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Belief-of-existence determiners : evidence from the syntax and semantics of Nata augments Gambarage, Joash Johannes 2019

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BELIEF-OF-EXISTENCE DETERMINERS: EVIDENCEFROM THE SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF NATAAUGMENTSbyJoash Johannes GambarageB.A (Education), The University of Dar Es Salaam, 2004M.A (Linguistics), The University of Dar Es Salaam, 2007A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinThe Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies(Linguistics)THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA(Vancouver)October 2019© Joash Johannes Gambarage, 2019The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend tothe Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the dis-sertation entitled:Belief-of-Determiners in Bantu: Evidence from the Syntax and Semanticsof Nata Augmentssubmitted by Joash Johannes Gambarage in partial fulfillmentof the requirements forthe degree of Doctor of Philosophyin LinguisticsExamining Committee:Lisa MatthewsonCo-supervisorRose-Marie DéchaineCo-supervisorMichael Rochemont (deceased)Supervisory Committee MemberHotze RullmannUniversity ExaminerGloria Onyeoziri-MillerUniversity ExamineriiAbstractThis thesis makes two inter-related claims about the augment (a.k.a pre-prefix or initial vowel) based on evidence from Nata (Eastern Bantu, E45).Syntactically, the Nata augment is the realization of the functional categoryD(eterminer). The view that the augment is D is consistent with the claimthat argument expressions are DPs, while predicate nominals obligatorilylack the D shell (cf. Longobardi 1994; Matthewson 1998; Déchaine andTremblay 2011 and others). Semantically, I argue that the D distinction inNata is solely based on speaker’s belief of existence.Beyond Nata, I claim that the core notion of existence is pertinent toother Bantu languages as well. The thesis challenges the widely held viewthat the D position is necessarily related to specificity or definiteness. Idemonstrate that, once definiteness and specificity are controlled for in aprecise fashion, the true contribution of Nata Ds as belief-of-existence Dscan be discerned.Cross-linguistically, the Bantu belief-of-existence D intersects with Sal-ish assertion-of-existence Ds. In Salish, existence is asserted based on thespeaker’s personal knowledge (Matthewson 1998). In Nata, this require-ment is lacking. The Nata belief of existence D thus behaves as “the weak-est D”, as it does not require a speaker to have personal knowledge ofthe individual. The theoretical implications of this analysis are twofold.First, existence Ds come in (at least) two guises, belief-of-existence versusassertion-of-existence. Second, existence Ds—in both Bantu and Salish—differ from “common ground” Ds of the type found in English, with thelatter (but not the former) coding definiteness/specificity.iiiLay SummaryIn this thesis I studied the determiner systems of the Nata (Bantu) language.I concluded that common semantic features of definiteness and specificityfound in other well-studied languages are missing in Nata. My work opensup the notion of existence as it relates to the article system of Lillooet (Sal-ish) following Matthewson’s (1998) study. While the similarities betweenBantu and Salish – two unrelated families – suggest that the notion of ex-istence is robustly available as a determiner distinction, I proposed thatexistence determiners come in (at least) two guises, one is a system likeNata in which a speaker’s personal knowledge of the referent is not re-quired (belief of existence), the second is a system like Lillooet in which aspeaker’s personal knowledge of the referent is required (assertion of ex-istence). I have argued that existence determiners are also found in otherBantu languages.ivPrefaceThis dissertation consists of original and independent work by the author,Joash Johannes Gambarage, and is mainly based on fieldwork data fromnative speakers of Nata spoken in Tanzania and from the introspective judg-ments of the researcher. This fieldwork is covered by UBC Ethics Certificatenumber H16-01163 under the title “Weak Determiners in Bantu: Evidencefrom the Syntax and Semantics of Pre-prefixes in Nata”.A version of Chapter 2 of this dissertation, The Nata augment: now yousee it, now you don’t! appeared earlier as a qualifying paper under the UBCWorking Papers in Linguistics volume 34, pages 45–59. Some sections ofthe same chapter also appeared earlier as an article entitled The Pre-prefix inNata: An Interface Account in the Selected Proceedings of the 43rd AnnualConference on African Linguistics, University of Kansas volume 30, pages194–266.The picture presented as Figure 1.1 was taken with permission from theScope Fieldwork Project directed by Dr. Benjamin Bruenning (University ofDelaware). Map 1, The Ikoma-Nata-Isenye Cline, is from Higgins (2011) whocites the Survey Department of SIL’s Uganda-Tanzania Branch for providingher with such maps.vTable of ContentsAbstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiLay Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivPreface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vTable of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viList of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvList of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviiList of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xviiiAcknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiDedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxiv1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 The goals of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2 Theoretical assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2.1 The DP hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2.2 The predicate/argument hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . 51.2.3 The assertion-of-existence hypothesis . . . . . . . . . 51.2.4 Choice function accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7vi1.4 The language and the people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.4.1 Language classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.4.2 Dialect continuum and Nata neighbours . . . . . . . . 111.4.3 Language endangerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131.4.4 Previous literature on Nata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131.4.5 Orthography and transcriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141.5 Why study Nata? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151.5.1 Phonology of the augment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The V–type augments . . . . . . . . . . . . . The VV–type augment . . . . . . . . . . . . . The CV–type augment . . . . . . . . . . . . . The CVV–type augment . . . . . . . . . . . . 191.5.2 Morphology of the augment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201.5.3 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syntactic categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The verb complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251.6 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 The Nata augment: now you see it, now you don’t! . . . . . . 282.1 The puzzling behaviour of the Nata augment . . . . . . . . . 302.1.1 Sometimes the Nata augment is there . . . . . . . . . 302.1.2 Sometimes the Nata augment isn’t there . . . . . . . . 322.2 Possible accounts and why they don’t work . . . . . . . . . . 342.2.1 The mass-count contrast does not condition the aug-ment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342.2.2 Case does not condition the augment . . . . . . . . . . 402.2.2.1 Verb extensions do not license the augment . 452.2.2.2 No evidence for morphological Case in Nata 472.2.2.3 The augment is not semantically vacuous . . 492.2.3 Deixis does not condition the augment . . . . . . . . . 512.2.3.1 Defining deixis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512.2.3.2 The Nata augment does not encode deixis . . 51vii2.2.4 Definiteness does not condition the augment . . . . . 552.2.4.1 Defining definiteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562.2.4.2 The Nata augment does not encode novelty-familiarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562.2.4.3 The Nata augment does not presuppose ex-istence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582.2.4.4 The Nata augment does not presupposeuniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602.2.4.5 The Nata augment does not assert uniqueness 622.2.4.6 The Nata augment does not presup-pose/assert maximality . . . . . . . . . . . . 632.2.4.7 Augments are not weak/strong German def-inite Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652.2.5 Specificity does not condition the augment . . . . . . 702.2.5.1 Defining specificity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702.2.5.2 The Nata augment does not encode specificity 742.2.5.3 The augment is not the English this-specificindefinite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 772.2.5.4 The augment is not the English indefinite a . 802.2.6 The Nata augment is not a ‘domain restrictor’ . . . . . 822.2.6.1 Similarities between the Nata Ds and do-main restriction Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842.2.6.2 Differences between the Nata augment anddomain restriction Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902.3 Solving the Nata puzzle: the two ingredients . . . . . . . . . 942.3.1 Ingredient 1: argument vs predicate nominals . . . . . 952.3.2 Ingredient 2: overt versus covert augment . . . . . . . 962.4 Summary and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973 The Syntax of Nata D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993.2 The internal syntax of the Nata DP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003.2.1 The decomposition of the Nata noun . . . . . . . . . . 100viii3.2.2 The augment as a proclitic D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033.2.2.1 The augment does not co-occur with theDEM proclitic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043.2.2.2 The augment does not co-occur with thehonorific proclitic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053.2.3 Predictions for the proposal that augments are Ds . . 1063.3 Predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083.3.1 Nata nominal predicates are φ-N . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093.3.1.1 Simple nominal predicates lack a D . . . . . 1093.3.1.2 D-linked wh-phrases as complex nominalpredicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123.3.2 Nata adnominal predicates are φ-A . . . . . . . . . . 1143.3.2.1 Post-copula adjectives lack a D . . . . . . . . 1143.3.2.2 Adjectival modifiers lack a D . . . . . . . . . 1153.3.3 Nata secondary predicates are φ-X . . . . . . . . . . . 1163.3.3.1 Nata secondary nominal predicates lack a D 1173.3.3.2 Nata secondary adjectival predicates lack a D1183.3.4 Nata adverbials lack a D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203.3.5 Nata infinitives lack a D-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223.4 Argument nominals are D-φ-N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233.4.1 D is required in all argument positions . . . . . . . . . 1253.4.1.1 D is required in subject position . . . . . . . 1253.4.1.2 D is required in direct object positions . . . . 1293.4.1.3 D is required in indirect object position . . . 1323.4.1.4 D is required with gerunds . . . . . . . . . . 1343.4.1.5 D is required with temporal arguments . . . 1353.4.2 D is required with complex nouns . . . . . . . . . . . 1363.4.2.1 D is required with N-N compounds . . . . . 1363.4.2.2 D is required with determiner spread . . . . 1383.5 Polarity-sensitive argument DPs are D∅-φ-N . . . . . . . . . 1413.5.1 Negation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1463.5.1.1 Sentential negation licenses D∅ . . . . . . . 1483.5.1.2 Adversative predicates license D∅ . . . . . . 155ix3.5.1.3 Covert negation/reduced pitch licenses D∅ . 1573.5.1.4 Negative light verbs license D∅ . . . . . . . 1603.5.2 Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1623.5.2.1 Polar questions license D∅ . . . . . . . . . . 1623.5.2.2 Wh-questions do not license D∅ . . . . . . . 1643.5.3 Conditionals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1653.5.4 Modals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1673.5.4.1 Epistemic modals license D∅ . . . . . . . . . 1673.5.4.2 Subjunctive mood licenses D∅ . . . . . . . . 1703.5.4.3 Evidentials license D∅ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1713.6 Summary and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1754 The semantics of Nata D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1774.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1774.2 Defining Existence Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1784.3 The proposal: Nata Ds encode ‘existence’ . . . . . . . . . . . 1814.4 Properties of speaker-oriented existence Ds . . . . . . . . . . 1864.4.1 Speaker-oriented existence Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1874.4.2 Ds encode a core notion of existence . . . . . . . . . . 1874.4.2.1 Existence with actual referents . . . . . . . . 1874.4.2.2 Existence with non-actual referents . . . . . 1904.5 Correlated properties of speaker-oriented existence Ds . . . . 1914.5.1 Speaker-oriented Ds do not encode definiteness . . . . 1924.5.2 Speaker-oriented Ds do not encode specificity . . . . . 1934.5.3 Polarity Ds must be licensed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1954.5.3.1 Licensing in St’át’imcets . . . . . . . . . . . . 1964.5.3.2 Licensing in Nata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1984.6 The Locus of Parametric Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2024.6.1 Requirement for speaker’s personal knowledge . . . . 2034.6.2 Surmising contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2054.6.3 Non-materialized referents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2104.6.4 Possible worlds: attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2124.6.5 Deictic features in D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215x4.7 Choice function analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2204.7.1 Defining choice functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2204.7.2 Interpretation of Ds in assertion-of-existence contexts 2224.7.2.1 Interpretation of overt Ds in declaratives . . 2244.7.2.2 Interpretation of overt Ds with/under nega-tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2244.7.2.3 Interpretation of overt Ds in interrogatives . 2254.7.2.4 Interpretation of overt Ds in modals . . . . . 2264.7.2.5 Interpretation of overt Ds in conditionals . . 2274.7.3 Interpretation of overt Ds in belief-of-existence con-texts: surmising, possible worlds... . . . . . . . . . . . 2274.7.4 Interpretation of overt Ds in quantifier phrases . . . . 2304.7.4.1 Universal quantifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2304.7.4.2 The problem with the SG-ọsẹ quantifier . . . 2324.7.4.3 Simple generics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2354.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2365 Existence in other Bantu languages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2385.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2385.2 Belief of existence D systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2425.2.1 Existence Ds in Runyankore-Rukiga . . . . . . . . . . 2425.2.1.1 R/Rukiga Ds do not encode definiteness . . . 2425.2.1.2 R/Rukiga Ds do not encode specificity . . . . 2435.2.1.3 D distinction in R/Rukiga . . . . . . . . . . . 2445.2.1.4 Overt Ds as belief of existence Ds . . . . . . 2465.2.2 Existence Ds in Haya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2485.2.2.1 Haya Ds do not contrast for definiteness . . 2495.2.2.2 Haya Ds do not encode specificity . . . . . . 2505.2.2.3 D distinction in Haya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2515.2.2.4 Overt Ds as belief-of-existence Ds . . . . . . 2535.2.2.5 Accounting for residual cases in Haya . . . . 2545.2.3 Existence Ds in Luganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2585.2.3.1 Luganda Ds do not encode definiteness . . . 259xi5.2.3.2 Luganda Ds do not encode specificity . . . . 2605.2.3.3 D distinctions in Luganda . . . . . . . . . . . 2615.2.3.4 Overt Ds as belief-of-existence Ds in Luganda2625.2.3.5 Accounting for residual issues in Luganda . . 2645.2.4 Existence Ds in Kinande . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2655.2.4.1 Kinande Ds do not encode definiteness . . . 2665.2.4.2 Kinande Ds do not encode specificity . . . . 2675.2.4.3 D distinction in Kinande . . . . . . . . . . . 2675.2.4.4 Overt Ds behave as belief-of-existence Ds . . 2695.2.4.5 Accounting for residual issues in Kinande . . 2715.2.5 Existence Ds in Xhosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2745.2.5.1 Xhosa Ds do not encode definiteness . . . . . 2755.2.5.2 Xhosa Ds do not encode specificity . . . . . . 2765.2.5.3 D distinction in Xhosa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2775.2.5.4 Overt Ds as belief-of-existence Ds . . . . . . 2795.2.6 Existence Ds in Zulu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2815.2.6.1 Zulu Ds do not encode definiteness . . . . . 2825.2.6.2 Zulu Ds do not encode specificity . . . . . . 2825.2.6.3 D distinction in Zulu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2835.2.6.4 Overt Ds as belief-of-existence Ds . . . . . . 2865.2.6.5 Accounting for residual cases in Zulu . . . . 2875.3 Assertion-of-existence D systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2915.3.1 Existence Ds in Bemba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2915.3.1.1 Bemba Ds do not encode definiteness . . . . 2925.3.1.2 Bemba Ds do not encode specificity . . . . . 2935.3.1.3 D distinction in Bemba . . . . . . . . . . . . 2945.3.1.4 Overt Ds as assertion-of-existence Ds . . . . 2965.4 Ds that do not encode existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2995.4.1 Lack of Existence Ds in Dzamba . . . . . . . . . . . . 2995.4.2 Dzamba Ds contrast for novelty-familiarity . . . . . . 3005.4.3 Dzamba Ds do not contrast for specificity . . . . . . . 3025.5 Summary, remarks and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305xii6 Locus of Variation in Bantu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3086.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3086.2 DP-internal constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3096.2.1 D and demonstratives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3096.2.2 D and modifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3116.2.3 D and personal pronouns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3146.2.4 D and the universal quantifier ‘every’ . . . . . . . . . 3166.3 DP-external constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3186.3.1 Sentence fragment answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3196.3.2 Surface c-command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3206.3.3 Locality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3236.3.4 Clause-mate restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3266.3.5 Topic marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3286.3.6 Focus licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3316.3.6.1 Focussed DPs in negative environments . . . 3326.3.6.2 Focussed DPs in relative clauses . . . . . . . 3336.3.6.3 Focused DPs with clefts . . . . . . . . . . . . 3356.3.6.4 Focussed DPs in declarative sentences . . . . 3376.3.6.5 Focussed stressed DPs in Xhosa/Zulu . . . . 3386.4 Areas of further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3426.4.1 D requirement on proper names . . . . . . . . . . . . 3426.4.1.1 N is not Pred in the ‘an Einstein’ test . . . . 3436.4.1.2 N is not strictly Pred in complement clauses 3456.4.1.3 The N-to-D movement test . . . . . . . . . . 3466.4.2 D requirement on prepositional objects . . . . . . . . 3476.4.2.1 Objects of comitative P permit overt orcovert D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3476.4.2.2 Objects of associative P permit overt orcovert D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3486.4.2.3 Objects of locative P require overt D . . . . . 3506.4.3 D and locatives in other Bantu languages . . . . . . . 3556.4.3.1 Bemba/Kinande-type: objects of locative Pprohibit overt D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355xiii6.4.3.2 Zulu/Luganda: objects of locative P permitovert D sometimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3576.5 Summary and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365xivList of TablesTable 1.1 Useful orthographic symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Table 1.2 The Nata N-prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Table 1.3 Nata syntactic categories and augment possibilities . . . . 23Table 1.4 Agreement paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Table 1.5 The Nata verb template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Table 2.1 Similarities and differences between Zulu and Nata Ds . . 40Table 2.2 Three-way distinction of deictic demonstratives in Nata . 52Table 2.3 Distribution of definite strong and weak Ds and Nata Ds . 70Table 2.4 Similarities and differences in the three languages . . . . . 84Table 3.1 Operators that license the polarity-sensitive D∅ . . . . . . 175Table 4.1 Requirements for use of the existence Ds . . . . . . . . . . 184Table 4.2 Summary of correlated diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Table 4.3 Locus of variation between St’át’imcets and Nata . . . . . 202Table 5.1 Different D distinctions among augment languages . . . . 240Table 5.2 R/Rukiga Ds and their correlation with other D systems . 242Table 5.3 Haya Ds and their correlation with other D systems . . . . 249Table 5.4 Luganda Ds and their correlation with other existence Ds . 259Table 5.5 Kinande Ds and their correlation with other existence Ds . 266Table 5.6 Xhosa Ds and their correlation with other existence Ds . . 275Table 5.7 Zulu Ds and their correlation with other existence Ds . . . 281Table 5.8 Bemba Ds and their correlation with other existence Ds . . 292xvTable 5.9 Dzamba Ds and their correlation with existence Ds . . . . 300Table 6.1 Parametric variation in the syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Table 6.2 Syntactic-semantic similarities and variation . . . . . . . . 362xviList of FiguresFigure 1.1 003-Not-All-Birds-In-Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Figure 3.1 Pitch pattern for regular sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Figure 3.2 Pitch pattern for sentences with covert negation . . . . . 159xviiList of AbbreviationsACC accusativeAOE assertion of existenceAPL associative pluralAPPL applicativeAUG augmentBOE belief of existenceC noun classCAUS causativeCOMP complementizerCOP copulaDAT dativeDEF definitenessDEIX deicticDEM demonstrativeD(ET) determinerDST distalEC Expletive constructionERG ergativexviiiEXIS assertion-of-existenceFEM feminineFOC focusFUT futureFV final vowelGEN genitiveIPFV imperfectiveINCIP incipientINF infinitiveINTERM intermediateLOC locativeMASC masculineMOD modalNEG negationNMLZ nominalizerNOM nominativeNT number neutralOBJ objectOBL oblique markerOCC occupationOM object markerPART partitivePASS passivePROG progressivexixPROX proximalPST pastPFV perfectivePL pluralPOSS possessivePRES presentPROX proximalRED reduplicantREFL reflexiveREL relativeREM remoteSA subject agreementSG singularSUB subjectSUBJV subjunctivexxAcknowledgementsI cannot exhaust a list of people who helped me achieve this remarkablestage of my life. My greatest thanks is to my two co- supervisors Dr. LisaMatthewson and Dr. Rose-Marie Déchaine, for their constructive criticisms,insightful suggestions, support and courage in every part of this thesis. Dr.Matthewson has tirelessly read many drafts of this thesis and provided on-time feedback every time. Her deep knowledge of both St’át’imcets andformal semantics became a keystone to my semantic analysis. Dr. Matthew-son and Dr. Henry Davis have played a vital role in my exploration of theBantu–Salish connection. I thank Dr. Déchaine for always taking me outof my comfort zone, challenging me to be a critical thinker and less of ahasty writer. She has challenged me on how to present the data, to makeargumentation and connections, to go back, to restart: all these were justto make my work better even when she knew doing that would take extratime and pain. The late Dr. Michael Rochemont was a member of my for-mer committee and he contributed greatly to the earlier drafts of this thesis.His belief in me, and that my research could be something extraordinaryto the field was awakening. His memory will live with me as long as I shalllive. Any errors are solely mine but any exposition embodied in this thesisis largely due to my committee.I should also thank my two amazing university examiners, Dr. HotzeRullmann and Dr. Gloria Onyeoziri-Miller, for their comments that raisedthe bar of the quality of this work.I thank several language consultants who accepted to share their beau-tiful languages with me. From Nata, my fellow native speakers: Sab-xxihiti Winyanya, Mnata Sarota, Nyabhikwabhe Yati (Baunsa), Mugesi Ma-chota, Peter Kishora and my sister Wasato Gambarage. I thank my cousinWinyanya Marobhe and his wife Nyambura for allowing me and my col-league to stay at their house for two months (July and August, 2016) forno cost during my fieldwork in Nata. Thanks for their generosity and forfeeding us so well: Muuchọmiri bhọọsẹ chwẹẹ! I thank the many otherlanguage consultants and/or speaker-linguists I have worked with: Man-disa Ndlovu and Lutsha Bata (Xhosa); Mthuli Buthelezi (Zulu); Dr. PhillipMutaka and Jack Mutaka (Kinande); Edie Amaitum and Richard Musoka(Luganda); Musonda Chilengwe (Bemba); Dr. Eyamba Georges Bokamba(Dzamba); Dr. Asiimwe Allen (Runyankore-Rukiga); and Angela Katabaro(Haya). This dissertation could not be what it is without them.I am grateful to the following people for providing feedback, encourage-ment and insights on various aspects of my work: Manfred Krifka, Larry Hy-man, Vicki Carstens, Malte Zimmerman, Talmy Givón, Georges Bokamba,Phillip Mutaka, Claire Halpert, Michael Diercks, Patricia Schneider–Zioga,and Holly Higgins. This research has also benefited from the commentsfrom several members of the UBC Linguistics department who were alsomy early teachers: Hotze Rullmann, Martina Wiltschko, Doug Pulleyblankand Henry Davis. Thank you Molly Babel, Bryan Gick, Kathleen Hall andin loving memory, Eric Vatikiotis-Bateson, for introducing me to the the-oretical linguistics world, along with others mentioned above. Thanks tothe audiences of ACAL47 and ACAL50 for their valuable comments andquestions.Thanks to my friend and colleague James Gauthier, my first friendin Canada. I also thank my classmates in the 2010 cohort: James Crip-pen, Sihwei Chen, Ella Fund-Reznicek, Tianhan Liu, Michael McAuliffe,Stacey Menzies, Kevin McMullin, and Lauren Quinn. My first TAs Jen-nifer Glougie, Jennifer Abel, Patrick Littell and Heather Bliss made myfirst classes less stressful. Thanks Jen Abel for proofreading this work.Thanks to all my colleagues: Andrei Anghelescu (with whom I conductedthe field work in Nata), Erin Guntly, Emily Sadlier-Brown, Adriana Osa-Gomez, Herman Keupdjio, Sam Akinbo and all the members of the NataxxiiWorking Group. Thank you Edna Dharmaratne and Shaine Meghji for be-ing extraordinary staff members.I am highly indebted to my family for their support throughout thislife. Thanks to my sons “the boys” Jones and Eli. You two were absolutelyamazing. I will forever appreciate your prayers every night and your funnyjokes that put a smile on my face during downtimes. I owe my wife Neemaenormous thanks for always being on my side, in the hills and valleys ofmy academic journey. She agreed to take on many family responsibilities;she provided moral and financial support throughout my studies here atUBC. Words just can’t be enough. Thanks to Neema’s friends behind thescenes: Julie, Kashmira and Nancy at Westcoast Suites. Thanks to PennyDesjarlais and Nancy Moseley for being so special to my family. Thanksto mom and dad for their upbringing and giving me the gift of speakingNata–the language I love so dearly. Thanks to my second family, OakridgeSeventh-Day Adventist Church, and to all my friends in the Afro-CaribbeanSabbath school group. I have always felt a sense of belonging.I wish to thank and acknowledge funding sources that made my PhDstudies possible: (i) the UBC Four Year Fellowship (2010-2014); (ii) In-ternational Partial Tuition Scholarship (2011-2018); (iii) Faculty of Grad-uate studies Award (2015/2018); (iii) UBC Emergency Fund for develop-ing country students (2015/2016). (iv) Stipend for Teaching Assistantshipfrom the UBC Linguistics Department (2011-2016). (v) Salary as a NataLanguage consultant to the 2013/2014 field methods class. (vi) SSHRC In-sight Grant to Douglas Pulleyblank (2011-2016). (vii) SSHRC Insight Grantto Lisa Matthewson and Hotze Rullmann (2016-2017).Last but not least, thanks to the Almighty God for providing all of thesewonderful people and resources listed above, and everything else besides.xxiiiDedicationTo my beautiful wife Neema and to my two awesome boys: Jones and Eli.xxivChapter 1IntroductionIf I have seen farther it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.— Sir Isaac NewtonThis thesis explores the syntactic and semantic properties of the aug-ment (a.k.a the pre-prefix) in Nata (Eastern Bantu, E45). The augment isthe leftmost element of the noun domain labelled as AUG in (1a). The aug-ment precedes the noun-class prefix (the element marked as C; see §1.5.2for details about noun classes). Thus, traditionally the Nata noun templateis presented as in (1b).(1) a. o=mú-nwaAUG=C3-mouth‘a/the mouth’b. AUGMENT=CLASS PREFIX–NOUN STEMIn this thesis I investigate the syntactic status of the augment in casessuch as (2), where nominals denoting an entity appear with the augment,but nominals denoting a property lack the augment, (3).[Context: Bahati is a gender neutral name. A woman and a man are stand-ing before us. M is wondering which person is Bahati:]1(2) a. BahatiBahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhen=o=mo-súbheCOP=AUG=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’b. #Bahati#BahatiBahatim=mo-subhen=mo-súbheCOP=C1-man‘Bahati is a man.’(3) [Context: M is describing Bahati’s gender:]a. #Bahati#BahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhen=o=mo-súbheCOP=AUG=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’b. BahatiBahatiBahatim=mo-subhen=mo-súbheCOP=C1-man‘Bahati is a man.’Largely, in this thesis, I investigate the semantic principle that forcesNata speakers to use an overt augment in sentences such as (4), and not incontexts such as (5a).(4) a. n-a-a-rọch-en-á-á-rotʃ-eFOC-PST-see-FVo=mo-subheo=mo-súβeAUG=C1-man‘S/he saw a/the man.’2b. ta-a-rọch-eta-a-rotʃ-éNEG-PST-see-FVo=mo-subheo=mo-súβeAUG=C1-man‘S/he didn’t see a/the man.’(5) [Context: The speaker does not believe that X saw any man:]a. ta-a-rọch-eta-a-rotʃ-eNEG-PST-see-FVmo-subhemo-súβeC1-man‘S/he didn’t see a/any man.’b. *n-a-a-rọch-e*n-a-a-rotʃ-eFOC-PST-see-FVmo-subhemo-súβeC1-manIntended: ‘S/he saw a/*any man.’In order to provide an analysis of the Nata augment, I adopt the hypoth-esis that nominal arguments are DPs, and predicate nominals are φP/NP(Stowell 1989; Longobardi 1994, 2001, 2008; Déchaine 1993). I provideevidence that the augment instantiates the category of D, whose surfaceform may vary according to whether D is overt as in (4) or covert (D∅) asin (5a) (see Longobardi 1994, 2001, 2008; Déchaine 1993; Déchaine et al.2018). I claim in this thesis that the cases in (2) and (3) involve a partitionbetween a DP argument and a nominal predicate which lacks a D layer. Iwill therefore gloss the augment as D from now on.While I argue in this thesis that syntactically the augment is D, the Nataaugment does not seem to encode definiteness or specificity as widely as-sumed in the literature on the semantics of Ds. Rather, the contrast betweenthe overt D in (4) and the covert D in (5a) is forced by the speaker’s com-mitment to existence of a referent for the NP. I show that the Nata augmentsystem is strikingly similar to the D system of St’át’imcets (Salish) whichencodes the notion of ‘assertion-of-existence’ (see Matthewson 1998, 1999).3The rest of Chapter 1 highlights the goals of this thesis and the the-oretical framework in which the notion of the augment/D is couched. Iintroduce the Nata language and people and discuss why studying Nata isimportant.1.1 The goals of the thesisThis thesis explores various syntactic and semantic properties of the aug-ment in Nata. The thesis has four main goals:(6) a. To present a syntactic-semantic analysis of the augment/D systemin Nata.b. To compare Nata’s augment/D system with the strikingly similarD system of St’át’imcets (Salish) and other Bantu languages.c. To revisit previous semantic hypotheses and show that none ofthe previous semantic accounts are capable of accounting for whatforces augment/D choices in Nata and Bantu more generally.d. To account for the locus of parametric variation between the Nataaugment/D and other Ds (in Bantu and in Salish).1.2 Theoretical assumptionsI briefly review the relevant frameworks for the current proposal about theaugments in Nata. I employ the following frameworks: (i) the DP hypothe-sis, (ii) the assertion of existence account, (iii) syntactic licensing accounts,and (iv) the choice function account. While I will not attempt to reviewall the details of each account, I do present the main insights that resonatewith my proposal. I start with the DP hypothesis.1.2.1 The DP hypothesisThe DP hypothesis was developed in the wake of Brame (1982), Szabolsci(1983), and Abney (1987); its basic assumption is that the determiner is4the functional category D that selects an NP as its complement, (7a). Thisview is consistent with the current proposal that the augment is the mor-phosyntactic realization of the functional category D. As such, I will notadopt the earlier version of the internal structure of the NP which assumesthe noun is the head of the phrase and the D sits in the specifier of the NP(Jackendoff 1977; Chomsky 1981), (7b).(7) a. DPSpecifier D′D NPb. NPD N′NIn Chapter 3, I show that the DP hypothesis is supported by the internalstructure of Nata DPs.1.2.2 The predicate/argument hypothesisLongobardi (1994), following Stowell (1989), explicitly argues that a com-mon noun must have a D to function as an argument. This assumptionmakes a distinction between argument and predicate nominals:(8) D and argumenthood (Longobardi 1994: 620, 628)a. A ‘nominal expression’ is an argument only if it is introduced bya category D (p.620).b. DP can be an argument, NP cannot (quoting Stowell 1989).I adopt Longobardi’s predicate/argument contrast and argue that, in Nata,Ds are not only necessary for projecting a DP but are also required forargumenthood (i.e., making an entity-denoting argument of type e).1.2.3 The assertion-of-existence hypothesisMatthewson (1998) unearths a new typology of indefinite Ds in St’át’imcetswhose function is encoding assertion of existence. She illustrates thatSt’át’imcets Ds encode the following distinction:5(9) Determiners in St’át’imcets (Matthewson 1998: 53-54)a. The non-polarity Ds (X...a) encode assertion of existence.b. The polarity D encodes failure to assert existence.Matthewson illustrates that the overt Ds, X...a (where X refers to differ-ent elements encoding deictic distinctions), consistently encode assertionof existence, while the D ku fails to encode existence. A major motivationfor adopting the assertion-of-existence account is the observation that Dsin both Nata and St’át’imcets encode whether the speaker believes the NP’sreferent exists. I provide a semantic analysis of the D system in Nata andcompare it with the strikingly similar D system in St’át’imcets.1.2.4 Choice function accountsI claim that Nata Ds require an analysis involving choice functions whichis consistent with various works on indefinite Ds (Reinhart 1997; Winter1997; Kratzer 1998; Matthewson:1999; and others). The definition of achoice function is as follows:(10) A choice function definition:A function f is a choice function (CH(f)) if it applies to any non-emptyset and yields a member of that set. Reinhart (1997: 372)I argue in Chapter 4 that Nata augments are all analyzable as indefinites.Thus, in Reinhart’s (1997) formulation, D is a function, f<<e,t>e> whichtakes a nominal expression of type <e,t>, and yields an entity from the NPset it is applied to. The preview of my analysis for an example like (11a) isgiven in (11b):(11) a. MakuruMakurúMakurua-ka-ghoor-aa-ka-ɣór-aSA1-PST-buy-FVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru bought a book.’6b. 9f [CH(f) & [Makuru bought f(book)]]There is a choice function (f) which picks out a book from theset of books and Makuru bought the book chosen by f.In chapter 4, I discuss the specific properties of choice functions that Iadopt, and the implication of choosing one approach over the other.1.3 MethodologyThough I speak Nata natively, to avoid building a theory based only onmy own judgments, I adopted Featherston’s (2007) standards for collectinglinguistic data by verifying attested data with multiple informants. I con-ducted fieldwork in the village of Nata Mbisso (the heartland of the Natalanguage) in July and August 2016. I worked with 6 speakers (3 malesand 3 females). Five of the speakers were born and raised in Nata village,and one female speaker was born and raised in Mugeta village. Their agesranged between 40 and 60 and they all spoke Nata natively1.Semantic fieldwork is a challenging enterprise. Therefore, well-designed elicitation techniques have to be employed, which include but arenot limited to spontaneous discourse and direct elicitations (Dimmendaal2001; Matthewson 2004; and others). Matthewson (2004) argues furtherthat one cannot gather adequate information about meaning from sponta-neous discourse alone, but must also include direct elicitation, asking con-sultants for grammaticality, felicity and truth value judgments. The findingsof the current research resulted from these methodological practices.In spontaneous elicitations, speakers were asked to tell their ownstories and narratives like folktales. In directed elicitations, I primarilyused two methods. One was setting up a relevant context of use. Forinstance, to verify whether the augment can be used in new discoursecontexts, the consultants in their individual elicitation sessions were1. One of the language consultants was my older sister, whom I grew up with in the samehousehold until her late teenage years when she got married and moved to Nata-Mbisovillage. The reason I included her is because I was interested to see if there would be anydifferences between her grammaticality and felicity judgements and mine. I did not comeacross any.7asked to pay attention to the context of use and provide a relevant re-sponse. An example of a context used in directed elicitations is given below:[Context: Suppose Wanchota goes to school and on her way back shemeets a man who stops her to ask for directions. When she gets home, thefirst thing she says to her mom is about what happened on her way home.She goes: Mama, guess what?...(please continue)].I also employed the option of using the Totem Field storyboard model(cf. Burton and Matthewson 2015), and Bruening’s (2008) storyboards forquantifier elicitation. These were presented as powerpoint slides on a lap-top. For instance, using Bruening’s image 003 (http://udel.edu/~bruening/scopeproject/scopeproject.html), I asked the consultants if it was at all pos-sible to say all (the) birds are sitting in the tree in Nata given the scenariobelow. In turn, as the answer was no, I asked them to give the correctsentence one would use in this scenario:Figure 1.1: 003-Not-All-Birds-In-TreesMy role as a speaker-linguist was clear in this undertaking. I producedsentences and asked the consultants to give their judgements in relation tothe context. This was fun! I also noticed that when some consultants had a‘foggy head’, they would give responses that were infelicitous and counter-8intuitive; however, they rejected such responses in the following elicita-tions as if they had never said anything like that. As a speaker-linguistI could easily tell that a consultant’s mind was not on task, and I wouldask them to take a break, or drink something refreshing to help them keepfocussed on the task.For the other Bantu languages I report on in Chapter 5–Runyankore-Rukiga, Kinande, Xhosa, Zulu, Bemba, and Dzamba–I used phone inter-views and asked speakers to help with checking my transcriptions. ForHaya and Luganda, the elicitations were done here at UBC with nativespeakers who are UBC students.1.4 The language and the peopleNata is an endangered Bantu language spoken in Tanzania by approxi-mately 7000 speakers. Speakers of the language call themselves a=βanáataand refer to their language as e=kináata. In the context of Swahili, whichdoes not have augments, all languages are referred to by using the Ki- pre-fix; thus, Nata is called Kináata. In the English text, I have omitted theaugment e= and the ki- prefix to be consistent with the meta-language(English). Thus, throughout I refer to the language under study as ‘Nata’.Nata is spoken in several villages in the two districts of the Mara Region,namely Serengeti and Bunda. The majority of Nata speakers are found inthe Mara Region, particularly in the villages of Nata-Mbiso, Nata-Motukeri,Makondose and Bwanda. Nata people claim that their first ancestors livedin Bwanda (a.k.a Rakana), but today, the heartland of Nata is the villagesof Nata-Mbiso and Nata-Motukeri. There are a number of villages whichcombine Nata speakers and speakers of other languages. These include thevillages of Mugeta and Kyandege in the Bunda district, and the villages ofNyiichoka, Ikoma and Burunga in the Serengeti district.91.4.1 Language classificationIn the wider typology of African languages, Greenberg (1963) shows thatNata belongs to the Bantu family, which falls under the Niger-Congo family.The latter falls under a major group known as the Benue-Congo group.There have been attempts to classify Bantu languages into zones of re-lated languages. Guthrie (1948) places Nata under group E.40 (Ragoli-Kuria Group) where Nata and Ikoma are coded as E45 (Zone E, Group 40,Index 5). The languages under the Ragoli-Kuria Group are listed in (21):(12) Ragoli-Kuria Group (E.40)E.41 Logoolį (Ragoli)E.42 Gųsįį (Kisii)E.43 KorįaE.44 ZanakįE.45 Nata (Ikoma)E.46 Sonjo (Sonyo)Guthrie (1971) maintains the above classification in which Nata andIkoma are treated as one and the same language. A number of classifica-tions treat Nata and Ikoma as the same language, where Nata and Ikomaconsistently belong to the East Nyanza subgroup which is comprised ofGusii, Kuria, Zanake, Ngoreme and Shashi (see Nurse (1977), as well asNurse and Philippson (1980)). Nata, Isenye and Ikoma are also treated asone language in Heine’s (1976) classification.Maho (2003) attempts a new classification where he moves some lan-guage groups placed in Guthrie’s (1948) zone E, to the new group namedJE.40, which has a total of 19 languages. For instance, Guthrie’s E.20(Kwaya-Ruuri) and E.40 (Lagooli-Kuria) groups are now in the JE.40 group.Surprisingly, Isenye, which is a sisterlect to Nata, is only mentionedin Heine’s classification. In the most current classification by Ethnologue,Nata, Isenye and Ikoma share the same code (E.45) and ISO number (ISO-639-3: NTK). These three lects together constitute an east-west Ikoma-10Nata-Isenye cline as shown in Map 1 below. Present-day Nata is borderedto the west by Isenye, to the east by Ikoma, to the north by Ngoreme andKuria, and to the south by the Gurumeti river and the Serengeti NationalPark.Map 1: The Ikoma-Nata-Isenye cline1.4.2 Dialect continuum and Nata neighboursDuring Nata data collection, I noticed that speakers exhibited some mi-nor variations in certain sounds (e.g. o=ɣóɣoro vs o=kóɣoro ‘leg’), and inH-tone placements (e.g. e=keróóngoori vs e=kéroongoori ‘porridge’) . Theelders remarked that the differences stem from a split between a Southerndialect and a Northern dialect. However, these differences are not pre-dictable based on a Southern/Northern split.Nata is mutually intelligible with languages of zone E which are found inthe Kuria Group, e.g. Kuria, Isenye, Ikoma, Zanaki, Ikizu, Sizaki and Shashito mention a few. There is controversy about whether these are dialects ordifferent languages. I hold the view that Nata, Ikoma, and Isenye are closelyrelated dialects, and are distinct from the rest. Hill et al. (2007:42) show,11for instance, that Ikoma and Nata share 89% lexical similarity, Ikoma andIsenye 85%, and Nata and Isenye 88%. It should be noted, however, thatthe major linguistic differences between the three lects (Nata, Ikoma, andIsenye) do not relate to lexical items, but rather to the phonology; e.g.Dahl’s Law (a voicing dissimilation rule where a voiceless obstruent be-comes voiced when immediately followed by a syllable with another voice-less obstruent, Meinhof (1932)) applies differently, and tonal melodies andvowel harmony rules are also different (cf. Aunio 2010 and Higgins 2011).Shetler (1996) gives two views on migration and settlement of the KuriaGroup in the present-day Mara Region. One view is that south Mara groupsall came together to Mara from the Great Lakes (Nyanza or Lake Victoria).According to this view, the Great Lakes family was one big language familythat included the Haya, Kerewe and the Jita-Kwaya-Ruuri languages, whichnow share few cognates with Nata–Ikoma–Isenye. Shetler contends thatdue to increasing pressure on the land, the Kuria group started moving eastand split into small groups. The groups which crossed the Mara river andproceeded to the east became what is today the east Mara, Lagooli-Kuria;and the group that proceeded south of the Mara river formed the Nata-Ikoma-Isenye cline. Shetler also presents an alternative view supported bythe indigenous people that the Ikoma and Temi (Sonjo) were one group thatlived at the eastern side of the Serengeti Plain (Arusha), and that the Ikomabroke off and traveled west across the Serengeti Plain. According to thisview, later the group was further divided into the present-day Ikoma, Nata,Isenye and Ngoreme tribes. This happened around 300-400 AD. Maho’s(2003) classification, where he collapses Guthrie’s E.20 and E.40 groupsinto JE40, may have possibly followed this historical path.There are notable differences in cultural practices among these groups,especially as regards marriage ceremonies, male circumcision, dance forms,and musical instruments. Shetler (1996:12) argues that although the Bantupeople speaking these lects claim that they are separate languages, linguis-tically and culturally they are closely related to each other, suggesting thatthe Nata-Ikoma-Isenye people had a common heritage in the past.121.4.3 Language endangermentNata is classified by the Ethnologue as a language that is in trouble or”threatened”, as the intergenerational transmission is in the process of be-ing broken. This corresponds to yellow on the language cloud display athttp://www.ethnologue.com/cloud/ntk.Although Nata is presently used for communication at a family level,the language is partially used by the child-bearing generation but not bychildren. Children and adolescents can understand Nata but they alwaysspeak Swahili to their parents and peers. There are a number of factors thatpresent a threat to the future of Nata. One is language contact, particularlywith Swahili, which is a dominant language. The second one is the lack ofpolicies that support minority language learning. This has led children andadolescents to pay no attention to minority languages; as a consequencethey only speak Swahili both when socializing with their peers and at home.As noted in Mekacha (1993) and Hill et al. (2007), Nata children growup speaking Swahili as their first language. This change has been drasticand rapid: within the same family, siblings in their 30s have Nata as theirfirst language, while siblings in their late teens have Swahili as their firstlanguage. Hill et al. (2007:34) note that Nata “has a certain amount ofprestige attached to it by its speakers, but […] its functional value anduse are declining, possibly signalling the death of the language variety inthe coming generations.” Nata is at a tipping point, and timely documen-tation is needed to stabilize and revitalize the language. In terms of theendangerment status of related lects, the rate of endangerment is higherfor Isenye than Ikoma, based on the fact that Ikoma has many more speak-ers (19,000), than Isenye (8,000). By comparison, Nata has only 7,000speakers (see Muzale and Rugemalira 2008).1.4.4 Previous literature on NataNata is an understudied language. There are three theses on Nata that Iknow of: Mekacha’s (1985; 1993) on the phonological processes affect-ing Nata vowels and the sociolinguistic impact of Swahili on Nata, respec-13tively, and Johannes (2007) on the Nata nouns structure. Currently, AndreiAnghelescu is writing a PhD thesis on Nata tone and vowel harmony.Other existing publications on the language include a few papers pub-lished as Qualifying Papers (from UBC) or conference proceedings. Theseinclude: Gambarage (2012) and Gambarage (2013) on augmented andunaugmented N-stems in Nata and vowel harmony in Nata, respectively;The morphophonology of tone in Nata by Anghelescu (2013); Verbal mor-photonology of Nata by Lam (2013); and Quantification and Freedom ofChoice in Nata by Osa-Gomez (2016). There are also several book chap-ters in the recently published OUP volume Africa’s Endangered Languages:Documentary and Theoretical Approaches. This book included four chapterson Nata: Gambarage and Pulleyblank (2017) on vowel harmony; Déchaineet al. (2017) on deverbal nouns; Anghelescu et al. (2017) on tone; and Gam-barage et al. (2017) on documenting Nata. Lastly, the UBC Nata WorkingGroup (NaWoG) is working to produce a record of the grammar of Nata inthe form of a descriptive grammatical sketch.1.4.5 Orthography and transcriptionsNata does not have a standard orthography. As a member of the Nata com-munity, I am making efforts to assist the Nata community to develop andstandardize an orthography which would best represent the sound systemof the language. As noted by Mekacha (1993), Swahili has a detrimen-tal effect on local languages, such that speakers of Nata think that Natasounds are similar to Swahili ones. Since tense /e,o/ and lax mid /ɛ,ɔ/vowels contrast and have a high functional load, I have proposed to markthe lax mid vowels with a subdot in the orthography, hence <ẹ,ọ>. Thesubdot system is very common amongst Africanists from west Africa. Thisis in line with the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) efforts in the Mararegion to promulgate the spelling systems for the local languages (see Hig-gins 2010). Special graphemes used in Nata are presented in Table 1.1; allother graphemes are common Roman forms.14Table 1.1: Useful orthographic symbolsOrthography IPA. Ex. Orthography Ex. IPA Glossgh ɣ ghóra ɣóra buybh β bhára βára countng’ ŋ ang’amá aŋamá cystng ŋg anguhá aŋguhá tickny ɲ anyáma aɲáma meatọ ɔ rọra rɔŕa seeẹ ɛ rẹra rɛra babysitNata is a tone language. I use the diacritic ( ´ ) to mark high tone, asseen in the examples in Table 1.1. For a discussion of tone realization inNata see Anghelescu et al. (2017).Lastly, in this thesis I use a four-line system when presenting data. Theseconsist of the orthography, a broad phonetic transcription, a morphemegloss and a free translation. Any relevant context of use will appear insquare brackets before the relevant example.1.5 Why study Nata?Nata is a language that is woefully under-researched (compared to the lan-guages of more economically-developed regions). This research presentsan in-depth examination of the syntactic and semantic properties of DPs.Unearthing these aspects will contribute greatly to the typological and theo-retical understanding of the structure of DPs and the syntactic and semanticfeatures encoded in the Nata D system. This dissertation is the first explo-ration that reports on the syntax and semantics of the D in Nata or anyrelated Zone E45 language.Furthermore, Nata augment data provide new evidence for augmentsas Ds that encode existence, as opposed to being inherently definite or spe-cific or lacking a semantic function as claimed in previous accounts. Thissuggests a deep typological split between Bantu languages and languages15like English, whose D system contrasts for definiteness. Crucially, Nata aug-ments compare with D systems in some Salish languages, which introducea whole new area of inquiry regarding the “Bantu-Salish connection”2.Moreover, the current Nata work is not only an investigation and docu-mentation of a particular linguistic phenomenon related to augments, butis also a contribution to the linguistic theory of the human faculty of lan-guage, hence it shapes our understanding of universal grammar (UG). Fur-thermore, the diagnostic tests used in this thesis could be used to test forthe linguistic function of augments in other Bantu languages.Finally, as a Nata speaker-linguist I have always wished to contribute toNata language documentation. This special motivation is based on the factthat I was born and raised in the Nata-speaking community, where for thepast two decades I have witnessed drastic social changes that pushed Natato the verge of extinction. Writing a thesis on Nata is a fulfilment of oneof the many promises I have committed myself to through Nata languagedocumentation.In the rest of this section I outline some basic phonological, morpho-logical and syntactic characteristics which define Nata typologically as aBantu language. Familiarity with these properties will facilitate our under-standing of the proposal I present in the later chapters.1.5.1 Phonology of the augmentHere I discuss the different phonological forms/structures of the augmentas the left-most element of the nominal structure. Unlike Bantu augmentlanguages like Luganda which have only simple V(owel)-type augments(a.k.a initial vowels, see Hyman and Katamba 1993), Nata augments comein different syllable structures. I discuss four augment structures: the V–type augment, the VV-type, the CV–type, and the CVV–type. I start withthe V-type.2. This is not the first work to claim a linguistic connection between widely-separatedlanguage families: there is work on the ‘Romance-Bantu connection’, De Cat and Demuth(2008), as well as a ‘Salish-Japanese connection’ Kratzer (2005), Kiyota (2009). The V–type augmentsExamples of V–type augments are given in (13). As one can see, the V-typeaugments are manifested in seven surface/phonetic forms /i e ɛ a ɔ o u/,consistent with Nata as a seven vowel system3.(13) V-augment typesa. i=kj-ɔɔ́de ‘a/the honey badger’ C7b. i=βj-andá ‘(the) intestines’ C8c. e=me-kéra ‘(the) tails’ C4d. e=βí-taβo ‘(the) books’ C8e. ɛ=kɛ-rɛɛ́rɔ ‘a/the relish’ C7f. a=βa-aná ‘(the) children’ C2g. ɔ=mɔ-́rɔrɔ ‘a/the fire’ C3h. o=mo-síimo ‘(the) bone marrow’ C14i. o=βu-sɔɔ́hu ‘(the) greediness’ C14j. u=mw-aaká ‘a/the year’ C3k. u=βw-ɔɔŋgɔ́ ‘a/the brain’ C14Note that augments are manifested with different vowel heights (high,mid and low) and/or tongue root qualities (advanced [ATR] or retracted[RTR]) based on vowel harmony phonotactics. For discussions of Natavowel harmony rules see Gambarage (2013) , Gambarage and Pulleyblank(2017), and Anghelescu (2019). The VV–type augmentThe next case concerns the Nata VV augment form which is found withmonomoraic/monosyllabic class 9 nouns, (14a-c) but not with longer N-stems (i.e., disyllabic or polysyllabic), (14d-f):3. In Johannes (2007), it was claimed, based on impressionistic vowel quality, that Nataaugment vowels preceding the prefixes (Cj/Cw) (where C is a consonant) are variants ofhigh vowels (i.e., are the lax high vowels [ɪ ʊ]). Further research has confirmed that thereare no lax high vowels in Nata (see Gambarage (2013, 2017); Gambarage and Pulleyblank2017; Higgins 2011).17(14) The C9 VV vs V augmentsa. áa=n-da ‘a/the stomach’b. aa=n-dá ‘a/the lice’c. aa=ø-swɛ́ ‘a/the fish’d. a=m.borí ‘a/the goat’e. a=ø-kaβirá ‘a/the tribe’f. a=ø-kurú ‘a/the tortoise’For class 9 monosyllabic N-stem cases such as in (14a-c), I propose thatthe augment is a long vowel due to the word minimality constraint in (15):(15) Noun minimality constraint in Nata:A noun must consist of at least three moras.The minimal noun size requirement is three moras in Nata. However,when the interpretive component requires the covert augment to be used,for the reasons I make clear in Chapter 4, the minimal noun size require-ment cannot over-rule this semantic requirement:(16) a. MariaMariáMariat-a-it-iret-a-it-ireNEG-PST-kill-PFVaa=swéaa=ø-swéDET=9-fish‘Maria did not kill any fish.’b. MariaMariáMariat-a-it-iret-a-it-ireNEG-PST-kill-PFVswéø-swé9-fish‘Maria did not kill any fish.’ The CV–type augmentThe CV-type augment is found with class 5 nouns; class 5 nouns; it has theform ri-, beginning with a trill or tap, (17)4:4. A few monosyllabic class 5 nouns (about 3 in number) occur with the V-type augmentand a long form of the C5 prefix rii-, as in (i).18(17) The CV form ri- with mono- and polymoraic stemsa. rí=i-to ‘a/the leaf’b. ri=i-rú ‘a/the knee’c. ri=i-sɛ ́ ‘(the) cow dung’d. rí=í-βohe ‘a/the stone’e. ri=i-βurúuŋga ‘an/the egg’f. ri=i-kuβáte ‘a/the stalk’In Bantu historical linguistics, it is claimed that the augments and pre-fixes were CVs in Proto-Bantu (see Meinhof 1932; Guthrie 1967-1971;Maho 1999; see Diercks 2010 on Bukusu which still has a CV augmentin most noun classes with an exception in classes 1 and 9 which have a V-type.). If this is correct, then the cases in (17) retain the old augment shape.The prefixes seem to have lost their initial consonant, -r- (cf. De Blois 1970;De Wolf 1971; Williamson 1993; Maho 1999; Ndayiragije et al. 2012)5. Aswe saw for the VV-type, the CV type also would be realized as a covert Din contexts where the covert D is required semantically. See Chapter 4 fordiscussion of such contexts. The CVV–type augmentThe CVV-type augment occurs with the class 10 nouns and begins witha voiceless palatal affricate tʃ, (18). While the VV-type only occurs withmonosyllabic stems as a result of the noun minimality constraint given in(15), the CVV prefix is invariable as it occurs with all sorts of class 10 nouns:(i) The V-type with the V-rii- in monomoraic noun stemsa. e=rii-nɔ́ ‘a/the tooth’b. e=rii-kɔ́ ‘a/the kitchen’c. e=rii-sɔ́ ‘an/the eye’It is not clear to me why these nouns still maintain a V-type augment and not the CV-typeas we saw above. Apparently, some grammaticalization process is happening with the class5 augment and prefix but the direction of the change is unknown. Since when the covertaugment is semantically required, it is the only the initial vowel which deletes and not therii prefix, as I will show in Chapter 4, I will treat the rii- element in (i) as a prefix and notpart of the augment.5. In Nata, if there are two syllables containing an /r/ sound, the second /r/ will delete.19(18) The CV form tʃaa with mono- and polymoraic stemsa. tʃáa=ø-ka’ ‘(the) lions’b. tʃáa=n-dá ‘(the) lice’c. tʃaa=ŋ-gɔkɔ́ ‘(the) chickens’d. tʃaa=m-baráhɛ ‘(the) Thomson’s gazelles’The tʃaa= augment will also be realized as a covert augment when usedin semantic contexts requiring the use of a covert D, as (19b) below shows:(19) a. MariaMariáMariat-i-it-iret-a-it-ireNEG-PST-kill-PFVtʃáa=katʃáa=ø-kaD=ø-lions‘Maria did not kill the lions.’b. MariaMariáMariat-i-it-iret-a-it-ireNEG-PST-kill-PFVkakalions‘Maria did not kill any lions.’As I show in this thesis, regardless of the augment structure, all theaugment structures discussed here behave the same syntactically and se-mantically, consistent with the proposal I make in Chapters 3 and Morphology of the augmentIn this section, I present the Nata noun class prefixes, the prefixal materialfollowing the augment. As with many other Bantu languages, noun stemsin Nata are marked with prefixal morphology that corresponds to the nounclass of the nominal. Following the Bantu tradition, a list of the noun classeswith their prefixes in Nata is given in Table 1.2 below (cf. Meeussen 1967;Denny and Creider (1986); Maho 1999; and others). I have included theversion of each nominal without an overt augment, which occurs in certainsyntactically and semantically-defined environments. In chapters 3 and 4, Iwill argue that such nominals need to be licensed by a non-factual operator.20Table 1.2: The Nata N-prefixesCL N-prefix Overt AUG+N Gloss Covert AUG+N Gloss1 /mo-/ o=mo-súβe ‘a/the man’ mo-súβe ‘any man’2 /βa-/ a=βa-súβe ‘(the) men’ βa-súβe ‘any men’3 /mo-/ o=mu-tɛŕɛβi ‘a/the ladle’ mu-tɛŕɛβi ‘any ladle’4 /me-/ e=mi-tɛŕɛβi ‘(the) ladles’ mi-tɛŕɛβi any ladles’5 /re-/ ri=i-βáβa ‘a/the wing’ i-βáβa ‘any wing’6 /ma-/ a=ma-βáβa ‘(the) wings’ ma-βáβa ‘any wings’7 /ɣe-/ e=ɣe-túumbe ‘a/the chair’ ɣe-túumbe ‘any chair’8 /βe-/ a=βe-túumbe ‘(the) chairs’ βe-túumbe ‘any chairs’9 /N-/ a=m-bɔrɛt́ɛ ‘a/the goat’ m-bɔrɛt́ɛ ‘any goat’10 /N-/ caa=m-bɔrɛt́ɛ ‘(the) goats’ m-bɔrɛt́ɛ ‘any goats’11 /ro-/ o=ro-síri ‘a/the rope’ ro-síri ‘any rope’10 /N-/ caa=∅-sirí ‘(the) ropes’ ∅-sirí ‘any rope’12 /ka-/ a=ɣa-síri ‘a/the rope’ (dim.) ɣa-síri ‘any rope’ (dim.)13 /to-/ o=to-sirí ‘(the) ropes’ (dim.) to-sirí ‘any ropes’ (dim.)14 /βo-/ o=βu-kaanɔ́ ‘(the) sesame’ βu-kaanɔ́ ‘any sesame’15a /ɣo-/ ɣo-tuka ‘to dig’ ɣo-tuka ‘to dig’15 /ɣo-/ o=ɣo-twe ‘a/the ear’ ɣo-twe ‘any ear’16 /ha-/ a=há-se ‘a/(the) place(s)’ há-se ‘any place(s)’19 /he-/ e=he-sirí ‘(the) ropes’ (dim.) he-sirí ‘any ropes’ (dim.)20 /ɣo-/ o=ɣo-síri ‘a/the rope’ (aug.) ɣo-síri ‘any rope’ (aug.)21 /ɣe-/ e=ɣesirí ‘(the) ropes’ (dim.) ɣesirí ‘any ropes’ (dim.)Nata has a total of 19 N-classes, but traditionally 21 if the classes 17 koand 18 mo, which I analyze here as prepositions, would be added6. Class15a is an infinitive class; as a nomininal/verbal predicate it appears herewith no augment (see Schadeberg 2006). Note that the augment vowel al-ways agrees with the [+/-back] feature value of the N-prefix vowel. Obvi-ously, this rule does not apply with defective prefixes in C9 and C10 nouns,whose noun prefix has no vowel. The chart does not present all prefixalallomorphs resulting from vowel phonotactic conditions (see Gambarageand Pulleyblank 2017 for a fuller vowel harmony account).6. Classes 17 and 18 in Nata behave as prepositions rather than regular N-classes or locativeclasses. They do not trigger concord or number morphology, and they do not take modifierslike regular N-classes. See chapter 6 for further discussion.21The N-prefix has been argued to have both a descriptive and an evalu-ative function (cf. Fortune 1984; Déchaine et al. 2014). In the descriptivedimension, the N-prefix hosts some semantic concepts (class features) (cf.Denny and Creider 1986; Maho 1999; Contini-Morava 2000 and others)and it also marks number (see Carstens 2001; Déchaine et al. 2014). Inits evaluative dimension, the N-prefixes encode the speaker’s perspective(Déchaine et al 2014, Déchaine and Gambarage (2016), see also Potts 2007for a general discussion of evaluatives). I do not discuss the properties ofthe N-prefixes any further (see Déchaine and Gambarage 2016 for discus-sion). In chapter 3, I return to the issue of noun decomposition and thesyntactic function of the augment.1.5.3 SyntaxFor the purpose of the discussion of augments in Chapter 3, in §.,I briefly outline what syntactic categories are present in Nata and whichones may take an augment. Then, in §. I briefly touch on the issueof agreement, which is crucial in understanding both phrasal and sentencestructures. Finally, in §. I finish with the verb structure, which willhelp us to understand the various morphemes that may appear in the verbcomplex. Syntactic categoriesNata appears to have the following syntactic categories: nouns, adjectives,possessives, demonstratives, numerals, adverbs and verbs. In Table 1.3, Ilist each category with their possibility of taking an augment. Note thatnouns, adjectives, and possessives may or may not occur with the augmentdepending on the syntactic status as shown in Table 1.37.7. In Chapter 3, I will show that weak quantifiers behave syntactically as a subclass ofadjectives, but strong quantifiers behave differently, eg., consistently they do not take anaugment. Additionally, proper names and pronouns do not take augments. In Chapter 6, Iwill return to the issue of proper names and pronouns where I will discuss the implicationof my proposal for these categories.22Table 1.3: Nata syntactic categories and augment possibilitiesCategory With AUG Gloss Syntactic statusNouns o=mo-súβe ‘a/the man’ argument DPAdjectives o=mo-koro ‘a/the big one’ argument DPPossessives u=w-ane ‘mine’ argument DPCategory Without AUG Gloss Syntactic statusNominals mo-súβe ‘a man’ predicateAdjectives mo-koro ‘big’ modifierPossessives w-ane ‘my’ modifierDemonstratives -nɔ ‘this’ modifierNumerals i-βere ‘two’ modifierAdverbs iɣoro ‘up’ modifierVerbs -tuka ‘dig’ predicateIn Chapter 3, I will give arguments that the syntactic categories occur-ring with the augment, i.e., those labelled traditionally as nouns, adjectives,and possessives, are argument DPs; and categories without an augment arepredicates and/or modifiers. AgreementAs an agglutinating language, Nata exhibits exuberant agreement phenom-ena. I discuss the three types of agreement. The first one is concordialagreement, a system of feature sharing (gender and number/φ) betweennouns and modifiers, (20a). The second one is subject-verb agreement–a syn-tactically conditioned co-variation between the subject and the predicateusually involving gender, number, and in some cases person, (20b). Thethird one is object-verb agreement, which involves an anaphoric reading orTopichood, (20c) (see Bresnan and Mchombo 1987b; Contini-Morava 2000;Corbett 2000, 2006; Aikhenvald 2000; Carstens 2000, 2008; Baker 2003;23Zamparelli 2008; Henderson 2006; Giusti 2008; Diercks 2010; Carstensand Diercks 2011; and others)8.(20) Types of agreementa. Concordial agreement[e=ki-ghẹsọ[e=ki-ɣɛsɔ[D=C7-knifeki-rẹ]ki-rɛ]C7-long]ghi-ka-gw-aɣi-ka-gw-áSA7-PST-fall-FV‘A long knife fell.’b. Subject-verb agreemente=ki-ghẹsọe=ki-ɣɛsɔD=C7-knifeghi-ka-gw-aɣi-ka-gw-áSA7-PST-fall-FV‘A knife fell.’c. Object-verb agreementa-gha-(ke)-gw-isia-ɣa-(ke)-gw-isiSA7-PST-(OM7)-fall-FVe=(ki)-ghẹsọe=(ki)-ɣɛsɔD=C7-knifeLit: ‘S/he dropped (it) the knife.’The one difference between subject-verb agreement and object-verbagreement is that the latter is optional while the former is not. However, Iwill not focus on the subject-verb and object-verb agreement types as theyare not central to the current discussion. The N-prefixes and the differentagreement targets on various syntactic categories (adjectives (A), numerals(Num.), quantifiers (Quant.), demonstratives (Dem.), and possessive pro-nouns (Poss.pron.)) are given in Table 1.4 below.8. Carstens (2001, 2008) tries to unify these agreement types using a Chomskyan Agreeaccount.24Table 1.4: Agreement paradigmsI II III IV V VI VII VIIICL N A Num. Quant. Dem. Poss.pron. V.SA V.OMC1 mo- mo- u- u- u- u- a- mo-C2 βa- βa- βa- βa- βa- βa- βa- βa-C3 mo- mo- u- u- u- u- o- o-C4 me- me- e- ɣi- ɣi- ɣi- ɣe- ɣe-C5 (r)i- (r)i- ri- rj- ri- ri- re- re-C6 ma- ma- a- ɣa- ɣa- ɣa- ɣa- ɣa-C7 ke- ke- ki- ki- ki- ki- ke- ke-C8 βe- βe- βi- βi- βi- βi- βe- βe-C9 N-/ø- N/ø- i- i- i- i- e- e-C10 N-/ø- N/ø- i- tʃa- tʃi- tʃi- tʃe- tʃe-C11 ro- ro- ru- ru- ru- ru- ro- ro-C12 ka- ka- ka- ka- ka- ka- ka- ka-C13 to- to- tu- tu- tu- tu- to- to-C14 βo- βo- βu- βu- βu- βu- βo- βo-C15 ko- ko- ku- ku- ku- ku- ko- ko-C16 ha- ha- ha- ha- ha- ha- ha- ha-C19 he- he- hi- hi- hi- hi- he- he-C20 ɣo- ɣo- ɣu- ɣu- ɣu- ɣu- ɣo- ɣo-C21 ke- ke- ki- ki- ki- ki- ke- ke-The chart does not present all allomorphs resulting from vowel phono-tactic conditions (see Anghelescu 2019 for further discussion). Also, in thistable, various agreement prefixes may reflect Dahl’s Law, i.e., some obstru-ents such as k are realized as ɣ before a voiceless obstruent. The verb complexThe Nata verb template shown in Table 1.5 is similar in many respectsto that of other Bantu languages. Some exceptions include two elements,25namely the ‘nasal clitic’ (Nasal) and the second object marker (OM2). Dou-ble object constructions are found in a few Bantu languages; and the nasalclitic is only found in Zone E languages. In Table 1.5, slots I and II can befilled by a nasal clitic or NEG.Table 1.5: The Nata verb templateI II III IV V VI VII VIII IXa. (Nasal=) –– SA Tense (OM1) (OM2) Verb (Ext) Asp/FVb. –– (NEG) SA Tense (OM1) (OM2) Verb (Ext) Asp/FVWe will see consistently that object DPs can be dropped when there arecorresponding OMs in the verb, in which case the referents must be famil-iar to the discourse participants. Secondly, as Table 1.5 shows, the nasalclitic and negation must be in complementary distribution as exemplifiedin (21c):(21) NEG and the nasal clitic cannot co-occur [Nata]a. o=mo-subheo=mo-subheD=C1-mann=a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-an=a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-aN=SA-FUF-OM6-OM1-bring-APL-FV‘A/the man will bring it to him/her.’b. o=mo-subheo=mo-subheD=C1-manta-a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-ata-a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-aNEG-SA-FUF-OM6-OM1-bring-APL-FV‘A/the man will not bring it to him/her.’c. *o=mo-subhe*o=mo-subheD=C1-mann=ta-a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-an=ta-a-ku-gha-mu-ret-er-an=NEG-SA-FUF-OM6-OM1-bring-APL-FVIntended: ‘A/the man will not bring it to him/her.’26Initial diagnostics show that the nasal has some left-periphery func-tions, such as being a strong assertion marker or sureness marker (see Kotaniand Gambarage 2016). It is also possible that the nasal has some otherfunctions, eg., Focus marking as Brown (2013) observes, or some modalityfunction as Francis (2014) observes. More research is needed to pin downits function.1.6 Thesis outlineThe structure of the remainder of this thesis will be as follows. In Chapter2 I will review the literature in relation to the augment/D phenomena.I revisit various D contrasts and show that none of these are capable ofexplaining the core function of the augment/D in Nata. This leads to myproposal.The syntactic-semantic analysis of the Nata augment is presented in twodistinct chapters. Chapter 3 presents the syntactic proposal for the augmentas D. Chapter 4 presents the semantic analysis of the augment where I claimthat the augment requires a choice function analysis following Matthewson(1999). I compare the Nata augments with the strikingly similar determinersystem in St’át’imcets (Salish) (Matthewson 1998; 1999).In Chapter 5, I extend my analysis and argue that the notion of existenceis pertinent to other Bantu languages with augments also. I conclude that ofthe nine languages I investigated, D systems in eight languages encode thespeaker-oriented notion of existence, namely, Nata, Runtankore-Rukiga,Haya, Luganda, Kinande, Xhosa, Zulu and Bemba. One language, Dzamba(spoken in the Democratic Republic of Congo), encodes novelty-familiarity,hence the notion of existence is not applicable to Dzamba.Chapter 6 is my last chapter in which I discuss the parametric variationof augments in Bantu. I show that some variations can be explained underthe current theory and some augment aspects may be reducible to inde-pendent syntactic variation. This chapter also gives the direction of futureresearch.27Chapter 2The Nata augment: now yousee it, now you don’t!This chapter reviews the literature and establishes the groundwork of themorphosyntactic and semantic features that are traditionally assumed tobe hallmarks of Ds, that may be linked to the Nata augment. The augment,as I argue in future chapters, is a morphosyntactic head instantiatingthe category D (cf. Halle and Marantz 1993; Embick and Noyer 2001;Hornstein et al. 2005). I hold the view that cross-linguistically features oroperations involving Ds may vary from language to language depending onD-feature composition. In natural languages, the D position can be a locusfor: (a) a mass-count distinction (Déchaine et al. 2018), (b) Case (Halpert2012), (c) deictic force (Gillon 2006; Guillemin 2009), (d) definiteness(Heim 1988; 2011; Schwarz 2009; 2012), (e) specificity (Enç 1991) ornone of the above1. Using data from Nata, I argue in this chapter that thefollowing generalizations are upheld in Nata.1. The Bantu overt augment has previously been linked to features of gender and num-ber (see Ndayiragije et al. 2012), Topicality (see Petzell 2003), and Focality (Hyman andKatamba 1993). Ndayiragije et al argue that in Kirundi, vowel harmony between the aug-ment and the N-prefix vowel is a result of an AGREE relation. For a discussion of Natavowel harmony rules between the augment and the prefix see Gambarage and Pulleyblank(2017), also refer to Chapter 1. In Chapters 5 and 6, I return to the notions of Topicalityand Focus after presenting my proposal in Chapters 3 and 4.28(22) Generalizations about the Nata augment:a. The Nata augment is not conditioned by the mass-count contrast.b. The Nata augment is not conditioned by Case.c. The Nata augment is not conditioned by deixis.d. The Nata augment is not conditioned by definiteness.e. The Nata augment is not conditioned by specificity.f. The Nata augment is not a domain restriction element.I show that mass-count, Case, deixis, definiteness, specificity or domainrestriction do not condition the selection of the augment in Nata. In Chap-ters 3 and 4, I will present my grand proposal about the syntactic-semanticfunction of the Nata augment.The chapter is organized as follows. In §2.1 I present the problem, thepuzzling behaviour of Nata augments. This leads to §2.2 where I investi-gate possible accounts and why they do not work for Nata. In §2.2.1 discussthe possibility that the mass-count distinction may force augment choice,in a manner similar to the distinction between count nouns with a non-expletive D and mass nouns with an expletive D in Old French. I show thatthe overt augment cannot be an expletive element. In §2.2.2 I explore thenotion of Case and rule out the hypothesis that the augment can assign Caseto its complement NP/φP. In §2.2.3-§2.2.5 I investigate the semantic fea-tures of deixis, definiteness, and specificity and show that Nata speakers donot switch augments based on deixis, (in)definiteness, or (non-)specificitycontrasts. In §2.2.6 I discuss the notion of domain restriction where I showthat DPs containing an augment may or may not be interpreted via do-main restriction, unlike Skwxwú7mesh deictic Ds and the non-deictic D inOkanagan (Gillon 2006, Lyon 2011). In §2.3 I give a roadmap on how the29augment puzzles can be resolved, which leads to my proposal in Chapters3 and 4. In §2.4 I give a summary and conclusion.2.1 The puzzling behaviour of the Nata augmentI seek to provide a definitive answer to the question of what features un-derlie the contrast between Nata argument DPs with an overt augment andargument DPs without one. Below I provide initial data showing the con-texts in which Nata speakers switch nominal expressions.2.1.1 Sometimes the Nata augment is thereIn declarative sentences, the Nata overt augment is obligatorily presentwhen used in an argument position, such as in (23a); or in argument posi-tion in embedded clauses, such as in (23b).(23) a. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-mana-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛk-aSA1-PST-laugh-FV‘A/the man laughed.’b. N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg–PST-see-FV[o=mo-subhe[o=mo-súβe[D=C1-mana-ra-sẹk-a]a-ra-sɛḱ-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]‘I saw [a/the man laughing].’When the covert augment is used in the cases in (23) they turn out tobe ungrammatical, as (24) shows.(24) a. * mo-subhe* mo-súβeC1-mana-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛḱ-aSA1-PST-laugh-FVIntended: ‘A/the man laughed.’30b. *N-ka-rọr-a*N-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg–PST-see-FV[ mo-subhe[ mo-súβe[ C1-mana-ra-sẹk-a]a-ra-sɛḱ-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]Intended: ‘I saw [a/the man laughing].’Another environment where the overt augment may be used is in nega-tive sentences with the felicity condition that the DP is associated with anexistential interpretation, as in (25).(25) [Context: The speaker believes that a man who did not laugh exists]a. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-manta-a-sẹk-ireta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘A/the man did not laugh.’b. a-ka-bhugh-aa-ka-βuɣ-aSA1-PST-say-FV[ango[aŋgo[thato=mo-subheo=mo-subheD=mo-subhet-a-a-sẹk-ire]t-a-a-sɛk-ire]NEG-SA1-PST-laugh-PFV]‘S/he said [that a man didn’t laughed].’Finally, the overt augment is also used in post-copula environmentswhere the nominal expression taking the augment always denotes anindividual.[Context: Bahati is a gender neutral name. A woman and a man are stand-ing before us. M is wondering which person is Bahati:](26) a. BahatiBahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhen=o=mo-súβeCOP=D=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’31b. o=mo-subheo=mo-subheD=C1-manni-weni-weCOP-RELBahatiBahatiBahatiLit: The man is the one who is Bahati.’The puzzle with the cases in (25) and (26) is that the overt augmentmay be not used if these structures have different interpretations, as I showin the following subsection.2.1.2 Sometimes the Nata augment isn’t thereWhile we saw that in negative sentences the overt augment is possible, ina restricted set of negative environments the overt augment is unavailable,and speakers switch to using the covert augment. Note that for the covertaugment to be used, there must be some kind of a non-factual operator to li-cense this element (compare with example (24) above) (see Progovac 1993;Gambarage 2012; 2013; Carstens and Mletche 2015 and many others).(27) [Context: The speaker does not believe that a man laughed]a. mo-subhemo-súβeC1-manta-a-sẹk-ireta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘No man laughed.’b. a-ka-bhugh-aa-ka-βuɣ-aSA1-PST-say-FV[ango[aŋgo[thatmo-subhemo-subhemo-subhea-gha-sẹk-a]a-ɣa-sɛk-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]‘S/He said [that a man laughed] (I doubt it).’32(28) [Context:The speaker does not believe that a man laughed]a. #o=mo-subhe#o=mo-súβeD=C1-manta-a-sẹk-ireta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFVIntended: ‘No man laughed.’b. #Makuru#MakuruMakurua-ka-bhugh-aa-ka-βuɣ-aSA1-PST-say-FV[ango[aŋgo[thato=mo-subheo=mo-suβeD=mo-subhea-gha-sẹk-a]a-ɣa-sɛk-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]Intended: ‘Makuru said [that a man laughed] (I doubt it).’Finally, the last case involves post-copula environments where the aug-ment seems to be obligatorily absent. The nominal expression in (29a) onlydenotes a property. This contrasts with the nominal argument with a D in(29b), which denotes an individual or entity and is marked as infelicitousin this this context2.(29) [Context: M is describing Bahati’s gender...]a. BahatiBahatiBahatim=mo-subhen=mo-súβeCOP=C1-man‘Bahati is a man.’b. #Bahati#BahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhen=o=mo-súβeCOP=D=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’2. Note that the copula nasal, which is underlyingly n, may be homorganic to the im-mediately following nasal or consonant if no vowel intervenes between, as (29a) shows.Compare with the example in (26), where no copula nasal assimilation takes place.33In summary, the data presented above give us three classes of nominalexpressions: argument DPs with an overt augment, examples (23)-(26); ar-gument DPs with a covert augment, example (27); and nominal expressionswithout an augment, example (29). These are summarized below:(30) a. Argument DPs with an overt augment: [DP D[...]]b. Argument DPs with a covert augment: [DP D∅[...]]c. Non-argument nominals (no augment): [φP φ[...]]Factors underlying the distribution of nominals above will be exten-sively discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. At this moment we remain agnos-tic about what these nominal distinctions follow from. At the end of thischapter I will give a roadmap on how my proposal in Chapters 3 and 4will explain the syntactic-semantic factors forcing augment choices in Nata.Before presenting such a proposal, here, I consider a range of possible ac-counts to show that none of the previously proposed D accounts can explainwhat conditions the choice of augment in Nata.2.2 Possible accounts and why they don’t workI start each section by giving a brief review of the relevant literature onhow these features are encoded in other D-systems, then I turn to Nata toshow why these accounts cannot explain what conditions the presence orabsence of the overt augment as summarized in (30a)-(30b). I start withthe mass-count distinction.2.2.1 The mass-count contrast does not condition theaugmentI consider whether the partition of the Nata augment system between theovert augment and the covert/null augment is conditioned by factors thatpartition nouns like mass-count or non-count–count as is the case in manylanguages. I show these factors do not force augment choice in Nata. In34some languages, English, for instance, an overt D is obligatory with sin-gular count nouns, (31). However, a bare noun is possible with countplurals (32a), abstract nouns, (32b), mass nouns, (32c), when used in non-unique/non-familiar contexts:(31) Alternation in overt D bare nouns [English]a. A boy is climbing up the treeb. The boy is climbing up the treec. *Boy is climbing up the tree(32) Appearance of plural/abstract/mass nounsa. (The) boys are climbing up the tree.b. (The) truth can be painful to hear.c. (The) milk is white.In some Romance languages, an expletive D–a D with no semanticfunction–is inserted in mass or abstract nouns only to satisfy a syntacticrequirement (Longobardi 1994; Kyriakaki 2014; Déchaine et al. 2018).Déchaine et al. (2018) show that in some varieties of Old French, abstractnouns and mass nouns (count nouns) may take an expletive D. The alterna-tions involve DPs with an expletive D (the cases in a) and DPs with covertD/D-drop (the b cases). D.M and D.F stand for masculine and feminine Ds,respectively:35(33) Abstract Ns in Old French [Déchaine et al., 2018: 171]a. Mesbutsiifvus2PLplestpleasequethatjeo1SGvus2PLdietell//La veritéD.FEM truthvus2PLcunterai1SG.will.tell‘If it interests you, I will tell you my adventure.’(lit.‘tell the truth.’[From Lais de Marie de France, Guigemarv.312–13]b. Entrebetweeneus3PLmeinentmaintainjoiejoymutmuchgrant.great‘They are happy to finally be together.’(lit.‘maintain much joy.’) [From Lais de Marie de France,Chievrefueil v.94](34) Mass Ns in Old French [Déchaine et al., 2018: 171]a. Eandparbysunhisdundonationunt3PL.havele cunreiD.MASC provision‘He had furnished them with provisions.’(lit.‘have the provision’) [From Le voyage de saint Brendan,v.582]b. MaisbutDeusGodnenotvoltwantquethatplusmoredeof.theforsoutsideVenistcamecunreidprovisionpurforsulonlymunmycorsbody‘But God did not want to bring from outside provisions destinedonly to feed me.’[From Le voyage de saint Brendan, v.1583-4]Adopting the hypothesis that nominal arguments are DPs (Longobardi1994, 2001, 2008), Déchaine et al. analyze the overt D which is used tomark definite descriptions here as a non-referring D as it does not involve36a definite interpretation3.Expletive Ds (non-denoting Ds) are obligatory with generic (kind-denoting) expressions in a number of languages. In Greek, (35a), Italian,(35b), and French, (35c) the definite D is used as an expletive D where itreceives a generic interpretation.(35) Expletive D in generics [Kyriakaki 2010: 255; 263]a. *(I)the.MASC.PLelefand-eselephant.MASC-PLlatrev-unadore.PRES-3PL*(ta)the.NEU.PLfistikj-a [Greek]peanut.NEU-PL‘Elephants adore peanuts.’ (Generic subject and object).’b. *(I)the.PLcastor-ibeaver-PLsonobe.3PLintelligent-i. [Italian]intelligent-PL‘Beavers are intelligent.’c. Lesthedodosdodossontareéteints [French]extinct‘Dodos are extinct.’In Nata, the overt augment occurs with count Ns (36)-(37), abstractNs (38), and mass Ns, (39)-(40). Recall from Chapter 1 that the classprefix expresses number morphology (singular/plural), and number mark-ing on mass nouns is interpreted as follows: ‘some amount of X’ appear-ing with singular morphology, and an interpretation akin to ‘X’ or ‘lots3. There are different expletive Ds discussed in the linguistic literature that I will not ex-haust here. One kind is that found in Catalan, German and Brazillian Portugese whichmark body part nouns to express (extended) inalienable possession (see Vergnaud and Zu-bizarreta 1992; Longobardi 1994.). Nata does not have this type of Ds. Another categoryis the polydefinite Ds in Greek and related languages, which I relate to Nata D-doublingconstructions which I discuss in Chapter 3. Expletive Ds are also obligatory with generic(kind-denoting) expressions in a number of languages: Greek, Italian, French etc where thedefinite D receives a generic interpretation (see recently Espinal (2017); Kyriakaki 2014).Obviously, Nata overt Ds do have a semantic function as I argue in Chapter 4.37of X’ appearing with plural morphology (see Borer 2005; Chierchia 1998;Schwarzschild 2006; Wiltschko 2009; Gillon 2010 for discussion in otherlanguages).(36) a. [a=ø-ka-raam][o=ø-mu-ráam][D=C9-pen]i-ka-bhunek-ai-ka-βunek-aSA9-PST-break-FV‘A/the pen broke.’b. *[ø-karaam]*[ø-karaam]C1-pen]i-ka-bhunek-ai-ka-βunek-aSA9-PST-break-FVIntended: ‘A/the pen broke.’(37) a. [a=bha-kári][a=βa-kari][D=C2-women]bha-ka-het-aβa-ka-het-aSA2-PST-pass-FVha-nọha-nɔC16-here‘(The) women passed here.’b. *[bha-kári]*[βa-kari][C2-women]bha-ka-het-aβa-ka-het-aSA2-PST-pass-FVha-nọha-nɔC16-hereIntended: ‘(The) women passed here.’(38) a. [o=bho-bhiihi][o=βo-βíihi][D=C14-lie]bhu-ka-mw-oor-aβu-ka-mw-óor-aSA14-PST-cost-FV‘(The) lies cost him/her.’b. *[bho-bhiihi]*[o=βo-βíihi][D=C14-lie]bhu-ka-mw-oor-aβu-ka-mw-óor-aSA14-PST-OM1-cost-FVIntended: ‘(The) lies cost him/her.’38(39) a. [ri=i-sahẹ][rí=í-saahɛ]D=C5-bloodri-ko-om-ari-ka-om-áSA5-PST-dry-FV‘(An/the) amount of blood dried up.’b. *[i-sahẹ]*[í-saahɛ]C5-bloodri-ko-om-ari-ka-om-aSA5-PST-dry-FVIntended: ‘(An/the) amount of blood dried up.’(40) a. [a=ma-saahẹ][a=ma-saahɛ]D=C6-bloodgha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FV‘(The) blood/lots of blood spilled.’b. *[ma-saahẹ]*[ma-saahɛ]C3-bloodgha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FVIntended: ‘(The) blood/lots of blood spilled.’The fact that covert augments are ruled out in contexts which in En-glish, allow bare plurals and bare mass nouns, and which in Old French,allow bare count nouns, provides an argument for lack of alternation be-tween mass and count nouns and/or count vs. non-count nouns in Nata.Furthermore, I do not analyze Nata overt augments as expletive Ds due tothe semantic claim I articulate in Chapter 4, that the overt augments havea particular semantic function. One way to diagnose expletive Ds in Ro-mance and related languages is to use the definite D in contexts in whichDPs do not refer to unique or familiar referents. This cannot serve as a diag-nostic for Nata given that overt augments are not definites as I argue below.Finally, analyzing overt augments as expletive Ds does does not explain thesemantic contrast between overt augments and covert augments in Nata.392.2.2 Case does not condition the augmentIn this section I consider Halpert’s (2012; 2015) arguments that Case con-ditions the augment in Zulu. Points of convergence and departure betweenthe Case analysis and the behaviour of augments in Nata are summarizedbelow:Table 2.1: Similarities and differences between Zulu and Nata DsProperty Halpert’s analysis Nata augmentsLicensing is vP internal 3 3Non-overt AUG are licensed 3 3Augment choice by Case 3 7Licensing by CAUS or APPL 3 7AUGs are semantically vacuous 7 3I review arguments for the Case account then show that Case does notforce augment choice in Nata.Halpert (2012, 2015), following Schütze’s (1997) analysis for Icelandicargument nominals, argues that Zulu has a system of Case corresponding tothe inherent, structural, and quirky Case found in languages like Icelandic.According to Halpert, examples of inherent Case include argument expres-sions with overt augments (41a), and elements that replace the augment,such as pre-nominal demonstratives (41b) or the oblique element thatmarks benefactive objects, kwa-, (41c). Halpert claims that examples ofstructural Case are augmentless ([-A]) nominals, as in (42a). Finally, basedon Halperts, quirky Case (an unpredictable Case morphology which marksnominals but does not license them) corresponds to augment-permittingstructures (those with vowel coalescence); this includes objects of comita-tives, (43a) and certain temporal adverbials, (43b).40(41) Halpert’s inherent Case [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 237; 130; 212]a. A-ngi-m-bon-iNEG-1SG-see-NEGu-muntuAUG-1person‘I don’t see the person.’b. lo1DEMmntwana1childu-ya-ganga1S-YA-misbehave‘This child is misbehaving.’c. u-SiphoAUG-1Siphou-zo-pheka1S-FUT-cookukudlaAUG.15foodkwa-zinganeKWA-10child‘Sipho will cook food for the children.’(42) Halpert’s structural Case [Zulu, adapt. Halpert 2012: 91]a. A-ngi-bon-iNEG-1SG-see-NEGmuntu1person‘I don’t see anybody.’b. *ngi-bona1SG-seemuntu1personIntended: ‘I see a/the person.’(43) Halpert’s quirky Case [Zulu, adapt. Halpert 2012]a. u-MfundoAUG-1Mfundou-dlala1S-playi-bholaAUG-5ballno-muntu [>na+u-muntu]NA.AUG-1person‘Mfundo is playing soccer with someone/the person.’b. u-MlungisiAUG-1Mlungisiu-zo-fika1S-FUT-arrivenga-sonto [>nga+i-sonto]NGA.AUG-5sunday‘Mlungisi will arrive on Sunday.’41Halpert argues that overt augments function as morphological Case li-censors, while augmentless nominals (covert augments in the current anal-ysis) are restricted to vP-internal positions where they can be structurallylicensed via a local relation with a Licensing head L. Thus, according toHalpert’s analysis, in constructions with zero or one external argument,only one nominal (the highest argument) may be licensed, (44).(44) Augmentless licensing via L [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 94]Here L asymmetrically c-commands and licenses the highest (the mostlocal) augmentless nominal argument inside vP. Halpert argues that in neg-ative constructions involving heads that take a specifier argument – CAUSor APPL, as in (45a) – L can license one more augmentless nominal argu-ment. Thus, there is a 1-to-1 mapping between augmentless nominal ar-guments and the licensing heads, which means three or four augmentlessnominals are impossible in Zulu as the ungrammaticality of (45b) shows.Curiously, the second augmentless nominal has to be licensed by V0 throughCAUS or APPL, as illustrated in (46). Halpert argues that the highest aug-mentless argument is licensed by L and Case introduced by APPL/CAUSis passed down to V0 (under feature inheritance (Chomsky 2008; Asarina2011))4.4. In Bantu APPL and CAUS may co-occur. For this Halpert argues that the appearance ofboth CAUS and APPL does not mean that each will independently license an augmentlessnominal; rather, she argues that there is one V0, hence only one argument will be licensedby them.42(45) No triple augmentless nominals [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 108; M.B]a. uSiphoAUG.1Siphoa-ka-fundis-el-iNEG-1SG-teach-APPL-NEGmuntu1persona-bantwanaAUG-2childlutho7thing‘Sipho doesn’t teach (the) kids anything for anyone.’b. *uSiphoAUG.1Siphoa-ka-fundis-el-iNEG-1SG-teach-APPL-NEGmuntu1personbantwana2childlutho7thingIntended: ‘Sipho doesn’t teach any kids anything for anyone.’(46) Case licensed via APPL/CAUS [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 94]Halpert argues further that augmentless nominals are licensed in aprobe-goal (Agree(ment)) fashion with the effect that all augmentless nom-inals must be vP internal. Extending this to conjoint/disjoint data, sheargues that the disjoint morpheme YA in non-negative data is a morpho-logical spell out of L. Just as L probes for augmentless nominals for Caselicensing, Halpert argues that L probes the vP content for an XP to agreewith, and if the vP has no argument, YA spells out as a result of the probefailing to find its goal:43(47) Disjoint morphological marker YA [Halpert 2012: 166]Halpert claims that evidence for (47) comes from predicates with no the-matic subject like weather predicates, (48), as well as constructions whereall of the arguments of the verb have moved out of vP, leaving it empty(i.e., after A-movement has occurred), (49a), in contrast with (49b) whichhas a vP-internal argument:(48) Weather predicates [Adapt. Halpert, 2012: 181]a. ku-ya-banda17S-YA-cold‘It’s cold.’b. *ku-banda17S-coldIntended: ‘It’s cold.’(49) Disjoint/conjoint [Adapted from Halpert, 2012: 142; 194]a. i=qandakD=C5.eggu=SiphoiD=C1.Sipho[u-ya-li-pheka1S-YA-5O-cookti tk VP] (disjoint)‘As for the egg, Sipho is cooking it.’b. u=SiphoD=C1.Siphou-(*ya-li)-pheka1S-(YA-5O)-cooki=qanda (conjoint)D=C5.egg‘Sipho is cooking an egg.’44Halpert concludes therefore that augmentless nominals are argumentsthat need structural Case licensing, (50a); the counterpart augmented Nsare inherently/intrinsically case-marked KPs, (50b)5.(50) Structural and inherent K [Halpert, 230]a. DPD NPb. KPKaugDPD NPHalpert’s assumption that there is morphological Case in Zulu that headsa ‘Kase Phrase’ (KP) is novel to Bantu, but not to other languages (see Lam-ontagne and Travis 1986; Loebel 1994 in the analyses of German, Finnish,Russian, and Spanish DPs)6. However, I do not extend Halpert’s analysisof Zulu augments to Nata for three major reasons: (i) The Nata augmentis not conditioned by Appl/Caus heads (§; (ii) The elements thatintroduce Halpert’s Case system are missing (§, (iii) The Nata aug-ment is not semantically vacuous (§ Verb extensions do not license the augmentWhile it is true that the augmentless nominal argument must be licensedvP-internally, the treatment of CAUS and APPL as Case licensers is cross-linguistically puzzling as similar heads cannot be treated as forming a syn-tactic/semantic class with operators that license polarity elements. APPL/-CAUS do not play any licensing role in Nata, which I also believe is the case5. Halpert discusses restrictions on expletive constructions and conjoint/disjoint morphol-ogy in Zulu as providing evidence for her account. Nata lacks such structures. However,see Carstens and Mletshe 2016 for a review of Halpert’s account where they argue that suchrestrictions do not derive from Case but from Focus.6. The KP was proposed first by Lamontagne and Travis (1986) and advanced by Loebel(1994) in the analyses of German, Finnish, Russian, and Spanish, in which Loebel arguesthat K selects for a DP. For instance, she splits up the German article/D der into two sep-arate functional categories: the D d-, which hosts some semantic content (i.e., referentialfeatures), and er, which has a syntactic function, namely K.45in Zulu7. Rather, as I argue in Chapter 3, augmentless nominal argumentsare licensed by a non-factual operator (NEG and others) (see also Chapter6 for various licensing parameters in Bantu).In addition, licensing of covert augments in Nata does not seem tokeep track of either locality or a 1-to-1 mapping between the non-factualoperators and covert augments to be licensed. A single operator in casessuch as (51) can license multiple covert augments in an unselective bindingfashion:[Context: A mentally confused person always makes up stuff. You hearhim hallucinating saying A man is teaching kids some language for a visitorjust at the front door of your house. You go outside to calm him down. Yousay, that’s not true, (51)].(51) Multiple DPs with a polarity D∅ [Nata]mo-subhemo-súβeC1-mant-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-teach-APPL-FVmu-ghenimú-ɣeniD=C1-visitorbha-anaβa-anáD=C2-childki-ghambọkí-ɣambɔD=C7-language‘No man is teaching any kids any language for any visitor.’In this case, a single NEG c-commands/takes scope over the entire propo-sition in LF where it licenses all the covert augments in the proposition.Nata DP arguments containing a covert augment are at odds with the gen-eral licensing condition proposed by Halpert, (52):(52) [Halpert, p.93]Augmentless nominal generalization (Final):An augmentless nominal argument must be local to a nominal-licensing head.7. See Hyman and Katamba (1993); Carstens and Mletshe (2016); and Cheng and Downing(2009) who define locality as a function of the Focus parameter in Zulu.46I rule out the APPL and CAUS as licensors in Nata. The treatment ofCAUS and APPL as Case licensers is cross-linguistically puzzling and similarheads cannot be treated as forming a syntactic/semantic class with non-factual operators that license polarity elements like NEG. No evidence for morphological Case in NataElements used in Halpert’s account as evidence for Case are missing in Nata.Halpert takes the surfacing of the disjoint morphology YA in weather pred-icates as the correlate of L which probes to license structural Case. Datawith weather predicates in Nata do not show signs of probe-goal relationsthat may substantiate a Case theoretic–account in Nata. (53), for instance,contains weather predicates which also lack thematic subjects, however,there is no morphology to signal the probe-goal activity8.(53) Weather predicates [Nata]a. ko-mitit-irekoo-mítit-ireSA20-cold-PFV‘It’s cold.’b. ko-rinde-erekoo-ríínda-ireSA20-gloom-PFV‘It’s gloomy.’Additionally, according to Halpert’s analysis, augment-permitting struc-tures (comitative objects, instrumentals, etc.,) are an exceptional type ofmorphological Case, namely quirky Case, because they have an unusualand unexpected agreement morphology and they do not license nominals.Nevertheless, these structures involve vowel coalescence phonological pro-cesses, with an underlying augment vowel, which happens in many lan-guages irrespective of their Case morphology (see Casali 2003 and others).In Nata, hiatuses involving objects of comitatives are resolved by way ofvowel harmony, and have no bearing on Case, as these are cross-linguisticphonological processes:8. It is not clear whether the subject agreement in (53) is a class 15 or 17 or 20. I will useclass 20 since class 15 in Nata is the infinitive class and 17 is prepositional; see Chapter 6.47(54) Augment-permitting structures [Nata]a. MakuruMakurúMakurun-a-ku-bhar-an-an-aa-ku-bhar-an-aMN-SA1-IMPF-RECIP-FVnu=u=mw-aanana=u=mw-aanawith=D=C1-child‘Makuru is playing with a child.’b. *Makuru*MakurúMakurun-a-ku-bhar-an-an-aa-ku-bhar-an-aFOC-SA1-IMPF-RECIP-FVna= mw-aanana= mw-aanawith= C1-childIntended: ‘Makuru is playing with a child.’We can see that the hiatus (a+u) formed of the oblique structure andthe prepositional vowel is resolved by right-to-left harmony resulting in thehomophonous vowels (u+u) (see Anghelescu 2019 for more vowel hiatuscontexts). This has nothing to do with Case.Halpert remarks that augment-replacing structures such as argumentnominals occurring with pre-nominal DEMs cannot occur with the aug-ment. This seems to support both De Dreu’s (2008) and Carstens and Mlet-she’s (2016) observation that the augment in Zulu has D-like properties.If the augments were Case, we would predict that they could co-occurwith pre-nominal DEM, but they do not. In Nata pre-nominal DEMs alsodo not occur with the augment and the language shows no signs of mor-phological Case. Halpert seems to correctly locate overt augments in thesame structural position as augment-replacing material (e.g., pre-nominalDEMs), where they are in complementary distribution (see Chapter 3), con-sistent with the cross-linguistic treatment of pre-nominal DEMs and Ds, buther analysis fails to identify the augment as a D element:...augment-replacing morphology is selected for in certain con-structions and carries some semantic content. Selection ofaugment-replacing morphology eliminates the need for an aug-ment. [Halpert 2012: 222]48There are two choices for Halpert for augmentless nominal arguments:either they do not contain a D (in which case we get the problem of pred-icate nominals which cannot equal argument DPs (see Zerbian and Krifka2008), or they do (but she does not adopt a covert D option). Halpertmakes an implicit assumption that there is a DP-shell but it is not clear inher analysis what fills the D slot in her analysis in (50) above. In this thesis,I will demonstrate, consistent with previous literature on Zulu (see de Dreu2008; Adams 2010; Carstens and Mletshe 2016; and others), that the Nataaugment is linked to various D-like properties syntactically (see Chapter 3)and semantically (see Chapter 4). The augment is not semantically vacuousI agree with Halpert that augments in Zulu, like in Nata, do not contrast fordefiniteness or specificity, as I show in this thesis. However, I do not treatovert augments in Nata or Zulu as semantically vacuous as Halpert claims:I have argued that the augment vowel is essentially a mor-phosyntactic default that does not correspond to any particularmeaning or syntactic configuration. [Halpert 2012: 222]I argue that in the syntax, a covert augment must be licensed by a higheroperator, but that this has a reflex in the semantics. For instance, the inter-pretive contrast between (55a) and (55c) seems to be that the augmentlessnominal in (55c) must be interpreted under the scope of the non-factual op-erator where it yields a non-existential interpretation, while the overt aug-ment in (55a) is associated with an existential interpretation (cf. Matthew-son 1998; Giannakidou 1998, 2006):(55) Interpretive contrast [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 214-215]a. u-XolaniAUG-1Xolaniu-dlala1S-playno-mfana [>na+umfana)]NA.AUG-1boy‘Xolani is playing with a boy.’49b. *u-XolaniAUG-1Xolaniu-dlala1S-playna-mfanaNA-1boyIntended: ‘Xolani is playing with a boy.’c. u-XolaniAUG-1Xolania-ka–dlal-iNEG-1S-play-NEGna-mfanaNA-1boy‘Xolani is not playing with any boy.’In these cases what forces the choice of an augmentless nominal doesnot seem to be structural Case; rather it is when Ds are interpreted withscope under a non-factual operator like NEG. Halpert admits that the con-ditioning factor is NEG but provides no explanation for the effect of NEG:The environment in (281)[55a] is an environment where a coreargument, such as a subject or direct object, would also be re-quired to bear an augment... By contrast, if we place nominalswith augment-permitting prefixes in negated sentences, as in[55c], the augment may now be dropped.[Halpert 2012: 222]Halpert seems to acknowledge the role of non-factual operators suchas NEG in the distribution of augments but adopts a different analysis thatthere is an abstract L (apparently distinct from NEG) that does the licens-ing. It indeed seems that NEG is the relevant operator that licenses theaugmentless nominal. Similar examples are available in Nata as I show inChapter 3. Note that under Halpert’s analysis of oblique arguments, caseslike (55a) are treated as exceptions (i.e., quirky Case). The Case analysisthus fails to provide a unified account for simple cases such as these.Since I cannot find any connection between Case and negation in Nata, Itake non-factual operators as the overt realization of L in Halpert’s account.The implication of my analysis is that L/NEG not only accounts for thesyntactic distribution but also for the interpretive contrast between the twoaugment choices, as I show in the future chapters. I therefore rule out the50Case analysis for Nata augments. In Chapter 5, I provide an alternative andunified analysis for Zulu and Nata augments.2.2.3 Deixis does not condition the augmentIn this section I explore whether the Nata augment is the locus of deic-tic features, namely spatial/temporal and visibility features. I argue thataugments in Nata do not encode deixis. Defining deixisIn other languages D is the locus of deictic force (see Hanks 2005; Gillon2006; Guillemin 2007; and many others). Deixis is a way in which “the ref-erence of certain elements in a sentence is determined in relation to either adiscourse participant, or to a specific time and/or place of the discourse (orutterance)”, (Guillemin 2009: 9). In some languages deictic features aremarked on D (Gillon 2006 on Skwxwú7mesh; Guillemin 2007 on MauritiusCreole), while in others, they are introduced by a demonstrative (Hanks2005 on a typology of deictic elements; Lyon 2011 on Okanagan; Gam-barage 2012 on Nata). In yet other languages, deictic features are markedboth on D and on demonstratives (Matthewson 1998 on St’át’imcets).Typically, deictic distinctions include proximity, and this can be eitherspatial or temporal, and visibility (see Matthewson 1998; Gillon 2006). De-spite the range of distinctions among deictic Ds, all deictic elements locatea referent in space/time in relation to discourse participants. In the nextsection I show that Nata augments do not encode deictic features. The Nata augment does not encode deixisAs I argued in Gambarage (2012), Nata augments are not deictics; spa-tial deixis is fixed by the deictic demonstratives (DEMs) occurring in post-nominal position9. A table below shows three types of spatial DEMs in9. Nata has a pre-nominal DEM which replaces the augment and appears with no H-tone.The element always marks referents mentioned in the previous discourse, unlike deicticdemonstratives. See Chapter 3 for further discussion.51Nata: proximal, intermediate, and distal. DEMs are marked with a classprefix, which means they agree with the head noun10.Table 2.2: Three-way distinction of deictic demonstratives in NataDemonstrative Agree with singular N Agree with plural Neg. o-mu-kári ‘woman’ C1 e.g. a-βa-kári ‘women’ C2Proximal: -nɔ ú-nɔ ‘this’ βá-nɔ ‘these’Intermediate: -jɔ ú-jɔ ‘that’ βá-jɔ ‘those’Distal: -ri uu-ri ‘that over there’ βáa-ri ‘those over there’As I argued in Gambarage (2012), Nata augments are not deictics, andshow no contrast between proximal and distal spatial features as I showbelow (see also Lyon 2011 for a similar claim about Okanagan Salish).A DP with an overt augment can introduce a referent that is proximal orintermediate to the speaker or distal from the speaker:(56) [Nata]Deictic demonstrative (Subject position)a. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanu-nọú-nɔC1-PROX.DEMa-kaa-n-dọr-a [Proximal]a-kaa-n-dɔŕ-aSA1-PST-1sg-see-FV‘This woman saw me.’b. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanu-yọú-jɔC1-INTERMa-kaa-n-dọr-a [Intermediate]a-kaa-n-dɔŕ-aSA1-PST-1sg-see-FV‘That woman saw me.’c. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanuu-riuu-ríC1-DIST.DEMa-kaa-n-dọr-a [Distal]a-kaa-n-dɔŕ-aSA1-PST-1sg-see-FV‘That woman over there saw me.’10. In the singular forms, but not in plural, the DEMs have lost the prefix consonant, there-fore they only appear with a vowel prefix not a CV one (see de Wolf 1971; Hyman 1999).52(57) Deictic demonstrative (Object position)a. N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg-PST-see-FVo=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanu-nọ [Proximal]ú-nɔC1-PROX.DEM‘I saw this woman.’b. N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg-PST-see-FVo=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanu-yọ [Intermediate]ú-jɔC1-INTERM.DEM‘I saw that woman.’c. N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg-PST-see-FVo=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanuu-ri [Distal]uu-ríC1-DIST.DEM‘I saw that woman over there.’Notice that the longer the demonstrative vowel, the farther the referent isfrom the speaker (e.g., uuu-ri is ‘way over there’).Furthermore, Nata augments do not encode a contrast in visibility asin Downriver Halkomelem determiners (cf. Wiltschko 2009 and referencestherein) or the St’át’imcets D system (Matthewson, 1998) which contrastfor a discourse referent present and visible at the location of the utterancevs. a referent not visible at the location of the utterance. Nata overt aug-ments can introduce a referent that is visible to the speaker (58a), or totallyinvisible to the speaker (58b).(58) a. o=mu-sẹkẹẹnyao=mu-sɛkɛɛnyáD=C1-sando-ri-itek-ireo-ri-itek-ireSA3-PST-spill-PFVha-nọ [Visible]há-nɔC16-here‘Sand spilled over here.’53b. o=mu-sẹkẹẹnyao=mu-sɛkɛɛnyáD=C1-sandw-o-ɲíw-o-ɲíC-SA-bemuu-mw-ẹẹrí [Invisible]muu-mw-ɛɛríC18-C3-moon‘There is sand on the moon.’These examples show that Nata augments do not encode a visible-invisible distinction. The augments also do not encode sensory evidence(i.e., visual) (cf. Chafe 1986; Garrett 2001; Déchaine 2007; Matthewson2011; Matthewson et al. 2007; Waldie 2012, and others) as this is done bya special particle, ka-, which is adjoined to the demonstrative as shown in(59)11.(59) a. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanka-u-nọka-u-nɔ́VIS-C1-PROX.DEMa-ra-yaar-a [Proximal]a-ra-yáar-aSA1-PRES-run-FV3‘Here comes a/the woman running!’ (Visual)7‘Here comes a/the woman running!’ (Auditory)b. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanka-uu-rika-uu-ríVIS-C1-DIST.DEMa-ra-yaar-a [Distal]a-ra-yáar-aSA1-PRES-run-FV3‘I see a/the woman over there running!’ (Visual)7‘I hear a/the woman over there running!’ (Auditory)I argue that it is the particle ka- that encodes visual evidentiality andnot the augment. The evidence for this is that the augment can be used incontexts where the referent is not visible as I showed above.Finally, I show that temporal deixis is not encoded by Nata augments.An augmented NP can refer to an entity from the past (60a), an entity inthe present (60b) or an entity in the future (60c).11. Some Nata speakers seem to use another strategy which is to replace ka- with oŋ- (C1).In the plural ka- may be replaced with βa-. However, the meaning is the same across thesevariants. Speakers think that the source of variation lies in dialectical differences, i.e.,south vs north. However, the demarcation between the two dialects overlaps considerablyin many respects, as I hinted in chapter 1.54(60) a. KarẹKárɛin.the.pasta=bha-bhyem-ia=βá-βjeem-iD=C2-hunt-FVm-ba-arẹm-ba-arɛ ́C-C2-werebha-aruβa-arúC2-many‘In the past there were many poachers.’b. chaa-ø-sikótʃaa-ø-sikóD=C10-daychi-nọtʃí-nɔC10-thisa=βa-βyem-ia=βá-βjeem-iD=C2-hunt-FVm-ba-suuhum-ba-suuhuC-C2-few‘Nowadays there are few poachers.’c. čaa-ø-sikóčaa=ø-sikóD=C10-dayčí-nɔčí-nɔC10-thisče-kúu-č-ače-kúu-č-aC10-INF-come-FVa=βa-βyem-ia=βá-βjeem-iD=C2-hunt-FVm-ba-ko-bhor-am-ba-ko-bhor-aC-C2-FUT-end-FV‘In the coming days, poachers will be rare.’To sum up, until now we have seen that Nata augments do not encodefeatures encoded in the D systems of other languages such as mass-countdistinctions, Case and deixis. This leads to the conclusion that Nata aug-ments differ from D systems that have those features as part of their Dspecification.2.2.4 Definiteness does not condition the augmentDefiniteness has been claimed to be a universal semantic feature whereit is either expressed within the D system or elsewhere in the grammar(Lyons 1999; Guillemin 2007). While definiteness is a phenomenon foundwith Ds in many languages, including English, I show that Nata augmentsdo not encode definiteness. I argue that definiteness in Nata comes fromelsewhere.552.2.4.1 Defining definitenessThe notion of definiteness is defined variably in the semantic literature.One standard view of definiteness is a novelty–familiarity contrast. I con-sider several other views related to definiteness–presupposition and/or as-sertion of uniqueness, presupposition and/or assertion of maximality–toshow that all these notions do not force augment choice in Nata. Eachsection starts with a literature review. The Nata augment does not encode novelty-familiarityThe novelty-familiarity hypothesis introduced by Christophersen (1939)and adapted by Hawkins (1978) and Heim (1982) is one way of definingdefiniteness. Indefinite DPs are argued to be novel to the common groundof the discourse while familiar DPs are familiar to the common ground ofthe discourse (Christophersen 1939; Hawkins 1978; Heim 1982; Ladusaw1979; Matthewson 1998; Schwarz 2009; and others). English is one of thelanguages that encode this distinction in its D system as the examples belowillustrate. Assume (61b) is a follow-up to (61a):(61) a. A/#the police officer stopped me today. [novel]b. What did #a/the police officer say to you? [familiar]The use of the English novel/unfamiliar D a in (61a) does not depend onthe addressee having background information about the referent (i.e., itis not used in discourse anaphoric contexts); however, the familiar articlethe does, as (61b) shows. When this article is used, both the speaker andthe hearer must have access to/knowledge of the discourse antecedent(i.e., the referent can have been mentioned in the previous discourse).Therefore, English the accesses the common ground of the discourse whilea does not. This shows that novelty-familiarity is overtly expressed and iscrucial for D choice in English, as indicated by the infelicitous use of the in(61a) and a in (61b).56Nata augments do not encode this distinction. The only possible can-didate that occurs in affirmative/declarative familiar contexts is the overtaugment; its counterpart, the covert augment, must be conditioned by somenon-factual operator as we saw at the outset. The overt augment appearsboth in familiar and novel contexts, hence there is no familiarity require-ment associated with the use of overt augments. In narratives, the overtaugment is the same in both novel and familiar contexts. Assume (62b) isa continued story from (62a):(62) a. (novel)HayọHayotherekarẹkárɛlong.agon=aarẹ-họn=aarɛ-́hɔSAM=be-LOCo=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛḿiD=C1-chief‘Long ago there was a chief’‘Once upon a time there was a chief.’b. (familiar)mbembesoo=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛḿiD=C1-chiefa-ra-kom-aa-ra-kóm-aSA1-PST-gather-FVa=bha-toa=βáa-toD=C2-people‘So, *a/the chief gathered the people.’In these examples there is no familiar-novel distinction that is expressedby the overt augment, as the same augment is used both in novel and indiscourse anaphoric/familiar contexts. I show that the same generalizationholds for non-narrative data; there is a lack of a familiar-novel distinctionin the Nata augment system:[Context: In (63a) a girl is telling her friends about what happened to hertoday. The day after, her friends follow up with (63b) or (63c).](63) a. (novel)Weeche?W-éech-e?2sg-knowRẹẹrọRɛɛrɔ́Todayo=mo-sirikareo=moo-sirikaréD=C1-policea-kaa-ny-imeereria-kaa-ɲí-imeereriSA1-PST-OM-stop‘You know what? A police officer stopped me today.’57b. (familiar)o=mo-sirikareo=mo-sirikaréD=C1-policeu-you-yoC3-DEMni-hení-heCOP-WHa-a-ru-ure?a-a-ru-iré?SA1-PST-come-PFV‘Where did the/that police officer come from?’c. (familiar)u-ka-mu-rọr-au-ka-mú-rɔr-a2SG-PST-OM1-see-FVo=mo-sirikareo=mo-sirikaréD=C1-policewi-ichọ?wa-itʃɔ?of-yesterday‘Dd you see (him) the police officer from yesterday?’We see that the same augment is used regardless of whether the policeofficer is a novel referent or is mentioned in the previous discourse. Theovert augment does not place any constraints on the common ground ofdiscourse. The implications of the lack of the semantic features of defi-niteness is that the Nata grammar uses other tools to express such features.Argument DPs are interpreted as definite when used with materials rein-forcing definiteness like DEMs, as in (63b), or object markers (OMs), suchas in (63c), which shows that the overt D is not a definite D (see Carstens2001, 2008, Adams 2010; and others). The Nata augment does not presuppose existenceThe notion of presupposition of existence is cross-linguistically analyzed ona par with the notion of familiarity (Stalnaker 1974; Diesing 1992; Heim1982; Chung and Ladusaw 2004, Matthewson 1998; and others). Presup-position of existence, like the notion of familiarity, also heavily relies onthe common ground of the discourse. This is precisely what automaticallyrules out Nata overt augments as they are not presuppositional elements,unlike Ds in systems like English.One type of presupposition I consider here is logical presupposition de-fined in terms of a semantic relation between propositions as in Soames(1989: 556) quoted in Matthewson (1998: 92)12:12. I will not discuss various versions of presupposition of existence. For instance, logicalpresupposition is also informally defined in terms of a presupposition being able to ‘survive58(64) [Matthewson 1998: 92]Logical presuppositionA proposition P logically presupposes a proposition Q iff the truth ofQ is a necessary condition for P to be true or false.Matthewson (1998) gives the example in (65), again from Soames(1989: 557), which shows that the proposition Q must be true in orderfor P to be assigned a truth value (either true or false).(65) a. P: The queen of England is popular.b. Q: England has a (unique) queen.In (65), if Q is false, the truth value of P cannot be determined (cf. Heimand Kratzer 2010). Presupposition of existence in English is exemplified bythe definite D that must access the common ground of the discourse.Nata augments are not definite Ds, unlike the English definite D. Firstnote that the overt augment can be used in contexts in which a referent ispresupposed to exist, as in (66).(66) [Context: There is only one Ikizu chief known]a. o=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛmiD=C1-chiefwawaofa=bhi-ikiichoa=βi-ikitʃoD=C2-Ikizu.peoplem-mo-bhem=mo-βéFOC=SA1-cruel‘The chief of the Ikizu people is cruel.’b. Q: Ikuzu people have a chiefMy strong argument for not analyzing overt augments as presupposingexistence comes from the fact that the overt augment can also be used innovel/non-presuppositional discourse contexts, as in (67) repeated fromabove, where the chief is not in the common ground of the discourse:negation’ (see Frege 1997; Soames 1989; Aldridge 1992 and others). Another notion ofpresupposition is expressive presupposition or Strawson’s presupposition, which describes arelation between a sentence S and a proposition Q in context C; see particularly Strawson(1950) and other recent works. For a helpful review of the different types of presuppositionssee van der Sandt (2019).59(67) HayọHayotherekarẹkárɛlong.agon=aarẹ-họn=aarɛ-́hɔSAM=be-LOCo=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛḿiD=C1-chief‘Long ago there was a chief.’‘Once upon a time there was a chief.’If Nata overt augments are not pressupositional we correctly predictthat they will be used in a variety of other non-presuppositional contexts.Certainly, in (68), the speaker presents their hope that they will find abow to buy, but the utterance does not hold any presupposition of a bow,and yet the overt D is used:[Context: M broke B’s bow and she cannot find a similar bow to replaceit. She articulates her compensation plan:](68) N=ne-gho-ko-ghor-er-aN=ne-ɣo-ko-ɣor-er-aSAM=1sg-2sg-buy-APPL-FVo=bhu‐tao=βu- tae=C14-bow‘I will buy you a bow.’Presuppositional Ds are absent in Nata. The lack of presuppositional Ds inNata can be derived from a negative setting of a Common Ground Param-eter, consistent with Matthewson (1998). Next I show that presuppositionof uniqueness is not part of semantics of the Nata augment. The Nata augment does not presuppose uniquenessThe Nata overt augment does not presuppose a unique referent which satis-fies the nominal property. If augments in Nata were Fregean definites thatpresuppose uniqueness, we might expect presupposition failure in contextswhere a referent referred to by the speaker was not the same one in thehearer’s mind. For instance (69a) is challenged in (69b) as the hearer doesnot have a unique man in his/her mind, leading to presupposition failure:60(69) a. A: The man is standing at the door.b. B: I have no idea which man you are talking about.If overt augments presupposed uniqueness, it would not be possibleto have the overt augment used felicitously in context where there is nounique referent under discussion, and yet the overt augment is used, (70).Since the Nata overt D does not introduce referents that are presupposedto be unique, it is infelicitous to reply to () with () as if the D is projectinga presupposition.(70) a. o=mo-subheo=mo-suβeFOC-SA1-be-LOCn-i-i-meer-iren-a-imeer-ireD=C1-manmo=o-ghe-sekumó=ó-ɣe-sekuFOC-SA1-stand-PFV‘A man is standing at the door.’b. #N-ty-eeche#N-tj-eech-é1sg-NEG-know-FVm=mo-subhe=kem=mo-súbhe=keCOP=C1-man=WHo-ku-ghamb-ao-ku-ɣámb-a2SG-IMPFV-talk-FV‘I don’t know which man you are talking about.’c. Ne-we?Ne-weCOP=WH‘Who is it?’The examples in (70) are incompatible with a uniqueness presupposi-tion. The overt augment is felicitous when the hearer is not aware thatthere is only one man in the context. We will see throughout this thesisthat Nata overt augments are freely used in non-unique contexts such asin existential sentences which introduce indefinite DPs or weak quantifiers(see Milsark 1974).612.2.4.5 The Nata augment does not assert uniquenessIt is also plausible to test for definiteness using a Russellian account of as-sertion of uniqueness. Some semanticists consider uniqueness assertionsas hallmark properties of definiteness (Russell 1905; Sharvy (1980); Lyons1999; and many others). First, we find that Nata unique singular referents,such as the sun and moon, are introduced using DPs containing overt aug-ments. In (71) ‘sun’ or ‘moon’ denotes a singleton set, which is implicitlypart of the interlocutors’ common ground knowledge.(71) a. u=mw-ẹẹríu=mw-ɛɛríD=C5-moono-ri-ibhís-ireo-ri-iβís-ireSM3-C5-hide-PFVmu-u-ma-saaromu-u-ma-sáaroLOC-PPF-C6-cloud‘The moon is hiding behind the clouds.’b. a=βa-náataa=βa-naataD=C2-Natam-ba-haa-sáásaam-am-ba-haa-sáásaam-aSAM-C2-HABT-worship-FVi=ry-oobhai=rj-ooβáD=C5-sun‘Nata people worship the sun.’Evidence for the fact that overt augments do not assert uniquenesscomes from considering further Nata data. In (72b), an overt augmentis used in answers that do not assert a unique referent; and in (73) it isbeing used in contexts where there is more than one contextually-salientelement satisfying the nominal property.[Context: The questioner sees the addressee opening the cupboard with avariety of utensils, glasses, and cups and has no idea what the addresseewants to take from the cupboard](72) a. Ne-keNe-keCOP-WHu-kwẹẹnd-á?u-kwɛnd-á?2sg-want-FV‘What do you want?’62b. Ni-kwẹẹnd-áNi-kwɛnd-a1s-want-FVe=ghi ‐kọọmbẹe=ɣi- kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘I want a cup.’[Context: There are several cups on a table, equidistant from speaker, Lyon2015: 130, originally from Gillon 2006: 88]13(73) Nu-u-h-ẹNe-u-h-ɛ ́1sg-2sg-give-FVe=ɣi- ‐kọọmbẹe=ɣi- ‐kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘Give me a cup.’[Consultant’s comment: I’d pass you one of the cups]In example (73) the Nata language consultants responded by saying thatthey would grab any one of the cups on the table. Similar responses havebeen reported in Gillon’s (2006) and Lyon’s (2015) works. Both contextsshow that the addressee is not talking about a unique cup in context, hencea uniqueness assertion is not encoded. Having seen that Nata augments forsingular referents do not either presuppose or assert uniqueness, now weturn to what happens when plural and mass Ns have overt augments. The Nata augment does not presuppose/assert maximalityAfter considering uniqueness for singular DPs, I consider the notion ofmaximality for plural and mass entities (Link 1983; Krifka 2003; andothers) and show that maximality is not a presuppositional or an assertivecomponent of the denotation of augments. If augments presupposed max-imal individuals/entities, they would not be felicitous with plural/massreferents that are not maximal to the hearer without the hearer challengingthe presupposition, (74):13. Note that the Nata consultant’s comment was exactly the same as what Lyon’s consul-tant also said.63[Context: It is very rare to see police officers in this village. Makuru tellshis mom what happened today, (74a). Mom follows up with (74b).].(74) a. RẹẹrọRɛɛrɔ́Todaya=bha-sirikarea=βa-sirikaréD=C2-policebha-ka-ny-imeerer-iβa-ka-ɲ-imeerer-iSA2-PST-1SG-stop-CAUS‘Police officers stopped me today.’b. ni-hẹni-hɛCOP-WHbha-ru-ure?βa-ru-ire?SA2-from-PFV‘Where did they come from?’The augment in the nominal a=bha-sirikare ‘police officers’ does not pre-suppose maximal plural individuals. If this was the case then mom wouldhave challenged the presupposition with a reaction such as All of them? or Ihave no idea which police officers you are talking about, but as mom’s responsein (74b) shows, she is oblivious about where the officers came from.Furthermore, augments used with plural entities do not assert maxi-mality. Nata data show that speakers can use overt augments with pluralDPs to refer to a non-maximal subset of the contextually salient individualssatisfying the nominal property, (75). With (75), the consultants commentthat they would respond by grabbing some of the cups or seek clarificationfrom the speaker on the number of cups the speaker wants, which shows anon-maximal plural sum of cups. Note that class 8 bhi marks plurality.[Context: There are several cups on a table, equidistant from the speaker.Context adapted from Lyon (2011:8)].(75) Nu-u-h-ẹNu-u-h-ɛ ́1sg-2sg-give-FVe=bhi‐kọọmbẹe=βi ‐kɔɔ́mbɛe=C8-cup‘Give me cups.’64With mass nouns, overt augments do not presuppose or assert max-imality either. In (76) the DP o=mo-sori ‘soup’ appears in existentialsentences which introduce indefinite DPs or weak quantifiers:[Context: B just arrived and he wants to eat his lunch first. He says: I hateeating dry rice. His friend has served some soup and left some in the pot.He surprises B by saying (76):](76) o=mo-sorio=mo-sóriD=C1-soupw-o-nyiw-o-ɲiFOC-SA3-bemo=o=nyongomo=a=ɲonŋóLOC=D=C3-pot‘There is soup in the pot.’In (76), the overt augment is used even though the soup is not maximal(the speaker is not talking about all the soup in the context, which rulesout the possibility that overt augment may assert or presuppose maximalreference). Note that overt augments will be fine to be used in contextswhere the speaker might in fact be referring to all the soup in the context(e.g., in contexts where the soup in the pot was the only soup in the con-text), and the speaker may wish his friend to have it all. This propertyaligns with the neutral status of augments regarding definiteness as I arguefurther below. Throughout this thesis I will argue that augments in Nata arenot definites and show that they can only access the speaker’s knowledgebut not the hearer’s, as proposed for many indefinite Ds (see Ionin 2006;Lyon 2011, 2013; Matthewson 1998, 1999, 2001; Gillon 2006; and others).Next, I compare Nata with the weak or strong definite Ds in German. Augments are not weak/strong German definite DsSome dialects of German possess a distinction between weak and strong def-inite Ds (see for instance Schwarz 2009, 2012 and references therein, andWiltschko 2013 and references therein)14. Weak definite Ds (or reduced Ds)14. Schwarz (2009) and Wiltschko (2013) list dialects which contrast for weak-strong in-cluding: the Rhineland dialect, Mönchen-Gladbach dialect, Viennese dialect, Cologne di-65are used to refer to unique referents (e.g., sun, moon), as in (77a), or are in-terpreted under situational uniqueness, (78a). The examples come from anAustro-Bavarian dialect (see Wiltschko 2013 and references therein). (I usestrong-weak instead of other labels e.g., full vs. reduced Ds, respectively):(77) Weak D contexts [Austro-Bavarian, Wiltschko 2013: 171]a. DaDETweakMondmoonisisheittodaynetnotzumto.DETweaksegnseen‘The moon isn’t visible today.’b. #DeaDETstrongMondmoonisisheittodaynetnotzumto.DETweaksegnseenIntended: ‘The moon isn’t visible today.’(78) Weak D contexts [Austro-Bavarian, Wiltschko 2013: 170]a. DaDETweakHonsHansisisimin.DETweakSpitoihospital‘Hans is in the hospital.’b. #DeaDETstrongHonsHansisisimin.DETweakSpitoihospitalIntended: ‘Hans is in the hospital.’Strong Ds (full form Ds), on the other hand, have to be used in deicticdemonstrative/pointing contexts, as in (79a), or be used in discourseanaphoric contexts, as in (80b)15.alect, Swiss German dialect, Bavarian dialect, Hessian (Frisian) dialect, Austro-Bavarian,and Standard German.15. Both Schwarz and Wiltschko agree that the choice of definite Ds also correlates withother syntactic factors, not semantics only, e.g., the type of relative clauses. In many, if notall German dialects, the strong Ds are used on restrictive relative clauses while the weak Dsare used on non-restrictive clauses. Nata shows no variation of augments with restrictiveor non-restrictive relative clauses.66[Context: A points to a house (the only one in the immediate surrounding)and asks B:](79) Strong D contexts [Austro-Bavarian, Wiltschko 2013: 173]a. GfoitLikedayoudesDETstrongHaus?house‘Do you like this house?’b. #GfoitLikedayous’DETweakHaus?house‘Do you like this house?’(80) Anaphoric contexts [Standard German, Schwarz 2009: 30]a. HansHanshathaseinen Schriftstellera writerundandeinen Politikera politicianinterviewtinterviewed‘Hans interviewed a writer and a politician.’b. ErHehathas#vom/von demfrom theweak/from thestrongPolitikerpoliticiankeinenointeressanteninterestingantwortenanswersbekommengotten‘He didn’t get any interesting answers from the politician.’The Nata augment system does not seem to encode the weak-strongdistinction for two main reasons. First, as Schwarz illustrates, German Dscontrast for novelty-familiarity, which is not the case with the augment inNata as we saw earlier. Second, considering all the contexts that force Dchoice in German dialects, the overt augment is used in all these contextsin Nata:(81) [Context involving unique referents: overt augment is obligatory]67a. u=mw-ẹẹríu=mw-ɛɛríD=C5-moono-ri-ibhís-ireo-ri-iβís-ireSM3-C5-hide-PFVmu-u-ma-saaromu-u-ma-sáaroLOC-PPF-C6-cloud‘The moon is hidden behind the clouds.’b. * mw-ẹẹrí* mw-ɛɛríC5-moono-ri-ibhís-ireo-ri-iβís-ireSM3-C5-hide-PFVmu-u-ma-saaromu-u-ma-sáaroLOC-PPF-C6-cloudIntended ‘The moon is hidden behind the clouds.’[Context: My friend is wondering where my sister went. I say:](82) In situational unique contexts: overt augment is obligatorya. m-mo-rw-iire.n-mo-ro(r)-ire.FOC-3sg-be.sick-PFV.a-ka-ghia-ka-ɣi3sg-PST-gokw=o=mu-ghabhokw=o=mu-ɣaβoLOC=o=C1-doctor‘She is sick. She went to the doctor.’b. *m-mo-rw-iire.*n-mo-ro(r)-ire.FOC-3sg-be.sick-PFV.a-ka-ghia-ka-ɣi3sg-PST-gokw= mu-ghabhokw= mu-ɣaβoLOC= C1-doctorIntended: ‘She is sick. She went to the doctor.’In discourse anaphoric contexts, as in (84), the same overt augment isused as in discourse new contexts, (83).[Context: B reports to her friends what happened to her on the way home:](83) a. w-eche?w-etʃe?2sg-knowrẹẹrọrɛɛrɔ́todayo=mo-sirikareo=mo-sirikaleD=C1-policea-ka-ny-iimereri (novel)a-ka-ɲi-imerer-iSA1-PST-stop-FV‘You know what? Today a police officer stopped me.’68b. *w-eche?*w-etʃe?2sg-knowrẹẹrọrɛɛrɔ́todaymo-sirikaremo-sirikareC1-policea-ka-ny-iimereria-ka-ɲi-imerer-iSA1-PST-stop-FVIntended: ‘You know what? Today a police officer stopped me.’[Context: The following day, one of her friends follows up:](84) a. u-ka-mu-rọr-au-ka-mu-rɔr-a2sg-PST-OM-see-FVo=mo-sirikareo=mo-sirikareD=C1-policeghwiiki? (familiar)ɣwíiki?again‘Did you see the police officer again?b. *u-ka-mu-rọr-a*u-ka-mu-rɔr-a2sg-PST-OM-see-FVmo-sirikaremo-sirikareC1-policeghwiiki?ɣwíiki?againIntended: ‘Did you see the police officer again?’We saw that strong Ds in German and related dialects are used withdemonstrations, however, in Nata the same overt D is being used.(85) In deictic contexts: overt augment is obligatorya. o=mo-sirikareo=mo-sirikaréD=C1-police.officeru-nọu-nɔC1-DEMm=mu-tatam=mu-tatáCOP=C1-bad‘That police officer is troublesome.’b. * mo-sirikare* mo-sirikaréC1-policeu-nọu-nɔC1-DEMm=mu-tatam=mu-tataCOP=C1-troublesomeIntended: ‘That police officer is troublesome.’We can therefore summarize the differences between the two systemsas follows:69Table 2.3: Distribution of definite strong and weak Ds and Nata DsVariation German German Nata NataWeak D Strong D Overt AUG Covert AUGDefinite D 3 3 7 7Assertion of uniqueness 3 7 3 7Situationally unique 3 7 3 7Anaphoric contexts 7 3 3 7Deictic contexts 7 3 3 7Despite the fact that overt augments are used in discourse-anaphoricenvironments and in demonstration/deictic contexts like strong Ds in Ger-manic dialects, the fact that the same augment is used in weak definitecontexts rules out the possibility that the weak-strong distinction is respon-sible for forcing augment choice in Nata.2.2.5 Specificity does not condition the augmentIt is not the case that Nata augments encode specificity. I present datato show that Nata augments surface in a variety of non-specific contexts,hence ruling out the specificity hypothesis. Defining specificityOne of the most common definitions of specificity states that a DP is specificwhen the speaker has a specific individual/entity in mind (Givón 1970,1978; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Hedberg et al. (2009); Matthewson 1998;and others). Compare the cases in (86), which can be said to be specific,with the non-specific cases in (87):(86) a. A friend (of mine) gave me this fidget spinner.b. I will be giving a student a make-up midterm.70(87) [Context: speaker is not referring to any specific entity]a. A wrench will do that job nicely.b. I need a horse for my rodeo practice.The subject DP a friend (of mine) in (86a) and the object DP a student in(86b) refer to a specific individual in the speaker’s mind16. In most lin-guistics literature, the DPs in (87) are not treated as specific indefinites.They have been given various analyses. In some accounts such DPs are in-terpreted with the universal quantifier reading (Eisner 1994; Dayal 1998,2004, Menéndez-Benito 2010); in others they are interpreted under do-main restriction (e.g., the DP denotation is implicitly restricted to a horsewith some identifying property that the speaker has in mind (see Portnerand Yabushita 2001; Schwarzschild 2002; Breheny (2003); Gillon 2006).Yet in others they are accounted for under a choice function approach (seeEbert to appear for a helpful review). I show below that the overt augmentis used in both specific and non-specific contexts such as these, consistentwith the proposal I articulate in Chapter 4.I consider three tests for (non)specificity that can be used to show thatNata augments do not encode specificity. The first one is Enç’s (1991)which is based on the notion that specific DPs introduce referents knownto the speaker (see also Hedberg et al. 2009; Matthewson 1998). Enç arguesthat the specific reading of the DP in the second sentence in (88) is that theDP will pick out two girls who are members of the set of children introducedin the preceding sentence, while the non-specific reading is one in which theDP picks out any two girls. The example in (88) is taken from Matthewson(1998: 41); emphasis is mine:16. Fodor and Sag (1982) claim that the indefinite a in English sentences such as (i) isambiguous between the quantificational reading (where it obeys scope islands) and thereferential (specific) reading and hence they are unusual indefinites (see also Kratzer 1998):(i) Each teacher overheard the rumour that a student of mine had been called before thedean..71(88) A lot of children came in. I knew two girls.The second test is for non-specific DPs which are found in free choiceenvironments, i.e., contexts that give the addressee freedom of choice(89) (see Kadmon and Landman 1993; Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito2003; Osa-Gomez 2016). Note that in (89c) the Free Choice Item (FCI) anyis used.(89) [Context: There are a bunch of cups lying on the table]a. M: Pass me a cup.b. W: Which do you want?c. M: Just pass me ANY cup.The third test is to see if augments can be used in characterizing state-ments (i.e., statements that express generalizations about sets of entitiesor situations believed to exist without asserting that such entities exist,(90) (see Carlson and Pelletier 1995; Krifka 2003; Déchaine and Tremblay(2011)).(90) Owls hunt butterflies.I show that augments are fine with all these interpretations hence theycannot be treated as specific.While the English indefinite a seems to be used both in specific and non-specific contexts, and English therefore shows no overt contrast of speci-ficity in its D system, languages like Turkish or Persian allow a specificitycontrast to be encoded morphologically (Enç 1991; Hedberg et al. 2009).The following examples from Hedberg et al. (2009) indicate that Turkishmarks specific direct object DPs with the accusative case marker ; withoutthis marking, object DPs get a non-specific interpretation.(91) [Turkish, Hedberg et al. 2009:4-5]Specificity marking72a. Bugüntodaybironeavukat-lawyer-ACCgör-üyor-umsee-PROG-1SG‘I am seeing a (particular) lawyer today.’b. Bugüntodaybironeavukatlawyergör-üyor-umsee-PROG-1SG‘I am seeing a lawyer today (some lawyer or other).’In a way similar to Turkish, Persian also marks specific direct objectswith the suffix -RA, which is realized as either -o or -ro due to vowel har-mony (see Hedberg et al. 2009):(92) [Persian, Hedberg et al. 2009:5]Specificity markinga. Emruztodayyea/onevakil-(i)-olawyer-I-RAmi-bin-amDUR-see-1SG‘I am seeing a (particular) lawyer today.’b. Emruztodayyea/onevakillawyermi-bin-amDUR-see-1SG‘I am seeing a lawyer today (some lawyer or other).’I show Nata overt augments are neutral with respect to specificity, hencethey are fellicitous in specific and non-specific contexts. Unlike Turkish orPersian-style Ds, augments in Nata are not switched based on the notion ofspecificity17.17. Thanks to Rose-Marie Déchaine (p.c) for shedding more light on this question. Sheobserves that the specificity/referentiality feature is also marked in the Niger-Congo lan-guage family, pointing me to references like Aboh (2004), Ajiboye (2005) and others. Someresearch has shown other semantic features are also encoded. For instance, see Arkoh andMatthewson (2013) and references therein for discussion of the familiar definite D nʊ inAkan (Kwa) but see Bombi (2018) and Owusu and Korsah (2019) for responses to this paper.See also Chapter 5 for discussion about the definite D in Dzamba.732.2.5.2 The Nata augment does not encode specificityNata overt augments appear in specific contexts, as shown in (93), butagain the same augments can appear in non-specific contexts as in (94).The context in (94) is from Ferch (2012):[Context: B: I wish I had a cup. I would drink from this stream. A replies:](93) e=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔmbɛD=C7-cupn-ke-nyin-ke-ɲiFOC-C7-bemu-u=n.dọbhọmu-a=n.dɔβɔ́LOC-D=C9.bucketi-yọ [Nata]i-jɔC9-DEMLit: ‘A cup is in that bucket.’‘There is a cup in that bucket.’[Context: Before going to the store, I confirm my shopping list with myroommate].(94) N-to-ko-ghor-aN-to-ko-ɣor-aFOC-2pl-FUT-buy-FVe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣí-kɔɔmbɛD=C7-cupnenaande=bhe-chiikọe=βe-tʃíikɔD=C8-spoon‘We need a cup and some spoons.’Nata overt augments fail Enç’s (1991) specificity test which distin-guishes between specific (under discussion) and non-specific (not underdiscussion) DPs. The overt augment contained in the DP that picks out thetwo specific girls (under discussion), (95b), is the same augment used withthe non-specific DP (for not under discussion children), (95a).(95) a. [a=bha-ana[a=βa-ana[D=C2-childbha-mwe]βa-mwe]C2-some]bha-gha-sọh-aβa-ɣa-sɔh́-aSA2-PST-come.in-FV‘Some children came in’.74b. N-ka-mẹɲa=muN-ka-mɛɲ́-a=mu1sg-PST-know-FV=among[a=bha-ana[a=βa-aná[D=C2-childbha-bhere]βá-βere]C2-two]‘I knew two children among them.’As we saw in the previous section about definiteness, example (95)demonstrates that Nata overt augments are neutral with respect to speci-ficity also. The overt augment in a=bha-ana ‘children’ is used in both thespecific and non-specific DP (see similar results in St’át’imcets, a languagewith existence Ds (Matthewson 1998)).Nata augments appear in sentences that allow them to be associatedwith a specific interpretation, (96); however, the same augments also fea-ture with Free Choice Items (FCIs), as in (97), in which a specific readingis unattainable.(96) e=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-bookki-nọki-nɔC7-RELn-gor-irene-ɣor-ire1sg-bought-PFVn-ke-bhen-ke-βéCOP-C7-bad‘A book that I bought is bad.’(97) [Context: A bunch of books are lying on the table]a. chaghor-atʃaaɣor-achoose-FVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Choose a book.’b. chaghor-atʃaaɣor-achoose-FVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-bookkyɔ-ky-ɔśɛkjɔ-kj-ɔśɛRED-C7-any‘Choose any/ANY book.’In example (96) e=ghitabho ‘a book’ has an existential interpretation.Note that the DP in (96) is modified by a relative clause which narrows75the domain of the NP and reinforces specificity. In example (97) the sameaugment is used but the referent is non-specific. As Osa–Gómez (2016) il-lustrates, the ambiguous NPI/FCI jọ-j-oọsẹ ‘any’ in (97b) is a FCI functioningas a maximal domain widener, in which case it requires the overt augment.As I show in Chapter 4, this is consistent with my analysis that the NP hasa non-empty reference, hence the overt augment is required18.Lastly, Nata DPs containing overt augments receive a generic interpre-tation when used in generics or characterizing statements, which expressgeneralizations about sets of entities or situations (Krifka 2003; Déchaineand Tremblay 2011). Thus, the DPs in (98) have a non-specific reading:(98) a. cha=ny.ahuumetʃa=ɲ.ahuuméD=C10.owln=chi-haa-byeman=tʃi-haa-βjemaSAM-SA10-HAB-hunte=bhi-bhabhayoe=βi-βaaβáyoD=C8-butterfly‘Owls hunt butterflies.’b. a=bha-kária=βa-káriD=C2-womanm=ba-haa-atim=ba-haa-atiSAM-SA10-HAB-chopchaa=∅-kwétʃaa=∅-kweD=C10-wood‘Women chop wood.’I show in Chapter 4 that the use of overt augments in generics is consistentwith my analysis that DPs containing overt augments may be associatedwith a specific or non-specific interpretation. This explains why genericNP expressions like ‘owls’, ‘butterflies’, ‘women’ and ‘wood’ in (98) take theovert augment even though they do not denote specific referents. Note thatin Nata, and Bantu more generally, generic statements require the habitualaspectual marker, which is argued in Déchaine and Tremblay (2011) to bethe overt realization of the covert generic operator proposed by Chierchia18. For a discussion of the item -ɔ-ɔśɛ ‘any’ see Osa-Gómez (2016), and the discussion inChapter 3 indicating that this item can also be used as an NPI forcing the use of the polarityD. See Krifka (1995) for a related claim that only the stressed ANY in English is a domainwidener.76(1998) and Krifka (2003), and argued to select for the generic reading19.I thus rule out the specificity hypothesis. Having shown that definitenessand specificity are not encoded in the Nata augment system, I turn to theneutral status of the augment with respect to these features. The augment is not the English this-specific indefiniteIonin (2006) argues that the English this-indefinite involves a felicity con-dition focusing on the knowledge state of the speaker, i.e., the speakerconsiders only her own view of what’s noteworthy, and not the state of herlistener’s knowledge. Ionin adds that the this-indefinite is specific in thesense of encoding ‘noteworthiness’, a notion similar to referentiality (seeFodor and Sag’s (1982)) or presupposition of existence along the lines ofDiesing (1992). See also Kratzer (1998). Ionin gives the crucial examplefrom Maclaran (1982)):(99) There is this man who lives upstairs from me who is driving me madbecause he jumps rope at 2 a.m. every night (Maclaran:1982:85).I argue that the Nata overt augment is used in many contexts wherethe English this-indefinite is used, however, there are differences betweenthe two. Consider, for instance, the differences and similarities of the twosystems presented below:19. Krifka (2003) discusses the possibility that generic statements also have a kind readingwhich is specific to a genus, e.g., by owls in (98a) the speaker maybe referring to a specificgenus of the Tyto type. This is consistent with the use of the overt augment, although I willnot address the kind analysis in this thesis.77Summary of contexts English thisref Nata overt augmentThere-insertion context 3 3Speaker-knowledge 3 3Used in specific contexts 3 (3)Scope under a non-factual Op 7 7Definite contexts 7 (3)Noteworthy statement required 3 7Uniqueness implicature contexts 7 (3)Since the this-indefinite is essentially a non-deictic demonstrative, wemay think that at least one Nata demonstrative would be its counterpart.On the contrary, it appears that both the Nata pre-nominal and post-nominal demonstratives are ruled out in similar there-insertion contexts,(101), but the overt augment is allowed, (100)20:(100) N=a-nyi-hoN=a-nyi-hoSAM=SA1-be-LOC[o=mo-subhe][o=mo-suβe][D=C1-man]a=bhaa-toa=βaa-toD=C2-peoplebha-ko-bhugh-aβa-ko-βuɣ-aSA2-IMPF-say-FVn-a-haa-turutumb-an-a-haa-turutumb-aSAM-HAB-be.witcho-bho-tikoo-βo-tikoD=C14-night.time‘There is a man; the people say he plays black magic at night.’20. It appears that in Nata, thisref readings are fixed by the element hano ‘here’, which mustoccur with the overt D:(i) N=e-nyiN=e-nyiFOC-1sg-havena-[a=-ø-singorina-[a=-ø-singoriwith-[D=C9-songha-nọ]ha-nɔ]C16-here]yo=o=ko-bhin-er-ayo=o=ko-bhin-er-aof=D=C15-callinga-bha-toa=βaa-toD=C2-people‘I have a song here for calling/attracting people’78(101) a. *N=a-nyi-ho*N=a-nyi-hoSAM=SA1-be-LOC[o=mo-subhe[o=mo-suβe[D=C1-manu-nọ]u-nɔ]C1-this]a=bhaa-toa=βaa-toD=C2-peoplebha-ko-bhugh-aβa-ko-βuɣ-aSA2-IMPFsay-FVn-a-haa-turutumb-an-a-haa-turutumb-aSAM-HAB-be.witcho-bho-tikoo-βo-tikoD=C14-night.timeIntended: ‘There is this man; the people say he plays blackmagic at night.’b. *N=a-nyi-ho*N=a-nyi-hoFOC=SA1-be-LOC[unọ=mo-subhe][unɔ=mo-suβe][DEM=C1-man]a=bhaa-toa=βaa-toC1-this]bha-ko-bhugh-aβa-ko-βuɣ-aD=C2-peoplen-a-haa-turutumb-an-a-haa-turutumb-aSA2-IMPFsay-FVo-bho-tikoo-βo-tikoSAM-HAB-be.witchIntended: ‘There is the/this man; the people say he plays blackmagic at night.’This prohibition for Nata demonstratives must be derived from the factthat Nata demonstratives are definite while the this-indefinite is not.What sets apart the English this-indefinite and the Nata overt augment isthe fact that the former involves a noteworthy property, i.e., a statement ofsomething noteworthy about the individual denoted by the indefinite. Thisis similar to adding descriptive content about the referent of the indefinite.For instance, below the noteworthy property is added by a relative clause(RC):(102) Noteworthy property by RC-modification [Ionin 2006:7]a. #I want to see this new movie.b. I want to see this new movie that my friends have been recommend-ing to me for ages.79c. I want to see this new movie – it’s one that my friends have beenrecommending to me for ages.According to Ionin, (102a) is infelicitous because it does not have anoteworthy statement. The Nata overt augment does not require this con-dition. This follows from the fact that the English this-indefinite is specificwhile the overt augment is neutral with respect to specificity, which cor-rectly predicts that the overt augment will be used both with noteworthystatements and without. I thus rule out the possibility that the Nata overtaugment can be analyzed as a specific indefinite. The augment is not the English indefinite aWe saw above that the English indefinite D a can be used in both specificand non-specific indefinite contexts like the Nata overt augment. At facevalue, one may conclude that the augment is the equivalent of indefinitea in English. For instance, one may argue that both the English a, (103),and the Nata augment, (104), are used in non-coreferential contexts wherea speaker is referring to two different entities/individuals.(103) I saw a raccoon in the playground, and I saw another/a raccoon inthe backyard.[Context: Nata and Tiriina are separate locations. Context was adaptedfrom Matthewson (1999) and Lyon (2013)].(104) N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg-PST-see-FVa=ma-yaania=ma-yaaníD=C6-gazelleTiiriina,Tiiriina,Tiriina,nanaandn-ka-rọr-an-ka-rɔr-a1sg-PST-see-FVa=ma-yaanía=ma-yaaniD=C6-gazelleNataNaataNata‘I saw a gazelle in Tiriina, and I saw a/another gazelle in Nata.’80However, while in coreferential contexts in English, the definite D is re-quired when referring to the antecedent as in (105b), (see Heim 2011), inNata, the overt augment is used both in non-coreferential (104) and coref-erential contexts, (106), which indicates that the augment does supportcoreference. In (106), there is no different augment choice. As we saw in§.2.2.4, for familiar referents, the OM morphology must be used to markreferents interpreted anaphorically21.(105) a. *John opened a doori. And Sophie closed a doori.b. John opened a doori. And Sophie closed the door/iti.(106) MakuruMakuruMakurua=ki-ighor-aa-ka-iɣ.or-aSA1-PST-open.REVS-FVe=ghe-sek-u,e=ɣe-sek-u,D=C7-door,MasatoMasatoMasatoa-ka-ghi-sẹnchẹk-a,a-ka-ɣi-sɛɲtʃɛk-a,SA1-PST-OM-close.REVS-FVe=ghe-sek-ue=ɣe-sek-uD=C7-door‘Makuru opened a door, and Masato closed (it) the door.’The second argument against analyzing the Nata augment as the coun-terpart of English indefinite a comes from the fact that a can be used eitherunder the scope of non-factual operators, paralleling the NPI any, or it canbe used outside the scope of negation, where it yields an existential inter-pretation:(107) a. I didn’t bring a pen. I forgot it in my drawer.b. I didn’t bring a/any pen. I forgot to buy one.Unlike English, which maintains the same indefinite in both contexts, Nataforces different augment choice: the argument with the overt augment is21. Speakers prefer to drop the overt object DP when the OM is used. But they also acceptthe overt DP if it is preceded by a pause, which suggests that the object DP is dislocated/ina topic position.81used for existential wide scope (108a); the argument nominal with thecovert augment is used for existential narrow scope (108b).(108) a. MakuruMakuruMakuruta-a-ghor-ireta-a-ɣor-iréNEG-PST-buy-PERFe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru did not buy a book.’b. MakuruMakuruMakuruta-a-ghor-iréta-a-ɣor-iréNEG-PST-buy-PERFɣí-etaβoɣí-etaβoC7-book‘Makuru did not buy a/any book.’I rule out the hypothesis that the Nata augment is like the English in-definite a. Next, I discuss the notion of domain restriction.2.2.6 The Nata augment is not a ‘domain restrictor’Gillon (2006) and Lyon (2011, 2013) present empirical claims that Ds inSkwxwú7mesh and Okanagan are interpreted via domain restriction: thenotion that the interpretation of a DP or NP which provides the range for aquantifier is contextually restricted (see Westerstahl 1984; von Fintel 1994,1998; Matthewson 2000, 2001 and many others). For instance, both theDPs the man/men in (109) and the QP everyone in (110) are interpreted withrespect to a context set (C).(109) Contextually salient man/men [Gillon 2006: 70]a. The man was laughingb. The men were laughing(110) Contextually salient Q NP [von Fintel 1998: 2; 1994: 28]82a. Everyone had a good time.b. The dinner guests had rhubarb pie for dessert. Everyone de-veloped a rash.With the men, Gillon argues that the speaker does not refer to all the menin the world but rather the men in the context set. Likewise the man doesnot refer to a singleton man in the whole world; rather, it refers to a uniqueman in the discourse context. With (110), von Fintel (1994, 1998) arguesthat the quantifier everyone does not quantify over all the individuals inthe world, but is restricted to individuals who attended the relevant event,(110a) or who had the rhubarb pie, (110b)22.Gillon on deictic Ds in Skwxwú7mesh and Lyon on the determiner iʔin Okanagan argue that the Ds are sensitive to the context of use (domainrestriction). They argue also that the Ds are associated with an implicatureof uniqueness or maximality. Under the Cooperative Principle of conver-sation, conversational implicatures are inferences arising from pragmaticsand are not tied to any structural configurations (Grice 1975; Levinson2000). When speakers are having a conversation, they are tied to conver-sational principles (maxims) which they may either ‘flout’/violate or obey(see Grice 1975; Levinson 1983 for discussion of conversational maxims).While I show that the Nata overt augment is consistently used in all thediscourse contexts supporting Gillon’s (2006) and Lyon’s (2013) analysesof Ds, I show that the Nata overt augment behaves differently from Ds inthese two languages. Consider first the similarities and differences betweenthe Nata augment, the Skwxwú7mesh deictic Ds (d-Ds), and the Okanagannon-deictic context-sensitive domain restrictor D, iʔ.22. I do not explore all the versions/extensions of domain restriction analyses. See West-erstahl 1984 who argues that the itself is a domain restrictor. Gillon (2006) argues thatdefiniteness is not necessary, and that a uniqueness/maximality implicature also providesdomain restriction. Von Fintel (1994, 1998) argues with quantifier data that domain re-striction is provided by a quantificational D. Matthewson (2000, 2001) provides data fromSt’át’imcets arguing that domain restriction is done by a non-quantificational determiner,which co-occurs with the quantificational element, as in “all the students”.83Table 2.4: Similarities and differences in the three languagesAugment/D properties Nata AUG Skw’sh d-Ds Okan. iʔEncodes definiteness 7 7 7Encodes specificity 7 7 7Interpreted via domain restriction (3) 3 3Carries /MAX-implicature 7 3 3Gillon specifically argues that Skwxwú7mesh deictic Ds are sensitive tothe context of use to the effect that they are able to access the commonground of the discourse via domain restriction. Nata augments are fine tobe used with referents established in the context set, however, they do notaccess the addressee’s knowledge in any way. I propose instead that unique-ness or maximality in Nata arises from the morphology (e.g., by using OMs,or DEMs) or is purely pragmatic but does not come from the semantics ofthe augment itself. Another point of departure from treating the augmentas a domain restrictor, which I consider here, is that the Nata augmentsystem exhibits a semantic contrast that is ruled out in Skwxwú7mesh andOkanagan. First I compare then contrast data from Nata and Ds that arealways interpreted via domain restriction. Similarities between the Nata Ds and domain restriction DsAt first, the Ds in these languages appear to behave like the Nata overtaugment. Gillon and Lyon illustrate that Ds in these two languages do notpresuppose/assert uniqueness or familiarity and are used in a variety ofcontexts: definite, indefinite, specific, and non-specific. For instance, bothGillon and Lyon show that speakers can use the same Ds in both novel andfamiliar contexts, which is the case we saw for Nata above. A representativeexample comes from Skwxwú7mesh, (111):84(111) Skwxwú7mesh Ds [Squamish, Gillon 2006: 5]a. [Novel]Chen1sg.skw’ách-nexwlook-tr(lc)ti/ta/kwa/kwidetswí7kaman‘I saw a man.’b. [Familiar]Narlkwʼáyhungryti/ta/kwa/kwidetswí7kaman‘The man is hungry.’Furthermore, Gillon and Lyon argue that Ds in these languages areanalyzed with respect to the contextually restricted set (domain restric-tion) with a referent matching the NP description. The following contextadapted from Lyon (2013: 143-144) shows that the Nata overt augment canalso be used in contexts where the DP picks the only referent in the context.[Context: My friend and I are tossing two balls, and my friend throwsthem to me when I go inside. When I came back the balls were gone, I ask,(112a), and he answers, (112b):](112) a. e=me-bhiirae=me-βiiráD=C4-ballni-hẹne-hɛCOP-WHghe-nyí?ɣe-ɲí?SA4-be‘Where are #(the) balls?’b. N-ne-ghi-rẹki-ireN-ne-ɣi-rɛkɛ(r)-ireFOC-1sg-OM8-throw-PFV‘I threw them.’For (112a) to be felicitous the DP in (112a) must be referring tothe balls in context, hence the DP in (a) picks the only balls intro-duced by the context set. The interpretation of the DP e=mebhiira ‘theballs’ in (112a) arises from the contextually salient set (domain restric-85tion). Another example comes from data involving non-interrogative cases:[Context: Makuru is babysitting his younger sibling. Busy mom gets an-noyed by Makuru consistently reporting what the child is doing. Mom: Youkeep pestering and calling (saying)...](113) a. u=mw-aanau=mw-aanaD=C1-childa-ri-iti-irea-ri-ité(r)-ireSA1-PST-spill-PFVa=ma-bhẹẹrẹa=ma-bhɛɛ́rɛD=C6-milk‘The/#a child spilled the milk.’b. u=mw-aanau=mw-aanaD=C1-childa-ri-iti-irea-ri-ité(r)-ireSA1-PST-spill-PFVe=ke-roongoorie=ke-róóŋgooriD=C7-porridge‘The/#a child spilled the porridge.’c. u=mw-aanau=mw-aanaD=C1-childa-a-kọr-irea-a-kɔr-iréSA1-PST-do-PFVhang’u.haŋú.PART.NahọNahɔ́why.noto-ko-mu-tẹm-a?ó-ko-mú-tɛm-a?2sg-FUT-OM1-hit-FV‘The/#a child did this... Why don’t you spank him?’Given this context, the mom must be referring to the same trouble-making kid, the one in the context. Notice that the OM in the last sen-tence, (113c), co-refers with the DP denoting the child in the context, whichmeans this is the same child mentioned in the previous discourse. However,as I have argued in §2.2.4, the augment can in fact be used in contexts thatdo not refer to unique/maximal referents in the context.In quantificational environments in Skwxwú7mesh, Gillon argues thatdomain restriction is provided by the deictic D appearing in the universallyquantified DP:86(114) Squamish Ds [Skwxwú7mesh, Gillon 2006: 100]S-ennom-1sg.sbjmenjustkwélash-tshoot-trí7xwalltadetmex-míxalhredup-bear‘I shot all of the bears.’The Nata overt augment is used in a variety of contexts, therefore is pre-dicted to be used with a contextually restricted set denoted by a universallyquantified DP, such as in (115). Here the DP a=bhaana ‘(the) children’ re-stricts the domain of the universal quantifier, by denoting a contextuallysalient set of children and not all the children in the world. Notice thatwhen the quantifier -ọsẹ is in singular form it denotes the universal quanti-fier every and when it is in plural it is all, and both must co-occur with theaugment23.(115) a. [u=mw-ana[u=mw-ana[D=C2-childw-ọọsẹ]w-ɔsɛ]́C2-all]a-ghi-itẹm-ẹr-aa-ɣa-itɛm-ɛr-aSA2-PST-enter-FVmo=o=nyumbamo=a-ɲuumbáLOC18=D=house‘Every child entered into the house.’23. Nata quantifiers do not sit in D0 position (i.e., do not create a generalized quantifier oftype <<e,t>t>) as in English (see Chapter 4). However, Nata speakers use the Swahiliform kila ‘every’, pronounced as kira in Nata, which seems to replace the augment andsits in D in object positions, as in (ia). This produces a QP structure as the English ‘every’in every child. Speaker marginally accept the singular Nata quantifier SG-ọsẹ in an objectposition, i(b).(i) a. N-ka-ghamban-aN-ka-ɣámban-a1sg-PST-talk-FVnanawithkira[kira[everymw-aana]mw-aná]C1-child]‘I talked with every child.’b. %N-ka-ghamban-a%N-ka-ɣámban-a1sg-PST-talk-FVnanato[u=mw-aana[u=mw-aná[D=C1-childw-ọọsẹ]w-ɔsɛ]́C1-all]‘I talked to every children.’It seems that the quantifier SG-ọsẹ is undergoing some changes resulting into subject-objectasymmetry but it is not clear to me why.87b. [a=bha-ana[a=βa-ana[D=C2-childbh-ọọsẹ]βa-ɔsɛ]́C2-all]bha-ghi-itẹm-ẹr-aβa-ɣa-itɛm-ɛr-aSA2-PST-enter-FVmo=o=nyumbamo=a-ɲuumbáLOC18=D=house‘All #(the) children entered into the house.’c. N-ka-ghamban-aN-ka-ɣámban-a1sg-PST-talk-FVnanato[a=bha-aana[a=βa-aná[D=C2-childbh-ọọsẹ]βa-ɔsɛ]́C1-all]‘I talked to all #(the) children.’Here, the domain of the quantifier is contextually restricted. The quan-tifier then quantifies over elements/subsets of the range (a DP of type e)which picks out a restricted domain (see Matthewson 2001; Lyon 2013).Finally, the Ds in Skwxwú7mesh and Okanagan are used in sentencesthat may carry an implicature of uniqueness/maximality. Both Gillon andLyon give examples showing that domain-restriction Ds by default carry animplicature of uniqueness/maximality that can be cancelled.(116) Skwxwú7mesh Ds [Skwxwú7mesh, Gillon 2006: 89]Chen1sg.skwélash-tshoot-trta/tsidetmíxalhbearkwidetcheláklh.yesterdayChenrlkw’ách-nexwlook-tr(lc)ta/tsidetchánatthreemíxalh,bearswelhconjnarltl’íw’-numut-witescape-refl-3pl‘I shot a bear yesterday. I saw three bears, but some escaped.’[Context: There was a bowl of berries on the table, but now it is gone. Iask “What happened to the berries?” You reply:](117) Okanagan Ds [Okanagan, Lyon 2013: 143]a. ʔiɬ-əneat-[DIR]-1SG.ERGiʔDETs-p’y’q-aɬqNOM-ripe-fruit‘I ate (all) the berries.’88b. ʔiɬ-əneat-[DIR]-1SG.ERGiʔDETs-p’y’q-aɬq,NOM-ripe-fruitnáxə̌mɬCONJilíʔDEMk’m-xt-m-nexcept-BEN-2SG.OBJ-1SG.ERGiʔDETs-p’y’q-aɬqNOM-ripe-fruit‘I ate some/#the berries, but I saved you some.’Both Gillon and Lyon argue that when the domain restrictor Ds inSkwxwú7mesh and Okanagan are used, the hearer expects the referent(s)to be unique/maximal in any contexts, unless the context rules the uniqui-ness/maximality interpretation out, or the implicature is cancelled. As theyargue, the Ds in Skwxwú7mesh and Okanagan imply the conversational im-plicatures of uniqueness/maximality as their default semantics.In Nata, the overt augment can be used in sentences that may implyuniqueness, (118) or maximality of referents/entities, (119), which maybe cancelled. The example in (118) refers to one gazelle; it is also possiblefor the addressee to think that this was the only gazelle in context, however,the second part cancels that implicature. In (119a) the addressee may thinkthat the speaker is referring to the maximal soup; however, the proportionalreading of (119b) cancels any maximality implicature that the speaker atethe entire bowl of soup.(118) N-ka-ras-aN-ka-rás-a1sg-PST-see-FVa=ma-yaania=ma-yaaníD=C6-gazelleTiiriina,Tiiriina,Tiriina,n-ka-rọr-an-ka-rɔr-a1sg-PST-see-FVe-che-nde,e=tʃe-nde,D.PART=C10-othermaremarebutchi-ka-ng’ọs-achi-kayaaraSA10-PST-escape-FV‘I shot a gazelle in Tiriina, I saw others but they escaped.’[Context: Your friend is preparing some soup. There was a bowl of soupon the table, but now it’s gone. I ask what happened to the soup? Yourfriend replies (replicated from Lyon 2013)]89(119) a. o=mo-sorio=mo-sóriD=C3-soupn=ne-nyw-iren=né-ɲw-ireFOC-1sg-ate-PFV‘I ate some/the soup.’b. o=woo-ndéo=woo-ndéD=C9-anothern=né-wi-it-iren=né-wo-ite(r)-ireFOC-1sg-OM3-spill-PFV‘The rest I spilled (it).’The cancellation of the implicature really shows that the overt augment isnot a maximality operator, otherwise it would force the infelicitous read-ing as with the English determiner the in #I ate the soup, the rest I spilled.In spite of the parallels in the data so far between the three languages,based on some differences shown immediately below I will propose a dif-ferent analysis of Nata, according to which the D does not enforce domainrestriction. Differences between the Nata augment and domainrestriction DsWhile the overt augment in Nata is used in domain restriction contexts andin sentences that may imply unique or maximal entities, I do not think thatdomain restriction is part of the representation of the Nata augment as isargued to be the case for the Ds in Skwxwú7mesh and Okanagan. I argueinstead that that the value for the interpretation of the DPs containing theovert augment in these contexts is supplied by the context and it does notcome from the augment itself. I give reasons why the Nata augment is nota domain restrictor element like Ds in Skwxwú7mesh and Okanagan.First, if we consider further Nata data we see that the augment doesnot always refer to referents in a contextually restricted domain. In (120),for instance, the speaker presents their hope that they will buy a cup,even if they do not know where they will find one to buy. Similarly,in Nata, the overt augment is used in cultural assumptions that only90surmise that a referent exists but such referents cannot be analyzed ascoming from a contextually restricted set, (121). The same is true withgenerics/characterizing statements presented above, which use referentsthat do not have context-dependent meaning24.[Context: M broke B’s cup and she is hoping to go to the store. She artic-ulates her compensation plan:](120) N=ne-gho-ko-ghor-er-aN=ne-ɣo-ko-ɣor-er-aSAM=1sg-2sg-buy-APPL-FVe=ɣi‐kọọmbẹe=ɣi- ‐kɔɔ́mbɛe=C7-cup‘I will buy you a cup.’[Context: B is chewing and she bites her lip. B says:](121) o=mo-too=móo-toD=C1-personn-aa-ku-n-gaamb-an-a-ku-ŋ-gaamb-aSAM-SA1-PROG-1SG-talkbhwahẹẹnẹβwahɛɛ́nɛwell/good‘Some person is speaking well of me.’I argue that the augment cannot be a domain restrictor element, sinceupon saying (121), the speaker may have an unrestricted set of possibili-ties about who may be talking about them. For instance, the speaker onlybelieves that such an individual exists but has no idea where they are lo-cated, i.e., whether or not they live in Nata, in Canada or in any part ofthe world. Thus context-dependence cannot be at issue here. In chapter4, I present a proposal that explains the role of the augment in all thesepuzzling contexts25.My strongest reason for parameterizing Nata apart fromSkwxwú7mesh/Okanagan Ds is not because Nata augments utilize24. Nata augments also do not support Etxeberria and Giannakidou’s (2010) view that theD head provides domain restriction or bears deictic features.25. In my understanding Gillon or Lyon do not discuss data involving cultural assumptions.This is a new area of inquiry in relation to D meanings and domain restriction.91domain restriction only in a subset of contexts, but rather because Okana-gan and Skwxwú7mesh Ds do not encode the contrast that forces augmentchoice in Nata. As I argue more elaborately in Chapters 3 and 4, theNata augment has a contrast between the overt augment and the covertaugment relative to non-factual operators. Both Gillon and Lyon illustratethat Ds in these languages can be used in declarative sentences as well asin non-factive environments. A classic example comes from the Okanagandomain-restriction determiner iʔ which can be used under the scope of anon-factive operator as well as outside the scope of such an operator26.(122) The Okanagan iʔ determiner [Okanagan, Lyon 2011: 26)]a. iʔDetsqəltmíxʷmanlutaʔNEGkaʔkíc-ísfind.(DIR)-3SG.ERGiʔDetsənklʼcaʔsqáxaʔhorse‘The man didn’t find any horses.’b. iʔDetsqəltmíxʷmanlutaʔNEGkaʔkíc-ísfind.(DIR)-3SG.ERGiʔDetsənklʼcaʔsqáxaʔhorse‘The man didn’t find the horses.’Gillon (2006) also shows that all deictic Ds in Skwxwú7mesh are equallyavailable in declarative sentences as well as in those with non-factual op-erators. She argues that the non-deictic D, kwi, is the closest candidateto polarity sensitive Ds. However, kwi, like all the other Ds ti/ti/kwa, canoccur in non-factive environments (123b), but can also be used in factiveenvironments (123a)27.(123) Skwxwú7mesh kwi determiner[Skwxwú7mesh, Gillon 2006: 6-7]26. I do not talk about the Okanagan oblique element t, which according to Lyon (2013),is not a determiner but a semantically vacuous morphological reflex of semantic incorpo-ration. This is not relevant for Nata.27. Gillon shows that different DPs in Skwxwú7mesh can take different scope with respectto an operator.92a. Chen1sg.ssilh7-ánbuy-trti/ta/kwa/kwidetsts’úkwi7fish‘I bought a/the fish.’b. Núrl.Qchexw2sg.ssilh7-ánbuy-trkwidetsts’úkwi7?fish‘Did you buy a fish?’c. Háw,Negháwkbe.notsts’úkwi7fish‘No there weren’t any fish.’Gillon concludes that non-factual operators do not force D choice inSkwxwú7mesh, and there is no polarity sensitive D. In contexts where the(strong) NPI reading applies, like (123c), apparently, none of the Ds isused, which is interesting given Gillon’s claim that argument nominals inSquamish are DPs.Nata speakers switch augments in these contexts, as I illustrate moreelaborately in Chapters 3 and 4. In the examples below, Nata differs cru-cially from domain restrictor Ds which are insensitive to the interpretivecontrast I reveal in Chapter 4.(124) a. N-ka-ghor-aN-ka-ɣor-a1sg-PST-buy-FVa=∅.swe [Nata]a=∅.sweD=C9.fish‘I bought a/the fish.’b. N-ty-a-a-ghor-ireN-tj-a-a-ɣor-ire1sg-NEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVa=∅.swea=∅.sweD=C9.swe‘I did not buy a/the fish.’93(125) a. N-ty-a-a-ghor-ireN-tj-a-a-ɣor-ireFOC-NEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFV∅.swe∅.sweC9.fish‘I did not buy any fish.’b. *N-ka-ghor-a*N-a-ka-ɣor-aFOC-1sg-SA1-PST-buy-FV∅.swe∅.sweC9.fishIntended: ‘I bought a/the fish.’The differences in the semantics of the Nata augments and domain-restriction Ds introduced in the data above separate the Nata augment sys-tem from Skwxwú7mesh/Okanagan Ds. I argue in this thesis that it is ageneral property of Nata overt Ds that they can appear in a variety of con-texts: in specific, non-specific, familiar, novel, context-dependent, or inpragmatic contexts that give rise to conversational implicatures of unique-ness or familiarity. This behaviour is predicted under the analysis I developin Chapter 4, which has to do with speaker-oriented belief in the existenceof a referent.2.3 Solving the Nata puzzle: the two ingredientsTo account for the distribution of both nominals appearing with the aug-ment on the surface, and those without the augment on the surface, I adoptthe hypothesis that the D category in Nata is instantiated by the augment.Two ingredients will be needed. The first ingredient comes from Longob-ardi’s hypothesis that nominal arguments are DPs and predicate nominalsare NPs (Longobardi 1994, 2001, 2008). Longobardi’s proposal is also inline with the second ingredient I propose here; that in the overt syntax andat the meaning level, nominals may vary according to whether the aug-ment is overt or covert (D∅). By covert, I mean that the augment has nophonological content, but is not semantically vacuous. Thus, to understandwhat is forcing augment choice in the puzzling data presented in the outsetof this chapter, three nominal distinctions must be understood: argument94DPs with an overt augment, (126a); argument DPs with a covert augment,(126b); and nominal expressions without an augment, (126c):(126) a. Argument DPs with an overt augment: [DP D[...]]b. Argument DPs with a covert augment: [DP D∅[...]]c. Non-argument nominals (no augment): [φP φ[...]]The two ingredients for solving the Nata augment puzzles derive thesedistinctions. One is the contrast between nominal arguments versus nom-inal predicates; and ingredient two is the semantic distinction between ar-gument nominals appearing with overt augment vs those with the covertaugment. I briefly discuss both ingredients below.2.3.1 Ingredient 1: argument vs predicate nominalsThe hypothesis I adopt is that Nata augmented nominals are DP arguments;they denote entities of type e, (127). On the other hand predicate nominalsdenote a property and lack a DP shell, (128).[Context: Bahati is a gender neutral name. A woman and a man are stand-ing before us. M is wondering which person is Bahati](127) a. BahatiBahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhe [DP=Argument]n=o=mo-subheCOP=D=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’b. #Bahati#BahatiBahatim=mo-subhe [NP=Predicate]n=mo-súβeCOP=C1-man‘Bahati is a man.’95(128) Context: M is describing Bahati’s gender...]a. BahatiBahatiBahatim=mo-subhe [NP=Predicate]n=mo-súβeCOP=C1-man‘Bahati is a man.’b. #Bahati#BahatiBahatin=o=mo-subhe [DP=Argument]n=o=mo-subheCOP=D=C1-man‘Bahati is the man.’I will argue in the subsequent chapter that the proposal that argumentsare DPs in Nata makes certain correct predictions about the syntactic dis-tribution of augments.2.3.2 Ingredient 2: overt versus covert augmentIn Chapter 4, I will present my core semantic proposal that the choice be-tween the overt augment and the covert augment depends on whether thespeaker believes the noun phrase’s referent exists or not. I will show thatthe Nata overt augment commits speakers to belief-of-existence, (129); andthe covert augment does not commit speakers to belief of existence, (130a).(129) a. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-mana-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛk-aSA1-PST-laugh-FV‘A/the man laughed.’b. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-manta-a-sẹk-ireta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘A/the man did not laugh.’96(130) a. mo-subhemo-súβeC1-manta-a-sẹk-ireta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘No man laughed.’b. * mo-subhe* mo-súβeC1-mana-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛḱ-aSA1-PST-laugh-FVIntended: ‘A/the man laughed.’The overt augment contrasts with a phonologically null augment whichrequires syntactic licensing by a non-factual operator. Thus, an affirma-tive sentence like (130b) will always be ungrammatical. The details of myproposal are given in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 4, I will argue that theinterpretation of the augment requires an analysis involving choice func-tions (cf. Reinhart 1997; Matthewson 1999).2.4 Summary and conclusionIn this chapter I have argued that the following proposals about the aug-ments are upheld in Nata:(131) a. The Nata augment is not conditioned by mass-count distinc-tions.b. The Nata augment is not conditioned by Case.c. The Nata augment is not conditioned by deixis.d. The Nata augment is not conditioned by definiteness.e. The Nata augment is not conditioned by specificity.f. The Nata augment is not a domain restriction element.97I have ruled out various hypotheses. First, Nata augments are not of theRomance-type in which overt Ds appear as expletive Ds on mass and ab-stract nouns. In Chapter 4, I will argue more elaborately that Nata speakersswitch the augments on semantic basis, and that augments are not seman-tically vacuous. I showed that neither Case nor deixis can condition theaugment. I also argued that the Nata augment is not like English-type Ds asthey do not encode or contrast for definiteness, i.e., augments do not inducea common ground interpretation or presuppose existence or uniqueness. Ihave shown that Nata utilizes OMs and DEMs to derive definite readings.Thus, definiteness and specificity features are not part of the semantics ofthe Nata augment; these features come from elsewhere in the grammar.The Nata augment also cannot be analyzed as a specificity marker as itappears in a variety of non-specific contexts. The position I have taken isthat Nata overt augments are neutral with regard to (in)definiteness and(non)specificity and this explains why they appear in definite/specific aswell as in indefinite/non-specific contexts.I showed that Nata augments are compatible with domain restriction,however, they do not require domain restriction given that augments can beused in contexts that do not contextually restrict the interpretation of DPscontaining them. Definiteness, specificity, deixis, and domain restrictioncome from elsewhere.The exposition of this chapter forms the basis for the theoretical un-derstanding of the syntax and the semantics of augments in the context ofa broad typology of Ds cross-linguistically. In the next chapter I focus onthe syntactic proposal then move to my proposal about the semantics ofaugments.98Chapter 3The Syntax of Nata D3.1 IntroductionOn the basis of data from Nata, I argue in this chapter that the category Dis instantiated by the augment. I provide arguments that support analyzingthe augment as a realization of the functional category D (see similar claimsin Bantu: Dreu 2008; Visser 2008; de Dreu 2008; Giusti 2008; Taraldsen2010; Ndayiragije et al. 2012; Carsten and Mletche 2015). Many of thediagnostics are novel, and the data sets considered cover a wide range ofcontexts, so this study both deepens and broadens our understanding of thesyntax of the augment.The chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2 I discuss the DP internalstructure and present the proposal that augments are Ds. In §3.3 I show thataugments cannot be used in nominal predicates. In §3.4 I give evidence toshow that Ds are obligatorily required in all argument positions. In §3.5 Idiscuss the distribution of polarity Ds and show that they are licensed by anon-factual operator. In §3.6 I talk about areas for future research, and in§3.7, I give a summary and conclusion.993.2 The internal syntax of the Nata DPTraditional approaches to Bantu nouns treat the augment as part of thenoun class prefix (N-prefix), as in (132a) (see Guthrie 1967-71; Meeussen1967; and others). Based on evidence from Nata, I treat a noun suchas (132a) as morphosyntactically complex, that is, as a DP, as shown in(132b).(132) [Nata]a. omo-subheomo-súβeC2-√man‘a/the man’b. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C2-√man‘a/the man’I first discuss the decomposition of Nata nouns into D=φ-N structure,then I provide arguments that the augment fits to be analyzed as D.3.2.1 The decomposition of the Nata nounI decompose the Nata noun into the lexical part (√N), the N-prefix(number/phi(φ)), here labelled as C(lass)), and the augment (D). I treatthe DP o=mo-subhe a/the man’ in (132b), for instance, as having the lex-ical part/nominal stem -subhe ‘man’, which first merges with φ, and φPmerges with D, (133a). The full DP structure of o=mo-subhe is in (133b).(133) a. DPD φPφ Nb. DPDo=φPφ-mo-N-súβeI treat the augment o= and number/φ -mo- in (133b) as functional ele-ments (cf. Carstens 1991, 2001, 2008; Diercks 2012, 2010; Déchaine et al.2014. See also Borer 2005; Marantz 1997; Wiltschko 2009 and others). I100agree with the Bantuists’ proposal that the internal structure of the Bantunoun projects Number/φ as a functional head of NumP/φP (see Carstens2001; Giusti 2008; Déchaine et al. 2013; Gambarage 2012, 2013; and oth-ers). The rationale for the assumption that number/φ projects as a func-tional head (F0), is based on the fact that number is semantically predictable(cf. Kihm 2005; Carstens 2001, 2005, 2008). Therefore, I choose to usethe label φP/Phi but Num can also be used (Aboh 1998; Morava-Contini2000)1. The choice between these two labels is completely arbitrary. Notealso that in some Bantu accounts, number and class features are analyzedas playing a role in Agree relations, i.e., checking φ-features of agreement[gender, Number] (see Baker 2003; Diercks 2010; Carstens 2001; and oth-ers for discussion). In this thesis I will not investigate these claims, as theywill take us far afield. For an extensive discussion of the descriptive and theevaluative function of N-prefixes in Bantu, see Fortune (1984), Déchaine etal. (2014) and for Nata see Déchaine and Gambarage (2016) and Déchaineet al. (2017). For insights about number see Schwarzschild (2002) and oth-ers. For various lattice approaches to number, see Link (1983), Landman(1991), Chierchia (1998), Rullmann and You (2006), and many others, andfor Bantu see Déchaine et.al. (2014).While (133b) is an example of a DP formed from a non-deverbal noun,I extend the decomposition of the noun into D, φ and N to DPs formedfrom deverbal nouns as well. Deverbal nouns are nouns whose stems arecomposed of a verbal root and a final vowel morpheme (FV)2. For instance,1. There are other proposals about the F0 that projects when the N-prefix merges with thelexical head/L:(i) a. N-prefix projects nP (Ferrari-Bridgers 2008).b. N-prefix projects GenderP (Corbett 1991).c. N-prefix projects NumP (Aboh 1998, Cinque 1995).I do not use the label nP to avoid confusion with the use of this label for other functionalelements, eg., see Déchaine et al (2017) on final vowels. I do not use genderP due tonon-uniform treatments of N-prefixes as gender (see Ferrari-Bridgers (2008) and Carstens(2008).2. I assume with Mudzingwa (2010) that stems and roots are coexistensive in non-deverbalnouns, and that roots and FVs make a stem in deverbal nouns. The root is a radical, it doesnot have internal structure (see Bauer 1983; Good 2005; Gambarage 2011; and others).101the DP o=mokomi ‘a collector’ in (134a) has a verbal root kom- ‘collect’ anda FV i, while the non-deverbal noun in (133b) repeated in (134b) lacks theseformatives.(134) [Nata]a. o=*(mo)-kom-io=*(mo)-kóm-iD=C1-√collect-FV‘a/the collector’b. o=*(mo)-subheo=*(mo)-súβeD=C1-√man‘a/the man’Except for proper names which I discuss in Chapter 6, noun class is oblig-atory for all common nouns, hence both nominal roots and nominal stemsmust be inflected with φ before they take D. Thus, I treat the non-deverbalnoun o=mo-súβe ‘a/the man’ in (135a) as structurally similar to the de-rived noun, (135b)3.(135) a. DPDo=φPφmoNsúβeb. DPDo=φPφmóNkóm-iI use the label N for lexical projections, which may contain FVs. How-ever, for the discussion of types of roots and the contribution of the finalvowel morpheme in Nata see Déchaine et al. (2017)4.The structural position of Nata augments proposed in (135) is consis-tent with the DP hypothesis (Brame 1982; Abney 1987) and its variousextensions (Szabolsci 1987; Déchaine 1993; Longobardi 1994 and others)3. Note that one signature of deverbal nouns is that H-tone is always on the N-prefix; seeDéchaine et al. (2017) and Anghelescu (to appear) for discussion.4. In Déchaine et al. (2017) the deverbal nouns have type-flexible roots (e.g., they areverbal in the context of tense and are nominal in the context of φP, while type-rigid rootscannot be used in the context of tense. Refer to Déchaine et al. (2017) for the implicationsof this claim in relation to Distributed Morphology (Marantz and Halle 1993; Marantz 1997,2013; Embick and Noyer 2001).102in which heads must project to phrases. However, unlike word-level Dsin English and other languages with word-level Ds, the augment has mor-phosyntactic properties of a clitic as I argue below.3.2.2 The augment as a proclitic DOne possible criticism of treating the augment as D may come from the mor-phosyntactic appearance of the augment, i.e., the augment does not appearas a word class determiner like a or the in English. Indeed the augment isnot a word class D. I claim that the augment has the morphosyntactic sta-tus of a proclitic (Meeussen 1967; Van de Velde 2008; van de Velde 2019),a bound element that attaches to a phrase (eg., φP in Nata) (cf. Zwicky1977; Ajiboye 2005, Déchaine 1993). Thus, I make a distinction between aword category and a structural position in a tree that elements with similarstructural status may occupy. I mark the augment with a clitic convention“=” throughout.The dissociation between word classes and functional elements that areF0 is elaborated in Ghomeshi et al. (2009) (see also Lyons 1999):...determiners are assumed to occupy a position fixed by thehierarchy of functional categories, which allows for the disso-ciation between the word class (determiner) and the syntacticposition its members occupy (D). Ghomeshi et al. (2009: 05)The treatment of augments as proclitics, instantiating the category D,may contribute to our understanding of why certain pre-nominal procliticsthat may occupy the D position are in complementary distribution with theaugment. Next, I focus on these distributional properties.1033.2.2.1 The augment does not co-occur with the DEM procliticThe first case that supports the analysis of the augment in Nata as a procliticD comes from the fact that it cannot co-occur with the pre-nominal DEMwhich also attaches to φP as a proclitic D, as in (136a)5:(136) a. u-nọ=mu-kariu-nɔ=mú-kariC1-DEM=C1-womann-aa-ku-yaar-an-aa-ku-yáar-aC-SA1-PROG-run-FV‘The woman is running.’b. *u-nọ=o=mu-kari*u-nɔ=o=mú-kariC1-DEM=D=C1-womann-aa-ku-yaar-an-aa-ku-yáar-aC-SA1-PROG-run-FV’The woman is running.’I propose that the pre-nominal DEM in (136a) sits in D position, (137b).Thus the augment (137a) can only be used if the D slot is not occupied byother D material.(137) a. DPDo=φPmu-kárib. DPDunɔ=φPmú-kariThe one semantic difference between the augment and the pre-nominalDEM in Nata is that the pre-nominal DEM functions as a strong D (i.e.,has anaphoric readings) (cf. Ashton 1944; Carstens 1991, 2008; Van deVelde 2005; 2019; and others) while the augment does not. I will analyzethe augment and the pre-nominal DEM as proclitics that occupy the samestructural position, hence the two cannot co-occur.5. Nata has two demonstratives: the pre- and the post-nominal. Refer to Chapter 6 where Idiscuss the post-nominal DEM which co-occurs with the augment but differs both from thepost-nominal DEM and the augment in phonological and deictic features.1043.2.2.2 The augment does not co-occur with the honorific procliticThe proclitic ɲa=, appears to have the honorific meaning ‘Mr /Ms/Mas-ter/Mistress’ and syntactically, appears to replace the augment. Comparethe augment data in (138) with the examples with the ɲa= honorific in(139):(138) The overt augment positionD=Cl-N Glossa. o=mu-twé (C1) ‘a/the head’b. a=ma-ŋána (C6) ‘(the) words’c. a=ma-βí (C6) ‘(the) poop’(139) The honorific proclitic positionHon=Cl-N Glossa. ɲá=(*o=)mu-twe (C1) ‘Master head’ (big-headed person)b. ɲá=(*a=)ma-ŋana (C6) ‘Master words’ (talkative person)c. ɲá=(*a=)ma-βi (C6) ‘Master poop’ (smelly kid)Déchaine et al. (2014) report on a class of evaluatives in Shona called “hon-orifics” which translate as Mr/Ms, e.g., when mù-kómáná ‘a/the boy’ takesthe honorific prefix va- as in vá-mù-kómáná it renders the meaning ‘Mr.boy’. In their analysis they argue that honorifics in Shona associate to theD position in the syntax. This is consistent with my treatment of the Natahonorific proclitic ɲa as D, which predicts that it will be in complementarydistribution with the augment as in (139). The corresponding structuresfor o=mu-twé ‘a/the head’ and ɲá=ɣu-twe ‘Mr/Ms head’ are in (140):(140) a. DPDo=φPmutwéb. DPDɲá=φPmutwe105The Nata honorific proclitic does not function as an evaluative N-prefixas is the case in Shona, which allows prefix stacking. In Nata, evaluativemeaning is created by substituting an ordinary N-prefix, e.g., o=mu-twé‘head’ (C3), for the evaluative N-prefix as in o=ɣu-twé ‘big bad head’ (C20)(cf. Déchaine and Gambarage 2016). Therefore, both the evaluative andhonorific interpretations are possible at the same time: ɲá=ɣu-twe ‘Master/Mr/Ms big bad head’. I suggest that the honorific prefix and the augmentoccupy the same structural position.3.2.3 Predictions for the proposal that augments are DsThe proposal that the category D in Nata is instantiated by augments makescertain predictions about the syntactic distribution of augments on nom-inals. There is ample evidence in the literature that Ds serve to turn apredicate into an argument (cf. Carlson 1980; Higginbotham 1985; Stow-ell 1989; Longobardi 1994, 2001, 2008; Matthewson 1998; Van de Velde2019). In a series of papers Longobardi provides extensive argumentationin favour of the view that D is required for argumenthood:(141) D and argumenthood (Longobardi 1994: 620, 628)a. A ‘nominal expression’ is an argument only if it is introduced bya category D (p. 620).b. DP can be an argument, NP cannot.I adopt the hypothesis that nominal arguments are DPs (Longobardi1994, 2001, 2008). The Longobardi-style analysis is consistent with thesplit between arguments and predicates in Nata. I show below that pred-icates lack a D, (142a); .and nominal arguments are DPs which may varyin the overt syntax according to whether D is pronounced (overt), (142b)or unpronounced (covert/D∅), (142c). The analysis developed here distin-guishes three types of nominal expressions, as follows.(142) a. Nominal predicates (no augment): φ-Nb. Argument DPs (overt augment): D-φ-N106c. Argument DPs (covert augment): D∅-φ-NI discuss the syntactic distribution of each of these three structures withexamples from Nata starting with predicates such as φ-N, (143a), thenD=φ-N arguments such as (143b), and arguments with a phonologicallynull D such as (143c).(143) The contrast in argument DPs [Nata]a. [φP=predicate]MakuruMakuruMakurum=mw-aanam=mu-anáCOP=C1-child‘Makuru is a child.’b. [DP=argument]MakuruMakuruMakurua-gha-sughut-aa-ɣa-súɣut-aSA-PST-push-FVu=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-child‘Makuru pushed a/the child.’c. [DP=argument]MakuruMakuruMakurut-a-a-sughut-iret-a-a-súɣut-ireNEG-SA-PST-push-PFVmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘Makuru did not push any child.’On the surface the DP containing the null D in (143c) appears with thesame φ-N structure as a nominal predicate in (143a). I argue that they aredifferent structurally. The seeming φ-N structure in (143c) is an argumentDP containing a null D, which is accessed semantically in LF. This null D re-quires syntactic licensing, i.e., it must be licensed by a non-factual operator.The nominal predicate φ-N structure in (143a), on the other hand, lacks Daltogether. In fact, we will see in Chapter 4 that while (143c) talks aboutentities that the speaker does not believe exist in the universe of discourse,nominal predicates denote some property and never an entity/individual.1073.3 PredicatesCross-linguistically, verbal and nominal predicates have been reported tolack the D shell (see Déchaine 1993; Lyon 2013; Hedberg and Potter 2010;den Dikken, 2006; Witschko 2009; Matthewson 1998 and many others).In many languages, nominal predicates are found with the predicationalcopula where the post-copula nominal denotes a property predicated ofthe subject (Higgins 1973; Lyon 2013; Hedberg and Potter, 2010; denDikken 2006; Mikkelsen 2005; and others). A classical example comesfrom German, where nominal predicates (NPs) which express a propertyappear without a D, (144a) but argument NPs which enter into identityrelation (DP=DP) occur with a D, (144b):(144) Predicate/Argument [German, Wiltschko 2009:26]a. MariaMariáistis[Lehrerin] [NP=predicate][teacher]‘Mary is [a teacher].’b. MariaMariasahsaw[die Lehrerin] [DP=argument][D teacher]‘Mary saw [the teacher].’Another well known case of predicates is adjectival predicates whichdenote a property or quality (Levinson 1978; Partee 1986; Déchaine 1993;Villalba 2009; and others). Examples come from English copula construc-tions which also require a tensed form of the copula be. In (145) the post-copula predicate which is an adjectival predicate lacks a D:(145) Adjectival predicates in Englisha. John is busy.b. Sarah is honest.While in some languages like English nominal predicates may be DPs, asin Sarah is a teacher, and rarely are NPs as as in Lucy is boss (see Zamparelli1081995, Longobardi 1994; Lyon 2013), I show that Nata nominal predicatesconsistently lack a D.3.3.1 Nata nominal predicates are φ-NLongobardi’s generalization that DPs can be arguments will make a weakclaim for Nata in which nominal predicates consistently lack a D. Thus,Nata needs a stronger version of this, something like (146).(146) Generalization for Nata nominal predicatesNata nominal predicates lack a D.I will show that nominal predicates in Nata have the φ-N structure,which means they always agree with the subject of which the property ispredicated (see Chapter 1 for discussion of concordial agreement). I arguethat in Nata, φ qua class prefix diagnoses predicative expressions. I discusssimple nominal predicates, and secondary predicates, where I show all ofthese lack a D-layer. Simple nominal predicates lack a DSimple φ-N predicates are formed of number (φ) and the nominal stem(N) and must occur with the overt copula6. Nominal predicates denote aproperty where they lack a D, as the cases in (a) below show. Note thatthe predicate must agree in number with the subject. The caveat fromthe English translation in cases such as (147a) or (148a) is that nominalpredicates in English may appear as DPs (see Higgins 1973; Déchaine 1993;Mikkelsen 2005; Zamparelli 1995 for arguments about DP predicates inEnglish), even if there is no D in the actual Bantu examples.(147) Question: What gender is Bhahati?6. The copula is a homorganic nasal, as it assimilates to the place of articulation of thefollowing consonant; see Johannes (2007) and Anghelescu (2019).109a. BhahatiβahatiBhahatim=mo-subhem=mo-súβeCOP=C1-man‘Bhahati is a man.’b. #Bhahati#βahatiBhahatino=o=mo-subhene=o=mo-súβeCOP=D=C1-man‘Bhahati is the man.’(148) [Context: A friend is telling you about Masato’s behaviour:]a. MasátoMasátoMasatom=mw-iibh-i [Nata]m=mw-iiβ-íCOP=C1-steal-FV‘Masato is a thief.’b. #Masáto#MasátoMasatono=o=mw-iibh-ino=o=mw-iiβ-íCOP=D=C1-steal-FV‘Masato is the thief.’Note that a property can be predicated of a plural subject and predicatesmust agree in number with the subject DP.(149) [Context: What is the gender of Masato and Bhahati?]a. MasatoMasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatim=ba-subhe [Nata]m=ba-súβeCOP=C2-man‘Masato and Bhahati are men.’110b. #Masato#MasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatin=a=ba-subhen=a=ba-súβeCOP=D=C2-man‘Masato and Bhahati are (the) men.’(150) [Context: B commenting on the behaviour of two men]a. MasatoMasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatim=bi-ibh-i [Nata]m=ba-iβ-íCOP=C2-steal-FV‘Masato and Bhahati are thieves.’b. #Masato#MasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatin=a=bhi-ibh-in=aa=βa-iβ-íCOP=D=C2-steal-FVIntended: ‘Masato and Bhahati are the thieves.’Since nominal predicates are not entity-denoting DPs, they are not ex-pected to be used as arguments. This is confirmed by (151) which showsthat a φ-N nominal is not licit in argument position.(151) a. *mo-subhe*mo-súβeC1-mana-a-hik-irea-a-hik-ireSA1-PAST-arrive-PFV[Nata]Intended: ‘A/the man has arrived.’b. *bha-subhe*βa-suβeC2-menbha-a-hik-ireβa-a-hík-ireSA2-PAST-arrive-PFVIntended: ‘(The) men have arrived.’1113.3.1.2 D-linked wh-phrases as complex nominal predicatesThe ex-situ wh-questions are formed of a nominal predicate introduced by acopula nasal, followed by a wh-word, forming a cleft structure, as in (152a);or they may be formed of a predicate nominal and wh-word, without a cop-ula nasal, as in (152b). The host NP never takes a D as (152c) shows. Thenon-use of the augment is predicted for predicate nominals if the augmentis a D.(152) a. m=mw-aana=kem=mu-ana=keCOP=C1-child=WHa-ku-rayaar-aa-ku-rajáar-a3s-PROG-run-FVha-yọ?ha-jɔ?C16-there‘[It] is which child running there?’b. mw-aana=kemu-ana=keC1-child=WHa-ku-rayaar-aa-ku-rajáar-a3s-PROG-run-FVha-yọ?ha-jɔ?C16-there‘Which child is running (out) there?’c. *u=mw-aana=ke*u=mu-aná=keD=C1-child=WHa-ku-rayaar-aa-ku-rajáar-a3s-PROG-run-FVha-yọ?ha-jɔ?C16-thereIntended lit: ‘[It] is which child running there?’‘Which child is running (out) there?’I treat the homorganic copula nasal in (152a) as a FOC marker (cf. Rizzi(1997); Allen 2014; Gambarage and Keupdjio 2013), and the φ-N=ke in(152a)-(152b) as a predicate nominal. I treat the invariable wh-element=ke which encliticizes on a nominal predicate as a complementizer (C),introducing the φ-N nominal predicate. As has been widely observed inBantu expletive constructions, Bantu lacks overt expletive pronouns (cf.Simango 2006; Riedel 2009)112(153) FOCP(FOC)NXPφPmw-aana‘child’CPC=ke‘which’IPakurayaara...‘s/he is running...’Since D-linked wh-questions ask about an entity/individual establishedin the discourse context i.e., which individual out of a larger salient set(Den Dikken and Giannakidou 2002; Hirose 2003), the lack of D in theex-situ D-linked wh-phrases can only be explained by syntactic factors.One piece of evidence showing that the cases in (152) involve predica-tion comes from Nata in-situ type questions. When the wh-element and thecopula nasal remain in-situ therefore separated from the nominal predicate,the NP may now take a D to form a DP.(154) a. *mw-aana*mu-anáC1-childu-yọu-yɔC1-RELa-ku-yaar-aa-ku-jáar-a3s-PROG-run-FVha-yọha-jɔC16-therene-we?ne-we?COP-C1.whIntended: ‘The child who is running (out) there is which one?’b. u=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childu-yọu-jɔC1-RELa-ku-yaar-aa-ku-jáar-a3s-PROG-run-FVha-yọha-jɔC16-therene-we?ne-we?COP-C1.whLit: ‘The child who is running (out) there is which one?’The syntactic status of D in D-linked questions varies across languages(see Pesetsky 1987; Den Dikken and Giannakidou 2002; Hirose 2003). In113a language like Zulu, D-linked questions may or may not co-occur with theD depending on the syntactic position of the wh element (Buell 2011; Pou-los and Msimang 1998; Halpert 2012). For instance, Buell (2011) reportsthat when an agreeing element -phi ‘which’ follows the noun, the D cannotoccur, (155a); however, when the right-dislocated noun occurs with it, theD shows up on the noun, (155b):(155) D-linked wh-words [Zulu, Halpert 2012: 133]a. w-a-bona2s-PST-seemu-ntu1-personmu-phi?1-which‘Which person did you see?’b. w-a-bona2s-PST-seemu-phi1-whichu=mu-ntu?AUG-1-person‘Which person did you see?’I leave open the question whether in the in-situ type, the wh elementoccupies the D position like English D-linked wh-word. Further research isneeded to understand the locus of variation for D-linked questions withinBantu and beyond.3.3.2 Nata adnominal predicates are φ-AI follow the Bantuist tradition of grouping together nouns and adnomi-nal modifiers (i.e. adjectives) as “nominal expressions” (see Wilkins andKimenyi 1975; Givón 1970 and others). The language-internal evidencefor this comes from the concordial agreement: adnominal modifiers are in-flected for number/noun-class and must agree in number with a head noun.That is, adnominal modifiers appear with a φ-A structure (see Chapter 1 fordiscussion). Post-copula adjectives lack a DOne category of adnominal predicates is post-copula adjectives which areφ-A. Post-copula adjectives appear with no D and pattern the same as other114clearly predicative nominals as we saw above (cf. Déchaine 1993, 2001;Lyon 2013).(156) a. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanm=mu-rẹm=mu-rɛCOP=C1-tall[Nata]‘A/the woman is tall.’b. e=bhe-bhusee=βe-βúseD=C8-monkeym=be-nyiinim=be-ɲíiniCOP=C8-clever‘Monkeys are clever.’ Adjectival modifiers lack a DThe second category of adnominal predicates are adjectival modifierswhich also have φ-A structure and they immediately follow the nominalthat they modify, resulting in a surface N-A order, (157).(157) a. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanmu-rẹ [Nata]mu-rɛC1-tall‘a tall woman.’b. e=bhe-bhusee=βe-βúseD=C8-monkeybe-nyiinibe-ɲíiniC8-clever‘clever monkeys.’As predicted under the current theory that all nominal predicates denote aproperty, φ-A adnominal predicates are ruled out in argument positions7.7. To convey the equivalent of degree modification as in very tall, Nata deploys stress on apredicate, which as expected lacks a D (i):115(158) a. *mu-rẹ*mu-rɛC1-talla-a-hik-irea-a-hik-ireSA1-PAST-arrive-PFV[Nata]Intended: ‘A/the tall one has arrived.’b. *bhe-nyiini*βe-ɲíiniC8-cleverbhe-e-hik-ireβe-e-hik-ireSA8-PAST-arrive-PFVIntended: ‘The clever (ones) have arrived.’In §3.4 I show that when the augment is used with φ-A predicates an argu-ment DP is formed where it denotes an entity, and as such the DP can beused in argument positions. Here, I conclude that all φ-Ns and φ-A struc-tures are predicates therefore they lack a D.3.3.3 Nata secondary predicates are φ-XAnother context to illustrate predication is with secondary predicates foundin small clauses. Secondary predicates are expressions that convey infor-mation about the subject or the object but are not the main predicate ofthe clause (Déchaine 1993; Huddleston and Pullum 2002; Ullrich 2018; Ir-imia 2005; Stowell 1981; Schneider-Zioga and Mutaka 2014). The currentanalysis predicts that predicates in these structures will lack a D. The com-mon types of secondary predicates I discuss here are: (i) complement smallclauses (SC) and (ii) adjunct predicates. In a language like English, com-plement SCs appear with no tense marker (159); with an infinitive copulalike to be or the relator as, (160a). These compare to a full CP structure (atensed clause) in (160b):(i) o=mo-teo=mo-téD=C3-treeMU-REmú-rɛvery.C3-tall‘a very tall tree.’116(159) a. I consider [Joe intelligent]. [=descriptive]b. I hammered [the metal flat]. [=resultative]c. The news made [Lucy sad]. [=causative]d. I saw [Lucy leave]. [=bare infinitive](160) a. I consider [Joe (as/to be) intelligent].b. I believe [that Joe is intelligent].On the other hand, adjunct predicates are not complements and maydepict the subject, (161a) or the object, (161b) (see see Déchaine 1993;Irimia 2006; Pylkkänen 2002).(161) a. Lucy ran the race hungry. [subject depictive]b. Lucy prefers her meat well-cooked. [Object depictive]There are various treatments of secondary predicates that I cannot ex-haustively discuss here (see Déchaine 1993; Irimia 2006; Pylkkänen 2002).One popular syntactic analysis for secondary predicates is the one thattreats depictives as adjunct phrases merged at the level of VP if they refer todirect objects, and at the level of vP if they modify the external argument.In contrast, resultatives are treated as complements merged to the V layer(see Irimia 2006; Pylkkänen 2002). I show that Nata secondary predicateslack a D, as we would expect if they were nominal predicates. Nata secondary nominal predicates lack a DI argue that secondary predicates in all the small clause structures availablein Nata consistently lack a augment, as one would expect if the augment isD. The evidence comes from complement clauses with either the infinitivecopula as in (162a), or with the relator -anga ‘as’ or ‘like’, (163a), which in-troduce a nominal predicate. Note the verb rọr- here is multiply ambiguousbetween see, consider and find.117(162) What is your consideration about Wasato? [Nata]a. N=ni-haa-rọr-aN=ni-haa-rɔŕ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-see/find-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasatom=mu-ghabho]m=mú-ɣaβo]COP=C1-healer]‘I find [Wasato to be a healer].’b. #N=ni-haa-rọr-a#N=ni-haa-rɔŕ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-see/find-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasatono=o=mu-ghabho]ne=o=mu-ɣaβo]COP=D=C1-healer]Intended: ‘I find [Wasato to be a healer].’(163) What do you think about Wasato’s manner?a. N=ni-haa-rọr-aN=ni-haa-rɔŕ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-consider-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasaton=aangan=aŋgáSAM=asmw-aana]mu-aná]C1-child]‘I see [Wasato as a child].’b. #N=ni-haa-rọr-a#N=ni-haa-rɔŕ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-consider-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasaton=aangan=aŋgáSAM=asu=mw-aana]u=mu-aná]D=C1-child]Intended: ‘I see [Wasato as a child].’I confirm that the augment cannot be used in any nominal predicates.This conclusion is also reached with adjectival predicates. Nata secondary adjectival predicates lack a DSecondary adjectival predicates also appear with copulas and indicate theproperty is predicated of the subject. As expected, such predicates have a118φ-A structure and do not carry a D. Note that the copula is crucial for thesecases as well:(164) What do you think about Wasato’s look? [Nata]a. N=ni-haa-bhugh-aN=ni-haa-βúɣ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-consider-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasatom=mu-chọmu]m=mu-tʃɔḿu]COP=C1-good]‘I consider Wasato beautiful.’b. #N=ni-haa-bhugh-a#N=ni-haa-βúɣ-aFOC=1sg-HAB-consider-FV[Wasato[Wasato[Wasatono=o=mu-chọmu]ne=o=mu-tʃɔḿu]COP=D=C1-good]Intended: ‘I consider Wasato beautiful.’Small clauses formed of predicate adjuncts are also found in Nata andshow that predicate adjuncts lack a D as predicted by the current analysis.The depictive predicates, which are adjectives, may depict a property overthe subject, (165), direct object (166a)8. In any case, the secondary pred-icate cannot appear with a D. Note that the predicates here are adjectivalin nature.(165) Secondary predicates [Subject depictive]a. MariaMariaMariaa-ka-yar-aa-ka-jáar-aSA1-PST-ran-FVmo-rwiire [Nata]mo-rwíireC1-sick‘Maria ran sick.’8. Pylkkänen (2002) argues that in English a depictive cannot modify an indirect argument(ia) or a DP inside PP (ib).(i) a. *I gave Mary the meat hungry.b. *I talked to Sue drunk.Irimia (2006) shows with data from Romanian, Slavic and Albanian that these results arenot cross-linguistically valid. In Nata, modification of an indirect object or of a DP insidePP is also not possible with regular φ-A, but is possible with typical adverbs.119b. *Maria*MariaMariaa-ka-yar-aa-ka-jáar-aSA1-PST-ran-FVo=mo-rwiireo=mo-rwíireD=C1=sickIntended: ‘Maria ran sick.’(166) Secondary predicates [Object depictive]a. MasatoMasatoMasatoa-ka-ria-ka-riSA1-PST-eat-FV[a=n.yama[a=ɲ.ama[D=C9.meatm-bese]m-bése]C9-raw]‘Masato ate [the meat raw].’b. #Masato#MasatoMasatoa-ka-ria-ka-riSA1-[PST-eat-FV[a=n.yama[a=ɲ.amaD=C9.beefa=m-bese]a=m-bése]D=C9-raw]Intended: ‘Masato ate [the meat raw].’The lack of augment in depictive predicates support the argument thatthe augment is D and that predicates cannot take a D.3.3.4 Nata adverbials lack a DThere are two main classes of adverbials in Nata. One class is spatial ad-verbials which behave like the English adverbs down or up, which cannottake an augment/D.(167) Spatial adverbs as non-argumental adverbialsa. ghi-ka-gh-iɣi-ka-ɣ-iC7-PST-go-FV[ighoro/haa-se][iɣóro/haa-sé][up/C16-down]‘(It) went up/down.’120b. *ghi-ka-gh-i*ɣi-ka-ɣ-iC7-PST-go-FV[i=ighoro/a=haa-see][i=iɣóro/a=haa-sé][D=up/D=C16-down]Intended: ‘(It) went up/down.’The other class is temporal adverbials, which are treated as secondary(depictive) predicates (see Déchaine 1993). My analysis correctly pre-dicts that adverbs may require a φ, and adverbial modification will blockthe augment/D. This is correct. Nata speakers reject sentences with theaugment on a temporal adjunct equivalent to “all day/night” in English,(168b/169b). These cases also sound odd to me.(168) Temporal adjuncts as non-arguments [Nata]a. a-gha-tẹm-aa-ɣa-tɛm-a3sg-PST-hit-FVa-m-beerea-m-béerePPF-C9-drum[bho-tiko[βo-tíko[C14-nightbho-ghima]βó-ɣima]C14-whole]‘S/he played a/the drum all night.’b. *a-gha-tẹm-a*a-ɣa-tɛm-a3sg-PST-hit-FVa-m-beerea-m-béerePPF-C9-drum[o=bho-tiko[o=βo-tíko[o=C14-nightbho-ghima]βó-ɣima]C14-whole]Intended: ‘S/he played a/the drum all night.’(169) Temporal adjuncts as non-arguments [Nata]a. a-ka-rer-er-aa-ka-rér-er-a3sg-PST-cry-APPL-FVe-ki-ghẹsọe-kí-ɣɛsɔPPF-C7-knife[mw-ise[mw-isé[C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-whole]‘S/he cried for a/the knife all day.’b. *a-ka-rer-er-a*a-ka-rér-er-a3sg-PST-cry-APPL-FVe-ki-ghẹsọe-kí-ɣɛsɔPPF-C7-knife[o=mwise[o=mw-ise[o=C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-whole]‘S/he cried for a/the knife all day.’121I analyze the temporal adjuncts as non-argument adjuncts which adjointo the VP as shown below. This explains why they lack a D.(170) VPVPVtema‘hit’DPa=mbeere‘drum’YPbhotiko bhoghima‘all night’3.3.5 Nata infinitives lack a D-layerIn Bantu, infinitives are formed with the C15 prefix ku-, which Bantu gram-marians have described as having both the properties of a verb and a noun(a.k.a verbo-nominal stems) (see Schadeberg 2006: 80). When ku-stemsare used without a D they must be verbal predicates, (171a)/(172a):(171) a. Ni-kwẹẹnd-aNe-kwɛnd-á1Sg.SM-want-FVkw-eemb-akw-eemb-áC15-sing-FVkẹkɛlikeMasatoMasatoMasato‘I want to sing like Masato.’b. *Ni-kwend-a*Ni-kwend-á1Sg.SM-want-FVu=kw-eemb-au=kw-eemb-áD=C15-sing-FVkẹkɛlikeMasatoMasatoMasatoIntended: ‘I want to sing like Masato.’122(172) a. MasatoMasatoMasatoa-ke-end-aa-kɛ-ɛnd-aSA1-PST-want-FVko-bhor-iko-βor-iINF-ask-FV‘Masato wanted to ask.’b. *Masato*MasatoMasatoa-ke-end-aa-kɛ-ɛnd-aSA1-PST-want-FV[o=ko-bhor-i][o=ko-βor-i][D=INF-ask-FV]Intended: ‘Masato wanted to ask.’Stems attaching to INF or inflected with C15 and taking a D must functionas gerunds rendering an entity denoting reading, as I show in §3.4.The data with predicates above demonstrated that nominal predicatesin Nata lack the augment which is consistent with the analysis of it as D-layer. We saw that predicates do not denote individuals but a property; assuch they cannot be used in an argument position. In what follows, I turnto D=φ-N structures where I show that D is required with all argumentnominals.3.4 Argument nominals are D-φ-NIn the previous section I showed that Nata nominal predicates Nata lack aD. Here, I claim that an augment is required to close off the NP predicateand create a DP, which is consistent with its analysis as D (Stowell 1989;Longobardi 1994; Alexiadou et al. 2007). One piece of evidence for ana-lyzing the augment as a D is that it can turn a predicate into an argument(cf. Longobardi 1994; 2001; Déchaine 1993). The following examples mayprovide evidence for this argument9.9. Partee (1986) argues that property-denoting nominals can be type-shifted to entity-denoting DPs of type e, and type e can raise to a property of type <e,t>. Similar claimsare found in Longobardi (1994), Heim and Kratzer (2010), but see Chierchia (1998) for adifferent approach, in which he argues that in some languages, plural/mass bare NPs arearguments on their own.123(173) [Context: I know that the police caught a thief but I didn’t knowthe thief’s name is Masato. The next day a friend asks me if I feelsorry for Masato. I ask: Who is Masato? He answers:]a. #Masáto#MasátoMasatom=mw-iibh-i [Nata]m=mw-iiβ-íCOP=C1-steal-FV‘Masato is a thief.’b. MasátoMasátoMasatono=o=mw-iibh-ino=o=mw-iiβ-íCOP=D=C1-steal-FV‘Masato is the thief.’[Context: I know that the police caught two male thieves but I didn’t knowthe thieves’ names are Masato and Bhahati. The next day a friend asks meif I feel sorry for Masato and Bhahati. I ask: Who are Masato and Bhahati?He answers:](174) a. #Masato#MasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatim=bi-ibh-i [Nata]m=ba-iβ-íCOP=C2-steal-FV‘Masato and Bhahati are thieves.’b. MasatoMasatoMasatonanaandBhahatiβahatiBhahatin=a==bhi-ibh-in=aa=βa-iβ-íCOP=D=C2-steal-FV‘Masato and Bhahati are the thieves.’The cases in (173)-(174) point to equative and specificational copulas inwhich DP1 denotes the same individual as DP2 (cf. Higgins 1973; Mikkelsen2005; Lyon 2013; Sneider-Zioga and Mutaka 2014). It is worth pointing outthat the definite construal of o=mwiibhi ‘the thief’ in (173) or a=bhiibhi ‘thethieves’ in (174) is not an inherent property of the D; rather the definiteness124effect comes from the context (refer to Chapter 2 for further discussion). Iclaim that the generalization in (175) is robust in all argument positions inNata:(175) The generalization about argument nominalsAll Nata argument nominals must have a DI present a range of Nata data to show that the D is required in all argu-ment positions, consistent with Longobardi’s claim that argument nominalsmust have a D. I focus on the D requirement with simplex Ns in argumentposition (§3.4.1) and with complex Ns in argument position: N-N com-pounds and D spreading contexts, (§3.4.2).3.4.1 D is required in all argument positionsWith the exception of proper names, which I discuss in Chapter 6, the Din Nata is obligatory in all argument positions. I consider in turn the sub-ject (§, direct object (§, indirect object (§, possessor(§, and prepositional object positions (§ For each of thesecontexts, I provide examples of both singular and plural DPs and for allnoun types: count, abstract and mass nouns. This is because in many lan-guages, plural DPs behave differently than singular DPs relative to the real-ization of overt D (see Vergnaud and Zubizarreta 1992; Krifka 1999, 2003;Borer 2005; Chierchia 1998; Longobardi 2001; Déchaine et al. 2018). D is required in subject positionThe D is obligatory in subject position. The (b) cases show that argumentnominals are consistently ruled out if they do not appear with a D. I startwith count nouns.125(176) Count N Singular, Subject Positiona. e=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cupghi-ka-hiringit-aɣi-ka-híriiŋgit-aSA7-PST-roll-FVha-aseha-asédown‘A/the cup rolled down.’b. *ghi-kọmbẹ*ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛC7-cupghi-ka-hiringit-aɣi-ka-híriiŋgit-aSA1-PST-roll-FVha-aseha-asédownIntended: ‘A/the cup rolled down.’(177) Count N Plural, Subject Positiona. e=bhi-kọmbẹe=βi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C8-cupbhi-ka-hiringit-aβi-ka-híriiŋgit-aSA8-PST-roll-FVha-aseha-asédown‘(The) cups rolled down.’b. *bhi-kọmbẹ*βi-kɔɔ́mbɛC8-cupbhi-ka-hiringit-aβi-ka-híriiŋgit-aSA8-PST-roll-FVha-aseha-asédownIntended: ‘(The) cups rolled down.’Abstract nouns are argument DPs as they obligatorily occur with the D.Most abstract nouns take class 14 βo which marks abstract entities. Theclass is neutral with respect to the singular-plural contrast10.(178) Abstract N, Subject Position:10. Recall from Chapter 1 that there are exceptions with noun classifications, hence ab-stract nouns may feature with other classes as well: u=rw-ambe (C14), ‘gossip’, a=ma-reghe (C6) ‘commotion’ etc. I will not investigate here what controls the choice of the classmarker/number morphology on these cases.126a. o=bho-bhiihio=βo-βíihiD=C14-liesbhu-gha-suut-aβu-ɣasúut-aSA14-PST-cost-FVMariaMariaMaria‘(The) lies cost Maria.’b. *bho-bhiihi*βo-βíihiC14-liesbhu-gha-suut-aβu-ɣasúut-aSA14-PST-cost-FVMariaMariaMariaIntended: ‘(The) lies cost Maria.’As with count and abstract nouns, a D is obligatory with mass nouns inargument position. Certain mass nouns denoting fluids that clot or entitiesdescribed as ‘some amount of X’ or ‘a count of X’, (??) as opposed to ‘lotsof X or X’, (??) can take singular morphology (refer also to Chapter 2):(179) Mass N, Subject Position:a. ri=i-sahẹrí=í-saahɛD=C5-bloodri-ko-om-ari-ka-om-áSA5-PST-dry-FV‘The/some amount of blood dried up.’b. *i-sahẹ*í-saahɛC5-bloodri-ko-om-ari-ka-om-aSA5-PST-dry-FVIntended: ‘The/some amount of blood dried up.’(180) Mass N, Subject Position:a. a=ma-saahẹa=ma-saahɛD=C6-bloodgha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FV‘(The) blood spilled.’127b. *ma-saahẹ*ma-saahɛC6-bloodgha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FVIntended: ‘(The) blood spilled.’Mass nouns that show no singular plural count take plural morphologyalways. A noun such as a=manche ‘water’ in (181) as opposed to fluidsthat clot as in (179) above, takes plural morphology, but still takes the D.This shows that the D is obligatory in all these cases:(181) Mass N, Subject Position:a. a=ma-nchea=ma-ntʃéD=C6-watergha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FV‘(The) water spilled.’b. *ma-nche*ma-ntʃéC6-watergha-ghi-itek-aɣa-ɣa-iték-aSA6-PST-spill-FVIntended: ‘(The) blood spilled.’Ds are required on all subject arguments, whether they are in the mainclause (182) or in the subordinate clause (183):(182) Subjects in main clausesa. [u=-mw-aana[u=-mu-ana[D=C1-childa-ka-bhugh-a]a-ka-βuɣ-a]SA1-PST-say-FV]angoaŋgothatMariaMariaMarya-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛk-aSA1-PST-laugh-FV‘[A/the child said] that Mary laughed.’128b. *[mw-aana*[mu-ana[C1-childa-ka-bhugh-a]a-ka-βuɣ-a]SA1-PST-say-FV]angoaŋgothatMariaMariaMarya-gha-sẹk-aa-ɣa-sɛk-aSA1-PST-laugh-FVIntended: ‘[A/the child said] that Mary laughed.’(183) Subjects in subordinate clausesa. MariaMariaMarya-ka-bhugh-aa-ka-βuɣ-aSA1-PST-say-FV[ango[aŋgo[thatu=-mw-aanau=-mu-anáD=C1-childa-gha-sẹk-a]a-ɣa-sɛk-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]‘Mary said [that a/the child laughed].’b. *Maria*MariaMarya-ka-bhugh-aa-ka-βuɣ-aSA1-PST-say-FV[ango[aŋgo[thatmw-aanamu-anáC1-childa-gha-sẹk-a]a-ɣa-sɛk-a]SA1-PST-laugh-FV]Intended: ‘Mary said [that a/the child laughed].’ D is required in direct object positionsWhen an argument is complement to V (i.e., is a direct object) the D is stillobligatory, as the examples in (184) and (185) show:(184) Count N, Direct Object Singulara. MariaMariaMarya-kẹ-ẹghia-ka-ɛɣ-íSA1-PST-wash-FVe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘Mary washed a/the cup.’129b. *Maria*MariaMarya-kẹ-ẹghia-ka-ɛɣ-íSA1-PST-wash-FVghi-kọmbẹɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛC7-cupIntended: ‘Mary washed a/the cup.’(185) Count N, Direct Object Plurala. MariaMariaMarya-kẹ-ẹghia-ka-ɛɣ-íSA1-PST-wash-FVe=bhi-kọmbẹ [Count, pl.]e=βi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C8-cup‘Mary washed (the) cups.’b. *Maria*MariaMarya-kẹ-ẹghia-ka-ɛɣ-íSA1-PST-wash-FVbhi-kọmbẹβi-kɔɔ́mbɛC8-cupIntended: ‘Mary washed (the) cups.’Abstract nouns behave the same as count nouns in requiring a D in asthe examples below show:(186) Abstract N, Object positiona. MakuruMakuruMakurua-ka-ghamb-aa-ka-ghamb-aSA1-PST-speak-FVo=bho-bhiihio=βo-βíihiD=C14-lies‘Makuru told lies.’b. *Makuru*MakuruMakurua-ka-ghamb-aa-ka-ghamb-aSA1-PST-speak-FVbho-bhiihiβo-βíihiC14-lies‘Makuru told lies.’There is no exception for mass nouns not to take a D in any syntacticposition. Recall that mass nouns may exhibit a number contrast taking130either singular morphology, (187), or plural morphology, (188); whereasmass nouns that show no such contrast take plural morphology always,(189). As the (b) cases show, the D is obligatory in all these cases:(187) Mass N, Object positiona. a-gha-sangor-ia-ɣa-sáŋgor-i3sg-PST-clean.up-FVri=i-saahẹrí=í-saahɛD=C5-blood‘S/he cleaned up the/some amount of blood.’b. *a-gha-sangor-i*a-ɣa-sáŋgor-i3sg-PST-clean.up-FVi-saahẹí-saahɛC5-bloodIntended: ‘S/he cleaned up the/some amount of blood.’(188) Mass N, Object positiona. a-ka-ruus-ia-ka-rúus-i3sg-PST-draw-CAUSa=ma-saahẹa=má-saahɛD=C6-blood‘S/he drew (the) blood.’b. *a-ka-ru-si*a-ka-rúu-si3sg-PST-draw-CAUSma-saahẹmá-saahɛC6-bloodIntended: ‘S/he drew (the) blood.’(189) Mass N, Object positiona. a-ka-rẹẹt-aa-ka-rɛɛt-a3sg-PST-bring-CAUSa=ma-nchea=má-ntʃéD=C6-water‘S/he brought (the) water.’131b. *a-ka-rẹẹt-a*a-ka-rɛɛt-a3sg-PST-bring-FVma-nchemá-ntʃéC6-waterIntended: ‘S/he brought (the) water.’ D is required in indirect object positionNot only are Ds required when the argument is a direct object of the mainpredicate, but also when an argument is an indirect object, as in (191):(190) Count N, Indirect Object Singulara. MariaMariaMariaa-ka-haa-ka-h-áSA1-PST-give-FVu=-mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘Maria gave a/the child a/the cup.’b. *Maria*MariaMariaa-ka-haa-ka-h-áSA1-PST-give-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-childe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cupIntended: ‘Maria gave [a/the child] a/the cup.’(191) Count N, Indirect Object Plurala. MariaMariaMariaa-ka-haa-ka-h-áSA1-PST-give-FVa=bha-anau=βa-anáD=C2-childe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘Maria gave (the) child a/the cup.’b. *Maria*MariaMariaa-ka-haa-ka-h-áSA1-PST-give-FVbha-aanaβa-anáC2-childe=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cupIntended: ‘Maria gave a/the children a/the cup.’132The D is required with abstract nouns, (192) and mass nouns, (193) inan indirect object position as well. Note that the verb here carries applica-tive inflection to add an inanimate indirect object argument. The orderof arguments is rigid due to what is believed to be a Focus marking effectwhich I do not discuss here (see Sadlier-Brown 2013 for a discussion ofword order between DO and IO in Nata).(192) Abstract N, Object positiona. A-ka-bhọh-ẹr-aA-ka-βɔh́-ɛr-aSA1-PST-sue-APPL-FVMakuruMakuruMakuruo=bho-bhiihio=βo-βíihiD=C14-lies‘S/he sued Makuru because of lies.’b. *A-ka-bhọh-ẹr-a*A-ka-βɔh́-ɛr-aSA1-PST-sue-APPL-FVMakuruMakuruMakurubho-bhiihiβo-βíihiC14-liesIntended: ‘S/he sued Makuru because of lies.’(193) Mass N, Object positiona. a-gha-tah-er-aa-ɣa-táh-er-aSA1-PST-fetch-APPL-FVa=ma-nchea=má-ntʃéD=C6-watere=ghi-kọmbẹe=ɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛD=C7-cup‘S/he fetched (the) water with a/the cup.’b. *a-gha-tah-er-a*a-ɣa-táh-er-aSA1-PST-fetch-APPL-FVa=ma-nchea=má-ntʃéD=C6-waterghi-kọmbẹɣi-kɔɔ́mbɛC7-cupIntended: ‘S/he fetched (the) water with a/the cup.’Finally, I turn to gerundive nouns which I show require D, unlike in-finitive predicates which lack one all together.1333.4.1.4 D is required with gerundsThe infinitives or ku-stems in Nata cannot be used in argument positionsas the (b) cases show. When the augment/D is present, the infinitive verb(the predicate) is turned into a DP/gerund and it is used as an argument11:(194) a. u=kw-eemb-au=kw-eemb-áD=C15-sing-FVkokoof15MasatoMasátoMasaton=gu-chomuŋ=gu-tʃómuCOP=C15-good‘Masato’s singing is good.’b. *kw-eemb-a*kw-eemb-aC15-sing-FVkokoof15MasatoMasatoMasaton=gu-chomuŋ=gu-tʃómuCOP=C15-goodIntended: ‘Masato’s singing is good.’(195) a. o=ko-mer-ao=ko-mer-aD=C15-swallow-FVghu-ka-mor-er-iɣu-ka-mó-rer-iSA-PST-OM-cry-CAUS‘(The) swallowing made him/her cry.’b. *ko-mer-a*ko-mer-aC15-swallow-FVghu-ka-mor-er-iɣu-ka-mó-rer-iSA-PST-OM-cry-CAUSIntended: ‘(The) swallowing made him/her cry.’11. For Bantu languages with no augments/Ds such as Swahili, the stem with the infinitiveku- can be used in the context of a verbal predicate (infinitive) as in (1a), or as a gerund,(1b) (cf Carstens 1993: 178):(i) a. Ni-na-tak-a1sg-PRES-want-FVku-imbaC15-singkamalikeJuma [Swahili]Juma‘I want to sing like Juma.’b. ku-imbaC15-singkwa15ofJumaJumaku-me-ni-furah-ish-aSA15-PFV-1sg-be.happy-CAUS-FV‘Juma’s singing made me happy.’1343.4.1.5 D is required with temporal argumentsWe saw in §3.3.2 that temporal adjuncts equivalent to “all day/night” inEnglish (196a) cannot take a D as they modify a VP.(196) Temporal adjuncts as non-arguments [Nata]a. a-ka-rer-er-aa-ka-rér-er-a3sg-PST-cry-APPL-FVe-ki-ghẹsọe-kí-ɣɛsɔPPF-C7-knife[mw-ise[mw-isé[C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-full]‘S/he cried for a/the knife all day.’b. *a-ka-rer-er-a*a-ka-rér-er-a3sg-PST-cry-APPL-FVe-ki-ghẹsọe-kí-ɣɛsɔPPF-C7-knife[o=mwise[o=mw-ise[o=C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-whole]‘S/he cried for a/the knife all day.’My analysis predicts that when a temporal expression is an argument, itmust be a DP, and so will be licit with the augment/D. This property obtainswith Nata adverbials which parallel adverbials in many languages: for in-stance, temporal adjunct cases found in St’át’imcets, on which Matthewson(1998) remarks,If temporal nouns such as day have an intrinsic temporal com-ponent, the temporal adjuncts may already be licensed (or ‘sit-uated’) without the need for a determiner to perform this func-tion... When a determiner is needed for syntactic reason to cre-ate an argument, even temporal phrases will require a D, (p.81).This seems to be borne out in the following Nata example:(197) Question: How much time do you need to assemble my table?a. Nu-u-h-ẹNe-u-h-ɛ1sg-2sg-give-MOD[o=mwise[o=mwisé[o=C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-whole]‘You give me a/the whole day.’135b. *Nu-u-h-e*Ne-u-h-ɛ1sg-2sg-give-MOD[mw-ise[mw-isé[C3-daymo-ghima]mó-ɣima]C3-whole]Intended: ‘You give me a/the whole day.’For the cases like (197) I propose the tree in (198), in which φ projectsa φP which merges with the D to create an argument DP.(198) VPVNuuhe‘You give me’DPDo=φPφPmw-ise‘day’φPφmoA-ghima‘whole’3.4.2 D is required with complex nounsThis section shows that compounds and nouns in partitive structures (thosewhich are a result of D spreading) must have an augment to function asarguments, which supports an analysis of the augment as D. D is required with N-N compoundsIt is widely known that DPs which are formed by the compounding of twonouns allow one determiner (cf. Ndayiragije et al. 2012; Stegen 2002;Bauer 2003; and others). The English examples in (199) show that inde-pendent DPs have each a D; however, if they form a compound, the twonouns result in one DP which will retain only the leftmost D, as in (200a):136(199) a. A babyb. A sitter(200) a. A baby-sitterb. *baby a sitterc. *A baby a sitterThe table below indicates that both stem (N-prefix plus √N) and root(√N) compounds exist in Nata. Crucially, when an N-N compound isformed, only one D is realized, namely the D of the head (which is theleft-hand member of the N-N compound):(201) Stem-stem compoundD=C7-√N D=C9-√N D=C7-√N–C9-√Na. e=ke-mer-a a=ɲ-tʃɔka e=ke-mer-a–ɲ.tʃɔkaD=C7-swallower D=C9-snake D=C7-swallower-FV–C9.snake‘a swallower’ ‘a snake’ ‘a/the snake-swallower’.b. ″ ″ *ke-mer-a–a=ɲ.tʃɔkaC7-swallower-FV–D=C9.snakeIntended: ‘A/the snake-swallower’.c. ″ ″ *e=ke-mer-a–a=ɲ.tʃɔkae=C7-swallower-FV–D=C9.snakeIntended: ‘A/the snake-swallower’.137(202) Root-root reduplicationD=C1-√N D=C1-√N D=C1-√N–√Na. o=mo-súβe o=mo-súβe o=mo-súβe-suβéD=C1-man D=C1-man D=C1-man-RED‘a man’ ‘a man’ ‘a real man.’b. ″ ″ *mo-súβe-o=mo-suβéC1-man-D=C1-manIntended: ‘a real man.’c. ″ ″ *o=mo-súβe-o=mo-suβéD=C1-man-D=C1-man’Intended: ‘a/the real man.’As is evident from these examples, all nominal compounds in Nata allowone D12. D is required with determiner spreadIn some languages, when DPs take certain modifiers (i.e., adjectives, quan-tifiers, etc.), a determiner or a clitic-like particle occurs on the modifiers.This phenomenon is commonly known as D-spreading/doubling (see Buell2011; Giusti 1994 on Hebrew; Delsing 1993 on Scandinavian dialects; Mor-wood 2001; and numerous authors on Classical (CG) and Modern Greek(MG), Alexiadou et al. 2007, Alexiadou 2014)13.(203) D Spreading with adjectivesa. heDETgunewomenheDETsofe [CG, Morwood 2001: 125]wise‘The wise woman.’12. There are different types of compounding discussed in the literature; here I only presentcrucial data for the current proposal.13. Note also that languages like Albanian, LIthunian, and Romanian have D doubling thatinvolves Ds appearing as suffixes or clitic-like-material (see Alexiadou et al. 2007).138b. tothevivliobooktotheoreogood[MG, Alexiadou et al. 2007: 73]‘The good book.’c. enastorbigenakarman[Northern Swedish, Delsing 1993: 143]‘A big man.’This agreement phenomenon does not receive a uniform treatmentacross languages. In some languages D spreading has a semantic contri-bution (e.g., in Greek it is definiteness spreading, and in Northern Swedishdialect it is indefiniteness spreading (Delsing 1993). In other languages likeModern Hebrew, the contribution is debatable; some scholars say D dou-bling correlates with the construct state (Borer 1988; Ritter 1991; Siloni2002; Kremers 2009; Alexiadou et al. 2007; Alexiadou 2014; and others);while others say it is purely a syntactic phenomenon (see Giusti 2002)14.In Nata, augments display an agreement phenomenon similar to D-doubling/spreading. First, a modified nominal expression in argument po-sition permits a D on a head noun but does not require D-doubling on themodifier, (204). These DPs have an “indefinite construal” e.g., are used indiscourse-new contexts.(204) o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womanmo-nyiinimo-ɲíiniC1-wisea-ka-het-aa-ka-hét-aSA1-PST-pass-FVhanọ [Nata]hánɔhere‘A wise woman passed here.’In D-doubling structures both the nominal expression and the modifierappear with the overt D, (205)-(206). I argue that D-doubling in Nata is notpleonastic. The function of the extra D on adjectives and weak quantifiers14. Androutsopoulou (1996) argues that the double determiners found with DefiniteSpreading structures are “expletive” Ds at least to some Greek speakers. Giusti argues the Dspreading in Hebrew serves a purely syntactic role, particularly that of encoding agreementbetween the DP and its satellites by bearing φ and case features.139is to create DPs that can pick out a subset from the set referred to by thefirst DP, hence rendering a presuppositional/partitive reading (cf. Alexi-adou and Wilder 1998, Kolliakou 2004; Alexiadou et al, 2007; Alexiadou2014)15.(205) D-spreading: Adjectivesa. o=mu-kario=mu-káriD=C1-womano=mo-nyiinio=mo-ɲíiniD=C1-wisea-ka-het-aa-ka-hét-aSA1-PST-pass-FVha-nọ [Nata]há-nɔ16-hereLit: ‘The woman, the wise (one) passed here’‘The wise woman passed here.’b. e=ghi-tabhoe=ɣi-taβoD=C7-booke=ghi-chomue=ɣi-tʃómuD=C7-goodghi-ka-gwaɣi-ka-ɣw-aC7-PST-fall-FVLit: ‘The book, the good (one) fell’‘The good book fell.’(206) D-spreading: weak quantifiersa. a=bha-anau=βa-anáD=C2-childa=bha-ndea=βáa-ndeD=C2-some/otherbha-ka-het-aβa-ka-hét-aSA2-PST-pass-FVha-nọhá-nɔ16-here‘The other kids passed here.’b. a=bha-anaa=βa-anáD=C2-childa=bha-rua=βaa-rúD=C2-manybha-ka-het-aβa-ka-hét-aSA2-PST-pass-FVhanọhánɔhere‘Many of the kids passed here.’15. There is evidence in the literature that D-spreading never applies to demonstratives.This is true in Nata, as we saw in Chapter 1.140Here the presuppositional/partitive reading is that there is one individ-ual or multiple individuals out of a group of individuals being talked about.I analyze the D-doubling structures as appositive structures with D=φ-Nand D=φ-A arguments. I treat the DP internal modification by none D-doubling structures as corresponding to the structure in (207a), and theD-doubling cases as corresponding to the structure in (207b), which is theappositive structure.(207) a. DP2Da=φPφPbha-ana‘kids’φPbhande‘certain’b. DPDP1a=bhaana‘kids’DP2a=bhaande‘the other’D-doubling structures in Nata correlate to the construct state in He-brew (Ritter 1991; Siloni 2002), and to Greek, in which clitic-doubling hasa familiarity effect (see Anagnostopoulou 1994; Alexiadou et al. 20007;Alexiadou 2014). However, as I argued in Chapter 2, the presupposition-al/familiarity reading of the D-doubling structures is not inherently fromDs, but from the contextually salient set. In the next section I will focus onthe distribution of covert Ds.3.5 Polarity-sensitive argument DPs are D∅-φ-NThe Nata overt D in (208a) contrasts with the covert D∅ in (208b).(208) a. N-ka-rọr-aN-ka-rɔŕ-a1sg-PST-see-FVu=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-child‘I saw a/the child.’141b. N-ty-a-a-rooch-eN-tj-a-a-rootʃ-e1sg-NEG-SA1-PST-see-PFVmw-aanam-anáiC1-child‘I didn’t see any child.’The contrasting Nata Ds are presented as in (219), where (219a) is anovert D and (219b) is a covert D:(209) a. DPDu=φPφ-mw-N-aanab. DPD∅φPφ-mw-N-aanaThe phonologically null D is restricted in its distribution, appearing onlyin polarity contexts where it is c-commanded by a non-factual operator; forthis reason I refer to it as a polarity-sensitive D∅, a label I use interchange-ably with the null D∅ (cf. Progovac 1993; Haspelmath 1997; Matthewson1998; Lahiri 1998; Farkas 2002; Giannakidou 2001, 2011; von Fintel 1999;and others). Consistent with the literature on polarity-sensitive elements,I claim that the distribution of the polarity-sensitive D∅ is captured by thefollowing generalization:(210) Polarity licensing condition for null D:The polarity D∅ must fall under the c-command domain/scope of anon-factual operator. (The set of non-factual operators in Nata in-cludes Negation, Modality, Question operators, and Conditionals.)The terms ‘C-command’ and ‘Operator’ need to be defined. For c-command,I adopt the definition of asymmetrical c-command given in (211) (Reinhart1421976; Chomsky 1981). This type of c-command is consistent with the factthat the operator always c-commands the polarity D∅16.(211) α c-commands β iff:a. The first binary-branching node that dominates α also dominates β.b. Neither α nor β dominate each other.c. α c-commands β but β does not c-command α.The term ‘Operator’ is defined as an element which binds a variable(see Heim 1982; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990; Longobardi 1994;Cinque 1990; and others). For instance Heim (1982) gives the followingexamples of Operators:We take operators to include quantifiers, negation, temporaland modal operators (which are in some sense quantifiers, i.e.,quantifiers over times and possible worlds).[Heim 1982:143]Heim’s examples of operators include both factual and non-factual op-erators. I distinguish a set of operators that licenses polarity Ds from thosewhich do not. I argue that DP operators such as quantifiers, (212a), nullDPs in Spec, CP, (212b) or wh-phrases, (212c) do not license the polarityD∅. This is the case in Nata, (213)-(214) (see also Matthewson 1998 forsimilar observations in Salish). Since I discuss Nata wh-phrases in §3.5.2 Iwill not give any examples here to avoid repetition.(212) DP operatorsa. Every child found a key.b. [The man [Opi that found my keys ti]] was Socrates.c. Who found my keys?16. Evidence for this comes from lexical negation and the negative light verb which cannotlicense a subject DP containing the D∅, as we shall see below.143(213) a. u=mw=aanau=mw=aanáD=C1-childw-ọọsẹw-ɔɔsɛ ́C1-everya-a-tọọr-irea-a-tɔɔr-ireSA1-PST-find-FVo=ro-hungurọo=ro-huŋgurɔ́D=C11-key‘Every child found a key.’b. *u=mw=aana*u=mw=aanáD=C1-childw-ọọsẹw-ɔɔsɛ ́C1-everya-a-tọọr-irea-a-tɔɔr-ireSA1-PST-find-FVro-hungurọro-huŋgurɔ́C11-keyIntended: ‘Every child found a key.’(214) a. o=mo-too=móo-toD=C1-personu-nọu-nɔC1-RELa-a-tọọr-irea-a-tɔɔr-ireSA1-PST-find-FVo=ro-hungurọo=ro-huŋgurɔ́D=C11-keyrw-anẹrw-anɛC11-mym-Makurun-MakuruFOC-Makuru‘A person who found my key was Makuru.’b. *o=mo-to*o=móo-toD=C1-personu-nọu-nɔC1-RELa-a-tọọr-irea-a-tɔɔr-ireSA1-PST-find-FVro-hungurọro-huŋgurɔ́C11-keyrw-anẹrw-anɛC11-mym=Makurun=MakuruFOC-MakuruIntended: ‘A person who found my key was Makuru.’Crucially, all operators sit in A’-position; the DP cases in (212a)/(212b)in English, and the corresponding examples in Nata, have already raisedto an A’-position in LF, while (212c) has done so in the overt syntax (seeLongobardi 1994; Cinque 1990; Matthewson 1998 and others).I will largely focus on ‘non-factual’ operators, operators which licensethe polarity D∅. I show that in some cases the non-factual operators may144take the entire proposition under their scope/c-command. I use an Englishnegation example for illustration:(215) a. John didn’t see any woman.b. It is not the case [that there is a woman that John saw].The DP containing the D∅ must always fall under the scope of a non-factual operator. In Chapter 4 I argue that in this environment Nata DPs donot allow an existential interpretation (cf. Hoeksema 2012; Matthewson1998, 1999; Progovac 2000; Giannakidou 2000, 2011; von Fintel 2009;and others). In (215b), the sentence does not assert existence of a womanthat John saw. This contrast will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4.Crucially, the Nata polarity-sensitive D∅ appears in a variety of ‘polarityenvironments’, consistent with the typology of environments allowing po-larity sensitive elements. These environments include super-strong, strong,weak, and super-weak (see (see Zwarts 1998; Progovac 1998, 2000; Gian-nakidou 1998, 2000, 2006; Hoeksema 2012; Krifka 1995; von der Wouden1997; Gajewski 2011; Lin 2015; and others). Building on polarity classifi-cations, the appropriate term that fits the broad range of environments inwhich the Nata D∅ occurs is non-veridical (cf. Giannakidou 2006; Gajewski2011; Hoeksema 2012; Ladusaw 1980)17. Giannakidou and Mari (2018)define veridicality as followings:(216) a. F is veridical iff Fp entails p i.e., when Fp is true p is also true.b. F is non-veridical iff Fp does not entail p i.e., when Fp is true pmay or may not be true.One other possibility we may discuss regarding licensing of the polarityD is with downward entailing (DE) operators (cf. Ladusaw 1980; Progovac1993; Halpert 2012; Giannakidou 2011). While the Nata polarity D may17. There are many other ways of testing levels of negativity, e.g., anti-additive and anti-morphic, which I do not discuss here. For a discussion of these cases see Hoeksema 2012and others.145be licensed in a variety of downward entailing environments such as nega-tion, conditional, etc., I do not assume that the Nata polarity D can onlybe licensed in DE environments. Typical cases of non-DE operators are Q-morphemes in polar questions, and models which may license the polarityD in Nata but are not DE operators (see Progovac 1993; 2000). Anotherreason is that not all DE operators may license the polarity D in Nata. Forinstance, a quantifier like -suhu ‘few’ is a DE operator but does not inher-ently license the polarity element; I showed in Chapter 2 that all QPs inNata take a range/a DP that contains an overt D (see further discussion inChapter 4). In what follows I present a variety of licensing environmentsto show that polarity Ds consistently appear under the scope/c-commanddomain of a non-factual operator: negation (§3.5.1), question operators(§3.5.2), conditionals (§3.5.3) and modals (§3.5.4).3.5.1 NegationNegation as a non-factual operator licenses the polarity D in Nata. Unlikemany languages that display a strong tendency for polarity elements tofollow their licensor, Nata presents a different parameter for licensing ofpolarity Ds on subject DPs, i.e., the subject DP in (217a) precedes NEG inthe overt syntax18. In Nata, overt c-command is not a licensing requirementas the D∅ in any non-existential construction may precede the licensor as(217a) illustrates. In negative existential constructions, the DPs containinga polarity D∅ may precede the licensor, (217a) or follow it (217b), withno difference in meaning in the two structures.(217) Negative existential constructions in Nataa. mu-karimu-káriC2-womanta-a-nyihọta-a-ɲíhɔNEG-3SG-there-isa-a-rooch-ea-a-rootʃ-é3SG-PST-like-PFVYohanajohanáJohnLit: ‘There is no woman (who) saw John’¬[9x [woman (x) & x saw John]].18. Needless to say, objects DPs follow negation.146b. ta-a-nyihọta-a-ɲíhɔNEG-3SG-there-ismu-karimu-káriC2-womana-a-rooch-ea-a-rootʃ-é3SG-PST-see-PFVYohanajohanáJohnLit: ‘There is no woman (who) saw John’¬[9x [woman (x) & x saw John]].Based on these data I claim that it is the underlying (syntactic) representa-tion, i.e., input structure/the structure before spell-out, that fixes the scoperelation in Nata (see Sportiche et al. 2013 for a related discussion). Theclaim that scope relations are determined by the input structure coincideswith the well-known Bantuist claim that subject DPs are base generated atSpec, vP and are realized at a higher position, Spec, XP after movement(see Koopman and Sportiche 1991; Ngonyani:1998; Carstens 2005, 2001;Halpert 2012; and many others)19. I claim that licensing happens in thecovert syntax at which point the Op c-commands the subject before raisingto Spec, XP.(218) Licensing of subject polarity DsXPD∅-φPsubj NegPNeg vP3D∅-φPsubjLicensed herevPv0 VPV DPobj19. I do not discuss the structural position of various functional elements such as tense andsubject agreement (INFL) in Nata (see Ngonyani 1999 and references therein for discussionin Bantu.)147The landing site of the subject DP is a matter of controversy in Bantu,and I will not discuss this topic here (see Ngonyani 1998, 1999, 2001;Kinyololo 1991; Diercks 2010 for discussion). In Chapter 6, I discuss thec-command parameter in other Bantu languages and show that Nata isconsistent with Giannakidou’s (2001, 2011) observation that not all polar-ity elements must be c-commanded by their licensers in the overt syntax;language-specific conditions may apply.I show that different kinds of negation license the D∅ in Nata. Thecases I discuss here include sentential negation, adverbial negation, ad-versative/negative predicates, and intonational negation. I start with thesentential one. Sentential negation licenses D∅Sentential negation licenses the polarity D∅ in all argument positions.Some accounts may predict that licensing of polarity D may be restricted toargument position or with some verb asymmetry. For instance, there maybe some restriction with either unergative verbs for which the subject ofthe verb is the agent argument or with unaccusative intransitive verbs forwhich the subject of the verb is a patient/theme argument (see Perlmutter1978; Burzio 1986; Zeller and Ngoboka 2013)20.20. In Nata, unergative and unaccusative verbs seem to pattern differently when they takea passive morpheme. Unergative verbs allow passivization, (ia), while unaccusative verbsdo not, (ib). (Adding an applicative morpheme here will neutralize the contrast.).(i) a. o=mu-gharukao=mu-ɣárukaD=C1-eldera-gha-sẹk-u [unergative verb]a-ɣa-sɛk-uSA1-PST-laugh-PASS‘An/the elder was laughed at.’b. *o=mu-gharuka*o=mu-ɣárukaD=C1-eldera-ka-hik-u [unaccusative verb]a-ka-hik-uSA1-PST-arrive-PASSIntended: An/the elder was caused to arrive.’I take this as language internal evidence that there is an unergative/unaccusative contrastin Nata. Other tests available in the literature are inapplicable in Nata. For instance, inEnglish unergative subjects pattern differently from unaccusative subjects when used withthere–constructions: *There laughed two men vs There arrived two men. See also Zeller and148(219) a. vPAGENT vPv Vlaughb. vPv VPVarriveNTHEMEI start by showing there is no verb asymmetry or number restriction inthe licensing of D∅. I argue that since NEG occurs above vP a polarity sen-sitive D∅ in the subject position of an unergative intransitive verb, (220);or with an unaccusative intransitive verb, (221) will be licensed:(220) a. mu-gharukamu-ɣárukaC1-elderta-a-sẹk-ire [unergative verb]ta-a-sɛk-iréNEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘No elder laughed.’b. bha-gharukaβa-ɣárukaC2-elderbha-ta-a-sẹk-ireβa-ta-a-sɛk-iréSA2-NEG-PST-laugh-PFV‘No elders laughed.’(221) a. muu-kimuu-kíC1-ladyta-a-hik-ire [unaccusative verb]ta-a-hik-iréNEG-PST-arrive-PFV‘No lady arrived.’b. bhaa-kiβaa-kíC1-ladybha-ta-a-hik-ireβa-ta-a-hik-iréSA2-NEG-PST-arrive-PFV‘No ladies arrived.’Ngoboka 2014; Bresnan and Kanerva 1989; Demuth 1997 who use a locative inversion testwhich also does not work for Nata.149Additionally, sentential negation can license D∅ in in-situ objects; thisholds of both singular (222a) and plural (222b) DPs:(222) a. N-tj-a-ghor-ireN-te-a-ɣór-iré1sg-NEG-PST-buy-PFVki-ghẹsọkí-ɣɛsɔC7-knife‘I didn’t buy any knife.’b. N-tj-a-ghor-ireN-te-a-ɣór-iré1sg-NEG-PST-buy-PFVbhi-ghẹsọβí-ɣɛśɔC8-knife‘I didn’t buy any knives.’Sentential negation can also license the D∅ with a transitive verb onsubject (223a), object (223b) or both subject and object, (223c)21.(223) a. mw-aanamu-anáC1-childt-a-a-rooch-et-a-a-rootʃ-éNEG-SA1-PST-see-FVMakuruMakuruMakuru‘No child saw Makuru.’b. MakuruMakuruMakurut-a-a-rooch-et-a-a-rootʃ-éNEG-SA1-PST-see-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘Makuru didn’t see any child.’c. mo-subhemo-suβéC1-mant-a-a-rooch-et-a-a-rootʃ-éNEG-SA1-PST-see-FVma-yaanima-jaaníC1-gazelle‘No man saw any gazelle.’21. Since I have already shown that number does not matter in licensing, from now on Iwill present singular-plural pairs only when necessary.150Similarly, for the ditransitive verb ha ‘give’ in (224), NEG can licensenull D with any one of the arguments of the verb: with the subject DPmu-kari ‘woman’, the Goal/indirect object mw-aana ‘child’, and the the-me/direct object ma-βɛɛ́rɛ ‘milk’:(224) a. mu-karimu-káriC1-womant-a-a-h-eret-a-a-h-eréNEG-SA1-PST-give-PFVmw-aanamu-anáC1-childma-bhẹẹrẹma-βɛɛ́rɛC6-milk‘No woman gave any child any milk.’b. ¬[9xyz [woman (x) & milk (z) & child (y) & x gave z to y]].The informal semantics in (224) corresponds to the underlying (syn-tactic) representation in (225) where NEG scopes over the entire proposi-tion, thereby c-commanding all the polarity Ds in the sentence (cf. Uribe-Etxebarria 1994; Bruening 2014; Matthewson 1998).(225) Licensing of polarity Ds in ditransitive verbsNegPNeg vP3D∅-φPsubj vP3D∅-φPINDO vPv0 VPV 3D∅-φPDO151Extensional suffixes such as applicatives (APPLs) take a specifier-argument, hence add an extra argument (see Rugemalira 1993; Pylkkänen2002; Halpert 2012)22. An example of a sentence with a transitive applica-tivized verb in (226) shows that NEG can scope over the subject (226a),any one of the objects (226b-d), all the objects (226e), or the subject andall the objects (226f):(226) a. mo-subhemo-súβeC1-mant-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVo=mu-ghenio=mú-ɣeniD=C1-visitoru-nọú-nɔC1-DEMu=mw-anau=mw-anáD=C1-childu-yọu-jɔC1-DEMe=ki-ghambọe=kí-ɣambɔD=C7-languageki-nọki-nɔC7-DEM‘No man is teaching that child that language for this visitor.’b. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeo=C1-manu-nọú-nɔC1-DEMt-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVmu-ghenimú-ɣeniC1-visitoru=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childu-yọú-jɔC1-DEMe=ki-ghambọe=kí-ɣambɔD=C7-languageki-nọki-nɔC7-DEM‘This man is not teaching that child this language for any visitor.’c. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-manu-nọú-nɔC1-DEMt-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVo=mu-ghenio=mú-ɣeniD=C1-visitoru-nọú-nɔC1-DEMmw-aanamu-anáC1-childe=ki-ghambọe=kí-ɣambɔD=C7-languageki-nọki-nɔC7-DEM‘This man is not teaching any child this language for this visitor.’22. The applicative morpheme has the highest valency (i.e., number of arguments), for thatreason I do not give examples of causativized verbs which take fewer arguments.152d. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-manu-nọú-nɔC1-DEMt-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVo=mu-ghenio=mú-ɣeniD=C1-visitoru-nọú-nɔC1-DEMu=mw-aanao=mu-anáD=C1-childu-yọu-jɔC1-DEMki-ghambọkí-ɣambɔC7-language‘This man is not teaching that child any language for this visitor.’e. o=mo-subheo=mo-súβeD=C1-manu-nọú-nɔC1-DEMt-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVmu-ghenimú-ɣeniC1-visitormw-aanamu-anáC2-childki-ghambọkí-ɣambɔC7-language‘This man is not teaching any children any language for any visitor.’f. mo-subhemo-súβeC1-mant-a-a-kw-eegh-er-it-a-a-kw-eeɣ-éer-iNEG-SA1-PST-teach-APPL-FVmu-ghenimú-ɣeniC1-visitormw-aanamu-anáC2-childki-ghambọkí-ɣambɔC7-language‘No man is teaching any kids any language for any visitor.’Given the evidence that polarity-sensitive D∅ is licensed in any argu-ment position in an applicative sentence, it must be the case that sententialNEG occurs above both Spec, vP and Spec, ApplP in covert syntax:153(227) Licensing of polarity Ds in ditransitive applicative verbsNegPNeg ...vP3D∅-φPsubj vPv0 ApplP3D∅-φPO1 VP3D∅-φPO2 VPV 3D∅-φPDONEG, in a matrix clause, can license the polarity D∅ in the subjectand/or the object of an embedded clause, (228a). It can also take the entireroot clause licensing any argument in its c-command in the covert syntax,(228b)(228) a. MakuruMakuruMakurut-a-a-bhugh-iret-a-a-bhugh-ireNEG-3sg-PST-say-PFV[ango[aŋgo[thatmw-aanamw-aanaC1-childa-ki-ibh-aa-ka-iβ-a3sg-PST-steal-FVma-kuwa]ma-kuwa]C6-sugarcane]‘Makuru didn’t say that any child stole any sugarcane.’154b. mu-ghabhomu-ɣaβoC1-healert-a-a-bhugh-iret-a-a-βuɣ-ireNEG-3sg-PST-say-PFV[ango[aŋgo[thatmw-aanamw-aanaC1-childa-ki-ibh-aa-kaiβ-a3sg-PST-steal-FVma-kuwa]ma-kuwa]C6-sugarcane]‘No healer said that any child stole any sugarcane.’I now consider adversative predicates, which confirm the generalizationthat licensing occurs when NEG appears above the DP containing D∅ incovert syntax. Adversative predicates license D∅Adversative predicates, which are verbs that are inherently negative (a.k.alexical negations), can license D∅ in object position but not in subject posi-tion (cf. Progovac 1993, 2000; Giannakidou 1998, 2001). This is consistentwith Yoon’s (2013) observation that lexical negations cross-linguisticallydo not truth-conditionally negate a proposition. For example, adversativepredicates such as ang- ‘refuse’ can license D∅ in object position, (229a),but not in subjects of either an intransitive, (229b), or transitive sentence,(229c).(229) a. A-ka-ang-aA-ka-ang-aSA1-PST-refuse-FVku-ghẹgh-aku-ɣɛɣ́-aINFT-carry-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘S/he refused to carry any child.’b. * mw-aana* mu-anáC1-childa-ka-ang-aa-ka-aŋg-aSA1-PST-refuse-FVghu-sẹk-aɣu-sɛḱ-aINFT-laugh-FV*‘Any child refused to laugh.’155c. * mu-kári* mu-káriC1-womana-ka-ang-aa-ka-aŋg-aSA1-PST-refuse-FVku-ghẹgh-aku-ɣɛɣ́-aINFT-carry-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-child*Any woman refused to carry a child.’The data in (229) contrast with cases with overt Ds in the subject po-sition of adversative predicates, (230). These are correctly predicted to beacceptable as overt Ds do not need to be c-commanded by a licenser.(230) a. u=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childa-ka-ang-aa-ka-aŋg-aSA1-PST-refuse-FVghu-sẹk-aɣu-sɛḱ-aINFT-laugh-FV‘A/the child refused to laugh.’b. o=mu-kário=mu-káriD=C1-womana-ka-ang-aa-ka-aŋg-aSA1-PST-refuse-FVku-ghẹgh-aku-ɣɛɣ́-aINFT-carry-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘A/the woman refused to carry any child.’The restriction on licensing the polarity D∅ in subject argument DPswith the adversative predicates in (229b,c) can be represented as in (231b).This contrasts with the non-lexical licensing in (231a) in which the lexicalnegation is lower in the tree than NEG.156(231) Syntactic constraints on licensing of D∅a. Sentential negation can license D∅ in subjectsNegPNeg vP3D∅-φPsubj v0verb VPV 3D∅-φPobjb. Lexical NEG cannot license D∅ in subjects*vP7D∅-φPsubj v0neg.verb VPV 3D∅-φPobjLexical negation in Nata can be used as a diagnostic for the positionin which Nata subject DPs with D∅ are licensed. It shows that not onlydo subjects have to be under Spec, vP to be licensed, also the licenser hasto c-command the polarity element, hence the structure in (231b) is notpossible. Covert negation/reduced pitch licenses D∅It appears that Nata lacks lexical items corresponding to the English nega-tive predicates ‘doubt’ or ‘deny’ in (232).157(232) a. I doubt that Mary ate anything. [Progovac 1998: 08]b. I deny that Mary ate anything.c. *Mary ate anything.When Nata speakers are casting doubt on or disagreeing about the ex-istence of an entity, they can use a special kind of reduced pitch, renderingsimilar meanings to ‘I doubt’ or ‘I deny’. This may license the polarity D∅on either subject, (233a), object, (233b), or both, (233c). I mark this pitcheffect with the symbol ▽ as in (233):(233) a. ▽ mu-kari▽ mu-káriC1-womana-ka-bhaator-aa-ka-βáátor-a3sg-PST-spank-FVMakuruMakuruMakuru‘(I deny that) any woman spanked Makuru.’b. ▽Makuru▽MakuruMakurua-ka-bhaator-aa-ka-βáátor-a3sg-PST-spank-FVmw-aanamw-anáC1-child‘(I deny that) Makuru spanked any child.’c. ▽ mu-kari▽ mu-káriC1-womana-ka-bhaator-aa-ka-βáátor-a3sg-PST-spank-FVmwa-anamwá-anaC1-child‘(I doubt that) any woman spanked any child.’A voice recording of a Nata male consultant captured differences in theintonation patterns between the regular sentence (Figure 3.1) and the sen-tence containing the covert negation (Figure 3.2). In the regular sentence(Figure 3.1), the blue curve (pitch) in the waveform has higher frequencythan in the sentence marked with covert negation (Figure 3.2), which ap-pears with compressed pitch, thus low frequency:158Figure 3.1: Pitch pattern for regular sentencesFigure 3.2: Pitch pattern for sentences with covert negationTo account for the licensing of D∅ in the cases like (233), I proposethat the reduced pitch is realized as a covert negation (cf. Uribe-Etxebarria1994; Hoeksema 2012; Swart 2009; and others) which licenses the D∅. Thecovert negation unselectively licenses the D∅ in subject, object or both asseen in (233). Since the overt D requires no licensing it is expected that it159will also be used with the covert negation. This prediction is correct as theexample below shows:(234) ▽o=mu-gheni▽o=mú-ɣeniD=C1-guesta-ka-bhaator-aa-ka-βáátor-a3sg-PST-spank-FVu=mwa-anau=mwá-anau=C1-child‘(I doubt that) a/the visitor hit a/the child.’The semantic contrast between the overt and the covert D∅ will bedealt with in Chapter 4. The last case under negation is about the negativeadverbs keeré ‘yet’ and naabha ‘never’, which I now turn to. Negative light verbs license D∅Polarity Ds can be licensed by a negative light verb keeré ‘be before’ ‘bewithout’ or ‘be yet’ (cf. Giannakidou 2002; Watanabe 2004; Halpert 2012;and others), (235). This negative light verb cannot license the subject, asthe case in (235b) shows. This restriction also points to a common factabout licensing, namely that the subject DPs containing a D∅ are licensedat Spec, vP, hence they cannot be licensed by the negative light verb theyprecede:(235) a. u=mw-aanau=mw-aanaD=C1-childa-kerea-keré3sg-be.yetku-nyw-aku-ɲw-aINFT-drink-FVke-rongoorike-róŋgooriC7-porridgeLit: ‘A/the child is yet to eat any porridge.’b. * mw-aana* mw-aanaC1-childa-kerea-keré3sg-be.yetku-nywaku-ɲwaINFT-drinkke-rongoorike-róŋgooriC7-porridgeIntended: ‘Any child is yet to eat any porridge.’Since the licensor heads the vP, the subject DP containing the D∅ gen-erated in its Spec cannot be licensed:160(236) The negative light verb cannot license D∅ on subjects*vP7D∅-φPsubj vPv0keereVPV 3D∅-φPobjIf we use a covert negation or other kinds of licensors that can occurwith the minimizer, the subject will be licensed by such a licensor:(237) ▽ mw-aana▽ mw-aanaC1-childa-kerea-keré3sg-yetku-nywaku-ɲwaINFT-drinkke-rongoorike-róŋgooriC7-porridge‘(I doubt that) any child is yet to eat any porridge.’The structure in (238) corresponds to the licensing of the subject by ahigher operator. This shows that licensing of D∅ in subject DPs strictlyobserves the syntactic condition in (210) that the licensor is above Spec,vP, where it scopes over/c-commands the subject in the covert syntax.(238) An Op above vP can license D∅XPOp/▽ ...vP3D∅-φPsubj vPv0keereVPV 3D∅-φPobj161I close this subsection by showing that the speaker can switch the D∅to the overt D in the cases discussed above:(239) u=mw-aanau=mw-aanaD=C1-childa-kerea-keré3sg-yetku-nywaku-ɲwaINFT-drinke=ke-rongoorie=ke-róŋgooriD=C7-porridge‘A/the child is yet to eat (the) porridge.’I will argue in chapter 4 that this switch corresponds to a semantic differ-ence to do with the notion of existence.3.5.2 QuestionsI first discuss polar/yes-no questions which license the polarity D∅ and thenturn to content questions where I show that DP operators do not license thepolarity D∅. For a discussion of D-linked wh-questions refer to predicateclefts under § Polar questions license D∅In polar/yes-no questions, D∅ can be licensed under the scope of the ques-tion operator. This is shown in (240):(240) [Context: Speaker is not sure if there was any child]a. angoangoQmw-aanamw-áanaC1-childa-ka-rọr-aa-ka-rɔŕ-a3s-PST-see-FVMaria? [Subject]María?Mary‘Did any child see Mary?’b. angoangoQMariaMaríaMarya-ka-bhọn-aa-ka-βɔń-a3s-PST-find-FVmw-aana? [Object]mw-áana?C1-child‘Did Mary find any child?’162As Gambarage and Keupdjio (2013) demonstrate, polar questions inNata do not have an overt Q(uestion) morpheme. The Q-morpheme inNata derives from a rising intonation (↑) (cf. Cheng 1991; Rooryck 1994;Cheng and Rooryck 2000). Thus, the Q-operator is sitting in C where it c-commands the DP containing the D∅ (see Progovac 2000; Gambarage andKeupdjio 2013):(241) Licensing of D∅ in polar questionsCPC(Qn↑) ...X vPDPsubj v0v VPV DPobjIn this analysis, the Q-operator takes the clause as its complement,hence c-commanding the DP containing the D∅ in the covert syntax. Iclaim that this rising intonation is a realization of C which licenses D∅.As expected, overt Ds are not restricted in their distribution whichmeans they can be used with the polar question. The question about whatforces different D choices in Nata will be answered in Chapter 4 which talksabout the semantics of Nata D.(242) [Context: Speaker is talking about his friend’s child]a. angoangoQu=mw-aanau=mw-áanaD=C1-childa-ka-rọr-aa-ka-rɔŕ-a3s-PST-see-FVMaria? [Subject]María?Mary‘Did a/the child see Mary?’163b. angoangoQMariaMaríaMarya-ka-bhọn-aa-ka-βɔń-a3s-PST-find-FVu=mw-aana? [Object]u=mw-áana?D=C1-child‘Did Mary find a/the child?’In Chapter 4, I will adopt the common analysis that the DP containingthe overt D such as in (242) scopes above the non-factual operator (cf.Matthewson 1998,1999; Giannakidou 2002; Gambarage 2012; and manyothers). Wh-questions do not license D∅Wh-phrases, like some other DP operators like quantifiers discussed above,cannot license the polarity D in any object DP argument, hence the overtD must be used, (243). In subordinate clauses, however, some other non-factual operator, e.g, the evidential verb bhugha (discussed below) can li-cense the D∅, (244):(243) a. Ne=weNe=waCOP=WHa-a-rooch-ea-a-róotʃ-é3sg-PST-see-FVe=ke-bhuse?e=ke-βúse?D=C7-monkey‘Who saw a/the monkey?’b. *Ne=we*Ne=weCOP=WHa-a-rooch-ea-a-rootʃ-é3sg-PST-see-FVke-bhuse?ke-βúse?C7-monkeyIntended: ‘Who saw a/the monkey?’[Consultant comment: If you do not have anything in mind,why would you ask?][Context: There are no monkeys in Vancouver. B heard someone claim-ing to have seen one; he thinks it was some other animal. B says withincredulous voice:]164(244) Ne=weNe=weCOP=WHabhughirea-βuɣ-ireSA-say-PFVa-ka-rọr-aa-ka-rɔr-a3sg-PST-see-FVke-bhuse?ke-βúse?C7-monkey‘Who said s/he saw a monkey? (I don’t believe there was any).’In Chapter 4 I argue that this restriction has to do with the presuppo-sitional property of the wh-phrases (cf. Erteshik-shir 1993; Matthewson1998; Gambarage 2013). For the discussion of Nata D-linked questionswhich are concealed predicate clefts in which case they lack a D, see §3.6.I next turn to conditionals where I show that, like negative sentences andpolar questions, conditionals also license D∅.3.5.3 ConditionalsPolarity Ds are licensed in non-factual if-clauses/conditional sentences.[Context: A mother has a sick child and only elderly people know thetraditional cure of the disease. She would be happy if any elder comesbut that’s impossible, because there are no elders in this community]23.[Adapted from Matthewson, 1999: 90]23. When I re-ordered (245) such that the apodosis (consequent) came before the protasis(antecedent), some speakers accepted it marginally and some accepted it fully:(i) %Maria%MariaMarian=a-nga-chọọmiir-un=a-ŋga-tʃɔɔmiir-uSAM=SA1-COND-be.happy-FVmu-gharukamu-ɣarukaC1-eldera-nga-bhọnẹk-irea-ŋga-βɔnɛk-ireSA1-COND-show.up-PFV‘Mary would be happy if any elder showed up.’[Consultant comment: She cannot talk about wellness of a child first if there are noelders.]Based on the consultant’s comment, the issue why this is not straightforwardly good or badmay have to do, I believe, with the reordering effect (the consequent before the antecedent).Further research is needed to pin down what exactly is going on with cases like (i).165(245) mu-gharukamu-ɣárukaC1-eldera-nga-bhọnẹk-irea-ŋga-βɔnɛk-ireSA1-COND-show.up-PFVMariaMariaMarian=a-nga-chọmiir-un=a-ŋga-tʃɔɔmir-uSAM=SA1-COND-be.happy-FV‘If any elder showed up Mary would be happy.’For conditional sentences, I claim that the conditional Operator nga ‘if’sits in C position above the matrix clause, where it c-commands the subjectin the antecedent as the proposed structure in (249) shows (cf. Progovac1993, 2000):(246) Licensing of D∅ in conditionalsXPŋga‘if’IP...vP3D∅=φPsubj vPv0 VPV0 CPIPI ...As expected, the overt D is not restricted in its distribution therefore itmay be switched with the polarity D, (247).166[Context: A mother has a sick child and only elderly people know thetraditional cure of the disease. There is a specific elder who knows themedicine for the disease. A mother says she will be happy if that eldershowed up] [Adapted from Matthewson, 1999: 90](247) o=mu-gharukao=mu-ɣárukao=C1-eldera-nga-bhọnẹk-irea-ŋga-βɔnɛk-ireSA3-COND-show.up-PFVMariaMariaMarian=a-nga-chọmiir-un=a-ŋga-tʃɔɔmir-uSAM=PST-COND-be.happy-FV‘If an/the elder showed up Mary would be happy.’In Chapter 4, I will explain what the semantic difference is between theovert and the covert D. The next section is about modals where I showthat they are also non-factual operators that can license the polarity D likenegation, the Q-morpheme in polar questions, and conditionals.3.5.4 ModalsTo conclude this section, I consider epistemic modals, which express thestrength of a speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition. In Nata,they include possibility modals, the subjunctive mood, and hearsay eviden-tials. My assumption behind treating mood and evidentials as subclasses ofmodality in Nata is that these two also express uncertainties or hypothet-ical situations (see Givón 2018; De Haan 1999; Matthewson et al. 2007;and others) Epistemic modals license D∅The weak epistemic modal, the adverbial hamwe ‘maybe’ or ‘perhaps’,can license the polarity D∅, (248). When this adverbial modal is used it24. See Aikhenvald (2014, 2015) for the view that in some languages evidentiality is not asubcategory of modality; also see Déchaine et al. (2017) for arguments that some, but notall, evidentials have modal force.167means that the speaker is casting doubt on the validity of the propositionunder the modal (cf. Heim 1992; Giannakidou 1998; Condoravdi (2002);Matthewson 1998, Matthewson et al. 2007; Giannakidou and Mari 2018;and others).[Context: It’s started raining and it’s getting dark. A girl comes home cry-ing; someone pushed her at the playground. She tells Mom and Grandmathat almost everyone has left by now. Mom goes to the playground to askwho did that. Grandma is wondering about Mom’s delay:](248) a. HamweHamweMaybemw-anamu-anáC1-childa-a-mo-bhereki-irea-a-mó-βereke(r)-ireSA1-PST-OM1-call-PFV‘Maybe a kid called her.’b. HamweHamweMaybea-bhwin-ea-βwíin-e2s-find-PFVmw-anamw-aanáC2-childha-yọhá-jɔC16-therea-a-bhor-iria-a-βór-iriSA1-PST-ask-PFV‘Maybe she found a kid there and asked.’The syntactic licensing of the D∅ must be that the modal operatorhamwe, which adjoins to IP as an adjunct, c-commands the DP argumentwith D∅. Given the examples in (248) the Operator must occur higher thanthe subject or the object, c-commanding the polarity element:168(249) Licensing of D∅ in ModalsXPYPHamwe‘maybe’IP...vP(3D∅=φPsubj) vPv0 VPV0 (3D∅=φPObj)We have seen very consistently that an overt D may be used with anyof the operators since it is not syntactically restricted. Indeed, the overt Dcan be used with the modal25.[Context: It is a sunny day and it’s around 3PM and lots of kids are atthe playground. A girl comes home crying; someone pushed her at theplayground. Mom goes to ask who did that but she is delayed comingback. Grandma is wondering about Mom’s delay]:(250) a. HamweHamweMaybeu=mwa-anaa=mw-anáD=C1-childu-yọu-jɔC1-DEMn-a-yar-iren-áá-jar-ireSAM-SA1-run-PFV‘Maybe that kid ran away.’25. When the copula nasal which functions as a strong assertion marker (SAM) or Focusmarker is used, the polarity D∅ cannot be used.(i) HamweHamweMaybe(*n-)a-a-bhwin-e(*n-)a-a-βwíin-eSAM-SA1-PST-find-PFVmw-anamw-aanáC2-childha-yọhá-jɔC16-therea-a-bhor-iria-a-βór-iriSA1-PST-ask-PFV%Intended: ‘Maybe she did find a kid there and asked.’A combination of a strong assertion marker and the polarity D∅ may be ruled out for se-mantic reasons. I do not investigate the restrictions involving this element on this occasion.169b. HamweHamweMayben-a-ku-ghamban-an-a-ku-ɣamban-aSAM-SA1-PROG-talk-FVnu-u=mw-aanana-u=mu-anáwith-D=C1-childu-yọu-jɔC1-DEM‘Maybe she is talking to that kid.’The semantic contrast between the overt D and the polarity D∅ will bediscussed in Chapter Subjunctive mood licenses D∅Subjunctive clauses are often analyzed as being non-factual. The preciseformalization differs widely, with proposals treating them as non-assertive(Bolinger 1972; Hooper 1975), as irrealis (Givón 2018; Palmer 1968), asnonveridical (Giannakidou 2009), or as modal (Giorgi and Pianesi (1998);Portner 1998). Whatever the precise mechanism, relevant to the presentanalysis is the fact that, in Nata, the subjunctive patterns together withother non-factual operators in licensing D∅. Example (251) illustrates thelicensing of D∅ in the context of a subjunctive clause, where the subjunctiveclause type is marked by the subjunctive mood marker -ɛ. The (a) exampleillustrates D∅ in subject position, and the (b) example illustrates D∅ inobject position:(251) [Context: An athlete wondering if there are any rope-hurdles.]a. ro-siriro-siriC11-roperoo-n-dich-ẹro-n-ritʃ-ɛ ́SA11-1sg-trip-SUBJVn-te-kw-imeerer-an-te-kw-iméérer-a1sg-NEG-PROG-stop-FV‘Should a rope trip me, I am not stopping.’b. m-bọn-ẹm-bɔn-ɛ ́1sg-find-SUBJVro-siriro-síriC11-ropeenieniIn-ko-bhururuk-an-ko-βúúruk-a1sg-PROG-jump-FVtutujust‘Should I encounter a rope, I am just jumping over.’170Here the subjunctive mood conveys the speaker’s attitude that they arenot committing to the truth of the embedded proposition, which is whatGiannakidou (2009) means by non-veridicality. Since the overt D is notrestricted in its distribution it can be use in subjunctive sentences as (251)shows:(252) [Context: An athlete talking about rope-hurdles on the jumps.]a. o=ro-sirio=ro-sirio=C11-roperoo-n-dich-ẹro-n-ritʃ-ɛ ́SA11-1sg-trip-SUBJVn-te-kw-imeerer-an-te-kw-iméérer-a1sg-NEG-PROG-stop-FV‘Should a/the rope trip me, I am not stopping.’b. n-dọr-ẹn-dɔɾ-ɛ ́1sg-see-SUBJVo=ro-siri,o=ro-síri,o=C11-rope,enieniIn-ko-bhururuk-an-ko-βúúruk-a1sg-PROG-jump-FVtutujust‘Should I see a/the rope, I am just jumping over.’In Chapter 4, I show that there is a clear semantic contrast which forcesNata D choice in all these environments. The last case is about evidentials. Evidentials license D∅Evidentiality is a grammatical way of encoding the source of information,e.g., the speaker has firsthand information (i.e., using sensory evidence)or non-firsthand information (i.e., s/he heard about the event or was justtold about it) (Jakobson 1957; Aikhenvald 2004 and many others). Lan-guages differ in the way they code evidentials, with some languages codingthe source of information morphologically (Nuu-chah-nulth), others syn-tactically (Plains Cree) and yet others lexically (English) (see Waldie 2012;Matthewson et al. 2007; Déchaine et al. 2016; and others). I discuss lexi-cal evidentials in Nata, which have to do with the verb of perception -oogu‘hear’ and the verb of report -bhugha ‘say’. The use of these evidential verbsis based on participants presenting the meaning of a proposition p without171committing to the truth of p, hence p may not be asserted. I show thatevidentials, as non-factual operators, may license the D∅. Reportative evidential verbsWhen the verb -oogu ‘hear’ is used, the speaker may be casting doubt onthe reliability of the information source. In such contexts, the D∅ is used:[Context: B hears a rumour about a death of a child. The person who saidit is not a reliable source and also no wailing was heard. B reports:](253) a. ny-og-uɲ-oog-u1sg-hear-PASSmw-aanamu-anáC1-childa-a-ku-rea-a-ku-ire3sg-PST-die-PFV‘I heard a child died (I doubt it).’b. ny-og-uɲ-oog-u1sg-hear-PASSMariaMariaMariaa-kw-er.ir-ua-kw-éér.ir-uSA1-die-APPL2-PASSmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘I heard Maria lost a child (I doubt it).’The overt D which is not restricted in its syntactic distribution is alsopossible with this operator.[Context: A/the child had no hope to recover from leukaemia. There waswailing last night. B reports the bad news](254) a. ny-og-uɲ-oog-u1sg-hear-PASSu=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childa-a-ku-rea-a-ku-ire3sg-PST-die-PFV‘I heard a/the child died (and it’s confirmed).’172b. ny-og-uɲ-oog-u1sg-hear-PASSMariaMariaMariaa-kw-er.ir-ua-kw-éér.ir-uSA1-die-APPL2-PASSu=mw-aanau=mu-anáu=C1-child‘I heard Maria lost a/the child (and it’s confirmed).’If the child is believed to exist but it did not die this will also leadto the use of the overt D. In Chapter 4, we will see that the semantics ofthe Nata Ds aligns with the fact that when interlocutors cast doubt on theinformation source about the existence of the DP referent, D∅ is licensed,and when they trust the information source and believe that the DP referentexists, the overt D is used. The quotative evidential marker -bhughaLike the evidential verb -oogu ‘hear’, the verb -bhugha ‘say’ is used as aquotative evidential and can license the D∅ as shown below:[Context: Person A and B are walking, and C stops B to inform her of thedeath of a child. C is not a reliable source and also no wailing was heard.B tells A:](255) a. a-bugh-aa-βuɣ-a3sg-say-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-childa-a-ku-rea-a-ku-ire3sg-PST-die-PFV‘She says (that) a child died.’b. a-bugh-aa-βuɣ-a3sg-say-FVMariaMariaMariaa-kw-er.ir-ua-kw-éér.ir-uSA1-die-APPL2-PASSmw-aanamu-anáC1-child‘She says that Maria lost a child.’173The overt D can also be used with the quotative evidential verb asshown in (256) below26.[Context: Person A and B are walking, and C stops B to inform her of adeath of a child who has been sick for long time. C is a trustworthy person.Before A asks B what was C saying, B says:](256) a. a-bugh-aa-βuɣ-a3sg-say-FVu=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-childa-a-ku-rea-a-ku-ire3sg-PST-die-PFV‘She says (that) a/the child died.’b. a-bhugh-aa-βuɣ-a3sg-say-FVMariaMariaMariaa-kw-er.ir-ua-kw-éér.ir-uSA1-die-APPL2-PASSu=mw-aanau=mu-anáD=C1-child‘She says that Maria lost a child.’As I show in Chapter 4, If the speaker believes that the child existsbut does not believe that it died, the overt D should be used. We haveseen that the evidentials are non-factual operators that can license the D∅.Thus evidentials are consistent with all the other non-factual operators wediscussed above, which govern the meaning of the polarity D∅ appearingin their c-command. The question about what forces D choice with theseoperators will be answered in Chapter 4.26. There is a (dis)confirmational particle ango (here marked as a complementizer (C) thatcan be used with the polarity D∅ as in the example below:(i) AngoAŋgoCa-bhugh-aa-βuɣ-a3sg-say-FVmw-aanamu-anáC1-childa-a-ku-rea-a-ku-ire3sg-PST-die-PFV‘She says a child died (I disconfirm it).’I do not discuss this discourse particle here.1743.6 Summary and conclusionIn this chapter, based on various distributional tests for Nata Ds, I havereached the conclusion that the Nata augment is syntactically a D. I havedistinguished nominal expressions that are predicate nominals from thosewhich are argument nominals. Nominal predicates predictably lack a D,thus appear with the φ-N structure. Such nominals do not denote an indi-vidual, rather they denote a property. On the other hand, argument nomi-nals have the D-layer, either overtly or covertly.The DP containing the null D appear with the same φ-N structure as anominal predicate. However, I have shown that the syntactic distributionof each of these structures vary. Predicate nominals need no licensing,while the polarity-sensitive D∅ is syntactically restricted and it must be c-commanded by a non-factual operator. The operators that license D∅ aresummarized in Table 3.1.Table 3.1: Operators that license the polarity-sensitive D∅Environments Op licensing D∅ Subj Obj Diagnostics fromNegation Sentential Neg 3 3 Klima 1964Intonational Neg 3 3 Swart 2009Lexical Neg 7 3 Yoon 2013Negative light v 7 3 Halpert 2012Interrogatives Yes/No Qns 3 3 Cheng 1991WH-Qns 7 7 Pesetsky 1987Conditionals If-clauses 3 3 Matthewson 1999Modals Modals 3 3 Matthewson 1998Subjunctive mood 3 3 Giannakidou 2002Hearsay evidentials 3 3 Matthewson 1998I argued that subject DPs with D∅ are generated in Spec, vP and arelicensed under the c-command domain of Negation. This correctly rulesout licensing of D∅ in subjects by lexical negation and negative light verbswhich do not c-command the subject DP with a D∅. I have shown thatunaugmented NPs referred to as ”bare NPs” in much Bantu literature (see175Progovac 1993; Hyman and Katamba 1993; Visser 2008; Halpert 2012; andothers), in Nata, are in fact DPs containing a polarity D∅. Nata argumentDPs cannot be bare NPs/φPs as demonstrated in this chapter; only nominalpredicates can be bare NPs/φPs.On the overt Ds, I have shown that the overt Ds appear as a syntacticdefault; as such, they appear in a variety of syntactic environments andthey need no licensing. Having established that the Nata augment is a D,in the next chapter I present and then argue for the semantic proposal thatunderlies the two Ds presented below:(257) a. Argument DPs: Db. Polarity-sensitive Argument DPs: D∅I will claim that D choice in (257) is forced by the semantic notion of ‘ex-istence’.176Chapter 4The semantics of Nata D4.1 IntroductionBefore we delve into my proposal about the semantic function of aug-ments/Ds in Nata, I wish to make a quick recap of what we have learnedso far about Nata augments. In the previous chapter, I established thatthe augment is the realization of the functional category D. In chapter 2,I examined various potential D contrasts, and concluded that the general-izations in (258) are upheld in Nata:(258) a. Augments/Ds do not encode (in)definiteness.b. Augments/Ds do not encode (non)specificity.c. Augments/Ds do not encode deictic features.d. Augments/Ds do not encode Case.e. Augments/Ds do not encode mass-count distinction.f. Augment/Ds are not domain restriction elements.In this chapter, I present and then argue for a proposal about the se-mantic function of the Nata D. I seek to provide a definitive answer to the177question of what semantic principle underlies the contrast between the twoNata DP types in (259):(259) a. Argument DPs with an overt D.b. Argument DPs with a covert D/D∅.I claim that the contrast between Nata DPs with an overt D in (259a) andthe DPs with a covert D/D∅ in (259b) involves the notion of ‘existence’ (seeGivón 1978; Matthewson 1998; Van de Velde 2005; Gambarage 2012). Iwill show that the Nata D system is strikingly similar to the D system ofSt’át’imcets (Lillooet Salish), hence the two represent an emerging typologyof ‘speaker-oriented existence Ds.’ Within a formal account, I claim thatNata Ds require an analysis involving choice functions (Reinhart 1997). Iprovide an existence-based choice function account following Matthewson(1999). However, since languages differ in the way they encode existence,i.e., the Nata belief-of-existence Ds differ from the assertion-of-existence Dsin St’át’imcets, I will discuss the implication of Nata Ds for this approach.This chapter is organized as follows. In §4.2 I introduce the system ofexistence Ds. In §4.3 I present my proposal for Nata Ds and discuss theimpetus for treating augments as speaker-oriented existence Ds. In §4.4 Idiscuss the main properties of speaker-oriented existence Ds. In §4.5, I dis-cuss other correlated properties of existence Ds where I argue that they fol-low from the main properties of speaker-oriented existence Ds. Thus, §4.4and §4.5 highlight the many parallels found between Nata and St’át’imcetsD systems. In §4.6 I show that languages encode semantic notions of ex-istence slightly differently. Following this, I discuss various factors for pa-rameterizing existence Ds in Bantu and Salish. The choice function accountis presented in §4.7. In §4.8 I present further predictions and the theoreticalimplications. In §4.9 I conclude.4.2 Defining Existence DsMatthewson (1998) provides an analysis of indefinite Ds in St’át’imcetswhich encode ‘assertion of existence.’ According to Matthewson, the overt178Ds X...-a, (where X is a placeholder for different elements encoding deicticdistinctions), as in (260a,b), consistently encode assertion of existence; onthe other hand, ku (260c) encodes non-assertion of existence, though notby denying it:(260) St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 55-56Encoding Existencea. ʔá ’z-ən-ašaz’-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[ti[ti[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z-a]sts’úqwaz-a]fish-DET]kʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie bought [a fish].’=9x, x a fish, Sofie bought xb. xʷʔazcw7aozNEGk-škw-sDET-NMLZRʔá ’z-ən-ašá ’z-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[ti[ti[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z-a]sts’úqwaz’-a]fish-DET]kʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie didn’t buy [a fish].’=9x, x a fish, ¬Sofie bought xc. xʷʔazcw7aozNEGkʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRʔá ’z-ən-ašáz’-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[kʷ-u[ku[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z]sts’-úqwaz’]fish]kw-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie didn’t buy [a/any fish].’=¬9x, x a fish, Sofie bought xWithin Bantu, Givón illustrates using Bemba data that DPs with an overtD refer to entities that ‘exist’ in the world of discourse. However, Givónopts to use the term ‘referentiality’, which I will not adopt here because of179the confusion that may arise given that some scholars use that term syn-onymously with ‘specificity.’ The Bemba D distinction is consistent withMatthewson’s characterization of the assertion of existence Ds in St’át’imcets.In (261a,b) for instance, Givón shows that nominals with overt Ds (thosewith an initial vowel and a class prefix (VCV nominals, his term) denoteexistence/referentiality, while their counterparts (those without an overtD) always fall under the scope of a non-factual operator (negation, modals,conditional, etc.) where they denote non-existence/non-referential mean-ing, (261c). Note that (261d) is bad because there is no licensor.(261) D contrast in Bemba [Adapted from Givón 1978: 301]a. u=mu-anaD=C1-childa-a-someneSM1-PST-readi=ci-taboD=C7-book‘A/the child read a/the book.’b. u=mu-anaD=C1-childt-a-a-someneNEG-SM-PST-readi=ci-taboD=C7-book‘A/the child did not read a/the book.’c. u=mu-anaD=C1-childt-a-a-someneNEG-SM-PST-readci-taboC7-book‘A/the child did not read any book.’d. *u=mu-ana*D=C1-childa-a-someneSM1-PST-readci-taboC7-book‘*A/the child read any book.’Based on this characterization, both Givón (1978) and Matthewson(1998) define existence in the following terms:(262) Informal definition of existenceIt involves, roughly, the speaker’s intent to ‘refer to’ or ‘mean’ anominal expression to have non-empty references– i.e. to ‘exist’ –180within a particular universe of discourse (i.e., not necessarily withinthe real world) Givón (1978: 293-294).Below I present my full proposal where I claim that the D contrast inNata is also based on the notion of existence. Given that not all languagesencode exactly the same notion of existence, the type of existence encodedin Nata Ds is extensively discussed in this chapter.4.3 The proposal: Nata Ds encode ‘existence’The existence D distinction found in St’át’imcets and Bemba Ds also de-rives the D choice in Nata. As the examples in (263a,b) show, when Nataspeakers intend to commit to the existence of a referent contained in theproposition, the overt D is used. When speakers do not wish to commit toexistence, the only option available is to use the null D/polarity sensitiveD, which must fall under the c-command domain of a non-factual operator,e.g., negation, (263c). For this reason, speakers will never use the polarityD in affirmative/positive declarative sentences as they have no licensor,(263d).(263) D contrast in Nataa. MakuruMakurúMakurua-ka-ghor-aa-ka-ɣór-aSA1-PST-buy-PFVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru bought a/the book.’=9x [book(x) & [Makuru bought x]]b. MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-iréNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru did not buy (a/the) book.’=9x [book(x) & ¬ [Makuru bought x]]181c. MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-iréNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVghi-tabhoɣí-taβoC7-book‘Makuru did not buy any book.’¬[9x [book(x) & Makuru bought x]]d. *Makuru*MakurúMakurua-ka-ghor-aa-ka-ɣór-aSA1-PST-buy-PFVghi-tabhoɣí-taβoC7-bookIntended: ‘Makuru bought a/the book.’The semantic core of the D distinction in St’át’imcets, Bemba and Natais the notion of ‘existence’ consistently. Based on Givón’s characterizationof Bemba Ds, we may simply present the contrast expressed in the Nata Dsystem for the examples in (263) as (264):(264) Determiner choice in Nata (Preliminary)a. Overt D: conveys the speaker’s commitment to existence of anentity for the noun phrase.b. Covert D: conveys a lack of speaker commitment to existence.While (264) seems at first glance to be a fair characterization of Nata Ds,within the emerging typology of speaker-oriented existence Ds discussed inthis thesis, (264) cannot be a sufficient generalization to capture the dif-ferent existence D distinctions. As Matthewson illustrates, in St’át’imcets,speakers fail ‘positively’ to assert existence in examples similar to (265), inwhich a referent has not materialized yet. I show below that this is not thecase with Nata.(265) a. I will marry the next chief of Fountain (whoever it is).b. I will donate a chair for the new school.182I claim that both the Nata and the St’át’imcets D systems indeed have ex-istence as their semantic core. The core difference between the two systemsrelates to cases where the speaker believes in the existence of a referent ofa noun phrase, but does not have positive evidence for its existence. To bemore precise, in St’át’imcets existence is asserted, while in Nata existenceis believed. Thus, the two speaker-oriented existence Ds behave differentlywith respect to the requirement for asserting existence. The Nata overt Dbehaves as a weaker version of St’át’imcets assertion-of-existence Ds, as aspeaker’s personal evidence for the referent is not a requirement for encod-ing existence in Nata. To account for the general behaviour of Nata Ds, Iclaim that the generalization in (266) is crucial:(266) Informal definitionNata Ds encode ‘speaker’s belief of existence’: the speaker believesthat a nominal expression has a non-empty reference– i.e., a refer-ent ‘exists’ within a particular universe of discourse (not necessarilywithin the actual world).The Nata D contrast proposed in (264) has to be revised as in (267):(267) Determiner choice in Nata (Final)a. Overt D: conveys the speaker’s commitment to a belief of exis-tence of an entity for the noun phrase.b. Covert D: conveys a lack of speaker commitment to a belief ofexistence for the noun phrase.The interpretive contrast given in (267) is consistently supportedthroughout the Nata data1. I discuss data from both Nata and St’át’imcetsand claim that the parameter of variation between the two D systems is aspresented in Table 4.1:1. Note that ‘belief of existence’ is a cover term for the description of Nata Ds. One mayalso choose to call Nata Ds presumptive, assumptive, suppositional, etc. Thanks to MichaelRochemont for this observation.183Table 4.1: Requirements for use of the existence DsSt’át’imcets NataLocus of parametric variationExistence of an entity is only believed 7 3Existence of an entity is always asserted 3 7I will argue that the Nata belief-of-existence Ds do not have a require-ment for asserting existence, as is the case in St’át’imcets. Based on thisfact, I propose a split in speaker-oriented-existence Ds as in (268):(268) Speaker-oriented Existence DsAssertion of existenceeg., St’át’imcetsX...-a kuBelief of existenceeg., NataOvert D Covert D∅While the contrast in the St’át’imcets Ds is expressed overtly, the lackof phonological content for the polarity sensitive D∅/the covert D in Natais also explained within the syntactic-semantic mapping. The covert D isinterpretable at LF as marking DPs with non-existential interpretation. Thismapping for Nata is presented in (269) below:(269) Syntactic-Semantic mappingSemantic function Phonology Overt syntaxCommitment to existence Pronounced D Argument DP: DLack of commitment to existence Unpronounced D Argument DP: D∅Property denoting N/A Predicate: NPIn (269), the D contrast is expressed overtly in the syntax where it in-volves the deployment of the phonological content of D. My claim in Chap-ter 3 was that property-denoting nominals differ from the DPs containing184a D∅ in that predicate nominals do not have a D shell, but argument nom-inals in Nata are DPs (cf. Stowell 1989; Longobardi 1994; Déchaine andTremblay 2011; and others)2. The motivation for analyzing Nata overt Dsas existence Ds is discussed below.A major motivation for the proposal that Nata Ds encode the notionof existence comes from the many parallels that Nata Ds have with the‘speaker-oriented existence Ds’ in languages such as Bemba (Bantu) (Givón1978), Luganda (Bantu) (Van De Velde 2005) and St’át’imcets (Salish)(Matthewson 1998; 1999).Givón argues clearly that the core notion that forces Bemba D choiceis that an entity ‘exists’ in the world of discourse. Givón’s definition ofexistence is repeated below:(270) Givón’s definition of existenceIt involves, roughly, the speaker’s intent to ‘refer to’ or ‘mean’ anominal expression to have non-empty references– i.e. to ‘exist’ –within a particular universe of discourse (i.e not necessarily withinthe real world)’ Givón (1978: 293-294).More explicitly, Matthewson acknowledges that the Bantu D system is sim-ilar in many respects to the St’át’imcets system, as she remarks:Givón makes the cross-linguistic claim that nominals fallingunder the scope of a possible modality or negative modalitymay receive either a referential (i.e. assertion of existence) ornon-referential interpretation; otherwise all nominals are inter-preted referentially (1978: 294). This is the case in Bembaas well as in Salish. [...]Givón’s definition is based on Bemba(Bantu), whose determiner system shows similarity with Salishsystems. [Matthewson 1998: 55, 69]2. As I argued previously, I will maintain unaugmented NPs (referred to as “bare NPs” inmuch Bantu literature (cf. Progovac 1993; Hyman and Katamba 1993; Visser 2008; Halpert2012)), in Nata are DPs containing a covert D.185The parallels between Bantu Ds and the Salish ‘assertion of existence’Ds have also been observed by Van de Velde (2005) in Luganda:[...]the recurrent observation that objects of negative verbs andnouns modified by a question word do not have an augmentis reminiscent of the role of the determiner in Salish languages.According to Matthewson (1998), Salish determiners encode as-sertion of existence. In the Salish languages there are determin-ers that assert the existence of a referent and there are deter-miners that do not assert existence (without, however, denyingit). The non-assertion of existence marker in St’át’imcets is ku.It is restricted in its syntactic distribution... As I see it, the de-terminer ku in St’át’imcets corresponds to a certain extent to theabsence of the augment in Ganda (J15), whereas the assertionof existence determiners correspond to the augment.[Van de Velde 2005: 16]While I agree also that the two language families (Bantu and Salish)have ‘existence’ as the core semantics of their Ds, I argue below (and inChapter 5) that Nata, like Luganda, encodes the notion of belief of existencewhich is slightly different from the notion of assertion-of-existence foundin St’át’imcets and Bemba systems. The parallels between Nata belief-of-existence Ds and St’át’imcets assertion-of-existence Ds provide further evi-dence that speaker-oriented existence is robustly available as a determinerdistinction (see Gambarage and Matthewson 2019). Below I will discussthe two different notions of existence which introduce the locus of varia-tion within the speaker-oriented existence Ds. I first discuss core propertiesof the speaker-oriented existence Ds.4.4 Properties of speaker-oriented existence DsThe Nata belief-of-existence system shares some core properties with otherexistence Ds, e.g., assertion-of-existence Ds in St’át’imcets. I propose that(271) provides the defining core properties of existence Ds.186(271) a. Existence Ds are speaker-oriented systems.b. Existence Ds encode existence (i.e., by assertion or belief).I discuss these properties with data from both Nata and St’át’imcetsstarting with the speaker-based property.4.4.1 Speaker-oriented existence DsSpeaker-oriented existence Ds, unlike the speaker-hearer English systemwhich involves common ground knowledge, have a negative setting ofthe common ground parameter, i.e., do not access the hearer’s knowledge(Matthewson 1998). Both in Salish and Bantu (Nata) the speaker is the solearbiter. This does not mean that assertion-of-existence or belief-of-existenceDs cannot feature in definite/familiar discourse contexts. Matthewson, forinstance, illustrates that the D X...-a Ds in St’át’imcets only encode assertionof existence and not a novel-familiar distinction. The same is true in Nata.Belief-of-existence Nata Ds are neutral with respect to the novel-familiardistinction; as a result, they are used both in novel and in familiar contexts(see Van de Velde 2019; and Chapter 2).4.4.2 Ds encode a core notion of existenceIn both systems, the D choice is forced by the notion of ‘existence’, and notdefiniteness or specificity. I show that existence Ds may encode the exis-tence of either actual things or non-actual things in the world of discourse. Existence with actual referentsMatthewson argues explicitly that D choice in St’át’imcets is based on as-sertion of existence. She illustrates that the DP ti sts’úqwaz’a with the Dti…a in (272) is interpreted with existential force whereby it asserts theexistence of a fish, as the informal semantics show. On the other hand, theDP with the polarity D ku is interpreted under the scope of a non-factualoperator (negation, conditionals, modals, and question-morphemes) where187it is associated with a non-existential interpretation. In (273) ku is licensedby negation.(272) Existential Force [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 55]a. ʔá ’z-ən-ašaz’-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[ti[ti[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z-a]sts’úqwaz-a]fish-DET]kʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie bought [a fish].’=9x, x a fish, Sofie bought xb. xʷʔazcw7aozNEGk-škw-sDET-NMLZRʔá ’z-ən-ašá ’z-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[ti[ti[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z-a]sts’-úqwaz’-a]fish-DET]kʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie didn’t buy [a fish].’=9x, x a fish, ¬Sofie bought x(273) No-existential Force [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 56]a. xʷʔazcw7aozNEGkʷ-škw-sDET-NMLZRʔá ’z-ən-ašáz’-en-asbuy-TR-3ERG[kʷ-u[ku[DETš ’cúqʷa ’z]sts’-úqwaz’]fish]kw-škw-sDET-NMLZRSophieSophieSophie‘Sofie didn’t buy [a/any fish].’=¬9x, x a fish, Sofie bought xThe Nata belief-of-existence D/the overt D can be used in contextswhich assert existence, (274). Here, the DP e=ghi-tabho ‘a/the book’ is in-terpreted with existential force paralleling the use of the St’át’imcets overtD ti…a in (272) above:188(274) Existential Interpretation [Nata]a. MakuruMakurúMakurua-ka-ghor-aa-ka-ɣor-aSA1-PST-buy-PFVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru bought a/the book.’=9x [book(x) & [Makuru bought x]]b. MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-ireNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru did not buy (a/the) book.’=9x [book(x) & ¬ [Makuru bought x]]Likewise, the non-belief-of-existence D must be interpreted under thescope of a non-factual operator such as negation to render the non-existential interpretation:(275) Non-existential Interpretation [Nata]MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-ireNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVghi-tabhoɣí-taβoC7-book‘Makuru did not buy any book.’¬[9x [book(x) & Makuru bought x]]The polarity/non-belief-of-existence D in Nata parallels the determinerku in St’át’imcets, which fails to assert existence; hence, both Ds are notassociated with existential interpretation. Note crucially that while DPsinterpreted under the scope of negation may be argued to deny existenceof a referent denoted by the NP, speakers do not always deny existence.When a polarity DP is interpreted under the scope of a modal or a questionmorpheme, the speaker is not denying existence, but rather conveying alack of commitment to existence (see Matthewson 1998, 1999).1894.4.2.2 Existence with non-actual referentsBoth Givón (1978) and Matthewson (1998) show that in certain contexts,existence Ds can be used to talk about referents that exist only in the mindof the speaker, i.e., the Ds can be used in non-actual worlds such as vi-sions and dreams. Thus, the use of the assertion-of-existence D ti...a in(276) is consistent with the existential interpretation of the policemen inthe speaker’s dream (i.e., the policeman is a participant that exists only inthe mind of the speaker).(276) Existence Ds in dreams [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 132]a. kʷʔíkʷlaxʷ-kankw7íkwlacw-kandream-1SG-SUBkʷ-a-škw-a-sDET-PROG-NMLZRtúp-u ’n-aštúp-un’-aspunch-TR-3ERGš-Johns-JohnNMLZR-John[ti[tiDETplíšmən-a]plísmen-a]policeman-EXIS‘I dreamed that John hit a policeman.’b. *kʷʔíkʷlaxʷ-kan*kw7íkwlacw-kandream-1SG-SUBkʷ-a-škw-a-sDET-PROG-NMLZRtúp-u ’n-aštúp-un’-aspunch-TR-3ERGš-Johns-JohnNMLZR-John[ku[kuNON-EXISplíšmən]plísmen]policemanIntended: ‘I dreamed that John hit a policeman.’The same is true in Nata: the belief-of-existence Ds can also be used indescribing dreams or visions. Example (1) talks about non-actual worlds.The speaker is only describing mythical creatures such as ogres that hedreamt about3.3. One may wonder if it is possible to convey existence in non-actual world using a thirdperson, for instance, Maria dreamed about ogres fighting with each other. Unlike St’át’imcetswhere lack of speaker personal knowledge is linked with the use of an non-assertion of190(277) Description of dream [Nata]a. n-ka-rọọt-an-ka-rɔɔt-aSAM-1sg-PST-drean-FVa=amanania=ma-naniD=C6-ogresgha-ra-rwaan-aɣa-ra-ruan-aSA-PROG-fight-FV‘I dreamed about ogres fighting with each other.’b. *n-ka-rọọt-a*n-ka-rɔɔt-aSAM-1sg-PST-drean-FVma-nanima-naniC6-ogresgha-ra-rwaan-aɣa-ra-ruan-aSA-PROG-fight-FVIntended: ‘I dreamed about ogres fighting with each other.’Below I show that all other correlated properties of existence Ds followfrom the core properties of speaker-oriented existence Ds.4.5 Correlated properties of speaker-orientedexistence DsI discuss the correlated diagnostics of speaker-oriented existence Ds andclaim that they follow from the core properties of the speaker-oriented ex-istence Ds discussed in §4.4 above. These are summarized below:existence D, in Nata it is possible for the speaker to use the overt D in such contexts if hehas reason to believe that the subject of the sentence.If the speaker has a reason to notcommit to a belief that Maria dreamt s/he will embed the proposition under a reportativeor quortative verb which will license the polarity D, and render the non-belief of existenceinterpretation of ogres; something like:(i) Nyoghw-aɲ-oɣw-a1sg-hear-FVM. a-ka-rọọt-aM. a-ka-rɔɔt-aM. SAM-1sg-PST-drean-FVamananima-naniC6-ogresgha-ra-rwaan-aɣa-ra-ruan-aSA-PROG-fight-FV‘I hear (that) M. I dreamed about ogres fighting with each other.’For the discussion about evidential lexical verbs see Chapter 3.191Table 4.2: Summary of correlated diagnosticsCorrelated diagnostics of Ds in the two languages St’át’imcets NataEncoding definiteness 7 7Encoding specificity 7 7Polarity sensitivity 3 3Some of the Nata data discussed here are repeated from Chapters 2 and3 for the purpose of comparing the Nata belief-of-existence system and theSt’át’imcets assertion-of-existence system.4.5.1 Speaker-oriented Ds do not encode definitenessThe lack of a definiteness distinction in St’át’imcets and Nata follows frommy analysis that Ds in these languages are speaker-based; they do not accessthe hearer’s knowledge. Matthewson argues explicitly that Ds in Salish donot make any familiar-novel distinction, as the English system does. TheSt’át’imcets data in (278) show that the assertion-of-existence D ti...a is usedwhen the individual is novel and when it is familiar:(278) No familiar-novel contrast [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998:34]a. hú ’y-ɬkanhuy’-lhkangoing.to-1SG.SUBptakʷɬ,ptakwlh,tell.storyptakʷɬ-minptakwlh-mintell.story-APPLlčʔalts7ahere[ti š ’mə́ ’mɬač-a]…[ti smém’lhats-a] …[DET woman(RED)-DET]…‘I am going to tell a legend, a legend about [a girl]i.’ (novel)b. waʔwa7PROGkʷuʔku7QUOTʔílalílalcrylátiʔláti7DEIC[ti šmə́ ’mɬač-a][ti smém’lhats-a][DET woman(RED)-DET]‘[The girl]i was crying there.’ (familiar)192The novelty-familiarity distinction is also irrelevant in Nata. The sameD is used with novel and in familiar referents, as shown below:(279) a. hayọhayotherekarẹkárɛlong.ago[o=mu-tẹmi][o=mu-tɛḿi][D=C1-chief]a-gha-simok-aa-ɣa-símok-aSA1-PST-rise-FV‘Long ago a chief was enthroned.’ (novel)b. o-ro-sikoo-ro-síkoD=C11-dayru-mwe,rú-mweC11-one[o=mu-tẹmi][o=mu-tɛḿi][D=C1-chief]a-gha-kom-aa-ɣa-kóm-aSA1-PST-gather-FVa=bha-toa=βáa-toD=C2-peoplebha-acheβá-atʃeC2-his‘One day the chief gathered his people.’ (familiar)The St’át’imcets assertion-of-existence Ds X...-a and the Nata belief-of-existence D do not encode definiteness. What the interpretations of DPslike ti šmə́ ’mɬač-a ‘a/the girl/woman’ and o=mu-tẹmi ‘a/the chief’ have incommon here is that they are associated with an existential interpretation.Next I consider specificity.4.5.2 Speaker-oriented Ds do not encode specificityThe data in both languages show that existence Ds do not contrast for speci-ficity. The Ds can be used both in specific and non-specific contexts. InSt’át’imcets the same assertion-of-existence D can be used to refer to a spe-cific referent or a non-specific referent4:(280) [Context: The speaker has just heard on the telephone that ateacher she knows named Leo is coming. She reports this infor-4. Note that in these examples the enclitic =a portion of the determiner is phonologicallydeleted following the auxiliary wa7.193mation to a colleague] [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 42)]:xʷuz’cuz’going.tokʷuʔku7QUOTčʔašts7ascome[ti waʔ čuná ’m-xal][ti wa7 tsunám’ -xal][DET PROG teach-INTR][Specific]‘A teacher is coming.’(281) [Context: The speaker has just heard on the telephone that ateacher is coming (she does not know who). She reports this infor-mation to a colleague] [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 42)]:xʷuz’cuz’going.tokʷuʔku7QUOTčʔašts7ascome[ti waʔ čuná ’m-xal][ti wa7 tsunám’-xal][DET PROG teach-INTR][Non-specific]‘A teacher is coming.’Similarly in Nata, Ds do not encode specificity. The same D is used torefer both to specific, (282) and non-specific referents, (283).(282) [Context: The speaker has just heard on the telephone that a farmershe knows is coming. She reports this information to a colleague:][Context adapted from Matthewson 1998]a. o=mo-remio=mó-rem-iD=C1-farm-FVn=aa-ku-cha [Specific]n=aa-ku-tʃáSAM-3sg-FUT-FV‘A farmer is coming.’b. * mo-remi* mó-rem-iC1-farm-FVn=aa-ku-chan=aa-ku-tʃáSAM-3sg-FUT-FVIntended: ‘A farmer is coming.’194(283) [Context: The speaker has just heard on the telephone that a farmeris coming (she does not know who). She reports this informationto a colleague:] [Context adapted from Matthewson 1998]a. o=mo-remio=mó-rem-iD=C1-farm-FVn=aa-ku-cha [Non-specific]n=aa-ku-tʃáSAM-3sg-FUT-FV‘A farmer is coming.’b. * mo-remi* mó-rem-iC1-farm-FVn=aa-ku-chan=aa-ku-tʃáSAM-3sg-FUT-FVIntended: ‘A farmer is coming.’These examples show that when the St’át’imcets assertion-of-existenceDs and the Nata belief-of-existence Ds are used, they encode existence ofa referent of a noun phrase. They do not care about whether the referentdenoted by a noun phrase is specific or non-specific, hence the D distinctionin these languages is not based on the notion of specificity.4.5.3 Polarity Ds must be licensedAs we saw in Chapter 3, polarity Ds are syntactically restricted in that theymust be licensed by a non-factual operator. Both non-assertion-of-existenceand non-belief-of-existence Ds are polarity sensitive Ds, hence must be in-terpreted under the scope of a non-factual operator, where they cannot beassociated with an existential interpretation. It is important to note thatlanguages whose Ds do not contrast for the notion of existence may dis-guise this contrast. Consider for instance, a system like English, (284),or Okanagan, (285), whose D systems do not contrast for existence. Theindefinite Ds can be used both in assertion-of-existence and non-assertion-of-existence contexts. The Okanagan data are repeated from Chapter 2.195(284) a. I didn’t talk to a man who yelled at me. [existential]b. I didn’t talk to a man/any man. [non-existential](285) Ds do not contrast for existence [Okanagan, Lyon 2011: 26)]a. iʔDetsqəltmíxʷmanlutaʔNEGkaʔkíc-ísfind.(DIR)-3SG.ERGiʔDetsənkl ’caʔsqáxaʔhorse‘The man didn’t find the horses.’b. iʔDetsqəltmíxʷmanlutaʔNEGkaʔkíc-ísfind.(DIR)-3SG.ERGiʔDetsənkl ’caʔsqáxaʔhorse‘The man didn’t find any horses.’Unlike in English and Okanagan, D choice is forced by existential in-terpretation in both St’át’imcets and Nata. As we have seen from the out-set, the Ds used in contexts where a referent is either asserted or believedto exist must be morphologically distinct from the ones used in contextsthat render a non-existential interpretation. I discuss such contexts first inSt’át’imcets, then in Nata. Licensing in St’át’imcetsMatthewson demonstrates that the polarity D ku in St’át’imcets is syntacti-cally restricted and must fall under the c-command domain of a non-factualoperator such as negation (286), a question morpheme (287), a modal(288), or a conditional operator, (289). In such environments, the speakerdoes not intend an existential interpretation.(286) Negation licenses ku [St’át’imcets; Matthewson, 1999: 88]cw7aozNEGkw-sDET-NMLZRáts’x-en-assee-TR-ERG[kuNON.EXIS.DETsqaycw]man‘She didn’t see any men.’ ( ̸= ‘She didn’t see the men.’)196(287) Yes/no Q licenses ku [St’át’imcets; Matthewson, 1999: 88]áts’x-en-lhkácwsee-TR-2SG.SUBJhaYNQ[ku sqaycw][DET man]‘Did you see a man/any man?’.(288) The modal kelh licenses ku [St’át’imcets; Matthewson, 1998: 54]təxʷp-mín-ɬkantəcwp-mín-lhkanbuy-APPL-1SG.SUBJkɬkelhmight[kʷu[ku[DETpukʷ]pukw]book]natxʷnatcwtomorrow‘I might buy [a book] tomorrow’.[Context: Mary will be happy if any elders come, but that’s impossible,because there are no elders in this community].(289) Conditional licenses ku [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1999: 90]cuz’going.totsa7cwhappykw-sDET-NMLZRMaryMarylh-t’íq-asHYP-arrive-3CONJ[ku[DETqelhmémen’]old.person(DIMIN)]‘Mary will be happy if any elder comes.’Matthewson states that when a speaker has an entity in mind thatmatches the NP description, the assertion-of-existence D must be used. Inthis case, the DPs containing a determiner ending with a take wide scopewith respect to these operators, where they receive an existential interpre-tation. Compare the D data in the modal contexts in (288) and in condi-tionals in (289) and the data below, in which the assertion-of-existence Dis used.197(290) Modal environment [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 54]təxʷp-mín-ɬkantəcwp-mín-lhkanbuy-APPL-1SG.SUBkɬkelhmight[ti[ti[DETpúkʷ-a]púkw-a]book]natxʷnatcwtomorrow‘I might buy a/the book tomorrow’.[Context: There are a bunch of elders in this community. Mary dislikesmost of these elders and doesn’t want them to come. There is just one elderwho she wants to come].(291) Conditional environment [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1999: 90]cuz’going.totsa7cwhappykw-sDET-NOMMaryMarylh-t’íq-asHYP-arrive-3CONJ[ti[DETqelhmémen’-a]old.person(DIMIN)-EXIS]‘Mary will be happy if an elder comes.’ Licensing in NataWe saw in St’át’imcets that the polarity sensitive D must be licensed; thesame is true for Nata D∅. As we saw in Chapter 3, the D∅ may be licensedby negation (292), the Q-morpheme (293), the modal operator (294), andthe conditional morpheme (295). With all of these operators, when speak-ers are not conveying belief of existence of the DP referent, they alwaysswitch to using the D∅.(292) Negation licenses D∅ [Nata]a. ghi-tabhoɣí-taβoC7-bookghi-ta-a-hun-ireɣi-ta-a-hun-ireC7-NEG-PST-hit-PFVMakuruMakuruMakuru‘No book hit Makuru.’198b. MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-ireNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVghi-tabhoɣí-taβoC7-book‘Makuru did not buy any book.’(293) [Context: Speaker is not sure if there was any child.]a. angoangoQmw-aanamu-ánaC1-childa-ka-rọr-aa-ka-rɔŕ-a3s-PST-see-FVMaria?María?Maria‘Did any child see Maria?’b. angoangoQMariaMaríaMariaa-ka-bhọn-aa-ka-βɔń-a3s-PST-find-FVmw-aana?mu-ána?C1-child‘Did Maria find any child?’(294) [Context: B is not sure if there were children at the playground.]a. hamwehamwemaybemw-anamw-anáC1-childn-a-areFOC-SA1-PST-aréFOC-SA1-PST-bea-ra-bharaanaa-ra-βaraanaSA1-PROG-playha-yọhá-jɔthere‘Maybe a kid was playing there’.b. hamwehamwemaybeMakuruMakuruMakurua-ka-bhọn-aa-ka-βɔń-a3sg-find-PFVmw-anamw-anáC1-childha-yọhá-jɔC16-there‘Maybe Makuru found a kid there’.(295) [Context: Maria has a sick child and she would be happy if anyelder comes and shows her a cure but that’s impossible, becausethere are no elders in this community] [Adapted from Matthewson1991999:90].mu-gharukamu-ɣárukaC1-eldera-ngi-i-ch-irea-nga-i-tʃ-íreSA3-COND-REFL-come-PFVMariaMariaMarian=a-nga-chọmir-un=a-ŋga-tʃɔmer-uSAM=PST-COND-be.happy-PASS‘If any elder came Maria would be happy.’As we saw in St’át’imcets, if a Nata speaker intends to commit to thebelief of existence of an entity, s/he has to switch and use the belief-of-existence D. As can be seen below, the overt D can be used with negation(296), with the Q-morphemes (297), with the modal (298), and with theconditional (299). In all these cases the DPs with the overt D are associatedwith an existential interpretation.(296) a. e=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-bookghi-ta-a-hun-ireɣi-ta-a-hun-ireC7-NEG-PST-hit-PFVMakuruMakuruMakuru‘A/the book did not hit Makuru.’b. MakuruMakurúMakurut-a-a-ghor-iret-a-a-ɣor-ireNEG-SA1-PST-buy-PFVe=ghi-tabhoe=ɣí-taβoD=C7-book‘Makuru did not buy a/the book.’(297) [Context: Speaker is inquiring about some child]a. angoangoQu=mw-aanau=mw-áanaD=C1-childa-ka-rọr-aa-ka-rɔŕ-a3s-PST-see-FVMaria?María?Maria‘Did a/the child see Maria?’200b. angoangoQMariaMaríaMariaa-ka-bhọn-aa-ka-βɔń-a3s-PST-find-FVu=mw-aana?u=mw-áana?D=C1-child‘Did Maria find a/the child?’[Context: It is a sunny day and lots of kids’ noises are coming from theplayground. Makuru went to the playground. Mom is wondering why heis not back for lunch].(298) a. hamwehamwemaybea=bha-anaa=βa-anáD=C2-childrenm=bha-ku-bharaan-am=bá-ku-βáraan-aFOC=SA2-IMPFV-play-FVna-wẹna-wɛ́with-3sg‘Maybe the/some children are playing with him’.b. hamwehamwemayben=a-a-ku-bharaan-an=á-á-ku-βáraan-aFOC=SA1-IMPF-play-FVnanawitha=bha-anaa=βa-anáD=C2-children‘Maybe he is playing with (the) children’.(299) [Context: Maria has a sick child and only elderly people know thetraditional cure of the disease. There is a specific elder who knowsthe medicine for the disease. Maria says she would be happy if thatelder showed up] [Adapted from Matthewson 1999: 90].o=mu-gharukao=mu-ɣárukaD=C1-eldera-ngi-i-ch-irea-nga-i-tʃ-íreSA3-COND-REFL-come-PFVMariaMariaMarian=a-ŋga-chọmiir-un=a-ŋga-tʃɔmer-uSAM=PST-COND-heal-PFV‘If an/the elder came Maria would be happy.’201I adopt the common analysis for these cases that the DP containing theovert D is interpreted semantically as scoping above the non-factual oper-ator (see Matthewson 1998, 1999; Giannakidou 1998; Gambarage 2012;and others).The many parallels between the Nata augment/D system and theSt’át’imcets assertion-of-existence D system are based on the fact that thecore semantics of both systems is a speaker-oriented commitment to exis-tence of a referent. While this seems to be the case, the two systems alsoseem to slice their semantic pie slightly differently. I discuss these differ-ences below.4.6 The Locus of Parametric VariationThe upshot of the semantic/pragmatic factors that form the basis of theparametric variation for St’át’imcets and Nata is given below.Table 4.3: Locus of variation between St’át’imcets and NataLocus of variation among Ds St’át’imcets NataSpeaker’s personal knowledge is required 3 7Speaker conveys existence by surmising 7 3Speaker conveys existence of non-materialized entities 7 3Speaker conveys existence in possible worlds (7) 3Deictic features in D 3 7To understand how Nata belief-of-existence Ds and St’át’imcetsassertion-of-existence Ds slice up their semantic pie differently in termsof the points in Table 4.3, I consider the generalization in (300):(300) The relation between Nata and St’át’imcets DsAssertion of existence asymmetrically entails belief of existence.Nata overt Ds are more permissive than St’át’imcets Ds ending with-a. The entailment relation in (300) predicts that in all the contexts202where a St’át’imcets assertion-of-existence D X...-a is used, the Nata belief-of-existence D will also be used, but the reverse implication does nothold. For example, the Nata D can be used in surmising contexts but theSt’át’imcets assertion-of-existence Ds cannot. Another way to say this isthat the existence-related Ds are in a subset-superset relationship (i.e., theSt’át’imcets system is a subset of the Nata system). I discuss the relevantcontexts below.4.6.1 Requirement for speaker’s personal knowledgeThe requirement for speaker’s personal knowledge is one of the conditionsfor asserting existence which seems to be missing in Nata. Matthewson(1998) shows that in St’át’imcets, if the speaker did not personally witnessthe event or does not have personal knowledge of a referent, the speakerwill only use the non-assertion-of existence ku. As Matthewson demon-strates, in (301), the speaker was only told by someone that a chief cameto visit her (e.g., she was sick in bed at the time and did not witness anychief visiting), hence the use of the non-assertion-of existence ku. Notethe usage of the quotative particle ku7, which is an evidential marker in-dicating speaker direct knowledge is missing (i.e., s/he did not witness theevent) (Matthewson et al. 2007; Matthewson 1998; 2011):(301) The determiner ku [St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998: 179]’ƛakt’akgokʷuʔku7QUOTʔá ’cx-ən-č-ašáts’x-en-ts-assee-TR-1SG.OB-3ERG[kʷu[kuNON.EXIS.DETkʷúkʷupiʔ]kukwpi7]chiefʔiiwhen.PASTnátxʷ-ašnatcw-asday-3SG.CONJ‘A chief came to see me yesterday (I was told).’However, when a Stʼátʼimcets speaker is a witness, i.e., has full knowl-edge of the individual, the assertion-of-existence enclitic -a is used. Herethe QUOT particle disappears because the speaker has witnessed the event:203(302) X...a determiners [St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998: 179]’ƛakt’akgoʔá ’cx-ən-č-ašáts’x-en-ts-assee-TR-1SG.OB-3ERG[kʷu[kuDETkʷúkʷupiʔ-a]kukwpi7-a]chief-EXISʔiiwhen.PASTnátxʷ-ašnatcw-asday-3SG.CONJ‘A chief came to see me yesterday (I saw him).’In Nata, speaker’s personal knowledge/first hand evidence is not a re-quirement for belief of existence. As I showed in Chapter 3, the Nata lexicondoes not have evidential particles/clitics like St’át’imcets, but the languagedoes have verbs that can function as evidentials–for instance, the quotativeverb nyoogwa ‘I heard’ as in (303). Unlike the St’át’imcets example (301),Nata belief-of-existence Ds will be used even in contexts where the speakerwas only told about a chief’s visit and never met him, (303). Recall fromChapter 3 that the quotative verb nyoogwa can in fact license the polarity Din contexts where the speaker does not trust the source of information/doesnot believe that a chief exists, which will parallel the St’át’imcets D ku.(303) ny-oghw-aɲ-oɣhw-a1sg-hear-FVo=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛḿiD=C1-chiefa-ka-chaa-kaa-tʃáSA1-PST-comeku-n-dọr-aku-ne-rɔŕ-aC15-1sg-see-FVichọitʃɔ́yesterday‘I heard a chief came to see me yesterday.’The use or non-use of the overt Ds does not depend on speaker’s personalknowledge. Whether the speaker lacks personal knowledge as in (303), orthe speaker has personal knowledge as in (304), the overt D is used.204(304) o=mu-tẹmio=mu-tɛḿiD=C1-chiefa-ka-chaa-kaa-tʃáSA1-PST-comeku-n-dọr-aku-ne-rɔŕ-aINFT-1O.sg-see-FVichọitʃɔ́yesterday‘A chief came to see me yesterday (I saw him).’We see that the St’át’imcets assertion-of-existence Ds require speaker’spersonal knowledge (i.e., the speaker to be a witness) in order to be used;however, we see that the Nata D can be both used in similar contexts andbeyond, which indicates that assertion of existence entails belief of exis-tence. In Nata speakers commit to the belief of existence when they havea reason to do so; but obviously speaker’s personal knowledge is not a re-quirement for a belief of existence system.4.6.2 Surmising contextsMatthewson (1998) illustrates that in surmising contexts in St’át’imcets––contexts in which the speaker supposes that entities exist without havingevidence to confirm their existence––the assertion of existence Ds cannotbe used. If the speaker did not witness the event, extra morphologicalmarking by special particles/clitics is required to indicate that the speakerlacks personal knowledge of the event. In (305), for instance, the parti-cle k’a ‘surmise’ (also analyzed and glossed as an inferential evidential inMatthewson et al. 2007) is a non-factual operator which licenses the non-assertion-of-existence D:(305) No speaker knowledge [St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998: 160/2]a. šámaʔsáma7white.personk’ak’asurmise[kʷu[ku[NON.EXIS.DETšqwal’-ən-táli]sqwal’-en-táli]tell-TR-ERG.EXTR]‘It must have been a white man who told her.’205b. qá ’m’t-š-ašqam’t-s-ashit-CAUS-3ERGk’ak’asurmise[kʷu[ku[NON.EXIS.DETʔúxʷalmixʷ]...ucwalmicw]...person]...‘A person might have been hit...’If no particle or non-factual operator is used, the default interpretationis that the speaker has personal knowledge of the event, and therefore of theindividual involved in the event, hence the assertion-of-existence D mustbe used:(306) Speaker knowledge [St’át’imcets, Matthewson 1998: 160-1]a. túp-u ’n-aštup-un’-aspunch-TR-3ERGš-Johns-JohnNOM-John[ti[ti[DETplíšmən-a]plismen-a]policeman-EXIS]‘John hit a policeman.’(Speaker witnessed the event [so knows the individual]).b. *túp-un-aš*túp-un’-aspunch-TR-3ERGš-Johns-JohnNOM-John[kʷu[ku[NON.EXIS.DETplíšmən]plísmen]policeman]‘John hit a policeman.’(= I saw John hit a policeman whom I have never seen).Furthermore, in cases where the speaker believes in the existence ofan entity due to cultural assumptions, but has not directly witnessed theentity, the non-assertion-of-existence D is used5. Note that the future tensehere licenses the polarity D:(307) [Context: Suppose that there is a belief in this community that ifyou see a trail of ants, you’ll eat meat tonight. You see a trail of5. Thanks to Henry Davis for eliciting these data for me and thanks to Lisa Matthewson forhelping to gloss them.206ants]:#ts’aqw-an’-émeat-TR-1PL.ERGkelhFUTta ts’í7-aDET meat-EXISlhkúnsatodayku-sgapNON.EXIS.DET-evening‘We will eat meat tonight.’Consultant: corrected ta...a to ku [St’át’imcets]In this example, the speaker asks the elicitor to switch the assertion ofexistence D ta...a to the non-assertion of existence D ku, indicating that thespeaker does not agree to assert the existence of meat. This shows furtherthat in St’át’imcets, when an assertion-of-existence D is used, existence isnot merely believed, but rather asserted based on the speaker’s personalevidence of the referent.Nata patterns differently in two ways. The first is that Nata does notmark speaker evidence morphologically; the second is that there is no re-quirement for assertion of existence, i.e., the speaker is not required to haveknowledge of the referent to use the overt D. Since assertion of existenceentails belief of existence, we predict that the Nata belief-of-existence Dwill be used both in contexts where existence of a referent is asserted aswell as in surmising contexts, and this is correct. In (308), the speakerhas personal evidence about the existence of the individual, and belief ofexistence follows from assertion of existence:(308) a. YohanaYohanaJohna-gha-tẹm-aa-ɣa-tɛm-aSA1-PST-hit-FVo=moo-sirikareo=moo-sirikaréD=C1-policeman‘John hit a policeman.’(Speaker witnessed the individual).b. *Yohana*YohanaJohna-gha-tẹm-aa-ɣa-tɛm-aSA1-PST-hit-FVmoo-sirikaremoo-sirikaréC1-policemanIntended: ‘John hit a policeman.’207Belief-of-existence Ds can also be used in contexts where the speaker did notwitness the referent but is only surmising that an entity exists. That is, thespeaker believes in the existence of an entity due to cultural assumptions,as shown in (309)-(311).(309) [There is a sun-shower outside. B says...]a. a=n-gweáa=ŋ-gweD=C9-leopardye-ku-bhaje-ku-βáSA9-PROG-bee-rii-bhor-ae-rii-βór-aC9-SMLT-give-birth-FV‘A leopard will be giving birth.’b. * n-gwe* ŋ-gweC9-leopardye-ku-bhaje-ku-βáSA9-PROG-bee-rii-bhor-ae-rii-βór-aC9-SMLT-give-birth-FVIntended: ‘A leopard will be giving birth.’(310) [Context: Z is chewing and she bites her lip. She says:]a. o=mo-too=móo-toD=C1-personn-aa-ku-n-gaamb-an-a-ku-ŋ-gaamb-aSAM-SA1-PROG-1SG-talkbhwahẹẹnẹβwahɛɛ́nɛwell/good‘Some person is speaking well of me.’b. * mo-to* móo-toC1-personn-aa-ku-n-gaamb-an-a-ku-ŋ-gaamb-aSAM-SA1-PROG-1SG-talkbhwahẹẹnẹβwahɛɛ́nɛwell/goodIntended: ‘Some person is speaking well of me.’(311) [Context: It’s 3p.m. B sees a trail of ants carrying their food. Bsays:]208a. mu-ghorọọbhamu-ɣorọọβaC3-eveningn-to-ko-reer-an-to-ko-réer-aSAM-2sg-FUT-eat-FVa=n.yamaa=ɲ.ámaD=C9-beef‘We will have beef (for dinner) tonight.’b. *mu-ghorọọbha*mu-ɣorọọβaC3-eveningn-to-ko-reer-an-to-ko-reer-aSAM-2sg-FUT-eat-FVn.yamaɲ.amaC9-beefIntended: ‘We will have beef (for dinner) tonight.’These data show clearly that Nata speakers are not asserting the existenceof these referents; rather, they are only surmising, anchoring their beliefsof existence to cultural knowledge. In (311), for instance, the speaker mayhave no idea where beef will come from, but still the belief-of-existence Dmust be used to convey the belief in the existence of beef. Note furtherthat while future tense can license the polarity D in St’át’imcets, as we sawin example (308) above and as we shall see also below, strikingly in Nata,even though there is a licensor, the speaker can o