kenya. A further indication of the growing popularity of Jomo Kenyatta, particularly as a result of the agitation for his release during the 1961 election campaign, was seen in the following public opinion poll:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Mboya</th>
<th>Ngala</th>
<th>Odinga</th>
<th>Kiano</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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This poll also pointed out the overwhelming popularity of Tom Mboya over other nationalist leaders and showed the comparatively weak position of Oginga Odinga. There could be little doubt that the two figures to watch at the constitutional conference were Mboya and Kenyatta, for both individuals represented well over half the African population in Kenya.

In February the start of the longest constitutional conference in British colonial history (fifty days) began at Lancaster House. The dominant feature of this lengthy conference was the demand of Ronald Ngala and the representatives of KADU for a form of government embodying regionalism or a means of protecting tribal
rights. According to Tom Mboya: "The difference between KANU and KADU over tribalism is this: KANU concedes that tribal feelings exist but say they can be eliminated by wise leadership and positive action; KADU is exaggerating these feelings to entrench tribalism." Essentially Mboya was correct, for the idea of regionalism appealed to the smaller tribes of Kenya in which they would obtain primary control over such issues as land, education, police, and the composition of the regions. This policy, however, was a direct threat to African cooperation in the country at a time when national unity was essential if the country was to achieve stability. A statement by Mboya during the 1961 election campaign was beginning to be proven correct. At that time he had declared that: "I am convinced that envy, jealousy, personal ambition, and tribalism are our greatest evils today." In this conflict between Africans, it was nearly two months before Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling, was able to reach a settlement. Throughout the duration of the conference, KADU voiced the fear of an emergence of authoritarian rule and personality cults such as developed in Ghana. Regardless of KADU objections it was apparent that in the eyes of a large number of Africans the cult of personality had already surrounded Jomo Kenyatta.
After weeks of debate a compromise constitution was eventually reached in which a type of federalism was introduced in Kenya. The new parliament was to consist of an Upper and Lower House. The Lower House or House of Representatives was to be based on approximately equal single-member constituencies elected on the basis of universal suffrage. The Upper House or Senate was to include one member from each district and non-voting members representing special interests. Six regional assemblies were to be created and elected by the districts. The Council of Ministers was to include two officials (Minister of Legal Affairs and the Minister of Defense) and fourteen elected members of the legislature equally divided between KADU and KANU. The full details of the proposed constitution were to be worked out by this new coalition government in Kenya. The outcome of the conference was essentially a compromise plan which saw the institution of regionalism with the maintenance of a strong central government. The Times, commenting on the lengthy and at times hopeless talks, commended Mr. Maudling, who it said "has timed his initiative with shrewd understanding of the mood of despair and self-disgust to which the conference delegates have been reduced after five weeks of fruitless talk—a feeling mixed with bitterness and dismay among the backbenchers as they have observed the incompetence or rigidity of their leaders."
Perhaps the greatest success the Colonial Secretary achieved at the conference was in getting KANU to hold off on its demand for immediate independence. This provided the African a little more time to gain practical experience in the administration of the government. Both leaders of the African parties expressed cautious optimism with the eventual outcome of the talks. Jomo Kenyatta declared: "This is certainly the basis for discussion. I am now more optimistic. I would not say this is what we want, but it does go a long way towards it." Ronald Ngala commented: "We require to examine the Colonial Secretary's ideas in much greater detail, but at first sight they seem to represent a sound basis for discussion." Opposition members in the House of Commons praised Mr. Maudling for his patience and tact in making the constitutional conference an eventual success. Clearly, the Secretary of State was to be commended in his efforts which brought about some rapprochement between the two African parties at this critical stage in Kenya's constitutional evolution. The Secretary of State made the long-awaited announcement that self-government would be proclaimed in the Colony after the next general election. "The question of a date for independence," Mr. Maudling said, "was not on the agenda of the recent conference. We made it clear that it would be for the Government which was elected
under the new constitution to discuss the question of independence with Her Majesty's Government." The full details of the proposed constitution, however, were not fully expressed until March, 1963.

Although a coalition government was formed in the country, reconciliation among the dissident African groups was not immediately achieved. A rundown economy in Kenya together with rising unemployment contributed to the mounting political instability, with the result that strikes occurred and the threat of violence became very real. A rift in KANU began to develop in August when the commissions to delimit the regional boundaries in Kenya arrived. Tribal loyalties came to the forefront as some members of KANU gave evidence which conflicted with KANU's policy of seeking no change in the provincial boundaries. A largely Luo meeting of Trade Unionists in Nairobi criticized Kenyatta and formed a Luo Political Movement. Only Tom Mboya's loyalty to Kenyatta and his concern for his own political future prevented an open break in KANU. The Kamba members of the Legislative Council in KANU desired to be in a separate Region from either the Kikuyu or the Masai. As a consequence, under the leadership of Paul Ngei they broke with KANU in November, 1962, and formed their own tribal organization, the African People's Party. Ngei, who had experienced a long period of antipathy to Kenyatta, was
unable to come to terms with KADU which was also being faced with tribal differences which were seriously to hurt its chances in the 1963 election.

In November Sir Patrick Renison resigned as Governor and was replaced by Malcolm Macdonald, a politician and a diplomat rather than an administrator. This in itself was a significant change and indicated the declining role of the Governor in the actual administration of the Colony. Clyde Sanger, writing in The Manchester Guardian Weekly, criticized the resigning Governor in this manner:

The sad truth is that Sir Patrick is more of a kindly squire than the astute sort of Governor Kenya needed in the post emergency period. His lack of political foresight has meant that his three years' regime has been a disastrous time for Kenya. The inept handling of the release from detention of Mr. Jomo Kenyatta led Kenya first into the period of a minority Government and then, because he could find no full escape from the earlier blunder, into an awkward coalition of the two African parties.71

It was clear that the Kenyatta issue was a disaster for Governor Renison, but regardless of who the chief executive had been, a decision either way would have been met by serious criticism. The Governor's failure to meet the issue before it developed into a major crisis, however, caused immense political chaos in the Colony. This made it impossible for the majority party to assume the reins of government and gain some measure of administrative experience before independence was proclaimed. As it was, KANU experienced less than six months of gov-
erning Kenya before independence came.

In March, 1963, a summary of the proposed constitution for Kenya was presented in a White Paper. The Central Legislature was to include 41 members in the Senate, 117 persons in the House of Representatives, and 12 Specially Elected Members to be elected by Legco. The only qualifications were that "all members of the National Assembly must be British Subjects or British protected persons who are at least 21 years old and are literate in English." An Electoral Commission was to be called upon to review boundaries of the constituencies every eight to ten years. The Senate was to have the power to delay bills for up to one year; however, no money bills could be delayed in the Senate. The Governor was to have the power to appoint ministers to the Executive on the advice of the Prime Minister. "Except in respect of those matters in which the Governor is explicitly empowered to act in his discretion [defence, external affairs, and internal security], the Governor must obtain, and act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet.

The new constitution provided for seven regional assemblies plus one for the Nairobi area. These assemblies were to have elected and specially elected members with each District in the Region having the same number of members. Each Regional Assembly was to elect its own pres-
ident who could be delegated executive functions from the Central Government. All legislation enacted in the Regions was to "ensure compliance with Central Government legislation." The Central Government and the Regional Assemblies were each to have their own public services and "all such authorities should endeavour to maintain reasonably uniform rates of pay and conditions of service throughout all the public services." Local government was reserved exclusively to the Regional Assemblies with the result that "the whole of Kenya must be comprised within the area of some local government authority, of which there will be two basic upper tiers, municipalities and county councils, and four types of lower tiers; urban councils and township councils, and, in the rural areas, area councils and local councils."

These proposals for various levels of government in Kenya were clearly the results of the efforts of KADU negotiators at Lancaster House. The expense to the Colony to maintain eight separate services as well as a multitude of governments would be a tremendous burden on the precarious finances of the country. Nevertheless, the institution of these proposals in the new constitution was the price for a compromise solution. The acceptance of these terms by KANU was a significant compromise on its part. It was apparent, however, that the wide degree of autonomy given to local areas together with
the establishment of regional councils, stimulated the maintenance of tribalism. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Duncan Sandys, commenting on his trip to Kenya, reported to the House of Commons in March, 1963, that "unhappily the whole political life in Kenya today is permeated by inter-tribal rivalry and suspicion." In spite of the dangers of tribalism, Mr. Sandys made the inevitable announcement that on May 26, 1963, full internal self-government would be granted to Kenya. This date immediately followed the spring general election in Kenya.

The election of May, 1963 was the final step before African rule was to be established in Kenya Colony. Fought on emotional issues the election was between African and African, with the main issue being the question of unitary government versus federalism. In essence, it was a campaign of the weak against the strong in which KANU enjoyed a large measure of support throughout the country. For the first time Africans were discussing the problems of nation building and of restoring confidence in the country's future after several years of political and economic instability. While KADU was urging the protection of minority or tribal rights, KANU was looking beyond the election to the future of the country. In its April election manifesto, KANU outlined its objectives in this manner:
The Marxist theory of class warfare has no relevance to Kenya's situation. Attitudes which were appropriate when we were fighting for independence have to be revised. The KANU government will welcome those non-Africans who choose to joint with us in the noble task of building a Kenya nation. Their training, skills, and knowledge will be of the greatest value to us. We are confident that those who show confidence in us will appreciate the need to pass on to the nation what they can teach the people. They will be fully accepted by us, not only through legal forms, but in our hearts.

With self-government won and the frustrations of colonialism removed, the responsible African leaders at last were looking on their country in a new light. And although the problems of independence were beyond the comprehension of many of the voters, the confidence in the future of Kenya as expressed by Kenyatta, Mboya, and others, was convincing enough to give KANU a decisive victory. In the Senate KANU emerged as the majority party while in the House of Representatives KANU captured eighty-two seats, KADU gained forty-two members, and five remained vacant. In the Regional Assemblies, tribal loyalties were more evident as KANU won a majority in the Eastern, Central and Nyanza Regions, while KADU gained victories in the Rift Valley, Coast, and Western Regions. With the victory of the Kenya African National Union, Jomo Kenyatta became the first Prime Minister of Kenya.

In June a Kenya ministerial delegation headed by Tom Mboya met with Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, to discuss steps to be taken for the transfer of power to the Kenya Government. At this meeting the question of
the formation of an East African Federation was examined with both sides supporting its formation. Owing to African initiative in the matter, the British Government pressed for quick transfer of power, declaring: "It was agreed that it was desirable that Kenya should become independent shortly before the inauguration of the Federation, which it was hoped would take place before the end of the year." The African representatives also obtained the guarantee that no British military base would remain in Kenya, although British forces would be allowed twelve months after independence to leave. Soon after this meeting Duncan Sandys announced in the House of Commons on July 2, 1963, that Kenya would become an independent country on December 12, 1963. With this long-awaited announcement preparations were made for a final conference to complete the arrangements for independence. Once again African leaders travelled to London to meet with the Secretary of State, but this was to be the final chapter in the series of constitutional conferences which in less than four years had propelled Kenya to independence.

The conference, which sat between September 25 and October 19, 1963, included Ministers of the Kenya government (KANU) and a delegation from the official opposition (KADU). The Secretary of State suggested that the problem facing the conference was how to reconcile the need for national unity with the desire for minority
safeguards. Mr. Sandys reaffirmed the objective declared in 1962 as a "united Kenya nation, capable of social and economic progress in the modern world—a Kenya in which men and women have confidence in the sanctity of individual rights and liberties, and in the proper safeguarding of the interests of the minorities." The main issues at the conference were certain amendments proposed by the Kenya Government but objected to by the KADU Opposition. Under the proposed constitution a National Security Council, composed of a Minister of the Central Government and a representative of each of the seven Regions, was to have the power to determine the maximum strength of each regional force. Under the accepted amendment the National Security Council was to be charged with fixing the actual establishment, as well as the maximum strength of the Central and Regional police contingents. A second change gave the Inspector General (who was to be in overall command of the police) the power to post all ranks of the Police Force into any Regional contingent without requiring the consent of the Regional Commissioners of Police concerned. At the same time, there were to be no restrictions on the movement of police reinforcements from one part of the country to another. These new provisions clearly were an effort by the Central Government to maintain greater authority over the policing of the country and thereby achieve a greater degree of unity and cooperation throughout the country.
A second major change concerned the public service in which there was a change from eight to a single public service commission for the country, composed of seven independent members appointed on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission. This new provision ensured that there would be common qualifications and standards throughout Kenya. "The Region should not be entitled to insist on tribal connections as a qualification...the Commission should be required, as at present, to endeavour to secure that, so far as is practicable, the staff on the Central Government establishment should include a reasonable number of persons from each Region, and that the staff of a Region should include a substantial proportion of persons drawn from that Region." With a clear mandate from the people of Kenya, the KANU Government was able to introduce this proposal in an effort to create a national public service divorced from tribal affiliations. This, the Government hoped, would prevent the growth of autonomous civil services from a foundation of tribal loyalty.

The third significant amendment, to the Framework of 1962 dealt with amendments to the constitution. Changes affecting the "entrenched rights of individuals, Regions, Tribal Authorities or Districts" would require the support of a 75% vote in the House of Representatives and a 90% vote in the Senate, while all other amendments
to the constitution necessitated a 75% vote in each House of Parliament. As an alternative procedure for obtaining a 75% vote in both Houses for a constitutional amendment, the Secretary of State offered the proposal of a two-thirds majority in a nation-wide referendum. The categories of rights to which the high percentage requirements for amendment pertained were more closely defined to include:

-- the rights of the individual, (including the judiciary and citizenship),
-- tribal authorities (including the all-important tribal land rights),
-- districts (including the Senate for which the 83 Districts form the electoral constituencies)

In addition, this requirement would apply to the structure of the Regions with regard to the provisions governing Regional boundaries and the composition of the Regional Assemblies. It would not, however, apply to the sections of the constitution defining the actual powers of the Regional Assemblies.

Mr. Sandys pointed out that the "unique constitution, which is neither federal nor unitary, has raised problems on which there are no exact precedents or experience to guide us, particularly with regard to the allocation of functions between the Centre and the Regions." For this reason the constitutional amendment changes were made in order to provide "some element of flexibility" in the constitution "so that it can be corrected in the light of experience." In a letter to
Mr. Sandys dated October 19, 1963, Jomo Kenyatta on behalf of the Government of Kenya accepted the proposed amendments and added: "It is not our intention to seek to make further amendments to the constitution except in so far as subsequent experience shows that to be absolutely necessary." The Opposition party in Kenya, however, refused to accept the changes and did not attend the final plenary session of the conference. Clearly, the conference was a victory for KANU, for it indicated a trend towards the consolidation of power and authority in the centre and away from the Regions. With the conclusion of the conference all that remained before independence could be proclaimed was the official passage of the Kenya Independence Bill in the House of Commons.

In November the Bill was introduced and passed in the British Parliament after a lengthy debate in the Commons. Mr. Sandys reassured Parliament about the capability of Kenyatta as leader, when he declared: "In recent months Mr. Kenyatta's wise and generous-minded speeches have won him much respect among all races in Kenya and here in Britain." At the same time, Ronald Ngala, as leader of the Kenya opposition, declared that "K.A.D.U. now look forward to full and mutual cooperation with the Government in establishing confidence and effective administration for the good of all people in Kenya." This was a reassuring statement, for it had become quite
apparent that the success of the Kenya nation in the future would depend primarily on the ability of all the tribes of Kenya to work together for the good of the entire country. Writing on this matter Tom Mboya has suggested that:

This is only possible where you have popular leadership and a strong party machine. It is impossible where you have a multi-party system with the opposition party waiting for the day it can replace the government. We cannot over-emphasize the importance of national unity in this crucial stage of post-independence development.88

With this hope Kenyans set out to 'Harambee'—Pull Together. On November 26, 1963, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. R.P. Hornby, told the House of Commons:

The passing of this Bill will not tear out the pages of history that have been written by Britain and by Kenya during the last 70 years or so. We wish Kenya prosperity and unity, strength and tolerance, and in wishing her well for the future we trust that the links and the friendship between her and this country will continue to grow with the years.89

On December 12, 1963, the seventy-three year old Jomo Kenyatta, convicted manager of Mau Mau, watched as the black, red, green and white flag of independent Kenya climbed the flagstaff in Nairobi, and the Prime Minister spoke to the people of Kenya, declaring:

Only we can save ourselves. Nobody else can save us. In the past we have blamed the Englishman when anything went wrong. We said he was sucking our blood. Now the government is ours, and now you will blame Kenyatta. But you should know that Kenyatta, by himself, cannot give you anything. I urge you to
work hard so that our 'Uhuru' will be meaningful. From today on, our motto will be 'Uhuru na Kazi', [Freedom and Work].

The feeling of confidence in the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta brought political stability to Kenya for the first time since the country became a Colony. The inclusion in the administration of European, Asian and Arab members as ministers gave hope that Kenya would be a truly non-racial society. Tom Mboya, in January, 1964 suggested that: "In the last four months we have been able to create the most cordial, friendly and harmonious relations between the races as have never existed at any time before." Whether such an atmosphere will last, however, only time will determine. The final stages in Kenya's constitutional development were reached during the autumn of 1964. Soon after independence had been declared many members of the KADU opposition party crossed the floor of the House of Representatives to join KANU. On November 10, 1964 the last member of the Opposition, Ronald Ngala, left his seat and joined KANU, thereby making Kenya a one-party state. On December 12, 1964, the first anniversary of Kenya's independence was celebrated with the announcement that Kenya would become a republic within the British Commonwealth. Kenyatta, "the burning spear", became the first president of Kenya, and his first act was to appoint Oginga Odinga as his vice-president. This undoubtedly was a blow to the aspirations of Tom Mboya, and perhaps has laid the seeds for
a bitter campaign to determine Kenyatta's successor when that time arrives. In the meantime, however, it is to Kenyatta that Kenya must look for leadership in the struggle to achieve political, economic and social stability.

The rapid pace with which Kenya reached independence and the political chaos that emerged during the final four years before independence was conferred may be attributed to a number of factors. The final stage in Kenya's evolution to independence was a most difficult one. The effect of the Mau Mau rebellion both retarded and hastened the transitional period. While Mau Mau destroyed the old Kenya dominated by the settler, it led to a political awakening of Africans throughout the country as well as a changed attitude among Kenya Europeans. For these reasons, Mau Mau greatly stimulated the nationalistic fervour which had already begun to be felt in the Colony. At the same time, however, the Emergency regulations initially retarded the development of a single national party appealing to Africans, of all tribes. Instead the formation of national political parties was prevented until 1960, encouraging in the meantime the growth of regional African political bodies which appealed to tribal loyalties.

With the formation of African political parties on a nationwide basis, there were only four years in
which experience in party politics and government could be gained by a sufficient number of Africans. Here, however, the effects of the Emergency played their part in creating a chaotic political situation. The concentration on the single goal of independence was the primary concern of both the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union. Few thoughts were directed towards the future problems and prospects of Kenya. The gradual transition to self-government and independence in Tanganyika contrasted markedly with that of Kenya. Under the moderate leadership of Julius Nyerere the Tanganyika African National Union was able to appeal effectively for independence over a longer period of time than was KANU in Kenya. As it was, when self-government came to Tanganyika the country already was united behind a single leader with the result that a more unified and responsible attitude towards the final objective of independence could be taken.

The success of Tanganyika's independence movement naturally had its effect on the Kenya nationalist movement and created demands for similar status as that of Tanganyika. In this respect, however, the political and constitutional development in both countries had been different and it was clear that political experience in Kenya was not as great as that in Tanganyika. Nevertheless, Kenya Africans sought a similar rate of advance as that
taking place in their neighbouring country. For this reason, the British Government found itself in a position where it found it necessary to accede to the nationalist demands.

The role of the British Government during this final phase in the political and constitutional development of Kenya was both understanding and decisive. A realization of the political awakening in Kenya among the indigenous population marked British policy there after 1960. An acceptance of the inevitability of African rule in Kenya Colony was foremost in the minds of British negotiators during the final years of Colonial rule. Out of this changed attitude developed a growing trust of the Colonial Office on the part of African politicians, and this new cooperation greatly assisted the negotiations at the Lancaster House Conferences. Although many may criticize the haste with which Britain left Kenya, African nationalism could not be deterred or delayed without more bloodshed. Clearly, Kenya could not be isolated from the developments which were taking place in the rest of Africa. The decision to remain in the British Commonwealth once independence was declared illustrated the acceptance of the important role Britain had played in Kenya's development and the acknowledgement of the necessity for British cooperation in the future.
While greater understanding was reached between the Colonial Office and the African, suspicion continued to strain the relationship between the African and the conservative European settler. The continued inflexible stand adopted by men such as Group Captain Briggs and Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck hindered the transition from European to African rule in the country. The distrust of the politically active settlers had been nurtured over a half century and most stands adopted by the European political parties were considered by the African leaders to be attempts to hang on to the last vestige of white supremacy in the country. Even the policies of Michaël Blundell were viewed with some suspicions despite the important role he had played in bringing about a greater understanding between the white and black points of view. Of these European liberals Tom Mboya has written: "They came forward to try to create a halfway-house between white supremacy and what they called 'extreme nationalism'. They could not be accepted fully by any nationalist, but they serve a purpose in helping their own people face the realities of the change which was taking place around them....So the European 'liberal' is often mistrusted, because he will not completely accept the new order. It was this mistrust which led to the failure of Sir Michael Blundell."
The role of the Asian in the final years before independence came to Kenya was small. The initiative was taken by the African to achieve constitutional advance in the Colony and to this end the Asian contributed little. Throughout the post-Mau Mau period the Asian had been in the middle of the political battle between white and black. Little close association had been developed between African and Asian because the European power and culture was far more attractive to the African than was the Asian trading community. In addition, economic rivalry and jealousy had developed between Asian and African, for the African by the late nineteen-fifties was no longer entirely dependent on the small Asian traders. In the final years of Colonial rule the Asian clearly recognized that Kenya's political future was going to rest in the hands of the African. To this end Asians in Legco supported most African demands for increased representation and responsibility and were careful not to hinder the African drive for independence. Thus when independence came the Asians gained some ministerial responsibility, and Chanan Singh, Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister Kenyatta in 1962, was able to say: "I cannot believe that there will be in future as bad discrimination as there was in the past....I think we will be able to get over the difficulties that sometimes frighten people in the same way as we have got
over difficulties in the past....The leaders of Kenya Africans do not give me the impression that they want to discriminate against us."

With the achievement of independent status in Kenya, the problem of racialism lessened as some harmony between the races emerged as Kenyans attempted to cooperate with each other for the betterment of their country. Yet, it is ironic that one of the greatest problems which European occupation of Kenya at the turn of the twentieth century was able to reduce markedly—that of tribal animosity—reemerges today as perhaps the greatest danger to the future political stability of the country. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya, during its first year of independence, has been able to maintain political stability. For Kenya, however, political stability is only the foundation on which economic and social stability must be built.
NOTES

1 The Times, February 4, 1960

2 The African elected members delegation contained two groups—The Kenya Independence Movement (Mboya) and the Kenya National Party (Muliro). Although united over independence, these groups differed over domestic issues.


5 The Observer, January 24, 1960.


8 Ibid., p. 8.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

10 Ibid., p. 10.


12 Blundell, op.cit., p. 266.


16 Loc.cit.

17 Blundell, op.cit., p. 274.


32 Mboya, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

33 *The Times*, October 21, 1960. See also Mboya, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55, 74.

34 *The Times*, September 1, 1960.


36 *Africa Digest*, vol. 8 (October, 1960), p. 56.


38 *Africa Digest*, vol. 8 (February, 1961), pp. 139-140.


40 *Africa Digest*, vol. 8 (February, 1960), p. 140.


43 Mboya, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
44 Blundell, op.cit., p. 297.
46 The Times, April 13, 1961.
48 Bennett and Rosberg, op.cit., pp.196-197.
49 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
51 The Times, August 9, 1961.
52 The Economist, April 22, 1961.
54 Ibid., cols.1153-1154.
55 The Economist, August 5, 1961.
61 Ibid., p. 11.
63 Mboya, op.cit., p. 72.
64 Rake, op.cit., p. 211.
67 *Loc.cit.*
68 *Loc.cit.*
70 Bennett, *op.cit.*, pp. 157-158.
76 *Ibid.*, pp.9-10
78 Only one of seven hundred candidates was European.
83 *Loc.cit.*
In early 1964 Kenya called on British troops to meet the uprising of Somali tribesmen on Kenya's north-eastern border.


The Asians were involved with their own religious divisions which overshadowed any interest they might have had in the political developments.

Delf, op.cit., p. 70.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECONOMIC PENDULUM 1953-1963

Throughout the nineteen-fifties African nationalists agitated for political advancement in the belief that economic benefits would automatically come to their people once constitutional recognition was granted. For this reason, African leaders in Kenya channelled all their energies along the political path and left the considerations of the economic needs of the Colony for the most part to the discretion of the United Kingdom and Kenya Governments. During the period in which Emergency regulations were imposed on Kenya, the economic burden of fighting the Mau Mau terrorists was overwhelming (See Appendix I). Yet through generous and frequent loans and grants from the United Kingdom, Kenya was able to meet the financial exigencies created by Mau Mau. At the same time, the Colony was able to enjoy its greatest period of economic prosperity. It is quite apparent that in spite of the devastation and instability created by Mau Mau, the economic development of Kenya was not retarded and, in fact, expanded owing to a determined effort on the part of both the Kenya and the British Governments to maintain the rate of economic growth of the post-World War II period.

During the first four years of the Emergency,
official statements in Kenya's Legislative Council consistently reflected the buoyant economic conditions in the colony. In July 1954, Kenya's Finance Minister, Mr. Ernest Vassey, was able to declare in the Legislative Council that "our revenue was being maintained and was, indeed, coming in at a rate slightly higher than anticipated". Governor Baring on October 18, 1955, in his Speech from the Chair, told the members of Legco that "in spite of Kenya's troubles the continued flow of new capital investment is further and encouraging evidence of the confidence of investors in the Colony's future. Since the beginning of 1955, nearly £2 million of new capital has been committed in the establishment of new commercial and industrial enterprises and in the expansion of those already existing." The generally optimistic outlook reflected in Legco during these first post-Mau Mau years was evident in a speech delivered during the budget debate in May, 1956, by Mr. W.E. Grosskill, a European elected member. He declared:

I certainly think that few countries in the world have weathered the storm of rebellion with less effect on their economy than our country has during the last three years....The State of Emergency continues but undoubtedly the enemy is tired and sick, and our economy is still expanding...the country's economy is sound....

Again in the Governor's speech in late 1956, it was stated very confidently that: "The economic recovery of Kenya is proceeding at remarkable speed." And finally,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its survey of the economic development of Kenya commented that: "Since World War II, it appears that Kenya has enjoyed a period of considerable economic expansion despite the effects of the Mau Mau Emergency and the changing prospects for its main export commodities in world markets."

This virtually uninterrupted growth of the economy was primarily in the European agricultural areas, although African contributions to the economy increased as well. The principal reasons for the rapid increase in the European sector's productivity may be attributed to good climatic conditions and healthy world markets for Kenya's commodities. In addition, the determination displayed by the British and Kenya Governments to defeat the Mau Mau movement, and perhaps the lack of a definitive statement on the ultimate status of the Colony, helped to maintain a reasonable degree of confidence among investors. Europeans within Kenya, particularly during the first years of the Emergency still maintained a predominant political role in the country's administration and were still quite optimistic about their future status in the Colony. Apart from the multi-racial aspects of the Lyttelton Constitution in 1954 and the voting procedures outlined in the Coutts Report in 1955, the predominant role
of Kenya Europeans had not seriously been altered as a result of Mau Mau. For this reason they were confident that their economic contribution to the economy would continue to reap rewards both for the country and for themselves.

While the European sector was continuing to enjoy economic prosperity, the African sector in Kenya, partly as a result of the Emergency, came to receive greater attention. Several official commissions investigated the economic conditions of Africans and many of their recommendations were accepted. However, it would be wrong to suggest that these investigations were solely a result of Mau Mau uprising. Already in 1946 a ten year development plan had been instigated. By 1952 the country's economy was expanding sufficiently to fulfill the planned objective of increasing agricultural productivity. In spite of Mau Mau, economic development continued to progress in the nineteen-fifties and much-needed land reform and examination of wage structures were able to take place with an eye to improving the standard of living of the African. The East African Royal Commission made an exhaustive study of the economic and social conditions in East Africa during a two year period from 1953 to 1955. The need for such a study, however, had been recognized by the British Government before the outbreak of violence in Kenya.
Certainly Mau Mau stimulated plans to improve African welfare but it was not the sole cause for such reforms. The steady progress in the economy in the post-World War II period provided the much-needed finances to implement the recommendations of such reports.

Perhaps the most important and certainly the longest overdue report was that of the committee on African Wages which was submitted to the Kenya Government in 1954. The economic level of the African had lagged far behind that of the European. It was, therefore, to study the wage structure of Africans in Kenya, that the Carpenter committee was appointed. The findings of this committee clearly pointed out the need for the institution of some permanence in the employment of African urban workers. Throughout the first fifty years of urbanization in Kenya African labourers maintained a firm foothold in their native reserves, showing a reluctance to abandon their subsistence economy. The ties of Kenya's traditional culture continued to disrupt the effective functioning of African labourers outside the reserves. Family life was disrupted and in Nairobi there had been a ratio of five men to every one woman. African workers would remain only short periods in urban areas and then would return to their families in the reserves. The Carpenter Report stressed the importance of this imbalance when it declared: "We
consider that the basic condition for the emergence of an effective African labour force is the removal of the African from the enervating and retarding influences of his economic and cultural background, and his permanent resettlement outside the reserves."

More than one-half of the adult African male labour force was found to be of the migrant type, which to employers represented an easy source of cheap labour. "Few employers," the Report suggested, "are prepared to expend time and labour on the 'training' of workers unless there is a reasonable prospect of such workers remaining permanently with them; this undoubtedly provides one explanation of why so few Kenya Africans ever advance to the stage of becoming skilled workers." Thus from the findings of this Report it was clear that the temporary nature of his employment outside the native reserves, and the resulting continuation of the effects of his traditional subsistence economy and cultural background, prevented the African from becoming a significant factor in the labour market in the urban areas. This instability of native labour, it was suggested, could be overcome if a sufficient wage was provided so that the African could support the essential needs of himself and his family, guarantee regular employment, and provide a home in which his family could live together. Yet, at the time of the Report's findings, one-
half of African urban workers in private industry and one-quarter of those in the public services were found to be receiving wages insufficient for the basic needs of health, decency, and working efficiency.

The Report found that three-quarters of the contract workers in non-plantation agriculture received inadequate wages to support a minimum standard. Those in plantation agriculture were somewhat better off. The low wages, therefore, were not encouraging a greater African contribution to the economy or improving the subsistence level of African existence. In order to improve the stability of urban native employment and at the same time uplift the poor standard of living of the vast majority of the indigenous population, the Carpenter Report urged the introduction of a new minimum wage.

The new minimum wage formula as it would operate in Nairobi, called for an increase in the basic minimum wage for urban workers of sixteen shillings, fifty cents per month with an allowance for houses of five shillings per month. These new measures would become effective on January 1, 1955. An interim measure, in recognition of the urgency of the matter, called for the immediate granting of a flat increase of ten shillings on all existing minimum rates together with the prescribing of a new housing allowance based on the average economic rent of a bed-space in local authority
housing locations. The most significant feature of the new minimum wage proposals was that the basis for the statutory minimum wage was to be changed from one which took into account only the needs of a single man ('bachelor' minimum wage), to one based on the needs of a family unit. The 'family' minimum was to be two and one-half times the 'bachelor' minimum. The regulations called for this new measure to be implemented over a ten year period with fifteen percent per year being added to the 'bachelor' minimum with a similar increase in the housing allowance. Thus, the new proposals called for a dual minimum wage linked to an age qualification, with those over twenty-one years of age and a service qualification of thirty-six months continuous employment outside the native land units receiving the 'family' minimum wage.

Throughout the Report the investigating committee made it quite clear that they believed that low wages were a cause rather than an effect of the low productivity of African labour, particularly in the urban areas. The majority report, supported by committee members Harry Thuku and Solomon Adagala, clearly called for an immediate increase in African wages in Kenya. However, a minority report submitted by F.T. Holder, disagreed with the conclusions of the Report. "In my view," declared Mr. Holder, "the relationship between wages and productivity
is a matter of fundamental importance to the Colony's economy and a proposal which takes no account of productivity, and therefore of the capacity of the country to support the standard of living proposed, is likely to lead to economic bankruptcy." The minority report called for a raising of the level of production before one could consider uplifting the standard of living. Yet, the economy, under the circumstances of the Mau Mau rebellion, was quite buoyant, and capable of meeting a higher wage bill. The investigating committee apparently recognized that the process of Africanization was inevitable in many facets of Kenya life, both political and economic. If Africans were to enter successfully into all spheres of Kenya's administration and development, it was necessary for them to quickly adapt to an exchange economy. For the Africans to participate effectively in a cash economy, it was essential, for contentment and stability, that they share in the economic benefits of prosperity.

One year after the Carpenter Report on African Wages had been issued, a second and equally important report was published. The East Africa Royal Commission, headed by Sir High Dow, presented a detailed report on the economic problems and prospects in East Africa with particular reference to Kenya. The Commissioners summarized their findings in this manner:
...more profoundly perhaps than any educational
disability, the African has...been handicapped
by his traditional form of society which has
sought its security and stability in a mode of
life which has had little specialization on the
side of production, few opportunities for the
exchange of goods, and few human contacts with
the outside world. Fear of the unknown rather
than a curiosity about what it contains is not
an attitude of mind which makes for human pro­
gress, whatever the level may be at which that
progress is sought.

For the African it was a dilemma to choose between
traditional tribal security and the unfamiliar exchange
economy. The elimination of tribal warfare, the dis­
ruption of traditional methods of birth control, the
improvement in medical facilities, and the disruption
of the traditional old age security within the family
unit, contributed significantly to the economic dil­
emma which faced the African. The rapid growth of
population as a result of many of these factors made
it difficult for the land to support the population even
at a fixed standard of living. For this reason, it was
essential for the African to enter into the cash econ­
omy, for the old idea of self-sufficiency was rapidly
becoming ineffectual and impractical.

The East African Report suggested that the
customary agricultural system together with the increas­
ing population was untenable in crowded areas. By in­
creasing agricultural production in the native areas both
the African and the Kenyan economy could be greatly
stimulated. Clearly, the system of unrestricted owner-
ship of land in the African areas was incompatible with productive agriculture. For this reason, the Report recommended individual land tenure through purchase and sale rather than through customary law. Under this system the fragmentation of land holdings could be ended. Fears over the failure of customary tenure to meet the land shortage might be eliminated through a land tenure law. To this end the Report urged the formation of territorial Land Development Boards to ensure a territorial rather than a district approach to land development.

The Land Development Board should not be representative of any sectional or racial interests nor should it be precluded from considering any land in the territory. It should be a committee specializing, on behalf of the whole community, in the execution of the main aim outlined in this Report: the encouragement of production from the land in a way that is economically and socially satisfactory. This was a significant statement, for it introduced a non-racial concept in regard to the usage of land and foretold the eventual opening up of the White Highlands on a non-racial basis. This new principle also suggested the possibility of limiting land holdings to a certain size in specified areas. The Commissioners stated in decisive terms that: "In so far as barriers to free land exchange are not removed, to that extent will the prosperity of the people of East Africa be retarded....The traditional policy of 'land reservation' and of safeguarding sectional interests, whether of Africans or non-Africans,
must be abandoned in the interests of the community as a whole."

The recommendations of Sir Hugh Dow were reaffirmed in the important report of R.J.W. Swynnerton on African agriculture. His five year plan stressed the need for private African ownership of land through surveys and demarcation, and also the consolidation of various fragmented land holdings characteristic of the African's traditional land holding system. The Swynnerton Plan also proposed the acquisition of ten-acre plots of land for landless Africans. Land for this project was to be obtained through irrigation schemes and other land reclamation schemes such as the eradication of the tsetse fly and the draining of swamps. By providing this land it was hoped that African agriculture could be intensified through education and technological assistance in order that production could be increased to such a level where the African could enter the cash economy. Commenting on these recommendations Governor Baring declared: "The task is thus not only to give the African a sense of economic security in the new system, but to reorientate his concepts away from the tribalism which has meant so much to him for so many hundreds of years towards a wider social system."

These three reports dealing with the economic climate of Kenya—and more particularly the African econ-
omic sector—laid the foundations for the transfer of the African economy from a traditional subsistence economy to a cash economy. The emphasis on agriculture reaffirmed the fact that agriculture would continue to be the 'bread and butter' of Kenya's economy for some years to come, and the need for agricultural research and land consolidation which had largely featured the ten year Development Plan of 1946. As the African correspondent for the Times Weekly Review suggested: "Already before the Emergency there was a spontaneous tendency to switch over from communal farming on the traditional tribal pattern to private ownership. Now this movement has become official policy and is wedded to that of land consolidation." The demands voiced by African nationalists after the Second World War and the eventual outbreak of hostilities in 1952 underlined the fact that a much greater effort was necessary if African agriculture, and similarly, if the African economy were to advance beyond the subsistence level. For this reason, the Swynnerton Plan was launched with a gift of £5 million from the United Kingdom Government.

It was in the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan that the Emergency had perhaps its greatest effect on the country's economy. The area most closely affected by the agricultural proposals was that held by the Kikuyu. With several thousand members of this tribe
in detention camps at various places throughout the Colony, it became considerably easier to achieve closer administration and technical development. Whereas prior to the Emergency Jomo Kenyatta and other Kikuyu leaders were highly suspicious of any efforts at land reclamation or consolidation, with these leaders restricted the members of the tribe became more receptive to European efforts in this direction. Explanations could be given in greater detail and the advantages of legal land tenure could be more easily explained. With a relative calm in political activity in the mid-fifties arising out of the Emergency regulations, Kenya's Department of Agriculture was anxious to demarcate new holdings and hedge them, as well as to establish firm land tenure. By 1957, Mr. Swynnerton was able to point out that "we have achieved enormous success, amazing success I should say, in the Central Province with the Kikuyu tribe which has given so much trouble in the Emergency. The people themselves, at bottom realize the advantage of land consolidation but they have a stratum of political agitators on top which stirred up their fears and suspicions. The effects of the Emergency has [sic] been to remove this source of obstruction." Mr. Swynnerton also pointed out that Africans were agreeing to stock limitation, soil conservation and afforestation. Many Kikuyu after the Second World War had already indicated a willingness
to accept land reform, but it was for official policy to give a real impetus to agricultural reform.

Finance Minister Ernest Vassey was in complete agreement with the findings of these official reports, for he believed that the growth potential in African agriculture at this time was one of the greatest potentials that Kenya had. These reports indicated determined government efforts to expand the African economy. Yet, the effect of their recommendations would take time to become operative. In the meantime, the country's economy continued to develop. Ernest Vassey has suggested reasons why economic development in Kenya during the mid-fifties was virtually uninterrupted by the Emergency, when he wrote:

Surely it is the recognition of these facts, of the fact that the Government's economic and financial policy is directed, as far as possible, to assisting development, and of the determination of the United Kingdom Government to help Kenya through the interim period of financial difficulty, that has kept the inflow of capital into the country running at a reasonable level, despite Emergency troubles. 22

That the United Kingdom recognized the urgent need to intensify agricultural development in Kenya was apparent from the remarks of Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton when he declared: "As the House is aware, the need for intensified agricultural development is greater in Kenya than in other African territories because it is in Kenya that pressure on the land is greatest; and there are also special resettlement problems arising out of the
movement of population during the emergency." The British Government's desire to maintain the post-war economic growth was equally evident, for Mr. Lyttelton told the Commons that "we have all along, throughout the emergency, tried to retard as little as possible all the social and economic schemes which, as the security of the Colony advances, we hope to be able to push forward more quickly." Clearly, the large financial grants made to Kenya were intended not only to restore law and order in the Colony but also to promote the economic development programmes already launched in Kenya.

While the British Government was providing funds to meet the costs of the Emergency the level of wages in Kenya showed an increase as a result of the Carpenter Report. Prior to the Emergency there had existed an abundance of cheap labour. However, with many thousands of Kikuyu removed from the labour force a temporary shortage of cheap labour also stimulated an increase in both urban and rural wages. Thus, by 1956 the statutory minimum emolument had been raised over the previous two years from 59.50 sh to 100 sh per month for adult workers (an increase of 68%) and from 50.50 sh to 88 sh for other workers. With this increase in wages better living and working conditions gradually became available for Africans and this had
its effect on African output. By 1957 land consolidation under African survey teams was progressing at a rapid pace while African production of cash crops such as coffee, tea, wattle, pyrethrum, and pineapple was increasing.

African production of coffee in particular played a large part in the development of the African cash economy. In the decade or two prior to the Emergency a great reluctance on the part of European farmers to encourage African coffee production had been apparent. Indeed, European farmers considered that African production would seriously threaten their markets. In the early years of limited African coffee production, growers often received more trees than they could effectively handle. However, government controls were introduced which maintained the high quality of Kenya coffee while at the same time created a firm foundation for African production. Mr. G.M. Roddan, Kenya's Director of Agriculture declared in 1953 that:

"We have, in coffee, laid the foundations of a very promising industry for the Africans. We feel that it is being developed on much sounder lines than in our neighbouring territories, and we propose to build as quickly as we can on these foundations in the knowledge that we have an industry that will stand competition in the world's markets, and is efficient by any standards."

The Director's confidence was rewarded, for the acreage for coffee production was greatly increased as land con-
solidation was introduced. By 1958, three new African coffee factories were opened. A year or so later African-produced coffee was awarded a prize at the annual agricultural show for being judged the best coffee produced in the Colony.

As Africans entered the cash economy tea and sugar production by Africans stimulated the country's economy. Farmers' training centres were built in Nyanza province to train African farmers in the promotion of improved crop and animal husbandry. This helped to increase African production, although less than twenty percent of European output, and to bring the African into the cash economy. Commenting on the progress in Kenya's economic development Marion Forrester has written:

Many of the barriers to achieving this goal are based on the fact that the carriers of economic progress to Kenya upset traditional society in favor of their individual or group interests, which were not identical with those of the native population. This situation brought about an exchange economy juxtaposed with the traditional economy, and created most of the obstacles. For instance, the political strife, the racial tension, the restrictive labour and land policies, the restrictions of African production and sales in agriculture, the small domestic market, the export deficit, and the low per capita income of the African. The net result of these barriers has created an atmosphere in the Colony which dampens the initiation of an over-all economic development program.29

With the new atmosphere of cooperation between African and European in the agricultural development of Kenya,
the two sectors gradually became more and more intertwined. An increase in road construction and irrigation schemes made the African areas more accessible. This factor combined with the land consolidation schemes greatly speeded up the process of bringing the African farmer into the cash economy.

The final important step taken during the Emergency to stimulate African production occurred in 1959 with the opening of the White Highlands on a non-racial basis. Michael Blundell was the first European politician to recognize the importance of opening up the White Highlands to all races, and he incorporated such a proposal in his party platform. Not only did he recognize the economic importance of making land in the Highlands more fully utilized and more productive, but he also saw the political significance of such a measure. Ever since the immigrant races settled in Kenya the question of land tenure in the fertile highlands was a tense issue. At the turn of the century this area was guaranteed exclusively to the Europeans and remained that way until 1959. The Carter Land Commission in its investigations in the early thirties reaffirmed the status of the White Highlands. In fact at that time the Secretary of State for the Colonies directed the Commissioners to the effect that persons of European descent were to continue to enjoy a privileged
position in the Highlands.

Since 1934 the occupation of the White Highlands has remained a tense emotional issue particularly among the Kikuyu. Clearly, this was a major grievance which played its part in fomenting antagonism which eventually found an outlet in Mau Mau. The Dow Commission Report of 1955, while not actually advocating the opening up of the Highlands, did in fact, urge the creation of a climate of opinion which would eventually support such a plan without increasing racial hostility. The Report said:

But two facts stand out as resulting from the policy of the exclusive tenure of land in the Highlands by Europeans. Firstly, the bitterness which has persisted over the extinguishing of African rights in the area, and secondly, the sense of injustice caused in African eyes by broad acres reserved for a few individuals alongside an African reserve in which land hunger exists....It was seldom that any African suggested to us that any European who was using his land fully should be deprived of that land, but our attention was constantly being directed to the fact of unused or partially used land in the Highlands.31

Approximate figures showed that about 4,000 Europeans were engaged in agriculture on 16,500 square miles. This area was about 30% of the arable land which was suitable for productive agriculture. Yet, some 250,000 non-Europeans lived and worked in the White Highlands but without any rights of tenure. These individuals could not help but develop a sense of frustration particularly
since their tribal leaders had suggested numerous times that this land rightfully belonged to them.

In 1958 figures given in the House of Commons suggested that less than 2% of agricultural land in the Highlands was unleased and that some 997 square miles were not being used properly. Mr. John Stonehouse, a Labour Member of Parliament acquainted with East Africa, urged the Government to open up the Highlands to all races. At this time, however, the Colonial Office was unwilling to follow such a course.

In Kenya European conservative politicians continued to be inflexible in their attitude on the Highlands question. Group Captain Briggs asserted:

> In my opinion, once the principles of the reservation of the Highlands for European use and settlement is broken what might well start as a mere trickle would, in no time, become a flood. That would be the end of European settlement and of the European community—and, ultimately, a disaster for Kenya and particularly the African masses, who would be abandoned to what could only be some form of totalitarian regime. 34

These comments, however, were clearly motivated by political considerations as well as economic ones. Comments in a letter appearing in the Kenya Weekly News were more outspoken than those of Group Captain Briggs, for they suggested: "...for the foreseeable future, 'one well within the lifetime of everyone under fifty', we certainly ought to be the 'Dominant Race'—by seniority of 1,000 years or so and by right of achievement and
endeavour. Not because we are white or European, but because of what we have done and are doing."

The conservative Europeans still foresaw, as did the Governor, the complementary development of African and European agricultural policy. The emotionalism surrounding the Highlands question did little to advance cooperation between the two races or to encourage any confidence either inside or outside the country.

In spite of these feelings, the political implications arising out of the maintenance of the status quo in the Highlands, especially with the lifting of the Emergency regulations appearing to be imminent, prevailed in the thinking of Kenya Government officials. In the fall of 1959, a sessional paper on "Land Tenure and Control Outside the Native Lands" was issued with its aims "to ensure that the basis of tenure and management of agricultural land will be the same throughout Kenya, regardless of race or tribe." A Central Land Advisory Board with equal representation from the three races in Kenya was to be established. The criterion for granting leases in the Highlands was to be the farming capabilities of the proposed tenants and not their race. Under the new scheme an application was to be refused if:
1. The applicant already has sufficient land or interest in the area.
2. The area of land is likely to prove uneconomic for the intended purpose.
3. The terms and conditions of the proposed transaction are onerous; or
4. The information before the boards suggests that the proposed transferee is unlikely, for any reason, to be a good farmer of the holding.  

Commenting on the significance of this decision, Mr. Wilfred Havelock, Minister for Local Government and Lands in Kenya, declared: "No longer will our agricultural land be subjected to racial allocation but it will be available for proper and intensive development by farmers of any race, provided that such individuals have the capacity and the means to fulfil this great responsibility."  

Thus, what has often been referred to as "a selfish clique" was in law removed from its autonomous position in Kenya's richest land. At the same time, the new scheme opened the way for European purchase of native reserves. The rapid change in Kenya's political climate, however, discouraged large European purchases in this area. 

The opening up of the White Highlands was highly significant for the future development of Kenya, for it created a situation where all land in Kenya was to be obtained through individual rather than racial or tribal qualifications. With agriculture as the basic industry of Kenya, an opportunity to administer a single policy of agriculture became possible. No longer would it be necessary to develop African and European
agriculture along complementary lines. The opening of the White Highlands together with the agricultural revolution which had been occurring in African areas helped greatly to stimulate African production. At the same time, pressure on the land was reduced with the resettlement of thousands of Africans in the Highlands. Politically, a grievance which had festered in the minds of Kikuyu leaders for half a century, was at last removed.

While important steps were taken to promote agricultural development in the African sector, the problem of industrial development also received consideration during the Emergency. In 1954 the Industrial Development Corporation was set up to give legal and corporate status to an organization already operating in Kenya as the Industrial Management Corporation. The body was instituted to coordinate more effectively the industrial development of the Colony. At the same time, more than 299 African cooperative societies had been established to encourage and promote progress in African producer societies.

The confidence of small investors in the future of Kenya was indicated when such secondary industries as the manufacture of floor polish, patent medicines and cosmetics, and stationery, were established in the Colony. In 1955 alone new commercial and industrial enterprises
begun in Kenya included: manufacturing of margarine, soap manufacturing, manufacturing of cotton-wool, and surgical dressings, crown corks and seals, nuts, bolts, and rivets. Indeed, by 1956, the continued inflow of capital into Kenya together with increased agricultural production, created a buoyant economy in which only £10 million of a total of £14 million offered by the United Kingdom for the period 1955-1956, was needed. Investment funds were available to expand the tea-industry, and for the distribution of petroleum products, as well as for mining exploration. This latter enterprise did not, however, prove to be too encouraging. The following table gives an indication of the continuing confidence of Kenya investors, a condition arising partly from the determined efforts of the Kenya Government to advance African agriculture and African education, and partly from the success of the war against the Mau Mau insurgents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth in the per capita domestic income in pounds, particularly during the period 1953-1955, gives further evidence of the healthy economic conditions in Kenya during the first years of the Emergency:
PER CAPITA DOMESTIC INCOME IN POUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>157.0</td>
<td>155.0</td>
<td>179.0</td>
<td>170.0</td>
<td>166.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>680.0</td>
<td>646.0</td>
<td>731.0</td>
<td>656.0</td>
<td>556.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It might be noted that the downward trend apparent in 1957 reflected the growing political unrest in the Colony and foretold the economic collapse which was to occur within a very few years.

Marion Forrester has commented on the trend indicated in the above tables, in this manner: "...the disparity in income levels among the three races is such that, in fact, the bulk of the annual improvement goes to the non-African segments of the population, while the Africans remain largely outside the beneficial flow of economic progress." She has suggested that at this time some two-thirds of investments in Kenya went to the European sector. For this reason, it was apparent that there was a need for capital formation in the African sector in order to hasten the African's adaptation to an exchange economy. The establishment of industries in African areas would improve the region's economic position as well as break down the stagnant effects of the traditional subsistence living. Thus, the establishment of new factories in Nairobi and Mombasa and the growth of the National Income from £107 million in 1952 to £170 million in 1957, were tempered by the fact that
investment was not yet reaching into the African areas.

During the Emergency, therefore, while the economy generally expanded, the need for the African to acquire special skills to meet the challenge of modern industry became increasingly apparent. For this reason the Colony still remained critically dependent on an influx of capital, enterprise, and managerial ability to meet the requirements of Kenya's economy while Africans were being trained and educated to assume a major role in the country's industrial development. While industrial development was essential for the future economic growth of Kenya, agriculture would remain the major source of income. In recognizing this fact, the Kenya Government pointed out that "agricultural production is the backbone of economic development and the expansion of industrial production is to a large extent integrated with it. Development therefore must depend on ensuring a high income from agriculture, port and commercial services, and also on increasing the tempo of geological survey and the rapid development of discovered mineral resources."

During the years of the Emergency, investment in Kenya increased at a healthy rate although primarily in the European sector. Agricultural production received considerable attention with Africans participating to a much greater extent in the production
of cash crops. During the mid-fifties the Colony was blessed with good world markets and suitable weather conditions as well as a relatively stable political climate. In 1959 continued progress was made in land consolidation, with the result that production rose. Tea, pyrethrum, and arabica coffee exports showed healthy increases, although market conditions indicated the start of a downward trend. During this same year there was the enactment of the Industrial Training Ordinance to promote apprenticeship and other forms of training in industry. This was an important step forward in the programme to increase the number of skilled Africans.

By 1960, however, the encouraging start made to the introduction of the African to the exchange economy received a severe setback, which was to disrupt the rate of economic development which had occurred in the early years of the Emergency. As early as 1957 there were signs that the tremendous development in the country's economy, particularly during the years 1954-55, was slowing down. At this time, one could perhaps look to the independence of Ghana, the first African elections in Kenya, and the increased tempo in the demands for greater African representation and responsibility in Kenya affairs, as factors contributing to the economic slowdown. The decline in investment in the country, indicated a growing lack of confidence among investors in the future political stability
of Kenya. Their concern was soon to be justified. With the lifting of the Emergency restrictions early in 1960, and the beginning of a series of important constitutional conferences at Lancaster House, political activity in Kenya became heated. The outspoken demands of African nationalists together with the unrealistic ambitions of a group of conservative Europeans served to create an explosive political climate in the Colony. By the time of the second Lancaster House Conference in 1962 both European and African political groups were divided. Little attention was being devoted to economic and social matters, as the game of politics dominated discussions in the Colony. As a result, during the years immediately preceding independence political uncertainty and instability were prevalent throughout the country. This adversely affected what confidence investors had earlier displayed in Kenya.

Tom Mboya, speaking at a press conference in London in October 1960, recognized the importance of political stability and its effect on investment, when he declared:

The question of confidence and the need for us to reassure investors in order to promote a continuous flow of capital while at the same time achieving the maximum political development has been recognized since the Lancaster House Conference in February... K.A.N.U. will do what it can to ensure that conditions are created and maintained which will instil confidence and guarantee security for investors, and for the persons whom we need in these developments. We are as much interested in stability
and the maintenance of law and order as are Europeans or other people in Kenya.46

Mr. Mboya, master politician that he was, was well aware of the fact that political considerations must predominate if he was to maintain his influential role in Kenya's independence movement.

In spite of Mboya's attempts to reassure investors, and in spite of the efforts of Kenya cabinet ministers Mr. Havelock and Mr. Bruce McKenzie to encourage increased investment by European countries, investment capital declined at a rapid rate. An examination of the industrial index shows the rate of decline and clearly reflects the rise in African political aspirations:

**INDUSTRIAL INDEX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1955</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1955</td>
<td>136.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1956</td>
<td>127.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1957</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1958</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1959</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1960</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Industrial shares after the 1960 constitutional conference fell from £35,154,555 to £23,725,917, or a fall of 32.5%. The market value of gilt-edged stocks of the Kenya Government and of the East Africa High Commission slumped from £84,377,000 to £69,023,971, or a fall of 18.1%. Together these figures represented a decline of faith in Kenya's stability and economic potential of £26,781,663 or 22.4%. This crisis in confidence was explained by Finance Minister K.W.S. MacKenzie in this manner:
This recession is a classic example of one which a country has talked itself into. The year 1960 was a year of record exports and should have been a boom year. This trouble is entirely psychological. I believe it is still within the power of the people of Kenya to get themselves out of this mess. It is in the same belief that the British Government is prepared to stand by us and see us through.

Despite the optimistic tone apparent in Mr. MacKenzie's statement it was clear that both Europeans and Africans in Kenya were intent on maintaining or extending their own political positions with little concern about the economic consequences.

While these political disruptions severely retarded the inflow of investment capital, a series of natural disasters created havoc in the country's agricultural production. The great advances made in agriculture during the nineteen-fifties, received a devastating blow in 1960-1961. Until October, 1960, acute drought caused irreparable damage to the country's agricultural position. Added to this was a plague of army worm, and an excessive rainfall at the end of 1961 which resulted in devastating floods. The final crippling blow dealt to Kenya's economy was a steep fall in the world prices of most of her primary products in the latter half of 1960. Although interrupted slightly in early 1961, this trend continued well into 1962. As a result, Kenya's economy, vitally dependent on healthy world markets and good climatic conditions, suffered considerably in the early sixties.
The flood and famine conditions of 1961 not only ruined many crops but also led to bad road conditions and poor communications throughout the Colony. In the European sector the atmosphere of political uncertainty hindered development with the result that cash crops receded. In the African areas the weather conditions created a feeling of apathy among many farmers which did little to improve the deteriorating agricultural situation. On the positive side, however, in agricultural administration the process of localization was carrying on at a brisk pace. The Department's annual report for 1962 declared.

It has been recognized for some time that unless the African farmer is encouraged to take an active part in the policy-making process it is unlikely that he will develop a sense of responsibility in agricultural and other matters. The Department's policy is to encourage this process in every possible way and its implementation is already improving our extension effort and helping considerably in instances where legislation has to be invoked. It is all part of the process of taking the people with us and our relations with farmers generally can confidently be stated to be excellent at the present time.52

In the Central Province, for example, some fifty-six percent of Senior Field Officers were qualified Africans. In preparing Africans to meet the challenge of modern agricultural techniques, agricultural education by 1963 was available at Egerton College, Siriba College, Embu Training Centre, and thirteen Farmers' Training Centres throughout the country.
While improvements in the training of Africans in modern agricultural methods were occurring, Europeans engaged in agriculture were becoming increasingly restless. The effect of the political and climatic conditions was well summarized by Marion E. Doro, when she wrote:

>

Loss of confidence in their economic future resulted in limited planting by white farmers, widespread African unemployment, a drop in the sales of agricultural equipment, reduced construction activities, and tighter credit restrictions. Money flowed out of the country at the rate of £1,300,000 a month during 1960, and the normal land market became practically non-existent.53

For the Europeans in Kenya who were unwilling to adapt to the Africanization of Kenya, the British Government in mid 1960, introduced a plan to buy European land and resell it to Africans for resettlement purposes. This not only would relieve African land pressures, but also would create a land market for Europeans who wanted to leave Kenya. Under a land development loan fund, £4,000,000 was to be allocated for the purchase of land. Through government purchases Europeans were to get one-half the purchase price on sale and the balance in three yearly instalments at 5% interest.

The Convention of Associations, however, advocated a scorched earth policy unless the British Government bought them out at their prices; they sought a guarantee of land titles or compensation for their property which they valued at £70,000,000. "...a Convention poll in December...revealed that up to 60 percent of the farmers
would leave if the African government could not secure property rights and maintain law and order. The more broad-minded farmers in the Kenya National Farmers Union sought title security and a system of compensation to restore confidence in the economy. This group supported the government land scheme as a means to promote African land ownership and win national sympathy for land titles. The Kenya Coalition under Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck pointed out that the European settlers had large capital holdings but the British Government refused to finance a full compensation plan. The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Fraser, was against this last proposal. "I believe," he said, "that there is little future either for Kenya or for the European farmer in what I might term the negative approach—the organized withdrawal of skill and capital. The policy of Her Majesty's Government is precisely the reverse of this, and rightly so. In stable Government and in expanding economy lies the greatest hope for all in Kenya...." Thus, the demands of some European settlers for safeguards against any form of expropriation were not met, with the result that capital fled the country, imports were reduced, and customs revenue declined.

The political implications of the 1960 Lancaster House Conference together with the fears of a repetition of the violence in the Congo, discouraged new investment from entering the country and encouraged the withdrawal
of local finances. Added to the effects of this loss of capital were the findings of two Commissions in 1961. The Flemming Commission was appointed to inquire into civil servants' salaries. Its findings came as a shock to local officials, for it found that the wage bill should be increased by £6,000,000 per year. Half of this amount was to be paid by the British Government, but the remaining £3,000,000 was to be the financial burden of the Kenya Government. A second commission, headed by the chairman of Lloyd's Bank, Sir Jeremy Raisman, was asked to examine the common market structure in East Africa. The commissioner recommended adjustments whereby Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would work as one fiscal unit. In the past Kenya had gained far more than the other countries from the common market set up. Under the proposed scheme Kenya was to contribute about £640,000. Thus the recommendations of these two schemes would severely aggravate Kenya's economic difficulties.

It seems that Kenyans will either have to tighten their belts and face up to increased taxation, or put into cold storage the many plans for development including African education and the settlement of African farmers. The newly-elected African politicians who have been returned on grandiose promises to relatively unsophisticated voters will find it difficult to explain the hard economic facts of life.

While these economic difficulties continued to mount in 1962, a new problem faced Kenya.
Between June, 1961, and June, 1962, employment fell 8,000 or 1.4%, reaching the lowest level since 1954. The negative attitude of some Europeans farmers had its effect, for employment in the agricultural sector fell 2.6%. The greatest decline in employment came in the building industry, a useful barometer of the prevailing economic climate, where employment fell 30%. The non-African communities were relatively the hardest hit, however, for European employment fell 10.6%, Asian employment was down 4.6%, and African employment fell less than 1%. With a fall in employment the wage bill also declined, particularly among Europeans. The European wage bill, owing particularly to increased emigration, decreased by 8.5%. For the Africans their cost of living rose 3% and their wages rose 5%. "This upward trend towards higher average earnings for Africans is, of course, bound to continue as more and more Africans assume positions of greater responsibility and in response to the continued pressure for higher wages by the trade unions." A final indication of the weakened economic conditions in the Colony in 1962 was the fall in the number of firms that were conducting business in Kenya. Some 8.8% of all firms, or 1,005 firms, went out of business. This decline was particularly evident in small firms of from one to four persons.

The year independence was declared in Kenya, was one in which some economic recovery was recorded. Indeed,
TABLE II

Gross Capital Formation, 1954-1963
this year proved to be the best for economic growth since 1957. This was due partly to good climatic and market conditions, and partly to a lessening of political tension. The economic recovery was due also to a 50% increase in the price of sisal, which brought about a 12% rise in the value of the country's agricultural product. However, the £ 5.5 million increase in the value of exports was not spread very widely. The great increase in sisal was counteracted by low coffee prices (although these did show a marked recovery toward the end of 1963), and marketing difficulties with pyrethrum. Tourism showed rapid advances and displayed indications of becoming the country's best source of revenue next to agriculture.

While these advances were being made in the economy, investment still was lagging. Kenya's annual economic survey commented that the "present level of investment is almost certainly too low to keep the economy moving faster than the 3 per cent annual increase in the population." The following table clearly illustrates the gravity of the investment lag:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF INVESTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958  £ 40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959  £ 40,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960  £ 41,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961  £ 31,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962  £ 33,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963  £ 29,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Nairobi Stock Exchange as an indicator of investment confidence plummetted sharply after the 1960 constitutional
conference and did not level off until it halved in 1962. Since that time it rose from 52.1 in April, 1962 to 95.1 shortly after independence was proclaimed. A further barometer of confidence in Kenya is the value of construction. The value of plans approved in the construction industry in 1963 was less than one-quarter that of the 1958-1959 average. An indication of the economic consequences of the country's political instability during the early nineteen-sixties can be seen from the following figures for the construction in the Colony.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF CONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>£ 13,000,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>£ 9,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>£ 7,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>£ 5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contrasted to the dismal picture in the construction industry were the prospects of the tourist and transport industries. The 1964 Economic Survey reported that "transport has in recent years been one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the economy."

Clearly reflecting this boom in transportation profits was a 23% rise in tourism in 1963. In recent years the tourist industry had recorded a healthy average rate of expansion of 15%. The following table shows the rapid increase in the number of tourists visiting in Kenya:
TABLE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Resident Buildings Completed</th>
<th>Non-Resident Buildings Completed</th>
<th>Plans Approved (Nairobi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Buildings Completed and Nairobi Plans Approved, 1957-1963
(Index of Value 1958/9 = 100)
As a source of foreign exchange, tourism ranks second only to the coffee and sisal industries. In 1960 visitors in Kenya spent about £4.6 million while in 1963 it was estimated that the dollars flowing into Kenya from tourists totalled about £7.2 million.

While 1963 was a year in which Kenya halted the downward trend in her economy, difficulties still remained. The cost of living index, owing particularly to higher food prices, showed a steady rise. In 1960 it was 292, in December 1962 it was 315, by December 1963 it had risen to 317, and in April 1964 it had reached 321. On the credit side this rise was accompanied by an increase in earnings. However, the level of employment continued to fall and had reached a critical level. The following figures clearly point out the serious nature of the employment problem:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>271,800</td>
<td>219,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Industry and Commerce</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>158,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>161,400</td>
<td>157,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>542,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>622,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>535,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 1963 level of employment was 7.9% below the 1962 level. These figures point up the fact that the economy, while showing signs of expanding in monetary value, was not at the same time creating employment. The sharp decline in investment in agriculture and industry might be pinpointed as the principal cause. Both building construction and agricultural ventures such as the development of tea plantations require much labour. In addition, the purchase of farms for settlement and the cutback in pyrethrum-growing also reduced the number of farm labourers.

The 1964 Economic Survey has suggested that "wage increases have exceeded productivity increases with the consequence that employers have had to economise in the use of labour and have been encouraged to adopt more capital intensive methods of production when possible." The following table illustrates this point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1963</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>£ 42,135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>£ 19,074,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>£ 27,720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>581,274</td>
<td>£ 88,929,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>480,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>36,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>17,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>535,146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only do the above figures show the fall in employment, but they also clearly show the large contribution
that the non-African communities have continued to make to the economy of the country. The need for the continuation of the large role played by expatriates in the economy of Kenya, of necessity, must continue. With this objective in mind, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its survey of Kenya's economy, stressed the problem of human limitations in the advancement of the country's economy. "The availability of an adequate supply of human skills in Kenya," the Report declared, "will depend on the presence of non-Africans both in the civil service and in private activity."73

For this reason Kenya's Development Plan for 1964-1970 emphasizes the need to devote the highest priority to education and agricultural development. At the same time the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development stresses throughout its report the need for economy and increased efficiency in all phases of the economy. A critical budgetary situation emerged in Kenya in 1960, and it is for this reason that financial prudence in spending is essential. The International Bank's study suggested that improvement in the budgetary situation and continuing policies of financial prudence were required to provide a foundation for successful development and prevent serious cutbacks. These conditions were necessary for:
a. encouraging local Asians and Europeans to invest their savings in Kenya and to repatriate the large sums transferred abroad during the recent period of uncertainty;

b. encouraging these people to stay in Kenya and to contribute their critically needed skills to Kenya's growth;

c. attracting from foreign sources public and private funds for expanding production.74

The forecast budget deficit for 1964-1965 was £10,000,000, indicating the alarming proportions to which the budgetary crisis had grown.

The prospect of holding the line on expenditures is one which cannot be cherished by African politicians. Having campaigned for independence with the promise of improved economic conditions for the African people, these leaders will find it difficult to justify to their less aware followers the necessary slowdown in economic development. Not only does this become an economic problem, it also enters the political sphere. Should the African leaders not make good on their broad promises of the pre-independence days, the prospect for political instability might once again become very real. Should such a condition occur the opportunity for restoring investment confidence in the country would be all but doomed. It is therefore, a difficult problem which faces Kenya's new leaders.

Despite these difficulties Kenya's African leaders have launched their country boldly on its course of independence. Their aim has been described as "the
Reported Employment and Earnings, 1954-1963
creation of a democratic African socialist Kenya: 'democratic' because it will be a free society in which there will be no place for discrimination by race, tribe, belief or otherwise; 'African' because the nation must grow from indigenous roots, adapting the best from other cultural systems; 'socialist' because all people have the right to be free from economic exploitation and social inequality."

The major policies which will guide Kenya's economic development during its first seven years of independence, include:

1. a social policy which seeks to preserve the traditional spirit of mutual social responsibility while adapting it to the needs and circumstances of the modern state;
2. an educational policy that recognizes social aspirations and the need for skilled manpower as well as limited financial means and the burden of rapid population growth;
3. a manpower policy which is aimed at alleviating unemployment and developing a skilled labour force;
4. a wage policy which is designed to eliminate exploitation and discrimination, but is clearly related to productivity and conditions of supply and demand;
5. a policy to ensure the equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth among the people of the various regions;
6. an investment policy which is designed to stimulate private capital formation and employment opportunities for labour;
7. a policy to secure greater participation in economic affairs by the Government and people of Kenya;
8. a policy towards the external suppliers of funds containing assurance against nationalization and designed to encourage a net flow of foreign capital;
9. a policy to develop new and existing institutions for promoting domestic savings and their productive utilization;
10. a policy emphasizing self-help, schemes, which will involve the people of Kenya in planning and working for their own development;
11. industrialization and agricultural policies which recognize their mutual interdependence and the dominant
role of agriculture;
12. a trade policy designed to conserve foreign exchange resources in order to finance capital imports;
13. a tax policy which considers incentives, income distribution, ability to pay, the responsiveness of tax revenues, to economic growth, relative needs of central and regional governments, the impact of a central bank on fiscal policy and the need for synchronization with tax policies of the other countries in East Africa.77

There is little doubt that Kenya's leaders having attained political independence for Kenya, are anxious to gain their economic independence. There is a wish to produce in Kenya many of the goods which that country now imports. However, Kenya's leaders appear to be realistic enough to recognize the fact that for some years to come the finances, skills, and technical knowledge of Kenya's non-Africans must remain a vital cog in the country's economic machinery.

With independence the prospects for a return of confidence in the country's economy brightened somewhat. Little more than a year after her independence, Kenya's opportunities for receiving investment capital seem to be steadily improving. Only Kenyans, however, can determine whether capital will flow into the country. The political stability which has been maintained in the country since December 1963, suggests that Kenyans of all tribes and races are determined to 'Harambee' Pull together— to assure a promising future for the country's rapidly expanding population.
An additional factor influencing Kenya's economic development is not peculiar to Kenya alone. Like all newly emerged underdeveloped nations, Kenya is highly vulnerable to influences growing out of the Cold War. President Kenyatta has repeated on numerous occasions, both before and following independence, that: "Ideological labels are of no concern to us; the only criterion will be the effectiveness of the institution in achieving greater welfare for all our people."

Caught in the middle of the struggle for influence between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, Kenya has become involved in this struggle. Her Vice-President, Mr. Oginga Odinga, has for some years maintained a close relationship with the Republic of China. Her Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Mr. Tom Mboya, has over a number of years been associated with the United States. His influential role, particularly during the nineteen-fifties, in the International Labour Movement brought him into close contact with world leaders. In addition, the flirtations of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania with the Republic of China, are also of no mean interest to Kenya leaders. Finally, the recent American airlift of missionaries from the strife-torn Congo aroused strong feelings among many Kenyans. Clearly, it is difficult for Kenya to remain entirely aloof from the ideo-
logical power struggle.

Yet, in spite of the political intricacies involved, Kenya is able to benefit economically from the East-West animosity. The most influential weapon with which to gain favour in underdeveloped countries is the advancement of economic rewards. For this reason, Kenya has succeeded considerably, following her independence, in restoring confidence among investors—both from economic and political motives. Large grants of financial assistance and technical aid have flowed in from the United States, Japan and Sweden, West Germany and the Commonwealth countries. In addition, the Soviet Union, in July 1964, announced that it would assist in the construction of a textile mill, a radio station, a fish cannery, a food processing factory, a sugar factory, and a paper mill. The Republic of China offered Kenya an interest free loan in the form of equipment and technical assistance of $15,000,000 and a grant of $2,500,000. The United Kingdom extended a new grant and loan to Kenya for civil and defence purposes totalling $78,400,000 in the form of gifts and services, and $70,000,000 in long term loans. This brought the total amount of British aid to Kenya since the second world war to $280,000,000. Only Britain's aid to India has exceeded this amount. Commenting on the continued generosity of the United Kingdom, Kenya's
Minister of Finance, Mr. James Gicharu, declared: "We feel it is only Britain which could be so generous because of the contact we have had all these last seventy years."

It would seem clear that the economic prospects for Kenya, provided the country is able to maintain political stability, are quite good. Although recovery from the effects of political unrest, poor climatic conditions, and poor world markets, between 1960 and 1962, has been slow, Kenya's new leaders appear determined to chart their country's course along lines which they are confident will assure healthy economic development. By increasing education at all levels and in all fields, by maintaining political harmony and thereby encouraging investment confidence, and by utilizing the vast human resources of the expatriates in the country, Kenya can achieve economic expansion during the course of her new development plan. Once the economically advanced nations of the world, together with non-Africans within Kenya, have become accustomed to independent nations under African leadership, such as Kenya, vitally needed investment will flow into the country. With increased funds Kenya will be able to continue to expand, not only her economy but also her social services to provide a better life for all Kenyans.
NOTES


2 Ibid., October 18, 1955, vol.67, col.10.


7 Ibid., p. 12.

8 Ibid., p. 139.

9 In 1953 69% made between 65/ and 199/ a month; 5% made over 200/ a month; and 26% made under 65/ a month. In rural areas 83% received between 35/ and 69/ a month including house and rations. G.M. Kournossoff, The Underlying Causes of the 1953 Emergency in Kenya, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, 1959, p. 108ff.


12 Ibid., p. 427.

13 Ibid., pp. 429-430.


16 About 90% of Kenya's population was engaged in agriculture.


18 At the same time, the Troup Report was tabled with a parallel plan to that of Mr. Swynnerton for the development of European agriculture.


20 Ibid., p. 211.


22 Ibid., pp. 106-107.


25 Kenya's labour unions also played a role in gaining wage increases. Their association with the international labour movement afforded them considerable support and assistance. By associating with the Kenya nationalist movement the trade unions were able to achieve considerable success, particularly during the period when political activity was restricted. The work of Tom Mboya and his Kenya Federation of Labour was quite successful in the 1955 Mombasa dock strike where wages and working conditions were soon improved.


27 European farmers expressed anxiety that African grown coffee would flood the world market with an inferior quality of coffee. This they felt would lower the world market price.


32 This figure represents about one percent of the total population.


36 See Ibid., p. 13.


38 Loc. cit.


40 Forrester, op. cit., p. 45.

41 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

42 Ibid., p. 48.

43 Africa Digest, vol. 6 (November-December, 1958), section on Kenya.

44 Cmd., op. cit., p. 34.

45 The sale of African produced crops in 1956 was £ 6 million. In 1960 this total had risen to £ 10 million.


51 The army worm refers to the larva of a moth, which spreads over an area stripping the land of green leaves.


54 Loc. cit.


56 The largest portion of this increase in wages was to go to expatriate civil service officers.

57 Because Kenya was the commercial and transportation centre of the East African area, she benefitted considerably more than did the other territories.


60 Ibid., p.6.


62 Ibid., p.52.

63 The brief army mutiny in January 1964, caused a slight pause in the recovery but now the market is standing up well at about 91.

64 Economic Survey 1964, p. 35.

65 Ibid., p.33.

66 Ibid., p.36.
Traditionally African social and cultural structure is communal by nature. It had a built-in social security system in the past. Thus, a form of socialism is natural for Kenya, and her goal, therefore, is a classless society based on 'Ujamaa'—the extended family—and a United States of Africa.


The appointment of the very capable Tom Mboya to this post, indicates the importance of economics to the future of Kenya.

President Kenyatta had the distinction of heading an African committee to seek an end to the civil war in the Congo. Kenya's President is also head of the Organization of African Union.


CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL ADVANCES 1953-1963

The growth of Kenya's economy in the mid-nineteen-fifties was reflected in many respects in social advances in the Colony. Social integration and the spread of medical, educational and housing facilities for Africans, can be attributed in part to a new mode of thought emerging out of the troubles of 1952. At the same time, however, the economic advancement during the mid-fifties played a significant role in meeting many of the African grievances arising out of social injustices and a lack of adequate facilities. During the pre-World War II period the Colonial Office devoted little concentrated effort towards the social needs of the indigenous population. This was particularly true in the field of education. However, as economic prospects in the Colony steadily rose in the late forties and early fifties, funds became available to provide for many of the medical and educational needs of the African people. The outbreak of hostilities temporarily interrupted this growth but it did not halt it. Indeed, once the major military crisis was met, the Colonial Office devoted large sums of money towards making up for lost time in the social services. The force of African nationalism demanded great haste in providing for increased social
facilities for the African people. Thus, with funds available, a concentrated effort was launched against the retarded position of social services in Kenya. Clearly, the Mau Mau rebellion did not adversely affect the overall development of the social services, and indeed, stimulated this growth.

The most lasting and significant effect of the Mau Mau rebellion was its contribution to the breaking down of traditional barriers and the disruption, particularly among the Kikuyu, of the tribal way of life. A most revolutionary concept was introduced into the traditional mode of life under the name of "villagization". The original aim of this policy was to increase security for loyal Kikuyu against the Mau Mau rebels. With isolated homesteads throughout Kikuyuland, it was difficult for these loyal Kikuyu to protect themselves, for their position was relatively indefensible. Dr. J.C. Carothers, in his study of the psychology of Mau Mau saw great possibilities in the policy of "villagization". He has written:

As far as long-term issues are concerned, and apart from several other advantages which are no concern of this report it would seem that there are great psychological advantages to be gained from it by the Kikuyu. Their isolation, suspicion and long-standing social insecurity need a development of this sort. And now that their traditional occasions of association have largely broken down, they badly need more opportunities for social living. One can envisage such villages developing their local industries, their shops, their churches, and health centres, schools and
clubs; and developing opportunities for employment of young men who too often now drift off, to townships and return with strange and often false ideas with which to reinfect their credulous country cousins. Such villages could also meet the needs of squatters on European farms where a chief complaint has been of insecurity of tenure. Perhaps above all, and to anticipate a subject which will arise again in this report, it would help to solve the problem of family disruption and flatten out the cultural diversity between the men and women which seems to have played such a part in giving rise to 'Mau Mau'.

Certainly the ideal envisaged by Dr. Carothers was one which many Kenyans would like to achieve.

"Villagization" was far from popular with the Kikuyu, for it was "quite contrary to all their customs and their normal mode of life, and, in fact, cuts across everything that they ever thought about in their way of life." Yet, in many cases, these villages offered superior medical facilities than did the isolated homesteads. Kenya's Minister for Local Government, Health and Housing, outlined the basic health features of the new villages. These include:

1. A proper standard of layout of house construction.
2. The provision of pit latrines.
3. The provision of safe water supplies, which includes the protection of springs.
4. The erection of cattle 'boma'.
5. The building of rat-proofed grain stores to prevent plague and the general destruction of food stocks.
6. The composting of refuse adjacent to the cattle 'boma' and the consequent production of supplies of manure.
7. The spraying of houses with insecticide to prevent vermin infestation.
Although these provisions were quite primitive by modern standards, they were apparently effective, for Dr. Anderson, Kenya's director of medical services, was able to tell the Legislative Council: "I was astonished at the high standard of hygiene and tidiness that these villages had achieved."

The establishment of these villages proceeded at a rapid rate. By the end of 1954, 50-70% of the population of Nyere and Fort Hall districts were being accommodated in such villages. At the same time urban housing was not being overlooked by the Government. Cement block homes were constructed just outside Nairobi to absorb the fringe population and relieve some of the slum conditions in the city. In the Governor's speech from the chair on October 14, 1954, it was disclosed that it was "the continued intention of the Government to take every opportunity to encourage the building of sufficient houses and the provision of adequate ancillary services in the urban areas to accommodate our urban populations and thereby to develop a stabilized and contented community."

By providing better housing facilities for the African population, significant results were evident. The preponderance of women in the villages and of men in the urban areas had created an imbalanced society, which was bringing about the breakdown of tribal life and native
authority. "Villagization" was a step towards rebuilding the family unit. Teams of two Africans and two Europeans were sent into the villages to learn what the needs of the people were and to assist in the training of village leaders. Increased social welfare was provided, security against Mau Mau terrorists was strengthened, and the consolidation of scattered plots was spurred on. The new hut villages were created by taking one-quarter acre from each owner to provide sites for the new villages. With "villagization", Government influence was greater and officials were able to receive more effective cooperation from the Africans in their programmes of land reclamation and consolidation. As a measure arising directly out of the difficulties of Mau Mau, "villagization" had long range effects in the breaking down of the traditional society and rebuilding it along more contemporary lines.

While rehabilitation of the Kikuyu was being carried on through the process of "villagization", and detention an attempt to lessen legal discrimination was promoted in the Colony. The Royal Commission on East Africa commented on this matter in this manner:

East Africa cannot afford customs or vested interests which continue to lead to the waste of resources through ill-used land or useless cattle through conspicuous consumption based on privilege or status, through ill-trained and badly directed labour, or through outworn restrictions on employment of members of particular races,
through agricultural production protected by monopolistic devices or state regulation, through restrictions on the use of land for agricultural and urban purposes....Race or colour cannot be regarded as a ground for any discrimination or restriction which the community is not prepared to accept on other grounds....The goal of social action in East Africa should be based on the realization that this relatively extremely under-developed region has so far failed to grasp its undoubted opportunities, and that it has been restrictive in major policies, ranging from unwillingness to share its potential wealth with new-comers able to assist development to unwillingness to join in co-operative effort even between the tribes and races of which its people are composed.7

On December 3,1953, a resolution was passed in Legco "that Government be requested to compile a list of laws and subsidiary legislation which discriminate between persons on the ground of race and to report thereon."8 This resolution, born out of the violence of Mau Mau, resulted in a survey of all Ordinances and Orders in Council which were of a discriminatory nature. In 1954, some positive action was taken towards eliminating discrimination, when the findings of the Lidbury Report were published. As a result of the recommendations of this investigation, the country's civil service received a complete overhaul. The recommendations included the introduction of a new salary structure not based on any racial differentiation, approval of government posts being opened to candidates of all races, the setting up of training grades for local candidates, and the formulation of the Civil Service Commission. Not only was this a significant step in the removal of discriminatory legis-
lation, but it was also a first major step toward Africanization of government positions. Although Asians too might have benefited from the non-racial terms of employment outlined in the Lidbury Report, the process of Africanization largely eliminated any major benefits Asians might have derived from such legislation.

A second step in the elimination of discrimination on racial grounds in Kenya was introduced in 1957. A motion was introduced in Legco calling for the progressive elimination of all forms of discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and public places. The question arose despite a statement of the Kenya Hotelkeepers' Association in 1956, which intimated that all their hotels were non-racial. There could be little doubt that the removal of discriminatory practices would be a slow process indeed. Commenting on the pace of this policy, Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, declared in the House of Commons:

However, while being anxious to secure further improvement by every form of persuasion and guidance, the Kenya Government does not consider that there is scope at the present time for hastening the process by legislation. I agree with the Kenya Government's view. 9

The Emergency regulations were still in force and pockets of Mau Mau rebels continued to reappear. For this reason, such racial restrictions as those imposed on political gatherings could not immediately be removed. In addition, it was a difficult task to legislate against personal
feelings held by individuals—many of which were not bred of inherent racial biases but rather of a feeling of cultural superiority.

Nonetheless, the gradual removal of the colour bar continued and by 1960 Asians and Africans could freely enter hotels and other public places without fear of insult or racial restrictions. Asians, for example could enjoy inter-racial social gatherings such as those held at the United Kenya Club in Nairobi. However, social intercourse might occur frequently, yet the feelings deeply felt by some individuals towards others were difficult and in some instances impossible to remove. No amount of legislation could alter the way these individuals felt.

Perhaps the most significant piece of legislation passed was that dealing with land. The opening up of the White Highlands removed perhaps the greatest source of racial antagonism in Kenya. The acquisition of land in Kenya on the basis of individual merit was of immeasurable importance in fostering more cordial relations between the races. Political, economic, and social grievances attached to the reservation of the White Highlands were legally removed. By this action 'de jure' discrimination was largely removed from Kenya. Although 'de facto' discrimination still exists in Kenya, certainly up until independence, racialism no longer is a major
problem in Kenya. With Africans taking over the country's public administration as a result of the series of Lancaster House Conferences, discrimination against the African has virtually ended.

In education, one of the last strongholds of segregation, steps were taken following the constitutional conference in 1960, to integrate the school system, In January, 1961, the Limuru Girls' School was opened to all races. Although previous to this announcement, higher education had been available on a non-racial basis to all with the academic qualifications, the decision in January was a landmark in Kenya's social evolution. Writing in the *Kenya Weekly News*, Alan Moor has commented that:

> The Limuru Girls' School is to pioneer an experiment of great significance to the New Kenya. Other European schools in the country are expected to follow suit.

> There has been considerable emotional reaction to this revolutionary change of outlook, and not unnaturally so, but the time is here to make an unemotional assessment of the implications involved. Some educational integration of Kenya's polyglot society is clearly implicit in the Lancaster House settlement, which signposts our future line of advance. The only question is how this can best be accomplished.10

Closely following this announcement was a statement declaring that all races would be admitted to Kenya's European secondary and grammar schools in January, 1962. The *East African Standard* reflected the attitude which was becoming prevalent among most Europeans
in Kenya when it editorialized the question of school integration:

...it will almost certainly be accepted without the acrimony and heat which could have been expected only a year ago, so much has the country changed since the Lancaster House Conference. Any critic should be faced squarely with the question: What is the alternative?...To face reality, this is only the first step towards opening schools of the future to children of all races, providing they can pass the examinations on a broader and competitive scale. Those parents who cling to the mono-racial concept forever must be convinced they can accept the economic liability, for they cannot expect the Government's financial support.

Shortly after the November 25 announcement, the Delamere Boys' High School in Nairobi became the first European secondary school to be integrated.

After half a century of segregation in many facets of Kenya's life, social integration was rapidly becoming a reality. There can be little doubt that the Mau Mau rebellion stimulated this development, for it focused attention on the problem which in the past many had accepted without question. The political developments in the five years before independence, however, provided the real catalyst in the process of integrating Kenya. The ultimate decision that Kenya was an African country destined to be ruled by Africans made it inevitable that segregation would end. The economic collapse associated with the political advances created financial burdens which made it imperative to achieve the fullest use out of all educational facilities, there-
by hastening school integration. In independent Kenya, therefore, racialism no longer is the major problem or source of unrest that it was in the pre-independence period.

While the Mau Mau rebellion provided considerable opportunities for reorientation of the traditional African way of life, it did at the same time create problems. The disruption of the traditional family unit created great hardships among the elderly Africans. In the past there had been two distinct age groups among Africans—the younger generation, particularly those under the age of initiation, and their elders. The 'age group' type of society prevalent among the Kikuyu and some other Kenya tribes, made it the responsibility of the younger people to care for their elders. Under their natural laws of population control in the past, there had been sufficient land to support the family unit including the aged members. However, as tribal warfare was eliminated, medical facilities improved, traditional methods of population control disrupted, unemployment increased, and population rapidly expanded, it became increasingly difficult for the younger generation to care effectively for their aged relatives. In addition, the gradual disruption of the traditional society with the advent of the white man, caused the younger generation to shirk this customary responsibility.
Arising out of the transition from an old to a new civilization, was the need to provide some system of social security. With the economically buoyant conditions prevalent in the country during the mid-nineteen-fifties, it became economically feasible to consider a solution to this problem of old-age security. In 1957, therefore, the country's social security committee issued a report with specific recommendations to meet the growing needs of Kenya's older citizens. This committee concluded that there was an urgent need to provide state insurance schemes for social security in old age. The only prohibiting factor was the cost of such a scheme.

The Report, which considered several different plans, decided upon an "assessment method" contributory pension plan. They described this as "a method by which contributions are so determined that the income from them over a short period is approximately sufficient to meet the expenditure over the same period....Its chief advantage is that it allows for automatic adjustment on account of increased expectation of life, depreciation of money, increased wages, increased cost of living and other factors." Both Africans and non-Africans were to be included in the scheme, although the need of the African was considerably greater. Two features of this scheme were that it was to be non-transferable and that all contributions were to be income-tax deductible. The cost-
bearing formula was to see equal contributions paid by the employer and the employee, with the Central Government bearing the whole cost of the administration of the scheme. The Report suggested that the administration costs would range between £ 35,000 and £ 40,000 per annum.

At the outset the scheme would cover approximately one-third of the total number of employees. The formula for contributions was to be the following:

**PENSION SCHEME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Salary of Contributors</th>
<th>Contributions per month (50% each payable by employer and employee)</th>
<th>Pensions per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to Sh. 499</td>
<td>Sh. 4</td>
<td>Sh. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. 500 to Sh. 999</td>
<td>Basic 4</td>
<td>Basic 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplemental A 5</td>
<td>Supplemental A 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sh. 1,000 &amp; over</td>
<td>Basic 4</td>
<td>Basic 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplemental A 5</td>
<td>Supp.A 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplemental B 12</td>
<td>Supp.B 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under this scheme during the first few years of its operation the total annual cost in employer and employee contributions would amount to £ 433,000. This would be divided in the following manner:

**FINANCIAL BREAKDOWN OF PENSION SCHEME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Contributions</th>
<th>Employers Share</th>
<th>Employees Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>£ 108,000</td>
<td>£ 65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Industry</td>
<td>£ 325,000</td>
<td>£ 195,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The report suggested that the new pension scheme would also act as an inducement to a greater pride in work, less absenteeism and better output. In addition it would create greater security and give rise to more permanence in employment. "The feeling of insecurity," the Report added, "which is commonly felt by people living close to the subsistence level becomes a neurotic fear which consumes much energy and wastes much effort." Thus, the pension scheme, born out of the new demands created by the transition in African society, and stimulated by the Mau Mau uprising, became an important piece of legislation in easing the burden faced by the African in his adjustment to his fast-changing environment.

The conditions which brought about the introduction of the pension scheme also were instrumental in creating another problem which legislation could not adequately solve. The problem of unemployment became acute by the early nineteen-sixties and today is perhaps Kenya's greatest social problem. This question was considered in chapter four where it was shown that the level of employment in 1963 was less than that recorded in 1954. Clearly, the social implications of this condition are obvious. However, two factors which are adding to the gravity of the problem are the emigration of non-Africans and a rapidly expanding population. The first factor has caused a large outflow of capital and with it employment
opportunities from Kenya. The gravity of the unemployment problem can be seen from the following table:

**UNEMPLOYMENT REPORTED IN 1963**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>6,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>8,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>10,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>10,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>11,695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is an alarming rise which only an inflow of investment capital, an acceptance of African leadership by Europeans, and the maintenance of political stability, can curb.

The political developments in Kenya Colony beginning with the 1960 Lancaster House Conference caused a tremendous outflow of expatriates from the Colony. Not only did this disrupt the country's economy but it also caused a severe shortage of qualified people in the social services. Both in the field of medicine and that of education did the emigration of expatriates cause harmful effects to the future social growth of the country. A fear of the future under African leadership together with an unwillingness of some to adjust to and accept the New Kenya stimulated this exodus. The following statistics give an indication of the enormity of this situation:
EMIGRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Asian and Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3,394</td>
<td>2,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>2,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>6,052</td>
<td>2,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8,379</td>
<td>1,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qr.</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qr.</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Qr.</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Qr.</td>
<td>2,458</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Qr.</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Qr.</td>
<td>1,683</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the number of permanent emigrants has steadily risen, the number of immigrants to Kenya has fallen from 14,785 in 1955 to 6,340 in 1963.

A second factor which is beginning to affect seriously Kenya's economic and social position is her rapid rise in population. Officials have estimated that Kenya's population is increasing at the rate of more than 3% annually and is doubling every twenty-five years. This represents one of the highest rates of population increase in the world. The following table clearly illustrates the population explosion in Kenya:

POPULATION

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5,405,966 (Official census year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8,115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8,352,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8,636,263 (Official census year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8,847,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9,376,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population explosion has created serious social problems in Kenya and has led to the advocacy of birth con-
trol methods to reduce the birth rate. Only with a rapid upswing in the building and construction industry together with continued agricultural expansion, can Kenya hope to cope with the growth in population and its associated problem of unemployment.

Despite this rapid increase in population, the country still is not suffering from overcrowding in the urban areas. Densities of population in Kenya, as a result of resettlement schemes, vary from five to 690 per 22 square mile. In addition, the process of urbanization and the growth of towns has not yet become unmanageable, for Kenya, with less than 8% of the population living in towns, compares with 23% for Ghana and 43% for South Africa. The significant aspect of Kenya's level of urban population is the fact that the country has gradually been overcoming its earlier difficulties which accompanied urbanization and the transition from the traditional way of life. In the late nineteen-thirties and the nineteen-forties, the gradual disruption of the traditional society, resulting from the pressures of employment and higher wages, and the attractions of European life, forced many African males into the urban centres. This caused a disruption of the family unit leading to a startling imbalance of 295 males per 100 females. Dr. J.C. Carothers has considered this development as one of the major causes of the Mau Mau rebel-
lion. He has pointed out the gross disparity in the levels of educational advancement of the men and women, with the latter lagging far behind. Dr. Carothers states:

To the present writer's mind, the extreme diversity of advancement in different sectors of Kikuyu society, and especially the diversity between the men and women, is the most striking and unfortunate feature of transition in Kikuyuland. Where all move on together, transition could be easier; but here the problem of transition itself becomes a different one for men and women, and one has to ask what psychological effects are likely to accrue for each. 24

The women have remained in their traditional setting experiencing little change in their way of life. Kikuyu women, accustomed to do as their menfolk direct, remained in the reserve receiving little opportunity for formal education, while their men were living in the towns adjusting to a new way of life. The children in many instances were raised on the reserve without a full-time father and were taught the traditional lessons of life by the mother. Yet, as the child grew up he came more in contact with the alien life and a conflict developed within him. Thus, this often sudden contact with modern civilization created new problems for the African. These then were the difficulties caused by urbanization.

However, the process of "villagization" and improved urban housing as outlined earlier in this chapter, have met with considerable success in coping with this problem. At the same time, increased wages,
the implementation of the Lidbury Commission proposals, educational opportunities for women, and an increase in political responsibility for the African, have helped to recreate the family unit in the urban areas, and arouse a political consciousness among the female population. By 1962, the imbalance in the sex distribution was considerably reduced, for the ratio was down to 163 males per 100 females, indicating a considerable immigration of women and children into the towns. Yet, as in any large urban area where unemployment is high, the problem of the slum remains. Describing Nairobi, Peter Ritner has written: "And these native towns keep swelling and writhing, like blind blobs of insensate protoplasm that mean to devour the world. It is not East Africa any more; it is Harlem with gigantomachy." Only as the country's economy improves and housing facilities are built at a level sufficient to meet the population's needs, can Kenya hope to ease this social ill, common to all urban centres.

The exodus from Kenya of expatriates has not only added to the battle against poverty, but it has magnified the danger of two other enemies—disease and ignorance. The outbreak of Mau Mau had perhaps its most harmful effects on the country's health services. The restriction and detention of many thousands of Kikuyu withdrew a number of 'trained' medical aids from active
practice. In addition, the creation of detention camps and village settlements called for increased medical attention, for the health demands of communal living were considerable. The policy of "villagization" created greater opportunities for more intensive health administration and this had the effect of putting far greater strain on the hospitals to which more people were now seeking admission. The increased demands on the medical profession were reached partly by the implementation of mobile dispensaries mounted on Land Rovers which were introduced in the new village settlements in Central Province in 1956. Thus, with the growing population and increased urbanization the need to provide greater medical facilities for the population increased.

Similarly, the demands for education continued to increase in Kenya as a greater political awareness arose. The association of education with power and money-making may be considered the source of a major African grievance leading to Mau Mau. Tom Mboya, perhaps best reflected the African sentiments concerning education when he wrote that "no colonial power had deliberately set about the task of educating the mass of the people for the day of Independence."
The reasons for this, of course, were firstly that the finances for such a major undertaking were not available before World War Two; and secondly that the day of independence arrived at such a rapid pace that the Colonial Office had failed to prepare for it until it was too late. In spite of this, Government efforts in the nineteen-fifties were considerable in making up for lost time.

The first major confrontation with the problem of education came with the Bishop Beecher Report in 1946. By 1960, the goals set down in the Beecher Report had been reached and in many cases doubled. A comparison of the growth in education over the ten years between 1946-1955, points up the rate of expansion which occurred. In 1946 there were 326 Africans at secondary schools and 16 passed the School Certificates; by 1955 this figure had reached 3,060 with 233 receiving the School Certificate. In 1946 there were 738 primary and intermediate teachers in training in Kenya; by 1956 this number had quadrupled to 2,951. There were 4,944 teachers at work in 1946 including 49 trained graduates; by 1955 this number had almost doubled to 9,431, with 162 being trained graduates. Finally, in 1946 there were 2,291 schools with 205,580 Africans in attendance. In 1956 this number had expanded to 3,488 schools with 439,646 African children
receiving an education.

Yet, while education developed at a rapid rate in the post-World War Two period, this policy of expansion did not escape unscathed from the Mau Mau rebellion. The African independent schools, considered to be a major source of Mau Mau propaganda, suffered severely from the rebellion. Some 188 independent schools were closed, although shortly after the declaration of the Emergency twenty reopened under missionaries and 38 reopened under District Education Boards. As a result of the practices of the hard-core Mau Mau in Central Province alone, some 112 schools were destroyed. Before the programme of "villagization" could be fully implemented, intimidation by Mau Mau terrorists hampered progress in education. Owing to the threat of retaliation from the Mau Mau many parents at first were reluctant to send their children to the former independent schools which had been reopened under new management.

The post-World War Two period witnessed a concerted effort to expand the primary education system in Kenya. However, officials by the mid-nineteen-fifties became increasingly aware of the need for expanding higher education. For this reason a detailed report on higher education in East Africa was made in 1957. The Report declared:
The Government are anxious to expand the facilities for higher education in East Africa, but limited funds dictate the scale on which progress can be made and it is important to ensure that all branches of education develop in proportion to one another and in proportion to the other social services for the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{31}

At the same time, the Report recognized that: "Education is the key to progress in agriculture and industry, in public health and curative medicine, and in the sciences and the arts; and no less in government and political life, for without it democratic institutions become unworkable or pernicious." At this time the two major institutions for higher learning available to Kenya students were the Makerere College in Uganda and the Royal Technical College in Nairobi. The latter college established in 1956 provided facilities for higher technological training, professional training, research, vocational training in science, arts, and engineering. In addition, the Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education provided technical education for the people of the coast of Kenya as well as for some of the residents of Zanzibar. This emphasis on providing increased facilities for creating more skilled workers in Kenya was a concrete step forward in the process of Africanization and in meeting the growing inevitability of African independence.

An additional impetus to the provision of opportunities for higher education was created by Tom
Mboya on his visit to the United States in 1959. Here he was able to make arrangements for Africans in Kenya to study at American universities. This was the beginning of an airlift of students to many foreign countries for the purpose of obtaining advanced training in many fields of study. Since this time the programme has expanded considerably. On the other hand, the flow of educators into Kenya has not received the same support, although one wonders whether this method of providing Africans with an opportunity to receive higher education might not be the more profitable in the long run. Those that travel abroad to not always return to their home country and even if they do they do not always extend the benefits of their learning to their fellow countrymen. In addition, the number of students going abroad cannot hope to fully meet Kenya's need.

On his return from the United States, Mr. Mboya and other nationalist leaders devoted their full attention to the struggle for independence. Yet, in spite of this concentration on political activity and the economic difficulties it created in the early nineteen-sixties, Kenya's government expenditure rose rapidly, particularly following independence. The Central Government expenditure rose from £ 46,370,000 in 1959/60 to £ 56,480,000 in 1962/63 to an estimated £ 65,190,000 in 1963/64. Of this amount social services accounted for approximately 20%. The following
table illustrates the financial allotment to social services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Edu­cation</strong></td>
<td>7,120,000</td>
<td>8,100,000</td>
<td>8,590,000</td>
<td>8,350,000</td>
<td>8,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>3,030,000</td>
<td>3,430,000</td>
<td>3,420,000</td>
<td>3,410,000</td>
<td>3,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>1,640,000</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
<td>1,920,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,790,000</td>
<td>13,200,000</td>
<td>13,940,000</td>
<td>13,260,000</td>
<td>13,460,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fall in education expenditures by the Central Government during 1962-1963 may be attributed to the transfer of former Government Schools to Boards of Governors. In the past the Government met the expenditure of these schools and received the fees as revenue. Under the new system a grant was made but the Government did not receive the revenue from the fees. The slight decline in expenditure for health services by the Central Government can be accounted for by the fact that a substantial part of the health services, particularly after January 1, 1964, were transferred to local Authorities. The overall picture, however, would indicate that the growth of health services has been maintained and in some instances expanded.

It is in the battle against disease and ignorance that the consequences of political evolution have been most disturbing. The fear of the unknown future forced many competent educators and medical practitioners to flee Kenya. This has occurred despite the statements
of President Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya to the effect that such departments of government as the medical, legal, and works departments should not be immediately subject to the process of Africanization. Kenya leaders are only too well aware of the necessity of encouraging expatriates to remain in Kenya after independence. In 1963 only 50 of 811 doctors practicing in the country were Africans. Not only does this indicate the urgent need to train local people, it also illustrates that on an overall basis Kenya has only one doctor for every 10,000 people. Added to the shortage of human resources is that of a limitation of physical resources. The International Bank in its survey of Kenya's economy remarked that "Kenya ranks among the less developed countries in the supply of hospital beds." Throughout the country there is only one hospital bed per 1,000 population. Yet, there is a great disparity in the levels of service provided in the various regions, for Nairobi boasts a ratio of 5.1 beds per 1,000 population.

At the present time five provincial hospitals, thirty-two district hospitals, twenty-one subordinate centres, thirty-five mission hospitals and a few private hospitals serve Kenya's needs. It is a major task which faces Kenya's new leaders to provide reasonable health facilities for the rapidly expanding population. Not only must a better bed to population ratio be achieved
to meet the present needs but also increased facilities will be required to take care of the growing population, 350 beds per year will have to be provided at a cost of £ 1,050 per bed. The country's development plan calls for a doubling of this bed ratio in twenty years.

Certain steps have been taken and more are planned for the future to meet some of the difficulties of providing proper health care to all the people. "The linchpin of Kenya's health policy is the rural health centre, in which curative medicine is coordinated with preventive and promotive medicine." This policy brings health services closer to the people particularly in the poorly serviced rural areas. To date there are 141 of these health centres and by 1970 the country hopes to add another 106 centres. Even in this programme difficulties are being faced which have accrued as a result of the African political advancement. A shortage of trained staff and a lack of adequate finances continues to hamper the programme. The improvement of the financial resources clearly depends on a sharp improvement in the country's economic climate. The provision of qualified staff, however, will depend for some time to come on the expatriate medical practitioners who have remained in Kenya. In 1963 fifty-seven medical students were enrolled at Makerere University College. This number far from meets the requirements of Kenya's health services. Many African medical students study abroad, but this is
not always a totally satisfactory arrangement. The International Bank suggests that: "There are recognized disadvantages to relying on overseas training: the studies may not be appropriate to Kenya's needs and there may be delays in students returning to the country immediately."

Some steps to encourage local training have already been taken in Kenya. In 1959 the King George VI Hospital Medical Training School in Nairobi was rebuilt. It now offers courses for training for most grades of auxiliary medical staff with the intention of integrating teaching where possible and coordinating curative and preventative interest. In addition, the 1964-1970 Development Plan calls for the provision of a post-graduate medical centre at the Kenyatta National Hospital. It is hoped that this scheme will provide increased staff through the employment of students at the hospital. Also it is felt that local training will mean a saving of about £2,500 per year per student. Although the future is not overly bright for Kenya's medical services, the increase in local medical training, greater assistance from United Nations organizations, and increased foreign aid will go a long way in meeting the problem.

The outlook for combatting ignorance is perhaps somewhat brighter than the struggle to provide health services for the entire population. The Kenya Government has clearly stated that during the period of
Kenya's current development plan, education must have the highest priority. The plan outlines the following objectives for which Kenya's new government must strive in the field of education:

1. to provide universal education through primary school.
2. to ensure enough places at the secondary and higher levels to educate those with recognized abilities, and
3. to organize the educational system to meet the manpower need of the country.

The plan focuses its main emphasis on the need to expand rapidly the number of secondary schools. It also wants to develop an increased number of African teachers to replace the large number of expatriates. The following tables indicate the nature of Kenya's education expenditures:

**RECURRENT EXPENDITURE 1961/62**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Expenditure</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>£3,369,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>82,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1,125,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>489,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Technical</td>
<td>197,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>762,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and General (including Miscellaneous services)</td>
<td>500,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£6,526,924</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE 1960/63**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Expenditure</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>£889,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>29,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>380,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>143,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Technical</td>
<td>200,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Schemes</td>
<td>5,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£1,649,833</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The provision of primary education has expanded to such an extent that 90% of African boys and 50% of African girls entered into the seven year primary education programme in 1962. These percentages clearly indicate that the provision of primary education has almost caught up to the needs of the African children. It is in the provision of facilities for secondary education where Kenya lags. The International Bank tackled this issue, when it commented: "In the mission's opinion, it would not make good economic sense to invest scarce resources in pursuing a primary school goal of 'seven years of schooling for all' during a period when there is a critical need for a good share of these scarce resources at the post-primary level." The challenge, however, is not one of just providing the financial means to meet the costs of adequate secondary education facilities. It is also one of finding enough qualified teachers. The shortage has become acute owing to the loss of expatriate staff which followed the rise in African political fortunes. Between 1964 and 1967 at least 400 additional secondary teachers will be required in Kenya. This number cannot yet be met solely by qualified African teachers and aliens will continue to be needed.

The number of Africans entering secondary schools doubled between 1957 and 1961 and rose from 6,422
in 1961 to 10,155 in 1963. At the same time, in 1962 alone some fifteen new aided secondary schools were opened, despite the economic situation. Throughout Kenya there are thirty-eight teacher training institutions which are trying to meet the non-financial challenge of providing education to Kenyans. To meet the teaching needs of the country, both primary and secondary, there were 4,300 students in 1963 in these teacher training colleges. Although this represented a considerable rise over the number a decade ago, it still will not provide enough qualified teachers, particularly secondary teachers, to meet the needs of the country's rapidly expanding education programme.

In the field of technical and trade schools the Kenya Government is making impressive strides forward. In the seven technical and trade schools throughout the country students are provided with a complete set of tools appropriate to the trade for which they are training. After they have successfully passed through their training course these tools become their personal property. In 1963 there were 938 students enrolled in these seven schools where they were receiving training as carpenters, builders, painters, plumbers and electricians, etc. In the process of Africanization which is taking place in all fields of employment, the technical schools are training Africans to assume much of the work which for many years was dominated by Asians.
Considerable expansion is planned over the next few years in the field of technical secondary education. In 1963 Kenya had four such schools which offered general education with particular emphasis on the special scientific and technical interests and aptitudes of its selected pupils. In 1961 the Kenya Polytechnic in Nairobi was opened offering civil, mechanical and electrical engineering, telecommunications, science, domestic science, building, surveying, printing and technical teacher training. In 1963 the enrollment at this school was 965, more than double that of 1961, its first year of operation. The costs of providing adequate technical training facilities for Kenya's needs are overbearing, particularly during the present economic uncertainty. For this reason, the International Bank in its Report recommended that "the programs of the ministries, plus on-the-job training program of statutory boards and commissions, combined with those of private firms, should continue to form the major part of vocational training."

The expansion of facilities for higher education in East Africa continued, when on June 28, 1963, the University of East Africa, bringing together the Makerere University College of Uganda, the Royal College in Nairobi, and the University College of Tanganyika, was opened in Nairobi with Dr. Julius Nyerere as
its first Chancellor. This step brought about the initiation of East African degrees, thereby severing all relations with the University of London. In 1962 more than 3,700 Kenya students were awarded bursaries to study abroad, giving hope for the future of the young country should these trained students return to spread their knowledge throughout Kenya. With the continued flow of bursaries and scholarships the number of trained university students in Kenya is expanding at a healthy rate. This gives hope for Kenya's future educational and technological development, particularly as Africanization speeds up throughout the country.

Closely allied to the expansion of formal education in recent years has been the growth of adult education. This is a field of considerable importance if the great educational imbalance between the younger and older generations is to be even partially overcome. Under the country's new development programme a Board of Adult Education is to be established to coordinate all the institutions concerned with education. This plan will not only give better direction to the programme but it will also introduce some economy by preventing duplication and overlapping of services.

A final feature of Kenya's expanding social services is concerned with the country's youth. With the rising rate of unemployment, together with continuing
economic stagnation up until independence, many of Kenya's young people have found themselves frustrated and inactive. For this reason, the new government has decided to create a National Youth Service. Its purpose will be to create useful work, education, training, and promote a sense of national unity, for it will "draw young men from all racial and tribal groups and weld them into harmonious units which will devote their energies to projects of national importance." The aim for the year 1964-1965 is to have 7,000 young people participating in the service. This is a very vital part of Kenya's determined effort to make itself independent in every way. Many young people will receive more advanced training and education who might otherwise have not been so fortunate. Part of the education programme envisaged will impart standards of good citizenship to the young people, in an effort to complete the transition from a traditional to a modern society. Also by appointing junior field unit leaders the Kenya Government will be able to develop experienced and responsible leaders for the country's future years.

The National Youth Service programme is also an effort to overcome perhaps Kenya's greatest problem in its future development—tribalism. By integrating the young people of many tribes the difficulties of tribalism should gradually be reduced. The introduction
of individual land tenure together with an increase in urbanization will also tend to reduce the effects of tribalism. With a gradual increase in social service facilities and the introduction of national programmes of cooperation and education, tribalism as it affects the social and economic development of Kenya will gradually wither away. The social advances made by the African in Kenya since 1953 have gone a long way to reduce poverty, disease, and ignorance; and in the process they have facilitated the African's transition from the traditional tribal way of life to that of the modern world. This transition, however, has just begun and it will be several generations before the traditional society has been remodelled along modern lines.
NOTES


6 Many of those Africans held in detention camps received training as carpenters, metal workers, mechanics in agriculture, etc.


12 The decision to hold a round table constitutional conference with representatives of all races in Kenya attending was a significant step in the growing recognition that Kenya was, after all, an African country.


15 At the outset, owing to administrative difficulties, agricultural workers were not to be included in the social security plan.
The recommendations of this report, published in September 1949 (with implementation beginning in January, 1952), may be summarized as follows:

1. that a unified teachers' service be established with salary scales linked to those of Government servants and that a super-annuation scheme be started;

2. that the Education Department should have an adequate staff to control and supervise effectively;

3. that as a temporary measure supervisory teams be formed to allow the voluntary agencies to supervise effectively the primary and intermediate schools.
4. that District Education Boards should be responsible for primary and intermediate education in their areas and that the costs be met from fees and grants from Central and local governments;

5. that Regional Education Boards be established for primary and day intermediate schools not covered by District Education Boards, for boarding institutions and secondary schools and teacher-training;

6. that by 1961 there should be 2,000 primary schools, providing 4,000 Standards I and II and 2,000 Standards III and IV, with 340 intermediate schools and 12 secondary schools providing 26 classes in Forms 1 and 2 and 16 Forms 3 and 4, and

7. that in addition, a new grade of teacher (a KT1), with minimum qualifications of School Certificate plus two years' training, should be introduced, and a total of fifty training centres, including existing ones, be established.


32 Ibid., p. 72.

33 Increased costs arose from the pension scheme, the operation of the army, the reorganization of the government and the establishment of embassies, and an increase in public debt obligations.


35 Ibid., p. 47.


38 In 1963 Kenya had a total of 11,344 beds.


41 The Economic Development of Kenya, p. 246.


43 The saving would be made because local training costs less than overseas training and students would be able to perform services at the hospital, which in the past were handled by substitute staff who had to be paid.


46 There was a fall in the percentages entering primary schools owing to an increase in fees in 1963. At the same time, however, the intermediate course—level 5 to 8—showed a marked rise. In 1960 29.5% of children completing the primary course entered the intermediate course. In 1963 this number had risen to 80%. In the intermediate courses English is the language of instruction.


50 The fees at the technical and trade schools were about Sh.150 for the first year, and Sh.180 for the second year.

51 The subjects taught included English, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, History, Geography; choice of Mechanical Engineering, Metalwork, Woodwork, Masonry, and Bricklaying, Engineering Science or Building Science, and Technical Drawing. The fees were Sh.400 per annum.

In 1963 it was estimated that there were about 7,000 Kenya students studying abroad.

The various institutions to be coordinated included literacy education, formal evening classes, and correspondence courses, occupational education, in agriculture and industry, and liberal education geared to general knowledge and cultural interests.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

From Mau Mau to independence Kenya has experienced revolutionary changes in her political, economic and social institutions, despite the violence and the Emergency regulations. The African struggle for independence has not been an easy one and the consequences of that struggle have not been entirely desirable. The post-independence period is not the utopia of many Africans' dreams. For many Africans the achievement of independence has brought about a sense of disillusionment for economic rewards have not followed hand in hand with independence.

There has been a reluctance on the part of some Kenyans to accept the full responsibility of independence.

This newly won independence has made the African ultra-sensitive to any efforts to criticize the administration of his country. In spite of the continued presence of Europeans and Asians, Kenya is an African country. Multi-racialism is not present and it is only a matter of time before Africanization eliminates most Europeans and Asians from positions of influence. Europeans and Asians are finding it necessary to conform to African rule or face expulsion from the country. Both for the expatriates and for the Africans
themselves the problems of independence have been shown to be just as difficult and just as challenging as those which were faced and overcome in the pre-independence era.

In the struggle for independence the unity of Kenya's nationalist movement was quite remarkable. However, such unanimity of the nationalist movement differed little from similar movements in Ghana, Tanganyika, and most other newly emerged African nations. But can national unity be maintained in Kenya? Nationalism in Africa was nurtured primarily by one desire—to rid the continent of the white man. It was a simple matter for the African in Kenya to blame the white man for holding him back and preventing him from achieving economic, social, and political advancement. The white man made a convenient scapegoat for the natural shortcomings of Kenya, and was a useful focal point with which to channel all the African's grievances. In 1963, however, the white man no longer controlled the administrative reins of the government. No longer did he practise legal segregation. No longer did the white man control the richest land in all Africa for his exclusive use. No longer did the white man enjoy exclusive benefits of superior social services. On December 12, 1963, the African became master of his destiny. He recognized that the economic capabilities and technical
superiority of the white man was essential for some years to come if Kenya was to survive. Yet, there would seem to be little doubt that Kenya's leaders are determined that political independence will be maintained regardless of the economic and social consequences. For this reason, it would appear that the European is living in Kenya on borrowed time. He must conform to the will of his African leaders or be forced out of the country regardless of his economic or technological contributions to the country.

For Kenya, therefore, the future rests on the strength of a thin thread of stability. Stability can only be maintained through national unity. Yet, in Kenya four races and many dozens of tribes, speaking almost as many languages, joined together in a common cause to remove their white overlords. This has been accomplished in the political field. What can hold these people together in a common unit in the future? A common culture and common language do not exist. There is no common history to unite them. Their national borders are arbitrary. No common religious ties exist. What then can mould Kenyans into a cohesive group to press forward together on the road to political, economic, and social advancement?
While many areas of Kenya, particularly the urban centres, are developing rapidly along modern lines, many of the rural areas still remain trapped in the traditional environment. For the full and effective development of the country the cooperation of all citizens is essential. Yet, it is no easy task to unite these people, for the effective unifying element is no longer present. Hostility to neo-colonialism, although being invoked more and more as an effective unifying force, still is not strong enough to create national unity in Kenya. For this reason the country has reached another transition period, one in which the old hostility for colonialism is gradually being replaced by the new antipathy for the neo-colonialists. To the present time, however, this new cry does not have the attractive ring of the old anti-white sentiment which was so effective in building a nationalist movement.

One alternative for creating national unity is the common hope that Kenya will grow and mature with its African neighbours into a strong and prosperous continent. A sense of pride in the accomplishments of working together in cooperative self-help schemes for self-improvement is an important first step in the direction of national unity. Community development committees have already been established in Kenya,
which cut across tribal barriers. This scheme, it is hoped, will help to bring the people to support the Government's efforts to develop the country. A cooperative effort for the betterment of their own country, therefore, is one course which might be followed in Kenya in order to create a new nationalism. Closely allied to this objective is that of creating a united Africa. This is an ideal to which many African leaders subscribe, yet it appears to be far in the future. The plans for an East African Federation, promised immediately following Kenya's independence, have not yet come to fruition nor do the prospects appear to be wholly optimistic. The difficulties of uniting an area as large as the African continent, with so many divergent races, languages, and tribes, are very considerable. The goal of a united Africa, perhaps based on a common desire to oppose the neocolonialists, could make an effective focal point with which African leaders could bring together their people. This objective, however, has many obstacles to overcome, for it must rise above the vigorous drive for personal power so prevalent among Africa's new leaders. This scheme, therefore, in the long run would tend to disrupt what sense of unity already exists on the continent.
One alternative remains and that is to force national unity through one-party authoritarianism. One-party rule in many African states appeared to be a natural outcome of independence. Certainly, in the immediate post-independence months in most African countries there was no real basis for opposition parties to emerge. As Julius Nyerere has suggested, there no longer was the distinction between the "ruler" and the "ruled". One-party rule, however, has vested considerable power in the hands of one person--Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania--which has led in some cases to rather ruthless dictatorships. Any opposition which might emerge to challenge their individual leadership can easily be suppressed through decisive authoritarian measures. Many political opponents of Kwame Nkrumah have found themselves imprisoned for failing to support his leadership. Julius Nyerere has expelled Europeans for failing to acknowledge a visiting African dignitary. Deportations as a rule are not frequent but the process of Africanization often has the same result. Clearly, therefore, one-party rule with the timely implementation of authoritarian tactics, has proved to be an effective method of maintaining national unity.
In Kenya, too, one-party rule has emerged less than a year after independence. Will authoritarianism be the inevitable outcome of this form of rule? The political stability of Kenya during its first sixteen months of independence has been maintained. The tremendous following which Jomo Kenyatta still enjoys, both in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, has contributed in a large way to this unity. Yet signs of crisis appeared soon after independence. The desire of Kenya's Somali tribesmen in the north-eastern region of the country, to unite with the Somali Republic, has caused considerable bloodshed already. This festering war is a constant threat to the country's political stability despite the determination of President Kenyatta to employ force against the 250,000 Kenya Somalis should they attempt to secede from Kenya.

Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, owing both to his age and his continuing popularity, it would seem that Kenya, for the present time, will escape the need to resort to authoritarian rule. However, the future political stability of the country does not appear to be quite so bright. The scramble for power, once Kenyatta has departed from the political stage, is bound to rekindle animosities, not just between the large tribes and the small, but between the Luo and the Kikuyu. The recognition of the role of the Kikuyu as the fathers of Kenya's nationalist movement can-
not be easily overlooked in any power struggle. With this prospect in mind, it would seem that whoever succeeds Jomo Kenyatta, will be forced to engage in authoritarian rule to retain his control over the people and maintain national unity. Economic and social development are vitally dependent on political stability, and Kenya cannot afford the luxury of engaging in bitter political power struggles. Yet, national unity in Africa appears to be predicated on strong personal leadership. One can only hope that authoritarianism will not enter into Kenya on the coat tails of the successor to Jomo Kenyatta.
### APPENDIX I*

#### EMERGENCY STATISTICS UP TO THE END OF 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Casualties</th>
<th>killed</th>
<th>Captured wounded</th>
<th>Captured in action</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Surrendered</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,503</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>26,625</td>
<td>2,714</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Forces Casualties</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loyal Civilians</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### COST OF THE EMERGENCY UP TO JUNE 30, 1959:

- **Grants from Her Majesty's Government**: £24,250,000
- **Interest free loans from Her Majesty's Government**: £5,250,000
- **Borne by the Kenya Government**: £26,085,424

**Total Cost**: £55,585,424

## APPENDIX II*

### AFRICAN ELECTION RESULTS, MARCH 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Candidate 1</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza North</td>
<td>M. Muliro (Luo)</td>
<td>6,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.W.W. Awori (Sitting</td>
<td>6,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.N.W. Siganga</td>
<td>4,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.D. Otiende</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.B. Akatsa</td>
<td>1,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.G.W. Kadima</td>
<td>1,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza Central</td>
<td>A.O. Odinga (Luo)</td>
<td>9,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.A. Ohanga (Sitting Mbr)</td>
<td>3,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H.D. Odaba</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G.N. Onyolo</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.P. Oranga</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyanza South</td>
<td>L.G. Oguda (Luo)</td>
<td>13,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.K. Kebaso</td>
<td>8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T.arap Towett</td>
<td>6,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.J. Bonga</td>
<td>3,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Orinda Okun</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.K. arap Chumah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sitting Member)</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>D.T. arap Moi (Tugan-</td>
<td>4,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sitting Member)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.K. Tipis</td>
<td>1,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.M. ole Tameno</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>B. Mate (Meru)</td>
<td>24,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Mathu (Sitting Mbr)</td>
<td>14,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Nyagah</td>
<td>5,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Waruhiu</td>
<td>2,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Kioni</td>
<td>1,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akamba</td>
<td>J.N. Muimi (Akamba-</td>
<td>8,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sitting Member)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D.N. Mumu</td>
<td>7,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M.J. Makilya</td>
<td>3,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast</td>
<td>R.G. Ngala (Giriama)</td>
<td>3,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Mwanyumba</td>
<td>2,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F.J. Khamisi</td>
<td>2,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.M. Mwashumbe</td>
<td>712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Jeremiah (Sitting Mbr)</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>T.J. Mboya (Luo)</td>
<td>2,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.M.G. Argwings-Kadheken</td>
<td>1,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M.Gikonyo (Sitting Member)</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.M. Kasyoka</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX III

A COMpendium of confllicting comments on Kenya

Let us rather refuse to discuss this great question of paramountcy, except in the sense of our own inherent right to rule in the future.

--Lord Delamere, 1930

Quite a number of African tribes, and more especially the Kikuyu and the Kavirondo, are becoming politically minded, and although a good many years must elapse before they can make any claim to be as well educated as the white man, they are certain to claim political equality before very long.

--L.S.B. Leakey, 1936

We intend...to remain the dominant race and the ruling factor in East Africa.

--Col. Durham(farmer) 1930

Every big plan that is conceived in Europe for the 'development' of Africa only adds to its gravity. I have said once, and I stress it: it requires no effort to prove that these plans are first and foremost for the European's benefit and tend to help the African, if at all, only in their stride. As I have said before, this knowledge is seeping through Africa. It comes on the top of older fears and disillusions.

--Negley Farson, 1950

If the Europeans in Kenya cannot reside and prosper there with the good will of the Africans, they are imperilling 'now' the future good will of Black Africa towards Great Britain.

--W. McGregor Ross, 1927

We have established the fact that we have rights in the area known as the Highlands, and we have not...the slightest intention of giving up those rights or having them interfered with, and I think it is a real waste of time for minorities in this Council to keep on questioning them.

--Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, 1944.
In another ten years we shall have a black race managing its own local affairs almost completely and accustomed to honesty and justice and therefore not prepared to stand either dishonesty or oppression.

--Sir Philip Mitchell, 1954

I submit...that it should be obvious to everyone who is thinking of the real future and progress and development of East Africa that what the African requires is not restricted but continuing, increasing European settlement.

--Frederick Harris (MP) 1952

In Africa, irresponsible people, black and white, have drifted about the country poisoning the minds of the primitive African who cannot think for himself....Instead of recognizing the inherent differences between black and white, we preach equality to them, and put strong temptations in their way.

--Ione Leigh, 1954.

...one thing I am sure of is that the assumption that primitives are inferior as human beings, to dwellers in more highly developed societies, is based not on science but on ignorance.

--Colin Wills, 1953.

...we, the representatives of the older civilization, in curing this problem may have to accept restrictions on our liberty and restrictions on our standards in order that we can promote here a healthy community.

--Sir Michael Blundell, 1952

...the chief thing to say about Mr. Blundell...is that...he will almost certainly be Kenya's first Prime Minister...I am as sure about this as about any prophecy I have ever made in my life--when the colony arrives at independent government.

--John Gunther, 1955

...I am inclined to predict that he [Kenyatta] will be built into a legendary figure, whose destiny it is to overthrow the European intruders and to lead his people to freedom, independence, and national greatness.

--Kingsley Martin, 1952
APPENDIX III

Both inside and outside detention camps, one constantly hears a naive insistence that all will be well 'when Kenyatta comes back'.

--Sir Edward Grigg, 1955

Time will also do the new Kenya justice in the eyes of the world.

--Sir Michael Blundell, 1963.
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22. **Kenya-Proposals for New Constitutional Arrangements, 1957, Cmnd. 309.**

23. **Kenya-Despatch on the New Constitutional Arrangements, 1958, Cmnd. 369.**


25. **Documents relating to the death of eleven Mau Mau detainees at Hola Camp in Kenya, 1959, Cmnd. 778.**
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II. General Works

1. Books


A well documented statistical survey of the plight of the African. The authors, supporters of socialism, urge immediate African independence.

A brief survey of recent developments in the constitutional development of Kenya. Includes a helpful discussion of the major economic and social problems facing the East African country.


Written by a former Governor of Kenya from 1925-1931, this book sympathizes with the settler community in East Africa. Against the introduction of a common roll for voting in the Colony.


The authors have provided their readers with a detailed analysis of the 1960 elections, devoting particular attention to the constitutional development prior to the election. The book carefully points out the important role Kenyatta played in Kenya politics in 1960-1961 even though he was still in 'exile'.


A very good discussion of political transition in Kenya from 1954-1962. The author was a prominent participant in constitutional conferences during this period. Blundell only discusses briefly his work as Minister of Agriculture in Kenya.

A short chapter points out the problems in Kenya will have to face beyond independence. The author points out the wish of African leaders to keep the Cold War out of their continent.


Includes a chapter by Carl Rosberg which gives a fine analysis of the political conflict and constitutional change taking place in Kenya in the nineteen-fifties. The editors have included an extensive bibliography.


Some interesting comments on the early contributions of the Asian to the development of East Africa.


A personal reflection on the political evolution of East Africa. Sir Andrew Chhen, former Governor of Uganda, stresses the various economics, political and social problems facing the emerging nations of East Africa.


A fine analysis of what the future will be in the newly independent African countries. Useful comments on pan-Africanism, the one-party state, and neo-colonialism. Good bibliography of recent publications on Africa.


A short objective study of the role of the
Asian in East Africa. Concludes that the Asians must reinforce the best intentions of the African leaders.


An interesting and colourful biography of Jomo Kenyatta written just before his release from custody. The author is particularly effective in pointing out the religious force of Kenyatta and the magnetism of his personality.


The author discusses the role of the British in Kenya and gives a useful concluding chapter outlining the 'dual policy' operative in Kenya in the nineteen-thirties.


Particularly useful comments on African education and land. The author presents comments on the political background to Mau Mau. Sympathetic to the African.


The author, an American negro, examines closely the problems arising out of the separate development of the African and European economies. Suggests that money motivates the African to labour and recommends that loans be made more available to Africans.


Discusses the contribution of a former Chief Native Commissioner in Kenya, to the early development of the country. Emphasizes Ainsworth's efforts to encourage African labour in the reserves and the opposition he met from the European settlers.


A useful discussion of the emerging countries of Africa. One of the first attempts at examining each African country as it struggles to achieve its independence. A useful guide to the various nationalist movements based on the personal travels of the author.


The standard work on the early British policy in Africa. Provides helpful background on the early political development of the British East Africa Protectorate.


A colourful account of the use of pseudo-gang operations to capture a hard-core Mau Mau leader. The author was recently expelled from Kenya.


Some useful comments of early development in East Africa, including a brief discussion on Kenya tribes.

A short objective study of the Indian in East Africa, emphasizing his early contribution to the area's economic development. Suggests the Asian became isolated from other races, owing to his own petty religious rivalries.


The author, the Africa correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, gives a colourful chapter on big game in East Africa. Also a useful summary of Africa's place in the Cold War.


An interesting book on the author's early life and experiences in Kenya. Useful comments on African culture. As a member of the European settler community, Mrs. Huxley has a pro-European point of view.


Elspeth Huxley has given her readers a colourful account of the growth of Kenya Colony. Based on fine documentation, her book follows the life and experiences of Lord Delamere and is, indeed, sympathetic to the white settlers.


A fascinating approach to the history of Kenya based on the private correspondence of the two authors during a lengthy written debate on the problems and prospects of Kenya. An additional section at the end of the book gives the authors' views of the Mau Mau uprising.

One of the more recent works on East Africa, Ingham's account gives a brief summary of events during the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya. Unfortunately, the author does not attempt to discuss in any detail the important constitutional developments of 1960-1961.


An objective account of constitutional developments in Uganda up to 1958. Includes a discussion of the difficulties created by the Kingdom of Buganda.


The author, who lived and worked in Africa for over thirty years, devotes a chapter to Tom Mboya. He points out the good and bad features of Mboya's personality and discusses his nationalist attitude.


An African's view of detention camps pointing up the brutality which the author himself experienced. Introduction by Marjory Perham. The author says he holds no bitterness to the Europeans; he praises Jomo Kenyatta.


Excellent background on the Kikuyu customs and culture. The author clearly is attracted to many of the ancient customs of his tribe. Useful comments on Kikuyu's attitude to land.


A helpful discussion of the social, economic, and political background of Mau Mau. Does not point up the financial difficulties which constantly faced the Colony before World War Two.

A good account of Mau Mau which offers useful recommendations. Critical of Mau Mau but sympathetic with many of the African grievances.


An excellent discussion of relations between the African and the European. Gives full account of African social conditions and shows very fine foresight. Mr. Leakey points out that some Africans tribes were becoming politically conscious and warns that they would soon claim political equality.


As one of the foremost authorities on the Kikuyu tribe, Mr. Leakey provides an excellent discussion of economic, political and social causes of Mau Mau. The author clearly sympathizes with the African.


A very pro-European account which states that the African is incapable of thinking for himself. In discussing Mau Mau the author ignores African grievances and remains convinced that Kenya is not an African country. The author provides little documentation.


A short account which is sympathetic to the African and highly critical of the politically active settler community.


A very useful account on African land, taxation, labour and education. Deals primarily with the Kikuyu but does include some notes on the Masai. Takes a pro-African point of view.


The most recent study of the bizarre Mau Mau uprising, describing in detail the disgusting and brutal oathing ceremonies and the massacre at Lari. Several photographs add to the colour of this book which adopts an anti-Kenyatta bias.


A unique collection of early writings on East Africa including some useful selections on land and Labour. Useful comments on Kikuyu and Masai tribes.


A helpful account of the views of Kenya's leading nationalist between 1952 and 1962. Organization is confusing and the author's views on political and constititional development could be enlarged.


The author includes a chapter which takes a general look at Tom Mboya. Based primarily on Mboya's speeches in the United States, the book includes two inaccuracies in the factual material. Auseful timetable of African independence is included.


The views of Kenya's Governor at the time of the outbreak of Mau Mau. The author is sympathetic to the African and during 1944-1952 urged equal representation of all races. Sir Philip Mitchell foresaw that the African will administer his own affairs by the nineteen-sixties.

The views of an educated Kikuyu, suggesting that the separate development of white and black institutions creates a feeling of inferiority in the African.


The views of an American working in Africa and observing the emergency of African nationalism. Useful comments on party politics in Kenya and chaos in the Congo.


Presents the views of a pioneer administrator in East Africa.


A helpful discussion of the contribution of the missionary to the development of East Africa. Good account of early African education.


A short account of Kenya Colony with some useful comments on Mau Mau. The author is sympathetic to the African and suggests that in 1954 Sir Oliver Lyttelton ignored African pleas for increased representation and responsibility.


A colourful biography of Tom Mboya, the rising young man of African politics. The author gives only a sketchy account of Mboya's political activities. Several interesting photographs enhance the value of this book.
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A compassionate defense of the African, including a sympathetic discussion of Mau Mau. The author also includes a brief discussion of United States-African relations.


The views of a member of Kenya's Legislative Council which are pro-African. A very helpful guide to the first three decades of British occupancy.


In the introduction to his subject the author shows himself to be sympathetic to Kenyatta. A very full account of the trial is presented including many interesting comments by Kenyatta.


A short general survey dominated by the figure of Nkrumah. The subject, a study of the emerging African continent, is too broad for adequate treatment.


A detailed account of constitutional development in Kenya. Emphasizes the moderate approach used by Nyerere.


Written by an Afrikaaner, this book is a powerful and moving defense of the indigenous people of Africa. Considers the African viewpoint in the racial struggle. The author is optimistic about the future of Africa.

An effective approach to the subject which suggests that the European settlers failed to change with the Africans. The author is nostalgic about the passing of the past in Kenya, but is hopeful about the future of the country.


The author, born in Africa and a former candidate for election in Kenya, has written a clear, concise study of the political, economic and social conditions in Kenya. Her discussion is well thought out and is based on a personal knowledge of the situation in East Africa.

2. Pamphlets


3. Periodicals


"Kenya's Search for Unity." The Economist, August 19, 1961, pp. 712-713.


"Reconstruction in Kenya." Round Table, vol.46 (June, 1954), pp.251-258


4. Newspapers

East Africa and Rhodesia

East African Standard

Economist

Kenya Weekly News

Manchester Guardian

The Observer

The Spectator

The Times