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Administrators' perceptions of the outcomes of implementing three provincial policies on community college.. 1986

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ADMINISTRATORS* PERCEPTIONS OF THE OUTCOMES OF IMPLEMENTING THREE PROVINCIAL POLICIES ON COMMUNITY COLLEGE GOVERNANCE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA BY ALAN ROBERT MITCHELL Dip., Building, (T.E.D.) W.A., 1969 Dip., Technical Teachers, (T.E.D.) W.A. , 1973 B.Ed., W.A.Institute of Technology, 1979 Dip. Ed. Admin., W.A.Institute of Technology, 1979 M.A. London University, 1985 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Administrative, Adult and Higher Education) We accept t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n as conforming to the required standard IHE_yNIVERSIIY_QF_BR December 1986 @ Alan Robert MITCHELL, 1986 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree th a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood th a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e , Adul t and Higher Education The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 17th December 1986 A B S T R A C T Recent s t u d e n t s of p o l i c y have devoted much a t t e n t i o n t o the a n a l y s i s o-f p o l i c y implementation, d e s c r i b i n g the changes t h a t occur d u r i n g the implementation o-f p o l i c y i n v a r i o u s ways. T h i s i s another such study, the purpose o-f which was to determine how a d m i n i s t r a t o r s o-f community c o l l e g e s p e r c e i v e d the outcomes o-f implementing t h r e e p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s concerned with governance of the c o l l e g e system i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The p r o v i n c i a l Government, through the M i n i s t e r and M i n i s t r y s t a f f , was the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r , community c o l l e g e governance was the p o l i c y t o p i c , and community c o l l e g e system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were the implementors. A s u b s i d i a r y purpose i s t o determine what d i s c r e p a n c i e s , i f any, e x i s t e d between the p o l i c i e s ' i n t e n t i o n s , and the outcomes o-f those p o l i c i e s as p e r c e i v e d by the i mplementors. Guided by a conceptual framework developed from the l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i c y implementation and based on Easton's (1965B) p o l i t i c a l systems t h e o r y , a case study method was used t o c o l l e c t and analyse the data. The documented and p e r c e i v e d i n t e n t i o n s of f o r m u l a t o r s i n r e l a t i o n t o the t h r e e p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s examined were reasonably congruous, but only two of the p o l i c i e s were p e r c e i v e d t o be implemented i n a way t h a t corresponded at a l l c l o s e l y t o the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s . From an a n a l y s i s of the p e r c e p t i o n s of p o l i c y implementors, a number of d i f f e r e n t outcomes emerged which d i d not a l i g n with the i n t e n t i o n s of those who formulated the p o l i c i e s . The f o l l o w i n g major c o n c l u s i o n s were reached. i 1 Governance of the community c o l l e g e system i n B.C. was p e r c e i v e d t o have become more s i m p l i f i e d and e f f i c i e n t as a r e s u l t of the p o l i c i e s . 2 A d m i n i s t r a t o r s p e r c e i v e d t h a t d e c i s i on—making moved from the C o u n c i l s t o the M i n i s t e r and the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e , thus p r o v i d i n g a more c e n t r a l i s e d governance s t r u c t u r e . 3 There appeared t o be an i n t e r e s t i n g connection (strong r e l a t i o n s h i p ) between a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of i n t e n t and t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of outcomes. 4 It was p e r c e i v e d t h a t a lack of t r u s t e x i s t e d between the M i n i s t r y and v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t groups i n v o l v e d i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system. The f i n d i n g s have p r a c t i c a l , t h e o r e t i c a l and methodological i m p l i c a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g recommendations f o r f u t u r e p o l i cy-makers, some a d d i t i o n s t o the body of knowledge on p o l i c y implementation, and some s u g g e s t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h on t h i s t o p i c . T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Page A B S T R A C T i A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S ix C H A P T E R O N E STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 1 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2 WHY GOVERNANCE POLICIES? 3 The Case For C o l l e g e Autonomy 6 The Case For C o o r d i n a t i o n and C o n t r o l 8 The P o l i c i e s To Be Considered 11 DEFINITION OF TERMS 15 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 19 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 20 SUMMARY 22 NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE 23 C H A P T E R T W O LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 24 EASTON'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY 25 IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS 30 P o l i c y as an A u t h o r i t a t i v e Statement 32 P o l i c y I n c l u d i n g Implementation 33 S y n t h e s i s 33 A DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL 37 The Environment 38 The Inputs 39 The Processes 43 The Outcomes 46 i i i THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 48 TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 51 CONCLUSIONS 58 NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO 60 C H A P T E R T H R E E RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 61 THE VALUE OF A CASE STUDY 62 The Case 65 SOURCES OF DATA 65 L e g i s l a t i o n and Q-f-ficial Documents 66 Other Documentation 67 Interviews with Key Persons 67 DATA ANALYSIS 69 VALIDATION OF RESEARCH 71 REPORTING OF FINDINGS 75 NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE 75 C H A P T E R F O U R AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLLEGE/POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 76 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT 77 The C o n s t i t u t i o n 77 The P a r l i a m e n t a r y System 78 The Economic C l i m a t e 80 POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 84 The C o l l e g e System 85 The M i n i s t r y O-f-fice 90 INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY 91 The Intermediary C o u n c i l s 92 Other I n t e r e s t Groups 96 i v THE ACTORS 99 SUMMARY 100 NOTES ON CHAPTER FOUR 104 C H A P T E R F I V E THE INTENTIONS AND PERCEIVED OUTCOMES OF THREE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 105 P A R T O N E THE POLICY INTRODUCING SYSTEM MISSION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES 106 DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS 107 PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS 110 POLICY COMMUNICATION LINKAGES 113 Formulators' Knowledge of The C o l l e g e System 113 Formal and In-formal Communication Linkages 113 PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES 118 SUMMARY OF POLICY ONE - INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES 121 Documented I n t e n t i o n s 121 Pe r c e i v e d I n t e n t i o n s 122 Communication Linkages 122 P e r c e i v e d E f f e c t s 122 CONCLUSIONS 124 P A R T TWO THE POLICY DISSOLVING THE INTERMEDIARY COUNCILS 126 DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS 126 PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS 128 POLICY COMMUNICATION LINKAGES 132 Communication Not C o n s u l t a t i o n 132 PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES 133 SUMMARY OF POLICY TWO - INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES 137 Documented I n t e n t i o n s 137 Per c e i v e d I n t e n t i o n s 137 Communication Linkages 137 E f f e c t s Outcomes 138 CONCLUSIONS 139 P A R T T H R E E : THE POLICY PROVIDING FOR THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT OF ALL COLLEGE BOARD MEMBERS 141 DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS 142 PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS 143 POLICY COMMUNICATION LINKAGES 144 C o n s u l t a t i o n and Communication 144 Major Change or Threat 145 PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES 146 SUMMARY OF POLICY THREE - INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES 148 Documented I n t e n t i o n s 148 Pe r c e i v e d I n t e n t i o n s 150 Communication Linkages 150 Pe r c e i v e d E f f e c t s 150 CONCLUSIONS 151 NOTES ON CHAPTER FIVE 153 C H A P T E R S I X SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 154 SUMMARY 154 The Purposes of the Research 154 The Method Employed 155 The F i n d i n g s 155 vi CONCLUSIONS 167 1 S i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the System Governance S t r u c t u r e 168 2 C e n t r a l i s a t i o n of Decision-Making 168 3 P o l i c y Design - R e l a t i o n s h i p of P e r c e i v e d Intent and P e r c e i v e d Outcomes 170 4 A Need f o r T r u s t Between P o l i c y Formulators and Implementors 171 IMPLICATIONS 172 I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r P r a c t i c e 172 I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Theory 176 I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Methodology 178 FURTHER RESEARCH 179 NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX 181 S E L E C T E D B I B L I O G R A P H Y 182 G L O S S A R Y 193 A P P E N D I C E S APPENDIX ONE Interview I n t r o d u c t i o n 194 APPENDIX TWO Interview Question Guide f o r P o l i c y I n t e n t i o n s 195 APPENDIX THREE Interview Question Guide f o r P o l i c y Outcomes 197 APPENDIX FOUR Interviewees 199 APPENDIX FIVE Format of Ch a r t s Used f o r I n t e r p r e t i n g Interview T r a n s c r i p t s 200 APPENDIX SIX Interview Coding 201 APPENDIX SEVEN Members of Ad v i s o r y Panel 202 APPENDIX EIGHT A d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' Comments on Lack of T r u s t 203 v i :i. L I S T O F T A B L E S TABLE 1 Implementation as a C h a r a c t e r i s t i c o-f the P o l i c y Process 34 TABLE 2 C l a s s i - f i c a t i o n o-f Implementation V a r i a b l e s 54 TABLE 3 Remarks on P e r c e i v e d E-f-fects o-f F i s c a l R e s t r a i n t 82 TABLE 4 C o l l e g e s Included i n the B.C. System 88 TABLE 5 Formulators' P e r c e p t i o n s o-f I n t e n t i o n s - P o l i c y One 112 TABLE 6 P e r c e p t i o n s o-f P o l i c y Formulators' Knowledge 114 TABLE 7 Implementors' Comments on M i n i s t r y ' s Lack of Compliance 120 TABLE 8 Summary of F i n d i n g s Related t o P o l i c y One 123 TABLE 9 Formulators' P e r c e p t i o n s of I n t e n t i o n s - P o l i c y Two 130 TABLE 10 Summary of F i n d i n g s Related t o P o l i c y Two 139 TABLE 11 Implementors' P e r c e p t i o n s of P o l i t i c a l E f f e c t s 149 TABLE 12 Summary of F i n d i n g s Related t o P o l i c y Three 152 TABLE 13 Summary of P o l i c y A n a l y s i s F i n d i n g s 156 L I S T O F F I G U R E S FIGURE 1 i p l i f i e d Model of Easton's P o l i t a l Systems Theory 26 FIGURE 2 Simple Systems Theory A p p l i e d t o P o l i c y Implementation 28 FIGURE 3 P o l i t i c a l Systems Model Adapted f o r Implementation A n a l y s i s 29 FIGURE 4 Schema t o Analyse E f f e c t s of P o l i c y Implementation 56 v i i i A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S The r e s e a r c h embodied i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has onl y been made p o s s i b l e through the combined e f f o r t s of a l a r g e number of persons, t o whom the author owes a l a r g e debt of g r a t i t u d e . Acknowledgement i s given t o the one I c a l l God, f o r t o t a l p r o v i s i o n i n a l l t h i n g s , not the l e a s t of which i s t h e comfort and encouragement of the Holy S p i r i t . My wi f e , Barbara has shared i n a t o t a l way, not onl y i n the p a r t n e r s h i p of l i v i n g and working together away from home, but i n the f r u s t r a t i o n s and j o y s t h a t have formed p a r t of t h i s program. Her t y p i n g and computing s k i l l s have been s t r e t c h e d beyond the bounds of a s t i m u l a t i n g c h a l l e n g e , but her l o v e , i n t e r e s t and support have grown throughout the program. The g e n e r o s i t y of the Education Department of Western A u s t r a l i a n f o r a l l o w i n g l e a v e t o undertake t h i s study, and the s e n i o r o f f i c e r s who encouraged the program are g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged. To Dr J» Dennison, Research S u p e r v i s o r , f o r h i s generous support i n time and e x p e r t i s e , and Dr's J . Andrews, and I. Housego, members of my committee f o r t h e i r p a t i e n c e , p e r s i s t e n c e and r i g o r o u s guidance, I r e c o r d my s i n c e r e thanks. A l s o t o Dr A. S o l e s f o r a d v i c e and c o n t a c t s , and Mrs P. Turner, who generously e d i t e d many of the e a r l y d r a f t s of the d i s s e r t a t i o n , thank you. My wife and I a l s o express our thanks t o f e l l o w s t u d e n t s and f a c u l t y of A.A.H.E. who helped our s t a y i n Canada t o be such a pl e a s a n t and s t i m u l a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e . i x C H A P T E R O N E STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM The d i s t r i b u t i o n o-f power i n o r g a n i s a t i o n a l decision-making has always produced healthy debate which has -fascinated s c h o l a r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s a l i k e . This debate o-f ten r e v o l v e s around governance i s s u e s o-f c e n t r a l i s e d and d e c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making, and i n community c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n governments f r e q u e n t l y develop p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s t o a l t e r that balance. In such cases governments must not only be concerned with c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n i s s u e s , but with the p o s s i b l e e f f i c i e n c y with which t h e i r p o l i c i e s w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d , and even more important, the outcomes of p o l i c y implementation. Furthermore, i n post-secondary education,^ the heed t o balance government c o n t r o l mechanisms w h i l s t maintaining academic autonomy can be examined through a concern f o r the apparent discrepancy between p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation. How a c t o r s i n t e r p r e t the e f f e c t s of t h a t implementation has been shown by previous a n a l y s t s t o be important. "The p u l l between unfettered respons- iveness t o perceived c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by c e n t r a l planning agencies i s of paramount concern t o educators i n v i r t u a l l y a l l postsecondary j u r i s d i c t i o n s " (Fraser,1979:38). This research i s concerned with a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceptions of the outcomes of three such p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia (B.C.). In t h i s Chapter the problem i s s t a t e d i n the form of researchable questions, and t h e i r elements examined t o o u t l i n e the study parameters. I t w i l l f i r s t address the governance i s s u e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the elements of autonomy, c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n t r o l , then i d e n t i f y the p o l i c i e s t o be stu d i e d and the i s s u e s 1 t o be i n c l u d e d , and then o f f e r some d e f i n i t i o n s of key words used throughout the d i s s e r t a t i o n . The Chapter w i l l conclude with some statements on the importance and l i m i t a t i o n s of the study. Regular reference w i l l be made t o s t u d i e s reported i n the United S t a t e s of America (U.S.A.), not only because of the i n t r i n s i c worth of doing so, but because of the strong s i m i l a r i t y which the community c o l l e g e s of the U.S.A. have with those of B.C.2 THE_RESEARCH_QUESTIONS The purpose of t h i s study i s t o determine some important i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o p o l i c y implementation and t o e x p l a i n why there i s of t e n a discrepancy between p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s and p o l i c y outcomes. The study w i l l address both p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o the outcomes of implementing three governance p o l i c i e s . The f o l l o w i n g major and s u b s i d i a r y questions w i l l be used t o focus the research. What do system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s perceive t o be the outcomes of implementing three recent p r o v i n c i a l Government p o l i c i e s r e l a t i n g t o the governance of the community c o l l e g e system of B r i t i s h Columbia? The three p o l i c i e s have t o do with: the system M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s 1982-87' statement; the a b o l i t i o n of the three intermediary C o u n c i l s ; and Government appointment of a l l C o llege Board members. A s u b s i d i a r y question i s r e l a t e d t o , and should a s s i s t i n the explanation o f , the major research question. What, i f any, d i s c r e p a n c i e s e x i s t between f o r m u l a t i o n and implem- e n t a t i o n of the p o l i c i e s as perceived by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ? WHY_GQVERNANCE_POLIC In order t o address some governance i s s u e s r a i s e d i n the research problem, i t i s meaningful t o e s t a b l i s h a context by b r i e f l y examining a number of s t u d i e s i n the area of a u t h o r i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . This task w i l l f i r s t r e q u i r e an examination of the h i s t o r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s on c o l l e g e autonomy, and w i l l then focus on va r i o u s aspects of c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n t r o l . Under the Westminster system of government, the m i n i s t e r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r post-secondary education i n B.C., as t i t u l a r head, c l e a r l y has the power t o make d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g the d e l i v e r y of the post-secondary s e r v i c e s , and a l s o has the l e g a l entitlement t o delegate a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o ensure tha t government p o l i c i e s are r e a l i s e d . ^ The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the post-secondary education s e r v i c e i s l a r g e l y dependent upon such m i n i s t e r i a l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , upon the agencies t o which a u t h o r i t y i s delegated, and upon what shape the systems' decision-making framework assumes. This s e c t i o n addresses some of the important i s s u e s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a balance of power i n the decision-making framework f o r the c o l l e g e system. "Governance i s the framework i n which d e c i s i o n making occurs" (Deegan & Goilattscheck,1985:73). This d e f i n i t i o n i s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d as f o l l o w s : "The policy-making, o b j e c t i v e - s e t t i n g , and e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y i n ... [the system! i n c l u d e s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or management -functions t o the extent t h a t they r e l a t e t o the execution of p o l i c y and a u t h o r i t y " (E.R.I.C. Thesaurus,1982:110). Governance p o l i c i e s were not analysed i n conjunction with i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e g e s . Rather, the r e s u l t s of implementing system-wide governance p o l i c i e s , as perceived by system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , were analysed. The search f o r governance models i n post—secondary education f i r s t focussed on i n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t t e r n s which were described as * b u r e a u c r a t i c ' , where the r a t i o n a l and formal aspects were predominant; a ' c o l l e g i a l ' p a t t e r n , where p r o f e s s i o n a l and academic communities were in v o l v e d i n p a r t i c i p a t o r y management; a ' p o l i t i c a l ' p a t t e r n , i n which c o n f l i c t was the acceptable norm; and f i n a l l y on the 'garbage can' model, where ambiguity was the dominant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and i n which the i n s t i t u t i o n "does not know what i t i s doing" (Cohen & March,1974:3). "More recent models such as s o c i a l networks, loose c o u p l i n g , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e a r n i n g , and examining i n s t i t u t i o n s as c u l t u r e s r e j e c t the more i n t e n t i o n a l and r a t i o n a l assumptions of the t r a d i t i o n a l models" (Peterson,1985:9). The Carnegie Commission declared: "No c l e a r theory about governance w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education i s g e n e r a l l y accepted as a b a s i s f o r approaching p o l i c y , and t h i s , a d d i t i o n a l l y , complicates an examination of the s u b j e c t " (1973:13). In an attempt t o i s o l a t e the perceived i n t e n t i o n s of p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s and the perceived outcomes, t h i s study w i l l i n c i d e n t l y i d e n t i f y any discrepancy between outputs and outcomes r e l a t e d t o the three p o l i c i e s . Governance p o l i c i e s d e c l a r e 4 government i n t e n t i o n s f o r decision-making w i t h i n the system, and the outcomes of implementation reveal something of the impact upon the system. Boyd h i g h l i g h t s some of these i s s u e s i n h i s paper on 'Competing Values i n Educational P o l i c y and Governance,' when he w r i t e s : "The d i f f i c u l t y of course, i s t o achieve and maintain govern- mental arrangements and p o l i c i e s that s t r i k e a d e s i r a b l e balance between the advantages (and disadvantages) of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n " (1984:9). Bald r i d g e extends t h i s view when he s t a t e s , "a study of the p o l i t i c a l dynamics surrounding d e c i s i o n - making would help unravel some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n studying academic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " (1971:21). Any research on p u b l i c p o l i c y implementation must consider the human s e t t i n g i n which p o l i c y i n t e n t i s expressed and r e a l i s e d . S i m i l a r l y the government which assumes the f i n a n c i a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c o l l e g e s e r v i c e must delegate a u t h o r i t y t o agencies, a l b e i t human agencies, i n such a way as t o optimise the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r p o l i c i e s (see Jennings (1980) and Housego (1986)). According t o the Carnegie Commission "governance i s a means and not an end. I t should be devised and adjusted not f o r i t s own sake but f o r the sake of the welfare of the academic e n t e r p r i s e " (1973:3). Nevertheless, c l e a r l i n e s of communication as w e l l as l e v e l s of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and a u t h o r i t y need t o be e s t a b l i s h e d and maintained f o r the e f f e c t i v e governance of the system. The f o l l o w i n g subsections i d e n t i f y some of the important i s s u e s of de l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system. Also 5 i d e n t i f i e d are the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s t o be included i n t h i s study. Ibe_Case_£gr_Cgllege_A,ytgngmy There i s a l a r g e body of l i t e r a t u r e o u t l i n i n g the problems of c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n respect t o the apparent c o n f l i c t with l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l autonomy. Such autonomy was one of the fundamental o b j e c t i v e s of the community c o l l e g e movement. Beswick et a l (1983), Campbell (1971), Dennison (1976), Gleazer (1968), Medsker (1960), Monroe (1976), and o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g many Government Reports and Commissions of Inquiry i n Canada and the U.S.A., have s t r e s s e d the importance of i n s t i t u t i o n a l autonomy i n community c o l l e g e governance. I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s autonomy has i n the pa s t , and can i n the f u t u r e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e t o c o l l e g e f l e x i b i l i t y and the encouragement of l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e s . Sidney Brossman, f o r example, argues: Local management of community colleges must be maintained i f these colleges are to remain true to the basic reason for t h e i r existence. This means that state agencies, while carrying out t h e i r state r o l e s , should in no way diminish the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of l o c a l boards (Sear 1 e, 1978s 1 9 ) . Conversely, Ashworth reminds us that the demand f o r autonomy alone i s not of i t s e l f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r standing o u t s i d e government c o n t r o l : To w i l l the end without having to hand the means whereby the end can be achieved in a way that a t t r a c t s support and assent i s the mark of p o l i t i c a l incompetence and no amount of high- f a l u t i n g nonsense about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of autonomy ... or the sanctity of academic freedom should be allowed to obscure that (1983; 6 7 ) . These w r i t i n g s c a l l r esearchers t o examine both the r o l e of c e n t r a l policy-making i n higher education, and the inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s of making p o l i c i e s t h a t can be r e a l i s e d . 6 The Task Force on the Community Colleges i n B r i t i s h Columbia, e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1973, d e c l a r e d , a f t e r extensive research, t h a t one o-f the important f u n c t i o n s was that - the governance and operation of every college should reflect the concerns of a l l elements within the college and i t s wider community. Community colleges oust be highly responsive to community needs for learning (Task Force, 1974: 11) . The Task Force a l s o recommended "that c o l l e g e s be granted corporate s t a t u s ; and f u r t h e r , that the c o l l e g e board be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r determining p o l i c i e s ..." (1974:16). The Organisation f o r Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.CD.) rep o r t e d , "the examiners are of the opinion t h a t some a u t h o r i t i e s go too f a r i n t h e i r attempts t o c o n t r o l i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s " (1976:82). If Brossman's a s s e r t i o n i s accurate, a c l o s e examination of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between government and c o l l e g e a u t h o r i t y i s e s s e n t i a l . He w r i t e s , " v i r t u a l l y every important development i n community c o l l e g e education i s the r e s u l t of innovations stemming d i r e c t l y from l o c a l boards being f r e e from s t a t e u n i f o r m i t y " (Searle,1978:22). Dennison notes " t r a d i t i o n - a l l y , autonomy i s a much de s i r e d q u a l i t y f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education and any form of p r o v i n c i a l s t r u c t u r e i s perceived as a t h r e a t t o such autonomy" (1979:35). The r h e t o r i c seems t o have gone unheeded by p o l i t i c i a n s and p u b l i c policy-makers, as the c o n t r o l of f i n a n c e , course p r o v i s i o n , c u r r i c u l a r matters, and other important d e c i s i o n s are becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y c e n t r a l i s e d . Cohen and A s s o c i a t e s record t h i s d r i f t when they observe: Gradually, steadily, seemingly i r r e s i s t i b l y , governmental agencies, commissions, boards, and legislature are impinging on 7 the colleges. A l l is done with the best of intentions: program duplication among colleges in the same region must be avoided, data must be reported uniformly, minimum standards for programs and personnel must be maintained. But people in the colleges nay be forgiven i f they see the state as an unwelcome intruder (1975:1). The h i s t o r y of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between government and - c o l l e g e s •forms an important backdrop -for t h i s study o-f p o l i c y implemen- t a t i o n . Gallagher (1984) r e p o r t s : "Zealously guarded autonomy, r e g i o n a l responsiveness, and c u r r i c u l u m comprehensiveness were the bedrock f o r B r i t i s h Columbia c o l l e g e s " (1984,9;2:7). More than a decade ago Cohen and Associates observed a c e n t r a l i s i n g tendency: control of community colleges i s gravitating toward state capitals. Responsibility for funding, planning, and managing everything from cost accounting to instructional techniques is moving steadily away from local o f f i c i a l s (1975:1). Again, McGivney notes the b u r e a u c r a t i c i n f l u e n c e s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n : The centralization imperative appears to be driving most private and public organizations toward an increasingly bureaucratic character in their structures. Consequently, educational policy making systems and organizational structures over the long term are becoming more bureaucratic, specialized, and centralized (1984:49). However, the whole debate on c e n t r a l i s a t i o n versus l o c a l autonomy i s generated from the perceptions of t h i s balance by a c t o r s w i t h i n the system, as w e l l as those not d i r e c t l y a s s o c i a t e d with the system, but a f f e c t e d by the r e l e v a n t p o l i c i e s . The_Case_f_ or_Cogrdi.natign_and_Control. P o l i c i e s on c o l l e g e governance i n c l u d e the phenomenon of c o o r d i n a t i o n , and the degree of c o o r d i n a t i o n must be balanced with elements of c o n t r o l , which i n turn a f f e c t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the system. In the context of England's education governance, Jennings notes " i t i s ... c l e a r t h a t party 8 p o l i t i c a l l eaders l i k e ... more c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l over l o c a l s e r v i c e s " (1980:2). For example, i-f the p r o v i n c i a l Government i n B.C. i s p r o v i d i n g the bulk of the funding f o r the operation of c o l l e g e s , i t wants to be able t o implement i t s p o l i c i e s through the system t o maintain a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Thus c o l l e g e c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o n t r o l becomes an important f a c t o r i n p u b l i c p o l i c y . The examination of the conditions under which power and social control become legitimated and transformed into authority is an important undertaking in trying to understand the governance and control of organizations (Pf ef f er , 1981 s 6) . Glenny reported s t u d i e s of the c o o r d i n a t i o n phenomenon with regard t o higher education i n the U.S.A., and w h i l s t r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t "both the laws e s t a b l i s h i n g c o o r d i n a t i n g agencies and t h e i r a c t u a l operations depend on a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n the h i s t o r i c a l development o-f the s t a t e " (1985:8), went on t o d e c l a r e : the most successful coordination involves widespread participa- tion by faculty and administrators of the coordinated organizations, experts and lay people from the public and representatives of organizations interested in education (1985:20). Many c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s s t r o n g l y oppose p r o v i n c i a l c o o r d i n a t i o n on the b a s i s of i t s apparent ' c o n t r o l ' f u n c t i o n s , which threaten the degree of c o l l e g e autonomy (Hoi1ick-Kenyon, 1979:41). But, as the f i n a n c i a l commitment of the p r o v i n c i a l Government t o community c o l l e g e s grew, so the demand f o r stronger l i n k s between a l l segments of the system gave r i s e t o a need f o r c e n t r a l c o o r d i n a t i o n , planning and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . The M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s p o l i c y statement 1982-87 of the Government of B.C.^ l i s t e d governance as the f i r s t of i t s ' o b j e c t i v e s ' . I t s t a t e s with respect t o c o o r d i n a t i o n t h a t the 9 system w i l l "preserve an intermediate l e v e l s t r u c t u r e , comprising one or more c o u n c i l ( s ) , which can provide input t o the government and t o educational i n s t i t u t i o n s based on a p r o v i n c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e " ( M i n i s t r y of Education,1983C:11). This l e v e l of decision-making was abandoned e a r l y i n the 1982-87 period when the three e x i s t i n g C o u n c i l s were d i s s o l v e d , and the c o o r d i n a t i n g r o l e became the d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Government, through the o f f i c e of the M i n i s t e r of Education. Recent reviews have exposed the i n c r e a s i n g e x t e r n a l pressures on the governance of post-secondary education, and on government's a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l the system. McGivney recognised the environmental pressures not only on i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n the system of education but a l s o on the s t a t e system i t s e l f . Because the states receive aid from the federal government, the politics of education at state level should be examined from a perspective that recognizes that the state i s not only a regulator but also a regulatee (McGivney, 1984: 44) . He f u r t h e r reviewed the s t a t e versus l o c a l c o n t r o l research i n t o conceptual models of 'State Education Governance P a t t e r n s ' , and concluded t h a t " s t a t e p o l i t i c s and education has c l e a r l y begun to emerge and be recognised as a s e r i o u s and important f i e l d of study," and t h a t the "conceptual models have yet t o be completely i ntegrated" (1984:49). There i s a case f o r p r o v i n c i a l governments i n Canada t o assume greater c o n t r o l over the community c o l l e g e systems of education, i f f o r no other reason than t o ensure f i n a n c i a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o t h e i r e l e c t o r a t e s , as they assume a higher percentage of the e s c a l a t i n g c o s t s of t h i s s e r v i c e . But there are other reasons. 10 There i s a need f o r both a p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l planning p e r s p e c t i v e i n p o l i c y areas other than education, such as economic and s o c i a l (see 0.E.C.D.,1976). Such planning could provide a r a t i o n a l model of c o o r d i n a t i o n that minimise d u p l i c a t i o n of s e r v i c e s , optimise economies of s c a l e , and e l i m i n a t e wasteful and d y s f u n c t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s of the t o t a l s e r v i c e without j e o p a r d i s i n g the q u a l i t y , but s t i l l f o s t e r i n g comprehensiveness, a c c e s s i b i l i t y , and p o t e n t i a l i n n o v a t i o n of s t a f f and students, w i t h i n the broader government p o l i c y framework. Indeed, the l i t e r a t u r e on mangement of p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s supports the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n imperative i n times of f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t or when p r o v i d i n g a framework f o r unpopular changes. Ib§_EQilEig§_to_be_Cgnsidered The Government of B.C. has taken p r a c t i c a l steps t o ensure t h a t the domains over which community c o l l e g e s can e x e r c i s e freedom of choice i n matters of governance are reduced. The proclamation of the The College and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e Act (1977), was a s i g n i f i c a n t move t o provide a p r o v i n c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e on post- secondary education. In assessing the implementation of the Act, Dennison observed: The post-Bill B2 period has been characterized by a host of new procedures affecting program and course approval, budgetary control, governance, and associated factors which influence the day to day operations of the colleges and institutes ... the Act placed emphasis upon centralization of the system (1980:5). I t was during 1982 t o 1983 t h a t the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s s t u d i e d i n t h i s research were announced. The development of the system's M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s statement was the f i r s t of these i n i t i a t i v e s . 1 1 P o l i c y One I n s t i t u t i o n a l decision-making p o t e n t i a l was i n f l u e n c e d by r e q u i r i n g C o l l e g e Boards t o a l i g n t h e i r M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s with those of the p r o v i n c i a l Government. "Each component of the system w i l l be accountable f o r the attainment of a l l a p p l i c a b l e o b j e c t i v e s described i n the f o l l o w i n g document w i t h i n the time-frame f o r which they are p e r t i n e n t " ( M i n i s t r y of Education,1983C:7). Each c o l l e g e was founded on a b a s i s of l o c a l and r e g i o n a l support, indeed of l o c a l governance. Since the establishment of the c o l l e g e s t h e i r f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n had changed, and by 1980 the p r o v i n c i a l Government was p r o v i d i n g almost a l l c o l l e g e income. A need was perceived by the Government t o develop p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s f o r these c o l l e g e s i n areas of governance, program r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n , and support f o r economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s of the Government. A f t e r wide c o n s u l t a t i o n , a M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s statement was developed,- i n the form of a f i v e - y e a r plan f o r the system. The i n i t i a t i v e c a l l e d on i n s t i t u t i o n s t o develop a f i v e - y e a r p l a n , g i v i n g due cognisance t o , and pres e r v i n g harmony w i t h , the p r o v i n c i a l plan. This document w i l l serve as the b a s i s f o r the f i r s t p o l i c y i n i t i a t e d , i n as much as i t encompasses governance i s s u e s i n the c o l l e g e s s e c t o r . I t provides a foundation document on which t o pursue the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perception of governance p o l i c y implementation outcomes. P o l i c y Two Three intermediary C o u n c i l s were e s t a b l i s h e d t o act as c o o r d i n a t i n g agencies f o r the Government t o ensure the e f f e c t i v e implementation of i t s p o l i c i e s , and simultaneously t o represent f a i r l y , c o l l e g e needs t o the Government. Many recorded t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o r a l l y and i n formal documents. Dennison h i g h l i g h t s some of the inherent problems i n t h i s arrangement by r e c o r d i n g the "emphasis on c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ... the c o n f l i c t i n g mandates ... the wide d i v i s i o n of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ... the competing l o g i s t i c s f o r program a l l o c a t i o n s ... and the i d i o s y n c r a t i c nature" (1980:5-8) of the C o u n c i l s themselves. The C o l l e g e - I n s t i t u t e Educators' A s s o c i a t i o n (C.I.E.A.) submitted a b r i e f , f i r s t t o the P r e s i d e n t s ' Council and subsequently t o the M i n i s t e r of Education i n 1982, endorsing the abandonment of the t h r e e C o u n c i l s , by recommending, "C-IEA urges the repeal of Part 6 S e c t i o n 45-52 and t h e r e f o r e the a l t e r a t i o n of those other s e c t i o n s of the Act which r e f e r t o the C o u n c i l s " (C.I.E.A.,1982:17). E l l i s and Mugridge (1983), i n t h e i r case-study of the Open Learning I n s t i t u t e , a l s o complained of the i m p o s i t i o n on educational e f f i c i e n c y of the m u l t i p l i c i t y of intermediary bodies i n the establishment of that i n s t i t u t i o n . Indeed, one of the c o o r d i n a t i n g C o u n c i l s reported t o the government: It is tempting to suggest that B i l l 82 be revised to do away with the existing three Councils and substitute something more like the Council of Higher Education and a College Commission referred to above but with terms of reference and membership altered to conform to new situations (Academic Counci 1 ,1980: 13). Community c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were a l s o v o c i f e r o u s i n expressing d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n the c o o r d i n a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . ^ S u f f i c i e n t d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was expressed t o persuade the Government t o modify the p o l i c y statement and f u r t h e r change the 13 decision-making s t r u c t u r e o-f post-secondary education c o o r d i n a t i o n by d i s s o l v i n g the three C o u n c i l s , and r e q u i r i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s t o deal d i r e c t l y with the o-f-fice of the M i n i s t r y of Education. In July 1983, the three Councils were eliminated as part of the provincial government's restraint program ... the centralizing trend appeared to be strengthening ... this government fe l t that increased control, especially over budget-setting decisions, was necessary (Cal der , 1984: 86-87) . The perceived e f f e c t s of implementing such governance p o l i c i e s formed a major t h r u s t f o r t h i s research. P o l i c y Three Concurrent with the a b o l i t i o n of the C o u n c i l s was a f u r t h e r p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e by the Government of B.C. The d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e d the m i n i s t e r r e s p o n s i b l e f o r post—secondary education t o appoint a l l c o l l e g e governors, r a t h e r than all o w the previous p r a c t i c e of e l e c t e d School Board members s e l e c t i n g t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on C o l l e g e Boards. When the c o l l e g e s were e s t a b l i s h e d i n the 1960's, they were governed i n d i r e c t l y through the School Boards which operated under the P u b l i c Schools Act. During t h i s time Co l l e g e Council membership comprised appointees from p a r t i c i p a t i n g School Boards, as w e l l as the p r i n c i p a l of the c o l l e g e and the school d i s t r i c t superintendent, p l u s two members appointed by the Lieut e n a n t - Governor-in—Counci1. In 1970 the c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l was removed from the Council and the number of Government appointees incre a s e d , with a m a j o r i t y of School Board appointees guaranteed. The i n c l u s i o n of the d i s t r i c t superintendent ceased i n 1973. The proclamation of the Col l e g e s and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e Act i n 1977 14 changed the name of the governing body from Council t o Board and rea f f i r m e d the c r i t e r i o n f o r Board s i z e as f o l l o w s : ...the number of positions on the board is twice the number of school d i s t r i c t s , included, in whole or in part, within the college region of the college, less one position (College and. P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act,Part 111,7,(2);1977). I t a l s o provided c o l l e g e s with c o r p o r a t i o n s t a t u s . In 1980 the balance of membership changed t o giv e a m a j o r i t y of one appointed by the Government. This provided the b a s i s on which the p r o v i n c i a l Government enacted l e g i s l a t i o n i n 1983, t o become e f f e c t i v e from February 1984, which i s the t h i r d p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e examined i n t h i s study. The l e g i s l a t i o n s t a t e d "the board of a c o l l e g e s h a l l c o n s i s t of 5 or more members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor i n C o u n c i l " (Cgl1ege and I n s t i t u t e Act,Part 3,6;1977). DEFINITIQN_QF_TERMS A d m i n i s t r a t o r s In the context of t h i s r e s e a r c h , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s means those persons i n v o l v e d i n system—wide decision-making on c o l l e g e governance. The term w i l l encompass M i n i s t e r s of Education, senior bureaucrats i n the M i n i s t r y of Education i n v o l v e d i n the post-secondary education s e c t o r , College Board chairmen and members, and c h i e f executive o f f i c e r s of c o l l e g e s and major i n t e r e s t groups such as B.C.A.C. and C.I.E.A. These persons are so c l a s s i f i e d as system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s because of t h e i r d i r e c t involvement i n the implementation of c o l l e g e system governance p o l i c i e s . 15 C o l l e g e System The term c o l l e g e system means those e n t i t i e s i n B.C. which are d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n the d e l i v e r y of post-secondary education programs a v a i l a b l e through the f i f t e e n community c o l l e g e s i n the province. I t w i l l be used synonymously with 'community c o l l e g e system'. Communication Linkage The term communication l i n k a g e i s used i n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n t o r e f l e c t the meaning developed by Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) i n r e l a t i o n t o what they c a l l the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n environment and the p o l i c y implementation environment. They d e f i n e i t as f o l l o w s : These linkages consist of a series of crisscrossing cofflfflunications networks between policy makers, implementors, intermediaries, recipients, lobbyists, and others who become involved in the implementation process. - Since these different actors may attempt to resist or circumvent policy directives for a variety of reasons, a c r i t i c a l component in these networks consists of compliance mechanisms that are employed in an effort ; to move various actors to carry out policy instructions (1980:59-60). Environment Environment i s defined as: Those aspects of a society that f a l l outside the boundaries of a po l i t i c a l system can be generalized by stating that they consist of a l l the other sub-systems of the society. They constitute the environment of the po l i t i c a l system. Environment embraces the social as well as the physical environment (East on , 1965A: 70-71) . In t h i s study, environment r e l a t e s t o p o l i c y implementation and i n c l u d e s those pressures exerted on the system from the documented and l e g a l d i r e c t i o n s and c o n s t r a i n t s of p o l i c y statements. 16 Governance Governance has been p r e v i o u s l y described i n t h i s Chapter (see p.3), and w i l l be used i n the context of t h i s study t o mean the framework of a u t h o r i t a t i v e decision-making a f f e c t i n g the system of community c o l l e g e s i n B.C. Implementation Implementation w i l l r e f e r t o "the s o c i a l a c t i v i t y that f o l l o w s upon, and i s stim u l a t e d by" (Brewer & deLeon,1983:256) "the adoption of a p o l i c y and before r o u t i n i z a t i o n of op e r a t i o n s , a c t i v i t i e s or tasks that are governed by the p o l i c y " (Schneider, 1982:716). Inputs Inputs are defined as the i n t e n t i o n s of p o l i c y , both documented and perceived by fo r m u l a t o r s , which i n c l u d e the standards and o b j e c t i v e s derived from those i n t e n t i o n s , as well as the resources a v a i l a b l e t o implement the p o l i c y . I n t e r e s t Group For t h i s study, the term w i l l be used t o in c o r p o r a t e both l e g i t i m i s e d and n o n - l e g i t i m i s e d pressure groups, (see Kogan, 1975:75), but w i l l i n c l u d e only those with d i r e c t i n t e r e s t i n the implementation of c o l l e g e governance p o l i c i e s i n B.C. Therefore, w i t h i n those confines the d e f i n i t i o n given by Wrong can be employed. People who share a common s i t u a t i o n often have l i k e i n t e r e s t s which are capable of transformation into common i n t e r e s t s . If they achieve successful mobilization by developing a sense of c o l l e c t i v e i d e n t i t y and finding or creating an organization to defend and promote th e i r i n t e r e s t s , the in t e r e s t s of them a l l 17 become the i n t e r e s t s of each. The maintenance of the organization and of the s o l i d a r i t y that helps sustain i t becomes v i t a l l y relevant to the f u l f i l l m e n t of in d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s previously pursued in i s o l a t i o n or in competition with other members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y (1979:179-180). Outcomes The use of the word outcome throughout t h i s study should be taken to mean the unintended consequences of a p o l i c y . Outcomes w i l l be l o c a t e d through the perceptions of c o l l e g e system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s who implement the p o l i c i e s . Outputs Throughout t h i s study, t h i s term assumes a somewhat d i f f e r e n t meaning t o t h a t ascribed by systems theory. Rather than p r o j e c t the concept of "an a u t h o r i t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of values" (Easton,1965A:126), i t w i l l be used t o convey the r e a l i s a t i o n of p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s , but not i n c l u d i n g outcomes. Perceptions Personal perceptions are the prime s t i m u l u s f o r a c t i o n with respect t o implementing p o l i c y . This research focusses on the perceived outcomes of system governance i n i t i a t i v e s , and the word perceived w i l l be used i n the same general sense as i t s use i n the p o l i c y implementation l i t e r a t u r e , reviewed i n Chapter Two. That i s , the term perceptions w i l l be used t o r e f l e c t adminis- t r a t o r s ' personal value and b e l i e f frameworks i n r e l a t i o n t o the p o l i c y elements. P o l i c y P o l i c y means a formal statement of i n t e n t by a governing 18 a u t h o r i t y . I t i s a l s o used i n the more general sense, t o convey the complete process which i n c l u d e s implementation through t o termina t i o n of the p o l i c y . P o l i c y E f f e c t s P o l i c y e f f e c t s i s used t o comprise both p o l i c y outputs outcomes as described above, and t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e s r e a l i s a t i o n of p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s as w e l l as the consequences of the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y . P o l i c y Formulators P o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , or p o l i c y a r c h i t e c t s , i n c l u d e the r e l e v a n t M i n i s t e r s of Education, s e n i o r bureaucrats attached t o the o f f i c e of the M i n i s t r y , and past o f f i c e r s o-f the M i n i s t r y . A l l these o f f i c e r s represent the group who were seen t o be inv o l v e d i n the formulati o n of any of the three p o l i c i e s being examined. P o l i c y Implementors The term implementor i s used i n t h i s study t o i n c l u d e only a d m i n i s t r a t o r s who r e c e i v e , i n t e r p r e t and put the p o l i c i e s i n t o a c t i o n , or i n a c t i o n , w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system. I t i s used t o i n c l u d e C o l l e g e Board chairmen and members, c h i e f e x ecutive o f f i c e r s of c o l l e g e s and i n t e r e s t group execu t i v e s . and p o l i c y both the unintended IHE_SI6NIFICANCE_QF_IHE_§iyBY The whole process of p o l i c y a n a l y s i s i s c r i t i c a l t o p o l i c y - makers, policy-implementors, and p o l i c y - e v a l u a t o r s . As the governance of post-secondary education appears t o become 19 i n c r e a s i n g l y c e n t r a l i s e d , so the importance of understanding the processes involved i n e f f e c t i v e implemention becomes more important f o r p o l i t i c i a n s , c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and academics. Clearly, the techniques of skilled policy analysis are very ouch needed to inform that task - for i t is in the f i e l d of policy analysis that one may find the tools and techniques, the technologies and the strategies for blending the contributions of politics and expertise in the processes of public policy-making for education (Downey, 1984: 3) . Although t h i s work can only make a small c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the understanding of government p o l i c y f o r community c o l l e g e s , i t i s important t h a t such knowledge be pursued with i n c r e a s i n g r e g u l a r i t y , enthusiasm and s c h o l a r s h i p . I t i s an important example of research t h a t attempts t o i d e n t i f y d i f f e r e n c e s between p u b l i c p o l i c y i n t e n t and outcomes, and thus has a p p l i c a t i o n t o the p u b l i c p o l i c y process, i n p a r t i c u l a r t o the community c o l l e g e systems i n Canada, e s p e c i a l l y i n B.C. A search of the l i t e r a t u r e r e v e a l s that no previous s t u d i e s of the e f f e c t s of implementing p r o v i n c i a l governance p o l i c i e s i n the community c o l l e g e system of B.C. have been conducted. This r e i n f o r c e s the need not only f o r t h i s study, but f o r the launching of complementary research t o add t o the understanding of t h i s p u b l i c f u n c t i o n . IHE_LIMIIAIIONS_OF_IHE_SILjDY The study i s l i m i t e d t o the period f o l l o w i n g the Government's announcement of the three p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s : (a) System M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s , March 1983, (b) A b o l i t i o n of intermediary C o u n c i l s , J u l y 1983, (c> Government appointment of College Board members, J u l y 1983, and extend through t o the establishment of the new M i n i s t r y f o r Post-Secondary Education i n February 1986. During t h i s time the system was a l s o subject t o f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of 'formula funding', and other Government i n t e r v e n t i o n , but these are excluded from the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s being examined. In many s i t u a t i o n s i t was impossible t o segregate apparent causes and e f f e c t s of the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s being considered without r e c o g n i s i n g these other i n t e r v e n t i o n s . The term community c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i s r e s t r i c t e d t o persons who are perceived as key decision-makers i n the implemen- t a t i o n of the governance p o l i c i e s . The research i s l i m i t e d by the degree t o which those persons were a v a i l a b l e and w i l l i n g t o make documents a c c e s s i b l e , and/or t o d i s c u s s the r e l e v a n t i s s u e s . Furthermore, middle l e v e l managers w i t h i n c o l l e g e s were not included i n the sample frame of those interviewed and t h e r e f o r e l i m i t s perceptions t o s e n i o r executives w i t h i n the system. Yin (1985) s t a t e s some of the inherent problems of i n t e r v i e w s when he w r i t e s "they are sub j e c t t o the problems, b i a s , poor r e c a l l , and poor or i n a c c u r a t e a r t i c u l a t i o n " (1985:85). The examination of the p o l i c i e s w i l l be l i m i t e d t o the f a c t s recorded i n l e g i s l a t i o n , formal documents, correspondence and the accuracy of r e c a l l e x h i b i t e d by interviewees. Because p o l i c y " c o n s i s t s of a web of d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s t h a t a l l o c a t e s value" (Easton, 1967:130), the study cannot i n c o r p o r a t e the t o t a l i t y of t h a t web, nor indeed of a l l the values held by p a r t i c i p a n t s . The succ e s s i v e refinement of the i n t e r v i e w question elements by the researcher a l s o serves t o l i m i t the scope of the study. 21 SUMMARY This chapter has defined the research problem and has addressed some of the major i s s u e s i n v o l v e d . I t has provided some background t o the three p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s t h a t formed the p r o v i n c i a l Government's i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o the governance of community c o l l e g e s i n B.C. A b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the dominant f e a t u r e s of the problem provided some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e i r i n c l u s i o n , and the d e f i n i t i o n s provide f o r an improved under- standing of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . The f i n a l s e c t i o n of the Chapter o u t l i n e d both the importance and l i m i t a t i o n s of the study. , NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE 1. Whilst t e c h n i c a l and c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t i n the use of the terms 'post-secondary education', 'higher education' and ' t e r t i a r y education', i n t h i s study they a l l r e f e r t o post compulsory school educational s e r v i c e s provided by a l l p u b l i c l y funded agencies, and can be used interchangeably. 2. See Macdonald (1962) Higher_Education_in_British_Col.umbia. and Hoi1ick-Keynon's unpublished d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n (1979) , An a n a l y s i s of the Coordination of Community. Col1eges_in_British_Columbia. 3. See W i l d i n g , N., and Laundy, P., (1972), An_Ency.cl.gp.aedia_gf_Parli.am ; and Ib__£Ql. lf§9e__Qd_ I nst i t ut e_ Act, 1977, B.C. 4. The M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s statement r e f e r r e d t o here and throughout the t h e s i s i s e n t i t l e d Integrated F_ye Year Planning f o r the B r i t i s h Columbia College and I n s t i t u t e Systems. System O b j e c t i v e s 1982-87. 5. The f i r s t d r a f t of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s document e n t i t l e d i n t e g r a t e d F i v e Year Planning f o r the Br i t Ish Columbia Co l l e g e and I n s t i t u t e System:. System Obje c t i v e s 1982-87, was sent t o c o l l e g e s and i n s t i t u t e s with an accompanying l e t t e r from the M i n i s t e r of Education, was dated March 31, 1982. I t was r e d r a f t e d s e v e r a l times, and a copy dated March 1983 was f o r m a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d t o c o l l e g e s i n May 1983. 6. See Notes from B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of Co l l e g e s workshop, 'Understanding Occupational T r a i n i n g ' , November,1980:28-29. C H A P T E R T W O LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT "Major p o l i c i e s " , according t o Ba l d r i d g e , "commit the o r g a n i z - a t i o n t o d e f i n i t e g o a l s , s e t the s t r a t e g i e s f o r reaching those g o a l s , and i n general determine the long-range d e s t i n y of the o r g a n i z a t i o n " (1971:21). The importance of the p o l i c y concept i s demonstrated by the volume of research generated. With respect t o p o l i c i e s r e l a t i n g t o governance, i t has been suggested t h a t researchers "may have generated one of the l a r g e s t bodies of l i t e r a t u r e i n the f i e l d of higher education" (Deegan & Gollattscheck,1985:73). U n t i l r e c e n t l y , such works have tended to focus on the p o l i c y - f o r m a t i o n stage r a t h e r than upon the implementation stage. The purpose of t h i s review i s t o provide f o r the development of a conceptual framework t o guide the research: t h a t i s t o provide the researcher with the 'instruments' t o a l l o w f o r a d e s c r i p t i v e a n a l y s i s of the phenomena being s t u d i e d . In the f i r s t p l a c e the l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g with p o l i c y implementation w i l l be addressed. This w i l l be done by ana l y s i n g Easton's (1965B) systems model as i t r e l a t e s t o the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . What then f o l l o w s w i l l be a survey of p u b l i c a t i o n s on the r o l e implementation p l a y s i n the p o l i c y process. Another purpose of the l i t e r a t u r e review i s t o d i s t i n g u i s h the s i g n i f i c a n t parameters on which a s u i t a b l e conceptual framework f o r studying implementation can be based. F i n a l l y , a conceptual framework w i l l be advanced which i n c o r p o r a t e s these v a r i a b l e s , and serves t o guide t h i s research p r o j e c t . EASION^S_PQLIIICAL_SYSIEMB David Easton has made important c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p o l i t i c a l theory. H i s f i r s t book i n a s e r i e s , The P o l i t i c a l System, presented the case f o r a t h e o r e t i c a l model t o provide a foundation f o r a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l behaviour. This was c l o s e l y f o llowed by A Framework f o r P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s which elaborated t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l framework by s p e c i f y i n g some of the elements of the model. H i s t h i r d book, A Systems A n a l y s i s of P o l i t i c a l L i f e , developed the conceptual s t r u c t u r e s noted i n the f i r s t two volumes w i t h i n a systems theory and provided a working model. Each element i n the model i s presented as a u s e f u l t o o l i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l behaviour, through what he c a l l s ' e m p i r i c a l theory'. This theory has been widely used i n the a n a l y s i s of the p o l i c y process i n higher education (see M i l l e t , 1968; Howell & Brown, 1983; and T a y l o r , 1983). However, the model s p e c i f i c a l l y addresses p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n rather than implementation, and although not d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s r e s e a r c h , o f f e r s some us e f u l conceptual bases. Easton's (1965B) p o l i t i c a l systems model enables the researcher t o cope with many of the complex p o l i t i c a l phenomena. I t a l l o w s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n i n t e r r e l a t i o n s i n a systematic way, and i s comprehensive, i n as much as i t provides f o r a n a l y s i s of many of the r e l e v a n t p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Systems a n a l y s i s h i g h l i g h t s the i n t e r — r e l a t i o n s h i p s between sub-systems, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of inputs t o outputs, and the consequential outcomes of decision-making, and provides f o r a n a l y s i s of the flow of information w i t h i n the system. Figure One presents a simple s t r u c t u r e of the major r e l a t i o n s h i p s defined by t h i s theory. 25 FIGURE 1 SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF EASTON'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY FEEDBACK LOOP Source: Easton 1965B. Easton's <1965B) model o f f e r s conceptual t o o l s which a s s i s t the examination of implementation e f f e c t s , emphasising the importance of i d e n t i f y i n g i n p u t s i n t o a p o l i t i c a l system and the p e c u l i a r nature of these as they are converted from supports and demands to outputs and outcomes. The s t r e s s demands place on the e q u i l i b r i u m of the p o l i t i c a l system whether or not they are converted t o outputs i s r e c o g n i s a b l e . Easton describes the key stakeholders as 'gatekeepers' or s t r u c t u r a l r e g u l a t o r s i n the system, whom he me t a p h o r i c a l l y l i n k s with c o n t r o l l e r s " r e g u l a t i n g the flow along the demand channels" (1965B:88>. The i d i o s y n c r a c i e s of output and feedback concepts i n order t o 2 6 analyse communication between the p o l i t i c a l system and i t s environment, with emphasis on i t s c y c l i c a l nature, are a l s o u s e f u l . Easton draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between "outputs' ( d e l i b e r a t e a l l o c a t i o n of resources or values) and 'outcomes' (consequential behaviour or m o b i l i s a t i o n of resources or values) as important l i n k s i n the conceptual model. Figure Two provides a simple a p p l i c a t i o n of the systems theory t o the a n a l y s i s of p o l i c y implementation. However, i t should be noted t h a t i n t h i s f i g u r e , the ' p o l i t i c a l system' i n Easton's theory i s replaced with p o l i c y implementation, an approach i d e n t i f i e d by Weatherley and Lipsky (1977) and supported by s c h o l a r s such as Bardach (1977), Pressman and Wildavsky (1979), and B a r r e t t and Fudge (1981). This simple i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can be extended t o encompass many of the important v a r i a b l e s i n the flow of i n f o r m a t i o n between p o l i c y i n t e n t , as expressed by formal p o l i c y statements and those undocumented but s t i l l intended by p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , and p o l i c y outcomes as perceived by implementors. Some of these can be i n s e r t e d i n t o the systems model (see Figu r e Three). This p r e s e n t a t i o n of informa t i o n flow and decision-making p o i n t s enables the researcher t o e x t r a c t many of the dynamic elements of the implementation process, by observing the behaviour of system and sub-system members without being bound t o a formal h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e . This approach a s s i s t s i n i d e n t i f y i n g some of the means and ends by which p o l i c i e s a re, or are not, implemented, and thus provides a u s e f u l t o o l by means of which t o examine p o l i c y outcomes. Elmore o u t l i n e s some of the important f e a t u r e s of a systems model required when analysing p o l i c y implementation: (1) Clearly s p e c i f i e d tasks and objectives that accurately r e f l e c t the intent of the p o l i c y ; (2) a management plan that a l l o c a t e s tasks and performance standards to subunits; (3) an objective means of measuring subunit performance; and (4) a system of management controls and s o c i a l sanctions s u f f i c i e n t to hold subordinates accountable for the i r performance (1978:195). SIMPLE SYSTEMS THEORY APPLIED TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION FISURE 2 ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT Policy Intentions Documented & Perceived INPUT Poli c y Implementation P R O C E S S — O U T P U T S Intentions Realised *» OUTCOMES Unintended Policy E f f e c t s ENVIRONMENT FEEDBACK LOOPS Policy E f f e c t s Inform Next Po l i c y Change FIGURE 3 POLITICAL SYSTEMS MODEL ADAPTED FOR EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION FEEDBACK LOOP FEEDBACK LOOP Source: Easton, 1965B:110 Whilst Easton's model provides the researcher with a -framework f o r a n a l y s i s beyond the formal h i e r a r c h y of the o r g a n i s a t i o n , one which encompasses the behaviour of both formal and informal a c t o r s , i t does not c l a r i f y the r o l e of the p o l i c y formulators as opposed t o the p o l i c y implementors other than t o i d e n t i f y them as the a u t h o r i t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t systems or sub-systems. A p o l i t i c a l system i s not a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of human beings that i s selected out for in v e s t i g a t i o n . It i s a set of int e r a c t i o n s i s o l a t e d from other kinds of i n t e r a c t i o n in which the human being i s engaged (1965A:36). Easton's theory a l l o w s f o r the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l behaviour w i t h i n an o r g a n i s a t i o n , and i s appropriate too f o r research i n t o the p o l i t i c a l outcomes of p o l i c y implementation i n the c o l l e g e system when complemented with some of the implementation v a r i a b l e s i d e n t i f i e d by others. IMPLEMENIAIIQN.I The concept of implementation i s not new,^ but the focus of researchers has tended towards the fo r m u l a t i o n element of the p o l i c y process. Only r e c e n t l y have a n a l y s t s turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the inherent problems of p o l i c y execution. The term 'implementation' serves t o descr i b e the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o l i c y statements by a c t o r s i n the system. Brewer and deLeon's d e f i n i t i o n captures some of the important p o i n t s : "Implementation i s the execution of the s e l e c t e d option - an option that may bear only f a i n t resemblance t o ... o r d e r l y recommendations, o f t e n t o the a n a l y s t ' s wonderment, f r u s t r a t i o n or ch a g r i n " (1983:19). 3 0 The concept of p o l i c y implementation by 'Street Level Bureaucrats', o u t l i n e d by Weatherley and Lipsky ( 1 9 7 7 ) , and an examination of Dunsires (1978) 'Implementation Gap' i s supported by w r i t e r s such as Jennings ( 1 9 8 0 ) , B a r r e t t and Fudge (1981) and Housego ( 1 9 8 6 ) , who provide appropriate a n a l y s i s of t h i s important element of the p o l i c y process. The implementation phenomenon i s more a c c u r a t e l y understood i f i t i s f i r s t examined i n r e l a t i o n t o other stages of the p o l i c y process, f o r as Pressman and Wildavsky a s s e r t , "each element i s dependent on the other" ( 1 9 7 9 : 1 7 8 ) . The process of making public policy can best be understood as one that involves a complicated interaction between government institutions, actors, and the particular characteristics of substantive policy areas (Bardach , 1977: i x ) . This s e c t i o n w i l l i d e n t i f y some of the p o l i c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and element i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s by examining some d e f i n i t i o n s of the word p o l i c y , followed by an a n a l y s i s of some of the p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s emanating from a focus on implementation as a stage i n the process. I t w i l l conclude with a s y n t h e s i s of p o l i c y process models i n which the implementation stage i s i d e n t i f i e d . P o l i c y can mean the process of a r r i v i n g at a u t h o r i t a t i v e d e c i s i o n s on which a system or o r g a n i s a t i o n a c t s at some f u t u r e time. Conversely i t can i n c o r p o r a t e the execution phase, where p o l i c y i s not r e a l i s e d u n t i l i t i s f u l l y implemented. There have been many attempts t o d e f i n e p o l i c y , and i t i s necessary t o look at some of the i s s u e s r a i s e d i n these d e f i n i t i o n s t o understand something of the nature of the implementation process. 31 P g l i c _ _ a s _ a n _ A u t h o r i t a t Most d e f i n i t i o n s o-f p o l i c y suggest the e x e r c i s e of power and i n f l u e n c e over decision-making, but may f a i l t o describe whether or not implementation i s included. Downey epitomises t h i s e x c l u s i o n of implementation i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n which de s c r i b e s the proposed 'output' i n the for m u l a t i o n process, but does not in c l u d e the v a r i e t y of values assigned t o such a statement by the p o l i c y implementors. A policy, then, is a major decision by a governing authority. It selects and establishes a value from competing sets of values; i t declares an intent to act on the selected value; i t allocates resources, from society's scarce resources, to that value; and i t sets guidelines for persons who are to act on the achievement of the authority's intent (1984:4). Kogan w r i t e s of p o l i c i e s as "operational statements of values" (1975:55), but suggests t h a t "any s i n g l e p o l i c y takes on m u l t i p l e guises and i s viewed d i f f e r e n t l y at many p o i n t s of a complex system" (1975:238). This suggests that on the one hand he views p o l i c y as a p r e s c r i p t i v e mandate, but, on the other, p e r c e i v e s p o l i c y as t a k i n g form only when i t i s i n t e r p r e t e d . Wildavsky could be c l a s s i f y i n g p o l i c y i n e i t h e r of these forms when he dec l a r e s : " P o l i c y i s a process as well as a product. I t i s used to r e f e r t o a process of decision-making and a l s o t o r e f e r t o the product of that process" (1979:387). Jennings c h a r a c t e r i s e s p o l i c y as g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n t o d e c i s i o n s , g o a l s , and values and having "a f u t u r e o r i e n t a t i o n ... Cwhich] al l o w s f o r changes i n the context of decision-making" (1977:30). He goes on t o de c l a r e that p o l i c i e s need not be e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d . Sometimes these Mays of doing may be found f i x e d i n t r a d i t i o n s or conventions, because they have been p e r p e t u a t e d w i t h o u t c r i t i c a l r e e x a m i n a t i o n or t e s t i n g . Yet they have the effect and f o r c e of p o l i c y (1977:32). Pol icy_Includ:Lng_Ime Easton i n c o r p o r a t e s the process and product concept when he w r i t e s : The essence of a policy lies in the fact that through i t certain things are denied to some people and Bade accessible to others. A policy, in other words, whether for a society, for a narrow association, or for any other group, consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocates value. A decision alone i s of course not a policy ... (1967:129-130). However, Harman reminds h i s readers t h a t p o l i c y i s r e l a t e d t o a c t i o n , but i n doing so i m p l i e s that p o l i c y i s only r e a l i s e d when implemented. Policy can be viewed basically as a course of action or inaction toward the accomplishment of some intended or desired end. It embraces both what i s actually intended and what occurs as a result of the intention (1980:56). For Lindblom "most, perhaps a l l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t s make or change p o l i c y i n the process of t r y i n g t o implement i t " (1980:64). Table One provides an overview of w r i t e r s who f e a t u r e the implementation phase as prominent i n the p o l i c y process. Syntheses P o l i c y i s used t o mean both an a u t h o r i t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n of resources t o i n f l u e n c e f u t u r e decision-making, which may or may not be r e a l i s e d as 'intended', or i t may mean the a c t s of i n t e r p r e t i v e behaviour by members of a system i n response t o a given statement of ' i n t e n t ' . This conversion process i s viewed by d i f f e r e n t s c h o l a r s i n a v a r i e t y of ways. To Hargrove (1975) i t i s 'the missing l i n k ' , t o Bardach (1977) i t i s 'the implementation game', and t o Dunsire (1978) 'the implementation gap'. Discrepancy between i n t e n t and outcome can occur at any stage of the p o l i c y process, but apparently occurs most f r e q u e n t l y during implementation. TABLE 1 IMPLEMENTATION AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE POLICY PROCESS A c o l l a t i o n o-f va r i o u s authors' c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n s o-f the implementation element i n the p o l i c y process JENNINGS (1977) I n i t i a t i o n Refemulation of Opinion Emergence of Alternatives Discussion and Debate Legitimisation Implementation HARK AH (i960) Issue Emergence & Problem I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Development and Authorisation Implementation Evaluation Termination BARRETT ft FUDGE (1981) Environmental Demands and Needs Policy Decisions Organisation Mediation Execution HAKAHURA ft SHALLU000 (1980) Formation Implementation Evaluation ST JOHN (1981) Plan to Plan Assessment Po l i c y Formulation Implementation Evaluation & Review BREHER ft deLEOK (1983) I n i t i a t i o n Estimation Selection Implementation Evaluation Termination Easton (1967), Kogan (1975), Jennings (1977) and Downey (1984) tend t o support the concept t h a t the p o l i c y i s complete when the statement i s i s s u e d , whereas w r i t e r s such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Harman (1980), B a r r e t t and Fudge (1981), and Brewer and deLeon (1983) encompass the important i n t e r p r e t i v e phase, known as implementation. The implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions ...[which] examines those factors that contribute to the realization or nonrealization of policy objectives (Van Meter & Van Horn,1975:448). In order t o understand the outcomes o-f p o l i c y implementation, i t i s assumed t h a t phase i s an i n t e g r a l part of the p o l i c y process, which cannot be evaluated i n i t s e n t i r e t y as a p o l i c y u n t i l the implementation phase i s complete. Jennings (1980) and Housego (1986) c l e a r l y demonstrate how p o l i c i e s t o r e d i s t r i b u t e governance a u t h o r i t y are not always implemented as intended. The study of the p o l i c y process f a i l s t o i n c l u d e the m u l t i p l i c i t y of v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g the p o l i t i c a l dynamics, unless the implementation process i s i n c l u d e d . Dunsire supports t h i s p o i n t - of-view when he w r i t e s " e v a l u a t i o n of p o l i c i e s w i l l go a s t r a y i f they assume t h a t the e f f e c t s they measure are a f u n c t i o n of the p o l i c i e s decided r a t h e r than of the policies-as-implemented" (1978:18). I n s t i t u t i o n s engage humans, who introduce a degree of v a r i e t y and i n t e r n a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t i s not evident i n a mechanical system. I t i s impossible t o understand p o l i c y implementation without c o n s i d e r i n g the formal and informal nature of p o l i t i c s w i t h i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n , and how i t i s perceived by a c t o r s . A d m i n i s t r a t o r s d e f i n e t h e i r own view-point which serves as r e a l i t y i n guiding t h e i r a c t i o n s . A l l are governed by v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , and customs th a t are not e a s i l y d i s c e r n i b l e , but may develop s t r u c t u r e , -functions and communication networks t h a t are not c o n s i s t e n t with the -formal o r g a n i s a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s , that matter the Government's i n t e n t i o n s , f o r example, system governance p o l i c i e s . Implementation consists of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given policy, assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to subunits consistent with these objectives, monitoring system performance, and making internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization's goals. The process i s dynamic, not static; the environment continually imposes new demands that require internal adjustments. But implementation is always goal-directed and value-maximizing (Elmore, 1978: 191) . There i s agreement among the m a j o r i t y of p o l i c y a n a l y s t s that implementation i s an i n t e g r a l but t h e o r e t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t element of the p o l i c y process. However, there i s a great deal of debate as t o where the boundaries of these segments l i e . Indeed, many of the phenomena explored f o r the implementation element can be and are e q u a l l y w e l l i d e n t i f i e d i n other phases of the p o l i c y process. In f a c t Nakamura and Smallwood d e c l a r e : "In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , p o l i c y e v a l u a t i o n [which i s t h e i r t h i r d p o l i c y phaseD i s subject t o many of the same p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e s and c o n s t r a i n t s as the f i r s t two p o l i c y environments [Formulation & Implementation]" (1980:83). Bardach a l s o says of h i s own model, " t h i s o v e r a l l conception of the 'implementation process' does not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the conception found i n previous s c h o l a r l y l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t " (1977:37). Again Van Meter and Van Horn recognise t h a t " i n most re s p e c t s t h i s framework d i f f e r s l i t t l e from other adaptions of p o l i t i c a l systems models f i r s t introduced by Easton" (1975:446), i d e n t i f y i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between p o l i c y and performance as the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e . Such admissions o f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n the or f o r c o l l e g e development o-f a s u i t a b l e conceptual -framework f o r t h i s research i n t o perceived implementation e f f e c t s . 6_DEyELQPMENT_QF_THE_M The b a s i c conceptions of Easton's <1965B> framework i n c l u d e i n t r a - s o c i e t a l and e x t r a - s o c i e t a l i n p u t s t o the system from the t o t a l environment, i n the form of supports and demands. With respect t o these phenomena, i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n i s given t o the establishment of p r e c i s e boundaries. Nevertheless the a n a l y s i s of the conversion of i n p u t s , with a view t o t h e i r being included or r e j e c t e d and r e c e i v i n g an a u t h o r i t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n i n the form of an output from the p o l i t i c a l system, i s a c l e a r and u s e f u l arrangement f o r examining p o l i c y implementation, even though t h i s i s not the apparent i n t e n t i o n of the model. The model's ' s c i e n t i f i c ' base i s v a l u a b l e i n some areas of r e s e a r c h , but tends t o l o s e the a b i l i t y t o cope with some of the human elements w i t h i n a system, such as probing the reasons why power i s unequally d i s t r i b u t e d . B u r r e l l and Morgan make the point that systems theory c l e a r l y "encompasses a whole range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s " <1982s59>, and as s e r t t h a t the open systems approach does not carry with i t the implication that any one particular kind of analogy is appropriate for studying a l l systems, since i t i s possible to discern different types of open systems in practice <1982s59>. Because the systems model i s so d i v e r s e , and perhaps because of i t s s u c c e s s f u l adoption by so many s c h o l a r s , much c r i t i c i s m has accompanied i t s use. There are a number of problems a s s o c i a t e d with the adoption of Easton's (1965B) p o l i t i c a l systems model. Ham and H i l l r e p o r t : i t would be wrong to accept Easton's conceptualisation of the poli t i c a l system as an accurate description of the way systems work in practice. While Easton's identification of processes is valuable, the neat, logical ordering of those processes in terms of demand i n i t i a t i o n , through the conversion process to outputs, rarely occurs so simply in the practical world of policy-making (1984:15). In the absence o-f experimental research, where human beings are forced t o adopt c e r t a i n behaviour, researchers must develop methods of i s o l a t i n g s u i t a b l e e x i s t i n g behaviour v a r i a b l e s f o r a n a l y s i s . The l i n e a r approach, r e f i n e d by Easton and o t h e r s , appears t o provide a w e l l t e s t e d framework through which much can be learned. Each model i n c l u d e s some inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s , e i t h e r i n the b a s i c assumptions on which the model i s b u i l t , or w i t h i n the model i t s e l f . T h i s s e c t i o n i d e n t i f i e s some of these weaknesses under the sub-headings of Easton's (1965B) conceptual elements, and where p o s s i b l e addresses them i n terms of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r research problem. The_Enyironment The environment according t o Easton c o n t a i n s "those aspects of a s o c i e t y t h a t f a l l o u t s i d e the boundaries of the p o l i t i c a l system" (1965A:70). His p o l i t i c a l systems theory c o n c e p t u a l i s e s "the idea of a system embedded i n an environment and subject t o i n f l u e n c e s from i t t h a t threaten t o d r i v e the e s s e n t i a l v a r i a b l e s of the system beyond t h e i r c r i t i c a l range" (1965B:33). Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), and Bardach (1977) extend t h a t concept f o r the implementation phase of a p o l i c y by c a l l i n g on a n a l y s t s t o i d e n t i f y a d i f f e r e n t environment f o r p o l i c y implementation from th a t of p o l i c y formation. From these views of the implementation environment, Van Meter and Van Horn c i t e strong support -for examining "the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s " (1975:471). These elements are o-f p a r t i c u l a r value t o t h i s study because of the pressure on the c o l l e g e system exerted by formula funding,2 c o l l e c t i v e agreements, and the changing r o l e of c o l l e g e s , which i s pointed out by Dennison and Gallagher: "community c o l l e g e s must be as dynamic as the s o c i e t y they serve ... A l l the i s s u e s c a l l f o r f r e s h v i s i o n , a n t i c i p a t i o n , and change" (1986:140). Besides the i n f l u e n c e s exerted through the passage of time, the implementor has the added c o n s t r a i n t of the p o l i c y statement. Thus the environment i s not the same f o r the p o l i c y implementor as i t was fo r the p o l i c y f ormulator, even i n the same p o l i c y process. The_lnp.uts Scholars of p o l i c y implementation have shown tha t Easton's conceptual input must be examined through many design v a r i a b l e s . Recent a n a l y s t s expose important l i n k s between the design of the p o l i c y statement and the implementation process, a t h e o r e t i c a l l i n k t h a t "pointCs3 t o a chain of causation between i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s and f u t u r e consequences" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979:xxi). These s c h o l a r s a s s e r t "the p o s s i b i l i t y of a mismatch between means and ends [which3 c a l l s i n t o question the adequacy of the o r i g i n a l p o l i c y design" ( 1 9 7 9 : x x i i i ) . "The great problem, as we understand i t , i s t o make the d i f f i c u l t i e s of implement- a t i o n a part of the i n i t i a l f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y " (1979:143). They i d e n t i f y the lack of knowledge as an important c o n d i t i o n l i n k i n g p o l i c y i n p u t s with implementation outcomes, and emphasise the importance of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of implementation with design. Their "model p r e s c r i b e s c l e a r l y s t a t e d g o a l s , d e t a i l e d p l a n s , t i g h t c o n t r o l s ... i n c e n t i v e s and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n " (1979:179). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) set out t o develop a conceptual model i n which the 'determinants' and the 'consequences' o-f p o l i c y could be i d e n t i f i e d and examined through the important implementation phase. Their conceptual framework i s expressed through s i x fundamental elements. (1) an environment that both stimulates government o f f i c i a l s and receives the products of their work; (2) demands and resources that carry stimuli from the environment to policy makers; (3) a conversions process, including the formal structures and procedures of government, that transforms (converts) demands and resources into public policies; (4) the policies that represent the formal goals, intentions, or statements of government o f f i c i a l s ; (5) the performance of the policy as i t i s actually delivered to clients; and (6) the feedback of policies and performances to the environment, which i s transmitted back to the conversions process as demands and resources of a later point in time (1975:446). In respect t o i n p u t , they i d e n t i f i e d "two d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : the amount of change i n v o l v e d and the extent t o which there i s goal consensus among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the implementation process" (1975:458). Hargrove l i s t s a s e r i e s of questions t o be asked during the p o l i c y input phase, and suggests "a f a i l u r e t o ask them and develop s a t i s f a c t o r y answers could condemn p o l i c i e s from the beginning, f o r a l t e r n a t i v e s i n v o l v e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of implementation f e a s i b i l i t y " (1975:23). These questions have t o do with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o n s u l t a t i o n , degree of t h r e a t , p r o f e s s i o n a l c a p a c i t y , degree of change, the p r o v i s i o n of resources and u n c e r t a i n t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as perceived by the 40 implementors. He b r i n g s i n t o sharp r e l i e f the importance o-f p o l i c y designs t a k i n g cognisance of the implementation phase. "The p o l i c y development a n a l y t i c r o l e should contain an implementation p e r s p e c t i v e because a concern f o r execution should be part of every new p o l i c y i d e a " (1975:16). Weatherley and Lipsky i d e n t i f y " c o n f l i c t i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c requirements" (1977:185), as an important flaw i n p o l i c y i n p u t . This was p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i f the p o l i c y d i d not have an adequate p r o v i s i o n of resources incorporated (1977:193). Bardach takes the concept of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s between p o l i c y f ormulators and p o l i c y implementors beyond the l e v e l of bureaucracy and h i g h l i g h t s "the problems of o b s t r u c t i o n by i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s possessed of monopoly power" (1977:103), which he determines can be addressed i n the design of the p o l i c y statement. He a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h a t the impersonal nature of problems a s s o c i a t e d with implementation should be addressed at the design stage. " S o c i a l entropy throws up three main problems t o plague government programs: the problem of incompetence, the problem of v a r i a b i l i t y i n the o b j e c t s of c o n t r o l , and the problem of c o o r d i n a t i o n " (1977:125). Elmore, when developing four d i f f e r e n t ' i d e a l ' models according t o which implementation can be analysed, h i g h l i g h t s the most s i g n i f i c a n t l i n k between p o l i c y input and execution by means of the * systems management' model. Implementation consists of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately r e f l e c t the intent of a given p o l i c y , assigning r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and standards of performance to subunits consistent with these objectives, monitoring system performance, 41 and (Baking internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization's goals (1978:191). Conversely, i n h i s " C o n f l i c t and Barga i n i n g ' model he suggests the design of p o l i c y statements i n c o r p o r a t e "the preferences and resources of p a r t i c i p a n t s " (1978:218) i n order t o ensure e f f e c t i v e implementation. St. John a l e r t s readers t o the need t o consider the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the subsystems, l a b e l l e d micro s t r u c t u r e s by many authors, i n the design of p o l i c y . If new services are being introduced in a system of institutions at a state or national level i t i s important to assess the capacity of the institutions when designing a strategy (1981:54). Such s t u d i e s have l e d Brewer and deLeon t o support the i n c l u s i o n of d e l i b e r a t e i n c e n t i v e s t o implementors when designing p o l i c y (1983:273). L e g i s l a t i o n i s often used t o communicate p o l i c y , and whatever form i t t a k e s , places a degree of c o n s t r a i n t on implementors t h a t i s not exerted on p o l i c y f ormulators. When p o l i c y i s expressed through l e g i s l a t i o n , i t provides a l e g i t i m a t e statement of a u t h o r i t y and s e t s c e r t a i n parameters which need t o be recognised during i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Such a mandate, i f c a r e f u l l y planned with e f f e c t i v e implementation i n mind, b u i l d s c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a i n t o a p o l i c y t h a t narrow the scope of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . But Bardach recognises there are perhaps other more u s e f u l ways of proclaiming p o l i c y than through l e g i s l a t i o n . "Other t h i n g s equal, p o l i c y designers should p r e f e r t o operate through manipulating p r i c e s and markets r a t h e r than through w r i t i n g and e n f o r c i n g r e g u l a t i o n s " (1977:253), because "policymakers u s u a l l y do not implement p o l i c y themselves ... [ r a t h e r ] r e l y on another set of a c t o r s ... t o a c t u a l l y c a r r y out the p o l i c i e s they p r e s c r i b e " (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:32). "While c l a r i t y does not ensure f a i t h f u l compliance, i t i s a necessary step toward e f f e c t i v e implementation" (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:33). Weatherley and Lipsky noted i n t h e i r e x t ensive research program th a t "the r e g u l a t i o n s s t i p u l a t e d what needs t o be done but provided no b l u e p r i n t f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g the process" (1977:180). Brewer and deLeon a l s o suggested t h a t "The a u t h o r i z a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t i n the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of r e q u i s i t e resources t o c a r r y out the assigned t a s k s ; i t f r e q u e n t l y does not" (1983:262). Holt a l s o a l e r t s us t o the problems of expressing p o l i c y statements through l e g i s l a t i o n . It i s notoriously d i f f i c u l t to get the checks and balances right in participatory schemes that carry legislative force. Apathy might reinforce a hierarchy, or open the door to the cabals of po l i t i c a l activists (1980:108). The_Prgce__e_ The process used by Easton between inputs and outputs r e q u i r e s a t t e n t i o n t o communication l i n k a g e s between formulators and implementors when examining the e f f e c t s of implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky i n t h e i r seminal work on Imjglemjjntatign a l e r t p o l i c y a n a l y s t s t o the f a c t t h a t p o l i c y f a i l u r e i s not always caused by "dramatic elements Csuch as] great c o n f l i c t ... Cor those] of p o l i t i c a l importance" ( 1 9 7 9 : x v i i i ) , or even l a c k of e s s e n t i a l resources, but as was shown i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r case study, i t was the " p e r f e c t l y o r d i n a r y circumstances [ t h a t ] present s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s t o implementation" ( 1 9 7 9 : x v i i i > . Elmore r e p o r t s the e f f e c t s of o f f i c i a l documents i n the implementation process thus: An agency sight, for example, put a great deal of effort into developing an elaborate collection of rules and regulations or an elegant system of management controls, knowing f u l l well that i t doesn't have the resources to make them binding on other actors. But the expectation that the rules might be enforced i s sufficient to influence the behaviour of other actors <1978:220-221). Brewer and deLeon observe: Too many projects have foundered because implementation was not distinguished from the earlier steps in the total process, thus making i t almost impossible to translate a policy into i t s component, operational programs with any fi d e l i t y (1983:254). Other f a c t o r s concern the p r o v i s i o n of resources, human and f i n a n c i a l , and the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s i n which the p o l i c i e s are i n i t i a t e d . Pressman and Wildavsky a l e r t t h e i r readers t o the importance i n the p o l i c y process of implementation when they d e c l a r e t h a t "the emphasis i s not on what implementation does t o programs but on what the f o r c e s t h a t produce p o l i c y do t o implementation" ( 1 9 7 9 : x i i ) . P o l i c y i s s u e s t h a t have a f f e c t e d implementation a l s o i n c l u d e c l a r i t y and communication, acceptance of goals by implementors, motivation and e v a l u a t i o n c r i t e r i a , "the amount of change i n v o l v e d " , and the extent t o which p a r t i c i p a n t s are committed t o the new p o l i c y (Van Meter & Van Horn,1975:458). Nakamura and Smallwood's (1980) t r i p a r t i t e model of the p o l i c y process, based on f u n c t i o n a l l y o r i e n t e d environments, provides a us e f u l framework i n which t o analyse the implementation sec t o r p a r t i c u l a r l y with t h e i r development of the l i n k a g e s between the environments. Pressman and Wildavsky make the point that "implementers must know what they are supposed t o do i n order t o be e f f e c t i v e " (1979:179), so p o l i c y statements must be e f f e c t i v e l y communicated. 44 F a c t o r s such as ambiguity i n the p o l i c y statement may w e l l r e s u l t i n compromise i n the process of p o l i c y implementation. Berman, f o r example, suggests some f a c t o r s t h a t cause discrepancy between p o l i c y i n t e n t and execution. "Ambiguity i s r e f l e c t e d by m u l t i p l e g o a l s , o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g , and i n the lack of s p e c i f i c i t y about means" (1978:168). He goes on t o d e c l a r e " i t seems obvious that the more ambiguous the i n t e n t of a p o l i c y , the more l a t i t u d e the a d m i n i s t e r i n g agency has i n d e f i n i n g a government program" (1978:168). " P o l i c y vagueness can grow out of the i n a b i l i t y of p o l i c y makers t o agree on the problem they are s o l v i n g " (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:37). Weatherley and L i p s k y observed t h a t "a law and i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s , intended t o produce uniform a p p l i c a t i o n of procedures, i n s t e a d y i e l d e d wide v a r i a t i o n s i n a p p l i c a t i o n " (1977:188). Time i s another c r i t i c a l element of p o l i c y communication. As Bardach p o i n t s out, implementation takes a long time, much longer than most of the program sponsors had hoped i t would take and longer even than the law's hypothetical 'reasonable man' might have expected (1977:180). The t i m i n g of the i n f o r m a t i o n flow has s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s or otherwise of p o l i c y implementation. Such 'gatekeeping' can a f f e c t the flow v e r t i c a l l y and h o r i z o n t a l l y w i t h i n a p o l i t i c a l system and can i n c l u d e not only the i n i t i a l p o l i c y statement and i t s subsequent i n t e r p r a t i v e d i r e c t i v e s , but a l s o the flow of i n f o r m a t i o n feedback loops (Easton,1965B and Dunsire,1978). B a r r e t t and Fudge draw a t t e n t i o n t o the importance of time i n both the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and p o l i c y implementation process. (1981:175). 45 The Outcomes Government, whether national, regional or local, appears to be adept at making statements of intention, but what happens on the ground often falls a long way short of the original aspirations. Government either seems unable to put its policy into effect as intended, or finds that its interventions and actions have unexpected or counter-productive outcomes which create new problems (Barrett & Fudge,1981s4). People respond to p o l i c i e s on the basis of how they perceive the p o l i c y statement aligns with t h e i r own personal needs and values. The implementation process is necessarily one of consensus- building and accommodation between policy-makers and implesenters. The central problem of implementation is not whether implementers conform to prescribed policy but whether the implementation process results in consensus in goals, individual autonomy, and commitment to policy on the part of those who must carry it out (Elmore, 1978: 209) . When viewing implementation as part of an Organizational Development Model, Elmore describes implementation f a i l u r e not as "the r e s u l t of poor management control or the persistence of bureaucratic routines, but arisCing3 out of a lack of consensus and commitment among implementers" (1978:213). Even i f p o l i c y were well designed, meticulously enunciated and communicated through an organisational structure that was conducive to r e a l i s i n g the policy i n i t i a t i v e , there i s s t i l l the important d i s p o s i t i o n of the influencer (Van Meter & Van Horn,1975; Mintzberg,1983). In order to assess the l i k e l y behaviour of a p o l i c y implementor, researchers need to establish t h e i r perceptions. Barrett and Fudge report on "three aspects CthatJ seem of p a r t i c u l a r relevance. 1. perceptions of the scope for action; 2. perceptions of the need for action; 3. motivation to act" (1981:28). 46 The experience each implementor brings to an organisation, together with the values, ethics and attitudes he or she holds in that organisation, combine to create a base -for perceiving any given p o l i c y . Perceptions are also influenced by the organisational structure, peers, professional bodies and commitment. "In spi t e of empirical evidence that a process operates i n a certain way, people can nevertheless p e r s i s t i n the be l i e f that i t ought to operate in another way" (Elmore, 1978:227). This misapplication may be caused by many variables. Van Meter and Van Horn draw on the work of Kaufman (1971) to id e n t i f y some of these. Goals and objectives may be rejected for numerous reasons: they offend implementors' personal values or extraorganizational loyalties; they violate implementors' sense of self interest; or they alter features of the organization and its procedures that implementors desire to maintain (1975:482). Mintzberg captures some of these points and re l a t e s them to the exercise of power of implementors' perceptions when he observes: To understand the behaviour of the organization, i t is necessary to understand which influencers are present, what needs each seeks to f u l f i l l in the organization, and how each is able to exercise power to f u l f i l l them (1983:22). Brewer and deLeon add to the concept of individual perceptions by drawing attention to "subtle factorCs] ... [such asD the degree of int e r e s t of the o r i g i n a l decision maker" (1983:269). They go on to report that "the incentive problem becomes acute when an agency i s ordered to carry out a program that i t considers outside i t s primary r o l e " (1983:272). Most p o l i c y analysts have tended to equate policy formation decisions with action. In other words, these "decisions are seen as the outputs of the p o l i c y process, the assumption being that 47 once made they w i l l be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a c t i o n " ( B a r r e t t & Fudge, 1981:8-9). As Dror noted " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s are the most important element i n p u b l i c policymaking" (1968:64). An a n a l y s i s of B a l d r i d g e ' s p o l i t i c a l / p o w e r model r e v e a l s t h a t four f i f t h s concentrates on the formation of p o l i c y (1971:Figure 2.2:22), whereas the execution or implementation element only occasion one f i f t h of the a n a l y t i c a l framework. He openly d e c l a r e s t h a t h i s model "focuses on p o l i c y - f o r m i n g processes, because major p o l i c i e s commit an o r g a n i z a t i o n t o d e f i n i t e goals and set the s t r a t e g i e s f o r reaching those g o a l s " ( B a l d r i d g e , et al,1977:10). Such statements g i v e i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and the l i k e l y divergence i n behaviour of those implementing the p o l i c i e s . The e x e r c i s e of divergent behaviour was c e r t a i n l y evidenced i n the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y i n the c o l l e g e system of B.C. Indeed Hoi1ick-Kenyon observed: the description of the origins of the colleges ... describes the po l i t i c a l efforts of grass roots movements to get colleges started. This process, in turn, resulted in a strong bias towards local community control of the institution, once i t was in operation. This commitment i s reflected today in the resistance that is evident in British Columbia to centralize the control of the community colleges on a province-wide basis (1979:111-112). IHE_PQLIIICS_gF_I Hargrove observes t h a t p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have served the implementation concept w e l l by developing the p o l i t i c a l aspects of the process. They begin with a policy as i t was i n i t i a l l y shaped by the politics of reaching agreement and then chart the continuing politics of program administration in which politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and publics vie for control over the direction of the program. Their conception is the broadest of 48 a l l current usages because i t excludes nothing that is relevant to understanding what happens (1975:3). "The implementation environment i s c h a r a t e r i z e d by a high degree of d i v e r s i t y , f l u i d i t y , and complexity i n terms of a c t o r s , arenas, b u r e a u c r a t i c i m p e r a t i v e s , l i n k a g e s , and compliance mechanisms" (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:65). Bardach adds, implementation politics i s , I believe, a special kind of politi c s . It is a form of poli t i c s in which the very existence of an already defined mandate, legally and legitimately author- ized in some prior process, affects the strategy and tactics of the struggle (1977:37) . Implementors have been shown t o face the task of attempting t o coordinate and o r c h e s t r a t e many v a r i a b l e s when c a r r y i n g out p o l i c y d i r e c t i v e s t h a t can of themselves be ambiguous and d i f f u s e . Their problems are exacerbated by the need t o r e c o n c i l e implementation r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s with i n t e r n a l norms w i t h i n a wide v a r i e t y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g s . I t can be concluded t h a t there i s a v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s at work i n both the form u l a t i o n and implementation phases of the p o l i c y process. As a result, there appear to be many situations in which implementers possess a considerable degree of independent discretion and authority to exercise their own po l i t i c a l judgements in order to influence and shape the policy process (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:111). Indeed the e x e r c i s i n g of p o l i t i c s i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system i s seen as an ongoing process that changes almost continuously. Hargrove a l e r t s h i s readers t o the c e r t a i n t y of the presence of the p o l i t i c a l process i n implementation, and t o the u n c e r t a i n t y of the p r o p e r t i e s of th a t process (1975:69). He agrees t h a t i t i s s i m i l a r t o the behaviour experienced i n p o l i c y formation, but 49 d i f f e r e n t because i t cannot ignore the e f f e c t of that s e c t o r (1975:70). As there i s d i f f i c u l t y i n i d e n t i f y i n g p o l i c y implementation from the for m u l a t i o n phase, so i t i s a l s o d i f f i c u l t t o separate the p o l i t i c s of the two elements. E s s e n t i a l l y implementation i s the next phase i n the p o l i c y process i n which the fo r m u l a t i o n element has d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e , o f t e n with the support of l e g i s l a t i o n . Truman (1951) and Kogan (1975) developed t h e o r i e s based on the i n f l u e n c e of i n t e r e s t groups, and t o some extent B a l d r i d g e ' s (1971) power p o l i t i c a l model employs the same method. Nevertheless, Bardach makes one of the important d i s t i n c t i o n s between the p o l i c y formation and implementation s e c t o r s when he r e v e a l s the l i m i t e d extent t o which i n t e r e s t groups i n f l u e n c e implementation. "Since t h e r e i s con s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n among a c t o r s with respect t o how they view t h e i r p o s s i b l e l o s s e s , c o a l i t i o n s do not r e a d i l y emerge" (1977:42). He makes another important observation by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between "implementation p o l i t i c s ' and "adoption p o l i t i e s ' , which he perceives as emerging more on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s than i n the formation of c o a l i t i o n s (1977:42-43). Each of the p o l i c y d e f i n i t i o n s and research p r o j e c t s on implementation c i t e d e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e the concept of p o l i t i c s , which can be broadly or narrowly defined. Within the context of a p o l i t i c a l system, an o r g a n i s a t i o n could be termed p o l i t i c a l when i t demonstrates "any p e r s i s t e n t p a t t e r n of human r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t i n v o l v e s , t o a s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t , c o n t r o l , i n f l u e n c e , power or a u t h o r i t y " (Dahl,1976:3) . But 5 0 Easton l i n k s the system and the behaviour o-f the persons. A p o l i t i c a l system, therefore, w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d as a set of i n t e r a c t i o n s , abstracted from the t o t a l i t y of s o c i a l behaviour, through which values are a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y allocated for a society. Persons who are in the process of engaging in such i n t e r a c t i o n s , that i s , who are acting in p o l i t i c a l r o l e s , w i l l be referred to g e n e r i c a l l y as the members of the system (1965A:57). This i s a v a l u a b l e guide when a n a l y s i n g the behaviour of governance p o l i c y implementors. A l l those engaged i n the r e l a t e d decision-making can be i d e n t i f i e d as members of the p o l i t i c a l system. The p o w e r / p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s as w e l l as c o a l i t i o n s are important f a c t o r s i n the p o l i c y implementation process. Elmore argues t h a t the c o n f l i c t bargaining model "permits us t o make conceptual sense of the implementation process" <1978:220) , without having t o be unduly i n f l u e n c e d by the formal h i e r a r c h y and "without a s s e r t i n g that everyone's behaviour i s governed by a p r e d i c t a b l e set of b u r e a u c r a t i c r o u t i n e s " (1978 : 2 2 0 ) . IQWARDS_A_CQNCEPIUAL Students of p o l i c y implementation have demonstrated that c e r t a i n f a c t o r s are important t o implementors. They have described how those v a r i a b l e s can be incorporated i n new p o l i c y s e t t i n g s or used i n determining the e f f e c t s of declared p o l i c i e s . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n i n t h i s work w i l l develop a conceptual framework using such v a r i a b l e s i n order t o provide a b a s i s on which t o pursue t h i s study. 51 Elmore suggests that "the evidence favours [ n e i t h e r ] one model [ n l o r another" (1978:226), and Berman observes "although these areas of agreement do not yet c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l y a r t i c u l a t e d framework, l e t alone a theory" (1978:159), the value of adapting s u i t a b l e e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s f o r the p o l i c y process could provide a base on which t o analyse the perceived implementation e f f e c t s . Mintzberg observes " t h e o r i e s are usefu l because they s h o r t c u t the need t o s t o r e masses of data. One need not remember a l l the d e t a i l s one has learned about a phenomenon. Instead one s t o r e s a theory, an a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t e x p l a i n s many of them" (1983:x). Implementation i s concerned with the p o l i t i c a l process of successive refinement and conversion of p o l i c y statements i n t o p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i v e s , procedures, t a s k s , s t r a t e g i e s , and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n s . Such procedure i s forming the input f o r subsequent p o l i c y changes. This refinement, conversion and n e g o t i a t i o n a l l i n v o l v e the e x e r c i s e of p o l i t i c s , and suggest a us e f u l a s s o c i a t i o n with the l i n e a r nature of the systems model, and v e r i f i c a t i o n of those t h e o r i e s which a s s i s t i n the a n a l y s i s of behaviour. The concern of t h i s research i s the a n a l y s i s of how t h i s process i s perceived by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . But i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i c y implementation the perceptions of any one person, or one body, should not be viewed as being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r every major d e c i s i o n w i t h i n the system, f o r i t i s f a r more l i k e l y t o i n v o l v e numerous i n d i v i d u a l s than c o a l i t i o n s (Bardach,1977:42), nor should the process be viewed as s t a t i c . Hamblin i n h i s review of the l i t e r a t u r e observes "on the behavioural s i d e , [of p o l i c y ] many s c h o l a r s work with d e r i v a t i o n s of a model which was developed by Easton" (1984:14). Easton's (1965B) p o l i t i c a l systems model has some p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o make i n an a l y s i n g t h i s research problem, but i t s l i m i t a t i o n s are too strong t o ignore. The present w r i t e r there-fore proposes t o develop a s u i t a b l e conceptual -framework based on Easton's model, but modified t o provide the research with a s u i t a b l e base on which t o i n c l u d e more p r o v i s i o n f o r the v a r i a b l e s which other researchers have determined as important t o p o l i c y implementation outcomes. This framework a c t s as a guide t o the gathering of data, i n c l u d i n g the c o n s t r u c t i o n of i n t e r v i e w s , as well as a base on which t o r e p o r t the f i n d i n g s of the research. Yin observes that i n order t o allo w research f i n d i n g s t o be compared with previous work "key d e f i n i t i o n s should not be i d i o s y n c r a t i c . Rather each ... u n i t of a n a l y s i s e i t h e r should be s i m i l a r t o those p r e v i o u s l y s t u d i e d by others or should d e v i a t e i n c l e a r , o p e r a t i o n a l l y defined ways" (1985:33). For these reasons i t i s considered wise t o co n s t r u c t the conceptual framework from t h i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l systems model. Table Two c o l l a t e s those v a r i a b l e s derived from t h i s review which are assumed t o c o n t r i b u t e t o the examination of p o l i c y implementation outcomes. This study r e q u i r e s the i n c l u s i o n of the p o l i c y a r c h i t e c t s or formulators w i t h i n the same boundary as implementors, f o r they not only c o n t r i b u t e t o the design, communication and enunc i a t i o n of the p o l i c y , but a l s o t o i t s implementation. The model i s based on the premise t h a t the system i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from i t s environment, which i n a complex p o l i t i c a l system i s p o s s i b l e only i n theory. The important aspects of p o l i c y design, communication, and e n u n c i a t i o n , which are e s s e n t i a l l y "the degree t o which p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s are tra n s m i t t e d t o implementors c l e a r l y , a c c u r a t e l y , c o n s i s t e n t l y , and i n a t i m e l y manner" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:478), are recognised by a l l authors c i t e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e review. These aspects of implementation can be considered 'inputs' i n Easton's terms, having already passed through the systems c y c l e at l e a s t once p r e v i o u s l y i n the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n stage. When the key i s s u e s of tha t input are i d e n t i f i e d , they can be fol l o w e d through v a r i o u s processing and conversion p o i n t s w i t h i n Easton's (1965B) conceptual model, t o provide f o r observation of outputs and outcomes of the p o l i t i c a l system. TABLE 2 COLLATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WHEN POLICY OUTCOMES ARE THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES IMPLEMENTATION POLICY INPUT IMPLEMENTATION IMPLEMENTATION ENVIRONMENT & DESIGN PROCESS OUTCOMES Economic Social Incentives/ C l a r i t y of Incentives/ P o l i t i c a l State Sanctions Statement Sanctions Policy Change/Threat Time Understanding Statement Complexity Consultation Consultation Influences Ambiguity Ambiguity Commitment Resources Imperfect Knowledge 54 In order t o c o l l a t e these important v a r i a b l e s w i t h i n a framework that i s both accepted and understood i n the r e l a t e d d i s c i p l i n e s , F igure Four i s developed from Easton's <1965B) p o l i t i c a l systems model, with the conceptual m o d i f i c a t i o n s o u t l i n e d above. This research i s not designed t o prove or disprove a theory, nor t o develop grounded theory, but i s advanced i n the knowledge of e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s which provide a base on which both t o design i n t e r v i e w s and proceed with the a n a l y s i s and d e s c r i p t i o n of the case. The environment i s seen as not only an important conceptual t o o l by Easton f o r a p o l i t i c a l system, but by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Berman (1978), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), and Brewer and deLeon (1983) as a v i t a l element of the implementation process. The important v a r i a b l e s are described as the economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l s t a t e s of the s o c i e t y , with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the f a c t t h a t such s t a t e s change over time, and are fundamentally d i f f e r e n t f o r p o l i c y f o rmulators and p o l i c y implementors. In the case of researching p o l i c y implementation e f f e c t s , s c h o l a r s have suggested t h a t i n p u t s should c o n s i s t not only of documented i n t e n t i o n s , but perceived i n t e n t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as these r e l a t e t o those i n v o l v e d i n the implementation process. Other important v a r i a b l e s of system input f o r implementors are the a l l o c a t i o n of resources, and the e x p l i c i t n e s s with which r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are delegated. 55 FIGURE 4 A SCHEMA OF THEORIES TO ASSIST IN THE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION E N V I R O N M E N T E N V I R O N M E N T \ / * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I N P U T * (POLICY INTENT) * * I nENTIFIED_VARIABLES * Documented I n t e n t i o n s * Perceived I n t e n t i o n s * Delegation o-f R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s * A l l o c a t i o n of Resources * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * F L O W O F E F F E C T S * (COMMUNICATION LINKAGES) * * IDENTIFIED_VARIABLES * Degree of Change or Threat Perceived * C l a r i t y of Purpose and Goals * Degree of Ambiguity * Designed Incentives and Sanctions * Degree of C o n s u l t a t i o n with Implementors * Formulators' Knowledge * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * \ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * O U T C O M E S * (IMPLEMENTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF * UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES) * IDENTIFIED VARIABLES * Implementors'Perceptions of P o l i c y E f f e c t s * Perceived Value of Incentives/Sanctions * In f l u e n c e r s ' and I n t e r e s t Groups Response * Commitment t o P o l i c i e s * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * / \ E N V I R O N M E N T E N V I R O N M E N T 5 6 Both the systems theory and the f u r t h e r developments of t h a t theory f o r p o l i c y implementation reported i n t h i s work have st r e s s e d the v a r i o u s aspects of the flow of e f f e c t s or l i n k a g e s between p o l i c y f ormulators and p o l i c y implementors. The independent v a r i a b l e s i d e n t i f i e d as important t o implementation i n c l u d e the degree of change or t h r e a t perceived by implementors, the c l a r i t y of purpose of the p o l i c y and the degree of ambiguity i t c o n t a i n s . Whether or not the p o l i c y i n c l u d e s i n c e n t i v e s or s a n c t i o n s , and how these are perceived by implementors i n p r a c t i c e , a l s o i n f l u e n c e the e f f e c t s . Other important aspects a f f e c t i n g implementation concern the degree of c o n s u l t a t i o n t h a t took place i n the formation of the p o l i c y , and the perceived knowledge of the formulators. In t h i s case study, the outcomes are more c l o s e l y examined than the outputs, and s e v e r a l v a r i a b l e s are i d e n t i f i e d as c r u c i a l . These are predominantly contained i n the perceptions of those implementing the p o l i c y , and i n c l u d e t h e i r personal commitment t o the p o l i c y outputs and t h e i r r e l a t i v e i n t e r e s t i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l and i n t e r e s t group responses t o the p o l i c y , as w e l l as t h e i r perceptions of both rewards and s a n c t i o n s f o r compliance or non-compliance r e s p e c t i v e l y with the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s . According t o Easton, p o l i c y outcomes are the "consequences t r a c e a b l e t o CtheD a u t h o r i t a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n s " (1965B:352), or modified outputs, " i n d i r e c t consequences" (Howell & Brown, 1983:21). This research w i l l focus on those unintended a c t i v i t i e s t h a t r e s u l t from the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s , as perceived by p o l i c y implementors. I t i s the i m p o s i t i o n of a new formal decision-making s t r u c t u r e promulgated by the p r o v i n c i a l Government t h a t gives r i s e t o a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' behaviour. A l l p o l i c i e s take on m u l t i p l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n a complex o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s e t t i n g , each person w i t h i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y viewing the i s s u e s d i f f e r e n t l y . CONCLUSIONS P o l i c y implementation i s a t h e o r e t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t element, of the p o l i c y process. I t i s an i n t e g r a l part of tha t process and i s c l o s e l y i n t e r t w i n e d with other elements, i n c l u d i n g ' i n p u t s ' , 'conversion processes', 'outputs' and 'feedback loops' i n terms of systems theory. In t h i s respect the models e s t a b l i s h e d f o r p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n provide a framework on which t o b u i l d the study on implementation e f f e c t s . Indeed Bardach makes the po i n t when he a s s e r t s " i t i s widely and c o r r e c t l y r e a l i z e d t h a t the bargaining and maneuvering, the p u l l i n g and h a u l i n g , of the po l i c y - a d o p t i o n process c a r r i e s over i n t o the p o l i c y - implementation process" (1977:38). The complexity of f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g implementation makes both d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s very d i f f i c u l t . Pressman and Wildavsky s t r e s s the importance of theory i n t h i s a n a l y s i s : " p o l i c i e s imply t h e o r i e s , whether s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y or not, p o l i c i e s p o i n t t o a chain of causation between i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s and f u t u r e consequences" (1979:xxi). Furthermore, each type of p o l i c y w i l l " d i s p l a y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c processes, s t r u c t u r e s , and r e l a t i o n s h i p s among f a c t o r s that i n f l u e n c e the execution of p u b l i c p o l i c y " (Van Meter & Van Horn,1975:458). 58 The strong r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i c y f o rmulators and p o l i c y implementors has already been e s t a b l i s h e d . "While the r o l e s might d i f f e r i n name, i n p r a c t i c e they are v i r t u a l l y i n d i s t i n g - u i s h a b l e " (Brewer & deLeon, 1983s254). This a l l o w s some scope f o r the employment of a t h e o r e t i c a l model designed f o r the a n a l y s i s of the whole p o l i c y process, t o be used as a base f o r the a n a l y s i s of segments. The ' P o l i t i c a l Systems Model' developed by Easton (1965A, 1965B, & 1967) has been most commonly used f o r the whole p o l i c y process. I t o f f e r s a framework t h a t i s as p e r t i n e n t as any a l t e r n a t i v e t o e s t a b l i s h the outcomes of the implemen- t a t i o n process. This review has attempted t o expose some of the s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s of the p o l i c y process. I t has a l s o attempted t o show that t h e o r e t i c a l l y - b a s e d research can make a meaningful c o n t r i b u t i o n t o understanding behaviour i n the context of p o l i c y implementation. In order t o make such analyses w i t h i n the systems model, researchers must i d e n t i f y and describe both the boundaries of the p o l i t i c a l system, thus e s t a b l i s h i n g the environment i n which the system operates, and the members of the p o l i t i c a l system, t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n with one another and with a c t o r s e x e r t i n g i n f l u e n c e from outside the system boundaries. 5 9 N O T E S O N C H A P T E R TWO 1. H.A.Simon, (1947), A d m i n i s t r a t i ye Behaviour, noted that "The act u a l p h y s i c a l task of c a r r y i n g out an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s o b j e c t i v e s f a l l s t o the persons at the lowest l e v e l of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h i e r a r c h y . " See a l s o Kaufman's (1960) Study of the U.S.A.'s Forest S e r v i c e . 2. Formula funding was introduced a f t e r the M i n i s t e r withdrew funding a l l o c a t i o n powers from the intermediary c o u n c i l s , i n an attempt t o provide a system wide formula f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of operating funds t o the c o l l e g e s and i n s t i t u t e s . 3. See RILEY & BALDRID6E (1977), Governing Academic I n s t i t u t i o n s , Chapters 17 and 18, and MINGLE, J . , (1981), Challenges of Retrenchment, Chapter 8. 60 C H A P T E R T H R E E RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN Chapter One focussed on the elements of the sta t e d problem. Chapter Two reviewed the l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i c y implementation which enabled the development of "sharper and more i n s i g h t f u l questions about the Cproblem]" (Yin,1985:20), and provided a conceptual framework on which t o b u i l d the current research p r o j e c t . T h i s Chapter w i l l d e scribe an appropriate method of conducting the research w i t h i n the boundaries e s t a b l i s h e d i n the f i r s t two Chapters. I t w i l l develop "the l o g i c t h a t l i n k s the data t o be c o l l e c t e d (and the c o n c l u s i o n s t o be drawn) t o the i n i t i a l q uestion" (Yin,1985:27). The nature and extent of the study has been l a r g e l y determined by the researcher's a b i l i t y t o obtain and analyse a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceptions of the e f f e c t s of governance p o l i c i e s w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system of B.C. Yin c l aims t h a t f o r research i t i s p o s s i b l e t o " i d e n t i f y some s i t u a t i o n s i n which a s p e c i f i c s t r a t e g y has d i s t i n c t advantage" (1985:20). Based on a blend of the s t r a t e g i e s he o u t l i n e s i n Case Study. Research and the ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' approach of Guba and L i n c o l n (1981), a case study method was employed t o i n t e r p r e t the implementation of government p o l i c y w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system i n B.C. B a l d r i d g e (1971) employed a case study method t o analyse and develop the p o w e r / p o l i t i c a l model of i n f l u e n c e s on p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n during the student r e v o l t s at The New York U n i v e r s i t y i n the 1960's. Robert Dahl (1961) u t i l i s e d the case method i n the research reported i n h i s priz e w i n n i n g p u b l i c a t i o n Who 61 Governs? According t o Lowi (1964), the case method i s one of the most important methods of a n a l y s i n g p o l i t i c a l science. The case method was chosen because i t enabled the researcher t o observe and i d e n t i f y many of the implementation v a r i a b l e s w i t h i n the system, which c o n t r i b u t e t o perceived ' f a i t h f u l execution' or 'slippage' of the p o l i c i e s on governance. As Guba and L i n c o l n e x p l a i n , the ab i l i t y to tap into the experience of others in their own natural language, while u t i l i z i n g their value and belief frameworks, is virtually impossible without face-to-face and verbal interaction with them (1981s155). Mintzberg's advice t o researchers t o produce some p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s i n t h e i r work w i l l a l s o be heeded where p o s s i b l e . "I am f i r m l y convinced" he d e c l a r e s , "that the best route t o more e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y making i s b e t t e r knowledge i n the mind of the p r a c t i t i o n e r of the world he or she a c t u a l l y f a c es" (1983sx). Nevertheless, the methodological procedures set out i n t h i s Chapter were not construed as r e s t r i c t i v e , but rather as a guide to the development and r i g o r of the research. IHE_VALUE_OF_A_CASE_SILJDY A case study approach t o the research problem provided a method which allowed f o r deep probing of p o l i c y statements as w e l l as the study of behaviour. B a l d r i d g e w r i t e s , A case study i s an intensive investigation of one organisation in a f i e l d setting. Like an anthropologist in a foreign land, the case-study researcher tries to find out how the local situation ticks ... He is not bound by one method, but capitalizes on any approach that might help unravel a new puzzle ... A case study, then, i s basically an exploratory piece of research carried out in one f i e l d setting by u t i l i z i n g a variety of techniques (1971:32). Much has been w r i t t e n about the advantages and disadvantages o-f the case method and the d e t a i l s of t h a t debate w i l l not be repeated here.^ Howell and Brown argue that the carefully constructed case study can be just as f r u i t f u l in explaining the policy-Baking process - and sometimes more so - than the statistically-based survey, which enjoys the advantages of producing a broader source of quantifiable material for generalization or explanation (1983:14). A survey approach was contemplated f o r t h i s p r o j e c t , but the inform a t i o n sought was considered too d i v e r s e t o attempt i t s r e t r i e v a l from a manageable q u e s t i o n n a i r e . The v a l i d i t y of survey questions i n t h i s type of research was seen as problematic, and the d i f f i c u l t i e s appeared t o be more e a s i l y overcome with a semi-structured i n t e r v i e w . Doern and Aucoin asserts For the most part, however, the survey research method i s inappropriate at the higher echelons of policy-making. For one thing, most high-level policy-makers do not appreciate being subjected to set questionnaires, at least not in the current context. Therefore i t i s usually necessary to employ a good number of open-ended questions in the interview setting and this often limits the possibility of following accepted procedures of survey research (1971:30). The growing number of case s t u d i e s used f o r t h i s type of research o f f e r s strong testimony t o t h e i r perceived value i n p r o v i d i n g researchers with a d e t a i l e d and s e n s i t i v e p i c t u r e of the behaviour being i n v e s t i g a t e d (see Dahl, 1961; B a l d r i d g e , 1971; Kogan, 1975; Howell & Brown, 1983; and Housego, 1986). A meta-analysis technique was not appropriate because of the lack of research conducted i n the area. Indeed, an experimental research p r o j e c t or s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s were both seen as i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r e t h i c a l and p r a c t i c a l reasons r e s p e c t i v e l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n s i d e r i n g the nature o-f the problem, and the p o s i t i o n s held by those whose perceptions were sought. Guba and L i n c o l n support the case study approach f o r t h i s type of research, and d e c l a r e : "Interviewing i s v i r t u a l l y the only technique t h a t provides access t o ' e l i t e s ' - those with s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge of the s i t u a t i o n - and i t provides information much more q u i c k l y than ob s e r v a t i o n " <1981:18). There i s s u f f i c i e n t q u a l i f i e d support i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i c y implementation t o warrant the use of the case method i n t h i s research. Furthermore, G r e e n f i e l d d e c l a r e s , " S o c i a l s c i e n c e has been too s u c c e s s f u l i n teaching us t o see t r u t h i n numbers and t o i n s i s t t h a t nothing i s t r u e unless i t i s t r u e everywhere" (1979:237). He suggests t h a t researchers "take s e r i o u s l y ... a b a s i c t h e o r e t i c a l and methodological question: what i s the r e l a t i o n between the unique event and the context i n which i t e x i s t s " (1979:238)? The case method provided the most v a l u a b l e research t o o l f o r thoroughly i n v e s t i g a t i n g the implementation v a r i a b l e s of government p o l i c i e s on c o l l e g e governance. Yin a s s e r t s "case s t u d i e s have a d i s t i n c t i v e p lace i n e v a l u a t i o n research" (1985:25), and o u t l i n e s some a p p l i c a t i o n s : The most important is to explain the causal links in real l i f e interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. A second application i s to describe the real l i f e context in which an intervention has occurred. Third, an evaluation can benefit, again in a descriptive mode, from an i l l u s t r a t i v e case study ... Finally, the case study strategy may be used to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear single set of outcomes (1985:25). These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y the concerns of t h i s research. Furthermore, Mintzberg observes t h a t "policy-making research should be r i c h i n r e a l world d e s c r i p t i o n and not be 64 obsessed with r i g o r " ( 1 9 B 3 : v i i i ) , and Y i n s t r e s s e s the use of the case study s t r a t e g y when "a 'how' or 'why' q u e s t i o n i s being asked about a contemporary s e t of events, over which the i n v e s t i g a t o r has l i t t l e or no c o n t r o l " (1985:20). These a l l r e i n f o r c e t h e b a s i s on which t h i s r e s e a r c h e r chose the case study method t o conduct the r e s e a r c h . The_Case Both the a n a l y s i s of the r e s e a r c h elements conducted i n Chapter One, and the review of l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i c y implementation r e p o r t e d i n Chapter Two, i n d i c a t e the importance of the d i s p o s i t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . It i s c l e a r t h a t t o c o n f i n e t h i s r e s e a r c h w i t h i n the l i m i t s of a d o c t o r a l t h e s i s , the case must be d e l i m i t e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , the case t o be s t u d i e d i s d e f i n e d as 'the system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of the outcomes of implementing t h r e e governance p o l i c i e s . To t h i s end the r e s e a r c h method w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e i n i t s design those phenomena most l i k e l y t o r e v e a l answers t o the q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y r a i s e d . The case c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d as a Type 2 i n Y i n ' s taxonomy, because while i t i s a s i n g l e case, i t has m u l t i p l e u n i t s embedded i n i t s s t r u c t u r e (1985:41). Data w i l l be analysed by s e p a r a t i n g p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s from the implementors, and a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n made between M i n i s t r y personnel and c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . SgyRCES_QF_DATA The c o l l e c t i o n of data f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h r e q u i r e d not o n l y a search of r e l e v a n t documents, but the conduct of i n t e r v i e w s and a p p r o p r i a t e a n a l y s i s w i t h i n the context i n which the documents were produced and i n t e r p r e t e d . Within the -framework of a modified systems model, the case study was not l i m i t e d t o , but was guided by the elements i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e Four, Chapter Two, i n order t o examine p e r c e i v e d outcomes. Because the data r e l a t e t o events o c c u r r i n g over a f i v e year p e r i o d , access t o documents was comprehensive, and the r e c o l l e c t i o n of respondents assumed t o be r e a s o n a b l y f a c t u a l . L _ 9 i _ I _ t i o n _ a n d _ 0 f f i _ _ a _ _ D g c u _ e n t s The f i r s t p o l i c y of the t h r e e being i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s study was communicated through an o f f i c i a l statement from the p r o v i n c i a l Government, the other two are i d e n t i f i e d i n l e g i s l a t i o n . The l e g a l c ontext i n which t h e p o l i c i e s were being implemented was proclaimed i n part i n the C o l l e g e and Proy_n__al. I n s t i t u t e s Act which was promulgated i n 1977, with major amendments i n October 1979 and J u l y 1983. The M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s document was f i r s t d r a f t e d i n March 1982, r e d r a f t e d i n November 1982, then f o r m a l l y i s s u e d a f t e r f u r t h e r amendment i n March 1983. B i l l No 20, the C o l l e g e and I n s t i t u t e Amendment Act 1983, i s the formal document d e c l a r i n g the changes i n governance being i n v e s t i g a t e d i n t h i s study. These documents, with the accompanying correspondence and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n documents, served as the recorded p o l i c y statement from the p r o v i n c i a l Government of B.C., from which the major p o i n t s r e l a t i n g t o system governance were e x t r a c t e d , and the d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n s and outputs i d e n t i f i e d . Other important documents of an o f f i c i a l n a ture were a v a i l a b l e i n 6 6 the form o-f r e p o r t s generated by the three intermediary C o u n c i l s , whose d i s s o l u t i o n occurred w i t h i n the time -frame under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h i s work; these provided evidence of the Co u n c i l s ' i n f l u e n c e on the governance of the c o l l e g e system. These documents were examined i n order t o i d e n t i f y the C o u n c i l s ' s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r p o l i c y outcomes. Q£her_Dgcumentatian Important and i n f l u e n t i a l documents were a l s o generated by the Council of College P r i n c i p a l s i n B.C., the B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of Co l l e g e s , the C o l l e g e - I n s t i t u t e Educators' A s s o c i a t i o n of B.C., and other key stakeholders i n the system. An examination of these documents provided evidence of pressures a p p l i e d t o a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n the system by r e l e v a n t i n t e r e s t groups. Relevant correspondence from a v a r i e t y of s e c t o r s w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l system were examined i n order t o i d e n t i f y environmental elements of support and demand as well as i n t r a - s o c i e t a l supports and demands. Documents were used not only as primary data, but to "corroborate information from other sources" (Yin,1985s80), i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t gained from i n t e r v i e w s . As Guba and L i n c o l n a s s e r t , " i n t e r v i e w i n g has many advantages with respect t o data c o l l e c t i o n . Among i t s s t r e n g t h s i s that there i s l e s s chance of misunderstanding between the i n q u i r e r and the respondent than other approaches" (1981s187). lDt^CYiews_with_Key_Per5gns The p r i n c i p a l undocumented i n t e n t i o n s of governance p o l i c i e s were discovered by i n t e r v i e w i n g p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s . V i r t u a l l y a l l of 67 the a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n the formation of the three p o l i c i e s were a c c e s s i b l e w i t h i n B.C., and a v a i l a b l e f o r i n t e r v i e w . Guba and L i n c o l n add t h e i r support t o the i n t e r v i e w method of data c o l l e c t i o n when they writes of a l l the means of exchanging information or gathering data known to man, perhaps the oldest and most respected i s conversation. Simple or complex, face-to-face exchanges between human beings have served for eons to convey messages, express sympathy, declare war, make truces, and preserve h i s t o r y . As an extension of that heritage, interviewing with a purpose (Dexter,1970,p.136) - i s perhaps the oldest and c e r t a i n l y one of the most respected of the t o o l s that the inquirer can use (1 9 8 1 s 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 ) . A sample of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a c t i v e i n the p o l i c i e s ' implementation was a l s o interviewed. Interviewees i n c l u d e d p u b l i c servants employed by the M i n i s t e r , community c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l s , d i r e c t o r s and Board members, and c h i e f o f f i c e r s of i n t e r e s t groups, t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r perceptions of the implementation outcomes of the sta t e d p o l i c i e s . In order t o provide as comprehensive an a n a l y s i s as p o s s i b l e , c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were drawn from seven of the f i f t e e n c o l l e g e s , with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from urban, semi-rural and r u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Interviews were a l s o conducted with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of major i n t e r e s t groups, on the presumption t h a t they e x e r c i s e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e both on the implementation process and on the perceptions of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . By means of i n t e r v i e w s the researcher was abl e t o e s t a b l i s h some p r i v a t e as w e l l as p u b l i c p o s i t i o n s with respect t o i n d i v i d u a l r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of p o l i c y statements. The proforma f o r the in t e r v i e w questions appears i n Appendicies Two and Three. Gordon de s c r i b e s a "standardized non-scheduled i n t e r v i e w i n g " technique i n which he c a l l s f o r the posing of c e r t a i n questions 68 t o a l l int e r v i e w e e s , but not n e c e s s a r i l y the same t o each <1975:6). This r e q u i r e s the i n t e r v i e w e r t o assume more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " f o r d i r e c t i n g the flow of the i n t e r v i e w w h i l e at the same time a l l o w i n g f o r freedom t o pursue l i n e s of questioning that might a r i s e during the course of the i n t e r v i e w " (Hamblin, 1984:51). This s t r a t e g y was adopted t o in c r e a s e the scope f o r rel e v a n t data c o l l e c t i o n and was strengthened by a l l i n t e r v i e w s being conducted by the researcher. Questions were posed on the b a s i s of important implementation v a r i a b l e s i d e n t i f i e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e review, and incorporated such t h i n g s as perceptions of the extent of the proposed change-threat, c l a r i t y of goals and purpose, b u i l t - i n i n c e n t i v e s , s a n c t i o n s , resources, assignment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and whether or not implementors were consulted during the for m u l a t i o n phase. D£IA_ANALYSIS Data were organised t o e s t a b l i s h f i r s t of a l l the nature and extent of the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s as described through the documented and perceived i n t e n t i o n s . Key i n t e n t i o n s were thus i d e n t i f i e d i n the l e g i s l a t i o n , o f f i c i a l documentation, and i n i t i a l i n t e r v i e w s , and formed the b a s i s of a second round of i n t e r v i e w s t o d i s c e r n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceptions of p o l i c y outcomes. Each i n t e r v i e w was recorded on audio-tape, t r a n s c r i b e d verbatim onto a word processor and produced i n the form of typed t r a n s c r i p t s . These were returned unedited t o the respondents, other than those with whom p i l o t i n t e r v i e w s were conducted, f o r checking f a c t u a l d e t a i l s and unintended e r r o r s . Interviewees were i n v i t e d t o c a r r y out t h i s check w i t h i n four weeks of r e c e i p t 6 9 and r e t u r n the comments only i f they f e l t c o r r e c t i o n s were necessary. Whilst 75% e i t h e r confirmed the accuracy of the t r a n s c r i p t or returned i t with varying amounts of e d i t i n g , the other 257. i n d i c a t e d t h e i r agreement by not r e p l y i n g . E d i t o r i a l changes were made on computer-stored copies and the r e s u l t i n g t r a n s c r i p t s searched f o r responses t o questions i n order t o e x t r a c t the perceived i n t e n t i o n s or outcomes. In order t o a r r i v e at a meaningful overview of the i n t e r v i e w s , c h a r t s were compiled with the questions l i s t e d across the top, and the respondents' answers summarised r e t a i n i n g t h e i r own words and l i s t e d under each q u e s t i o n , i n the format shown i n Appendix F i v e . If answers given were considered t o be more a p p l i c a b l e t o another q u e s t i o n , the colour of the ink used was changed. Separate c h a r t s were compiled f o r p o l i c y formulators and implementors, with f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n s being made w i t h i n the implementor category t o i d e n t i f y p r o f e s s i o n a l f u l l - t i m e c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , board members, and i n t e r e s t group spokespersons. Each chart contained answers t o questions r e l a t i n g t o a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y . This r e q u i r e d the co m p i l a t i o n of four c h a r t s f o r each group of respondents, one f o r each of the three p o l i c i e s , and one f o r o v e r a l l general governance questions which were not l i m i t e d t o any one of the three but could be considered as r e l e v a n t t o a l l . The summarised answers were then c o l l a t e d , so tha t a l l answers t o a p a r t i c u l a r question could be grouped f o r s i m i l a r i t y , and group answers were then paraphrased by the researcher. A l l statements made by respondents were a l s o coded, using the a n a l y t i c a l 70 •framework e s t a b l i s h e d i n Chapter Two, so t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s could be i s o l a t e d by conducting a search i n the computer. The coding used i s shown as Appendix S i x . V6LIDAII0N_QF_RESEARCH Case s t u d i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y those a s s o c i a t e d with the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , have come under heavy c r i t i c i s m -for t h e i r l a c k of v a l i d a t i o n . Cohen and Manion suggest "perhaps the most p r a c t i c a l way of a c h i e v i n g greater v a l i d i t y i s t o minimise the amount of b i a s as much as p o s s i b l e " (1984:252). To t h i s end questions were posed as unambiguously as p o s s i b l e , a l l i n t e r v i e w s were conducted by the researcher and samples were chosen t o optimise r e p r e s e n t - a t i v e n e s s as w e l l as e x p e r t i s e . Yin s t a t e s t h a t "the case study i n v e s t i g a t o r a l s o must maximise four aspects of the q u a l i t y of any design (1) construct v a l i d i t y , (2) i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y ... (3) e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y , and (4) r e l i a b i l i t y " (1985:27). Guba and L i n c o l n argue t h a t such concerns f a l l w i t h i n the s c i e n t i f i c paradigm, and "propose c e r t a i n analagous terms as more ap p r o p r i a t e " t o behavioural s t u d i e s through what they term the n a t u r a l i s t i c paradigm, i . e . , " c r e d i b i l i t y f o r t r u t h value [ i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y ] , f i t t i n g n e s s f o r a p p l i c a b i l i t y [ e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y ] , * a u d i t a b i 1 i t y ' f o r consistency [ r e l i a b i l i t y ] , and c o n f i r m a b i l i t y f o r n e u t r a l i t y [ c o n s t r u c t v a l i d i t y ] " (1981:104). Such a l t e r n a t i v e s seem t o s a t i s f y Kogan's p l e a , when i n r e l a t i o n t o p o l i c y s t u d i e s he w r i t e s ; " s o f t e r and more modest imagery i s needed" (1975:23). To address the f i r s t of these v a l i d a t i o n c r i t e r i a , Y i n suggests two steps. (1) select the specific types of changes that are to be studied ... and (2) demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been selected (1985:37). The researcher i d e n t i f i e d from documents the s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i o n s of the t h r e e p o l i c i e s with respect t o governance, and then determined from i n t e r v i e w s the extent t o which those i n t e n t i o n s were r e a l i s e d . An examination of perceived outcomes enabled the researcher t o e s t a b l i s h d e v i a t i o n . Yin suggests t h a t a s t r a t e g y to i n c r e a s e construct v a l i d i t y i s t o "use m u l t i p l e sources of evidence" (1985:37); t h i s should be done when the data are being c o l l e c t e d . Cohen and Manion suggest "one way of v a l i d a t i n g i n t e r v i e w measures i s t o compare the i n t e r v i e w measure with another measure that has already been shown t o be v a l i d " (1984:252). This concept, which they term convergent v a l i d i t y , i s a l s o a p p l i e d during data c o l l e c t i o n and was incorporated i n t o the present study by asking of both p o l i c y formulators and p o l i c y implementors many s i m i l a r questions. Respondents were requested to i d e n t i f y any areas important t o the study but not covered by the q u estions, and t o name persons expert i n the f i e l d , i n c l u d i n g those who would o f f e r an opposing view. If more than two respondents named the same person, t h a t person was interviewed. C r e d i b i l i t y or i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y i s d i f f i c u l t t o monitor, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of d e s c r i p t i v e or e x p l o r a t o r y r e s e a r c h , f o r i t r e l i e s on the extent t o which a researcher can p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f y causes of e f f e c t s . Yin suggests "pattern matching ... explanation b u i l d i n g and time s e r i e s a n a l y s i s " as s u i t a b l e t a c t i c s (1985:36), and 6uba and L i n c o l n suggest g i v i n g a t t e n t i o n t o these q u e s t i o n s , "what can be done t o produce f i n d i n g s t h a t are most l i k e l y t o be found c r e d i b l e by sources Cand3 how can c r e d i b i l i t y be te s t e d with sources" (1981:105)? C r e d i b i l i t y i s seen as a most important p r i n c i p l e i n t h i s work, and "the o v e r a l l problem of making i n f e r e n c e s " (Yin,1985:38) i s addressed i n data r e p o r t i n g and conclu s i o n s . A panel of experts was r e c r u i t e d t o s c r u t i n i s e the questions t o be asked, and assess the comprehensiveness of those questions and t h e i r i m p a r t i a l i t y . This panel c o n s i s t e d of persons chosen f o r t h e i r experience, knowledge of the f i e l d and academic achieve- ments, and met together with the researcher t o d i s c u s s the is s u e s . Panel members are l i s t e d i n Appendix Seven. Because the study i s designed t o analyse a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceived outcomes of implemented p o l i c i e s , every endeavour was made t o e s t a b l i s h that the answers t o i n t e r v i e w questions were not d i s t o r t e d . To t h i s end respondents were asked t o e d i t t r a n s c r i p t s of i n t e r v i e w s t o reduce e r r o r . Again a wide range of sources of data were used, which provided "convergent l i n e s of i n q u i r y " (Yin,1985:37). Hargrove observes t h a t "the common c r i t i c i s m of case s t u d i e s i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s th a t one cannot be sure i f they are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of l a r g e r p a t t e r n s or even what such p a t t e r n s might look l i k e " (1975:74-75). The use of w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d t h e o r i e s enhanced the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e p l i c a t i o n as d i d the use of sound research method t o improve f i t t i n g n e s s or a p p l i c a b i l i t y . However, t h i s study i s not seen as one th a t w i l l o f f e r much scope f o r g e n e r a l i s a b l e or u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d c o n c l u s i o n s , but r a t h e r de s c r i b e s a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n of behaviour that may i n some respects p a r a l l e l the r e s u l t s o-f past and -future research so as to improve understanding o-f the p o l i c y process. F i n a l l y , thorough documentation o-f the case provides -for a u d i t - a b i l i t y . In order t o maximise t h i s aspect o-f the resear c h , Yin gives the f o l l o w i n g advice. The general way of approaching the r e l i a b i l i t y problea is to make as many steps as possible as operational as possible, and to conduct research as i f someone were always looking over your shoulder (1985:40). The inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s of v a l i d a t i o n are present but not insurmountable. For Hamilton et a l : proof is rarely obtainable in case study research. Rather than setting proof as a primary goal, the case-study worker should aim to increase understanding of the variables, parameters and dynamics of the case under study (1977:188). Guba and L i n c o l n place the emphasis back i n t o c r e d i b i l i t y when they observe t h a t i t i s "impossible t o have i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y without r e l i a b i l i t y " (1981:120). Indeed they go on t o a s s e r t " a u d i t a b i 1 i t y r e q u i r e s simply t h a t the work of one evaluator (or team) can be te s t e d f o r consistency by a second evaluator or team" (1981:124). In t h i s research every precaution was taken t o cross-check data, r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t there i s no theory of p o l i c y implementation t o be proven. Rather, p o l i t i c a l systems theory guided the d i r e c t i o n of the re s e a r c h , and provided a systematic method of a n a l y s i s . Hargrove e x p l a i n s , "we need case s t u d i e s which are performed with " t h e o r e t i c a l a l e r t n e s s ' t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of developing g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s " (1975:75). 74 The research p r o j e c t was submitted t o , and approved by The U n i v e r s i t y o-f B r i t i s h Columbia (U.B.C.) Behavioural Sciences Screening Committee For Research and Other Studies I n v o l v i n g Human Subje c t s , and a l l r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s of approval were s a t i s f i e d . RIPQBIINS_QE_EINDi_es The context of the research reported i n Chapter Four by o u t l i n i n g those environmental i n f l u e n c e s on the implementation of the p o l i c i e s which were revealed i n documents and through i n t e r v i e w s . Chapter F i v e r e p o r t s on and discusses the i n t e r v i e w f i n d i n g s . I t i s d i v i d e d i n t o three p a r t s . Each part p o r t r a y s , f o r a given p o l i c y , the for m u l a t o r s ' i n t e n t i o n s , the perceived communication l i n k a g e s between formulators and implementors, and the perceived outcomes. The f i n a l Chapter of the d i s s e r t a t i o n summarises the f i n d i n g s , draws conclusions and presents some i m p l i c a t i o n s on the b a s i s of the f i n d i n g s . NQIES_Q__CHA_IER_IHREE 1. See Mouzelis, (1975), Organisation and Bureaucracy. Y i n , (1985), The Case Study Methodi_ An Annotated B i b l i o g r a g h y , and B u r r e l l 3< Morgan, (1982), SociQ_ogical Paradigms and QL9_QL__t_gnal Ana_ysis_ Elements of the Sociology of Corporate L_fe. 75 C H A P T E R F O U R AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLLEGE/POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ITS ENVIRONMENT Chapter Two i l l u s t r a t e d the importance of the c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l system i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i c y implementation. This Chapter describes the boundaries of the p o l i t i c a l system i n questio n , by f i r s t d e s c r i b i n g the s o c i e t y i n which the p o l i c i e s were d e c l a r e d , and then examining the context of the system. Before r e p o r t i n g the perceived i n t e n t i o n s and outcomes of the three governance p o l i c i e s described by p o l i c y f o rmulators and implementors r e s p e c t i v e l y , i t i s necessary t o i d e n t i f y some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the context i n t o which the p o l i c i e s were introduced. Colleges were f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n B.C. by l o c a l communities through the a u t h o r i t y of t h e i r School Boards. This happened without the d i r e c t involvement of the p r o v i n c i a l Government. In r e l a t i o n t o the present s t a t u s of these c o l l e g e s , t h e r e are na t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l phenomena that need t o be considered as environmental i n f l u e n c e s and examined under the sub-headings of "The C o n s t i t u t i o n ' , "The Parliamentary System', and "The Economic Climate'. From these n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l viewpoints the working of the post-secondary education system i s examined with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the r o l e s of the c o l l e g e s and the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e with respect t o governance. There are a number of p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l groups w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system, and others which tend t o s t r a d d l e the boundaries between the system and i t s environment. This chapter w i l l i d e n t i f y these va r i o u s i n t e r e s t groups, and w i l l end by r e f e r r i n g t o the 76 environment with which the c o l l e g e / p o l i t i c a l system i n t e r a c t s . I t i d e n t i f i e s those elements seen t o be i n f l u e n t i a l i n the implementation of governance p o l i c i e s . IHE_SOCIO =PQLIIICAL_CQNIEXI A l l s o c i e t i e s , according t o Easton, employ a conscious process of making and executing p o l i c y . The forffl of the mechanism and the kind of sanctions are, however, matters for empirical investigation; they do not invalidate the conclusion that there is discernible a process whereby values are authoritatively allocated for the whole society (1967:141). In order t o address the conceptual boundaries of the c o l l e g e / p o l i t i c a l system, t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l i d e n t i f y some of the important elements of the s o c i e t y with which i t i n t e r a c t s , - and some of the s o c i a l systems w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y r e l a t e d t o the c o l l e g e / p o l i t i c a l system. The activities of a society, ... are broader than those of any of i t s component groups. Briefly, the broadest grouping of human beings who live together and collectively undertake to satisfy a l l the minimum prerequisites of group l i f e is what we refer to when we speak of a society (Easton, 1967: 135) . In the context of t h i s study the geographical boundaries of the province of B.C. are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the wider s o c i e t y i n respect t o l e g i s l a t i v e , economic, and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s which a l l i n t e r a c t with the governance of i t s d i s t i n c t i v e community c o l l e g e system. The_Constitution The Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e s the p r o v i n c i a l Governments as the a u t h o r i t i e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r education. Section 93 of the B r i t i s h North America Act s t a t e s : "In and f o r 77 each Province the L e g i s l a t u r e may e x c l u s i v e l y make Laws i n r e l a t i o n t o Education ..." ( B r i t i s h North America Act 1867- 1907:19), although there are some who d i s p u t e t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l monopoly. P e i t c h i n i s i n h i s study, Financing Post Secondary Education i n Canada, di s c u s s e s the debate on i n t e r p r e t i o n of the i n t e n t i o n s of the founding f a t h e r s i n today's context (see Peitchinis,1971:26-33). As t h i s debate has never been the subject of a j u d i c i a l r u l i n g from the Supreme Court, i t seems appropriate t o set aside the long standing arguments to the effect that post-secondary institutions f u l f i l l national and international objectives, or that the architects of confederation in 1867 had not conceived of higher learning as part of 'education' (Denni son , 1986B: 2) , and t o consider the mandate of the Government of B r i t i s h Columbia to "make laws i n r e l a t i o n t o " community c o l l e g e s . There i s no n a t i o n a l department or m i n i s t r y of education f o r Canada, d e s p i t e the s u b s t a n t i a l f i n a n c i a l a i d given t o prov i n c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r post-secondary education. Indeed there are no n a t i o n a l education a c t s , and no c l e a r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , a s t a t e of a f f a i r s which received some degree of c r i t i c i s m from the O.E.CD (O.E.CD. , 1976:89) . The_Par_i_mentary_System The Canadian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the B r i t i s h parliamentary system provides the e l e c t e d p r o v i n c i a l Government of B.C. with the power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n i t i a t i n g both l e g i s l a t i o n and p o l i c i e s with respect t o post-secondary education throughout the province. The p r o v i n c i a l Government i s able t o plan and d i r e c t the governance s t r u c t u r e s of a l l s e c t i o n s of education. P r o v i n c i a l Governments take i n t o account i n t e r e s t group pressures and 78 a n t i c i p a t e -future pressures by d e c l a r i n g p o l i c i e s t h a t best secure what they perceive as being the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . If t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are perceived by t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s as a t t r a c t i v e and adequate they are l i k e l y t o be r e - e l e c t e d . As has been noted e a r l i e r , l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i s i n g the establishment of community c o l l e g e s i n B.C. was incorporated i n t o the P u b l i c Schools Act as e a r l y as 1958. The U n i v e r s i t i e s Act (1974) and the Colleges and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e Act (1977) are examples of p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n which recognise some of the d i f f e r e n c e s between v a r i o u s t e r t i a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r governance s t r u c t u r e s . Within these Acts a u t h o r i t y i s delegated t o v a r i o u s agencies and persons which, among other t h i n g s , d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between U n i v e r s i t i e s , C o l l e g e s and I n s t i t u t e s . The Acts d i s t i n g u i s h p o l i t i c a l systems, f i r s t because the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s are d i f f e r e n t , secondly because the goals of the var i o u s s e c t i o n s are d i f f e r e n t and t h i r d l y because the framework of decision-making e x t e r n a l t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s d i f f e r s . B.C. has developed a governance s t r u c t u r e f o r c o l l e g e s u n l i k e t h a t of most other provinces i n Canada, which d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from the t r a d i t i o n a l u n i v e r s i t i e s and the p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e s (Dennison,1986As8). The Col l e g e s and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e Act (1977) served t o e s t a b l i s h f o r the f i r s t time, l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t separated c o l l e g e s from both the u n i v e r s i t i e s and compulsory education s e c t o r s , and t o a c e r t a i n extent the i n s t i t u t e s from the c o l l e g e s . The Act delegated to the M i n i s t e r the power t o : "(a) e s t a b l i s h ... p o l i c y r e s p e c t i n g post-secondary education and t r a i n i n g i n the Province, 79 (b) provide such s e r v i c e s as he c o n s i d e r s necessary ... " <Cgllege & P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act,1977:2). The Act a l s o provided -for the establishment o-f three intermediary C o u n c i l s which would r e l a t e t o the M i n i s t e r and t o the c o l l e g e and i n s t i t u t e s e c t o r . These C o u n c i l s comprised, the Academic C o u n c i l , the Occupational T r a i n i n g C o u n c i l , and the Management Advisory C o u n c i l . There are many d i v e r s e pressures exerted on the c o l l e g e / p o l i t i c a l system -from the environment, i n a d d i t i o n t o government i n i t i a t i v e s t o change the governance s t r u c t u r e of the c o l l e g e system. Indeed, there appears t o be s u f f i c i e n t pressure on the system t o cause implementation of governance p o l i c i e s t o be d i s t o r t e d . T h e E c g n g m i c C l i m a t e Between 1980 and 1983 Canada experienced an economic r e c e s s i o n not equalled s i n c e the 1930s ( M i n i s t r y of Supply Canada, Rsegrts 1985:xi). Although the r e c e s s i o n i n f l u e n c e d the whole country, each province developed i t s own s t r a t e g y t o address the problem. As B.C. " i s centred l a r g e l y upon n a t u r a l resource e x p l o i t a t i o n , i t s u f f e r e d somewhat more than most provinces" (Dennison, 1986B:3). In May 1983, a S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was e l e c t e d on a campaign pl a t f o r m t h a t emphasised f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . I r r e s p e c t i v e of the p o l i t i c a l concerns of the campaign, the impact of t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s was soon f e l t through p o l i c i e s that a f f e c t e d the governance of community c o l l e g e s . 80 Despite the -fact that the research i n t e r v i e w s i n v o l v e d no question d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o f i n a n c e , a l l but one p o l i c y formulator and h a l f of the implementors interviewed commented on the p e r i o d of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t being experienced i n the c o l l e g e system. A l l M i n i s t r y o f f i c e r s interviewed commented on the e f f e c t s of the p r o v i n c i a l f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s . Most used the word ' r e s t r a i n t ' , but a l l r e f e r r e d t o the strong i n f l u e n c e which the p r o v i n c i a l economy exerted on Government p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , indeed a d j e c t i v e s l i k e ' i n tense', and 'overwhelming' were used t o d e s c r i b e the period of r e s t r a i n t . Table Three summarises comments on f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t s as a f f e c t i n g c o l l e g e governance during p o l i c y implementation. One of the major reasons f o r the Government a b o l i s h i n g the three intermediary C o u n c i l s was a r e s o l v e t o reduce the o p e r a t i o n a l c o s t s of the system. There i s a l s o some agreement that the d i s s o l u t i o n of the C o u n c i l s provided more f i n a n c i a l f l e x i b i l i t y at the c o l l e g e l e v e l . F i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t i s a l s o perceived by M i n i s t r y s t a f f and c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s as having a major i n f l u e n c e upon implementation of a l l the current governance p o l i c i e s . Respondent's comments such as "the primary t h r u s t of i t was t i e d i n with Government's o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n s , the cost of Government operating had t o be reduced" (4s2)^, and "we were expecting the c o l l e g e s t o make very s u b s t a n t i a l savings through changes i n the way they conduct t h i n g s , so ... the C o u n c i l s ' e l i m i n a t i o n became part of the r e s t r a i n t " (7s14), were t y p i c a l perceptions of f i n a n c i a l i n f l u e n c e s . 81 TABLE 3 QUOTATIONS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS DEMONSTRATE THE PERCEIVED CONNECTION BETWEEN FISCAL RESTRAINT AND THE EFFECTS ON SYSTEM GOVERNANCE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. POLICY FQRMULATORS "[The] Minister ... advised the institutions ... that restraint was something that they were going to have to live with" <4s3). "It was a desire to save a substantial amount of money in a tine of over- whelming restraints" (5:1). "At that time we were coming into a period of restraint on Bovernment spending" (7: 14) . "They were quite a costly operation and in a period Df fiscal restraint" (8:4). "They f i t into a broader context, and evaluation of those policies, trying to keep something like restraint out of i t is ... almost impossible" (9:22). "It was a time of restraint and people had to remember the context" (10:15). PROFESSIONAL COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS "Rationalisation, joint planning and cooperation of colleges ... [has] proven to be extremely d i f f i c u l t to pull off in times of severe restraint" (12:16). "Well funding drags the college M.6.0. to the extent that the provincial funding has been responsive to the provincial M.6.0.'s" (20:12). "Unfortunately the timing allowed them also to include some of the elements of the restraint strategies" (22:15). BOARD MEMBERS - INTEREST GROUPS AND OTHER OBSERVERS "I recognise that there has been a recession" (16:12). "During a time of recession when funding is short, when monies are being clipped, there is some feeling of hostility" (17:8). "I think the prime policy that would affect us would be probably the one that's been imposed on them by the Treasury Board" (18:13). "Legislative changes in 1983 were made to improve the system. They were made to contain the system within a p o l i t i c a l economic strategy that the Government had committed it s e l f to" (21:7). NOTE: In some cases quotations have been e d i t e d f o r b r e v i t y . 82 However, there were other ways i n which f i n a n c i a l pressure i n f l u e n c e d the e f f e c t s of the governance p o l i c i e s . As p a r t of t h e i r economic s t r a t e g y , the Government decided t o assume the task of determining what programs would be provided through the c o l l e g e s , because of the p o t e n t i a l f o r t r a i n i n g t o a s s i s t the p r o v i n c i a l economy. This l e d t o a d i s t i n c t i o n being made between ' P r o v i n c i a l Programs' and 'Local Programs', whereby c o l l e g e s could o f f e r only l o c a l programs without approval from the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e . Indeed, the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement 2 recorded i n i t s preamble: "Occupational and manpower development w i l l be the p r i n c i p a l area of expansion f o r the current f i v e year p e r i o d " (1983C:4). Many a d m i n i s t r a t o r s interviewed commented on the pressures exerted on the c o l l e g e system t o c o n t r a c t academic programs and expand v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g programs. Another strong i n f l u e n c e on the f i s c a l s i t u a t i o n arose from the f a c t t h a t l o c a l School Boards were n e i t h e r c o l l e c t i n g taxes t o f i n a n c e the c o l l e g e s nor c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e i r c a p i t a l or operating c o s t s . Having been almost t o t a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g the c o l l e g e s i n t h e i r l o c a l i t y under the p r o v i s i o n of an amendment to the P u b l i c Schools Act, l o c a l School Boards long possessed a strong c l a i m t o governance of the c o l l e g e s . Since the p r o v i n c i a l Government had assumed the l o c a l School Boards' f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and the f e d e r a l Government had cut back i t s f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o post—secondary education, the Government of B.C. assumed a r a p i d l y i n c r e a s i n g expenditure f o r a s e r v i c e which they considered was not s u f f i c i e n t l y accountable. One respondent reported t h i s phenomenon i n the •following way, " r a p i d l y e s c a l a t i n g c o s t s o-f operating the system, and the -feeling on the part of Government [was] that there had t o be much more c o n t r o l , much more c e n t r a l i s e d c o n t r o l " (5:1). PQSI_SECONDARY_EDUC Within the community c o l l e g e system of B.C., there are some other contextual c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t need t o be i s o l a t e d f o r the purpose of analysing the e f f e c t s of the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia (U.B.C.) e s t a b l i s h e d under i t s own c h a r t e r i n 1915, and i t s s a t e l l i t e campus i n V i c t o r i a , together with three p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s , ^ composed the e n t i r e formal post-secondary education s e r v i c e u n t i l 1964, apart from some v o c a t i o n a l schools e s t a b l i s h e d by the M i n i s t r y of Education. In 1962 the President of U.B.C. prepared a repo r t on the f u t u r e of higher education i n B.C. which set out many of the p r i n c i p l e s adopted f o r the establishment of the c o l l e g e s and the B.C. I n s t i t u t e of Technology (B.C.I.T.). In a time of unprecedented growth, s i x t e e n c o l l e g e s , i n c l u d i n g two p r i v a t e l y - o p e r a t e d c o l l e g e s , together with the B.C.I.T. and s i x post-secondary p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e s , p l u s the Open Learning I n s t i t u t e , were e s t a b l i s h e d i n response t o the plan o u t l i n e d by Macdonald (1962). However, as i s so often the case in other areas of unanticipated growth, a lack of rational coordination and certain duplication of function, with accompanying confusion of goals, became increasingly evident (Dennison , 1979: 2) . By 1980 the number of u n i v e r s i t i e s had t r e b l e d , and students graduating from secondary school could enrol i n e i t h e r the 84 u n i v e r s i t y sector or the c o l l e g e sector when they wished t o pursue academic programs. The - f i r s t two years o-f many u n i v e r s i t y courses were a v a i l a b l e at the c o l l e g e s i n a -form p r o v i d i n g t r a n s f e r a b i l i t y of c r e d i t . The use of the word 'system' f o r the c o l l e g e sector i n B.C. has caused c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n s t e r n a t i o n among those involved i n i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e l . C olleges i n B.C. had p r e v i o u s l y been considered autonomous, independent, l o c a l agencies of p a r t i c u l a r f a c e t s of post-secondary -education. To be combined with other s i m i l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n s under p r o v i n c i a l Government aud i t came as something of a s u r p r i s e , and o f f e r e d some t h r e a t t o the p r e v i o u s l y perceived independence. Indeed Dennison noted an "area of confusion was created as c o l l e g e s , a f t e r the e l i m i n a t i o n of l o c a l funding, appeared t o be moving from a community, toward p r o v i n c i a l o r i e n t a t i o n " ( 1 9 8 6 A s l l ) . The Government, through the three governance p o l i c i e s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s study, made d e l i b e r a t e moves t o e s t a b l i s h a governance s t r u c t u r e f o r the c o l l e g e system i n the province t h a t aimed t o provide f o r system-wide plan n i n g , c l a r i t y of a u t h o r i t y r o l e s and i d e n t i f i a b l e l i n e s of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . These p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s not only met with some measure of r e s i s t e n c e , but generated some attempts t o i n f l u e n c e the r e l o c a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system. Ihe?_Qgl Iege_System The c o l l e g e system i n B.C. i s fragmented and d i v i d e d , with p a r t i c i p a n t s making competing claims. Divided l o y a l t i e s and s p e c i a l i s e d i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s , each with d i f f e r e n t goals f o r the system, attempt t o ob t a i n favourable outcomes from p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . One of the respondents described i t as a "dog-eat-dog kind of world and everybody's out competing f o r every buck they can get" (12:16). Amendments t o the P u b l i c Schools Act i n 1958 provided f o r the establishment of community c o l l e g e s i n B.C., which were intended t o be a f f i l i a t e d with the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Indeed, Macdonald (1962), who i s thought to have provided the b l u e p r i n t f o r the c o l l e g e system i n B.C., perceived such i n s t i t u t i o n s as being c l o s e l y l i n k e d with the U.B.C. In accordance with h i s recommendations c o l l e g e s were e s t a b l i s h e d as autonomous i n s t i t u t i o n s with f i n a n c i a l support from the l o c a l communities they served, and they o f f e r e d the f i r s t two years of u n i v e r s i t y programs. The l e g i s l a t i o n o f f e r e d very l i t t l e d e l i n e a t i o n of the r o l e and purpose of the c o l l e g e s . The promulgation of the Colleges and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act, i n 1977, was seen as a benchmark p o l i c y of the B.C. Government i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a system based on p r o v i n c i a l rather than l o c a l goals. This Act was "touted as i n n o v a t i v e and important" at the time (Academic Counci1,1980:4). Dennison captures some of the r e a c t i o n s of c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s when he w r i t e s : Froia the point of view of the colleges, this [centralisation] trend is away from the fundamental concept of colleges as community based institutions, under community control and responsive to community needs ... the powers of college boards, since the implementation of the Act, are regarded as limited at best and insignificant at worst (1980:5-6). The l e g i s l a t i o n enacted i n 1977 provided not only the f i r s t Act of the province designed f o r c o l l e g e s , but was probably the f i r s t p r o v i n c i a l statement of the Government's perception of the r o l e community c o l l e g e s were t o f u l f i l l w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . This 86 statement c e r t a i n l y announced some r a d i c a l changes t o the governance o-f the c o l l e g e system. Chapter One e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the f i f t e e n community c o l l e g e s needed t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the other forms of post-secondary i n s t i t u t i o n s . In the p o l i t i c a l environment, c o l l e g e admin- i s t r a t o r s are the major stakeholders i n the implementation of governance p o l i c y . Most of the c o l l e g e s serve an i d e n t i f i a b l e geographical r e g i o n , based on p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d School Board d i s t r i c t s . Although the Task Force Report on the Community College (1974) was never accepted by the incoming Government, the r e g i o n a l concept i t espoused has been g e n e r a l l y accepted as an agreed p o l i c y guide (1974:58-59). Because h i s t o r i c a l l y each c o l l e g e i n B.C. i s rooted i n the l o c a l community, there i s a s p e c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with that population's post-secondary education needs. F o r r e s t e r observed " c o l l e g e s obtained the vast m a j o r i t y of t h e i r students from t h e i r surrounding r e g i o n " (1985:3). These geographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are more pronounced when the e f f e c t s of the system governance s t r u c t u r e are observed by means of a count of c o l l e g e personnel attached t o urban, semi- urban, and r u r a l c o l l e g e s . In t h i s context the c o l l e g e s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d as shown i n Table Four. F i g u r e s shown i n brackets under the c o l l e g e represent the t o t a l number of enrolments i n each c o l l e g e f o r the academic year 1984/85, followed by the percentage of f u l l - t i m e enrolments i n the same year. The l e g i s l a t i o n empowers the Government through the Lieutenant- Governor i n C o u n c i l , t o designate "(a) a c o l l e g e , and 87 TABLE 4 COLLEGES INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM OF B.C. URBAN SEMI-URBAN RURAL CAPILANO COLLEGE CARIBOO COLLEGE (4138) 587. (3611) 557. EAST KOOTENAY COLLEGE (1150) 507. CAMOSUN COLLEGE (4756) 677. COLLEGE NEW CALEDONIA NORTH ISLAND COLLEGE (2521) 707. (2361) 217. DOUGLAS COLLEGE (4519) 467. FRASER VALLEY COLLEGE NORTHERN LIGHTS COLLEGE (2489) 517. (1404) 437. KWANTLEN COLLEGE MALASPINA COLLEGE (3934) 587. (2951) 727. NORTHWEST COMMUNITY COLLEGE (968) 707. VANCOUVER COMMUNITY OKANAGAN COLLEGE COLLEGE (9858) 647. (3772) 657. SELKIRK COLLEGE (1429) 807. NOTE: Name o-f c o l l e g e f o l l o w e d by number of F u l l Time Equivalent (F.T.E.) students i n 1984-85, and the percentage of students e n r o l l e d f u l l time. Source: M i n i s t r y Of Education B_C__Pg_t_Secondary_EnrQ_ment S t a t i s t i c s , October 31, 1984. 88 <b) the area o-f the P r o v i n c e t h a t i s the c o l l e g e r e g i o n ..." <QeLIgaes & P r o v i n c i a l Insti.tut.es Act, 1977:4). A c o l l e g e once designated i s e s t a b l i s h e d as a c o r p o r a t i o n , which c o n s i s t s of a governing Board whose composition i s a l s o r e g u l a t e d by the Act. The governing Board a p p o i n t s a c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l or p r e s i d e n t , and the necessary s t a f f t o a c h i e v e i t s o b j e c t i v e s . The l e g i s l a t i o n decreed: The objects of a college are to provide comprehensive (a) courses of study equivalent to those given by a university at the f i r s t and second year post-secondary level, (b) post-secondary education or training, and (c) continuing education ( C o l l e g e s & P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e ) ! Act, 1977:5). The powers and d u t i e s of the Boards were a l s o proclaimed i n the Act, and were wide and d e t a i l e d . They i n c l u d e d the requirement to "manage, adm i n i s t e r and c o n t r o l the p r o p e r t y , revenue, expenditure, b u s i n e s s and other a f f a i r s of t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n and, without l i m i t i n g the g e n e r a l i t y of the f o r e g o i n g , the board has the power to ..." ( C o l l e g e s 2< P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act, 1977:6). Of p a r t i c u l a r r e l e v a n c e t o t h i s study are t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between what c o l l e g e personnel p e r c e i v e as the system, a g a i n s t the p e r c e p t i o n s of those employed by the p r o v i n c i a l Government. The f i r s t d i s c r e p a n c y i s r e v e a l e d by the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Government's M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s document: A system by which is meant the 21 colleges and institutes, the councils, the Minister, and ministry staff, a l l working to the common end of providing educational opportunities that will enable adults throughout the province to meet changing individual and economic needs ( M i n i s t r y of Education , 1983C: 5) . There had been c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e on the Government t o a b o l i s h 89 the p r o v i n c i a l C o u n c i l s (see p.91), although many f e l t t h a t a s i n g l e intermediary body was necessary. Observers w i t h i n the system o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g comments about the e f f i c a c y of the C o u n c i l s : "they applauded the change" (10:2), "there was general concurrence ... that the C o u n c i l s should go" (7:2), and "there was r e a l l y not any t e a r s shed f o r the C o u n c i l s " (8:8). Thus there was no element of s u r p r i s e i n the p o l i c y f o r the system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . On the other hand, the p o l i c y changing the composition of the C o l l e g e Boards was proclaimed i n a somewhat d i f f e r e n t context. There were a number of o r g a n i s a t i o n s t r u c t u r a l problems t o do with the e x i s t i n g College Boards. For i n s t a n c e , the s i z e of some Boards was unmanageable, members were f i n d i n g the t a s k s of s e r v i n g on the School Boards as w e l l as the College Board onerous, the involvement and i n f l u e n c e of f a c u l t y on College Boards was seen as suspect, and a c e r t a i n amount of p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m was being r e c e i v e d by the Government from School Boards. There was mixed r e a c t i o n t o the announcement of the change i n the composition of the C o l l e g e Boards. Many respondents t a l k e d i n terms of the c o l l e g e s ' 'maturity' and 'coming of age' when the Boards were l e g a l l y separated from the School Boards, but others decried the move as "a retrograde step and an anti-democratic step" (11:7). I b _ _ M i n i s t r y _ 0 f f i c e In 1970 when t e c h n i c a l and v o c a t i o n a l schools were being melded with the more r e c e n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d two year or community c o l l e g e s , the M i n i s t e r of Education appointed a team of four 9 0 people t o form the inaugural Department of Post-Secondary Education. This team q u i c k l y expanded and included more than f i f t y by the time the intermediary C o u n c i l s were e s t a b l i s h e d . In 1986 the p r o v i n c i a l Government appointed a M i n i s t e r f o r Post- Secondary Education, and w h i l s t the o f f i c e was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l post-secondary education i n c l u d i n g u n i v e r s i t i e s and i n s t i t u t e s as wel l as community c o l l e g e s , only s i x s t a f f were t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Department from the U n i v e r s i t y s e c t o r , but 117 from the Education s e c t o r . I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h i s number w i l l s t a b i l i s e at something between 105 and 110 employees, according t o one senior o f f i c e r . People employed i n the o f f i c e of the M i n i s t r y are very i n v o l v e d i n the implementation of governance p o l i c i e s , and as such t h e i r perceptions of the p o l i c i e s and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n have an important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o make to the system and t o t h i s study. Many who were interviewed i d e n t i f i e d both the c o n f l i c t s which had e x i s t e d between the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e and the intermediary C o u n c i l s , and the p r e v a i l i n g strength of the former group i n the implementation of governance p o l i c i e s . INIiBESI_GROyP_ACIiyiIY The number of formal o r g a n i s a t i o n s that c o n s t i t u t e s the c o l l e g e system i s ex t e n s i v e , and i n c l u d e s the e l e c t e d Government and Opposition, the o f f i c e of the M i n i s t r y , the previously-mentioned C o u n c i l s w h i l e they were i n e x i s t e n c e , and the i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e g e s , which can be f u r t h e r d i v i d e d i n t o governing Boards, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , academic c o u n c i l s or committees, f a c u l t y , student 91 groups, and the l i k e . This s e c t i o n w i l l focus a t t e n t i o n on the p r i n c i p a l i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t groups w i t h i n the system, i n an attempt t o i d e n t i f y the r o l e of each i n i n f l u e n c i n g the implementation of p o l i c i e s on c o l l e g e governance. Ib__lQtercnediar__Counci_s Three intermediary C o u n c i l s were e s t a b l i s h e d by l e g i s l a t i o n i n B.C. f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of the fourteen r e g i o n a l c o l l e g e s and s i x p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e s . ^ The Act r e q u i r e d the M i n i s t e r t o " e s t a b l i s h , i n c o n s u l t a t i o n with the c o u n c i l s , p o l i c y r e s p e c t i n g post-secondary education and t r a i n i n g i n the Province" (Colleges and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act,1977:3(1)(a)>. Although the Act e s t a b l i s h e d the three C o u n c i l s as separate c o r p o r a t i o n s , i t made no p r o v i s i o n e i t h e r i n the l e g i s l a t i o n , o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e or p o l i c i e s f o r them t o c o n s u l t one another. Southern and Dennison noted an intermediary body i s one organisational mechanise by which many governments have sought to monitor the expenditures of public money ... while simultaneously respecting, to the extent practicable, Ctheir institution's] autonomy in the interests of preserving academic freedom (1985:79). The B.C. Government e s t a b l i s h e d the C o u n c i l s p a r t l y t o monitor the r a p i d l y r i s i n g p u b l i c expenditure on the c o l l e g e system, as w e l l as t o coordinate n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l v o c a t i o n a l programs. However, the Executive Committee of the Management Advisory Council noted one serious problem is that the Councils have accepted restrictions which seem contrary to the Act. Section 52(1)(d) makes i t clear that M.A.C. shall allocate funds for a l l programs not assigned to another council ... In other words, a l l funds to institutions should flow through one of the three Councils, ... Funds for Continuing Education and much of Adult Basic Education short-circuited the Councils in 1979 (November , 1979: 2) . T h i s was one of the many c o o r d i n a t i o n problems t h a t i r r i t a t e d o f f i c e r s of the C o u n c i l s , M i n i s t r y s t a f f and c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . The Management Adv i s o r y C o u n c i l ' s e x e c u t i v e r e p o r t e d t h a t c o o r d i n a t i o n and communication between the t h r e e C o u n c i l s was s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d when they observed t h a t " i n p r a c t i c e , i n t e r — c o u n c i l communication has been imperfect or worse" (November,1979:3). Hoi1ick-Kenyon seemed t o o v e r s t a t e the case when he r e p o r t e d i n h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n on the c o o r d i n a t i o n of community c o l l e g e s i n B.C., t h a t "persons i n B r i t i s h Columbia today are completely opposed t o c o o r d i n a t i o n of any kind" (1979:41). These C o u n c i l s were t o be s h o r t l i v e d , being d i s s o l v e d by a Government of the same p o l i t i c a l p a r t y t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d them, i n l e s s than f o u r y e a r s . R e a c t i o n s from s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n t e r v i e w e d r e f l e c t e d a f e e l i n g of resentment a g a i n s t the C o u n c i l s , from persons i n the c o l l e g e s and the M i n i s t r y , f o r usurping the power and a u t h o r i t y t h a t once were t h e i r s . The environment i n which th e C o u n c i l s operated i s summarised i n a p o s i t i o n paper endorsed by the Management Adv i s o r y C o u n c i l i n August 1981. 1 a lack or [ s i c ] coordination and i n t e r r e l a t i o n between educational program planning and funding, and that of support services, c a p i t a l equipment and f a c i l i t i e s ; 2 a d i v i s i o n of accountability, among the a l l o c a t i n g agencies to the Minister, and from the i n s t i t u t i o n s to the a l l o c a t i n g agencies 3 a d i f f e r e n t Bhil.05gp.hi. cal aggrgach to program approvals• between the Academic Council and the Occupational Training Council as well as an incomprehensible d i v i s i o n of program responsibi1ity; 4 a lack of clear role d e f i n i t i o n of the agencies involved - Ministry, Councils, Boards, ministry s t a f f , etc.; 5 tog much invglyement by council in the d e t a i l of i n s t i t u t i o n a l operational budgets; 6 an unaddressed need for short and long terra glanning at the i.Q§titutignal level and at the g r g v i n c i a l level, which i s responsive to needs; 7 an u n r e a l i s t i c set of annual, deadlines for budget estimates and a l l o c a t i o n s which LIDEQse a severe constraint on e f f e c t i v e decision-making and planning a c t i v i t i e s at the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l (Management Advisory Counci1,1981:3). The Occupational T r a i n i n g Council Fo l l o w i n g recommendations of the 'Goard Commission' (1977), the p r o v i n c i a l Government decided t o e s t a b l i s h the Occupational T r a i n i n g C o u n c i l . This Council was t o provide a more e f f i c i e n t means of c o o r d i n a t i n g p r o v i n c i a l and f e d e r a l programs, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the t r a d e s t r a i n i n g areas. According t o some respondents the formation of t h i s Occupational T r a i n i n g Council was 'very important' t o the M i n i s t r y of Labour t o maintain l i a i s o n with the unions. But i t was perceived by others i n another way. "The O.T.C. q u i t e c l e a r l y perceived t h e i r r o l e as a d i r e c t i o n a l component w i t h i n the system" (8:5), and c o n f l i c t arose because of the "debating forum" (1:10) t h a t e x i s t e d i n that C o u n c i l , as we l l as the perceived excessive c o n t r o l over the f u n c t i o n i n g of the c o l l e g e s . Furthermore, t h i s Council c o n s i s t e d of persons who possessed experience i n the p r e v i o u s l y operated p r o v i n c i a l v o c a t i o n a l s c h o o l s , which formed a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i s e d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . The Occupational T r a i n i n g Council had c e n t r a l i s e d a great deal of decision-making, most of which had been p r e v i o u s l y c a r r i e d out by the College Boards. 94 The Management Advisory Council The Management Advisory Council c o n s i s t e d of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a l l c o l l e g e s and i n s t i t u t e s i n the province; under the p r o v i s i o n s of the o r i g i n a l Act a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e could be the chairman of the College Board or a person designated by the chairman. The p r a c t i c e was f o r c o l l e g e chairmen t o nominate e i t h e r the c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l or d i r e c t o r , or some other person; i n at l e a s t one case th a t nominee was not even a College Board member. I t was then r e a l i s e d t h a t the employees of the Boards could i n f a c t make d e c i s i o n s and recommendations which were bi n d i n g on the Boards, or t h a t the Council could c o n s i s t of non-Board members. The Act was subsequently amended t o read "the chairman of the board of each i n s t i t u t i o n or a member of the board of each i n s t i t u t i o n designated by the chairman" (College and I n s t i t u t e Act Amend- ment, 1980:4: 15) . The Management Advisory Council was authorised t o : (a) require an i n s t i t u t i o n to prepare and forward to i t , in a form and by a date designated by i t , the f i n a n c i a l requests to the Government for the next f i s c a l year covering those programs that are not the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of another c o u n c i l , (b) receive, review and coordinate the f i n a n c i a l requests received from the i n s t i t u t i o n s under paragraph (a), (c) make recommendations to the Minister, by a date designated by him, respecting the f i n a n c i a l requests received under paragraph (a), (d) a l l o c a t e to the i n s t i t u t i o n s funds provided by the Government for programs that are not the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of another council (Colleges and P r o v i n c i a l I n s t i t u t e s Act,1977:Section 52). Interviewees expressed the view t h a t t h i s was an e f f e c t i v e Council f o r p a r t i c i p a t i v e management in—as—much as a l l c o l l e g e s were represented. The Academic C o u n c i l The Academic C o u n c i l was r e s p o s i b l e f o r s Those programs of study usually considered as [sic] appropriate to the f i r s t and second years of a university education; most of the career oriented technical studies, and a few areas of vocational study which are closely allied to one or the other of these categories (Academic Counci 1 ,1979s 7) . It a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t i t had e s t a b l i s h e d s p e c i f i c committees i n i t s f i r s t year of o p e r a t i o n s t o address "unmet o p p o r t u n i t i e s at the l e v e l of system-wide p o l i c i e s and p l a n s " (Academic C o u n c i l , 1979s10). In a r e p o r t requested by the M i n i s t e r of E d u c a t i o n , the Management Adv i s o r y C o u n c i l (see p.92) p u b l i s h e d the i d e n t i f i e d 'problem a r e a s ' of the t h r e e C o u n c i l system which r e v e a l e d among other t h i n g s t h a t t h e r e was "a d i f f e r e n t e b i i g s g g n i c a i aggroach t o program app r o v a l s between the Academic C o u n c i l and the Occupational T r a i n i n g C o u n c i l as well as an incomprehensible d i v i s i o n of program r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " (Management Adv i s o r y C o u n c i l , 1981s3). So the implementation of the Government's c o o r d i n a t i n g p o l i c i e s caused severe d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . Many of the people i n t e r v i e w e d from the M i n i s t r y , C o l l e g e Boards, or p r o f e s s i o n a l c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i d e n t i f i e d the d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i e s being e x e r c i s e d by the t h r e e C o u n c i l s as causing c o n f 1 i c t . Qther_Interest_Grguc)s There are a number of important l e g a l l y - c o n s t i t u t e d groups which form an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the c o l l e g e system a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and i n t e r a c t with the major p l a y e r s i n the implementation of governance p o l i c i e s , but are not i n c l u d e d i n the p r o v i n c i a l 96 Government's l e g i s l a t i v e or p o l i c y d e s c r i p t i o n s o-f the c o l l e g e system. The most prominent groups i n c l u d e the C o u n c i l of C o l l e g e P r i n c i p a l s i n B.C., the B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of C o l l e g e s , and the C o l l e g e - I n s t i t u t e E d u c a t o r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n of B.C. The B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of C o l l e g e s T h i s a s s o c i a t i o n known as (B.C.A.C.) was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n 1976, and comprises r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a l l community C o l l e g e Boards i n B.C. " I t r e p r e s e n t s the i n t e r e s t s , and f u r t h e r s the cause, of each board" (B.C.A.C. pamphlet), as well as c o o r d i n a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the community c o l l e g e s e c t o r . I t employs a f u l l - t i m e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r , and has played a major r o l e i n the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the c o l l e g e system. I t s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d the o p e r a t i o n a l d r a f t of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement i s s u e d by the M i n i s t r y i n March 1983. The C o l l e g e - I n s t i t u t e E d u c a t o r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n The C o l l e g e - I n s t i t u t e E ducators' A s s o c i a t i o n of B.C. (C.I.E.A.) was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1980 as the successor o r g a n i s a t i o n t o the C o l l e g e F a c u l t i e s F e d e r a t i o n . From an i n i t i a l membership of e i g h t f a c u l t y unions, C.I.E.A. has grown t o i n c l u d e twelve f a c u l t y unions r e p r e s e n t i n g approximately 2,100 f u l l - t i m e e q u i v a l e n t f a c u l t y at t h i r t e e n d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t i s a conglomeration of independent c o l l e g e f a c u l t y unions, and i s r e g i s t e r e d under the S o c i e t i e s Act of B.C. [It] lobbies the government, Ministry o f f i c i a l s , the opposition and other interest groups on matters pertaining to colleges and institutes ... maintains media contacts, issues press releases and arranges media coverage of college-institute issues ... [and] acts in coalition with teacher, student, parent, labour and other groups (C. I. E. A. , 1985s 5) . I t s stand on c o l l e g e governance i s s u e s i s perhaps most s u c c i n c t l y recorded i n a paper i t r e c e n t l y prepared f o r the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) Task Force on Education. During the period from 1982 to 1986 ... the government has increasingly centralised the system and has subordinated educational objectives to economic and po l i t i c a l ones ... By means of a nest of legislation and policy, the provincial government has achieved greater control and direction of the college-institute system by radically centralizing the governance, funding, and operation of the system ... At the heart of many of the most serious problems in the college-institute system today i s the structure of the college and institute boards (C.I.E.A.,1986:2-4). The C L E . A. submitted a comprehensive r e p o r t on the e f f e c t s of the Act and i n p a r t i c u l a r "the widespread discontent w i t h i n c o l l e g e s and i n s t i t u t e s with the t h r e e - c o u n c i l system" (1982:13). They were a l s o lobbying against c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of system decision-making and the composition of the Co l l e g e Boards. Although the membership of t h i s group i s predominantly f a c u l t y members, t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on the c o l l e g e system i s such t h a t i t was considered important t o i n c l u d e them as an i n t e r e s t group i n the c o l l e g e governance s t r u c t u r e . The B.C. Council of P r i n c i p a l s Many of those interviewed t e s t i f i e d t o the i n f l u e n c e exerted on implementing system governance p o l i c i e s by t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n whose f u l l t i t l e i s 'Council of P r i n c i p a l s of the B.C./Yukon Colleges and I n s t i t u t e s ' . I t i s an ad hoc o r g a n i s a t i o n which comprises a l l p r i n c i p a l s of the f i f t e e n community c o l l e g e s included i n t h i s study, and as a body seeks "to provide l e a d e r s h i p t o c o l l e g e and i n s t i t u t e education" (Council of P r i n c i p a l s , Terms of Reference, 1985:2). Comments such as "the Council of P r i n c i p a l s ... was 98 s t r o n g l y i n support o-f the demise of the C o u n c i l s " (20:2), "the recent r e v i s i o n t o the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s was i n i t i a t e d by the Council of P r i n c i p a l s " (22:17), and "the Council of P r i n c i p a l s ... serves that purpose L"a group t h a t could argue with the Government i n the place of the C o u n c i l s ] now" (21:1), r e v e a l the perceived importance of t h i s group. They see one of t h e i r f u n c t i o n s as: reviewing position papers, policies or procedures of the Ministry of Education, which are of general interest to the Council of Principals and advising the Ministry [and] individual institutions as to the position of the Council where such communication is warranted (Terms of Reference, 1985: 2) . This a s s o c i a t i o n comprising small numbers, i s perceived t o exert c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on the governance of the c o l l e g e system. IHE_ACTORS Within t h i s system there i s a wide range of a d m i n i s t r a t o r behaviour t h a t a f f e c t s the implemention of governance p o l i c i e s . Easton's (1965B) conceptual framework provides a v a l u a b l e means of i d e n t i f y i n g the important a c t o r s i n the study, whose perceptions can then be examined. Within a l l p o l i t i c a l systems there are persons or groups of persons responding t o the v a r i o u s f o r c e s a c t i n g on that system. "The e x i s t e n c e of a p o l i t i c a l system" argues Easton "must i n c l u d e p l u r a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s through which the i n d i v i d u a l members are l i n k e d t o each other and through which the p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s of the system are pursued" (19658:177). Actors must be drawn from the L e g i s l a t u r e , the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e , the c o l l e g e s and t h e i r d i v e r s e grouping of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and i n t e r e s t groups. 99 Because implementation e f f o r t s can vary according t o the composition, d i s p o s i t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n of the a c t o r s and the c o n d i t i o n s of the environment, i t i s necessary t o take account of a l l key a c t o r s . A l i s t of people implementing the governance p o l i c i e s f o r the community c o l l e g e system must i n c l u d e not only c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and o f f i c e r s attached t o the M i n i s t r y , but a l s o those i n the other i n t e r e s t groups o u t l i n e d above. This study takes i n t o account those who are engaged on a f u l l - t i m e and part-time b a s i s i n a d m i n i s t e r i n g the community c o l l e g e system w i t h i n B.C. For a v a r i e t y of reasons many of the occupants of such p o s i t i o n s would not want t o be i d e n t i f i e d with a p o l i t i c a l community, but Easton a s s e r t s "we are s a i d t o be p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e when our a c t i v i t y r e l a t e s i n some way t o the making and execution of p o l i c y f o r a s o c i e t y " (1967:128). This c l e a r l y demands the i n c l u s i o n of M i n i s t e r s of Education, Deputy M i n i s t e r s , A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r s , and D i r e c t o r s from the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e as well as c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l s , d i r e c t o r s , Board chairmen and members. The o f f i c e r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r community c o l l e g e governance i n each of the i n t e r e s t groups p r e v i o u s l y i d e n t i f i e d would a l s o be members i n the p o l i t i c a l system. A l i s t of s p e c i f i c a c t o r s i n t e r v i e w e d , are i d e n t i f i e d i n Appendix Four. SUMMARY The c o l l e g e system has evolved something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , a or i e n t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , where i n t o i t s present c o n d i t i o n from c o l l e c t i o n of strong community- l o c a l r e s i d e n t s c o n t r i b u t e d both 100 f i n a n c i a l l y and by s e r v i n g on governing Boards. The d e c l a r a t i o n of the C o l l e g e s and P r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e Act (1977) i n t r o d u c e d a new p r o v i n c i a l dimension and provided some l e g a l governance boundaries. The p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e which l e d t o the development of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement was c a r r i e d out i n an environment where t h e r e was a great deal of ambiguity with r e s p e c t t o the r o l e of the community c o l l e g e i n the p o s t - secondary education s e r v i c e of the p r o v i n c e . "The system d i d not ... have a w e l l - d e f i n e d sense of g o a l s " (4:19) s a i d one respondent, and "the statements were developed at a time t h a t t h e r e was a l o t of ... debate about what's going t o happen t o the system" (9:14) e x p l a i n e d another. A l l t h i s "at a time when t h i n g s were s t a r t i n g t o get r a t h e r tumultuous both w i t h i n the system, and w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e i n g e n e r a l " (8:29). These comments r e f l e c t some of the p r e s s u r e s both from w i t h i n the system and a l s o from the environment with which i t i n t e r a c t s . Most s t u d e n t s of p o l i c y implementation have accepted the view taken by Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) who i d e n t i f i e d t he l a c k of r e s o u r c e s f o r implementing the p o l i c y as a most important f a c t o r . In the case of the present study, the system, while s t i l l being pressured by a shortage of r e s o u r c e s , was s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t i n f l u e n c e s , because the implementation of one of the p o l i c i e s a c t u a l l y reduced expenditure. Those who were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t i n the p r o v i n c e attempted t o encourage c o l l e g e s t o "be s u p p o r t i v e of the economic development a s p i r a t i o n s of Government" (7:11). 101 The promulgation of the three governance p o l i c i e s emerged from a somewhat h o s t i l e environment, one c h a r a c t e r i s e d by f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . From the environment came demands f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of r o l e s w i t h i n the decision-making framework of the c o l l e g e system. The three p o l i c i e s were meant t o address t h i s . A period of economic c o n s t r a i n t produced some s i g n i f i c a n t pressures on the governance of the c o l l e g e / p o l i t i c a l system. F i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t was perceived a l s o t o have caused the Government t o c o n t r o l more of the decision-making with respect t o program approvals w i t h i n the c o l l e g e s by f o s t e r i n g more v o c a t i o n a l l y - o r i e n t e d courses. There was con s i d e r a b l e s o c i a l pressure on the system t o r e t a i n the o r i g i n a l mandate of the c o l l e g e s , that i s t o serve the needs o f , and be governed by, the l o c a l community. The B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of Co l l e g e s had r a i s e d s e v e r a l concerns with the M i n i s t r y , as had the C.I.E.A. because of the tendency t o c e n t r a l i s e decision-making of the c o l l e g e system i n the M i n i s t r y . Many groups i n the environment c a l l e d f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s throughout the whole system. The other p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e t h a t can be perceived i s the changes of people w i t h i n the system. Changes of M i n i s t e r s , bureaucrats and i n t e r e s t group e x e c u t i v e s , not t o mention s t a f f changes i n c o l l e g e s , i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y a l t e r the p o l i t i c a l f o c i w i t h i n the system. Evidence of a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i n the previous governance s t r u c t u r e demanded changes of va r i o u s magnitudes, and the demise of the C o u n c i l s was i n i t i a t e d by many i n t e r e s t groups. Demands 102 emerged l a r g e l y -from perceptions of c o l l e g e s ' 'maturity', where i n s t i t u t i o n s were seen t o r e q u i r e the support of the School Boards no longer, and as a r e s u l t of the perceived t h r e a t of c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making. Implementors of governance p o l i c i e s were defined as those whose f u l l - t i m e occupation was predominantly concerned with c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p l u s C o l l e g e Board members, and included p o l i t i c i a n s , M i n i s t r y s t a f f and c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . Other i n t e r e s t groups such as B.C.A.C., C L E . A . , and the Council of P r i n c i p a l s , are shown t o be boundary spanning groups which sought to i n f l u e n c e governance p o l i c i e s . In t h i s chapter are i d e n t i f i e d some of the i n t e r e s t groups and a c t o r s through which i n t e r a c t i o n took place. I t provides a u s e f u l backdrop against which t o examine the documented and perceived i n t e n t i o n s of those who took the three p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s , and against which t o analyse p o l i c y implementors' perception of outcomes. The data on the perceived i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , and the outcomes perceived by implementors, are reported i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. NOTES ON CHAPTER FOUR 1. Quotations without name or date are drawn from t r a n s c r i p t s of i n t e r v i e w s , which are o r i g i n a l source data. 2. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA, (March 19S3) Post Secondary Department, lQtegrated_Fiye_Year_Planni G Q l l f=9e_and_Institute_System System_Ob_ecti yes___982-87. 3. The three p r i v a t e post-secondary i n s t i t u t i o n s operating i n the 1960's were Columbia C o l l e g e , T r i n i t y Western C o l l e g e , Notre Dame. 4. Kwantlen C o l l e g e , a f i f t e e n t h community c o l l e g e , was e s t a b l - ished i n 1980, and i n 1985 two i n s t i t u t e s were merged, the B.C. I n s t i t u t e of Technology and the P a c i f i c Vocational I n s t i t u t e . 104 C H A P T E R F I V E THE INTENTIONS AND PERCEIVED OUTCOMES OF THREE GOVERNANCE POLICIES I n t e n t i o n s t h a t are documented by p o l i c y formulators are s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by both f o r m u l a t o r s ' and implementors' perceptions. These i n tu r n i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c y outcomes, as do elements of p o l i c y design. " I n i t i a l statements of p o l i c y are expected t o set boundaries w i t h i n which implementation w i l l occur" (Nakamura & Smal1wood,1980:32). Whilst i t i s often d i f f i c u l t t o i s o l a t e p r e c i s e l y what t o i n c l u d e i n the ' i n i t i a l ' statement of p o l i c y , such statements form the conceptual input of the p o l i t i c a l systems theory. The l i t e r a t u r e reviewed i n Chapter Two i d e n t i f i e d some important v a r i a b l e s with respect t o p o l i c y changes made during implemen- t a t i o n . The questions generated from that review formed the b a s i s of questions asked of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s during i n t e r v i e w s i n t h i s study. Questions were asked having t o do with communication, c o n s u l t a t i o n , the degree of ac t u a l change, perceived i n t e n t i o n s and commitment t o p o l i c i e s . These elements were a l l assumed t o have s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e during p o l i c y implementation. P o l i c i e s can be expressed i n a v a r i e t y of ways (Hi 11,1983:74). This chapter attempts t o unravel some of the i n t e r a c t i o n and report the boundaries of the p o l i c i e s , as d e l i n e a t e d both by the documented and perceived i n t e n t i o n s of p o l i c y formulators and the outcomes perceived by p o l i c y implementors. Emphasis i s placed on anal y s i n g the communication elements, such as the degree of c o n s u l t a t i o n e x e r c i s e d during p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and the p e r c e i v e d degree o-f change i n the system or t h r e a t t o the system p e r c e i v e d by implementors. The chapter w i l l be presented i n th r e e p a r t s with each p a r t r e p o r t i n g , with r e s p e c t t o a given p o l i c y , t h e documented i n t e n t i o n s , the p e r c e i v e d p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s as d e c l a r e d by f o r m u l a t o r s , the communication l i n k a g e s and p o l i c y outcomes as p e r c e i v e d by the implementors. These headings a l i g n with the important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of p o l i c y implementation i d e n t i f i e d i n Chapter Two. Each p a r t w i l l a l s o d e s c r i b e the p e r c e i v e d communication l i n k a g e s between f o r m u l a t o r s and implementors. The p o l i c i e s w i l l be analysed i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order of e n d o r s a t i o n by the Government of B.C. No attempt i s made t o l o c a t e the sources of the t h r e e p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . Kogan a s s e r t s : The sources of policy generation are so d i f f i c u l t to locate, let alone place in any logical pattern, that detecting changes in values, or the pressures by which change i s effected, is more a matter of art than of analysis (1975:23). P A R T O N E THE POLICY INTRODUCING SYSTEM MISSION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES P a r t One of t h i s chapter a n a l y s e s the i n t e n t i o n s and outcomes of the Government's i n i t i a t i v e t o develop Integrated F i v e Year Planning f o r the B r i t i s h Columbia C o l l e g e and I n s t i t u t e System (1983). The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement was probably t h e f i r s t major governance i n i t i a t i v e a f t e r t he d e c l a r a t i o n of the C o l l e g e s and I n s t i t u t e s Act; i t formulated the p r o v i n c i a l Government's p e r s p e c t i v e on the c o l l e g e system. For some time c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s had been ask i n g the 1 0 6 Government f o r more s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s p e r t a i n i n g t o the d i r e c t i o n o-f c o l l e g e s p a r t l y because of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of unp r e d i c t a b l e d e c i s i o n s on program approval and funding w i t h i n the system, and p a r t l y as c o l l e g e s moved toward a greater u n i f o r m i t y p r o v i n c e - wide (Dennison,1986As10). Part One w i l l be presented i n four s e c t i o n s ; the documented i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y ; the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s as perceived by the p o l i c y formulators; the communication l i n k a g e s i n r e l a t i o n t o the p o l i c y ; and the p o l i c y outcomes as perceived by the p o l i c y implementors which were each supported i n l i t e r a t u r e . These w i l l be f ollowed by a d i s c u s s i o n of the f i n d i n g s on the p o l i c y . DQCy_E_IED_POLICY_I_IENI The f i r s t p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e on governance of the c o l l e g e system was introduced l e s s a b r u p t l y than the f o l l o w i n g two, in-as-much as d r a f t s of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s statement were widely c i r c u l a t e d , debated and r e w r i t t e n before being adopted by the M i n i s t e r of Education^. However, a l e t t e r t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s appended t o the document provides an o f f i c i a l statement on the r e v i s e d r o l e of c o l l e g e s as apparently expected by the Government. In i t the c o l l e g e s were c a l l e d upon t o sharpen t h e i r focus upon p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l g o a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y economic and manpower needs, r a t h e r than continue t h e i r emphasis on the defined needs of the l o c a l r e g i o n . I t was "intended t o serve as the b a s i s f o r the prepar a t i o n of long and short term plans by each of the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of the c o l l e g e s and i n s t i t u t e system" ( M i n i s t r y of Education,B.C.,1983Cs3). 107 The governance objectives were designed to contribute to the overall mission of the system, and to c l a r i f y the p r o v i n c i a l Government's s p e c i f i c goals and objectives. "The system w i l l operate through an organizational structure that w i l l , through i t s individual components, develop, co-ordinate, and deli v e r education to achieve common purposes" (Ministry of Education, B.C.,1983C:9). The o f f i c i a l document records four primary objectives, and because each of the subsections dealing with the * decision—making structure' objective commences with the word 'preserve', one may assume that the document was not designed to introduce any major change to the governance of the system. OBJECTIVE A 1. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES In the 1982-87 period, the college and institute system will have three levels of decision-making responsibility. The organiz- ations at each level will be cohesive. Appropriate and necessary lay, community-appointed representation and input will be included. The system M i l l : a) preserve the overall provincial policy-making responsib- i l i t y , decision-making capacity, and accountability of the Minister and the Government b) preserve an intermediate level structure, comprising one or more Council(s), which can provide input to the Government and to educational institutions based on a provincial perspective c) preserve the responsibility of the Boards of colleges and institutes for developing institutional policy relating to the delivery of education consistent with their region- specific or program-specific mandates (Ministry of Education,B.C.,19Q3C:11). Governance was the f i r s t i n a l i s t of eight goals. It was clear "the purpose of t h i s goals and objectives document i s to provide an overall framework, for the co-ordinated planning of the college and i n s t i t u t e education" (Minister of Education B.C.,1983C:5). The Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement continued by providing some clear intentions with respect to consultation by those decision-making bodies. 108 In performing t h e i r functions, each of the decision-making bodies w i l l be responsible for undertaking necessary consultation in advance of making decisions. This w i l l happen as follows: a) the Minister w i l l undertake to consult with Boards and with the Council (or Councils) concerning the p r o v i n c i a l policy framework b) Council(s) w i l l be encouraged to e s t a b l i s h or continue p r o v i n c i a l advisory committees, including program advisory committees c) Boards w i l l be encouraged to take account the opinions of the educators and students through the use of i n t e r n a l program advisory committees d) i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l be expected to p a r t i c i p a t e in external program advisory committees ... ( M i n i s t r y o-f Education B.C. ,1983C: 12) . The document thus places an o b l i g a t i o n upon the M i n i s t e r t o consult both College Boards and p r o v i n c i a l C o u n c i l s with respect t o the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y -framework, which i n c l u d e s governance. A document developed i n a s s o c i a t i o n with the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement was e n t i t l e d G u i d e l i n e s f o r the P r e p a r a t i o n Sf I n s t i t u t e S t r a t e g i c and Qfjerat i onal Plans. I t assumed con s i d e r a b l e importance i n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceptions of the governance p o l i c y outcomes, because i t became the s t r a t e g y document t o a s s i s t i n the r e a l i s a t i o n of the i n t e n t i o n s of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement. I t focussed a t t e n t i o n on i n s t i t u t i o n a l planning r a t h e r than system planning, but g i v e s an idea of the general M i n i s t r y impact on c o l l e g e s when, i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , i t s t a t e s : In 1987, a major system wide review wi l l be undertaken of the outcomes of the strategic planning process. This review wi l l coincide with the analysis of the 'reasons, i f any', for the continued existence of colleges and institutes, which i s required under Section 66 of the College and Institute Act ( M i n i s t e r of Education B.C.,1983A:1). 109 P i R Q i i y i D _ P Q L I C Y _ I N T E N T I O N S Both p o l i c y -formulators and implementors were asked the question: "In your o p i n i o n , was the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement intended as a major change t o the c o l l e g e system, as f a r as governance i s concerned?" One p o l i c y formulator saw the statement thus: The most important intentions were to signal to the institutions that there was an overall philosophy and direction at work here, and the Government assumed responsibility for stating that ... i t was a signal that the world has changed in respect to colleges, that kind of signal had often been given through the budget systems and through new legislation, and through speeches that the Minister might give in the house, or any number of other vehicles. But certainly in the B.C. system, this was the f i r s t time i t had ever been attempted through an actual policy statement (4:20). Another respondent b e l i e v e d that i t was intended as a major change. However, s i x out of the e i g h t p o l i c y f ormulators interviewed agreed that t h i s p o l i c y "wasn't intended as a v e h i c l e f o r d i r e c t i n g the system i n a new d i r e c t i o n " (9:14). P o l i c y implementors' opinions as t o whether i t was intended t h a t t h i s p o l i c y would provide a major impetus f o r change t o the governance of the system were evenly s p l i t . There were implementors who perceived t h a t " i t was intended t o represent a major change" (21:21), which was supported by a s s e r t i o n s such as; "Oh yes, sure i t was ... They were very d e l i b e r a t e l y c e n t r a l i s i n g and going f o r t h i s c o n t r o l decision-making" (15:15). There were those who f e l t t h a t " i t i s probably the l e a s t profound of the M i n i s t r y d e c i s i o n s over recent years" (11:9), and another a d m i n i s t r a t o r asserted: It was not either a subtle or a mischievous effort to change anything at a l l other than in institutions where we planned day by day, or week by week, to have us get a sense of longer term direction. No i t was not intended to produce major change (14:16). In summary, a maj o r i t y of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s perceived t h i s p o l i c y as not intending t o change the governance s t r u c t u r e of the 110 system, although some opposed t h a t view. Indeed, p o l i c y implementors who were a l s o asked t o v e r b a l i s e t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of the i n t e n t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n the p o l i c y t o b r i n g about change were evenly d i v i d e d , with s i x implementors b e l i e v i n g i t was intended t o change the s t r u c t u r e and s i x p e r c e i v i n g t h a t no such change was intended. Another q u e s t i o n was asked r e l a t i n g t o the degree of change t h a t had occurred i n the decision-making framework of the system, but those responses w i l l be analysed under the f o l l o w i n g s u b - s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d p e r c e i v e d outcomes. Many p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s saw the i n t e n t i o n of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement as p r o v i d i n g an o v e r a l l d e f i n i t i o n and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the community c o l l e g e from the p r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t r y p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i s was the most commonly s t a t e d aim as pe r c e i v e d by i n t e r v i e w respondents. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e was a d i v e r s i t y of p e r c e i v e d i n t e n t i o n s , ranging from "the major i s s u e was the M i n i s t e r committing t o c o n s u l t with Boards on p o l i c y i s s u e s b e f o r e he made p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . I t was t r y i n g t o t i e down the M i n i s t e r " ( 7 : 9 ) , t o en s u r i n g "that the community c o l l e g e s would s e r v e the needs of the p r o v i n c e as p e r c e i v e d by the Government ... i n the most c o s t - e f f i c i e n t manner p o s s i b l e " ( 6 : 9 ) . The p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s p e r c e i v e d by respondents', are summarised i n Table F i v e ; these c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as i n t e n d i n g t o : (a) p r o v i d e governance d i r e c t i o n and c l a r i f i c a t i o n of r o l e s , (b) i n c r e a s e awareness of the p r o v i n c i a l p e r s p e c t i v e and the need f o r f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t , (c) p r o v i d e a framework f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n and system p l a n n i n g , (d) r e t a i n e d u c a t i o n a l autonomy i n c o l l e g e s . Ill TABLE 5 A SUMMARY OF POLICY FORMULATORS' PERCEPTIONS OF POLICY INTENTIONS "The goals and objectives were intended to do two things. One was to c l a r i f y , and the other was to provide a signal for change ... in the governance area ... was to simply provide t h i s as formal d i r e c t i o n ... where people cooperated with one another and where certain kinds of policy were reasonably c l e a r l y defined" (4s 18-19) . "The most important intentions were to signal to the i n s t i t u t i o n s that there was an ov e r a l l philosophy and d i r e c t i o n at work ... and ... i t was a signal that the world had changed" (4s 20). "I think we wanted to define some broad parameters i n which the system could function ... they were always asking for some defined goal or d i r e c t i o n ... t h i s simply t r i e d to take a l l of the aspects and give i t some form" (5s 13) . "To make c e r t a i n that the community colleges would serve the needs o-f the province ... in the most c o s t - e f f i c i e n t manner" (6s 9). "The intention of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was to form the parameters for the d i r e c t i o n of the college system ... the key thing was to ensure that there was appropriate consultation" (7:8). " B a s i c a l l y what we said i s that we can increase the comprehensiveness and a c c e s s i b i l i t y of the entire system" (9: 15) . "They needed to s t a r t looking at t h e i r future, coming.out of a development and growth phase and into a consolidation phase" (10s9). Questions Has it intended to preserve a high degree of educational autonomy in the col leges? "Yes d e f i n i t e l y , you w i l l not f i n d in the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement anything that smacks of t e l l i n g the colleges how to carry out educational services" (7s 12) . _____Y_____y____I____________ FQrmuIatorsJ__Know]ued There was l i t t l e doubt t h a t those concerned with the fo r m u l a t i o n of a l l three p o l i c i e s were seen t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y f a m i l i a r with the c o l l e g e system. Twenty persons were asked the question "Do you t h i n k the p o l i c y f ormulators were s u f f i c i e n t l y informed about the community c o l l e g e system?" e a r l y i n the i n t e r v i e w . Table Six summarises t h e i r responses. Although there was not complete unanimity, t h e i r opinions c o i n c i d e d s u f f i c i e n t l y t o conclude that they perceived the p o l i c y f ormulators as w e l l informed. E9C__i__D.d_.lQf Q_____-9________-9Q______9_- When examining the perceived outcomes of t h i s p o l i c y , the importance of communication l i n k s between p o l i c y f ormulators and implementors emerged c o n s i s t e n t l y , not only through the -focus of in t e r v i e w questions, but through volunteered responses i n answer to questions with a l t e r n a t i v e t a r g e t s . Such l i n k a g e s were not only important f o r conveying the meaning of the p o l i c y statement and supporting documents, but a l s o showed the environmental pressures on p o l i c y f ormulators. P o i n t s such as the e f f o r t which formulators were seen t o have made t o communicate and co n s u l t with implementors, the degree of ambiguity perceived by a l l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and the perceived absence of s a n c t i o n s and i n c e n t i v e s i n the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e , a l l played r o l e s of var y i n g importance i n l i n k i n g p o l i c y formulators with implementors. TABLE 6 SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A QUESTION ON PERCEPTIONS OF POLICY FORMULATORS' AND IMPLEMENTORS'UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM QUESTION: Do you think the policy formulators were suff ic iently in-formed about the community college system? "Oh h e l l yes ..." (4s6> . "Probably a l o t more aware than most of us give them c r e d i t f o r " ( 5 : 5 ) . "Yes, they understood" ( 6 : 4 ) . "Yes" ( 7 : 3 ) . "Sure the people within the Ministry were s u f f i c i e n t l y informed" (8s 12) . "I think so" (9s6) . "I think the p o l i t i c i a n s had t h e i r ears pretty close to events" ( 1 0 : 4 ) . "There have been a number of consultative mechanisms, and I don't want to f a u l t most Ministry o f f i c i a l s for taking pains to work out consultative committees with the Council of P r i n c i p a l s or with Boards or with the college system in general" ( l i s 3 ) . "Oh yes" (12s5) . "They don't have a detailed knowledge of colleges" ( 1 3 : 4 ) . "No ... people in p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s r e a l l y do not understand what colleges are" ( 1 4 : 4 ) . "Now you have Ministry s t a f f i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y making decisions in my opinion that are far beyond t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , to say nothing of t h e i r competence" (15s 1 ) . "Some people in the Ministry ... understand colleges" (16s 14). "No ... there was a reaction to pressure from Boards, pure and simple" (17s 2 ) . "Oh I think so, yes" (18:3) . "The Minister was probably reasonably well informed, I doubt that the others were" ( 1 9 : 5 ) . "Yes" ( 2 0 s 5 ) . "No, but that's been an ongoing problem ... of the education system" ( 2 1 s 6 ) . "Yes they've been s u f f i c i e n t l y informed" ( 2 2 : 5 ) . "Yes ... they're informed" (23:6) 114 C o n s u l t a t i o n "There was c e r t a i n l y every e f f o r t from the M i n i s t r y l e v e l t o d i s t r i b u t e them [ M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s ] t o the c o l l e g e s and get c o n s u l t a t i o n " (12:16). "I give f u l l marks t o a small group of bureaucrats on tha t i s s u e ... who t r a v e l l e d the province ... and d i d go back and r e d r a f t and r e d r a f t " (16:35). Very few respondents d i d not agree t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n between formulators and implementors was thoroughly executed during f o r m u l a t i o n . Although t h i s research considered only the e f f e c t s of the f i n a l M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s statement issued by the M i n i s t r y i n May 1983, i n the context of c o n s u l t a t i o n , the h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e on i t s fo r m u l a t i o n i s important. I t has been p r e v i o u s l y noted that the f i r s t d r a f t was dated May 1982; and respondents made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t a prolonged p e r i o d of c o n s u l t a t i o n f o l l o w e d , which apparently culminated i n a weekend seminar with M i n i s t r y s t a f f , c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n c l u d i n g Board members, and i n t e r e s t groups. At t h i s meeting p o l i c y i s s u e s were discussed openly and the B.C.A.C. agreed t o r e v i s e the document, but maintain the t h r u s t of the seminar d i s c u s s i o n s and preserve the M i n i s t r y purpose. One M i n i s t r y o f f i c e r observed: if there was any one thing that to me was a signal that our process had worked, and that we had that kind of consultation, i t was that particular event (4:23). Indeed, i n a l e t t e r t o c o l l e g e and i n s t i t u t e Board chairmen, the A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r of Education s t a t e d t h a t the r e v i s e d statement forwarded t o the M i n i s t e r f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n was " i d e n t i c a l t o the March 8 1983, document prepared by the B.C.A.C. and forwarded t o me as a statement of the A s s o c i a t i o n ' s understanding of the i n t e n t of the M i n i s t r y " ( M i n i s t r y of Education, March 24,1983:1). Furthermore, the p o l i c y statement f i n a l l y enacted d i s p l a y e d a note on the cover page: This document i s identical to the draft document dated February 1983, prepared by the British Columbia Association of Colleges with the exception that Appendix B has been altered to reflect changed timelines ( M i n i s t r y of Education ,B. C. , 1983C: cover) . Ambiguity Although t h e r e was widespread acceptance t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n had occ u r r e d , t h e r e was not a s i m i l a r degree of acceptance on the que s t i o n of c l a r i t y of communication. "Some may have a l e g i t i m a t e c r i t i c i s m , s a y i n g t h a t they weren't sure what the document meant. The document was obscure and enigmatic a t times" (21:25). One respondent saw the ambiguity of the document as a ploy t o p r o v i d e f o r c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the o r g a n i s a t i o n : In the absence of any quantifiers in the Ministry's own document, then the Ministry absolutely controls the quantitites ... wherever i t suits them, they make an exception for their purpose ... so they certainly wrote their own statement so that i t wouldn't hinder them at a l l (15:18). However, t o the q u e s t i o n whether they b e l i e v e d t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t ambiguity i n the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement t o allow c o l l e g e s a reasonable degree of f l e x i b i l i t y , another respondent r e p l i e d : Yes, and that's probably why they don't worry about i t too much ... There isn't too much in there that says you cannot do this, you can interpret i t to serve your own needs, so i f that's the case why bother about i t (13:13). S t i l l other a d m i n i s t r a t o r s denied any l i n k between the system M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s and c o l l e g e f l e x i b i l i t y . " F l e x - i b i l i t y doesn't emanate from the M i s s i o n and Goals statement" (11:11), and I don't suppose the statement had to be ambiguous in order to allow f l e x i b i l i t y . I think sometimes the statements were sufficiently broad and general that there was opportunity to choose some specific responses, how we would go about doing things (12:17). 116 There was a general agreement that the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Objec t i v e s document was a very ambiguous one, not only because o-f the i s s u e s i t -failed t o address, but i n the manner i n which some of the i s s u e s were addressed. "I th i n k t h a t much of the wording was fuzzy and e q u i v o c a l " (14:19), s a i d one respondent; and another: " i t ' s rather an innocuous document r e a l l y " (18:8). C r i t i c i s m of the document's wording came from respondents both w i t h i n the M i n i s t r y and i n the c o l l e g e s . "The document i s near u n i n t e l l i g i b l e by a layman and i s only i n t e l l i g i b l e t o the p r o f e s s i o n a l t o the extent t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l can deal with jargon" (14:19). I t was a l s o g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t the document "has never been o p e r a t i o n a l i s e d " (11:11), "you can't r e f e r e n c e back t o anything i n there" (15:15), which has created c o n s i d e r a b l e f r u s t r a t i o n i n the minds of p o l i c y implementors. "We don't have c r i t e r i o n referenced decision-making, we have a b s o l u t e l y no foggy notion of what the c r i t e r i a are t h a t are going t o be a p p l i e d at any one time" (11:10). Sanctions and Incentives P o l i c y implementation a n a l y s t s such as Bardach (1977), Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) and Brewer and deLeon (1983) have noted the importance of i n c e n t i v e s and san c t i o n s i n i n f l u e n c i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of p o l i c y implementation. Therefore a question was asked of p o l i c y formulators whether i t was intended t o i n c l u d e these elements i n the p o l i c y . The response t o t h i s question was c o n s i s t e n t : "there were no formal s a n c t i o n s or rewards" (8:26). 117 Several o f f i c e r s a l l u d e d t o informal s a n c t i o n s through the r e g u l a t i o n of budgets by the M i n i s t r y . PERCEIVED JfOLICY_gyTC P o l i c y implementors were asked t o i d e n t i f y the important outcomes of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e . This request e l i c i t e d a v a r i e t y of responses. One a d m i n i s t r a t o r observed "as f a r as I can make out, there aren't any outcomes. I th i n k i t ' s l a r g e l y a non-event" ( l i s 10), w h i l s t another declared "I t h i n k the r e a l i t y i s a re d u c t i o n i n j u s t about every c o l l e g e , and the whole c o l l e g e system i s being both demeaned and diminished" (15s16). There i s no unanimity among p o l i c y implementors on the outcomes of t h i s p o l i c y , but there are some themes which emerge from the v a r i e t y of responses r e c e i v e d . Most c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l s interviewed agreed that t h e i r own c o l l e g e ' s M i s s i o n , Goals, and Objectives d i d a l i g n with those of the p r o v i n c i a l Government. Some i n t e r p r e t e d i t as mandatory, saying " c e r t a i n l y that was the i n t e n t , t h a t was the e x p l i c i t d i r e c t i o n t h a t we have been given" (14s16); another p r i n c i p a l reported "yes, we've chosen t o go that way ... when we d i d our own f i v e year p l a n , we used those same c a t e g o r i e s and developed our o b j e c t i v e s ... w i t h i n t h a t umbrella" (12:14). But the perceived outcomes encompass f a r more than a l i g n i n g c o l l e g e M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s with those of the p r o v i n c i a l Government. One of the major d i f f i c u l t i e s p o l i c y implementors perceived about the implementation of t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t the M i n i s t r y was not complying with i t s own p o l i c y statement. Table 11.8 Seven summarises responses received with regard t o t h i s t o p i c . To a question asking p o l i c y implementors t o what extent they thought t h a t the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s had changed the decision-making framework of the c o l l e g e system, the f o l l o w i n g responses were recorded: "Not at a l l " (11:12). "I don't t h i n k that i t ' s ... had any impact at a l l " (12:20). "I don't t h i n k they have" (14:22). "I don't t h i n k that i t has changed d e c i s i o n - making th a t much i n B.C." (17:8). "I don't t h i n k i t ' s changed i t at a l l " (18:11). To sum up, seven out of the twelve respondents expressed the view that the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s p o l i c y represented l i t t l e or no change i n the system governance. Three people f e l t t h a t there were changes as a r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y and one o f f i c e r remained uncommitted. C o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , i n c l u d i n g Board members, regarded i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n as of minimal s i g n i f i c a n c e . Furthermore the c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n c l u d i n g Board members tended t o see the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s statement d i m i n i s h i n g over time. Indeed the observation was shared by most p o l i c y implementors. "I don't th i n k i t made much d i f f e r e n c e ... because i n e f f e c t the system more or l e s s ignored i t a f t e r a while" (13:12). Despite the f a c t that p o l i c y formulators saw i t as the i n t e n t i o n of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s p o l i c y t o preserve a high degree of educational autonomy i n c o l l e g e s , the p o l i c y implementors saw i t from another p e r s p e c t i v e . However, one Board member remarked "I t h i n k that i t was the o b j e c t i v e " (17:9), but s t a t e d t h a t that o b j e c t i v e had not been r e a l i s e d . Nine out of twelve interviewees d i d not see the M i s s i o n , Goals, and 119 TABLE 7 SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTORS'COMMENTS ON THE MINISTRY'S LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MISSION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES POLICY. "Decisions made in V i c t o r i a are not related to college decision-making. Decisions made in the Ministry o f f i c e are too open to change generated by p o l i t i c a l whims" ( 1 1 : 9 ) . "I can't r e c a l l at any time, at a ... discussion, or negotiation with any Ministry people or Government people, that i t ' s ever been made reference to" ( 1 2 s 1 7 ) . "I think i t ' s used when i t s u i t s somebody and ignored other times. My impression i s that for most of the time i t ' s ignored" ( 1 3 : 1 6 ) . "It r e a l l y hasn't been used much at a l l " ( 1 4 : 2 0 ) . "Whenever i t s u i t s them, they make an exception for th e i r purpose" ( 1 5 : 1 8 ) . "One could r e a l l y say there hasn't been much change, because Government would have done what i t wanted anyway" (16s 2 6 ) . "I would ... prefer to see the Ministry not quite as d i c t a t o r i a l " (18s 1 3 ) . " B a s i c a l l y i t was a set of l i m i t a t i o n s or boundaries within which i n d i v i d u a l i n s t i t u t i o n s would operate, but i t didn't constrain Government in any way" ( 1 9 s 1 4 ) . "The Ministry Mission and Goals statement, over the l a s t six months has been meaningless ... the Ministry ... has made us absolutely cynical that the Ministry has any plan whatsoever in mind, because there have been 180 degree s h i f t s in operating funds and excellence funds, in c a p i t a l funds ... the practice of the Ministry has nothing to do with t h e i r Mission and Goals statement" (20s 14) . "The Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement from each i n s t i t u t i o n should have allowed i n s t i t u t i o n s at least to look down the road and say t h i s i s what we're going to do, the Ministry has said t h i s i s acceptable, but ... the i n s t i t u t i o n s can't predict what's going to happen ... i t didn't have any r e l a t i o n s h i p to r e a l i t y " ( 2 1 : 2 2 - 2 3 ) . "In terms of being an instrument to guide the operation of the system in a concerted or causal basis, i t r e a l l y i s n ' t " (22s 1 3 ) . O b j e c t i v e s as p r e s e r v i n g a high degree of e d u c a t i o n a l autonomy f o r c o l l e g e s , two respondents o f f e r e d n e u t r a l responses and one a d m i n i s t r a t o r answered, "I don't t h i n k t h a t t h e r e has been any i n t e n t i o n t o weaken the i n s t i t u t i o n s or t h e i r governance" (14:22). SyMMARY_QF_POLICY_g Dgcumented_I.ntentioQS The governance component of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s P l a n s statement was b r i e f and c o n t a i n e d fundamentally f o u r documented i n t e n t i o n s . The major i n t e n t i o n s s t a t e d i n the p o l i c y documents fo c u s on the need f o r the system t o p l a c e g r e a t e r emphasis on p r o v i n c i a l and n a t i o n a l economic and manpower needs. They a l s o c l a i m t o p r o v i d e f o r long term and s h o r t term p l a n n i n g , and s t a t e t h a t the t h r e e l e v e l s of decision-making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i l l be maintained. (a) O v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t o be h e l d by the M i n i s t e r . (b) Three l e v e l s of decision-making were t o be maintained by the M i n i s t r y , C o u n c i l and Boards. (c) C o l l e g e Boards c o n s i s t i n g of 'community-appointed' l a y persons were t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o l l e g e governance. The p o l i c y document c l e a r l y intended c o n s u l t a t i o n t o be p r a c t i s e d at a l l l e v e l s of the decision-making framework, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t the M i n i s t e r should c o n s u l t with both C o u n c i l s and Boards on p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y i s s u e s . There i s some evidence t h a t the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s 121 statement, together with the accompanying G u i d e l i n e s for the Pr.f=E_____9D of I n s t i t u t e S t r a t e g i c and Qrjeratignal Plans, d i d exert i n f l u e n c e on c o l l e g e s ' planning p e r s p e c t i v e s . However, •from the responses r e c e i v e d i t i s not c l e a r that the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Objectives p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e was the p r i n c i p a l cause o-f the perceived planning e-f-fect. P_L__i____lD__Qti_DS I t was held by the -formulators that the p o l i c y was intended t o d e f i n e and c l a r i f y the r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s of the agencies w i t h i n the system. Those who were c l o s e s t t o the f o r m u l a t i o n of the p o l i c y thought that i t was intended t o provide a framework f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n and system planning. Cgmmunicatign__in_ages Most persons interviewed considered the p o l i c y formulators t o be well-informed about the c o l l e g e system. Those most c l o s e l y associated with the f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation of t h i s p o l i c y b e l i e v e d t h a t the d r a f t documents had been widely c i r c u l a t e d , with extensive c o n s u l t a t i o n t a k i n g place during f o r m u l a t i o n . The p o l i c y was, i n the main, seen t o have been e f f e c t i v e l y communicated, but the document i t s e l f was perceived t o be very unclear and not p r a c t i c a l . Respondents b e l i e v e d t h a t no s a n c t i o n s or rewards were included i n the p o l i c y and that i t was not intended t o make a major change t o the framework f o r decision-making w i t h i n the system. ElC£eiyed_Effects P o l i c y implementors b e l i e v e d that no change had taken p l a c e i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system as a r e s u l t of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s p o l i c y statement. However, most thought th a t the i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e g e s had made an e f f o r t t o a l i g n i n s t i t u t i o n a l M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s with those of the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y statement, but a l s o observed t h a t the M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s were not constrained by t h i s p o l i c y , nor were they o b l i g e d t o remain w i t h i n i t s g u i d e l i n e s . Therefore the p o l i c y had no impact on c o l l e g e system governance. TABLE 8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY ONE DOCUMENTED INTENTIONS Greater Emphasis on P r o v i n c i a l / N a t i o n a l Economic & Manpower Needs Provide f o r Long Term & Short Term Planning C o n s u l t a t i o n t o be P r a c t i s e d at a l l L e v e l s PERCEIVED INTENTIONS Define & C l a r i f y Respective Roles of Agencies i n System Provide Framework f o r C o n s u l t a t i o n & System Planning COMMUNICATION LINKAGES Extensive C o n s u l t a t i o n Exercised Extensive Ambiguity Major Change or Threat Not Intended Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or P r a c t i s e d Formulators Knowledge S u f f i c i e n t l y Broad OUTPUTS No I n t e n t i o n s Completely R e a l i s e d PERCEIVED OUTCOMES I n s t i t u t i o n s A l i g n with P r o v i n c i a l M i s s i o n Goals & Obje c t i v e s M i n i s t r y Not Constrained by P o l i c y No C o n s u l t a t i o n f o r P r o v i n c i a l P o l i c i e s Exercised CONCLUSIONS If the perceptions of respondents were an accurate assessment of the v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s being s t u d i e d , then the f a c t t h a t they f e l t p o l i c y formulators were well-informed about the c o l l e g e system, and t h a t extensive c o n s u l t a t i o n took place p r i o r t o the p o l i c y ' s r e c e i v i n g o f f i c i a l s t a t u s , are good grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t the p o l i c y w i l l be e a s i e r t o implement than i f the case were otherwise. The other major elements which would appear to have some s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the implementation of p o l i c y were that a d m i n i s t r a t o r s considered the document very ambiguous and did not co n t a i n e i t h e r i n c e n t i v e s or sa n c t i o n s f o r implementors. According t o s c h o l a r s of implementation, these must c o n t r i b u t e t o p o l i c y s l i p p a g e . The perceived i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y do not e n t i r e l y a l i g n with the documented i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y f ormulators. Informants considered t h a t the p o l i c y was not intended t o change the governance s t r u c t u r e of the system, and indeed, one of the documents supports t h i s p o i nt-of-view by s t a r t i n g the d e s c r i p t i o n of each of the governance decision-making l e v e l s with the word, 'preserve'. However, both the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement and M i n i s t e r i a l correspondence support the notion t h a t "Occupation and Manpower development w i l l be the p r i n c i p a l area of expansion f o r the current f i v e year p e r i o d " ( M i n i s t r y of Education,B.C.,1983Cs4>. The p o l i c y documents c l e a r l y developing and executing a high major decision-making l e v e l s enunciated the i n t e n t i o n of l e v e l of c o n s u l t a t i o n among the w i t h i n the system. This i s 124 complimented by the statement " a l l s t r a t e g i e s f o r a c t i o n a r i s i n g out of the o b j e c t i v e s should be i n i t i a l l y proposed by c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of the c o l l e g e and i n s t i t u t e system, r a t h e r than by the M i n i s t r y " ( M i n i s t r y of Education,B.C.,1983Cs3). This concept was supported by the perceptions of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , as was the i n t e n t i o n t h a t the p o l i c y would form the b a s i s f o r system planning. Indeed, i n most ways the documented i n t e n t i o n s c o i n c i d e with the i n t e n t i o n s perceived by p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , which i f subsequently r e a l i s e d ; are considered outputs. P o l i c y implementors, however, saw t h i s p o l i c y as "a non-event" ( l i s 10) because the M i n i s t r y d i d not comply with i t s own p o l i c y document. With respect t o governance, implementors noted the M i n i s t e r ' s lack of commitment t o r e t a i n i n g the intermediary C o u n c i l ( s ) , p l u s they b e l i e v e d they were not consulted with respect t o p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y matters. Implementors t e s t i f i e d t hat major changes were made t o a l l aspects of c o l l e g e and system a d m i n i s t r a t i o n without r e f e r e n c e t o the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Ob j e c t i v e s statement. Despite the p o s i t i v e communication l i n k a g e s of the p o l i c y and the general c o r r e l a t i o n of perceived and documented i n t e n t i o n s , the outcomes were b e l i e v e d by system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s t o have had no r e a l e f f e c t on the system's governance s t r u c t u r e . P A R T T W O THE POLICY DISSOLVING THE INTERMEDIARY COUNCILS In J u l y 1783 the Government o-f B.C. decided t o change the governance s t r u c t u r e o-f the c o l l e g e system by a b o l i s h i n g the three intermediary C o u n c i l s which i t had e s t a b l i s h e d l e s s than four years e a r l i e r . This d e c i s i o n was promulgated i n a number of amendments made t o the Qol_l_eg.es and I n s t i t u t e Act. This Part w i l l r e p o r t the research f i n d i n g s i n r e l a t i o n t o the amendment t o a b o l i s h the intermediary C o u n c i l s . They w i l l be presented under four s e c t i o n s ; the documented i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e ; the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s ' perceived i n t e n t i o n s ; the communication l i n k a g e s incorporated i n the p o l i c y , and f i n a l l y the implementors' perceived outcomes. This Part w i l l conclude with a summary of the f i n d i n g s . I t should be noted t h a t some of the C o u n c i l s ' powers were w i t h - drawn by the M i n i s t e r before t h e i r d i s s o l u t i o n . Calder records: In 1982, the main executive function of the Councils, budgetary allocation to the institutions, had been eliminated under the powers given the Minister under the Act. At that time also, the Councils' role in program approval was eliminated (1984:86). The C o u n c i l s had a l s o s u f f e r e d budget cuts which forced them t o reduce t h e i r support s t a f f . These moves r e f l e c t some of the M i n i s t e r ' s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Council s t r u c t u r e before t h i s p o l i c y was proclaimed. _Q_yMENIED_POLICY_INIEN For the purposes of t h i s study, the documents examined concerning the a b o l i t i o n of the intermediary C o u n c i l s date from the announcement i n the L e g i s l a t u r e i n J u l y 1983, when the Col l e g e s 126 and I n s t i t u t e A c t was amended t h r o u g h B i l l 20 (1983B). T h i s B i l l •forms p a r t o f "a l a r g e p a c k a g e o f p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n ... t o ' d o w n s i z e ' t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r " ( C a l d e r , 1 9 8 4 : 8 3 ) . I t amends t h e A c t by e l i m i n a t i n g a l l r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e C o u n c i l s , and p r o c l a i m s t h e i r d i s s o l u t i o n . On the repeal of (a) section 44 of the College and I n s t i t u t e Act, the occupational t r a i n i n g c o u n c i l , (b) section 46 of the College and I n s t i t u t e Act, the academic co u n c i l , or (c) section 48 of the College and I n s t i t u t e Act, the management advisory council i s dissolved and (d) the appointment of each member of the council i s terminated, (e) a l l the r i g h t s and property of the council are transferred to and vested in the government, (f) the government assumes a l l obligations and l i a b i l i t i e s of the c o u n c i l , and (g) where paragraph (a) applies, a matter under review of the occupational t r a i n i n g council under section 29 (1) of the AEBLintLEishiB Act i s referred back to the minister under that Act ('Minister of E d u c a t i o n B.C., B i l l 20,1983B:4). A l t h o u g h t h e B i l l was q u i t e c l e a r on t h e i n t e n t o f t h e i n i t i a t i v e , i t had some f a r — r e a c h i n g e f f e c t s , w h i c h a r e d e s c r i b e d i n p a r t by o t h e r documents and by t h e p e r c e p t i o n s o f what was a c t u a l l y i n t e n d e d . When i n t r o d u c i n g t h e B i l l i n t o t h e L e g i s l a t u r e t h e M i n i s t e r o f E d u c a t i o n c l a i m e d t h a t t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u n c i l s was p a r t o f an o v e r a l l Government p o l i c y , w h i c h aimed t o a c h i e v e " t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of B o a r d s , a g e n c i e s and c o m m i s s i o n s where p r a c t i c a l " ( H a n s a r d , L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y , 1 9 8 3 : 1 3 6 6 ) . D u r i n g d e b a t e t h e M i n i s t e r s t a t e d : One of the thrusts of the Government i s to ensure a considerable degree of autonomy for colleges. There are considerable administrative burdens to be borne by them, and I think freedom and f l e x i b i l i t y in t h e i r operation should be encouraged (Hansard,1983:1367) . I t seems t h a t t h e C o u n c i l s c r e a t e d a l e v e l o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n 127 the system's o r g a n i s a t i o n t h a t was unacceptable t o most a d m i n i s t r a t o r s or i n t e r e s t groups i n the system. Respondents provided such reasons f o r the C o u n c i l s ' demise as " d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way Co u n c i l s were o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d " (4:2), "not pr o v i d i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n across the system" (8:3), and " i t simply d i d n ' t work as a v e h i c l e f o r governance" (6:1). There was strong and widespread support f o r the a b o l i t i o n of the Co u n c i l s among a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , which, according t o one in t e r v i e w e e , encouraged a high degree of c o n s u l t a t i o n and communication between the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e and c o l l e g e s on t h i s p o l i c y . A l e t t e r sent by the M i n i s t e r of Education t o a Coll e g e Board Chairman on J u l y 7th 1983, the day the B i l l was introduced i n t o the L e g i s l a t u r e , summarised some of the i n t e n t i o n s both of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y and of the changes i n the composition of College Boards. Basically what these amendments propose is the elimination o-f the three councils, the alteration of board composition so that a l l board appointments are to be made by the Lieutenant-Governor-in- Council and the strengthening of the ministerial authority to issue policies and directives ( M i n i s t e r of Education ,7: 7s 83) . These condensed i n t e n t i o n s r e v e a l s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n s of the l e g i s l a t i o n , not only t o d i s s o l v e the C o u n c i l s , but a l s o t o strengthen the M i n i s t e r ' s a u t h o r i t y , and a d e l i b e r a t e movement of formal c o n t r o l . _ERCEiyED_PQLICY_I_ A d m i n i s t r a t o r s perceived a wide v a r i e t y of i n t e n t i o n s i n the p o l i c y t o a b o l i s h the Councilss f o r i n s t a n c e , t o " r e l i e v e the burden of ... having t o e x p l a i n t o three d i f f e r e n t C o u n c i l s " 128 (10s4) was often coupled with what was perceived t o be an inherent i n t e n t i o n t o a greater degree of c e n t r a l i s e d d e c i s i o n - making. "The d e s i r e t o have as d i r e c t contact as p o s s i b l e between the Government of the day and the i n s t i t u t i o n s " (4s1), or to reduce c o s t s and t o remove the d u p l i c a t i o n of work by Co u n c i l s and the M i n i s t r y were other i n t e n t i o n s perceived. The p r e v a i l i n g account given by senior M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s was the i n t e n t i o n of s i m p l i f y i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and r e s t a t i n g the var i o u s a u t h o r i t y r o l e s of the system components. This was i n response t o mounting d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , and the confusion of r o l e s , a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which i n t e n s i f i e d during the C o u n c i l s ' e x i s t e n c e . There was c o n f l i c t between C o u n c i l s and the M i n i s t r y , C o u n c i l s and other i n s t i t u t i o n s , as we l l as among the C o u n c i l s . This p o l i c y was seen as a way t o e l i m i n a t e t h a t c o n f l i c t . The perceived i n t e n t i o n of s i m p l i f y i n g and c l a r i f y i n g the governance s t r u c t u r e of the system was expressed i n many d i v e r s e ways, and c e r t a i n l y not always i n response t o the question, "what do you b e l i e v e were the prime i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y t o a b o l i s h the three intermediary C o u n c i l s ? " Table Nine summarises some of those comments. Observations have already been made on p o l i c y f o rmulators' perc- eptions of the period of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t being imposed upon the system, nevertheless most se n i o r p u b l i c servants interviewed saw t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e as inte n d i n g t o reduce costss There were several intentions that were operating at once, among them was the Government's desire to achieve budgeting e f f i c i e n c i e s . Councils cost money at a time when ... the 129 Government said that o v e r a l l costs of operating Government should be reduced (4s 1) . TABLE 9 SUMMARY OF POLICY FORMULATORS' COMMENTS ON PERCEIVED INTENTIONS TO SIMPLIFY THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE. "The desire to have as d i r e c t contact as possible between the Government of the day and the i n s t i t u t i o n s " ( 4 s 1 ) . "I think i t was a desire to sim p l i f y ... the Councils tended to echo the work that was done by the bureaucrats" ( 5 s 1 ) . "[There] were so many questions about where the power lay and so much ambiguity, that the Ministry o f f i c i a l s concluded early in the game that they [the Councils] should be abolished" ( 6 : 2 ) . "The p r i n c i p a l r o l e [of the Ministry] ... i s to set up the structure and parameters within which the i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l function" ( 7 s 3 ) . "I would say we have b a s i c a l l y a monitoring function on governance" (8s 1 1 ) . "It was addressing the fact that there were just so many e n t i t i e s involved ... i t was an attempt to c l a r i f y what was a messy s i t u a t i o n " (9s 2 - 4 ) . "The Councils were causing a tremendous amount of problems and confusion in the i n s t i t u t i o n s because they weren't coordinating t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and al l o c a t i o n s " (10s 1) . 130 "We had t o save money every p o s s i b l e occasion we could ... Cthe Council Cs3 became a t a r g e t " (5:1). F i v e o-f the e i g h t p o l i c y •formulators i n t e r v i e w e d , gave 'cost s a v i n g ' as one of the i n t e n t i o n s behind the p o l i c y of d i s s o l v i n g the C o u n c i l s . Many of the senior bureaucrats interviewed supported the M i n i s t e r ' s c e n t r a l i s a t i o n motive f o r the p o l i c y , which became even more evident when they were asked whether the p o l i c y aimed t o delegate more a u t h o r i t y t o the c o l l e g e s . A m a j o r i t y of respondents saw i t as a matter of a u t h o r i t y moving away from the c o l l e g e s . These perceptions were f u r t h e r supported i n the responses t o a question on the perceived r o l e of the M i n i s t r y a f t e r the a b o l i t i o n of the C o u n c i l s . Responses included not only "the a l l o c a t i o n of d o l l a r s " (5:4) but a l s o "program d i r e c t i o n " (4:5), and "we tend t o ... concentrate an enormous amount on the e v a l u a t i o n or the assessment of programing methods w i t h i n an i n s t i t u t i o n " (5:4). These comments i l l u s t r a t e the amount of c o n t r o l which was assumed t o be i n t e g r a l t o t h e i r c o o r d i n a t i n g f u n c t i o n . Another important observation can be made from the responses of p o l i c y f ormulators on the Government i n i t i a t i v e t o a b o l i s h the C o u n c i l s ; a f t e r i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r own perceived i n t e n t i o n s , most affi r m e d t h a t those i n t e n t i o n s were being r e a l i s e d . Again, most responded i n a way t h a t c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t they d i d not a n t i c i p a t e any unforeseen negative e f f e c t s from the implementation of t h i s p o l i c y . 13 3. PQLICY_COMMUNICAIION_LI QQ!D!DyDiQ§tiQD_y9t_Q9D§yItat.iDn Most p o l i c y -formulators interviewed i n d i c a t e d that they thought the reasons -for a b o l i s h i n g the Coun c i l s were f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e l y communicated t o implementors. This p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e f o l lowed intense lobbying from M i n i s t r y s t a f f , College Boards, p r o f e s s i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and i n t e r e s t groups, hence i t s announcement came as no s u r p r i s e t o those working i n the c o l l e g e system. Furthermore, the communication of the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s were seen t o be of l e s s importance than the C o u n c i l s ' demise. Nevertheless, i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system the d i s s o l u t i o n of the C o u n c i l s r e q u i r e d some movement of a u t h o r i t y from the intermediary bodies t o another agency or agencies, and so the communication l i n k a g e s assumed an important r o l e . Although the ma j o r i t y of p o l i c y formulators b e l i e v e d the reasons f o r the change were c l e a r l y communicated t o p o l i c y implementors, no common agreement could be reached from implementors' perceptions on t h i s p o i n t . I t was not easy f o r implementors t o c l a r i f y whether or not c o n s u l t a t i o n had taken place i n the formative stages of t h i s p o l i c y . Implementors c e r t a i n l y supported the notion t h a t the Coun c i l s should be d i s s o l v e d . "We had been advising for a number of years and breathed a mighty sigh of r e l i e f when i t act u a l l y happened, so consulting us on taking the decision wouldn't have been necessary" (11:2). Another reported "I t h i n k the system was w e l l aware of the problem and was quick t o impose a r a t i o n a l e on the d e c i s i o n " (12:2). Nevertheless there was considerable support f o r the idea of r e p l a c i n g the three C o u n c i l s with a s i n g l e C o u n c i l , e i t h e r f o r the whole c o l l e g e system or a l t e r n a t i v e l y the whole post- secondary system i n the province, which caused one interviewee t o comment: "In the con-fusion o-f the -few months that -followed t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n , there wasn't ever any attempt t o e x p l a i n or d i s c u s s . There c e r t a i n l y wasn't any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n " (21:2). P o l i c y Formulators' Knowledge of the System Interview responses revealed that w h i l s t implementors had d i f f i c u l t y i n i d e n t i f y i n g the p o l i c y f ormulators f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n i t i a t i v e , there was a general consensus t h a t most o f f i c e r s i n the M i n i s t r y were knowledgeable and well-informed on the c o l l e g e system; t h i s view, but with l e s s enthusiasm, was extended t o the M i n i s t e r but most implementors b e l i e v e d t h a t other cabinet members and M.L.A.'s g e n e r a l l y were not informed about the c o l l e g e system, and, as one respondent put i t , t here was a l a r g e " c r e d i b i l i t y gap" (13:13). Ambiguity No-one interviewed i d e n t i f i e d any ambiguity inherent i n the Government's i n t e n t i o n t o a b o l i s h the three C o u n c i l s , but d e t a i l e d understanding of where the a u t h o r i t y was t o be r e d i s t r i b u t e d was f a r from c l e a r . There was no agreement between formulators and implementors on whether t h i s p o l i c y c l a r i f i e d the dele g a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s from C o u n c i l s . PERCEiyED_PQ_ICY_OyiCOMES A wide v a r i e t y of outcomes was seen as r e s u l t i n g from t h i s p o l i c y . One that was evident from most i n t e r v i e w s with implementors, but perhaps most s t r o n g l y i n the case o-f those who hold membership on a C o l l e g e Board, was the i n c r e a s e i n i n t e r a c t i o n between Boards and M i n i s t r y . "I t h i n k the biggest e-f-fect of the a b o l i t i o n of the C o u n c i l s i s t h a t there was a much be t t e r interchange between M i n i s t r y and i n d i v i d u a l Boards" (17s1). This d i r e c t c o n t a c t , however, was not always viewed with f avour. Now that the Councils have gone, the buffer has gone between institutions and the Government. I don't know whether the Government anticipated this, but now when funding i s deficient, as i t always seems to be, the responsibility is now perceived to rest more and more with the Government, whereas when the Councils were in place, they often served as lighting rods. So in a sense i t ' s a healthier more honest relationship (21:12). " I t became e a s i e r , i n my o p i n i o n , t o s o r t out o v e r a l l program processes and p o l i c i e s without the C o u n c i l s , without having t o s a t i s f y three divergent C o u n c i l s " (19s1). Most p o l i c y implementors interviewed agreed t h a t a major e f f e c t of t h i s p o l i c y was t o s i m p l i f y the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f o r system governance. There was strong consensus that the demise of the C o u n c i l s removed a l a y e r of bureaucracy that was seen t o hinder decision-making i n the c o l l e g e system. When implementors were questioned on the most n o t i c e a b l e e f f e c t s of t h i s p o l i c y , the m a j o r i t y of observers r e f e r r e d e i t h e r t o a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , or t o the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of decision-making i n the M i n i s t r y . Several commented on both. Nevertheless, "the main e f f e c t was t o remove a d i s i n t e g r a t e d p a t t e r n of decision-making" (11:1). P o l i c y implementors at a l l l e v e l s tended t o agree that 134 the most noticeable change was some clearing of the c l u t t e r of an administrative type, and of a decision-making type ... There was just so much confusion in the r o l e s of the Councils, and so much upset over that, that any kind of smooth running of the operation just became impossible ( 2 0 : 1 ) . A n o t h e r e v e n more c l e a r l y — e n u n c i a t e d p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t s o f a b o l i s h i n g t h e t h r e e C o u n c i l s was t h e s h i f t i n g o f a u t h o r i t y f r o m t h e C o u n c i l s t o t h e M i n i s t r y . E v e r y p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t o r i n t e r v i e w e d i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e / s h e saw a movement t o w a r d s t h e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g power i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f f i c e . Some s t a t e d t h a t a l i m i t e d d e g r e e of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y r e v e r t e d t o t h e c o l l e g e s , o r t h a t no c h a n g e o c c u r r e d , b u t s u p p o r t e r s o f s u c h news were a c l e a r m i n o r i t y : The f i r s t and most noticeable e f f e c t was that the powers that had previously been held by the Councils were d i s t r i b u t e d between the Minister on the one hand and the Boards of colleges on the other ... As i t act u a l l y turned out, most of the e f f e c t i v e power went to the Minister ( 1 4 : 1 ) . T h i s q u o t e c o n v e y s t h e p e r c e i v e d outcome f o r most o f t h e i m p l e m e n t o r s i n t e r v i e w e d . Comments s u c h a s " I t h i n k t h a t most o f t h e a u t h o r i t y t h a t was h o u s e d i n t h e f o u r ^ p r o v i n c i a l C o u n c i l s s t a y e d a t t h e p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l " ( 1 2 : 3 ) , and " t h e e f f e c t o f i t was t a k i n g a l l t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g back i n t o t h e M i n i s t r y " ( 1 8 : 1 ) , were t y p i c a l o f t h e t h o u g h t s e x p r e s s e d . T h e r e was c l e a r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e p o l i c y of e l i m i n a t i n g t h e C o u n c i l s was s e e n t o have been e f f e c t i v e l y i m p l e m e n t e d . " I t h i n k i t h a s been i m p l e m e n t e d e f f e c t i v e l y . I mean t h e y [ t h e C o u n c i l s ] j u s t s i m p l y d i s a p p e a r e d " ( 1 7 : 3 ) . B u t n o t a l l i m p l e m e n t o r s r e g a r d e d t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e C o u n c i l s a s t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e p o l i c y . Many i m p l e m e n t o r s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p o l i c y outcomes c o u l d be e x p r e s s e d i n t h i s r e s p o n s e : "The p o l i c y i t s e l f , w h i c h was t o w i t h d r a w i n t o t h e M i n i s t r y t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r o l e o f t h e B o a r d s , h a s been c o m p l e t e d t o a ' t ' " ( 1 1 : 1 4 ) , o r a s a n o t h e r r e s p o n d e n t r e p o r t e d , t h e r e h a s been " t h e - f e e l i n g o-f c a s t r a t i o n by many B o a r d members ... We had r e a l i n f l u e n c e b e f o r e , we d o n ' t h a ve t h a t much i n f l u e n c e now ... The B o a r d s a r e r e l a t i v e l y p o w e r l e s s now" ( 1 4 : 8 ) . Of t h o s e t h a t p e r c e i v e d t h e most n o t i c e a b l e outcome a s i n c l u d i n g a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r e , some b e l i e v e d t h a t s e v e r a l f u n c t i o n s had been l o s t t o t h e s y s t e m . T h i s had come a b o u t a s f o l l o w s : 1) The r e m o v a l o f a l l n o n - p o l i t i c a l b o d i e s d e s i g n e d t o d i s c u s s s y s t e m p r o b l e m s . There was no body formed ... where I can take problems in a formal manner ( 1 5 : 1 ) . 2) The r e m o v a l of a l a y body t o a d v i s e on a s y s t e m w i d e - b a s i s . The Councils themselves provided an opportunity to bring people in who may not have been interested in the admin- i s t r a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n , and allow them to make a contribution to the system ( 4 : 9 ) . 3) The r e m o v a l of an a g e n c y t h a t c o u l d a s s e s s p r o g r a m s . The Academic Council which was sort of looking after the nuts and bolts of transfer from colleges to un i v e r s i t y ... I don't think the Ministry picked up the b a l l on that and frankly I don't think colleges have ... I don't r e c a l l anything at the time saying that that would be one of the reasons for abolishing the Councils. I think i t was just one of the things they sai d , well I just assumed somebody would look after i t ( 1 3 : 6 ) . 4) The r e m o v a l of a body t o w h i c h t h e M i n i s t r y was r e s p o n s i b l e . There was a sense in which ... the Councils ... ca l l e d the Ministry a few times on blatant practices in the Ministry ( 2 0 : 3 ) . 5) The r e m o v a l of s t a b i l i t y i n Government p o l i c y m a t t e r s . The i n e r t i a of the Council system was both a blessing and a curse. It was a curse in that i t r e a l l y took a long time to change d i r e c t i o n , longer than i t needed to. On the other hand, because the Councils were made up larg e l y of people who were independent of the Government ... [and] a l l three had capable people who went about t h e i r job in a thorough way, didn't always agree with a l l the decisions they [the Government] made ... I guess the old system was 136 less likely to make sudden changes ... less subject to direct p o l i t i c a l manipulation (19:8-9). At least the Councils had some degree of autonomy from the Government and could make decisions that were not directly p o l i t i c a l decisions (21:2). SyMMARY_QF_POLICY Documented_Intentions Only two s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e n t i o n s were e l i c i t e d -from the documents, the major one being t o d i s s o l v e the three C o u n c i l s , the other t o strengthen the M i n i s t e r ' s a u t h o r i t y and power i n the governance s t r u c t u r e . PeCEgiyed_Intentions P o l i c y -formulators saw the a b o l i t i o n o-f the C o u n c i l s as inte n d i n g t o ease the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l o a d , t o s i m p l i f y the governance s t r u c t u r e and t o reduce d u p l i c a t i o n of work and inter—agency c o n f l i c t . Other perceived i n t e n t i o n s included the r e s t a t i n g of a u t h o r i t y r o l e s and the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of system decision—making i n the M i n i s t r y , as wel l as the redu c t i o n of c o s t s by e l i m i n a t i n g the C o u n c i l s . There was some support f o r the view t h a t the p o l i c y was intended t o t r a n s f e r t o the c o l l e g e s some of the power held by C o u n c i l s . The evidence supports the view t h a t the Co u n c i l s should have been abolished: "there was general concurrence ... that the C o u n c i l s should go" ( 7:2). Communicatign_Linkages Several aspects of the design of t h i s p o l i c y are worthy of note. The communication of the reasons f o r the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e was seen by p o l i c y f ormulators t o be e f f e c t i v e ; but among 137 implementors an even s p l i t on the point meant that there was no general agreement. Consultation was not seen to have been e-ffectively held, although many -felt that consultation was not necessary because of the support a l l i n t e r e s t groups gave to the a b o l i t i o n of the Councils. Some doubt was expressed by administrators about the p o l i c y formulators' knowledge of the system. Respondents believed that there was no ambiguity i n the policy statement on the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Councils, but did not agree on the intention about where to locate delegated authority and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . No incentives or sanctions for p o l i c y implementors were perceived to be intended or r e a l i s e d by system administrators. __C___ved_E_fects The f i r s t obvious e f f e c t was the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Councils. Policy implementors also t e s t i f i e d to the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the administrative structure of the system, and a more d i r e c t contact with the Ministry. There i s strong evidence that implementors perceived as real p o l i c y outcomes the s h i f t of decision-making authority to the Ministry o f f i c e , and that some functions previously performed at the Council level had been l o s t to the system because of the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Councils. System administrators suggested that the a b o l i t i o n of the Councils had reduced the cost of system governance. 138 TABLE 10 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY TWO DOCUMENTED INTENTIONS D i s s o l v e Three Intermediary C o u n c i l s Strengthen A u t h o r i t y & Power o-f M i n i s t r y PERCEIVED INTENTIONS Ease A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Load & S i m p l i f y Governance S t r u c t u r e Restate A u t h o r i t y Roles C e n t r a l i s e Decision-Making Reduce Costs Delegate Some Council Powers t o Col l e g e s COMMUNICATION LINKAGES C o n s u l t a t i o n Not Exe r c i s e d E f f e c t i v e l y Minimal Ambiguity Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or P r a c t i s e d Some Doubt About Formulators' Knowledge OUTPUTS A b o l i t i o n of Three Intermediary C o u n c i l s L e g i s l a t e d A u t h o r i t y of M i n i s t r y Strengthened S i m p l i f i e d A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S t r u c t u r e PERCEIVED OUTCOMES Costs of Governance Reduced More D i r e c t Contact with M i n i s t r y Excessive Decision-Making Located i n M i n i s t r y Some System Functions Lost CONCLUSIONS The second governance p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e t o be examined revealed some q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f e a t u r e s from those of the previous p o l i c y . The documented i n t e n t i o n s are f a r more p r e c i s e , which i s probably the r e s u l t of s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n t o communicate the p o l i c y . I t s b r e v i t y and conciseness, however, f a i l e d t o c l a r i f y the 139 important s e t of i s s u e s inherent i n the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the a u t h o r i t y p r e v i o u s l y held by the C o u n c i l s . Indeed, w i t h i n the conceptual framework developed f o r t h i s r e s e a r c h , the a b o l i t i o n of the C o u n c i l s could be i n t e r p r e t e d as an output, and the other e f f e c t s as outcomes. In r e l a t i o n t o t h i s p o l i c y , the communication l i n k between p o l i c y formulators and implementors was not viewed i n the same way by both p a r t i e s , which probably r e f l e c t s the l a c k of c o n s u l t a t i o n on the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n perceived by most a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . P o l i c y implementors expressed pleasure at the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the governance s t r u c t u r e , but concern that "most of the e f f e c t i v e power went t o the M i n i s t e r " (14:1). The environmental i n f l u e n c e s seemed t o have exerted pressures f o r c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making. That i s t o say, the f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s being experienced by the system were c r u c i a l i n t h i s development. This strong demand f o r increased economic c o n t r o l at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l seemed t o b r i n g about an e f f e c t i n the implementation of t h i s p o l i c y which req u i r e d the Government t o e x e r c i s e an a u t h o r i t a t i v e r o l e wherever there was doubt about the l o c a t i o n of decision-making a u t h o r i t y . Hence the i n t e n t i o n noted i n the M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r (see p.126), even though the a u t h o r i t y was already a v a i l a b l e through other l e g i s l a t i o n . Indeed the tendency t o c e n t r a l i s a t i o n a f f e c t e d by the l e g i s l a t i o n and the energies expended by c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s attempting t o counter that movement, seem t o have reduced the questioning of why f u n c t i o n s have been l o s t t o the system. 140 P A R T T H R E E THE POLICY PROVIDING FOR THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT OF ALL COLLEGE BOARD MEMBERS The o r i g i n a l amendment (1958) t o the P u b l i c Schools Act which provided -for the establishment, maintenance and operation of community c o l l e g e s authorised the membership of c o l l e g e governing Co u n c i l s t o be composed almost e x c l u s i v e l y of appointees of the 'cooperating' School Boards. The p r i n c i p a l , who was appointed by the C o u n c i l , the d i s t r i c t superintendent of schools and two persons appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Counci1 were the only other members. In 1970 the c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l was removed from membership on the Board of his/h e r c o l l e g e . The number of Government appointments increased, but the School Board appointments were s t i l l i n the ma j o r i t y . In 1973 the d i s t r i c t superintendent of schools was removed, and i n 1977, when the _9.1Li3__ and P r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e s Act was passed, the Col l e g e C o u n c i l s became c o r p o r a t i o n s and were known as College Boards, but a m a j o r i t y of School Board appointees was maintained. A f u r t h e r amendment i n 1980 s h i f t e d the balance: the Government now appointed the maj o r i t y of governors. The p o l i c y d e c i s i o n t o appoint a l l members of Colle g e Boards was made by the Government of B.C. i n J u l y 1983, and simultaneously the s i z e of the Boards was reduced. Ninety-three School Board appointees were removed from o f f i c e and the Government appointed f i f t y - f o u r persons t o repl a c e them. T h i s , the t h i r d p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e t o change the governance s t r u c t u r e of the c o l l e g e system i n B.C. has already been described as having been introduced by means of a number of 1 4 1 changes i n l e g i s l a t i o n . In order t o examine the perceived p o l i t i c a l outcomes o-f t h i s p o l i c y , the r e p o r t w i l l again d e s c r i b e the documented i n t e n t i o n s , the perceived i n t e n t i o n s , the communication l i n k a g e s between formulators and implementors, and then the outcomes perceived by implementors. A summary of the f i n d i n g s on t h i s p o l i c y w i l l then be presented and conclusions drawn. DQCUMENIED_PDLICY The proclamation of the p o l i c y t o a b o l i s h School Board appointees on the Coll e g e Boards was contained i n the same B i l l 20 <1983B) which enunciated the p r e v i o u s l y - d e s c r i b e d p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e . The B i l l simply statess Section 6 is repealed and the following substituted: AfiBDintments to boards of colleges 6 The board of a college shall consist of 5 or more members appointed by the Lieutenant Sovernor in Council ( M i n i s t e r of Education B.C.,1983B:2). During the debate on t h i s amendment, the M i n i s t e r reported t o the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly t h a t : It is our view that most of the rationale for having a school board trustee or an appointee by the school di s t r i c t on the board of a college i s not really there any longer (Hansard, 1983: 1367) . An i n t e n t i o n was a l s o expressed i n the M i n i s t e r ' s l e t t e r t o a College Board Chairman i n d i c a t i n g that the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e aimed t o s t a b i l i s e numbers on College Boards. There had been complaints both of too many members, as was experienced i n the Okanagan, and of too few, as i n the Fraser V a l l e y . The M i n i s t e r a l s o declared t h a t a reason f o r t h i s change i n the composition o-f College Boards was that "schools and school d i s t r i c t s are no longer used as a v e h i c l e -for r a i s i n g e i t h e r c a p i t a l or operat i n g expenses" (Hansard,1983:1367). They should no longer be represented on College Boards. However, as a spokesperson f o r the Opposition declared "I don't know who has convinced him Cthe M i n i s t e r ] t h a t he should have t h i s heavy hand over the c o l l e g e s , but I t h i n k we have t o consider that i t i s s t r i c t l y a p o l i t i c a l move" (Hansard,1983:1374). PIRCEIVED_POLICY_IN There was testimony o f f e r e d t o support the notion t h a t the c o l l e g e s had matured t o a point where they were no longer dependent on School Boards. One respondent asserted "the primary reasons f o r doing i t was t h a t c o l l e g e s could now stand on t h e i r own ... and be counted as independent e n t i t i e s " (4:12). This p o l i c y sought t o give both College and School Boards d i s t i n c t l y separate c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Several respondents expressed the b e l i e f t h a t f u n c t i o n a l reasons were not the primary motive behind t h i s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e , although most pointed t o one or more f u n c t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s before the p o l i c y was introduced: (a) overload of work f o r l a y persons; (b) "the c o l l e g e e v o l u t i o n was being held back because of the c o n s t r a i n t s imposed by School Boards" (5:10); (c) s i z e ; and (d) the p o s s i b i l i t y of f a c u l t y being on the Board of t h e i r own or an a d j o i n i n g c o l l e g e ; a l l were given as p o s s i b l e reasons. However, the major i n t e n t i o n perceived i n t h i s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e was p o l i t i c a l . The view th a t the Government was "experiencing probably some o-f the heaviest -flak ... from School Board members" (6s6) through the " p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of some School Boards" (7:5), dominated the responses, but other i s s u e s , such as union-College Board r e l a t i o n s , and " c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t " (4;11), were a l s o mentioned. _Q_ r c Y_co__y_icAiio_ Q9DiyI__ti9D__D__QQ!!![DyDi£i|t.iQQ P o l i c y formulators and implementors were asked i f they b e l i e v e d that any c o n s u l t a t i o n had occurred p r i o r t o the proclamation of the p o l i c y . Answers record an almost unanimous " a b s o l u t e l y none" (11:7). The only d i s s e n t e r j u s t i f i e d h i s d i f f e r e n c e of opinion by e x p l a i n i n g , " i t was no sec r e t about what was i n the wind" (13:8). Answers t o the c o n s u l t a t i o n question brought some of the most d i r e c t responses, ranging from a s t r a i g h t "no" (12:9), (17:4), t o , "you're not going t o con s u l t with the o p p o s i t i o n , t o decide t h a t you're going t o e l i m i n a t e the o p p o s i t i o n " (14:12). There was an element of s u r p r i s e i n respondents' r e a c t i o n s t o the announcement of t h i s change i n governance s t r u c t u r e . " I t was announced one afternoon t h a t i t was done, so there was a b s o l u t e l y no c o n s u l t a t i o n " (20:8). However, there was a keen awareness of the h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of Board composition. P o l i c y implementors were wel l aware of the l i n k s with the School Board t r u s t e e s and the times when College Board members were predominantly School Board appointments. The major i t y of those interviewed recounted the changes from the inauguration of the 144 Col1eges and I n s t i t u t e s Act, when School Board members held a maj o r i t y o-f one, and subsequent amendments t o the Act, which gave the Government appointees a ma j o r i t y of one. !3siQ!I_QbaQ9!=_gr_Threat In the case of t h i s p o l i c y i t was c l e a r t o both formulators and implementors that no c o n s u l t a t i o n took place p r i o r t o i t s proclamation. Despite the p o l i t i c a l nature of the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e and the apparent lack of c o n s u l t a t i o n , most of the M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s d i d not perceive the p o l i c y as a major change to the system or a t h r e a t t o implementors of the p o l i c y . Only one out of the eigh t p o l i c y formulators interviewed saw t h i s p o l i c y as a major change or t h r e a t t o the c o l l e g e governance system. Some be l i e v e d t h a t the implementation of the change was l i k e l y t o be seen as a t h r e a t by others and at l e a s t two f e l t t h a t the p r o b a b i l i t y was s t i l l growing. " I t h i n k a number of people, on r e f l e c t i o n of what's happened over the l a s t couple of years, s c r a t c h t h e i r head, and wonder i f i t was the r i g h t d e c i s i o n " <8s17), was one forumulator's response; he a l s o explained "I don't t h i n k i t was seen as a t h r e a t by very many of the c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ... i t didn't seem t o be seen as t e r r i b l y much of a t h r e a t by the f a c u l t y groups at the time, but i t developed i n t o that"<8s17). Conversely, of the twelve p o l i c y implementors interviewed on t h i s t o p i c , ten perceived i t as a t h r e a t t o at l e a s t some of the system components, i f not a l l . Comments such as the f o l l o w i n g , record these perceptions: " i t was u n i v e r s a l l y seen as a dramatic 145 change ... the vast m a j o r i t y o-f us saw i t as a tragedy" (20:8-9), and " i t c e r t a i n l y concerned i n t e r e s t groups, f a c u l t y , students, s t a f f , community groups; a l s o I f e e l f a i r l y confident i t a f f e c t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n the same way" (21s15). There was no suggestion t h a t the p o l i c y statement was ambiguous, although there was a wide d i v e r s i t y of opinion as t o i t s i n t e n t . P E R Q i i y i D _ P Q L I C Y _ O U I C g M E S Several questions were used i n an attempt t o assess implementors' perceptions of the outcomes of t h i s p o l i c y . Questions were posed s o l i c i t i n g 'key f a c t o r s ' , perceived "changes t o the framework' of system decision-making and "unforeseen e f f e c t s ' . Implementors gave c o n f l i c t i n g reasons why t h i s p o l i c y might have been introduced. There were some implementors who i d e n t i f i e d with the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s ' perceived i n t e n t i o n , t h a t "the c o l l e g e s had matured" (13:8), "the c o l l e g e s had come of age and didn't have t o depend on School Boards f o r t h e i r input" (18:4). Again the l i n k with scarce f i s c a l resources was made by many; i n that the p r o v i n c i a l Government was p r o v i d i n g most of the establishment and operating c o s t s of c o l l e g e s . Implementors perceived the M i n i s t r y would want t o be able t o hold Boards accountable f o r t h e i r f i s c a l management. There was again a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t Government wanted t o be able t o implement p r o v i n c i a l economic p o l i c i e s through the College system. Implementors regarded changing the composition of Coll e g e Board membership as one method the Government b e l i e v e d would provide f o r the more e f f e c t i v e achievement of t h i s o b j e c t i v e . 146 A n o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t t h a t c o u l d h a v e p o l i t i c a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s was s u g g e s t e d by one r e s p o n d e n t who s a i d ; one of the e f f e c t s of the change has been a rapid infusion of new people to Boards in the system, and as a r e s u l t a need for them to learn the background of the system, how i t operates, and to understand the complexities of i t ... I think one of the biggest d i f f i c u l t i e s i s that people have been appointed to Boards without any prior exposure to a governance structure ( 1 9 : 1 2 ) . An outcome o f a s i m i l a r n a t u r e was t h e u p h e a v a l i t c r e a t e d i n t h e e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e of t h e B.C.A.C. One i m p l e m e n t o r o b s e r v e d : s t a r t i n g from the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l , i t decimated the B.C. Association of Colleges ... the key positions at the p r o v i n c i a l level on the B.C.A.C. were ... School Board people ... so i t sapped the B.C.A.C. from the perspective of just the manpower issue for a while ( 2 0 : 9 - 1 0 ) . A n o t h e r i m p l e m e n t o r warned t h a t one r e s u l t m i g h t be t h a t i f t h e Government c h a n g e d , and t h e new M i n i s t e r ' s ' p l e a s u r e ' d i d n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h a t of t h e p r e v i o u s o f f i c e b e a r e r , t h e r e c o u l d be a one h u n d r e d p e r c e n t c h a n g e i n c o l l e g e g o v e r n o r s . A rguments were o f f e r e d f o r and a g a i n s t t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t B o a r d s had now become more p o l i t i c a l , b u t t h e r e was c l e a r l y a p r e d o m i n a n c e o f t h o s e who b e l i e v e d " t h e r e h a s been an i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c i s a t i o n o f B o a r d s h a v i n g a l l one c l e a r p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n " ( 1 2 : 1 0 ) : The Government w i l l say we wanted a cross-section of people, and that we're appointing people who are committed to education, and i t ' s not p o l i t i c a l . But you look at the appointments, p a r t i c - u l a r l y those that have been made since the [ p o l i c y has been announced] and I guarantee that y o u ' l l f i n d no N.D.P. You'll find very few women, you'l l f i n d no representation from c u l t u r a l minorities ... yo u ' l l fi n d no representation from people on welfare ... you w i l l predominantly f i n d male Government supporters in business (20: 17-18) . C o n v e r s e l y , o t h e r s have n o t p e r c e i v e d a l l t h e e f f e c t s a s a d v e r s e . " I t ' s been a s t r a n g e and u n e x p e c t e d c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t o u r B o a r d h a s become much more s e n s i t i v e t o t h e need o f a r t i c u l a t i n g w i t h 147 the school d i s t r i c t s " (12:10). I suggest that i f they Cthe Board members] took an aggressive private criticism of the Government, that would be more effective. I know that Board members who have close connections with Cabinet Ministers and other people in Government will go and talk to them in the privacy of their own offices ... that's probably more effective (12s 12-13). The p o l i t i c a l outcomes perceived by p o l i c y implementors are best described by summarising comments as shown i n Table Eleven. I t can be seen t h a t a l l but one o-f the twelve implementors b e l i e v e d that there were strong p o l i t i c a l outcomes on the governance of the c o l l e g e system. This view i s supported by newspaper a r t i c l e s such as the Nanaimo D a i l y Free Press and the Nanaimo Times, which both reported a c a l l by the Nanaimo N.D.P. a s s o c i a t i o n f o r the r e s i g n a t i o n of the Malaspina College Board. Both newspapers reported the president of the l o c a l N.D.P. and College Board member, as saying "an appointed board simply doesn't work. I t i s not r e s p o n s i b l e t o the people of Nanaimo but t o the government which appointed i t " (Nanaimo Times,May 8,1986). Again the Ubyssey featured a f r o n t page s t o r y quoting the President of the C L E . A. as saying "increased government involvement i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of B.C.'s c o l l e g e s i s transforming them i n t o 'the economic and p o l i t i c a l t o o l s of the government'" (The Ubyssey, October 21,1986). _UMMARY_gF_POLICY_IHRE ygcu_ented__ntent_gns The documents examined revealed three prime i n t e n t i o n s . 1. The Government would appoint a l l C o l l e g e Board members. 2. School Board appointees would no longer be on College Boards. 148 TABLE 11 SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTORS' COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S APPOINTING ALL COLLEGE BOARD MEMBERS "Boards have been l e s s a c t i v e spokesmen f o r t h e c o l l e g e s ... th e y a r e e l e c t e d by C a l l o c a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y c a u c u s " (11:8). "There has been an i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of B o a r d s , h a v i n g a l l one c l e a r p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n " (12:10). "The a p p o i n t e e s have been a b i t more p o l i t i c a l t h a n e x p e c t e d . . . [ t h e y ] see t h e i r f u n c t i o n as r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e Government's or C a b i n e t ' s i n t e r e s t s " (13:10). " T h i s way you can be more a s s u r e d of t h e l o y a l t y of t h e Board Members and t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e Board t o be a b l e t o o p e r a t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y " (14:10). " I t ' s made t h e game p a r t of t h e same p o l a r i s a t i o n i n t h i s p r o v i n c e t h a t e x i s t s about most o t h e r t h i n g s , which i s t o say i t becomes v e r y much a p o l i t i c a l game then ... c o l l e g e s i n c e r t a i n a r e a s c l e a r l y t e n d t o get f a v o u r a b l e d e c i s i o n s made i n v o l v i n g money, and o t h e r s d on't" (15:7). "In t h i s c o n t e x t ... I t h i n k t h i s Government i s a h i g h l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n agency, i t i s almos t beyond t h e bounds of democracy ... i t was j u s t p a r t of t h i s Government's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o be i n t o t a l c o n t r o l of a n y t h i n g and e v e r y t h i n g " (16:18-19). " I t was seen as removing t h e community i n p u t i n t o Boards and c e r t a i n l y making them p o l i t i c a l p e o p l e r a t h e r than community p e o p l e " (17:4). "Some p e o p l e who a r e a p p o i n t e d have a v e r y s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l b i a s , or s h o u l d I say p a r t y b i a s , and they would not speak out a g a i n s t a n y t h i n g t h e Government p r o p o s e d , whether i t would b e n e f i t or harm t h e c o l l e g e system". (18:5). "The system i s p r o b a b l y l e s s c r i t i c a l t h a n i t has been i n t h e p a s t , of Government and Government a c t i o n s " (19:13). "The narrower band of d i s c u s s i o n ... t h e d e f i n i t e l a c k of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of l a r g e segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , t h e sense of where t h e s i g n a l s come from f o r Board members, i n so many c a s e s now i t ' s a s i g n a l from t h e p r o v i n c i a l M.L.A., or from t h e p a r t y p e r s p e c t i v e " (20:11). "Boards have become much more a p a r t of Government i n t h e sense t h a t when p r o p o s a l s go f o r w a r d from c o l l e g e s t o t h e M i n i s t r y , we r e a l l y have a r e l a t i o n s h i p between two p a r t s of t h e same t h i n g " (21:18). " I t c l e a r l y makes i t e a s i e r f o r t h e Government t o i n i t i a t e changes a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l , but I don't b e l i e v e t h a t t h e change i n t h e c o l l e g e system had any e f f e c t on t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s " (22: 10) . 149 3. The s i z e and c o m p o s i t i o n o-f C o l l e g e B o a r d s would be s t a b i 1 i s e d . P s r c e i y e d _ i n t e n t i g n s R e s p o n d e n t s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e r e was n o t t h e same d e g r e e o-f s u p p o r t -from e i t h e r p o l i c y - f o r m u l a t o r s o r i m p l e m e n t o r s -for t h i s p o l i c y a s t h e r e was w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s two p o l i c i e s . M i n i s t r y o - f - f i c i a l s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y saw i t a s a p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , b u t t h a t t h e c o l l e g e s , even s o , were no l o n g e r d e p e n d e n t on t h e S c h o o l B o a r d s , and t h a t t h e p o l i c y was i n t e n d e d t o r e s o l v e • f u n c t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , w h i c h m a n i f e s t e d t h e m s e l v e s b o t h i n s i z e and c o m p o s i t i o n . S y s t e m a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a l s o p e r c e i v e d t h a t t h i s p o l i c y i n t e n d e d t o c u r b p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m o f t h e Government p o l i c i e s on e d u c a t i o n . C g m m u n i c a t i g n _ L i n k a g e s I t was shown t h a t p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s a g r e e d w i t h i m p l e m e n t o r s t h a t no c o n s u l t a t i o n had o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y . T h o s e i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f f i c e p e r c e i v e d t h e p o l i c y d i d n o t i n i t i a t e major c h a n g e i n t h e g o v e r n a n c e o f t h e s y s t e m , b u t a l m o s t a l l i m p l e m e n t o r s v i e w e d i t a s i n t e n d i n g t o p r o v i d e a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e . P o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s d i d n o t p e r c e i v e t h e p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t a s ambiguous, b u t c o n s i d e r e d i t t o c o n t a i n a w i de v a r i e t y of i n t e n t i o n s . No i n c e n t i v e s o r s a n c t i o n s were p e r c e i v e d t o h a v e been e x e r c i s e d when i m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s p o l i c y . E s r c e i y e d _ E f f e c t s P o l i c y i m p l e m e n t o r s n o t e d many e f f e c t s f r o m t h i s p o l i c y . F i r s t was t h e o b v i o u s p o l i c y e f f e c t t h a t t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e B o a r d s 150 d i d change, as d i d t h e i r s i z e , which by d e f i n i t i o n must be termed an output. A second and a s s o c i a t e d e f f e c t was the sudden i n f l u x of new governors, which can be termed an outcome. However, the strongest comments received i n d i c a t e d a perceived outcome was the p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the Boards, which was expressed i n a v a r i e t y of ways. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s b e l i e v e d a t h r e a t t o the system e x i s t e d . If the Government changed there was a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a l l c o l l e g e governors would a l s o change. P o l i c y implementors perceived t h a t the o r i e n t a t i o n toward l o c a l community had been s i g n i f i c a n t l y depreciated by the changes i n College Board appointments. C O N C L U S I O N S I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s p o l i c y was introduced with the l e a s t amount of c o n s u l t a t i o n and communication. As with the previous p o l i c y expressed through l e g i s l a t i o n , there appeared l i t t l e ambiguity i n the statement, and the major t h r u s t of the p o l i c y , seems t o have been e f f e c t i v e l y implemented. However, t h i s p o l i c y seems t o have created the l a r g e s t amount of d i s s e n t i o n among a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and probably because of the apparent attempt t o smother p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m which had been seen t o emanate from School Board members and School Board groups. A t h r e a t has emerged from the perceived problems inherent i n a change of Government, when a l l Board members could be replaced. Furthermore, the seeming l o s s of community o r i e n t a t i o n i n c o l l e g e governance i s a l s o perceived as a t h r e a t . This p o l i c y produced more p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n than the o t h e r s , and claims were made that i t threatens the democracy of c o l l e g e governance. TABLE 12 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY THREE COMMUNICATION LINKAGES C o n s u l t a t i o n Not Exe r c i s e d Minimal Ambiguity Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or P r a c t i c e d OUTPUTS Government Appoints A l l Co l l e g e Board Members School Board Appointees Eli m i n a t e d S t a b i l i s e d S i z e & Composition of Coll e g e Boards PERCEIVED OUTCOMES Inf l u x of New College Governors Col l e g e Boards P o l i t i c a l l y P a r t i s a n Threat Emerging with Change of Government Community O r i e n t a t i o n Lost OUTPUTS Government Appoints A l l College Board Members School Board Appointees E l i m i n a t e d S t a b i l i s e S i z e & Composition of College Boards PERCEIVED OUTCOMES Inf l u x of New College Governors P a r t i s a n P o l i t i c s i n Co l l e g e Boards Threat Emerging with Change of Government Loss of Community O r i e n t a t i o n N O T E S O N C H A P T E R F I V E 1. The o r i g i n a l d r a f t of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement was developed i n the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e and c i r c u l a t e d t o c o l l e g e s i n February 1982. The p o l i c y document used f o r t h i s research, was dated March, 1983. 2. The reference t o the f o u r t h Council made by t h i s respondent was t o the ad hoc committee located i n the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e , who were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of funds and the c o o r d i n a t i o n of c o n t i n u i n g education programs throughout the province. C H A P T E R S I X SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS This chapter sums up the purposes of the study, the methodology employed and the p r i n c i p a l f i n d i n g s , which are organised under the headings of the three p o l i c i e s examined. In connection with each f i n d i n g some app r o p r i a t e a n a l y s i s i s o f f e r e d . The four major c o n c l u s i o n s reached from the study are summarised, together with d i s c u s s i o n s i n support of each c o n c l u s i o n . I m p l i c a t i o n s which a r i s e from the study are organised under three c a t e g o r i e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r the f i e l d of p r a c t i c e , f o r the body of theory appropriate t o the study and f o r the methodology employed i n the gathering of data. F i n a l l y , a number of suggestions are made f o r f u r t h e r research a r i s i n g from the study. SUMMARY Ib__Pyr.BQ____of _the_Research The major purpose of the study was t o determine how a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n community c o l l e g e s i n B.C. perceive the implementation of three recent p r o v i n c i a l Government p o l i c i e s concerned with governance of the c o l l e g e system. For the purposes of the study the a r c h i t e c t s of the p o l i c i e s , the M i n i s t e r of Education and h i s s t a f f , are r e f e r r e d t o as the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s , while the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s at va r i o u s l e v e l s of the c o l l e g e system are r e f e r r e d t o as p o l i c y implementors. A s u b s i d i a r y purpose, i n accord with c u r r e n t theory on p o l i c y implementation, was t o determine what d i s c r e p a n c i e s , i f any, e x i s t between the r e a l i s e d i n t e n t of the p o l i c y , as revealed i n the s t a t e d and reported perceptions of the fo r m u l a t o r s , and the 154 outcomes o-f the p o l i c i e s as perceived by the implementors. Ihe_Metngd_Emrji gyed The research was designed on the b a s i s of Y i n ' s (1985) case study method i n c o r p o r a t i n g Buba and L i n c o l n ' s (1981) n a t u r a l i s t i c paradigm. Interviews were conducted with a sample of system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n c l u d i n g the r e l e v a n t M i n i s t e r of Education, a past and the then current A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r of Education, M i n i s t r y d i r e c t o r s and s e n i o r o f f i c e r s , C o l l e g e Board chairmen and members, c o l l e g e p r i n c i p a l s and d i r e c t o r s , and s e n i o r o f f i c e r s of other major i n t e r e s t groups. In order t o e s t a b l i s h perceived i n t e n t i o n s , i n t e r v i e w s were conducted with those most c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with the f o r m u l a t i o n of the p o l i c i e s . These were coupled with the documented i n t e n t i o n s t o provide what i s c a l l e d , i n t h i s study, the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s . A second round of i n t e r v i e w s was then conducted with those involved i n the implementation of the p o l i c i e s i n order t o e s t a b l i s h p o l i c y outputs and perceived p o l i c y outcomes. An a n a l y s i s of both r e l e v a n t documents and i n t e r v i e w t r a n s c r i p t s provided the b a s i c data on which the f i n d i n g s are based. The f i n d i n g s which f o l l o w w i l l i n c l u d e d i s c u s s i o n of the outcomes of the t h r e e p o l i c i e s as perceived by implementors, the d i s c r e p a n c i e s between i n t e n t i o n s and outcomes where these d i s c r e p a n c i e s were found and an a n a l y s i s of the foregoing based upon the evidence found. The_Findings The major f i n d i n g s of each p o l i c y are summarised i n the previous chapter a f t e r r e p o r t i n g the a n a l y s i s . These are c o l l a t e d and again presented below i n Table T h i r t e e n , which represents a c o l l a t i o n of Tables E i g h t , Ten and Twelve. I t i n c l u d e s the i n t e n t i o n s of each p o l i c y as determined from the documentary evidence obtained, the i n t e n t i o n s as perceived by formulators of the p o l i c i e s , the communication l i n k a g e s between formulators and implementors as perceived, the outputs and the outcomes of the p o l i c i e s as perceived by the implementors. POLICY 1 TABLE 13 SUMMARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS FINDINGS DOCUMENTED INTENTIONS POLICY 2 POLICY 3 Greater Eaphasis on Pr o v i n c i a l / National Econoaic & Manpower Needs Provide for Long Tere & Short Tera Planning Maintain 3 Levels of Decision-flaking Responsibility Consultation to be Practised at a l l Levels Dissolve Three Interaediary Councils Governient to Appoint A l l College Board Heibers Strengthen Authority & Power of Ministry Eliminate School Board Appointees S t a b i l i s e Size k Coaposition of College Boards POLICY 1 Define k C l a r i f y Respective Roles of Agencies in Systea PERCEIVED INTENTIONS POLICY 2 POLICY 3 Ease Adainistrative Load & S i a p l i f y Resolve Functional D i f f i c u l t i e s Governance Structure Size & fleabership of Boards Provide Fraaework for Consultation Restate Authority Roles fc Systea Planning Curb Public C r i t i c i s a of Governient by School Boards Centralise Decision-Raking Reduce Costs Delegate Soae Council Pollers to Colleges 156 COMMUNICATION LINKAGES POLICY 2 POLICY 3 Consultation Not Exercised Effectively Consultation Not Exercised Miniaal Aabiguity Hiniaal Asbiguity POLICY 1 Extensive Consultation Exercised Extensive Aibiguity Major Change or Threat Not Intended Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised Foraulators' Knowledge Sufficiently Broad POLICY 1 No Intentions Coapletely Realised POLICY 1 Institutions Align with Provincial Mission Goals & Objectives Ministry Not Constrained by Policy No Consultation for Provincial Policies Exercised Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised Soie Doubt About Foraulators' Knowledge OUTPUTS POLICY 2 Abolition of Three Interaediary Councils Legislated Authority of Ministry Strengthened. Siaplified Adainistrative Structure PERCEIVED OUTCOMES POLICY 2 Costs of Bovernance Reduced More Direct Contact nith Ministry Excessive Decision-Making Located in Ministry Soae Systea Functions Lost Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised POLICY 3 6overnaent Appoints All College Board Heebers School Board Appointees Eliainated Stabilised Size & Coaposition of College Boards POLICY 3 Influx of Nen College Governors College Boards Politically Partisan Threat Eaerging K i t h Change of Boverneent Coaaunity Orientation Lost 157 Although Dunsire does not use the term outcome and output i n the same way as t h i s r e p o r t , he nevertheless notes that they r a r e l y correspond when p o l i c i e s are t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a c t i o n : Government (or other policy makers) may devise a p o l i c y to solve a problem, meaning that they envisage an output from governmental agencies which, i f produced, would in t h e i r estimation solve i t : but i t i s common experience that the output a c t u a l l y produced i s not that which was envisaged ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 8 ) . This study has shown tha t the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s documented and perceived by the -formulators do not n e c e s s a r i l y c l o s e l y a l i g n with the p o l i c y outputs. I t a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t the outcomes perceived by p o l i c y implementors do not equate with the outputs determined -for each p o l i c y . Furthermore, the study shows tha t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' perceptions o-f p o l i c y outcomes may be an important v a r i a b l e i n f l u e n c i n g the implementation of the p o l i c i e s (see 170). P o l i c y 1 - System M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s 1.1 The f i n d i n g s of the research as summarised i n Table Thirteen i n d i c a t e that no s i g n i f i c a n t changes were perceived t o occur i n the governance of the system as a r e s u l t of the p o l i c y , even though the perceived i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s were not a l t o g e t h e r incongruous with those of the documented i n t e n t i o n s . This can perhaps be best explained when we note t h a t the w r i t t e n p o l i c y statement revealed that most of the i n t e n t i o n s r e l a t e d t o governance r e q u i r e d some d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t a c t i o n by the M i n i s t e r or M i n i s t r y . The a c t i o n l a t e r , however, tended to bear no r e l a t i o n t o the p o l i c y once i t was proclaimed. 1.2 In r e t r o s p e c t , i t i s apparent that in f o r m a t i o n concerning p r o v i n c i a l / n a t i o n a l economic and manpower needs, e s s e n t i a l elements i n f u t u r e program planning, was not made known t o the c o l l e g e s . The c o l l e g e s were t h e r e f o r e unable to i n c l u d e programs w i t h i n t h e i r f i v e year plans t h a t would address s p e c i f i c manpower needs. Although there are a number o-f i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r c u r r i c u l u m development i n t h i s f i n d i n g , the s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h i s research l i e s i n the lack of e f f e c t i v e communication between p o l i c y f ormulators and implementors, a phenomenon upon which many previous s c h o l a r s of p o l i c y implementation have focussed (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975. Weatherly & Lipskey, 1977; Berman, 1978; Elmore, 1978; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979; and Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). The research a l s o suggests that the e x e r c i s e of p o l i t i c s , at i n d i v i d u a l and i n t e r e s t group l e v e l s , i n f l u e n c e d the implementation e f f e c t s . 1.3 Planning by c o l l e g e s f o r the long-term and short-term was judged to have been ignored by the M i n i s t r y when new p r o v i n c i a l programs, such as 'Training Access', the 'Local Economic Renewal Development Grant', and the 'Fund f o r E x c e l l e n c e i n Education', were introduced. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s b e l i e v e d t h a t no reference was made to the c o l l e g e s ' i n t e g r a t e d planning documents when proposals considered under these schemes were r e j e c t e d or accepted. Indeed, i t was suggested by one implementor t h a t the c o l l e g e 'Five year plans' "may not have been read by people i n the M i n i s t r y " (21s22). Another respondent reported! I have sent in ... annual reports, ... five year plans, ... inst- itutional evaluations, ... and a l l of those things have places in them when you're talking about system ideas. I've never had one question, or one response to any of those things (20s 15) . 1.4 The p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n of maintaining three l e v e l s of 159 decision-making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the system, that i s the M i n i s t r y , the Council or C o u n c i l s and the College Boards, was abandoned by the M i n i s t e r when he subsequently recommended the d i s s o l u t i o n of the C o u n c i l s . The demise of the C o u n c i l s was i n i t i a t e d j u s t a few months a f t e r the formal p o l i c y statement on t h e i r r e t e n t i o n was issued. With respect t o t h i s e f f e c t s , a l l respondents observed a number of s i g n a l s t h a t could help e x p l a i n the implementors' perceptions. The respondents expressed t h e i r alarm t h a t the M i n i s t e r had not consulted them on the e l i m i n a t i o n of t h i s l e v e l of decision-making, even though most a d m i n i s t r a t o r s s t r o n g l y supported the d i s m a n t l i n g of the e x i s t i n g governance s t r u c t u r e . System a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were a l s o aware of the r e s u l t a n t strengthening of the M i n i s t e r ' s a u t h o r i t y , which enabled him t o amend L e g i s l a t i o n at reasonably short i n t e r v a l s . F i n a l l y , the f a i l u r e t o implement a p o l i c y generated by the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e was perceived as a lack of commitment t o that p o l i c y , and t h i s was i n t e r p r e t e d f u r t h e r as a s i g n a l t o d i s r e g a r d other aspects of the p o l i c y statement. 1.5 The f a i l u r e of the M i n i s t e r t o c o n s u l t other decision-making l e v e l s of system governance i n r e l a t i o n t o the composition of College Boards a l s o f e l l short of r e a l i s i n g the s t a t e d aims of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s may w e l l have r e s u l t e d from a d e f i c i e n c y i n the p o l i c y design. The M i n i s t e r has the l e g a l means t o delegate a u t h o r i t y f o r system governance to whichever agencies he considers appropriate. I t would have perhaps been wiser not t o i n c l u d e a c o n s u l t a t i o n mechanism f o r making d e c i s i o n s which so c l e a r l y r ested with the o f f i c e of the M i n i s t e r (see 1.7). 160 1.6 The perception that extensive c o n s u l t a t i o n i n the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n process had taken place (see p.113), t h a t the p o l i c y was expressed i n a formal w r i t t e n statement and not l i m i t e d by the c o n s t r a i n t s of l e g i s l a t i o n , that the p o l i c y was not perceived by formulators or implementors to o f f e r a major change or t h r e a t t o present c o l l e g e autonomy and that a l l respondents considered the p o l i c y formulators t o have an adequate knowledge of the c o l l e g e system (see Table 6:114), are a l l considered by previous a n a l y s t s t o provide f o r more e f f e c t i v e implementation (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975$ Bardach, 1977; B a r r e t t & Fudge, 1981; and Brewer & deLeon, 1983). However, these were perceived t o be of l i t t l e or no consequence when compared with the M i n i s t e r ' s f a i l u r e t o comply with a p o l i c y which he had i n i t i a t e d . 1.7 Interviewees expressed some doubt about the need to i n c l u d e governance i n a M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s statement, given t h a t the d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the p r e r o g a t i v e of the r e l e v a n t M i n i s t e r (see 1.5), and should, as many a d m i n i s t r a t o r s b e l i e v e d , not be considered a system M i s s i o n , Goal, or O b j e c t i v e . ^ I t should a l s o be noted that respondents viewed the M i s s i o n , Goals, and O b j e c t i v e s p o l i c y as the most ambiguous of the three governance p o l i c i e s i n question, and t h i s may have a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d t o the implementors' perceptions of outcomes. One respondent's comment may w e l l r e f l e c t the a t t i t u d e of most implementors: That's one of the reasons we don't mind i t [the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement], i t allows you, within the limits of the resources available, to do whatever you want (20: 14). 1.8 The implementation of the p o l i c y on M i s s i o n , Goals, and 161 Objectives was perceived by a d m i n i s t r a t o r s as n e i t h e r r e l o c a t i n g nor changing the a u t h o r i t y or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o-f a c t o r s i n the c o l l e g e system (see 1.6). A d m i n i s t r a t o r s were i n c l i n e d t o f e e l t h a t the M i n i s t e r ' s d i s r e g a r d f o r the p o l i c y c o n t r i b u t e d t o a d e p r e c i a t i o n i n i t s value as a p o l i c y document. I t can a l s o be seen th a t implementors were i n a p o s i t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e the e f f e c t s of t h i s p o l i c y . In a recent independent study conducted by Dennison, where i t was concluded t h a t "the strong f e e l i n g i n the c o l l e g e community th a t the M i n i s t r y paid l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o i n d i v i d u a l c o l l e g e p l a n s , but responded t o i t s own 'system' pl a n " (1986Asl3), accords with the f i n d i n g s of t h i s research. P o l i c y 2 - The A b o l i t i o n of The Three Intermediary C o u n c i l s 2.1 There was no disagreement that the documented i n t e n t of the p o l i c y of a b o l i s h i n g the three intermediary C o u n c i l s was r e a l i s e d . The C o u n c i l s were d i s s o l v e d by l e g i s l a t i o n . 2.2 The documented i n t e n t i o n t o strengthen the a u t h o r i t y of the M i n i s t r y was r e a l i s e d in-as-much as p o l i c y implementors confirmed th a t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and powers a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y a l l o c a t e d t o the C o u n c i l s r e v e r t e d , i n the main, to the M i n i s t r y (see p.133). 2.3 P o l i c y formulators noted the e x i s t e n c e of a number of undocumented i n t e n t i o n s i n t h i s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e (see Table 9s130), and those too were r e a l i s e d i n p a r t , d e s p i t e the lack of c o n s u l t a t i o n , the lack of s t a t e d i n c e n t i v e s or sanctions and the implementors' expressed doubt about the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t o r s ' knowledge of the system. The cost of operating the C o u n c i l s was dispensed w i t h , and the i n c r e a s e i n M i n i s t r y s t a f f was minimal. 2.4 P o l i c y implementors perceived that the system's admin- i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e was s i m p l i f i e d as a r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y , i n that there was more d i r e c t contact between the Boards and the M i n i s t r y . However, t h i s more d i r e c t l i n k between c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s was seen t o have both p o s i t i v e and negative consequences. The m a j o r i t y of respondents i n d i c a t e d approval and support f o r the more d i r e c t and more frequent interchange between the M i n i s t r y and the c o l l e g e s , because i t gave l e s s scope f o r communication d i s t o r t i o n . However, the Government i s c o n s t a n t l y under attack from the Opposition on the L e g i s l a t u r e and i t s supporters, because there i s no b u f f e r agency between Government and the c o l l e g e s . In view of the p u b l i c nature of the community c o l l e g e system, a l l major d e c i s i o n s , and c e r t a i n l y p o l i c i e s i n i t i a t e d by the Government, are seen as p a r t i s a n and so i n v i t e p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m from o p p o s i t i o n i n t e r e s t groups. 2.5 The increased p r o p o r t i o n of funding f o r c o l l e g e s provided by the p r o v i n c i a l Government was perceived by p o l i c y formulators t o imply a commensurate s h i f t i n a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . System a d m i n i s t r a t o r s perceived t h a t such an intended s h i f t i n a u t h o r i t y has been r e a l i s e d . This i n t u r n reduced the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the community o r i e n t a t i o n on the b a s i s of which the c o l l e g e s were founded. 2.6 Because of the overwhelming support f o r the C o u n c i l s ' demise, expressed by a l l respondents, the n e c e s s i t y f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n on the f o r m u l a t i o n of t h i s p o l i c y seemed t o be reduced. However, many expressed the view t h a t a s i n g l e Council was, and s t i l l i s , r e q u i r e d i n the governance s t r u c t u r e of the system. 0 That no such body was e s t a b l i s h e d was seen t o r e s u l t from the lack of c o n s u l t a t i o n between Col l e g e Boards and the p o l i c y formulators and the e x e r c i s e of s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d p o l i t i c a l behavi our. 2.7 Respondents a l s o expressed the view t h a t some f u n c t i o n s formerly c a r r i e d out by the C o u n c i l s , and seen as important to the system, had been l o s t during the implementation of t h i s p o l i c y (see p.136). I t was claimed that t h e r e was now inadequate p r o v i s i o n f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s and the l i k e t o i n f l u e n c e course and program d e t a i l s at a p r o v i n c i a l system l e v e l . The M i n i s t r y o f f i c e has not e s t a b l i s h e d a s u i t a b l e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t o provide f o r commercial and i n d u s t r i a l l i a i s o n on such matters f o r the whole province. I t was a l s o held t h a t the C o u n c i l s had acted as an independent s c r u t i n e e r of M i n i s t r y d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s , and t h a t no agency was seen to f i l l the same r o l e i n the new governance s t r u c t u r e . As one respondent from the M i n i s t r y observed: Some Df the functions performed by the Councils: taking a second look at things; providing an independent examination of certain kinds of issues; making sure that certain programs for us were examined; in f a c t , ought to have been taken on by someone ( 4 : 8 ) . 2.8 The implementation of t h i s p o l i c y was seen to produce the greatest s h i f t of a u t h o r i t y from the C o u n c i l s t o the M i n i s t r y . The research revealed t h a t much of the C o u n c i l s ' decision-making a u t h o r i t y could not e a s i l y be delegated t o c o l l e g e s , but the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e was perceived t o have increased i t s d e c i s i o n - making c a p a c i t y beyond what implementors b e l i e v e d was necessary. 164 P o l i c y 3 - Government Appointment of a l l C o l l e g e Board Members 3.1 The documented i n t e n t i o n s of t h i s p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e were e s s e n t i a l l y r e a l i s e d in-as-much as the Government, s i n c e the p o l i c y was decl a r e d , has appointed a l l C o l l e g e Board members. The cooperating School Boards do not make any appointments. One other r e s u l t of t h i s p o l i c y was that i n some regions of the province the number of College Board members was reduced. 3.2 The f i r s t perceived i n t e n t i o n recorded i n Table Thirteen a l i g n e d with one of the documented i n t e n t i o n s and was seen t o be implemented e f f e c t i v e l y . However, implementors d i d not agree i n t h e i r perceptions of the e f f e c t s of the i n t e n t i o n t o l i m i t the p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m of Government as expressed by School Board r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . This phenomenon might best be explained by noting that implementors d i d not perceive College Boards as i n i t i a t i n g any p o l i t i c a l pressure p r i o r t o the p o l i c y change. As one respondent put i t : At the time the decision was made, the Government was getting a lot of heat from trustees, individually and from the B.C.S.T.A., as an organisation, questioning the wisdom of their policies in the public school system. I think Government feared that the trustees involved with College Boards might use that other forum as another base for a po l i t i c a l attack ... They've been burned in a number of other situations ... but I don't think they've ever been burned by College Boards or by this Association [B.C. Association of Colleges] <19s 10-24). 3.3 Even though there was consensus that no c o n s u l t a t i o n between p o l i c y formulators and implementors took place on t h i s i n i t i a t i v e (see p.144), and no i n c e n t i v e s or sa n c t i o n s were w r i t t e n i n t o the p o l i c y statement, t h i s p o l i c y was seen t o have been e f f e c t i v e l y implemented. This success can best be measured i n terms of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the p o l i c y i n achieving the sta t e d i n t e n t i o n s . 3.4 Many a d m i n i s t r a t o r s saw the e f f e c t s as p a r t i s a n i n nature and as re p r e s e n t i n g n e i t h e r l o c a l community nor p r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s (see Table l i s 149). In a recent I n s t i t u t i o n a l E v a l u a t i o n o-f the Vancouver Community C o l l e g e i t was reported that frequent mention was made of the fact that, with the change in the way Board members are appointed, a distinctly narrower spectrum of the community was represented on the Board (V.C.C., I n s t i t u t i o n a l E v a l u a t i o n Interim Report,1986s9). An e x p l a n a t i o n -for these perceptions might be found i n the h o s t i l e environment reported i n Chapter Four, where i t was shown that the economic and p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n which the p o l i c i e s were i n i t i a t e d was such as t o i n v i t e more d i r e c t p r o v i n c i a l Government c o n t r o l . This c e n t r a l i s i n g pressure was s t r o n g l y r e s i s t e d at the c o l l e g e l e v e l , because i t was perceived as being a departure from the h i s t o r i c nature of c o l l e g e s i n B.C. Evidence f o r the r e a l i t y of t h i s r e s i s t a n c e may be found i n Hoi1ick-Kenyon's (1979) d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n on c o l l e g e c o o r d i n a t i o n . This p o l i c y i n volved the strongest perceived p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f e r e n c e with the governance of the c o l l e g e system. This observation i s supported by implementors' responses t o the questions "In what ways would you encourage the system t o change i t s governance s t r u c t u r e ? " Eight of the twelve p o l i c y implementors suggested changing the composition of C o l l e g e Boards. Again, i t i s suggested that because implementors saw t h i s p o l i c y as p o l i t i c a l l y motivated, they b e l i e v e d that College Board membership was not r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the community at l a r g e . The f a c t that appointments were "at the M i n i s t e r ' s 166 pleasure' a l s o i m p l i e d t h a t party p o l i t i c a l s e l e c t i o n and c o n s i d e r a t i o n o-f p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e were i n f l u e n t i a l i n the choice of appointees. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t they b e l i e v e d i n the importance of the r o l e of the Board i n the system's governance, and many expressed the hope th a t a u t h o r i t y would be r e s t o r e d t o broadly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Boards i n the f u t u r e . 3.5 Another of the outcomes of t h i s p o l i c y was perceived t o be the sudden l a r g e turnover of College Board members (see pp.147). The new members had i n i t i a l l y r e q u ired c o n s i d e r a b l e o r i e n t a t i o n both formal and informal t o t h e i r r o l e . This c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l e d another perception of p o l i c y outcomes which emerged, namely the th r e a t t o the s t a b i l i t y of the system a r i s i n g from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a sudden i n t r o d u c t i o n of so many new Board members. Were the Government of B.C. t o change and invoke 'the M i n i s t e r ' s pleasure', a d m i n i s t r a t o r s feared that t h i s could b r i n g about a major change i n Board membership i n a very short space of time. CONCLUSIONS This research has been a case study bound by time and place. G e n e r a l i s a b l e conclusions cannot be drawn from i t . However, the f o l l o w i n g conclusions could serve as hypotheses f o r f u t u r e g e n e r a l i s a b l e research, which i n turn w i l l a s s i s t i n u n r a v e l l i n g "what the important v a r i a b l e s are i n implementation processes" (Hargrove,1975s13). Four major conclusions from t h i s study w i l l be discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n , the f i r s t t h r e e r e l a t e t o the primary purpose of the study and the f o u r t h r e l a t e d t o the 167 s u b s i d i a r y purpose. F i r s t , the governance s t r u c t u r e was seen by a l l l e v e l s t o be s i m p l i f i e d . Second, a d m i n i s t r a t o r s saw the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of decision-making i n the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e as a negative outcome. T h i r d , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' responses revealed an apparent r e l a t i o n s h i p between the perceived i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y and the perceived p o l i c y outcomes d e s p i t e the d i f f e r e n c e of perceived i n t e n t i o n s . F i n a l l y , i t can be concluded from t h i s study t h a t there i s a need f o r the strengthening of mutual t r u s t between p o l i c y a c t o r s . 1 Simei. i.f i c a t i o n _ o f _the_System_Boyernance_Stru A d m i n i s t r a t o r s at a l l decision-making l e v e l s of the system b e l i e v e d t h a t a major outcome of implementing the three governance p o l i c i e s under study was a more s i m p l i f i e d and e f f i c i e n t governance s t r u c t u r e . Those who were c l o s e s t t o the formulati o n of the p o l i c i e s perceived them as c l a r i f y i n g what was seen as ( 1 ) a confusing and unmanageable ta n g l e of d e c i s i o n - making agencies, (2) c e n t r a l i s i n g decision-making i n the M i n i s t r y and (3) e s t a b l i s h i n g a governance framework f o r the community c o l l e g e s w i t h i n which the p r o v i n c i a l Government p o l i c i e s would be more e f f e c t i v e l y planned and pursued. Indeed, one i n t e n t i o n c l e a r l y perceived by both p o l i c y formulators and implementors was the p u r s u i t of a more s i m p l i f i e d governance s t r u c t u r e f o r the c o l l e g e system. The gr e a t e s t impetus t o t h i s change came from the a b o l i t i o n of the C o u n c i l s , but more was given by the ending of School Board appointments t o the College Boards. 2 C e n t r a l i s a t i g n _ g f _ D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g I t was the view of a m a j o r i t y of implementors that a u t h o r i t y had s h i f t e d during the implementation of these p o l i c i e s i n the d i r e c t i o n of the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e , and tha t most of t h i s movement took place as a r e s u l t of the d i s s o l u t i o n of the three C o u n c i l s . One way t o view the f i n d i n g s of t h i s study i s t o suggest that p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s on c o l l e g e governance do i n f l u e n c e the l o c a t i o n of decision-making a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the system, but that a d m i n i s t r a t o r s perceive the l o c a t i o n of that a u t h o r i t y i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Even though the design v a r i a b l e s and communication l i n k a g e s do not s a t i s f y the c r i t e r i a which other s c h o l a r s have i d e n t i f i e d as important i n o p t i m i s i n g e f f e c t i v e implementation, the perceived c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making output did c o i n c i d e with the documented and perceived i n t e n t i o n s of at l e a s t two of the p o l i c i e s . Formulators a l s o perceived t h a t the governance p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s were intended t o provide c o l l e g e s with a high degree of autonomy i n s t r i c t l y educational matters. However, most implementors claimed t h a t these i n t e n t i o n s , had i n the main, not been r e a l i s e d . A p o s s i b l e explanation of t h i s lack of correspondence l i e s i n the economic environment i n which these p o l i c i e s were implemented, (see p.80ff) and the Government's perceived need t o reduce the extent t o which community c o l l e g e s e x e r c i s e d a u t h o r i t y . I t must a l s o be acknowledged that the implementation of these p o l i c i e s , together with some previous Government d e c i s i o n s on funding, were seen by system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s as even stronger reasons f o r s h i f t i n g the centre of a u t h o r i t y t o the M i n i s t r y . 169 Although t h i s study did not attempt to analyse the e f f e c t s of the 'Formula Funding' p o l i c y of the B.C. Government upon the colleges, the issue of formula funding and f i n a n c i a l r e s t r a i n t was prominent in a l l the discussions (see Table 3s82). 3 Pol icy._Design_-__e_atign and_Perce_yed_Qutcomes This study suggests that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s perception of the intent of a p o l i c y w i l l be r e f l e c t e d in his/her perception of the outcomes. Brewer and deLeon make reference to the importance and scope of p o l i c y intentions: One can see that a decision is laden with intention - about objectives and goals, instrumental means, and timing and sequencing of events. Aspects o-f political communication are inextricably bound with each intentional element (1983:221). There were considerable v a r i a t i o n s among the elements i n the formulation, communication and timing of the three p o l i c i e s examined i n t h i s study. Previous research indicates that these elements, often c a l l e d 'design variables', have a s i g n i f i c a n t influence upon implementors' interpretation and commitment to policy i n i t i a t i v e s (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: Hargrove, 1975; Bardach, 1977; Elmore, 1978; Barrett ?< Fudge, 1981; and Brewer & deLeon, 1983). In t h i s study both formulators and implementors of p o l i c i e s expressed the view that what they saw as the intentions of the p o l i c i e s were being r e a l i s e d , despite the v a r i a t i o n in t h e i r views of the intentions and despite the differences in the ways in which the three p o l i c i e s were communicated and formulated. This phenomenon occurred so frequently that i t appears worthwhile for further research to be 170 undertaken i n order t o f i n d out why. 4 A_Need_fgr_Tru_t_Betwe The a n a l y s i s of respondents' comments r e v e a l e d a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n of m i s t r u s t between the government and v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t groups i n c l u d i n g t h e c o l l e g e s and the i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h i s l a c k of t r u s t was seen t o have upon the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s and the p o l i c y outcomes. The frequency with which a l a c k of t r u s t among major i n t e r e s t groups arose suggests t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s may well have been i n f l u e n c e d by t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n with p a r t i c u l a r groups of s t a k e - h o l d e r s . Furthermore, the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p with one or another i n t e r e s t group may well cause other o b s e r v e r s t o i d e n t i f y them with the agenda of t h a t group. Appendix E i g h t summarises some of the concern expressed about the lack of t r u s t . I t may be argued t h a t these 'p e r c e p t i o n s of implementors', or the broader term ' d i s p o s i t i o n ' as used by Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and Mintzberg (1983), r e f l e c t implementors' own v a l u e s , which i n t u r n are converted i n t o a c t i o n or i n a c t i o n as a r e s u l t . E x p r e s s i o n s of m i s t r u s t suggest t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n as t o where the a u t h o r i t y a c t u a l l y l i e s , c o n f i r m i n g some of the assumptions on which B a l d r i d g e ' s (1971) p o w e r / p o l i t i c a l model i s based, where he suggests governance i s based on the p l u r a l i t y of i n t e r e s t i n post-secondary edu c a t i o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . They a l s o suggest t h a t much of the n e g o t i a t i o n d u r i n g the implementation of p o l i c i e s i s motivated by the p e r c e i v e d a s s o c i a t i o n of a c t o r s with the va l u e s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t groups. I t might well be the case t h a t f u t u r e s t u d i e s w i l l 171 analyse the degree t o which p o l i c i e s are e f f e c t i v e l y implemented when r e l a t e d t o the amount of mutual t r u s t between a c t o r s i n the p o l i c y p r o c e s s . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n c o u l d a l s o be viewed as an important i m p l i c a t i o n f o r f u t u r e p o l i c i e s between Government and col1eges. IMPLICATIONS Hargrove suggests some guidance f o r p r a c t i t i o n e r s when he writess " P o l i c y r e s e a r c h upon implementation should be p r e s c r i p t i v e i n i t s c a p a c i t y t o suggest means f o r improving the d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s " (1975s45). There are s e v e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of the f i n d i n g s of t h i s study t h a t p r o v i d e u s e f u l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p r a c t i o n e r s . These, together with some a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the body of knowledge r e l a t i n g t o the p o l i c y p r o c e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y implementation, are s e t out i n t h i s s e c t i o n . l!DEli£ations_f o r _ P r a c t i ce 1. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s need t o examine whether the s i m p l i f i e d governance s t r u c t u r e can be maintained and whether at the same time those f u n c t i o n s l o s t t o the system, i f co n s i d e r e d necessary, can be r e s t o r e d . In view of the f i r s t c o n c l u s i o n of t h i s r e s e a r c h , t h a t the governance of the c o l l e g e system was seen t o be s i m p l i f i e d , system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s need t o take cognisance of some of the outcomes which f o l l o w from t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . A d m i n i s t r a t o r s at a l l l e v e l s expressed the view t h a t some f u n c t i o n s had been l o s t t o the system as a r e s u l t of implementing the p o l i c y of a b o l i s h i n g the C o u n c i l s (see 2.7s164). 2. In a s i m i l a r manner, p o l i c y formulators should examine the consequences of the perceived c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of decision-making i n the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e , which was i d e n t i f i e d i n the second conc l u s i o n of t h i s research. Questions must be asked about the r o l e of Coll e g e Boards i f t h i s perception of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i s an i n d i c a t i o n of r e a l i t y . Indeed, does t h i s perceived s h i f t i n decision-making a u t h o r i t y represent a s h i f t i n d i r e c t i o n f o r c o l l e g e o b j e c t i v e s ? Does the word 'community' take on a d i f f e r e n t nuance when used t o c h a r a c t e r i s e a c e r t a i n type of post-secondary i n s t i t u t i o n i n B.C.? P o l i c y formulators need t o ask the qu e s t i o n , whether the gain i n o r g a n i s a t i o n a l e f f i c i e n c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y as r e f l e c t e d i n conclusion one and two of t h i s r e s e a r c h , has been o f f s e t by the l o s s of l o c a l community persons, both l a y and p r o f e s s i o n a l s , involved i n the governance of community c o l l e g e s . Housego and Downey noted, i n terms of the school s e c t o r , "to s t r i v e f o r e f f i c i e n c y i n government i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t o c e n t r a l i z e . On the c o n t r a r y , d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n can r e s u l t i n e f f i c i e n c i e s as worthy as those achieved through c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " (1985:3). In l i g h t of the above, p o l i c y formulators should examine the r o l e p o l i t i c s play i n the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y . 3. Many a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , both p o l i c y formulators and implementors, f i n d the present c o n t r o l by the M i n i s t e r and the M i n i s t r y t o be f a r too p a r t i s a n . Even though several respondents expressed the view that the Government appointment of College Board members was being p r a c t i s e d i n a r e s p o n s i b i l e way, others perceived t h i s form of governance t o be p a r t i s a n , and t h e r e f o r e subject t o abuse. Whilst the p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n i n the case of P o l i c y Three was r e a l i s e d , p o l i c y -formulators at the p r o v i n c i a l Government l e v e l should note that the outcomes i n t h i s case are l e s s than acceptable t o the implementors. C e n t r a l i s a t i o n o-f decision-making has provided a degree of e f f i c i e n c y not a v a i l a b l e under the previous governance s t r u c t u r e , but at the cost of l o s i n g community involvement i n decision-making. The w r i t e r a n t i c i p a t e s that there w i l l be continued a g i t a t i o n t o modify t h i s p o l i c y so as t o accommodate the perceptions of p o l i c y implementors with respect t o the p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l nature of the present governance s t r u c t u r e . Colleges r e q u i r e a greater d e v o l u t i o n of decision-making a u t h o r i t y . The spectre of Government using the funding and operation of the c o l l e g e system f o r p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l purposes t o a t t r a c t v o t e s , r a t h e r than i n the p u r s u i t of educational o b j e c t i v e s , looms l a r g e i n the eyes of many p o l i c y implementors. While t h i s c o n d i t i o n continues there seems l i t t l e hope of reaching s t a b i l i t y i n the community c o l l e g e system. 4 . I r r e s p e c t i v e of how a p o l i c y i s constructed, those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s f o r m u l a t i o n might w e l l assess and consider how i t s i n t e n t i s perceived by those who w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s implementation, i f the p o l i c y i s t o be r e a l i s e d . I t appears that whatever the accuracy of that p e r c e p t i o n , i t i s t h i s perception which i s seen t o be r e a l i s e d . I f , f o r example, the government appointment of a l l C o l l e g e Board members i s perceived t o be a p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l a c t , whatever the f u t u r e a c t i o n s of the Board, they w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be perceived as f u l f i l l i n g t hat 174 end. Furthermore, i f successful implementation of p o l i c i e s depends upon the support of implementors, then policy formulators might well attempt to narrow the apparent gap between implementors' and formulators' perceived intentions. 5. The value of communicating policy objectives i s not to be underestimated. When po l i c y objectives are not e f f e c t i v e l y communicated from policy formulators to p o l i c y implementors, the intentions of the p o l i c y are less l i k e l y to be r e a l i s e d . Van Meter and Van Horn observes The delivery of public services w i l l be influenced by the manner in which standards and objectives are communicated to implementors and the standards and objectives have t h e i r i n d i r e c t impact on the d i s p o s i t i o n of implementors through i n t e r - organizational communication a c t i v i t i e s . Clearly implementors' responses to the policy w i l l be based, in part, on t h e i r percep- tions and in t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i t s objectives ( 1 9 7 5 s 4 7 4 ) . System administrators need to address a resolution to conclusion number four of t h i s study. Questions such ass How can the mutual t r u s t of a l l pa r t i c i p a n t s in the policy process be improved? How can a greater degree of openness of p o l i c y planning be integrated with system governance? How can partic i p a n t s in the implementation process be involved i n the policy formulation process? and How does the mobilisation of p o l i t i c a l behaviour by administrators influence the r e d i s t r i - bution of authority? F i n a l l y when examining communication linkages with respect to the f i d e l i t y of implementation, p o l i c y makers should recognise the salience of p o l i t i c a l models. In other words, a plausible explanation of the apparent gap between policy intentions and p o l i c y outcomes can perhaps be more adequately described by analysing the exercise of p o l i t i c a l l i n k a g e s employed throughout t h i s study.- P f e f f e r suggests "the p o l i t i c a l model presumes t h a t p a r o c h i a l i n t e r e s t s and preferences c o n t r o l choice" <1981s22). The p o w e r / p o l i t i c a l model developed by B a l d r i d g e (1771) a l e r t s readers t o the importance of the concept of ' c o n f l i c t ' i n the communication process, and H i l l d e s c r i b e s the communication process as 'bargaining p o l i t i c s ' (1983:72). Lindblom w r i t e s "pursuasion stands as a fundamental f e a t u r e of a l l p o l i t i c a l systems" (1980:30). This observation has both p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r students of the p o l i c y process and the p o l i t i c s of implementation. _Q3_____t_QQ_______bfiQC¥ This study confirms the p o s i t i o n held by Nakamura and Smallwood who submit that e f f e c t i v e implementation of p o l i c i e s i n o r g a n i s a t i o n s depends on "communication l i n k a g e s that e x i s t w i t h i n , and between, the d i f f e r e n t environments and o u t s i d e the system" (1980:27-28). Recent a n a l y s t s of p o l i c y implementation suggest t h a t when documented i n t e n t i o n s and perceived i n t e n t i o n s correspond, the planned output i s more l i k e l y t o be r e a l i s e d . - In t h i s study, the i n t e n t i o n s expressed i n the p o l i c y documents were not always congruent with the fo r m u l a t o r s ' perceived i n t e n t i o n s . However, i t i s s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the planned outputs were not perceived t o be r e a l i s e d f o r P o l i c y One. But f o r P o l i c i e s Two and Three, where documented and perceived i n t e n t i o n s d i d not correspond so c l o s e l y , the planned outputs were seen t o be r e a l i s e d . This supports the view that p l a c e s the emphasis on the importance of context i n the a n a l y s i s of implementation. A p l a u s i b l e explanation emerges when the communication l i n k a g e 176 between p o l i c y -formulators and p o l i c y implementors i s more c l o s e l y examined. This t r i a d of p o l i c i e s i n d i c a t e s that those expressed through l e g i s l a t i o n were the most e f f e c t i v e l y implemented. Many t h e o r i s t s have observed t h a t the proclamation of p o l i c y through l e g i s l a t i o n i s fraught with problems.,_ This could be explained by observing the l i m i t e d extent t o which those p o l i c i e s expressed through l e g i s l a t i o n could be modified during implementation. Therefore, the importance of c o n s i d e r i n g the environment i n which the p o l i c i e s were implemented i n r e l a t i o n t o the communication of those p o l i c i e s , whether or not through l e g i s l a t i o n , must be taken i n t o account. The phenomena i d e n t i f i e d by previous s c h o l a r s as important v a r i a b l e s of p o l i c y implementation should not be viewed i n i s o l a t i o n . There i s evidence i n t h i s study t o suggest t h a t the v a r i a b l e s should rather be considered i n conjunction with one another, and that those v a r i a b l e s should be compared with the p o t e n t i a l leeway as perceived by implementors. This i s perhaps best demonstrated by comparing the r e s u l t s of t h i s research with the view put forward by Bardach (1977), that implementor d e c i s i o n s are taken more on an i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l than i s the case during p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n , where the formation of c o a l i t i o n s i s predominant. Such a view i s not supported by t h i s research. Rather, the i n d i v i d u a l perceptions of implementors seem t o be r e l a t e d t o both t h e i r h i e r a r c h i c a l p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the system and the i n t e r e s t group with which they are a s s o c i a t e d . In the context of t h i s research, these phenomena can u s e f u l l y be viewed as sub-systems or para-systems i n Easton's terms, where the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t group seeklsl t D i n s t i l l in i t s members a high level of diffuse support in order that regardless of what happens the members wil l continue to be bound by strong ties of loyalty and affection (Easton,1965As124) . This supports the work of Lowi (1964), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and others who suggest that "the implementation process w i l l vary depending on the nature of the p o l i c y t o be c a r r i e d out" (Van Meter & Van Horn,1975s458) I______t__Q____r____ In general terms, i t appears that the use of the case method has much to o f f e r research i n t o p o l i c y implementation. Furthermore, the use of i n t e r v i e w s from which to compile data has emerged again as a powerful research t o o l , p a r t i c u l a r l y when one considers the high-ranking o f f i c e of the respondents from whom answers were obtained. But there are a number of methodological a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t should be considered i n the design of f u t u r e research of t h i s nature. One change recommended would be t o reduce the number of p o l i c i e s analysed, p r e f e r a b l y t o one s i n g l e p o l i c y , i n order t o devote more a t t e n t i o n t o the number of persons included f o r i n t e r v i e w . This would p a r t i c u l a r l y provide f o r the i n c l u s i o n of middle l e v e l managers, f a c u l t y and s t a f f , whose perceptions would add d e t a i l t o the account of the p o l i c y outcomes. Another advantageous a l t e r n a t i v e would be t o conduct the research at the time when the p o l i c y was a c t u a l l y being formulated and implemented. The study of the case would be appreciably improved :i. 78 i f p e rceptions were analysed r e g u l a r l y throughout p o l i c y •formulation and implementation, so that changes i n perceptions over time could be documented. Such t i m i n g would a l l o w the researcher t o evaluate the extent t o which p o l i c y implementation can be "regarded as a process o-f i n t e r a c t i o n and n e g o t i a t i o n , t a k i n g p lace over time, between those seeking t o put p o l i c y i n t o e f f e c t and those upon whom a c t i o n depends" (Ba r r e t t & Fudge, 1981:4). Much of the debate i n the case study l i t e r a t u r e r e v o l v e s around the i s s u e of whether or not a s i n g l e case study provides s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o c o n s t i t u t e an a d d i t i o n t o knowledge. The value of t h i s study would have been c o n s i d e r a b l y enhanced i f s i m i l a r cases had been a v a i l a b l e f o r comparison. Since none were a v a i l a b l e , i t stands as a set of f i n d i n g s r e q u i r i n g the t e s t of f u r t h e r case s t u d i e s or more g e n e r a l i s a b l e research. E U _ I b i R _ R E S E _ R C H During the conduct of t h i s research s e v e r a l p o i n t s emerged as important t o our understanding of the community c o l l e g e system i n B.C. and of the p o l i c y implementation process w i t h i n t h a t system. They need t o be v i g o r o u s l y pursued through f u r t h e r research. 1 A c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the balance i n governance f u n c t i o n between the c h i e f executive o f f i c e r of c o l l e g e s and the College Board. This matter was r a i s e d by s e v e r a l respondents i n i n t e r v i e w s , and was seen t o be an important f a c t o r i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system. 179 2 An examination of the e f f e c t s of system governance p o l i c i e s on s t a f f morale. A number of respondents perceived a lowering of morale as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making, and t h i s too i s an important aspect of the e f f e c t s of implementing system governance p o l i c i e s . 3 An a n a l y s i s of the r e s p e c t i v e r o l e s of the n a t i o n a l , p r o v i n c i a l , r e g i o n a l and l o c a l agencies i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the c o l l e g e system. This p l e a f o r a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of r o l e s and decision-making a u t h o r i t y i s not new,, but the need f o r f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s a l s o became obvious as a r e s u l t of t h i s study. 4 An examination of the impact of p r o v i n c i a l governance p o l i c i e s on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s . This study has addressed some of the perceived outcomes of implementing p o l i c i e s on the governance of the system. However, there are obvious outcomes at the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l i n s t i t u t i o n with i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r course p l a n n i n g , s t a f f r e c r u i t m e n t , funding and f a c i 1 i t i e s . 5 Further study of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between perceived p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s and perceived p o l i c y outcomes from the implementors' p e r s p e c t i v e i s d e s i r a b l e . There seems t o be a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between perceived i n t e n t i o n s and perceived outcomes, and f u r t h e r research on t h i s phenomenon may a s s i s t both i n understanding p o l i c y implementation, and d i s c o v e r i n g reasons f o r such a phenomenon. 180 The u t i l i s a t i o n o-f a predominantly s t r u c t u r a l theory as a base •for t h i s research has produced a p a r t i c u l a r view o-f the p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . There remains a need -for -further research using a l t e r n a t i v e frameworks t o provide comparative s t u d i e s i n t h i s important f i e l d of human behaviour. I t would a l s o be u s e f u l t o embark on some l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d i e s of the same p o l i c i e s c a r r i e d through t o t h e i r " t e r m i n a t i o n ' , i n order more a c c u r a t e l y t o assess the perceived outcomes over the longer term. NQIiS_ON_CHAPIER_SIX 1. A d r a f t r e v i s i o n of the Integrated Fi_ye Year Pl_anni_ng for the Bri.ti.sh Columbia College and I n s t i t u t e Systems System Mission j . GDal_s^ and Ob j e c t i v e s 1286-1996, was c i r c u l a t e d on March 6, 1986 where 'governance' had been removed. 2. See Gallagher, (1985) f o r a ple a t o e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r - mediary body f o r c o l l e g e s i n B.C. 3. See Brown, R.G.S., and S t e e l , D.R., (1979), Ihe_Administratiye_Prgces , Secnd E d i t i o n , Methuen 8e Co., L t d . , London, (p. 185) . 4. See Van Meter and Van Horn, (1975), f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on the a f f e c t s of goal consensus upon implementation; B a r r e t t and Fudge 1981, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on p o l i c y - a c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and Brewer and deLeon, 1983, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on i n t e n t - i o n a l i t y . 5. 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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA, Post-Secondary Department, lQ t e g r a t e d _ F i y e _ Y e a r _ P I a n n i n g _ f C g l l e g e _ a n d _ l n s t i t u t e , Oper a t i o n s and Plannings February 2, 1982 F i r s t compiled March 31, 1982 D r a f t No 1 November 5, 1982 D r a f t No 2 March 24 1983C D r a f t No 3 19.1 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1985, B.C. Post-Secondary Enrolment S t a t i s t i c s 1984/85, Prepared by Support S e r v i c e s . MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, CANADA, 1985, Report JL RQy_I_Cgmm____on_on_the_Econo lQd_Bg__Il9E[0]_nt_Pros_ects_for_Canada, Ottawa. PUBLIC SCHOOLS ACT, 1960, P r o v i n c e o-f B r i t i s h Columbia, Revised, Queens P r i n t e r , B r i t i s h Columbia. TASK FORCE ON THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1974, Hazel L'Estrange, Chairman, Tg_ards_t.ne_LearniQg_Cgmm , Research and Development D i v i s i o n , Department o-f Education. VANCOUVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 1986, l Q _ t i t u t i g n a l _ E y a l u a t i g n _ I n t e r _ m _ R e _ g r t . G L O S S A R Y A. C Academic C o u n c i l . B. C. B r i t i s h Columbia B.C.A.C. B r i t i s h Columbia A s s o c i a t i o n o-f C o l l e g e s B.C.I.T. B r i t i s h Columbia I n s t i t u t e of Technology B.C.S.T.A. B r i t i s h Columbia School T r u s t e e s A s s o c i a t i o n C L E . A. C o l l e g e I n s t i t u t e Educators' A s s o c i a t i o n of B. E. R.I.C E d u c a t i o n a l Resources Information Centre F. T.E. F u l l Time E q u i v a l e n t M.A.C. Management Ad v i s o r y C o u n c i l M.B.O. Mi s s i o n Goals and O b j e c t i v e s M.L.A. Member of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly N.D.P. New Democratic P a r t y O.E.CD. O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r Economic Cooperation and Development O.L.I. Open Lea r n i n g I n s t i t u t e O.T.C. Occupational T r a i n i n g C o u n c i l S.O.C.R.E.D. S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y U.B.C U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia U.S.A. United S t a t e s of America V . C C Vancouver Community C o l l e g e A P P E N D I C E S APPENDIX 1 I N I i R y i E _ _ I N I R Q D y C I I O N O P E N I N G Introduce s e l f - P r i n c i p a l from West A u s t r a l i a , C u r r e n t l y studying towards an Ed. D . at U.B.C. Intere s t e d i n B.C.'s Community College System and Implementation of Governance P o l i c i e s Thank, interviewee f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g O u t l i n e purpose of study (a) Understand the governance of the c o l l e g e system. (b) Study the implementation of Government p o l i c y i n B.C. Refer t o p r a c t i c a l outcomes (a) Importance of understanding how d i s t r i b u t i o n of decision-making and devol u t i o n of a u t h o r i t y occurs. <b> The need f o r A u s t r a l i a n s t o l e a r n from overseas. (c) The importance of e s t a b l i s h i n g a balance between p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s and educational autonomy. BACKROUND TO RESEARCH B r i e f l y d e s c r i b e the three p o l i c i e s on governance. (a) A b o l i t i o n of three intermediary C o u n c i l s . (b) A b o l i t i o n of School Board appointments. (c) System Mission Goals and Ob j e c t i v e s . E x p l a i n t h a t the three i s s u e s w i l l be questioned s e p a r a t e l y . These p o l i c i e s represent p r o v i n c i a l Government i n i t i a t i v e s on the governance of the community c o l l e g e system i n B.C. Governance i s taken t o mean the framework i n which d e c i s i o n s are made f o r the system. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s i s used t o mean a l l persons d i r e c t l y i n v olved i n system decision-making and in c l u d e s the M i n i s t e r , M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s , Board members, major i n t e r e s t groups, and p r o f e s s i o n a l c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . CONFIDENTIALITY & PERMISSION TO RECORD Ex p l a i n d i f f i c u l t y of note t a k i n g , and the need f o r accuracy. Assure interviewee of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . Seek permission t o record the i n t e r v i e w . Present Interviewee Consent Forms and ask f o r s i g n a t u r e . 194 APPENDIX TWO INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR POLICY INTENTIONS A b o l i t i o n _ o f _ C g u n c _ l _ Qis What do you b e l i e v e were the major i n t e n t i o n s of the p o l i c y t o a b o l i s h the three intermediary C o u n c i l s ? Q2s In your o p i n i o n , were the reasons f o r the p o l i c y change c l e a r l y communicated t o a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n the system? Q3s Did the p o l i c y aim t o delegate more a u t h o r i t y t o the c o l l e g e s when the C o u n c i l s were d i s s o l v e d ? Q4s What i s the major intended r o l e of the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e i n the governance of the c o l l e g e system? Q5s Do you thi n k the p o l i c y formulators were s u f f i c i e n t l y informed about the community c o l l e g e system? Q6s What degree of independent d i s c r e t i o n d i d the p o l i c y intend t o provide c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s with respect t o governance? Q7: Do you b e l i e v e the p r o v i n c i a l Government's p o l i c y i n t e n t i o n s are being r e a l i s e d ? Q8: Have there been any unforseen e f f e c t s from the a b o l i t i o n of the three C o u n c i l s ? Ggy_rnm_n__A_Bgintm_nt_gf Q9: What were the key f a c t o r s that i n f l u e n c e d the Government t o d i r e c t l y appoint a l l members t o College Boards? Q10: Did any c o n s u l t a t i o n occur with c o l l e g e s p r i o r t o the proclamation of the p o l i c y ? Q l l s Was the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e t o a b o l i s h l o c a l School Board appointments t o c o l l e g e s seen as a major change or t h r e a t t o the system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ? Q12s Has there been any unforseen e f f e c t s from the change? Q13s Why was no term of o f f i c e s p e c i f i e d f o r appointments? _i__ion__oa____nd_Ob Q14s Was the proclamation o-f the M.6.0. 's intended as a major change t o the c o l l e g e system as f a r as governance i s concerned? Q15s What were the most important i n t e n t i o n s of the Government's system M.G.O.'s statement? Q16s Do you b e l i e v e the M.G.O.'s were e f f e c t i v e l y communicated t o members of the c o l l e g e system? Q17s What sa n c t i o n s and i n c e n t i v e s are e x e r c i s e d f o r implementers of the M.G.O.'s? Q18s In what way have the M.G.O.'s changed the framework f o r decision-making i n the c o l l e g e system? Q19s Was i t intended t o preserve a high degree of educational autonomy f o r the c o l l e g e s ? Q20s How important, i n your o p i n i o n , are the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s on system governance? Q21s What are the important undeclared or undocumented elements of the p o l i c i e s on governance? Q22s Are there any other i s s u e s on which you would l i k e t o comment with respect t o the p o l i c i e s on governance? 1 9 6 APPENDIX THREE INIiByiEW_QyE_IION__yiDE_F A b g l i t i g n _ g f _ C g u n c i I s 1. What do you b e l i e v e were the most n o t i c e a b l e e f f e c t s of the p o l i c y t o a b o l i s h the three intermediary Councils? 2. In your opinion were the reasons f o r the p o l i c y change c l e a r l y communicted t o a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n the system? 3. In your o p i n i o n , d i d the p o l i c y aim t o delegate more a u t h o r i t y t o the c o l l e g e s when the Cou n c i l s were d i ssolved? 4. In your o p i n i o n , what i s the major r o l e of the M i n i s t r y o f f i c e i n the implementation of t h i s governance p o l i c y i n the c o l l e g e system? 5. Do you thi n k the p o l i c y formulators were s u f f i c i e n t l y informed about the Community College System? 6. In your o p i n i o n , what degree of independent d i s c r e t i o n d i d the p o l i c y intend t o provide c o l l e g e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s with respect t o governance? 7. How e f f e c t i v e l y do you b e l i e v e that was implemented? 8. Do you b e l i e v e any unforseen e f f e c t s have emerged from a b o l i s h i n g the three C o u n c i l s ? A b g _ i t i g n _ g f _Schgg__Bgard_AeBgintments 9. In your o p i n i o n , what were the key f a c t o r s that i n f l u e n c e d the Government t o d i r e c t l y appoint a l l members t o Col l e g e Boards? 10. Do you b e l i e v e any c o n s u l t a t i o n occurred with c o l l e g e s p r i o r t o the proclamation of the P o l i c y ? 11. In your o p i n i o n , was the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e t o a b o l i s h l o c a l School Board appointments t o c o l l e g e s seen as a major change or th r e a t t o the system a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ? 13. Do you b e l i e v e there have been any unforseen e f f e c t s from the change? 14. What do you b e l i e v e were the reasons no term of o f f i c e was s p e c i f i e d f o r appointments? 14a In your o p i n i o n , what changes have occurred t o the d e c i s i o n making process or framework of the system because of the change i n Board membership? 197 Mi5_ign__Gg_____and_ 15= In your o p i n i o n , was the proclamation of the M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obj e c t i v e s intended as a major change t o the c o l l e g e system, as f a r as governance i s concerned? PROBE Have the c o l l e g e M.G.O.'s been c l o s e l y a l l i g n e d t o those of the p r o v i n c i a l Government's f o r the system? 16. In your o p i n i o n , what were the most important outcomes of the Government's system M i s s i o n , Goals, and Obje c t i v e s statement? 17. Do you b e l i e v e the Mission Goals and Objectives were e f f e c t i v e l y communicated t o members of the College System? 18. Do you b e l i e v e there i s s u f f i c i e n t ambiguity i n the M.G.O. statement to allow the c o l l e g e a reasonable degree of f l e x i b i l i t y ? 21. In your o p i n i o n , what sanctions and i n c e n t i v e s are exe r c i s e d f o r implementers of the M.G.O.'s? 22. How do you b e l i e v e the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of system governance i s evaluated? 25. In your o p i n i o n , i n what way has the Mission Goals and Obj e c t i v e s changed the framework f o r decision-making i n the Colle g e System? 28. Do you b e l i e v e the MGO's intended t o preserve a high degree of educational autonomy f o r the c o l l e g e s ? General Governance Issues 23. How important, i n your o p i n i o n , are the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s on system governance? 24. What do you b e l i e v e are the important undeclared or undocumented elements of the p o l i c i e s on governance? 26. In what ways would you encourage the system t o change i t s governance s t r u c t u r e ? 32. Is there any other i s s u e s on which you would l i k e t o comment with respect t o the implementation of the three p o l i c i e s ? 33. Are there any other areas that my questions have not covered which you consider are important t o the implementation of governance p o l i c i e s ? 34. Can you recommend anyone knowledgeable of the area being examined who could a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s study, or someone who would provide an opposing view t o your own? 198 APPENDIX FOUR INTERVIEWEES BEINDER Frank Mr -former Executive D i r e c t o r of B.C.A.C. BENNETT Be r y l Ms Member Malaspina College Board BUCKLEY Robert Mr Member of S e l k i r k College Board former P r e s i d e n t B.C.A.C. COUCH Don Mr Executive D i r e c t o r B.C. A s s o c i a t i o n of Colleges former Executive D i r e c t o r of The Academic Council FISHER Grant Dr A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r Post Secondary Education former P r i n c i p a l Camosun College FRASER Bruce Dr P r i n c i p a l Malaspina College former M i n i s t r y D i r e c t o r GALLAGHER Paul Dr P r i n c i p a l Vancouver Community College HARDWICK Walter Dr Ex former M i n i s t e r f o r Education President Knowledge Network HEINRICH John Mr former M i n i s t e r f o r Education KENNEDY Jim Dr former Chairman of V.C.C. and former Chairman Exec Comm Management Advisory Council MacIVER Sandy Mr former D i r e c t o r P o l i c y & Planning M i n i s t r y McCANDLESS R i c Mr D i r e c t o r Research and A n a l y s i s M i n i s t r y MOORE Barry Dr P r i n c i p a l Fraser V a l l e y C o l l e g e MORIN Lloyd Dr P r i n c i p a l Camosun College NEWBERRY Jack Dr Exec D i r Management S e r v i c e s M i n i s t r y PERRA Leo Mr P r i n c i p a l S e l k i r k College RIZUN H i l d a Ms Chairman Capilano College Board SHOOP Michael Mr former D i r e c t o r Planning M i n i s t r y SOLES Andrew Mr former A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r U n i v e r s i t i e s THOMPSON Lome Mr Executive D i r e c t o r Program S e r v i c e s M i n i s t r y WATERS John Mr President C.I.E.A. WING Dennis Dr P r i n c i p a l North Island C o l l e g e 199 APPENDIX F I V E FQRf_AI_OF_CHARI__USED_FOR POLICY INFLUENCERS separate chart -for <a> FORMULATORS ) p r i n c i p a l (b) IMPLEMENTERS )board member ) i n t e r e s t group POLICY NUMBER — (Separate chart f o r each p o l i c y ) RESPONDENT NUMBER RESPONDENT NUMBER RESPONDENT NUMBER QUESTION NUMBER QUESTION NUMBER QUESTION NUMBER ANSWERS TD SPECIFIC QUESTIONS HERE SUMMARISED AND RECORDED IN THE APPROPRIATE COLUMN USIN6 THE RESPONDENTS OWN HORDS IF ANSWERS TO ANOTHER QUESTION HERE GIVEN, THE SUMMARY HAS RECORDED UNDER THE COLUMN OF THE QUESTION HHICH PROMOTED THE RESPONSE BUT IN A DIFFERENT COLOURED INK QUESTION NUMBER APPENDIX SIX INTERVIEW CODING Q QUESTION; PR; PROBE: I - = INTERVIEWER; R - = RESPONDENT POLICY 1 (Mission Goals, Objectives) POLICY 2 ( A b o l i t i o n of Councils) POLICY 3 (Government Board Appointments) Comments on general governance i s s u e s P01; P02; P03; POG; DESIGN VARIABLES Amount of Change Degree of Threat C l a r i t y of Goals Sanctions & Incentives Consultat i on Resources Formulators Knowledge Assign R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s Intent Stated Intent Unstated Is 2; 3; 5; 6; 7; S; 9; 10; 11; ENVIRONMENT ENV Economic State S o c i a l State P o l i t i c a l S t a te 17; 18; 19; COMMUNICATION VARIABLES C l a r i t y of Purpose 13; Degree of Ambiguity 14; Timing 16; Degree of B u r e a u c r a t i s a t i o n 22; Perceived E f f e c t i v e n e s s Comm'n 23; INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION VARIABLES I/P Perceived Importance of P o l i c y Understanding of P o l i c y I n f l u e n c e r s I n d i v i d u a l Committment In t e n t i o n s R e a l i s e d I n t e n t i o n s Not Re a l i s e d 24; 27; 30; 31; 33; 34; I. = INTENTION: P. = PERCEPTION: R. = REALISED: 0. = OUTCOMES. ?oi APPENDIX SEVEN MIMBERS_OF_RESEARCH_AD DAY B i l l P r i n c i p a l Douglas College DENNISON John Professor Higher Education U.B.C. FAST Lawrence D i r e c t o r Academic A f f a i r s Vancuver Community College HOLLYCK-KENYON Tim Researcher on B.C. c o l l e g e c o o r d i n a t i o n ROBERTSON B i l l former Head of Department of Distance Education B.C. I n s t i t u t e of Technology SOLES Andrew former Deputy M i n i s t e r f o r Education APPENDIX EIGHT SOME C O L L E G E A D M I N I S T R A T O R S ' COMMENTS I M P L Y I N G L A C K OF TRUST "In the case of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r system, among the i l l s was the fact that a l l of the various parti e s within the system did not always have a well defined sense of goals, nor did they always cooperate well with one another" (4s19). "If people of good w i l l can work together [they w i l l ] demonstrate the potential of the system to solve d i f f i c u l t problems and to work them out in a reasonably i n t e r a c t i v e fashion" (4s31). "The attitude seems to be, I ' l l cooperate with you, i f there i s an advantage in i t for me" (12s 16) . "Right now I just don't think that we're very c r e d i b l e . I don't think people believe us" (12:24) . "The Minister has the authority to delegate a l o t of his powers to Boards, even though he retains f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Ministers have not chosen to do that, and I contend that they have not chosen to do that because they don't have enough confidence yet in the competence and a b i l i t y of Boards" (14:3). "What i t r e a l l y demonstrated though, i s how a bureaucracy ... need p o l i c y - makers to keep them on track" (23s3). "You w i l l f i n d in any level of Government ... people sometimes being captured by the bureaucrats in the colleges ... You've got to be on your toes, because there's nobody more crafty than a seasoned bureaucrat, believe me" (23:14).

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