UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Schengen, then and now : the origins and crisis of the borderless European Union. Meyre, Maureen 2017

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


24-ubc_2017_September_Meyre_Maureen.pdf [ 4.19MB ]
JSON: 24-1.0354548.json
JSON-LD: 24-1.0354548-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 24-1.0354548-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 24-1.0354548-rdf.json
Turtle: 24-1.0354548-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 24-1.0354548-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 24-1.0354548-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

 i     SCHENGEN, THEN AND NOW:  THE ORIGINS AND CRISIS OF THE BORDERLESS EUROPEAN UNION  by  Maureen Meyre  B.A., The American University of Beirut, 2014  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS   in   The College of Graduate Studies  (Interdisciplinary Studies)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Okanagan)   August 2017  © Maureen Meyre, 2017     ii    iii  Abstract The recent turmoil in Italy, resulting from the arrival of thousands of refugees from the Middle East and North African Region (MENAR) in the hope of constructing a better future in Europe has demonstrated the limitations of European immigration policies and the potential weakening of the promise of integration founded on the principles of liberal institutionalism. This research therefore aims at challenging the liberal institutionalist assumption which views commitment to borderless commerce and freedom of movement made in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Schengen Agreements as essential to maintaining stability in Europe. With regards to the challenges to European unity posed by the contemporary security and refugee crises the research adopts a neorealist paradigm to answer whether liberal perspectives still contribute to the understanding of the refugee crisis since its inception in 2010.  The thesis employs a qualitative, interdisciplinary approach based on a small-n sample of the ‘Big Three’ – Germany, the United Kingdom and France – to get an appreciation of the political aspirations of policy-makers and develop an understanding of how key tendencies in public opinion affect the decision-making processes at the national level and the balance of power at the EU-level. Since this small-n approach cannot produce knowledge generalizable to the entire European Union (EU), the research will compensate by comparing the political cultures of the ‘Big Three’ because the way they have responded to the refugee crises can at least be expected to influence the policy options pondered by other member-states. In brief, the main purpose of this research is to yield valuable insights about how the refugee crisis provoked a crystallization of public opinion between Europhiles and Eurosceptics.   iv  Table of Contents Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................. iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................. iv Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................................................ ix Chapter 1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................................1   The Schengen Area ..................................................................................................................................1  The Refugee Crisis ...................................................................................................................................7  Theoretical Framework ..........................................................................................................................12  Hypotheses for Testing ..........................................................................................................................16  Methodology: The Case Study Approach ..............................................................................................18 Chapter 2. Historical Review ..........................................................................................................................23   The Reconstruction of Europe ...............................................................................................................23  Supranational Authority in Coal and Steel ............................................................................................27  The Failure of European Defence ..........................................................................................................30  The Functionalist Ideology of Integration..............................................................................................33  The Formative Years, 1954-1958 ..........................................................................................................35  De Gaulle Returns ..................................................................................................................................40  The United Kingdom: Distant Observer ............................................................................................41  The Franco-German Partnership ........................................................................................................45  In Search of Monetary Stability .............................................................................................................47  The Delors Commission and the Birth of Schengen Europe .................................................................50  From Schengen to Amsterdam ...............................................................................................................53  The Post-9/11 Era ..............................................................................................................................57 Chapter 3. Germany as Hegemon: From Rehabilitation to Responsibility ................................................59 a. The Limits of Merkelism ...................................................................................................................59 b. Political Impact ..................................................................................................................................61 c. Economic Impact ...............................................................................................................................69 d. Institutional Impact ............................................................................................................................80 e. Security Impact ..................................................................................................................................86 Chapter 4. United Kingdom as Heretic: Limited Liability ..........................................................................93 a. Splendid Isolation ..............................................................................................................................93 b. Political Impact ..................................................................................................................................96  v  c. Economic Impact .............................................................................................................................102 d. Institutional Impact ..........................................................................................................................110 e. Security Impact ................................................................................................................................115 Chapter 5. France as Subject: Integration as Security ...............................................................................124 a. The Demise of the French Left ........................................................................................................124 b. Political Impact ................................................................................................................................126 c. Economic Impact .............................................................................................................................136 d. Institutional Impact ..........................................................................................................................143 e. Security Impact ................................................................................................................................148 Chapter 6. Schengen and European Integration in Question ....................................................................155 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................163  Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................165  Appendices ......................................................................................................................................................211  Appendix A Schengen Timeline ..................................................................................................................211 Appendix B Enlargement of the European Union (1952-2013) ..................................................................212 Appendix C Refugee Crisis Timeline ..........................................................................................................213 Appendix D Operationalization ...................................................................................................................214 Appendix E European Economic Community (EEC) vs. European Free Trade Association (EFTA) ........215 Appendix F Three-Pillared Structure ...........................................................................................................216 Appendix G From Amsterdam to Lisbon ....................................................................................................217 Appendix H Fortress Europe: New Borders Within Schengen ....................................................................218            vi  Abbreviations African Union (AU) Alternative for Germany (AfD) Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ACTSA) Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (AsylbLG)  Bretton Woods (BW) Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI) Central African Republic (CAR) Centre D’Accueil et D’Orientation (CAO)  Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur L’Europe (CVCE) Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Christian Social Union (CSU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Common European Asylum System (CEAS) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) Dependent Variable (DV) Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis) Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) Direction de L’Information Légale et Administrative (DILA) En Marche! (EM) European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) European Communities (EC) European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) European Court of Justice (ECJ) European Currency Unit (ECU) European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) European Defense Community (EDC) European Drugs Unit (EDU) European Economic Community (EEC) European External Action Service (EEAS) European Free Trade Area (EFTA)  vii  European Judicial Area (EJA) European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) European Monetary Fund (EMF) European Monetary System (EMS) European Monetary Union (EMU)  European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) European Parliament (EP) European Payments Union (EPU) European Political Communities (EPC) European Rates Mechanism (ERM) European Recovery Program (ERP) European Refugee Fund (ERF) European Security Defence Policy (ESDP)  European Security Strategy (ESS) European Union (EU) European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) European Voluntary Worker (EVW) External Investment Plan (EIP) Federal Direct Investment (FDI) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Five Star Movement (FSM) Free Syrian Army (FSA) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Independent Variable (IV) Institut National de Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) International Criminal Court (ICC)  International Organization for Migration (IOM) International Relations (IR) Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB)   Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS or IS)  Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Les Républicains (LR)  viii  Member of Parliament (MP) Middle East and North African Region (MENAR)  National Health Service (NHS) National Institute for Statistics (Istat) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)  Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (Pegida) Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)  Popular Party for Freedom and Direct Democracy (FDDV) Red Army Faction (RAF) Schengen Border Codes (SBC)  Schengen Information System (SIS) Single European Act (SEA) Social Democratic Party (SPD) Socialist Party (SP) Treaty of EU (TEU) Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB) Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) United Kingdom (UK) United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) United Nations (UN) United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) United Nations Children’s Funds (UNICEF) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) United Nations Statistic Division (UNSD) United States (U.S) Visa Information System (VIS) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS)    ix  Acknowledgement I would like to thank Dr. Carl C. Hodge without whom this work would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my mother, E. Meyre, my husband, R. Merhi and his brother, Y. Merhi for their support.      1  Chapter 1. Introduction  The Schengen Area In the 1990s, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing refugee crisis generated new security externalities – ranging from asylum seekers and illegal immigration to traffickers of illicit substances, arms and human beings – which forced policymakers to devise national programs to restore order in answer to sudden change. West European leaders were compelled to reframe their political engagement within a new de-militarized international security regime whereby new threats, such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and transnational terrorism, replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and the military defense of Western Europe as top security priorities. Like scholar Robert Jervis described, in the absence of the Cold War as an important structuring element of the international order, the security dilemma becomes more troublesome because countries automatically begin to worry about the new threats that could undermine democracies and cause conflict (i.e. illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism).1 In this competitive environment, whereby “the prospects for major crises and war in Europe” were “likely to increase markedly,” the governments of France and Germany agreed to deepen cooperation in the domains of immigration and trade as well as use international institutions to keep a balance of power among the major powers and several minor powers of the European system.2 In 1985 and 1990 the signing of the Schengen agreements and convention, wherein initially France, Germany, and the Benelux states agreed to remove their mutual border controls, not only sealed the fate of the European Union (EU) as a regional trade block but it also demonstrated that the member-states had chosen to ignore the potential security costs of eliminating internal border controls without strengthening the external borders of the EU.  In 1992, the reunification of Germany confronted its government to the challenge of controlling the flows of retuning Germans and ex-Yugoslav refugees who had crossed international borders in order to seek refugee in West Europe and East Germany.3 This refugee crisis not only caught Germany unprepared, forcing the government to spend $6 billion in support, it also revealed that Bonn acted as “a magnet for immigrants                                                           1 Philipp Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” Journal of European Integration 20, no.2/3 (September 1997): 131. 2 Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 135. Originally quote from J.J. Mearsheimer, “Correspondence: Back to Future, Part II” International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe,” International Security 15, no.2 (Fall 1990): 6, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0017.pdf. 3 The Yugoslav wars, which began in the early 1990s and ended in 2001, precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia and the independence of new East European countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Following the end of the German occupation of Eastern Europe in 1945, the West created the socialist state of Yugoslavia to bring together a federation of six republics including the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Albanians and Slovenes under the 1st president of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito. The consequences of Tito’s death in 1980 were tremendous, tensions arose when the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army attempted to take over Slovenia and Croatia, pushing other ethnic groups to fight for political autonomy for more than ten years. The last armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which opposed an ethnic Albanian army to the Republic of Macedonia, ended in November 2001. BBC, “Balkans war: A Brief Guide,” BBC, March 1, 2016.  2  […] seeking a haven from economic and political strife.”4 Because nearly 1 million asylum seekers crossed Germany’s borders by 1993, member-states hoped to resolve these problems by dropping “the visa requirements for ex-Yugoslav nationals” or providing “a form of provisional admission” to grant some refugees the ‘right to stay’ under special statuses, such as ‘de facto status’ or ‘humanitarian status’. Yet, this relaxation of such rules by former Communist (Hungary, Austria) and West European countries (Italy, Germany) was short-lived, as it never reflected a complete consensus for assisting displaced persons but rather a determination “to maintain a facade of human concern.”5 Once the situation deteriorated in 1992, the Union took certain measures to regain control of its “borders more effectively and prevent the entry of asylum seekers” by voting new regulations, such as the Dublin Parallel Accord. According to it, if the states concerned by the crisis did not want “to be considered as potential states of first asylum,” they could act as “buffer states” by strengthening surveillance programmes at the borders or by replacing asylum protection with internal assistance directly in the region of origin.6  While some argue that Germany’s restriction of asylum rules in 1993 was a perfect example of the ways national governments retained control over immigration in areas of high political salience and thereby limited EU-harmonization of certain key policy areas, the 1990s refugee crisis provided political leaders with the opportunity to exploit the lessons of the crisis so that Europe could arm itself with the necessary institutional tools to deal with the problems associated with failed states and conflicts (i.e. internal displacement, visa harmonization, and asylum seeking policies).7 For this purpose, the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreements set forth new guidelines to complement the abolition of border with more effective surveillance at the borders with the help of new tools and institutions, such as the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC)8, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the European Drugs Unit (EDU), and the Schengen Information System (SIS) – a database aimed at storing and sharing “information on aliens, asylum seekers, criminals, and those under surveillance by security state security agencies.”9 At the convention, member states also set forth new guidelines for the delivery of “uniform [short-term] visas to                                                           4 On top of the 400,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Germany in 1992, 100,000 additional refugees from the former Yugoslavia, 200,000 ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, and 100,000 family dependents (unification of families) arrived in West Germany (with an addition 100,000 to 200,000 illegal immigrants). Michael W. Devine, “German Asylum law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 7, no.4 (January 1993): 796-98. 5 Michael Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,” Refugee 14, no.3 (June/July 1994): 32-34. Originally quoted from T. Argent, Croatia’s Crubicle: Providing Asylum for Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1992), 1. 6 Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,” 32-35. 7 Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of EU Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” Policy Studies Journal 32, no.1 (February 2004): 150-51. 8 At the 1990 Convention, the signatories agreed to work on the creation of the European Dactyloscopy in order to record fingerprints of undocumented migrants in a database. 9 Julia Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe,” Migration Policy, October 1, 2005. Emek M. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 287-89.  3  allow travel throughout the Schengen area” and designated the member state “responsible for the handling of asylum applications.”10 All of this measures were destined to prepare the EU for the abolition of borders scheduled in January 1995 and consolidate a regime based upon the “four liberties of movement of goods, capitals, services and persons.”11 By 1997, the signatories agreed to commit themselves to forge a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and incorporate the Schengen agreements (and convention) as EU law in the treaty of Amsterdam, placing the decision-making power for Schengen under the Council of Ministers of the EU; that is, under the control of national governments at the EU level.12 The UK and Ireland, which opted out of the Schengen agreements by remaining “out of the provisions in the pillar covering ‘visa, asylum, immigration and other matters dealing with the free movement of 3rd country national’,” have retained access to SIS and routinely take part in cross-border surveillance programmes and criminal investigations within the Schengen area.13 Denmark also kept its rights to maintain independence with regards to the application of Schengen rules in that it can decide whether or not to implement new decisions made under the Schengen agreement; however, it has been part of the Schengen borderless area ever since it agreed to abolish its borders in 1996.14 Over the years, the use of such practices by European countries fostered the idea of an à la carte Europe, whereby France and Germany act as the leading advocates of European integration and the UK as the distant outsider, whose government is often backed by some of the newer member-states that have often shared British scepticism about certain aspects of integration. To attenuate rising tensions among Europhiles, the notion of “asylum shopping” was removed from EU treaties on Schengen and replaced with a “set of rules for determining responsibility for asylum applications” and managing the external borders of the EU.15 The Dublin II Regulation, which established in 2003 “a method for deciding which country amongst the signatories” sought to better equip governments with sets of new guidelines for the processing of application and repatriation of failed asylum seekers.16 According to the Dublin regulation, member-states agreed that the country responsible for reviewing an asylum application should be either the country in which the refugee first arrived, or the one which had issued a visa                                                           10 Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.” Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 287. 11 Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 2 no.1 (January 2015): 99. 12 Italy signed the Schengen agreements in 1990 (entered area in 1997), Portugal and Spain in 1991 (entered area in 1995), Greece in 1992 (entered area in 2000), Austria in 1995 (entered area in 1997), Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in 1996 (entered area in 2001). Following Amsterdam, the Union approved the set up of a European Refugee Fund (ERF) aimed at providing help to EU recipients in case of massive refugee influxes as well as the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) – a group of legal experts, national prosecutors and police enforcement units helping “national prosecuting authorities in their criminal investigation of organized crime.” See appendix A for timeline of Schengen. Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.” 13 Maria O’Neill, “EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions, the View from One of the Schengen Opt-out States,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice 18, no.1 (2010): 83. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289. 14 Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 99. Originally quoted from ff 5. 15 Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.” 16 European Commission, “Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions,” press release, July 13, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2436_en.htm.  4  or otherwise facilitated entry. In order to find a balance between freedom of movement and security, the Dublin regulation was then supplemented by ‘compensatory measures’, (i.e. the development of policies for EU’s external borders, the establishment of a EU-wide visa policy, and the intensification of cooperation on law enforcement) or safeguards to preserve internal security and thwart potential threat to national security.   Over the years, the Schengen system showed major flaws for member-states “never questioned the myth of the loss of control and the supposed security deficit that comes with it.”17 In 1984, when the German and French government agreed to sign the Saarbrücken accords – the precursor to the Schengen agreement – “to seek a solution to the ongoing strikes by French truck drivers and custom officials protesting the long queues at internal borders of the EU,” they failed to appreciate the porous nature of Europe’s external borders.18 This can be explained by the fact that Paris, London and Bonn have always linked economic vitality to freedom of mobility, and hence historically treated migration “as a labor market issue” with little regards for the cultural and social integration of foreigners.19 In other words, the main rationale of the Schengen regime was theorized merely as a solution to facilitate trade, ‘a missing piece’ for completing a European market free of physical barriers between producers and consumers. As a result, the discussion of the need for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU’s external relations, for instance, tended to neglect the challenges facing post-Cold war Europe: first, the difficulty of monitoring the entry and movements of individuals from outside the EU, especially considering the degree of permeability of the external borders of the EU in light of the Schengen commitment to borderless mobility; second, the emergence of transnational actors conducting terrorist operations and transnational criminality; and third, the potential challenge to internal social order arising from conflicts between, on the one side, native Europeans, first- and second-generation immigrants, and, on the other side, the new migrant population. This is especially worrisome given the “endeavour to abolish checks at common borders” and transfer “them to their external borders” had huge security implications: the abolition of internal borders meant that national government had to tackle illegal immigration and organized crime at the external borders of the EU but none of the signatories was willing to harmonize or even “approximate their visa policies […] in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the filed of immigration and security that result from easing” border controls and security checks.20  The events of September 11, 2001 inaugurated a new era of international terrorism, forcing the EU to draw on a unique range of instruments to address the many complex security challenges it could anticipate in                                                           17 Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 100. 18 Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 104. 19 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and Karen Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System,” German Politics & Society 24, no.3 (October 2006): 1. 20 Article 7 and 17 of The Schengen Acquis – Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985, O. J. (L239) 13.  5  the future. When militants associated with Al Qaeda, an Islamic extremist group based in Afghanistan under the rule of Osama Bin Laden, highjacked planes and carried attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon thus making more than 3,000 casualties in the United States, the West realized the gravity of the problem of Islamic fundamentalism. Like former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in a Foreign Affairs essay, “defeating terrorism is a priority that drives not only military action to subdue individual terrorists and deter their state supporters but also multilateral cooperation in law enforcement and intelligence sharing.”21 Colin’s defense of the war on terrorism and its ‘strategy of partnership’ resonated in the minds of European office holders who feared “the terror cells lurking in Southeast Asia” and Europe could destabilize the road to enlargement.22 Hence, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was drafted by the European Commission to remind member-states of their commitment to respond to the changing dynamics of international terrorism and consolidate their foreign policy achievements in regions of conflict to deter threats associated with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.23 For instance, the EU passed a number of unprecedented measures to strengthen Europol, intensify cooperation with the U.S. on improving air safety, and create an EU arrest warrant which was approved by the Council on November 16, 2001 including a list of 27 Islamist organizations suspected of being involved in the 11 September attacks against Washington.24 In fact, by the end of the 20th century, security had become “a necessary precondition for the establishment and the expansion of free movement,” and a means to separate citizens from aliens, or “a discrepancy between safe and potentially ‘risky’ individuals.”25 To achieve this objective, the Schengen Border Codes (SBC) was used to clarify the rules pertaining to the management of external borders, the validity of travel documents, and the procedure for border checks on third-country nationals at the EU’s external borders but it contributed highly to the implicit categorization of migrants as suspected threats.26 According to the SBC, all EU citizens “shall undergo a minimum check” consisting of “a rapid and straightforward verification,” whereas third-country nationals are subject on entry and exit to thorough checks and scrutiny of all travel documents, therefore “generating an implicit association of immigrants and criminals” in the minds of the EU publics.27  Intra-state cooperation on immigration, security or terrorist matters remained nevertheless rather limited, as national governments preferred externalizing their actions via regional undertakings such as the                                                           21 Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs 84, no.1 (January/February 2004): 22. 22 Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” 22. 23 EEAS Strategic Planning, A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, 6, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 24 Euractiv, “EU Foreign Ministers to Adopt Further Counter-Terrorism Measures,” Euractiv, October 7, 2001. Euractiv, “EU Adopts European Arrest Warrant,” Euractiv, November 18, 2001. 25 Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 102. 26 Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1. 27 See article 7, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1. Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 102.  6  European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).28 The externalization of EU powers – the expansion of the acquis communautaires to third-countries – has been divided into specialized networks through which the EU could provide technical and financial assistance and oblige underdeveloped countries in the Mediterranean “to assume more responsibility, such as in the areas of defence and security.”29 But the impact of such actions is dependent on the ability of the EU to convince countries with no prospect of EU membership that adopting European rules to manage migrant flows and the security of the Mediterranean coast was in their national interest in the long-run.30 In the absence of a common strategic culture the EU failed to develop a coherent approach to regional and global security issues, with the result that member-states strive to impose their own definition of ‘security’ and ‘defense’ on EU priorities to this day. Even within NATO national perspectives among the member-states on what issues constitute fundamental strategic concerns converge only minimally.31 Meanwhile, intelligence sharing among member-states remains contingent on the willingness of national governments to inform each other about security-related issues, while EU external actions raise questions of legitimacy with regards to “the cooperation of the EU […] with third countries which do not necessarily respect human rights.”32  Even in the absence of a sharing mechanism, the comparatively prosperous EU economy prior to the financial crisis of 2008 encouraged Brussels and the member-states to embrace the benefits of Schengen Europe while neglecting its possible costs. In the early 2000s, the EU externalized its borders eastward because approving more applications for EU membership would consolidate the Union as a strong global actor but the French and Dutch ‘no’ to the proposed European constitution of 2005 dealt a blow to Brussels. With 54.9% of the French voters and 61.6% Dutch voters having questioned the legitimacy of the EU’s hierarchical international system, thus undermining the Union’s process of expansion, many technocrats in Brussels feared “the rejection of the Constitution would likely slow down or block EU enlargement.”33 However, the accession to EU membership by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia,                                                           28 The ENP and EMP are two policy instruments of the EU devised to bring European member-states and Mediterranean countries closer by enhancing the skills of law enforcement agencies and political authorities to secure their borders. For more information about the ENP and EMP, see Amelia Hadfield, “ENP and EMP: The Geopolitics of ‘Enlargement Lite’,” in The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security, ed. Michelle Pace (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 65-107. Sarah Wolff, “The Mediterranean Dimension of EU’s Internal Security,” in The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security, ed. Michelle Pace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 154-85. 29 Thierry Balzacq, The External Dimension of the EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security (New York, NY: Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 159. Originally quoted from Philippe C. Schmitter, Neo-Neo Functionalism: Déjà Vu, All Over Again? (Florence: European University Institute, July 2002), 16. 30 Balzacq, The External Dimension of the EU Justice and Home Affairs, 176. 31 Steve Marsh and Alan P. Dobson, “Fine Words, Few Answers: NATO’s Not-So-New Strategic Concept,” in NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance, ed., Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2013): 155-177. 32 Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Chaira Steindler, “Uncertainties at the European Union’s Southern Borders: Actors, Policies, and Legal Frameworks,” European Security 24, no.3 (July 2015): 370. 33 Simon Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no.3 (September 2006): 421-22  7  Slovakia, and the Czech Republic in 2004 were, in fact, followed by the accession of two additional countries of the former Communist bloc which entered the Union in 2007 (see appendix B).34 On top of causing a legitimacy crisis of 2005 caused by the decisions of the Dutch and French government to set up their own referendum on the constitutional, during which “the failure of the constitutional referendum” in France and the Netherlands humiliated Brussels. Yet, what truly “triggered a veritable sense of crisis in Brussels” was the sense that two founders had turned their backs on the EU project, mainly because French and Dutch opposition manipulated “anti-Muslim sentiment, opposition to EU membership for Turkey and fears over losing control of immigration policy” to gain credibility and electoral support.35 Regardless of the outcome of the referenda, EU official proceeded to deepen their cooperation in the domains of counterterrorism and border management. By 2004, the Union had already committed itself to linking the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) “to tools of foreign policy, including development cooperation and economic cooperation” with TNCs.36 Though partnerships with countries of origin and TNCs The main was to fight human trafficking at the borders with the help of new institutional tools and surveillance programmes.37 The objective of consolidating strong partnerships with TNCs was further doomed by the London and Madrid attacks in 2005 and 2006. Four years after the 11 September attacks, Europe had become the target of Islamist terrorism because its “involvement in the ‘War on Terror,’ specifically support given to the United States” during and after the 2003 Iraqi war, justified the bombings from the point of view of the terrorists.38 Besides, the uproar caused by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005 and 2006, and the ensuing riots in France’s suburbs all signalled the beginning of a new era marked by the rise of social tensions between native European populations and the migrant population under the cloud of religiously-motivated terrorism.  The Refugee Crisis The opening of borders served to alleviate the burden of the past and bring together different peoples into a political family for the benefits of peace and trade liberalization but the Schengen signatories and the other EU member-states that later joined the agreement ignored the security and cultural implications of abolishing                                                           34 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007 transforming the EU25 into the EU27. Croatia became an EU member on January 1, 2013, after it complied with the political conditions thus forming the EU28. 35 The Guardian, “Dutch say 'Devastating no' to EU Constitution,” The Guardian, June 2, 2005. Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union,” 422. 36 In Tampere, Finland, the European Council evaluated the security needs of the region by creating the ERF to fund refugee crises; the European Judicial Area (EJA) to process judicial decisions and “cross-border information exchange for prosecutions;” and Frontex, also referred to as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union to help countries at the external border of the Union to implement surveillances programmes and keep the frontiers safe.  Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289-90. 37 Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289-90. 38 Katie Friesen, “The Effects of the Madrid and London Subway Bombings on Europe’s View of Terrorism,” Review Digest Human Rights and Human Welfare, Supplement (2007): 10.  8  controls, because at the time their governments believed that borders were becoming irrelevant in an interconnected world where European and global trade was bound to expand. By seeking to eliminate restrictions on mobility and simplify the lives of those who crossed borders on a daily basis, the “essential functions” of Europe’s internal borders – that is, the symbolic meaning of the border as a protection against external threats and a means to preserve the identity of a given people – were removed completely. In sovereign nation-states, borders have ‘essential functions’ which structure societies politically, economically, institutionally, and shield populations from security externalities. The elimination of such functions invariably placed additional pressure on the countries at the external borders of the EU to intensify their maritime surveillance programs and deter illegal immigration – if not in the name of national security then certainly in pursuit of EU security. The beginning of the Arab Springs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya triggered a regional crisis whereby the governments of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi were toppled from power by their own citizens.39 This movement inspired the Syrian people to rise against Syrian president after Bashar al-Assad – who feared the Arab Spring revolutions in the Maghreb might set off demonstrations in Syria – brutally arrested a group of teenagers for spraying anti-government slogans” on their school walls in Daraa, therefore sparking outrage “over the children's arrests and mistreatment.”40The deterioration of the crisis in Syria quickly led to a regional crisis whereby thousands of Syrian refugees trapped in neighboring countries decided to take “the perilous voyage over the Mediterranean and Aegan seas” in order to apply for asylum in Europe.41 But the refugee crisis that struck Italy, Spain and Greece in 2012 brought to light the limitations of the EU as an anchor of peace and stability because the Syrian crisis (see appendix C) had also attracted thousands of migrants from Africa and Asia. While in January 2014, a total of 925 Kosovars, 5,840 by Syrians, 2,955 Afghanis, and 1,110 Albanians lodged their first-time asylum applications in the EU28, those numbers increased significantly in January 2015, amounting to 647, 045 Non-EU additional asylum applications.42  For sixty years, the national governments of the EU member-states have been unable, if not unwilling, to build a common basis for the foreign and security policies of the Union, through which intelligence information could be shared among the EU28.43 Although efforts were made at the supranational level to compensate for these shortcomings, with a view to protecting the stability of the EU and containing                                                           39 Al Jazeera, “Syria's Civil war Explained From the Beginning,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2017. 40 Joe Sterling, “Daraa: The Spark That lit the Syrian Flame,” CNN, March 1, 2012. 41 Lizzie Dearden, “6 Charts and a map That Show Where Europe's Refugees are Coming From - and the Perilous Journeys They are Taking,” Independent, September 2, 2015.  42 Eurostat, “First Time Asylum Applicants in the EU28 by Citizenship, Q1 2014 – Q1 2015,” last modified September 18, 2015, accessed July 15, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:First_time_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_citizenship,_Q1_2014_%E2%80%93_Q1_2015.png. 43 EU28 is an abbreviation for the 28 members of the EU: France, The UK, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Portugal, Republic of Cyprus, Ireland, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.   9  threats at the Union’s external borders, EU action has been limited to the 1998 development of the Global Approach to Migration and other intergovernmental programs designed to externalize Europe’s actions to its neighboring countries. The “Global Approach to Migration” – also called EUROSUR – was the first formulation of an approach towards saving lives in the Mediterranean through which national governments could devise common tools44 to ensure the physical safety of illegal migrants. The policy was successful in that it reminded member-states of their duties to uphold the liberal principles entrenched in the European political ideal and “replace the model of ‘Fortress Europe.”45 In spite of that EU member-states (including the ‘Big Three’) nurtured partnerships with the autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to satisfy short-term economic gains and, by the same token, participated in the deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean with Brussels, actions which share a part of responsibility for the refugee crisis. The fact that member-states have preferred to keep these issues within the “national cadre” poses a serious threat to the survival of the Schengen regime, because it allows national governments to ignore major issues such as the EU’s lack of institutional coherence and policy harmonization in the domains of immigration.46 Moreover, the existing EU asylum system was built on weak basis because “discrepancies between Member States’ procedures” (i.e. to withdraw or request international protection) contributed “to differences in recognition rates, secondary movements, so-called asylum shopping and ultimately, to an unfair distribution of responsibilities among Member States.”47 With the arrival of new migrants in the early 2010s, the EU parliament and Council were compelled to draft a new Dublin Regulation (The Dublin III regulation EU No 604/2013) to transfer “asylum seekers from one member state to another” when family members can be brought together “and have their asylum claims dealt with by the same authorities.”48  While the Libyan and Tunisian ‘Arab Springs’ did not disturb the status-quo in Europe, the Syrian war and the rise of IS has destabilized the European institutions so profoundly that they forced the EU28 to address the permeability of Schengen area’s borders.49 In March 2011 the receiving center in Lampedusa already suffered “a serious deterioration of public health conditions due to approximately 500 migrants                                                           44 At the EU level, the EURODAC was created to record fingerprints; the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to facilitate assessment of asylum applications with the help of special asylum teams assisting member-states; Frontex to patrol and secure the EU’s external borders; and EUROPOL to tackle organized crime connected to human trafficking, illegal immigration and drug wars. Anita Ora, “Hotspots and Emergency Relocation State of Play,” (briefing paper, European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579070/EPRS_BRI(2016)579070_EN.pdf. 45 Jorrit Rijpma and Mathias Vermeulen, “EUROSUR: Saving Live or Building Borders,” European Security 24, no.3 (July 2015): 456. Originally quoted from Colleen Thouez, Towards a Common European Migration and Asylum Policy? UNCHR New Issues in Refugees Research (Geneva: UNCHR, 2000).  46 Mathias Jopp, Rummel Reinhardt, and Peter Schmidt, Integration and Security in Western Europe: Inside the European Pillar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 8. 47 European Commission, “Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions.” 48 Refugee Council, “The ‘Dublin’ Regulation and Family Unity,” (briefing paper, London, 2015), https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/6143/Nov15_Dublin_III.pdf. 49 Santino Severoni, Increased Influx of Migrants in Lampedusa, Italy, viii, http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf.   10  arriving daily during that period” but the responses developed by Brussels have tended to be ad hoc, temporary and inefficient, as demonstrated by the short-lived naval operation of Mare Nostrum. The latter program, which was established in 2013 to compensate for the underfunding of Frontex but terminated in October 2014, exemplifies the lack of seriousness with which Brussels analyzed the situation in Italy.50 Rather than deterring illegal immigration, Mare Nostrum convinced migrants that Europe would at least save them from drowning in the attempt to reach its shores.51 Though the mission had saved up to 100,000 people by the end of 2015, Brussels quickly understood that Mare Nostrum acted as a push factor for migrants to leave their home country. The program was replaced immediately by Operations Triton and Poseidon – two naval border-surveillance programs devised to monitor the Italian, Maltese and Greek shorelines - rather than patrolling “the seas searching for vessels in distress.”52 The consequences of this policy change have been dramatic as the number of deaths in the Mediterranean skyrocketed to 3,740 in October 2016, which demonstrated that removing the primary push factor (the search-and-rescue missions) had no bearing on the humanitarian crisis in the south of Europe.53 Another push factor – the existence of ‘hotspots’ in the Southern Europe serving as reception centers – has also acted as a catalyst for migrants, legitimizing their journey to Europe via Libya and other transit countries. Their original purpose was to facilitate the recording of fingerprints through the EURODAC system in order to apprehend the migrants directly on the boats and force them to record their fingerprints. This scheme had thus far been successful in that 87% of migrants recorded their fingerprints in January 2016 and 100% in February 2016 after disembarking from boats; however, the lack of “interconnectivity of databases” between the 28 member-states; and the fact that EURODAC database remains optional except for countries located at the external borders of the Union prevents the program from being fully operative.54  When member-states reviewed the EURODAC regulation, they focused on the securitization of immigration through the recording of fingerprints in the EURODAC database, thus laying down the conditions under which member-states’ designated authorities and Europol can store fingerprints and request “the comparison of data with those stored in the Central System” for immigration and/or security purposes.55                                                           50 Frontex remains a very weak organization because it depends on “contributions of assets and experts” made by the EU28 “on a voluntary basis.” European Commission, “European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders,” press release, December 15, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm. 51 The Economist, “Do not Send me Your Huddled,” The Economist, April 24, 2015. 52 The Economist, “Do not Send me Your Huddled.” 53 United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR), “Mediterranean Death Toll Soars, 2016 is Deadliest Year yet,” October 25, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html. 54 Darren Neville, Sarah Sy and Amalia Rigon, On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration, 40, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU(2016)556942_EN.pdf. Originally quoted from European Commission, Italy – State of Play Report, COM (2016) 85 ANNEX 3, 10 February 2016. 55 The EURODAC database, which was adopted in 2000 and first implemented in 2003, was revised in late 2013 to allow law enforcement agencies access to the database. Countries like Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein signed separate agreements to take part in the Dublin and EURODAC system. Article 1 (2) of Regulation 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Establishment of 'Eurodac 'for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective  11  Once law enforcement agencies record the fingerprints, member-states are required to upload the information onto the shared database, but many do not fulfill this obligation because only states at the external borders of the Union must share all fingerprints data.56 For that reason, many criticize the Dublin law for trapping asylum-seekers with the recording of their fingerprints under the Return Directive (2008/115/EC).57 Under Dublin law, asylum-seekers must lodge their application in the first European country into which they cross. Yet, many have tried to avoid falling into such a trap by mutilating their own fingers, “hoping they can either live clandestinely in another member-state or persuade another member-state to process their asylum application.”58  The election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States challenges the neoliberalist assumption that views the state as “trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns, but by nonstate actors” whose aim is to condition the behaviours and choices of national governments.59 Indeed, in light of his apparent Euroscepticism, Trump’s election may come to symbolize the end of an era of domination by international institutions and the return of a nationalist foreign policy based “on securing marrow material gains for the United States.”60 The change of tone in the Washington government has compelled Berlin to act as the new promoter of EU integration against the renationalization of policies of liberal democracies. When the new American president “disparaged NATO as ‘obsolete’ and chastised German Chancellor Angela Merkel” for using Europe as a “vehicle for Germany,” he shocked many European observers who understood that Europe had to become the new motor for the liberalization of global trade.”61 From its beginnings the project of European integration has always been instrumental to the national foreign and economic policy goals of the member-states, mostly clearly so in the cases of Britain, France, and Germany, however, Trump’s “departure from the norms of the postwar transatlantic relationship” may come to reveal the varying national levels of enthusiasm for integration and foster the application of European                                                           Application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person and on Requests for the Comparison With Eurodac Data by Member States' law Enforcement Authorities and Europol for law Enforcement Purposes, and Amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 Establishing a European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (recast), 2013 O.J. (L180), 1. 56 EurActiv, “EU Rules Prevent Sharing of Refugee Fingerprints,” EurActiv, February 23, 2016. 57 The return directive established the common standards for all member-states, whereby illegally staying non-EU nationals can be removed from their territories. Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, 2008/115 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EC). 58 James Politi, “A Question of Identity for EU’s Migrants,” Financial Times, June 15, 2015. Maryellen Fullerton, “Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 29, no.1 (March 2016): 69. 59 Stephen Krasner, “State and Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no.3 (April 1976): 317. 60 Joseph M. Grieco, Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), 302. Kathleen McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2017. Stewart M. Patrick, “Trump and World Order,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017. 61 McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union.”  12  norms of “variable geometry” that have always been present.62 Hence, this thesis addresses the question as whether the principle of freedom of mobility remains viable in times of mass migration to Europe’s frontiers by observing the political reactions of the ‘Big Three’ to the arrival of more than a million non-EU migrants. The research looks more specifically at how the refugee crisis triggered a ‘domino’ effect by explaining how the crisis affected the confidence of public opinion, thus generating a decrease in support for the EU borderless region and the fragmentation of old, traditional parties. Through the analysis of state behavior, the thesis seeks to provide a comparative account of the ways in which three Western democracies have been transforming their approach to immigration from the late refugee crisis of the 1990s to the Syrian conflict of 2016. As opposed to the 1989-93 refugee crisis, whereby European countries had opted for the strategy of “walling off” because they could avoid the security problems by confining them to the East of Europe “in what amounts to a state of quarantine,” the EU cannot ignore the security implications of welcoming more than a million migrants.63  Theoretical Framework This paper adopts neorealism as theoretical paradigm to conduct a study of state behaviour, for the main reason that “there is no good other than the acceptance and understanding of reality.”64 Although the EU was founded upon the tenets of neoliberal institutionalism – a political philosophy adopting a progressive conception of European integration rejecting the principles of nationally-centered governance – neoliberalism does not fit the objective of a research on the 2015 refugee crisis. Just as it “failed to account why the incentives to make the security cooperation during the Yugoslav breakup wars were weak,” neoliberalism cannot account for the consolidation of Fortress Europe because it is premised on a neoliberal economic model which advocated “the reduction of state influence in the market, the liberalization of society [...], and a general trend toward deregulation.”65 By contrast, neorealism provides a solid theoretical foundation to assess policy-decisions, mainly because it rejects both the view that “the trading state” has replaced rather than supplemented “the political-military state,” and that the proposition of interdependence is among the strongest forces conditioning international politics.66 Put simply, it guides the research with a coherent set of beliefs about the conditions for a successful state in the “international regime” and offers a rational framework to interpret the decisions of policy-makers in terms of power, interests and rationality.67                                                            62 McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union.” 63 Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 151. 64 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), 21 65 Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, “Glossary,” European Union Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 400. Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 150. 66 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security 25, no.1 (July 2000): 14. 67 In Keohane’s words, the international regime describes the set of governing agents “that affect relationships of interdependence.” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  13  Neorealism can ascertain the dynamics and limitations of political decision-making at the EU and national levels while addressing an equally important phenomenon referred to as path dependence – that is, the process through which “current and future states, actions, or decisions depend upon the path of previous states, actions, or decisions” affecting the way initiatives are argued and chosen by the political elite.68 As a result, policy-makers tend to focus on political alternatives that are only marginally different from those they ultimately select, because custom, legal precedent, and institutional inertia limit their options. In today’s world, decisions are also largely controlled by public opinion – the collection of people’s preferences and beliefs on matters of public importance – which conditions policy action at the national level indefinitely. Within the neorealist paradigm, the researcher can then explore variances “in the interpersonal networking of key politicians and their relative autonomy from followers,” all the while acknowledging the many forms of political systems that coexist in an interdependent world.69  For the thesis, the application of Neorealist principles is also conditioned by Nietzsche’s notion of “tragic realism,” even though tragic realism is rarely cited by international relations theory, in so far as it stresses the “limited character of all political orders.”70 In assessing the particularities of each case study the researcher can ensure that the interpretative quest will generate findings about the particular reality of a situation without making reference to “otherworldly ideals” or to pessimistic views of life.71 The purpose of the study is concerned with the analysis of “the most likely medium to long term future scenario,” but at the same, it is also descriptive and explanatory in that it tries to yield one or more explanations about the same event.72 Tragic realism therefore complements Neorealism in that it informs “an affirmative view of life,” and provides a “remedy for pessimism” and for viewing the world in strictly objective terms without insisting upon conclusions and judgements about the “success” or “failure” of political choice.73 Given that France, Germany and Great Britain have related yet separate political histories and state traditions, neorealism highlights the uncertainty of decision-making and the difficulty of overcoming conflicts within the realm of international negotiations when perceptions of national interest conflict with common goals. In the language of political realism the state is placed at the center of the political inquiry to uncover the different processes that influence state behaviour during a major crisis, inasmuch as state behaviour is                                                           1972), 19. Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 11. 68 Scott Page, “An Essay on the Existence and Causes of Path Dependence,” published June 20, 2005, 2, accessed January 15, 2016, https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/pek/pathdependencepage.pdf. 69 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Neo-Functionalism,” in European Integration Theory, ed., Ante Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2003), 6. 70 Paul E. Kirkland, “Nietzsche's Tragic Realism,” The Review of Politics 72, no.1 (January 2010): 56. 71 Kirkland, “Nietzsche's Tragic Realism,” 72. 72 Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 132. 73 Kirkland, “Nietzsche's Tragic Realism,” 72.  14  always dominated by the constant threat of conflict – be it military, economic or social.74 As Mearsheimer noted, “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states,” even in the absence of security externalities from trade as a result of the removal of customs and border controls.75 Despite securing peaceful relations among European states, national governments have remained skeptical of the idea of furthering the institutional reach of the EU, because the significance of international institutions has decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as the nature of the world changed from bipolarity to multipolarity, the priorities of national governments shifted towards the securitization of human mobility. Because this refugee crisis invariably called into question the durability of interdependence in which non-state authorities derive power and influence on national policy through the imperative of economic competitiveness and the pursuit of market share, neorealist principles.76 With the escalation of the refugee and immigration challenge EU member-states have a new raison d’être: to thwart the physical mobility of populations by imposing restrictions as systemic constraints to control the flows of aliens. This change is justified by the fact that non-territorial actors (i.e. supranational organizations and multinational corporations) are losing their ascendance on the international political scene while the territorial state is recovering as dominant force in world politics once again. In brief, those who believed that the pooling of economic sovereignty and the elimination of border controls would result in the transcendence of the nation-state in Europe and lay the foundations for European political unity did not predict the damages made by the immigration crisis. As Waltz recognised, “the removal of worries” - or in the case of Europe, the removal of borders – cannot assume “the termination of conflict”77 or foreclose on the chances that perceptions of national interest will diverge rather than converge.  While realism had always been the subject of criticism in light of its rejection of the salience of international institutions, neorealism concedes the necessity for a state to give away part of its national sovereignty to a universal institution whose aim is to protect the territorial and military integrity of different countries under common principles of cooperation. In other words, neorealism now shares one characteristic with neoliberalism in that both paradigms conceive of the international regime similarly: states, multinational corporations and international organization strive to achieve their goals by way of economic exchange and intensified cooperation through bargaining or the satisfaction of individual interests.78 Hence, the research recognizes the importance of institutions as part of the international system but stresses their manipulation as                                                           74 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics, 5. Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980). 75 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no.3 (December 1994): 10. 76 Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” 16-18. 77 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 59. 78 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” International Organization 41, no.4 (September 1987): 729.  15  an inequitable exertion and centralization of power by bigger states.79 This phenomenon, ‘bandwagoning’, refers to the inevitable continuation and extension of institutional power over smaller states, which neorealism challenges by questioning the durability of an international system based on the devolution of economic power. That smaller states are almost forced to adhere to specific institutions because of regime compatibility, economic interests and/or survival needs does not guarantee that they will remain subordinated to the demands of the community – irrespective of the economic gains that may be granted by one state to another in exchange for expected political advantages.80 Accordingly, the refugee crisis has induced a chain reaction whereby smaller states became hostile to the idea of strengthening the structure of European cooperation, thus showing the supremacy of ‘high politics’ (immigration and security) over ‘low politics’ (economic interdependence). Today, the legitimacy of international institutions is being questioned by national governments who decry the EU for inhibiting “the behavior of actors and their ability to cooperate with one another.”81  The main difference that separates neoliberal from neorealist tenets is that the former places a primary emphasis on economic incentives as systemic constrains while overlooking the role of other factors on the stability of an international regime. It thus ignores the existence of two essential factors having a profound impact on the behaviour and choices of nation-states: the responsibilities of national political leadership in the international regime and the essentially archaic nature of the international environment.82 Neoliberalism and and/or liberal institutionalism run the risk of treating ‘balance of power’ merely as the product of the intensification of the economic interdependence, without taking into consideration ‘the limitless character of the lust for power’ within and among states.83 Furthermore, because it assumes that “international law and multilateral institutions will provide a cooperative infrastructure for the stable management of IR,” the liberal assumption omits the fact that economic incentives do not necessarily mitigate the disruptive challenge of negative externalities, such as the terrorist acts and refugee crises of the early twenty-first century.84  Neorealism makes a clear distinction between morality and practicality to provide researchers with the ability to separate normative theory from empirical practice when forming judgments about decisions and political leadership in international relations. Therefore, to understand how the refugee crisis revealed cracks within the EU institutional scheme, uncovering “the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies” serves to single out the propelling principle “to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are                                                           79 Maya Swisa, “Future Stability in the EU: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism,” Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the EU 21, no.11 (April 2013): 126. 80 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 59. 81 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” 18. 82 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 729. 83 John Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition,” International Studies 46, no.1 & 2 (January 2009): 207. 84 Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition,” 207.  16  present.”85 By contrast, the neoliberal perspective tends to ignore the existence of salient actors to integration such as social, cultural and religious aspects of European integration, all the while endorsing a massive system of economic expansion without structuring the geographical limits and scope of its political enterprise. The questions of relative gains, and thus the motivation of states to fulfill short-term goals, are explicitly overlooked by “the logical sequence that links the freedom of citizens in democratic states to expanding commerce over a widening geographical area.”86 With the onset of the refugee crisis, neorealism appears to provide the necessary tools to explain the apparent renationalization of policies at the state level and address the migration security linkage in political rather than humanitarian terms. Hence, the ultimate objective of the research is to reveal the pertinence of neorealism to public discourses in the EU and to analyze whether or not the emergence of new security externalities legitimizes the pursuit of nationally-determined goals applicable to world problems.  Hypotheses for Testing  The thesis seeks to determine whether the Schengen area has been undermined by the immigration crisis by exploring the differences in policy responses across Germany, France and the United Kingdom to assess the viability of Schengen regime in the face of a challenge to its central assumptions. Whether or not a link between the abolition of internal borders and the political fragmentation of the EU exists, a set of assumptions on the utility of borders will structure the research into to map out the situation in each country. First, it is assumed that borders and/or border controls are crucial to the ordering of society, thus logically implying that national governments made a strategic miscalculation with Schengen in that they failed to predict the opportunity costs of abolishing internal border controls – that is, the emergence of new security externalities. Under circumstances of social stress, security externalities condition the decisions of states to maximize absolute gains and minimize losses from external threats; in the case of Europe, however, the political stability of the entire continent depends on the willingness of member-states to address the permeability of its external borders. Second, the research borrows David Newman’s conception of borders or boundaries as neither visible nor contiguous, but existing “by virtue of the nature of belonging to a common interest group, sharing specific values, social status and identities,” to explain the phenomenon under study.87 As a result comparatively weak states such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria, were placed at the forefront the refugee crisis without having the administrative and financial wherewithal to secure their borders appropriately.88                                                           85 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Laws and Theories,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 38. 86 Swisa, “Future Stability in the European Union: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism,” 131. John R. O’Neal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no.3 (September 2003): 371-393. 87 David Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 18, no.1 (March 2003): 15. 88 Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 19-20.  17  Consequently, the asymmetric effects of the refugee crisis in the south and east of Europe have empowered populist movements to press national governments to restrict asylum rules, discriminate against ‘visible minorities’ and erect their national walls against refugees, because without borders to structure the cultural, social and political imaginations of a given people, such mechanisms are the vehicles “through which difference is perpetuated”89 and sense of national identity preserved. Hence, borders are regarded as essential to the ordering of society because they allow the construction of differences between “us” and “them”, which then forges a sense of belonging that “becomes part of the cultural, social and political imaginations” of a given people.90 It is exactly through this political imagination that national identity is shaped “to create order through the construction of differences, whereby ‘others’ are expected to respect the rights of the self […] because the nature of power relation is such that they have no alternative.”91 The European Union has since its inception achieved much to fashion a community of like-minded and culturally-affiliated peoples, but it is now apparent that many citizens of the member-states insist that an alternative, the sovereign nation-state, remains an option. The contemporary crisis of the Schengen Agreement obviously gives the concept of renationalization of European politics new relevance, as the nationalist critique of Schengen Europe has become instrumental to more general critique of the EU’s integrationist agenda that is now commonly labelled “Euroscepticism.” Because the continuing viability of border-free commerce and movement of people (dependent variable) and the agreements to create the SEA and Schengen norms that made both possible (independent variable) are being threatened by the successive crises in the MENAR, the Syrian conflict and the spread of transnational terrorism (intervening variables), the extent to which EU member-states attempt to reverse and/or deepen certain aspects of the integration of Europe will yield valuable information about the robustness of Schengen as a free trade area and the durability of the EU’s integrationist project. Hence, this study adopts a state-centric approach to discuss the role of the German, British and French governments as key players in the current crisis and investigate the effects of Schengen (i.e. removal of borders) on their behavior. Four sub-hypotheses will test the presence or absence of causal mechanisms precipitating the fragmentation of the Schengen regime and the value neorealist theory as the most robust paradigm to analyse European immigration.  1) Hypothesis 1.1 (Borders: Political Functions): When a state fails to control human movement at its borders, it will have to combat the rise of radical ideologies and populist political movements questioning the legitimacy of the current political establishment.                                                           89 Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 20. 90 Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 20.  91 Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 17.  18  Borders are a territorial expression of national identity. During an immigration crisis and in the absence of strict control at the external borders, states and their citizenry will adopt a more discriminative discourse when debating issues and policies related to immigration, leading to social division and radicalized politics. 2) Hypothesis 1.2 (Borders: Economic Function): When a free trade area is weakened due to relentless pressure and perceived threats from the massive influx of refugees, the state will attempt to restrict the economic benefits granted to non-EU nationals.  Borders can be understood as agents of trade or providers of economic and financial stability by allowing the state to monitor and regulate commerce within its territory. Because the abolition of borders is crucial element to the neo-liberal agenda of the EU, during an immigration crisis states will act to deter the economic threat posed by an unprecedented influx of migrants, many of whom arrive with little or no documentation. A state might resort to restrictive policies against the nationals of non-EU states since the ‘other’ is perceived as an economic threat, rather than added value for the economy. 3) Hypothesis 1.3 (Borders: Institutional Function): In the absence of external border controls for the EU, member-states will adopt nationally-determined policies and resistance to European supranationalism, possibly reverting to protectionism and a return to border controls. Frontiers play a significant role in the maintenance of peace and stability within a region given that their legal role gives “the state the possibility to enforce restrictions of entry” and impose specific frontiers as “the limits to the authority of the state.”92 Political radicalization and social divisions in certain instances will compel national governments to foster ad hoc intra-Community (intergovernmental) cooperation on matters pertaining to the crisis, as any EU-level compromise (supranational) would entail ceding more power to the EU. 4) Hypothesis 1.4 (Borders: Security Function): The real or imagined erosion of public safety will force states to pass laws restricting individual freedoms in reaction to the security interests and demands of the native population. Borders can be perceived as important agents of identity formation. For example, the principles of citizenship, known as jus soli (the right of soil) and jus sanguinis (the right of blood), not only condition the ways natives perceive foreigners in their own country, but they also impact the state’s ability to monitor its citizens, integrate foreigners and promote social equality. The absence of security and strong European legal frameworks will compel states to restrict the rights of ‘aliens’ to the native society.  Methodology: The Case Study Approach Ever since scholars like Robert Keohane declared that statistical operations could not “bridge the gap that lies between description and explanation” researchers have turned to alternative modes of enquiry to decipher the                                                           92 Franziska Doebler- Hagedorn, “The State at its Borders: Germany and the Schengen Negotiations,” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003), 81-83.  19  meanings and intentions of policy-makers.93 For this research, the use of qualitative studies provides the best foundation to make sense of inferences that cannot be explained with numbers alone. In effect, those who select quantitative methods tend to ignore critical variances among similar cases and avoid contextualizing the presence of factors, because in doing so they can enlarge the sample size of a statistical analysis.94 Yet scholars have long established that actors of the international regime must make use of qualitative tools to re-assess the verisimilitude of previous policies and produce detailed accounts of the ways occurrences form patterns of behaviour in the context in which decisions are taken by policymakers.   Logically, the study follows a qualitative historical and comparative analysis of the ‘Big Three,’ using the small n case study approach, and more particularly “a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study.”95 The comparability of the Big Three resides in common commitment that Germany, the UK and France share as retired great powers who have sought since 1945 to make common peace and prosperity integral to the European integration project. More importantly, the comparative exercise was selected because it enables the conceptualization of each case study as wholes with “combinations of characteristics” and specific sets of comparable processes “chosen for study because of their significance for current institutional arrangements” – in this case, the institutions of the EU.96 Because each country has been affected by the refugee crisis, albeit in very different ways and to different extents, conducting a statistical research on the response of states to the refugee crisis (i.e. performing a study on the economic and fiscal impacts of crisis on the ‘Big Three’ only) would provide an incomplete picture of the immigration conundrum. Hence, the comparative method is chosen because it fits the objectives of the research design whereby “the data situation of ‘few cases, many variables’ precludes application of statistical method.”97 The holistic nature of the comparative exercise in “the qualitative tradition” also brings much more richness to the findings, especially when it is arranged “in a manner sensitive to chronology”98 as well as to national political context. By ordering a sequence of events and “searching case material for causal factors” the research will yield data “identifying potential critical decision points leading up to” the refugee crisis of 2015.99 This method further strengthens the validity of the findings because through the case study method, an embedded analysis of accounts can be organized chronologically to identify patterns of governance and “assess whether differences other than those in the main variable of interest might account for                                                           93 Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” 19. 94 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 19. 95 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 18. 96 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, With a New Introduction (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 3. 97 Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 148. 98 Ragin, The Comparative Method, 3. 99 Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 215.  20  the differences in outcomes.”100 To make sense of the data, close-ended questions (sub-hypotheses) composed by and for the researcher’s line of enquiry will be used to guide the investigation and provide “reader-analysts” with a pattern to test the replicability of the three case studies and the possible extension of a future study to include other cases. Like Robert K. Yin and Karen A. Heald affirmed in their study, the robustness of a study “can be measured by having more than one analyst respond to each question” for each case study.”101 Through this inductive method of controlled comparison, the performance of the ‘Big Three’ can be evaluated to “isolate the difference in the observed outcomes as due to the influence of variance in the single independent variables.”102 This can be achieved by following the process-tracing method to yield the most comparable data.  By tracing the process through which the old continent was transformed into the New Europe, a complex economic union and regulatory environment, the thesis initially reviews how certain key political actors participated in the institutional metamorphosis of Europe into the borderless economic region most commonly referred to as the Schengen Zone. To look for the causal factors leading to the apparent re-nationalization of EU politics and erosion of integrationist solidarity, the research adopts a deterministic understanding of reality to make sense of the outcomes of the refugee crisis and identify “‘critical junctures’ when certain choices or events occurred that set countries (or other units of analysis) down long-run trajectories of change.”103 In James Mahoney’s words, “in the absence of the cause, the outcome of interest would not have happened.”104 The objectives is “to determine whether X cause Y, in case Z,” and by the same token, explain how “the ordering of events within the sequence” structure the decision-making processes of political actors.105  The process-tracing method will produce sufficient knowledge about each case to assess when and where a convergence of behavior across the three cases testifies to causal patterns through which we can seek “to build a generalizable theoretical explanation from empirical evidence.”106 With the degree of variance of the Independent Variable (IV) and its apparent impact of the Dependent Variable (DV), process-                                                          100 George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 81. 101 Yin, Robert K. and Karen A. Heald, “Using the Case Survey Method to Analyse Policy Studies,” Administrative Science Quarterly 20, no.3 (September 1975): 373. 102 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 81. 103 James Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” Security Studies 24, no.2 (June 2015): 204. Originally quoted from Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Conjunctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Keleman, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 341–69; Hillel David Soifer, “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 12 (December 2012): 1572–97. 104 James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no.4/5 (April/May 2008): 417. 105 Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 205. Originally quoted from James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (August 2000): 507–48; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). 106 Bennet describes causal mechanisms, as “observable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate” in specific contexts and induce changes on “the affected entity’s characteristics […] that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 137. Derek Beach and Rasmus B. Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 4 and 27.  21  tracing enables the researcher to gain knowledge about new “sequences of linked causal factors.”107 Considering that in a political system any given end can be reached by many potential means, a careful examination of national complexities allows to construct knowledge (about a society) that takes into consideration the existence of multiple causal and institutional mechanisms and explains outcomes in a more satisfactory way than the quantitative method.108 The next step of the research addresses the reliability and validity of sources. Can the available scholarly literature on the EU and three states under study provide enough factual substance to disprove or confirm the sub-hypotheses? The research requires rejection criteria to demarcate a set of sources that will be disregarded for the purpose of drawing legitimate comparisons.109 This will help to maintain the commitment to replicability whereby sources are selected according to reasonable criteria of comparable scholarly standard and thematic focus. For example, sources that neither refer to ‘European immigration’ nor ‘the refugee crisis’ as key words of references, are to be excluded from the source base in order to tighten the scope of the study and enhance the validity of comparative observations, to ensure in other words that it is not the case that “all our ideas are nothing but copies of our [sense] impressions.”110 For this purpose, sources, such as historical and statistical reports, government documentation, journal and magazine articles, will be collected for this study. For the study case on Germany, Spiegel, Deutsche Welle and The Local will be chosen as main sources, given that only a limited number of German magazines publish articles in English; for the British case study, The Guardian, Financial Times, The Telegraph, and The Economist; and for the French case study, Le Monde, Le Figaro and other secondary journalistic sources such as L’Express, L’Observateur or les Échos. If necessary, other supporting information will be included from other newspapers to compensate for the lack of counterfactual information, such as Al Jazeera, the Washington Post, the New Yorker, Foreign Affairs, the Economist, and the Telegraph. are also used as sources of reference on IR issues for each case study. The research can thus proceed with the case study method with the aim of establishing whether patterns within a relationship have been found once or repeatedly;111 the robustness of the findings will be judged by the explanatory and predictive power of the theory derived from the policy implementations of three countries facing non-state threats “emerging from cross-border human mobility.”112 To the extent that the three states under study have coped successfully with this challenge, they remain collectively committed to some form of                                                           107 Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 204. 108 Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines, 73. George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 207 and 241. 109 Yin and Heald, “Using the Case Survey Method to Analyse Policy Studies,” 374. 110 Also, see appendix D for operationalization of concepts used in the research. Kenneth N. Watz, “Laws and Theories,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 31. Yong-Soo Eun, “Rethinking Logic of Inference and Explanation in the Field of International Relations,” Politics 32, no.3 (October 2012): 163. 111 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 1. 112 Nazli Avdan, “States' Pursuit of Sovereignty in a Globalizing Security Context: Controlling International Human Mobility,” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2010), 47.  22  European integration; to the extent that the effort limits their national sovereignty they remain individually sceptical concerning the EU’s role in their future.    23  Chapter 2. Historical Review  The Reconstruction of Europe This chapter retraces the evolution of the European integration project from the early 1950s until the ratification of the Treaty on EU (TEU or Treaty of Maastricht) in 1992, which culminated in the establishment of the Single Market – under the Single European Act (SEA) – and the creation of a borderless region known as the Schengen area. In 1986, the SEA began the implementation of the Schengen Agreement of 1985 by abolishing physical barriers to the movement of goods and people among the signatory states, and by revolutionizing the way individuals lived, worked and moved across the European continent.113 Yet although the Schengen Agreements provided EU member-states with the necessary impetus to initiate the political, social and economic regionalisation of the continent through the incremental removal of police and security checks, the greatest achievement on European integration dated to the creation the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)114 in 1952 and then the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. By founding these institutional vehicles Western Europe could aspire to the pooling of resources essential to economic recovery by the continent into a borderless, market-oriented region grounded on the principles of economic fairness and social stability.  In truth, if the ECSC-signatories had refused to operate within the new norms set by the ECSC, EEC or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), no European country could have modernized its industries and compete as the third regional force behind the United States (U.S.), Japan and the industrializing Asian countries of the Pacific Rim. At the regional level, six West European states – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – agreed to share the responsibility of devising the ECSC – an organization based not on the diplomatic convergence of sovereign states but on the fusion of elite and national economic preferences in the specific sectors of coal and steel.115 The performance of the ECSC completely surpassed the expectations of European leaders, because it revived the concept of ‘internationalism’ as “a special form of the doctrine of the harmony of interests” through the use of an institutional solution to deal with the problem of collective action.116 Its apparatus managed the functional integration of heavy industries with a view to achieve une union sans cesse plus étroite (an ever-closer                                                           113 The original signatory states of the SEA were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 114 The ECSC is also referred to as the Treaty of Paris, as it was signed in the capital of France, Paris. 115 Ira Straus, “Atlantic Federalism: The Political Leaders of the Allied Forces,” Peace and Change 24, no.3 (July 1999): 285. 116 Carr, The Twenty-Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 85. In his essays, Hans J. Morgenthau argued that “to make nations actually secure    from attack” and give them a sense of security, nation-states created a working system or an international organization committed to maintaining the collective security of all members. Thus, by removing the feeling of insecurity and establishing the ECSC, the problem of security could no longer be “the concern of the individual nation […] Security becomes the concern of all nations.” Hans J. Morgenthau and Thompson W. Kenneth, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, NY: Knopf, 1985), 451.  24  union)117 and create a neutral authority to regulate the domains of coal, iron and steel among ECSC signatories. By definition, member-states were compelled to cede parts of their sovereignty to it. The ECSC thus became the first legal and institutional expression of the integrationist principle of supranationalism, the idea that European institutions and policies supersede the authority of their national equivalents.118 The devastating economic consequences of the World War II moved a generation of European leadership to forge a common system whereby each government could reap economic benefits for the re-establishment of a liberal-democratic political order. The wartime decision of governments in exile of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg to create a Benelux customs unions (Treaty of Brussels)119 served as one of the bases for promoting intergovernmental talks on economic, social and military cooperation between the Benelux, France and Great Britain.120 The quick formation of a binding customs union suggested that countries were finally willing to transcend national differences and cooperate under the umbrella of a common organization for the collective defense of Western Europe. The five Brussels Treaty Powers121 inaugurated the Council of Europe on January 28, 1949 to serve as an extension of the treaty with the help of a Consultative Assembly meeting publicly and a Council of Ministers meeting in private.122  Yet very quickly the Council came to symbolize the ideological battle between pro-European functionalist and anti-federalist proponents; the British government and other anti-federalists, who preferred to keep the organization as strictly intergovernmental, forced the founding members to restrict the powers of the national delegations with functions limiting the capacity of the Council to make decision on the behalf of its members.123 This reverberated on the decision of the newly-founded Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)124 whose government in Bonn rejected membership on the Council on the grounds that political tensions over the Saar region                                                           117 ‘An ever-closer union’. 118 Andreas Staab, The EU Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 5. 119 In 1948, the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Brussels, formally known as the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, to eliminate obstacles to trade and establish a customs union with common policies. The Treaty of Brussels later “served as the basis of the Western European Union (WEU).” For more information on the WEU, see footnote 187. Derek W. Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, European Union Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13. 120 Nieves and Borrogán, “Glossary,” 407.  121 France, Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, along with Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland. 122 The Council of Europe operates as an institutional platform whose aim is to maintain the rule of law in the EU by working closely with national governments and multinational organizations. While the Council of Europe has adopted the European flag and anthem, it is not part of the EU framework and acts as an independent diplomatic organization whose aims are to monitor the progress made by member states and make recommendations through independent expert monitoring bodies. In contrast, the Council of the European Union (also called the European Council) was created in 1992 by the TEU: the treaty, which merged “the Council of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)” with a single commission and single council, reinforced the powers of the Council of Europe through which national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. Council of Europe, “Values: Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law,” accessed July 9, 2017, http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values. Susana Muñoz and Raquel Val, “The Council of the European Union,” CVCE, July 9, 2016, accessed July 9, 2017, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_council_of_the_european_union-en-de23700c-e50a-4e0e-a7de-80665e4caf9f.html. 123 Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community, A History (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), 17.  124 The Federal Republic of Germany was established on May 23, 1949 out of the three Western (American, British, French) zones of occupation). During the Cold War, the FRG was commonly referred to as West Germany.  25  prevented it from taking part in collective enterprise alongside France and that membership would mean abandoning East Germany.125   Bonn’s refusal to become part of the European Council meant that the US ultimately had to provide a measure of security to all Western Europe against German recidivism as well as Soviet aggression through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the inclusion of a rearmed FRG within its membership. The founding phase of NATO was thus coterminous with – and ran partly parallel to – the initial stages of European integration that led to the EU. The pro-federalists, who were hoping the Council could constitute one of the many forces working for Western unity while enmeshing the FRG into a binding international organization, decided to seek help from their principal [American] ally in order to reconstruct the continent and build a solid partnership based on trust, credibility and the sharing of mutual political values.126 Through NATO’s platform, Washington could hope to implement its ‘double containment’ policy and exert enough pressure to obtain concessions from Bonn in exchange for its integration in the European market.127 To guarantee its place within NATO’s framework, nevertheless, Bonn had to accept a host of unprecedented constraints on its military capacities, notably the forswearing of nuclear weapons and the complete integration of its armed forces into NATO.128 As former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt commented in 1997, “it was also natural that during the Cold War West Germany participated in the integration process while maintaining a close relationship with the Washington, since Germany’s security ultimately rested more on the United States than on its European allies.”129 Indeed, with Germany prostrate and militarily occupied, many Western countries assumed that the UK would responsibly act as the leader of Europe’s institutional reconstruction while helping to mediate tensions between the French and Germans; however, London’s outright rejection of the European [federalist] project dictated that continental Europe adopt an alternative approach to political unity.130 As wartime prime minister Winston Churchill once stated, “we are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed.”131  Given that Washington preferred not to antagonize its British ally for isolating itself, France took advantage of this opportunity to impose its lead and become the central player in decisions pertaining to the economic development of Europe and the integration of West Germany until 1973 when the UK finally joined the European Community after two decades of political disengagement. To a significant extent, these early                                                           125 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), 89. 126 Schwartz, America's Germany, 88-9.  127 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 91. 128 Josef Joffe, “Europe's American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy 54 (Spring 1984): 72. 129 Helmut Schmidt, "Miles to Go: From American Plan to EU," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1997. 130 Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 13.  131 Klaus Larres, "Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill’s Post-War Foreign Policy," Journal of European Integration History 2, no.1 (1996): 17.  26  policy choices by Bonn, London, and Paris have ever since influenced British, German, and French dispositions on the goals and extent of European integration. As NATO was being established to provide military security, most Western European states agreed to become part of the Bretton Woods (BW) monetary system – the extension of an essentially unilateral American monetary governance to Western Europe.132 With the U.S. acting as the ‘center region’ or the financial intermediary lending credibility to the financial systems of European governments, members participating in the BW monetary system adopted a common development strategy of undervalued currencies, controls on capital flows and trade.133 Through such a system of balance and checks dominated by Washington, the U.S. could establish the rules for commercial and financial relations among European countries, all the while granting long-term Federal Direct Investment (FDI) through the European Recovery Program (ERP) loans to boost the European economy and facilitate a massive increase in international trade.134 Accordingly, Western Europe began a process of transformation involving military alliance as well as economic integration, the former driven by intergovernmental cooperation while latter the involved the surrender of increments of national sovereignty such as the ECSC. While the French remained wary of German power, the Americans insisted that the economic success of the continent depended on the recovery of West Germany. In fact, the U.S. objected that “the principal barrier” to recovery “was the French attitude toward Germany.”135 American policymakers quickly informed Paris that it would have to recognize that Washington “would not agree to [a] system […] which would postpone German recovery until full recovery [of] other countries had been assured.”136 They were adamant that creating a European federation would boost efforts towards European unity and increase the pace at which the US could invest capital into the European market, but also to make sure that it could impose its will by controlling the transfer of capital inflows through the Marshall Plan and making the FRG the engine of West European economic recovery. By supplementing the ERP with the European Payments Union (EPU), the Bretton Woods system allowed the West German government to take part in the liberalization of the European economy, which in turn, increased the volume of Europe’s foreign trade, enabling currency                                                           132 Joffe, “Europe's American Pacifier,” 68. 133 Michael P. Dooley, David F. Landau, and Peter Garber, “The Revived Bretton Woods System,” International Journal of Finance & Economics 9, no.4 (October 2004): 307. 134 The ERP is commonly referred to as the Marshall Plan, after Secretary of State, George Marshall, who conceived it. David M. Andrews, Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations Since Bretton Woods (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6. 135 Sherril B. Wells, Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 130. 136 The Marshall Plan, also referred to as the European Recovery Program (ERP), provided help to many European countries including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. It was U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall who called for the reinstatement of Bonn into the wider European system through the implementation of the EPR – a scheme for the replacement of the inflated Reichsmark with a new currency, the Deutsche Mark. Schwartz, America’s Germany, 31.  27  alignments and facilitating the subsequent expansion of a single West European market.137 In addition, the U.S. introduced a sixteen-member Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 to coordinate the implementation of the ERP and the continuation of the process of multilateral trade and monetary liberalization by managing the flow of American capital into Europe.138 That the OEEC was established around a strong Franco-German axis and served as a network of multilateral organizations for the U.S. to impose its say in negotiations, transformed the organization into the chief forum through which the idea of removal of nontariff barriers was discussed into panels of intergovernmental discussions, therefore increasing economic interdependence in Europe.139 In this way a strong Franco-German partnership was built into the European integration process, while the United Kingdom participated enthusiastically in NATO yet remained cool to the potentially federative thrust of economic integration.  Supranational Authority in Coal and Steel  Ever since Churchill explicitly expressed his reluctance to commit London to the European plan, the U.S. had to find an alternative political intermediary – one who could help Washington fulfill its role as Europe’s pacifier. Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority governing the ECSC, was designated as the most reliable person to become Europe’s new policy mediator. Monnet could “claim to be ‘The Frenchman that Washington trusted most’”; his wartime experience as the human channel for the subsidies, which backed the French government in Algiers and the French resistance forces during the war, forged his reputation as a man of strong [federal] conviction.”140 In the eyes of his American and Canadian counterparts, “Monnet was a master of introducing ‘European interests into American mechanisms’,” because by persuading President Roosevelt to engage the United States in post-war reconstruction of Europe and spurring mobilization of the U.S. economy, he had successfully acquired American support while also laying the foundations for a lasting transatlantic relationship that was needed to defeat Nazi Germany.141 Following his promotion as a top-level unofficial advisor and policy-maker for the Marshall Plan, Monnet put forward his plans to rally support for the transformation of the old continent into a federal power – ‘the United States of Europe’ or the idea that Europe could be governed by a central authority imposing rules on a market consisting of multiple European                                                           137 John Gillingham, "European Integration, 1950-2003 Superstate or New Market Economy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20. 138 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 86. 139 As the OEEC lacked the proper authority to enforce decisions, its jurisdiction and power to act on behalf of its members was insignificant because the organization relied on the principles of voluntary cooperation. Gillingham, "European Integration, 22. Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 77. 140 During the late 1940s, Monnet’s political party, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), “suddenly embraced European federalism, apparently to better pursue the economic interests […] and to foster anti-Communist interposition.” Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 105. Gillingham, European Integration, 21. 141 Trygve Ugland, Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011), 73. Originally quoted from Stéphane Roussel, Jean Monnet (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 131. Wells, Jean Monnet, 65.  28  nation-states.142 At home, Monnet’s challenge consisted of convincing the French elite that the reconciliation of European and American differences was a precondition for a true Atlantic community, which would in turn, facilitate the survival of France as the leader of Western Europe. Because Paris “was beginning to feel inferior as she realized attempts to limit” German industrial domination “were bound to fail,” France could nonetheless take advantage of the modernization and integration of its industry into a huge market whereby German industry was put on the same footing as French industry to enhance competitive efficiencies.143 As Monnet suggested, the creation of a supranational authority overseeing the re-introduction of West Germany into Europe as constitutive part of a European hub of coal and steel established in the industrial region of the Ruhr Valley would free “the latter from the discrimination born of defeat” and offer the Élysée a measure of assurance that reviving German industrial strength might not be turned against France.144 His reasoning, in fact, perfectly embodied the enlightened self-interests of the first generation of European integrationists according to whom France as a nation could recover only with Germany, not in competition against it because if French industry were exposed to German competition within an expanding European market, its productivity would be raised and its confidence restored.  Throughout Monnet’s efforts, we see how the French had always regarded European integration as an instrument of national interest and neoliberal institutions as the vehicles of neorealist foreign policy – to enhance their position among the West and bolster Western Europe collectively against the American and Soviet superpowers. Indeed, although Monnet’s goal for Europe unity pointed toward federation, member-states of the ECSC and other European institutions were free to interpret the project of integration as a vehicle for furthering national interests. Andrew Moravcsik stresses for example that from a neo-realist perspective France’s goal was to overcome a recent history of military defeat through the establishment of an independent Europe in which France could play a major, possibly dominant, role.145 This explains why Monnet lobbied the French government to convince the executive branch that Paris could assume leadership only if it established European control over West Germany’s material production. First, his team focused on elaborating an economic plan – “modernization or decadence” – to address the ways France could take advantage of the international postwar economic boom and incrementally abandon its policies of economic protectionism.146 Second, Monnet believed that although France ought to elevate itself and forget about its historic politique de méfiance (policy of mistrust) against Germany, it could not do so on its own.147 Hence, he claimed that the                                                           142 Gillingham, European Integration, 21. 143 Wells, Jean Monnet, 129. 144 Wells, Jean Monnet, 129. 145 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 27-35. 146 François Duchêne and Jean Monnet, Jean Monnet: The First Statement of Independence (New York, NY; London: W.W. Norton & Company 1994), 178. 147 Gérard Bossuat, "Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Français et le Processus D’Unité en Europe Occidentale D’Alger à Rome, 1943-1958," Journal of European Integration History 1, no.1 (1995): 91.  29  ‘Big Three’ – France, the FRG and the UK – had to devise a common political project through which governments could delegate sovereignty to a supranational institution and intervene decisively to “upgrade the common interests” of the European ideal.148 His logic was grounded on the fact that Europe’s economic recovery could never be achieved if countries did not accept the establishment of a greater authority regulating the distribution of capital and resources. Third, the only legitimate answer to Europe’s historic dilemma was to reach “l’état de bonheur et paix”149 through the abandoning of national sovereignty and the gradual approval of a supranational150 authority governing Europe’s policy-making processes.151 By grouping “nations together in institutions and by operating within a common set of rules and actions, a common spirit would evolve in that narrowly focused endeavour.”152 Indeed, the federal argument purported that since states had always been traditionally reluctant to yielding part of their sovereign control and had failed to preserve peace and stability among each other, only a neutral supranational body could handle the task of unifying decision-making processes over specific policy areas and, in effect, dismantle national sovereignty by stealth. In exchange for ECSC membership, national governments would have to compromise and yield part of their sovereign control to a supranational authority at least in specific policy realms, beginning with coal and steel. The goal of European federalists was to remove economic issues from the political arena and place them under a permanent international governmental organization. Provided that national governments willingly ceded part of their sovereign power to a supranational authority, the institutionalization of cooperation would serve to dampen mutual suspicions, most particularly French fear of Germany’s resurgence, and offer the Germans a fair chance to integrate into Western Europe’s political life on liberal-democratic terms.153 Yet, although Monnet was eager to create institutions, which could break old patterns of thinking and behaviour as well reshape group psychology, he knew that such changes would require a lot of time “to persuade people […] change men’s mind” and convince the French that it was “time to adjust to the needs for major transformation.”154  On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister, later prime minister, Robert Schuman officially endorsed the institutional proposal for the creation of the ECSC, which aimed at transcending the nation-state and formally proposed a joint program of sectoral economic integration presided over by a High Authority – the supranational component of the treaty.155 The International Ruhr Authority would allocate the equal sharing of industrial resources and manage the economic sectors involved in the exchange of raw materials. Finally, the                                                           148 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 160. 149 “State of happiness and peace.” 150 Supranationalism refers to a process by which national governments share sovereignty with transnational institutions whose laws and policies are binding on those governments. Wells, Jean Monnet, 131. 151 Bossuat, "Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Français," 88.  152 Wells, Jean Monnet, 245. 153 Schwartz, America's Germany, 203. 154 Jean Monnet, Memoirs (London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 432. 155 Wells, Jean Monnet, 245. Originally quoted from Stanley Hoffman, “Review of The Uniting of Europe.”  30  ECSC would be coordinated through international public supervision to contain West Germany’s future rearmament: its jurisdiction would also fall under the power of the High Authority, presided over by Jean Monnet himself. Although the member-states were hardly ready to merge into a federal block, the ECSC gave hope to the idea that, like the thirteen colonies, the nations of Europe could eventually form a political union of their own.156 By restricting integration to a sector of economic activity the ECSC avoided a formal debate about federalism – and hence political union – while in substance federalizing a strategic sector of the West European economy. The idea of a federal Europe would have met serious opposition in France, a country with most robust unitary tradition of any democratic state; ironically, the country whose re-emergent strength France sought above all to restrain, West Germany, was a federal republic whose comfort with decentralized authority was to give key advantages when European integration returned to the issue of political union. Where Germany had since 1870 been the greatest problem in maintaining France’s place in Europe, it was now to be central to the solution.   In 1951, the ratification of the Treaty of Paris established a new type of political governance: it not only provided a solid, common foundation for the reconciliation of France and Germany, but it also marked the beginning of the sectoral economic integration of Europe into an institutional structure. More importantly, the treaty compelled every ECSC member to abide by the rules of the High Authority and accept the oversight of a supranational administration of their industries to ensure that all comparably placed consumers in the common market had equal access to the sources of production.157 By setting down “common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe,” Monnet effectively used his influence to impose France as the leader of the European enterprise.158 His pragmatic view of politics aimed at finding means that would be perceived as fair by Paris and Bonn, whilst preventing the Federal Republic “from becoming the dominant power on the West European continent.” 159 This strategy ultimately gave France a measure of security through shared authority of the supervision of Europe’s coal and steel production.   The Failure of European Defence By 1952, the international climate changed for the worse when the Korean War broke out and further deepened a sense of fear that American commitment to Europe might be diminished in proportion to its involvement in Asia. Although Monnet did not initially believe that military and defense matters should be incorporated into a strategy for political federalism in Europe, he knew that France was worried about the possibility of fully rearming Germany through NATO. Indeed, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that in                                                           156 Gillingham, European Integration, 27. 157 EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” last modified October 15, 2010, accessed February 15, 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0022. 158 Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 16. 159 Max Jansen, History of European Integration 1945-1975 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1979), 34.   31  case of another war against the U.S.S.R.160, West Germany should have the same equal access to nuclear weapons as other European NATO or ECSC members.161 To weaken Adenauer’s position, Monnet undertook the delicate task of modeling another even bolder supranational venture – the European Defense Community (EDC) – with the help of French Prime Minster René Pleven to safely rearm Germany and subject it to supranational authority. Modelled upon the ECSC, the plan asserted France’s willingness to institutionalize a European army “composed of nationally-integrated units” in which every member-state would include its own military units. After signing the draft in May 1952, the French socialists debated the EDC treaty exhaustively and proposed that a mechanism be established to oversee the EDC with the help of an ECSC-like Council of Ministers, a popularly elected assembly and the creation of an additional institutional organ – the European Political Community (EPC). 162 More importantly, it stipulated the conditions under which France accepted a gradual reestablishment of a German army and a return to peaceful relations based on a lasting reconciliation with Bonn. Whereas the French political class regarded the EDC as an innovative solution designed to transform Europe into a third military pole – alongside the U.S. and the British Empire, through which mutual anxieties could be assuaged – Adenauer saw the EDC as a means to regain a measure of national sovereignty for the FGR as well as a tool to form a Europe that itself should be the new sovereign in defense and foreign policy.163 Very quickly, though, tensions over the nature and legitimacy of a European army paralyzed the French Parliament thereby putting a definite end to the ratification process. The EDC episode ultimately revealed France’s instrumentalist approach to European integration, validating the neo-realist interpretation of its interpretation, which claims that the French Parliament could advance the idea of putting West Germany’s army under supranational authority but always rejected the notion of doing the same to France’s military.   The EDC’s failure prompted U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to threaten Paris with the removal of U.S. troops stationed in France. In his 1953 speech – 'the agonizing reappraisal' – Dulles warned that the defeat of the Euro-army plan would precipitate “a crisis of almost terrifying proportions.”164 Concerns about German economic recovery and the “old fears of domination of the Ruhr in Europe’s economy” were predicated on the belief that if European countries failed to ratify the EDC, a German-Soviet alliance could surface and threaten “with great vehemence and force” the stability of the continent.165 Dulles thought of the                                                           160 On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was erected to create a political and military union comprised of the Soviets, its satellite countries and East Germany five days after West Germany became an official member of NATO on May 9, 1955. Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 17. 161 Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Belief in Britain, France, and the FRG (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 179. 162 Gillingham, European Integration, 30. John Gillingham, "American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties," Journal of European Integration History 1, no.1 (1995): 25. 163 Renata Dwan, “Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54,” Cold War History 1, no.3 (April 2001): 144, doi: 10.1080/713999932. Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 211. 164 Gillingham, European Integration, 30. 165 Schwartz, America's Germany, 62.  32  EDC as an essential tool of 'dual containment' against a recidivist Germany and an expansionist Soviet Union; according to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, by contrast, a softer approach to the Euro-army would allow the continent to eliminate the crucial factors at play – security externalities, trade competition – in the collective security dilemma and ultimately achieve greater economic independence.166 This would make it possible for American forces to withdraw from Europe in the near future.167 Nonetheless, the objective of the EDC rested on the ability of the French to accept the welding together of Paris and Bonn as the foundation of West European unity. Unfortunately, internal divisions in the French National Assembly forestalled the ratification of the treaty. While the Gaullists rejected the EDC because of the loss of sovereignty it portended, the Communists were staunchly against ratification, as they feared that creating a regional Western continental block would constitute a real threat to the Soviets and ultimately compel Moscow to extend its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe.168 Divided between those who did not want to rearm Germany too quickly and those who did not want to cede more sovereignty to an EDC supranational authority, the French Assembly failed to support the principle of military unity, and hence rejected the framework of the EDC. Even though Dulles’ “antagonizing reappraisal” speech had warned France about not further delaying action, French prime minister Pierre Mendès remained apathetic to Washington’s threat and allowed the Parliament to reject the EDC. Following the incident, Dulles “viewed him [Mendès] as a tool of the U.S.S.R.” and an unpredictable ally.169  In the verdict of a major historian of European integration, John Gillingham, “the EDC was a case of old wine in new bottles: a policy conceived in the French national interest, dressed up in European language, and from a military standpoint having little other than symbolic significance.”170 The EDC’s failure meant that henceforth the Western European states would concentrate their collective efforts on economic prosperity and stability while depending for their security on the U.S. and NATO. NATO, a military alliance founded on the basis of an international treaty, became the vehicle for West German rearmament and the defence of Western Europe, so that European integration thereafter excluded military integration and outsourced defense to an American-led institution.171 In short, the EDC fiasco indicated that federalism would never provide the substance of European unity in the near term, ultimately leading to the emergence of a competing approach to integration, functionalism.                                                            166 Ronald Pruessen, "Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to The European Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle,” Journal of European Integration History 2, no.1 (1996): 52. 167 Brian R. Duchin, “Agonizing Reappraisal: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community,” Diplomatic History 16, no.2 (April 1992): 203. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 121. 168 Kevin Ruane, “Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 13, no.4 (December 2002): 152. 169 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 123. 170 Gillingham, European Integration, 29. 171 Gillingham, European Integration, 31-2.  33  Monnet’s federal model was swiftly replaced by the functional theory of integration, which unlike federalism did not seek the abolition of sovereign control or the broad ceding of national autonomy to a supranational authority. In short, by uncovering and making clear “the relations of things”, functionalism would soon dominate public debates on integration and serve as the theoretical principled for incrementally expanding the sectoral integration of other economic domains beyond coal and steel.172 Therefore, the first decade of postwar European recovery, 1945-55, witnessed the success of the ECSC and the failure of the EDC, setting the course for European integration as an economic rather than a political project.   The Functionalist Ideology of Integration During the World War II the combatant state “had all adopted much the same ways and means for dealing with problems of supply and production and distributions under conditions of war.”173 Functionalist theory held that the same principles of rationally administered supply-and-demand could in peacetime be applied to the West European economy. By applying the functionalist ideal, pro-Europeans could finally establish a union based on the creation of trust among nations for the realization of common objectives in functionally-specific realms of policy and bring about by virtue of habit the incremental fusion of Europe’s economic, social and political functions along with the harmonization of policy-making processes. At the heart of the functionalist argument resided one essential, constitutive principle: the “Community Method” or the belief that “members acknowledge a shared responsibility for their problems” and act in unison to solve specific policy dilemmas.174 This ‘shared responsibility’ – political scientist Karl Deutsch explained – strengthens the bonds between European countries, through which common rules are agreed upon to serve the practical interests of the community at large and stimulate the transfer of knowledge as well as consolidate the role of political institutions as strong ‘functions’ of the overall system.175 Political scientists, intrigued by Deutsch’s approach to functionalism and European integration, looked to the prospect of forging a new European identity, not just as a practical political goal but also as a philosophical ideal erected upon the ideal of building transnational policy communities through sectoral integration. The result was to be a “de-culturalized and universal Europe” – one in which reference to ‘culture’ could be replaced by other terms such as common principles and values.176 By transcending the national legacies of the past through practical though limited integrative measures, the European continent evolved toward ever-greater cooperation among the member-                                                          172 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1975), 17. 173 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 17. 174 Walter Hallstein, “The European Economic Community,” Political Science Quarterly 78, no.2 (June 963): 170. 175 Bertrand Badie and Dirk Berg-Schlosser, International Encyclopaedia of Political Science (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011), 929-34. Thomas Risse, “Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no.2 (April 2005): 293. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 176 Jan Ifversen, “Europe and European Culture – A Conceptual Analysis,” European Societies 4, no.1 (January 2002): 11.   34  states of the Treaty of Paris because associating to a new European psyche meant that nationally constituted groups sharing similar features would coalesce and work together in harmony, under the auspices of a regulatory supranational authority. The latter organ – independent from the grip of national governments – would represent the interests of the Community as a whole and assist member-states in their transition towards the full Common Market.177  The ECSC of 1952 was in a sense the first instalment in functionalist integration, because the pooling of coal and steel production eventually required common standards and practices that would in time ‘spillover’ into the manufacturing sector, necessitating common standards there as well as a practical and cost-effective measure rather than a political commitment. Functionalist proponents initially presupposed that spillovers into other domains of regulation and governance would inevitably occur as a natural requirement of sectoral economies of scale cooperating at the European level. Theoretically, nobody could predict the number of spillovers that were likely to emerge from a collective undertaking, but they would in any case become unavoidable. Put simply, their presence would indicate a certain degree of automaticity in the collective management of political and economic affairs  serving to shift the expectations of sectoral interest groups in the direction of support for further integration.178 Accordingly, functionalists assumed that more demands for intra-state cooperation would erode the “ubiquitous” yet “anachronistic” place held by territorial states in the modern world, and ultimately increase the pace at which national governments ceded sovereign power to Europe’s supranational authority.179 Monnet’s federal principle – whose main purpose was to reshape the collective political psyche so that governments would shift away from unilateralism – also endorsed the continual transfer of responsibilities of the national states to institutions functioning at the supranational European level, but the latter considered himself to be “an ‘institutionalist’ – in the sense of being vigilant about the institutions” of the ECSC and cautious about the inability of states to act altruistically and build lasting alliances based on common priorities rather than national neuroses. He once observed: It is astonishing how little the word “alliance”, which people find so reassuring, really means in practice if all it implies is the traditional machinery of cooperation… where national sovereignty is ultimately vested in points of prestige and solutions are compromises between them.180   For advocates of functionalism, this “traditional machinery of cooperation” symbolized a return to an archaic mode of governance grounded on the popular attachment to the concepts of nation, national preferences and popular sovereignty. To enable the flourishing of a solid institutional-building system, in which decision-making processes would be agreed upon through mutual consent, the ideological and cultural attachment to                                                           177 Hallstein, “The European Economic Community,” 168. 178 Ben Rosamon, “The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctonalism of Erns B. Haas,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no.2 (August 2006): 244. 179 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 256. 180 Duchêne and Monnet, Jean Monnet, 365.  35  the nation had to be destroyed, for Europe’s history of 1914 to 1945 had made it the “instrument of social revolution” and political turmoil.181 The memory of the 1930s and 1940s – among which was the economic crash facilitating the rise national socialism and fascism in Europe – was ever-present in the efforts of functionalist theorists to dismantle the European nation-state. The functional process therefore attempted to bind the populations of Europe into a broader, regional system of political belonging by way of economic necessity; its mission was to abolish nationalism through stealth, as the rational functioning of the European market deprived the national market of substantive meaning. In this way, “every economic act becomes, in fact, a political decision.”182 “Once the benefits of such functional cooperation became evident, there would be more pressure to extend it elsewhere” in other, possibly higher, forms of political cooperation.183 Yet functionalism falsely assumed that the ‘high politics’ of foreign and defense affairs would remain substantially unaffected by the liberalization of markets on the one hand and the quasi-socialistic satisfaction of material needs on the other.184 This fundamental mistake meant that functional scholars omitted a crucial factor in their analysis of European integration: the durability of ‘high politics’ and its resistance to change forced upon it by mundane matters of economic necessity. Indeed, to expand the European community, functionalist advocates centered most of their efforts on satisfying demands justified by the technocratic requirements of modern European economy rather than by political union. They assumed economic ‘functions’ would inevitably induce the transfer of more national power to the supranational authority and foster the creation of political cooperation. But they failed to appreciate that national sentiment might not yield automatically to European sentiment at the popular level, which meant that European integration would be a top-down project furthered by interstate bargaining at the highest level of political leadership – in short, by diplomacy.  The Formative Years, 1954-1958 While in the new strategic environment West Germany did not pose a threat to the security interests of France – as the US, France and Great Britain had already started to build up their own nuclear forces – pro-Europeans nevertheless realized that they needed to secure Bonn as a strategic partner against Moscow.185 Hence, the Paris Agreement was signed on October 23rd, 1954 to include West Germany into NATO as a permanent member of the organization. As Monnet pointed out, Adenauer “was wise enough to renounce atomic weapons, and […] pay whatever price needed to bind Germany and France together” in a WEU.186 To                                                           181 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 208. 182 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 207. 183 David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), 136. 184 Risse, “Neofunctionalism,” 301. 185 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 123. 186 Monnet, Memoirs, 399.  36  do so, the latter organization was designed to control Germany’s military revival and act as an intermediary mediator between West Germany and NATO, as well as between Paris and Bonn.187 A French reconciliation with Germany was indeed vital to the interests of France, because only a supranational authority could legally restrain German power and prevent it from becoming aggressive towards its neighbours. Eventually, France’s economy would also be exposed to German competition, thereby compelling it to accept more modernization of its production, liberalization of investment, and reform of labour practices. In other words, France had employed an integrative project as in instrument of national interest, preserving a measure of national autonomy without undermining the goal of common European security.    Meanwhile, a strong political initiative was required to carry on the gradual sector-by-sector integration of three highly regulated industries – transports, conventional power and atomic power – if pro-Europeans wanted to revive and extend the momentum of integration inaugurated with the ECSC – or, as Monnet termed it, “the Community method”.188 By linking energy to coal production, thus combining the principles embedded in the ECSC to a new economic system, Monnet attempted to canvass support for the drafting of a treaty which would substantially broaden the competence of the High Authority189, accelerate pooling processes in the domains of nuclear power, and control the distribution of fissile materials across Europe. Surprisingly, this new framework appealed to the Gaullists who saw it as an excellent opportunity to gain political leverage over West Germany. France could control the production of fissile materials for military purposes and reinforce a system in which the Commission of the EURATOM would closely supervise Bonn’s nuclear activity to ensure “the security of atomic energy supply within the framework of a centralized monitoring system.”190  In addition Monnet contacted Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Dutch foreign minister Johan Beyen to discuss progress on European integration, as the former endorsed a plan for the extension of sectoral integration to nuclear energy and the latter the creation of a general common market.191 In spite of                                                           187 The WEU played in important role in shaping EU diplomacy, as it not only provided Europeans with a substitute for NATO’s European security umbrella, but it also acted as the legitimate extension of the defensive alliance created by the Treaty of Brussels which included the official participation of Germany and Great Britain. Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 108. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 127. 188 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 139. 189 The term ‘High Authority’ was first used by Robert Schuman in his address to describe the new supranational entity of the ECSC to the French Parliament on May 9, 1950. This supranational authority first emerged as the ECSC’s High Authority to monitor the integration of Europe’s coal and steel sectors. However, the Treaty of Rome of 1958 replaced the High Authority with the European Commission for the ECSC and set up the powers of the EEC Commission and the Euratom Commission. On April 8, 1965, the Merger Treaty combined all three institutions to create a Single Commission whose task was to represent “the interests of the European Communities independently of those of the Member States.” Acting as the only politically independent entity of the EU, the Commission is responsible for overseeing the collaboration of member-states and coordinating policy-making processes and implementation. CVCE, “European Commission,” last modified July 9, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_commission-en-281a3c0c-839a-48fd-b69c-bc2588c780ec.html. 190 European Commission, “Research and Innovation Energy: What We Do,” last modified August 11, 2015, accessed February 25, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/index_en.cfm?pg=what. 191 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 140.  37  personal skepticism about a customs union, Monnet could not disregard the fact that “discussion about European integration had already focused in 1953 on the issues which the Beyen proposal raised.”192 In turn, this meant that Monnet would have to present the economic measures of both Spaak and Beyen’s proposals in Paris “as the preferred approach to integration, because it provided not only a convenient ‘smoke screen’ behind which France could protect its interests but also a bargaining chip that could be traded for economic concessions needed to make French entrance into a future customs union politically acceptable.”193 As Walter Hallstein explained, by committing to a customs unions, nation-states agreed to converge their economies and implement “common rules of competition” to facilitate “the free movement of goods,” meaning that national policies in many separate fields would start “to make less and less sense.”194 Yet with France still recovering from the EDC debacle, Spaak and Beyen “agreed to eschew the term ‘supranational’, instead referring vaguely to the ‘establishment of a common authority endowed with the necessary powers’” to regulate the gradual abolition of customs.195  Notwithstanding the fact that the FGR had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons for WEU membership, Paris remained highly doubtful of Bonn’s intentions. In private talks between French foreign minister Antoine Pinay and Adenauer, the West German Chancellor had already expressed his outright rejection of supranational control over nuclear energy, arguing that the WEU provided the best platform for rearming West Germany.196 However, the 1956 Suez crisis highlighted France’s weakness as an independent actor in the new world order, especially given the fact that the French felt betrayed by Eisenhower’s administration, which preferred to nurture its strategic relationship with the UK and exclude France from negotiations on the Middle East. For its part, the UK was more concerned about repairing its relationship with Washington than with France, its partner in the Suez operation. Thus isolated, Paris was compelled to accelerate its reconciliation with Bonn, for it became much more suspicious of London’s involvement in the Middle East and Northern Africa:197  When [British prime minister] Eden called [French prime minister Guy] Mollet to inform him that the British had unilaterally agreed to a ceasefire in the Middle East, which the French had strenuously opposed, Adenauer counselled Mollet to “make Europe your revenge.198 This was West Germany’s invitation to the dance. Bonn now remained Paris’ most important political ally, which prompted the Élysée to soften its stance on German participation in EU policy-making and isolate London from talks on a customs union, since the French felt rejected from the ‘Atlantic’ sphere of influence                                                           192 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (New York, NY; London: Routledge, 2000), 191-94. Originally quoted from Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit., pp.400 ff. 193 Gillingham, European Integration, 36. 194 Hallstein, “The European Economic Community,” 163. 195 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 141. 196 Frances Lynch, France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome (London: Routledge, 1997), 149. 197 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 115. 198 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 144.  38  and could benefit from the renewal of the Franco-German partnership instead. In addition, there remained a strong ideological conflict between Paris and London on the appropriate way for Europe to regulate its trade. As Moravcsik points out, “with Britain preferring the status quo” or an EFTA “to a customs union, and France preferring the customs union” to an EFTA, a Franco-British agreement on the trade liberalization of Europe seemed unfeasible.199 While the British would not give up the preferential system they had established for the Commonwealth, the French would never accept “common rules of competition” if London did not cut off its ties with Washington or negotiate the terms of its entry into the European market in a way that did not destabilize France’s fragile agricultural and social sectors. The UK proposed a joint economic plan, the ‘Plan G’, which Mollet rejected immediately, as it separated the continent into two different areas rather than a single trade entity. That is, it envisioned the fusion of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)200 with the Common Market, guaranteeing free trade between an Anglo-French and a German-Benelux-Italian customs union, but undermining the partnership of France with West Germany (see appendix E).201 On the other hand, the French still had to convince the Germans of the necessity to ratify the EURATOM treaty before moving on to discuss a final proposal for the Common Market. Despite that, “the popular view that French industry would not survive the competitive climate of the Common Market” made it more difficult to find common grounds between France and West Germany and avoid “a repetition of the EDC fiasco.”202 Whether or not the French Parliament would agree to the principle of the Common Market rested on the willingness of the Germans to ratify the EURATOM rapidly, because French opposition to the internal market “could bring down the entire integration process.”203 Yet, because the German cabinet supported Adenauer in his endeavour to strengthen Franco-German economic ties, the Chancellor promised French foreign minister Christian Pineau that Bonn would link the Common Market to the nuclear agreement under the same framework. Paris would then have to renounce its policies of trading preferences with former overseas possessions and accept the irreversibility of the Common Market; in exchange, West Germany would send $200 million in aid over five years to the French to compensate for their imminent loss of Algeria.204 Already, the muscle of German economic recovery was being felt: the Chancellor’s leverage was                                                           199 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 145. 200 The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was created by the British as a political organization oriented towards the liberalization of trade and commerce throughout Europe. With Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland as treaty signatories, EFTA represented a serious alternative to the Common Market. See Gillingham, European Integration, 37. 201 Lynch, France and the International Economy, 157. 202 Lynch, France and the International Economy, 150-51. Originally quoted from P. Gerbet, “La Relance Européenne Jusqu’à la Conférence de Messine,” in The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome, ed., Enrico Serra (Brussel: Bruylant, 1989).  203 Lynch, France and the International Economy, 150. Originally quoted from MAE DE-CE 1945-1960, ‘Allemagne’, 368, meeting in Brussels, 11 February 1956. 204 On the same day, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden called Mollet to inform him that the UK was withdrawing from the Middle East, meaning that the French army was deserted by British troops in the Suez Canal and forced to negotiate a compromise with Adenauer to compensate for its loss against the Egyptians (1954-1962) and subsidize its war in colonial war in Algeria. Jeffrey Vanke “The Treaty of Rome and Europeanism,” Journal of the Historical Society 7, no.4 (December 2007): 465.  39  strong enough to convince the Élysée’s budgeters who desperately “needed the German cash” and expected that the internal market would at once alleviate France’s deficit and improve its overall economy.205  By comparison, negotiations on EURATOM did little to produce a grand institutional design for intra-state cooperation. Monnet’s original nuclear program involved the adoption of the principle of ‘mutual renunciation’ but he quickly changed his opinion on the nuclear future of France. In Paris, the French political elite strongly believe that the EURATOM framework should not hamper France’s right to construct nuclear weapons and compete in the nuclear arms race with its own force de frappe.206 But because the result of negotiations were no more than symbolic, the French government “went ahead with its own national isotope separation program,” since Germany still continued to purchase uranium from the U.S.207 In a later conversation with Charles de Gaulle, Adenauer confirmed French suspicions once he indicated that he viewed the 1954 German renunciation of the right to produce atomic weapons as not binding forever, thus implying that the FGR reserved the right to build its own nuclear power.208 This obviously reinforced the widely accepted belief “that France would not always be able to rely on American nuclear protection” and would need to build a “one-way nuclear striking force as the most feasible kind of French deterrent.”209 As a result, partnership with the FRG could serve France’s interests, but it had its limits and could never be permitted to dilute national autonomy in matters of security. By agreeing to endorse the French preference to focus on the EURATOM framework, Adenauer established the basis upon which Paris and Bonn could gather support and build a strong bilateral coalition against that of the British and Americans. However, he did so because he also feared that the French Parliament might reject the entire Common Market. The West German government was neither as Anglophobic nor anti-American as its French counterpart, but it set a priority on reconciliation and cooperation with France. In sum, both the French and German governments tried “to sideline or overrule opposition” in European “institutional environments of majority decision making” where member-states could easily bond in subgroups to exclude reluctant states, such as the UK.210 In essence, France’s policy was forthrightly anti-British while West Germany’s was not, yet was sufficiently focused on the imperative of partnership with France that relations with Britain remained subordinate until its accession to the European market in 1973.                                                            205 Vanke, “The Treaty of Rome and Europeanism,” 465-66. 206 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 149. 207 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 148. 208 Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 279 ff23. 209 Kohl, French Nuclear Policy, 25. 210 Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism From the Élysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21.  40  The Treaties of Rome, which merged the ECSC, a Common Market211 and EURATOM under a single framework, allowed Monnet to fulfill three of his major objectives: to acquire financial help in the transition to the market, to integrate West Germany into another institutional arrangement, and to oust the UK from the European economic sphere. The Treaties of Rome finally came into force in January 1958, making the Parliamentary Assembly in Luxembourg and the Court of Justice common to all three Communities. The Rome signatories established more than a free trade union by emphasizing in writing “the principle that the problems of one member was the problems of all;” that is, the principle of burden-sharing.212 Additionally, the treaties of Rome introduced a common external tariff policy that included a 10% deduction in custom duties and the harmonization of the economic sectors involved in the Common Market with the exception of agriculture, which was given special treatment through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) – mainly because of French opposition to pooling all resources.  De Gaulle Returns Former President General de Gaulle’s return to the political stage, with an overwhelming majority of 78.5 percent in the election of December 1958,213 marked a crucial turning point in the history of European integration. Former Head of the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946, De Gaulle sought a new constitution and the return of France to the first rank of powers. Hostile to Monnet’s federal plan for the ‘United State of Europe’, he was determined to preserve France’s sovereign rights and slow down the process of sovereign pooling. One explanation given for his return to power suggests that, in a period of institutional malaise, the French electorate was looking to vote for a man who could embody a certain image of France to the outside world; that is, an authoritative and pragmatic figure who could embody France’s lost imperial grandeur. Despite the propensity of the French to identify him with the Right, de Gaulle sought to maintain French unity and win over the French electorate by claiming to “stand for a France that was beyond Right and Left.”214 His political vision was essentially grounded on “the assertion that ‘France cannot be France without greatness’”215 or by remaining dependent on external support from either from the US or the High Authority for Europe. By undertaking negotiations with the Soviets the General demonstrated his willingness to assert France as a fully independent power and impose Gaullism as the unofficial ideology of the Fifth Republic, founded and consolidated constitutionally between 1958 and                                                           211 The Treaties of Rome created the Common Market, which is also referred to as the European Economic Community (EEC). 212 Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 18. 213 On December 21, 1958, General de Gaulle was re-elected as President of France. Direction de L’Information Légale et Administrative (DILA), “1958: L’Élection Du 21 Décembre,” published February 8, 2017, accessed March 2, 2017, http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/elections-presidentielles-depuis-1958.html. 214 Andrew Knapp, Gaullism Since de Gaulle (Brookfield, Wis: Darmouth, 1994), 6. 215 Knapp, Gaullism Since de Gaulle, 3.  41  1962.216 De Gaulle’s ideology challenged the main foundations of supranationalism because it strictly “opposed any institutional development which might threaten to direct political attention away from the existing national governments.”217 In fact, de Gaulle was the least apologetic in viewing European integration in instrumental terms, appropriating the Europeanist vocabulary while “emptying it of its integrationist meaning and using it to secure for France a distinctive position of leadership within a loosely confederated Europe.”218 French foreign policy under De Gaulle’s presidency represents the most clear-cut vindication of the neo-realist interpretation of European integration. De Gaulle’s return also signified that Britain’s chance of trading with the Common Market [or accessing full membership] remained very slim, at least until the General occupied the Élysée219, since British dependency on the US was perceived by most of the French political elite as detrimental to the overall progress of the integration process. Consequently, for more than a decade, the European continent witnessed and suffered from a battle of ‘two Europes’: a ‘continental’ Europe led by the Franco-German partnership and a ‘Scandinavian’ Europe dominated by the UK.   The United Kingdom: Distant Observer Although it followed the ECSC’s negotiations closely, the British government always strongly resisted the idea of ceding sovereignty to the new organization – or creating the impression that it accepted principles that overrode its political autonomy. In the late 1940s, the UK devised its own strategy to impose itself as the champion of European diplomacy through the Council of Europe. Formed by the Treaty of London in 1949, the Council served as a core institution representing the countries that had refused to adopt supranationalism or federalism through which “European foreign ministers […] could exchange views on matters of current concern.”220 Yet it was described at times as nothing more than a “talking shop.”221 The claim that London’s lack of commitment to Europe slowed down the development of new regional initiatives was substantiated in                                                           216 Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 269-73. 217 David L. Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 75.  218 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 105. 219 In May 1968, groups of activists, students and workers started to demonstrate violently to protest the fact that “the still booming French economy […] was still handing out its rewards unevenly, in terms of gender, social class, profession, age, and region.” For a week, the French rebelled against police enforcements and organized massive demonstrations leading to civil unrest across France compelling de Gaulle’s administration to seek solutions because popular opinion perceived the General as “more or less a conservative force representing capital and not labour.” To regain popular consent, he decided to set up a referendum whose aim was to reform the Senate and establish “part-elected, part-nominated bodies representing various social, economic and local interests” to include the civil society in the decision-making processes of the executive. However, the French were uninterested in the Senate and voted ‘no’ to de Gaulle’s political reformation, thus forcing him to resign in 1969. John Gaffney, Political Leadership in France (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 66-90. 220 Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 136.  221 Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 136.  42  1954 by the British refusal to associate with European military integration, which suddenly put a halt to the federal design and undermined any argument for establishing the EPC. In Churchill’s own words: We are not members of the EDC, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal Europe system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by the preposition “with” but not “of” – we are with them, but not of them.222  “Britain’s response to the [EDC] plan” remained “sympathetic but non-committal,” as Churchill’s Conservative government thought that the Empire prevented the country from “compromising both its sovereignty and its ‘global responsibilities’.”223 In direct retaliation, the French Parliament abstained from ratifying the EDC and logically argued that pooling its right to national sovereignty was prejudicial to France’s interests, if the UK refused to do so.224 Four years later, London was still uninterested and unprepared to enter the EEC as a full member. British cooperation with Europe was limited to an agreement regularizing the Anglo-ECSC relations, which briefly stated the UK’s “desire to establish an intimate and enduring association with the Community.”225 Nevertheless, during both the Messina and Venice negotiations, the UK clearly showed that it remained at odds with the aspiration of continental European countries. British Conservatives essentially opposed the creation of a common external tariff as a significant economic burden on the fragile markets of its overseas colonies and, by consequence, decided to focus their efforts on the EFTA. With EFTA and the EEC competing with each other, the continent became separated between the EEC’s six and EFTA’s seven-country coalition, the first committed to economic integration while the latter confined itself to liberalized trade.226 Although EFTA was set up to represent those countries that did not want federal institutions or supranational authorities and believed that cooperation among sovereign states to liberalize trade was sufficient to govern European affairs, it could not compete with the EEC, as West Germany, rapidly recovering its rank as the largest European economy, had refused to take part in it.227 While EFTA offered attractive economic alternatives (such as, the removal of tariffs and a non-supranational framework) British prime minister Harold Macmillan acknowledged that the main game was on the continent and that the UK would be disadvantaged in the long-run. He thus prompted his team to open negotiations for a potential British entry into the EEC because in his own words if the British “cannot beat them [the Six], let us join them.”228  From the start, Macmillan wrongly thought that an entente with de Gaulle could be easily achieved, since both men shared the same ideological objectives: to reap as much benefit as possible from liberalized                                                           222 Jansen, History of European Integration, 48. 223 Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 63. 224 Jansen, History of European Integration, 47. 225 Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur L’Europe (CVCE), “Agreement Concerning the Relations Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Coal and Steel Community,” published December 18, 2016, accessed July 5, 2016, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/de859fe5-dd07-4666-89b0-4f1ef2825b13/publishable_en.pdf. 226 See Appendix E for chart of EEC and EFTA’s members. 227 Gillingham, European Integration, 37. 228 Jansen, History of European Integration, 88.  43  trade and attenuate the supranational character of the EEC. Instead, de Gaulle took advantage of the weakening of the EFTA to distance the UK even more from the EU: his era in France “actually witnessed a close pattern of cooperation with the supposedly despised and illegitimate European Commission,” whereby de Gaulle could enjoy “considerable leverage in intra-EEC negotiations” without the UK or EFTA to challenge his leadership.229 In other words, British membership in the EEC could only diminish France’s dominant position within the community; if the EEC was to be an instrument of French policy in Europe, British membership was antithetical. Conscious of the fact that “the Six and Seven” was “not primarily an economic but a political problem,” Macmillan undertook the delicate task of negotiating British entry in strategic terms, all the while hoping that de Gaulle might be willing to accept a bilateral nuclear partnership as a quid pro quo for French concession over a British entry in the EEC.230 However, the decision in 1962 by American President John F. Kennedy to cancel the delivery to the British of Skybolt nuclear-tipped missile systems put British nuclear defence policy on hold. But after secretly learning about Kennedy’s rejection of de Gaulle’s proposal for Tripartism in NATO – “a three-power French-UK-United States directorate” – Macmillan offered bilateralism as a solution to de Gaulle’s nuclear impediment “to prove to the US government that Britain was finally prepared to play a full and constructive role within the EEC, and that the French were to blame for the economic division of Western Europe.”231 To safeguard the UK’s nuclear capacity and insure that it remained a loyal ally, Washington agreed to sign a secret agreement – the Nassau Accords – providing new Polaris missiles to Britain on the condition that firing “the weapons remained firmly held in American hands.” As historian Gillingham notes, that the UK “came begging Kennedy for a substitute for the abruptly cancelled U.S.-made Skybolt missiles” meant that “the British had not achieved nuclear independence; they had fallen into complete dependence.”232  The situation at Nassau created a general dynamic that crystallized relations between France and the UK, and hence prevented the development of any real institutional progress at the European level. For de Gaulle, Macmillan had again been unable to break away from the Americans and ‘choose Europe’.233 Because “alliances have no absolute virtue, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based,” de Gaulle understood that nuclear cooperation with the British prime minister would never be achievable, for Macmillan                                                           229 Mark Kramer, “Introduction: De Gaulle and Christian Gaullism in France's Cold War Foreign Policy,” in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, ed. Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 6. 230 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 176. 231 Wolfram Kaiser, “The Bomb and Europe Britain, France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations 1961-1963,” Journal of European Integration History 1, no.1 (1995): 72. James Ellison, “Britain, de Gaulle's NATO policies, and Anglo-French rivalry, 1963-1967,” in Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969, ed. Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 86. 232 Gillingham, European Integration, 67-8. 233 Alan Campbell, “Anglo-French Relations a Decade Ago: A New Assessment (1),” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) 58, no.3 (July 1982): 239.  44  never intended on taking the anti-American road to form an independent nuclear entente with France.234 Macmillan and de Gaulle indeed realized they had irreconcilable differences: while the former resisted “change to preserve London’s prestige despite the gradual decline of its economy and imperial power,” the latter’s post-war raison d’être was grounded on the need to reconstruct the country from the ashes of war and humiliation into the leader of Europe.235 More importantly, de Gaulle understood that France could never fully trust Macmillan to choose Europe over the United States; nor could he accept the fact that the foundations of the Franco-British entente therefore remained subject to choices and decisions made by the Atlantic alliance. When the British preferred to pledge full political allegiance to Washington because they had “faith in their ability to influence the Americans to do what” was “best for Britain” in Europe, de Gaulle assumed that Macmillan would never become genuinely attached to the European ideal or act as a reliable partner.236 Since “British parliamentarians approached the integration process in terms of British interests – defense in the case of the WEU, and economic later” – there could be no grounds for any entente.237 Britain could only strengthen its Atlantic ties at the expense of weakening its European relations.  As proclaimed by de Gaulle, France took careful note of Britain’s double-dealing and decided to veto Britain’s entry to punish a deceitful ally until “proof was supplied that [it] would not behave as America’s Trojan Horse.”238 By vetoing Britain’s applications for EEC membership twice – once in 1963 and again in 1967 – and thence paralyzing subsequent discussions on the institutional evolution of the EEC itself, the general articulated the same independence for France within the European economic project that it had asserted in national defence. Having thwarted London, the French president then turned his attention to Brussels. De Gaulle’s institutional paralysis of the 1960s targeted the Commission, “the embryonic technocracy, for the most part foreign” by “ridiculing those who dreamt of a European federation, a project devoid of all realism.” 239 It was during the so-called “empty chair” crisis240 that he expressed his aversion for the expansion of the Commission into a stronger actor thereby, freezing negotiations on the supranational character of the Community, and the expansion of the Common Market. Although the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise ended the crisis by swiftly giving de Gaulle the assurance that member-states could revert to unanimity vote in the Council when major interests were at stake, many of the European political class still                                                           234 John L. Hess, The Case for de Gaulle: An American Viewpoint (New York, NY: Willian Morrow and Company, 1968), 119. 235 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 263. 236 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 262. 237 Vanke, “The Treaty of Rome,” 466.  238 Hess, The Case for de Gaulle, 121. Knapp, Gaullism Since de Gaulle, 353. 239 Gillingham, European Integration, 70. 240 The ‘empty chair’ crisis was resolved by the Luxembourg compromise which ended a crisis between de Gaulle and Walter Hallstein, president of the Commission in 1965, over the proposals addressing the financing of the CAP. While de Gaulle blocked any progress at the EU level by freezing communication with Brussels, he was doing so to undermine the powers of the Commission and obtain concessions on the extension of the rights of member-states to have a veto on any matter through majority voting. Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, “Glossary,” 388.  45  believed that “as long as de Gaulle governed, there was not much [we could] do with France.”241 This meant that for the next two decades the leadership of European integration was overwhelmingly a Franco-German affair. By ousting the UK from EU leadership, de Gaulle had succeeded in preserving for France a leadership role in Western Europe. It is moreover important to note that de Gaulle’s policy was the earliest iteration of what was later labelled by scholars and journalists “Eurosceptism” with specific reference to British policy toward the EEC after the UK became a member: a posture of critical membership in the EEC (later EU) characterized by resistance to its supranational thrust.  The Franco-German Partnership  While the Germans perceived the deteriorating state of the Anglo-French relationship as “an obsolete left-over of a nineteenth and early twentieth century mentality,” Bonn continued to nurture its relations with Paris.242 The continued partnership between France and West Germany was vital to the emergence of both countries as the regional forces of the continent, which de Gaulle clearly understood. For that reason, the general sought to consolidate his partnership with Bonn, but doubts about the nature of West Germany’s commitment to Europe prompted the Élysée to question Adenauer’s cultural attachment to the U.S. In effect, that some Germans “saw their democratic entity as entwined with that of the Atlantic Alliance,” since the enrichment of Germany’s peaceful nuclear programme remained dependent on the willingness of the U.S to provide the nuclear military shield, concerned many pro-Europeans who doubted the political sincerity of Bonn.243 Simply put, de Gaulle had kept out a British Trojan horse for American strategic dominance in Europe only to realize that a German Trojan horse would suit Washington just as well. By quickly turning Bonn, not Paris, into the dominant force in European integration, most German officials were convinced that “they had more to gain from a direct alliance between Germany and the US than from a European entente.”244 Because the Adenauer government sensed that Germany was fundamentally central to de Gaulle’s vision of France’s place in Europe and Europe’s place in the world, he drove a harder bargain, strengthening the Federal Republic’s Atlantic and European ties simultaneously. By agreeing to deepen political cooperation, with the Franco-Germany partnership heading the project, the Germans could prove to de Gaulle that they were willing to set forth the basis upon which the Six245 could revive the spirit of EPC. De Gaulle’s government took the initiative to create the Fouchet Commission, through which member-states could reinforce the political character of the EEC and compensate for its lack of convergence in the political and                                                           241 Kramer, “Introduction: De Gaulle and Christian Gaullism in France's Cold War Foreign Policy,” 6. Quote attributed to West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, 1969. 242 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 261. 243 Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities, 261-62. 244 Vanke, “The Treaty of Rome,” 465, ff 42. 245 The ‘Six’ founding fathers of the ECSC: France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.  46  military domains, but the “plan was rejected by the other Five as a poorly disguised attempt to replace the Treaty of Rome with a new, purely intergovernmental organisation,” one that suited de Gaulle’s preference for confederalism246 but remained incompatible to the terms of the Treaty of Rome.247 Even if it meant freezing negotiations on the Fouchet Plan, the general preferred to abandon his political projects f