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Communist China's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations Van Der Stoel, William 1962

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD THE AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS by WILLEM VAN DER STOEL B. A., C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1958 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1 9 6 2 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis f o r scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be alloxved without my written permission. Department The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. ABSTRACT This study i s an attempt to discover the deeper motives be-hind Communist China's present policy toward the Afro-Asian nation^. From the outset i t was assumed that this policy was entirely motivated by ideological considerations*. As I progressed with the research, how-ever, I became increasingly aware that•ideology was not the only gen-erating power behind Peking's policy, but that there was instead a more profound force at work. This so-called force, or power, or motive, what-ever the case may be, has i t s roots deeply buried i n Chinese history and I have chosen to c a l l i t China's traditionally legitimate aspirations;. Although, in historic China, these aspirations were largely culturally inspired, they have recently been obscured by the tenets of a revolu-tionary doctrine called Communism. Historically, China has exercised a dominating role i n South-east Asia, for which the main source of inspiration and justification lay i n the Confucian system of government. This position of hegemony was challenged i n the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the western powers who had l i t t l e understanding of China's traditional role. With the founding of the Communist regime, i n 1 9 4 9 , however, China once again entered upon a period of strong central authority and was thus i n a position to re-assert herself and pursue a policy directed toward a revival of China's traditional aspirations. The structure of this paper consists of five main parts. The f i r s t two sections are devoted to an analysis of the ideological framework within which China's policy operates, as well as the actual strategy which has evolved from i t . The emphasis here has been placed on what I have termed the "Asianization" of Communism and the pragmatic approach taken by the Chinese Communists on the implementation of their long-term aims. The f i n a l three sections are devoted to a discussion of the major instruments which Peking has at i t s disposal for the penetration of Southeast Asia. Two of these instruments, the overseas Chinese and the Conmtunist parties, are, i n my opinion, of singular importance and deserve separate treatment, for both these instruments are bound to play a determining role i n the future development of Southeast Asian societies. Although the topic presupposes a discussion of both the Asian and African nations, the emphasis i n this study, has been on the former. The African orientation of Communist China's policy i s of a very recent nature and consequently there i s only scant information available on the subject. However, Africa does form an integral part i n Peking's ideol-ogy and overall strategy toward the "colonial and semi-colonial , , coun-tries and this aspect has been treated accordingly. With respect to the Asian countries, I have preoccupied myself only with those i n which Peking's influence has been and i s most notable. For this reason, only passing reference has been made to the Philippines and Japan because, for the moment, these countries appear to be outside the scope of China's sphere of activity. This study i s based on such major sources as Mao Tse-tung's theoretical works, and recently published works by Barnett and Brim-mell. Much of the basic information derived from these sources, has been supplemented, however, by material from such publications as Survey of the Mainland China Press' and Peking Review. These last two sources were of great value i n supplying i l l u s t r a t i v e material of a wide scope and have been used quite extensively. TABLE OF CONTESTS ABSTRACT. CHAPTER I The Ideological Background of the Chinese Communist Regime. CHAPTER II Communist China's Foreign Policy and i t s Application to the Afro-Asian World. CHAPTER III Three Instruments of Policy and their Effect on the Afro-Asian Nations. CHAPTER IV The Overseas Chinese. CHAPTER V Communist Parties i n Asia and their Peking Orientation,. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER I THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME Introduction The emergence of Communist China i n 19-49 ushered i n a new era i n the history of the Far East. In the wake of World War II, a surge for national-i s t independence swept over the Asian Continent. The days of colonial rule were numbered. China, the largest and most populous nation i n the Far East, as well as i n the world, did not escape the effects of this r i s i n g tide of anti-colonialism and nationalist revolution. Since the middle of the nineteenth century China had experienced the f u l l impact of Western encroachments on her s o i l . She had been forced, not infrequently at gun point range, to make concessions to these foreign "barbarians" and their seemingly unsatiable demands for commercial rights i n the treaty ports. Most humiliating of a l l , China had been forced to grant extraterritorial rights and. t a r i f f concessions which constituted a direct challenge to her sovereignty. Repugnant as these concessions, were, a nation steeped i n the traditions of Confucius;' teachings, could hardly be expected to prove a match for the dynamic forces of mercantilism and Western technol-ogy. The powerlessnesff to prevent the western powers from establishing their ever-growing spheres of influence and the feeling of resentment result-ing from th i s , inevitably l e d to the planting of the seeds of Chinese nationalism, a nationalism strongly anti-imperialist i n nature. The f i r s t signs of a change i n the making came from the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer uprising, but i t was not u n t i l the f i r s t two decades - i n the twentieth century, Z following the Russo-Japanese war, that this anti-imperialist form of nation-alism began to assume a more definite form and grew; into a revolutionary movement. During the f i r s t decades, of the twentieth century an increasing awareness developed i n China that something had to be done i f the nation's identity was to be preserved and total disintegration prevented. The nationalist movement gained momentum and i n 1912 the Republic of China was; proclaimed, thereby bringing to an end centuries of monarchial rule. By the end of World War I the revolutionary movement was firmly established and con-sisted mainly of students, workers and intellectuals, whose paramount aim was to claim for China her rightful, place among the nations of the world. The nucleus of this movement was formed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang party. The founding of the Republic of China constituted a break with the past and marked the beginning of a transitional ppriod during which the na-tion groped for a new p o l i t i c a l and social structure suitable to the require-ments of a new era. The old governmental, structure, i n i t s original form at least, was no longer adequate to serve the needs of China i n contact with a modern world. New p o l i t i c a l and social institutions were urgently required i f the nation was to adapt i t s e l f successfully to a changing environment, and to put i t s own house i n order. In their search for new p o l i t i c a l formulae, and imbued with a sense of urgency i n the face of continued foreign encroachment, the Chinese turned to the West. Perhaps by applying Western s c i e n t i f i c and technological meth-ods, which i n the past had been used so effectively against China, could the nation reassert i t s e l f and resist the "barbarians" with their own weapons. There followed the introduction of bourgeois liberalism, but i t was" never given time to take root and the Kuomintang's brief experiment with p a r l i a -mentary democracy proved unsuccessful. Parliamentary democracy f a i l e d i n 3 China for two main reasons. In the f i r s t place i t was an alien concept i n a traditionally authoritarian society; i n the second place i t was not designed to bring quick results, and a speedy solution was considered imperative. Thus, i n effect, there existed i n China what may be termed a p o l i t -i c a l vacuum, and the need to f i l l i t was urgent. I t i s hardly surprising that, under those circumstances, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 could not f a i l to exercise an attraction on Chinese intellectuals. Although Marxism was, at the time, an alien doctrine i n China, nevertheless the dynamic social revolution taking place i n Russia offered distinct p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the long overdue Chinese revolution. It i s significant that Dr. Sun lat-sen, father of the Chinese nationalist revolution, although rejecting Communism as un-suitable for China, nevertheless agreed to l e t Comintern agent, Borodin, re-organize the Kuomintang party structure along Communist lines. It would be incorrect to say that by the 1920's Cranmunism had been accepted as the new p o l i t i c a l creed which could remedy the nation's i l l s . Chiang Kai-shek's subsequent military action, which was aimed at wiping out Coinmunist rural bases, proved ample evidence to the contrary. It i s signif-icant, however, to note that from 1921 onward, when the Chinese Communist Party was founded, a small but determined group of revolutionaries were con-vinced that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine did provide the answer to China's problems. Imbued with a messianic f a i t h i n the teachings of Marxism-Lenin-ism, the Chinese Communists began their long, and at times almost disastrous, struggle for power. When i n 1949 their struggle was crowned with success, and the "Mandate of Heaven" bestowed upon them, there appeared on the Asian scene not merely another postwar nationalist government, but an ideology. More-over, this was an ideology wedded to the idea of world revolution, and the 4, ultimate attainment of socialism on a world-wide scale. Developments since 1949 have made i t increasingly evident that the Chinese Communist regime has established firm p o l i t i c a l control over more than 600,000,000 Chinese. In addition, the regime has embarked on a large scale industrialization and communication programme aimed at building up the strength of the nation and setting a formidable example for the new nations i n Asia. The "Chinese way" i n social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic developments has inevitably made i t s impact f e l t among those newly Independent and strug-gling nations. Peking, not content to merely set an example for the newly indepen-dent and emerging nations of Asis and Africa, has developed an active policy of "friendship" and "support" towards these nations. In order to extend i t s own sphere of influence, Peking has resorted to an extremely effective device whereby i t s own anti-imperialist struggle has been identified, and indeed made an integral part, of the struggle for independence carried on by these nations. Thus, Peking has.allotted i t s e l f the role of champion of the nation-a l independence movement and principal defender against "Western Imperial-ism" . In the l a s t analysis, Communist China's policy towards the Afro-Asian countries, depends for i t s source of inspiration and for i t s justification, on the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism. Domestic, as well as foreign, policies, must always be i n accordance with, or i n any case made to f i t , the "universal truth" of Marxism-Beninism. It becomes necessary, there-fore, i n any discussion of Communist China's foreign policy, to examine the ideological background as being the foremost source of authority. 5 Alignment with Soviet Russia Consequences From the very beginning, the Chinese Communists have aligned them-selves with Soviet Russia, and thus with the s o c i a l i s t bloc as a whole. In July, 1949, Mao Tse-tung pronounced his famous dictum "we must lean on one side". More recently, Vice-Premier, Chen Y i expressed himself even more ex-p l i c i t l y by declaring that "the Chinese revolution i s a continuation of the 1 great October Socialist Revolution." Ideologically this alignment means 2 irrevocable acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as the "universal truth". From the Chinese Communist point of view this acceptance i s essential i f the unity 1. Survey of Mainland China Press, (S.M.C.P.) Chen Y i speaking at Peking r a l l y , #2377, Kov. i960, p. 6. 2. The term Marxism-Leninism i s here defined as comprising the basic tenets of Marx's proletarian revolution and their subsequent modification by Lenin i n his anxiety to provide a Marxist j u s t i f i -cation for a revolution undertaken i n defiance of Marxist principles. Marxism consists of three main elementsj the philosophy of di a l e c t i c a l materialism, the primacy of the economic factor as the basis of society and the theory of State and revolution. Lenin's modification resulted from the fact that he carried out the revolution i n a country which contrary to Marx's teachings, was not a highly c i v i l i z e d and industrial-ized country. Consequently, Lenin was obliged to create a highly centralized and undemocratic party and subordinate every other i n s t i -tution to i t . The dictatorship of the proletariat, which Marx intended to be a transitional form, became permanent and the "withering away" of the State was postponed indefinitely. The Communists became the masters rather than the vanguard of the workers as Marx had clearly stated i n the Communist Manifesto, As for "democratic centralism", the basis of party organization, under Lenin, the emphasis came to be increasingly placed on "centralism". Stalin later completed the process and turned the party into a mono-l i t h i c organ exercising absolute authority. Benin, therefore, trans-formed Marxism by making i t applicable to the practical requirements of Russian conditions and placing greater emphasis on centralized control than Marx had intended. 6 of the Communist bloc, at least for the outside world, i s to be maintained. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines form the cement, the unifying force, which holds together the s o c i a l i s t camp. This belief probably goes far to explain, on the one hand, Peking's recent vicious attacks on so-called "Yugoslav revisionism", and on the other hand, Peking's concurrence with Khrushchov's action i n Hungary. From the alignment with Soviet Russia, and the unquestionable truth of Marxism-Leninism, i s . derived a second fundamental ideological conceptj namely, the division of the world into two diametrically opposed social sys-tems: the imperialist (capitalist) and the anti-imperialist (socialist) sys-tem. This division i s held to be irreconcilable. "In the end", said Mao Tse-tung, "the s o c i a l i s t system w i l l replace the capitalist system. This 3 i s an objective law independent of human w i l l . " In other words, the pre-sent world i s engaged i n an ideological struggle to the end, i n which ultimate triumph belongs to socialism as dictated by the irreversible course of history. Thus, time i s on the side of socialism. One important aspect of this world-wide competition i n ideologies, as seen through Chinese" doctrinarian eyes, i s that ultimate triumph w i l l not be achieved by passive acceptance of the status quo, for capitalism, when l e f t to i t s own, w i l l not see the error of i t s ways. Any suggestion, therefore, that socialism should come to terms with capitalism, or adopt a policy of l i v e and l e t l i v e , i s an untenable proposition i n the long run. Equally, "peaceful co-existence", frequently declared to be the objective of Peking's policies, can 3. Barnett, A. D., Communist China and Asia, New York, Harper and Brothers, I960, P. 68 - quotation from Mao's speech i n Moscow, Nov. 1957. 7 at best serve as a short term expedient or ta c t i c a l manoeuvre. From the Chin-ese Communist standpoint, the world i s dynamic and change i s the very essence of the Chinese revolution and indeed of the world soc i a l i s t revolution as a whole. The momentum of the revolution must be maintained, and the creation of tension should be welcomed rather than discouraged. It was Mao Tse-tung who expressed this cardinal aspect of Chinese Communist ideology as early as 1936, when he said that the guiding laws of war were developmental and that "nothing remains changeless." He also added that the only way to eliminate war was 4 "to oppose war by means of war.." More recent evidence of the continued pre-valence of this belief i s furnished by Premier Yu Chao-li, who stated: "We must acquire a correct under-standing of the objective law that imperialism breeds war precisely because we want to use this law to oppose, prevent and eliminate imperial-i s t war .... To fight for and realize world peace, i t i s necessary to wage a struggle against the policies of ag- „ gression and plunder of imperialism."-' It i s i n this insistence on the continual need for change, and the propriety of violent revolution that the real source of the present Sino-Soviet ideolog-i c a l dispute must be sought. Doctrinariani sm The above serves as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the fact that the Chinese Com-munist leaders have never accepted Marxism-Leninism as a static doctrine. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung has consistently opposed the so-called "doctrinarian" 4. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1953, Vol. I, P. 179. 5« S. M. C. P;, art i c l e entitled "Imperialism i s the Source of War i n modern times ... #2233, Mar. I960, PP. 11-12. view of "formula" interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He has ju s t i f i e d his opposition on the basis of Lenin's authority that "the most essential thing i n Marxism, the l i v i n g soul of Marxism" i s "the concrete analysis of concrete conditions." For Mao, Marxism-Leninism i s not a system of f i n i t e rules. On the contrary, i t i s a l i v i n g force, a science, which "has i n no way summed up a l l knowledge of truth, but i s ceaselessly opening up, 7 through practice, the road to the knowledge of truth. Thus, i t seems that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine serves a dual purpose. On the one hand i t embodies the ultimate truth, and for this reason commands unquestionable allegiance and submission. On the other hand, i t i s a creative science, thus preserving an element of f l e x i b i l i t y . Mao Tse-tung, leading exponent of Chinese ideology, i s generally credited with the sinicization of the Marxist-Leninist doc-trine and i t s practical application to the Chinese scene. It was Mao who, according to Ch'en Po-ta, produced a "l i v i n g synthesis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the g Chinese Revolution." 6 . Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1 9 5 3 , Vol. 1, p. 193. 7 . Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice". July, 1 9 3 7 , p. 2 9 6 . 8 . Tang, P. S. H., Communist China Today, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1 9 5 7 , p. 1 . 9 To a l l intents and purposes then, Mao deserves the f i t -ting epithet of a practical revolutionary. As one writer pointed out, "The Maoist strategy accomplished for China what Leninism had 9 accomplished for Russia." In Mao's sinicization of Communism to the extent of harmoniz-ing i t with China's own nationalist aspirations and economic 9a ambitions of the peasantry, l i e s the key to much of the Ccmmunists' success i n China. 9. Brimmell, J. H., Communism i n South East Asia. London, Oxford U.K., Press, 1959, p. 133.. 9.- (a) "The Maoist strategy" involves the establishment of a p o l i t i c a l party, organized i n accordance with Leninist principles, which draws i t s support from a purely peasant base. Mao Tse-tung early recognized the potential inherent i n the peasantry as a revolutionary force.- In a passionately worded document entitled Report on an Investigation of the Agrarian  Movement i n Hunan (1927), Mao expresses his conviction that "The force of the peasantry i s l i k e that of the raging winds and driv-ing rain..... No force can stand i n i t s way." The years following 1927 were marked by the gradual shift of the basis of the Chinese Conraunist Party from the working class to the peasantry. This implied a serious deviation from Marx's doctrine of a proletarian based revolution and Moscow did not con-ceal i t s disapproval. Mao looked to the village as the key center of revolutionary action and gave the impetus to the formation of t e r r i t o r i a l bases i n the remote hinterland equipped with military forces. This strategy resulted i n the ultimate triumph of com-munism i n China. 10 Interdependence of "theory" and "practice" Essentially, i t i s the interplay and interdependence of "theory" and "practice" which l i e s at the root of Chinese Communist ideology. In order to enable a continued dynamic and pragmatic approach to the Chinese revolution, the relationship between these two concepts i s necessary. As early as 1937 Mao Tse-tung stated that the outstanding characteristic of Marxist philosophy -dialectical materialism - was " i t s practicability; i t s emphasis on the depen-dence of theory or practice, emphasis on practice as the foundation of theory, which i n turn serves practice", and he consequently instructed his cadres i n Tenan that they should study the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the aim of "integrating i t with the practical movement of the Chinese revolution..." and to seek a method "for solving the theoretical and tact i c a l problems of the Chinese Revolution." ^ Furthermore, Mao expressed his distinct disapproval of the "subjective" comrades who apply Marxism-Leninism as i f i t were a fixed formula by simply quoting words and phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Once having established the fundamental principle of mutual inter-dependence between "theory" and "practice" this principle could be made appli-cable to the concept of "National Roads" to Communism. Although the "theory", i.e., the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, must be the same for a l l coun-tries i n the s o c i a l i s t camp, nevertheless, the "practice" may d i f f e r from one country to another according to specific national conditions. The same i n es-sence, but different i n the specific forms. Going one step further, the Chin-ese Communists believe that Marxism must be given a definite national form IcT Steiner. H. A.. The Annals,of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l  and Social Science. Vol. 321, Jan. 1959, P. 34. 11. Ibid., P. 35. 12. Ibid., P. 35. 13. Ibid., P. 38. 11 13a before It can be useful. In accordance with this view, the Chinese Com-munist Politburo statement of December 29, 1956, was quite consistent i n stating that Stalin had erred by "being unmindful of the independent and equal status of Communist parties of various lands" and had exhibited "great-nation chauvenistic tendencies." On the other hand, i t was equally consistent i n stating that the "national roads" to Communism must a l l adhere to the "uni-versal truth" of Marxism-Leninism which are generally applicable." 1^ Thus, whatever differences i n form there may exist i n national proleterian move-ments, bloc solidarity must under no circumstances be sacrificed. Revisionism In addition to rejecting the doctrinarian approach to ideology, the Chinese Communists are also opposed to so-called revisionism. At present the international Communist movement has the important responsibility" to de-fend the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and oppose modern revision-15 ism," reads the 1958 resolution adopted by the Eighty National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. This i t was commented "ushered i n a new stage i n the international Communist movement of our time...." In the Chinese Communist ideological arsenal revisionism or right' wing opportunism constitutes one of the principal dangers facing the inter-national Communist movement. I t i s considered downright heresy, and i f toler-ated would seriously undermine the solidarity of the socialist camp. "There may be "national roads" to Communism, but there can be no "national Commu-nism". 1 7 Even though imperialism i s disintegrating as the Chinese have re-peatedly declared, nevertheless, i t retains i t s fundamental aggressive nature. 13. Steiner, H. A., Ibid., P. 38. 13a Mao Tse-Tung - Selected Works "On New Democracy", Vol. 3, 194-0, P. U. Steiner, H. A., Ibid., P. 39. 15. Peking Review. #14, June, 1958, P. 23 16. S. M. C. P.. #1782, May 1958, P. 15. 17. Steiner, H. A., The Annals. Vol. 321, January, 1959, P. 38. 13 Therefore, the only way to contain and eventually to eliminate i t i s by main-taining a "united front". When i n 1958 the "Let a hundred flowers bloom" period was quickly followed by the destruction of the "weeds" (those who c r i t i c i z e d the fundamentals of socialism), the Peking leaders acted i n the interest of ideological unity. Equally, when Tito declared his opposition to 18 the division of the world into camps, he was nothing less than a t r a i t o r . Whereas Peking could adopt a tolerant view of Gomulka's brand of "National Road" Communism, i t had to be equally intolerant of the Yugoslav leading group's "revisionism". The fundamental point i n modern revisionism, as typified by the Yugo-slav leading group, i s the "substitution of the reactionary theory of the State 19 standing above the classes for the Marxist-Leninist theory of the State." By placing the state above the classes, the revisionists are i n effect, i t i s argued, playing i n the hands of the imperialists and peddling bourgeois: theory. For i t i s the fundamental principle of Marxism-Leninism that i n order "...for the proletarian revolution to succeed, the old m i l i t a r i s t , bureaucratic state machine must be smashed and replaced by a new, revolutionary state machine i n 20 the hands of the people". The picture of Chinese Communist ideology which by now emerges i s characterized by, at the same time, r i g i d i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y . Between these two poles the Ghinese walk the extremely thin line of pragmatis:m. , Since the Chinese revolution i s dynamic and must maintain i t s momentum, there can be no sharp division between "theory" and"practice". The two are i n fact mutually interdependent. Theoretically, the "universal truth" provides the all-embracing 18. Peking Review, #18, July, 1958, P. 6. 19. Peking Review, #17, June, 1958, P. 6. 20. S. M. C. P., #2375, November, I960, P. 50, Red Flag article quoting Lenin. 13 unifying bond. In practice, however, the constantly changing world scene de-mands f l e x i b i l i t y . Neither "doctrinarism" nor "revisionism" are to be tolerated, and i t i s l e f t to the ideological architect to interpret orthodox ideology i n the light of practical necessities. Asianization of Communism The question now arises as to how i n fact the Chinese Communists bring about the harmonization between the theoretical and practical approach to ideology. This question must be examined i n the light of the specific features; of the Chinese revolution, as well as the general colonial and semi-colonial con-ditions prevalent i n Asia and Africa. Reference has been made earlier to Mao Tse-tung 's contributions i n the f i e l d of ideology. Mao's greatest originality i n this f i e l d would seem to be i n the practical application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the Chinese scene. Most of the theoretical spade\*ork was performed by Lenin, but i t was Mao Tse-tung who.proved himself the unrivalled practitioner. The foremost fea-ture of what i s now commonly recognized as "Maoism" i s that the application of of this doctrine i s not limited merely to the Chinese revolution, but extends to the Asian revolution as a whole. "Maoism", therefore, i s Asian i n nature rather than just Chinese. The real determinant of what may be termed the "Asianization" of Com-munism appears to be twofold: Mao Tse-tung 1s On New Democracy and Lenin's essay on "Imperialism". The f i r s t contains an authoritative exposition of what i s com-monly called "Maoism" and constitutes the adoption of Marxist theories to the conditions of the Asian revolution i n i t s Chinese aspects. Lenin's essay on "Imperialism" forms ..." the bridge over which the Marxist theories- passed to Asia. "Maoism" "Maoism", as i t was expounded i n 1940, i s based on the premise that the present-day character of Chinese society i s colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. In order to change this character of Chinese society, two steps i n the Chinese revolution are required. The f i r s t step i s to change a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society. The second, which follows the completion of the transitional f i r s t step, i s the build-ing of a socia l i s t society on the Russian model. The 2 1 . Brimmell, J. H., Communism i n South East Asia. London, Oxford University Press, 1959, P. 137 . completion of the f i r s t step, therefore, forms the foremost immediate object-ive of the Chinese revolution. This f i r s t step Mao has called "New Democracy". Essentially, "New Democracy" i s the continuation of the old Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolu-tion, the origin of which dates back to the Opium War i n 194-0, but i t s char-acter has changed. Since the outbreak of World War I and the October Revolu-tion i n Russia i n 1917, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed i t s character. It now ho longer belongs to the old category of democracy, but to the category of the new democracy. It i s new because the objective of the present revolution i s to replace the old economic, p o l i t i c a l and cultural order by a new order of a so c i a l i s t nature. At the same time the triumph of the social i s t revolution i n Russia has made the Chinese revolution part of the pro-letarian-socialist world revolution. The important feature of "New Democracy" i s i t s all-encompassing nature. I t has served to make a l l colonies and semi-colonies a l l i e s of the revolutionary front of world socialism. any revolution that takes place i n a colony or semi-colony against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, belongs no longer to the old category of bourgeois-democratic world revolu-tion, but to a new category, and i s no longer part of the old bourgeois or capitalist world revolution, but part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-s o c i a l i s t world revolution. 22 Mao, thus established a common bond between the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary movements i n the colonies and semi-colonies of Asia and Africa. Their common aim was to fight imperialism and change the colonial and semi-feudal character of their societies into one of independence and democracy. As long as this remained their mutual aim they were a l l i e s and to-gether, formed part of the world-wide revolutionary front. 22 Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy, Peking, Foreign Language Press, I960, p.10. 15 The exclusive Asian nature of "New Democracy" can be seen from the fact that Mao Tse-tung provided for a transitional form of state which was to be adopted by the revolutions i n colonial and semi-colonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This state system was to be comprised of a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes, including the proletariat^ the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Mao was careful to point out that this new state system was distinct from any system hitherto known. Formerly only two basic kinds of state sys-tems had been i n existence. Bourgeois dictatorship which existed i n western democratic countries and dictatorship of the proletariat which existed i n the Soviet Union. In both instances the dictatorship rested on a single-class basis. In Mao's new-democratic state system, however, joint dictatorship rested on a multi-class basis. Mao, thus advocated a revolution based on widespread sup-port from a l l classes willing to share i n the revolutionary struggle. It i s this type of revolution on a mass, basis which has been adopted by the Com-munist movements i n Southeast Asia as their guiding principle. Broadly speaking, "Maoism" may be defined as the transformation of Marxism-Leninism i n such a way as to make a predominantly western doctrine ap-plicable to the requirements of the eastern scene. "Maoism" does not pretend to deviate from the "ultimate truth", but i t has. shown a great deal of ingen-uity i n applying this "truth" to a predominantly agrarian social structure. Other Comparisons On the subject of peasant participation i n the world revolutionary movement, Marx took a dim view. For Marx, China was merely an example of an Oriental Despotism with a static agrarian society which could not conceivably 23 produce a proletarian or true working-class revolution. 3 In his opinion the 2|. Tang, P. S. H., Communist China Today, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, P. 9. 16 working-class revolution could only succeed i n the industrial societies of Western Europe. Lenin, on the other hand, faced with the discouraging pro-spects of West European revolution, and conscious perhaps of the revolutionary potential i n Asia, took a different view. In 1919 he told delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Eastern Peoples that due to the "peculiar conditions which do not exist i n European countries", Communist theory and practice must be applied to conditions i n which the "main mass w i l l consist of the peasantry". " Lenin thus established the for-mal basis for an alliance between workers and peasants which Mao later employ-ed so effectively. It was Mao Tse-tung who f i r s t organized and used the peasantry to bring about a successful Communist revolution i n Asia. In doing so he showed his originality by reversing the Soviet pattern of an urban revolution f i r s t . Instead Mao set up rural bases (Soviets), equipped with military units, which served as principal operational basis for the expanding revolution. Lenin was careful to stress the need for a disciplined avant garde of professional revolutionaries, a small tightly organized group to lead the alliance. He adopted the phrase "vanguard and organized detachment of the 25 working class." In 1920 the Congress of the Communist International adopt-ed the following resolution: " The Communist Party i s part of the working class, namely, i t s most advanced, class-conscious and therefore most revolutionary part ... The Communist Party i s the organized p o l i t i c a l lever ... (to lead the proletarian and semi-proletarian mass) in the right direction." Tang, P. S. H., Ibid., P. 11. 2<5. Tang, P. S. H., Ibid., P. 17. 2.6. Tang, P. S. H. Ibid., P. 17. 17 The Chinese Communists have carefully preserved Lenin's organizational fea-ture. Article I of the 195-4 Constitution states that the Chinese Peoples Republic i s lead by the working class. At the same time the constitution underlines the basic Communist contention that the power of the State i s s t i l l an instrument of the ruling classes for suppressing the ruled classes. Proletarian hegemony i s also evident from the fact that after the success of the Chinese Communist revolution i n 19-49, the peasantry was almost im-mediately relegated to a secondary position. Evidently Mao Tse-tung regard-ed the peasants only as a means to serve the cause of the revolution. In this •aiem s e the peasants were a means to an end, namely, the triumph of the revolution and the transfer of power into the hands of the working class;. The Chinese Communist form of government, as stipulated i n the Con-stitution, i s defined as "democratic centralism". This paradoxical phrase was; f i r s t coined by Lenin as a result of the need for a high degree of central-ized control. In actual practice this means control extending from the top down. In theory, however, i t leaves room for grass-root participation i n formulating the central directives. The Chinese Communists have proceeded to place their own interpretation on "democratic centralism" by defining i t as a 27 "unity of opposites", which enables both the decentralization and central-ization of power at the same time. For this purpose "democratic" i s defined as "democracy under centralized guidance" and "centralism" i s defined as "centralism based on democracy". The deduction that can be made from this Marxian verbal sparring i s that whatever the merits of "democratic" i n the governmental process, the Chinese Communists s t i l l prefer to place the empha-sis on "centralism". Mao Tse-tung also inherited from both Lenin and Stalin the concept 27. S. M. C. P.. #1795. June. 1958. P>. 7. 28. S. M. C. P., Ibid., P. 7. IS of a "united front". In the middle of the 1930's the Comintern established a new general line by instructing a l l Coimnunist parties outside the Soviet Union to cooperate with l e f t i s t and socia l i s t groups i n forming a "popular 29 30 front" against Fascism. Adopting this concept to China. Mao has b u i l t 29. The so-called "United front" tactics were f i r s t introduced at the thir d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party of 1921. Under these tactics Communists abroad were to establish contact with the masses either by co l -laborating with leaders of non-Ccmmrunist organizations ("united front from above"), or by appealing to the rank and f i l e members of such organizations, ("united front from below")\; The resounding success, scored by the French Communist party between 1934 and 1936 by applying the "united front from above" tactics, lead to the general acceptance of these tactics, i n the sec-ond half of the 1930's. Communist parties sought the collaboration of so-c i a l i s t organizations at a l l levels i n order to build up a "popular front" against Fascism. By 1947 these tactics were abandoned as a result of Gomin-form instructions which l a i d down that the Communists were to close their ranks and unite their efforts on the basis of the common anti-imperialist and democratic platform. 30. Mao Tse-tung employed the tactic of "united front" with consider-able success, i n the 1930's i n setting up an anti-Japanese front between the Communists and the Nationalist regime. Behind this front the Communists managed to preserve their identity and further their own cause. In On New  Democracy Mao defines the "united front" as one between Communism and the Three People 1s Principles i n the stage of democratic revolution. Rejecting Communism, he said, i s i n fact rejecting the "united front". The Three People's Principles of the new democracy contain the three cardinal p o l i -cies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers. 19 his programme for China, particularly during the f i r s t years after 1949, on a multi-class, rather than a single-class basis. Hence, his emphasis on such 31 concepts as "New Democracy" and "Peoples' Democratic Dictatorship". In the l a t t e r case the inference i s dictatorship by the people over the few so-called "reactionaries? and "deviationists". In the second issue of the jour-nal, Red Flag, issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Wang Chia-hsiang gives the following ideological explanation: "Bourgeois democracy ( i . e . Western democracy) i s dictatorship by the few over the great majority .... While pro-letarian dictatorship means democracy for the great majority, the working people." 32 Since the Communist Party has been assigned the ideological role of o vanguard of the working people, this means i n effect that "democracy" flows from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. The same writer sums i t a l l up by declaring that the proletarian cause of revolution and construction can only advance with: "A Communist Party that takes Marxism-Leninism as i t s guide to action, builds i t s e l f on the principle of democratic centralism, establishes. close ties with the masses, strives to become the very heart of the working people, and educates i t s members and the masses of the people i n Marxism-Leninism." 33 The importance to the Chinese Communists of the concept of "united front" i n their ideological system may be gauged from a recent exposition by Chang Chi-yi. This expose'could conceivably be interpreted as an attempt to 3 1 . In the 1 9 5 4 Constitution the term "Dictatorship" i s replaced by "State". Communist China i s now referred to as the "Peoples' Demo-cratic State", which continues to be based on a multi-class united front. 3 2 * S. M. C. P., # 1 7 9 5 , June, 1 9 5 8 , P. 6 . 3 3 . S. M. C. P., # 1 7 9 5 , June, 1 9 5 8 , P. 1 0 . 20, distinguish between Soviet and Chinese ideological practice. Chang starts out by stating that the People's Democratic United Front forms an integral part of the class struggle and thus a constitutent component of the general line of the Chinese Communist Party. He then proceeds to point to Marxism-Leninism as the authoritative source which ca l l s for the elimination of the exploiting classes. This, he contends, can be achieved by two methods. The f i r s t i s the method of seizure as used by the Russian Revolution. The second i s the method of people's democratic united front, as used by the Chinese. The latter i s the more moderate and gradual method which leads to peaceful transformation. Furthermore, i t makes possible the co-operation between the working class and the national bourgeoisie on the basis of iden-34 t i t y of interests, namely, opposition to foreign imperialism. 34. The role of the national bourgeoisie i n the Chinese revolution i s distinct from that of the national bourgeoisie i n Russia. Because China i s a colony and a semi-colony suffering from aggression by others, her national bourgeoisie has "at certain times and to a certain degree a revolutionary quality", as expressed i n i t s opposition to foreign imperialism. "Thus i n China the task of the proletariat i s to take into account the revolutionary quality of the national bourgeoisie and form with i t an united front against imperialism ...11 (On Hew  Democracy, p. 19). In Tsarist Russia, Mao explains the national bourgeoisie was i n no way revolutionary and the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with i t . The Chinese practice can obviously be extended to a l l "colonies and semi-colonies suffering from aggression by others". 21 "Imperialism" - A Contributary Factor There can be l i t t l e doubt that Lenin furnished the Chinese Com-munists with one of their most effective ideological weapons when he wrote his essay on "Imperialism". It i s this weapon which Peking has succeeded i n giving i t s maximum practical value, as an instrument designed f o r the pene-tration into the new nations of Africa and Asia. Whereas, formerly "Imper-ialism" served as the bridge over which Marxism-Leninism passed into Asia, more recently i t has come to serve as the bridge over which Communist China i s passing into Southeast Asia and Africa. The basic contention of Lenin's thesis on "Imperialism" i s that under a capitalist economic system imperialist wars are "absolutely inevit-able", as long as the means of production are privately owned. A theoretical and h i s t o r i c a l analysis of capitalism shows that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Monopoly, i.e., the formation of cartels and syndicates, forms the highest stage of capitalist development and leads, i n turn, to the transformation of capitalism into imperialism. Imperialism i s manifested by an increasing struggle to acquire sources of raw materials and markets, thus leading to the acquisition of colonies. Once having established the association between monopolist capital-ism and colonial conquest, Lenin proceeds to divide the world into two main groups - colony-owning countries and colonies or, to use Chinese Communist terminology, the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. Furthermore, imperialism i s intolerant, for i t introduces everywhere "the striving for domination, not for freedom" and i t leads to national oppression and the v i o l -ation of national independence. Lenin concludes that monopoly capitalism i s the "economic quintessence of imperialism" and that i t has "grown into a 22 world system of colonial oppression and of financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world, by a handful of Advanced" countries." Moreover, and this has assumed increasingly significant pro-portions i n the Chinese interpretation, any system of alliance among the imperialist powers i s inevitably nothing more than a "truce" i n periods be-35 tween Wars. Lenin's expose'of "Imperialism", particularly i n terms of division of the world, and identification of capitalism with colonial conquest, con-tains two major implications with regard to the Chinese revolution. In the f i r s t place the Chinese revolution i s not an isolated phenomena, but part of the world-wide revolution as a whole. In the second place, the Chinese revolution has become the prototype of a l l revolutions i n colonial and semi-colonial countries. I t i s the realization of these two implications which has given the Chinese Communists the opportunity to extend the scope of their own revolution beyond i t s national boundaries. Chinese Communist Interpretation Apart from acceptance of Lenin's basic contentions on "Imperialism", 36 the Chinese hold the view that "Imperialism is by nature predatory". The imperialist countries persistently follow a policy of aggression and oppression. When this policy meets with obstacles and peaceful means do not succeed i n surmounting them, imperialism resorts to means of war. "Imperialist War", 37 therefore, " i s a continuation of i t s policy of aggression and enslavement." Consequently, as long as imperialism exists, there w i l l be no hope for a lasting peace, for peace to the imperialists means no more than an interval 3 5 . Lenin, "Imperialism", The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York, International Publishers, 1939. 3 6 . S. M. C. P., #2233, March, I 9 6 0 , p; 4 37. S. M. G. P., Ibid., P. 4. 23 between wars, i n which preparations are made for the next war. Imperialism i s thus viewed as an inherently aggressive force, bound on striking a deadly blow as soon as the opportunity presents i t s e l f . To counteract this "threat" and to safeguard world peace, the people of the world should form an united front and wage an active struggle against this "threat". This twofold requirement was expressed by Chairman L i u Shao-chi during his recent v i s i t to Moscow. "Imperialism", he said, "can assuredly be prevented from launching a world war, and world peace safeguarded, i f only the peoples of the world are further mobilized to form an international united front against the imperialist polic-ies of aggression and war and carry out persistent struggles. against the imperialist bloc headed by the U.S." 38 Despite this constant "imperialist threat" the Chinese Communists believe, that time i s on their side. Since World War II a gradual shift has taken place i n the relative positions of strength between the imperialist and the s o c i a l i s t camp. As a result of postwar nationalist movements, economic dislocations, and the rise of socialism i n Asia, the old imperialist system has broken down. Not only i s imperialism declining day by day, and the soci a l i s t camp strengthening i t s position steadily, but at the present time "socialism has attained superiority over imperialism with the East wind prevailing over the West wind". Socialism, therefore, i s now i n a position to O Q "force imperialism to accept peaceful co-existence." ^ Furthermore, imperial-ism i s undergoing a process of internal disintegration as a result of the i r -reconcilable contradictions among the imperialist countries, and what i s 38. S. M. C. P., #2398, December, I960, P. 33 39. S. M. C. P., #2233, March, I960, PP. 13-14. 24 believed to be a deepening economic c r i s i s i n the capitalist world. In this respect the United States, by virtue of i t s position as China's number one enemy, has come under heaviest f i r e . United States' imper-ialism, though outwardly strong i n appearance, i s declared to be only a "paper tiger". Not only i s "U. S.-phobia" entirely groundless, i t is also "extremely erroneous" and harmful to over-estimate the imperialist "forces of war, and 4-0 under-estimate the forces of peace and socialism." In characteristic Com-munist verbiage the implication of this warning would seem to be nothing less than a clarion c a l l to action on the part of the "forces of peace". Application to Asia and Africa Finally, attention should be drawn to the application of the doctrine of "Imperialism" to the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa. At the Bandung Conference (1955) the assembled delegates unanimously accepted a reso-lution declaring their opposition to imperialism i n any form. The Chinese Communists have repeatedly u t i l i z e d this declaration to prevent the spread, and ultimately assure the withdrawal of, "Western imperialism" from the Asian and African continents. Furthermore, Peking has consistently declared i t s support to the Afro-Asian nations i n their "heroic" struggle for national i n -dependence. As ideological justification, the Chinese point to Lenin's dictum that the contradictions between imperialism and the'colonies and semi-colonies are irreconciliable. Also on Lenin's authority, i t i s stated that "In the era of imperialism, national wars waged by the colonies and semi-colonies are ... inevitable" and that these wars " w i l l inevitably be a continuation of their 41 national liberation policy." Evidently Peking has succeeded i n establish-ing, on ideological grounds, a definite relationship between the national independence movements and the, doctrine of "Imperialism". 4.0. S. M. C. P., #1787, May, 1958, P. 50. 4 l . S. M. C. P., #2233, March, I960, P. 5. 25 Conclusion In conclusion i t may be said that Marxism-Leninism forms the L e i t - motiv i n a l l of Communist China's actions and pronouncements. This i s not to say, however, that the Chinese Communists have been content to accept Moscow's doctrine as a static force. On the contrary, the sinicization of Marxism-Leninism has enabled i t s transformation into a dynamic revolution-ary force. F l e x i b i l i t y and pragmatism appear to be the guiding principles i n the application of doctrine to the realities, of the Asian scene. Further-more, i t would seem that ideological principles are to be applied with a view to pursuing two specific aims: unity and action. Unity i n the sense of conformity and unquestionable solidarity i n the ranks of the soc i a l i s t camp. Hence, Peking's determined stand against "revisionism". Action i s equally essential, partly to ensure the continued momentum of the Chinese and thus the world revolution; partly to provide a counterbalance against the aggressive forces of imperialism. The most distinguishing feature of Chinese Communist ideology would seem to be not so much i t s conformity to the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism, although this should not be under-estimated, but rather, to use a paradoxical term, i t s "practical conformity"; a constant inter-play between theory and practice, with emphasis on the la t t e r . It i s this "practical conformity" which has opened up the way for the peaceful penetration of the Afro-Asian countries. 26 CHAPTER 11 COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE AFRO - ASIAN WORLD Introduction As i n the case of ideology, Communist China's foreign policy i s characterized by dynamic as well as pragmatic considerations. Whole heart-ed acceptance of Lenin's doctrine of Imperialism that the world i s engaged i n a continual struggle between revolutionary socialism and reaction-ary capitalism means, i n effect, the denial of a world order based on the principle of status quo. As long as the world i s divided, the situation i s f l u i d , and constant efforts are required to speed up the ultimate triumph of socialism. At the same time, however, the need i s recognized for flexible and adjustable policies to suit varying local conditions. Southeast Asia provides the most striking example of the degree of adjustment of which Pe-king's policy i s capable. Prior to 1955, Peking appeared to be bound at achieving i t s objectives i n this area by militant revolutionary means. Throughout the area, local Communist parties conducted a campaign of insur-rection which was aimed at achieving power by force. When the attempt came to naught, a gradual change in tactics developed, ultimately resulting i n the Bandung Conference at which Peking publicly endorsed a policy of "peace-f u l co-existence". From the outset i t i s necessary to establish a clear distinction, in so far as this i s possible or indeed advisable, between Peking's long-range objectives i n foreign policy and i t s short-term aims. The former 27 are of a permanent nature and may be said to be derived and influenced by both ideological and national considerations. Short-term aims, on the other hand, are dictated by immediate considerations to cope with the f l u i d state of the international scene. Such short-term tactics can be compared to "detours" which are employed when the main avenue i s temporarily blocked by obstacles. Their ultimate value, of course, i s judged by the degree to which these tactics work i n the interest and further the achievement of long-term objectives. The Chinese Communists have proved to be s k i l f u l manip-ulators i n the use of these t a c t i c a l devices i n furthering their long-term strategy. China's Claim to World Prestige Chinese Communist foreign policy seems to be guided by three p r i n c i -pal objectives. The f i r s t of these i s China's claim for a position of pres-tige among the great powers. A claim which i s born out of a deep sense of past humiliation and a present feeling of pride. In the opinion of one stud-ent of international affairs, the Chinese do not "think of themselves as an I Asian power at a l l " but see themselves as a world power. Although i t i s open to dispute whether the Chinese have i n fact attained a world power status, nevertheless, they do seem intent on securing recognition as a force i n world p o l i t i c s and to dispel any notions of i n f e r i o r i t y . This seems to be deeply rooted i n Chinese history. Traditionally, China occupied a fore-most position on the Asian continent and her cultural influence extended far beyond her frontiers. From the middle of the nineteenth century u n t i l the coming to power of the present Communist regime i n 1949, however, China suf-fered humiliation and internal chaos and became a victim of western and Japanese imperialism. Incapable of resisting foreign pressure, the nation 1. R. Harris, "China and the World", International Affairs, (April, 1959) Vol. 35, p. 168. 28 deteriorated economically and p o l i t i c a l l y and i t s prestige was reduced to a minimum. Small wonder then that the present regime i s anxious to refute past humiliations and claim a position of prestige i n the eyes of the world. Evidence of this deep-seated passion to claim for China a place under the sun can be found i n Chou En-lai's speeches. In a major foreign policy speech to the F i r s t National Peoples* Congress on June 28, 1956, he said: "China i s playing an ever more important role i n promoting the de-velopment of the entire international situation. I t has become more and more d i f f i c u l t to ignore China's views i n the settlement of many major inter-2 national issues." In April, I960, almost four years later, speaking again to the National Peoples' Congress, Chou said that the Chinese peoples' great achievements i n soci a l i s t construction were "winning the plaudits of millions upon millions of people" and he added: "...the overwhelming majority of man-3 kind...are not anti-Chinese, but ardently demand friendship with China." Once allowances have been made for the propaganda value such statements hold with respect to the domestic scene, there s t i l l remains a core of sentiment which cannot be dismissed. There may be truth i n a statement that China i n 4 the past was and i s today s t i l l an "isolated, superior, separate entity" , but the present regime i s making efforts to break through this isolation bar-ie r and to secure an increment i n i t s prestige abroad. Mao Tse-tung probably expressed more than just a fervent wish when he said i n the f a l l of 1949: 5 "Our nation w i l l never again be an insulted nation." This was the pledge 2~. Chou En-lai, On Present International Situation, China's Foreign  Policy, and the Liberation of Taiwan, Speech to F i r s t National Peoples' Congress, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1956, p.23. 3. Survey of Mainland China Press" (S.M.C.P.) #2241, April, I960, p. 3. 4* R. Harris, loc. c i t . p. 168. 5. W. Levi, "China and the Two Great Powers", Current History (Dec. I960), p. 321. of a man who had personally experienced the humiliations and frustrations of foreign encroachments and who, l i k e many of his fellow compatriots, was con-scious of a deep sense of historical pride. National Security - Pre 1949 The second principal objective i s national security. I t i s this objective which has earned Communist China the reputation of being a military expansionist power. In the case of China, national security has traditionally been closely related to the problem of controlling certain strategic p e r i -pheral areas. Preoccupation with these areas seems to have stemmedfrom the traditional threat of invasion posed by barbaric tribes from the North and Northwest. This problem was aggravated by the vastness of China's territory and the lack of firm p o l i t i c a l control over the fringe t e r r i t o r i e s . In an ef-fort to counter this continuous threat, whenever a strong dynasty ruled, military expansion was undertaken to secure p o l i t i c a l control over these peri-pheral areas and thereby strengthen p o l i t i c a l unification. Apart from the strategic aspects, China's preoccupation with her peripheral areas also stems from a fundamental principle of Chinese govern-ment, namely, the relation between the superior and inferi o r state. The Con-fucian system of China i n i t s bearing on international relations rested on the principles of familism and inequality of nations. The world was regarded as a natural unit i n which the Middle Kingdom was the center of c i v i l i z a t i o n . A l l those l i v i n g outside the Middle Kingdom were considered "barbarians" with a c i v i l i z a t i o n inferior to China's. Gradually the Confucian system was ex-tended to these border states and as they became c i v i l i z e d they were regarded as members of the Confucian family, of nations, but occupied an inferior status. In recognition of China's primacy i n this family of nations, the 20 border states were required to send periodic tributary missions to the Chin-ese Imperial Court and were often kept under close supervision. Generally speaking, however, China did not seek to control directly the internal af-fair s of these border states. In fact, they were largely autonomous as long as they kept the peace and performed their obligations, as inferior states. The significant feature of China's relationship to these "tributary" or dependent states was that Chinese "suzerainty" did not rest on a r i g i d legal code, but rather on a cultural code of reason and natural law. This distinction was l i t t l e understood by the western powers when i n the nine-teenth century they sought to open relations with China and also with her border states. States such as Indochina, Burma and Korea, which had recog-nized China's suzerainty were to become either independent or colonies of foreign powers. Historically, relations between the border states and Imperial China have oscillated between tributary status and outright subjection. As early as 221 B.C., during the Ch'in period, the central government's aim was to exert effective control over the outlying areas. In the ensuing period of unification, both North Korea and North Vietnam were conquered. During the Han period, (206 B.C. 0 222 A.D.), military expansion continued i n the direction of Central Asia, which was conquered and reduced to a sub-jective status. During the same period, Annam became a dependent state of China. The greatest military exploits, however, were achieved under China's foremost empire builder, Pan Ch'ao, during the later Han empire. He subdued a l l far western states i n Northwestern China and also consolidated China's control over Indochina. Burma became a vassal state of China following i t s conquest by Kublai Khan i n 1284. In the following centuries the process of 31 expansion continued u n t i l completed i n the seventeenth century with the con-quest of Formosa. Beginning i n the nineteenth century u n t i l the establishment of the present Eeking regime i n 1949, China lacked strong central control. It was during this period that China f e l l prey to the economic onslaught of what she traditionally regarded as the foreign "barbarians." The impact of the industrial revolution i n Western Europe necessitated the search for markets and raw materials and the mysterious land of Cathay became a focus of inter-est. In addition a mixture of economic and strategic interests attracted both Japan and Tsarist Russia to the Chinese scene. Before long their mutual interests proved incompatible and i n the resulting clash, China became the battleground for the resolution of their differences. For China, the result of these encroachments was the gradual loss, of p o l i t i c a l control over the peripheral areas. The empire began to crumble at the fringes and p o l i t i c a l unity declined. Forced to grant p o l i t i c a l and economic concessions to the encroaching powers, China lost control over such dependent states as Korea, Burma and Indochina, which had traditionally recog-nized Chinese suzerainty. Even more serious was the threat posed by expan-sionist Russia and Japan to such areas as Chinese Turkestan and Manchuria, for these formed integral parts of China's territory and because of their mineral wealth were of prime economic significance. The centripetal effect of these encroachments ultimately threatened the continued existence of China as a nation. National Security - Post 1949 The founding of the Peking regime i n 1949 marked the restoration of a strong central government on mainland China. Historically this meant 32 that once again China was i n a position to pursue an expansionist policy with the spreading and consolidating of p o l i t i c a l control over the peripheral areas. In order to launch their new programme for the development of the na-tion, the regime * s. foremost task was to establish effective p o l i t i c a l control over the territories which had traditionally been regarded as forming part of China's, sphere of influence. National security, therefore, became synonymous with p o l i t i c a l control. Post World War II developments are largely responsible for obscuring what may be termed the his t o r i c a l l y legitimate interests- of China. Two major forces, Communism and nationalism, made their impact on the international scene. Prom a Western standpoint, nationalism was not incompatible with China's hi s t o r i c a l expansionist aspirationsi P o l i t i c a l unity and independence of for-eign control were the legitimate objectives of the nationalist movements through-out Asia. The Peking leaders, therefore, were: able to u t i l i z e the force of "^nationalism i n furthering their own h i s t o r i c a l interests. As Werner Levi points out: "...Chinese nationalism, l i k e a l l big-power nationalism, aims at imperial greatness, usually rationalized as a search for security, the fulfillment of a higher mission, or the restoration of historical rights." o Where Chinese nationalism did prove incompatible, however, was where i t came i n contact with other legitimate nationalist movements i n adjoining t e r r i t o r i e s . Here i t becomes necessary to examine the second major post war development which profoundly affected China's historical legitimate aspirations — the rise of Communism i n Asia. 6 . W. Levi, "China and the Two Great Powers", Current History (Dec. I 9 6 0 , p. 3 2 1 . 33 As pointed out earlier, the rise to power of the Chinese Communists i n 1949 meant the emergence of a strong central government and the establish-ment of a new ideology, an ideology which i s at once revolutionary i n character and dedicated to the eventual communization of the world. If the forces of history are allowed to continue their unobstructed course, so the argument runs, then Communism w i l l eventually overtake and u l t i -mately replace capitalism. Inherent i n this ideology i s one crucial factor, namely, that the world i s dynamic and constantly changing. The principle of status quo i s therefore fundamentally incompatible with Communist doctrine, ex-cept as a temporary ta c t i c a l manoeuvre. Having accepted these basic doctrines, the Chinese Communists have proceeded to apply the principle of a dynamic world to suit their own national interests and as a result, their approach to revo-lution has become militant. The revolution not only i s dynamic — i t must be kept dynamic. It i s precisely at this juncture that history and ideology have clashed. No longer do Chinese expansionist policies appear to be the result of traditionally legitimate aspirations, but rather the result of a deliberate militant revolutionary policy aimed at spreading Communism on a global scale. Chinese Communism therefore has tended to obscure, and i n some cases, super-sede traditional Chinese aspirations for p o l i t i c a l unification and control over the peripheral areas. Since 1949 Chinese Communist policy has been guided by the f u l f i l l -ment of the fundamental objective of national security. From the outset Peking embarked on a programme of securing either direct or indirect control over strategic areas along China's borders. Tibet was occupied by the People;'s Liberation Army i n 1950-51, but i t was not u n t i l 1959 that Peking established 34 i t s complete p o l i t i c a l control. No Chinese occupation occurred i n North Korea or North Vietnam, but by operating through local Communist organizations the Chinese Communists now exercise indirect p o l i t i c a l control, which eventually may reduce these areas to a status of complete dependence on China. In For-mosa and along the Sino-Indian border, Peking has been confronted with strong opposition. It claims that these territories, as well as Tibet, form an integ-r a l part of China's territory and pose a threat to China's national security. I t seems l i k e l y , therefore, that these areas w i l l remain pressure points as long as they continue to be outside Peking's sphere of effective control. Domination over Southeast Asia Peking's third and, for purposes of this paper, the most important objective i s the revival of the ancient policy of seeking to establish a dominant position i n Southeast Asia. As early as the close of the thirteenth century, the armies of Kubla Khan overran Java and i n the early fifteenth century Cheng Ho, the great eunuch admiral attempted to establish Chinese suzerainty over Southeastern Asian states. The seven naval expeditions which he led reached as far as India and the East African coast. Consequently, dozens of Asian and Southeast Asian states became Chinese vassals. From this period also dates the tributary system under which states were required to make periodic tributes at the Chinese Imperial Court. In the context of world history this period i s significant for i t marked the beginning of Chi-nese colonization of Southeast Asia, for example, Java, Borneo, Malaya and Thailand. "Ever since, some form of control over Southeast Asia, has been an 7 enduring feature of Chinese polxqgr." 7. J. M. van der Kroef, "China i n Southeast Asia" Current History (Dec. 1957). Vol.32-3p.350. 2£ Historically then, China as an Asian nation, has had a traditional stake i n Southeast Asia. She occupied a dominant position i n the region i n historic times and she was responsible for the settlement of this region by Chinese from the southern provinces who carried their own culture and came to occupy a dominant position i n the economic l i f e of the countries i n which they settled. These so-called overseas Chinese now constitute a formidable economic and p o l i t i c a l weapon i n the hands of Peking i n conducting i t s policy toward Southeast Asia. As i n the case of the peripheral areas, China's aspirations for a dominant position i n Southeast Asia have been strongly influenced by the for-ces of nationalism and Communism. From a purely theoretical standpoint, the nationalistic aspirations on the part of many of the Southeast nations would appear to constitute the very antithesis to China's designs. Essentially, nationalism aims at terminating colonial rule and working out one's own des-tiny by seeking to establish a national identity. I t seems inconceivable, therefore, that nationalism would tolerate shedding the yoke of western colon-ialism, only to see i t replaced by a new form of oriental colonialism. From a practical standpoint the situation i s more complex. The economic, p o l i t i c a l and social problems facing practically a l l of these nations have proved to be formidable obstacles i n their search for a national identity. The w i l l may be present but the means are often lacking. Consequently, their power of re-sistance i s lou and they become a f e r t i l e f i e l d for any power aiming to estab-l i s h i t s hegemony over the area. In any discussion of Communist China's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations, i t i s important to constantly bear i n mind these three basic moti-vations: restoration of China as a great power; national security i n terms of p o l i t i c a l control over the peripheral areasj and restoration of a t r a d i -tionally dominant position of the Chinese empire i n East Asia. These moti-vations constitute the principal ingredients of Peking's long-term strategy with respect to Asia. 'JGhange11 and "United Front" Ideologically, tvo basic concepts underly Peking's strategy. The f i r s t of these i s the concept of revolutionary change. No situation i s static, 8 and there can be no such thing as "solving problems i n the western sense." The creation of tension i s an inherent characteristic of what the Chinese Com-munists regard as a protracted conflict between Communism and capitalism. The world stage must be kept i n a constant state of flux and i t becomes desir-able to promote change wherever this enhances the prospects of greater power for the Communist bloc. The second basic ideological concept i s that of keep-ing a united front; a broad alignment of forces which support long-range aims. It was pointed out earlier that i n 194-0, Mao Tse-tung i n On New  Democracy u t i l i z e d the concept of united front i n determining the Chinese Com-munist approach to Southeast Asia. In declaring the Chinese revolution to be part of the wider proletarian-socialist world revolution, Mao made the follow-ing significant statement: "No matter what classes, parties or i n d i -viduals i n the oppressed nations join the revolution, and no matter whether or not they are conscious of this fact and f u l l y understand i t , so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolu-tion and they themselves become a l l i e s of this revolution." 9 8. A. D. Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York, Harper & Brothers, I960, p. 71. 9. Mao Tse-tung. On New Democracy, Peking. Foreign Language Press, I960, p. 15. 37; The implications are twofold. F i r s t , the national liberation movements, by-virtue of their anti-colonialism are automatically made part of the world-wide proletarian-socialist revolution, whether they know or not. Secondly, since China i s the leading exponent of the revolution i n Asia, she has thus awarded herself a dominant position over her "allies." Evidently, the Chinese Communists intended to restore their traditional position of hegemony i n Asia by presenting themselves as the champion of nationalism and the fierce op-ponent of colonialism} two sentiments uppermost i n the minds of the people struggling for national liberation. Soviet Preparation for an Asian Offensive Prior to 1949 there was l i t t l e the Chinese Communists could do to influence directly the course of development i n Asia. Not only were they oc-cupied with their own revolution but also Moscow was s t i l l the focal point for international Communism. Moscow's attention was directed westward and the period between 1943 and 1947 witnessed the growth of Russian influence i n Europe. The real importance of Communism to Asia, therefore, was largely a negligible force. During this same period profound changes were i n the mak-ing on the Asian scene. The f i r s t impetus to what may be termed the Asian revolution was provided by the 1904 Russo-Japanese war. Japan's victory i n this war had done much to destroy the mystical nature of European superiority and when i n 1942 Europe was removed from the Asian scene, the stage was. set for the liberation of Southeast Asia. The real turning point i n the South-east Asian revolution came with the granting of independence to India and 10 Pakistan i n 1947, and to Burma shortly thereafter. The f i n a l stage of the 10. J. H. Brimmell, Communism i n South:East Asia, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 175. -3& resurgence of South and Southeast Asia lasted from 194-3-1948, and i t i s sig-nificant to note that i t was a spontaneous indigenous struggle, without the assistance from Communism, By this time, Moscow had become quite aware of the potentialities inherent i n the Southeast Asian revolution for international Communism. The f i r s t move i n a new Russian offensive was made i n September, 1947, with the establishment of the Cominform. The Soviet delegate, Zhdanov, i n a major speech, set the ideological tone for the proposed penetration of Southeast Asia. The recent war, he said, had brought about a powerful move-ment for national liberation i n the colonies and dependencies which had placed the rear of the capitalist system i n jeopardy. He branded the United States as the principal capitalist power bound on an "expansionist course." Furthermore, he spoke of two concepts which were to play a significant role i n China's Communist policy: the division of the world into two major camps and the need for coexistence of the two systems over a long period 11 of time." On a more practical l e v e l Zhdanov indicated the role Com-munism was to play i n Southeast Asia by stating that the Soviet Union was: "A staunch (defender) of the liberty and independence of a l l nations and a foe of ...colonial exploitation i n any shape or form." !2' China at the Calcutta Conference Subsequent developments indicate that the Chinese Communists took their cue from Zhdanov's speech, and even went one step further, i n 11. J. H. Brimmell, Communism i n South East Asia, New lork, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 2'52*54#-12. Ibid., p. 254. introducing the new concept of a Chinese Communist sphere of influence, embracing the whole of Southeast Asia and distinct from the Russian sphere of influence. The means by which they hoped to bring about this grand design was expounded at the Calcutta Youth Conference held i n February, 1948. In a speech before the Conference, the Chinese delegation declared that: "The people of Southeast Asia, who have been enslaved by imperialism for many years, should today take advantage of the present movement and strive for complete liberation. The Chinese people are on the eve of victory but they are struggling for an earlier realization of i t and for the guarantee of i t s outcome. This requires the assistance of and association with the liberation campaign of the peoples of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the victory of the Chinese people would f a c i l i t a t e the struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia and would greatly encourage their fight. The liberation campaign of the Chinese people cannot be separated from the liberation campaign of the peoples of Southeast Asia."^3 With one clever stroke, the Chinese Communists established not only the inseparability of the Chinese and Southeast Asian revolutions, but also declared the success of their respective national liberation campaigns to be mutually interdependent. In accordance with this strategy the confer-ence called upon the youth of Southeast Asia to establish firm unity be-tween the working peasant and student youth i n the face of foreign imper-ialism. The concept of united front thus became the protective shield behind which the Chinese Communists came to execute their penetration of Southeast Asia. The significance of this concept may be gauged from one of Mao Tse-tung's works entitled - People's Democratic Dictatorship - i n 13. J. H. Brimmell, Communism i n South East Asia, Hew York, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 259. 40 which he successfully adapts the Deninist technique to the Asian revolu-tion. "It marks the second great turning point i n the history of the Communist movement, after which Marxism, already rendered alien to the West by i t s adaption to the Russian revolution, was to be further trans-14 formed into a vehicle for the Asian resurgence." In this work, Mao not only emphasizes the need for a united front and a national basis com-prising the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class, but he also calls for the wider formation of an International United Front. China, he said, must unite "in a common struggle with the peoples of a l l coun-tries...This means allying ourselves with the Soviet Union, with every New Democratic country, and with the proletariat and broad masses i n a l l other countries." Since 1949 much of the Communists' success i n Southeast Asia has been due to the fact that i t has been an enduring a l l y of nationalism. As one writer points out: "The memory of this common nationalist-Communist front i s an inexhaustible reservoir of p o l i t i c a l advantage for the Com-munists...." A O Furthermore, nationalism's greatest unifying power l i e s i n i t s principal manifestation of unshakable and often i r r a t i o n a l anti-colonialism. This i s shown by a determination to wipe out the humiliation of past foreign encroachments and to exert the right to self-determina-tion. 14. J. H. Brimmell, Communism i n South East Asia, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 265-15. Ibid.. p. 266. 16. J. M. van der Kroef, "Marxism i n Southeast Asia", Current History, (Nov. 1954) p. 290. 41 By and large, this appears to be the strategy Peking has been pur-suing with respect to Southeast Asia. A strategy of self-identification, which, although cloaked i n the broad ideological framework of Communist world revolution, nevertheless, i s deeply rooted i n tradition. Werner Levi undoubtedly makes a strong point when he asserts that i n the case of China's Asian neighbours, Peking's actions are ju s t i f i e d not by ideology, 17 but by history. Chinese Tactics - Mao Tse-tung's Contribution Where Peking has shown the greatest amount of ingenuity i s i n the f i e l d of tactics. Here the Chinese Communists display a great deal of f l e x i b i l i t y and adaptability. Short-term tactics are designed and imple-mented with a definite long-term goal i n mind. Their primary value l i e s i n the extent to which they can be adapted to suit changing conditions. Their principal justification l i e s i n the fact that they form an integral part of the wider whole and further the long term strategical aim. Thus, i n effect, they are means to an end. The basic formula for this tactical approach was f i r s t set forth by Mao-Tse-tung i n 1928. At that time, however, i t was applied only to guerilla warfare, i n which the Chinese Communists were then engaged. Mao's formula was the following: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass? enemy ti r e s , we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." 18 17. Werner Levi, "China and the Two Great Powers", Current History. (Dec. I960), p. 323-25. 18. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, London, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. 1954, Vol. 1, p. 212. 42 Mao was probably one of the f i r s t military theorists to recognize or i n any way formulate the principle of strategic retreat, the object of such a retreat being to conserve strength and to prepare for the counter of-fensive. Eight years later, Mao enlarged the narrow guerilla warfare basis of this principle by making i t applicable to the wider struggle against imperialism: "A strategically protracted war," he said, "and a campaign or battle of quick decision are...,too principles to be emphasized simultaneously i n the c i v i l war, which are also applicable i n the anti-imperialist war." ' Mao, thus pointed out the importance of taking the whole situation into consideration and defined the relationship between the whole (strategy) and the parts (tactics). Turning to the development of tactics i n Peking's policy since 1949, i t appears that the pattern which i t follows largely coincides with Mao's formula. Since 1949 these tactics have been a mixture of attraction, intimidation and subversion. Prior to 1955 the emphasis was on intimi-dation. From 1952 onwards, however, a gradual change developed which by 1955 resulted i n an almost complete change of emphasis. During the next three years Peking openly pursued a policy of attraction which led to some relaxation of tension i n Southeast Asia. By 1958 Peking once again changed i t s tactics and has since adopted a militant posture which was more clearly demonstrated at the time of the revolt i n Tibet. 19. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, London, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. 1954, Vol. 1, p. 248 43 1949-1952 Militant Revolution The period between 1949 and 1952 was characterized by militant revolutionary methods. Throughout Southeast Asia, local Communist par-ties and other Communist-instigated groups, launched insurrectionist movements aimed at undermining and eventually overthrowing local author-i t y and disrupting v i t a l communications and services. In most cases these l e f t i s t groups professed identification with nationalistic aims and adopted a sharp anti-colonial attitude. Ironically, the terrorist meth-ods proved i n the end to be self-defeating. Instead of furthering the cause of nationalism, they had the opposite effect of generating a mood of fear and aversion among the l o c a l people who began to see the Communist guerillas as a threat to their own l i f e and property. The movement also suffered from a lack of overall planning and co-ordination. Consequently, i n such countries as Indonesia, Malaya and Burma, the authorities were able to cope effectively with these local brush f i r e s . Western observers generally assume that the 1948 Calcutta Con-ference provided the overture to the wave of violence which swept over Southeast Asia, for i t was shortly after this Conference that the Com-munist rebellions broke out. It i s well to remember, however, that only one year earlier Zhdanov, i n his speech to the Comintern, had given a clear indication of the new Moscow policy for an offensive i n Southeast Asia. Though Moscow-inspired, Peking readily adopted this militant attitude as a means to further i t s own designs for Southeast Asia. The momentum of the Chinese revolution was thus carried over into the Southeast Asian Arena. One of the f i r s t steps taken by the Chinese Communists follow-ing their accession to power was to hold the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries i n Peking i n November of 1949. This brought together Communist and left-wing labour leaders, rather than government representatives. The aim of the Conference vras to establish solidarity i n fighting wars of national liberation. Although the con-ference achieved l i t t l e , i t s significance stems from the fact that i t was held i n Eeking and provided one of the f i r s t examples of the new regime's efforts to reassert i t s e l f as a dominant power i n Asia. Militant Tactics Applied to National Interests Apart from pursuing a militant revolutionary course i n South-east Asia proper, the Chinese Communists employed similar tactics i n fur-thering their own national interests. This was the period when Chinese Communist "volunteers" took an active part i n the Korean War. Regardless of whether Moscow or Peking wasthe prime instigator behind the North Korean attack on South Korea i n June, 1950, the significant fact remains that Korea constituted a part of traditional China*s "sphere of influence". Further, when the United- Nations' forces crossed the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l i n 1950 i n their advance northward, this could not f a i l to become an object of serious concern to Peking, the reason being that North Korea contained the primary source of hydro electric power which was of v i t a l importance to the industrial development of Southern Manchuria. During this period, Communist China also extended i t s influence to North Vietnam. In January, 1950, both Peking and Moscow recognized the Vietnamese Democratic Republic under Ho Chi Minh. This marked the opening scene i n a drama which culmin-ated i n the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam i n 1954. Since then North Vietnam has come tinder strong p o l i t i c a l and economic control from Communist China and has formed an important jumping-off base for the penetration of Southeast Asia. At the present time both Laos and South Vietnam appear to be the prime targets and the presence of Vietnamese Communist rebel troops has been a continuous feature of the reports com-ing from these areas. Tibet - Historical Position of China Another peripheral area which figured prominently during this period of militant revolutionary tactics, was Tibet. China's claim to suzerainty over Tibet appears to date from the seventeenth century when three separate armies invated the country, driving out the Mongols who had occupied a dominating position i n Tibet since the thirteenth century. Following this conquest the Sino-Tibetan boundary was demarcated i n 1727 and Tibet divided into two parts. West of the demarcation point the coun-try was handed over to the rule of the Dalai Lama under suzerainty of the Manchu Emperor. Tibetan chiefs of states and tribes i n the provinces of Kham and Amdo to the east, were given the status of semi-independent feud-atories of China. This loose arrangement lasted for nearly two centuries u n t i l the later Chinese conquest in i t i a t e d i n 1905 as the result of the Bri t i s h advance on Lhasa i n the preceding year. From 1790 onward the Man-chus proceeded to establish absolute control over Tibet and also strength-ened their hold over newly acquired territory on the Indian border. In 1790 Nepal was reduced to tributary status. Starting with the Cpium War i n 184-0 China's position i n Tibet began to weaken and continued to deteriorate u n t i l after the T'aip'ing rebellion, China was i n no position to take further interest i n Tibet. Following the advance of Bri t i s h troops into Lhase i n 1904 an Anglo-Tibetan treaty was negotiated. Under the terms of the treaty the Tibetan government agreed to recognize the B r i t i s h protectorate of Sikkim and to prevent other foreigners from exercising influence i n Tibet. Two years later Peking was persuaded to accept the treaty and under the terms of ac-cession specifically agreed not to encroach on Tibetan territory nor to interfere i n the government of Tibet. As i t soon turned out the Chinese had no intention of honoring the agreement. In 1910 a Chinese army under General Chao Erh - feng marched into Lhasa and two years later some 5,000 Chinese troops were sent to reestablish Chinese control i n Eastern Tibet. The Lhasa govern-ment determined to retain i t s autonomy, embarked on a large-scale war with China over the Sino-Tibetan frontier. The Tibetans recovered a l l of East Tibet from the Chinese garrisons and proclaimed their independence of China. Under the terms of the Simla treaty signed i n 1914 by Tibet and Britain but repudiated by China, both Britain and China were to respect the t e r r i t o r i a l integrity of Tibet, China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognized and China was not to colonize Tibet. Due to the Chinese government's subsequent repudiation of the treaty i t was recognized that a l l rights and privileges claimed by the government of China with regard to Tibet were revoked. This was the situation when i n October, 1950, Chinese Com-munist troops attacked Tibet, declaring that China feared external aggression through Tibet. It was only later that the Chinese Communist government claimed Tibet to be part of China's territory. In September, 1951, the Chinese army entered Lhasa, established the permanent occupation of Tibet and forced the Tibetans to sign a Seventeen-point Agreement. Under the terms of the Seventeen-Foint Agreement, Tibet was reduced to a status of p o l i t i c a l subservience to Peking. The Tibetans were granted freedom of religious belief and regional autonomy under the leadership of the Chinese People's Government. In addition, external affairs were to be handled by the Chinese People's Government and Tibetan troops were to be integrated into the Pelple's Liberation Army. Three years later, i n April, 1954, these same provisions were substantially confirmed i n the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Com-munication. According to the Agreement, India accepted the principle that Tibet constituted an integral part of China and India agreed to hand over a l l her property i n Tibet to the Chinese authorities. The Agree-ment l e f t one important issue untouched,. however, namely, the delimitation of the rugged mountain border between India and China. The Chinese had already begun a military build-up on the Indian border, but the whole border issue did not erupt u n t i l 1959. Sino-Soviet Relations The apparent determination which the Chinese Communist regime displayed during these f i r s t years of i t s existence i n consolidating p o l i t -i c a l control was also shown i n relation to i t s closest a l l y , the Soviet Union. Two months after the Chinese Communist government was formally established i n October, 1949, Mao Tse-tung paid his f i r s t v i s i t to the 48 Soviet Union. The most important outcome of the nine-week v i s i t was the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assist-ance. Apart from giving China military and economic backing, the Treaty provided for the curtailment of traditional Russian special rights i n China. Supplementary agreements provided for the joint Sino-Soviet ad-ministration of the principal railways i n Manchuria i n contrast to the a l -most exclusive control exercised i n the are by the U.S.S.R. since 1945. In addition the agreement provided for the joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur, u n t i l the end of 1952 at the latest, and the establishment of several long-term joint stock companies; to operate mostly i n China's borderlands: For example - Sinkiang and Dairen. In Outer Mongolia the Chinese Communists agreed to accept the continuation of the U.S.S.R's pre-dominant influence. Two years later, during Chou En-lai's v i s i t to Moscow i n September, 1952, the two governments announced the,return of the Man-churian railways to sole Chinese management by the end of 1952. Similarly i t was announced that Port Arthur would continue to be under joint control beyond the 1952 deadline. At this time the Korean War was s t i l l i n progress and the Chinese Communists might well have realized the desirability for the continuing presence of Soviet naval forces i n the Port. The climax came i n 1954 when, during Krushchov's v i s i t to China, the Russians agreed to s e l l a l l their shares i n the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies and to return Port Arthur to sole Chinese control by the end of 1955. The chief aim of the new Chinese Communist Government during the period 1949 - 1952, appears to have been to expand and consolidate i t s p o l i t i c a l control over China. From a traditional standpoint, this called for the re-establishment of effective control over the peripheral areas and 49 the revival of the ancient policy of China's hegemony i n Southeast Asia. The momentum of the Chinese revolution, the new Soviet offensive, and the surging tide of nationalism as well as the general i n s t a b i l i t y i n the Southeast Asian region produced the stimuli for a militant revolutionary approach. 1952 - 1955 Transitional Period The period 1952-1955 was one of transition i n Communist tactics culminating i n the 1955 Bandung Conference and the o f f i c i a l adoption of the "peaceful co-existence" l i n e . Two main causes for the s h i f t i n tactics were, f i r s t l y , the failure of Communist insurrections i n Southeast Asia, and secondly, the growing strength of western opposition to the spread of Communism i n the area. In countries such as Indonesia, Malay and the Philippines, the Communist rebels were either defeated, driven underground or reduced to guerilla existence i n the jungles. In addition, their vio-lent tactics had alienated large parts of the public. A more serious obstacle i n the path of Communist China's policy was presented by the United States. The latter began to display a growing interest i n Southeast Asia which stemmed from the recognized need to f i l l the power vacuum created as a result of the removal of the European colon-i a l powers from the area. As part of a wider policy of "containment" of world communism, the United States concluded between 1950 and 1952 a series of bi l a t e r a l and multilateral security pacts with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines. Additional steps were taken i n the form of United States' guarantees to the Taiwan regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, and large scale foreign aid to the newly emerging nations i n an effort to bol-ster their weak economic and military preparedness. Peking regarded s:o United States; actions as interference i n i t s sphere of influence and re-duced the already low level of United States prestige i n Chinese eyes to that of a most dangerous and unscrupulous "imperialist" power. "Peaceful Coexistence" - Mew Approach. Faced with these obstacles, Communist China began looking for a different approach i n the fulfilment of i t s long term strategy. In October, 1952, the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union heralded the new line of "peaceful co-existence." This new lin e , already used by Zhdanov i n 194-7, emphasized the economic and cult-u r a l aspects of p o l i t i c a l warfare, rather than the military aspects. The hitherto used cold war tactic of open aggression was now replaced by the "parliamentary" approach, which envisaged the boring from within through the established p o l i t i c a l and economic institutions of non-Communist nations. The Chinese Communists formally endorsed the new line of "peaceful co-existence" during the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference held i n Peking i n December, 1952. One of the significant outcomes of this Conference, attended by 4-00 delegates from thirty-seven countries, was the setting up of a Permanent Liaison Bureau to promote increased cultural and other contacts between China and the neighbouring Asian states. Furthermore, these contacts, i n contrast to previous procedures, were to be made on a government-to-goyemment lev e l . Prior to 1952, Peking's interests i n Asian countries centered principally upon Com-munist parties. The Peking Peace Conference i s significant i n yet another respect, not only did i t mark a parti a l retreat from r i g i d and revolutionary dogmatism, but i t also marked "a f i r s t step i n Peking's § 1 bid for leadership i n Asia on a broader and less doctrinaire basis." For the f i r s t time, China was emerging as the leading bearer of Communism i n Asia. Mao's concept of united front consisting of China and her " a l l i e s " against the west was now formally accepted, pav-ing the way for the gradual s h i f t from Moscow to Peking as the centre of control for Asian affa i r s . Geneva Conference, 1954 The next stage of the transitional period i n Peking's tactics came i n 1954 with the Geneva Conference. Chou En-lai played a leading role at this Conference and discovered the potentialities of an active, posi-tive diplomacy on a government-to-government basis. An important result of the Conference was the already referred to Sino-Indian Agreement re-garding Tibet i n Apr i l , 1954' Apart from acknowledging Chinese sovereign-ty over Tibet, the Agreement set forth five basic principles for the promotion of world peace: mutual respect for each other's t e r r i t o r i a l integrity and sovereignty; nonagression; non-intervention i n each others internal a f f a i r s ; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence. These five principles, otherwise known as the Pancha Shila, mutually agreed to by Nehru and Chou En-lai, have since come to provide the basic framework for Peking's dealings with the nations of Southeast Asia. The impact of Pancha Shila i n Asia may be considered significant as i t probably did much to allay original fear of China's militant tactics and many Asians began to feel the need for a policy of accommodation with the Chinese colossus to the North. Even more so i n view of the fact that during a v i s i t to New Delhi i n June, 1954, Chou En-lai went on record as 20. A. D. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, New York, Harper & Brothers, I960, p. 98. 52 favouring people's right to self-determination. Bandung Conference, 1955 - Completion of Change The f i n a l act i n the transition i n Communist China's t a c t i c a l framework came i n April, 1955, when 34-0 delegates including the p r i n c i -pal leaders of twenty-nine Asian and African nations assembled i n Ban-dung, Indonesia, for a major conference from which the western powers were excluded. The objective of the Conference, which was sponsored by the five Columbo powers, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon, was to seek common ground for mutual co-operation among the Afro-Asian nations and by doing so they hoped to make a contribution to the maintenance of international peace and s t a b i l i t y . Both Chou En-lai and Nehru dominated the Conference. It soon became apparent, however, that China intended to u t i l i z e this opportunity to promote Peking's new foreign policy li n e of "peaceful co-existence." In his major address to the Conference, Chou made a great play for Asian solidarity i n the face of continuous western colonialism. He stressed the need for Asia-African co-operation i n the economic and cultural fields and asserted that this co-operation should be based on the principle of "equality and mutual benefit;" a term which has since come into prominent use i n Peking's relations with Afro-Asian coun-t r i e s . Reiterating the five principles of "peaceful co-existence" he told the delegates that China was ready "to establish normal relations with other Asian and African countries on the basis of the s t r i c t adherence to 21 these principles...." In an effort to allay any fears on the part of the Afro-Asians for their ominous neighbour, he said that "China has no 21. China and the Asian - African Conference (documents) Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1955, p. 19. 53 intention whatsoever to subvert the governments of i t s neighbouring 22 countries." In fact i t was the other way round, China, he said was suffering from the subversive activities carried out by the United States of America. In a grand conciliatory gesture, indicative of China's peaceful intentions, Chou affirmed the Chinese Government's willingness to s i t dovm and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss, the question of relaxing tension i n the Taiwan area.' Chou En-Lai's statements had some effect i n reducing tension i n the Southeast Asian area, but apparently he did not succeed entirely i n allaying the fears of some delegates for an expansionist China. One of the dominant themes of the conference was anti-colonialism and Chou made a great'pitch* for the acceptance of this theme as the basis for common ground among the represented nations. Some of the delegates, however, notably President Sukarno of Indonesia, made i t clear that they not only opposed colonialism, but opposed i t i n a l l i t s manifestations, "in the 24 classic form" as well as i n " i t s modern dress." . This neo-colonialist appearance, Sukarno f e l t , could manifest i t s e l f i n the form of economic control, intellectual control, or actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. Whether or not this attitude can be held directly responsible remains obscure, but i t was significant that Chou signed a treaty with Indonesia concerning the status of the over-seas Chinese. 22T China and the Asian - African Conference (documents) Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1955, p. 26. 23. Ibid., p. 28. 24. A. Appadorai, The Bandung Conference, Hew Delhi, Sapru House, 1955, p. 19. Internal and External Causes for Change The Bandung Conference then, marked a turning point i n Peking's t a c t i c a l framework. During the next two years Communist China's Asian offensive was to be executed within the framework of "peaceful co-exist-ence" and based on the five principles of Pancha Shila. Domestically, Communist China at this time was i n the midst of a period of industrial-ization, as a result of the F i r s t Five Year Plan in i t i a t e d i n 1953. I t seems conceivable, therefore, that Chou En-lai was quite sincere when he told the delegates of the Bandung Conference that "Like other countries (Asia and Africa), we are i n urgent need of a peaceful international environment for the development of our independent and sovereign econ-25 omy." Another development which might have had some bearing on Pek-ing's change i n tactics, was the coming into being of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato) i n February, 1955. Great Britain, France, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines pledged themselves to undertake common action i n the event of Communist attack and to devise common measures to counter Communist subversion i n the area. As a result of Seato, Communist China was now faced with an Anti-Communist bulwark i n the areas i n which i t hoped to expand i t s i n -fluence. Even more disquieting to Peking must have been the fact that South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, although not members of SEATO, were designated as territories forming part of SEATO's security sphere. Sub-sequent developments have shown that the p o l i t i c a l and economic insta-b i l i t y of these territories qualified them as prime targets for Commun-i s t China's drive into Southeast Asia. 25. China and the Asian - African Conference (documents), Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1955, p. 14-. 55 The formal adoption of the nex* line of peaceful co-existence by a l l Communist parties was made i n Moscow i n 1956. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,Khrushchov, probably, with Southeast Asian countries i n .view, announced that Communists could 26 now achieve power through the "peaceful" and even "parliamentary" path. This line was later reaffirmed i n November, 1957, i n a declaration signed by Khrushchov, Mao and other representatives calling for close co-operation between Communist parties and Socialist parties, which meant in effect the revival of the old "popular front" tactics of the 1920's and 1930's i n a new framework of "peaceful co-existence." Neutrality - An Ally of World Revolution The clearest evidence of a change of mind on the part of Pek-ing's rulers, was presented i n a speech on foreign policy delivered by Chou En-lai to the F i r s t National People's Congress i n June, 1956. The speech indicated a departure from Peking's original stand regarding so-called neutral or non-aligned nations. On the eve of the Chinese Com-munists coming to power i n July, 1949, Mao had categorically stated that neutrality was a mere camouflage and that throughout the world people had to choose between imperialism and socialism. "Sitting on the fence," 27 he said, " w i l l not do; nor i s there a third road." In 1956, Chou indicated the reversal of this attitude when he told the Congress that "the many countries which do not join military blocs, particularly countries of Asia and Africa, actively participating i n international 27. Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1953, p. 9. 5$ a f f a i r s , have greatly strengthened the international forces of peace and 28 neutrality and resolutely defend their national sovereignty." By implication the forces of neutrality, just as the forces of nationalism earlier, were now considered to be " a l l i e s " of the forces of peace, (Communism). Taiwan - An Integral part of China Despite these milder temperatures emanating from the Chinese mainland, the cold sting of the Taiwan breeze remained. So far the Chin-ese Communists have remained unshakeably determined to reclaim Taiwan, which they regard as an integral part of Chinese territory. As long as Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime continues to exist i t poses a con-stant threat to the mainland's national security, particularly where Chiang has repeatedly declared his ultimate aim to recapture the main-land. An additional source of anxiety for Peking has been the fact that the continued existence of the Taiwan Nationalist regime i s v i r t u a l l y dependent upon United States military backing. A steady barrage of anti-United States propaganda has pictured the United States Government as the greatest "war-monger and treacherous imperialist" since the second World War. Also the United States stands accused of interfer-ence i n the internal affairs of Communist China, for not only have the Americans allegedly reduced Taiwan to a vi r t u a l state of "occupation" but i n addition, Peking has constantly held the view that Taiwan i s an "internal" matter and any outside interference f a l l s within the cate-gory of "foreign aggression." Legally speaking, the Chinese Communists 28. Chou En-lai "On Present International Situation, China's Foreign Policy and the Liberation of Taiwan, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1956, p. 5. 57. appear to have a strong case for i t was agreed at the Yalta Conference by the A l l i e d Powers that following the end of the war, Formosa would be restored as a legal internal part of China. Since 1949, however, Formosa landed i n the vortex of international p o l i t i c s and as a result has become a p o l i t i c a l rather than an internal issue. For Peking, how-ever, Taiwan remains a s t r i c t l y internal matter, closely bound up with China's national interests. Consequently, the chief cause for China's continued militancy stems from the question of Taiwan and Peking's r i g i d attitude towards this "bastion of United States imperialism." In retrospect i t may be said that the period 1955-1957 marked the height of Peking's "peaceful co-existence" offensive into South-east Asia. This period was characterized by the occasional injection of a milder note i n Peking's policy announcement; the extension of formal diplomatic relations with countries such as Nepal (1955) and Ceylon (1957); an increase i n cultural exchanges; an apparent willingness to settle the status of overseas Chinese in bi l a t e r a l agreements; and a stepped up programme for economic aid to the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia. 1957 - New Shift i n Tactics By 1957, a new shift i n tactics became apparent. The s h i f t was marked by the continuing public adherence to the line of "peace-f u l co-existence" and the emergence of a more militant posture. This hardening of Peking's policies, and incidentally of Sino-Soviet policy i n general, seems to have derived i t s main impetus from Mao Tse-tung's re-evaluation of the relative positions of the two world camps. He 58 considered " 'that the present world situation had reached a new turn-29 ing point».» The East wind was now prevailing over the West wind by which he meant that the forces of socialism had now gained the edge over the forces of capitalism; the former were now i n the ascendance whereas the l a t t e r were allegedly losing their strength as a result of econom-i c crises and internal dissent and diversity. In response to this favour-able world trend, Mao called for the strengthening of discipline within the Communist bloc and the presentation of a united front toward the West. The question remains, what prompted Mao to interpret the bal-ance of world power as he did, and why he re-emphasized a militant pos-ture i n the conduct of China's foreign policy] A number of explanations may be advanced. F i r s t of a l l , the Chinese may have been encouraged by the launching of the f i r s t Russian Sputnik i n the f a l l of 1957. This marked a technological achievement of the f i r s t magnitude. Also, i t was accomplished ahead of similar United States efforts to put a satel-l i t e into orbit. The Russian Sputnik could therefore be interpreted as a major triumph i n the technological f i e l d for the Communist bloc. Second-ly , the Chinese were disturbed by Khrushchov's de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party i n 1956. Close upon the heels of Khrushchov's public condemnation of Stalin's brutal methods, came the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt and the methods used 29. A. D. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, New York, Harper & Brothers, I960, p. 106. 59 to suppress i t were the same St a l i n i s t methods which Khruschov had re-cently condemned. In addition there followed Khrushchov's failure to bring Marshal Tito back to the fold. In view of these developments the Chinese Communists could not be expected to be very enthused about Stalin's dethronement. Although they formally endorsed the new Mos-cow line, the Chinese could nevertheless argue that the effects of de-Stalinization had weakened the unity of the Communist bloc. Since un-i t y was considered to be among the primary exigencies for the successful world revolution, Peking took an adamant stand against "revisionism"; against a l l forces leading to a weakening i n Communist bloc unity. A third possible explanation for the hardening of Chinese Communist pol-icy may have been a domestic f a i l u r e . The F i r s t Five Year Plan had failed to reach many of i t s production targets, and there was evidence of by no means dangerous but nevertheless audible, discontentment among the people with the crash programme methods employed by the regime. Also, the Chinese Communist leaders were on the eve of launching their gigantic programme for the large scale communization of the entire pop-ulation. In anticipation of possible opposition and other d i f f i c u l t i e s connected with this revolutionary undertaking, Peking's leaders may have foreseen the possibilities for greater internal unity being deriv-ed from increased outward militancy. It would be relatively simple with the aid of propaganda devices, to turn Chinese provocation into an external threat to China's t e r r i t o r i a l integrity and any military meas-ures required i n connection with such provocations could be presented as measures to safeguard China's national security. A combination of these factors i s l i k e l y to have been respon-sible for Communist China's change i n tactics by 1957. Evidence of the 6:o newly adopted militant posture was revealed i n a number of events during the following three years. In the f a l l of 1958 the mainland Chinese sud-denly intensified their shelling of the Nationalist held off-shore i s -lands of Quemoy and Matsu. Anxiety over a possible invasion attempt of Formosa precipitated a show of strength by the United States Seventh Fleet i n the area and a renewed United States military guarantee to the regime of "Chiang Kai-shek". Chinese reaction was indignant and Chou En-lai warned the United States that i t must accept the consequences i f i t persisted. He declared the off-shore islands an internal matter and the United States had no right to interfere with the recovery by the Chinese people of their islands. One week later, Chen Y i , Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic, said the islands posed an im-mediate threat to the mainland and declared categorically that "the Chinese people are determined to recover Quemoy and Matsu, and no force 30 on earth can stop them." Tibet as an Example of Militant Tactics In the spring of 1959 occurred the ruthless, suppression of the revolt i n Tibet. Chinese action resulted i n the complete subjugation of the country to Peking's control and the removal of the l a s t vestiges of local authority granted under the 1954 Sino-Tibetan Agreement. Peking Review, an o f f i c i a l Chinese Government publication, i n explaining the Tibetan situation, concluded with an indictment that the Tibetan l o c a l government and the reactionary clique of the. upper social strata colluded with imperialists, gathered together rebellious bandits 30. Peking Review, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 5. 61 and during the night of March 19 launched an armed attack against the People's Liberation Army garrison i n Lhasa. ^ Chou En-lai called the rebellion a threat to the motherland and national security and announced 32 that henceforth the Tibetan local government (Kasha) would be dissolved. Peking clearly regarded Tibet as an internal matter and exploited the re-volt to establish once and for a l l p o l i t i c a l , as well as military control over an area which i t claimed had traditionally been an integral part of China. The determined stand taken by Peking i n the Tibet question was evident i n a subsequent ar t i c l e i n Peking Review. In commenting on the United Nations General Assembly adoption of a resolution to place the Tibet question on i t s agenda, the ar t i c l e condemned the Assembly action as a cold war farce directed by the United States, and as crude interference i n China's internal af f a i r s . Not only was the resolution condemned as i l -legal, null and void, but the United States was accused of being "the most 33 vicious enemy of the Chinese people." Sino - Indian Border Dispute A corollary to the suppression of the Tibet revolt was the outbreak of Sino-Indian border clashes. The dispute was one of long stand-ing, but had so far been allowed to remain dormant. It centered around the question of the delimitation of the rugged mountain frontier between .the two countries. The Chinese government holds to the view that the 31. Peking Review, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 6. 32. Ibid.7 p. 6. 33. Peking Review, October 27, 1959, pp. 6-7. 62 entire Sino-Indian boundary, about 2,000 kilometers, long, has never been delim ited, whereas the Indian government takes the stand that the entire length of the boundary has been either defined by treaty or recognized by custom and u n t i l now the Chinese government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the government of India up to the custom-ary border. Two main sectors of the boundary are now i n dispute: the western sector i n the region of Ladalh and the sector east of Bhutan, the so-called McMahon line. Concerning the western sector, the Indian govern-ment holds that the boundary line i t claims was fixed by a treaty con-cluded between the authorities of the Tibet region of China and the Kash-mir authorities i n I 8 4 2 . The Chinese claim, however, that this treaty contained no provisions about the concrete location of the boundary and furthermore that the greatest part (about 80 per cent) of the area now disputed by the Indian government i s part of China's Sin kiang, which was no party to the treaty. Consequently, the Chinese f e e l i t i s incon-ceivable to hold that, judging by this treaty, vast areas of Sin kiang have ceased to belong to China but have become part of Ladahh. Regarding the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, the Chinese government absolutely does not recognize the so-called McMahon line. The Indian government holds that the so-called McMahon line i s the product of the 1914- Simla Conference jointly attended by Britain, China and the Tibet Region of China, and i s therefore valid. The government contends that the arrangements for the Simla Conference 63 were made with the f u l l knowledge and consent of the government of China and that at no stage did they object to the discussions on the boundary during the conference. Consequently the agreement which resulted from the conference i n regard to the McMahon line boundary between India and Tibet must be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. The Chinese government on the other hand, has declared the Simla Convention to be void of legal v a l i d i t y because China at the time repudiated the confer-ence and refused to recognize any treaty or similar document which might then or thereafter be signed by Britain and Tibet. The present Peking regime has dismissed the McMahon line as a product of the B r i t i s h policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China. The whole matter erupted i n 1959 when Chinese border guards, violated the customary McMahon boundary line and occupied the territory south of the li n e . The Chinese government subsequently l a i d claim to about 40,000 square miles of what the Indian government regards has been indisputable Indian territory for decades, and i n some sectors for over a century. The Indians were indignant and protested strongly against China's provocative actions. The line taken by the Chinese was that Indian troops had re-peatedly made intrusions into Chinese territory along the western sector of the boundary. Also the Chinese charged that since the outbreak of the rebellion i n Tibet, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary. In doing so they not only overstepped the McMahon line but actually invaded and ^ 34 ~ — ~ occupied Chinese territory. 34* Peking Review, September 15, 1959, p. 8. 6 4 Reaffirming their view that the entire Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited, the Chinese government called for the overall settle-ment of the boundary question through friendly negotiations and adher-ence to the five principles of "peaceful co-existence." Pending this settlement Peking believed that the status quo along the border should be maintained. ^ India was thus declared the "aggressor" state and China as-sumed the role of the "victim" which presented a peaceful front. Looking at the question from the standpoint of China's traditional interests i n the peripheral areas, the Sino-Indian border conflict appears to be more than just a t a c t i c a l manoeuvre committed as they were to "peaceful co-existence" and conscious as they must have been, of the adverse effect their actions would have on Southeast Asian opinion. The Chinese Com-munists, nevertheless, choose to pursue their militant course of action. It seems highly doubtful that such detrimental action would be consider-ed justifiable unless a question of overriding national interest were involved. Evidently, Peking i n the f i n a l analysis s t i l l regards matters exclusively Chinese to carry more weight than the dictates of Communist ideology, although not openly admitting so. For practical purposes, however, ideology serves as a cloak to hide and of course further these exclusively nationalist aims. If the above assumption i s correct, the question s t i l l remains why, Peking i n the case of India, chose to re-sort to militant tactics, whereas i n the case of Burma, with which coun-try a settlement of the mutual boundary line was by then i n an advanced state of success - chose to employ peaceful tactics. The answer must be with the Peking tacticians. 35. Peking Review, September 15, 1959, p. 6. 66 Militant Tactics and their Effect on Asia It may be suggested that i n a l l these crises since 1957, the off-shore islands, Tibet and the Sino-Indian boundary, the common fac-tor was China's national interest. Much of the explanation for China's militant and uncompromising attitude may be derived from these funda-mental interests which are aimed at complete t e r r i t o r i a l unification of the country, national security and p o l i t i c a l control over the peri-pheral areas. These considerations probably account for the generally mild opposition shown by the Asia and Southeast nations toward China at the time of the Korean War and the f i r s t off-shore islands c r i s i s i n 1954. The new Peking regime at f i r s t was to be given a chance to con-solidate i t s position and to prove i t s e l f before judgment was passed. After a l l , many of the emerging Asian states were similarly engaged i n trying to find their feet and assert themselves. Perhaps formal adop-tion of the "peaceful co-existence" approach i n 1955 was taken as proof of the regime's peaceful intentions. Since 1958, however, such con-siderations of China's peaceful intentions were dealt a severe blow. There seems l i t t l e doubt that Peking's action i n Tibet seriously dam-aged i t s reputation i n Asia and has made many Asians far more fearful and suspicious of Peking's "peaceful co-existence." A Ceylonese opposition leader commented "...new imperial-ism has entrenched i t s e l f strangling everything that lies, i n i t s path to world supremacy." The Pakistani President called for co-operation between India and Pakistan to "defend" India i n case of a "threat from outside". The Indonesian paper Merdeka called China "expansionist" 66 and accused her of not recognizing religion as part of the national l i f e . Cambodia and Burma, both sharing common frontiers with Com-munist China and acutely aware of the need to seek for some form of accommodation with their giant neighbour, were less outspoken, but nevertheless concerned i n their reactions. Premier UMu of Burma stated that legally Tibet must be regarded as part of China, but he suggested that Tibet be granted independence. A Cambodian newspaper, Meataphum also considered Tibet was China's internal af f a i r , but at 36 the same time labelled Nehru's expression of protest as "courageous." The pressure exerted i n South and Southeast Asia, following Peking's brutal suppression of the revolt i n Tibet has "opened the eyes of many Asians to the Character of the Chinese Coimiiunist regime 37 and had a tremendous impact on attitudes toward China." Whatever national or traditional j u s t i f i c a t i o n there may have been for China* s actions i n Tibet or on the Sino-Indian boundary, i t has now largely been superseded by the image of an expansionist and revolutionary power determined to pursue i t s long-term revolutionary aims. Ideologically, these aims are Communism on a world-wide scale. On a more practical level this c a l l s for the withdrawal of the western powers or i n Communist terminology, "the imperialists" from Asia. Their withdrawal would open the way for Communist China to re-estab-l i s h her hegemony over the area, and thus exert a more profound i n f l u -ence over i t s p o l i t i c a l development. At the same time i t would 3 6 . j y y k P . , #2003,. April, 1959, p. 32-37 . 3 7 . Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 108. m re-establish China's traditional position of leadership i n Asia. From this i t may be gathered that ideology and national interest are not only mutually compatible but also mutually reinforcing. This latter, i n the sense that both concepts can be directed toward achieving the same end - domination of Asia! Chou En-lai's advocacy at the 1954 Geneva Conference of a kind of Chinese "Monroe Doctrine" for Asia, appears to be i n accordance with this l i n e of"thinking. Drawing on the analogy of the United States' Monroe Doctrine, i t would imply the exclusion from this area of foreign ideologies (for example - capitalism) and the predominance of a single power (Communist China). Obviously Peking would be l e f t with a clear f i e l d to operate. Bringing about the withdrawal of the Western Powers from Asia must therefore be considered as constituting one of Peking's im-mediate primary aims. Hence, i t s continuous strong opposition to SEATO and the United States i n particular. As long as the West i s able to main-tain their position, i t w i l l continue to be an obstacle to Peking's u l t i -mate objective. Conclusion In conclusion i t may be said that,at the present time Peking's main objective i s to get the imperialist world, particularly the United States, out of Asia. To this end, Peking supports Afro-Asian solidarity and national liberation movements. Since Peking regards Asia as Com-munist China's special sphere of influence, much emphasis i s placed on both these aspects. In fact, the importance attached by Peking to these 68 national liberation movements may well be at the bottom of the present Sino-Bxissian dispute. One shrewd observer of Sino-Soviet affairs has analyzed the dispute as: follows: Assuming that "national liberation" i s i n the forefront of Peking's objectives, and i f i t i s to be promptly-achieved, i t requires warlike action. Mr. Khrushchov, however, by calling for universal and general disarmament has for a l l practical purposes subordinated "national liberation" to the pursuing of world peace through peaceful co-existence and disarmament. Consequently, the Soviet Communist Party has blown up the possibility of a peaceful 38 transition to socialism out of a l l proportion. Herein, i t seems, l i e s the core of the present ideological dispute and i t i s at this juncture that Moscow and Peking d i f f e r . Peking takes the view that not only should national liberation receive priority, but also i t should be achieved by militant means. Moscow, on the other hand, showing greater awareness of the dangers inherent i n nuclear war, takes the view that less, militant means are not only safer but i n the long run w i l l achieve the same long-term objective that the Chinese have. Apparently i n Moscow's view, war i s not i n -evitable and "peaceful co-existence" has become an aim i n i t s e l f . Peking, however, has never regarded "peaceful co-existence" as more than a t a c t i c a l manoeuvre to be replaced or de-emphasized whenever conditions so demand. Judging from Peking's policy since 1957, i t would seem that the present world situation demands more militant pos-ture on the part of the Communist bloc vis a vis the Western World. 38. Victor Zorza i n Manchester Guardian, Jan. 18, 1962, p. 7 69 CHAPTER III THREE INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE AFRO - ASIAN NATIONS Introduction In the implementation of i t s long term policy toward the Afro-Asian world, Peking has at i t s disposal a varied number of weapons rang-ing from outright military pressure to the subtle tactics of penetration. Since the choice of weapons l i e s exclusively with Peking, each particular weapon can be chosen on the basis of prevailing conditions i n any one country. Moreover, the choice of weapons can be made to suit Peking's tactics during any given period. Consequently, f l e x i b i l i t y i n the appli-cation of these instruments is a primary feature of Peking's policy. Over the years the main instruments which Peking has employed have been diplomacy, trade and economic aid, propaganda and cultural relations, overseas Chinese, and Communist parties. In general, during the period between 1949 and 1955 the emphasis was mostly on diplomacy, the overseas Chinese and local Communist parties. These instruments were largely geared to the pursuit of subversive and insurrectionist activities on a non-governmental l e v e l . Since the 1955 Bandung Conference and the resulting formal switch to the new "peaceful co-existence" l i n e , the emphasis has been increasingly on such instruments as cultural and eco-nomic relations, and the conduct of diplomatic relations on a govern-ment-to-government lev e l . Perhaps the most striking example of this 70 change i n emphasis i s provided i n the form of the role played by local Communist parties. 1 In the period following 1948 they were instructed to pursue their aims by means of militant revolutionary tactics. Since 1956, however, their activities have been carried out through "parlia-mentary" methods and i n some cases this has been accompanied by a con-siderable degree of success. Diplomatic Recognition One of the f i r s t tasks the new Communist regime embarked upon after achieving power, was not only to obtain diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible, but also to make Peking the diplomatic centre of gravity of Asia. This lat t e r ambition was i n accordance with a more fundamental objective, namely, the elevation of China to a position of world prestige. Almost immediately, Peking received de jure recog-nition from Burma (mid-December, 1949), India (late December, 1949), Pakistan and Ceylon (January, 1950)' and Indonesia (spring, 1950). Follow-ing the Bandung Conference, Peking extended her formal diplomatic r e l a -tions with Nepal (1955), and Cambodia (1958). In contrast to the estab-lishment of diplomatic relations with such existing national entities as mentioned above, Peking has extended diplomatic "encouragement" to many of the struggling and newly emerging nations of Africa. As part of i t s overall policy of support for "national liberation", Peking has extended diplomatic recognition to the self-proclaimed Algerian Moslem Provisional Government (September, 1958) and the Independent Republic of the Congo (August, I960). In addition to affirming the legality of such 1. Overseas Chinese and Communist parties as instruments of policy, w i l l be discussed i n Chapters I? and V respectively. 71 independence movements, China has consistently declared i t s solidarity with and unwavering support of these anti-colonial struggles. In con-trast to the early establishment of diplomatic relations with Asian neighbours, Communist China's diplomatic advance into Africa i s of a relatively recent nature. By 1957, Egypt was the only African country with which Peking enjoyed diplomatic relations. Since that time the heightened impact of Africa on the world p o l i t i c a l scene, as reflected i n an increasing number of African colonies achieving independence, has led Peking to expand i t s diplomatic frontiers to this continent. Early i n 1958, China extended diplomatic recognition to the newly created United Arab Republic, which was followed by the establishment of rela-tions with Morocco and Mali during the second half of 1958. Since mid-1959, Peking has had an ambassador i n Khartoum i n the Sudan, and from I960 onward i t has established relations with the African States of Guinea, Ghana and the Somali Republic. The extension of diplomatic frontiers has not only added to Communist China's prestige abroad, but also provided the Peking regime with a valuable source of communication. Under the protection of diplomatic immunity, o f f i c i a l s attached to Com-munist China's legations abroad are indeed i n a favourable position to establish or direct contacts with pro-Peking elements i n their host countries. That Peking has not been completely reluctant to u t i l i z e i t s legations for such "undiplomatic" purposes i s pointed out by a recent incident i n Indonesia when a consular o f f i c i a l of Communist China i n Bandjarmasin was placed under 4-1 hours house arrest by the Indonesians for interference i n government anti-Chinese measures. 72 Peking as Diplomatic Center of Gravity A second aspect of the instrument of diplomacy has.been to raise Peking to a position of diplomatic center of gravity i n Asia. As part of the long term objective to revive China's ancient position of domination and leadership i n the Far East, Peking has since 194-9 played host to a large number of international conferences mostly on a semi-official level. The most important of such conferences were the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference i n November, 194-9, and the Asian Women's Confer-ence i n December, 194-9, both of which included l e f t i s t participants from a l l Southeast Asian countries, the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students i n Ap r i l , 1951, the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference i n October, 1952, which was attended by 4-29 delegates^ from more than forty p o l i t i c a l entities i n the region, and f i n a l l y the Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which convened i n August, 1954-, and con-sisted of 263 delegates from sixty-eight countries. Such an impressive stream of delegates no doubt provided Peking's leaders with valuable op-portunities for contacts and to acquaint many delegates with the "pro-gressive"1 nature of the Chinese Communist regime. On a more o f f i c i a l l e v e l , Peking has played host to a large number of government leaders. President Sukarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister Nehru of India, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Prime Minister U Nu of Burma and President Sekou Toure of the newly established Republic of Guinea have a l l been given the red carpet treatment by Peking. Sig-nific a n t l y many of these v i s i t s were accompanied or soon followed by treaties of friendship and other agreements regarding economic and techni-cal assistance. 73 Trade and Economic Assistance The second major instrument of Peking's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations i s trade and economic assistance. The importance of this instrument has become increasingly apparent since 1955* The most s i g n i f i -cant feature of the Sino-Soviet bloc's economic foreign policies i s that economic and p o l i t i c a l motives are closely interwoven and i t i s commonly recognized that both Moscow and Peking attach a high priority to their p o l i t i c a l objectives. The Communists hope that by expanding their trade and aid programmes they w i l l succeed i n raising their prestige i n the underdeveloped nations and encourage these nations to loosen their exist-ing ties with the West. Not only should there be greater economic co-operation among the Afro-Asian nations but also their economies should develop along s o c i a l i s t lines and become increasingly orientated toward the Communist bloc. Although the Soviet Union by virtue of i t s greater economic strength within the Communist bloc has been able to offer more aid to the underdeveloped countries than ebmmunist China, the letter's role i n this economic "offensive" has, nevertheless, assumed increasing s i g n i f i -cance, the main reason being that Communist China's stepped up aid pro-grammes have led to serious strains on domestic consumption and placed heavy burdens on the country's much needed resources for economic development. The o f f i c i a l policy defined by the Chinese Communist Party Cen-t r a l Committee and State Council i n 1954 assigned p r i o r i t y to exports over domestic requirements. Under this policy commodities that are"''not 74 i i essential to the livelihood of the people 1 should be exported i n "•as large a quantity as possible.'" Those commodities which are more important to consumers i n China, "'but short of an urgent.demand i n the domestic market'" should be "'reduced i n domestic sales to make a bigger export possible.'" Those commodities "'essential to the livelihood of the people'" and i n short supply should be made available for export 2 according to limited quotas. In 1956, Chou En-lai defined Peking's ec-onomic aims as being the promotion of "the economic development of both parties" on the principle of "equality, mutual benefit and each making 3 up what the other lacks". The wider p o l i t i c a l aim of Peking's eco-nomic policy was clearly stated i n 1958, when Peking called for "'Great or economic cooperation among Asian and African countries'" i n order that these countries could "'free themselves quickly from the economic en-slavement by imperialism and drive off the waves of the U.S. economic cr i s i s ' . Consequently, Peking's economic policies vis a vis the under-developed countries i n Asia and Africa serve a twofold purpose. F i r s t , to achieve their economic dependency on China and secondly, as a result of this, to weaken western and particularly United States, influence i n the area. Peking's trade with Southeast Asia i s striking for a number of reasons. Both China and Southeast Asia are basically raw material pro-ducing areas, since they have a predominantly agricultural economy. 2. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 217. 3. Chou En-lai, On Present International Situation, 4. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 212. p. 20. 75 Since 1953, however, China has undergone a substantial degree of indus-t r i a l development and become an exporter of manufactured goods during the f i r s t two Five-Year Plans. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has not experienced a similar degree of industrial development which has enabled the Chinese to stage a major drive to capture control of the markets for manufactured goods i n that region. This became particularly evident after 1958 when, following the break i n trade relations with Japan i n that year, China embarked on a policy of drastic price cutting and dumping i n the area. Textiles and a variety of other manufactured goods were sold at prices five to ten per cent below the price for comparable Japanese and Indian goods. The result has been a substantial rise i n Communist China's trade with the area while at the same time causing damage to both Japan-ese and Indian sales i n the same region. Economic Orientation toward Africa Since 1958 Communist China's economic policy has begun to orien-tate toward Africa as well. The emergence of new nationalist regimes throughout the sub-Saharan area has been accompanied by a major increase i n Chinese Communist activity i n this region. Toward the end of 1958 China was reportedly making progress i n establishing trade relations with Ghana and Nigeria, and she signed a three-year trade and payments agree-ment with the United Arab Republic. In the same year, the f i r s t Sino-Tunisian trade agreement was signed. The agreement was valid for one year, subject to automatic renewal and provided for a total of nine million Swiss francs' worth of 5. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia,pp. 242-A3. 76 trade from each side. In November of I960, Communist China signed a new trade agreement with Tunisia and i n the same month an agreement was con-cluded with Morocco which called for a total of seven b i l l i o n Moroccon francs' worth of trade each way. Morocco was to export to China, phos-phates, vehicles, minerals and sardines, and China would send tea, cotton 6 and textiles to Morocco. Also i n I960, an agreement was signed be-tween China and the Republic of Guinea which provided for an annual ex-change of goods between the two countries to a value of 4.92 American dollars. ^ An indication of the relative importance of Communist China's foreign trade with the Afro-Asian nations may be derived from the follow-ing s t a t i s t i c s . Peking stated i n 1958 that during the f i r s t Five Year Plan, 16$ of i t s total foreign trade was with these nations as compared g to 1% with the Socialist bloc and 9% with the West, mainly Europe. On the basis of these figures and those released by the United States Department of Commerce, i t appears that by I960 approximately two-thirds of Peking's total trade with non-Communist areas was being carried on with 9 the Afro-Asian nations totalling about 700 million American dollars. By I960, Communist China had concluded intergovernmental trade agreements not only with a l l of the Communist bloc countries, but also with India, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, the United Arab Republic, 6*1 S.M.C.P., #2380, Nov. 10, I960, p. 29. 7. Denis Warner, "Chinese Bearing Gifts", The Reporter, Nov. 10, I960, p. 27. 8. Peking Review, June 17, 1958, p. 13. 9* Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 235. 77 Lebanon, Nepal, Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan. From 1954 onward, when Communist China's policy took an out-ward turn, the instrument of trade assumed an increasingly significant role. Between 1954 and 1957, Peking's trade with the underdeveloped non-Communist countries i n the Far East and Southeast Asia increased by over 40$. Trade with this area rose from 425 million dollars i n 1954 to over 600 million dollars i n 1957j 1 1 a large part of the increase consisting of r i s i n g Chinese Communist exports of manufactured goods. Communist China's techniques and patterns i n trade with the Afro-Asian nations may best be understood from an analysis of the b i l a t e r a l agreements with these countries. Trade with Southeast Asian Countries Prior to 1955, Communist China's trade with Burma amounted to less than one million dollars. Following the signing of a three-year trade agreement i n 1954, Sino-Burmese trade rose to 20 million dollars i n 1955, and over 30 million dollars i n 1956. In 1957 trade remained at the 20 to 30 million dollar level. 1 2 Since rice i s Burma's chief export product and China herself i s a rice producing country, the Chinese have refrained from absorbing these rice purchases i n Burma for their own domestic needs. Instead, Burmese rice has become an important commodity i n the establishment of a t r i -angular trade pattern between China, Burma and Ceylon. In this three-way trade system China's purchases of Burmese rice are forwarded to Ceylon, which i n turn i s one of China's chief suppliers of rubber. In 1955, when 10. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p.235. 11. Ibid., p. 238. 12. Ibid., p. 240. 78 Burma was having d i f f i c u l t i e s i n selling i t s rice, China bought a total of 250,000 tons of rice i n Burma to be forwarded to Ceylon i n payment 13 for Chinese rubber purchases, from this latter country. In October, I960, an agreement was signed by which China purchased from Burma 300,000 to 400,000 tons of rice of the 1961 crop. China i n turn has exported s i z -able amounts of manufactured goods to Burma, including steel, cotton and glass?. Communist China's trade with Ceylon has evolved largely on the basis of a rubber - rice barter. In 1953, when Ceylon was having d i f -f i c u l t i e s i n marketing i t s rubber, the two countries signed a five-year trade agreement which called for an annual exchange of 50,000 tons of 1*5 rubber for 270,000 tons of rice. ^ A noteworthy feature of this agree-ment was that China was prepared to pay for Ceylonese rubber at prices higher than world market levels. Under this agreement, trade between the two countries rose from less than one million dollars i n 1950, to 95 million dollars i n 1953. Between 1954 and 1957, trade fluctuated at the range between 40 and 70 million dollars. When the f i r s t agreement ex-pired, i t was renewed in 1957, for another period of five years, beginning i n 1958, but the guaranteed quantities of rubber and rice were reduced to a minimum of 30,000 tons of rubber and 200,000 tons of rice. The premium on rubber, which had been a feature of the 1953 agreement was abolished, 13. L i u Hua, "Communist China, 1955Communist China Problem Research Series E.C. 15, Hong Kong, 1955, p. 87. ^ S.M.C.P. #2367,' October 24, I960, p. 8. 15. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 24I. 79 however, and the prices to be used were those prevailing i n international markets. To soften the blow, China undertook to grant Ceylon economic aid for a period of five years. Between January and September, I960, Chinese ex-ports to Ceylon totalled Rs. IO4.47 million of which about Rs. 15 million consisted of manufactured goods. During the same period exports from Ceylon to China totalled Rs. 92 million consisting entirely of rubber. China has made an impressive advance i n her textile sales to Ceylon and has caused serious concern among Ceylon's leading textile suppliers, Japan, India and the United Kingdom. The main cause for concern has been the fact that China's price i s generally some 20 per cent to 30 per cent lower 16 than the Japanese, while her quality i s sometimes almost as good. Communist China also carries on a substantial trade with Indo-nesia which i s numerically the largest and potentially, one of the wealthiest countries i n Southeast Asia. Indonesia i s rich i n raw mater-i a l s and a major exporter of rubber; a product sought by Communist China i n increasing quantities. Sino-Indonesian trade has risen rapidly as a consequence of trade agreements signed i n 1953 and 1956. By 1957 i t had reached a total amount of 53 million American dollars. In addition to the export of cotton textiles, a major commodity i n this trade, the Chinese have also sold Indonesia a variety of other manufactured goods, including machines and appliances. Copra, sugar and rubber con-17 stitute the main Indonesian exports to Communist China. Indonesia's 1ST S. Y. Tung, "Ceylon -"A Firm Trading Base", Far Eastern Economic Review, (Jan. 12, 1961), vol. 31, #2, pp. 53-5. 17. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 240. 80 exports, rubber i n particular, have assumed increasingly significant pro-portions since 1957, a fact which may par t i a l l y explain why Peking is no longer prepared to pay prices high above world market levels for Ceylon-ese rubber. One indication of Peking's desire for closer Sino-Indo-nesian relations was revealed i n 1956 when Indonesia, i n the throes of an economic c r i s i s , had d i f f i c u l t i e s i n meeting i t s export commitment. Pek-ing came to i t s assistance by voluntarily extending the time limit for 18 settling past trade d e f i c i t s . In contrast to the above mentioned countries which have formal diplomatic relations with Peking, Malaya - Singapore have so far refrain-ed from recognizing the Peking regime. Malaya, i t must be remembered suf-fered the f u l l impact of Red guerilla warfare during the period between 1948 and 1952 and i t was not u n t i l i960 that the government announced the l i f t i n g of the emergency regulations which had remained i n force during these years. Although government forces have succeeded i n driving the guerillas deep into the jungles, their presence, nevertheless, continues to form a source of i r r i t a t i o n i n Malaya. Despite this situation, how-ever, Sino-Malayan trade has been substantial. In 1950-51, following the outbreak of the Korean War, but prior to the time that restrictions on China trade became effective, trade between these countries reached a total of over 70 million dollars annually, about half of which consisted of Malayan rubber exports to China. As a consequence of Great Britain's restrictions on the export of rubber to Communist China, trade temporarily declined to an average of 30 - 4-0 million dollars annually between 1953-1955. 18. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 24.0. 81 Because of the reopening of the rubber trade i n 1956 and a simultaneous vigorous Chinese Communist export drive, trade between these countries jumped to 76 U.S. million dollars; two-thirds of which consisted of exports of textiles and other manufactured goods from Communist China to Malaya. Due to the adverse effect of Peking's exports on the local economies of both Malaya and Singapore, the governments of the latter two clamped import restrictions on cement and textiles from Communist China. Because of these restrictions Chinese exports to Malaya and Singapore i n the f i r s t two months of I960 declined to a total of M#39 million, main items being rice, textile goods, f r u i t , nuts and dairy products. During the same period China imported from Malaya and Singapore M # 10.8 million 19 worth of crude rubber and a further M $ 460,000 of spices. Communist China's trade with other Southeast Asian nations seems to have been on a comparatively small scale. Apart from North Korea and North Vietnam, which have been firmly drawn into Peking's economic orbit, Communist China signed a trade agreement with Cambodia in 1956 which provided for 5 million pounds sterling worth of exports each 20 way. Also, i n early 1959, China signed a trade agreement with Thai-land which, l i k e Malaya, has imposed new import restrictions on Chinese goods flooding Thai markets. Furthermore, i t i s estimated that up to June, 1955, China imported some 100,000 bales of cotton from Pakistan 19. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, pp. 241-2. 20. Peking Review, September 2, 1958, p. 9. 82 when China's domestic production of raw cotton was reduced i n 1954 be-21 cause of floods, droughts and insect pests. Sino-Japanese Trade Relations Perhaps the most interesting i l l u s t r a t i o n of the extent to which p o l i t i c a l motives dominate Peking's trade relations with non-Com-munist Asian countries i s provided by the course of Sino-Japanese trade since 1952. Between 1952 and 1955 Communist China concluded three p r i -vate trade agreements with Japanese businessmen. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Sino-Japanese trade, on the basis of these three private agreements, reached the substantial total of 150 million dollars i n 1956. Optimism prevailed i n Japanese trade circles because of this favourable trend and a possible further increase i n Sino-Japanese trade. This optimism led to the opening of negotiations for a fourth p r i -vate trade agreement i n the f a l l of 1957. This time, however, the Chinese Communists proceeded to use trade as a p o l i t i c a l weapon, by pressing hard for their p o l i t i c a l demands. Peking's strong pressure resulted eventually in a willingness on the part of the Japanese government, although i t was not a direct participant, to concede a number of Peking's demands, among others an exchange of permanent non-official trade missions. Negotia-tions eventually led to the signing of a new agreement which called for trade each way of about 100 million dollars i n 1958. In February, 1958, representatives of the Japanese iron and steel industry also signed an agreement which providedfor the exchange of Japanese steel products for Chinese iron ore and coal to a total value of close to 300 million dollars 21. Communist China, Problem Research Series, E.C. 15,pp. 87-8. 83 22 each way over a five-year period. Following what appeared to be a mutually profitable expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, Peking i n May, 1958, suddenly seized upon the so-called "flag incident" i n Tokyo, to denounce the Kishi government i n violent terms and to break off a l l trade relations with Japan. In view of the favourable trend i n Sino-Japanese relations, i t i s questionable that Peking would allow a minor p o l i t i c a l issue such as the "flag i n c i -dent" to disrupt this trend, unless p o l i t i c a l motives had gained the upper hand. The continuing diplomatic deadlock between the two countries, despite strong pressure from Peking to break i t , may conceivably have been interpreted by the Chinese as a setback i n their efforts to raise Communist China's prestige abroad. A more plausible explanation, how-ever, i s derived from Peking's simultaneous trade drive to capture the Southeast Asian markets for Communist China's manufactured goods. I f the increased Afro-Asian orientation of Communist China's trade formed a definite part of Peking's long term policy with respect to this region, then i t may well have deliberately precipitated the break i n Sino-Japanese trade relations i n order to divert and thereby intensify the flow of economic goods i n a North-South direction. This would enable Peking to make a more concerted effort i n an area where i t hoped to i n -crease i t s position of p o l i t i c a l predominance and prestige. Perhaps the most compel!ing reason behind Peking's drastic action against Japan is genuine concern over the rapid growth of Japan's industrial capacity and the corresponding effect of Japanese exports to 22. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p.236-7. 84 Southeast Asia. By far the most advanced industrial nation i n Asia, but almost total l y lacking i n raw materials, Japanese capital has penetrated Southeast Asia i n the form of loans, reparation payments and investments. Fifteen different mines i n this region are allegedly exploited by Japan-23 ese capital. According to a joint statement signed by the Chinese and Japanese Communist parties in October, 1959, Japan's industrial and min-ing production was 2.7 times the pre-war level, surpassing the peak level 24 during World War II by 110 per cent. Whatever the accuracy of such st a t i s t i c s , i t i s sufficiently clear that Japan forms the most formidable competitor to Peking's economic designs i n Southeast Asia. Even more dis-quieting to the Chinese Communists i s the fact that Japan has the backing of the United States, their number one public enemy. The revision of the Japanese United States "Security Treaty" i n I960 met with firm Chinese disapproval. The treaty was condemned as an aggressive military alliance and interpreted as a threat to the revival of Japanese militarism. It was allegedly a United States plot against Asia while at the same time i t reduced Japan to a United States tool for war and aggression. In retrospect, i t would seem that Peking encouraged the expan-sion of trade with Japan as a means of extracting p o l i t i c a l concessions. When i t became apparent i n 1958 that Tokyo was not prepared to grant a l l of Peking's demands, the latt e r seized upon the "flag incident" as a pretense 23. Peking Review. Sept. 8. 1959. p. 14-15. 24. Peking Review, October 27, 1959, p. 11. 85 to break off a l l trade relations with Japan and direct i t s economic ef-forts into an area with greater p o l i t i c a l potentialities. In doing so, however, Peking was confronted with a major obstacle i n the form of Japan's firmly established trading position i n Southeast Asia. In order to re-move this obstacle, Communist China embarked on a twofold course of action; on the one hand she launched a vigorous trade offensive designed to capture control of export markets for industrial goods; on the other hand, she conducted a campaign to discredit the Kishi government and re-vive old fears of Japanese militarism. Although the Chinese Communists can claim some i n i t i a l successes, the question remains how effective this p o l i t i c a l l y motivated trade offensive w i l l be i n the long run, as against the sound economic principles and competitive strength of Japanese trade. Economic Aid to Asian Countries One last aspect of economics as an instrument of Communist China's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations needs to be mentioned. Since 1956, Peking has extended economic aid to a number of non-Communist coun-tries on an increasingly large scale. Although the magnitude of this aid i s small i n comparison with United States and Russian programmes, neverthe-less, i n terms of Communist China's national income and in view of the strained economic situation within China, this foreign aid has already assumed substantial proportions. Between 1953, when Peking started i t s foreign aid programmes, and 1956, a l l i t s foreign aid went to neighbouring Communist countries. During the period 1953-1957, which coincided with Communist China's f i r s t Five Year Plan, the total estimated grants of 86 economic aid was 779 million dollars of which 55 million dollars went to non-Communist countries i n the Afro-Asian area — Cambodia, Nepal, Cey-25 Ion and Egypt. Of the remaining 724 million dollars the lion's share consisted of grants to both North Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia. In June, 1956 Peking started i t s f i r s t aid programme to a non-Communist country i n the form of a 22.4 million dollar grant to Cambodia covering a period of three years. Under the agreement China agreed to help build a cement factory, a paper-mill, a textile m i l l and a plywood factory, without compensation or conditions attached. In 1958, when Cambodia and Communist China established diplomatic relations, Peking expressed i t s readiness to aid Cambodia according to the latter's needs and capabilities" i n building small sized iron and steel works. In conformity with the Ban-dung s p i r i t , Peking simultaneously expressed i t s wish "....to see the other Asian-Africa countries, as well as ourselves, prosperous, rich and strong... In October, 1956, Communist China agreed to provide Nepal with a 12.6 million dollar grant over a three-year period. In contrast to the Cambodian agreement, the agreement with Nepal stipulated that no Chinese technical personnel were to be sent to Nepal. In March, I960, when the pre-vious grant had not yet been used, a new Sino-Nepalose agreement was signed whereby China agreed to give Nepal a free grant of aid to the value of 100 million Indian Rupees, over a three-year period. This time Nepal accepted Chinese technical personnel on i t s s o i l but the specific stipulation was made that their standard of l i v i n g , while i n Nepal, was not to exceed that 25. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia,pp. 244-5. 26. Peking Review, Oct. 7, 1958, p. 15. 27. loc. c i t . 87 28 of similar personnel i n Nepal. These stipulations may be regarded as an attempt on the part of Nepal to avoid possible p o l i t i c a l implications accruing from the stationing of Chinese technical personnel on Nepalese s o i l . In the case of Burma, Communist China agreed i n 1956 and 1957 to help to build two te x t i l e mills. In addition she granted Burma a $ 30 million, non-interest bearing loan i n January, 1961, for a period of six 29 years. The loan i s to be repaid i n ten years, starting i n 1971. The offering of long term loans to non-Communist countries has been a fea-ture of Peking's foreign aid programme since late 1957 and early 1958. Reportedly two large offers were made to Indonesia i n 1958 (11.2 million 30 dollars) and 1959 (4-0 million dollars) i n order to help defray costs of Indonesian imports from Communist China. In September, 1958, Ceylon accepted a loan of approximately 10 million dollars to be paid i n four 31 annual instalments with interest at 2.5 per cent. The loan was made in the form of equipment, supplies and f a c i l i t i e s at a time when Ceylon suffered damage from excessive floods. In addition Ceylon was given a 15.75 million dollar grant i n September, 1957, presumably to soften the blow of reduced income from rubber exports to Communist China resulting 32 from Chinese insistence on paying lower prices for Ceylonese rubber. Economic Aid toward African Countries Recently the Chinese Communists have also expanded their foreign 28. Peking Review, March 29, I960, p. 10. 29. S.M.C.P., #2416, Jan. 8, 1961, p. 23. 30. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 249. 31. Ibid.,pp. 249-50. 32. Ibid., pp. 248-49. 88 aid programme to include the newly independent nations of Africa. As part of Communist China's campaign to win friendship and good w i l l i n Africa, an economic and technical assistance agreement was concluded with Guinea in September, I960, the f i r s t between Communist China and an African coun-try. Under the Agreement, Peking granted Guinea a 25 million dollar interest-free loan, repayable i n ten years beginning i n 1970. Also Peking agreed to send experts and technicians as well as provide complete equip-33 ment and machinery. Furthermore, the loan was made "without any con-34 ditions or privileges attached." A few months prior to this agreement i n May, I960, Communist China made an outright g i f t of 1000 tons of rice to the newly independent Republic of Guinea. Morocco provides an interesting example of the kind of technical assistance Peking provides. Being a tea drinking nation, but lacking domes-t i c cultivation of this highly popular beverage, Morocco has traditionally been an importer of tea, with the resulting drain on i t s foreign exchange. Early i n I960, therefore, a team of Chinese specialists went to Morocco to explore the possib i l i t i e s for tea cultivation there. Whether or not the prospects are favourable remains unknown, but i n November of the same year, the Moroccan government signed a trade agreement with Communist China, under which the latt e r would provide Morocco with coffee, textiles and tea. Egypt has;also been a target i n Communist China's trade and eco-nomic aid offensive. In August, 1955, the two countries signed a three-year trade agreement covering the purchase of 13,000 tons of cotton. During the 33. Denis Warner, "Chinese Bearing Gifts", The Reporter, Nov. 10, I960, pp. 27-8. 34. Ibid., p. 27. 89 f i r s t year, Communist China was to buy 10 million pounds sterling worth of cotton from Egypt and as a result became the second biggest customer of Egyptian cotton. The 1956 Suez c r i s i s furnished Peking with an opportun-i t y to show i t s support for the Nasser regime by announcing a U.S. 4.7 million dollar cash grant to Egypt. In December, 1958, Peking announced the signing of a second three-year trade agreement with Egypt. The I960 protocol to this December, 1958, trade agreement was signed on February 24- I t provided for exchanges worth 15 million pounds sterling each way, China supplying frozen beef, machinery, building materials, tea and si l k ; 35 against Egyptian cotton and minerals. Although generally speaking Sino-Egyptian relations appear to have been mutually satisfactory, Peking's suppression of the revolt i n Tibet seems to have interjected a discordant note. The Information Department of the United Arab Republic expressed criticism of Peking's action by terming the rebellion "an eastern version 36 of the Hungarian revolution". Other discordant notes were heard i n the months that followed.. In August, 1959, a leading Chinese ju r i s t demanded the immediate release by the United Arab Republic of one of the leaders of the Lebanese Communist party, who had been arrested by U.A.R. author-i t i e s two months previously. In October of the same year, Al Ahram, an United Arab Republic paper, alleged that a l l Arab capitals had "boy-cotted" the National Day celebrations called for by the Chinese embassies. 35. Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 248. Also Far Eastern Economic Review (July 21, I960) vol. 29, #3, p . m . 36. S.M.C.P. #2002, April 23, 1959, p. 42. 90 From the foregoing i t may be seen that trade and economic aid form a useful instrument i n Communist China's long-term policy toward the Afro-Asian world, particularly since 1955 when she formally adopted the"Competitive co-existence" line . The wider p o l i t i c a l motives behind this economic offensive cannot be denied, because a regime which follows an economic policy that forces the population to l i v e on a minimum sub-sistence level, and even below this level, for the sake of increasing ex-ports, cannot be assumed to follow a sound economic policy i n the interest of the population as a whole. This assumption i s even less, r e a l i s t i c i n the ligh t of the regime's commitment to a crash programme of industrial-ization. Indeed, the methods and techniques applied i n expanding trade and foreign aid are indicative of Communist China's wider p o l i t i c a l designs regarding the Afro-Asian world. At the same time, however, i t would be un-f a i r to deny to the Peking regime a measure of ingenuity i n conducting i t s trade offensive. Such examples as Ceylonese rubber, Burmese rice, both v i t a l l y important export commodities for these countries, and Moroccan tea cultivation have already been cited i n this respect. An example even more il l u s t r a t i v e of Communist China's ingenuity i s the comment by Wen Liang that perfumed prints, considered a novelty i n the world's textile indus-37 try, were sel l i n g i n Asia and Africa l i k e "hot cakes". Propaganda and Cultural Relations The third major instrument of Peking's policy i s propaganda and cultural relations. This instrument assumes particular importance when jT. Peking Review, Oct. 21, 1958. p. L j . 91 viewed against the background of Communist China's objective to win friend-ship and establish closer relations with the peoples of Asia and Africa. The promotion of cultural relations with these peoples i s i n Peking's opinion, a natural outcome of common past experience and common future tasks and should be based on the principle of "equality, mutual benefit 38 and mutual respect." Thus, co-operation and solidarity among equals. Indeed, solidarity has come to be regarded as the magic concept underlying a l l of Communist China's relations with the Afro-Asian world. Since the Bandung Conference "a link has been forged between the national independent movements on the two continents". Not only do they influence each other but they "surge forward together l i k e successive waves i n a 39 ris i n g tide. The Chinese, Asian and African people, so runs the argu-ment, have had the same experience of prolonged, imperialist and colon-i a l i s t aggression and oppression and today they face the same common tasks. Therefore, "...the Chinese peoples always regard i t as their noble inter-national duty to back the national liberation struggles of a l l oppressed nations" and consequently pledge their "unfailing and resolute support.^ The Chinese Communists have given concrete expression to this concept of solidarity by means of concluding bil a t e r a l Friendship Associa-tions. The purpose of these Friendship Associations i s to back the just struggle of African and Asian people against imperialism and colonialism 38. Peking Review. May 26, 1959, p. 7. 39. Peking Review. March 29, I960, p. 12. 40. Ibid., p. 3. 92 and furthermore, to foster friendly relations and economic and cultural exchanges between Chinese and Afro-Asian peoples. The Chinese-African People's Friendship Association was established i n April, I960 for pre-cisely this purpose. By 1955, such bilateral Associations had been established between China and a number of Asian countries including India, Ceylon, Pakistan, North Vietnam and Indonesia. In 1958, the Arab-Chinese friendship society was formed i n Cairo. So far as can be determined the primary value of these bilateral Friendship Associations was largely of a cultural .nature through the mutual exchange of good w i l l missions and cultural ensembles, Non-aggression Treaties. Since I960, however, presumably as a result of Peking's increased Afro-Asian orientation, a new dimension has been added by which Friendship has assumed distinct p o l i t i c a l overtones. In the course of I960, Peking formally signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with at least three Asian countries — Afghanistan, Cambodia and Burma. It i s stated i n the preamble of the Treaty with Afghanistan that i t i s concluded i n accord-ance with the United Nations Charter and the s p i r i t of the Bandung Confer-ence. The real core of these three non-aggression treaties, consists of the provision that neither party i s to take part i n any military alliance directed against the other, and article 2 of the Sino-Burmese Treaty pro-vides that there shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the two parties." ^ 4 1 . Peking Review, February 2, I960, p. 13. 93 Peking undoubtedly stands to gain from these treaties by making friendship conditional on the other party's consent to refrain from join-ing military alliances; an obvious intrusion on the sovereignty of these countries. I t must be assumed also that one of Peking's objectives i s to prevent any of these close neighbours from joining SEATO, which i s con-sidered an aggressive military alliance by Peking. The year I960 was also significant i n another respect. Peking signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Republic of Guinea, the f i r s t such treaty with an African country. From Peking's standpoint this was "...a momentous event not only i n the history of Chinese-Guinean relations but A2 also i n the history of relations between China and Africa." Nationwide Solidarity Campaigns In their quest for friendship and solidarity the Chinese Com-munists have also used the device of publicly announcing nationwide s o l i -darity campaigns. Support for a particular country's struggle for national liberation i s given by proclaiming "Algeria Day" (March 30, I960), "Congo Day" (April, I960),"Uganda Day" (July 5, 1959, or "Algeria Week" (April, I960). In cases where no particular country warrants such distinction, recourse can be taken i n "Imperialists Quit Africa Day" (December 1, I960) and"Anti-Colonialism Day" (April, 1958). On such occasions, huge mass r a l l i e s are held i n Peking during which i t is asserted that "Over 600 million back up Algeria's people" and that i n return, these 600 millions have drawn great encouragement from the struggle of the African people. 42. Denis Warner, "Chinese Bearing Gifts", The  Reporter, Nov. 10, I960. 94 A huge mass r a l l y was held i n April, I960, on the occasion of the F i f t h Anniversary of the Bandung Conference. Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-chairman of the National Committee of Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l Consultative Conference, told the gathering that "The common task of opposing imperialism, safe-guarding world peace and developing their national economies has closely 43 linked together the Chinese and African people." Another mass r a l l y was held on March 24, I 9 6 0 , for the purpose of giving all-out support to the Second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference to be held i n Conakry (Guinea) the following month. From the foregoing i t can be seen that Pek-ing's conception of friendly relations extends beyond the governmental level and has come to include the mass of the people. The inevitable ef-fect of such mass identification must be a greater awareness on the part of the people of where their loyalties should be. An Algerian Moslem or a Congolese soldier i s a brother i n arms who fights for the same cause and deserves every possible support. In this way a sense of association or solidarity i s generated whereby the Chinese people look upon the Asian and African people as friends with a common experience and common tasks. This mass "indoctrination" i f carried far enough, may ultimately prove to be a . powerful instrument i n the hands of Peking's leaders. In addition to the above mentioned unorthodox measures i n promot-ing friendly relations, Communist China also employs the more conventional methods such as the exchange of goodwill missions. In this respect, cultural groups have been particularly active. For example, the Chinese 4 3 . Peking Review, April 19, I 9 6 0 , p. 10 . 95 Acrobatic Art Troupe and the Chinese Nationalities Song and Dance En-semble have made extensive and according to Peking, highly successful tours of Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco and Burma. In addition, Peking has seen a steady stream of military, economic, educational and student mis-sions, from many Afro-Asian nations. Not only are such missions encour-aged but they also receive lavish treatment. Communist China's propaganda machinery has also been quite active i n achieving closer relations with the Afro-Asian countries. Peking's foreign language press turns out large volumes of books and maga-' zines i n several Asian languages. Special Communist propaganda films and radio broadcasts also form important means for spreading propaganda, and i n 1957 Peking beamed a total of 230 hours a week of radio programmes to the Far East. The Chinese Communists claim that since their take-over i n 194-9, 280 l i t e r a r y works from more than twenty Asian-African countries have been translated i n Chinese and published. ^ A further integral part of "people's diplomacy" has been the establishment of sympathetic or potentially sympathetic groups i n Asia, so-called "front organizations". These consist of "peace committees" and Asian-African solidarity com-mittees which are co-ordinated on a world-wide basis, through Communist dominated bureas. Although the effectiveness of such measures i s d i f f i -cult to assess, nevertheless they do seem to provide for a greater degree of communication and to contribute to winning confidence and support among key groups i n the Asian and African societies. 44- Peking Review, August 5, 1958, p. 20. 96 Conclusion Taking an overall view of Peking's three instruments of policy diplomacy, economics, and culture — the most dominant feature which emerges is the part they play in achieving a definite p o l i t i c a l purpose. In varying degrees, they seem to bring the Afro-Asian nations i n closer alignment with and ultimately i n orbit around Peking. Once i n orbit they become v i r t u a l l y dependent on ground control. In this respect Communist China's trade offensive must be considered the potentially most effective instrument. I f the Chinese Communists succeed i n capturing control of Asian and African markets, thereby tying the economies of these countries more firmly to the economy of mainland China, this w i l l undoubtedly f a c i l i t a t e the poss i b i l i t y for greater p o l i t i c a l control. To a l l intent and purposes, Afro-Asian solidarity w i l l then have become nothing more but a synonym for economic control. Whereas a l l three instruments were i n use prior to 1 9 5 5 , since the Bandung Conference there has been a marked increase i n the magnitude and intensity of these instruments. Even more so since I 9 6 0 , following the independence movements i n Africa. As for the effect of these instruments on Afro-Asian nations, i n i t i a l l y they seem to have provided a measure of success. The Chinese Communists ap-peared genuinely interested i n alleviating anxieties on the part of their neighbours and cultivating friendly relations with them. Since the sup-pression of the revolt i n Tibet, however, and the accompanying intrusions along the Sino-Indian border, Peking's friendly overtures have appeared i n a different l i g h t . Its friendly posture has been damaged and relations with Peking are now permeated more by a sense of insecurity and inequality, than by a genuine wish to seek friendly relations with the giant to the north. •98 Chapter IV THE OVERSEAS CHINESE Introduction. One of the unique and potentially most effective instruments for the penetration of Asia which Peking has at i t s disposal i s the overseas Chinese. Much of the importance of this instrument stems from the fact that the overseas Chinese have traditionally occupied a dominant and often v i t a l position i n the economies, of the Southeast Asian countries. They own a very large percentage of the small r e t a i l stores and workshops, as v e i l as a s i z -able proportion of the large commercial firms i n the area. As r e t a i l merchants they provide the economic link between urban and rural centres of population. They have traditionally controlled the milling and sale of r i c e , the staple food i n Southern Asia. They were formerly important i n money lending, but they play a smaller role i n this today, partly because of restrictions which have been imposed on them. They have also had a major part i n developing large-scale enterprises. In the pre-war period the role of the overseas Chinese i n the production of rubber, t i n , teak and many other commodities was second i n importance only to that of the European and far superior to that of the lo c a l people. In countries such as Malaya, Singapore and Thailand, where their concentration i s largest, they contribute the bulk of the urban industrial and working class. On the eve of World War Two, the economic activity of these minor-i t y groups had reached the point where they constituted the middle class i n the social structure of the countries i n which they resided. The rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism following the end of the war, however, marked the beginning of a period of increasing discrimination against the overseas Chinese • Southeast Asian nationalism early developed an anti-Sinitic tradition,. due to the fact that the Chinese achieved a social and economic position 99 always distinctive and usually superior to that of the indigenous population. Nationalism brought i n i t s wake the aspirations of the people for the estab-lishment of an indigenous middle class, capable of controlling their own econ-omy and increasing social standards. Since the overseas Chinese by this time were firmly entrenched i n the economy and most indigenous people lacked the s k i l l s and training for a successful business career, the former came to be resented and subjected to various forms of discrimination. Position of the overseas Chinese and the resulting problems. Traditionally the overseas Chinese have shown a p o l i t i c a l apathy and their participation i n the p o l i t i c a l affairs of their country of residence has been negligible. At the same time, they have shown strong attachment to their cultural heritage. Preservation of language, religious beliefs and social customs have served not only as a unifying force among the overseas Chinese communities but also as a continuous link with the mother country. As long as the mother country remained p o l i t i c a l l y weak and unstable, however, and exercised a position of l i t t l e international importance, the overseas Chinese were thrown on their own resources and could expect l i t t l e support from this side. Since 1949* mainland China's star has been steadily i n the ascendence and has reached the point where today, Communist China i s i n -creasingly becoming a power to be reckoned with i n the realm of interna-tional a f f a i r s . This newly acquired position of strength and prestige has inevitably affected the overseas Chinese. Becoming increasingly exposed to discriminatory measures i n the pursuit of their only means of livelihood and lacking the p o l i t i c a l power to counter this pressure, their only source of comfort and support l i e s i n the mother country. At the same time, the presence of minority Chinese cultural en-claves within these newly developing Southeast Asian communities poses a 100 J d i f f i c u l t assimilation and integration problem. This problem i s twofold. On the one hand the Southeast Asian countries are i n the process of creating a national consciousness through a nationwide programme of education and by set-ting uniform standards of language, history, and social behavior. The Chinese, however, with their own system of vernacular schools, have shown a reluctant attitude to this programme of cultural integration. On the other hand, the problem of integration i s further aggravated by the question of dual national-i t y , whereby u n t i l recently, a Chinese who became a sit i z e n of the country of his domicile, retained his Chinese citizenship. Thus the question facing many Southeast Asian governments i s whether the overseas Chinese w i l l eventually become integrated i n loc a l societies or w i l l continue to form a separate element. The overseas Chinese as an instrument of policy. At present the status of overseas Chinese i s a prime factor i n the relationship between Southeast Asian governments and the government i n Peking. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai declared Peking's readiness to solve this problem on the basis of bi l a t e r a l agreements and at least one such agreement was signed with Indonesia. But i t took more than five years after r a t i f i c a t i o n before i t was fi n a l l y put into effect. From Peking's standpoint, the presence of ten million Chinese,* controlling a v i t a l sector of the economy i n an area where i t hopes to increase i t s influence, constitutes a unique vehicle for the implementation of i t s long range policy, particularly where Communist China's prestige i n Asia has been 1. A breakdown of the number of ethnic Chinese and their percentage of the to t a l population i n Southern Asian countries i s as follows: Malaya 2,365,000 (37.8 percent); Singapore 965,000 (76.8 percent); Thailand 2,360,000 (11.3 percent) Cambodia 230,000 (5.5 percent); South Vietnam 780,000 (6.2 percent); Hbrth Viet-nam 50,000 (0.4 percent); Indonesia 2,250,000 (2.7 percent); Burma 320,000 (1.6 percent); Philippines 270,000 (1.2 percent); Laos 10,000 (0.6 percent). Figures taken from Barnett, Communist China i n Asia, p. 176. 101 growing. The combined effect of Peking's increment i n prestige and the heightened insecurity on the part of the overseas Chinese would suggest a growing Horth-South gravitational p u l l . Strangely enough, Peking's formal policy pronouncements do not substantiate any such orientation. On the con-trary, the growing importance of Southeast Asian goodwill and support i n international relations to China's foreign policy has prompted Peking to adopt a new l i n e . Since 1954- overseas Chinese interests have been "sacri-ficed" to the extent where they are discouraged from appealing to Peking and urged to conduct themselves as law abiding citizens of their countries of residence. The principal cause for this major shift i n overseas Chinese policy was the corresponding shift i n tactics i n 1955 from militant revolu-tion to "peaceful co-existence." Once again, therefore, p o l i t i c a l objec-tives constituted the determinant factor i n the employment of this unique instrument of Communist China's policy towards the Asian nations. Historical significance of the overseas Chinese Historically the term "overseas Chinese" dates from 1898 when i t was f i r s t used by Hsu Yun-chiao. Since that time, Chinese governments have followed^ a policy of binding overseas Chinese more closely to the mother land. The prime reason behind this policy was the overseas Chinese practice of sending remittances to their families l i v i n g i n China, for whom these remittances were often a significant part of livelihood. According to pre-war estimates, overseas Chinese, including those l i v i n g i n the United States, 2 annually remitted between eighty million and one hundred million dollars. The most significant single aspect of this was that these remittances formed an important item i n China's balance of payments. In 1935, for example, 2. Hsiao Chi-jung "Revenue and Disbursement of Communist China", Communist  China Problem Research Series. E. C. 8, Hong Kong, 1955, p. 13. 102 eighty per cent of China's trade d e f i c i t was made up by remittances and in 1936 they exceeded the trade d e f i c i t by 30 per cent.^ The post war years registered a sharp drop i n remittances due partly to an unstable currency situation and partly to the prohibitive measures instituted by the United States government regarding remittances from overseas Chinese i n America to mainland China. There was, however, also a drop in remittances from overseas Chinese i n Southeast Asia. This was caused by the alienation of overseas Chinese as a result of the persecution of families at home, many of whom suffered from Communist land reform policies i n the 1920's and 1930'sj and because the Communist cadres, which had been despatched to Southeast Asia, to carry out organizational and propaganda a c t i v i t i e s among the overseas Chinese, were recalled during the period of take-over from the Euomintang. From this period, 19205s and 1930's, also date the f i r s t forms of extortion employed by the Chinese Communists. The importance of the overseas Chinese may also be judged from the feet that under the New Republican Constitution i n 1912, provision was made for six "overseas" senators and i n 1932 an Overseas Affairs Commission was established. Peking's policy prior to 1955 When the Chinese Communists came to power i n 1949 their policy toward the overseas Chinese was l a i d down i n the Common Program, passed i n the 1949 and 1954- Constitution. Articles 58 and 98 respectively state that: "The People's Republic of China shall protect the acquired rights and interests of overseas Chinese. ^  Also at the f i r s t All-China Peoples Delegates Conference, 30 seats were allocated to the overseas Chinese. 3. Lu Yu-sun, "Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese". Communist  China Problem Research Series. E.C. 12, Hong Kong, 1956. p. 3. 4- Ibid, p. 14. 103 In, the organizational sphere a central Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs was established with ministerial status plus an additional three organizations dealing respectively with propaganda, organizational and intelligence activ-i t i e s among the overseas Chinese. In addition, commissions or departments were set up i n those provinces and d i s t r i c t s which contained a heavy concentra-tion of returned overseas Chinese, or families of the Chinese l i v i n g abroad. It soon became apparent, however, that Peking's real objective i n taking these measures was to secure money and to instigate the overseas Chinese to oppose local authorities. It should be remembered that this was the period when Communist China applied militant revolutionary tactics i n i t s dealings with Asian countries. Regarding the f i r s t objective the government announced i n June 1951 the importance of securing remittances and i n January 1952 the Government Administration Council stressed that "every means must be used" to secure these remittances. By means of extortion letters, forcibly written by families i n Red China, ransom letters, blackmail threats of retaliation, and various other forms of pressure, Peking proceeded to squeeze money out of overseas Chinese ^ i n Indonesia, Philippines, Indo-China, Thailand and Burma. In order to handle these remittances there were by 1950 some one thousand Endorsement bureaus i n existence i n Southeast Asian countries. In June 1951 the regulation became effective whereby a l l remittances received by these 5. Lu Yu-sun, "Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese", Communist  China Problem Research Series. E. C. 12, Hong Kong, 1956. p. 57. 6. According to a Reaber report from Singapore (June 23, 1951) 58 overseas Chinese had each received circular letters from the Kwantung People's Govern-ment ordering them to pay taxes to t a l l i n g HK20 million, under threat of retalaliation - Communist China Problem Research Series E.0. 12. p. 69 104 7 bureaus should be sold to the Bank of China for Communist money. The effectiveness of this campaign becomes evident in light of the fact that in 1956 i t was estimated remittances totalled $106 million, |27 million in excess of Communist China's trade deficit for the same year. In 1959 remittances were estimated to be between $110 - $L40 million. 8 Also, since 1951, investment companies were established to attract overseas Chinese to invest in the mother land. Pressure was exerted on their families to invest in "productive enterprises" thereby depriving them of eventual control of their money. The money is invested on a joint state-private basis with the overseas Chinese putting up the major share of the capital and the state retaining the controlling influence. The first such joint state-private enterprise, the so-called South China Enterprise Company, was established in February 1951 in Canton, with 30 per cent capital and 70 per cent private capital. Apart from the financial aspect, Communist China's policy has also shown a marked interest in attracting overseas Chinese students to aid in the construction of socialism. The All-China Student's Union has been sending agents abroad to overseas Chinese schools to induce students to return. By way of incentive, the Peking regime has reserved 10 per cent of admissions to mainland Chinese colleges and universities for these students; promised free education and exemption from military service to students from Burma, Malaya and Indonesia; and given them assurances of good jobs once their educa-tion has been completed. ^ The majority of overseas Chinese students which 7. Communist China Problem Research Series E. C. 12, p. 59-8. R. J. Coughlin, Double Identity. Hong Kong. Hone Kong University Press, I960, p. 46. 9. Peter S.H. Tang. Communist China Today. New York, Frederick A. Praoger 1957, p. 442. 105 were induced to return appear to have come from Indonesia where many schools are controlled by l e f t i s t elements, ^  and i t was estimated that by the end of 1953, 7000 students had returned from this country. 1 1 In their dealings with the Southeast Asian governments, the Chinese Communists held the view that an overseas Chinese, regardless of his citizen-ship status i n the country of residence, retained his Chinese citizenship and owed allegiance to the new Peking regime. This attitude understandably created resentment on the part of lo c a l governments who saw themselves confronted with a minority group, economically in f l u e n t i a l and culturally homogeneous, over which they had no p o l i t i c a l control. Consequently, as long as Peking persisted i n adhering to this attitude, the overseas Chinese continued to be a source of f r i c t i o n i n the relations with Southeast Asia. Prom Peking's standpoint, how-ever, effective control over the overseas Chinese provided a most valuable instrument for the penetration of Southeast Asia. I f "A rise or f a l l i n strength of the government controlling China i t s e l f has a direct influence upon their (overseas Chinese) p o l i t i c a l position i n the country of their residence" then the newly acquired position of Red China must have been a source of strength to both the regime as well as the minority groups. Up to 1954- Peking did nothing to dispel mistrust i n Southeast Asia. In a major propaganda effort to gain maximum loyalty and support, Peking used three principal forms of appeal: F i r s t , protection o f interests of overseas Chinese by diplomatic meansj sedondly, i t s claim to patriotic loyalty and appeal to pride i n China's new international status; thirdly, special privileges 10. Communist China Problem Research Series. E. C. 12. p. 42. 11. loc.©It. 12. Communist China Problem Research Series. E. C. 12. p. 4« 106 were accorded to overseas Chinese and their dependents i n China. This propa-ganda effort was carried out through a variety of channels including Chinese schools, the Chinese owned press, radio broadcasts and cultural missions and served to attract Chinese capital for foreign exchange and investment purposes. It also served to attract young intellectuals. Peking's policy since 1955 Since 1954, however, Communist China's policy towards the overseas Chinese underwent a major change i n t a c t i c s . The growing importance of South-east Asian goodwill and support to China's foreign policy as reflected i n the formal adoption of the "peaceful-coexistence" line at Bandung, prompted a new approach. The regime began to display an attitude of aloofness with regard to the overseas Chinese which found expression i n discouraging them from appealing to Peking and expressing willingness to relinquish claims of allegiance. While v not disclaiming the overseas Chinese "ardent love for the so c i a l i s t fatherland" i t was now recognized that they could make a voluntary choice of citizenship. It was declared that those choosing the nationality of their country of domi-c i l e were to pledge allegiance to that country, contribute to i t s welfare, liv e as law-abiding citizens and refrain from joining overseas Chinese associa-tions and societies. Not only did the Chinese Communists express their readi-ness to negociate a solution to the question of dual nationality, but they also appeared willing to fo r f e i t any previous claims they might have had on those overseas Chinese who chose to become, or already were, citizens of their country of residence. This new policy was declared to follow the established standards of serving s o c i a l i s t construction, the five principles of peaceful co-e3istence, 13. S. M. C. P. #1722 Fab;';;?!, 1958, p. 29. Statement by Fang Fang, Vice Chairman of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. 107 as well as the legitimate interests of overseas Chinese. Obviously the term "legitimate interests" was sufficiently vague and a l l encompassing as to provide for a variety of interpretations. Peking's approach since 1954 was embodied i n the following formal statement by Ho Hsiang-ning i n February 1958 to the National People's Congress: We hold that overseas Chinese should be free to choose the nationality of the country i n which they reside and should be loyal to that country and i t s people. As for those who wish to remain Chinese subjects we ask them to con-tinue to observe the policies, laws and regula-tions of their countries of residence and to respect the customs and habits of loc a l people. 15 Under the "non-protectionist" line overseas Chinese were thus openly encouraged to cooperate i n the development of the national economies of the newly independ-ent countries. This major sh i f t i n tactics had i t s effects both internally and ex-ternally. As a p o l i t i c a l instrument, particularly where i t concerned an "inter-nal" matter, Peking recognized the value of overseas Chinese support and was reluctant to give i t up. As Chou En-lai said i n a major policy speech to the Fi r s t National People's Congress on June 28, 1956: We attach great importance to the positive role played by the broad masses of patriotic overseas Chinese i n promoting the cause of the peaceful liberation of Taiwan. 16 Economically and socially, however, the position of overseas Chinese dependents 14. S.M.C.P. #1735 March 9, 1958. p. 33 15» G. W. Skinner, "Overseas Chinese i n Southeast Asia". The Annals (January 1959). Vol. 321. p. 146. 16. Chou En- l a i . On Present International Situation Peking Foreign Language Press. 1956. p. 32. 108 and returning overseas Chinese i n China proper lost some of the favoured treatment which i t enjoyed up to 1954. Since the start of the great leap forward the emphasis i n Communist China's policy has been on a stepped up programme of assimilation and economic integration of overseas Chinese depend-ents. Formerly, the government, i n an effort to win their loyalty and finan-c i a l support, had treated these dependents as a privileged class and during the period of land reform, Communist propaganda proclaimed "favoured treatment" of land owned by overseas Chinese. The combined effect of Peking's socializa-tion programme plus the apparent shift i n tactics has jeopardized the special position of both the overseas Chinese and their dependents on the mainland. In A p r i l , 1958, a meeting of the Kwantung Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee and Overseas Chinese bureau chiefs c r i t i c i z e d the over-emphasis of special characteristics of overseas Chinese dependents and returned overseas Chinese and charged that they had looked upon themselves as a privileged class. The meeting advocated a new policy, directed toward the big leap forward, whereby "the overseas Chinese should be organized to make a big leap forward on the ideological and productive fronts." At the same time they were to be 17 educated and remoulded i n order "to serve socialism." Under the new plan drawn up by Hsiao Ch'ing the government's domestic policy toward returning overseas Chinese included among others, halting of duty free entry of goods; sharper control over personal luggage; resettlement i n native provinces; accumulation of foreign exchange by stipulating that 50 percent of interest payments be payable i n foreign currency; and p o l i t i c a l remoulding. As a result of these measures the lives of many overseas families on the mainland have become virtu a l l y no different from other Chinese. 17. S.M.C.P. #1764. A p r i l 29, 1958. p. 45. 109 Three years later, i n I960, the plan was modified due to an anti-Chinese wave of discrimination which swept through Southeast Asia, particularly i n Indonesia, and the resulting influx i n returning overseas Chinese. In protest against these discriminatory actions, the Chinese Communists issued a veiled warning by declaring that "...our great fatherland i s the most power-f u l supporter of overseas Chinese." Meanwhile , Communist China opened her arms wide to the thousands of fellow countrymen fleeing from persecution. The State Council issued a special directive dealing with the reception and re-settlement of returning overseas Chinese. Under the terms of this directive a special committee was set up for this purpose. Furthermore, the returned overseas Chinese were to be resettled according to the needs of the state as well as the wishes of the persons concernedj a l l baggage was to be exempted from custom duties; and a l l money and materials "shall forever be their private 19 20 property." 7 It was reported that between 1949 and 1959, 300,000 overseas Chinese had returned home; a large part of which consisted of returnees from Indonesia. On the basis of the foregoing i t appears that Communist China has conducted a two faced policy with respect to the overseas Chinese since 1955. The dual purpose of this policy was clearly expressed by Liao Ch'eng-chin, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission i n a new year's broadcast to the overseas Chinese on 30 December, 1959. On the one hand he expressed continued support by saying "lou may count on your prosperous and strong 21 so c i a l i s t mother-country". On the other hand he attempted to dispel any 18. S.M.C.P. #2161 December 16, 1959, p. 24. 19. S.M.C.P. #2192 February 2, I960, p. 24. 20. S.M.C.P. #2161 December 16, 1959, p. 25. 21. S.M.C.P. #2172 December 30, 1959, p. 17. 110 notions of fear and resentment on the part of the Southeast Asian governments by saying that China would not use the overseas Chinese "to launch so-called 22 •subversive a c t i v i t i e s ' / thus reiterating a pledge given by Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference i n 1955. The effect of policy change on Southeast Asia The next point to be examined i s the effects of the shift i n Communist China's policy vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese upon the governments of Southeast Asia. Generally speaking the foremost effect appears to have been a more deter-mined effort to find a solution to the problem of assimilation. Many Southeast Asian politicians f e l t that the mid 1950's might be their last opportunity to bring l o c a l Chinese under control and to achieve nationalistic ends before the 23 growing weight of Peking's international influence could block these steps. This view was widespread i n Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia. In dealing with the problem of local Chinese, Southeast Asian govern-ments are confronted with three major aspects; Education, citizenship and economics. The f i r s t and the last are of predominantly national nature i n the sense that they are closely related to nationalistic aims and can conceivably be dealt withwlthout resort to China. Citizenship, however, i s a matter which can not be adequately solved without China's cooperation. For as long as Peking continues to consider overseas Chinese as having Chinese citizenship, regardless of their l o c a l status, they can not be brought under effective l o c a l control. Education as a factor The educational aspect of the problem centres around the existence of vernacular schools, where Chinese students receive a Chinese^orientated 22. S.M.C.P. #2172 December 30, 1959. p. 18 23. Skinner, The Annals, p . 144. I l l education and the language of instruction i s also Chinese. This situation would be less objectionable perhaps, i f i t were not for the fact that i n many cases these schools have proved to be f e r t i l e ground for the cultivation of a pro-Eeking attitude. Consequently, this type of education tends to lead to cultural isolation and a p o l i t i c a l outward orientation. The existence of Chinese communal schools became an object of special concern i n those Southeast Asian countries which were intent upon creating a national identity through a larger degree of national consciousness. In Thai-land, for example, the Ministry of Education, between 1948 and 1955, waged a largely successful campaign to Thai-ify staffs and curricular. P o l i t i c a l influence was banned from the schools and by 1955 a l l instruction was i n the Thai language except for 5§- hours of Chinese weekly. This campaign followed i n the wake of restrictive measures introduced i n 1948 whereby a l l Chinese secondary schools were closed and the number of Chinese primary schools was to be reduced from 430 to 152, In the Philippines, control of education has been completely i n the hands of the Philippine Ministry of Education since 1957. The Indonesian government i n 1957 instituted a radical policy to ensure a national system of education. Within one year hundreds of Chinese language schools were converted to Indonesian language schools with a standard national curriculum. Only major c i t i e s were allowed to have foreign schools which resulted i n a drop of the number of Chinese schools from over 1000 to a few hundred. Perhaps the most interesting example of establishing a national school system, took place i n Malaya, where the indigenous population holds only a slight majority over the overseas Chinese. In 1959 i t was estimated that the Chinese constituted 37.8 percent of the t o t a l population, and a widespread system of vernacular schools was already i n existence. In a major effort to bring about the Malayanlzation of the country, the government aimed at bringing a l l vernacular schools into a national system of education with 112 Malayan as the language system of education and emphasis on the teaching of the country's history. The Malayan approach thus aimed at integrating the vernac-ular schools i n a national system, rather than eliminating them, as was the case i n Thailand and Indonesia. Citizenship as a factor The second major aspect of the overseas Chinese problem with which Southeast Asian governments are concerned i s citizenship. In a striking depart ture from previous policy, Peking at the Bandung Conference i n 1955 offered to negotiate a solution to the dual nationality question on a b i l a t e r a l basis. The f i r s t , and so far only, Treaty on Dual Nationality was signed with Indo-nesia i n 1955 but didnot go into effect u n t i l January I960. Under the provi-sions of the Treaty those Chinese having acquired citizenship were to choose between Indonesian or Chinese citizenship within two years. Those who neglec-ted to choose would automatically acquire Chinese citizenship. In addition, the Chinese government renounced a l l claims to citizenship of those Chinese who choose to adopt Indonesian nationality. The cause of the delay i n imple-mentation o f the Treaty appears to be attributable i n part to a deterioration! i n Sino-Indonesian relations since the end of 1959* Far reaching discrimin-atory measures aimed against the overseas Chinese taken by the Indonesian government evoked protest notes from Peking. The Chinese consul to Bandjarmasin was placed under 41 hours house arrest by military authorities for alleged interference with government measures. In West Java, military authorities suppressed overseas Chinese schools and forcibly evacuated many Chinese. The k i l l i n g of two Chinese women during these actions evoked a strong protest from Peking, "demanding" that the Indonesian government make an "open-apology" for the k i l l i n g . In the same note, Peking also "demanded" that Indonesian govern-ment "stop at one©" the compulsory evacuation and various persecutions of the overseas Chinese.^ - One possible explanation of Indonesia's behavior vis-a-vis 24. S.M.C.P. #2299, July 11, I960, p. 37 113 the overseas Chinese i s that the government i s working on the assumption that Peking so values Indonesia's international support, particularly on such matters as anti-colonialism and Taiwan, that i t w i l l not risk a complete disruption i n the relations between the two countries. Encouraged by these assumptions the Indonesian government has seen f i t to pass decrees, backed by the army, which imposed an exorbitant tax on Chinese aliens (July 1957) and banned a l l Chinese language publications (April 1958). There i s , however, a more pro foundeconomic reason behind Indonesian discriminatory actions which w i l l be discussed presently. In those Southeast Asian countries which have not entered into a b i l a t e r a l agreement with Communist China, the dual nationality problem con-tinues to exist. When Malaya became independent i n August 1957, a l l those born on or after independence automatically acquired Malayan citizenship. This, however, did not solve the citizenship status of the large number of Chinese already l i v i n g i n the country prior to independence. Here the government followed a more cautious approach so as to avoid upsetting the delicate balance between indig.'enous Malayans and overseas Chinese. A less successful attempt at assimilation was made i n South Vietnam. In the f a l l of 1956 a campaign was launched, with the purpose of long-range assimilation, whereby automatic citizen-ship was to be granted to a l l persons of Chinese extraction born i n Vietnam* In preparation for this move, another campaign was launched a few days earl i e r with the purpose of confiscating al i e n registration papers of l o c a l born Chinese and compelling them to accept citizenship. The result was mass-civil diso-bedience and consequent failure of the forced assimilation e f f o r t . In Cambodia, which has shown a marked tendency to follow a policy of accommodation with Communist China, the overseas Chinese, which constitute 5«5 percent of the t o t a l population,'appear to;tea relatively small problem. In February 1956, when the Premier of Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk paid a two week v i s i t to Peking a firm 114 basis was l a i d for the future development of friendly Sino-Cambodian relations. The cornerstone of these relations was declared to be the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which henceforth would be considered as the "immutable rules guiding" Sino-Cambodian relations. 2^ Cambodia agreed to follow a policy of peace and neutrality. In return for this "co-operative" attitude, Chou En-lai made an appeal to the overseas Chinese l i v i n g i n Cambodia urging them to respect Cambodian laws and customs and contribute to the economic develop-26 ment of the country. The effect of Peking's change i n tactics also had a notable impact on Thailand's policy toward the overseas Chinese. Prior to the bandung Con-ference and the establishment of Seato, of which Thailand i s a member, the government followed a decidedly anti-Chinese policy. Citizens of alien extrac-tion, which meant largely the Chinese, were discriminated against i n matters of land policy, military service and p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e . legislation passed i n 1953 denied Thai citizenship to a l l those whose parents were Chinese. Follow-ing the Bandung Conference, however, there occurred a relaxation i n the anti-Chinese campaign. A law passed i n 1956 declared any person who was born within the Kingdom to be a Thai citizen by bir t h . In addition, the government related the former discrimatory measures pertaining to matters of nationality, electoral laws and military service. The general relaxation of p o l i t i c a l tension i n Southeast Asia induced the government to permit the formation o f p o l i t i c a l parties. As a result, two left-wing socialist groups, the labour Party and the Economist Party came to the fore, which began to press for a policy of neutralism and "peaceful Co-existence", and a greater orientation towards Communist China. 'An 1958 this neutralist trend was abruptly halted by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, who, i n 25. Peking Review. September 2, 1958. p. 8. 26. Ibid. p. 9. 115 a military coup ousted Premier Phibul, dissolved the National Assembly and instituted a tight dictatorship, banning a l l p o l i t i c a l parties and stepping up efforts to suppress Communist a c t i v i t i e s . As a result anti-Chinese measures were intensified and most Chinese have shown a marked unwillingness to take advantage of the 1956 Nationality Act. Economics as a factor The third and most profound aspect of the overseas Chinese problem has been their economic position i n Southeast Asia. There are some ten million overseas Chinese and i n most countries excepting Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, their numbers constitute less than seven percent of the to t a l population. Their economic superiority, however, has been far out of propor-tion to their numerical i n f e r i o r i t y . As pointed out earlier, the Chinese have traditionally occupied a major role i n the economic structure of their countries of residence to the extent where they formed the bulk of the prosperous bus-iness and professional middle class. Their importance was particularly f e l t i n the day to day sector of the economy. Due to the steady increase i n growth of an indigineou3 Southeast Asian middle class, demanding i t s own right to a share of the nation's welfare, a conflict has developed between the Chinese and the lower middle classes. This antagonism has led to a series of discrim-inatory measures being taken by the various governments against the Chinese entrepeneur i n an effort to c u r t a i l his monopolistic hold on the economy. Invariably, a l l Southeast Asian governments have practiced economic discrimina-tion on a legal basis by barring overseas Chinese from certain legally spec-i f i e d categories of occupation. In Thailand, for example, acts passed i n 1949, 1951, and 1952 reserved 18 industrial and service occupations for Thai citizens. In addition the Thai administration embarked on a sweeping programme to ThahTy the national economy by means of massive government participation i n industry, transport, commerce and financej a process aimed at monopolizing 116 those fields which previously had been dominated by Chinese. In the Philip-pines, a b i l l was passed i n 1954- aimed at nationalizing the r e t a i l trade and i t affected some 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese r e t a i l establishments. Also, a subsequent decree required Philippine owned r e t a i l enterprises to employ only Philippine citizens. Even more sweeping than the Thai restrictions, was the decree passed i n South Vietnam i n September 1956, barring Chinese nationals from 11 important categories of occupations. This action had by 1957 thor-oughly disrupted the entire Vietnamese economy and forced the government to retreat from i t s restrictive position. The most far reaching discriminatory measures were taken i n Indonesia where the government struck a crippling blow against the Chinese when i t passed a decree i n May 1959 barring a l l aliens from engaging In business enterprises outside provincial and regencial capitals. By the end of the year, a l l aliens were to cease commercial operations except i n a few major c i t i e s and within these c i t i e s they were required to l i v e i n restricted areas. The effect of such discriminatory measures, clearly aimed at the Chinese, has been the serious disruption and dislocation of the r e t a i l sector of the Indonesian economy with the rural areas being the hardest h i t . The actions taken against the overseas Chinese provide an i l l u s t r a t i o n of i r r a t i o n a l i t y inherent i n the ultra-nationalist current which i s sweeping over Indonesia and which has recently found a new rallying point i n the struggle for Dutch-held New Guinea. Not only i s the government deliberately depriving i t s e l f of the v i t a l services of an important sector of the economy, i n the ab-sence of an adequate indigineous substitute, but i n addition discrimination has led to a strain i n the relations with Communist China. The Peking government has sent a number of strong protest notes but, characteristically, i t has refrained from outright condemnation of the Indone-sian government. Instead, Peking has pictured the Indonesian government as 117 having fallen victim to outside subversively minded forces and attributed Indonesian anti-Chinese measures to United States aggressive designs to under-27 mine Sino-Indonesian friendship. This i n i t i a l approach was apparently the result of an agreement reached e a r l i e r during Dr. Subandrio's (the Indonesian Foreign Minister) v i s i t to Peking i n October of 1959. In a Sino-Indonesian Joint Communique', i t was stated that i n the process towards economic develop-ment and s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia the economic position o f the Chinese nations 28 "may be affected i n some ways." . It was also agreed that a solution should be found whereby the proper rights and interests of Chinese nationals would be respected. Towards the end of 1959 when the effects of the anti-Chinese cam-paign became more widely known, Peking's attitude hardened. In a l e t t e r to the Indonesian Foreign Minister on December 15, Chen I i , Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, seriously protested against the "intolerable 29 ' situation." Referring to the principles set forth i n the Joint Communique , whereby the economic resources of the overseas Chinese would continue to play a useful role i n the economic development of Indonesia, Chen Y i stated that the forced evacuation o f Chinese had resulted i n their "proper rights and 30 interests...(being) impaired and their personal safety infringed on." He proposed immediate r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Treaty on Dual Nationality, government protection of Chinese nationals and government aid to f a c i l i t a t e the departure of those Chinese who wished to return to mainland China. Simultaneously, the let t e r stated that certain forces, bent on sabotaging friendship between the 31 two countries, were making use of these government regulations. 27. S.M.C.P. #2131. November 2, 1959, p. 48. 28. Peking Review. October 20, 1959, p. 12. 29. Peking Review. December 15, 1959, p. 7. 30. Ibid., p. 6. 31. Peking Review. December 15, 1959, p. 6. 118 Despite the fact that the Treaty f i n a l l y went into effect i n January I960 and Peking continued to protest against the persecution of the overseas Chinese, the Indonesian government has continued to persist i n i t s course of action. In June of I960 i t was announced that more than 40,000 overseas Chinese had returned to China between January and May of the same year, the majority coming from Indonesia. ^2 Evaluation of discriminatory measures The Indonesian experiment has been dealt with at some length because i t points out the relative weight Peking attaches to the overseas Chinese as an instrument i n i t s overall Southeast Asian policy. Evidently Peking i s not prepared at this time to l e t the welfare of the overseas Chinese, no matter how seriously affected, interfere with i t s policy of winning support and friend-ship among the Southeast Asian nations. It may well be, however, that Peking i s taking a calculated risk and expects to benefit from the present situation i n the long run; thus a t a c t i c a l manoeuvre designed to serve a long term aim. For the Indonesian government's discriminatory actions and this i s true of a l l Southeast Asian governments, cannot have failed but to raise Peking's prestige i n the eyes of the overseas Chinese. Their traditional p o l i t i c a l apathy has been modified by an increasing p o l i t i c a l awareness for the need of protection. And where else could they look for protection but to the Mother Country? Conversely Peking's non-protectionist attitude might, therefore, result i n strengthening the bonds between the overseas Chinese and the home country. Peking's non-protectionist attitude should, however, not be implied to mean that i t no longer exercises any form of control over the overseas Chinese• Judging from a pronouncement made by Chou En-lai i n August 1958, 32. S.M.C.P. #2277. June I960, p. 22. 119 the reverse appears to be the case. Said Chou En-lai: "...the overwhelming majority of overseas Chinese i n Southeast Asian countries has always lived on friendly terms with the l o c a l inhabitants, i n accordance with the directives 33 of the Chinese government...." Similar sentiments have been voiced by an outside observer of the overseas Chinese who stated i n January, 1959, that "most of Peking's Chinese partisans overseas are by now sufficiently dis-ciplined to accept the new non-protectionist line without demur."^ Such pronouncements would seem to lend credence to the b e l i e f that Peking continues to retain for i t s e l f the power to manipulate the overseas Chinese as an important instrument i n i t s Southeast Asian policy. Allegiance of overseas Chinese There has been much speculation as to where the allegiance of the overseas Chinese ultimately l i e s — with Peking or Taipei, No doubt the increr-meat i n mainland China's international position of prestige plus the treatment of overseas Chinese dependents i n the great leap forward have had some bearing on this question. Generally speaking, however, the overall p o l i t i c a l climate i n Southeast Asia seems to be a determinant factor i n this respect, particularly among the leadership corps i n most overseas Chinese communities. In Thailand, for example, an anti-Communist campaign launched by the Thai-police i n 1952 and which profoundly affected the Chinese community, gave strong impetus during 1953-54 to a Kuomintang revival i n Thailand. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce became strongly Nationalist orientated, most pro-Communist officers were ar-rested and throughout 1953 the ranks of "publicly pro-Kuomintang" leaders swelled. **5 By the beginning of 1955 the Chinese i n Thailand gave the appearance, 33. Peking Review. Sept. 2, 1958, p. 9. 34. G. W. Skinner. The Annals, p. 147. Vol. 32. 35. G. U. Skinner. Leadership and Power i n the Chinese Community of Thailand New York, Cornell University. Pren. 1958. p. 289. " 120 at least, of a community solidly behind the Nationalist cause. .Between February and September, 1955, under the influence of the Bandung Conference, the p o l i t i -c a l pendulum began to swing left-ward again. A new p o l i t i c a l climate was created and as a result more pro-Peking attitudes became apparent among the Chinese leadership corps i n Bangkok; a development also characteristic of most overseas Chinese communities elsewhere i n Southeast Asia. ^6 I f the logic of this argu-ment i s pursued further i t would lead to the tentative conclusion that the combined effect of the suppression of the revolt i n Tibet, the Indian border intrusions and the widespread discriminatory actions against the overseas Chinese, have sufficiently altered the p o l i t i c a l climate to allow the pendulum to swing downward and perhaps to the right from i t s previous l e f t i s t position. Type of Chinese society - a contributing factor Another factor which has some bearing on the question o f overseas Chinese allegiance i s the type of Chinese society. The case of Java, Indonesia might well be applicable to other parts of Southeast Asia as well. In Java two types of Chinese society exist. The Paranakans (the mixed blood offspring of Chinese male immigrants and indigenous women) and the Totoks (Chinese-born immigrants whose language of daily use i s Chinese). Whereas many of the Perana-kans are considered to have only a sentimental interest i n China, the Totoks, 37 on the other hand, are "strongly orientated towards China." Although the Totok society was strong2y reinforced and stabilized due' £& a resurgence of Chinese immigration i n the late 1930's and late 1940's, and they constitute a slight majority i n most important commercial c i t i e s , nevertheless, the 36. G. W. Skinner. Leadership and Power i n the Chinese Community of Thailand New York, Cornell University. Pren. 1958. p. 302. 37. G. W. Skinner. "The Chinese of Java", Colloquium on Overseas Chinese, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, p. 3. 121 Peranakans, as of 1958, s t i l l held a numerical superiority i n the probable 38 ration of 60:4.0. In the post-war years Totok leaders i n i t i a t e d a campaign for the r e s i n i f i c a t i o n of the Peranakan society through the medium of Peking orientated Chinese schools. The apparent success of this campaign has led the Indonesian government since late 1957 to attempt to check the resin i f i c a t i o n of Peranakan children by setting up a system of national education. I f the above mentioned example i s v a l i d and i f i t i s justifiable to apply i t on a large scale, then the implication would seem to be that the "Peranakans" are the least and the young Chinese students the most pro-Peking orientated. The l a t t e r aspect i s also borne out by the pro-Peking attitude prevalent i n Singapore where over half the population consists of Chinese youth under twenty years of age. Conclusion In the f i n a l analysis, however, the allegiance of the overseas Chinese must be judged from two basic factors. In the f i r s t place, i n terms of their economic tradition, the overseas Chinese are primarily concerned with "making a l i v i n g or amassing a fortune." To the extent to which they are allowed-to pursue this concern without interference, they take only "a passive interest 39 i n the formal p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country i n which they l i v e " , or i n the country of their cultural heritage. In the second place, the overseas Chinese can not but feel a sense of pride i n the achievements of their Mother Country. 38. G. ¥. Skinner. "The Chinese of Java", Colloquau&on Overseas Chinese, New York, -Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, p. 3. 39. R. J . Coughlin. Double Identity - the Chinese i n Modern Thailand, Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press, I960, p. 169. 122 Regardless of the present regime's shortcomings, at least one fact cannot be denied, after a century of weakness and i n s t a b i l i t y i t has given China a new sense of direction and international prestige. This fact should not be underestimated i n the consideration of the overseas Chinese as one of the greatest assets i n Red China's long term policy toward Southeast Asia. As one writer observes: There can be no question that the interest of the overseas Chinese i n China has grown even more i n the past decade and would have grown, even i f Peking had done nothing to encourage i t . For throughout Southeast Asia the Chinese has u n t i l recently found himself an object of h o s t i l i t y and scorn viewed as a necessary e v i l because of the nature of the peasant economies of these countries ' Today with Red China a world power, the Nanyang (overseas Chinese) holds his head higher and the new national govern-ments of Southeast Asia are not unaware of the fact that a r t i c l e 98 of the Chinese Communist Constitution declares that 'The People's Republic of China shall protect the acquired rights and interests of overseas Chinese.' 4O 40. J.M. Van der Kroef. "China i n Southeast Asia", Current History. (Dec. 1957). VolJ2-33p. 35D. 123 Chapter V COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEIR PEKING ORIENTATION Introduction The Asian Communist Parties and their related front organizations constitute the f i f t h and f i n a l instrument i n Communist China's Afro-Asian policy. Taken together they provide a significant single instrument for the eventual expansion of Communism throughout Asia. Although Communist Parties are existing i n a l l Southeast Asian nations, there i s a notable difference i n the relative degrees of effectiveness and success which they have been able to register. Their greatest successes, so far, have been scored i n North Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia, whereas i n countries such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya and the Philippines, their effectiveness has been held to a minimum largely as a result of strong anti-Communist actions on the part of l o c a l c i v i l i a n and military authorities. Despite these discrepancies, however, the Asian Communist Parties have at least one important feature i n common and that i s a pronounced Peking orientation. Prior to 194-9 Communist expansion i n Southeast Asia was carried out under Cominform guidance, but following the founding of the Chinese Communist regime, emphasis began to shift to Peking. Reorganization on Chinese model The success of the Communist revolution i n China was convincing proof that the Maoist strategy was particularly well suited to the conditions prevail-ing i n Asia. Encouraged by this success, the new regime lost no time i n propa-gating the "Chinese Path" for a l l revolutionary movements i n the area. At a meeting of Asian Trade Unions held i n Peking i n November, 194-9, the basic prin-ciples of Mao's strategy were outlined. These included a broad united front consisting of workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, 124 the central position o f the Communist party i n this front, and the creation of national armies and t e r r i t o r i a l bases. Peking's efforts met with consider-able success for, i n 1951, most Asian Communist Parties underwent a general reorganization based on the Chinese model and the new party programmes echoed the Maoist Strategy of a united front and greater peasant participation i n the revolutionary struggle. 1951, therefore, constitutes a land mark i n the history of Asian Communism, for i t was i n this year that "Peking replaced Moscow as the major source of inspiration and advice to the Communist movement i n Southeast Asia." 1 This closer relationship has not prevented Asian Communism from maintaining a degree of independence from Peking and i n "many Asian nations the Communist parties feel they must guard against becoming too closely identified with Peking." 2 One possible explanation which may have contributed to this guarded attitude i s the fact that Communism i n Asia must be made applicable to special conditions. This would suggest an interesting pa r a l l e l with the Chinese Communist revolution. In the same way, as Mao Tse-tung insisted on adapting Soviet Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese conditions, so the Asian Communist parties i n s i s t on tailoring Maoism to suit their own lo c a l conditions. Thus, by invoking the principle of "National Roads to Communism" the ultimate form Communism i n Asia w i l l assume w i l l l i k e l y d i f f e r from that of either Moscow or Peking. As one writer puts i t : "...just as the pressure of Russian circumstances has modified Marxism, into Soviet Communism, and that of Chinese Circumstances has modified Com-munism i n China, so, i f Communism should triumph i n Southeast Asia, i t w i l l be a different form of Communism again, which ultimately arises." 3. 1. J.H. Brimmell, Communism i n Southeast Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 313-2. D. A. Barns t t , Communist China i n Asia. New York, Harper Brothers, I960. p. 162. 3. Brimmell, Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 377. 125 Moscow's influence Despite the fact that Peking's regional influence i n Asia has been a growing force since 1949 and that Communist parties i n the area are more closely modelled on the Chinese pattern than ever before, nevertheless, Moscow is. s t i l l regarded as the headquarters of world-wide Communist movements. I t s t i l l provides the ultimate authority i n matters of doctrinal and strategic guidance. This became apparent i n 1956 when Kiushclsv' i n a major speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union expounded a new line i n Communist thinking. Basing his argument on the contention that the capitalist system was disintegrating and that the superiority of the socialist system was a guarantee for victory, he declared that was was no longer " f a t a l -i s t i c a l l y inevitable." The existing world situation had made Stalin's method of exporting armed revolution suicidal. Therefore, Krushchev now called for the peaceful triumph of socialism from "within" - a course of action for which China provided the example par excellence. This new line was subsequently adopted at a meeting of Communist and Workers Parties of 64- countries, including Southeast Asia, i n Moscow i n November of 1957. The meeting issued a Peace Manifesto which stated that: The so c i a l i s t countries.. .are firmly convinced that socialism i s bound to win, but they know that socialism cannot be implanted from without, that i t w i l l come, above a l l , as a result of struggle by the working class and a l l other progressive forces within each country. 4-. Although the peaceful intentions of world Communism were there for a l l to see, nevertheless, i t was recognized that these were continuously threatened by the Western bloc's aggressive designs such as the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine and SEATO. By implication "peaceful coexistence" thus acquired a double meaning. On the one hand i t provided for the use of "parliamentary" methods wherever 4. J . H. Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 387. 126 this was feasible; on the other hand i t maintained the concept of "armed struggle" wherever the severity of opposition made this practical. The effect of the "peaceful coexistence" line has been a noticeable feature i n the development of Communism i n Asia. In Indonesia and Singapore, the Communist Parties have scored considerable successes as a result of using "parliamentary" methods and i n the case of Indonesia only resolute action on the part of the military i n 1957 prevented the communists from active partic-ipation i n President Sukarno's Cabinet. In Indo-China, on the other hand, "armed struggle" has been a dominant feature of communist efforts with con-siderable amounts of success. It should be added, however, that the close prox>Lmity of Communist China and the existence of an operational t e r r i t o r i a l base i n North Vietnam are two major factors which account for much of this success• Communism i n Indo-china The development of Communism i n Indo-china i s marked by a close interrelationship of revolutionary a c t i v i t y between Vietnam and China as well as between i t s three component parts: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Since 1951, when the old Indo-Chinese communist party was reformed under the new t i t l e of Lao Dong or Vietnamese Worker's Party, i t has exercised a controlling influence over i t s Cambodian and Laotion counterparts. This primary position i s partic-ularly significant i n view of Lao Dong' almost to t a l Communist Chinese orienta-tion. The party's statutes claim that i t i s based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, as adapted to the r e a l i t i e s of the Vietnamese revolution and the party's platform i s derived from Mao Tse-tung's On New Democracy. As a result of this situation communist a c t i v i t i e s i n Laos and Cambodia bear a close a f f i n i t y to Lao Dong and through the la t t e r to the Communist Chinese Party. 127 Historically Vietnam's relations with China are characterized by alternate periods of direct subjection or vassalage. As early as 214 B.C., China's armies occupied the eastern half of Worth Vietnam and Central Vietnam, and i n 113 B. C. Emperor Han Wu t i incorporated Nan lueh (the then existing appellation for the above mentioned parts of Vietnam) into the Han empire. During the Dinh dynasty (968 - 980) Vietnam became a tributary state of China. As part of the Ming expensionist program North Vietnam was again invaded (1406 - 1407) only this time strong Vietnamese opposition led to the expulsion of the Ming and i n 1428 the territory once again achieved tributory status. The Manchus viewed North Vietnam as well as the other tributary states i n Southeast Asia from the "standpoint of maritime trade and as possible fields 5 of colonial expansion". More recently these areas have assumed strategic and defensive significance. "These buffer areas," Laos, Thailand, Burma and Korea, "the Chinese were wi l l i n g to defend when necessary...but they were un-wil l i n g to l e t them grow strong enough to be troublesome." As a result of imperial China's suzerainty over North Vietnam the area experienced a strong Chinese cultural influence, which began during the Western Han and became particularly pronounced during the T'ang dynasty. In view of the historic Sino-Vietnamese relationship there can be l i t t l e surprise at the fact that Vietnamese Communism early developed a distinct Chinese orientation. By the time World War I I broke out, the Communist Party of Indo-China which has been formed originally i n Hong Kong, had made l i t t l e progress because of French police action to suppress the movements. However, i n 1941, the Vietminh or Vietnam Independence League was formed i n Kwangsi province, consisting of mainly l e f t i s t Vietnamese revolutionaries. 5. Hf.C.Hinton. China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam. New York. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. pp. 6-7. 6. Ibid, p. 6. 128 Aided and encouraged by the Kuomintang, the Vietminh set up a well organized anti-Japanese resistance Movement i n Indochina and by the end of the war, Ho Chi-minh, a Moscow trained revolutionary, had won complete control over this movement. Immediately after the Japanese surrender i n August 1945, Ho pro-claimed his Provisional Government, a VietminhNlominated regime, but i t was largely ignored by the Chinese Nationalist forces who were then i n occupation of the territory north of the 16th p a r a l l e l . Instead, they t r i e d to turn local administrative authority over to various non-Gommunist groups. Thwarted i n his attempts to take over control of the country and faced with the subsequent breakdown of negotiations with the French for independence i n 1946, Ho removed his government to the country side, where i t was transformed into a guerilla organization on Mao13 Yenan model with a t e r r i t o r i a l base and a people's army. This marked the beginning of an eight year struggle against the French which f i n a l l y culminated i n the 1954 Geneva settlement. From the outset of the c i v i l war i n Vietnam i n December 1946, the Communist controlled Vietminh closely followed the example of the Chinese Communist Party i n building up a military arm of i t s own. Until 1949 there were few contacts between the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists, but almost immediately after the Chinese Communist armies reached the borders of Vietnam they began to supply aid i n the form of equipment, supplies and the training of personnel i n China. This support proved important to the Vietminh, but Ho Chi Minh did not seek the active participation of Chinese troops i n his struggle against the French.-^ "...In view of the inherent Vietnamese dislike of Chinese 7 of any kind, i t would have been fat a l for his cause". to do so. Ety the end of 1952 the Vietminh camp had become an undisguised Communist regime with the Lao Dong Party representing the Communist Party of 7. M. D. Kennedy. ' A Short History of Communism i n Asia. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957. p. 424. 129 Vietnam. The Vietminh became openly linked i n a united front with the embryo Communist parties of Laos and Cambodia and with i t s united front organization, the Lien Viet. The close interrelationship of this united front became apparent i n 1953 when Vietminh broadcasts were declaring that Lao Dong and the Vietminh people had "a mission to create revolution i n Laos and Cambodia and to bring about their union with Vietnam." ^ Within this Chinese inspired broad united front, the Vietminh dom-inated Iao Dong party forms the controlling influence. The party's domestic policy closely reflects that l a i d down i n Mao Tse-tung's On New Democracy and emphasis has been placed on agrarian reforms, the wooing of intellectuals, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and the promise of equal rights to minorities. Another move which closely resembled the Chinese model was made i n 1955 when the party, having earlier placed great emphasis on the peasants and agrarian reforms as revolutionary means, declared that after the completion of these reforms the peasants must follow the road leading to collectivization. ^ Despite these efforts, however, North Vietnam has experienced serious d i f f i -culties i n the agrarian sector of i t s economy which led i n 1956 to the outbreak of armed revolt. The position of the leadership corps i n the united front i s undoubted-l y an important factor i n maintaining close Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietminh leaders share a common Lenninist ideology and a common Maoist revolutionary strategy. At the same time, however, they try to maintain comparative freedom of action and Peking so far appears to have acquesced i n this state of a f f a i r s . There has also been speculation as to the existence of factional division between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups. The basis for t h i s speculation was the 0 . M. D. Kennedy. A Short History of Communism i n Asia. London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957. p. 425. 9. Ibid, p.435-130 replacement by Ho of Truong Chlnh, reputedly the leader of a pro-Chinese faction -within the lao Dong, as party General Secretary i n 1956. Although such a d i v i -sion i s conceivable i n view of historic Vietnamese resentment toward the Chinese, there seems l i t t l e respect for a radical change i n the present close Sino-Vietnamese relations as long as Ho-Chi-Minh's leadership i s secure. That this i s the case becomes evident from a declaration made by Ton Due Thang, chairman of the Lien Viet Front. Hesaid that Mao's precepts of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology had been 'ingeniously applied' by president Ho Chi-Minh and the Lao Dong to the concrete conditions i n Vietnam.1 Since 1949, Sino-Vietnamese relations have developed to the point where at the present time the North Vietnam regime i s i n many respects a dependent state of Communist China. As a result of this development, North Vietnam has become an area of prime importance i n Peking's overall Southeast Asian policy. Not only does Communist China recognize the country's strategic importance as a buffer area, but more important, i t realizes the value of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as both a showcase for a l l of Asia and a firmly established t e r r i t o r i a l base for the penetrationof Indo-China. During the perios of the Indo-Chinese war, the Chinese refrained from openly intervening, as they had done i n the Korean war i n 1951, possibly because the Vietnamese people's army was i n no real danger and possibly because of the effect this might have on the Vietnamese. The likelihood has been suggested, however, that the Chinese were responsible for bringing about a f i n a l settlement, which f e l l short of Vietminh demands, because of fear that the Vietminh might become too strong and independ-ent. Such a move would obviously have been one of self-interest on the part of Peking but at the same time i t might have added to the already existing 10. M. D. Kennedy. A Short History of Communism i n Asia. London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957. p. 436. 11. Hintqn. , China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam, p. 19 131 Vietminh resentment of the Chinese. Laos and Cambodia Since the early f i f t i e s North Vietnam has figured prominently i n connection with Communist ac t i v i t i e s i n Laos and Cambodia. Evidently the Viet-minh leaders regard these areas as within their special sphere of revolutionary a c t i v i t y . The Chinese Communists also have a large stake i n Laos and Cambodia, however, and they have played a significant role i n developing strategy toward these areas, but i t i s the Vietnamese Communists who have taken the lead i n organizing and aiding the pro-Communist movements i n these two areas. Following the Japanese Surrender, small left-wing independence groups, bi t t e r l y hostile to the French, launched the Lao Issank (Free Laos) and Khmer Issarak (Free Cambodia) movements. When the French returned i n 1946 both move-ments were excluded from any participation i n the p o l i t i c a l development of their countries. Their leaders and supporters were driven out and fled to Thailand from where they operated i n exile with Vietminh assistance. Later, however, they were able to shift their operations back to Laos and Cambodia where the Lao Issarak set up the Pathet Lao United Front and the Khmer Issarak established a Khmer Issarak Front. By this time both front organizations had come under strong pressure from Vietminh leaders and i n 1951 they were integrated with the Communist controlled Vietminh by the establishment of the Joint People *s Committee of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Since then, the Vietminh's control and direction of their revolutionary struggles has become vir t u a l l y complete. This integration 12 marked the opening of an "extremely significant" new phase i n the Communist movement i n Indo-China and has proved to be an important factor i n Communist plans for securing control of the whole of Indo-China. In Cambodia the Khmer Issarak group has so far made l i t t l e headway i n organizing effective guerilla a c t i v i t i e s . One reason for the lack of success i s 12. Kennedy. A Short History of Communism i n Asia, p. 428. 1 3 2 the geographical location of the country which has no common border with North Vietnam, but a more compelling reason seems to be the personal popularity of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the Geneva Conference he abdicated early i n 1955, i n order to form his own Popular Socialist Community party and won a landslide victory i n the subsequent elections. In both the 1955 and 1958 Cam-bodian elections the Communists were unable to win a single seat. Also since 1955, Prince Sihanouk has come under the influence of Nehru and has pursued a policy of s t r i c t neutralism and toeing the Chinese l i n e . As long as he persists i n this policy and i s able to keep western influence out of the country, there i s l i t t l e prospect of the Communists becoming a real threat to Cambodia's independence. Communism i n Laos In Laos, on the other hand, the Bathet Lao movement has presented a major threat to the government and the country's independence. Three main fac-tors appear to be responsible for this situation. F i r s t , the Pathet Lao have developed strong guerilla forces which operate from an established t e r r i t o r i a l base i n the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, bordering on both North Vietnam and Communist China. Secondly, active United States military participation on behalf of the "legal" government, has brought western "imper-ialism" to China's doorstep. Thirdly, internal s t r i f e between the various p o l i t i c a l factors has prevented the emergence of a single authoratative government. Under the 1954 Geneva settlement both Laos and Cambodia were declared independent neutral countries and efforts were to be made to bring about a irapj^ cJkej&ejit. between the Pathet. Lao and the government of Laos. In addition a three man Truce Supervisory Committee was stationed i n the country to supervise the implementationo f the Geneva agreement. In spite of these measures, however, the period 1954 - 1957 was marked by a precarious balance i n which neither the Pathet Lao nor the government of Laos was able to gain a decisive military victory. The Pathet Lao also succeeded, with Vietminh support, i n preventing the integration 133 of the two northern provinces into the new state, as had been specified i n the Geneva agreement of 1954. Then i n November, 1957, as a result of a major shift i n strategy which occurred two years earlier, a p o l i t i c a l agreement was reached between the Pathet Lao and the government of neutralist premier Souvanna Phouma. Under this agreement the two northern provinces were to reintegrate under the central government, 15 percent (approximately 1500 men) of the Pathet Lao army were to be incorporated i n the national army and a new coalition government of National Unity, including the Pathet Lao representatives, was to be set up. Also the Pathet Lao movement gained legal status and was permitted to organize as a p o l i t i c a l party called the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front.) Taking advantage of their newly acquired legal status, the Communists began an intensive drive to win p o l i t i c a l support by pursuing the new Communist line of "parliamentary" methods. This effort proved so successful that during the 1958 elections they not only won 9 seats ou$ of a t o t a l Assembly membership of 59, but also managed to establish a controlling influence over an anti-government coalition which gained 4-0 percent of the popular vote. ^ At the same time, the Pathet Lao movement retained an underground organization and delayed the integration of i t s troops into the national army. Subsequent ef-forts by the government to impose a greater measure of control over the Com-munists failed, the Neo Lao Hak Xat members were later excluded from the Cabinet and by 1959 cooperation had deteriorated to the point where the Pathet Lao reverted once again to insurrectionist methods. Since 1959 any efforts to bring about a rapprochement between the government and the Pathet Lao have failed and the Communists have posed an increasingly serious threat by steadily building up and expanding their t e r r i t o r i a l base. The situation i s further aggravated by the fact that the internal p o l i t i c a l struggle i n Laos has assumed definite 13. Barnett. Communist China i n Asia. p. 484-134 cold war overtones with the l e f t i s t s headed by Prince Souphanouvong representing the Communists, the rightists headed by Prince Boun Oum representing a strong pro-American attitude and the neutralists headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma, a half-brother of Prince Souphanouvong, representing a middle of the road attitude. The personal r i v a l r i e s among these three princes have so far prevented the formation of a coalition government i n Laos and the successful outcome of the present international conference on Laos. Chinese stake i n Laos The Chinese Communists have a large stake i n Laos and are evidently not prepared to accept any international agreement which might i n any way jeopardize their present favourable position i n the area. The f i r s t formal indications of Peking's attitude toward Laos followed i n the wake of a statement by the Laotian Premier i n February 1959 i n which he repudiated the 1954 Geneva agreement and declared the government's opposition against the resumption of act i v i t i e s of the international supervisory commission. Peking's immediate reaction was that the statement constituted a "grave act of unscrupulous viola-tion of the Geneva Agreements and (formed) part of the United States imperialist plot of aggression against Indo-China." ^ Subsequent efforts by the United Nations Secretary General to mediate were condemned as i l l e g a l and Hammershjold himself was branded as"a tool of the vicious conspiracy of the United States." ^ Then i n May, 1959, following an order by the government of Laos that a l l Pathet Lao fighting units were to surrender, Peking's attitude hardened. A statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared these measures against the Pathet Lao to be tantamount to an "open launching of c i v i l war i n Laos." China, i t was declared, could not look on with indifference and i f the Laotion govern-ment persisted i n sabotaging the Geneva agreements i t had to be prepared to 14. S.M.C.P. #1960. February 18, 1959. p. 40. 15. S.M.C.P. #2144, November 21, 1959. p. 48. 335 shoulder " a l l the grave consequences. 16 As the situation i n Laos worsened and the United States became more openly involved, the Chinese Communists became more outspoken i n their criticism of the United States. The tension i n Laos was attributed to the United States imperialists 1 conspiracy to "turn Laos 17 into their colony and a military base against China...." and to draw Laos into the SEATO bloc. This, they declared, constituted a menace to the security of China. ^ The position of Laos i n terms of the wider framework of Communist China's policy was expressed by Chen Y i i n September 1959 when he said that: China has never encroached on other countries nor w i l l she tolerate encroachment by other countries. In international a f f a i r s , we always stand for the settlement of disputes between nations through peaceful negitiations, and for peaceful coexistence...between coun-tries with different social systems. 19 There can be l i t t l e doubt that Communist China i s deeply committed i n the conflict over Laos, but so i s the United States. On balance, however the Chinese are i n a more favourable position. In the f i r s t place the Pathet Lao has proved to be a highly organized and successful instrument at the polls as well as i n insurrectionist a c t i v i t i e s . In the second place the geographical proximity of North Vietnam and Communist China has been a valuable source of supply to the Pathet Lao i n securing their t e r r i t o r i a l base and strengthening their military arm. These two factors have enabled the Chinese to play a behind the scene role i n Laos and prevented them from becoming openly involved as happened i n Korea. Obviously, the Pathet Lao i s i n no real danger of defeat at the present time. United States involvement on the other hand, has from necessity been much more conspicuous and this open involvement; has cl#ar;3y played into the hands of Peking. 16. Peking Review. May 26, 1959. P« 13. 17. Ibid. June 2, 1959. p. 10. 18. Ibid. Aug. 18, 1959. p. 9. 19. Peking Review. Sept. 8, 1959. p. 13. 136 Peking can now claim that western imperialism poses a serious threat to the peaceful intentions of Communism i n Asia, a threat which can only be countered by active resistance. I f the immediate aim of Communist China's policy i s to drive western imperialism out of Asia, and i f the United States continues to hold i t s present position i n the area, there can be no prospect for an early-l e t up of Communist a c t i v i t i e s i n Indo-China. Generally speaking Peking's direct influence has been strongest where ethnic Chinese make up the bulk of the Communist Party membership. This appears to be the case i n Thailand, Malaya and Singapore. In malaya, for example, 95 20 percent of the members of the Malayan Communist Party are overseas Chinese, and i n Thailand the Communist Party i s estimated to have as many as 5000 Chinese 21 members as against 200 indigenous Thais. With the exception of Singapore, where Communist influence i s very pronounced, Communist ac t i v i t i e s i n Thailand and Malaya pose no immediate threat to the authority of the l o c a l governments. Communism i n Thailand Reference has already been made to the anti-Communist measures under-taken by the Thai administration during 1950 - 1954 and the oscillating position of the overseas Chinese leadership corps. In 1946 the o f f i c i a l ban on the Com-munist Party was l i f t e d but i n the following year i t was imposed again. The party has been unable to make much headway i n Thailand because the government i n recent years has taken increasingly stern measures against subversive activ-i t i e s and suppressed p o l i t i c a l parties i n general. In 1955, as a result of a relaxation of government legal measures, a brief flourishing of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s occurred and at least one small party sprang up with a decidedly pro-Peking orientation. In 1958, however, following a new military coup a l l p o l i t i c a l parties were banned and the suppression of a l l communist subversive 20. Barnett. Communist China i n Asia, p. 159. 21. Ibid, p. 490. 137 a c t i v i t i e s , was stepped up. As a result there appears to be l i t t l e prospect of a Comiminist success i n Thailand unless Peking decides on largescale Com-munist i n f i l t r a t i o n from across the Laotian border. Communism i n Malaya Similarly, as i n the case of the Vietminh, the Malayan Communist party has from i t s early beginnings been Chinese inspired. Originally the party was formed by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern i n 1930 but by the outbreak of World War II, Chinese agents were active i n organizing the party on the basis of an anti-Japanese popular front. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia provided the singularly most important impetus to the growth of the Communist Movement i n Malaya. The party withdrew to the jungle and organized i t s e l f into a guerilla resistance movement called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. In return for their cooperation with the British, the resistance movement was provided with Br i t i s h arms. In 1948, following the Calcutta Conference, the Malayan Communists launched a fullscale insurrectionist campaign i n which the nucleus consisted of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. The campaign was carried out on the pattern of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of protracted warfare and campaigns of quick decision, and i t aimed at the establishment of liberated areas as t e r r i t o r i a l bases and the formation of a broad anti-imperialist united front. Forced with a serious threat, government authorities i n Malaya issued drastic Emergency Regulations which proved so effective that i n the following year, 1949, the Communist Party's central committee admitted failure and de-cided to withdraw to the jungle i n order to set up a liberation army supported by Chinese squatters. Although the insurrectionist movement continued during 1950 and 1951, i t s effectiveness gradually declined as a result of determined government 66uhtei>measures. One major outcome of the struggle was that the poorly con-ducted campaign had reduced Communist prestige to a point where the Malayan 338 22 Communist Party had worked up a "mass aversion". Often the only way the Com-munists could secure support was through blackmail and terrorist t a c t i c s . In 1951 the Malayan Communists, realizing the adverse effect their violent tactics had had on the c i v i l i a n people, adopted a change of attitude. The party's p o l i t -bureau produced a new series of directives which called for a halt to indiscrim-inating military destruction and the antagonization of the v i l l a g e r s . The new directives called instead for a policy of winning the people's support, expan-sion of a mass base, i n f i l t r a t i o n aot the trade unions and withdrawal of the Liberation army deep into the jungle. From then on the Communists would direct their terrorist attacks against government forces rather than against the c i v i l i a n population. An interesting sidelight of the p o l i t i c a l situation i n Malaya has been the position of the Malaya Chinese Association, a p o l i t i c a l organization consist-ing largely of Chinese business interests. This Association has kept aloof from the Communist Party and turned to support the government. Shortly after the 1951 Kuala Lumpur municipal elections, the Malayan Chinese Association formed an a l -liance with the United Malayan National Organization which became the basis for the subsequent achievement of Malayan independence i n 1957. The Malayan Chinese Association's open support and cooperation with the government has undoubtedly been an important factor i n the declining fortunes of the Malayan Communist Party. Since 1955 when the party adopted a new programme which c ailed for the strengthening of Malayan national unity and was designed to appeal to the three main ethnic groups i n the country, the Communists have attempted to broaden their p o l i t i c a l support. labour unions and student groups have been their special targets. The achievement of independence i n Malaya i n 1957 also appeared to have an adverse effect on the fortunes of the Malayan Communists. Their earlier appeals for unity i n the face of B r i t i s h imperialism suddenly became meaningless and they 22* Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 326. 139 were forced to find new reasons for their existence. A l l t h i s , however should not be interpreted as a complete removal of the Communist threat i n Malaya. Their guerilla strength has declined steadily, but the danger of p o l i t i c a l subversion remains• Furthermore, the Malayan Communists have not concealed their long term struggle for the achievement of a people's democracy and the eventual establish-ment of socialism i n Malaya. Communism i n Singapore In contrast to Malaya, where Communist fortunes have been steadily declining, the Communist Party i n Singapore has been increasingly successful i n dominating the country's p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Much of the party's success can be attributed to the fact that since 1955 i t has heavily i n f i l t r a t e d Singapore's labour unions and Chinese high schools. So tight, i n fact, i s the Communist control over these groups that they have frequently used these workers and students to foment riots and strikes, thereby, seriously threatening the internal security of Singapore. The Communists' main p o l i t i c a l instrument i s the People's Action Party which was formed i n 1954- and emerged as the strongest p o l i t i c a l group i n the municipal elections i n Singapore i n 1957. Despite government efforts to c u r t a i l communist act i v i t y by arresting key leaders, the party continued to grow and i n 1959 elections for a new Assembly, the People's Action Party won a resounding victory. It promptly proceeded to demand f u l l independence from the British Government, but so far the Br i t i s h have been unwilling to grant more than i n -ternal self-government. Internally the Paaple's Action Party appears to be suffering from a p o l i t i c a l struggle between two factions• The f i r s t of these i s headed by Lee Kuan Yew, a determined anti-imperialist and left-wing s o c i a l i s t , but not a 140 Communist. The second faction i s headed by Lim Chin Siong who i s decidedly pro-Chinese Communist i n outlook. When Lee became Prime Minister of Singapore, after the 1959 elections, the almost impossible situation developed whereby a non-Communist Prime Minister came to rely for his main support on pro-Peking Chinese labour and student groups. Although Lee has had some success i n dimin-ishing Communist influence i n the party's organization, the fact nevertheless remains that the base of the party continues to rest fundamentally on these tightly Communist controlled groups. Communism i n Burma The history of Communist development i n Burma provides a striking difference from that i n North Vietnam. Burma shares a 1500 mile common frontier with Communist China, but so far the Chinese have shown l i t t l e inclination to exploit this geographical proximity to i t s fullest extent. In fact, Peking has shown a willingness to conduct i t s relations with neutralist Burma i n a friendly atmosphere of cooperation and mutual support as evidenced by the recent conclu-sion of a Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. A more fundamental explanation for Peking's apparent "lack of interest", however, may be found i n the profound lack of unity of the Communist movement i n Burma. Following a s p l i t i n Communist ranks i n 1946, two separate parties have been i n existence: the Burma Communist Party or "White Flag" Communists and the Communist Party of Burma or "Red Flag" Com-munists. Both parties follow the marxist l i n e , but they seem to di f f e r i n their respective interpretations of Marxism. Marxism has been a dominant force i n the development of the Burmese Nationalist Movement and i n a l l likelihood i t was a factor i n the formation of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPEL) during World War I I . In i t s original form the AFPEL consisted of the Communist Party prior to i t s s p l i t , and the Socialists under Premier U Nu, but i n 1947 the Communists were expelled from membership and the Socialists became the dominant group i n the AFPEL. The 141 Socialist Party's p o l i t i c a l philosophy rests on the acceptance of Marxism as a guide to action i n the revolutionary movement and the application of Chinese and Russian methods to Burma's own conditions, and one of these conditions i s that Burma i s a devout Buddhist country. As a result, the basically material-i s t i c approach of Marxism has been modified to the extent of satisfying the country's s p i r i t u a l needs. It i s this peaceful Buddhist approach to Marxism, as contrasted with, the violent opportunistic approach, which appears to be at the root of the factional differences i n the Burmese Communist Movement. Despite these differences, however, both Communist parties embarked on a programme of insurrection against the government i n March 1948. Faced with this Communist threat and the additional threat posed by hostile actions from remnant Kuomintang troops who had fled to Burma i n 1949, the government came perilously close to losing control of the country. From 1951 onwards, how-ever, i t steadily regained control and by 1957 i t was estimated the Communists' armed strength had been reduced to under 1000 men. 2 ^ With the decline i n Communist guerilla strength came the increase i n above ground p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . In 1950 the Communists established a front organization, since called the Burma Workers' Party, which soon came to form the strongest element i n a parliamentary group called the National United Front. This group acquired a key position i n mid-1958 when as a result of the break-up of AFPEL the National United Front came to occupy a balance of power position i n parliament. The Communists were quick to exploit their favourable position by demanding concessions from U Nu, i n return for their support. U Nu was saved from this blackmail position by General Ne Win, who i n the f a l l of 1958 took over the premiership from U Nu and immediately took vigorous steps i n combating 23. Barnett. Communist China i n Asia. p. 496. 142 r i s i n g Communist influence. In I960 U Nu returned to the premiership but i n recent weeks reports from Burma indicate that the military has once again taken over and placed the premier under arrest. It i s conceivable that there i s a connection between the military coup and a possible threat of rising Communist influence• Despite the lack of unity among the Burmese Communists and the possible source of confusion this may be for Peking and Moscow, the Chinese Communist influence i s an established fact. In 1951, following instructions from Peking, The Burma Communist Party adopted a new line advocating a peaceful end to the fighting and the formation o f a broad united front with a l l revolutionary forces. There have also been repeated communications across the border with China. In 1950 the People's Unity Party was set up, i n the closest approximation to the Burma Communist Party on a legal basis, which claimed to represent four classes of people, thus echoing the Chinese model, and devoted i t s e l f to a study of the thought of Mao. Since the formal proclamation of the "peaceful co-existence" line i n 1956, the Communist parties of Burma have accepted the Peking imposed line of ending the war through negotiation rather than insurrection. Sino-Burmese boundary dispute as a factor Part of the explanation for the friendly atmosphere i n Sino-Burmese relations can probably be found i n Communist China's change i n tactics between 1949 - 1955. From the beginning of the founding of the Communist regime, Pekings attention centered around militant revolution through local Communist organiza-tions. This militant approach was prompted by the b e l i e f that China s t i l l had a valid claim to which she considered to be her former terr i t o r i e s and depen-dencies. Mao Tse-tung expressed this b e l i e f indirectly i n a theoretical work entitled She Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party which appeared 143 i n 194-9. He states that: In defeating China i n war, the imperialistic powers had taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her t e r r i t o r i e s . Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Prescadores Islands, Port Arthur} England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong} France occupied Amnam; and even an i n -significant country like Portugal took Macao. 24 By 1954 this claim had lost some of i t s tenatality because the rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism and the corresponding loosening grip of the colonial powers. Peking was now forced to deal with extremely nationalist conscious independent l o c a l governments and, therefore, had to change i t s approach accord-ingly. The formal acceptance of the "peaceful co-existence" line marked the opening of a new phase i n Communist China's t a c t i c s . Relations with Southeast Asia were now openly conducted on a government-to-government level and i n the 1954 edition of Mao's theoretical work any reference to those countries now having independent governments, for example Burma and Nepal, was dropped. They were no longer openly considered as dependencies of China. There s t i l l remained, some longstanding questions of dispute, however, but attempts were made to seek a peaceful solution to them. The Sino-Burmese boundary question was a case i n point. The dispute dates back to the end of the 19th century when a joint Anglo-Chinese commission surveyed the boundary between 1897 and 1900, but l e f t a 200 mile stretch north of Myitkyina (Latitude 25° 35' N) undetermined. These three village tracts i n Kachin State have subse-quently formed the crux of the Sine—Burmese boundary dispute. Despite Sun Yat-sen's claims to the territory, the Br i t i s h i n 1934 for the f i r s t time extended their authority over the area north of Myitkyina. In the same year joint boun-dary commission was created under a neutral chairman appointed by the League of Nations. The Qommission's findings awarded three-fifths of the disputed territory to China, but the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War prevented the implementation Hinton. China's Relations with Burma and Vietnam. p._ 49. 144 of these findings. At the end of the war the-Chinese Nationalist government again put forward strong claims to the triangle above Myitkyina and when the Communist regime took over i n 1949 no f i n a l solution had been reached. During the neat five years the boundary dispute remained unsolved, but the year 1954, following a stopover by Chou En-lai i n Rangoon on his return home from the Geneva Conference, marked the beginning of a period of closer Sine—Burmese relations. Prior to 1954 Sino-Burmese relations were strained as a result of repeated ex-cursions by Chinese Communist troops into the disputed area. In October 1956 Premier U Nu of Burma went on a v i s i t to Peking for talks accompanied by leaders from the disputed Kachin state and a new joint boundary commission was set up to survey the entire boundary. Following the completion of the commission's work, a Sino-Burmese Boundary agreement was signed i n October I960 which gave control over the major portion of the disputed area to China. The significant point which emerges from this discussion i s that the entire Sine—Burmese boundary settlement took place i n an atmosphere of mutual cooperation j this i s i n stark contrast to the hostile mood prevailing .in the present Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Burma's policy of neutrality and seeking accommodation with Communist China was undoubtedly a prime factor i n bringing about a peaceful solution to the dispute. At the same time this may explain to a large extent why Peking has thus far refrained from exploiting the Communist Parties i n Burma more f u l l y . Communism i n Indonesia - model for Asia One of the Southeast Asian contries where Communism has been most ef-fective i s Indonesia. "The case of Indonesia i s a model for the Communist move-ment i n Southeast Aisa." ^ There are two main reasons why the Communist party 25. Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 376. 145 of Indonesia has been successful. F i r s t , the creation of a mass base of support since 1951. The result of which has been that i n the 1957 l o c a l elections the Conraunist party emerged as the strongest party i n Java, the center of p o l i t i c a l power i n Indonesia. Second, from i t s early beginnings i n the 1920's the party has identified i t s e l f with Indonesian nationalism and given loyal support to many of President Sukarno's proposals. Between 1927 and 1945 the Communist party, which was closely linked with Moscow remained v i r t u a l l y eclipsed as a p o l i t i c a l force. In October 1945 the party was re-established i n Djakarta and began to pursue a policy of giving support to a series of left-wing cabinets. Dissension among the party's leader-ship, the lack of mass support, and the f a i l u r e of an ill-timed communist-led uprising i n Madiun i n 1948, a l l contributed to the party's f a l l i n g i n disrepute. From 1950 onward, however, the party's fortunes began to change. In 1953 A i d i t , who had v i s i t e d China, became Secretary General of the Communist Party and under his direction the 5th Party Congress adopted a new programme i n 1954 which was based on the Maoist l i n e . The new Programme advocated the establishment of a people 's democracy and called for the formation of a four-class national united front with strong emphasis to be placed on the inclusion of the peasants into this front. A i d i t outlined the Communist party's new approach i n the following terms: "a certain framework of democratic freedom exists i n Indon-nesia which allows the Communist Party today to use demo-cratic institutions to attain i t s immediate p o l i t i c a l aims." 26 In the 1955 - 1956 elections the Communist Party managed to p o l l 20 percent of the popular vote and obtained 29 out of 257 seats i n Parliament. The party continued to lend support to various non-Communist Cabinets, but failed to secure active participation i n the government. From 1955 onwards the p o l i t i c a l situation i n Indonesia deteriorated 26. Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 362. 146 rapidly. The openly anti-Communist Moslem dominated Masjumi party, which had so far maintained an uneasy form of participation i n the government, suddenly announced i t s withdrawal from the newly formed Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. In addi-tion vice-president Hatta, who represented a moderate and l i b e r a l viewpoint, resigned his post and the f i r s t of a series of rebellions by regional military commanders i n the outlying areas of Indonesia occurred. In the midst of this c r i s i s President Sukarno embarked on a tour of Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Communist China and upon his return displayed a notable pro-Peking attitude. Echoing Mao-Tse-tung's dictum that colonialism imist die because i t i s the irrovocable law of nature and that friend-ship between the two nations was permanent, Sukarno declared that: The triumph of the Chinese People's Republic i s the triumph of Indonesia. The triumph of Indonesia i s also the triumph of the Chinese People's Republic. The triumph of 27 Indonesia i s the triumph of a l l Asia...." Acting upon this newly acquired wisdom Sukarno subsequently proposed his concept of "guided democracy" as a cure for the nation's p o l i t i c a l i l l s . Although he declared this new concept to be based on the traditional Indonesian democratic principle of "Gotong Rojong" (mutual cc—operation.) there was, however, an unmistakable resemblance to Mao Tse-tung's concept of "democratic centralism". "Guided Democracy" meant, i n effect, the formation of a cabinet representative of a l l p o l i t i c a l parties i n Parliament, including the Communists, while Sukarno would personally "guide" the democratic discussions and thus retain a controlling influence. Needless to say, the Communists wholeheartedly supported the President's proposal. They intensified their p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s and by late 1957 claimed 28 the party's membership ho have jumped from 8000 i n 1952 to over one million. 27. Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 371. 28. Barnett. Communist China i n Asia, p. 494* 147 This phenomenal growth further resulted i n the expansion of the party's mass base to the point where i t emerged i n 1957 as the strongest p o l i t i c a l party on Java, and by 1958 the prospects for a Communist victory i n the national elec-tions, scheduled for 1959, appeared to be highly favourable. By this time, however, the military had become increasingly uneasy about the rapidly deteriorating p o l i t i c a l situation i n Indonesia and the cor-responding threat posed by the rising influence of the Communists. Although the military has so far shunned outright responsibility for carrying out the process of government i t has nevertheless reserved for i t s e l f the prerogative of intervention. The exercise of this prerogative since 1958 has been largely instrumental i n limiting the a c t i v i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l parties i n general and reducing Communist influence i n particular. These efforts seem to have prevented for the time being, a Communist take-over i n Indonesia, but they did not result i n doing away with the party's mass base of support. As long as the Communists are able to pursue their peaceful strategy of revolution from below, they w i l l continue to form a threat to the country's p o l i t i c a l independence. One feature of the development of the Communist movement i n Indonesia i s the apparent contest being waged by both Moscow and Peking to win a position of influence i n the country. At f i r s t there appears to have been a division of roles between the two. Since 1955, however, Peking's role appears to have i n -creased. Much of the Indonesian Communist Party's success can be attributed to the application of the Maoist principles of united front with major emphasis on peasant support. At the same time, however, the party has closely adhered to the "parliamentary" line as advocated by Khruschov at the 20th Party Congress i n Moscow i n 1956. In an effort to maintain the good w i l l and support of both Moscow and Peking, the Indonesian Communist Party has been careful to avoid the image of being overly dependent on either one. Consequently, i t has attempted to picture i t s e l f as following a kind of "Indonesian Marxism." "We must create a Marxism that w i l l match the s p i r i t and characteristics of Indonesia...so that 148 29 the people w i l l see nothing foreign i n i t . . . . ' 1 The fact remains, however, that Indonesia, this wealthiest and most populous of Southeast Asian nations, has become a focal point of Communist interests i n this area of the world. Conclusion In conclusion i t may be said that the Communist movement i n Southeast Asia has, since 1949, displayed a distinct Chinese orientation. The year 1951 marked a reorganization of Communist parties and party programmes on the basis . of the Chinese model.. Although Moscow i s s t i l l accepted as the ultimate source of world-wide Communist strategy, nevertheless, Peking's regional influence has been unmistakably instrumental i n securing Communist successes i n Indo-China and Indonesia. In those Southeast Asian countries where Peking has so far refrained from exploiting the Communist parties to the fullest extent, i t has been guided by the exigencies of a wider p o l i t i c a l strategy. In the case of Burma and Cambodia, as long as these countries are willing to toe the Chinese li n e , Peking i s not l i k e l y to embark on full-scale subversive a c t i v i t i e s . A l l this does not mean however, that the Chinese Communists have abandoned.their ultimate hopes with respect to these countries and Southeast Asia generally. They w i l l doubtlessly continue i n their long term strategy to drive out im-perialism and bring the area under effective p o l i t i c a l and economic control. Depending on whether or not Communism i n Southeast Asia w i l l develop a distinct character of i t s own, removed from the influence of both Moscow and Peking, the Communist Parties w i l l continue to form an important instrument i n the fulfilment of Peking's Southeast Asian policy. 29. Brimmell. Communism i n Southeast Asia, p. 372. 149 CONCLUSION The founding of the Chinese Communist regime i n 1949 must be regarded as one of the most singularly important outcomes of World War II. I t was important for two main reasons. F i r s t , i t marked the triumph of Communism i n Asia for the f i r s t time i n history. Secondly, i t ushered i n a new period i n the history of the Far East. The Chin-ese revolution which derived i t s main impulse from the teachings of Marx and Lenin coincided with the growing nationalist revolution i n Asia. Despite the ideological commitment of the former, however, both these revolutions were nutured by a common objective, namely, to cast off the yoke of European colonialism and to hasten the evolution to-ward national independence. This common objective, together with past colonial experience, has been largely responsible for the present Chinese Communist regime's claim that the two revolutions are " a l l i e s " and i n as much as they oppose imperialism, become part of the pro-letarian-socialist world revolution. Communist China has traditional, as well as ideological interests i n South and Southeast Asia. Traditionally, this region, particularly Southeast Asia, has been under strong Chinese influence for many centuries. In the old Confucian system of government, China conceived of herself as the only bearer of c i v i l i z a t i o n , sur-rounded by numerous dependencies who were required to f u l f i l the o b l i -gations of their inferior status. Apart from China's cultural 150 influence, however, the Chinese have been traditionally preoccupied with the expansion of effective p o l i t i c a l control over their peri-pheral areas as a means of safeguarding against repeated invasions by hostile tribes. Invariably therefore when a strong dynasty ruled the empire i t embarked on an expansionist policy of extending and consoli-dating the government's p o l i t i c a l control. Ideologically, Communist China today conceives herself as the leader of the "liberation" movement among the "colonial -and semi-colonial people" i n Asia and Africa. While i t s tactics vary from place to place and from time to time, the overall strategy of Peking toward the Afro-Asian nations i s to alienate these countries from the West and to draw them eventually to the "camp of peace and socialism". While this strategy may lead to only painstakingly slow results, the Chinese are not discouraged, for they believe that time and history are on their side, and that patience i s their greatest virtue. The main source of inspiration and authority for Communist China's policy i s derived from the revolutionary doctrines of Marx and Lenin. These form the "ultimate truth", the Communist gospel, from which no deviation can be tolerated. There must be the closest pos-sible unity i n the Communist bloc, i n order to successfully resist the aggressive forces of imperialism and eventually carry the soc i a l i s t revolution to i t s ultimate triumph. Marxism-Leninism, therefore, pro-vides the great unifying force for the socialist camp. At the same time, the Chinese Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism i s a dynamic 151 force, a "creative science", which is constantly undergoing changes as a result of changing world conditions. "Nothing remains changeless" r Mao Tse-tung once said; the world i s dynamic and in a constant state of flux. I t would be impossible, therefore, to conceive of a world based on the principle of status quo or a "doctrinarian" interpretation of ideology. Instead the "ultimate truth" of Marxism-Leninism l i e s i n the practical application of this doctrine to the requirements of a constant-ly changing environment. There must be a constant interplay and mutual interdependence between "theory" and practice". The Chinese Communist consider this relationship to be v i t a l i n view of the fact that Commun-i s t doctrine must be tailored to suit the special conditions of the country i n which i t hopes to triumph. Hence, the concept of "national roads to Communism". The history of the Chinese Communist revolution provides the most convincing example of the validity of this concept, for i t was Mao Tse-tung who on the basis of Lenin's essay on "Imperialism" estab-lished the theoretical framework for the "Asianization" of Soviet Com-munism. He early recognized the potential inherent i n the peasantry as a basis of support for the revolutionary movement in predominantly agrarian societies and consequently demonstrated their usefulness i n the successful completion of the Chinese revolution. Mao also demon-strated the successful use of a "united front" based on the greatest possible participation of a l l revolutionary classes. Perhaps the 152 greatest testimony to Mao Tse-tung's contributions to the ideologi-cal framework of Marxism-Leninism i s that "Mao:ism" has become the established pattern for the Communist revolution in Southeast Asia and that there has been a shift i n emphasis from Moscow to Peking as the foremost source of advice and support i n the region. Southeast Asia i s considered as a Chinese sphere of i n f l u -ence and Peking's long-term strategy toward this region is aimed at establishing i t s e l f i n a position of hegemony. In order to realize this aim, the Chinese Communists have displayed great v e r s a t i l i t y i n tactics. These tactics are designed and pursued with the long-term objective i n mind, and are dependent on the internal and external conditions prevailing during any given period of time. Prior to 1955 Peking followed a militant revolutionary approach, marked by insur-rectionist movements throughout Asia. With the start of China's industrial reconstruction programme i n 1953, and the emergence of an increasing number of nationalist-minded Asian nations, Peking came to favour the "peaceful co-existence" approach as a means of winning greater international support for i t s policies. Since 1958, i t has become increasingly evident, however, that Chinese nationalist as-pirations occupy a predominant place i n Peking's overall policy and that these w i l l continue to do so as long as the present government has the strength and authority to back up their claims. These nationalist aspirations have led to a curious dichoto-my of the Peking government's policies toward specific Asian coun-t r i e s . On the one hand, this i s marked by a policy of self-aggrandize-ment and assertiveness i n becoming a world power, while on the other 153 hand i t i s marked by an anxiety to present China as the friendly pro-tector of new So'iivtheast Asian and African nations. The recent sup-pression of the revolt i n Tibet, and the adverse effect this had on Southeast Asian opinion would seem to suggest that "peaceful co-existence" i s only regarded as a temporary ta c t i c a l device i n the pur-suit of wider Chinese nationalist aims. To achieve her policy objectives Communist China has s k i l -f u l l y operated a number of instruments - diplomacy, economics, culture, the overseas Chinese, and local Communist parties. From the outset, the new regime aimed to expand i t s diplomatic frontiers and to establish Peking as the diplomatic center of gravity i n Asia. Over the past ten years Peking has witnessed a steady stream of v i s i t i n g heads of state and delegations from a large number of Afro-Asian nations. At the same time, Chou En-lai's v i s i t s abroad have done much to cultivate an atmos-phere of friendship and goodwill between China and her " a l l i e s " . In the past few years, the Peking regime has also made marked efforts to expand i t s economic relations and technical aid programmes with Southeast Asia and since I960 with Africa. A significant feature of Communist China's "trade offensive" has been the growing import-ance of industrial products i n her exports to these regions, as part of an economic drive to capture control of markets, which hitherto have been dominated by Japan and India. There are certain specific and immediate motives behind this trade drive. F i r s t , Communist China needs petroleum, rubber and non-ferrous metals, and other basic commodities, to continue i t s plans of 154 "socialist construction". Secondly, through expanded exports to South-east Asia, Peking seeks to earn more foreign exchange to pay for these essential imports. Thirdly, Communist China aims to propagandize her industrial progress and enhance her national prestige. Fourthly, Pek-ing attempts to use trade and aid to win goodwill, and to promote closer relations with the Southeast Asian and African countries. By and large, commercial agreements between Communist China and Southeast Asia have been arranged on a barter basis, and the most striking example has been the Sino-Ceylonese rubber for rice barter. Both i n value and percentage, the trade has been rather modest but when i t i s viewed i n terms of China's own domestic needs, the impor-tance cannot be denied. Also, China has since 1958, seriously entered the f i e l d of economic aid and long-term loans, and Chinese technicians and experts are today employed i n a large number of underdeveloped coun-tri e s i n Africa and Asia. In addition to trade, the existence of some ten million over-seas Chinese i n Southeast Asia, provides a useful channel for Peking's economic drive. Their unique economic position i n Southeast Asia gives them a significance out of a l l proportion to their numbers. Although Peking for the moment, appears willing to "sacrifice" their interests for the sake of winning the support of nationalist regimes i n inter-national affairs, there can be l i t t l e doubt that the regime w i l l continue to view the overseas Chinese as a major instrument i n extending i t s influence over the Asian scene. In so far as relations between mainland 155 China and the Southeast Asian governments are concerned, the existence of overseas Chinese continues to be a source of f r i c t i o n . Many South-east Asian governments are confronted with the problem of integrating these p o l i t i c a l l y weak but economically influential minority groups into a larger framework of national consciousness. This task i s compli-cated by the fact that the overseas Chinese have strong cultural a f f i l i a -tions and f e e l an unmistakable pride i n the growing international pres-tige of their mother country. Finally, Peking has since 1951 extended i t s influence over the Communist parties i n Southeast Asia. In such countries as Indonesia, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, application of the "Maoist" strategy of revolution has been accompanied by a considerable amount of success. Since 1951, a general reorganization has taken place of Asian Communist Party programmes on the basis of the Chinese model and these have come openly to embrace the principle of "united front" with mass peasant support. Indonesia today provides the outstanding example of the extent to which this peaceful "parliamentary" approach has been successful, and i t has made this country a model for the Communist revo-lution i n Asia.. There can be no doubt that Communist China today i s a growing force i n the world and particularly i n Asia. To what extent Peking w i l l eventually succeed i n achieving i t s long-term strategy toward the Afro-Asian nations w i l l depend i n large measure on i t s a b i l i t y to develop and strengthen i t s domestic economy, and on the attitude i t takes i n 156 conducting relations with these countries. At the moment, Com-munist China's militant posture can be largely attributed to the un-fulfilment of nationalist aspirations and not even Moscow appears to be able, at the present time, to alter this posture. Communist revo-lutionary doctrine, has so far proved to be an indispensable tool i n pursuing these nationalist aims, but whether or not, China w i l l con-tinue to accept Marxism-Leninism as the "ultimate truth", once their aims have been accomplished, remains a question for the future. 157 BIBLIOGRAPHY Documents Brandt, C. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press, 1952. Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question. Peking, Foreign Lan-guage Press, I960 - A collection of formal diplomatic exchanges between India and China expressing the respective views held by these countries i n the boundary dispute. Primary Sources Appadorai, A. The Bandung Conference. New Delhi, Sapru House, 1955. The author, who i s the Secretary General of the Indian Council of World Affairs gives a non-political account of the major developments and resolutions passed at the f i r s t Asian-African Conference. Barnett, D. A. Communist China i n Asia. New York, Harper and Brothers. I960. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations -the most recent and comprehensive survey on Communist China's relations with Asian Countries - a valuable source i n establishing the main outlines of the thesis. Brimmell, J . H. Communism i n Southeast Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 1959 - An invaluable source i n providing an insight into the transformation of the Communist doctrine and i t s application to the Asian scene. Carew Hunt, R. N. The Theory and Practice of Communism. London, Geoffrey Bles, 1950 - A penetrating study of Marxist theory and the contributions made to i t by Lenin and Stal i n . Chang, CM., Communist China i n Asian A f f a i r s . Washington, D. C. Institute of Ethnic Studies, 1958 - General reference source. Chou En-Lai. On Present International Situation. China's Foreign  Policy, and the Liberation of Taiwan. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1956 - Major Policy Speech to the First National Peoples Congress on June 28, 1956. Clyde, P. H. The Far East. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1958 - General reference source. Communist China Problem Research Series. Hong Kong, The Union Research Institute - Four separate studies have been consulted. 1. Hsiao Chi-jung "Revenue and Disbursement of Communist China," 1955, E. C. 8 2. Lu Yu-sun, "Programs of Communist China for overseas Chinese" 1956, E. C. 12. 158 3. Lin Hua, "Communist China, 1955", E. C. 15 - deals with China's foreign trade. 4. Yun Ho, "Communist China, 1957", 2. C. 20 - deals with Sino-Soviet Relations. Concerning the Situation i n Laos. Peking, Foreign Language Press, - Collection of statements and letters by Chinese o f f i c i a l s as well as editorials and news reports on Laos. Coughlin, R . J . Double Identity - the Chinese i n Modern Thailand -Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, I960 - discusses changes i n Chinese allegiance as a result of fluctuation i n Asian p o l i t i c a l climate. Author expresses the view that the Chinese i n Thailand are culturally alienated from China. F i f i e M , R. H. The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-1958. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1958, - general reference source. Hinton, H. C. Chinese Relations with Burma and Vietnam. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958, - survey of historic relations and traditional Vietnamese Anti-Chinese resent-ment - Vietnamese anxious to retain independence from Peking. Kennedy, M. D. A Short History of Communism i n Asia. London, Weiden-feld and Nicolson, 1957 - source provides valuable informa-tion with regard to the influence exercised by the Vietnam Communist party over i t s counterparts i n Laos and Cambodia. Lenin. Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York, International Publishers, 1939- - Lenin's theoretical expose' of the relationship between monopolycapital and the acquisition of colonies. - Important work with regard to Chinese Communists1 identification of Asian nationalism with Anti-imperialism. Mao Tse-tung. On People's Democratic Dictatorship. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1953. New Democratic-Constitutionalism. Peking, Foreign Lan-guage Press, I960. On New Democracy. Peking, Foreign Language Press, I960. On Practice. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1953. On the Protracted War. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954* Our Study and the Current Situation. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1955. The Question of Independence and Autonomy Within the United  Front. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954. 259 'Imperialism' and a l l Reactionaries are Paper Tigers. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1958. These were major sources and were used abundantly throughout this paper, particularly i n Chapters I and I I . Panikkar, K. M. The Afro-Asian States and their Problems. London, George Allen and Union Ltd., 1959 - expresses the Asian viewpoint that democracy remains a borrowed ideology, whose implica-tions are l i t t l e understood and whose institutions have no special significance. Schwartz, B. I. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951 - most authoritative and well-documented account of Mao's rise to power within the Chinese Communist Party. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. London, Lawrence and Wishart, Vol. 1 (1954); Vol. 2 (1954); Vol. 3 (1954); Vol. 4 (1956) -Collection of Mao's writings from the earliest days of his revolutionary a c t i v i t i e s - a valuable source i n analyzing the evolution of Maoism. Steiner, H. A. The International Position of Communist China: P o l i t i c a l  and Ideological Directions of Foreign Policy. New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. Tang, P. S. H. Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, - 1957, used primarily for ideological background material. - Shows how present Chinese Communist ideology has evolved from i t s Marxist-Leninist form and been adapted to the specific Asian conditions• Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard. The Left Wing i n Southeast Asia. New York, William Sloane Association, 1950 - published under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations - only useful for back-ground material on l e f t wing movments prior to 1950. Walker, R. L. China under Communism - the f i r s t five years - New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955 - general reference source. Secondary Sources Appleton, S. "Communism and the Chinese i n the Philippines", Pacific  Affairs, (Dec. 1959), Vol. 32. Boorman, H. L. "Peking i n World P o l i t i c s " , Pacific Affairs, ( f a l l 196l), Vol. 34- #3. 160 Bosch, van der, A. "Chinese Thrust i n Southeast Asia", Current  History. (Dec. 1959). Brenda, H. J . "Communism i n Southeast Asia", Yale Review, (March,1956) Vol. 45. Cohn, D. L. "The Communist Approach to Burma", Atlantic (Sept.1956) F a l l , B. F. "Vietnam's Chinese Problem", Far Eastern Survey.(May 1958) Vol. 27. Far Eastern Economic Review - Published i n Hong Kong (July 21, I960) Vol. 29 #3. (Jan. 12, 1961) Vol. 31 #2. Hudson, G. F. "Communist Ideology i n China", International A f f a i r s . (April, 1957) Vol. 33. King, J . K. "Thailand's Bureaucracy and the threat of Communist Subversion" Far Eastern Survey.(Nov. 1954), Vol. 23. Kozicki, R. J . "The Sino-Burmese Frontier Problem", Far Eastern Survey. (March, 1957) Vol. 26 #3. Kroef, van der, J . M. "Marxism i n Southeast Asia", Current History (Nov. 1954) Vol. 27. "China i n Southeast Asia", Current History. (Dec. 1957), Vol. 32-33. Levi, Werner "China and the Two Great Powers", Current History, (Dec. I960), Vol. 37. Lindsay, M. "The Policy of the Chinese People's Government i n Asia", Journal of International A f f a i r s . 1957, Vol. 11, #2. Mallory, W. H. "Chinese Minorities i n Southeast Asia", Foreign Affai r s . (Jan. 1956), Vol. 34 #2. Peking Review 1958-1961 issues were consulted at great length - a Mainland China publication and an invaluable source of information. Pye, L. W. "Communism i n Southeast Asia", Journal of International  Af f a i r s . 1956, Vol. 10 #1. Sacks, M. "The Strategy of Communism i n Southeast Asia", Pacific A f f a i r s . (Sept. 1956), Vol. 23. Schwartz, B. I. "On the Originality of Mao Tse-tung", Foreign Af f a i r s . Vol. 34. 161 Shao Chuan Leng "Conununist China's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia", Far Eastern Survey, (Jan. 1959) Vol. 28. Skinner, G. W. "Overseas Chinese i n Southeast Asia", The Annals of  the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Science, (Jan. 1959) Vol. 321. Steiner, H. A. "Ideology and Polit i c s i n Communist China", The Annals... (Jan. 1959) Vol. 321. Survey of Mainland China Press.published by the American Consulate-General i n Hong Kong - contains a digest of the principal publications on the mainland - used very extensively i n this paper. Warner, Denis. "Chinese Bearing Gifts", The Reporter.(Nov. 10, I960). Colloquiam on Overseas Chinese - New York, Institute of Pacific iRelations, 1958 - ed. by Morton H. Fried - contains one a r t i c l e by G. W. Skinner entitled "The Chinese of Java". 

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