AN EXPLORATION AND EXPANSION OF BERNARD LONERGAN'S
INTENTIONALTY ANALYSIS FOR EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

by

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ABSTRACT

This study consists of an exploration and expansion of Bernard Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy. It contends that Lonergan’s account of the structure and operations of human consciousness directed toward human experience, understanding, judgment and decision offers a mode of understanding a range of key topics in the field of secular education and educational philosophy. Moreover, the integrative nature of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis provides a means of systematically ordering issues in educational philosophy related to human cognitive and existential development.

Following a discussion of the key terms: education; philosophy; intentionality; knowledge; and consciousness; the first chapter contextualizes the study in reference to educational philosophy and to Lonergan Studies. Chapter two explores Lonergan’s intentionality analysis as it occurs throughout his writings, but especially his principal philosophical text, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. Lonergan’s lectures on various topics in education and educational philosophy are discussed in chapter three, with the interpretive framework being his intentionality analysis.

An expansion unfolds in chapter four where the structure and process of human intentionality are shown to inform educational issues related to the centrality and quality of human experience. These issues include the desire to know, the sense of wonder, the raising of questions, and the creative dimensions of imagination. Further issues emerge on the level of intelligence, including the notion of the self-correcting process of learning. These dimensions of human intentionality then lead to an extensive account of the elements and processes of general human development.

The expansion continues in chapter five concerning metaphysics and ethics. Educational topics pertinent to this dimension of his analysis include critical thinking, self-knowledge and humanness, human authenticity, wisdom as practical reasoning, the emergence of a worldview, certain social implications, and the ethical and moral ramifications of this account of intentionality.

The study concludes with some criticisms and assessments, and finds, overall, in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis a relatively systematic and comprehensive framework in which to understand and order key elements of educational philosophy.
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Within the limited horizon of my own subjectivity, this dissertation embodies the principles of emergent probability, as Lonergan explains them. Myriad influences in my life over the past twenty-five years have made this study possible. These influences, embodied in my teachers, colleagues and friends, represent an amazing array of knowledge and values that in one way or another has become my own. I thank each one for their contribution: P. Joseph Cahill, William Hordern, Frederick E. Crowe, S. J., Tad Dunne, Foster Walker, Eamonn Callan, Patrick and Wendy Crean, Jean Norlund, Donna Dinsmore, Joan Pries, Kate Kinloch, Rob Fitterer, Mark Cheeseman, and Patti Towler.

For their insightful and challenging commentary on my work, I thank the members of my dissertation committee: Pamela Courtenay-Hall, Paul Burns and Daniel Vokey. My deep regret is that Murray Elliott of the Educational Studies Department of the University of British Columbia, under whose direction I began this study, passed away in March, 2001, before this work really took shape. He was always an inspiration.

I also wish to thank my colleagues at Regis University, Denver, for their interest in, and support of, the research and writing of this dissertation.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I am not a specialist in education, but I have suffered under educators for very many years, and I have been teaching for an equally long time .... [Y]ou can listen to me as I speak about philosophy and its relation to theology and to concrete living. But most of the concrete applications, the ironing out of the things, will have to be done by you who are in the fields of education and philosophy of education. 

This study consists of an exploration and expansion of key aspects of Bernard Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of educational philosophy. The main objective in pursuing this line of investigation and interpretation is to help introduce to the field of educational philosophy a growing scope of studies that interprets and develops the philosophy of Jesuit philosopher, Bernard Lonergan. Since Lonergan’s publication of his central philosophical work, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, there have been efforts in Lonergan Studies to apply various aspects of Lonergan’s thought to certain issues in education. In my estimation, however, his system of thought, centered in his intentionality analysis, provides a vision for education larger than mere application to discrete topics in education. While many of these possible applications may be valid, Lonergan is a thinker who has developed a philosophy based on an understanding of human conscious intentionality that helps to clarify certain key issues in educational philosophy, and that also provides a means to order and interrelate key topics within a broad system of thought and worldview. The exploration and expansion pursued in this study will map out this larger vision.

The primary method used to achieve this convergence of Lonergan’s thought and educational philosophy will be an exploration of intentionality analysis as it appears in Lonergan’s cognitional theory, in his epistemology, his metaphysics and ethics. This will reveal the ways in which Lonergan’s unique theory of the structure, processes and results

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of the intentional operations of human consciousness relate to and inform various dimensions of educational philosophy. It will also lead to an account of the systematic ordering of some main issues within the discipline. The primary intent is not to defend the full scope of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, but rather to reveal its interesting, useful and perhaps even exciting effects and possible future expansions in the field of educational philosophy. References to Lonergan’s work are relatively rare in the field of educational philosophy; and in the field of Lonergan Studies there has not yet appeared a general investigation of his intentionality analysis related to the general field of educational philosophy, such as I offer here. My hope is for this study to contribute to development of both Lonergan Studies and educational philosophy.

My work will unfold in six chapters. Following the introductory chapter that will identify and discuss the key concepts and contexts of this study, the second chapter will provide an analysis of Lonergan’s understanding of insight and human consciousness that is crucial to the exploration and expansion that follows. The third chapter will examine Lonergan’s own analysis of education presented in 1959 as a series of lectures dealing with various topics Lonergan thought relevant to his audience of Catholic educators. The fourth chapter, building on the understanding in chapter two of his intentionality analysis, and drawing on some aspects of his educational lectures, explains the relation that Lonergan’s account of cognitional theory and epistemology has to certain salient issues in educational philosophy. The fifth chapter continues this exploration and expansion by focusing on the metaphysical and ethical dimensions of his intentionality analysis. By way of conclusion to this study, the sixth chapter will offer some criticism and evaluation of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis as it relates to educational philosophy. Chapters two and three constitute the expansion portion of my study in that Lonergan’s chief texts, multi-faceted that they are, that I find especially relevant to educational philosophy are understood largely in reference to his intentionality analysis. Chapters four and five compose the expansion phase in that Lonergan’s analysis is mapped onto the landscape of educational philosophy. As a rationale for adopting this approach of exploration and
expansion, I appeal to the work of others in the field of Lonergan Studies that profitably employ this mode of inquiry.  

The method I will employ in this study amounts to a mapping, as it were, of issues in the field of educational philosophy onto the philosophical framework of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. Following the interpretive explorations of chapters two and three, this approach in chapters four and five will draw on the integral methodological structure of human consciousness as it develops and expands, according to Lonergan, from the experiential level, to the level of understanding, and to the level of judgment, that then culminates on the level of deliberating and deciding. Thus, chapter four will deal with experiential issues and issues related to developing intelligence, and chapter five will treat issues of assessment and judgment, and various key affirmations of the human subject and of human intersubjectivity arising from this analysis. Lonergan has depicted this integral methodological (also called heuristic) structure of human consciousness as applied to the field of theology. In his work, Method in Theology, this application resulted in Lonergan delineating eight “functional specialties” that distinguish and interrelate all the major fields of inquiry in theology. While it would require a work having at least the scope of Method in Theology to argue thoroughly for a clearly differentiated and interrelated set of functional specialties for education, at least it seems reasonable to suggest that there are experiences, understandings, judgments and decisions that occur within the field of education and educational philosophy, and that applying this set of differentiations to the field provides a means to map and certain important issues.

As I begin this exploration and expansion, it will be helpful to understand the key concepts and main contexts.

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2 The work of one of the key interpreters of Lonergan’s thought, Frederick E. Crowe, includes some major studies in Lonergan described as an “exploration” and “expansion.” In the first annual “Lonergan Workshop” held at Boston College in June, 1974, Crowe delivered a paper on Lonergan’s notion of value in which he explores its development and the interrelations this notion has with other aspects of his work. At the 7th annual Lonergan Workshop in 1985, Crowe turned his attention again to the notion of value, but this time to expand on it. In the expansion, Crowe probed in creative ways the implications this notion has in related fields of inquiry. See Frederick E. Crowe, “An Exploration of Lonergan’s New Notion of Value,” and “An Expansion of Lonergan’s Notion of Value,” in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, ed. Michael Vertin, (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 51-70 and 344-59.) A similar mode of study was carried out by Jeffrey Nichols, “The Relationship of Symbols and Bias in the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan: an Exploration and Expansion,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1995).
Key Concepts

While it would be difficult to establish universally accepted definitions of the key concepts in this study, at least I can indicate the general meaning of these terms as they will be used here. The terms I will discuss are: education; philosophy; intentionality and intentionality analysis; knowledge; consciousness and experience.

Education

Education has been defined in a variety of ways. Considerable debate has been generated on the question of what counts as education, and what might be included within its purview. Is education essentially a matter of the acquisition of understanding and knowledge? Is it largely a matter of formal schooling? Does education encompass emotional and physical development? Does it occur naturally as individuals grow and mature, or is education a more deliberate act intended for specific outcomes? Such questions do not admit ready answers. Indeed, such questions provoke educational philosophers to consider the meaning of education in a variety of ways.

The meaning of the term in common usage given in Webster's dictionary is, “the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., esp. by formal schooling; teaching; training.” The definition is further expanded in Webster’s to include the knowledge acquired by the process of education (such as one has an education); to denote education as formal schooling activities; and to designate the systematic study of teaching and learning. The definition of education has not always been so expansive. Earlier in the history of human civilization, prior to the advance of cultures centering on intellectual pursuits, Howard Ozmon and Samuel Craver tell us,

3 Such is the case in the debate between R. S. Peters and R. K. Elliott where Peters regards education as, in part, the pursuit of truth, a pursuit which is justified instrumentally (as a means of rationally justifying one’s beliefs, actions and feelings) and non-instrumentally (as purely for the pleasure of seeking knowledge for its own sake.) Elliott appreciates the connection Peters draws between education and the development of reason and reasons, but he sees Peters’ connection between truth and the pleasure inherent in achieving the good life as faulty. The pursuit of truth and knowledge may not be ‘pleasurable’ and in fact may be arduous and painful (see R. S. Peters “The Justification of Education” and R. K. Elliott, “Education and Justification,” in Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White, [New York: Routledge, 1998], 207-30 and 231-45.)
education centered solely on concern with survival issues—learning the necessary skills for living. Later, training was expanded to include the learning and developing of skills to manage leisure time, and to develop socially and culturally. By the turn of the twentieth century, the notion of knowledge transmission emerged as central to the meaning of education, such as we find in Dewey’s statement of 1911. “Speaking generally, education signifies the sum total of processes by which a community or social group, whether large or small, transmits its acquired power and aims with a view to securing its own continued existence and growth.”

As education developed as a distinct field of practice in society, having its own categories of investigation and modes of theoretical inquiry, the definition of education seems to have acquired more specialized meanings. By mid-twentieth century, the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States recognized the broader conception of education as pertaining to growth and development in human beings, but the society still preferred its special denotation as formal schooling.

The term education may refer to any deliberate effort to nurture, modify, change and/or develop human conduct or behavior; or it may refer to organized schooling. For purposes of consensus we adopt the latter (institutionalized schooling). Whenever education, thus defined, is taking place we find: (1) Preferences for certain procedures, resources and goals (methods, means, and ends) implicit or explicit in the undertaking. (2) The employment of criteria, guides or reasons with which procedures, resources and goals are determined and established.

However widely or narrowly education seems to be defined, there persists a common aspect in most, if not all, conceptions—that of human development and learning. Indeed, it would be difficult to argue, I suspect, that education has occurred where there is no evidence of development and where nothing has been learned.

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4 Howard A. Ozmon and Samuel M. Craver, Philosophical Foundations of Education, 4th ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990), xii. These are very broad and sweeping statements on the development of human civilizations. While it is unclear as to how applicable they may be on a wide scale, at least they seem appropriate to civilizations of the West, arising from the cultures developing in Sumer, Egypt, and other regions of the Mediterranean.


R. S. Peters introduces the widely cited compendium of essays, *The Concept of Education*, by reflecting on the essential features of education in terms of educational process. This process he determines to be the learning of skills, learning by experience, the learning of principles in understanding, learning to question and to develop a critical attitude, and learning to engage in “conversation” beyond the “explicit learning situations.” Later in the book, Michael Oakeshott develops this theme of learning by relating it to teaching with its resulting intellectual encounters and achievements. It seems, according to Peters and Oakeshott, and no doubt to many others, that in a philosophy of education a key component involves reflection on the nature of education centering on the activities of learning as they occur in the process of human development. It may be that if learning does not occur in some positive and productive way, education has not happened, even though the edifice for schooling might be in place, even if all the players might occupy their appointed positions, and a plan of instruction mapped out perceptively, and with sophistication.

Education is not only a question of development and learning on the personal level, education also has important meaning to the life of a society and culture as educated persons take on social roles and create culture. Practical learning appears to be a primary concern of Alfred North Whitehead where he declares, “education is the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge.” He argues passionately against the all too common occurrence of ideas falling into disuse—against an education that languishes and suffers inertia. Moreover, Whitehead believes, a social or cultural group “which does not value trained intelligence is doomed.” More recently, in adapting aspects of Marxist analysis and critique, but recognizing certain capitalist and economic functions of education, Alexander Sidorkin argues that education performs a central function in the social and economic life of the community. He sees the “labor of learning” as the means of knowledge production, and he regards learning as a pivotal social activity. “Learning

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activity can be defined as an activity,” he explains, “an immediate product of which is not as important as changes that occur in the person-subject [the subjective side] of the activity; education, in turn, is a social sphere where learning activity plays a central role.”12 These broader senses of education as social construction and function establish the broader scope of what is meant by education today.

From various angles, then, learning and education are inextricably bound together. Their meanings encompass the development and achievements of the individual. They also relate to the social and cultural dimensions of human life. The educational thrust of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, as it will become clear, centers on human development and learning, with an analysis of cognitional structure and activity being key to understanding the elements and processes of education. For Lonergan, in important ways, education also unfolds as a developing understanding and knowledge of oneself, of the world, and of the manner in which an individual makes one’s way in the world. In short, the meaning of education, as the term is employed in this study, will encompass both the personal dimensions and the social dimensions, and both the formal and non-formal aspects of education. As I probe the various facets of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, I hope to show in what ways Lonergan appeals to the various meanings of education in the personal and social realms, and I will explore how Lonergan understands education as human development occurring in these facets of human life.

**Philosophy**

Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, as will be come clear, constitutes his central philosophical position. But in what sense is this analysis to be counted as philosophy? To answer this question, we need to grasp, at least in a cursory way, some general meaning of the term “philosophy.” While it may be difficult to arrive at a precise definition of the

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term "philosophy," in considering a few positions by noted thinkers on the nature of philosophy, it will become clear how Lonergan uses the term and presents his case.\textsuperscript{13}

Bertrand Russell, widely influential in the twentieth century as a philosopher and historian of philosophy, grapples with what philosophy is in his introduction to \textit{A History of Western Philosophy}.

Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition or that of revelation. All definite knowledge—so I should contend—belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man’s Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man’s Land is philosophy.\textsuperscript{14}

Despite various difficulties in this denotation, such as the division between science and theology along the lines of reason and authority, and of the division between belief and “definite knowledge,” (it seems to me, science in various ways appeals to authority and belief, and credible theology appeals strongly to reason),\textsuperscript{15} it stresses the importance of reason leading to knowledge, and that philosophy should not appeal to “revelation.” Reason (and there are various ways to understand the term),\textsuperscript{16} clearly, is a hallmark of philosophical thinking.

Where Russell points to how philosophy is done—rationally, that is—John Dewey, in explaining the nature of philosophy, points to outcomes, namely an explanation of things in terms of totality, of generality and ultimateness.\textsuperscript{17} Philosophy concerns itself with gathering together “the varied details of the world and of life into a single inclusive
whole … ."  

In Dewey, there is always the essential practical aspect to philosophy. “Whenever philosophy has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life.” Philosophy, accordingly, takes a pragmatic turn in Dewey.

Martin Heidegger, whose influence pervades philosophical thought in the twentieth century, has taken philosophical discourse on a path somewhat different from that which had been commonly practiced. In simplest terms, Heidegger seems to have taken philosophy from the realm of theory and idealism and repositioned it in the real world of being and time. For Heidegger, philosophy in its radical historicality occurs as a “walking around” the issue, so to speak, which creates an introduction to the issue at hand, and establishes its context that helps one better to attend to the matter and to broaden its disclosure. This contextualization, however, should not be regarded as a distancing in order to see things “objectively,” but as an encounter with being, with existence. While Heidegger’s philosophy tends to be obscure and complex, perhaps reflecting the very qualities of existence itself, it is clear that, for him, philosophy exhibits and develops the meditative quality of being, and that thinking is not so much about being as it is a feature of being. Through Heidegger, we come to see philosophy as more fully engaged with existence as experienced life.

Arthur C. Danto’s study, *What Philosophy Is*, determines philosophy to be the effort at “seeing what reality itself consists in.” Its elements, he explains, consist in what philosophy is about, namely, understanding the character of knowledge and applying that mode of knowing to the world. While the conceptions of philosophy in Danto, Heidegger, Dewey and Russell appeal to descriptive, and perhaps commonsense, meanings given to the term philosophy, these are expressions of an earlier time, and are eclipsed, in some measure at least, by today’s more radical and provocative practitioners. Richard Rorty, for one, offers his take. Philosophy, subsequent to the perceived collapse and negation of

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epistemology as it traditionally has been engaged, is believed to have assumed hermeneutical, dialogical and edifying roles. Rorty explains,

I want now to generalize this contrast between philosophers whose work is essentially constructive and those whose work is essentially reactive. I shall thereby develop a contrast between philosophy which centers in epistemology and the sort of philosophy which takes its point of departure from suspicion about pretensions of epistemology. This is the contrast between “systematic” and “edifying” philosophies.23

Rorty goes on to state that the point of philosophy today simply is to “keep the conversation going,” and wisdom the “ability to sustain conversation.”24 The role of philosophical thinking unfolds as the engagement of thought and expression for solving human problems, in thinking differently and creatively about issues, and in taking an effective place at the table of social discourse. While this certainly broadens out the conception of philosophy, does it not beg the question of why this type of role is ‘philosophical’? Are there not a host of other disciplines charged with this same mandate to generate and facilitate conversation from which solutions to issues and problems might arise? Economics, criminology, health care and education, for instance, all seem to facilitate and seek to improve in some way the conversation as groups and societies find themselves living together and endeavoring to solve their common problems.

Given this general context of philosophy, Lonergan’s approach comes more clearly to light. While the scope of what counts as philosophy today appears to be broad, Lonergan understands philosophy in a specific, more traditional way. One of Lonergan’s clearer articulations of the meaning of philosophy is found in his short work, Philosophy of God and Theology.25 In exploring this topic, Lonergan provides an account of philosophical thinking in terms of the specialized manner in which the human mind operates, as a mode of systematic thought.26 Explaining the development of systematic thinking from classical metaphysics represented in Aristotelian philosophy that determined and articulated first principles from which the objective world is understood, Lonergan finds

24 Ibid., 378.
26 Ibid., 1.
in modern science another systematic mode of thought, one that is liberated from the
domination of metaphysics, one that focuses not on the discovery of necessity but of
possibility. For Lonergan, there is yet a third mode of systematic thought that
constitutes the proper domain of contemporary philosophy. He explains,

We have been contrasting two manners in which systematic thinking has been carried out, and we have now to advert to a third. Its basic terms denote the conscious and intentional operations that occur in human knowing. Its basic relations denote the conscious dynamism that leads from some operations to others. Its derived terms and relations are the procedures of common sense, of mathematicians, of empirical scientists, of interpreters and historians, of philosophers and theologians. It begins from cognitional theory: What are you doing when you are knowing? It moves to epistemology: Why is doing that knowing? It concludes with a metaphysics: What do you know when you do it?

As far as Lonergan is concerned, this third mode of systematic thinking underlies all other modes of knowing, and as such, unfolds as philosophy. Metaphysics is the culmination of this mode of thought and reflects the operations of human conscious intentionality expressed in all fields of human inquiry, such as what Lonergan articulates as transcendental method. For Lonergan, metaphysics expresses a unity of the various fields of knowledge based not on the content of knowledge, but based on the knowing process.

It would be an interesting, and perhaps a lively, exercise to debate the strengths and value of Lonergan's approach as compared to other approaches. However, my present aim in this section is merely to recognize the complexity of this question of the nature of philosophy, and to offer a basic understanding of Lonergan's way of practicing philosophy as intentionality analysis.

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27 Ibid., 6-7.
28 Ibid., 7-8.
29 See his definition of metaphysics in Insight, 415.
Intentionality

Roderick Chisholm traces the use of term “intentionality” in the field of philosophy back to St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God, and to William of Ockam who distinguished intentional existence of the objects of thought and the subjective existence of the thoughts themselves.\(^3\) As a philosophical term, “intentionality” also was used by Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, to distinguish between intentional and non-intentional actions. Later, Edmund Husserl used the term to describe Franz Brentano’s analysis of mental phenomena characterizing a particular orientation of thoughts or psychological attitudes toward an object.\(^3\)

The issue of intentionality, to be sure, is not without controversy. Tim Crane, in characterizing the field of intentionality in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, points to two main questions. “Do all mental states exhibit intentionality?” and “Do only mental states exhibit intentionality?”\(^\text{32}\) These questions concern the relation of the mind and objects. As Crane explains,

> Intentionality is the mind’s capacity to direct itself on things. Mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes (and others) exhibit intentionality in the sense that they are always directed on, or at, something: if you hope, believe or desire, you must hope, believe or desire something. Hope, belief, desire and any other mental state which is directed at something, is known as intentional states. Intentionality in this sense has only a peripheral connection to the ordinary ideas of intention and intending. An intention to do something is an intentional state, since one cannot intend without intending something: but intentions are only one of many kinds of mental states.\(^\text{33}\)

Lonergan seems largely to express this understanding of intentionality, although he seems to prefer to use the terms “act” rather than “state.” Further, Lonergan understands

\(^\text{31}\) *Ibid*.
\(^\text{33}\) *Ibid.*, 816. I note that the language Lonergan uses is today regarded as sexist, but the common parlance of his day generally understood the masculine to include the feminine. I certainly regard Lonergan’s use of the masculine to be gender neutral, and every effort has been made to avoid sexist language in my own writing.
intentionality and intentionality analysis in contrast to what he calls “faculty psychology.” Faculty psychology, Lonergan believes, fails to deal with the existential subject, the one who is not only a knower but a doer, one who “deliberates, evaluates, chooses, acts.” It understood mental phenomena as various faculties, such as intellect and will, or, as Lonergan notes, “different uses of the same faculty, such as speculative and practical intellect, or different types of human activity, such as theoretical inquiry and practical execution.” Faculty psychology offered an abstract account of the various categories of the mind, or types of human activity, but it failed to account for the concrete, self-determining and self-constituting human subject. Increasingly, Lonergan rejected this old mode of thinking about human beings. In his lecture on art, he explains,

We must pass from the logical essence of man, something that is common to heroes and scoundrels, mewling infants and saints, something that is verified in everyone equally, to man as a concrete potentiality and concrete duty; from man as a substance to man as a conscious subject; from thinking of a set of faculties and their actuation to thinking of a concrete flow of consciousness, and to thinking of that concrete flow in terms of the subject and his concern that defines the horizon of his world.

The contrast between faculty psychology and intentionality analysis highlights the turn to the human subject that dominates Lonergan’s philosophical outlook.

Lonergan presented his intentionality analysis over the course of his academic life, beginning first in his primary philosophical work, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, after which he explored additional aspects of human intentionality, such as what appears in the early sections of *Method in Theology*. While recognizing the importance of the later developments in Lonergan’s thought, in that Lonergan recognized

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35 Ibid.

36 *Topics in Education*, 83; and also note 16.

37 Ibid., 209-10.


the need to address the role of feelings, and to account more fully for the existential questions of choice, decision, and personal transformation, the major portion of this study will focus on intentionality as it appears in *Insight*, since this provides the groundwork and framework for the core of Lonergan’s philosophy. While the thrust of this exploration and expansion will center on the intentionality analysis of *Insight*, it should become clear that certain aspects of Lonergan’s later analysis, particularly his account of the elements and processes of human decision-making and transformation, are anticipated in the earlier work. While this study stresses Lonergan’s analysis in *Insight*, it will also integrate his later analysis within the framework of his cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, especially where his later work seems particularly relevant to educational philosophy.

**Intentionality Analysis in *Insight***

In a published interview in which he reflects on his work *Insight*, Lonergan explains how it came to be so constructed. In this interview he also affirms the objective of the work essentially as intentionality analysis.

‘... I was dealing in *Insight* fundamentally with the intellectual side—a study of human understanding—in which I did my study of human understanding and got human intelligence in there, not just a sausage machine turning out abstract concepts. That was my fundamental thrust.

‘Once I did that, well, you had to go out and go on to a theory of judgment—because you had obviously separated yourself from any possible intuitive basis of knowledge. And I had to have a true judgment, one true judgment at least, so I had to have chapter XI, ‘I am a knower.’

‘Then “What do you know?” so I had another chapter on being.

‘How do you know you know it?” I had to have another chapter on objectivity.

‘When I had that much done, I could see people all around saying, “well, if you have this sort of position you can’t have a metaphysics.” So I thought I’d be safer to put in four more chapters on metaphysics.

‘“Well, you can’t have an ethics,” so I put in a chapter on that.

‘And, “You can’t prove the existence of God,” so I put in a chapter on that.

‘Then, “What has this to do with your being a priest?” So I put in a little bit on religion in chapter XX—a moving viewpoint!

‘The viewpoint kept moving. In the summer of 1959 ... I gave an institute at Xavier in Cincinnati, on the philosophy of education. In preparing that I read a lot of
Piaget, also Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form*, things like that, and that was the beginning of entry into these things. Then von Hildebrand, and Frings’ book on Scheler were a big help. I was also meeting questions of my own. One also has feelings oneself too, you know.

‘There is a spreading out, moving on, including more. Like recently what I’ve got a hold of is the fact that I’ve dropped faculty psychology and I’m doing intentionality analysis. And what I did in *Insight* mainly was intentionality analysis of experiencing, understanding, judging ...’

Lonergan thus clarifies his work as intentionality analysis. Lonergan also characterizes his work as a development, a moving viewpoint, in which new insights are added to, or transform, the old, and there comes into view an increasingly broader and more comprehensive view. The basic core of his intentionality analysis unfolds in *Insight*, but that opens the door to further refinements and expansions of the analysis. An in-depth account of this analysis will occur in chapter two of this study; here I offer merely a basic sense of what is meant by the term.

**Knowledge**

A major focus on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis pertains to the nature of human knowledge. It will be helpful to gain some sense, early on, as to what Lonergan means by knowledge. While there is considerable ambiguity in the commonsense dictionary meaning of the term, when we enter the field of philosophy itself, what is meant by knowledge acquires some precision. Philosopher Anthony Quinton states, “According to the most widely accepted definition, knowledge is justified true belief.” Such a definition, Quinton goes on to show, gives rise to several other terms that fill out the meaning of knowledge: truth (since “we can have knowledge only of what is true”); belief; justification. With the possibility of knowledge resting on the grasping of truth, the question of knowledge becomes a matter of a theory of truth, and in philosophy there are several. Two chief theories within the rationalist tradition are the correspondence

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41 *Webster’s Dictionary* expresses a range of meanings of knowledge, from “acquaintance or familiarity” to “awareness,” “understanding,” to “all that has been perceived or grasped by the mind.”


theory of truth and the coherence theory. A. N. Prior explains that the correspondence theory holds that “truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact,” while the coherence theory maintains that “the more our beliefs hang together in a system, the truer they are.” There exist other accounts of truth, such as the “existence theory” and the “performative theory.” It is not necessary to explore in detail this complex philosophical debate on the nature of truth and the meaning of knowledge, made even more complex with some recent postmodern theories that throw the questions of power and power relations into the mix. We need to note, simply, that, while it is common to introduce the notions of justification and belief when speaking of knowledge, Lonergan takes a different approach.

A full account of the meaning of knowledge unfolds in the following chapter where I explore the elements and operations of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. But as an introductory statement, the following should suffice. Lonergan regards knowledge as the expression of an act of judgment in which one affirms that some element of human experience has been understood correctly, and that correct understanding emerges when the conditions needed for affirmation are grasped, and that one grasps that the conditions have been fulfilled. He states, “… a complete increment of knowing occurs only in judgment.” Knowledge depends on correct judgment, and correct or true judgment is possible when all the relevant questions pertaining to the understanding of some data, or set of data, have been satisfactorily answered. Elsewhere, Lonergan states that knowledge is the “complete context of correct judgments.” For Lonergan, knowledge not only encompasses the question of truth but also the question of probability. He explains,

45 Ibid., 224.
47 Foucault, as perhaps one of the better-known proponents of postmodern thought, explores the power-knowledge relations in his work Discipline and Punish. Cf. Michael Peters, “Michel Foucault,” in Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education: from Piaget to the Present, ed. Joy A. Palmer (London: Routledge, 2001), 172.
48 This expression of the meaning of knowledge occurs throughout various works of Lonergan. For instance, see Insight, 305-06; 355; 367 and Topics in Education, 177.
49 Insight, 374.
50 Ibid., 372.
When the virtually unconditioned is grasped by reflective understanding, we affirm or deny absolutely. When there is no preponderance of evidence in favor of either affirmation or denial, we can only acknowledge our ignorance. But between these extremes there is a series of intermediate positions, and probable judgments [and hence probable knowledge] are their outcomes.\textsuperscript{51}

While more will be said of Lonergan's position on knowledge as his cognitive theory and epistemology are explored in the next chapter, we can see here that he develops a very precise meaning to the term, and uses it to understand and critique other philosophical positions.\textsuperscript{52}

**Consciousness**

“Consciousness” is another term that will arise throughout this study. Its meaning presents a further array of questions and complexities. The Western intellectual tradition reveals a long and complex history dealing with the question of human consciousness. According to Eric Lormand, the term ‘consciousness’ became embedded in philosophical thought through Descartes who dealt with consciousness mainly in terms of introspection, that is, in being aware of one’s own mental occurrences.\textsuperscript{53} Lormand sees subsequent philosophical interest in consciousness as discussions pertaining to the qualities of awareness in mental occurrences or, in one way or another, taking off from earlier Cartesian introspective epistemology. Many key Western philosophers have attempted to identify and understand how it is that we have mental states that can be known as mental states—Leibniz does this in terms of apperception, and Kant in terms of empirical apperception (the flux in inner appearances) and transcendental apperception (the unchanging, permanent consciousness that reveals an abiding self).\textsuperscript{54} Later on, the conception of consciousness broadened out to include not only introspective aspects but also an account of its orientation toward things external to mental operations, that is, what

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}, 324. More will be said of the “virtually unconditioned” in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Topics in Education}, 158-92.

\textsuperscript{53} Eric Lormand. “Consciousness,” in \textit{Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, vol. 2. \textit{Brahman to Derrida}. (London: Routledge, 1998), 581-96. Lormand's article recognizes that there are the additional related questions of knowledge in general and of intentionality, but he limits his discussion to the two dealing most explicitly with the nature of conscious experience.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, 583.
amounts to an account of intentionality. A well-known articulation of this quality of consciousness is found in Sartre who maintains that being conscious is being conscious of something.\textsuperscript{55} Lormand identifies yet a broader conception of the term where social conditions and limitations determine the nature of consciousness, a view underlying the notions of false consciousness, class consciousness or consciousness raising, such as is expounded in the work of Hegel, Marx or Luckacs.\textsuperscript{56} With this expansion, there seems to have developed gradually a tighter relationship between mentality and physicality.

Much could be said on the various positions on what is meant by "consciousness" in philosophy and the specialized field now known as "consciousness studies."\textsuperscript{57} In understanding consciousness, the dominant approach for many years was basically some manner of Cartesian introspection where one took stock of the inner elements that constitute human consciousness. Lonergan, however, rejects this sort of "introspection." He explains, "there is the word, introspection, which is misleading inasmuch as it suggests an inward inspection. Inward inspection is just myth. Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision."\textsuperscript{58} Lonergan does not deny the events of consciousness but rejects the mistaken notion that they are identified and understood by somehow looking at the events. "Introspection," as Lonergan regards this activity, "may be understood to mean, not consciousness itself but the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness .... The reader will do it, not by looking inwardly, but by recognizing in our expressions the objectification of his subjective experience."\textsuperscript{59} As Lonergan scholar, Hugo Meynell, suggests, truth or genuine knowledge, in this case knowledge of consciousness, is not apprehended in sensations of any kind (visual, for instance), but in reasonable

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 584.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Method in Theology, 8.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 8-9.
The complaint Lonergan has with introspection, it seems, concerns the mode of access, and not the existence of such inner events or states.

In recent times, the philosophical problem of consciousness brought to the fore by Nagel, Chalmers, and others, centers on the questions of how one is conscious, and of how to explain the phenomenon of consciousness as experienced. These questions, however, seem to be prior to Lonergan’s starting point. Lonergan clearly takes as a given the phenomena of experience, that is, data as supplied by the senses and data as supplied by various activities of thought. His inquiry then moves to the questions of what the intelligent and reasonable person does with that welter of experience in the various processes of consciousness. His inquiry focuses, not on the question of how consciousness arises from the human biological substrate but on the subsequent development of consciousness that grasps insights, develops them and acts upon them. Simply put, Lonergan’s notion of consciousness includes the reception of experiential data by the human mind as well as the various mental operations that one brings to bear upon that set of data.

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61 *Insight*, 95-7. Lonergan makes the distinction between the data of sense, meaning the experience of the effects of the five senses, and the data of consciousness, meaning the experience of mental activities such as thoughts, images, insights, beliefs, and so forth. At first it may seem that Lonergan is suggesting that sense data are not data included in consciousness (by distinguishing data of sense and consciousness), thus potentially supporting the notion that there are two consciousnesses, one of an outer world and one of an inner that perpetuates the dualism that has dogged Western philosophy. However, Lonergan’s distinction differentiates the sense experience and the experience of the operations of consciousness. For instance, one can experience pain and one can also experience the understanding of the pain, such as its cause and its relief. (Lonergan states elsewhere, “Potencies are not data of consciousness; operations and dynamisms are.” in *Caring About Meaning. Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey and Cathleen Going [Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982], 43.) It seems that Lonergan wants to distinguish between some data as rather low-level activity of consciousness and “thought data” which contain (or include) more complex, operational activities of consciousness. Both, he suggests, are data that constitute the quality of one’s consciousness, but the technical terminology gives rise to a certain measure of confusion. At any rate, Lonergan draws the distinction between the experiences arising from the human senses and the experience of having various intelligent and evaluative acts, and it is this distinction that differentiated his study from Chalmers.
Experience

Since experience is the starting point of his analysis, it is important to be clear, initially, as to what Lonergan means by the term, although its full sense and implications will become clear throughout the course of this study. Lonergan speaks of two types of data that are included within the scope of human experience: the data of sense, and the data of consciousness. The data of sense encompasses what commonly is thought of as the results of the five senses in seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching. To this grouping Lonergan adds "higher level" experiences of consciousness: the experience of understanding, the experience of assessing and judging, and the experience of deliberating and deciding. While one could readily identify the experiences of sense, it is more difficult to identify the experiences of consciousness, largely because we are not used to attending to ourselves in this self-reflective way. Also, it is difficult to differentiate these experiences of consciousness because they do not operate as discrete, isolated occurrences. Lonergan seeks to aid this process of differentiation in his account of insight, as I will discuss in chapter two, by identifying in various types of insights (mathematical, scientific, commonsense) the particular elements and how they work together.

Perhaps a brief contrast with Dewey's view of experience will help to clarify Lonergan's position. Dewey maintained that experience "consists of the active relations subsisting between a human being and his natural and social surroundings," in which the individual undergoes changes due to the affect of environmental factors, and in which the individual affects environmental factors through one's actions. Experience is the consequential relations of person and environment, and in grasping the nature of these relations, an individual comes to understand oneself and one's environment, and comes to grasp meaning. In setting forth such a theory of experience, Dewey rejects the separation of doing and knowing, and affirms experience not merely as the "empirical," but as the

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63 Ibid, 274.

64 Ibid, 275.
Lonergan’s position, I suggest, is largely compatible with Dewey’s appreciation of the interconnection between an environment and the human subject in that Lonergan regards the interrelation of experience, knowing and doing as highly interactive and integrative, it being also a unitary process in the individual’s consciousness and in expressions of that consciousness. For Lonergan, and it seems for Dewey as well, experience is not something that is given, after which mental faculties are then engaged to make sense out of given experience. Experience encompasses the process, that is to say, the actual operations, of all of consciousness. It is this broad view of experience that Lonergan appeals to throughout his intentionality analysis.

Thus far, I have identified the key terms of this study: education; philosophy; intentionality; knowledge; consciousness; experience. In discussing the meanings attributed to these terms, one begins to develop a sense of Lonergan’s approach to the questions related to intentionality and educational philosophy. Before we move on, however, it will be helpful to discuss the contexts of this study.

**Contexts**

As noted earlier in this introduction, the main contexts of this study include the fields of educational philosophy and of Lonergan Studies.

**Educational Philosophy**

Educational philosophy has been understood as “a branch of philosophy concerned with virtually every aspect of the educational enterprise. It significantly overlaps other, more mainstream branches (especially epistemology and ethics, but even logic and metaphysics).” While there are many ways to understand this broad field of inquiry, one way that fits well with the exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s work in the field, is to distinguish the topical and systematic approaches.

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65 Ibid., 276.
The Topical Approach

Philosophy of education ranges widely over the intellectual landscape of modern times, covering the traditional questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, addressing the nature and conception of education, and exploring the philosophical questions related to the various social and political dimensions of teaching, learning, schooling. In adding to this traditional routing, new trails blazed by influential thinkers in recent times seem inevitably (and perhaps properly) to find a hearing among today's cadre of philosophers of education. I find, for instance, in the literature of the discipline various topics addressed that include autonomy and paternalism, justice and care, gender, humanness and sexuality, critical thinking, hermeneutics and pluralism, environment and social structure, and new approaches to political responsibility and citizenship. One characteristic of educational philosophy, then, seems to be its proclivity to be issue-related and topical in nature. As further evidence, in the Paul Hirst and Patricia White compendium volumes, *Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition*, one finds a new, or newly rejuvenated, set of issues that, since the 1980s, increasingly has dominated the discourse of educational philosophy. This set includes the political questions related to the individual and society, the ontological question of the constitutive nature of person and the elements of human formation and development, and the practical question of what it is to live a good life. What counts as educational philosophy today at least is this: disciplined reflection taking cues from the intellectual and philosophical climate of the times and recasting the issues in terms of educational theory and mandate, and providing clarity and direction for educational policy and practice.

Various educational philosophers, following more topical approaches, have been clear on such a methodology. R. S. Peters, being one of the more influential educational philosophers of the 20th century, "sought to apply to educational issues the clarity and

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analytic power of mainstream philosophical thinking ....” His efforts, it seems, similar
to those of fellow educational philosopher, Israel Scheffler, applied conceptual and
linguistic analysis to the various topics related to education and, indeed, to the concept of
education itself. In general terms, then, Peters and Scheffler affirm the importance of
engaging a distinct philosophical methodology—that is, following a process of analysis
and manner of expression commonly accepted within the broader area of general
philosophy. It seems reasonable to assert, then, that philosophical methodology emerges
as an important element in educational philosophy, whether it is of the sort utilized by
analytical or ordinary language philosophy, or that found in other general philosophies—
pragmatism, existential analysis, or even a more classical metaphysics. What moves some
aspect of human experience or some question from mere educational interest or relevance
into the realm of the philosophical are the modes of questioning and analysis engaged,
and the type of methodology used in probing the matter at hand. With the topical
approach, there is exhibited an array of subjects and themes (as mentioned—autonomy,
paternalism, justice, and so forth), handled in an accepted philosophical way, that
constitute somewhat of an agenda for contemporary educational philosophy.

Added to the contemporary spectrum of topics found in educational philosophy, an
older catalog of interests in general philosophy retains a certain vigor, at least in some
circles of thought. The statements of the Philosophy of Education Society in defining
itself, for instance, stipulate that a philosophical treatment of the questions of meaning,
truth and method, are required of educational philosophy. Expanding on this, Richard
Millard and Peter Bertocci point out that the elements of educational philosophy mirror
the elements of general philosophy, namely, philosophical treatments of values,
epistemology, humanness and worldview. Others stress the importance of the topic of
educational aim, suggesting that not only should the practice of education be toward
some particular goal or goals, but that the aims should be philosophically understood and
presented. For instance, Whitehead discusses aims in terms of his perceived phases and
cycles of human development along with the interrelational aspects of all of existence,

69 John White, “R. S. Peters,” in Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education, from Piaget to the Present, ed. Joy
70 Cf. Christopher Lucas’ rendering of the statement of the Committee on the Philosophy of the Education
Society in What Is Philosophy of Education?, 111; and Millard and Bertocci’s account of the relation of
general philosophy and educational philosophy in the same volume, 195.
and Peters' aims are presented in terms of the nature and structure of the human mind and the acquisition of knowledge.\textsuperscript{71}

Branching out from this primary commitment to traditional philosophical topics, we find in Frankena that the focus shifts from epistemology and metaphysics to moral and social philosophy, likely reflecting a repositioning of general philosophy from the speculative concerns of an older mode of philosophy to the practical concerns of how human beings conduct themselves individually and socially.\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, ethical issues and moral principles, moral codes or moral reasoning have acquired increasing importance in the field of educational philosophy since at least the 1960s. Today, questions of ethics and morals have become dominant themes in the field.

Educational themes of both the earlier, traditional mode of educational philosophy and the increasingly issued-centered character of the discipline in more recent times depict a considerable range of questions, scope of topics, and mode of analysis included within the purview of educational philosophy. Along with this topical approach to educational philosophy there exists another that seeks to develop a more integrated and comprehensive treatment of educational issues. In effect, this aims at an intentionally systematic treatment of educational philosophy.

The Systematic Approach

Although Richard Rorty seems to have devoted considerable thought and effort to discredit traditional systematic philosophy, there are some philosophers of education who have attempted to construct a less topically structured, more systematic treatment.\textsuperscript{73} A


\textsuperscript{73} Although I will focus mainly on the work of Thomas F. Green, another systematic philosophy of education appears in the work of Thomas H. Groome, \textit{Sharing Faith. A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry} (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). Although this work takes a religious angle, still it sets up the categories and interrelations of thought typical of a systematic educational philosophy.
brief consideration of such a recent systematic educational philosophy will help to fill out the picture of what counts today as educational philosophy.

Thomas F. Green offers such an approach to educational philosophy. To date, his systematic educational philosophy appears as a three-volume treatment providing analyses of the activities of teaching, of the forms those activities take in various institutional, social and political contexts, and of the creation of the personal directives that govern one's conduct and responsibilities. Engaging in what perhaps Rorty might call an outmoded style of philosophy, Green has attempted to produce a relatively comprehensive and coherent vision of the theory and practice of education. His objective is clear:

The course I had in mind to construct was a full program in philosophy of education, beginning with the conceptual analysis of the activities of teaching with full understanding that these activities take place in institutions, and for the sake of human beings concerned not simply to live, but to live well . . . . These volumes, so far, constitute a single coherent body of work, not three discrete efforts as they have so far been understood even by their author.

At the heart of Green's approach to educational philosophy lie the noticing, understanding and articulating of the activities and operations of learning and teaching. As he explains, "Philosophy is an activity and not a subject, something to do rather than

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74 The earliest of the volumes is The Activities of Teaching (Troy, NY: Educator's International Press, 1998) appearing originally in 1971. This work was followed by Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Troy, NY: Educator's International Press, 1997), first published in 1980. While the focus of this volume is on the structure, administration and actual operation of the educational system, its approach has a distinct philosophical dimension. He explains, "My purpose has been to describe both the structure and the dynamics of what I have chosen to call 'the educational system,' and to do so in a way that will capture the essential rationality so that the behavior of the system, its inherent processes, may become intelligible in a way that is independent of differences in political and economic ideology." The work on moral formation and education is the latest to appear, Voices. The Educational Formation of Conscience (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). Apparently a fourth volume of this systematic treatment is planned. "To this book, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience, is to be added a second volume, already underway, called Walls: Education in Communities of Text and Liturgy . . . . Discussion there flows from the conviction that in a highly pluralistic world in which commons and sect are separated by high walls of one sort or another, the health of the commons depends upon the possibility of strong sectarian education."

Voices, xii.

75 Thomas F. Green, The Activities of Teaching, viii.
something to study."  Accordingly, “to the question ‘Where should I start the study of philosophy?’ there are many answers . . . . From my own view, the best approach would be simply to observe someone else doing it and then start doing it yourself.”

Given this methodology, what counts as educational philosophy, for Green, includes attending to and thematizing what goes on in the actual teaching process, in the development of beliefs and belief systems, in knowing and knowing correctly, and in the various modes of student learning. Green’s systematic educational philosophy involves two key operations: first, identifying the various educational acts and, second, clarifying how these activities can and do occur, and might occur more effectively. In this methodology, its clues come from the field of education itself more than from the topics en vogue within philosophy or social theory.

Clearly, then, educational philosophy reveals itself as a many-faceted discipline: topical or systematic; rooted in traditional philosophical discourse or adopting contemporary philosophical analyses; and addressing various social, economic or political concerns. What counts as educational philosophy today covers a wide territory whose horizons seem inexorably to be pushed back as different, perhaps new, methodologies are adopted. Its many activities include: striving toward a rigorous explanation of elements related to teaching and learning; upholding the importance of giving reasons and being committed to the refinement of those reasons; addressing the questions related to the development, integrity and value of the human subject; offering a view of social and political life in which education enjoys a strategic role; and adopting a philosophical mode of discourse and rational argument. In the exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into this field, we will see that Lonergan’s unique account of the operations of human consciousness relates to many key topics addressed in educational philosophy, and also offers a basis for a systematic treatment that orders and develops educational issues as a relatively (or at least potentially) comprehensive understanding of human education.

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76 Ibid., xiii. Perhaps Green is overstating his case in order to emphasize his particular focus on the “activity” of both philosophizing and teaching. There can be no mistake that philosophy, as evidenced in many university curricula, is also a subject to be studied.

77 Ibid.
It should be noted that my engagement of the field of educational philosophy in this study is very broad, and that the thinkers I refer to within this field are not meant to be representative. Rather my intention is to identify the work of certain educational philosophers who have treated various key issues as they fall within the primary differentiations and operations identified in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis.

**Lonergan Studies**

Lonergan Studies is a relatively new, but growing, field of inquiry covering a large number of topics that center on the work of the philosopher and theologian, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. Born in Buckingham, Quebec in 1904, Bernard was the oldest of three children. At age thirteen, Bernard entered the boarding school of Loyola College in Montreal. In 1922, at age eighteen, he joined the Society of Jesus, embarking on an academic career that would prove to be remarkably productive. Spanning almost half a century, his scholarly vocation consisting of research, writing and teaching has resulted in a projected twenty-five volume set of his collected works.

Lonergan’s academic training followed not an unusual route for Jesuits. Studying first in the standard curriculum of languages, mathematics, philosophy and literature in his home country, he later pursued studies in the Greek and Latin classics at Heythrop College, England from 1926 to 1929. While at Heythrop, he covered more philosophy and mathematics, and undertook concentrated study of the works of John Henry Newman and other important thinkers of the 19th century. Upon completion of these studies, Lonergan was given a three-year teaching assignment at Loyola College in Montreal, after which he began, in 1934, doctoral level theological studies in Rome.

With a background in classical and modern philosophy, and having studied St. Augustine along the way, doctoral studies led Lonergan more deeply into the thought of St. Thomas. He approached the work of Thomas first critically, and then as an apprentice, “reaching up to the mind of Aquinas.”

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79 Published by the University of Toronto Press, the projected number of volumes have increased from an initial twenty-two in 1988, including an index volume, to twenty-five at the present time. To date, 2003, eleven volumes have been published.
grace” in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Frederick Crowe, a close associate of Lonergan and one of the most prominent Lonergan scholars,\(^8\) believes that more than the theological contribution made, this work’s importance lies in its uncovering “of the way Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood and thought again and judged and wrote.”\(^8\) Lonergan’s theological interest in Aquinas inevitably led to an investigation of the cognitional theory under-girding Aquinas’ theology and philosophy. The crowning work in this phase of his academic career was the publication in the late 1940s of a series of articles exploring the concept of ‘verbum.’ It is here that the key concepts and elements related to human cognition are set forth, later to be reworked and developed, revised and updated, into a full-fledged philosophical treatise of his own published finally in 1957 as *Insight. A Study of Human Understanding.* This work exhibits a certain indebtedness to Aquinas, but it goes beyond him and represents a different and unique system of thought. In large measure, Lonergan’s interests and studies lead up to *Insight,* and most everything subsequently flows from it, whether his Christology, his theological analysis, his methodology, economics, or his lectures on educational issues.

Following the publication of *Insight,* Lonergan’s reputation as a major thinker, in the Catholic intellectual world at least, began to grow. Education professor and Lonergan scholar, David G. Creamer, notes, “*Insight* was well received by religious and secular scholars … [and] has received the status of a philosophical classic.”\(^8\) Lonergan’s most widely known work appeared in 1972. *Method in Theology* applies the philosophical position established in *Insight* to understanding the scope and task of theological inquiry, and added new insights into the nature and significance of conversion and its various types.

While *Method in Theology* propelled Lonergan to prominence in the theological world, already by the mid-1960s Lonergan’s influence was beginning to be felt on a wide scale. Crowe writes in 1967, “… his disciples sense a latent power in his thought, the

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\(^8\) For such an assessment of Crowe’s work, largely devoted to the study, interpretation and promotion of Lonergan’s thought, see Michael Vertin, “Editor’s Introduction” in Frederick E. Crowe, *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea,* ed. Michael Vertin (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), vii-x.

\(^8\) Ibid.

gathering momentum of a truly significant impact upon some future period."\textsuperscript{84} What has emerged since then is a movement called “Lonergan Studies,” among other effects, spawning several journals, the most noted being, \textit{Method. A Journal of Lonergan Studies}. There have been established more than a dozen centers and institutes around the world given to the promotion and development of Lonergan’s thought. Conferences are regularly held on interpreting and relating Lonergan’s work to other issues and important thinkers, including Jane Jacobs in the field of sociology and cultural analysis and Hans-Georg Gadamer in the field of philosophy and hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{85}

While there have been some major studies done on the relation of Lonergan’s ideas to education and issues pertinent to educational philosophy, these have been largely related either to the field of religion and religious education, or related to curriculum development. One of the earliest treatments of Lonergan and education appeared in the Lonergan festschrift of 1964 in an essay entitled, “Towards an Effective Philosophy of Education.”\textsuperscript{86} The problem Vanier deals with concerns the need for philosophy, and philosophy of education as a practical manifestation of philosophy, to “comprehend reality in its total unity and its basic characteristics.”\textsuperscript{87} Specifically, for Vanier, this is a matter of obtaining a knowledge of developing knowledge. In his view, Lonergan’s \textit{Insight} makes this knowledge possible in that he makes explicit what generally has remained implicit with respect to this type of development.\textsuperscript{88} As simply an anticipation of the importance Lonergan’s analysis of human insight holds for education, Vanier states,

\begin{quote}
... in our perspective, which is that of \textit{Insight}, the philosophy of education starts from the concrete data of cognitional operations. It is a clearly distinct science within the cultural order, achieving its development not through a series of basic revisions but through a constant search for
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, 174.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.} 174-75.
precision in its methods, for differentiation and integration of new data coming from the development of sciences or the renewal of pedagogy.\(^8^9\)

The key to the educational philosophy stemming from Lonergan’s work on insight, in Vanier’s view, is the framework for collaboration on education within the sciences made possible by Lonergan’s account of the development of knowledge. As will become clear in this study, there exists the potential to interrelate the findings of science within an overarching framework, this being Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, but I will show that it offers more. It brings to educational philosophy a new understanding of the human subject and a new understanding of key elements of educational philosophy that focus on that vast horizon of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Another study relating Lonergan and education appears in the work of Frederick E. Crowe in which he deals with the problem of the conflict in education between what is commonly called progressive education and what is known as traditional education.\(^9^0\) This work will be dealt with later when we examine Lonergan’s thought on the nature of development and “genetic method.”

A third study focusing on Lonergan’s educational philosophy appears in the essay of philosopher, Hugo Meynell. In this short work, Meynell attempts to introduce to his audience of educational philosophers and theorists the work of Lonergan, showing its contribution to an understanding of the nature of knowledge, its structure and norms that lead to a clear understanding of the nature and aims of education.\(^9^1\) Essentially, Meynell argues, “it is the very essence of education to promote in those educated the capacity to exercise the four transcendental precepts,” that is, to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be reasonable and to be responsible.\(^9^2\) Throughout the essay, Meynell sets aside any direct treatment of educational issues, offering rather a clear and commonsense account of Lonergan’s position on knowing and the demands that that position places on individuals. Meynell concludes his account by suggesting that the aim of education according to Lonergan is “to foster attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility to the

\(^8^9\) Ibid., 178.
\(^9^2\) Ibid.
uttermost." While Meynell presents a lucid and direct account of Lonergan’s position on knowing (itself not a mean accomplishment, in my view), there is no direct treatment of the issues of education and no mention of educational philosophy. More direct engagement of educational philosophy is needed to realize the impact Meynell desires. As I hope to show, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can be expanded in a direct and broad way into the field of educational philosophy.

In addition to these three published works directly on Lonergan and education, there have been a handful of theses, articles and smaller segments of works that explore this relation. Some of these will be discussed later in this study as they relate to certain larger issues of educational philosophy.

Limitations

This present study is a study of educational philosophy and a study of the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. Both of these fields of inquiry are large and complex, and a satisfying treatment of all aspects of the relation between the two would likely require several volumes. To make this study more manageable, my treatment must have limitations. A helpful limitation is to consider the central focus of Lonergan’s philosophy, leaving explorations of the extended reaches of his philosophy for other studies in education. Because various explorations and expansions of Lonergan’s work into the religious dimension of educational philosophy have been conducted already, I will not be

93 Ibid., 12.
94 Regarding Lonergan Studies itself, a fuller and more adequate treatment than what I can offer here of the philosophical perspective and tradition of Lonergan would have to probe at least the Thomistic and classical traditions which Lonergan engages both positively and negatively, and relate this to his engagement of modern philosophies, including existentialism. And of course, the field of philosophy of education is vast, and continues to spread out in a great many directions.
95 Such reaches would cover Lonergan’s philosophy of religion, his theological methodology and, more recently, his economic theory. In fact, as shall be noted, some studies of the relation of education and other aspects of Lonergan’s thought already have been undertaken.
96 For religious education questions, at least as they are usually understood as instruction in religious faith, one should consult these works. Not a comprehensive list, it includes some of the main treatments of Lonergan and religious education. Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: a Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), especially in the earlier sections where the “foundations” of religious education are set forth, 116-31; Robert J. Henman, The Child as Quest: Method and Religious Education (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983);
addressing the issue of religious education in this work, although in some sense, it has been purported that virtually any aspect of human existence exhibits a religious quality. In his lectures on education, Lonergan distinguishes between secularist education and philosophy of education and religious education. The difference is that the former ends with ethics and the latter considers “when the autonomous subject stands before God.” While the religious stance is of utmost importance to the religious person, most education that concerns educational philosophy is not religious education, and thus I will largely set aside the questions of religion and concentrate on secularist education and philosophy of education.

Further limitations of this study should be noted. First, I will be limiting my focus to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis as it appears mainly in Lonergan’s cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. The most substantial treatment of these topics appear in *Insight*, but there have been further significant developments of his intentionality analysis in subsequent writings, and these will be considered throughout this study. Moreover, this concentration on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis of *Insight* (but not to the exclusion of his other works) will hopefully help to change a perceived neglect of this demanding philosophical work, at least relative to his more accessible *Method in Theology*.

Secondly, a significant development of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis occurs in his appreciation and explanation of the role of feelings in the operations on human
consciousness. The element of feelings in human cognition will be dealt with at various points in this study, but a fuller treatment of this element of human existence as it relates to education should, perhaps, occur within the field of educational psychology. So, while the topic of human affectivity arises in this study of educational philosophy, in comparison to the topics of understanding, rationality, and reasonable choice, its treatment will be relatively limited.

Thirdly, it should be noted what this study is not. It is not a work treating some particular educational problem, or a logically argued philosophical position on some issue in educational philosophy. This study rather concerns itself with understanding the central tenets of the philosophy of a significant thinker, and exploring and expanding these into the broad field of educational philosophy. This work, I believe, has in view the general horizon of educational philosophy in which some of its key parts are related to the whole. There is much work in educational philosophy that will not be addressed, and, as noted earlier, that work I do consider is in relation to the mapping of issues in educational philosophy onto the systematic framework revealed in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis.

And fourthly, as a textual limitation, in dealing with Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, the preferred edition of Insight, and of his other works cited, will be the Collected Works edition, where these have been published. Where his works have not yet appeared in the Collected Works edition, the most recent edition will be cited.

In the next chapter I will first examine Lonergan’s analysis of human consciousness as it appears in his early writings, as it takes on central importance as intentionality analysis in Insight, and, then how it develops post-Insight. This will set the stage for other chapters that deal with what implications Lonergan’s cognitional theory, his epistemology, metaphysics and ethics hold for educational philosophy.

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100 A thoroughgoing treatment of Lonergan’s development of intentionality analysis with respect to feelings would have to address the work of Lonergan scholars Robert Doran, Bernard Tyrrell (referred to later in this study), and others, who explore and expand the psychological dimensions and implications of Lonergan’s analysis.

101 In some cases, several editions of some works have been published. For instance, to date Insight has been published in five editions, the most recent being the Collected Works edition of 1992. Lending themselves best to scholarly research, the Collected Works editions are carefully edited and indexed, offering extensive notes, glossaries and translations of terms. It should be noted that Method in Theology has not yet appeared in a Collected Works edition.
CHAPTER TWO
Lonergan’s Intentionality Analysis

Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have experienced. A third dimension of rationality emerges when the content of our acts of understanding is regarded as, of itself, a mere bright idea and we endeavor to settle what really is so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgment on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.¹

All of Lonergan’s work in one way or another leads up to, and then flows from, his account of the differentiated but interrelated acts of human intentionality identified as experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. Identifying these acts leading to human insight, and coming to terms with the far-reaching implications of those acts, constitute the centerpiece of Lonergan’s philosophical work extending over several decades. Frederick Crowe, one of the chief interpreters and earliest proponents of Lonergan’s thought, has stated that it is Lonergan’s “discovery of insight,” this being the core of his intentionality analysis, that is undoubtedly his greatest contribution to the world of thought and scholarship.² While Lonergan is not interested so much in developing an educational philosophy as he is in addressing the broader scope of cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, I maintain that his treatment of these wider concerns has relevance to educational philosophy, and as such, his intentionality analysis invites an expansion, as we shall see, into the field of educational philosophy.

The aim of this chapter is to establish the main contours and scope of intentionality analysis that will lead in subsequent chapters to an expansion of key elements of his

¹ Method in Theology, 9.
² Frederick E. Crowe offered this assessment in his lecture series at Regent College, November 10-11, 1995. Audio recordings of these lectures are available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, Ontario, and at the Regent Carey Library, Regent College, Vancouver, B.C.
analysis. This chapter will focus on Lonergan's principal philosophical work, *Insight*, but inasmuch as his work on human cognition, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics spans virtually his entire career, earlier writings and those subsequent to *Insight* also will be examined briefly in relation to the development of his analysis of the operations of human consciousness.

**Analysis of Human Consciousness in the Early Lonergan Corpus**

Lonergan's doctoral studies covered the years 1938 to 1940 and revealed an early interest in the nature and function of the human mind. While his dissertation centered on the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas concerning operative grace, and the various associated theological disputations pertaining to the relations of grace and liberty, of the natural and supernatural, and of the divine and human will, the work was a historical treatment that probed the questions of the nature of theological development and of intellectual operations underlying theological reflection. Specifically, Lonergan understood that historical inquiry must take into account the function of human intelligence, and he further discovered that speculation on the development of thought, while aiming at certitude, can achieve in the end only degrees of probability. For Lonergan, what became paramount in historical inquiry was the method of inquiry one employs and, for him, a method suited to such a task was one that in general terms operates not only in theology but in mathematics and physics. In a way, then, Lonergan's dissertation was not so much about the dogmas propounded by Aquinas as it was about the development of Aquinas' thinking in the realm of speculative theology, and about the general structure and operations of the human mind. Crowe is clear on this point: "... the real value of his dissertation lay less in points of objective theology than in factors that are more subjective and methodological, factors that for this very reason are far more fundamental;

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in this respect the influence of Lonergan’s doctoral work on his subsequent development can hardly be exaggerated.”\(^7\) Crowe goes on to say, “His real discovery was of the way Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood and thought again and judged and wrote.”\(^8\) In Aquinas, Lonergan found a thinker wrestling not only with the deep theological questions of the day but also with the profound questions concerning the elements and processes of the human mind as it comes to understand and to know.

This longstanding interest in cognitional theory, extending back even to his years at Heythrop College in England, from 1926 to 1930,\(^9\) took on new life in the mid-forties when Lonergan conducted another extensive study of St. Thomas, this time on the question of the “inner word”—what essentially amounted to the question of Thomas’ cognitional theory.\(^10\) Published first in a series of articles from 1946 to 1949, and then as a monograph in 1967, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, this work offers an account of the procession of the inner word in acts of understanding and acts of rational consciousness through conceptualization and judgment. His analysis unfolded not by attending to the products of these acts found, for instance, in concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, but by attending to the performance of the acts as they progress from lesser to greater complexities of understanding.\(^11\) While Lonergan uses the term “reason” and “rationality” to speak of the operations of this inner word, his meaning extends beyond mere deductive reasoning, logic and syllogistic thinking. In its essence, reasoning is “simply the development of insight; it is motion towards understanding. In the concrete such development is a dialectical interplay of sense, memory, imagination, insight, definition, critical reflection, judgment . . . .”\(^12\) The cognitional theory at work in Aquinas and explicated by Lonergan seems to have set the course for Lonergan’s next great project, namely, to undertake a wide-ranging and penetrating inquiry into the occurrence, operations and capabilities of human understanding.

\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ibid., 14.
\(^10\) Ibid., 48-9.
\(^12\) Ibid., 71. Expanding on this statement, Frederick Crowe offers a further helpful account of Lonergan’s notion of rationality as it appears in *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, in *Lonergan*, 49-50.
Intentionality Analysis in *Insight*

*Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, first published in 1957, sets aside the theological questions and disputations of his earlier inquiries, and takes up the question of the nature of insight as it occurs within the realms of mathematics, the natural sciences, and the world of common sense. In what follows, I will consider Lonergan’s own assessment of this work in his introductory remarks to *Insight* and in later reflections; examine in detail the key cognitional operations in the occurrence of insight in empirical inquiry; outline the corresponding operations of insight in the world of common sense; and discuss Lonergan’s analysis of judgment and the limitations of knowledge due to human bias.

**Introductory Remarks**

Lonergan’s original intention for *Insight* was to elucidate the methods of human inquiry and then to develop an effective method of inquiry for theological studies. What resulted was a more general study of how human beings come to know virtually anything that uncovered and elucidated the general cognitional activities involved in that cognitive process. Lonergan reports, “The problem tackled in the book was complex indeed. At its root was a question of psychological fact. Human intellect does not intuit essences. It grasps in simplifying images intelligible possibilities that may prove relevant to an understanding of data.” The operations of insight are revealed throughout this work in a series “five-finger exercises inviting the reader to discover in himself and for himself just what happens when he understands.” This is followed by an account of how understanding moves to knowledge in an act of judgment. The subsequent account

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15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 269.

17 Ibid., 273.
leads to the questions of being and objectivity and of what human knowledge is oriented towards and to which it intentionally aims. The final chapters of the book discuss how the operations of insight are applied in philosophy, in ethics and in a general theology. The three basic questions of the book to which Lonergan proposes answers are, “What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? The first answer is a cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is a metaphysics.” While it is not explicitly stated in the text itself, Insight seems to unfold in general relation to these three questions as follows. The cognitional theory is formulated largely in chapters one through eight in which Lonergan gives an account of the basic operations of consciousness in seeking knowledge. The explicit epistemology appears in chapters nine through thirteen in which Lonergan gives an account of knowledge, self-knowledge, the knowledge of being and objectivity. Lonergan’s metaphysical work appears in chapters fourteen through seventeen that deal with the method, elements, and modes of metaphysics. These accounts bring Lonergan in chapter eighteen to another topic related to metaphysics, that is, to the ethical questions arising from a grasp of cognitional process and from a knowledge of what knowledge is. In ethics, Lonergan addresses the existential questions of decision and action based on knowledge and affirmation of the good and the true. This, then, is the overall structure of the book and, for my purposes of grasping his analysis of the operations of human consciousness in terms of intentionality analysis, my focus will first be on the “Preface,” “Introduction,” and the first ten chapters that present “insight as activity,” essentially this being his cognitional theory and account of human knowing that forms the basis of his epistemological, metaphysical and ethical assertions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters of this study.

Lonergan leads into his study through a “Preface” and a substantial “Introduction,” both of which provide important perspectives on the purpose, value and applications of

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18 Ibid., 273-75
19 Ibid., 275.
20 Method in Theology, 25.
21 While it would take at least another dissertation to argue for and conclude definitively the correlation between the three questions Lonergan formulates in Method and the structure of Insight, and in fact this interpretative grid might not fit tightly, I propose the correlation simply to help in sorting through the complexities of the book and to help in understanding his intentionality analysis.
his intentionality analysis. One of the most important elements of the "Preface" is the definition he offers of the term "insight."

By insight, then, is meant not any act of attention or advertence or memory but the supervening act of understanding. It is not recondite intuition but the familiar event that occurs easily and frequently in the moderately intelligent, rarely and with difficulty only in the very stupid. In itself it is so simple and obvious that it seems to merit the little attention that commonly it receives. At the same time, its function in cognitional activity is so central that to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results is to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and opinion.22

The field of experience to which Lonergan attends, then, is common and general, and concerns the cognitional activity that occurs in virtually any instance of human knowing. While this discussion of an underlying unity of knowledge immediately presents difficulties to persons emphasizing the intersubjective, social, or historical aspects of knowledge—for if all knowledge is contextual and conditioned, what unity can be attributed to the "whole field of human inquiry and opinion"—the reasonable inquirer should be open to at least hearing out Lonergan, and to reserve judgment, until a thorough understanding has been achieved. The elements of knowledge that provide a commonality to human inquiry and opinion, for Lonergan, clearly are not found in a synthesis achieved through an analysis of the body of knowledge drawn from the various fields of inquiry, such as what Paul Hirst and some other educational philosophers seem to seek in their epistemological analyses.23 Rather, the common elements are found in the knowing process. Lonergan explains,

... we are concerned not with the object understood in mathematics but with mathematicians' acts of understanding, not with objects understood in the various sciences but with scientists' acts of understanding, not with

22 Insight, 3.
the concrete situations mastered by common sense but with the acts of understanding of men of common sense.  

The primary focus of Lonergan’s work, then, is on the knowing process. It is on knowing what the activities of knowing are, and how those activities result in what one calls “knowledge.” In his intentionality analysis, Lonergan’s basic concern is to gain insight into acts of insight.

With the central thrust of the work clearly articulated in the “Preface,” his “Introduction” sets forth the strategy of execution. First, it should be noted, Lonergan’s motivation, in part, arises from the problem of Cartesian dualism perplexing philosophy of the modern age; and for him, the solution is found only in an understanding of the nature of knowledge verified in the knowing subject. Secondly, the nature of knowledge is uncovered not in an analysis of the ungraspable breadth of what is known, but in grasping the structure of the knowing process embodied in the knowing subject. Thirdly, Lonergan’s strategy is to invite the inquirer to identify and to understand the elements and processes of knowing that are found in one’s actual performance of the process. This invitation leads to what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation,” and it is key to his entire analysis. Fourthly, Lonergan notes this self-understanding and self-appropriation is a slow and incremental process that is not achieved in a single leap. It is a process that begins with simple, elementary insights that build toward a full and satisfactory self-appropriation and self-affirmation.

Of Lonergan’s preliminary remarks on insight, the singularly most important assertion for the legitimacy of my inquiry and thesis appears as the final point of his “Introduction.” There he states: “… the order of the assembly [of the elements, relations, alternatives and implications of conscious intentionality] is governed, not by the abstract considerations of logical or metaphysical priority, but by concrete motives of pedagogical efficacy.” Lonergan presents the elements, relations and operations of intentionality as a quest for insight. In Lonergan’s analysis, human intentionality has a definite structure and
order, and that structure and order exhibit a basic educational relevance. For this reason, then, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can be regarded as an analysis of the elements and processes of education at a very basic level. Put another way, human intentionality, through and through, is an educational phenomenon. Frederick Lawrence summarizes the pedagogical dimension of intentionality addressed in *Insight* this way:

Lonergan’s pedagogy in *Insight* invites the reader to venture ‘into mathematics and physics, into the subtleties of common sense and depth psychology, into the processes of history, the intricacies of interpretation, the dialectic of philosophies, and the possibility of transcendent knowledge.’ He wants us ‘to apprehend, to appropriate, to envisage in all its consequences, the inner focus of ... [one’s] own intelligence and reasonableness’ in insight. To gain insight into insight is ‘to pierce the outer verbal and conceptual exhibitions of mathematics, of science, and of common sense, and to penetrate to the inner dynamism of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection,’ and ‘one’s own essential and restricted freedom.’

In effect, Lonergan’s assertion would be that learning in virtually every domain of human inquiry involves insight, and Lonergan’s introduction leads us to expect that, the better we understand insight, the better we can create the conditions under which it is likely to occur.

As Lonergan’s analysis of human intentionality unfolds throughout *Insight*, one should be clear as to Lonergan’s overarching intention. While in this work there is no shortage of theoretical propositions, objectifications of the process of human consciousness, and assertions on the nature of human subjectivity, of the world and of the universe of being, the appeal is not to grasp, necessarily, Lonergan’s assertions. The appeal and intention is to attend to one’s own experiences of intentionality, to understand them, and thus to move toward achieving self-knowledge. Lonergan’s work, as “pedagogical efficacy,” is to aid this developmental process. The understanding required for this task involves a self-reflective dimension and the development of a “moving viewpoint,” that is, it involves a gradual accumulation of insights into conscious intentionality where, as the process unfolds, there emerges an “appropriation of one’s

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30 Frederick Lawrence, “Lonergan, the Integral Postmodern?” *Method. A Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 115. Here Lawrence is citing Lonergan’s original “Preface” to *Insight*. 
own intellectual and rational self-consciousness.”31 In order to understand the dimensions of self-reflection, and to understand the movement of Lonergan’s thought from cognitional theory to his engagement with philosophical questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, I will examine more closely the details of his intentionality analysis.

**Cognitional Operations**

Since, for Lonergan, understanding attends to and arises from the breadth of human experience, the first step in understanding cognitive intentionality, the point of departure if you will, in the quest of self-knowledge, is first a matter of drawing attention to the *experience* of having an insight. Thus he begins, “... our first task will be to attain familiarity with what is meant by insight, and the only way to achieve this end is, it seems, to attend very closely to a series of instances all of which are rather remarkable for their banality.”32 The instance appealed to is the well-known “eureka” experience of Archimedes in which certain features of the occurrence of insight are identified. First, Lonergan notes, insight comes as a “release to the tension of inquiry.” The experience considered at this point involves not so much the release of tension as the drive that creates the tension in the first place. It is a tension between the question or problem one faces and the solution needed to answer it. “Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is the drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain.”33 In the array of cognitional activities that constitutes human consciousness, the force that seems to move cognitional operations forward is the desire, or drive, to know.34

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34 Lonergan clearly identifies cognitional activities as dimensions of conscious human experience. Without human consciousness, what would also include the sub-conscious and semi-conscious states, can one be said to have experience? Perhaps there are good arguments for holding that humans can have experience without consciousness, but based on this cognitional theory, Lonergan would deny this as a possibility. The full scope of Lonergan’s conceptions of experience comes into view in due course.
Secondly, Lonergan suggests that, "insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly." While an insight into a particular situation is desired, still it is not achieved on command. An insight seems to take its own time to arrive, and when it does, it comes unannounced. The conditions for its occurrence can be set auspiciously, and all the clues can be noticed and given their due, but the actual moment of having the insight is a surprising occurrence in the consciousness of the inquirer, a defiant "de-routinization" so to speak, that, in certain respects, catches the individual unaware. It is an act that distinguishes discovery from mere conclusions. "Were there rules for discovery, then discoveries would be mere conclusions." The "aha" experience, however, expresses an insight of creative uncovering, of "dis-cover-y." Insight occurs not from following rules but by allowing the dynamics of human cognition the freedom, relaxation and enjoyment to break out of restrictive patterns in order to achieve new beginnings and novel intellectual grasps with, of course, their concomitant emotional effects.

Thirdly, insight arises from, and is dependent upon, what can be thought of as the internal conditions of consciousness. Where the human senses depend on external stimuli, on that which can be seen, heard, felt, and so forth, insights depend on internal states and functions of consciousness. These conditions include such things as alertness in one’s situation, asking questions, and "the accurate presentation of definite problems." At this early stage in his treatise, Lonergan begins to draw the distinction between what is given to human consciousness by the senses, if you will, the data of sense, and what consciousness produces by way of attentiveness, of wonder and curiosity, by falling into or establishing patterns of experience for specific purposes, and by way of thoughts and ideas that pertain to some matter at hand. Later on he calls these products, and a host of other such evidences, the "data of consciousness." In accounting for the experience of insight, the distinction between data of sense and data of consciousness is a difference between what is apprehended of external things and what "internal" products and activities arise through patterned or creative acts of consciousness.

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35 *Insight*, 29.
38 *Ibid.*, 95-7. Lonergan deals explicitly with the distinction between the data of sense and the data of consciousness in the section that maps out the canons of empirical method.
Fourthly, Lonergan claims that "insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract." Problems call for solutions that will work in actual situations, the results of which can be verified empirically by the senses and anticipated and grasped in images. These results also draw on the resources of abstract thought expressed in formulae, definitions, postulates and deductions. In its function as a pivot, insight grasps the possibility of some solution in the abstract and determines its actualization in the concrete. Analogously, Lonergan also calls insight a "hinge" and a "mediator." The experience of insight pertains, of course, to the particular situation at hand, but it also anticipates abstractly other similar situations as it reaches for broader, deeper, more novel opportunities of understanding. The details of an immediate situation are thus considered in reference to the ideas and formulations of past insights, sciences, and symbols.

And fifthly, once the insight has been achieved, once an understanding of some problem situation has been grasped, the solution that is thorough and effective needs not to be puzzled over again. When one catches on to a joke, or discovers the solution to a puzzle, for instance, the insight normally does not have to be learned again. The insight, Lonergan explains, "passes into the habitual texture of one's mind," and it can be recalled and drawn upon almost at will. While a single insight may occur initially in a flash, groups and patterns of insights tend to accumulate gradually and, only over time, do they come to constitute the texture of one's mind. Insights are grouped and interrelated to form potentially a body of knowledge related to some field of interest and inquiry. It is a body of knowledge that allows one to become an expert in some subject area, and allows one to make confident and authoritative judgments and pronouncements.

These five characteristics discerned by Lonergan from anecdotal accounts are such that they may be identified in any clear occurrence of insight, and as such they form Lonergan's basic definition. Leading from this elementary characterization of the phenomenon of insight, Lonergan embarks on a more substantive account of other elements of insight. The eureka-type experience is one sort of insight. Formulating a

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39 Ibid., 30.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Lonergan is addressing what he discerns as common occurrences of insight. Unfortunately, there are those individuals with certain cognitive disabilities that may have cognitive experiences somewhat different that what Lonergan describes.
44 Insight, 30.
definition is another type. Lonergan explains that a definition requires various components: a definite and limited question or object at hand; various concepts that are related to that which is being defined (concepts that result from “supposing, thinking, considering, formulating, defining”); and an image or series of images that anticipates and illumines necessity and impossibility. Grasping the necessary elements in the thing being defined “constitutes the [definitional-type] insight.” The grasp is then related to the question of the definition—and it is the question that plays a crucial role in the emergence of insight. Lonergan explains:

This primordial drive ... is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words; for insights, concepts, words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such wanting is the pure question. On the other hand, though the pure question is prior to insights, concepts and words, it presupposes experiences and images. Just as insight is into the concretely given or imagined, so the pure question is about the concretely given or imagined. It is the wonder which Aristotle claimed to be the beginning of all science and philosophy. But no one just wonders. We wonder about something.

The actual process involved in human consciousness leading to a definition, Lonergan states, is triggered by this drive of the question. That is to say, the pure question of the drive leads to the specific question of the concrete situation. From this basic orientation, one looks for hints and clues that will lead to a satisfactory definition, and when these are grasped, human imagination tests out the possibilities and intelligently relates them to the question at hand. As the insights and images evoked by the question are tested against the situation, and as adjustments are made to the possible definition, an increasingly satisfactory definition emerges and, as the question becomes fully satisfied, a conclusive definition may be achieved. Lonergan explains the process: “The image strains to approximate the concepts. The concepts, by added conceptual determinations, can express their differences from the merely approximate image.” Through this interplay of image and concept the definition eventually becomes formulated.

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44 Ibid., 33.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 34.
47 Ibid., 35.
The resulting definition, Lonergan suggests, can be either a nominal definition that tells us about the correct usage of names, such as that found in dictionaries, or it can be an explanatory definition that defines an object or event in terms of its use and relation to other things, perhaps such as that found in a handbook or manual.\textsuperscript{48} That is to say, in an explanatory definition, the objective it is to offer an account of the relations of the elements in the thing being defined rather than the relation of words to objects.\textsuperscript{49} The point here is not a full account of the nature of definitions and their nominal and explanatory roles. Lonergan rather seeks merely to elucidate the ever-expanding range of consciousness as it grasps increasingly complex situations that demand increasingly complex insights.

The point Lonergan goes on to make affirms that human insight required to create or intelligently grasp a definition unfolds in a certain way. One might legitimately argue with Lonergan on various illustrative points, indicating here and there where his analysis of the eureka experience doesn't quite fit with one's own experience of it, or perhaps that his explanation of how one grasps the definition of a circle, for instance, is inadequate in some detail. However, Lonergan would point out, as he does elsewhere,\textsuperscript{50} the acts of raising questions, of challenging his assertions, and of exploring refinements and possible corrections in the examples and explanations he offers, reflect the very dynamism that he identifies as the structure and processes of inquiry. To argue against his position, Lonergan maintains, requires one to engage the very processes he has differentiated and interrelated.

While insights can occur in relative isolation, more often than not they occur in relation to other insights, as suggested, and they come to relate to a growing body of knowledge in the context of a developing mastery in some subject area. Insights are added to insights; definitions give rise to new definitions; corrections and revisions of

\textsuperscript{48} Lonergan does not illustrate the difference between nominal and explanatory definitions as a difference between a dictionary and a handbook, but it seems to me that this illustration fits quite well.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 36-7.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 20. "Moreover, if it can be shown that the upper context [of the structure and operational differentiations of consciousness] is invariant, that any attempt to revise it can be legitimate only if the hypothetical reviser refutes his own attempt by invoking experience, understanding, and reflection in an already precise manner, then it will appear that, while the noëma or intentio intenta or pensée pensée may always be expressed with greater accuracy and completeness, still the immanent and recurrently operative structure ... must always be one and the same."
those earlier insights occur; and definitions and postulates are refined while better, more complete and intellectually satisfying grasps of situations result. New and better insights are achieved. Lonergan sees this process emerge and develop as the "higher viewpoint." The specific example by which Lonergan illustrates this is the development of a student's basic understanding of arithmetic into a grasp of algebra that involves increasing familiarity with and application of symbolic expression, and greater facility in the use of symbol as a carrier of meaning. Simply put, as an activity of human consciousness, understanding grasps the intelligibility in objects that are presented to consciousness by sense or represented by images. The grasping of such intelligibility Lonergan calls "direct insight." Lonergan explains this more fully in his accounts of the self-correcting process of learning and of human development, issues that I will explore more fully in chapter four.

Besides direct insight there exists also inverse insight that "responds to a more subtle and critical attitude that distinguishes different degrees or levels or kinds of intelligibility." "While direct insight grasps the point, sees the solution, or comes to know the reason," Lonergan explains, "inverse insight apprehends that in some fashion the point is that there is no point, or that the solution is to deny a solution, or that the reason is that the rationality of the real admits distinctions and qualifications." In inverse insight, the data of sense or the data presented in mental images can be received into consciousness as primordial experience, but there is denied any intelligibility to those data, at least in reference to a certain line of questioning or inquiry. The difference between direct insight and inverse insight, then, rises on the question of intelligibility, on the question of the possibility of understanding.

Essentially, intelligibility is what is grasped when one understands. It is what is absent when understanding does not exist, and is present when it does. Prior to understanding, there is no intelligibility grasped in data of sense or data given in mental images. When understanding emerges, the intelligibility that is grasped may be grasped in a

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51 Ibid., 37-8.
52 Ibid., 38-43.
53 Ibid., 44.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. By the last phrase, Lonergan suggests that an inverse insight sets limits to what is identified as the real, and that an inverse insight grasps what is unreal.
56 Ibid.
straightforward manner resulting from the anticipations and expectations of human intelligence. The intelligibility that is grasped may be seen later to be wrong or inadequate, and corrections to the insight might be made to achieve a more satisfying grasp of intelligibility. But such insights produced by correcting intelligible grasps are all direct insights. With the introduction of the notion of inverse insight, the matter of intelligibility shifts from the data to the nature of the questions about the data.

Inverse insight entails the denial of intelligibility in the data along a certain line of inquiry or mode of questioning. When inverse insight occurs, the intelligibility originally anticipated by the question or line of questions is no longer anticipated. Denying expected intelligibility is a denial of the possibility of intelligibility, under certain conditions, in the data presented to one’s consciousness. In such a case, an insight, however, has occurred, but it is not into the intelligibility of the data, because the data are unintelligible within a certain mode of inquiry; the insight is that there is no possible insight. To deny an expected intelligibility, to deny that which human intelligence naturally tends to seek and expect, is to run counter to the spontaneous anticipations of human intelligence. It is to find fault not with the answers, as what occurs in denying some intelligibility already reached, but with the questions themselves.57

Inverse insights are important since, among other reasons, they promote the development of scientific collaboration and scientific generalization.58 For instance, a scientist does not have to discover the laws of physics appropriate to China and the laws of physics for Canada, since gravity, for instance, works generally the same way on objects in both places. Inverse insight grasps that, for physics, there is nothing relevant to be understood by asking questions about the features of individual objects that relate solely to the particularities of time or place. The laws or insights of physics are to transcend time and place in that their aim is to apply across time and for all locations. That objects exist in various locations and at various times are simply givens: why an

57 *Ibid.* 47-9. The examples of inverse insight Lonergan offers include the ancient notion of incommensurable magnitudes and the recent notion of irrational numbers, uncountable multitudes, an aspect of Newton’s first law of motion, and the basic insight into space and time afforded by the theory of special relativity.

object exists in China and not in Canada, by and large, is a meaningless question in physics. Lonergan explains:

[Inverse insight] makes scientific collaboration possible, because the work done in this place at this time is relevant to knowledge of what will occur at this other place at this other time. The results do not depend upon the time and place, but upon something at this time and at this place. Similarly, the results there do not depend upon that time and that place, but upon something at that time and at that place. If that were not true, we would need a different science for every time and every place.\(^{59}\)

While Lonergan recognizes that inverse insights are not often sought, and that the questions leading to inverse insight are less obvious to inquirers, these types of insights, however, are very important.\(^{60}\)

Those empirical data that do not admit "immanent intelligibility," those data within the realm of science, for instance, that are attached to an object's particularity and which are not explanatory of the object, Lonergan calls the "empirical residue."\(^{61}\) The difference between inverse insight and the empirical residue is this: inverse insight occurs as a case of understanding—understanding that immanent intelligibility does not exist—while the empirical residue is data that are captured by the senses that does not admit intelligibility within a framework of inquiry. The former, then, is a category (what Lonergan calls "level") of understanding while the latter is a category (or level) of experience. It is of the nature of explanation and understanding, Lonergan holds, to attend to those elements of an individual thing that relate to elements in other things, to find correlations and to discover some pattern or interrelated patterns of generalization. Attending to elements within a thing itself can produce only description, while explanation, on the other hand, requires a consideration of similar elements in other things. The empirical residue, because it lacks the intelligibility arising from comparison with other things, can be described but it cannot be explained.

Perhaps a few brief illustrations will help illumine what Lonergan means here. One can explain in geometry why a circle is round, but one cannot explain in geometry why

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 58.
\(^{60}\) Ibid., 58.
\(^{61}\) Insight, 50.
this circle is not another circle. In botany, one can describe and give an explanatory account of this tree here, but the botanist does not explain why this tree is not that tree. Trees are simply given to one's consciousness as empirical data, and the particularity of this tree—that it is this tree and not another—is not explainable within the bounds of botany. Particularity, however, may be explainable within the bounds of gardening or landscape architecture. One could explain that a tree located here is not there because it was not planted over there for good reason by a property owner, but such an explanation does not add to (but could draw on) the understanding of the scientific properties of trees.

The importance of the empirical residue and of the inverse insight will become apparent as Lonergan expands on his account of insight and explains the heuristic structures that arise from the basic operations of insight. In this first chapter of *Insight*, however, Lonergan identifies its basic elements by appealing to the actual experience of insight. “For just as in any subject one comes to master the essentials by varying the incidentals, so one reaches familiarity with the notion of insight by modifying the illustrations and discovering for oneself and in one’s own terms the point that another attempts to put in terms he happens to think will convey the idea ….”

In effect, this first chapter is an invitation to begin to have insight into insight by attending to the experience of insight.

In the second chapter, “Heuristic Structures of Empirical Method,” Lonergan turns his attention to the actual functioning and interrelations of the various elements of insight. The progression of his analysis is explained: “But if a set of fundamental notions has been introduced, no effort has been made to capture the essential dynamism of human intelligence. Now a first move must be made in this direction ….” Without being an empiricist per se, Lonergan offers a cognitional theory and epistemology that draw on a type of empiricism that sets him apart from the grand metaphysical projects of scholasticism and idealism. By beginning with experience and not metaphysics, Lonergan establishes the importance of human experience in understanding and reflection, and upholds his Jesuit tradition that values in a unique way analysis, learning

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64 Where empiricism is an epistemological commitment that limits knowledge to the realm of sense data, Lonergan clearly is not an empiricist, since his epistemology covers not only understanding sense data but also data of consciousness.
and teaching as means of enriching and expanding one’s world of experience. Lonergan works also within a Jesuit tradition that appreciates the need for learning and faith to be brought into the contemporary world of science and modern life. Lonergan sees a way forward in this through, among other things, appreciating, as I have noted, two sets of empirical data—the data of sense and the data of consciousness. How human cognition and intelligence relate to and constitute these sets are matters of heuristics—how the unknown becomes known, or as Meynell suggests, heuristics as a matter of understanding in terms of a “structure of concepts by means of which the inquirer gives a preliminary description of what is to be known, such as will serve to direct his inquiry.”

In one respect, insight occurs spontaneously and relatively unexpectedly, and as such it can happen without much deliberate effort. However, there are structures that exist which, understood and utilized intentionally, can move one more deliberately along the path toward insight. This sort of intentionality may require considerable effort, especially in more complex situations. The desire to know is a pure, detached, disinterested and unrestricted desire, Lonergan suggests, but it takes on form and is directed toward specific achievements of knowing through heuristic structures.

According to Lonergan, heuristic structures function as methodological frameworks. They operate in relation to the empirical data of sense and the data of consciousness, and they promote the occurrence of insight and knowledge through a deliberative process. Lonergan explains:

Our concern has been the methodical genesis of insight. Scientists achieve understanding, but they do so only at the end of an inquiry. Moreover, their inquiry is methodical, and method consists in ordering means to

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65 Letson, Douglas and Michael Higgins. *The Jesuit Mystique* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1995), 137. The authors report that John English of the Ignatian Center at Guelph, Ontario, “sees the Spiritual Exercises as the absolute bedrock of Jesuit educational philosophy,” and what the Exercises are about is experience reflecting on experience, articulating experience, and interpreting experience and making a decision out of the experience. Being composed of a series of five distinct steps that guides one in the process of reflection, the Exercises constitute basic Jesuit pedagogy. English explains, “The *Ratio Studiorum* [the historic 1599 handbook of Jesuit pedagogy] was just a technique to move people through experience to reflection, to articulating, to interpreting, and to deciding. That’s how I understand the Ignatian pedagogy that’s in the Exercises and which gets transferred into the school system.”


67 Throughout *Insight* Lonergan refers to the “pure, detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know,” or some similar version of this string of terms. *Insight*, 825, and elsewhere.
achieve an end. But how can means be ordered to an end when the end is knowledge and the knowledge is not yet acquired? The answer to this puzzle is the heuristic structure. Name the unknown. Work out its properties. Use the properties to direct, order, guide, the inquiry.  

Heuristic structures, in this way, simply are a means to anticipate insights through methodical investigations. Lonergan takes his initial cues in understanding heuristics from the world of science, and appropriately so, in his view, since science has been particularly clear in articulating the methodological dimensions of inquiry, and has been remarkably successful in achieving results.

Essentially, there are two basic types of heuristic structures to which modern science appeals. The first is the classical. Drawing on examples from the history of science, Lonergan identifies the basic classical process as one that names the unknown (such as the ‘x’ in mathematics), finds similars to be understood similarly, and recognizes similarities as of two kinds—similars in relation to humans and similars in relation to other things. Things can be similar in relation to the human senses, and they can be similar in relation to each other, such as the elements in chemistry’s periodic table. One main objective in science is to grasp the general laws that govern the way things exist and change under certain conditions. Laws have to transcend particularity and achieve a wide generality, and this occurs when the relations of things are not in terms of one’s sense experience, but in terms of understanding “measured relations of things to one another.” On the basis, then, of the relation of things to one another, “there exists an extremely solid foundation for the affirmation that principles and laws are the same for all observers because they lie simply and completely outside the range of observational activities.” For Lonergan, laws of nature are not observed; data are what is observed. Laws are understood and formulated. Classical heuristic structures anticipate laws that explain and govern the existence of things independent of the particularities of time and place; and the formulation of such laws apply general knowledge to particular cases. The intelligibility that is grasped through classical heuristic structures is an abstraction that

68 Insight, 67-8.
69 Ibid., 61-2.
70 Ibid., 65.
71 Ibid.
accounts for the systematic processes occurring within the data empirically grasped for determining laws and regularities of recurrence.\footnote{Ibid., 71. Lonergan defines “systematic process” thus: “that, other things being equal, (1) the whole of a systematic process and its every event posses but a single intelligibility that corresponds to a single insight or single set of unified insights, (2) any situation can be deduced from any other without an explicit consideration of intervening situations, and (3) the empirical investigation of such processes is marked not only by a notable facility in ascertaining and checking abundant and significant data but also by a supreme moment when all data fall into a single perspective, sweeping deductions become possible, and subsequent exact predictions regularly are fulfilled.”}

The second type of heuristic structure is the statistical. Where classical investigations seek laws arising from systematic processes, statistical investigations seek to understand non-systematic processes, and aim to achieve understanding that is expressed in terms of probabilities.\footnote{Ibid., 72-3. A nonsystematic process occurs where there are multiple insights, where non single set of laws holds for the whole process, that the nonsystematic process can be deducible in all its events, and that it exhibits “coincidental aggregates”, in that “(1) the members of the aggregate have some unity based on spatial juxtaposition or temporal succession or both, and (2) there is no corresponding unity on the level of insight and intelligible relation.”} Where the orientation of classical investigations is toward abstraction, the statistical is toward the concrete. The difference, Lonergan explains, in the classical and the statistical may be illustrated in the difference between the study and understanding of a cause of death, and the study and understanding of death rates.\footnote{Ibid., 74} Where spatial, temporal, and other variables enter into classical inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the empirical data that lead to particular laws, in statistical inquiry, the concern with the spatial and temporal pertains to ascertaining frequencies. Lonergan further notes the difference in the mentality of the classical and statistical inquirer. The former finds the greater interest in regularities and patterns of recurrence, where the latter finds divergences from regular frequencies the greater interest.\footnote{Ibid., 75}

While Lonergan provides considerable detail as to the differences between classical and statistical structures, and relates these differences to direct and inverse insight, and to the occurrence of the empirical residue discussed earlier, the point of all this is not to understand the nature of scientific laws and empirical inquiry so much as it is to understand the cognitional processes occurring in the act of insight.\footnote{Ibid., 76} He later will show

\footnote{Ibid., 91. “For our goal is not any scientific object, any universal and necessary truth, any primary propositions. Our goal is the concrete, individual, existing subject that intelligently generates and critically evaluates and progressively revises every scientific object, every incautious statement, every rigorously logical resting place that offers prematurely a home for the restless dynamism of human understanding. Our ambition is to reach neither the known nor the knowable but the knower.”}
how the classical and statistical modes of inquiry are complementary, and how they draw on the same cognitional processes. But prior to that, in a third chapter, Lonergan identifies the canons of empirical method in which are found a unity of method exhibited in all occurrences of scientific and mathematical insight.

To advance his objective, then, of achieving a general account of cognition that identifies and explains cognitional processes in all modes of inquiry, and in seeing the first clues for this in empirical inquiry (largely due to its general acceptance and to its impressive results in science and technology), Lonergan identifies six canons of empirical method. The canon of selection operates as a double pronged process that, in the first place, discards those data that are not a consequence of sensible experience, such as assumptions and deductions not supported by empirical data, and in the second place, directs the inquirer toward those "issues that he can settle by the decisive evidence of observation and experiment."\(^{77}\)

The canon of operations sets forth the principles that guide the inquirer in the further development of insights into the data. Both classical and statistical laws expand cumulatively and indefinitely as human ingenuity seizes upon opportunities to develop technologies and create from nature artifacts for the advancement of human life in various ways. Insights increasingly expand the human ability to analyze not only created physical objects but also the objects developed in the realm of theory. Desired insights are those that are successful and correct, and where such insights are identified, there tends to develop sets of insights that are "tried and true." Insights develop as mistakes and oversights in observation come to light and are corrected or eliminated, and as the activities of empirical observation are refined and intensified. This development is further promoted through the intellectual efforts at systematization, where the laws of science tend to promote the discovery of more laws, and where some new set of laws becomes interrelated with other sets, and then systematized. As greater scopes of systematization develop, as new data are brought to light, as minor revisions give way to more radical theories and understandings, the inquirer achieves a higher, more comprehensive grasp of things, and new sets of insight become more broadly verified and increasingly certain.\(^{78}\)

\(^{77}\) *Ibid.*, 95.

A higher viewpoint emerges and takes hold as a broader and less vulnerable grasp of understanding develops.

The canon of relevance further directs the attention of the inquirer to the observation of things not in relation to human beings but in relation to each other. In the final analysis, the intelligibility sought is not of our experience of things but of things in relation to other things; it is the intelligibility immanent in things themselves. The resulting understanding of sense data yields insights that are formulated in classical and statistical laws that reveal an understanding of things in and of themselves.

The emergence of insights in empirical inquiry also rests on the canon of parsimony, an operation that allows for affirmation only of what is in fact known, and excludes from any knowledge claim that which is unknown or unknowable. The claims of knowledge cannot exceed the scope of the intelligibility immanent in the empirical data, nor can they affirm intelligibility within the data that has not been sufficiently demonstrated. Answers must be pertinent and satisfying to the questions raised.

Further, the objective of empirical science is “the complete explanation of all phenomena or data.” Lonergan explains the canon of complete explanation and the concomitant development of insights in reference to a comparison of Galilean and Einsteinian physics. What was advanced at one time becomes repudiated at a later time as new questions put to the data find the old answers unsatisfactory, or that under an older theoretical framework these new questions cannot be answered. New data, new insights and new theories arise to meet the challenge of new questions. Various understandings in terms of human experience, what Lonergan call “experiential conjugates,” are gradually supplanted by understandings in terms of laws and principles that are “invariant under inertial or, generally, under continuous transformations.” Complete explanation has in view a full account of the experiential, or potentially experiential, world in terms of the principles, theories and laws that govern the physical world in its entirety.

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79 Ibid., 99-102.
80 Ibid., 102.
81 Ibid., 107.
82 Ibid., 107-9.
83 Ibid., 108.
The final canon of empirical method is the canon of statistical residues. Where classical modes of inquiry involve some manner of abstraction, there will always remain empirical data related to particular situations or things that are not accounted for by the abstraction processes of understanding. Laws reveal only the abstract component in concrete relations of things to one another, and the concrete components that are not explained by the abstract laws or principles form the empirical residue. “It is a residue left over after classical method has been applied, and it calls for the implementation of statistical method.”

The difference in classical and statistical method regarding understanding data, generally, is that classical method determines the systematic relations of things to other things, and which can be expressed in laws and principles, while the statistical identifies the nonsystematic relations of things to other things, and are expressed in terms of states and frequencies. The former attends to the general and the abstract while the latter to the totality of data as particular elements within a field of inquiry. The former achieves a certain level of determinancy while the latter identifies ideal frequencies and probability.

Lonergan thus finds in empirical method these two basic modes of cognitive operations, the classical and the statistical, that are brought to bear on the world of human experience. Understood as unfolding under the six canons of empirical method, the two modes produce insights that not only have been demonstrated to be immensely effective in achieving results in their respective fields of inquiry, whether in the natural sciences or the social sciences, but despite their seemingly radical differences in approach to human knowledge and understanding (such as may be evidenced by the differences within the research university, for instance, between the sociology and psychology departments, on the one hand, and the physics and chemistry departments on the other), there remains a similar set of cognitive operations. After all, both types of inquiry occur within the consciousness of the one human species, within a consciousness desiring to know.

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84 Ibid., 111.
85 Lonergan clearly differentiates the classical and statistical, and theoretically it may be helpful to do so. In actual practice of empirical inquiry, however, the two methods, I suspect, may be conflated in various ways and to varying degrees.
86 Lonergan’s appeal to the natural sciences raises, at least for me, certain concerns. These will be address in chapter six where I offer criticism and evaluations of Lonergan’s work. The main objective in this chapter is to understand his intentionality analysis.
Lonergan probes the similarity between the two basic modes of empirical method in next chapter, "The Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations." The account of Lonergan's intentionality analysis takes a significant step forward in his demonstration of the ways in which classical and statistical methods and heuristics operate. Lonergan maintains that in his cognitional theory, while there are endless objects to be known, while there are many radically different fields of inquiry, and while the individuals engaged in empirical inquiry vary infinitely, there is essentially only one "knowing." He means by this that within the knowing process there can be identified a single general pattern of cognitive operations. Lonergan's argument might be along the same lines of generality found, for instance, in an account of the basic invariant structure of human DNA occurring in the almost endless number of possible human beings, and which distinguishes the species from all other forms of life. Similarly, while there are endless possibilities of knowledge, Lonergan maintains there is only one basic operational structure to human knowing. To meet the possible challenge to his cognitional theory that there are radically different, irreconcilable modes of knowing, such as what he distinguishes as knowledge based in classical empirical method and knowledge based in statistical method, Lonergan at least must show the complementarity of these two basic types of empirical knowing. This he does by explaining the complementarity both in the knowing process of human consciousness and in what is known.

First, he argues, a complementarity appears in the operations of knowing found in classical and statistical methods. The heuristics in each anticipate systematic or nonsystematic relations and, while these are very different types of relations, Lonergan maintains, only together can they aim at an account for the entire scope of experiential data. Together, the heuristic structures of classical and statistical methods seek to explain as completely as possible all data in a single set, and both methods engage a similar empirical method where hypotheses are formulated, implications are worked out, and results are tested in terms of observable data. Further to this complementarity, the classical laws help to determine the scope of the statistical laws, and the statistical laws

87 *Insight*, 128.
help to determine classical laws. Moreover, the formulations of classical and statistical inquiry are complementary in that the "classical formulations regard conjugates, which are verified only in events. And statistical formulations regard events, which are defined only by conjugates." Another dimension of this complementarity is found in their modes of abstraction. Classical heuristic procedures abstract from the data an account of their systematic relations, and statistical heuristic procedures abstract from the data a determination of "an ideal frequency from which actual frequencies may diverge but only nonsystematically." Regarding verification, both classical and statistical laws are complementary in that "classical laws determine what would happen if conditions were fulfilled, while statistical laws determine how often one may expect conditions to be fulfilled." Finally, both classical and statistical laws pertain to the explanation of the same set of data. That is to say, "certain aspects of all data receive the classical type of explanation while other aspects of the same data are explained along statistical lines."

In short, there exists a complementarity in the knowing that arises from a systematic understanding of the data typical of classical inquiry and in the knowing that arises from non-systematic understanding typical of statistical inquiry. Only by engaging both classical and statistical methods can one move toward that scientific objective of complete explanation of all intelligible data.

Secondly, Lonergan argues that there also is a classical and statistical complementarity in the known. What are known are objects in the real world, that is to say, the world of being. The knowing is possible on account of the anticipated intelligibility of the objects that are to be known. According to classical and statistical heuristic structures, certain patterns and relations are expected in the data grasped by consciousness, such that the grid, so to speak, for understanding already is present in the mind of the knower, structured in terms of the operations of consciousness, and developed as the inquirer...

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89 *Ibid.* Lonergan offers an example. "Mendel's statistical laws of macroscopic genetic characters led to the postulation of microscopic entities named genes; to each was assigned, on the classical model, a single determinate effect and manifestation; genes with incompatible effects were classified as dominant and recessive; and so statistical combinations of classically conceived genes became the explanation of nonsystematic macroscopic phenomena."

90 *Ibid.*, 131


comes to know the world of experience. There is a "worldview," an anticipated intelligibility of all of being, already at work in which data are grasped by the senses or are present to consciousness by images. It is a worldview that draws upon the manner in which things are known classically and statistically, and which explicitly integrates the notion of schemes of recurrence as the concrete manifestation of intelligible data. Lonergan explains:

On the one hand, the world of our experience is full of continuities, oscillations, rhythms, routines, alterations, circulations, regularities. On the other hand, the scheme of recurrence not only squares with this broad fact but also is related intimately both to classical and to statistical laws. For the notion of the scheme emerges in the very formulation of the canons of empirical method. Abstractly, the scheme itself is a combination of classical laws. Concretely, schemes begin, continue, and cease to function in accord with statistical probabilities.  

To be sure, Lonergan admits that this explanation expresses only very broad generalities. The overarching explanatory framework is intended to encompass all known objects, and thus it cannot be used to explain all the particularities of data that potentially are knowable. But on a very general level, the data of the knowable universe are thought to occur in schemes of recurrence or disappear in terminations or in breakdowns of schemes of recurrence. Greater precision is given to the notion of schemes of recurrence in Lonergan’s explanation of emergent probability.

Emergent probability is Lonergan’s theory of world process, that is, it is a theory of the ways schemes of recurrence unfold in the concrete functioning of things and events in the world of being. The theory of emergent probability recognizes the complementarity of classical and statistical modes of inquiry in that the classical, abstract and universal qualities of the theory provide an understanding of the concrete, particular occurrence of schemes and of their recurrence. Emergent probability provides the explanatory

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94 *Ibid.*, 140-41. Lonergan then provides a helpful illustration of schemes of recurrence. "Just as a chain reaction is a cumulative series of changes terminating in an explosive difference, so a generalized equilibrium is such a combination of defensive circles that any change within a limited range is offset by opposite changes that tend to restore the initial situation. Thus, health in a plant or animal is a general equilibrium; again, the balance of various forms of plant and animal life within an environment is a generalized equilibrium; again economic process was conceived by the older economists as a generalized equilibrium."

95 *Ibid.*, 139.
framework for the immanent intelligibility of the experienced universe, the universe of data potentially to be known by human inquiry. Lonergan elaborates:

Intelligent inquiry aims at insight. But classical laws alone offer no insight into numbers, distributions, concentrations, time intervals, selectivity, uncertain stability, or development. On the contrary, they abstract from the instance, the place, the time, and the concrete conditions of actual functioning. Again, statistical laws, as a mere aggregate, affirm in various cases the ideal frequency of the occurrence of events. They make no pretense of explaining why there are so many kinds of events, or why each kind has the frequency attributed to it. To reach explanation on this level, it is necessary to effect the concrete synthesis of classical laws into a conditioned series of schemes of recurrence, to establish that such schemes, as combinations of events, acquire first a probability of emergence and then a probability of survival through the realization of the conditioned series, and finally to grasp that, if such a series of schemes is being realized in accord with probabilities, then there is available a general principle that promises answers to questions about the reason for numbers and distributions, concentrations and time intervals, selectivity and uncertain stability, development and breakdowns. To work out the answers pertains to the natural sciences. To grasp that emergent probability is an explanatory idea is to know what is meant when our objective was characterized as a generic, relatively invariant, and incomplete account of the immanent intelligibility, the order, the design of the universe of our experience.  

The terms of emergent probability provide the broad explanatory framework for knowing all data, and depict the complementarity of intelligibility of the data known classically and the intelligibility of the data known statistically. Order and design found in things and events are understood in terms of emergent probability and exhibit certain properties that, given the wide generality of the theory, are relatively invariant. As such, then, the theory takes on the character of a worldview. In effect, emergent probability constitutes a worldview that reflects the cognitive processes of human understanding and the nature of intelligibility immanent and graspable in the world of being. While the patterns of intelligibility addressed thus far concern classical and statistical methods, later

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96 Ibid., 147-48. At this point in his intentionality analysis, Lonergan focuses on the natural sciences because they supply, for him, as noted earlier, the clearest examples of the differentiated levels and operations of human consciousness. Later, emergent probability will be applied to other realms of human knowing.
on in *Insight*, Lonergan identifies and elucidates other methods of understanding that factor into the worldview of emergent probability.

Besides the classical and statistical methods, then, there is genetic method where an "intelligibly related sequence of systems"97 is anticipated. Also, dialectical method may be applied in grasping the knowable where "the relations between successive stages of [a] changing system," it is anticipated, "will not be directly intelligible."98 Lonergan goes on to claim that, "taken together, the four methods are relevant to any field of data; they do not dictate what the data must be; they are able to cope with data no matter what they may prove to be."99 Lonergan leaves these questions of genetic and dialectical methods for a later time as they do not fall strictly within the purview of empirical inquiry, but pertain to an understanding of life in general and human life in particular. I will consider them, especially genetic method, in due course. But at this point it is important to note that the various operations of human consciousness differentiated by Lonergan at a basic level of generality direct one's mode of inquiry in distinct but interrelated ways, and includes within its scope the intelligibility, and possible intelligibility, of the entirety of being. In chapter four of *Insight*, then, one sees the complementarity of the classical and statistical methods of empirical inquiry mapped out in terms of both the knowing process and what is known, and this complementarity anticipates a subsequent treatment of genetic and dialectical method to fill out Lonergan's account of human intentionality.

In the fifth chapter Lonergan deals with an understanding of space and time. Where chapters one through four concern themselves with the empirical method of the natural sciences, the scope of the discussion is broadened out here with the introduction of the questions of space and time—largely the purview of physics—that Lonergan sees as conjoining the insights of the natural sciences with those of the world of common sense. The world of the natural sciences finds in physics a practical application in the inventions, improvements and mastery of technology, with its effects on the practical lives of human beings.

Lonergan defines space and time as the "ordered totalities of concrete extensions and concrete durations."\(^{100}\) Such concrete extensions and durations are grasped both in terms of an individual's experience of them and in terms of the principles of science that grasp the immanent intelligibility of space and time. Without exploring the complexities of his discussion of frames of reference; of how frames of reference are transformed; the rise of geometric theory; and setting aside (in the interest of Lonergan's larger question of the nature of insight) his discussion of Newtonian physics, Minkowskian space theory and relativity principles of Einstein; it may be sufficient to note that, according to Lonergan, the concrete intelligibility of space and time arises through the classical insights that grasp the general and abstract, as well as through the statistical insights that grasp the laws governing the occurrence of the concrete and particular. As with the natural sciences, the intelligibility of space and time may be understood in terms of the theory of emergent probability that accounts for the likelihood of occurrence of events in space according to certain theories and laws of science, and according to the probability of things actually occurring that exhibit those theories and laws. Lonergan explains:

The concrete intelligibility of Space is that it grounds the possibility of those simultaneous multiplicities named situations. The concrete intelligibility of Time is that it grounds the possibility of successive realizations in accord with probabilities. In other words, concrete extensions and concrete durations are the field or matter or potency in which emergent probability is the immanent or form of intelligibility.\(^{101}\)

A key point in all of this is to show that the complementarity of classical and statistical modes of inquiry is essential to a satisfactory account of space and time, and that the insights which occur within the field of physics span both the relatively certain and verifiable understanding of the natural sciences and an understanding of things in particular places and times and for practical purposes. In other words, there occurs an enmeshment of the scientific world and the largely non-theoretical world of common sense. For instance, weather forecasting draws on laws pertaining to pressure and temperature, and a host of other laws pertaining to the physical properties, and also draws

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 194.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 195.
on averages in temperature and other phenomena, and possible deviations from averages, in suggesting what to expect of tomorrow's weather. Perhaps other fields of inquiry might also be illustrative of this fusion of modes of understanding, such as economics that draws on statistical theories and principles of monetary exchange but requires an application in the non-theoretical, practical world of finance and commerce. For their clarity and precision, however, Lonergan prefers the illustrations arising from natural sciences.

By the end of chapter five, then, Lonergan completes his illustrations from the natural sciences of the elements and operations of direct insight. (Later on, Lonergan will have much more to say on further features of human intentionality and how those elements interrelate.) With the different operations of scientific insight identified, and their operations and interdependence generally stated, Lonergan now moves on to show how in the world of common sense these elements and operations function in generally the same way. Although the world of common sense offers a more familiar terrain than the specialized precision of the scientific, for his purposes, common sense lacks in clarity and universal validity, both of which Lonergan required for his analysis. Before dealing with the more complex world of human intentionality found within the world of common sense, Lonergan aimed to set forth the basic differentiations of human cognition, and scientific method that for him provided the clearest illustrations. Prior to addressing that more complex world of common sense, it may be helpful to skip ahead to a more complete presentation of his intentionality analysis, and then from this base, attempt to understand the complex world of common sense, at least as Lonergan presents it.

In a pivotal essay included in a festschrift volume published for his sixtieth birthday in 1964, Lonergan provides an overview of his intentionality analysis in terms of cognitional theory.102 The essay is a six-fold affirmation of his position in *Insight* that attempts to provide additional clarity to the basic position of his entire philosophical edifice. First, Lonergan affirms that cognitional structure is dynamic. It is a structure inasmuch as it is a highly organized whole whose parts exist by virtue of their functional relations to other parts, and the functionality results in a unity not achievable without

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each part. Not only do the parts, as activities, function in this dynamic way, the whole structure has a functionality that is self-assembling and self-constituting.  

Secondly, Lonergan affirms that human knowing is precisely such a dynamic structure. The parts, so to speak, of human knowing are the irreducible activities of “seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging.” The activities of sense perception alone do not constitute knowing, nor do the activities of understanding one’s experience. And while judging concludes in an increment of knowledge, it cannot occur properly without an appeal to sense experience and to the understanding that appeals to experience. Human knowing is a whole whose parts must include the operations of experiencing and understanding and judging. Human knowing, as a dynamic structure, is also self-assembling and self-constituting in that it “puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached.” This occurs consciously, intelligently and rationally inasmuch as one experiences, understands and judges.

Thirdly, Lonergan distinguishes between consciousness and self-knowledge. Consciousness is simply the experience of knowing, that is, the experience of experiencing, of understanding and of judging. Self-knowledge, on the other hand, is a much more demanding achievement where the dynamic structure is applied to itself, namely, (1) experiencing experience, understanding and judging, (2) understanding one’s experience of experience understanding and judging, and (3) judging one’s understanding of experience, understanding, and judging to be correct.

While consciousness happens

103 Collection, 205-6.
104 Ibid., 206.
105 Ibid., 207.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., 208. While this all may sound rather obscure and perhaps obtuse, it is an articulation that undergirds much of Lonergan’s work. For instance, his Method in Theology begins with an even more elaborate version: “Thus, if for brevity’s sake we denote the various operations on the four levels [but this time Lonergan has thematized more fully the fourth level of consciousness, decision, beyond the three that aim at knowledge] by the principal occurrence on that level, we may speak of the operations as experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. These operations are both conscious and intentional. But what is conscious can be intended. To apply the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious is a fourfold matter of (1) experiencing one’s experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) understanding the unity and relations of one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and (4) deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.” (Method in Theology, 14-5.)
because we are human beings, self-knowledge is achieved because we are intentionally seeking self-knowledge, and are seeking it in an attentive, intelligent and reflective way.

Fourthly, Lonergan affirms that knowing occurs in the ordered and productive performance of these activities, and results in the knowledge of being and reality, these two terms being essentially identical for Lonergan. Further, the result is “objective” knowledge, this meaning a grasp of “the intrinsic relation of knowing to being ...” Lonergan goes on to explain this epistemological theorem.

The intrinsic objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intentionality. Nor need this intentionality be inferred, for it is the dominant content of the dynamic structure that assembles and unites several activities into a single knowing of a single object. Human intelligence actively greets every content of experience with the perplexity, the wonder, the drive, the intention, that may be thematized by (but does not consist in) such questions as, What is it? Why is it so? Inquiry through insight issues forth in thought that, when scrutinized, becomes formulated in definitions, postulates, suppositions, hypotheses, theories. Thought in turn is actively greeted by human rationality with a reflective exigence that, when thematized, is expressed in such questions as, Is that so? Are you certain? All marshaling and weighing of evidence, all judging and doubting, are efforts to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. Accordingly, the dynamic structure of human knowing intends being. That intention is unrestricted, for there is nothing that we cannot at least question. The same intention is comprehensive, for questioning probes every aspect of everything; its ultimate goal is the universe in its full concreteness. Being in that sense is identical with reality: as apart from being there is nothing, so apart from reality there is nothing; as being embraces the concrete totality of everything, so too does reality.

Fifthly, Lonergan argues for his position not only positively but also negatively, averring and illustrating that other positions that do not sufficiently make the differentiations he advances result in confusions on the questions of objectivity, reality, and being. The positions of naïve realism and idealism are contrasted by Lonergan’s critical realism.  

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108 “Cognitional Structure,” 211.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid., 302. This appears to be the central paragraph of the section that the editors of the Collected Works call “a splendid epitome of the position Lonergan had developed over the years.”  
111 Ibid., 214-9.
And sixthly, in the essay Lonergan identifies and expands, perhaps all too briefly, on the interrelation of knowing and living. Beyond the empirical, intellectual and rational consciousness that together aim at objectivity, there is rational self-consciousness that aims at understanding and affirming oneself, embraces human intersubjectivity, and takes into account all of human living.\textsuperscript{112} The “move beyond” is a shift from a concern with knowing being to a concern with realizing the good. Lonergan explains, “Now there emerge freedom and responsibility, encounter and trust, communication and belief, choice and promise and fidelity.”\textsuperscript{113} The three-fold levels of cognitional structure expand out on a fourth level of consciousness where the existential subject makes its way in the world, finds out who it truly is, becomes self-revelatory, and encounters other human subjects on the same question of self constitution, freedom, and genuine humanness.\textsuperscript{114} Lonergan explains that the objectivity resulting from truly affirming being and reality is not repudiated by the subjectivity of rational self-consciousness. Rather, objectivity is the result of authentic subjectivity, and directs and informs the existential level of freedom and choice. In such a way, then, the dynamic structure of objective knowing is intimately tied to the “larger dynamic structure that is human living.”\textsuperscript{115} If one can truly know, then one can make decisions and more freely take charge of one’s own life based on a reasonable understanding of things, of situations, of oneself.

By the end of chapter five, then, Lonergan has presented the basic outline of his intentionality analysis expressed in cognitional theory. Simply put, for the knowing person, there are three distinct but related level of operations: the level of experience that provides the data through sensory input and images; the level of understanding that provides possibility of meaning by ordering and interrelating the data of sense and of consciousness, by identifying terms, defining, abstracting and accounting for things in relation to oneself and to other things; and the level of judging, this being actual objective knowledge, on which is grasped the intrinsic relation of knowing and being. And, as Lonergan points out in his later article that summarizes his theory of cognitional structure, there is a fourth level of consciousness added to the three levels yielding

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 219.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 219-20.
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 221.
\end{itemize}
knowledge. While it is in his work on theological method that the level of decision becomes more fully developed and integrated within a methodology, even at this earlier stage of Lonergan's work, deciding as a distinct operation of consciousness is present. More than in the empirical sciences, this further differentiation emerges more dramatically in the realm of practical living where one draws on insight in deciding what to do about what one experiences, understands and judges. And Lonergan has much to say about practical, commonsense living.

**Practical Living**

With the cognitional structure and dynamism of human intentionality explained, Lonergan turns his attention to an account of how it functions in the practical world where one makes a living and seeks to enter effectively into one's community. Human intelligence, as a crucially important facet of intentionality, is manifested not only in the disciplines of mathematics and science but also in the modes of life and myriad deportments that form social life and human cultures. The norms, functions and achievements of social communities and cultures are constituted largely by what Lonergan calls common sense. Grasped readily in its contrast to the aims of scientific knowledge, common sense does not aspire to universally valid knowledge, but is content with mastery of particular and concrete situations. Common sense, Lonergan explains, has little use for the technical language found in the sciences and tends to steer away from specialized modes of speech, being satisfied rather to engage common parlance and word meanings. Further, common sense is not inclined toward theory and the theoretical, but is intimately connected to the actual events and concerns of practical, daily living, and seeks solutions to problems that solve immediate needs. "Indeed, the supreme canon of common sense," Lonergan maintains, "is the restriction of further questions to the realm of the concrete and particular, the immediate and practical. To advance in common sense is to restrain the omnivorous drive of intelligence and to brush aside as irrelevant, if not

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116 *Insight*, 200.  
silly, any question whose answer would not make an immediate palpable difference.\textsuperscript{118} While insights in the sciences entertain and thrive on unrestricted questioning, common sense insights limit questioning, and thus limit the scope of knowledge to the concrete, actual, practical.

Common sense does not have the precision and universality found in the language of the sciences but, similar to the sciences, the insights of common sense arise from understanding the data of human experience, including both personal experience and experience arising from the collective collaboration of the group. The imprecision and generalities of common sense language are sufficient so long as the ends of successful problem solving and daily living are achieved.\textsuperscript{119} Further, the judgments of common sense, as acts of reflective understanding, are insights\textsuperscript{120} that arise within the context of a particular cultural horizon or social milieu. Such judgments tend to accumulate and form within a particular group a fund of accepted conclusions that become the standards of the community. These standards change and grow as new insights are proposed. New insights then become added to the common body of knowledge in the collaborative effort to rise to new challenges of living, and to find more effective and efficient ways of doing things. Where the judgments of science strive to identify, understand and answer satisfactorily all relevant questions, and thus achieve a sound judgment, the judgments of common sense also strive to identify, understand and answer satisfactorily all relevant questions. A key difference between science and common sense, however, is what counts as a relevant question in science and what counts as relevant in the world of common sense.\textsuperscript{121} As Lonergan further explains,

\begin{quote}
It is this fundamental difference in the criterion of the relevance of further questions that marks the great divide between a scientific attitude and a commonsense attitude. Because he aims at ultimate explanation, the scientist has to keep asking why until ultimate explanation is reached. Because the layman aims at knowing things as related to us, as entering into the domain of human concerns, his questioning ceases as soon as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 201.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 202.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 304.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 318-24.
further inquiry would lead to no immediate appreciable difference in the
daily life of man."\(^{122}\)

The judgments of science aim at a universal validity where knowledge of how to produce and detonate plastic explosives, I suggest for instance, applies in the Middle East as much as it does in the United States. In contrast, how particular suicide bombers are viewed in society differ greatly from one culture to another. The point Lonergan strives to make is that, while the fields of inquiry differ greatly (in science inquiry concerns things as they are related to one another, and in common sense it concerns things as related to us), there is operative the same general dynamic cognitional structure. Although what human beings attend to and understand and judge vary widely, the attending, the understanding and the judging in science and common sense, as operations of intentionality, exhibit the same basic cognitional processes. In both there is at work a consciousness that can be called "human," and that work is a three-fold functioning of the knowing process leading to a fourth level concerning the operations of deciding.

Where the scientist is more interested in understanding how things are and operate as objects, as things-to-other-things, and not concerned so much about how those things relate to a particular individual, by contrast, a person operating primarily in the world of common sense is more interested in how things relate to the individual human subject. This commonsense concern, Lonergan explains, centers on things in relation to an individual or to a group of individuals. In the world of common sense, besides an interest in the thing to be understood, there is also the person to be understood.\(^{123}\) Understanding of the thing-to-me relationship changes as the individual differs one from to another, and differs over time. This type of understanding grasps patterns of experience in terms of the subjective field of common sense.

It should be noted that, for Lonergan, common sense pertains to that enormously broad world of human meaning that is distinguished by its primary concern with the practical world, with the making of one's way in the world, with making sense of things in relation to one's immediate needs and interests. In summarizing Lonergan's notion of common sense, Mark and Elizabeth Morelli explain, "By 'common sense' he means especially the

\(^{122}\) Ibid., 320-1.
\(^{123}\) Ibid., 204-5.
ordinary, spontaneous mode of intellectual inquiry and development, rather than the stock of ideas and practices generated, maintained, and occasionally transformed by that activity. While Lonergan contrasts scientific knowing and common sense, within a realm of inquiry, both can contribute to the mastery of the field of study or interest. As Lonergan scholar Terry Tekippe suggests,

Both common sense and science are fully human projects. Despite their difference in orientation, they share a common quest in insight. Abstruse scientists will always need persons of common sense to serve their practical needs. And science ... often returns ... with applications that turn out to be, after all, eminently practical.

Common sense arises through the efforts of making practical sense of that large and complex realm of human experience. Lonergan explains this effort as involving a patterning of our experience in various ways. Patterns of experience are the sensations and images that arise and become ordered according to one’s interests, attention, or purposes as one encounters the world. Those sensations and images then acquire a place within one’s stream of consciousness. It is a stream that involves a temporal succession of experiential elements as well as some direction or purpose or intention. While not all experiences are patterns of experience, for there also exist “unconscious patterns of neural process,” Lonergan distinguishes four basic types of experiential patterns that order the elements of experience in various ways.

First, the biological pattern is understood as intelligible relations that link together “sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, bodily movements” that serve mainly the functions of “intussusception” or reproduction or self-preservation. “Extroversion” is a basic characteristic of the biological pattern of experience where the body and its physical capabilities are oriented toward the external conditions and opportunities of the organism.

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126 Insight, 204.
127 Ibid., 206. “Intussusception” refers to the process of digestion, particularly the flow of material through the intestines.
Secondly, the aesthetic pattern of experience finds an order to experiences beyond the purposes of healthy biological function, where joy, pleasure, play, and the exhilaration of beauty are sought. A person engaging the world of art and creative expression normally exhibits an aesthetic pattern of experience.\textsuperscript{128} “The artist establishes his insights, not by proof or verification, but skillfully embodying them in colors and shapes, in sounds and movements, in the unfolding situations and actions of fiction.”\textsuperscript{129} Art makes use of symbolic expression where expression cannot be grasped simply by intellectual formulation and appraisal. Aesthetic patterns propel one out of biological experience, and beyond oneself, and they allow one to flourish in a larger range of human freedom.

Thirdly, the creativity and freedom found in aesthetics, Lonergan believes, can become the tools for the spirit of inquiry in the intellectual pattern of experience. What develops in the intellectual pattern of experience (such as is evident in the work of the scientist engaging empirical method) is the explanation of things, the solutions to problems, the understanding of situations, and the achievement of good judgment. Insights of this type are subject to great variation in frequency, intensity, duration and purity, and are “dependent upon native aptitude, upon training, upon age and development, upon external circumstances, upon chance that confronts one with problems and that supplies at least the intermittent opportunity to work towards their solution.”\textsuperscript{130} The intellectual pattern operates on the elements of experience by quickly and effectively differentiating and interrelating those elements into a hermeneutical structure that should achieve meaning and intellectual satisfaction.

And fourthly, there is the dramatic pattern of experience that pertains to the actual activity of getting things done in the course of ordinary living. This pattern organizes and structures the motives and purposes of human decisions and actions in the art of living one’s own life. The dramatic pattern manages the welter of the experiences of consciousness presented by biological, aesthetic and intellectual operations and achievements, and draws upon the educational and learning processes that contribute to the constitution of the individual. Lonergan characterizes it this way:

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 207-08.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 208. For an explanation of the nature of insight in musical composition, Lonergan refers to the work of Susan Langer, \textit{Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key} (New York: Scribner’s, 1953).
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 209.
The characters in this drama of living are molded by the drama itself. As other insights emerge and accumulate, so too do the insights that govern the imaginative projects of dramatic living. As other insights are corrected through the trial and error that give rise to further questions and yield still further complementary insights, so too does each individual discover and develop the possible roles he might play, and under the pressure of artistic and affective criteria, work out his own selection and adaptation. Out of the plasticity and exuberance of childhood through the discipline and the play of education there gradually is formed the character of the man. It is a process in which rational consciousness with its reflection and criticism, its deliberation and choice, exerts a decisive influence. Still, there is no deliberation or choice about becoming stamped with some character; there is no deliberation about the fact that our past behavior determines our present habitual attitudes; nor is there any appreciable effect from our present good resolutions upon our future spontaneity. Before there can be reflection or criticism, evaluation or deliberation, our imaginations and intelligence must collaborate in representing the projected course of action that is to be submitted to reflection and criticism, to evaluation and decision. Already in the prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence, the dramatic pattern is operative, outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity. Ordinary living is not ordinary drama. It is not learning a role and developing in oneself the feelings appropriate to its performance. It is not the prior task of assembling materials and through insight imposing upon them an artistic pattern. For in ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the pattern, nor first the role and then the feelings. On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned, and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively.\textsuperscript{131}

While the matter of deliberation and choice, what Lonergan later regards as the distinct fourth level of conscious intentionality, does not receive a fuller treatment until after \textit{Insight}, in the dramatic pattern explained here, the fourth, existential operations of intentionality clearly comes to the fore. Not only does Lonergan discuss the interplay of the dramatic pattern as it anticipates insights and unfolds in artful human living, but Lonergan touches upon the crucially important factors of feelings and affectivity that are intertwined in our knowing and doing. While rational self-consciousness is an achievement of the dramatic subject, it is not without its limitations and pitfalls. Often the

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, 211-12.
dramatic subject fails in judgment and deliberation, a failure Lonergan explains in terms of bias.

Before turning to his account of bias, it should be noted that, while Lonergan has identified four basic patterns of experience, this should not be regarded as a full and complete account. Other qualities or types of patterns can be distinguished, such as the "artistic" pattern, which Lonergan mentions later on.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 232. This could be another term for the aesthetic pattern of experience that the artist in part engages in the production of works of art. One could perhaps identify, as another instance, a religious pattern of experience.} My purpose here is not a comprehensive account of all the possible patterns based on Lonergan's analysis, but to indicate generally that patterns naturally tend to arise for different general types of experience, and that these patterns are expressed in terms of basic human intentionality. Conscious experience presents the data—the sensations and images—that provoke attention and wonder, and then insights, both direct and reflective, emerge within the various patterns in which human beings operate.

**Insights and Their Limitations: the Question of Judgment**

Previously, Lonergan's examples of science were used because of their clarity and precision to uncover the basic structure of cognition in the knowing process. This structure later is used as a framework for understanding cognition as it operates in the world of ordinary living. It is in the world of common sense knowledge, because of its lack of precision and relative vulnerability to charges of incompleteness, partiality, oversights, and so forth, that Lonergan finds abundant examples of failures in judgments. Such failures are due to bias of which Lonergan distinguishes three basic types. This is not to suggest that scientists are less susceptible to bias than other knowers. Rather, scientists perhaps are more likely to have biases exposed through the rigor of analyses and scrutiny to which their work more commonly is subjected.

First, there is individual bias. The effective and common functioning of a human being allows for and promotes the spontaneity of experiences, the free unfolding of human intelligence in inquiry and understanding, and ideally this leads to the unhindered process of reflection that engages thorough assessment and sound judgment. Such optimal and
ideal functioning often can be impaired or blocked in various ways. Within the individual there is a tension—what Lonergan calls a dialectic—between an altruism that seeks the good in intersubjective relations and an egoism that concerns solely the interests of the individual who fails to take into account the experiential spontaneity and intelligence that occurs intersubjectively. The problem with egoism is not the attention given to self-development, but the discounting of the intersubjective qualities of that development. The egoist may operate intelligently in solving various problems one encounters, but such an individual likely fails to consider the further questions arising from the broader experiences of social life. Egoism results in an incomplete development of intelligence and ultimately suffers the "exclusion of correct understanding." There is a deliberate refusal to entertain further questions that might upset what the egoist regards as thoroughly intelligent and reasoned solutions and assessments. Further questions are ignored or rejected because there is a self-sufficiency and satisfaction that meet immediate or self-centered needs. For Lonergan, the raising of further questions is the qualitative difference between a person on the quest of knowledge and wise living and the egoist operating with individual bias, devising reasons for discounting further questions.

There exists also group bias that, like individual bias, interferes with, among other things, the development of practical common sense. Where individual bias, in varying degrees, tends to discount the intersubjective dimensions of knowing and wise living, group bias in fact is buttressed by intersubjective viewpoints. The groups of which Lonergan speaks are social collectives that are defined by "the pattern of relations of a social order, and they are constituted by the realization of those dynamic relations." The bias, or blind spot, evident in a social order involves an outright rejection of the "insights that reveal its well-being to be excessive or its usefulness at an end." In general terms, Lonergan explains how group bias can lead to tensions and conflict among competing groups in a society, and how defensive and offensive mechanisms emerge within the social dynamic. Ideas that challenge the dominant group are suppressed, and

133 *Insight*, 244-45.
the corrective insights needed for group development in the interest of all members are in some way discounted.\textsuperscript{137} Again, the bias results in a blockage of the free development of intelligence and reasonableness by limiting the field of questions and, as a result, such bias precludes the needed solutions.

If individual bias and group bias leading to shorter cycles of social regress, to retarded or partial developments, are difficult to identify and overturn, general bias operative in longer social cycles is that much more difficult to identify, resist or overturn. General bias is explained in terms of the process of history and the functioning, or the lack of functioning, of emergent probability as “the cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probability.”\textsuperscript{138} To recall, schemes of recurrence are patterns and relations between data that tend to recur in accord with classical and statistical laws, where the earlier occurrence sets that stage for subsequence recurrences. In human history, human beings grasp the insights where possible schemes of recurrence are anticipated; they then set about to create the material and social conditions that make these possible schemes of recurrence actual. In this manner, humans transform their environment and create their own history. Human beings are charged with the directing of human history, but the tools of common sense, because they are not calibrated to the dimensions of human history, are not usually up to the challenge. Common sense does not consider the depth and scope of history, but is content with directing the affairs of particular groups at particular times. Simply put, “common sense is unequal to the task of thinking on the level of history.”\textsuperscript{139} The specific challenge of history is for humans “progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.”\textsuperscript{140} Common sense is able partially to meet this challenge, but it needs the insights of science and philosophy and other specializations of human intelligence. Common sense, however, more concerned with the immediate and practical, does not easily embrace these seemingly extraneous insights. Given the concrete and immediate focus of common sense, successive higher viewpoints are not readily embraced.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 248-50. This section encapsulates Lonergan’s social theory of power, development decline and disintegration.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 252.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 253.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
Where historical process, one way or another, resists the successive higher viewpoint, a process comes into play that builds on this general resistance. Viewpoints emerge that are less comprehensive than what existed earlier; the scope of human understanding narrows. In the course of such a cycle, less comprehensive viewpoints are increasingly embraced; common sense more and more disregards timely and fruitful ideas; the conditions needed for future development that are dependent upon those fruitful ideas are not allowed to emerge and subsequent stages of growth are never realized. The result is an increasing inability to provide social correctives and to set the stage for future development. Lonergan identifies three basic consequences of this longer cycle of decline due to general bias. The social situation deteriorates cumulatively. There is a mounting irrelevance of detached and disinterested intelligence. And finally, the detached and disinterested intelligence is surrendered.

If insights have limitations due to bias, especially those in the realm of commonsense, then questions of the adequacy, the accuracy, the correctness of insights emerge as exceedingly important considerations in the knowing process. Subjecting insights to this line of questioning, for Lonergan, is a matter of judgment. In developing this point, Lonergan distinguishes two basic types of insights. One type arises when propositions are merely found interesting, considered and regarded as possibilities of meaning; another type results when propositions are affirmed or denied. The former type is an expression primarily of an act of understanding, while the latter primarily is an act of judgment. The former answers questions for intelligence, the latter answers questions for reflection. The former deals with explanation and the latter with answering yes or no, or some qualification of yes or no. In Lonergan’s cognitional theory and epistemology, understanding unfolds on one level of consciousness; judgment unfolds on another, higher, that is to say, more comprehensive level, that presupposes lower, previous levels. While understanding moves one toward some increment of knowledge, it is in the act of judgment that knowledge actually is attained. In the act of judgment, that is, when a judgment is made, for Lonergan, the insights produced by human intelligence have been

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141 Ibid., 254.
142 Ibid., 254-55.
143 Ibid., 296.
144 Ibid., 298.
raised to the level of reflection, and some understanding of the data of human experience
is affirmed to be accurate or complete. At this point one can say, with qualifications, one
'knows.'

Judgments, also called by Lonergan "acts of reflective understanding," result from
the process of inquiry where, in addition to the attention given to the data that are
presented in one's consciousness, and building on acts of understanding where various
possibilities of meaning or explanation have been grasped, there arises a penetrating
encounter with the question, Is it so? The reflective grasp of understanding determines
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a prospective judgment. That is to say, "to
grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to grasp the prospective
judgment as virtually unconditioned." In Lonergan's analysis, a judgment that is
virtually unconditioned, 1) has certain conditions in that the judgment, "stands in need of
evidence sufficient for a reasonable pronouncement," 2) has those conditions known by
the knower and, 3) realizes that those conditions are fulfilled. Reflective understanding
actually occurs when the conditions are understood and when the fulfillment of those
conditions has been achieved. In reflective understanding, the understanding of the
data, and of the possibilities of meaning given to those data, are raised to a new level of
understanding by the reflective move that grasps what would constitute a satisfactory
affirmation of what otherwise is merely possible understanding. In the act of judgment,
possible knowledge is affirmed as actual knowledge.

Grasping the virtually unconditioned occurs in different degrees of thoroughness that
produces judgments of varying degrees of soundness, certitude, or reliability. For
instance, Lonergan, I have noted, has distinguished two very broadly conceived realms of
knowledge—that of science and mathematics, and that of common sense—and
accordingly there are two types of judgments. In science and mathematics, the questions
for understanding and judgment are in terms of things as they are related to one another,
and in common sense the questions for understanding and judgment are related to things
in relation to the knower. Of course, in mathematical and scientific knowing, there exists
a relation between the knower and the known, but the chief objective is knowledge that is

\[145\] ibid., 304.
\[146\] ibid., 305.
\[147\] ibid.
not limited to the status of some particular knower. For example, in science and mathematics the intention in understanding the definition of a circle is to understand “circle-ness”, while in the world of common sense, the intention in understanding the definition of a circle is to create and use circular things for practical purposes. Specific questions relevant to scientific inquiry are very different questions from those arising in the realm of common sense; what is proper and accepted as a legitimate further question in science is not a legitimate question in common sense, and vice versa. The criteria of what is relevant and accepted is vastly different in these two widely variant realms of knowledge, and the resulting quality of knowledge is different, mainly in terms of exactness, precision, generalizability and mode of discourse.

While scientific judgments and judgments of common sense differ in quality, both must contend to some degree with bias—individual, group or general. Grasping the virtually unconditioned is fraught with obstacles, false starts and failure, and overcoming bias is a challenge on an ascending scale of difficulty, from individual to general. What one is often left with in judgment, then, amounts to something less than the virtually unconditioned. Lonergan explains that our judgments, often at best, are in degrees of probability. Between the extremes of affirming or denying absolutely when the virtually unconditioned is grasped completely, or when there is no preponderance of evidence for affirmation or denial and ignorance declared, one may settle upon a “series of intermediate positions” of probable judgments. In probable judgments, one increasingly converges upon the full or definitive truth, especially so in science where it, more than common sense, is strongly committed and dependent upon the cumulative and incremental development of knowledge.

Striving toward knowledge “tends toward a limit” as it seeks increasing accuracy, and new and improved theories to replace the older and less adequate ones. The knowing process unfolds as an increasing, incremental satisfaction of the drive to know, and operates through what Lonergan call the “self-correcting process of learning.” The limit of which Lonergan speaks is double-edged, for there is a lower-end limit in the field of

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148 Perhaps Lonergan’s contrast between scientific knowing and common sense knowing in reference to human subjectivity is too sharp, as will be noted in the concluding chapter.
149 *Insight*, 320-1.
presentations and there is the upper-end limit in the structure of the human mind.\textsuperscript{152} That is to say, one is restricted to what one knows by the possible data open to the human inquirer, and restricted also by operations of human consciousness brought to bear upon those data. But one’s openness to the widest scope of data, and one’s optimal performance of the structured operations of human consciousness move one effectively to meet those limits over time and in community. It should be noted that grasping the virtually unconditioned, according to Lonergan, does not depend upon an anticipated “end” to knowledge; it depends upon being open to further questions, to welcoming and addressing those questions as they arise, and then discerning, as the relevant questions become less and less, that the “limit” of inquiry has been reached, and a final judgment can then be made.

Lonergan maintains that, with the act of judgment, a single increment of knowledge emerges. Failing to grasp fully the virtually unconditioned, a judgment is posited as probable, perhaps even highly probable, and while it is open to revision, in that the self-correcting process of learning takes effect, the probable judgment tends to move a field of knowledge toward a fuller, broader and more satisfactory understanding of the data of sense and the data of consciousness. Judgment may be thought of as a higher-level understanding for it requires understanding not of things directly, but understanding of the conditions, that is, understanding questions that need answering in order to make an affirmation.

For Lonergan, then, this is what constitutes human knowledge, both direct insight and reflective insight, and it expresses key elements in his intentionality analysis. In these early chapters of \textit{Insight} there is mapped out in considerable detail the structure and general operations of human understanding leading to knowledge. In highly abbreviated form, I have presented these “activities of knowing”\textsuperscript{153} to which so much of his intellectual energies and writing have been devoted. The remainder of \textit{Insight} expands the cognitional theory and epistemology into a metaphysics and ethics where Lonergan considers that which can be affirmed based on this understanding of human

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, 328-9.

\textsuperscript{153} Lonergan calls the first half of the book, “Insight as Activity.” This leads to the second half, “Insight as Knowledge,” which largely constitutes his metaphysics, in that he defines metaphysics as the answer to the question of “what is known when that [the activities of the knowing process] are done.” See my earlier reference in footnote 22.
consciousness. Aspects of Lonergan’s metaphysics and ethics will be considered later as the main thrust of chapter five as I expand his intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy. What I have presented so far in this chapter is his basic position on the structure and operations of insight. This forms the hub, so to speak, of Lonergan’s entire philosophy, and informs his positions taken on so many other topics, including education. My presentation of Lonergan’s work in this chapter also forms the theoretical and methodological basis for what follows in this study.

While this philosophical nucleus remains intact throughout Lonergan’s work over time, there have been some significant developments. I will now move on to explore briefly how his intentionality analysis has been elucidated and developed further in his subsequent writings.

### Intentionality Analysis in the Later Lonergan Corpus

Following the publication of *Insight*, Lonergan received considerable attention in the Catholic philosophical world. In the summer of 1958, he delivered a series of lectures on *Insight*, published just the year before. Circumstances surrounding these talks at St. Mary’s University, Halifax, are recounted by Frederick Crowe in the “Editorial Preface” of the *Collected Works* edition of the published version, and include an explanation of the textual correspondence between these published lectures and what is found in *Insight*.

The editors, Elizabeth and Mark Morelli, gave their volume the title, *Understanding and Being*, explaining in their “Introduction” that chapters 1—5 correspond to the first part of *Insight* (hence, *Understanding*) and chapters 6—10 correspond to the second part which treats of metaphysics and its extension into other areas (hence, *Being*).

The Morellis explain that the lectures were not simply a restatement of *Insight*, but “a new expression of its central themes, reflecting a still greater familiarity with

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154 *Understanding and Being*, [xii]-xix.
contemporary philosophical and theological trends." They maintain that the greatest
difference between these lectures and Insight concerns the emphasis on self-
appropriation. While Lonergan explains that the central aim of Insight is to “promote the
personal appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness,” this point, they
suggest, is often missed by its readers. The Morellis proposed that perhaps because of this
common failure, self-appropriation takes center stage in the lecture series, and thus,
“gives these lectures a special place among Lonergan’s works.” In noting a further
difference, by comparing Insight and the 1958 lectures, Crowe maintains that the lectures
offer, “advances, for example, on the question of probability.” Despite these perhaps
relatively small augmentations and advances, however, there is no indication that
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis diverged by 1958 in any significant way from its
formulation in the completed Insight manuscript of 1953.

The next significant work of Lonergan occurred in the following summer, at “the
Institute” on education at Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. While audiotapes and
extensive notes of the Institute were for years circulated in unpublished form among
Lonergan followers, it was not until 1993 that the first published text appeared as Topics
in Education, this being the tenth volume of the Collected Works. Due to the relevance
these lectures have for my study and expansion of intentionality analysis into educational
philosophy, this work will be considered in detail in the next chapter. As will be pointed
out, Lonergan’s exploration of certain topics in education develop in new ways his
intentionality analysis with respect to the certain themes in existentialist thought and in
aesthetics.

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156 Elizabeth A Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, “Editors’ Introduction” in Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being: an Introduction and Companion to Insight, viii. This preface, omitted in the Collected Works edition, is the work of the Morellis who first produced the published version of the series from tape recordings and various sets of notes.
157 Ibid., ix.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 74.
Lonergan’s next main block of writings, post-Insight, has been published as a collection of essays appearing originally in various forums between 1943 and 1967. Frederick Crowe provides the reader with an extensive introduction and circumstantial account of each of these essays in the first edition of Collection. These essays, dealing mainly with theological and philosophical topics, reveal Lonergan’s abiding interest in cognitional theory and epistemology, and express his attempt after the publication of Insight to respond to some of the criticisms of his basic position. While these essays provide opportunities for comparing their themes with those of Insight, and depict the genetic development of his thought, Lonergan’s assertions in Collection on the elements and operations of human intentionality are consistent with those of Insight and, at most, simply offer further clarifications and support. For purposes of understanding new dimensions of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, however, three key elements in these essays bear mentioning.

First, these essays provide further evidence that Lonergan’s method of inquiry differs significantly from scholastic philosophy. A key difference is that Lonergan connects the question of epistemology to a phenomenological account of human cognition, to an account of the experiences of sense and of understanding and of knowing. Crowe suggests that the essay, “Insight: a Preface to a Discussion,” a particularly important piece in this collection, was provoked by Lonergan’s dismay at scholasticism’s lack of a “method or anything analogous to a crucial experiment with which to solve their endless disputed questions.” Crowe goes on to suggest, “it seemed to him that the basic cognitional structure provided by Insight along with the development leading to its ‘universal viewpoint’ might do something to remedy that situation.” Further, Lonergan departs from scholastic thinking on “intellectual intuition.” Crowe reports,

Lonergan never took to his [Etienne Gilson’s] view of an intuition of being, influential though it is and even dominant in North American scholasticism. The evidence discernible in an empirical investigation of

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163 Ibid., xxvii.
the way we do in fact know argued to a reflective and critical process in which conditional ideas are tested till we reach the unconditioned and can make the affirmation by which we know.”\textsuperscript{164}

While some scholars may be tempted to interpret and possibly to dismiss Lonergan on the basis of a wrongly understood association with scholastic thought, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, in the opinion of Crowe, marks a clear departure.

Secondly, in “Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought,” Lonergan develops the theme of structure that runs through \textit{Insight}, in that the levels of experience, understanding and reflection are shown to parallel the proportionate structure of being as potency, form and act, with a resulting objectivity in affirmations of the experiential, normative and absolute modes of being.\textsuperscript{165} While this structural emphasis is evident throughout \textit{Insight}, Crowe states it acquires here a greater clarity and precision. As it will become evident in expanding Lonergan’s analysis of human intentionality into the realm of educational philosophy, these structural elements of consciousness are crucially important.

Thirdly, while the notion of development related to the operations of consciousness are essential to Lonergan’s portrayal of how human consciousness unfolds and how the self becomes “oneself,” it is in the essays “Existenz and Aggiornamento” and “Dimensions of Meaning” that the “law of growth,” as Crowe describes it, receives a more deliberate treatment.\textsuperscript{166} Understanding human understanding, and knowing what knowing is, become intimately tied to the profound questions of self and personhood, and tied to that even greater question of the meaning of human existence. As I shall show, these matters pertain to certain elements of educational philosophy, but Lonergan’s treatment of them in this essay is evidence of the importance human growth and development hold in Lonergan’s understanding of intentionality.

Most of Lonergan’s writings following \textit{Insight} that address intentionality analysis are expansions, clarifications, restatements, or applications, or are some combination of these. However, the work that \textit{Insight} philosophically and vocationally anticipates,

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Ibid.}, xxx.
\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Ibid.}, xxxii-xxxiii. In the essay, Lonergan relates the categories of knowing identified in his earlier studies of Aquinas and the later categories of \textit{Insight}. See “Editorial Notes” in the \textit{Collected Works} edition of \textit{Collectio}, 282-83.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Ibid.}, xxxiii-xxxiv.
Method in Theology, constitutes a major development that must be explained. The relation between these two books has been explored in great detail and from various angles by a number of Lonergan scholars, and some aspects of these developments have been related to the realm of education. These relationships will be considered in chapter five, particularly in reference to moral and ethical questions, and to the existential questions of choice and decision. My interest here, however, is on any significant development of, or deviation from, the intentionality analysis of the earlier work, and in Method in Theology one finds such a development. Crowe’s succinct summary of Lonergan’s overarching vocational strategy indicates the nature of such advance.

So it was that for thirty-four years, from the start of his doctoral dissertation in 1938 till the publication of his Method in Theology in 1972, Lonergan labored to create an instrument that would do the job [of creating a fundamental method]. Earlier he might have called this an ‘instrument of mind,’ as do the English editions of Bacon, but now perhaps would prefer to call it an instrument of an incarnate subject.... ‘Incarnate subject’ suggests something more integral—people who experience, question, understand, reflect, judge, deliberate, decide, and sometimes fall in love.

Simply put, the differentiations and operations of human consciousness spelled out under the categories of insight acquire an important expansion in terms of methodology in Method in Theology. The functional nature of human subjectivity provides a structure for organizing and guiding, in two phases, any inquiry into human culture that seeks to be carried out productively, and the results of which are to be assembled cumulatively. The first phase of inquiry in this type of scholarship covers research, interpretation, history,

and dialectic. The second phase unfolds more specifically in theological studies, and in any field of inquiry within the humanities, and moves one beyond the detached inquiry to develop committed positions. For theology, these further specialties include foundations, doctrines, systematics and communications. The defining difference between the two phases concerns the mode of human commitment in the activity of inquiry, where, in the humanities, the first phase is not dependent upon the scholar’s embodiment of the values of the tradition under consideration. In the second phase there is required a personal appropriation of those values through understanding and expressing the meaning of that tradition. In short, the structure of human consciousness presented in Insight becomes the cognitional basis of the later methodological studies concerning not only theological inquiry but inquiry within any scholarly realm of the humanities.

A further important development in Method in Theology concerns his account of conversion. Conversion, generally, arises from the exercise of human freedom to effect a change in one’s personal horizon. This may involve an “about-face,” and a repudiation of former features on one’s horizon, and a new beginning to thinking and doing.\footnote{Method in Theology, 237-8.} Lonergan describes three types. Intellectual conversion means a radically new understanding of knowing and knowledge. The new understanding regards knowledge as a compound of experiencing, understanding and judging.\footnote{Ibid., 238.} Moral conversion “changes the orientation of one’s decision and choice from satisfactions to values.”\footnote{Ibid., 240.} And religious conversion “is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations.”\footnote{Ibid.} Due to the common sense meaning of “conversion” as one being converted to a new faith or religious tradition, in this study I will not use the term but rather refer to “transformations,” and limit these to intellectual and moral realms of meaning, as I have limited my focus in this study largely to secularist education.

Further, it should be noted that, in light of my interest in relating the study to a secular context, my interest is not in theological method or inquiry but in educational
inquiry generally and educational philosophy specifically. The primary difference is that the former entertains the question of the "universal viewpoint" while the latter generally does not address such religious matters. Stated in the previous chapter, this study is in relation to secular education, and thus my exploration and expansion will stop after I consider the question of ethics. To explain this delimitation more substantially, I appeal to Lonergan's distinctions.

Because the subject is intelligent, rational, free, and responsible, the development of the subject consists in becoming aware of that nature—intelligent, rational, free, responsible—and taking his stand upon the criteria immanent in that nature, on absolute norms, on being guided by the true and false, right and wrong, good and evil, and devoting oneself to, even sacrificing oneself for, these criteria. And it is passing through a crisis—well, it is a gradual process, but there are also critical periods in the development of any individual when one becomes aware of oneself or finds oneself. That is the emergence of ethical value. Now if one has stopped short at ethical value, one is left with a secularist philosophy of education. If one includes ethical value, of course, one has a rather high type, a very high type, the highest possible type, of secularist education. But there is also religious value. Religious value appears when you go a step further, when the autonomous subject stands before God.

To develop the religious question related to Lonergan's intentionality analysis and general philosophy presumes upon an individual an interest in and embrace of religious experience and religious commitments. This seems to lie outside the scope of most work of a general educational philosophy.

The explicit theological methodology, however, that Lonergan sought and achieved could have some bearing on educational philosophy, I believe, in that it would be centrally important to a theological educational philosophy (and there seems to be increasingly more thought given to this special topic). My focus on Lonergan's work in intentionality analysis, leaving aside its implications for religious experience and theological method, still provides, however, a substantial body of material to develop and expand upon, and seems to hold more direct relevance to the field of general educational philosophy.

174 Craig Dykstra and others in the Association of Theological Colleges are taking a leading role in reflection on the philosophy of theological education.
Published two years after *Method in Theology*, the second collection of Lonergan’s shorter writings exhibits further development of his thought as it ranges over various theological, philosophical and cultural inquiries. The editors of *A Second Collection* note that these later essays show Lonergan’s emphasis shifting from the question of knowledge to the question of the existential subject operating on the “fourth level of human consciousness.” They suggest the themes of this period signify the “primacy of the fourth level of human consciousness, the existential level, the level of evaluation and love” and “secondly, the significance of historical consciousness.” While this seems to be the case, and confirmed by Crowe’s analysis, Crowe clearly treats the emergence of a distinct fourth level as a development of earlier positions. In fact, the fourth, existential, decisional level receives substantial treatment in other earlier key works of Lonergan, a point not missed by Ryan and Tyrrell. “[I]t is enlightening to note that Lonergan’s first important publication, *Grace and Freedom*, his doctoral dissertation, is concerned with the fourth level of evaluation and Christian love. So the existential level is not entirely missing in Lonergan’s earlier work.” Of course, the questions of choice, decision, moral value and love, are considerations relevant to the educational experience, and thus are of considerable importance to a philosophy of education, and will be discussed in chapter five. Lonergan’s earlier treatment of the existential question arises in *Insight*, and it should not be overlooked in understanding this important dimension of human intentionality, for there we see this mode of intentionality given its place and basic exposition in relation to the fullest account of cognitive intentionality. As this study unfolds, the earlier work will be considered along with the later developments.

The final essay in this collection, “*Insight Revisited*,” finds Lonergan returning to his philosophical masterpiece. In their editorial comments on this essay, Ryan and Tyrrell perhaps make too much of the differences between *Insight* and post-*Insight* work, and not enough of the genetic development of his thought. Ryan and Tyrrell believe that this essay “is a return from a far, advanced position that Lonergan has reached since *Insight*.

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Lonergan tells us what he was doing in *Insight*, and then tells us what he thinks he should have done.” And further, they suggest the essay, “paces off the distance that Lonergan has come since then.” In suggesting that the post-*Insight* work is vastly removed from the positions developed earlier serves the interest of the editors to find a topical unity to this volume of essays. It does, however, give the impression, I believe inaccurately, that Lonergan sees in the earlier work significant mistakes that needed to be corrected, and that his subsequent work is a vast improvement. Whatever objections one might find with Lonergan’s assertions of *Insight*, and of course there are many such opportunities in a work having such a scope, I see Lonergan’s subsequent work not as a correction, except in reference to his account of the knowledge of God, but as a development and expansion. Lonergan is noted for the “organic” quality in his life-long work, and more than anything, in my view, this essay is an historical account of the writing of *Insight* and a reaffirmation of his intentionality analysis as central to his philosophical and methodological assertions.

The most recent collection of essays appeared in 1985, and covers the period from the close of *A Second Collection* in 1973 to the last, or almost last, writings published during Lonergan’s life. The editor of *A Third Collection*, Frederick Crowe, makes no attempt to find some unifying theme to these essays, other than the operative consciousness and the insightful mind that produced them. He suggests, “there is a unity, but it is the

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179 While Lonergan by and large does not seem later to retract his basic assertions of *Insight*, it is on one point he does acknowledge a deficiency. In their introduction to the question of God in *Insight*, the editors of The Lonergan Reader state, “Lonergan’s treatment of God’s existence and nature in *Insight* met with some criticism at the Lonergan Congress of 1970. In a lecture series of 1972, on the philosophy of God and theology, Lonergan acknowledged an incongruity in his approach to the issue in *Insight*: ‘while my cognitional theory was based on a long and methodical appeal to experience, in contrast my account of God’s existence and attributes made no appeal to religious experience.’ In his later works, leading up to and including *Method in Theology*, the manner of treatment shifts. In ‘*Insight* Revisited,’ in 1973, Lonergan puts the matter this way: ‘In *Method* the question of God is considered more important than the precise manner in which an answer is formulated, and our basic awareness of God comes to us not through our arguments or choices but primarily through God’s gift of his love.’ While Lonergan never retracted his claim that critical method yields knowledge of God’s existence, his later treatments introduce explicitly the religious horizon of the inquiring subject.” The Lonergan Reader, ed. Mark D. Morelli and Elizabeth A. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 292.

180 The editors of The Lonergan Reader explain the post-*Insight* writings this way. “Lonergan’s post-*Insight* reflections on the general categories of human studies—meaning, the good, and history—and his eventual proposal of a new method for theology, based on transcendental method, constitute the second phase of a single methodological project, a prolongation of his effort to anchor modern culture to its transcultural base in the self-transcending subject.” The Lonergan Reader, 23. Moreover, Lonergan’s work is described in the dust jacket of *Method in Theology* this way. “The intellectual development of very few twentieth-century thinkers has been as consistent and as organic as that of Bernard Lonergan.”
background unity of the mind that produced the papers, of the subjectivity that, from the base of a securely appropriated foundation, can move in many directions with surety and find ever new and continuously creative applications.\textsuperscript{181} At best, Crowe offers, these essays might indicate some new angle or nuance to Lonergan's established positions,\textsuperscript{182} but certainly one cannot find here any significant deviation from the positions advanced in \textit{Insight}. More than anything, these essays affirm not only the intentionality analysis formulated by Lonergan in the fifties and sixties, but exemplifies the effectiveness of personally appropriating those insights in tackling the great and difficult issues of the times. In a way, then, along the lines of these post-\textit{Insight} writings, a philosophy of education enmeshed in the project that Lonergan maps out as "a study of human understanding," anticipates a practical working out of the structure and values embodied in the human subject as a knower and a doer.

Other writings of Lonergan have been published or republished posthumously, including works on economics, theology and English-language Christology, and other works are in the planning stages for publication.\textsuperscript{183} These studies draw on his account of human intentionality, and develop his position on this matter that pertains to various issues and inquiries presented to Lonergan in the academy. While the full scope of Lonergan's work has some relevance to his account of the elements and operations of human consciousness, \textit{Insight}, to be sure, contains the seminal treatment and expression of his intentionality analysis, and in drawing on certain subsequent developments, I hope to show, his philosophy holds considerable promise for fruitful relation to educational philosophy.

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 2. Crowe speaks of the possibility of finding in these essays, "a sudden new and illuminating nuance in what to the untrained eye is merely repetitious."
In the following chapters, I will explore the manner in which Lonergan’s intentionality analysis informs and advances in various ways key elements of educational philosophy. My exploration will consider first Lonergan’s topical treatment of educational matters. The topical approach will be followed by a systematic treatment of educational philosophy in chapters four and five where the structure and operations of human intentionality will be seen to relate to and inform educational philosophy in a more integrated manner.
CHAPTER THREE

Intentionality Analysis and Topics in Education

Philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life unlivable. The great task that is demanded if we are to make it livable again is the recreation of the liberty of the subject, the recognition of the freedom of consciousness.

The previous chapter set forth the broad contours of Lonergan's intentionality analysis as it has developed over a lifetime of reflection and refinement, and especially as it received a major philosophical analysis in his primary philosophical work, *Insight*. In a rare departure from his familiar fields of philosophy and theology, and to a lesser extent, economics, shortly after the publication of *Insight*, Lonergan delved into the realm of education and educational philosophy in a series of lectures that was later published as *Topics in Education*. For the most part, Lonergan addresses educational issues he deemed significant in terms of some of the key ideas developed on the elements and operations of human consciousness. Many of these issues relate to his intentionality analysis that, we have seen, lies at the center of the earlier work. In this chapter, I will discuss Lonergan's key assertions on education and relate them to his earlier work, and also indicate how in certain respects his thought on education represents an advance on his position in *Insight*.

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1 *Topics in Education*, 232.
2 In the following exchange between Lonergan, nearing the end of his life, and Cathleen Going of the Thomas More Institute in Montreal, Lonergan explains his reluctance to address educational issues. "C.G.: You used to insist: 'I won't say anything about education; that's for other people to do.' After Xavier, you didn't return directly to reflection or writing on education? B. Lonergan: No. Usually, for people who write on education, education is all they know. That isn't very helpful for teaching. There are countless books, sponsored by Foundations, on learning theory and the people who write the books are people who want a grant; they don't know anything about learning. C.G.: But why did you refuse to talk about it further? B. Lonergan: I had other things to do, eh? C.G.: Were you really returning to it in Method when you were talking about contributing to the education of theologians? B. Lonergan: Yes. And some change may come in a hundred years." In Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey and Cathleen Going, eds. *Caring About Meaning, Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 55-6.
My objective here is to show how Lonergan’s lectures anticipate an educational philosophy, yet to be developed, that draws on his intentionality analysis. Advancing such a development, of course, is the chief aim of my dissertation. An exposition and critique of the various topics on education that Lonergan addresses in these lectures will lead in following chapters to a more systematic treatment of his intentionality analysis as central themes in educational philosophy.

To recall, the general structure I have adopted for understanding the discipline of educational philosophy consists of a distinction between a systematic approach and a topical approach. This distinction fits well with how Lonergan’s work relates to the field. *Insight* is a distinctly systematic treatise on philosophy, and relating his fundamental assertions to educational philosophy will result in basically a systematic expansion of his ideas into the field of educational philosophy. In these lectures, however, Lonergan takes a topical approach in dealing with various educational problems and concerns, and the topics he selects seem to pertain roughly to broad subject areas composing curricula of higher-level education—philosophy, mathematics, science, and so forth. In what follows, my mode of discussing the relation of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and his treatment of educational issues, in order to grasp more readily his understanding of this field, and for ease of reference, will proceed chronologically through the various topics as they are presented in the printed version of the lectures, and then offer some criticism and assessment with respect to the thesis of my study. Before dealing with Lonergan’s treatment of educational topics, however, it is important for hermeneutical purposes to understand the context of these lectures.

First, I raise the question of what to call these lectures. It seems to me they are not philosophy of education *per se*. Initially, the lecture series was announced “as ‘an Institute on the Philosophy of Education ... under the leadership of Father Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. ...’”3 In fact, a transcript of the lectures completed in 1979 uses the title, *The Philosophy of Education. Lectures by Bernard Lonergan 1959.*4 It is reported, however, that Lonergan preferred the title of the printed version of the lectures to be *Topics in Education*, with a reference to educational philosophy placed in the sub-title.

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3 *Topics in Education*, xii.
4 The transcription was completed by James and John Quinn, and copies of the manuscript are available at the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto.
This preference was honored in the published volume of the *Collected Works* edition whose full title came to be *Topics in Education. The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education.*\(^5\) Perhaps there was some unease with the more direct relation suggested between Lonergan’s thought on educational issues and the specialized work of educational philosophy. Perhaps revealing such unease, in the opening lecture, Lonergan stresses the point that he is not a philosopher of education, and he explicitly defers to others for working out a philosophy of education.\(^6\) In my view, naming these lectures “topics in education” better fits their scope, structure and presentation than does “educational philosophy.”

While certain aspects of these lectures have a philosophical tone due to the rigor of analysis and the nature of the questions addressed, Lonergan’s reach extends in many non-philosophical directions. For instance, he deals with theological questions at various points throughout the lecture series,\(^7\) and in other sections he provides detailed descriptions of mathematics and science, replete with illustrations and even drawings, not at all philosophical in tone or intent. Of course, Lonergan treats various issues that do arise in educational philosophy, and he offers some analyses of these issues in terms of his basic philosophical position. Indeed, the intent of the lectures, expressed in the advertisement of the institute was to present a “philosopher speaking to educators much as a biologist would speak to medical doctor, a mathematician to a physicist.”\(^8\) As such, the intent seems to be not so much a presentation of a philosophy of education as an account of what forms the “the bases for a philosophy of education.”\(^9\) These lectures, then, may be regarded as a prolegomena to a philosophy of education.\(^10\) The various topics identified here by Lonergan relate to those “bases” that, we shall see, complement

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\(^6\) *Topics in Education*, 24.
\(^7\) *Topics in Education*, 58-69, 241-50 and 257.
\(^8\) Doran, “Editor’s Preface,” in *Topics in Education*, xii.
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^10\) Understanding more of the circumstances surrounding these lectures will help further in understanding Lonergan’s approach and content given to these educational topics. First, the lectures form the basis of an “Institute”\(^10\) on education offered at Xavier University in Cincinnati from August 3rd to the 14th, 1959. Lonergan’s invitation to the Institute came in the wake of the publication of *Insight* two years before, and the publication of a second revised edition in 1958.
and constitute what could be regarded as an anticipation of my systematic expansion of his intentionality analysis into educational philosophy in subsequent chapters.\(^{11}\)

By the 1950’s, Lonergan was established as a major thinker in the Catholic intellectual world,\(^{12}\) and it seems there was considerable interest in exploring the implications his thought held for other disciplines. His lectures on education, not atypical in format from Lonergan’s usual summer engagements at various institutions in North America\(^{13}\), were in part to hear what an important thinker had to say on education.\(^{14}\) Given the philosophical context of these lectures as referencing his work on insight, then, there is good reason to interpret at least the philosophical dimensions of his educational thought in terms of his basic position set forth in *Insight*. Concerning these lectures, it should be noted that his audience consisted of a group of fifty-five Catholic educators and intellectuals.\(^{15}\) Later Lonergan expressed concern as to the “narrowly Catholic tone” of the lectures and suggested an introduction was needed to explain it.\(^{16}\) The editors provide such explanation. “... those registering for the Institute were largely teachers in the

\(^{11}\) I do not want to belabor the point in the main body of the text, but should there be any question as to the lectures not being strictly a work of educational philosophy, the following may be considered. Further argument against the lectures not being classed distinctly as educational philosophy includes the following points. The lectures exhibit loose organization and an ambling style, as well as a free-ranging treatment and sometimes unclear associations of ideas. Thus, they do not aspire to a philosophical level, at least according to how we have come to see Lonergan present philosophy in *Insight*. Indeed the editors of the volume found it difficult to discern a clear organization in certain segments of the lecture series.\(^{11}\) They explain, “...at times the notes [of Lonergan for the lectures, found posthumously] clarified the organization of Lonergan’s thought in ways that were not clear, at least immediately, from the lectures. And so frequently we have introduced new division and subdivision headings and other organizing devices, indicating in our footnotes that this is the case.” (“Editors’ Preface,” *Topics in Education*, xvii). Moreover, judging by Lonergan’s written remarks concerning the series, they seemed to be, as it were, a little of this and a little of that. Regarding his preparation for the lectures, he writes, “‘On education course: plan to integrate stuff on existentialists with theory of Art in S.K. Langer (*Feeling and Form*), follower of Cassirer; eke out with *Insight*, for intellectualist, scientific side; throw in a bit of theol[ogy]!” (*Topics in Education*, xii-xiii.). The lecture series, I maintain, are aptly considered “topics,” and while he covers an enormous range of topics, many of them unevenly developed and occasionally disconnected, still they hold important insights and assertions that relate to educational philosophy and his intentionality analysis. My aim in this chapter is to identify these insights and assertions that will be lead to and find expansion in the systematic treatment of educational philosophy in the following chapter.


\(^{13}\) The editors note that “institute” seems to mean a series of lectures of longer duration than merely a few lectures. *Topics in Education*, xi.

\(^{14}\) *Topics in Education*, xi-xii.

\(^{15}\) *Ibid.*, xii.

\(^{16}\) *Ibid.*, xv.
Catholic school system of the United States, and ... the system was fighting for survival in a not altogether friendly society." 17 Although his audience was Catholic, clearly, Lonergan’s intention was to have his thoughts on education relate to the larger world of educational and cultural inquiry and understanding.

This, then, appears to be the context for his lectures. I now move on to an exposition and critique of these lectures that cover seven distinct topics. These include the problem of educational philosophy, aspects of the human good (in three lectures), the new learning (in two lectures dealing with mathematics and science), philosophy, general education, art, and history. I will examine each of these topics as they appear in the text.

**The Problem of Educational Philosophy**

The first topic addressed concerns the nature and purpose of educational philosophy itself. While there is little in this chapter that explicitly references Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, perhaps an overview of his general, introductory assertions on education will set the stage for discovering how insight informs the topics he subsequently raises.

The initial points of discussion concern the current state of education and the effect of philosophical thought in determining the role that education plays in contemporary society. John Dewey, believed by some to be a key figure in contemporary education, receives initial criticism. Lonergan dismisses, almost outright, Dewey’s approach to education finding that the relation between philosophy and education, so central to Dewey’s philosophical analysis, has not produced the results that advance significantly educational practice. “Philosophy is the reflective component,” Lonergan says of Dewey’s approach, “and education is the active component, at the ultimate level of reflection and action in human life. Philosophy is the guide and the inspiration of education, and education is the verification, the pragmatic justification of a philosophy.” 18 Lonergan goes on to state that, this being the position of Dewey to link

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17 Ibid., xix.
18 *Topics in Education, 5.*
education and philosophy in the closest possible manner, the ineffectiveness of Dewey's thought to "improve" education serves to invalidate Dewey's work. "Now it can be argued that Dewey's correlation between philosophy and education, while undoubtedly it has influenced education in this country and elsewhere to a tremendous extent, has been invalidated by the results." If philosophy is to impact society in a concrete and dramatic way, and it fails to do so, then it fails in its fundamental purpose.

There could be a number of objections to Lonergan's assessment and dismissal of Dewey, such as whether or not Dewey's vision of education has ever really been implemented. If this is the case that Dewey's educational philosophy does not work, although this criticism may be applied to progressive education generally, it cannot apply legitimately to Dewey himself. Also, one could question the basis of Lonergan's assessment, that is to say, on what grounds does it seem not to "work"? There is plenty of evidence to suggest Dewey's ideas have worked and have shaped a relatively successful American public education in the course of the twentieth century. At any rate, Lonergan seems hastily to dismiss progressive education, in part possibly reflecting the general opinion of his undoubtedly more traditional, and perhaps more socially conservative, audience. To support his view of the failure and dysfunctionality of progressive education, he cites the well-known analyses of Arthur Bestor, Albert Lynd, Hilda Neatby and Rudolf Flesch, and appeals to the work of Mortimer Adler and Milton Mayer for an assessment of the ongoing debate between traditional and progressive education.

In rejecting progressive education, Lonergan does not call simply for a return to traditional education, for he finds that the rejuvenated traditionalism of Adler and Mayer

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 This, at least, is the opinion of educational philosopher, Jerrold Coombs, who expressed this criticism in a doctoral seminar in which these remarks of Lonergan were discussed.
22 Edward L Dejnozka and David E. Kapel, American Educators' Encyclopedia (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 171. This seems to be the assessment of the authors of the article on Dewey.
23 It seems to me that Lonergan exhibits a certain bias against "progressive education," as comes out in a seemingly off-handed remark in the fifth lecture. In illustrating a point in reference to the principle of contradiction, he speaks of someone who is unable to differentiate the true and the false as "one of the first victims of progressive education." Topics in Education, 120. By the same token, however, Lonergan exhibits a certain disdain for the traditional education that he himself experienced. "Since I am addressing educators, I would like to add a final note. It's about something I suffered from. Teaching physics without the students knowing the relevant mathematics is not teaching physics..." The problem he identifies is teaching without understanding much of the learning process. Ibid., 145.
24 Ibid., 7-8. Of course, one could question the accuracy, completeness and motivations of each of these analysts.
exhibits certain weaknesses of its own, mainly in regard to its defense of immutable truths, its doctrine of eternal properties of things, and its upholding of non-scientific methods in acquiring knowledge.\textsuperscript{25} For Lonergan, the problem among traditionalists generally concerns their lack of "vision" and lack of "a principle of integration and judgment," as well as a rejection of "the great power ... offered on the modernist side by their close correlation between fundamental philosophic notions and educational theory."\textsuperscript{26} Simply put, for Lonergan, traditionalism lacks an engagement with the realities of modern life.\textsuperscript{27}

With the approach of progressive education dismissed, and the traditional approach found wanting, the implied expectation is for a new approach that is neither traditional nor progressive. It would be one that fully meets the challenges of the times. Lonergan goes on to discuss this need in light of the development of education's role in society and the challenges facing contemporary education.\textsuperscript{28} Over the course of Western thought from the Renaissance onward, Lonergan explains, there has been considerable philosophical effort expended to express the humanistic ideal of persons endowed with reason and freedom, and, in utilizing the power of education, to create a society based on reason and freedom.\textsuperscript{29} Lonergan traces this development along three lines. One line of development maintained the medieval division and symbiosis of the four main disciplines of learning, namely theology, philosophy, the liberal arts and the sciences. Another line saw philosophy emerge as a distinct discipline, completely autonomous from the other areas of learning, especially theology, and having its own methods and criteria. A third line of development, largely in reaction to certain Enlightenment tendencies, saw philosophy emerge "as the successor to religion," to become "the supreme arbiter in all things."\textsuperscript{30} Lonergan explains that this third form appears as "naturalism" in the English-speaking world and in France, and as "historicism" in Germany.\textsuperscript{31}

According to Lonergan, it is this secularist philosophy that has come to influence the ideas of modern education and place it under state control. Under the control of the state,
education, while mitigating to some extent the ideal of human freedom, it nevertheless gained a large measure of support (thereby perhaps mitigating that freedom), and became funded by the public purse. In the process, a certain set of rights came to be ensured for the individual, and education became protected from religious views thought to be antithetical to human freedom, dignity, and reason.\(^\text{32}\) With the state taking charge of education, Lonergan suggests, "there had to be created a new caste, a priesthood of the new philosophy, the men of universal wisdom able to consult and judge specialists in any particular field."\(^\text{33}\) Thus, there emerged the need and opportunity for the development of a new breed of thinker. Enter the educational philosopher. Lonergan regards the educational philosopher as the grand seer, the "philosopher king," who has obtained that universal wisdom needed to pronounce on the general course of learning and social development.\(^\text{34}\) The role of educational philosophy, in Lonergan's estimation, is to create and to purvey the wisdom needed by the educational specialists who provide leadership and direction for education in secular society.\(^\text{35}\)

From this historical account of the emergence of secular society and state-sponsored and state-controlled education, Lonergan moves on to characterize the challenges facing contemporary education. By his analysis, three major factors have affected education mid-twentieth century. First, the massive increase in human population presents to education the problems of illiteracy on a wide scale, and of maintaining our current standard of living. Citing the analysis of Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, Lonergan explains the problem is one of "extending higher civilization to the lower classes without debasing its standard and diluting its quality to the vanishing point."\(^\text{36}\) The second feature, and the one to which he devotes a great deal of attention in these lectures, pertains to the "new learning." By this, Lonergan means the transformation of learning in

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) At best, the suggested elevated status of the educational philosopher sounds over-stated, but it is difficult to say how serious Lonergan was in his "priesthood" and "men of universal wisdom" remarks. Given the care the editors gave to reflecting the meaning of the spoken word, it is reasonable to assume that a hyperbole or satire would have been noted in the explanatory notes. There is no editorial comment.

\(^{36}\) Topics in Education, 15. It is unclear from the text as to why Lonergan refers to massive population as a pedagogical problem cast in terms of class and standard of living. Lonergan never really returns to this matter in these lectures. Certain problems exists in such a remark: elitism; social and cultural domination by the "superior classes"; cultural and human insensitivities. Thankfully, this remark never again surfaces in his lectures, but one wonders how this thinking might pervade Lonergan's other remarks.
the field of mathematics; the change in science brought about through relativity theory and quantum mechanics; the introduction of a plethora of modern languages and literature into the academy (no longer limited to Latin, Greek and Hebrew); the advances in the study of ancient civilizations brought about in the twentieth century through archaeological and “paleontological” discoveries; and the revolutions in the human sciences, especially in psychology and the study of post-Depression economics. The third major factor concerns the development of specializations in learning and in culture that have produced a body of knowledge that is “mountainous, divided and unassimilated.” Largely setting aside the first and third issues, Lonergan devotes the main thrust of his lectures to the development of the second issue, the new learning, what he later describes, in part, as exhibiting a new “versatility of understanding.”

Before delving into the issue of the new learning, however, Lonergan addresses the matter of educational philosophy itself. Since the audience Lonergan addresses consists mainly of practitioners in the field of education within the Catholic tradition, his specific concern centers on a “Catholic” philosophy of education, and several preliminary points are made. First, none of the three lines of philosophical development mentioned earlier suits the contemporary situation for Catholic educators. Secularist philosophy that ignores or opposes religion clearly will not do. Philosophy that is separate from a faith tradition also is not desirous since such a bifurcation is antithetical to the integration that Catholic education promotes. Moreover, the old medieval symbiosis of human knowledge does not take into account the “new learning.” What is needed, according to Lonergan, is a distinctly “philosophy of” education. Since education is a matter of “genesis, development, [and] history,” education therefore needs a philosophy that attends to and understands thoroughly these categories. Lonergan poses the question thus, “How do you account in your philosophy for the notion of the developing individual

37 Ibid., 16. This remark on economics likely reflects a longstanding interest of Lonergan that resulted in two volumes of his Collected Works.
38 Ibid., 18.
39 Ibid., 19.
40 Ibid., 23. “On the theoretical side, our problem is that, as traditionally conceived by Catholics, philosophy is not a ‘philosophy of...’, not a subject of other subjects, but philosophy simply. There is a host of problems connected with that shift in conception, and some of them are very technical. I believe that shift in conception can be effected on a basis strictly in harmony with the tradition, and it will be my attempt to offer some indication as to how this can be done.”
41 Ibid.
What does philosophy do with the notion of the development of the individual or the development of society? A philosophy of education simply cannot adopt the ancient mode of philosophy since medieval philosophy is unable to come to terms with the important existential questions of achieving meaning in the here and now, in immediate lived experience. But neither would philosophy of education ignore or reject the achievements of ancient philosophy if it is "developmental" in the sense of adding to and transforming what has gone before. The vision Lonergan thus holds for philosophy of education is one that encompasses "truth" from traditional philosophy and "meaning" from contemporary philosophy.

What is needed for philosophy of education, then, is a philosophy that "remains true to itself and yet develops, that preserves its identity and yet takes over the mastery of different successive ages …." Such a philosophy takes account of individual and historical developments. That is, it accounts for developments that are "concrete," and "existential in the general sense of that term (not in the sense of particular existentialist schools) …." It is just such a philosophy, Lonergan suggests, one may encounter in his "recent work," Insight, where it attempts to retain the best of medieval philosophy while incorporating the historical, developmental and existential dimensions of human existence. So, with brief overtures made to his work on human intentionality in Insight, he moves on in the following lectures to address an assortment of topics pertinent to the field of Catholic education, and what he views as topics of importance to education generally.

The Invariant Structure of the Human Good

With the vision of a new philosophy sketched out at least in very general terms, the next issue Lonergan tackles is the question of the human good. Education is a particularly human concern, and in order to establish what good education and educational

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42 Ibid., 21.
43 Ibid., 21. Lonergan began initially speaking of medieval philosophy but then began to refer to medieval philosophy as "traditional Catholic conception of philosophy."
44 Ibid., 22.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 23.
philosophy are, for Lonergan, it is important to establish the the nature of the human good. The human good is understood in terms of its invariant structure that, Lonergan explains, pertains to features of the good found in any society or culture at any place and time. He initially distinguishes the absolute and universal good, which is equivalent to being, and the human good consisting of things that exist which are dependent upon human apprehension and choice. As such, there emerges a question as to the relationship between the human good and insight. While Lonergan here does not make explicit reference to his work on insight, this reference to apprehension and choice seems to correspond very closely to two key differentiations he makes in the operations of consciousness. Human apprehension is a matter of understanding and judgment, and choice a matter of deliberation and decision. Apprehension and choice express themselves in human creations that reveal a basic and, Lonergan will argue, invariant structure. There is revealed a basic invariant process that humans engage in achieving goods.

The structure of the human good is found by Lonergan to have three basic elements. First, there is “the particular good that might be a thing, such as a new car, or an event ... or a satisfaction, or an operation. The particular good regards the satisfaction of a particular appetite.”

Secondly, there is the good of order. Lonergan describes this as the “setup” that allows for the production and apprehension of particular goods, such as the family that produces goods necessary for its members to develop and flourish, or the “technology-economy-polity,” or an educational system, or the church, and so forth. The good of order seeks to provide the means for continued production of particular goods that comes about through schemes of recurrence. For a more substantive account of schemes of recurrence than what is offered in this lecture, Lonergan makes reference to *Insight* and its explanation of types of recurrence, development and probability. It is the good of order that gives rise to recurrence of good things, in that “coordinated human operations”

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48 Ibid., 28 “The good is not an abstract notion. It is comprehensive. It includes everything...The notion of the good is absolutely universal, that applies to everything that exists...”
49 Ibid., 32.
50 Ibid., 34.
51 Ibid.
coalesce and interrelate to continue to produce goods. Further, the coordination of effort in achieving the good occurs through cognitional habits, volitional habits and skills that achieve knowing, willing and skillful partnerships. In the production of goods, coordinated efforts also depend on institutions based on and administered in terms of policies and mechanisms designed for effective decision-making and for sustaining social order. Moreover, Lonergan explains, coordinated efforts at achieving the good of order depends on material things being set in place to facilitate human cooperation, such as buildings, documents and equipment of various kinds. The good of order also depends upon the role individuals come to play in cooperative efforts, and upon exploiting the status associated with that role, such as a parental role in the family, or a pupil, or teacher, in an educational system.

The third element of the invariant structure is value. “Not only are there setups, but people ask, ‘Is the setup good?’” Lonergan identifies three kinds of value: aesthetic, ethical and religious. Aesthetic value is the “realization of the intelligible in the sensible.” He explains, apprehending aesthetic value occurs when we see, feel, hear, taste, even smell, things that are good, and the good of order becomes transparent to one’s consciousness through sensible apprehensions. Ethical value centers on the human subject as an effective goods-producer. Lonergan notes that, with the ethical sense of value, the question of the good moves from things to persons, to the person as creating the good of order by participating in its processes, and of valuing the person as an “autonomous, responsible and free agent.” Ethical value appreciates the essential quality of human freedom in the realization of the good.

With the question of ethical value, Lonergan explains, one arrives at the zenith of secularist educational philosophy, but beyond this there is the question of religious value and the concern with one’s existence in relation to self-transcendence and transcendent being.

52 Ibid., 35.
53 Ibid., 36.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 37.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 38.
With ethical value there emerges the autonomy of spirit, the subject taking his stand upon the truth, upon what is right, upon what is good. Religious value appears when you go a step further, when the autonomous subject stands before God, with his neighbor in the world and history, when he realizes within himself the internal order, the metaphorical justice of 'justification, that inner hierarchy in which reason is subordinate to God, and sense to reason.\[60\]

To some extent, Lonergan develops the religious question later in these lectures, a move entirely appropriate, I believe, given the context of these lectures discussed earlier. With the question of value addressed in its three dimensions, with identifying the purpose and operation of the good of order, and by distinguishing these two elements from particular goods, Lonergan frames in broad outline the invariant structure of the human good.

As an object of human intentionality, then, I understand the good to include particular things that satisfy particular desires, wants and needs; the systems that are designed to produce various particular good things; and the aesthetic, ethical and religious values we place on things, how we are to prioritize goods and their production, and how, and on what basis, we ultimately will conduct our lives to achieve the good.

Given this invariant structure, four additional features of the human good are identified. First, Lonergan notes that the human good is a philosophical question, and as such, according to his conception of 'philosophy,' it is concerned with identifying a single explanatory account valid for any time or place, "from the Stone Age to the present …"\[61\] Second, particular goods, the good of order, and values relate to each other in an "interlocking" manner inasmuch as human intelligence, human reflection and reasonableness allow one to create and critique particular goods as well as the setups that produce the goods, and allow one to determine the worth of it all.\[62\] Third, the structure of the human good is a synthetic structure, by which Lonergan means that the human good encompasses an objective expression as well as subjective processes of emergence. Lonergan suggests, for instance, a human family is an expression of the good of order in that it produces concrete, particular goods, but it is also a complex system of personal

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\[60\] Ibid.
\[61\] Ibid., 39.
\[62\] Ibid., 39-40.
human relations. Both the subjective and objective qualities of the human good work together to realize concrete goods, and both the subjective and objective are revealed in the structure of the human good. In this account, one comes to see that Lonergan’s notion of the good encompasses a broad sweep of human existence and reflects in various ways, as I shall show, the very dynamism of human consciousness that creates and critiques the human good—a dynamism elucidated in *Insight*.

The final feature of the human good in his account ties directly to his intentionality analysis. Lonergan explains that the structure of the human good reflects, or parallels, the structure of cognitional activity as three distinct but interrelated operations or levels of consciousness.

Our acquaintance with the particular good is mainly a matter of experience. But to know about the good of order, you have to understand. It is intelligence, understanding, insight, that is chiefly relevant to knowing the good of order. And it is when one reflects on different orders, different possible setups and systems, that one comes to the notion of value, and such reflection is on the level of judgment. You will recall from *Insight* that experience, understanding, and judgment are three fundamental levels of consciousness.64

Lonergan identifies a further parallel to this structure of consciousness in the way that groups and societies may be differentiated (appealing to the analyses of Pitirim Sorokin),65 and another parallel in the different types of “existential subjectivity” identified by Søren Kierkegaard as the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious expressions of human life.66 Among other things, by this analysis Lonergan seems to illustrate the widespread applicability of the structure of consciousness in explaining various aspects of individual and social life.

In relation to my thesis that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can be expanded to educational philosophy, the point of probing Lonergan’s lectures on educational topics is to identify the importance such analysis obtains in Lonergan’s presentation. To this end, so far we have seen that the operations of human consciousness as differentiated and

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63 Ibid., 40.
64 Ibid., 41.
65 Ibid., 41-2. Sorokin distinguishes, Lonergan points out, “three types of society, or culture or civilization: sensate, idealistic, and ideational.”
66 Ibid., 42.
interrelated reflect the basic structure Lonergan finds in the human good. Lonergan notes ample illustrations of this type of development in economics, industry and electronics, and in Toynbee’s analysis of history and human civilization. While, I suppose, any of these illustrations could be critiqued and perhaps objected to, I am not concerned at this point to make such judgments on Lonergan’s account of the human good, but simply to understand his approach and his assertions, and to discover the role his account of human intentionality plays in his thought on these matters.

This account of the human good envisions an account of the good of anything, and in particular for these lectures, an account of the good of education and educational philosophy. Accordingly, based on the categories and differentiations of insight, the good of education and educational philosophy manifests in the particular “good things” educated people produce; the good manifests in the educational systems that “produce” educated persons and effective institutions that provide the systems necessary for the production of goods; and the good manifest in aesthetic, ethical and religious values apprehended through the processes of education and educational philosophy. Education and educational philosophy are good on the level of the particular good, on the level of the good of order and in apprehending value on the aesthetic level, the ethical level and on the religious level. Simply put, it is Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, its structure and operations, that gives rise to his account of the invariant structure of the human good, and allows Lonergan to propose what is the good of education and educational philosophy.

The remainder of Lonergan’s discussion of the human good concerns its negative counterpart, that is, the structure of evil and the negation of value. This section appears to be largely a refinement of his basic position, but with a strong theological emphasis. Since it does not contribute significantly, however, to a positive account of Lonergan’s contribution to educational philosophy, I will not entertain its many complexities here.

In short, then, Lonergan determines that the question of the good of education springs from the more profound question of the good of anything. The good of anything is understood in terms of its invariant structure that consists of three distinct parts or dimensions—the particular good, the good of order and the apprehension of value.

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67 Ibid., 43-8.
Education and educational philosophy are good to the extent that individuals come to learn through grasping intelligibility in the world of experience, an achievement that understands and creates particular goods. Also, education and educational philosophy are good because they create and engage the good of order, those “setups” that tend to create learners through educational systems and, through educational philosophy, those setups are understood and evaluated, corrected, refined and developed to become more effective producers of the good of order and, derivatively, producers of particular goods. And finally, education and educational philosophy are good because they promote an understanding and apprehension of value in the realms of aesthetics, ethics and religion.

Diversity and Integration of the Human Good

In the next lecture, Lonergan continues his discussion of the features of the human good by probing, in light of its invariant structure, the question of what gives rise to the enormous differences of expression to the human good, and what occurs when those differences coalesce in communities. To answer this, Lonergan turns to the operations of human intelligence that is involved in the production of goods, intelligence that develops and expresses itself in various ways. Drawing on a basic distinction explained in *Insight*, Lonergan differentiates intellectual development and reflective development. Intelligence comes to bear upon a situation composed of sensible data or mental images; insights arise; counsel is sought; policies established; common consent garnered; action taken; new situations arise; new counsel is sought; new policies formed, and so forth; and the process of human life in its communal relations unfolds. Not only are individual goods achieved in this general manner, but the good of order, the “setup” that perpetuates the production of goods, develops and changes. This, in turn, gives rise to an even greater diversity of goods. New equipment is produced, institutions are reformed and new ones created, and the society, at least as a liberal democracy, ideally comes to enjoy more democracy and wider access to higher levels of education. In the process, healthy and happy personal relations develop, and there is realized a “development in taste, in

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68 *Ibid.*, 50. For a fuller account of these operations, see my previous chapter.
aesthetic value ... in ethics, in the autonomy of the subject ... .” As such, intellectual development can occur in any number of directions and, thus, intelligence admits enormous variety of expression of the human good.

The human good, Lonergan maintains, also develops in reference to the third level of consciousness, the reflective level, on which one engages processes that lead to and enhance one’s ability in assessment and judgment. On this level, ostensibly one comes to reflect on the human good as good, on its structure and its processes. It is on the level of judgment that differences arise as to the particular good of order to be created and engaged. Further differences arise in relation to the types of aesthetic, ethical and religious values admitted into one’s life, into society and into a culture, including the depth and breadth of such values. Diversity arises as the invariant structure is given different expression in different groups and societies. While the structure is invariant, its scope of content is enormous, as evidenced in differences between school curricula and systems of school administration.

Lonergan finds further differences also occurring due to the biases that result in failures of development, and in the contamination, so to speak, of the good with the non-good. As discussed in the previous chapter, all insight is subject to bias of some type, and it is the degree of success at overcoming such bias that further accounts for diversity in the human good. To explain diversity on this basis, in this lecture Lonergan briefly recounts his explanation in *Insight* of personal, group and general bias that were shown to mitigate the emergence of insight, and shown to trigger the cycles of decline on the personal, social and cultural levels, and on the scale of civilization itself.

Simply put, human goods are human achievements expressed in the concrete acts of experiencing, understanding, judging and choosing. These acts reflect both the invariant structure of the good, and they account for the diversity in the human good on the social, cultural and civilizational levels. With diversity accounted for, Lonergan moves on in his lecture to discuss integration.

The basis for integration in any society or culture is its *common* sense that develops through shared processes and products of intelligence that create a single body of

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common knowledge. This, in turn, produces goods that can be traced to this common source. Reflecting his treatment of common sense in *Insight*, Lonergan distinguishes four basic models of social interrelations that depict different modes of integration. First, he identifies primitive societies as those whose common culture admits little intellectual differentiations (and hence little diversity, but strong cohesion) among its members. Each member, whether the hunter, the gatherer, the fisher or the gardener, operates in accord with a shared intelligence. Secondly, the society having a more differentiated common sense develops increased specializations of occupations and specializations in knowledge. In such societies there emerge arts and crafts, writing, arithmetic, astronomy and so forth. Thirdly, there emerges a new model of social life with the development of a distinct intellectual class that creates new modes of critical thought and analysis. Early forms of this appeared in classical Greek culture, and developed in Western civilization into what Lonergan calls “classicism.”

The most recent mode of social life, in the fourth place, has developed where the intellectual achievements in abstract thought and analysis have become increasingly applied to concrete social and historical contexts, the effect being, Lonergan explains, the emergence of “historical consciousness.” Historical consciousness is characterized by the realization that human beings “are more the masters of our own destiny than we had thought,” and that “the entire fabric of human existence appears as a historical product, as the result of man’s apprehension, judgment, choice, action.” The importance of historical consciousness in Lonergan’s educational thought can hardly be overstressed, for in speaking of the great need for Catholic education to “rise to the level of the times,” he means for it to come to terms with—to understand and integrate—historical consciousness in its educational philosophy. He explains:

Are we to seek an integration of the human good on the level of historical consciousness, with the acknowledgement of man’s responsibility for the

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human situation? If so, how are we to go about it? These are the fundamental questions for a philosophy of education today. There is a need for a philosophy on the level of our time, a philosophy that is concrete, existential, genetic, historical, a ‘philosophy of ...,’ and Catholic. There is required, too, and education that is on the level of our time.\textsuperscript{80}

Achieving an integration of historical consciousness into philosophy and educational philosophy is clearly the challenge Lonergan perceives for educators today. In effect, this means for him a challenge to integrate his intentionality analysis into philosophy and educational philosophy.\textsuperscript{81} He states, “... historical consciousness emerges when there is grasped the relevance of human intelligence and wisdom to the whole of human life.” While Lonergan does not intend significantly to meet the challenge in these lectures, he does articulate the challenge as he perceives it. He suggests it is his analysis of human intentionality that rises to the level of the challenge.

In short, Lonergan presents in this lecture aspects of diversity and integration of the human good, both of which, I point out, draw directly on his intentionality analysis. These aspects of the human good and insight address what Lonergan identifies as the contemporary mode of social life, namely historical consciousness. It is coming to terms with historical consciousness that constitutes the basic challenge for education and educational philosophy that needs to rise to the level of the times. In what follows, Lonergan expands on the meaning of this challenge.

Human Development

Following the lectures on the invariant structure of the human good and his account of differences and integrations, in the next lecture Lonergan relates the human good to an account of the human person as a developing subject. His account of the developing subject, again, rests on an account of the human subject with respect to the differentiated and interrelated operations of consciousness. Lonergan very briefly restates his

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}, 78. The editors note that Lonergan adopts the phrase, “level of our time” from the writings of Ortega y Gasset who, as a philosopher of education, they also note, likely has influenced Lonergan’s thought on education.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Ibid.}, 76.
explanation in *Insight* of human consciousness as operating on four levels, the empirical, the intellectual, the rational levels, and the level of self-consciousness.  

In this rendering, Lonergan gives much stronger emphasis to the question of horizon (perhaps reflecting his engagement of existentialist themes noted in the "Editors' Preface") and to the question of the "flow" of consciousness. Human consciousness is not a rigid structure but a flow of awareness that finds direction from our various concerns, spreading out to the edges of our horizon of awareness; it is a horizon that is on the move. The flow of consciousness issues forth in patterns of experience as consciousness seeks to find or create order among the elements of experience, and as consciousness establishes itself in a "directed organization of selected data." 

In the flow of consciousness there are various patterns of experience, but given the context of education and educational philosophy, Lonergan profiles most prominently the intellectual pattern of experience. Accordingly, we find here a further elucidation of its chief characteristics identified in *Insight*: wonder, the pure desire to know, questioning, and the aim to know being. In the intellectual pattern of experience there can be distinguished the known, the known unknown, and the unknown unknown. As one moves from the latter to the former, one develops intellectually, that is to say, one's horizon develops. All patterns of experience potentially undergo development, but it is in reference to the intellectual pattern of experience that Lonergan addresses the question of human development. While in *Insight* Lonergan has provided a much more extensive and detailed account of development in terms of genetic development, as will be discussed in chapter four, his angle here concerns three distinct types of development—development of horizon, philosophic development and moral development.

Lonergan's lecture moves forward from the following general statement on the nature of development.

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82 Ibid., 81-2; Crowe notes the various terms Lonergan uses in speaking of the fourth level, "An Exploration of Lonergan's New Notion of Value," 56.
83 Ibid., xiii.
84 Ibid., 83-5.
85 Ibid., 83.
86 Ibid., 86-8.
87 Ibid., 89-90.
Development depends upon, and is measured by, not so much the external objects with respect to which one operates as the organization of one’s operations, their reach, their implications, the orientation of one’s living, of one’s concern. Development retains all that was had before and adds to it, and it can add to it enormously. It eliminates previous evils by finding a higher integration in which the problems solve themselves. It finds this higher integration by working, not at the periphery but at the root, at the Sorge, at the concern, and by effecting the shift from the concern that is all too human to the spiritual aspiration of man that has its fundamental and first appearance in the pure desire to know that grounds the intellectual pattern of experience and sets the standards for one’s morality.\textsuperscript{88}

Unlike in \textit{Insight}, here Lonergan does not draw explicitly on the antecedent notions of systems and schemes of recurrence, of heuristic structures, or on the more technical aspects of higher-level integrations. Rather, he launches directly into a description of the development in the intellectual pattern of experience and its three distinct types. First, horizon development can occur in reference to the objects of knowledge and the methods of investigation such as what occurs in scientific development. In this case, the results, if they are genuine developments, come to be universally adopted in that scientific knowledge tends to be accepted by all scientists. For instance, space science is applicable to the Americans as well as the Russians.\textsuperscript{89} The results are also permanent achievements in that they establish their place within an accepted body of knowledge and contribute to future development and advancements. In that scientists generally do not abandon later proven theorems to revert to earlier positions within a paradigm, the development is a forward, progressive movement.\textsuperscript{90}

By contrast, in a second mode of development, the philosophic (by which Lonergan means development not only in philosophy but also in theology, the human sciences and their cognate disciplines), development occurs as an expansion of horizon, a development that, unlike in the sciences, is not universal or permanent.\textsuperscript{91} This mode of development

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, 92.
\textsuperscript{89} In my estimation, Lonergan seems to hold to a highly inflated confidence in the universality of science and the effectiveness of scientific method. This is a concern I will return to in the concluding evaluative chapter. Lonergan’s position on the structure and operations of human consciousness could still be made effectively by recognizing more widely the contingency of scientific knowledge and scientific method itself.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Topics in Education}, 92-4.
\textsuperscript{91} Again, the universality and permanence of scientific knowledge will be questioned in the concluding chapter.
occurs as positions are taken, or as opposing positions are adopted. Positions once rejected can be revived and readopted, and old inspirations may be revitalized. Different and opposing horizons emerge, recede, expand or collapse altogether. The difference between scientific and philosophic development results from a difference in the content of the horizon. In science, the content includes its "concepts, postulates, axioms, methods...." In the philosophic horizon, the content not only includes these knowledge categories, but also the human subject. This horizon encompasses the knowing subject, and any change in this horizon, Lonergan explains, requires some change in personal stance, some change in the life of the person.

The most complex mode of development, in the third place, is moral development, complex both in its actualization and complex in its theoretical understanding. This horizon of development pertains to a development of the notion of the human good as it relates to the achievement of particular goods, to the good of order, and to the apprehension of values. As such, moral development concerns individual judgments and choices, willing and human action; and the variety of expression of such development is enormous. Further, a thorough understanding of the moral horizon must take into account not only the intellectual and rational dimensions of thought and action, but also the symbolic and affective. Such understanding, for Lonergan, is obtained in reference to the invariant structure of the human good, to ordering one's life in accord with that good (that is, emphasizing responsibility for producing and participating in the good, as opposed merely to following some law, some rule or code of conduct). One thus becomes engaged in ethical action that advances the human good on the level of particular goods, the level of the good of order and in terms of the apprehension of value. Moral development involves an appreciation and actuation of the good on its various levels.

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92 Ibid., 93.
93 Ibid., 94-96. Lonergan later develops this notion as a question of conversion on the intellectual, ethical and religious levels. See Method in Theology, 217, 237-44.
94 "It [moral development] is a type of development that is extremely complex not only in itself but also in thought about it." Ibid., 96.
95 Ibid., 96-8. Here Lonergan recognizes the place and importance of the symbolic and affective, and indeed it is important to educational philosophy. Recognizing this importance as well, others such as Robert Doran, noted earlier, and Mark Doorley, focusing on Lonergan's potential impact on education and educational philosophy, have explored this dimension of his thought. Mark Joseph Doorley, "The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality of Bernard Lonergan," (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1994).
96 Ibid., 104-6.
with the emphasis being on the active side rather that on the side simply of moral knowledge. Being moral, most importantly, involves moral action, for it is action that constitutes the real moral dimension, action that is concrete and historical, at least in the sense of being connected to human intelligence as manifest in actual judgments and choices. From his relatively brief account of human development (which provokes the question of it being adequate since Lonergan himself suggest the matter is "extremely complex"), Lonergan notes certain corollaries for education.

In the first place, education is a matter of constructing one's own world by achieving personal development through expanding one's own horizons. It is what one does for oneself. The educator can provide guidance to the student along the line of intellectual development, but if as a student one does not make the effort to expand one's own horizon, any effort of the teacher ultimately comes to no effect, and genuine development does not occur. Rather than imposition, then, a better mode of education is to nurture the desire to know and to evoke questions and to welcome curiosity. Building on the natural tendency to ask questions, the teacher needs to control and direct the questions, to teach students the art of question-asking, and to press them on the hard questions without stifling the flow of questions. To this end, the educator may engage what Lonergan calls "active method." Here the appeal is to "more fundamental potentialities represented, for example, by the wonder of desiring to understand, a wonder which is unlimited in its scope, and by its corollaries in the affective field and in the field of the will." In active method, the student encounters other questions, symbols, and expressions that appeal to the unfamiliar, to potential interests, to the problems with the status quo. It is a method designed for one to see that broader horizons are needed in order to achieve more satisfactory answers.

As a second corollary, moral education depends on the ability to distinguish different patterns of experience, particularly the ability to distinguish the intellectual and the

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97 Ibid., 106.
98 Ibid., 103-4.
99 One wonders as to how Lonergan harmonizes these remarks with his disparaging comments on progressive education in the opening lecture.
100 Topics in Education, 104.
101 Ibid., 105.
moral, and to distinguish the intellect from will.\textsuperscript{102} While the moral dimension is implicit in a great variety of topics of study, such as is found in art, in language study, history, and so forth, it is usually later in intellectual development that moral issues become differentiated within these areas of inquiry. When this occurs, Lonergan explains, distinct sets of questions and problems can be treated and solved utilizing their own modes of explanation, theories, and solutions.\textsuperscript{103}

And thirdly, in reference to philosophy of education, education involves not only the horizon development of the student, but in important ways, too, the horizon of the teacher, the mentor, the professor, the administrator. Problems in education, Lonergan believes, can be traced to problems with the development and enlargement of the horizons of the “educationalist,”\textsuperscript{104} and of the teacher. That enlargement requires a transformation of the person from the small private world of the individual to the “universe of being,” and when such development on the part of the teacher or educationalist has been impeded or imbalanced, the good that is achieved through education is diminished.\textsuperscript{105}

With this account, then, of the human good, covering three lectures, the scope of Lonergan’s educational vision begins to come into view (a vision that I will develop more systematically in the following chapters), and the answer to the question of the good of education unfolds in terms of the profound questions of self-transformation and of the transformation of being itself (although Lonergan’s discussion of this is very brief).

In short, then, the primary topic addressed by Lonergan in this lecture centers on the issue of personal development and growth that pertains to the knowing processes, and the orientation and transformations of one’s own consciousness. For Lonergan, this pertains to differentiating the various “internal” operations of the knowing process, and of willing and doing. In education this differentiation applies not only to the student in intellectual and moral development but to the educationalists and teachers who manage and operate the educational “good or order.” This, then, provides the framework for discussing other

\textsuperscript{102} By the time of these lectures, Lonergan has not completely abandoned certain terms used in faculty psychology, such as ‘will,’ but they increasingly become less significant in his work.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 105-6.
\textsuperscript{104} Lonergan describes “educationalists” as “the person or group that has the power and the money, that runs the bureaucracy, that makes the decisions.” Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
topics in education that Lonergan addresses in the remaining lectures. His treatment here of the human good encapsulates in briefest of form what Lonergan constructed over seventeen chapters of *Insight*, and finally what he formulated in chapter eighteen as “The Possibility of Ethics.” With Lonergan’s position set forth on the human good, along with its implications drawn for education and educational philosophy, in the remaining lectures Lonergan addresses various subject areas commonly covered in formal educational programs—mathematics, science, philosophy, art and history. I will examine briefly his key assertions on these topics to understand more fully Lonergan’s engagement of educational issues.

**Mathematics and the New Learning**

The next main topic Lonergan addresses focuses on a new mode of understanding and doing mathematics. In order to highlight the new, Lonergan describes the old learning, and he does so in reference to pre-classical and classical modes of understanding. A pre-classical horizon was limited to a concern with the concrete, practical world of survival and of making one’s way in the world. In this horizon, human insight focused on commonsense situations and, as the insights of the group became accumulated, there emerged some common understanding of what it meant to be wise or silly, intelligent or stupid, brave or cowardly, just or unjust. What cannot be done within such a pre-classical mode of consciousness, however, is to develop universal definitions.

Next, the classical mode of understanding emerged with the flourishing of Greek culture in which arose the ability to generate universal definitions through gaining insight into sensible data, by abstracting the essential and universally valid features of things, and in distinguishing these from the particular, the accidental. A key intellectual achievement in classical thought was to distinguish matter from form. By this process, Lonergan explains, the Greeks began to operate in the intellectual pattern of experience and, citing Jacques Barzun and others, Lonergan explains the Greeks came to “discover”

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106 One main illustration of such classical thought Lonergan draws on is the definition of a circle in Euclidian geometry. Classic thought sought to postulate the abstract formulation of all circles, not just some circles. *Topics in Education*, 110-3.
The classical mindset sought to achieve universally valid understanding, and to develop modes of reasoning, deduction and theory based on universal definitions, principles, axioms, and postulates.

In recent times, Lonergan holds, there have been significant developments beyond the classical mode of understanding as evident in a new “versatility of understanding.”108 This relatively profound shift may be seen in the development of a new method of geometry and mathematics, where the old mode of drawing conclusions from “necessary, self-evident truths” became supplanted by a “hypothetico-deductive” method which operates by selecting a number of axioms, postulating them, and determining the validity of those assumptions based on the results of those assumptions.109 This new versatility of understanding in the field of mathematics led to greater demand for rigor that, around the turn of the twentieth century, gave rise to the development of symbolic logic. Lonergan suggests, “by using symbolic logic mathematicians have been able to work out properties of rigorously deductive systems and to discover the limitations of such systems ...”110 In this shift, the very process of deduction, Lonergan explains, underwent development and expansion. Deduction was no longer simply a matter of adding “more conclusions on to your deductive structure, but moving from a lower one to a higher one.”111

Further, the new versatility of understanding appears in refining the mode of abstraction where the results of abstraction have come to be determined by the field of data to which an explanation applies. Lonergan describes this new mode of abstraction as finding the intelligible within the sensible field of experience.112 The process of abstraction that determines the relevant by stripping away the irrelevant has become refined in that the issue becomes a matter of determining “the relations between

107 Ibid., 118-21. Although Lonergan’s lectures predates by a year Bruno Snell’s publication of The Discovery of Mind (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960), Lonergan draws on this work in support of a similar intellectual history in Method in Theology, 90-9. I think this term represents what Lonergan seeks to explain. 
108 Topics in Education, 121.
109 Ibid., 122-3. Lonergan appeals to the “Lobatchevskian experience” as evidence of this shift. 
110 Ibid., 123. Lonergan appeals to the work of Whitehead and Russell, to Goedel and others in showing the new foundations of mathematics. 
111 Ibid., 124.
112 Ibid., 124-5. Lonergan illustrates this in reference to Newton’s discovery of laws of motion and in Einstein’s discovery of the theory of special relativity.
intelligence and sensible data," and creates a versatility of understanding that is "distinctively modern."113

Additional evidence of the new versatility of understanding in mathematics appears in the development of group theory. To show this, drawing on the historical analysis of Pierre Boutroux, Lonergan describes three major phases of mathematical theory. With the Greeks there emerged a mathematics concerned with objects and numbers. This was followed by a development of differential calculus "concerned with understanding the motion in itself qua moving."114 The third major development in mathematics occurred in the emergence of group theory. With group theory the process of abstraction centers upon not the "process of genesis in the object, but the operations of the subject."115 Mathematics in this modern phase stresses the importance of the operations and groups of operations performed by the mathematician or theorist.

The primary point Lonergan endeavors to make in delineating the shift in mathematical learning concerns the shift in focus from the objects of knowledge to the operations of the knowing subject. The new learning has transformed mathematics in a profound way, one that constitutes, Lonergan does not fail to stress, the central focus of his study of human insight.

I may note, finally, that my book Insight is a study of operations. The fundamental operation examined there is the act of understanding, insight. Everything else is defined in terms of one’s experience of insight. Three fundamental levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging are worked out. The universe of proportionate being is found to be isomorphic with the three basic operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging. If the subject will be intelligent and reasonable, if he will perform those operations, he will agree with the conclusions reached in Insight; and if he does not wish to agree with those conclusions, he will have to find some way of building a horizon that will close him off from his own intelligence and his own reasonableness.116

113 Ibid., 125.
114 Ibid., 127.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., 131. It is hoped that the educationalist or teacher considering Lonergan’s work presented in this study will not be alarmed or offended by the imperialist, arrogant tone of this remark, and will consider Lonergan’s self-defense more as an invitation to identify and explore these intentionalities of consciousness within one’s one life, which is really the point of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis presented in his cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. See his introductory remark of Insight, 13-7. I wonder if Lonergan himself is being intelligent and reasonable by suggesting that one must "agree with
With this reference to *Insight*, Lonergan makes one of his clearest statements, notwithstanding its audacious tone, in these lectures as to the central importance his intentionality analysis holds not only for reflection on education, but for all dimensions of human understanding and those activities that draw on understanding.

Thus far, then, Lonergan explains that the shift to the human subject has opened up new vistas of intellectual inquiry resulting in a greatly expanded versatility of understanding that requires, in his view, a new philosophy to account for and integrate adequately that versatility within a general view of existence. The topics in education raised so far—the human good (including its invariant structure, integration, and its representation in human development) and the new learning in mathematics—demonstrate this shift and the complexities it engenders, as well as its daunting challenges for educators. And while that new educational philosophy is suggested, at least up to this point in these lectures, it is merely adumbrated.

**Science and the New Learning**

In the next lecture, Lonergan continues this theme of the new learning but moves his focus to the field of science. The initial question addressed concerns the nature of science itself. Lonergan presents in much abbreviated form the basic assertions in *Insight* on classical and statistical heuristic structures, and outlines his account of the canons of empirical method in which are distinguished the key human cognitive operations of inquiry and understanding. It is not necessary to repeat here Lonergan's position on human understanding discussed earlier in this study. However, it should be noted the effect he believes the new learning has in science.

First, science no longer is viewed in terms of achieving absolute certainty but in terms of determining probability. Scientific knowledge is a matter of judgment, and judgment consists of grasping what are the conditions for determining and for affirming that those conditions are fulfilled. Sound judgment depends on asking relevant questions, and on

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those conclusions” of *Insight*, since not every conclusion of the book may not meet its own criterion of good judgment; there are, in fact, further questions to be raised, as I show in the final chapter.
ascertaining the existence of further relevant questions.117 As such, scientific knowledge is a matter of growth and development that grasp the intelligibility of data in greater and greater detail and complexity.

A further effect of the new learning in science appears in the shift in emphasis from things and causes to analysis and synthesis, from development and utilization of empirical method to determining the relations among the elements constituting some object or objects of study.118 Empirical method replaces the old science of acquiring knowledge of things through determining the essences and deducing properties. In empirical method, “there is an upward spiral from the data through a series of hypotheses until finally there is reached, as it were, a ceiling, a stopping point in this process of moving from data to interrelated premises and conclusions ... .”119

Yet another effect of the new learning in science appears in a change in the notion of science itself where it is found that the objectives of science have shifted from determining laws and systems to determining states and probabilities, and where probabilities determine the states.120 This amounts, in Lonergan’s analysis, to a significant movement in science from the object to the subject, from understanding things to understanding the human processes of understanding. In this there arises a new understanding of the scope, development and contextualization of human knowledge. One’s perception of the world and the entire universe, accordingly, becomes fluid and relative to one’s horizon and point of view.

On the topic of science then, Lonergan seeks to demonstrate to his audience the widespread effect of the new learning, and again we see at various points the connections made to his intentionality analysis, at least in reference to heuristic structures, the canons of empirical method, and his emphasis on probability. While Lonergan does not explore in any substantive way the impact these dimensions of insight have in educational philosophy, clearly, Lonergan suggests the relation, and while he is limited to what he can accomplish in ten short lectures, I take this as further invitation for the study and expansion I present in subsequent chapters. Where Lonergan broaches the nature of

117 Ibid., 148-50.
118 Ibid., 154-5.
119 Ibid., 155-6. This appears what Lonergan means, at least in part, by “finality,” and how it operates within the framework of human intentionality.
120 Ibid., 157.
human understanding, there come into view the philosophical questions of determining what is real and of developing some particular notion of being. From the question of science, then, Lonergan moves in the next lecture to the philosophical questions of meaning and of grasping what is real.\footnote{121}

**Theory of Philosphic Differences**

The problem Lonergan addresses in this lecture concerns educational philosophy’s rather lofty goal of establishing truth criteria and determining value in the vast and growing literature related to the field of education.\footnote{122} In light of the new learning in mathematics and science, there has been a remarkable shift in understanding the objects of science and in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge no longer concerns some absolute immutable truth, but concerns the development of understanding and achieving greater degrees of probability where understanding becomes verified in the data.

Lonergan explains that, while mathematics and science have undergone such a transformation, there has not occurred in the human sciences a similar transformation in understanding the human subject.\footnote{123} This, Lonergan believes, has led, at least in part, to philosophical differences and conflicts, and only in the measure that “the problems of differences can be got round somehow,” can philosophy of education realize one of its “great utilities”, namely, providing “ultimate criteria for judging the truth and estimating the value of what is to be found in the constant, enormous flow of books and articles for educators.”\footnote{124} Lonergan explains how one can find their way through these problems, and come to terms with philosophical differences. Essentially, philosophical differences concern different views of self-understanding and views of reality, and they can arise in a variety of ways.

First of all, changes in understanding objects of study can effect a change in the individual engaged in understanding. This can occur in terms of habit of thought where, for instance, one understands geometry a certain way and this affects how one
understands other things, such as the processes of grasping necessity and impossibility in sensible data. Again, an understanding of space can have a profound affect on how we perceive ourselves and our world. A prime example of this may be found, Lonergan suggests, in the effect the theory of special relativity has had in a contemporary understanding of the world. The relation of understanding things and understanding oneself is further illustrated by the intersubjective nature of human consciousness. There are phenomena, such as the smile, that rely on the connection between human subjects for determining meaning. Grasping meaning depends on the full complex of the interpersonal situation. Put generally,

Intersubjective phenomena are not about something; they are determinants within an interpersonal situation. The whole development of consciousness can be of that type. A fundamental part of our knowing, or ordinary living, is on the intersubjective level. The feelings we have with different persons unconsciously determine a great part of our dealings with them.

While intersubjectivity remains crucially important in understanding most facets of reality, still, if one interprets reality solely on the basis of intersubjectivity, Lonergan tells us, one will acquire a “mythic consciousness” where everything within one’s horizon is personified.

As another illustration of how we construct the notion of the real from our interaction with the world, Lonergan draws on Piaget’s analysis of the infant coming to encounter the world of objects. Through sensory perceptions the infant interacts with an environment in certain ways. At this stage of development, the infant comes to regard the real world as that which is given in sensory experience. Testing one’s perceptions from various sensory inputs, Piaget maintains, yields a basic understanding of objects that, for all intents and purposes, is counted as knowledge. Based on this process, Lonergan explains, there arises the viewpoint of being as the “already-out-there-now-real.” This

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125 Ibid., 161-2. Reference is made here to Lonergan’s earlier lecture that deals with processes of understanding in geometry.
126 Ibid., 162-5.
127 Ibid., 166-7.
128 Ibid., 167.
129 Ibid., 168.
viewpoint establishes itself through the developments and sensory refinements occurring in infancy and childhood, and constitutes a formidable opponent to other views of being and reality. In other words, we tend to regard that which is real as that which we encounter through the senses and, in effect, regard reality solely as the "things out there." Our sensory encounter with objects in the world greatly influences our understanding of who we, ourselves, are as objects in that world. Lonergan, however, rejects this notion of reality based solely on sensory experience. Knowledge does not consist merely of our immediate experience of the world, nor of our intelligent awareness of things through the complex of sensory engagements of objects in the world. Rather, for Lonergan, knowledge results from the combined process of experience, understanding and judging.

In the remainder of this lecture Lonergan provides an account of his fundamental position on knowing, contrasted by other positions that, by Lonergan's estimation, illustrate philosophic differences on the most fundamental level of questions of knowledge, being and reality. While perhaps many hearing his lectures may be encountering Lonergan's cognitional theory and epistemology for the first time, in this study we are already well acquainted with his position, and there is no need to restate what he presents here to his audience. Rather, let us focus on the educational questions.

One clear point Lonergan makes in this lecture concerns the importance for Catholic educators to broaden their scope of reading and reflection on educational issues, and to overcome their fear of falling prey to modes of thought not compatible with official Catholic dogma. By understanding philosophic differences in terms of cognitional theory and epistemology, Lonergan believes one can gain an effective means of understanding and evaluating different approaches to basic questions of human life and existence, and one is able to determine the validity, or proper scope and relations, of positions according to the various levels of human consciousness. As the levels of experience, understanding and judging are stressed differently in different systems of thought, and as the levels of consciousness are perhaps confused, diminished or ignored,

130 Ibid., 168-70.
131 Ibid., 176-7.
132 Ibid., 177-92.
133 Ibid., 177-8.
different, and sometimes opposing, philosophical positions arise. Lonergan illustrates this by again referring to the analyses of Kierkegaard and Sorokin that distinguish different modes of life and thought.

Lonergan distinguishes philosophical differences in terms of positions and counterpositions, a distinction elaborated more fully in Insight. But basically, "positions are philosophic, ethical, artistic, practical views that are in harmony with the full implications of the three levels."134 "Counterpositions," understood within this framework occur where a "blind spot, a limited horizon" emerges due to one’s thinking having a "limitation to the intellectual level or to the experiential level."135

What is becoming clear, then, in these lectures is the manner in which Lonergan uses his analysis of human consciousness intentionality to understand and assess the stages and processes of development in the many important dimensions of human life, including education. These lectures, it seems, offer merely hints and clues of what this means for education, and to a lesser extent, educational philosophy. It would have been helpful, I believe, to his audience of educationists and teachers had Lonergan himself applied his intentionality analysis more fully to the realm of educational philosophy by relating his position to those of some of well-known philosophers of education, mid-twentieth century. As an expansion of insight to educational philosophy, then, in the following chapters I will undertake such a task. The main exception, however, to Lonergan’s general lack of substantive engagement with important thinkers on education is Piaget, already encountered in Lonergan’s treatment of human development, and to whose work Lonergan turns in the next lecture.

Piaget and the Idea of General Education

Lonergan moves on to address two further topics in education in the next lecture, the emerging field of child cognitive development in the work of Jean Piaget and the matter of general education. Over a long and enormously productive career, Lonergan explains, Piaget conducted and compiled many empirical studies uncovering the cognitive

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
processes infants and children engage when encountering the world and in developing increased sophisticated understandings of the world. Piaget distinguishes and interrelates two key processes in cognitive development, namely, assimilation and adjustment. Basically, for Piaget, development occurs as a “sum of adaptations, and that ... adaptation has two poles, two elements that are at least notionally distinct and can become really distinct.”\textsuperscript{136} Development can occur through adaptation, and adaptation occurs through assimilation and through adjustment.\textsuperscript{137} Assimilation proceeds where some scheme of cognitive operations performed on an object are adapted for performance on another object, and adjustment occurs as the new object necessitates or invites some change in the scheme of operations.\textsuperscript{138} The point of Lonergan’s reference to Piaget appears to be a further illustration of the new subjective turn in understanding the learning processes.

Lonergan goes on to explain other features of Piaget’s notion of development and suggests its utility in explaining “active method” that focuses on the activities of the inquirer rather than on the things done to the object to be understood.\textsuperscript{139} One key element in Piaget’s account of development is its double-pronged, subject-object effect. On the side of the object, the operations of assimilation and adjustment have the effect of ordering the objects of one’s world where the world becomes “a spatially and causally integrated set of objects.”\textsuperscript{140} On the side of the subject, there occurs a change in perception as one increasingly sees oneself as an object in that ordered world; this then opens up the possibilities of a new, different self-understanding. Lonergan explains, “... insofar as the subject becomes capable of decentering, of seeing things from a different viewpoint, in different perspectives, he becomes just another object in his own world.”\textsuperscript{141} While Lonergan finds Piaget moving in a helpful direction by focusing on the processes of human cognition, he maintains that further refinements and developments in the area of human meaning are required.\textsuperscript{142} More specifically, cognitive processes are one thing, engaging them in the construction of a meaningful world another. Lonergan finds in

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 196.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 196-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 197.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 206.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
Piaget a substantial and appealing account of the human subject as a cognitively developing being, but a fuller appreciation of the subjective dimension of cognition and cognitive development is needed, one centering on the differentiation of the various operations of consciousness, that is, an account of experiencing, understanding and judging. Lonergan sees the work of Piaget, perhaps, lending empirical support to certain aspects of his intentionality analysis, but he sees Insight as the more complete account of human cognition.

The second topic discussed in this lecture pertains to general education. Lonergan depicts general education as the mode of learning that provides one with a basic orientation to the world in which the cognitive processes that have produced scholarly achievements in one area are then applied to other areas of study, and permit one to become a specialist in another area, and in some cases several areas. Lonergan finds Piaget's theory of assimilation and adjustment to be relevant to the main theses of general education, particularly regarding the elucidation of the subjective dimensions of learning. According to Lonergan, Piaget complements especially well a program of study commonly associated with general education, that is, a curriculum stressing human subjectivity through language study, study of the arts, literature, history and philosophy, more than the human sciences, and mathematics, and more than the natural sciences.

In short, Lonergan continues the development of his thesis that there has occurred in learning and culture a significant shift to the human subject. His treatment of Piaget and general education illustrate this shift and its importance in education. But while the shift can be detected, it is suggested that a fuller understanding and embrace of this shift may be found in Lonergan's own work on intentionality analysis. Following his treatment of Piaget and general education, Lonergan moves forward in his account of the shift by addressing the topic of art.

\[143\] Ibid., 204.
\[144\] Ibid., 205-6.
\[145\] Ibid., 206. However, if Lonergan's argument is that there has occurred the paradigm shift from the objects of knowledge to the knowing process and the subjective qualities of knowledge not only in mathematics but also in the natural sciences, then what is the need for this sort of curriculum dichotomy, since it all comes to consider in important ways the subjective element, and thus, the qualities of Piaget's assimilation and adjustment, and of transposition of the processes of intelligence from one field of inquiry to another?
To recap, the interpretive framework that I apply to these topics reflects Lonergan’s account of the differentiations of consciousness and products of that differentiation, on the one hand, represented in subject specializations such as mathematics, natural science, philosophy and pedagogical psychology and, on the other hand, the differentiations thematized as a general group of operations of consciousness yielding knowledge, that is, experiencing, understanding and judging. These matters concern largely the questions of theoretical constructions and abstractions. Thus far, I have attempted to show the underlying effect Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has in his treatment of the human good, the new learning in mathematics and science, in understanding basic philosophical positions, in developmental psychology and general education. Lonergan now moves on in the final two lectures to address life in the concrete, and thus he turns his attention first to art and then to history.

**Art**

For Lonergan, the withdrawal to theory anticipates a return to the concrete with a deeper understanding and broader vision of the whole, and with a sense of a greater possibility of fuller “actuation.”\(^\text{146}\) In what may be regarded as an anticipation of certain postmodern themes,\(^\text{147}\) and with the differentiations of consciousness shown to give rise to myriad further differentiations in human subjects in understanding the world of things, Lonergan can now return to the question of the concrete unity of subject and object, with a heightened understanding of both the parts and the whole.

Lonergan begins his remarks on art with reference to the definition proposed by Susan Langer, where she denotes art as, “... an objectification of a purely experiential pattern.”\(^\text{148}\) Lonergan takes great care in elaborating each of these terms and


\(^{147}\) According to some, it was only in the 1960s and 1970s that postmodernism came to be recognized as a distinct philosophical movement. This movement is represented in the work of Jean-François Lyotard and others, who reveal an intense focus on human subjectivity. Lonergan has been plying this line of analysis, but from a different philosophical tradition. See. Michalinos Zembylas, “Jean-François Lyotard,” in *Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education, from Piaget to the Present*, ed. Joy A. Palmer (London: Routledge, 2001), 148-54.

\(^{148}\) *Topics is Education*, 211. The editors note that this precise definition is not found in Langer’s *Feeling and Form*, and seems to be a definition Lonergan created stemming from his reading of Langer.
combinations of terms—pattern, experiential, pure pattern, purely experiential, objectification—and suggests that Langer’s insight into the world of art fits well with his account of consciousness. Langer’s world of art, in Lonergan’s estimation, reflects human consciousness operating on the basic level of elemental encounter with the world and on the level of developing a primary stage of meaning. This level concerns a primary encounter of being prior to the imposition of further levels of order and meaning that eventually come to bear upon human experience, such as what occurs through the intellectual pattern of experience.\(^{149}\) In a move that reflects the basic orientation of the new learning seen in mathematics and science, Lonergan transposes the discussion of art from the realm of the creative expression of artisans to the art that is one’s life, an art that beckons one back to the concrete world of experiencing being in all its feeling of awe, fascination and sense of the uncanny, in all its “openness to the world, to adventure, to greatness, to goodness, to majesty.”\(^{150}\) Reflecting the turn to human subjectivity, Lonergan shifts the questions of understanding art from that of the objects of art to the processes of consciousness, and especially the processes related to the level of pure experience and the emergence of elemental meaning.\(^{151}\)

The experience of being liberated from the constrictions of inquiry’s search for “exact knowledge,” and embracing life in freedom and ecstasy are the elemental materials, the data, so to speak, of art. The experience, however, can be objectified, and thus the subjective becomes objective. Analogously, artistic expression mirrors the process of understanding in mathematics and science that moves the operations of insight to grasp definitions, formulae and hypotheses.\(^{152}\) Art, Lonergan explains, creates the symbols that draw us to the experiences of life and meaning in the concrete world,\(^{153}\) and it is through art that human possibilities and potentialities are explored.\(^{154}\) Lonergan discusses these potentialities of human living in reference to various art forms under his categories of space, time and language, and covers, accordingly, pictures, sculpture, architecture, music, narrative, drama, and lyric.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., 211-7. 
\(^{150}\) Ibid., 214. 
\(^{151}\) Ibid., 216-7. 
\(^{152}\) Ibid., 218. 
\(^{153}\) Ibid., 221. 
\(^{154}\) Ibid., 217, 222.
For Lonergan, the importance art holds as a topic in educational philosophy concerns the vital role art plays in the creative expression of human consciousness and the importance it has in valuing and expressing "inner freedom" essential to the development and flourishing of all dimensions of consciousness. He suggests, "art is a fundamental element in the freedom of consciousness itself. Thinking about art helps us to think, too, about exploring the full freedom of our ways of feeling and perceiving." For Lonergan, art conceived in very broad terms takes on tremendous significance in the educational enterprise by providing the conditions and impetus for personal development, and in overcoming the subject-object bifurcations characteristic of classical thought, such as is exposed in existentialist analysis.

Although the basic structure of the experience of consciousness is set forth in *Insight*, it appears that Lonergan offers through his discussion of art a richer account of the experiential level of consciousness. By interpreting the expressions or forms of art in reference to "purely experiential patterns" and "elemental meaning," Lonergan expands his philosophy of human subjectivity in the area of aesthetics in a way that parallels for art what he suggests of the new learning found in mathematics and science. His intentionality analysis applied to the realm of art provides an understanding of the structure of human consciousness that differentiates various levels of meaning and modes of operations, and understands the domain of aesthetic and symbolic meaning by relating the operations of human consciousness to the affective and symbolic experience of space, time and language. Lonergan's treatment of these topics, he admits, is very sketchy, but it does, in my estimation, represent a clear development in his analysis of insight.

Basically, Lonergan shows that the processes of understanding and judgment lead one to a withdrawal from the world of concrete living, with its order and levels of meaning. The withdrawal, however, occurs in anticipation of a return to that world of concrete living but with an deeper sense of its value, its meaning, its forms, and its potentialities for human life. Where many of the other topics addressed in these lectures, by and large, involve a restatement of some of the basic assertions of *Insight*, in this lecture one finds

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157 *Ibid.*, 228. "I am drawing attention to elementary aspects of consciousness. Since I have to speak in general, and very rapidly, of pictures, statues, architecture, and music, I can do no more than this."
Lonergan expanding on the experiential dimensions of human consciousness, replete with an account of its affective and psychic dimensions. Here Lonergan builds on his intentionality analysis in ways that fill out some of its earlier gaps, and foreshadow later developments that unfold in his theological philosophy and methodology. The few pages in *Insight* on the aesthetic pattern of experience become an entire lecture and chapter in this work, and the dominance of the intellectual pattern begins to become better balanced by the patterns of experience that attend to feeling, freedom and personal encounter. Clearly, the skeletal structure of aesthetics given in *Insight* begins to be filled out more fully here. And while Lonergan limits his engagement of aesthetics mainly to the work of Langer and others outside the field of education, perhaps, by departing briefly from the lectures themselves, the significance of his treatment may be grasped if I relate it more directly to that field.

In educational philosophy, the topic of aesthetic education represents a distinct field of inquiry and analysis, the early expressions of which may be found in the works of the German romantic philosophers. In was not until the 1960s, however, that educators and educational philosophers more widely began to realize and explore the unique contribution art makes in human learning and development. Art education theorist, Bennett Reimer, reveals in his survey of the field the primary features of the discipline as one may find it today. First, the cognitive dimensions of aesthetic education bring to the learner an understanding of form, such as sounds, colors, and actions. In addition to form, aesthetic education enlarges one’s understanding of the content and function, or

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158 Several studies illustrate this development, including Lonergan’s own work in *Method in Theology* (see his section, “Feeling” and his chapter “Meaning”); *Method in Theology*, 30-4 and 57-99, as well as the work of Robert Doran mentioned earlier.

159 In the fourth chapter of this study I will suggest how Lonergan’s intentionality analysis might apply in further ways to the field of art education.


utility, of the various modes of art.\textsuperscript{163} A third significant feature of art education relates to the role one’s feelings play in the apperception of the world and in the construction of meaning. Reimer goes on to explain:

The point is that opportunities to employ feeling in these cognitive operations [of making discriminations between events, of classifying events, of abstracting parts from wholes, of integrating levels of interrelations, of comprehending relations, and so forth], and the experience of the expansion of self such engagements afford, are at the core of the value of the arts and of aesthetic education. The central function of education in the arts is to help all students develop their capacity to gain such cognition, which is likely to be what is of most worth from the arts.\textsuperscript{164}

In addition to the emphases on the cognitive dimension of art education, on the role of operations, and on differentiating the “levels” and the process of development, Reimer’s account of aesthetic education bears further remarkable similarity to Lonergan’s analysis of the subjective side of art typical of the new learning Lonergan profiles throughout his lecture series. Lonergan’s insights on this topic are much more remarkable given that his lectures predate Reimer’s analysis by almost forty years, and occurred prior to the new interest in art education that Reimer suggests began in the 1960s.

Lonergan, I believe, makes a contribution to the philosophy of art education by understanding art in this way. According to Lonergan, art never is regarded as a field of expression and inquiry opposed to the rigors of intellectual analysis, nor is it closed off from the intellectual pattern of experience that unfolds through wonder and flourishes through questioning taken to its limits. Further, for Lonergan, art never is a pastime or an amusement, but rather, in its more developed forms it is a return to the world of experience enriched by the creative and penetrating achievements of intelligence, judgment and good decisions. Moreover, art must be thought of as integral, not peripheral, to a curriculum of study and teaching, for inasmuch as art and art education explore and embrace the ever-greater potentialities of human living through new visions of existence, art and art education remain at the center of human subjectivity. Finally, for Lonergan, art not only is thought of as the handiwork of artisans; it is integral to all

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 154-7.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 160-1.
human beings in that all persons express themselves in the “art of living.” Art is a matter of expressing the experience and process of transforming one’s world and oneself, and a matter of envisioning and achieving greater experiences, wider understandings, and more penetrating judgments within the universe of human existence.

Such, then, is Lonergan’s account of the topic of art confirmed as vitally important to education and educational philosophy in the recent analysis of Reimer. Here again one sees him draw extensively on his intentionality analysis in the discussion. Lonergan’s analysis, I believe, represents a significant development of Lonergan’s own thought in the area of aesthetics and symbol, and pertains to an important field in educational philosophy.

**Human History**

The final topic Lonergan addresses concerns history, an enduring theme in the course of Lonergan’s academic career. He leads off this lecture by stating that reflection on history is “one of the richest, profoundest, most significant things there is.” The first point Lonergan makes concerns the “problem of history,” that is, how is history to be conceived. Simply put, understanding human history, for Lonergan, occurs in reference to the “flow” of human consciousness controlled by “free acts” of individuals that ultimately are the “source of everything distinctively human.” When one understands some segment of history, the locus of that inquiry, Lonergan believes, must be the human subject whose subjectivity creates human history, and whose operations of consciousness result in the insights that provide the structure, content and analysis of history. Given the general scope of what is to be studied in history, Lonergan moves on to consider in the rest of the lecture three broad specializations: the history of philosophy, the history of theology and general history.

The history of philosophy can be constructed around the general positions and counter-positions on the question of knowing and cognition, and on the resulting views of

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165 *Topics in Education*, 233.
167 Neither in these lectures nor in *Insight* does Lonergan explicitly address the question of natural history, this being the larger domain in which human history occurs.
Drawing on the categories established in the lecture on philosophical differences, Lonergan suggests that for history of philosophy the “three basic operations [of consciousness] lead to three modes in which the subject is organized, and that organization of the subject expresses itself in three fundamentally different types of philosophy: empiricist, idealist, or realist.”\footnote{169} Lonergan briefly suggests how these different philosophical positions give rise to different histories. What is of significance in one system of thought is of different, or no, consequence in another; different modes of life emerge and develop; different histories result. For history of philosophy, as in general history,\footnote{170} the crucial question becomes the nature of the position taken by the subject on basic questions of what is to count as knowledge, and the ability that that position has to progress and to develop.\footnote{171}

Next, the history of theology admits a host of problems, not the least being the question of understanding the development of theology as a distinct field of learning and inquiry, along with understanding the emergence of its own method of inquiry, technical language and formulations of beliefs. One of the primary points Lonergan makes is that even in theology, understanding its history centers on an understanding of human consciousness with its differentiations and developments.\footnote{172}

The issue of understanding human subjectivity arises, similarly, in general history. By general history, Lonergan means more than an historical understanding of the specialized areas of human thought and action, such as mathematics, physics, philosophy, theology, military action, technology, and so forth. General history is an account of human thought and action on a wide scale, involving groups, societies, and cultures. This wide-scale account of human living in the concrete pertains to the actual achievement of the human good, or an account of the failure to achieve the human good (that admits, we recall, \footnote{168} One could readily assert that the sequence averred by Lonergan of first cognitional theory, then epistemology, and then metaphysics, may not be the actual sequence of emergence in one’s own thought. That is to say, our metaphysical assertions may influence our position on epistemology and cognition. However, Lonergan’s thought, as a systematic philosophy, unfolds according to this sequence of positions on cognitive experience, and hence his account of the world of being reflects this mode of analysis. \footnote{169} Topics in Education, p. 238. \footnote{170} Ibid., 240. \footnote{171} Ibid. \footnote{172} Ibid., 249-50. For a development of this theme, see Frederick E. Crowe, “Dogma versus the Self-correcting Process of Learning,” in Foundations of Theology, ed. Philip McShane (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), 22-40.}
enormous diversity).\textsuperscript{173} As such, Lonergan explains, there is no one single history for all time, or even one history for all people at any given time.\textsuperscript{174} The problem this presents is one of complete historical relativism in which one might think it impossible to truly know anything of the past, since history changes as people change, and history perceived in one time is different from history perceived in another time.\textsuperscript{175} One may be led to believe there exists no “objective” standpoint from which to “view,” and thus “know,” the realities of the past (a problem, perhaps, reflecting a faulty epistemology stemming from the notion that “knowing” somehow consists of “looking”).\textsuperscript{176} If each group and each individual in the group has an understanding of historical data that never attains the status of true knowledge, then does not history become merely a plethora of equally valid surmises and opinions? The problem presents itself as a radical historical relativism. For Lonergan, however, one can transcend such radical relativism; and understanding the different operations of insight is the key.

Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, while fully appreciating the subjective dimensions of the operations in the concrete expression of insight, while affirming one’s ability and responsibility in directing the flow of consciousness, and while regarding history as ultimately a human creation, has established that the subjective operations proceed from an invariant structure that, as he explains, gives rise to an invariant structure of the human good. Similarly, in historical understanding there is an invariant structure that admits two movements. One movement occurs from data upward through possibilities of understanding to judgment and knowledge. The other occurs in a reverse order from judgment or knowledge to an understanding of the data of experience.\textsuperscript{177} Lonergan describes this structure as scissor-like:

I believe that the scientific approach to general history has to be of the same type as the history of science. In other words; all science is a matter of a scissors action—from above downward and from below upward; data,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} 
Topics in Education, 255.
\item \textsuperscript{174} 
Ibid., 253-5.
\item \textsuperscript{175} 
Ibid., 255.
\item \textsuperscript{176} 
See the widely cited work on this topic, Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
\item \textsuperscript{177} 
Topics in Education, 255-6.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
alone, lack significance; principles and leading ideas, alone, lack reality; it is by the coming together of the two that a science is developed.\textsuperscript{178}

Thus, the structure of human consciousness, in quest of insight, operates by this interplay of data and theory, of experience and ideas, and permits intelligibility to be grasped, articulated, and put to the test in terms of the data given in human experience, and in terms of the satisfying explanatory hypothesis related to that block of experience.

Historical knowledge is not a matter of looking upon or gaping at the data, nor is it a fanciful imagination of what occurred in the past without intense regard to the data of historical experience. Rather, it is an increasingly thorough and complete accounting for the data by theoretical explanations that continually are revised to better account for those data. In other words, history is a matter of insight, that is to say, insight as it unfolds on the level of understanding and of judgment. The result of general history, Lonergan suggests, is not a complete triumph of certitude over relativism, but an historical knowledge that is increasingly sound, and always humbly provisional. “There is going to be a pluralism, and I think that pluralism is more honest and more fruitful than any attempt to select out what everyone can agree on and disregard the rest.”\textsuperscript{179} Simply put, historical understanding strives to discern and affirm the intelligibility in historical data, and, for Lonergan, this depends entirely on the operations of human consciousness striving toward insight and achieving knowledge.

According to Lonergan, then, the question of history, as a question of education and educational philosophy, reflects the shift from the objects of history to the subjective operations of consciousness in constructing historical understanding and in achieving historical knowledge. Again, we see the terms and relations of the “new learning” set forth in reference to the operations of human consciousness, that is to say, the question of history set forth in reference to insight. As a topic in education, Lonergan draws on his intentionality analysis not only to understand some of the basic problems of history in postclassical cultures—for one, pluralism and relativism in tension with determinism and certitude—but also to overcome the radical positions on relativity that deny the

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 251.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 256.
possibility of historical knowledge while still affirming the role of human freedom in making choices and in creating history.

Assessments

As a series of topics in education, Lonergan’s lectures, among other effects, introduce one to his penetrating and nuanced account of the universe of being and of human existence, and the role and challenges that that account presents to education and educationalists and teachers. I will first offer some general criticism of this work and then suggest how these topical studies point to ways in which Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can be expanded into a philosophy of education.

First, let us consider how to propose criticisms, and then focus on specific points. With such a wide-ranging scope of topics, and with his treatment of them sometimes given in very broad terms, it is difficult to determine where to begin a critique. A considerable number of general and far-reaching questions arise. For instance, should one tackle Lonergan on the basis of world history, and question how sufficient, accurate or valid are his analyses of human civilization in terms of the categories of pre-classical, classical, and post-classical societies? Along the same line, are the three main challenges of education—massive illiteracy, specialization of knowledge and the “new learning”—truly the primary challenges (even in his day), and is his characterization of these issues borne out by the historical data? Given my limited focus, then, my criticisms at this point (in addition to what has been raised throughout this chapter) will be in terms of the lectures themselves, and their relation to intentionality analysis, and not in reference to wider fields of learning and analysis broached in various ways in these lectures. The reason for this is that I am aiming at an expansion of Lonergan’s central philosophical position into educational philosophy, and not at an exposition of Lonergan’s thought, generally, on an assortment of educational issues.

The exposition I have offered in this chapter of these lectures show, perhaps more clearly that does the published text itself, the unifying theme of these lectures centering on the subjective turn of the new learning. It, admittedly, has been a daunting challenge
to weave this thread through the vast array of topics Lonergan considers, topics that are not always clearly interrelated, and which exhibit much of the spontaneous character of the spoken word. If one is not quite familiar with Lonergan’s work, one could easily be puzzled as to how these various key and peripheral topics tie together. A conclusion would have provided the means for Lonergan to tie together these various topics and relate them more explicitly to his basic philosophical positions on the nature of human insight and intentionality.¹⁸⁰

A second point of criticism concerns another omission. At the outset of the lectures, Lonergan identifies three new factors that have a profoundly important bearing on contemporary education, factors that make a traditional approach to education outmoded and untenable.¹⁸¹ These are the problems of a rapidly growing world population and mass illiteracy; the new learning; and the increasing specialization in learning and knowledge that is “mountainous and unassimilated.”¹⁸² While three problems are identified, Lonergan focuses almost exclusively on the problem of the new learning, although there are brief passages that deal with the matter of integration of knowledge and the problem of increasing specialization.¹⁸³ There is no explanation given for largely omitting the other two problems, even though Lonergan’s work perhaps could make a major contribution in understanding and solving at least the question of an increasing fragmentation of knowledge due to rapid specialization.¹⁸⁴ As we have seen in the previous chapter, all knowledge, for Lonergan, exhibits the invariant basic structure of

¹⁸⁰ There could be other themes and commonalities that might be discerned within these lectures. For instance, one could have highlighted the curricular nature of the topics Lonergan has identified and perhaps have developed a unifying thesis considering a program of study focusing on the various elements of human subjectivity. As another possibility, one may have been able to trace a thread of concern with theology and Catholic culture throughout the lectures. My focus has been on his intentionality analysis, and thus I have considered the relation these lectures have to the analysis, and what effect this has in a philosophy of education.
¹⁸¹ Topics in Education, 14.
¹⁸² Ibid., 15-8.
¹⁸³ Lonergan, in fact, makes reference to the problem of increasing specialization of knowledge, but in comparison to the time and attention given to the “new learning,” those references seem disproportionately small. On specialization, see Topics in Education, 41, 50-8, 81-2, 176-7, 179, 235, 254 and 256.
¹⁸⁴ Lonergan does pick up the question of specialization later in his career, and in fact constructs his theological method around what he calls “functional specialization,” essentially a methodological answer to the problem of the exponential growth of knowledge and the inability of any one person to grasp it all. See Method in Theology, 125-45. While Lonergan focuses on theological knowledge, it would make an interesting and perhaps helpful study to relate his categories of theological inquiry to the realm of education and educational philosophy. In my view, it would itself be a study, however, of dissertation proportions.
the operations of human consciousness, and while specializations are inevitable and necessary for the advance of knowledge, still there may be found an underlying unity. It is this unity that forms the basis of cosmopolis that in *Insight* envisions the integration of knowledge for the genuine advancement of human life and world harmony. (This will be treated more fully in chapter five of this study.) While Lonergan was limited to the ten days of lectures, and could cover only so much in such a limited timeframe, at least a clearer statement on the nature of these untreated problems could have been offered, along with some indication of a mode of solution.

Thirdly, and most substantially, my complaint about these lectures concerns a lack of explicit methodology, especially noticeable since his work on human intentionality (that informs much of what Lonergan presents on education) is methodological at its core. Throughout the lectures, Lonergan emphasizes the new focus on the human processes of understanding. Among other things, the shift in focus to the human subject has had the effect of moving the crucial questions of learning and education from the products of knowledge, from information, from what is known, to the knowing process. Over the course of the lectures, Lonergan addressed the methodological aspects of this process, such his brief discussion of the canons of empirical method,¹⁸⁵ and where he discusses the theory of philosophic differences.¹⁸⁶ As well, Lonergan makes references to “operations” and “groups of operations” in describing various fields of study and cognitive development.¹⁸⁷ While there are these references to method and operations in these lectures, however, Lonergan does not develop their methodological implications as he does in *Insight*,¹⁸⁸ and he does not seem to apply explicitly any of these methods to his overall treatment of the topics on education. If there exists a methodological structure to these lectures as a whole, it is not explicitly stated. One could argue, perhaps, that the unfolding of the lectures follows the manner in which various subject areas are treated in formal programs of education—philosophy, mathematics, science, psychology, art and

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¹⁸⁵ *Topics in Education*, 141-4
¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 127-32; 168-9; 176-80; 235.
¹⁸⁸ To recall, the four central types of method Lonergan explains in *Insight* are classical method; statistical method; genetic method; and dialectical method. These special methods are rooted in generalize empirical method.
history. If this is so, this is not based on the methodology Lonergan propounds and what one sees developed in *Method in Theology*.

More specifically, the problem is this: without an explicit methodology, the topics treated by Lonergan seem arbitrary, and without a clear movement toward progressive and cumulative results. Throughout the text, one is left wondering where the discussion is going and how things interrelate. In fact, the editors themselves, as mentioned earlier, found it difficult to determine the flow of thought and overall cohesion to the lectures. The overall effect of this renders the lectures something less than a philosophy of education. At minimum, a philosophy of education would have a clearly stated thesis and argument or exposition of material assembled toward its central theme. What we find in the text, however, is an assortment of topics on education, some of which have a bearing on issues in philosophy and educational philosophy. Other topics relate to a host of other matters including pedagogy, modern thought and culture, theology and Catholic faith. In my estimation, a much more focused and fruitful discussion of key issues pertaining to educational philosophy could have resulted had the methodological dimensions of Lonergan's intentionality analysis been explicitly adopted in these lectures. Probing the impact Lonergan's intentionality analysis could have on educational philosophy, especially its methodological dimensions, will constitute the main thrust of the next chapters, and hopefully help model a corrective to what I see as the main deficiency of these lectures.

In putting forth this criticism, and others, however, I do not want to diminish the value Lonergan's insights in these lectures hold for educational philosophy. This can be seen in several areas. First, in this work we find a clear explanation of the good of education and educational philosophy, this given in terms of the good of anything, and the good of anything is explained in terms of the structure and realizations of the human good. They are good, concretely, because of their ability to create and expand particular goods; because education and educational philosophy develop and enhance the systems that are needed and designed to produce and reproduce particular goods; and because they promote the apprehension of value in the realms of aesthetics, ethics and religion. To cast

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189 Later, Lonergan describes method as, "normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." *Method in Theology, 4.*
this in terms of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, the good reflects the levels of human consciousness in that experience corresponds to the concrete good, intelligence and understanding correspond to the good of order, and judgment corresponds to values in the realms of aesthetics (corresponding to experience), ethics (corresponding to understanding and reason) and religion (corresponding to judgment, at least in reference to judgments of value). While there remained to be developed in Lonergan's thought, by the late 1950s, a clearer differentiation and integration of the level of deliberation and decision, the relation is well established between the human good and the four basic levels of human intentionality analysis. In chapter five of this study I will expand on the relation of the human good and insight in terms of the appreciation and development of humanness and its place within the field of educational philosophy.

Secondly, Lonergan provides a theoretical account of the extent and value of diversity in education. In the second of the three lectures dealing with the human good, Lonergan offers a clear articulation of his understanding of how diversity occurs within a cultural horizon, and between cultures that compose a civilization. In recent times, diversity has emerged as an issue garnering some attention in educational philosophy, but Lonergan's analysis, already in the late 1950's, raised this question and, through his understanding of the operations of human consciousness, he sets forth an appreciation of diversity that explains, and provides the basis for appreciating, differences in values and different expressions of the concrete human good. The invariant structure of consciousness informs Lonergan's account of the invariant structure of the human good. The invariant structure, however, admits enormous varieties of expression of the good. While aspects of the "differentials and integrations" are not so strongly developed in

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190 While it seems to me that these divisions and categories are not clean and decisive with one-to-one correspondences with the levels of consciousness, there does seem to be the general correspondence that Lonergan suggests. See Method in Theology, 33-9.
191 See Frederick E. Crowe, "An Exploration of Lonergan's new Notion of Value," 51.
192 Perhaps this analysis of education and educational philosophy of the 1990s captures the importance of diversity. "Within the field narrowed to educational theory, postmodernity is manifested as paradoxes revealed through the seaminess of discourses: discourses (academic, political, or popular) bloat and rupture, showing raggedy stuffing and the tricks of language. At least the shared tragic stories suggest a common experience of the world, a basis from which stories about may originate. But from here on out, any shared vision is likely lost, for in the face of infinite differences and tragedies resulting from conflicts we encounter fundamental philosophical and strategic differences: Is our goal to seek consensus, or to embrace the tragedies of dissensus from the outset?" Megan Boler, "An Epoch of Difference: Hearing Voices in the Nineties," Educational Theory 50, no. 3 (summer 2000): 358-9.
In *Insight*, in these lectures they are given high profile. Lonergan offers a detailed account of the processes engaged in creating particular goods that unfold within the contexts of social groups, of cultures and of the totality of human history. Lonergan further explains that while diversity arises through the processes of development, and hence exhibits its positive qualities, diversity also results from a lack of development where a culture may fail to integrate and interrelate its elements, to expand their meaning, and to contribute to the good of the group (however that might be conceived). This type of diversity is not good, and needs to be corrected or overcome. In general terms, Lonergan provides a framework for understanding "good" diversity and for incorporating diverse expressions of the human good according to higher integrations of human consciousness that contribute to the ongoing effort to grasp the intelligible and the rational, and according to the manner in which human responsibility is embraced in the creation of history.

Basically, diversity arises inasmuch as different expressions of the human good occur on the various levels of its invariant structure—on the level of particular goods, on the level of the good of order, and on the level of the apprehension of value. While diversity is a given, inasmuch as the various levels of consciousness are engaged in the production of human goods, understanding and integrating the diversity of the human good represents a profoundly important *educational* question. And it is chapter five that I will consider diversity as a more distinct issue in educational philosophy, especially as it is related to the derivative question of integration envisioned in Lonergan's notion of world culture. Here I note simply that the question of diversity appears as a development of his notion of the human good in *Insight*, and that Lonergan finds of the question of integration as having importance in understanding education.

Thirdly, Lonergan introduces the notion of "active method" as a mode of learning that draws explicitly on the emergence of wonder and affective commitment that occurs spontaneously in human consciousness. Although Lonergan's description of the method is preliminary in tone and relatively undeveloped, some of its basic features are clear. It is a method that directs question-asking to the unfamiliar and the unknown based on an

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193 *Topics in Education*, 78.
understanding of the dynamism of one’s consciousness. In encountering the new and unfamiliar, one’s horizon of interest and concern expands, more satisfying answers can be grasped, and students are able better to concretely construct their own world. The principle underlying active method lies not in the external conditions of objects within a learning situation, but in the internal structure and operations of one’s own consciousness. While only hints and sketches are given by Lonergan on the topic of active method, it seems that significant potential exists in expanding on this notion and perhaps developing a new mode of pedagogy, such as what has occurred recently in the emergence of constructivism. Such pedagogy would be rooted deeply in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and its concomitant educational philosophy. It would be a pedagogy that differentiates explicitly the various levels of human consciousness, understands the different questions appropriate to those levels, and envisions in broad terms the results of personal, social, cultural and historical construction and development. While Lonergan unfortunately does not explore the possibilities for educational philosophy along these lines, others have. At any rate, while the lectures overall lack a strong methodological dimension, at least in terms of active method we see Lonergan beginning to raise the methodological question in relation to education.

And fourthly, in what appears to be a significant development in his thought on education, Lonergan addresses the topic of art and art education and introduces more fully the affective and symbolic dimensions of consciousness, along with the crucially important matter of freedom and creativity. While the intellectual pattern of experience tends to draw one away from the concrete into the realm of theoretical meaning and abstraction, a realm that necessitates some measure of detachment from immediate

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194 It appears that Lonergan may have coined the term “active method” or have adopted it from some source extraneous to educational philosophy. Active method, if it is a term used in education, it does not appear to be commonly used and is not indexed in the literature in the field.
195 Constructivism is based on an epistemology that regards knowledge “as temporary, developmental, non-objective, internally constructed, and socially and culturally mediated.” Its roots have been traced to Piaget’s theories of cognition. Catherine Twomey Fosnot, Constructivism: Theory, Perspectives, and Practice (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996), ix, 3.
experience, Lonergan explains, it is in the aesthetic pattern of experience that a person is brought initially, or by way of return, to encounter the concrete world of feeling, symbol, and the sensory context of life. Where *Insight* emphasizes the intellectual dimension of consciousness, Lonergan provides a counterbalance by expanding on the experiential dimensions of consciousness in his lecture on the various aspects of art and its centrality in human living; that is, the "art" of human living. A philosophy of education stemming from Lonergan’s position on art, then, would require a thorough understanding and integration of the affective and symbolic, the creative and emancipatory qualities of conscious within the overall educational enterprise. While Lonergan touches upon these themes briefly, the full impact of Lonergan’s view of art in education and educational philosophy remains to be explored.

The lectures, as a whole, reveal various ways in which the basic philosophical position Lonergan has developed in *Insight*, as well as further aspects of conscious intentionality developed since its original publication, relate to various topics in education. Unfortunately, this relation between intentionality and some of the topics Lonergan treats is not often explicitly set forth in the lectures. However, Lonergan’s does often present clues as to what a philosophy of education “consonant with the theory of knowledge and philosophy” might, at least in part, entail, but it is in the following chapters of this study that a more direct relation will be considered between Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and educational philosophy. It is an expansion that will unfold more as a systematic exploration of educational philosophy than the topical treatment Lonergan has provided in these lectures.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Intentionality Analysis and Educational Philosophy:
Structure and Process

Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.¹

The previous chapter considered Lonergan’s thoughts on various educational topics, particularly as they relate to the broader context of his intentionality analysis. In ranging widely over the educational landscape, the “Cincinnati Lectures” do not exhibit a clear recognition of many key issues in educational philosophy at the forefront of discussion in the late 1950s.² Lonergan could have related certain aspects of his intentionality analysis more directly to the climate of educational philosophy of that era, in a similar way that his thought can be expanded, as I hope to show, to help bring insight and clarity to some of the issues in educational philosophy today. This chapter will constitute the first phase of this expansion that will lead, in a systematic manner, into a second phase expansion in the next chapter. To recall, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis largely unfolds in answer to three basic cognitive questions, and in answer to the basic existential question. His cognitional theory answers the question “What does one do when one knows?” His epistemology answers the question, “Why is doing that called ‘knowing.’” His

¹ *Insight*, 22.
² See the survey: Walter Feinberg and Jason Odeshoo, “Educational Theory in the Fifties: The Beginning of a Conversation,” *Educational Theory* 50, no. 3 (summer 2000): 289-306. They identify some of the salient topics in educational theory as progressivism, reconstructionism, experimentalism, and some of the key philosophical themes as transcendental realism, pragmatism, logical positivism, cultural relationism and existentialism as expressed mainly in the work of Sartre and Kierkegaard. As well, articles of note appearing in the 1950s focus on the works of John Dewey, Charles Pierce, G. F. W. Hegel, Aquinas, Josiah Royce, Edmund Burke, John Henry Newman, Matthew Arnold and Martin Buber. Lonergan touches upon a few of these topics, themes and writers, but by comparison, his treatment is rather limited.
metaphysics answers the question "What does one know when that is done?" These cognitive questions lead to the existential, and thus ethical, question of what one is to do about what one knows. This chapter and the next will follow, roughly, this philosophical differentiation of questions. Here I will consider Lonergan’s cognitional theory and epistemology as they relate directly to important elements in educational philosophy. In four sections, this chapter will discuss: Lonergan’s basic philosophical orientation; intentionality and the impetus for education; the self-correcting process of learning; and development and progress in relation to intentionality.

Lonergan’s Philosophical Orientation

Understanding the general character of Lonergan’s philosophy is key to understanding the manner in which Lonergan’s intentionality analysis may be expanded into the realm of educational philosophy. The discussion offered in this section will cover the empirical base of his philosophy and its general methodological orientation.

The Empirical Base

Lonergan’s point of departure in exploring the phenomenon of insight, reminiscent perhaps of Dewey’s overriding educational concern, is the human person in the concrete experience of life. Specifically, that point of departure for Lonergan is the experience of consciousness, at least as he uniquely articulates it. When one has an experience of some kind, more often than not one’s attention is drawn to the physical object or some event that is related to that experience. While the object remains an important element in the experience, Lonergan’s interest is in the experience of the experience, that is to say, on

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3 See Lonergan’s statement on the division of the three fields of philosophical inquiry in Method in Theology, 25.
4 It should be noted that the division cannot fall neatly or sharply into four categories. This is due in part to the fact that there is a great deal of interrelation, interdependence and overlap between cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics clearly evident in the field of educational philosophy. Educational philosophy as a system of thought draws on all four lines of inquiry making it difficult to make assertions in one without concomitant assertions in the others. I propose by this differentiation to follow Lonergan’s lead and to present a systematic treatment that Lonergan’s thought inspires.
the experience of consciousness. Throughout his work on insight there remains always the reference to one’s experience as it builds in the accumulation of sense data and as it expands with the mounting of mental images. New experiences emerge as those data of sense and images acquire meaningful relations and ever more meaningful integrations within one’s life. Lonergan maintains that an evaluation of his analysis involves attending to one’s own experiences of knowing and deciding, discovering the differentiations and dynamism of one’s own consciousness, and then to verify within that subjective field the operations and interrelations he has identified.

Lonergan’s intentionality analysis rests upon the actual experience of knowing and deciding, and its verification depends upon a personal analysis of these qualities. As such, his aim is not a development of an abstract philosophy so much as it is an understanding of the human experience in terms of the experience of the internal operations of consciousness. Lonergan is clear on this:

... the whole point of the present answer [to what is the nature of insight] would be missed if the reader insisted on concluding that I must be engaged in setting forth lists of abstract properties of human knowing. The present work is not to be read as though it described some distant region of the globe which the reader never visited, or some strange and mystical experience which the reader never shared. It is an account of knowledge. Though I cannot recall to each reader his personal experiences, he can do so for himself and thereby pluck my general phrases from the dim world of thought to set them in the pulsing flow of life.

For Lonergan, the first and preeminent requirement in understanding his general philosophy, and thus a philosophy of education emanating from it, becomes an exposition and thorough understanding of one’s experience, of being an understanding, knowing and responsible person. He explains further, “... the point here, as elsewhere, is appropriation; the point is to discover, to identify, to become familiar with, the activities of one’s own intelligence ...” The intentionality analysis that arises from this requires

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5 In *Method in Theology*, 14. Lonergan speaks of “experiencing one’s experiencing ...” This is difficult to conceptualize, and it is not altogether clear to me what the difference is between simply “experiencing” and “experiencing one’s experiencing.” At any rate, the point I wish to make is that the basic reference point of Lonergan’s philosophy is human experience.

6 *Insight*, 13.

an educational philosophy to be fully attuned to the intentional experiences of the individual. While Lonergan’s cognitional theory is basic to his intentionality analysis, Lonergan’s primary commitment in his analysis is not to the theory but to the human experience of being conscious and being cognitive, that is, of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible.

Perhaps Lonergan’s approach can be clarified by contrasting it with one postmodern philosophy that also stresses the importance of human experience, one that seems to enjoy a strong adherence in certain sectors of educational philosophy today. Jean-Francois Lyotard has emerged as a thinker of key importance. His critique of modern philosophy has been extensive, radical and de-centering. He rejects the long-held legitimacy of the “Grand Narrative” of Western culture in which specific rules of knowledge, emancipation, meaning and truth are thought to govern science, technology, education and all of modern culture. Philosopher Michalinos Zembylas explains, “Lyotard examines the collapse of such ‘Grand Narratives’ and suggests that they must give way to less ambitious petits récits, little narratives, that resist closure and totality.”

With the hegemony of Enlightenment epistemology dismantled, along with its rigid social order, the hope is that novel questions and new modes of inquiry can be embraced and legitimized. Given this new openness toward thought and life, there emerges a celebration of “the ill-defined, the unknowable, the irreducible, the unpresentable, that resist global categorization.” For Lyotard, the structures of knowledge and the resulting power relations reflecting Enlightenment thought and culture have collapsed. In their place, the human subject has emerged as all-important, expressing personal subjectivity, however that may manifest itself.

Lonergan’s orientation to philosophy can be understood in reference to this relatively recent development in philosophical thought. Lonergan’s general philosophical approach, and hence a Lonerganian approach to educational philosophy, it seems to me, embraces

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aspects of the thought of Lyotard while upholding some aspects of Enlightenment thought. On the one hand, Lonergan affirms a “meta-narrative,” so to speak, by identifying the prevenient structure of human consciousness in which are identified various distinct but interrelated operations that “govern” the possibility of knowledge, and that constitute a “normative” pattern for knowing and doing. Lonergan explains: “The detached and disinterested desire to know and its unfolding in inquiry and reflection not only constitute a notion of being but also impose a normative structure upon man’s cognitional acts.” A statement sounding more antithetical to Lyotard, I imagine, would be difficult to find. On the other hand, Lonergan may find a receptive hearing among these thinkers, for not only is his philosophy rooted in the individual human subject, but its referent, that is, its source of justification and verification (although Lyotard may not be concerned at all with this), is the functioning, intending human subject. Lonergan explains the connection this way: “The result [of a philosophy of being] can exist in a self-affirming subject, and the process can be produced only by the subject in which the result is to exist. It follows that the directives of the [philosophical] method must be issued by the self-affirming subject to himself.” The combination of the subjective and the normative in Lonergan both appreciates a universality that allows for scientific and other types of meaningful collaboration, and offers a response to the de-personalization and disembodiment of the knowing subject, such as is found in the philosophy of Karl Popper. As we have seen in chapter two, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, while focusing on human experience, exhibits features that avoid a radical personalization of meaning and a concomitant recasting of knowledge in largely self-referent terms that may too easily uphold and value the irrational and absurd as legitimate forms of knowledge. If the irrational and absurd were admitted as legitimate forms of knowledge, any criteria of

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12 Insight, 420.
13 Ibid., 423. Lonergan specifically is speaking of metaphysics and a method of metaphysics which he denotes as “what one knows when actual knowledge occurs.” Cf. Method in Theology, 25.
14 One of the overriding reasons for Lonergan’s interest in science as an exemplar of human knowing is its success, manifest in the widespread acceptability and verification of its assertions. This potential of scientific knowledge to transcend many cultural boundaries and allow for scientist of varying backgrounds to collaborate on a wide scale. It is difficult to speak of “Enlightenment” without gross generalizations and oversimplifications.
15 This position has received a clear expression in the work of, for instance, Karl Popper, especially in his essay, “Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject,” in Philosophy Today, No. 2, ed. Jerry H. Gill (Toronto: Macmillan, 1969), 228-74.
"knowing" based on "outside" verification would have to be surrendered. We would have no way of judging what it means to make sense. In recognizing and elucidating the normative dimension, as Lonergan describes it, he maintains that one can know what counts as knowledge not only for oneself, but also for others who are also committed to intelligence and reasonableness.

Simply put, Lonergan’s philosophy, expressed as intentionality analysis, is rooted in the personal experience of consciousness, but it unfolds from this subjective base into the world of knowledge and action through identifying, understanding and affirming the operations of consciousness that all knowing and deciding persons engage. This represents a movement from the experiential base to methodology.

**Philosophical Method**

From the empirical base in human subjectivity, Lonergan’s basic philosophical orientation unfolds in terms of a general philosophical methodology. Lonergan develops this as generalized empirical method in *Insight*, and transcendental method in *Method in Theology*. In effect, generalized empirical method becomes folded into a transcendental method that retains the cognitive qualities but adds the clearly differentiated existential qualities of deliberation and choice. In this section, I will examine both methods, but with the realization that transcendental method encompasses the larger philosophical vision that includes the full scope of conscious intentionality (at least as far as Lonergan has developed it.) Four basic points need to be stressed: that Lonergan’s philosophical method is rooted in experience (hence “empirical”); that this account of experience can be generalized; that this becomes the general mode and structure of inquiry; and that this is a philosophical expression of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis.

First, then, as has already been indicated, the early expression of Lonergan’s methodology, generalized empirical method, rests on the experience of the knower.

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16 I note that in Lonergan’s work there are developed several types of methodologies, or sub-methodologies (some of which will be elaborated in this study) under his basic philosophical methodology that is expressed as generalized empirical method and transcendental method, the former receiving much more elaborate exposition in *Insight* than the latter in *Method in Theology*.
Lonergan initially focused on the experience of insight of the scientific inquirer, but then also other types of "knowledge experiences" are considered, such as what occurs in the realm of common sense. As Lonergan develops his intentionality analysis, the field of experience broadens to encompass virtually any instance of human knowing. As Lonergan scholar, Matthew Lamb points out, generalized empirical method, as Lonergan's lifelong work, "has transformed method from its empiricist and idealist reifications as sets of axioms, principles, or systems into its concrete embodiments in the related and recurrent activities of ongoing communities of knowers and doers in history."\(^{17}\) The empirical base of method, then, theoretically encompasses the experience of all knowers and doers.

Secondly, the personal experience of knowing and doing in Lonergan's work becomes generalized as a basic pattern of operations of consciousness found in all experiences of knowledge and decision. Generalized empirical method maps out the activities of the subjective process of coming to know first within the realm of scientific inquiry, for it is in this realm of knowledge that Lonergan finds a model of effective, systematic, collaborative and cumulative inquiry. But this is not the only type of successful inquiry. Lonergan considers other types, and he finds in them a similar basic set of activities stemming from the experience of the inquirer leading to what may be deemed knowledge. As Lonergan explains, in the field of inquiry relevant to a study of insight,

... precision was our primary objective, and so our examples were taken from the fields of mathematics and physics. Still, the occurrence of insight was not restricted to the minds of mathematicians, when doing mathematics, and to the minds of physicists, when engaged in the department of science. On the contrary, one meets intelligence in every walk of life. There are intelligent farmers and craftsmen, intelligent employers and workers, intelligent technicians and mechanics, intelligent doctors and lawyers, intelligent politicians and diplomats ... . In every case, the man or woman of intelligence is marked by a greater readiness in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing the issue, in grasping implications, in acquiring knowhow ... . For insight is ever the same, and even its most modest achievements are rendered conspicuous by the

Thus, in all experiences of what properly counts as knowledge, there are common characteristics, basic patterns of operations in consciousness.

Not only are the cognitive operations generalized, but so too is the existential operation of deliberation and choice. While it would have been helpful had Lonergan provided the intentionality of deciding an exposition similar in detail to what he provided for experiencing, understanding and judging in *Insight*, we nevertheless are given a clear account of this differentiated level. Lonergan states, “Finally, the rational subject, having achieved knowledge of what is and could be, rationally gives way to conscious freedom and conscientious responsibility.” More specifically, this involves, “… deciding to operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one’s experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.”

In his philosophical methodology, all cases of human intentionality are generalized as experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.

Thirdly, this perceived generalization leads to a formulation of that generalization in the articulation of generalized empirical method and transcendental method. First, regarding generalized empirical method, it should be noted what the method is not. The method delineating the activities of insight found in all areas of knowledge does not constitute a step-by-step procedure that when followed carefully yields some anticipated result. It is not a formula of any kind, nor is it a set of instructions. Moreover, generalized empirical method discovered by Lonergan is not a theoretical framework, or an “ideal construct” imposed on one’s mental operations in order to achieve knowledge. Rather, the method is intended to be an articulation of the actual experience of knowing, and an account of what occurs in conscious experience for knowledge to arise. Generalized empirical method makes explicit the operations of the inquirer’s mind; that is, the inquirer’s consciousness that engages distinct but interrelated functions, and that gives rise to various types of questions appropriate to those functions or operations. It is a

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18 *Insight*, 196.
19 *Method in Theology*, 16.
method rooted in human experience whose components are differentiated by the three basic operations of consciousness—experience, understanding and judgment—leading to knowledge. Generalized empirical method articulates the operations as differentiated but interrelated, that bring order to data, and that result in judgments which, in meeting certain criteria, are deemed knowledge.

Put in direct and highly simplified terms, by engaging generalized empirical method, Hugo Meynell explains, "we can come to make true and well-founded judgments, and we know in principle how to do so; reality is nothing other than what true judgments are about, and well-founded judgments tend to be about." While such a claim may provoke a chorus of philosophical objections (on the matter of "truth," for instance), the basic assertion would be difficult, perhaps self-contradictory, to deny. Conscious human subjects are capable of experience, of understanding and of judgment, and together these lead to knowledge of things that actually exist. To deny this, it seems one would have to engage experience, understanding, and judgment.

Lonergan has provided a fuller account than does Meynell on the self-contradiction inherent in a denial of the basic structure and operations of human conscious intentionality. The account appears in Lonergan’s explanation of transcendental method that builds on the generalized empirical method of Insight, but with the added dimension of the differentiated fourth level of human consciousness, the level of choice and decision. Lonergan explains:

First, the operations exist and occur. Despite the doubts and denials of positivists and behaviorists, no one, unless some of his organs are deficient, is going to say that never in his life did he have the experience of seeing or of hearing, of touching or smelling or tasting, of imagining or perceiving, of feeling or moving; or that if he appeared to have such experience, still it was mere appearance, since all his life long he has gone about like a somnambulist without any awareness of his own activities. Again, how rare is the man that will preface his lectures by repeating his

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22 Ibid.
23 It would make an interesting and useful study to trace the relation of generalized empirical method and transcendental method, and to show the development of his thought on method and the change of his terminology. Whatever the difference might be, however, both methods are rooted in Lonergan’s understanding of the basic structure and intentionality of human consciousness.
conviction that never did he have even a fleeting experience of intellectual curiosity, of inquiry, of striving and coming to understand, of expressing what he has grasped by understanding. Rare too is the man that begins his contributions to periodical literature by reminding his potential readers that never in his life did he experience anything that might be called critical reflection, that he never paused about the truth or falsity of any statement, that if ever he seemed to exercise his rationality by passing judgment strictly in accord with the available evidence, then that must be counted as mere appearance for he is totally unaware of any such event or even any such tendency. Few finally are those that place at the beginning of their books the warning that then have no notion of what might be meant by responsibility, that never in their lives did they have the experience of acting responsibly, and that least of all in composing the books they are offering the public. In brief, conscious and intentional operations exist and anyone that cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist.\textsuperscript{24}

In this way, Lonergan appeals to one’s actual experience of the intentionalities that underlie transcendental method.\textsuperscript{25}

Fourthly, Lonergan’s account of generalized modes and patters of operations enter the realm of philosophical thought and discourse as a distinctive philosophical methodology. It is one thing to know how scientists and other insightful people figure things out; it is another to develop this “insight into insight” into a philosophical position. What takes generalized empirical method and transcendental method to the level of philosophy (and thus makes it that much more interesting and relevant to \textit{educational} philosophy), reflecting to some extent Dewey’s notion of philosophy discussed earlier, is the realization and articulation of the wide generality of the method. Its scope of relevance, theoretically, is the totality of all knowledge and human action. That is to say, it is the nature of knowledge and action to exhibit this pattern of conscious intentionality.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Method in Theology}, 16-7.

\textsuperscript{25} A question can be raised as to the boldly unqualified nature of Lonergan’s claim. For instance, one could identify these experiences of consciousness, but still be relatively unclear as to the precise nature of their functioning, or identify them in different configurations than does Lonergan, such as passing judgment based on some experience that has not been grasped intelligibly. My point here is that perhaps there may be a more disjointed, un-patterned, less unified and un-integrated way the intentional operations actually function in one’s experience of consciousness. While this \textit{may} be possible, Lonergan’s account nevertheless provides an ordering and understanding of the differentiated operations of consciousness that help one to understand key elements of educational philosophy, even though there may be other ways to understand the structure and operations of human consciousness.
Moreover, generalized empirical method reflects with remarkable accuracy Hirst’s criterion of philosophical discourse as “the clarification of the concepts and propositions through which our experience and activities are intelligible.” Why and how experiences become intelligible are central questions addressed by Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and generalized empirical method. But more than this, the method fits with Danto’s description of philosophy as seeing what reality itself consists in, and for Lonergan, this is the aim of the method, as noted by Meynell, namely, an affirmation of reality, of being. And reflecting the concerns of Lyotard, as illustrative of at least one mode of postmodern thought, Lonergan’s philosophical methodology propels one to the existential crises of deliberation and choice.

In this way, then, Lonergan achieves through his philosophical method a certain unity of the subjective realm of personal experience and the normative and universal realm. Put simply, the subjective experience of knowing, understood as operations of human consciousness unfolding in experience, understanding, judging and deciding becomes the basis for articulating the objective norms of all instances of true, authentic knowing and doing. I have stressed, as well, the philosophical character of generalized empirical method and transcendental method in order to point out that, as a philosophical methodology, there is a natural relation to educational philosophy. As I will show throughout this chapter and the next, this basic, generalized methodology will provide an ordering principle that will move our exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s work forward in a systematic manner. It is the explicit methodological structure that was largely absent in Lonergan’s *Topics in Education*. Overall, this philosophical method, being an articulation of the differentiated and interrelated process of conscious intentionality, meets educational philosophy on its own terms as philosophy.

To sum up this section, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis is grounded in human experience. It rests on the empirical ground of all of human knowing and doing, and unfolds, as we shall see, with a constant confirmation, or verification, in human experience. Its broad relevance to education rests on a shared concern with grasping the

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Intelligibility of human experience, and in truly developing the performance of human consciousness on all its levels. As noted in my account of insight in Lonergan's thought, his notion of experience encompasses not only sensory experience, but the experience of consciousness, and it is precisely in the discovery and articulation of his philosophical methodology that the impact and fuller meaning of the experience of consciousness comes into focus; that is, we have experiences of understanding, of judging and of deciding, in addition to sensory experience. In relation to educational philosophy, then, the importance of the experience of the learner (and the teacher) is basic. In this way, Lonergan provides a unique extension to the meaning of experience that goes beyond the usual connotation of sense experience. As the experience of sense and of consciousness acquire a philosophical expression in his methodology, the ordered, patterned and normative qualities of experience become philosophical terms and relations, and, as we shall see, many of its dimensions have a direct relevance to key issues in educational philosophy. To move this work forward, then, in the next section I will consider some important educational qualities of various elements of human cognition as Lonergan understands them.

**Intentionality and the Impetus for Education**

This section will explore the question of why the need for education and how this need relates to specific elements of intentionality on the level of experience. These elements include: the desire to know; the phenomenon of wonder; the nature of question-asking; and the role of imagination and images. In setting the stage for a discussion of the elements, I will consider the general question of the need for education.

**Need for Education**

If education and educational philosophy, for Lonergan, arise from the field of human experience, what, more precisely, is the character of human experience that accounts for the need for education? In one sense, the answer is intuitive, for one can argue that it is
simply the nature of human beings to learn and develop in various ways, and thus we have the need to be taught, to become educated. But it is one objective of philosophy, and particularly of educational philosophy on this question, to get beyond the intuitive and to make explicit the issue at hand, and to offer a reasoned account. Thus the question is raised: what is it about human beings that make activities that we call education possible, needed, or wanted?

The question of the need for education has longstanding currency in educational philosophy. Barbara Herman’s exposition of moral education, for instance, explains that, according to Kant, the capacity for, and stages of reasoning, elevate human beings above the impulses and dictates of instinct to a level beyond the objective world of things that are used to satisfy basic survival needs. On this higher plane of reasoning, the objects in the world are assessed in terms of one’s needs, where eventually abstract objects of thought and concepts begin to acquire their own desirability. To achieve the properly desired thoughts and concepts, training is required. For Kant, Herman explains, education becomes both possible and necessary by virtue of the human capacity for the abstract thinking engaged in anticipating possible ends in the distant future, and for constructing ideas as desired objects.\(^\text{28}\)

Educational philosopher Robert S. Brumbaugh, in developing for education the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, finds the basic need for education arising from the ontological and cosmological reality of the human person as a complex entity that extends over time.\(^\text{29}\) The point made is that the need and impetus for education, according to process educational philosophy, arises inasmuch as the process of coming to


\(^{29}\) Robert S. Brumbaugh, Whitehead, Process Philosophy, and Education (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982), 4-5. The perdurance of a human being, as an actual entity, may or may not occur authentically or effectively, but understanding and ordering one’s life according to the natural stages, these being educational activities that occur in all actual entities, tend to encourage authenticity and effectiveness. This process is a matter of “concrescence”, that is, a process whereby other actual entities come to constitute the components of another actual entity. The basic pattern of human entities coming into existence and enduring over time involves the first phase of “romance,” this involving an initial encounter with the other entities that constitutes a process of concrescence, and where a certain excitement arises concerning the unexplored possibilities of being. A second phase emerges in “precision” activities where the particular elements in the event are readjusted and the other elements of the event are “surveyed and articulated.” A final phase of “generalization,” also called “satisfaction,” occurs where the event acquires “stability” and the event comes to an end. See also Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected ed., ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 7.
be can be achieved more authentically and effectively. Actual entities can “just happen” or they can happen more intentionally and in better ways. Education helps to ensure the latter.

Another line of thinking on this question appears in Michael Oakeshott’s work. In setting forth the case that the mandate for education concerns mainly the matter of learning to think, Oakeshott sees the possibility and need of education resting on a basic human ontology. He explains:

By learning, I mean an activity possible only to an intelligence capable of choice and self-direction in relation to his own impulses and to the world around him. These, of course, are pre-eminently human characteristics, and, as I understand it, only human beings are capable of learning. A learner is not a passive recipient of impressions … . He is a creature of wants rather than needs, of recollection as well as memory; he wants to know what to think and what to believe and not merely what to do.\(^{31}\)

While one may object to such strict limitations,\(^{32}\) for Oakeshott, the possibility of learning and education lies in the need to choose and direct one’s life, and to do so according to conscious desires and wants. Beings without the ability to remember, to acquire knowledge and beliefs, have no need or capacity for education.

Lonergan, as well, provides a take on this question of “why education?” The need for education, and the incentive to learn and to be taught, stems from his understanding of who human beings are at a very basic level. In Lonergan’s explanation of insight, we find an account of the human subject in terms of a primordial ontology. The need for education, for learning, for knowing, arises from the human capacity for experiencing the world, and of finding oneself part of that world in ever widening horizons of ever-deepening meaning. More specifically, the impetus for education, according to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, arises from the need for the structure of consciousness to acquire content. Education is a means whereby that content is acquired and by which it becomes assembled in a structured and incremental manner. We function as

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\(^{30}\) One may readily be impressed by the complexities and intricacies of Whitehead’s *Process and Reality.*


\(^{32}\) For instance, some animals appear to have abilities for choice and self-direction, and seem to be able to learn.
"experiencers" having capacity to experience more, to understand and to know more, and to know better. Being human, at a most basic level, means having sensory and mental experiences, experiences driven by the desire to know and energized by the capacity for wonder and question-asking. Being human also exhibits the capacity for enhancing one's experiences by achieving ever-higher levels of meaning through interrelating more and more elements of our experience. This human ontology, then, is essentially educational in character. For Lonergan, the impetus that propels us toward the educational enterprise arises from the very structure and operations of our consciousness, this being the "morphology,"33 at it were, of our knowing, a structure that is "programmed" to operate in specific ways, to grow, and to achieve satisfaction.

Examining in more detail key elements of this structure, its operations, and its satisfactions will lead us to consider further elements that I (as do others) regard as important to educational philosophy. These elements include the desire or drive to know; the ability to wonder and ask questions; one's capacity to create and experience images; the self-correcting process of learning; and the nature of development whereby one can determine progress.

Desire to Know

The rationale for education, I have pointed out, for Lonergan arises from the human capacity for consciousness and the need to constitute, to fill out, as it were, its basic structure. Consciousness, designed in a structured way, develops as content in the form of data becomes present to oneself. That content begins to be acquired on the basis of our desire to know. The difference between what I have called the "impetus for education" and the "desire to know" is a difference between, if you will, an architect's blueprints and the contractor calling workers together to begin actual construction. The desire to know "animates" our consciousness and propels it along the path of development.

The desire to know, as desire, is the basic experience of consciousness leading to the achievements and satisfactions for which one's consciousness is structured. It is a desire

33 Throughout *Insight* Lonergan speaks of the "isomorphism" (iso-morph-ism) of the knowing and the known. See *Insight*, 424, 509-11, 522.
rooted in one’s biological constitution, but propels one upward into the world of conscious awareness in quest of knowledge. The biological substrate is a necessary condition for the existence and development of a human being, but for human life it is not sufficient. Lonergan explains that experience is dependent upon the physical existence and appropriate functioning of one’s body. Experiences of seeing, hearing, touching, and so forth, “have a bodily basis; they are functionally related to movements; and they occur in some dynamic context that somehow unifies a manifold of sensed contents and acts of sensing.” But the biological pattern of experience takes on a uniquely human aspect with the awakening of the desire to know. Lonergan, we recall, begins his account of insight thus,

Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted has many names. In what precisely it consists is a matter of dispute. But the fact of inquiry is beyond all doubt.

While Lonergan usually speaks of this experience as desire, here he speaks of “drive,” perhaps to emphasize the forcefulness of the impulse to know. At any rate, it operates as the driving force of inquiry and learning, the satisfaction of which is met in the particular insights that release the “tension of inquiry.”

Lonergan also calls the desire to know “the pure question.” He explains.

Name it what you please—alertness of mind, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry, active intelligence, the drive to know. Under any name, it remains the same, and is, I trust, very familiar to you. This primordial drive, then, is the pure question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any word; for insights, concepts, words have to do with answers, and before we look for answers we want them; such wanting is the pure question.

With the link made between the notion of the pure desire and “the pure question,” the importance Lonergan places on the role of questioning in the emergence of insight

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34 Insight, 205.
35 Ibid., 28.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 34, (emphasis mine).
becomes clear. The pure question is given ontological status in that it occurs as a phenomenon of our conscious existence, namely, desiring answers to questions before we can even formulate them. This pure questioning, in Lonergan’s view, arises from a very basic yearning for answers that expresses the nature of consciousness, a consciousness that anticipates achieving our potentials as intelligent and reasonable human beings.

Elsewhere, Lonergan speaks evocatively of the desire to know as “eros of the mind.” The drive, or mental eros, constitutes an orientation toward the world expressed as a “pure, detached, disinterested desire simply to know.”

It is the necessary element for the emergence of all other components and activities of knowing—wondering, questioning, inquiring, assessing, and so forth. There are, Lonergan recognizes, competing drives on this primordial level of experience, but where the “intellectual drive is dominant, ... in that measure the scientific observer [as a paradigmatic knower] becomes an incarnation of inquiring intelligence ...” Attending to the desire, nurturing it, and giving it dominance over other desires, Lonergan explains, takes “positive effort” and “rigorous training.”

While the educational implications of the eros of mind are clear enough—that there needs to develop concomitantly some sort of deliberate and structured patterning that is enhanced by training—it seems to me that in addition to focusing on the structured development of education, some importance needs to be attached to the matter of eros itself, to the matter of the elemental erotic quality of learning and achieving knowledge.

Without recognizing the value of the eros of mind, it is perhaps more likely that the “spirit of learning” innate to one’s consciousness could be diminished, squelched or even destroyed. Whitehead addresses this matter precisely in his indictment of some educators in the teaching of literature. “The great English Universities, under whose direct authority school-children are examined in plays of Shakespeare, to the certain destruction of their enjoyment, should be prosecuted for soul murder.” How often have we encountered so-called learning situations where we find the environment to be hostile to our feeling of wanting to learn? It seems to me that Lonergan’s notion of eros of mind bears similarities

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38 Ibid., 97.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
to what Whitehead was appealing for in his romance phase of learning, where the horizon of possible integrations with other elements of existence attracts and excites the learner.\textsuperscript{42}

Lonergan, I believe, exhibits a similar significant interest in the affective dimension of life and learning that has persisted for some time in educational thought. Lonergan's eros of mind resonates, it seems to me, with Friedrich Schiller's design for human education arising within the philosophical tradition of German romanticism. He developed his educational theory in terms of a doctrine of the three drives—the sensuous, the formal and the play—where directing, encouraging and integrating the drives become the chief objective of education.\textsuperscript{43} And Lonergan's eros of mind is not incompatible, I suggest, with the educational philosophy found in Nietzsche's \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}. There one finds a distinct appreciation of learning in terms of transforming not only understanding, but also the transforming of one's entire existence through a sensuous and unbridled Dionysian sense of, and orientation to, life.\textsuperscript{44}

Other educational philosophies may recognize the importance of desire in the learning process, but Lonergan not only recognizes the desire to know as a motivational factor in starting the learning process. The desire to know also is recognized by him as the quality of consciousness that achieves satisfaction at every stage of the knowing process, covering a life-time of inquiry, exploration and discovery. To some extent then, this desire controls and directs many, if not most, facets of one's life. Lonergan describes its pervasive power thus:

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}, 17-8, 21-2.
\textsuperscript{44} Richard Schacht, "A Nietzschean Education: Zarathustra/Zarathustra as Educator," in \textit{Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives}, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (London: Routledge, 1998), 323-32. The sort of education emerging from Nietzsche involves in a central way an aesthetic appreciation of life that widely engages our experiences of actual living, in its finitude and freedom. "The lesson Nietzsche learned from the Greeks ... has to do with the role of the arts ... in effecting a transformation of our consciousness in such a way that not only our experience but our lives and the very aspect of existence are transformed ... ." And further, "'As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes it with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves into such a phenomenon,' Nietzsche recognizes we may well need an education of the right sort to come to appreciate and find this not only a sufficient but also an invigorating diet." (p. 326).
It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, in the narrow prison of his study or his laboratory. It can send him on dangerous voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from other interests, other pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can fill his waking thoughts, hide from him the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his dreams. It can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret though there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of success. What better symbol could one find for this obscure, exigent, imperious drive, than a man, naked, running excitedly crying, ‘I’ve got it’?\(^{45}\)

From the dramatic insight of an Archimedes, to the commonplace occurrence of a child recognizing a mother’s face, or a child learning the spelling of a new word, according to Lonergan, the desire to know operates incessantly and inexorably in the unfolding of human consciousness. While a crucially important question for education concerns directing the desire to the specific and incremental achievements of knowledge, there is a more basic concern with nurturing the desire and allowing it the freedom to find expression and satisfaction in any learning situation.

However, it is not only in learning situations that the desire to know operates. The desire to know, Lonergan suggests, is not merely an intellectual desire, although it is in the “intellectual pattern of experience” that the desire to know perhaps achieves most prominence. The desire to know, as a governing principle that orders other desires, moves an individual in the development of consciousness to go beyond oneself and to embrace the “other.” For Lonergan, it is this desire that moves one toward self-transcendence, and to realize “higher integrations in the realm of being,”\(^{46}\) and moves one toward even the possibility of “transcendent knowledge” of “transcendent being.”\(^{47}\) While it would take me beyond my limited focus here to launch a discussion of the controversial question of “God,” I wish merely to point out that within Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, there is an appreciation of the religious orientation of human beings, at least as religion is understood in a very general way.

\(^{45}\) *Insight*, 28-9

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 656

\(^{47}\) This is the thrust of his theological philosophy set forth in the nineteenth chapter of *Insight*, “General Transcendent Knowledge,” 657-708.
At any rate, the possibility of self-transcendence rests with the desire to know, and sets up certain tensions in managing impulses somewhat at odds with this pure desire. As Lonergan explains:

The immanent source of transcendence in man is his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin of the radical further questions that take him beyond the defined limits of particular issues. Nor is it solely the operator of his cognitional development. For its detachment and disinterestedness set it in opposition to his attached and interested sensitivity and intersubjectivity … 48

Much later, in Method in Theology, Lonergan develops the notion of knowledge born of religious love.49 The point to be made here is that, while the desire to know pertains explicitly to cognitive development, the desire permeates many other aspects of human existence, and thus tends to broaden out the conception of knowledge itself to include not merely intellectual assent, but a fully existential encounter of being.50 This desire is a desire to encounter being beyond oneself, a desire to embrace being more fully. There are several intriguing facets to this development of Lonergan’s thought for education, and some of these later developments have been explored in other studies that deal with the religious questions.51 As noted in chapter one, my study is limited to a general secularist educational philosophy, by which I mean (as does Lonergan) ending at the ethical questions. The experience of the desire to know may propel one to encounter the question of God, but it may not. More than likely, however, it would propel one to consider the question of decision and action in relation to this world and to one’s interpersonal

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48 Ibid., 659-60.
49 Method in Theology, 115.
50 In Insight, one sees this relation, but in Method in Theology the existential encounter is developed as its own “level” of consciousness.
51 For instance, in her doctoral dissertation, Catherine Siejk has expanded on the educational dimensions of religious knowledge, conversion and authenticity, all of which Lonergan develops more fully in his post-Insight work. Catherine Siejk, “Toward a Religious Education Practice that Promotes Authentically Lived Christian Faith Within a Christian Community: a Religious Education Interpretation of Bernard Lonergan’s Understanding of Christian Authenticity,” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1992). See also educational philosopher, Thomas Groome’s exploration and application of Lonergan’s notion of conversion to educational themes in Sharing Faith. It should be noted that these later developments in Lonergan’s thought are developments, and not major deviations or contradictions of the basic position he has elaborated in Insight.
relations in it. This is the scope of interest in this study, and these questions will arise more specifically in due course.

In short, Lonergan's intentionality analysis begins with the recognition and explanation of the desire to know. For him, yearning, need, anticipation, interest, drive, passion, and other such terms that touch upon this basic drive of consciousness, occur primordially in human beings, and remain important in one's development throughout life, especially in sustaining one's pursuit of knowledge both in the short term and in life-long learning. As a desire to know, then, the desire is to have experiences, and to have ever broader, more complex experiences. But beyond this, the desire is for meaning and for intelligibility to be developed from those experiences. Thus, desire propels one toward the discovery of meaning and, as shall be seen when I consider aspects of understanding, meaning balanced with, and integral to, the larger contexts of one's life. As desire, it is the drive that makes learning possible at the most basic level, for it orients one to the pursuit of knowledge, and penetrates all of the activities of education intended to achieve knowledge. While the element of desire is not often treated in a substantial way in educational philosophy, in Lonergan it enjoys an elevated position of importance.

Given this status, then, one sees the role of the educator to be not one of creating in the student the desire to know, for this exists already by virtue of possessing human consciousness. The role rather is to create ever-better conditions for the fulfillment and healthy growth of the desire and, equally important, to guard against its suppression and disintegration. A significant step forward in performing this role, perhaps, would be understanding how the desire begins to express itself as a sense of wonder and, more concretely, in the emergence of questions.

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52 For a rather rare example, however, of the treatment of eros in education and educational philosophy, see Timothy L. Simpson and James Scott Johnston, "Eros Between Plato and Garrison: Recovering Lost Desire," *Educational Theory* 52, no. 2 (spring 2002): 223-39. Their overall position is clear. "We believe that Plato has something positive to say about the project that Garrison undertakes: the project of transforming eros into an intelligently directed desire for the practice of education." (223). Lonergan likewise, I believe.
The phenomena of curiosity and wonder have been longstanding subjects of inquiry in education, and have emerged in some educational philosophies as important factors in learning and development. The experience of wonder has been recognized in various ways in educational philosophy, such as a state of awe or amazement, or as curiosity or puzzlement, or perhaps as a more intentional investigation of some subject matter. Maria Montesorri, one of the better-known proponents of nurturing the innate wonder of children, finds that children who develop their capacity for wonder are able better to achieve a "concentration of spirit," an ability, by her analysis, to engage in sustained periods of study and inquiry. While complete concentration of the spirit, Montesorri believes, appears only in "great men," each child has the ability to engage it to some degree, and when this concentration, this focus of attention, this inner freedom and force, is allowed expression and fulfillment, a tremendous satisfaction results in the learner. Montessori develops this line of thought and integrates her appreciation of wonder within a new understanding of pedagogy. "Certainly here is the key to all pedagogy: to know how to recognize the precious instinct of concentration [that is, wonder] in order to make use of it in the teaching of reading, writing and counting and, later on, of grammar, arithmetic, foreign languages, science, etc."

Montessori offers some compelling perspectives, but for a sustained treatment of the phenomenon of wonder as an element of educational philosophy, one can turn to Thomas F. Green's analysis of the activities of teaching. He identifies at least two species of wonder—the kind that is born of ignorance and ends with knowledge, and the kind that is born in awe and amazement, and which continues through the acquisition of knowledge. The difference is in wondering how (curiosity), in the former case, and wondering at (awe), in the latter. Green argues that wonder and curiosity characterize "the mother of
motivation," and as such, educators hold the responsibility to protect and nurture this important quality in the student. This is an especially weighty responsibility, given what Green regards as the particularly "delicate nature" of awe and wonder.58

Another voice that appreciates the experience of wonder in the educational process has arisen in the recent work of Kieran Egan who identifies the various types of understanding involved in the educational process, those "intellectual tools" that shape our cognitive development. Of the various modes of understanding—the mythic, the romantic, the philosophic, the ironic and somatic—wonder finds its fullest expression and significance in the romantic. Egan explains, romantic understanding "encourages us to include in the curriculum the content that seems best able to stimulate students' senses of wonder and awe."59 While other modes of understanding are not devoid of wonder, Egan suggests that it is in romantic understanding that wonder moves to the fore in mental development.

From various perspectives, then, the phenomena of wonder and awe factor into the educational enterprise and, commensurately, factor into an educational philosophy that fully appreciates the experience of understanding and knowing. Lonergan discovers wonder, as do Montessori, Green and Egan, to be one of the key motivators in learning. Lonergan regards this capacity of consciousness as integral to the educational process. Without wonder emerging spontaneously on the experiential level of consciousness, according to Lonergan, insights simply could not occur. "In the human child it [the light and drive of intelligent inquiry] is a secret wonder that, once the mystery of language has been unraveled, reaches forth in a cascade of questions."60 Through wonder, human consciousness orients one toward objects such that they grab our attention in myriad ways. As we wonder, our experience begins to be patterned in a certain way, and we begin to exercise our intelligence in seeking to know some thing or, more generally, some field of inquiry. This especially is evident in what Lonergan describes as the "aesthetic pattern of experience."

57 Ibid., 201.
58 Ibid.
60 Insight, 196-7.
The aesthetic pattern of experience unfolds in the concrete expressions of the artist through the creation of works of art, through making and organizing colors and shapes, sound and movement, and in the “unfolding situations and actions of fiction.” Wonder, integral to the world of the artist, helps bring to one’s consciousness the experience of colors, shapes, sound, movement; it evokes questions and sustains the artist in the management and understanding of those experiences. Lonergan explains the primordial place of wonder this way:

Prior to the neatly formulated questions of systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground. As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep. Again, as a two-fold liberation of sense and intelligence, art would exhibit the reality of the primary object of that wonder.

In the previous chapter we saw that Lonergan developed the themes of wonder, curiosity and freedom of inquiry in his lecture on art and related them to Langer’s philosophy, but in Insight, the stage was already set for this further development. As his thought developed even further along this line, feeling and symbol come to acquire increasing importance in Lonergan’s work. Where others have explored aspects of these developments in Lonergan’s thought, a full understanding of Lonergan’s ideas in this area would have to explain and assess their assertions. My modest aim here is to draw attention to this one affective quality of human subjectivity because it relates so directly to the educational experience.

Of these studies, the work of Mark Doorley stands out, especially where, among other things, he discusses the relation of feeling and the unfolding of inquiring intelligence. Specifically, his study leads to an analysis of the effect feelings, and by implication the feeling of wonder, have in question-asking. “A person who is under the sway of self-regarding feeling,” Doorley suggests, “will not encourage questions that make no

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61 Ibid., 208.
62 Ibid.
64 Mark Doorley, “The Role of Feelings.”
immediate difference in his world but may in fact make a difference in the world. By contrast, a person under the sway of self-transcending feeling is more apt to attend to all questions that are pertinent to the issue, independently of whether or not their answers will make a difference to him. Moreover, Doorley goes on to suggest that feelings, in Lonergan’s analysis, play a crucial role in the apprehension of value, and that the apprehension of value forms and directs questions related to judgments and decisions. In effect, then, wonder, as a feeling, has a transcendental quality that propels one beyond the world of immediacy, and lays before the person the possibility of grasping value and of changing one’s world in terms of value. While I will return to these broader questions in chapter five where I discuss questions of morals and ethics, I note here that it is in the experience of wonder that these life- and world-changing issues find their genesis.

To return to the matter of the structure and processes of insight, if the desire to know is at the center, as it were, of our consciousness, it is wonder, not only for the artist, but for any “experincer,” that begins to direct that drive towards particular objects or elements of our experience. As Lonergan explains, “... no one just wonders. We wonder about something.” To be sure, the dynamism of wonder is not limited to the world of art and of the senses. Wonder, as Lonergan remembers Aristotle, is the beginning of all science and philosophy. So where the desire to know, the eros of mind, emerges in the very awakening of consciousness, wonder carries that consciousness further in directing it toward things to know, and promotes the unfolding of intelligent inquiry. Further, in that unfolding, wonder is given the tool of language that aids the flourishing of more rigorous and intellectually demanding fields, such as may be found in mathematics and science. And although the leap may be large from the basic experience of wonder to the amazing achievements of science, Lonergan finds a clear relation and continuity.

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65 Ibid., 163-4.
66 Ibid., 164.
67 Insight, 34.
68 Ibid., 34 and 380.
Questions

While wonder is a general orientation of our consciousness towards things to know, the emergence of a distinct question constitutes a concrete advance of wonder toward achieving knowledge. The question tends to concentrate and narrow one’s cognitive intentionality. On the role of the question, Lonergan distinguishes, over the course of his study of insight, four types. The first type, the pure question, has already be discussed in the section on the desire to know.

As consciousness develops through the emergence of intelligence and rationality, two further types of questions arise. Lonergan explains, “there are questions for intelligence asking what this is, what that means, why this is so, how frequently it occurs or exists. There also are questions for reflection that ask whether answers to the former type of questions are correct.” Later, Lonergan identifies a fourth type of question that occurs when one is faced with a decision, the question of whether and how to act in accord with the knowledge achieved through understanding and judgment. Simply put, the “rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards the knowledge of being. But the rationality of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and doing.” Certain questions give rise to insight. This insight, then, gives rise to further questions pertaining to the course of action one may take.

While more will be said of the crucially important role questions play in the learning process, the point I stress here is that, according to Lonergan, the capacity to ask questions arises from the desire to know—from the “pure question”—and that this capacity moves the experience of wonder to more focused attention and concentration. In the unfolding of consciousness, the process of questioning becomes directed toward different ends—for understanding, judging and deciding. The role of the question in evoking and shaping higher levels of consciousness, according to Lonergan, persists through the development of human intentionality leading to knowledge, then to concrete decisions and actions. Where education concerns itself with knowledge and with actions

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69 Ibid., 367-8.
70 Ibid., 636.
informed by knowledge, then, question-asking becomes the cornerstone of the educational enterprise.

The importance of question-asking relates to more than what Montessori sees merely as nurturing a sense of wonder and awe in children; to more than a “romantic understanding” in Egan’s analysis where it is relegated to the distinctive “literary” aspects of culture and history.\(^1\) For Lonergan, question-asking, like desire and wonder, more along the lines of Green’s contention, pertains to all of conscious living and doing throughout one’s life. While this place and function of questioning, perhaps, might be intuitively recognized and tacitly affirmed, it is in Lonergan’s analysis of the structures and operations of intentionality that this idea becomes thematized. In comparison to others who have treated this issue in educational philosophy, Lonergan’s position takes the issue further than some, and regards question-asking (and the condition of its possibility in wonder) as basic to the entire educational process.

**Imagination**

Where question-asking, for Lonergan, takes on the role and has the effect of more and more directing thought and action towards specific ends, and thus has a “limiting” quality in terms of intentionality, of narrowing increasingly the field of inquiry, and of eliminating more and more data of experience from the scope of relevance to the question

\(^1\) See Egan, *The Educated Mind*, 71 ff. While Egan’s recognition of the importance of wonder in cognitive development is largely confined to what he defines as a “romantic” mode of understanding, wonder becomes segmented out and isolated from other modes of understanding. Perhaps this is due to his method of inquiry in which he examines cultural history and determines that there are several distinct ways of understanding. While all modes of understanding contribute to an overall culture, they are seen to be very different and in some respects incompatible and mutually incomprehensible. His point is that, “Education...can best be understood as a process in which the individual recapitulates the kinds of understanding developed in the culture’s history. Such a view implies we can learn something of practical value for education by studying how this transition was made historically, and we might also understand why the transition is so problematic ...” (p. 73). Egan’s method consists of examining the products of knowledge appearing in the history of culture, a history revealing distinct segments and very different products. By contrast, it should be noted that Lonergan engages a methodology that examines not the products of knowledge but the processes and activities of knowing, and the result is not the inherent segmentation one finds in Egan (though Egan tries to overcome this by requiring of education an engagement of all the different types of understanding); for Lonergan there exists a unity inasmuch as the knower is a single being, and while the activities of knowing are differentiated, the end result is a single increment of knowledge. In Egan, the further effect is that wonder becomes prominent primarily in one type of understanding, while in Lonergan wonder—and questioning—permeates the entire knowing process.
at hand (what occurs, for instance in classical modes of inquiry), Lonergan identifies a complementary quality of consciousness that tends to expand the scope of data through the generation of images. But before probing the phenomenon of image creation in relation to Lonergan's intentionality analysis, let us consider briefly the manner in which imagination, as an element in the learning process and in education generally, has been dealt with by some educational philosophers.72

Late in life, Immanuel Kant, was asked to give a series of lectures on education that were published shortly before his death in 1804. In what amounts to an assortment of reflections on education concerning various practical aspects of child rearing, teaching and learning related to his philosophical system, Kant highlights, not surprisingly, themes of discipline; development toward the overall perfection of mankind; the importance of abstraction and the formation of ideals; along with the role of principles and rules in guiding thought and action. The whole point of education, he believes, is the cultivation of mental faculties in which imagination does play a role. For Kant, imagination serves the mental faculty of memory by supplying to memory impressions that subsequently lead to understanding.73 While assigning to it a legitimate role in the education process, Kant did not attribute to imagination the higher regard reserved for the faculties of understanding, judgment and reason.74 Nevertheless, in Kant we see a relative early recognition of the importance of imagination in human education.

In a much more emphatic way, Dewey's seminal work, Democracy and Education, stresses the value of imagination as being more than the mental faculty that helps furnish the mind with understanding. Imagination, for Dewey, seems to take on epistemological and hermeneutical importance, having an expanded role in the learning process. Dewey explains, "... it is too customary to identify the imaginative with the imaginary, rather than with a warm and intimate taking in of the full scope of a situation."75 Through imagination, a person senses the meaning of various activities, and comes to appreciate those events in terms of a larger context. It is through imagination that, for Dewey, bits

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74 Ibid., 73-4.
75 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, 236.
and pieces of knowledge are taken into a personal framework of meaning. Through imagination, knowledge becomes imbued with value and used for practical purposes. Moreover, he explains, “were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge ... .” That road, so to speak, is constructed in part as a work of “intellect or understanding” in which the imagination plays an interpretative role through integrating and expanding meaning. He goes on to suggest, “... it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it.” If knowledge involves a re-presenting and a connecting of objects in new situations, then it is the mental activity of imagination that allows this to occur. It seems in Dewey, then, we find an educational philosophy in which imagination plays a prominent role in the development of meaning and knowledge.

As a teacher and professor in higher education, and one who has reflected widely on the practice and theory of learning and education, Northrop Frye holds imagination in particularly high esteem. In the education process, Frye regards the development of imagination as important to the flourishing of one’s total mental capabilities. In the higher levels of education, this being Frye’s primary orbit of influence and concern, ideally, imagination should be given free rein in the exploration of the “radical side” of the mind; that is to say, that aspect of creative thought where new visions of society may be considered and where new possibilities for social life can be anticipated and realized. For Frye, it is the teaching of literature that cultivates such creative thinking and helps to...

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76 Ibid., 340. Dewey says knowledge, “is a perception of those connections of an object which determine its applicability in a given situation.”
77 Ibid., 237.
78 Ibid., 236.
79 Ibid., 237.
80 Although Northrop Frye is not a philosopher of education, per se, he has reflected widely on the theoretical and philosophical aspects of education and is revered as an expert on teaching and in providing insight into the educational process. Northrop Frye, “The Developing Imagination,” in Modern Philosophies of Education, ed. John Paul Strain (New York: Random House, 1971), 213. While I don’t suggest Frye is a Kantian, but as illustrated, he likely subsumes some basic Kantian notions that have dominated so much of Western thought well into the twentieth century. As an educator, Frye has developed a sophisticated ideal for education that unfolds in three phases, roughly corresponding to the elementary and secondary periods of schooling, with the third phase being the undergraduate university years. Each phase has a conservative and a radical aspect that, respectively, consolidates the facts gleaned in learning through memory, and explores and advances the principles that govern past knowledge and expands of them and takes them to new territory. cf. Frye, 215.
ensure that the educated person enjoys the effects of an active and productive imagination.\(^81\)

From various lines of thinking in educational philosophy then, we can see that the development and role of imagination, if not given widespread recognition, certainly enjoys a particularly strong appreciation among some educators.\(^82\) Lonergan, I believe, shares with Dewey an understanding of the role of imagination in making a connection between various data of experience and in grasping new and novel possibilities of understanding. While Lonergan believes this function of imagination leads to knowledge, he maintains that the images themselves do not count as knowledge. Knowledge, for Lonergan, is a result of reflective insight (judgment) and not a result of a grasp of merely possible knowledge, which is what imagination grasps through the images it creates. For Lonergan, insights depend on images and on imagination.

Based on the elements of insight thus far related to the educational enterprise, it becomes clear how images arise on the experiential level of human consciousness. When one encounters some situation or another, the eros of mind (the pure question) causes attention to be drawn to some data, or sets of data, within one’s field of experience as we spontaneously begin to notice things. This basic awareness begins quickly to expand as the desire to know prompts one to ponder the situation generally, or perhaps to begin to sense some vague problem, unease or dissatisfaction with the connections being made among the elements of these data. As one may begin to wonder about the data of experience within some context, questions will begin to arise spontaneously, but initially more as a general puzzlement than as a clearly articulated “why” or “how.” In the formal schooling situation, it may be that the lesson of the day presents a problem or raises some question. As one’s attention continues to be focused on the situation, the question persists, and there occurs a widening of conscious awareness as possible solutions to the puzzlement, to the question, begin to be anticipated. Such desire for, and anticipation of, solutions, Lonergan believes, are expressed initially through the creation of images that express some idea or ideas that later may be formulated linguistically. As the human

\(^81\) Ibid., 226.

subject consciously focuses on situations, on perplexities and problems, images begin to “take hold” within one’s consciousness and, through them, concrete possible explanations and solutions are anticipated and tested out. By this process, ways of ordering the elements that resolve the tension created by the puzzle or the question are grasped in the image.83 It is in this manner that Lonergan suggests human imagination functions in one’s consciousness in relation to knowing.

Mental images arise, in the case of inquiring intelligence, from the desire to know, but, Lonergan also explains, they can arise from our fears. On the basic level of experience, then, imagination is seen as the “playground of our desires and fears.”84 It operates widely in managing our basic feelings, our desires and fears, and directs these desires toward insight. Without the play of imagination, obtaining insight into one’s world of experience is not possible. About this Lonergan is clear, “... the image is necessary for insight.”85 From the concrete world of objects, including our biological, physical encounters with those objects, through wonder and the raising of questions in response to the eros of mind, to the creation of images, we begin to move to the world of possibility, of thought, of meaning, of explanation. The image begins to propel one from the experiential realm to begin development toward the abstract world of concepts and generality, that is, to take that leap forward in the development of insight, and to begin to grasp and formulate definitions.

As noted earlier in the overview of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, the grasping of definitions moves one forward in the development of insight. The definition reveals that one catches on to the basic identification of a “thing,” or some basic explanation of a thing or condition. In this advance toward insight, the intellectual efforts take off from the imagination that “has been released from other cares.” Lonergan goes on to explain, “... it [imagination] is free to cooperate with intellectual effort, and its cooperation consists in endeavoring to run parallel to intelligent suppositions, while at the same time restraining

83 See the extensive empirical study on the nature of insight in which a great many examples are given of questioning, of puzzling over situations, of using images in finding solutions and gaining insight into situations. Robert J. Sternberg and Janet E. Davidson, eds. The Nature of Insight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). This work is largely complementary to Lonergan’s work in that both attempt to account for the experience of insight. Lonergan’s work, however, goes much further by developing an epistemology and metaphysics based on the empirical studies.
84 Ibid., 32.
85 Ibid., 33.
supposition within some limits of approximation to the imaginable field.\textsuperscript{86} The expression of the definition reveals the role of imagination in the fields of geometry and mathematics. But in the field of aesthetics, the function of imagination is revealed more dramatically.

Lonergan’s account of the aesthetic pattern of experience, as with his account of wonder, illustrates well the role of imagination. While, surprisingly, there is no \textit{explicit} mention of the operation of imagination and the role of the image in his discussion of aesthetics, imagination and image certainly play a significant role. What was merely a mental image in Lonergan’s initial account of insight, in the aesthetic pattern of experience the image becomes a symbol. For the artist, he explains, “free experience and free creation are prone to justify themselves by an ulterior purpose or significance. Art then becomes symbolic.”\textsuperscript{87} If image is the mental representation, then the symbolic is the physical expression of an image,\textsuperscript{88} a physical object that is also imbued with feeling. And as such, a symbol,

\begin{quotation}
... is an expression of the human subject outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation or appraisal. It seeks to mean, to convey, to impart, something that is to be reached ... through a participation, and in some fashion a reenactment of the artist’s inspiration and intention.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{quotation}

In the aesthetic pattern, meaning-seeking operations of human consciousness, dominated by the experienced patterns of sight, sound, physical movement, and so forth, produce images of symbolic depth that not only express meaning beyond the boundaries of language, but evoke creative operations of imagination on the part of the viewer or hearer in grasping meaning of the artistic symbols. In the aesthetic pattern of experience, the creation of physical objects as symbols expresses the power of imagination and

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}, 34.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, 208. Clearly, aesthetics is not the only realm of meaning that engages symbols. Symbols occur is virtually all facets of life. Lonergan refers often to symbols in mathematics. See \textit{Insight}, 42-3, 170-1.
\textsuperscript{88} Lonergan does not seem to stress the distinction between sign and symbol, although he appears to imply a difference. For Lonergan, there are “conventional” signs such as is found in written language, while the symbol is related more to the realm of human intersubjectivity where meaning is imbued with feeling. At any rate, in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, symbol seems to be the more important term, and the finer distinctions between sign and symbol are not major concerns for him. See \textit{Method in Theology}, 70.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Insight}, 208.
anticipates further intellectual insight that conceptualizes and articulates meaning represented in those images.

In sum, then, while one may undoubtedly identify other patterns of experience in which imagination plays an affective role, Lonergan finds the basic thrust toward insight occurring in dramatic ways on the experiential level of human consciousness, both in the intellectual patterns and in the aesthetic patterns of human experience.

Thus far, we have been examining the various dimensions of human experience as basic activities of consciousness. Understanding the various elements of consciousness in their awakening and development toward insight has certain implications for education. Based on the discussion thus far of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, these at least are clear.

First, education is profoundly a personal activity, for it is rooted in the very structure of one’s consciousness. As such, education centers on one’s experience and, reflecting the dynamic operations of consciousness as they spontaneously and inexorably enlarge and move forward, education seeks to expand and enrich human life.

Secondly, education on a basic, primordial level, depends on desire or eros of mind, and only later does it flourish in intellectual achievement and other educational activities. Without the desire to know education could not occur. For Lonergan, education is to be understood as a process rooted in this basic and primordial feeling of human consciousness, and as such, education is basic to human life. As the desire to know becomes more directed in its intentionality, and as it becomes fulfilled in the achievements of education, there results a certain deep and pleasing satisfaction. While consciousness is understood as charged by the drive and desire to know, and ultimately of satisfaction, the role of the educator includes creating learning situations that are better, more conducive, to achieving the satisfactions of the basic desire to know, to grasping insight, and to assisting an individual’s learning process by managing situations where

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90 Lonergan notes the feeling and satisfaction of learning in the case of Helen Keller. See *Method in Theology*, 70. Along this same line, a particularly dramatic illustration of the emotionally charged nature of grasping insights may be found in the recent PBS documentary in which Andrew Wiles and other mathematicians describe and explain their discovery of the solution to Fermat’s last theorem. They recount the process leading up to the insight. See: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/proof/wiles.html for the transcript. The full emotional impact is depicted very poignantly in the actual video.
this basic human drive is better appreciated, and channeled more productively in
directions of more successful outcomes.

Thirdly, as consciousness awakens in a sense of wonder, it begins to grow and
becomes directed toward particular things. The world of experience becomes increasingly
differentiated and ordered, and that world of experience enlarges through the asking of
questions, more questions, and different kinds of questions. It could be said that an
educator who does not understand or appreciate the importance and function of question-
asking fails in a fundamental way to understand a very basic dynamism of learning and
education; indeed, this would be a failure to grasp a fundamental dimension of human
existence.

And fourthly, while all the other elements of consciousness on the level of experience
exhibit some measure of creativity, it is in the generation of mental images expressed in
thoughts and symbols that one makes dramatic headway toward achieving insight.
Education, accordingly, ought to encourage and champion what one might call
“possibility thinking,” that is, thinking broadly, thinking “laterally.” While there comes a
time to control thoughts, to analyze them and discard certain ideas, there must also be a
time to think widely, perhaps wildly. To see this happen, a better educational setting is
one that encourages the learner to express a certain freedom of imagination, one that
allows a person’s imagination the luxury of untethered range over the mindscape of
possibility.

In what I have considered so far, an educational philosophy that draws upon
Lonergan’s intentionality analysis regards education as profoundly a matter of
intentionality expressed in various modes of human experience. As such, experienced-
based education requires of philosophy of education a strong appreciation and
understanding of experience as the driving force underlying thought and human knowing.
Consciousness unfolds through operations on the level of experience, but the desire or
drive of consciousness is not satisfied simply by adding more data to those already
produced and accumulated by sense experience and by images generated by creative and
free imagination. Consciousness is on the move, as Lonergan suggests. It develops. As
consciousness unfolds, that data of experience take on meaning; increasing order is

\[91\text{Ibid.}, 495.\]
brought to bear upon experience; cognitive meaning takes hold and blossoms; learning occurs. To understand more fully this movement of consciousness, one needs to understand Lonergan’s extensive account of the learning process and its far-reaching implications.

The Self-Correcting Process of Learning

This section will focus on the next level of Lonergan’s cognitional theory, beyond experience, namely, the level of intelligence, and on the relevance this level has to certain further elements of educational philosophy. These will include the experience and nature of learning and the learning process, what Lonergan uniquely terms, the “self-correcting process of learning.”

Where the basic elements promoting insight are found on the level of experience—the desire, the wonder, the question, the image—these elements find fuller expression and wider meaning on the next level of human consciousness. The quest for insight takes on a much more direct and intentional focus as one tries to make sense out of one’s massive and growing body of experience. The profoundly personal, perhaps intense, and sensuous elements of consciousness, along with the unbridled range of images and thought, as well as the sense of desire and yearning to know, all give way in the inexorable movement of consciousness to greater precision and clarity of meaning as more pointed questions arise (those questions beyond the “pure question”). On the level of intelligence, clearer differentiations arise, definitions become formulated and better refined, and explanations are proposed and refined. However, before we turn to an account of the educational implications of the operations of consciousness on the level of intelligence, it should be noted that in fact the questions of intelligence and learning endure as centrally important issues in educational philosophy. Here we find a particularly rich tradition.
Learning as an Issue of Educational Philosophy

Various facets of Enlightenment thought influencing the development of educational philosophy of one sort or another, and giving rise to the eventual concern of education for the masses, center on the importance and processes of human learning. For instance, Francis Bacon, as early as 1605, in his treatise on learning, argued against religious objections to learning and the acquisition of human knowledge, and advocated what he thought to be an effective program of learning composed of three parts—history for one’s memory, “poesy” for one’s imagination, and philosophy for one’s reason. These, it was thought, encouraged mental acuity, and resulted in great benefits to society.\(^2\) Hobbes’ great treatise on citizenship, the _Leviathan_, established the importance of a *learned* citizenry where one’s imagination is trained and where reason and knowledge govern one’s place in the social order.\(^3\) Rousseau also saw a place for training in the later stages of a child’s tutorship, in that the training of the senses precedes the onset of adolescence, after which one may progress to the greater depths of self-understanding, and to the learning of a trade.\(^4\) Johann Friedrich Herbart, as well, perceived the need for learning and instruction not only in the realm of knowledge, but also in the realm of “sympathy,” thus expanding the reach of educational concern beyond solely the intellectual to include the psychological and affective.\(^5\)

Clearly, the concern with learning—its conditions, its processes, barriers, psychological aspects, and so forth—from the dawn of Enlightenment thought down through modern times, has occupied the attention of widely influential thinkers. The matter of learning, moreover, retains a certain cachet, within the field of educational philosophy to the present day, as discussed in my introductory chapter, at least as evident in the quantity and diversity of literature published on the topic of learning.\(^6\) While much

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\(^3\) Thomas Hobbes, _Leviathan_ (New York: Collier Books, 1962), especially chapters 2 and 3 on the imagination, and chapter 5 on reason and science.


\(^6\) Appearing in 1967, the influential volume, *The Concept of Education*, deals with learning more than any other educational issue. Evidence of the ongoing interest in aspects of learning within the discipline of educational philosophy is supported by the number of published journal articles and books appearing even
of the literature, certainly on the practical level of formal schooling, addresses extensively the content of what is learned and the theory and techniques of learning, in addition to this, educational philosophy explores the more basic human processes of cognitive development, what constitutes knowledge, how knowledge is achieved, and how this relates to a generalized conception of self and personhood. For Lonergan, these questions are central to his intentionality analysis and, in large measure, are questions that are addressed in his explanation of the self-correcting process of learning.

While the topic of the self-correcting process of learning is addressed by Lonergan before he deals explicitly and extensively with the third level of human consciousness, this being judgment, he does not suggest that this learning process does not involve judgment. And by treating this topic at this point in this study, that is, as related to understanding before I consider explicitly the matters of judgment in relation to educational philosophy, I do not suggest that the reflective and evaluative operations of consciousness are not evident here, since, it should be noted, human intentionality operates not as isolated activities; in any level of intentionality other levels are operative. After all, Lonergan explains, consciousness is a unity. I deal with the self-correcting process of learning at this point because the main point to the self-correcting process is understanding, how it grows and develops. Judgment, or what Lonergan also calls "reflective understanding," is involved, but the main point to Lonergan’s account of the self-correcting process is not an account of how one makes judgments, and what counts as a good judgment. This comes later in his analysis. The self-correcting process of learning uses judgment more than it understands the operations and objectives of judgment. In the self-correcting process of learning, Lonergan intends to offer his understanding of understanding, although he again refers to the self-correcting process of learning in his account of judgment. In reference to the self-correcting process of learning and the operations of judgment, he says,

Judgment on the correctness of insights supposes the prior acquisition of a large number of correct insights. But the prior insights are not correct because we judge them to be correct. They occur within a self-correcting

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in the last five years. For instance, a search of the Philosopher’s Index for items on education and learning during this time period yielded 180 citations.

97 Method in Theology, 17-8.
process in which the shortcomings of each insight provoke further questions to yield complementary insights.  

According to Lonergan, the correction, then, is not a judgment per se, but rather an adjustment, a fuller explanation, a more adequate understanding. As such, the self-correcting process in Lonergan’s analysis is more a second-level operation than a third-level.

Learning as a Self-Correcting Process

A clue to the centrality of this notion of the self-correcting process of learning in Lonergan’s work is a textual one. In the first five chapters of Insight, Lonergan strives for clarity and precision by identifying the various components of insight, how they work as differentiated elements, and how they are interrelated. In these chapters we encounter examples of insight exhibiting an elevated demand for intellectual rigor and focused concentration appropriate to the disciplines of mathematics, geometry and physics. A shift, however, occurs in chapter six where he suggests, the “illustrative basis of our study must now be broadened. In the previous five chapters, precision was our primary objective, and so our examples were taken from the fields of mathematics and physics.”

But insight, he stresses, occurs not only in the minds of mathematicians and scientists. It also occurs in the minds of those engaged with everyday life. This transition into an account of insight in the world of common sense brings with it the notion of the self-correcting process of learning in which the various levels of cognition revealed in empirical science are seen to operate, but with less precision, also on the practical level of making one’s way in the world. In reference to the text, then, it is Lonergan’s notion of the self-correcting process of learning that bridges in the book the concept of insight uncovered through analyses of scientific inquiry and insight manifested in the much larger world of everyday living. Intelligence operative in the world of common sense, as it seeks to acquire knowledge and “know-how,” as it solves the concrete problems we

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98 Insight, 311.
99 Insight, 196.
100 Ibid.
face day by day, operates largely as a self-correcting process of learning. It should be noted, however, that this positioning at a crucially important place in his overall account of insight does not suggest that the self-correcting process of learning does not occur in the sciences. Rather, because of its lack of precision and more pronounced vulnerability to error, common sense more readily reveals, for Lonergan’s purposes, the operations of the self-correcting process.

There are two basic aspects to the self-correcting process of learning that Lonergan explores; one that concerns the internally directed dynamism of developing consciousness; and the other that concerns the external assistance given to the self-correcting process through teaching. The first deals with the subjective spontaneous operations of consciousness in its striving toward insight. From the child’s “secret wonder” that “rushes forth in a cascade of questions,” we see initially a rather unrestrained and disordered engagement of an individual’s world of experience. Put another way, the “spirit of inquiry … in its native state is untutored.” While such inquisitiveness orients one to intellectual inquiry, if one does not begin to learn, one will never channel this activity to productive ends. One will never realize the fruit of discovery or eventually achieve mastery of some subject area. Moreover, this learning is something one can do only for oneself. Lonergan suggests, “if we would master the answers, we somehow have to find them out ourselves.” Such self-directed learning is a matter of achieving genuine understanding. As is the case in grasping a definition, “it is the occurrence of that grasp [of understanding for oneself] that makes the difference between repeating the definition of a circle as a parrot might, and uttering it intelligently, uttering it with the ability to make up a new definition for oneself.” These, then, are the key features and functions of the “self” in self-correction. But what of the “correction”?

Learning occurs as the process of gaining new and better insights unfold, and where the need for self-correction arises as one realizes that some image or images, some insight or insights, grasped earlier are now found to be inadequate. The dynamism underlying this realization—this insight into the insufficiency of insight—is the question. "Insofar as any question is followed by an insight, one has only to act, or to talk, or

\[101\] Ibid., 197.
\[102\] Ibid.
\[103\] Ibid., 33.
perhaps merely to think, on the basis of that insight, for its incompleteness to come to
light and thereby generate a further question." As further questions arise, new insights
are needed, insights that can be added to those that have already survived scrutiny and
adjustment or correction. In the process, a basic stock of knowledge emerges and comes
to endure. Lonergan concludes, "... such is the spontaneous process of learning. It is an
accumulation of insights in which each successive act complements the accuracy and
covers over the deficiency of those that went before." But, more specifically, what is
the dynamism that sets in motion this self-correcting process, and what propels it forward
to its proper end?

As understanding unfolds, and as self-correction takes its effect, it is the question that,
again, emerges as the operator. The activity of question-asking (expressing in a concrete
way the eros of mind) has an ordering effect on the learning process. The random and
unguided torrent of questions in the young child needs to take on order and direction if
the individual is to learn and achieve some measure of intellectual satisfaction. Learning
does not occur all at once, but through a sequence of inquiry that builds toward a
determinate end. As a learning activity, one question leads spontaneously to the next for,
we are told, "questions are not an aggregate of isolated monads." Where questioning
relates to a specific field of inquiry, that field begins to expand and deepen as the insights
accumulate, and as one becomes increasingly familiar with that field’s intellectual terrain.
However, as the insights accrue, there persists a sense that there are more relevant
insights yet to come, and one realizes that further insights are needed to achieve mastery.
Hence, more penetrating questions need to be asked, and in the raising of further
questions additional adjustments and corrections are made to the enduring insights. As
one approaches mastery, the relevant questions tend to thin out. The insights that are
grasped are found to be increasingly satisfying and thorough. Once mastery in some field
of inquiry has been attained, one may find that the body of insights pertinent to that
particular area also has a certain relevance to another area, perhaps another cognate
discipline, for instance. As these relations of insights among various fields are explored,
knowledge expands, and further adjustments and corrections are initiated.

104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 197.
An illustration may be helpful of how this self-correcting process might work. One may be curious about how and when the new Canadian Territory of Nunavut came to be. To answer these questions, it would be necessary to gain insight into the relevant historic development. The inquirer would investigate briefly the history of the Dene, Inuit and other peoples of the north, uncover the process leading toward self-government during the 1960s through to the 1990s, and discover the issues in the debates and the provisions of Federal legislation culminating in the Territorial vote on a proposed boundary between the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Through such an inquiry, one could attain a reasonably accurate historical understanding of how the Territory came into existence as a geographical and political entity.

During the process of inquiry, a person could be sidelined by other issues, such as the controversies generated by opposing opinion on the boundary, or whether or not division was a good idea at all. But by refocusing again on the original question of "how" rather than "why" (though they are not unrelated), the inquiry could easily get back on track.

Based on some simple research, then, one soon could articulate how Nunavut came about, and the insight to answer the initial question would be achieved. During the process of gaining this insight, one's explanation could be refined as some of the data may be found to be inaccurate. Names and dates could be corrected as the information is analyzed. Should one newspaper report be contradicted by another, then references to a third or fourth authoritative report, or an appeal to some other type of documentation, might be necessary to establish the facts. In the process, the authority of the document's authors may need to be questioned. Once all the significant and relevant questions are answered, the answer to the question, even if brief, might be viewed as a sufficiently accurate and complete insight to allow one to say one now "understands" how Nunavut came to be. This self-correcting process brings one to the question of judgment, of saying 'yes, this is how it came to be' or 'no' to this understanding, and if 'yes', then one claims reasonably not only to understand, but to know.

While questioning along a certain line may come to an end once satisfying answers are found, still there exist other tangential lines of inquiry that may be followed. Consciousness as a dynamic operation of question-asking, and self-correcting may lead the inquirer concerning the formation of Nunavut to consider the effects of division on
the capital cities of Iqaluit and Yellowknife, on the economies of the two territories, and
to inquire about the social conditions of other communities in the north. By relating one
field of inquiry to another, one might consider issues related to Canadian sovereignty in
the Arctic, the development of Inuit languages and cultures, and so forth. The explanation
of how Nunavut came to be could now be expanded in relation to the larger questions of
how northern Canadians have coped with the division since 1999, and what are the
political, cultural and social ramifications now, and what they may be in the future. By
Lonergan’s analysis, the self-correcting process of learning unfolds by a person
correcting earlier insights through obtaining satisfying insights in response to some type
of question that is met by another question, the answer to which is met by yet a further
question, and, “once more the same process will reveal another aspect of incompleteness,
to give rise to still further questions and still further insights.”

Simply put, the self-correcting process of learning occurs largely in response to the
desire to know, to understand fully, and unfolds as self-directed operations of
consciousness. The process involves first a matter of identifying and attending to relevant
data. At this point the self-correcting commences, and the process moves forward by
intelligently putting the pieces of data together in meaningful ways, and adjusting the
explanatory framework along the path leading to an account, eventually, of all the
relevant data. The process reaches a terminus, and the self-correction ends, when there is
an assessment that there are no unanswered relevant questions. The understanding that
one has achieved in some field of inquiry is appropriate, full and satisfying. Such, then, is
the basic internal, self-directed functioning of the process.

The second aspect of the self-correcting process of learning concerns the operations of
learning that are externally affected and directed through the functions of teaching.
Lonergan explains,

Such [self-correcting] learning is not without teaching. For teaching is the
communication of insight. It throws out the clues, the pointed hints, that
lead to insight. It cajoles attention to drive away the distracting images
that stand in insight’s way. It puts the further questions that reveal the
need of further insights to modify and complement the acquired store. It

\[107\] Ibid.
has grasped the strategy of developing intelligence, and so begins from the simple to advance to the more complex.\textsuperscript{108}

Perhaps this is somewhat reminiscent of Emile’s tutor in Rousseau’s account of education and child-rearing, whose role was to not get in the way of the child’s learning but to facilitate the encounter with learning experiences and situations, and to oversee a student’s growing self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{109} While the self-correcting process occurs as a pivotal function of one’s own consciousness, as it adjusts and corrects itself, the process is aided tremendously through the nurturing provided by good teaching. I suspect there is much that could be gleaned from Lonergan by way of practical advice for teaching, and many of his assertions may strike teachers as intuitively correct. However, in reference to the self-correcting process, there seem to be at least two key points important to mention in relation to the function of teaching and learning.

First, while learning functions as an “internal” process of self-correction, the process does not happen optimally in isolation. As Lonergan suggests, insights can be presented by a teacher, or a tutor, to a learner as options to consider in expanding or correcting the insights one has already achieved. The crucial matter thus becomes one of communication. But while common sense tells us communication is integral to teaching (for something must be offered by a teacher that affects a student in some way), in a philosophy of education based on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, I see it emerging as an especially important issue. As Lonergan states, “teaching is the communication of insight.”

For Lonergan, communication is not merely imparting information. It involves creating and sustaining a shared field of experience from which emerges common meaning based on a substantive engagement of intersubjectivity, such as gesture and response, shared language and interpretation, commonly engaged social patterns and interaction, and so forth. Communication further requires a concerted effort and substantial success at overcoming alienation of student and teacher, at overcoming bias and other elements that prohibit or diminish the flourishing of understanding, for if there

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}, 197-8.

\textsuperscript{109} Rousseau, \textit{Emile}, 140ff. In this section, Rousseau stresses the importance of self-knowledge, self-discovery, and learning that arises from natural curiosity and motivated by the utility of knowledge.
is a bias against an insight, no amount of effort at communicating the insight will lead to an "aha" experience. Communication, as an educational act, involves both speech and action, and it operates thus:

Talking is a basic human art. By it each communicates to others what he knows, and at the same time provokes the contradictions that direct his attention to what he has overlooked. Again, far more impressive than talking is doing. Deeds excite our admiration and stir us to emulation. We watch to see how things are done. We experiment to see if we can do them ourselves. We watch again to discover the oversights that led to our failures. In this fashion the discoveries and inventions of individuals pass into the possession of many, to be checked against their experience, to undergo the scrutiny of their further questions, to be modified by their improvements. By the same token, the spontaneous collaboration of individuals is also the communal development of intelligence in the family, the tribe, the nation, the race.

The implications of this account of communication for education, I believe, are profound in that they demand a high-level engagement of the teacher, both in terms of commitment and understanding.

Regarding commitment, the primary requirement, I suggest, is for a connectedness between student and teacher on a basic experiential level. This may be a quality not easily gained by a teacher for it requires a teacher to encounter and participate in the experiential world of a student, perhaps one very different from what the teacher is used to. It requires a teacher to learn, understand and effectively engage the language of the student and the use of language by a student. This, at minimum, presupposes some sensitivity to a culture, or sub-culture, that could be peculiar or even objectionable in some way. For a formal schooling situation, it requires the teacher to be committed to creating a genuine community of shared meaning. By this standard, Lonergan transposes

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110 This point is broached in Michael Corso’s study of Lonergan’s thought in relation to religious education. He explains, “In addition, teachers must make an effort to discover the specific meanings and values that inform the particular group of students they teach. Following Freire, Thomas Groome [who draws on Lonergan’s analysis] refers to such an effort as being ‘with’ students.” Michael Joseph Corso, “Christian Religious Education for Conversion: A Lonerganian Perspective,” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1994), 419.
111 Insight, 198.
teaching and learning into certain existential categories—the creating of meaning, personal involvement, interdependence, and so forth.\textsuperscript{112}

Moreover, teaching as the communication of insight supports fully Paulo Freire’s contention that education must not engage “the banking method of learning,”\textsuperscript{113} and that a “pedagogy of the oppressed: be ‘forged with, not for, the oppressed (be they individuals or whole peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity.’”\textsuperscript{114} Inasmuch as any learner is engaged in a struggle to attain or to regain their humanity, Freire’s and Lonergan’s insights stress the importance of the communicative dimension of teaching, and that communication be grounded in the teacher’s solidarity with the student. In effect, then, this moves the issue of education into the social and political realms (that will be considered more fully in the next chapter). Although learning as a self-correcting process is what one carries out for oneself, the social and political dimensions of teaching, as integral to this process, take on central importance.

Secondly, for Lonergan, teaching requires an understanding, and better teaching can flow from a better understanding, of the various operations of consciousness involved in the learning process. It is in relation to such processes that one grasps the “strategy of


\textsuperscript{113}Perhaps enough of the nature of insight has been portrayed so far and the implications it has for education and educational philosophy set forth to expand briefly on why, according to Lonergan, the notion of “imparting” knowledge is largely erroneous. The notion stems from the image, I believe, of a knowledge holder (a teacher, for instance) articulating knowledge in words and the hearer (the student) hearing the words and thereby acquiring the same knowledge as the knowledge holder. This is analogous to gift-giving; something is imparted from one person to another. The problem with this notion concerns the fact that bits of knowledge or information are regarded as objects that are implanted into one’s consciousness. According to Lonergan, this is \textit{not} how things are apprehended by human consciousness. There is no “impartation.” Rather, things come into consciousness through the experience of an individual—through the experience of sense or of mental images. The elements of experience then become involved in the hermeneutical processes of understanding and interpretation as meaning is assigned to those elements of experience. Then as one comes to assess and judge the correctness, appropriateness or adequacy of the possible interpretation, the meaning is regarded as true, or appropriate or sufficient, and in the act of judging thus and so, knowledge is produced by the individual. Knowledge results not by receiving the information or knowledge package; it results from the experiential, creative, hermeneutical and evaluative acts of one’s own consciousness. Acquiring knowledge is a subjective, creative act, not an act of receiving objective bits of information. However, we do encounter knowledge held by others, but again, rather than impartation, that knowledge enters our consciousness as our experience of others who have the knowledge. We experience them through the senses and their knowledge may be encountered by us through our mental images—which then go through the process of understanding and judging. On the “way of tradition” see the discussion of Frederick Crowe’s work later in this chapter.

developing intelligence," a strategy largely in reference to the self-correcting process of learning, one that finds its genesis in the basic human drive to know and in the activities of wonder and of asking further questions. In this process, meaning begins to arise as various elements of one's experience are differentiated and interrelated. In due course, the knowing teacher, attuned to these processes, develops strategies to ensure the various elements of the process are not overlooked or executed poorly. How the strategy becomes formulated and carried out is a practical matter, but however it occurs, it attends to the process of self-correction in the individual learner, and with cooperative and intersubjective engagement of the teacher. Teaching significantly assists such development of learning, and good teaching explicitly understands the process of development, and it engages deliberately a strategy that best fosters that development of intelligence, reasonableness and personal responsibility. 

In short, the notion of the self-correcting process of learning articulates how insights arise, and identifies generally the conditions conducive or detrimental to their emergence. While it is a process that occurs in the individual learner, it is a process that can be aided tremendously by the external nurture of a committed and understanding teacher. To be sure, there are any number of variant understandings of how human intelligence develops, and perhaps some of them are not incompatible with Lonergan's analysis of consciousness. But Lonergan is clear that the question of learning ought to be understood primarily in terms of what goes on in human consciousness according to a self-correcting process spontaneously arising from the desire to know and the propensity to ask questions.

This matter of the learning process, however, raises more fundamental and pervasive questions. What is a process, and what makes it "developmental" and "progressive"? To these questions, Lonergan provides a particularly thorough response.

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115 Insight, 198.
116 But how does developing intelligence relate to the notion of responsibility as these ideas are connected here? The self-correcting process of learning is a development of understanding of the data of experience that leads to assessment and judgment that in turn leads to deliberation and decision. Decision expresses the wisdom that one has gained in the development of intelligence, and in the measure to which one acts in accord with that intelligence and resulting insight, one can be said to act responsibly. (More will be said of this in the section on the ethical implications of Lonergan's intentionality analysis.)
Development and Progress in Relation to Intentionality Analysis

For a comparison to the broader scope of Lonergan's treatment of development, in this section I will first briefly consider Dewey's position on development. I will then explore the key elements of Lonergan's notion of development. This will lead to a detailed account of genetic method and its relation to education, especially as applied in the educational thought of Lonergan scholar, Frederick Crowe.

Thus far, we have considered the elements and operations of the level of experience and the level of intelligence as they have a bearing on educational philosophy. Development occurs properly on all levels of consciousness, and a theory of development provides understanding of all dimensions of human consciousness. According to Lonergan, development is most dramatically illustrated in the growth and unfolding of human intelligence. Hence, we will consider this aspect of Lonergan's intentionality analysis related to the second level operations (although what implication this has to other levels will become clear).

First, however, let us understand the question of development as it has appeared in the thought of John Dewey, one of the more influential proponents in educational philosophy of development and growth. Dewey sets the stage for treating growth as an educational issue in his seminal work, *Democracy and Education*. There his position on development appears primarily under two themes: "education as growth" and "natural development and social efficiency." First, Dewey defines growth by what we commonly mean by development, namely, "... cumulative movement of action toward a later result." Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 41. Growth, he explains, occurs because there is a predisposition to do so, and the ability appears in the qualities of immaturity. Where immaturity is usually seen in negative terms, Dewey stresses its positive quality as containing the possibility for growth. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 42. More specifically, the possibility for growth pertains to two factors. First, the child in its immaturity exhibits a dependency that, while it may connote a certain helplessness, positively, it reveals a strong sensitivity and responsiveness to a child's environment. That is to say, in its helpless state, the child is strongly affected by its surroundings.

118 Ibid., 42.
Secondly, a child, being immature, exhibits a marked "plasticity," this being the ability to adapt to physical conditions and challenges and, more importantly, the ability to learn from experiences.\(^{119}\) Both dependency and responsiveness to environment lead to growth. Dewey determines that if life itself is development, and if growth is largely what life is about, then education as a process of growth and development is a matter of life itself; education is not for life, it is life. In applying these assertions to education, Dewey claims, "(i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming [of experience]."\(^{120}\) In education, the overarching objective, then, is to "ensure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth."\(^{121}\)

The second theme Dewey explicitly considers picks up on Rousseau's contention that education "is a process of development in accordance with nature."\(^{122}\) But while Dewey appreciates Rousseau's emphasis on attending to the natural purpose and function of one's physical body, he rejects his notion that these "natural" patterns of growth are the only guide for development. Dewey recognizes the importance of social efficacy to balance the "natural-development-only" approach. Dewey maintains that the function of education, in part, is to train a person in the management of economic resources.\(^{123}\) In Dewey's educational philosophy we find a particularly clear focus on the question of human development and its relation to educational aims and practices. By analyzing the individual human experience of growth from immaturity to maturity, and by recognizing the need to guide and control growth to meet social exigencies, Dewey formed a notion of development that tried to balance both the personal, natural experiences of life with the humanly created environment with its norms and controls. Because both of these dimensions exert considerable force in human life, for Dewey, education, prudently, must accommodate both types of demands.

The theme of development persists through much of Dewey's work in educational philosophy, a theme that has set the stage for subsequent vigorous debate. A great deal of thought and writing on educational philosophy reflects the enduring tension between

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 43-5.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., 50.
\(^{121}\) Ibid., 51.
\(^{122}\) Ibid., 112.
\(^{123}\) Ibid., 118-9.
“traditional” and “progressive” education, a tension inherently related to the issue of “progress,” and at least derivatively related to the question of social development. While the debate that such controversy generates usually centers on the practical, more immediate questions of, for instance, the strategies for education, the types of schools that are to receive public funding, the nature of the curriculum, standardization and testing, and so forth, the underlying educational philosophies of traditional and progressive education address the questions of both personal growth and the development of social values and configurations.

As early as 1938, Dewey articulated the key issues at the center of the conflict between traditional and progressive education as differences largely in terms of how individual and social development is believed to occur.\(^\text{124}\) Since Dewey’s time at least, the debates over fundamental approaches to progress and development have shifted and changed, and have come to embrace new issues (such as diversity and multiculturalism in education) while still engaging the enduring questions (such as the teaching of religious values in schools or upholding rigorous intellectual standards) that seem never to be settled by some conclusive answer. Ironically, one wonders if there has been much genuine development on this issue of educational philosophy, at least as it has been mapped out by Dewey.\(^\text{125}\)

Returning to Lonergan’s work, one finds a thoroughgoing analysis of the issue of development. While Lonergan, clearly, deals in a substantial way with the matter of

\(^{124}\) John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1963 [originally published in 1938]), 17-23. Succinctly contrasted, Dewey presents the two modes of education thus. “If one attempts to formulate the philosophy of education implicit in the practices of the new education, we may, I think, discover certain common principles amid the variety of progressive schools now existing. To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; to learning from texts and teachers, learning from experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill, is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.” (pp. 19-20).

\(^{125}\) One of the more significant recent treatments, I believe, of the issue of development in education appears in the substantial reference work, David R. Olson and Nancy Torrance, eds. *The Handbook of Education and Human Development: New Models of Learning, Teaching and Schooling* (Malden Mass.: Blackwell, 1998). This major reference work, however, exhibits a noticeable absence of any thoroughgoing philosophical analysis of the notion of development. Where Dewey focused largely on the biological development of the human organism to inform his notion of development, the work of educationists contributing to this volume focus largely on the developmental aspects of cognition and psychological growth and maturity. While I have focused on Dewey because of his historical significance and his seminal influence, other, more recent, understandings of development could be considered.
cognitive development, his thinking unfolds as a more penetrating account of the nature of development itself, any kind of development. Hence, Lonergan offers an account of wider consequence than does Dewey who was concerned mainly with human development and its social implications. In my estimation, in terms of generality, and in terms of depth of analysis, (to recall some characteristic features of philosophical thought), Lonergan’s account has considerable philosophical weight, and should have appeal to an educational philosophy that seeks a wider and more penetrating understanding of human development, and even understanding of development on a cosmic scale (as will be discussed in the next chapter).

In introducing his work on insight, Lonergan establishes the relation of how human consciousness operates and what it achieves in terms of progressive development.

... [I]nsight into insight brings to light the cumulative process of progress. For concrete situations give rise to insights which issue into policies and courses of action. Action transforms the existing situation to give rise to further insights, better policies, more effective courses of action. It follows that if insight occurs, it keeps recurring; and at each recurrence knowledge develops, action increases its scope, and situations improve.\(^{126}\)

These early hints of the nature of development and progress anticipate Lonergan’s substantive treatment offered later on in *Insight*. But here, clearly, the stage is set: understanding development is a matter of understanding how insights arise, how they come to be related to one another, and how they accumulate and affect the way human beings make their way in the world. As discussed earlier (pp. 168-9), Lonergan’s intentionality analysis articulates his understanding of the various ways of question-asking, and how questions unfold concerning various types of data. To recall, ways of raising questions in empirical study occur within two basic methodological frameworks—the classical and the statistical. Although dealing with different questions for different sets of data, Lonergan found in the classical and the statistical a certain complementarity that he then developed as generalized empirical method.\(^{127}\) As

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\(^{126}\) *Insight*, 8.

\(^{127}\) Briefly, both classical and statistical methods attended to data in a heuristic manner that structures the data in ways that tend to yield different insights. Both distinguish in explanatory frameworks data that are understood systematically and those understood nonsystematically, and seek laws that govern either the systematic as is the case with the classical, or the non-systematic as is the case with the statistical. Both
generalized empirical method was articulated for the field of science, and then applied to fields of inquiry and knowledge other than the scientific, two related but distinct methods of inquiry also were identified by Lonergan, namely, genetic method and dialectical method. To understand Lonergan's notion of development, it is necessary especially to understand what he means by genetic development, a notion that in my view has received far too little attention within Lonergan Studies.

Since the notion of development, according to Lonergan, "is peculiarly subject to the distorting influence of counterpositions," to guard against this vulnerability, one must be clear on the "principles" of development and how they give rise to genetic method. Where the classical and statistical heuristic structures of systematic and nonsystematic occurrences inform empirical method, he suggests, it is the notion of development that provides the heuristic structure of genetic method which accounts for the naturally
developing world of human knowing and doing. What does Lonergan mean by this? He explains:

As classical method anticipates an unspecified correlation to be specified, an indeterminate function to be determined, so genetic method finds its heuristic notion in development. In the plant there is the single development of the organism; in the animal there is the two-fold development of the organism and the psyche; in man there is the threefold development of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence.\textsuperscript{130}

That is to say, the notion of development supplies the basic understanding of how the substrates of the human person affect and supply the conditions for higher integrations, of how, in intelligent consciousness, an intelligible order arises that then unfolds in even greater integrations through a rational and reasonable life lived in the concrete world.

The Notion of Development

Lonergan defines development as “a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.”\textsuperscript{131} He applies this definition by way of illustration to the development of the human person from an organic state through the emergence of psychic sensitivities that flourish most dramatically in the realm of human intelligence. A full and satisfying account of Lonergan’s notion of development in relation to education would have to probe and illumine the many fascinating dimensions to his lengthy explanation. One would need to explore the manner in which his account of development could have a significant bearing on practical education and provide insightful analysis to many aspects of the practice of teaching. My aim here, however, is more theoretical and philosophical, namely, to show how Lonergan addresses the matter of development as a general principle underlying existence.

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibid.}, 484. It should be noted that Lonergan’s work substantiates the claim of the three-fold development in human beings; his work does not substantiate the claim of the limited development in plants and animals.  
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}, 479.
In Lonergan, the notion of development rests on a grasp of its seven basic principles. There is the “principle of emergence” where the chemical elements and compounds invite higher integration in organisms; organisms invite higher integrations in sensitive consciousness; sensitive consciousness invites still higher integrations in the accumulating of insights. It is the principle of emergence operative in both the organic and inorganic modes of existence that explains the possibility, motivation and direction of the desire to know that intends and moves toward insight.\textsuperscript{132}

Secondly, there is the “principle of correspondence.” While various manifolds and aggregates of manifolds differ, and thus require different higher integrations, there is a range of difference that bears enough similarity or correspondence that allows for a similar type of higher integration. Lonergan explains:

\begin{quote}
It is true, of course, that not every difference in the underlying manifold demands a different integration; the same kind of atom can have subatomic components at different energy levels; the same kind of organism admits differences of size, shape, weight; similarities of character and temperament are compatible, probably enough, with neural differences; and the same theory can be reached from different data.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

Essentially, the principle of correspondence explains the possibility of systematizing differing manifolds.\textsuperscript{134}

Thirdly, the “principle of finality” governs development toward a limit in the realization of, for instance, some genus or species in the biological sphere. There can be potentially greater systematizations and higher integrations, given certain conditions, but the form of existence achieved through development that results in members of a genus or species is a terminus of sorts. As elements come together in higher integrations, the nature of those elements tends to delimit the possibility for integration, at least without the introduction of new elements.

Fourthly, the “principle of development” itself, Lonergan explains, describes the linked sequence of higher integrations whereby one systematization leads to the next, and so forth, “until the possibilities of development along a given line are exhausted and the

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 477.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
relative stability of maturity is reached."\textsuperscript{135} For one to explain that a development has occurred, then, it is necessary to show how the relation of one set of elements or events is actually a higher integration of a previous set.

In the fifth place, "the course of development is marked by an increasing explanatory differentiation."\textsuperscript{136} As the higher integrations of manifolds occur in increasingly complex systematizations, the occurrence admits ever-greater potential intelligibilities. For instance, more can be known of a human being as a complete person than one knows in an account of all of one's individual biological cells. By way of illustration, Lonergan explains generally how considerable differentiation can arise from very similar biological manifolds. Human beings as infants can have very similar biological constitutions but become very different as adult individuals.

...[M]en of widely different temperament and character began, as infants, from instances of sensitive consciousness that not only were remarkably similar but also remarkably undifferentiated; there were sensations, but perceptiveness was undeveloped; there was nothing to remember, and powers of imagination were latent; affects were global affairs of elementary types; and skills were limited to wailing. Finally, intellectual development has its roots in the detached and disinterested desire to know; but the mere desire is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to highly differentiated structures that are masteries of logic, mathematics, natural science, common sense, philosophy, and human science; but these intelligible differentiations are yet to come, and they come only in and through the process of development.\textsuperscript{137}

In the sixth place, Lonergan describes how development can admit some minor degree of flexibility in how the integration of the manifolds occur and yet still achieve the same basic higher integration. He explains, "a normal sea urchin can result from an embryo subjected to distorting pressures; psychic health can be due to untutored spontaneity or to the ministrations of the psychiatrist; the same science can be taught successfully in accord with different methods."\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 478.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 479.
And seventhly, development is capable also of major flexibility, but then the end result, the higher integration, will be altered substantially, such as could have happened in evolutionary development in species adaptation.\footnote{Ibid., 478-9.}

These principles, then, are the factors by which Lonergan proposes how one may understand development. To understand human development well, one must understand development arising from various types of manifolds, from inorganic matter to the organic, from the organic extending to the psychic, and then from the psychic to intelligent life. In the previous section we saw how development occurs in the self-correcting process of learning, but here we see a wider integration of human development that accounts not only for the intelligent component, but accounts also for the biological and psychic substrates. Thus, Lonergan accounts in a general way for growth and development of all aspects of an individual's life, and anticipates what we will investigate later on, namely, various dimensions of social development.

While there are these physical and psychic aspects to development, aspects that factor into an account of education as a developmental process, Lonergan finds that for the human being, development is intimately tied to the occurrence of insight. Hence, in the realm of education as a field of study and practice, the development of insight takes center stage. Lonergan explains:

The principal illustration of the notion of development is, of course, human intelligence. An otherwise coincidental manifold of data or images is integrated by insights; the effort to formulate systematically what is grasped by insight, or alternatively the effort to act upon it, gives rise to further questions, directs attention to further data, leads to the emergence of further insights, and so the cycle of development begins another turn. For if one gives free reign to the detached and disinterested desire to know, further questions keep arising. Insights accumulate into viewpoints, and lower viewpoints yield to higher viewpoints. If images are the sole basis of movement, there develops logic; if images serially related to facts form the basis, the development is mathematical; if the data in their bearing on human living determine the circle, there develops common sense; if data in their relations to one another are one's concern, there develops empirical science; finally, if one attends to the circle of development itself and to the structure of what can be known of proportionate being, the development is philosophic. In each of these
fields, as in organic growth and in the unfolding of the psyche, development is a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and of emergence.\textsuperscript{140}

Here one sees that various facets of human inquiry and learning are instances of specific types of development and, depending on what data are attended to, different systematizations and integrations of insights arise. One also sees how general fields of inquiry develop. In addition to an explanation of the development of human inquiry, then, one finds a basic philosophical account of the disciplinary structure of education, and thus an explanation of not only the personal experience of education, but an explanation of how, very generally, in the field of education, all learning and inquiry are distinguished and interrelated.

The importance that the notion of development plays in Lonergan’s philosophy of education can, in my view, hardly be overstressed. Here we find, first, the central place that the notion of insight has in his account of human development. Human development occurs in reference to the emergence and integration of insights into the contexts of one’s life.

Secondly, Lonergan’s reflection on the circularity and progress of development of any sort raises the whole matter to a philosophical plane. As he suggests, “if one attends to the circle of development itself and to the structure of what can be known of proportionate being,\textsuperscript{141} the development is philosophic.” That is to say, Lonergan’s account of development, as a philosophical account, is a matter related to the nature of existence and reveals the fundamental properties and operations of all of existence. In Lonergan, the question of development moves beyond an account of biological development analogously applied to educational matters (such as we saw with Rousseau and Dewey), and also moves beyond limiting an account of development in education to mainly cognitive development. By this, I suggest, Lonergan elevates the question from the realm of empirical observation with implications discerned for educational practice to

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 483-4.

\textsuperscript{141} “Proportionate being” is being or reality that is proportionate to our knowing, that is, that there is an immanent intelligibility existent in being. See \textit{Insight}, 676.
the realm of philosophy, and as development unfolds in terms of genetic method, as I shall discuss, he elevates the matter to the realm of educational philosophy.

And thirdly, this formulation of the notion of development clearly addresses issues of profound educational importance—including at least the experience of data and images, intelligence and formulations, the emergence of viewpoints, and the development of the whole range of human inquiry (such as is carried out formally in programs of study and institutions of learning). In all of this, it should be noted that the general account of development rests squarely on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis in that the structure and operations of knowing and doing provide the clues to an understanding and knowledge of existence, what Lonergan calls “proportionate being.” Lonergan’s concern is with development of any kind, but development of the distinctly human kind, such as what we are after in education, is explained more fully in terms of genetic method.

**Genetic Method**

From this notion of development, Lonergan strikes out on a further elaboration of how human beings grow and develop. This further mode or method of understanding is called genetic method. In genetic method, Lonergan seeks to construct a framework, a methodology, for understanding comprehensively the human situation. Just as empirical method, resting on classical and statistical heuristic structures, constitutes the framework for understanding empirical enquiry and, thus, for understanding the world of natural science, so the notion of development constitutes the heuristic structure for genetic method that composes the framework for understanding the human world with its biological and psychic (feeling) elements, as well as its dimensions of intelligence. The explanatory power of genetic method, as Lonergan describes it, is indeed penetrating and extensive:

Within this metaphysical context [namely, the explanatory reach of genetic method] it has been found possible, I believe, to offer a single integrated view that finds its point of departure in classical method yet embraces biology, the psychology of behavior and depth psychology, existentialist reflection upon man, and fundamental elements in the theory
of individual and social history, of morals and asceticism, of education and religion.\textsuperscript{142}

While it would take this inquiry far beyond its scope limited to educational philosophy to probe with any depth the compactly stated and carefully nuanced dimensions of the metaphysical dimensions of genetic method, still a basic grasp of genetic method is in order, at least in terms of setting forth the general framework for understanding the overall character of human existence and education. As education concerns itself with more than the processes and achievements of learning subject matter, such that its scope of interest and relevance extend to virtually all aspects of human existence, genetic method takes on particular importance. Genetic method provides the theoretical framework for understanding the developmental aspects of all facets of human existence, along with understanding the potential or actual breakdowns of human development and their possible correctives.

Genetic method applies the basic notion of development to the case of human existence and appears to function analogously to empirical method with its canons of operations. Like the rules that govern empirical inquiry leading to insight, genetic method, Lonergan explains, operates according to a set of basic principles or “laws” by which one understands human development.

First, there is a fundamental recognition of the individuation and unity of the human person. Lonergan explains this basic understanding: “... a man is an individual existing unity differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, and intellectual conjugates.”\textsuperscript{143} These elements, brought together as conjugates of various types of experience—behaviors, bodily movements, interaction with other things, use of language, and so forth—operate as flexible schemes of recurrence. That is, as a person may be observed as being a certain way or doing certain things, the individual exhibits a complexity of elements that reveal patterns of behavior that have a certain intelligibility to them. One tends to act in ways that are thought out, that make sense, and in ways that tend to be successful at achieving desired effects in one’s interactions with the world. Besides these externally related experiences, there are also internally focused experiences

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Ibid.}, 503-4.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Ibid.}, 495. Lonergan refers to conjugates as elements of a certain type that are brought together.
of emotional and intellectual engagements, along with imaginative representations where the individual manages these experiences in terms of an overall sense of self. There is an enormous range of possibilities for experience as well as modes of managing these elements of one's existence, including suppressing sensitive flow, obsessing on imaginative representations, devoting energies to intellectual pursuits, or even being overwhelmed by physical sickness. For Lonergan, understanding the developmental process involves understanding the manner in which experiences coalesce into various types of conjugates in the self-constituting individual.

Secondly, the individual develops in its enormous array of possible conjugates. The conjugates (those combinations of the physical, chemical, organic, psychic and intellectual elements of one's individual existence) operate not merely as coincidental, random occurrences, but they occur as "systems on the move." They develop; the person develops. As systems, developments occur in terms of higher integration of the lower level manifolds, and where the change in the higher integration effects a change in the lower. Through a reflexive circularity, the changing underlying manifolds effects a change in the higher integration. By way of illustration, Lonergan supplies a general educational example, reminiscent of the self-correcting process of learning:

Thus, unless one asks the further questions, one remains with the insights one has already, and so intelligence does not develop; inversely, because one wants to develop [as a result of the desire to know], one can frequent the lectures and read the books that put the further questions and help one to learn.

In development there occurs an interrelatedness and an intentional integration, at least partially successful, initially, and, subsequently, with increasing success at integrating more elements of one's individual being in higher syntheses where that success is evidenced by ever-greater personal growth. For instance, as one develops, there occurs a greater engagement of human intersubjectivity. Lonergan explains, "unless one is

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144 Ibid. While many elements of one's existence can be managed, it should be noted that there are elements that cannot be managed, and which exert considerable control over one's like, such as some types of illness, accidents of some type or another, natural disasters, and so forth.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.
encouraged out of shyness, timidity, pretended indifference, to zest and risk and doing, to humility and laughter, one will not develop but merely foster the objective grounds for one’s feeling of inferiority.”

The point he emphasizes is that as the person develops, the development is a movement through systematic processes—intelligible processes, but perhaps not explicitly understood by the person—of higher, more extensive integrations of elements of the underlying manifold. For Lonergan, the higher integration of the organic and psychic levels occurs largely through an “intellectual” integration, since it is the intentionality of consciousness that seeks intelligibility and meaning that in turn provides the control and direction in the self-constituting individual.

Thirdly, Lonergan further explains the general functioning of the various types of manifolds, these being the organic, psychic, intellectual or external, as “the law of integration.” The law governs the manner in which these different levels correspond and interrelate. Lonergan recognizes that the initiative for development may stem from any of the levels where there are needs to be met, urges to be satisfied, problems to be solved, questions to be answered, and changing environments to be responded to. The initiative for personal change and development can occur from a variety of sources, and can occur, perhaps, rather forcefully.

However, the initiative for change and adaptation may be thwarted if there is not an appropriate and effective change on all the various levels of a person’s being. A change in one level, because a person is a unity of conjugates, will require change in other conjugates. For instance, “the nonconscious neural basis can send up its signals that express a starved affectivity or other demands for fuller living, but the signals need an interpreter and the interpreter an intelligent and willing pupil.”

The demand or need becomes conscious, even dimly conscious, and to meet it may require cooperation among all dimensions of the self-constituted individual. Unless there occurs the adjustments and

147 Ibid., 496.
148 Ibid., 494. Lonergan uses the term “intellectual” to mean more than a logical, dispassionate, carefully reasoned analysis of one’s life. By Lonergan’s use of the term, he means that meaning and intelligibility are sought for all the biological and psychic components of one’s life, and that in achieving this level of intelligibility does not detract from the feeling components, but enhances them by relating them to the other components of one’s existence. Lonergan explains, “It remains that a word be said on total development in man. Organic, psychic, and intellectual development are not three independent processes. They are interlocked, with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic.”
149 Ibid., 497.
advances on the other levels, and within the level itself that produces the demand and
initiation for development, growth towards a fuller life becomes impaired, and the
individual develops compensations that have the potential of determining other
behaviors, attitudes, and a host of other types of affectivities. In terms of the practicalities
of life, such compensation may affect even the ability to achieve good and healthy
employment.\textsuperscript{150} Again, Lonergan regards insight to be key to the development, not only
as the controller of the experiential conjugates, but also as the higher-level integrator. For
an individual, as insight takes its place as the superior factor of control, the various
initiatives for development that arise on any level of one’s being are understood ever
more fully (the whole point of insight) and, in the reflective phases of insight, the means
of satisfying the human need for well-being are grasped and their value apprehended.

Fourthly, development occurs in terms of who and how the individual is at present,
and who and how the person can be in the future, that is to say, development occurs as a
tension between actuality and potentiality. Lonergan calls this the “law of limitation and
transcendence.”\textsuperscript{151} From maintaining the regularities of development that have occurred
in the past, such as the usual ways in which one encounters new situations, the habits of
thought and behavior, and the repetition of various patterns of experience, there occurs a
rising tension due to the upwardly directed dynamism of human life that seeks to realize
new modes of development. This dynamism anticipates new expressions of spontaneity,
engages entirely new habits of thought and behavior, and develops entirely new patterns
of experience. Managing this tension consciously and intelligently becomes a challenge
of considerable proportions and, if done successfully, represents a significant
achievement. Lonergan explains:

Intellectual development [following the principles of genetic method] rests
upon the dominance of a detached and disinterested desire to know. It
reveals to a man a universe of being in which he is but an item, and a
universal order in which his desires and fears, his delight and anguish are
but infinitesimal components in the history of mankind. It invites man to
become intelligent and reasonable not only in his knowing but also in his
living, to guide his actions by referring them, not as an animal to a habitat,
but as an intelligent being to the intelligible context of some universal

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}
order that is or is still to be. Still it is difficult for man, even in his knowing, to be dominated simply by the pure desire, and it is far more difficult for him to permit that detachment and disinterestedness to dominate his whole way of life. For the self as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering, functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and self-interested center within its own narrow world of stimuli and responses.\textsuperscript{152}

Simply put, there exists a tension in human development between the pure desire that propels one potentially to go beyond oneself, and the sensitive psyche that finds security, reassurance, and comfort in maintaining the status quo in its self-oriented environment of the familiar and the immediate. Development requires a management of the intellectual desire for transcendence (in the sense of going beyond oneself) and of the psychic desire for self-satisfaction. Within this tension, development actually occurs as the individual manages in intelligent and reasonable ways the limitations demarked by one's own internal, psychic needs, and the drive that propels one beyond such limitations in encountering the world and embracing the "other" in social and environmental engagements.

And fifthly, human development occurs optimally—as a high and perhaps lofty objective—in terms of human genuineness, that is, as a human being known to oneself without pretense or illusion. There is a starting point of development in the individual as one actually is. There is an end or term to any given occurrence of development realized in achieving the goal of the development, and there is a process whereby the development unfolds. For development to be genuine, according to Lonergan, there must be a conscious and correct, three-fold apprehension of the starting point, of the process, and of the end to which development aims.\textsuperscript{153} Conscious apprehension is the key,\textsuperscript{154} for if something occurs unconsciously, the question of genuineness for Lonergan does not arise, although perhaps there is a question of malfunction or breakdown. The benefit of

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, 498.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Ibid.} I note that this may be development in theory; how it actually is worked out in one's life may include significant levels of guess-work, serendipity, and welcomed or un-welcomed surprises!
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ibid.}, 500. "It [the requirement of genuineness] arises only inasmuch as development occurs through consciousness." Lonergan does recognize, however, that genuineness has sometimes been thought of as exemplified in the "simple and honest soul," one who is not "given to deep and prolonged self-scrutiny." (p. 499). However, the special meaning of the term Lonergan advances requires a decidedly strong element of reflection and self-scrutiny.
genuineness is a unity to the development where all the elements of the process contribute to, and are intentionally directed toward, the same outcome. That is to say, if "they [the apprehensions of the start, the goal and the process] are correct, the conscious and unconscious components of development are operating from the same base along the same route to the same goal." Where human development is not genuine, then, there is a misapprehension of the starting point, of the process and/or the goal, and the conscious and unconscious components of the process will be operating to some extent at cross-purposes.

Lonergan suggests that the question of genuineness arises when, for instance, one grapples with the issues of managing the tension between limitation and transcendence. The question is of managing the tension between systems that tend to occur as schemes of recurrence, and as "systems on the move," such as when those systems embrace new elements and transform the old, creating new and higher levels of integrations. The problem is in achieving a development that apprehends accurately the originating states of the two systems, somewhat at odds, and integrating in positive ways how, for instance, the conditions of limitation are recognized, but yet pushing the edges of those limits so as to achieve some measure of self-transcendence. If this can be accomplished, and a realistic goal or end has been achieved, then the person who has developed in this manner can be said to exhibit genuineness.

In the human being, it remains that genuineness is a category of conscious intelligence, and as such, genuineness is a matter of insight. If one has insight into one's own processes engaged in the development of consciousness, insight into the elements that are to be developed, and into the result of the development, and if that insight is correct, then there exists the possibility of genuineness. If the insight has its desired, proper effect of bringing understanding and reasonableness to bear upon the situation, then genuineness is actualized. Lonergan describes its effects this way:

Genuineness is the admission of that tension [of limitation and transcendence] into consciousness, and so it is the necessary condition of

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155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., 499. Lonergan recognizes that genuineness is used to describe the "simple and honest soul" who is not "given to deep and prolonged self-scrutiny." This is not the genuineness Lonergan explicates.
the harmonious cooperation of the conscious and unconscious components of development. It does not brush questions aside, smother doubts, push problems down, escape to activity, to chatter, to passive entertainment, to sleep, to narcotics. It confronts issues, inspects them, studies their many aspects, works out their various implications, contemplates their concrete consequences in one’s life and in the lives of others.\textsuperscript{158} Of the activities that humans engage in developing toward the realization of genuineness, one sees that it is understanding and judgment that govern the operations of cognitive development as the individual strives to achieve genuineness. (More will be said of genuineness when later we consider Lonergan’s notion of authenticity.)

In all five basic principles of genetic method that apply to human existence, the essential thrust of the method is to provide a framework for understanding any sort of human development. As such, genetic method is a heuristic structure. In its application, genetic method is a systematic unfolding of the activities and procedures that work together towards the actual achievement of human development. All of this, one should be reminded, rests squarely on Lonergan’s account of the nature and processes of insight.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, one sees in Lonergan that the notion of development, so profoundly critical to understanding the educational enterprise as a developmental process, receives a particularly sustained and penetrating analysis, and intends to illumine how any educational activity may be thought to be developmental.

\textbf{Genetic Method Applied to Education}

A clear example of how Lonergan’s notion of development and genetic method may be applied to education appears in the work of Frederick Crowe on educational process. An additional value of Crowe’s work on genetic method illustrates its more explicit incorporation of the fourth level of intentionality in the process. Although he applies the methodological position of Lonergan worked out explicitly for the realm of theological inquiry,\textsuperscript{160} its underpinnings in a general account of development and genetic method are

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Ibid.}, 502.
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Ibid.}, 503.
\textsuperscript{160} In \textit{Method in Theology}, this is revealed in the upward movement of the first phase of theological inquiry, and the downward movement in the second.
eminently clear: educational process stems from an analysis of human consciousness and unfolds optimally as systematic processes rooted in genetic method.

Specifically, Crowe’s objective is to enunciate a “strategy for education.”\footnote{161} As such, he provides a methodological framework delineating a set of procedures for appreciating and incorporating harmoniously within a system of education what he calls “two vector forces.” The two forces pertain to the development from “below upward” in the operations of learning, and to the development from “above downward” where the achievements of learning and wisdom are passed along to the learner as received “gifts”\footnote{162} of one’s tradition or heritage. Both the way of tradition and the way of heritage illustrate, Crowe suggests, “the constant factors of human development: experience, understanding, reflection, values, and the two-way traffic of their development as gift or as achievement.”\footnote{163} In what follows in his study, Crowe provides a clear, practical account of how education could be carried out based on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis generally, and based on his general notion of development and of genetic method specifically.

The fundamental problem Crowe addresses concerns a perceived need to reconcile “the age-old opposition in education between the way of progress and the way of tradition.”\footnote{164} According to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, the two “ways” are readily recognized, first in the case of achievement but also in the way of heritage. Achievement unfolds as a development upward from the empirical level where “data are received, grouped, recalled,” to an intelligent level “on which we ask why, form ideas,” to the level of reasonableness, “on which we reflect, test our ideas, form judgments, reach the truth,” to the responsible level, “the level of values, on which we take action in accordance with

\footnotesize\begin{itemize}
\item 161 Frederick E. Crowe, Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1985). It should be noted that Crowe takes advantage of the later developments of Lonergan’s thought on value and on the upward and downward directions of consciousness in its two basic modes of development, as presented in Lonergan’s Method in Theology. My aim is to concentrate more on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis itself, for there is much in this analysis on its own to be expounded and related to education. Although Crowe includes in his analysis and thesis the “later Lonergan,” Crowe’s work illustrates very well how the basic notion of development and genetic method apply to education.
\item 162 Again, I would want to differentiate what Crowe means by “gift,” and what is meant by the discredited notions of “education as impartation” or “education as banking.”
\item 163 Ibid., xiii.
\item 164 Ibid., 1.
\end{itemize}
an informed conscience." In this way, as much as is reasonable and responsible, we come to be whom we choose to be, and make our way in the world as we see fit. It is a matter of personal achievement. However, there is a way complementary to the way of achievement. This is the way of heritage. Here the upwardly directed operations essentially are reversed, Crowe notes, and they usually occur prior to the way of achievement. The learner is presented with, and may come to receive, the values and attitudes of one’s family and community traditions. Where values and attitudes are reflected upon, a certain stock of beliefs is apprehended by the learner, and a set of values become fully adopted as one’s own. The next stage of development unfolds in an ever-deepening understanding of those beliefs and values, an understanding that orders, directs and produces experiences compatible with those beliefs and values. Experiences arise that are increasingly “mature and perceptive.” While these two phases of human development are differentiated, Crowe believes they need not be at odds.

Integrating the way of achievement and the way of heritage, that is, the way of progress and the way of tradition, is a problem whose solution, Crowe finds, lies in understanding the very structure of human consciousness—in its constants as the structure of its operations and in the variables of its actual concrete development. His solution to integration appeals not to the manner in which a curriculum might be able to incorporate elements of each phase, nor does it appeal to any technical methods of instruction. Rather, the appeal is primarily to the interiority of the learner, to the subjectivity of the human subject engaged in the activities of learning. The solution regards not the academic subject that is being taught, but regards the human subject-as-subject. The solution unfolds this way.

First, picking up on Lonergan’s assertion, Crowe maintains there exists a basic unity to the human person, a unity of consciousness. While there are the two basic ways that consciousness operates, that is as two vector forces, still there is a unity to that consciousness. Crowe suggests, it “is not a matter of one component feeling and another

\[\text{165 Ibid., 12.}\]
\[\text{166 Ibid., 14.}\]
\[\text{167 Ibid., 13-4. While Lonergan and Crowe see the way of heritage unfolding on the experiential level as experience that is “mature and perceptive,” I tend to think that the effect on the experiential level might be a control and limiting of experience to those that fit with traditional understandings, the convictions of right and wrong, the acceptable and unacceptable, and the scale of values adhered to by family and community. Of course, much of the effect, for good or ill, would depend upon the nature of the tradition being received.}\]
thinking; it is "I" who both feel and think."\textsuperscript{168} If the human subject, then, follows the way of heritage, and also succeeds in the way of achievement, there is a resulting natural unity to these two ways embodied in the learner as a single unity of consciousness, as an integral individual.

Secondly, Crowe notes, there is an integration of the two phases in that there occurs a "communication" between the levels of consciousness that integrates the various elements of experience consisting of data of sense and data of consciousness. As such, the existence and integration of the elements of one level affects the existence and integration of elements on another level.\textsuperscript{169} Again, it is Lonergan's genetic method that underlies Crowe's appreciation and explanation of the interrelatedness of the conjugates. It is this method that anticipates a synthesis of these conjugates on a higher level. In a reverse effect, genetic method also recognizes that the synthesis achieved on the higher level of integration causes change in the elements on the lower levels. With this model, Crowe finds that the effect of a line of development originating in tradition can ripple downward through the operations of one's consciousness. Another line of development can originate in one's sense or imaginal experience and move upward to the levels of intelligent grasp, of judgment, and of values and decision.

The two lines of development, unfortunately, also can run at odds with each other, and in education, Crowe finds ample evidence of the conflict. But Crowe also finds hope. "The all-out war between opposing approaches [of traditional and progressive education] can be transformed into peaceful cooperation, once there is a sufficiently fundamental analysis of human operations to accommodate both and assign to each its role."\textsuperscript{170} Thus, there can occur an arbitration of this opposition within one's own consciousness, a management of the tension, as it were, (signaling, perhaps, a genuine development), through understanding the different modes of conscious operations, and assigning an appropriate place and function to each approach.

Given this analysis of the operations of human consciousness applied to educational process and development, Crowe goes on to explain the role of the educator through the various stages of learning. Early on, the teacher seeks to encourage the development of

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
consciousness in the way of achievement, while at the same time attempting to moderate the way of tradition, since tradition at first tends to dominate one’s development. As the way of achievement develops, one’s sense of self begins to emerge and, with it, the increasing ability to express oneself, form arguments, criticize and perhaps rebel. This stage of development sees unfolding a growing opposition between achievement and tradition, especially dramatic and painful in adolescent years. The wise parent, educator, and the increasingly aware teenager, understand “what is going forward,” and seek as much as possible to “be reasonable and responsible in dealing with each other.” Development tends to favor more the way of achievement in this stage. Finally, “after these painful years of conflict, the mature person reaches a state of relative equilibrium, of real integration, of resultant unity of the vector forces.”

The strategy for education that Crowe advances is one that understands and appreciates these two vector forces—the internal drive of achievement upward, and the externally conditioned drive of tradition downward—operating in the developing consciousness of the learner. Crowe’s is a strategy that recognizes the proper place and function of each force within an individual’s consciousness, and engages and promotes them in what he sees as their proper time and place for the education of the learner. The eventual aim of the educator is to see realized in the learner a maturity that balances these vector forces in some equilibrium, and reduces the length of time and significance of the period of conflict.

Throughout the remaining five chapters of Crowe’s book, he expands on education as achievement and education as heritage, and he considers various ways of integration. He further explores how the two vector forces tend to operate in post-secondary education, and also how these two ways are expressed in Christian and theological education. While Crowe, a seasoned educator, offers much by way of insight and wisdom on the style and execution of education based on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, my concern is more with a philosophy of education than with a strategy of education (although the two cannot

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171 Ibid., 26.
172 Ibid., 26-7. This seems to assume that conflict of this nature is not positive and developmental. Is this always the case? The question should be raised as to the manner in which conflict can raise important issues, can help to perceive or establish one’s identity, can expand one’s understanding of an issue, and can lead to needed correctives. Of course, to appreciate the positive elements of conflict in education, Crowe would have to deal with specific issues of conflict in considerably more detail.
be separated completely). Related to my objective, I find in Crowe’s work a lucid and penetrating illustration, entirely faithful\textsuperscript{173} to Lonergan’s central position on the question of development and the structure and operations of insight. While Crowe draws on some of Lonergan’s discoveries, post-\textit{Insight}, such as the upward and downward movements,\textsuperscript{174} his central thesis reflects the developmental aspects of insight that unfolds as differentiated yet interrelated operations of human consciousness.

In short, Lonergan offers a sustained and penetrating analysis of human development by identifying and explaining the principles of development generally, and by setting forth the principles of human development in his account of genetic method. The notion of development and genetic method arise from Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, particularly its articulation of as cognitional theory and epistemology. Crowe provides an example of how the notion of development, both in an upward vector movement and a downward movement, may be applied to the field of education, and how genuine development can be determined in terms of the systematic integration of experiential data through the operations of understanding, judgment and decision. While there may be myriad other possible applications of this notion of development, my aim here has been to outline its primary features, and to suggest how this aspect of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis pertains to educational philosophy as an account of human development, and learning as a chief manifestation of development.

\textbf{Summary}

The objective in this chapter has been to understand aspects of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis as it unfolds as cognitional theory and epistemology, and to relate these aspects of his analysis to certain topics in the field of educational philosophy. This objective led me to consider in the first section the basic philosophical orientation of

\textsuperscript{173} Crowe widely is regarded as one of, if not the principal, interpreter of Lonergan’s writings.

\textsuperscript{174} The upward and downward movements come to the fore most clearly in Lonergan’s theological method where the functional specialties are shown to progress from research, interpretation, history and dialectic in an upward movement from experience to truth and personal transformation. The downward movement parallels the upward through the functional specialties of foundations, doctrine, systematics and communications. Both the upward and downward specialties reflect the operations of consciousness: experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.
Lonergan’s thought centered in human experience. The second section, focused more directly on the operations of insight itself which led, in the third section, to a discussion of the actual unfolding of human consciousness on the second level where one finds Lonergan’s explanation of the operations of intelligence, along with his extensive account of the learning process. As an important dimension of human understanding, the fourth section dealt with the issue of development, generally, and genetic method specifically related to human development. I found in Crowe’s analysis of traditional and progressive education a clear application of genetic method to the field of education that draws on the assertions of Insight, but incorporates key developments of Method in Theology.

Overall, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has been expanded in this chapter into the field of educational philosophy in reference to his basic philosophical approach centering on human experience generally, and on an understanding of the human experience of insight. One can see that his cognitional theory and epistemology have importance in understanding various elements essential to the educational experience and in understanding the process and dynamism of learning itself, and what relevance and importance these aspects of his intentionality analysis have for educational philosophy. In the next chapter, I will continue this exploration and expansion, but do so in relation to Lonergan’s metaphysics and ethics.
CHAPTER FIVE

Intentionality Analysis and Educational Philosophy:
Results in Metaphysics and Ethics

Within this metaphysical context it has been found possible, I believe, to offer a single integrated view that finds its point of departure in classical method yet embraces biology, the psychology of behavior and depth psychology, existentialist reflection upon man, and fundamental elements in the theory of individual and social history, of morals and asceticism, of education and religion.1

This chapter will continue the expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of educational philosophy by considering some of the results of his analysis of human consciousness. By results, I mean what one actually affirms of the self and of the world as integral systems of processes based on this analysis. In the previous chapter I focused on Lonergan’s cognitional theory and epistemology, that is, on the elements and processes of conscious intentionality, those questions that deal with what one does when one knows and why doing those activities is called knowing. This chapter will focus on the outcomes of the metaphysical and ethical questions, generally understood as what one knows when those activities are done. Put another way, the previous chapter examined the elements and various parts of the knowing process and their relation to educational philosophy; this chapter considers those parts as they function more as a whole. Thus, I will consider, following a brief account of the importance of the basic question of results in educational process, seven issues in educational philosophy that can be informed by Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, and that unfold in a systematic manner. From the human subject to the world of intersubjectivity, these topics include: critical thinking; self-knowledge and humanness; authenticity; wisdom; worldview; social life; and moral knowledge and moral action. Each of these topics, as I shall show, garners considerable

1 *Insight*, 503-4.
interest and analysis within the field of educational philosophy and, together, they represent a broad horizon of thought within the field.

My objectives are limited here to showing the relevance Lonergan’s work on intentionality analysis has to these seven issues. These themes in educational philosophy are selected in that they depict an every expanding horizon of meaning and reality—from the interior operations of consciousness, to the growing awareness and understanding of the world, and the way one makes one’s way in the world, to a development of a worldview, and then to consider the most profound questions for secularist education (at least how Lonergan regards these questions), the questions of morals and ethics. Again, these issues reflect the operations of human intentionality expanding from experience, to understanding, to judgment, to decision. Some of these issues historically have been dominant themes in education; others are relatively new to the field; but within a Lonerganian philosophy of education, each have their function and interrelations.

First, however, let us consider the matter of educational process as a process that leads to expected and appropriate results. As has been shown in the previous chapter, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and notion of development provide an in-depth understanding of the elements of developmental educational process. His understanding of the internal dynamics of human consciousness is key to understanding this process. But the internal dynamics are intentional; they operate for specific ends, and for education, this broaches the question of results. To be sure, this question of results of educational process appears as a question having some importance in educational philosophy.

Among other issues, R. S. Peters wrestles with the question of the results of education in his essay, “What Is an Educational Process?” ² Peters does not find it enlightening nor helpful to identify or adopt a single particular educational process leading to results or a set of results for, he explains, there are many processes that may be equally educational, such as “instructing,” “educating,” “reforming,” “initiating,” and so forth, with each having its own particular end or ends.³ For Peters, understanding educational processes amounts to understanding the cognitive and normative criteria by which a process may be

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regarded as educational. This raises the question of results. The educational criteria are essentially two: one that addresses achievement related to the cognitive perspective of which Peters speaks; the other addresses the tasks of education related to the moral quality of the processes.

With respect to achievement, Peters argues, a person may be deemed “educated” when the individual not only achieves a certain set of skills and acquires a body of knowledge, but also the individual must have achieved an ability to understand the underlying principles of that body of knowledge related to the skill set. Moreover, the result of education occurs in an “all-round type of development” through which a person relates acquired skills to the larger context of one’s life, and by which one’s “outlook” is transformed by knowledge and understanding. In addition to such achievement, there exists the question as to the tasks involved in the educational process. That is to say, achieving an education requires certain tasks, and those tasks, to be legitimately regarded as educational process, must be known to the learner, and be effective in terms of results. Peters explains, “they [the educational activities] must therefore approximate to the tasks in which the learner knows what he is doing and gradually develop towards those standards of excellence which constitute the relevant achievement.” Thus, the criteria for a process to be regarded as educational, according to Peters, seem to be the achievement of a perspective on the world, or at least a general sense of the “form of life,” and also that the learner knowingly engages tasks for specific purposes. In other words, education is not a random, happenstance, activity; it includes known, intentional activities that result in knowledge. The educational activities are deliberate and relevant to an overall educational process leading to the education of “the whole man.”

Peters expands this basic view of educational process in describing its results as “the educated man,” whose characteristics include, as Jane Roland Martin, quoting Peters, describes it, obtaining “a body of knowledge and some kind of conceptual scheme to raise this knowledge above the level of a collection of disjointed facts, which in turn implies some understanding of principles for organizing facts and of the ‘reason why’ of

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4 Ibid., 6-7.
5 Ibid., 9
6 Ibid., 9, 21.
things." Specific educational activities include: appreciating and understanding the standards of evidence and canons of knowledge accepted in the various forms of knowledge; achieving a balance of the practical and theoretical dimensions of knowledge; and the acquisition of a certain "depth, breadth and knowledge of the good." Martin takes Peters to task on these accounts for, aside from the obvious gender insensitivity, she believes he, at least tacitly, promotes a narrow vision of the educated person in which is "presupposed a divorce of mind from body, thought from action, and reason from feeling and emotion." The primary complaint here is that, at best, Peters advances an educated mind, hardly an educated person. Martin finds in Rousseau a more appealing ideal of the educated person where two processes are distinguished—productive processes and reproductive processes. However, while Rousseau divided these results between Emile and Sophie, productive and reproductive respectively, Martin suggests that males and females participate in both processes, and that only by considering and embracing the dimensions of each gender can a more complete ideal of the educated person emerge.

Interesting as this debate may be, the points I wish to make are, first, that the question of what an educational process actually produces emerges as an issue garnering considerable attention in educational philosophy, and, secondly, that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis relates to this issue in clear and direct ways. From my point of view, Martin would be more resonant than Peters with the approach of Lonergan regarding educational process in that, while the intellectual dimension remains crucially important, Lonergan regards educational process as a development of the "whole person," that includes both cognitive and existential dimensions. In fact, according to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, the cognitive processes and results serve the existential dimension of deliberation and choice, and, as I shall show, they are intended to qualitatively enhance the meaning and making of one’s way in the world.

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 319.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 322-3.
In what follows, several specific aspects of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis posited as metaphysics and ethics will be considered, these being those elements that lend themselves readily to expansion into the field of educational philosophy. Again, it should be noted that a full and satisfying treatment of each of these issues would require a text perhaps the size of Insight itself. My modest aim merely is to support my thesis that, and in what way, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis may be appropriately expanded in this manner.

Critical Thinking

This first main section will consider the question of the nature of knowledge. This is a development of the epistemological issues considered in the previous chapter, in that the structure and processes discussed there lead to an affirmation of how one actually sorts through questions and problems. Thus is raised the question of critical thinking. While this issue pertains to the structure and process issues of the previous chapter, it also pertains to the metaphysical questions of the nature of knowledge, and it bears upon most other metaphysical issues that arise later in this chapter. In this section, I will outline some of the main features of critical thinking; reveal the relevance of Lonergan’s thought to this matter by discussing the study of educational philosopher, Lance Grigg on Lonergan and critical thinking, and suggest a corrective to his work; and provide a more clearly differentiated account of judgment as a Lonerganian contribution to this issue.

In recent times, critical thinking has emerged as a theme in educational philosophy attracting considerable attention. Randall R. Curren’s overview of contemporary educational philosophy reveals that since the 1960s, “there has developed a large body of work on critical thinking predicated on the inadequacy of formal deductive logic as an account of quality in inference, argumentation and reasoning.”12 He finds that this emphasis on critical thinking, “has produced not only one of the more important streams of theoretical analysis undertaken in recent philosophy of education,” but also has

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prompted "innovations in curriculum and evaluation procedures at all levels of instruction."\textsuperscript{13}

John Chaffee, a well-known theorist on the application of critical thinking in education, defines critical thinking as "our active, purposeful, and organized efforts to make sense of our world by carefully examining our thinking and the thinking of others in order to clarify and improve our understanding."\textsuperscript{14} After considering the various commonsense meanings of the term, Kenneth Hawes, of Harvard's Philosophy of Education Research Center, settles on the notion of critical thinking as "characterized by some kind of reasoned or reasonable evaluation."\textsuperscript{15} He goes on to suggest that under the broad heading of critical thinking there must be included a differentiation between the production of things (from ideas and expressions of ideas to actions and physical movements), and the evaluation (engaging "choice, judgment, selection, etc.") of those things in terms of the purposes and constraints of the situation.\textsuperscript{16} Hawes contends that critical thinking as strictly evaluative in focus and intent is not enough, since a critical thinker needs to account for the production of the things in the mind. Hawes thus argues for "creative" thinking over against "critical" thinking, since creative thinking, connotatively, encompasses both the creative and the critical dimensions of thinking.

Strong evidence supporting Hawes' contention to include both the critical and creative dimensions under the rubric of critical thinking theory may be found in the work of other key theorists. For instance, the guide to, and an evaluation of, critical thinking offered by Stephen P. Norris and Robert H. Ennis stress the importance of "good thinking" in which critical thinking is an overlapping and interrelated process with creative thinking.\textsuperscript{17} Stating that, "creative thinking requires evaluative critical thinking before its results can be accepted," they explain that the key elements of critical thinking relate to evaluative thought, and the key elements of creative thinking relate to reflective thought, and that

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, 234.
\textsuperscript{14} John Chaffee, \textit{Thinking Critically}, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 276. Chaffee's book, it may be noted, is used as a key reference text in some educational programs, including Regis University, with which I am associated.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, 48. Hawes goes on to offer a succinct summary of the work of Dewey, Richard Paul, John McPeck, and Robert Ennis on critical thinking, (pp. 50-3).
each strives toward a "reasonable" performance of either creative or critical thought. That is to say, good thinking involves reflection and evaluation, and both produce reasonable results as based on not just any, but the best, conclusions.

Another significant proponent of critical thinking, Richard Paul, incorporates aspects of creative thinking with the evaluative aspects, although Paul does not use the terms "creative" or "creative thinking" in the clear and precise manner of Norris and Ennis. The creative dimension comes to the fore in Paul in his explanation of dialogical and dialectical thinking. Regarding dialogical thinking, Paul discusses the tendency of learners to be egocentric, that is, "to assume our perspectives to be the only (or only plausible) one, to resist considering issues from the perspectives of others." Regarding dialectical thinking, the aim is to develop the "ability to reflect critically on one's own thinking and to reason sympathetically within frames of reference distinct from, and even opposed to, one's own." The point made by Norris and Ennis, and by Paul and Rudinow, avers the interrelation of analytical thought that evaluates, and the creative thought that seeks out and embraces new ideas and novel connections among ideas. In what follows, I suggest that Lonergan's intentionality analysis provides a means for a particularly in-depth analysis of critical thinking, especially as it encompasses both the evaluative and creative aspects of thought and knowledge.

First, critical thinking, in the strict sense of "evaluation," by Lonergan's analysis of human consciousness, occurs primarily on the third level of operations where a set of questions pertaining to assessment, weighing evidence and judgment arises. In Insight, Lonergan calls this "reflective understanding" or "judgment." To recall my earlier account, the act of judgment is an act of "rational consciousness" where an increment of actual knowledge occurs as some understanding of a thing or situation is reasonably affirmed to be the case. The knowing person makes a judgment that the conditions of

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18 Ibid., 3.
21 Insight, 304-40. Chapter ten is devoted to an exposition of reflective understanding.
22 Ibid., 636.
knowledge have been identified and fulfilled. There are no further relevant questions unanswered pertaining to the thing or situation, and a reasonable affirmation is made that such and such is actually the case.\textsuperscript{23} A finality, of sorts, has been reached.\textsuperscript{24}

For Lonergan, critical thinking as an act of judgment squarely meets issues Curren identifies as giving rise to the interest in critical thinking in educational theory. An act of judgment is not so much an act of deductive logic as it is an act of reasoning, of considering all options, of seeing the whole picture. But for Lonergan, the act of judgment does not occur as an isolated cognitive act, in the sense that one can make judgments without performing other operations in one’s consciousness. Judgment occurs in reference to the experience of the individual and concerns the understanding of that experience grasped by the individual. Judgment cannot properly occur without reference to experience and understanding, for it builds on these levels of consciousness in the effort to attain knowledge. It follows that the creative thinking advocated by Hawes seems to be largely what Lonergan demands of the act of judgment, namely, the creative production of ideas and expressions of ideas (what Lonergan largely means by “understanding”), as well as an evaluation of those ideas.

In a recent and rare treatment of Lonergan’s contribution to educational philosophy, the doctoral study of Lance Grigg explores Lonergan’s analysis of rational consciousness in relation to the theory of critical thinking. The problem Grigg finds with recent theories of critical thinking centers on a common lack of differentiating appropriately acts of consciousness and of affirming that true, definitive judgments are possible.\textsuperscript{25} Grigg is critical of McPeck, for example, who emphasizes the importance of a skeptical approach

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\textsuperscript{23} Lonergan terms this act the grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Lonergan scholar, Robert Doran, prefers the term, “contingently unconditioned.” He explains why: “Elsewhere, and especially in \textit{Insight}, the metaphor of ‘weighing evidence’ is explained by appealing to a reflective act of understanding that grasps that the conditions for a prospective judgment are or are not fulfilled. If they are fulfilled, the prospective judgment is ‘virtually’ or (better, I think) ‘contingently’ unconditioned.” Robert M. Doran, “\textit{Intelligentia Fidei} in \textit{De Deo Trino}, Pars Systematica: A Commentary on the First Three Sections of Chapter One,” \textit{Method. A Journal of Lonergan Studies} 19, no. 1 (spring, 2001): 42.

\textsuperscript{24} See Lonergan’s account of finality, \textit{Insight}, 470-6.

\textsuperscript{25} Lance M. Grigg, “Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy for Education,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 1995). As the title suggests, Grigg’s interest concerns applying Lonergan’s philosophy, largely stemming from his essays on cognitional theory and his book on theological method, to certain issues or problems in educational theory, and by far the main educational problem he focuses on is critical thinking. I do not recommend Grigg’s work as a comprehensive and thorough treatment of critical thinking. As I have pointed out, there are significant oversights in his treatment. It is, however, a rare treatment of critical thinking in reference to Lonergan’s thought, and I support, as I point out, some of his analysis of this relation.
to problems and situations, and the ability to suspend judgment. By contrast, in Lonergan, the point to critical thinking is to actually make judgments, that is to say, to know of what judgments consist, and how to make them well. As further evidence of an insufficient differentiation among acts of consciousness, Grigg also points to Harvey Siegel's work on critical thinking which suggests the person who thinks critically is one who not only values reasons, but who also is committed to act on that which is reasonable: an aim of education is to foster the critical attitude which values both the finding of reasons and acting reasonably. Grigg's problem with this position is that there is no account of how reasons are generated by the thinker. Yet another complaint arises concerning the work of Francis Schrag who, Grigg suggests, regards critical thinking as merely the explanation of various subject areas or situations, but Schrag fails to raise thinking to the needed critical level. Grigg points out that both Siegel and Schrag lack the clarity and depth of differentiation between various mental acts, a deficiency that generates confusion on the question of what true knowledge consists. Grigg believes that Lonergan is the key to understanding more fully and more clearly what lies at the heart of critical thinking, that is, what counts as true knowledge.

The theorist most compatible with Lonergan on critical thinking, according to Grigg, is Matthew Lippman. His Philosophy for Children outlines a "reflective paradigm of critical practice" in which a learning situation is constructed where the student becomes comfortable and adept at questioning, correcting errors, clarifying ambiguities, and becoming increasingly "reasonable." But despite this affinity, Grigg finds in Lippman a failure to distinguish between "rational self-consciousness and being critical," a failure that results in something less than achieving truly critical thought.

Grigg, I recognize, latches on to an important relation between Lonergan and an important issue in educational philosophy. Unfortunately, however, Grigg does not

26 Ibid., 14-5. Others, too, have difficulties with McPeck's work, such as Richard Paul who finds that McPeck does not appreciate the inter-disciplinary, "multi-logical" processes of critical thinking. These are complex issues, and addressing them gives rise to a host of variant positions and controversies. See Richard Paul, "McPeck's Mistakes" in Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World, ed. A. J. A. Binker (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University, 1990), 411-20.
28 Ibid., 17-22.
29 Ibid., 91-3.
30 Ibid., 93.
consider other theorists in the field who are far more complementary to Lonergan’s position. Grigg’s work would have benefited by a wider analysis of the field and by exploring the affinity between Hawes, Norris and Ennis, Paul and Rudinow, and others. Moreover, while I agree with Grigg’s basic assessment, which is my main point here, that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis adds an important differentiation to the field of critical thinking by distinguishing acts of judgment from acts of understanding, and by regarding the evaluative and affirmative acts as those resulting in knowledge, I believe that Grigg’s reference to “rational self-consciousness” is not what Lonergan means by “judgment.” And perhaps a clarification and suggested correction are in order.

While other theorists have failed to understand the “relationship between rational self-consciousness and being critical,” Grigg maintains that an adequate understanding of critical thinking rests upon this differentiation. He states:

... teaching for critical thinking involves teaching for rational self-consciousness. After the student has made a verified judgment about any concept or theory, she is encouraged to reflect on the processes that got her there. This reflection will reveal to her a consciousness that seeks sufficient reasons for her belief and the beliefs of others. In other words, she will move from being rationally conscious to being rationally self-conscious.

However, by my reading of Lonergan, Grigg’s description of the reflective acts of the student still remains within what, according to Lonergan, constitutes “rational consciousness.” Lonergan’s differentiation between rational consciousness and rational self-consciousness is not a differentiation between rational thought and an analysis of rational thought. It is one thing to grasp the reasons and affirm something to be probably true, or find reason enough to make an intelligent and sufficiently sound affirmation, or to grasp that more needs to be accounted for and that the reasonable thing is to suspend judgment. It is another thing to decide to act in accord with what is reasonably affirmed. Lonergan states that it is the decision to act that is an act of rational self-consciousness.

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 96.
33 Insight, 636. Lonergan states, “Judgment is an act of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality
Rational self-consciousness expresses itself properly in terms of the moral dimensions of insight, that is, in considering the options, in determining the right thing to do, and actually carrying out the action. (More will be said of this shortly when the moral dimensions of Lonergan’s insight are considered in the later sections of this chapter.) Understanding and affirming the various distinct and interrelated acts of consciousness are still acts of understanding and judgment.

For Lonergan, it is a behavioral act that constitutes the act of rational self-consciousness. It seems to me, however, that this point of clarification does not destroy Grigg’s basic argument that some theorists on critical thinking lack certain important differentiations that Lonergan supplies. For Lonergan, critical thinking does not end with skeptical thinking, nor does it rely solely upon a learning situation that fosters a questioning frame of mind. Critical thinking arises from the operations of consciousness that intend and produce judgments. It is dependent upon asking the appropriate questions related to one’s experience, and especially related to one’s understanding of those experiences. It occurs when the evidence for some possible understanding is weighed. It occurs in grasping what else needs to be known in order to assess the adequacy of some understanding, and then grasping that one in fact has the related, relevant knowledge to affirm some additional increment of knowledge. On this basis, one can affirm some understanding or explanation as true, or probably true. Critical thinking is a personal achievement where one identifies and understands the elements and patterns of experience in relatively satisfying and complete explanations and reasons, and where one arrives at a certain sense of confidence in affirming ‘yes’ or ‘no’ through approaching or grasping the virtually unconditioned. Critical thinking, according to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, also means becoming comfortable with letting go of unsubstantiated, so-called certitudes, of becoming comfortable with probabilities and, if the conditions are appropriate, with saying “not yet,” or “maybe later.”

Based on Lonergan’s analysis, critical thinking can be understood in terms of the conditions and processes of consciousness giving rise to the ability to make good judgments, and the ability to make reasonable affirmations. Further, in Lonergan’s

of decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency between his knowing and his deciding and doing.”
philosophical system, such affirmation is the key to the unfolding of a metaphysics. That is to say, without sound judgment, metaphysics becomes highly vulnerable to criticism and tends to fall apart under analysis, and, in such a case, one’s account of existence and reality legitimately may be regarded as faulty and ultimately unreasonable. The first major constructive step in this metaphysics is an account of oneself as a human being, particularly, an account of oneself as a knower. To these questions I turn in the next section.

**Self-knowledge and Humanness**

This section will examine what Lonergan regards as the crucially important result of the knowing process, namely, knowledge of oneself. I will explore this question as related to one’s understanding of humanness, and related to other issues prominent in the field of educational philosophy: the issues of autonomy, indoctrination and knowledge transposition. As shall be seen, self-knowledge is a basic metaphysical affirmation from which flow other concomitant and commensurate affirmations of existence. As such, self-knowledge is basic, that is, primary, not derivative, in a Lonerganian educational philosophy.

Self-knowledge, including obtaining a clear sense of what it means to be a human being, hardly can be disputed as a longstanding concern addressed in educational philosophy. For instance, Rousseau’s “last act of youth’s drama” sees Emile beginning to explore and come to terms with the world beyond his immediate community. The purpose of Emile’s travels abroad are for him to truly master his own person, and to come to know what type of individual he is and wants to be. While Rousseau positions self-knowledge as a question of self-mastery and social deportment, more recently the issue appears in a variety of concerns in education related to the self-constitution of the individual. For instance, within the field of educational philosophy the question of

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autonomy is addressed by Eamonn Callan,\textsuperscript{35} indoctrination by John P. White, and the polymorphic character of intelligence by Howard Gardner.\textsuperscript{36} Being self-directed (a matter of autonomy), self-constituted (a matter of indoctrination),\textsuperscript{37} and acquiring the ability to transpose knowledge from one situation to another (Gardner's contention), I believe, are issues that give meaning and depth to the questions of self and personhood. In a similar vein, intentionality analysis, for Lonergan, is directed in large measure toward the fundamental issues of what it means to be a human being, and of how one individually attains a broadly conceived, multifaceted sense of personhood. But how is this worked out in Lonergan's thought?

Lonergan's intentionality analysis presented in \textit{Insight} unfolds, first, as an account of the activities performed by the knower. This leads in the second part to a general account of what is known when those activities are performed. In \textit{Insight}, the results of activities of knowing begin to be discussed explicitly in chapter eleven, where Lonergan shifts from an account of "insight as activity" to an account of "insight as knowledge."\textsuperscript{38} The first main result of the activities of knowing is the "self-affirmation of the knower," that being the achievement of knowledge of oneself as a performer of the operations of consciousness. Knowledge, it may be recalled, engages reflective insight, also called reflective understanding, which culminates in an act of judgment. It is a heightened ability in self-reflection that, in part, it seems, distinguishes humans from other animals, and adds to one's experience an \textit{understanding} (in that in the act of self-reflection one


\textsuperscript{37} The question of indoctrination is one of considerable complexity, as evident in the debate in the 1960s and 1970s between Henry Rosemont, Jr., Ivan Snook and John P. White. See Ivan Snook, "Indoctrination and Intentions" and Henry Rosemont, Jr. "On the Concept of Indoctrination" in \textit{Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition}, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White, vol. 4, \textit{Problems of Educational Content and Practices} (London: Routledge, 1998), 308-20 and 321-30. However the phenomenon of indoctrination is cast, and whether or not teaching can be free of indoctrination, the problem at least on one score, in my view, is its effect of lessening a person's ability to be critical about propositions and assertions and thus lessens the ability to choose for oneself in a knowing way propositions and assertions one subscribes to. This essentially is a matter of self-knowledge and of being fully human.

\textsuperscript{38} These are the titles given to the two halves of the book.
identifies the experience of understanding) of the various distinct patterns of experience.\textsuperscript{39}

While there may exist various types of self-affirmation (such as in exercising one’s franchise or demanding one’s rights), Lonergan sees self-affirmation in terms of affirming oneself as a \textit{knower}. This he regards as one of the primary outcomes of the knowing process. Lonergan explains what this entails. “By ‘self-affirmation of the knower’ is meant that the self as affirmed is characterized by such occurrences as sensing, perceiving, imagining, understanding, formulating, reflecting, grasping the unconditioned, and affirming.”\textsuperscript{40} Carrying out any of these activities, perhaps, is not remarkable in itself, or identifying them an unusual discovery. But what has been regarded as a remarkable achievement is realizing an explicit, clear and distinct differentiation among these activities, and realizing the dynamic interrelatedness in which they operate.\textsuperscript{41} The self-affirmation that Lonergan hopes to lead students of \textit{Insight} towards embraces not merely a knowledge of how objects of thought are handled in one’s consciousness, that is, by clearly articulating the general process of inquiry in such fields as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and so forth. \textit{Insight} also is designed to lead persons, more importantly, to a knowledge of themselves in the performance of various operations of consciousness that give rise to most any type of knowledge. The result is a greater understanding of one’s own “inner being,” that is, of one’s own consciousness.

Self-knowledge (achieved in an act of judging and affirmation) pertains not merely to what one is as a being, as a “unity-identity-whole” (as Lonergan defines “thing”),\textsuperscript{42} but pertains to whom one is as a subject, that is, as an operator, an experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding human being. Self-knowledge unfolds in understanding more fully and in developing more widely the capabilities of one’s own conscious intentionalities. One knows oneself, by Lonergan’s design, as one’s

\textsuperscript{39} While humans and other animals have similar basic experiences on the biological level, and perhaps even in terms of psychic experience; Lonergan maintains that humans bring to bear upon experience a heightened intelligence and rationality.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Insight}, 343.

\textsuperscript{41} See the epithets regarding Lonergan’s achievement represented in his book, \textit{Insight}, noted in the introductory chapter of this study.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{ibid.}, 270-95. Lonergan’s important chapter on “Things” presents the theoretical basis for identifying and differentiating one thing from another thing. Human beings are things, but they are not static things, for they are complex systems on the move. That it to say, their identity, while enduring over time, develops and advances.
consciousness achieves knowledge that results from an explicit apprehension of the three
distinct levels of cognitive consciousness, but also takes into account and understands the
fourth level of existential consciousness. Get this straight, Lonergan believes, and all
other aspects of knowledge can fall into place appropriately.  

In Lonergan, self-knowledge is the “objective” frame of reference for human knowing
and doing: it is objective inasmuch as the processes engaged in knowing and doing
become formulated as an invariant and normative structure for all instances of affirmation
that can count as knowledge. By this frame of reference, knowledge is not a body of
information “received” by a knower or “inputted” by a teacher. It is rather a result of
performing the subjective processes of consciousness yielding a reasonable affirmation. It
is only through the full and unimpeded operations of those subjective processes that one
can, according to Lonergan, achieve “objective knowledge,” that is, knowledge of what
may be identified as “reality,” the actual world of being, of which individuals are a part.
Self-knowledge is a profoundly personal endeavor, and as objective knowledge it is an
equally profound expression and realization of one’s own humanness. Simply put, to be
human, more than anything else, is to be a knower, and as a high achievement, to be a
knower of oneself.

While self-knowledge in some fashion covers an understanding of the various
components constituting the person, and includes an understanding of the feelings and
values one holds, and how one engages in interpersonal relations, the key to the
enterprise, for Lonergan, consists in understanding understanding, that is, understanding
the levels of cognitive intentionality occurring in human consciousness. To achieve this

43 Ibid., 22.
44 Ibid. The realism that Lonergan espouses may be glimpsed in this passage. “For the appropriation of
one’s own rational self-consciousness, which has been so stressed in this introduction, is not an end in itself
but rather a beginning. It is a necessary beginning, for unless one breaks the duality in one’s knowing, one
doubts that understanding correctly is knowing. Under the pressure of that doubt, either one will sink into
the bog of knowing that is without understanding, or else one will cling to understanding but sacrifice
knowing on the altar of immanentism, an idealism, a relativism. From the horns of that dilemma one
escapes only through discovery—and one has not made it yet if one has no clear memory of its startling
strangeness—that there are two quite different realisms, that there is an incoherent realism, half animal and
half human, that poses as a halfway house between materialism and idealism, and on the other hand that
there is an intelligent and reasonable realism between which and materialism the halfway house is
idealism.”
45 Ibid.; Lonergan comes to state some years later, “... objectivity is simply the consequence of authentic
subjectivity ... of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility.” Method in Theology, 265.
level of understanding requires mainly an understanding oneself, an understanding of oneself as a knowing human subject.

Regarding self-knowledge, an important development in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis occurred during the period between writing *Insight* and the publication of *Method in Theology*. Where *Insight* emphasized the first three levels of intentionality, *Method in Theology* develops more fully the fourth level of deciding, although deciding is not at all absent in the earlier work, as shall become clear when we discuss ethics. Self-knowledge, then not only intelligently grasps and affirms the processes of knowing, but also the processes of deciding. Lonergan explains:

All the operations on these four levels are intentional and conscious. Still, intentionality and consciousness differ from level to level, and within each level the many operations involve further differences. Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have experienced. A third dimension of rationality emerges when the content of our acts of understanding is regarded as, of itself, a mere bright idea and we endeavor to settle what is really so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgment on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.

Thus, in Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, self-knowledge includes a penetrating account of how one makes decisions.

For Lonergan, moreover, decision-making, and indeed the knowing process as a whole, is not solely an intellectual event. Where he stresses the intellectual aspects of intentionality in *Insight*, in *Method in Theology* there is a clearer and more dramatic realization of the place and importance of feelings in human intentionality, especially important on the level of deciding. Lonergan explains what he means by feelings.

Distinct from the operational development [of skills] there is the development of feeling. On this topic I ... distinguish non-intentional

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Thus, self-knowledge as the process of knowledge turned in upon itself, results in an objective account of objectivity.

46 *Method in Theology*, 9 and 15.

states and trends from intentional responses. The former may be illustrated by such states as fatigue, irritability, bad humor, anxiety, and the latter by such trends or urges as hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort. The states have causes. The trends have goals. But the relation of the feeling to the cause or goal is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal . . . . The feeling relates us, not just to a cause or an end, but to an object. Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin.\textsuperscript{48}

Feelings, Lonergan goes on to explain, are “intentional responses to two main classes of objects.”\textsuperscript{49} One the one hand, there are objects regarded as agreeable or disagreeable, satisfying or dissatisfying. On the other hand, there are objects regarded in terms of value, and are distinguished in terms of a scale of preference. Lonergan distinguishes vital, social, cultural, personal and religious values, in a scale of ascending order.\textsuperscript{50} In general, Lonergan explains, feeling-based responses to value “both carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or of which we transcend ourselves.”\textsuperscript{51}

In Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, one goal is to have one’s feelings increasingly respond to objects of value, and not merely to objects of self-interest and satisfaction. Education plays an important role in this development. While feelings arise spontaneously, still they can be managed in developmental ways. He explains that,

\ldots feelings are enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of the objects that arouse them, and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste, of discriminating praise and carefully worded disapproval, that will conspire with the pupil’s or student’s own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, 30-1.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}, 31.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Ibid.}. Objects that are agreeable or disagreeable are ambiguous, since what is agreeable may not be a true good, and what is valuable may be a true good, and thus a real value.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, 32. Attending to the development of feelings in an educational context, it should be noted, may involve more dramatic interventions where the feelings of a student may be such that learning is impaired, or that the learning environment of others disrupted. “Acting out” or other inappropriate affectivity may call for certain therapeutic interventions. This relates more to educational psychology than to educational philosophy. As an aside, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has been used as a basis to develop certain psychotherapies and psychological depth analysis. See Bernard Tyrrell, \textit{Christotherapy} (New York: Paulist
While the aim of education, according to Lonergan, is to meet the need of values apprehension, still there remains the responsibility of the individual to understand and to manage one’s own feelings. As he suggests, “it is much better to take full cognizance of one’s feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself.”

As such, then, for Lonergan, self-knowledge rings as an anthem for education. Self-knowledge is understanding of the most fundamental, personal order and, as Lonergan suggests, promises the highest dividends: in satisfying the quest for knowledge; in acquiring a reasonable degree of self-assurance; and in opening up possibilities for achieving wider understanding. Essentially, self-knowledge rests on achieving insight, and achieving insight into insight. While the discussion of this point so far has been in generalities, Lonergan is clear as to the details.

Knowing oneself as a knower, Lonergan tells us, actually comes by way of “self-appropriating” the distinct but interrelated operations of one’s own consciousness. Knowing that human beings engage the conscious operations of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding is not enough. There is required the further step of noticing and performing those activities yourself. It is a matter of knowing—in Lonergan’s sense of making a true judgment—one’s experiences, one’s understanding, one’s judgments, one’s decisions. In other words, an individual makes true judgments of what one’s experiences consist and how experiences operate. One makes true judgments of how one’s understanding unfolds and what it produces. One makes true judgments on what a true judgment entails and how a judgment can be deemed true. And one makes a true judgment as to the nature and quality of one’s decisions. In his treatise on the topic of self-knowledge in Lonergan’s thought, Boston College professor, Joseph Flanagan explains,

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53 Method in Theology, 33.

54 “True,” for Lonergan, means a judgment in which is grasped the virtually unconditioned. See the previous section on critical thinking where Lonergan’s notion of truth as reasonable judgment is discussed.
You are a knower, if you are a concrete, intelligible unity who experiences, understands, and judges. The field in which these conditions are to be verified is the data of your own consciousness. Are you conscious of yourself sensing, raising questions, getting insights, formulating them into ideas, questioning the ideas, and judging them? It is important to notice the question is not whether you know something. The question is about the performance of your own cognitional activities.55

One can be aware that these various operations—experience, understanding, judging and deciding—occur in human beings, but self-appropriation involves an affirmation that, and how, they actually occur in one’s own life.

If Lonergan’s contention is correct that self-affirmation of the knower, as he sets it forth, produces an understanding of conscious intentionality, and that this becomes the foundation, so to speak, of all other achievements of knowledge, then a few comments on these issues in terms of insight may be in order.56 Thus, on the question of autonomy, the goal of self-knowledge is to develop the capability to think and act as a free agent according to one’s own intelligence and reasoned judgment, free from the control of other agents. With respect to indoctrination, self-knowledge gives rise to skills in assessing various modes of understanding and in making judgments as to the soundness of positions and the reliability of systems of thought. Regarding the polymorphic character of intelligence, transposing past knowledge to new situations occurs on the basis of the interrelatedness of all knowledge through the invariant structure of human cognition. It is the structure of consciousness that allows for the connections to be made among elements of knowledge and for transpositions of frames of reference.57 An example of this is found

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55 Joseph Flanagan. *Quest for Self-Knowledge. An Essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 134. Here Flanagan uncharacteristically omits the level of decision; I know of no reason it should not be included.

56 Noted in chapter four, Lonergan suggests that to deny the four levels of conscious intentionally would require one to, in practice, affirm the levels since a denial would have to engage some measure of experience, understanding, judgment and decision. As I noted in that chapter as well, while this may be true, it does not follow that these intentionalities must be subscribed to precisely as Lonergan lays them out. This is for each individual to discern themselves. However, the point I wish to make is that Lonergan’s differentiations help one to distinguish, interrelate and understand in helpful ways a host of issues in educational philosophy that otherwise may be confusing, disconnected from other issues, and from a relatively complete view of the educational enterprise.

in Matthew Lamb’s commentary on Lonergan’s methodology, or, what Lamb calls “meta-method” and the resulting potentialities for collaboration. He states:

Lonergan’s meta-method provides the foundations for an ongoing collaboration inasmuch as it has succeeded in thematising the related and recurrent operations or structures of human historical interiority. No sphere of human historical activity is foreign to its methodical interests.58

The example, by way of schematic diagram occurs at the end of the essay where Lamb shows the interrelatedness of physics, chemistry, the other natural sciences and the human sciences.59 It is knowledge and application of the structure and operations of human intentionality, according to Lonergan and Lonergan scholars, that better enables this transposition.

To be sure, these “broad lines” are indeed general, and invite greater investigation and expansion than what I provide here. My point merely is to show, first, that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis gives rise to the question of self-knowledge, and that he offers an account of what it means to be a human being. Based on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, one can know who one is as a person, as an operating human subject, and on this basis, one increasingly can take possession of oneself. Secondly, I suggest that in Lonergan’s thought, humanness is expressed, at least in part, in a full and deep achievement of self-knowledge.60 And thirdly, I indicate in what way the matters of humanness and self-knowledge in Lonergan’s thought inform certain issues given some prominence in educational philosophy stemming from the related questions of autonomy, indoctrination and knowledge transposition. However, these issues are the beginning steps toward what Lonergan’s intentionality anticipates in other dimensions of the educational enterprise. While complete self-knowledge never can be achieved because

59 Ibid., 66. This interrelatedness of knowledge is also expressed as emergent probability, as I will discuss later in this chapter.
60 This assertion is compatible with the reflections of R. K. Elliott where he suggests that being human not only encompasses the question of understanding but also the matter of knowledge in the context of one’s whole life and related to the dynamics and processes of one’s development as a human being. R. K. Elliott, “Education and Being Human” in Philosophy of Education. Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, ed. Paul Hirst and Patricia White, vol. 2, Education and Human Being (London: Routledge, 1998), 114-5.
the field of inquiry, which is oneself, a dynamic operating subject, a complex system on the move, and one has only a single lifetime for the task, nevertheless, one may move toward that goal of a profound and thoroughly humanized education.

In short, in this section I have shown how educational philosophy can find in Lonergan's account of self-knowledge a clear and strong articulation of the importance of understanding critically and affirming one's own subjectivity. As religion professor William Shea has noted of Lonergan's work, "For Lonergan ... education mediates what it means to be human. In a community possessed of differentiated consciousness, education is the context in which recognition and appropriation of the subject's subjectivity is a primary goal."61 Most everything else related to the educational enterprise in what follows expands upon this fundamental realization.

**Authenticity**

Critical thinking, then, turned towards the human subject yields, according to Lonergan's intentionality analysis, self-knowledge. Self-knowledge raises the question of genuineness or, what Lonergan also calls, authenticity. This section will first examine the issue of authenticity as a concern in educational philosophy. Secondly, it will consider Lonergan's treatment of this matter as it appears in *Insight*, and then in *Method in Theology*. Thirdly, it will suggest ways that Lonergan's intentionality analysis related to human authenticity can be expanded into the field of educational philosophy.

**Authenticity in Educational Philosophy**

First, the question may be raised as to what way the issue of authenticity has been regarded as an element of educational philosophy. While this matter of authenticity does not seem to factor prominently in the literature of the discipline, neither is it entirely

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absent, and as education and educational philosophy continue to broaden their reach of concern into the realm of human subjectivity (as distinct from the learning of subject knowledge), perhaps the issue of authenticity will take on increasing importance. And if so, then Lonergan, I believe, could make a helpful contribution.

Authenticity has emerged as a point of interest in educational philosophy, at least since the appearance of Heidegger’s work on the questions of thinking and being, including his philosophical analysis of what it means to be true to oneself. Various educational philosophers, such as Michael Bonnett, have highlighted Heideggerian themes and applied them directly to the realm of education. Bonnett relates authenticity to the intricacies of the teacher-student relationship, suggesting that authenticity requires such a relationship be one of openness, trust and sympathetic engagement. He explains that, for Heidegger, authentic understanding and authentic living involves some understanding of ourselves in some particular situation in which humans are compelled to make choices. This self-understanding, Bonnett suggests, often is skewed or suppressed by idle chatter, or by the busyness of life, or by the distractions of others in the situation. The meaning of our own existence in the situation becomes obscured, and we become unable to think deeply concerning our own history and self-constitution. Bonnett goes on to explain that, “this is an essentially irresponsible ‘averaged off’ understanding of life in which we don’t think things through … but understand them only in terms of what is current in the fashion and the gossip.” In Heideggerian terms, then, “to live thus is to live ‘inauthentically.’” In such a way, Hiedegger, through Bonnett, presents to educational philosophy the problem of human authenticity, and, accordingly, this topic may be regarded as an element of considerable importance inasmuch as education relates to a basic understanding of human subjectivity.

64 Ibid., 25.
Genuineness in *Insight*; Authenticity in *Method in Theology*

Lonergan offers a detailed account of authenticity in *Insight*, but the term used for this quality of consciousness is “genuineness.” Genuineness, he explains, occurs on various levels of conscious intentionality, of which an initial expression (and here he uncharacteristically uses the term ‘authenticity’) occurs on the level of experience. On this level, he identifies a certain *joie de vivre* arising from an uninhibited expression of consciousness as it acquires an aesthetic appreciation of certain goods to which it aims. He states, “conscious living is itself a joy that reveals its spontaneous *authenticity* in the untiring play of children, in the strenuous games of youth, in the exhilaration of sunlit morning air, in the sweep of a broad perspective, in the swing of melody.”

In the aesthetic pattern of experience, genuineness is expressed in the appreciation and attainment of good, positive experiences resulting from creative, playful expressions of consciousness and in the generation of positive feeling. Lonergan finds in experiential spontaneity a human genuineness manifest in the true joy that conscious life can bring.

Along with the genuineness of such experiential extroversion there also exists, more profoundly for Lonergan, a genuineness concerning one’s interiority, that is, concerning the explicit operations of one’s consciousness. In the intellectual pattern of experience (as distinguished from the aesthetic pattern, just discussed, that more directly is related to sensory experience), where consciousness is oriented more toward grasping the intelligibility of data than toward creative expression and feeling (though these elements are still operative), the question of genuineness concerns human consciousness as development that manages well the tension between limitation and transcendence, and concerns the development of consciousness that grasps correctly the starting point, the process and the goal of the development. Lonergan speaks of this goal as “completion” or “finality.” In addition to the conscious management of this tension, genuineness produces a certain harmony among the conscious and unconscious elements involved in

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65 *Insight*, 207. My italics.
the process as that potential finality becomes realized in actual being. Lonergan explains the intricacies of this development as follows:

Every development involves a starting point in the subject as he is, a term in the subject as he is to be, and a process from the starting point to the term. However, inasmuch as a development is conscious, there is some apprehension of the starting point, the term and the process. But such apprehensions may be correct or mistaken. If they are correct, the conscious and unconscious components of the development are operating from the same base along the same route to the same goal. If they are mistaken, the conscious and unconscious components, to a greater or lesser extent, are operating at cross-purposes. Such conflict is inimical to development, and so we have the conditional law of genuineness, namely, that if a development is conscious, then its success demands correct apprehensions of its starting point, its process, and its goal.  

Genuineness, then, generally means knowing who one is as a conscious being, knowing the goals to which one properly aims in seeking knowledge and in the process of actually becoming who we can be, and knowing how the goals are achieved through effectively directing key internal activities and resources to achieve the goals. In the process of genuine development there is gained also affective support and affirmation in the process through a sense of well-being, that is, through feeling good and right as one grows and develops.

In Method in Theology, Lonergan broadens out his notion of genuineness in terms of authenticity. The issue remains the high quality of one’s own interiority, but the question of authenticity now arises also in reference to one becoming a person committed to valuing, to seeking fulfillment, to achieving the ends to which the various operations of consciousness are directed (stemming from experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding). This high quality of interiority pertains to the congruency of knowledge and feeling in the quest for self-transcendence. He states, “Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence.” By this achievement Lonergan means, essentially, a true grasp of what or who one is as a knowing individual, attentive to, and enacting fully, the processes of one’s own interiority by which one is propelled beyond the self to the world of

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68 Ibid., 500.
69 Method in Theology, 80, 110-1.
70 Ibid., 104.
intersubjectivity, to the wider world of being. (This “wider world” will be explored more concretely in later sections of this chapter.) The propulsion occurs through “operators” that include question-asking, apprehending value, and seeking fulfillment. Authenticity involves truly knowing the elements and objectives of one’s experiences, intelligence, good judgment, and wise decisions. It involves discerning one’s feelings that accompany these intentionalities, and drawing on these feelings in realizing the objectives of these operations of consciousness. Authenticity involves a development of oneself as an individual who ever more widely engages the world in more meaningful and value-based ways. As such, authenticity is a deeply personal and meaningful developmental process in which one understands the elements of one’s own subjectivity, one understands the goals to which one strives, and one understands the self-transforming processes involved in personal fulfillment.

Lonergan’s Authenticity for Educational Philosophy

With a concern similar to Bonnett’s, the question of authenticity for Lonergan centers on the question of the quality of one’s consciousness, specifically, the quality of one’s intentionality, including the ability to make good choices in life. Both of these concerns pertain to the question of human development. Lonergan understands authentic aesthetic development as that which results in positive feeling stemming from play and attentiveness to the beauty and joy in sensory experiences. There is also an authenticity related to cognitive development, such as we see elucidated in Insight, and related to existential development, such as one finds in Method in Theology. Regarding authentic cognitive development, the objective is to achieve knowledge, at least within a Lonerganian frame of reference, about the world, and to achieve knowledge of oneself as one who intends and achieves the good.

According to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, the topic of authenticity is understood specifically in terms of the question of “the good,” this being the goal, or the “finality,” of segments of the education process. This can be explained more fully as follows. For Lonergan, we recall from his lectures on educational topics, the structure of the good has
three main aspects: particular goods, the good of order, and value.\textsuperscript{71} Human authenticity as an educational aim, then, understands the particular goods to be achieved in educational process, overall, and in its various more limited segments. For instance, this might include becoming the good citizen as an overall objective, or becoming a skilled computer programmer as a limited objective. As a matter of educational philosophy, authenticity also requires a knowledge of the good of order, as well as an engagement of that good of order in the achievement of particular goods (see pp. 100-5). This pertains to understanding, critiquing and participating in the systems available for the realization of goods, such as the economic system, political system and educational system. An inauthentic person might be able to achieve particulars goods for one’s own well-being, but fail to understand or operate within the “setup” designed for goods production.\textsuperscript{72} An authentic person, by contrast, understands and utilizes the setups in achieving various goods. In relation to the good of order, the authentic person would also be committed to responsible action in changing and improving the “setup” in order to make it more effective and equitable in the interest of the greater good of the community.

Responsible action moves the question of authenticity from the largely cognitive realm to the existential, where one’s choices are made not merely in terms of what satisfies various immediate needs, but are made according to what is of true value. That is to say, the goal of education, as achieving the good, also involves the apprehension and judgment of value. Understanding the good of order and engaging the “setup” for the production of goods are activities of a certain kind: seeing the good of order as worthwhile is another kind. The latter is a matter of apprehending value and making judgments of value. In his education lectures, Lonergan explains the question of value.

Not only are there setups, but people ask, ‘Is the setup good?’ They say, ‘There is nothing wrong with him, it’s the setup.’ Children fight about particular goods, but men fight about the value of the good of order. The international tension that we call the Cold War exists because people in the West have a different idea of the good of order from that of the Soviets. The question of what precisely is to be the good of order concretely functioning and determining the habits, the institutions, the

\textsuperscript{71} Topics in Education, 33.

\textsuperscript{72} Cheating or lying, and other unethical behaviors, might be used to achieve personal goods, while circumventing the good of order, that is, by avoiding the systems that were designed to produce the goods.
material equipment, the personal status of everyone in every respect of their lives—the total human good of order—raises the question of value.\textsuperscript{73}

Later, in \textit{Method in Theology}, Lonergan emphasizes more strongly the role of value in the realization of the good and its relation to human achievement of authenticity. In his intentionality analysis, value “is what is intended in deliberation, just as understanding is what is intended in questions for intelligence, and just as judging truth and affirming being are what are intended in questions for reflection.”\textsuperscript{74} As such, “value is a transcendental notion.”\textsuperscript{75} Inasmuch as value is what one seeks to realize in deciding about the good and the good of order, it propels one from making judgments about what merely is so, to making judgments about the worth of something. This, then, may bring one to a point of decision on taking action to apprehend concretely the good as values for oneself, and to assist others in the realization of their good. Lonergan explains,

\begin{quote}
By deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, we can know and do, not just what pleases us, but what truly is good, worth while. Then we can be principles of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true love. But it is one thing to do this occasionally, by fits and starts. It is another to do it regularly, easily, spontaneously. It is, finally, only by reaching the sustained self-transcendence of the virtuous man that one becomes a good judge, not on this or that human act, but on the whole range of human goodness.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

For Lonergan, the apprehension and judgment of value depends on the authenticity of the human subject. “Such judgment are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject’s being.”\textsuperscript{77}

To clarify what Lonergan appears to mean by judgment of value, it may be helpful to compare this type of judgment with his explanation of judgment of fact. For Lonergan, as discussed in chapter two, a judgment of fact is a cognitive act that grasps the virtually

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Topics in Education}, 36-7.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Method in Theology}, 34.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}, 35.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.}, 37.
unconditioned. A judgment of value, while it, draws on a cognitive ability to grasp the facts in a given situation, it is an existential apprehension and commitment to the worth of something, and brings one to a place of taking a stand on a matter, of deciding to act. The objectivity of a judgment of fact depends on how intelligent and reasonable a person is with respect to the question at hand. The objectivity of a judgment of value depends on this, plus depends on how responsible one is in deliberating, assessing, and deciding. Lonergan explains the comparison this way:

Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact. They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and one can disapprove of what does. They do not differ in structure, inasmuch as in both there is the distinction between criterion and meaning. In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject; judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better.

Lonergan goes on to explain further aspects of the relation between the two types of judgment.

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings. The feelings in question are not the already described non-intentional states, trends, urges, that are related to efficient and final causes but not to objects. Again, they are not intentional responses to such objects as the agreeable or disagreeable, the pleasant or painful, the satisfying or dissatisfying. For, while these are objects, still they are ambiguous objects that may prove to be truly good or bad or only apparently good or bad. Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility of the actuality of moral self-transcendence.

78 Insight, 408.
79 Method in Theology, 37.
In the judgment of value, the three components unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust toward moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself.  

These statements represent a development, and perhaps, at the time, a developing, of Lonergan's position on the fourth level of consciousness. They are not easy to unravel, especially since there appears to be a 'moving viewpoint' at play. However, on the question of judgment, Crowe provides some clarity. He explains the development of Lonergan's thought:

Responsibility now belongs to a new level, as distinct from that of reflection as the intellectual is from the empirical and the rational from the intellectual. That was not the case in Insight. There, deliberation, decision, and the like, do not constitute a new and distinct level, but a continuation or extension of cognitional activity. ... The accent is so much on the cognitional that the criterion of the good is seen as self-consistency in the knower between his knowing and his doing, and value is defined as the "possible object of rational choice."

The general lines of the contrast under this heading between Insight and Method are therefore fairly clear. There has been a shift from the cognitional to the affective, from the dynamism of "mind" intent on knowing God to the dynamism of "heart" oriented to him in love and bent on union with him, from a three-level structure of conscious intentionality to one with four levels, from an emphasis on what is reasonable in conduct to an emphasis on what is responsible.

I think we can say also that the outline of the chronological stages in the shift are fairly familiar to all of us. The turn to the subject which was already accomplished in Insight has led to an emphasis on the existential subject, and then to a locating of the criterion for judgments of value in the authenticity of the subject.

Questions remain as to what role the virtually unconditioned now plays as one moves from judgment of fact, through apprehension of value, and then to judgments of value that unfold existentially on the level of decision. One wonders how the how cognitive

80 Ibid., 37-8.
81 Frederick Crowe has researched thoroughly the development of Lonergan's thought on the fourth level. He claims that by the time Method in Theology was written, Lonergan realized some of the distinctions treated in Insight really called for a differentiation between the cognitive levels and the existential level. In Method in Theology, Lonergan speaks of the fourth level in a "cascade of terms." Frederick E. Crowe, "Lonergan's New Notion of Value," in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 56.
82 Crowe, "Lonergan's New Notion of Value," 54.
objectivity relates to existential objectivity. One also wonders about the dynamics of sublation, whereby a higher level adds to and transforms the earlier level, and how facts might be transformed by value and choice. These are issues that need to be settled within Lonergan Studies, and I will further discuss aspects of this problem in the next chapter where I offer some evaluation of Lonergan’s work. My point here is to relate Lonergan’s understanding of authenticity to educational philosophy.

Notwithstanding these important technical points, I think it is safe to say that the main thrust of Lonergan’s notion of authenticity concerns the operations of human consciousness and sets forth authenticity in terms of an individual allowing those operations to function well, to function to their potential, and to achieve personal fulfillment in being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. But what relevance has this to educational philosophy?

Earlier, I discussed Bonnett’s account of authenticity as an important quality in the student-teacher relationship. By contrast, Lonergan’s approach focuses first on the subjectivity of the persons involved in an educational situation. In this context, striving toward authenticity means that the question of one’s own interiority is the question that initially comes to the fore. This line of questioning entails ever-increasing differentiations of the elements of one’s own interiority, of one’s own consciousness. It means also that one increasingly becomes familiar with the processes and intentions of those various levels of consciousness. As one approaches higher degrees of authenticity, one becomes “at home” in reflecting on oneself as a knowing, feeling and caring, and deciding agent. Inasmuch as authenticity is not sought or intended, little or no thought is given to the question of these interior processes and qualities of consciousness. In an education not concerned with authenticity on this scale of magnitude, there is little or no explicit concern with the importance and achievements of being a benevolent person, and in achieving and promoting positive, developmental intersubjectivity, and in becoming a truly loving person. Authenticity for educational philosophy, drawing on Lonergan’s

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83 The issue of sublation is evident in a early form in Insight were the cognitive levels are seen to interrelate and work together to a single increment of knowing. In Method in Theology, sublation is key in understanding the transformations of consciousness, what Lonergan calls intellectual, moral and religious conversion, and in understanding the move toward self-transcendence. See Method in Theology, 214-43 and 316-7.

84 These questions are brought to mind by points raised in Vokey’s work, “Bernard J. F. Lonergan on the Objectivity of Judgments of Value,” (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1980),
intentionality analysis, thus values the goal of self-transcendence as it is promoted on the experiential level, on the level of understanding and judgment, and is promoted on the existential level of choice and transformation.

It is on the basis of a self-transcending subject, then, that the question of the interpersonal relationship of interest to Bonnett can be understood. If there exist significant impairments in the operations of one's own consciousness, these could become a threat, cognitively and affectively, to a relationship that an individual might have.\(^85\) In the educational setting, the problems of personal inauthenticity may be evident within the student, or within the teacher, or within both. An educational philosophy that draws on Lonergan's notion of authenticity is able to explicitly thematize these elements and operations of interiority, and is able, in theory, to understand the role they play in human development, and perhaps lead one to recognize breakdown in the process, and to determine corrective measures. The value of Lonergan's analysis of authenticity for educational philosophy, at minimum, is that it identifies the importance of understanding and more effectively operates according to the operations and intentionalities of one's own consciousness, and a realization that this affects dramatically one's own personal development on various levels, and affects the intersubjective dimensions of one's life.

Admittedly, this account is complex, perhaps seemingly obscure and difficult to understand. In view of this, perhaps, greater clarity can be gained on the matter by reference to the work of Catherine Siejk that addresses the question of Lonergan's account of authenticity in relation to religious education. First, Siejk recognizes that Lonergan's antecedent thoughts on authenticity appear in his discussion of genuineness. She notes, genuineness occurs as one transforms oneself through correct understanding (that is, through knowledge) and through a "willing" that moves one to act in accord with that knowledge.

He [Lonergan] describes the genuine person as one who admits into one's consciousness the 'opposed apprehensions of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be.' Human genuineness, he says, is admitting into consciousness the tension between limitation and transcendence. It

\(^85\) I hasten to emphasize that these are highly sensitive and complex questions related to depth psychology and psychotherapy, and require a great deal of study and care. Others skilled in these fields, such as Robert Doran and Bernard Tyrrell, have explored the value of Lonergan's intentionality analysis in these areas.
involves the self as ‘operator’ relentlessly transforming the self as ‘integrator’ through the raising of further questions. Although an ideal, genuineness is nevertheless the necessary condition for all ‘acts of correct understanding and willing.’

Siejk explains that the process of raising further questions sets one on the path toward self-transcendence and raises the possibility of developing and achieving authenticity. Human achievement, concretely, aims at attaining some good, and that for the authentic person the good attained is not only good for oneself, but as a true good, it is a good that is valued for others. The personal good that is achieved through an authentic consciousness by the process of raising further questions, and by making true judgments, can be judged to be a truly human good, and as such, a true value (although Siejk does not explain how, cognitively and affectively, a judgment of value actually is made). In such a judgment, then, as a mark of authenticity, there occurs a measure of self-transcendence. The person who is authentic grasps a good as that which is a good not merely because it is satisfying to oneself, or because it “seems” to be good. The good is determined to be of value by being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible, and by this process, it is realized as a good for others, and perhaps for the whole human community.

Siejk goes on to explain the developmental aspect, or struggle, to achieve authenticity.

Our self-transcendence, our human development, has at its center a principle of tension between limitation and transcendence: what we are and what we are still to be. Becoming a truly integrated person does not mean living a life devoid of tension, nagging questions, unresolved feelings. Rather, it means facing the questions that take us beyond ourselves and embracing the tensions and achievements of bringing forth in everyday structures “a continuous stream of appropriate attention, intelligence, judgment, and decisions about situations at hand.” [quoting Lonergan scholar Tad Dunne, on Lonergan’s notion of authenticity]. … The fundamental processes, or what Lonergan calls schemes of recurrence (being attentive, reasonable, responsible, loving), that make us authentic human beings, work under probability; their successful achievement is

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87 Ibid., 150.
One can see from Siejk’s analysis the developmental aspects of Lonergan’s account of authenticity, and can discern some relevance to educational philosophy. While authenticity is never secure, it becomes an educational aim to help students (and teachers) more fully to understand the elements and dynamism of human consciousness, and to actually attain authenticity in ever-greater measure by attaining self-transcendence in acts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible and loving human beings.

Again, it must be stressed, authenticity does not factor significantly in the literature of traditional educational philosophy. Aside from a few articles and studies on the questions of authenticity, largely in reference to works of existential philosophy, it is a question that should be explored more widely and substantially in the interest of creating a more person-focused, humanized education. If this occurs, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, I believe, could make an important contribution by suggesting the nature of the question as one centering on several factors, including personal development, the elements and dynamism of one’s own consciousness, and the actual effects of the experiential, cognitive and existential dimensions of one’s life. Most significantly, for Lonergan, human authenticity is key to cognitive and moral self-transcendence. As such, the question of authenticity becomes in a Lonerganian philosophy of education one of considerable importance. Without addressing authenticity, one faces significant limitations in, as Siejk explains, “facing the questions that take us beyond ourselves and embracing the tensions and achievements of bringing forth in everyday structures ‘a continuous stream of appropriate attention, intelligence, judgment and decisions about situations at hand.’”

The question of authenticity leads one from a consideration of “interior” conditions to expressions of interior life in the concrete, practical world. Thus, I move on to the question of wisdom as practical reasoning.

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89 Siejk, “Toward a Religious Education Practice,” 160-1. Siejk omits the always-important Lonerganian quality of being “intelligent.” It must be added to the list of self-transcendent acts.
90 Ethical and moral questions will be addressed later in this chapter.
91 Ibid., 161.
Wisdom as Practical Reasoning

In this section I move from considering critical thinking, self-knowledge and human authenticity to consider the realm of “critical doing.” In terms of Lonergan’s systematic philosophy, this movement aids in a transition from the second and third levels of consciousness, from understanding and judging, to the fourth level of deliberating and deciding. This pertains to the topic of practical reasoning that bridges the questions of judging and the questions of how one is going to act in a practical way. Before I consider some ways in which this topic, also referred to as “wisdom,” has been addressed in educational philosophy and consider Lonergan’s particular angle on this question, I will first note the distinction between wisdom as largely an intellectual achievement, and wisdom as determining a concrete course of action, or as Lonergan seems to use the term, practical reasoning.

Wisdom as a philosophical concern extends back to early Greek philosophy. Over the centuries of development in Greek thought the term acquired various refinements. C. F. Delaney explains,

> From the pre-Socratics through Plato this was a unified notion. But Aristotle introduced a distinction between theoretical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis), the former being intellectual virtue that disposed one to grasp the nature of reality in terms of its ultimate causes …, that latter being the ultimate practical virtue that disposed one to make sound judgments bearing on the conduct of life.\(^{92}\)

Nicholas Smith goes on to explain that in Aristotle, “theoretical wisdom (sophia) is Nous (the ability to grasp first principles) plus epistēmē (scientific knowledge or understanding) … [and] practical wisdom (phronēsis) is knowledge of means and

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Delaney maintains that it is this distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom that persisted through the Middle Ages and continues to our day. Despite this early emergence and appreciation of wisdom, in either of its main forms, the matter has not always been high on the agenda of educational philosophy. However, there seems to be growing interest in the topic of wisdom within the field.

A relatively early modern proponent of wisdom as an important aim of education was Alfred North Whitehead who believed that schools of higher learning in the early twentieth century have increasingly pushed wisdom to the margins of educational concern. "In the schools of antiquity," he suggests, "philosophers aspired to impart wisdom," but "in modern colleges our humbler aim is to teach subjects. The drop from the divine wisdom, which was the goal of the ancients, to text-book knowledge of subjects, which is achieved by the moderns, marks an educational failure, sustained through the ages." Whitehead’s mandate for education was to recover as an aim of education the importance of wisdom as the application of theoretical knowledge. He suggests, "What I am anxious to impress on you is that though knowledge is one chief aim of intellectual education, there is another ingredient, vaguer but greater, and more dominating in its importance, ... 'wisdom'."

In Whitehead’s educational philosophy, wisdom properly becomes enacted in the phase of "generalization," after one has become adept in the phases of "romance" and "precision." In the generalization phase, one comes to apply knowledge to wider dimensions of life, and does so by again adopting the "discursive" mode of thinking that flourished in the romance phase. Moreover, says Whitehead, "an education which does

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95 The only rare appearance of “wisdom” as an entry in the main reference works in educational philosophy is evidence of the marginal place this topic obtains in the field, at least in the twentieth century.
98 Ibid., 30
99 Ibid., 36-7.
not begin by evoking initiative and by encouraging it must be wrong. For its whole aim is the production of active wisdom.\textsuperscript{100} One may reject the "phase" approach to education (preferring perhaps a more integrative mode of education), but it would be more difficult to object to Whitehead's emphasis on wisdom as the application of knowledge and its importance in education. It would be difficult to argue that wisdom, so conceived, should not be emphasized in education and that education should be solely a matter of theoretical knowledge. It is such an emphasis and integration that is supported by Lonergan's intentionality analysis.

Although Lonergan, later in his writings, turned to other matters concerning theology and methodology, wisdom as an intellectual virtue factored prominently in his writings early on.\textsuperscript{101} Crowe explains:

\begin{quote}
During the years of research into St. Thomas, wisdom was a fundamental intellectual virtue, the dominant one in the hierarchic trio that began with understanding, developed into science, and culminated in wisdom. It underwent some evolution at the time of \textit{Insight}, but continued to play a major role well into the Roman period of 1953-65.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Drawing on Aquinas, Lonergan initially saw wisdom occurring in three forms. First, in its higher form, wisdom arises from a mystical grasp of transcendent knowledge—a grasp of the totality of things. Secondly, in its lower form, wisdom occurs as "knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes." And in its third form (the form that is normally understood as theoretical wisdom), the principles of a metaphysics are spelled out. This includes not only an understanding of things in their ultimate causes, but, Lonergan maintains, an understanding of the human subject in terms of cognitive operations. That is to say, wisdom understands the nature and structure of all knowledge.\textsuperscript{103} As a contribution to metaphysics (that is, what we come to know and posit as knowledge when the operations of consciousness unfold properly and fully), then, wisdom occurs when

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Ibid.}, 37.
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.}. The "Roman period" to which Crowe refers is the years Lonergan spent teaching at the Gregorian University, the Jesuit College, in Rome.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Insight}, 432-3.
one grasps the knowledge of all things generally. But wisdom also has a more specific focus, and one that has more direct relevance to education.

In the previous section I examined Lonergan’s account of self-knowledge, and as knowledge, it involved judgment with respect to the self, that is, a determination of the elements, operations and developments of the human subject. With wisdom there is raised the question of judgment (based on thorough understanding) concerning some practical, concrete situation. (Lonergan also speaks of this sort of knowledge as prudence.) A cobbler, for instance, makes judgments about the practical matter of shoe production and repair, judgments that are based upon a broad understanding of this particular field, and based upon an accumulation of insights (direct and reflective). Lonergan explains,

You build up gradually in any concrete situation ... a familiarity, and gradually acquire all the insights that are relevant to what commonly happens. You get a view of the whole setup. In any particular field one comes gradually to a point where one has a sufficient accumulation of insights; one is at home, one is familiar, one is a master of the trade; one knows whether or not there are any further questions relevant to a particular judgment. ... The capacity of the cobbler or the craftsman in any trade or way of life is a particular wisdom and, insofar as it is practical, a particular prudence.\footnote{Lonergan discusses wisdom usually in terms of a habit of mind producing good judgment and knowledge in practical matters, thus expressing a notion of practical reasoning.\footnote{To understand this in terms of Lonergan’s cognitional theory, wisdom draws on the operations of understanding, but as a higher, more comprehensive level of conscious intentionality, wisdom intends sound judgment, particularly judgment related to the concrete, practical world. Lonergan scholar, Ivo Coelho, expresses Lonergan’s practical reasoning as resulting from self-knowledge that moves epistemological questions to questions of metaphysics.\footnote{That is to say, wisdom is knowledge of how to act in particular situations and, more broadly, how to conduct one’s life.}}}

Lonergan scholar, Ivo Coelho, expresses Lonergan’s practical reasoning as resulting from self-knowledge that moves epistemological questions to questions of metaphysics.\footnote{Ivo Coelho, Hermeneutics and Method: the ‘Universal Viewpoint’ in Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 26-8.} That is to say, wisdom is knowledge of how to act in particular situations and, more broadly, how to conduct one’s life.

\footnote{Topics in Education, 149.}
\footnote{Hugo Meynell, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 108-30.}
For Lonergan, wisdom exhibits not only a theoretical quality (as an aspect of metaphysics expressed as philosophical wisdom), it also has a related existential dimension. Lonergan explains the difference in the two relations this way:

We do not put theory and practice in separate compartments; on the contrary, our practice is the fruit of our theory, and our theory is orientated to practical achievement. We distinguish pure science and applied science, applied science and technology, technology and industry; but the distinctions are not separations, and, however great the differences between basic research and industrial activity, the two are linked by intermediate zones of investigation, discovery, invention. Finally, ... we may say that philosophy has invaded the field of the concrete, the particular, and the contingent, of the existential subject’s decisions and of the history of peoples, societies, and cultures; and this entry of philosophy into the realm of the existential and the historical not merely extends the role of philosophic wisdom into concrete living but also, by that very extension, curtails the functions formerly attributed to prudence.  

In Lonergan’s analysis, where prudence (or practical reasoning) is thought of as a quality of action, prudence benefits by the direction and control that philosophical wisdom brings to bear on decisions.

With wisdom understood as having different forms, the theoretical and the practical, the general and the particular, Lonergan is clear that the achievement is a gradual process. As Lonergan sees wisdom as a topic in education, he sees it mainly as a question of development and process. In his educational lectures, he explains this process as follows:

So wisdom is something that we acquire. With regard to human judgment it is generally acknowledged that we can trust the judgment of a man who is experienced in a given field; he has a certain wisdom there. On the other hand, we do not trust him insofar as he says anything that goes outside his field. Again, we connect degrees of wisdom with age .... So wisdom, while it is necessary for good judgment, for knowing whether or not there are any further questions, still is a foundation that lies ahead. It is not the sort of foundation that we have at the start and on which we build; it is the goal toward which we move. And we can always grow in wisdom.  

107. Editors Crowe and Doran point out that Lonergan was not trying to rejuvenate the antiquated notion of prudence, but his use of the term here was for a specific purpose: “Lonergan has found the old notion of prudence useful for understanding the particular and changeable with which history deals.”  (p. 310).

108. Topics in Education, 150.
As an issue for education, then, the achievement of wisdom is a matter of growth. But how does wisdom fit and function within an educational philosophy that draws on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis?

First, Lonergan intentionality analysis identifies wisdom as an aim and a result of that level of conscious operation intending judgment in some practical matter, and as such, it is an operation, a process. As a process, it is a progressive development towards the goal of good judgment. For educational philosophy, then, unlike Whitehead’s portrayal of wisdom especially as the application of knowledge, wisdom is understood as the growing and sharpening ability to assess matters in some concrete situation. Where Whitehead seems to stress know-how in knowledge application, for Lonergan the focus on wisdom not only includes the application of knowledge, it also stresses the importance of the knowing process of the human subject. We saw this emphasis on operations and on process emerge in Lonergan’s lectures on “science and the new learning.” As an educational philosophy stemming from intentionality analysis, understanding and affirming the elements and operations on the level of judgment become paramount. Clearly, a central question for educational philosophy dealing with wisdom concerns the elements and processes of human judgment.

Secondly, in the interest of developing wisdom, a Lonerganian philosophy of education identifies two key features of education: comprehensiveness and balance. The comprehensiveness pertains to some specific field of inquiry. As a learner proceeds in the process of inquiry, there occurs a gradual accumulation of understanding and knowledge regarding an entire delimited field of inquiry. It is this relatively deep or comprehensive knowledge that distinguishes the expert or master. As expert, this individual can readily determine what further questions are relevant, and to what degree of probability an affirmation can be made. As this comprehensive view emerges, so does a sense of proportion and balance of the elements related to the situation at hand.

In the development of both a broad view of a field of inquiry, and of proportioning and balancing the elements and questions related to the field, Lonergan sees the role of the educator as crucially important. He states, “the educator’s role in developing wisdom is to develop the view of the whole, to prevent one-sidedness, to add differentiations to the
virtual whole that is pre-contained in the pure desire to know." In this respect, education as a cooperative enterprise appears as vitally important in the development of judgment in the learner, and in the achievement of wisdom.

In short, Lonergan's account of wisdom in relation to his intentionality analysis focuses on the elements and operations of judgment. As philosopher and theologian David Tracy notes, in Lonergan's analysis, "the wise man, in the highest sense of that word, is a man not merely of understanding but of judgment." For Lonergan, then, wisdom does not appear as some or another set of sage epithets, sayings or fables. Nor is wisdom necessarily evident in the person who has an ability simply to apply knowledge effectively. Wisdom occurs rather in sound judgment, intending to affect a practical decision. An educational philosophy that draws on Lonergan's intentionality analysis understands and affirms the general normative operations of human consciousness leading to the third level of judgment on which is grasped a sense of the relative complete view of things in a specific field, and through which may be obtained a balanced grasped of the various elements in a given situation. Simply put, wisdom is the achievement of a practical rationality that reasonably assesses a given situation or area of knowledge; it is the charge and aim of a Lonerganian educational philosophy to understand how this happens.

Worldview

Where wisdom generally is delimited by some area of inquiry and expertise, a more general scope of understanding and judgment pertains to and anticipates the development of a worldview. Thus far I have explored the results of Lonergan's intentionality analysis as they relate to elements drawing some attention in educational philosophy. I have considered the results in understanding and in evoking change to the inner conditions of one's subjectivity. Specifically, humanness and self-knowledge, critical thinking, authenticity and wisdom have been shown to have prominence in the field of educational

\[\text{Ibid., 152.}\]

\[\text{David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 74.}\]
philosophy, and been shown how they can be cast in terms of Lonergan's metaphysics. In this section, I will explore further dimensions of his metaphysics by moving beyond the matters largely of human subjectivity to the matters involving more dramatically the realm of human intersubjectivity.\(^\text{111}\)

Not only does Lonergan's intentionality analysis yield results in understanding and transformations on the personal level of interiority, it has a bearing on awareness of the larger world of inter-personal life and engagement. The awareness, as it develops in an educational process, informally and formally, can emerge as a worldview. Worldview can encompass the elements of one's existence that extend to the farthest reaches of one's horizon of awareness. As this horizon broadens, it may include questions of "ultimate concern,"\(^\text{112}\) and as such it encompasses a knowledge, or anticipated knowledge of transcendent being. Such a worldview exhibits a distinctive "religious" quality. While there certainly is a religious dimension that unfolds from Lonergan's intentionality analysis, and there have been many studies done of Lonergan's religious thought, and on Lonergan and religious education,\(^\text{113}\) my focus in this section will be on the manner in which Lonergan's intentionality analysis forms a worldview that is delimited to the horizon of human beings in their encounter with the physical world and with each other. It is a worldview that may be developed into a theology (and into an "other-worldview" perhaps), but at this stage, it is a worldview rooted in generalized empirical method and

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\(^{111}\) It should be noted that some of the topics in educational philosophy, such as critical thinking, treat various issues as closely related, perhaps even conflated under the one topic. The structure of Lonergan's thought lends itself to making sharp differentiations based on an analysis of the operations of human consciousness (though interrelations, interdependence and even sublations occur among the levels of Lonergan's differentiations of consciousness, as discussed in chapter two). The point to be made is that while critical thinking encompasses intersubjective elements, such as what one finds in Richard Paul's work, for instance, Lonergan treats intersubjectivity after a clear account is given of human subjectivity. For examples of intersubjectivity in critical theory, see Richard Paul, "Power, Vested Interest, and Prejudice: On the Need for Critical Thinking in the Ethics of Social and Economic Development," and "Using Critical Thinking to Identify National Bias in the News," in Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World, ed. A. J. A. Binker (Rohnert Park, CA: Sonoma State University, 1990), 224-8 and 255-68.

\(^{112}\) While there are many notions of "religion," existentialist theologian, Paul Tillich, offers a broad definition. "The object of theology is what concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us." Paul Tillich. Systematic Theology. Three Volumes in One. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967),12. In fact, it is Tillich's notion of religion that Lonergan's includes in his discussion, Method in Theology, 106.

\(^{113}\) I have noted these in the introductory chapter, and some of these have been referenced in other parts of this study.
the notion of emergent probability; it is not rooted in the full-fledged theological method of *Method in Theology*.

In this section, I will consider the matter of worldview as an element of educational philosophy; discuss Lonergan’s enlargement of emergent probability into a worldview; and identify the relevance of this worldview to other elements of educational philosophy discussed so far.

The history of educational philosophy depicts in one way or another a concern with worldview—a concern with how one sees, with an ever-wider vision, the world beyond oneself, the world that includes family, community, society, culture, civilization, and ultimately the universe of being. The question of constructing a worldview, I believe, appears with different faces in educational philosophy. It may appear, for instance, as the question of citizenship. In mapping out the various elements of education and in showing their interrelatedness, Dewey concludes *Democracy and Education* with the thesis that a democratic society is one which best fosters a “greater variety of mutually shared interests” through the “continuous reconstitution or reorganization of experience, of such a nature as to increase its recognized meaning or social content, and as to increase the capacity of individuals to act as directive guardians of this reorganization.”

Educating citizens, then, as members of a democratic society, involves understanding the world as an open-ended process of development of meaning, and as involving an ongoing reconstitution of social life in which the responsibility of the citizen is to participate intelligently in this process with the aim of sustaining the basic structure of the group.

An equally substantial and relatively recent treatment of the matter of citizenship appears in the work of Eamonn Callan, whose particular approach offers a new perspective on citizenship, arguing against the “justice as fairness” political philosophy of John Rawls. Taking a different angle, Callan argues that justice is reasonableness, and political order rests upon a commitment to and realization of “reasonableness” in its various manifestations. Moreover, it is the function of education to ensure that such an ideal of justice is realized in society. Advancing reasons and reasonableness in social relationships, in Callan’s estimation, seems to be an overarching virtue that subsumes

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most other political virtues needed and valued in liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{115} Arguing against the narrowly conceived political liberalism of Rawls, Callan maintains, “liberal politics is a politics of virtue,”\textsuperscript{116} not limited to the political arena solely.

The scope of such an undertaking that Callan envisions could easily be regarded as creating a worldview. The education designed and delivered to learners for citizenship in a liberal democracy is an education not just for the realm of political engagement, but encompasses many others aspects of one’s life, and envisions to a large extent the social and cultural milieu of a community, even a civilization. Contrary to Rawls’ rather weak position on political education, Callan argues, educating for citizenship in a liberal democracy involves a transformation of individuals in a way that has “large consequences for how they live beyond the realm of civic responsibility.” In this educational enterprise, Callan goes on to say, “we need to ask about the overall value of the life that such a self would enjoy and not only about the political benefits that would flow from the desired transformation.”\textsuperscript{117} A worldview in terms of citizenship, then, encompasses the vast interrelations and extensions of the self and community and of societies of communities.

In addition to the sense of worldview as encompassing the political and social world, there is a sense of worldview in some educational philosophies expressed as a cosmology. As such, the vision extends not only to the political and social realms, but also to a general understanding of things in their totality. Whitehead, for instance, perceived the ultimate aim of education to be a grasp of world process where one has acquired an “intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge which has particular reference to the life of the being possessing it.”\textsuperscript{118} In drawing on such themes in process philosophy and applying them to educational philosophy, Robert Brumbaugh explains the ultimate aim of education is to embrace a metaphysical vision of reality on a grand scale, where the individual, having a unique creativity and style, is “at home in the cosmic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] \textit{Ibid.}, 3.
\item[117] \textit{Ibid.}, 51. In my view, engaging ideas of Callan and Lonergan in dialogue could prove to be a compelling dialectic. Unfortunately, such a study is beyond my immediate concern here.
\end{footnotes}
community," and where we are creatively sharing in "cosmic temporal advance and evolving creativity ... capable of creating and experiencing values of aesthetic intensity." In applying process philosophy to education, and perhaps where other grand metaphysical schemes are applied similarly, creating a worldview, in the sense of an all-encompassing vision that serves as a reference point for understanding the various elements of that world, becomes an ultimate goal for the learner, and for which the methods and objectives of pedagogy can be directed.

Formation of a worldview, then, as an outcome of education, and an issue to be addressed in educational philosophy, appears in various forms. One aspect of worldview may be in terms of understanding how the various elements of society, culture, and politics fit together within one's world of experience, of interest, of influence, in which case the matter becomes a question, at least in part, of citizenship. Another aspect of worldview might envision, in a speculative, general way, the order, structure and interrelations of elements of the universe. In this case, the aims of education include acquiring some sense of the overall structure of reality, its various dimensions, and an understanding of the place and purpose of human beings within the cosmos. While there are certainly the social and cultural aspects to Lonergan's intentionality analysis, as I shall show in the next section, here I will focus on its implication for a worldview on the grand scale of cosmology, offering terms and relations for understanding the differentiated and interrelated elements of existence. This will involve exploring the dimensions of a worldview evident in various ways in Lonergan's intentionality analysis already discussed.

Early on in *Insight*, classical and statistical modes of inquiry and types of knowledge are distinguished. Despite their differences, however, they share a complementarity in that both the classical mode and the statistical coalesce to form a basic worldview. This worldview regards existence as composed of intelligible things and operations grasped in terms of systematic and non-systematic schemes of recurrence. Lonergan describes this type of recurrence as emergent probability. It forms the general explanatory structure not only for scientific inquiry into data, but also provides the general categories for the

intelligibility found in the world of common sense,\textsuperscript{121} and informs the philosophical question of “things,” how things are identified, differentiated, distributed, concentrated, and how they develop or disintegrate.\textsuperscript{122} Overall, it is the general explanatory framework of all elements of existence, including human existence. Such a worldview is expressed, for instance, in geological and evolutionary theories.

Emergent probability applied to the realm of human existence sees human action as unfolding probabilities. Lonergan explains, generally, that “the course of human history is in accord with emergent probability; it is the cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probability.”\textsuperscript{123} Things unfold in terms of emergent probability, and our understanding and knowledge of such emergence exhibits a similar characteristic. That is to say, activities of insight, namely the understanding and judging of our experiences, are intentional, developmental, interrelated and upwardly directed so that an insight or set of insights achieved provides the ground for the emergence of further insights and for the corrections or adjustments of previous insights. This process produces rational consciousness that, in turn, presents to an individual some set of choices in what to do about the knowledge that one has achieved. Where one chooses to act in accord with rational consciousness, one expresses rational self-consciousness, and thus contributes to the ongoing emergence of other expressions of existence.

This self-constitution of rational forms of life is paralleled by a similar emergence of schemes of order, systematization and recurrence in other forms of being. That is to say, the intelligibility Lonergan discovers in the knowing process is paralleled by the intelligibility in that which is known. We can engage in acts of understanding because there are elements in the real world that are understandable, and they are understandable because they are ordered and develop systematically and in terms of schemes of recurrence.

For Lonergan, then, the real world (what Lonergan also terms “existence” and “being”) can be understood as phenomena, these being manifolds and aggregates of manifolds, that have been brought into existence through a process of emergence.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 234-9.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 284-92.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 252.
paralleling in a very general way the operational structure of human consciousness (which, in fact, is part of the real world, too). Simply put, that which is known is structured and operates in developmental patterns that move from the primary elements to higher-level integrations achieving higher levels of complexity. In turn, the higher levels of existence have an effect on the lower level elements and, in the process of development, the limitations and possibilities for recurrences of existence are managed according to the probabilities of sustainability and recurrence. In short, then, the notion of emergent probability is a worldview grasping the basic form and possibility of intelligibility in all of being, as it is, and as it unfolds.

Lonergan explains how emergent probability functions in the case of developing life, whether in merely organic life, or a higher level of psychic (or sentient) life, or intelligent life.

It is emergent probability that provides the compound conditioned series of things and of schemes of recurrence such that the developing organism or psyche or intelligence will have an environment in which it can function successfully. It is with respect to this field of emergent probability that the genetic sequence enjoys a two-fold flexibility: a minor flexibility that reaches the same goal along different routes, and a major flexibility that shifts the goal in adaptation to environmental change. Not only do conjugate forms emerge in coincidental manifolds of lower level events; not only do flexible circles of schemes of recurrence result from the conjugate forms; but also operations in accord with the schemes (1) are linked with occurrences outside the organism, the psyche, the intelligence, (2) effect the higher systematization of the lower chemical, neural or psychic manifold, and (3) so transform the lower manifold as to evoke the emergence of the next conjugate forms that will yield new schemes that will enable the developing subject to function in its environment towards still further development.\textsuperscript{124}

As a worldview envisioning the totality of things, what emergent probability achieves in explanatory generality, it sacrifices in explicit detail and specificity, but it does gain in applicability to myriad instances of existence. To be sure, with such a worldview one has to settle for broad generalities, but by the same token, there may result a certain benefit and satisfaction, as will be explained soon, stemming from a rather all-encompassing view.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 487.
Emergent probability further expresses a general worldview not only of development, with its categories and interrelations, but it also provides a general explanatory viewpoint of breakdown, decline and ultimate disintegration of existent things—whether they be in the operations of knowing or in the realm of the known. Just as things come to be and develop, they can also come apart and pass away. Lonergan illustrates this by showing that, in the process of seeking intelligibility and knowledge, the breakdown can begin with certain conflicts arising due to individual, group or general bias. Such bias-generated conflict may result in a truncation of development, or even eventual complete collapse.

As individuals, so societies fail to reach universal willingness that reflects and sustains the detachment and disinterestedness of the unrestricted desire to know. More or less automatically and unconsciously, each successive batch of possible and practical courses of action is screened to eliminate as unpractical whatever does not seem practical to an intelligence and a willingness that not only are developed imperfectly but also suffer from bias. But the social situation is the cumulative product of individual and group decisions, and as these decisions depart from the demands of intelligence and reasonableness, so the social situation becomes, like the complex number, a compound of the rational and irrational.\(^{125}\)

As irrationality and unintelligibility begin to take hold, the situation disintegrates further, and the cycle of decline establishes itself. The process of decline, Lonergan believes, is terminated or reversed only by direct insights into the intelligible and, by inverse insights that grasp what is unintelligible. The unintelligible is exposed and the results of decisions based on such unintelligibility or irrationality can be eliminated.\(^{126}\)

Both in its general contours for understanding the interrelations and development of the elements of existence, and for understanding the failure to develop as manifest in some process of some downward cycle of decline, emergent probability in Lonergan’s thought constitutes the basic heuristic structure of reality. This worldview flows directly from his analysis of insight in which a parallel intelligibility, an isomorphism, is found between the actual knowable things in the universe of being and the knowing process. Essentially, the line of thinking is this: the desire to know seeks intelligibility because

\(^{125}\) Ibid., 651.
\(^{126}\) Ibid., 652.
things are intelligible; things are intelligible because they come into existence in terms of emergent probability; insight exhibits this process of emergence as well as understands this process as a worldview. In philosophy of education, then, there is an understanding of the structure and processes of human intentionality as grasping intelligibility. There is also a grasp of the general structure and functionality of the universe. Human insight reveals and illustrates the way elements of being come into existence and hold together, and the way elements of existence can and, in certain cases, do fail to develop, exhibit breakdown and cease to exist.

Emergent probability, I suggest, has significance in relation to some elements of educational philosophy discussed so far. First, it relates to the achievement of wisdom. For Lonergan, we recall, wisdom depends in part on the achievement of a worldview. That is to say, wisdom, as related to some delimited context, depends on a general grasp of the totality of things within that scope. It depends on a grasp of how things fit together, interrelate and operate. The notion of emergent probability is a worldview that grasps that totality, at least in a general sense, and it provides a means for one to discern a balance for, and perspective on, the various elements known to contribute that totality. This broad vision allows the learner, the knower, to gain a sense of the whole, and to make judgments and decisions with a larger view in mind, one of the chief characteristics of wise practical reasoning.

Secondly, worldview promotes a more profound personal authenticity. For Lonergan, we recall, authenticity, in part, depends on an understanding of development leading to an anticipated goal. Emergent probability explains the process of all development in general terms, and thus provides one with an understanding on a wide scale of one of the chief elements needed to achieve authenticity. In effect, an understanding of emergent probability promotes deliberate control over the process of development by creating conditions better likely to achieve greater and more effective, and thus more authentic, human development.

And thirdly, emergent probability as a worldview allows a person to gain some understanding of a key element that mitigates development, namely, unintelligibility. Emergent probability as an explanatory framework allows for a learner and educator to become more intelligently and intentionally committed to the pursuit of intelligibility,
and to know what constitutes intelligibility and, in fact, to know why this pursuit is important to the overall scheme of things.

An educational philosophy that embraces and integrates the worldview of emergent probability would commit itself explicitly to the grasp of intelligibility, and would explicitly promote the development of intelligibility in the educational theories and policies that that philosophy undergirds. Lonergan’s mode of educational philosophy that understands the structure and process of intelligibility might be contrasted by an educational philosophy that discounts the importance of grasping the intelligible ground of existence and of working out its implications. While it is not my aim in this study to develop such comparisons, I simply note that this type of a philosophy of education might be one that favors an account of knowledge as power, with knowledge arising not from intelligibility but from pure assertion and power structures.¹²⁷

While worldview can include a vision of totality in Lonergan’s philosophy, in other systems of thought, as discussed, it also can have a more immediate and narrow focus. That narrower view of the world may be demarked, for instance, as I found in Callan’s position, by political, social or cultural concerns. In Lonergan’s philosophy, one finds such possible demarcations.

Social Implications of Intentionality Analysis

In this section we continue our expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of educational philosophy by considering more of the concrete implications this analysis has for understanding social life. After noting the connection between social theory and educational philosophy, most of this section will focus on the social philosophy stemming from Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, and to illustrate the type of application this may have in education, the work of Robert Doran on this topic will be explored.

¹²⁷ This is a broad and general statement, and is suggested here only as speculation for purposes of clarifying Lonergan’s approach. It would be a task far beyond the reaches of this study to offer a satisfying and fully supported account, however valuable that might be at some point, of these two variant approaches to knowledge and educational philosophy.
Many educational philosophies relate to, or are constructed in support of, some particular social order. As noted earlier, Dewey’s educational philosophy unfolded in terms of participatory democracy. Callan’s educational philosophy supports liberal democracy on a wide scale. Paulo Freire developed his educational philosophy for persons suppressed politically and economically, for persons and groups striving for emancipation. In their educational philosophies, Henri Giroux and Peter McLaren champion in different ways a social construction, more “leftist” in character. They envision a deeper egalitarianism and the eradication of all types of exploitation.\textsuperscript{128} Lonergan, similarly, through his intentionality analysis, offers an account of social order in which education plays a crucially important role.

Human intentionality, one recalls, stems from the basic experience of the \textit{eros} of mind, the desire to know, and develops in the unfolding of insights in which the task of learning, to a significant degree, centers on obtaining understanding, making good judgments and asserting truth or probability. It also directs one toward the objective of being wise in life’s decisions and to being true to oneself. This, to a large extent, focuses on the development and operations of consciousness on the individual level. But societies, Lonergan states, are basically groups of individuals,\textsuperscript{129} and thus there exist social dimensions and implications to this basic unfolding and fulfilling of intentionalities.

For Lonergan, the operations and fulfillments of intentionality have a wide-ranging effect in any cultural or social milieu. Societies depend upon and thrive due to the achievements of consciousness of its individual members. But societies, like individuals, also suffer the effects of the inabilities of human consciousness to achieve understanding and knowledge, and to make wise decisions.\textsuperscript{130} In applying his analysis of consciousness to the metaphysical realm of social theory, Lonergan does not adhere to explicitly, or

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Insight}, 651. “As individuals, so societies . . . .”
\textsuperscript{130} It would seem appropriate to use the term “society” here in the same sense identified by Robert Doran, who offers an exposition of Lonergan’s “cosmopolis” as applied to education. “Society, then, consists of the five dimensions of spontaneous subjectivity, technological institutions, the economic system, the legal and political domain, and culture, where culture is a matter of both everyday meanings and values and reflective objectifications of everyday transactions.” Robert Doran, “Education for Cosmopolis,” in \textit{Theological Foundations}, vol. 2, \textit{Theology and Culture} (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), 371.
defend, any one particular mode of social organization, such as, liberal democracy, communitarianism, socialism, or some other type. The issue concerns not the mode of group decision-making, or upholding and implementing some ideal of justice, or of designing certain social or economic policies. Rather, the issue for Lonergan is a matter of structure, operations and processes that all intelligent, reasonable and responsible social organizations share.

More specifically, the social implications of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis concern the possibilities of higher integrations of social life in which greater goods (material goods, goods as knowledge, the good of order, and the apprehension of value) become attainable on wider scales. As related to a social philosophy, the key element is an identification and understanding of the good of order that unfolds, as an instance of genuine development, in the production of goods in a recurrent and sustainable fashion. In the exposition in chapter two of Lonergan’s notion of the human good, its various elements were explained. These included a brief account of the good of order. In relation to social organization, the good of order takes on considerable importance. In this context, Lonergan offers a more extensive account:

Now through this desire and the knowledge it generates, there comes to light a second meaning of the good. Besides the good that is simply object of desire, there is the good of order. Such is the polity, the economy, the family as an institution. It is not the object of any single desire, for it stands to single desires as systems to systematized, as universal condition to particulars that are conditioned, as scheme of recurrence that supervenes upon the materials of desires and the efforts to meet them and, at the price of limited restrictions, through the fertility of intelligent control, secures an otherwise unattainable abundance of satisfactions.¹³¹

Persons express the good of order on the individual scale in the realization of other goods and, through intelligence, they grasp how this might be achieved in cooperation with others. As persons reasonably determine the highest probability of achievement, and then wisely choose the appropriate course of action, effective social order (grasped as a good in itself) emerges, and individual goods on a broader scale are actually achieved.

Lonergan names the social order that realizes the good of order, being the good that leads to all other goods, “cosmopolis.”

The questions of social development pertain to the emergence of cosmopolis, and for Lonergan they are questions of the nature and development largely of common sense. In the world of common sense, the practical aspects of human living are directed toward the concrete achievements of human goods in the here-and-now, and in the immediate future. While common sense may be highly productive, inasmuch as social development manifests in an upward movement, as embodying products of common sense, social life becomes vulnerable to the limitations of common sense manifested in a “make-do” approach to issues and problems. One of the chief problems here, Lonergan explains, is the general lack, by and large, of a consideration of truly long-range planning, that is, among other things, planning beyond the immediate boundaries of one’s own life. He finds in the world of common sense a commonly shared disinterest in the effects decisions might have for generations to come. Lonergan discussed this matter in his education lectures in terms of the inability of common sense to function effectively on the level of history. The extent to which common sense is short-sighted is the degree to which the production of goods and the unfolding of reasonable judgments and wise decisions are at risk. What promotes the good of order both on the individual and social scales, Lonergan maintains, is the wider view, the “higher viewpoint.” Social life expressed in (and to some extent as) common sense, Lonergan explains, needs a higher viewpoint to effectively counter the forces of reversal and decline, and to overcome other limitations of a purely commonsense approach to things. It is social life aspiring to the higher viewpoint is what Lonergan terms “cosmopolis.” He explains further:

There is needed, then, a further manifestation of finality, of the upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism of generalized emergent probability. Earlier, in the chapter on common sense as object, it was concluded that a viewpoint higher than the viewpoint of common sense was needed; moreover, that X was given the name ‘cosmopolis,’ and some of its aspects and functions were indicated. But the subsequent argument revealed that, besides higher viewpoints

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132 Stephen Toulmin provides an etymology and history of the term “cosmopolis” in his Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 67-69. Lonergan, clearly, develops the notion of the connection of the natural order and the social order, and regards the good of order, giving rise to the possibility of insight, as the supervening order of all other efforts of social order—family, politics, institutions, and so forth.
in the mind, there are higher viewpoints in the realm of being; and both the initial
and subsequent argument have left it abundantly clear that the needed higher
viewpoint is a concrete possibility only as a consequence of an actual higher
integration.\textsuperscript{133}

Cosmopolis, for Lonergan, envisions that higher integration of common sense’s
intellectual capital, its wealth of practical knowledge, and stock of values, in an explicit
and intentional redirection of its operations and goals. The redirection of cosmopolis is
toward the achievement of insight and the implementation of a general, truly
developmental methodology for sorting through problems, for charting a collective
course of genuine development, and for achieving the individual and social goods that
good judgment upholds.

The higher integration of cosmopolis, more specifically, is necessary to counter the
limitations of common sense with its “exaltation of the practical, the supremacy of the
state, the cult of the class.”\textsuperscript{134} As intelligence and reasonableness are brought to bear in
ever increasing measure upon social life, Lonergan finds cosmopolis unfolding in five
characteristic ways. First, it prevents mere practicality from being shortsighted in its
dealings with problems. It mitigates and corrects governmental decisions, on all levels,
being made for reasons of mere political expediency.\textsuperscript{135} Secondly, cosmopolis arises
where the insights that have potential in moving the group forward in genuine
development are promoted and allowed their due effect. Where biases suppress such
insights, in cosmopolis they are exposed and overturned.\textsuperscript{136} Thirdly, concerning the
present, it seeks to destroy the efforts of dominant groups in society to rationalize its
biases into principles and policies of social life. Such rationalizations manifest in the
screening of memories of how groups ascended to power, and in the falsification of
history in which the group “overstates its case.” It is the business of cosmopolis to
“satirize the catchwords and the claptrap and thereby to prevent the notions they express
from coalescing with passions and resentments to engender obsessive nonsense for future
generations.”\textsuperscript{137} Fourthly, inasmuch as cosmopolis seeks to protect the future by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Insight,} 656.
\item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Ibid.,} 263.
\item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Ibid.,} 263-4.
\item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid.,} 264.
\item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.,} 265.
\end{itemize}
correcting the current efforts of dominant groups at justifying their biases, so it seeks to correct the past rationalizations of bias. There is required a critique of history to expose the instances of rationalizations of the irrational and the intelligent masks of the unintelligent and unintelligible beliefs. And fifthly, cosmopolis works not by taking a clear and rigid stand against the general biases of the groups of a society, for its object is to change society from within, and not overthrow it. This is a hard-won war of many battles where, bit-by-bit, the biases are exposed for what they are, and are transformed from refusals to understand into an acceptance of understanding. In cosmopolis, social life develops on the basis of good common sense and reverses the decline inherent in common nonsense. In short, cosmopolis appears as the commitment to the flourishing of insight, to grasping the intelligent and the reasonable, and to promoting responsible action. It also functions to resist the elements in society that oppose or mitigate these objectives.

It [cosmopolis] stands on a basic analysis of the compound-in-tension that is man; it confronts problems of which men are aware; it invites the vast potentialities and pent-up energies of our time to contribute to their solution by developing an art and a literature, a theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and help they need and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense.

In cosmopolis, then, we find Lonergan’s social vision as one resting on his intentionality analysis, committed to the full realization of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility in whatever social or cultural milieu they may occur. The social vision, however, is one thing; its educational implications are another.

The clearest manifestation to date, by my reading, of the educational implications of Lonergan’s social theory, occurs in the thought of Robert Doran. His article, “Education for Cosmopolis,” spells them out. Following Lonergan’s lead, Doran sees the threat to society and culture to be the increasing inability to achieve an integration of its various

140 *Ibid.*, 266.
elements. This results in a weakened and constricted effort at social and cultural harmony. (Integration and synthesis, we recall, are important for the occurrence of development.) This inability initiates the process toward less development, toward anti-development, and ultimately, through the "longer cycle of decline," to social and cultural disintegration.\footnote{Doran, "Education for Cosmopolis," 380-6.} Doran perceives education to be potentially the antidote to the agent that sparks social decline.

The education Doran proposes follows a "liberal curriculum" executed in a four-year educational program designed to "promote the agency required for cosmopolitan collaboration in the face of the longer cycle of decline."\footnote{Ibid., 386.} Reflecting the "Great Books" tradition, the first year would focus on the key ideas of modernity and their effect in establishing social values, ordering human affairs and interactions, along with the rise of the contemporary sense of self, community and culture. The second and third years would study cosmologies and forms of human life that have developed in the major civilizations of the world. The objective here is an understanding of the broad ordering of the history of our contemporary situation. The fourth year would be devoted to a study of the possible ways forward in authentic development that achieves the needed higher integration and collaboration on a global scale.\footnote{Ibid., 387.} Doran believes that the basis or foundation for such a collaboration is found in uncovering the different methodologies used in the various fields of knowledge, and to find a unified methodology, this being Lonergan's generalized empirical method, to these variances.\footnote{Ibid., 390.} The objective here is to find within the normative patterns of one's own consciousness the operations that are thematized largely as Lonergan describes them, and to begin to overcome the fragmentation of knowledge due to its increasing specializations, along with the deepening isolation of social life that results from the absence of an overarching methodology. In briefest of terms, then, this is Doran's educational vision arising from Lonergan's account of cosmopolis as it expresses a general vision of human social structure and interaction.
If one should apply Lonergan’s intentionality analysis in its implications for social order and process, seek to integrate its basic elements in an educational philosophy, and develop a specific program of educational courses and objectives suited to cosmopolis, Doran’s approach may be one. However, there may be others. If the basic structure of operations of consciousness is normative and universal to all cases of normal cognitive functioning, would not the knowledge encountered in the texts found widely within existing educational curricula, and the knowledge grasped by individuals in the learning process, be illustrative and instructive in bringing to light the normative patterns—if one knows what to look for? Could not the discovery of these normative patterns lead to an integrative, collaborative and unified methodology that becomes the objective in Doran’s fourth year? My basic question is this. Is a new curriculum needed for cosmopolis, or would some existing curriculum be sufficient to educate teachers in the structure and operations of human conscious intentionality as Lonergan describes it? I suspect a new curriculum is not needed to bring understanding of Lonergan’s unique approach to human intentionality, nor would it be needed to redirect the objectives of teaching and learning towards the understanding and flourishing of these elements of human subjectivity.

At any rate, the point to be made is that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has direct, and potentially dramatic, consequences for society through finding and implementing the creative modes of greater understanding, integration, harmony and genuine development that underlies cosmopolis. The role of education within cosmopolis (similar to the role of education in other social theories, such as Dewey’s or Callan’s) is to promote the emergence and development of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility on a social scale. This social vision, as Lonergan suggests, rests on the understanding of, commitment to, and achievement through, the individual gaining insight, and in gaining insight into insight and responsible action. In cosmopolis, this leads to the more specific question of ethics, that is, to the question of the manner in which the individual will adhere to the normative operations of consciousness related to an interpersonal or social context.
Moral Dimensions of Intentionality Analysis

With this section, we come to another convergence of the questions of human subjectivity and human intersubjectivity. In Lonergan’s thought, it is the moral dimension that brings one to the important point of existential choice and transformation. Following a discussion of some recent analysis of moral issues in educational philosophy, I will examine the various dimensions of Lonergan’s ethics and draw on the work of Lonergan scholar and ethicist, Kenneth Melchin, to provide clarity on this complex matter. I will then relate Lonerganian ethics to some key issues in moral philosophy as they appear in educational philosophy. With this section, my expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into a secularist educational philosophy largely will be complete.

Drawing on his metaphysics, Lonergan’s moral philosophy clearly is based upon his intentionality analysis. The normative operations of human consciousness experienced by an individual, Lonergan explains, give rise to a set of “precepts” for conducting one’s life. As a set of general directives, the precepts are not specific rules which one must follow, nor are they a code of conduct of a specific nature that stipulates a definite course of action. The level of generality found in the precepts situates them more as an ethical methodology, that is, as a way of raising the needed, appropriate questions for moral and ethical living. Based on his intentionality analysis, Lonergan identifies four basic “transcendental precepts” that guide moral decision-making: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and be responsible. Although articulated fully only after his work, Insight, these precepts find their genesis in Lonergan’s exposition of the differentiated operations of human consciousness. However, before discussing the relevance of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis for moral and ethical issues as they arise in educational philosophy, it will be helpful to consider the context of moral theory and ethics in Method in Theology, 231. “Our formula is a continuous and ever more exacting application of the transcendental precepts. Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible.”

One could debate the distinction between the terms “moral” and “ethics,” but it seems the generally accepted distinction is between the moral as the actual embodiment in thought and deed of that which is moral in an individual, and ethics as the study, the theory, the philosophy underlying moral conduct. Webster’s denotes “moral” as a determination of right and wrong, of knowing good and right conduct, and involving the articulation of laws or principles that point to moral behavior. Webster’s further defines
contemporary educational philosophy in order to see how Lonergan’s basic position could be expanded in this area of educational philosophy.

Promoting right behavior and the proper treatment of others have been, for centuries, important aims in education.\textsuperscript{147} There has developed, consequently, an enormous body of literature in educational theory and philosophy dealing with ethics and morals.\textsuperscript{148} One recent development in moral education that illustrates particularly well the character of current thought in this field has been in the area of professional educational ethics. Here the concern has arisen, following the lead of other professional groups and organizations, to establish some guidance for moral conduct for educators and others engaged in the practice of education. Jerrold Coombs, notes in his overview of this development that only recently has professional educational ethics received increasing attention in the field of education.\textsuperscript{149} While Coombs focuses on professional ethics, he encompasses in his discussion the more general question of teaching morality and ethics in formal schooling situations, and thus, it seems to me, this provides a particularly good overview both of professional ethics and the climate of moral education generally.\textsuperscript{150}

Coombs suggests that there are two basic approaches followed in the teaching of educational ethics. One type of approach involves identifying relevant moral principles, and in the better of these approaches, according to Coombs, there is guidance in applying ethical theory or principles to particular situations through “case analysis.”\textsuperscript{151} Another type concerns the elucidation of what may be considered the “process of good ethical

\textsuperscript{147} In this study, references to educational philosophies and strategies, from Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, to Thomas F. Green, \textit{Voices: the Educational Formation of Conscience} bear this out.

\textsuperscript{148} As evidence of this vast quantity of literature, searches on key databases in education and educational philosophy yield thousands of citations to works published in the last ten years on ethics and moral issues in education.

\textsuperscript{149} Jerrold Coombs, “Educational Ethics: Are We on the Right Track?” \textit{Educational Theory} 48, no. 4 (fall 1998): 555. “Although educational philosophers, as well as other educators, have long been interested in ethical issues in education, the ethics of teachers, administrators, and others who occupy positions in educational institutions has not been the primary focus of their concern. This new interest in professional ethics has generated a sufficient number of articles, books, and courses in ethics for specialists in various areas of education to warrant our talking about the ‘field’ of educational ethics.”

\textsuperscript{150} While Coombs’ focus is on professional ethics, and “educational ethics,” he addresses the question of understanding moral and ethical thought and practice in the larger context of not only engaging ethics in the profession by the professionals, but also the teaching of ethics to students. As a result, his work concerns the whole spectrum of ethics in educational philosophy, and thus it provides a helpful overview of the field.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}, 558-9.
By his evaluation, the results of these two types of approaches have resulted in modest gains in ethical perception and sensitivity, but, according to Coombs, considerable distance yet remains to be covered. Specifically, for Coombs, the needs are these: to afford students, in better ways, the opportunity “to reflect on a broader range of exemplars and possible exemplars of their moral concepts together with the reasons others have for regarding these as cases of the concepts”; to broaden the reach of the “meaning of particular moral concepts and their relationships to other moral concepts”; to introduce new moral concepts to a student’s repertoire; to understand the role of power, authority and responsibility relations in the application of moral concepts; to attend more closely to the particulars of morally problematic situations; and to reflect upon not fictional but actual moral dilemmas.

In important ways, Coombs’ prescriptions could reflect what needs to be done in any venue given to the teaching of ethics—in the university (Coombs’ main interest), in the high school, in the earlier grades, in the workplace, and so forth. One of Coombs’ chief concerns is to show the moral situation as one of considerable complexity and reach, and to discredit the one-track, or two-track, thinking that can often be found in approaches that uphold the strict application of rules or moral imperatives. The key in determining the right thing to do, it seems, is to think carefully, and to think widely. While there are many other approaches to ethical theory, and to the manner in which educational philosophy engages the issues, Coombs’ analysis of the current state of moral and ethical teaching in education, and his perception of what needs to be done to move this forward, are essential contributions to the field.
field of study forward, provides a helpful reference for understanding Lonergan's approach to the matter of ethics.

As mentioned, Lonergan's fuller treatment of ethics and morality appear in his later writings, but in *Insight* the stage is set for these subsequent developments. For instance, the "transcendental precepts" spelled out in later writings have a related expression in *Insight* as "moral precepts." No mistake should be made of the connection Lonergan develops in *Insight* between the operations of human consciousness yielding a rational self-consciousness, and the moral needs and demands that one encounters in these operations. The moral question emerges as one of consistency in knowing and doing. Lonergan establishes the context for, and basic thrust of, his presentation of moral questions and precepts in terms of other codes and imperatives, notably Kant's. He explains:

In different strata of society, in different epochs, in different cultures and civilizations, one meets with different moral codes. But the content of the moral code is one thing, and the dynamic functioning that demands its observance is another. Our consideration has centered on that dynamic function, on the operative exigence for self-consistency in self-consciousness, and since contrast is luminous, on the threefold escape of fleeing self-consciousness, of mitigating the moral code by rationalization, and of giving up hope in the struggle. In brief, we have been dealing with the question, Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'? Our answer differs from the Kantian answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical imperative, we disagree inasmuch as we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence and reason.156

Clearly, then, what Lonergan seeks is not a code of ethics, or even a set of principles that can be applied in helping one to make morally good decisions. The aim is more general. Lonergan seeks to establish what goes on in one's consciousness—how one gains insights and how one comes to know what is the right thing to do. He states: "Now the division and the hierarchy of values reveal how the dynamic exigence of rational self-

156 *Insight*, 623-4. The point is that the 'ought' in Kant is different from the moral impulse and direction of Lonergan's position in that Lonergan's ethics rests on his analysis of intelligence and reason leading to responsible action. This is related to the structure and operations of human consciousness: understanding and judging and deciding. The "imperative" is derived from these operations of consciousness, and is formulated in *Method in Theology* as the precepts, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible; see *Method in Theology*, 20.
consciousness for self-consistency unfolds into a body of moral precepts concretely operative in moral consciousness." In other words, the making of one's way in the world rises or falls on the commitment to, and actual grasp of, insight—direct insight in acts of understanding; reflective insight in acts of judgment that realizes rational consciousness in knowing; and rational self-consciousness in acting correctly through making decisions intelligently and reasonably in accord with that understanding and judgment.

The question of the relation of Lonergan's intentionality analysis and the realm of ethics and morality represents a clear development of his thought in which is introduced new terms and relations to an already detailed and intricate metaphysics. For instance, in his chapter in *Insight*, "The Possibility of Ethics," Lonergan explains the nature and role of the human will, the notion of values, and the nature of human freedom. Each of these new elements relate to the dynamic structure of human consciousness, and while these refinements are necessary, they do add considerable complexity to the basic analysis of intentionality. A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to Lonergan's work on ethics and moral living and, admittedly, an in-depth treatment would require a lengthy treatise probing the myriad primary and secondary sources. My modest aim here is to present an outline of the main contours of Lonergan's moral theory for educational philosophy. To achieve this aim, I will rely on the lucid work of Kenneth Melchin who, in his

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157 *Insight*, 625.


book, *Living With Other People*, provides a faithful interpretation of Lonergan’s thought.\(^{160}\)

While Melchin’s ultimate aim concerns developing a “Christian ethics” which he specifically addresses in the latter half of the book, the first part discusses the Lonerganian approach to ethics and moral reasoning, an approach philosophically based and presented, and suited to my purposes here of expanding on a general, that is, secularist, philosophy of education. Following Lonergan’s lead, Melchin presents a key distinction in ethics between moral knowing and moral doing, cast as two different questions, one of knowledge and the other of moral action. “What is the good?” concerns moral knowledge; “Shall I choose to do the good?” is the question of moral doing.\(^{161}\) The overriding concern in Melchin centers on the first question since it is the more fundamental, and, more often than not, it is the one less attended to. However, as it appears in Lonergan Studies, it is the question whose answers inform the question of moral choice. One of the most important steps one can take, Melchin claims, in attaining moral knowledge is to notice and to consider not the objects of our experience (for morality, this includes the people we seek to help, the problems that need to be resolved, and so forth) but the inner forces of our experience, our desires, drives and so forth, that propel us toward being morally responsible.\(^{162}\)

In focusing on the moral experience, Melchin explains that we often respond spontaneously to situations that need help, to situations that come to our attention through a cry, a shout, someone’s stumble in the middle of a street. We commonly have experiences of moral action through response, seemingly instinctively, to such situations by our words of comfort, or in a step forward, or in a reach to lift one up. Melchin believes that to “understand moral life fully requires attending to the basic experience of responsibility itself as a dynamism of care that is revealed to us in our own moral action.”\(^{163}\) That is to say, the basis for moral action, according to Melchin, appears not in the application of moral principles or codes, but authentic moral action occurs in terms of

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\(^{160}\) Melchin’s doctoral work was done on Lonergan’s ethics (published as *History, Ethics and Emergent Probability*, cited earlier), and he continues to be very active in Lonerganian academic circles, and continues to publish works on Lonergan endorsed by other Lonergan scholars such as David Burrell, Cynthia Crysdale and Sean McEvenue. They praise Melchin’s treatment of Lonergan’s ethics.

\(^{161}\) Melchin, *Living with Other People*, 12.

\(^{162}\) Ibid. 17-8.

\(^{163}\) Ibid., 20.
the “more basic interior grounding to morality that accounts for both the origin of the rules themselves and for the way in which they function in our own lives.” To elucidate the basis of morality, then, the appeal is primarily to one’s experience from which unfold and develop the other elements of human knowing. Moral teaching is not without some sort of moral rules, but the basis of moral rules should be discovered in the experience and dynamism of our own consciousness, and that “the reason they [the rules] can take such a hold on us is that the teaching elicits this dynamic of responsibility in us and works with it.” That is to say, the dynamism that propels one to act morally is the desire, the need, to achieve authentic fulfillment of the basic intentions of one’s consciousness. With the experiential base established for understanding ethics, Melchin moves on to discuss how understanding morality unfolds.

In moral reasoning, two basic types of judgments are sought. The one type concerns judgments of fact. This involves asking questions of the type, What is it? and Is it so? The fact questions, for Melchin, are necessary in moral reasoning, for it is difficult even to begin to know what to do if you have no clear idea of what is going on. But settling matters of fact alone—or at least making reasonable judgments about what is the state of affairs—is not in itself to address a moral issue or question. The moral question really emerges with “act” questions, and these questions require another type of judgment, judgments of value. Deciding and choosing what to do involves questions of importance, of knowing what is significant, what is less significant in some situation, and on what basis these assessments are made. Are they based on what we know to be true, or are they based on conjecture or speculation? Are they based on a reasonable understanding of what is good for the individuals in the situation, or are they based solely on what satisfies my desires and yields my satisfaction, my promotion? And more importantly, are the questions related to value even being asked at all, or is one not open to this type of scrutiny?

Like the ‘fact’ questions, Melchin explains, there are two types of ‘act’ questions. Only this time, the questioning intends goals or objectives that are quite different. Now,

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164 Ibid., 21.
165 Ibid.
166 While the structure of questioning may be helping in distinguishing that fact from the act, it seems to me that the questions cannot so easily be distinguished in actual, concrete circumstances.
the "What?" means "What do I do?" and the "Is it so?" means "Is this the right thing to do?" The realm of "act" questions, in Lonergan's thought, properly constitutes the moral, ethical realm, and the pervasive questions always are whether we will act on what we know, and if that action will be consistent with knowledge relevant to a situation. In the realm of moral action, however, a further question arises. Knowing the right thing to do, and knowing that a particular action would be consistent with that knowledge, does not mean that one will actually launch the action. Thus the question arises, "Will I do the right thing or not?" And with the answer, one actually decides to act morally in accord with one's moral knowledge, or to act in a way that is not. In this way, moral knowledge leads to the question of moral action.

The distinctive quality of moral knowledge and moral action, Melchin goes on to explain, is tied to the social character of that knowledge and action. What we know and how we come to know the right thing to do "... do not fall wholesale from the sky. They emerge from people's efforts to order life in the interest of our most comprehensive notions of human well-being." Moral meaning—the way we make sense of our experiences of interactions with others—can occur simply in terms of our own needs and interests, or it can occur in terms of the social order in which we are familiar and function on a regular basis, or it can occur in terms of the good we desire for all of humanity, for all of human history. Very likely, I might add, it can, and does, occur in some combination of these interests. The good we desire to achieve by our actions, and the judgments of value whereby we attach importance to those goods, occur in terms of these three basic realms of meaning, those being the personal, the social and the historical realms.

167 Ibid., 24.  
168 Ibid., 24-5.  
169 Ibid., 26.  
170 Melchin goes on to show how decisions occur within a personal horizon—the limits of what can be seen from a vantage point—and that the horizon in which we find ourselves is determined by history and by our culture. We have a moral horizon in which we see certain things to which we respond and map out courses of action. But beyond that horizon, there are elements that have moral consequence, and we can only become aware of them by transcending our horizon. An existing horizon acts as a screening process for our concerns and values, and serves to screen out the concerns and values of others, especially those of a different culture. When our horizons move back and take in otherwise unknown or strange elements, this is "conversion," a notion developed explicitly in Method in Theology. Extending our moral horizon is a main objective of moral education, a moral quest that often is not easily won. See pp. 27-31.  
171 Ibid. 60.  
172 Ibid., 80.
In summary, then, Melchin presents Lonergan’s ethics as a set of fundamental moral directives pertinent to various levels of human interactions: on the personal level related to one’s self-constitution, on the social level by adding to the good of others in community, and on the historical level in envisioning the good of human progress, and leading to a critique of social structures, positively or negatively, according to the support or mitigation of that progress. In fulfilling these moral obligations, as a moral person, one reaps certain benefits in personal development—particularly the benefit of fulfillment of conscious intentionality, the desire of which moves one to moral action in the first place. It is a development that, I suggest, results in ever-heightened levels of authenticity. As Melchin suggests, “as we advance in our capacities to live out our fundamental moral obligations, we advance both personally and socially.”

In order to tie more directly Lonergan’s intentionality analysis to the basic thrust of Melchin’s ethics, a few points need to be stressed. First, there is the role of the question. Moral knowledge and moral action depend on the raising of questions leading to insight. In the section “Questions” in chapter four I discussed the fundamental role that question-asking plays in the emergence of insight. In a similar way, in Melchín we see that moral insights are dependent upon the emergence of moral questions.

Secondly, in moral reasoning the various levels of “internal” activities are differentiated. On the first level, one attends to the experience of moral responsibility; on the second level, one comes to understand the data that relate to a moral situation, and comes to understand the possible courses of action one may take; on the third level of judgment, one determines what in fact is the situation and what is the good and right thing to do about it. These levels of conscious operations yielding moral knowledge lead to the fourth level of deliberation where choices actually are made for some action to be launched.

Thirdly, Lonergan’s analysis gives rise to a set of moral precepts operative in Melchin’s ethics aimed at achieving self-consistency between one’s rational knowing and one’s rational doing. (Here the “one” is one who is seeking to be authentic.) If one’s personal experience of a moral situation lays at the heart of moral knowledge, then one seeks to “be attentive” to that experience. If understanding seeks intelligible order to the

173 ibid.
elements of the moral experience, then one seeks to "be intelligent" in finding meaning in
the situation, and in being open to ever-widening horizons of possible meaning,
personally, socially, historically. If one is to know accurately the situation of some moral
problem, and to know what is the morally right thing to do, then one seeks to "be
reasonable" which, in Lonergan's terms, means being committed to reflective analysis of
the meaning(s) attributed to experience and to affirming the best possible explanation and
reasons. And if one is to act morally, one seeks to be committed to "being responsible."
Such responsible action entails following through on attentiveness, intelligence and
reasonableness. This, then, is a brief overview of the moral dimensions of Lonergan's
intentionality analysis. But what contribution might this approach have for educational
philosophy?

Coombs indicates, as we have noted, certain needed developments in the area of
professional ethics, and in the teaching of ethics to promote more effectively moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning. Lonergan's intentionality analysis, I believe, provides
some possible ways to move moral thought forward along the lines of Coombs' analyses.

In the first place, Coombs identifies the need to broaden the reach of the meaning of
particular moral concepts. According to Lonergan, the level of intelligence functions
precisely to this end. Understanding operates best in considering wide and ever-
broadening possibilities of meaning for the elements of one's experience. Based on
Lonergan's account of understanding, a strong argument could be made for engaging
diversity in one's moral outlook, and, as Melchin suggests, pushing back the boundaries
of one's horizon by valuing multiculturalism in educational policy. According to
Lonergan, sound understanding and judgment occur when all the relevant questions are
asked, so closing off oneself from other related, relevant cultural perspectives and
questions that differ from one's own, precludes a considerable array of questions that
could promote wider understanding and more considered and careful ("care-full")
judgment. While Coombs may not go this far in embracing multiculturalism and
diversity, in Lonergan we find a champion of these qualities in moral thinking.

Secondly, it is suggested that moral education needs to encourage the introduction of
new moral concepts into a student's repertoire. Coombs cites "silencing" as an example
of such a new concept. Again, Lonergan's intentionality analysis (to recall Crowe's
exposition) may be expanded in an account of two vector forces where an individual understands and affirms the knowledge and value of one's place and time (or perhaps jettisons one's tradition based upon reasonable judgment), and where a person generates knowledge for oneself. The difference is the way of tradition and the way of achievement. According to Lonergan, conscious intentionality, especially in the way of achievement, is a highly creative operation that, in fact, produces new understanding and new concepts to express that understanding. The need expressed by Coombs, and addressed in terms of Lonergan, is a need for insight in the mode of achievement. Lonergan's analysis intentionally calls for new understanding, new concepts, new meaning.

And thirdly, Coombs identifies the need for greater attention to the particulars of morally problematic situations. According to a Lonerganian ethics, Coombs is entirely correct in stressing this concern, since the basis of moral reasoning, the foundation of moral knowledge, if you will, is the actual human experience of the moral situation. Moral knowledge, as with knowledge of any kind, depends upon being attentive to that experience. Overlooking elements, suppressing them, denying them, only leads to poor understanding, and to knowledge that is inherently flawed. Where Coombs recognizes certain needs in moral education, Lonergan's cognitional theory and account of insight indicate in a more fundamental and integrative way how some of these needs may be met.

While Coombs' analysis assists one in understanding the current state of moral education, I find it remarkable that he makes no mention of the need actually to see students act in more morally responsible ways. Is not the whole point of moral reasoning not merely to think morally, but also to act morally? Perhaps this aim is addressed by Coombs in his other writings, or perhaps the reason for this omission here is intentional, reflecting the position that education is concerned with helping students think things through, and to be sensitive to the moral dimensions of situations, after which it is up to the individual to express that knowledge or not, or to express it in whatever way one chooses.

In Lonergan's analysis of insight, the development of consciousness always moves to the question of acting on one's knowledge, as is made abundantly clear in Melchin's exposition of Lonergan's ethics. It is the question of, and need for, personal fulfillment.
Lonergan's overriding moral precept is to act in a way that is consistent with the knowledge one has achieved. A failure to act in a manner consistent with one’s moral knowledge constitutes moral failing, and reflects a failure of education to evoke a change in one’s own being. And the larger effect is a failure to make a change for the good in one’s world. Teaching ethics based on Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, in addition potentially to meeting some of Coombs’ concerns, will compel one not only to ask the question of what one is to do, but based on the need to fulfill the directives of intentionality, a Lonerganian ethics is designed to spark the moral action in anticipation of the positive affective and cognitive fulfillment it brings. Lonerganian ethics assists one in understanding more fully the intentionality of moral questions, both in process and effect. Self-understanding and self-knowledge ultimately help one to enact the moral, ethical decision because on that basis, one knows its elements, its processes, and one acquires a sense of the feeling of personal fulfillment, such as experienced in fulfilling other aspects of human intentionality. The transcendental precepts are designed to realize both knowledge and action.

In short, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, to be sure, relates to many of the moral questions found within educational philosophy. Insight results in moral knowledge and brings one to the place of moral action. Knowing the right thing to do, but failing to launch appropriate moral action constitutes a moral failing. While the failing may negatively impact others, the failing demonstrates a more severe problem, namely, a personal moral impotence to develop authentically according to the dynamism of consciousness that moves one developmentally to higher levels of integrating our world of experience in wider and deeper grasps of meaning, and in realizing opportunities for achieving genuine goods for oneself and also for others.

With the moral dimension addressed, I believe the main contours now have been drawn in an expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of general, secularist educational philosophy. It has been an expansion essentially systematic in structure leading from experience, through questions of understanding and judgment, to the higher-level integration these questions and answers acquire in the decision and actions of the learner and teacher.
Summary

This chapter has explored the metaphysical dimensions of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, and has expanded elements of his metaphysics and ethics into the realm of educational philosophy. Here I have explored the “results” of intentionality analysis, specifically, the knowledge of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

To set the stage initially for this expansion, I considered the nature and importance of educational process, aims and results. R. S. Peters’ emphasis on the intellectual aims of education, it was noted, has been called into question by Jane Roland Martin, but it is in Lonergan’s account of human intentionality that we find an appreciation of both the intellectual development of the student and the concomitant importance attributed to the development of the whole person that Martin demands. With the significance of educational process and results established as a significant issue in educational philosophy, and with some basic understanding of a Lonerganian approach to this question, I moved into a discussion of seven key features of Lonergan metaphysics and ethics. This reveals in what ways Lonergan’s intentionality analysis encompasses the whole person, and the place and functions of the intellectual dimension of human development and achievement as well as the existential dimensions.

The first issue considered in Lonergan’s metaphysics relates to the basis of metaphysics in Lonergan’s system of thought, that is, the processes and dynamism of intentionality that yields knowledge of existence and the real world. Broaching the important issue in educational philosophy of critical thinking, I pointed out that for Lonergan, the operations of understanding and judgment distinguish and interrelate two key dimensions of the knowing process: creative thought and critical thought. I have shown also that Lonergan’s philosophy serves to inform the current discussion of critical thinking by showing the importance of both dimensions of thinking as integral to the educational process. Also, as Grigg argues, Lonergan’s analysis of human consciousness that differentiates understanding and judgment brings clarity to otherwise confusing notions of what constitute the “critical” dimensions of thought. Critical thought according to Lonergan unfolds as operations of judgment that yield knowledge and that embrace
probability and degrees of certitude, and, given the fulfillment of the conditions, critical thought can assent to truth. Critical thinking takes the creative thought expressed in possibilities of understanding to the level of judgment and the consequent achievement of knowledge.

Critical thinking, as an important dimension of Lonergan’s metaphysics, is turned upon the human subject. With this focus on the human subject, critical thinking, or what Lonergan calls “judgment,” yields self-knowledge. In the educational process, becoming familiar with and affirming the operations of one’s own consciousness is crucially important to everything else that follows. This involves noticing and understanding the broad differentiations that Lonergan outlines as the elements and operations of cognitive intentionality. With Lonergan’s primary focus on the human subject as an operating subject, he brings a new understanding to the related issues in educational philosophy of autonomy, indoctrination and knowledge transposition. In Lonergan’s thought, self-knowledge leads to a generalized understanding of the human person, in that the operations of consciousness are seen to be a normative, invariant pattern. Thus, we find for educational philosophy a new and penetrating meaning of humanness. For Lonergan, humanness most profoundly and importantly means self-knowledge and self-possession, in the sense of being self-directed and reasonably responsible for the direction of one’s own life.

From this account of self-knowledge and what it means to be a human being, there arises the question of human authenticity. In Lonergan’s thought, the metaphysical question of authenticity pertains to the quality of one’s own subjectivity spelled out in reference to the ends or satisfactions to which human consciousness strives. Being authentic, in Lonergan’s terms, entails a knowledge of these ends to which the processes of consciousness are directed, and marshalling the intellectual, and affective resources of human subjectivity in fulfilling those intentions or ends. The demands this places on educational processes cover not only intellectual pursuits, but the feelings and symbols, the values and commitments developed and established by the learner in the promotion of the well-being of the individual as a whole and integral being.

While these dimensions of Lonergan’s metaphysics attend to the operations of human subjectivity, as my expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis continued, the horizon
of concern expanded. I thus moved from the question of authenticity to explore the question of wisdom as concerned with not only the interior world of thought and feelings, but also with things in the world of concrete living. For Lonergan, the question of wisdom attends to the scope of knowledge as a whole, and moves one to consider practical reasoning in actually making one’s way in the world. Specifically, the elements of knowledge take on the character of wisdom as a sense of the whole scheme of things emerges, at least in limited horizons and contexts, and where increments of knowledge related to some context or horizon find a meaningful interrelation and appropriate balance within that horizon. Wisdom is the achievement of a cognitive grasp of an overall order and balance to the elements of one’s own existence, and in terms of the other elements of existence.

Wisdom takes hold in an educational process where an individual increasingly regards oneself as part of a world process. Lonergan is clear on the general character of this worldview. The nature of one’s own existence and the existence of all of reality, reflecting the dynamism of human consciousness leading to insight and action, is grasped in terms of emergent probability. In emergent probability, one sees that systems give rise to higher, more complex systems; development occurs; life flourishes; and satisfactions and fulfillments are realized. Accordingly, one grasps more clearly the human good, not merely in terms of personal satisfactions, but in terms of what is good for others, for the community, for society, for civilization. One attains an understanding of the good of order, and of what value this good has in the life of the community, the society, and the human race overall. Educational philosophy, drawing on Lonergan’s worldview, based on the elements and operations of human intentionality, acquires a new and penetrating account of development itself. One understands the broad lines of world process, growth and progress. By the same token, through Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, one is given tools by which one can detect elements and processes of decline, diagnose anti-development and, based on this evaluation, perhaps one can more effectively evoke change by reversing the process and cycles of decline, both on the individual level and on the level of the group.

Moving even more dramatically into the realm of human intersubjectivity, I came to show certain social and cultural implications of Lonergan’s worldview of emergent
probability. Lonergan expresses the social and cultural dimensions of insight and emergent probability in terms of cosmopolis. Simply put, cosmopolis is committed to the pursuit of that which is intelligent, reasonable and responsible in establishing, maintaining, and developing social and cultural life. In applying this mode of social order to the realm of education, Robert Doran has suggested a program of learning that is designed specifically and thematically to develop the powers of intelligence, judgment and decision. The classic liberal tradition that Doran seems to embrace may give rise to the social ideal of cosmopolis, but I have suggested that other curricula also may be effective in this regard. What would be essential in reconstructing any curriculum for cosmopolis would be to differentiate and to interrelate, intentionally and clearly, the various levels and operations of human consciousness, and to promote their development and flourishing within the overall social system. Regardless of the specific curriculum adopted, however, Lonergan’s notion of cosmopolis calls for a consideration of the educational questions of citizenship and political structure in terms of their congruency to the structure and dynamism of human consciousness. Cosmopolis aims at and is designed to propel one toward authentic fulfillment of human conscious intentionality. Cosmopolis, moreover, contends with the root of bias in human inauthenticity. The crucial questions pertain to how well any social and cultural milieu promotes human development in terms of expanding human experience, understanding, good judgment and wisdom, and responsible decisions. Thus, one finds in Lonergan an emphasis not on some social or political system or structure, but on understanding and explicitly applying the basic structure, processes and results of human intentionality.

Finally, expanding on Lonergan’s metaphysics I came to address the moral and ethical questions. Developing creative and critical thinking, achieving self-knowledge, striving toward authentic living, developing an understanding of world process, and grasping basic social and political expressions of that process, all bring one to the existential questions of decisions and actions. One faces the questions pertaining to the moral domain of living rightly and living well. Lonergan’s intentionality analysis gives rise to a set of precepts that guides one’s decision-making process as it pertains to how we might live well in relation to each other. As Melchin points out, there are different types of moral questions that relate to different fields and scopes of concern. The fact questions
lead existentially to value questions, and these in turn give rise to the need to make choices and enact decisions that are consistent with a sense of care and attentiveness, thorough understanding and sound judgment. A Lonerganian approach to moral issues, I point out, can help realize the goal of moral reasoning, namely, the launching of moral action.

In the previous chapter, the structure and process of cognitive intentionality as Lonergan sets them out was explored and expanded upon for educational philosophy. With this chapter I continued this expansion by considering key elements of the metaphysical and ethical aspects of human conscious intentionality. And here I complete my exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of secular educational philosophy. In the final chapter I will turn to the questions of criticism and evaluation, and offer some conclusions regarding Lonergan’s account of human intentionality and educational philosophy.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion:
Summary, Criticism, and Assessments

There remains the question, What practical good can come of this book [Insight]? The answer is more forthright than might be expected, for insight is the source of not only theoretical knowledge but also of all its practical applications, and indeed of all intelligent activity. Insight into insight, then, will reveal what activity is intelligent, and insight into oversights will reveal what activity is unintelligent. But to be practical is to do the intelligent thing, and to be unpractical is to keep blundering about. It follows that insight into both insight and oversight is the very key to practicality.¹

This study has undertaken an exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy. In its first section, the concluding chapter will discuss the systematic nature of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. Its second section will offer some criticisms of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis in relation to educational philosophy, noting certain oversights and other points of vulnerability. In the final section, it will summarize how Lonergan’s work on the dynamics, processes, and operations of human intentionality presents a helpful heuristic structure for educational philosophy, and suggest ways in which future work could realize the particular strengths of Lonergan’s approach.

Elements of the Systematic Approach

In the introductory chapter, I pointed out that within the field of educational philosophy there could be distinguished two basic approaches: the topical approach and the systematic. The topical approach, by my analysis, tends to examine issues and respond to

¹ Insight, 8.
problems within education as they become identified and analyzed from some philosophical perspective or perspectives, such as found in the works of R. S. Peters and Israel Scheffler. Lonergan largely followed this approach in his 1959 lecture series on education where he analyzed various issues and related them to his views on philosophy, religion, and culture. The systematic approach, while it addresses topics and issues, applies some explicit system of thought to issues under consideration, and attempts to treat in a relatively comprehensive and integrative way key factors in educational philosophy. Lonergan's intentionality analysis, as it is explored and expanded into the field of educational philosophy, appears as a mode of systematic educational philosophy.

Chapter two presented Lonergan's basic position on intentionality analysis, indicated developments in that position, and showed its central place in his system of thought. Chapter three presented Lonergan's topical approach to the field of education. For my purposes, I interpreted his lectures largely in terms of his intentionality analysis in order to relate them more directly to the systematic account of Lonergan's relevance to educational philosophy that I offer in chapters four and five. In what follows, I hope to summarize this systematic approach. But to do that, I will recall very briefly what Lonergan means by systematization.

Lonergan identifies one of the canons of classical empirical inquiry as the canon of operations, and its chief operation is systematization. He explains:

> A mere congeries of laws will not suffice. For if one is to operate upon the concrete, one must be able to employ at once several laws. To employ several laws at once, one must know the relations of each law to all the others. But to know many laws, not as mere congeries of distinct empirical generalizations, but in the network of interrelations of each to all the others, is to reach a system.  

Lonergan is describing the scientific use of laws; his intentionality analysis, however, rather than laws, unfolds in an account of structure and operations, but these features, similar in function to scientific laws, work in a similarly systematic manner. Lonergan goes on to explain that the goal of such systematization of thought is to achieve a

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comprehensive understanding of some field of inquiry. There are many aspects of this field that are not covered in this study, but as noted in the introductory chapter, my aim has been to identify some key issues in educational philosophy that can be mapped (that is, situated and interrelated within human consciousness) according to Lonergan's intentionality analysis. It would be a daunting task to aim at comprehensiveness in terms of subject area. But Lonergan’s analysis does aim at comprehensiveness in terms of the general structure and processes of human subjectivity. In his analysis, the structure and processes of a basic set of human experiences are related to the physical world, and those related to the “interior” world of human consciousness. While not every element of these two realms is accounted for, at least the heuristic structure is set forth in dealing with the details as they might be presented to a Lonerganian system of thought.

Rather than reiterate at this point the summary sections of chapters four and five, I refer the reader to their concluding sections that depict the systematic ordering and interrelation of key elements in a Lonerganian educational philosophy. A few general comments here on the systematic nature of my exploration and expansion, however, may be in order.

From this account of intentionality analysis, one can anticipate some key characteristics of a systematic educational philosophy. First, the field of inquiry is the experience associated with education in its many facets. Secondly, there is to be achieved a differentiation of the elements of that experience, along with an account of the interrelation of those educational experiences into ever-greater complexities and interrelation. Thirdly, a widening understanding of the field of education unfolds by a cumulative and incremental process of understanding that adds knowledge to an already solid base of knowledge. Fourthly, a systematic philosophy of education anticipates (in a heuristic manner), though it may not yet have achieved, a relatively comprehensive understanding of the field of inquiry. As such, a systematic educational philosophy, by

3 Ibid.

4 There are many aspects of human subjectivity even on a general scale that are not covered—such as many types of feelings commonly experienced, or the many cases of cognitive breakdowns and failures—but the structure for understanding these many aspects is comprehensive (though general).

5 Robert Doran’s work is a good example of this.

6 By “solid base” is meant that some understanding has achieved the “virtually unconditioned,” that is, an understanding that answers satisfactorily all the relevant questions. That is to say, the evidence is understood to support the conclusion.
Lonergan’s design, is one that is always in a state of incremental, progressive development, as is the field, and is open to revision as new data and understandings come to light; but it is always carried out with the aim of a comprehensive grasp of the field. Overall, the heuristic structure that I have elucidated in this study applies the operations of intentionality to the field of educational philosophy. This has been carried out, however, with not a few concerns being noted and various questions raised.

**Criticisms**

While much of this exploration and expansion has a definite appeal, such as will be discussed in the final section, there are certain lacunae and other vulnerabilities related to Lonergan’s work that bear mentioning. The criticisms given here are offered from one who generally accepts the basic philosophical approach of Lonergan, that is, an approach that begins with an analysis of human experience and knowing, and develops in an open-ended account of the particularities, dynamics and possibilities of existence. In effect, this amounts to a version of the philosophical view known as “critical realism.”

Clearly, one could attack Lonergan’s position from a great number of opposing philosophical positions, such as those discussed in the first chapter, and criticize accordingly the expansion of his intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy.

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7 Critical realism is how Lonergan describes his system of thought in relation to other systems. “The naïve realist knows the world mediated by meaning but thinks he knows it by looking. The empiricist restricts objective knowledge to sense experience; for him understanding and conceiving, judging and believing are merely subjective activities. The idealist insists that human knowing always includes understanding as well as sense; but he retains the empiricist’s notion of reality, and so he thinks of the world mediated by meaning as not real but ideal. Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world; and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence.” *Method in Theology*, 238-9.

While this is Lonergan’s version, there are, indeed, other views within the camp of critical realism. See the account of A. G. Rampsperger in “Critical Realism,” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 2. (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 261-3. One also might raise the question as to how neatly these categories hold up in one’s actual philosophical system: are there “pure” idealists, empiricists, and so forth. (One, however, does need categories of some sort.)

who hold these various positions are free to launch such a critique, and from a Lonerganian viewpoint, in the interest of exposing all counter-positions, such criticisms are welcomed. The criticisms here fall within two broad categories: those that pertain to Lonergan’s intentionality analysis itself, and those that pertain more specifically to its relation to the field of educational philosophy.

At the outset, however, it should be pointed out that already there have arisen some criticisms in the body of this study. In chapter two, for instance, where I offered an account of intentionality analysis covering the full scope of Lonergan’s writing, it was suggested that he does not relate the unfolding of knowledge to the world of practical, daily living as fully as he could. One result of this is that Lonergan opens himself to the criticism that he is unduly “intellectual” in his account of human consciousness. In chapter three, with respect to Lonergan’s treatment of educational topics in his lecture series, I suggested that he does not engage significantly the methodological structure and utility that his intentionality analysis affords. As a further criticism, his treatment seems to be arbitrary and incomplete, even in light of the scope of discussion Lonergan initially delineates in the introductory lecture. As I moved to examine the details of his intentionality analysis in chapters four and five, I pointed out that certain relevant features seem to be un- or under-developed, such as his account of feeling and symbol, even though he attempted to remedy this, at least to some extent, in his 1959 lectures on

“Lonergan and Method in the Natural Sciences,” 59-72; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “History and Meaning in Bernard Lonergan’s Approach to Theological Method,” 88-100; and Nicholas Lash, “Method and Cultural Discontinuity,” 127-43. What I believe to be the more significant of these criticisms will be referred to in my set of criticisms to follow.

9 If there are elements of counter-position in Lonergan’s basic position, then based on Lonergan’s philosophical commitments, it is crucially important that these be exposed. A counter-position is one in which the assertion is opposed to the actual cognitive performance engaged in making it.

10 Philosophical positions opposing Lonergan could be divided into at least two broad categories. The first covers those that present an alternative philosophical system with resulting differing positions on human cognition, on epistemology, and on metaphysics, with their implications for education. The second covers those that reject either the possibility or the desirability of the kind of “meta-narrative” that Lonergan proposes in terms of an overarching structure to human cognition, such as we find in Richard Rorty, as discussed briefly in the first chapter.

art and education. In what follows, what I see as the more important of these criticisms will be addressed more fully. I will also raise new concerns.

**Criticisms Centering on Intentionality Analysis**

One of the basic elements of Lonergan's cognitional theory is desire, specifically, the desire to know. Lonergan maintains that it is the driving force in the unfolding of human consciousness; it is the catalyst, the dynamism, that propels one from lower-level to higher-level operations, and, in effect, provides for the possibility of human self-transcendence in true judgments of fact and value. The thrust of my criticism related to desire takes two angles.

First, Lonergan speaks of the desire to know as a "pure" desire. As such, it is unrestricted, detached and disinterested. By this designation, it appears that Lonergan wants to stress that the desire to know is a unique desire, one that forms the central core, as it were, of the conscious human subject. The problem this presents, I find, relates to Lonergan's appeal to the human experience of insight and knowing for verification. *Insight*, we are told, is an "invitation" to discover within one's own experience the differentiations and interrelations of the levels of consciousness that he identifies. Is it possible to identify within one's realm of experience the "pure" desire to know, especially as it is further described as "detached," "disinterested," and "unrestricted"? It seems that desire, by definition, is directed toward some need or satisfaction, and as such, it is intentional by nature. Desire reflects some intentionality, yet Lonergan's pure desire to know as "detached" and "disinterested" lacks the intentionality that commonly is associated with desire. If desire is intentional by nature, how is it possible to identify the pure desire to know as an element within one's experience of desire without reference to an object of desire? If it is not possible, then the desire is not detached or disinterested. In other words, the question is whether one can meaningfully claim to simply have desire without an object of some sort.

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12 *Insight*, 12-3. "On a third level, the dynamic cognitional structure to be reached is not the transcendental ego of Fichtean speculation, nor the abstract pattern of relations verifiable in Tom, Dick and Harry, but the personally appropriated structure of one's own experiencing, one's own intelligent inquiry and insights, one's own critical reflection and judging and deciding. The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the experiment will be performed not publicly but privately."
Specifically, the problems is this: How can Lonergan appeal to human experience for verification if one cannot discern the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know as an element of one's experience? If the answer is that one cannot, then another question arises. If the pure desire to know is not a discernable, intentional desire, is there a way to retain the empirical base of his cognitional theory? This may be possible. Lonergan could still appeal to the desire to know, but without characterizing it in the way he does as a seemingly highly speculative, theoretical notion. Perhaps it would be more relevant to one's experience if Lonergan appealed merely to explicit evidences of the desire to know, such as may be found in his account of the sense of wonder or the experience of having questions, and then suggest rather than the desire to be pure, detached and disinterested, it is all-pervasive.

Stressing the experiential evidences of the desire to know, rather than the "pure" desire to know would place the cognitional theory more clearly in the realm of common experience, and less in the realm of theoretical speculation. This move would still retain the important place attributed to the desire to know in cognitional theory. It would also allow for verification of his cognitional theory in the realm of experience, given the likely possibility of one identifying and reflecting on the experience of wonder and question-asking. If Lonergan still wished to argue for a "pure" desire to know, it more properly should arise as an element of his metaphysics rather that his cognitional theory rooted in immediate experience.

A second angle on the desire to know concerns its preeminent place in cognition. If cognitional theory is rooted in the actual experience of cognition, and in Lonergan's philosophy this is the case, then the question arises as to the place and function that other desires, in addition to the desire to know, have in human cognition and in the unfolding of human consciousness generally. Human experience that encompasses the data of sense and of consciousness includes, as not uncommon experiences, sexual desires, the desire for recognition and acceptance, the desire for love in various forms, and the desire for power. On the level of experience, in knowing, does one ever actually experience solely the desire to know? From my own experience, the desire to know tends to occur (perhaps

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always) in combination with other desires. At various places in his philosophy of insight, Lonergan recognizes that other desires may be involved in the knowing process, but Lonergan sees, at least in *Insight*, these desires, at best, playing a distinctly subordinate role in the knowing process, or, at worst, actually interfering with the knowing process.\(^1\)

As an improvement to Lonergan’s cognitional theory, perhaps these other desires may be viewed not so disparagingly, and, in fact, they may be seen as involved in, promoting, enhancing, and even necessary in, the knowing process. It should be noted that Lonergan does appreciate feelings in the apprehension of values (as discussed earlier), but this apprehension occurs near the end of a knowing process, as the knowing process develops into the deciding process.

Other philosophers recently have raised this point of other desires in relation to knowing. As one who attempts to understand and incorporate other desires within the field of epistemology, Martha Nussbaum offers an account of the role of love in human knowing, suggesting, among other things, that epistemology needs to give up the aim of “calepticism,” and embrace mystery, some measure of unknowing, and attend to a more “literary” experience of knowing.\(^1\)

Perhaps Lonergan’s analysis of the desire to know, with its place in the development of human consciousness, could be enhanced by the views of Nussbaum, and others. In fact, there are some promising developments in this regard. Some Lonergan scholars recently have discerned the value (though not without pointed criticisms) of certain aspects of Nussbaum’s analysis, and suggest some helpful

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\(^1\) Lonergan, clearly, elevates in importance the desire to know above all other desires. He avers, “However, among men’s many desires, there is one that is unique. It is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As other desire, it has its satisfaction. But unlike other desire, it is not content with satisfaction. Of itself, it heads beyond one’s own joy in one’s own insight to further question whether one’s own insight is correct. It is a desire to know, and its immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned that, by the fact that it is unconditioned, is independent of the individual’s likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking.” *Insight*, 619.

Elsewhere, Lonergan takes a more negative view of other desires. “The remote criterion [of truth] is the proper unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know. In negative terms, this proper unfolding is the absence of interference from other desires that inhibit or reinforce, and in either case distort, the guidance given by the pure desire.” *Insight*, 573. Lonergan does not state explicitly that all other desires inhibit the pure desire, but this implication is present. If the pure desire has special, preeminent epistemic fiat, then other desires would tend to be a threat.

\(^1\) “Caleptic” is the term Nussbaum adopts from the Greek in order to capture that sense of knowing as “apprehending,” “grasping firmly,” and achieving certainty. See Martha Nussbaum, “Love’s Knowledge” in *Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 265. Her basic position on the desire of love and knowing is presented in this pivotal essay.
congruencies between her thought and Lonergan's. While these inquiries have focused on the role of desire and love in the realms of ethics and religious feeling and belief, the more fundamental question of desire in the knowing process remains to be studied more fully. The pure desire in Lonergan's intentionality analysis could be refined so that a greater understanding of feelings can be appreciated as part of one's actual experience of knowing.

Given this criticism, however, a brief word of defense would be fair. While other desires (such as for power, acceptance and sex) may largely be absent in Lonergan's intentionality analysis, his desire to know, it seems to me, is not at all inimical to the desire of love. It could be argued that the desire to know really is an expression of the desire to love, especially in its transcendental thrust to experience, to understand and to know another person. Both the desire to know and to love propel one beyond oneself. They move one to commitment and to accept mystery, as a named unknown, as part of one's horizon. As such, Lonergan's account of the desire to know would be compatible with a much earlier notion of sexual intimacy, as a "knowing," such as found in early English translations of the Bible. Thus, the criticism that Lonergan omits love as a dynamism in the processes of developing consciousness and knowledge is not entirely valid; in Lonergan, the desire to know encompasses, although perhaps tacitly, certain aspects of the desire of love.

At any rate, in the interest of accounting for the full range of the human experience of knowing, there is a need to focus more intently on all the desires operative in the knowing process. Future studies in Lonergan's thought in relation to education need to address more completely the roles that various types of feeling and yearning play in the unfolding and flourishing of human knowledge.

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17 As noted earlier, such explorations of the role of feelings in the knowing process and in the development of consciousness have been undertaken by several scholars within Lonergan Studies. The seemingly most substantive studies have been done by Robert M. Doran in *Subject and Psyche: Ricoeur, Jung and the Search for Foundations* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979); and in *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences.* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981).
A second point of criticism centering on intentionality analysis relates to the methodological preeminence given to the field of mathematics and science. Lonergan upholds the results of science as being especially successful and cumulative in its results. This moves him to find within mathematics and science the most clearly evident, established and cumulatively productive method of inquiry. For Lonergan, understanding the elements and processes of scientific method holds the key to establishing similar epistemological success in other realms of inquiry. However, while it would be difficult to deny that science, and its applications in technological advances, have produced some impressive results in terms of making human life more productive, comfortable, and secure, still technology has produced its dehumanizing effects. These would include such effects as isolation, technology’s enormous capabilities for amusement and entertainment, the production of pollution of all sorts, and the depletion of natural resources, not to mention the effect of science and technology in promoting a view of nature itself as a resource to be exploited. Mary Hess’ criticism of Lonergan along this line suggests that the preeminence given to the method of knowing in the natural sciences, thankfully, has been tempered somewhat in Method in Theology’s distinctly secondary place given to scientific method. Even so, the whole structure and process of insight remains genetically rooted in the scientific paradigm. As such, if scientific method exhibits certain weaknesses in its results, does this not cast a shadow on Lonergan’s generalized empirical method that stems from scientific method?

While Lonergan provides a balance to scientific methodology through his account of the human good and his analysis of human values, his elevation of scientific method throughout his work has the effect of privileging scientific knowledge over other types of knowledge. The balance suggested by Hess might be achieved by questioning the results of science and their applications in technology in terms of their enhancements of human life. The “further question,” in the interest of achieving knowledge, in Lonergan’s philosophy, should be raised as to what value these achievements have for the human situation, and for the good of the whole cosmos. Overall, Lonergan’s intentionality

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18 Some important analysis and critique of science and technology appear in the work of Neil Postman in *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986); This concern arises also among a growing community of environmental philosophers.  
analysis would be balanced better, in my estimation, if the discursive, creative, and analogical aspects of knowing were given greater prominence in his analysis right from the start. Lonergan does consider this somewhat in his account of insight in common sense, but the method of common sense in his analysis is subjugated to the canons of empirical method. Generalized empirical method does lead Lonergan to account for other types of method, such as I see in genetic method and dialectical method, that better cover the non-scientific modes of knowing, but these derivative methods still bear the primary marks of a linear, progressive and cumulative process of knowing, the hallmarks of scientific methodology. In my experience, the imaginational, intuitional, non-linear and serendipitous aspects of knowing could all factor to some extent in the development of knowledge, and in the free development and flourishing of consciousness.

Simply put, while I see value in distinguishing the three basic operations and levels of consciousness—experiencing, understanding and judging—leading to the fourth level of deciding (in fact, key points in chapters four and five attempt to show this value), in taking his cues primarily from mathematics and science, Lonergan seems to buttress a scientific hegemony. Lonergan further privileges scientific knowing by calling his expanded methodology “generalized empirical method,” and by conforming non-scientific modes of inquiry to this scientific paradigm. It is a hegemony that has been called into question, directly or by implication, from a number of sources discussed earlier, including certain instances of postmodern philosophy and the work of Thomas Kuhn. Lonergan could have avoided this questionable elevation of scientific methodology by beginning, perhaps, with commonsense knowing, and by distinguishing the three levels of knowing and the fourth level of consciousness within commonsense operations. This also could have made Lonergan’s rather daunting analysis of human insight more immediately accessible to a wider audience, and made his analysis of human consciousness and knowing more readily applicable to education, since much of education pertains to the world of common sense, at least how Lonergan characterizes common sense in chapters six and seven of Insight.

A corrective to this apparent lack in Lonergan, it seems to me, comes through in the hermeneutics and epistemology of Lonergan scholar, David Tracy, especially in his substantial work, The Analogical Imagination. Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981). See especially his sections dealing with the “uncanny,” and the final section that discusses the analogical imagination.
A third point of criticism concerns Lonergan’s definition and account of human intelligence. Throughout the unfolding of his intentionality analysis, Lonergan speaks mainly of one basic operation of “intelligence,” this being the second-level operation of understanding, of grasping intelligibilities. Lonergan’s analysis seeks to identify the common processes in all such abilities, and this Lonergan defines as the act of understanding, also called direct and inverse insight. Complementary to this, there is reflective understanding that takes intelligence to a new level in which the intelligibility that is grasped is subjected to questions as to the accuracy, truth, or probability of truth, of the understanding. At any rate, Lonergan regards human intelligence as largely a matter of understanding—of grasping intelligibilities and of discerning their acceptability. This could be regarded as a relatively narrow, perhaps too narrow, connotation.

Other educational thinkers speak of various types of intelligence, such as Howard Gardner in terms of “multiple intelligences,” and Kieran Egan in terms of mythic, romantic, philosophic, ironic and somatic understandings. If other types of intelligence are relevant to the educational enterprise, as Gardner and Egan suggest, and if Lonergan’s broad, generalized account of intelligence does not, or cannot, take into account very well these other types of intelligence, one wonders if Lonergan’s limited theory of human intelligence is deficient in important ways.

A similar point was raised in the criticism of Nicholas Lash where he suggests that, “Lonergan pays comparatively little attention to the bewilderingly wide range of methods of cognitional procedure which characterize different social and cultural contexts.”21 Lash’s complaint is that an understanding of the human subject must be concretized in the social and cultural context of the individual; Lonergan’s analysis, he says, is too formal and abstract.22 Specifically, the problem as I see it is this: What ways, if any, can Lonergan’s theory of human intelligence that deals mainly with grasping intelligibility, and assessing that grasp, accommodate multiple-theory accounts of intelligence or of understanding?

22 Ibid., 136.
Briefly, let us consider, for instance, the position of Howard Gardner. One of his main contentions is that human intelligence, for it to be truly developed, needs to be informed by a more artistic approach to meaning and life. He explains that cognition needs a broader definition, one that deems “the capacities of those in the arts as fully cognitive—no less cognitive than the skills of mathematicians and scientists, as viewed by my fellow developmentalists.”\(^{23}\) Cognitive capacities, or “intelligences,” reflect the ability of an individual to attend to certain types of data in special ways. According to an array of criteria,\(^ {24}\) Gardner has identified eight relatively autonomous intelligences: linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, interpersonal, intra-personal, and naturalist.\(^ {25}\) He maintains that each individual has stronger or weaker capabilities in each of these areas, and that to develop one’s mind means to engage a variety of intelligences in dealing with some topic or situation. One important feature of Gardner’s approach, according to educational philosopher Mindy Kornhaber, is that his account “validates educators’ everyday experience: students think and learn in many different ways.”\(^ {26}\) As it stands, Gardner’s account seems to be broader and richer than Lonergan’s account of intelligence as basically a matter of understanding and assessing understanding.

The question thus is raised as to whether there is basically one intelligence or many intelligences. This is a significant question within the field of intelligence theory,\(^ {27}\) and the fact that Lonergan’s intelligence-as-understanding theory does not address this question, leaves it vulnerable to question, criticism and perhaps rejection. I do suggest, however, that Lonergan’s position is not fundamentally incompatible with theories of Gardner or Egan, since all of Gardner’s intelligences and all of the types of understanding identified by Gardner (in some ways similar to Egan’s categories) can be subsumed under the basic theory of understanding proposed by Lonergan. Gardner suggests that for any

\(^ {23}\) Ibid., 273-4.
\(^ {24}\) Ibid., 275. Kornhaber explains that these criteria may be used to identify more intelligences than the eight Gardner identifies; the important point for Gardner is that there simply are multiple intelligences.
\(^ {25}\) Ibid.
\(^ {26}\) Ibid., 276.
\(^ {27}\) As mentioned, Kieran Egan, researching and writing in the field, also maintains there are different types of basic intelligences. Kieran Egan, *The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). One is also reminded of Paul Hirst’s theory of the forms of knowledge in his *Knowledge and the Curriculum: a Collection of Philosophical Papers* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 54-68; 84-100.
type of intelligence, "deep understanding should be our central goal; we should strive to
inculcate understanding of what, within our cultural context, is considered true or false,
beautiful or unpalatable, good or evil." And in Egan, each of the intellectual tools for
his five areas of understanding shares the common activity of understanding. For both
Gardner and Egan, the differences among types of intelligences arise in terms of the data
of experience, and not in terms of the process of understanding itself. By comparison,
Lonergan's position is that intelligence that attends to different data and fields of inquiry
exhibits the same basic processes called understanding. A Lonerganian response to the
question of multiple intelligences, then, is to understand the nature and processes of
understanding, for only then will one be able to grasp the more particularized
manifestations of understanding. While this may be the nature of a Lonerganian response
to the question (though a great deal of analysis and argument would be needed to
substantiate it and make it more compelling), the fact remains that this question is not
addressed thoroughly in Lonergan's account of human intelligence. A full and satisfying
response remains to be offered to determine more clearly the relation of Lonergan's
“second-level” intelligence theory to other theories.

In the fourth place, moving this critique along the lines of Lonergan's cognitional
theory, from experience to judgment, it seems to me that Lonergan may be vulnerable to
criticism on certain aspects of his notion of judgment. While others have objected to
Lonergan as quoted by Kornhaber in "Howard Gardner," 276.

29 Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests that the clear distinction Lonergan makes between understanding and
judgment, or in other terms, the distinction between direct and reflective insight, cannot be made so
strongly, since, Pannenberg claims, all perceptions "implicitly claim truth and correctness." Wolfhart
Pannenberg, "History and Meaning in Bernard Lonergan's Approach to Theological Method," in Looking
another who objects to Lonergan's notion of judgments of value on at least two counts. Daniel James
University, 1980). First, he suggests that where Lonergan distinguished between judgments of value and
decision, these acts are really one and the same. He states, "The first point to be made concerns the
relationship between a judgment of value and decision. Now, it would sometimes seem that the two are
distinct, for in one context Lonergan distinguishes between knowing and deciding .... One may suppose,
then, that first one judges that something is truly worthwhile, and only subsequently decides to act
accordingly. I would argue, however, that a decision and a judgment of value are one and the same."
(Vokey, 107-8) Vokey's basic point seems to be that, by Lonergan's analysis, a judgment of value is more
a fourth-level operation of deciding than a third-level operation of judging in that in an act of deciding one
knows what is truly worthwhile. There does seem to be some ambiguity in Lonergan on the question of
judgment value. For instance, does Lonergan mean by his statement, "by deliberation, evaluation, decision,
action we come to know ... what truly is good, worthwhile." (Method in Theology, 35) that in deciding, we
criticism focuses on its distinctly formal definition. Lonergan, one may recall, defines an act of judgment as that which involves reflective understanding. Reflective understanding meets "questions for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status of a virtually unconditioned ..." By this, Lonergan means that knowledge has certain conditions, and that in an act of judgment the conditions must be understood as being met. The conditions are understood through the raising of relevant questions. This notion of judgment, given most attention in *Insight*, pertains to judgments related to insights that grasp the intelligibility of things. Later, Lonergan expanded his notion of judgment to encompass not only fact questions but also value questions. Such an expansion evokes several questions and problems, such as those raised by Daniel Vokey, and discussed briefly in the previous footnote. These seem to be valid points, and suggest needed clarifications on the distinction between these two very different types of judgment. However, I wish to raise a question on the nature of the virtually unconditioned itself.

The virtually unconditioned is achieved, according to Lonergan, only if all the conditions for affirmation are identified, that is, if all the relevant questions have been raised, and if it is understood that all the conditions have been fulfilled, if all the relevant questions have been answered satisfactorily. The problem arises specifically in more complex situations. Lonergan admits, "unfortunately, the more complex judgments become, the more complex is the analysis of the grounding act of reflective knowledge, or that in our deciding we act on that knowledge, or that by our deciding we know in the sense of confirming knowledge? What is the meaning of "by"? At any rate, there needs to be clarification of Lonergan’s meaning here.

Secondly, Vokey objects to Lonergan’s account of the judgment of value because, for these types of judgment, “Lonergan cannot demonstrate the fulfillment of the proximate conditions of objectivity in judgments of value, i.e. that true judgments of value occur.” (Vokey, 162). It seems to me this assessment is valid, in the sense that judgments of value do not depend on the grasp of the virtually unconditioned, for its criterion is the “authenticity or lack of authenticity of the subject’s being.” (Method in Theology, 37) But if this is the case, in what sense can a judgment of value be “true” by Lonergan’s criterion? As Vokey points out, one can only state that it is the value of a virtuous person (Vokey, 162). Again, this appears to be the case. I cannot resolve this matter, and I am not sure it can be resolved from the texts of *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. It seems there needs to be additions to these works, after all, both are not to be the final word on human intentionality. By Lonergan’s own word, they are moving viewpoints. More analysis needs to be done on the differences and relations between the levels of judgment and decision, and the operations involved in these two processes. Moreover, further analysis, I believe, needs to be done on the process of values apprehension leading to value judgment, and what precisely is known in such a judgment.

30 *Insight*, 299.
31 Ibid., 305.
As situations or problems become more complex, a much larger field of relevant data comes into play. For instance, it is relatively simple to know if one has left the front door unlocked when one has gone to work. The conditions for knowing if this is the case is asking and answering the relevant question, Have I gone back home and tested the handle? However, it is much more complex to know if the United States was justified in invading Iraq in 2003. In more complex cases, it may be impossible to identify, let alone fully understand, all the conditions, and thus impossible to raise all the relevant questions. If it is impossible to raise all the relevant questions, or even know what they are, then knowledge that rests on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned is not possible.

Lonergan does suggest, however, that judgments that fail to grasp the virtually unconditioned may be assigned some degree of probability. Between complete ignorance and complete certitude, there is this vast field of probable knowledge, and perhaps this is the locus of much of the thought and assertions within education and educational philosophy. Lonergan’s notion of the virtually unconditioned could apply better in the natural sciences where one’s field of inquiry and scope of relevant data can be defined more readily than in the humanities that deal more directly with the world of common sense. If so, then Lonergan’s notion of judgment applied to the educational field should be cast more in terms of asserting some degree of probability that one’s judgment is correct than in terms of absolute certainty stemming from a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. Within Lonergan Studies, at least as it relates to the field of education and educational philosophy, the tentative, qualified, and probable nature of judgments and knowing needs to be stressed.

In addition to these four points of criticism related to his cognitional theory and epistemology, I offer two further criticisms related to his general metaphysics. First, Lonergan’s overall system of thought seems to be very general, perhaps, too general to suit many educational philosophers. When Lonergan speaks of all knowledge and all of reality, the terms he uses have to be very abstract and vague in order for his assertions to apply on such a grand scale. Such abstraction, Lonergan tells us, is the nature of classical

32 Ibid., 304-5.
(as distinct from statistical) inquiry. The problem that this presents is that in saying something about everything, very little is said about anything in particular. Lonergan's resulting metaphysics tends to be very abstract, but at least in philosophy of education, the issues addressed tend to be considerably more concrete. For instance, Lonergan's political theory, represented as cosmopolis, provides only the very broad lines of social and cultural process, while the focus of educational philosophers tend to be more focused on this or that political system in its practical operations and effects, such as is found in the thought of Dewey and Callan. Because of the highly general and abstract nature of Lonergan's intentionality analysis, one could argue that this system of thought has very little practical relevance to the realm of applied philosophy, including educational philosophy. This, I suggest, is a problem with Lonergan's thought, and one not unnoticed by its critics. However, I suggest it is one that is not insurmountable.

The problem of the distinctly abstract and general nature of Lonergan's analysis can be overcome (if thought worthwhile to do so), I believe, by expending the considerable effort needed in understanding such generalities and abstractions, and by exercising not a little creative thought in making application to some more concrete and practical field of inquiry. Admittedly, Lonergan's work places a heavy burden on the practitioner, and challenges the educational philosopher, for instance, to supply the content, and to actually engage the processes of Lonergan's system of thought in explicitly intentional ways. Odd as it may sound in the context of this complaint, Lonergan stresses (in the opening quotation of this chapter) the practical qualities of his intentionality analysis, though it may be a feature of his work that escapes many. I maintain, identifying the key is one thing; using it is another. That is to say, the persons adopting a Lonerganian educational philosophy still must create, receive and attend to their own data, understand those data, bear the burden of making judgments and wise decisions based on direct and reflective insights, and become fully aware, intelligent, reasonable and responsible practitioners of educational philosophy. Educationists applying Lonergan's intentionality analysis as responsible practitioners would also assist students in identifying and

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33 Ibid., 111-4.
35 Hopefully this study has risen to this challenge in some small way.
fulfilling the immanent intentionalities of their own consciousnesses. This means, within a Lonerganian system of thought, identifying and fulfilling the transcendental precepts: be attentive; be intelligent; be reasonable; be responsible. The problem, put another way, is one of exercising patience and persistence in exploring and expanding Lonergan’s thought in the field of education. Dealing with Lonergan’s thought, in my experience, can be demanding and, as such, the effort required in coming to terms with intentionality as he perceives it may prove to be a mitigating factor in the appeal his work might have in specific fields of inquiry.

A second point of general criticism may be cast in reference to the “normative” claims Lonergan makes for his system of philosophical thought. Admittedly, the question of normativeness is a complex matter, and one of far-reaching consequences, in that it pertains to whole systems of philosophy. However, my point is simple and relatively brief. To a large extent, Lonergan’s intentionality analysis rests on the determination and affirmation of the normative structure and invariant patterns and operations of human consciousness. The claim that one’s philosophical position has a normative quality can evoke a chorus of objections such may be found in the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, or various postmodern thinkers. Unfortunately, Lonergan’s analysis of human consciousness as presented in Insight and, to my knowledge, in subsequent writings, is not addressed by Lonergan in terms of the question of normativeness as a philosophical problem. One result of this omission, if not being guilty of the offence itself, might be “guilt by association.” Lonergan’s position may be discredited simply by its association with a normative Enlightenment epistemology by the use of terms associated with normative philosophy in his cognitional theory; it tends to sound “Enlightenment-like.”

It would have been helpful if Lonergan had launched an analysis and defense of

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36 Insight, 22, 404, 420; and Method in Theology, 4, 6, 13-5, 20, 24
38 Frederick Lawrence, “‘The Modern Philosophic Differentiation of Consciousness’ or What is the Enlightenment?” in Lonergan Workshop, Volume 2, ed. Frederick Lawrence (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981), 213-79. While Lawrence interprets many key Enlightenment themes positively in terms of Lonergan’s account of the unfolding of consciousness, the negative features of Enlightenment are discussed in terms of Gadamer’s “critique of ideology.” See pp. 251-64. Admittedly, understanding Enlightenment thought, itself, is an enormous problem. My reference to the issue is simply to recognize that this may be a problem for some encountering Lonergan’s work, and that there may be ways to respond. Unfortunately those ways do not come from Lonergan himself.
normative philosophical assertions, including how such assertions are possible and valid in that they stem from a particular historically conditioned standpoint.

Some Lonergan scholars, to address this problem, have attempted to show that the normativeness to which Lonergan appeals is not the “cover story” or power-based knowledge structures abhorrent to postmodernism and other anti-Enlightenment positions. In fact, they claim that Lonergan embodies several key tenets of postmodern philosophy that stress the tentative nature of judgment and the profound affect of personal, cultural, and social conditions of knowledge, along with the intimately personal “dynamic state of being in love.” While there might be some legitimacy to the view that the normative qualities in Lonergan’s thought, as process-related, are not the normative metaphysical positions found in Enlightenment philosophy, there yet remains some distance to cover in disassociating Lonergan from some older and often rejected forms of philosophy.

This relates to another perceived gap, and hence criticism, of Lonergan Studies. To date there has not appeared a thorough analysis and critique of the historical contexts and conditions of Lonergan’s thought in reference to the larger concerns and criticism of Western “paradigms” of inquiry and knowledge, such as what may be found in certain postmodern critiques. Much has been written on the traditions and influence underlying Lonergan’s thought, some written by Lonergan himself, but these tend not to critique the larger traditions as historical movements.

The problem of normativeness in general philosophy surfaces also in educational philosophy. Patrick Suppes raised this question to the American Philosophy of Education Society in his 1968 lecture, “Can There Be a Normative Philosophy of Education?” He outlines certain philosophies that admit a normative philosophy of education, but then notes that these philosophies are generally discredited. These include Gnostic-type philosophies that claim a special knowledge that results in a superior metaphysics and a

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39 Meynell, Redirecting Philosophy, 115-22.
special method. There are also philosophies based on *a priori* synthetic propositions from which are deduced principles related to education. A third approach determines through empirical analysis the factual information related to education regarding teaching and learning, child development and so forth.\(^4^3\) This leads to a delineation of the principles of what ought to be done in education. Such an approach, some believe, may fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy.

My point is this. Where Lonergan does not deal explicitly with this question, his thinking remains vulnerable to the criticisms levied against normative philosophy and normative educational philosophy. There may be strong defenses latent within Lonergan’s philosophy against such attacks, but any concerted effort at this largely is absent within the Lonergan corpus, or within Lonergan Studies it is thinly spread over the field. It is not my aim to mount such a defense at this point, but simply to point out this current vulnerability. If the relevance of Lonergan’s thought is to enjoy a wider appeal to educators and educational philosophers, its normative quality needs to be addressed more fully, and recast, perhaps, in terms of structure, process and method, as distinct from educational propositions and principles, in order to meet at least the acceptable criteria of normativeness that Suppes outlines.\(^4^4\)

**Criticisms Centering on Education**

The criticisms mentioned thus far pertain mainly to the philosophical side of the exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the field of education. To fill out and conclude this critique, I wish to raise a few points of criticism related more to more directly to the educational side.

In the first place, while Lonergan offers a penetrating account of development and progress, there is very little that relates to the development of a person from infancy, through childhood, to adolescence and adulthood. There are a few references in

\(^{4^3}\) *Ibid.*, 277-78.

\(^{4^4}\) *Ibid.*, 286. Suppes is not opposed to a normative philosophy of education. For him, there can be an acceptable normative philosophy of education, but it is one that is a balanced methodology where the following dialectical tensions are accounted for: the child’s interests and the needed academic achievements; student-centered curriculum and skill-oriented learning; the primacy of the experiences of the child and the primacy of the content of the curriculum; and the need for freedom and the need for discipline.
Lonergan’s work to this type of human development, but in education, the elements, processes and cognitive development in learning as they grow and mature are significant considerations. The relation of the structure and operations of human consciousness to the various stages of child cognitive development remains to be explored in Lonergan studies, or developed as new insights related to, or improving, the cognitive structure set forth by Lonergan.

Secondly, there seems to be an omission of the question of virtue within Lonergan’s intentionality analysis, and within the Lonergan corpus overall. Virtue has emerged as a significant question in education, due in part to the recent works of Alasdair Maclntyre, Robert Bellah, Eammon Callan, and others. There have been some initial explorations within Lonergan studies on virtue ethics, but the possibility of fruitful interaction between virtue-centered education and Lonergan’s thought largely remains latent at the present time. Kenneth Melchin has provided some Lonerganian insights on the topics of virtue, but not specifically in relation to education. His approach appeals to the deontological quality of ethics stemming from the structure of moral knowledge. He also shows how Lonergan helps one to understand the limits of virtue and the possibility for expanding virtue by overcoming personal vice. It remains to be seen how a Lonerganian theory of virtues arising specifically from the possibilities of cognitive and moral self-transcendence could be expanded more fully as a moral philosophy for education.

These criticisms pertaining to various aspects of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis and to education, strike me more as opportunities for further development and expansions on the intentionality analysis itself than as an attack on, or a dismantling of, Lonergan’s basic position. These criticisms also suggest possible further expansions of Lonergan’s

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45 Lonergan does deal with child development in his lectures on Piaget, but the focus seems to be more on Piaget’s understanding of symbol and the processes of assimilation and adjustment than on the development of consciousness in children. See Topics in Education, 201-3.

46 This also may be a criticism of many other philosophies of education, although the matter of age-related development appears in some, such as Rousseau’s and Whitehead’s.


51 Ibid., 91, 114.
work in relation to educational philosophy. In light of these detractors and drawbacks, throughout this study I have suggested positive and, in some instances, particularly compelling, features of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. To conclude this work, it would be helpful briefly to delineate them.

**Concluding Positive Assessments**

This study has undertaken an exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the field of educational philosophy. As a philosophy in its own right, his intentionality analysis unfolds as cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. As a philosophy, I have found it to contain parallels and convergences with several key elements of educational philosophy. Lonergan himself showed in a preliminary and topical manner some of the relations his thought has to education and educational philosophy. However, in order to establish the main contours of the relation Lonergan’s basic philosophical position has to a general educational philosophy (as distinct from special forms of educational philosophy, such as art education and religious education), there is required a concentrated analysis of his intentionality analysis itself. In my attempt to provide this, it has been shown how crucially important his intentionality analysis has been throughout his writings, how substantially he treats this question in his main philosophical work, *Insight*, and how his analysis has developed in subsequent writings.

In that Lonergan’s work is highly systematic, the exploration and expansion reflects the organic, that is, the interrelated and growing character of his thought as a relatively systematic ordering and constructing of elements related to educational philosophy. His analysis of the experience of consciousness differentiates and interrelates the data of sense and the data of consciousness. He identifies and explains the drive that animates the dynamic operations as the desire to know, a desire that includes not only intellect but also commitment, and the embrace of mystery in images and symbols. The desire to know is the dynamism that propels one to self-transcendence, to intersubjectivity, and to communion and community by seeking fulfillment of the various intentionalities
operative within human consciousness. In this, Lonergan provides a relatively comprehensive system of analysis. Based on this general understanding of the orientation and key assertions Lonergan makes, I have found certain qualities of his thought to be especially compelling in relation to educational philosophy.

First, although Lonergan’s system of thought exhibits certain gaps and oversights, still the broad framework for philosophy of education emerges as a relatively comprehensive treatment, at least in a general way. As a heuristic, it anticipates or can accommodate the key elements of an educational philosophy. Lonergan’s horizon for his intentionality analysis theoretically encompasses all human knowing and doing. As elements of philosophy of education arise, each, potentially, can be integrated within his systematic philosophy and philosophy of education. The advantage to this, I suggest, is an actual integration, wholeness, and anticipated completeness (assuming that these are positive qualities) for education and educational philosophy.

Secondly, this expansion of Lonergan’s work into a general educational philosophy provides a grand vision, and an overall purpose and direction, for education. According to human intentionality as Lonergan conceives it, the goal of education is to achieve the human good. The human good is what promotes the development and flourishing of human existence in all its manifestations as it strives to create individual satisfactions and shared values, and as it creates the mechanisms to achieve goods in a sustainable manner. The vision of education is to be attentive to the full scope of human experience, and to understand and achieve that which is intelligent, reasonable and responsible. In other words, the aim of education is to achieve cosmopolis. With such “visionary” direction and purpose, the practical questions of education can be ordered, prioritized and ultimately answered; the vision thus functions as a methodology for educational philosophy.

It should be noted, however, that “education for cosmopolis” as Doran calls it, is not set forth in terms of predetermined outcomes, but set forth in terms of the types of questions asked, appropriate to various levels of human consciousness. As such, cosmopolis reflects a methodology designed to achieve an experienced-based, intelligent,

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52 For an understanding of the need for an overarching narrative or grand vision for education, see Neil Postman, “Will Our Children Only Inherit the Wind?” Theory and Research in Social Education 28, no. 4 (fall 2000): 580-86.
reasonable, and responsible education and educational system. However, if cosmopolis is key to some grand vision for education, then its transcultural qualities, in that its structure and operations are purported to be normative, need to be explained and defended, and the application of cosmopolis to varied cultural contexts needs to be worked out for actual situations.

Thirdly, a Lonerganian systematic educational philosophy, while regarding individuals as contributing to the good of the whole, places high value on the freedom, creativity, development and flourishing of the individual person. In this system of thought, one tends not to encounter the opposition between individualism found within certain forms of social and political liberalism, for instance, and certain forms of communitarian social structures where individual rights and freedoms are secondary to those of the group. By Lonergan’s analysis, one can find a balanced emphasis on subjectivity and intersubjectivity, where freedom and creativity, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsible action, are designed to contribute to the good of the group. For educational philosophy, then, the understanding and value of any social or political system is grasped in terms of the human good, and not in terms of perpetuating social norms or merely in terms of citizenship. After all, learning to be a good citizen of some oppressive social order may not amount to good education, at least how Lonergan understands ‘good.’

Fourthly, in that Lonergan’s approach to epistemology provides the broad contours of the knowing process, it provides an understanding of the differences and interrelations of various types of knowledge and subject areas commonly found in formal education. Notwithstanding Lonergan’s initial appeal to the natural sciences in the early chapters of *Insight* (an appeal that needs to be better balanced), perhaps this general view of the entire field of human knowing can help avoid epistemological imperialism and supremacy of, for instance, the natural and applied sciences over the more speculative inquiries and the studies represented in the humanities. Each has its place and balance within Lonergan’s approach. Moreover, each manifestation of knowledge, in one way or another, is related to the other as all fields of inquiry contribute to the overall stock of human knowledge. This aspect of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has the potential to

53 As discussed in the second chapter, Lonergan explains this balance and interrelation in terms of classical and statistical heuristics, their complementarity, as well as the four basic epistemological methodologies that all find their basis in his cognitional theory: the classical; the statistical; the genetic; and the dialectic.
illustrate how the work of philosophers of human cognition, such as Egan and Gardner, could be critiqued and situated within an overall philosophical position that would provide for an integrated theory and practice of education that a systematic educational philosophy requires.

In the fifth place, I find that Lonergan’s intentionality analysis has the potential to reorient the entire educational enterprise from one largely attending to the “objective” world of subject disciplines and fields of knowledge to attending more to the personal, subjective qualities of consciousness constituting the human subject. The primary focus of education, by Lonergan’s design, is on the individual processes of consciousness in being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. As such, it casts the character of education with a distinctly human face, understands the crucially important developmental qualities of cognitive and existential growth, and orients the needed curriculum, instruction, and knowledge acquisition in terms of the primary quest of self-knowledge and self-transcendence.

Overall, these are the distinctive positive qualities of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis I find particularly relevant to educational philosophy. Perhaps these are qualities that are especially needed in education and educational philosophy today. Virginia Tech Professor and educational philosopher, Megan Boler, describes the contemporary context of education and educational philosophy in disturbing terms.

This is a tale about the “postmodern” subject who has, tragically, come of age in a climate of crisis. To grow up in the 1990s is, for many, to learn to live and breathe disasters of both global and local proportions. Like the tragic figure in the 1999 film The Fight Club, young men made millionaires in Silicon Valley may come to abhor IKEA furniture and return to bloody brawling to reestablish the lost sense of identity in the face of modern demise, loss of meaning, and certain heritage. Abandoned by God and, most likely, by one’s own father, devoid of human contact and intimacy, one communicates to others largely through computer-mediated interactions. Tragedy, measured by material emotional loss, cannot help but be a potent sign of the millennial times .... In the 1990s one witnesses tragedy in postmodern paradoxes I will call “pastiche”: the “imitation of a peculiar or unique idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language.” This pastiche subject is the modern variation of the tragic spectator who alternates between blind actions and helpless witnessing. Not surprisingly, listening and witnessing
are themes that thread through the 1990s decade of educational theory...

Whether of pragmatist, existential, of French or American bent, the authors of Educational Theory may be said to agree that tragedy is a uniquely human condition of paradox: the too-late recognition, after the fact, of the error of our ways ... 54

By contrast, Lonergan’s philosophical aim is to be constructive, progressive and incremental toward greater realizations of human development. As his philosophy, manifest in his intentionality analysis, engages the field of education, a positive systematic and person-oriented philosophy of education comes into view. It is one that, I trust, serves as an antidote to the pessimism that Boler finds pervading contemporary life and education.

This study has been an exploration and expansion of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis into the realm of educational philosophy. Where Lonergan’s system of thought offers helpful, compelling, and on many points even convincing, analyses of human subjectivity, of personhood, of the learning processes and of the world of intersubjectivity, of social life and world process, his thought can help recast, inform and interrelate many key issues in educational philosophy. In various ways, I have attempted to show how his thought can advance toward greater understanding and possible resolution certain discussions and issues within the field. As well, I have attempted to show how Lonergan’s intentionality analysis can provide direction to the educational enterprise on the philosophical level. Where there appears to be certain gaps and oversights, further work needs to be done to refine Lonergan’s thought, and perhaps see it repositioned on certain matters. But, however strongly or weakly one finds the relation of his intentionality analysis to educational philosophy, there can be no mistake that Lonergan’s primary vision for education and educational philosophy stresses in strong and clear terms the importance of development, enhancement and fulfillment of human life, from the inside out, as it were. My aim has been to introduce to general educational philosophers Lonergan’s work, and to suggest to Lonergan scholars ways that his intentionality analysis can be expanded into the field of educational philosophy. I have

sought to show how Lonergan’s thought provides a means to understand and advance educational issues in unique and fruitful ways. The emphasis on human subjectivity in terms of the structure and processes of human consciousness, with its wide-ranging potential implications in virtually all facets of educational philosophy, for me, gives rise to a feeling of hope in light of Boler’s despair. Her despair at the end of the last century, perhaps, will give way to optimism at the beginning of this new century as Lonergan’s thought becomes more widely known and applied.


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