ADMINISTRATORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE OUTCOMES
OF IMPLEMENTING THREE PROVINCIAL POLICIES
ON COMMUNITY COLLEGE GOVERNANCE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

BY

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B.Ed., W.A.Institute of Technology, 1979
M.A. London University, 1985

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Administrative, Adult and Higher Education)

We accept this dissertation as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

December 1986
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ABSTRACT
Recent students of policy have devoted much attention to the analysis of policy implementation, describing the changes that occur during the implementation of policy in various ways. This is another such study, the purpose of which was to determine how administrators of community colleges perceived the outcomes of implementing three provincial policies concerned with governance of the college system in British Columbia. The provincial Government, through the Minister and Ministry staff, was the policy formulator, community college governance was the policy topic, and community college system administrators were the implementors. A subsidiary purpose is to determine what discrepancies, if any, existed between the policies' intentions, and the outcomes of those policies as perceived by the implementors.

Guided by a conceptual framework developed from the literature on policy implementation and based on Easton's (1965B) political systems theory, a case study method was used to collect and analyse the data.

The documented and perceived intentions of formulators in relation to the three policy initiatives examined were reasonably congruous, but only two of the policies were perceived to be implemented in a way that corresponded at all closely to the policy intentions. From an analysis of the perceptions of policy implementors, a number of different outcomes emerged which did not align with the intentions of those who formulated the policies. The following major conclusions were reached.
Governance of the community college system in B.C. was perceived to have become more simplified and efficient as a result of the policies.

Administrators perceived that decision-making moved from the Councils to the Minister and the Ministry office, thus providing a more centralised governance structure.

There appeared to be an interesting connection (strong relationship) between administrators' perceptions of intent and their perceptions of outcomes.

It was perceived that a lack of trust existed between the Ministry and various interest groups involved in the governance of the college system.

The findings have practical, theoretical and methodological implications, including recommendations for future policy-makers, some additions to the body of knowledge on policy implementation, and some suggestions for further research on this topic.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research embodied in this dissertation has only been made possible through the combined efforts of a large number of persons, to whom the author owes a large debt of gratitude. Acknowledgement is given to the one I call God, for total provision in all things, not the least of which is the comfort and encouragement of the Holy Spirit.

My wife, Barbara has shared in a total way, not only in the partnership of living and working together away from home, but in the frustrations and joys that have formed part of this program. Her typing and computing skills have been stretched beyond the bounds of a stimulating challenge, but her love, interest and support have grown throughout the program.

The generosity of the Education Department of Western Australian for allowing leave to undertake this study, and the senior officers who encouraged the program are gratefully acknowledged.

To Dr J. Dennison, Research Supervisor, for his generous support in time and expertise, and Dr’s J. Andrews, and I. Housego, members of my committee for their patience, persistence and rigorous guidance, I record my sincere thanks. Also to Dr A. Soles for advice and contacts, and Mrs P. Turner, who generously edited many of the early drafts of the dissertation, thank you.

My wife and I also express our thanks to fellow students and faculty of A.A.H.E. who helped our stay in Canada to be such a pleasant and stimulating experience.
CHAPTER ONE
STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The distribution of power in organisational decision-making has always produced healthy debate which has fascinated scholars and practitioners alike. This debate often revolves around governance issues of centralised and decentralised decision-making, and in community college administration governments frequently develop policy initiatives to alter that balance. In such cases governments must not only be concerned with centralisation and decentralisation issues, but with the possible efficiency with which their policies will be interpreted, and even more important, the outcomes of policy implementation. Furthermore, in post-secondary education, the need to balance government control mechanisms whilst maintaining academic autonomy can be examined through a concern for the apparent discrepancy between policy formulation and implementation. How actors interpret the effects of that implementation has been shown by previous analysts to be important. "The pull between unfettered responsiveness to perceived constituencies and limitations imposed by central planning agencies is of paramount concern to educators in virtually all postsecondary jurisdictions" (Fraser, 1979:38).

This research is concerned with administrators' perceptions of the outcomes of three such policy initiatives in British Columbia (B.C.). In this Chapter the problem is stated in the form of researchable questions, and their elements examined to outline the study parameters. It will first address the governance issues, in particular the elements of autonomy, coordination and control, then identify the policies to be studied and the issues
to be included, and then offer some definitions of key words used throughout the dissertation. The Chapter will conclude with some statements on the importance and limitations of the study. Regular reference will be made to studies reported in the United States of America (U.S.A.), not only because of the intrinsic worth of doing so, but because of the strong similarity which the community colleges of the U.S.A. have with those of B.C.

**THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The purpose of this study is to determine some important issues relating to policy implementation and to explain why there is often a discrepancy between policy intentions and policy outcomes. The study will address both practical and theoretical issues relating to the outcomes of implementing three governance policies. The following major and subsidiary questions will be used to focus the research.

What do system administrators perceive to be the outcomes of implementing three recent provincial Government policies relating to the governance of the community college system of British Columbia? The three policies have to do with: the system Mission, Goals, and Objectives 1982-87' statement; the abolition of the three intermediary Councils; and Government appointment of all College Board members.

A subsidiary question is related to, and should assist in the explanation of, the major research question.
What, if any, discrepancies exist between formulation and implementation of the policies as perceived by administrators?

**WHY GOVERNANCE POLICIES?**

In order to address some governance issues raised in the research problem, it is meaningful to establish a context by briefly examining a number of studies in the area of authority distribution. This task will first require an examination of the historical and theoretical perspectives on college autonomy, and will then focus on various aspects of coordination and control.

Under the Westminster system of government, the minister responsible for post-secondary education in B.C., as titular head, clearly has the power to make decisions affecting the delivery of the post-secondary services, and also has the legal entitlement to delegate authority and responsibility to ensure that government policies are realised. The effectiveness of the post-secondary education service is largely dependent upon such ministerial policy decisions, upon the agencies to which authority is delegated, and upon what shape the systems' decision-making framework assumes. This section addresses some of the important issues in establishing a balance of power in the decision-making framework for the college system.

"Governance is the framework in which decision making occurs" (Deegan & Gollattscheck, 1985:73). This definition is further clarified as follows: "The policy-making, objective-setting, and exercise of authority in ... [the system] includes
administrative or management functions to the extent that they relate to the execution of policy and authority" (E.R.I.C. Thesaurus, 1982:110). Governance policies were not analysed in conjunction with individual colleges. Rather, the results of implementing system-wide governance policies, as perceived by system administrators, were analysed.

The search for governance models in post-secondary education first focussed on institutional patterns which were described as 'bureaucratic', where the rational and formal aspects were predominant; a 'collegial' pattern, where professional and academic communities were involved in participatory management; a 'political' pattern, in which conflict was the acceptable norm; and finally on the 'garbage can' model, where ambiguity was the dominant characteristic and in which the institution "does not know what it is doing" (Cohen & March, 1974:3). "More recent models such as social networks, loose coupling, organizational learning, and examining institutions as cultures reject the more intentional and rational assumptions of the traditional models" (Peterson, 1985:9).

The Carnegie Commission declared: "No clear theory about governance within institutions of higher education is generally accepted as a basis for approaching policy, and this, additionally, complicates an examination of the subject" (1973:13). In an attempt to isolate the perceived intentions of policy initiatives and the perceived outcomes, this study will incidently identify any discrepancy between outputs and outcomes related to the three policies. Governance policies declare
government intentions for decision-making within the system, and the outcomes of implementation reveal something of the impact upon the system.

Boyd highlights some of these issues in his paper on 'Competing Values in Educational Policy and Governance,' when he writes: "The difficulty of course, is to achieve and maintain governmental arrangements and policies that strike a desirable balance between the advantages (and disadvantages) of centralisation and decentralisation" (1984:9). Baldridge extends this view when he states, "a study of the political dynamics surrounding decision-making would help unravel some of the difficulties in studying academic administration" (1971:21).

Any research on public policy implementation must consider the human setting in which policy intent is expressed and realised. Similarly the government which assumes the financial and constitutional responsibility for the college service must delegate authority to agencies, albeit human agencies, in such a way as to optimise the effectiveness of their policies (see Jennings (1980) and Housego (1986)). According to the Carnegie Commission "governance is a means and not an end. It should be devised and adjusted not for its own sake but for the sake of the welfare of the academic enterprise" (1973:3). Nevertheless, clear lines of communication as well as levels of accountability and authority need to be established and maintained for the effective governance of the system. The following subsections identify some of the important issues of delegation of authority and responsibility in the governance of the college system. Also
identified are the particular policy initiatives to be included in this study.

The Case for College Autonomy

There is a large body of literature outlining the problems of centralised decision-making, particularly in respect to the apparent conflict with local institutional autonomy. Such autonomy was one of the fundamental objectives of the community college movement. Beswick et al (1983), Campbell (1971), Dennison (1976), Gleazer (1968), Medsker (1960), Monroe (1976), and others, including many Government Reports and Commissions of Inquiry in Canada and the U.S.A., have stressed the importance of institutional autonomy in community college governance. It is believed that this autonomy has in the past, and can in the future, significantly contribute to college flexibility and the encouragement of local initiatives. Sidney Brossman, for example, argues:

Local management of community colleges must be maintained if these colleges are to remain true to the basic reason for their existence. This means that state agencies, while carrying out their state roles, should in no way diminish the responsibilities of local boards (Searle, 1978:19).

Conversely, Ashworth reminds us that the demand for autonomy alone is not of itself a justification for standing outside government control:

To will the end without having to hand the means whereby the end can be achieved in a way that attracts support and assent is the mark of political incompetence and no amount of high-faluting nonsense about the desirability of autonomy ... or the sanctity of academic freedom should be allowed to obscure that (1983:67).

These writings call researchers to examine both the role of central policy-making in higher education, and the inherent difficulties of making policies that can be realised.
The Task Force on the Community Colleges in British Columbia, established in 1973, declared, after extensive research, that one of the important functions was that -

the governance and operation of every college should reflect the concerns of all elements within the college and its wider community. Community colleges must be highly responsive to community needs for learning (Task Force, 1974:11).

The Task Force also recommended "that colleges be granted corporate status; and further, that the college board be responsible for determining policies ..." (1974:16).

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) reported, "the examiners are of the opinion that some authorities go too far in their attempts to control institutional decisions" (1976:82). If Brossman's assertion is accurate, a close examination of relationships between government and college authority is essential. He writes, "virtually every important development in community college education is the result of innovations stemming directly from local boards being free from state uniformity" (Searle, 1978:22). Dennison notes "traditionally, autonomy is a much desired quality for institutions of higher education and any form of provincial structure is perceived as a threat to such autonomy" (1979:35).

The rhetoric seems to have gone unheeded by politicians and public policy-makers, as the control of finance, course provision, curricular matters, and other important decisions are becoming increasingly centralised. Cohen and Associates record this drift when they observe:

Gradually, steadily, seemingly irresistibly, governmental agencies, commissions, boards, and legislature are impinging on
the colleges. All is done with the best of intentions: program duplication among colleges in the same region must be avoided, data must be reported uniformly, minimum standards for programs and personnel must be maintained. But people in the colleges may be forgiven if they see the state as an unwelcome intruder (1975:1).

The history of relationships between government and colleges forms an important backdrop for this study of policy implementation. Gallagher (1984) reports: "Zealously guarded autonomy, regional responsiveness, and curriculum comprehensiveness were the bedrock for British Columbia colleges" (1984,9;2:7). More than a decade ago Cohen and Associates observed a centralising tendency:

control of community colleges is gravitating toward state capitals. Responsibility for funding, planning, and managing everything from cost accounting to instructional techniques is moving steadily away from local officials (1975:1).

Again, McGivney notes the bureaucratic influences that contribute to this centralisation:

The centralization imperative appears to be driving most private and public organizations toward an increasingly bureaucratic character in their structures. Consequently, educational policy making systems and organizational structures over the long term are becoming more bureaucratic, specialized, and centralized (1984:49).

However, the whole debate on centralisation versus local autonomy is generated from the perceptions of this balance by actors within the system, as well as those not directly associated with the system, but affected by the relevant policies.

The Case for Coordination and Control

Policies on college governance include the phenomenon of coordination, and the degree of coordination must be balanced with elements of control, which in turn affect the distribution of authority within the system. In the context of England's education governance, Jennings notes "it is ... clear that party
political leaders like ... more centralised control over local services" (1980:2). For example, if the provincial Government in B.C. is providing the bulk of the funding for the operation of colleges, it wants to be able to implement its policies through the system to maintain accountability. Thus college coordination and control becomes an important factor in public policy.

The examination of the conditions under which power and social control become legitimated and transformed into authority is an important undertaking in trying to understand the governance and control of organizations (Pfeffer, 1981:6).

Glenny reported studies of the coordination phenomenon with regard to higher education in the U.S.A., and whilst recognising that "both the laws establishing coordinating agencies and their actual operations depend on a variety of social, economic, and political factors in the historical development of the state" (1985:8), went on to declare:

the most successful coordination involves widespread participation by faculty and administrators of the coordinated organizations, experts and lay people from the public and representatives of organizations interested in education (1985:20).

Many college administrators strongly oppose provincial coordination on the basis of its apparent 'control' functions, which threaten the degree of college autonomy (Hollick-Kenyon, 1979:41). But, as the financial commitment of the provincial Government to community colleges grew, so the demand for stronger links between all segments of the system gave rise to a need for central coordination, planning and accountability.

The Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy statement 1982-87 of the Government of B.C.4 listed governance as the first of its 'objectives'. It states with respect to coordination that the
system will "preserve an intermediate level structure, comprising one or more council(s), which can provide input to the government and to educational institutions based on a provincial perspective" (Ministry of Education, 1983:11). This level of decision-making was abandoned early in the 1982-87 period when the three existing Councils were dissolved, and the coordinating role became the direct responsibility of the Government, through the office of the Minister of Education.

Recent reviews have exposed the increasing external pressures on the governance of post-secondary education, and on government's ability to control the system. McGivney recognised the environmental pressures not only on institutions within the system of education but also on the state system itself.

Because the states receive aid from the federal government, the politics of education at state level should be examined from a perspective that recognizes that the state is not only a regulator but also a regulatee (McGivney, 1984:44).

He further reviewed the state versus local control research into conceptual models of 'State Education Governance Patterns', and concluded that "state politics and education has clearly begun to emerge and be recognised as a serious and important field of study," and that the "conceptual models have yet to be completely integrated" (1984:49).

There is a case for provincial governments in Canada to assume greater control over the community college systems of education, if for no other reason than to ensure financial accountability to their electorates, as they assume a higher percentage of the escalating costs of this service. But there are other reasons.
There is a need for both a provincial and national planning perspective in policy areas other than education, such as economic and social (see O.E.C.D., 1976). Such planning could provide a rational model of coordination that minimise duplication of services, optimise economies of scale, and eliminate wasteful and dysfunctional attributes of the total service without jeopardising the quality, but still fostering comprehensiveness, accessibility, and potential innovation of staff and students, within the broader government policy framework. Indeed, the literature on management of public institutions supports the centralisation imperative in times of financial constraint or when providing a framework for unpopular changes.

The Policies to be Considered

The Government of B.C. has taken practical steps to ensure that the domains over which community colleges can exercise freedom of choice in matters of governance are reduced. The proclamation of the The College and Provincial Institute Act (1977), was a significant move to provide a provincial perspective on post-secondary education. In assessing the implementation of the Act, Dennison observed:

The post-Bill B2 period has been characterized by a host of new procedures affecting program and course approval, budgetary control, governance, and associated factors which influence the day to day operations of the colleges and institutes ... the Act placed emphasis upon centralization of the system (1980:5).

It was during 1982 to 1983 that the policy initiatives studied in this research were announced. The development of the system's Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was the first of these initiatives.
Policy One

Institutional decision-making potential was influenced by requiring College Boards to align their Mission, Goals, and Objectives with those of the provincial Government. "Each component of the system will be accountable for the attainment of all applicable objectives described in the following document within the time-frame for which they are pertinent" (Ministry of Education, 1983C:7).

Each college was founded on a basis of local and regional support, indeed of local governance. Since the establishment of the colleges their financial position had changed, and by 1980 the provincial Government was providing almost all college income. A need was perceived by the Government to develop provincial policies for these colleges in areas of governance, program rationalisation, and support for economic and social policies of the Government. After wide consultation, a Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was developed in the form of a five-year plan for the system. The initiative called on institutions to develop a five-year plan, giving due cognisance to, and preserving harmony with, the provincial plan. This document will serve as the basis for the first policy initiated, in as much as it encompasses governance issues in the colleges sector. It provides a foundation document on which to pursue the administrators' perception of governance policy implementation outcomes.

Policy Two

Three intermediary Councils were established to act as
coordinating agencies for the Government to ensure the effective implementation of its policies, and simultaneously to represent fairly, college needs to the Government. Many recorded their dissatisfaction with this organisational structure orally and in formal documents. Dennison highlights some of the inherent problems in this arrangement by recording the "emphasis on centralization ... the conflicting mandates ... the wide division of accountability ... the competing logistics for program allocations ... and the idiosyncratic nature" (1980:5-8) of the Councils themselves. The College-Institute Educators' Association (C.I.E.A.) submitted a brief, first to the Presidents' Council and subsequently to the Minister of Education in 1982, endorsing the abandonment of the three Councils, by recommending, "C-IEA urges the repeal of Part 6 Section 45-52 and therefore the alteration of those other sections of the Act which refer to the Councils" (C.I.E.A.,1982:17). Ellis and Mugridge (1983), in their case-study of the Open Learning Institute, also complained of the imposition on educational efficiency of the multiplicity of intermediary bodies in the establishment of that institution. Indeed, one of the coordinating Councils reported to the government:

It is tempting to suggest that Bill 82 be revised to do away with the existing three Councils and substitute something more like the Council of Higher Education and a College Commission referred to above but with terms of reference and membership altered to conform to new situations (Academic Council,1980:13).

Community college administrators were also vociferous in expressing difficulties inherent in the coordination structure. 6

Sufficient dissatisfaction was expressed to persuade the Government to modify the policy statement and further change the
decision-making structure of post-secondary education coordination by dissolving the three Councils, and requiring institutions to deal directly with the office of the Ministry of Education.

In July 1983, the three Councils were eliminated as part of the provincial government's restraint program ... the centralizing trend appeared to be strengthening ... this government felt that increased control, especially over budget-setting decisions, was necessary (Calder, 1984:86-87).

The perceived effects of implementing such governance policies formed a major thrust for this research.

Policy Three

Concurrent with the abolition of the Councils was a further policy initiative by the Government of B.C. The decision required the minister responsible for post-secondary education to appoint all college governors, rather than allow the previous practice of elected School Board members selecting their representatives on College Boards.

When the colleges were established in the 1960's, they were governed indirectly through the School Boards which operated under the Public Schools Act. During this time College Council membership comprised appointees from participating School Boards, as well as the principal of the college and the school district superintendent, plus two members appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council. In 1970 the college principal was removed from the Council and the number of Government appointees increased, with a majority of School Board appointees guaranteed. The inclusion of the district superintendent ceased in 1973. The proclamation of the Colleges and Provincial Institute Act in 1977
changed the name of the governing body from Council to Board and reaffirmed the criterion for Board size as follows:

...the number of positions on the board is twice the number of school districts, included, in whole or in part, within the college region of the college, less one position (College and Provincial Institutes Act, Part 111, 7, (2); 1977).

It also provided colleges with corporation status.

In 1980 the balance of membership changed to give a majority of one appointed by the Government. This provided the basis on which the provincial Government enacted legislation in 1983, to become effective from February 1984, which is the third policy initiative examined in this study. The legislation stated "the board of a college shall consist of 5 or more members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council" (College and Institute Act, Part 3, 6; 1977).

DEFINITION_OF_TERMS

Administrators

In the context of this research, administrators means those persons involved in system-wide decision-making on college governance. The term will encompass Ministers of Education, senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education involved in the post-secondary education sector, College Board chairmen and members, and chief executive officers of colleges and major interest groups such as B.C.A.C. and C.I.E.A. These persons are so classified as system administrators because of their direct involvement in the implementation of college system governance policies.
College System

The term college system means those entities in B.C. which are directly involved in the delivery of post-secondary education programs available through the fifteen community colleges in the province. It will be used synonymously with 'community college system'.

Communication Linkage

The term communication linkage is used in this dissertation to reflect the meaning developed by Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) in relation to what they call the policy formulation environment and the policy implementation environment. They define it as follows:

These linkages consist of a series of crisscrossing communications networks between policy makers, implementors, intermediaries, recipients, lobbyists, and others who become involved in the implementation process. Since these different actors may attempt to resist or circumvent policy directives for a variety of reasons, a critical component in these networks consists of compliance mechanisms that are employed in an effort to move various actors to carry out policy instructions (1980:59-60).

Environment

Environment is defined as:

Those aspects of a society that fall outside the boundaries of a political system can be generalized by stating that they consist of all the other sub-systems of the society. They constitute the environment of the political system. Environment embraces the social as well as the physical environment (Easton, 1965A:70-71).

In this study, environment relates to policy implementation and includes those pressures exerted on the system from the documented and legal directions and constraints of policy statements.
Governance

Governance has been previously described in this Chapter (see p.3), and will be used in the context of this study to mean the framework of authoritative decision-making affecting the system of community colleges in B.C.

Implementation

Implementation will refer to "the social activity that follows upon, and is stimulated by" (Brewer & deLeon, 1983:256) "the adoption of a policy and before routinization of operations, activities or tasks that are governed by the policy" (Schneider, 1982:716).

Inputs

Inputs are defined as the intentions of policy, both documented and perceived by formulators, which include the standards and objectives derived from those intentions, as well as the resources available to implement the policy.

Interest Group

For this study, the term will be used to incorporate both legitimised and non-legitimised pressure groups, (see Kogan, 1975:75), but will include only those with direct interest in the implementation of college governance policies in B.C. Therefore, within those confines the definition given by Wrong can be employed.

People who share a common situation often have like interests which are capable of transformation into common interests. If they achieve successful mobilization by developing a sense of collective identity and finding or creating an organization to defend and promote their interests, the interests of them all
become the interests of each. The maintenance of the organization and of the solidarity that helps sustain it becomes vitally relevant to the fulfillment of individual interests previously pursued in isolation or in competition with other members of the collectivity (1979:179-180).

Outcomes
The use of the word outcome throughout this study should be taken to mean the unintended consequences of a policy. Outcomes will be located through the perceptions of college system administrators who implement the policies.

Outputs
Throughout this study, this term assumes a somewhat different meaning to that ascribed by systems theory. Rather than project the concept of "an authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1965A:126), it will be used to convey the realisation of policy intentions, but not including outcomes.

Perceptions
Personal perceptions are the prime stimulus for action with respect to implementing policy. This research focusses on the perceived outcomes of system governance initiatives, and the word perceived will be used in the same general sense as its use in the policy implementation literature, reviewed in Chapter Two. That is, the term perceptions will be used to reflect administrators' personal value and belief frameworks in relation to the policy elements.

Policy
Policy means a formal statement of intent by a governing
authority. It is also used in the more general sense, to convey the complete process which includes implementation through to termination of the policy.

Policy Effects
Policy effects is used to comprise both policy outputs and policy outcomes as described above, and therefore includes both the realisation of policy intentions as well as the unintended consequences of the particular policy.

Policy Formulators
Policy formulators, or policy architects, include the relevant Ministers of Education, senior bureaucrats attached to the office of the Ministry, and past officers of the Ministry. All these officers represent the group who were seen to be involved in the formulation of any of the three policies being examined.

Policy Implementors
The term implementor is used in this study to include only administrators who receive, interpret and put the policies into action, or inaction, within the college system. It is used to include College Board chairmen and members, chief executive officers of colleges and interest group executives.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The whole process of policy analysis is critical to policy-makers, policy-implementors, and policy-evaluators. As the governance of post-secondary education appears to become
increasingly centralised, so the importance of understanding the processes involved in effective implementation becomes more important for politicians, college administrators, and academics.

Clearly, the techniques of skilled policy analysis are very much needed to inform that task - for it is in the field of policy analysis that one may find the tools and techniques, the technologies and the strategies for blending the contributions of politics and expertise in the processes of public policy-making for education (Downey, 1984: 3).

Although this work can only make a small contribution to the understanding of government policy for community colleges, it is important that such knowledge be pursued with increasing regularity, enthusiasm and scholarship. It is an important example of research that attempts to identify differences between public policy intent and outcomes, and thus has application to the public policy process, in particular to the community college systems in Canada, especially in B.C.

A search of the literature reveals that no previous studies of the effects of implementing provincial governance policies in the community college system of B.C. have been conducted. This reinforces the need not only for this study, but for the launching of complementary research to add to the understanding of this public function.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is limited to the period following the Government's announcement of the three policy initiatives:

(a) System Mission, Goals, and Objectives, March 1983,

(b) Abolition of intermediary Councils, July 1983,

(c) Government appointment of College Board members, July 1983,
and extend through to the establishment of the new Ministry for Post-Secondary Education in February 1986. During this time the system was also subject to financial restraint, the introduction of 'formula funding', and other Government intervention, but these are excluded from the policy initiatives being examined. In many situations it was impossible to segregate apparent causes and effects of the particular policies being considered without recognising these other interventions.

The term community college administrators is restricted to persons who are perceived as key decision-makers in the implementation of the governance policies. The research is limited by the degree to which those persons were available and willing to make documents accessible, and/or to discuss the relevant issues. Furthermore, middle level managers within colleges were not included in the sample frame of those interviewed and therefore limits perceptions to senior executives within the system.

Yin (1985) states some of the inherent problems of interviews when he writes "they are subject to the problems, bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation" (1985:85). The examination of the policies will be limited to the facts recorded in legislation, formal documents, correspondence and the accuracy of recall exhibited by interviewees. Because policy "consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocates value" (Easton, 1967:130), the study cannot incorporate the totality of that web, nor indeed of all the values held by participants. The successive refinement of the interview question elements by the researcher also serves to limit the scope of the study.
SUMMARY

This chapter has defined the research problem and has addressed some of the major issues involved. It has provided some background to the three policy initiatives that formed the provincial Government's intervention into the governance of community colleges in B.C. A brief discussion of the dominant features of the problem provided some justification for their inclusion, and the definitions provide for an improved understanding of the dissertation. The final section of the Chapter outlined both the importance and limitations of the study.
NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE

1. Whilst technical and cultural differences exist in the use of the terms 'post-secondary education', 'higher education' and 'tertiary education', in this study they all refer to post compulsory school educational services provided by all publicly funded agencies, and can be used interchangeably.


5. The first draft of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives document entitled *Integrated Five Year Planning for the British Columbia College and Institute Systems: System Objectives 1982-87*, was sent to colleges and institutes with an accompanying letter from the Minister of Education, was dated March 31, 1982. It was redrafted several times, and a copy dated March 1983 was formally distributed to colleges in May 1983.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT

"Major policies", according to Baldridge, "commit the organization to definite goals, set the strategies for reaching those goals, and in general determine the long-range destiny of the organization" (1971:21). The importance of the policy concept is demonstrated by the volume of research generated. With respect to policies relating to governance, it has been suggested that researchers "may have generated one of the largest bodies of literature in the field of higher education" (Deegan & Gollattscheck, 1985:73). Until recently, such works have tended to focus on the policy-formation stage rather than upon the implementation stage.

The purpose of this review is to provide for the development of a conceptual framework to guide the research: that is to provide the researcher with the 'instruments' to allow for a descriptive analysis of the phenomena being studied. In the first place the literature dealing with policy implementation will be addressed. This will be done by analysing Easton's (1965B) systems model as it relates to the policy formulation. What then follows will be a survey of publications on the role implementation plays in the policy process. Another purpose of the literature review is to distinguish the significant parameters on which a suitable conceptual framework for studying implementation can be based. Finally, a conceptual framework will be advanced which incorporates these variables, and serves to guide this research project.
EASTON'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY

David Easton has made important contributions to political theory. His first book in a series, *The Political System*, presented the case for a theoretical model to provide a foundation for analysis of political behaviour. This was closely followed by *A Framework for Political Analysis* which elaborated that theoretical framework by specifying some of the elements of the model. His third book, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, developed the conceptual structures noted in the first two volumes within a systems theory and provided a working model. Each element in the model is presented as a useful tool in the analysis of political behaviour, through what he calls 'empirical theory'. This theory has been widely used in the analysis of the policy process in higher education (see Millet, 1968; Howell & Brown, 1983; and Taylor, 1983). However, the model specifically addresses policy formulation rather than implementation, and although not directly applicable to this research, offers some useful conceptual bases.

Easton's (1965B) political systems model enables the researcher to cope with many of the complex political phenomena. It allows identification of action interrelations in a systematic way, and is comprehensive, in as much as it provides for analysis of many of the relevant political activities. Systems analysis highlights the inter-relationships between sub-systems, the relationship of inputs to outputs, and the consequential outcomes of decision-making, and provides for analysis of the flow of information within the system. Figure One presents a simple structure of the major relationships defined by this theory.
Easton's (1965B) model offers conceptual tools which assist the examination of implementation effects, emphasising the importance of identifying inputs into a political system and the peculiar nature of these as they are converted from supports and demands to outputs and outcomes. The stress demands place on the equilibrium of the political system whether or not they are converted to outputs is recognisable. Easton describes the key stakeholders as 'gatekeepers' or structural regulators in the system, whom he metaphorically links with controllers "regulating the flow along the demand channels" (1965B:88). The idiosyncracies of output and feedback concepts in order to
analyse communication between the political system and its environment, with emphasis on its cyclical nature, are also useful. Easton draws a distinction between 'outputs' (deliberate allocation of resources or values) and 'outcomes' (consequential behaviour or mobilisation of resources or values) as important links in the conceptual model.

Figure Two provides a simple application of the systems theory to the analysis of policy implementation. However, it should be noted that in this figure, the 'political system' in Easton's theory is replaced with policy implementation, an approach identified by Weatherley and Lipsky (1977) and supported by scholars such as Bardach (1977), Pressman and Wildavsky (1979), and Barrett and Fudge (1981). This simple interpretation can be extended to encompass many of the important variables in the flow of information between policy intent, as expressed by formal policy statements and those undocumented but still intended by policy formulators, and policy outcomes as perceived by implementors. Some of these can be inserted into the systems model (see Figure Three). This presentation of information flow and decision-making points enables the researcher to extract many of the dynamic elements of the implementation process, by observing the behaviour of system and sub-system members without being bound to a formal hierarchical structure. This approach assists in identifying some of the means and ends by which policies are, or are not, implemented, and thus provides a useful tool by means of which to examine policy outcomes. Elmore outlines some of the important features of a systems model required when analysing policy implementation:
(1) Clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect the intent of the policy;
(2) a management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to subunits;
(3) an objective means of measuring subunit performance; and
(4) a system of management controls and social sanctions sufficient to hold subordinates accountable for their performance (1978:195).

**FIGURE 2**

SIMPLE SYSTEMS THEORY APPLIED TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

ENVIRONMENT

INPUT
Policy Intentions Documented & Perceived

PROCESS
Policy Implementation

OUTPUTS
Intentions Realised

OUTCOMES
Unintended Policy Effects

FEEDBACK LOOPS
Policy Effects Inform Next Policy Change

ENVIRONMENT
FIGURE 3

POLITICAL SYSTEMS MODEL ADAPTED FOR EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION

Source: Easton, 1965B:110
Whilst Easton's model provides the researcher with a framework for analysis beyond the formal hierarchy of the organisation, one which encompasses the behaviour of both formal and informal actors, it does not clarify the role of the policy formulators as opposed to the policy implementors other than to identify them as the authorities in different systems or sub-systems.

A political system is not a constellation of human beings that is selected out for investigation. It is a set of interactions isolated from other kinds of interaction in which the human being is engaged (1965A:36).

Easton's theory allows for the analysis of political behaviour within an organisation, and is appropriate too for research into the political outcomes of policy implementation in the college system when complemented with some of the implementation variables identified by others.

IMPLEMENTATION_IN_THE_PUBLIC_POLICY_PROCESS

The concept of implementation is not new, but the focus of researchers has tended towards the formulation element of the policy process. Only recently have analysts turned their attention to the inherent problems of policy execution. The term 'implementation' serves to describe the interpretation of policy statements by actors in the system. Brewer and deLeon's definition captures some of the important points: "Implementation is the execution of the selected option - an option that may bear only faint resemblance to ... orderly recommendations, often to the analyst's wonderment, frustration or chagrin" (1983:19).
The concept of policy implementation by 'Street Level Bureaucrats', outlined by Weatherley and Lipsky (1977), and an examination of Dunsire's (1978) 'Implementation Gap' is supported by writers such as Jennings (1980), Barrett and Fudge (1981) and Housego (1986), who provide appropriate analysis of this important element of the policy process.

The implementation phenomenon is more accurately understood if it is first examined in relation to other stages of the policy process, for as Pressman and Wildavsky assert, "each element is dependent on the other" (1979:178).

The process of making public policy can best be understood as one that involves a complicated interaction between government institutions, actors, and the particular characteristics of substantive policy areas (Bardach, 1977:ix).

This section will identify some of the policy characteristics and element interrelationships by examining some definitions of the word policy, followed by an analysis of some of the political issues emanating from a focus on implementation as a stage in the process. It will conclude with a synthesis of policy process models in which the implementation stage is identified.

Policy can mean the process of arriving at authoritative decisions on which a system or organisation acts at some future time. Conversely it can incorporate the execution phase, where policy is not realised until it is fully implemented. There have been many attempts to define policy, and it is necessary to look at some of the issues raised in these definitions to understand something of the nature of the implementation process.
Policy as an Authoritative Statement

Most definitions of policy suggest the exercise of power and influence over decision-making, but may fail to describe whether or not implementation is included. Downey epitomises this exclusion of implementation in his definition which describes the proposed 'output' in the formulation process, but does not include the variety of values assigned to such a statement by the policy implementors.

A policy, then, is a major decision by a governing authority. It selects and establishes a value from competing sets of values; it declares an intent to act on the selected value; it allocates resources, from society's scarce resources, to that value; and it sets guidelines for persons who are to act on the achievement of the authority's intent (1984:4).

Kogan writes of policies as "operational statements of values" (1975:55), but suggests that "any single policy takes on multiple guises and is viewed differently at many points of a complex system" (1975:238). This suggests that on the one hand he views policy as a prescriptive mandate, but, on the other, perceives policy as taking form only when it is interpreted. Wildavsky could be classifying policy in either of these forms when he declares: "Policy is a process as well as a product. It is used to refer to a process of decision-making and also to refer to the product of that process" (1979:387). Jennings characterises policy as giving direction to decisions, goals, and values and having "a future orientation ... [which] allows for changes in the context of decision-making" (1977:30). He goes on to declare that policies need not be explicitly stated.

Sometimes these ways of doing may be found fixed in traditions or conventions, because they have been perpetuated without critical reexamination or testing. Yet they have the effect and force of policy (1977:32).
Policy, Including Implementation

Easton incorporates the process and product concept when he writes:

The essence of a policy lies in the fact that through it certain things are denied to some people and made accessible to others. A policy, in other words, whether for a society, for a narrow association, or for any other group, consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocates value. A decision alone is of course not a policy... (1967:129-130).

However, Harman reminds his readers that policy is related to action, but in doing so implies that policy is only realised when implemented.

Policy can be viewed basically as a course of action or inaction toward the accomplishment of some intended or desired end. It embraces both what is actually intended and what occurs as a result of the intention (1980:56).

For Lindblom "most, perhaps all, administrative acts make or change policy in the process of trying to implement it" (1980:64). Table One provides an overview of writers who feature the implementation phase as prominent in the policy process.

Synthesis

Policy is used to mean both an authoritative allocation of resources to influence future decision-making, which may or may not be realised as 'intended', or it may mean the acts of interpretive behaviour by members of a system in response to a given statement of 'intent'. This conversion process is viewed by different scholars in a variety of ways. To Hargrove (1975) it is 'the missing link', to Bardach (1977) it is 'the implementation game', and to Dunsire (1978) 'the implementation gap'. Discrepancy between intent and outcome can occur at any stage of the policy process, but apparently occurs most frequently during implementation.
### TABLE 1

**IMPLEMENTATION AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE POLICY PROCESS**

A collation of various authors' conceptualisations of the implementation element in the policy process

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<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Issue Emergence &amp; Problem Identification</td>
<td>Environmental Demands and Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformulation of Opinion</td>
<td>Development and Authorisation</td>
<td>Policy Decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergence of Alternatives</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Organisation Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discussion and Debate</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Execution</td>
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<td>Legitimisation</td>
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<td>Formation</td>
<td>Plan to Plan</td>
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<td>Implementation</td>
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<td>Evaluation</td>
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<td>Implementation</td>
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<td>Evaluation &amp; Review</td>
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<td>Termination</td>
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Easton (1967), Kogan (1975), Jennings (1977) and Downey (1984) tend to support the concept that the policy is complete when the statement is issued, whereas writers such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Harman (1980), Barrett and Fudge (1981), and Brewer
and deLeon (1983) encompass the important interpretive phase, known as implementation.

The implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions ...[which] examines those factors that contribute to the realization or nonrealization of policy objectives (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:448).

In order to understand the outcomes of policy implementation, it is assumed that phase is an integral part of the policy process, which cannot be evaluated in its entirety as a policy until the implementation phase is complete. Jennings (1980) and Housego (1986) clearly demonstrate how policies to redistribute governance authority are not always implemented as intended.

The study of the policy process fails to include the multiplicity of variables influencing the political dynamics, unless the implementation process is included. Dunsire supports this point-of-view when he writes "evaluation of policies will go astray if they assume that the effects they measure are a function of the policies decided rather than of the policies-as-implemented" (1978:18).

Institutions engage humans, who introduce a degree of variety and internal inconsistency that is not evident in a mechanical system. It is impossible to understand policy implementation without considering the formal and informal nature of politics within the organisation, and how it is perceived by actors. Administrators define their own viewpoint which serves as reality in guiding their actions. All are governed by values, beliefs, and customs that are not easily discernible, but may
develop structure, functions and communication networks that are not consistent with the formal organisational patterns, or for that matter the Government’s intentions, for example, college system governance policies.

Implementation consists of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given policy, assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to subunits consistent with these objectives, monitoring system performance, and making internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization’s goals. The process is dynamic, not static; the environment continually imposes new demands that require internal adjustments. But implementation is always goal-directed and value-maximizing (Elmore, 1978:191).

There is agreement among the majority of policy analysts that implementation is an integral but theoretically distinct element of the policy process. However, there is a great deal of debate as to where the boundaries of these segments lie. Indeed, many of the phenomena explored for the implementation element can be and are equally well identified in other phases of the policy process. In fact Nakamura and Smallwood declare: "In the final analysis, policy evaluation [which is their third policy phase] is subject to many of the same political influences and constraints as the first two policy environments [Formulation & Implementation]" (1980:83). Bardach also says of his own model, "this overall conception of the ‘implementation process’ does not differ significantly from the conception found in previous scholarly literature on the subject" (1977:37). Again Van Meter and Van Horn recognise that "in most respects this framework differs little from other adaptions of political systems models first introduced by Easton" (1975:446), identifying the distinction between policy and performance as the distinguishing feature. Such admissions offer substantial assistance in the
development of a suitable conceptual framework for this research into perceived implementation effects.

A DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL

The basic conceptions of Easton’s (1965b) framework include intra-societal and extra-societal inputs to the system from the total environment, in the form of supports and demands. With respect to these phenomena, insufficient attention is given to the establishment of precise boundaries. Nevertheless the analysis of the conversion of inputs, with a view to their being included or rejected and receiving an authoritative allocation in the form of an output from the political system, is a clear and useful arrangement for examining policy implementation, even though this is not the apparent intention of the model. The model’s ‘scientific’ base is valuable in some areas of research, but tends to lose the ability to cope with some of the human elements within a system, such as probing the reasons why power is unequally distributed.

Burrell and Morgan make the point that systems theory clearly "encompasses a whole range of possibilities" (1982:59), and assert that

the open systems approach does not carry with it the implication that any one particular kind of analogy is appropriate for studying all systems, since it is possible to discern different types of open systems in practice (1982:59).

Because the systems model is so diverse, and perhaps because of its successful adoption by so many scholars, much criticism has accompanied its use. There are a number of problems associated with the adoption of Easton’s (1965b) political systems model.
Ham and Hill report:

it would be wrong to accept Easton's conceptualisation of the political system as an accurate description of the way systems work in practice. While Easton's identification of processes is valuable, the neat, logical ordering of those processes in terms of demand initiation, through the conversion process to outputs, rarely occurs so simply in the practical world of policy-making (1984:15).

In the absence of experimental research, where human beings are forced to adopt certain behaviour, researchers must develop methods of isolating suitable existing behaviour variables for analysis. The linear approach, refined by Easton and others, appears to provide a well tested framework through which much can be learned. Each model includes some inherent difficulties, either in the basic assumptions on which the model is built, or within the model itself. This section identifies some of these weaknesses under the sub-headings of Easton's (1965B) conceptual elements, and where possible addresses them in terms of this particular research problem.

The Environment
The environment according to Easton contains "those aspects of a society that fall outside the boundaries of the political system" (1965A:70). His political systems theory conceptualises "the idea of a system embedded in an environment and subject to influences from it that threaten to drive the essential variables of the system beyond their critical range" (1965B:33). Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), and Bardach (1977) extend that concept for the implementation phase of a policy by calling on analysts to identify a different environment for policy implementation from that of policy formation.
From these views of the implementation environment, Van Meter and Van Horn cite strong support for examining "the economic, social and political conditions" (1975:471). These elements are of particular value to this study because of the pressure on the college system exerted by formula funding, collective agreements and the changing role of colleges, which is pointed out by Dennison and Gallagher: "community colleges must be as dynamic as the society they serve ... All the issues call for fresh vision, anticipation, and change" (1986:140). Besides the influences exerted through the passage of time, the implementor has the added constraint of the policy statement. Thus the environment is not the same for the policy implementor as it was for the policy formulator, even in the same policy process.

**The Inputs**

Scholars of policy implementation have shown that Easton's conceptual input must be examined through many design variables. Recent analysts expose important links between the design of the policy statement and the implementation process, a theoretical link that "point[s] to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979:xxi). These scholars assert "the possibility of a mismatch between means and ends [which] calls into question the adequacy of the original policy design" (1979:xxiii). "The great problem, as we understand it, is to make the difficulties of implementation a part of the initial formulation of policy" (1979:143). They identify the lack of knowledge as an important condition linking policy inputs with implementation outcomes, and emphasise the importance of the effectiveness of implementation with
design. Their "model prescribes clearly stated goals, detailed plans, tight controls ... incentives and indoctrination" (1979:179).

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) set out to develop a conceptual model in which the 'determinants' and the 'consequences' of policy could be identified and examined through the important implementation phase. Their conceptual framework is expressed through six fundamental elements.

(1) an environment that both stimulates government officials and receives the products of their work; (2) demands and resources that carry stimuli from the environment to policy makers; (3) a conversions process, including the formal structures and procedures of government, that transforms (converts) demands and resources into public policies; (4) the policies that represent the formal goals, intentions, or statements of government officials; (5) the performance of the policy as it is actually delivered to clients; and (6) the feedback of policies and performances to the environment, which is transmitted back to the conversions process as demands and resources of a later point in time (1975:446).

In respect to input, they identified "two distinguishing characteristics: the amount of change involved and the extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the implementation process" (1975:458).

Hargrove lists a series of questions to be asked during the policy input phase, and suggests "a failure to ask them and develop satisfactory answers could condemn policies from the beginning, for alternatives involve different levels of implementation feasibility" (1975:23). These questions have to do with the characteristics of consultation, degree of threat, professional capacity, degree of change, the provision of resources and uncertainties, particularly as perceived by the
implementors. He brings into sharp relief the importance of policy designs taking cognisance of the implementation phase. "The policy development analytic role should contain an implementation perspective because a concern for execution should be part of every new policy idea" (1975:16).

Weatherley and Lipsky identify "conflicting bureaucratic requirements" (1977:185), as an important flaw in policy input. This was particularly evident if the policy did not have an adequate provision of resources incorporated (1977:193). Bardach takes the concept of conflict of interests between policy formulators and policy implementors beyond the level of bureaucracy and highlights "the problems of obstruction by individuals and organizations possessed of monopoly power" (1977:103), which he determines can be addressed in the design of the policy statement. He also considers that the impersonal nature of problems associated with implementation should be addressed at the design stage. "Social entropy throws up three main problems to plague government programs: the problem of incompetence, the problem of variability in the objects of control, and the problem of coordination" (1977:125).

Elmore, when developing four different 'ideal' models according to which implementation can be analysed, highlights the most significant link between policy input and execution by means of the 'systems management' model.

Implementation consists of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given policy, assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to subunits consistent with these objectives, monitoring system performance,
and making internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization's goals (1978:191).

Conversely, in his 'Conflict and Bargaining' model he suggests the design of policy statements incorporate "the preferences and resources of participants" (1978:218) in order to ensure effective implementation. St. John alerts readers to the need to consider the organisational structure of the subsystems, labelled micro structures by many authors, in the design of policy.

If new services are being introduced in a system of institutions at a state or national level it is important to assess the capacity of the institutions when designing a strategy (1981:54).

Such studies have led Brewer and deLeon to support the inclusion of deliberate incentives to implementors when designing policy (1983:273).

Legislation is often used to communicate policy, and whatever form it takes, places a degree of constraint on implementors that is not exerted on policy formulators. When policy is expressed through legislation, it provides a legitimate statement of authority and sets certain parameters which need to be recognised during interpretation. Such a mandate, if carefully planned with effective implementation in mind, builds certain criteria into a policy that narrow the scope of interpretation. But Bardach recognises there are perhaps other more useful ways of proclaiming policy than through legislation. "Other things equal, policy designers should prefer to operate through manipulating prices and markets rather than through writing and enforcing regulations" (1977:253), because "policymakers usually do not implement policy themselves ... [rather] rely on another set of actors ... to actually carry out the policies they prescribe"
(Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:32). "While clarity does not ensure faithful compliance, it is a necessary step toward effective implementation" (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:33). Weatherley and Lipsky noted in their extensive research program that "the regulations stipulated what needs to be done but provided no blueprint for administering the process" (1977:180). Brewer and deLeon also suggested that "The authorization of legislation does not necessarily result in the appropriation of requisite resources to carry out the assigned tasks; it frequently does not" (1983:262). Holt also alerts us to the problems of expressing policy statements through legislation.

It is notoriously difficult to get the checks and balances right in participatory schemes that carry legislative force. Apathy might reinforce a hierarchy, or open the door to the cabals of political activists (1980:108).

**The Processes**

The process used by Easton between inputs and outputs requires attention to communication linkages between formulators and implementors when examining the effects of implementation. Pressman and Wildavsky in their seminal work on *Implementation* alert policy analysts to the fact that policy failure is not always caused by "dramatic elements [such as] great conflict ... [or those] of political importance" (1979:xviii), or even lack of essential resources, but as was shown in their particular case study, it was the "perfectly ordinary circumstances [that] present serious obstacles to implementation" (1979:xviii).

Elmore reports the effects of official documents in the implementation process thus:
An agency might, for example, put a great deal of effort into developing an elaborate collection of rules and regulations or an elegant system of management controls, knowing full well that it doesn't have the resources to make them binding on other actors. But the expectation that the rules might be enforced is sufficient to influence the behaviour of other actors (1978:220-221).

Brewer and deLeon observe:

Too many projects have foundered because implementation was not distinguished from the earlier steps in the total process, thus making it almost impossible to translate a policy into its component, operational programs with any fidelity (1983:254).

Other factors concern the provision of resources, human and financial, and the organisational structures in which the policies are initiated. Pressman and Wildavsky alert their readers to the importance in the policy process of implementation when they declare that "the emphasis is not on what implementation does to programs but on what the forces that produce policy do to implementation" (1979:xii).

Policy issues that have affected implementation also include clarity and communication, acceptance of goals by implementors, motivation and evaluation criteria, "the amount of change involved", and the extent to which participants are committed to the new policy (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:458).

Nakamura and Smallwood's (1980) tripartite model of the policy process, based on functionally oriented environments, provides a useful framework in which to analyse the implementation sector particularly with their development of the linkages between the environments. Pressman and Wildavsky make the point that "implementers must know what they are supposed to do in order to be effective" (1979:179), so policy statements must be effectively communicated.
Factors such as ambiguity in the policy statement may well result in compromise in the process of policy implementation. Berman, for example, suggests some factors that cause discrepancy between policy intent and execution. "Ambiguity is reflected by multiple goals, often conflicting, and in the lack of specificity about means" (1978:168). He goes on to declare "it seems obvious that the more ambiguous the intent of a policy, the more latitude the administering agency has in defining a government program" (1978:168). "Policy vagueness can grow out of the inability of policy makers to agree on the problem they are solving" (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:37). Weatherley and Lipsky observed that "a law and its administrative regulations, intended to produce uniform application of procedures, instead yielded wide variations in application" (1977:188).

Time is another critical element of policy communication. As Bardach points out,

implementation takes a long time, much longer than most of the program sponsors had hoped it would take and longer even than the law's hypothetical 'reasonable man' might have expected (1977:180).

The timing of the information flow has significant impact on the effectiveness or otherwise of policy implementation. Such 'gatekeeping' can affect the flow vertically and horizontally within a political system and can include not only the initial policy statement and its subsequent interpretative directives, but also the flow of information feedback loops (Easton, 1965B and Dunsire, 1978). Barrett and Fudge draw attention to the importance of time in both the policy formulation and policy implementation process. (1981:175).
The Outcomes

Government, whether national, regional or local, appears to be adept at making statements of intention, but what happens on the ground often falls a long way short of the original aspirations. Government either seems unable to put its policy into effect as intended, or finds that its interventions and actions have unexpected or counter-productive outcomes which create new problems (Barrett & Fudge, 1981:4).

People respond to policies on the basis of how they perceive the policy statement aligns with their own personal needs and values.

The implementation process is necessarily one of consensus-building and accommodation between policy-makers and implementers. The central problem of implementation is not whether implementers conform to prescribed policy but whether the implementation process results in consensus in goals, individual autonomy, and commitment to policy on the part of those who must carry it out (Elmore, 1978:209).

When viewing implementation as part of an Organizational Development Model, Elmore describes implementation failure not as "the result of poor management control or the persistence of bureaucratic routines, but arising out of a lack of consensus and commitment among implementers" (1978:213). Even if policy were well designed, meticulously enunciated and communicated through an organisational structure that was conducive to realising the policy initiative, there is still the important disposition of the influencer (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Mintzberg, 1983). In order to assess the likely behaviour of a policy implementor, researchers need to establish their perceptions. Barrett and Fudge report on "three aspects [that] seem of particular relevance.

1. perceptions of the scope for action;
2. perceptions of the need for action;
The experience each implementor brings to an organisation, together with the values, ethics and attitudes he or she holds in that organisation, combine to create a base for perceiving any given policy. Perceptions are also influenced by the organisational structure, peers, professional bodies and commitment. "In spite of empirical evidence that a process operates in a certain way, people can nevertheless persist in the belief that it ought to operate in another way" (Elmore, 1978:227). This misapplication may be caused by many variables. Van Meter and Van Horn draw on the work of Kaufman (1971) to identify some of these.

Goals and objectives may be rejected for numerous reasons: they offend implementors' personal values or extraorganizational loyalties; they violate implementors' sense of self interest; or they alter features of the organization and its procedures that implementors desire to maintain (1975:482).

Mintzberg captures some of these points and relates them to the exercise of power of implementors' perceptions when he observes:

To understand the behaviour of the organization, it is necessary to understand which influencers are present, what needs each seeks to fulfill in the organization, and how each is able to exercise power to fulfill them (1983:22).

Brewer and deLeon add to the concept of individual perceptions by drawing attention to "subtle factor[s] ... [such as] the degree of interest of the original decision maker" (1983:269). They go on to report that "the incentive problem becomes acute when an agency is ordered to carry out a program that it considers outside its primary role" (1983:272).

Most policy analysts have tended to equate policy formation decisions with action. In other words, these "decisions are seen as the outputs of the policy process, the assumption being that
once made they will be translated into action" (Barrett & Fudge, 1981:8-9). As Dror noted "organizational decisions are the most important element in public policymaking" (1968:64). An analysis of Baldridge's political/power model reveals that four fifths concentrates on the formation of policy (1971:Figure 2.2:22), whereas the execution or implementation element only occasion one fifth of the analytical framework. He openly declares that his model "focuses on policy-forming processes, because major policies commit an organization to definite goals and set the strategies for reaching those goals" (Baldridge, et al, 1977:10). Such statements give insufficient attention to the significance of interpretation, and the likely divergence in behaviour of those implementing the policies. The exercise of divergent behaviour was certainly evidenced in the redistribution of authority in the college system of B.C. Indeed Hollick-Kenyon observed:

the description of the origins of the colleges ... describes the political efforts of grass roots movements to get colleges started. This process, in turn, resulted in a strong bias towards local community control of the institution, once it was in operation. This commitment is reflected today in the resistance that is evident in British Columbia to centralize the control of the community colleges on a province-wide basis (1979:111-112).

THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Hargrove observes that political scientists have served the implementation concept well by developing the political aspects of the process.

They begin with a policy as it was initially shaped by the politics of reaching agreement and then chart the continuing politics of program administration in which politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups and publics vie for control over the direction of the program. Their conception is the broadest of
all current usages because it excludes nothing that is relevant to understanding what happens (1975:3).

"The implementation environment is characterized by a high degree of diversity, fluidity, and complexity in terms of actors, arenas, bureaucratic imperatives, linkages, and compliance mechanisms" (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:65). Bardach adds, implementation politics is, I believe, a special kind of politics. It is a form of politics in which the very existence of an already defined mandate, legally and legitimately authorized in some prior process, affects the strategy and tactics of the struggle (1977:37).

Implementors have been shown to face the task of attempting to coordinate and orchestrate many variables when carrying out policy directives that can of themselves be ambiguous and diffuse. Their problems are exacerbated by the need to reconcile implementation responsibilities with internal norms within a wide variety of institutional settings. It can be concluded that there is a variety of political forces at work in both the formulation and implementation phases of the policy process.

As a result, there appear to be many situations in which implementers possess a considerable degree of independent discretion and authority to exercise their own political judgements in order to influence and shape the policy process (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:111).

Indeed the exercising of politics in the governance of the college system is seen as an ongoing process that changes almost continuously.

Hargrove alerts his readers to the certainty of the presence of the political process in implementation, and to the uncertainty of the properties of that process (1975:69). He agrees that it is similar to the behaviour experienced in policy formation, but
different because it cannot ignore the effect of that sector (1975:70). As there is difficulty in identifying policy implementation from the formulation phase, so it is also difficult to separate the politics of the two elements. Essentially implementation is the next phase in the policy process in which the formulation element has direct influence, often with the support of legislation.

Truman (1951) and Kogan (1975) developed theories based on the influence of interest groups, and to some extent Baldridge's (1971) power political model employs the same method. Nevertheless, Bardach makes one of the important distinctions between the policy formation and implementation sectors when he reveals the limited extent to which interest groups influence implementation. "Since there is considerable differentiation among actors with respect to how they view their possible losses, coalitions do not readily emerge" (1977:42). He makes another important observation by distinguishing between 'implementation politics' and 'adoption politics', which he perceives as emerging more on an individual basis than in the formation of coalitions (1977:42-43).

Each of the policy definitions and research projects on implementation cited explicitly or implicitly include the concept of politics, which can be broadly or narrowly defined. Within the context of a political system, an organisation could be termed political when it demonstrates "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, control, influence, power or authority" (Dahl,1976:3). But
Easton links the system and the behaviour of the persons.

A political system, therefore, will be identified as a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behaviour, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society. Persons who are in the process of engaging in such interactions, that is, who are acting in political roles, will be referred to generically as the members of the system (1965A:57).

This is a valuable guide when analysing the behaviour of governance policy implementors. All those engaged in the related decision-making can be identified as members of the political system.

The power/political relations of individuals as well as coalitions are important factors in the policy implementation process. Elmore argues that the conflict bargaining model "permits us to make conceptual sense of the implementation process" (1978:220), without having to be unduly influenced by the formal hierarchy and "without asserting that everyone's behaviour is governed by a predictable set of bureaucratic routines" (1978:220).

**TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Students of policy implementation have demonstrated that certain factors are important to implementors. They have described how those variables can be incorporated in new policy settings or used in determining the effects of declared policies. The following section in this work will develop a conceptual framework using such variables in order to provide a basis on which to pursue this study.
Elmore suggests that "the evidence favours [neither] one model [nor another]" (1978:226), and Berman observes "although these areas of agreement do not yet constitute a fully articulated framework, let alone a theory" (1978:159), the value of adapting suitable existing theories for the policy process could provide a base on which to analyse the perceived implementation effects. Mintzberg observes "theories are useful because they shortcut the need to store masses of data. One need not remember all the details one has learned about a phenomenon. Instead one stores a theory, an abstraction that explains many of them" (1983:x).

Implementation is concerned with the political process of successive refinement and conversion of policy statements into particular directives, procedures, tasks, strategies, and interpretation of the stated intentions. Such procedure is forming the input for subsequent policy changes. This refinement, conversion and negotiation all involve the exercise of politics, and suggest a useful association with the linear nature of the systems model, and verification of those theories which assist in the analysis of behaviour. The concern of this research is the analysis of how this process is perceived by administrators. But in the analysis of policy implementation the perceptions of any one person, or one body, should not be viewed as being responsible for every major decision within the system, for it is far more likely to involve numerous individuals than coalitions (Bardach,1977:42), nor should the process be viewed as static. Hamblin in his review of the literature observes "on the behavioural side, [of policy] many scholars work with derivations of a model which was developed by Easton" (1984:14).
Easton's (1965B) political systems model has some positive contributions to make in analysing this research problem, but its limitations are too strong to ignore. The present writer therefore proposes to develop a suitable conceptual framework based on Easton's model, but modified to provide the research with a suitable base on which to include more provision for the variables which other researchers have determined as important to policy implementation outcomes. This framework acts as a guide to the gathering of data, including the construction of interviews, as well as a base on which to report the findings of the research. Yin observes that in order to allow research findings to be compared with previous work "key definitions should not be idiosyncratic. Rather each ... unit of analysis either should be similar to those previously studied by others or should deviate in clear, operationally defined ways" (1985:33). For these reasons it is considered wise to construct the conceptual framework from this well established political systems model.

Table Two collates those variables derived from this review which are assumed to contribute to the examination of policy implementation outcomes. This study requires the inclusion of the policy architects or formulators within the same boundary as implementors, for they not only contribute to the design, communication and enunciation of the policy, but also to its implementation. The model is based on the premise that the system is distinguishable from its environment, which in a complex political system is possible only in theory. The important aspects of policy design, communication, and
enunciation, which are essentially "the degree to which policy objectives are transmitted to implementors clearly, accurately, consistently, and in a timely manner" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:478), are recognised by all authors cited in the literature review. These aspects of implementation can be considered 'inputs' in Easton's terms, having already passed through the systems cycle at least once previously in the policy formulation stage. When the key issues of that input are identified, they can be followed through various processing and conversion points within Easton's (1965B) conceptual model, to provide for observation of outputs and outcomes of the political system.

TABLE 2

COLLATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WHEN POLICY OUTCOMES ARE THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION Environment</th>
<th>POLICY INPUT &amp; DESIGN</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Incentives/</td>
<td>Clarity of</td>
<td>Incentives/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Social State</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>Change/Threat</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to collate these important variables within a framework that is both accepted and understood in the related disciplines, Figure Four is developed from Easton's (1965B) political systems model, with the conceptual modifications outlined above. This research is not designed to prove or disprove a theory, nor to develop grounded theory, but is advanced in the knowledge of existing theories which provide a base on which both to design interviews and proceed with the analysis and description of the case.

The environment is seen as not only an important conceptual tool by Easton for a political system, but by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Berman (1978), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), and Brewer and deLeon (1983) as a vital element of the implementation process. The important variables are described as the economic, social, and political states of the society, with particular emphasis on the fact that such states change over time, and are fundamentally different for policy formulators and policy implementors.

In the case of researching policy implementation effects, scholars have suggested that inputs should consist not only of documented intentions, but perceived intentions, particularly as these relate to those involved in the implementation process. Other important variables of system input for implementors are the allocation of resources, and the explicitness with which responsibilities are delegated.
FIGURE 4
A SCHEMA OF THEORIES TO ASSIST IN THE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

ENVIRONMENT

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

INPUT
(POLICY INTENT)

* *

IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
Documented Intentions
Perceived Intentions
Delegation of Responsibilities
Allocation of Resources

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

FLOW OF EFFECTS
(COMMUNICATION LINKAGES)

* *

IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
Degree of Change or Threat Perceived
Clarity of Purpose and Goals
Degree of Ambiguity
Designed Incentives and Sanctions
Degree of Consultation with Implementors
Formulators' Knowledge

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OUTCOMES
(IMPLEMENTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES)

* *

IDENTIFIED VARIABLES
Implementors' Perceptions of Policy Effects
Perceived Value of Incentives/Sanctions
Influencers' and Interest Groups Response
Commitment to Policies

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

ENVIRONMENT
Both the systems theory and the further developments of that theory for policy implementation reported in this work have stressed the various aspects of the flow of effects or linkages between policy formulat ors and policy implementors. The independent variables identified as important to implementation include the degree of change or threat perceived by implementors, the clarity of purpose of the policy and the degree of ambiguity it contains. Whether or not the policy includes incentives or sanctions, and how these are perceived by implementors in practice, also influence the effects. Other important aspects affecting implementation concern the degree of consultation that took place in the formation of the policy, and the perceived knowledge of the formulators.

In this case study, the outcomes are more closely examined than the outputs, and several variables are identified as crucial. These are predominantly contained in the perceptions of those implementing the policy, and include their personal commitment to the policy outputs and their relative interest in the professional and interest group responses to the policy, as well as their perceptions of both rewards and sanctions for compliance or non-compliance respectively with the policy intentions.

According to Easton, policy outcomes are the "consequences traceable to [the] authoritative allocations" (1965:352), or modified outputs, "indirect consequences" (Howell & Brown, 1983:21). This research will focus on those unintended activities that result from the policy intentions, as perceived by policy implementors. It is the imposition of a new formal
decision-making structure promulgated by the provincial Government that gives rise to administrators' behaviour. All policies take on multiple interpretations in a complex organisational setting, each person within the administrative hierarchy viewing the issues differently.

CONCLUSIONS

Policy implementation is a theoretically distinct element of the policy process. It is an integral part of that process and is closely intertwined with other elements, including 'inputs', 'conversion processes', 'outputs' and 'feedback loops' in terms of systems theory. In this respect the models established for policy formulation provide a framework on which to build the study on implementation effects. Indeed Bardach makes the point when he asserts "it is widely and correctly realized that the bargaining and maneuvering, the pulling and hauling, of the policy-adopting process carries over into the policy-implementation process" (1977:38).

The complexity of factors influencing implementation makes both description and analysis very difficult. Pressman and Wildavsky stress the importance of theory in this analysis: "policies imply theories, whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences" (1979:xxi). Furthermore, each type of policy will "display characteristic processes, structures, and relationships among factors that influence the execution of public policy" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:458).
The strong relationship between policy formulators and policy implementors has already been established. "While the roles might differ in name, in practice they are virtually indistinguishable" (Brewer & deLeon, 1983:254). This allows some scope for the employment of a theoretical model designed for the analysis of the whole policy process, to be used as a base for the analysis of segments. The 'Political Systems Model' developed by Easton (1965A, 1965B, & 1967) has been most commonly used for the whole policy process. It offers a framework that is as pertinent as any alternative to establish the outcomes of the implementation process.

This review has attempted to expose some of the significant features of the policy process. It has also attempted to show that theoretically-based research can make a meaningful contribution to understanding behaviour in the context of policy implementation. In order to make such analyses within the systems model, researchers must identify and describe both the boundaries of the political system, thus establishing the environment in which the system operates, and the members of the political system, their interaction with one another and with actors exerting influence from outside the system boundaries.
NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO

1. H.A. Simon, (1947), *Administrative Behaviour*, noted that "The actual physical task of carrying out an organization's objectives falls to the persons at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy."
   See also Kaufman's (1960) Study of the U.S.A.'s Forest Service.

2. Formula funding was introduced after the Minister withdrew funding allocation powers from the intermediary councils, in an attempt to provide a system wide formula for the allocation of operating funds to the colleges and institutes.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Chapter One focussed on the elements of the stated problem. Chapter Two reviewed the literature on policy implementation which enabled the development of "sharper and more insightful questions about the [problem]" (Yin, 1985:20), and provided a conceptual framework on which to build the current research project. This Chapter will describe an appropriate method of conducting the research within the boundaries established in the first two Chapters. It will develop "the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial question" (Yin, 1985:27). The nature and extent of the study has been largely determined by the researcher's ability to obtain and analyse administrators' perceptions of the effects of governance policies within the college system of B.C.

Yin claims that for research it is possible to "identify some situations in which a specific strategy has distinct advantage" (1985:20). Based on a blend of the strategies he outlines in Case Study Research and the 'naturalistic' approach of Guba and Lincoln (1981), a case study method was employed to interpret the implementation of government policy within the college system in B.C.

Baldridge (1971) employed a case study method to analyse and develop the power/political model of influences on policy formulation during the student revolts at The New York University in the 1960's. Robert Dahl (1961) utilised the case method in the research reported in his prizewinning publication Who
Governos? According to Lowi (1964), the case method is one of the most important methods of analysing political science. The case method was chosen because it enabled the researcher to observe and identify many of the implementation variables within the system, which contribute to perceived 'faithful execution' or 'slippage' of the policies on governance. As Guba and Lincoln explain,

the ability to tap into the experience of others in their own natural language, while utilizing their value and belief frameworks, is virtually impossible without face-to-face and verbal interaction with them (1981:155).

Mintzberg’s advice to researchers to produce some practical results in their work will also be heeded where possible. "I am firmly convinced" he declares, "that the best route to more effective policy making is better knowledge in the mind of the practitioner of the world he or she actually faces" (1983:x). Nevertheless, the methodological procedures set out in this Chapter were not construed as restrictive, but rather as a guide to the development and rigor of the research.

THE VALUE OF A CASE STUDY

A case study approach to the research problem provided a method which allowed for deep probing of policy statements as well as the study of behaviour. Baldridge writes,

A case study is an intensive investigation of one organisation in a field setting. Like an anthropologist in a foreign land, the case-study researcher tries to find out how the local situation ticks ... He is not bound by one method, but capitalizes on any approach that might help unravel a new puzzle ... A case study, then, is basically an exploratory piece of research carried out in one field setting by utilizing a variety of techniques (1971:32).
Much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of the case method and the details of that debate will not be repeated here. Howell and Brown argue that the carefully constructed case study can be just as fruitful in explaining the policy-making process - and sometimes more so - than the statistically-based survey, which enjoys the advantages of producing a broader source of quantifiable material for generalization or explanation (1983:14).

A survey approach was contemplated for this project, but the information sought was considered too diverse to attempt its retrieval from a manageable questionnaire. The validity of survey questions in this type of research was seen as problematic, and the difficulties appeared to be more easily overcome with a semi-structured interview. Doern and Aucoin assert:

For the most part, however, the survey research method is inappropriate at the higher echelons of policy-making. For one thing, most high-level policy-makers do not appreciate being subjected to set questionnaires, at least not in the current context. Therefore it is usually necessary to employ a good number of open-ended questions in the interview setting and this often limits the possibility of following accepted procedures of survey research (1971:30).

The growing number of case studies used for this type of research offers strong testimony to their perceived value in providing researchers with a detailed and sensitive picture of the behaviour being investigated (see Dahl, 1961; Baldridge, 1971; Kogan, 1975; Howell & Brown, 1983; and Housego, 1986).

A meta-analysis technique was not appropriate because of the lack of research conducted in the area. Indeed, an experimental research project or statistical analysis were both seen as inappropriate for ethical and practical reasons respectively,
particularly considering the nature of the problem, and the positions held by those whose perceptions were sought. Guba and Lincoln support the case study approach for this type of research, and declare: "Interviewing is virtually the only technique that provides access to 'elites' — those with specialized knowledge of the situation — and it provides information much more quickly than observation" (1981:18).

There is sufficient qualified support in the analysis of policy implementation to warrant the use of the case method in this research. Furthermore, Greenfield declares, "Social science has been too successful in teaching us to see truth in numbers and to insist that nothing is true unless it is true everywhere" (1979:237). He suggests that researchers "take seriously ... a basic theoretical and methodological question: what is the relation between the unique event and the context in which it exists" (1979:238)? The case method provided the most valuable research tool for thoroughly investigating the implementation variables of government policies on college governance. Yin asserts "case studies have a distinctive place in evaluation research" (1985:25), and outlines some applications:

The most important is to explain the causal links in real life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies. A second application is to describe the real life context in which an intervention has occurred. Third, an evaluation can benefit, again in a descriptive mode, from an illustrative case study ... Finally, the case study strategy may be used to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear single set of outcomes (1985:25).

These characteristics accurately portray the concerns of this research. Furthermore, Mintzberg observes that "policy-making research should be rich in real world description and not be
obsessed with rigor" (1983:viii), and Yin stresses the use of the case study strategy when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control" (1985:20). These all reinforce the basis on which this researcher chose the case study method to conduct the research.

The Case

Both the analysis of the research elements conducted in Chapter One, and the review of literature on policy implementation reported in Chapter Two, indicate the importance of the disposition of the individual actors and, in particular, system administrators. It is clear that to confine this research within the limits of a doctoral thesis, the case must be delimited. Accordingly, the case to be studied is defined as 'the system administrators' perceptions of the outcomes of implementing three governance policies. To this end the research method will incorporate in its design those phenomena most likely to reveal answers to the questions already raised. The case could be classified as a Type 2 in Yin's taxonomy, because while it is a single case, it has multiple units embedded in its structure (1985:41). Data will be analysed by separating policy formulators from the implementors, and a further distinction made between Ministry personnel and college administrators.

Sources of Data

The collection of data for this research required not only a search of relevant documents, but the conduct of interviews and
appropriate analysis within the context in which the documents were produced and interpreted. Within the framework of a modified systems model, the case study was not limited to, but was guided by the elements indicated in Figure Four, Chapter Two, in order to examine perceived outcomes. Because the data relate to events occurring over a five year period, access to documents was comprehensive, and the recollection of respondents assumed to be reasonably factual.

**Legislation and Official Documents**

The first policy of the three being investigated in this study was communicated through an official statement from the provincial Government, the other two are identified in legislation. The legal context in which the policies were being implemented was proclaimed in part in the *College and Provincial Institutes Act* which was promulgated in 1977, with major amendments in October 1979 and July 1983. The Mission, Goals, and Objectives document was first drafted in March 1982, redrafted in November 1982, then formally issued after further amendment in March 1983. Bill No 20, the *College and Institute Amendment Act 1983*, is the formal document declaring the changes in governance being investigated in this study. These documents, with the accompanying correspondence and interpretation documents, served as the recorded policy statement from the provincial Government of B.C., from which the major points relating to system governance were extracted, and the declared intentions and outputs identified.

Other important documents of an official nature were available in
the form of reports generated by the three intermediary Councils, whose dissolution occurred within the time frame under consideration in this work; these provided evidence of the Councils' influence on the governance of the college system. These documents were examined in order to identify the Councils' significance for policy outcomes.

Other Documentation

Important and influential documents were also generated by the Council of College Principals in B.C., the B.C. Association of Colleges, the College-Institute Educators' Association of B.C., and other key stakeholders in the system. An examination of these documents provided evidence of pressures applied to administrators in the system by relevant interest groups.

Relevant correspondence from a variety of sectors within the political system were examined in order to identify environmental elements of support and demand as well as intra-societal supports and demands. Documents were used not only as primary data, but to "corroborate information from other sources" (Yin, 1985:80), in particular that gained from interviews. As Guba and Lincoln assert, "interviewing has many advantages with respect to data collection. Among its strengths is that there is less chance of misunderstanding between the inquirer and the respondent than other approaches" (1981:187).

Interviews with Key Persons

The principal undocumented intentions of governance policies were discovered by interviewing policy formulators. Virtually all of
the actors involved in the formation of the three policies were accessible within B.C., and available for interview. Guba and Lincoln add their support to the interview method of data collection when they write:

of all the means of exchanging information or gathering data known to man, perhaps the oldest and most respected is conversation. Simple or complex, face-to-face exchanges between human beings have served for eons to convey messages, express sympathy, declare war, make truces, and preserve history. As an extension of that heritage, interviewing with a purpose (Dexter, 1970, p.136) - is perhaps the oldest and certainly one of the most respected of the tools that the inquirer can use (1981:153-154).

A sample of administrators active in the policies' implementation was also interviewed. Interviewees included public servants employed by the Minister, community college principals, directors and Board members, and chief officers of interest groups, to establish their perceptions of the implementation outcomes of the stated policies. In order to provide as comprehensive an analysis as possible, college administrators were drawn from seven of the fifteen colleges, with representatives from urban, semi-rural and rural institutions. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of major interest groups, on the presumption that they exercise political influence both on the implementation process and on the perceptions of administrators. By means of interviews the researcher was able to establish some private as well as public positions with respect to individual interpretations of policy statements. The proforma for the interview questions appears in Appendicies Two and Three.

Gordon describes a "standardized non-scheduled interviewing" technique in which he calls for the posing of certain questions
to all interviewees, but not necessarily the same to each (1975:6). This requires the interviewer to assume more responsibility "for directing the flow of the interview while at the same time allowing for freedom to pursue lines of questioning that might arise during the course of the interview" (Hamblin, 1984:51). This strategy was adopted to increase the scope for relevant data collection and was strengthened by all interviews being conducted by the researcher. Questions were posed on the basis of important implementation variables identified in the literature review, and incorporated such things as perceptions of the extent of the proposed change-threat, clarity of goals and purpose, built-in incentives, sanctions, resources, assignment of responsibilities and whether or not implementors were consulted during the formulation phase.

DATA ANALYSIS

Data were organised to establish first of all the nature and extent of the provincial policies as described through the documented and perceived intentions. Key intentions were thus identified in the legislation, official documentation, and initial interviews, and formed the basis of a second round of interviews to discern administrators' perceptions of policy outcomes. Each interview was recorded on audio-tape, transcribed verbatim onto a word processor and produced in the form of typed transcripts. These were returned unedited to the respondents, other than those with whom pilot interviews were conducted, for checking factual details and unintended errors. Interviewees were invited to carry out this check within four weeks of receipt
and return the comments only if they felt corrections were necessary. Whilst 75% either confirmed the accuracy of the transcript or returned it with varying amounts of editing, the other 25% indicated their agreement by not replying. Editorial changes were made on computer-stored copies and the resulting transcripts searched for responses to questions in order to extract the perceived intentions or outcomes.

In order to arrive at a meaningful overview of the interviews, charts were compiled with the questions listed across the top, and the respondents' answers summarised retaining their own words and listed under each question, in the format shown in Appendix Five. If answers given were considered to be more applicable to another question, the colour of the ink used was changed. Separate charts were compiled for policy formulators and implementors, with further divisions being made within the implementor category to identify professional full-time college administrators, board members, and interest group spokespersons. Each chart contained answers to questions relating to a particular policy. This required the compilation of four charts for each group of respondents, one for each of the three policies, and one for overall general governance questions which were not limited to any one of the three but could be considered as relevant to all.

The summarised answers were then collated, so that all answers to a particular question could be grouped for similarity, and group answers were then paraphrased by the researcher. All statements made by respondents were also coded, using the analytical
framework established in Chapter Two, so that particular points could be isolated by conducting a search in the computer. The coding used is shown as Appendix Six.

**VALIDATION OF RESEARCH**

Case studies, and particularly those associated with the social sciences, have come under heavy criticism for their lack of validation. Cohen and Manion suggest "perhaps the most practical way of achieving greater validity is to minimise the amount of bias as much as possible" (1984:252). To this end questions were posed as unambiguously as possible, all interviews were conducted by the researcher and samples were chosen to optimise representativeness as well as expertise.

Yin states that "the case study investigator also must maximise four aspects of the quality of any design (1) construct validity, (2) internal validity ... (3) external validity, and (4) reliability" (1985:27). Guba and Lincoln argue that such concerns fall within the scientific paradigm, and "propose certain analogous terms as more appropriate" to behavioural studies through what they term the naturalistic paradigm, i.e., "credibility for truth value [internal validity], fittingness for applicability [external validity], 'auditability' for consistency [reliability], and confirmability for neutrality [construct validity]" (1981:104). Such alternatives seem to satisfy Kogan's plea, when in relation to policy studies he writes; "softer and more modest imagery is needed" (1975:23). To address the first of these validation criteria, Yin suggests two steps.
(1) select the specific types of changes that are to be studied ...
(2) and demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do
indeed reflect the specific types of change that have been
selected (1985:37).

The researcher identified from documents the specific intentions
of the three policies with respect to governance, and then
determined from interviews the extent to which those intentions
were realised. An examination of perceived outcomes enabled the
researcher to establish deviation. Yin suggests that a strategy
to increase construct validity is to "use multiple sources of
evidence" (1985:37); this should be done when the data are being
collected. Cohen and Manion suggest "one way of validating
interview measures is to compare the interview measure with
another measure that has already been shown to be valid" (1984:252).
This concept, which they term convergent validity,
is also applied during data collection and was incorporated into
the present study by asking of both policy formulators and policy
implementors many similar questions. Respondents were requested
to identify any areas important to the study but not covered by
the questions, and to name persons expert in the field, including
those who would offer an opposing view. If more than two
respondents named the same person, that person was interviewed.

Credibility or internal validity is difficult to monitor,
particularly in the case of descriptive or exploratory research,
for it relies on the extent to which a researcher can positively
identify causes of effects. Yin suggests "pattern matching ... explanation building and time series analysis" as suitable
tactics (1985:36), and Guba and Lincoln suggest giving attention
to these questions, "what can be done to produce findings that
are most likely to be found credible by sources [and] how can credibility be tested with sources" (1981:105)? Credibility is seen as a most important principle in this work, and "the overall problem of making inferences" (Yin, 1985:38) is addressed in data reporting and conclusions.

A panel of experts was recruited to scrutinise the questions to be asked, and assess the comprehensiveness of those questions and their impartiality. This panel consisted of persons chosen for their experience, knowledge of the field and academic achievements, and met together with the researcher to discuss the issues. Panel members are listed in Appendix Seven. Because the study is designed to analyse administrators' perceived outcomes of implemented policies, every endeavour was made to establish that the answers to interview questions were not distorted. To this end respondents were asked to edit transcripts of interviews to reduce error. Again a wide range of sources of data were used, which provided "convergent lines of inquiry" (Yin, 1985:37).

Hargrove observes that "the common criticism of case studies in social science is that one cannot be sure if they are representative of larger patterns or even what such patterns might look like" (1975:74-75). The use of well-established theories enhanced the possibility of replication as did the use of sound research method to improve fittingness or applicability. However, this study is not seen as one that will offer much scope for generalisable or universally valid conclusions, but rather describes a particular pattern of behaviour that may in some
respects parallel the results of past and future research so as to improve understanding of the policy process.

Finally, thorough documentation of the case provides for auditability. In order to maximise this aspect of the research, Yin gives the following advice.

The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many steps as possible as operational as possible, and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder (1985:40).

The inherent difficulties of validation are present but not insurmountable. For Hamilton et al:

proof is rarely obtainable in case study research. Rather than setting proof as a primary goal, the case-study worker should aim to increase understanding of the variables, parameters and dynamics of the case under study (1977:188).

Guba and Lincoln place the emphasis back into credibility when they observe that it is "impossible to have internal validity without reliability" (1981:120). Indeed they go on to assert "auditability requires simply that the work of one evaluator (or team) can be tested for consistency by a second evaluator or team" (1981:124).

In this research every precaution was taken to cross-check data, recognising that there is no theory of policy implementation to be proven. Rather, political systems theory guided the direction of the research, and provided a systematic method of analysis. Hargrove explains, "we need case studies which are performed with 'theoretical alertness' to the possibility of developing generalizations" (1975:75).
The research project was submitted to, and approved by The University of British Columbia (U.B.C.) Behavioural Sciences Screening Committee For Research and Other Studies Involving Human Subjects, and all relevant conditions of approval were satisfied.

REPORTING OF FINDINGS

The context of the research reported in Chapter Four by outlining those environmental influences on the implementation of the policies which were revealed in documents and through interviews. Chapter Five reports on and discusses the interview findings. It is divided into three parts. Each part portrays, for a given policy, the formulators' intentions, the perceived communication linkages between formulators and implementors, and the perceived outcomes. The final Chapter of the dissertation summarises the findings, draws conclusions and presents some implications on the basis of the findings.

NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COLLEGE/POLITICAL SYSTEM
AND ITS ENVIRONMENT

Chapter Two illustrated the importance of the conceptualisation of a political system in the analysis of policy implementation. This Chapter describes the boundaries of the political system in question, by first describing the society in which the policies were declared, and then examining the context of the system. Before reporting the perceived intentions and outcomes of the three governance policies described by policy formulators and implementors respectively, it is necessary to identify some of the characteristics of the context into which the policies were introduced.

Colleges were first established in B.C. by local communities through the authority of their School Boards. This happened without the direct involvement of the provincial Government. In relation to the present status of these colleges, there are national and provincial socio-political phenomena that need to be considered as environmental influences and examined under the sub-headings of 'The Constitution', 'The Parliamentary System', and 'The Economic Climate'. From these national and provincial viewpoints the working of the post-secondary education system is examined with particular emphasis on the roles of the colleges and the Ministry office with respect to governance. There are a number of politically influential groups within the college system, and others which tend to straddle the boundaries between the system and its environment. This chapter will identify these various interest groups, and will end by referring to the
environment with which the college/political system interacts. It identifies those elements seen to be influential in the implementation of governance policies.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

All societies, according to Easton, employ a conscious process of making and executing policy.

The form of the mechanism and the kind of sanctions are, however, matters for empirical investigation; they do not invalidate the conclusion that there is discernible a process whereby values are authoritatively allocated for the whole society (1967:141).

In order to address the conceptual boundaries of the college/political system, this section will identify some of the important elements of the society with which it interacts, and some of the social systems within that society related to the college/political system.

The activities of a society, ... are broader than those of any of its component groups. Briefly, the broadest grouping of human beings who live together and collectively undertake to satisfy all the minimum prerequisites of group life is what we refer to when we speak of a society (Easton, 1967:135).

In the context of this study the geographical boundaries of the province of B.C. are representative of the wider society in respect to legislative, economic, and political factors which all interact with the governance of its distinctive community college system.

The Constitution

The Canadian Constitution firmly establishes the provincial Governments as the authorities responsible for education. Section 93 of the British North America Act states: "In and for
each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education ..." (British North America Act 1867-1907:19), although there are some who dispute this jurisdictional monopoly. Peitchinis in his study, Financing Post Secondary Education in Canada, discusses the debate on interpretation of the intentions of the founding fathers in today's context (see Peitchinis,1971:26-33). As this debate has never been the subject of a judicial ruling from the Supreme Court, it seems appropriate to set aside the long standing arguments to the effect that post-secondary institutions fulfill national and international objectives, or that the architects of confederation in 1867 had not conceived of higher learning as part of education (Dennisson,1986B:2),

and to consider the mandate of the Government of British Columbia to "make laws in relation to" community colleges. There is no national department or ministry of education for Canada, despite the substantial financial aid given to provinces, particularly for post-secondary education. Indeed there are no national education acts, and no clear national policies, a state of affairs which received some degree of criticism from the O.E.C.D (O.E.C.D.,1976:89).

The Parliamentary System
The Canadian interpretation of the British parliamentary system provides the elected provincial Government of B.C. with the power and responsibility for initiating both legislation and policies with respect to post-secondary education throughout the province. The provincial Government is able to plan and direct the governance structures of all sections of education. Provincial Governments take into account interest group pressures and
anticipate future pressures by declaring policies that best secure what they perceive as being the public interest. If their positions are perceived by their constituents as attractive and adequate they are likely to be re-elected.

As has been noted earlier, legislation authorising the establishment of community colleges in B.C. was incorporated into the Public Schools Act as early as 1958. The Universities Act (1974) and the Colleges and Provincial Institute Act (1977) are examples of provincial legislation which recognise some of the differences between various tertiary institutions and their governance structures. Within these Acts authority is delegated to various agencies and persons which, among other things, differentiates between Universities, Colleges and Institutes. The Acts distinguish political systems, first because the organisational structures are different, secondly because the goals of the various sections are different and thirdly because the framework of decision-making external to the institutions differs. B.C. has developed a governance structure for colleges unlike that of most other provinces in Canada, which distinguishes them from the traditional universities and the provincial institutes (Dennison, 1986:8). The Colleges and Provincial Institute Act (1977) served to establish for the first time, legislation that separated colleges from both the universities and compulsory education sectors, and to a certain extent the institutes from the colleges. The Act delegated to the Minister the power to:

"(a) establish ... policy respecting post-secondary education and training in the Province,}
provide such services as he considers necessary ... " (College & Provincial Institutes Act, 1977:2). The Act also provided for the establishment of three intermediary Councils which would relate to the Minister and to the college and institute sector. These Councils comprised,

- the Academic Council,
- the Occupational Training Council, and
- the Management Advisory Council.

There are many diverse pressures exerted on the college/political system from the environment, in addition to government initiatives to change the governance structure of the college system. Indeed, there appears to be sufficient pressure on the system to cause implementation of governance policies to be distorted.

**The Economic Climate**

Between 1980 and 1983 Canada experienced an economic recession not equalled since the 1930s (Ministry of Supply Canada, Report, 1985:xii). Although the recession influenced the whole country, each province developed its own strategy to address the problem. As B.C. "is centred largely upon natural resource exploitation, it suffered somewhat more than most provinces" (Dennison, 1986B:3). In May 1983, a Social Credit Party administration was elected on a campaign platform that emphasised financial restraint, particularly in the public sector. Irrespective of the political concerns of the campaign, the impact of their priorities was soon felt through policies that affected the governance of community colleges.
Despite the fact that the research interviews involved no question directly related to finance, all but one policy formulator and half of the implementors interviewed commented on the period of fiscal restraint being experienced in the college system. All Ministry officers interviewed commented on the effects of the provincial financial policies. Most used the word 'restraint', but all referred to the strong influence which the provincial economy exerted on Government policy decisions, indeed adjectives like 'intense', and 'overwhelming' were used to describe the period of restraint. Table Three summarises comments on financial restraints as affecting college governance during policy implementation. One of the major reasons for the Government abolishing the three intermediary Councils was a resolve to reduce the operational costs of the system. There is also some agreement that the dissolution of the Councils provided more financial flexibility at the college level.

Financial restraint is also perceived by Ministry staff and college administrators as having a major influence upon implementation of all the current governance policies. Respondent's comments such as "the primary thrust of it was tied in with Government's overall directions, the cost of Government operating had to be reduced" (4:2), and "we were expecting the colleges to make very substantial savings through changes in the way they conduct things, so ... the Councils' elimination became part of the restraint" (7:14), were typical perceptions of financial influences.
TABLE 3

QUOTATIONS FROM INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS DEMONSTRATE THE PERCEIVED CONNECTION BETWEEN FISCAL RESTRAINT AND THE EFFECTS ON SYSTEM GOVERNANCE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.

POLICY FORMULATORS

"[The] Minister ... advised the institutions ... that restraint was something that they were going to have to live with" (4:3).

"It was a desire to save a substantial amount of money in a time of overwhelming restraints" (5:1).

"At that time we were coming into a period of restraint on Government spending" (7:14).

"They were quite a costly operation and in a period of fiscal restraint" (8:4).

"They fit into a broader context, and evaluation of those policies, trying to keep something like restraint out of it is ... almost impossible" (9:22).

"It was a time of restraint and people had to remember the context" (10:15).

PROFESSIONAL COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS

"Rationalisation, joint planning and cooperation of colleges ... [has] proven to be extremely difficult to pull off in times of severe restraint" (12:16).

"Well funding drags the college M.G.O. to the extent that the provincial funding has been responsive to the provincial M.G.O.'s" (20:12).

"Unfortunately the timing allowed them also to include some of the elements of the restraint strategies" (22:15).

BOARD MEMBERS - INTEREST GROUPS AND OTHER OBSERVERS

"I recognise that there has been a recession" (16:12).

"During a time of recession when funding is short, when monies are being clipped, there is some feeling of hostility" (17:8).

"I think the prime policy that would affect us would be probably the one that's been imposed on them by the Treasury Board" (18:13).

"Legislative changes in 1983 were made to improve the system. They were made to contain the system within a political economic strategy that the Government had committed itself to" (21:7).

NOTE: In some cases quotations have been edited for brevity.
However, there were other ways in which financial pressure influenced the effects of the governance policies. As part of their economic strategy, the Government decided to assume the task of determining what programs would be provided through the colleges, because of the potential for training to assist the provincial economy. This led to a distinction being made between 'Provincial Programs' and 'Local Programs', whereby colleges could offer only local programs without approval from the Ministry office. Indeed, the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement recorded in its preamble: "Occupational and manpower development will be the principal area of expansion for the current five year period" (1983C:4). Many administrators interviewed commented on the pressures exerted on the college system to contract academic programs and expand vocational training programs.

Another strong influence on the fiscal situation arose from the fact that local School Boards were neither collecting taxes to finance the colleges nor contributing to their capital or operating costs. Having been almost totally responsible for establishing the colleges in their locality under the provision of an amendment to the Public Schools Act, local School Boards long possessed a strong claim to governance of the colleges.

Since the provincial Government had assumed the local School Boards' financial responsibility, and the federal Government had cut back its financial contributions to post-secondary education, the Government of B.C. assumed a rapidly increasing expenditure for a service which they considered was not sufficiently
accountable. One respondent reported this phenomenon in the following way, “rapidly escalating costs of operating the system, and the feeling on the part of Government [was] that there had to be much more control, much more centralised control” (5:1).

POST SECONDARY EDUCATION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Within the community college system of B.C., there are some other contextual considerations that need to be isolated for the purpose of analysing the effects of the policy initiatives.

The University of British Columbia (U.B.C.) established under its own charter in 1915, and its satellite campus in Victoria, together with three private institutions, composed the entire formal post-secondary education service until 1964, apart from some vocational schools established by the Ministry of Education. In 1962 the President of U.B.C. prepared a report on the future of higher education in B.C. which set out many of the principles adopted for the establishment of the colleges and the B.C. Institute of Technology (B.C.I.T.). In a time of unprecedented growth, sixteen colleges, including two privately-operated colleges, together with the B.C.I.T. and six post-secondary provincial institutes, plus the Open Learning Institute, were established in response to the plan outlined by Macdonald (1962).

However, as is so often the case in other areas of unanticipated growth, a lack of rational coordination and certain duplication of function, with accompanying confusion of goals, became increasingly evident (Dennison, 1979:2).

By 1980 the number of universities had trebled, and students graduating from secondary school could enrol in either the
university sector or the college sector when they wished to pursue academic programs. The first two years of many university courses were available at the colleges in a form providing transferability of credit.

The use of the word 'system' for the college sector in B.C. has caused considerable consternation among those involved in its administration at the institutional level. Colleges in B.C. had previously been considered autonomous, independent, local agencies of particular facets of post-secondary education. To be combined with other similar organisations under provincial Government audit came as something of a surprise, and offered some threat to the previously perceived independence. Indeed Dennison noted an "area of confusion was created as colleges, after the elimination of local funding, appeared to be moving from a community, toward provincial orientation" (1986A:11). The Government, through the three governance policies identified in this study, made deliberate moves to establish a governance structure for the college system in the province that aimed to provide for system-wide planning, clarity of authority roles and identifiable lines of accountability. These policy initiatives not only met with some measure of resistance, but generated some attempts to influence the relocation of authority within the college system.

The College System

The college system in B.C. is fragmented and divided, with participants making competing claims. Divided loyalties and specialised interest-groups, each with different goals for the
system, attempt to obtain favourable outcomes from policy decisions. One of the respondents described it as a "dog-eat-dog kind of world and everybody’s out competing for every buck they can get" (12:16). Amendments to the Public Schools Act in 1958 provided for the establishment of community colleges in B.C., which were intended to be affiliated with the University of British Columbia. Indeed, Macdonald (1962), who is thought to have provided the blueprint for the college system in B.C., perceived such institutions as being closely linked with the U.B.C. In accordance with his recommendations colleges were established as autonomous institutions with financial support from the local communities they served, and they offered the first two years of university programs. The legislation offered very little delineation of the role and purpose of the colleges.

The promulgation of the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act, in 1977, was seen as a benchmark policy of the B.C. Government in establishing a system based on provincial rather than local goals. This Act was "touted as innovative and important" at the time (Academic Council, 1980:4). Dennison captures some of the reactions of college administrators when he writes:

From the point of view of the colleges, this [centralisation] trend is away from the fundamental concept of colleges as community based institutions, under community control and responsive to community needs ... the powers of college boards, since the implementation of the Act, are regarded as limited at best and insignificant at worst (1980:5-6).

The legislation enacted in 1977 provided not only the first Act of the province designed for colleges, but was probably the first provincial statement of the Government’s perception of the role community colleges were to fulfill within its jurisdiction. This
statement certainly announced some radical changes to the governance of the college system.

Chapter One established that the fifteen community colleges needed to be distinguished from the other forms of post-secondary institutions. In the political environment, college administrators are the major stakeholders in the implementation of governance policy. Most of the colleges serve an identifiable geographical region, based on previously established School Board districts. Although the Task Force Report on the Community College (1974) was never accepted by the incoming Government, the regional concept it espoused has been generally accepted as an agreed policy guide (1974:58-59). Because historically each college in B.C. is rooted in the local community, there is a special identification with that population's post-secondary education needs. Forrester observed "colleges obtained the vast majority of their students from their surrounding region" (1985:3). These geographical characteristics are more pronounced when the effects of the system governance structure are observed by means of a count of college personnel attached to urban, semi-urban, and rural colleges. In this context the colleges can be distinguished as shown in Table Four. Figures shown in brackets under the college represent the total number of enrolments in each college for the academic year 1984/85, followed by the percentage of full-time enrolments in the same year.

The legislation empowers the Government through the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, to designate "(a) a college, and
TABLE 4

COLLEGES INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM OF B.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Semi-Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capilano College</td>
<td>(4138) 58%</td>
<td>Cariboo College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camosun College</td>
<td>(4756) 67%</td>
<td>College New Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas College</td>
<td>(4519) 46%</td>
<td>Fraser Valley College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwantlen College</td>
<td>(3934) 58%</td>
<td>Malaspina College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Community College</td>
<td>(9858) 64%</td>
<td>Okanagan College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selkirk College</td>
<td>(1429) 80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Name of college followed by number of Full Time Equivalent (F.T.E.) students in 1984-85, and the percentage of students enrolled full time.

A college once designated is established as a corporation, which consists of a governing Board whose composition is also regulated by the Act. The governing Board appoints a college principal or president, and the necessary staff to achieve its objectives. The legislation decreed:

The objects of a college are to provide comprehensive (a) courses of study equivalent to those given by a university at the first and second year post-secondary level, (b) post-secondary education or training, and (c) continuing education. (Colleges & Provincial Institutes Act, 1977:5).

The powers and duties of the Boards were also proclaimed in the Act, and were wide and detailed. They included the requirement to "manage, administer and control the property, revenue, expenditure, business and other affairs of that institution and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the board has the power to ..." (Colleges & Provincial Institutes Act, 1977:6).

Of particular relevance to this study are the differences between what college personnel perceive as the system, against the perceptions of those employed by the provincial Government. The first discrepancy is revealed by the publication of the Government's Mission, Goals, and Objectives document:

A system by which is meant the 21 colleges and institutes, the councils, the Minister, and ministry staff, all working to the common end of providing educational opportunities that will enable adults throughout the province to meet changing individual and economic needs (Ministry of Education, 1983C:5).

There had been considerable pressure on the Government to abolish
the provincial Councils (see p.91), although many felt that a single intermediary body was necessary. Observers within the system offered the following comments about the efficacy of the Councils: "they applauded the change" (10:2), "there was general concurrence ... that the Councils should go" (7:2), and "there was really not any tears shed for the Councils" (8:8). Thus there was no element of surprise in the policy for the system administrators. On the other hand, the policy changing the composition of the College Boards was proclaimed in a somewhat different context.

There were a number of organisation structural problems to do with the existing College Boards. For instance, the size of some Boards was unmanageable, members were finding the tasks of serving on the School Boards as well as the College Board onerous, the involvement and influence of faculty on College Boards was seen as suspect, and a certain amount of political criticism was being received by the Government from School Boards. There was mixed reaction to the announcement of the change in the composition of the College Boards. Many respondents talked in terms of the colleges' 'maturity' and 'coming of age' when the Boards were legally separated from the School Boards, but others decried the move as "a retrograde step and an anti-democratic step" (11:7).

The Ministry Office

In 1970 when technical and vocational schools were being melded with the more recently established two year or community colleges, the Minister of Education appointed a team of four
people to form the inaugural Department of Post-Secondary Education. This team quickly expanded and included more than fifty by the time the intermediary Councils were established. In 1986 the provincial Government appointed a Minister for Post-Secondary Education, and whilst the office was responsible for all post-secondary education including universities and institutes as well as community colleges, only six staff were transferred to the Department from the University sector, but 117 from the Education sector. It is anticipated that this number will stabilise at something between 105 and 110 employees, according to one senior officer.

People employed in the office of the Ministry are very involved in the implementation of governance policies, and as such their perceptions of the policies and their interpretation have an important contribution to make to the system and to this study. Many who were interviewed identified both the conflicts which had existed between the Ministry office and the intermediary Councils, and the prevailing strength of the former group in the implementation of governance policies.

**INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY**

The number of formal organisations that constitutes the college system is extensive, and includes the elected Government and Opposition, the office of the Ministry, the previously-mentioned Councils while they were in existence, and the individual colleges, which can be further divided into governing Boards, administration, academic councils or committees, faculty, student
groups, and the like. This section will focus attention on the principal internal and external interest groups within the system, in an attempt to identify the role of each in influencing the implementation of policies on college governance.

**The Intermediary Councils**

Three intermediary Councils were established by legislation in B.C. for the coordination of the fourteen regional colleges and six provincial institutes. The Act required the Minister to "establish, in consultation with the councils, policy respecting post-secondary education and training in the Province" (Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act, 1977:3(1)(a)). Although the Act established the three Councils as separate corporations, it made no provision either in the legislation, organisational structure or policies for them to consult one another. Southern and Dennison noted an intermediary body is one organisational mechanism by which many governments have sought to monitor the expenditures of public money ... while simultaneously respecting, to the extent practicable, [their institution's] autonomy in the interests of preserving academic freedom (1985:79).

The B.C. Government established the Councils partly to monitor the rapidly rising public expenditure on the college system, as well as to coordinate national and provincial vocational programs. However, the Executive Committee of the Management Advisory Council noted one serious problem is that the Councils have accepted restrictions which seem contrary to the Act. Section 52(1)(d) makes it clear that M.A.C. shall allocate funds for all programs not assigned to another council ... In other words, all funds to institutions should flow through one of the three Councils, ... Funds for Continuing Education and much of Adult Basic Education short-circuited the Councils in 1979 (November, 1979:2).
This was one of the many coordination problems that irritated officers of the Councils, Ministry staff and college administrators. The Management Advisory Council’s executive reported that coordination and communication between the three Councils was severely strained when they observed that "in practice, inter-council communication has been imperfect or worse" (November, 1979:3). Hollick-Kenyon seemed to overstate the case when he reported in his dissertation on the coordination of community colleges in B.C., that "persons in British Columbia today are completely opposed to coordination of any kind" (1979:41). These Councils were to be shortlived, being dissolved by a Government of the same political party that established them, in less than four years. Reactions from senior officers interviewed reflected a feeling of resentment against the Councils, from persons in the colleges and the Ministry, for usurping the power and authority that once were theirs.

The environment in which the Councils operated is summarised in a position paper endorsed by the Management Advisory Council in August 1981.

1 a lack or [sic] coordination and interrelation between educational program planning and funding, and that of support services, capital equipment and facilities;

2 a division of accountability among the allocating agencies to the Minister, and from the institutions to the allocating agencies ...;

3 a different philosophical approach to program approvals between the Academic Council and the Occupational Training Council as well as an incomprehensible division of program responsibility;

4 a lack of clear role definition of the agencies involved - Ministry, Councils, Boards, ministry staff, etc.;
too much involvement by council in the detail of institutional operational budgets;

an unaddressed need for short and long term planning at the institutional level and at the provincial level which is responsive to needs;

an unrealistic set of annual deadlines for budget estimates and allocations which impose a severe constraint on effective decision-making and planning activities at the institutional and provincial level (Management Advisory Council, 1981:3).

The Occupational Training Council

Following recommendations of the 'Board Commission' (1977), the provincial Government decided to establish the Occupational Training Council. This Council was to provide a more efficient means of coordinating provincial and federal programs, particularly in the trades training areas. According to some respondents, the formation of this Occupational Training Council was 'very important' to the Ministry of Labour to maintain liaison with the unions. But it was perceived by others in another way. "The O.T.C. quite clearly perceived their role as a directional component within the system" (8:5), and conflict arose because of the "debating forum" (1:10) that existed in that Council, as well as the perceived excessive control over the functioning of the colleges. Furthermore, this Council consisted of persons who possessed experience in the previously operated provincial vocational schools, which formed a highly centralised organisational structure. The Occupational Training Council had centralised a great deal of decision-making, most of which had been previously carried out by the College Boards.
The Management Advisory Council

The Management Advisory Council consisted of representatives of all colleges and institutes in the province; under the provisions of the original Act a representative could be the chairman of the College Board or a person designated by the chairman. The practice was for college chairmen to nominate either the college principal or director, or some other person; in at least one case that nominee was not even a College Board member. It was then realised that the employees of the Boards could in fact make decisions and recommendations which were binding on the Boards, or that the Council could consist of non-Board members. The Act was subsequently amended to read "the chairman of the board of each institution or a member of the board of each institution designated by the chairman" (College and Institute Act Amendment, 1980:4:15).

The Management Advisory Council was authorised to:

(a) require an institution to prepare and forward to it, in a form and by a date designated by it, the financial requests to the Government for the next fiscal year covering those programs that are not the responsibility of another council,
(b) receive, review and coordinate the financial requests received from the institutions under paragraph (a),
(c) make recommendations to the Minister, by a date designated by him, respecting the financial requests received under paragraph (a),
(d) allocate to the institutions funds provided by the Government for programs that are not the responsibility of another council

(Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act, 1977:Section 52).

Interviewees expressed the view that this was an effective Council for participative management in-as-much as all colleges were represented.
The Academic Council

The Academic Council was responsible for:

Those programs of study usually considered as (sic) appropriate to the first and second years of a university education; most of the career oriented technical studies, and a few areas of vocational study which are closely allied to one or the other of these categories (Academic Council, 1979:7).

It also reported that it had established specific committees in its first year of operations to address "unmet opportunities at the level of system-wide policies and plans" (Academic Council, 1979:10).

In a report requested by the Minister of Education, the Management Advisory Council (see p.92) published the identified 'problem areas' of the three Council system which revealed among other things that there was "a different philosophical approach to program approvals between the Academic Council and the Occupational Training Council as well as an incomprehensible division of program responsibility" (Management Advisory Council, 1981:3). So the implementation of the Government's coordinating policies caused severe difficulties for system administrators. Many of the people interviewed from the Ministry, College Boards, or professional college administrators identified the different philosophies being exercised by the three Councils as causing conflict.

Other Interest Groups

There are a number of important legally-constituted groups which form an integral part of the college system administration, and interact with the major players in the implementation of governance policies, but are not included in the provincial
Government's legislative or policy descriptions of the college system. The most prominent groups include the Council of College Principals in B.C., the B.C. Association of Colleges, and the College-Institute Educators' Association of B.C.

The B.C. Association of Colleges

This association known as (B.C.A.C.) was incorporated in 1976, and comprises representatives of all community College Boards in B.C. "It represents the interests, and furthers the cause, of each board" (B.C.A.C. pamphlet), as well as coordinating the political interests of the community college sector. It employs a full-time Executive Director, and has played a major role in the redistribution of authority within the college system. It strongly influenced the operational draft of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement issued by the Ministry in March 1983.

The College-Institute Educators' Association

The College-Institute Educators' Association of B.C. (C.I.E.A.) was established in 1980 as the successor organisation to the College Faculties Federation. From an initial membership of eight faculty unions, C.I.E.A. has grown to include twelve faculty unions representing approximately 2,100 full-time equivalent faculty at thirteen different institutions. It is a conglomeration of independent college faculty unions, and is registered under the Societies Act of B.C.

[It] lobbies the government, Ministry officials, the opposition and other interest groups on matters pertaining to colleges and institutes ... maintains media contacts, issues press releases and arranges media coverage of college-institute issues ... [and] acts in coalition with teacher, student, parent, labour and other groups (C.I.E.A., 1985:5).
Its stand on college governance issues is perhaps most succinctly recorded in a paper it recently prepared for the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) Task Force on Education.

During the period from 1982 to 1986 ... the government has increasingly centralised the system and has subordinated educational objectives to economic and political ones ... By means of a nest of legislation and policy, the provincial government has achieved greater control and direction of the college-institute system by radically centralizing the governance, funding, and operation of the system ... At the heart of many of the most serious problems in the college-institute system today is the structure of the college and institute boards (C.I.E.A.,1986:2-4).

The C.I.E.A. submitted a comprehensive report on the effects of the Act and in particular "the widespread discontent within colleges and institutes with the three-council system" (1982:13). They were also lobbying against centralisation of system decision-making and the composition of the College Boards. Although the membership of this group is predominantly faculty members, their influence on the college system is such that it was considered important to include them as an interest group in the college governance structure.

The B.C. Council of Principals

Many of those interviewed testified to the influence exerted on implementing system governance policies by this association whose full title is 'Council of Principals of the B.C./Yukon Colleges and Institutes'. It is an ad hoc organisation which comprises all principals of the fifteen community colleges included in this study, and as a body seeks "to provide leadership to college and institute education" (Council of Principals, Terms of Reference, 1985:2). Comments such as "the Council of Principals ... was
strongly in support of the demise of the Councils" (20:2), "the recent revision to the Mission, Goals, and Objectives was initiated by the Council of Principals" (22:17), and "the Council of Principals ... serves that purpose [a group that could argue with the Government in the place of the Councils] now" (21:1), reveal the perceived importance of this group. They see one of their functions as:

reviewing position papers, policies or procedures of the Ministry of Education, which are of general interest to the Council of Principals and advising the Ministry [and] individual institutions as to the position of the Council where such communication is warranted (Terms of Reference, 1985:2).

This association comprising small numbers, is perceived to exert considerable influence on the governance of the college system.

THE ACTORS

Within this system there is a wide range of administrator behaviour that affects the implementation of governance policies. Easton's (1965b) conceptual framework provides a valuable means of identifying the important actors in the study, whose perceptions can then be examined. Within all political systems there are persons or groups of persons responding to the various forces acting on that system. "The existence of a political system" argues Easton "must include plurality of political relationships through which the individual members are linked to each other and through which the political objectives of the system are pursued" (1965b:177). Actors must be drawn from the Legislature, the Ministry office, the colleges and their diverse grouping of administrators and interest groups.
Because implementation efforts can vary according to the composition, disposition and interaction of the actors and the conditions of the environment, it is necessary to take account of all key actors. A list of people implementing the governance policies for the community college system must include not only college administrators and officers attached to the Ministry, but also those in the other interest groups outlined above. This study takes into account those who are engaged on a full-time and part-time basis in administering the community college system within B.C.

For a variety of reasons many of the occupants of such positions would not want to be identified with a political community, but Easton asserts "we are said to be participating in political life when our activity relates in some way to the making and execution of policy for a society" (1967:128). This clearly demands the inclusion of Ministers of Education, Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers, and Directors from the Ministry office as well as college principals, directors, Board chairmen and members. The officers responsible for community college governance in each of the interest groups previously identified would also be members in the political system. A list of specific actors interviewed, are identified in Appendix Four.

SUMMARY

The college system has evolved into its present condition from something quite different, a collection of strong community-oriented institutions, where local residents contributed both
financially and by serving on governing Boards. The declaration of the Colleges and Provincial Institute Act (1977) introduced a new provincial dimension and provided some legal governance boundaries.

The policy initiative which led to the development of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was carried out in an environment where there was a great deal of ambiguity with respect to the role of the community college in the post-secondary education service of the province. "The system did not ... have a well-defined sense of goals" (4:19) said one respondent, and "the statements were developed at a time that there was a lot of ... debate about what's going to happen to the system" (9:14) explained another. All this "at a time when things were starting to get rather tumultuous both within the system, and within the province in general" (8:29). These comments reflect some of the pressures both from within the system and also from the environment with which it interacts.

Most students of policy implementation have accepted the view taken by Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) who identified the lack of resources for implementing the policy as a most important factor. In the case of the present study, the system, while still being pressured by a shortage of resources, was subject to different influences, because the implementation of one of the policies actually reduced expenditure. Those who were responsible for financial restraint in the province attempted to encourage colleges to "be supportive of the economic development aspirations of Government" (7:11).
The promulgation of the three governance policies emerged from a somewhat hostile environment, one characterised by financial constraints and conflicting interests. From the environment came demands for a clarification of roles within the decision-making framework of the college system. The three policies were meant to address this. A period of economic constraint produced some significant pressures on the governance of the college/political system. Financial restraint was perceived also to have caused the Government to control more of the decision-making with respect to program approvals within the colleges by fostering more vocationally-oriented courses. There was considerable social pressure on the system to retain the original mandate of the colleges, that is to serve the needs of, and be governed by, the local community.

The B.C. Association of Colleges had raised several concerns with the Ministry, as had the C.I.E.A. because of the tendency to centralise decision-making of the college system in the Ministry. Many groups in the environment called for a clarification of powers and responsibilities throughout the whole system. The other political influence that can be perceived is the changes of people within the system. Changes of Ministers, bureaucrats and interest group executives, not to mention staff changes in colleges, individually and collectively alter the political foci within the system.

Evidence of a conflict of interests in the previous governance structure demanded changes of various magnitudes, and the demise of the Councils was initiated by many interest groups. Demands
emerged largely from perceptions of colleges' 'maturity', where institutions were seen to require the support of the School Boards no longer, and as a result of the perceived threat of centralised decision-making.

Implementors of governance policies were defined as those whose full-time occupation was predominantly concerned with college administration, plus College Board members, and included politicians, Ministry staff and college administrators. Other interest groups such as B.C.A.C., C.I.E.A., and the Council of Principals, are shown to be boundary spanning groups which sought to influence governance policies.

In this chapter are identified some of the interest groups and actors through which interaction took place. It provides a useful backdrop against which to examine the documented and perceived intentions of those who took the three policy initiatives, and against which to analyse policy implementors' perception of outcomes. The data on the perceived intentions of the policy formulators, and the outcomes perceived by implementors, are reported in the following chapter.
NOTES ON CHAPTER FOUR

1. Quotations without name or date are drawn from transcripts of interviews, which are original source data.

2. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA, (March 1983)
   Post Secondary Department,

3. The three private post-secondary institutions operating in the 1960's were Columbia College,
   Trinity Western College,
   Notre Dame.

4. Kwantlen College, a fifteenth community college, was established in 1980, and in 1985 two institutes were merged, the B.C. Institute of Technology and the Pacific Vocational Institute.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE INTENTIONS AND PERCEIVED OUTCOMES
OF THREE GOVERNANCE POLICIES

Intentions that are documented by policy formulators are significantly influenced by both formulators' and implementors' perceptions. These in turn influence the policy outcomes, as do elements of policy design. "Initial statements of policy are expected to set boundaries within which implementation will occur" (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980:32). Whilst it is often difficult to isolate precisely what to include in the 'initial' statement of policy, such statements form the conceptual input of the political systems theory.

The literature reviewed in Chapter Two identified some important variables with respect to policy changes made during implementation. The questions generated from that review formed the basis of questions asked of administrators during interviews in this study. Questions were asked having to do with communication, consultation, the degree of actual change, perceived intentions and commitment to policies. These elements were all assumed to have significant influence during policy implementation.

Policies can be expressed in a variety of ways (Hill, 1983:74). This chapter attempts to unravel some of the interaction and report the boundaries of the policies, as delineated both by the documented and perceived intentions of policy formulators and the outcomes perceived by policy implementors. Emphasis is placed on analysing the communication elements, such as the degree of consultation exercised during policy formulation and the
perceived degree of change in the system or threat to the system perceived by implementors. The chapter will be presented in three parts with each part reporting, with respect to a given policy, the documented intentions, the perceived policy intentions as declared by formulators, the communication linkages and policy outcomes as perceived by the implementors. These headings align with the important characteristics of policy implementation identified in Chapter Two. Each part will also describe the perceived communication linkages between formulators and implementors. The policies will be analysed in chronological order of endorsement by the Government of B.C.

No attempt is made to locate the sources of the three policy initiatives. Kogan asserts:

The sources of policy generation are so difficult to locate, let alone place in any logical pattern, that detecting changes in values, or the pressures by which change is effected, is more a matter of art than of analysis (1975:23).

PART ONE
THE POLICY INTRODUCING SYSTEM
MISSION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES

Part One of this chapter analyses the intentions and outcomes of the Government's initiative to develop Integrated Five Year Planning for the British Columbia College and Institute System (1983). The introduction of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was probably the first major governance initiative after the declaration of the Colleges and Institutes Act; it formulated the provincial Government's perspective on the college system. For some time college administrators had been asking the
Government for more specific policies pertaining to the direction of colleges partly because of the proliferation of unpredictable decisions on program approval and funding within the system, and partly as colleges moved toward a greater uniformity province-wide (Dennison, 1986:10).

Part One will be presented in four sections: the documented intentions of the policy; the policy intentions as perceived by the policy formulators; the communication linkages in relation to the policy; and the policy outcomes as perceived by the policy implementors which were each supported in literature. These will be followed by a discussion of the findings on the policy.

**DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS**

The first policy initiative on governance of the college system was introduced less abruptly than the following two, in-as-much as drafts of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement were widely circulated, debated and rewritten before being adopted by the Minister of Education. However, a letter to the institutions appended to the document provides an official statement on the revised role of colleges as apparently expected by the Government. In it the colleges were called upon to sharpen their focus upon provincial and national goals, particularly economic and manpower needs, rather than continue their emphasis on the defined needs of the local region. It was "intended to serve as the basis for the preparation of long and short term plans by each of the constituent parts of the colleges and institute system" (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983:3).
The governance objectives were designed to contribute to the overall mission of the system, and to clarify the provincial Government's specific goals and objectives. "The system will operate through an organizational structure that will, through its individual components, develop, co-ordinate, and deliver education to achieve common purposes" (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983C:9). The official document records four primary objectives, and because each of the subsections dealing with the 'decision-making structure' objective commences with the word 'preserve', one may assume that the document was not designed to introduce any major change to the governance of the system.

OBJECTIVE A 1. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES

In the 1982-87 period, the college and institute system will have three levels of decision-making responsibility. The organizations at each level will be cohesive. Appropriate and necessary lay, community-appointed representation and input will be included. The system will:

a) preserve the overall provincial policy-making responsibility, decision-making capacity, and accountability of the Minister and the Government

b) preserve an intermediate level structure, comprising one or more Council(s), which can provide input to the Government and to educational institutions based on a provincial perspective

c) preserve the responsibility of the Boards of colleges and institutes for developing institutional policy relating to the delivery of education consistent with their region-specific or program-specific mandates (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983C:11).

Governance was the first in a list of eight goals. It was clear "the purpose of this goals and objectives document is to provide an overall framework for the co-ordinated planning of the college and institute education" (Minister of Education B.C., 1983C:5). The Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement continued by providing some clear intentions with respect to consultation by those decision-making bodies.
In performing their functions, each of the decision-making bodies will be responsible for undertaking necessary consultation in advance of making decisions. This will happen as follows:

a) the Minister will undertake to consult with Boards and with the Council (or Councils) concerning the provincial policy framework

b) Council(s) will be encouraged to establish or continue provincial advisory committees, including program advisory committees

c) Boards will be encouraged to take account the opinions of the educators and students through the use of internal program advisory committees

d) institutions will be expected to participate in external program advisory committees ...

(Ministry of Education B.C., 1983C:12).

The document thus places an obligation upon the Minister to consult both College Boards and provincial Councils with respect to the provincial policy framework, which includes governance.

A document developed in association with the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was entitled Guidelines for the Preparation of Institute Strategic and Operational Plans. It assumed considerable importance in administrators' perceptions of the governance policy outcomes, because it became the strategy document to assist in the realisation of the intentions of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement. It focussed attention on institutional planning rather than system planning, but gives an idea of the general Ministry impact on colleges when, in the introduction, it states:

In 1987, a major system wide review will be undertaken of the outcomes of the strategic planning process. This review will coincide with the analysis of the 'reasons, if any', for the continued existence of colleges and institutes, which is required under Section 66 of the College and Institute Act (Minister of Education B.C., 1983A:1).
PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS

Both policy formulators and implementors were asked the question: "In your opinion, was the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement intended as a major change to the college system, as far as governance is concerned?" One policy formulator saw the statement thus:

The most important intentions were to signal to the institutions that there was an overall philosophy and direction at work here, and the Government assumed responsibility for stating that ... it was a signal that the world has changed in respect to colleges, that kind of signal had often been given through the budget systems and through new legislation, and through speeches that the Minister might give in the house, or any number of other vehicles. But certainly in the B.C. system, this was the first time it had ever been attempted through an actual policy statement (4:20).

Another respondent believed that it was intended as a major change. However, six out of the eight policy formulators interviewed agreed that this policy "wasn't intended as a vehicle for directing the system in a new direction" (9:14). Policy implementors' opinions as to whether it was intended that this policy would provide a major impetus for change to the governance of the system were evenly split. There were implementors who perceived that "it was intended to represent a major change" (21:21), which was supported by assertions such as; "Oh yes, sure it was ... They were very deliberately centralising and going for this control decision-making" (15:15). There were those who felt that "it is probably the least profound of the Ministry decisions over recent years" (11:9), and another administrator asserted:

It was not either a subtle or a mischievous effort to change anything at all other than in institutions where we planned day by day, or week by week, to have us get a sense of longer term direction. No it was not intended to produce major change (14:16).

In summary, a majority of policy formulators perceived this policy as not intending to change the governance structure of the
system, although some opposed that view. Indeed, policy implementors who were also asked to verbalise their perceptions of the intentions inherent in the policy to bring about change were evenly divided, with six implementors believing it was intended to change the structure and six perceiving that no such change was intended. Another question was asked relating to the degree of change that had occurred in the decision-making framework of the system, but those responses will be analysed under the following sub-section entitled perceived outcomes.

Many policy formulators saw the intention of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement as providing an overall definition and clarification of the community college from the provincial Ministry perspective. This was the most commonly stated aim as perceived by interview respondents. Nevertheless, there was a diversity of perceived intentions, ranging from "the major issue was the Minister committing to consult with Boards on policy issues before he made policy decisions. It was trying to tie down the Minister" (7:9), to ensuring "that the community colleges would serve the needs of the province as perceived by the Government ... in the most cost-efficient manner possible" (6:9). The policy intentions perceived by respondents, are summarised in Table Five; these could be interpreted as intending to:

(a) provide governance direction and clarification of roles,
(b) increase awareness of the provincial perspective and the need for financial restraint,
(c) provide a framework for consultation and system planning,
(d) retain educational autonomy in colleges.
"The goals and objectives were intended to do two things. One was to clarify, and the other was to provide a signal for change ... in the governance area ... was to simply provide this as formal direction ... where people cooperated with one another and where certain kinds of policy were reasonably clearly defined" (4:18-19).

"The most important intentions were to signal to the institutions that there was an overall philosophy and direction at work ... and ... it was a signal that the world had changed" (4:20).

"I think we wanted to define some broad parameters in which the system could function ... they were always asking for some defined goal or direction ... this simply tried to take all of the aspects and give it some form" (5:13).

"To make certain that the community colleges would serve the needs of the province ... in the most cost-efficient manner" (6:9).

"The intention of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was to form the parameters for the direction of the college system ... the key thing was to ensure that there was appropriate consultation" (7:8).

"Basically what we said is that we can increase the comprehensiveness and accessibility of the entire system" (9:15).

"They needed to start looking at their future, coming out of a development and growth phase and into a consolidation phase" (10:9).

**Question:**

*Has it intended to preserve a high degree of educational autonomy in the colleges?*

"Yes definitely, you will not find in the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement anything that smacks of telling the colleges how to carry out educational services" (7:12).
POLICY COMMUNICATION LINKAGES

Formulators' Knowledge of the College System

There was little doubt that those concerned with the formulation of all three policies were seen to be sufficiently familiar with the college system. Twenty persons were asked the question "Do you think the policy formulators were sufficiently informed about the community college system?" early in the interview. Table Six summarises their responses. Although there was not complete unanimity, their opinions coincided sufficiently to conclude that they perceived the policy formulators as well informed.

Formal and Informal Communication Linkages

When examining the perceived outcomes of this policy, the importance of communication links between policy formulators and implementors emerged consistently, not only through the focus of interview questions, but through volunteered responses in answer to questions with alternative targets. Such linkages were not only important for conveying the meaning of the policy statement and supporting documents, but also showed the environmental pressures on policy formulators. Points such as the effort which formulators were seen to have made to communicate and consult with implementors, the degree of ambiguity perceived by all administrators, and the perceived absence of sanctions and incentives in the policy initiative, all played roles of varying importance in linking policy formulators with implementors.
TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A QUESTION ON PERCEPTIONS OF POLICY FORMULATORS' AND IMPLEMENTORS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM

QUESTION: Do you think the policy formulators were sufficiently informed about the community college system?

"Oh hell yes ..." (4:6).

"Probably a lot more aware than most of us give them credit for" (5:5).

"Yes, they understood" (6:4).

"Yes" (7:3).

"Sure the people within the Ministry were sufficiently informed" (8:12).

"I think so" (9:6).

"I think the politicians had their ears pretty close to events" (10:4).

"There have been a number of consultative mechanisms, and I don't want to fault most Ministry officials for taking pains to work out consultative committees with the Council of Principals or with Boards or with the college system in general" (11:3).

"Oh yes" (12:5).

"They don't have a detailed knowledge of colleges" (13:4).

"No ... people in political positions really do not understand what colleges are" (14:4).

"Now you have Ministry staff individually and collectively making decisions in my opinion that are far beyond their responsibility, to say nothing of their competence" (15:1).

"Some people in the Ministry ... understand colleges" (16:14).

"No ... there was a reaction to pressure from Boards, pure and simple" (17:2).

"Oh I think so, yes" (18:3).

"The Minister was probably reasonably well informed, I doubt that the others were" (19:5).

"Yes" (20:5).

"No, but that's been an ongoing problem ... of the education system" (21:6).

"Yes they've been sufficiently informed" (22:5).

"Yes ... they're informed" (23:6)
Consultation

"There was certainly every effort from the Ministry level to distribute them [Mission, Goals, and Objectives] to the colleges and get consultation" (12:16). "I give full marks to a small group of bureaucrats on that issue ... who travelled the province ... and did go back and redraft and redraft" (16:35). Very few respondents did not agree that consultation between formulators and implementors was thoroughly executed during formulation. Although this research considered only the effects of the final Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement issued by the Ministry in May 1983, in the context of consultation, the historical perspective on its formulation is important. It has been previously noted that the first draft was dated May 1982; and respondents made it quite clear that a prolonged period of consultation followed, which apparently culminated in a weekend seminar with Ministry staff, college administrators including Board members, and interest groups. At this meeting policy issues were discussed openly and the B.C.A.C. agreed to revise the document, but maintain the thrust of the seminar discussions and preserve the Ministry purpose. One Ministry officer observed:

if there was any one thing that to me was a signal that our process had worked, and that we had that kind of consultation, it was that particular event (4:23).

Indeed, in a letter to college and institute Board chairmen, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Education stated that the revised statement forwarded to the Minister for consideration was "identical to the March 8 1983, document prepared by the B.C.A.C. and forwarded to me as a statement of the Association's understanding of the intent of the Ministry" (Ministry of Education, March 24, 1983:1). Furthermore, the policy statement
finally enacted displayed a note on the cover page:

This document is identical to the draft document dated February 1983, prepared by the British Columbia Association of Colleges with the exception that Appendix B has been altered to reflect changed timelines (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983C: cover).

Ambiguity

Although there was widespread acceptance that consultation had occurred, there was not a similar degree of acceptance on the question of clarity of communication. "Some may have a legitimate criticism, saying that they weren't sure what the document meant. The document was obscure and enigmatic at times" (21:25). One respondent saw the ambiguity of the document as a ploy to provide for centralisation of the organisation:

In the absence of any quantifiers in the Ministry's own document, then the Ministry absolutely controls the quantities ... wherever it suits them, they make an exception for their purpose ... so they certainly wrote their own statement so that it wouldn't hinder them at all (15:18).

However, to the question whether they believed there was sufficient ambiguity in the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement to allow colleges a reasonable degree of flexibility, another respondent replied:

Yes, and that's probably why they don't worry about it too much ... There isn't too much in there that says you cannot do this, you can interpret it to serve your own needs, so if that's the case why bother about it (13:13).

Still other administrators denied any link between the system Mission, Goals, and Objectives and college flexibility. "Flexibility doesn't emanate from the Mission and Goals statement" (11:11), and

I don't suppose the statement had to be ambiguous in order to allow flexibility. I think sometimes the statements were sufficiently broad and general that there was opportunity to choose some specific responses, how we would go about doing things (12:17).
There was a general agreement that the Mission, Goals, and Objectives document was a very ambiguous one, not only because of the issues it failed to address, but in the manner in which some of the issues were addressed. "I think that much of the wording was fuzzy and equivocal" (14:19), said one respondent; and another: "it's rather an innocuous document really" (18:8). Criticism of the document's wording came from respondents both within the Ministry and in the colleges. "The document is near unintelligible by a layman and is only intelligible to the professional to the extent that the professional can deal with jargon" (14:19).

It was also generally agreed that the document "has never been operationalised" (11:11), "you can't reference back to anything in there" (15:15), which has created considerable frustration in the minds of policy implementors. "We don't have criterion referenced decision-making, we have absolutely no foggy notion of what the criteria are that are going to be applied at any one time" (11:10).

Sanctions and Incentives
Policy implementation analysts such as Bardach (1977), Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) and Brewer and deLeon (1983) have noted the importance of incentives and sanctions in influencing the effectiveness of policy implementation. Therefore a question was asked of policy formulators whether it was intended to include these elements in the policy. The response to this question was consistent: "there were no formal sanctions or rewards" (8:26).
Several officers alluded to informal sanctions through the regulation of budgets by the Ministry.

**PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES**

Policy implementors were asked to identify the important outcomes of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy initiative. This request elicited a variety of responses. One administrator observed "as far as I can make out, there aren't any outcomes. I think it's largely a non-event" (11:10), whilst another declared "I think the reality is a reduction in just about every college, and the whole college system is being both demeaned and diminished" (15:16). There is no unanimity among policy implementors on the outcomes of this policy, but there are some themes which emerge from the variety of responses received.

Most college principals interviewed agreed that their own college's Mission, Goals, and Objectives did align with those of the provincial Government. Some interpreted it as mandatory, saying "certainly that was the intent, that was the explicit direction that we have been given" (14:16); another principal reported "yes, we've chosen to go that way ... when we did our own five year plan, we used those same categories and developed our objectives ... within that umbrella" (12:14). But the perceived outcomes encompass far more than aligning college Mission, Goals, and Objectives with those of the provincial Government. One of the major difficulties policy implementors perceived about the implementation of this policy was that the Ministry was not complying with its own policy statement. Table
Seven summarises responses received with regard to this topic.

To a question asking policy implementors to what extent they thought that the Mission, Goals, and Objectives had changed the decision-making framework of the college system, the following responses were recorded: "Not at all" (11:12). "I don't think that it's ... had any impact at all" (12:20). "I don't think they have" (14:22). "I don't think that it has changed decision-making that much in B.C." (17:8). "I don't think it's changed it at all" (18:11). To sum up, seven out of the twelve respondents expressed the view that the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy represented little or no change in the system governance. Three people felt that there were changes as a result of this policy and one officer remained uncommitted. College administrators, including Board members, regarded its introduction as of minimal significance. Furthermore the college administrators including Board members tended to see the significance of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement diminishing over time. Indeed the observation was shared by most policy implementors. "I don't think it made much difference ... because in effect the system more or less ignored it after a while" (13:12).

Despite the fact that policy formulators saw it as the intention of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy to preserve a high degree of educational autonomy in colleges, the policy implementors saw it from another perspective. However, one Board member remarked "I think that it was the objective" (17:9), but stated that that objective had not been realised. Nine out of twelve interviewees did not see the Mission, Goals, and
TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTORS' COMMENTS ON THE MINISTRY'S LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MISSION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES POLICY.

"Decisions made in Victoria are not related to college decision-making. Decisions made in the Ministry office are too open to change generated by political whims" (11:9).

"I can't recall at any time, at a ... discussion, or negotiation with any Ministry people or Government people, that it's ever been made reference to" (12:17).

"I think it's used when it suits somebody and ignored other times. My impression is that for most of the time it's ignored" (13:16).

"It really hasn't been used much at all" (14:20).

"Whenever it suits them, they make an exception for their purpose" (15:18).

"One could really say there hasn't been much change, because Government would have done what it wanted anyway" (16:26).

"I would ... prefer to see the Ministry not quite as dictatorial" (18:13).

"Basically it was a set of limitations or boundaries within which individual institutions would operate, but it didn't constrain Government in any way" (19:14).

"The Ministry Mission and Goals statement, over the last six months has been meaningless ... the Ministry ... has made us absolutely cynical that the Ministry has any plan whatsoever in mind, because there have been 180 degree shifts in operating funds and excellence funds, in capital funds ... the practice of the Ministry has nothing to do with their Mission and Goals statement" (20:14).

"The Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement from each institution should have allowed institutions at least to look down the road and say this is what we're going to do, the Ministry has said this is acceptable, but ... the institutions can't predict what's going to happen ... it didn't have any relationship to reality" (21:22-23).

"In terms of being an instrument to guide the operation of the system in a concerted or causal basis, it really isn't" (22:13).
Objectives as preserving a high degree of educational autonomy for colleges, two respondents offered neutral responses and one administrator answered, "I don't think that there has been any intention to weaken the institutions or their governance" (14:22).

**SUMMARY OF POLICY ONE - INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES**

**Documented Intentions**

The governance component of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives Plans statement was brief and contained fundamentally four documented intentions. The major intentions stated in the policy documents focus on the need for the system to place greater emphasis on provincial and national economic and manpower needs. They also claim to provide for long term and short term planning, and state that the three levels of decision-making responsibility will be maintained.

(a) Overall responsibility was to be held by the Minister.

(b) Three levels of decision-making were to be maintained by the Ministry, Council and Boards.

(c) College Boards consisting of 'community-appointed' lay persons were to be responsible for college governance.

The policy document clearly intended consultation to be practised at all levels of the decision-making framework, and in particular, that the Minister should consult with both Councils and Boards on provincial policy issues.

There is some evidence that the Mission, Goals, and Objectives
statement, together with the accompanying Guidelines for the Preparation of Institute Strategic and Operational Plans, did exert influence on colleges' planning perspectives. However, from the responses received it is not clear that the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy initiative was the principal cause of the perceived planning effect.

Perceived Intentions
It was held by the formulators that the policy was intended to define and clarify the respective roles of the agencies within the system. Those who were closest to the formulation of the policy thought that it was intended to provide a framework for consultation and system planning.

Communication Linkages
Most persons interviewed considered the policy formulators to be well-informed about the college system. Those most closely associated with the formulation and implementation of this policy believed that the draft documents had been widely circulated, with extensive consultation taking place during formulation. The policy was, in the main, seen to have been effectively communicated, but the document itself was perceived to be very unclear and not practical. Respondents believed that no sanctions or rewards were included in the policy and that it was not intended to make a major change to the framework for decision-making within the system.

Perceived Effects
Policy implementors believed that no change had taken place in
the governance of the college system as a result of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy statement. However, most thought that the individual colleges had made an effort to align institutional Mission, Goals, and Objectives with those of the provincial policy statement, but also observed that the Ministry officials were not constrained by this policy, nor were they obliged to remain within its guidelines. Therefore the policy had no impact on college system governance.

TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY ONE

DOCUMENTED INTENTIONS

Greater Emphasis on Provincial/National Economic & Manpower Needs
Provide for Long Term & Short Term Planning
Consultation to be Practised at all Levels

PERCEIVED INTENTIONS

Define & Clarify Respective Roles of Agencies in System
Provide Framework for Consultation & System Planning

COMMUNICATION LINKAGES

Extensive Consultation Exercised
Extensive Ambiguity
Major Change or Threat Not Intended
Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised
Formulators Knowledge Sufficiently Broad

OUTPUTS

No Intentions Completely Realised

PERCEIVED OUTCOMES

Institutions Align with Provincial Mission Goals & Objectives
Ministry Not Constrained by Policy
No Consultation for Provincial Policies Exercised
CONCLUSIONS

If the perceptions of respondents were an accurate assessment of the various conditions being studied, then the fact that they felt policy formulators were well-informed about the college system, and that extensive consultation took place prior to the policy's receiving official status, are good grounds for believing that the policy will be easier to implement than if the case were otherwise. The other major elements which would appear to have some significance in the implementation of policy were that administrators considered the document very ambiguous and did not contain either incentives or sanctions for implementors. According to scholars of implementation, these must contribute to policy slippage.

The perceived intentions of the policy do not entirely align with the documented intentions of the policy formulators. Informants considered that the policy was not intended to change the governance structure of the system, and indeed, one of the documents supports this point-of-view by starting the description of each of the governance decision-making levels with the word, 'preserve'. However, both the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement and Ministerial correspondence support the notion that "Occupation and Manpower development will be the principal area of expansion for the current five year period" (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983:4).

The policy documents clearly enunciated the intention of developing and executing a high level of consultation among the major decision-making levels within the system. This is
complimented by the statement "all strategies for action arising out of the objectives should be initially proposed by constituent parts of the college and institute system, rather than by the Ministry" (Ministry of Education, B.C., 1983: 3). This concept was supported by the perceptions of policy formulators, as was the intention that the policy would form the basis for system planning. Indeed, in most ways the documented intentions coincide with the intentions perceived by policy formulators, which if subsequently realised, are considered outputs.

Policy implementors, however, saw this policy as "a non-event" (11:10) because the Ministry did not comply with its own policy document. With respect to governance, implementors noted the Minister's lack of commitment to retaining the intermediary Council(s), plus they believed they were not consulted with respect to provincial policy matters. Implementors testified that major changes were made to all aspects of college and system administration without reference to the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement. Despite the positive communication linkages of the policy and the general correlation of perceived and documented intentions, the outcomes were believed by system administrators to have had no real effect on the system's governance structure.
PART TWO

THE POLICY DISSOLVING THE INTERMEDIARY COUNCILS

In July 1983 the Government of B.C. decided to change the governance structure of the college system by abolishing the three intermediary Councils which it had established less than four years earlier. This decision was promulgated in a number of amendments made to the Colleges and Institute Act. This Part will report the research findings in relation to the amendment to abolish the intermediary Councils. They will be presented under four sections; the documented intentions of the policy initiative; the policy formulators' perceived intentions; the communication linkages incorporated in the policy, and finally the implementors’ perceived outcomes. This Part will conclude with a summary of the findings.

It should be noted that some of the Councils’ powers were withdrawn by the Minister before their dissolution. Calder records:

In 1982, the main executive function of the Councils, budgetary allocation to the institutions, had been eliminated under the powers given the Minister under the Act. At that time also, the Councils' role in program approval was eliminated (1984:86).

The Councils had also suffered budget cuts which forced them to reduce their support staff. These moves reflect some of the Minister’s dissatisfaction with the Council structure before this policy was proclaimed.

DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS

For the purposes of this study, the documents examined concerning the abolition of the intermediary Councils date from the announcement in the Legislature in July 1983, when the Colleges
and Institute Act was amended through Bill 20 (1983B). This Bill forms part of "a large package of provincial legislation ... to 'downsize' the public sector" (Calder, 1984:83). It amends the Act by eliminating all references to the Councils, and proclaims their dissolution.

On the repeal of
(a) section 44 of the College and Institute Act, the occupational training council,
(b) section 46 of the College and Institute Act, the academic council, or
(c) section 48 of the College and Institute Act, the management advisory council is dissolved and
(d) the appointment of each member of the council is terminated,
(e) all the rights and property of the council are transferred to and vested in the government,
(f) the government assumes all obligations and liabilities of the council, and
(g) where paragraph (a) applies, a matter under review of the occupational training council under section 29 (1) of the Apprenticeship Act is referred back to the minister under that Act (Minister of Education B.C., Bill 20, 1983B:4).

Although the Bill was quite clear on the intent of the initiative, it had some far-reaching effects, which are described in part by other documents and by the perceptions of what was actually intended. When introducing the Bill into the Legislature the Minister of Education claimed that the dissolution of the Councils was part of an overall Government policy, which aimed to achieve "the elimination of Boards, agencies and commissions where practical" (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 1983:1366). During debate the Minister stated:

One of the thrusts of the Government is to ensure a considerable degree of autonomy for colleges. There are considerable administrative burdens to be borne by them, and I think freedom and flexibility in their operation should be encouraged (Hansard, 1983:1367).

It seems that the Councils created a level of decision-making in
the system's organisation that was unacceptable to most administrators or interest groups in the system. Respondents provided such reasons for the Councils' demise as "difficulties in the way Councils were originally established" (4:2), "not providing coordination across the system" (8:3), and "it simply didn't work as a vehicle for governance" (6:1). There was strong and widespread support for the abolition of the Councils among administrators, which, according to one interviewee, encouraged a high degree of consultation and communication between the Ministry office and colleges on this policy.

A letter sent by the Minister of Education to a College Board Chairman on July 7th 1983, the day the Bill was introduced into the Legislature, summarised some of the intentions both of the introduction of this policy and of the changes in the composition of College Boards.

Basically what these amendments propose is the elimination of the three councils, the alteration of board composition so that all board appointments are to be made by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council and the strengthening of the ministerial authority to issue policies and directives (Minister of Education, 7:7:83).

These condensed intentions reveal stated intentions of the legislation, not only to dissolve the Councils, but also to strengthen the Minister's authority, and a deliberate movement of formal control.

**PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS**

Administrators perceived a wide variety of intentions in the policy to abolish the Councils: for instance, to "relieve the burden of ... having to explain to three different Councils"
was often coupled with what was perceived to be an inherent intention to a greater degree of centralised decision-making. "The desire to have as direct contact as possible between the Government of the day and the institutions" (4:1), or to reduce costs and to remove the duplication of work by Councils and the Ministry were other intentions perceived.

The prevailing account given by senior Ministry officials was the intention of simplifying the organisational structure and restating the various authority roles of the system components. This was in response to mounting dissatisfaction, and the confusion of roles, authority and responsibility, which intensified during the Councils' existence. There was conflict between Councils and the Ministry, Councils and other institutions, as well as among the Councils. This policy was seen as a way to eliminate that conflict. The perceived intention of simplifying and clarifying the governance structure of the system was expressed in many diverse ways, and certainly not always in response to the question, "what do you believe were the prime intentions of the policy to abolish the three intermediary Councils?" Table Nine summarises some of those comments.

Observations have already been made on policy formulators' perceptions of the period of fiscal restraint being imposed upon the system, nevertheless most senior public servants interviewed saw this particular policy initiative as intending to reduce costs. There were several intentions that were operating at once, among them was the Government's desire to achieve budgeting efficiencies. Councils cost money at a time when ...
Government said that overall costs of operating Government should be reduced (4:1).

\textbf{TABLE 9}

**SUMMARY OF POLICY FORMULATORS' COMMENTS ON PERCEIVED INTENTIONS TO SIMPLIFY THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE.**

"The desire to have as direct contact as possible between the Government of the day and the institutions" (4:1).

"I think it was a desire to simplify ... the Councils tended to echo the work that was done by the bureaucrats" (5:1).

"[There] were so many questions about where the power lay and so much ambiguity, that the Ministry officials concluded early in the game that they [the Councils] should be abolished" (6:2).

"The principal role [of the Ministry] ... is to set up the structure and parameters within which the institutions will function" (7:3).

"I would say we have basically a monitoring function on governance" (8:11).

"It was addressing the fact that there were just so many entities involved ... it was an attempt to clarify what was a messy situation" (9:2-4).

"The Councils were causing a tremendous amount of problems and confusion in the institutions because they weren't coordinating their activities and allocations" (10:1).
"We had to save money every possible occasion we could ... [the Councils] became a target" (5:1). Five of the eight policy formulators interviewed, gave 'cost saving' as one of the intentions behind the policy of dissolving the Councils.

Many of the senior bureaucrats interviewed supported the Minister's centralisation motive for the policy, which became even more evident when they were asked whether the policy aimed to delegate more authority to the colleges. A majority of respondents saw it as a matter of authority moving away from the colleges. These perceptions were further supported in the responses to a question on the perceived role of the Ministry after the abolition of the Councils. Responses included not only "the allocation of dollars" (5:4) but also "program direction" (4:5), and "we tend to ... concentrate an enormous amount on the evaluation or the assessment of programing methods within an institution" (5:4). These comments illustrate the amount of control which was assumed to be integral to their coordinating function.

Another important observation can be made from the responses of policy formulators on the Government initiative to abolish the Councils; after identifying their own perceived intentions, most affirmed that those intentions were being realised. Again, most responded in a way that clearly indicated that they did not anticipate any unforeseen negative effects from the implementation of this policy.
Most policy formulators interviewed indicated that they thought the reasons for abolishing the Councils were fairly effectively communicated to implementors. This policy initiative followed intense lobbying from Ministry staff, College Boards, professional administrators and interest groups, hence its announcement came as no surprise to those working in the college system. Furthermore, the communication of the policy intentions were seen to be of less importance than the Councils' demise. Nevertheless, in the governance of the college system the dissolution of the Councils required some movement of authority from the intermediary bodies to another agency or agencies, and so the communication linkages assumed an important role. Although the majority of policy formulators believed the reasons for the change were clearly communicated to policy implementors, no common agreement could be reached from implementors' perceptions on this point.

It was not easy for implementors to clarify whether or not consultation had taken place in the formative stages of this policy. Implementors certainly supported the notion that the Councils should be dissolved.

"We had been advising for a number of years and breathed a mighty sigh of relief when it actually happened, so consulting us on taking the decision wouldn't have been necessary" (11:2).

Another reported "I think the system was well aware of the problem and was quick to impose a rationale on the decision" (12:2). Nevertheless there was considerable support for the idea of replacing the three Councils with a single Council, either for
the whole college system or alternatively the whole post-secondary system in the province, which caused one interviewee to comment: "In the confusion of the few months that followed that legislation, there wasn't ever any attempt to explain or discuss. There certainly wasn't any prior consultation" (21:2).

Policy Formulators' Knowledge of the System
Interview responses revealed that whilst implementors had difficulty in identifying the policy formulators for this particular initiative, there was a general consensus that most officers in the Ministry were knowledgeable and well-informed on the college system; this view, but with less enthusiasm, was extended to the Minister but most implementors believed that other cabinet members and M.L.A.'s generally were not informed about the college system, and, as one respondent put it, there was a large "credibility gap" (13:13).

Ambiguity
No-one interviewed identified any ambiguity inherent in the Government's intention to abolish the three Councils, but detailed understanding of where the authority was to be redistributed was far from clear. There was no agreement between formulators and implementors on whether this policy clarified the delegation of responsibilities from Councils.

PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES
A wide variety of outcomes was seen as resulting from this policy. One that was evident from most interviews with
implementors, but perhaps most strongly in the case of those who hold membership on a College Board, was the increase in interaction between Boards and Ministry. "I think the biggest effect of the abolition of the Councils is that there was a much better interchange between Ministry and individual Boards" (17:1). This direct contact, however, was not always viewed with favour.

Now that the Councils have gone, the buffer has gone between institutions and the Government. I don't know whether the Government anticipated this, but now when funding is deficient, as it always seems to be, the responsibility is now perceived to rest more and more with the Government, whereas when the Councils were in place, they often served as lighting rods. So in a sense it's a healthier more honest relationship (21:12).

"It became easier, in my opinion, to sort out overall program processes and policies without the Councils, without having to satisfy three divergent Councils" (19:1).

Most policy implementors interviewed agreed that a major effect of this policy was to simplify the organisational structure for system governance. There was strong consensus that the demise of the Councils removed a layer of bureaucracy that was seen to hinder decision-making in the college system. When implementors were questioned on the most noticeable effects of this policy, the majority of observers referred either to a simplification of the organisational structure, or to the centralisation of decision-making in the Ministry. Several commented on both. Nevertheless, "the main effect was to remove a disintegrated pattern of decision-making" (11:1). Policy implementors at all levels tended to agree that
the most noticeable change was some clearing of the clutter of an administrative type, and of a decision-making type ... There was just so much confusion in the roles of the Councils, and so much upset over that, that any kind of smooth running of the operation just became impossible (20:1).

Another even more clearly-enunciated perception of the results of abolishing the three Councils was the shifting of authority from the Councils to the Ministry. Every policy implementor interviewed indicated that he/she saw a movement towards the centralisation of decision-making power in the Ministry office. Some stated that a limited degree of decision-making authority reverted to the colleges, or that no change occurred, but supporters of such news were a clear minority:

The first and most noticeable effect was that the powers that had previously been held by the Councils were distributed between the Minister on the one hand and the Boards of colleges on the other ... As it actually turned out, most of the effective power went to the Minister (14:1).

This quote conveys the perceived outcome for most of the implementors interviewed. Comments such as "I think that most of the authority that was housed in the four provincial Councils stayed at the provincial level" (12:3), and "the effect of it was taking all the decision-making back into the Ministry" (18:1), were typical of the thoughts expressed. There was clear evidence that the policy of eliminating the Councils was seen to have been effectively implemented. "I think it has been implemented effectively. I mean they [the Councils] just simply disappeared" (17:3). But not all implementors regarded the dissolution of the Councils as the essence of the policy. Many implementors' understanding of the policy outcomes could be expressed in this response: "The policy itself, which was to withdraw into the Ministry the decision-making role of the Boards, has been
completed to a 't'" (11:14), or as another respondent reported, there has been "the feeling of castration by many Board members ... We had real influence before, we don't have that much influence now ... The Boards are relatively powerless now" (14:8). Of those that perceived the most noticeable outcome as including a simplification of structure, some believed that several functions had been lost to the system. This had come about as follows:

1) The removal of all non-political bodies designed to discuss system problems.
   
   There was no body formed ... where I can take problems in a formal manner (15:1).

2) The removal of a lay body to advise on a system wide-basis.

   The Councils themselves provided an opportunity to bring people in who may not have been interested in the administration of a particular institution, and allow them to make a contribution to the system (4:9).

3) The removal of an agency that could assess programs.

   The Academic Council which was sort of looking after the nuts and bolts of transfer from colleges to university ... I don't think the Ministry picked up the ball on that and frankly I don't think colleges have ... I don't recall anything at the time saying that that would be one of the reasons for abolishing the Councils. I think it was just one of the things they said, well I just assumed somebody would look after it (13:6).

4) The removal of a body to which the Ministry was responsible.

   There was a sense in which ... the Councils ... called the Ministry a few times on blatant practices in the Ministry (20:3).


   The inertia of the Council system was both a blessing and a curse. It was a curse in that it really took a long time to change direction, longer than it needed to. On the other hand, because the Councils were made up largely of people who were independent of the Government ... [and] all three had capable people who went about their job in a thorough way, didn't always agree with all the decisions they [the Government] made ... I guess the old system was
less likely to make sudden changes ... less subject to direct political manipulation (19:8-9).

At least the Councils had some degree of autonomy from the Government and could make decisions that were not directly political decisions (21:2).

**SUMMARY OF POLICY TWO -- INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES**

**Documented Intentions**

Only two significant intentions were elicited from the documents, the major one being to dissolve the three Councils, the other to strengthen the Minister's authority and power in the governance structure.

**Perceived Intentions**

Policy formulators saw the abolition of the Councils as intending to ease the administrative load, to simplify the governance structure and to reduce duplication of work and inter-agency conflict. Other perceived intentions included the restating of authority roles and the centralisation of system decision-making in the Ministry, as well as the reduction of costs by eliminating the Councils. There was some support for the view that the policy was intended to transfer to the colleges some of the power held by Councils. The evidence supports the view that the Councils should have been abolished: "there was general concurrence ... that the Councils should go" (7:2).

**Communication Linkages**

Several aspects of the design of this policy are worthy of note. The communication of the reasons for the policy initiative was seen by policy formulators to be effective; but among
implementors an even split on the point meant that there was no general agreement. Consultation was not seen to have been effectively held, although many felt that consultation was not necessary because of the support all interest groups gave to the abolition of the Councils. Some doubt was expressed by administrators about the policy formulators' knowledge of the system. Respondents believed that there was no ambiguity in the policy statement on the dissolution of the Councils, but did not agree on the intention about where to locate delegated authority and responsibility. No incentives or sanctions for policy implementors were perceived to be intended or realised by system administrators.

Perceived Effects
The first obvious effect was the dissolution of the Councils. Policy implementors also testified to the simplification of the administrative structure of the system, and a more direct contact with the Ministry. There is strong evidence that implementors perceived as real policy outcomes the shift of decision-making authority to the Ministry office, and that some functions previously performed at the Council level had been lost to the system because of the dissolution of the Councils. System administrators suggested that the abolition of the Councils had reduced the cost of system governance.
### TABLE 10
**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY TWO**

**DOCUMENTED INTENTIONS**

- Dissolve Three Intermediary Councils
- Strengthen Authority & Power of Ministry

**PERCEIVED INTENTIONS**

- Ease Administrative Load & Simplify Governance Structure
- Restate Authority Roles
- Centralise Decision-Making
- Reduce Costs
- Delegate Some Council Powers to Colleges

**COMMUNICATION LINKAGES**

- Consultation Not Exercised Effectively
- Minimal Ambiguity
- Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised
- Some Doubt About Formulators’ Knowledge

**OUTPUTS**

- Abolition of Three Intermediary Councils
- Legislated Authority of Ministry Strengthened
- Simplified Administrative Structure

**PERCEIVED OUTCOMES**

- Costs of Governance Reduced
- More Direct Contact with Ministry
- Excessive Decision-Making Located in Ministry
- Some System Functions Lost

**CONCLUSIONS**

The second governance policy initiative to be examined revealed some quite different features from those of the previous policy. The documented intentions are far more precise, which is probably the result of specific legislation to communicate the policy. Its brevity and conciseness, however, failed to clarify the
important set of issues inherent in the redistribution of the authority previously held by the Councils. Indeed, within the conceptual framework developed for this research, the abolition of the Councils could be interpreted as an output, and the other effects as outcomes.

In relation to this policy, the communication link between policy formulators and implementors was not viewed in the same way by both parties, which probably reflects the lack of consultation on the policy formulation perceived by most administrators. Policy implementors expressed pleasure at the simplification of the governance structure, but concern that "most of the effective power went to the Minister" (14:1). The environmental influences seemed to have exerted pressures for centralised decision-making. That is to say, the financial constraints being experienced by the system were crucial in this development. This strong demand for increased economic control at the provincial level seemed to bring about an effect in the implementation of this policy which required the Government to exercise an authoritative role wherever there was doubt about the location of decision-making authority. Hence the intention noted in the Minister's letter (see p.126), even though the authority was already available through other legislation. Indeed the tendency to centralisation affected by the legislation and the energies expended by college administrators attempting to counter that movement, seem to have reduced the questioning of why functions have been lost to the system.
PART THREE

THE POLICY PROVIDING FOR THE GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENT OF ALL COLLEGE BOARD MEMBERS

The original amendment (1958) to the Public Schools Act which provided for the establishment, maintenance and operation of community colleges authorised the membership of college governing Councils to be composed almost exclusively of appointees of the 'cooperating' School Boards. The principal, who was appointed by the Council, the district superintendent of schools and two persons appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council were the only other members. In 1970 the college principal was removed from membership on the Board of his/her college. The number of Government appointments increased, but the School Board appointments were still in the majority. In 1973 the district superintendent of schools was removed, and in 1977, when the Colleges and Provincial Institutes Act was passed, the College Councils became corporations and were known as College Boards, but a majority of School Board appointees was maintained. A further amendment in 1980 shifted the balance: the Government now appointed the majority of governors. The policy decision to appoint all members of College Boards was made by the Government of B.C. in July 1983, and simultaneously the size of the Boards was reduced. Ninety-three School Board appointees were removed from office and the Government appointed fifty-four persons to replace them.

This, the third policy initiative to change the governance structure of the college system in B.C. has already been described as having been introduced by means of a number of
changes in legislation. In order to examine the perceived political outcomes of this policy, the report will again describe the documented intentions, the perceived intentions, the communication linkages between formulators and implementors, and then the outcomes perceived by implementors. A summary of the findings on this policy will then be presented and conclusions drawn.

**DOCUMENTED POLICY INTENTIONS**

The proclamation of the policy to abolish School Board appointees on the College Boards was contained in the same Bill 20 (1983B) which enunciated the previously-described policy initiative. The Bill simply states:

Section 6 is repealed and the following substituted:

**Appointments to boards of colleges**

6 The board of a college shall consist of 5 or more members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council (Minister of Education B.C., 1983B:2).

During the debate on this amendment, the Minister reported to the Legislative Assembly that:

It is our view that most of the rationale for having a school board trustee or an appointee by the school district on the board of a college is not really there any longer (Hansard, 1983:1367).

An intention was also expressed in the Minister's letter to a College Board Chairman indicating that the policy initiative aimed to stabilise numbers on College Boards. There had been complaints both of too many members, as was experienced in the Okanagan, and of too few, as in the Fraser Valley. The Minister
also declared that a reason for this change in the composition of College Boards was that "schools and school districts are no longer used as a vehicle for raising either capital or operating expenses" (Hansard, 1983:1367). They should no longer be represented on College Boards. However, as a spokesperson for the Opposition declared "I don't know who has convinced him [the Minister] that he should have this heavy hand over the colleges, but I think we have to consider that it is strictly a political move" (Hansard, 1983:1374).

**PERCEIVED POLICY INTENTIONS**

There was testimony offered to support the notion that the colleges had matured to a point where they were no longer dependent on School Boards. One respondent asserted "the primary reasons for doing it was that colleges could now stand on their own ... and be counted as independent entities" (4:12). This policy sought to give both College and School Boards distinctly separate constituencies.

Several respondents expressed the belief that functional reasons were not the primary motive behind this policy initiative, although most pointed to one or more functional difficulties before the policy was introduced: (a) overload of work for lay persons; (b) "the college evolution was being held back because of the constraints imposed by School Boards" (5:10); (c) size; and (d) the possibility of faculty being on the Board of their own or an adjoining college; all were given as possible reasons. However, the major intention perceived in this policy initiative
Policy Communication Linkages

Consultation and Communication

Policy formulators and implementors were asked if they believed that any consultation had occurred prior to the proclamation of the policy. Answers record an almost unanimous "absolutely none" (11:7). The only dissenter justified his difference of opinion by explaining, "it was no secret about what was in the wind" (13:8). Answers to the consultation question brought some of the most direct responses, ranging from a straight "no" (12:9), (17:4), to, "you're not going to consult with the opposition, to decide that you're going to eliminate the opposition" (14:12).

There was an element of surprise in respondents' reactions to the announcement of this change in governance structure. "It was announced one afternoon that it was done, so there was absolutely no consultation" (20:8). However, there was a keen awareness of the historical evolution of Board composition. Policy implementors were well aware of the links with the School Board trustees and the times when College Board members were predominantly School Board appointments. The majority of those interviewed recounted the changes from the inauguration of the
Colleges and Institutes Act, when School Board members held a majority of one, and subsequent amendments to the Act, which gave the Government appointees a majority of one.

Major Change or Threat

In the case of this policy it was clear to both formulators and implementors that no consultation took place prior to its proclamation. Despite the political nature of the policy initiative and the apparent lack of consultation, most of the Ministry officials did not perceive the policy as a major change to the system or a threat to implementors of the policy. Only one out of the eight policy formulators interviewed saw this policy as a major change or threat to the college governance system. Some believed that the implementation of the change was likely to be seen as a threat by others and at least two felt that the probability was still growing. "I think a number of people, on reflection of what's happened over the last couple of years, scratch their head, and wonder if it was the right decision" (8:17), was one forumulator's response; he also explained "I don't think it was seen as a threat by very many of the college administrators ... it didn't seem to be seen as terribly much of a threat by the faculty groups at the time, but it developed into that" (8:17).

Conversely, of the twelve policy implementors interviewed on this topic, ten perceived it as a threat to at least some of the system components, if not all. Comments such as the following, record these perceptions: "it was universally seen as a dramatic
change ... the vast majority of us saw it as a tragedy” (20:8-9), and "it certainly concerned interest groups, faculty, students, staff, community groups; also I feel fairly confident it affected administrators in the same way" (21:15). There was no suggestion that the policy statement was ambiguous, although there was a wide diversity of opinion as to its intent.

PERCEIVED POLICY OUTCOMES

Several questions were used in an attempt to assess implementors’ perceptions of the outcomes of this policy. Questions were posed soliciting ‘key factors’, perceived ‘changes to the framework’ of system decision-making and ‘unforeseen effects’. Implementors gave conflicting reasons why this policy might have been introduced. There were some implementors who identified with the policy formulators’ perceived intention, that “the colleges had matured” (13:8), "the colleges had come of age and didn’t have to depend on School Boards for their input" (18:4).

Again the link with scarce fiscal resources was made by many; in that the provincial Government was providing most of the establishment and operating costs of colleges. Implementors perceived the Ministry would want to be able to hold Boards accountable for their fiscal management. There was again a recognition that Government wanted to be able to implement provincial economic policies through the College system. Implementors regarded changing the composition of College Board membership as one method the Government believed would provide for the more effective achievement of this objective.
Another interesting result that could have political repercussions was suggested by one respondent who said:

one of the effects of the change has been a rapid infusion of new people to Boards in the system, and as a result a need for them to learn the background of the system, how it operates, and to understand the complexities of it ... I think one of the biggest difficulties is that people have been appointed to Boards without any prior exposure to a governance structure (19:12).

An outcome of a similar nature was the upheaval it created in the executive committee of the B.C.A.C. One implementor observed:

starting from the provincial level, it decimated the B.C. Association of Colleges ... the key positions at the provincial level on the B.C.A.C. were ... School Board people ... so it sapped the B.C.A.C. from the perspective of just the manpower issue for a while (20:9-10).

Another implementor warned that one result might be that if the Government changed, and the new Minister's 'pleasure' did not coincide with that of the previous office bearer, there could be a one hundred per cent change in college governors.

Arguments were offered for and against the perception that Boards had now become more political, but there was clearly a predominance of those who believed "there has been an increased politicisation of Boards having all one clear political orientation" (12:10):

The Government will say we wanted a cross-section of people, and that we're appointing people who are committed to education, and it's not political. But you look at the appointments, particularly those that have been made since the [policy has been announced] and I guarantee that you'll find no N.D.P. You'll find very few women, you'll find no representation from cultural minorities ... you'll find no representation from people on welfare ... you will predominantly find male Government supporters in business (20:17-18).

Conversely, others have not perceived all the effects as adverse. "It's been a strange and unexpected consequence that our Board has become much more sensitive to the need of articulating with
the school districts" (12:10).

I suggest that if they [the Board members] took an aggressive private criticism of the Government, that would be more effective. I know that Board members who have close connections with Cabinet Ministers and other people in Government will go and talk to them in the privacy of their own offices ... that's probably more effective (12:12-13).

The political outcomes perceived by policy implementors are best described by summarising comments as shown in Table Eleven. It can be seen that all but one of the twelve implementors believed that there were strong political outcomes on the governance of the college system. This view is supported by newspaper articles such as the Nanaimo Daily Free Press and the Nanaimo Times, which both reported a call by the Nanaimo N.D.P. association for the resignation of the Malaspina College Board. Both newspapers reported the president of the local N.D.P. and College Board member, as saying "an appointed board simply doesn't work. It is not responsible to the people of Nanaimo but to the government which appointed it" (Nanaimo Times, May 8,1986). Again the Ubyssey featured a front page story quoting the President of the C.I.E.A. as saying "increased government involvement in the administration of B.C.'s colleges is transforming them into 'the economic and political tools of the government'" (The Ubyssey, October 21,1986).

SUMMARY OF POLICY THREE -- INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES

Documented Intentions

The documents examined revealed three prime intentions.

1. The Government would appoint all College Board members.

2. School Board appointees would no longer be on College Boards.
TABLE 11

SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTORS' COMMENTS ON THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S APPOINTING ALL COLLEGE BOARD MEMBERS

"Boards have been less active spokesmen for the colleges ... they are elected by [a] local political party caucus" (11:8).

"There has been an increased politicisation of Boards, having all one clear political orientation" (12:10).

"The appointees have been a bit more political than expected ...[they] see their function as representing the Government's or Cabinet's interests" (13:10).

"This way you can be more assured of the loyalty of the Board Members and the willingness of the Board to be able to operate consistent with provincial policy" (14:10).

"It's made the game part of the same polarisation in this province that exists about most other things, which is to say it becomes very much a political game then ... colleges in certain areas clearly tend to get favourable decisions made involving money, and others don't" (15:7).

"In this context ... I think this Government is a highly authoritarian agency, it is almost beyond the bounds of democracy ... it was just part of this Government's determination to be in total control of anything and everything" (16:18-19).

"It was seen as removing the community input into Boards and certainly making them political people rather than community people" (17:4).

"Some people who are appointed have a very strong political bias, or should I say party bias, and they would not speak out against anything the Government proposed, whether it would benefit or harm the college system". (18:5).

"The system is probably less critical than it has been in the past, of Government and Government actions" (19:13).

"The narrower band of discussion ... the definite lack of representation of large segments of the population, the sense of where the signals come from for Board members, in so many cases now it's a signal from the provincial M.L.A., or from the party perspective" (20:11).

"Boards have become much more a part of Government in the sense that when proposals go forward from colleges to the Ministry, we really have a relationship between two parts of the same thing" (21:18).

"It clearly makes it easier for the Government to initiate changes at the administrative level, but I don't believe that the change in the college system had any effect on their operations" (22:10).
3. The size and composition of College Boards would be stabilised.

Perceived Intentions

Respondents considered that there was not the same degree of support from either policy formulators or implementors for this policy as there was with the previous two policies. Ministry officials reported that they saw it as a political decision, but that the colleges, even so, were no longer dependent on the School Boards, and that the policy was intended to resolve functional difficulties, which manifested themselves both in size and composition. System administrators also perceived that this policy intended to curb public criticism of the Government policies on education.

Communication Linkages

It was shown that policy formulators agreed with implementors that no consultation had occurred prior to the proclamation of this policy. Those in the Ministry office perceived the policy did not initiate major change in the governance of the system, but almost all implementors viewed it as intending to provide a significant change. Policy formulators did not perceive the policy statement as ambiguous, but considered it to contain a wide variety of intentions. No incentives or sanctions were perceived to have been exercised when implementing this policy.

Perceived Effects

Policy implementors noted many effects from this policy. First was the obvious policy effect that the composition of the Boards
did change, as did their size, which by definition must be termed an output. A second and associated effect was the sudden influx of new governors, which can be termed an outcome. However, the strongest comments received indicated a perceived outcome was the politicisation of the Boards, which was expressed in a variety of ways. Administrators believed a threat to the system existed. If the Government changed there was a possibility that all college governors would also change. Policy implementors perceived that the orientation toward local community had been significantly depreciated by the changes in College Board appointments.

CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that this policy was introduced with the least amount of consultation and communication. As with the previous policy expressed through legislation, there appeared little ambiguity in the statement, and the major thrust of the policy, seems to have been effectively implemented. However, this policy seems to have created the largest amount of dissention among administrators, and probably because of the apparent attempt to smother political criticism which had been seen to emanate from School Board members and School Board groups. A threat has emerged from the perceived problems inherent in a change of Government, when all Board members could be replaced. Furthermore, the seeming loss of community orientation in college governance is also perceived as a threat. This policy produced more political agitation than the others, and claims were made that it threatens the democracy of college governance.
TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS RELATED TO POLICY THREE

COMMUNICATION LINKAGES

Consultation Not Exercised
Minimal Ambiguity
Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practiced

OUTPUTS

Government Appoints All College Board Members
School Board Appointees Eliminated
Stabilised Size & Composition of College Boards

PERCEIVED OUTCOMES

Influx of New College Governors
College Boards Politically Partisan
Threat Emerging with Change of Government
Community Orientation Lost

OUTPUTS

Government Appoints All College Board Members
School Board Appointees Eliminated
Stabilise Size & Composition of College Boards

PERCEIVED OUTCOMES

Influx of New College Governors
Partisan Politics in College Boards
Threat Emerging with Change of Government
Loss of Community Orientation
NOTES ON CHAPTER FIVE

1. The original draft of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement was developed in the Ministry office and circulated to colleges in February 1982. The policy document used for this research, was dated March, 1983.

2. The reference to the fourth Council made by this respondent was to the ad hoc committee located in the Ministry office, who were responsible for the distribution of funds and the coordination of continuing education programs throughout the province.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter sums up the purposes of the study, the methodology employed and the principal findings, which are organised under the headings of the three policies examined. In connection with each finding some appropriate analysis is offered. The four major conclusions reached from the study are summarised, together with discussions in support of each conclusion. Implications which arise from the study are organised under three categories, specifically for the field of practice, for the body of theory appropriate to the study and for the methodology employed in the gathering of data. Finally, a number of suggestions are made for further research arising from the study.

SUMMARY

The Purposes of the Research

The major purpose of the study was to determine how administrators in community colleges in B.C. perceive the implementation of three recent provincial Government policies concerned with governance of the college system. For the purposes of the study the architects of the policies, the Minister of Education and his staff, are referred to as the policy formulators, while the administrators at various levels of the college system are referred to as policy implementors. A subsidiary purpose, in accord with current theory on policy implementation, was to determine what discrepancies, if any, exist between the realised intent of the policy, as revealed in the stated and reported perceptions of the formulators, and the
outcomes of the policies as perceived by the implementors.

The Method Employed

The research was designed on the basis of Yin's (1985) case study method incorporating Guba and Lincoln's (1981) naturalistic paradigm. Interviews were conducted with a sample of system administrators including the relevant Minister of Education, a past and the then current Assistant Deputy Minister of Education, Ministry directors and senior officers, College Board chairmen and members, college principals and directors, and senior officers of other major interest groups. In order to establish perceived intentions, interviews were conducted with those most closely associated with the formulation of the policies. These were coupled with the documented intentions to provide what is called, in this study, the policy intentions. A second round of interviews was then conducted with those involved in the implementation of the policies in order to establish policy outputs and perceived policy outcomes. An analysis of both relevant documents and interview transcripts provided the basic data on which the findings are based.

The findings which follow will include discussion of the outcomes of the three policies as perceived by implementors, the discrepancies between intentions and outcomes where these discrepancies were found and an analysis of the foregoing based upon the evidence found.

The Findings

The major findings of each policy are summarised in the previous
chapter after reporting the analysis. These are collated and again presented below in Table Thirteen, which represents a collation of Tables Eight, Ten and Twelve. It includes the intentions of each policy as determined from the documentary evidence obtained, the intentions as perceived by formulators of the policies, the communication linkages between formulators and implementors as perceived, the outputs and the outcomes of the policies as perceived by the implementors.

**TABLE 13**

**SUMMARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS FINDINGS**

**DOCUMENTED INTentions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY 1</th>
<th>POLICY 2</th>
<th>POLICY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Emphasis on Provincial/ National Economic &amp; Manpower Needs</td>
<td>Dissolve Three Intermediary Councils</td>
<td>Government to Appoint All College Board Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for Long Term &amp; Short Term Planning</td>
<td>Strengthen Authority &amp; Power of Ministry</td>
<td>Eliminate School Board Appointees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain 3 Levels of Decision-Making Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stabilise Size &amp; Composition of College Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation to be Practised at all Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PERCEIVED INTentions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY 1</th>
<th>POLICY 2</th>
<th>POLICY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Define &amp; Clarify Respective Roles of Agencies in System</td>
<td>Ease Administrative Load &amp; Simplify Governance Structure</td>
<td>Resolve Functional Difficulties - Size &amp; Membership of Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Framework for Consultation &amp; System Planning</td>
<td>Restate Authority Roles</td>
<td>Curb Public Criticism of Government by School Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centralise Decision-Making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce Costs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delegate Some Council Powers to Colleges</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### COMMUNICATION LINKAGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY 1</th>
<th>POLICY 2</th>
<th>POLICY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extensive Consultation Exercised</td>
<td>Consultation Not Exercised Effectively Consultation Not Exercised</td>
<td>Extensive Ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive Ambiguity</td>
<td>Minimal Ambiguity</td>
<td>Minimal Ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Change or Threat Not Intended</td>
<td>Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised</td>
<td>Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives/Sanctions Not Included or Practised</td>
<td>Some Doubt About Formulators' Knowledge</td>
<td>Some Doubt About Formulators' Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulators' Knowledge Sufficiently Broad</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
<td>OUTPUTS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY 1</th>
<th>POLICY 2</th>
<th>POLICY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Intentions Completely Realised</td>
<td>Abolition of Three Intermediary Councils</td>
<td>Government Appoints All College Board Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislated Authority of Ministry Strengthened.</td>
<td>School Board Appointees Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simplified Administrative Structure</td>
<td>Stabilised Size &amp; Composition of College Boards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OUTPUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY 1</th>
<th>POLICY 2</th>
<th>POLICY 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions Align with Provincial Mission Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry Not Constrained by Policy</td>
<td>Costs of Governance Reduced</td>
<td>Influx of New College Governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Consultation for Provincial Policies Exercised</td>
<td>More Direct Contact with Ministry</td>
<td>College Boards Politically Partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excessive Decision-Making Located in Ministry</td>
<td>Threat Emerging with Change of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some System Functions Lost</td>
<td>Community Orientation Lost</td>
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Although Dunsire does not use the term outcome and output in the same way as this report, he nevertheless notes that they rarely correspond when policies are translated into action:

Government (or other policy makers) may devise a policy to solve a problem, meaning that they envisage an output from governmental agencies which, if produced, would in their estimation solve it; but it is common experience that the output actually produced is not that which was envisaged (1978:18).

This study has shown that the policy intentions documented and perceived by the formulators do not necessarily closely align with the policy outputs. It also reveals that the outcomes perceived by policy implementors do not equate with the outputs determined for each policy. Furthermore, the study shows that administrators' perceptions of policy outcomes may be an important variable influencing the implementation of the policies (see 170).

Policy 1 - System Mission, Goals, and Objectives

1.1 The findings of the research as summarised in Table Thirteen indicate that no significant changes were perceived to occur in the governance of the system as a result of the policy, even though the perceived intentions of the policy formulators were not altogether incongruous with those of the documented intentions. This can perhaps be best explained when we note that the written policy statement revealed that most of the intentions related to governance required some direct or indirect action by the Minister or Ministry. The action later, however, tended to bear no relation to the policy once it was proclaimed.

1.2 In retrospect, it is apparent that information concerning provincial/national economic and manpower needs, essential
elements in future program planning, was not made known to the colleges. The colleges were therefore unable to include programs within their five year plans that would address specific manpower needs. Although there are a number of implications for curriculum development in this finding, the significance for this research lies in the lack of effective communication between policy formulators and implementors, a phenomenon upon which many previous scholars of policy implementation have focussed (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Weatherly & Lipskey, 1977; Berman, 1978; Elmore, 1978; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979; and Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980). The research also suggests that the exercise of politics, at individual and interest group levels, influenced the implementation effects.

1.3 Planning by colleges for the long-term and short-term was judged to have been ignored by the Ministry when new provincial programs, such as 'Training Access', the 'Local Economic Renewal Development Grant', and the 'Fund for Excellence in Education', were introduced. Administrators believed that no reference was made to the colleges' integrated planning documents when proposals considered under these schemes were rejected or accepted. Indeed, it was suggested by one implementor that the college 'Five year plans' "may not have been read by people in the Ministry" (21:22). Another respondent reported:

I have sent in ... annual reports, ... five year plans, ... institutional evaluations, ... and all of those things have places in them when you're talking about system ideas. I've never had one question, or one response to any of those things (20:15).

1.4 The policy intention of maintaining three levels of
decision-making responsibility in the system, that is the Ministry, the Council or Councils and the College Boards, was abandoned by the Minister when he subsequently recommended the dissolution of the Councils. The demise of the Councils was initiated just a few months after the formal policy statement on their retention was issued. With respect to this effects, all respondents observed a number of signals that could help explain the implementors’ perceptions. The respondents expressed their alarm that the Minister had not consulted them on the elimination of this level of decision-making, even though most administrators strongly supported the dismantling of the existing governance structure. System administrators were also aware of the resultant strengthening of the Minister’s authority, which enabled him to amend Legislation at reasonably short intervals. Finally, the failure to implement a policy generated by the Ministry office was perceived as a lack of commitment to that policy, and this was interpreted further as a signal to disregard other aspects of the policy statement.

1.5 The failure of the Minister to consult other decision-making levels of system governance in relation to the composition of College Boards also fell short of realising the stated aims of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy initiative. This may well have resulted from a deficiency in the policy design. The Minister has the legal means to delegate authority for system governance to whichever agencies he considers appropriate. It would have perhaps been wiser not to include a consultation mechanism for making decisions which so clearly rested with the office of the Minister (see 1.7).
1.6 The perception that extensive consultation in the policy formulation process had taken place (see p.113), that the policy was expressed in a formal written statement and not limited by the constraints of legislation, that the policy was not perceived by formulators or implementors to offer a major change or threat to present college autonomy and that all respondents considered the policy formulators to have an adequate knowledge of the college system (see Table 6:114), are all considered by previous analysts to provide for more effective implementation (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Bardach, 1977; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; and Brewer & deLeon, 1983). However, these were perceived to be of little or no consequence when compared with the Minister's failure to comply with a policy which he had initiated.

1.7 Interviewees expressed some doubt about the need to include governance in a Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement, given that the delegation of authority and responsibility is the prerogative of the relevant Minister (see 1.5), and should, as many administrators believed, not be considered a system Mission, Goal, or Objective. It should also be noted that respondents viewed the Mission, Goals, and Objectives policy as the most ambiguous of the three governance policies in question, and this may have also contributed to the implementors' perceptions of outcomes. One respondent's comment may well reflect the attitude of most implementors:

That's one of the reasons we don't mind it [the Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement], it allows you, within the limits of the resources available, to do whatever you want (20:14).

1.8 The implementation of the policy on Mission, Goals, and
Objectives was perceived by administrators as neither relocating nor changing the authority or responsibility of actors in the college system (see 1.6). Administrators were inclined to feel that the Minister's disregard for the policy contributed to a depreciation in its value as a policy document. It can also be seen that implementors were in a position to influence the effects of this policy. In a recent independent study conducted by Dennison, where it was concluded that "the strong feeling in the college community that the Ministry paid little attention to individual college plans, but responded to its own 'system' plan" (1986A:13), accords with the findings of this research.

Policy 2 - The Abolition of The Three Intermediary Councils

2.1 There was no disagreement that the documented intent of the policy of abolishing the three intermediary Councils was realised. The Councils were dissolved by legislation.

2.2 The documented intention to strengthen the authority of the Ministry was realised in-as-much as policy implementors confirmed that the responsibility and powers authoritatively allocated to the Councils reverted, in the main, to the Ministry (see p.133).

2.3 Policy formulators noted the existence of a number of undocumented intentions in this policy initiative (see Table 9:130), and those too were realised in part, despite the lack of consultation, the lack of stated incentives or sanctions and the implementors' expressed doubt about the policy formulators' knowledge of the system. The cost of operating the Councils was dispensed with, and the increase in Ministry staff was minimal.
2.4 Policy implementors perceived that the system's administrative structure was simplified as a result of this policy, in that there was more direct contact between the Boards and the Ministry. However, this more direct link between college administrators and Ministry officials was seen to have both positive and negative consequences. The majority of respondents indicated approval and support for the more direct and more frequent interchange between the Ministry and the colleges, because it gave less scope for communication distortion. However, the Government is constantly under attack from the Opposition on the Legislature and its supporters, because there is no buffer agency between Government and the colleges. In view of the public nature of the community college system, all major decisions, and certainly policies initiated by the Government, are seen as partisan and so invite public criticism from opposition interest groups.

2.5 The increased proportion of funding for colleges provided by the provincial Government was perceived by policy formulators to imply a commensurate shift in accountability. System administrators perceived that such an intended shift in authority has been realised. This in turn reduced the significance of the community orientation on the basis of which the colleges were founded.

2.6 Because of the overwhelming support for the Councils' demise, expressed by all respondents, the necessity for consultation on the formulation of this policy seemed to be reduced. However, many expressed the view that a single Council
was, and still is, required in the governance structure of the system. That no such body was established was seen to result from the lack of consultation between College Boards and the policy formulators and the exercise of self-interested political behaviour.

2.7 Respondents also expressed the view that some functions formerly carried out by the Councils, and seen as important to the system, had been lost during the implementation of this policy (see p.136). It was claimed that there was now inadequate provision for professional associations and the like to influence course and program details at a provincial system level. The Ministry office has not established a suitable organisational structure to provide for commercial and industrial liaison on such matters for the whole province. It was also held that the Councils had acted as an independent scrutineer of Ministry decisions and actions, and that no agency was seen to fill the same role in the new governance structure. As one respondent from the Ministry observed:

Some of the functions performed by the Councils: taking a second look at things; providing an independent examination of certain kinds of issues; making sure that certain programs for us were examined; in fact, ought to have been taken on by someone (4:8).

2.8 The implementation of this policy was seen to produce the greatest shift of authority from the Councils to the Ministry. The research revealed that much of the Councils’ decision-making authority could not easily be delegated to colleges, but the Ministry office was perceived to have increased its decision-making capacity beyond what implementors believed was necessary.
3.1 The documented intentions of this policy initiative were essentially realised in-as-much as the Government, since the policy was declared, has appointed all College Board members. The cooperating School Boards do not make any appointments. One other result of this policy was that in some regions of the province the number of College Board members was reduced.

3.2 The first perceived intention recorded in Table Thirteen aligned with one of the documented intentions and was seen to be implemented effectively. However, implementors did not agree in their perceptions of the effects of the intention to limit the public criticism of Government as expressed by School Board representatives. This phenomenon might best be explained by noting that implementors did not perceive College Boards as initiating any political pressure prior to the policy change. As one respondent put it:

At the time the decision was made, the Government was getting a lot of heat from trustees, individually and from the B.C.S.T.A., as an organisation, questioning the wisdom of their policies in the public school system. I think Government feared that the trustees involved with College Boards might use that other forum as another base for a political attack ... They've been burned in a number of other situations ... but I don't think they've ever been burned by College Boards or by this Association [B.C. Association of Colleges] (19:10-24).

3.3 Even though there was consensus that no consultation between policy formulators and implementors took place on this initiative (see p.144), and no incentives or sanctions were written into the policy statement, this policy was seen to have been effectively implemented. This success can best be measured in terms of the effectiveness of the policy in achieving the stated intentions.
3.4 Many administrators saw the effects as partisan in nature and as representing neither local community nor provincial interests (see Table 11:149). In a recent Institutional Evaluation of the Vancouver Community College it was reported that frequent mention was made of the fact that, with the change in the way Board members are appointed, a distinctly narrower spectrum of the community was represented on the Board (V.C.C., Institutional Evaluation Interim Report, 1986:9).

An explanation for these perceptions might be found in the hostile environment reported in Chapter Four, where it was shown that the economic and political climate in which the policies were initiated was such as to invite more direct provincial Government control. This centralising pressure was strongly resisted at the college level, because it was perceived as being a departure from the historic nature of colleges in B.C. Evidence for the reality of this resistance may be found in Hollick-Kenyon's (1979) doctoral dissertation on college coordination.

This policy involved the strongest perceived political interference with the governance of the college system. This observation is supported by implementors' responses to the question: "In what ways would you encourage the system to change its governance structure?" Eight of the twelve policy implementors suggested changing the composition of College Boards. Again, it is suggested that because implementors saw this policy as politically motivated, they believed that College Board membership was not representative of the community at large. The fact that appointments were 'at the Minister's
pleasure' also implied that party political selection and consideration of political allegiance were influential in the choice of appointees. Administrators indicated that they believed in the importance of the role of the Board in the system's governance, and many expressed the hope that authority would be restored to broadly representative Boards in the future.

3.5 Another of the outcomes of this policy was perceived to be the sudden large turnover of College Board members (see pp.147). The new members had initially required considerable orientation both formal and informal to their role. This closely paralleled another perception of policy outcomes which emerged, namely the threat to the stability of the system arising from the possibility of a sudden introduction of so many new Board members. Were the Government of B.C. to change and invoke 'the Minister's pleasure', administrators feared that this could bring about a major change in Board membership in a very short space of time.

CONCLUSIONS
This research has been a case study bound by time and place. Generalisable conclusions cannot be drawn from it. However, the following conclusions could serve as hypotheses for future generalisable research, which in turn will assist in unravelling "what the important variables are in implementation processes" (Hargrove,1975:13). Four major conclusions from this study will be discussed in this section, the first three relate to the primary purpose of the study and the fourth related to the
subsidiary purpose. First, the governance structure was seen by all levels to be simplified. Second, administrators saw the centralisation of decision-making in the Ministry office as a negative outcome. Third, administrators' responses revealed an apparent relationship between the perceived intentions of the policy and the perceived policy outcomes despite the difference of perceived intentions. Finally, it can be concluded from this study that there is a need for the strengthening of mutual trust between policy actors.

1. **Simplification of the System Governance Structure**

Administrators at all decision-making levels of the system believed that a major outcome of implementing the three governance policies under study was a more simplified and efficient governance structure. Those who were closest to the formulation of the policies perceived them as clarifying what was seen as (1) a confusing and unmanageable tangle of decision-making agencies, (2) centralising decision-making in the Ministry and (3) establishing a governance framework for the community colleges within which the provincial Government policies would be more effectively planned and pursued. Indeed, one intention clearly perceived by both policy formulators and implementors was the pursuit of a more simplified governance structure for the college system. The greatest impetus to this change came from the abolition of the Councils, but more was given by the ending of School Board appointments to the College Boards.

2. **Centralisation of Decision-Making**

It was the view of a majority of implementors that authority had
shifted during the implementation of these policies in the direction of the Ministry office, and that most of this movement took place as a result of the dissolution of the three Councils. One way to view the findings of this study is to suggest that provincial policies on college governance do influence the location of decision-making authority within the system, but that administrators perceive the location of that authority in different ways. Even though the design variables and communication linkages do not satisfy the criteria which other scholars have identified as important in optimising effective implementation, the perceived centralised decision-making output did coincide with the documented and perceived intentions of at least two of the policies.

Formulators also perceived that the governance policy initiatives were intended to provide colleges with a high degree of autonomy in strictly educational matters. However, most implementors claimed that these intentions, had in the main, not been realised. A possible explanation of this lack of correspondence lies in the economic environment in which these policies were implemented, (see p.80ff) and the Government’s perceived need to reduce the extent to which community colleges exercised authority.

It must also be acknowledged that the implementation of these policies, together with some previous Government decisions on funding, were seen by system administrators as even stronger reasons for shifting the centre of authority to the Ministry.
Although this study did not attempt to analyse the effects of the 'Formula Funding' policy of the B.C. Government upon the colleges, the issue of formula funding and financial restraint was prominent in all the discussions (see Table 3:82).

3. Policy Design - Relationship of Perceived Intent and Perceived Outcomes

This study suggests that an individual's perception of the intent of a policy will be reflected in his/her perception of the outcomes. Brewer and deLeon make reference to the importance and scope of policy intentions:

One can see that a decision is laden with intention - about objectives and goals, instrumental means, and timing and sequencing of events. Aspects of political communication are inextricably bound with each intentional element (1983:221).

There were considerable variations among the elements in the formulation, communication and timing of the three policies examined in this study. Previous research indicates that these elements, often called 'design variables', have a significant influence upon implementors' interpretation and commitment to policy initiatives (see Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Hargrove, 1975; Bardach, 1977; Elmore, 1978; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; and Brewer & deLeon, 1983). In this study both formulators and implementors of policies expressed the view that what they saw as the intentions of the policies were being realised, despite the variation in their views of the intentions and despite the differences in the ways in which the three policies were communicated and formulated. This phenomenon occurred so frequently that it appears worthwhile for further research to be
undertaken in order to find out why.

4. A Need for Trust Between Policy Formulators and Implementors

The analysis of respondents' comments revealed a clear expression of mistrust between the government and various interest groups including the colleges and the influence that this lack of trust was seen to have upon the policy intentions and the policy outcomes. The frequency with which a lack of trust among major interest groups arose suggests that administrators' perceptions may well have been influenced by their association with particular groups of stake-holders. Furthermore, the administrators' relationship with one or another interest group may well cause other observers to identify them with the agenda of that group. Appendix Eight summarises some of the concern expressed about the lack of trust. It may be argued that these 'perceptions of implementors', or the broader term 'disposition' as used by Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and Mintzberg (1983), reflect implementors' own values, which in turn are converted into action or inaction as a result.

Expressions of mistrust suggest that there is a difference of opinion as to where the authority actually lies, confirming some of the assumptions on which Baldridge's (1971) power/political model is based, where he suggests governance is based on the plurality of interest in post-secondary education administration. They also suggest that much of the negotiation during the implementation of policies is motivated by the perceived association of actors with the values of particular interest groups. It might well be the case that future studies will
analyse the degree to which policies are effectively implemented when related to the amount of mutual trust between actors in the policy process. This conclusion could also be viewed as an important implication for future policies between Government and colleges.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Hargrove suggests some guidance for practitioners when he writes: "Policy research upon implementation should be prescriptive in its capacity to suggest means for improving the delivery of services" (1975:45). There are several explanations of the findings of this study that provide useful implications for practitioners. These, together with some additional contribution to the body of knowledge relating to the policy process, particularly implementation, are set out in this section.

**Implications for Practice**

1. Administrators need to examine whether the simplified governance structure can be maintained and whether at the same time those functions lost to the system, if considered necessary, can be restored. In view of the first conclusion of this research, that the governance of the college system was seen to be simplified, system administrators need to take cognisance of some of the outcomes which follow from this conclusion. Administrators at all levels expressed the view that some functions had been lost to the system as a result of implementing the policy of abolishing the Councils (see 2.7:164).
2. In a similar manner, policy formulators should examine the consequences of the perceived centralisation of decision-making in the Ministry office, which was identified in the second conclusion of this research. Questions must be asked about the role of College Boards if this perception of administrators is an indication of reality. Indeed, does this perceived shift in decision-making authority represent a shift in direction for college objectives? Does the word 'community' take on a different nuance when used to characterise a certain type of post-secondary institution in B.C.? Policy formulators need to ask the question, whether the gain in organisational efficiency, particularly as reflected in conclusion one and two of this research, has been offset by the loss of local community persons, both lay and professionals, involved in the governance of community colleges. Housego and Downey noted, in terms of the school sector, "to strive for efficiency in government is not necessarily to centralize. On the contrary, decentralization can result in efficiencies as worthy as those achieved through centralization" (1985:3). In light of the above, policy formulators should examine the role politics play in the redistribution of authority.

3. Many administrators, both policy formulators and implementors, find the present control by the Minister and the Ministry to be far too partisan. Even though several respondents expressed the view that the Government appointment of College Board members was being practised in a responsible way, others perceived this form of governance to be partisan, and therefore subject to abuse. Whilst the policy intention in the case of
Policy Three was realised, policy formulators at the provincial Government level should note that the outcomes in this case are less than acceptable to the implementors. Centralisation of decision-making has provided a degree of efficiency not available under the previous governance structure, but at the cost of losing community involvement in decision-making.

The writer anticipates that there will be continued agitation to modify this policy so as to accommodate the perceptions of policy implementors with respect to the partisan political nature of the present governance structure. Colleges require a greater devolution of decision-making authority. The spectre of Government using the funding and operation of the college system for partisan political purposes to attract votes, rather than in the pursuit of educational objectives, looms large in the eyes of many policy implementors. While this condition continues there seems little hope of reaching stability in the community college system.

4. Irrespective of how a policy is constructed, those responsible for its formulation might well assess and consider how its intent is perceived by those who will be responsible for its implementation, if the policy is to be realised. It appears that whatever the accuracy of that perception, it is this perception which is seen to be realised. If, for example, the government appointment of all College Board members is perceived to be a partisan political act, whatever the future actions of the Board, they will inevitably be perceived as fulfilling that
end. Furthermore, if successful implementation of policies depends upon the support of implementors, then policy formulators might well attempt to narrow the apparent gap between implementors' and formulators' perceived intentions.

5. The value of communicating policy objectives is not to be underestimated. When policy objectives are not effectively communicated from policy formulators to policy implementors, the intentions of the policy are less likely to be realised. Van Meter and Van Horn observe:

The delivery of public services will be influenced by the manner in which standards and objectives are communicated to implementors and the standards and objectives have their indirect impact on the disposition of implementors through inter-organizational communication activities. Clearly implementors' responses to the policy will be based, in part, on their perceptions and interpretations of its objectives (1975:474).

System administrators need to address a resolution to conclusion number four of this study. Questions such as: How can the mutual trust of all participants in the policy process be improved? How can a greater degree of openness of policy planning be integrated with system governance? How can participants in the implementation process be involved in the policy formulation process? and How does the mobilisation of political behaviour by administrators influence the redistribution of authority? Finally when examining communication linkages with respect to the fidelity of implementation, policy makers should recognise the salience of political models. In other words, a plausible explanation of the apparent gap between policy intentions and policy outcomes can perhaps be more adequately described by analysing the exercise of political
linkages employed throughout this study. Pfeffer suggests "the political model presumes that parochial interests and preferences control choice" (1981:22). The power/political model developed by Baldridge (1971) alerts readers to the importance of the concept of 'conflict' in the communication process, and Hill describes the communication process as 'bargaining politics' (1983:72). Lindblom writes "pursuasion stands as a fundamental feature of all political systems" (1980:30). This observation has both practical and theoretical implications for students of the policy process and the politics of implementation.

Implications for Theory

This study confirms the position held by Nakamura and Smallwood who submit that effective implementation of policies in organisations depends on "communication linkages that exist within, and between, the different environments and outside the system" (1980:27-28). Recent analysts of policy implementation suggest that when documented intentions and perceived intentions correspond, the planned output is more likely to be realised. In this study, the intentions expressed in the policy documents were not always congruent with the formulators' perceived intentions. However, it is surprising that the planned outputs were not perceived to be realised for Policy One. But for Policies Two and Three, where documented and perceived intentions did not correspond so closely, the planned outputs were seen to be realised. This supports the view that places the emphasis on the importance of context in the analysis of implementation. A plausible explanation emerges when the communication linkage
between policy formulators and policy implementors is more closely examined.

This triad of policies indicates that those expressed through legislation were the most effectively implemented. Many theorists have observed that the proclamation of policy through legislation is fraught with problems. This could be explained by observing the limited extent to which those policies expressed through legislation could be modified during implementation. Therefore, the importance of considering the environment in which the policies were implemented in relation to the communication of those policies, whether or not through legislation, must be taken into account.

The phenomena identified by previous scholars as important variables of policy implementation should not be viewed in isolation. There is evidence in this study to suggest that the variables should rather be considered in conjunction with one another, and that those variables should be compared with the potential leeway as perceived by implementors. This is perhaps best demonstrated by comparing the results of this research with the view put forward by Bardach (1977), that implementor decisions are taken more on an individual level than is the case during policy formulation, where the formation of coalitions is predominant. Such a view is not supported by this research. Rather, the individual perceptions of implementors seem to be related to both their hierarchical position within the system and the interest group with which they are associated. In the context of this research, these phenomena can usefully be viewed
as sub-systems or para-systems in Easton's terms, where the particular interest group seek[s] to instill in its members a high level of diffuse support in order that regardless of what happens the members will continue to be bound by strong ties of loyalty and affection (Easton, 1965:124).

This supports the work of Lowi (1964), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and others who suggest that "the implementation process will vary depending on the nature of the policy to be carried out" (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975:458)

Implications for Methodology

In general terms, it appears that the use of the case method has much to offer research into policy implementation. Furthermore, the use of interviews from which to compile data has emerged again as a powerful research tool, particularly when one considers the high-ranking office of the respondents from whom answers were obtained. But there are a number of methodological alternatives that should be considered in the design of future research of this nature. One change recommended would be to reduce the number of policies analysed, preferably to one single policy, in order to devote more attention to the number of persons included for interview. This would particularly provide for the inclusion of middle level managers, faculty and staff, whose perceptions would add detail to the account of the policy outcomes.

Another advantageous alternative would be to conduct the research at the time when the policy was actually being formulated and implemented. The study of the case would be appreciably improved
if perceptions were analysed regularly throughout policy formulation and implementation, so that changes in perceptions over time could be documented. Such timing would allow the researcher to evaluate the extent to which policy implementation can be "regarded as a process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends" (Barrett & Fudge, 1981:4).

Much of the debate in the case study literature revolves around the issue of whether or not a single case study provides sufficient evidence to constitute an addition to knowledge. The value of this study would have been considerably enhanced if similar cases had been available for comparison. Since none were available, it stands as a set of findings requiring the test of further case studies or more generalisable research.

**FURTHER RESEARCH**

During the conduct of this research several points emerged as important to our understanding of the community college system in B.C. and of the policy implementation process within that system. They need to be vigorously pursued through further research.

1 A clarification of the balance in governance function between the chief executive officer of colleges and the College Board. This matter was raised by several respondents in interviews, and was seen to be an important factor in the governance of the college system.
2 An examination of the effects of system governance policies on staff morale. A number of respondents perceived a lowering of morale as a result of centralised decision-making, and this too is an important aspect of the effects of implementing system governance policies.

3 An analysis of the respective roles of the national, provincial, regional and local agencies in the administrative structure of the college system. This plea for a clarification of roles and decision-making authority is not new, but the need for further analysis also became obvious as a result of this study.

4 An examination of the impact of provincial governance policies on the administration of particular institutions. This study has addressed some of the perceived outcomes of implementing policies on the governance of the system. However, there are obvious outcomes at the level of the individual institution with implications for course planning, staff recruitment, funding and facilities.

5 Further study of the relationship between perceived policy intentions and perceived policy outcomes from the implementors' perspective is desirable. There seems to be a direct relationship between perceived intentions and perceived outcomes, and further research on this phenomenon may assist both in understanding policy implementation, and discovering reasons for such a phenomenon.
The utilisation of a predominantly structural theory as a base for this research has produced a particular view of the policy analysis. There remains a need for further research using alternative frameworks to provide comparative studies in this important field of human behaviour. It would also be useful to embark on some longitudinal studies of the same policies carried through to their 'termination', in order more accurately to assess the perceived outcomes over the longer term.

NOTES ON CHAPTER SIX

1. A draft revision of the Integrated Five Year Planning for the British Columbia College and Institute System: System Mission, Goals, and Objectives 1986-1996, was circulated on March 6, 1986 where 'governance' had been removed.

2. See Gallagher, (1985) for a plea to establish an intermediary body for colleges in B.C.


4. See Van Meter and Van Horn, (1975), for a discussion on the affects of goal consensus upon implementation; Barrett and Fudge 1981, for a discussion on policy-action relationships; and Brewer and deLeon, 1983, for a discussion on intentionality.

5. See Bardach, (1977), and Brewer and deLeon, (1983), for the limitations of expressing policy through legislation.

6. O.E.C.D., (1976), called for clarity at national and provincial levels. The Task Force on the Community College in B.C., (1974), also called for clarification of decision-making with respect to provincial, regional and institutional levels. Many students of community college governance in B.C., have also expressed concern at the lack of role clarity.
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GLOSSARY

A.C. Academic Council.
B.C. British Columbia
B.C.A.C. British Columbia Association of Colleges
B.C.I.T. British Columbia Institute of Technology
B.C.S.T.A. British Columbia School Trustees Association
C.I.E.A. College Institute Educators' Association of B.C.
E.R.I.C. Educational Resources Information Centre
F.T.E. Full Time Equivalent
M.A.C. Management Advisory Council
M.G.O. Mission Goals and Objectives
M.L.A. Member of the Legislative Assembly
N.D.P. New Democratic Party
O.E.C.D. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
O.L.I. Open Learning Institute
O.T.C. Occupational Training Council
S.O.C.R.E.D. Social Credit Party
U.B.C. University of British Columbia
U.S.A. United States of America
V.C.C. Vancouver Community College
APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION

OPENING

Introduce self - Principal from West Australia, Currently studying towards an Ed. D. at U.B.C. Interested in B.C.'s Community College System and Implementation of Governance Policies

Thank interviewee for participating

Outline purpose of study

(a) Understand the governance of the college system.
(b) Study the implementation of Government policy in B.C.

Refer to practical outcomes

(a) Importance of understanding how distribution of decision-making and devolution of authority occurs.
(b) The need for Australians to learn from overseas.
(c) The importance of establishing a balance between provincial policies and educational autonomy.

BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

Briefly describe the three policies on governance.

(a) Abolition of three intermediary Councils.
(b) Abolition of School Board appointments.
(c) System Mission Goals and Objectives.

Explain that the three issues will be questioned separately.

These policies represent provincial Government initiatives on the governance of the community college system in B.C.

Governance is taken to mean the framework in which decisions are made for the system.

Administrators is used to mean all persons directly involved in system decision-making and includes the Minister, Ministry officials, Board members, major interest groups, and professional college administrators.

CONFIDENTIALITY & PERMISSION TO RECORD

Explain difficulty of note taking, and the need for accuracy.
Assure interviewee of confidentiality.
Seek permission to record the interview.
Present Interviewee Consent Forms and ask for signature.
APPENDIX TWO

INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR POLICY INTENTIONS

Abolition of Councils

Q1: What do you believe were the major intentions of the policy to abolish the three intermediary Councils?

Q2: In your opinion, were the reasons for the policy change clearly communicated to administrators in the system?

Q3: Did the policy aim to delegate more authority to the colleges when the Councils were dissolved?

Q4: What is the major intended role of the Ministry office in the governance of the college system?

Q5: Do you think the policy formulators were sufficiently informed about the community college system?

Q6: What degree of independent discretion did the policy intend to provide college administrators with respect to governance?

Q7: Do you believe the provincial Government's policy intentions are being realised?

Q8: Have there been any unforeseen effects from the abolition of the three Councils?

Government Appointment of all College Board Members

Q9: What were the key factors that influenced the Government to directly appoint all members to College Boards?

Q10: Did any consultation occur with colleges prior to the proclamation of the policy?

Q11: Was the policy initiative to abolish local School Board appointments to colleges seen as a major change or threat to the system administrators?

Q12: Has there been any unforeseen effects from the change?

Q13: Why was no term of office specified for appointments?
Mission Goals and Objectives Statement

Q14: Was the proclamation of the M.G.O.'s intended as a major change to the college system as far as governance is concerned?

Q15: What were the most important intentions of the Government's system M.G.O.'s statement?

Q16: Do you believe the M.G.O.'s were effectively communicated to members of the college system?

Q17: What sanctions and incentives are exercised for implementers of the M.G.O.'s?

Q18: In what way have the M.G.O.'s changed the framework for decision-making in the college system?

Q19: Was it intended to preserve a high degree of educational autonomy for the colleges?

Q20: How important, in your opinion, are the provincial policies on system governance?

Q21: What are the important undeclared or undocumented elements of the policies on governance?

Q22: Are there any other issues on which you would like to comment with respect to the policies on governance?
APPENDIX THREE

INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE FOR POLICY OUTCOMES

Abolition of Councils

1. What do you believe were the most noticeable effects of the policy to abolish the three intermediary Councils?

2. In your opinion were the reasons for the policy change clearly communicated to administrators in the system?

3. In your opinion, did the policy aim to delegate more authority to the colleges when the Councils were dissolved?

4. In your opinion, what is the major role of the Ministry office in the implementation of this governance policy in the college system?

5. Do you think the policy formulators were sufficiently informed about the Community College System?

6. In your opinion, what degree of independent discretion did the policy intend to provide college administrators with respect to governance?

7. How effectively do you believe that was implemented?

8. Do you believe any unforeseen effects have emerged from abolishing the three Councils?

Abolition of School Board Appointments

9. In your opinion, what were the key factors that influenced the Government to directly appoint all members to College Boards?

10. Do you believe any consultation occurred with colleges prior to the proclamation of the Policy?

11. In your opinion, was the policy initiative to abolish local School Board appointments to colleges seen as a major change or threat to the system administrators?

12. Do you believe there have been any unforeseen effects from the change?

13. What do you believe were the reasons no term of office was specified for appointments?

14a In your opinion, what changes have occurred to the decision making process or framework of the system because of the change in Board membership?
**Mission, Goals, and Objectives Statement**

15. In your opinion, was the proclamation of the Mission, Goals, and Objectives intended as a major change to the college system, as far as governance is concerned?

PROBE Have the college M.G.O.'s been closely alligned to those of the provincial Government's for the system?

16. In your opinion, what were the most important outcomes of the Government's system Mission, Goals, and Objectives statement?

17. Do you believe the Mission Goals and Objectives were effectively communicated to members of the College System?

18. Do you believe there is sufficient ambiguity in the M.G.O. statement to allow the college a reasonable degree of flexibility?

21. In your opinion, what sanctions and incentives are exercised for implementers of the M.G.O.'s?

22. How do you believe the effectiveness of system governance is evaluated?

25. In your opinion, in what way has the Mission Goals and Objectives changed the framework for decision-making in the College System?

28. Do you believe the MGO's intended to preserve a high degree of educational autonomy for the colleges?

**General Governance Issues**

23. How important, in your opinion, are the provincial policies on system governance?

24. What do you believe are the important undeclared or undocumented elements of the policies on governance?

26. In what ways would you encourage the system to change its governance structure?

32. Is there any other issues on which you would like to comment with respect to the implementation of the three policies?

33. Are there any other areas that my questions have not covered which you consider are important to the implementation of governance policies?

34. Can you recommend anyone knowledgeable of the area being examined who could also contribute to this study, or someone who would provide an opposing view to your own?
APPENDIX FOUR

INTERVIEWEES

BEINDER Frank Mr former Executive Director of B.C.A.C.
BENNERT Beryl Ms Member Malaspina College Board
BUCKLEY Robert Mr Member of Selkirk College Board
         former President B.C.A.C.
COUCH Don Mr Executive Director B.C. Association of Colleges
         former Executive Director of The Academic Council
FISHER Grant Dr Assistant Deputy Minister Post Secondary
         Education former Principal Camosun College
FRASER Bruce Dr Principal Malaspina College
         former Ministry Director
GALLAGHER Paul Dr Principal Vancouver Community College
HARDWICK Walter Dr Ex former Minister for Education
         President Knowledge Network
HEINRICH John Mr former Minister for Education
KENNEDY Jim Dr former Chairman of V.C.C. and former Chairman
         Exec Comm Management Advisory Council
MacIVER Sandy Mr former Director Policy & Planning Ministry
McCANDLESS Ric Mr Director Research and Analysis Ministry
MOORE Barry Dr Principal Fraser Valley College
MORIN Lloyd Dr Principal Camosun College
NEWBERRY Jack Dr Exec Dir Management Services Ministry
PERRA Leo Mr Principal Selkirk College
RIZUN Hilda Ms Chairman Capilano College Board
SHOOP Michael Mr former Director Planning Ministry
SOLES Andrew Mr former Assistant Deputy Minister Universities
THOMPSON Lorne Mr Executive Director Program Services Ministry
WATERS John Mr President C.I.E.A.
WING Dennis Dr Principal North Island College
APPENDIX FIVE

FORMAT OF CHARTS USED FOR INTERPRETING INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

POLICY INFLUENCERS

   separate chart for (a) FORMULATORS

   )principal
   (b) IMPLEMENTERS )board member
   )interest group

POLICY NUMBER -- (Separate chart for each policy)

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RESPONDENT NUMBER

ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WERE SUMMARISED
AND RECORDED IN THE APPROPRIATE COLUMN USING
THE RESPONDENTS OWN WORDS

RESPONDENT NUMBER

IF ANSWERS TO ANOTHER QUESTION WERE GIVEN,
THE SUMMARY WAS RECORDED UNDER THE COLUMN OF
THE QUESTION WHICH PROMOTED THE RESPONSE BUT
IN A DIFFERENT COLOURED INK

RESPONDENT NUMBER

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APPENDIX SIX

INTERVIEW CODING

Q = QUESTION; PR = PROBE;
I = INTERVIEWER; R = RESPONDENT

POLICY 1 (Mission Goals, Objectives) P01;
POLICY 2 (Abolition of Councils) P02;
POLICY 3 (Government Board Appointments) P03;
Comments on general governance issues P0G;

DESIGN VARIABLES

Amount of Change 1;
Degree of Threat 2;
Clarity of Goals 3;
Sanctions & Incentives 5;
Consultation 6;
Resources 7;
Formulators Knowledge 8;
Assign Responsibilities 9;
Intent Stated 10;
Intent Unstated 11;

ENVIRONMENT

Economic State 17;
Social State 18;
Political State 19;

COMMUNICATION VARIABLES

Clarity of Purpose 13;
Degree of Ambiguity 14;
Timing 16;
Degree of Bureaucratisation 22;
Perceived Effectiveness Comm'n 23;

INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION VARIABLES

Perceived Importance of Policy 24;
Understanding of Policy 27;
Influencers 30;
Individual Commitment 31;
Intentions Realised 33;
Intentions Not Realised 34;

I. = INTENTION; P. = PERCEPTION; R. = REALISED; Q. = OUTCOMES.
APPENDIX SEVEN

MEMBERS OF RESEARCH ADVISORY PANEL

DAY Bill Principal Douglas College
DENNISON John Professor Higher Education U.B.C.
FAST Lawrence Director Academic Affairs Vancouver Community College
HOLLYCK-KENYON Tim Researcher on B.C. college coordination
ROBERTSON Bill former Head of Department of Distance Education B.C. Institute of Technology
SOLES Andrew former Deputy Minister for Education
APPENDIX EIGHT

SOME COLLEGE ADMINISTRATORS' COMMENTS IMPLYING LACK OF TRUST

"In the case of this particular system, among the ills was the fact that all of the various parties within the system did not always have a well defined sense of goals, nor did they always cooperate well with one another" (4:19).

"If people of good will can work together [they will] demonstrate the potential of the system to solve difficult problems and to work them out in a reasonably interactive fashion" (4:31).

"The attitude seems to be, I'll cooperate with you, if there is an advantage in it for me" (12:16).

"Right now I just don't think that we're very credible. I don't think people believe us" (12:24).

"The Minister has the authority to delegate a lot of his powers to Boards, even though he retains final responsibility. Ministers have not chosen to do that, and I contend that they have not chosen to do that because they don't have enough confidence yet in the competence and ability of Boards" (14:3).

"What it really demonstrated though, is how a bureaucracy ... need policymakers to keep them on track" (23:3).

"You will find in any level of Government ... people sometimes being captured by the bureaucrats in the colleges ... You've got to be on your toes, because there's nobody more crafty than a seasoned bureaucrat, believe me" (23:14).