COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY
TOWARD
THE AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS
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This study is an attempt to discover the deeper motives behind Communist China's present policy toward the Afro-Asian nations. From the outset it was assumed that this policy was entirely motivated by ideological considerations. As I progressed with the research, however, I became increasingly aware that ideology was not the only generating power behind Peking's policy, but that there was instead a more profound force at work. This so-called force, or power, or motive, whatever the case may be, has its roots deeply buried in Chinese history and I have chosen to call it China's traditionally legitimate aspirations. Although, in historic China, these aspirations were largely culturally inspired, they have recently been obscured by the tenets of a revolutionary doctrine called Communism.

Historically, China has exercised a dominating role in Southeast Asia, for which the main source of inspiration and justification lay in the Confucian system of government. This position of hegemony was challenged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the Western powers who had little understanding of China's traditional role. With the founding of the Communist regime, in 1949, however, China once again entered upon a period of strong central authority and was thus in a position to re-assert herself and pursue a policy directed toward a revival of China's traditional aspirations.

The structure of this paper consists of five main parts. The first two sections are devoted to an analysis of the ideological framework
within which China's policy operates, as well as the actual strategy
which has evolved from it. The emphasis here has been placed on what
I have termed the "Asianization" of Communism and the pragmatic approach
taken by the Chinese Communists on the implementation of their long-
term aims.

The final three sections are devoted to a discussion of the
major instruments which Peking has at its disposal for the penetration
of Southeast Asia. Two of these instruments, the overseas Chinese and
the Communist parties, are, in my opinion, of singular importance and
deserve separate treatment, for both these instruments are bound to
play a determining role in the future development of Southeast Asian
societies.

Although the topic presupposes a discussion of both the Asian
and African nations, the emphasis in this study, has been on the former.
The African orientation of Communist China's policy is of a very recent
nature and consequently there is only scant information available on the
subject. However, Africa does form an integral part in Peking's ideol­
ogy and overall strategy toward the "colonial and semi-colonial" coun­
tries and this aspect has been treated accordingly. With respect to the
Asian countries, I have preoccupied myself only with those in which
Peking's influence has been and is most notable. For this reason, only
passing reference has been made to the Philippines and Japan because,
for the moment, these countries appear to be outside the scope of China's
sphere of activity.
This study is based on such major sources as Mao Tse-tung's theoretical works, and recently published works by Barnett and Brimmell. Much of the basic information derived from these sources, has been supplemented, however, by material from such publications as Survey of the Mainland China Press and Peking Review. These last two sources were of great value in supplying illustrative material of a wide scope and have been used quite extensively.
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CHAPTER I

THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE

CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

Introduction

The emergence of Communist China in 1949 ushered in a new era in the
history of the Far East. In the wake of World War II, a surge for nationalist
independence swept over the Asian Continent. The days of colonial rule
were numbered. China, the largest and most populous nation in the Far East,
as well as in the world, did not escape the effects of this rising tide of
anti-colonialism and nationalist revolution.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century China had experienced the
full impact of Western encroachments on her soil. She had been forced, not
infrequently at gun point range, to make concessions to these foreign
"barbarians" and their seemingly unsatiable demands for commercial rights in
the treaty ports. Most humiliating of all, China had been forced to grant
extraterritorial rights and tariff concessions which constituted a direct
challenge to her sovereignty. Repugnant as these concessions were, a nation
steeped in the traditions of Confucius' teachings, could hardly be expected
to prove a match for the dynamic forces of mercantilism and Western technol­
ogy.

The powerlessness to prevent the western powers from establishing
their ever-growing spheres of influence and the feeling of resentment resulting
from this, inevitably led to the planting of the seeds of Chinese
nationalism, a nationalism strongly anti-imperialist in nature. The first
signs of a change in the making came from the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer
uprising, but it was not until the first two decades in the twentieth century,
following the Russo-Japanese war, that this anti-imperialist form of nationalism began to assume a more definite form and grew into a revolutionary movement.

During the first decades of the twentieth century an increasing awareness developed in China that something had to be done if the nation's identity was to be preserved and total disintegration prevented. The nationalist movement gained momentum and in 1912 the Republic of China was proclaimed, thereby bringing to an end centuries of monarchial rule. By the end of World War I the revolutionary movement was firmly established and consisted mainly of students, workers and intellectuals, whose paramount aim was to claim for China her rightful place among the nations of the world. The nucleus of this movement was formed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang party.

The founding of the Republic of China constituted a break with the past and marked the beginning of a transitional period during which the nation groped for a new political and social structure suitable to the requirements of a new era. The old governmental structure, in its original form at least, was no longer adequate to serve the needs of China in contact with a modern world. New political and social institutions were urgently required if the nation was to adapt itself successfully to a changing environment, and to put its own house in order.

In their search for new political formulae, and imbued with a sense of urgency in the face of continued foreign encroachment, the Chinese turned to the West. Perhaps by applying Western scientific and technological methods, which in the past had been used so effectively against China, could the nation reassert itself and resist the "barbarians" with their own weapons. There followed the introduction of bourgeois liberalism, but it was never given time to take root and the Kuomintang's brief experiment with parliamentary democracy proved unsuccessful. Parliamentary democracy failed in
China for two main reasons. In the first place it was an alien concept in a traditionally authoritarian society; in the second place it was not designed to bring quick results, and a speedy solution was considered imperative.

Thus, in effect, there existed in China what may be termed a political vacuum, and the need to fill it was urgent. It is hardly surprising that, under those circumstances, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 could not fail to exercise an attraction on Chinese intellectuals. Although Marxism was, at the time, an alien doctrine in China, nevertheless the dynamic social revolution taking place in Russia offered distinct possibilities for the long overdue Chinese revolution. It is significant that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese nationalist revolution, although rejecting Communism as unsuitable for China, nevertheless agreed to let Comintern agent, Borodin, reorganize the Kuomintang party structure along Communist lines.

It would be incorrect to say that by the 1920's Communism had been accepted as the new political creed which could remedy the nation's ills. Chiang Kai-shek's subsequent military action, which was aimed at wiping out Communist rural bases, proved ample evidence to the contrary. It is significant, however, to note that from 1921 onward, when the Chinese Communist Party was founded, a small but determined group of revolutionaries were convinced that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine did provide the answer to China's problems. Imbued with a messianic faith in the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese Communists began their long, and at times almost disastrous, struggle for power.

When in 1949 their struggle was crowned with success, and the "Mandate of Heaven" bestowed upon them, there appeared on the Asian scene not merely another postwar nationalist government, but an ideology. Moreover, this was an ideology wedded to the idea of world revolution, and the
ultimate attainment of socialism on a world-wide scale.

Developments since 1949 have made it increasingly evident that the Chinese Communist regime has established firm political control over more than 600,000,000 Chinese. In addition, the regime has embarked on a large scale industrialization and communication programme aimed at building up the strength of the nation and setting a formidable example for the new nations in Asia. The "Chinese way" in social, political, and economic developments has inevitably made its impact felt among those newly independent and struggling nations.

Peking, not content to merely set an example for the newly independent and emerging nations of Asia and Africa, has developed an active policy of "friendship" and "support" towards these nations. In order to extend its own sphere of influence, Peking has resorted to an extremely effective device whereby its own anti-imperialist struggle has been identified, and indeed made an integral part, of the struggle for independence carried on by these nations. Thus, Peking has allotted itself the role of champion of the national independence movement and principal defender against "Western Imperialism".

In the last analysis, Communist China's policy towards the Afro-Asian countries, depends for its source of inspiration and for its justification, on the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism. Domestic, as well as foreign, policies, must always be in accordance with, or in any case made to fit, the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism. It becomes necessary, therefore, in any discussion of Communist China's foreign policy, to examine the ideological background as being the foremost source of authority.
Alignment with Soviet Russia

Consequences

From the very beginning, the Chinese Communists have aligned themselves with Soviet Russia, and thus with the socialist bloc as a whole.

In July, 1949, Mao Tse-tung pronounced his famous dictum "we must lean on one side". More recently, Vice-Premier, Chen Yi expressed himself even more explicitly by declaring that "the Chinese revolution is a continuation of the great October Socialist Revolution." 1 Ideologically this alignment means irrevocable acceptance of Marxism-Leninism 2 as the "universal truth". From the Chinese Communist point of view this acceptance is essential if the unity...


2. The term Marxism-Leninism is here defined as comprising the basic tenets of Marx's proletarian revolution and their subsequent modification by Lenin in his anxiety to provide a Marxist justification for a revolution undertaken in defiance of Marxist principles. Marxism consists of three main elements: the philosophy of dialectical materialism, the primacy of the economic factor as the basis of society and the theory of State and revolution. Lenin's modification resulted from the fact that he carried out the revolution in a country which contrary to Marx's teachings, was not a highly civilized and industrialized country. Consequently, Lenin was obliged to create a highly centralized and undemocratic party and subordinate every other institution to it. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which Marx intended to be a transitional form, became permanent and the "withering away" of the State was postponed indefinitely. The Communists became the masters rather than the vanguard of the workers as Marx had clearly stated in the Communist Manifesto.

As for "democratic centralism", the basis of party organization, under Lenin, the emphasis came to be increasingly placed on "centralism". Stalin later completed the process and turned the party into a monolithic organ exercising absolute authority. Lenin, therefore, transformed Marxism by making it applicable to the practical requirements of Russian conditions and placing greater emphasis on centralized control than Marx had intended.
of the Communist bloc, at least for the outside world, is to be maintained. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines form the cement, the unifying force, which holds together the socialist camp. This belief probably goes far to explain, on the one hand, Peking's recent vicious attacks on so-called "Yugoslav revisionism", and on the other hand, Peking's concurrence with Khrushchov's action in Hungary.

From the alignment with Soviet Russia, and the unquestionable truth of Marxism-Leninism, is derived a second fundamental ideological concept; namely, the division of the world into two diametrically opposed social systems: the imperialist (capitalist) and the anti-imperialist (socialist) system. This division is held to be irreconcilable. "In the end", said Mao Tse-tung, "the socialist system will replace the capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will." 3 In other words, the present world is engaged in an ideological struggle to the end, in which ultimate triumph belongs to socialism as dictated by the irreversible course of history. Thus, time is on the side of socialism.

One important aspect of this world-wide competition in ideologies, as seen through Chinese doctrinarian eyes, is that ultimate triumph will not be achieved by passive acceptance of the status quo, for capitalism, when left to its own, will not see the error of its ways. Any suggestion, therefore, that socialism should come to terms with capitalism, or adopt a policy of live and let live, is an untenable proposition in the long run. Equally, "peaceful co-existence", frequently declared to be the objective of Peking's policies, can

at best serve as a short term expedient or tactical manoeuvre. From the Chinese Communist standpoint, the world is dynamic and change is the very essence of the Chinese revolution and indeed of the world socialist revolution as a whole. The momentum of the revolution must be maintained, and the creation of tension should be welcomed rather than discouraged. It was Mao Tse-tung who expressed this cardinal aspect of Chinese Communist ideology as early as 1936, when he said that the guiding laws of war were developmental and that "nothing remains changeless." He also added that the only way to eliminate war was "to oppose war by means of war." More recent evidence of the continued prevalence of this belief is furnished by Premier Yu Chao-li, who stated:

"We must acquire a correct understanding of the objective law that imperialism breeds war precisely because we want to use this law to oppose, prevent and eliminate imperialist war .... To fight for and realize world peace, it is necessary to wage a struggle against the policies of aggression and plunder of imperialism."

It is in this insistence on the continual need for change, and the propriety of violent revolution that the real source of the present Sino-Soviet ideological dispute must be sought.

**Doctrinarianism**

The above serves as an illustration of the fact that the Chinese Communist leaders have never accepted Marxism-Leninism as a static doctrine. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung has consistently opposed the so-called "doctrinarian"

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5. S. M. C. P., article entitled "Imperialism is the Source of War in modern times ... #2233, Mar. 1960, PP. 11-12.
view of "formula" interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. He has justified his opposition on the basis of Lenin's authority that "the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism" is "the concrete analysis of concrete conditions." 6 For Mao, Marxism-Leninism is not a system of finite rules. On the contrary, it is a living force, a science, which "has in no way summed up all knowledge of truth, but is ceaselessly opening up, through practice, the road to the knowledge of truth." 7 Thus, it seems that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine serves a dual purpose. On the one hand it embodies the ultimate truth, and for this reason commands unquestionable allegiance and submission. On the other hand, it is a creative science, thus preserving an element of flexibility.

Mao Tse-tung, leading exponent of Chinese ideology, is generally credited with the sinicization of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its practical application to the Chinese scene. It was Mao who, according to Ch'en Po-ta, produced a "living synthesis of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the actual practice of the Chinese Revolution." 8

To all intents and purposes then, Mao deserves the fitting epithet of a practical revolutionary. As one writer pointed out, "The Maoist strategy accomplished for China what Leninism had accomplished for Russia." 9

In Mao's sinicization of Communism to the extent of harmonizing it with China's own nationalist aspirations and economic ambitions of the peasantry, 9a lies the key to much of the Communists' success in China.


9. (a) "The Maoist strategy" involves the establishment of a political party, organized in accordance with Leninist principles, which draws its support from a purely peasant base.

Mao Tse-tung early recognized the potential inherent in the peasantry as a revolutionary force. In a passionately worded document entitled *Report on an Investigation of the Agrarian Movement in Hunan (1927)*, Mao expresses his conviction that "The force of the peasantry is like that of the raging winds and driving rain.... No force can stand in its way."

The years following 1927 were marked by the gradual shift of the basis of the Chinese Communist Party from the working class to the peasantry. This implied a serious deviation from Marx's doctrine of a proletarian based revolution and Moscow did not conceal its disapproval. Mao looked to the village as the key center of revolutionary action and gave the impetus to the formation of territorial bases in the remote hinterland equipped with military forces. This strategy resulted in the ultimate triumph of communism in China.
Interdependence of "theory" and "practice"

Essentially, it is the interplay and interdependence of "theory" and "practice" which lies at the root of Chinese Communist ideology. In order to enable a continued dynamic and pragmatic approach to the Chinese revolution, the relationship between these two concepts is necessary. As early as 1937 Mao Tse-tung stated that the outstanding characteristic of Marxist philosophy - dialectical materialism - was "its practicability; its emphasis on the dependence of theory on practice, emphasis on practice as the foundation of theory, which in turn serves practice", and he consequently instructed his cadres in Yenan that they should study the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the aim of "integrating it with the practical movement of the Chinese revolution..." and to seek a method "for solving the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese Revolution." Furthermore, Mao expressed his distinct disapproval of the "subjective" comrades who apply Marxism-Leninism as if it were a fixed formula by simply quoting words and phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

Once having established the fundamental principle of mutual interdependence between "theory" and "practice" this principle could be made applicable to the concept of "National Roads" to Communism. Although the "theory", i.e., the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, must be the same for all countries in the socialist camp, nevertheless, the "practice" may differ from one country to another according to specific national conditions. The same in essence, but different in the specific forms. Going one step further, the Chinese Communists believe that Marxism must be given a definite national form.

11. Ibid., P. 35.
12. Ibid., P. 35.
13. Ibid., P. 38.
before it can be useful. In accordance with this view, the Chinese Communist Politburo statement of December 29, 1956, was quite consistent in stating that Stalin had erred by "being unmindful of the independent and equal status of Communist parties of various lands" and had exhibited "great-nation chauvenistic tendencies." On the other hand, it was equally consistent in stating that the "national roads" to Communism must all adhere to the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism which are generally applicable. Thus, whatever differences in form there may exist in national proletarian movements, bloc solidarity must under no circumstances be sacrificed.

Revisionism

In addition to rejecting the doctrinarian approach to ideology, the Chinese Communists are also opposed to so-called revisionism. At present the international Communist movement has the important responsibility --- to defend the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and oppose modern revisionism," reads the 1958 resolution adopted by the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. This it was commented "ushered in a new stage in the international Communist movement of our time...."

In the Chinese Communist ideological arsenal revisionism or right-wing opportunism constitutes one of the principal dangers facing the international Communist movement. It is considered downright heresy, and if tolerated would seriously undermine the solidarity of the socialist camp. "There may be "national roads" to Communism, but there can be no "national Communism". Even though imperialism is disintegrating as the Chinese have repeatedly declared, nevertheless, it retains its fundamental aggressive nature.

13a Mao Tse-Tung - Selected Works "On New Democracy", Vol. 3, 1940, P.
15. Peking Review, #14, June, 1958, P. 23
Therefore, the only way to contain and eventually to eliminate it is by maintaining a "united front". When in 1958 the "Let a hundred flowers bloom" period was quickly followed by the destruction of the "weeds" (those who criticized the fundamentals of socialism), the Peking leaders acted in the interest of ideological unity. Equally, when Tito declared his opposition to the division of the world into camps, he was nothing less than a traitor. 18

Whereas Peking could adopt a tolerant view of Gomulka's brand of "National Road" Communism, it had to be equally intolerant of the Yugoslav leading group's "revisionism".

The fundamental point in modern revisionism, as typified by the Yugoslav leading group, is the "substitution of the reactionary theory of the State standing above the classes for the Marxist-Leninist theory of the State." 19

By placing the state above the classes, the revisionists are in effect, it is argued, playing in the hands of the imperialists and peddling bourgeois theory. For it is the fundamental principle of Marxism-Leninism that in order "...for the proletarian revolution to succeed, the old militarist, bureaucratic state machine must be smashed and replaced by a new, revolutionary state machine in the hands of the people". 20

The picture of Chinese Communist ideology which by now emerges is characterized by, at the same time, rigidity and flexibility. Between these two poles the Chinese walk the extremely thin line of pragmatism. Since the Chinese revolution is dynamic and must maintain its momentum, there can be no sharp division between "theory" and "practice". The two are in fact mutually interdependent. Theoretically, the "universal truth" provides the all-embracing

unifying bond. In practice, however, the constantly changing world scene demands flexibility. Neither "doctrinarism" nor "revisionism" are to be tolerated, and it is left to the ideological architect to interpret orthodox ideology in the light of practical necessities.

Asianization of Communism

The question now arises as to how in fact the Chinese Communists bring about the harmonization between the theoretical and practical approach to ideology. This question must be examined in the light of the specific features of the Chinese revolution, as well as the general colonial and semi-colonial conditions prevalent in Asia and Africa. Reference has been made earlier to Mao Tsetung's contributions in the field of ideology. Mao's greatest originality in this field would seem to be in the practical application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the Chinese scene. Most of the theoretical spadework was performed by Lenin, but it was Mao Tse-tung who proved himself the unrivalled practitioner. The foremost feature of what is now commonly recognized as "Maoism" is that the application of this doctrine is not limited merely to the Chinese revolution, but extends to the Asian revolution as a whole. "Maoism", therefore, is Asian in nature rather than just Chinese.

The real determinant of what may be termed the "Asianization" of Communism appears to be twofold: Mao Tse-tung's On New Democracy and Lenin's essay on "Imperialism". The first contains an authoritative exposition of what is commonly called "Maoism" and constitutes the adoption of Marxist theories to the conditions of the Asian revolution in its Chinese aspects. Lenin's essay on "Imperialism" forms ..." the bridge over which the Marxist theories passed to Asia.21

"Maoism"

"Maoism", as it was expounded in 1940, is based on the premise that the present-day character of Chinese society is colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. In order to change this character of Chinese society, two steps in the Chinese revolution are required. The first step is to change a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society. The second, which follows the completion of the transitional first step, is the building of a socialist society on the Russian model. The

completion of the first step, therefore, forms the foremost immediate objective of the Chinese revolution.

This first step Mao has called "New Democracy". Essentially, "New Democracy" is the continuation of the old Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution, the origin of which dates back to the Opium War in 1940, but its character has changed. Since the outbreak of World War I and the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed its character. It now no longer belongs to the old category of democracy, but to the category of the new democracy. It is new because the objective of the present revolution is to replace the old economic, political and cultural order by a new order of a socialist nature. At the same time the triumph of the socialist revolution in Russia has made the Chinese revolution part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

The important feature of "New Democracy" is its all-encompassing nature. It has served to make all colonies and semi-colonies allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism.

--- Any revolution that takes place in a colony or semi-colony against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, belongs no longer to the old category of bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but to a new category, and is no longer part of the old bourgeois or capitalist world revolution, but part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. 22

Mao, thus established a common bond between the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary movements in the colonies and semi-colonies of Asia and Africa. Their common aim was to fight imperialism and change the colonial and semi-feudal character of their societies into one of independence and democracy. As long as this remained their mutual aim they were allies and together, formed part of the world-wide revolutionary front.

The exclusive Asian nature of "New Democracy" can be seen from the fact that Mao Tse-tung provided for a transitional form of state which was to be adopted by the revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This state system was to be comprised of a joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes, including the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie.

Mao was careful to point out that this new state system was distinct from any system hitherto known. Formerly only two basic kinds of state systems had been in existence. Bourgeois dictatorship which existed in western democratic countries and dictatorship of the proletariat which existed in the Soviet Union. In both instances the dictatorship rested on a single-class basis. In Mao's new-democratic state system, however, joint dictatorship rested on a multi-class basis. Mao, thus advocated a revolution based on widespread support from all classes willing to share in the revolutionary struggle. It is this type of revolution on a mass basis which has been adopted by the Communist movements in Southeast Asia as their guiding principle.

Broadly speaking, "Maoism" may be defined as the transformation of Marxism-Leninism in such a way as to make a predominantly western doctrine applicable to the requirements of the eastern scene. "Maoism" does not pretend to deviate from the "ultimate truth", but it has shown a great deal of ingenuity in applying this "truth" to a predominantly agrarian social structure.

Other Comparisons

On the subject of peasant participation in the world revolutionary movement, Marx took a dim view. For Marx, China was merely an example of an Oriental Despotism with a static agrarian society which could not conceivably produce a proletarian or true working-class revolution. In his opinion the

working-class revolution could only succeed in the industrial societies of Western Europe. Lenin, on the other hand, faced with the discouraging prospects of West European revolution, and conscious perhaps of the revolutionary potential in Asia, took a different view. In 1919 he told delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Eastern Peoples that due to the "peculiar conditions which do not exist in European countries", Communist theory and practice must be applied to conditions in which the "main mass will consist of the peasantry." Lenin thus established the formal basis for an alliance between workers and peasants which Mao later employed so effectively. It was Mao Tse-tung who first organized and used the peasantry to bring about a successful Communist revolution in Asia. In doing so he showed his originality by reversing the Soviet pattern of an urban revolution first. Instead Mao set up rural bases (Soviets), equipped with military units, which served as principal operational basis for the expanding revolution.

Lenin was careful to stress the need for a disciplined avant garde of professional revolutionaries, a small tightly organized group to lead the alliance. He adopted the phrase "vanguard and organized detachment of the working class." In 1920 the Congress of the Communist International adopted the following resolution:

"The Communist Party is part of the working class, namely, its most advanced, class-conscious and therefore most revolutionary part ... The Communist Party is the organized political lever ... (to lead the proletariat and semi-proletarian mass) in the right direction." 25

The Chinese Communists have carefully preserved Lenin's organizational feature. Article I of the 1954 Constitution states that the Chinese Peoples Republic is lead by the working class. At the same time the constitution underlines the basic Communist contention that the power of the State is still an instrument of the ruling classes for suppressing the ruled classes. Proletarian hegemony is also evident from the fact that after the success of the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949, the peasantry was almost immediately relegated to a secondary position. Evidently Mao Tse-tung regarded the peasants only as a means to serve the cause of the revolution. In this sense the peasants were a means to an end, namely, the triumph of the revolution and the transfer of power into the hands of the working class.

The Chinese Communist form of government, as stipulated in the Constitution, is defined as "democratic centralism". This paradoxical phrase was first coined by Lenin as a result of the need for a high degree of centralized control. In actual practice this means control extending from the top down. In theory, however, it leaves room for grass-root participation in formulating the central directives. The Chinese Communists have proceeded to place their own interpretation on "democratic centralism" by defining it as a "unity of opposites", which enables both the decentralization and centralization of power at the same time. For this purpose "democratic" is defined as "democracy under centralized guidance" and "centralism" is defined as "centralism based on democracy". The deduction that can be made from this Marxian verbal sparring is that whatever the merits of "democratic" in the governmental process, the Chinese Communists still prefer to place the emphasis on "centralism".

Mao Tse-tung also inherited from both Lenin and Stalin the concept

27. S. M. C. P., #1795, June, 1958, P. 7.
of a "united front". In the middle of the 1930's the Comintern established a new general line by instructing all Communist parties outside the Soviet Union to cooperate with leftist and socialist groups in forming a "popular front" against Fascism. Adopting this concept to China, Mao has built

29. The so-called "United front" tactics were first introduced at the third Congress of the Soviet Communist Party of 1921. Under these tactics Communists abroad were to establish contact with the masses either by collaborating with leaders of non-Communist organizations ("united front from above"), or by appealing to the rank and file members of such organizations, ("united front from below"). The resounding success scored by the French Communist party between 1934 and 1936 by applying the "united front from above" tactics, lead to the general acceptance of these tactics in the second half of the 1930's. Communist parties sought the collaboration of socialist organizations at all levels in order to build up a "popular front" against Fascism. By 1947 these tactics were abandoned as a result of Cominform instructions which laid down that the Communists were to close their ranks and unite their efforts on the basis of the common anti-imperialist and democratic platform.

30. Mao Tse-tung employed the tactic of "united front" with considerable success, in the 1930's in setting up an anti-Japanese front between the Communists and the Nationalist regime. Behind this front the Communists managed to preserve their identity and further their own cause. In On New Democracy Mao defines the "united front" as one between Communism and the Three People's Principles in the stage of democratic revolution. Rejecting Communism, he said, is in fact rejecting the "united front". The Three People's Principles of the new democracy contain the three cardinal policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communists and assistance to the peasants and workers.
his programme for China, particularly during the first years after 1949, on a multi-class rather than a single-class basis. Hence, his emphasis on such concepts as "New Democracy" and "Peoples' Democratic Dictatorship". In the latter case the inference is dictatorship by the people over the few so-called "reactionaries" and "deviationists". In the second issue of the journal, Red Flag, issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Wang Chia-hsiang gives the following ideological explanation:

"Bourgeois democracy (i.e. Western democracy) is dictatorship by the few over the great majority ... While proletarian dictatorship means democracy for the great majority, the working people." 32

Since the Communist Party has been assigned the ideological role of vanguard of the working people, this means in effect that "democracy" flows from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. The same writer sums it all up by declaring that the proletarian cause of revolution and construction can only advance with:

"A Communist Party that takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, builds itself on the principle of democratic centralism, establishes close ties with the masses, strives to become the very heart of the working people, and educates its members and the masses of the people in Marxism-Leninism." 33

The importance to the Chinese Communists of the concept of "united front" in their ideological system may be gauged from a recent exposition by Chang Chi-yi. This expose' could conceivably be interpreted as an attempt to

31. In the 1954 Constitution the term "Dictatorship" is replaced by "State". Communist China is now referred to as the "Peoples' Democratic State", which continues to be based on a multi-class united front.
33. S. M. C. P., #1795, June, 1958, P. 10.
distinguish between Soviet and Chinese ideological practice. Chang starts out by stating that the People's Democratic United Front forms an integral part of the class struggle and thus a constituent component of the general line of the Chinese Communist Party. He then proceeds to point to Marxism-Leninism as the authoritative source which calls for the elimination of the exploiting classes. This, he contends, can be achieved by two methods. The first is the method of seizure as used by the Russian Revolution. The second is the method of people's democratic united front, as used by the Chinese. The latter is the more moderate and gradual method which leads to peaceful transformation. Furthermore, it makes possible the co-operation between the working class and the national bourgeoisie on the basis of identity of interests, namely, opposition to foreign imperialism. 34

34. The role of the national bourgeoisie in the Chinese revolution is distinct from that of the national bourgeoisie in Russia. Because China is a colony and a semi-colony suffering from aggression by others, her national bourgeoisie has "at certain times and to a certain degree a revolutionary quality", as expressed in its opposition to foreign imperialism. "Thus in China the task of the proletariat is to take into account the revolutionary quality of the national bourgeoisie and form with it an united front against imperialism ..." (On New Democracy, p. 19). In Tsarist Russia, Mao explains the national bourgeoisie was in no way revolutionary and the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. The Chinese practice can obviously be extended to all "colonies and semi-colonies suffering from aggression by others".
"Imperialism" - A Contributary Factor

There can be little doubt that Lenin furnished the Chinese Communists with one of their most effective ideological weapons when he wrote his essay on "Imperialism". It is this weapon which Peking has succeeded in giving its maximum practical value, as an instrument designed for the penetration into the new nations of Africa and Asia. Whereas, formerly "Imperialism" served as the bridge over which Marxism-Leninism passed into Asia, more recently it has come to serve as the bridge over which Communist China is passing into Southeast Asia and Africa.

The basic contention of Lenin's thesis on "Imperialism" is that under a capitalist economic system imperialist wars are "absolutely inevitable", as long as the means of production are privately owned. A theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism shows that free competition gives rise to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly. Monopoly, i.e., the formation of cartels and syndicates, forms the highest stage of capitalist development and leads, in turn, to the transformation of capitalism into imperialism. Imperialism is manifested by an increasing struggle to acquire sources of raw materials and markets; thus leading to the acquisition of colonies.

Once having established the association between monopolist capitalism and colonial conquest, Lenin proceeds to divide the world into two main groups - colony-owning countries and colonies or, to use Chinese Communist terminology, the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. Furthermore, imperialism is intolerant, for it introduces everywhere "the striving for domination, not for freedom" and it leads to national oppression and the violation of national independence. Lenin concludes that monopoly capitalism is the "economic quintessence of imperialism" and that it has "grown into a
world system of colonial oppression and of financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world, by a handful of 'advanced' countries." Moreover, and this has assumed increasingly significant proportions in the Chinese interpretation, any system of alliance among the imperialist powers is inevitably nothing more than a "truce" in periods between Wars. 35

Lenin's expose of "Imperialism", particularly in terms of division of the world, and identification of capitalism with colonial conquest, contains two major implications with regard to the Chinese revolution. In the first place the Chinese revolution is not an isolated phenomena, but part of the world-wide revolution as a whole. In the second place, the Chinese revolution has become the prototype of all revolutions in colonial and semicolonial countries. It is the realization of these two implications which has given the Chinese Communists the opportunity to extend the scope of their own revolution beyond its national boundaries.

Chinese Communist Interpretation

Apart from acceptance of Lenin's basic contentions on "Imperialism", the Chinese hold the view that "Imperialism is by nature predatory". 36 The imperialist countries persistently follow a policy of aggression and oppression. When this policy meets with obstacles and peaceful means do not succeed in surmounting them, imperialism resorts to means of war. "Imperialist War", therefore, "is a continuation of its policy of aggression and enslavement." 37 Consequently, as long as imperialism exists, there will be no hope for a lasting peace, for peace to the imperialists means no more than an interval

36. S. M. C. P., #2233, March, 1960, P. 4
between wars, in which preparations are made for the next war.

Imperialism is thus viewed as an inherently aggressive force, bound on striking a deadly blow as soon as the opportunity presents itself. To counteract this "threat" and to safeguard world peace, the people of the world should form an united front and wage an active struggle against this "threat". This twofold requirement was expressed by Chairman Liu Shao-chi during his recent visit to Moscow.

"Imperialism", he said, "can assuredly be prevented from launching a world war, and world peace safeguarded, if only the peoples of the world are further mobilized to form an international united front against the imperialist policies of aggression and war and carry out persistent struggles against the imperialist bloc headed by the U.S." 38

Despite this constant "imperialist threat" the Chinese Communists believe, that time is on their side. Since World War II a gradual shift has taken place in the relative positions of strength between the imperialist and the socialist camp. As a result of postwar nationalist movements, economic dislocations, and the rise of socialism in Asia, the old imperialist system has broken down. Not only is imperialism declining day by day, and the socialist camp strengthening its position steadily, but at the present time "socialism has attained superiority over imperialism with the East wind prevailing over the West wind". Socialism, therefore, is now in a position to "force imperialism to accept peaceful co-existence." 39 Furthermore, imperialism is undergoing a process of internal disintegration as a result of the irreconcilable contradictions among the imperialist countries, and what is

38. S. M. C. P., #2398, December, 1960, P. 33
believed to be a deepening economic crisis in the capitalist world.

In this respect the United States, by virtue of its position as China's number one enemy, has come under heaviest fire. United States' imperialism, though outwardly strong in appearance, is declared to be only a "paper tiger". Not only is "U. S.-phobia" entirely groundless, it is also "extremely erroneous" and harmful to over-estimate the imperialist "forces of war, and under-estimate the forces of peace and socialism." In characteristic Communist verbiage the implication of this warning would seem to be nothing less than a clarion call to action on the part of the "forces of peace".

Application to Asia and Africa

Finally, attention should be drawn to the application of the doctrine of "Imperialism" to the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa. At the Bandung Conference (1955) the assembled delegates unanimously accepted a resolution declaring their opposition to imperialism in any form. The Chinese Communists have repeatedly utilized this declaration to prevent the spread, and ultimately assure the withdrawal of, "Western imperialism" from the Asian and African continents. Furthermore, Peking has consistently declared its support to the Afro-Asian nations in their "heroic" struggle for national independence. As ideological justification, the Chinese point to Lenin's dictum that the contradictions between imperialism and the colonies and semi-colonies are irreconcilable. Also on Lenin's authority, it is stated that "In the era of imperialism, national wars waged by the colonies and semi-colonies are ... inevitable" and that these wars "will inevitably be a continuation of their national liberation policy." Evidently Peking has succeeded in establishing, on ideological grounds, a definite relationship between the national independence movements and the doctrine of "Imperialism".

40. S. M. C. P., #1787, May, 1958, P. 50.
41. S. M. C. P., #2233, March, 1960, P. 5.
Conclusion

In conclusion it may be said that Marxism-Leninism forms the Leit-motiv in all of Communist China's actions and pronouncements. This is not to say, however, that the Chinese Communists have been content to accept Moscow's doctrine as a static force. On the contrary, the sinicization of Marxism-Leninism has enabled its transformation into a dynamic revolutionary force. Flexibility and pragmatism appear to be the guiding principles in the application of doctrine to the realities of the Asian scene. Furthermore, it would seem that ideological principles are to be applied with a view to pursuing two specific aims: unity and action. Unity in the sense of conformity and unquestionable solidarity in the ranks of the socialist camp. Hence, Peking's determined stand against "revisionism". Action is equally essential, partly to ensure the continued momentum of the Chinese and thus the world revolution; partly to provide a counterbalance against the aggressive forces of imperialism.

The most distinguishing feature of Chinese Communist ideology would seem to be not so much its conformity to the "universal truth" of Marxism-Leninism, although this should not be under-estimated, but rather, to use a paradoxical term, its "practical conformity"; a constant inter-play between theory and practice, with emphasis on the latter. It is this "practical conformity" which has opened up the way for the peaceful penetration of the Afro-Asian countries.
CHAPTER 11

COMMUNIST CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY

AND

ITS APPLICATION TO THE AFRO - ASIAN WORLD

Introduction

As in the case of ideology, Communist China's foreign policy is characterized by dynamic as well as pragmatic considerations. Whole hearted acceptance of Lenin's doctrine of Imperialism — that the world is engaged in a continual struggle between revolutionary socialism and reactionary capitalism — means, in effect, the denial of a world order based on the principle of status quo. As long as the world is divided, the situation is fluid, and constant efforts are required to speed up the ultimate triumph of socialism. At the same time, however, the need is recognized for flexible and adjustable policies to suit varying local conditions. Southeast Asia provides the most striking example of the degree of adjustment of which Peking's policy is capable. Prior to 1955, Peking appeared to be bound at achieving its objectives in this area by militant revolutionary means. Throughout the area, local Communist parties conducted a campaign of insurrection which was aimed at achieving power by force. When the attempt came to naught, a gradual change in tactics developed, ultimately resulting in the Bandung Conference at which Peking publicly endorsed a policy of "peaceful co-existence".

From the outset it is necessary to establish a clear distinction, in so far as this is possible or indeed advisable, between Peking's long-range objectives in foreign policy and its short-term aims. The former
are of a permanent nature and may be said to be derived and influenced by both ideological and national considerations. Short-term aims, on the other hand, are dictated by immediate considerations to cope with the fluid state of the international scene. Such short-term tactics can be compared to "detours" which are employed when the main avenue is temporarily blocked by obstacles. Their ultimate value, of course, is judged by the degree to which these tactics work in the interest and further the achievement of long-term objectives. The Chinese Communists have proved to be skilful manipulators in the use of these tactical devices in furthering their long-term strategy.

China's Claim to World Prestige

Chinese Communist foreign policy seems to be guided by three principal objectives. The first of these is China's claim for a position of prestige among the great powers. A claim which is born out of a deep sense of past humiliation and a present feeling of pride. In the opinion of one student of international affairs, the Chinese do not "think of themselves as an Asian power at all" but see themselves as a world power. Although it is open to dispute whether the Chinese have in fact attained a world power status, nevertheless, they do seem intent on securing recognition as a force in world politics and to dispel any notions of inferiority. This seems to be deeply rooted in Chinese history. Traditionally, China occupied a foremost position on the Asian continent and her cultural influence extended far beyond her frontiers. From the middle of the nineteenth century until the coming to power of the present Communist regime in 1949, however, China suffered humiliation and internal chaos and became a victim of western and Japanese imperialism. Incapable of resisting foreign pressure, the nation

deteriorated economically and politically and its prestige was reduced to a
minimum. Small wonder then that the present regime is anxious to refute
past humiliations and claim a position of prestige in the eyes of the world.

Evidence of this deep-seated passion to claim for China a place
under the sun can be found in Chou En-lai's speeches. In a major foreign
policy speech to the First National Peoples' Congress on June 28, 1956, he
said: "China is playing an ever more important role in promoting the de-
velopment of the entire international situation. It has become more and
more difficult to ignore China's views in the settlement of many major inter-
national issues." In April, 1960, almost four years later, speaking again
to the National Peoples' Congress, Chou said that the Chinese peoples' great
achievements in socialist construction were "winning the plaudits of millions
upon millions of people" and he added: "...the overwhelming majority of man-
kind...are not anti-Chinese, but ardently demand friendship with China." Once allowances have been made for the propaganda value such statements hold
with respect to the domestic scene, there still remains a core of sentiment
which cannot be dismissed. There may be truth in a statement that China in
the past was and is today still an "isolated, superior, separate entity",
but the present regime is making efforts to break through this isolation bar-
rier and to secure an increment in its prestige abroad. Mao Tse-tung probably
expressed more than just a fervent wish when he said in the fall of 1949:
"Our nation will never again be an insulted nation." This was the pledge

2. Chou En-lai, On Present International Situation, China's Foreign
Policy, and the Liberation of Taiwan, Speech to First National
3. Survey of Mainland China Press (S.M.C.P.) #2241,
April, 1960, p. 3.
4. R. Harris, loc. cit. p. 168.
of a man who had personally experienced the humiliations and frustrations of foreign encroachments and who, like many of his fellow compatriots, was conscious of a deep sense of historical pride.

**National Security - Pre 1949**

The second principal objective is national security. It is this objective which has earned Communist China the reputation of being a military expansionist power. In the case of China, national security has traditionally been closely related to the problem of controlling certain strategic peripheral areas. Preoccupation with these areas seems to have stemmed from the traditional threat of invasion posed by barbaric tribes from the North and Northwest. This problem was aggravated by the vastness of China's territory and the lack of firm political control over the fringe territories. In an effort to counter this continuous threat, whenever a strong dynasty ruled, military expansion was undertaken to secure political control over these peripheral areas and thereby strengthen political unification.

Apart from the strategic aspects, China's preoccupation with her peripheral areas also stems from a fundamental principle of Chinese government, namely, the relation between the superior and inferior state. The Confucian system of China in its bearing on international relations rested on the principles of familism and inequality of nations. The world was regarded as a natural unit in which the Middle Kingdom was the center of civilization. All those living outside the Middle Kingdom were considered "barbarians" with a civilization inferior to China's. Gradually the Confucian system was extended to these border states and as they became civilized they were regarded as members of the Confucian family, of nations, but occupied an inferior status. In recognition of China's primacy in this family of nations, the
border states were required to send periodic tributary missions to the Chinese Imperial Court and were often kept under close supervision. Generally speaking, however, China did not seek to control directly the internal affairs of these border states. In fact, they were largely autonomous as long as they kept the peace and performed their obligations, as inferior states.

The significant feature of China's relationship to these "tributary" or dependent states was that Chinese "suzerainty" did not rest on a rigid legal code, but rather on a cultural code of reason and natural law. This distinction was little understood by the western powers when in the nineteenth century they sought to open relations with China and also with her border states. States such as Indochina, Burma and Korea, which had recognized China's suzerainty were to become either independent or colonies of foreign powers.

Historically, relations between the border states and Imperial China have oscillated between tributary status and outright subjection. As early as 221 B.C., during the Ch'in period, the central government's aim was to exert effective control over the outlying areas. In the ensuing period of unification, both North Korea and North Vietnam were conquered. During the Han period, (206 B.C. 0 222 A.D.), military expansion continued in the direction of Central Asia, which was conquered and reduced to a subjective status. During the same period, Annam became a dependent state of China. The greatest military exploits, however, were achieved under China's foremost empire builder, Pan Ch'ao, during the later Han empire. He subdued all far western states in Northwestern China and also consolidated China's control over Indochina. Burma became a vassal state of China following its conquest by Kublai Khan in 1284. In the following centuries the process of
expansion continued until completed in the seventeenth century with the conquest of Formosa.

Beginning in the nineteenth century until the establishment of the present Peking regime in 1949, China lacked strong central control. It was during this period that China fell prey to the economic onslaught of what she traditionally regarded as the foreign "barbarians." The impact of the industrial revolution in Western Europe necessitated the search for markets and raw materials and the mysterious land of Cathay became a focus of interest. In addition a mixture of economic and strategic interests attracted both Japan and Tsarist Russia to the Chinese scene. Before long their mutual interests proved incompatible and in the resulting clash, China became the battleground for the resolution of their differences.

For China, the result of these encroachments was the gradual loss of political control over the peripheral areas. The empire began to crumble at the fringes and political unity declined. Forced to grant political and economic concessions to the encroaching powers, China lost control over such dependent states as Korea, Burma and Indochina, which had traditionally recognized Chinese suzerainty. Even more serious was the threat posed by expansionist Russia and Japan to such areas as Chinese Turkestan and Manchuria, for these formed integral parts of China's territory and because of their mineral wealth were of prime economic significance. The centripetal effect of these encroachments ultimately threatened the continued existence of China as a nation.

National Security - Post 1949

The founding of the Peking regime in 1949 marked the restoration of a strong central government on mainland China. Historically this meant
that once again China was in a position to pursue an expansionist policy with
the spreading and consolidating of political control over the peripheral
areas. In order to launch their new programme for the development of the na-
tion, the regime's foremost task was to establish effective political control
over the territories which had traditionally been regarded as forming part of
China's sphere of influence. National security, therefore, became synonymous
with political control.

Post World War II developments are largely responsible for obscuring
what may be termed the historically legitimate interests of China. Two major
forces, Communism and nationalism, made their impact on the international
scene. From a Western standpoint, nationalism was not incompatible with China's
historical expansionist aspirations. Political unity and independence of for-
eign control were the legitimate objectives of the nationalist movements through­
out Asia. The Peking leaders, therefore, were able to utilize the force of
"nationalism in furthering their own historical interests. As Werner Levi
points out:

"...Chinese nationalism, like all big-
power nationalism, aims at imperial greatness,
usually rationalized as a search for security,
the fulfillment of a higher mission, or the
restoration of historical rights." 6

Where Chinese nationalism did prove incompatible, however, was where it came in
contact with other legitimate nationalist movements in adjoining territories.
Here it becomes necessary to examine the second major post war development
which profoundly affected China's historical legitimate aspirations — the rise
of Communism in Asia.

Current History (Dec. 1960, p. 321.)
As pointed out earlier, the rise to power of the Chinese Communists in 1949 meant the emergence of a strong central government and the establishment of a new ideology, an ideology which is at once revolutionary in character and dedicated to the eventual communization of the world.

If the forces of history are allowed to continue their unobstructed course, so the argument runs, then Communism will eventually overtake and ultimately replace capitalism. Inherent in this ideology is one crucial factor, namely, that the world is dynamic and constantly changing. The principle of status quo is therefore fundamentally incompatible with Communist doctrine, except as a temporary tactical manoeuvre. Having accepted these basic doctrines, the Chinese Communists have proceeded to apply the principle of a dynamic world to suit their own national interests and as a result, their approach to revolution has become militant. The revolution not only is dynamic — it must be kept dynamic.

It is precisely at this juncture that history and ideology have clashed. No longer do Chinese expansionist policies appear to be the result of traditionally legitimate aspirations, but rather the result of a deliberate militant revolutionary policy aimed at spreading Communism on a global scale. Chinese Communism therefore has tended to obscure, and in some cases, supersede traditional Chinese aspirations for political unification and control over the peripheral areas.

Since 1949 Chinese Communist policy has been guided by the fulfillment of the fundamental objective of national security. From the outset Peking embarked on a programme of securing either direct or indirect control over strategic areas along China's borders. Tibet was occupied by the People's Liberation Army in 1950-51, but it was not until 1959 that Peking established
its complete political control. No Chinese occupation occurred in North Korea or North Vietnam, but by operating through local Communist organizations the Chinese Communists now exercise indirect political control, which eventually may reduce these areas to a status of complete dependence on China. In Formosa and along the Sino-Indian border, Peking has been confronted with strong opposition. It claims that these territories, as well as Tibet, form an integral part of China's territory and pose a threat to China's national security. It seems likely, therefore, that these areas will remain pressure points as long as they continue to be outside Peking's sphere of effective control.

**Domination over Southeast Asia**

Peking's third and, for purposes of this paper, the most important objective is the revival of the ancient policy of seeking to establish a dominant position in Southeast Asia. As early as the close of the thirteenth century, the armies of Kubla Khan overran Java and in the early fifteenth century Cheng Ho, the great eunuch admiral attempted to establish Chinese suzerainty over Southeastern Asian states. The seven naval expeditions which he led reached as far as India and the East African coast. Consequently, dozens of Asian and Southeast Asian states became Chinese vassals. From this period also dates the tributary system under which states were required to make periodic tributes at the Chinese Imperial Court. In the context of world history this period is significant for it marked the beginning of Chinese colonization of Southeast Asia, for example, Java, Borneo, Malaya and Thailand. "Ever since, some form of control over Southeast Asia has been an enduring feature of Chinese policy."  

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Historically then, China as an Asian nation, has had a traditional stake in Southeast Asia. She occupied a dominant position in the region in historic times and she was responsible for the settlement of this region by Chinese from the southern provinces who carried their own culture and came to occupy a dominant position in the economic life of the countries in which they settled. These so-called overseas Chinese now constitute a formidable economic and political weapon in the hands of Peking in conducting its policy toward Southeast Asia.

As in the case of the peripheral areas, China's aspirations for a dominant position in Southeast Asia have been strongly influenced by the forces of nationalism and Communism. From a purely theoretical standpoint, the nationalistic aspirations on the part of many of the Southeast nations would appear to constitute the very antithesis to China's designs. Essentially, nationalism aims at terminating colonial rule and working out one's own destiny by seeking to establish a national identity. It seems inconceivable, therefore, that nationalism would tolerate shedding the yoke of western colonialism, only to see it replaced by a new form of oriental colonialism. From a practical standpoint the situation is more complex. The economic, political and social problems facing practically all of these nations have proved to be formidable obstacles in their search for a national identity. The will may be present but the means are often lacking. Consequently, their power of resistance is low and they become a fertile field for any power aiming to establish its hegemony over the area.

In any discussion of Communist China's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations, it is important to constantly bear in mind these three basic motivations: restoration of China as a great power; national security in terms
of political control over the peripheral areas; and restoration of a traditionally dominant position of the Chinese empire in East Asia. These motivations constitute the principal ingredients of Peking's long-term strategy with respect to Asia.

"Change" and "United Front"

Ideologically, two basic concepts underly Peking's strategy. The first of these is the concept of revolutionary change. No situation is static, and there can be no such thing as "solving problems in the western sense." The creation of tension is an inherent characteristic of what the Chinese Communists regard as a protracted conflict between Communism and capitalism. The world stage must be kept in a constant state of flux and it becomes desirable to promote change wherever this enhances the prospects of greater power for the Communist bloc. The second basic ideological concept is that of keeping a united front; a broad alignment of forces which support long-range aims.

It was pointed out earlier that in 1940, Mao Tse-tung in On New Democracy utilized the concept of united front in determining the Chinese Communist approach to Southeast Asia. In declaring the Chinese revolution to be part of the wider proletarian-socialist world revolution, Mao made the following significant statement:

"No matter what classes, parties or individuals in the oppressed nations join the revolution, and no matter whether or not they are conscious of this fact and fully understand it, so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they themselves become allies of this revolution." 9

The implications are twofold. First, the national liberation movements, by virtue of their anti-colonialism are automatically made part of the worldwide proletarian-socialist revolution, whether they know or not. Secondly, since China is the leading exponent of the revolution in Asia, she has thus awarded herself a dominant position over her "allies." Evidently, the Chinese Communists intended to restore their traditional position of hegemony in Asia by presenting themselves as the champion of nationalism and the fierce opponent of colonialism; two sentiments uppermost in the minds of the people struggling for national liberation.

Soviet Preparation for an Asian Offensive

Prior to 1949 there was little the Chinese Communists could do to influence directly the course of development in Asia. Not only were they occupied with their own revolution but also Moscow was still the focal point for international Communism. Moscow's attention was directed westward and the period between 1943 and 1947 witnessed the growth of Russian influence in Europe. The real importance of Communism to Asia, therefore, was largely a negligible force. During this same period profound changes were in the making on the Asian scene. The first impetus to what may be termed the Asian revolution was provided by the 1904 Russo-Japanese war. Japan's victory in this war had done much to destroy the mystical nature of European superiority and when in 1942 Europe was removed from the Asian scene, the stage was set for the liberation of Southeast Asia. The real turning point in the Southeast Asian revolution came with the granting of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947, and to Burma shortly thereafter. The final stage of the

resurgence of South and Southeast Asia lasted from 1943-1948, and it is significant to note that it was a spontaneous indigenous struggle, without the assistance from Communism.

By this time, Moscow had become quite aware of the potentialities inherent in the Southeast Asian revolution for international Communism. The first move in a new Russian offensive was made in September, 1947, with the establishment of the Cominform. The Soviet delegate, Zhdanov, in a major speech, set the ideological tone for the proposed penetration of Southeast Asia. The recent war, he said, had brought about a powerful movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies which had placed the rear of the capitalist system in jeopardy. He branded the United States as the principal capitalist power bound on an "expansionist course." Furthermore, he spoke of two concepts which were to play a significant role in China's Communist policy: the division of the world into two major camps and the need for coexistence of the two systems over a long period of time." On a more practical level Zhdanov indicated the role Communism was to play in Southeast Asia by stating that the Soviet Union was:

"A staunch (defender) of the liberty and independence of all nations and a foe of colonial exploitation in any shape or form." 12

China at the Calcutta Conference

Subsequent developments indicate that the Chinese Communists took their cue from Zhdanov's speech, and even went one step further, in

12. Ibid., p. 254.
introducing the new concept of a Chinese Communist sphere of influence, embracing the whole of Southeast Asia and distinct from the Russian sphere of influence. The means by which they hoped to bring about this grand design was expounded at the Calcutta Youth Conference held in February, 1948. In a speech before the Conference, the Chinese delegation declared that:

"The people of Southeast Asia, who have been enslaved by imperialism for many years, should today take advantage of the present movement and strive for complete liberation. The Chinese people are on the eve of victory but they are struggling for an earlier realization of it and for the guarantee of its outcome. This requires the assistance of and association with the liberation campaign of the peoples of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the victory of the Chinese people would facilitate the struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia and would greatly encourage their fight. The liberation campaign of the Chinese people cannot be separated from the liberation campaign of the peoples of Southeast Asia."^{13}

With one clever stroke, the Chinese Communists established not only the inseparability of the Chinese and Southeast Asian revolutions, but also declared the success of their respective national liberation campaigns to be mutually interdependent. In accordance with this strategy the conference called upon the youth of Southeast Asia to establish firm unity between the working peasant and student youth in the face of foreign imperialism. The concept of united front thus became the protective shield behind which the Chinese Communists came to execute their penetration of Southeast Asia. The significance of this concept may be gauged from one of Mao Tse-tung's works entitled - *People's Democratic Dictatorship* - in

which he successfully adapts the Leninist technique to the Asian revolution. "It marks the second great turning point in the history of the Communist movement, after which Marxism, already rendered alien to the West by its adaption to the Russian revolution, was to be further transformed into a vehicle for the Asian resurgence." In this work, Mao not only emphasizes the need for a united front and a national basis comprising the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class, but he also calls for the wider formation of an International United Front. China, he said, must unite "in a common struggle with the peoples of all countries...This means allying ourselves with the Soviet Union, with every New Democratic country, and with the proletariat and broad masses in all other countries."  

Since 1949 much of the Communists' success in Southeast Asia has been due to the fact that it has been an enduring ally of nationalism. As one writer points out: "The memory of this common nationalist-Communist front is an inexhaustible reservoir of political advantage for the Communists...." Furthermore, nationalism's greatest unifying power lies in its principal manifestation of unshakable and often irrational anti-colonialism. This is shown by a determination to wipe out the humiliation of past foreign encroachments and to exert the right to self-determination.

15. Ibid., p. 266.
By and large, this appears to be the strategy Peking has been pursuing with respect to Southeast Asia. A strategy of self-identification, which, although cloaked in the broad ideological framework of Communist world revolution, nevertheless, is deeply rooted in tradition. Werner Levi undoubtedly makes a strong point when he asserts that in the case of China's Asian neighbours, Peking's actions are justified not by ideology, but by history. 17

**Chinese Tactics - Mao Tse-tung's Contribution**

Where Peking has shown the greatest amount of ingenuity is in the field of tactics. Here the Chinese Communists display a great deal of flexibility and adaptability. Short-term tactics are designed and implemented with a definite long-term goal in mind. Their primary value lies in the extent to which they can be adapted to suit changing conditions. Their principal justification lies in the fact that they form an integral part of the wider whole and further the long term strategical aim. Thus, in effect, they are means to an end.

The basic formula for this tactical approach was first set forth by Mao-Tse-tung in 1928. At that time, however, it was applied only to guerilla warfare, in which the Chinese Communists were then engaged. Mao's formula was the following:

"Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." 18

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Mao was probably one of the first military theorists to recognize or in any way formulate the principle of strategic retreat, the object of such a retreat being to conserve strength and to prepare for the counter offensive. Eight years later, Mao enlarged the narrow guerilla warfare basis of this principle by making it applicable to the wider struggle against imperialism:

"A strategically protracted war," he said, "and a campaign or battle of quick decision are...two principles to be emphasized simultaneously in the civil war, which are also applicable in the anti-imperialist war." 19

Mao, thus pointed out the importance of taking the whole situation into consideration and defined the relationship between the whole (strategy) and the parts (tactics).

Turning to the development of tactics in Peking's policy since 1949, it appears that the pattern which it follows largely coincides with Mao's formula. Since 1949 these tactics have been a mixture of attraction, intimidation and subversion. Prior to 1955 the emphasis was on intimidation. From 1952 onwards, however, a gradual change developed which by 1955 resulted in an almost complete change of emphasis. During the next three years Peking openly pursued a policy of attraction which led to some relaxation of tension in Southeast Asia. By 1958 Peking once again changed its tactics and has since adopted a militant posture which was more clearly demonstrated at the time of the revolt in Tibet.

1949-1952 Militant Revolution

The period between 1949 and 1952 was characterized by militant revolutionary methods. Throughout Southeast Asia, local Communist parties and other Communist-instigated groups, launched insurrectionist movements aimed at undermining and eventually overthrowing local authority and disrupting vital communications and services. In most cases these leftist groups professed identification with nationalistic aims and adopted a sharp anti-colonial attitude. Ironically, the terrorist methods proved in the end to be self-defeating. Instead of furthering the cause of nationalism, they had the opposite effect of generating a mood of fear and aversion among the local people who began to see the Communist guerillas as a threat to their own life and property.

The movement also suffered from a lack of overall planning and co-ordination. Consequently, in such countries as Indonesia, Malaya and Burma, the authorities were able to cope effectively with these local brush fires.

Western observers generally assume that the 1948 Calcutta Conference provided the overture to the wave of violence which swept over Southeast Asia, for it was shortly after this Conference that the Communist rebellions broke out. It is well to remember, however, that only one year earlier Zhdanov, in his speech to the Comintern, had given a clear indication of the new Moscow policy for an offensive in Southeast Asia. Though Moscow-inspired, Peking readily adopted this militant attitude as a means to further its own designs for Southeast Asia. The momentum of the Chinese revolution was thus carried over into the Southeast Asian Arena.
One of the first steps taken by the Chinese Communists following their accession to power was to hold the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries in Peking in November of 1949. This brought together Communist and left-wing labour leaders, rather than government representatives. The aim of the Conference was to establish solidarity in fighting wars of national liberation. Although the conference achieved little, its significance stems from the fact that it was held in Peking and provided one of the first examples of the new regime's efforts to reassert itself as a dominant power in Asia.

Militant Tactics Applied to National Interests

Apart from pursuing a militant revolutionary course in South-east Asia proper, the Chinese Communists employed similar tactics in furthering their own national interests. This was the period when Chinese Communist "volunteers" took an active part in the Korean War. Regardless of whether Moscow or Peking was the prime instigator behind the North Korean attack on South Korea in June, 1950, the significant fact remains that Korea constituted a part of traditional China's "sphere of influence". Further, when the United-Nations' forces crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 in their advance northward, this could not fail to become an object of serious concern to Peking, the reason being that North Korea contained the primary source of hydro electric power which was of vital importance to the industrial development of Southern Manchuria. During this period, Communist China also extended its influence to North Vietnam. In January, 1950, both Peking and Moscow recognized the Vietnamese Democratic Republic under Ho Chi Minh. This marked the opening scene in a drama which culminated in the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam in 1954. Since then
North Vietnam has come under strong political and economic control from Communist China and has formed an important jumping-off base for the penetration of Southeast Asia. At the present time both Laos and South Vietnam appear to be the prime targets and the presence of Vietnamese Communist rebel troops has been a continuous feature of the reports coming from these areas.

Tibet - Historical Position of China

Another peripheral area which figured prominently during this period of militant revolutionary tactics, was Tibet. China's claim to suzerainty over Tibet appears to date from the seventeenth century when three separate armies invaded the country, driving out the Mongols who had occupied a dominating position in Tibet since the thirteenth century. Following this conquest the Sino-Tibetan boundary was demarcated in 1727 and Tibet divided into two parts. West of the demarcation point the country was handed over to the rule of the Dalai Lama under suzerainty of the Manchu Emperor. Tibetan chiefs of states and tribes in the provinces of Kham and Amdo to the east, were given the status of semi-independent feudatories of China. This loose arrangement lasted for nearly two centuries until the later Chinese conquest initiated in 1905 as the result of the British advance on Lhasa in the preceding year. From 1790 onward the Manchus proceeded to establish absolute control over Tibet and also strengthened their hold over newly acquired territory on the Indian border. In 1790 Nepal was reduced to tributary status.

Starting with the Opium War in 1840 China's position in Tibet began to weaken and continued to deteriorate until after the T’aip’ing
rebellion, China was in no position to take further interest in Tibet. Following the advance of British troops into Lhase in 1904 an Anglo-Tibetan treaty was negotiated. Under the terms of the treaty the Tibetan government agreed to recognize the British protectorate of Sikkim and to prevent other foreigners from exercising influence in Tibet. Two years later Peking was persuaded to accept the treaty and under the terms of accession specifically agreed not to encroach on Tibetan territory nor to interfere in the government of Tibet.

As it soon turned out the Chinese had no intention of honoring the agreement. In 1910 a Chinese army under General Chao Erh-feng marched into Lhasa and two years later some 5,000 Chinese troops were sent to reestablish Chinese control in Eastern Tibet. The Lhasa government determined to retain its autonomy, embarked on a large-scale war with China over the Sino-Tibetan frontier. The Tibetans recovered all of East Tibet from the Chinese garrisons and proclaimed their independence of China. Under the terms of the Simla treaty signed in 1914 by Tibet and Britain but repudiated by China, both Britain and China were to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognized and China was not to colonize Tibet. Due to the Chinese government's subsequent repudiation of the treaty it was recognized that all rights and privileges claimed by the government of China with regard to Tibet were revoked.

This was the situation when in October, 1950, Chinese Communist troops attacked Tibet, declaring that China feared external aggression through Tibet. It was only later that the Chinese Communist government
claimed Tibet to be part of China's territory. In September, 1951, the Chinese army entered Lhasa, established the permanent occupation of Tibet and forced the Tibetans to sign a Seventeen-Point Agreement.

Under the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Tibet was reduced to a status of political subservience to Peking. The Tibetans were granted freedom of religious belief and regional autonomy under the leadership of the Chinese People's Government. In addition, external affairs were to be handled by the Chinese People's Government and Tibetan troops were to be integrated into the People's Liberation Army.

Three years later, in April, 1954, these same provisions were substantially confirmed in the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Communication. According to the Agreement, India accepted the principle that Tibet constituted an integral part of China and India agreed to hand over all her property in Tibet to the Chinese authorities. The Agreement left one important issue untouched, however, namely, the delimitation of the rugged mountain border between India and China. The Chinese had already begun a military build-up on the Indian border, but the whole border issue did not erupt until 1959.

**Sino-Soviet Relations**

The apparent determination which the Chinese Communist regime displayed during these first years of its existence in consolidating political control was also shown in relation to its closest ally, the Soviet Union. Two months after the Chinese Communist government was formally established in October, 1949, Mao Tse-tung paid his first visit to the
Soviet Union. The most important outcome of the nine-week visit was the thirty-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Apart from giving China military and economic backing, the Treaty provided for the curtailment of traditional Russian special rights in China. Supplementary agreements provided for the joint Sino-Soviet administration of the principal railways in Manchuria in contrast to the almost exclusive control exercised in the area by the U.S.S.R. since 1945. In addition the agreement provided for the joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur, until the end of 1952 at the latest, and the establishment of several long-term joint stock companies to operate mostly in China's borderlands: For example - Sinkiang and Dairen. In Outer Mongolia the Chinese Communists agreed to accept the continuation of the U.S.S.R.'s predominant influence. Two years later, during Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow in September, 1952, the two governments announced the return of the Manchurian railways to sole Chinese management by the end of 1952. Similarly it was announced that Port Arthur would continue to be under joint control beyond the 1952 deadline. At this time the Korean War was still in progress and the Chinese Communists might well have realized the desirability for the continuing presence of Soviet naval forces in the Port. The climax came in 1954 when, during Krushchov's visit to China, the Russians agreed to sell all their shares in the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies and to return Port Arthur to sole Chinese control by the end of 1955.

The chief aim of the new Chinese Communist Government during the period 1949 - 1952, appears to have been to expand and consolidate its political control over China. From a traditional standpoint, this called for the re-establishment of effective control over the peripheral areas and
the revival of the ancient policy of China's hegemony in Southeast Asia. The momentum of the Chinese revolution, the new Soviet offensive, and the surging tide of nationalism as well as the general instability in the Southeast Asian region produced the stimuli for a militant revolutionary approach.

1952 - 1955 Transitional Period

The period 1952-1955 was one of transition in Communist tactics culminating in the 1955 Bandung Conference and the official adoption of the "peaceful co-existence" line. Two main causes for the shift in tactics were, firstly, the failure of Communist insurrections in Southeast Asia, and secondly, the growing strength of western opposition to the spread of Communism in the area. In countries such as Indonesia, Malay and the Philippines, the Communist rebels were either defeated, driven underground or reduced to guerilla existence in the jungles. In addition, their violent tactics had alienated large parts of the public.

A more serious obstacle in the path of Communist China's policy was presented by the United States. The latter began to display a growing interest in Southeast Asia which stemmed from the recognized need to fill the power vacuum created as a result of the removal of the European colonial powers from the area. As part of a wider policy of "containment" of world communism, the United States concluded between 1950 and 1952 a series of bilateral and multilateral security pacts with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Philippines. Additional steps were taken in the form of United States' guarantees to the Taiwan regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, and large scale foreign aid to the newly emerging nations in an effort to bolster their weak economic and military preparedness. Peking regarded
United States' actions as interference in its sphere of influence and reduced the already low level of United States prestige in Chinese eyes to that of a most dangerous and unscrupulous "imperialist" power.

"Peaceful Coexistence" - New Approach.

Faced with these obstacles, Communist China began looking for a different approach in the fulfillment of its long term strategy. In October, 1952, the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union heralded the new line of "peaceful co-existence." This new line, already used by Zhdanov in 1947, emphasized the economic and cultural aspects of political warfare, rather than the military aspects. The hitherto used cold war tactic of open aggression was now replaced by the "parliamentary" approach, which envisaged the boring from within through the established political and economic institutions of non-Communist nations. The Chinese Communists formally endorsed the new line of "peaceful co-existence" during the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference held in Peking in December, 1952. One of the significant outcomes of this Conference, attended by 400 delegates from thirty-seven countries, was the setting up of a Permanent Liaison Bureau to promote increased cultural and other contacts between China and the neighbouring Asian states. Furthermore, these contacts, in contrast to previous procedures, were to be made on a government-to-government level. Prior to 1952, Peking's interests in Asian countries centered principally upon Communist parties. The Peking Peace Conference is significant in yet another respect, not only did it mark a partial retreat from rigid and revolutionary dogmatism, but it also marked "a first step in Peking's
bid for leadership in Asia on a broader and less doctrinaire basis."

For the first time, China was emerging as the leading bearer of Communism in Asia. Mao's concept of united front consisting of China and her "allies" against the west was now formally accepted, paving the way for the gradual shift from Moscow to Peking as the centre of control for Asian affairs.

Geneva Conference, 1954

The next stage of the transitional period in Peking's tactics came in 1954 with the Geneva Conference. Chou En-lai played a leading role at this Conference and discovered the potentialities of an active, positive diplomacy on a government-to-government basis. An important result of the Conference was the already referred to Sino-Indian Agreement regarding Tibet in April, 1954. Apart from acknowledging Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, the Agreement set forth five basic principles for the promotion of world peace: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; non-intervention in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful coexistence.

These five principles, otherwise known as the Pancha Shila, mutually agreed to by Nehru and Chou En-lai, have since come to provide the basic framework for Peking's dealings with the nations of Southeast Asia. The impact of Pancha Shila in Asia may be considered significant as it probably did much to allay original fear of China's militant tactics and many Asians began to feel the need for a policy of accommodation with the Chinese colossus to the North. Even more so in view of the fact that during a visit to New Delhi in June, 1954, Chou En-lai went on record as

favouring people's right to self-determination.

Bandung Conference, 1955 - Completion of Change

The final act in the transition in Communist China's tactical framework came in April, 1955, when 340 delegates including the principal leaders of twenty-nine Asian and African nations assembled in Bandung, Indonesia, for a major conference from which the western powers were excluded. The objective of the Conference, which was sponsored by the five Columbo powers, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Ceylon, was to seek common ground for mutual co-operation among the Afro-Asian nations and by doing so they hoped to make a contribution to the maintenance of international peace and stability. Both Chou En-lai and Nehru dominated the Conference. It soon became apparent, however, that China intended to utilize this opportunity to promote Peking's new foreign policy line of "peaceful co-existence." In his major address to the Conference, Chou made a great play for Asian solidarity in the face of continuous western colonialism. He stressed the need for Asia-African co-operation in the economic and cultural fields and asserted that this co-operation should be based on the principle of "equality and mutual benefit;" a term which has since come into prominent use in Peking's relations with Afro-Asian countries. Reiterating the five principles of "peaceful co-existence" he told the delegates that China was ready "to establish normal relations with other Asian and African countries on the basis of the strict adherence to these principles...." In an effort to allay any fears on the part of the Afro-Asians for their ominous neighbour, he said that "China has no

intention whatsoever to subvert the governments of its neighbouring countries." In fact it was the other way round, China, he said was suffering from the subversive activities carried out by the United States of America. In a grand conciliatory gesture, indicative of China's peaceful intentions, Chou affirmed the Chinese Government's willingness to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.

Chou En-Lai's statements had some effect in reducing tension in the Southeast Asian area, but apparently he did not succeed entirely in allaying the fears of some delegates for an expansionist China. One of the dominant themes of the conference was anti-colonialism and Chou made a great 'pitch' for the acceptance of this theme as the basis for common ground among the represented nations. Some of the delegates, however, notably President Sukarno of Indonesia, made it clear that they not only opposed colonialism, but opposed it in all its manifestations, "in the classic form" as well as in "its modern dress." This neo-colonialist appearance, Sukarno felt, could manifest itself in the form of economic control, intellectual control, or actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. Whether or not this attitude can be held directly responsible remains obscure, but it was significant that Chou signed a treaty with Indonesia concerning the status of the overseas Chinese.

23. Ibid., p. 28.
Internal and External Causes for Change

The Bandung Conference then, marked a turning point in Peking's tactical framework. During the next two years Communist China's Asian offensive was to be executed within the framework of "peaceful co-existence" and based on the five principles of Pancha Shila. Domestically, Communist China at this time was in the midst of a period of industrialization, as a result of the First Five Year Plan initiated in 1953. It seems conceivable, therefore, that Chou En-lai was quite sincere when he told the delegates of the Bandung Conference that "Like other countries (Asia and Africa), we are in urgent need of a peaceful international environment for the development of our independent and sovereign economy." Another development which might have had some bearing on Peking's change in tactics, was the coming into being of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato) in February, 1955. Great Britain, France, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines pledged themselves to undertake common action in the event of Communist attack and to devise common measures to counter Communist subversion in the area. As a result of Seato, Communist China was now faced with an Anti-Communist bulwark in the areas in which it hoped to expand its influence. Even more disquieting to Peking must have been the fact that South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, although not members of SEATO, were designated as territories forming part of SEATO's security sphere. Subsequent developments have shown that the political and economic instability of these territories qualified them as prime targets for Communist China's drive into Southeast Asia.

The formal adoption of the new line of peaceful co-existence by all Communist parties was made in Moscow in 1956. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchov, probably, with Southeast Asian countries in view, announced that Communists could now achieve power through the "peaceful" and even "parliamentary" path. This line was later reaffirmed in November, 1957, in a declaration signed by Khrushchov, Mao and other representatives calling for close cooperation between Communist parties and Socialist parties, which meant in effect the revival of the old "popular front" tactics of the 1920's and 1930's in a new framework of "peaceful co-existence."

Neutrality - An Ally of World Revolution

The clearest evidence of a change of mind on the part of Peking's rulers, was presented in a speech on foreign policy delivered by Chou En-lai to the First National People's Congress in June, 1956. The speech indicated a departure from Peking's original stand regarding so-called neutral or non-aligned nations. On the eve of the Chinese Communists coming to power in July, 1949, Mao had categorically stated that neutrality was a mere camouflage and that throughout the world people had to choose between imperialism and socialism. "Sitting on the fence," he said, "will not do; nor is there a third road." In 1956, Chou indicated the reversal of this attitude when he told the Congress that "the many countries which do not join military blocs, particularly countries of Asia and Africa, actively participating in international

affairs, have greatly strengthened the international forces of peace and neutrality and resolutely defend their national sovereignty." By implication the forces of neutrality, just as the forces of nationalism earlier, were now considered to be "allies" of the forces of peace, (Communism).

Taiwan - An Integral part of China

Despite these milder temperatures emanating from the Chinese mainland, the cold sting of the Taiwan breeze remained. So far the Chinese Communists have remained unshakeably determined to reclaim Taiwan, which they regard as an integral part of Chinese territory. As long as Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime continues to exist it poses a constant threat to the mainland's national security, particularly where Chiang has repeatedly declared his ultimate aim to recapture the mainland. An additional source of anxiety for Peking has been the fact that the continued existence of the Taiwan Nationalist regime is virtually dependent upon United States military backing. A steady barrage of anti-United States propaganda has pictured the United States Government as the greatest "war-monger and treacherous imperialist" since the second World War. Also the United States stands accused of interference in the internal affairs of Communist China, for not only have the Americans allegedly reduced Taiwan to a virtual state of "occupation" but in addition, Peking has constantly held the view that Taiwan is an "internal" matter and any outside interference falls within the category of "foreign aggression." Legally speaking, the Chinese Communists

appear to have a strong case for it was agreed at the Yalta Conference by the Allied Powers that following the end of the war, Formosa would be restored as a legal internal part of China. Since 1949, however, Formosa landed in the vortex of international politics and as a result has become a political rather than an internal issue. For Peking, however, Taiwan remains a strictly internal matter, closely bound up with China's national interests. Consequently, the chief cause for China's continued militancy stems from the question of Taiwan and Peking's rigid attitude towards this "bastion of United States imperialism."

In retrospect it may be said that the period 1955-1957 marked the height of Peking's "peaceful co-existence" offensive into Southeast Asia. This period was characterized by the occasional injection of a milder note in Peking's policy announcement; the extension of formal diplomatic relations with countries such as Nepal (1955) and Ceylon (1957); an increase in cultural exchanges; an apparent willingness to settle the status of overseas Chinese in bilateral agreements; and a stepped up programme for economic aid to the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia.

1957 - New Shift in Tactics

By 1957, a new shift in tactics became apparent. The shift was marked by the continuing public adherence to the line of "peaceful co-existence" and the emergence of a more militant posture. This hardening of Peking's policies, and incidentally of Sino-Soviet policy in general, seems to have derived its main impetus from Mao Tse-tung's re-evaluation of the relative positions of the two world camps. He
considered "that the present world situation had reached a new turning point". The East wind was now prevailing over the West wind by which he meant that the forces of socialism had now gained the edge over the forces of capitalism; the former were now in the ascendance whereas the latter were allegedly losing their strength as a result of economic crises and internal dissent and diversity. In response to this favourable world trend, Mao called for the strengthening of discipline within the Communist bloc and the presentation of a united front toward the West.

The question remains, what prompted Mao to interpret the balance of world power as he did, and why he re-emphasized a militant posture in the conduct of China's foreign policy? A number of explanations may be advanced. First of all, the Chinese may have been encouraged by the launching of the first Russian Sputnik in the fall of 1957. This marked a technological achievement of the first magnitude. Also, it was accomplished ahead of similar United States efforts to put a satellite into orbit. The Russian Sputnik could therefore be interpreted as a major triumph in the technological field for the Communist bloc. Secondly, the Chinese were disturbed by Khrushchov's de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1956. Close upon the heels of Khrushchov's public condemnation of Stalin's brutal methods, came the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt and the methods used

to suppress it were the same Stalinist methods which Khrushchov had recently condemned. In addition there followed Khrushchov's failure to bring Marshal Tito back to the fold. In view of these developments the Chinese Communists could not be expected to be very enthused about Stalin's dethronement. Although they formally endorsed the new Moscow line, the Chinese could nevertheless argue that the effects of de-Stalinization had weakened the unity of the Communist bloc. Since unity was considered to be among the primary exigencies for the successful world revolution, Peking took an adamant stand against "revisionism"; against all forces leading to a weakening in Communist bloc unity. A third possible explanation for the hardening of Chinese Communist policy may have been a domestic failure. The First Five Year Plan had failed to reach many of its production targets, and there was evidence of by no means dangerous but nevertheless audible, discontentment among the people with the crash programme methods employed by the regime. Also, the Chinese Communist leaders were on the eve of launching their gigantic programme for the large scale communization of the entire population. In anticipation of possible opposition and other difficulties connected with this revolutionary undertaking, Peking's leaders may have foreseen the possibilities for greater internal unity being derived from increased outward militancy. It would be relatively simple with the aid of propaganda devices, to turn Chinese provocation into an external threat to China's territorial integrity and any military measures required in connection with such provocations could be presented as measures to safeguard China's national security.

A combination of these factors is likely to have been responsible for Communist China's change in tactics by 1957. Evidence of the
newly adopted militant posture was revealed in a number of events during the following three years. In the fall of 1958 the mainland Chinese suddenly intensified their shelling of the Nationalist held off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Anxiety over a possible invasion attempt of Formosa precipitated a show of strength by the United States Seventh Fleet in the area and a renewed United States military guarantee to the regime of "Chiang Kai-shek". Chinese reaction was indignant and Chou En-lai warned the United States that it must accept the consequences if it persisted. He declared the off-shore islands an internal matter and the United States had no right to interfere with the recovery by the Chinese people of their islands. One week later, Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic, said the islands posed an immediate threat to the mainland and declared categorically that "the Chinese people are determined to recover Quemoy and Matsu, and no force on earth can stop them."  

Tibet as an Example of Militant Tactics

In the spring of 1959 occurred the ruthless suppression of the revolt in Tibet. Chinese action resulted in the complete subjugation of the country to Peking's control and the removal of the last vestiges of local authority granted under the 1954 Sino-Tibetan Agreement.

Peking Review, an official Chinese Government publication, in explaining the Tibetan situation, concluded with an indictment that the Tibetan local government and the reactionary clique of the upper social strata colluded with imperialists, gathered together rebellious bandits

and during the night of March 19 launched an armed attack against the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa. Chou En-lai called the rebellion a threat to the motherland and national security and announced that henceforth the Tibetan local government (Kasha) would be dissolved. Peking clearly regarded Tibet as an internal matter and exploited the revolt to establish once and for all political, as well as military control over an area which it claimed had traditionally been an integral part of China. The determined stand taken by Peking in the Tibet question was evident in a subsequent article in Peking Review. In commenting on the United Nations General Assembly adoption of a resolution to place the Tibet question on its agenda, the article condemned the Assembly action as a cold war farce directed by the United States, and as crude interference in China's internal affairs. Not only was the resolution condemned as illegal, null and void, but the United States was accused of being "the most vicious enemy of the Chinese people."  

Sino-Indian Border Dispute

A corollary to the suppression of the Tibet revolt was the outbreak of Sino-Indian border clashes. The dispute was one of long standing, but had so far been allowed to remain dormant. It centered around the question of the delimitation of the rugged mountain frontier between the two countries. The Chinese government holds to the view that the

32. Ibid., p. 6.
entire Sino-Indian boundary, about 2,000 kilometers long, has never been delimited, whereas the Indian government takes the stand that the entire length of the boundary has been either defined by treaty or recognized by custom and until now the Chinese government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the government of India up to the customary border.

Two main sectors of the boundary are now in dispute: the western sector in the region of Ladalh and the sector east of Bhutan, the so-called McMahon line. Concerning the western sector, the Indian government holds that the boundary line it claims was fixed by a treaty concluded between the authorities of the Tibet region of China and the Kashmir authorities in 1842. The Chinese claim, however, that this treaty contained no provisions about the concrete location of the boundary and furthermore that the greatest part (about 80 per cent) of the area now disputed by the Indian government is part of China's Sin kiang, which was no party to the treaty. Consequently, the Chinese feel it is inconceivable to hold that, judging by this treaty, vast areas of Sin kiang have ceased to belong to China but have become part of Ladakh.

Regarding the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, the Chinese government absolutely does not recognize the so-called McMahon line. The Indian government holds that the so-called McMahon line is the product of the 1914 Simla Conference jointly attended by Britain, China and the Tibet Region of China, and is therefore valid. The government contends that the arrangements for the Simla Conference
were made with the full knowledge and consent of the government of China and that at no stage did they object to the discussions on the boundary during the conference. Consequently the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon line boundary between India and Tibet must be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. The Chinese government on the other hand, has declared the Simla Convention to be void of legal validity because China at the time repudiated the conference and refused to recognize any treaty or similar document which might then or thereafter be signed by Britain and Tibet. The present Peking regime has dismissed the McMahon line as a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China.

The whole matter erupted in 1959 when Chinese border guards violated the customary McMahon boundary line and occupied the territory south of the line. The Chinese government subsequently laid claim to about 40,000 square miles of what the Indian government regards has been indisputable Indian territory for decades, and in some sectors for over a century. The Indians were indignant and protested strongly against China's provocative actions.

The line taken by the Chinese was that Indian troops had repeatedly made intrusions into Chinese territory along the western sector of the boundary. Also the Chinese charged that since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary. In doing so they not only overstepped the McMahon line but actually invaded and occupied Chinese territory.

Reaffirming their view that the entire Sino-Indian boundary had never been delimited, the Chinese government called for the overall settlement of the boundary question through friendly negotiations and adherence to the five principles of "peaceful co-existence." Pending this settlement Peking believed that the status quo along the border should be maintained.

India was thus declared the "aggressor" state and China assumed the role of the "victim" which presented a peaceful front. Looking at the question from the standpoint of China's traditional interests in the peripheral areas, the Sino-Indian border conflict appears to be more than just a tactical manoeuvre committed as they were to "peaceful co-existence" and conscious as they must have been, of the adverse effect their actions would have on Southeast Asian opinion. The Chinese Communists, nevertheless, choose to pursue their militant course of action. It seems highly doubtful that such detrimental action would be considered justifiable unless a question of overriding national interest were involved. Evidently, Peking in the final analysis still regards matters exclusively Chinese to carry more weight than the dictates of Communist ideology, although not openly admitting so. For practical purposes, however, ideology serves as a cloak to hide and of course further these exclusively nationalist aims. If the above assumption is correct, the question still remains why, Peking in the case of India, chose to resort to militant tactics, whereas in the case of Burma, with which country a settlement of the mutual boundary line was by then in an advanced state of success - chose to employ peaceful tactics. The answer must be with the Peking tacticians.

Militant Tactics and their Effect on Asia

It may be suggested that in all these crises since 1957, the off-shore islands, Tibet and the Sino-Indian boundary, the common factor was China's national interest. Much of the explanation for China's militant and uncompromising attitude may be derived from these fundamental interests which are aimed at complete territorial unification of the country, national security and political control over the peripheral areas. These considerations probably account for the generally mild opposition shown by the Asia and Southeast nations toward China at the time of the Korean War and the first off-shore islands crisis in 1954. The new Peking regime at first was to be given a chance to consolidate its position and to prove itself before judgment was passed. After all, many of the emerging Asian states were similarly engaged in trying to find their feet and assert themselves. Perhaps formal adoption of the "peaceful co-existence" approach in 1955 was taken as proof of the regime's peaceful intentions. Since 1958, however, such considerations of China's peaceful intentions were dealt a severe blow. There seems little doubt that Peking's action in Tibet seriously damaged its reputation in Asia and has made many Asians far more fearful and suspicious of Peking's "peaceful co-existence."

A Ceylonese opposition leader commented "...new imperialism has entrenched itself strangling everything that lies in its path to world supremacy." The Pakistani President called for co-operation between India and Pakistan to "defend" India in case of a "threat from outside". The Indonesian paper Merdeka called China "expansionist"
and accused her of not recognizing religion as part of the national life. Cambodia and Burma, both sharing common frontiers with Communist China and acutely aware of the need to seek for some form of accommodation with their giant neighbour, were less outspoken, but nevertheless concerned in their reactions. Premier UNa of Burma stated that legally Tibet must be regarded as part of China, but he suggested that Tibet be granted independence. A Cambodian newspaper, Meataphum also considered Tibet was China's internal affair, but at the same time labelled Nehru's expression of protest as "courageous."

The pressure exerted in South and Southeast Asia, following Peking's brutal suppression of the revolt in Tibet has "opened the eyes of many Asians to the Character of the Chinese Communist regime and had a tremendous impact on attitudes toward China."

Whatever national or traditional justification there may have been for China's actions in Tibet or on the Sino-Indian boundary, it has now largely been superseded by the image of an expansionist and revolutionary power determined to pursue its long-term revolutionary aims. Ideologically, these aims are Communism on a world-wide scale. On a more practical level this calls for the withdrawal of the western powers or in Communist terminology, "the imperialists" from Asia. Their withdrawal would open the way for Communist China to re-establish her hegemony over the area, and thus exert a more profound influence over its political development. At the same time it would

re-establish China's traditional position of leadership in Asia. From this it may be gathered that ideology and national interest are not only mutually compatible but also mutually reinforcing. This latter, in the sense that both concepts can be directed toward achieving the same end – domination of Asia!

Chou En-lai's advocacy at the 1954 Geneva Conference of a kind of Chinese "Monroe Doctrine" for Asia, appears to be in accordance with this line of thinking. Drawing on the analogy of the United States' Monroe Doctrine, it would imply the exclusion from this area of foreign ideologies (for example - capitalism) and the predominance of a single power (Communist China). Obviously Peking would be left with a clear field to operate.

Bringing about the withdrawal of the Western Powers from Asia must therefore be considered as constituting one of Peking's immediate primary aims. Hence, its continuous strong opposition to SEATO and the United States in particular. As long as the West is able to maintain their position, it will continue to be an obstacle to Peking's ultimate objective.

Conclusion

In conclusion it may be said that at the present time Peking's main objective is to get the imperialist world, particularly the United States, out of Asia. To this end, Peking supports Afro-Asian solidarity and national liberation movements. Since Peking regards Asia as Communist China's special sphere of influence, much emphasis is placed on both these aspects. In fact, the importance attached by Peking to these
national liberation movements may well be at the bottom of the present Sino-Russian dispute. One shrewd observer of Sino-Soviet affairs has analyzed the dispute as follows: Assuming that "national liberation" is in the forefront of Peking's objectives, and if it is to be promptly achieved, it requires warlike action. Mr. Khrushchov, however, by calling for universal and general disarmament has for all practical purposes subordinated "national liberation" to the pursuing of world peace through peaceful co-existence and disarmament. Consequently, the Soviet Communist Party has blown up the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism out of all proportion. 38

Herein, it seems, lies the core of the present ideological dispute and it is at this juncture that Moscow and Peking differ. Peking takes the view that not only should national liberation receive priority, but also it should be achieved by militant means. Moscow, on the other hand, showing greater awareness of the dangers inherent in nuclear war, takes the view that less militant means are not only safer but in the long run will achieve the same long-term objective that the Chinese have. Apparently in Moscow's view, war is not inevitable and "peaceful co-existence" has become an aim in itself. Peking, however, has never regarded "peaceful co-existence" as more than a tactical manoeuvre to be replaced or de-emphasized whenever conditions so demand. Judging from Peking's policy since 1957, it would seem that the present world situation demands more militant posture on the part of the Communist bloc vis à vis the Western World.

CHAPTER III

THREE INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY
AND
THEIR EFFECT ON THE AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS

Introduction

In the implementation of its long term policy toward the Afro-Asian world, Peking has at its disposal a varied number of weapons ranging from outright military pressure to the subtle tactics of penetration. Since the choice of weapons lies exclusively with Peking, each particular weapon can be chosen on the basis of prevailing conditions in any one country. Moreover, the choice of weapons can be made to suit Peking's tactics during any given period. Consequently, flexibility in the application of these instruments is a primary feature of Peking's policy.

Over the years the main instruments which Peking has employed have been diplomacy, trade and economic aid, propaganda and cultural relations, overseas Chinese, and Communist parties. In general, during the period between 1949 and 1955 the emphasis was mostly on diplomacy, the overseas Chinese and local Communist parties. These instruments were largely geared to the pursuit of subversive and insurrectionist activities on a non-governmental level. Since the 1955 Bandung Conference and the resulting formal switch to the new "peaceful co-existence" line, the emphasis has been increasingly on such instruments as cultural and economic relations, and the conduct of diplomatic relations on a government-to-government level. Perhaps the most striking example of this
change in emphasis is provided in the form of the role played by local Communist parties. 

In the period following 1948 they were instructed to pursue their aims by means of militant revolutionary tactics. Since 1956, however, their activities have been carried out through "parliamentary" methods and in some cases this has been accompanied by a considerable degree of success.

Diplomatic Recognition

One of the first tasks the new Communist regime embarked upon after achieving power, was not only to obtain diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible, but also to make Peking the diplomatic centre of gravity of Asia. This latter ambition was in accordance with a more fundamental objective, namely, the elevation of China to a position of world prestige. Almost immediately, Peking received de jure recognition from Burma (mid-December, 1949), India (late December, 1949), Pakistan and Ceylon (January, 1950) and Indonesia (spring, 1950). Following the Bandung Conference, Peking extended her formal diplomatic relations with Nepal (1955), and Cambodia (1958). In contrast to the establishment of diplomatic relations with such existing national entities as mentioned above, Peking has extended diplomatic "encouragement" to many of the struggling and newly emerging nations of Africa. As part of its overall policy of support for "national liberation", Peking has extended diplomatic recognition to the self-proclaimed Algerian Moslem Provisional Government (September, 1958) and the Independent Republic of the Congo (August, 1960). In addition to affirming the legality of such

1. Overseas Chinese and Communist parties as instruments of policy, will be discussed in Chapters IV and V respectively.
independence movements, China has consistently declared its solidarity with and unwavering support of these anti-colonial struggles. In contrast to the early establishment of diplomatic relations with Asian neighbours, Communist China's diplomatic advance into Africa is of a relatively recent nature. By 1957, Egypt was the only African country with which Peking enjoyed diplomatic relations. Since that time the heightened impact of Africa on the world political scene, as reflected in an increasing number of African colonies achieving independence, has led Peking to expand its diplomatic frontiers to this continent. Early in 1958, China extended diplomatic recognition to the newly created United Arab Republic, which was followed by the establishment of relations with Morocco and Mali during the second half of 1958. Since mid-1959, Peking has had an ambassador in Khartoum in the Sudan, and from 1960 onward it has established relations with the African States of Guinea, Ghana and the Somali Republic. The extension of diplomatic frontiers has not only added to Communist China's prestige abroad, but also provided the Peking regime with a valuable source of communication. Under the protection of diplomatic immunity, officials attached to Communist China's legations abroad are indeed in a favourable position to establish or direct contacts with pro-Peking elements in their host countries. That Peking has not been completely reluctant to utilize its legations for such "undiplomatic" purposes is pointed out by a recent incident in Indonesia when a consular official of Communist China in Bandjarmasin was placed under 41 hours house arrest by the Indonesians for interference in government anti-Chinese measures.
Peking as Diplomatic Center of Gravity

A second aspect of the instrument of diplomacy has been to raise Peking to a position of diplomatic center of gravity in Asia. As part of the long term objective to revive China's ancient position of domination and leadership in the Far East, Peking has since 1949 played host to a large number of international conferences mostly on a semi-official level. The most important of such conferences were the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference in November, 1949, and the Asian Women's Conference in December, 1949, both of which included leftist participants from all Southeast Asian countries, the Executive Committee of the International Union of Students in April, 1951, the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in October, 1952, which was attended by 429 delegates from more than forty political entities in the region, and finally the Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which convened in August, 1954, and consisted of 263 delegates from sixty-eight countries. Such an impressive stream of delegates no doubt provided Peking's leaders with valuable opportunities for contacts and to acquaint many delegates with the "progressive" nature of the Chinese Communist regime.

On a more official level, Peking has played host to a large number of government leaders. President Sukarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister Nehru of India, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, Prime Minister U Nu of Burma and President Sekou Toure of the newly established Republic of Guinea have all been given the red carpet treatment by Peking. Significantly many of these visits were accompanied or soon followed by treaties of friendship and other agreements regarding economic and technical assistance.
Trade and Economic Assistance

The second major instrument of Peking's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations is trade and economic assistance. The importance of this instrument has become increasingly apparent since 1955. The most significant feature of the Sino-Soviet bloc's economic foreign policies is that economic and political motives are closely interwoven and it is commonly recognized that both Moscow and Peking attach a high priority to their political objectives. The Communists hope that by expanding their trade and aid programmes they will succeed in raising their prestige in the underdeveloped nations and encourage these nations to loosen their existing ties with the West. Not only should there be greater economic cooperation among the Afro-Asian nations but also their economies should develop along socialist lines and become increasingly orientated toward the Communist bloc.

Although the Soviet Union by virtue of its greater economic strength within the Communist bloc has been able to offer more aid to the underdeveloped countries than Communist China, the latter's role in this economic "offensive" has, nevertheless, assumed increasing significance, the main reason being that Communist China's stepped up aid programmes have led to serious strains on domestic consumption and placed heavy burdens on the country's much needed resources for economic development.

The official policy defined by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council in 1954 assigned priority to exports over domestic requirements. Under this policy commodities that are
essential to the livelihood of the people" should be exported in "as large a quantity as possible." Those commodities which are more important to consumers in China, "but short of an urgent demand in the domestic market" should be "reduced in domestic sales to make a bigger export possible." Those commodities "essential to the livelihood of the people" and in short supply should be made available for export according to limited quotas. In 1956, Chou En-lai defined Peking's economic aims as being the promotion of "the economic development of both parties" on the principle of "equality, mutual benefit and each making up what the other lacks". The wider political aim of Peking's economic policy was clearly stated in 1958, when Peking called for "Great or economic cooperation among Asian and African countries" in order that these countries could "free themselves quickly from the economic enslavement by imperialism and drive off the waves of the U.S. economic crisis." Consequently, Peking's economic policies vis à vis the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa serve a twofold purpose. First, to achieve their economic dependency on China and secondly, as a result of this, to weaken western and particularly United States influence in the area.

Peking's trade with Southeast Asia is striking for a number of reasons. Both China and Southeast Asia are basically raw material producing areas, since they have a predominantly agricultural economy.

Since 1953, however, China has undergone a substantial degree of industrial development and become an exporter of manufactured goods during the first two Five-Year Plans. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has not experienced a similar degree of industrial development which has enabled the Chinese to stage a major drive to capture control of the markets for manufactured goods in that region. This became particularly evident after 1958 when, following the break in trade relations with Japan in that year, China embarked on a policy of drastic price cutting and dumping in the area. Textiles and a variety of other manufactured goods were sold at prices five to ten per cent below the price for comparable Japanese and Indian goods. The result has been a substantial rise in Communist China's trade with the area while at the same time causing damage to both Japanese and Indian sales in the same region.  

trade from each side. In November of 1960, Communist China signed a new trade agreement with Tunisia and in the same month an agreement was concluded with Morocco which called for a total of seven billion Moroccan francs' worth of trade each way. Morocco was to export to China, phosphates, vehicles, minerals and sardines, and China would send tea, cotton and textiles to Morocco.  

Also in 1960, an agreement was signed between China and the Republic of Guinea which provided for an annual exchange of goods between the two countries to a value of 4.92 American dollars.  

An indication of the relative importance of Communist China's foreign trade with the Afro-Asian nations may be derived from the following statistics. Peking stated in 1958 that during the first Five Year Plan, 16% of its total foreign trade was with these nations as compared to 75% with the Socialist bloc and 9% with the West, mainly Europe.  

On the basis of these figures and those released by the United States Department of Commerce, it appears that by 1960 approximately two-thirds of Peking's total trade with non-Communist areas was being carried on with the Afro-Asian nations totalling about 700 million American dollars.  

By 1960, Communist China had concluded intergovernmental trade agreements not only with all of the Communist bloc countries, but also with India, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, the United Arab Republic, 

Lebanon, Nepal, Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan. \(^{10}\)

From 1954 onward, when Communist China's policy took an outward turn, the instrument of trade assumed an increasingly significant role. Between 1954 and 1957, Peking's trade with the underdeveloped non-Communist countries in the Far East and Southeast Asia increased by over 40%. Trade with this area rose from 425 million dollars in 1954 to over 600 million dollars in 1957; \(^{11}\) a large part of the increase consisting of rising Chinese Communist exports of manufactured goods. Communist China's techniques and patterns in trade with the Afro-Asian nations may best be understood from an analysis of the bilateral agreements with these countries.

**Trade with Southeast Asian Countries**

Prior to 1955, Communist China's trade with Burma amounted to less than one million dollars. Following the signing of a three-year trade agreement in 1954, Sino-Burmese trade rose to 20 million dollars in 1955, and over 30 million dollars in 1956. In 1957 trade remained at the 20 to 30 million dollar level. \(^{12}\)

Since rice is Burma's chief export product and China herself is a rice producing country, the Chinese have refrained from absorbing these rice purchases in Burma for their own domestic needs. Instead, Burmese rice has become an important commodity in the establishment of a triangular trade pattern between China, Burma and Ceylon. In this three-way trade system China's purchases of Burmese rice are forwarded to Ceylon, which in turn is one of China's chief suppliers of rubber. In 1955, when

\(^{10}\) Barnett, *Communist China in Asia*, p.235.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 238.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 240.
Burma was having difficulties in selling its rice, China bought a total of 250,000 tons of rice in Burma to be forwarded to Ceylon in payment for Chinese rubber purchases, from this latter country. In October, 1960, an agreement was signed by which China purchased from Burma 300,000 to 400,000 tons of rice of the 1961 crop. China in turn has exported sizable amounts of manufactured goods to Burma, including steel, cotton and glass.

Communist China's trade with Ceylon has evolved largely on the basis of a rubber - rice barter. In 1953, when Ceylon was having difficulties in marketing its rubber, the two countries signed a five-year trade agreement which called for an annual exchange of 50,000 tons of rubber for 270,000 tons of rice. A noteworthy feature of this agreement was that China was prepared to pay for Ceylonese rubber at prices higher than world market levels. Under this agreement, trade between the two countries rose from less than one million dollars in 1950, to 95 million dollars in 1953. Between 1954 and 1957, trade fluctuated at the range between 40 and 70 million dollars. When the first agreement expired, it was renewed in 1957, for another period of five years, beginning in 1958, but the guaranteed quantities of rubber and rice were reduced to a minimum of 30,000 tons of rubber and 200,000 tons of rice. The premium on rubber, which had been a feature of the 1953 agreement was abolished.

however, and the prices to be used were those prevailing in international markets. To soften the blow, China undertook to grant Ceylon economic aid for a period of five years. Between January and September, 1960, Chinese exports to Ceylon totalled Rs. 104.47 million of which about Rs. 15 million consisted of manufactured goods. During the same period exports from Ceylon to China totalled Rs. 92 million consisting entirely of rubber. China has made an impressive advance in her textile sales to Ceylon and has caused serious concern among Ceylon's leading textile suppliers, Japan, India and the United Kingdom. The main cause for concern has been the fact that China's price is generally some 20 per cent to 30 per cent lower than the Japanese, while her quality is sometimes almost as good.\textsuperscript{16}

Communist China also carries on a substantial trade with Indonesia which is numerically the largest and potentially, one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is rich in raw materials and a major exporter of rubber; a product sought by Communist China in increasing quantities. Sino-Indonesian trade has risen rapidly as a consequence of trade agreements signed in 1953 and 1956. By 1957 it had reached a total amount of 53 million American dollars. In addition to the export of cotton textiles, a major commodity in this trade, the Chinese have also sold Indonesia a variety of other manufactured goods, including machines and appliances. Copra, sugar and rubber constitute the main Indonesian exports to Communist China.\textsuperscript{17} Indonesia's

\textsuperscript{17} Barnett, Communist China in Asia, p. 240.
exports, rubber in particular, have assumed increasingly significant proportions since 1957, a fact which may partially explain why Peking is no longer prepared to pay prices high above world market levels for Ceylonese rubber. One indication of Peking's desire for closer Sino-Indonesian relations was revealed in 1956 when Indonesia, in the throes of an economic crisis, had difficulties in meeting its export commitment. Peking came to its assistance by voluntarily extending the time limit for settling past trade deficits. 18

In contrast to the above mentioned countries which have formal diplomatic relations with Peking, Malaya - Singapore have so far refrained from recognizing the Peking regime. Malaya, it must be remembered suffered the full impact of Red guerilla warfare during the period between 1948 and 1952 and it was not until 1960 that the government announced the lifting of the emergency regulations which had remained in force during these years. Although government forces have succeeded in driving the guerillas deep into the jungles, their presence, nevertheless, continues to form a source of irritation in Malaya. Despite this situation, however, Sino-Malayan trade has been substantial. In 1950-51, following the outbreak of the Korean War, but prior to the time that restrictions on China trade became effective, trade between these countries reached a total of over 70 million dollars annually, about half of which consisted of Malayan rubber exports to China. As a consequence of Great Britain's restrictions on the export of rubber to Communist China, trade temporarily declined to an average of 30 - 40 million dollars annually between 1953-1955.

Because of the reopening of the rubber trade in 1956 and a simultaneous vigorous Chinese Communist export drive, trade between these countries jumped to 76 U.S. million dollars; two-thirds of which consisted of exports of textiles and other manufactured goods from Communist China to Malaya. Due to the adverse effect of Peking's exports on the local economies of both Malaya and Singapore, the governments of the latter two clamped import restrictions on cement and textiles from Communist China. Because of these restrictions Chinese exports to Malaya and Singapore in the first two months of 1960 declined to a total of M$ 39 million, main items being rice, textile goods, fruit, nuts and dairy products. During the same period China imported from Malaya and Singapore M $ 10.8 million worth of crude rubber and a further M $ 460,000 of spices. 19

Communist China's trade with other Southeast Asian nations seems to have been on a comparatively small scale. Apart from North Korea and North Vietnam, which have been firmly drawn into Peking's economic orbit, Communist China signed a trade agreement with Cambodia in 1956 which provided for 5 million pounds sterling worth of exports each way. 20

Also, in early 1959, China signed a trade agreement with Thailand which, like Malaya, has imposed new import restrictions on Chinese goods flooding Thai markets. Furthermore, it is estimated that up to June, 1955, China imported some 100,000 bales of cotton from Pakistan

when China's domestic production of raw cotton was reduced in 1954 because of floods, droughts and insect pests.  

Sino-Japanese Trade Relations

Perhaps the most interesting illustration of the extent to which political motives dominate Peking's trade relations with non-Communist Asian countries is provided by the course of Sino-Japanese trade since 1952. Between 1952 and 1955 Communist China concluded three private trade agreements with Japanese businessmen. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Sino-Japanese trade, on the basis of these three private agreements, reached the substantial total of 150 million dollars in 1956. Optimism prevailed in Japanese trade circles because of this favourable trend and a possible further increase in Sino-Japanese trade. This optimism led to the opening of negotiations for a fourth private trade agreement in the fall of 1957. This time, however, the Chinese Communists proceeded to use trade as a political weapon, by pressing hard for their political demands. Peking's strong pressure resulted eventually in a willingness on the part of the Japanese government, although it was not a direct participant, to concede a number of Peking's demands, among others an exchange of permanent non-official trade missions. Negotiations eventually led to the signing of a new agreement which called for trade each way of about 100 million dollars in 1958. In February, 1958, representatives of the Japanese iron and steel industry also signed an agreement which provided for the exchange of Japanese steel products for Chinese iron ore and coal to a total value of close to 300 million dollars.

each way over a five-year period. 22

Following what appeared to be a mutually profitable expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, Peking in May, 1958, suddenly seized upon the so-called "flag incident" in Tokyo, to denounce the Kishi government in violent terms and to break off all trade relations with Japan. In view of the favourable trend in Sino-Japanese relations, it is questionable that Peking would allow a minor political issue such as the "flag incident" to disrupt this trend, unless political motives had gained the upper hand. The continuing diplomatic deadlock between the two countries, despite strong pressure from Peking to break it, may conceivably have been interpreted by the Chinese as a setback in their efforts to raise Communist China's prestige abroad. A more plausible explanation, however, is derived from Peking's simultaneous trade drive to capture the Southeast Asian markets for Communist China's manufactured goods. If the increased Afro-Asian orientation of Communist China's trade formed a definite part of Peking's long term policy with respect to this region, then it may well have deliberately precipitated the break in Sino-Japanese trade relations in order to divert and thereby intensify the flow of economic goods in a North-South direction. This would enable Peking to make a more concerted effort in an area where it hoped to increase its position of political predominance and prestige.

Perhaps the most compelling reason behind Peking's drastic action against Japan is genuine concern over the rapid growth of Japan's industrial capacity and the corresponding effect of Japanese exports to

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Southeast Asia. By far the most advanced industrial nation in Asia, but almost totally lacking in raw materials, Japanese capital has penetrated Southeast Asia in the form of loans, reparation payments and investments. Fifteen different mines in this region are allegedly exploited by Japanese capital.  

According to a joint statement signed by the Chinese and Japanese Communist parties in October, 1959, Japan's industrial and mining production was 2.7 times the pre-war level, surpassing the peak level during World War II by 110 per cent. Whatever the accuracy of such statistics, it is sufficiently clear that Japan forms the most formidable competitor to Peking's economic designs in Southeast Asia. Even more disquieting to the Chinese Communists is the fact that Japan has the backing of the United States, their number one public enemy.

The revision of the Japanese United States "Security Treaty" in 1960 met with firm Chinese disapproval. The treaty was condemned as an aggressive military alliance and interpreted as a threat to the revival of Japanese militarism. It was allegedly a United States plot against Asia while at the same time it reduced Japan to a United States tool for war and aggression.

In retrospect, it would seem that Peking encouraged the expansion of trade with Japan as a means of extracting political concessions. When it became apparent in 1958 that Tokyo was not prepared to grant all of Peking's demands, the latter seized upon the "flag incident" as a pretense

to break off all trade relations with Japan and direct its economic efforts into an area with greater political potentialities. In doing so, however, Peking was confronted with a major obstacle in the form of Japan's firmly established trading position in Southeast Asia. In order to remove this obstacle, Communist China embarked on a twofold course of action; on the one hand she launched a vigorous trade offensive designed to capture control of export markets for industrial goods; on the other hand, she conducted a campaign to discredit the Kishi government and revive old fears of Japanese militarism. Although the Chinese Communists can claim some initial successes, the question remains how effective this politically motivated trade offensive will be in the long run, as against the sound economic principles and competitive strength of Japanese trade.

**Economic Aid to Asian Countries**

One last aspect of economics as an instrument of Communist China's policy toward the Afro-Asian nations needs to be mentioned. Since 1956, Peking has extended economic aid to a number of non-Communist countries on an increasingly large scale. Although the magnitude of this aid is small in comparison with United States and Russian programmes, nevertheless, in terms of Communist China's national income and in view of the strained economic situation within China, this foreign aid has already assumed substantial proportions. Between 1953, when Peking started its foreign aid programmes, and 1956, all its foreign aid went to neighbouring Communist countries. During the period 1953-1957, which coincided with Communist China's first Five Year Plan, the total estimated grants of
economic aid was 779 million dollars of which 55 million dollars went to non-Communist countries in the Afro-Asian area — Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon and Egypt. Of the remaining 724 million dollars the lion's share consisted of grants to both North Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia.

In June, 1956 Peking started its first aid programme to a non-Communist country in the form of a 22.4 million dollar grant to Cambodia covering a period of three years. Under the agreement China agreed to help build a cement factory, a paper-mill, a textile mill and a plywood factory, without compensation or conditions attached. In 1958, when Cambodia and Communist China established diplomatic relations, Peking expressed its readiness to aid Cambodia according to the latter's needs and capabilities in building small sized iron and steel works. In conformity with the Bandung spirit, Peking simultaneously expressed its wish "...to see the other Asian-Africa countries, as well as ourselves, prosperous, rich and strong..."

In October, 1956, Communist China agreed to provide Nepal with a 12.6 million dollar grant over a three-year period. In contrast to the Cambodian agreement, the agreement with Nepal stipulated that no Chinese technical personnel were to be sent to Nepal. In March, 1960, when the previous grant had not yet been used, a new Sino-Nepalose agreement was signed whereby China agreed to give Nepal a free grant of aid to the value of 100 million Indian Rupees, over a three-year period. This time Nepal accepted Chinese technical personnel on its soil but the specific stipulation was made that their standard of living, while in Nepal, was not to exceed that

27. *loc. cit.*
of similar personnel in Nepal. These stipulations may be regarded as an attempt on the part of Nepal to avoid possible political implications accruing from the stationing of Chinese technical personnel on Nepalese soil.

In the case of Burma, Communist China agreed in 1956 and 1957 to help to build two textile mills. In addition she granted Burma a $30 million, non-interest bearing loan in January, 1961, for a period of six years. The loan is to be repaid in ten years, starting in 1971. The offering of long term loans to non-Communist countries has been a feature of Peking's foreign aid programme since late 1957 and early 1958. Reportedly two large offers were made to Indonesia in 1958 (11.2 million dollars) and 1959 (40 million dollars) in order to help defray costs of Indonesian imports from Communist China. In September, 1958, Ceylon accepted a loan of approximately 10 million dollars to be paid in four annual instalments with interest at 2.5 per cent. The loan was made in the form of equipment, supplies and facilities at a time when Ceylon suffered damage from excessive floods. In addition Ceylon was given a 15.75 million dollar grant in September, 1957, presumably to soften the blow of reduced income from rubber exports to Communist China resulting from Chinese insistence on paying lower prices for Ceylonese rubber.

Economic Aid toward African Countries

Recently the Chinese Communists have also expanded their foreign

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31. Ibid., pp. 249-50.
32. Ibid., pp. 248-49.
aid programme to include the newly independent nations of Africa. As part of Communist China's campaign to win friendship and good will in Africa, an economic and technical assistance agreement was concluded with Guinea in September, 1960, the first between Communist China and an African country. Under the Agreement, Peking granted Guinea a 25 million dollar interest-free loan, repayable in ten years beginning in 1970. Also Peking agreed to send experts and technicians as well as provide complete equipment and machinery. Furthermore, the loan was made "without any conditions or privileges attached." A few months prior to this agreement in May, 1960, Communist China made an outright gift of 1000 tons of rice to the newly independent Republic of Guinea.

Morocco provides an interesting example of the kind of technical assistance Peking provides. Being a tea drinking nation, but lacking domestic cultivation of this highly popular beverage, Morocco has traditionally been an importer of tea, with the resulting drain on its foreign exchange. Early in 1960, therefore, a team of Chinese specialists went to Morocco to explore the possibilities for tea cultivation there. Whether or not the prospects are favourable remains unknown, but in November of the same year, the Moroccan government signed a trade agreement with Communist China, under which the latter would provide Morocco with coffee, textiles and tea.

Egypt has also been a target in Communist China's trade and economic aid offensive. In August, 1955, the two countries signed a three-year trade agreement covering the purchase of 13,000 tons of cotton. During the

34. Ibid., p. 27.
first year, Communist China was to buy 10 million pounds sterling worth of cotton from Egypt and as a result became the second biggest customer of Egyptian cotton. The 1956 Suez crisis furnished Peking with an opportunity to show its support for the Nasser regime by announcing a U.S. 4.7 million dollar cash grant to Egypt. In December, 1958, Peking announced the signing of a second three-year trade agreement with Egypt. The 1960 protocol to this December, 1958, trade agreement was signed on February 24. It provided for exchanges worth 15 million pounds sterling each way, China supplying frozen beef, machinery, building materials, tea and silk; against Egyptian cotton and minerals. Although generally speaking Sino-Egyptian relations appear to have been mutually satisfactory, Peking's suppression of the revolt in Tibet seems to have interjected a discordant note. The Information Department of the United Arab Republic expressed criticism of Peking's action by terming the rebellion "an eastern version of the Hungarian revolution". Other discordant notes were heard in the months that followed. In August, 1959, a leading Chinese jurist demanded the immediate release by the United Arab Republic of one of the leaders of the Lebanese Communist party, who had been arrested by U.A.R. authorities two months previously. In October of the same year, Al Ahram, an United Arab Republic paper, alleged that all Arab capitals had "boy-cotted" the National Day celebrations called for by the Chinese embassies.

From the foregoing it may be seen that trade and economic aid form a useful instrument in Communist China's long-term policy toward the Afro-Asian world, particularly since 1955 when she formally adopted the "Competitive co-existence" line. The wider political motives behind this economic offensive cannot be denied, because a regime which follows an economic policy that forces the population to live on a minimum subsistence level, and even below this level, for the sake of increasing exports, cannot be assumed to follow a sound economic policy in the interest of the population as a whole. This assumption is even less realistic in the light of the regime's commitment to a crash programme of industrialization. Indeed, the methods and techniques applied in expanding trade and foreign aid are indicative of Communist China's wider political designs regarding the Afro-Asian world. At the same time, however, it would be unfair to deny to the Peking regime a measure of ingenuity in conducting its trade offensive. Such examples as Ceylonese rubber, Burmese rice, both vitally important export commodities for these countries, and Moroccan tea cultivation have already been cited in this respect. An example even more illustrative of Communist China's ingenuity is the comment by Wen Liang that perfumed prints, considered a novelty in the world's textile industry, were selling in Asia and Africa like "hot cakes". 37

Propaganda and Cultural Relations

The third major instrument of Peking's policy is propaganda and cultural relations. This instrument assumes particular importance when

viewed against the background of Communist China's objective to win friendship and establish closer relations with the peoples of Asia and Africa. The promotion of cultural relations with these peoples is in Peking's opinion, a natural outcome of common past experience and common future tasks and should be based on the principle of "equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect." Thus, co-operation and solidarity among equals.

Indeed, solidarity has come to be regarded as the magic concept underlying all of Communist China's relations with the Afro-Asian world. Since the Bandung Conference "a link has been forged between the national independent movements on the two continents". Not only do they influence each other but they "surge forward together like successive waves in a rising tide. The Chinese, Asian and African people, so runs the argument, have had the same experience of prolonged, imperialist and colonialist aggression and oppression and today they face the same common tasks. Therefore, "...the Chinese peoples always regard it as their noble international duty to back the national liberation struggles of all oppressed nations" and consequently pledge their "unfailing and resolute support."

The Chinese Communists have given concrete expression to this concept of solidarity by means of concluding bilateral Friendship Associations. The purpose of these Friendship Associations is to back the just struggle of African and Asian people against imperialism and colonialism.

40. Ibid., p. 3.
and furthermore, to foster friendly relations and economic and cultural exchanges between Chinese and Afro-Asian peoples. The Chinese-African People's Friendship Association was established in April, 1960 for precisely this purpose. By 1955, such bilateral Associations had been established between China and a number of Asian countries including India, Ceylon, Pakistan, North Vietnam and Indonesia. In 1958, the Arab-Chinese friendship society was formed in Cairo. So far as can be determined the primary value of these bilateral Friendship Associations was largely of a cultural nature through the mutual exchange of good will missions and cultural ensembles.

Non-aggression Treaties

Since 1960, however, presumably as a result of Peking's increased Afro-Asian orientation, a new dimension has been added by which Friendship has assumed distinct political overtones. In the course of 1960, Peking formally signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with at least three Asian countries — Afghanistan, Cambodia and Burma. It is stated in the preamble of the Treaty with Afghanistan that it is concluded in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the spirit of the Bandung Conference. The real core of these three non-aggression treaties consists of the provision that neither party is to take part in any military alliance directed against the other, and article 2 of the Sino-Burmese Treaty provides that there shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the two parties."

Peking undoubtedly stands to gain from these treaties by making friendship conditional on the other party's consent to refrain from joining military alliances; an obvious intrusion on the sovereignty of these countries. It must be assumed also that one of Peking's objectives is to prevent any of these close neighbours from joining SEATO, which is considered an aggressive military alliance by Peking.

The year 1960 was also significant in another respect. Peking signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Republic of Guinea, the first such treaty with an African country. From Peking's standpoint this was "...a momentous event not only in the history of Chinese-Guinean relations but also in the history of relations between China and Africa."  

Nationwide Solidarity Campaigns

In their quest for friendship and solidarity the Chinese Communists have also used the device of publicly announcing nationwide solidarity campaigns. Support for a particular country's struggle for national liberation is given by proclaiming "Algeria Day" (March 30, 1960), "Congo Day" (April, 1960), "Uganda Day" (July 5, 1959, or "Algeria Week" (April, 1960). In cases where no particular country warrants such distinction, recourse can be taken in "Imperialists Quit Africa Day" (December 1, 1960) and "Anti-Colonialism Day" (April, 1958). On such occasions, huge mass rallies are held in Peking during which it is asserted that "Over 600 million back up Algeria's people" and that in return, these 600 millions have drawn great encouragement from the struggle of the African people.

A huge mass rally was held in April, 1960, on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of the Bandung Conference. Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-chairman of the National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, told the gathering that "The common task of opposing imperialism, safeguarding world peace and developing their national economies has closely linked together the Chinese and African people." Another mass rally was held on March 24, 1960, for the purpose of giving all-out support to the Second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference to be held in Conakry (Guinea) the following month. From the foregoing it can be seen that Peking's conception of friendly relations extends beyond the governmental level and has come to include the mass of the people. The inevitable effect of such mass identification must be a greater awareness on the part of the people of where their loyalties should be. An Algerian Moslem or a Congolese soldier is a brother in arms who fights for the same cause and deserves every possible support. In this way a sense of association or solidarity is generated whereby the Chinese people look upon the Asian and African people as friends with a common experience and common tasks. This mass "indoctrination" if carried far enough, may ultimately prove to be a powerful instrument in the hands of Peking's leaders.

In addition to the above mentioned unorthodox measures in promoting friendly relations, Communist China also employs the more conventional methods such as the exchange of goodwill missions. In this respect, cultural groups have been particularly active. For example, the Chinese

43. Peking Review, April 19, 1960, p. 10.
Acrobatic Art Troupe and the Chinese Nationalities Song and Dance Ensemble have made extensive and according to Peking, highly successful tours of Sudan, Ethiopia, Morocco and Burma. In addition, Peking has seen a steady stream of military, economic, educational and student missions, from many Afro-Asian nations. Not only are such missions encouraged but they also receive lavish treatment.

Communist China's propaganda machinery has also been quite active in achieving closer relations with the Afro-Asian countries. Peking's foreign language press turns out large volumes of books and magazines in several Asian languages. Special Communist propaganda films and radio broadcasts also form important means for spreading propaganda, and in 1957 Peking beamed a total of 230 hours a week of radio programmes to the Far East. The Chinese Communists claim that since their take-over in 1949, 280 literary works from more than twenty Asian-African countries have been translated in Chinese and published. 

A further integral part of "people's diplomacy" has been the establishment of sympathetic or potentially sympathetic groups in Asia, so-called "front organizations". These consist of "peace committees" and Asian-African solidarity committees which are co-ordinated on a world-wide basis, through Communist dominated bureaus. Although the effectiveness of such measures is difficult to assess, nevertheless they do seem to provide for a greater degree of communication and to contribute to winning confidence and support among key groups in the Asian and African societies.

44. Peking Review, August 5, 1958, p. 20.
Conclusion

Taking an overall view of Peking's three instruments of policy — diplomacy, economics, and culture — the most dominant feature which emerges is the part they play in achieving a definite political purpose. In varying degrees, they seem to bring the Afro-Asian nations in closer alignment with and ultimately in orbit around Peking. Once in orbit they become virtually dependent on ground control. In this respect Communist China's trade offensive must be considered the potentially most effective instrument. If the Chinese Communists succeed in capturing control of Asian and African markets, thereby tying the economies of these countries more firmly to the economy of mainland China, this will undoubtedly facilitate the possibility for greater political control. To all intent and purposes, Afro-Asian solidarity will then have become nothing more but a synonym for economic control. Whereas all three instruments were in use prior to 1955, since the Bandung Conference there has been a marked increase in the magnitude and intensity of these instruments. Even more so since 1960, following the independence movements in Africa. As for the effect of these instruments on Afro-Asian nations, initially they seem to have provided a measure of success. The Chinese Communists appeared genuinely interested in alleviating anxieties on the part of their neighbours and cultivating friendly relations with them. Since the suppression of the revolt in Tibet, however, and the accompanying intrusions along the Sino-Indian border, Peking's friendly overtures have appeared in a different light. Its friendly posture has been damaged and relations with Peking are now permeated more by a sense of insecurity and inequality, than by a genuine wish to seek friendly relations with the giant to the north.
Chapter IV

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

Introduction.

One of the unique and potentially most effective instruments for the penetration of Asia which Peking has at its disposal is the overseas Chinese. Much of the importance of this instrument stems from the fact that the overseas Chinese have traditionally occupied a dominant and often vital position in the economies of the Southeast Asian countries. They own a very large percentage of the small retail stores and workshops, as well as a sizable proportion of the large commercial firms in the area. As retail merchants they provide the economic link between urban and rural centres of population. They have traditionally controlled the milling and sale of rice, the staple food in Southern Asia. They were formerly important in money lending, but they play a smaller role in this today, partly because of restrictions which have been imposed on them. They have also had a major part in developing large-scale enterprises. In the pre-war period the role of the overseas Chinese in the production of rubber, tin, teak and many other commodities was second in importance only to that of the European and far superior to that of the local people. In countries such as Malaya, Singapore and Thailand, where their concentration is largest, they contribute the bulk of the urban industrial and working class.

On the eve of World War Two, the economic activity of these minority groups had reached the point where they constituted the middle class in the social structure of the countries in which they resided. The rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism following the end of the war, however, marked the beginning of a period of increasing discrimination against the overseas Chinese. Southeast Asian nationalism early developed an anti-Sinitic tradition, due to the fact that the Chinese achieved a social and economic position
always distinctive and usually superior to that of the indigenous population. Nationalism brought in its wake the aspirations of the people for the establishment of an indigenous middle class, capable of controlling their own economy and increasing social standards. Since the overseas Chinese by this time were firmly entrenched in the economy and most indigenous people lacked the skills and training for a successful business career, the former came to be resented and subjected to various forms of discrimination.

Position of the overseas Chinese and the resulting problems.

Traditionally the overseas Chinese have shown a political apathy and their participation in the political affairs of their country of residence has been negligible. At the same time, they have shown strong attachment to their cultural heritage. Preservation of language, religious beliefs and social customs have served not only as a unifying force among the overseas Chinese communities but also as a continuous link with the mother country. As long as the mother country remained politically weak and unstable, however, and exercised a position of little international importance, the overseas Chinese were thrown on their own resources and could expect little support from this side. Since 1949, mainland China's star has been steadily in the ascendence and has reached the point where today, Communist China is increasingly becoming a power to be reckoned with in the realm of international affairs. This newly acquired position of strength and prestige has inevitably affected the overseas Chinese. Becoming increasingly exposed to discriminatory measures in the pursuit of their only means of livelihood and lacking the political power to counter this pressure, their only source of comfort and support lies in the mother country.

At the same time, the presence of minority Chinese cultural enclaves within these newly developing Southeast Asian communities poses a
difficult assimilation and integration problem. This problem is twofold. On the one hand the Southeast Asian countries are in the process of creating a national consciousness through a nationwide programme of education and by setting uniform standards of language, history, and social behavior. The Chinese, however, with their own system of vernacular schools, have shown a reluctant attitude to this programme of cultural integration. On the other hand, the problem of integration is further aggravated by the question of dual nationality, whereby until recently, a Chinese who became a citizen of the country of his domicile, retained his Chinese citizenship. Thus the question facing many Southeast Asian governments is whether the overseas Chinese will eventually become integrated in local societies or will continue to form a separate element.

The overseas Chinese as an instrument of policy.

At present the status of overseas Chinese is a prime factor in the relationship between Southeast Asian governments and the government in Peking. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai declared Peking's readiness to solve this problem on the basis of bilateral agreements and at least one such agreement was signed with Indonesia. But it took more than five years after ratification before it was finally put into effect.

From Peking's standpoint, the presence of ten million Chinese, controlling a vital sector of the economy in an area where it hopes to increase its influence, constitutes a unique vehicle for the implementation of its long range policy, particularly where Communist China's prestige in Asia has been

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1. A breakdown of the number of ethnic Chinese and their percentage of the total population in Southern Asian countries is as follows: Malaya 2,365,000 (37.8 percent); Singapore 965,000 (76.8 percent); Thailand 2,360,000 (11.3 percent); Cambodia 230,000 (5.5 percent); South Vietnam 780,000 (6.2 percent); North Vietnam 50,000 (0.4 percent); Indonesia 2,250,000 (2.7 percent); Burma 320,000 (1.6 percent); Philippines 270,000 (1.2 percent); Laos 10,000 (0.6 percent). Figures taken from Barnett, *Communist China in Asia*, p. 176.
The combined effect of Peking's increment in prestige and the heightened insecurity on the part of the overseas Chinese would suggest a growing North-South gravitational pull. Strangely enough, Peking's formal policy pronouncements do not substantiate any such orientation. On the contrary, the growing importance of Southeast Asian goodwill and support in international relations to China's foreign policy has prompted Peking to adopt a new line. Since 1954 overseas Chinese interests have been "sacrificed" to the extent where they are discouraged from appealing to Peking and urged to conduct themselves as law abiding citizens of their countries of residence. The principal cause for this major shift in overseas Chinese policy was the corresponding shift in tactics in 1955 from militant revolution to "peaceful co-existence." Once again, therefore, political objectives constituted the determinant factor in the employment of this unique instrument of Communist China's policy towards the Asian nations.

Historical significance of the overseas Chinese

Historically the term "overseas Chinese" dates from 1898 when it was first used by Hsu Yun-chiao. Since that time, Chinese governments have followed a policy of binding overseas Chinese more closely to the motherland. The prime reason behind this policy was the overseas Chinese practice of sending remittances to their families living in China, for whom these remittances were often a significant part of livelihood. According to pre-war estimates, overseas Chinese, including those living in the United States, annually remitted between eighty million and one hundred million dollars.² The most significant single aspect of this was that these remittances formed an important item in China's balance of payments. In 1935, for example,

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eighty per cent of China's trade deficit was made up by remittances and in 1936 they exceeded the trade deficit by 30 per cent.³ The post war years registered a sharp drop in remittances due partly to an unstable currency situation and partly to the prohibitive measures instituted by the United States government regarding remittances from overseas Chinese in America to mainland China. There was, however, also a drop in remittances from overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. This was caused by the alienation of overseas Chinese as a result of the persecution of families at home, many of whom suffered from Communist land reform policies in the 1920's and 1930's; and because the Communist cadres, which had been despatched to Southeast Asia, to carry out organizational and propaganda activities among the overseas Chinese, were recalled during the period of take-over from the Kuomintang. From this period, 1920's and 1930's, also date the first forms of extortion employed by the Chinese Communists. The importance of the overseas Chinese may also be judged from the fact that under the New Republican Constitution in 1912, provision was made for six "overseas" senators and in 1932 an Overseas Affairs Commission was established.

Peking's policy prior to 1955

When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949 their policy toward the overseas Chinese was laid down in the Common Program, passed in the 1949 and 1954 Constitution. Articles 58 and 98 respectively state that: "The People's Republic of China shall protect the acquired rights and interests of overseas Chinese." ⁴ Also at the first All-China Peoples Delegates Conference, 30 seats were allocated to the overseas Chinese.

In the organizational sphere a central Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs was established with ministerial status plus an additional three organizations dealing respectively with propaganda, organizational and intelligence activities among the overseas Chinese. In addition, commissions or departments were set up in those provinces and districts which contained a heavy concentration of returned overseas Chinese, or families of the Chinese living abroad.

It soon became apparent, however, that Peking's real objective in taking these measures was to secure money and to instigate the overseas Chinese to oppose local authorities. It should be remembered that this was the period when Communist China applied militant revolutionary tactics in its dealings with Asian countries. Regarding the first objective the government announced in June 1951 the importance of securing remittances and in January 1952 the Government Administration Council stressed that "every means must be used" to secure these remittances. By means of extortion letters, forcibly written by families in Red China, ransom letters, blackmail threats of retaliation, and various other forms of pressure, Peking proceeded to squeeze money out of overseas Chinese in Indonesia, Philippines, Indo-China, Thailand and Burma.

In order to handle these remittances there were by 1950 some one thousand Endorsement bureaus in existence in Southeast Asian countries. In June 1951 the regulation became effective whereby all remittances received by these bureaus had to be reported.


6. According to a Reaber report from Singapore (June 23, 1951) 58 overseas Chinese had each received circular letters from the Kwantung People's Government ordering them to pay taxes totalling HK20 million, under threat of retaliation. - Communist China Problem Research Series E.C. 12. p. 69
bureaus should be sold to the Bank of China for Communist money. The effectiveness of this campaign becomes evident in light of the fact that in 1956 it was estimated remittances totalled $106 million, $27 million in excess of Communist China's trade deficit for the same year. In 1959 remittances were estimated to be between $110 - $140 million.

Also, since 1951, investment companies were established to attract overseas Chinese to invest in the mother land. Pressure was exerted on their families to invest in "productive enterprises" thereby depriving them of eventual control of their money. The money is invested on a joint state-private basis with the overseas Chinese putting up the major share of the capital and the state retaining the controlling influence. The first such joint state-private enterprise, the so-called South China Enterprise Company, was established in February 1951 in Canton, with 30 per cent capital and 70 per cent private capital.

Apart from the financial aspect, Communist China's policy has also shown a marked interest in attracting overseas Chinese students to aid in the construction of socialism. The All-China Student's Union has been sending agents abroad to overseas Chinese schools to induce students to return. By way of incentive, the Peking regime has reserved 10 per cent of admissions to mainland Chinese colleges and universities for these students; promised free education and exemption from military service to students from Burma, Malaya and Indonesia; and given them assurances of good jobs once their education has been completed. The majority of overseas Chinese students which

were induced to return appear to have come from Indonesia where many schools are controlled by leftist elements, and it was estimated that by the end of 1953, 7000 students had returned from this country.

In their dealings with the Southeast Asian governments, the Chinese Communists held the view that an overseas Chinese, regardless of his citizenship status in the country of residence, retained his Chinese citizenship and owed allegiance to the new Peking regime. This attitude understandably created resentment on the part of local governments who saw themselves confronted with a minority group, economically influential and culturally homogeneous, over which they had no political control. Consequently, as long as Peking persisted in adhering to this attitude, the overseas Chinese continued to be a source of friction in the relations with Southeast Asia. From Peking's standpoint, however, effective control over the overseas Chinese provided a most valuable instrument for the penetration of Southeast Asia. If "A rise or fall in strength of the government controlling China itself has a direct influence upon their (overseas Chinese) political position in the country of their residence" then the newly acquired position of Red China must have been a source of strength to both the regime as well as the minority groups.

Up to 1954 Peking did nothing to dispel mistrust in Southeast Asia. In a major propaganda effort to gain maximum loyalty and support, Peking used three principal forms of appeal: First, protection of interests of overseas Chinese by diplomatic means; secondly, its claim to patriotic loyalty and appeal to pride in China's new international status; thirdly, special privileges

11. loc. cit.
were accorded to overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. This propaganda effort was carried out through a variety of channels including Chinese schools, the Chinese owned press, radio broadcasts and cultural missions and served to attract Chinese capital for foreign exchange and investment purposes. It also served to attract young intellectuals.

Peking's policy since 1955

Since 1954, however, Communist China's policy towards the overseas Chinese underwent a major change in tactics. The growing importance of Southeast Asian goodwill and support to China's foreign policy as reflected in the formal adoption of the "peaceful-coexistence" line at Bandung, prompted a new approach. The regime began to display an attitude of aloofness with regard to the overseas Chinese which found expression in discouraging them from appealing to Peking and expressing willingness to relinquish claims of allegiance. While not disclaiming the overseas Chinese "ardent love for the socialist fatherland" it was now recognized that they could make a voluntary choice of citizenship. It was declared that those choosing the nationality of their country of domicile were to pledge allegiance to that country, contribute to its welfare, live as law-abiding citizens and refrain from joining overseas Chinese associations and societies. Not only did the Chinese Communists express their readiness to negotiate a solution to the question of dual nationality, but they also appeared willing to forfeit any previous claims they might have had on those overseas Chinese who chose to become, or already were, citizens of their country of residence. This new policy was declared to follow the established standards of serving socialist construction, the five principles of peaceful co-existence,

as well as the legitimate interests of overseas Chinese. Obviously the term "legitimate interests" was sufficiently vague and all encompassing as to provide for a variety of interpretations. Peking's approach since 1954 was embodied in the following formal statement by Ho Hsiang-ning in February 1958 to the National People's Congress:

We hold that overseas Chinese should be free to choose the nationality of the country in which they reside and should be loyal to that country and its people. As for those who wish to remain Chinese subjects we ask them to continue to observe the policies, laws and regulations of their countries of residence and to respect the customs and habits of local people.

Under the "non-protectionist" line overseas Chinese were thus openly encouraged to cooperate in the development of the national economies of the newly independent countries.

This major shift in tactics had its effects both internally and externally. As a political instrument, particularly where it concerned an "internal" matter, Peking recognized the value of overseas Chinese support and was reluctant to give it up. As Chou En-lai said in a major policy speech to the First National People's Congress on June 28, 1956:

We attach great importance to the positive role played by the broad masses of patriotic overseas Chinese in promoting the cause of the peaceful liberation of Taiwan.

Economically and socially, however, the position of overseas Chinese dependents

14. S.M.C.P... #1735 March 9, 1958. p. 33
and returning overseas Chinese in China proper lost some of the favoured treatment which it enjoyed up to 1954. Since the start of the great leap forward the emphasis in Communist China's policy has been on a stepped up programme of assimilation and economic integration of overseas Chinese dependents. Formerly, the government, in an effort to win their loyalty and financial support, had treated these dependents as a privileged class and during the period of land reform, Communist propaganda proclaimed "favoured treatment" of land owned by overseas Chinese. The combined effect of Peking's socialization programme plus the apparent shift in tactics has jeopardized the special position of both the overseas Chinese and their dependents on the mainland.

In April, 1958, a meeting of the Kwantung Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee and Overseas Chinese bureau chiefs criticized the over-emphasis of special characteristics of overseas Chinese dependents and returned overseas Chinese and charged that they had looked upon themselves as a privileged class. The meeting advocated a new policy, directed toward the big leap forward, whereby "the overseas Chinese should be organized to make a big leap forward on the ideological and productive fronts." At the same time they were to be educated and remoulded in order "to serve socialism." 17 Under the new plan drawn up by Hsiao Ch'ing the government's domestic policy toward returning overseas Chinese included among others, halting of duty free entry of goods; sharper control over personal luggage; resettlement in native provinces; accumulation of foreign exchange by stipulating that 50 percent of interest payments be payable in foreign currency; and political remoulding. As a result of these measures the lives of many overseas families on the mainland have become virtually no different from other Chinese.

Three years later, in 1960, the plan was modified due to an anti-Chinese wave of discrimination which swept through Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, and the resulting influx in returning overseas Chinese. In protest against these discriminatory actions, the Chinese Communists issued a veiled warning by declaring that "...our great fatherland is the most powerful supporter of overseas Chinese." 18 Meanwhile, Communist China opened her arms wide to the thousands of fellow countrymen fleeing from persecution. The State Council issued a special directive dealing with the reception and resettlement of returning overseas Chinese. Under the terms of this directive a special committee was set up for this purpose. Furthermore, the returned overseas Chinese were to be resettled according to the needs of the state as well as the wishes of the persons concerned; all baggage was to be exempted from custom duties; and all money and materials "shall forever be their private property." 19 It was reported that between 1949 and 1959, 300,000 20 overseas Chinese had returned home; a large part of which consisted of returnees from Indonesia.

On the basis of the foregoing it appears that Communist China has conducted a two faced policy with respect to the overseas Chinese since 1955. The dual purpose of this policy was clearly expressed by Liao Ch'eng-chin, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in a new year's broadcast to the overseas Chinese on 30 December, 1959. On the one hand he expressed continued support by saying "You may count on your prosperous and strong socialist mother-country". 21 On the other hand he attempted to dispel any

notions of fear and resentment on the part of the Southeast Asian governments by saying that China would not use the overseas Chinese "to launch so-called 'subversive activities';" thus reiterating a pledge given by Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

The effect of policy change on Southeast Asia

The next point to be examined is the effects of the shift in Communist China's policy vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese upon the governments of Southeast Asia. Generally speaking the foremost effect appears to have been a more determined effort to find a solution to the problem of assimilation. Many Southeast Asian politicians felt that the mid 1950's might be their last opportunity to bring local Chinese under control and to achieve nationalistic ends before the growing weight of Peking's international influence could block these steps. This view was widespread in Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Indonesia.

In dealing with the problem of local Chinese, Southeast Asian governments are confronted with three major aspects: Education, citizenship and economics. The first and the last are of predominantly national nature in the sense that they are closely related to nationalistic aims and can conceivably be dealt with without resort to China. Citizenship, however, is a matter which can not be adequately solved without China's cooperation. For as long as Peking continues to consider overseas Chinese as having Chinese citizenship, regardless of their local status, they can not be brought under effective local control.

Education as a factor

The educational aspect of the problem centres around the existence of vernacular schools, where Chinese students receive a Chinese-orientated

22. S.M.C.P. #2172 December 30, 1959. p. 18
education and the language of instruction is also Chinese. This situation would be less objectionable perhaps, if it were not for the fact that in many cases these schools have proved to be fertile ground for the cultivation of a pro-Peking attitude. Consequently, this type of education tends to lead to cultural isolation and a political outward orientation.

The existence of Chinese communal schools became an object of special concern in those Southeast Asian countries which were intent upon creating a national identity through a larger degree of national consciousness. In Thailand, for example, the Ministry of Education, between 1948 and 1955, waged a largely successful campaign to Thai-ify staffs and curricular. Political influence was banned from the schools and by 1955 all instruction was in the Thai language except for 5½ hours of Chinese weekly. This campaign followed in the wake of restrictive measures introduced in 1948 whereby all Chinese secondary schools were closed and the number of Chinese primary schools was to be reduced from 430 to 152. In the Philippines, control of education has been completely in the hands of the Philippine Ministry of Education since 1957. The Indonesian government in 1957 instituted a radical policy to ensure a national system of education. Within one year hundreds of Chinese language schools were converted to Indonesian language schools with a standard national curriculum. Only major cities were allowed to have foreign schools which resulted in a drop of the number of Chinese schools from over 1000 to a few hundred. Perhaps the most interesting example of establishing a national school system, took place in Malaya, where the indigenous population holds only a slight majority over the overseas Chinese. In 1959 it was estimated that the Chinese constituted 37.8 percent of the total population, and a widespread system of vernacular schools was already in existence. In a major effort to bring about the Malayanization of the country, the government aimed at bringing all vernacular schools into a national system of education with
Malayan as the language system of education and emphasis on the teaching of the country's history. The Malayan approach thus aimed at integrating the vernacular schools in a national system, rather than eliminating them, as was the case in Thailand and Indonesia.

Citizenship as a factor

The second major aspect of the overseas Chinese problem with which Southeast Asian governments are concerned is citizenship. In a striking departure from previous policy, Peking at the Bandung Conference in 1955 offered to negotiate a solution to the dual nationality question on a bilateral basis. The first, and so far only, Treaty on Dual Nationality was signed with Indonesia in 1955 but did not go into effect until January 1960. Under the provisions of the Treaty those Chinese having acquired citizenship were to choose between Indonesian or Chinese citizenship within two years. Those who neglected to choose would automatically acquire Chinese citizenship. In addition, the Chinese government renounced all claims to citizenship of those Chinese who choose to adopt Indonesian nationality. The cause of the delay in implementation of the Treaty appears to be attributable in part to a deterioration in Sino-Indonesian relations since the end of 1959. Far reaching discriminatory measures aimed against the overseas Chinese taken by the Indonesian government evoked protest notes from Peking. The Chinese consul to Bandjarmasin was placed under 41 hours house arrest by military authorities for alleged interference with government measures. In West Java, military authorities suppressed overseas Chinese schools and forcibly evacuated many Chinese. The killing of two Chinese women during these actions evoked a strong protest from Peking, "demanding" that the Indonesian government make an "open apology" for the killing. In the same note, Peking also "demanded" that Indonesian government "stop at once" the compulsory evacuation and various persecutions of the overseas Chinese.24 One possible explanation of Indonesia's behavior vis-a-vis

24. S.M.C.P. #2299, July 11, 1960, p. 37
the overseas Chinese is that the government is working on the assumption that Peking so values Indonesia's international support, particularly on such matters as anti-colonialism and Taiwan, that it will not risk a complete disruption in the relations between the two countries. Encouraged by these assumptions the Indonesian government has seen fit to pass decrees, backed by the army, which imposed an exorbitant tax on Chinese aliens (July 1957) and banned all Chinese language publications (April 1958). There is, however, a more profound economic reason behind Indonesian discriminatory actions which will be discussed presently.

In those Southeast Asian countries which have not entered into a bilateral agreement with Communist China, the dual nationality problem continues to exist. When Malaya became independent in August 1957, all those born on or after independence automatically acquired Malayan citizenship. This, however, did not solve the citizenship status of the large number of Chinese already living in the country prior to independence. Here the government followed a more cautious approach so as to avoid upsetting the delicate balance between indigenous Malayans and overseas Chinese. A less successful attempt at assimilation was made in South Vietnam. In the fall of 1956 a campaign was launched, with the purpose of long-range assimilation, whereby automatic citizenship was to be granted to all persons of Chinese extraction born in Vietnam. In preparation for this move, another campaign was launched a few days earlier with the purpose of confiscating alien registration papers of local born Chinese and compelling them to accept citizenship. The result was mass-civil disobedience and consequent failure of the forced assimilation effort. In Cambodia, which has shown a marked tendency to follow a policy of accommodation with Communist China, the overseas Chinese, which constitute 5.5 percent of the total population, appear to be a relatively small problem. In February 1956, when the Premier of Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk paid a two week visit to Peking a firm
basis was laid for the future development of friendly Sino-Cambodian relations. The cornerstone of these relations was declared to be the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which henceforth would be considered as the "immutable rules guiding" Sino-Cambodian relations. Cambodia agreed to follow a policy of peace and neutrality. In return for this "co-operative" attitude, Chou En-lai made an appeal to the overseas Chinese living in Cambodia urging them to respect Cambodian laws and customs and contribute to the economic development of the country.

The effect of Peking's change in tactics also had a notable impact on Thailand's policy toward the overseas Chinese. Prior to the Bandung Conference and the establishment of SEATO, of which Thailand is a member, the government followed a decidedly anti-Chinese policy. Citizens of alien extraction, which meant largely the Chinese, were discriminated against in matters of land policy, military service and political office. Legislation passed in 1953 denied Thai citizenship to all those whose parents were Chinese. Following the Bandung Conference, however, there occurred a relaxation in the anti-Chinese campaign. A law passed in 1956 declared any person who was born within the Kingdom to be a Thai citizen by birth. In addition, the government related the former discriminatory measures pertaining to matters of nationality, electoral laws and military service.

The general relaxation of political tension in Southeast Asia induced the government to permit the formation of political parties. As a result, two left-wing socialist groups, the Labour Party and the Economist Party came to the fore, which began to press for a policy of neutralism and "peaceful Co-existence", and a greater orientation towards Communist China. In 1958 this neutralist trend was abruptly halted by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, who, in

a military coup ousted Premier Phibul, dissolved the National Assembly and instituted a tight dictatorship, banning all political parties and stepping up efforts to suppress Communist activities. As a result anti-Chinese measures were intensified and most Chinese have shown a marked unwillingness to take advantage of the 1956 Nationality Act.

**Economics as a factor**

The third and most profound aspect of the overseas Chinese problem has been their economic position in Southeast Asia. There are some ten million overseas Chinese and in most countries excepting Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, their numbers constitute less than seven percent of the total population. Their economic superiority, however, has been far out of proportion to their numerical inferiority. As pointed out earlier, the Chinese have traditionally occupied a major role in the economic structure of their countries of residence to the extent where they formed the bulk of the prosperous business and professional middle class. Their importance was particularly felt in the day to day sector of the economy. Due to the steady increase in growth of an indigenous Southeast Asian middle class, demanding its own right to a share of the nation's welfare, a conflict has developed between the Chinese and the lower middle classes. This antagonism has led to a series of discriminatory measures being taken by the various governments against the Chinese entrepreneur in an effort to curtail his monopolistic hold on the economy.

Invariably, all Southeast Asian governments have practiced economic discrimination on a legal basis by barring overseas Chinese from certain legally specified categories of occupation. In Thailand, for example, acts passed in 1949, 1951, and 1952 reserved 18 industrial and service occupations for Thai citizens. In addition the Thai administration embarked on a sweeping programme to Thaiify the national economy by means of massive government participation in industry, transport, commerce and finance; a process aimed at monopolizing
those fields which previously had been dominated by Chinese. In the Philip­
pines, a bill was passed in 1954 aimed at nationalizing the retail trade and
it affected some 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese retail establishments. Also, a
subsequent decree required Philippine owned retail enterprises to employ only
Philippine citizens. Even more sweeping than the Thai restrictions, was the
decree passed in South Vietnam in September 1956, barring Chinese nationals
from 11 important categories of occupations. This action had by 1957 thor­
oughly disrupted the entire Vietnamese economy and forced the government to
retreat from its restrictive position.

The most far reaching discriminatory measures were taken in Indonesia
where the government struck a crippling blow against the Chinese when it passed
a decree in May 1959 barring all aliens from engaging in business enterprises
outside provincial and regencial capitals. By the end of the year, all aliens
were to cease commercial operations except in a few major cities and within
these cities they were required to live in restricted areas. The effect of
such discriminatory measures, clearly aimed at the Chinese, has been the serious
disruption and dislocation of the retail sector of the Indonesian economy with
the rural areas being the hardest hit.

The actions taken against the overseas Chinese provide an illustration
of irrationality inherent in the ultra-nationalist current which is sweeping
over Indonesia and which has recently found a new rallying point in the struggle
for Dutch-held New Guinea. Not only is the government deliberately depriving
itself of the vital services of an important sector of the economy, in the ab­sence of an adequate indigineous substitute, but in addition discrimination
has led to a strain in the relations with Communist China.

The Peking government has sent a number of strong protest notes but,
characteristically, it has refrained from outright condemnation of the Indone­sian government. Instead, Peking has pictured the Indonesian government as
having fallen victim to outside subversively minded forces and attributed Indonesian anti-Chinese measures to United States aggressive designs to undermine Sino-Indonesian friendship. This initial approach was apparently the result of an agreement reached earlier during Dr. Subandrio's (the Indonesian Foreign Minister) visit to Peking in October of 1959. In a Sino-Indonesian Joint Communiqué, it was stated that in the process towards economic development and stability in Indonesia the economic position of the Chinese nations "may be affected in some ways." It was also agreed that a solution should be found whereby the proper rights and interests of Chinese nationals would be respected. Towards the end of 1959 when the effects of the anti-Chinese campaign became more widely known, Peking's attitude hardened. In a letter to the Indonesian Foreign Minister on December 15, Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, seriously protested against the "intolerable situation." Referring to the principles set forth in the Joint Communiqué, whereby the economic resources of the overseas Chinese would continue to play a useful role in the economic development of Indonesia, Chen Yi stated that the forced evacuation of Chinese had resulted in their "proper rights and interests...(being) impaired and their personal safety infringed on." He proposed immediate ratification of the Treaty on Dual Nationality, government protection of Chinese nationals and government aid to facilitate the departure of those Chinese who wished to return to mainland China. Simultaneously, the letter stated that certain forces, bent on sabotaging friendship between the two countries, were making use of these government regulations.

30. Ibid., p. 6.
Despite the fact that the Treaty finally went into effect in January 1960 and Peking continued to protest against the persecution of the overseas Chinese, the Indonesian government has continued to persist in its course of action. In June of 1960 it was announced that more than 40,000 overseas Chinese had returned to China between January and May of the same year, the majority coming from Indonesia. 32

Evaluation of discriminatory measures

The Indonesian experiment has been dealt with at some length because it points out the relative weight Peking attaches to the overseas Chinese as an instrument in its overall Southeast Asian policy. Evidently Peking is not prepared at this time to let the welfare of the overseas Chinese, no matter how seriously affected, interfere with its policy of winning support and friendship among the Southeast Asian nations. It may well be, however, that Peking is taking a calculated risk and expects to benefit from the present situation in the long run; thus a tactical manoeuvre designed to serve a long term aim.

For the Indonesian government's discriminatory actions and this is true of all Southeast Asian governments, cannot have failed but to raise Peking's prestige in the eyes of the overseas Chinese. Their traditional political apathy has been modified by an increasing political awareness for the need of protection. And where else could they look for protection but to the Mother Country? Conversely Peking's non-protectionist attitude might, therefore, result in strengthening the bonds between the overseas Chinese and the home country.

Peking's non-protectionist attitude should, however, not be implied to mean that it no longer exercises any form of control over the overseas Chinese. Judging from a pronouncement made by Chou En-lai in August 1958,

32. S.M.C.P. #2277, June 1960, p. 22.
the reverse appears to be the case. Said Chou En-lai: ",...the overwhelming majority of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asian countries has always lived on friendly terms with the local inhabitants, in accordance with the directives of the Chinese government...." 33 Similar sentiments have been voiced by an outside observer of the overseas Chinese who stated in January, 1959, that "most of Peking's Chinese partisans overseas are by now sufficiently disciplined to accept the new non-protectionist line without demur." 34 Such pronouncements would seem to lend credence to the belief that Peking continues to retain for itself the power to manipulate the overseas Chinese as an important instrument in its Southeast Asian policy.

**Allegiance of overseas Chinese**

There has been much speculation as to where the allegiance of the overseas Chinese ultimately lies — with Peking or Taipei. No doubt the increment in mainland China's international position of prestige plus the treatment of overseas Chinese dependents in the great leap forward have had some bearing on this question. Generally speaking, however, the overall political climate in Southeast Asia seems to be a determinant factor in this respect, particularly among the leadership corps in most overseas Chinese communities. In Thailand, for example, an anti-Communist campaign launched by the Thai-police in 1952 and which profoundly affected the Chinese community, gave strong impetus during 1953-54 to a Kuomintang revival in Thailand. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce became strongly Nationalist orientated, most pro-Communist officers were arrested and throughout 1953 the ranks of "publicly pro-Kuomintang" leaders swelled. 35 By the beginning of 1955 the Chinese in Thailand gave the appearance,


at least, of a community solidly behind the Nationalist cause. Between February and September, 1955, under the influence of the Bandung Conference, the political pendulum began to swing leftward again. A new political climate was created and as a result more pro-Peking attitudes became apparent among the Chinese leadership corps in Bangkok; a development also characteristic of most overseas Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 36 If the logic of this argument is pursued further it would lead to the tentative conclusion that the combined effect of the suppression of the revolt in Tibet, the Indian border intrusions and the widespread discriminatory actions against the overseas Chinese, have sufficiently altered the political climate to allow the pendulum to swing downward and perhaps to the right from its previous leftist position.

Type of Chinese society - a contributing factor

Another factor which has some bearing on the question of overseas Chinese allegiance is the type of Chinese society. The case of Java, Indonesia might well be applicable to other parts of Southeast Asia as well. In Java two types of Chinese society exist. The Paranakans (the mixed blood offspring of Chinese male immigrants and indigenous women) and the Totoks (Chinese-born immigrants whose language of daily use is Chinese). Whereas many of the Paranakans are considered to have only a sentimental interest in China, the Totoks, on the other hand, are "strongly orientated towards China." 37 Although the Totok society was strongly reinforced and stabilized due to a resurgence of Chinese immigration in the late 1930's and late 1940's, and they constitute a slight majority in most important commercial cities, nevertheless, the


Peranakans, as of 1958, still held a numerical superiority in the probable ratio of 60:40. In the post-war years Totok leaders initiated a campaign for the resinification of the Peranakan society through the medium of Peking orientated Chinese schools. The apparent success of this campaign has led the Indonesian government since late 1957 to attempt to check the resinification of Peranakan children by setting up a system of national education.

If the above mentioned example is valid and if it is justifiable to apply it on a large scale, then the implication would seem to be that the "Peranakans" are the least and the young Chinese students the most pro-Peking orientated. The latter aspect is also borne out by the pro-Peking attitude prevalent in Singapore where over half the population consists of Chinese youth under twenty years of age.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, however, the allegiance of the overseas Chinese must be judged from two basic factors. In the first place, in terms of their economic tradition, the overseas Chinese are primarily concerned with "making a living or amassing a fortune." To the extent to which they are allowed to pursue this concern without interference, they take only "a passive interest in the formal political life of the country in which they live," or in the country of their cultural heritage. In the second place, the overseas Chinese can not but feel a sense of pride in the achievements of their Mother Country.


Regardless of the present regime's shortcomings, at least one fact cannot be denied, after a century of weakness and instability it has given China a new sense of direction and international prestige. This fact should not be underestimated in the consideration of the overseas Chinese as one of the greatest assets in Red China's long term policy toward Southeast Asia. As one writer observes:

There can be no question that the interest of the overseas Chinese in China has grown even more in the past decade and would have grown, even if Peking had done nothing to encourage it. For throughout Southeast Asia the Chinese has until recently found himself an object of hostility and scorn viewed as a necessary evil because of the nature of the peasant economies of these countries.... Today with Red China a world power, the Nanyang (overseas Chinese) holds his head higher and the new national governments of Southeast Asia are not unaware of the fact that article 98 of the Chinese Communist Constitution declares that 'The People's Republic of China shall protect the acquired rights and interests of overseas Chinese.'

Chapter V

COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND THEIR
PEKING ORIENTATION

Introduction

The Asian Communist Parties and their related front organizations constitute the fifth and final instrument in Communist China's Afro-Asian policy. Taken together they provide a significant single instrument for the eventual expansion of Communism throughout Asia. Although Communist Parties are existing in all Southeast Asian nations, there is a notable difference in the relative degrees of effectiveness and success which they have been able to register. Their greatest successes, so far, have been scored in North Vietnam, Laos and Indonesia, whereas in countries such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Malaya and the Philippines, their effectiveness has been held to a minimum largely as a result of strong anti-Communist actions on the part of local civilian and military authorities. Despite these discrepancies, however, the Asian Communist Parties have at least one important feature in common and that is a pronounced Peking orientation. Prior to 1949 Communist expansion in Southeast Asia was carried out under Cominform guidance, but following the founding of the Chinese Communist regime, emphasis began to shift to Peking.

Reorganization on Chinese model

The success of the Communist revolution in China was convincing proof that the Maoist strategy was particularly well suited to the conditions prevailing in Asia. Encouraged by this success, the new regime lost no time in propagating the "Chinese Path" for all revolutionary movements in the area. At a meeting of Asian Trade Unions held in Peking in November, 1949, the basic principles of Mao's strategy were outlined. These included a broad united front consisting of workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie,
the central position of the Communist party in this front, and the creation of national armies and territorial bases. Peking's efforts met with considerable success for, in 1951, most Asian Communist Parties underwent a general reorganization based on the Chinese model and the new party programmes echoed the Maoist Strategy of a united front and greater peasant participation in the revolutionary struggle. 1951, therefore, constitutes a landmark in the history of Asian Communism, for it was in this year that "Peking replaced Moscow as the major source of inspiration and advice to the Communist movement in Southeast Asia." 1

This closer relationship has not prevented Asian Communism from maintaining a degree of independence from Peking and in "many Asian nations the Communist parties feel they must guard against becoming too closely identified with Peking." 2 One possible explanation which may have contributed to this guarded attitude is the fact that Communism in Asia must be made applicable to special conditions. This would suggest an interesting parallel with the Chinese Communist revolution. In the same way, as Mao Tse-tung insisted on adapting Soviet Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese conditions, so the Asian Communist parties insist on tailoring Maoism to suit their own local conditions. Thus, by invoking the principle of "National Roads to Communism" the ultimate form Communism in Asia will assume will likely differ from that of either Moscow or Peking. As one writer puts it:

"...just as the pressure of Russian circumstances has modified Marxism, into Soviet Communism, and that of Chinese Circumstances has modified Communism in China, so, if Communism should triumph in Southeast Asia, it will be a different form of Communism again, which ultimately arises." 3


Moscow's influence

Despite the fact that Peking's regional influence in Asia has been a growing force since 1949 and that Communist parties in the area are more closely modelled on the Chinese pattern than ever before, nevertheless, Moscow is still regarded as the headquarters of world-wide Communist movements. It still provides the ultimate authority in matters of doctrinal and strategic guidance. This became apparent in 1956 when Krushchëv, in a major speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union expounded a new line in Communist thinking. Basing his argument on the contention that the capitalist system was disintegrating and that the superiority of the socialist system was a guarantee for victory, he declared that was was no longer "fateistically inevitable." The existing world situation had made Stalin's method of exporting armed revolution suicidal. Therefore, Krushchëv now called for the peaceful triumph of socialism from "within" - a course of action for which China provided the example par excellence.

This new line was subsequently adopted at a meeting of Communist and Workers Parties of 64 countries, including Southeast Asia, in Moscow in November of 1957. The meeting issued a Peace Manifesto which stated that:

The socialist countries...are firmly convinced that socialism is bound to win, but they know that socialism cannot be implanted from without, that it will come, above all, as a result of struggle by the working class and all other progressive forces within each country. 4.

Although the peaceful intentions of world Communism were there for all to see, nevertheless, it was recognized that these were continuously threatened by the Western bloc's aggressive designs such as the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine and SEATO. By implication "peaceful coexistence" thus acquired a double meaning. On the one hand it provided for the use of "parliamentary" methods wherever

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this was feasible; on the other hand it maintained the concept of "armed struggle" wherever the severity of opposition made this practical.

The effect of the "peaceful coexistence" line has been a noticeable feature in the development of Communism in Asia. In Indonesia and Singapore, the Communist Parties have scored considerable successes as a result of using "parliamentary" methods and in the case of Indonesia only resolute action on the part of the military in 1957 prevented the communists from active participation in President Sukarno's Cabinet. In Indo-China, on the other hand, "armed struggle" has been a dominant feature of communist efforts with considerable amounts of success. It should be added, however, that the close proximity of Communist China and the existence of an operational territorial base in North Vietnam are two major factors which account for much of this success.

Communism in Indo-China

The development of Communism in Indo-China is marked by a close interrelationship of revolutionary activity between Vietnam and China as well as between its three component parts: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Since 1951, when the old Indo-Chinese communist party was reformed under the new title of Lao Dong or Vietnamese Worker's Party, it has exercised a controlling influence over its Cambodian and Laotian counterparts. This primary position is particularly significant in view of Lao Dong's almost total Communist Chinese orientation. The party's statutes claim that it is based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, as adapted to the realities of the Vietnamese revolution and the party's platform is derived from Mao Tse-tung's On New Democracy. As a result of this situation communist activities in Laos and Cambodia bear a close affinity to Lao Dong and through the latter to the Communist Chinese Party.
Historically Vietnam's relations with China are characterized by alternate periods of direct subjection or vassalage. As early as 214 B.C., China's armies occupied the eastern half of North Vietnam and Central Vietnam, and in 113 B.C. Emperor Han Wu ti incorporated Nan Yueh (the then existing appellation for the above mentioned parts of Vietnam) into the Han empire. During the Dinh dynasty (968 - 980) Vietnam became a tributary state of China. As part of the Ming expansionist program North Vietnam was again invaded (1406 - 1407) only this time strong Vietnamese opposition led to the expulsion of the Ming and in 1428 the territory once again achieved tributary status. The Manchus viewed North Vietnam as well as the other tributary states in Southeast Asia from the "standpoint of maritime trade and as possible fields of colonial expansion". More recently these areas have assumed strategic and defensive significance. "These buffer areas," Laos, Thailand, Burma and Korea, "the Chinese were willing to defend when necessary...but they were unwilling to let them grow strong enough to be troublesome." As a result of imperial China's suzerainty over North Vietnam the area experienced a strong Chinese cultural influence, which began during the Western Han and became particularly pronounced during the T'ang dynasty.

In view of the historic Sino-Vietnamese relationship there can be little surprise at the fact that Vietnamese Communism early developed a distinct Chinese orientation. By the time World War II broke out, the Communist Party of Indo-China which has been formed originally in Hong Kong, had made little progress because of French police action to suppress the movements. However, in 1941, the Vietminh or Vietnam Independence League was formed in Kwangsi province, consisting of mainly leftist Vietnamese revolutionaries.

6. Ibid. p. 6.
Aided and encouraged by the Kuomintang, the Vietminh set up a well organized anti-Japanese resistance movement in Indochina and by the end of the war, Ho Chi-minh, a Moscow trained revolutionary, had won complete control over this movement. Immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, Ho proclaimed his Provisional Government, a Vietminh-dominated regime, but it was largely ignored by the Chinese Nationalist forces who were then in occupation of the territory north of the 16th parallel. Instead, they tried to turn local administrative authority over to various non-Communist groups. Thwarted in his attempts to take over control of the country and faced with the subsequent breakdown of negotiations with the French for independence in 1946, Ho removed his government to the countryside, where it was transformed into a guerrilla organization on Mao's Yenan model with a territorial base and a people's army. This marked the beginning of an eight year struggle against the French which finally culminated in the 1954 Geneva settlement.

From the outset of the civil war in Vietnam in December 1946, the Communist controlled Vietminh closely followed the example of the Chinese Communist Party in building up a military arm of its own. Until 1949 there were few contacts between the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists, but almost immediately after the Chinese Communist armies reached the borders of Vietnam they began to supply aid in the form of equipment, supplies and the training of personnel in China. This support proved important to the Vietminh, but Ho Chi Minh did not seek the active participation of Chinese troops in his struggle against the French. "...in view of the inherent Vietnamese dislike of Chinese of any kind, it would have been fatal for his cause". to do so.

By the end of 1952 the Vietminh camp had become an undisguised Communist regime with the Lao Dong Party representing the Communist Party of

Vietnam. The Vietminh became openly linked in a united front with the embryo Communist parties of Laos and Cambodia and with its united front organization, the Lien Viet. The close interrelationship of this united front became apparent in 1953 when Vietminh broadcasts were declaring that Lao Dong and the Vietminh people had "a mission to create revolution in Laos and Cambodia and to bring about their union with Vietnam." 8

Within this Chinese inspired broad united front, the Vietminh dominated Lao Dong party forms the controlling influence. The party's domestic policy closely reflects that laid down in Mao Tse-tung's *On New Democracy* and emphasis has been placed on agrarian reforms, the wooing of intellectuals, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and the promise of equal rights to minorities. Another move which closely resembled the Chinese model was made in 1955 when the party, having earlier placed great emphasis on the peasants and agrarian reforms as revolutionary means, declared that after the completion of these reforms the peasants must follow the road leading to collectivization. 9

Despite these efforts, however, North Vietnam has experienced serious difficulties in the agrarian sector of its economy which led in 1956 to the outbreak of armed revolt.

The position of the leadership corps in the united front is undoubtedly an important factor in maintaining close Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietminh leaders share a common Leninist ideology and a common Maoist revolutionary strategy. At the same time, however, they try to maintain comparative freedom of action and Peking so far appears to have acquiesced in this state of affairs. There has also been speculation as to the existence of factional division between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups. The basis for this speculation was the


replacement by Ho of Truong Chinh, reputedly the leader of a pro-Chinese faction within the Lao Dong, as party General Secretary in 1956. Although such a division is conceivable in view of historic Vietnamese resentment toward the Chinese, there seems little respect for a radical change in the present close Sino-Vietnamese relations as long as Ho-Chi-Minh's leadership is secure. That this is the case becomes evident from a declaration made by Ton Duc Thang, chairman of the Lien Viet Front. He said that Mao's precepts of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology had been 'ingeniously applied' by president Ho Chi-Minh and the Lao Dong to the concrete conditions in Vietnam.¹⁰

Since 1949, Sino-Vietnamese relations have developed to the point where at the present time the North Vietnam regime is in many respects a dependent state of Communist China. As a result of this development, North Vietnam has become an area of prime importance in Peking's overall Southeast Asian policy. Not only does Communist China recognize the country's strategic importance as a buffer area, but more important, it realizes the value of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as both a showcase for all of Asia and a firmly established territorial base for the penetration of Indo-China. During the period of the Indo-Chinese war, the Chinese refrained from openly intervening, as they had done in the Korean war in 1951, possibly because the Vietnamese people's army was in no real danger and possibly because of the effect this might have on the Vietnamese. The likelihood has been suggested, however, that the Chinese were responsible for bringing about a final settlement, which fell short of Vietminh demands, because of fear that the Vietminh might become too strong and independent.¹¹ Such a move would obviously have been one of self-interest on the part of Peking but at the same time it might have added to the already existing

Vietminh resentment of the Chinese.

**Laos and Cambodia**

Since the early fifties North Vietnam has figured prominently in connection with Communist activities in Laos and Cambodia. Evidently the Vietminh leaders regard these areas as within their special sphere of revolutionary activity. The Chinese Communists also have a large stake in Laos and Cambodia, however, and they have played a significant role in developing strategy toward these areas, but it is the Vietnamese Communists who have taken the lead in organizing and aiding the pro-Communist movements in these two areas.

Following the Japanese Surrender, small left-wing independence groups, bitterly hostile to the French, launched the Lao Issank (Free Laos) and Khmer Issarak (Free Cambodia) movements. When the French returned in 1946 both movements were excluded from any participation in the political development of their countries. Their leaders and supporters were driven out and fled to Thailand from where they operated in exile with Vietminh assistance. Later, however, they were able to shift their operations back to Laos and Cambodia where the Lao Issarak set up the Pathet Lao United Front and the Khmer Issarak established a Khmer Issarak Front. By this time both front organizations had come under strong pressure from Vietminh leaders and in 1951 they were integrated with the Communist controlled Vietminh by the establishment of the Joint People's Committee of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Since then, the Vietminh's control and direction of their revolutionary struggles has become virtually complete. This integration marked the opening of an "extremely significant" new phase in the Communist movement in Indo-China and has proved to be an important factor in Communist plans for securing control of the whole of Indo-China.

In Cambodia the Khmer Issarak group has so far made little headway in organizing effective guerilla activities. One reason for the lack of success is

the geographical location of the country which has no common border with North Vietnam, but a more compelling reason seems to be the personal popularity of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the Geneva Conference he abdicated early in 1955, in order to form his own Popular Socialist Community party and won a landslide victory in the subsequent elections. In both the 1955 and 1958 Cambodian elections the Communists were unable to win a single seat. Also since 1955, Prince Sihanouk has come under the influence of Nehru and has pursued a policy of strict neutralism and toeing the Chinese line. As long as he persists in this policy and is able to keep western influence out of the country, there is little prospect of the Communists becoming a real threat to Cambodia's independence.

Communism in Laos

In Laos, on the other hand, the Pathet Lao movement has presented a major threat to the government and the country's independence. Three main factors appear to be responsible for this situation. First, the Pathet Lao have developed strong guerilla forces which operate from an established territorial base in the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, bordering on both North Vietnam and Communist China. Secondly, active United States military participation on behalf of the "legal" government, has brought western "imperialism" to China's doorstep. Thirdly, internal strife between the various political factors has prevented the emergence of a single authoritative government.

Under the 1954 Geneva settlement both Laos and Cambodia were declared independent neutral countries and efforts were to be made to bring about a rapprochement between the Pathet Lao and the government of Laos. In addition a three man Truce Supervisory Committee was stationed in the country to supervise the implementation of the Geneva agreement. In spite of these measures, however, the period 1954 - 1957 was marked by a precarious balance in which neither the Pathet Lao nor the government of Laos was able to gain a decisive military victory. The Pathet Lao also succeeded, with Vietminh support, in preventing the integration
of the two northern provinces into the new state, as had been specified in the Geneva agreement of 1954. Then in November, 1957, as a result of a major shift in strategy which occurred two years earlier, a political agreement was reached between the Pathet Lao and the government of neutralist premier Souvanna Phouma. Under this agreement the two northern provinces were to reintegrate under the central government, 15 percent (approximately 1500 men) of the Pathet Lao army were to be incorporated in the national army and a new coalition government of National Unity, including the Pathet Lao representatives, was to be set up. Also the Pathet Lao movement gained legal status and was permitted to organize as a political party called the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front.)

Taking advantage of their newly acquired legal status, the Communists began an intensive drive to win political support by pursuing the new Communist line of "parliamentary" methods. This effort proved so successful that during the 1958 elections they not only won 9 seats out of a total Assembly membership of 59, but also managed to establish a controlling influence over an anti-government coalition which gained 40 percent of the popular vote. At the same time, the Pathet Lao movement retained an underground organization and delayed the integration of its troops into the national army. Subsequent efforts by the government to impose a greater measure of control over the Communists failed, the Neo Lao Hak Xat members were later excluded from the Cabinet and by 1959 cooperation had deteriorated to the point where the Pathet Lao reverted once again to insurrectionist methods. Since 1959 any efforts to bring about a rapprochement between the government and the Pathet Lao have failed and the Communists have posed an increasingly serious threat by steadily building up and expanding their territorial base. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the internal political struggle in Laos has assumed definite

cold war overtones with the leftists headed by Prince Souphanouvong representing the Communists, the rightists headed by Prince Boun Oum representing a strong pro-American attitude and the neutralists headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma, a half-brother of Prince Souphanouvong, representing a middle of the road attitude. The personal rivalries among these three princes have so far prevented the formation of a coalition government in Laos and the successful outcome of the present international conference on Laos.

Chinese stake in Laos

The Chinese Communists have a large stake in Laos and are evidently not prepared to accept any international agreement which might in any way jeopardize their present favourable position in the area. The first formal indications of Peking's attitude toward Laos followed in the wake of a statement by the Laotian Premier in February 1959 in which he repudiated the 1954 Geneva agreement and declared the government's opposition against the resumption of activities of the international supervisory commission. Peking's immediate reaction was that the statement constituted a "grave act of unscrupulous violation of the Geneva Agreements and (formed) part of the United States imperialist plot of aggression against Indo-China." Subsequent efforts by the United Nations Secretary General to mediate were condemned as illegal and Hammerskjold himself was branded as "a tool of the vicious conspiracy of the United States." Then in May, 1959, following an order by the government of Laos that all Pathet Lao fighting units were to surrender, Peking's attitude hardened. A statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared these measures against the Pathet Lao to be tantamount to an "open launching of civil war in Laos." China, it was declared, could not look on with indifference and if the Laotion government persisted in sabotaging the Geneva agreements it had to be prepared to

shoulder "all the grave consequences." 16 As the situation in Laos worsened and the United States became more openly involved, the Chinese Communists became more outspoken in their criticism of the United States. The tension in Laos was attributed to the United States imperialists' conspiracy to "turn Laos into their colony and a military base against China..." 17 and to draw Laos into the SEATO bloc. This, they declared, constituted a menace to the security of China. 18 The position of Laos in terms of the wider framework of Communist China's policy was expressed by Chen Yi in September 1959 when he said that:

China has never encroached on other countries nor will she tolerate encroachment by other countries. In international affairs, we always stand for the settlement of disputes between nations through peaceful negotiations, and for peaceful coexistence...between countries with different social systems. 19

There can be little doubt that Communist China is deeply committed in the conflict over Laos, but so is the United States. On balance, however the Chinese are in a more favourable position. In the first place the Pathet Lao has proved to be a highly organized and successful instrument at the polls as well as in insurrectionist activities. In the second place the geographical proximity of North Vietnam and Communist China has been a valuable source of supply to the Pathet Lao in securing their territorial base and strengthening their military arm. These two factors have enabled the Chinese to play a behind the scene role in Laos and prevented them from becoming openly involved as happened in Korea. Obviously, the Pathet Lao is in no real danger of defeat at the present time. United States involvement on the other hand, has from necessity been much more conspicuous and this open involvement has clearly played into the hands of Peking.

Peking can now claim that western imperialism poses a serious threat to the peaceful intentions of Communism in Asia, a threat which can only be countered by active resistance. If the immediate aim of Communist China's policy is to drive western imperialism out of Asia, and if the United States continues to hold its present position in the area, there can be no prospect for an early let up of Communist activities in Indo-China.

Generally speaking Peking's direct influence has been strongest where ethnic Chinese make up the bulk of the Communist Party membership. This appears to be the case in Thailand, Malaya and Singapore. In Malaya, for example, 95 percent of the members of the Malayan Communist Party are overseas Chinese, and in Thailand the Communist Party is estimated to have as many as 5000 Chinese members as against 200 indigenous Thais. With the exception of Singapore, where Communist influence is very pronounced, Communist activities in Thailand and Malaya pose no immediate threat to the authority of the local governments.

Communism in Thailand

Reference has already been made to the anti-Communist measures undertaken by the Thai administration during 1950 - 1954 and the oscillating position of the overseas Chinese leadership corps. In 1946 the official ban on the Communist Party was lifted but in the following year it was imposed again. The party has been unable to make much headway in Thailand because the government in recent years has taken increasingly stern measures against subversive activities and suppressed political parties in general. In 1955, as a result of a relaxation of government legal measures, a brief flourishing of political activities occurred and at least one small party sprang up with a decidedly pro-Peking orientation. In 1958, however, following a new military coup all political parties were banned and the suppression of all communist subversive

activities, was stepped up. As a result there appears to be little prospect of a Communist success in Thailand unless Peking decides on largescale Communist infiltration from across the Laotian border.

Communism in Malaya

Similarly, as in the case of the Vietminh, the Malayan Communist party has from its early beginnings been Chinese inspired. Originally the party was formed by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern in 1930 but by the outbreak of World War II, Chinese agents were active in organizing the party on the basis of an anti-Japanese popular front. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia provided the singularly most important impetus to the growth of the Communist Movement in Malaya. The party withdrew to the jungle and organized itself into a guerilla resistance movement called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. In return for their cooperation with the British, the resistance movement was provided with British arms. In 1948, following the Calcutta Conference, the Malayan Communists launched a fullscale insurrectionist campaign in which the nucleus consisted of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. The campaign was carried out on the pattern of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of protracted warfare and campaigns of quick decision, and it aimed at the establishment of liberated areas as territorial bases and the formation of a broad anti-imperialist united front. Forced with a serious threat, government authorities in Malaya issued drastic Emergency Regulations which proved so effective that in the following year, 1949, the Communist Party's central committee admitted failure and decided to withdraw to the jungle in order to set up a liberation army supported by Chinese squatters.

Although the insurrectionist movement continued during 1950 and 1951, its effectiveness gradually declined as a result of determined government counter-measures. One major outcome of the struggle was that the poorly conducted campaign had reduced Communist prestige to a point where the Malayan
Communist Party had worked up a "mass aversion". Often the only way the Communists could secure support was through blackmail and terrorist tactics. In 1951 the Malayan Communists, realizing the adverse effect their violent tactics had had on the civilian people, adopted a change of attitude. The party's politbureau produced a new series of directives which called for a halt to indiscriminating military destruction and the antagonization of the villagers. The new directives called instead for a policy of winning the people's support, expansion of a mass base, infiltration of the trade unions and withdrawal of the Liberation army deep into the jungle. From then on the Communists would direct their terrorist attacks against government forces rather than against the civilian population.

An interesting sidelight of the political situation in Malaya has been the position of the Malaya Chinese Association, a political organization consisting largely of Chinese business interests. This Association has kept aloof from the Communist Party and turned to support the government. Shortly after the 1951 Kuala Lumpur municipal elections, the Malayan Chinese Association formed an alliance with the United Malayan National Organization which became the basis for the subsequent achievement of Malayan independence in 1957. The Malayan Chinese Association's open support and cooperation with the government has undoubtedly been an important factor in the declining fortunes of the Malayan Communist Party.

Since 1955 when the party adopted a new programme which called for the strengthening of Malayan national unity and was designed to appeal to the three main ethnic groups in the country, the Communists have attempted to broaden their political support. Labour unions and student groups have been their special targets. The achievement of independence in Malaya in 1957 also appeared to have an adverse effect on the fortunes of the Malayan Communists. Their earlier appeals for unity in the face of British imperialism suddenly became meaningless and they

were forced to find new reasons for their existence. All this, however should
not be interpreted as a complete removal of the Communist threat in Malaya. Their
guerilla strength has declined steadily, but the danger of political subversion
remains. Furthermore, the Malayan Communists have not concealed their long term
struggle for the achievement of a people's democracy and the eventual establish­
ment of socialism in Malaya.

Communism in Singapore

In contrast to Malaya, where Communist fortunes have been steadily
decreasing, the Communist Party in Singapore has been increasingly successful in
dominating the country's political life. Much of the party's success can be
attributed to the fact that since 1955 it has heavily infiltrated Singapore's
labour unions and Chinese high schools. So tight, in fact, is the Communist
control over these groups that they have frequently used these workers and
students to foment riots and strikes, thereby, seriously threatening the internal
security of Singapore.

The Communists' main political instrument is the People's Action Party
which was formed in 1954 and emerged as the strongest political group in the
municipal elections in Singapore in 1957. Despite government efforts to curtail
communist activity by arresting key leaders, the party continued to grow and in
1959 elections for a new Assembly, the People's Action Party won a resounding
victory. It promptly proceeded to demand full independence from the British
Government, but so far the British have been unwilling to grant more than in­
ternal self-government.

Internally the People's Action Party appears to be suffering from a
political struggle between two factions. The first of these is headed by Lee
Kuan Yew, a determined anti-imperialist and left-wing socialist, but not a
Communist. The second faction is headed by Lim Chin Siong who is decidedly pro-Chinese Communist in outlook. When Lee became Prime Minister of Singapore, after the 1959 elections, the almost impossible situation developed whereby a non-Communist Prime Minister came to rely for his main support on pro-Peking Chinese labour and student groups. Although Lee has had some success in diminishing Communist influence in the party's organization, the fact nevertheless remains that the base of the party continues to rest fundamentally on these tightly Communist controlled groups.

Communism in Burma

The history of Communist development in Burma provides a striking difference from that in North Vietnam. Burma shares a 1500 mile common frontier with Communist China, but so far the Chinese have shown little inclination to exploit this geographical proximity to its fullest extent. In fact, Peking has shown a willingness to conduct its relations with neutralist Burma in a friendly atmosphere of cooperation and mutual support as evidenced by the recent conclusion of a Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. A more fundamental explanation for Peking's apparent "lack of interest", however, may be found in the profound lack of unity of the Communist movement in Burma. Following a split in Communist ranks in 1946, two separate parties have been in existence: the Burma Communist Party or "White Flag" Communists and the Communist Party of Burma or "Red Flag" Communists. Both parties follow the marxist line, but they seem to differ in their respective interpretations of Marxism.

Marxism has been a dominant force in the development of the Burmese Nationalist Movement and in all likelihood it was a factor in the formation of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPEL) during World War II. In its original form the AFPEL consisted of the Communist Party prior to its split, and the Socialists under Premier U Nu, but in 1947 the Communists were expelled from membership and the Socialists became the dominant group in the AFPEL. The
Socialist Party's political philosophy rests on the acceptance of Marxism as a guide to action in the revolutionary movement and the application of Chinese and Russian methods to Burma's own conditions, and one of these conditions is that Burma is a devout Buddhist country. As a result, the basically materialistic approach of Marxism has been modified to the extent of satisfying the country's spiritual needs. It is this peaceful Buddhist approach to Marxism, as contrasted with the violent opportunistic approach, which appears to be at the root of the factional differences in the Burmese Communist Movement.

Despite these differences, however, both Communist parties embarked on a programme of insurrection against the government in March 1948. Faced with this Communist threat and the additional threat posed by hostile actions from remnant Kuomintang troops who had fled to Burma in 1949, the government came perilously close to losing control of the country. From 1951 onwards, however, it steadily regained control and by 1957 it was estimated the Communists' armed strength had been reduced to under 1000 men. 23

With the decline in Communist guerilla strength came the increase in above ground political activities. In 1950 the Communists established a front organization, since called the Burma Workers' Party, which soon came to form the strongest element in a parliamentary group called the National United Front. This group acquired a key position in mid-1958 when as a result of the break-up of AFPEL the National United Front came to occupy a balance of power position in parliament. The Communists were quick to exploit their favourable position by demanding concessions from U Nu, in return for their support. U Nu was saved from this blackmail position by General Ne Win, who in the fall of 1958 took over the premiership from U Nu and immediately took vigorous steps in combating

rising Communist influence. In 1960 U Nu returned to the premiership but in recent weeks reports from Burma indicate that the military has once again taken over and placed the premier under arrest. It is conceivable that there is a connection between the military coup and a possible threat of rising Communist influence.

Despite the lack of unity among the Burmese Communists and the possible source of confusion this may be for Peking and Moscow, the Chinese Communist influence is an established fact. In 1951, following instructions from Peking, The Burma Communist Party adopted a new line advocating a peaceful end to the fighting and the formation of a broad united front with all revolutionary forces. There have also been repeated communications across the border with China. In 1950 the People's Unity Party was set up, in the closest approximation to the Burma Communist Party on a legal basis, which claimed to represent four classes of people, thus echoing the Chinese model, and devoted itself to a study of the thought of Mao. Since the formal proclamation of the "peaceful co-existence" line in 1956, the Communist parties of Burma have accepted the Peking imposed line of ending the war through negotiation rather than insurrection.

**Sino-Burmese boundary dispute as a factor**

Part of the explanation for the friendly atmosphere in Sino-Burmese relations can probably be found in Communist China's change in tactics between 1949 – 1955. From the beginning of the founding of the Communist regime, Peking's attention centered around militant revolution through local Communist organizations. This militant approach was prompted by the belief that China still had a valid claim to which she considered to be her former territories and dependencies. Mao Tse-tung expressed this belief indirectly in a theoretical work entitled *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* which appeared
in 1949. He states that:

In defeating China in war, the imperialistic powers had taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Prescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao. 24

By 1954 this claim had lost some of its tenability because the rising tide of Southeast Asian nationalism and the corresponding loosening grip of the colonial powers. Peking was now forced to deal with extremely nationalist conscious independent local governments and, therefore, had to change its approach accordingly. The formal acceptance of the "peaceful co-existence" line marked the opening of a new phase in Communist China’s tactics. Relations with Southeast Asia were now openly conducted on a government-to-government level and in the 1954 edition of Mao's theoretical work any reference to those countries now having independent governments, for example Burma and Nepal, was dropped. They were no longer openly considered as dependencies of China.

There still remained, some longstanding questions of dispute, however, but attempts were made to seek a peaceful solution to them. The Sino-Burmese boundary question was a case in point. The dispute dates back to the end of the 19th century when a joint Anglo-Chinese commission surveyed the boundary between 1897 and 1900, but left a 200 mile stretch north of Myitkyina (Latitude 25° 35' N) undetermined. These three village tracts in Kachin State have subsequently formed the crux of the Sino-Burmese boundary dispute. Despite Sun Yat-sen's claims to the territory, the British in 1934 for the first time extended their authority over the area north of Myitkyina. In the same year joint boundary commission was created under a neutral chairman appointed by the League of Nations. The Commission's findings awarded three-fifths of the disputed territory to China, but the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War prevented the implementation

of these findings. At the end of the war the Chinese Nationalist government again put forward strong claims to the triangle above Myitkyina and when the Communist regime took over in 1949 no final solution had been reached. During the next five years the boundary dispute remained unsolved, but the year 1954, following a stopover by Chou En-lai in Rangoon on his return home from the Geneva Conference, marked the beginning of a period of closer Sino-Burmese relations. Prior to 1954 Sino-Burmese relations were strained as a result of repeated excursions by Chinese Communist troops into the disputed area. In October 1956 Premier U Nu of Burma went on a visit to Peking for talks accompanied by leaders from the disputed Kachin state and a new joint boundary commission was set up to survey the entire boundary. Following the completion of the commission's work, a Sino-Burmese Boundary agreement was signed in October 1960 which gave control over the major portion of the disputed area to China.

The significant point which emerges from this discussion is that the entire Sino-Burmese boundary settlement took place in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation; this is in stark contrast to the hostile mood prevailing in the present Sino-Indian boundary dispute. Burma's policy of neutrality and seeking accommodation with Communist China was undoubtedly a prime factor in bringing about a peaceful solution to the dispute. At the same time this may explain to a large extent why Peking has thus far refrained from exploiting the Communist Parties in Burma more fully.

Communism in Indonesia - model for Asia

One of the Southeast Asian countries where Communism has been most effective is Indonesia. "The case of Indonesia is a model for the Communist movement in Southeast Asia." 25 There are two main reasons why the Communist party

of Indonesia has been successful. First, the creation of a mass base of support since 1951. The result of which has been that in the 1957 local elections the Communist party emerged as the strongest party in Java, the center of political power in Indonesia. Second, from its early beginnings in the 1920's the party has identified itself with Indonesian nationalism and given loyal support to many of President Sukarno's proposals.

Between 1927 and 1945 the Communist party, which was closely linked with Moscow remained virtually eclipsed as a political force. In October 1945 the party was re-established in Djakarta and began to pursue a policy of giving support to a series of left-wing cabinets. Dissension among the party's leadership, the lack of mass support, and the failure of an ill-timed communist-led uprising in Madiun in 1948, all contributed to the party's falling in disrepute. From 1950 onward, however, the party's fortunes began to change. In 1953 Aidit, who had visited China, became Secretary General of the Communist Party and under his direction the 5th Party Congress adopted a new programme in 1954 which was based on the Maoist line. The new Programme advocated the establishment of a people's democracy and called for the formation of a four-class national united front with strong emphasis to be placed on the inclusion of the peasants into this front. Aidit outlined the Communist party's new approach in the following terms:

"a certain framework of democratic freedom exists in Indonesia which allows the Communist Party today to use democratic institutions to attain its immediate political aims." 26

In the 1955-1956 elections the Communist Party managed to poll 20 percent of the popular vote and obtained 29 out of 257 seats in Parliament. The party continued to lend support to various non-Communist Cabinets, but failed to secure active participation in the government.

From 1955 onwards the political situation in Indonesia deteriorated

rapidly. The openly anti-Communist Moslem dominated Masjumi party, which had so far maintained an uneasy form of participation in the government, suddenly announced its withdrawal from the newly formed Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. In addition vice-president Hatta, who represented a moderate and liberal viewpoint, resigned his post and the first of a series of rebellions by regional military commanders in the outlying areas of Indonesia occurred.

In the midst of this crisis President Sukarno embarked on a tour of Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Communist China and upon his return displayed a notable pro-Peking attitude. Echoing Mao-Tse-tung's dictum that colonialism must die because it is the irrevocable law of nature and that friendship between the two nations was permanent, Sukarno declared that: The triumph of the Chinese People's Republic is the triumph of Indonesia. The triumph of Indonesia is also the triumph of the Chinese People's Republic. The triumph of Indonesia is the triumph of all Asia...." 27 Acting upon this newly acquired wisdom Sukarno subsequently proposed his concept of "guided democracy" as a cure for the nation's political ills. Although he declared this new concept to be based on the traditional Indonesian democratic principle of "Gotong Rojong" (mutual co-operation.) there was, however, an unmistakable resemblance to Mao Tse-tung's concept of "democratic centralism". "Guided Democracy" meant, in effect, the formation of a cabinet representative of all political parties in Parliament, including the Communists, while Sukarno would personally "guide" the democratic discussions and thus retain a controlling influence.

Needless to say, the Communists wholeheartedly supported the President's proposal. They intensified their political activities and by late 1957 claimed the party's membership to have jumped from 8000 in 1952 to over one million. 28

This phenomenal growth further resulted in the expansion of the party's mass base to the point where it emerged in 1957 as the strongest political party on Java, and by 1958 the prospects for a Communist victory in the national elections, scheduled for 1959, appeared to be highly favourable.

By this time, however, the military had become increasingly uneasy about the rapidly deteriorating political situation in Indonesia and the corresponding threat posed by the rising influence of the Communists. Although the military has so far shunned outright responsibility for carrying out the process of government, it has nevertheless reserved for itself the prerogative of intervention. The exercise of this prerogative since 1958 has been largely instrumental in limiting the activities of political parties in general and reducing Communist influence in particular. These efforts seem to have prevented for the time being, a Communist take-over in Indonesia, but they did not result in doing away with the party's mass base of support. As long as the Communists are able to pursue their peaceful strategy of revolution from below, they will continue to form a threat to the country's political independence.

One feature of the development of the Communist movement in Indonesia is the apparent contest being waged by both Moscow and Peking to win a position of influence in the country. At first there appears to have been a division of roles between the two. Since 1955, however, Peking's role appears to have increased. Much of the Indonesian Communist Party's success can be attributed to the application of the Maoist principles of united front with major emphasis on peasant support. At the same time, however, the party has closely adhered to the "parliamentary" line as advocated by Khrushchov at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow in 1956. In an effort to maintain the good will and support of both Moscow and Peking, the Indonesian Communist Party has been careful to avoid the image of being overly dependent on either one. Consequently, it has attempted to picture itself as following a kind of "Indonesian Marxism." "We must create a Marxism that will match the spirit and characteristics of Indonesia...so that
the people will see nothing foreign in it...." 29 The fact remains, however, that Indonesia, this wealthiest and most populous of Southeast Asian nations, has become a focal point of Communist interests in this area of the world.

Conclusion

In conclusion it may be said that the Communist movement in Southeast Asia has, since 1949, displayed a distinct Chinese orientation. The year 1951 marked a reorganization of Communist parties and party programmes on the basis of the Chinese model. Although Moscow is still accepted as the ultimate source of world-wide Communist strategy, nevertheless, Peking's regional influence has been unmistakably instrumental in securing Communist successes in Indo-China and Indonesia. In those Southeast Asian countries where Peking has so far refrained from exploiting the Communist parties to the fullest extent, it has been guided by the exigencies of a wider political strategy. In the case of Burma and Cambodia, as long as these countries are willing to toe the Chinese line, Peking is not likely to embark on full-scale subversive activities. All this does not mean however, that the Chinese Communists have abandoned their ultimate hopes with respect to these countries and Southeast Asia generally. They will doubtlessly continue in their long term strategy to drive out imperialism and bring the area under effective political and economic control. Depending on whether or not Communism in Southeast Asia will develop a distinct character of its own, removed from the influence of both Moscow and Peking, the Communist Parties will continue to form an important instrument in the fulfilment of Peking's Southeast Asian policy.

The founding of the Chinese Communist regime in 1949 must be regarded as one of the most singularly important outcomes of World War II. It was important for two main reasons. First, it marked the triumph of Communism in Asia for the first time in history. Secondly, it ushered in a new period in the history of the Far East. The Chinese revolution which derived its main impulse from the teachings of Marx and Lenin coincided with the growing nationalist revolution in Asia. Despite the ideological commitment of the former, however, both these revolutions were nurtured by a common objective, namely, to cast off the yoke of European colonialism and to hasten the evolution toward national independence. This common objective, together with past colonial experience, has been largely responsible for the present Chinese Communist regime's claim that the two revolutions are "allies" and in as much as they oppose imperialism, become part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Communist China has traditional, as well as ideological interests in South and Southeast Asia. Traditionally, this region, particularly Southeast Asia, has been under strong Chinese influence for many centuries. In the old Confucian system of government, China conceived of herself as the only bearer of civilization, surrounded by numerous dependencies who were required to fulfill the obligations of their inferior status. Apart from China's cultural
influence, however, the Chinese have been traditionally preoccupied with the expansion of effective political control over their peripheral areas as a means of safeguarding against repeated invasions by hostile tribes. Invariably therefore when a strong dynasty ruled the empire it embarked on an expansionist policy of extending and consolidating the government's political control.

Ideologically, Communist China today conceives herself as the leader of the "liberation" movement among the "colonial and semi-colonial people" in Asia and Africa. While its tactics vary from place to place and from time to time, the overall strategy of Peking toward the Afro-Asian nations is to alienate these countries from the West and to draw them eventually to the "camp of peace and socialism". While this strategy may lead to only painstakingly slow results, the Chinese are not discouraged, for they believe that time and history are on their side, and that patience is their greatest virtue.

The main source of inspiration and authority for Communist China's policy is derived from the revolutionary doctrines of Marx and Lenin. These form the "ultimate truth", the Communist gospel, from which no deviation can be tolerated. There must be the closest possible unity in the Communist bloc, in order to successfully resist the aggressive forces of imperialism and eventually carry the socialist revolution to its ultimate triumph. Marxism-Leninism, therefore, provides the great unifying force for the socialist camp. At the same time, the Chinese Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism is a dynamic
force, a "creative science", which is constantly undergoing changes as a result of changing world conditions. "Nothing remains changeless", Mao Tse-tung once said; the world is dynamic and in a constant state of flux. It would be impossible, therefore, to conceive of a world based on the principle of status quo or a "doctrinarian" interpretation of ideology.

Instead the "ultimate truth" of Marxism-Leninism lies in the practical application of this doctrine to the requirements of a constantly changing environment. There must be a constant interplay and mutual interdependence between "theory" and practice. The Chinese Communist consider this relationship to be vital in view of the fact that Communist doctrine must be tailored to suit the special conditions of the country in which it hopes to triumph. Hence, the concept of "national roads to Communism".

The history of the Chinese Communist revolution provides the most convincing example of the validity of this concept, for it was Mao Tse-tung who on the basis of Lenin's essay on "Imperialism" established the theoretical framework for the "Asianization" of Soviet Communism. He early recognized the potential inherent in the peasantry as a basis of support for the revolutionary movement in predominantly agrarian societies and consequently demonstrated their usefulness in the successful completion of the Chinese revolution. Mao also demonstrated the successful use of a "united front" based on the greatest possible participation of all revolutionary classes. Perhaps the
greatest testimony to Mao Tse-tung's contributions to the ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism is that "Maoism" has become the established pattern for the Communist revolution in Southeast Asia and that there has been a shift in emphasis from Moscow to Peking as the foremost source of advice and support in the region.

Southeast Asia is considered as a Chinese sphere of influence and Peking's long-term strategy toward this region is aimed at establishing itself in a position of hegemony. In order to realize this aim, the Chinese Communists have displayed great versatility in tactics. These tactics are designed and pursued with the long-term objective in mind, and are dependent on the internal and external conditions prevailing during any given period of time. Prior to 1955, Peking followed a militant revolutionary approach, marked by insurrectionist movements throughout Asia. With the start of China's industrial reconstruction programme in 1953, and the emergence of an increasing number of nationalist-minded Asian nations, Peking came to favour the "peaceful co-existence" approach as a means of winning greater international support for its policies. Since 1958, it has become increasingly evident, however, that Chinese nationalist aspirations occupy a predominant place in Peking's overall policy and that these will continue to do so as long as the present government has the strength and authority to back up their claims.

These nationalist aspirations have led to a curious dichotomy of the Peking government's policies toward specific Asian countries. On the one hand, this is marked by a policy of self-aggrandizement and assertiveness in becoming a world power, while on the other
hand it is marked by an anxiety to present China as the friendly protec-
tor of new Southeast Asian and African nations. The recent sup-
pression of the revolt in Tibet, and the adverse effect this had on
Southeast Asian opinion would seem to suggest that "peaceful co-
existence" is only regarded as a temporary tactical device in the pur-
suit of wider Chinese nationalist aims.

To achieve her policy objectives Communist China has skil-
fully operated a number of instruments - diplomacy, economics, culture,
the overseas Chinese, and local Communist parties. From the outset,
the new regime aimed to expand its diplomatic frontiers and to establish
Peking as the diplomatic center of gravity in Asia. Over the past ten
years Peking has witnessed a steady stream of visiting heads of state
and delegations from a large number of Afro-Asian nations. At the same
time, Chou En-lai's visits abroad have done much to cultivate an atmos-
phere of friendship and goodwill between China and her "allies".

In the past few years, the Peking regime has also made marked
efforts to expand its economic relations and technical aid programmes
with Southeast Asia and since 1960 with Africa. A significant feature
of Communist China's "trade offensive" has been the growing import-
ance of industrial products in her exports to these regions, as part
of an economic drive to capture control of markets, which hitherto
have been dominated by Japan and India.

There are certain specific and immediate motives behind this
trade drive. First, Communist China needs petroleum, rubber and non-
ferrous metals, and other basic commodities, to continue its plans of
"socialist construction". Secondly, through expanded exports to South- east Asia, Peking seeks to earn more foreign exchange to pay for these essential imports. Thirdly, Communist China aims to propagandize her industrial progress and enhance her national prestige. Fourthly, Peking attempts to use trade and aid to win goodwill, and to promote closer relations with the Southeast Asian and African countries. By and large, commercial agreements between Communist China and Southeast Asia have been arranged on a barter basis, and the most striking example has been the Sino-Ceylonese rubber for rice barter.

Both in value and percentage, the trade has been rather modest but when it is viewed in terms of China's own domestic needs, the importance cannot be denied. Also, China has since 1958, seriously entered the field of economic aid and long-term loans, and Chinese technicians and experts are today employed in a large number of underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia.

In addition to trade, the existence of some ten million overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, provides a useful channel for Peking's economic drive. Their unique economic position in Southeast Asia gives them a significance out of all proportion to their numbers. Although Peking for the moment, appears willing to "sacrifice" their interests for the sake of winning the support of nationalist regimes in international affairs, there can be little doubt that the regime will continue to view the overseas Chinese as a major instrument in extending its influence over the Asian scene. In so far as relations between mainland
China and the Southeast Asian governments are concerned, the existence of overseas Chinese continues to be a source of friction. Many Southeast Asian governments are confronted with the problem of integrating these politically weak but economically influential minority groups into a larger framework of national consciousness. This task is complicated by the fact that the overseas Chinese have strong cultural affiliations and feel an unmistakable pride in the growing international prestige of their mother country.

Finally, Peking has since 1951 extended its influence over the Communist parties in Southeast Asia. In such countries as Indonesia, North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, application of the "Maoist" strategy of revolution has been accompanied by a considerable amount of success.

Since 1951, a general reorganization has taken place of Asian Communist Party programmes on the basis of the Chinese model and these have come openly to embrace the principle of "united front" with mass peasant support. Indonesia today provides the outstanding example of the extent to which this peaceful "parliamentary" approach has been successful, and it has made this country a model for the Communist revolution in Asia.

There can be no doubt that Communist China today is a growing force in the world and particularly in Asia. To what extent Peking will eventually succeed in achieving its long-term strategy toward the Afro-Asian nations will depend in large measure on its ability to develop and strengthen its domestic economy, and on the attitude it takes in
conducting relations with these countries. At the moment, Communist China's militant posture can be largely attributed to the unfulfilment of nationalist aspirations and not even Moscow appears to be able, at the present time, to alter this posture. Communist revolutionary doctrine, has so far proved to be an indispensable tool in pursuing these nationalist aims, but whether or not, China will continue to accept Marxism-Leninism as the "ultimate truth", once their aims have been accomplished, remains a question for the future.
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