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Curriculum evaluation Beckett, Kelvin Stewart 1976

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CURRICULUM EVALUATION by KELVIN STEWART BECKETT B.A., University of British Columbia, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Faculty of Education) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1976 @ Kelvin-Stewart Beckett, 1976 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of this thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of tyCXA^ Qo-h lo The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V6T 1W5 Date ft I ABSTRACT There are two parts to this paper. The first is an account of what must be involved in evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum. "Curriculum evaluation", in this sense of the term, refers to a kind of instrumental evaluation. After examining some of the logical features of various sorts of instrumental evaluation, I argue that evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum must involve determin-ing whether the thing being evaluated serves well as a programme of activities to the end that someone learn something that is worth learning. The second part of this paper is an attempt to clarify and criticize the accounts of curriculum evaluation given by Robert Stake and Michael Scriven. Stake would have the evaluator evaluate curricula from the point of view of local customs. Scriven, on the other hand, would have him evaluate curricula, on one account, from the point of view of a curriculum and, on a second, from the economic point of view and from the point of view of either educational instruments or simply instruments. Because it is reasonable to suppose that the evaluator should do an on-the-whole evaluation of curricula, both Stake's and Scriven's accounts are criticized for being incomplete. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The Question 1 1.2 Its Significance 2 1.3 1 ts Answer 7 1.4 Its Importance 9 1.5 Curriculum 9 2. INSTRUMENTAL EVALUATIONS 14 2.1 Instruments 14 2.2 Good Instruments 17 2.3 Good Instruments of a Kind 20 2.4 Good Instruments of a Kind, continued 28 3. CURRICULUM EVALUATION 37 3.1 Introduction 37 3.2 A Good Means 39 3.3 Good as Something Learned 48 4. STAKE O N CURRICULUM EVALUATION 53 4.1 Description and Explanation 53 4.2 Evaluation 58 4.3 The Form of the Evaluation 59 TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued Page 4.4 The Content of the Evaluation 64 4.5 Conclusion 69 5. STAKE O N CURRICULUM EVALUATION 70 5.1 Two Senses of "Evaluation" 70 5.2 The First Account 72 5.3 The Second Account 74 5.4 The Third Account 77 5.5 The Fourth Account 82 5.6 Conclusion 92 6. CONCLUSION 94 6.1 Evaluating Things as Curricula 94 6.2 Stake and Scriven 96 6.3 Some Comments on the Major Thesis 98 6.4 Some Comment on Stake and Scriven , 99 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish ro thank Dr. Jerrold Coombs, Dr. Walter Boldt, and especially Dr. LeRoi Daniels, for their helpful criticism during the course of writing this thesis. v 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Question There are many sorts of curriculum evaluation. That is to say, there are many kinds of activities which can be correctly described as "curriculum evaluation". I will give an account of what must be involved in one of them. I will give an account of what must be involved in the activity which has as its upshot that something either is or is not a good curriculum. "X is a good curriculum" is a value judgment. It is a judgment of the value, worth, or merit of X . A value judgment is the upshot of an evalu-ation. "X is a good curriculum" is one possible upshot of the evaluation with which I will be concerned. Now, an evaluation must involve determining whether the thing being evaluated fulfills, or fulfills to a greater degree than something else, certain standards. What standards are used in a particular evaluation depends on the kind of evaluation being made. "If X has charac-teristics a, b, and c, X is a good curriculum", is the form of the standard used in the evaluation with which I will be concerned. If X fulfills the standard, X is a good curriculum. If, on the other hand, X fails to fulfi l l the standard, X is not a good curriculum. The kind of evaluation with which I will be concerned, then, must involve determining whether X has certain characteristics, 1 2 here labelled "a " , "b", and "c" . 1.2 Its Significance. There are, as has been said, many kinds of activities which can be correctly described as "curriculum evaluation". The nature of the activity with which I will be concerned can be clarified by distinguishing it from other sorts of curriculum evaluation. "Curriculum" in "curriculum evaluation" can refer to an object of evaluation, a kind of evaluation, or both. If it refers to an object of evaluation, "curriculum evaluation" refers to the evaluation of curricula. A curriculum can be the object of many kinds of evaluation. For instance, a curriculum can be evaluated from the economic, moral or any of the other "basic" points of view (Taylor, p. 300).' If "curriculum" in "curriculum evaluation" refers to a kind of evaluation, "curriculum evaluation" refers to the evaluation of things as curricula. Many things can be evaluated as curric-ula. For instance, curricula and entertainment programmes can be evaluated as curricula. Finally, if "curriculum" in "curriculum evaluation" refers both to an object of evaluation and to a kind of evaluation, "curriculum evaluation" refers to the evaluation of curricula as curricula. 1.2.1 A curriculum can be evaluated from many points of view. In specifying that the object of evaluation is a curriculum, no implication can be drawn as to the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Now, evalu-ating something as "good" from one point of view is not the same as evaluating it as "good" from another. If X is good from the economic point of view, X is economically good. If, on the other hand, X is good from the moral point 3 of view, X is morally good. Something can be good from one point of view and not good from another without inconsistency. There is no inconsistency in affirm-ing that X is economically good while denying that it is morally good. The reason is that in evaluating something from a point of view one is using a certain set of standards. Thus, evaluating something from the economic point of view involves using economic standards, while evaluating something from the moral point of view involves using moral standards. The point of view from which an evaluation is made depends on what standards are used in making it. Thus, if someone says that X is good because it is inexpensive, it can be inferred that X is being evaluated from the economic point of view, because standards of expense are economic standards. If, on the other hand, someone says that X is not good because it is unjust, it can be inferred that X is being evaluated from the moral point of view, because standards of justice are moral standards. X can be both economically good and morally bad, because different standards are used in evaluating X from the economic point of view than those which are used in evaluating X from the moral point of view. A curriculum can be evaluated from the moral, economic and the other basic points of view. The evaluation with which I will be concerned is an evalu-ation from a point of view, but it is not an evaluation from one of the basic points of view. The evaluation with which I will be concerned has as its upshot that something either is or is not a good curriculum. It will be shown below (p. 28) that "X" is a good curriculum" is the same as IfiX is, as a curriculum, good". "X is, as a y, good" is the same as "X is, from the point of view of a Y, good",, (Taylor, pp. 5-6). Thus, "X is, as a curriculum, good" is the same as "X is, from the point of view of a curriculum, good". The evaluation with which I will be concerned, then, is an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum. Evaluations made from this point of view can be distinguished from evaluations made from other points of view on the basis of the standards used in making them. It is my intention to discover what standards are used in evalu-ations made from the point of view of a curriculum. 1.2.2 Just as we can evaluate curricula from many points of view, we can evaluate many kinds of things from the point of view of a curriculum. In specifying that the kind of evaluation being done is an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum, no implication can be drawn as to what the object of evaluation is. Generally, anything can be evaluated from a particular point of view if it can be said either to fulfi l l or to fail to fulfi l l the standards used in making that kind of evaluation. Consider the following. An auger is a tool used to bore holes in wood. If an auger bores holes well, it is aogood auger. If, on the other hand, it does not bore holes well, it is not a good auger (Hare, p. 101). "If X bores holes in wood well, X is a good auger" is the standard used in evaluating something from the point of view of an auger. We can evaluate an auger from the point of view of an auger because it makes sense to suppose that an auger can fulfil l or fail to fulfi l l the standard used in making that kind of evaluation. That is, it makes sense to suppose that an auger can bore holes either well or i l l . We can also evaluate knives and knitting needles from the point of view of an auger. It makes sense to suppose 5 thai- a knife or knitting needle can fulfi l l or fail to fulfi l l the standard used in making that kind of evaluation. That is, it makes sense to suppose that knives and knitting needles can bone holes either well or i l l . But, we cannot evaluate plans or policies from the point of view of an auger, because it does not make sense to suppose that plans or policies can either fulfi l l or fail to fulf i l l the standard used in making that kind of evaluation. That is, it does not make sense to suppose that plans or policies can bore holes in wood either well or i l l . Plans and policies cannot be used to bore holes, and thus cannot be used to bore them either well or i l l . Generally, only those things which can be used as an X can be evaluated from the point of view of an X . Because things other than curricula (e .g . , programmes of entertainment) can be used as curricula, things other than curricula can be evaluated from the point of view of a curriculum. Even if we could evaluate something from a particular point of view, we may in fact not. We do not commonly evaluate knitting needles from the point of view of an auger. Just as we can evaluate something from the point of view of an X only if we can use it as an X, we in fact evaluate something from the point of view of an X only if in fact we use it as an X . As we sometimes have occasion to use knitting needles to bore holes in wood, we sometimes have occasion to evaluate them from the point of view of an auger. Now, we sometimes have occasion to use things other than curricula as curri-cula, and thus we sometimes have occasion to evaluate things other than Gum-'s cula from the point of view of a curriculum. 6 1 .2.3. I will use the term "curriculum evaluation" to refer to a parti-cular kind of evaluation - in part, an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum. Now, evaluations can be distinguished on the basis of the point of view from which they are made, but this is not the only basis which can be used to distinguish them. A l l evaluations are either grading or ranking evalu-ations (Taylor, p. 4). The evaluation with which I will be concerned is a grading evaluation made from the point of view of a curriculum. I will be concerned with the evaluation which has as its upshot that something either is or is not a good curriculum. "Good" is a grading label. Something is good if it meets certain standards. Something is a good curriculum if it meets the standards used in evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum. "Best" is a ranking label. Something is best if it fulfills certain stan-dards to a higher degree than anything else. Something is the best curriculum if it fulfills to a higher degree than anything else the standards used in evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum. In specifying that something has a certain grade, no implication can be drawn as to what rank it has. Something can be good and rank very high. For instance, X can be a good student and rank high with respect to his fellow students if most of the latter are not good students. On the other hand, some-thing can be good and rank very low. For instance, Y can be a good student and rank low with respect to his fellow students if most of the latter are very good students. Conversely, in specifying that something has a certain rank, no implication can be drawn as to what grade it has. Something can be the best and be graded good. For instance, the best student in a class of good students 7 would be a good student. On the other hand, something can be the best and be graded bad. For instance, the best student in a class of bad students would be a bad student. Something's having a certain grade does not imply that it has a certain rank, because its meeting or not meeting certain standards does not imply that it stands in any particular relation with other things that can be said to either meet or not meet the standards in question. Conversely, something's having a certain rank does not imply that it has a certain grade, because its standing in a certain relation to other things that can be said either to meet or not to meet the standards in question, does not imply that it either meets or does not meet those standards. The evaluation with which I will be concerned is a grading evaluation made from the point of view of a curriculum. Its upshot is that something either is or is not a good curriculum. A good curriculum may or may not be the best curriculum, in fact, it may be the worst. Whether it is the worst depends on the class of comparison involved. 1.3 Its Answer I will argue as follows. The term "curriculum" refers to a programme of activities designed to be used to get someone to learn something. Evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum, then, is the same as evaluat-ing it from the point of view of a programme of activities designed to be used to get someone to learn something. A curriculum is, in the broadest sense of the term "instrument", an instrument. An instrument is something which serves 8 or is used as a means to an end. Evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum is evaluating it from the point of view of a particular kind of instrument. "Curriculum evaluation", then, as I will use the term, refers to a kind of instrumental evaluation. The upshot of an instrumental evaluation is that something either is or is not a good instrument. As we will see, a good instrument is something which serves well as a means to good ends. The upshot of a particular kind of instru-mental evaluation is that something either is or is not a good instrument of its kind. A good instrument of a kind can be either something which serves well as a means to the ends for which it is designed to be used, something which is designed to be used to serve good ends, or both. For instance, a good instrument of torture is, roughly, something which serves well as a means to torturing people; a good policy is, roughly, a course of action, etc., which is designed to be used to serve good ends; and, of interest to us, a good curriculum is a programme of activities which serves well as a means to getting someone to learn something which is good as something learned. A programme of activities serves well as a means to getting someone to learn something which is good as something learned if, first, as a means it is effective, efficient, not immoral, not i l legal, not expensive, etc., and if the side-effects of its use are not undesirable; and, second, if what is to be learned is intrinsically, inherently, contributively, instrumentally, etc., valuable. 9 1.4 Its Importance As we have said, there are many activities which can be correctly described as "curriculum evaluation". Why, then, choose for analysis the activity of evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum? Two reasons: first, an account of all the activities which are encompassed by the term "curriculum evaluation" would be inappropriate given limitations of space; and, second, of all the important points of view from which curricula should be evaluated, an account of evaluating them from the point of view of a curriculum seems most needed. Both Robert Stake and Michael Scriven give accounts of what should be involved in the evaluation of_ curricula. After having said what must be involved in evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum, I will consider in turn the accounts of curriculum evaluation offered by Stake and Scriven. Though my primary intention will be to clarify those accounts, oppor-tunities for criticism will not be found lacking. 1.5 Curriculum Evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum is the same as evaluating it as a curriculum. But what is it to evaluate something as a curriculum? Though "philosophers have scarcely begun to explore the concept of curriculum", (Martin, p. 1?), a beginning has been made. First, con-sider the following: 10 "We shall take the term 'curriculum' to be the label for a programme or course of activities which is explicitly organized as the means whereby pupils may attain the desired objectives, whatever these may be." (Hirst and Peters, p. 60) Assuming for the moment that a curriculum is a programme or course of activities, this definition is too wide since it includes some things which are not curricula. That is, some things which are programmes or courses of activities are not curricula. For instance, if the objective of a programme of activities is either the assassina-tion of Idi Amin or the election of A to the office of student-body president, it is not a curriculum. The definition, as formulated, is too wide, but a definition which more accurately reflects common usage is suggested in it. It might be said that the assassination of Idi Amin and the election of A to the office of student-body president are not "pupil" objectives, not objectives of persons as pupils. A "pupil" is "one wnp is taught". ( C O . P . , p. 994). The role of persons as pupils, then, is to learn something. Following this suggestion, the definition can be reformulated: a curriculum is a programme or course of activities which is explicitly organized as a means whereby someone (a pupil) may learn something. In thus narrowing the definition of the term "curriculum" the objections made above have been met. A curriculum is a programme of activities of a certain kind. It can be distinguished from other programmes of activities on the basis of its objectives. Curricula are neither assassination nor election programmes; they are learning programmes. "The term curriculum is, of course, used very variedly, but I shall take it to mean a programme of activities 11 designed so that pupils will attain by learning certain specifiable ends or objectives." (Hirst, p. 2). (emphasis mine) (4) Now, is a curriculum a programme or course of activities? First, a "curriculum" is a "course (of study)" ( C O . P . , p. 300). Just as it makes sense to say of someone that he is uusing" or "following" a programme or course, it makes sense to say of him that he is "using" or "following" a curriculum. But, though it makes sense to say of someone that he is "using" a programme, regard-less of the kind of programme in question, whether it makes sense to say that he is "following" a programme depends on the kind of programme in question. For instance, though we can both use and follow a curriculum, we can use, but not follow, a computer programme. The difference here is that a curriculum is a programme of human activities, whereas a computer programme is a programme of computer "behaviors". Curricula, then, belong to the category of programmes. They are distinguishable from other programmes both on the basis of their content, i .e . , they are programmes of activities, and on the basis of their objectives, i .e . , they are designed to be used to get someone to learn something. I will use the term "curriculum" to mean "a programme of activities designed to be used to get someone to learn something". I recognize, however, that the definition remains too wide. That is, some things which are programmes of activities, etc., are not curriculaco For instance, a programme of brain-stimulation designed to be used to get someone to learn something is not a curricu-lum;^ and, second, a programme of activities designed to be used to get some-one to learn the whereabouts of a needle in a haystack is not a curriculum.^ A more precise definition than the one I will use would include certain phrases to qualify the sort of activities which can be the content of a curriculum, and certain phrases to qualify the sort of learning that can come about by the use of a curriculum. The task of discoveringg what these qualifying phrases are, however, will not be undertaken here. For our purposes, then, evaluating something from the point of view of a curriculum is, roughly, the same as evaluating it as a programme of activ-ities designed to be used to get someone to learn something. 13 FOOTNOTES 1. "In all civi l ized cultures there are eight points of view...that may be desig-nated as 'basic 1. We call them basic because of two factors. First, they pervade the culture, in the sense that the conduct of any given individual in the culture is always subject to a value system belonging to at least one of them.. .Second, they are the dominant points of view in a culture, in sense that they set the values of the major social institutions and activities which carry on the civil ization of the culture. These major social institu-tions and activities are the moral code, the arts, the pure and applied sciences, the religion or religions, the economic, political, and legal systems, the customs and traditions, and the educational institutions. The eight basic points of view corresponding to these institutions and activities are the moral, the aesthetic, the intellectual, the religious, the economic, the political, the legal, and the point of view of etiquette or custom. There is no single point of view corresponding to the educational institutions of a society, since education is a process which may take place within any point of view. Thus there is moral education, aesthetic education, intel-lectual education, religious education, and so on" (Taylor, pp. 299-300). 2. Analogously, only those things that can be either X or not-X can be evaluated from the X point of view. For instance, only those things that can be either moral or immoral can be evaluated from the moral point of view. A blade of grass cannot be evaluated from the moral point of view because it can be neither moral or immoral. 3. Analogously, only those things which are in fact either X or not-X do we in fact evaluate from the X point of view. For instance, air can be either economic or not, but as it in fact has no economic value, we do not evaluate it from the economic point of view. 4. In the first definition of "curriculum" it is said that the programme of activities is "explicitly organized as the means whereby pupils may attain the desired objectives", whereas in the second definition it is said that the programme of activities is "designed so that pupils will attain.. .certain specifiable ends or objectives". Whether the objectives of a programme of activities are specified is irrelevant to the question of whether it is a curricu-lum. Whether they are specifiable, i .e . , whether there are objectives, clearly is relevant. If a programme of activities does not have objectives, it cannot have learning objectives. 5. This example was suggested to me by Professor Coombs. 6. This example was suggested to me in reading an unpublished manuscript of Professor Daniels. Professor Daniels there discusses the question of what sort of learning must be intended to come about before we would say that a curriculum was being followed. 2 INSTRUMENTAL EVALUATIONS 2]i.l! Instruments The first thing to notice about the word "curriculum" is that it is a functional word. That is, in order to explain its meaning fully, we have to say what its denotatum is used for, or what it is supposed to do (Hare, p. 100). "Curriculum" is a functional word of a certain kind. Notice, though it makes sense to ask what a curriculum is "for" , it does not strictly make sense> to ask what it is supposed to "do". Curricula belong to the category of programmes. Though we can ask what a programme is for, we cannot ask what it is supposed to do. Programmes are not the sort of thing that can do anything. "Curriculum" is a functional word of a certain kind, namely, an instrument label. An instru-ment is a thing used in performing an action. ( C O . P . , p. 631). We can ask what an instrument is for, but not what it is supposed to do. Instruments are not the sort of thing that can do anything. Instruments are designed to be used in performing actions. What the use of a curriculum is supposed to do is get someone to learn something. Curricula, then, are functional things of a certain kind, namely, instruments. The word "instrument" is commonly used to refer to material objects which are used in performing actions. It is not obvious that non-material 14 15 objects, e .g . , programmes, plans, policies, etc., can be used in performing actions. The apparent difficulty with the notion of "using" non-material objects can be illustrated as follows: Let us say that X is a programme, plan, or policy which calls for the.actions a, b, and c. If X is an instrument it makes sense to say that someone can use X in doing a, b, and c. But, it might be objected, is not "using X " the same as! "doing a, b, and c"? Consider, a person can do a, b, and c without using X . If he decided to do a, then b, then c, (rather than d, e, and f) by tossing a coin, it would not be plausible to describe him as "using X " . Roughly speaking, the crux is that he must do a, b, and c in order to carry out the programme, with the purposes of the programme in mind, in order to be said to be "using X " . Thus, a person can even do d, e, and f and be correctly described as "using X" , if, for instance, he did ikfoerrf because in the circumstances he found it impossible to do d 'ysb,"-.andrC, ; ' if doing d, e, and f is much the same as doing a, b, and c, and so on. Regardless of its exact sense, then, it makes sense to suppose that at least some non-material objects can be used in performing actions. That is, it makes sense to suppose that at least some non-material objects are instruments. A curriculum is an instrument which is used to get someone to learn something. If the use of a curriculum does in fact get someone to learn some-thing, we can say its use was "instrumental" in getting the person to learn some-thing. Something is "instrumental" to something else if it "serv(es) as instrument or means to (something else)" (Ibid). A curriculum which is instrumental in getting someone to learn something serves as a means in getting someone to learn something. Whether its use does in fact serve as a means, a curriculum 16 is designed to serve as a means in getting someone to learn something. We noted earlier that a curriculum is a particular kind of instrument. Instruments can be distinguished either on the basis of what they are designed to be used for, or on what Hare calls their "morphological characteristics". Thus, curricula can be distinguished from entertainment programmes because the former are designed to be used to get someone to learn something, whereas the latter are designed to be used to entertain people; and curricula can be distinguished from computer programmes which are designed to be used to get someone to learn something, because the former are programmes of human activities, whereas the latter are programmes of computer "behaviors". Similarly, curricula themselves can be distinguished on the basis of either what they are designed to be used to get someone to learn, or on the kind of programme of activities they are. Thus, a science curriculum can be distinguished from a mathematics curriculum because the former is designed to be used to get some-one to learn science, whereas the latter is designed to be used to get someone to learn mathematics; and an enquiry curriculum can be distinguished from a didactic curriculum because the former is a programme of enquiry activities, whereas the latter is a programme of lectures. Instrument labels can rlefer to certain morphological characteristics, certain things for which something is designed to be used, or both. It is important to note here that the label "curriculum" refers to both. A curriculum is a programme of activities designed to be used to get someone to learn some- thing. 2.2 Good Instruments Since a curriculum is an instrument of a certain kind, evaluating something as a curriculum is the same as evaluating it as a certain kind of instrument. The upshot of an instrumental evaluation is that something either is or is not a good instrument. It is a good instrument if it fulfills the stand-ards used in doing an instrumental evaluation. On the other hand, it is not a good instrument if it does not fulfi l l the standards used in doing an instru-mental evaluation. The upshot of a certain kind of instrumental evaluation is that something either is or is not a good instrument of a certain kind. It is a good instrument of a certain kind if it fulfills the standards used in doing that kind of instrumental evaluation. On the other hand, it is not a good instru-ment of a certain kind if it does not fulfi l l the standards used in doing that kind of instrumental evaluation. Knowing the standards used in doing an instrumental evaluation, and the kind of instrumental evaluation that is to be done, one can infer the standards used in doing that kind of instrumental evaluation. What, then, are the standards used in doing an instrumental evalu-ation? An instrument is something which serves or is used as a means to some end. staying of something that it is a good instrument, then, is the same as saying that when used it is good as a means to some end. Now, there are two general reasons we might have for denying that something is good as a means to an end: first, it might not serve well as a means, and, second, the end it serves might not be good. Thus, there are two general reasons we might have for denying that something is a good instrument: first, when used it might not serve well as a means and, second, the end it is designed to be used to serve might not be good. These are both reasons for denying thate'something is a good instru-ment because in certain circumstances either can be decisive. First, if X when used does not serve as a means at a l l , it is not a good instrument. But, if X does not serve as a means at a l l , it does not serve well as a means. In certain circumstances, then, we would be justified in denying that something is a good instrument for the reason that when used it does not serve well as a means. Second, if X is used to serve immoral ends, it is not a good instrument, for it is not used to serve good ends. In certain circumstances, then, we would be justified in denying that something is a good instrument for the reason that it is not used to serve good ends. The two general standards used in instrumental evaluations are, then, a conjunction of/ first, If X serves well as a means, X is a good instrument and, second, If X is used for good ends, X is a good instrument. Something which fails to meet either or both of the two general standards is not a good instru-ment. On the other hand, something which meets both standards is a good instrument. For instance, an instrument of torture is not a good instrument because it is not used for good ends; a completely ineffective heart-lung machine, though used for good ends, is not a good instrument because it does not serve well as a means; whereas a good curriculum is a good instrument because when used it serves well as a means to good ends. The two general standards have certain features that should be noticed. First, it cannot be said that in doing an instrumental evaluation one of them should be given greater weight than the other. Though, in general, the value of the ends for which an instrument is used should be given greater weight than the value it has as a means, consider the follow-ing comparative evaluation between two instruments, X and Y . X serves well as a means, but the ends it is used for are not good. Y, on the other hand, does not serve well as a means, but the ends it is used for are good. If one of the two general standards should always be given greater weight than the other, on the basis of the information we have we [should be able to say either that X is a better instrument than Y , or the reverse. We cannot. The question, Which is the better instrument, X or Y?, depends for its answer on the reason for denying that Y serves well as a means, and the reason for deny-ing that X serves as a means to good ends. Assuming that moral considerations always take precedence, if X is not a means to good ends because the ends are immoral, and if Y does not serve well as a means for some other reason than as a means, it is immoral, Y is a better instrument than X . If, on the other hand, Y does not serve well as a means because as a means it is immoral, and if X is not a means to good ends for some other reason than the ends are immoral, X is a better instrument than Y . Neither of the two general stand-ards should always be given greater weight than the other, because there are at least some reasons which are decisive and which can be reasons for denying that something fulfills either of them. 20 The second thing to notice is that an instrument may fail to meet either of the two general standards for any one of several reasons. This is the reason for calling them "general" standards. For each reason that can be given for denying that an instrument meets one of the general standards, there is a corresponding specific standard used in doing instrumental evaluations. For instance, as it is possible to deny that an instrument serves well as a means, because when used it is not effective in achieving any end, effectiveness is a specific standard used in doing instrumental evaluations. Similarly, as it is possible to deny that an instrument is used for good ends, because the ends are immoral, the morality of the ends is a specific standard used in doing instru-mental evaluations. 2.3 Good Instruments of a Kind Curriculum evaluation is a kind of instrumental evaluation. Having looked at what is involved in evaluating something as an instrument, it is now appropriate to look at various kinds of instrumental evaluations. Before doing so, however, there is one general point that should be made. The important difference between evaluating something as an instrument, and evaluating it as an instrument of a certain kind, is that the class of com-parison used in the former is broader than, and includes that used in the latter. In evaluating something as an instrument, the class of comparison used is that of all instruments, whereas in evaluating something as an instrument of a certain kind, the class of comparison used is that of all instruments of that kind. The former contains, but is not exhausted by, the latter. 21 Instruments can be distinguished on the basis of the end for which they are used, or on the basis of their morphological characteristics. Regard-less of the basis on which an instrument is distinguished, if the kind of instru-ment it is is not good, it is not a good instrument. For instance, if an instru-ment is distinguished on the basis of the end for which it is used, its not being a good kind of instrument implies that the end for which it is used is not good. Thus, it is not a good instrument. Similarly, if an instrument is distinguished on the basis of its morphological characteristics, its not being a good kind of instrument implies that it does not serve well as a means. Thus, it is not a good instrument. Something which is a good instrument of a certain kind may or may not be a good instrument, depending on whether the kind of instrument it is is good. For instance, a good instrument of torture is not a good instrument, whereas a good heart-lung machine is. Something which is not a good instru-ment of a certain kind may or may not be a good instrument. If the kind of instrument it is is bad, it is not a good instrument. But, if the kind of instrument it is is good, it may be a good instrument. Consider the following: Within the class of all instruments a heart-lung machine would rank very high and thus would be a good instrument. Within the class of all heart-lung machines, one which malfunctioned 50% of the time would not be a good heart-lung mach-ine. However, a machine which can be used to save the lives of one of every two persons on which it is used would certainly rank high within the class of all instruments, and would thus be a good instrument. The reason is that a heart-lung machine is used for very desirable ends, and thus, even if it is only 22 partially effective, we would still consider it a desirable instrument. As we have seen, the upshot of an instrumental evaluation is that the thing being evaluated either is or is not a good instrument. The upshot of a certain kind of instrumental evaluation is that the thing being evaluated either is or is not a good instrument of that kind. If X. fulfills the: standards used in evaluating something as an X , >X i:is raitgooaVXi X„ Assuming that "X" is a label which refers to an instrument of a certain kind, what does "X is a good X " mean? Hare and Von Wright offer one answer to this question. In doing so they use the term "instrumental goodness" such that, if X is a good X , X is instrumentally good. Lewis and Baylis discuss the meaning of "instrumental goodness" or "instrumental value" in the context of distinguishing between various sorts of value or goodness a thing might have. The terms "instrumental goodness" and "instrumental value" do not frequently occur in ordinary language. They are, rather, technical terms used primarily by philosophers, and different philos-ophers interpret them in different ways. Thus, Hare and Von Wright interpret them to mean "a good means to some end", and Lewis and Baylis interpret them to mean "a means to a good end". I will argue that the expressions may also mean "a good means to a good end", and that for most kinds of instruments, including curricula, "X is a good X" means "X is a good means to a good end". 2.3.1 Lewis and Baylis. C . I . Lewis distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic value, and within the class of extrinsic value, inherent and instrumental value. Something has intrinsic value if it is "valuable for its own sake" (p. 392). An experience would be an example of the sort of thing to which we might attribute intrinsic value. Something has extrinsic value if it is "valuable for the sake of something else" (Ibid). Something which is valu-able for the sake of something else is either inherently or instrumentally valu-able. Inherent values are "those (values) which are to be found in experience of the object itself to which the value is attributed" (Ibid). Thus, an object of good experiences is inherently valuable. A painting would be an example of the sort of thing to which we might attribute inherent value. Instrumental values are "those (values) which are realizable in the experience of something else to which the object in question may be instrumental" (Ibid). Thus, some-thing is instrumental ly valuable if it is instrumental to something else, the experience of which is good. That which is instrumental in the production of a painting would be an example of the sort of thing to which we might attribute instrumental value. Lewis' distinction between the kinds of extrinsic value a thing might have is made primarily on the basis of the nature of the relationship a thing has with something else which is valuable. Thus, if something is valuable because it stands in the relation of being the object of valuable experiences, it is inherently valuable. If, on the other hand, it is valuable because it stands in an instrumental relation to something which is valuable, it is instru-mental ly valuable. Notice, however, if instrumental values are "those (values) which are realizable in the experience of something else to which the object in question may be instrumental", and if inherent values are "those (values) which are foube foundpln experience of the object itself to which the value is attributed"; something is instrumental ly valuable if it stands in an instrumental relation to something which is inherently valuable. This suggests that Lewis intends extrinsix values also to be distinguished on the basis of the kind of value a thing has in which an extrinsically valuable thing stands in relation. If this is the case inherently valuable things must be the objects of experiences which have a certain kind of value, i . e . , intrinsic value. Though Lewis says "only the content of some actual or possible experience.. .will be called in -tr insical ly.. .valuable" (Ibid), and "the value of good objects... is here classed as extrinsic value always" (Ibid), it is not clear that in order for something to be inherently valuable it must be the object of intrinsically good experiences. That is, it is not clear that aJJ valuable experiences have only intrinsic value. There are many problems with Lewis' classification of the kinds of value, two of which concern his definition of "instrumental value". First, the classification itself is of only limited usefulness because many things which have value have neither intrinsic, inherent, nor instrumental value as Lewis uses the terms.^ In order to improve the classification the definitions of each member might be widened, or new categories of value introduced. Second, his notion of "instrumental value" lacks content because the term "instrumental" appears in his definition of the term. In order to give content to the notion a meaning-equivalent for "instrumental" must be introduced in the definiens. In response to these and other difficulties, Baylis reformulates the scheme as follows. Baylis distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic value, but within the class of extrinsic value distinguishes inherent, instrumental and contributive value. Something is intrinsically valuable or good if it is "good 25 in itself" (p. 443). "For an entity to be intrinsically good it must have a non-derivative positive worth...It must' not owe all its value to its relations to other valuable things" (Ibid). Extrinsic goods, on the other hand, are "goods whose value is derivative from their relation to something else of value" (p. 442). The kind of extrinsic value a thing has depends primarily on the nature of the relationship it has with something else of value. Contributively good things are "those things which are necessary parts of a good whole" (Ibid). A spark plug?, to use Baylis1 example, is the sort of thing to which we might attribute contributive good, because a spark plug is a necessary part of a good whole, namely, a gasoline motor. Inherently good things are "those things which derive their value from being objects of experiences which are intrinsically good" (p. 443). A painting would be the sort of thing to which we might attribute inherent good. Though Baylis says that something is instrumental ly good if it is ;(1) "a good means to something good" (p. 442) (emphasis mine), he goes on to say, (2) "Anything is instrumental ly good insofar as it is a causal factor in the production of something which is good, that is, is a condition or a cause or a contributing cause of something good. Instrumentally good things derive their value from the value of that to which they are a means" (Ibid). But, it seems to me, something can be a causal factor in the production of some-thing, good without being a good means to something good. There is an in-consistency here which can be resolved as follows. Instrumental good is said to be a species of extrinsic good. As extrinsic goods are "those goods whose value is derived from their relation to something else of value", Baylis, to be consistent, must say what he does in (2) above, that is, "instrumentally good things derive their value from the value of that to which they are a means". If, however, instrumentally good things are things which are a good means to something good (1), at least some extrinsical ly good things would derive part of their value from something other than the value of that to which they are a means. That is to say, instrumentally good things would derive part of their value from the manner in which they behave as means. Thus, to be consistent, if instrumental good is to be a species of extrinsic good, Baylis must hold that something has instrumental good if it is a means to a good end. Baylis1 reformulation of Lewis' classification of the kinds of value has improved the scheme in at least three respects: first, by introducing the notion of "contributive good" he has widened the scheme's application, and thus improved its usefulness; second, by widening the definition of "instrumental value" from "a means to that which is inherently valuable" to "a means to that which is valuable", he has further improved the scheme's usefulness; and, third, by substituting "a causal factor" or "a means to an end" for "instrumental to" in the definition of "instrumental good", he has given content to the notion. We will have occasion below to make use of Baylis' classification of the kinds of value. It is important now merely to note that the technical term "instrumental value" or "instrumental good" has come to mean, to some philosophers, "a means to a good end". Thus, "X is instrumentally valuable" means "X is a means to a good end". 27 2.3.2 Von Wright and Hare discuss the meaning of the term "instrumental goodness". Here, "instrumental goodness" means the same as "good" when the latter is attributed to an instrument. Von Wright says "instrumental goodness is mainly attributed to imple-ments, instruments, and tools - such as knives, watches, cars, etc" (p. 19). After considering what "instrumental goodness" means in these contexts, he concludes that "to attribute instrumental goodness to some thing is primarily to say of this thing that it serves some purpose wel l" (p. 20). Hare considers a case where "good" is attributed to a specific instrument, namely, an auger. An "auger" is a "tool for boring holes in wood" ( C O . P . , p. 76). "We can say that if an auger will not bore holes at a l l , then it certainly is a bad one" (p. 101). But, " 'Good auger1 means a lot more than 'auger which is conducive to the end that augers are used for, sc. bor-ing holes'; it means at least 'auger which is conducive to fulfi l l ing well the end that augers are used for, sc. to boring holes well ' " (Ibid). Thus, when "good" is attributed to a particular instrument it means "primarily" (Von Wright) or "at least" (Hare) "a good means to the end for which the instrument is designed to be used". If "X" refers to an instrument, then,"X is a good X" means "X serves well as a means to the end for which it is designed to be used". 2.4 Good Instruments of a Kind, continued. I now propose to look more closely at the meaning of "good" when it is attributed to particular instruments. The first thing to notice is "Whenever instrumental.. .goodness is in question... the judgment that X is a good K attributes to the individual thing a goodness;sof>fits kind. The phrase "X is a good K1 may be regarded as identical with 'X is, as a K, good' " (Von Wright, p. 20). That is, if "K" is a label used to refer to an instrument, "X is a good K" is the same as "X is, as a K, good". "X is a good K" is one possible upshot of a particular kind of instrumental evaluation, namely, a K evaluation, or an evaluation from the point of view of a K. The kind of instrumental evalu-ation in question depends on the kind of instrument K is. Now, instruments can be distinguished on the basis of what different instrument labels refer to. For instance, if "K" refers to a curriculum, "X is a good K" is one possible upshot of a curriculum evaluation; whereas if "K" refers to an auger, "X is a good K" is one possible upshot of what mightabesleal.ledsidni'iilauger evalua-tion". But, instruments can be distinguished on grounds other than what dif-ferent labels refer to. Of interest here is the following. Instruments can be distinguished on the basis of what general characteristics of instruments instru-ment labels refer to. For instance, "instruments of torture" refers solely to the end, i .e. , torturing people, for which the instrument is designed to be used; "policy" refers solely to certain morphological characteristics the instru-ment in question has; and "watch" refers to both the end for which the instrument is designed to be used and, at least according to the definition of the term I will use, to certain morphological characteristics the instrument has. I now propose to look at what the terms "good instrument of torture", "good policy" and "good watch" mean. I do not contend that the meaning of "good" depends on what general characteristics of instruments an instrument label refers to. I do think, however, that assuming this to be true will help us see just what it does depend on. 2.4.1. An instrument of "torture" is an instrument which is designed to be used to "inf l ict.. .severe bodily pain, e .g . , as punishment or means of persuasion" ( C O . P . , pp. 1369-70). Instruments of torture may have a variety of morphological characteristics, but to be correctly describable as an "instrument of torture" a thing must be such that it can be used to inflict severe bodily pain. Thus, the rack and the thumb-screw have different mor-phological characteristics, but both are designed to be used to inflict severe bodily pain. Now, if we assume that there is but one end for which instru-ments of torture are designed to be used, and that this end is achievable by a variety of means, evaluations from the point of view of an instrument of torture involve the following: a class of comparison with respect to ends which has but one member, and a class of comparison with respect to means which has a number of members. Because all instruments of torture are, we are assuming, designed to be used to achieve the same end, the value of some-thing as an instrument of torture does not depend on the value of the end for which it is designed to be used. That is, because there is but one member in the class of comparison with respect to ends, it does not make sense to suppose that the end for which a particular instrument of torture is designed to be used ranks either high or low within that class. On the other hand, because instru-ments of torture are designed to be used to achieve a particular end by a variety of means, the value of something as an instrument of torture does depend on the value it has as a means to that end. That is, because there is more than one member in the class of comparison with respect to means, it makes sense to suppose that the means a thing uses to achieve the end of instruments of torture ranks either high or low within that class. Thus, a good instrument of torture is something which serves well as a means to the end for which instruments of torture are designed to be used, i .e. , inflicting severe bodily pain. 2.4.2. A "policy" is a "course of action adopted by government, party, etc." (C^O.D., p. 940).4 Policies may be designed to be used for a variety of ends, but to be correctly describable as a "policy" a thing must be a course of action, etc. Thus, foreign and domestic policies are designed to be used to achieve different ends, but both have the morphological characteristic of being a course of action, etc. Now, if we assume that policies have but one set of morphological characteristics, and that they are designed to be used to achieve a variety of ends, evaluations from the point of view of a policy involve the following: a class of comparison with respect to means which has but one member, and a class of comparison with respect to ends which has a number of members. Because all policies, we are assuming, have the same morphological characteristics, the value of something as a policy does not de-pend on the value it has as a means to the end for which it is designed to be used. That is, because there is but one member in the class of comparison with respect to means, it does not make sense to suppose that the means a thing uses to achieve the end for which it is designed, ranks either high or low in that class of comparison. On the other hand, because policies are designed to be used to achieve a variety of ends, the value of something as a policy does depend on the value of the ends it is designed to be used to achieve. That is, because there is more than one member in the class of comparison with respect to ends, it makes sense to suppose that the ends a particular policy is designed to be used to achieve, rank either high or low in that class of comparison. Thus, a good policy is something which is a course of action, etc., designed to be used to achieve good ends. 2.4.3 In the analyses of the terms "good instruments of torture" and "good policy" I have assumed that if an instrument label refers to either, but not both, the end for which the instrument is designed to be used, or the means by which some end is to be achieved, the class of comparison with respect to the character-istic referred to has but a single member. The falsity of the assumption can be shown by considering an example of an instrument label which refers to both an end to be achieved and a means by which that end is to be achieved. A "watch" is a "small timepiece worked by coil spring" ( C . O . D . , p. 1471). That is, a watch is an instrument designed to be used to keep time by means of a coil spring. If we assume that a watch is designed to be used to achieve a single end, in evaluating something as a watch the class of comparison with respect to ends has but a single member, and thus the value of the watch cannot depend on the value of the end for which it is designed to be used. Similarly, if we assume that a 32 watch is designed to be used to keep time by a single means, in evaluating some-thing as a watch the class of comparison with respect to means has but a single member, and thus the value of a watch cannot depend on the value it has as a means to keeping time. But, if the value of a watch as a watch depends on neither the value of the end for which it is designed to be used, nor on the value it has as a means to that end, we are forced to conclude that all watches as watches have the same value. Clearly this is mistaken. Our assumption, then, must be false. It cannot be the case that if an instrument label refers to a specific end, or a specific means by which some end is to be achieved, in evaluating some-thing as an instrument of that kind the class of comparison with respect to ends or means must have but one member. Further consideration of the evaluation of things as watches will show how this dilemma is to be resolved. First, watches are not designed to be used to achieve a single end. That is, watches are not simply designed to be used to keep time. There are watches which are designed to be used to keep time to within 1 minute/day, 1 minute/month, 1 minute/year, and we can imagine an atomic watch designed to be used to keep time to within 1 millisecond/year. Second, watches are not designed to keep time by a single means. That is, watches are not designed to keep time simply by means of a coil spring. The spring in a watch can have a variety of sizes, shapes and strengths, and be made of a variety of metals and metal alloys. Thus, in evaluating something as a watch the classes of compari-son with respect to both ends and means have more than one member. There are two reasons we might have, then, for denying that something is a good watch: first, within the class of comparison with respect to ends it might rank low, 33 i .e . , it might not be designed to keep accurate time; and, second, within the class of comparison with respect to means it might rank low, i .e . , it might not serve well the end for which it is designed, that is, it might not keep time wel l . A good watch, then, is something which serves well the end of keeping accurate time. Similar remarks can be made regarding instruments of torture and policies. Though we would have no difficulty with an analysis of "good policy" which con-cluded that a "good policy" is "a course of action, etc., which serves well a good end", there is at least an apparent difficulty with an analysis of "good instru-ments of torture" which concluded that a "good instrument of torture" is "some-thing which serves well the end of inflicting bodily pain of better than average severity". One is inclined to object that because an instrument of torture is a kind of instrument, and a good instrument is something which serves well as a means to good ends, the argument implies that inflicting bodily pain of better than average severity is an instance of a good end. It should be recalled, however, in evalu-ating something as an instrument of torture, the class of comparison with respect to ends is not all ends for which an instrument can be used, but only those ends for which an instrument of torture can be used. Because an instrument of torture is designed to be used to inflict severe bodily pain, ranking high in the class of comparison with respect to ends implies inflicting bodily pain of better than aver-age severity. Generally, a good instrument of a kind is something which serves well as a means to the end for which it is designed to be used, and something which serves as a means to ends which are better than average ends for which that kind of instrument can be used. 34 This generalization must be qualified. Though it is always possible that in evaluating something as an instrument of a certain kind, the classes of comparison with respect to both means and ends have more than one member, in some kinds of instrumental evaluation this is in fact not the case. There may be several reasons for this not being the case, but it is appropriate to mention only one here. Consider the following. Hare claims that "'good auger" means... at least 'auger which is conducive to fulfil l ing well the end that augers are used for, sc. to boring holes well ' " (p. 101). Now, I think Hare is correct here and the reason is as follows: Though it is possible that augers might be designed to be used to serve a variety of ends, in fact they are not. Augers are designed simply to bore holes in wood; but we can imagine augers designed to bore holes in hard, soft, wet, dry, rough, smooth, etc., wood. If in fact augers were designed to be used for a variety of purposes, in evaluating something as an auger we might want to say that something is a good auger because it serves well a variety of purposes, that is, it is a good all-purpose auger. Augers, however, are not designed to serve a variety of purposes. Thus, in evaluating something as an auger the single class of comparison used is that with respect to means. A good auger, then, as Hare says, is something which serves well the end of boring holes in wood, that is, something which bores holes in wood wel l . 2.4.4. Some kinds of instrumental evaluations involve the use of but one class of comparison. Curriculum evaluations involve the use of two. In evalu-ating things as curricula it is important to recognize not only that there are important differences in the kinds of activities a curriculum can call for, but that there are important differences in the kinds of things people can be got to learn by using a curriculum. Thus, a curriculum can call for students to hold guns to each others' heads, or to study the great 19th century Russian novelists; and a curriculum can be used to get students to learn how to ki l l people, or to learn what is involved in acting morally. 36 FOOTNOTES 1. "Instrumental value" is a technical term because its definition includes a technical term. Instrumental value is a species of extrinsic value, and "extrinsic value" is a technical term. "If any should insist on repudiating our usage...of 'intrinsic value' and 'extrinsic value', and (instead) reserving (the))terms for (the) distinction between... (and so on)...we should of course have no ground for quarrel with that choice of terminology. Indeed  it is perhaps so well entrenched in customary usage  that it should be respected^ (pp. 390-91). (emphasis mine) The distinctions Lewis makes between the kinds of value are logical distinctions. They need not be reflected in the way we talk about value. 2. For instance, those things which are instrumental to something which is either intrinsically or instrumental ly valuable are not, according to Lewis' scheme, valuable. 3. By ua good means to something good", Lewis might mean "an effective means to something good", in which case there would not be an in-consistency. 4. As a definition of "policy" this is clearly inadequate. However, my purpose in using it is not to say something about policies. It is, rather, to say something about instrumental evaluations. 3 CURRICULUM EVALUATION 3ol Introduction As we have said, the term "curriculum" refers to a programme of activities which is designed to be used to get someone to learn something. We have also said that "curriculum evaluation", as we will use the term, refers to a kind of instrumental evaluation. In some, but not all instrumental evaluations, two classes of com-parison are involved. There are two classes of comparison involved in curricu-lum evaluations: first, the class of all programmes of activities which can be used to get someone to learn something; and, second, the class of all things which persons can be got to learn by the use of a programme of activities. The first class of comparison excludes all things which are not programmes of activities, and all programmes of activities which cannot be used to get some-one to learn something. The second class of comparison excludes all things which cannot be learned, and all things which cannot be learned by the use of a programme of activities. On the basis of the distinction between the two classes of comparison, we can distinguish between two evaluations which together comprise an evalu-ation from the point of view of a curriculum: first, an evaluation of a 37 38 programme of activities as a means of getting someone to learn something; and, second, an evaluation of what it is intended he should learn as something learned. If within the class of all programmes of activities which can be used to get some-one to learn something, X serves better as a means than most, then X serves well as a means. Similarly, if within the class of all things which can be learned by the use of a programme of activities, what is to be learned is better than most, then what is to be learned is good as something learned. The relationship between curriculum evaluation and its two constituent evaluations is as follows. First, if X serves well as a means, there is a neces-sary, but not sufficient, reason to suppose that X is a good curriculum. If, on the other hand, X does not serve well as a means, there is sufficient reason to suppose that X is not a good curriculum. Second, if what is to be learned by the use of X is good as something learned, there is a necessary, but not suf-ficient reason to suppose that X is a good curriculum. If, on the other hand, what is to be learned is not good as something learned, there is sufficient reason to suppose that X is not a good curriculum. Evaluating something as a curriculum, then, involves determining whether the thing being evaluated fulfills two general standards. They are a conjunction of first, If X serves well as a means of getting someone to learn something, X is a good curriculum and, second!,/ If what is to be learned by the use of X is good as something learned, X is a good curriculum. X is not a good curriculum if it fails to meet either or both of these standards. If, on the other hand, X meets both standards, it is a good curriculum. There are a number of reasons one might have for denying that some-thing meets either of the two general standards. I will look at each standard in turn. 3.2 A Good Means Before considering the reasons one might have for denying that a programme of activities serves well as a means of getting someone to learn some-thing, two general points should be made. The first concerns any evaluation of something as a means to something else; and the second concerns any evaluation of something as something used to attain something else. In evaluating something as a means to something else what is being done is an evaluation from a particular point of view, but is not an evaluation from the moral, economic, or any of the other basic points of view. Evaluating X as a means to Y is the same as evaluating it from the point of view of a means to Y . Because it is not an evaluation from the moral or economic point of view, there is no inconsistency in affirming that X is a good means to Y, and denying that it is either moral or economic. Consider, that which is a good means to torturing people, might be both an immoral and an uneconomic thing. It would be both immoral and uneconomic if the class of all things which can torture people includes only things which are both immoral and uneconomic, because that which ranks high in the class of comparison is both immoral and uneconomic. If torturing people is itself immoral, then that which is a good means to torturing people is immoral. Generally, X can be both a good means to Y and a bad thing, because evaluating something as a means to Y is not an on-the-whole evaluation. 40 A curriculum, however, cannot be both a good means of getting some-one to learn something and an immoral or uneconomic thing, roughly speaking, because within the class of all programmes of activities which can be used to get someone to learn something, there are many members which are both moral and economic things. The seoond general point to be made concerns evaluations of things as things used to attain an end, that is, instrumental evaluations or evaluations of things as instruments of a certain kind. Any instrument can be used in a variety of ways to achieve a variety of ends. However, evaluating something as an instrument of a certain kind involves evaluating it as itHs intended to be used, and to the end for which it is intended. For instance, though a hammer can be used, to threaten people, evaluating it as a hammer involves evaluating it as something used for beating, breaking, driving nails, etc. ( C O ' . P . , p. 536). Further, though a hammer might be used to drive in nails by placing a hand over the nail and banging the back of the hand, evaluating it as a hammer involves evaluating it as something used to strike the nail directly. Evaluating something as a curriculum, then, involves evaluating it as it is intended to be used, and to the end for which it is intended. Just as an evaluation of something as something used to bang a hand which is draped over a nail, or as something used to threaten someone, is not an evaluation of it as a hammer, an evaluation of something as something other than a programme of activities, or as something which is not used to get someone to learn something, is not an evaluation of it as a curriculum. 41 3.2.1 Anything which is, is used or serves as a means to some end, can be either an effective or an ineffective means to that end. Effectiveness is a good-making characteristic of things which serve as means. If X fulfills the standard of effectiveness used in evaluating something as a means to Y , we have reason to suppose that X serves well as a meansi to Y . Conversely, if X does not fulfi l l the standard of effectiveness, we have reason to suppose that X does not serve well as a means to Y . Effectiveness admits of degree in at least two respects. First, something can be more or less effective with respect to a single end. For instance, a watch which keepss time to within 1 minute/month is more effective than a watch which 'Ileee;ps> time to within 2 minutes/month. Second, something can be more or less effective with respect to more than one end. For instance, an all-purpose hammer which can be used to bang in both 2" and finishing nails is a more effective a l l -purpose hammer than one which can only be used to bang in finishing nails. Because curricula are typically used to achieve more than one end, a curriculum can be more or less effective than another in either one or both of the respects noted above. Further, because curricula are typically used to get more than one person to learn something, a curriculum which gets a higher percentage of students to learn what it is intended they should learn than another is a more effective curriculum than the other. The standard of effectiveness used in evaluating something as a curricu-lum is imprecise. Two things can be said concerning it. First, if a curriculum is effective with respect to aM the ends for which it is used, with all students who follow it, it is an effective curriculum. Second, if a curriculum is not even partially effective with respect to any of the ends for which it is used, with none of the students who follow it, it is not an effective curriculum. A more precise statement of the standard of effectiveness used in evaluating some-thing as a curriculum is not possible because, within the above-mentioned limits, the standard depends on the kind of curriculum being evaluated. For instance, if something is being evaluated as a mastery curriculum, the standard would be very high. If, on the other hand, something is being evaluated as an art ap-preciation curriculum, we would expect the standard to be considerably lower. 3.2.2. Anything which is, is used or serves as, a means to some end, can be either an efficient or an inefficient means to that end. Efficiency is a good-making characteristic of things which serve as means. If X fulfills the standard of efficiency used in evaluating something as a means to Y , we have reason to suppose that X serves well as a means to Y . Conversely, if X does not fulf i l l the standard of efficiency, we have reason to suppose that X does not serve well as a means to Y . Efficiency admits of degrees in sevenal senses. A thing's efficiency is its ratio of useful work performed to the total energy expended ( C O . P . , p. 389). Thus, W is a more efficient means to Y than X if it performs more useful work than X using the same amount of energy, if using less energy it per-forms the same amount of useful work, and so on. For instance, a toaster which toasts more bread using the same amount of energy as another, toasts the same amount of bread using less energy, and so on, would be a more efficient toaster than the other. 43 The term "efficient" when applied to a curriculum refers to the ration of learning accomplished to the total energy expended. Though the energy may be that of a variety of things (e .g . , equipment used) and persons (e .g . , students, teachers, administrators, etc.), of primary concern would be the energy expended by teachers and students. Two considerations seem particularly relevant here: first, the total time involved in carrying out the activities a curriculum calls for; and, second, the difficulty of the work involved in the activities. ^ The standard of efficiency used in evaluating something as a curriculum is imprecise. Some things which curricula can be designed to get people to learn might take a life-time of hard work for most people to learn; whereas other things might take but a few hours of relatively easy wonk for most people to learn. For instance, if something is being evaluated as a curriculum designed to get people to learn how to do science, the standard of efficiency would be quite low. If, on the other hand, something is being evaluated as a curriculum designed to get someone to learn the multiplication tables, the standard of efficiency would be quite high. Within very wide limits, the standard of efficiency used in evalu-ating something as a curriculum depends on the kind of curriculum in question. 3.2.3 Effectiveness and efficiency are characteristics peculiarly associated with things which are, are used or serve as, a means to some end. That is, the terms "effective" and "efficient" are used to describe the manner in which things behave as means. Effectiveness and efficiency are good-making characteristics, but not the only good-making characteristics, of things which serve as means. For every point of view from which something serves as a means can be evaluated, there is at least one corresponding good- and bad-making characteristic of things which serve as means. To illustrate this point I will consider only one. The remarks I will make with reference to evaluating something which serves as a means from the economic point of view, can also be made with reference to evaluating something which serves as a means from any point of view. Anything which is, is used or serves as, a means to some end, can be either an economic or an uneconomic means to that end. Economy is a good-making characteristic of things which serve as means. If X fulfills the standard of economy used in evaluating something as a means to Y, we have reason to suppose that X serves well as a means to Y . Conversely, if X does not fulfi l l the standard of economy, we have reason to suppose that X does not serve well as a means to Y . Saying that something is an economic means to Y is not the same as saying it is an economic thing. X is an economic means to Y if within the class of all things which can be used as a means to Y , X is more economic than most. Because it is always possible that everything which can serve as a means to Y is an uneconomic thing, X may be both aneeconomic means to Y and an uneconomic thing. For instance, if Y is the placing of a man on the moon, that which is an economic means to Y , would not be an economic thing. The primary consideration here would be that in the class of all things which can have economic value a manned moon-shot would rank very low because the rate of return on investment, and perhaps also the amount of return on investment, would be very low. Thus, even the most economic manned moon-shot would not be an economic thing. Because the use of a curriculum can be very inexpensive; and because the return and, in some cases, the rate of return on investment can be very high; it is not plausible to suppose that an economic curriculum would not be an economic t.hing.bs^ V . V J . J noi be. cr. en.-,, J • ...i-ig. The standard of economy used in evaluating something as a curriculum is imprecise. To consider only one relevant factor, the use of some curricula can be very expensive, whereas the use of other curricula can involve little or no expense at a l l . For instance, a curriculum designed to be used to get some-one to learn how to operate television studio equipment might be very expensive, whereas a curriculum designed to be used to get someone to learn the alphabet might involve very little expense. In evaluating something as a curriculum of the first kind, the standard of economy would be very low; whereas in evaluating something as a curriculum of the second kind, the standard of economy would be considerably higher. Within very wide limits, then, the standard of economy used in evaluating something as a curriculum depends on the kind of curriculum in question. 3.2.4 There is one final standard used in evaluating things as means, but which requires a modest change in the language I have been using in order to be discussed. Rather than saying "X is a means to Y" we can say "Y is an effect of X " . This is the case because the term "means", as I have been using it, refers to a causal relationship. Thus, saying that "X is a means to Y " is the same as saying that "X is a or the cause of Y " . Saying that "X is a or the cause of Y " is the same as saying "Y is an effect of X " . Now, Y need 46 not be the only effect of X . If X, or the use of X, has effects other than the effects it is intended to have, I will term these "side-effects". The side-effects of X may be either desirable, undesirable, or neither. Desirable side-effects are good-making characteristics of things which serve as means. Conversely, undesirable side-effects are bad-making characteristics of things .which serve as means. If X has undesirable side-effects we have reason to suppose that X does not serve well as a means to Y . Conversely, if X has desirable side-effects we have reason to suppose that X serves well as a means to Y . The side-effects of X may be both desirable and bad things without contradiction because evaluating things as side-effects of the use of something is not the same as evaluating them on-the-whole. Consider the following. An instrument of torture is something which is designed to be used to inflict severe bodily pain. A side-effect of the use of an instrument of torture might be that the person being tortured dies. This would be a bad thing, but it need not be an undesirable side-effect. If the person takes considerable time to die, suffers severe bodily pain in doing so, tells his torturers; what they want to know, etc., his dying might be a desirable side-effect. Generally, whether a side-effect of X is desirable, undesirable, or neither, depends first on what X is intended to do and, second, and more importantly, on the context in which X is typically used. The first consideration is tr ivial. Consider the following: If we know that X is used for Y, the only side-effect of its use which is either necessarily desirable or undesirable is the converse of Y . The converse of Y is necessarily undesirable because it is given that X is used for Y . For instance, assuming that a hammer is used solely 47 to bang in nails, if its use results in a previously banged-in nail being pulled out, this would necessarily be an undesirable side-effect of its use. Similarly, if a curriculum used to initiate students into rational morality had the temporary effect of morally indoctrinating them, this would necessarily be an undesirable side-effect of its use. Aside from the above, whether a side-effect of the use of something is desirable, undesirable, or neither, depends on a complex set of human interests and desires which are affected by its use in a particular context. Though we use X to attain Y, there are other things which we commonly want, and do not want, to result from its use. For instance, though we use a hammer to bang in nails, we also want a hammer to be such that it can be used safely and, when used, does not split the wood. Injury to the user and damage to the wood are commonly thought to be undesirable side-effects of the use of a hammer and, if they resulted from using a hammer in the way in which it is intended to be used, they would be reasons for supposing that the hammer does not serve well as a means. Similarly, students forgetting what they have learned, or adopting the attitude that there is nothing more to learn, would commonly be thought to be undesirable side-effects of the use of a curriculum, and would thus be reasons for supposing that the curriculum does not serve well as a means. But, just as we can imagine contexts in which injury to the user (e .g . , he is a masochist) and splitting the wood (e .g . , it is the purpose for banging in the nail) would not be considered undesirable side-effects of the use of a hammer; we can imagine contexts in which students forgetting what they have learned and adopting the attitude that there is nothing more to learn would be considered desirable side-effects of the use of a curriculum. For instance, we can imagine a curriculum in a school for espionage agents where, once the students have mastered certain classified knowledge, which is only of value as a means to learning something else, their forgetting what they have learned would be considered a desirable side-effect of the use of the curriculum. Also, we can imagine a comprehensive and long-term curriculum, the use of which is a necessary means to a desirable national unity which, if it had the effect of students adopting the attitude that there is nothing more to learn, would have what would be considered a desirable side-effect. Curricula can be and are used in a myriad of contexts and, thus, what side-effects of their use count as desirable, undesirable, or neither, depends to a large extent on the particular context in which they are used. 3.3 Good as Something Learned The second of the two general standards used in curriculum evaluation is, lif, what is to be learned by the use of X is good as something learned, X is a good curriculum. If X is used to get someone to learn Y , and if Y ranks high within the class of all things that someone can be got to learn by the use of a curriculum, Y is good as something learned. Now, Y can be good as something learned for a variety of reasons. I will discuss four categories of reasons one might have for affirming or denying that Y is good as something learned, namely, intrinsic, inherent, contributive, and instrumental reasons. 3.3.1 Something is "intrinsically good" if it is "good in itself (Baylis, p. 443). If "learning" is a normative term,^ then, regardless of what "Y" refers to, learning Y is intrinsically good. Learning Y may be more or less in-trinsically good than learning Z, but neither can be intrinsically bad or intrin-sically neutral. If, on the other hand, "learning" is not a normative term, then learning Y may or may not be intrinsically good. Whether it is intrinsically good would depend on what "Y" refers to. At least some things that "Y" can refer to are intrinsically good. "For any entity to be intrinsically good it must have a non-derivative positive worth...It must not owe all its value to its relations to other valuable things" (Ibid). Learning how to do science or mathematics owes part but not all of its value to its relations to other valuable things. Learning how to do science or mathematics, then, is intrinsically valuable. 3.3.2 Inherently good things are "those things which derive their value from being objects of experiences which are intrinsically good" (Ibid). If by "experiences" is intended "sense experiences", and it is not clear that it is, learning Y cannot have inherent value because learning is not the sort of thing which can be the object of sense experiences. If by "experiences", however, is intended "mental experiences", then learning Y can have inherent value be-cause learning is the sort of thing that can be the object of mental experiences; that is, learning is the sort of thing that can be thought about. Even if learning Y can have inherent value, however, its doing so would not seem to be an important consideration in evaluating it as something learned. 50 3.3.3 Contributively good things are "those things which are necessary parts of a good whole" (Ibid, p. 442). Learning Y can have contributive value because learning something can be a necessary part of learning something else which is valuable. For instance, a necessary part of what is involved in know-ing how to read is knowing the alphabet. Learning the alphabet is contributively good, because it is a necessary part of something good, namely, learning how to read.^ To illustrate perhaps the most important aspect in which something can have contributive value as something learned, consider the following. Let X be a curriculum designed to be used to get someone to learn Y . Let us say further that learning Y necessarily involves learning a, b, and c. If learning Y is valuable, then learning either a, b, or c is contributively valuable. Now, we might imagine that X consists of three subordinate curricula, that is, curricula designed to get persons to learn a, b, and c. If, for instance, X is a mathe-mdthematics curriculum we can distinguish between kinds of mathematics curricula: first, part of what is involved in learning mathematics is more suitable for younger persons, and part is more suitable for older persons, and thus we distinguish bet-ween kinds of mathematics curricula according to the age of those who are intended to use them; and, second, for practical reasons we often distinguish between mathematics curricula on the basis of the branch of mathematics persons are intended to learn. Each of these kinds of mathematics curricula are designed to be used to get someone to learn something which is contributively valuable, because what is to be learned is a necessary part of something good, namely, learning mathematics. 3.3.4 "Instrumentally good things derive their value from the value of that to which they are a means" (Ibid). Learning Y may have instrumental value because learning is the sort of thing that can be a means to some end. Now, the thing to which learning Y is a means may be intrinsically, inherently, contributively, or instrumental ly good, or it may be good from a variety of points of view. For instance, if "Y" refers to appreciating literature, learning Y mayybe a means to intrinsically good experiences; if "Y" refers to painting, learning Y may be a means to producing inherently valuable works of art; if "Y" refers to constructing a spark plug, learning Y may be a means to construct-ing a spark plug, and thus be a means to something which is contributively valu-able; if "Y" refers to carpentry, learning Y may be a means to earning a dollar, which, in turn, may be a means to something good; and, finally, if "Y" refers to the law, medicine or dentistry, learning Y may be a means to practicing one of the three, which would certainly be good from the economic point of view, if not from other points of view.*' k Evaluating something as something learned is a complex activity. The above is an outline of the sorts of considerations that might be involved in carrying it out. 52 FOOTNOTES i l . The move from mechanical and electrical to human energy is more compli-cated than I indicate because the use of a curriculum may involve the expending of "mental energy" as well as physical energy. Because of its complexity I talk simply of the time involved in using a curriculum and, vaguely, the "difficulty" of the work involved. 2. For instance, "learning" is used normatively in contexts such as the following: "How is your son doing in school?" "He is doing well, thank you. He has learned a lot." 3. "Science, history, literary appreciation, philosophy, and other such cultural activities.. .can be, and to a large extent are, pursued for the sake of values intrinsic to them rather than for the sake of extrinsic ends" (Feters, p. 160). Though speaking of doing, rather than learning, science, history, etc., the same remarks made with reference to the former can be made with reference to the latter. (This qualification applies in footnotes 4 and 5 as well). 4. "Curriculum activities.. .such as science, history, literary appreciation, and poetry are 'serious'.. .(in part because they) contribute much to the quality of l ife" (Peters, p. 159). One can imagine a "good life" in which these are necessary parts. They would then, according to Baylis' use of the term "contributively", be contributively good. 5. More importantly, pursuing such activities as those mentioned in footnotes 3 and 4, "insensibly change a man's view of the world. A man who has read and digested Burke finds it difficult to look on Americans in quite the same way; his concept of jealousy develops overtones after seeing Othello. If he is also a trained scientist he scarcely sees the same world as his untrained contemporary; for he is being trained in modes of thought that cannot be tied down to particular times and places" (Peters, p. 160). 4. STAKE O N CURRICULUM EVALUATION Shake gives an account of what he thinks the curriculum evaluator should do. On his account he should pursue both evaluational and non-evaluational activities. The latter are |x> precede and form the basis upon which the former is to be done. The evaluation Stake would have the evalu-ator do is one from the point of view of local custom. 4.1 Description and Explanation There are two non-evaluational activities Stake thinks the curriculum evaluator should pursue: first, observation and description of the "educational activity" (1967a, p. 532), a part of which is observation and description of what happens when curricula are used to educate; and, second, research into and explanation of the educational activity, a part of which is research into and explanation of what happens when curricula are used to educate. First, consider the following: "iThe''purpose of educational evaluation is expository: to acquaint the audience with the workings of certain educators and their learners...A full evaluation re-sults in a story...It tells what happened" (1967b, p. 5). "Educational evaluation", as the term is used here, refers to the evaluation(?) of educational practice. It would include the evaluation of people as educators, 53 54 the evaluation of people as learners, and the evaluation of educational curricula. As our concern is with the third evaluation, the above can be reformulated as follows: the purpose of curriculum evaluation is expository: to acquaint the audience with the workings of certain educators and their learners which are  called for by a curriculum. A full curriculum evaluation results in a story. It tells what happened when a curriculum was used. The term "expository" means "descriptive; explanatory" ( C . O . D . , p. 427). A full evaluation, then, describes and explains what happens (generally), and a full curriculum evaluation describes and explains what happens when a curriculum is used. The phrase "what happened" is ambiguous. It might refer to the activities educators and learners pursued, the consequences of those.'- activities, or both. If the first is intended, describing and explaining what happened is describing the activities and explaining why they were engaged in. If, on the other hand, the second is intended, describing and explaining what happened is describing the consequences of the activities and explaining why they came about. If, finally, the third is intended, describing and explaining what happened is both the above. In order to discover what Stake intends by the phrase "what happened" I will consider two aspects of an evaluation he has made. "The TCity Evalu-ation" (1974) is an evaluation of the Twin City Institute of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota. A part of the evaluation is an evaluation of the courses conducted at the Institute. First, consider the following. Included under the heading "Class Aims and Accomplishments" (Ibid, p. 106), and in addition to the class title (."American Studies", Ibid), the names of the educators, and the number of learners, is the following: "Aims. To examine American experience as revealed through histories and art forms. To relate contemporary problems to American traditions and mores. "Sketch. Built a group, let it plan activities. Used thematic rather than chronological study of American events, followed such themes as 'the making of a president', 'packing the Supreme Court1, 'important American writers since 1945'. Took six field trips. "Comment. Sustained high leyel of interest and excite-ment. Students involved more in interpretation - often with too few facts - than in acquisition of facts. Teachers, students, were open, honest, about their bias and ignorance -a good scene." (Ibid). Under the heading "Aims" is a statement of the activities called for by a programme. It is not clear the programme is a curriculum, because it is not clear it is designed to be used to get someone to learn something. Under the heading "Sketch" is a description of the activities pursued in following the programme. It would appear that the programme was in fact followed because "following such themes as 'the making of a president', 'packing the Supreme Court', (and) 'important American writers since 1945' """would appear to instantiate the aim of "examin(ing) American experience as revealed through histories and art forms". Under the heading "Comment" is both a further des-cription of the activities pursued - they were pursued with "interest and excite-ment", "open(ly), honestly)" - and what appears to be an evaluation of the class from an unspecified point of view - the class is said to have been "a good scene". 56 Not included under any heading is a description of the consequences of pursuing the activities, or an explanation of why the consequences, if any, came about. Nor is there, at least explicitly, an explanation of why the activities were pursued. It is possible, of course, but not plausible, that the statements under the heading "Aims" are intended as such an explanation. That is to say, they were pursued because they are called for by the programme which was being used. Second, consider the following, made with reference to the Russian class at the Institute).'. "Aims. To experience, to ponder the Russian way of life -communication, incentives, political systems, culture. To learn some of the language through informal discussions, role playing, class projects. To send a group to visit the USSR. "Sketch. Using such activities as the coronation and pub-lication of a newspaper, the students became familiar with some Russian language and culture. "Comment. Teachers competent, industrious, ingenious, but the class too 'academic' for some students" (Ibid, p. 116). Under the heading "Aims" is a statement of the activities called for by a prog-ramme. The programme is a curriculum because it is designed to be used to get someone to learn something, namely, "some of the (Russian) language". Under the heading "Sketch" is both a description of the activities pursued in following the programme - "coronation (perhaps role-played) and publication of a news-paper" - and a description of the consequences of the activities - "the students became familiar with some Russian language and culture". Under the heading "Comment" is what appears to be an evaluation of the teachers - they are said to be "competent, industrious, ingenious" - and an evaluation of the class from the point of view of at least some of the students - it is said to have been "too 'academic" ". Not included, at least explicitly, under any heading, is an explanation of either why the activities were pursued, or why the consequences came about. However, though it is not reasonable to suppose that the "Aims" are intended as an explanation of why the activities were pursued, it is reasonable to suppose that "using such activities as the coronation and the publication of a newspaper" is intended as an explanation of why "the students became familiar with some Russian language and culture". The presumption, then, is that Stake thinks the evaluator should, first, describe both the activities educators and their learners pursue, and the con-sequences of pursuing those activities and, second, explain why the consequences came about. The evaluator should do this because, according to Stake, one of his purposes is the "understanding of the educational activity". "In the matter of selection of variables for evaluation, the evaluator must make a subjective decision. Obviously... he cannot look at all of them. The ones he rules out will be those that he assumes would not contribute to an under-standing of the educational activity" (1967a, p. 532). Elsewhere Stake says that one of the purposes of the evaluator is to "contribute to education" (Ibid, p. 524); "to contribute to (the) understanding (of the) substance (and) function (of an educational programme)" (1969, p. 370); and to 58 "creat(e) a better frame of reference for understanding educational programs" (Ibid, p. 371). 4.2 Evaluation Description and explanation are two, but not the only two, purposes of the educational evaluator. "The specialist sees himself as a 'describer', one who describes aptitudes and environments and accomplish-ments. The teacher...on the other hand, expect(s) an evaluator to grade something or someone as to merit. Neither sees evaluation broadly enough. Both descrip-tion and judgment are essential - in fact, "they are the two basic acts of evaluation" (1967a, p. 525). Elsewhere, "evaluation is the discovery of the nature and worth of something" (1969, p. ;370), and, thus, educational evaluation is the discovery of the nature and worth of "the educational activity". The educational evaluator should, according, to Stake, grade something (e .g . , a curriculum) or someone (e .g . , an educator) because one of his purposes should be to "find immediately relevant answers for decision making" (Ibid, p. 373), or to do that which "lead(s) to better decision making" (1967b, p. 5) in matters relating to education. By "better decision making" he means decisions which result in "better development, better selection, and better use of curricula" (Ibid). That is, "better" qualifies the decision made rather than the process of decision-making, though there is also the implication that the better the decision made the better the process of decision-making that preceded it. Decisions are to be made by someone other than the evaluator concerning the development, 59 selection and use of curricula. The evaluator's contribution to the decision-making process is seen to be that of "rating" curricula; that is, his "rating (is) to be used in making an educational decision" (1967:, p. 538). The third purpose of the educational evaluator, then, is said to be that of evaluating things and persons either used or concerned in education. The third purpose of the educational evaluator, as curriculum evaluator, then, is to evaluate curricula. 4.3 The Form of fhe Evaluation The purposes of description and evaluation are not, according to Stake, unrelated. An evaluation of something is to be based on the description given of it. Before considering from what point of view Stake thinks a curriculum should be evaluated, I will look at the main features of the description he would have the evaluator give of the use of a curriculum. From the description we can infer, to a certain extent, what standards he thinks appropriate in evaluating curricula and, thus, to a certain extent, the kind of evaluation he thinks the curriculum evaluator should do. Consider the following: "Whether the immediate purpose is description or judgment, three bodies of information should be tapped.. .antecedent, transaction, and outcome data" (1967a, pp. 527-28). An antecedent is "any condition existing prior to teaching and learning which may relate to outcomes" (Ibid, p. 528). Transactions are "the countless encounters of students with teachers, student with student, author with reader, parent with 60 counsellor - the succession of engagements which comprise the process of education" (Ibid). Outcomes are "the consequences of educating - immediate and long-range, cognitive and conative, personal and community-wide" (Ibid). If the immediate purpose is description, antecedent, transaction, and outcome data should be "classed as intents and observations" (Ibid). That is to say, a distinction should be drawn between intended and observed antecedents, transactions, and outcomes. On the "intent" side the evaluator is to describe, first, the setting or environment in which the curriculum is intended to be used; second, the activities which the curriculum calls for; and, third, the objectives of the curriculum. On the "observation" side the evaluator is to describe, first, the setting or environment in which the curriculum is actually used; second, the activities which are actually pursued; and, third, the consequences of pursuing these activities. Stake goes on to say, "For any educational program there are two principal ways of processing descriptive evaluation data: finding the contingencies among antecedents, transactions, and o u t -comes, and finding the congruence between Intents and Observations:" (Ibid, p. 533). Stake says "the data for a curriculum are congruent if what was intended actually happens. To be fully congruent the intended antecedents, transactions and out-comes would have to come to pass" (Ibid). Depending on whether the concern is with Intents or Observations, the "contingency criterion":is either logical or empirical. "Whenever Intents are evaluated the contingency criterion is one of logic" (Ibid, p. 534). For instance, the evaluator might ask, "Is there a logical connection between this (intended) event and this purpose?" (Ibid). That is to say, 61 is it logically possible for this activity to have the consequences called for in the objectives of the curriculum? If it is not possible, the evaluator has suf-ficient evidence, quite apart from empirical evidence, for affirming that when pursued the activity will not have the consequences it is intended to have. "Evaluation of observation contingencies", on the other hand, "depends on empirical data" (Ibid). For instance, "to say 'this arithmetic class progressed rapidly because the teacher was somewhat but not too sophisticated in mathematics' demands empirical data" (Ibid). In summary, with regard to Intents, the logical contingency criterion is fulfilled if it is logically possible for the objectives to be met by carrying out the intended activities in the intended setting; and, with regard to Observations, the empirical contingency criterion is fulfilled if the observed outcomes result from the activities which are actually carried out in the observed setting. Now, can we say fulfil l ing or failing to fulfi l l any of the three criteria gives us reason to suppose that a curriculum either is or is not good? First, if observed and intended antecedents and transactions are congruent, though we have reason to suppose both that the curriculum is being followed, and that an evalu-ation based in part on the results of its use is a fair evaluation, we do not have reason to suppose the curriculum is either good or bad. Conversely, if observed and intended antecedents and transactions are not congruent, though we have reason to suppose both that the curriculum is not being followed, and that an evaluation based in part on the consequences of the activities pursued is not a fair evaluation, we do not have reason to suppose the curriculum is either good or bad. 62 If, however, observed and intended outcomes are congruent, we have a necessary, but not sufficient, reason to suppose the curriculum is good because its use is effective with respect to the ends for which it is designed to be used. If its use is effective we have reason to suppose that it serves well as a means and, thus, that it is good from, amongst others, the point of view of a curricu-lum. If, on the other hand, observed and intended outcomes are not congruent, we might have reason to suppose the curriculum is either good or bad, depend-ing on why there is a lack of congruence. Congruence of outcomes is lacking if, first, only some of the intended outcomes are observed to come about or, second, all the intended, plus other, outcomes are observed to come about. If the former is the case we have reason to suppose the curriculum is not good because its use is not effective with respect to its ends; whereas, if the latter is the case, we have reason to suppose the curriculum is good because its use is effective with respect to its ends. The additional- or side-effects being either desirable or undesirable would give us reason to suppose the curriculum is either good or bad, but failure to meet the congruency criterion, in the sense under discussion, does not imply that the side-effects are either desirable or undesirable. Second, if the logical contingency criterion is fulfi l led, if, that is, it is logically possible for the intended outcomes to result from pursuing the intended transactions in the intended setting, we do not have reason to suppose the curriculum is either good or bad. Though they may come about when the curriculum is used, they may not. If, however, the logical contingency criterion is not fulfi l led, we have reason to suppose the curriculum is not good because it is logically impossible for it to be effective with respect to the ends for 63 which it is designed to be used. Third, if the empirical contingency criterion is fulfi l led, if, that is, observed outcomes result from pursuing the observed transactions in the observed setting, we may or may not have reason to suppose the curriculum is good, depending on whether observed and intended antecedents, transactions, and out-comes are congruent. Similarly, if the empirical contingency criterion is not fulfi l led, we may or may not have reason to suppose the curriculum is good, depending on several factors. I will illustrate this point by considering only one. Assuming that observed and intended antecedents, transactions and outcomes are congruent, even if the outcomes resulted from something other than the use of the curriculum the curriculum may yet be effective. It might be that the curriculum called for students to learn Y, but that the students with whom it was actually used already knew Y before they started following the curriculum. Yet it might still be that, by using the curriculum in question, students not already knowing Y could learn Y . Such a curriculum would be effective with respect to its ends. On the basis of the description Stake would have the evaluator give, we can infer no more than that he thinks the effectiveness of a curriculum with respect to the ends for which it is designed to be used is a relevant consideration in evaluating it. Effectiveness is one of the specific standards we have shown to be used in evaluating a programme of activities as a means of getting some-one to learn something; and evaluating a programme of activities as a means is one of the two general standards we have shown to be used in evaluating some-thing from the point of view of a curriculum. It might be, then, that Stake would have the evaluator give the above description of the use of a curriculum 64 as a necessary preliminary to evaluating it from the point of view of a curriculum. Effectiveness, however, is not, according to Stake, the only relevant consideration in evaluating a curriculum. Though the evaluator "should give primary attention to the variables specifically indicated by the educator's objec-tives...he must.. .search for unwanted side effects and incidental gains (as well)" (1967a, p. 532). This is a second specific standard we have shown to be used in evaluating a programme of activities as a means and, thus, is a second reason to suggest that Stake would have a curriculum evaluated from the point of view of a curriculum. The above is a part, but not a l l , of what Stake would have the evalu-ator do. So far no mention has been made of the point of view from which he would have the objectives of a curriculum evaluated. If our assumption is correct, if, that is, Stake would have the evaluator evaluate curricula from the point of view of a curriculum, he must, as we have seen, have him evaluate the objectives from the point of view of something learned. This, however, as we will now see, is not the sort of evaluation Stake has in mind. 4.4 The Content of the Evaluation The aspect of Stake's work I will now be considering admits of two interpretations: either he is talking about the standards to be used in evaluating the objectives of a curriculum, or about the procedures to be followed in making such an evaluation. I will show^ifr'sktthdt^fttaken as talk about procedures, what he says is not reasonable; and, second, taken as talk about standards, what he says, though reasonable, is inadequate. First, consider the following. "Evaluators will seek out and record the opinions of persons of special qualifications. These opinions, though subjective, can be very useful, and can be gathered objectively, independent of the solicitor's opinions. A responsibility for processing judgments is much more acceptable to the evaluation specialist than one of rendering judgments himself" (Ibid, p. 526-27). In passing it should be noted that, depending on what Stake intends by "proces-sing judgments", he may or may not be saying that the evaluator should evaluate curricula. If the evaluator is intended to agree or disagree with the judgments of "persons of special qualifications", then it is intended that he should. If, on the other hand, the evaluator is intended simply to record their judgments, then it is not intended that he evaluate curricula. As we will see, Stake intends the former. Now, depending on what Stake intends by "Bersons of special qual if i-cations", regardless of who is to do the evaluating, the suggested procedure for evaluation may or may not be reasonable. Consider the following. A department chairman is asked to eval'oate^ a student for a committee of another university to which the student has applied for admission. The department chairman, however, having never taught the student, has no fInst-hand knowledge relevant to evalua-ting him. In this case we would expect, and think it reasonable, that he seek the opinion of the student's advisor and others who have recently taught him. They have "special qualifications" in the sense that they have knowledge relevant to the determination of how well in the past the student has performed. Suitably qualified it would be reasonable for the department chairman to agree with, or simply to record, these opinions. One person with special qualifications Stake says the curriculum evalu-ator should consult is the "subject-matter specialist" (Ibid, p. 527). A subject-matter specialist might be able to tell the evaluator whether the use of the sort of subject-matter, or content, a curriculum has is likely to be such that the objectives of the curriculum will be met. If the evaluator has good reasons for trusting his judgment he might agree with or simply record it. Given the diff i-culty of making a reasonable judgment of this kind, the evaluator might be well advised to follow such a procedure. But, the subject-matter specialist is not the only person with special qualifications Stake thinks the evaluator should consult. "(There are) five groups having important opinions on education: spokesmen for society at large, subject-matter specialists, teachers, parents, and the students themselves. Members of these and other groups are judges who should be heard...An evaluation of a school program should portray the merit and fault per-ceived by well-identified groups, systemmatically processed and collected" (Ibid). Whereas it was plausible to assume that the subject-matter specialist might have special qualifications to make an evaluation of a curriculum's subject-matter, with his inclusion with teachers and students, and especially with parents and spokesmen for society, it is clear that the special qualifications Stake has in mind are not of a sort that makes it reasonable for the evaluator, at least if he is evaluating from the point of view of a curriculum, to follow the suggested procedure. The special qualifications these four groups seem to have is that 67 they are all affected, at least potentially, by the choice to adopt a particular curriculum. Though it might be a good thing that they be party to such a decision, the relationship between what they think to be a good curriculum and what is in fact a good curriculum would merelyebe accidental. If the evaluator's intention is to evaluate from the point of view of a curriculum, then, it would not be reasonable for him to follow this procedure. According to Stake, however, the evaluator is not to evaluate from the point of view of a curriculum; which becomes clear when we consider the above, which is apparently talk about procedure, in the context of the following: "Two bases of values analysis suggest themselves to the evaluator: (1) a logical basis to check on the reason-ableness of the selection of objectives, given a certain value position; and (2) an empirical basis to see how broadly (e .g . , in the community, among the faculty.. .) certain value positions are held and how desirable certain objectives are perceived to be" (1970, p. 183). In (1) the evaluator is said to ask, Do the objectives follow logically from "a given value position"? (or, From what value position can the objectives be deduced?); and in (2) he is said to ask, Is the value position from which the objectives can be deduced held "broadly" in the community and faculty? (or, Do the objectives follow logically from the value position held broadly in the community and faculty?). This implies that Stake would have the evaluator evaluate the objec-tives of a curriculum from the point of view of (lo'cal) custom, which is one, but not the most important, of the eight "basic" points of view Taylor lists (p. 300). Though the object of evaluation here is said to be the objectives of a curriculum, it is possible that Stake would also have the side-effects of the use 68 of a curriculum evaluated from the point of view of local custom. If this is correct, then by "unwanted side-effects and incidental gains" (above, p. 64) Stake means "side-effects which, in context, are either desirable or undesirable from the point of view of local custom", that is to say, side-effects unwanted by the community and faculty, and incidental effects which are considered gains by the community and faculty. Generalizing Staked view in this way is at least consistent with the following generalization he himself makes. His comments are made in the context of a criticism of Scriven's account of curriculum evaluation. "Scriven did not, unfortunately, say that judgment data should be treated as the social psychologist would treat 'preferences'... He did not even say that the educator should receive an objective report as to what values are placed on various things by various groups. He did say that curriculum and instruction should be subjected to values analyses such as the philosopher might employ... Scriven prefers logical analysis to empirical. Stake (1967a) voted for empiricism, urging the development of a social-science based technology to handle judgment data" (1970, p. 187). Stake, then, would have the evaluator evaluate curricula from the point of view of local custom. He is to determine whether the objectives of a curriculum follow from values held widely amongst both the faculty of the institution in which the curriculum is being used, and the members of the com-munity in which the institution is situated. If the objectives can be so deduced, they are good. If not, they are not good. Assuming that effectiveness in most communities is considered a good-making characteristic of curricula, Stake would have the evaluator evaluate curricula from the point of view of local custom. 69 4.5 Conclusion Stake's account of evaluating curricula is in several important respects incomplete. We have seen (section 4.2) that he intends his account to be of an evaluation of curricula made in a certain context, primarily one in which the evaluator has a role to play in deciding what curricula schools should adopt. As there is nothing in the account to suggest that the evaluator's role is to be limited to making only one kind of evaluation, it is open to the criticism of being incomplete. On his account it is possible, even likely, that the evaluator should recommend for adoption by a school a curriculum which calls for, to give only four examples, immoral, i l legal, or uneconomic activities, or which serves as a means to getting students to learn something which is not good as some-thing learned. Though a curriculum's being good from the point of view of local custom gives us a reason to suppose that it is good on-the^whole, it does not give us sufficient reason. Because there is no inconsistency in affirming that something is both good from the point of view of local customs and immoral, illegal and uneconomic; and because it can be argued that all three of the latter considerations should be given greater weight than the former in evaluating some-thing on-the-whole; it is possible, and perhaps likely that, according to Stake, the evaluator should recommend for adoption by a school a curriculum which is bad on-the-whole. Stake's account of evaluating curricula, then, is significantly incomplete. 70 5. SCRIVEN O N CURRICULUM EVALUATION Scriven gives an account of what he thinks the curriculum evaluator should do. What he should do, according to Scriven, is evaluate, that is, determine the value, worth, or merit of, curricula. One, but not the only, evaluation he should do is an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum. 5.1 Two Senses of "Evaluation" Scriven distinguishes between a normative and a non-normative sense of "evaluation", and thus between a normative and a non-normative sense of "curriculum evaluation". His purpose is to indicate that his is an account of "curriculum evaluation" in its normative sense. Scriven distinguishes between "evaluation" in the sense of "judg((ing) merit or worth" and "evaluation" in the sense in which it is used when we speak of "evaluating a situation". "Although the typical goals of evaluation require judg-ment of merit or worth, when somebody is asked to evaluate a situation or the impact of certain kinds of materials on the market then what is being called for is an analytical description of the process, usually with respect to certain possible causal connections, indeed an interpretation... In this sense it is not inappropriate to regard some kinds of process research as evaluation" (1967, p. 49). 70 71 "Evaluation" in the first sense "must produce...a judgment of value, merit, or worth" (1974, p. 4). "Evaluation" in the second sense makes "no attempt... to justify any correlative assignments of merit" (1967, p. 50). "Curriculum evaluation", used normatively, refers to the activity or activities which have as theirr upshot judgments of the value, merit, or worth of curricula. "Curriculum evaluation", used non-normatively, refers to the activity of describing what happens when a curriculum is used, that is, describing both the activities involved in using a curriculum, and the effects of those activities. The activities to which the two senses of "evaluation" refer, are not unrelated. An evaluation (normative) which either is or involves evaluating some-thing as a means to certain ends or goals, must involve determining whether the thing or its use is effective with respect to its ends or goals. But, determining effectiveness can not be all that is involved in evaluations of this kind. "Evaluation proper must include, as an equal partner with the measurement of performance against goals, procedures for the evaluation of goals. That is, if it is to have any reference to goals at a l l " (1967, p. 53). (1) Evaluating a situation may involve determining whether the performance of some-thing in the situation achieves certain goals. "Evaluation" in the sense indicated here is non-normative. A related normative evaluation would be, according to Scriven, that the thing in question achieves either good or bad goals. Such would be an "instrumental evaluation" in the sense in which Lewis and Baylis use the term. Because a curriculum is something which is used to achieve certain ends or goals, an evaluation (normative) which is related to evaluating the situation in 72 which a curriculum is used, would be an evaluation of the goals of the curriculum. Further, such an evaluation is, according to Scriven, a necessary part of any "proper" evaluation of curricula. I will now consider four accounts of curriculum evaluation Scriven has given. Needless to say, they are accounts of "curriculum evaluation" in its normative sense. 5.2 The First Account "Evaluation is. . .a(n) activity which.. .consists simply in the gathering and confirming of performance data with a weighted set of (criterion) scales to yield either compar-ative or numerical ratings, and a justification of (a) the data-gathering instruments, (b) the weightings, and ( cp the selection of (criteria)" (Ibid, p. 40). (2) In evaluating curricula, then, we want to know how well they perform. The first thing the evaluator must ask is, How did the curriculum perform? To answer this question he gathers and confirms performance data. The second thing he must ask is, Did the curriculum perform well? To answer this question he compares its actual performance with the critieria of good performance. If it fulfills the criteria the curriculum performs well. If not, it does not perform wel l . If more than one criterion is involved, and if the performance of the curriculum fulfills some but not all of them, then, depending on the weights assigned to the criteria, the curriculum may or may not have performed wel l . If, to give but one example, the curriculum fulfills all but one lightly weighted criterion, then on-the-whole it performs wel l . 73 The third thing the evaluator must ask is, Are the criteria I have used appropriate or justified? Elsewhere Scriven says both that the appropriate criterion is one of need (see below, section 5.5), and that the appropriate criteria are, roughly, those used in evaluating something from the point of view of a curricu-lum (see below, section 5.4). Finally, the fourth question the evaluator must ask is, Are the weightings I have assigned to the criteria appropriate or justified? Elsewhere Scriven says both that, if we assume the criteria are deducible from the criterion of need, their weightings are justified by appeal to the criterion of need (see below, section 5.5), and that criteria relating to the effects of the use of a curriculum on students are to be given greater weight than criteria relating to the effects of its use on institutions, and persons other than students (see below, section 5.4). Because a failure either to select the appropriate criteria, or to give the criteria selected their proper weightings, can lead to an unjustified conclusion concerning a curriculum's worth, the evaluator must answer the third and fourth questions Scriven poses. For instance, assuming that effectiveness is an appropriate criterion to use in evaluating curricula, an inappropriate weight-ing would lead to an unjustified conclusion, if it is affirmed, that a curriculum performed well even though it failed conspicuously to be effective with respect to the ends for which it is designed to be used. The above is a formal statement of what must be involved in evaluating something or someone as a performer. Without content it is incomplete. It will have content when the criteria and weightings used in the evaluation are given. Scriven begins the process of adding content in the next account. 74 5.3 The Second Account In "General Strategies in Evaluation" (1972b), under the heading "Summary of the Evaluator's Task" (Ibid, p. 190), Scriven says, "Al l he needs to do is to judge how well the project succeeded in attaining its stated goals and side-effects, whether the project should have been tried, and whether others can do or have done better" (Ibid). Assuming that the "project" referred to is a curriculum project, the evaluator is to ask, (a) Is the use of the curriculum effective with respect to its stated goals? (b) What, if any, desirable or undesirable side-effects does its use have? (c) Should the project have been tried? and (d) Can others do or have others done better? If the use of the curriculum is effective with respect to its goals; if, for example, its use has important desirable, but no important undesirable, side-effects; if the project should have been tried; and if no one else can do, or has done, better; then it is good. (a) and (b) are relevant considerations in determining whether the curricu-lum serves well as a means, (a) and (b), then, are relevant considerations in evaluating a curriculum from, amongst others, the point of view of a curriculum. The relevance of (c) and (d), however, is somewhat obscurebscure First, it is not obvious that the fact that a curriculum project should have been tried gives us reason to suppose that, regardless of the point of view from which it is being evaluated, its product is good. Clearly it depends on the reason for saying it should have been tried. Two reasons which might be given are that funds are available and cannot be used for any more worthy project. But, that such funds should be spent on the project need not give us reason to suppose that its product will be good. First, the project might only be the best of a bad lot for which the funds are available; and, second, and more important, even if the project is the best of a good lot, it might fail to produce a good product. A justified project need not produce a good product. Taken literally, (c) is not a relevant consideration in determining the worth of a curriculum. Suitably interpreted, however, it is relevant. The follow ing is what I think Scriven has in mind. In justifying a curriculum project the ' principal consideration would be the value of the proposed curriculum's objectives. Though a proposed curriculum project might be unjustified even if the objectives of the curriculum are good, if the objectives are bad then the project cannot be justified. On this interpretation, the evaluator is to ask, (c!) Are the objectives of the curriculum good? (c), then, is relevant to evaluating curricula from, amongst others, the point of view of a curriculum. By (d) "whether others can do or have done better", I take it that Scriven means, "whether others can do or have done better in developing a  curriculum with the same objectives". Others can do or have done better, then, if they can or have developed a curriculum which serves better as a means to the objectives in question. Now, in (a) and (b), Scriven would have the evaluator do a grading evaluation of the curriculum as a means. The evaluator is to ask "how well (did)) the project succeed in attaining its stated goals and side-effects" Here, the evaluator is to do a ranking evaluation of the curriculum as a means. The class of comparison he is to use is either all actual curricula, or all possible curricula, with the same objectives. Though the first is not a plausible interpretation of Scriven's intent, if the class of comparison is all possible curricula, ranking high within the class would imply that the curriculum in question serves well as a means; and, thus, (d) would be redundant, merely a re-statement of (a) and (b). I think in (d) Scriven intends that the evaluator should do a ranking evaluation. I do not think, however, that it is either; of the two ranking evalur ations he mentions. Consider the following. "It is tempting to cheer up a group of hard-working educators by telling them that their project was tremendously successful in that it achieved its (desir-able) goals with 98 per cent of the students enrolled. But, if the evidence suggests there are faster and cheaper ways to achieve the goals, with desirable affective side-effects, can you really say it was a worthwhile project? (1972b, p. 191). (emphasis mine) Here, the class of comparison used in ranking curricula with regard to how well they achieve certain goals is not all curricula which have been used to achieve the goals, nor is it all curricula which can be imagined to achieve the goals; rather it is all curricula which have been imagined, presumably by the evaluator, to achieve the goals. The point Scriven is making is a practical one. If the evaluator knows of, or can imagine, a curriculum which would serve better as a means to the objectives of the curriculum being evaluated, he should not recom-mend that the latter be adopted by his client. To summarize, the evaluator should, (a) and (b), grade a curriculum as a means to the ends for which it is designed to be used; (c) evaluate the ends; and (d) rank the curriculum as a means within the class of all curricula which have or have been imagined to serve as a means to the ends in question. Because it is not clear from what point or points of view the side-effects and ends are to be evaluated, it is not yet clear what kind or kinds of instrumental evaluation Scriven is recommending. 5.4 The Third Account In "The Methodology of Evaluation" (1967) Scriven gives three lists of what he cal Is""criteria of educational achievement for evaluation studies" (Ibid, pp. 72-80). As he entitles the second "Secondary Effects", it can be inferred that the first is a list of Primary Effects. There are five categories of primary effects and they are said to be based on Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives. A . Primary Effects. 1. Knowledge, of 2. Comprehension or Understanding, of 33. Motivation 4. Nonmental abilities 5. Noneducational variables B. Secondary Effects. 1. Effects on teachers 2. Effects on other students 3. Effects on other teachers 4. Effects on administrators 5. Effects on parents 6. Effects on the school or college 7. Effects on taxpayers 78 C . Other Considerations. 1. Range of applicability 2. The importance of improvement of education in that range 3. Costs in dollars or some other valuables 4. Moral considerations First, some points of clarification. As the above are said to be "criteria of educational achievement", it can be inferred that Scriven intends curricula to be evaluated from the point of view of an educational curriculum. Because a curriculum need not be designed to educate someone, and because evaluating a non-educational curriculum from the point of view of an educational curriculum would not be a fair evaluation, it can further be inferred that Scriven intends his checklist to be used to evaluate educational curricula. Notice, how-ever, Scriven does not intend his checklist to be used to evaluate aJJ^  educational curricula. The criteria are to be used to evaluate educational curricula used in public schools or colleges (thus, B.7, effects on taxpayers, and B.6, effects on the school or college). The second point of clarification concerns the distinctions between the three classes of criteria. First, the distinction between primary and secondary effects is relatively clear. As the class of secondary effects includes, B . l , effects on teachers, B.3, effects on other teachers, and B.2, effects on other students, it can be assumed that the class of primary effects includes a l l , and only those, effects on students who use the curriculum being evaluated. A l l other effects of the use of the curriculum, which are relevant to evaluating it, are classed as either "secondary effects" or "other considerations". 79 Second, the distinction between "secondary effects" and "other considera-tions" is somewhat less clear. Thus, C . l , Range of applicability, would seem to call for a determination of the potential the curriculum has for having effects classed as "primary" and "secondary" at institutions other than the one in which it is being evaluated; C.2, The importance of improvement of education in that range, would seem to call for a determination of the desirability or undesirability of these potential effects; C .3 , Costs in dollars or some other valuables, would seem to call for a determination of the economic effects of the use of the curriculum on taxpayers, the school or college and, perhaps, also on students and parents; and C.4, Moral considerations, would seem to ca l l , at least in part, for a determina-tion of the effects of the use of the curriculum on all individuals mentioned jin A and B. Notice, however, C.3 and C.4 involve considering more than just the effects of the use of the curriculum. For instance, the cost of purchasing rights to the curriculum is not, and the morality of the activities which it calls for, at least in part, is not, determined by considering the effects of the use of the curriculum. I think it can be assumed, then, in the class of "other considera-tions" Scriven has included considerations which he thinks should be mentioned, but which, because they include more than just a consideration of effects of the use of the curriculum, do not fit happily into either of his first two classes. Finally, it can be assumed that in distinguishing between primary and secondary effects, if not necessarily between these two and "other considerations", Scriven is distinguishing between criteria which are to be given greater and lesser weight in evaluating something from the point of view of an educational curriculum. 80 With these points of clarification in mind, it is time to consider whether the criteria of educational achievement Scriven mentions are adequate as criteria for evaluating something as an educational curriculum used in the context of a public school or college. That is, to refer back to Scriven's first account (section 5.2): Are all criteria mentioned relevant?; Are all relevant criteria mentioned?; and Are the weightings to be assigned to the criteria appropriate? In answer to the first question it can be said that all criteria Scriven mentions,>i are indeed relevant. A . l , Knowledge, of, and A . 2 , Comprehension or understanding, of, are relevant in determining, first, whether the use of the curri-culum is effective with respect to the ends for which it is designed to be used, and, second, whether the ends are good as something learned, in the context of 3 education. A . 3 through C.2 are relevant in determining whether the use of the curriculum in a public school or college has desirable or undesirable side-effects, and thus, in determining how well the curriculum serves as a means. Finally, C.3 and C.4 (cost and moral considerations) are also relevant in determining how well the curriculum serves as a means. The criteria Scriven mentions, then, are all relevant in evaluating from the point of view of an educational curriculum. Though all criteria mentioned are relevant, not all relevant criteria are mentioned. No mention is made of the time involved in achieving the desired effects or, at least explicitly, of the activities which the curriculum calls for and are intended as the means of achieving the desired effects. We have already said that C.3 and C.4 (cost and moral considerations) involve more than just a consideration of the effects of the use of the curriculum. In fact, they may be intended, at least in part, to indicate that the activities are to be evaluated from the economic and the moral points of view, evaluations which involve more than just a consideration of effects. Morally good and economic activities, how-ever, need not be good on-the-whole activities. If they are, to mention but two examples, illegal and contrary to local custom, they might be bad on-the-whole. Scriven, then, does not mention all the relevant criteria, because a cur-riculum which fulfills all the criteria he does mention, but which is inefficient and calls for activities which are both illegal and contrary to local custom, may not be, and most likely is not, a good educational curriculum. In answer to the third question, it can be said that the weightings to be assigned to the criteria are not appropriate. First, that something is an effect on a student who uses the curriculum ( i . e . , a primary effect) is not a sufficient reason to give it greater weight than other considerations ( i . e . , secondary effects and, in part, "other considerations"). Consider, even if the use of a curriculum succeeded in educating those students who used it, if its use is immoral because of the effects it has on persons other than the students, it would not be a good educational curriculum. A second curriculum which did not succeed as well in educating those students who used it, but which did not have morally undesirable side-effects, would be a better educational curriculum. Second, it seems sensible to take the distinction between "other con-siderations" and the other two categories (primary and secondary effects), to have been made primarily on the grounds of whether or not the criteria in the category refer to the effects of the use of the curriculum. But that something is such an effect is not a sufficient reason to give it a greater weight than other considera-tions. Suppose that a curriculum which calls for some students to trick other 82 students into locking themselves in their homes, and keep them there for a short time under the threat of dire punishment if they should attempt to escape, which activities, say, are a means of getting the imprisoned students to appreciate the perfidy of such actions, would not be a good educational curriculum. But, notice, the activities the curriculum calls for might be considered immoral, not, at least primarily, because of their consequences, but mainly because of what they are, namely, actions which impinge on the freedom of others. A curriculum which is less successful in getting students to appreciate the perfidy/ of such actions, but which does not call for activities which are in themselves immoral, is a better curriculum. If I am correct in inferring the grounds for drawing the distinctions, then, the weightings Scriven would assign to the classes of criteria are inapprop-riate: that is to say, the criteria classed as "primary effects" should not neces-sarily be given greater weight than those classed as "secondary effects"; and those classed as either "primary" or "secondary" effects should not necessarily be given greater weight than those classed as "other considerations". Though the point of using a curriculum is to have effects on students, other considerations, as we have seen, can and, in certain circumstances do, take precedence. 5.5 The Fourth Account In "Evaluation Perpectives and Procedures" (1974) Scriven gives a thirteen-point checklist which he says "can be used to evaluate almost any product to which the language refers" (Ibid, p. 7). Specifically, it "provides an extremely versatile instrument for determining the quality of all kinds of educational activities 83 and products" (Ibid). Before considering the: details of the checklist, there are two general points that should be made. First, the checklist is designed to be used to evalu-ate "products", that is, things which are describable as "things produced". Because a curriculum is a thing produced, the checklist can be used to evaluate a curriculum. But, notice, if the checklist is designed to be used to evaluate "almost any product", we should not expect any of the checkpoints to refer to a specific product, for instance, a curriculum. Thus, we should not expect that the checklist is designed to be used to evaluate things as curricula. The second general point to be made is that the checklist is designed to be used to make at least two evaluations. Consider, Scriven says "top scores (on a checkpoint) require good evidence of good performance; the bottom score implies that either good evidence or good performance is lacking" (Ibid, p. 23). Using the checklist one first makes an evaluation of the data and "if the prod-uct passes this preliminary inspection, you then ask how well it! did" (Ibid, p. 12). If an evaluator does not have good evidence upon which to base his judgment of the product's worth, any judgment he makes is open to question. This is not, however, the conclusion Scriven draws. He says "Every checkpoint on the checklist has a clear a priori rationale.. .That is, a straightforward argument can be constructed that failure to meet any one of the check-points immediately leaves open a serious doubt that the  product is simply not of good quality" (Ibid, p. 7). (emphasis mine) But, depending on the reason for failure, failure to meet a checkpoint may or may not leave open doubt that the product is good. If a product fails to meet a 84 checkpoint because good performance is lacking, assuming that the rationale for the checkpoint is sound, we would have such a reason. If, on the other hand, a product fails to meet a checkpoint because good evidence is lacking, we would not have reason to suppose that it is not good. In the context of an evaluation, a lack of good evidence implies there is not good reason to suppose that the thing being evaluated is either good or bad, and thus, there is not good reason to sup-pose that it is bad. My concern is with the evaluation of products, not with the evaluation of data upon which the former evaluation is based. For my purposes, then, the only grounds for asserting that a product has failed to meet a checkpoint will be that it has not performed wel l . The thirteen items in the checklist fall naturally into five categories: A . Preconditions. "Checkpoints 1 and 2 (need and market) are the preconditions, without which nothing will have value" (Ibid, p. 12). B. Performance. Checkpoints 3-10 apparently measure different aspects of a product's performance. The evaluator is to ask "how well (the product) did on items 3-10, rated against need and market con-siderations" (Ibid). C. Educational significance. "A synthesis of items 1-10.. .provides the score for checkpoint 11 (educational significance).. .which is a big pay-off checkpoint" (Ibid). D. Cost-effectiveness. "When you look at cost and combine it with item 11 to give cost-effectiveness, you have arrived at checkpoint 12 (the other major indicator)" (Ibid). E. Post-marketing support. Checkpoint 13, post-marketing support, is said to be "an important further desideratum that bears on continued pro-duction" (Ibid). It is "desirable rather than necessary" (Ibid, p. 21). Briefly, the evaluator is to ask, first, Is the product designed to be used to "satisf(y) a genuine need or at least a defensible want"? (Ibid, p. 12); second, Is there a "demonstrably reachable market" (Ibid, p. 14) for the productl third, for our purposes, Does the product serve well as a means to the ends for which it is designed to be used ,?;f<founth/ Is the product educationally signifi-cant? (that is, does it serve well as a means of satisfying an educational need in a large and important market? (see Ibid, p. 14); fifth, What costs are in -volved in using the product?; and sixth, What post-marketing support would be required by a purchaser of the product? The first thing to notice is that the checklist is to be used in making some kind of instrumental evaluation of a product. Under the heading "causation (checkpoint 9) (Ibid, p. 16) Scriven says, "one way or another it must be shown that the effects reported could not reasonably be attributed to something other than the treatment or product" (Ibid) (emphasis mine). Further, under the heading "side-effects" (checkpoint 7) (Ibid), he says "there must be a systematic, skilled, independent search for side-effects during, at the end of, and after the 'treatment'" (Ibid). The products which the checklist is to be used to evaluate, then, are such that they have, or when used they have, effects; and further, evaluating them involves evaluating them as things which have, or when used have, effects. The checklist, then, is to be used to evaluate products as things which serve or are used as instruments. T h . . : ",s e .vH*-nc:e rc> . . . f86 Though it is clear the checklist is to be used to make an instrumental evaluation, it is not clear what kind of instrumental evaluation. First, consider the possibility that it is intended to be used to make evaluations of things as educational instruments. There is evidence to support this contention: first, in rating a product against checkpoint 11 the evaluator is to ask, Is the product educationally significant?, that is, does it serve well as a means to satisfying an educational need in a large and important market?; and, second, under the heading "process" (checkpoint 8) (Ibid), Scriven says that process observation, that is, observation of the use of the product, "is necessary even though the pay-off emphasis is of primary importance. It may substantiate or invalidate (a) certain descriptions of the product, (b) the causal claims involved in evaluation (that the gains were due to the treatment), or (c) it may bear on moral questions that have pre-emptive force in any social interaction such as education" (Ibid). It is not clear that Scriven is thinking of products used in any social interaction, and giv-ing as an example products used in education; or of products used in education, and noting that because education is a form of social interaction, moral considera-tions are relevant in evaluating educational products. The latter, however, would seem to be the more plausible alternative. Conversely, there is evidence to suggest that the checklist, rather than being intended to be used in evaluating things as! educational instruments, is intended to be used simply to evaluate things as instruments. Scriven says that if a product "satisfies a genuine need or at least a defensible want" (Ibid, p. 12), and if the need or want in question is "important" (Ibid, p. 13), then the product fulfills the need checkpoint. The parallel between "genuine need" and "defensible want" suggests that a "genuine need" is a valuable someone lacks, or at least would lack if it were not for the existence of the product being evaluated. Scriven goes on to give "survival" and "health" (Ibid) as examples of genuine needs, and says that a need is more important than another need if, for example, it has greater "social significance (compensatory justice or some other factor)" (Ibid), greater "urgency" (Ibid), or greater "possible multiplicative effects (for example, the need for tool skills is not just a function of immediate utility but also of how much other accomplishments depend on them)" (Ibid). As stated, none of these is an example of an educational need. Survival, health, social justice, and tool skills, which are trained rather than educated, are perhaps all needs, but they are not educational needs. The wide range of examples given suggests that rather than using the checklist to evaluate things as educational instruments, it is to be used simply to evaluate things as instruments. Though the checklist must be used to do either a simple instrumental evaluation, or an evaluation of something as an educational instrument, but not both, it can be used to do either of the above and another kind of evaluation, namely, an evaluation from the economic point of view. Checkpoint 11 (cost) can be used in any one of the three above-mentioned evaluations, but check-point 2 (market) can only be used in the third. Whereas cost can be a considera tion in either an economic evaluation, or an evaluation of something as a means to satisfy an education, or simply a, need; the "size and importance of the demonstrably reachable market" (Ibid, p. 14) is not a relevant consideration in the latter two evaluations. There is no inconsistency in affirming that there is a large and important market for it. The reason is that something serves well as a means to the ends for which it is designed to be used if, when it is used, not, if and when it is used, it is effective, efficient, and so on. Consider, the Edsel has not sold well, and thus has not been used extensively, and yet many people would claim it is a good car. If the size and importance of the demonstrably reachable market is relevant in evaluating something as a car, the fact that there has not been a large market for Edsels or, for that matter, for Rolls Royces, would be a reason for asserting that neither the Edsel nor the Rolls is a good car. But, it is not. If the markets for the two were to improve overnight, we would not take this to be a reason for thinking them better cars than they are today. Market considerations, however, if not relevant in evaluating things as instruments, or as instruments of a kind, clearly are relevant in evaluating things from the economic point of view. I would suggest, then, that Scriven intends the checklist to be used to do both an evaluation of products from the economic point of view, and an evaluation from the point of view of either an instrument or an educational instrument. For our purposes we can assume that the checklist is to be used to evaluate things both as educational products and as economic products. For both purposes it is inadequate. First, and briefly, though mention is made of cost and market, no mention is made of return, or rate of return, on investment. An inexpensive product which can be marketed widely, would not be a good econ-omic product if the return on investment was low and if what return there was was spread over a considerable length of time. Thus, the checklist is inadequate if it is to be used to evaluate things as economic products. 89 Second, and of more importance to us, the checklist is inadequate if it is to be used to evaluate things as educational products because, first, not all relevant criteria are mentioned and, second, the weightings to be assigned to the criteria are, at least in part,, inappropriate. We will return to the second point later. With regard to the former two things should be noticed. First, no criteria are given which could be used to distinguish educationally significant from edu-cationally insignificant uses to which products might be put. That is to say, no mention is made of what counts as a good end when evaluating something from the point of view of an educational product. Second, some, but not a l l , criteria which are used to distinguish good educational product performance from bad are mentioned. That is to say, little mention is made of what counts as serving well as a means when evaluating some-thing from the point of view of an educational product. The eight performance checkpoints Scriven mentions are the following: checkpoint 3 ("True Field Trials"). "Checkpoint 3 stresses the necessity for field trial data that refers (a) to the final version (of the product) and (b) to typical _ users who are (c) operating without producer (or other special) assistance, in (d) a typical setting" (Ibid, p. 14); checkpoint 4 ("True consumer"). As "quite often there will be several different groups of consumers of a given product, each in-terested in different aspects of it, data should be gathered on all aspects, scored separately, and only then combined" (Ibid, p. 15); checkpoint"5 ("Crucial comparisons"). "Few if any useful evaluations avoid the necessity to present data on the comparative performance of critically competitive producers" (Ibid); check- point 6 ("Long term performance"). "A followup (investigation) is almost always 90 desirable and often crucial since certain undesirable effects may take a while to surface" (Ibid, p. 16); checkpoint 7 ("Side-effects"). "There must be a systematic, skilled, independent search for side-effects during, at the end of, and after the 'treatment'" (Ibid); checkpoint 8 ("Process"). Process observation "is necessary even thoughtfhe payoff emphasis is of primary importance. It may substantiate or invalidate (a) certain descriptions of the product, (b) the causal claims involved in evaluation. ..or (c) it may bear on moral questions that have pre-emptive force" (Ibid); checkpoint 9 ("Causation"). "One way or another it must be shown that the effects reported could not reasonably be attributed to something other than the treatment or product" (Ibid); and, finally, checkpoint 10 ("'Statistical signi-ficance"). The data, it is said, must have statistical significance before we can say they are good data. Of the eight performance checkpoints, six (checkpoints 3-8) are relevant in evaluating the performance of the evaluator, rather than the performance of the product, and two (checkpoints 9 and 10) are relevant in evaluating the data upon which the evaluation of the product is qpjwneritly ttofcbefcbased. This is not to say that in explaining each checkpoint Scriven is not informative on the question of what counts as good product performance; only that the checkpoints, as stated, are irrelevant to answering it. I have said that some but not all of the criteria used in evaluating product performance are mentioned in the checklist. Checkpoint 12 ("Cost-Effectiveness") includes two; and in explaining checkpoint 8 ("Process") Scriven says that "moral questions.. .have pre-emptive force" (Ibid),, p. 16). Criteria not included in the checklist, to name but two, would be those of the legality and the customariness of the use of the product. 91 With regard to the weightings to be assigned to the checkpoints, Scriven is correct in saying that "moral questions... have pre-emptive force" (Ibid), but it is not clear that he is correct in saying that "need" is a "precondition... without which nothing will have value" (Ibid, p. 12), because it is not clear what exactly counts as a need. His claim is correct if taken analytically; if, that is, by "need" he means any "valuable which is lacking". On this interpretation failure to meet the need checkpoint implies either that the product is not used for valuable ends, or that the ends, though valuable, are not lacking, in which case the product cannot serve, and thus cannot serve well, as a means to them. In either case the product is not good. If, however, a "need" is not any valuable which is lacking, and if we assume that a product fails to meet the checkpoint because it is not, in this sense, used to fulfi l l a "need", then the product need not be bad. On this interpretation of "need", then, his claim is not correct. But, notice, even if, as seems plausible, the claim is intended analyti-cally, the need checkpoint cannot always be given greater weight than the per-formance checkpoints, assuming this is what Scriven intends, because failure to meet the latter might mean that the product is completely ineffective in achieving its goals. Such a product would have no less and no more value than one which is not designed to fulfil l a need. Though Scriven says that failure to meet the need checkpoint implies that the product has no value, he fails to say that failure to meet at least one of the performance checkpoints might also mean that the product has no value. 5.6 Conclusion In the first and second accounts of curriculum evaluation Scriven has given what I take to be adequate formal accounts of what must be involved in, first, any evaluation and, second, any evaluation of something as a performer. Suitably interpreted, the second can bei'taken to be a formal account of what must be involved in an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum. In the third and fourth accounts of curriculum evaluation Scriven has given what I have argued are inadequate full accounts of what must be involved in evaluating, first, from the point of view of a curriculum and, second, from the points of view of both economics and educational curricula, or, more generally, educational instruments. FOOTNOTES In context there is no inconsistency here. According to Scriven, evaluation must indeed include "measurement of performance against goals". The question of whether evaluation "is to have any refer-ence to goals at a l l " is a question concerning curriculum evaluation procedure. The question is whether the evaluator should know the goals of the curriculum before he carries out his research. Thus, "the less the evaluator hears about the goals of the project the less tunnel vision will develop, the more attention will be paid to looking for actual effects (rather than checking on alleged effects)" (1974, p. 36). Knowing all the effects the use of a curriculum has, the evaluator can determine whether the curriculum achieves its goals. In response to comments by Stufflebeam, Scriven says, "Stufflebeam begins with a quotation (the one given) that, if consistency is the mark of a narrow mind, shows that I am broadminded. Excellent! What I should have said, of course, was 'criterion scales' not 'goal scales' " (1974, p. 46). It should be noted that the term "education" is here used in a special sense, roughly the sense which Peters speaks of. What goes on at an educational institution need not be "education" in this sense of the term. 6. CONCLUSION I have attempted to become clear about what must be involved in one important aspect of evaluating curricula, namely, evaluating them from the point of view of a curriculum. I have also attempted to become clear about what two important American scholars have argued should be involved in evaluating curri-cula. After reviewing the one major and two minor theses contained in this paper, I will briefly indicate how the first might be further developed, and explain why it is that the Stake and Scriven accounts are inadequate. 6.1 Evaluating Things as Curricula It is my contention that evaluating something as a curriculum neces-sarily involves determining whether it serves well as a programme of activities to the end that someone learn something which is good as something learned; and that this involves determining whether it is an effective and efficient means, which is good, or ateleast not bad, from certain of the eight basic points of view, and which results in desirable or, at least, not undesirable side-effects; to the end that someone learn something which is, on-the-whole, good as some-thing learned. I argued that "curriculum evaluation", in this sense of the term, refers to a kind of instrumental evaluation; and, further, that as it involves the use of classes of comparison with respect to both means and ends which are not single 94 95 member classes; and as it is important, for the purposes of evaluation, to distinguish between members of both classes; curriculum evaluation is the sort of instrumental evaluation which necessarily involves determining whether the thing being evalu-ated serves well as a means to good ends. Given that a "curriculum" is, roughly, a "programme of activities which is designed to be used to get someone to learn something", I concluded the first step in my argument with the assertion that something is good from the point of view of a curriculum if it serves well as a programme of activities to the end that someone learn something which is good as something learned. I then went on to argue that the standards used in the two subordinate evaluations which together comprise an evaluation from the point of view of a curriculum are as follows: First, in evaluating something as something which when used is a means to some end (and thus in evaluating a programme of act i-vities as a means of getting someone to learn something), we would want to know whether it is an effective, efficient, moral, legal, economic, customary, etc., means; and whether its use has any desirable or undesirable side-effects. If the object of evaluation fails to meet,v\with one exception, any of these standards, we have a reason but not a sufficient reason for supposing that it does not serve well as a means. If the object of evaluation fails to meet the standard of morality, we have sufficient reason for supposing that it does not serve well as a means. Second, in evaluating the ends for which something is used (and thus in evaluating what is intended should be learned as something learned), we would want to know whether it is intrinsically, inherently, contributively, or instrument-ally valuable. The learning which is intended to be achieved by the use of a 96 curriculum may be valuable in only one of these senses and still be good as some-thing learned. However, assuming that the classification of the kinds of value is exhaustive, something cannot be both good as something learned and lack all four of the kinds of value. Finally, throughout the second step of my argument it was necessary to point out that none of the standards used in evaluating from the point of view of a curriculum could be cast in the form of a precise general statement because, within very wide limits, the standard depends on the kind of curriculum evalua-tion being done. 6.2 Stake and Scriven Stake, I argued, would have curricula evaluated from the point of view of local custom. He also says, either because it is customarily valued or for some other reason, that the effectiveness of the use of the curriculum with respect to the ends for which it is designed should be determined. Scriven, on the other hand, on at least one of his accounts, would have curricula evaluated as curricula, and, on a second account, would have them evaluated: (a) from the economic point of view and (b), either as instruments or, more narrowly, as educational instruments. Both accounts are, in several important Respects, inadequate. First, they are inadequate as accounts of evaluating curricula. Stake and, to a lesser extent, Scriven, give accounts which are incomplete and which give priority of place to less important kinds of evaluations. Thus, Stake fails to mention moral, legal, curriculum and economic evaluations of curricula and, in mentioning an ^vc ' jat io evaluation from the point of view of local custom, gives priority of place to an evaluation which is less important than those he fails to mention. Scriven, on the other hand, fails to mention evaluations from the points of view of local custom and law and, in mentioning an economic evaluation, gives priority of place to an evaluation which, it can be argued, is less important than at least one evaluation he fails to mention, namely, a legal evaluation. Second, as accounts of certain kinds of evaluations that should be carried out with respect to curricula, both are inadequate. Thus, Stake does not explicitly say that side-effects are to be evaluated from the point of view of local custom, nor does he argue that effectiveness is a good-making charac-teristic from this point of view. Though we would expect people would want objectives they think valuable to be met, it might be that they loathe anything which is effective. Scriven, on the other hand, though he says moral considera-tions have "pre-emptive force", does not tell us what would be involved in evaluating a curriculum from the moral point of view. Further, his account of an economic evaluation, though it includes consideration of costs, does not include consideration of return, and rate of return, on the investment in the curriculum. Finally, and primarily, his account of evaluating from the point of view of an educational curriculum is inadequate because he fails to give criteria by which we can distinguish between educationally "significant" and educationally insignificant curricular goals. Thus, we have no way to distinguish good from bad educational curriculum goals. 98 6.3 Some Comments on the Major Thesis Further development of my thesis concerning evaluating from the point of view of a curriculum should, I think, be made along the following lines. First, though I used the term "curriculum" to mean "a programme of activities designed to be used to get someone to learn something", I indicated (Section 1.5) that a more precise definition would include certain phrases to qualify both the sort of activities a curriculum can cal l for and the sort of learning that can result from the use of a curriculum. The use of a more precise definition would result in a narrowing of the classes of comparison used in curriculum evaluations. But this, I think, would not detract from the account I have given. If a narrow-ing of the classes of comparison were to exclude, for instance, activities which are moral or immoral, legal or i l legal, economic or uneconomic, and so on, or learning outcomes which are intrinsically, inherently, and so on, valuable or disvaluable, this, of/ course, would have an important effect on the account I have given. I do not think, however, and the examples given (in section 1.5) of a programme of brain-stimulation and learning the whereabouts of a needle in a haystack do not suggest, that the narrowing of the classes of comparison would have such effects as these. Second, though I have mentioned what I take to be the important points of view from which a curriculum should be evaluated, I have not argued in any systematic way for regarding some kinds of evaluations as more significant than others. Such an argument would require, as a necessary preliminary, an account of how evaluating from the point of view of a curriculum is to be distinguished from, for instance, moral, legal, and economic evaluations. This would be complicated by the fact the former evaluation includes evaluations of the act i-vities a curriculum calls for from the moral, legal, and economic points of view. If, as seems plausible, something cannot be both good from the point of view of a curriculum, and not good from either the moral, legal, or economic points of view? though separate evaluations of a curriculum as a whole would not be required, and thus there would be no problem in assigning weights to them, there would still remain the problem of assigning weights in evaluating the act i-vities which a curriculum calls for. Finally, my major thesis might be further developed by considering, in a general way, in what sort of context curricula are typically used. In doing so we would be able to say something about what would count as desirable and undesirable side-effects of the use of many, if not most, curricula. In argu-ing that certain things must necessarily be involved in evaluating from the point of view of a curriculum, detailed comment on side-effects would have been in-appropriate. Clearly, however, the value or disvalue of side-effects can be decisive in determining the worth of a curriculum. 6.4 Some Comment on Stake and Scriven Stake's and Scriven's accounts of evaluating curricula are, as we have seen, inadequate as accounts of both evaluating curricula from a particular point of view and, simply, evaluating curricula. The reason is, I think, that neither seem to be aware, or at least not sufficiently aware, of the distinctions between kinds of evaluations. In attempting to give accounts of what the curriculum evaluator should do without marking these distinctions, they have apparently failed to notice that their accounts are inadequate in the abovementioned res-pects. If they were clear that evaluating curricula involves several different kinds of evaluations, I think they would have given more thought to completing their accounts and to indicating, in a more detailed way, the importance to be assigned to each constituent kind of evaluation. 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Baylis, C. A . Grading, Values, and Choice. P. W. Taylor (ed.) Problems of Moral Philosophy : An Introduction to Ethics. Belmont, California : Dickenson, 1967. 2. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, (fifth edition) Oxford : Clarendon, 1964. 3. Hare, R. M . The Language of Morals. New York : Oxford University Press, 1964. 4. Hirst, P. H. Knowledge and the Curriculum : A Collection of Philosophical Papers. London & Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. 5. Hirst, P. H., R. S. Peters. The Logic of Education. London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 6. Lewis, C . I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. La Salle, Illinois : Opencourf, 1946. 7. Martin, J . R. Introduction. Jc. R. Martin (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Education : A Study of Curriculum. Boston : Al lyn and Bacon, 1970. 8. Peters, R. S. Ethics and Education. London : Allen & Unwin, 1970. 9. Scriven, M . The Methodology of Evaluation. B. O . Smith (ed.) Perspectives on Curriculum Evaluation. A ERA Monograph Series on Evaluation. No. 1. Chicago : Rand McNal ly , 1967, 38-83. 10. Scriven, M . An Introduction to Meta-Evaluation. Education Product Report, 2, 1969, pp. 36-38. 11. Scriven, M . EvduatlonSfcrcNoBIre Profession!^Pedestrian Practice. J . Weis (ed.) Curriculum Evaluation : Potentiality and Reality. Toronto : OISE, 1972, 182-39. (a) 12. Scriven, M . General Strategies in Evaluation. J . Weis (ed.) Curriculum Evaluation : Potentiality and Reality. Toronto : OISE, 1972, 182-92. (b) 13. Scriven, M . The Evaluation of Teachers and Training. California Journal of Educational Research, XXV , 3, 1973, pp. 109-115. BIBLIOGRAPHY - continued 14. Scriven, M . Evaluation Perspectives and Procedures. W. J . Popham (ed.) Evaluation in Education : Current Applications. Berkeley : McCutchen, 1974, 3-93. 15. Stake, R. The Countenance of Educational Evaluation. Teachers College Record, 68, 7, 1967, pp. 523-40. (a) 16. Stake, R. Toward a Technology for the Evaluation of Educational Programs. B. O . Smith (ed.) Perspectives on Curriculum  Evaluation. AERA Monograph Series on Evaluation. No. I. Chicago : Rand McNal ly , 1967, 1-12. (b) 17. Sta 17. Stake, R. Testing in the Evaluation of Curriculum Development. Review of Educational Research, 38, 1, 1968, pp. 75?—81. 18. Stake, R. Objectives, Priorities and Other Judgment Data. Review of Educational Research, 40, 2, 1970, pp. 181-205. 19. Stake, R. Measuring What Learners Learn. E. R. House (ed.) School Evaluation : The Politics and Process. Berkeley : McCutchen, 1973, 193-223. (a) 20. Stake, R., T. Denny. Needed Concepts and Techniques for Util izing More Fully the Potential of Evaluation. R. W. Tyler (ed.) Educational Evaluation : New Roles, New Means. The 68th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II. Chicago : NSSE, 1969, 370-90. 21. Stake, R., C. Gjerde. An Evaluation of TCITY, The Twin City Institute for Talented Youth. R.H.P. Kraft et al (eds.) Four Evaluations : Anthropological, Economic, Narrative, and  PortrayaI. AERA Monograph Series on Curriculum Evaluation. No . 7. Chicago : Rand McNal ly , 1974, 99-139. 22. Stake, R., D. D. Gooler. Measuring Educational Priorities. E. R. House (ed.) School Evaluation : The Politics and Process. Berkeley : McCutchen, 1973, 279-90. (b) 23. Taylor, P. W. Normative Discourse. Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood, 1973. 24. Von Wright, G . H. The Varieties of Goodness. New York The Humanities Press, 1963. 

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