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African labour in South Central Africa, 1890-1914 and nineteenth cneutry colonial labour theory MacKenzie, John MacDonald 1969-12-31

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AFRICAN LABOUR IN SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA, 1890-1914 AND NINETEENTH CENTURY COLONIAL LABOUR THEORY by . JOHN MACDONALD MACKENZIE .. M.A., University of Glasgow, 1964 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS DOCTOR OF PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF FOR THE DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of History We .accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1969 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree tha permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date ii ABSTRACT This thesis is concerned with the mobilisation of African labour in South Central Africa and the creation of a dual economy there. The problem it seeks to examine is why a purely migrant labour system was created, in which Africans spent only short periods in the cash economy interspersed with longer periods in their own subsistence one. This problem is closely linked with the wider issues of land policy, native policy, and colonial labour theory in the nineteenth century. Using the records of the Colonial Office and of the British South Africa Company's administrations in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, together with other contemporary material, an attempt is made to examine the relationship between developments in the Rhodesias and wider colonial experience, between the Company's aims in its administration and the Colonial Office's control of it. Colonial labour theory in the nineteenth century is found to have emerged as a response to the end of the slave trade and the emancipation of the slaves, as a need to substitute for force both stimulants (like taxation) to overcome so-called tropical indolence and a modicum of land hunger to overcome excessive dependence on subsistence. This had to be balanced, however, by the need to protect the interests and rights of indigenous peoples in the face of humanitarian concern and international opinion. These considerations, coupled with iii administrative expediency and the desire of European settler communities for the security of social and political segreg ation, led to the creation of a reserves policy. In Southern Rhodesia, the absence of a genuine reserves policy during the first years of settlement appeared to lead to disastrous relations with the native peoples. The Colonial Office insisted upon the creation of reserves, and the effect, if not the intention, of subsequent Company native policy was to move Africans increasingly on to the reserves, away from European centres of employment, opportunities for marketing produce and stock, and principal lines of communication. As a result, Africans' capacity to respond rationally to the cash economy actually declined as opportunities for exploring the various avenues into it were withdrawn with geographical isolation. In consequence labour became a purely migratory experience which entailed brief periods in the essentially alien environment (accentuated by ordinance) of the town or mine loc ation. This was accentuated also by the migration of labour into Southern Rhodesia from throughout South Central Africa and the import of indentured labour from overseas, policies pursued by an administration convinced of the inadequacy of the internal labour supply. Thus Colonial Office concern for the protection of the native interest led to the perpetuation of an inefficient and, to the African, disturbing system, which ultimately facilit ated the mortgaging of Africans' social and political development. CONTENTS page. Preface v Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The Colonial Office and Labour in the Nineteenth Century 12 Chapter 2: The South African Background 57 Chapter 3: The Mobilisation of Labour within Rhodesia .. 10k Chapter k'. Labour from the Districts, Mashonaland ...... 159 Chapter 5: Labour from the Districts, Matabeleland 205 Chapter 6: Labour from Outside, Indian Ocean and Northern Zambezia 2^1 Chapter 7: Labour from Outside, Nyasaland, Mozambique and the Transvaal 29A-Chapter 8: Labour and the African 329 Conclusion 361 A Note on Tribes and their Nomenclature 368 Bibliography , 369 MAPS Southern Rhodesia: Districts and Mines Northern Rhodesia: Tribal Areas Labour Routes in South Central Africa PREFACE There is no more obvious phenomenon in Africa than labour migration, and it has received a proportionately large amount of attention from both anthropologists and sociologists. Historians of Central Africa have however merely glanced at labour migration. They have seen it as an important part of European political penetration, but its origins have not yet been studied on the scale of Sheila van der Horst's Native Labour in South Africa (1942). The research that has been done is either in the form of rather sketchy articles or unpublished theses, and there has been no attempt to set the colonial labour experience into the wider context of colonial labour theory. This thesis cannot fully fill this gap. It is intended as an introduction to the problem of the origins and develop ment of attitudes towards labour in both the colonial and the tribal situations, and the application of those attitudes in the growth of a dual economy and the formation of policy. An extremely difficult problem in this part of Africa is terminology. South Central Africa is a term of convenience intended to include several modern countries and to draw the mind away from the European-created boundaries so often irrelevant in African history. Unfortunately, it is a term based purely on previous European scholarship. Recently, another term has been coined that has perhaps better historical precedents, Zambesia (e.g. in Stokes and Brown, The Zambesian Past, 1966). It also suffers from being of European creation and instantly produces vi the unfortunate qualifying phrases Southern Zamhesia and Northern Zambesia. For the purposes of this thesis, South Central Africa may be defined as that area from which Rhodesia secured its African labour supply between 1890 and 1914, that is Rhodesia itself, most of Zambia and Malawi, and parts of Mozambique, the Northern Transvaal and Botswana. A second difficulty is that countries have changed their names, sometimes several times. Some scholars appear to make the modern terms retro-active; others use the name current in each period. In this thesis the modern term will be used in any general context - as in the above paragraph - and the historical term where a particular point of time is concerned. Yet another problem of terminology is that so many words that have perfectly legitimate meanings have developed pejorative overtones through association with the colonial period. Perhaps the most obvious example is the word native, a word that is virtually a compliment when used of Wales, Alsace, New England and so on, but is now to be avoided in an African context. It is unfortunate that historians have to avoid such a word, simply because of past misuse, for there is no real substitute for it. It has proved necessary to use it sparingly in this thesis, for a total ban seems foolish. An even more obvious example of misuse is the word "boy" invariably used in the colonial situation in Central Africa as a synoniym of "labourer" or "servant" or even of simply "male African". In this thesis the word is of course used only to mean a male adolescent or child. It should be vii recognised, however, that when it occurs in a quotation it very often involves the much wider meaning! Labour migration is of course a continuing process -a relatively stabilised African urban industrial population is still the exception rather than the rule. It should also be remembered that in the case of Rhodesia, current political problems are coloured by labour migration. There can be little doubt that the present regime is delighted that a truly permanent African urban population has never been created, that the reserves exist as a massive system of outdoor relief during a period of high African unemployment. Several Africans inter viewed by me in Rhodesia regarded their reserves, their villages, their land, however small and poor, as an insurance against the vagaries of the European economic climate. Thus Africans in Rhodesia regard institutions that are undoubtedly a bar to their political progress as necessary to their day-to-day needs. To visit a Rhodesian reserve - particularly one near Salisbury - is to see the conditions so often described by Native Commissioners fifty years ago, a community of women and children with an old headman and occasionally an unemployed male or an older child on holiday from school. Almost daily examples of labour migration appear to the traveller or research worker in south central Africa: the youthful employee in a *Hortense Powdermaker in her Copper Town; Changing Africa (New York, 1962), pp. 92-93 has an excellent example of this problem. One of her research assistants referred to two ten year old boys as "gentlemen", so aware was he of the debasing of the word "boy". viii hotel saving to buy a team of oxen to help farm the ancestral land in Inyanga; the young men on the Malawian bus boister ously returning home after a spell in the Johannesburg mines; the depot of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association nearby the Blantyre mission of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian on land actually leased from the mission; the crowded bus that leaves Harare township, Salisbury, for Blantyre every night, via the Mozambique enclave, full of returning migrants using an old route by modern means; the Rhodesian farmer annoyed that the labourer supplied by the government agency had "run away"; and, most interestingly of all, the Africans from the southern end of the country waiting for work on the Mazoe Mine in Rhodesia who took temporary employment as archaeological labourers on an excavation on the Portuguese site of Dambarare within sight of the mine - as work became available, the archaeological labour ers melted awayj These are just a few personal examples from an extended visit to Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi in 1967. All manuscript references in the thesis apply to the National Archives of Rhodesia in Salisbury, and are prefixed by the abbreviation NA. All references prefixed C.O. are Colonial Office files in the Public Record Office, London. A fuller account of the sources can be found in the biblio graphy. This thesis has been prepared with the help of the resources of a number of institutions, the universities of British Columbia, Glasgow and Lancaster, the ''University College ix of Rhodesia, the British Museum, the Public Record Office, the National Register of Archives, the Institute of Historical Research, the National Archives of Rhodesia, the former Church of Scotland mission in Blantyre, Malawi, and my thanks are due to the various staffs of libraries and archives who have eased my passage. My thanks are also due to my supervisor, Dr. R.V. Kubicek, who read and effectively criticised each chapter astonishingly promptly, to the beleaguered history department of the University College of Rhodesia, whose seminars proved so informative, to Mrs. P.E.N. Tindall and the Rev. Kenneth Pattison, who provided much-needed hospitality in Rhodesia and Malawi, and to Callisto Kapipiro and Alex Jana, with whom I explored Rhodesian reserves and up-country Malawi respectively. INTRODUCTION Migration and labour are expressions of one of the basic instincts of all living creatures, the instinct for survival. In human history they have been transformed from mere survival mechanisms to the motive power and the brain of the modern economic system. Migration has changed from a group to an individual activity; it has acquired ideological, religious and personal motives, but has remained basically economic. Labour on the other hand has been transformed from a personal to a group activity and in the process has accumulated immense ideological accretions. This thesis is concerned with the meeting of two different types of migration, and the labour which became a function of that clash. One migration formed part of the expansion of Europe; the other was the continuing ebb and flow of Bantu migration which had been going on across Africa for many centuries. The migration of Europeans was one of the most significant features of the nineteenth century. It had been gathering momentum for several centuries. The crusading zeal of Prince Henry the Navigator in his desire to outflank Islam had turned into an acquisitive drive for the mineral wealth of South America and the luxury traffic of the Orient. These mining and trading contacts were turned by mercantilism into an econ omic system that European nations could opt out of only at their peril. So for the first time Europeans came into contact with other peoples on a global scale. The Spanish in South America 2 were the first to experience the problems of indigenous labour, and the ideological battle was joined. The conquistadores acted as conquerors exacting from their tributary peoples the rights that conquerors had demanded since the earliest days of tribalism. As later in Africa, the colonial power caught up with their own colonial conquerors. Their brutality was answered by the clerical paternalism of Las Casas, colonial exploitation of the Indians by the ameliorative efforts of the Spanish Crown. The systems of encomiendas and repartimientos were essentially designed to avoid slavery. They gave the colonials rights over tribute and labour, but not over the persons of the Indians, and under public rather than private control. The process of the conquerors brought under the control of a colonial power anxious for its own international prestige was to be repeated in Africa in the late nineteenth century. But there were important elements of the Spanish experience -the early creation of a large "poor white" population and the rapid predominance of the mestizo or half-caste population -that were not repeated. Moreover, in the intervening period the European conscience towards Africa suffered a prolonged and disastrous lapse. The early respect of the Portuguese for the King of the Congo, or in a less formalised way for the Monomotapa of the Rozwi Empire in Rhodesia, in the sixteenth century proved short-lived. The Arabs of the East Coast had already solved their slight labour difficulties by a combination 3 of forced migration and forced unfree labour which fitted very-well into the Moslem tradition: slavery. Europeans turned slavery into a system of exploitation that has never ceased to disturb the historical conscience, however much historians have sought expiation in increasingly shocked and lurid description. Slavery was the most important conditioner of nineteenth century labour policy. It produced in Britain a humanitarian reaction that was as Tory as it was Whig and as Whig as it was Tory: the most ardent anti-slavery gentlemen were also the most anti-democratic. The contemporary jibe that they were more interested in slaves whom they had never seen than the very real and apparent* sufferings of the domestic working classes- was a pointed one. Their humanitarianism, with a few notable exceptions, was often more akin to the benevol-2 ence of anti-vivisectionists. They were however zealous in devoting their lives to the eradication of a great evil, and they founded a crusade that was to have far-reaching ramifications. Many false comparisons have been made between the humanitarianism of the abolitionists and the severity of •z late nineteenth century imperialism. Curtin has shown^ how those concerned for the welfare of slaves could support forced labour as a necessary alternative. It is thus not true to say that a considerable revolution in thought on colonial labour - from benevolence to harshness, based on a developing racism - occurred during the nineteenth century. :; The anti-slavery movement produced two quite different schools of thought. It was the progenitor of both a benevolent and a harsh-paternalism, of both the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Societies of the later century and of the colonial paternalists. It was not of course the sole progenitor of these attitudes. Nor is it true that advancing European technology was the only other parent of the Victorian cultural superiority complex. When an Africanist like Sir Harry Johnston made the gross error of characterising African peoples as Stone Age,^ he was not just influenced by the racism of his day. He did so as the bearer of a strange mixture of thought and impressions that were the late nineteenth century inheritance. It was a mixture of Hegelian Euroce.ntrism, of the rather arrogant brand of utilitarianism dispensed at Haileybury earlier in the century for Indian consumption, of the obiter dicta of "armchair anthropologists" seeking to establish their science with a full blown theory of racism, of sociologists converting evolutionism to their own ends,^ of travellers (a truly important influence here) conveying as heightened a contrast as possible to their large and avid reading public, of the intellectual paternalism proceeding from the universities, and in particular from Oxford, and finally of the Victorian obsess ion with visual technological achievement in which they them selves had so excelled. The century-long anti-slavery crusade was accompanied by a great debate which centred on the nature of the free labour that was to take its place. The debate was conditioned by the various intellectual strands enumerated above, together with the requirements of a developing capitalism that had outgrown the need for slavery, but had not developed a real labour theory or policy either at home or abroad. Both these problems were still far from solution when Europeans, first penetrated Central Africa in appreciable numbers. Their reactions were based, however unwittingly, partly on this debate, partly on South African experience, and partly on the nature of the societies they found in Central Africa. They found slave trading and indigenous slavery; they found an unconcern for life which, forgetting their not so remote ancestors and the nature of the African environment, they characterised as barbarism and savagery; they found societies pursuing firstly the economic migration of shifting cultivation, pressed on relentlessly by a poor soil, and secondly the political migration of fission and coherence so characteristic of Bantu tribal organisation. The political sway of the Rozwi, the culture of the Empire of the Monomotapa which the Portuguese had encountered and respected, had declined and fragmented. Offshoots of two great Bantu peoples, the Zulus from the South and the Luba-Lunda from the North, had become the overlords of the region. Just as the Roman towns in England had been ignored by the invading Saxons, so the stone zimbabwes were abandoned. The study of the varied nature of the response of Central African societies to the whole series of influences that came to bear upon them in the nineteenth century has proved one of the most fruitful approaches to the history of the pre-colonial period. They faced the incursions of other tribes, and were assimilated, raided or compelled to offer tribute. Superior and subject tribes faced the Arab slave traders as fitful collaborators or victims as the case might be. 'In the early years of European penetration, it was soon clear that the balance of power would change again. Missionaries revealed this better than any other early group, simply because they tended to settle permanently. In Malawi in particular, both at the southern and northern ends of the Lake, they took up residence with the raided and then set about halting the activities of the raiders. The missionaries invariably provided a fillip to colonial control, though with militant Cape Company colonialism from the South and militant Foreign Office diplomatic imperialism from the East, little fillip was necessary. The rulers of Central African societies almost all felt Lobengula's celebrated sensation of the Chameleon and the Fly.^ They soon became aware of the dangers of the European incursions and the tribute that would be exacted in defeat -taxes, labour and control. The Europeans ostensibly wished to save them from themselves, from savagery and slavery, but the suffering of the merely probable was infinitely preferable to the systematic suffering of the European tax-gatherer and of 7 1 capitalist enterprise drawing labour into its insatiable maw. This European penetration was achieved by a remarkable combination of endemic diplomacy and warfare. Treaties were proffered, accepted and revoked. Various excuses were tendered for the forcible destruction of warlike tribes, of which raiding, slave or otherwise, was the most common. Few events reveal more about African tribes or their colonial rulers than the peaceful - as with the Bemba and the Lozi -or the warlike - as with the Ndebele, sections of the Ngoni and the Yao - establishment of colonial hegemony. Labour migration was then seen by Chartered Company magnates and 7 colonists as the catalyst of tribal fragmentation and of the erosion of traditional authority. Taxation was introd uced to speed this process (in addition to providing revenue) and reserves reluctantly established at the behest of the imperial authorities. The acceptance of reserves remained reluctant until European colonists awakened to the political dangers of a landless African proletariat. In Rhodesia, Europeans have balanced policy on the knife-edge between the needs of capitalist production and the fear of a politically conscious working class. Seasonal migration began as an unfortunate necessity - like that of another conquered people, the Irish, to England - but what made economic sense did not make political sense. The Irish had eventually settled and formed an urban sub-culture. Given the population imbalance, 8 Africans could not be permitted to do the same. The missionaries had sought imperial control, but the control imposed was seldom to their liking. While it was only within its framework that they could successfully pursue their religious objects, they usually objected to the colonials' methods, and this is particularly true of the recruiting of labour. They faced a very real dilemma here. While approving the end, civilization through the medium of the dignity of labour, they disapproved of the means. During the penetration period, the more sophisticated chiefs like Lobengula or Lewanika had been educated - often by the local missionary - to an awareness of the existence of a moderating influence, to them the Great White Queen, to us the Colonial Q Office. Chiefs and missionaries alike continued to turn to London to curb the worst excesses of the "man on the spot". In the Spanish Empire the Church had succeeded in doing this with one important difference - the Spanish Church was a monolithic establishment inextricably bound up with the State. The British Church was fragmented and important only insofar as the adherents of each branch at home could influence policy. What distinguishes British colonial church history in South Central Africa is the fashion in which it rapidly lost control of both the African and the European situation in the colonial q period. Chiefs and Church turned to a Colonial Office which in a sense owed its modern development to labour. Sir Henry-Taylor describes in his Autobiography"*"^ how inadequate the Colonial Office was during the twenties and thirties of the nineteenth century to cope with the move towards the abolition of slavery, how some new and bright clerks were appointed of whom he was one. Sir James Stephen emerged through emancip ation as the first great Permanent Under Secretary. After him the Colonial Office never lost its humanitarianism, but during the twentieth century it - like the Church - lost control of the Southern African situation. The Devonshire Declaration and the Passfield Memorandum only just saved it from losing.control of East African developments. The creation of the Union of South Africa was a triumph for the devolutionists; the development of the conception of indirect rule marked the triumph of an anachronistic Whiggism. Both events were fatal to the growth of a colonial labour policy parallel to the domestic one. The Central African Federation was a last clutching at straws, a chimera of racial partnership and political advance. This thesis is an attempt to approach labour from a number of angles: firstly from the Colonial Office in the nineteenth century, though what is said is merely a general exploration, so much remains to be winkled from the Colonial Office Archives secondly from the South Africa that produced the Chartered Company and so many of the early settlers; thirdly from the 10 tribal environment. This provides the background. The thesis goes on to examine the mechanism of migrant labour, the techniques of mobilisation at work, and the establishment of a corpus of ideas on African labour that has proved long-lived. There are a number of incidental problems, the relationship of the Colonial Office with the Company, of the Company with the settlers, of the settlers with the Africans, of the missionaries with the settlers, of the Colonial Office with its opposition at home, and permutations of all five. While providing constant and irritating constraint, the Colonial Office not surprisingly failed in this period to establish the groundwork for a progressive labour policy which was the sina qua non of a progressive political policy. Having lost the initiative the Colonial Office was never able to regain it. 11 FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION. 1 See for example the recent work of J. Pope-Hennessy, Sins of the Fathers.(London, 19671 2 This contention is not as remarkable as it seems. Sir Henry Taylor (vid. inf.), who was an official in the Colonial Office for almost fifty years from 1824, opposed slavery, supported Governor Eyre after his brutal supp ression of the Jamaican uprising, and attacked vivisection. For further details see Chapter 1. -3 Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa, (Madison, 196k), pp.- 273-4. 4 Sir Harry H. Johnston, paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute, January 15, 1889, quoted in Stokes & Brown, op. cit., p. 356. 5 Thomas Huxley in his Romanes Lecture of 1893 disclaimed the idea that biological theories of evolution provided any indication of human social progress, Evolution and Ethics  and Other Essays, (New York, 1898} p. "ET. 6 Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London, 1958) recounts the King of the Matabele's own description of his feelings as the concession:seekers closed in. 7 Eric Stokes & Richard Brown, (eds.), The Zambesian Past, (liondon, 1966} p. 93, for the Company's hope regarding the Ndebele. The fact that the tribe did not fragment led to the War of 1893. 8 There is an interesting example of the monarch expressing his personal opinion in 1911. During the discussions regarding the transfer of Bechuanaland to South Africa in 1911, the chiefs petitioned George V in the traditional way. He personally wrote on a Colonial Office minute that his sympathies were with the chiefs. C.O. 417/499. 9 Terence 0. Ranger, "State and Church in Southern Rhodesia, - 1919 - 39." Historical Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland pamphlet, n.d. 10 Henry Taylor, Autobiography, (London, 1885} p. 64. 12 CHAPTER 1 THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND LABOUR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY Colonial labour policy in the nineteenth century developed as a response to emancipation. It was conditioned in a number of ways: by the tentative ideas of trusteeship that had emerged from the eighteenth century and Burke in particular; by domestic attitudes towards the labouring poor; by the racial views of "armchair" anthropologists, sociologists and of travellers; and by the paternalistic tradition of aristocratic rule. Historians have seen the beginnings of trusteeship in the great speeches of Burke on the impeachment of Warren Hastings. And of course no one is more eminently quotable than Burke: it is very easy to be blinded to the ambivalence of his philosophy. He used such words as "trust" and "accountable""'" and asserted There is but one law for all, namely, that law which governs all law, the law of our Creator, the law of humanity, justice, equity -the law of nature, and of nations. But he was also the father of the colonial devolutionists who were to discover that the law of nature was not the law of humanity, justice, equity. Although he briefly took up the mitigation and ultimate suppression of the slave trade in 1780, he dropped the issue for, as John Morley wryly put it, "his sympathy was too strongly under the control of the polit ical reason".^ Humanity and justice for the slaves was 13 tempered by the need for justice for the owners. Another favourite quotation from this period of incipient trusteeship is that from the Parliamentary Committee on the East India Company Charter of 1833: It is recognised as an indisputable principle that the interests of the native subjects are to be consulted in preference to those of . Europeans whenever the two come into conflict. But no conflict was recognised where Europeans set out to decide what was good for their Indian subjects, whether the subjects liked it or not. Moreover, no such unequivocal statement was ever made for Australasia or North America, and not until the twentieth century for Africa. G.R. Mellor's 5 attempt^ to find a fully revealed and adopted policy of trusteeship in the first half of the nineteenth century is unconvincing. The sentiments undoubtedly existed and received mention in policy statements, but for most of their history they were invariably ineffectual and often intermittent. After Sir James Stephen^ there was never again so great a humanitarian at the Colonial Office, but the idea of imperial responsibility survived even when high officials in the Colonial Office were in league with the great capitalists of the day, as Edward Fairfield 7 was. The establishment of the High Commission territories in South Africa is evidence of this, although their subsequent perilous history is equally evidence of the tenuous nature of that trusteeship. Ik In short-, British colonial policy has always been, like Janus, two headed. It was not just that there was admini strative division - the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office for protectorates - nor was it just that there was an alternation of two different political parties in power. It was the dual nature of the philosophical strands that made up the attitudes to the colonial possessions. The Colonial Reformers had taken over Burke's concept of the necessity of devolution and allied it with their own ideas on Systematic Colonization,' organised emigration financed by land sales. The humanitarians distrusted them because they rode roughshod over the rights of indigenous peoples which were part of the metropolitan trust. In different ways they both denied laisser aller, the first on an individual level, the second on a collective basis. Later in the century., Herbert Spencer's sociology reveals excellently the inherent conflict in British nineteenth century thought. He attempted to unite the' util itarian concept of the greatest happiness of the greatest number with the doctrine of laisser faire and Lamarckian evolution, supplemented later by Darwin's theories of natural selection. His conclusion that the interest of each individual automatically complies with the interest of the aggregate of individuals hardly coincided with the utilitarian faith in the power of beneficial legislation imposed from above. Nor did it fit the political realities when the aggregate included 15 different social classes or different races. Just when social Darwinism appeared to be turning laisser faire into something more than just a commercial policy, it was overtaken by German metaphysics - Carlyle, their apostle,' described Spencer as "the most immeasurable ass in Christendom". Carlyle provides a magnificent link in nineteenth century colonial thought, by his longevity and by the scope of his influence. In Past and Present he argued the efficacy of systematic emigration as a safety valve for democratic agit ators - "instead of staying here to be a Physical-Force Q Chartist, unblessed and no blessingj" - as Rhodes was to do later in an oft-quoted incident.^ Remove the malcontents and ease population pressure at one blow. His Occasional  Discourse on the Nigger Question"^ revealed the extent of his contempt for "inferior peoples" and for "Exeter Hall Philan thropy". In the discourse, he attacked the West Indian negroes for their tropical indolence (a familiar theme in nineteenth century colonial labour theory), their refusal to adhere to his doctrine of work, which he so exalted in Past and Present. In his preoccupation with the hero in history, from Cromwell to Frederick the Great, and with German philosophy, he created the antecedents for the heroic labours of the great imperial ists of the turn of the century. The difference that has been observed in racial attitudes between the first and second halves of the nineteenth century 16 has frequently been expressed in a far too simplistic way. The process was extremely subtle. The racism of the second half of the century did not involve any real change in the attitude of the European to the non-European: it involved a change in attitude of the European's - and in particular the Northern European's - attitude towards himself. The terminology of "savage societies", "lower societies", "barbarism" and so on was as prevalent at the beginning of the century as it was at the end. Darwinian concepts of evolution applied socially provided an explanation for the different "levels" of society and civilization, and tended to favour the more liberal monogenesis arguments over the pplygenesis idea that had exercised the anthropologists in 11 debate for most of the century. The notion that an "advanced" civilization would automatically wipe out the representatives of a more backward civilization was as common before Darwin as after him. In his celebrated 12 inaugural lecture of 1841 Thomas Arnold, for example, applied in effect a survival of the fittest argument to the glory and ultimate destiny of the Saxon race. This concept reached its height later in the century when Social Darwinism took on what has been described as its external or collectivist guise"*"^ (as opposed to Social Darwin ism applied to an internal economic laisser-faire situation). The ideas of Benjamin Kidd"^ and even more so the extraordinary 15 eugenics of Karl Pearson ' entered into the fabric of imperial ideas, and greatly influenced notions of colonial labour, Pearson wrote both of the replacement of "dark-skinned tribes" by "a capable and stalwart race of white men" and of the exploitation of colonies by the use of indigenous labour. However, external Social Darwinism was directed not so much against the colonies as against other powers. Hence, for example, the Latins were looked down on with considerable distaste. When the United States was seizing Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines from a jaded, inferior people, the Spanish, Anglo-Saxon superiority was expressed in Joseph Chamberlain's panteutonism. There was a new high"respect for the United States to the extent that Britain was willing to give her support in the war with Spain and was willing to kow-tow to her over boundary disputes, even when the dispute involved one of Britain's own colonies, as in the case of the Alaska-British Columbia dispute. But even more important was the changed attitude towards Germany. The establishment of the German Empire and of Bismarckian state socialism had a profound effect in Britain. Fashionable intellectuals followed now in the footsteps of Carlyle in his adoration of German philosophy and statecraft rather than in the footsteps of Bentham and utilitarianism. The Fabians in their concern for socialism by existing means and their dislike of the muddle of the House of Commons 18 reflected this, (and it must be remembered that Sidney Webb was to some extent a follower of Pearson). So did the concern for the Education Act of 1902, state socialism passed by an unwitting Balfour, prompted by a justifiable respect for German education and technical advance. So too did Alfred Milner^with his German background and early education. Thomas Arnold's Saxon destiny reached its climax at the end of the century - it was behind that whole series of remarkable wills of Cecil John Rhodes. Arnold's son, Matthew, forms an interesting connection between his father's generation and fin de siecle imperialism. While it is true that he called for more Hellenism rather than Romanism in public life, he expressed contempt for the "barbarians, philistines and populace" and the now familiar dissatisfaction with laisser faire and 17 laisser aller. ' He was in fact one of the apostles of the meritocracy. Thomas Arnold's Saxon, Carlyle's hero and Matthew Arnold's meritocrat combined in the imperial idealists. Both Rhodes and Milner dedicated themselves to a life of public utility in surprisingly similar phrases. Rhodes wrote "The wish came to render myself useful to my country"; Milner 18 declared himself ready for a life of public usefulness. There can be little doubt that Rhodes's "mystic duty" was much more important to him than either money-making or politics. His first will expounding his idea of a secret society to further the ends of the Anglo-Saxon race was written when his fortune was 19 still unmade. The Oxford of Benjamin Jowett and James^-" Anthony Froude - the biographer of Carlyle - had created a sense of divine right, divine right in being English, divine right in being a member of the intelligentsia. It was a view espoused by Lansdowne, Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and reached its apotheosis in Curzon. Given this divine right and the obsession with heroic personal labours, it was natural that colonial labour policy should be based on the view that indigenous peoples must be the handmaidens of that divine will. Imperial statecraft was Germanic: the Germanic tradition of the mailed fist in the velvet glove entered colonial labour IQ policy while the humanitarian ideals of Stephen and Merivale y were still remembered. It was also Roman. Not only were the imperialists educated in the classics, they consciously adopted and took pride in Roman attitudes. Again Rhodes is an excell ent example of this: he carried the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius around with him, and was greatly flattered when likened in looks to a Roman Emperor. He had an ill-concealed contempt for the Latin peoples - witness his bullying tactics with the Portuguese -20 just as Romans and Saxons alike had swept aside the Celts. If racial attitudes emerged from a grand design of European destiny, they fed on fear. The fear of replacement dominates much of human activity - its most basic and perennial expression is in the fear of the older for the younger generation. The 20 Anglo-Indians discovered fear after the Mutiny, as have colonials of the growth of African nationalism produced by their own capitalist concentration and political repression. The Aliens Act of 1905 was a Unionist sop to the fear of the British working class towards immigrants. The attitudes of organised labour towards indigenous peoples in Southern Africa have above all expressed it. In nineteenth century Britain fear was a characteristic of attitudes towards the domestic working classes (plural at the beginning of the century, singular by the end). And that fear was as great before the First World War as it had been immediately after the Napoleonic Wars. By 1914 the labour movement had reversed the setbacks of the Taff Vale and Osborne decisions and the prospect of the "triple alliance" revealed the greatest obstructive power the unions had yet exhibited. The safe image of the liberal elite unions had gone. It is not surprising that colonial labour policies should envisage strict control. In the colonial situation itself, fear was naturally experienced more intensely by the "man on the spot". It was one of the causes of friction between colonials and the imperial authorities. Working class phobias were strong too. Their radical supporters were often the loudest proponents of the theory of the destruction of inferior races. The radicals frequently attacked concerns with colonial labour as distracting attention from the plight of those at home - often with complete justif ication. The fear that has already been described had ample 21 expression in the domestic situation - in inter-union rivalries, hatred of Irish-Catholic immigrants and so on. It was thus ripe for turning into Jingoism and Racism at the turn of the century. There was very little identification of the oppressed at home with the oppressed in the colonies. Between the days when the Lancashire cotton workers could sacrifice themselves for the slaves of the American South or a working men1s meeting in Clerkenwell burn Governor Eyre 21 in effigy in 1866 and the days when the imperial party became identified with dearer bread and Chinese "slavery", the working classes were wooed by the ideas of social imperialism. The "Critics of Empire" were either intellectual 22 radicals or journalists pandering to a minority taste. The Independent Labour Party, as exemplified by Ramsay MacDonald, advocated not so much anti-imperialism as ethical imperialism. In 1897, it would be difficult to find a working class meeting that would burn Rhodes or Jameson in effigy after the fiascos of the Raid and the Ndebele and Shona rebellions in Rhodesia. Liberal Imperialism had already created the atmosphere in which Chamberlain could play the tune of a "forward" colonial policy to considerable public acclaim. He of course was the political opportunist par excellence. At home he, the aloof, humane capitalist radical, imagined he could spike the guns of the socialists; in the colonial setting he thought he could spike the guns of the humanitarians 22 by providing a popular imperialism and a benevolent capitalism. His idea of training his son, Neville, was to send him to a remote West Indian island to establish a plantation and find manhood in toil and the control of negroes. v Even after the failure of Chamberlain and the return of the Liberals to power, the Colonial Office retained its combination of liberalism and Hegelian statecraft. They were fused in a paternalism that would take to itself the supreme arrogance of the Dual Mandate, which Hobson exposed even before it was properly formulated.^ The Governor Eyre controversy in the 1860's had produced two factions - the Jamaica Committee of John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, T.H. Huxley and others, and their opponents in Carlyle, 25 Ruskin and Tennyson. ^ In the Colonial Office bequeathed by Chamberlain, both factions would have found some sentiments with which to sympathise. The richest vein of influence on colonial labour policy is paternalism. So pervasive is it that it has already been touched on at several points. Paternalism in its various forms is quite clearly not unique to the Balliol and Toynbee Hall school of the late century. Paternalism has been an extremely strong thread throughout the past few thousand years of history. It is a deeply psychological instinct that has not wanted for social expression. It has varied only in quality, from severity to benevolence. It has always been inextricably bound up with religion. It was clearly a most extraordinary 23 type of paternalism that produced the Pyramids of Egypt or Silbury Hill in England or the great ship burials of Scandinavia, and incidentally these examples are amongst the early instances of organised labour on a large scale. Paternalism is evident in Plato's Republic, the paternalism of the philosopher ruler, the paternalism of the idea - which the Existentialists have struggled to escape. The paternal ism of the medieval church and feudal aristocracy has given way in turn to the paternalism of the monarchy, of the army, of the aristocracy, of the middle classes, and of the party and the state. The liberal ideal has never achieved fulfil ment. Paternalism is an integral part of African cultures -the paternalism of the tribe as embodied in the chief and above all as disembodied in the departed ancestors. In the colonial setting we see a severe paternalism, the tribal, in conflict with a paternalism that was in fact a running action between the severe and the benevolent. The result was colon ial anger and African confusion. African paternalism ran right through social and kin relationships. The African male when he married retained his dependence while accepting new obligations that fitted him more actively into the paternal istic framework. The Victorian family was also paternalistic, but with important differences. For one thing it was the nuclear family rather than the extended, and for another its 24 components on maturity were hurled off to make their own way in the world. The Native Cornmissioner from such a background often succeeded in finding a place in tribal paternalism, usually to the detriment of the chief. He interpreted his paternalistic duty as being to advise or coerce the Africans to enter by means of their labour the European economic system and adopt the cash criterion of social acceptibility. In other words he set out to force on them the individual fragmentation and traumatic break with family life which was such a feature of his own society. The Emancipation struggle had been a conflict of severity and benevolence, the negroes' subsequent so-called indolence a terrible lesson. Indolence was a fearful word to the Victorian mind, as it is in a different way in the twentieth century. Tennyson was fascinated by Ulysses' encounter with the Lotos-Eaters and the sailors' attraction to their life -"Should life all labour be? Surely, surely, slumber is more sweet than toil". But his sonorous sentiment in the last line of the poem Ulysses - "To strive', to seek, to find, and not to yield" - is much more characteristic. There is the same conflict in William Golding's Lord of the Flies: one group of boys wish to organise the collection and distribution of food while the others set off for a life of indolence and sport at the other end of the island. The problem could be ' seen as man's fall from grace - the primeval ancestors cast 25 out from Eden and forced to work by the sweat of their brows; or more scientifically as proto-man's emergence from the forests to the harder life of the plains. Some have seen a distinction between work and labour. Lewis Mumford in his recent The Myth of the Machine presents a picture of neolithic 26 life where all had to work and none had to labour. The Victorians turned work into a moral imperative, and it so happened that work meant labour to satisfy the needs of capitalist production. It is not surprising that the reaction was the worship of the romantic rural idyll, by Morris in his distinctive brand of socialism, by Voysey in his architecture and by Hardy in his novels. In Africa the contrast was immediate and unromantic - between iron age tribes with their village agriculture and village "industry" (pottery and smelting principally) and the labour of European farm or mine. To the Victorians the end was not in doubt: man must work and work equalled labour. The origins of this moral imperative have been seen in the Protestant Reformation, but it should be remembered that the ideal of medieval monastic life was hard work as well as contemplation - the Cistercians in particular pursued the ideal of laborare est orare. The moral need was enshrined in British poor law enactment from Tudor times and received its apotheosis in the Poor Law of 1834. Idleness must be made unattractive. The mercantilists 26 had espoused the need for reasons of state. It was at the bottom of the ideas of the colonial reformers, the systematic colonists. The Victorians turned it into an individual moral need, but it was nonetheless a reason of state, and nowhere was this more evident than in the colonial situation. The removal of the physical compulsion of slavery made the moral need imperative. The notion that labour was inviolable property to be disposed of only at the owners' wish fell before the paternalistic onslaught that labour was not property, but a social duty, a moral obligation. The fact that West Indian negroes had been permitted to lapse into sloth was a moral crime that had to be avoided in the future. In the imperial ism of the late century labour had the continuing justification of being an alternative to the domestic slavery and external slave trade found everywhere in the advance of explorers, missionaries and pioneers. It was transformed into a moral justification for exploitation to satisfy the most fervent capitalist, the most romantic pioneer, the most "improving" missionary. Paternalism was particularly attractive because it satisfied two philosophical worlds. Basically it was deter ministic. Given the religious content it could hardly be otherwise. Yet the severity-benevolence debate revealed a considerable scope for human tinkering - free will within a deterministic framework. Moreover, it was a tremendous, 27 though almost unwitting, make-weight to the laisser faire economists. While they were expounding their essentially deterministic view of the free market, the legislators were refusing to permit the social market to be free. Nowhere was this more true than in the realm of colonial labour. While free trade was only approaching its zenith there were constant attempts to control colonial labour - laisser aller was destroyed long before laisser faire. It should be noted that in the colonial situation there is a two-pronged attack on the colonial labour market. It is attacked by the colon ists because it does not produce - they wish to force labour. It is attacked by the Colonial Office under pressure from the humanitarians because it creates abuses. We have distinguished paternalism as important because it forms the megastructure of all nineteenth century colonial (and domestic) labour thinking, because it is a vantage point from which to view Victorian conceptions, conscious and sub conscious, and from which to see the attack on the ranks of laisser faire. On the individual plane, paternalism could take a variety of forms. The paternalism of the third Earl 27 Grey, 'the first great colonial formulator after Emancipation, was the benevolent paternalism of aristocratic obligation; the paternalism of Lord Milner the more arrogant paternalism of the meritocracy; that of Sydney Olivier °the paternalism of the intellectual Fabian, more benevolent, more sympathetic, but 28 no less paternalistic. So far, the general intellectual framework in which a colonial labour policy was constructed has been reviewed. It is now necessary to examine that policy itself. It is impossible to separate out labour policy from more general attitudes to indigenous peoples. For this reason it is interesting to begin with a comparison of two influential statements of 1841 - Herman Merivale's lectures delivered at Oxford as Professor of Political Economy and Thomas Arnold's inaugural lecture as Professor of Modern History. Merivale provides a good starting point because he became the Permanent Under Secretary at the Colonial Office during one of the most seminal periods for colonial labour policy, the secretaryship of state of Lord Grey. After the inadequacy of Robert William 29 Hay, 7 Sir James Stephen had firmly established the power of the Colonial Office's principal executive officer. But Stephen was the representative of an older strain. From the moment he entered the Colonial Office he was dedicated to Abolition. This was his life's work. Once accomplished, events ran against him. He was implacably opposed to indentured labour, seeing it rightly as controlled slavery under another name. In insisting on the most rigid controls on indentured labour he firmly laid down the Colonial Office humanitarian tradition. It fell to Merivale to maintain that tradition and yet live with 29 the political fact of indentured labour. Merivale's lectures^ are remarkable both for their breadth of view and for their liberality of outlook. In some of his views the world has hardly caught up with him to-day. He believed in complete amalgamation of the races, though he expressed it in the language of his time, "the only 31 possible Euthanasia of savage communities". He had no objection whatever to miscegenation - indeed he asserted the 32 "superior energy" of half-castes. It is not surprising that he admitted that his "views must undoubtedly appear somewhat wild and chimerical". In the same year that Merivale's Lectures were published, Thomas Arnold delivered his inaugural lecture. He dated the beginning of English history from the Saxon invasions and not before; he regarded the supremacy of the Germanic race as the ultimate in world history. His was the most influential statement yet of the disappearance theory: ...the mass of mankind have no such power; they either receive the impression of foreign elements so completely that their own individual character is absorbed, and they take their whole being from without; or being incapable of taking in higher elements, they dwindle away when brought into the presence of a more powerful life, and become at last extinct altogether.-^ When Herman Merivale became Stephen's successor at the Colonial Office he affirmed a tradition of humanitarian watchfulness that the Colonial Office never gave up, even when the children of the Oxford that Arnold had helped to create ruled the Empire 30 and the great capitalistic enterprises set up as new monopolies in the age of the so-called New Imperialism, the Chartered Companies. It is possible to trace Merivale's views right through the nineteenth century debate. His vigorous and optimistic conception of trusteeship with all its obligations becomes the warp to the woof of the colonial reformers' and all their successors' hopes for an orgy of devolution and a displaced trust. Three main themes run through the colonial labour debate of the nineteenth century - tropical indolence, land and artificial stimulants (usually taxation). The three are clearly closely connected. An excess of the second could produce the first, and could likewise cancel out the effects of the third. Ideas about tropical indolence and land developed from West Indian experience, but as the frontiers of colonised,Africa were pushed inwards - in the earlier period particularly in South Africa of course - Africa drew increasing attention. Opinions derived from the West Indians tended to be passed over to Africa. Clearly this was inadmiss ible, for slavery had atomised tribal society in transplantation, whereas the tribes in South Africa were of course largely intact. It was not until the end of the century that more sympathetic observers began to point out two facts —firstly that the position of the male in tribal society was largely a 31 defensive and ritualistic one, and secondly that African agriculture was even more seasonal than elsewhere with a rather obviously "slack" season. Merivale accepted the notion of tropical indolence, 35 as did most subsequent commentators, including J.A. Hobson-^ 36 and Sydney Olivier, although Olivier did point out that "loafing" is both more pleasant and more noticeable in the tropics. The basic question then was how was this indolence to be overcome. Merivale's answer was simple and total -there had to be complete amalgamation, promoted above all by education, including of course religious and moral instruction. Education ought to be a government concern so that its import ance might be fully appreciated. Here Merivale was clearly far in advance of domestic policy, and equally clearly reveals his debt to the utilitarians. The obvious corollary of this view was that reserves could not be permitted. To create reserves was to commit the same error that had been committed in North America -the abdication of responsibility. Reserves simply postponed the evil day. The colonists will complain, and with perfect truth, of the economical disadvantages which attend the interposition of uncultivated or half-cultivated tracts between populous districts; of their own suffering by the proximity of the natives, and of the political mischiefs produced by these little inert republics, stagnant in the very centre of society. And government will find itself, as it has 32 always done, unable to resist these importunities, and cajoled by the thousand implausibilities advanced in favour of removing these unfortunates a further stage into the wilderness, it will comply with the exigencies of the times, and the natives will be transported to some other region, to be followed there again with sure and rapid steps by the encroaching tide of European population.3° It might be argued that Merivale was in fact advocating a different form of extermination, that like the utilitarians he had little respect for the institutions of other peoples. This is not strictly the case. He pointed out that certain institutions were highly amenable to advancement into western civilization - again an ethnocentric view, but a prophetic one. He saw the irresistibility of western commerce and technology, and in the above passage he incid entally prophesied almost precisely what was to happen in Rhodesia. (The Land Commission of 191.6 that had been expected to increase African reserves in Rhodesia in fact decreased them). Merivale's conclusion was an extremely optimistic one. It would be interesting to discover whether it remained so after he became Permanent Under Secretary. .....we may be satisfied with the improved prospect of our relations with those much abused members of the human family, that there is now little fear of their being treated with injustice and oppression by the founders of colonies, armed with the authority of governments. We have at all events outlived.the days in which they were considered a lawful prey for the ferocity of ,q the zealot, or the cupidity of the adventurer. 7 33 While not so prophetic here, Merivale does reveal the total absence of real racist thought in his position. In this he followed Stephen of whom Knaplund writes that "the human itarianism and egalitarianism cropping up so frequently in his official minutes and memoranda were rooted in the relig ious conviction that before God all men are equal".^ The same could not be said of another important figure in the Colonial Office whom we must now examine. Sir Henry Taylor had a most remarkable career.^ He served in the "commonplace brick house at the end of Downing Street"^ that was the Colonial Office for almost half a century, 1824 - 1872. On the retirement of Stephen, he was offered the Permanent Under Secretaryship by Grey, but declined on the grounds that the post was compatible neither with health nor with his liter ary pursuits (he was an indifferent poet and playwright and the friend of many of the leading literary figures of his day). His racist feeling is revealed at the time of the Jamaican uprising and Governor Eyre controversy. In a letter to Sir Charles Elliott he argued that he could not agree ....that the value of human life is identical in all races, civilized and barbarous. ....The destruction of life of a high order produces great sorrow and distress amongst relatives and friends. But as you descend the scale, the suffering occasioned is more light and transitory.^ To revert to the Emancipation period, we find that he took up the indolence view in its most extreme form: 3k But to apply what is called 'the voluntary system' to the negro populations is about as reasonable as it would be to call upon a flock of sheep to find themselves a shepherd. He produced a most extraordinary idea for mitigating the effects of immediate emancipation. It was based on his conventional belief in the inviolable nature of property (it was he who proposed the twenty million pounds compensation^). He suggested that each slave ought to be able to buy himself out by instalments. He could be given enough to buy himself for Monday and Tuesday. He could then work on Monday and Tuesday to buy Wednesday for himself, and so on! In this way eman cipation would be achieved and the virtue of work inculcated at one and the same time. Taylor insists in his Autobiography that his proposal was turned down for purely political reasons,^ but the mind can hardly grasp the chaos and abuses that would have resulted from such a scheme. It certainly reveals Taylor for the archetypical paternalist that he was. And yet Taylor was completely unequivocal in his conception of the nature of the trust the imperial responsibility conveyed. In this, like Stephen, he was entirely opposed to the colonial reformers' devolutionary ideas. In a letter to Grey, dated May 6, 1852, he defended Grey's policy of meddling while at the Colonial Office, for ....even where the welfare of ignorant and unrepresented populations does not require the Home Government to control the local legislatures, there is another 35 consideration which may require it, which consideration is the honour of the  Crown (his italics) and that so long as the Crown is a branch of the legislatures - that is so. long as -the Colonies are Colonies - it must be the duty of the ministers of the Crown to prevent the C^own from becoming a party to acts of injustice and dishonesty and bad faith. 48 And again in his Autobiography he wrote With regard to the Cape which has hitherto been the extreme case of military expenditure for the protection of a colony, I think the question should be regarded as purely philanthropic -a question whether this country thinks it her duty to save and civilize barbarous tribes, whatever be the cost, or is prepared to let loose upon them the barbarous passions of civilized men. If the former, warfare must be conducted at the Cape by British troops under British control and at the cost of the British Treasury. If the latter, it is essential to this country's good name that irresponsibility should be established by separation. ^ This was at the same time the essence of trusteeship and of paternalism. The sentiment came from a man who could write 50 "I do not like the American people or any other people", that of a series of dangerous courses the 1832 Reform Bill was the least dangerous,-^" and that the American Civil War 52 was a lesson to all in the evils of democracy. It betrays the paternalist dilemma that will provide protection but not respect. The importance of Taylor in the Colonial Office has frequently been ignored. He had a considerable influence on three permanent under secretaries, Stephen, Merivale and 36 Rogers, and a much larger number of secretaries of state, as well as helping in the training of two future permanent 5k 55 under secretaries, Herbert^ and Meade, y and an important principal assistant under secretary, Edward Fairfield. While the Colonial Office officials had a very considerable influence on the day-to-day running of the Office and on the continuity of policy over a long period, a truly effective and doctrinaire Colonial Secretary like the third Earl Grey could have a greater influence on the direction of future policy. The examination of Grey must also begin with Emancipation. Just before Emancipation, Grey, then Viscount Howick, was parliamentary under secretary to Lord Goderich at the Colonial Office in his father's administration. It was then he first produced the idea that was to have most effect on colonial labour policy - the idea of the direct tax. He proposed the imposition of a land tax on the 56 emancipated negroes. When his view failed to find favour (and Taylor for one opposed it), he resigned. When he became Colonial Secretary in 18^-6 his chance of putting his ideas on direct taxation into practice had arrived. His creed was based on familiar principles - the.responsibility of the British imperium, the need for labour based on taxation, the Pax Britannica, public works, and the need for a total amalgamation of the races. Taxation was for him the great solution, "the motive 37 to exertion",^ the stimulant that tropical indolence required When Governor Sir William Winniett of the Gold Coast expatiate 58 in a despatch of May 22, 1850,y on the necessity of forced labour, Grey's reaction was one of suspicion. Instead he saw to it that Winniett's successor secured the co-operation of the chiefs of the Gold Coast to a poll tax of one shilling on every man, woman and child. This symbolizes Grey's policy But before the Gold Coast case arose he had already begun the application of his ideas in Ceylon and Natal. His concept of the stimulant was an old one. Hugh Murray in his Enquiries Historical and Moral Respecting the  Character of Nations and the Progress of Society (Edinburgh, 1808)^ had postulated that the optimum condition of progress occurs where the environment is neither too. hard nor too easy and so stimulates the right quantity of labour for the pursuit of the arts. He answered Malthus by arguing that population pressure could present a necessary and beneficial challenge to labour. In a celebrated despatch to Governor Torrington in Ceylon Grey expressed this view in terms of the colonial situation: In all European countries, the necessity of supplying their daily wants is, to the labouring classes, a sufficient motive to exertion; indeed the difficulty which they experience in obtaining the means of a comfortable subsistence is so great that it has generally been considered (as it always ought to be) the great object for 38 the Governments of these countries, in their financial arrangements, to avoid aggravating this difficulty by the imposition of taxes calculated to enhance the cost of subsistence. But the case is very different in tropical climates, where the population is very scanty in proportion to the extent of the territory; where the soil, as I have already observed, readily yields a sub sistence in return for very little labour and where clothing, fuel, and lodging, such as are required, are obtained very easily. In such circumstances there can be but little motive to exertion, to men satisfied with an abundant supply of their mere physical wants; and accordingly experience proves that it is the disposition of the races of men by which these countries are generally inhabited, to sink into an easy and listless mode of life, quite incompatible with any high degree of civilization. In Ceylon too he promoted his idea of public works in the Road Ordinance of 1847. It enacted that every male inhabit ant of the Island between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five years should be required to perform six days labour on road construction and maintenance, or commute the service for a payment, the value of which varied, but was nowhere more than three shillings. These roads were required to enable the planters to transport their coffee from the high lands of Ceylon to the coast for export. The Road Ordinance imposed in effect a direct tax. Fear of its effect when it came into operation in 1849 contributed to the insurrection of that year. But by far the most significant area for the imposition 39 of Grey's ideas was South Africa. There the annexation of Natal in 1843 and of British Kaffraria to the Cape in 1847 brought British administration into contact with the Bantu on a scale hitherto unknown in Cape Colony. Sir Harry Smith was sent to pursue a similar policy to that effected in New Zealand, for ....although no doubt there are some important points of difference in the character of the natives of New Zealand and of the Kafirs, yet in the main, human nature is everywhere the same, and the latter are far less completely barbarous than the former were forty or fifty years ago.°l Like Merivale, and unlike such radicals as Roebuck, Grey regarded the destruction of indigenous peoples as unthink able, even if it were possible, which in the case of the Bantu was soon obviously not the case. For my own part I confess I should grieve to think that the ultimate occupation of Southern Africa by a civilized population were only to be accomplished, like that of North America, by the gradual destruction of the native races before the advancing tide of a white occupation of the soil. I believe that, instead of this, the civilization of the Black, and the ultimate amalgamation of the two races, is not impracticable, if the superior power of this country is wisely and generously used to enforce on both sides a respect for each other's rights and to foster all those germs-of improvement which are already showing themselves among the aboriginal population."2 Amalgamation and respect were indeed an unusually idealistic combination, doomed to failure when the true size of the African population became evident, and when the diamonds of Kimberley and the gold of the Rand created their insatiable thirst for African labour from all over Southern Africa. But given this view it was natural that Grey was opposed to the idea of reserves. He proposed for the settlement of Natal a large number of locations scattered amongst the European population. By this means the Europeans would be supplied with local reservoirs of labour, while Africans would be greatly and gently encouraged to enter the European economy and indeed way of life. Like Merivale he prescribed education in the habits of civilized life. The result he envisaged was to become a familiar shibboleth of the civilizing mission school -the growing demand for the manufactured articles of Europe which would increase the trade and revenue of the colony and the wealth of the Mother Country. Needless to say, a direct tax completed the picture of the African inhabitants of Natal being led along the road to civilization. Both the nature of the tax and the principle of the locations began the debate between Grey and Shepstone, the diplomatic agent who was to become Natal's first Native Administrator. Shepstone insisted that the tax of seven shillings which was first imposed in 1849 should be a hut tax rather than Grey's preference for a cattle or land tax. Moreover, Shepstone disagreed with Grey's location policy. He disliked the idea of amalgamation, and held that Africans 41 could only be administered through their chiefs by an entirely separate administration on reserves. The conflict of the "imperial factor" and the "man on the spot", already of long standing, was carried over into the establishment of a native policy. Grey's creed was a surprising mixture of severe paternal ism and idealism. In a despatch to Sir Harry Smith, November 30, 1849,^ he regretted that the Natal tax was not high enough; had it been imposed earlier, it could then have been increased. He went on to suggest that the compulsory labour levied in lieu of tax should be deployed on road works. On the other hand he asserted that he looked to the day when there would be uniform ity of taxation for both Europeans and Africans. Such a hope was, to use Merivale's word, chimerical, but Grey's principle of direct taxation of native peoples became the norm in most parts of the dependent empire. A further application of Grey's tax.was in the Mauritius Labour Ordinance of 1847, designed to meet the problems created by the influx of indentured labourers to the Island. . Since Grey was also important in the establishment of indentured labour on a regular footing, it is now necessary to survey the institution of indentured labour and its effect on labour attitudes. The.indentured labour principle developed from the practice of indenturing European servants for work in the American and 42 West Indian colonies in the seventeenth century.In the eighteenth century it had largely given way to slavery - it had been attacked both on the grounds of expense and of humanity. It was resurrected now as part of the slavery and free labour debate. As early as 1829 the French island of Bourbon in the Indian Ocean had received labourers from 65 India. J In 1834 immigration began to Mauritius. Later British Guiana and to a lesser extent Jamaica and Trinidad were to participate. It became in fact part of the general upsurge of migration of the period - Portuguese from Madeira, Scotch and Irish, Germans and Maltese, liberated slaves from the squadrons on the West African coast, and Chinese through out the entire Pacific area. The Chinese indentured labour system reveals .very well the fashion in which indentured labour appeared as a substitute for slavery. It began - like slavery - surreptitiously, from several ports, of which Amoy was the most important. The first full-scale operations were undertaken by the French for Bourbon in 1845 and by the Spanish for Cuba in 1847. Like slavery it swiftly set up a large network of vested interests - British, American, French, Spanish and Dutch shipping interests, agents in the foreign communities of Canton, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese business men in Singapore, Penang, San Francisco. It created abuses - like kidnapping - which forced the Chinese authorities to recognise its existence and attempt to regulate it from the 1850's (it had hitherto been illegal). The credit-ticket system had already produced the widespread serfdom of debt-peonage, even more intolerable than the system that had prevailed in South America. Indentured labour moreover helped to create the Chinese xenophobia for Europeans, fanned by the communities in Shanghai, Canton and the other treaty ports, that became such an important feature of twentieth century Chinese history. It created a reciprocal xenophobia firstly in Australia and later in British Columbia and California, that produced first of all control and then exclusion. Chinese were scattered by it throughout the Pacific area (the continuation of an age-old migration) and into such far-flung places as the silver mines of Peru and the plantat ions of Cuba and British Guiana. Many fell out of sight of the European conscience, but that conscience was powerfully aroused by the Rand Chinese immigration (of which more in Chapter 2) and the indentured system in Western Samoa as late as the early nineteen twenties.^ But to return to the Indian indentured labour that had actually preceded the Chinese, the first burst of ill-controlled migration of Indians, high mortality rates, and accusations of inhumanity not surprisingly soon raised the cry of a new slavery. In 1838 Brougham in the Lords attacked the traffic, and shortly the Times followed suit. ' From 1839 to 1843 the migration was banned. Meanwhile, emigration from Sierra Leone was permitted from 1840 and Wakefield produced a variant on his 44 systematic colonization ideas. Immigration from Africa ought to be encouraged, supervised by a public authority, and finan ced from a tax on land in the West Indies. Inevitably, the labour question became inextricably bound up with the question of the West Indian monopoly. In Peel's administration, Stanley at the Colonial Office began agitating for a renewal of Indian immigration. Russell too believed that the colonies ought to be bolstered by immigrat ion rather than protection. By 1843, West African, Indian and Chinese schemes under the supervision of responsible government officers, were in the air. The West African was only a partial success, the Chinese a failure, but the Indian was to become the pattern for the rest of the century. Mauritius became the symbol of the good and evil of indentured labour. Mauritius was helped through the post-emancipation difficulties by the immigrants, but on the other hand was provided with a large vagrant problem. It was to combat this, and the habit of employee and employer of frequently changing jobs and workers respectively, that Grey made his new taxation proposals. He suggested to the Gover nor that there ought to be a tax on immigrants not under con tract and a stamp duty on contracts. These were incorporated in Ordinance 22 of 1847, along with provision for a duty on departures of less than five years' residence, and an increase r o in the penalty for absence from work. 45 The equalisation of the sugar duties made the conflict between slave and free labour a genuine one, in that slave-grown sugar from Cuba and South America could now compete equally with West Indian sugar. The colonies seemed to lose all round. The absence of immigrants raised cries of distress; the cost of the immigrants helped the colonies to the financial crashes and bankruptcies of 1847-48. Despite imperial aid,^ the colonies, thoroughly disillusioned, became extremely reluctant to bear the cost of repatriation. Grey espoused the principle of permanent transportation - of complete village communities if need be - but this was not acceptable to India House. It is not surprising, that Stephen at one time expressed himself "completely baffled" by,the whole 70 labour issue. What is important about the resurgence of indentured labour is the attitude of mind that, even after the end of slavery, labour could be drawn on from a reservoir and returned at will, subject to restrictions and controls. From the time of Grey onwards the migration was firmly established. It was extended to other nations. When the Palmerston government wished to stop the French taking free African labour from West Africa in 1858 - because it looked too much like slavery - Sir Frederic Ro-gers was sent to Paris to negotiate for Indian indentured labour. As Rogers himself said, the charge of quasi-slavery was simply transfeireid from 71 the Foreign Office to the India:; Office.' Thereafter, as 46 well as to French possessions, Mauritius, British Guiana, and the West Indies, Indians would go to Natal and East Africa, Chinese to the Straits Settlements, Borneo and South Africa. A whole range of migrations of increasing eccentricity would 72 73 be proposed - Arabs to Rhodesia, Assyrians to Borneo, Jews to Uganda^ - before indentured labour was finally discredited between the two world wars* The migrants who stayed contributed to the plural societies that Russell and Stephen in the beginning had feared as one of the results of indentured labour. As an interesting footnote to transport history, the movements of large numbers of indentured labourers helped to keep sailing ships alive at a time when all other 75 passengers were travelling by steam. y On the issue of indentured labour the Colonial Office and the Colonial Reformers could find some common ground. Moreover, both Grey and the reformers reveal a basic Victorian dilemma. Grey was a convinced free trader at the same time as he espoused metropolitan responsibility and social control of labour. The Colonial Reformers on the other hand attacked the notion of responsibility and demanded self-government all round (social freedom), while creating the systematic colonization plans which denied the free market in land sales. The Colonial Reformers have usually received a good press. They normally took up the usual Radical position that there must be no more extensions of territory and devolution of existing 47 colonies, but they drove their principles to an absurd, if logical, conclusion. They refused to see any difference between the Cape and Canada. Above all they insisted that it was an unavoidable law that indigenous peoples must disappear. Roebuck attacked the humanitarians for their fear of colonial rule (i.e. local rule). The lesson of history was that the savage must disappear in face of the relentless advance of the superior race, and it was futile to talk of justice and humanity when confronted with such an immutable law. They failed to see that the lesson of history was no iron law, but simply Merivale's "ferocity of the zealot" and ''cupidity of the adventurer". The humanit arians did see this and before the arguments of Cobden, Glad stone, Roebuck, Adderley, Wakefield, Molesworth, and Hume, they clung to the view that was later to be rationalised into a full-blown doctrine of trusteeship. Their tragedy was that the activities of the Boers on the "turbulent frontier" led them ever further into commitments and warfare. Sixteen years after Grey's publication of his Colonial  Policy, CB. Adderley (parliamentary under secretary at the Colonial Office, 1866-68 and chairman of the celebrated Select Committee of 1865) published his Review of the Colonial Policy  of Lord John Russell's Administration by Earl Grey and of  Subsequent Colonial History. Needless to say, he was highly critical of the imperial government's paternalist attitude and 48 was sceptical of the civilizing influence of direct taxation. Of Natal he said that "better relations with the natives 77 cannot be expected while the Colony is so kept in childhood". The rest of his argument can be expressed in three basic beliefs - that English colonies could only thrive with English 78 freedom;' that Crown colonies were not extensions of Empire, but merely occupations for use; that it was neither necessary nor possible to attempt to civilize indigenous peoples. Adderley's most damaging criticism of Grey was that his policy faltered between the only two possibilities in South Africa -control of native peoples through their chiefs or the destruct ion of the chiefs and tribes altogether,^^(as institutions that is). Adderley was right - although as we have seen Grey's policy had been obstructed by Shepstone - and it was a faltering that was to continue into the twentieth century. The ground work of a colonial labour policy was formed in the shifting sands of the conflict between the elements symbolized by Grey and Adderley. Late nineteenth century colonial attitudes towards labour reflected all the conflicts enumerated above: humanitarianism or severe paternalism, forced labour or free labour supplement ed by itomi grant indentured labour, direct stimulants or indirect stimulants, reserves or no reserves, maintenance of tribes or destruction of tribes, imperial responsibility or colonial freedom. And suffusing all were notions of the dignity of labour, of labour as a great civilising force, of labour as k9 the key to economic progress, as the principal prop of an imperial policy. These ideas and these conflicts had their greatest expression in South Africa, and were passed on, as will be seen, in particularly acute form to Rhodesia. 50 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1. 1 In his speech on Fox's East India Bill, Dec. 1, 1783? quoted in G.R. Mellor, British Imperial Trusteeship, 1783-1850, (London, 195D, p.22. 2 The impeachment of Warren Hastings, May 28, 1794. 3 John Morley, Burke (London, 1888), p.187. 4 Quoted in I.M. Cumpston, Indians Overseas in British  Territories, 1834-1854, (London, 1953), p.2. 5 Mellor, op.cit. 6 Sir James Stephen, 1789-1859, son of James Stephen, abolitionist but otherwise Tory die-hard; called to bar, 1811; legal adviser to the Colonial Office, 1813-1836; Permanent Under Secretary, 1836-1847; Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, 1849-7 Edward Fairfield, 1845-1897, assistant under secretary, Colonial Office, 1892-1897; principal assistant under secretary, 1897. His complicity in the Jameson Raid is well known, and is amply evidenced in the so-called "missing telegrams" printed in J.G; Lockhart & CM. Woodhouse, Rhodes (London, 1963), appendix. 8 Extract printed in George Bennett, The Concept of Empire, Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947 (London, 1962), pp. 139-140. 9 "I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'breadi bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism.... My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial state smen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus populat ion, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists." Quoted in V.I. Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, 1968), p.74. Also in Bernard Semmel",.; Imperial ism and Social Reform (London, i960), p.16. 10 Fraser's Magazine, December, 1849. 51 11 For a discussion of the monogenesis and polygenesis arguments, see Curtin, op.cit. 12 Thomas Arnold, Inaugural Lecture on the Study of Modern  History, (Oxford, 1841). • 13 See Semmel, op.cit., chapter III for a consideration of the Social Darwinism of Kidd and Pearson. 14 See particularly Benjamin Kidd's-The Control of the  Tropics, (New York, 1898). 15 Karl Pearson's ideas on "Socialism and Natural Selection" and on eugenics are contained in a large number of works. See particularly The Grammar of Science, (London, 1900). 16 Alfred Milner, 1854-1925, educ. Tubingen, King's College, London, and Balliol College, Oxford; called to bar, 1881; assistant editor of Pall Mall Gazette under Stead, 1883; joint secretary of University Extension Society in White-chapel; private secretary of Goschen, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1884-1889; director general of accounts in Egypt, l8o9-l892; chairman of Board of Inland Revenue, 1892-1897; High Commissioner in South Africa and Governor of Cape (Later of Transvaal), 1897-1905; Colonial Secretary, 1919-1921. 17 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, (London, 1869). 18 Lockhart & Woodhouse, op.cit., p.68, the Rhodes quotation and the Dictionary of National Biography for the Milner (it was a diary entry). See also, Cecil Headlam, The  Milner Papers (2 vols., London, 1933). 19 Herman Merivale, 1806-1874, educ. Oriel and Trinity Colleges, Oxford; called to bar, 1832; Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, 1837-1847; assistant under secretary, Colonial Office, 1847; permanent under secretary, 1848-1859; permanent under secretary, India Office, 1859. 20 The recent upsurge in interest in Celtic history and archaeology is interesting historiographically. It dates entirely from the discrediting of the exaggerated views of Saxon destiny. 21 This incident is mentioned in the Dictionary of National  Biography entry on Eyre. 52 22 Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire (London, 1968). 23 For this interesting incident, see Keith Felling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, (London, 1944), pp.17-31. 24 vid. inf., Chapter 2, pp.82-84. 25 Eyre's brutal suppression of the Jamaican insurrection of 1865 is well-known. For years after his recall he was hounded by the humanitarian Jamaica Committee, whom Carlyle called "a knot of nigger philanthropists". 26 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (New York, 1967). 27 Sir Henry George Grey, Viscount Howick, third Earl Grey, 1802-1894; educ. Trinity, Cambridge; entered House of Commons as Whig, 1826; parliamentary under secretary for the colonies, 1831-1833; secretary for war, 1835-1839; secretary of state for the colonies, 1846-1852. 28 Sydney Olivier, first Baron, 1859-1943; educ. Corpus Christi, Oxford; entered Colonial Office, 1882; Fabian, 1885; • honourary secretary of the Fabians, 1886-1889; Colonial Secretary, British Honduras, 1890-1891; Auditor General, Leeward Islands, 1895-1896; Colonial Secretary, Jamaica, 1900-1904; Governor of Jamaica, 1.907-1913; permanent under secretary to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1913-1917; assistant comptroller and auditor of the exchequer, 1917-1920; Secretary of State for India, 1924. 29 For a comment on Robert William Hay see the Autobiography of Sir Henry Taylor, p.231. 30 Herman Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, (London, 1841), 2 vols. 31 Merivale,.op.cit., Vol. II, p.l8l. 32 ibid., p.201. 33 ibid., p.l8l. 34 Arnold, op.cit., p.39. 35 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism; a Study,(London, 1902), Chapter 4, Imperialism and Lower. Races. 36 Sydney Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour, (London, 1906), passim. 37 Merivale, Lectures XVIII and XIX. 38 Merivale, Lecture XVII, p.176. 53 39 Meriyale, Lecture XVIII, pp.153-154. 40 Paul Knaplund, Sir James Stephen and the British Colonial  System, (Madison, 1953), p.20. 41 Sir Henry Taylor, 1800-1886; educ. by his father, an ardent admirer of Godwin; entered Colonial Office, 1824; refused offer to succeed Staphen, 1847; responsible to the secretary of state alone, 1859. 42 Taylor, op.cit., p. 3if. 43 Taylor to Elliot, June 12, 1868 in Edward Dowden (ed.), The Correspondence of Sir Henry Taylor (London, 1888), pp.284-285* Two more interesting insights into the mind of Taylor - and indeed into the Victorian mind - arise in two other letters in the same volume. In one, p.302, he argues (1870) that corporal punishment does not brutal-ise the public mind, but instead provides it with a sense of moral satisfaction. In another letter, p.396, he attacks vehemently (1881) the practice of vivisection. 44 Taylor, Autobiography, p.265. 45 ibid., p.127. 46 ibid., pp.127-129. 47 But he wished to throw off Canada, the damnosa hereditas, altogether, because of the dangers of war with the United States. ibid., p.234. See also Taylor to Earl Grey, May 6, 1852, Correspondence, pp.199-200. 48 Taylor, Correspondence, p.199. 49 Taylor, Autobiography, p.236. 50 ibid., p.231. This was in reply to a letter from Merivale who had expressed "American partialities", preferring an organisation constructed to an organisation constructively evolved. 51 ibid., p.222. 52 ibid., p.223. 53 Sir Frederic Rogers, Lord Blachford, 1811-1889; educ. at Oriel, Oxford; friend and pupil of Newman and Hurrell Froude; sympathetic to tractarian movement; leader writer on the Times;. helped to found the Guardian, 1846; Comm issioner for Emigration,; mission to Paris re. indentured labour, 1858-1859; permanent under secretary at the Colonial Office, 1860-1871. 54 54 Sir Robert George Wyndham Herbert, 1831-1905, grandson of First Earl of Carnarvon; educ. Balliol; private-, secretary to W.E. Gladstone, 1855; Colonial Secretary, Queensland, 1858; assistant secretary, Board of Trade, 1868; assistant under secretary, Colonial Office, 1870-; permanent under secretary, 1871-1892. 55 Sir Robert Meade, 1835-1898, permanent under secretary, Colonial Office, 1892-1897. 56 For his proposals on Emancipation, see Henry George, third Earl Grey, The Colonial Policy of Lord John  Russell's Administration, (London, 1853), Vol. I, p.76, Taylor, Autobiography, p.125, and W.P. Morrell, The Colonial Policy of Peel and Russell, (Oxford, 1930), p.201. 57 Grey, op.cit., Vol. II, p.260. 58 C.O. 96/18. Quoted in Curtin, op.cit., p.454. 59 Ibid., p.248. 60 Grey, op.cit., Vol. I, p.8l. 61 Grey, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 204. 62 Ibid., p.253. 63 Printed as an appendix to Grey, op.cit., Vol. II, pp.494-508. 64 A good description of this is in Epic Williams, Capitalism  and Slavery, (Chapel Hill, 1944). 65 For Indian indentured labour, see Cumpston, op.cit., Mellor, op.cit., and Morrell, op.cit. 66 P.C. Campbell, Chinese Coolie ••Emigration to Countries  within the British Empire, (London, 1923). - • 67 Cumpston, op.cit., pp.19 & 22. 68 Grey, op.cit., Vol. I, pp.71-75. Grey to Governor Gomm of Mauritius, Sept. 29, 1846. " I am of opinion that, instead of encouraging the Indian labourers to enter, before they arrive at Mauritius, into contracts of labour for several years for particular employers, and then endeavouring by stringent regulations to enforce the performance of these contracts, under 55 circumstances in which it is in the interest of the immigrants to break them; the true policy would be to adopt regulations, of which the effect would be, to make it the decided and obvious interest of the immigrants to work steadily and industriously for the same employers for a considerable time " He goes on to connect his ideas for Mauritius with his proposals for immediate emancipation and taxation of the slaves of 1833. 69 Two loans were offered by the imperial government -one of £200,000 to British Guiana and Trinidad in 1846, and another of £500,000 to the West Indies in 1848. Both Grey and Russell regarded aided immigr ation as a quid pro quo for the equalisation of the sugar duties. 70 Cumpston, op.cit., p.89. 71 G.E. Marindin (ed.), Letters of Frederic Rogers, Lord  Blachford, (London, 1896), p.171. 72 vid. inf., pp. 245-252. 73 K.G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule, North  Borneo, 1881-1946, (Singapore, 1958). P.154. The Assyrians eventually went to British GUiana. I am purposely blurring the distinction between indentured, labour and permanent migrant labour because it was so often blurred in practice. Only the Transvaal Chinese operation was carried out with such thoroughness (mainly by confining the Chinese to compounds) that there was a hundred per cent return. 74 In 1903, Joseph Chamberlain suggested Uganda to the Jewish leader, Herzl, as a place of settlement to which he could lead the Jews from the persecution of Eastern Europe. 75 E.H.H. Archibald, Travellers by Sea, (London, H.M.S.O., 1962), p.27. Note that migrant labourers were regarded and priced as freight. 76 Hansard, 3rd. series Vol. CXVI, 1851, pp.273-275. Roebuck advocated that colonists of superior intelligence ought to be planted in Kaffraria. To cries of NOi NOJ from members he said, "It was absurd to say you could attain the end without incurring the consequences...... The end justifies the means." 77 Adderley, op.cit., p.186. Peel in 1849 had described this reverence for the colonial legislature as "a high and haughty spirit of liberty". Taylor (Autobiography, p.269) described this sentiment as preposterous. Taylor had no patience with West Indian colonial legislatures in particular. See Morrell, op.cit., p.286. When Palmerston turned out Russell's administration in 1852, Adderley was waiting with a motion of censure on the government's colonial policy and was confident of victory. Palmer ston forestalled him. Grey was sorry he had no chance of defending himself. 57 CHAPTER 2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN BACKGROUND It is impossible to interpret nineteenth century British history in terms of an oscillation in policy of two alternat ing parties in power. Certainly from the 1860s, it is not possible to discover a pro-imperial party ranged against an anti-imperial one.^ There were important differences in policy, such as the successive attempts at federation in South Africa, culminating in Kimberley (with help from the Boers) reversing Carnarvon. In India, the successive viceroyalties of Lytton, Ripon, Dufferin and Lansdowne exhibited considerable reversals of policy. But what is more remarkable is the accommodation between the parties. Each chartered two imperial companies. Neither a Tory like Curzon nor a Whig like Minto could consider ceding any real power to Indians. In South Africa, Rhodes, while always distrusting "the imperial factor", found he could work almost equally happily with a Liberal Imperialist or a Unionist government. When Campbell-Bannerman set out to reverse Unionist policy in South Africa, he was not pursuing a little Englander policy, but simply a different sort of Empire. All this served to obscure the importance of the native peoples. In India Congress was not given sufficient notice: Curzon was prophesying its total downfall at the opening of the century when his own acts - and particularly the Partition 58 of Bengal - would provide it with effective rallying ground.^ In South Africa the problems of Bantu, Boer and Briton escalated, but it was the Boer-Briton confrontation that exploded, and in doing so served to obscure the Bantu problem. The fact that Africans remained so docile while Europeans fought each other, unfortunately fostered the impression - aided too by their subsequent unwillingness to go to work r that they were of little political import ance. •." The Liberal Government swept to power in 1906 saw the triumph of devolution. In 1906 Balfour revealed once more that the opposition to imperial responsibility had always cut across party lines. He argued that If any one Colony insisted upon enslaving its hewers of wood and drawers of water, it would have a perfect right to do so, and to request Great Britain or the colonies, if they interfered, to mind their own business, as it was only ^ exercising its right of self-government. Balfour was providing a hypothetical case that few in that period believed would ever come about. J. Ramsay MacDonald, writing in 1907, argued in favour of South African Federation because he believed that the Cape would never give up its "native policy" and that with federation, the state and its white population would be more civilized, and would ultimately extend the Cape policy to the rest of the country.^ This helps to explain why W.P. Schreiner, no less than a former 59 Cape premier, who saw the dangers and led a delegation to 7 reveal them, was ignored. And so the Liberal Party, remem bering its past colonial radicalism, rushed into South African devolution. While its left hand encouraged the rise of democracy and social justice at home, its right hand denied them abroad. What the Boer War had obscured to the Liberal Government, to Balfour and to MacDonald, was Adam Smith's concept of the conflict between defence and opulence. This conflict has o been seen as the key to all South African labour policy, and it has never been more obvious than in the present day. At first the problem of defence was external. Hottentots and Bushmen were never seen as a real defence problem. They simply provided further evidence for the "anthropologists" laws of the disappearance of the savage races. It is ironic that the Cape 49th Ordinance of 1828 permitted the entry of Bantu to work, while the more celebrated 50th of the same year gave the Hottentots equality before the law. The arrival of the Bantu to work combined with the annexations of Natal and British Kaffraria turned the external defence of the Boer commandoes into an internal one. It took time for its magnitude to be fully appreciated, just as the Ehodesian pioneers arriving in Mashonaland in 1890 grossly underestimated the African population because of the scattered nature of the small Shoha settlements. 60 Grey's Natal policy has already been reviewed in its wider imperial context. It is now possible to add a fresh consideration to the policy of small reserves and assimilation - defence. Small scattered locations would inevitably break up the tribes. In the future the policy of assimilation would proceed side-by-side with defensive measures. In 1855 Sir George Grey in his opening address to the Cape Parliament announced that the Africans were to become a part of ourselves, with a common faith and common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to our revenue; in short a source of strength and wealth to this colony, such as Providence designed them to be.9 Yet at the same time defensive restrictions were placed on the mobility of African labour. In 1853 the right of taking out a pass to visit a friend was withdrawn. In 1856 a central office .of registration was to be set up at King-williamstown. In 1838 six acts were passed to control immigration. One very revealing act was described as "An act for preventing Colonial Fingoes and certain other subjects of her Majesty /"the Fingoes were a Bantu tribe from the North-East Cape7 from being mistaken for Kafirs, and thereby harassed and aggrieved". As the Transkeian territories were added to the Cape, the pass laws for immigrants ceased to apply, and instead their African inhabitants came under the jurisdiction 61 of the Masters and Servants Laws. The tradition of Masters and Servants legislation making breach of civil contracts a criminal offence was firmly established in 1856, based on an earlier Masters, Servants and Apprentices Ordinance of 1841. It should be noted that this sort of defensive legis lation was also the norm in Britain for most of the nineteenth century. The combination laws may have been repealed in 1825, but any activity outside a narrow area of wage and hours negotiations still carried criminal liability. The very phrase Masters and Servants was not abandoned in Britain until the 1875 Employers and Workmen Act. While the problems are obviously very different, the motives behind the legislation were by no means dissimilar. The fact that domestic and colonial policy diverged widely in the twentieth century help to confirm the thesis that "Imperialism and the Rise of Labour" (to quote the title of Halevy's study) were incompatible. While Labour sentiment was often imperialist - witness some of the Fabians, and J.H. Thomas's celebrated remark to the officials of the Colonial Office, "I'm here to see there's no mucking about with the British Empire""^- it provided an example at home that was not lost on the nationalists abroad. From the l850's onwards, as the demand for labour in South Africa increased, legislation had to be a compromise between defence and the "motive to exertion". Natal reveals this well. In 1854 the Natal Native Affairs Commission advocated an increase in tax, reduction in the size of locations and exemptions from tax for labourers. In 1855 an Ordinance forbade Africans from squatting on Crown or private land; in 1857 Africans in employment were made exempt from tax; but the tax was not raised from Grey's figure until 1875 when it went up to fourteen shillings. Indentured Indians were introduced between i860 and 1866. There was more Indian immigration from 1874, and Indian population figures rose rapidly until the end of the century. Meanwhile in the Transvaal labour was regarded by the Boers as a tribute to conquerors. Here in the Natal legislation and the Transvaal attitudes we already have the precedents for the Rhodesian experience. And all this before the appearance of the large capitalist undertakings of the diamond and gold mines. The mines are only of interest to this thesis insofar as they provided competition for Rhodesia later in the century. In a sense the Rhodesian experience was more akin to that in South Africa before the discoveries of mineral wealth, for labour deployment in Rhodesia was always extremely scattered, and never highly concentrated as in -Kimberley or on the Rand. With the growth of the mines however, we do have a great increase in the importance of two factors. Firstly, wants became a greater stimulant to labour - chiefs sent out their men "to earn a gun". Secondly, the recruiting net was cast ever wider. A table"^ of new registrations at the Kimberley 63 and de Beers Mines in 1884 best reveals this: Shangaans British Basutos Sekukuni Basutos Zulus Portuguese Zulus Bakhatlas Matabele Colonials Bakwenas Batlapings Swazis Bamangwatos Barolongs Transvaal Basutos Others 681 195 2215 813 446 36 120 375 33 277 11 56 115 47. Already the labour network stretched throughout Southern Africa, into the furthest corners of Bechuanaland, into the South West of what was to become Southern Rhodesia, and into Mozambique. The opening of the gold mines cast the net even further, and introduced the practice of organised recruitment. As the need for labour on railway construction and the development of towns increased, increasingly severe measures were taken to ensure that squatting on Crown land was not a comfortable activity. In 1869> Cape Colony imposed a rent of ten shillings per hut on Crown land. In 1884, a rent of one pound per hut was levied in Natal. The 1876 Cape Location Act was designed against the similar practice on private land. A tax was imposed on landowners for tenants not in bona fide employment. . In 1880, the brief British administration in the Transvaal repealed the differential Boer taxation, and imposed a uniform tax of ten shillings. These were the stimulants, but the continuing need for defence is revealed in the strict vagrancy law of 1879 at the Cape, which greatly discouraged the movement of Africans, and therefore impeded their efforts to find work. In the l890's the labour thirst of the gold mines of the Rand saw the establishment of greater organisation in recruit ment and distribution. In 1893 a Native Labour Commissioner was appointed; in I896 a Native Labour Supply Association was set up; in 1895 recruitment in Portuguese East Africa was successfully centralised; in l889> 1896 and 1897 there were combinations of employers to reduce wages; and the 1895 pass law by which the employer kept the pass during the period of service was designed against desertions. Taxation continued to play a vital role. A hut tax levied in the Transvaal in 1895 was in effect a poll tax. In I898 there was a new departure in policy when these taxes were levied for the first, time in towns. The Orange Free State already had a poll tax of ten shillings, and in 1893 and I898 enacted squatters laws limiting squatters to five families on private land. Despite the organisation of labour recruiting, the evils of private touting continued, and the dispute between the farmers and the mining community - which will become very familiar in Rhodesia -became increasingly acerbic as demand increased. In the Cape the Location Law was amended in 1892, increasing the tax on landowners to one pound for every male African not 65 in employment. Many were turned off the land as a result. In 1894 the Glen Grey Act of the Cape widened the explicit dependence of labour on taxation. A tax of ten shillings was imposed on all those not in work - labour for three months provided exemption for a year; continuous labour for three years gave exemption for life. The Act also encouraged Africans to take up land by quit-rent under the European system of survey and individual tenure, another attempted attack on communalism. Rhodes in introducing the bill into the Cape Parliament openly asserted that it was hoped the measure 12 would cause an improvement in the labour supply. In fact the labour tax sections of the Glen Grey Act never worked and were repealed eleven years later, but the philosophy behind them is important to subsequent South African and Rhodesian labour policy. After the Boer War, South Africa experienced a dearth of labour. The War had diverted labourers elsewhere or kept them at home; the army had paid high wages to scouts, messengers, labourers during the War, so providing the means to stay at home for a while; and the mine owners took their first step towards encouraging labour by combining to reduce wages. In 1904 the Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission"1"^ revealed the nat ure of the debate in the Transvaal mining community regarding the encouragement of African labour or its replacement by European labour. Defence has been stressed as an important 66 part of South African native labour policy from its beginnings: we now find an interesting variation on this theme. In his evidence before the Commission one witness, Rudd, said Could Mr. Kidd replace the 200,000 native workers by 100,000 unskilled whites, they would simply hold the Government of the country in the hollow of their hand. I prefer to see the more intellectual section of the community at the helm The Native is at present, and I hope will long remain, a useful intermediary between the white employer and employee. ^ The Africans were here seen as a buffer between the capital ists and their fear of democracy. It was a question of lesser evils - the Scylla and Charybdis of South African policy. The introduction of Chinese labour was the expedient adopted to solve the problem of the refusal of Africans to work and the refusal of the mine owners to use Europeans instead. A total of 60,000 Chinese arrived on the Rand before they were all returned by 1912. The project helped the Unionist Government to its fall in 1905; the attempted confinement of so many Chinese in compounds and the result ant highly publicised evils of gambling, male prostitution and violence helped to discredit the whole system of indent ured labour. By this time, however, the much-vaunted free 15 labour market had been destroyed. At a critical moment, African labour had been undercut by the Chinese, who, although paid more than Africans, were obliged to stay longer and were 67 more effectively under the owners' control. In South Africa, Chinese indentured labour confirmed an established pattern of migrant labour. In Britain, the Chinese labour issue was seen not as an attack upon the interest of African labour but as an attack upon the interest of white labour, not so much as a humanitarian issue but 'as a conflict between Unionist Imper ialism and Liberal Imperialism. With the growing power of the European unions before and after the First World War, defensive provisions loomed ever larger in South African labour policy, until to-day the Nationalist Government is attempting the well-nigh impossible task of returning Africans to their Bantustans, glorified reserves. . In Adam Smith's conflict of defence and opulence, defence has become pre-eminent. For the sake of unity South African labour policy has been briefly reviewed over some hundred years of its history. It is impossible to understand the Rhodesian experience with out reference to South Africa. Rhodesia's ordinances were largely based on those of the Cape and of Natal, her administ rators were from South Africa, the native commissioners were invariably from the Natal native administration. Under the High Commissioner for South Africa, Rhodesia was. treated administratively as an extension of South Africa; as the brainchild of Rhodes this was an inevitable mental attitude, particularly as federation or union with South Africa was 68 throughout the pre-First World War period a distinct probab ility. For the duration of the Central African Federation, Rhodesia looked briefly North and East. In recent years the old orientation has re-established itself. Although the attitude was uppermost, it is the purpose of this thesis to establish the different conditions that prevailed in Rhodesia, and above all the nature of the power exercised by the imperial authority over the British South Africa Company. In his evidence to the Transvaal Labour Commission, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick said I started with and clung to the belief that we had an unlimited supply ^~of labour_7 in Central Africa if we chose to~extend our organisation and incur the expense, and I several times discussed with him /""Rhodes^ "the possibility of pushing on tjhe Cape""of Cairo railway with the object of pushing up the supply. ° The push to the North has been seen as the search for a golden Eldorado, as a pursuit for the further expansion of the Saxon race. Here is some evidence-at least that another commodity was sought, a commodity required to exploit the known riches of Kimberley and the Rand: labour. Labour recruiters were already trying their luck in the North from the 1870s. They were part of the romantic but arduous pioneering in Central Africa that inspired in Rhodes and Sir Harry Johnston1^ their dreams of the Cape to Cairo link. These pioneers, missionaries, hunters, explorers, had a great effect on the formation of 69 views on Africa and Africans, for their works had an extremely 18 wide and eager public., Undoubtedly the most prevalent view of the African that emerged was the child view, an idea current and influential from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth. There are a thousand possible expressions of this, but that of Lugard is effective in its succinctness and interesting as the opinion of a great Governor. To him the African holds the position of a late born child in the family of nations, and must as yet be schooled in the discipline of the nursery.1° Given nineteenth century conditions in Africa and the exhausted and fever-ridden state of the travellers, it is perhaps not surprising that they derived an extremely poor opinion of Africans. What is curious is that so many of them wished to impose on Africans concepts of work, of punctuality, and of the cash economy that were brutalising their own society at home, and that so many of them had set out to escape. David Livingstone had himself escaped from the world of sweated mill labouring. In his ideas for massive European emigration to Africa he wished to alleviate the iot of the working class at home, but it never seems to have occurred to him that the arrival of the European economy might have a similar effect 20 on the African. It is possible that in the midst of Africa home society itself took on a romanticised impression and nothing could seem worse than the slavery and warfare that 70 Africans suffered from. At any rate, the arrival of the European economy was regarded as the salvation of the African, and if, like a child, he had to be disciplined to work, it was entirely for his own good. Early missionaries frequently had difficulties in finding labour, simply because, according to the current realities in Africa, any self-respecting man would provide himself with slaves, and moreover because the more warlike tribes, accustomed to having slaves themselves, were quite 21 unwilling to serve in a menial capacity for Europeans. For many pioneers the' answer was forced labour. One of them, James Stewart, who travelled in the Zambezi area in the early sixties, believed this was7the only possible approach. On viewing the destruction of Nyanja villages by Yao raiders, he wrote After all the loss of an African village is little loss to the owners, and none to the world generally. They can soon rebuild and anything that compels them to work is rather a blessing than a curse.22 Another, more illustrious, Sir Samuel Baker, adopted forced labour while Governor of Equatoria, believing it to be necessary to overcome instinctive idleness.2^ In his book, The Albert N'yanza, he wrote in a vein highly reminiscent of Earl Grey, though more extreme: The natives of tropical countries do not progress.: enervated by intense heat, they incline rather to repose and amusement than to labour. Free 71 from the rigours of winters, and the excitement of changes in the seasons, the native- character assumes the monotony of their country's temperature. They have no natural difficulties to contend with-no struggle with adverse storms and icy winds and frost-bound soil; but an everlasting summer, and fertile ground producing with little tillage, excite no enterprise; and the human mind, unexercised by difficulties, sinks into languor and decay.^4 Of course Stewart and Baker were writing about very different parts of the Continent, but their views derived from the same technologically orientated contempt. They could understand "backwardness" (Baker actually placed it at the level of animal existence), but they were quite unable to comprehend that Africans might have suffered relative retrogression. In this they reflected their age, when Improvement was the principal norm. Baker was an administrator, though of a highly unorthodox kind. Other more conventional administrators also wrote copiously of their views of the African and his future. It 25 is interesting to start with Sir Bartle Frere ^ because he represents so well a school whose views would be taken over and modified by the principals in the period covered by this thesis. Towards the end of a life of long experience in India, South Africa and Zanzibar, Frere read a paper On the  Laws affecting the Relations between Civilized and Savage Life, as bearing on the dealings of Colonists with Aborigines, to 72 the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland on June 28, 1881. Frere maintains in this paper that while it is usual for savage races to be destroyed, expelled or driven back in the face of a civilized power, this law does not hold for more vigorous races like the Bantu. Their savagery is destroyed by another means, namely by proximity to the European civilization and by anxiety to approximate to this civilization. "There are no practical limits to the changes that may thus take place." But there are certain necessary conditions for these changes to take place, of which the most important is "Such a peace as Romans and English have ensured to subject races as a consequence of civilized sovereignty", a peace bringing "-with it protection for life and property, practical equality before the law, substitution of individual property for tribal commonage, abolition of slavery and private rights of making war and carrying arms, education in the arts of civilized life, legislation against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating substances that ruin health and retard material welfare of the native community. To secure all this an equitable form of taxation is required to meet the expenses of the administration. This is an extremely succinct and illuminating description of the policy of the "civilizing mission" school of administ rators on the threshold of the so-called New Imperialism. In some ways the discussion on the close of Frere's paper is even more interesting for contemporary views than the paper itself. 73 One speaker criticised Frere for his use of analogies from the Roman Empire.. The Britons that the Romans met in England were much more civilized than the natives of South Africa, and they were after all Aryans] The second speaker began by criticising the lumping together of the Bantu race as a chimera, and then went on to criticise the Roman analogy from the opposite end. The pax Britannica is not like the pax Romana. Our civilization is stiff. The Romans intermarried. We impose an uncongenial religion. Rome became the great melt ing pot of the Empire - peoples went there from all over the known world. But negroes do not come to meetings of societies 27 like ours. ' Another speaker, still desperately trying to find laws, postulated the law that native peoples disappear in face of Europeans in temperate climates, but not in tropical climates. In this discussion we see the extremes of pseudo-scientific racism juxtaposed with the most enlightened opinion of the day. In the year that Frere delivered his paper, Alfred Milner was called to the bar and started writing for the Pall Mall Gazette. He had written in his diary that he felt himself destined for a life of "public usefulness", a symbolic paternal PQ idealist sentiment. y His bright contemporaries at Balliol, Lyttelton Gell-^0 and Henry Birchenough^1 - both future directors of the British South Africa Company - were also in London, Birchenough actually sharing rooms with Milner. Rhodes was at Oriel, dreaming dreams. Sidney Webb entered 7k the Colonial Office, and Sydney Olivier would follow him in 1882. The British North Borneo Company-^ was granted its charter, the first of the new monopolies, the first chartered company to administer a territory since the East India Company had lost its charter in 1858. Colonial exploitation had entered a fresh phase. As Frere was reading his paper that revealed so much of past experience, the stage was set for the imperialism of the great paternalists ready to apply Germanic methods to the problems Frere described. There was little opposition. Chauvinistic imperialism cut directly across party lines* The Independent Labour Party was as yet weak. The majority of the Fabians were as imperialist as the Unionist Party itself ( Sydney Olivier a notable exception ). Opposition came principally from without, from the societies, the "Exeter Hall faction" that had taken to itself the duty of being the irrepressible conscience of the nation. The cries of a new slavery, of forced labour, of the need for imperial protection for indigenous peoples would be heard again - principally from the British and Foreign Aborigines' Protection Society - and coupled with war and rebellion in Rhodesia, would see to it that Joseph Chamberlain's administration at the Colonial Office was not only a more vigorous approach to colonial policy, but also a more firm espousal of the notion of imperial responsibility. It is appropriate at this stage to consider the attitudes to African labour of Cecil Rhodes himself. He was after all 75 the Colossus, in some ways almost the oracle for administrators in Rhodesia. Like most things about the man, his attitude was entirely paradoxical. He urged the most shady dealings with African chiefs like Lobengula-^ ; he fell wholeheartedly into the slaughter and reprisal that followed the Ndebele and Shona XL "rebellions"-^; yet he could win immense African respect in personal relations, as in the parleying after the Ndebele "rebellion". He adhered wholeheartedly to the "child view", yet could express the celebrated high-flown statement of "equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambezi", the civilized man being "a man whether white or black who has sufficient education to write his name, has some property or "55 works, in fact is not a loafer". "Loafer" was a favourite word of Rhodes. It reflects well his attitude towards work as a moral virtue. He drove himself unmercilessly and expected others to do the same. If Africans insisted on "loafing", they could not be civilized, and therefore to make them civilized, they had to be persuaded to work. Rhodes's "child view" was apparent in his support of the "strop bill" of 1891, which proposed corporal punishment for Africans. It was dropped. It was apparent also in his sponsoring of the Glen Grey Act^. He pleaded that his own school education was more in the nature of slavery than the work expected of an African. He spoke too in terms of an "inexorable law": If you are really one who loves the 76 natives, you must make them worthy of the country they live in, or else they are certain, by an inexorable law, to lose their country. You will certainly not make them worthy if you allow them / to sit in idleness and if you do not ,o train them in the arts of civilization. The paradox is perfectly revealed by Woodhouse in the Rhodes biography. Having attempted to show how much more enlightened Rhodes was compared with the Boers, Woodhouse writes, The best that could be said of him in this matter - and he often said it himself -was that he regarded the natives as child ren, who might one day attain the adult level of the white man, but were still far from it. Even that was only true of him in theory. In practice it would be truer to say that he regarded them as domestic animals: which is not to imply cruelty, for Englishmen are usually kind to domestic animals. But unlike children dogs are not expected to grow up into human adults; and unlike children dogs may be shot when they get out of hand. That was certainly Rhodes's attitude to the Matabele /~Ndebele_7in the early weeks of the Rebellion.-^ The domestic animal view fits Boer opinion of the period rather well; yet the Boers regarded Rhodes as a negrophilist. The paradox has been established, it is true, by reference to Rhodes's opinions at different points in his career, but these points are separated by no more than a few years, and his ambivalence is symptomatic of much of Southern African opinion. Rhodes certainly did nothing to allay the fears of the British and Foreign Aborigines* Protection Society, as expressed in Fox Bourne's pamphlet Matabeleland and the 30 Chartered Company, y or in the British and Foreign Aborigines' 77 Protection Society's Outlines of a Suggested Charter for  Natives under British Rule in South Africa,^ which had proposed that the Africans should be wards of the Crown; that reserves should be under Crown control; that there should be more power for the chiefs, education and advance ment for the natives, regulation of interference from outside, for example with regard to labour; that taxes ought to be restricted to hut tax, agreed with the natives; that the pass system ought to be limited to a single passport to help the Africans; that there ought to be complete freedom of action to seek labour, no curfew and no intoxicating liquor; and that the natives who have completely left the reserves ought to be admitted to some rights and privileges as fellow subjects with the whites. This was what Lord Milner was quite unprepared to do. His views on labour are revealed in countless despatches from South Africa. They coincided rather too accurately - for the taste of the Colonial Office officials, and indeed of his Resident Commissioner in Rhodesia, Sir Marshall Clarke^ -with those of the directors of the British South Africa Company and the men on the spot. He took a favourable attitude towards forced labour, particularly for public works. He felt it was the duty of native commissioners to put positive moral pressure on the Africans to work, and as his justification he sought refuge in the old tropical indolence argument - "The 78 black man is naturally inclined, much more than the white, to do nothing at all".^ He certainly realised the embarrassment such views caused the government and even attempted to suppress on occasion an offending sentence of a despatch that was to appear in a parliamentary paper. Milner, burdened as he was with the Briton-Boer problem and the resulting war in South Africa, lacked a doctrinaire "native policy". He made little contribution to the reserves-amalgamation debate. And of course his downfall and censure came about because he permitted, almost inadvert ently, the illegal corporal punishment of Chinese labourers. All was subordinated by this time to his reconstruction, his development of the mining economy, and consequent encouragement of British, immigration. The British and Foreign Aborigines' Protection Society Charter (vid. sup.) had expressed a curious mixture of respect for African institutions, more power to chiefs, and the notion of amalgamation, equal rights. Rhodes too had spoken of equal rights; he has also been described by his most recent biographers as a reserves man, believing that they would protect the African from the vices of the European, permit him to cultivate his own plot of land in peace, and give him a rudimentary political education.^ It is a dilemma that runs, right through the labour policy of the period., Neither South Africa nor Rhodesia wanted a permanent labour force for 79 security reasons. There was a fear of what would happen when the mines, a wasting asset, would no longer provide work. But the reserves on the other hand provided too much scope for lethargy, for the backward rule of chiefs (cf. Herman Merivale on reserves) and above all insufficient labour for present needs. The backwardness of the reserves was as much a matter for concern for the humanitarians and missionaries as for the officials of the Chartered Company. The fashion in which Rhodesian Africans were forced into a state of great insecurity on, or actively expelled from, Crown land, private property, urbanllocations, and even the reserves themselves (when alien ation took place as the result of inadequate survey0', will be recounted in greater detail later. This insecurity resulted from the establishment of a 45 powerful anti-reserves lobby. H. Wilson Fox, y in his copious memoranda of 1910 and 1912 drawn up for the Board of the Company, 46 attacked reserves and tribalism. He did however reach the logical conclusion that there had to be a permanent local labour policy. It would also seem preferable to arrange that the circumstances of the relations between the two races siould, as far as possible, be such that they should be able to regard each other from some other paint of view than the economic one.47 It was a fine sentiment, but the mineowners seemed unwilling to work it. There were advantages as well as disadvantages in a quick turnover of labour without wives and children. 80 Obviously wages could be kept down, and there was always the possibility - particularly acute under Rhodesian conditions -that a mine might be worked out and closed. It was the farmers, with much less danger of working out* their properties, who most strenuously advocated a pool of local labour. Wilson Fox quoted their congress of 1911, which resolved with regard to "foreign" labour that the boys be allowed to bring their women with them, so that they may, if they choose, settle for a number of years, or permanently, if they wish, in Southern Rhodesia.^ But the farmers were nonetheless unwilling to pay the wages necessary for such a permanent settlement. The most important convert to the anti-reserves position was Lord Gladstone,^ High Commissi.oner in South Africa, 1910-1914, whose despatches seem to indicate that he was to a large extent converted to his European environment in South Africa. With regard to the Southern Rhodesian Commission on Native 50 Reserves, he wrote to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State, I expressed the hope to Mr. Malcolm^"*" that some arrangement would be made to prevent the natives from wandering over the reserves far too large for their present requirements. The practice is demoralising and prejudices improvement in agriculture. Mr. Malcolm asked me whether objection would be taken to some curtailment of the area now allotted. I said that I did not think there would necessarily be objections to curtailment, provided that it could be justified by the clear 81 advantage of the whole scheme to the natives. We agreed that it would he desirable to adopt the principles of the Natives' Land Act. - that natives should be prohibited from holding land in territory under white occupation and vice versa.52 i This despatch was met with a chorus of disapproval in the Colonial Office. The extension of the Union Land Act to Rhodesia was regarded as "impossible and quite unacceptable". Later, another official wrote, "It is clear that the reserves constitute the only real means of safeguarding the native interest". ^ In a despatch of the previous week, Gladstone provides an excellent insight into current opinion of the African. On a visit to Rhodesia, he went to Zimbabwe, that essential of the African Grand Tour, and wrote The greatest factor in the irresistable attractiveness of Zimbabwe is the mystery of its origins. The flame of controversy has played round each feature of the ruins during the last ten years. The only result is that the doctors differ. But there is one conclusion that forces itself on the mind of the layman, with the weight almost of conviction, and that is that no Bantu or negroid races were ever capable either of such a stupendous conception or of its masterly execution.55 As early as 1906, an archarologist had asserted that Zimbabwe had been built by Africans,^ and now there is no doubt what ever among archaeologists that the "stupendous conception" is 57 indeed the work of Bantu peoples.^' As this passage makes clear, it was not just that Gladstone could not believe that 82 Great Zimbabwe had been built by Africans, but he did not want to believe it: such a possibility would upset his con ception of the Africans' place in the colonies. He had been sent as a great Liberal statesman to be.the first Governor General of the Union of South Africa, and there fore implicitly accepted the colour bar enshrined in its constitution. If these be the sentiments on land and culture of a Liberal statesman of some stature, it is reasonable to ask where the mantle of Stephen and Merivale had fallen during this period. Was their humanitarian spirit continued only by Exeter Hall philanthropy? An examination of works by a liberal, a Fabian and a leading member of the Independent Labour Party will attempt to discover the nature, the strength and the influence of the opposition to the "official opinion" of the day, with particular reference to Southern Africa. 58 J.A. Hobson's Imperialism: A Study^ is celebrated for his attack on capitalist imperialism. His premises with 59 regard to investment have now been largely refuted, J but less notice has been taken of his section on "Native Races". He expressed a belief in the civilizing mission - "The resources of the tropics will not be developed voluntarily GO by the natives themselves". White men could only organise and superintend the labour of the natives. By doing this they can educate the natives in the arts of industry 83 and stimulate in them a desire for material and moral progress, implanting new.'wants' which form in^-every society the roots of civilization. He accepted the analogy of the education of children, but attacked the chartered companies as "little else than private despotism rendered more than usually precarious in that it C p has been established for the sake of dividends", and was too dependent on the whim of the Managing Director. In a prophetic remark, he feared the political ambitions of the imported rulers. He saw through some of the basic contradictions of paternalism, pointing out that the kind of civilization to be imposed depended entirely upon the "civilizing nations"; that there was no attempt to understand the active or latent progressive forces of the subject race; that the international agreements of 1883 and 1890, carving up territory, cast a strange light on the trust theory. But, like all his contemporaries, he failed to see the dramatic rise in national ism. He regarded less interference in independent Indian states as a good sign, and moreover he was very complimentary about Basutoland as an example of sane imperialism in the midst of insane imperialism. He failed to see the immense problems the one would cause to a twentieth century state, and the dangers economic underdevelopment would cause to the freedom of the other. Insane imperialism he classified as handing over "these races to the economic exploitation of white colonists who will use them as 'live tools' and their lands as repositories 8k Cx of mining or other profitable treasure". ^ So far as labour is concerned, Hobson's sole legitimate pressures are the pressure of rising population, of new needs, and of increasing consumption. All taxation is forced labour; so is the bribing of chieftains to use their influence, as advocated by "the philanthropic Earl Grey" (the Fourth Earl).^ He attacked the alliance of administration and capitalism to be found most blatantly in South Africa, in Rhodes, on the Rand, and in Grey. At least, he argued ironically, the Transvaal had the virtue of being methodical - they took away-all land, broke up the tribal system, and gave the African no alternative but to work. This had a bearing on the idea of the permanent labour force in the locations, advocated by the President of the Rand Chamber of Mines in 1898^ and again by the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905, (which is treated in Hobson's second edition in 1906). To Hobson, such an idea would turn Africans into hostages to capitalism, virtually ascripti gloebi (remembering the South American and Portuguese African methods), simply breeding the next gener ation of labourers. He felt that white communities in these capitalist situations could never escape the taint of parasitism. With remarkable clarity Hobson saw all the contradictions of the revealed policy of his day. But in their place he set up a new set of contradictions, based on his conception of the civilizing mission through the medium of indirect rule. While ' 85 he had plenty of strictures about the nature of western capitalism and of trusteeship, he failed to question the quality of rule that indirect rule would produce. Sydney Olivier was, as George Bernard Shaw in his 67 lively memoir of him pointed out, ' a rare character. He was a colonial administrator who attended to all the pomp and trappings of a colonial governorship at the same time as questioning the very existence of the imperial power. His White Capitalism and Coloured Labour is a curious book. Several chapters of it are devoted to attacking bad race relations in the United States, and extolling the better conditions in the West Indies. ?/hen he does come to the point, he espouses the old friend, trop ical indolence: the African has no mechanical habit of industry. He has no idea of any obligation to be industrious for industry's sake, no conception of any essential dignity in labour itself, no delight in gratuitous toil.°9 He agreed with the South African Native Affairs Commission of 70 1905 that if the African is paid more he will simply work less, but he did make the attempt as we shall see to establish a cultural explanation for this phenomenon. He provided an excellent ironic description of "'the theory" behind colonial exploitation. Tropical countries are not suited for' settlement by whites. Europeans cannot labour and bring up families there. The black can breed and labour under good 86 government, but he cannot develop his own country's resources. He is brutish, benighted and unprogressive. The ' principal reason of (sic) this condition is that his life is made so easy for him by nature that he is not forced to work. The white man must, therefore, in the interests of humanity make arrangements to induce the black man to work for him. To him the economic profit which the black man does not value and cannot use; to the latter the moral and social advancement and elevation. To effect this development is the 'White man's Burden'; in this way must we control the tropics; along these lines alone can the problem of racial relations in our new possessions be solved.''7! The core of his argument rested on five propositions. , Firstly, the only distress caused by the lack of labour in South Africa was the distress of the foreign investor unable to obtain what he regarded as an adequate return on his investment. Secondly the disaffection between European and African was not the disaffection of race prejudice, but the disaffection of capitalism to labour and of industrial jealousy. Thirdly, where he cannot force the tropical peoples to labour for him, the capitalist turns to.countries where the population is under great restraint, namely India and China. Fourthly the capitalist who pleads a missionary motive is in effect a liar. If he really felt this he would be a missionary. Fifthly, the negrophilist is he whose judgement has not been distorted by the economic demands of 72 the capitalist industrial system. In his attack on the indentured labour system he pointed out that the West Indian 87 negro thought that the coolie was more of a slave than official opinion did. He went on from this to describe the negro in the West Indies as more free and independent than the indust rial proletariat at home. He was not averse to a sharp thrust at a fellow colonial admin i s t rat o r, The distinction in sensibility, in industrial standard, between an alien race and the white, is deemed by such an authority as Lord Milner, a Providential dispensation. Such a doctrine reacts upon the temper- of the employer in industry, and on his conception of suitable methods for dealing with coloured workmen. ' Milner's doctrine, he went on, is the product of the industrial relation - it has grown rapidly wherever capitalistic enterprise has been extended. It followed that the colonialist capital ist's fears are the fears of the capitalist everywhere, fears of the ill-effects of Christianising the population, fears of educating them to ideas above their station. Olivier revealed a remarkable sympathy for the African ethos. The African is more conscious of the unformulated powers of life and less under the dominion of the formulated; his consciousness is more open to what is beneath the superficial raft of established means of survival and less accessible to rational economic motive, and consequently unreliable as a wage earner. And so the African is regarded as a child, yet he is taxed and expected to work. But as soon as he takes up the attitude of a Wat Tylor or a Hampden he is vilified and killed.^ With one single 88 obvious blow, he knocked Arnold's, and all his disciples' devotion to the Saxons on the head - he pointed out their 75 tribalism and their savagery. • He could indeed have gone further and pointed to the remarkable similarities between Saxon notions of crime and punishment and those of, say, the Ndebele. Olivier's arguments were certainly damaging, but although he later briefly became the Secretary of State for India, he had very little effect on the course of events, at least in the short term. His friend, Sidney Webb, was later as Lord Passfield to enunciate unequivocally the trust for native peoples in East Africa, but Olivier, theoretically destructive, was unable to construct an alternative. He believed that Europeans should go to Africa since it was underpopulated, and an African land monopoly was as intolerable as any other.' How an administrative accommodation could be reached on such a basis, he was silent. He had nothing to say on the forces of African nationalism, although the precedents were already there in India and in embryo in West Africa. Olivier in short was firmly caught in the paternalist web. He could see that the notion of "upbringing" was wrong; that the manner of that "upbringing" was wrong; but he could find no channel by which to treat the subject as an adult. J. Ramsay MacDonald in his Labour and the Empire^ did have a prescription -89 the-democratic principle of native administration is to develop native civilization on its own lines - the educational method; the imperialist method is to impose on it.an alien ; 7o civilization - the political method.... The English merchant is celebrated for seeking to sell what the customers ought to have, rather than what they want, and this has been applied to the theory of British colonialism. 79 In a partial preview of Schumpeter,'J MacDonald found imperial administration the preserve of the upper class - "the most narrow visioned of our social classes". Like other critics, he sought, and easily found inconsistencies - there can be membership of the Empire without responsibility to the imperial life; the man on the spot conception of the imperial respon sibility is a negation of the imperial idea. And he added that in fact no one is regarded as being on the spot unless he belongs to the majority. He argued that the imperial authorities ought to retain control over native affairs until the franchise is granted - South Africa should know that a liberal policy is imposed upon it not by Downing Street, but by the Empire. However, his dictum, "We require residents rather than govern ors", revealed another convert to indirect rule, a remarkable Q-i position for a man of the Left. Hobson, Olivier and MacDonald all accepted some of the suppositions of the labour theory of their day. They failed to unravel the complications of colonial race-relations, administrative problems and labour policy. Moreover, Hobson 90 and MacDonald were converts to the developing fashion of indirect rule, a policy which could indeed blink at indig enous forms of forced labour and slavery. The Lozi of Barotseland, for example, probably maintained slavery longer than Northern Rhodesian administrators liked to think. The greatest exponent of the policy of indirect rule was Op of course Frederick Lugard, who was between 1900 and 1906 actively imposing it throughout Northern Nigeria. Although he had no direct concern with Southern Africa after his early career, his policies and views repay examination because of the enormous influence they enjoyed. To what extent did his policy fit the idealised view.of Hobson and MacDonald? Recently, Eric Stokes has pointed out^ that Lugard pursued his policies not because of the exigencies of the situation - as has often been argued - not in other words from a position of weakness, but from a position of strength. Where there was a position of real weakness, as in the Niger Coast Protectorate or in Malawi, the extension of authority was a "more gradual process, and in the end one more destructive of indigenous political forms".^ In other words, Lugard's policy did not necess arily arise from any respect for the Muslim emirates, but from a desire to extend authority swiftly and effectively by means of knocking out "the military resistance of the emirates with a few swift blows, oust the old rulers and instal pliant success-85 ors". y The acclaim with which Lugard's policy has been 91 received may indeed have been based on the wrong premises. Yet this was to become the principal gospel of colonial policy in Africa with enormous effects on reserves and labour policies. When we examine Lugard's approach to labour, we find all the difficulties and inconsistencies of colonial labour policy. His Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa^ was published outside our period, but the views contained in it are merely a systematization of ideas current in theory and practice for some years. On the one hand he had a tendency to favour the.; peasant cultivator, but adopted a modified form of the tropical abundance and tropical indolence theory. . He felt that taxation was a stimulant to productive industry because it tended to diminish the large surplus of grain crops that would otherwise be used for beer-making and as an excuse 86 for laziness in the following season. Thus he saw the function of taxation to be the creaming of the surplus that led to indolence if it were not forced into a market economy. On. the other hand, he was prepared to admit the educative influence of forced labour, though he insisted it should only be sanction ed as an emergency act, provided it was made attractive enough to stimulate voluntary recruitment subsequently.^ He was prepared to mix the direct stimulant with the indirect. Both these positions had been assailed ever since the slavery-free labour debate of a hundred years before, the one because direct 92 taxation was so little known to the domestic working class, and because it was so often linked with a confused or indefensible land policy, the other because it smacked so much of the slavery it intended to replace. It is possible that at a time when the state in Britain was entering more and more into the private lives of its citizens, such methods of controlling colonial labour did not seem so unacceptable. While Lord Lugard, in an extremely moderate way, rode both horses of the colonial labour policy - and they were indeed ridden for most of the inter-war period - Sir Harry Johnston was, as he had always been, more direct. He insisted oo in the History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races that it was absolutely necessary for Africans to work or be trampled underfoot. This would be even more likely if medical science made sufficient advance that the unhealthy areas of Africa could be made habitable for Europeans, for "a rush may then. sweep away the pre-existing rights of inferior oq races". ' He prophesied rightly that in Southern Africa the black man would continue to be the source of cheap labour for a long time, and that he would gradually be pushed off the high on to the low veld. It was the disunity of the African that had permitted the entry of Europeans in the first place, and it was in his continuing disunity that hope lay for the European: And just as it would need some amazing and stupendous event for all Asia to rise as one man against the invasion of Europe, so it is difficult to conceive 93 that the black man will eventually form one united negro people demanding autonomy, and putting an end to the control of the white man, and to the immigration, settlement, and intercourse^ of superior races from Europe and Asia.7 But like the invasion itself - and Johnston appears not to have considered this - it could be done piecemeal. Johnston's ultimate vision was of a race of Europeans in Africa with dark skins -Great white nations will populate in course of time South Africa, North Africa, and Egypt; and rills of Caucasion blood will continue, as in the recent and remote past, to circulate through Negro Africa, leavening the many millions of black men with that element of the white-skinned sub-species which alone has evolved beauty of facial features and originality of invention in thought and deed No doubt, as in Asia and South America, the eventual outcome of the colonization of Africa by alien peoples will be a compromise-a dark-skinned race with a white man's features and a white man's brain." By what miracle of eugenics this would happen, he is silent. The end of European rule was to Johnston unthinkable. This is one of the most important facts to remember about the vast majority of policy-makers in Africa during our period. In one sense, however, both Lugard and Johnston arrived at a corner of the truth about the future, (and the view of the future of any society is vital to how it handles the present). The vortex of twentieth century technology, industrialism, and education would claim all societies. How was this process to be facilitated? It could be done gently, 94 by the creation of reserves to provide some communal security, but just enough land hunger to provide a stimulant - along with taxes and developing wants - to work. Gr it could be effected by the destruction of tribal entities, by the breaking up of reserves in the name of land improvement, by a sort of African Highland Clearance designed to force "back ward" peoples into the modern economy. The first would produce the familiar, inefficient, but gloriously cheap, migrant labour system, which left women and children conven iently beyond the pale of education and social services. The second might create a more efficient labour force, but the inhumanity by which this would be accomplished offended the humanitarians, and the social and political dangers offended the political realists. The first became orthodoxy, and so attention was paid neither to the efficiency of the labour force, nor to the social and political future of the Africans, nor to the development of the peasant cultivator. The conflict had been continuing in South Africa for a century. The British after much introspection and debate in effect adopted the first policy. With less debate, the Afrikaans people had always adopted the clearance method, though not at first for industrial ends of course. When Rhodes set out to outflank the Boers, he opened up a vast new area where the same problem would be faced. African tribal societies in Central Africa faced a 95 dynamic nationalism, convinced of its own divine right, in the late nineteenth century. It was!a nationalism full of internal conflicts, that spoke with many voices, the exploit er, the missionary, the humane administrator. It carved out blocks of territory and attempted to turn them into labour units, while at the same time carving them up again for the sake of indirect rule. It established a labour melting pot, and then tried to keep the ingredients apart. The only response possible was another nationalism, developed in the seed-bed of capitalist production. Western European society divided against itself encountered fragmented societies, and created within the Pax Britannica (or whichever pax it might be) an economic, a social and eventually a political ferment. It is now necessary to turn to the origins of this process in Rhodesia. 96 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2. 1 A point confirmed by W. David Mclntyre in his recent The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-1875 (London, 1967). 2 A. Keppel-Jones in his South Africa (London, 1949) denied the effect of the "alternation of parties in domestic politics on the South African situation, but both Sir Henry Taylor (Autobio graphy, pp. 131 & 241) and Cecil Rhodes (Lockhart and Woodhouse, Rhodes, p.69) felt that this alternation was extremely important in vacillating colonial policy. 3 For a discussion of the different attitudes to empire of Campbell-Bannerman and of Milner. see A.M. Gollin's Proconsul in Politics (London, 1964;. 4 In 1900 Curzon said that Congress was "tottering to its fall", quoted in R.J. Moore, Liberalism and Indian Politics,  1872-1922 (London, 1966), p.7*5^ This was of course part of Curzon's conviction that he was working for all Indians, and that Congress was of a purely sectional nature. 5 Quoted in J. Ramsay MacDonald, Labour and the Empire (London, 1907), p.37. Balfour said this with regard to • the South African Chinese Labour Ordinance. 6 ibid., p.58. 7 W.P. Schreiner, 1857-1919; called to Cape bar, 1882; attorney general in Rhodes's second ministry, 1887; premier of Cape Colony at outbreak of the Boer War; preferred to defend an African, Denizulu, in a case brought against him by the Natal Government rather than attend the South African National Convention of 1908-1909; favoured a federal constitution for South Africa. 8 Sheila van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (London, 1942). 9 Quoted in van der Horst, op. cit., p.17. 10 Quoted in Lyman, R.W., The First Labour Government, 1924 (London, 1957), p.106. 11 van der Horst, op. cit., p.84. 12 Lockhart and Woodhouse, op. cit., p.197. 97 13 Cd. 1897. 14 ibid., p.65. 15 See D.J.N. Denoon, "The Transvaal Labour Crisis.•1901-1906", Journal of African History, VII, 3 (1967), pp.481-494. 16 Cd. 1897, p.124. 17 Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnston and the Scramble for  Africa (London, 1957) stakes the claim of Johnston to be one of the originators, if not the originator, of the Cape to Cairo idea. 18 See I-I.A.C. Cairns, Prelude'to Imperialism, British Reactions  to Central African Society,""1840-1890 (London, 1965) for an interesting and full discussion of these early contacts. 19 Frederick D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire (Edinburgh & London, 1893), vol. I~| p.74• 20 J.P.R. Wallis (ed.), The Zambezi Expedition of David  Livingstone 1853-1863 (London, 1956;, 2 vols. 21 Cairns, op.cit., p.31. -These remarks are culled from the diary of J.S." Moffat, 1864-22 J.P.R. Wallis (ed.), The Zambezi Journal of James Stewart  1862-1863 (London, 19527T '. 23 . T.D. Murray and A.S. White, Sir Samuel Baker: a Memoir (London, 1895), pp. 150-153- Every tribe was to be compelled to produce a certain amount of corn and cotton -it sounds rather like the rubber policy of Leopold's Congo. 24 Samuel Baker, The Albert N.:':,yanza (London, 1958), p.xxiii. 25 Sir Bartle Frere, 1815-1884; educ. Haileybury; writer-ship in the Bombay civil service, 1834; assistant coll ector at Poona, 1835; assistant commissioner of customs, 1845; political resident to the Raja of Sattara, and then commissioner when Sattara was annexed; 1850, commissioner for Sind; 1859, member of the Governor General's council; 1862, Governor of Bombay; 1872, sent to Zanzibar to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan; 1877, Governor of the Cape, and set about Carnarvon's plan for the federation of South Africa; recalled, 1880. 98 26 Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain  and Ireland, Vol. XI, (June 28, 1881), pp.313-352. 27 There is a fascinating example of this reluctance to permit the subject peoples of the Empire to come to Britain at the time of the coronation of Edward VII. Lewanika, King of the Barotse, announced that he wished to attend the coronation. All the official of the Colonial Office hoped that he would stay away. As one put it, a whole host of native chiefs would then wish to come, "and the prospect is rather appalling". The permanent under secretary, Sir Montague Ommanney, felt that invitations ought to be confined to "representatives of the ruling face". Lewanika eventually did come, and Chamber lain ordered that he be provided with a uniform with plenty of gold lace.' (minutes 13/1/02 & 16/6/02, C.O. 417/343 & 344). 28 He wrote firstly under John Morley and later under W..T. Stead, though he eventually disagreed with the latter's sensationalism, and resigned in 1885. 29 See Eric Stokes, The Political Ideas of English Imperialism. Inaugural lecture at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (London, I960). 30 P. Lyttelton Gell, 1852-1926; educ. King's College, London, and Balliol College, Oxford; first chairman, Council Universities Settlement in East London, 1884-1896; Direct or of the Guardian Insurance Company and of the British South Africa Company from 1899. 31 Henry Birchenough, 1853-1937; fellow of the Royal Empire Society, Chairman of Rhodesia and Mashonaland Railway Companies from 1925; President of the British South Africa Company, and Director of the Imperial and Contin ental Gas Association; Government special trade commiss ioner to South Africa, 1903; member of the Tariff Commission 1904; member of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy, 1916; Chairman, Advisory Council to the Ministry of Recon struction, 1918. 32 For the history of the British North Borneo Company, see K.G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule, North  Borneo 1881-1946, (Singapore, 1958). 33 Quite apart from the shady diplomacy, see Rhodes's agree ment with Frank Johnson of 1889 to overthrow the Ndebele by a midnight raid. Cairns, op.cit., p.236, and Eric Stokes & Richard Brown, The Zambesian Past, p.88. 99 34 Olive Schreiner's novel, Trooper Peter Halket in Mashona-land is an indictment of Rhodes for his activities at this time. The frontispiece shows several Rhodesian pioneers grinning beside the bodies of several Africans hanging from trees. 35 Lockhart & Woodhouse, op.cit., p.444. 36 vid. sup. p.65. 37 Lockhart & Woodhouse, op.cit., p.197. 38 ibid., p.348. 39 H.R. Fox Bourne, Matabeleland and the Chartered Company (London, 1897). H.R. Fox Bourne was the Secretary of the British and Foreign Aborigines' Protection Society. 40 London, 1900. 41 Sir Marshall Clarke, 1841-1909; A.D.C. to Sir Thomas Shepstone; played an important part in the federations attempts of 1877-1881; Resident Magistrate, Basutoland, 1881; Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, 1884-1893; Acting Administrator, Zululand, 1893-1898; Resident Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1905. He was by far the best Resident Commissioner that Rhodesia had. Ramsay MacDonald in Labour and the Empire p.101, held him up as an example of an enlightened native admin istrator. The Resident Commissionership was an office created under the Order in Council of 1898 which imposed tighter controls on the British South Africa Company administration. 42 Milner to Chamberlain, Oct. 4, 1901. C.O. 417/321. 43 Tel., Milner to Chamberlain, Aug. 8, 1902. He asked that the first paragraph of a despatch be not published. In fact he was too late. C.O.417/345. 44 Lockhart & Woodhouse, op.cit., p.196. 45 H. Wilson Fox, 1863-1921; M.P. (Unionist), North Warwicks, 1917-1921; educ. University College, London, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Lincoln's Inn; editor of South African Mining Journal, 1892; public prosec utor, Rhodesia, 1894; director of transport and commissariat, Mashonaland, 1897; manager, B.S.A.Co., 1898; Director of B.S.A.Co., 1913; Vice President of Royal Geographical Society, Fellow Royal Colonial Inst itute etc. 100 46 Memorandum on the Constitutional, Political, Financial  and Other Questions concerning Rhodesia (printed for the information of the Board, 1910). Another (1912). 47 Memo., 1912, p.245. 48 ibid., p.246. 49 -Herbert John, Viscount Gladstone, 1854-1930; son of W.E. and his father's private secretary 1880-1881; Liberal whip. 1881-1885; under secretary at the Home Office (1892-1894); First commissioner of Works (1894-1895); Chief Liberal Whip (1899); Home Secretary (1905-1910); First Governor General, South Africa, 1910-1914. "In effect he abandoned Gladstonian liberalism". (D.N.B.) 50 Lewis V. Harcourt, 1863-1922, Son of Sir William Harcourt, little Englander, private secretary to father; First Comm issioner of Works, 1905-1910; Colonial Secretary, I9IO-I915. 51 Dougal 0. Malcolm, 1877-1955; educ. Eton & New College Oxford; Fellow of All Souls (1899); entered the Colonial Office (1900); private secretary to Lord Selborne (High Commissioner in South Africa), 1905-1910; Secretary to Lord Grey in Canada, 1910-1911; joined Treasury, 1912; Director of B.S.A.Co., 1913; President of the Company, from 1937. In 1939 he published a eulogistic account of the exploits of the Company to celebrate the Fiftieth anniversary of the Charter. The British South Africa  Company, 1889-1939, (London, 1939). 52 Gladstone to Harcourt, Nov. 13, 1913. C.O. 417/526. 53 All who minuted the above were agreed. 54 Minute on Gladstone to Harcourt, Nov. 20, 1913, C.O. 417/526. The official was Vernon who was commenting on the eviction of Africans from alienated land when they would not pay the grazing fees imposed by the landlord. 55 Gladstone to Harcourt, Nov. 6, 1913, C.O. 417/526. 56 The first man to say that Zimbabwe was of Bantu origin, and not Ethiopian or Carthaginian or any of the other romantic possibilities was Randall-Maciver in Medieval Rhodesia, (London, 1906). He was not believed. In the late twenties the excavations of Miss Caton-Thompson and Miss Kathleen Kenyon established authoritively that the ruins are indeed of Bantu origin* To this day it is very difficult to convince European Rhodesians of this fact. 101 See G. Caton-Thompson, Zimbabwe Culture,(Oxford, 1931), and K.R. Robinson, R. Summers & A. Whitty, Zimbabwe Excavat ions, 1958, (Bulawayo, 1961). 57 The problem of Zimbabwe has unpleasant repercussions in Rhodesia under the Smith regime. The grant of the government to the Historical Monuments Commission has recently been reduced, and although the economic condition of the country would appear to justify this, there is also the suspicion among archaeologists that their findings are unpopular simply because they are finding more history for the Africans of Rhodesia than the pioneers ever gave them credit for. 58 J.A. Hobson: Imperialism: a Study (London 1902) 59 A recent excellent collection of documents well illustrates the development of and the attacks upon the theory of capitalist imperialism. D.K. Fieldhouse, The Theory of  Capitalist Imperialism, (London, 1967). 60 Hobson, op.cit., p.239. 61 ibid., p.240. 62 ibid., p.243. 63 ibid., p.259. 64 Albert Henry George Grey. Fourth Earl, 1851-1917, nephew of Third Earl (vid. sup.;; in H0use of Commons, 1880-1886; became a liberal unionist; friend of W.T. Stead, who introduced him to Cecil Rhodes, "who impressed him the most of any man that he had known" (D.N.B.); joined Board of B.S.A.Co. in 1889, though Joseph Chamberlain tried to dissuade him; administrator of Rhodesia, 1897; keen to introduce Glen Grey type of measure; Governor General of Canada, 1904-1911. 65 Hobson, op.cit., p.298. Cd. 9345. 66 Hobson, op.cit., p.295. 67 Margaret Olivier, Letters and Selected Writings of Sydney  Olivier, (London, 1948). George Bernard Shaw writes "Some Impressions". Sydney Olivier's description (in a fragment of autobiography included in this volume) of the state of the Colonial Office when he entered it in 1882 is as fascinating and illuminating as Sir Henry Taylor's description of the defence of the Colonial Office against the Chartists in I848 in his Autobiography, pp.35-36. 102 73 ibid. 74 ibid. 75 ibid. 76 ibid. 68 Sydney Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour, (London, 1906). 69 Olivier, op.cit., p.82. 70 Cd. 2399. 71 Olivier, op.cit., p.2. 72 ibid., chapters XI, XII and XIII passim, p.127. pp.149-151. p.163. p.138. 77 J. Ramsay MacDonald, Labour and the Empire, (London, 1907). 78 MacDonald, op.cit., p.18. 79 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, Tubingen, 1919); first English edn., 1951. 80 MacDonald, op.cit., p.27. 81 ibid., p.101. 82 Lord Frederick Dealtry Lugard, 1858-1945; educ. Sandhurst; Afghan War, 1879-1880; Sudan Campaign, 1885; Burma, 1886-1887; Lake Nyasa, 1888; administrator of Uganda, 1889-1892; Royal Niger Company, Borgu Treaties, 1894-1895; Lake Ngami (British West Charterland), 1896-1897; Commissioner, Hinterland, Lagos and Nigeria; High Commissioner & Commander in chief, Northern Nigeria, 1900-1906; Governor, Hong Kong, 1907-1912; Governor, North & South Nigeria, 1912-1913; Governor General, Nigeria, 1914-1919; British member of Mandates Commission at the League of Nations, 1922-1936. 83 Stokes & Brown, op.cit., p.354. 84 ibid. 85 ibid. 86 F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London, 1922"K 5th edn. with intro. by Margery Perham, 1965, P.235. 103 87 ibid., p.423. 88 H.H. Johnston, A History of the Colonization of Africa by- Alien Paces, (Cambridge, 1899); 2nd edn., 1913. Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, 1838-1927; educ. King's College, London & Royal Academy of Arts, 1876-1880; explored North Africa, Portuguese West & River Congo, 1879-1883; scientific expedition to Kilimanjaro, 1884; H.M. Vice-Consul in Cameroons, 1885; acting consul, Niger Coast Protectorate, 1887; Consul, Mozambique, 1888; founding British Central Africa Protectorate, 1889; Commissioner and Consul General, British Central Africa Protectorate, 1889-1896; Consul General, Tunis, 1897-1899; Special Commissioner and Consul General, Uganda, 1899-1901. 89 Johnston, op.cit., 1913 edn., p.445. 90 ibid., p.450. 91 ibid., p.450-451. 104 CHAPTER 3 THE MOBILISATION OF LABOUR WITHIN RHODESIA In discussing the beginnings of labour migration in Rhodesia, it is important to remember that both the Shona and the Ndebele peoples had been on the move until comparatively recently. The Shona had been driven North East by the invad ing Ngoni, and later by the Ndebele, who had themselves been driven northwards from the Transvaal by the Boers. The Ndebele had soon suffered a harrowing succession dispute upon the death of Mzilikazi, and Lobengula was hardly installed before he faced the concession seekers, convinced of a North ern Eldorado long before even the Rand was discovered. One of the best-known of the early explorer-prospectors 2 was Thomas Baines. He surprisingly proposed that the activities of Europeans could be restricted to advising and trading, that the Ndebele could work the gold for themselves. Clearly there were two fallacies in this idea - in the first place the Ndebele had no experience of mining, unlike the Shona, and secondly they had neither the technological nor capital base on which to conduct mining operations that would satisfy European middle men. In 1870, a concession was granted to the London and Limpopo Mining Company at Tati, long the subject of dispute among the Ndebele, the Bamangwato, the Boers, and the Imperial Government. It was never very successful and its labour force 105 was always small. The Company never succeeded in securing its relationship with the Ndebele, and reacted hysterically at the outbreak of hostilities in the Matabele War.^ But it did show the way, both metaphorically and geographically, (being on the way to Kimberley for the Matabele), to paid labour for Europeans. Ndebeles were already finding their way to Kimberley during the late 1870s. They took the journey to the mines probably more for communal reasons than personal. A period of labour at the mines had become a means for a man to prove himself, and more important to earn enough cash for a gun or some other trading articles .that would benefit his chief and his tribe. Such labour was remote, an experience wholly external to the man's tribal life, and withdrawal was compar atively easy.. The table quoted in chapter 2 reveals as many as 120 Ndebele recruits registering at Kimberley in 1884. Ndebele society was divided into three strata: the Zansi, the original Zulus who had departed from Natal under Mzilikazi; the Enhla, peoples who were assimilated on the way North; the Holi, the peoples whose lands they eventually occupied. The Holi outnumbered the other two groups together. It is impossible to discover from-which stratum of„Ndebele society these men derived, and it is true that many asserted themselves 5 to be Ndebele even when they were not. Lobengula appears to have been anxious.to help recruiters at this period, and one 106 would expect that he would order men from the Holi or Enhla strata of his society to go to work, and not from his regiments.^ The first evidence we have of a recruiting expedition is that of Alexander Baillie, sent North by the Griqualand West administration in 1876. His account reveals the Ndebele method one would expect. Lobengula sent out two strong patrols. One returned with twenty four men, but the other was caught by the rains in a sickly part of the country, and so to fulfil his agreement, Lobengula provided Baillie with fifty of his own attendants. The Ndebele came into contact with labouring in a different way after 1890. When the Pioneer Column made its way into Mashonaland - saved by the restraint of Lobengula -its members had the promised grants of land to look forward to, but it was the gold claims that principally interested them. The long tradition of a Northern Eldorado and the recent gold fever in the Transvaal had seen to that. It was not long before the Ndebele found themselves excluded from raiding and levying tribute from their neighbouring peoples. Indirectly this had been a tribute of labour. These Shona peoples now found themselves exposed to a new form of tribute, a tribute of direct labour for the Europeans who established farms or claims in the vicinity. In the border area around Fort Victoria, there can be little doubt that some at least of 107 the local Africans accepted labour as a form of protection fi?om Q their former Ndebele overlords. However, such labourers were just as liable to flee to their granite kopjes at the slight-9 est hint of the arrival of an Ndebele impi. This early Chartered period is extraordinary in many ways. The Colonial Office positively went out of its way to avoid responsibility. When a petition from the settlers -an early example of settler-Company friction - was forwarded to the Colonial Office by Labouchere, Knutsford, the Secretary of State, declared that he could not involve himself in the Company's ordinances."^ Moreover the Colonial Office had refused to appoint a Resident in the chartered territory.^ 12 The first real administrator, Jameson, acted - to put it in the words of a Colonial Office official in 1897 - as a benefic-13 ent despot. y It is hardly surprising then that the early labour policy should be entirely haphazard. The Company made its own ordinances, and supplemented them with extra-legal administrative activity. Pioneers staked out their grants of three thousand acres and made informal agreements with the inhabitants of any African villages that happened to lie upon them. The Company swiftly seized upon two well-established labour practices - locations near towns strictly controlled for African migrants only, and the stimulant of taxation. It is clear from the Company's Salisbury Native Rules and Regulations of 1892"^ that we are already encountering 108 the security provisons that were the basis of labour policy in the provinces and states to the South. On February 22nd, 1892, notice was given that an office for the registration and protection of servants and natives had been established in Salisbury; that Mr. Garrett Doyle had been appointed Registrar of Natives, and that rules and regulations would be strictly enforced. On September 26th of the same year rules and regulations were posted which claimed to create a balance between the protection of Africans and'of their employers. All Africans seeking work in Salisbury had to report to the Registrar to secure a pass permitting them to remain in Salisbury a certain number of days. If an African were found in the township without a pass or a contract of labour, he could be fined by the magistrate £1 or given 14 days imprisonment with or without hard labour. The employees required a written pass to be outside the location between the hours of 9.0 p.m. and daylight, subject to a penalty of £2 and/ or 14 days imprisonment. The Registrar of Natives was to assist Africans in finding employment and "to aid, advise and protect them", his activities being financed by a stamp of one shilling for each month of labour covered by the contract. These provisions "for the better protection of native labourers and for the suppression of vagrancy within the limits of certain townships" were incorporated in the Registration of Natives Regulations of 1895> which extended their operation to 109 15 Bulawayo, Umtali, Fort Victoria, Gwelo, as well as Salisbury. y While the protection of African servants and labourers is stressed, it is clear that the township pass system and the curfew were designed to protect the European inhabitants. Moreover, there appears to be no provision whatever for wives and families and for visits to and from the location. The principle is clearly laid down that the location is to be the temporary abode of an employee who is bound to leave on the date specified by his pass or by his contract. At Umtali, for example, the police were described as over-zealous. They had begun to arrest Africans before they had time to reach the native commissioner's office and obtain a pass."^ This had an adverse effect on the supply of labour in the town. Secondly, the Company took up a taxation policy. In the National Archives of Rhodesia, there is a record of an interest ing conversation between Rhodes and Jameson on taxation, a conversation that took place on May 15, 1892: Mr. Rhodes: As my suggestion, please consider we are strong enough to put on a hut tax for the following reasons - we don't sell liquor to the natives, and they must be choke full of beads and calico. The result is a steady drain on any gold in the country, which is either buried or taken to the Portuguese to buy liquor • with. A hut tax taking money, produce or labour will at any rate save us some of our gold carted out of the country; the only doubt is whether we are strong enough. Dr. Jameson: I quite agree, and I am sure we are strong enough. The only difficulty will be the collection. ' The labour motive is here conspicuous by its absence, but 110 it was not to remain so for long. When the Company did set about a taxation policy, it created a draft ordinance at a singularly unpropitious time, 18 the middle of the Matabele War. This ordinance was of course intended for Mashonaland only, and the Company attemp ted to move with considerable haste. The Colonial Office, however, refused to be hurried. When the Company made fresh efforts in July of 1893,the need for settled industry and for inducements to go to work were explicitly mentioned. The ordinance was postponed until the following year, and Rhodes impatiently gave orders for the tax to be collected before the Colonial Office had actually given its assent. This was typical of Rhodes, but the whole issue is most interesting from the point of view of the Colonial Office reaction. It marks the temporary victory of a Company faction within the Colonial Office. When the tax had originally been proposed, Sydney Olivier, true to his socialist beliefs, and flying in the face of Colonial Office as well as Company policy, wrote: The further concession they desire is a concession of forced labour. They employ the Pecksniffian argument with which we are so familiar in South Africa, that it is the holy mission of the white man to teach the native habits of settled industry: the industry, bien entendu, being always contemplated under the form of wage labour for the white man in the mines or on the land which he cannot work for himself. Ill They want to kill two birds with one stone, he went on -expropriate the land, starve the natives into working for the white expropriator on their own former property. His superior, Edward Fairfield, produced all the conventional . 21 arguments on the benefits of taxation and labour. But in 1894, Fairfield was prepared to go further. While admitting that the Company's administration had been collect ing tax wholly illegally, he advised that it would be better 22 not to quarrel with the Company over the issue. Rhodes had "squared"yet another useful contact. Fairfield did in fact conduct a private correspondence with Bourcher Hawksley, the Company's solicitor in London, who was to loom large in the Jameson Raid. In July of 1893, Fairfield had written My dear Hawksley, In re. the hut tax, you will have an answer in a day or two, not closing the door of hope, or damning the tax eternally, but pointing out that as Lendy and then Matabele have been unhappily corrupted by the example of the House of Commons and taken to banging one another about, this is hardly the moment to proceed with the consideration of the subject, inter annos leges (fiscales) silent. Rhodes' argument that the necessity of paying the tax will compel the Mashonas to work for the mining companies is all well enough in a Stock Exchange Luncheon Room, but it is hardly a Parliamentary argument y Taxation to stimulate labour had indeed been a parliamentary argument in the past, and by the end of the century it was- to be one again. 112 During the years of the uneasy truce in Rhodesia before the Matabele War, the Company probably had hopes that the Ndebele would fragment as a result of labour migration.^ Labour migration would attract young warriors anxious to acquire the trading goods that had been exhibited in Matabeleland for decades. The residue would be a broken tribal system and an ineffective warrior remnant. But demand was neither so great nor conditions sufficiently attractive for this vision to be in any way realistic. In any case there were sufficient Holi peoples to satisfy early demand in Rhodesia and even in Kimberley and the Transvaal. The conclusion of the Matabele War saw the extension of the Company's irregular policies to Matabeleland. The settler combatants had been enticed, like the pioneers, with promises of grants of land - this time 3,000 rnorgen or about 6,000 acres. The Company was anxious also to extend its taxation, though the Colonial Office Insisted that reserves should first be set up, and were duly placated by the Shangani and Gwaai reserves, even although these were totally inadequate in terms of water and soil resources. By and large the Ndebele stayed put. Jame son's agreement with the indunas after the War was relatively liberal, and one of the conditions imposed was that the chiefs 25 should send their men out to work. y Out of town, labour was simply exacted by owners of land or claims from the Africans who happened to live on their 113 concessions. This practice was to a certain extent regulated by the High Commissioner's proclamation No. Ik of 1896. Not less than seven heads of families could be established as a pri vate location, and rent could be levied after the first year if the Chief Native Commissioner were satisfied that there was sufficient land for all, except those leaving as labour-migrants. But the proclamation was purely permissive, and throughout Mashonaland and Matabeleland there were other informal, extra-legal arrangements. The South African 27 Native Affairs Commission of Enquiry of 1905 declared that as unalienated land was disposed of, the Africans on it were "left to make the best terms they could with the owners and are generally permitted to remain upon condition of paying pQ rent, furnishing labour, or both". These arrangements clearly had obvious benefits for the labour-hungry settlers, and in effect created tiny reservoirs of labour attached to each European enterprise, a concept that would probably have appealed to the third Earl Grey. But it was to create problems and abuses. Throughout this early period mines were as scattered as the farms. In the first place, concessions for the pioneers or for those participating in the Victoria Agreement2^ had of course been on an individual basis. Secondly, the gold deposits had turned out to be extremely scattered. There certainly was no reef in Rhodesia as on the Rand. Hence the Ilk country was much more favourable to the small man, and prospectors always had the hope of fresh discoveries. Al though the Chartered Company insisted on the flotation of companies for the exploitation of the gold, enterprises remained extremely small until the early years of the twentieth century. Since claims were usually associated with the grant or purchase of a large tract of land, mines in the early years supplied themselves with labour very much as the farms did. In other words the assumption in this period was that European enterprise, whether mining or farming, could simply be superimposed on the existing pattern of African kraals, and labour exacted in return for the right to continue working a portion of the land. This assumption ignored however a number of important considerations. Firstly, enterprises would not remain so small that such a labour policy would continue to be feasible. Secondly the imperial government would insist on the creation of reserves. Thirdly, villages were not static, but were accustomed to move on when the soil became exhausted. Fourth ly the absence of traditional raiding for cattle, the official sanction for the custom of lobolo,^^ and the creation of new markets, would all lead to a vast increase in African stock, which would soon become a "nuisance" to European farmers. And fifthly, increasing labour migration would deplete the number of potential labourers for the land or mine owner. Eventually, 115 indeed, those people whose kraals were near to a mine were the last people to go to work there, simply because they were able to make an adequate living selling their produce or providing other services.^~ Elsewhere, the native commissioners simply instructed the headmen to turn out some labour. Whether or not this was forced labour became the great question when the Company was faced with the rebellions not only of the Ndebele but also of the Shona, and the Imperial Government set about investigat ing its causes. The debate about whether or not there was forced labour is however something of a red herring. It is, as some one in the Colonial Office said, largely a matter of definition, and whatever was the nature of the physical compulsion, there was compulsion of an indirect type through out the period - taxation, evictions from land, compulsion by headmen or fathers anxious for cash. Forced labour was found to be one of the causes of the rebellions by Sir Richard 32 Martin, and it was a sufficiently emotive subject to be a useful tool in the hands of the Company's enemies. Certainly it existed in one form or another, but it was just one of several causes, and by no means the most important. The rinderpest killings, the tyranny of the African police, the sense of being conquered peoples, and above all the tremendous* influence of the tribal religious authorities,^ were more important. 116 What is surprising is that the Company and contemporary observers were so unaware of what was coming. One writer, E.F. Knight, ^ gave a glowing and optimistic account of a visit to Rhodesia in 1894. He contrasted the pre-Matabele War period with the period of his visit. Then the Shona had frequently fled to their granite kopjes to escape the raiding Matabele. Now they had come down to the plains, and were even inhabiting the former No Man's Land between the Matabele and the Mashona. In Mashonaland there is now no difficulty in obtaining a sufficiency of that cheap and efficient native labour without which the land, despite all its natural wealth, would remain a wilderness.-7-7 He felt that the. swiftness with which the administration had been restored after the war was remarkable. He was opposed to the establishment of reserves, arguing that the then current system of permitting kraals to remain scattered amongst the white population would be the most productive of labour. He attacked the notion that there was any forced labour in Rhodesia and insisted that indunas were simply induced to supply voluntary labour. In July of 1894, just a few months after the War, 800 Ndebele entered Bulawayo to work on the brickfields and in other capacities. But he feared that' there was a danger of the natives becoming too 36 rich, so prejudicing their will to work. Knight's view of Rhodesia in 1894 reveals a large number 117 of attitudes that must have been present among the settlers. They had achieved what they wanted, the destruction of the Ndebele nation and army; they had a considerable optimism about the future now that they were no.longer menaced by a warrior power. This euphoria was just possible in 1894, but it is surprising that the administration was so unaware of the rebellions that were to come almost until they broke out. F.C. Selous, the explorer and hunter who had guided the pioneer column up to the Mashonaland plateau, wrote of the rumblings before the storm in Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia (1896). As Knight had done, he praised the magnanimity of the settlement after the war. The Ndebele were permitted to go on occupying their lands, and most of their indunas were left in power provided that they supplied through the native commissioners labourers for the farms and mines. These labour "regulations", Selous went on, proved extremely irksome to the Ndebele because they were so indolent, with the result that African police were sent to the kraals to see to it that labourers were sent out, "and these policemen, I fear, some times exceeded their duties, and used their position to 38 tyrannise over the people". An induna, Umlugulu, who had been one of Lobengula's indunas, complained to him of the trouble caused by the African police. There was undoubtedly and inevitably strain between the 118 Ndebele and the Shona in the early period. Before the Matabele War, we have seen that the peoples around Fort Victoria several times sought refuge from the Ndebele impi either by joining the Europeans or by fleeing to their granite kopjes. This antagonism did not die overnight, particularly when it was exacerbated by European ideas of equality before the law. However the rebellions revealed the way in which both Ndebele and Shona could combine in the common object of casting out the Europeans, influenced as they were by the religious authorities which the Ndebele had largely taken 30 over from the Shona. y There is evidence also that early strain in labour relations was caused by the divisions within Ndebele society. The privileges of a warrior class died hard. H.C. Thomson in his Rhodesia and its Government, normally extremely hostile to the Company, explained that the forced labour between the Matabele War and the rebellions was partly an attempt on the part of the administration to equalise Ndebele society and stamp out indigenous slavery.^ The Zansi class had, according to him, been using the Holi and the Enhla to earn their tax for them. There is very little other evidence for this, but there is no reason to disbelieve Thomson, and it is certainly true that the Ndebele system was quite a rigid caste system, and inter-marriage for instance was discouraged until comparatively recently.^ So it would probably be surprising 119 if such social strains had not existed. An early tradition of labour migration from outside had been set up in the realm of domestic labour. Domestic servants were recruited from the Cape and Natal, from Portuguese East Africa, the British Central Africa Protect orate, and even from as far away as Kenya and Uganda.^ These aliens were sometimes resented by the indigenous Africans, particularly when - as with those from the Cape -43 they received much higher wages. y A considerable number of Cape Africans had been recruited for the Pioneer Column, and not unnaturally received the best jobs. At first the hut tax had not been too onerous. The native commissioners had accepted stock or produce during the first year, a form of tribute that was quite familiar. In 1895 however, the Chief Native Commissioner proposed that the profits from the sale of stock (usually to the white market) should accrue to the native department rather than be accredited to the village that had supplied them, so that the African taxpayers would realise the very real disadvantage in hand ing over stock and grain rather than cash.^ At least one native commissioner reported that this policy was highly successful in inducing Africans to go out to work. On the other hand, taxation did not arrive in every part of the country at once. It was not until after the rebellions that tax was levied on some of the northern areas of the country, 120 near the Zambezi Valley.^ Lewis Gann has pointed out that the small and pioneer ing nature of the native administration meant that officers were frequently moved around.^ They had thus little chance of becoming truly cognisant with the peoples of any one district. Moreover, many of the early officers of the native administration were of indifferent quality. They frequently had little or no administrative experience. One for example had been a trooper in the pioneer corps, and then a trader before becoming a field cornet and later a native commissioner.^ Their English in the early handwritten reports y is often poor - the Chief Native Commissioner frequently made spelling and grammatical corrections in red ink - and they ignored specific instructions from the Chief Native Commissioner as to policy, the arrangement of their reports, and so on. Of course, Company posts of this nature did not have the prestige nor the security of imperial appointments; the country was still unsettled and hardly developed at all; and many of the native commissioners were to lose their lives in the "rebellions" of 1896 and 1897. But even while the rebellions were in progress, native commissioners continued to display an unsympathetic arrogance and an exaggerated duty to turn out labour. One wrote (referring to the method used of attacking the Shona in their granite kopje strongholds), "the Mashonas express their great 121 objection of (sic) being dynamited", another, "I have just received an order from Mr. Baden for a hundred mine boys and 51 am collecting them";^ and a little later another wrote, "It seems to be feared that the rate of pay could not be brought down again owing to some supposed peculiarities of the native mind".52 The answers of the native commissioners of Mashonaland to a circular issued by the Chief Native Commissioner in 1895 are very revealing. This circular enquired about the native commissioners' views on labour and the necessity to introduce legislation- to regulate the same. The six replies (from Charter, Hartley, Marondellas, Salisbury town, Salisbury district, and Umtali) all unreservedly supported forced 53 labour.They produced various schemes for the operation of a quota system of extracting labourers from each kraal, taken out for periods of three months at a time, and returned in place of another batch; there should be a tax or punish ment (preferably corporal) on those who did not comply; there should be more police to chase up deserters; kraals were becoming too scattered because of the new-found security, and ought to be centralised in a location where they could be better supervised; there should be a register of all labourers. One made it clear that he was.actually attempt ing such a policy in his district. Only two felt that there ought to be some improvements in the conditions at the places 122 of work, and singled out the practice of employers flogging their labourers as a current abuse. In 1898, so soon after the end of the "rebellions", the old labour recruiting methods are still in evidence. Some of the flavour of these activities can be derived from the rather lurid quarterly reports of the native commissioners of that year. They still talk of "collecting", of "forward ing" and of "delivering". All 76 labourers delivered to the Confidence Reef mine early in that year ran away; 38 were "sent back". In Victoria, "pressure" was brought to bear on account of arrears in tax. But at the same time the native commissioner reported that labour migration was getting a bad 54 name because of the numbers who died en route. ^ As might be expected from such a raw administration labour policy was by no means uniform in this early period. But the basic points of a colonial labour policy had already emerged. Direct taxation was the cornerstone of the policy of stimul ants. As Knight reveals, the dispute between those who desired reserves for the Africans and those who preferred at least territorial integration had been joined. As a quid pro  quo for the Matabeleland taxation, the Colonial Office had insisted on the establishment of reserves, even if, in the absence of any adequate supervision, they were to be totally unsuitable as the Gwaai and Shangani reserves were. The Company pursued very much its own policy. There was no 123 imperial officer on the spot. The High Commissioner in South Africa was a remote and hardly effective figure. Conditions may have remained so had not the Jameson Raid and the Ndebele and Shona rebellions produced a massive attack on the Company's Charter, the Martin Report on the Company's Native Administ ration, and the need for the Colonial Office to bail the Company out, in Rhodesia in the shape of imperial troops, and in London, support for the continuation of the Charter. Subsequently, the mobilisation of labour became a more complex and a more controlled operation. But while the dual economy developed, the principles by which labour might be legitimately mobilised became a continuing dispute. One of the best known documents in Rhodesian history is Sir Richard Martin's Report on the Native Administration of 55 the British South Africa Company, 1897. Its findings on, inter alia, the question of forced labour, are so well-known that it is unnecessary to deal with them at any length here.5^ Its importance lies in three factors - the nature of the reception it was accorded in the Colonial Office, the deep distrust of officials of the native department that it engend ered there, and the distinction it continued to make between indirect and direct means of compulsion. Needless to say, the Company expressed self-righteous shock at the findings of the new commandant general and deputy 124 commissioner, and they made every attempt to delay Chamber lain in presenting it to Parliament and to the Select Comm-57 ittee on the British South Africa Company then meeting. The Colonial Office promptly introduced two problems of definition - whether or not the Company or its officials were at fault, and at what point forced labour ceased to be 58 forced labour. Lord Grey produced an extended reply to 59 Martin's Report, 7 which was in fact favourably received by Chamberlain, although his own officials were by no means so convinced. Of course, by the very nature of the subject, it was as possible to produce a corpus of evidence denying the existence of forced labour as it was to discover a body supporting it. Chamberlain indeed felt that Martin had not made sufficient allowances, and went so far as to assert that some form of forced labour was necessary to the spread of civilisation in Africa.^ "Sir Richard Martin has been too unbending, but his report should not be belittled or thrown over", was the reply of one of the Company's most vigorous critics, Hartmann Just.^ The furthest Mr. Chamberlain should go, Just went on, was to agree that encouragement to labour by hut tax was necessary for the natives' civilization. It is evident from this that because of Chamberlain's outright support for the Company - particularly in the shape of the honest and charismatic Grey - the Colonial Office officials had, in order to restrain the Secretary of State, to move 125 closer to his position. So far as the forced labour issue is concerned, about which so much paper and argument was wasted, one has sympathies with another official, Frederick Graham, who wrote "The matter is now merely of academic interest".^-7 While the new constitutional formula was being evolved, the officials followed their natural propensity to attack the Company; Edward Fairfield, the Board's most faithful support er, died when they most needed him. The attacks were direct ed against the whole South African basis of the Company: "Mr. Hawksley is the Company in London, as Mr. Rhodes is in Africa, and a pretty mess they have made of it. The most urgent reforms required are to place Mr. Rhodes under control, and to so constitute the London Board as to make it something more than a mere machine to register the dicta on com plicated administrative questions of a man whose function is to advise on legal tech nicalities.""^ Of course, the Charter was safe. The usual glib reasons of Treasury parsimony and Chamberlain's own implic ation in the Jameson Raid are plausible enough. But there was a more fundamental reason, which Milner expressed in a 65 letter to H.H. Asquith: y that nothing would unite Boer and Briton more effectively against the imperial authorities than if they took a strong line against the Company "for the prot ection of the Blacks". "This is the whole crux of the South African position."^ (it is interesting to consider to what extent the Transvaal felt less outflanked by a commercial rather than an imperial interest, even when that commercial 126 interest had instigated a violation of its territory.) Milner expressed the hope of being able to maintain a humane and progressive system in Rhodesia with the control he had over the administration. The great thing here is to secure the appointment of honourable and capable men as magistrates and native commissioners. If that can be done, I think the lot of the natives may be a very tolerable one and that even a system of compulsory labour indeed, under fair conditions and proper safeguards, may be turned to their advantage.67 These are the two basic clues to the future of labour mobilisation in Rhodesia. Rhodesia's future lay administ ratively, commercially, and ultimately politically with the rest of southern Africa, despite the fact that she would have an independent link with the Indian Ocean in the not-too-distant future. The Charter had to remain in being because it suited Miner's South African policies. The future of Rhodesian Africans was obscured as effectively as that of their cousins in the South by the Boer-Briton dispute. Milner's second assertion that the principal labour safeguard ought to lie simply in a corps of able magistrates and native commissioners was to create, by the Colonial Office's unwill ingness to accept it, the most contentious and obscurantist issue amongst the various parties, Africans, settlers, Company, High Commissioners and Colonial Office. The Colonial Office was to insist instead on a somewhat unreal exclusion of native 127 commissioners from the whole business of labour recruitment. The Boer War had a very considerable effect on the development of labour policy in Rhodesia. It held up for several years the definition and the execution of the Colonial Office attitude. Naturally, Milner, faced with war and the culmination of his South African policies, could only regard Rhodesia as a minor fringe problem during these years. Reports of the Resident Commissioner ( a post set up by the new Order-in-Council of 1898) had to run the gauntlet of the High Commissioner's over-worked office, and this meant either delay, or as Qn one notorious occasion, loss for over a year. The role of native commissioners in the recruiting of labour was to bedevil policy throughout our period. The ill-repute earned by the native commissioners before the 1897/1898 reconstruction resulted in a Colonial Office insistence that labour recruiting ought to be in the hands of an independent labour bureau, despite the fact that the newly-appointed Resident Commissioner (whom Chamberlain described in a traditional phrase as his "eyes and ears") now had access to all native commissioners' reports. Just such labour bureaux were set up in I898 and 1899 when Mashonaland and Matabeleland each received a labour board. These had however little effect on the activities of native commissioners, who continued to play an active part in recruitment, and indeed 128 the Mashonaland board had no recruiting agents at all, being solely concerned with distribution.^ The work of the boards was sabotaged by the facts that their tariffs were not adhered to, and that there was continuing competition between the two provinces. The labour supply and demand fluctuated violently in these closing years of the century. In 1898, two mines had 70 to close for lack of labour, although the Resident Commiss ioner was later to imply that the mines often closed for other 71 reasons and used the labour supply as a scapegoat.' In l899> on the other hand, the native department insisted on the.hut tax being paid in July, and refused to give a period of grace 72 as had been the practice hitherto.' The result was a glut of labour: a large proportion of the intending labourers had to be sent home, and within a very short time there was a renewed labour famine. Conditions remained exceptionally poor at the mines, and those which offered better pay, better food, or slightly better treatment had no difficulty in 73 obtaining labour. ^ Meanwhile, Colonial Office suspicions had again been aroused by the activities of the two Chief Native Commiss ioners, Taylor and Taberer, in a whole series of indabas they held in the course of 1899.^ These indabas-were held with a considerable show of European power: local Europeans, native commissioners, missionaries, police were present. In 129" Mashonaland, the Bishop of Mashonaland and a detachment of fifty mounted British South Africai Police took part. In Matabeleland, the recruiting agents of the new labour board were introduced to the assembled headmen. In their addresses to these indabas the Chief Native Commissioners insisted that it was the duty of the people to go out to work, that other peoples like the Fingoes (a Cape Bantu tribe who were currently being settled in the Bembezi district under an agreement with Rhodes) would come in and take their land, that Mr. Rhodes would be very angry with them, that it was a white man's country and that the Africans had to work like white men, that the local reserve would be taken from them if they did not work, and that although there would be no force used, it would be the indunas' duty to turn out labour. At each indaba there was stress on the idea of batches of men going out to work for three months at a time. In one district, Taylor asked how would they like it if he were to send the police and messengers around the kraals to turn people out to work. The assembled headmen were far from inarticulate at these meetings. On two occasions (at Insiza and Bubi) head men expressed bewilderment that they were told in one breath there would be no forced labour, and in the next that they would have to turn out labour. There were complaints also of poor wages, of injuries and deaths at the mines, that 130 there were not enough men left to work the land, of the fact that bureau recruits earned less than those recruited independently,, that "boys" from the Cape received much higher wages, that they were sometimes sent back when there was no work for -them. They resented also the fact that the admin istrators attacked those parts of their custom, such as witchcraft and certain beer and dance festivals, to which they objected, but upheld other parts such as lobolo, which served their purposes. Taylor announced that fathers-in-law should insist on receiving lobolo for their daughters. It will become clear later why there was this insistence on lobolo. The reports of these indabas caused the biggest stir in the Colonial Office since the Martin Report. The officials referred to Chamberlain's insistence to Rosmead (then High Commissioner) in 1896, that labour was not to be extorted through indunas as this smacked of forced labour. And the Secretary of State himself wrote that the Chief Native Comm issioners' inducements were "directly calculated to lead to 75 forced labour". ^ The Colonial Office brushed aside the attempts of the Company and of Taylor to defend the indabas.^ Taylor insisted that it was necessary to act in this way in order to uphold the authority of the indunas, and referred to the decline in labour recruitment during the past year, and the ineffectiveness of the low hut tax in getting men out to work. 131 The Colonial Office continued to send some of its sharpest letters to the Company, insisting that the draft native regulations would have to be forwarded before they were produced as a fait accompli in the Legislative Council (also set up by the 1898 Order-in-Council), that some alternative 77 on the lines of the Cape Glen Grey Act'' would have to be found, and refusing to accept the Board's excuse that it was 78 too busy. If any further evidence were needed to confirm the Colonial Office -in its suspicion of the native department and in its continuing conviction in the need for an independ-ent recruiting organisation, this was it. In 1901, the Resident Commissioner, Sir Marshall Clarke began to play an important part in the Company-Colonial Office debate. A whole series of reports arrived from him during this year, many of which had been held up for a considerable period in the High Commissioner's office. Clarke felt that in the case of ill-treatment, it was easier for labourers to desert than to apply for redress to the official who had recruited them. He reported that "the duties of the native commissioners to induce the natives to work and afterwards to collect taxes from their wages unwillingly earned, make their 79 position difficult and detracts from their influence". He went on to take up the attitude that the only true inducement to labour was the development of "legitimate wants", that tax was an unsatisfactory way of getting people out to work, and 132 80 that he disapproved of any application of the Glen Grey Act. This was a more "liberal" attitude than even the Colonial Office was willing to take up. But his most damning piece of information was that "pressure little short of force" had again been used by the native commissioners in the recruiting of labour. The Colonial Office set about a tighter reining in of the Company on the labour issue than had ever been exerted before. The Company was informed that in future recruiting within the country had to be on an independent basis, but on an official basis outside (in fact this distinction never On really operated);0 that if the native commissioners did not behave, they would have to be appointed by the High Comm issioner and be directly responsible to him, though paid by the Company; that "a state of things which has been tolerated to 83 Op too long cannot and will not be allowed to continue". The . Company reacted with considerable pique. Meanwhile there had already been further half-hearted attempts to set up a new labour supply association, but these had been thwarted by inter-provincial rivalry,and when a new labour board was eventually set up, it lasted hardly more 85 than a year from its inauguration on July 1st 1900. y The whole situation was greatly blurred by the fact that the Colonial Office was acting upon reports of the Resident Comm issioner that were months or even over a year old. Imperial 133 impotence was revealed when, just as a sterner line was being taken with the Company, native commissioners had again to be used for recruiting because of the failure of the 1900 board. Sir Marshall Clarke, to the annoyance of the Colonial Office, appeared to indulge in a volte face by declaring that in the establishment of a labour bureau the Company was simply being permitted to shuffle off complete responsibility from itself on to a quasi-independent board dependent for its success on or government officials. His judgment was, however, as will be shown below, as shrewd as it usually was. Milner supported the Company in its predicament by telegraphing on the veto on official activity We must riot ride the principle to death in ignorance or in disregard, of local circumstances We must not go too far ahead of colonial sentiment and lead them to suppose we are sacrificing their substantial interests for the sake of a hard and fast rule.°> Sir Marshall Clarke acquiesced in the instructions to the native commissioners that they were only to make requirements 00 known and register recruits who presented themselves. He eventually had to' agree also that in collecting tax, the native commissioners would have to inform those who could not pay that labour was.available in other districts.°9 They had still not escaped the basic problem of semantics, what constit-90 uted direct or indirect pressure. y That remarkable asset of the Company, Albert, fourth Earl 134 Grey, was able again to tide the Company over, and by private communication with Joseph Chamberlain, persuade the Colonial Office to agree to this interim arrangement.The Company pleaded that the business community was not yet sophisticated 92 enough to sustain a truly independent labour bureau, and miners and farmers combined for once to attack the Colonial Office for meddling in what they regarded as the perfectly °3 legitimate work of the native commissioners.'y The Presid ent of the Chamber of Mines in his address to the Annual 94 Meeting in 1902y^ was able to make a good case for the re-introduction of more strict government control in recruiting in view of the reappearance of the private labour "touts", concerned only with numbers and capitation fees, who had been such a bane in the early period. But his pleas for the greater protection of Africans were not unnaturally regarded within the Colonial Office as special pleading. Two new labour bureaux were in fact to be set up before 1914. While they lasted longer than their predecessors, they experienced precisely the same difficulties. First and foremost, they failed utterly to break the seasonal cycle of labour so familiar throughout Africa. When labour was plentiful after the harvest, the mines could supply them selves adequately from independent private recruitment, and the bureau was left with its recruits on its hands, and since it was too expensive to keep these recruits in the depots, 135 95 they were sent home or forwarded to the Rand. y When the seasonal shortage occurred, the bureau had no recruits like everyone else. The bureaux contributed to the jealousy between the various communities in Rhodesia: between Bulawayo and Salisbury, which had swiftly established an inter-city acerbity, between the larger and the smaller mines, and between the miners and the farmers. The Labour Fees Ordinance of 1906 (which imposed a tax of one shilling per month on all labourers, regardless of whether bureau recruits or not, levied on the mineowners in order to help finance the bureau) antagonised a number of mines who felt that the bureau was an organised charity for supplying labour to poorer, less well-organised mines. The mines were moreover disappointed with the standard of recruit the bureau sent, for experienced and healthier recruits preferred to travel independently. Moreover, it was well-known that dishonest mines applied for more labourers than they required in the hope of getting the right number when scarcity prompted the imposition of a strict quota system.y So far as the farmers were concerned the bureau was constantly suspected of being virtually a mining preserve. The capitation fees were too high for the farmers. When the Labour Tax Ordinance of 1911 was passed (a similar measure to that of 1906 except that it was imposed on the farmers also) they indulged in widespread refusal to pay. 136 Several were fined or sent to prison before the ordinance was repealed. Finance was indeed the never-ending worry of the various bureaux. The stipulations that were laid down by the imperial authorities with regard to medical examinations, food, clothing, transport, acclimatisation in depots and so on, cost more money than the bureaux were ever able to afford or raise in capitation fees. The setting up of great chains of rest houses, a day's march apart, was another immense capital cost. (These regulations will be reviewed in a later chapter.) Above all, the bureaux were extremely unpopular amongst the Africans themselves. They disliked the loss of freedom implied in the bureaux' shunting of them around; they dis liked being sent to mines that were unpopular, being separated from their friends; the bureaux African employees frequently came into disrepute; and labourers found that bureau recruits invariably received a lower wage at the mines than those who had presented themselves independently.^ Moreover, the ticket or coupon system of payment, used throughout the mines, was very unpopular, and militated against labour recruitment. Under this system, the African labourer was paid not by the calendar month, but by the number of shifts he completed, thirty shifts or endorsements on his ticket being the usual number. This was clearly open to abuses, and in addition gave a completely misleading impression about wage rates-to 137 the Colonial Office, where it ¥/as widely assumed that a completed ticket amounted to one month's labour. In fact, it could be much more. The Chief Native Commissioner 98 attacked this system, recognising its dangers, but neither the native department nor the bureaux succeeded in destroy ing it. There was another immense problem in the Colonial Office's insistence on this policy. And that is to what extent the bureaux were genuinely independent and success fully excluded the members of the native department from recruiting. At the beginning, the board did so not at all. In the longer-lasting bureaux it is still questionable whether the native department was excluded. Both in 1899 and in 1903, native commissioners became general managers of labour bureaux; some of the agents were recruited from the native department (five in 1899); the Chief Native Commissioners and other Company officials (such as mining officials) were on the boards of the bureaux. The 1903 bureau was empowered to arrange for recruiting agreements with the British Central African Protectorate, Portuguese East Africa, and the Trans vaal. It is here that the ultimate irony emerges. The idea that the bureaux were independent concerns merely under goverment supervision was a fiction. The bureau of 1903 was, despite its public share issue, virtually a department of the administration in terms of personnel and of policy control. 138 But other administrations, such as that of Nyasaland, actually refused to deal with it because it was not an agency of the Rhodesian administration. • Native commissioners continued to collaborate with its agents, and indeed its agents frequently acted as pass officers for the issue of permits to go to work. "'"^ While this covert collaboration went on, the Administrator, Sir William Milton, determined to placate the Colonial Office on the issue. When a Rhodesian committee appointed to enquire into native labour reported in 1906, it recommended that the native commissioners should again be permitted to do the recruiting, but Milton scotched the idea at once.^"^ Yet the bureau's unpopularity and diffic ulties were such that tov/ard the end of its life, it ceased to recruit in Rhodesia all together, and began to concentrate on the Company's vast estate and reservoir in the North, leaving the South to independent recruiting, and, presumably to native commissioner "influence". In 1908, the Company administration had taken over the recruiting operations in 102 Northern Rhodesia, leaving the bureau to operate in Southern Rhodesia only. But in 1912, the new bureau set up in that year, operated only in Northern Rhodesia. While the various labour bureaux were succeeding in alienating most sectors of Rhodesian society, black and white, the Company was of course continuing its policy of stimulants. We have seen that in the indabas of l899> the Chief Native 139 Commissioners set out to persuade Africans to insist on lobolo. This was eventually given statutory expression in the Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901. There is no question that a further stimulant to labour v/as one of the principal consid erations behind this ordinance. The Administrator said so in 103 a despatch to the Resident Commissioner, y although he point ed out that there were the additional reasons of avoiding contentious litigation with regard to forced marriages, infant betrothal and so on. Lobolo v/as made compulsory, except for Christian marriages, and limits were set on the number of cattle that could be transferred. The Colonial Office pointed out that the custom of lobolo, though universal in Mashonaland, was not universal throughout Matabeleland, and had indeed died out in some places.But the High Commissioner telegraphed that the administration could reserve powers of suspension in certain districts.^~®y The missionaries had of course opposed lobolo for a long time, failing to see that it had precisely the moral effects they would have desired. There is an interesting missionary reaction in the Zambezi Mission Record, the mag azine of the Jesuit Mission in Central Africa. Father Richartz of the Chishawasha Mission wrote that whenever the boys left school, the "pernicious custom of lobolo" lured them off to town to earn more wages than they could possibly . earn at the mission. And there they relapsed into paganism. Discussion on the raising of the hut tax continued over a considerable number of years. But the Colonial Office made any increase conditional upon the formal settlement of reserves. Under the 1898 Order-in-Council, the native commissioners were simply authorised to set aside such land as they deemed necessary for the needs of the natives in their districts. The result was a completely confused and heterogeneous policy. Some native commissioners set aside vast tracts of land, suitable and unsuitable; others allocated small reserves scattered throughout their districts -again reminiscent of the policy of the third Earl Grey. When lists of reserves were submitted to the Colonial Office in June of 1901, officials were able to detect certain chopping and 107 changing from previous lists. ' Description and surveying were usually inadequate, and Sir Hartmann Just concluded that "this is very unsatisfactory". In 1903, the Colonial Office received information that land on reserves was being 1 OQ alienated to private farmers, y which served to accentuate the Colonial Office's disquiet at a time when the Secretary of State was about to give approval to a tax increase. The Company did however proceed with its attempted adapt ation of the Glen Grey Act (which involved remission of tax for work done). But since the Glen Grey Act had encompassed at the same time another important principle, sale of land to Africans by quit rent, which was not going to be included in 141 the Rhodesian ordinance, the Glen Grey provisions were not acceptable to the Colonial Office. The amount mooted for the increased tax was £2. A deputation consisting of the President of the Chamber of Mines, the President of the Rhodesian Farmers' and Land owners' Association, the President of the Bulawayo. Chamber of Commerce, and a member of the Legislative Council, went to see Milner in Johannesburg in January of 1903. They demanded a tax of £4, an increase of 700 per cent. Milner informed that he was willing to consider a tax of £2, which was the same as the Transvaal tax, for he felt "legislation for the colonies should not be entirely guided by home sent iment"."''^ Having taken up this position,. Milner stubbornly adhered to it, even after the Resident Commissioner had decided that a £2 tax was excessive. The Resident Commissioner combined with missionary opin ion, including most notably Father Richartz of the Chishawasha Mission and John White, General Secretary of the Wesleyan Missions. Between them they argued that the Africans would be unable to meet such a tax, that it would involve hardship for African women, that it was in effect an indirect tax on Europeans, that the employers who could only pay low wages (which included the missions) would be seriously affected, that the recent bad harvest aggravated native unrest, and that the labour shortage was spurious.111 Richartz argued 1/---2 that even although his mission was only fifteen miles from Salisbury, his men would have difficulties earning enough ly h 113 HP to pay the tax. The Administrator tried to buy him off by offering special consideration for his tenants.' Milner was adamant that the hut tax would involve no hardship; "Nothing can shake my conviction on this subject".!"^ He even wrote to the Administrator that he was embarrassed by the opinion of the Resident Commissioner, and that if Milton 115 went on with the ordinance he would give it his support. The ordinance was in fact eventually disallowed by the Secretary of State on the grounds of fears of further African unrest. The Company was instead authorised to introduce a tax of £1, and the first collection of this began in 1904 after, the usual announcements in indabas.There is good evidence that the Colonial Office fear of another rebellion was justified, for reports of unrest after the tax 117 v/as introduced constituted something more than simply rumour. ' The higher tax appeared to solve the labour problems temporarily. In -succeeding years there were reports of surpluses, of recruits being sent to the Rand, of a demand for skilled labour which the Bureau could not meet, since experienced labourers found their own way to work. Hence the rent which the commercial branch of the Company began to levy on its unalienated land in 1908 had more the appearance of a producer of revenue than.of a stimulant. 143 Of course the settlers refused to accept the Company's view of unalienated land as its own private property, and even the native commissioners complained that the new rent was 119 a tactless and unnecessary further burden on the Africans. It was however the natural corollary of another piece of legislation that came into force in that year, the Private Locations Ordinance. This added to the insecurity of Africans on the land by bringing into the open the problem of whether Africans ought to be moved on to the reserves. The South African Native Affairs Commission of Enquiry of 1905 had recommended it., an'd those farmers who attacked "kaffir-farming" or who objected to their tenants' stock wanted it. On the other hand the Chief Native Commissioner of Mashonaland wished to encourage Africans to live on private land so that they would not sink into the apathy of the reserves, and farmers who found tenants to be their best source of labour went so far as to demand that Africans involved in a labour agreement under the 1896 Proclamation (see p. 113 ) should not be permitted to have passes to go to work. The ordinance the Company proposed involved a tax on tenants, location agreements registered with the native commissioner, and a guarantee of sufficient land for the tenants' needs. It aroused considerable opposition among those concerned with the labour supply. The Secretary of the Chamber of Mines wrote to the Administrator that the Private Locations Ordin ance would lead to the destruction of a valuable source of the labour supply of the territory by releasing the native of the necessity to earn the £30,000 per annum, which is the amount now paid to landowners in respect of rent.. It will in short, tend to drive them on to reserves where they can exist rent free, in sluggish indolence and barbarism. 21 This was the case of the absentee landlords, such as the mining companies, against whom the ordinance was partly directed. Opposition was such that the Legislative Council succeeded in emasculating the bill. The tax that emerged had to be paid only on those Africans who were not in bona  fide employment and who paid rent. In other words, a land owner could keep a potential labour supply on his land and not pay tax, provided he charged no rent from them. It would appear that the farmers' faction within the Legislative Council had won, for as the bill emerged, it was designed almost solely against absentee landlords. And the protective clauses for the tenants - such as that the native commissioner had to approve the land as sufficient for the tenants' needs -were excluded. Moreover, in one district at least, Mel-setter, landowners levied labour from their tenants, and succeeded in avoiding the payment of tax. Moreover, the reserves in Melsetter were particularly unsuitable, and there 122 were no reserves at all in the adjacent district of Inyanga. 145 Thus it can be seen that the non-availability of a suitable reserve could constitute a considerable constraint upon Africans' freedom of choice with regard to labour and land. There were circumstances under which this distraint could occur fortuitously. For example a rinderpest out break might result in a ban on the movement of cattle. Africans might then have no option but to stay where they were, and this might incur some labour agreement with the 123 landowner. ^ Insecurity for the African then seems to have been the main result of the Company land policy in effect if not in intention. The regulations with regard to Africans in towns remained burdensome. Both the Native Urban Locations Ordinance (which included the mines) of 1906 and the Salisbury Native Location Rules and Regulations of 1907 caused consider able concern within the Colonial Office. The regulations were regarded as "elaborate and vexatious" and their "aim is of course to make life on the location as burdensome as possible". "*"2^ ' The development of a powerful anti-reserves lobby (described in chapter 2) contributed to this insecurity. And the relationship of this to the need for a labour supply is obvious. The Private Locations Ordinance is an excellent example of a measure that could slip through the net of the Resident Commissioner. The Colonial Office appears to have been 146 totally oblivious of the practices that could exist under its aegis. The labour boards also reveal how tenuous was the control of the Colonial Office over the substance of labour recruiting. The problem of the reserves reveals the inevitable ignorance of the Colonial Office, which had to accept a fluid policy until the Coryndon Land Commission reported in 1916. While the Colonial Office could be spectacularly successful on such clear issues as the raising of the hut tax or the improvement of conditions on the mines, it permitted land and labour policy to drift. This drift is revealed in a number of ways. In 1907, an extraordinary system was set up in the Mrewas, Mtokos, and Victoria districts, whereby the native commissioners acted 125 as forwarding agents, ^ which seemed yet again to vitiate the attempts to create an independent recruiting system. In 1911, by Ordinance 16 of that year, private recruiters had to be licensed by the Government, but their continuing existence served to make the bureaux' task impossible. In 1911, the Chief Native Commissioner of Mashonaland suggested that an officer should be appointed iniieach district, "continually on the move visiting chiefs and kraals and preaching the 127 gospel of labour". In 1912, he spoke of "stirring up -1 pQ the natives to a sense of their obligations to the state", In the same year, the Chief Native Commissioner sent out a memorandum to all his native commissioners enquiring what 147 they thought of a proposed system whereby, after a careful census, Africans' certificates would be examined annually, and they would be spoken to severely if no work had been done. Of twenty-one native commissioners circularised, eleven agreed (some proclaiming that this was already standard practice), four disagreed (mainly because of absence of legal sanctions) and six had reservations. All except one agreed that recruiting ought to be on a personal basis and not done through the chiefs. Only one considered that this could amount to forced labour, observing that if the native commissioner did the ordering, he might also find himself 129 punishing disobedience. J By the outbreak of the First World War, Rhodesian labour demands were being satisfied because of the insecurity on the land, taxation, rents, the custom of lobolo, and the creation of such "legitimate" needs as ploughs, broken teams of oxen, clothing, and even bicycles. But while wants increased, the opportunities for alternatives also increased, in.the sale of stock, grain, and market gardening produce. It is this "grass roots" operation of labour stimuli which will be examined in the next chapter. 148 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1 Richard Brown, The Ndebele Succession Crisis, 1868-1877, Central African Historical Association, 1962. 2 NA;, Baines MSS. And L.H. Gann,, A History of Southern  Rhodesia, Early Days to 1934. (London, 1965), pp.55-57 J.P.R. Wallis, (ed.), The Northern Goldfields Diaries of  Thomas Baines. (London, 1946). 3., Baines to Windus, April 24, 1874. BA, 7/l/2 4 C.7196 for the Tati Company's demands for imperial protection. 5 A.J.B. Hughes, & J. Van Velsen, The Ndebele. (London, 1955). 6 Hughes & Van Velsen, op.cit. H.J. Taylor, A Short History  of the Native Tribes of Matab.eleland written for the information of the South African Native Affairs Commission. Annexure to minutes of Board of B.S.A.Co., Feb. 17, 1904. C.O.417/397. 7 Gann, op.cit., p.60. 8 C.7171 & C.7555. 9 E.F. Knight, Rhodesia of To-day, (London, 1895), chapter 1. K. Bradley in The Diary of a District Officer, (London, 1943), pp.19-21 describes how the Cewa similarly built their villages up hillsides as defence against the Ngoni. 10 C.7171. And Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and  Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965, (Oxford, 1966), p.105. 11 In 1892, the High Commissioner's representative at the court of Lobengula in Bulawayo, J.S. Moffat, was moved South. 12 A.R. Colquhoun, sometimes referred to as the first admin istrator, was styled Acting Resident Commissioner for Mashonaland. He resigned in I89I. 13 Minute, June 17, 1897. CO. 417/231. 14 It is significant that these Rules and Regulations, together with the Registration of Natives Regulations of 18§5, were not transmitted to the Colonial Office until 1897. C.O. 417/232. 149 15 ibid. 16 Report of the Native Commissioner, Umtali, March 31, 1901 NA N9/1/7 17 NA A. 1/3/10 18 B.S.A.Co., to CO., May 17, 1893. CO. 417/110. 19 B.S.A.Co., to CO., July 7, 1893. ibid. 20 Miinute to above, July 8, 1893. 21 ibid. 22 Mdnute, June 29, 1894 CIO. 417/136. 23 NA. CT 1/3/1 24 Moffat to Harris, Feb. 17, 1891 MO 1/1/5/4. 25 There are several testimonies to this informal arrange ment. F.C SeloUs, Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia, (London, I896), p.x. Knight, op ..cit.. p.17 Percy F. Hone, Southern Rhodesia, (London, 1909), p.41. 26 This assumption that labour migrants would be permanently lost to the land is odd considering the Company's other policies. 27 Cd. 2399. 28 Cd. 2399, p.31. 29 This was the enlistment agreement entered into by Jameson and the prospective combatants in the Matabele War. 30 The Native Marriages Ordinance of 1901. 31 Hone, op.cit., p.64. 32 He was sent to Rhodesia after the Jameson Raid and the outbreak of the Matabele Rebellion, styled Commandant General and Deputy Commissioner. 33 T.O. Ranger, The Role of Ndebele and Shona Religious  Authorities in the Rebellions of 1896 and 1897 in E. Stokes & R. Brown, The Zambesian Past, (London, 1966), pp.94-136. There is more expansive treatment in Ranger's ISO recent monograph on the rebellions, Revolt in Southern  Rhodesia, 1896-97, (London, 1967). 34 Knight, op.cit. 35 ibid., p.4. 36 ibid., p.17. He pointed out that Africans in Rhodesia could earn more than domestic servants in Britain, which was of course perfectly true, although there was less security in Rhodesian employment. Moreover, the relat ive earnings of African and European were closer at this time than they were at any*subsequent period. 37 Selous, op.cit., preface. 38 ibid. 39 Hughes & van Velsen, op.cit. & Ranger, op.cit. 40 H.C.Thomson, Rhodesia and its Government, (London, 1898), p.186. p.1§6: "Jameson had assured Gambo /one of the leading indunas7 that the Holi would still have to be the servants of the Matabele, but the Matabele were forced to work alongside the Holi." See also Hone, op.cit., p.41. 41 Hughes & van Velsen, op.cit., p.74. 42 Hone, op.cit., p. 17. Hugh Marshall Hole, Old Rhodesian  Days, (London, 1928), p. 45: "For domestic purposes we relied mainly on boys imported from the territories of the East Coast, where they had long been accustomed to work for slothful Portuguese employers and had become fairly efficient house servants." 43 A considerable number of Cape Africans were recruited for the Pioneer Column, and not unnaturally obtained the best jobs in Rhodesia. In 1899, a headman com plained to the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland about the influence and wages of these "Cape boys". Indaba at Fort Usher. Annexures to the minutes of Board of B.S.A.Co., Oct. 18, 1899. C.O. 417/276. 44 Circular of Chief Native Commissioner, April 19, 1895, NA N4/1/1. 45 Report of the native commissioner, Chilimanzi and Chibi, Dec. 1895. NA N9/1/1. 151 46 The native commissioner's control was not fully exercised over the Wankie district for example until at least 1903: NA NB 6/1/4. Even nearer the centres of white populat ion, the native commissioners often had difficulties collecting the tax. The native commissioner of the Bubi district,reported in 1898 that he could not collect hut tax in the wilder parts of the district: NA NB 6/1/1. And the native commissioner of the Makoni district complained in 1899 that he might have a chance of collecting all the hut tax if his district were half the size: NA N9/1/4. 47 Gann, op.cit., p.127. 48 NA N9/2/1. 49 Moreover the reports have been very badly kept. They appear to have been variously soaked, eaten by termites, and just rescued from fire. 50 Native commissioner, Hartley Hill, NA N9/2/1. 51 Native commissioner, Ndanga, ibid. 52 Native commissioner, Victoria, NA N9/2/2. 53 NA N 1/2/2. 54 All these reports are in NA N9/3/2. 55 C.8547. 56 Martin found that forced labour had indeed existed in Matabeleland, though he was less sure about Mashonaland (he clearly had no access to the reports described on p .122 supra). But in extenuation he found that native commissioners had at first endeavoured to obtain labour through the indunas, and when this was not forthcoming they had resorted to force. 57 B.S.A.Co., to C.O. Mar. 24, 1897, expressing great shock at the allegations and pleading that the Report be not submitted to the Select Committee until they had prepared a reply. Since the letter was not marked "immediate", it was not opened until Chamberlain had already taken the Martin Report to the Select Committee. c.o. 417/231.. 152 58 Minutes to the above. 59 Enclosure B.S.A.Co. to C.O. July 21, 1897, C.O.417/232. 60 Chamberlain to Frederick Graham, n.d. C.O. 417/232. 61 Minute to the above. C.O. 417/232. 62 ibid. 63 Minute of Graham, ibid. 64 Minute of Graham to new native regulations, June 17, 1897. C.O. 417/231. 65 Cecil Headlam, (ed.), The Milner Papers, (London, 1931), pp. 177-179. Milner to-Asquith, Nov. 18, 1897. 66 ibid., p. 178. 67 ibid., p. 179. 68 Report of Sir Marshall Clarke on Labour for the Mines, n.d., but appears to refer to 1899. Arrived at the Colonial Office in April 1901. Enclosure in Milner to Chamberlain no. 353 of 1901. C.O. 417/319. F. Perry (the imperial secretary) to Hartmann Just, Mar. 21, 1901, enclosing what he described as a "great bundle of arrears". Again in 1904, we find that two dispatches of the Resident Commissioner of Dec. 1902 were not transmitted to the Colonial Office until July of 1904. Milner to Lyttleton, July 30, 1904, CO. 417/ 392. 69 The Salisbury Bureau itself said, "We are convinced that the native commissioners in this province have heartily and cordially co-operated with the labour bureau to obtain labour for the mines, and that all possible moral and legal pressure has been exercised by the native commissioners to induce the natives to work on the mines. Enclosure in Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, Mar. 12, 1900,. enclosed in Kitchener to Chamberlain, May 31, 1901. C.O. 417/320. 70 There is a description of the closing of the Bonsor and Dunraven mines in Howard Hensman, A History of Rhodesia, (Edinburgh, 1900), p. 285. But he does point out that an explosion at the Bonsor Mine, causing loss of life had contributed to the acute labour shortage there. 153 71 Clarke to Milner, May 3, 1904, enclosed in Milner to Lyttelton, June 6, 1904, C.O. 417/392. 72 Clarke's report which arrived in the CO., long over due, in April of 1901. , 73 Clarke, enclosure in Kitchener to Chamberlain, May 31, 1901. Thomson, op.cit., p.51 describes the comparative ease.with which an employer who paid and treated well could obtain labour at a time of very considerable shortage. 74 Reports of indabas held throughout Rhodesia in 1899, annexures to minutes of board of B.S.A.Co., Oct. 18, 1899. CO. 417/276. 75 Minute of Chamberlain to the above, Dec. 20, 1899• 76 B.S.A.Co., to CO., Feb. 22, 1900. C.O. 417/208. B.S.A.Co., to CO. July 12, 1900. C.O. 417/310, and Taylor to Milton, May 26, 1900,. ibid. Taylor's appointment to the post of under-secretary for native affairs was vetoed by the Colonial Office in 1902. Sir Richard Martin wrote on that occasion, "I do not believe in Taylor as a Chief Native Commissioner" Martin to Graham, August 6, 1902. CO. 417/363-77 vid. sup., p.65. 78 CO. to B.S.A.Co., July 12, 1900. CO. 417/308. 79 Clarke's Report which arrived in the Colonial Office . in April of 1901. See also Cd. 1200. 80 ibid. 81 C.O. to B.S.A.Co., Oct. ,3, 1901 C.O. 417/320. 82 The quotation is from Sir Montague Ommanney's minute on the need for a strong letter. 83 B.S.A-Co., to C.O. Oct. 10, 1901. C.O. 417/338 Ommanney wrote in a minute of a visit by Grey and Lyttelton Gell to the Colonial Office, complaining of the tone of the Colonial Office's correspondence. "I understand that Mr. Gell, who appears; to be rather 154 an impulsive person, told Lord Selborne that the white population of Southern Rhodesia were much irritated and were sulking about Downing Street interference. No doubt they would like an absolutely free hand as regards native labour, but so long as the Secretary of State is responsible for the native labour policy, they must submit to reasonable regulations". It is interesting to note that Milner also frequently referred to the importance of not offending colonial sentiment.* He was of course a great friend of Lyttelton G-ell, corresponded with him weekly.for many years, and actually offered him the Imperial Secretaryship when he.(Milner) first went to the Cape (Gell private papers currently being catal ogued at the National Register of Archives, London). 84 Clarke to Milner March 12, 1900, enclosure in Perry to Just, March 21, 1901. C.O. 417/319. 85 Clarke to Milner May 8, 1901, enclosure in Kitchener to Chamberlain May 31, 1901. C.O. 417/320. 86 Clarke to Milner Aug. 30, 1901, enclosure in Milner to Chamberlain Oct. 24, 1901. C.O. 417/321. Of the ' earlier reports, Graham had written "If these reports are published there will be a pretty kettle of fish. It was in consequence of a similar report that Sir R, Martin's position in Rhodesia became intolerable". Minute, May 31, 1901. C.O. 417/320. 87 Tel., Milner to Chamberlain, Nov. 27, 1901, C.O. 417/ 321. 88 Clarke td Milner Aug. 30, 1901, enclosure in Milner to Chamberlain Oct. 24, 1901. :And B.S.A.Co. to CO., Nov 29, 1901. CO. 417/338. 89 Clarke to Milner Nov. 7, 1902, enclosure in Milner to Chamberlain Nov. 24, 1902. CO. 417/345. 90 "How are we to discriminate between nice degrees of moral suasion,," Minute, July 26, 1901, C.O. 417/320. 91 Chamberlain to Ommanney Nov. 29, 1901, enclosing a private letter from Earl Grey, Nov. 28, 1901. CO. 417/321. 155 92 B.S.A.Co., to CO. July 28, 1902. C.O. 417/364. 93 Enclosures Milner to Chamberlain, Jan.17, 1902, CO. 417/343, and April 4, 1902, C.O. 417/334. There is also a private letter P. Lyttelton Gell to H.W. Just, Dec. 16, 1901, CO. 417/343, pointing out the annoyance of the Rhodesian public opinion, and-claiming that the new policy stood in the way of Africans seeking "spontaneous individual contracts". 94 Enclosure, Milner to Chamberlain June 20, 1902 CO. 417/344. 95 Clarke to Milner May 3, 1904 (CO. 417/392), enclosure Wiilner to Lyttelton June 6, 19*04, reporting that 50 recruits had had to be sent to the Rand, and that more would follow. In another dispatch (Feb. 16, 1905, enclosure in Milner to Lyttelton Mar. 13, 1905, C.O. 417/407) the Resident Commissioner reported that 1,736 Rhodesian recruits of the Native Labour Bureau had been sent to the Rand between May 1st and August 31st of 1904. 96 Hone, op.cit., pp.70-74 has a good description of these practices. 97 This is a grievance that appears in a very wide variety of sources. It was mentioned several times at the indabas of 1899 (vid. sup.). The unpopularity of the bureau amongst Africans is a recurrent refrain from all sections of Rhodesian society. 98 Report of Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, 1907. NA N9/1/10. 99 W.H. Moodie, a native commissioner became chief labour agent of the 1899 bureau. Val Gielgud became the general manager of the 1903 bureau: he too was a native comm issioner at the time of his appointment. Five- agents of the bureau of 1899 were recruited, from the native department. B.S.A.Co., Reports, 1899. 100 Gielgud to Clarke Dec. 22, 1904, enclosure in Milner to Lyttelton, Jan. 1, 1905. CO. 417/407. 101 Milton to Chamber of Mines, Feb. 21, 1906, enclosure in Selborne to Elgin, Jan. 1., 1906. C.O. 417/422. 102 See B.S.A.Co., Reports, 1908. 103 Milton to Clarke Mar. 18, 1901, enclosure Perry to CO. May 8, 1901. CO. 417/320. 156 104 Tel.^j Chamberlain to Milner 10th May, 1901. The Colonial Office was also concerned about the justice of making non?:compliance a punishable offence. 105 Tel. Milner to Chamberlain, June 15, 1901, ibid. 106 Zambezi Mission Record, Vol. I, No. 11, Jan., 1901. 107 There is a vast correspondence on the reserves in Kitchener to Chamberlain, June 14, 1901, C.O. 417/320. The Resident Commissioner observed that certain reserves had disappeared or been reduced in area. One which had originally been described as "very good" was now described as "unsuitable". 108 Minute to above. 109 Milner to Chamberlain, March 23, 1903. C.O. 417/371. 110 Milner to Chamberlain, Jan. 12, 1903 CO. 417/371. 111 Lawley to Chamberlain, Aug. 10, 1903, CO. 417/373, containing large number of enclosures from the Resident Commissioner on the latter's objections to the tax increase. 112 Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, July 7, 1903, ibid. 113 Milton to Clarke, July 6, 1903, ibid. Within the Colonail Office it was Sir Hartmann Just who most vigorously opposed the £2 hut tax. 114 This quotation comes from Milner's comments on the immense correspondence with the Administrator and the Resident Commissioner. Milner again asserted his belief in the beneficial'nature of "every form of healthy, open-air, manual labour". He forgot that labour in the mines could be neither open-air nor healthy. 115 Milner to Milton (confidential) June 16, 1903. Through out the hut tax controversy there was a great deal of direct correspondence between the Administrator and the High Commissioner. Had the Colonial Office not upheld Clarke his position would have appeared ludicrous. Milner subsequently suggested that the post of Resident 157 Commissioner could be dispensed with, but the Colonial Office would not hear of it. Tel., Milner to Lyttelton August 12, 1904. C.O. 417/392. 116 Annexures to minutes of Board of B.S.A.Co., March 29, 1904. C.O. 417/398. 117 Milner to Lyttelton (confidential) April 11, 1904 on rumours of unrest in Inyanga. And also the report of the native commissioner, Charter district, that mess engers from the Mlimp were inciting rebellion because of the increased tax. African:'spies heard that the rebellion was to take place throughout Mashonaland. Report of Feb. 17, 1904, annexure 6 to the Board minutes of March 29, 1904. C.O. 417/398. 118 Gielgud pointed out the bureau's dilemma as to what to do with Africans who came from-the North of the Zambezi during the glut. Should they be given preference over Rhodesian Africans or be permitted to return home with news of their ill-fortune. Letter of Gielgud to the Rhodesia Herald, Feb. 6, 1905. 119 Report of the Chief Native Commissioner for Mashonaland, W.S. Taberer, 1908. N9/1/H. 120 For most of my material on the Private Locations Ordin ance I am indebted to an unpublished paper of Mr. J. Keith Rennie_, "The Private Locations Ordinance (1908) and the Melsetter .Labour Agreements." 121 Secretary of the Chamber of Mines to Administrator, June 15, 1906 NA A8/21/11. 122 -Milner to Lyttelton, Aug. 29, 1904 (C.0.417/392) point ing out the absence of a reserve in Inyanga. One was eventually provided when a mining company surrendered its holding for the purpose. 123 Native commissioner Bulilima-Mangwe, 1910. NB 6/l/H. 124 Minute of Grindle on Selborne to Elgin, Nov. 25, 1907. • C.O. 417/438. 125 Report of Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, 1907. NA N9/1/10. 158 126 See report of Chief Native Commissioner Mashonaland, 1912, for effect of this NA N9/1/15. 127 Report of Chief Native Commissioner,.Mashonaland, 1911. NA N9/1/14. 128 Report, 1912. NA N9/1/15. 129 All the replies to the circular are in NA N3/22/9. 159 CHAPTER 4 LABOUR FROM THE DISTRICTS MASHONALAND Before investigating the initial response of Africans to the money economy of their European overlords, it is necessary first to examine the nature of the sources. They are, almost without exception, of European provenance. The most detail ed local sources - and for the purposes of this study the most illuminating - are the native commissioners' reports. These provide interesting sets of statistics about population, kraal and hut concentration, crops, stock, trading, labour, and the response of tribal society to ordinances and regul ations. But these figures have to be approached with great caution. Native commissioners were obliged to supply figures each year, but the means of obtaining them accurately were seldom at their disposal. The chief native commission ers were frequently confronted with figures that in the aggregate made an obvious nonsense. The Chief Native Commissioner for Mashonaland viewed the statistical difficul ties of labour with mounting despair as the native registrat ion ordinance of 1903 (which had provided that Africans going to work required to take out a pass) became increasingly unenforceable. Although the figures have to be approached with caution, it is however possible to discern the internal logic of the 160 figures for any one district. Even here the native commissioner's prejudices have to be taken into account: his conviction that "his" people were lazy, or alternat ively that they supplied quite enough labour consistent with the requirements of indigenous agriculture. And such an attitude would clearly be related to his respect or lack of it for that indigenous agriculture. The difficulties of population statistics are threefold. Firstly, the boundaries of districts continually changed; secondly, the country was insufficiently surveyed to produce anything like an accurate area for each district; and thirdly the land and fiscal policies of the Company admin istration caused the African population to be continually on the move. It is therefore impossible to make comparisons from year to year unless it is clear that boundaries were constant and little movement took place, although such move ment is in itself highly significant. Reasonable accuracy can be presumed in taxation statistics, and these provide a good index of population (provided tax was levied effectively from the whole district). In this way, the de jure population /can he: (and was) used as an indication of the de facto population, although to do so we have to use a conversion factor derived from the native commissioner's observations. Statistics of kraal density and of kraal size can be presumed accurate at least in absolute terms, whether kraals 161 were large or small, scattered or concentrated. The native commissioner could not fail but be aware of population distribution in this crude way. The same applies to the incidence of stock rearing, whether cattle sheep or goats. The native commissioner appears to have spent a considerable amount of his time on his travels simply counting, people and animals. While his sums could not bear the detailed analysis of a modern economist, they do provide historical pointers to the nature and scale of the accommodation between the European and the indigenous economy. The statistics of trading in any given district are extremely important as an indication of alternative methods of entering the cash economy and as a correlative of the success or failure of labour recruiting. Here again it is possible to make judgments in absolute terms to satisfy the numerically less rigorous, though different, demands of historical analysis. The economist has been interested in whether the Africans' response to the European economy has been a rational or an irrational one, v/hether he has set out to maximise his real income or simply respond to the pressures, moral and fiscal, placed upon him; whether he has seen the wage earning part of his labour as supplementary and comple mentary to his village agriculture, or simply an external experience imposed upon him as a form of tribute and bearing 162 little relation to his traditional economic life. Central to this discussion is the question of the backward sloping labour supply function, whereby the supply of labour declines as wages increase, since the labourer's ceiling of want is reached more rapidly and he is able to withdraw his labour after a shorter period. This is of course quite the opposite to what happens in a sophisticated economy. It should be noted that in one important respect the demands of the European economy coincided with the preferen ces of the African labour force. An economy in this incipient state required a large, but highly flexible and highly mobile labour force. In almost every sector of the European economy we find the demand for labour is for large numbers for short periods. This was obviously true of the construction industry, particularly in the case of railway or telegraph construction. It was true of farming, for irrigation works, for the highly seasonal nature of the Rhodesian climate and growing potential, for the demands of a specialised crop like tobacco, already coming into vogue by 1914. Less obviously, it was true of the mining industry. Rhodesia was prospectors' country, more suited to small workers than large concentrations, particularly after the Company's relaxation of the conditions on the establishment of such smaller concerns. If mines swiftly appeared, they also swiftly disappeared. 163 This chapter sets out to give a resume of the labour situation in each district during the period 1898-1914. The date 1898 has been.chosen since from that date the native department was completely reorganised, and it is only from that date that virtually the whole country came under its jurisdiction, although.it was another few years before the authority of the Company administration was carried to the extreme edges of the low veld in the North or the South. The districts will here be treated in the two provinces of . Matabeleland and Mashonaland, since until 1913 each had a different Chief Native Commissioner with somewhat different views on labour, conditions were different in each, and the tribal concentration was different in each. In 1913, the two native administrations were combined under Sir Herbert Taylor, the man whom the Colonial Office had refused to consider as under secretary for native affairs because of his activities in the 1899 indabas. In 1905, the South African Native Affairs Commission (Cd.2399) had reached the conclusion that the maximum man power figure which could be extracted from the indigenous economy without occasioning its breakdown was 50% of tne male population between the ages of 15,and 40. This became the guideline in Rhodesia, and it soon became something of a magic figure in the reports of Rhodesian native commissioners.. It appears so frequently, that it is difficult not to suspect 164 that native commissioners felt under some obligation to produce the "right" figure. However, the figure was sometimes genuinely exceeded, and occasionally the figures are detailed enough to show that not all the officers were simply anxious to please. In this connection, it must be remembered that we are dealing with a labour force in a constant state of flux, working from one to twelve months in the year. A 50% labour figure for any one year does not therefore mean a 50% withdrawal from the indigenous economy at one point in time, although as the length of time worked greatly increased later in the period, this became increasingly the case. The following review of all the native department districts in Rhodesia attempts to examine the relationship of a number of different factors at district level to the performance of that district as a labour supplier. These factors are the pressure of population, the type of land tenure, the incidence of stock holding, the amount of trading, the proximity to centres of employment, and the nature of the indigenous economy of the area. All of this must necessarily be seen through the eyes of the native commissioners, although they must be treated as participants as well as observers. However, as far as possible, all these factors will be examined from the African point of view. 165 The province of Mashonaland is treated in this chapter; the province of Matabeleland in the next. Mashonaland was the first area taken over by the pioneers in 1890. The capital was established at Fort Salisbury on the high plateau, almost exactly in the centre of the province. Mines were establish ed to the North, North West and South West of the town. Farms spread out on the high veld, and later on to the low veld, when tobacco v/as developed early this century. The Shona peoples of the province were generally regard ed as poor labourers because of their supposedly inadequate physiques and unwillingness to leave the indigenous economy. But Mashonaland was close to the main supplies of external labour from North East Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Mozambique. Salisbury was the goal for the labour routes via Feira and Tete and for the railway line from Beira. A number of tables follow for which some explanation is required. The three familiar divisions of land will be stressed: the reserves as they existed in their somewhat fluid state up to the Southern Rhodesian Native Reserves Commission of 1916; unalienated land which the Company regarded as its own, and therefore as land on which it could levy rent; and alienated land, taken up by farmers, mines, and absentee companies, upon which the provisions of the Private Locations Ordinance operated. The category of able bodied men, which will be encounter-166 ed in the tables, usually consisted of tax-payers between the ages of 18 and 40, excluding kraal heads whose duties kept them at home. Where kraals tended to be small, there would be a larger number of headmen, and therefore a smaller potential labour supply, quite apart from the fact that smaller kraals could supply fewer men because of the reduced possibility of division of labour. Domiciled aliens were those aliens (labourers from outside Southern Rhodesia) who had been in the country long enough that they had to pay tax. There follows the review of each district of Mashonaland. MAZOE The Mazoe district was for several years two districts, North and South Mazoe, which stretched from Salisbury right up to the Portuguese East Africa frontier. North Mazoe was eventually largely incorporated in the Darwin district, and there were in fact so many other boundary changes that it is quite impossible to compare figures over any period of time. The entire area North of Salisbury, East of Lornagundi and West of Mrewa and Mtoko, had a population of from 20,000 to 30,000 during the period 1898-1914, clustered in very large villages. The area's agriculture was primitive; there were very few cattle; in any good harvest there was a tendency to overtrade. In 1906, it was reported from North 167 Mazoe that the Makorikori and Chikundi people preferred cash for lobolo purposes, although stock for lobolo increased in subsequent years. During the early years labour was turned out rigorously. In 1899 and 1900, 1,000 men from each district were "sent" south. In 1899, the clerk-in-charge of South Mazoe sent all those out to work who had insufficient money for tax. Touts operated up to the Zambezi, and a steady stream of "aliens" from the British Central Africa Protectorate (Nyasaland) and Portuguese East Africa soon became a feature of the district.. Most of these preferred to go to the bigger mines of the south, some even as far as Kimberley, although some stayed, often for long periods. In 1913 there were 1,800 domiciled alien taxpayers in the southern part of the region (by then the Mazoe district).' Bad harvests and attacks of locusts had a demoralising effect on the local inhabitants, as had the considerable competition of northern labourers. In 1903, it was reported that fewer and fewer Shona came out, and that was in a year of bad harvest, although there was abundant labour from the north. When this northern labour declined in numbers, the area faced an acute labour shortage. In 1911, the native commissioner reported that he was impressing on the chiefs the need for labour to turn out, and on European newcomers the need to treat Africans well. 168 In 1910, the native commissioner described his fiscal policy. His messengers watched assiduously for all boys who reached taxable age; he felt that there ought to be remission of tax for six months' work; aliens ought not to be taxed, since they left as soon as the time for their first taxing came round. By 1910, still less than kO% of the able bodied population worked. The effect of the British South Africa Company rent had been simply to send most Africans on unalienated land to the reserves swiftly created for them. Agreements under the Private Locations Ordinance were almost entirely for labour, and in 1913, Drew reported that the stringency of the agreements varied accord ing to the proximity of the reserves. Landowners close to a reserve could not risk so severe an agreement as those further away, av clear admission. that the motive of many landowners v/as to extort as much rent as possible consistent with retaining their labour supply. In 1912, he submitted the following labour return. 1 able bodied men in district 2 no. v/ho 3 period 4 2 as % worked months of 1 reserves unalienated land alienated land 1,753 845 3 48 80 55 3 69 619 600 4 97 The figure for those on alienated land reveals the extent of •V labour agreements binding labourers to their landlords, and 169 inflating the total labour figure. These figures apply to the smaller Mazoe district not far North of Salisbury. DARWIN The Darwin district was created out of the Mazoe district in 1909 and lies to the-North of Salisbury. The population rose rapidly from 10,855 in 1909 to over 15,000 in 1913, almost all in reserves, apart from a small number on mines. The area was poor in stock; there were no ploughs; and harvests varied widely over the period. In 1911, the crop was damaged by unusually heavy late rains,and the native commissioner reported that the Africans were too short handed to save it, despite the fact that only a small percent age went to work. .The demand for labour expanded during the period because prospectors were actively at work, and because the border at the north was closed due to smallpox on the Portuguese side. Immigrant labourers tended in any case to pass through the district to the richer lands of the south. The native commissioner attacked private touting and regretted the closure of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau agency in 1911. There were no people at all on alienated land and the few who were on unalienated land moved into the reserves or into Portuguese territory after the imposition of the British South Africa Company rent. All the inhabitants were therefore in 170 reserves and in 1912 of 4,500 able bodied men, only 1,372 worked an average of ki months (31%). However, this extremely low figure may have been based on the issue of passes, a notoriously bad guide to the actual numbers going out to work. But the area does appear thoroughly depressed. The mines in the district had difficulty in finding labour, and they also had difficulties in obtaining meal (1911 report), so communications may have been an important part of the problem. SALISBURY The Salisbury district was largely superseded in 1909 by the Goromonzi district, lying immediately to the north and east of the city of Salisbury. The population increased from 11,836 in 1900 to 15,715 in 1908. Two acres per head of population were cultivated, and crops were invariably good (despite frequent reports of locust damage), except for failures in 1903 and 1907. Employment in the district was on European farms and on a few mines like the Arcturus, Joker, Kambongo and Red Dragon. Almost all the local labour supply remained in the district from preference, despite the fact that wages were lower. Labour fluctuated as widely as is usual in such a district. The figure never reached 50% of the able bodied population until 1907 when the crop failed and the approach of hut tax 171 collection brought out an unemployable glut on. to the labour market, and there was a corresponding decrease in wages. There were few cattle in the district, and to this fact the native commissioner in 1901 attributed the poor labour supply. G0R0M0NZI Goromonzi was created in 1909, incorporating the Salisbury district. The population rose rapidly from 15,880 in 1909 to 18,928 in 1913, the increase being general on both reserves and alienated land, there being little evidence of much movement from the latter to the former. In 1913, the population v/as distributed 15,000 on reserves, 3,309 on alienated land, and 619 on mines. There v/as a reasonable amount of stock, but no ploughs, for heavily v/ooded land was used. As might be expected in a district so close to Salisbury, there was a large opportun ity for trading, although there was a tendency for this to decrease as European farmers began to go in for extensive mealie growing, which was of course the Africans' most marketable crop. So much did the local inhabitants prefer to be their own masters that they actually employed others from other districts to work for them at 10/- per month. Moreover, those villages near the mines could make money from beer-making and prostitution. On a visit to the Chikwakwa 172 Reserve in 1909, the native commissioner, R.C. Nesbitt, could see few young women, and was told that they were at the mines making money. The labour performance was described as poor right up to the end of the period, although the figures tend to belie this view. There was employment for some 12,000 in the district (1909), made up mainly of aliens and "indigenous" Africans from other districts. In 1910, of an-able bodied population of 3,666, 1,340 worked (37%), and in 1913, 1,869 of 3,980 worked (47%), but these were pass statistics, which the native commissioner himself described as useless. More over, in 1913, he reported that there was insufficient work in the area for the aliens, and that they were going to the mines at Gatooma. MARANDELLAS The Marandellas district lies across the line of rail between Salisbury and Umtali on the high veld. In 1901, the population of 13,436 was distributed in 120 kraals of an average of 28 huts and 112 people each. The district became mainly a farming one, although there was eventually some mining employment. With railway and road passing through there was clearly considerable opportunity for employment or marketing in either Salisbury or Umtali, or in the mines to the south west. However, there was the usual I' 173 flight to the reserves in the later years, and that meant away from the lines of communication where the land was alienated to European farmers. In 1909, there were 1,300 on private land and 1,410 on unalienated land of a populat ion of 13,341. All those subject to the British South Africa Company rent on unalienated land moved almost immed iately after its imposition. By 1913, of a population of 19,301, 18,243 were in reserves, and only 143 and 851 were left on unalienated and alienated land respectively. Trade fluctuated wildly according to the quality of the harvest. In 1903, a poor harvest brought out large numbers of prospective labourers who headed for Salisbury, Gwelo, Hartley and Mazoe. Not until 1908 and 1909 was there a large amount of trading again, but in 1911 acreages contracted because of the decline in prices. Farming had remained primitive, without ploughs and few draught animals, although there was approximately one head of cattle to every four in the population. In the early years, railway and road construction proved very popular and paid well. The labour supply subsequently fluctuated with the harvest until in 1912 it reached over 60% (2,363 of an able bodied population of 3,900), working for an average of five months. 174 MREWA This district lies to the North of Marandellas. Between 1900 and 1911 the population doubled and by the latter date they were almost all accommodated in reserves (22,947). It is good farming country, though not suited to the plough, and most of the harvests in the period were extremely good. It therefore became an area_of considerable trading. In 1909, the native commissioner reported that 12,000 bags of grain were sold at an average price of 3/-. In the same year 80 bulls were sold to Europeans. This alone would account for'well over half of the hut tax. There were good sales again in 1911 and 1912, although prices fell in 1913. Stock increased very rapidly: in 1901 there were only 550 head of cattle in the area; by 1906, 2,411, and this had more than doubled by 1911. The labour supply varied considerably from year to year. Even in seasons of bad harvest, as in 1903 and 1907, it was not good. In 1903, young men stayed at home to hunt for subsistence with the rest. In 1907, the locusts were very numerous and required considerable manpower to protect the gardens. The native commissioner repeatedly pointed out that a young man could earn enough to pay hut tax for his whole family, including father and brothers. The labour supply was however normally able to fulfil local demand, which v/as entirely farming work, but from the native commissioner's 175 • figures and estimates, it never seems to have reached 50% of the able bodied population. In 1912, it was only 38%, working for anything from one to twelve months. In 1913, it was decreasing. The native commissioner, E. Edwards, saw only one solution to the problem - smaller reserves and higher taxation. MT0K0 The Mtoko district lies North East of Mrewa and North of Makoni and Umtali, on the main route through the Mozambique enclave from Blantyre. The population increased over the period by several thousand, principally owing to immigration into the sparsely populated northern district, to 22,190 in 1913, all of them on reserves. The soil was extremely light and sandy, unable to bear maize, suitable only for various types of millet, and the population v/as very widely scattered in groups of just a few huts. There was seldom a crop surplus, and almost no cash trading in grain. There was however a considerable quantity of cattle and large numbers were traded in 1908, 1909, 1910 and 1911. In the latter year, 450 bulls were sold to Europeans, and 300 head were traded for grain. Employment opportunity in the area was slight. There were two or three mines on the Kaiser Wilhelm Goldfields whose furtunes fluctuated greatly. There was employment as runners, porters, servants and cattle drivers. In. 176 addition, the Anglo-Portuguese boundary commission provided employment for several years for several hundred men. Those who left the district tended to go to Umtali, a movement started by an American contractor called Oreeclr who had taken large numbers from the Mtoko district as well as the Makoni district to Umtali in the late nineties. In 1909 the district was quarantined because of smallpox and the inhabit ants were brought together into larger kraals in an attempt to stamp out the disease. It was also hoped of course that this rationalisation would improve the labour supply, although it was hardly suited to the soil and the agriculture of the area. In fact, the labour supply usually seemed adequate, since there was comparatively little opportunity in the district-. Towards the end of the period, opportunity did in fact contract, although the native commissioner in 1912 reported that 2,845 of an able bodied population of 4,462 on the reserves had worked (62%). One of the features of the area was the large number of labourers who passed through from Portuguese East Africa and Nyasaland, although this contracted later in the period. It meant that the district swarmed with touts of whom the native commissioners usually disapproved. The touts waited on the labour routes for hungry gangs whom they would take over and "sell" for capitation fees to the mines of the south. The native commissioner in 1911, Charles Bullock, recommended that 177 food ought to be provided for such gangs to save them from the touts. The acting native commissioner in 1913, G.E. Wincel, revealed very well in his report the all-too-frequent contempt for the indigenous economy, and the hope that "wants" would drive labour out: The innate'indolence which lures them to an agricultural life will not stand against their vanity which makes things that can only be paid off with money absolute necessities. LOMAGUNDI The Lomagundi district and the sub-district of Kanyamba (split in 1909-1910) lay to the extreme North of Rhodesia on the bank of the Zambezi, with a boundary with both Northern Rhodesia and Mozambique. It had a large population scattered over an immense area. While agriculture remained very backward and little land was alienated, there v/as considerable employment opportunity in the district because of the opening of several mines, of which the Ayrshire and the Eldorado v/ere the most important. By 1910, as many as 6,000 were employed in the area. There was a great deal of trading in smaller stock: in 1910 the Eldorado mine manager estimated that he had purchased during the year small stock to the value of £790. This could account for a lot of tax. 173 The labour performance of the region continued very poor for a number of years. In 1903, only 10% of the able bodied male population were estimated to have gone to work. Lobolo remained small, and wants low. Moreover, being very much a "pioneer"district, the early settlers gained a bad reputation for ill-treatment of their employ ees. In 1899, the acting native commissioner, B.B. Talbot, attacked them severely for this, and in 1909 (when 26% of able bodied males went out) W. S'elwyn Bazeley still consid ered that the conditions of labour were an important dis incentive. The district lay astride the most important labour route from the north in the early years. In 1907, 14,813 aliens sought passes to seek work. These came across the ferry at Feira from Portuguese East Africa and Northern Rhodesia. This figure began to decline when the railway reached up into Northern Rhodesia, directing the Bemba and the Bisa down the railway to Livingstone and Bulawayo. But numbers from Nyasaland and Mozambique remained high, and kraals on the road were able to earn their tax by selling beer and mealies to travellers - particularly those returning. Moreover, the men of the region did quite a lot of the work in the indigenous economy, since much tree felling was required, and this was men's work. Rent obligations were not high, both because little land was alienated and because 179 it was impossible to collect the British South Africa Company rent on unalienated land until 1911. It could not be collected earlier because no reserves had been demarcated, and its collection would have caused large scale emigration across the Zambezi. Corresponding with a large influx of settlers and small workers to the area, and therefore an increase in opportunity, labour figures rose considerably in 1911, (a year of bad harvest), to 5,000 of an able-bodied male population of 7,036 (71%). The native commissioner himself was surprised, but insisted that his staff had carefully checked the figures, and provided a list of reasons: there was a poor crop; less alien labour, and so less kraal sales; selling of beer at mines had been stamped out; and there had been a constant haranguing of chiefs on the need for labour. He advocated that the country should become independent of alien labour. In the following year, the assistant native commissioner was able to write "...the general complaint that the indigenous native will not work is quite unfounded". This area is a unique example of one of ample alternative opportunities of entering the cash economy, which were knocked away by the government and by changing conditions. HARTLEY This was a very large, sparsely populated district, 180 containing the Gatooma mining area, and some of the country's most important mines, just South of Salisbury. It was some time before a reasonably accurate population figure was arrived at. In 1906, it was stated to be 6,895, and it rose by 1913 to 11,705. An idea of the employment potential of the area can be derived from the fact that by 1909 the labouring force of alien and indigenous Africans' from other districts had almost outstripped the total local population, and by 1910 was several hundred in excess of it. Almost all of the local population were in reserves, where stock were plentiful, although agriculture was primitive. There was a lot of trading, but a really good harvest, as in 1911, greatly reduced the amount and the price, for traders were satisfied with the produce of Europeans and of other districts. The Shona were slow to offer themselves for work and only stayed for short periods when they did. By 1900 a large contingent of North Zambezi labourers was already supplying 40% of the total labour force; another 20% were from Port uguese East Africa, and the remaining 40% were from within Rhodesia. During 1906 and 1907, demand for labour rose rapidly since the Giant and the Battlefields mines began crushing operations, and there was a large increase in the number of small mining concerns. Since large numbers of labourers from the North passed straight through the district on their way to the Rand, the native commissioner intensified 181 his efforts to turn out local labour. In 1908 he informed the chiefs and headmen that there would have to be an improve ment. He also set about stopping the sale of beer to the mine compounds, explicitly because Africans earned too much money in this way. In the same year, however, the British South Africa Company rent sent many Africans off to the reserves. Yet in 1912, the native commissioner, E.G. Howman, reported that 1,590 of an able bodied male population of 2,385 had worked for an average of six months (67%). This may have already been an indication of the quality of the reserves to which almost all the Africans had now been driven. In his 1913 report Howman attacked these reserves: the Sanyati was "fly" (tsetse) infested; the Ganga was congested; and the Gabaza was only a narrow strip of land wedged between farms. In the same report he provided complete labour figures for the mines, which are so interesting as to merit quoting in full. month alien . . indigenous 1912 1913 1912 1913 January 5,514 5,582 1,763 1,192 February 5,437 5,483 1,760 1,290 March 5,393 5,510 1,833 1,539 April ' 4,960 5,650 2,106 1,574 May 4,194 5,474 2,488 1,920 June 5,199 4,294 2,460 2,291 July 5,473 5,667 2,463 2,744 August 5,383 5,815 2,347 2,271 September 5,373 6,259 1,818 1,975 October 5,515 6,500 1,620 1,747 November 5,598 6,615 1,349 1,509 December 5,523 - 1,213 -182 The average distribution by origin was 1,700 from Southern Rhodesia; 1,300 from Portuguese territory; 2,700 from Northern Rhodesia; 1 and 1,400 from Nyasaland. These figures reveal extremely well the nature of seasonal employment on the mines, although the differential between the dry and growing seasons is not as great as it had been in earlier years. During the planting season towards the end of the year, alien labour largely compensated for the dearth of local labour. Hence the majority of aliens travelled in winter months, which, particularly for those from the warmer North, could be injurious to their health (see chapter 8). The figures cannot however tell us which form of labour constituted competition for which. Indigenous labourers were able to find work during the period when they were least required in the indigenous economy. On the other hand the differential between the growing periods might have been greater if the local inhabitants had not had the compet ition of outside labour. In 1913, Howman pointed out that bad employers alone were short of labour and depended on the bureau, which was very bad for its reputation. CHARTER This district lies in Central Rhodesia between Hartley and Victoria, to the East of Gwelo and Selukwe. It was one of the most settled districts during the "rebellions" and 183 became in consequence an important trading centre for grain while much of the rest of the country was in.turmoil. In 1903 there were 46,074 inhabitants in 769 kraals of about 30 people each. A considerable amount of land alienation took place, and by 1913 the vast majority of the population were in reserves. The population distribution between 1909 and 1913 makes a useful comparison. 1909 1910 1913 reserves 42,300 47,496 48,593 unalienated land 1,500' 1,166 200 alienated land 10,000 7,288 9,964 The 1910 figures reveal the extent of movement to the reserves, while the 1913 figures reveal the fashion in which land alien ation could catch up with those on unalienated land. The pattern of movement was already set up by 1899, when there was extensive alienation to the Exploring Land and Mineral Company and to Willoughby's Central Estates. In consequence, 2,000 huts had to be moved, and the native commissioner reported that the Africans raised no objection because they were happy to turn over new land. (This might appear as a piece of special pleading, but it is important to remember that Africans of the area were accustomed to movement, both for security reasons and in search of virgin soil.) The population had a tendency to increase naturally on the healthy high veld, but not on the less healthy low veld. The area remained important in grain and cattle trading, i 184 and in the later years ploughs were rapidly acquired. There were a large number of government subsidised chiefs in this area. The labourers of the area had some unfortunate experiences in the early years. Quite apart from the bad health record of the Selukwe mines in that period, the Afrikaner farmers of the region were reported in 1898 to ill-treat their employees and cheat them of their wages. Then a contingent recruited by a native commissioner Taylor and Colonel Beal in I898 for Company road building were never paid (the acting native commissioner, B.B.Talbot, complained that this was bad for the reputation of the Company). Men were not surprisingly deterred by the sick ness contracted at the mines, and insisted that the visit ations of locusts kept them at home. There were some Shangaans in the south of the district who revealed their customary independence by insisting on working for the mine of their choice. The sale of grain provided' most with their hut tax. In 1906 there were arrears of tax in a year when the labour supply was poor. In 1908 and 1909 the native commissioner, J.W. Posselt, described the communal beer party reaping system and the wishes of the women as the biggest disincent ive to labour. Nonetheless, he disliked one of the incent ives, the British South Africa Company rent, which he regarded 185 quite rightly - as an unwarrantable confusion of the.t admin istrative and commercial branches of the Company. • In 1910, he reported that 50% had worked, and in 1912 he ascribed the continuing labour difficulty to the fact that many stayed permanently at work, that many/had earned enough for several years, and that others were rich in cattle. In 1913 he recommended a system of indenturing teenagers. Some 1,500 were affected under the Private Locations Ordinance and rents varied from 10/- to £1, being remitted at the rate of 10/- per month worked. The Exploring Land and Minerals Company put up its rent for 978 men and sued 80 for arrears (although the native commissioner reported that the agent had been lax). The Rhodesdale Estate put up its rent and charged crippling grazing fees which were with drawn on Posselt's representations. GUTU Gutu lies immediately to the North of Victoria. Its population figures are difficult to handle. In 1910, when figures are usually accurate, there was a large over-estimate. In 1913, a population of perhaps 38,100 were distributed 31,250 in-reserves, 4,100 on unalienated land, and 2,750 on alienated land. There was very little employment opportunity in the district, and it became perhaps more than any other district, the despair of successive native commissioners. 186 There was some grain trading, ploughs were used and progressive agricultural techniques were fostered on the lands of the Dutch Reformed Mission at Gutu and Chingombe, but the principal source of wealth was cattle. By 1909 there were 17,600 cattle in the Gutu district. While the people in the adjacent Chilimanzi district avoided selling, the people of Gutu sold in large numbers. In 1907, 2,000 cattle were sold, 400 were slaughtered for food and sacrifice, and in addition, 1,000 small stock were killed and 500 traded. Despite considerable sales, the numbers of cattle never ran down as they did in Victoria (vid.inf.). At first, the district seemed to provide a very satis factory labour force. In 1899> 1,822 were sent to Gweio and Selukwe; in 1900, 3>435 were sent. But during this period health and the death rate at the Selukwe mines can only be described as disastrous. There was a death rate of almost 10%. Much of this ill-health was caused by pulmonary diseases contracted by inhabitants of the hot low veld of Gutu working in unusual and unhealthy conditions at the much higher altitude of Selukwe. The native commissioner, J.H. Williams, reported in 1899 that every kraal in his district (there were 230 of almost one hundred people each) had lost someone at the Selukwe mines, and in some cases there had been several deaths. He added that anyone who had been to the Transvaal mines could not be induced to go to the mines of Selukwe. It seems as though the district never recovered 187 its confidence after this decimation. On the insistence of the Colonial Office, native commissioners ceased their activity in supplying labour after 1901,^ and thereafter Gutu supplied so small a number that native commissioners were shy of providing figures at all. The figure provided in 1908 of 1,657 was based on passes issued and is therefore suspect, since so many travelled independently and since pass figures were regarded as useless in most parts of the country, but if it is in any way accurate it can reflect only about 24% of the able bodied male population, and this was certain ly a year of high cattle sales. In 1910 the native commissioner, E.T. Kenny, attacked the employers, but in 1911 he suggested that the Government ought to take over all recruiting, and that all boys of 14 to 18 years should be apprenticed. Even in the bad harvest year of 1912 there was little improvement, and in 1913 the Africans would not turn out for fear of another bad harvest, but when it turned out well, they stayed to enjoy its fruits! CRTLIMANZI The Chilimanzi district lay adjacent to Gutu, East of Charter. For a period from 1902 to 1908 it was coupled with the Gutu district and in 1910 it was enlarged. It is there fore impossible to compare population figures, especially as those in the early years were admitted to be guesses. Two 188 groups of figures are however useful"and trustworthy. 1911 1913 reserves unalienated land alienated land 6,800 1,700 5,500 11,979 4,391 The 1913 figure for the reserves was'inflated both by movement within the district and by the immigration of some 2,000 who moved in from the Victoria district to escape the The number of ploughs in use, the numbers of stock, and the extent of trading greatly increased in the later few years. Between 1909 and 1911 cattle increased from 4,000 to 13,000 (only a fraction of this can be attributed to the enlargement of the district), and unlike Victoria or Chibi very few were sold. Moreover, most young men provided work for their lobolo. In 1908, the native comm issioner reported that the people of the district preferred to work for their tax; some 144 cattle were killed for food and sacrifice, some were exchanged for grain, but none were sold. There was employment opportunity in the district on small mines and farms. Labourers also travelled to Gwelo and Selukwe. 1,102 were sent out by the native commissioner's office in 1899, when he reported that Africans preferred to be sent through the office because they were well-treated, fed on the journey, and sure of employment on arrival. By 1903, effects of the Private Locations Ordinance. 189 however, the local inhabitants were reported to prefer travelling out independently, for they had developed a dis like for the Bureau and its agents. They turned out well for surface work, particularly when wages were high (as in 1901), but they stayed for short periods. They were unable to compete with the Shangaans and "North Zambezis" who were prepared to stay longer. Local demand was met, especially on the farms where most Private Locations Ordinance agree ments were for labour, but in 1912, despite the poor crop, labour figures still appear to be very low 1 able bodied men 2 no. who 3 2 as % in district worked of 1 reserves ' 3,300 750 23 alienated land 1,173 600 51 No period of work is mentioned. In 1913, work opportunity was expanding: the railway from . Umvuma to Victoria was being built; the small Falcon mine required labour; and Afrikaner farmers were trekking into the district, although the native commissioner reported that the Boers did not understand the local African and treated him badly. VICTORIA The Victoria district was a large, important and extremely populous region around Fort Victoria, now on the main route from Salisbury to the Transvaal. The population.increased 190 between 1899 and 1909 from 22,395 to 43,000. Thereafter, the Gutu and Ndanga districts were carved out and the population declined to 31,552, distributed (1913) on reserves 14,300, on unalienated land 8,250, on alienated land ,8,052, and on mines 950. In 1903,- only'10% were reported to be on reserves, already described as thickly populated. The levying of rent on British South Africa Company unalienated land began a movement which was contin ued by the Private Locations Ordinance. There was little mining in the area, and the alienated land was taken up by Dutch farmers "of the lowest class". A lot of the alien ated land remained unoccupied. Under section 3 of the Private Locations Ordinance rent was charged on the latter, and rent and labour or labour in remission of rent exacted on the occupied land. The most important feature of the area v/as stock-holding. By 1906, there were almost as many cattle as people. But in succeeding years the numbers, unlike anywhere else in Rhodesia, actually declined. There was little in the way of surplus crop;, there was only limited employment opportunity in the area; and so the sale of cattle formed the only alternative to enter the cash sector to earn tax. Moreover, it v/as a district in which many cattle were killed for food, and many more for sacrificial purposes. In 1908 1,700 head were sold, almost 600 were killed for food., and 235 were sacrificed. 191 These figures were kept up in succeeding years, and even more were killed for food in years of bad harvest like 1911 and 1912. By 1912 the native commissioner was reporting a considerable drain in cattle and expressing the hope that in future the local inhabitants would have no alternative but to go out to work. In 1909, he had described an instance at a village where a party were actually ready to leave for work when a cattle buyer arrived: cattle were sold and no one left. Crops were invariably good, and ploughs were progressively used, but the nature of the harvest appears to have had little effect on the labour supply. * The poor crop of 1908 meant that there was insufficient beer-making for the following season, and hence there was little of the communal harvest ing linked with beer consumption common to the region. Instead, it was each man for himself, with a resultant adverse effect on the labour supply. In 1912, the disastrous harvest kept men at home to help with the gathering of edible veld foods. An unusual feature was the cultivation of rice, which the native commissioner in 1901 recommended ought to be encour- . aged in view of the possibility of Chinese immigration! There was very little labour opportunity in the district. Most had to go to Umtali, Gwelo, Selukwe or indeed to the Transvaal. The native commissioner in 1901 insisted that there was too much land, and suggested that headmen should be 192 ordered to apportion land only to those who went out to work. When a few hundred were required for mining operations in the district, there was never any shortage, which suggests that the lack of opportunity was the greatest disincentive. A more sympathetic native commissioner, observing that several hundreds went to the Transvaal, attacked the wages and con ditions at Rhodesian mines. In 1911, it was pointed out that the Bureau's efforts were in vain because of the indep endent spirit of the local Africans who preferred to return to old employers wherever possible. The native commissioners were shy of providing figures. In 1909, however, Jackson reported that 10,450 were on the tax roll, and estimated that 4,400 went to work. Reducing the tax roll by 10% for headmen and aged, this provides a figure of 47% of the able bodied male population. CHIBI The Chibi district lay in the extreme South and South East of the country, South of Victoria, on the low veld. In many ways it resembled Victoria. The population increased rapidly from 1901 to 1909 when it reached 41,000. Thereafter it declined to 30,205 in 1913, of whom 26,725 were on reserves, 2,727 on unalienated land, and 753 on alienated land. There were the usual movements as a result of the British South Africa Company rent and the Private Locations Ordinance, and 193 moreover the severe famine of 1912 caused a large number of « deaths among the children and old people, and caused many others to move out of the district in search of food. The population was in large kraals and owned a very large quantity of cattle, the figure rising rapidly to 29,300 in 1911, after which it contracted just as rapidly. There was even less employment opportunity than in Victoria, and even less trading of cash crops. Cattle were by far the largest single entry to the cash sector of the economy, although in years of bad harvests traded cattle were mainly bartered for grain. In 1908, 700 cattle were sold, in 1909, 1,350, in 1910, 800, in 1911, 1,800, and in the famine years 1912-1913 the astonishing figure of 13,000 cattle were disposed of. In addition, cattle were moved around in large numbers (900 in 1911) for lobolo-purposes. For labour migrants the district was as close to the Transvaal as to the Rhodesian mining areas. In the early years, when native commissioners "sent" labourers to the native commissioners in the Gwelo and Selukwe districts for distribution, over 1,000 were sent each year. Attempts were made by the police to stop Africans going across to the copper mines at Messina or on to Johannesburg. At the turn of the century there were a number of other disincentives. Selukwe gained a bad reputation because of accidents and the health record, and high prices were paid for cattle in 1900 • 194 and 1901. As a result, in '1901, the native commissioner reported that the only Africans to go to work were 180 he sent to road-making, 170 to the Globe and Phoenix mine5. and 269 sent by the bureau agent Posselt to Selukwe. This disinclination to go to work remained in later years. The Bureau was disliked because its recruits received poorer pay than "independents"; in 1906 it was reported that the shortage of food "compelled men to remain with their families until their means of subsistence was assured"; in 1910, the native commissioner declared that the women kept the men at home, and insisted on the sale of cattle; in 1912, the native commissioner, P. Forestall, suggested that a government station should be built at the south of the district to stop men going to the Transvaal; but in 1913 of 1,000 who went to work, at least 400 went to Messina. Other features of the area were that 2,000 to 3,000 Mozambique Africans passed through the district annually; that white recruiters from the Transvaal operated illegally in later years at the junction of the Sabi and the Lundi rivers; that indigenous crafts did not die in the area as rapidly as elsewhere because of the absence of stores. NDANGA The Ndanga district lay between Gutu and Melsetter and had an extremely large population of both Karangas and 195 Shangaans, the one a Shona and the other an Nguni people. Very little land was alienated, but by 1911, the imposition of the Company rent had driven all of the Shangaans North to the reserve, leaving the South East largely uninhabited. In 1909, no less than eight chiefs refused to pay the rent, and in 1910 the native commissioner reported that it was uncollectable. In 1913> 47,719 inhabited the reserves, 21,039 were on unalienated land, and 265 were on alienated land. The inhabitants set up interesting relationships in the indigenous economy. In 1907, some areas had a bad harvest, and grain was bartered for cattle within the district. The Shangaans experienced a chronic shortage because of the predations of locusts and birds such as guinea fowl. The Shangaans were however the more advanced agriculturists and bought ploughs, breaking their excellent cattle to the yoke. The Karangas hired the.Shangaans to do their ploughing for them, and by 1910 there were almost thirty such itinerant ploughs. There was also some cash employment among the Africans, the usual wage being 10/- per month. There were a number of bad crop failures. In 1908, the failure was almost complete and the Africans were living on milk, game, and whatever they could forage in the bush. In the following year, despite the excellent harvest, they were unwilling to trade because of the recent memory of the 196 ' famine. In 1911 and 1912 there were serious crop failures and deaths from starvation, but most stayed at home to help in the search for subsistence. In 1913, an abundant harvest kept men at home to reap and enjoy the beer. By 1907 there were over 20,000 cattle in the district,, of which the Shangaan cattle were much praised. In succeed ing years 2,000 to 3,000 head were sold to Europeans annually. The people of Ndanga also suffered from the early dis astrous conditions at the Selukwe mines. The native comm issioner, J.W. Ekstein, complained of the shortages of food at the mines, the closures there in I898, the dismissals with out wages, the sick being driven away from the mines to die on the way home or at their kraals. Not surprisingly, in 1901, no one would go to Selukwe, using the locusts as an excuse to the native commissioner. But the Shangaans went to the Transvaal and even to Kimberley in large numbers, often journeying for long periods. Johannesburg, to which Shangaans had been going for many years, had become, accord ing to one native commissioner, something of an Eldorado in the Africans' minds. In 1907, the native commissioner, E.G. Howman, attacked the Rhodesian mines for "screwing the native down to the lowest possible wage". Nonetheless, the labour figure for Ndanga invariably passed 30% of the able bodied male population. In 1911 independent labourers going to Selukwe had another bad experience. There were too many 197 labourers that year; many had to return home or engage for a pittance. Some fell into the hands of unprincipled employers who "sold" them to others. Despite the Bureau's coupon system, introduced in' 1910, whereby Africans working six months received a 10/- coupon towards tax, and those working nine months a £1 coupon, the Bureau was never popular. MAKONI This district lies 'to the North of Umtali, West of Inyanga. After an initial low estimate of population, the figure rose only slowly until 1913 when there were 22,011 in the district, of whom 16,741 were on reserves, 5,220 on alienated land, and 50 in mines and towns. Kraals were very large, often of over 100 people. Although there were lots of cattle and small stock.in the district, there was little advance in agriculture. There were no ploughs. Yet, despite a series of poor harvests, the locals could satisfy part of the tax demand from the sale of grain. Even in a very poor harvest year, as in 1911, still there was trading. The district was an exceptionally poor supplier of labour; there v/as little incentive and mining was disliked. In 1908, the clerk-in-charge reported that two thirds of the able bodied men were at the kraals, "lolling about and drinking". 198 In 1910, the native commissioner, L.C. Meredith, hoped for a large increase in European agriculture to outclass the African producer and force him to work. During the next three years however, well over 50% went to work, and locally the period worked was invariably six months. In 1913 there was a large drop in the labour supply which the native commissioner attributed to the fact that most of the men had had to work in 1912, but it may also have had something to do with the unsettling effect of the Private Locations Ordinance and the movement to the reserves. This movement had begun after the imposition of the Company rent in 1908 (in that year alone i+5 kraals moved), and continued after 1910 from private land when farmers were demanding rents' of £3 or that Africans quit the land. Paradoxically, farmers soon noticed the loss of labour through the movement to the reserves. Theoretically, an area of large kraals ought to be able to supply more labour than one of smaller, but this is not necessarily the case, as Makoni illustrates. UMTALI The Umtali district lay north-south across the town of Umtali, south into the' Vumba mountains, and originally included the highlands of Inyanga. The population of the district experienced a considerable move to the reserves between 1910 199 and 1911, a movement of which the native commissioner, T.B. Hulley, greatly disapproved. Since his 1910 figures were later admitted to be an overestimate in every case, this move might have been greater than is immediately apparent from the figures. 1910 1911 reserves 7,200 9,319 unalienated land 1;500 2,180 alienated land 13,500 6,389 An unusual feature is the increase of population on unalienated land. Despite the considerable trading possibilities, agric ulture remained backward, a situation which Hulley attributed candidly to the insecurity of tenure. There were relatively large numbers of cattle and several hundred were killed for Umtali butchers annually, at least from 1910. Lobolo too was paid in cattle. It was of course a district of high labour opportunity, having one of Rhodesia's most important towns on the line of rail from Beira to Salisbury. But as such, it also attracted large numbers of immigrants, particularly for the mines, from North Zambezia, Portuguese East Africa, and Shangaans from the Melsetter district, who did not suffer from the unsettling effect of the proximity of their homes. In the early years, the.native commissioner reported that the high wages paid by the railway construction had an 200 unfortunate effect on the labour supply. Chief Mtasa, who ruled over 8,000 people, had supplied labour for the railway and to carry food from the rail head. In subsequent years the local inhabitants found alternatives for maintaining their independence: they burnt charcoal for the mines, and hawked vegetables to the town dwellers of Umtali. This independence was revealed also in the Africans' careful choice of employer. As Hulley put it, "In other words the pressure of economic circumstance is not sufficient to compel the local native to work for all and sundry". His surprise at such a rational response is fairly typical of many Rhodesian native commissioners' attitudes to their charges. In 1912, he provided a labour return: 1 able bodied 2 no. who 3 period 4 2 as % men in district worked months of 1 reserves 2,025 672 5 33 unalienated 320 108 7 4 alienated 3,250 2,070 5 63 and in 1913 he averred that no young man stayed continuously at the kraals. The Private Locations Ordinance produced in this area several agreements with a few hundred men to provide free labour, and only two thirds of these were given the opportunity of rent in remission. INYANGA The Inyanga district was separated from Umtali in 1903. By 1909, 90% of the population of 17,000 were already on 201 private or Crown land (an interesting slip - he referred to British South Africa Company land). By 1913, there were 1,300 on reserves, 3,500 on unalienated land, and 12,000 on alienated land. The native commissioner over the entire period was W.H. Hoodie, whose reports are extremely uninformative and whose figures are obviously unreliable. An indication of the requirements demanded of the inhabitants is provided by Moodie's estimate of 1909 that £10,000 was paid per annum in tax and rents. In that year he recorded that almost 300 cattle had been sold and £300 to £400 worth of grain traded. The rest was acquired by work. Moodie expressed himself baffled, considering there could be little over 4,000 able bodied men. in the population. In 1908, he had described a sort of "shift" system at the kraals whereby about five men went rout each year to work for the fiscal and rent requirements of the whole kraal, but by 1913 very few young men were able to stay at their kraals for lengthy periods. In 1912, Moodie produced a labour return - complaining of the necessity to do so - the detailed figures of which provide precisely the same percentage worked for each type of land tenure (33%). The return is clearly manufactured. 202 MELSETTER The Melsetter district is an elongated area South of Umtali, running along the border with Portuguese East Africa. Its populations more than doubled between 1900 and 1913, even allowing for some emigration into Portuguese territory in 1908 to avoid the Company rent. In 1909, the native commissioner, W.M. Longden, reported that the rent had caused dissatisfaction and distress, that many could not afford the £1 and wished to move, that land in the Sabi valley was so poor that it was not worth paying rent for. The population distribution changed between 1910 and 1913 according to the table below. The large increase in the reserves population is partly explicable by some immigration from the Ndanga district. 1910 1913 reserves 11,017 16,079 unalienated land 1,704 740 alienated land 10,996 9,071 There was very little trading and very few cattle in the district. The area was afflicted with locusts in some years, and even when a good crop was reaped on the high veld, the crop in the Sabi Valley was invariably poor. The labouring population, of whom many were Shangaans, had already consid erable experience of travelling to work by I898, when the native commissioner reported that some 2,000 had been to Johannesburg or Kimberley at one time or another. Most had 203 a distinct preference as to employment, and both the Bureau and public works in the area were unable to secure labour. An indication of the extent of labour emigration is provid ed by the fact that farmers insisted on their tenants stay ing on the land, and gave them just enough to pay their tax. Under the Private Location Ordinance some 1,321 males were party to agreements for labour in lieu of rent. It was the worst example (along with Umtali) of a system which it is difficult not to describe as forced labour. In 1912, the native commissioner revealed the diffic- . mlties in labour statistics when he reported that only half his circulars were returned by employers. But he submitted nevertheless a detailed labour return. 1 able bodied 2 no. who 3 2 as % men in district worked of 1 reserves 1,339 961 72 unalienated land • 101 80 ,79 alienated land 1,166 • 830 71 While the figures tally with the general impression of the district as one where there was little alternative to labour in entering the cash economy, it should be noted that his figures of able bodied men do not appear to fit the population figures adequately. This concludes the examination of all the districts of Mashonaland. The conclusions will be drawn in a comparative way at the end of the next chapter on Matabeleland. 204 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, NA N9/1/10 - N9/1/15. The native commissioners' reports for Mashonaland are in NA N9/1/4 - N9/1/16. Individual references will not be made in this chapter since all the material is to be found in those reports and in some others cited in the bibliography. See H.C.'Thomson, Rhodesia and its Government (London, 1898), p.51 and also reports of the native commissioners Mtokos and Makoni, I898. NA N9AA. See chapter 3, pp.131-132. 205 CHAPTER 5 LABOUR FROM THE DISTRICTS MATABELELAND. The-province of Matabeleland.was of course annexed by the Company only after the war of 1893. It seemed like the rich er prize: although less densely populated, the population seemed more willing and more able to come out to work; mines quickly sprang up; Bulawayo developed more rapidly than Salisbury; Rhodes's projected Cape to Cairo line ran through the province and made it more accessible to the Wankie coal fields and, later, to the reservoir of labour in the North. Great labour depots were soon set up in'Bulawayo, and Mashona land had to rely for northern labour either on the declining ; routes through Feira and Tete or an labourers (who had already travelled down the line from the North West), sent North East from Bulawayo by train. The districts of Matabeleland were diverse, and rich in labour migrant opportunity. Each is examined in detail below."'" GWELO This was one of the most important labour opportunity districts in Rhodesia, where the demand from within the district exceeded the possible local supply. The population 206 rose rapidly, and by 1910 40% was in the reserves, although this proportion changed again during the following year owing to the addition of an area where much of the land had been alienated. The figures for 1912 and 1913 reveal how swiftly the land was alienated. 1912 1913 reserves 3,550 3,750 unalienated land 4,000 1,75alienated-land 4,360 6,750 towns 2,210 2,2014,120 14,450 It was an area in which Africans cultivated light sandy soils, and agriculture tended to remain traditional. They introduced few ploughs, probably because of the nature of the soil and because there were insufficient cattle for draught purposes. However, immediately after the marriage ordinance of 1902 quite high lobolo was demanded, invariably in cattle. In a good season Africans tended to over-trade their grain, necessitating re-purchase at prices often advanced by 100%. The local labour supply was able to satisfy most of the demand in the district for surface and domestic work, but mining work was almost exclusively the preserve of "foreign ers". By 1904, 70% of the total labour force consisted of Africans from Nyasaland, Portuguese East Africa and in particular Shangaans from Gazaland. The proximity of mining compounds had two effects. Since mining workers were richer, social intercourse with them increased the imitative wants of 20? the locals, although since the district was elongated and some areas were far from the mines, this leavening effect was restricted. Secondly, the co-habitation of the local women with the transitory mining population caused serious disaffection between the traditional authorities and the European economy. The chiefs and headmen disapproved of the withdrawal of the women from their traditional place in village social and agricultural life, and of the fact that no sanction was provided to order the women back from the mining compounds. These effects become familiar in this type of district. INSIZA The Insiza district is a very instructive one because it lies on the line of rail mid-v/ay between two high employ ment areas, Bulawayo and Gwelo-Selukwe, and there were also some mines and a few farms in the district itself. Land was swiftly taken up by Europeans throughout the district, charging rents of from 10/- to £1 per hut, and already in 1899 the native commissioner, A.A. Campbell, was stressing the need for a reserve. In 1910, only 2% of the population was in a reserve and by 1913 this had gone up to only 7%. This meant that kraals were scattered and small, and 80% of all Africans in the district were "squatters" on European land. . 208 The district is also interesting in that it had a very-mixed population of Shona and Ndebele peoples. Its native commissioner almost throughout the period, A.A. Campbell, could be sympathetic and shrewd, though highly paternalistic, and wrote excellent reports. He pointed out that the Shona worked less in the cash economy than the Ndebele not because they were lazy (as many of his colleagues suggested), but because they were better agriculturists and cultivated more land. The Shona responded to the new dietary regulations for the mines introduced in 1907 (see chapter 8) by growing and marketing more beans and monkey nuts. Despite the fact . that the marriage ordinance never really worked (because women greatly outnumbered men) there was a large increase in the number of cattle, and correspondingly in the number of ploughs used. By 1910 there were 300 ploughs in the district and these were extensively loaned out among the Africans. Campbell shrewdly observed that the immediate effect of the Private Locations Ordinance was to cause a great deal of unrest and a resultant drop in the labour supply. The imposition of grazing fees was particularly irksome given the Bantu attitude towards cattle as a semi-sacred symbol of wealth. Like many other native commissioners, he placed great confidence in the younger generation, and was beginning to find by 1910 that some young men had become habitual workers. On the other hand, he disapproved of education as a disincentive 209 to work, and he held that the missions corrupted the morals p of the Africans. As in other districts, the locals invariably tended to fill jobs other than mining. His labour return for 1912 is extremely interesting. 1 able bodied 2 '-.No. who 3 period 4 2 as I men in district worked months of 1 reserves 255 108 4 42 unalienated land 1,000 600 5 60 alienated land 2,270 1,200 5 52 domiciled aliens •'643 643 11 100 Campbell's successor in 1913 attacked the Private Locations Ordinance as pushing the people to the reserves. MZINGWANE This district was joined with Insiza until 1908. Within the district there were several mines, and the vast majority of the land v/as alienated - so much so in fact that by 1913 there .were scarcely any people living on reserves or unalienated land. Being on the edge of Bulawayo, the district's agric ulture advanced rapidly. By 1909 the native commissioner could write that "almost every native owns a few cattle, some donkeys, and a plough" and there v/as a keen desire to own carts and wagons. Several Africans became market gardeners on the outskirts of Bulawayo, and as in other districts ploughs were hired out (with their oxen) at 10/- per day. Cattle were 210 demanded for lobolo, although male partners of marriage contracts complained of the women leaving for the mines. By 1909-1910, the native commissioner was claiming a work figure of 80% able bodied men working an average of six months in the year. This figure, even if exaggerated, undoubtedly reflects the demand in an area of almost complete alienation, and must include many "squatter" labour agree ments. . The Matabele Gold Reefs Company secured labour from its own properties at Essexvale for the Geelong and Ancient Mines which were outside the district, thus reducing the supply for the district itself. Considerable numbers were affected by the Private Locations Ordinance under section 3, and the usual complaints were made to the native commissioner about harsher labour agreements, higher rents, and grazing fees. By 1913 many were informing him of their desire to move out of the district to the reserves. 1912 labour return: 1 able bodied 2 No. who 3 period 4 2 as % men in district worked months of 1 reserves 38 15 5 39 unalienated land- 9 5 5 56 alienated land 2,116 1,500 6 71 domiciled aliens 540 500 12 93 2,703 2,020 7 75 211 BELINGWE This district was close to areas of high employment opportunity and some labour was also required within the district. Already by 1899 some Africans were becoming accustomed to travelling to Bulawayo, Insiza, Gwanda and Selukwe. It had a very large population which increased rapidly (24,451 in 1898 to 38,059 in 1912), inflated temp orarily by Chief Mpefu and his people from the Transvaal. It was a highly mixed population, including Ndebeles, Shonas, Basutos, and many smaller groups. The inhabitants were, like those in many adjacent dist ricts, described as highly independent, a poor field for the labour bureaux, largely preferring the indigenous economy and their rural crafts of pottery and basket making. In 1899, the native commissioner Jackson reported that the natives were the most industrious he had come across in Southern Africa, but that they preferred devoting their energies to agriculture rather than to serving a master. A large trade soon established itself and grain was sent as far as the Insiza and Filabusi mines and Bulawayo. Ploughs were used as labour saving devices, but the large trading demand appear ed to have little effect on the extent of the acreage under cultivation. Labour was always slow to come out in the area, mainly because the vast majority of the Africans lived on reserves. 212 By 1912 the figures were 31,610 on reserves, 4,060 on alienated land, 1,895 on unalienated land, and 474 at the mines, although the reserve population dropped the follow ing year due to overcrowding. A whole series of native commissioners passed through the district and took up various attitudes to the labour problem. As has been seen, involvement.in agriculture was stressed. In 1902 the native commissioner, J.W. Posselt, insisted that the depression in the European economy of that year was not due to the labour shortage. In 1903 496 young men turned out for the Globe"and Phoenix Mine at the request of the labour agent, Nielsen, and later in the year at hut tax collection 250 turned out for the Red and White, and Rose and Killarney Mines. It was hoped that the large numbers of Shangaans who passed through the area would act as an example to the local inhabitants. In 1906, a more sympathetic native commissioner suggested that one of the problems was the lack of classification of labourers as to their experience and ability. In the following year, there was a poor harvest,{ high prices for grain, and very few turned out. Yet another native commissioner, C.L. Carbut, suggested there should be a £3 tax on idleness. But in the following season when there was again a poor harvest, his successor claimed that 2,172 had worked for an average of 3 months from an able bodied population of 5,000. A similar figure of 40%-213 persisted in subsequent years. The Private Locations Ordinance affected only a few hundred, although the Anglo-French Matabeleland Company decided to forego rents on its .tenants, and insisted instead on each able bodied man working for them.for four months. In 1913, A.A. Campbell, more paternalistic and less sympath etic than he had been in Insiza, found that the labour situation in Belingwe'"has emphasised my conviction that the true interests of the natives cannot be better served than by compulsory labour, disguised under some more attract ive name to'make it acceptable to the shouters of the 'liberty of the subject'". He hoped that the Ndebele, who were more willing to leave the reserves to work, would influence the Shona., It is curious that he failed to make the distinctions" between the Ndebele and the Shona which he had been prepared to make at Insiza, and that he failed to observe that the vital difference between Belingwe and Insiza was that.different proportions of the population lived under the various modes of land tenure in each; SELUKWE The Selukwe district, adjacent to the Gwelo district, is another district of high labour opportunity. The demand within the district was far in excess of the potential supply, which meant, like Gwelo, that the local inhabitants had to compete with large numbers of immigrant labourers from North 21k Zambezi and Portuguese East Africa, willing to remain longer periods in employment. Because of the ready availability of land, the period 1910-1913 revealed only a slight move ment to the reserves. Agriculture progressed very slowly - better seed was introduced nearer European farms, but the plough was slow to appear and there were very few cattle. Nonetheless, there was considerable trading in the area. As early as 1899 there were six trading stations and ten mine stores. Even using traditional methods, the locals were able to market large quantities of grain and - after the new dietary regulations - monkey nuts and beans. As in other similar districts, the local inhabitants tended to offer themselves mainly for farm and domestic labour, although it is reported that the social life of the mines was more attractive. It is not unreal to talk of outside competition, for in 1904 there was actually a surplus of labourers offering themselves and employers tended to favour those from outside because of the longer periods they were prepared to work. It is interesting to note that the native commissioner, CT. Stuart, reported in 1910 that schools away from the mines had a tendency to reduce the labour supply, while schools on the mines (as at the Tebekwe Mine) positively attracted labour. 215 Labour returns for 1912 and 1913 1 able bodied 2 no. who 3 period 4 2 as % men in district worked months of 1 1912 1913 1912 1913 1912 1913 1912 1913 reserves 2,090 2,182 1,300 1,454 3i 4 62 68 unalienated land 820 640 540 426 ki 5 66 67 alienated land 723 1,042 482 728 ki 5 67 70 domiciled aliens 1,515 1,871 1,500 1,800 11 11 These labour returns never include the large nos. of foreign labour not paying tax. MATOBO This district to the South of Bulawayo was, like Insiza, rapidly alienated to European farmers. The result was that the population actually declined, particularly after the Private Locations Ordinance when there was an exodus to the Gwanda and Mzingwane districts amounting to 3,709 out of a total population of 19,823 in 1913. By 1902, most of the land had been taken over and rents of £1 per hut were being charged. It was a mixed population of Ndebele and Karanga people. Although there was little employment opportunity in the district itself (only 400 were employed in 1904 and 824 in 1912), Bulawayo to the North and the mines of Gwanda and Sebakwe to the East were not far away. 216 Despite the extensive land alienation, this was a district in which the indigenous economy responded rapidly: there was an exceptional growth in stock-holding; by 1907, 800 oxen had been broken for ploughing; by 1910, 590 ploughs were in use; there were many marriage agree ments under the ordinance and lobolo was high; trading was considerable. In 1913, "the native commissioner, F.G. Elliott, was able to report after the crop failure of 1912 and the ensuing famine which was general throughout Rhodesia, the inhabitants of the Matobo district were rich enough to buy grain to tide them over the bad period. The influence of ploughs is instructive in examining the relationship between the indigenous and the European economy. They were a most important want not just because of their cost, but because they also required of course a team of oxen to work them. Since cattle were introduced in this way to break the soil, ploughing became men's work. But in this as in other districts, ploughs were used mainly as labour saving devices rather than as means to increase acreage. The native commissioner reported that men stayed behind to do the ploughing, but then went to work, leaving the women to perform the rest of the agricultural cycle. At first, the native commissioner of the district was somewhat defensive about the labour performance of his district. In 1906, H.M. Jackson shrewdly observed that "the natives do 217 not follow the law of supply and demand (in labour), but act on sound economical grounds, for better wages in the plant ing season do not compensate for the loss of crops". Here he was attributing a rational economic response, the maxi misation of real income, which was very rare indeed in the native commissioners' reports of the period. Nevertheless, his successor, F.G. Elliott, was claiming by 1Q09-1910 that 65% of adult males were going out to work, that young men were beginning to work almost continuously, and that wants were increasing rapidly. So was the tribute levied by the European. In 1907, Jackson had written that Africans took great pride in bringing tribute to the government "as establishing their right to protection and consideration", but by 1909 Elliott was describing the mounting dissatisfaction at the ever-increasing alienation of the land. In 1912 he could write that young men were expected to pay in addition to their £1 hut tax as much as £2 in rent, plus grazing fees, for land that he had no time to use. The landowners had already decided that it was better to pay labour than keep it on the land. As we have seen, in 1913 alone, as a result of many irksome agreements under the Private Locations Ordinance, as much as 20% of the African population moved out of the district. 218 NYAMANDHLOVU This district lies to the North of Bulawayo in excellent cattle country. It was created out of the Bubi district (vid. inf.) in 1910. Between 1910 and 1913 there is a familiar pattern of a population shift to the reserves, although the numbers on alienated land did not appreciably decline because of continuing alienation. 2,500 Africans were affected under the Private Locations Ordinance, and in 1912, the native commissioner, Leo 0. Robinson, reported that those under labour agreements were anxious to leave for the reserves. Like Matobo, this was a district well endowed with both cattle and ploughs. To this day along the line of rail, tracts of this country are unin habited because they are in the possession of absentee land lords, often large companies with little connection with the land. Labour statistics are unsatisfactory - the figure of 50% working for if to 5 months is simply bandied about over these years. 1910 1913 reserves unalienated land alienated land 329 2,215 8,160 2,2.73 770 8,649 BULAWAYO The Bulawayo district was combined with Bubi in 1902 219 and recreated from parts of Bubi, Mzingwane and Bulilima in 1910. It was one of the most devastated districts during the rebellion (of 5,850 cattle before, only 130 remained after), but because of its proximity to the town of Bulawayo, it made a swift recovery. Cattle were sold to the inhabit ants and a large trade was soon established. Already in 1899, 20% of the "kaffir corn" crop was sold, 20% of the Nyaute (a form of millet) crop, and fully 50% of the J'mealie" (maize) crop, a performance which was maintained as more stores and hotels appeared. There was good employment opportunity also, on mines, of which the most important were the Morven and Queen's, and on farms. Almost the entire district was alienated, and by 1912 the Africans lived entire ly on alienated land or on mine and township locations. In consequence African acreage diminished during the period. The early native commissioner, R. Lanning, advocated a rigid state controlled labour policy, and requested permiss ion to be able to stop Africans going to the city of Bulawayo so that they could work in the district. A considerable number of aliens established themselves, many of whom became habitual labourers and formed the usual transient relations with local women. Because of the massive alienation of land, many Africans were affected by the Private Locations Ordinance. The acting native commissioner in 1912, H.N. Homans, was extremely critical 220 ' of the farmers who charged "exorbitant" grazing fees, "caused friction for want of tact and consideration", "kicked natives off the land to avoid building dipping tanks", and raised rents knowing that Africans could not leave because of restrictions on the movement of cattle. BUBI The Bubi district v/as also close to Bulawayo, though later cut off from it by the Bulawayo district. Despite the fact that the Nyamandhlovu district and part of the Bulawayo district were cut out of it in 1910, the population did not decline between 1903 and 1913. Land alienation proceeded rapidly. 1910 " 1913 reserves 4,885 9,420 unalienated land 1,346 1,605 alienated land 12,418 10,216 mines 181 879 The district's agriculture improved rapidly during the period. There was an immense increase in stock-holding with a corresponding increase in draught animals and in ploughs, although the acquisition of the latter outpaced the former. There were several extremely good crops during the period and there were sales of cattle, monkey nuts (from 1908), tobacco, and vegetables (from 1909), and considerable quantities of mealies. In I898, Val Gielgud, the native commissioner, advocated 221 the compulsory introduction of lobolo since the custom was dying out. He suggested £15 for a Zansi, £12 for an Enhla, and £10 for a Holi, pointing out the different levels of Ndebele society, and that the Holi were more expert in agriculture than the Zansi. This would have a beneficial effect upon the labour supply because it fell entirely on the younger men, unlike the tax. The marriage ordinance that emerged in 1901 at first created large lobolo figures for the district, although as elsewhere they rapidly declined. Young men insisted on the customary birth of a child before the payment of lobolo, and for this there was no provision in the ordinance. This reveals well the artificial nature of and the ulterior motive behind, the marriage ordinance. As early as 1899 the native commissioner reported that the rent charged on alienated land, was helping the labour situation, and the extent of land alienation seemed to provide the area with high labour statistics from the begin ning. A figure of 50% v/as reached in 1903, and in 1906 the native commissioner reported that 2,983 had worked a minimum of 3 months out of an able bodied population of 5,000. In 1912, the native commissioner claimed that 100% worked as long as 8 months, although this v/as greatly inflated in that year owing to the disastrous harvest. Since the 1913 figure tended to be low throughout Rhodesia, his labour return for that year is very useful. 222 1 able bodied 2 men in district no. who 3 period 4 2 as % worked months of 1 reserves unalienated land alienated land mines 2,856 2,060 7 72 390 243 7 62 1,886 479 1,350 469 7 10 72 98 BULILIMA-MANGWE The Bulilima-Mangwe district was an elongated area in the extreme South West of the country along the border with Bechuanaland. From 1902 to 1910 the population increased from 36,429 to 44,500, but in the latter year there was a fresh delimitation of boundaries. In 1913 the population of 36,778 was distributed 22,200 in reserves, 1,806 on unalienated land, and 9,772 on alienated land. The country was excellent for stock, and there were plenty of ploughs. In 1904, there was a large crop surplus and the proceeds were used to buy stock. But in 1907, an excellent harvest resulted in extremely low prices and had an adverse effect on the payment of tax. The native commissioner observed over the years that men took a larger part in agriculture than they used to, although ploughs were used only to save labour. W.E. Thomas, who had been born at the London Missionary Society at Inyati, was the native commissioner throughout the period from 1899 to 1912, and being himself a "native" 223 of Matabeleland- appears never to ^have gone on leave. In 1899 he was rapturous about the labour potential and performance of the area, but by 1902 he was gloomy about the labour situation. He failed to see that the depression in the European economy of that year was cause rather than effect of the poor labour turnout. In 1903 there was a poor crop and Thomas felt that the mines ought to seize their opport unity to make work attractive. The proximity of the Bechuanaland border meant that large numbers crossed to the Rand labour agent at Francistown for work on the Rand, where, they claimed, conditions were better and the rock softer. This exodus to the South and the size of the district made accurate labour figures impossible. r ? Almost 3,000.people;were affected by the Private Locations Ordinance, but agreements seem to have been not particularly onerous r there were no agreements for labour alone - and very few moved. . i WANKIE Wankie is an extremely interesting district. Government authority spread through it only slowly; very little land was alienated; agriculture hardly developed at all in the light sandy soils of the region where ploughs were useless; in the absence of trading ,stations there was no inducement to produce more than was necessary for domestic consumption; 224 there were few cattle, and small amounts were offered for lobolo. Moreover, the district was plagued with locusts which caused widespread crop destruction. The population was small (still only 5,700 in 1913) and consisted of peoples who had been raided by both the Lozi and the Ndebele and had given tribute to both. In the early years, what outside influence there was was bad influence according to the assistant native commissioner in 1904, Andrew Dale, who wrote, "The inhabitants of the district have not benefited by the influx of white and coloured (i.e. Cape Coloured) workmen during the year; owing to the class of foreigner they have come chiefly in contact with, a class little superior to their own, their respect for the European has distinctly decreased...." Yet there swiftly developed considerable employment opportunity, firstly on the railway construction to the Victoria Falls, and most importantly, on the Wankie Colliery. The latter provides the best instance in Rhodesia of a concentrated labour force in the earlier period. As many as 3,500 were employed on railway construction in 1904, although this rapidly declined. Foreign contract ors treated the Africans unscrupulously, and in 1907 the railway company reduced wages. As a result, old hands left, new ones would not enlist, and by 1909 when wages were still only 15/- per month plus meal and salt, the railway had a very 225 serious labour shortage. Wankie Colliery provided labour mainly for immigrants, although some locals were employed there. In 1904, the assistant native commissioner reported that 17 tribes were represented in the colliery's labour force which was expand ing rapidly. The local inhabitants sold tobacco to the labourers; there were the usual problems with women; and significantly enough, domiciled aliens tended to come under tribal control. The local labour figure expanded very slowly, and the effect of the 1912 famine was to keep men at home in search of edible roots to support their families. The famine in fact set off one of the. first strikes in Rhodesia. In view of the food shortage, the native commiss ioner, T.R. Jackson, urged headmen to send out up to 50% of their men to earn the cash to buy grain. This was accomp lished in May on condition that the men would be home for hoeing, and the headmen were given a highly successful tour of the colliery. When the rainy season came round however, the colliery wished to keep the labourers, and to compound the difficulties, a temporary compound manager was in charge since the permanent one was on leave. In December, 180 African labourers struck because of what the acting native commissioner describes as "legitimate grievances" against a compound manager about whom he himself had misgivings. The management insisted on the prosecution of the strikers, and the native f 226 commissioner was obliged to comply, imposing sharp fines. Yet the native commissioner's sympathies were clearly with the strikers (while deprecating their actions for the benefit of his superiors), and he criticised a "management, in certain quarters of which somewhat quaint notions appear to prevail re. the functions of a court of justice". Neither this nor the earlier bad accident record of Wankie was liable to endear it to the labouring force, and the native commissioner insisted that the only way out of the labour problem was to develop a permanent labouring class. SEBUNGWE-MAFUNGABUSI This district is quite unlike the others so far examined since it lies along the bank of the Zambezi, covering a very large area (much of which is now inundated by Lake Kariba), far from labouring opportunity. The peoples of the district were Tongas, Shankwes and Lozi, people who held only small stock, and whose agriculture scarcely progressed during the period. Not one plough was introduced. Nevertheless, the population more than doubled between 1901 and 1912, from 12,892 to 25,870. The earlier estimate was certainly too small, and the population was inflated by immigration from North West Rhodesia as well as by natural increase. Not surprisingly, opportunity and wants were few in the 227 early years. But an interesting trading pattern rapidly developed. The locals disposed of large numbers of small stock and in addition, produced tobacco which they sold to both the Ndebeles and to traders. This was the only surplus crop of the district. Employment opportunities expanded in adjacent districts. Both the Victoria Falls extension of the railway and the expanding Wankie Colliery provided extensive employment. Moreover, so primitive was the area that carriers were required right up to the end of the period. Some Tonga travelled down to Bulawayo and to the mines in the northern part of the Gwelo district. In 1906, the native commissioner, W.E. Farrer, criticised the incompetence of mine management for the labour difficulties of the country, and reported that Africans frequently told him that they would rather work for less wages for a sympathetic master. This is the kind of unquantifiable factor so often absent from economic analysis. Despite the comparative poverty of the area, considerable sums were exchanged for lobolo. Between the promulgation of the marriage ordinance (no. 2 of 1901) and 1905, lobolo of no less than £2,425 value was exchanged. Moreover, there existed the Kalila and the Garidzella systems, whereby a young man worked for his in-laws at their kraal for up to three years. But by the end of the period the number of marriages was in decline because of the absence of many of the 228 young men. By 1910, a labour figure well in excess of 50% is being mooted for the area. In 1912, the figure of 60% is stated categorically, although this may- have been increased by the poor harvest of that year. In 1913» the reserves were reported to be uninhabitable because of tsetse fly. GWANDA-TULI This district lay along the Limpopo in the extreme South of the country. The population was a mixture of Bechuana, Barenga, Karanga and Shangaan. There were never any reserves in the area, and land was alienated particularly in the last few years. In 1912, the population of 15,577 v/as distributed 5,271 on unalienated land, 8,806 on alienated land, and 1,500 on mines. Although cattle increased in numbers, and ploughs were used, particularly by the Bechuana, there was little increase in wants, and while most local labour demand could be met, very few left the district, Those v/ho did went to the copper mines at Messina in the Transvaal, just across the Limpopo. The labour performance was always poor. In 1904, the bad harvest kept men at home to look after their families, and at the poor harvest of 1908, 600 cattle were sold to pay for grain. \ In 1909 there was some increase in the labour supply because of the British South Africa Company rent on 229 unalienated land (the proceeds of which amounted In 1910 to £2,433). Even in 1912, the famine year, only 50% able bodied men worked. There were the usual problems of women at the mines. Labour returns for 1912 and 1913: 1 able bodied 2 no who 3 period 4 2 as % land men in district worked months of 1 1912 1913 1912 1913 1912 1913 1912 1913 reserves - - -unalienated 1,506 2,708 750 1,000 3 3 50 40 alienated 2,516 2,122 1,260 1,100 3 3 50 52 domiciled aliens 1,012 938 1,012 938 9 9 100 100 This is an example of figures whose.proximity to the 50% norm call their accuracy in doubt. CONCLUSIONS This examination of the'districts has revealed that stimulation to labour was affected by a whole series of incentives and disincentives which varied widely from district to district. The labour performance of each district depended on the nature of the interaction of these incentives and dis incentives. The most obvious conclusion which can be derived from this district mosaic is on a provincial level. Mashonaland was notorious throughout the period as a poor supplier of labour. In 1904, the statistical returns of Mashonaland and Matabeleland revealed that 21% of the able bodied population in the former 230 province and 46% in the latter had been to work for a minimum of three months. Before this the discrepancy had been even greater, and, despite the difficulties in compiling figures, it was assumed to continue thereafter. This distinction between the two provinces can be attributed - as it was by many contemporaries - to the inherent laziness of the Shona, or it can be attributed to a less effective body of native commissioners, or to inaccurate statistics. None of these is satisfactory. It is clear that the Shona were a more agricultural people, more closely wedded to the soil, than the Ndebele. Moreover, the Ndebele lost far more of their cattle in the "rebellions" of 1896-1897 and there is evidence that their better response to paid labour was prompted by a desire to recoup their herds. The Ndebele also, like the other Nguni tribe the Shangaans, had a longer tradition of contact with, and work for, the Europeans. They seemed to take more kindly to mining, despite the fact that it was the Shona in the past who had worked the gold of Rhodesia, though by very different methods. There can be little doubt too that the Ndebele were a physically stronger and more resilient people. After all, in the earliest years, the I'warlike" Ndebele had been described as extremely lazy. Moreover, the Shona appear to have been more easily demoralised by the influx of labour from outside. Their attachment to their 231 native village (which largely persists to this day) precluded them from competing with immigrants in the length of time they were prepared to .work. There is also some evidence that they found the movement to the reserves a more distressing and unsettling experience. In addition, it can be tentatively suggested that the factor of population growth in Matabeleland was greater than that in Mashonaland. Between 1902 and 1912, admittedly using only the most crude population figures, there would appear to have been a growth factor of %% in Matabeleland and of 38% in Mashonaland.^ . However, the relationship of cause and effect to the labour performance is almost imposs ible to establish. Population figures do however point to another obvious conclusion - that with more settled conditions, some good harvests, a vast increase in stock, and rudimentary health provisions, the first effect of European rule was to facil itate the survival of larger families. In the period 1898-1914, the African population of Rhodesia doubled, although it should be remembered that early estimates may have been too low, and that European operations in the Matabele War and the "rebellions" of 1896 and 1897 had slaughtered large numbers of the population. In I898 the Chief Native Comm issioner of Matabeleland reported that females outnumbered 5 males by l+ to 1. The larger factor of growth can thus be seen as a re-establishment of the balance. 232 Possibly as a result of the respective performance of their two provinces, the chief native commissioners of Matabeleland and Mashonaland assumed somewhat different stances over the reserves issue. W.S. Taberer in Mashona land was uncompromising in his attack on the reserves system. He regarded them as a means of demoralisation, of excluding the Africans from the "beneficent influence of the white man", maintaining the position of chiefs whose substantial power had been taken over by the government. The chiefs were no longer able to order labour, and the government could not. He established a myth of the "good old days", when "gangs came out laughing and singing", and recommended that an extra government officer be appointed for each district, who would travel around constantly "preaching the gospel of labour". In 1908 he provided another insight into his dislike of reserves, when in an attack on "negrophiles", o he implied that all Shona were potential murderers. Accordingly, he attacked the imposition of the British South -Africa Company.rent and the European farmers who threw Africans off their land and then complained of the shortage of labour. The reserves in his mind became almost hostile territories within the colony. Taylor in Matabeleland, on the other hand, having burned his fingers in 'the Colonial Office fire over the forced labour issue, attuned himself more to Company policy as modified by 233 known Colonial Office attitudes. In consequence, when Taberer left Rhodesia in 1913, Taylor became the Chief Native Commissioner for the whole country. He attacked the backwardness of the reserves, but not their existence. In 1912, he wrote to the administrator, "The development of the reserves^ thereby increasing the wants of the natives, is the true solution of the labour difficulty."^ He wrote this at a time when the bulk of the African population of Rhodesia were withdrawing further from the centres of European employment, further from the stores and'mining compounds that.stimulated such wants, further in many cases from the best agricultural .land. The process would eventually be reversed by the gross overcrowding of . reserves, but in a very real sense, it v/as the moderate party, complying with the desire of the Colonial Office for a haven for the African population at a time when eventual African political power was unthinkable, which most success fully pushed forward the development of land segregation, and the mortgaging of the Africans* political future. The ambivalence inherent in Taylor's attitude is clear from the remark's in his report of 1909 on the 4,000 Africans of all tribes who had become habitual labourers at the mines. This he said was a class that ought to be encouraged, by the provision of some land nearby and the construction of married . 10 quarters. 234 As has been seen, the two-actions which most aided the process of movement to the reserves were the imposition of the Company rent on land which v/as later'adjudged by the Privy Council not to belong to the Company at all, and the Private Locations Ordinance, the one an administrative act of the Company, the other an ordinance heavily influenced by settler desires. It is certain that the first was not intended to have such a result, and the second was only partially designed towards that end. The first was intended purely to raise revenue for the hard-pressed Company, and the argument that it might turn out more labour was used in its favour. The second was designed to give settlers the right to remove "tenants" if their presence or that of their stock was annoying to them, or to impose labour or rent agreements if they preferred. The first was a signal failure (in Mashonaland in 1909 only £3,619 was collected);'1''1" the second relied too much on the good offices of settler farmers given neither to negotiation nor compromise. ; The figures in our review of the districts make it abundantly clear that the rent obligations on alienated or unalienated land did succeed in turning out a far higher proportion of labour, but they reached the point where they became intolerable to so many. Africans that the-reserves became in their minds as never before a refuge from the constant cash demands of the European. 235 If the European created the demand for labour, he also provided the means of avoiding it. He created the demand for grain, for vegetables, for meat, which provided another, and for many a more attractive, avenue into the cash sector of the economy. In early days produce had been bartered for tax or for the baubles that then constituted "wants". But as Africans began to appreciate the possibility of a bridge between the cash economy and the indigenous economy, cash trad ing became the accepted norm. Our examination of the districts has revealed however that the simple syndrome that a good harvest equals much trading and little labour and vice versa does not stand. An over-abundant harvest could produce a large drop in prices and a net loss in trading income. An extraordinary bad harvest could keep the men at home to help their families through the famine. A lot also depended on the nature of the crop. There is some evidence of a conscious switch to maize, the most marketable crop, and the response to the government's dietary regulations in the growth of more monkey nuts and beans in certain districts reveals another rational link between the world of the mine and the world of the soil. And of course this diversification depended upon the versat ility of the soil and of the tribe in any one district. Cattle provide a much more enigmatic role in the discovery of alternatives. Cattle were of course to the Southern Bantu 236 the most important visible form of wealth, a sacred area of tribal life surrounded by taboos of sex and fertility. It is not surprising that their acquisition should provide a positive incentive to work. The lobolo ordinance was designed to maintain the importance of cattle. In some districts however, the cattle relationship with the European economy was seen to be reciprocal. Their sale could provide the money for tax or for the grain for subsistence. In only one district, Victoria, was the sale of cattle seen as almost the only entry to the cash economy, and, drained by the exigencies of famine, they proved a swiftly wasting asset. It seems that this district acquired so many head of cattle that the incentive for fresh acquisition was lost. It might not have been had there been closer employment opportunity. The arrival of the plough and the acquisition of cattle were clearly related. The plough required the breaking of large numbers of oxen. Since cattle were always the preserve of male activity, men became important in the physical act of breaking the soil, which had seldom been true of hoeing. But the evidence is that ploughs were used - where the soil and terrain were suitable - almost solely as a labour saving device, rather than as a means to increase acreage. As such, their effect on the labour supply, despite the few itinerant plough men, seems to have been positive rather than negative. In the light sandy soils where ploughs were useless, the scattering 237 of kraals greatly reduced the potential labour supply, part icularly where cultivation required constant pollarding of trees, a man's task. Undoubtedly one of the most important effects on the labour supply v/as the proximity of employment ^opportunity. To those far away, the difficult and sometimes dangerous journey was not unnaturally a disincentive, particularly after the disastrous accidents, death rates, and closures at certain of the mines. If there was the alternative of trade to hand, it v/as an easy way out. On the other hand, if there were no alternative, the journey had to be undertaken if the tax were to be met. Thus poor and remote districts could reveal quite a high labour figure. This is also true of the labour from the North of the Zambezi which will be examined in the next chapter. Others had a population v/here the habit of labouring was already established, as in the Shangaan areas of Ndanga and Melsetter. To be close to the labour source could be a disincentive because the alternative v/as all the more simple. Beer .and food could be sold, grain and meat traded. The existence of a large body of unmarried labourers in a district could create a market, could create a social problem, but it could also create a desire for the social life of the mine compound or town location, and the pay to procure from the store the means of imitating to some degree the culture of the European overlord. i 238 The area which supplied the optimum amount of labour was therefore the area which was close enough, but not too close, to the employment opportunity, that possessed the means of an interaction with the European economy in cattle or trade, not too much competition from immigrant workers, and the right balance of population on alienated land, unalienated land and reserves. This examination of the available data has revealed that in a situation where so many unquantifiables are present, it is not possible to prove or disprove any sort of labour supply function. The experience of the Umtali railway construction appears to indicate that a ceiling of want could be more rapidly reached with a high wage and have an adverse effect on the labour supply. But Rhodesia never had a fixed minimum or a fixed maximum wage; there never was the kind of employer combination that the Rand saw, and when wages were reduced, as on the Victoria Falls railway construction, the drop in supply 12 was not only immediate, but lasted for at least two years. Essentially Rhodesia had a free wage system, and this could produce some hard bargaining in the labour market place, sometimes giving the edge to the Rand with its guaranteed minimum (and its less severe liquor laws). It also produced a highly complex wage and labour situation in which, given the inadequate statistics, it is not possible to establish any wage labour connection. • By maintaining this free system, Rhodesian 239 employers provided considerable difficulties for themselves, not least of which was the damage to the Bureaux. They lost labour to the Rand, created disincentives to work within Rhodesia, and had themselves to seek labour from outside. 240 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 1 The native commissioners' reports for Matabeleland are in NA NB6/1/1 - NB6/1/12 and N9/1/16. Again, specific references will not be given. 2 "There are no mission stations in this district, and to this fact I attribute"a marked growing improvement in the morals of the natives." Report of native commissioner, Insiza, 1898. NA NB 6/1/2. 3 B.S.A.Co. Report for 1904. 4 The population figures are derived from a combination of the B.S.A.Co. Reports and the native commissioners' reports. 5 Report of Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, I898. NA NB 6/1/1. 6 Reports of Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland. NA N9/1/10; N9/1/13. 7 Ibid. N9/1/14. 8 Ibid. N9/1/11. 9 Taylor to Milton, March 5, 1912 NA N3/22/9. 10 Taylor's report in the B.S.A.Co. Report of 1909. 11 Report of Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, 1909. NA N9/1/12. 12 There are descriptions of labour difficulties at several mines after reductions in wages in the B.S.A.Co. Reports for 1901-1902, p.176. 241 CHAPTER 6 LABOUR FROM OUTSIDE INDIAN OCEAN AND NORTHERN ZAMBEZIA In 1904, when the Administrator and Chief Native Commiss ioners of Rhodesia were attempting to refute the arguments of the Resident Commissioner on the availability of labour, it v/as pointed out that almost 75% of the country's labour force consisted of "foreign" labourers. The country's wealth, the Administrator wrote, is scattered over Africa."'" This prop ortion remained true for most of our period. It is important to examine, this outside labour because of the effects it had firstly upon the African inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, secondly upon the peoples of its places of origin, thirdly on the relations between Rhodesia, the surrounding territ ories and the Colonial Office, and above all on African and European attitudes towards labour as only a temporary link between the indigenous and the cash economy. There were three different forms that labour from the outside could take. The Rhodesian administration encouraged tribes from Mozambique, the Cape, the Transvaal and Bechuana-land to immigrate permanently to form a quarry for a potential labour supply. They attempted to bring in labour from further afield, from Ethiopia, Somaliland and South Arabia, from India and from China. And they encouraged a large body of temp orary migrant labour from the surrounding territories, most 242 from the Company's own domain in the North, the remainder from Nyasaland and Mozambique. It is a feature of the period that the Company and the settlers were concerned to keep up the African population; any desire for racial balance was subordinated to the desire to create as large a potential labour force as possible. Thus, not only were whole tribes encouraged to immigrate, but measures were taken to stop emigration. The British South Africa Company rent levied from 1908 on unalienated land was not imposed on border areas lest the inhabitants decided to move off across the border into neighbouring terr itory. A considerable fluidity over the borders existed throughout the period. The Fingoes were, the most interesting example of an immigrant tribe. They were a tribe from the Transkei who had had a long history of co-operation with the British in the nineteenth century. The initiative for their move to Rhodesia came from Rhodes himself. The need for their labour was overtly expressed in a verbal agreement between Rhodes and the chiefs. He is reported to have said We do not love one another so- much' as'to give land without any return. Having come to your reserves and your titles I ask you to give at least three months' work a year.2 There would be no tax on the production of a work receipt, but otherwise there would be a tax of £3. In this way, a portion of the Cape Glen Grey Act was in effect transplanted 243 to Rhodesia by means of a private agreement between Rhodes as landlord and the Fingoes as tenants. The Fingoes began to arrive at their location at Bembesi North East of Bulawayo in 1898. The superintend-ant of their location reported that they were coming for labour purposes and to assist in the defence of the country if ever the Ndebele should rise again. The number of the Fingoes in the location never exceeded 1500 and by 1907 their numbers were dropping rapidly. The experiment was a failure, largely because of a whole series of bad harvests, ill-health, the death of stock from African coast fever, and disagreements regarding the levying of wage-free compulsory labour for the fencing of the location. In 1898 there were several other schemes afoot to bring African immigrants into the country. In that year a chief, Mpefu, a refugee from the war conditions in the Transvaal, was permitted to cross the border with some 3,000 followers and settle in the Belingwe district, and precautions were taken to stop the Boer police following.*1" This immigration was even more short-lived than the Fingo. In 1902, it was reported that he had returned to the Transvaal.^ More important from -the point of view of mining labour was the rather secretive scheme to entice Shangaans df Gungunhana's nation in Gazaland to re-enter the Melsetter district.^ The Administrator was anxious to resettle them along the Sabi 2kk River, which was reported to be able to support 15,000 Africans. In fact there was no systematic immigration, and it should be noted that only a few years later the Sabi Valley area was being described as particularly unproductive for its inhabit-7 ants. Africans had been coming in too across the Bechuanaland border. Some under Chief Banaame settled in a location which o had been allotted to Raditcladi, the brother of Chief Khama. In February, 1901, Temba chiefs from Cape Colony visited Rhodesia with a view to settling, looked over available land and returned to bring up their followers "as soon as military exigencies permit".^ In fact this scheme does not seem to have materialised. At first the Resident Commissioner, Sir Marshall Clarke, disapproved of this immigration on the grounds of infringement of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of Rhodesia. Milton set out to convince him of the need for more labour in view of the costly importation from the North, and Clarke later modified his position."*"^ The Colonial Office were sceptical of the Company1s' ability or desire to provide these people with sufficient land - labour was clearly the primary motive - and so Chamberlain informed Milner that all immig rants must be made aware of the land and labour situation. Colonial Office susceptibilites to the rights of the indigenous peoples of Rhodesia were aroused by the veiled threats of the 245 Chief Native Commissioners for Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the indabas held in 1899: if the local peoples would not go out to work, then other peoples would be brought in and would take their land. . This type of immigration is important because it reveals most clearly the land-labour syndrome. Such an agreement as that with the Fingoes makes it abundantly clear that land is to be a system of outdoor relief to underpin the migrant labour system and maintain the cheapness of labour. Moreover, this system confirmed the Colonial Office's conviction that the only means of protecting Africans' rights was by means of reserves. The second type of immigrant labour, an extension of the indentured labour from afar movement examined in chapter 2 .repays study because it reveals the bizarre lengths to which the Rhodesian administration was willing to go to secure labour, and because it reveals inter-imperial attitudes between Rhodesia and the Indian Empire and between Rhodesia and the other South African colonies. When recruiters turned their attention to the North East of Africa and to South Arabia, it was in more ways than one a reaction to the Boer War. The War meant the disruption of Rhodesia's communications southwards; it raised the fear that the mines would have to close, and that the Africans, seeing the discomfiture of the Europeans, would revolt. It offered 246 an opportunity to Rhodesia to prove its independence by 12 means of the link with the Indian Ocean through Beira. By chance, it involved acquiring a recruiter called J. Kusel, originally briefed by.a Rand Company. The efforts to obtain labour from the Red Sea - Gulf of Aden area take on in all their wild activity and complete futility something of the air of pantomime. Kusel had proceeded to Abyssinia to obtain labourers for the Consolid ated Goldfields of South Africa. On the outbreak of the Boer War.he offered his services to the Labour Board at Bulawayo and an agreement was signed on 21 September 1900. Kusel had submitted the detailed proposals he had drawn up for the Rand Company, including not a little shady business.^ He described conditions in Abyssinia, in Somaliland, and in the Yemen, the establishing of agents, the bribing of governors. Kusel promptly returned to the Red Sea area accompanied by a Rhodesian settler, -A.Tulloch, to act as paymaster for the British South Africa Company. At the end of November the Company informed the Colonial Office that agents had proceeded to Abyssinia and that the Aden authorities required notification from the Colonial 15 Office. y The Colonial Office were surprised and submitted the letter to the Foreign Office who replied that the enter prise should be stopped until King Menelik's views could be obtained. The usual questions were asked, "Why does Milner 247 If, know nothing of this? Has Sir Marshall Clarke reported?" Having established this Abyssinian smoke-screen, the recruiters next turned up in Djibouti, where trouble arose at a very early stage of the operations. The French regarded it as a breach of neutrality (with reference to the South African War) to permit Somalis to be shipped from 17 Djibouti to Southern Africa. ' Notwithstanding, a group of recruits were moved from Djibouti to Zeila by Tulloch and then illegally shipped to Aden, carefully avoiding Berbera where Tulloch had been ordered to report by the superintend-ant of customs at Zeila, and where the British consul had powers to stop the shipment. In subsequent correspondence to the Foreign Office this consul claimed that had he had an opport unity to' explain their contracts to them hardly any of the Somalis would have gone. Moreover he announced that Tulloch's action had caused great excitement in Djibouti and "people 18 inimical to Britain made much of it to the Abyssinian King". But this was not all. When this batch arrived in Beira Tulloch had difficulties keeping them together, firstly because Portuguese labour touts offered them higher wages and secondly because the Portuguese abducted seventy of them. There was even worse trouble with Kusel's party which followed. They rioted on arrival at Beira and clashed with the Portuguese police. It was reported in the Mozambique newspaper that the crew of the ."Herzog" of the Deutsche 248 Ost-Afrika shipping company had told them that they would be 19 chained and sold as slaves. After all this the labourers proved useless. However, the consultant engineer at the Surprise Mine found the few Arabs among the contracted labourers useful and asked for 20 more. And this set in train a yet more pointless round of recruitment. The trouble and expense to which the Company was willing to extend, despite these inauspicious beginnings, is a measure of the administration's belief in the inadequacy of the domestic supply. Tulloch submitted a detailed report on 21 labour prospects all the way up the East African coast. Even Lord Cromer played his part, telegraphing that Harrington in Addis Ababa did not consider that Abyssinian labour would be suitable, though King Menelik consented to the enlistment of labourers at five dollars (Maria Theresas) a head. The Foreign Office laconically communicated to the Colonial Office 23 that it agreed with Colonel Harrington's opinion. ^ Following Tulloch's confidence that an unlimited supply of labour could be obtained from the Aden area provided the permission of the Indian authorities could be obtained for the establishment of a depot, a sort of labour entrepot, in Aden itself, the second act of the Red Sea farce was played out. (Aden and the adjacent protected states were under the jurisdiction of the presidency of Bombay at this time.) H. Marshall Hole, a senior official of the Rhodesian administ-249 ration, was dispatched along with Kusel to begin recruitment on a large scale through Aden. Every precaution was taken to see that Hole would be given a co-operative welcome. At the request of the Company, the Colonial Office asked the India Office for an opinion and duly received a memorandum from Sir W. Lee Warner.^ The India Office apparently saw no objection and did not regard the India Emigration Act of 1883 as pertaining to the protected states. The Colonial Office contented itself with seeking assurances from the Company that the Rhodesian administration would be entirely responsible for recruitment, shipment, protection in Rhodesia and repatriation. Meanwhile, Hole in Aden was encountering difficulties. The new British Resident, General Maitland, refused to act until he received orders from his superiors in India. Arrangements went ahead; contacts were made with sultans in the interior; an island in Aden harbour with the unfort unate name of„Slave Island was chosen as a depot.^ BUt still Maitland refused to permit actual recruitment to begin. Bombay was raising difficulties. Unlike the India Office, the presidency regarded the India Emigration Act restricting the emigration of Indian indentured labourers as applying to the protected states. Correspondence was protracted and voluble. In August Rhodes himself personally cabled Curzon complaining of the delay, to which Curzon replied that he was 250 26 not aware of any delay. The Resident persisted in ignoring both the India Office and Cur-zon - he would take his orders onl from: Bombay, and he was advising non-co-operation. In London, the issue of the Protector of Immigrants had arisen, for should Hole's efforts ever be met with success, such an officer would have to be appointed. This minor controversy reveals perfectly the difficulties in Company rule and the exacerbated state of relations between the Colonial Office and the Company. It also reveals an interesting distinction in Company attitudes towards the Secretary of State and the permanent officials of the Colonial Office. The questions were who should appoint the Protector of Immigrants, and, more important, who should pay him. The permanent under secretary, Sir Montague Ommanney, felt that the Protector should be paid by the High Commissioner - he did not like the idea of "the contractor paying the inspector". Other officials, well aware of Treasury objections, suggested the method used for native officials: the Company paid, but the appointment was subject to the approval of the Secretary pQ of State. Finally, it was decided that the appointment should be made by the Secretary of State from nominees of the Company and paid by the Company, and this decision was commun-29 icated to the Company in August Of 1901. y Wilson Fox, the manager of the Company, reacted strongly 251 • , • to the proposal - "It is monstrous that we should, have the pay ing and the Colonial Office the patronage". It was furthermore, derogatory to the position of the Company to take the appointment of its officials out of its hands. It tends to give our enemies a handle against us,'as furnishing official proof that the Govt, still regards us with suspicion.3° And in a most revealing postscript he added If future discussion is to take place upon this matter, I think it would be wise for Lord Grey to approach Mr. Chamberlain direct. It is not much use arguing such a point with subordinate officials. Little did he know that Mr. Chamberlain had already produced the most cunning idea of all, namely that "payment should be made by 31 us, but recovered from the Company".-' And it was the "subordinate officials" who thought that this v/as going too far. At last after many months of waiting, Hole was informed by the London office that Curzon had telegraphed that the recruiting 32 could beginy but only for the first thousand, for Bombay had 33 decreed that Aden was not to be used as a permanent depot. y A most remarkable network of connections had been set up; journeys had been made to Lahej and Shagra; sultans had been tipped; agents and recruiters had been appointed. But the difficulties were only beginning. Sultans and sheiks who had glowingly promised large numbers of recruits (with an eye to their ov/n pockets) failed to comply. Recruiting in the Yemen as hoped v/as impossible since trouble had broken out on the border and British troops had been sent to quell the insurgents. 252 Fantastic stories about Rhodesia circulated in Aden, Sheikh Othman, and even in the interior: one of those who had "mut inied" (Hole's word) in Beira in the previous recruitment was in Aden assiduously spreading tales. Moreover, the rate of disappearance of recruits was remarkable. Kusel's first party from Lahej consisted of 338 Arabs; of these 150 deserted on the way to the medical inspection centre at Sheikh Othman, 60 refus ed to submit to the medical examination, 32.were rejected as medically unfit, leaving 96, one of whom was claimed by his 35 mother. ^ Later Hole discovered to his astonishment that on the way from the medical centre to the island depot some more deserted and others were picked up owing to the lack of vigil ance of the police. Eventually, 129 were despatched on a German steamer as deck cargo in the charge of a member of the British South Africa police, the whole journey to Beira to take over six weeks.^ The ludicrous end to the operation was in sight. The Arabs went up to Rhodesia; they refused to go underground; the mines had a surplus of surface labour; they and another group which followed with Hole were returned; and Kusel was ordered to wind recruitment in Aden. There were recriminations, bitterness, and 37 not a little wasted expenditure. Despite all, a renewed cry went up for labour from India it self, citing the many precedents for Indian indentured labour. In March of 1900, William Ewing of a firm of Glasgow agents had submitted a detailed report to Jones, Secretary of the British South Africa Company, on India emigrant labour.38 253 He provided figures for the 1890s of emigration to Mauritius, Natal, Fiji, Jamaica, Demerara, Trinidad, Dutch Guiana, Mombasa and the Seychelles, which reached a peak total of 19,613 in 1898-99. He argued that it was better to recruit in Calcutta the impoverished Indians coming down the Hooghly from Bihar and other perpetually depressed states. Again Rhodes was behind the renewed pressure. He would not propose it himself, but he' advised Milton to request Indian labour and then he (Rhodes) would lend his support.-77 It was over a year before the Chamber of Mines in Bulawayo took up the cry, requesting an exploratory recruitment of one thousand.^ There ensued much discussion as to whether India could afford any mining labour herself and v/here the best area for recruitment would be. An answer to the latter question was provided by the Rhodesia Land and Mine Owners' Association early in 1903 when they began to advocate strongly the suitability of Mopla labour.^ Sir G.S. MacKenzie, whose company, the British India Steam Navigation Company, had been involved in the transportation of the indentured labourers for the Uganda Railway, submitted costs involved in the trans porting of such labour to Rhodesia. ^ The Rhodesian case was greatly prejudiced by two facts, quite apart from the disastrous Aden experience. Firstly, German East Africa had recently applied to be included on the list of countries to which emigration was permitted under the 254 1883 Act. Secondly, the Bloemfontein Conference on customs, the Native Question, and Alien Immigration, called by Milner, was to meet in March of 1903, and the Colonial Office insist ed on adhering to its espoused policy that Rhodesia was an integral part of South Africa, and could not be permitted to introduce labour against South African opinion. The British South Africa Company corresponded with the Transvaal Chamber of Mines urging that British Indians would be the most 43 acceptable form of Asiatic labour to public sentiment. v Milner corresponded directly with Curzon on the issue, and by way of refusal Curzon simply sent to Milner a copy of.. the dispatch he had sent to the Secretary of State for India, Lord George Hamilton, with regard to the German request. He argued that the undeveloped nature of the country exposed Indians to greater dangers and that it was difficult for the administration of a newly opened territory to ensure that abuses were checked. He went on, The pioneers of colonial enterprise are naturally and necessarily masterful men, not very squeamish or tender hearted. It is probable that for the control of Africans sterner measures than are needed for Indians are absolutely necessary; and there is always a risk that the distinctions between the two races may not be recognised when both are labouring side by side, and that the similarity of colour may be held to justify similarity of treatment and may obscure the fact that the native African and the native Indian stand on entirely different levels.44 255 By such an extraordinary piece of racist - though perhaps sadly practical - argument did Curzon temporarily scotch de mands for Indian labour. Very temporarily, for within a few months the Company was making renewed enquiries to the Colonial Office, but that department stood by its strictures that Rhodesia was to wait to see what the Transvaal would do and had to prove conclusively that every supply of African h 5 labour had been tapped. y Milton dispatched a point by point reply to Curzon's reasons for refusal, ^ and late in 1903 the Colonial Office agreed to suggest to the India Office that an official of the Indian Government might be sent to South Africa to examine present conditions.*4'''7 Early in 1904, the Company submitted a letter to the Colonial Office which perfectly expresses the difference of opinion between them on the relationship between Rhodesia and South Africa: -The position of Rhodesia as a separate territory, progressive and emphatically British in sentiment, with great natural resources sterilised for want of an adequate industrial population, is exceptional, and since it is of the utmost importance, it is hoped that the solution of the comparatively simple problems to which the employment of-Indian labour in Rhodesia give rise, will not be delayed while the far more complex questions which must attend the employment of'similar, labour on the ' , o Witwatersrand, are being investigated. The geographical isolation of Rhodesia was also stressed, and 256 particularly the fact that Rhodesia had her own port of entry through Beira. Despite these repeated arguments, the Colonial Office refused- to attempt to persuade Curzon to change his mind for the reasons that Chamberlain had expressed in a minute of June 1903, that it was impossible to try Indian labour in Rhodesia first because it was not under direct imperial control, that the recent incidents of ill-treatment of Africans on Rhodesian mines had reduced confidence, and that the handicaps on Indians in South Africa were a bone of contention.^/ Throughout this period a yet more bitter controversy was that with regard to Chinese labour. Again it was sprung on the Colonial Office quite suddenly. In August of 1900 the Company communicated that the Board, the Administration and Mr. Rhodes were now in favour of the introduction of Asiatic labour and enquired whether the High Commissioner could authorise this by proclamation. "The British South Africa Company, as usual, shoot a bolt from the blue and expect to 50 get what they want without delay."^ This was the reaction of Hartmann Just, and the High Commissioner was promptly 51 instructed to decline to issue such a proclamation. During the next few years the Chinese labour question had a remark able effect on the protagonists of the Rhodesian labour issue. Chamberlain himself was an early convert. In 1901 he minuted, "Personally I think that the labour difficulty in Africa can 257 only be solved by the immigration of Asiatics under proper 52 conditions such as those adopted in the West Indies". The Colonial Office became divided between those who favoured Chinese labour and those who preferred Indian. The settlers divided from the administration and the mine owners, a polarisation similar to that which took place on the Rand. And the Resident Commissioner became divided from the High Commissioner with unfortunate effects on the system of imperial control in Rhodesia. To confound all, Rhodes (and Jameson also) eventually came out against Chinese labour. As always, the Company was well briefed. In 1899 and 1900 H. Wilson Fox had received memoranda from London 53 agents, Harvey Bros. & Co. ^ These stressed the advantages of Chinese - thrift, frugality, hard work, and since they were not British subjects they could not claim to stay in Rhodesia as Indians could. Examples of satisfactory exportation of both Chinese and Japanese were q/uoted -Chinese labour in British Guiana, on the silver mines of Peru, and Japanese on the coal mines in Mexico, and in Hawaii. Still seeking information, the Salisbury Chamber of Mines asked that a report might be sought from the consul general in China on coolie labour, food, the cost of shipment. It is interesting to note that Milton in his request that the question might be opened, pointed out that the recent 258 Fingo scheme had not produced enough labour to satisfy 55 requirements, y and one of the Harvey memoranda described the Fingo scheme as a fiasco. For two years the arguments continued. In a dispatch of July 1902 even the Resident Commissioner admitted that the labour supply was not dependable and that Asiatic labour might have to be introduced. Clarke was to regret this dispatch, for it was published in a blue book and later quoted against him by the Rhodesia Land and Mine Owners' Association when he had become an ardent opponent of the introduction of 56 Chinese labour* The arguments for and against Chinese labour eventually polarised on the question whether or not there was or could be an adequate supply of labour within the Rhodesias. On the one hand the mines complained volubly of their difficult ies; when the Boer War was over, it was felt that the best miners - the Shangaans for example - were being drained south to the Rand; and in any case both Shangaan and Ngoni labour cost a considerable amount to introduce, and then only for a 57 short period. On the other hand, the Resident Commissioner based his objections on two main arguments. Firstly, he claimed that the local supply was adequate, and certainly \?ould be now that the railway was pushing North into North Western Rhodesia. Secondly, he argued that only some mines were experiencing difficulties, and this was because conditions 259 58 there were unattractive. There were even voices within the Chamber of Mines that had argued similarly.-^ Meanwhile, Milner had been converted to an ardent support er of Chinese labour. Wilson Fox advised Milton of this in a confidential telegram and instructed him to whip up support.^ In reply, Milton announced that there was no popular support and that the elected members of the legislative council were firmly opposed.^ Fox replied in exasperation that he could not understand this popular attitude combined with the frequent complaints about the shortage of labour. What Fox apparently failed to realise was that Rhodesia was experiencing one of its first European class struggles. Those citizens who were not mineowners or administrators had no desire to be swamped by Asiatic immigrants, and hence resolutions from public meetings opposed were evenly matched with those from 63 meetings in favour. ^ Just a few days later, Fox in a private letter to Milton. cast a new and extremely interesting light on the Rhodesian Chinese labour agitation, when he wrote I quite agree with you that there are not many places in Rhodesia at which we could' at present usefully employ Chinese labour,, though I.'.believe that there are some; e,g, the Globe and Phoenix and the Wankie, but the point is not so much to get Chinese labour for ourselves as to help get if" for the Transvaal and thus to relieve the pressure upon r, our sources of supply of kaffir labour. ^ This is ample evidence not only of the interconnectedness of 260 southern African labour recruitment of Africans, which is obvious, but of the knowledge that Rhodesian mines were unable to compete with those of the Rand. The rift between Milner and Clarke grew. The High Commissioner informed the Colonial Office that Clarke's arguments were "based on the prejudice that low-class Chinese and Indians are morally and intellectually lower than Africans," (cf. Curzon), and that the native would have 65 unfair competition. ' According to Milner, "a little competition is exactly what the natives need". His argument is a curious variant of the second Earl Grey's theory of the need for a challenge in a tropical climate, a theory formulated some fifty years earlier. The Colonial Office, faithful as ever to its position that Rhodesia was an integral part of South Africa, refused to countenance Chinese immigration until it was approved for the Transvaal. Ironically of course, the Transvaal did eventually have Chinese immigration, perhaps to ..-66 the detriment of the fortunes, of its African inhabitants, while Rhodesian opinion against waxed strongly enough to be successful. Whether or not the relieving of Transvaal pressure on labour from the North redounded to the advantage of Rhodesia, taking Fox's view, must be examined later. All of these flirtations with indentured labour are illustrative of a number of important points with regard to the Rhodesian labour question, and also to the broader topic 261 of Company rule. We find the idea of a labour reserve firmly entrenched in the minds of Rhodesian policy makers. The concern with indentured labour only tended to under line this idea, that labour v/as something to be introduced temporarily and then returned. It helped to confirm the notion that labour in Africa could only be in a perpetual liquid state rather than a permanent force, and no real attempts were ever made to establish the latter. This led in part to the insistence by many parties that the domestic supply was entirely inadequate. Certainly, Sir Marshall Clarke was correct in seeing a direct correlation between desertions, the length of stay at a mine, and the conditions at the mine. He was prepared to recognise the operation of disincentives, of repulsion from work, where others v/ere only capable, of thinking in terms of compulsion. The indentured labour issue also tended to confirm the relationship of mutual suspicion between the Company and the Colonial Office, and suspicions of the Company.were even stronger when another imperial agency was concerned* Lord Curzon was not prepared to see any distinction betv/een an East African territory administered by Germans and a South Central one administered by a British Chartered Company. Moreover, the method of imperial control by High Commissioner through a pov/erless Resident Commissioner tended to aggravate the already strained relationship. 262 We find too that some of Chamberlain's beliefs have become enshrined dogma within the Colonial Office. Rhod esia is an integral part of South Africa and may not be regarded as an entirely separate growth as the Company at times argued. Only one Colonial Office official can be found who was prepared to argue that Rhodesia should be treated separately - Frederick Graham. ' Another dogma was that the Company must be permitted to develop its estates, and these estates included Northern Rhodesia, even if development there meant only to be an effective labour reservoir for the South. That the Colonial Office tended to be far less obstructive here than in the issue of indent ured labour must no?; be considered. LABOUR FROM NORTHERN ZAMBEZIA Northern Zambezia (which in the earlier period included the Lake Nyasa region) was marked out from the earliest days of European rule as an important source of labour. The explorer and treaty hawker, Joseph Thomson, v/rote in 1891 of the dense population between the Loangwa River and Lake Nyasa, of the large numbers of men controlled by chiefs Mpeseni and Mwasi. The Ngoni were already descending on Blantyre "to hoe the fields which it was their wont, only a few years ago, to devastate with fire and spear". And this would soon be true of the followers of Mwasi: indeed 263 more so, "for being in the first place less warlike, and in the second, occupying a somewhat poorer country, they v/ould the more readily turn their war axes literally into pruning CO hooks". ° In 1898, the first administrator of North Eastern Rhodesia, while still administering from Blantyre, wrote in his report, "The export of labour to Mashonaland is one of the most obvious directions in which we can contrib ute to the development and prosperity of Rhodesia, and our preliminary experiments in this direction seem likely to be 69 successful". y Conditions preceding large scale labour migration in Northern Zambezia differed from the South in that the Arab slavers had introduced a whole network of economic and political relations in which the bloody labour migration of the slave trade formed at the same time a means of exchange, an important export, and a pretext for alignments, alliances and warfare. These connections will be examined more closely in the las:t chapter, "Labour and the African", but it is important to remember that labour migration in Northern Zambezia constituted more a replacement for the slaving and trading economy than in the South. Of course, the two systems overlapped. In the 1880s the movement of Ngonis 70 to the Shire Highlands had already begun, and both Sir Sydney Shippard (the imperial commissioner in Bechuanaland) and Francois Coillard (the missionary to the Lozi) recorded 264 Africans travelling from Barotseland to Kimberley during that decade.^1 On the other hand, slave trading was still being mentioned in reports as late as 1913, particularly on the 72 North Western Rhodesia-Congo-Angola frontier. During the first few years of Rhodesia's development the labour supply from the North remained sporadic and badly-documented, largely because it v/as provided by the private "touting" system of adventurous, speculative, uncontrolled, independent recruiters. Colin Harding on his extensive travels throughout Barotseland frequently provided accounts of labour migrants, of whom there were "more than is. generally imagined".'-7 He proposed a scheme of officers to check on where the migrants were going, and to assist them to their destinations. But during the 1890s these glimpses remain tantalisingly brief and the numbers difficult to ascertain because as Harding himself reported, they hated being led in a gang and preferred the hazards of independent migration. In the British Central Africa Protectorate, the campaigns against the slave trade, the imposition of Harry Johnston's hut tax, and the beginnings of large scale migrat ion v/ere closely linked. But in North Eastern Rhodesia and in North Western Rhodesia administrative influence and with it the hut tax, spread very slowly. Hut tax v/as not effect ively levied from the entire region now known as Zambia until after I9O4. Its imposition occurred gradually and 265 unevenly. As late as 1910, it was reported that there was wholesale migration from districts where the tax was ten shillings into those where it was only five shillings, namely the Kasempa, Ndola and Loangwa districts. In 1914 some districts were still paying only three shillings.^ In North Western Rhodesia organised recruitment for Southern Rhodesia preceded the levy of hut tax by several years. The Bulawayo Chamber of Mines sent a recruiter called Bagley to Barotseland in 1896 and corresponded with the missionaries Coillard and Jalla seeking their assistance to reassure Lewanika that the recruits would be well-treated.^5 Lewanika was to be paid five shillings for every labourer recruited for six months and local chiefs were also to receive bonuses if it would increase the supply. The Ndebele rebell ion greatly hampered the operation of these arrangements, and subsequently the Chamber of Mines dealt directly with the 76 Resident at Lealui, Robert Coryndon. This recruitment was however neither numerically successful nor particularly popular. By the end of 1897 a scheme had been inaugurated under the joint aegis of the Bulawayo Chamber of Mines and the administration of Southern Rhodesia whereby a recruiting firm, Acutt and Crewe, would supply labour from the vicinity of the 77 Zambezi. ' By March of 1898 they had brought down 1,200 recruits. In 1899 Acutt and Crewe consolidated their position 266 when 6,000 acres were leased to them on the Kama River 130 rpQ miles North of Bulawayo. Despite the semi-official nat ure of the scheme it 'was subject to the customary recruiting abuses. In 1900, four of Acutt and Crewe's African employ ees, one Zulu and three Ndebeles, were involved in an incident in a Tonga village North of the Zambezi in which three Tonga v/ere v/ounded (one mortally) by shooting, and one Acutt and Crewe recruiter was v/ounded by an assegai. To the Colonial Office this incident smacked of a labour levy by 79 a quasi-police force.'7 Nevertheless, after the failure of the first Labour Board in September 1901, Acutt and Crewe continued to figure in Barotseland recruitment. In 1901 they recruited almost 2,000 men for the mines. Early in 1902 the mines agreed that they should pay £1 per head for labourers brought' down by Acutt and Crewe, who were to make private agreements with 80 the various mining companies. The recruiting company established shelters and food supplies on the migrants' route, but they were soon involved in the first of many disputes regarding monopoly recruitment. De Beers v/ere also recruiting in Barotseland and v/ere offering prospect of far higher wages in Kimberley. Both the administrations of Southern Rhodesia and of North Western Rhodesia had an ambivalent attitude tov/ards De Beers, for obvious reasons. The chief native commissioner of 267 Matabeleland, Taylor, decided to the Colonial Office's astonishment.that "of course" De Beers did not require a 8l licence. It is clear that commercial association was overriding political considerations. This was not so in the case of the Rand mines. While local interests were determined to preserve Northern Rhodesia for Southern Rhodesia, neither Lagden (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal) nor Milner was prepared to see the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (W.N.L.A.) cut off from this important source of supply. This controversy must however be examined in the context of the modus vivendi on labour recruitment with Mozambique. From 1903 to 1908 recruitment in North Western Rhodesia was in the hands of the Labour Bureau which used the W.N.L.A. threat to attempt to win support from all the Rhodesian mines. North Western Rhodesia became in fact the Bureau's most important single source of supply. In 1908, of a total of Qp 14,002 men recruited, 5,679 were recruited in the territory. Its importance both as a labour supply region and as an area of labour opportunity was greatly enhanced by the extension of the railway line northwards. The railway reached Broken Hill in 1906, and continued northwards towards the Katanga Border in the course of the next few years. Thousands of men, all .local, were employed as labourers in its construction, and farmers and prospectors followed it North, bringing their 268 labour demands with them. A relatively free recruiting system continued, although the administrator frequently complained of the unscrupulous touts (in 1904 many of these were reported to be Greeks).^ Nevertheless, Coryndon refused to permit the Bureau to have a monopoly of recruitment, and the issue became something of a dispute between Milton and Coryndon. But Coryndon's successor, Codrington from North Eastern Rhodesia, was more compliant towards the Southern Rhodesia administration. He refused to permit Transvaal recruitment while Southern Rhodesia still had a shortage.^*1" In 1905, the Transvaal Association had set out to recruit 1,000 men in North Eastern Rhodesia, and it is an indication of the difficulties placed in their way that they only succeeded in gaining 700 before. 85 they withdrew. y The comparative success of recruitment in North Western Rhodesia revealed firstly the success of the railway in siphoning off labour, and secondly the declining influence of Lewanika in Barotseland. The controversy surrounding Lewanika's share of the hut tax and the method of collecting it revealed the Company's ambiguity in attitude towards Barotseland in view of its dual administration of administrator and resident, the one at Livingstone, the other at Lewanika's court. The dispute between these two officers, R.T. Coryndon and Colin Harding, reflected Lewanika's growing discontent. 269 He was at pains to remind the Company that he had not been Rf, conquered like the Ndebele. The North Western Rhodesian native administration On was under-staffed, under-paid, and under-privileged. -Not surprisingly, this gave rise to abuse. There were complaints of excessive hut and crop burning on non-payment of hut tax, of flogging-, of forced labour, of undue influence on the part of the district commissioner in the business of recruiting. In two flogging accusations of 1909, both the Secretary for Native Affairs and the acting administrator defended the right of district commissioners to flog, although they had op in fact no such legal right at all. The Colonial Office became increasingly disturbed by the North Western Rhodesia administration and by Selborne's handling of them. The officials in the Colonial Office were furious when Selborne permitted a district commissioner who had shot deserters to go resign, rather than charge him with murder. y Another district commissioner accused of flogging and of forced labour was not suspended by Selborne until it was discovered that he was indulging in concubinage, hardly an unusual practice for the time. Moreover, Selborne refused to listen to the complaints of a settler called ^enables - who in a long and acrimonious correspondence attacked the North Western Rhodesia administration - simply on the grounds that he too 270 99 had an African mistress. 7 The Colonial Office repudiated Selborne's acceptance of the North Western Rhodesian administration's apologia, his assumption of the position of censor of private morals, and criticised "Selborne and his entourage" for failing to be "as watchful as they should'have been".^ The Colonial Office was particularly worried that these incidents took place near the Congo border. The parliamentary under secretary, Seeley, .remarked, "The pro-Leopold gang will soon 92 get hold of this". The Colonial Office also noted that the High Commissioner had very little power under the North Western Rhodesia Order in Council, and had no effective ad viser in the territory. By 1910, work opportunity v/as growing in North Western Rhodesia. In that year, 1,000 labourers v/ere. recruited by 93 the Kansanshi Mine in North Eastern Rhodesia.Jy But in 1911, when the hut tax was to go up to ten shillings uniform ly in the north of North Western Rhodesia, some headmen complained that their men had little chance of working for their tax. Southern Rhodesia was too far away, and the routes to the Kambwe and Star of the Congo mines were closed because of the sleeping sickness outbreak. In 1911» North Eastern Rhodesia was weaned from the care of the Foreign Office, and the two Northern Rhodesias v/ere united. The united territory will be examined after North 271 Eastern Rhodesia. The story of recruiting from North Eastern Rhodesia reveals many of the strains present in that of North Western Rhodesia. Relations between the Southern Rhodesian and North Eastern Rhodesian administrations were seldom perfect, abuses occurred, there were some disastrous recruiting experiences, and the quality and health of the recruits were seldom good. Soon after the establishment of the administration in North Eastern Rhodesia, Codrington, the administrator, gave a graphic account of the means by which labour was sought 95 /• out. v (His description was, surprisingly enough, in answer to allegations of ill-treatment by the police, made by two settlers.) When a European required labour, he applied to a village acknowledging his protection. If no one were forthcoming, he might try else¥/here or he might send presents as a bribe to- the chief, and ultimately he might threaten to withdraw his protection. When a chief repeatedly failed to comply, he was then brought to the boma (government office) and ordered to help the white man, to which his answer was invariably that he had no control over his young men. Codrington denied that this was forced labour, but went on to describe the "slovenly young men loafing in the squalor of unswept villages". Meanwhile the telegraph construction v/as at a halt, tracks were overgrown, and thousands of loads lay. 272 rusting and rotting at Karonga at the North end of Lake Nyasa.^ Nevertheless, no less than 1,500 of Mpeseni's Ngoni had migrated to Mashonaland in 1899. A three shilling hut tax came into force in North Eastern Rhodesia on the 1st of April 1901. One immediate effect of this tax was that the administration, companies and individuals had to start paying their employees in cash 97 instead of in cloth as hitherto.7' But for a while, as elsewhere, payment was accepted in kind or in labour, This "labour tax" drew the attention of the Foreign Office. Clement Hill, the permanent under secretary, pointed out to the British South Africa Company's Board that no provision 98 was made for such a system in the hut tax regulations.7 The Company's administration attempted to explain away the term labour tax (which had turned up quite openly and fool ishly in reports), but it was clear that they had been indul ging in a system of free labour to wipe out tax debts.. There was another system too, by which private employers paid Africans' tax directly to the boma on completion of a month's 99 labour.77 Considering that the tax was three shillings, this was indeed a cheap labour system. Ultimately, Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, insisted that this system smacked of forced labour. Inevitably, North Eastern Rhodesia became an important centre of recruiting, first of all for the Mashonaland Labour 273 Board, and later for the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau. Recruits were not only those indigenous to the territory, but also Nyasalanders who succeeded in evading the rest rictions of their own administration. There were two main routes into Mashonaland, one via Feira on•the Zambezi, where there were ferries, depots on the north and south banks, and a medical centre for examining recruits, and the other through the Mozambique enclave via Tete. The first became for a while the most important route into Rhodesia. Between April 1903 and March 190Zf, 6,981 i recruits crossed the ferries southwards and 4,298 crossed northwards.''"^"'" Of these the vast majority were from the British Central Africa Protectorate (from 1906 Nyasaland). The busiest months going south were April to June. This means that the majority of northern recruits reached the high plateau of Mashonaland in the winter months, succumbed to pulmonary diseases, and created enormous death rates. The importance of this route did however temporarily wane as the railway pushed north into Northern Rhodesia. After it reached Broken Hill, It was considered simpler to escort recruits from North Eastern Rhodesia to the railhead and entrain them south. But it was discovered that the recruits were even more susceptible to disease by this swifter method. The long v/alk via Feira had in fact had the advantage of acclimatising the migrants. Moreover, as the needs of 274 Mashonaland grew relative to those of Matabeleland, the rail route via Broken Hill, Livingstone, and Bulawayo proved too expensive a means of conveying labour to the more northerly province. The other route via Tete involved long negotiations with the Portuguese for the construction of a road to. connect across the Portuguese pedicle with the route from Fort Jame son to the border and from the southern border to Salisbury.^"' The road was well under way by 1904. As the Nyasaland authorities steadily tightened their restrictions on the export of labour to Rhodesia, this route declined in import ance for southbound traffic, although it is instructive to note that it remained important for returning migrants even after its usefulness to the Bureau had ended. Later, when there were attempts to centralise the Bureau's efforts in Salisbury, and establish one important route for the North Eastern Rhodesian recruits and the independent Nyasalanders who had continued to migrate despite official strictures, the road via Tete became more-travelled, and the route via Feira declined. There were as always a whole series of events that could have done little to enhance migratory labour for the African. There were burnings of villages to pay tax (which dismayed even Sir Alfred Sharpe10"5). Villages dispersed and made tax collection and the control of unscrupulous labour touts more 275 difficult. In 1901, an Afrikaans recruiter working for the Mashonaland Labour Board operated with armed messengers. He was known to have flogged one chief and had another shot. "^-^ In 1904, there was a considerable surplus of labour in Mashonaland during certain months, and Sir Marshall Clarke, the Resident Commissioner, complained that he himself had seen gangs of destitute Northern Zambezi Africans seeking 105 vainly for work. J (In 1906, when there was another such surplus, some had to accept work from the Shona in exchange for food alone.)106 In 1903, a recruiter called Hayes brought down 391 107 Africans from North Eastern Rhodesia. Instead of handing them over for reception and distribution in Salisbury, he disposed of them for his own private advantage, 68 to the Public Works Department at a fee of £3 per head and 323 to the Globe and Phoenix Mine at thirty shillings per head. Almost immediately, 248 deserted and 15 died. Despite these examples of sheer exploitation - or perhaps because of them -officials seldom had a good word for the recruits from North Eastern Rhodesia. In 1904, Val Gielgud, general manager of the Bureau and a former native commissioner, submitted a memorandum to the Company describing at great length the inadequacies of North Eastern Rhodesian Africans and their 1 08 unpopularity as workers in Southern Rhodesia. Although the record of the North Eastern Rhodesian admin istration was scarcely unimpeachable, there was a certain 276 proprietory attitude towards the indigenous Africans, which communicated itself in official annoyance at high death rates, ill-treatment in Southern Rhodesia, the inefficiency of -the Protector of Immigrants (who had been appointed in 1901), and the like. However, during the sleeping sickness outbreaks in the valleys of the Luapula and the Loangwa which halted recruitment during 1910-1912 in certain areas, and involved the closure of certain routes, the North Eastern Rhodesian administration reduced the issue to a discussion as to whether it was safer to recruit for the Congo or for Southern Rhodesia. In either event, the Administrator of North Eastern Rhodesia was determined that recruiting should not cease altogether because of the resultant loss to the revenue, despite the fact that there v/as a danger of the whole of the Central African labour supply being infected with the disease. The Bureau v/as never particularly successful in North Eastern Rhodesia, at least until the eve of its downfall. In 1908, it lamented the fact that only a small percentage of the thousands crossing the Zambezi at Feira did so under its auspices: the vast majority were "independents"."'"'^ In 1908, after the Bureau's organisation in North Eastern Rhodesia was taken over by the Southern Rhodesian administ ration, there were an inspector, two agents and a forwarding agent in the territory. Within Northern Rhodesia itself, 277 native commissioners played a larger part in labour recruit ment than they were permitted to do in the South. Some times the native commissioner even acted as a conductor for a gang of recruits. In 1904 for example, the native commissioner for the North Loangwa district escorted 854 men, chiefly Bemba, to the Kafue District for work with 111 the Northern Copper Company. The irony of recruitment in Northern Rhodesia is that it brought down in turn each of Southern Rhodesia's labour bureaux. The bureau which operated from 1906-1911 accum ulated vast financial liabilities because of the grave difficulties in operating in North Western Rhodesia and North Eastern Rhodesia. Capital expenditure on routes, shelters, food, and so on was immense. The territories were too sparsely populated to permit of intensive recruitment, and the Bureau never had a monopoly. The 50% deferred pay system, which the northern territories insisted upon in order to safeguard their revenues, was extremely costly to operate, and contributed greatly to the unpopularity of the Bureau, for independent recruits had no need to see 50% of their earnings vanish into a bureaucracy for which they not unnaturally had grave suspicions. Moreover, the distrib ution problems in Southern Rhodesia were very great, for it must be remembered that both mines and farms were widely scattered, and even the largest mine employed just over 273 1,000 men. The bureaux frequently compared this problem to the ease with which the Witwatersrand Association could so easily send its recruits along the highly concentrated reef at Johannesburg. The new Bureau established in 1912 eventually concent rated wholly on Northern Rhodesia. It greatly tightened up its operations, succeeded in escaping the deferred pay regulations, changed its office from Bulawayo to Salisbury, and attempted to move the point of ingress for the majority 112 of recruits to the route through Tete into Mashonaland. But it could not escape the severe competition. In 1913 the Bureau was competing with the Northern Rhodesia administration, the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, various trading firms and mission stations, Messrs Robert Williams, the Star of the Congo Mine, Bwane Mkubwa Mine, Kansanshi Mines, Luano Valley Coal Mines, the Kaombwe Gold Mining Syndicate, and there was even a reported migration of labourers to German East Africa ll7 to work on the railway or the rubber and cotton plantations. ^ Soon Northern Rhodesia would cease to be simply a labour reservoir, and experience considerable internal economic expansion. The majority of Africans from the entire Northern Zambezia area continued to travel to Rhodesia independently, One of the Colonial Office officials remarked that the Bureau seemed to be receiving only the residue of labour. The ultimate irony was that when the Bureau began to 279 submit much more detailed figures than hitherto it was discovered that bureau recruits from Northern Rhodesia suff ered twice the death rate of those who came down independ ently."''"'"*1" The Colonial Office was hoist with the petard of its own policy. So soon after its inception the fourth • labour bureau in ten years came under severe criticism, and certain districts of North Eastern Rhodesia were closed to it. The general manager wrote a voluminous defence in which he pointed out that bureau statistics were based on the entire period from recruitment to repatriation, i.e-. from home village back to home village, whereas statistics for "independents" 115 were based only on their period in the mines. 7 It was his one most telling argument, but it unintentionally revealed the enormous dangers of labour migration for the individual. Opposition to the Bureau's activities v/as emerging in various quarters of Northern Rhodesia in 1912 and 1913. In 1912, the settlers of North Eastern Rhodesia revealed a possessive attitude typical of most settlers in Central Africa. Despite the fact that the bureau recruited for Northern Rhodesian needs also, the settlers wished to see all recruiting for Southern Rhodesia brought to an end, and severe restrict ions placed on independent movement.Instead they demanded inter alia a labour levy for their own purposes. The officials of the Northern Rhodesian native administ ration also disliked the Bureau recruiting. In the report 280 • v of the Serenje district of Northern Rhodesia, September, 1913, the district commissioner wrote The natives of the district are obedient and respectful to the Government, but it is becoming patent that a spirit of indep endence is growing, whilst the constant recruiting of labour is the cause of grumbling. It is not reasonable to expect the natives to be constantly at work and at the same time to provide fpod for the community and others. ' In 1915> the Bureau had an embarrassing surplus on its hands for the third year running. The general manager, Wolfe Murray, had departed for war service. The Colonial Office's policy of an independent recruiting organisation, created because of the early abuses and because of the particular problems of colonial rule by Chartered Company, was discredited by its ineffectiveness and unpopularity with all concerned, not least among those whom it was designed to protect. This is the broad story, but before leaving Northern Rhodesia it is necessary to recapitulate somewhat to give a more detailed idea of the nature of recruitment there. In a Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau report for 1911, there is a graphic description of the complications of Northern Rhodesia recruiting. During the first six months of 1911, deferred pay was collected from. 18,000 Africans to the amount of £24,000, of which £15,000 was remitted North. Advances of £4,000 were recovered. 3,741 labourers were repatriated. 281 322 deceased estates were handled. £2,100 was expended on railway travel north of Livingstone, and £3,400 for railway-travel south of Livingstone. There v/ere medical examinat ions at seventeen different points, and rations were issued at 41 different points. There v/as a total correspondence of 10,000 letters with 700 different employers. The report went on: "At best the business is a risky one, and is at any time liable to contingencies which may very quickly cause great and unforeseen expense". Just such a contin gency had been the sleeping sickness outbreak of 1910. In 1911, only 1,689 recruits crossed the Feira ferry, but the bureau tried to turn the outbreak to its advantage by stifling the movement of independents. The Bureau of 1912 tried desperately to avoid the expenses that had brought down its predecessor. In January of 1912 a conference was held between the Marquis of Winchester (representing the Chartered Company), the general manager of the bureau, Kempster, and the administrators of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, at which it was decided to abolish the deferred pay provisions. Voluntary remittances v/ould contin ue to be received and forwarded. Very soon, however, the administrator of Northern Rhodesia began to recant, for none of the repatriated labourers seemed to be bringing any money -1 -1 o home, and so the deferred pay system was reintroduced. In March of 1913» another conference v/as held on the 282 mortality of Bureau recruits in Northern Rhodesia. The new general manager, Wolfe Murray, and a travelling inspector, set about examining the possibility of establishing a line of food and rest stations along the route Kasama-Mpika-Serenje-Broken Hill, linking up with the already existing route from Fort Jameson at Serenje. They discovered that such a line of stations was impracticable because of the competition.an recruiting in Northern Rhodesia, because the recruits hated to feel shepherded, because the stations tended to be unhealthy, and because there were in any case adequate water supplies along this route.Recruits preferred instead to receive a "piso" \ or grant of calico or salt with which to buy food, and to camp where they pleased on the journey to the railhead. The Bureau succeeded in avoiding dubious capital outlay, and in doing so perpetuated the declining calico system. Mashonaland was becoming the most important province for bureau distribution. Railway travel for the recruits was unhealthy and costly. The majority of northern recruits came from the extreme north east of Northern Rhodesia. The Portuguese were proving more amenable to the use of the route . via Tete by the bureau. The Nyasaland administration had failed in its attempts to block the migrati