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An exploration and expansion of Bernard Lonergan’s intentionalty [sic] analysis for educational philosophy Gaetz, Ivan 2003

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AN EXPLORATION AND EXPANSION OF BERNARD LONERGAN'S INTENTIONALTY ANALYSIS FOR EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY by IVAN KENNETH GAETZ B.A., University of Alberta, 1975 M.Div., Lutheran Theological Seminary, University of Saskatchewan, 1976 Th.M., Regis College, University of Toronto, 1985 M.L.S., University of Alberta, 1988 M.Ed., University of Alberta, 1991 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES in Department of Educational Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 2003 © Ivan Kenneth Gaetz, 2003 ABSTRACT This study consists of an exploration and expansion of Bernard Lonergan's intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy. It contends that Lonergan's account of the structure and operations of human consciousness directed toward human experience, understanding, judgment and decision offers a mode of understanding a range of key topics in the field of secular education and educational philosophy. Moreover, the integrative nature of Lonergan's intentionality analysis provides a means of systematically ordering issues in educational philosophy related to human cognitive and existential development. Following a discussion of the key terms: education; philosophy; intentionality; knowledge; and consciousness; the first chapter contextualizes the study in reference to educational philosophy and to Lonergan Studies. Chapter two explores Lonergan's intentionality analysis as it occurs throughout his writings, but especially his principal philosophical text, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Lonergan's lectures on various topics in education and educational philosophy are discussed in chapter three, with the interpretive framework being his intentionality analysis. An expansion unfolds in chapter four where the structure and process of human intentionality are shown to inform educational issues related to the centrality and quality of human experience. These issues include the desire to know, the sense of wonder, the raising of questions, and the creative dimensions of imagination. Further issues emerge on the level of intelligence, including the notion of the self-correcting process of learning These dimensions of human intentionality then lead to an extensive account of the elements and processes of general human development. The expansion continues in chapter five concerning metaphysics and ethics. Educational topics pertinent to this dimension of his analysis include critical thinking, self-knowledge and humanness, human authenticity, wisdom as practical reasoning, the emergence of a worldview, certain social implications, and the ethical and moral ramifications of this account of intentionality. The study concludes with some criticisms and assessments, and finds, overall, in Lonergan's intentionality analysis a relatively systematic and comprehensive framework in which to understand and order key elements of educational philosophy. iii T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract 1 1 Table of Contents ui Acknowledgements vi CHAPTER I Introduction 1 Key Concepts 4 Education 4 Philosophy 7 Intentionality • • 12 Intentionality Analysis in Insight 14 Knowledge 15 Consciousness 17 Education 20 Contexts 21 Educational Philosophy 21 Lonergan Studies 27 Limitations 31 CHAPTER II Lonergan's Intentionality Analysis 34 Analysis of Human Consciousness in the Early Lonergan Corpus 35 Intentionality Analysis in Insight 37 Introductory Remarks 37 Cognitional Operations 42 Practical Living 67 Insights and Their Limitations: the Question of Judgment 73 Intentionality in the Later Lonergan Corpus 80 CHAPTER III Intentionality Analysis and Topics in Education 91 The Problem of Educational Philosophy 95 The Invariant Structure of the Human Good 100 Diversity and Integration of the Human Good.... 106 iv Human Development. 109 Mathematics and the New Learning 115 Science and the New Learning 118 Theory of Philosophic Differences 120 Piaget and the Idea of General Education 123 Art 126 Human History 131 Assessments 135 CHAPTER IV Intentionality Analysis and Educational Philosophy: Structure and Process 143 Lonergan's Philosophical Orientation. 144 The Empirical Base 144 Philosophical Method 148 Intentionality and the Impetus for Education 154 Need for Education 154 Desire to Know. 157 Wonder : 164 Questions 168 Imagination.. 169 The Self-Correcting Process of Learning 177 Learning as an Issue of Educational Philosophy... 178 Learning as a Self-Correcting Process 180 Development and Progress in Relation to Intentionality Analysis 189 The Notion of Development 194 Genetic Method.. 199 Genetic Method Applied to Education 206 Summary 211 CHAPTER V Intentionality Analysis and Educational Philosophy: Results in Metaphysics and Ethics 213 Critical Thinking 217 Self-knowledge and Humanness 224 Authenticity ; 233 Authenticity in Educational Philosophy 233 V Genuineness in Insight; Authenticity in Method in Theology 235 Lonergan's Authenticity for Educational Philosophy 237 Wisdom as Practical Reasoning 246 Worldview 252 Social Implications of Intentionality Analysis 261 Moral Dimensions of Intentionality Analysis 269 Summary 281 CHAPTER VI Conclusion: Summary, Criticism, Assessments... 286 Elements of the Systematic Approach 287 Criticisms 289 Criticisms Centering on Intentionality Analysis ... 291 Criticisms Centering on Education 305 Concluding Positive Assessments 307 Bibliography 313 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi Within the limited horizon of my own subjectivity, this dissertation embodies the principles of emergent probability, as Lonergan explains them. Myriad influences in my life over the past twenty-five years have made this study possible. These influences, embodied in my teachers, colleagues and friends, represent an amazing array of knowledge and values that in one way or another has become my own. I thank each one for their contribution: P. Joseph Cahill, William Hordern, Frederick E. Crowe, S. J., Tad Dunne, Foster Walker, Eamonn Callan, Patrick and Wendy Crean, Jean Norlund, Donna Dinsmore, Joan Pries, Kate Kinloch, Rob Fitterer, Mark Cheeseman, and Patti Towler. For their insightful and challenging commentary on my work, I thank the members of my dissertation committee: Pamela Courtenay-Hall, Paul Burns and Daniel Vokey. My deep regret is that Murray Elliott of the Educational Studies Department of the University of British Columbia, under whose direction I began this study, passed away in March, 2001, before this work really took shape. He was always an inspiration. I also wish to thank my colleagues at Regis University, Denver, for their interest in, and support of, the research and writing of this dissertation. 1 CHAPTER ONE Introduction I am not a specialist in education, but I have suffered under educators for very many years, and I have been teaching for an equally long time . . . . [Y]ou can listen to me as I speak about philosophy and its relation to theology and to concrete living. But most of the concrete applications, the ironing out of the things, will have to be done by you who are in the fields of education and philosophy of education.1 This study consists of an exploration and expansion of key aspects of Bernard Lonergan's intentionality analysis into the realm of educational philosophy. The main objective in pursuing this line of investigation and interpretation is to help introduce to the field of educational philosophy a growing scope of studies that interprets and develops the philosophy of Jesuit philosopher, Bernard Lonergan. Since Lonergan's publication of his central philosophical work, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, there have been efforts in Lonergan Studies to apply various aspects of Lonergan's thought to certain issues in education. In my estimation, however, his system of thought, centered in his intentionality analysis, provides a vision for education larger than mere application to discrete topics in education. While many of these possible applications may be valid, Lonergan is a thinker who has developed a philosophy based on an understanding of human conscious intentionality that helps to clarify certain key issues in educational philosophy, and that also provides a means to order and interrelate key topics within a broad system of thought and worldview. The exploration and expansion pursued in this study will map out this larger vision. The primary method used to achieve this convergence of Lonergan's thought and educational philosophy will be an exploration of intentionality analysis as it appears in Lonergan's cognitional theory, in his epistemology, his metaphysics and ethics. This will reveal the ways in which Lonergan's unique theory of the structure, processes and results 1 Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Robert M . Doran and Frederick E . Crowe, vo l . 10. Topics in Education. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 24. Lonergan concludes his first often lectures on educational philosophy with this invitation. Hereafter I w i l l refer to this work as Topics in Education. 2 of the intentional operations of human consciousness relate to and inform various dimensions of educational philosophy. It will also lead to an account of the systematic ordering of some main issues within the discipline. The primary intent is not to defend the full scope of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, but rather to reveal its interesting, useful and perhaps even exciting effects and possible future expansions in the field of educational philosophy. References to Lonergan's work are relatively rare in the field of educational philosophy; and in the field of Lonergan Studies there has not yet appeared a general investigation of his intentionality analysis related to the general field of educational philosophy, such as I offer here. My hope is for this study to contribute to development of both Lonergan Studies and educational philosophy. My work will unfold in six chapters. Following the introductory chapter that will identify and discuss the key concepts and contexts of this study, the second chapter will provide an analysis of Lonergan's understanding of insight and human consciousness that is crucial to the exploration and expansion that follows. The third chapter will examine Lonergan's own analysis of education presented in 1959 as a series of lectures dealing with various topics Lonergan thought relevant to his audience of Catholic educators. The fourth chapter, building on the understanding in chapter two of his intentionality analysis, and drawing on some aspects of his educational lectures, explains the relation that Lonergan's account of cognitional theory and epistemology has to certain salient issues in educational philosophy. The fifth chapter continues this exploration and expansion by focusing on the metaphysical and ethical dimensions of his intentionality analysis. By way of conclusion to this study, the sixth chapter will offer some criticism and evaluation of Lonergan's intentionality analysis as it relates to educational philosophy. Chapters two and three constitute the expansion portion of my study in that Lonergan's chief texts, multi-faceted that they are, that I find especially relevant to educational philosophy are understood largely in reference to his intentionality analysis. Chapters four and five compose the expansion phase in that Lonergan's analysis is mapped onto the landscape of educational philosophy. As a rationale for adopting this approach of exploration and 3 expansion, I appeal to the work of others in the field of Lonergan Studies that profitably employ this mode of inquiry. The method I will employ in this study amounts to a mapping, as it were, of issues in the field of educational philosophy onto the philosophical framework of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Following the interpretive explorations of chapters two and three, this approach in chapters four and five will draw on the integral methodological structure of human consciousness as it develops and expands, according to Lonergan, from the experiential level, to the level of understanding, and to the level of judgment, that then culminates on the level of deliberating and deciding. Thus, chapter four will deal with experiential issues and issues related to developing intelligence, and chapter five will treat issues of assessment and judgment, and various key affirmations of the human subject and of human intersubjectivity arising from this analysis. Lonergan has depicted this integral methodological (also called heuristic) structure of human consciousness as applied to the field of theology. In his work, Method in Theology, this application resulted in Lonergan delineating eight "functional specialties" that distinguish and interrelate all the major fields of inquiry in theology. While it would require a work having at least the scope oi Method in Theology to argue thoroughly for a clearly differentiated and interrelated set of functional specialties for education, at least it seems reasonable to suggest that there are experiences, understandings, judgments and decisions that occur within the field of education and educational philosophy, and that applying this set of differentiations to the field provides a means to map and certain important issues. As I begin this exploration and expansion, it will be helpful to understand the key concepts and main contexts. 2 The work o f one o f the key interpreters o f Lonergan's thought, Frederick E . Crowe, includes some major studies in Lonergan described as an "exploration" and "expansion." In the first annual "Lonergan Workshop" held at Boston College in June, 1974, Crowe delivered a paper on Lonergan's notion o f value in which he explores its development and the interrelations this notion has with other aspects o f his work. A t the 7 l h annual Lonergan Workshop in 1985, Crowe turned his attention again to the notion o f value, but this time to expand on it. In the expansion, Crowe probed in creative ways the implications this notion has in related fields o f inquiry. See Frederick E . Crowe, " A n Exploration o f Lonergan's N e w Not ion of Value ," and " A n Expansion o f Lonergan's Not ion o f Value ," in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michae l Vert in, (Washington, D . C : Catholic University o f Amer ica Press, 1989), 51-70 and 344-59.) A similar mode o f study was carried out by Jeffrey Nichols , "The Relationship o f Symbols and Bias in the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan: an Exploration and Expansion," (Ph.D. diss., University o f Toronto, 1995). 4 Key Concepts While it would be difficult to establish universally accepted definitions of the key concepts in this study, at least I can indicate the general meaning of these terms as they will be used here. The terms I will discuss are: education; philosophy; intentionality and intentionality analysis; knowledge; consciousness and experience. Education Education has been defined in a variety of ways. Considerable debate has been generated on the question of what counts as education, and what might be included within its 3 * purview. Is education essentially a matter of the acquisition of understanding and knowledge? Is it largely a matter of formal schooling? Does education encompass emotional and physical development? Does it occur naturally as individuals grow and mature, or is education a more deliberate act intended for specific outcomes? Such questions do not admit ready answers. Indeed, such questions provoke educational philosophers to consider the meaning of education in a variety of ways. The meaning of the term in common usage given in Webster's dictionary is, "the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., esp. by formal schooling; teaching; training." The definition is further expanded in Webster's to include the knowledge acquired by the process of education (such as one has an education); to denote education as formal schooling activities; and to designate the systematic study of teaching and learning. The definition of education has not always been so expansive. Earlier in the history of human civilization, prior to the advance of cultures centering on intellectual pursuits, Howard Ozmon and Samuel Craver tell us, 3 Such is the case in the debate between R. S. Peters and R. K . Ell iot t where Peters regards education as, in part, the pursuit o f truth, a pursuit which is justified instrumentally (as a means o f rationally justifying one's beliefs, actions and feelings) and non-instrumentally (as purely for the pleasure o f seeking knowledge for its own sake.) Ell iott appreciates the connection Peters draws between education and the development o f reason and reasons, but he sees Peters' connection between truth and the pleasure inherent in achieving the good life as faulty. The pursuit o f truth and knowledge may not be 'pleasurable' and in fact may be arduous and painful (see R . S. Peters "The Justification o f Education" and R. K . Elliott , "Education and Justification," in Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White, [New York : Routledge, 1998], 207-30 and 231-45.) 5 education centered solely on concern with survival issues—learning the necessary skills for living. Later, training was expanded to include the learning and developing of skills to manage leisure time, and to develop socially and culturally.4 By the turn of the twentieth century, the notion of knowledge transmission emerged as central to the meaning of education, such as we find in Dewey's statement of 1911. "Speaking generally, education signifies the sum total of processes by which a community or social group, whether large or small, transmits its acquired power and aims with a view to securing its own continued existence and growth."5 As education developed as a distinct field of practice in society, having its own categories of investigation and modes of theoretical inquiry, the definition of education seems to have acquired more specialized meanings. By mid-twentieth century, the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States recognized the broader conception of education as pertaining to growth and development in human beings, but the society still preferred its special denotation as formal schooling. The term education may refer to any deliberate effort to nurture, modify, change and/or develop human conduct or behavior; or it may refer to organized schooling. For purposes of consensus we adopt the latter (institutionalized schooling). Whenever education, thus defined, is taking place we find: (1) Preferences for certain procedures, resources and goals (methods, means, and ends) implicit or explicit in the undertaking. (2) The employment of criteria, guides or reasons with which procedures, resources and goals are determined and established.6 However widely or narrowly education seems to be defined, there persists a common aspect in most, if not all, conceptions—that of human development and learning. Indeed, it would be difficult to argue, I suspect, that education has occurred where there is no evidence of development and where nothing has been learned. 4 Howard A. Ozmon and Samuel M . Craver, Philosophical Foundations of Education, 4 t h ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), xii. These are very broad and sweeping statements on the development of human civilizations. While it is unclear as to how applicable they may be on a wide scale, at least they seem appropriate to civilizations of the West, arising from the cultures developing in Sumer, Egypt, and other regions of the Mediterranean. 5 John Dewey, "Education," in Cyclopedia of Education, ed. Paul Monroe, (New York: Macmillan, 1911) as cited in Source Book in the Philosophy of Education, rev. ed., ed. William Heard Kilpatrick, (New York: Macmillan, 1936), 388. 6 Christopher J. Lucas, What is Philosophy of Education? (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 112. 6 R. S. Peters introduces the widely cited compendium of essays, The Concept of Education, by reflecting on the essential features of education in terms of educational process. This process he determines to be the learning of skills, learning by experience, the learning of principles in understanding, learning to question and to develop a critical attitude, and learning to engage in "conversation" beyond the "explicit learning situations." Later in the book, Michael Oakeshott develops this theme of learning by relating it to teaching with its resulting intellectual encounters and achievements. It seems, according to Peters and Oakeshott, and no doubt to many others, that in a philosophy of education a key component involves reflection on the nature of education centering on the activities of learning as they occur in the process of human development.9 It may be that if learning does not occur in some positive and productive way, education has not happened, even though the edifice for schooling might be in place, even if all the players might occupy their appointed positions, and a plan of instruction mapped out perceptively, and with sophistication. Education is not only a question of development and learning on the personal level, education also has important meaning to the life of a society and culture as educated persons take on social roles and create culture. Practical learning appears to be a primary concern of Alfred North Whitehead where he declares, "education is the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge."10 He argues passionately against the all too common occurrence of ideas falling into disuse—against an education that languishes and suffers inertia. Moreover, Whitehead believes, a social or cultural group "which does not value trained intelligence is doomed."11 More recently, in adapting aspects of Marxist analysis and critique, but recognizing certain capitalist and economic functions of education, Alexander Sidorkin argues that education performs a central function in the social and economic life of the community. He sees the "labor of learning" as the means of knowledge production, and he regards learning as a pivotal social activity. "Learning 7 R. S. Peters. "What Is an Educational Process?" in The Concept of Education, ed. R . S. Peters, (New York : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 14-22. 8 Michae l Oakeshott. "Learning and Teaching" in The Concept of Education, 156-57. 9 In addition see the well-known work o f Thomas F. Green. The Activities of Teaching: (Troy, N Y : Educator's International Press, 1998), first published in 1971, particularly chapters 6, 7 and 8: "Learning", "Teaching, Explaining and Giv ing Reasons" and "Judging". 1 0 Alfred North Whitehead. The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York : The Free Press, 1967), 4. 11 Ibid., 14. 7 activity can be defined as an activity," he explains, "an immediate product of which is not as important as changes that occur in the person-subject [the subjective side] of the activity; education, in turn, is a social sphere where learning activity plays a central 12 role." These broader senses of education as social construction and function establish the broader scope of what is meant by education today. From various angles, then, learning and education are inextricably bound together. Their meanings encompass the development and achievements of the individual. They also relate to the social and cultural dimensions of human life. The educational thrust of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, as it will become clear, centers on human development and learning, with an analysis of cognitional structure and activity being key to understanding the elements and processes of education. For Lonergan, in important ways, education also unfolds as a developing understanding and knowledge of oneself, of the world, and of the manner in which an individual makes one's way in the world. In short, the meaning of education, as the term is employed in this study, will encompass both the personal dimensions and the social dimensions, and both the formal and non-formal aspects of education. As I probe the various facets of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, I hope to show in what ways Lonergan appeals to the various meanings of education in the personal and social realms, and I will explore how Lonergan understands education as human development occurring in these facets of human life. Philosophy Lonergan's intentionality analysis, as will be come clear, constitutes his central philosophical position. But in what sense is this analysis to be counted as philosophy? To answer this question, we need to grasp, at least in a cursory way, some general meaning of the term "philosophy." While it may be difficult to arrive at a precise definition of the 1 2 Alexander Sidorkin, "The Labor o f Learning," Educational Theory 51, no. 1 (winter 2001): 99. 8 term "philosophy," in considering a few positions by noted thinkers on the nature of philosophy, it will become clear how Lonergan uses the term and presents his case.13 Bertrand Russell, widely influential in the twentieth century as a philosopher and historian of philosophy, grapples with what philosophy is in his introduction to A History of Western Philosophy. Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy.14 Despite various difficulties in this denotation, such as the division between science and theology along the lines of reason and authority, and of the division between belief and "definite knowledge," (it seems to me, science in various ways appeals to authority and belief, and credible theology appeals strongly to reason),15 it stresses the importance of reason leading to knowledge, and that philosophy should not appeal to "revelation." Reason (and there are various ways to understand the term),16 clearly, is a hallmark of philosophical thinking. Where Russell points to how philosophy is done—rationally, that is—John Dewey, in explaining the nature of philosophy, points to outcomes, namely an explanation of things in terms of totality, of generality and ultimateness.17 Philosophy concerns itself with gathering together "the varied details of the world and of life into a single inclusive 1 3 See also the brief reflections o f Paul Hirst and R. S. Peters on the nature of philosophy generally in their essay, "Education and Philosophy," in Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, vol . 1, Philosophy and Education, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White (London: Routledge, 1998), 28-9. 1 4 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1945), x i i i . 1 5 For a widely cited study on the relation o f science and theology, and their commonalities, see Ian Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms. A Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1974.); also see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed., (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1970), particularly chapter two, "The Route to Normal Science." 1 6 What counts as reason, o f course, is a contentious issue itself. Cf . Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, I N : University o f Notre Dame Press, 1988), especially pp. 8-11. 1 7 John Dewey, Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New Y o r k : The Free Press, 1966), 324. 9 whole In Dewey, there is always the essential practical aspect to philosophy. "Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life."19 Philosophy, accordingly, takes a pragmatic turn in Dewey. Martin Heidegger, whose influence pervades philosophical thought in the twentieth century, has taken philosophical discourse on a path somewhat different from that which had been commonly practiced. In simplest terms, Heidegger seems to have taken philosophy from the realm of theory and idealism and repositioned it in the real world of being and time. For Heidegger, philosophy in its radical historicality occurs as a "walking around" the issue, so to speak, which creates an introduction to the issue at hand, and establishes its context that helps one better to attend to the matter and to broaden its disclosure. This contextualization, however, should not be regarded as a distancing in order to see things "objectively," but as an encounter with being, with existence.20 While Heidegger's philosophy tends to be obscure and complex, perhaps reflecting the very qualities of existence itself, it is clear that, for him, philosophy exhibits and develops the meditative quality of being, and that thinking is not so much about being as it is a feature * 21 of being. Through Heidegger, we come to see philosophy as more fully engaged with existence as experienced life. Arthur C. Danto's study, What Philosophy Is, determines philosophy to be the effort at "seeing what reality itself consists in."22 Its elements, he explains, consist in what philosophy is about, namely, understanding the character of knowledge and applying that mode of knowing to the world. While the conceptions of philosophy in Danto, Heidegger, Dewey and Russell appeal to descriptive, and perhaps commonsense, meanings given to the term philosophy, these are expressions of an earlier time, and are eclipsed, in some measure at least, by today's more radical and provocative practitioners. Richard Rorty, for one, offers his take. Philosophy, subsequent to the perceived collapse and negation of W . T. Jones. The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, 2d rev. ed. (New Y o r k : Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 302-04. 2 1 Mar t in Heidegger, "Discourse on Thinking," in Modern Philosophies of Education, ed. John Paul Strain (New York : Random House, 1971), 474-76. 2 2 Arthur C . Danto, What Philosophy Is. A Guide to the Elements (New York : Harper and Row, 1968), x i i . 10 epistemology as it traditionally has been engaged, is believed to have assumed hermeneutical, dialogical and edifying roles. Rorty explains, I want now to generalize this contrast between philosophers whose work is essentially constructive and those whose work is essentially reactive. I shall thereby develop a contrast between philosophy which centers in epistemology and the sort of philosophy which takes its point of departure from suspicion about pretensions of epistemology. This is the contrast between "systematic" and "edifying" philosophies.23 Rorty goes on to state that the point of philosophy today simply is to "keep the conversation going," and wisdom the "ability to sustain conversation."24 The role of philosophical thinking unfolds as the engagement of thought and expression for solving human problems, in thinking differently and creatively about issues, and in taking an effective place at the table of social discourse. While this certainly broadens out the conception of philosophy, does it not beg the question of why this type of role is 'philosophical'? Are there not a host of other disciplines charged with this same mandate to generate and facilitate conversation from which solutions to issues and problems might arise? Economics, criminology, health care and education, for instance, all seem to facilitate and seek to improve in some way the conversation as groups and societies find themselves living together and endeavoring to solve their common problems. Given this general context of philosophy, Lonergan's approach comes more clearly to light. While the scope of what counts as philosophy today appears to be broad, Lonergan understands philosophy in a specific, more traditional way. One of Lonergan's clearer articulations of the meaning of philosophy is found in his short work, Philosophy of God and Theology?5 In exploring this topic, Lonergan provides an account of philosophical thinking in terms of the specialized manner in which the human mind operates, as a mode of systematic thought.26 Explaining the development of systematic thinking from classical metaphysics represented in Aristotelian philosophy that determined and articulated first principles from which the objective world is understood, Lonergan finds Richard Rorty. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 366. Ibid., 378. Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God and Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1973). Ibid., 1. 11 in modern science another systematic mode of thought, one that is liberated from the domination of metaphysics, one that focuses not on the discovery of necessity but of • • 27 possibility. For Lonergan, there is yet a third mode of systematic thought that constitutes the proper domain of contemporary philosophy. He explains, We have been contrasting two manners in which systematic thinking has been carried out, and we have now to advert to a third. Its basic terms denote the conscious and intentional operations that occur in human knowing. Its basic relations denote the conscious dynamism that leads from some operations to others. Its derived terms and relations are the procedures of common sense, of mathematicians, of empirical scientists, of interpreters and historians, of philosophers and theologians. It begins from cognitional theory: What are you doing when you are knowing? It moves to epistemology: Why is doing that knowing? It concludes with a metaphysics: What do you know when you do it?28 As far as Lonergan is concerned, this third mode of systematic thinking underlies all other modes of knowing, and as such, unfolds as philosophy.29 Metaphysics is the culmination of this mode of thought and reflects the operations of human conscious intentionality expressed in all fields of human inquiry, such as what Lonergan articulates as transcendental method. For Lonergan, metaphysics expresses a unity of the various fields of knowledge based not on the content of knowledge, but based on the knowing process. It would be an interesting, and perhaps a lively, exercise to debate the strengths and value of Lonergan's approach as compared to other approaches. However, my present aim in this section is merely to recognize the complexity of this question of the nature of philosophy, and to offer a basic understanding of Lonergan's way of practicing philosophy as intentionality analysis. Ibid., 6-7. Ibid., 7-8. See his definition of metaphysics in Insight, 415. 12 Intentionality Roderick Chisholm traces the use of term "intentionality" in the field of philosophy back to St. Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God, and to William of Ockam who distinguished intentional existence of the objects of thought and the subjective existence of the thoughts themselves.30 As a philosophical term, "intentionality" also was used by Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, to distinguish between intentional and non-intentional actions. Later, Edmund Husserl used the term to describe Franz Brentano's analysis of mental phenomena characterizing a particular orientation of thoughts or psychological attitudes toward an object.31 The issue of intentionality, to be sure, is not without controversy. Tim Crane, in characterizing the field of intentionality in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, points to two main questions. "Do all mental states exhibit intentionality?" and "Do only mental states exhibit intentionality?" These questions concern the relation of the mind and objects. As Crane explains, Intentionality is the mind's capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, is known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. An intention to do something is an intentional state, since one cannot intend without intending something: but intentions are only one of many kinds of mental states.33 Lonergan seems largely to express this understanding of intentionality, although he seems to prefer to use the terms "act" rather than "state." Further, Lonergan understands 3 0 Roderick M . Chisholm, "Intentionality," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vo l . 4, ed. Paul Edwards, (New York : Macmi l lan , 1967), 201. 31 Ibid. 3 2 T i m Crane, "Intentionality," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vo l . 4., 819-20. 33 Ibid., 816.1 note that the language Lonergan uses is today regarded as sexist, but the common parlance o f his day generally understood the masculine to include the feminine. I certainly regard Lonergan's use o f the masculine to be gender neutral, and every effort has been made to avoid sexist language in my own writing. 13 intentionality and intentionality analysis in contrast to what he calls "faculty psychology." Faculty psychology, Lonergan believes, fails to deal with the existential subject, the one who is not only a knower but a doer, one who "deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts."34 It understood mental phenomena as various faculties, such as intellect and will, or, as Lonergan notes, "different uses of the same faculty, such as speculative and practical intellect, or different types of human activity, such as theoretical inquiry and practical execution."35 Faculty psychology offered an abstract account of the various categories of the mind, or types of human activity, but it failed to account for the concrete, self-determining and self-constituting human subject.36 Increasingly, Lonergan rejected this old mode of thinking about human beings. In his lecture on art, he explains, We must pass from the logical essence of man, something that is common to heroes and scoundrels, mewling infants and saints, something that is verified in everyone equally, to man as a concrete potentiality and concrete duty; from man as a substance to man as a conscious subject; from thinking of a set of faculties and their actuation to thinking of a concrete flow of consciousness, and to thinking of that concrete flow in terms of the subject and his concern that defines the horizon of his world.37 The contrast between faculty psychology and intentionality analysis highlights the turn to the human subject that dominates Lonergan's philosophical outlook. Lonergan presented his intentionality analysis over the course of his academic life, beginning first in his primary philosophical work, Insight: A Study of Human T O Understanding, after which he explored additional aspects of human intentionality, such as what appears in the early sections of Method in Theology?9 While recognizing the importance of the later developments in Lonergan's thought, in that Lonergan recognized Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 79. . 3 5 Ibid. 3 6 Topics in Education, 83; and also note 16. 3 7 Ibid., 209-10. 3 8 Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M . Doran, vol. 3. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, 5 t h ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). Hereafter I will refer to this edition of the work as Insight. Where other editions of this work are cited, full bibliographic information will be given. j 9 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2d ed. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973). Hereafter I will refer to this work as Method in Theology. 14 the need to address the role of feelings, and to account more fully for the existential questions of choice, decision, and personal transformation, the major portion of this study will focus on intentionality as it appears in Insight, since this provides the groundwork and framework for the core of Lonergan's philosophy. While the thrust of this exploration and expansion will center on the intentionality analysis of Insight, it should become clear that certain aspects of Lonergan's later analysis, particularly his account of the elements and processes of human decision-making and transformation, are anticipated in the earlier work. While this study stresses Lonergan's analysis in Insight, it will also integrate his later analysis within the framework of his cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, especially where his later work seems particularly relevant to educational philosophy. Intentionality Analysis in Insight In a published interview in which he reflects on his work Insight, Lonergan explains how it came to be so constructed. In this interview he also affirms the objective of the work essentially as intentionality analysis. '... I was dealing in Insight fundamentally with the intellectual side—a study of human understanding—in which I did my study of human understanding and got human intelligence in there, not just a sausage machine turning out abstract concepts. That was my fundamental thrust. 'Once I did that, well, you had to go out and go on to a theory of judgment— because you had obviously separated yourself from any possible intuitive basis of knowledge. And I had to have a true judgment, one true judgment at least, so I had to have chapter XI, T am a knower.' 'Then "What do you know?" so I had another chapter on being. 'How do you know you know it?" I had to have another chapter on objectivity. 'When I had that much done, I could see people all around saying, "well, if you have this sort of position you can't have a metaphysics." So I thought I'd be safer to put in four more chapters on metaphysics. '"Well, you can't have an ethics," so I put in a chapter on that. 'And, "You can't prove the existence of God," so I put in a chapter on that. 'Then, "What has this to do with your being a priest?" So I put in a little bit on religion in chapter XX—a moving viewpoint! 'The viewpoint kept moving. In the summer of 1959 ... I gave an institute at Xavier in Cincinnati, on the philosophy of education. In preparing that I read a lot of 15 Piaget, also Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form, things like that, and that was the beginning of entry into these things. Then von Hildebrand, and Frings' book on Scheler were a big help. I was also meeting questions of my own. One also has feelings oneself too, you know. 'There is a spreading out, moving on, including more. Like recently what I've got a hold of is the fact that I've dropped faculty psychology and I'm doing intentionality analysis. And what I did in Insight mainly was intentionality analysis of experiencing, understanding, judging ... . 4 0 Lonergan thus clarifies his work as intentionality analysis. Lonergan also characterizes his work as a development, a moving viewpoint, in which new insights are added to, or transform, the old, and there comes into view an increasingly broader and more comprehensive view. The basic core of his intentionality analysis unfolds in Insight, but that opens the door to further refinements and expansions of the analysis. An in-depth account of this analysis will occur in chapter two of this study; here I offer merely a basic sense of what is meant by the term. Knowledge A major focus on Lonergan's intentionality analysis pertains to the nature of human knowledge. It will be helpful to gain some sense, early on, as to what Lonergan means by knowledge. While there is considerable ambiguity in the commonsense dictionary meaning of the term,41 when we enter the field of philosophy itself, what is meant by knowledge acquires some precision. Philosopher Anthony Quinton states, "According to the most widely accepted definition, knowledge is justified true belief."42 Such a definition, Quinton goes on to show, gives rise to several other terms that fill out the meaning of knowledge: truth (since "we can have knowledge only of what is true"); belief; justification.43 With the possibility of knowledge resting on the grasping of truth, the question of knowledge becomes a matter of a theory of truth, and in philosophy there are several. Two chief theories within the rationalist tradition are the correspondence Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection. Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, ed. W i l l i a m F . J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrel l (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 222-3. 4 1 Webster's Dictionary expresses a range o f meanings o f knowledge, from "acquaintance or familiarity" to "awareness," "understanding," to "a l l that has been perceived or grasped by the mind." 4 2 Anthony Quinton, "Knowledge and Belief ," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, vo l . 4 (New York : Macmi l lan , 1967), 345. 4 3 Ibid., 346. 16 theory of truth and the coherence theory. A. N. Prior explains that the correspondence theory holds that "truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact," while the coherence theory maintains that "the more our beliefs hang together in a system, the truer they are."44 There exist other accounts of truth, such as the "existence theory"45 and the "performative theory."46 It is not necessary to explore in detail this complex philosophical debate on the nature of truth and the meaning of knowledge, made even more complex with some recent postmodern theories that throw the questions of power and power relations into the mix.47 We need to note, simply, that, while it is common to introduce the notions of justification and belief when speaking of knowledge, Lonergan takes a different approach. A full account of the meaning of knowledge unfolds in the following chapter where I explore the elements and operations of Lonergan's intentionality analysis. But as an introductory statement, the following should suffice. Lonergan regards knowledge as the expression of an act of judgment in which one affirms that some element of human experience has been understood correctly, and that correct understanding emerges when the conditions needed for affirmation are grasped, and that one grasps that the conditions have been fulfilled 4 8 He states, "... a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment."49 Knowledge depends on correct judgment, and correct or true judgment is possible when all the relevant questions pertaining to the understanding of some data, or set of data, have been satisfactorily answered. Elsewhere, Lonergan states that knowledge is the "complete context of correct judgments."50 For Lonergan, knowledge not only encompasses the question of truth but also the question of probability. He explains, A . N . Prior, "Correspondence Theory o f Truth," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol . 2, ed. Paul Edwards ( N e w Y o r k : Macmi l lan , 1967), 223-4. 4 5 Ibid., 224. 4 6 Gertrude Ezorbsky, "Performative Theory o f Truth," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vo l . 6, ed. Paul Edwards (New York : Macmi l lan , 1967), 88. 4 7 Foucault, as perhaps one o f the better-known proponents o f postmodern thought, explores the power-knowledge relations in his work Discipline and Punish. Cf . Michae l Peters, " M i c h e l Foucault," in Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education: from Piaget to the Present, ed. Joy A . Palmer (London: Routledge, 2001), 172. 4 8 This expression o f the meaning o f knowledge occurs throughout various works o f Lonergan. For instance, see Insight, 305-06; 355; 367 and Topics in Education, 111. 4 9 Insight, 374. 5 0 Ibid., 372. 1 7 When the virtually unconditioned is grasped by reflective understanding, we affirm or deny absolutely. When there is no preponderance of evidence in favor of either affirmation or denial, we can only acknowledge our ignorance. But between these extremes there is a series of intermediate positions, and probable judgments [and hence probable knowledge] are their outcomes.51 While more will be said of Lonergan's position on knowledge as his cogntional theory and epistemology are explored in the next chapter, we can see here that he develops a very precise meaning to the term, and uses it to understand and critique other philosophical positions.52 Consciousness "Consciousness" is another term that will arise throughout this study. Its meaning presents a further array of questions and complexities. The Western intellectual tradition reveals a long and complex history dealing with the question of human consciousness. According to Eric Lormand, the term 'consciousness' became embedded in philosophical thought through Descartes who dealt with consciousness mainly in terms of introspection, that is, in being aware of one's own mental occurrences.53 Lormand sees subsequent philosophical interest in consciousness as discussions pertaining to the qualities of awareness in mental occurrences or, in one way or another, taking off from earlier Cartesian introspective epistemology. Many key Western philosophers have attempted to identify and understand how it is that we have mental states that can be known as mental states—Leibniz does this in terms of apperception, and Kant in terms of empirical apperception (the flux in inner appearances) and transcendental apperception (the unchanging, permanent consciousness that reveals an abiding self).54 Later on, the conception of consciousness broadened out to include not only introspective aspects but also an account of its orientation toward things external to mental operations, that is, what 51 Ibid., 324. More will be said of the "virtually unconditioned" in the next chapter. 52 Topics in Education, 158-92. 5 3 Eric Lormand. "Consciousness," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 2. Brahman to Derrida. (London: Routledge, 1998), 581-96. Lormand's article recognizes that there are the additional related questions of knowledge in general and of intentionality, but he limits his discussion to the two dealing most explicitly with the nature of conscious experience. 54 Ibid., 583. 18 amounts to an account of intentionality. A well-known articulation of this quality of consciousness is found in Sartre who maintains that being conscious is being conscious of something.55 Lormand identifies yet a broader conception of the term where social conditions and limitations determine the nature of consciousness, a view underlying the notions of false consciousness, class consciousness or consciousness raising, such as is expounded in the work of Hegel, Marx or Luckacs.56 With this expansion, there seems to have developed gradually a tighter relationship between mentality and physicality. Much could be said on the various positions on what is meant by "consciousness" in philosophy and the specialized field now known as "consciousness studies."57 In understanding consciousness, the dominant approach for many years was basically some manner of Cartesian introspection where one took stock of the inner elements that constitute human consciousness. Lonergan, however, rejects this sort of "introspection." He explains, "there is the word, introspection, which is misleading inasmuch as it suggests an inward inspection. Inward inspection is just myth. Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision."58 Lonergan does not deny the events of consciousness but rejects the mistaken notion that they are identified and understood by somehow looking at the events. "Introspection," as Lonergan regards this activity, "may be understood to mean, not consciousness itself but the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness .... The reader will do it, not by looking inwardly, but by recognizing in our expressions the objectification of his subjective experience."59 As Lonergan scholar, Hugo Meynell, suggests, truth or genuine knowledge, in this case knowledge of consciousness, is not apprehended in sensations of any kind (visual, for instance), but in reasonable " Ibid., 584. 56 Ibid. 5 7 See Thomas Nagel , ' "What Is It L ike to be a Bat? ' as cited in Er ic Lormand, "Consciousness," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vo l . 2, Brahman to Derrida (London: Routledge, 1998), 581-96; John R. Searle, "Consciousness and the Philosophers," in The New York Review of Books 44 , no. 4 (March 6, 1997): 43-50; and Dav id Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) 58 Method in Theology, 8. 59 Ibid., 8-9. 19 judgment.ftU The complaint Lonergan has with introspection, it seems, concerns the mode of access, and not the existence of such inner events or states. In recent times, the philosophical problem of consciousness brought to the fore by Nagel, Chalmers, and others, centers on the questions of how one is conscious, and of how to explain the phenomenon of consciousness as experienced. These questions, however, seem to be prior to Lonergan's starting point. Lonergan clearly takes as a given the phenomena of experience, that is, data as supplied by the senses and data as supplied by various activities of thought. His inquiry then moves to the questions of what the intelligent and reasonable person does with that welter of experience in the various processes of consciousness. His inquiry focuses, not on the question of how consciousness arises from the human biological substrate but on the subsequent development of consciousness that grasps insights, develops them and acts upon them.61 Simply put, Lonergan's notion of consciousness includes the reception of experiential data by the human mind as well as the various mental operations that one brings to bear upon that set of data. o u Hugo Meyne l l . Redirecting Philosophy. Reflections on the Nature of Knowledge from Plato to Lonergan (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1998), 267. 6 1 Insight, 95-7. Lonergan makes the distinction between the data o f sense, meaning the experience o f the effects o f the five senses, and the data o f consciousness, meaning the experience o f mental activities such as thoughts, images, insights, beliefs, and so forth. A t first it may seem that Lonergan is suggesting that sense data are not data included in consciousness (by distinguishing data o f sense and consciousness), thus potentially supporting the notion that there are two consciousnesses, one o f an outer world and one o f an inner that perpetuates the dualism that has dogged Western philosophy. However, Lonergan's distinction differentiates the sense experience and the experience o f the operations o f consciousness. For instance, one can experience pain and one can also experience the understanding o f the pain, such as its cause and its relief. (Lonergan states elsewhere, "Potencies are not data o f consciousness; operations and dynamisms are." in Caring About Meaning. Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey and Cathleen Going [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982], 43.) It seems that Lonergan wants to distinguish between some data as rather low-level activity o f consciousness and "thought data" which contain (or include) more complex, operational activities o f consciousness. Both, he suggests, are data that constitute the quality o f one's consciousness, but the technical terminology gives rise to a certain measure o f confusion. A t any rate, Lonergan draws the distinction between the experiences arising from the human senses and the experience of having various intelligent and evaluative acts, and it is this distinction that differentiated his study from Chalmers. 20 Experience Since experience is the starting point of his analysis, it is important to be clear, initially, as to what Lonergan means by the term, although its full sense and implications will become clear throughout the course of this study. Lonergan speaks of two types of data that are included within the scope of human experience: the data of sense, and the data of consciousness. The data of sense encompasses what commonly is thought of as the results of the five senses in seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching. To this grouping Lonergan adds "higher level" experiences of consciousness: the experience of understanding, the experience of assessing and judging, and the experience of deliberating and deciding. While one could readily identify the experiences of sense, it is more difficult to identify the experiences of consciousness, largely because we are not used to attending to ourselves in this self-reflective way. Also, it is difficult to differentiate these experiences of consciousness because they do not operate as discrete, isolated occurrences. Lonergan seeks to aid this process of differentiation in his account of insight, as I will discuss in chapter two, by identifying in various types of insights (mathematical, scientific, commonsense) the particular elements and how they work together. Perhaps a brief contrast with Dewey's view of experience will help to clarify Lonergan's position. Dewey maintained that experience "consists of the active relations subsisting between a human being and his natural and social surroundings," in which the individual undergoes changes due to the affect of environmental factors, and in which the individual affects environmental factors through one's actions.63 Experience is the consequential relations of person and environment, and in grasping the nature of these relations, an individual comes to understand oneself and one's environment, and comes to grasp meaning. In setting forth such a theory of experience, Dewey rejects the separation of doing and knowing,64 and affirms experience not merely as the "empirical," but as the 6 2 John Dewey, Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. (New Y o r k : The Free Press, 1966). Note that in his section, "The Modern Theory o f Experience and Knowledge," Dewey offers a helpful account o f the notion o f experience as it occurs in the work o f Plato, Bacon, Locke, and others. See pp. 266-76. 63 Ibid, 21 A. 64 Ibid, 275. 21 "experimental." Lonergan's position, I suggest, is largely compatible with Dewey's appreciation of the interconnection between an environment and the human subject in that Lonergan regards the interrelation of experience, knowing and doing as highly interactive and integrative, it being also a unitary process in the individual's consciousness and in expressions of that consciousness. For Lonergan, and it seems for Dewey as well, experience is not something that is given, after which mental faculties are then engaged to make sense out of given experience. Experience encompasses the process, that is to say, the actual operations, of all of consciousness. It is this broad view of experience that Lonergan appeals to throughout his intentionality analysis. Thus far, I have identified the key terms of this study: education; philosophy; intentionality; knowledge; consciousness; experience. In discussing the meanings attributed to these terms, one begins to develop a sense of Lonergan's approach to the questions related to intentionality and educational philosophy. Before we move on, however, it will be helpful to discuss the contexts of this study. C o n t e x t s As noted earlier in this introduction, the main contexts of this study include the fields of educational philosophy and of Lonergan Studies. E d u c a t i o n a l P h i l o s o p h y Educational philosophy has been understood as "a branch of philosophy concerned with virtually every aspect of the educational enterprise. It significantly overlaps other, more mainstream branches (especially epistemology and ethics, but even logic and metaphysics)."66 While there are many ways to understand this broad field of inquiry, one way that fits well with the exploration and expansion of Lonergan's work in the field, is to distinguish the topical and systematic approaches. 6 5 Ibid., 276. 6 6 Dennis M . Senchuck, "Philosophy of Education," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2d ed., ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 670. 22 The Topical Approach Philosophy of education ranges widely over the intellectual landscape of modern times, covering the traditional questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, addressing the nature and conception of education, and exploring the philosophical questions related to the various social and political dimensions of teaching, learning, schooling. In adding to this traditional routing, new trails blazed by influential thinkers in recent times seem inevitably (and perhaps properly) to find a hearing among today's cadre of philosophers of education. I find, for instance, in the literature of the discipline various topics addressed that include autonomy and paternalism, justice and care, gender, humanness and sexuality, critical thinking, hermeneutics and pluralism, environment and social structure, and new approaches to political responsibility and citizenship. One characteristic of educational philosophy, then, seems to be its proclivity to be issue-related and topical in nature. As further evidence, in the Paul Hirst and Patricia White compendium volumes, Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, one finds a new, or newly rejuvenated, set of issues that, since the 1980s, increasingly has dominated the discourse of educational philosophy. This set includes the political questions related to the individual and society, the ontological question of the constitutive nature of person and the elements of human formation and development, and the practical question of what it is to live a good life.67 What counts as educational philosophy today at least is this: disciplined reflection taking cues from the intellectual and philosophical climate of the times and recasting the issues in terms of educational theory and mandate, and providing clarity and direction for educational policy and practice. Various educational philosophers, following more topical approaches, have been clear on such a methodology. R. S. Peters, being one of the more influential educational philosophers of the 20th century,68 "sought to apply to educational issues the clarity and Paul Hirst and Patricia White, eds., Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition vol . 1 - 4 ( N e w Y o r k : Routledge, 1988). 6 8 Jane Roland Mar t in states, " . . .for many years Peters has been perhaps the dominant figure in philosophy o f education." in "The Ideal o f the Educated Person," in Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White, vo l . 1, Philosophy and Education. (London: Routledge, 1998.), 311. 23 analytic power of mainstream philosophical thinking ... ,"69 His efforts, it seems, similar to those of fellow educational philosopher, Israel Scheffler, applied conceptual and linguistic analysis to the various topics related to education and, indeed, to the concept of education itself. In general terms, then, Peters and Scheffler affirm the importance of engaging a distinct philosophical methodology—that is, following a process of analysis and manner of expression commonly accepted within the broader area of general philosophy. It seems reasonable to assert, then, that philosophical methodology emerges as an important element in educational philosophy, whether it is of the sort utilized by analytical or ordinary language philosophy, or that found in other general philosophies— pragmatism, existential analysis, or even a more classical metaphysics. What moves some aspect of human experience or some question from mere educational interest or relevance into the realm of the philosophical are the modes of questioning and analysis engaged, and the type of methodology used in probing the matter at hand. With the topical approach, there is exhibited an array of subjects and themes (as mentioned—autonomy, paternalism, justice, and so forth), handled in an accepted philosophical way, that constitute somewhat of an agenda for contemporary educational philosophy. Added to the contemporary spectrum of topics found in educational philosophy, an older catalog of interests in general philosophy retains a certain vigor, at least in some circles of thought. The statements of the Philosophy of Education Society in defining itself, for instance, stipulate that a philosophical treatment of the questions of meaning, truth and method, are required of educational philosophy. Expanding on this, Richard Millard and Peter Bertocci point out that the elements of educational philosophy mirror the elements of general philosophy, namely, philosophical treatments of values, epistemology, humanness and worldview.70 Others stress the importance of the topic of educational aim, suggesting that not only should the practice of education be toward some particular goal or goals, but that the aims should be philosophically understood and presented. For instance, Whitehead discusses aims in terms of his perceived phases and cycles of human development along with the interrelational aspects of all of existence, 6 9 John White, " R . S. Peters," in Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education, from Piaget to the Present, ed. Joy A . Palmer (London: Routledge, 2001), 119. 7 0 Cf . Christopher Lucas ' rendering o f the statement of the Committee on the Philosophy o f the Education Society in What Is Philosophy of Education?, I l l ; and M i l l a r d and Bertocci 's account of the relation o f general philosophy and educational philosophy in the same volume, 195. 24 and Peters' aims are presented in terms of the nature and structure of the human mind and the acquisition of knowledge.71 Branching out from this primary commitment to traditional philosophical topics, we find in Frankena that the focus shifts from epistemology and metaphysics to moral and social philosophy, likely reflecting a repositioning of general philosophy from the speculative concerns of an older mode of philosophy to the practical concerns of how human beings conduct themselves individually and socially.72 Indeed, ethical issues and moral principles, moral codes or moral reasoning have acquired increasing importance in the field of educational philosophy since at least the 1960s. Today, questions of ethics and morals have become dominant themes in the field. Educational themes of both the earlier, traditional mode of educational philosophy and the increasingly issued-centered character of the discipline in more recent times depict a considerable range of questions, scope of topics, and mode of analysis included within the purview of educational philosophy. Along with this topical approach to educational philosophy there exists another that seeks to develop a more integrated and comprehensive treatment of educational issues. In effect, this aims at an intentionally systematic treatment of educational philosophy. The Systematic Approach Although Richard Rorty seems to have devoted considerable thought and effort to discredit traditional systematic philosophy, there are some philosophers of education who have attempted to construct a less topically structured, more systematic treatment.73 A 7 1 Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, "The A i m s of Education: a Plea for Reform," in The Organisation of Thought, Educational and Scientific (Westport, C T : Greenwood Press, 1974), 1-28; and Paul Hirst, "The Nature and Structure of Curr iculum Objectives," in Knowledge and the Curriculum. A Collection of Philosophical Papers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 27-9. 7 2 W i l l i a m Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy o f M o r a l Education," Harvard Educational Review 20 (fall 1958): 300-13. 7 3 Although I w i l l focus mainly on the work o f Thomas F . Green, another systematic philosophy o f education appears in the work of Thomas H . Groome, Sharing Faith. A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry (New York : HarperCollins, 1991). Although this work takes a religious angle, stil l it sets up the categories and interrelations o f thought typical o f a systematic educational philosophy. 25 brief consideration of such a recent systematic educational philosophy will help to fill out the picture of what counts today as educational philosophy. Thomas F. Green offers such an approach to educational philosophy. To date, his systematic educational philosophy appears as a three-volume treatment providing analyses of the activities of teaching, of the forms those activities take in various institutional, social and political contexts, and of the creation of the personal directives that govern one's conduct and responsibilities.74 Engaging in what perhaps Rorty might call an outmoded style of philosophy, Green has attempted to produce a relatively comprehensive and coherent vision of the theory and practice of education. His objective is clear: The course I had in mind to construct was a full program in philosophy of education, beginning with the conceptual analysis of the activities of teaching with full understanding that these activities take place in institutions, and for the sake of human beings concerned not simply to live, but to live well ... . These volumes, so far, constitute a single coherent body of work, not three discrete efforts as they have so far been understood even by their author. At the heart of Green's approach to educational philosophy lie the noticing, understanding and articulating of the activities and operations of learning and teaching. As he explains, "Philosophy is an activity and not a subject, something to do rather than / 4 The earliest o f the volumes is The Activities of Teaching (Troy, N Y : Educator's International Press, 1998) appearing originally in 1971. This work was followed by Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Troy, N Y : Educator's International Press, 1997), first published in 1980. Whi le the focus o f this volume is on the structure, administration and actual operation o f the educational system, its approach has a distinct philosophical dimension. He explains, " M y purpose has been to describe both the structure and the dynamics o f what I have chosen to call 'the educational system,' and to do so in a way that w i l l capture the essential rationality so that the behavior o f the system, its inherent processes, may become intelligible in a way that is independent o f differences in poli t ical and economic ideology." The work on moral formation and education is the latest to appear, Voices. The Educational Formation of Conscience (Notre Dame, I N : University o f Notre Dame Press, 1999). Apparently a fourth volume of this systematic treatment is planned. "To this book, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience, is to be added a second volume, already underway, called Walls: Education in Communities of Text and Liturgy . . . . Discussion there flows from the conviction that in a highly pluralistic wor ld in which commons and sect are separated by high walls o f one sort or another, the health of the commons depends upon the possibility o f strong sectarian education." Voices, x i i . 7 5 Thomas F . Green, The Activities of Teaching, v i i i . 26 something to study."'6 Accordingly, "to the question 'Where should I start the study of philosophy?' there are many answers .... From my own view, the best approach would be simply to observe someone else doing it and then start doing it yourself."77 Given this methodology, what counts as educational philosophy, for Green, includes attending to and thematizing what goes on in the actual teaching process, in the development of beliefs and belief systems, in knowing and knowing correctly, and in the various modes of student learning. Green's systematic educational philosophy involves two key operations: first, identifying the various educational acts and, second, clarifying how these activities can and do occur, and might occur more effectively. In this methodology, its clues come from the field of education itself more than from the topics en vogue within philosophy or social theory. Clearly, then, educational philosophy reveals itself as a many-faceted discipline: topical or systematic; rooted in traditional philosophical discourse or adopting contemporary philosophical analyses; and addressing various social, economic or political concerns. What counts as educational philosophy today covers a wide territory whose horizons seem inexorably to be pushed back as different, perhaps new, methodologies are adopted. Its many activities include: striving toward a rigorous explanation of elements related to teaching and learning; upholding the importance of giving reasons and being committed to the refinement of those reasons; addressing the questions related to the development, integrity and value of the human subject; offering a view of social and political life in which education enjoys a strategic role; and adopting a philosophical mode of discourse and rational argument. In the exploration and expansion of Lonergan's intentionality analysis into this field, we will see that Lonergan's unique account of the operations of human consciousness relates to many key topics addressed in educational philosophy, and also offers a basis for a systematic treatment that orders and develops educational issues as a relatively (or at least potentially) comprehensive understanding of human education. Ibid., xiii. Perhaps Green is overstating his case in order to emphasize his particular focus on the "activity" of both philosophizing and teaching. There can be no mistake that philosophy, as evidenced in many university curricula, is also a subject to be studied. 77 Ibid. 27 It should be noted that my engagement of the field of educational philosophy in this study is very broad, and that the thinkers I refer to within this field are not meant to be representative. Rather my intention is to identify the work of certain educational philosophers who have treated various key issues as they fall within the primary differentiations and operations identified in Lonergan's intentionality analysis. Lonergan Studies Lonergan Studies is a relatively new, but growing, field of inquiry covering a large number of topics that center on the work of the philosopher and theologian, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, SJ. Born in Buckingham, Quebec in 1904, Bernard was the oldest of three children. At age thirteen, Bernard entered the boarding school of Loyola College in 78 Montreal. In 1922, at age eighteen, he joined the Society of Jesus, embarking on an academic career that would prove to be remarkably productive. Spanning almost half a century, his scholarly vocation consisting of research, writing and teaching has resulted in a projected twenty-five volume set of his collected works.79 Lonergan's academic training followed not an unusual route for Jesuits. Studying first in the standard curriculum of languages, mathematics, philosophy and literature in his home country, he later pursued studies in the Greek and Latin classics at Heythrop College, England from 1926 to 1929. While at Heythrop, he covered more philosophy and mathematics, and undertook concentrated study of the works of John Henry Newman and other important thinkers of the 19th century. Upon completion of these studies, Lonergan was given a three-year teaching assignment at Loyola College in Montreal, after which he began, in 1934, doctoral level theological studies in Rome. With a background in classical and modern philosophy, and having studied St. Augustine along the way, doctoral studies led Lonergan more deeply into the thought of St. Thomas. He approached the work of Thomas first critically, and then as an apprentice, "reaching up to the mind of Aquinas."80 His doctoral dissertation was on "operative 7 8 Frederick E . Crowe, Lonergan (Collegeville, M N : The Liturgical Press, 1992), 3-4. 7 9 Published by the University o f Toronto Press, the projected number o f volumes have increased from an initial twenty-two in 1988, including an index volume, to twenty-five at the present time. T o date, 2003, eleven volumes have been published. 80 Ibid., 47. 28 grace" in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Frederick Crowe, a close associate of 81 Lonergan and one of the most prominent Lonergan scholars, believes that more than the theological contribution made, this work's importance lies in its uncovering "of the way Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood and thought again and judged and wrote." Lonergan's theological interest in Aquinas inevitably led to an investigation of the cognitional theory under-girding Aquinas' theology and philosophy. The crowning work in this phase of his academic career was the publication in the late 1940s of a series of articles exploring the concept of 'verbum.' It is here that the key concepts and elements related to human cognition are set forth, later to be reworked and developed, revised and updated, into a full-fledged philosophical treatise of his own published finally in 1957 as Insight. A Study of Human Understanding. This work exhibits a certain indebtedness to Aquinas, but it goes beyond him and represents a different and unique system of thought. In large measure, Lonergan's interests and studies lead up to Insight, and most everything subsequently flows from it, whether his Christology, his theological analysis, his methodology, economics, or his lectures on educational issues. Following the publication of Insight, Lonergan's reputation as a major thinker, in the Catholic intellectual world at least, began to grow. Education professor and Lonergan scholar, David G. Creamer, notes, "Insight was well received by religious and secular scholars ... [and] has received the status of a philosophical classic."83 Lonergan's most widely known work appeared in 1972. Method in Theology applies the philosophical position established in Insight to understanding the scope and task of theological inquiry, and added new insights into the nature and significance of conversion and its various types. While Method in Theology propelled Lonergan to prominence in the theological world, already by the mid-1960s Lonergan's influence was beginning to be felt on a wide scale. Crowe writes in 1967, "... his disciples sense a latent power in his thought, the 8 1 For such an assessment o f Crowe's work, largely devoted to the study, interpretation and promotion o f Lonergan's thought, see Michae l Vert in, "Editor 's Introduction" in Frederick E . Crowe, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michae l Ver t in (Washington, D . C : Catholic University o f Amer ica Press, 1989), v i i -x . 8 2 Ibid. 8 3 Dav id G . Creamer. Guides for the Journey. John Macmurray, Bernard Lonergan and James Fowler (Lanham, M D : University Press o f America , 1996), 54. 29 gathering momentum of a truly significant impact upon some future period."84 What has emerged since then is a movement called "Lonergan Studies," among other effects, spawning several journals, the most noted being, Method. A Journal of Lonergan Studies. There have been established more than a dozen centers and institutes around the world given to the promotion and development of Lonergan's thought. Conferences are regularly held on interpreting and relating Lonergan's work to other issues and important thinkers, including Jane Jacobs in the field of sociology and cultural analysis and Hans-Georg Gadamer in the field of philosophy and hermeneutics. While there have been some major studies done on the relation of Lonergan's ideas to education and issues pertinent to educational philosophy, these have been largely related either to the field of religion and religious education, or related to curriculum development. One of the earliest treatments of Lonergan and education appeared in the Lonergan festschrift of 1964 in an essay entitled, "Towards an Effective Philosophy of Education."86 The problem Vanier deals with concerns the need for philosophy, and philosophy of education as a practical manifestation of philosophy, to "comprehend reality in its total unity and its basic characteristics." Specifically, for Vanier, this is a matter of obtaining a knowledge of developing knowledge. In his view, Lonergan's Insight makes this knowledge possible in that he makes explicit what generally has remained implicit with respect to this type of development.88 As simply an anticipation of the importance Lonergan's analysis of human insight holds for education, Vanier states, ... in our perspective, which is that of Insight, the philosophy of education starts from the concrete data of cognitional operations. It is a clearly distinct science within the cultural order, achieving its development not through a series of basic revisions but through a constant search for 8 4 Frederick E . Crowe, "Bernard Lonergan" in Modern Theologians, Christians and Jews, ed. Thomas E . B i r d (Notre Dame, I N : University o f Notre Dame Press, 1967), 126. 8 5 Frederick Lawrence, ed., The Beginning and the Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conferences (Chico, C A : Scholars Press, 1984); and Frederick Lawrence, ed., Ethics in Making a Living: the Jane Jacobs Conference (Atlanta, G A : Scholars Press, 1989). 8 6 Paul Vanier, "Towards an Effective Philosophy o f Education," trans., Jean-Marc Laporte, in Spirit as Inquiry. Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., ed. Frederick E . Crowe (Chicago: Continuum, 1964), 171-79. 8 7 Ibid., 174. 8 8 Ibid. 174-75. 30 precision in its methods, for differentiation and integration of new data o n coming from the development of sciences or the renewal of pedagogy. The key to the educational philosophy stemming from Lonergan's work on insight, in Vanier's view, is the framework for collaboration on education within the sciences made possible by Lonergan's account of the development of knowledge. As will become clear in this study, there exists the potential to interrelate the findings of science within an overarching framework, this being Lonergan's intentionality analysis, but I will show that it offers more. It brings to educational philosophy a new understanding of the human subject and a new understanding of key elements of educational philosophy that focus on that vast horizon of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Another study relating Lonergan and education appears in the work of Frederick E. Crowe in which he deals with the problem of the conflict in education between what is commonly called progressive education and what is known as traditional education.90 This work will be dealt with later when we examine Lonergan's thought on the nature of development and "genetic method." A third study focusing on Lonergan's educational philosophy appears in the essay of philosopher, Hugo Meynell. In this short work, Meynell attempts to introduce to his audience of educational philosophers and theorists the work of Lonergan, showing its contribution to an understanding of the nature of knowledge, its structure and norms that lead to a clear understanding of the nature and aims of education.91 Essentially, Meynell argues, "it is the very essence of education to promote in those educated the capacity to exercise the four transcendental precepts," that is, to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be reasonable and to be responsible.92 Throughout the essay, Meynell sets aside any direct treatment of educational issues, offering rather a clear and commonsense account of Lonergan's position on knowing and the demands that that position places on individuals. Meynell concludes his account by suggesting that the aim of education according to Lonergan is "to foster attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to the *vIbid.,m. 9 0 Frederick E . Growe, Old Things and New: a Strategy for Education (Atlanta, G A : Scholars Press, 1985.) 9 1 Hugo Meyne l l , "Bernard Lonergan and Education," Paideusis 7, no. 1 (fall 1993): 5. 9 2 Ibid. 31 uttermost."^  While Meynell presents a lucid and direct account of Lonergan's position on knowing (itself not a mean accomplishment, in my view), there is no direct treatment of the issues of education and no mention of educational philosophy. More direct engagement of educational philosophy is needed to realize the impact Meynell desires. As I hope to show, Lonergan's intentionality analysis can be expanded in a direct and broad way into the field of educational philosophy. In addition to these three published works directly on Lonergan and education, there have been a handful of theses, articles and smaller segments of works that explore this relation. Some of these will be discussed later in this study as they relate to certain larger issues of educational philosophy. Limitations This present study is a study of educational philosophy and a study of the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. Both of these fields of inquiry are large and complex, and a satisfying treatment of all aspects of the relation between the two would likely require several volumes.94 To make this study more manageable, my treatment must have limitations. A helpful limitation is to consider the central focus of Lonergan's philosophy, leaving explorations of the extended reaches of his philosophy for other studies in education.95 Because various explorations and expansions of Lonergan's work into the religious dimension of educational philosophy have been conducted already,961 will not be 93 Ibid., 12. 9 4 Regarding Lonergan Studies itself, a fuller and more adequate treatment than what I can offer here of the philosophical perspective and tradition o f Lonergan would have to probe at least the Thomistic and classical traditions which Lonergan engages both positively and negatively, and relate this to his engagement o f modern philosophies, including existentialism. A n d o f course, the field o f philosophy o f education is vast, and continues to spread out in a great many directions. 9 5 Such reaches would cover Lonergan's philosophy of religion, his theological methodology and, more recently, his economic theory. In fact, as shall be noted, some studies o f the relation o f education and other aspects o f Lonergan's thought already have been undertaken. 9 6 For religious education questions, at least as they are usually understood as instruction in religious faith, one should consult these works. Not a comprehensive list, it includes some o f the main treatments o f Lonergan and religious education. Thomas H . Groome, Sharing Faith: a Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry (New Y o r k : HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), especially in the earlier sections where the "foundations" of religious education are set forth, 116-31; Robert J. Henman, The Child as Quest: Method and Religious Education (Washington, D . C . : University Press o f America , 1983); 32 addressing the issue of religious education in this work, although in some sense, it has been purported that virtually any aspect of human existence exhibits a religious quality.97 In his lectures on education, Lonergan distinguishes between secularist education and philosophy of education and religious education. The difference is that the former ends no with ethics and the latter considers "when the autonomous subject stands before God." While the religious stance is of utmost importance to the religious person, most education that concerns educational philosophy is not religious education, and thus I will largely set aside the questions of religion and concentrate on secularist education and philosophy of education. Further limitations of this study should be noted. First, I will be limiting my focus to Lonergan's intentionality analysis as it appears mainly in Lonergan's cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. The most substantial treatment of these topics appear in Insight, but there have been further significant developments of his intentionality analysis in subsequent writings, and these will be considered throughout this study. Moreover, this concentration on Lonergan's intentionality analysis of Insight (but not to the exclusion of his other works) will hopefully help to change a perceived neglect of this demanding philosophical work, at least relative to his more accessible Method in Theology!19 Secondly, a significant development of Lonergan's intentionality analysis occurs in his appreciation and explanation of the role of feelings in the operations on human Catherine Lynne Siejke, "Toward a Religious Education Practice That Promotes Authentically L i v e d Christian Faith Wi th in a Christian Faith Community: A Religious Education Interpretation o f Bernard Lonergan's Understanding o f Christian Authenticity," Ph .D. diss., Boston College, 1992.; Michae l Corso, "Christian Religious Education for Conversion: a Lonerganian Perspective," Ph .D. diss., Boston College, 1994; Louis Roy , "Lonergan on Catholic Education: a Few Suggestions," in Faith Seeking Understanding: Learning and the Catholic Tradition (Manchester, N H : Saint Anse lm College Press, 1991), 155-63; M a r y C. Boys, "Conversion as a Foundation of Religious Education," Religious Education 11, no. 2 (March-A p r i l 1982): 211-24; 9 7 In the Jesuit tradition, a common mode o f thought is to "see G o d in a l l things," and by extension, then, Lonergan's thought reflecting this tradition would regard any act o f education, any act o f understanding, o f knowing, as related to, or in some sense reflecting, the being of God . So, in a broad sense, a l l education is "religious" education. See W i l l i a m A . Barry and Robert G . Doherty, Contemplatives in Action: the Jesuit Way (Mahwah, N J : Paulist Press, 2002), 77-80. 98 Topics in Education, 38. 9 9 Dav id Creamer suggests o f Insight, "It has received the status o f a philosophical classic and is one o f those books that many people speak about but few have read and even fewer have understood." in his Guides for the Journey. John Macmurray, Bernard Lonergan and James Fowler (Lanham, M D : University Press o f America , 1996), 54. 33 consciousness. The element of feelings in human cognition will be dealt with at various points in this study, but a fuller treatment of this element of human existence as it relates to education should, perhaps, occur within the field of educational psychology.100 So, while the topic of human affectivity arises in this study of educational philosophy, in comparison to the topics of understanding, rationality, and reasonable choice, its treatment will be relatively limited. Thirdly, it should be noted what this study is not. It is not a work treating some particular educational problem, or a logically argued philosophical position on some issue in educational philosophy. This study rather concerns itself with understanding the central tenets of the philosophy of a significant thinker, and exploring and expanding these into the broad field of educational philosophy. This work, I believe, has in view the general horizon of educational philosophy in which some of its key parts are related to the whole. There is much work in educational philosophy that will not be addressed, and, as noted earlier, that work I do consider is in relation to the mapping of issues in educational philosophy onto the systematic framework revealed in Lonergan's intentionality analysis. And fourthly, as a textual limitation, in dealing with Lonergan's intentionality analysis, the preferred edition of Insight, and of his other works cited, will be the Collected Works edition, where these have been published.101 Where his works have not yet appeared in the Collected Works edition, the most recent edition will be cited. In the next chapter I will first examine Lonergan's analysis of human consciousness as it appears in his early writings, as it takes on central importance as intentionality analysis in Insight, and, then how it develops post-Insight. This will set the stage for other chapters that deal with what implications Lonergan's cognitional theory, his epistemology, metaphysics and ethics hold for educational philosophy. I U U A thoroughgoing treatment o f Lonergan's development o f intentionality analysis with respect to feelings would have to address the work o f Lonergan scholars Robert Doran, Bernard Tyrre l l (referred to later in this study), and others, who explore and expand the psychological dimensions and implications o f Lonergan's analysis. 1 0 1 In some cases, several editions o f some works have been published. For instance, to date Insight has been published in five editions, the most recent being the Collected Works edition o f 1992. Lending themselves best to scholarly research, the Collected Works editions are carefully edited and indexed, offering extensive notes, glossaries and translations o f terms. It should be noted that Method in Theology has not yet appeared in a Collected Works edition. 34 CHAPTER TWO Lonergan's Intentionality Analysis Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have experienced. A third dimension of rationality emerges when the content of our acts of understanding is regarded as, of itself, a mere bright idea and we endeavor to settle what really is so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgment on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.1 All of Lonergan's work in one way or another leads up to, and then flows from, his account of the differentiated but interrelated acts of human intentionality identified as experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. Identifying these acts leading to human insight, and coming to terms with the far-reaching implications of those acts, constitute the centerpiece of Lonergan's philosophical work extending over several decades. Frederick Crowe, one of the chief interpreters and earliest proponents of Lonergan's thought, has stated that it is Lonergan's "discovery of insight," this being the core of his intentionality analysis, that is undoubtedly his greatest contribution to the world of thought and scholarship.2 While Lonergan is not interested so much in developing an educational philosophy as he is in addressing the broader scope of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, I maintain that his treatment of these wider concerns has relevance to educational philosophy, and as such, his intentionality analysis invites an expansion, as we shall see, into the field of educational philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to establish the main contours and scope of intentionality analysis that will lead in subsequent chapters to an expansion of key elements of his 1 Method in Theology, 9. 2 Frederick E . Crowe offered this assessment in his lecture series at Regent College, November 10-11, 1995. Aud io recordings o f these lectures are available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, Ontario, and at the Regent Carey Library, Regent College, Vancouver, B . C . 35 analysis. This chapter will focus on Lonergan's principal philosophical work, Insight, but inasmuch as his work on human cognition, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics spans virtually his entire career, earlier writings and those subsequent to Insight also will be examined briefly in relation to the development of his analysis of the operations of human consciousness. Analysis of Human Consciousness in the Early Lonergan Corpus Lonergan's doctoral studies covered the years 1938 to 1940 and revealed an early interest in the nature and function of the human mind. While his dissertation centered on the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas concerning operative grace, and the various associated theological disputations pertaining to the relations of grace and liberty, of the natural and supernatural, and of the divine and human will,4 the work was a historical treatment that probed the questions of the nature of theological development and of intellectual operations underlying theological reflection. Specifically, Lonergan understood that historical inquiry must take into account the function of human intelligence, and he further discovered that speculation on the development of thought, while aiming at certitude, can achieve in the end only degrees of probability.5 For Lonergan, what became paramount in historical inquiry was the method of inquiry one employs and, for him, a method suited to such a task was one that in general terms operates not only in theology but in mathematics and physics.6 In a way, then, Lonergan's dissertation was not so much about the dogmas propounded by Aquinas as it was about the development of Aquinas' thinking in the realm of speculative theology, and about the general structure and operations of the human mind. Crowe is clear on this point: "... the real value of his dissertation lay less in points of objective theology than in factors that are more subjective and methodological, factors that for this very reason are far more fundamental; 3 Frederick E . Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise (Cambridge, M A : Cowley, 1980), 16-7. 4 Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E . Crowe and Robert M . Doran, vo l . 1, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2000), 441-8. 5 Ibid., 156-7. 6 Ibid., 158. 36 in this respect the influence of Lonergan's doctoral work on his subsequent development can hardly be exaggerated."7 Crowe goes on to say, "His real discovery was of the way Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood and thought again and judged and wrote." In Aquinas, Lonergan found a thinker wrestling not only with the deep theological questions of the day but also with the profound questions concerning the elements and processes of the human mind as it comes to understand and to know. This longstanding interest in cognitional theory, extending back even to his years at Heythrop College in England, from 1926 to 1930,9 took on new life in the mid-forties when Lonergan conducted another extensive study of St. Thomas, this time on the question of the "inner word"—what essentially amounted to the question of Thomas' cognitional theory.10 Published first in a series of articles from 1946 to 1949, and then as a monograph in 1967, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, this work offers an account of the procession of the inner word in acts of understanding and acts of rational consciousness through conceptualization and judgment. His analysis unfolded not by attending to the products of these acts found, for instance, in concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, but by attending to the performance of the acts as they progress from lesser to greater complexities of understanding." While Lonergan uses the term "reason" and "rationality" to speak of the operations of this inner word, his meaning extends beyond mere deductive reasoning, logic and syllogistic thinking. In its essence, reasoning is "simply the development of insight; it is motion towards understanding. In the concrete such development is a dialectical interplay of sense, memory, imagination, insight, definition, critical reflection, judgment... ." The cognitional theory at work in Aquinas and explicated by Lonergan seems to have set the course for Lonergan's next great project, namely, to undertake a wide-ranging and penetrating inquiry into the occurrence, operations and capabilities of human understanding. 7 Frederick E . Crowe, Lonergan (Collegeville, M N : The Liturgical Press, 1992), 47. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 14. 10 Ibid., 48-9. 1' Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E . Crowe and Robert M . Doran, vo l . 2, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1997), 152-53. 12 Ibid., 71. Expanding on this statement, Frederick Crowe offers a further helpful account o f Lonergan's notion of rationality as it appears in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, in Lonergan, 49-50. 37 Intentionality Analysis in Insight 13 Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, first published in 1957, sets aside the theological questions and disputations of his earlier inquiries, and takes up the question of the nature of insight as it occurs within the realms of mathematics, the natural sciences, and the world of common sense. In what follows, I will consider Lonergan's own assessment of this work in his introductory remarks to Insight and in later reflections; examine in detail the key cognitional operations in the occurrence of insight in empirical inquiry; outline the corresponding operations of insight in the world of common sense; and discuss Lonergan's analysis of judgment and the limitations of knowledge due to human bias. Introductory Remarks Lonergan's original intention for Insight was to elucidate the methods of human inquiry and then to develop an effective method of inquiry for theological studies.14 What resulted was a more general study of how human beings come to know virtually anything that uncovered and elucidated the general cognitional activities involved in that cognitive process. Lonergan reports, "The problem tackled in the book was complex indeed. At its root was a question of psychological fact. Human intellect does not intuit essences. It grasps in simplifying images intelligible possibilities that may prove relevant to an understanding of data."15 The operations of insight are revealed throughout this work in a series "five-finger exercises inviting the reader to discover in himself and for himself just what happens when he understands."16 This is followed by an account of how understanding moves to knowledge in an act of judgment.17 The subsequent account 1 3 Whi le the first edition was published in 1957 by Longmans, Green & C o , as noted in the previous chapter, al l references wi l l be to the 5 t h edition of the work: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Frederick E . Crowe and Robert M . Doran, vo l . 3, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1992). 1 4 Bernard Lonergan, "Insight Revisi ted" in A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., ed. W i l l i a m F . J . Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrre l l (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 268. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 269. 17 Ibid., 273. 38 leads to the questions of being and objectivity and of what human knowledge is oriented towards and to which it intentionally aims.18 The final chapters of the book discuss how the operations of insight are applied in philosophy, in ethics and in a general theology.19 The three basic questions of the book to which Lonergan proposes answers are, "What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? The first answer is a cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is 70 a metaphysics ... ." While it is not explicitly stated in the text itself, Insight seems to unfold in general relation to these three questions as follows. The cognitional theory is formulated largely in chapters one through eight in which Lonergan gives an account of the basic operations of consciousness in seeking knowledge. The explicit epistemology appears in chapters nine through thirteen in which Lonergan gives an account of knowledge, self-knowledge, the knowledge of being and objectivity. Lonergan's metaphysical work appears in chapters fourteen through seventeen that deal with the method, elements, and modes of metaphysics.21 These accounts bring Lonergan in chapter eighteen to another topic related to metaphysics, that is, to the ethical questions arising from a grasp of cognitional process and from a knowledge of what knowledge is. In ethics, Lonergan addresses the existential questions of decision and action based on knowledge and affirmation of the good and the true. This, then, is the overall structure of the book and, for my purposes of grasping his analysis of the operations of human consciousness in terms of intentionality analysis, my focus will first be on the "Preface," "Introduction," and the first ten chapters that present "insight as activity," essentially this being his cognitional theory and account of human knowing that forms the basis of his epistemological, metaphysical and ethical assertions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters of this study. Lonergan leads into his study through a "Preface" and a substantial "Introduction," both of which provide important perspectives on the purpose, value and applications of 18 Ibid., 273-75 19 Ibid., 275. 2 0 Method in Theology, 25. 2 1 While it would take at least another dissertation to argue for and conclude definitively the correlation between the three questions Lonergan formulates in Method and the structure of Insight, and in fact this interpretative grid might not fit tightly, I propose the correlation simply to help in sorting through the complexities of the book and to help in understanding his intentionality analysis. 39 his intentionality analysis. One of the most important elements of the "Preface" is the definition he offers of the term "insight." By insight, then, is meant not any act of attention or advertence or memory but the supervening act of understanding. It is not recondite intuition but the familiar event that occurs easily and frequently in the moderately intelligent, rarely and with difficulty only in the very stupid. In itself it is so simple and obvious that it seems to merit the little attention that commonly it receives. At the same time, its function in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results is to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and opinion.22 The field of experience to which Lonergan attends, then, is common and general, and concerns the cognitional activity that occurs in virtually any instance of human knowing. While this discussion of an underlying unity of knowledge immediately presents difficulties to persons emphasizing the intersubjective, social, or historical aspects of knowledge—for if all knowledge is contextual and conditioned, what unity can be attributed to the "whole field of human inquiry and opinion"—the reasonable inquirer should be open to at least hearing out Lonergan, and to reserve judgment, until a thorough understanding has been achieved. The elements of knowledge that provide a commonality to human inquiry and opinion, for Lonergan, clearly are not found in a synthesis achieved through an analysis of the body of knowledge drawn from the various fields of inquiry, such as what Paul Hirst and some other educational philosophers seem to seek in their epistemological analyses.23 Rather, the common elements are found in the knowing process. Lonergan explains, ... we are concerned not with the object understood in mathematics but with mathematicians' acts of understanding, not with objects understood in the various sciences but with scientists' acts of understanding, not with Insight, 3. 2 3 Paul Hirst, "The Forms o f Knowledge Re-visited," in Knowledge and the Curriculum. A Collection of Philosophical Papers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 84-100. See also Kie ran Egan, The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997). 40 the concrete situations mastered by common sense but with the acts of understanding of men of common sense.24 The primary focus of Lonergan's work, then, is on the knowing process. It is on knowing what the activities of knowing are, and how those activities result in what one calls "knowledge." In his intentionality analysis, Lonergan's basic concern is to gain insight into acts of insight. With the central thrust of the work clearly articulated in the "Preface," his "Introduction" sets forth the strategy of execution. First, it should be noted, Lonergan's motivation, in part, arises from the problem of Cartesian dualism perplexing philosophy of the modern age; and for him, the solution is found only in an understanding of the nature of knowledge verified in the knowing subject.25 Secondly, the nature of knowledge is uncovered not in an analysis of the ungraspable breadth of what is known, but in grasping the structure of the knowing process embodied in the knowing subject.26 Thirdly, Lonergan's strategy is to invite the inquirer to identify and to understand the elements and processes of knowing that are found in one's actual performance of the process. This invitation leads to what Lonergan calls "self-appropriation," and it is key to his entire analysis. Fourthly, Lonergan notes this self-understanding and self-appropriation is a slow and incremental process that is not achieved in a single leap. It is a process that begins with simple, elementary insights that build toward a full and satisfactory self-appropriation and self-affirmation. Of Lonergan's preliminary remarks on insight, the singularly most important assertion for the legitimacy of my inquiry and thesis appears as the final point of his "Introduction." There he states: "... the order of the assembly [of the elements, relations, alternatives and implications of conscious intentionality] is governed, not by the abstract considerations of logical or metaphysical priority, but by concrete motives of pedagogical 29 efficacy." Lonergan presents the elements, relations and operations of intentionality as a quest for insight. In Lonergan's analysis, human intentionality has a definite structure and 24 Ibid., 4 Ibid., 12. Ibid. 25 26 27 Ibid., 13. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 11. 28 29 41 order, and that structure and order exhibit a basic educational relevance. For this reason, then, Lonergan's intentionality analysis can be regarded as an analysis of the elements and processes of education at a very basic level. Put another way, human intentionality, through and through, is an educational phenomenon. Frederick Lawrence summarizes the pedagogical dimension of intentionality addressed in Insight this way: Lonergan's pedagogy in Insight invites the reader to venture 'into mathematics and physics, into the subtleties of common sense and depth psychology, into the processes of history, the intricacies of interpretation, the dialectic of philosophies, and the possibility of transcendent knowledge.' He wants us 'to apprehend, to appropriate, to envisage in all its consequences, the inner focus of ... [one's] own intelligence and reasonableness' in insight. To gain insight into insight is 'to pierce the outer verbal and conceptual exhibitions of mathematics, of science, and of common sense, and to penetrate to the inner dynamism of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection,' and 'one's own essential and restricted freedom.'30 In effect, Lonergan's assertion would be that learning in virtually every domain of human inquiry involves insight, and Lonergan's introduction leads us to expect that, the better we understand insight, the better we can create the conditions under which it is likely to occur. As Lonergan's analysis of human intentionality unfolds throughout Insight, one should be clear as to Lonergan's overarching intention. While in this work there is no shortage of theoretical propositions, objectifications of the process of human consciousness, and assertions on the nature of human subjectivity, of the world and of the universe of being, the appeal is not to grasp, necessarily, Lonergan's assertions. The appeal and intention is to attend to one's own experiences of intentionality, to understand them, and thus to move toward achieving self-knowledge. Lonergan's work, as "pedagogical efficacy," is to aid this developmental process. The understanding required for this task involves a self-reflective dimension and the development of a "moving viewpoint," that is, it involves a gradual accumulation of insights into conscious intentionality where, as the process unfolds, there emerges an "appropriation of one's Frederick Lawrence, "Lonergan, the Integral Postmodern?" Method. A Journal of Lonergan Studies 18, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 115. Here Lawrence is citing Lonergan's original "Preface" to Insight. 42 own intellectual and rational self-consciousness."31 In order to understand the dimensions of self-reflection, and to understand the movement of Lonergan's thought from cognitional theory to his engagement with philosophical questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, I will examine more closely the details of his intentionality analysis. Cognitional Operations Since, for Lonergan, understanding attends to and arises from the breadth of human experience, the first step in understanding cognitive intentionality, the point of departure if you will, in the quest of self-knowledge, is first a matter of drawing attention to the experience of having an insight. Thus he begins, "... our first task will be to attain familiarity with what is meant by insight, and the only way to achieve this end is, it seems, to attend very closely to a series of instances all of which are rather remarkable for their banality."32 The instance appealed to is the well-known "eureka" experience of Archimedes in which certain features of the occurrence of insight are identified. First, Lonergan notes, insight comes as a "release to the tension of inquiry." The experience considered at this point involves not so much the release of tension as the drive that creates the tension in the first place. It is a tension between the question or problem one faces and the solution needed to answer it. "Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is the drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain."33 In the array of cognitional activities that constitutes human consciousness, the force that seems to move cognitional operations forward is the desire, or drive, to know.34 31 Ibid., 20. 32 Ibid., 27. 33 Ibid., 28. 3 4 Lonergan clearly identities cognitional activities as dimensions of conscious human experience. Without human consciousness, what would also include the sub-conscious and semi-conscious states, can one be said to have experience? Perhaps there are good arguments for holding that humans can have experience without consciousness, but based on this cognitional theory, Lonergan would deny this as a possibility. The full scope of Lonergan's conceptions of experience comes into view in due course. 43 Secondly, Lonergan suggests that, "insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly." While an insight into a particular situation is desired, still it is not achieved on command. An insight seems to take its own time to arrive, and when it does, it comes unannounced. The conditions for its occurrence can be set auspiciously, and all the clues can be noticed and given their due, but the actual moment of having the insight is a surprising occurrence in the consciousness of the inquirer, a defiant "de-routinization" so to speak, that, in certain respects, catches the individual unaware. It is an act that distinguishes discovery from mere conclusions. "Were there rules for discovery, then discoveries would be mere conclusions."36 The "aha" experience, however, expresses an insight of creative uncovering, of "dis-cover-y." Insight occurs not from following rules but by allowing the dynamics of human cognition the freedom, relaxation and enjoyment to break out of restrictive patterns in order to achieve new beginnings and novel intellectual grasps with, of course, their concomitant emotional effects. Thirdly, insight arises from, and is dependent upon, what can be thought of as the internal conditions of consciousness. Where the human senses depend on external stimuli, on that which can be seen, heard, felt, and so forth, insights depend on internal states and functions of consciousness. These conditions include such things as alertness in one's situation, asking questions, and "the accurate presentation of definite problems." At this early stage in his treatise, Lonergan begins to draw the distinction between what is given to human consciousness by the senses, if you will, the data of sense, and what consciousness produces by way of attentiveness, of wonder and curiosity, by falling into or establishing patterns of experience for specific purposes, and by way of thoughts and ideas that pertain to some matter at hand. Later on he calls these products, and a host of other such evidences, the "data of consciousness."38 In accounting for the experience of insight, the distinction between data of sense and data of consciousness is a difference between what is apprehended of external things and what "internal" products and activities arise through patterned or creative acts of consciousness. 35 Insight, 29. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 95-7. Lonergan deals explicit ly with the distinction between the data o f sense and the data o f consciousness in the section that maps out the canons of empirical method. 44 Fourthly, Lonergan claims that "insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract." Problems call for solutions that will work in actual situations, the results of which can be verified empirically by the senses and anticipated and grasped in images. These results also draw on the resources of abstract thought expressed in formulae, definitions, postulates and deductions.40 In its function as a pivot, insight grasps the possibility of some solution in the abstract and determines its actualization in the concrete. Analogously, Lonergan also calls insight a "hinge" and a "mediator."41 The experience of insight pertains, of course, to the particular situation at hand, but it also anticipates abstractly other similar situations as it reaches for broader, deeper, more novel opportunities of understanding. The details of an immediate situation are thus considered in reference to the ideas and formulations of past insights, sciences, and symbols. And fifthly, once the insight has been achieved, once an understanding of some problem situation has been grasped, the solution that is thorough and effective needs not to be puzzled over again.42 When one catches on to a joke, or discovers the solution to a puzzle, for instance, the insight normally does not have to be learned again. The insight, Lonergan explains, "passes into the habitual texture of one's mind,"43 and it can be recalled and drawn upon almost at will. While a single insight may occur initially in a flash, groups and patterns of insights tend to accumulate gradually and, only over time, do they come to constitute the texture of one's mind. Insights are grouped and interrelated to form potentially a body of knowledge related to some field of interest and inquiry. It is a body of knowledge that allows one to become an expert in some subject area, and allows one to make confident and authoritative judgments and pronouncements. These five characteristics discerned by Lonergan from anecdotal accounts are such that they may be identified in any clear occurrence of insight, and as such they form Lonergan's basic definition. Leading from this elementary characterization of the phenomenon of insight, Lonergan embarks on a more substantive account of other elements of insight. The eureka-type experience is one sort of insight. Formulating a 39 Ibid., 3 0 . 4 0 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 4 2 Lonergan is addressing what he discerns as common occurrences of insight. Unfortunately, there are those individuals with certain cognitive disabilities that may have cognitive experiences somewhat different that what Lonergan describes. 4 3 Insight, 3 0 . 45 definition is another type. Lonergan explains that a definition requires various components: a definite and limited question or object at hand; various concepts that are related to that which is being defined (concepts that result from "supposing, thinking, considering, formulating, defining");44 and an image or series of images that anticipates and illumines necessity and impossibility. Grasping the necessary elements in the thing being defined "constitutes the [definitional-type] insight."45 The grasp is then related to the question of the definition—and it is the question that plays a crucial role in the emergence of insight. Lonergan explains: This primordial drive ... is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words; for insights, concepts, words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such wanting is the pure question. On the other hand, though the pure question is prior to insights, concepts and words, it presupposes experiences and images. Just as insight is into the concretely given or imagined, so the pure question is about the concretely given or imagined. It is the wonder which Aristotle claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy. But no one just wonders. We wonder about something.46 The actual process involved in human consciousness leading to a definition, Lonergan states, is triggered by this drive of the question. That is to say, the pure question of the drive leads to the specific question of the concrete situation. From this basic orientation, one looks for hints and clues that will lead to a satisfactory definition, and when these are grasped, human imagination tests out the possibilities and intelligently relates them to the question at hand. As the insights and images evoked by the question are tested against the situation, and as adjustments are made to the possible definition, an increasingly satisfactory definition emerges and, as the question becomes fully satisfied, a conclusive definition maybe achieved. Lonergan explains the process: "The image strains to approximate the concepts. The concepts, by added conceptual determinations, can express their differences from the merely approximate image."47 Through this interplay of image and concept the definition eventually becomes formulated. "ibid., 3 3 . 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., 34 . ,47 Ibid., 3 5 . 46 The resulting definition, Lonergan suggests, can be either a nominal definition that tells us about the correct usage of names, such as that found in dictionaries, or it can be an explanatory definition that defines an object or event in terms of its use and relation to other things, perhaps such as that found in a handbook or manual.48 That is to say, in an explanatory definition, the objective it is to offer an account of the relations of the elements in the thing being defined rather than the relation of words to objects 4 9 The point here is not a full account of the nature of definitions and their nominal and explanatory roles. Lonergan rather seeks merely to elucidate the ever-expanding range of consciousness as it grasps increasingly complex situations that demand increasingly complex insights. The point Lonergan goes on to make affirms that human insight required to create or intelligently grasp a definition unfolds in a certain way. One might legitimately argue with Lonergan on various illustrative points, indicating here and there where his analysis of the eureka experience doesn't quite fit with one's own experience of it, or perhaps that his explanation of how one grasps the definition of a circle, for instance, is inadequate in some detail. However, Lonergan would point out, as he does elsewhere,50 the acts of raising questions, of challenging his assertions, and of exploring refinements and possible corrections in the examples and explanations he offers, reflect the very dynamism that he identifies as the structure and processes of inquiry. To argue against his position, Lonergan maintains, requires one to engage the very processes he has differentiated and interrelated. While insights can occur in relative isolation, more often than not they occur in relation to other insights, as suggested, and they come to relate to a growing body of knowledge in the context of a developing mastery in some subject area. Insights are added to insights; definitions give rise to new definitions; corrections and revisions of 4 8 Lonergan does not illustrate the difference between nominal and explanatory definitions as a difference between a dictionary and a handbook, but it seems to me that this illustration fits quite well. 4 9 Ibid., 36-7 . 5 0 Ibid., 20. "Moreover, if it can be shown that the upper context [of the structure and operational differentiations of consciousness] is invariant, that any attempt to revise it can be legitimate only if the hypothetical reviser refutes his own attempt by invoking experience, understanding, and reflection in an already precise manner, then it will appear that, while the noema or intentio intenta or pensee pensee may always be expressed with greater accuracy and completeness, still the immanent and recurrently operative structure ... must always be one and the same." 47 those earlier insights occur; and definitions and postulates are refined while better, more complete and intellectually satisfying grasps of situations result. New and better insights are achieved. Lonergan sees this process emerge and develop as the "higher viewpoint."51 The specific example by which Lonergan illustrates this is the development of a student's basic understanding of arithmetic into a grasp of algebra that involves increasing familiarity with and application of symbolic expression, and greater facility in the use of symbol as a carrier of meaning. Simply put, as an activity of human consciousness, understanding grasps the intelligibility in objects that are presented to consciousness by sense or represented by images. The grasping of such intelligibility Lonergan calls "direct insight."53 Lonergan explains this more fully in his accounts of the self-correcting process of learning and of human development, issues that I will explore more fully in chapter four. Besides direct insight th