

**SCHENGEN, THEN AND NOW:
THE ORIGINS AND CRISIS OF THE BORDERLESS EUROPEAN UNION**

by

Maureen Meyre

B.A., The American University of Beirut, 2014

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

The College of Graduate Studies

(Interdisciplinary Studies)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Okanagan)

August 2017

© Maureen Meyre, 2017

The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the College of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis/dissertation entitled:

SCHENGEN, THEN AND NOW: THE ORIGINS AND CRISIS OF THE BORDERLESS
EUROPEAN UNION

submitted by Maureen Meyre in partial fulfillment of the requirements of

the degree of Master of Arts

Dr. Carl Hodge, Associate Professor, Irvin K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences

Supervisor

Dr. Ruth Frost, Associate Professor, Irvin K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences

Supervisory Committee Member

Dr. Linda Hatt, Associate Professor, Irvin K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences

Supervisory Committee Member

Dr. Brigitte LeNormand, Assistant Professor, Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences

University Examiner

Dr. David Ding, Associate Professor, Irving K. Barber School of Arts and Sciences

External Examiner

Date Submitted to Grad Studies:

August 17, 2017

Abstract

The recent turmoil in Italy, resulting from the arrival of thousands of refugees from the Middle East and North African Region (MENAR) in the hope of constructing a better future in Europe has demonstrated the limitations of European immigration policies and the potential weakening of the promise of integration founded on the principles of liberal institutionalism. This research therefore aims at challenging the liberal institutionalist assumption which views commitment to borderless commerce and freedom of movement made in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Schengen Agreements as essential to maintaining stability in Europe. With regards to the challenges to European unity posed by the contemporary security and refugee crises the research adopts a neorealist paradigm to answer whether liberal perspectives still contribute to the understanding of the refugee crisis since its inception in 2010.

The thesis employs a qualitative, interdisciplinary approach based on a small-n sample of the ‘Big Three’ – Germany, the United Kingdom and France – to get an appreciation of the political aspirations of policy-makers and develop an understanding of how key tendencies in public opinion affect the decision-making processes at the national level and the balance of power at the EU-level. Since this small-n approach cannot produce knowledge generalizable to the entire European Union (EU), the research will compensate by comparing the political cultures of the ‘Big Three’ because the way they have responded to the refugee crises can at least be expected to influence the policy options pondered by other member-states. In brief, the main purpose of this research is to yield valuable insights about how the refugee crisis provoked a crystallization of public opinion between Europhiles and Eurosceptics.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Abbreviations	vi
Acknowledgement.....	ix
Chapter 1. Introduction.....	1
i. The Schengen Area	1
ii. The Refugee Crisis.....	7
iii. Theoretical Framework	12
iv. Hypotheses for Testing	16
v. Methodology: The Case Study Approach.....	18
Chapter 2. Historical Review	23
i. The Reconstruction of Europe	23
ii. Supranational Authority in Coal and Steel	27
iii. The Failure of European Defence	30
iv. The Functionalist Ideology of Integration.....	33
v. The Formative Years, 1954-1958	35
vi. De Gaulle Returns.....	40
vii. The United Kingdom: Distant Observer	41
viii. The Franco-German Partnership.....	45
ix. In Search of Monetary Stability	47
x. The Delors Commission and the Birth of Schengen Europe	50
xi. From Schengen to Amsterdam.....	53
xii. The Post-9/11 Era	57
Chapter 3. Germany as Hegemon: From Rehabilitation to Responsibility.....	59
a. The Limits of Merkelism	59
b. Political Impact	61
c. Economic Impact	69
d. Institutional Impact	80
e. Security Impact	86
Chapter 4. United Kingdom as Heretic: Limited Liability	93
a. Splendid Isolation	93
b. Political Impact	96

c. Economic Impact	102
d. Institutional Impact	110
e. Security Impact	115
Chapter 5. France as Subject: Integration as Security.....	124
a. The Demise of the French Left	124
b. Political Impact	126
c. Economic Impact	136
d. Institutional Impact	143
e. Security Impact	148
Chapter 6. Schengen and European Integration in Question	155
Conclusion	163
Bibliography	165
Appendices.....	211
Appendix A Schengen Timeline	211
Appendix B Enlargement of the European Union (1952-2013)	212
Appendix C Refugee Crisis Timeline	213
Appendix D Operationalization	214
Appendix E European Economic Community (EEC) vs. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)	215
Appendix F Three-Pillared Structure.....	216
Appendix G From Amsterdam to Lisbon	217
Appendix H Fortress Europe: New Borders Within Schengen.....	218

Abbreviations

- African Union (AU)
- Alternative for Germany (AfD)
- Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ACTSA)
- Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
- Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (AsylbLG)
- Bretton Woods (BW)
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF)
- Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI)
- Central African Republic (CAR)
- Centre D'Accueil et D'Orientation (CAO)
- Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur L'Europe (CVCE)
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
- Christian Social Union (CSU)
- Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
- Common European Asylum System (CEAS)
- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
- Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)
- Dependent Variable (DV)
- Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis)
- Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI)
- Direction de L'Information Légale et Administrative (DILA)
- En Marche! (EM)
- European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
- European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
- European Communities (EC)
- European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
- European Court of Justice (ECJ)
- European Currency Unit (ECU)
- European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC)
- European Defense Community (EDC)
- European Drugs Unit (EDU)
- European Economic Community (EEC)
- European External Action Service (EEAS)
- European Free Trade Area (EFTA)

European Judicial Area (EJA)
European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
European Monetary Fund (EMF)
European Monetary System (EMS)
European Monetary Union (EMU)
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
European Parliament (EP)
European Payments Union (EPU)
European Political Communities (EPC)
European Rates Mechanism (ERM)
European Recovery Program (ERP)
European Refugee Fund (ERF)
European Security Defence Policy (ESDP)
European Security Strategy (ESS)
European Union (EU)
European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust)
European Voluntary Worker (EVW)
External Investment Plan (EIP)
Federal Direct Investment (FDI)
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
Five Star Movement (FSM)
Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Independent Variable (IV)
Institut National de Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE)
Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs)
International Criminal Court (ICC)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
International Relations (IR)
Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB)
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Syria (ISIS or IS)
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Les Républicains (LR)

Member of Parliament (MP)
Middle East and North African Region (MENAR)
National Health Service (NHS)
National Institute for Statistics (Istat)
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (Pegida)
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)
Popular Party for Freedom and Direct Democracy (FDDV)
Red Army Faction (RAF)
Schengen Border Codes (SBC)
Schengen Information System (SIS)
Single European Act (SEA)
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Socialist Party (SP)
Treaty of EU (TEU)
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB)
Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R)
United Kingdom (UK)
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
United Nations Children's Funds (UNICEF)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
United Nations Statistic Division (UNSD)
United States (U.S)
Visa Information System (VIS)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS)

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Dr. Carl C. Hodge without whom this work would not have been possible.

I would also like to thank my mother, E. Meyre, my husband, R. Merhi and his brother, Y. Merhi for their support.

Chapter 1. Introduction

i. The Schengen Area

In the 1990s, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing refugee crisis generated new security externalities – ranging from asylum seekers and illegal immigration to traffickers of illicit substances, arms and human beings – which forced policymakers to devise national programs to restore order in answer to sudden change. West European leaders were compelled to reframe their political engagement within a new de-militarized international security regime whereby new threats, such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and transnational terrorism, replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and the military defense of Western Europe as top security priorities. Like scholar Robert Jervis described, in the absence of the Cold War as an important structuring element of the international order, the security dilemma becomes more troublesome because countries automatically begin to worry about the new threats that could undermine democracies and cause conflict (i.e. illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism).¹ In this competitive environment, whereby “the prospects for major crises and war in Europe” were “likely to increase markedly,” the governments of France and Germany agreed to deepen cooperation in the domains of immigration and trade as well as use international institutions to keep a balance of power among the major powers and several minor powers of the European system.² In 1985 and 1990 the signing of the Schengen agreements and convention, wherein initially France, Germany, and the Benelux states agreed to remove their mutual border controls, not only sealed the fate of the European Union (EU) as a regional trade block but it also demonstrated that the member-states had chosen to ignore the potential security costs of eliminating internal border controls without strengthening the external borders of the EU.

In 1992, the reunification of Germany confronted its government to the challenge of controlling the flows of retuning Germans and ex-Yugoslav refugees who had crossed international borders in order to seek refugee in West Europe and East Germany.³ This refugee crisis not only caught Germany unprepared, forcing the government to spend \$6 billion in support, it also revealed that Bonn acted as “a magnet for immigrants

¹ Philipp Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” *Journal of European Integration* 20, no.2/3 (September 1997): 131.

² Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 135. Originally quote from J.J. Mearsheimer, “Correspondence: Back to Future, Part II” International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe,” *International Security* 15, no.2 (Fall 1990): 6, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0017.pdf>.

³ The Yugoslav wars, which began in the early 1990s and ended in 2001, precipitated the breakup of Yugoslavia and the independence of new East European countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania. Following the end of the German occupation of Eastern Europe in 1945, the West created the socialist state of Yugoslavia to bring together a federation of six republics including the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Albanians and Slovenes under the 1st president of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito. The consequences of Tito’s death in 1980 were tremendous, tensions arose when the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army attempted to take over Slovenia and Croatia, pushing other ethnic groups to fight for political autonomy for more than ten years. The last armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which opposed an ethnic Albanian army to the Republic of Macedonia, ended in November 2001. BBC, “Balkans war: A Brief Guide,” BBC, March 1, 2016.

[...] seeking a haven from economic and political strife.”⁴ Because nearly 1 million asylum seekers crossed Germany’s borders by 1993, member-states hoped to resolve these problems by dropping “the visa requirements for ex-Yugoslav nationals” or providing “a form of provisional admission” to grant some refugees the ‘right to stay’ under special statuses, such as ‘de facto status’ or ‘humanitarian status’. Yet, this relaxation of such rules by former Communist (Hungary, Austria) and West European countries (Italy, Germany) was short-lived, as it never reflected a complete consensus for assisting displaced persons but rather a determination “to maintain a facade of human concern.”⁵ Once the situation deteriorated in 1992, the Union took certain measures to regain control of its “borders more effectively and prevent the entry of asylum seekers” by voting new regulations, such as the Dublin Parallel Accord. According to it, if the states concerned by the crisis did not want “to be considered as potential states of first asylum,” they could act as “buffer states” by strengthening surveillance programmes at the borders or by replacing asylum protection with internal assistance directly in the region of origin.⁶

While some argue that Germany’s restriction of asylum rules in 1993 was a perfect example of the ways national governments retained control over immigration in areas of high political salience and thereby limited EU-harmonization of certain key policy areas, the 1990s refugee crisis provided political leaders with the opportunity to exploit the lessons of the crisis so that Europe could arm itself with the necessary institutional tools to deal with the problems associated with failed states and conflicts (i.e. internal displacement, visa harmonization, and asylum seeking policies).⁷ For this purpose, the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreements set forth new guidelines to complement the abolition of border with more effective surveillance at the borders with the help of new tools and institutions, such as the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC)⁸, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the European Drugs Unit (EDU), and the Schengen Information System (SIS) – a database aimed at storing and sharing “information on aliens, asylum seekers, criminals, and those under surveillance by security state security agencies.”⁹ At the convention, member states also set forth new guidelines for the delivery of “uniform [short-term] visas to

⁴ On top of the 400,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Germany in 1992, 100,000 additional refugees from the former Yugoslavia, 200,000 ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, and 100,000 family dependents (unification of families) arrived in West Germany (with an addition 100,000 to 200,000 illegal immigrants). Michael W. Devine, “German Asylum law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe,” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 7, no.4 (January 1993): 796-98.

⁵ Michael Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,” *Refugee* 14, no.3 (June/July 1994): 32-34. Originally quoted from T. Argent, *Croatia’s Crubicle: Providing Asylum for Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Washington: US Committee for Refugees, 1992), 1.

⁶ Barutciski, “EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia,” 32-35.

⁷ Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of EU Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” *Policy Studies Journal* 32, no.1 (February 2004): 150-51.

⁸ At the 1990 Convention, the signatories agreed to work on the creation of the European Dactyloscopy in order to record fingerprints of undocumented migrants in a database.

⁹ Julia Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe,” *Migration Policy*, October 1, 2005. Emek M. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 287-89.

allow travel throughout the Schengen area” and designated the member state “responsible for the handling of asylum applications.”¹⁰ All of this measures were destined to prepare the EU for the abolition of borders scheduled in January 1995 and consolidate a regime based upon the “four liberties of movement of goods, capitals, services and persons.”¹¹ By 1997, the signatories agreed to commit themselves to forge a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and incorporate the Schengen agreements (and convention) as EU law in the treaty of Amsterdam, placing the decision-making power for Schengen under the Council of Ministers of the EU; that is, under the control of national governments at the EU level.¹² The UK and Ireland, which opted out of the Schengen agreements by remaining “out of the provisions in the pillar covering ‘visa, asylum, immigration and other matters dealing with the free movement of 3rd country national’,” have retained access to SIS and routinely take part in cross-border surveillance programmes and criminal investigations within the Schengen area.¹³ Denmark also kept its rights to maintain independence with regards to the application of Schengen rules in that it can decide whether or not to implement new decisions made under the Schengen agreement; however, it has been part of the Schengen borderless area ever since it agreed to abolish its borders in 1996.¹⁴ Over the years, the use of such practices by European countries fostered the idea of an *à la carte* Europe, whereby France and Germany act as the leading advocates of European integration and the UK as the distant outsider, whose government is often backed by some of the newer member-states that have often shared British scepticism about certain aspects of integration.

To attenuate rising tensions among Europhiles, the notion of “asylum shopping” was removed from EU treaties on Schengen and replaced with a “set of rules for determining responsibility for asylum applications” and managing the external borders of the EU.¹⁵ The Dublin II Regulation, which established in 2003 “a method for deciding which country amongst the signatories” sought to better equip governments with sets of new guidelines for the processing of application and repatriation of failed asylum seekers.¹⁶ According to the Dublin regulation, member-states agreed that the country responsible for reviewing an asylum application should be either the country in which the refugee first arrived, or the one which had issued a visa

¹⁰ Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.” Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 287.

¹¹ Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” *Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 2 no.1 (January 2015): 99.

¹² Italy signed the Schengen agreements in 1990 (entered area in 1997), Portugal and Spain in 1991 (entered area in 1995), Greece in 1992 (entered area in 2000), Austria in 1995 (entered area in 1997), Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in 1996 (entered area in 2001). Following Amsterdam, the Union approved the set up of a European Refugee Fund (ERF) aimed at providing help to EU recipients in case of massive refugee influxes as well as the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) – a group of legal experts, national prosecutors and police enforcement units helping “national prosecuting authorities in their criminal investigation of organized crime.” See appendix A for timeline of Schengen. Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.”

¹³ Maria O’Neill, “EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions, the View from One of the Schengen Opt-out States,” *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice* 18, no.1 (2010): 83. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289.

¹⁴ Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 99. Originally quoted from ff 5.

¹⁵ Gelatt, “Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe.”

¹⁶ European Commission, “Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions,” press release, July 13, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2436_en.htm.

or otherwise facilitated entry. In order to find a balance between freedom of movement and security, the Dublin regulation was then supplemented by ‘compensatory measures’, (i.e. the development of policies for EU’s external borders, the establishment of a EU-wide visa policy, and the intensification of cooperation on law enforcement) or safeguards to preserve internal security and thwart potential threat to national security.

Over the years, the Schengen system showed major flaws for member-states “never questioned the myth of the loss of control and the supposed security deficit that comes with it.”¹⁷ In 1984, when the German and French government agreed to sign the Saarbrücken accords – the precursor to the Schengen agreement – “to seek a solution to the ongoing strikes by French truck drivers and custom officials protesting the long queues at internal borders of the EU,” they failed to appreciate the porous nature of Europe’s external borders.¹⁸ This can be explained by the fact that Paris, London and Bonn have always linked economic vitality to freedom of mobility, and hence historically treated migration “as a labor market issue” with little regards for the cultural and social integration of foreigners.¹⁹ In other words, the main rationale of the Schengen regime was theorized merely as a solution to facilitate trade, ‘a missing piece’ for completing a European market free of physical barriers between producers and consumers.

As a result, the discussion of the need for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU’s external relations, for instance, tended to neglect the challenges facing post-Cold war Europe: first, the difficulty of monitoring the entry and movements of individuals from outside the EU, especially considering the degree of permeability of the external borders of the EU in light of the Schengen commitment to borderless mobility; second, the emergence of transnational actors conducting terrorist operations and transnational criminality; and third, the potential challenge to internal social order arising from conflicts between, on the one side, native Europeans, first- and second-generation immigrants, and, on the other side, the new migrant population. This is especially worrisome given the “endeavour to abolish checks at common borders” and transfer “them to their external borders” had huge security implications: the abolition of internal borders meant that national government had to tackle illegal immigration and organized crime at the external borders of the EU but none of the signatories was willing to harmonize or even “approximate their visa policies [...] in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that result from easing” border controls and security checks.²⁰

The events of September 11, 2001 inaugurated a new era of international terrorism, forcing the EU to draw on a unique range of instruments to address the many complex security challenges it could anticipate in

¹⁷ Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 100.

¹⁸ Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 104.

¹⁹ Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and Karen Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System,” *German Politics & Society* 24, no.3 (October 2006): 1.

²⁰ Article 7 and 17 of The Schengen Acquis – Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985, O. J. (L239) 13.

the future. When militants associated with Al Qaeda, an Islamic extremist group based in Afghanistan under the rule of Osama Bin Laden, hijacked planes and carried attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon thus making more than 3,000 casualties in the United States, the West realized the gravity of the problem of Islamic fundamentalism. Like former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in a *Foreign Affairs* essay, “defeating terrorism is a priority that drives not only military action to subdue individual terrorists and deter their state supporters but also multilateral cooperation in law enforcement and intelligence sharing.”²¹ Colin’s defense of the war on terrorism and its ‘strategy of partnership’ resonated in the minds of European office holders who feared “the terror cells lurking in Southeast Asia” and Europe could destabilize the road to enlargement.²² Hence, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was drafted by the European Commission to remind member-states of their commitment to respond to the changing dynamics of international terrorism and consolidate their foreign policy achievements in regions of conflict to deter threats associated with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.²³ For instance, the EU passed a number of unprecedented measures to strengthen Europol, intensify cooperation with the U.S. on improving air safety, and create an EU arrest warrant which was approved by the Council on November 16, 2001 including a list of 27 Islamist organizations suspected of being involved in the 11 September attacks against Washington.²⁴ In fact, by the end of the 20th century, security had become “a necessary precondition for the establishment and the expansion of free movement,” and a means to separate citizens from aliens, or “a discrepancy between safe and potentially ‘risky’ individuals.”²⁵ To achieve this objective, the Schengen Border Codes (SBC) was used to clarify the rules pertaining to the management of external borders, the validity of travel documents, and the procedure for border checks on third-country nationals at the EU’s external borders but it contributed highly to the implicit categorization of migrants as suspected threats.²⁶ According to the SBC, all EU citizens “shall undergo a minimum check” consisting of “a rapid and straightforward verification,” whereas third-country nationals are subject on entry and exit to thorough checks and scrutiny of all travel documents, therefore “generating an implicit association of immigrants and criminals” in the minds of the EU publics.²⁷

Intra-state cooperation on immigration, security or terrorist matters remained nevertheless rather limited, as national governments preferred externalizing their actions via regional undertakings such as the

²¹ Colin L. Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.1 (January/February 2004): 22.

²² Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” 22.

²³ EEAS Strategic Planning, *A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy*, 6, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

²⁴ Euractiv, “EU Foreign Ministers to Adopt Further Counter-Terrorism Measures,” *Euractiv*, October 7, 2001. Euractiv, “EU Adopts European Arrest Warrant,” *Euractiv*, November 18, 2001.

²⁵ Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 102.

²⁶ Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1.

²⁷ See article 7, paragraph 2 and 3 of the Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1. Basilien-Gainche, “The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?,” 102.

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).²⁸ The externalization of EU powers – the expansion of the *acquis communautaires* to third-countries – has been divided into specialized networks through which the EU could provide technical and financial assistance and oblige underdeveloped countries in the Mediterranean “to assume more responsibility, such as in the areas of defence and security.”²⁹ But the impact of such actions is dependent on the ability of the EU to convince countries with no prospect of EU membership that adopting European rules to manage migrant flows and the security of the Mediterranean coast was in their national interest in the long-run.³⁰ In the absence of a common strategic culture the EU failed to develop a coherent approach to regional and global security issues, with the result that member-states strive to impose their own definition of ‘security’ and ‘defense’ on EU priorities to this day. Even within NATO national perspectives among the member-states on what issues constitute fundamental strategic concerns converge only minimally.³¹ Meanwhile, intelligence sharing among member-states remains contingent on the willingness of national governments to inform each other about security-related issues, while EU external actions raise questions of legitimacy with regards to “the cooperation of the EU [...] with third countries which do not necessarily respect human rights.”³²

Even in the absence of a sharing mechanism, the comparatively prosperous EU economy prior to the financial crisis of 2008 encouraged Brussels and the member-states to embrace the benefits of Schengen Europe while neglecting its possible costs. In the early 2000s, the EU externalized its borders eastward because approving more applications for EU membership would consolidate the Union as a strong global actor but the French and Dutch ‘no’ to the proposed European constitution of 2005 dealt a blow to Brussels. With 54.9% of the French voters and 61.6% Dutch voters having questioned the legitimacy of the EU’s hierarchical international system, thus undermining the Union’s process of expansion, many technocrats in Brussels feared “the rejection of the Constitution would likely slow down or block EU enlargement.”³³ However, the accession to EU membership by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia,

²⁸ The ENP and EMP are two policy instruments of the EU devised to bring European member-states and Mediterranean countries closer by enhancing the skills of law enforcement agencies and political authorities to secure their borders. For more information about the ENP and EMP, see Amelia Hadfield, “ENP and EMP: The Geopolitics of ‘Enlargement Lite’,” in *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security*, ed. Michelle Pace (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 65-107. Sarah Wolff, “The Mediterranean Dimension of EU’s Internal Security,” in *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security*, ed. Michelle Pace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 154-85.

²⁹ Thierry Balzacq, *The External Dimension of the EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security* (New York, NY: Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 159. Originally quoted from Philippe C. Schmitter, *Neo-Neo Functionalism: Déjà Vu, All Over Again?* (Florence: European University Institute, July 2002), 16.

³⁰ Balzacq, *The External Dimension of the EU Justice and Home Affairs*, 176.

³¹ Steve Marsh and Alan P. Dobson, “Fine Words, Few Answers: NATO’s Not-So-New Strategic Concept,” in *NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed., Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2013): 155-177.

³² Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Chaira Steindler, “Uncertainties at the European Union’s Southern Borders: Actors, Policies, and Legal Frameworks,” *European Security* 24, no.3 (July 2015): 370.

³³ Simon Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no.3 (September 2006): 421-22

Slovakia, and the Czech Republic in 2004 were, in fact, followed by the accession of two additional countries of the former Communist bloc which entered the Union in 2007 (see appendix B).³⁴ On top of causing a legitimacy crisis of 2005 caused by the decisions of the Dutch and French government to set up their own referendum on the constitutional, during which “the failure of the constitutional referendum” in France and the Netherlands humiliated Brussels. Yet, what truly “triggered a veritable sense of crisis in Brussels” was the sense that two founders had turned their backs on the EU project, mainly because French and Dutch opposition manipulated “anti-Muslim sentiment, opposition to EU membership for Turkey and fears over losing control of immigration policy” to gain credibility and electoral support.³⁵ Regardless of the outcome of the referenda, EU official proceeded to deepen their cooperation in the domains of counterterrorism and border management. By 2004, the Union had already committed itself to linking the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) “to tools of foreign policy, including development cooperation and economic cooperation” with TNCs.³⁶ Though partnerships with countries of origin and TNCs The main was to fight human trafficking at the borders with the help of new institutional tools and surveillance programmes.³⁷ The objective of consolidating strong partnerships with TNCs was further doomed by the London and Madrid attacks in 2005 and 2006. Four years after the 11 September attacks, Europe had become the target of Islamist terrorism because its “involvement in the ‘War on Terror,’ specifically support given to the United States” during and after the 2003 Iraqi war, justified the bombings from the point of view of the terrorists.³⁸ Besides, the uproar caused by the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005 and 2006, and the ensuing riots in France’s suburbs all signalled the beginning of a new era marked by the rise of social tensions between native European populations and the migrant population under the cloud of religiously-motivated terrorism.

ii. The Refugee Crisis

The opening of borders served to alleviate the burden of the past and bring together different peoples into a political family for the benefits of peace and trade liberalization but the Schengen signatories and the other EU member-states that later joined the agreement ignored the security and cultural implications of abolishing

³⁴ Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on January 1, 2007 transforming the EU25 into the EU27. Croatia became an EU member on January 1, 2013, after it complied with the political conditions thus forming the EU28.

³⁵ The Guardian, “Dutch say ‘Devastating no’ to EU Constitution,” *The Guardian*, June 2, 2005. Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union,” 422.

³⁶ In Tampere, Finland, the European Council evaluated the security needs of the region by creating the ERF to fund refugee crises; the European Judicial Area (EJA) to process judicial decisions and “cross-border information exchange for prosecutions;” and Frontex, also referred to as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union to help countries at the external border of the Union to implement surveillances programmes and keep the frontiers safe. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289-90.

³⁷ Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 289-90.

³⁸ Katie Friesen, “The Effects of the Madrid and London Subway Bombings on Europe’s View of Terrorism,” *Review Digest Human Rights and Human Welfare*, Supplement (2007): 10.

controls, because at the time their governments believed that borders were becoming irrelevant in an interconnected world where European and global trade was bound to expand. By seeking to eliminate restrictions on mobility and simplify the lives of those who crossed borders on a daily basis, the “essential functions” of Europe’s internal borders – that is, the symbolic meaning of the border as a protection against external threats and a means to preserve the identity of a given people – were removed completely. In sovereign nation-states, borders have ‘essential functions’ which structure societies politically, economically, institutionally, and shield populations from security externalities. The elimination of such functions invariably placed additional pressure on the countries at the external borders of the EU to intensify their maritime surveillance programs and deter illegal immigration – if not in the name of national security then certainly in pursuit of EU security. The beginning of the Arab Springs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya triggered a regional crisis whereby the governments of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi were toppled from power by their own citizens.³⁹ This movement inspired the Syrian people to rise against Syrian president after Bashar al-Assad – who feared the Arab Spring revolutions in the Maghreb might set off demonstrations in Syria – brutally arrested a group of teenagers for spraying anti-government slogans” on their school walls in Daraa, therefore sparking outrage “over the children's arrests and mistreatment.”⁴⁰ The deterioration of the crisis in Syria quickly led to a regional crisis whereby thousands of Syrian refugees trapped in neighboring countries decided to take “the perilous voyage over the Mediterranean and Aegan seas” in order to apply for asylum in Europe.⁴¹ But the refugee crisis that struck Italy, Spain and Greece in 2012 brought to light the limitations of the EU as an anchor of peace and stability because the Syrian crisis (see appendix C) had also attracted thousands of migrants from Africa and Asia. While in January 2014, a total of 925 Kosovars, 5,840 by Syrians, 2,955 Afghans, and 1,110 Albanians lodged their first-time asylum applications in the EU28, those numbers increased significantly in January 2015, amounting to 647, 045 Non-EU additional asylum applications.⁴²

For sixty years, the national governments of the EU member-states have been unable, if not unwilling, to build a common basis for the foreign and security policies of the Union, through which intelligence information could be shared among the EU28.⁴³ Although efforts were made at the supranational level to compensate for these shortcomings, with a view to protecting the stability of the EU and containing

³⁹ Al Jazeera, “Syria’s Civil war Explained From the Beginning,” *Al Jazeera*, July 18, 2017.

⁴⁰ Joe Sterling, “Daraa: The Spark That lit the Syrian Flame,” *CNN*, March 1, 2012.

⁴¹ Lizzie Dearden, “6 Charts and a map That Show Where Europe’s Refugees are Coming From - and the Perilous Journeys They are Taking,” *Independent*, September 2, 2015.

⁴² Eurostat, “First Time Asylum Applicants in the EU28 by Citizenship, Q1 2014 – Q1 2015,” last modified September 18, 2015, accessed July 15, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:First_time_asylum_applicants_in_the_EU-28_by_citizenship,_Q1_2014_%E2%80%93_Q1_2015.png.

⁴³ EU28 is an abbreviation for the 28 members of the EU: France, The UK, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Portugal, Republic of Cyprus, Ireland, Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.

threats at the Union’s external borders, EU action has been limited to the 1998 development of the Global Approach to Migration and other intergovernmental programs designed to externalize Europe’s actions to its neighboring countries. The “Global Approach to Migration” – also called EUROSUR – was the first formulation of an approach towards saving lives in the Mediterranean through which national governments could devise common tools⁴⁴ to ensure the physical safety of illegal migrants. The policy was successful in that it reminded member-states of their duties to uphold the liberal principles entrenched in the European political ideal and “replace the model of ‘Fortress Europe.’”⁴⁵ In spite of that EU member-states (including the ‘Big Three’) nurtured partnerships with the autocratic leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to satisfy short-term economic gains and, by the same token, participated in the deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean with Brussels, actions which share a part of responsibility for the refugee crisis. The fact that member-states have preferred to keep these issues within the “national cadre” poses a serious threat to the survival of the Schengen regime, because it allows national governments to ignore major issues such as the EU’s lack of institutional coherence and policy harmonization in the domains of immigration.⁴⁶ Moreover, the existing EU asylum system was built on weak basis because “discrepancies between Member States’ procedures” (i.e. to withdraw or request international protection) contributed “to differences in recognition rates, secondary movements, so-called asylum shopping and ultimately, to an unfair distribution of responsibilities among Member States.”⁴⁷ With the arrival of new migrants in the early 2010s, the EU parliament and Council were compelled to draft a new Dublin Regulation (The Dublin III regulation EU No 604/2013) to transfer “asylum seekers from one member state to another” when family members can be brought together “and have their asylum claims dealt with by the same authorities.”⁴⁸

While the Libyan and Tunisian ‘Arab Springs’ did not disturb the status-quo in Europe, the Syrian war and the rise of IS has destabilized the European institutions so profoundly that they forced the EU28 to address the permeability of Schengen area’s borders.⁴⁹ In March 2011 the receiving center in Lampedusa already suffered “a serious deterioration of public health conditions due to approximately 500 migrants

⁴⁴ At the EU level, the EURODAC was created to record fingerprints; the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to facilitate assessment of asylum applications with the help of special asylum teams assisting member-states; Frontex to patrol and secure the EU’s external borders; and EUROPOL to tackle organized crime connected to human trafficking, illegal immigration and drug wars. Anita Ora, “Hotspots and Emergency Relocation State of Play,” (briefing paper, European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579070/EPRI_BRI\(2016\)579070_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579070/EPRI_BRI(2016)579070_EN.pdf).

⁴⁵ Jorrit Rijpma and Mathias Vermeulen, “EUROSUR: Saving Lives or Building Borders,” *European Security* 24, no.3 (July 2015): 456. Originally quoted from Colleen Thouez, *Towards a Common European Migration and Asylum Policy? UNCHR New Issues in Refugees Research* (Geneva: UNCHR, 2000).

⁴⁶ Mathias Jopp, Rummel Reinhardt, and Peter Schmidt, *Integration and Security in Western Europe: Inside the European Pillar* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 8.

⁴⁷ European Commission, “Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions.”

⁴⁸ Refugee Council, “The ‘Dublin’ Regulation and Family Unity,” (briefing paper, London, 2015), https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/6143/Nov15_Dublin_III.pdf.

⁴⁹ Santino Severoni, *Increased Influx of Migrants in Lampedusa, Italy*, viii, http://www.euro.who.int/_data/assets/pdf_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf.

arriving daily during that period” but the responses developed by Brussels have tended to be *ad hoc*, temporary and inefficient, as demonstrated by the short-lived naval operation of Mare Nostrum. The latter program, which was established in 2013 to compensate for the underfunding of Frontex but terminated in October 2014, exemplifies the lack of seriousness with which Brussels analyzed the situation in Italy.⁵⁰ Rather than deterring illegal immigration, Mare Nostrum convinced migrants that Europe would at least save them from drowning in the attempt to reach its shores.⁵¹ Though the mission had saved up to 100,000 people by the end of 2015, Brussels quickly understood that Mare Nostrum acted as a push factor for migrants to leave their home country. The program was replaced immediately by *Operations Triton* and *Poseidon* – two naval border-surveillance programs devised to monitor the Italian, Maltese and Greek shorelines - rather than patrolling “the seas searching for vessels in distress.”⁵² The consequences of this policy change have been dramatic as the number of deaths in the Mediterranean skyrocketed to 3,740 in October 2016, which demonstrated that removing the primary push factor (the search-and-rescue missions) had no bearing on the humanitarian crisis in the south of Europe.⁵³ Another push factor – the existence of ‘hotspots’ in the Southern Europe serving as reception centers – has also acted as a catalyst for migrants, legitimizing their journey to Europe via Libya and other transit countries. Their original purpose was to facilitate the recording of fingerprints through the EURODAC system in order to apprehend the migrants directly on the boats and force them to record their fingerprints. This scheme had thus far been successful in that 87% of migrants recorded their fingerprints in January 2016 and 100% in February 2016 after disembarking from boats; however, the lack of “interconnectivity of databases” between the 28 member-states; and the fact that EURODAC database remains optional except for countries located at the external borders of the Union prevents the program from being fully operative.⁵⁴

When member-states reviewed the EURODAC regulation, they focused on the securitization of immigration through the recording of fingerprints in the EURODAC database, thus laying down the conditions under which member-states’ designated authorities and Europol can store fingerprints and request “the comparison of data with those stored in the Central System” for immigration and/or security purposes.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Frontex remains a very weak organization because it depends on “contributions of assets and experts” made by the EU28 “on a voluntary basis.” European Commission, “European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe’s External Borders,” press release, December 15, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm.

⁵¹ The Economist, “Do not Send me Your Huddled,” *The Economist*, April 24, 2015.

⁵² The Economist, “Do not Send me Your Huddled.”

⁵³ United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR), “Mediterranean Death Toll Soars, 2016 is Deadliest Year yet,” October 25, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html>.

⁵⁴ Darren Neville, Sarah Sy and Amalia Rigan, *On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration*, 40, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU\(2016\)556942_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU(2016)556942_EN.pdf). Originally quoted from European Commission, Italy – State of Play Report, COM (2016) 85 ANNEX 3, 10 February 2016.

⁵⁵ The EURODAC database, which was adopted in 2000 and first implemented in 2003, was revised in late 2013 to allow law enforcement agencies access to the database. Countries like Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein signed separate agreements to take part in the Dublin and EURODAC system. Article 1 (2) of Regulation 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Establishment of Eurodac ‘for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective

Once law enforcement agencies record the fingerprints, member-states are required to upload the information onto the shared database, but many do not fulfill this obligation because only states at the external borders of the Union must share all fingerprints data.⁵⁶ For that reason, many criticize the Dublin law for trapping asylum-seekers with the recording of their fingerprints under the Return Directive (2008/115/EC).⁵⁷ Under Dublin law, asylum-seekers must lodge their application in the first European country into which they cross. Yet, many have tried to avoid falling into such a trap by mutilating their own fingers, “hoping they can either live clandestinely in another member-state or persuade another member-state to process their asylum application.”⁵⁸

The election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States challenges the neoliberalist assumption that views the state as “trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns, but by nonstate actors” whose aim is to condition the behaviours and choices of national governments.⁵⁹ Indeed, in light of his apparent Euroscepticism, Trump’s election may come to symbolize the end of an era of domination by international institutions and the return of a nationalist foreign policy based “on securing marrow material gains for the United States.”⁶⁰ The change of tone in the Washington government has compelled Berlin to act as the new promoter of EU integration against the renationalization of policies of liberal democracies. When the new American president “disparaged NATO as ‘obsolete’ and chastised German Chancellor Angela Merkel” for using Europe as a “vehicle for Germany,” he shocked many European observers who understood that Europe had to become the new motor for the liberalization of global trade.⁶¹ From its beginnings the project of European integration has always been instrumental to the national foreign and economic policy goals of the member-states, mostly clearly so in the cases of Britain, France, and Germany, however, Trump’s “departure from the norms of the postwar transatlantic relationship” may come to reveal the varying national levels of enthusiasm for integration and foster the application of European

Application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person and on Requests for the Comparison With Eurodac Data by Member States' law Enforcement Authorities and Europol for law Enforcement Purposes, and Amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 Establishing a European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (recast), 2013 O.J. (L180), 1.

⁵⁶ EurActiv, “EU Rules Prevent Sharing of Refugee Fingerprints,” *EurActiv*, February 23, 2016.

⁵⁷ The return directive established the common standards for all member-states, whereby illegally staying non-EU nationals can be removed from their territories. Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, 2008/115 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EC).

⁵⁸ James Politi, “A Question of Identity for EU’s Migrants,” *Financial Times*, June 15, 2015. Maryellen Fullerton, “Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 29, no.1 (March 2016): 69.

⁵⁹ Stephen Krasner, “State and Power and the Structure of International Trade,” *World Politics* 28, no.3 (April 1976): 317.

⁶⁰ Joseph M. Grieco, Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), 302. Kathleen McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2017. Stewart M. Patrick, “Trump and World Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2017.

⁶¹ McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union.”

norms of “variable geometry” that have always been present.⁶² Hence, this thesis addresses the question as whether the principle of freedom of mobility remains viable in times of mass migration to Europe’s frontiers by observing the political reactions of the ‘Big Three’ to the arrival of more than a million non-EU migrants. The research looks more specifically at how the refugee crisis triggered a ‘domino’ effect by explaining how the crisis affected the confidence of public opinion, thus generating a decrease in support for the EU borderless region and the fragmentation of old, traditional parties. Through the analysis of state behavior, the thesis seeks to provide a comparative account of the ways in which three Western democracies have been transforming their approach to immigration from the late refugee crisis of the 1990s to the Syrian conflict of 2016. As opposed to the 1989-93 refugee crisis, whereby European countries had opted for the strategy of “walling off” because they could avoid the security problems by confining them to the East of Europe “in what amounts to a state of quarantine,” the EU cannot ignore the security implications of welcoming more than a million migrants.⁶³

iii. Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts neorealism as theoretical paradigm to conduct a study of state behaviour, for the main reason that “there is no good other than the acceptance and understanding of reality.”⁶⁴ Although the EU was founded upon the tenets of neoliberal institutionalism – a political philosophy adopting a progressive conception of European integration rejecting the principles of nationally-centered governance – neoliberalism does not fit the objective of a research on the 2015 refugee crisis. Just as it “failed to account why the incentives to make the security cooperation during the Yugoslav breakup wars were weak,” neoliberalism cannot account for the consolidation of Fortress Europe because it is premised on a neoliberal economic model which advocated “the reduction of state influence in the market, the liberalization of society [...], and a general trend toward deregulation.”⁶⁵ By contrast, neorealism provides a solid theoretical foundation to assess policy-decisions, mainly because it rejects both the view that “the trading state” has replaced rather than supplemented “the political-military state,” and that the proposition of interdependence is among the strongest forces conditioning international politics.⁶⁶ Put simply, it guides the research with a coherent set of beliefs about the conditions for a successful state in the “international regime” and offers a rational framework to interpret the decisions of policy-makers in terms of power, interests and rationality.⁶⁷

⁶² McNamara, “Trump Takes Aim at the European Union.”

⁶³ Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 151.

⁶⁴ Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), 21

⁶⁵ Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, “Glossary,” *European Union Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 400. Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 150.

⁶⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” *International Security* 25, no.1 (July 2000): 14.

⁶⁷ In Keohane’s words, the international regime describes the set of governing agents “that affect relationships of interdependence.” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

Neorealism can ascertain the dynamics and limitations of political decision-making at the EU and national levels while addressing an equally important phenomenon referred to as path dependence – that is, the process through which “current and future states, actions, or decisions depend upon the path of previous states, actions, or decisions” affecting the way initiatives are argued and chosen by the political elite.⁶⁸ As a result, policy-makers tend to focus on political alternatives that are only marginally different from those they ultimately select, because custom, legal precedent, and institutional inertia limit their options. In today’s world, decisions are also largely controlled by public opinion – the collection of people’s preferences and beliefs on matters of public importance – which conditions policy action at the national level indefinitely. Within the neorealist paradigm, the researcher can then explore variances “in the interpersonal networking of key politicians and their relative autonomy from followers,” all the while acknowledging the many forms of political systems that coexist in an interdependent world.⁶⁹

For the thesis, the application of Neorealist principles is also conditioned by Nietzsche’s notion of “tragic realism,” even though tragic realism is rarely cited by international relations theory, in so far as it stresses the “limited character of all political orders.”⁷⁰ In assessing the particularities of each case study the researcher can ensure that the interpretative quest will generate findings about the particular reality of a situation without making reference to “otherworldly ideals” or to pessimistic views of life.⁷¹ The purpose of the study is concerned with the analysis of “the most likely medium to long term future scenario,” but at the same, it is also descriptive and explanatory in that it tries to yield one or more explanations about the same event.⁷² Tragic realism therefore complements Neorealism in that it informs “an affirmative view of life,” and provides a “remedy for pessimism” and for viewing the world in strictly objective terms without insisting upon conclusions and judgements about the “success” or “failure” of political choice.⁷³

Given that France, Germany and Great Britain have related yet separate political histories and state traditions, neorealism highlights the uncertainty of decision-making and the difficulty of overcoming conflicts within the realm of international negotiations when perceptions of national interest conflict with common goals. In the language of political realism the state is placed at the center of the political inquiry to uncover the different processes that influence state behaviour during a major crisis, inasmuch as state behaviour is

1972), 19. Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 11.

⁶⁸ Scott Page, “An Essay on the Existence and Causes of Path Dependence,” published June 20, 2005, 2, accessed January 15, 2016, <https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/pek/pathdependencepage.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Philippe C. Schmitter, “Neo-Functionalism,” in *European Integration Theory*, ed., Ante Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2003), 6.

⁷⁰ Paul E. Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Tragic Realism,” *The Review of Politics* 72, no.1 (January 2010): 56.

⁷¹ Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Tragic Realism,” 72.

⁷² Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 132.

⁷³ Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Tragic Realism,” 72.

always dominated by the constant threat of conflict – be it military, economic or social.⁷⁴ As Mearsheimer noted, “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states,” even in the absence of security externalities from trade as a result of the removal of customs and border controls.⁷⁵ Despite securing peaceful relations among European states, national governments have remained skeptical of the idea of furthering the institutional reach of the EU, because the significance of international institutions has decreased substantially since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as the nature of the world changed from bipolarity to multipolarity, the priorities of national governments shifted towards the securitization of human mobility. Because this refugee crisis invariably called into question the durability of interdependence in which non-state authorities derive power and influence on national policy through the imperative of economic competitiveness and the pursuit of market share, neorealist principles.⁷⁶ With the escalation of the refugee and immigration challenge EU member-states have a new *raison d'être*: to thwart the physical mobility of populations by imposing restrictions as systemic constraints to control the flows of aliens. This change is justified by the fact that non-territorial actors (i.e. supranational organizations and multinational corporations) are losing their ascendancy on the international political scene while the territorial state is recovering as dominant force in world politics once again. In brief, those who believed that the pooling of economic sovereignty and the elimination of border controls would result in the transcendence of the nation-state in Europe and lay the foundations for European political unity did not predict the damages made by the immigration crisis. As Waltz recognised, “the removal of worries” - or in the case of Europe, the removal of borders – cannot assume “the termination of conflict”⁷⁷ or foreclose on the chances that perceptions of national interest will diverge rather than converge.

While realism had always been the subject of criticism in light of its rejection of the salience of international institutions, neorealism concedes the necessity for a state to give away part of its national sovereignty to a universal institution whose aim is to protect the territorial and military integrity of different countries under common principles of cooperation. In other words, neorealism now shares one characteristic with neoliberalism in that both paradigms conceive of the international regime similarly: states, multinational corporations and international organization strive to achieve their goals by way of economic exchange and intensified cooperation through bargaining or the satisfaction of individual interests.⁷⁸ Hence, the research recognizes the importance of institutions as part of the international system but stresses their manipulation as

⁷⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, 5. Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980).

⁷⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no.3 (December 1994): 10.

⁷⁶ Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” 16-18.

⁷⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 59.

⁷⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” *International Organization* 41, no.4 (September 1987): 729.

an inequitable exertion and centralization of power by bigger states.⁷⁹ This phenomenon, ‘bandwagoning’, refers to the inevitable continuation and extension of institutional power over smaller states, which neorealism challenges by questioning the durability of an international system based on the devolution of economic power. That smaller states are almost forced to adhere to specific institutions because of regime compatibility, economic interests and/or survival needs does not guarantee that they will remain subordinated to the demands of the community – irrespective of the economic gains that may be granted by one state to another in exchange for expected political advantages.⁸⁰ Accordingly, the refugee crisis has induced a chain reaction whereby smaller states became hostile to the idea of strengthening the structure of European cooperation, thus showing the supremacy of ‘high politics’ (immigration and security) over ‘low politics’ (economic interdependence). Today, the legitimacy of international institutions is being questioned by national governments who decry the EU for inhibiting “the behavior of actors and their ability to cooperate with one another.”⁸¹

The main difference that separates neoliberal from neorealist tenets is that the former places a primary emphasis on economic incentives as systemic constraints while overlooking the role of other factors on the stability of an international regime. It thus ignores the existence of two essential factors having a profound impact on the behaviour and choices of *nation-states*: the responsibilities of national political leadership in the international regime and the essentially archaic nature of the international environment.⁸² Neoliberalism and and/or liberal institutionalism run the risk of treating ‘balance of power’ merely as the product of the intensification of the economic interdependence, without taking into consideration ‘the limitless character of the lust for power’ within and among states.⁸³ Furthermore, because it assumes that “international law and multilateral institutions will provide a cooperative infrastructure for the stable management of IR,” the liberal assumption omits the fact that economic incentives do not necessarily mitigate the disruptive challenge of negative externalities, such as the terrorist acts and refugee crises of the early twenty-first century.⁸⁴

Neorealism makes a clear distinction between morality and practicality to provide researchers with the ability to separate normative theory from empirical practice when forming judgments about decisions and political leadership in international relations. Therefore, to understand how the refugee crisis revealed cracks within the EU institutional scheme, uncovering “the central tendency among a confusion of tendencies” serves to single out the propelling principle “to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors are

⁷⁹ Maya Swisa, “Future Stability in the EU: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism,” *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the EU* 21, no.11 (April 2013): 126.

⁸⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reductionist and Systemic Theories,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 59.

⁸¹ Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” 18.

⁸² Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence Revisited,” 729.

⁸³ John Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition,” *International Studies* 46, no.1 & 2 (January 2009): 207.

⁸⁴ Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition,” 207.

present.”⁸⁵ By contrast, the neoliberal perspective tends to ignore the existence of salient actors to integration such as social, cultural and religious aspects of European integration, all the while endorsing a massive system of economic expansion without structuring the geographical limits and scope of its political enterprise. The questions of relative gains, and thus the motivation of states to fulfill short-term goals, are explicitly overlooked by “the logical sequence that links the freedom of citizens in democratic states to expanding commerce over a widening geographical area.”⁸⁶

With the onset of the refugee crisis, neorealism appears to provide the necessary tools to explain the apparent renationalization of policies at the state level and address the migration security linkage in political rather than humanitarian terms. Hence, the ultimate objective of the research is to reveal the pertinence of neorealism to public discourses in the EU and to analyze whether or not the emergence of new security externalities legitimizes the pursuit of nationally-determined goals applicable to world problems.

iv. Hypotheses for Testing

The thesis seeks to determine whether the Schengen area has been undermined by the immigration crisis by exploring the differences in policy responses across Germany, France and the United Kingdom to assess the viability of Schengen regime in the face of a challenge to its central assumptions. Whether or not a link between the abolition of internal borders and the political fragmentation of the EU exists, a set of assumptions on the utility of borders will structure the research into to map out the situation in each country. First, it is assumed that borders and/or border controls are crucial to the ordering of society, thus logically implying that national governments made a strategic miscalculation with Schengen in that they failed to predict the opportunity costs of abolishing internal border controls – that is, the emergence of new security externalities. Under circumstances of social stress, security externalities condition the decisions of states to maximize absolute gains and minimize losses from external threats; in the case of Europe, however, the political stability of the entire continent depends on the willingness of member-states to address the permeability of its external borders. Second, the research borrows David Newman’s conception of borders or boundaries as neither visible nor contiguous, but existing “by virtue of the nature of belonging to a common interest group, sharing specific values, social status and identities,” to explain the phenomenon under study.⁸⁷ As a result comparatively weak states such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria, were placed at the forefront the refugee crisis without having the administrative and financial wherewithal to secure their borders appropriately.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Laws and Theories,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 38.

⁸⁶ Swisa, “Future Stability in the European Union: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism,” 131. John R. O’Neal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no.3 (September 2003): 371-393.

⁸⁷ David Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18, no.1 (March 2003): 15.

⁸⁸ Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 19-20.

Consequently, the asymmetric effects of the refugee crisis in the south and east of Europe have empowered populist movements to press national governments to restrict asylum rules, discriminate against ‘visible minorities’ and erect their national walls against refugees, because without borders to structure the cultural, social and political imaginations of a given people, such mechanisms are the vehicles “through which difference is perpetuated”⁸⁹ and sense of national identity preserved.

Hence, borders are regarded as essential to the ordering of society because they allow the construction of differences between “us” and “them”, which then forges a sense of belonging that “becomes part of the cultural, social and political imaginations” of a given people.⁹⁰ It is exactly through this political imagination that national identity is shaped “to create order through the construction of differences, whereby ‘others’ are expected to respect the rights of the self [...] because the nature of power relation is such that they have no alternative.”⁹¹ The European Union has since its inception achieved much to fashion a community of like-minded and culturally-affiliated peoples, but it is now apparent that many citizens of the member-states insist that an alternative, the sovereign nation-state, remains an option.

The contemporary crisis of the Schengen Agreement obviously gives the concept of renationalization of European politics new relevance, as the nationalist critique of Schengen Europe has become instrumental to more general critique of the EU’s integrationist agenda that is now commonly labelled “Euroscepticism.” Because the continuing viability of border-free commerce and movement of people (dependent variable) and the agreements to create the SEA and Schengen norms that made both possible (independent variable) are being threatened by the successive crises in the MENAR, the Syrian conflict and the spread of transnational terrorism (intervening variables), the extent to which EU member-states attempt to reverse and/or deepen certain aspects of the integration of Europe will yield valuable information about the robustness of Schengen as a free trade area and the durability of the EU’s integrationist project. Hence, this study adopts a state-centric approach to discuss the role of the German, British and French governments as key players in the current crisis and investigate the effects of Schengen (i.e. removal of borders) on their behavior. Four sub-hypotheses will test the presence or absence of causal mechanisms precipitating the fragmentation of the Schengen regime and the value neorealist theory as the most robust paradigm to analyse European immigration.

- 1) Hypothesis 1.1 (Borders: Political Functions):** When a state fails to control human movement at its borders, it will have to combat the rise of radical ideologies and populist political movements questioning the legitimacy of the current political establishment.

⁸⁹ Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 20.

⁹⁰ Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 20.

⁹¹ Newman, “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework,” 17.

Borders are a territorial expression of national identity. During an immigration crisis and in the absence of strict control at the external borders, states and their citizenry will adopt a more discriminative discourse when debating issues and policies related to immigration, leading to social division and radicalized politics.

- 2) Hypothesis 1.2 (Borders: Economic Function):** When a free trade area is weakened due to relentless pressure and perceived threats from the massive influx of refugees, the state will attempt to restrict the economic benefits granted to non-EU nationals.

Borders can be understood as agents of trade or providers of economic and financial stability by allowing the state to monitor and regulate commerce within its territory. Because the abolition of borders is crucial element to the neo-liberal agenda of the EU, during an immigration crisis states will act to deter the economic threat posed by an unprecedented influx of migrants, many of whom arrive with little or no documentation. A state might resort to restrictive policies against the nationals of non-EU states since the ‘other’ is perceived as an economic threat, rather than added value for the economy.

- 3) Hypothesis 1.3 (Borders: Institutional Function):** In the absence of external border controls for the EU, member-states will adopt nationally-determined policies and resistance to European supranationalism, possibly reverting to protectionism and a return to border controls.

Frontiers play a significant role in the maintenance of peace and stability within a region given that their legal role gives “the state the possibility to enforce restrictions of entry” and impose specific frontiers as “the limits to the authority of the state.”⁹² Political radicalization and social divisions in certain instances will compel national governments to foster *ad hoc* intra-Community (intergovernmental) cooperation on matters pertaining to the crisis, as any EU-level compromise (supranational) would entail ceding more power to the EU.

- 4) Hypothesis 1.4 (Borders: Security Function):** The real or imagined erosion of public safety will force states to pass laws restricting individual freedoms in reaction to the security interests and demands of the native population.

Borders can be perceived as important agents of identity formation. For example, the principles of citizenship, known as *jus soli* (the right of soil) and *jus sanguinis* (the right of blood), not only condition the ways natives perceive foreigners in their own country, but they also impact the state’s ability to monitor its citizens, integrate foreigners and promote social equality. The absence of security and strong European legal frameworks will compel states to restrict the rights of ‘aliens’ to the native society.

v. Methodology: The Case Study Approach

Ever since scholars like Robert Keohane declared that statistical operations could not “bridge the gap that lies between description and explanation” researchers have turned to alternative modes of enquiry to decipher the

⁹² Franziska Doeblер- Hagedorn, “The State at its Borders: Germany and the Schengen Negotiations,” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003), 81-83.

meanings and intentions of policy-makers.⁹³ For this research, the use of qualitative studies provides the best foundation to make sense of inferences that cannot be explained with numbers alone. In effect, those who select quantitative methods tend to ignore critical variances among similar cases and avoid contextualizing the presence of factors, because in doing so they can enlarge the sample size of a statistical analysis.⁹⁴ Yet scholars have long established that actors of the international regime must make use of qualitative tools to reassess the verisimilitude of previous policies and produce detailed accounts of the ways occurrences form patterns of behaviour in the context in which decisions are taken by policymakers.

Logically, the study follows a qualitative historical and comparative analysis of the ‘Big Three,’ using the small *n* case study approach, and more particularly “a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study.”⁹⁵ The comparability of the Big Three resides in common commitment that Germany, the UK and France share as retired great powers who have sought since 1945 to make common peace and prosperity integral to the European integration project. More importantly, the comparative exercise was selected because it enables the conceptualization of each case study as *wholes* with “combinations of characteristics” and specific sets of comparable processes “chosen for study because of their significance for current institutional arrangements” – in this case, the institutions of the EU.⁹⁶ Because each country has been affected by the refugee crisis, albeit in very different ways and to different extents, conducting a statistical research on the response of states to the refugee crisis (i.e. performing a study on the economic and fiscal impacts of crisis on the ‘Big Three’ only) would provide an incomplete picture of the immigration conundrum. Hence, the comparative method is chosen because it fits the objectives of the research design whereby “the data situation of ‘few cases, many variables’ precludes application of statistical method.”⁹⁷ The holistic nature of the comparative exercise in “the qualitative tradition” also brings much more richness to the findings, especially when it is arranged “in a manner sensitive to chronology”⁹⁸ as well as to national political context. By ordering a sequence of events and “searching case material for causal factors” the research will yield data “identifying potential critical decision points leading up to” the refugee crisis of 2015.⁹⁹ This method further strengthens the validity of the findings because through the case study method, an embedded analysis of accounts can be organized chronologically to identify patterns of governance and “assess whether differences other than those in the main variable of interest might account for

⁹³ Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” 19.

⁹⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 19.

⁹⁵ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 18.

⁹⁶ Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, With a New Introduction* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 3.

⁹⁷ Borinski, “Realism and the Analysis of European Security,” 148.

⁹⁸ Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 3.

⁹⁹ Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 215.

the differences in outcomes.”¹⁰⁰ To make sense of the data, close-ended questions (sub-hypotheses) composed by and for the researcher’s line of enquiry will be used to guide the investigation and provide “reader-analysts” with a pattern to test the replicability of the three case studies and the possible extension of a future study to include other cases. Like Robert K. Yin and Karen A. Heald affirmed in their study, the robustness of a study “can be measured by having more than one analyst respond to each question” for each case study.”¹⁰¹ Through this inductive method of controlled comparison, the performance of the ‘Big Three’ can be evaluated to “isolate the difference in the observed outcomes as due to the influence of variance in the single independent variables.”¹⁰² This can be achieved by following the process-tracing method to yield the most comparable data.

By tracing the process through which the old continent was transformed into the New Europe, a complex economic union and regulatory environment, the thesis initially reviews how certain key political actors participated in the institutional metamorphosis of Europe into the borderless economic region most commonly referred to as the Schengen Zone. To look for the causal factors leading to the apparent re-nationalization of EU politics and erosion of integrationist solidarity, the research adopts a deterministic understanding of reality to make sense of the outcomes of the refugee crisis and identify “critical junctures” when certain choices or events occurred that set countries (or other units of analysis) down long-run trajectories of change.”¹⁰³ In James Mahoney’s words, “in the absence of the cause, the outcome of interest would not have happened.”¹⁰⁴ The objectives is “to determine whether X cause Y, in case Z,” and by the same token, explain how “the ordering of events within the sequence” structure the decision-making processes of political actors.¹⁰⁵ The process-tracing method will produce sufficient knowledge about each case to assess when and where a convergence of behavior across the three cases testifies to causal patterns through which we can seek “to build a generalizable theoretical explanation from empirical evidence.”¹⁰⁶ With the degree of variance of the Independent Variable (IV) and its apparent impact of the Dependent Variable (DV), process-

¹⁰⁰ George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 81.

¹⁰¹ Yin, Robert K. and Karen A. Heald, “Using the Case Survey Method to Analyse Policy Studies,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20, no.3 (September 1975): 373.

¹⁰² George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 81.

¹⁰³ James Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” *Security Studies* 24, no.2 (June 2015): 204. Originally quoted from Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Conjunctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Keleman, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 341–69; Hillel David Soifer, “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures,” *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (December 2012): 1572–97.

¹⁰⁴ James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no.4/5 (April/May 2008): 417.

¹⁰⁵ Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 205. Originally quoted from James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (August 2000): 507–48; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹⁰⁶ Bennet describes causal mechanisms, as “observable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate” in specific contexts and induce changes on “the affected entity’s characteristics [...] that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 137. Derek Beach and Rasmus B. Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 4 and 27.

tracing enables the researcher to gain knowledge about new “sequences of linked causal factors.”¹⁰⁷

Considering that in a political system any given end can be reached by many potential means, a careful examination of national complexities allows to construct knowledge (about a society) that takes into consideration the existence of multiple causal and institutional mechanisms and explains outcomes in a more satisfactory way than the quantitative method.¹⁰⁸

The next step of the research addresses the reliability and validity of sources. Can the available scholarly literature on the EU and three states under study provide enough factual substance to disprove or confirm the sub-hypotheses? The research requires rejection criteria to demarcate a set of sources that will be disregarded for the purpose of drawing legitimate comparisons.¹⁰⁹ This will help to maintain the commitment to replicability whereby sources are selected according to reasonable criteria of comparable scholarly standard and thematic focus. For example, sources that neither refer to ‘European immigration’ nor ‘the refugee crisis’ as key words of references, are to be excluded from the source base in order to tighten the scope of the study and enhance the validity of comparative observations, to ensure in other words that it is *not* the case that “all our ideas are nothing but copies of our [sense] impressions.”¹¹⁰ For this purpose, sources, such as historical and statistical reports, government documentation, journal and magazine articles, will be collected for this study. For the study case on Germany, *Spiegel*, *Deutsche Welle* and *The Local* will be chosen as main sources, given that only a limited number of German magazines publish articles in English; for the British case study, *The Guardian*, *Financial Times*, *The Telegraph*, and *The Economist*; and for the French case study, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and other secondary journalistic sources such as *L'Express*, *L'Observateur* or *les Échos*. If necessary, other supporting information will be included from other newspapers to compensate for the lack of counterfactual information, such as *Al Jazeera*, *the Washington Post*, *the New Yorker*, *Foreign Affairs*, *the Economist*, and *the Telegraph*. are also used as sources of reference on IR issues for each case study. The research can thus proceed with the case study method with the aim of establishing whether patterns within a relationship have been found once or repeatedly;¹¹¹ the robustness of the findings will be judged by the explanatory and predictive power of the theory derived from the policy implementations of three countries facing non-state threats “emerging from cross-border human mobility.”¹¹² To the extent that the three states under study have coped successfully with this challenge, they remain collectively committed to some form of

¹⁰⁷ Mahoney, “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation,” 204.

¹⁰⁸ Beach and Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines*, 73. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 207 and 241.

¹⁰⁹ Yin and Heald, “Using the Case Survey Method to Analyse Policy Studies,” 374.

¹¹⁰ Also, see appendix D for operationalization of concepts used in the research. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Laws and Theories,” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), 31. Yong-Soo Eun, “Rethinking Logic of Inference and Explanation in the Field of International Relations,” *Politics* 32, no.3 (October 2012): 163.

¹¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, NY: Random House, 1979), 1.

¹¹² Nazli Avdan, “States’ Pursuit of Sovereignty in a Globalizing Security Context: Controlling International Human Mobility,” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2010), 47.

European integration; to the extent that the effort limits their national sovereignty they remain individually sceptical concerning the EU's role in their future.

Chapter 2. Historical Review

i. The Reconstruction of Europe

This chapter retraces the evolution of the European integration project from the early 1950s until the ratification of the Treaty on EU (TEU or Treaty of Maastricht) in 1992, which culminated in the establishment of the Single Market – under the Single European Act (SEA) – and the creation of a borderless region known as the Schengen area. In 1986, the SEA began the implementation of the Schengen Agreement of 1985 by abolishing physical barriers to the movement of goods and people among the signatory states, and by revolutionizing the way individuals lived, worked and moved across the European continent.¹¹³ Yet although the Schengen Agreements provided EU member-states with the necessary impetus to initiate the political, social and economic regionalisation of the continent through the incremental removal of police and security checks, the greatest achievement on European integration dated to the creation the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)¹¹⁴ in 1952 and then the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. By founding these institutional vehicles Western Europe could aspire to the pooling of resources essential to economic recovery by the continent into a borderless, market-oriented region grounded on the principles of economic fairness and social stability.

In truth, if the ECSC-signatories had refused to operate within the new norms set by the ECSC, EEC or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), no European country could have modernized its industries and compete as the third regional force behind the United States (U.S.), Japan and the industrializing Asian countries of the Pacific Rim. At the regional level, six West European states – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – agreed to share the responsibility of devising the ECSC – an organization based not on the diplomatic convergence of sovereign states but on the fusion of elite and national economic preferences in the specific sectors of coal and steel.¹¹⁵ The performance of the ECSC completely surpassed the expectations of European leaders, because it revived the concept of ‘internationalism’ as “a special form of the doctrine of the harmony of interests” through the use of an institutional solution to deal with the problem of collective action.¹¹⁶ Its apparatus managed the functional integration of heavy industries with a view to achieve *une union sans cesse plus étroite* (an ever-closer

¹¹³ The original signatory states of the SEA were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

¹¹⁴ The ECSC is also referred to as the Treaty of Paris, as it was signed in the capital of France, Paris.

¹¹⁵ Ira Straus, “Atlantic Federalism: The Political Leaders of the Allied Forces,” *Peace and Change* 24, no.3 (July 1999): 285.

¹¹⁶ Carr, *The Twenty-Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939*, 85. In his essays, Hans J. Morgenthau argued that “to make nations actually secure from attack” and give them a sense of security, *nation-states* created a working system or an international organization committed to maintaining the collective security of all members. Thus, by removing the feeling of insecurity and establishing the ECSC, the problem of security could no longer be “the concern of the individual nation [...] Security becomes the concern of all nations.” Hans J. Morgenthau and Thompson W. Kenneth, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1985), 451.

union)¹¹⁷ and create a neutral authority to regulate the domains of coal, iron and steel among ECSC signatories. By definition, member-states were compelled to cede parts of their sovereignty to it. The ECSC thus became the first legal and institutional expression of the integrationist principle of *supranationalism*, the idea that European institutions and policies supersede the authority of their national equivalents.¹¹⁸

The devastating economic consequences of the World War II moved a generation of European leadership to forge a common system whereby each government could reap economic benefits for the re-establishment of a liberal-democratic political order. The wartime decision of governments in exile of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg to create a Benelux customs unions (Treaty of Brussels)¹¹⁹ served as one of the bases for promoting intergovernmental talks on economic, social and military cooperation between the Benelux, France and Great Britain.¹²⁰ The quick formation of a binding customs union suggested that countries were finally willing to transcend national differences and cooperate under the umbrella of a common organization for the collective defense of Western Europe. The five Brussels Treaty Powers¹²¹ inaugurated the Council of Europe on January 28, 1949 to serve as an extension of the treaty with the help of a Consultative Assembly meeting publicly and a Council of Ministers meeting in private.¹²² Yet very quickly the Council came to symbolize the ideological battle between pro-European functionalist and anti-federalist proponents; the British government and other anti-federalists, who preferred to keep the organization as strictly intergovernmental, forced the founding members to restrict the powers of the national delegations with functions limiting the capacity of the Council to make decision on the behalf of its members.¹²³ This reverberated on the decision of the newly-founded Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)¹²⁴ whose government in Bonn rejected membership on the Council on the grounds that political tensions over the Saar region

¹¹⁷ ‘An ever-closer union’.

¹¹⁸ Andreas Staab, *The EU Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 5.

¹¹⁹ In 1948, the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Brussels, formally known as the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, to eliminate obstacles to trade and establish a customs union with common policies. The Treaty of Brussels later “served as the basis of the Western European Union (WEU).” For more information on the WEU, see footnote 187. Derek W. Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, *European Union Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13.

¹²⁰ Nieves and Borrogán, “Glossary,” 407.

¹²¹ France, Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, along with Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland.

¹²² The Council of Europe operates as an institutional platform whose aim is to maintain the rule of law in the EU by working closely with national governments and multinational organizations. While the Council of Europe has adopted the European flag and anthem, it is not part of the EU framework and acts as an independent diplomatic organization whose aims are to monitor the progress made by member states and make recommendations through independent expert monitoring bodies. In contrast, the Council of the European Union (also called the European Council) was created in 1992 by the TEU: the treaty, which merged “the Council of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom)” with a single commission and single council, reinforced the powers of the Council of Europe through which national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. Council of Europe, “Values: Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law,” accessed July 9, 2017, <http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values>. Susana Muñoz and Raquel Val, “The Council of the European Union,” CVCE, July 9, 2016, accessed July 9, 2017, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_council_of_the_european_union-en-de23700c-e50a-4e0e-a7de-80665e4caf9f.html.

¹²³ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community, A History* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), 17.

¹²⁴ The Federal Republic of Germany was established on May 23, 1949 out of the three Western (American, British, French) zones of occupation). During the Cold War, the FRG was commonly referred to as West Germany.

prevented it from taking part in collective enterprise alongside France and that membership would mean abandoning East Germany.¹²⁵

Bonn's refusal to become part of the European Council meant that the US ultimately had to provide a measure of security to all Western Europe against German recidivism as well as Soviet aggression through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the inclusion of a rearmed FRG within its membership. The founding phase of NATO was thus coterminous with – and ran partly parallel to – the initial stages of European integration that led to the EU. The pro-federalists, who were hoping the Council could constitute one of the many forces working for Western unity while enmeshing the FRG into a binding international organization, decided to seek help from their principal [American] ally in order to reconstruct the continent and build a solid partnership based on trust, credibility and the sharing of mutual political values.¹²⁶ Through NATO's platform, Washington could hope to implement its 'double containment' policy and exert enough pressure to obtain concessions from Bonn in exchange for its integration in the European market.¹²⁷ To guarantee its place within NATO's framework, nevertheless, Bonn had to accept a host of unprecedented constraints on its military capacities, notably the forswearing of nuclear weapons and the complete integration of its armed forces into NATO.¹²⁸ As former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt commented in 1997, "it was also natural that during the Cold War West Germany participated in the integration process while maintaining a close relationship with the Washington, since Germany's security ultimately rested more on the United States than on its European allies."¹²⁹ Indeed, with Germany prostrate and militarily occupied, many Western countries assumed that the UK would responsibly act as the leader of Europe's institutional reconstruction while helping to mediate tensions between the French and Germans; however, London's outright rejection of the European [federalist] project dictated that continental Europe adopt an alternative approach to political unity.¹³⁰ As wartime prime minister Winston Churchill once stated, "we are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed."¹³¹

Given that Washington preferred not to antagonize its British ally for isolating itself, France took advantage of this opportunity to impose its lead and become the central player in decisions pertaining to the economic development of Europe and the integration of West Germany until 1973 when the UK finally joined the European Community after two decades of political disengagement. To a significant extent, these early

¹²⁵ Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), 89.

¹²⁶ Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 88-9.

¹²⁷ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 91.

¹²⁸ Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984): 72.

¹²⁹ Helmut Schmidt, "Miles to Go: From American Plan to EU," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1997.

¹³⁰ Urwin, "The European Community: From 1945 to 1985," 13.

¹³¹ Klaus Larres, "Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill's Post-War Foreign Policy," *Journal of European Integration History* 2, no.1 (1996): 17.

policy choices by Bonn, London, and Paris have ever since influenced British, German, and French dispositions on the goals and extent of European integration.

As NATO was being established to provide military security, most Western European states agreed to become part of the Bretton Woods (BW) monetary system – the extension of an essentially unilateral American monetary governance to Western Europe.¹³² With the U.S. acting as the ‘center region’ or the financial intermediary lending credibility to the financial systems of European governments, members participating in the BW monetary system adopted a common development strategy of undervalued currencies, controls on capital flows and trade.¹³³ Through such a system of balance and checks dominated by Washington, the U.S. could establish the rules for commercial and financial relations among European countries, all the while granting long-term Federal Direct Investment (FDI) through the European Recovery Program (ERP) loans to boost the European economy and facilitate a massive increase in international trade.¹³⁴ Accordingly, Western Europe began a process of transformation involving military alliance as well as economic integration, the former driven by intergovernmental cooperation while latter the involved the surrender of increments of national sovereignty such as the ECSC.

While the French remained wary of German power, the Americans insisted that the economic success of the continent depended on the recovery of West Germany. In fact, the U.S. objected that “the principal barrier” to recovery “was the French attitude toward Germany.”¹³⁵ American policymakers quickly informed Paris that it would have to recognize that Washington “would not agree to [a] system [...] which would postpone German recovery until full recovery [of] other countries had been assured.”¹³⁶ They were adamant that creating a European federation would boost efforts towards European unity and increase the pace at which the US could invest capital into the European market, but also to make sure that it could impose its will by controlling the transfer of capital inflows through the Marshall Plan and making the FRG the engine of West European economic recovery. By supplementing the ERP with the European Payments Union (EPU), the Bretton Woods system allowed the West German government to take part in the liberalization of the European economy, which in turn, increased the volume of Europe’s foreign trade, enabling currency

¹³² Joffe, “Europe's American Pacifier,” 68.

¹³³ Michael P. Dooley, David F. Landau, and Peter Garber, “The Revived Bretton Woods System,” *International Journal of Finance & Economics* 9, no.4 (October 2004): 307.

¹³⁴ The ERP is commonly referred to as the Marshall Plan, after Secretary of State, George Marshall, who conceived it. David M. Andrews, *Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations Since Bretton Woods* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6.

¹³⁵ Sherril B. Wells, *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 130.

¹³⁶ The Marshall Plan, also referred to as the European Recovery Program (ERP), provided help to many European countries including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. It was U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall who called for the reinstatement of Bonn into the wider European system through the implementation of the EPR – a scheme for the replacement of the inflated *Reichsmark* with a new currency, the *Deutsche Mark*. Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 31.

alignments and facilitating the subsequent expansion of a single West European market.¹³⁷ In addition, the U.S. introduced a sixteen-member Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 to coordinate the implementation of the ERP and the continuation of the process of multilateral trade and monetary liberalization by managing the flow of American capital into Europe.¹³⁸ That the OEEC was established around a strong Franco-German axis and served as a network of multilateral organizations for the U.S. to impose its say in negotiations, transformed the organization into the chief forum through which the idea of removal of nontariff barriers was discussed into panels of intergovernmental discussions, therefore increasing economic interdependence in Europe.¹³⁹ In this way a strong Franco-German partnership was built into the European integration process, while the United Kingdom participated enthusiastically in NATO yet remained cool to the potentially federative thrust of economic integration.

ii. Supranational Authority in Coal and Steel

Ever since Churchill explicitly expressed his reluctance to commit London to the European plan, the U.S. had to find an alternative political intermediary – one who could help Washington fulfill its role as Europe’s pacifier. Jean Monnet, the first president of the High Authority governing the ECSC, was designated as the most reliable person to become Europe’s new policy mediator. Monnet could “claim to be ‘The Frenchman that Washington trusted most’”; his wartime experience as the human channel for the subsidies, which backed the French government in Algiers and the French resistance forces during the war, forged his reputation as a man of strong [federal] conviction.”¹⁴⁰ In the eyes of his American and Canadian counterparts, “Monnet was a master of introducing ‘European interests into American mechanisms’,” because by persuading President Roosevelt to engage the United States in post-war reconstruction of Europe and spurring mobilization of the U.S. economy, he had successfully acquired American support while also laying the foundations for a lasting transatlantic relationship that was needed to defeat Nazi Germany.¹⁴¹ Following his promotion as a top-level unofficial advisor and policy-maker for the Marshall Plan, Monnet put forward his plans to rally support for the transformation of the old continent into a federal power – ‘the United States of Europe’ or the idea that Europe could be governed by a central authority imposing rules on a market consisting of multiple European

¹³⁷ John Gillingham, *“European Integration, 1950-2003 Superstate or New Market Economy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20.

¹³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 86.

¹³⁹ As the OEEC lacked the proper authority to enforce decisions, its jurisdiction and power to act on behalf of its members was insignificant because the organization relied on the principles of voluntary cooperation. Gillingham, *“European Integration*, 22. Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” in Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 77.

¹⁴⁰ During the late 1940s, Monnet’s political party, the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), “suddenly embraced European federalism, apparently to better pursue the economic interests [...] and to foster anti-Communist interposition.” Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 105. Gillingham, *European Integration*, 21.

¹⁴¹ Trygve Ugland, *Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011), 73. Originally quoted from Stéphane Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 131. Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 65.

nation-states.¹⁴² At home, Monnet's challenge consisted of convincing the French elite that the reconciliation of European and American differences was a precondition for a true Atlantic community, which would in turn, facilitate the survival of France as the leader of Western Europe. Because Paris "was beginning to feel inferior as she realized attempts to limit" German industrial domination "were bound to fail," France could nonetheless take advantage of the modernization and integration of its industry into a huge market whereby German industry was put on the same footing as French industry to enhance competitive efficiencies.¹⁴³ As Monnet suggested, the creation of a supranational authority overseeing the re-introduction of West Germany into Europe as constitutive part of a European hub of coal and steel established in the industrial region of the Ruhr Valley would free "the latter from the discrimination born of defeat" and offer the Élysée a measure of assurance that reviving German industrial strength might not be turned against France.¹⁴⁴ His reasoning, in fact, perfectly embodied the enlightened self-interests of the first generation of European integrationists according to whom France as a nation could recover only with Germany, not in competition against it because if French industry were exposed to German competition within an expanding European market, its productivity would be raised and its confidence restored.

Throughout Monnet's efforts, we see how the French had always regarded European integration as an instrument of national interest and neoliberal institutions as the vehicles of neorealist foreign policy – to enhance their position among the West and bolster Western Europe collectively against the American and Soviet superpowers. Indeed, although Monnet's goal for Europe unity pointed toward federation, member-states of the ECSC and other European institutions were free to interpret the project of integration as a vehicle for furthering national interests. Andrew Moravcsik stresses for example that from a neo-realist perspective France's goal was to overcome a recent history of military defeat through the establishment of an independent Europe in which France could play a major, possibly dominant, role.¹⁴⁵ This explains why Monnet lobbied the French government to convince the executive branch that Paris could assume leadership only if it established European control over West Germany's material production. First, his team focused on elaborating an economic plan – "modernization or decadence" – to address the ways France could take advantage of the international postwar economic boom and incrementally abandon its policies of economic protectionism.¹⁴⁶ Second, Monnet believed that although France ought to elevate itself and forget about its historic *politique de méfiance* (policy of mistrust) against Germany, it could not do so on its own.¹⁴⁷ Hence, he claimed that the

¹⁴² Gillingham, *European Integration*, 21.

¹⁴³ Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 129.

¹⁴⁴ Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 129.

¹⁴⁵ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 27-35.

¹⁴⁶ François Duchêne and Jean Monnet, *Jean Monnet: The First Statement of Independence* (New York, NY; London: W.W. Norton & Company 1994), 178.

¹⁴⁷ Gérard Bossuat, "Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Français et le Processus D'Unité en Europe Occidentale D'Alger à Rome, 1943-1958," *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 91.

‘Big Three’ – France, the FRG and the UK – had to devise a common political project through which governments could delegate sovereignty to a supranational institution and intervene decisively to “upgrade the common interests” of the European ideal.¹⁴⁸ His logic was grounded on the fact that Europe’s economic recovery could never be achieved if countries did not accept the establishment of a greater authority regulating the distribution of capital and resources. Third, the only legitimate answer to Europe’s historic dilemma was to reach “*l’état de bonheur et paix*”¹⁴⁹ through the abandoning of national sovereignty and the gradual approval of a supranational¹⁵⁰ authority governing Europe’s policy-making processes.¹⁵¹ By grouping “nations together in institutions and by operating within a common set of rules and actions, a common spirit would evolve in that narrowly focused endeavour.”¹⁵² Indeed, the federal argument purported that since states had always been traditionally reluctant to yielding part of their sovereign control and had failed to preserve peace and stability among each other, only a neutral supranational body could handle the task of unifying decision-making processes over specific policy areas and, in effect, dismantle national sovereignty by stealth. In exchange for ECSC membership, national governments would have to compromise and yield part of their sovereign control to a supranational authority at least in specific policy realms, beginning with coal and steel. The goal of European federalists was to remove economic issues from the political arena and place them under a permanent international governmental organization. Provided that national governments willingly ceded part of their sovereign power to a supranational authority, the institutionalization of cooperation would serve to dampen mutual suspicions, most particularly French fear of Germany’s resurgence, and offer the Germans a fair chance to integrate into Western Europe’s political life on liberal-democratic terms.¹⁵³ Yet, although Monnet was eager to create institutions, which could break old patterns of thinking and behaviour as well reshape group psychology, he knew that such changes would require a lot of time “to persuade people [...] change men’s mind” and convince the French that it was “time to adjust to the needs for major transformation.”¹⁵⁴

On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister, later prime minister, Robert Schuman officially endorsed the institutional proposal for the creation of the ECSC, which aimed at transcending the nation-state and formally proposed a joint program of *sectoral* economic integration presided over by a High Authority – the supranational component of the treaty.¹⁵⁵ The International Ruhr Authority would allocate the equal sharing of industrial resources and manage the economic sectors involved in the exchange of raw materials. Finally, the

¹⁴⁸ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 160.

¹⁴⁹ “State of happiness and peace.”

¹⁵⁰ Supranationalism refers to a process by which national governments share sovereignty with transnational institutions whose laws and policies are binding on those governments. Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 131.

¹⁵¹ Bossuat, “Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Français,” 88.

¹⁵² Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 245.

¹⁵³ Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 203.

¹⁵⁴ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 432.

¹⁵⁵ Wells, *Jean Monnet*, 245. Originally quoted from Stanley Hoffman, “Review of *The Uniting of Europe*.”

ECSC would be coordinated through international public supervision to contain West Germany's future rearmament: its jurisdiction would also fall under the power of the High Authority, presided over by Jean Monnet himself. Although the member-states were hardly ready to merge into a federal block, the ECSC gave hope to the idea that, like the thirteen colonies, the nations of Europe could eventually form a political union of their own.¹⁵⁶ By restricting integration to a sector of economic activity the ECSC avoided a formal debate about federalism – and hence political union – while in substance federalizing a strategic sector of the West European economy. The idea of a federal Europe would have met serious opposition in France, a country with most robust unitary tradition of any democratic state; ironically, the country whose re-emergent strength France sought above all to restrain, West Germany, was a federal republic whose comfort with decentralized authority was to give key advantages when European integration returned to the issue of political union. Where Germany had since 1870 been the greatest problem in maintaining France's place in Europe, it was now to be central to the solution.

In 1951, the ratification of the Treaty of Paris established a new type of political governance: it not only provided a solid, common foundation for the reconciliation of France and Germany, but it also marked the beginning of the *sectoral* economic integration of Europe into an institutional structure. More importantly, the treaty compelled every ECSC member to abide by the rules of the High Authority and accept the oversight of a supranational administration of their industries to ensure that all comparably placed consumers in the common market had equal access to the sources of production.¹⁵⁷ By setting down “common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe,” Monnet effectively used his influence to impose France as the leader of the European enterprise.¹⁵⁸ His pragmatic view of politics aimed at finding means that would be perceived as fair by Paris and Bonn, whilst preventing the Federal Republic “from becoming the dominant power on the West European continent.”¹⁵⁹ This strategy ultimately gave France a measure of security through shared authority of the supervision of Europe’s coal and steel production.

iii. The Failure of European Defence

By 1952, the international climate changed for the worse when the Korean War broke out and further deepened a sense of fear that American commitment to Europe might be diminished in proportion to its involvement in Asia. Although Monnet did not initially believe that military and defense matters should be incorporated into a strategy for political federalism in Europe, he knew that France was worried about the possibility of fully rearming Germany through NATO. Indeed, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that in

¹⁵⁶ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 27.

¹⁵⁷ EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,” last modified October 15, 2010, accessed February 15, 2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0022>.

¹⁵⁸ Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 16.

¹⁵⁹ Max Jansen, *History of European Integration 1945-1975* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1979), 34.

case of another war against the U.S.S.R.¹⁶⁰, West Germany should have the same equal access to nuclear weapons as other European NATO or ECSC members.¹⁶¹ To weaken Adenauer's position, Monnet undertook the delicate task of modeling another even bolder supranational venture – the European Defense Community (EDC) – with the help of French Prime Minister René Pleven to safely rearm Germany and subject it to supranational authority. Modelled upon the ECSC, the plan asserted France's willingness to institutionalize a European army “composed of nationally-integrated units” in which every member-state would include its own military units. After signing the draft in May 1952, the French socialists debated the EDC treaty exhaustively and proposed that a mechanism be established to oversee the EDC with the help of an ECSC-like Council of Ministers, a popularly elected assembly and the creation of an additional institutional organ – the European Political Community (EPC).¹⁶² More importantly, it stipulated the conditions under which France accepted a gradual reestablishment of a German army and a return to peaceful relations based on a lasting reconciliation with Bonn. Whereas the French political class regarded the EDC as an innovative solution designed to transform Europe into a third military pole – alongside the U.S. and the British Empire, through which mutual anxieties could be assuaged – Adenauer saw the EDC as a means to regain a measure of national sovereignty for the FRG as well as a tool to form a Europe that itself should be the new sovereign in defense and foreign policy.¹⁶³ Very quickly, though, tensions over the nature and legitimacy of a European army paralyzed the French Parliament thereby putting a definite end to the ratification process. The EDC episode ultimately revealed France's instrumentalist approach to European integration, validating the neo-realist interpretation of its interpretation, which claims that the French Parliament could advance the idea of putting West Germany's army under supranational authority but always rejected the notion of doing the same to France's military.

The EDC's failure prompted U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to threaten Paris with the removal of U.S. troops stationed in France. In his 1953 speech – 'the agonizing reappraisal' – Dulles warned that the defeat of the Euro-army plan would precipitate “a crisis of almost terrifying proportions.”¹⁶⁴ Concerns about German economic recovery and the “old fears of domination of the Ruhr in Europe's economy” were predicated on the belief that if European countries failed to ratify the EDC, a German-Soviet alliance could surface and threaten “with great vehemence and force” the stability of the continent.¹⁶⁵ Dulles thought of the

¹⁶⁰ On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact was erected to create a political and military union comprised of the Soviets, its satellite countries and East Germany five days after West Germany became an official member of NATO on May 9, 1955. Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 17.

¹⁶¹ Beatrice Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Belief in Britain, France, and the FRG* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 179.

¹⁶² Gillingham, *European Integration*, 30. John Gillingham, “American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties,” *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 25.

¹⁶³ Renata Dwan, “Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54,” *Cold War History* 1, no.3 (April 2001): 144, doi: 10.1080/71399932. Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 211.

¹⁶⁴ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 30.

¹⁶⁵ Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 62.

EDC as an essential tool of 'dual containment' against a recidivist Germany and an expansionist Soviet Union; according to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, by contrast, a softer approach to the Euro-army would allow the continent to eliminate the crucial factors at play – security externalities, trade competition – in the collective security dilemma and ultimately achieve greater economic independence.¹⁶⁶ This would make it possible for American forces to withdraw from Europe in the near future.¹⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the objective of the EDC rested on the ability of the French to accept the welding together of Paris and Bonn as the foundation of West European unity. Unfortunately, internal divisions in the French National Assembly forestalled the ratification of the treaty. While the Gaullists rejected the EDC because of the loss of sovereignty it portended, the Communists were staunchly against ratification, as they feared that creating a regional Western continental block would constitute a real threat to the Soviets and ultimately compel Moscow to extend its sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe.¹⁶⁸ Divided between those who did not want to rearm Germany too quickly and those who did not want to cede more sovereignty to an EDC supranational authority, the French Assembly failed to support the principle of military unity, and hence rejected the framework of the EDC. Even though Dulles' "agonizing reappraisal" speech had warned France about not further delaying action, French prime minister Pierre Mendès remained apathetic to Washington's threat and allowed the Parliament to reject the EDC. Following the incident, Dulles "viewed him [Mendès] as a tool of the U.S.S.R." and an unpredictable ally.¹⁶⁹

In the verdict of a major historian of European integration, John Gillingham, "the EDC was a case of old wine in new bottles: a policy conceived in the French national interest, dressed up in European language, and from a military standpoint having little other than symbolic significance."¹⁷⁰ The EDC's failure meant that henceforth the Western European states would concentrate their collective efforts on economic prosperity and stability while depending for their security on the U.S. and NATO. NATO, a military alliance founded on the basis of an international treaty, became the vehicle for West German rearmament and the defence of Western Europe, so that European integration thereafter excluded military integration and outsourced defense to an American-led institution.¹⁷¹ In short, the EDC fiasco indicated that federalism would never provide the substance of European unity in the near term, ultimately leading to the emergence of a competing approach to integration, *functionalism*.

¹⁶⁶ Ronald Pruessen, "Cold War Threats and America's Commitment to The European Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle," *Journal of European Integration History* 2, no.1 (1996): 52.

¹⁶⁷ Brian R. Duchin, "Agonizing Reappraisal: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community," *Diplomatic History* 16, no.2 (April 1992): 203. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 121.

¹⁶⁸ Kevin Ruane, "Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13, no.4 (December 2002): 152.

¹⁶⁹ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 123.

¹⁷⁰ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 29.

¹⁷¹ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 31-2.

Monnet's federal model was swiftly replaced by the functional theory of integration, which unlike federalism did not seek the abolition of sovereign control or the broad ceding of national autonomy to a supranational authority. In short, by uncovering and making clear "the relations of things", *functionalism* would soon dominate public debates on integration and serve as the theoretical principle for incrementally expanding the sectoral integration of other economic domains beyond coal and steel.¹⁷² Therefore, the first decade of postwar European recovery, 1945-55, witnessed the success of the ECSC and the failure of the EDC, setting the course for European integration as an economic rather than a political project.

iv. The Functionalist Ideology of Integration

During the World War II the combatant state "had all adopted much the same ways and means for dealing with problems of supply and production and distributions under conditions of war."¹⁷³ Functionalist theory held that the same principles of rationally administered supply-and-demand could in peacetime be applied to the West European economy. By applying the functionalist ideal, pro-Europeans could finally establish a union based on the creation of trust among nations for the realization of common objectives in functionally-specific realms of policy and bring about by virtue of habit the incremental fusion of Europe's economic, social and political functions along with the harmonization of policy-making processes. At the heart of the functionalist argument resided one essential, constitutive principle: the "Community Method" or the belief that "members acknowledge a shared responsibility for their problems" and act in unison to solve specific policy dilemmas.¹⁷⁴ This 'shared responsibility' – political scientist Karl Deutsch explained – strengthens the bonds between European countries, through which common rules are agreed upon to serve the practical interests of the community at large and stimulate the transfer of knowledge as well as consolidate the role of political institutions as strong 'functions' of the overall system.¹⁷⁵ Political scientists, intrigued by Deutsch's approach to functionalism and European integration, looked to the prospect of forging a new European identity, not just as a practical political goal but also as a philosophical ideal erected upon the ideal of building transnational policy communities through sectoral integration. The result was to be a "de-culturalized and universal Europe" – one in which reference to 'culture' could be replaced by other terms such as common principles and values.¹⁷⁶ By transcending the national legacies of the past through practical though limited integrative measures, the European continent evolved toward ever-greater cooperation among the member-

¹⁷² David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1975), 17.

¹⁷³ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 17.

¹⁷⁴ Walter Hallstein, "The European Economic Community," *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no.2 (June 1963): 170.

¹⁷⁵ Bertrand Badie and Dirk Berg-Schlosser, *International Encyclopaedia of Political Science* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011), 929-34. Thomas Risse, "Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no.2 (April 2005): 293. Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁷⁶ Jan Ifversen, "Europe and European Culture – A Conceptual Analysis," *European Societies* 4, no.1 (January 2002): 11.

states of the Treaty of Paris because associating to a new European psyche meant that nationally constituted groups sharing similar features would coalesce and work together in harmony, under the auspices of a regulatory supranational authority. The latter organ – independent from the grip of national governments – would represent the interests of the Community as a whole and assist member-states in their transition towards the full Common Market.¹⁷⁷

The ECSC of 1952 was in a sense the first instalment in functionalist integration, because the pooling of coal and steel production eventually required common standards and practices that would in time ‘spillover’ into the manufacturing sector, necessitating common standards there as well as a practical and cost-effective measure rather than a political commitment. Functionalists initially presupposed that spillovers into other domains of regulation and governance would inevitably occur as a natural requirement of sectoral economies of scale cooperating at the European level. Theoretically, nobody could predict the number of spillovers that were likely to emerge from a collective undertaking, but they would in any case become unavoidable. Put simply, their presence would indicate a certain degree of automaticity in the collective management of political and economic affairs serving to shift the expectations of sectoral interest groups in the direction of support for further integration.¹⁷⁸ Accordingly, functionalists assumed that more demands for intra-state cooperation would erode the “ubiquitous” yet “anachronistic” place held by territorial states in the modern world, and ultimately increase the pace at which national governments ceded sovereign power to Europe’s supranational authority.¹⁷⁹

Monnet’s federal principle – whose main purpose was to reshape the collective political psyche so that governments would shift away from unilateralism – also endorsed the continual transfer of responsibilities of the national states to institutions functioning at the supranational European level, but the latter considered himself to be “an ‘institutionalist’ – in the sense of being vigilant about the institutions” of the ECSC and cautious about the inability of states to act altruistically and build lasting alliances based on common priorities rather than national neuroses. He once observed:

It is astonishing how little the word “alliance”, which people find so reassuring, really means in practice if all it implies is the traditional machinery of cooperation... where national sovereignty is ultimately vested in points of prestige and solutions are compromises between them.¹⁸⁰

For advocates of functionalism, this “traditional machinery of cooperation” symbolized a return to an archaic mode of governance grounded on the popular attachment to the concepts of *nation*, *national preferences* and *popular sovereignty*. To enable the flourishing of a solid institutional-building system, in which decision-making processes would be agreed upon through mutual consent, the ideological and cultural attachment to

¹⁷⁷ Hallstein, “The European Economic Community,” 168.

¹⁷⁸ Ben Rosamond, “The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no.2 (August 2006): 244.

¹⁷⁹ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 256.

¹⁸⁰ Duchêne and Monnet, *Jean Monnet*, 365.

the *nation* had to be destroyed, for Europe's history of 1914 to 1945 had made it the "instrument of social revolution" and political turmoil.¹⁸¹ The memory of the 1930s and 1940s – among which was the economic crash facilitating the rise national socialism and fascism in Europe – was ever-present in the efforts of functionalist theorists to dismantle the European *nation-state*. The functional process therefore attempted to bind the populations of Europe into a broader, regional system of political belonging by way of economic necessity; its mission was to abolish *nationalism* through stealth, as the rational functioning of the European market deprived the national market of substantive meaning. In this way, "every economic act becomes, in fact, a political decision."¹⁸² "Once the benefits of such functional cooperation became evident, there would be more pressure to extend it elsewhere" in other, possibly higher, forms of political cooperation.¹⁸³ Yet functionalism falsely assumed that the 'high politics' of foreign and defense affairs would remain substantially unaffected by the liberalization of markets on the one hand and the quasi-socialistic satisfaction of material needs on the other.¹⁸⁴ This fundamental mistake meant that functional scholars omitted a crucial factor in their analysis of European integration: the durability of 'high politics' and its resistance to change forced upon it by mundane matters of economic necessity. Indeed, to expand the European community, functionalist advocates centered most of their efforts on satisfying demands justified by the technocratic requirements of modern European economy rather than by political union. They assumed economic 'functions' would inevitably induce the transfer of more national power to the supranational authority and foster the creation of political cooperation. But they failed to appreciate that national sentiment might not yield automatically to European sentiment at the popular level, which meant that European integration would be a top-down project furthered by interstate bargaining at the highest level of political leadership – in short, by diplomacy.

v. The Formative Years, 1954-1958

While in the new strategic environment West Germany did not pose a threat to the security interests of France – as the US, France and Great Britain had already started to build up their own nuclear forces – pro-Europeans nevertheless realized that they needed to secure Bonn as a strategic partner against Moscow.¹⁸⁵ Hence, the Paris Agreement was signed on October 23rd, 1954 to include West Germany into NATO as a permanent member of the organization. As Monnet pointed out, Adenauer "was wise enough to renounce atomic weapons, and [...] pay whatever price needed to bind Germany and France together" in a WEU.¹⁸⁶ To

¹⁸¹ Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 208.

¹⁸² Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, 207.

¹⁸³ David Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945* (Hounds-mill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), 136.

¹⁸⁴ Risso, "Neofunctionalism," 301.

¹⁸⁵ Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 123.

¹⁸⁶ Monnet, *Memoirs*, 399.

do so, the latter organization was designed to control Germany's military revival and act as an intermediary mediator between West Germany and NATO, as well as between Paris and Bonn.¹⁸⁷ A French reconciliation with Germany was indeed vital to the interests of France, because only a supranational authority could legally restrain German power and prevent it from becoming aggressive towards its neighbours. Eventually, France's economy would also be exposed to German competition, thereby compelling it to accept more modernization of its production, liberalization of investment, and reform of labour practices. In other words, France had employed an integrative project as an instrument of national interest, preserving a measure of national autonomy without undermining the goal of common European security.

Meanwhile, a strong political initiative was required to carry on the gradual sector-by-sector integration of three highly regulated industries – transports, conventional power and atomic power – if pro-Europeans wanted to revive and extend the momentum of integration inaugurated with the ECSC – or, as Monnet termed it, “the Community method”.¹⁸⁸ By linking energy to coal production, thus combining the principles embedded in the ECSC to a new economic system, Monnet attempted to canvass support for the drafting of a treaty which would substantially broaden the competence of the High Authority¹⁸⁹, accelerate pooling processes in the domains of nuclear power, and control the distribution of fissile materials across Europe. Surprisingly, this new framework appealed to the Gaullists who saw it as an excellent opportunity to gain political leverage over West Germany. France could control the production of fissile materials for military purposes and reinforce a system in which the Commission of the EURATOM would closely supervise Bonn's nuclear activity to ensure “the security of atomic energy supply within the framework of a centralized monitoring system.”¹⁹⁰

In addition Monnet contacted Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak and Dutch foreign minister Johan Beyen to discuss progress on European integration, as the former endorsed a plan for the extension of sectoral integration to nuclear energy and the latter the creation of a general common market.¹⁹¹ In spite of

¹⁸⁷ The WEU played an important role in shaping EU diplomacy, as it not only provided Europeans with a substitute for NATO's European security umbrella, but it also acted as the legitimate extension of the defensive alliance created by the Treaty of Brussels which included the official participation of Germany and Great Britain. Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 108. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, 127.

¹⁸⁸ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 139.

¹⁸⁹ The term ‘High Authority’ was first used by Robert Schuman in his address to describe the new supranational entity of the ECSC to the French Parliament on May 9, 1950. This supranational authority first emerged as the ECSC’s High Authority to monitor the integration of Europe’s coal and steel sectors. However, the Treaty of Rome of 1958 replaced the High Authority with the European Commission for the ECSC and set up the powers of the EEC Commission and the Euratom Commission. On April 8, 1965, the Merger Treaty combined all three institutions to create a Single Commission whose task was to represent “the interests of the European Communities independently of those of the Member States.” Acting as the only politically independent entity of the EU, the Commission is responsible for overseeing the collaboration of member-states and coordinating policy-making processes and implementation. CVCE, “European Commission,” last modified July 9, 2016, accessed July 1, 2017, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_commission-en-281a3c0c-839a-48fd-b69c-bc2588c780ec.html.

¹⁹⁰ European Commission, “Research and Innovation Energy: What We Do,” last modified August 11, 2015, accessed February 25, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/euratom/index_en.cfm?pg=what.

¹⁹¹ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 140.

personal skepticism about a customs union, Monnet could not disregard the fact that “discussion about European integration had already focused in 1953 on the issues which the Beyen proposal raised.”¹⁹² In turn, this meant that Monnet would have to present the economic measures of both Spaak and Beyen’s proposals in Paris “as the preferred approach to integration, because it provided not only a convenient ‘smoke screen’ behind which France could protect its interests but also a bargaining chip that could be traded for economic concessions needed to make French entrance into a future customs union politically acceptable.”¹⁹³ As Walter Hallstein explained, by committing to a customs unions, *nation-states* agreed to converge their economies and implement “common rules of competition” to facilitate “the free movement of goods,” meaning that national policies in many separate fields would start “to make less and less sense.”¹⁹⁴ Yet with France still recovering from the EDC debacle, Spaak and Beyen “agreed to eschew the term ‘supranational’, instead referring vaguely to the ‘establishment of a common authority endowed with the necessary powers’” to regulate the gradual abolition of customs.¹⁹⁵

Notwithstanding the fact that the FGR had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons for WEU membership, Paris remained highly doubtful of Bonn’s intentions. In private talks between French foreign minister Antoine Pinay and Adenauer, the West German Chancellor had already expressed his outright rejection of supranational control over nuclear energy, arguing that the WEU provided the best platform for rearming West Germany.¹⁹⁶ However, the 1956 Suez crisis highlighted France’s weakness as an independent actor in the new world order, especially given the fact that the French felt betrayed by Eisenhower’s administration, which preferred to nurture its strategic relationship with the UK and exclude France from negotiations on the Middle East. For its part, the UK was more concerned about repairing its relationship with Washington than with France, its partner in the Suez operation. Thus isolated, Paris was compelled to accelerate its reconciliation with Bonn, for it became much more suspicious of London’s involvement in the Middle East and Northern Africa:¹⁹⁷

When [British prime minister] Eden called [French prime minister Guy] Mollet to inform him that the British had unilaterally agreed to a ceasefire in the Middle East, which the French had strenuously opposed, Adenauer counselled Mollet to “make Europe your revenge.”¹⁹⁸

This was West Germany’s invitation to the dance. Bonn now remained Paris’ most important political ally, which prompted the Élysée to soften its stance on German participation in EU policy-making and isolate London from talks on a customs union, since the French felt rejected from the ‘Atlantic’ sphere of influence

¹⁹² Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (New York, NY; London: Routledge, 2000), 191-94. Originally quoted from Monnet, *Memoirs*, op. cit., pp.400 ff.

¹⁹³ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 36.

¹⁹⁴ Hallstein, “The European Economic Community,” 163.

¹⁹⁵ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 141.

¹⁹⁶ Frances Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1997), 149.

¹⁹⁷ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 115.

¹⁹⁸ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 144.

and could benefit from the renewal of the Franco-German partnership instead. In addition, there remained a strong ideological conflict between Paris and London on the appropriate way for Europe to regulate its trade. As Moravcsik points out, “with Britain preferring the status quo” or an EFTA “to a customs union, and France preferring the customs union” to an EFTA, a Franco-British agreement on the trade liberalization of Europe seemed unfeasible.¹⁹⁹ While the British would not give up the preferential system they had established for the Commonwealth, the French would never accept “common rules of competition” if London did not cut off its ties with Washington or negotiate the terms of its entry into the European market in a way that did not destabilize France’s fragile agricultural and social sectors. The UK proposed a joint economic plan, the ‘Plan G’, which Mollet rejected immediately, as it separated the continent into two different areas rather than a single trade entity. That is, it envisioned the fusion of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA)²⁰⁰ with the Common Market, guaranteeing free trade between an Anglo-French and a German-Benelux-Italian customs union, but undermining the partnership of France with West Germany (see appendix E).²⁰¹

On the other hand, the French still had to convince the Germans of the necessity to ratify the EURATOM treaty before moving on to discuss a final proposal for the Common Market. Despite that, “the popular view that French industry would not survive the competitive climate of the Common Market” made it more difficult to find common grounds between France and West Germany and avoid “a repetition of the EDC fiasco.”²⁰² Whether or not the French Parliament would agree to the principle of the Common Market rested on the willingness of the Germans to ratify the EURATOM rapidly, because French opposition to the internal market “could bring down the entire integration process.”²⁰³ Yet, because the German cabinet supported Adenauer in his endeavour to strengthen Franco-German economic ties, the Chancellor promised French foreign minister Christian Pineau that Bonn would link the Common Market to the nuclear agreement under the same framework. Paris would then have to renounce its policies of trading preferences with former overseas possessions and accept the irreversibility of the Common Market; in exchange, West Germany would send \$200 million in aid over five years to the French to compensate for their imminent loss of Algeria.²⁰⁴ Already, the muscle of German economic recovery was being felt: the Chancellor’s leverage was

¹⁹⁹ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 145.

²⁰⁰ The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was created by the British as a political organization oriented towards the liberalization of trade and commerce throughout Europe. With Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland as treaty signatories, EFTA represented a serious alternative to the Common Market. See Gillingham, *European Integration*, 37.

²⁰¹ Lynch, *France and the International Economy*, 157.

²⁰² Lynch, *France and the International Economy*, 150-51. Originally quoted from P. Gerbet, “La Relance Européenne Jusqu’à la Conférence de Messine,” in *The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, ed., Enrico Serra (Brussel: Bruylant, 1989).

²⁰³ Lynch, *France and the International Economy*, 150. Originally quoted from MAE DE-CE 1945-1960, ‘Allemagne’, 368, meeting in Brussels, 11 February 1956.

²⁰⁴ On the same day, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden called Mollet to inform him that the UK was withdrawing from the Middle East, meaning that the French army was deserted by British troops in the Suez Canal and forced to negotiate a compromise with Adenauer to compensate for its loss against the Egyptians (1954-1962) and subsidize its war in colonial war in Algeria. Jeffrey Vanke “The Treaty of Rome and Europeanism,” *Journal of the Historical Society* 7, no.4 (December 2007): 465.

strong enough to convince the Élysée's budgeters who desperately "needed the German cash" and expected that the internal market would at once alleviate France's deficit and improve its overall economy.²⁰⁵

By comparison, negotiations on EURATOM did little to produce a grand institutional design for intra-state cooperation. Monnet's original nuclear program involved the adoption of the principle of 'mutual renunciation' but he quickly changed his opinion on the nuclear future of France. In Paris, the French political elite strongly believe that the EURATOM framework should not hamper France's right to construct nuclear weapons and compete in the nuclear arms race with its own *force de frappe*.²⁰⁶ But because the result of negotiations were no more than symbolic, the French government "went ahead with its own national isotope separation program," since Germany still continued to purchase uranium from the U.S.²⁰⁷ In a later conversation with Charles de Gaulle, Adenauer confirmed French suspicions once he indicated that he viewed the 1954 German renunciation of the right to produce atomic weapons as not binding forever, thus implying that the FGR reserved the right to build its own nuclear power.²⁰⁸ This obviously reinforced the widely accepted belief "that France would not always be able to rely on American nuclear protection" and would need to build a "one-way nuclear striking force as the most feasible kind of French deterrent."²⁰⁹ As a result, partnership with the FRG could serve France's interests, but it had its limits and could never be permitted to dilute national autonomy in matters of security.

By agreeing to endorse the French preference to focus on the EURATOM framework, Adenauer established the basis upon which Paris and Bonn could gather support and build a strong bilateral coalition against that of the British and Americans. However, he did so because he also feared that the French Parliament might reject the entire Common Market. The West German government was neither as Anglophobic nor anti-American as its French counterpart, but it set a priority on reconciliation and cooperation with France. In sum, both the French and German governments tried "to sideline or overrule opposition" in European "institutional environments of majority decision making" where member-states could easily bond in subgroups to exclude reluctant states, such as the UK.²¹⁰ In essence, France's policy was forthrightly anti-British while West Germany's was not, yet was sufficiently focused on the imperative of partnership with France that relations with Britain remained subordinate until its accession to the European market in 1973.

²⁰⁵ Vanke, "The Treaty of Rome and Europeanism," 465-66.

²⁰⁶ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 149.

²⁰⁷ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 148.

²⁰⁸ Wilfrid L. Kohl, *French Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 279 ff23.

²⁰⁹ Kohl, *French Nuclear Policy*, 25.

²¹⁰ Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, *Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism From the Élysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21.

The Treaties of Rome, which merged the ECSC, a Common Market²¹¹ and EURATOM under a single framework, allowed Monnet to fulfill three of his major objectives: to acquire financial help in the transition to the market, to integrate West Germany into another institutional arrangement, and to oust the UK from the European economic sphere. The Treaties of Rome finally came into force in January 1958, making the Parliamentary Assembly in Luxembourg and the Court of Justice common to all three Communities. The Rome signatories established more than a free trade union by emphasizing in writing “the principle that the problems of one member was the problems of all;” that is, the principle of burden-sharing.²¹² Additionally, the treaties of Rome introduced a common external tariff policy that included a 10% deduction in custom duties and the harmonization of the economic sectors involved in the Common Market with the exception of agriculture, which was given special treatment through the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) – mainly because of French opposition to pooling all resources.

vi. De Gaulle Returns

Former President General de Gaulle’s return to the political stage, with an overwhelming majority of 78.5 percent in the election of December 1958,²¹³ marked a crucial turning point in the history of European integration. Former Head of the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946, De Gaulle sought a new constitution and the return of France to the first rank of powers. Hostile to Monnet’s federal plan for the ‘United State of Europe’, he was determined to preserve France’s sovereign rights and slow down the process of sovereign pooling. One explanation given for his return to power suggests that, in a period of institutional malaise, the French electorate was looking to vote for a man who could embody a certain image of France to the outside world; that is, an authoritative and pragmatic figure who could embody France’s lost imperial *grandeur*. Despite the propensity of the French to identify him with the Right, de Gaulle sought to maintain French unity and win over the French electorate by claiming to “stand for a France that was beyond Right and Left.”²¹⁴ His political vision was essentially grounded on “the assertion that ‘France cannot be France without greatness’”²¹⁵ or by remaining dependent on external support from either from the US or the High Authority for Europe. By undertaking negotiations with the Soviets the General demonstrated his willingness to assert France as a fully independent power and impose Gaullism as the unofficial ideology of the Fifth Republic, founded and consolidated constitutionally between 1958 and

²¹¹ The Treaties of Rome created the Common Market, which is also referred to as the European Economic Community (EEC).

²¹² Urwin, “The European Community: From 1945 to 1985,” 18.

²¹³ On December 21, 1958, General de Gaulle was re-elected as President of France. Direction de L’Information Légale et Administrative (DILA), “1958: L’Élection Du 21 Décembre,” published February 8, 2017, accessed March 2, 2017, <http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/elections-presidentielles-depuis-1958.html>.

²¹⁴ Andrew Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle* (Brookfield, Wis: Dartmouth, 1994), 6.

²¹⁵ Knapp, *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*, 3.

1962.²¹⁶ De Gaulle's ideology challenged the main foundations of supranationalism because it strictly “opposed any institutional development which might threaten to direct political attention away from the existing national governments.”²¹⁷ In fact, de Gaulle was the least apologetic in viewing European integration in instrumental terms, appropriating the Europeanist vocabulary while “emptying it of its integrationist meaning and using it to secure for France a distinctive position of leadership within a loosely confederated Europe.”²¹⁸ French foreign policy under De Gaulle's presidency represents the most clear-cut vindication of the neo-realist interpretation of European integration.

De Gaulle's return also signified that Britain's chance of trading with the Common Market [or accessing full membership] remained very slim, at least until the General occupied the Élysée²¹⁹, since British dependency on the US was perceived by most of the French political elite as detrimental to the overall progress of the integration process. Consequently, for more than a decade, the European continent witnessed and suffered from a battle of ‘two Europes’: a ‘continental’ Europe led by the Franco-German partnership and a ‘Scandinavian’ Europe dominated by the UK.

vii. The United Kingdom: Distant Observer

Although it followed the ECSC's negotiations closely, the British government always strongly resisted the idea of ceding sovereignty to the new organization – or creating the impression that it accepted principles that overrode its political autonomy. In the late 1940s, the UK devised its own strategy to impose itself as the champion of European diplomacy through the Council of Europe. Formed by the Treaty of London in 1949, the Council served as a core institution representing the countries that had refused to adopt supranationalism or federalism through which “European foreign ministers [...] could exchange views on matters of current concern.”²²⁰ Yet it was described at times as nothing more than a “talking shop.”²²¹ The claim that London's lack of commitment to Europe slowed down the development of new regional initiatives was substantiated in

²¹⁶ Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 269-73.

²¹⁷ David L. Coombes, *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 75.

²¹⁸ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 105.

²¹⁹ In May 1968, groups of activists, students and workers started to demonstrate violently to protest the fact that “the still booming French economy [...] was still handing out its rewards unevenly, in terms of gender, social class, profession, age, and region.” For a week, the French rebelled against police enforcements and organized massive demonstrations leading to civil unrest across France compelling de Gaulle's administration to seek solutions because popular opinion perceived the General as “more or less a conservative force representing capital and not labour.” To regain popular consent, he decided to set up a referendum whose aim was to reform the Senate and establish “part-elected, part-nominated bodies representing various social, economic and local interests” to include the civil society in the decision-making processes of the executive. However, the French were uninterested in the Senate and voted ‘no’ to de Gaulle's political reformation, thus forcing him to resign in 1969. John Gaffney, *Political Leadership in France* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 66-90.

²²⁰ Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, 136.

²²¹ Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, 136.

1954 by the British refusal to associate with European military integration, which suddenly put a halt to the federal design and undermined any argument for establishing the EPC. In Churchill's own words:

We are not members of the EDC, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal Europe system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by the preposition "with" but not "of" – we are with them, but not of them.²²²

"Britain's response to the [EDC] plan" remained "sympathetic but non-committal," as Churchill's Conservative government thought that the Empire prevented the country from "compromising both its sovereignty and its '*global* responsibilities'."²²³ In direct retaliation, the French Parliament abstained from ratifying the EDC and logically argued that pooling its right to national sovereignty was prejudicial to France's interests, if the UK refused to do so.²²⁴ Four years later, London was still uninterested and unprepared to enter the EEC as a full member. British cooperation with Europe was limited to an agreement regularizing the Anglo-ECSC relations, which briefly stated the UK's "desire to establish an intimate and enduring association with the Community."²²⁵ Nevertheless, during both the Messina and Venice negotiations, the UK clearly showed that it remained at odds with the aspiration of continental European countries. British Conservatives essentially opposed the creation of a common external tariff as a significant economic burden on the fragile markets of its overseas colonies and, by consequence, decided to focus their efforts on the EFTA. With EFTA and the EEC competing with each other, the continent became separated between the EEC's six and EFTA's seven-country coalition, the first committed to economic integration while the latter confined itself to liberalized trade.²²⁶ Although EFTA was set up to represent those countries that did not want federal institutions or supranational authorities and believed that cooperation among sovereign states to liberalize trade was sufficient to govern European affairs, it could not compete with the EEC, as West Germany, rapidly recovering its rank as the largest European economy, had refused to take part in it.²²⁷ While EFTA offered attractive economic alternatives (such as, the removal of tariffs and a non-supranational framework) British prime minister Harold Macmillan acknowledged that the main game was on the continent and that the UK would be disadvantaged in the long-run. He thus prompted his team to open negotiations for a potential British entry into the EEC because in his own words if the British "cannot beat them [the Six], let us join them."²²⁸

From the start, Macmillan wrongly thought that an entente with de Gaulle could be easily achieved, since both men shared the same ideological objectives: to reap as much benefit as possible from liberalized

²²² Jansen, *History of European Integration*, 48.

²²³ Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, 63.

²²⁴ Jansen, *History of European Integration*, 47.

²²⁵ Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur L'Europe (CVCE), "Agreement Concerning the Relations Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Coal and Steel Community," published December 18, 2016, accessed July 5, 2016, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/de859fe5-dd07-4666-89b0-4f1ef2825b13/publishable_en.pdf.

²²⁶ See Appendix E for chart of EEC and EFTA's members.

²²⁷ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 37.

²²⁸ Jansen, *History of European Integration*, 88.

trade and attenuate the supranational character of the EEC. Instead, de Gaulle took advantage of the weakening of the EFTA to distance the UK even more from the EU: his era in France “actually witnessed a close pattern of cooperation with the supposedly despised and illegitimate European Commission,” whereby de Gaulle could enjoy “considerable leverage in intra-EEC negotiations” without the UK or EFTA to challenge his leadership.²²⁹ In other words, British membership in the EEC could only diminish France’s dominant position within the community; if the EEC was to be an instrument of French policy in Europe, British membership was antithetical. Conscious of the fact that “the Six and Seven” was “not primarily an economic but a political problem,” Macmillan undertook the delicate task of negotiating British entry in strategic terms, all the while hoping that de Gaulle might be willing to accept a bilateral nuclear partnership as a *quid pro quo* for French concession over a British entry in the EEC.²³⁰ However, the decision in 1962 by American President John F. Kennedy to cancel the delivery to the British of Skybolt nuclear-tipped missile systems put British nuclear defence policy on hold. But after secretly learning about Kennedy’s rejection of de Gaulle’s proposal for Tripartism in NATO – “a three-power French-UK-United States directorate” – Macmillan offered bilateralism as a solution to de Gaulle’s nuclear impediment “to prove to the US government that Britain was finally prepared to play a full and constructive role within the EEC, and that the French were to blame for the economic division of Western Europe.”²³¹ To safeguard the UK’s nuclear capacity and insure that it remained a loyal ally, Washington agreed to sign a secret agreement – the Nassau Accords – providing new Polaris missiles to Britain on the condition that firing “the weapons remained firmly held in American hands.” As historian Gillingham notes, that the UK “came begging Kennedy for a substitute for the abruptly cancelled U.S.-made Skybolt missiles” meant that “the British had not achieved nuclear independence; they had fallen into complete dependence.”²³²

The situation at Nassau created a general dynamic that crystallized relations between France and the UK, and hence prevented the development of any real institutional progress at the European level. For de Gaulle, Macmillan had again been unable to break away from the Americans and ‘choose Europe’.²³³ Because “alliances have no absolute virtue, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based,” de Gaulle understood that nuclear cooperation with the British prime minister would never be achievable, for Macmillan

²²⁹ Mark Kramer, “Introduction: De Gaulle and Christian Gaullism in France’s Cold War Foreign Policy,” in *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*, ed. Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 6.

²³⁰ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 176.

²³¹ Wolfram Kaiser, “The Bomb and Europe Britain, France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations 1961-1963,” *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 72. James Ellison, “Britain, de Gaulle’s NATO policies, and Anglo-French rivalry, 1963-1967,” in *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*, ed. Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 86.

²³² Gillingham, *European Integration*, 67-8.

²³³ Alan Campbell, “Anglo-French Relations a Decade Ago: A New Assessment (1),” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 58, no.3 (July 1982): 239.

never intended on taking the anti-American road to form an independent nuclear entente with France.²³⁴ Macmillan and de Gaulle indeed realized they had irreconcilable differences: while the former resisted “change to preserve London’s prestige despite the gradual decline of its economy and imperial power,” the latter’s post-war *raison d’être* was grounded on the need to reconstruct the country from the ashes of war and humiliation into the leader of Europe.²³⁵ More importantly, de Gaulle understood that France could never fully trust Macmillan to choose Europe over the United States; nor could he accept the fact that the foundations of the Franco-British entente therefore remained subject to choices and decisions made by the Atlantic alliance. When the British preferred to pledge full political allegiance to Washington because they had “faith in their ability to influence the Americans to do what” was “best for Britain” in Europe, de Gaulle assumed that Macmillan would never become genuinely attached to the European ideal or act as a reliable partner.²³⁶ Since “British parliamentarians approached the integration process in terms of British interests – defense in the case of the WEU, and economic later” – there could be no grounds for any entente.²³⁷ Britain could only strengthen its Atlantic ties at the expense of weakening its European relations.

As proclaimed by de Gaulle, France took careful note of Britain’s double-dealing and decided to veto Britain’s entry to punish a deceitful ally until “proof was supplied that [it] would not behave as America’s Trojan Horse.”²³⁸ By vetoing Britain’s applications for EEC membership twice – once in 1963 and again in 1967 – and thence paralyzing subsequent discussions on the institutional evolution of the EEC itself, the general articulated the same independence for France within the European economic project that it had asserted in national defence. Having thwarted London, the French president then turned his attention to Brussels. De Gaulle’s institutional paralysis of the 1960s targeted the Commission, “the embryonic technocracy, for the most part foreign” by “ridiculing those who dreamt of a European federation, a project devoid of all realism.”²³⁹ It was during the so-called “empty chair” crisis²⁴⁰ that he expressed his aversion for the expansion of the Commission into a stronger actor thereby, freezing negotiations on the supranational character of the Community, and the expansion of the Common Market. Although the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise ended the crisis by swiftly giving de Gaulle the assurance that member-states could revert to unanimity vote in the Council when major interests were at stake, many of the European political class still

²³⁴ John L. Hess, *The Case for de Gaulle: An American Viewpoint* (New York, NY: Willian Morrow and Company, 1968), 119.

²³⁵ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 263.

²³⁶ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 262.

²³⁷ Vanke, “The Treaty of Rome,” 466.

²³⁸ Hess, *The Case for de Gaulle*, 121. Knapp, *Gaulism Since de Gaulle*, 353.

²³⁹ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 70.

²⁴⁰ The ‘empty chair’ crisis was resolved by the Luxembourg compromise which ended a crisis between de Gaulle and Walter Hallstein, president of the Commission in 1965, over the proposals addressing the financing of the CAP. While de Gaulle blocked any progress at the EU level by freezing communication with Brussels, he was doing so to undermine the powers of the Commission and obtain concessions on the extension of the rights of member-states to have a veto on any matter through majority voting. Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, “Glossary,” 388.

believed that “as long as de Gaulle governed, there was not much [we could] do with France.”²⁴¹ This meant that for the next two decades the leadership of European integration was overwhelmingly a Franco-German affair. By ousting the UK from EU leadership, de Gaulle had succeeded in preserving for France a leadership role in Western Europe. It is moreover important to note that de Gaulle’s policy was the earliest iteration of what was later labelled by scholars and journalists “Euroscepticism” with specific reference to British policy toward the EEC after the UK became a member: a posture of critical membership in the EEC (later EU) characterized by resistance to its supranational thrust.

viii. The Franco-German Partnership

While the Germans perceived the deteriorating state of the Anglo-French relationship as “an obsolete leftover of a nineteenth and early twentieth century mentality,” Bonn continued to nurture its relations with Paris.²⁴² The continued partnership between France and West Germany was vital to the emergence of both countries as the regional forces of the continent, which de Gaulle clearly understood. For that reason, the general sought to consolidate his partnership with Bonn, but doubts about the nature of West Germany’s commitment to Europe prompted the Élysée to question Adenauer’s cultural attachment to the U.S. In effect, that some Germans “saw their democratic entity as entwined with that of the Atlantic Alliance,” since the enrichment of Germany’s peaceful nuclear programme remained dependent on the willingness of the U.S to provide the nuclear military shield, concerned many pro-Europeans who doubted the political sincerity of Bonn.²⁴³ Simply put, de Gaulle had kept out a British Trojan horse for American strategic dominance in Europe only to realize that a German Trojan horse would suit Washington just as well. By quickly turning Bonn, not Paris, into the dominant force in European integration, most German officials were convinced that “they had more to gain from a direct alliance between Germany and the US than from a European entente.”²⁴⁴

Because the Adenauer government sensed that Germany was fundamentally central to de Gaulle’s vision of France’s place in Europe and Europe’s place in the world, he drove a harder bargain, strengthening the Federal Republic’s Atlantic and European ties simultaneously. By agreeing to deepen political cooperation, with the Franco-Germany partnership heading the project, the Germans could prove to de Gaulle that they were willing to set forth the basis upon which the Six²⁴⁵ could revive the spirit of EPC. De Gaulle’s government took the initiative to create the Fouchet Commission, through which member-states could reinforce the political character of the EEC and compensate for its lack of convergence in the political and

²⁴¹ Kramer, “Introduction: De Gaulle and Christian Gaullism in France’s Cold War Foreign Policy,” 6. Quote attributed to West German Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, 1969.

²⁴² Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 261.

²⁴³ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities*, 261-62.

²⁴⁴ Vanke, “The Treaty of Rome,” 465, ff 42.

²⁴⁵ The ‘Six’ founding fathers of the ECSC: France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands.

military domains, but the “plan was rejected by the other Five as a poorly disguised attempt to replace the Treaty of Rome with a new, purely intergovernmental organisation,” one that suited de Gaulle’s preference for confederalism²⁴⁶ but remained incompatible to the terms of the Treaty of Rome.²⁴⁷ Even if it meant freezing negotiations on the Fouchet Plan, the general preferred to abandon his political projects for a ‘union of states’ to focus instead on maintaining safeguards for the protection of France’s economy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).²⁴⁸ In his mind, these ‘safeguards’ were “the only progress he [de Gaulle] wanted,” which he “pursued unashamedly with the French interests in mind.” Hence, “some Europeans felt that European cooperation was turned into European exploitation” by the French, which further aggravated de Gaulle’s isolation from the EEC yet vindicated his policy of nationalist and purely instrumental cooperation with the Gaullist electorate at home.²⁴⁹ To compensate for the failure of the Fouchet Plan, de Gaulle and Adenauer agreed to sign, on January 22nd, 1963, the Treaty of Élysée as the core of France and Germany’s regularized bilateral intergovernmentalism.²⁵⁰

Even though the Common Market was dominated by the Franco-German partnership and the political development of the EEC remained substantially stagnant, the UK drastically changed its approach to European politics by signing a list of treaties to increase its bilateral collaboration in a wide range of policy areas, and eventually lead Whitehall towards full EEC membership.²⁵¹ However, the turning point in the history of Anglo-French relations was marked by de Gaulle’s resignation, which in turn, propelled former prime minister Georges Pompidou to Presidential office of the Élysée who supported the entry of the UK into the community.²⁵² During the Hague summit of 1969, the change of tone in French discourses meant that Paris had decided to soften its diplomatic approach with London, since de Gaulle’s long-standing commitment to protect continental Europe from an ally [the British] perceived to be loyal primarily to its Atlantic partner could no longer serve as a pretext to isolate London from European debates. In the heyday of

²⁴⁶ Confederalism refers to a political system in which *nation-states* are part of a wider Union that does not constrain the power of national governments to define their own policy objectives. In a confederation, while member-states can make collective decisions at the Union level once a consensus is reached on a given matter, they must also achieve unanimity to pass a new supranational law. Charles Blankart, “The European Union: Confederation, Federation or Association of Compound States?,” *Constitutional Political Economy* 18, no.2 (May 2007): 100.

²⁴⁷ The preamble of the Fouchet Plan even defended a certain idea of European identity – one that incorporated the crucial notions of “European civilization”, “human rights” and “principle of democracy.” Georges-Henri Soutou, “Les Présidents Charles de Gaulle et Georges Pompidou et les Débuts de la Coopération Politique Européenne: du Plan Fouchet au Plan Fouchet Light,” *Relations Internationales* 140, no.4 (March 2010): 10. Vincent Wright, *Continuity and Change in France* (Boston, Mass; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 232.

²⁴⁸ Soutou, “Les Présidents Charles de Gaulle et Georges Pompidou,” 14.

²⁴⁹ Vincent, *Continuity and Change in France*, 232.

²⁵⁰ Following the Treaty of Élysée, the Six agreed to sign the Merger Treaty in 1965 to fuse the executives of the European Communities (EC) with a single Commission and a Council by July 1, 1967 and simplify policy-making processes. Krotz and Schild, *Shaping Europe*, 30.

²⁵¹ London signed the Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany for Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy; the Agreement Between the United Kingdom and the Government of the Italian Republic for Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy; Exchanges of Notes Between the United Kingdom and Luxembourg Concerning the Acceptance of the British Visitors Passport for Travel Between the UK and Luxembourg. Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, 310.

²⁵² Sanders, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role*, 140.

the Heath-Pompidou era accommodating Paris' demands and renewing the Anglo-French relations seemed feasible, as London reassured Pompidou that its primary objective in the EU was to counter "the emergence of West Germany as the most powerful member of the EC" and keep "France as the Community's natural spokesman in the transatlantic dialogue."²⁵³ The point here is that since de Gaulle's election to the French presidency major progress in European integration was dominated by triangular diplomacy among the Big Three, each maximizing national leverage within the integrative project, while European officialdom in Brussels provided the chapter-and-verse of European integration for all of the EEC's member-states.

Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s France could be confident of its domination of a European project that excluded Britain, by the 1970s West Germany's strength forced Paris to ponder London as a partner in containing German pre-eminence. Obviously, compromises had to be made among the 'Big Three' to secure London's place in the union. During the summit, France was warned that discussions on expansion to admit new member-states to the EEC would begin on the condition that Pompidou agreed to address the ratification of agricultural financial regulations in terms of British accession to Europe and unite with Germany to preserve the interests of continental Europe. In return, German Chancellor Willy Brandt would have to accept France's request for a veto on any subsequent alteration of the financial regulation of the CAP.²⁵⁴ By agreeing on a set of objectives – completion, widening and deepening – EC officials could then structure the pace at which they addressed pressing issues such as that of finalizing a list of common political imperatives for the institutional evolution of the EC. Accordingly, "provisions were made for granting budgetary powers to the EP" in 1979 (completion); the Davignon and Werner committees established blueprints for organizing intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) on the need to deepen cooperation in foreign and monetary policies (deepening); and the UK's membership application was approved on the conditions that the issues of budget contribution and CAP be settled before enlargement (widening).²⁵⁵ Four years later, the compromises made at the Hague were highly important because they signified that member-states were willing to revive the integration project and allow, on January 1, 1973, the UK, Ireland and Denmark to formally become part of the continental union and form *l'Europe des neuf* with the Six founding fathers of the ECSC.²⁵⁶

ix. In Search of Monetary Stability

What was already evident for realist scholars who witnessed these events was that the "great illusion" of the times was "that economic and technological interdependence among the various factions of humanity" had

²⁵³ Peter Ludlow, *The Making of the European Monetary System* (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982), 26-31.

²⁵⁴ Alan S. Milward, "The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom's Accession," *Journal of European Integration History* 9, no.2 (2003): 123-24.

²⁵⁵ Jan Van der Hast, "The 1969 Hague Summit: a New Start for Europe?," *Journal of European Integration History* 9, no.2 (2003): 7.

²⁵⁶ 'Europe of the nine'.

definitively devalued the fact of political sovereignties.”²⁵⁷ This fact became more readily apparent when the prosperity of developed economies in the 1950s and 1960s gave way in the 1970s to slow growth and rising inflation. The dominance of Western economies in the international arena generally declined, while rivalry among Western economies rose in response to the harsher terms of trade competitiveness. Washington even “perceived the EC as an economic opponent,” holding it responsible for the deficit that the US experienced in its balance-of-payments.²⁵⁸ When the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) declared an oil embargo against the U.S. in retaliation for its support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 and extended the embargo to Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the UK, national currencies fluctuated wildly because oil prices had suddenly increased and disrupted trade both within the EEC and between the EEC and other economies.²⁵⁹ German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt firmly believed that failure to achieve monetary stability, above all in exchange rates, would “destroy that special Franco-German *entente*, on which Schmidt, disappointed by Britain’s performance in the Community, greatly relied.”²⁶⁰ It was under these circumstances of international and European economic turmoil that the first initiatives were undertaken to establish a European Monetary System (EMS). Schmidt knew that the Franco-German partnership had to push forward efforts to cooperate if West Germany wished to achieve convergence in monetary policy among European trading partners, especially considering the fact that British prime minister James Callaghan was well aware of the EMS idea, “but felt that efforts to solve it [economic crisis] should in the first place be made through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)” to prevent the creation of a monetary scheme that “could be interpreted as aimed against the U.S.”²⁶¹

Monetary stability rose to the top of the European agenda by 1972, pressing member-states to devise a regulatory instrument to guide monetary stability and implement a system in which national European currencies could fluctuate against each other within a limited range to better coordinate price stability – the “snake in the tunnel.”²⁶² For struggling economies – like that of new French President Valérie Giscard d’Estaing’s France – the “snake” and the EMS “provided an anti-inflationary anchor” because it could help reduce the costs of austerity, but by committing the French economy to austerity, Giscard weakened France’s bargaining position vis-à-vis West Germany’s strong leadership in the EMS. More importantly, the EMS revealed West Germany’s status as the dominant economy of the EEC, an economic dominance that would

²⁵⁷ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 748.

²⁵⁸ Volker Bornschier, ed., *State-Building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21.

²⁵⁹ Jan Tumlir, *Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1985) 3-10; Jeffry A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY: Norton, 2007), 363-68.

²⁶⁰ Jonathan Carr, *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), 141.

²⁶¹ Carr, *Helmut Schmidt*, 142.

²⁶² The “snake” allowed to maintain stable exchange rates by preventing exchanges rate fluctuations of more than 2.25%. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 238-40.

eventually translate into political leadership. This fact frustrated Giscard's budgeters who were constrained by an austerity programme – the Plan Barre – and did not have the necessary leverage to negotiate a “symmetrical” scheme in which strong currencies would share the burden of adjustment.²⁶³ The EEC began to evolve into a Deutsche Mark zone, with the EMS as an essentially German-led Europe monetary regime, the Deutsche Mark as its anchor and the German *Bundesbank* as a European central bank in everything but name.²⁶⁴ While the nature of the EMS remained asymmetrical, “exchange-rate stability” had “generated substantial trade advantages for Germany” in convincing other European nations to join the EMS, because by tying currencies to the D-mark they could acquire the external discipline needed to bring their own monetary and economic policies in line with international realities.²⁶⁵ While Bonn and Paris took the lead in promoting the EMS, with Britain expressing reservations, the EEC fell in line with the European Council approving the EMS officially in 1978.²⁶⁶

The mid-1980s, which were marked by the rise of a highly competitive international trade environment, exacerbated tensions among EMS-members who witnessed a sharp decrease in the comparative productivity of their economies and the overall decline of the competitiveness of the European trade bloc. Moreover, the realization by the French that the Franco-German partnership was now tilting toward a clear leadership position for Germany forced Paris to postpone the formation of monetary union.²⁶⁷ This substantially slowed down the negotiations leading up to the transformation of the EMS into a European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of a European Currency Unit (ECU), the precursor of the *Euro*, thereby generating a conflict of interests between West Germany and the rest of EMS-members until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.²⁶⁸

²⁶³ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 266-67.

²⁶⁴ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 267.

²⁶⁵ Michael J. Baun, *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996), 20-1.

²⁶⁶ The ERM was designed to be a system of adjustable exchange rates which the UK joined in 1991. The British government was forced to withdraw from the system on September 16, 1992 following the ‘Black Wednesday’ – a period of intense selling of sterling in the financial markets. The system instituted a European Rates Mechanism (ERM) whereby “most currencies could not fluctuate more than ± 2.5 per cent of an agreed parity.” Very quickly, the Germany currency became the ‘anchor currency’ of the ERM. West Germany’s economic ascendancy compelled the monetary authorities in ERM countries to take “German monetary policies as their point of reference and follow the decisions of the *Bundesbank*” very closely. Amy Verdun, “Economic and European Monetary Union,” in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 299.

²⁶⁷ Moravcsik, 240-41.

²⁶⁸ Article G of the Treaty on EU (TEU) changed the name of the EEC into the European Community (EC) and embedded it into the first pillar of the structure of the union. The treaty also introduced the three-pillared structure of the Union – an institutional scheme designed to separate the affairs of the member-states into the EC (first pillar), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP – second pillar) and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM – third pillar). The name of the union was also changed to the European Union, EU. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, art. G.

x. The Delors Commission and the Birth of Schengen Europe

In the early 1980s the Franco-German partnership driving European integration intensified. What was started in the 1970s with Giscard and Schmidt had to be carried forward by François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl in the form of an economic union to combat a deep sense of malaise resulting from stagnant institutional development of EEC institutions and growing unemployment. To remedy this situation, many argued that “the conversion of French political authorities to a German-type monetary philosophy” would help “pave the way for close Franco-German cooperation in forging a new institutional framework.”²⁶⁹ But the EEC budget quickly became a major point of contention between the “net contributors” – London, Paris and Bonn – and the primarily Southern European “net-beneficiary” member-states, which forced Brussels to contemplate the advantages of more fundamental economic change.²⁷⁰ EEC officials came to the conclusion that only a single market, akin in most respects to national market for Europe, could regulate the broader financial system and harmonize the macroeconomic policies of each member-state effectively. The single market initiative actually sprang from a 1985 commission report prepared by Britain’s Lord Cockfield advocating the abolition of “nontariff restrictions on trans-border economic activity” which “continued to exist and had increased [...] because of the protective responses of national governments to” the economic crisis and recession of the 1970s.²⁷¹ Jacques Delors, former finance minister for the Mitterrand government and the new President of the European Commission as of January 1985, promptly assumed leadership in Brussels for the Single European Act (SEA) and what became the most ambitious project in European integration since the Treaty of Rome.

Very quickly, however, British prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s analysis of the economic impact of the expansion of the EEC membership and the completion of a single market put Delors under pressure to convince member-states of the necessity of abolishing non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs), especially given that Thatcher speculated that both French and Italian agricultural interests would be affected by new accessions to the EEC; specifically, approving either Spain or Portugal’s applications for EEC accession without making the necessary policy revisions would ultimately divide the union between north and south, or between ‘poor’ and ‘rich’.²⁷² Thatcher’s analysis mattered, because the neo-liberal reforms she had imposed on the British economy had produced low-inflation growth, and the monetarist philosophy underpinning her economic policies was now the vogue of policy-makers in London and Washington. Hence, because “the

²⁶⁹ Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 18.

²⁷⁰ Leon Hurwitz and Christian Lequesne, eds. *Western Europe’s Move Toward Political Union* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 2.

²⁷¹ Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 23.

²⁷² At the heart of the SEA, this idea was translated as the requirement for convergence between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ through the modernisation of national economies and the acquisition of certain protective measures for France and Great Britain’s agricultural sectors. In parallel, the SEA also expanded the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers and empowered the (EP). The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Stephen Wall, *A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU From Thatcher to Blair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 62. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 315.

British experience inspired the SEA,” Delors placed Thatcher at the center of the negotiations for the establishment of the SEA to provide a model for states facing economic stagnation.²⁷³ The signing of the SEA caught Thatcher at the zenith of her prestige, as British methods became part of a neoliberal policy-making consensus that crossed traditional ideological lines and provided a new basis for cooperation at the European level.²⁷⁴ Yet although Thatcher was a genuine enthusiast of radically liberalized trade and commerce throughout the EEC, she was as sceptical of the European integrationist project as all of her predecessors who had openly spoken against any expansion of the regulatory ambit of the Brussels bureaucracy.

Thatcher’s preferred strategy – “divide and rule” – was based on her determination to maintain Britain’s leadership in advocating global trade openness.²⁷⁵ She knew that, in order to secure Britain’s national interest in a key phase of change in the EEC, she might have to convert other member-states to the neo-liberal philosophy she had embraced in the late 1970s. By securing a specific heading on the nature of the SEA’s treaty – “Chapter 1: Co-operation in Economic and Monetary Policy” – Thatcher restricted the meaning of the reference and implicitly defined the extent of Britain’s ‘co-operation’ with the EEC as both limited and circumspect, but also inherently vital to Europe’s political survival as a block of trade and investment to be reckoned with by the rest of the world.²⁷⁶ She therefore succeeded in making the United Kingdom the third main political player of European affairs by using the EEC as a vehicle of power and influence to rally support for neo-liberal policies. In her own words, she “realized that we [Brits] must make the best of it [SEA]” and saw “no merit in the alternative policy – practised for a time in earlier years by France – the so-called ‘empty chair’.²⁷⁷ What is instructive here is that Thatcher in her time viewed European integration much the same way as de Gaulle did in his, as a vehicle for the realization of national goals through multilateral cooperation rather than through integration. While Paris longed for independence from the U.S. through European unity and London wanted a continental free trade zone through European liberalization, the two countries now had common cause in preventing the EEC from being completely dominated by German economic power and its constitutive philosophy of *ordoliberalism*.²⁷⁸ France was

²⁷³ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 136-37. Carl Hodge, “A Perfect Storm: Europe in the Grip of Two Crises,” *On Track* 21, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 17.

²⁷⁴ Gillingham, *European Integration*, 145.

²⁷⁵ Wall, *A Stranger in Europe*, 66.

²⁷⁶ Wall, *A Stranger in Europe*, 69.

²⁷⁷ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1993), 551.

²⁷⁸ German ordoliberalism, which is better known as the Freiburg School, originated during the Weimar crisis in a context of financial turmoil, political violence and conditions of ungovernability. In the late 1930s, German philosophers sought to “rediscover the economic rationality of capitalist social relations” because “the experience of capitalist crisis of the late 1920s was proof that the economy cannot be left to organize itself.” In essence, German ordoliberalism aimed at finding ways to sustain market-liberal governance in the face of mass-democratic challenges, promote enterprise and protect entrepreneurs from competitive pressures. Recalcitrant workers ought to be transformed into willing entrepreneurs of their own labour power; and to do so, the state acts as “the locus of liberal governance.” German ordoliberals believe that since a “free economy presupposes the exercise of strong state authority, and that economic liberty is a practice of governance,” the state is the only actor that can conceive of competition and enterprise as a political task and thus, provide both economic interdependence and stability: “economic freedom is ordered freedom”

obviously not drawn to the idea on the basis of economic philosophy, but the repetitive devaluation of the Franc compelled newly elected French president François Mitterrand's government to embrace the spirit of Thatcher's preferred neo-liberal deregulatory strategy adopted by the UK and the rigors of monetary and fiscal discipline stressed by Germany. As finance minister at the time, in fact, Jacques Delors had overseen the redirection of French policy. In contrast, Kohl supported the single market initiative confident that Germany could still impose its preferred policies and lead the establishment of the trade area. As a convinced Europeanist, he favoured "the convergence of national economic philosophies and policies around monetarist, market-oriented ideals" and, by the same token, aspired to better nurture the crucial Franco-German bilateral relationship "as the cornerstone of a revitalized *Westpolitik* [...] to counterbalance the ground-breaking initiatives in Eastern Europe" and revive the European ideal.²⁷⁹

The SEA thus appeared to vindicate liberal institutionalism and the functionalist theory of integration, as the growing-together of Europe in some sectors had produced spillover into others. However, the critical push for reforms to answer the requirements of the market came not from the bottom-up but rather from the top-down, three national governments determined to secure the national interest in Europe's name. Of the three, West Germany was by far the most invested in the integrationist ideal. In the 1950s and 1960s integration had hastened economy recovery and fostered the rehabilitation of democracy. By the 1980s it was so central to German economic performance that governments in Bonn, and later in Berlin, tended to regard the national interest and the European interest as one and the same thing. Despite that, the SEA agenda proceeded on the eve of the end of the Cold War and German reunification, so that the growth of German dominance after 1989 was to make other member-states more mindful of their national interest. The ultimate result of the enterprise was the transformation of the EEC into the European Union, an economic, legal, and political structure based on the adoption of a liberal form of governance that derived its legitimacy for integrationists through the supranational authority of some of its institutions, for neo-liberals on the basis of open trade and commerce, and for national governments as a collective compromise in tackling the challenges of the 1980s. Yet the uniqueness of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lies in the fact that it constituted the first legal amendment to the principles laid in the Treaty of Rome while setting up the basis for the creation of an agreement on the freedom of labour mobility, which would then complement capital mobility and allow

and "the strong state is the locus of a social, moral and economic order." Bonefel Werner, "Freedom and the Strong State: on Germany Ordoliberalism," *New Political Economy* 17, no.5 (April 2012): 633-35.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher adopted neoliberalism as an end to Keynesianism seeking to merge her new economic liberal ideology with more traditional conservative agendas. Thatcher's neoliberal policies "aimed at reducing taxes, liberalizing exchange rate controls, reducing regulations, privatizing national industries, and drastically diminishing the power of labour unions." 'Neoliberalism' also "prescribes limited state intervention in the economy and favours privatisation of state-owned enterprises, deregulated labour markets and the use of the private sector or market mechanisms to deliver public services." Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21-22, and 38; Graig Berry, *Globalization and Ideology in Britain: Neoliberalism, Free Trade and the Global Economy* (New York, NY; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 5.

²⁷⁹ Baun, *An Imperfect Union*, 22.

European citizens to work and move freely across the continent. In sum, the SEA gave a “psychological boost” to the Community, by “helping it overcome the mood of Euro-pessimism that had predominated in the 1980s” and by paving the way for the first agreement on labour mobility: the Schengen Agreement.

References to the abolition of frontiers can be found in the 1985 Commission White Paper, which set out the legislative steps of the internal market:

The most obvious examples of the first category are customs posts at frontiers. Indeed, most of our citizens would regard the frontier posts as the most visible example of the continued division of the Community and their removal as the clearest sign of the integration of the Community into a single market.²⁸⁰

It was Mitterrand who encouraged the signing of the Schengen agreement to compensate for the failure of the Socialist Experiment in domestic policy. But when it became apparent in 1989 that West Germany was to become Germany once again, the French president focused on keeping France in step with the Federal Republic by revitalizing the French economy through more trade and competition. Complementing the SEA with a proposal for the free movement was Mitterrand’s way of regaining ascendancy on the European project “to obtain German concessions on monetary policies and prevent the Single Market from becoming an essential Anglo-German proposal.”²⁸¹ The potential problem was that the Cockfield Report and the SEA were essentially British visions for the European future, whereas Commissioner Delors was a student of the “Monnet method” and brought a statist approach to the realization of the SEA agenda.²⁸² Free trade and integration drove in roughly the same direction, but their destinations were not the same.

xi. From Schengen to Amsterdam

The principle of the freedom of mobility was devised to remove physical barriers to the movement of goods, services and people with the Single Market, not least of all to answer the pleas of both truck drivers and customs officials seeking a remedy to long queues at internal borders all over the EC. To solve this situation Paris suggested that the abolition of frontiers would enable the market to flourish faster, but also contribute to forming an “ever closer union of the peoples of the Member States” of the EC whereby European citizens could “find its expression in the freedom to cross internal borders for all nationals of the Member States and in the free movement of goods and services.”²⁸³ For Mitterrand’s government, Schengen seemed to be the best “alternative geopolitical *grand project*” to regain some authority over the integration project, while the abolition of borders could further solidify the French commitment to the free movement of goods, services, and people within a single market.²⁸⁴ On June 14, 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed to provide

²⁸⁰ *Completing the Internal Market: White Paper From the Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market* (Milan, 28-29 June 1985), COM (1985) 310 final (14 June, 1985).

²⁸¹ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 343.

²⁸² Gillingham, 158-59.

²⁸³ Council Decision (EC) No. 435/1999 of 20 May 1999, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 1.

²⁸⁴ Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 343.

guidance on the application of Schengen laws, making “it very clear from the beginning that from a police standpoint the planned abolition of border controls could only be tolerated if the expected deficits [caused by the abolition of borders] were more or less compensated.”²⁸⁵ In other words, Schengen norms assumed peace and stability not only among the signatory states but also in Europe’s broader international neighborhood. Internally, borderless commerce would inevitably facilitate borderless criminal activity, while posing questions about changes in residency by citizens of the member-states; externally, the Schengen regime implied common rules for the member-states concerning immigration to the EEC and standards for refugees and asylum. To elaborate a list of concrete measures, recommendations made by various groups were combined to develop legal tools for the implementation of a borderless region. Hence, the SIS, the EURODAC for fingerprinting, and the common system of asylum were set up at the Dublin Convention of 1990, the precursor of the 2013 Dublin regulation.²⁸⁶ And although many member-states objected to the abolition of borders controls, the principles embedded in the Schengen agreement appealed to many non-EEC countries (Iceland, Norway) who later joined the borderless area, because restricted access to the single market would be detrimental to their economies in the long-run.²⁸⁷ By contrast, the UK and Ireland formally opted out of the accords to maintain control of their borders, but the former was keen to participate in the creation of new regulatory measures to end the abusive use of the right to asylum and punish those transporting undocumented refugees. In deciding to opt-in issue-by-issue, the UK reiterated its commitment to safeguard its own external borders; however, London still sought to buttress the continent’s immigration policies by taking part in the elaboration of a list of ninety-two countries from which visas were required to enter the EEC.²⁸⁸ Hence, the fact that countries opted-in and opted-out of the Schengen area gave the impression of an *à la carte* EU,²⁸⁹ of a nationally circumstantial commitment to openness and a negligent appreciation of the possible security challenges that Schengen entailed.

In the 1990s, European leaders were compelled to reframe their political engagement within a new de-militarized international security regime whereby new threats, such as the proliferation of WMD and transnational terrorism, replaced the security concerns of the Cold War. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall, which generated new security externalities (i.e. movement of asylum seekers, traffickers, illegal immigration), forced European policymakers to devise their own national programs to restore order following the refugee crisis in the East. In 1993, Germany’s restriction of asylum rules perfectly illustrated how national

²⁸⁵ Brouwer, *Digital Borders and Real Rights*, 33.

²⁸⁶ Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 283-86. Teresa Hayter, *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls* (Ann Arbor, MI; London: Pluto Press, 2004), 59.

²⁸⁷ Switzerland, a non-EU country, partially joined the Schengen area in 2008 as well as Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 286. Council Decision (EC) No. 29/2000 of 28 June 1999, 2000 O.J. (L 15) 1.

²⁸⁸ Hayter, *Open Borders*, 59

²⁸⁹ Under article 23 and 24 of the SBC, the reintroduction of border controls for foreseen circumstances “for a limited period of up to 30 days” is legally permitted “as a last resort” to thwart anyone who may constitute “a serious threat to public policy.” Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, March 15, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1, art. 23.

governments attempted to retain control over immigration by circumventing institutional constraints in areas of high political salience and, by the same token, minimizing the harmonization level of certain key policies.²⁹⁰ Such practices have evidently fostered the idea of an *à la carte* Europe, where France and Germany acts as the founding partners and political motor of European integration, and the UK as the semi-detached outsider, often backed by some of the newer member-states who share British scepticism about certain aspects of integration. Yet, Paris, London and Bonn kept treating migration “as a labor market issue” with the signing of the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990, only giving peripheral attention to the potential security costs of eliminating internal border controls without strengthening the external borders of the EEC.²⁹¹ For integrationists the SEA, deepened commitment to supranational administration; for free traders, it broadened the ambit of commerce.

The end of the Cold War revived the need to discuss the possibility of creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a common defense program to support the community in its effort to mitigate the effects of the Balkan refugee crisis.²⁹² Member-states were also very concerned about the mounting criticism over the so-called democratic ‘deficit’²⁹³ of the EEC, and so they shifted “the locus of decision-making towards the European institutions” to set up an intergovernmental structure dividing the EC into three pillars, thus transforming it into the European Union (EU).²⁹⁴ The demands of a single market for goods, services, and labour alone implied that the member-states were willing in the name of order and security to establish state-like structures at the European level just as they dismantled them at the national level. On December 10, 1991, the approval of the Treaty of Maastricht – also called the Treaty on the EU (TEU) – permitted the expansion of the EEC into a pillared-structure: the ‘Community Method’²⁹⁵ Pillar I, the European Communities (EC, ECSC, EURATOM); and two intergovernmental structures, Pillar II (CFSP) and Pillar III (JHA).²⁹⁶ The TEU also established a set of rules to restrict the powers of the European Commission, the EP and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to oversee policies made in Pillar III, which led “to accusations that JHA exemplified the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’”.²⁹⁷ Finally, the EPC was replaced by the CFSP, so that

²⁹⁰ Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke, “The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization,” *Policy Studies* 32, no. 1 (February 2004): 150-51.

²⁹¹ Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, and Karen Schönwälder. “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System.” *German Politics & Society* 24, no.3 (October 2006): 1.

²⁹² Colette Mazzucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the EU* (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1997), 154.

²⁹³ In this context, ‘democratic deficit’ describes the limited authority of the EP to shape or amend, rather simply debate, EU policy.

²⁹⁴ Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 283-84.

²⁹⁵ ‘Community Method’ refers to “the use of ‘established’ process of decision-making, which involves a Community legislative initiative being agreed by the Council.” Nieves P.S. Borrogán, “Glossary,” 384.

²⁹⁶ David Phinnemore, “The European Union: Establishment and Development,” in *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P. S. Borrogán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 30.

²⁹⁷ A democratic deficit is characterized by the loss of democracy and transparency generated by the transfer of powers from EU institutions to member-state executives whereby institutions lose power over the policy-making process. Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 284.

Europe could “assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy.”²⁹⁸ But yet again member-states were set on keeping the CFSP as an intergovernmental platform for cooperation, which further limited the capacity of the EC²⁹⁹ to have a unified stance on foreign policy issues of mutual interests. This meant that decision-making would depend solely on the result of intergovernmental negotiations and the willingness of the member-states to cooperate in matters of foreign policies. Like scholar Deirdre Curtin noted, the EC fell short of what might normally be considered a union: a full political and legal entity with a coherent and uniform structure.³⁰⁰

Because the TEU was ill-equipped to undertake the complete institutional transformation member-states were convinced that making the Union more accountable and transparent to EU citizens (and transforming the character of the pillarized structure) would appeal to the public and thereby nurture popular legitimacy for integration and enlargement of the Union. In the early 1990s, “the EU’s ineffective foreign policy response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia” showed there was a pressing need to reform the EU institutions: the intergovernmental nature of the TEU’s Pillar II (CFSP) and III (JHA) constrained the development of policies.³⁰¹ Even member-states whose governments wanted a single market – and *only* a single market – had to face the fact of the practical pressure for harmonization of security and immigration policies was required at the EU level. However, the treaty would not have achieved much without German insistence that replacing unanimity vote by QMV and capping at 700 members the number of members of the EU parliament in Brussels was key to prepare the EU for enlargement and boost the institutional progress of the EU.³⁰² The treaty also aimed at combining policies on asylum and migration policies linked to the Schengen regime into the *acquis communautaire*; that is in Pillar I of the EU structure. For this purpose, the Treaty of Amsterdam “communautarized” the JHA and shifted much of its activity from Pillar III to Pillar I, while also modifying Pillar III to incorporate a new institution for regional cooperation on security matters – the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM).³⁰³ In addition, the treaty recommended the intensification of police cooperation through Europol to fulfill the objectives of providing “citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice” and working towards the development of common initiatives “in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”³⁰⁴ Yet the fact that the EC-pillar (the first pillar) was the only integrative structure of the Union – thus making it an

²⁹⁸ Treaty on EU, February 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.

²⁹⁹ The TEU changed the EEC’s name to EC.

³⁰⁰ Phinnemore, “The European Union: Establishment and Development,” 29. Originally quoted from Deirdre Curtin, “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces,” *Common Market Law Review* 30, no.1 (February 1993):17–69.

³⁰¹ Phinnemore, “The European Union: Establishment and Development,” 31.

³⁰² Phinnemore, “The European Union: Establishment and Development,” 33.

³⁰³ Pillar II (CFSP) remained untouched by the Treaty. The UK and Ireland opted out of the new AFSJ and Schengen cooperation (referred to as ‘enhanced cooperation’ in text). Phinnemore, “The European Union: Establishment and Development,” 32-33.

³⁰⁴ Treaty of Amsterdam, October 17, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1, art. K1. See appendix G for a detailed account of the EU treaties signed from 1997 to 2007.

overwhelmingly economic project – posed an important problem to the creation of any political arrangement in Europe.

The creation of the Schengen zone provides an illustrative example of the differences that lie at the core of the three-pillared structure: built on the premise of intergovernmental conference, the Schengen agreement remains a compelling example of “enhanced cooperation” through which competing interests were integrated to satisfy the economic imperatives of globalization. But “enhancing” cooperation and transferring the Schengen *acquis* under the first pillar meant that the pillared-structure was enlarged to comprise matters of security, freedom and crime without substantially offering a stronger basis on which member-states could forge a policy framework for the CFSP (see appendix F).³⁰⁵ Through the Schengen agreement – a unitary legal contract that entailed far-reaching political consequences arising from primarily economic goals – and the TEU challenged the ‘relaunching’ of the European ideal in that they compelled individual governments to make unitary decisions based on commitments to new political structures rather than solely on economic imperatives. But in spite of introducing new mechanisms for closer cooperation in Amsterdam, the EU failed to recognize the fact that incorporating the *acquis* as a condition for accession to the EU would not “contribute towards endowing Schengen cooperation with greater legitimacy.”³⁰⁶

xii. The Post-9/11 Era

The events of September 11, 2001 inaugurated a new era of international terrorism, which forced the EU to draw on a unique range of instruments to address the many complex security challenges that it could anticipate in the future. The ESS was written by the Commission as a response to the changing dynamics of the world, while reiterating the commitment of member-states to consolidate their foreign policy achievements in regions of conflict, such as the Balkans. Over the years, intra-state cooperation on immigration, security or terrorist matters remained, nevertheless, rather limited because “the absence of strategic culture” showed that the EU had “in fact abandoned the idea of developing a common strategic culture altogether,” preferring instead to favour regional undertakings like the ENP and the EMP.³⁰⁷ The failure of the EDC, the outsourcing of West European security to NATO and the American superpower meant that the member-states had never been compelled to view international affairs from a joint strategic perspective.

³⁰⁵ Charles Elsen, “Le Rôle des Accords de Schengen dans la Construction Européenne,” *Académie de Droit Européen* 12 (May 2001): 80.

³⁰⁶ Galina Cornelisse, “What’s Wrong with Schengen? Border Disputes and the Nature of Integration in the Area Without Internal Borders,” *Common Market Law Review* 51, no.3 (June 2014): 747. Originally quoted from Gehring, “Die Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs: Schengen und die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der Europäischen Union,” 5 *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* (1998), 43–78.

³⁰⁷ Ion Berindan, “Not Another ‘Grand Strategy’: What Prospects for the Future European Security Strategy?,” *European Security* 22, no. 3 (2013): 402.

Even in the absence of a uniform position on immigration the comparatively prosperous EU economy prior to the financial crisis of 2008 encouraged Brussels and the member-states to embrace the benefits of Schengen Europe while ignoring its possible costs. As previously said, the discussion of the need for a CFSP for the EU's external relations also tended to neglect the challenges facing post-9/11 Europe. On top of that, the rise of Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden's *mujahideen* movement created a rift between the East and West, hence pushing a minority of second- and third- generation immigrants, who feel alienated from the wider society and are easily radicalized by hate preachers, to revolt against the government of their home. With the onset of the refugee crisis in 2015,³⁰⁸ involving a mass influx of people from the Middle East and Northern Africa, the Schengen commitment to the free movement of goods, services and people in a single European market is placed at the core of EU's current crisis of legitimacy. Although many of those arriving in Europe had legitimate claims to refugee status, many others were economic migrants or crossed European borders wholly undocumented. Despite numerous attempts to consolidate the CEAS process, the refugee crisis has generated tensions among member-states who have failed to formulate a unified position on the question of illegal immigration. As a result, the rise of right-wing populist groups is being reinforced by the lack of seriousness with which the EU and mainstream political parties have been responding to the refugee crisis in Greece and Italy in particular. While during the years following the 9/11 attacks some argued that the balance between security and liberty did not do enough for security despite repeated warnings against such a possibility, it seems that the current crisis has already compelled member-states to align policies on security, immigration and asylum to minimize the damage already done to EU solidarity.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸ The mass arrival of thousands would-be asylum seekers on the shores of Lesbos (Greece), Lampedusa (Italy), Ceuta and Melilla (Spain) fleeing poverty, corruption or war following German Chancellor Angela Merkel's humanitarian call to Syrian refugees.

³⁰⁹ Christian Kaunert, "Liberty Versus Security? EU Asylum Policy and the European Commission," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5, no.2 (August 2009): 149.

Chapter 3. Germany as Hegemon: From Rehabilitation to Responsibility

a. The Limits of Merkelism

Following the shocking sexual assaults of hundreds of women in Cologne in 2015 and the successive terror attacks in Berlin, Hanover, Ansbach or Munich, chancellor Angela Merkel was forced to acknowledge her failure to predict the potentially damaging effects of the refugee crisis by admitting publicly that she “would rewind time by many, many years” so that the government could better prepare itself for the situation that caught Germany “unprepared in the late summer of 2015.”³¹⁰ In doing so, the chancellor was hoping to convince the public that tolerating the addition of a million Syrian, Iraqi, Eritrean, or Afghani asylum-seekers on German territory would benefit the country economically, and above all maintain leadership in Brussels by preserving Germany’s national self-interest and assuming its role of leadership and responsibility in the Syrian humanitarian crisis.

In Berlin, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) grounded its ‘open-door’ refugee policy on the assumption that the long-term benefits of refugees would offset the short-term pain caused by anti-refugee backlash, but the party failed to appreciate that under the Schengen rules a refugee policy instituted by Germany amounts to a refugee policy imposed on the entire EU, allowing thousands of people to enter Europe illegally through new migration channels and proceed from Germany to any other member-state subject to Schengen rules. The influx of illegal migrants frustrated the national governments of the Balkans who refused to share the burden of Merkel’s policy by welcoming refugees in their transit to Germany. Hungary, a Schengen signatory, and Bulgaria, a Schengen applicant, erected fences to secure their borders as new channels were created by human traffickers to enable the transfer of thousands of migrants of variable and often uncertain legal status. In Southern Europe, as efforts to establish reception centers in the main ‘entry points’ have been slowed down by the very fact that Southern European states, like Italy or Greece, are still struggling to recover from the 2010 financial crisis during which unemployment rates and high poverty soared. In other words, the lack of organizational capacity to receive refugees means that neither Rome nor Athens can guard the external borders of the EU effectively or have the wherewithal to fund assistance programs for the accommodation and integration of foreigners.³¹¹ Ultimately, Merkel’s humanitarian outreach to refugees triggered a domino effect by worsening the legitimacy and democratic crises of the EU; because she ignored the fact that many member-states would not be able to process the requests of all asylum claimants or provide decent living conditions to asylum seekers, the chancellor unwittingly contributed to the formation of a Fortress Europe (see appendix H) sentiment among European citizens and to the erosion of the

³¹⁰ Stefan Wagstyl, “Merkel Admits she Would Turn Back the Clock on Refugee Policy,” *Financial Times*, September 19, 2016.

³¹¹ The Local, “Europe’s Border” Germany’s New Showdown With Greece,” *The Local*, January 26, 2016.

principles embedded in the Schengen agreements.³¹² The nature of Germany's leadership in the humanitarian cause specifically undermined faith in Germany's EU leadership generally.

The severity of the crisis clearly isolated Merkel. Indeed, while under Adenauer West Germany was easily rehabilitated in large part due to its steadfast support for European integration and willingness to cooperate with its European counterparts, other member-states resent Merkel's decision to welcome refugees, especially since it was made without the consent of the other twenty-seven member-states. The chancellor's open-door policy has exposed countries to new asymmetric threats and revealed their vulnerabilities in the face of public disorder and social conflict. Among Merkel's severest critics has been the British government, co-architect of the SEA from which the Schengen Agreement evolved. The Conservative government of David Cameron repeatedly expressed its refusal to relocate a share of the refugees in light of the possible consequences for a national referendum on the UK's departure from the EU scheduled for June 23th, 2016. Many Conservative Members of Parliament (MP) were unnerved by the deterioration of the refugee crisis on the continent and the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a populist anti-EU party similar to the (AfD) yet many years older. Cameron had been pressed by UKIP and Eurosceptic Conservative members to announce that a future Conservative government would hold an in-out referendum on EU membership before the end of 2017 if re-elected in 2015. Even though the Tory leader favoured remaining in the EU, in the short-term his instrumentalization of anti-EU sentiment paid off, as his government was re-elected in a landslide in 2015; in the long-term it backfired when the British electorate voted to leave the EU the following year. Thus, one of the member-states least impacted by the migration and refugee crisis appeared to react to it more strongly than any other.

The extent to which the referendum outcome was influenced by the refugee crisis – and Germany's handling of it – is hard to measure, but Merkel's decision to choose Turkish president Recep Erdogan as a strategic partner to deter border crossings attests to the fact that Berlin no longer exerts enough leverage on its EU counterparts to craft a consensus among them. Rather than seeking political support through intergovernmental talks, the upcoming federal elections of September 2017 can give Merkel a chance to redeem herself and to regain popular credibility, as her support has increased by thirteen points since August 2016.³¹³ In truth, Merkel ought to run for a fourth term because no other political figure can protect her legacy of centrist politics against the threats posed by the right-wing populist party AfD. Following her victory at the annual vote for the CDU's chairmanship where she obtained 89.5% of approval, the chancellor might have a chance to convince the Christian Social Union (CSU) that running a joint campaign is crucial to beat the AfD

³¹² Spiegel, "Refugee Crisis Pushes Europe to the Brink," *Spiegel*, March 4, 2016.

³¹³ Rebecca Staudenmaier, "Support for Merkel Rebounds in Latest Poll," *Deutsche Welle*, October 6, 2016. The Economist, "By Running for a Fourth Term, Angela Merkel is Protecting her Legacy," *The Economist*, November 26, 2016.

and Martin Schulz, CSU's anointed candidate for chancellor, at the general elections scheduled for September 24th, 2017.³¹⁴

The German case study will most likely provide contradicting answers to our hypotheses, as recent developments have shown that native Germans have been quite receptive and helpful to Syrian and Iraqi refugees, knowing that Germany's economy has a comparatively strong capacity to absorb new labour. Yet the events in Cologne have impacted public opinion on the desirability of asylum seekers, many of whom lack the necessary skills to compensate for Germany's labour shortages in a highly-sophisticated economy. For instance, Merkel's call to prohibit the *burqa* (full veil) in all public buildings attests to the fact that tensions surrounding the presence of an 'alien' culture in Germany have emerged in public debates and amongst political representatives who perceive Islam, rightly or wrongly, as threatening to German culture and social norms. Ironically, Merkel's government has spoken repeatedly about the need for a common EU response to the crisis yet has felt compelled by the pressure of events to craft a national response. As 81% of German opinion favored a ban on the *burqa*, it appears the CDU is following the lead of previous mainstream political parties, like those of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria, that have already made the Islamic veil illegal.³¹⁵ Merkel's change of tone, which came after Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere proposed plans to outlaw the *burqa* in August 2017, clearly shows that her administration is determined to regain popular consent for her refugee policy by imposing reforms to prohibit "full-faced veils[...] "whenever it is legally possible," and reaching out to the CSU for political support.³¹⁶

b. Political Impact

That Merkel appreciates the value of integration and intensive labour migration is understandable given that Germany's road to recovery was enabled by European technocrats, who placed the country's political reconstruction at the heart of the integration project. In contrast to the post-WWII era in which it had to prove its commitment to liberal values and to the entire European continent, Germany must now take on the responsibilities of a central player contributing "to the peaceful resolution of multiple conflicts around the

³¹⁴ Stephan Wagstyl, "Angela Merkel Calls for ban on Full Veil in Election Pitch," *Financial Times*, December 6, 2016. Melanie Amann, Christiane Hoffmann, and Christoph Schult, "Merkel's Conservatives Divided as Campaign Begins," *Spiegel*, February 9, 2017.

³¹⁵ As of January 2017, the governments (and some local municipalities) of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark have banned or partially prohibited the wearing of the full-face Islamic veil in public spaces or in places, such as schools, hospitals and government buildings. Recently, the ECHR validated Belgium's decision to ban and sanction the wearing of the *niqab* in public spaces because the aims of this restriction are to maintain peaceful coexistence between the different communities living together in a democratic society and protect the rights of all." While the *niqab* allows a woman to show her eyes, the *burqa* hides the entirety of the face but Western governments rarely make a difference between the two as, in Belgium, concealing one's face is considered to be a criminal offense. Le Monde, "La Cour Européenne des Droits de L'Homme Valide L'Interdiction du Niqab en Belgique," *Le Monde*, July 11, 2017. BBC, "The Islamic Veil Across Europe," *BBC*, January 31, 2017. Carla Bleiker, "Survey: Germans Want a Burqa ban," *Deutsche Welle*, August 26, 2016.

³¹⁶ BBC, "The Islamic Veil Across Europe."

globe,” such as the Greek debt crisis of 2011, the Ukrainian civil war, and the refugee crisis.³¹⁷ Whereas in 2003 some compared Berlin to ‘the sick man of Europe’ after German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s administration refused to wage war against former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, this decision forced Germany to redefine both its diplomatic position in Europe and military engagement abroad. Although the implementation of this ambitious plan cost the Social Democratic Party (SPD) the federal elections of 2005 against Merkel’s CDU, Schröder transformed the ways political commentators described Germany’s role on the continent – that is, as Europe’s “indispensable nation” or the only country capable of making the Union more assertive on the international scene.³¹⁸ In effect, it was thanks to Schröder’s plan that Germany successfully revitalized its economy and survived the financial crash of the late 2000s: after the country realized in 2000 the long-term effects of very low fertility rates would have to be compensated by a series of measures to balance Germany’s declining demography, Schröder’s administration championed the creation of a ‘Green Card’ scheme in 2000, the migration law of 2004 and a combination of economic measures allowing the German government to mitigate the damages caused by the projected demographic crisis. While the latter lost his chancellorship to Angela Merkel in October 2005, mainly because the SPD had the courage to impose necessary reforms, the tables were turned by the financial crises of 2008 and 2010 during which time many EU governments had to recover from the crash and request German aid to implement austerity programs. In spite of that, French and British commentators developed an obsession with the “German model [...] as the only EMU country that got it all right.”³¹⁹ That Germany was spared from financial bankruptcy thanks to its excess of trade surplus and “its gains of competitiveness [...] founded on more effective wage suppression,” boosted Berlin’s prestige among EU officials who saw the country’s resilience during the financial crises as a model to be emulated.³²⁰ Following the financial crash in Europe, and because it fared much better than its European counterparts, Germany was expected to show more intra-European solidarity than any other member-state by hiring the young escaping poverty in the debt-ridden countries of Greece, Spain and Italy.

Nonetheless, Merkel’s 2015 call to Syrian and Iraqi refugees had a role in prompting more than 1,256,000 foreigners to migrate to the European Union, thus forcing the chancellor to reintroduce temporary border controls in September 2015 and adapt her discourse to win the support of the CDU’s sister party, the CSU in Bavaria.³²¹ The CDU and CSU formed a political alliance based on Christian democracy and conservatism after the end of the Second World War, but the accumulation of illegal migrants in Germany has

³¹⁷ Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016.

³¹⁸ Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role.”

³¹⁹ Servaas Storm & C.W.M. Naastepad, “Crisis and Recovery in the German Economy: The Real Lessons,” *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* 32 (January 2015): 3.

³²⁰ Storm & C.W.M. Naastepad, “Crisis and Recovery in the German Economy,” 4. Originally quoted form Engelbert Stockhammer, “Peripheral Europe’s Debt and Germany Wages. The Role of Wage Policy in the Euro Area,” *Discussion Paper* 29 (Mach 2011).

³²¹ Elspeth Guild et al., *Study of the LIBE Committee on Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area: Is Schengen Crisis-Proof?*, 13, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU\(2016\)571356_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf).

angered many CSU MPs who criticize Merkel's open-door policy for straining the country's capacity to absorb foreigners and fuelling the rise of xenophobic sentiment among the German public. Interestingly, while migrants refer to Merkel as the "compassionate mother" a survey of the Barometer of Public Opinion on Refugees in Germany found that 51% of respondents believed "the core values of our [German society] are undermined by refugees."³²² The discrepancy between the opinion of Syrian refugees and that of the German electorate attests to the fact that people remain wary of welcoming thousands of non-EU nationals who, for the most part, are unaccustomed to Western culture and moral values, liberal-democratic political rules, and legal codes. As a result, the arrival of almost 1.5 million asylum seekers not only stirred a heated debate on Germany's emerging cultural pluralism, but also created rifts between the native population and Germans with a *Migrationshintergrund* (migration background). Persistent opinion gaps on the issue of multiculturalism hinder the ability of the country to situate itself more prominently on the international political scene and define its responsibilities towards developing countries.³²³

The relationship of Germans with foreigners has always been affected by the perception that Germany never aspired to become a country of immigration, such as the U.S. or Canada.³²⁴ Although West Germany's booming economy drew upon labour from Southern Europe, until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, non-Germans living in the Federal Republic were viewed primarily in terms of labour policy rather than immigration policy. As former colonial powers, France and the UK have different experiences with non-European integration; whereas they "transformed their relations with the colonies from one of pure domination and patronage to an at least formally more equal partnership between the 'mother country' and the overseas territories even prior to outright decolonization," West Germany discouraged assimilation by segregating its foreign recruits in ethnic ghettos and depriving them of any political rights or much chance to become naturalized.³²⁵ In this way Italian, Spanish and Portuguese guest workers suffered from ethnic discrimination, yet their cultural proximity with the host country allowed them to integrate faster than Africans, Arabs or Turks, who were and still are described as outside the German *Leitkultur*. In 1989, 47% of poll respondents believed that Italians "behaved totally differently" and 69% described the Turks as such. Four years later, the share of respondents who had answered negatively about Italians plummeted to 24% whereas 58% still perceived Turks as aliens to German society.³²⁶ Unlike in France and the UK where "conceptions of nationhood based on a notion of ethnic purity became untenable" Germany's lack of colonial

³²² Philip Oltermann, "Mama Merkel: The Compassionate Mother of Syrian Refugees," *The Guardian*, September 1, 2015. Gerhards, Hans and Schupp, "German Public Opinion on Admitting Refugees," 247.

³²³ Christin Hess and Simon Green, "Introduction: The Changing Politics and Policies of Migration in Germany," *German Politics*, 25, no.3 (June 2016): 322.

³²⁴ Alan J. P. Taylor, *The Man and the Statesman* (London: Hamilton, 1955), 215.

³²⁵ Ruud Koopman et al., *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 13.

³²⁶ Oya S. Abali, *German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration*, 10,
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-GermanPublicOpinion.pdf>.

experience has made it difficult for Germans to embrace the concept of multiculturalism or ease requirements to obtain German citizenship.³²⁷ In the words of the immigration scholar Christian Joppke, “multiculturalism is an attack on the principle of the *nation-state*” because it claims that Germany has become a country of immigration in which the principle of the *nation-state* becomes obsolete and incompatible with the emergence of multi-national societies.³²⁸ This makes acquisition of German citizenship difficult, because foreigners need to provide evidence of their attachment to *nation-state* through assimilation.

Difficulty in amending naturalization laws also stems from Germany’s strict understanding of the naturalization process as “involving not only a change in legal status,” but also “a change in nature, a change in political and cultural identity,” which imposes “a social transubstantiation that immigrants have difficulty imagining, or let alone desiring.”³²⁹ During the post-war years, the political elite deprived foreigners of their rights to acquire German nationality with the *jus sanguinis* (the right of blood) clause, which made non-Germans ineligible to apply until 1998 when the SPD-Green government announced that a citizenship bill would include new rules tolerating dual citizenship. The CDU/CSU³³⁰ coalition promptly retaliated by organizing a petition campaign to rally voters against the principles of dual citizenship and labour migration and “open an entirely different world of populist politics where public opinion and mobilisation would develop into a decisive factor against liberalisation.”³³¹ Interestingly, the strategy used by the coalition to convey their message mirrors that of the AfD or Pegida³³²: with almost 5 million signatures in less than six weeks, the CDU’s strategy of manipulating the fears of the German public about the dangers of adopting new inclusive measures for the rights of minorities and foreigners to access dual-citizenship rights was successful in that it gathered enough support to counter, amend the SPD proposal and obtain a compromise law – the German Nationality Act of 2000.³³³ Like AfD leader Frauke Petry, who claimed that “the immigration of so many Muslims will change our [German] culture,” former conservative minister president of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber, argued that dual citizenship “presented a greater threat to Germany than the terrorism of the Red Army Faction (RAF), a far-left terrorist organization active in Germany since the 1970s,” while other CSU representatives backed these assertions by warning the public that such “reforms would imperil German identity, lead to Islamic parties in the Bundestag, and provoke uncontrolled waves of immigration, altogether

³²⁷ Koopman et al., *Contested Citizenship*, 13.

³²⁸ Christian Joppke, *Immigration and The Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 191.

³²⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990), 78.

³³⁰ The Christian Social Union (CSU) is a sister party of the CDU.

³³¹ Marc Morjé Howard, “The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law,” *German Politics* 17 no.1 (March 2008): 52.

³³² *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicization of the West - PEGIDA) a German nationalist and anti-Islam political movement founded in Dresden in October 2014.

³³³ Howard, “The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law,” 51-2.

undermining the integration of migrants already in Germany.”³³⁴ This narrative clearly echoes Petry’s charge that Merkel’s decision to open the border will hinder the integration chance of Muslims and transform German culture.³³⁵

In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis many simply disapprove of Merkel’s decision “to open the borders and invite everybody in, without consulting the parliament or the people.”³³⁶ Indeed, Merkel imposed her *Willkommenskultur* without anticipating that high popular discontent against the establishment in Berlin and the creation of multiple refugee camps in Germany would add pressure to restrict access to the German labour market by non-European refugees and, at the same time, propel the electoral rise of the AfD to 20.8% in the state elections of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 4th, 2016.³³⁷

The shift towards cultural pluralism accepted by Merkel’s government meant that Germany had apparently embarked on the path of multiculturalism and recognized the right of persecuted individuals to seek refuge in Europe.³³⁸ It was, in fact, under Schröder’s administration that Germany truly embraced pluralism when the first law addressing the place of migrants and refugees in German society was voted in 2004 – the Immigration Act. Although the government knew about the reluctance of the German public to recognize the place of migrants in German society, the bill was drafted to convey the message that Germany would “maintain restrictions in access to labour market” and select new migrants among a pool of highly-qualified individuals.³³⁹ Nevertheless, the political declaration made by the Chancellor on the failure of multiculturalism at the CDU party conference in December 2015 acknowledged the anxieties and apprehensions of German citizens about the arrival *en masse* of migrants into the EU and the supposed lack of

³³⁴ The SPD compromised on the naturalization law but still managed to eliminate the legal principle of *jus sanguinis* by replacing it with *jus solis* (the right of the soil). The final compromise, nevertheless, did not fully recognize the right to possess two nationalities as it offered the ‘option-model’ or the principle of double *jus soli* as a final solution to the dual citizenship conundrum. A person who had more than one nationality can legally submit a request to retain German citizenship before the age of twenty-three; additionally, any person automatically becomes a German citizen by birth “if at least one of the parents has had a legal residence permit for eight years or an unlimited residence permit for three years.” The new bill also involved the reduction of the residency requirement from fifteen to eight years for those holding “a valid residence permit, gainful employment and no criminal convictions.” The bill also allowed children who acquired German citizenship through the *jus solis* procedures to hold a second citizenship until 18 years old. Once an individual has reached 18 years of age, h/she is given 5 years to retain German citizenship. Howard, “The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law,” 53. Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), “Nationality Act,” last modified January 1, 2015,

http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitgesetz_englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Also, see Triadafilos, Triadafilopoulos, *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany* (Vancouver: UBC Press), 137. Originally quoted from Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, *The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 150, and from “Alle Schwarzen gegen die doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft,” *Die Tageszeitung*, January 4, 1999, and Wolfgang Zeitlmann, “Wir bekommen zweierlei Deutsche,” *Die Welt*, January 13, 1999. Susanne Beyer and Jan Fleischhauer, “‘The Immigration of Muslims Will Change our Culture’,” *Spiegel*, March 30, 2016.

³³⁵ Beyer and Fleischhauer, “‘The Immigration of Muslims Will Change our Culture’.”

³³⁶ Beyer and Fleischhauer, “‘The Immigration of Muslims Will Change our Culture’.”

³³⁷ BBC, “Merkel Named as German Chancellor,” October 10, 2005. Sebastian Fischer, “A Problem for Merkel and Germany,” *Spiegel*, September 5, 2016.

³³⁸ Koopman et al., *Contested Citizenship*, 72-3.

³³⁹ Federal Foreign Office, “Immigration Act,” last modified July 24, 2015, accessed April 15, 2017, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Zuwanderungsrecht_node.html#top.

integration of foreign communities into the German social mainstream, be they refugees, asylum seekers or economic migrants.³⁴⁰

A survey conducted in March 2016 found that 55% of German respondents believed that refugees should be repatriated whenever the situation in their country improves, which corroborates the assumption that the refugee crisis not only revealed ambiguities in Germany's welcoming culture but also that the country is divided ideologically.³⁴¹ Germans are clearly at odds with each other over how long the country should grant the right to protection to vulnerable especially considering that only 26% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that growing diversity made their country a better place to live.³⁴² In a similar way, the lifting of the Berlin Wall "brought with it freedom of movement for citizens of Central and Eastern Europe" but it also "increased fears of uncontrolled immigration to Western Europe" since more than 400,000 political refugees arrived to the FRG in 1990, thus forcing the government to restrict the 'right of return' enshrined in the 1953 Refugees' and Expellees' Law (*Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz*) for German refugees.³⁴³ First, the Asylum Compromise introduced a significant number of procedural constraints to amend the 1953 law and make the FRG less appealing to Germans wanting to emigrate from Eastern Europe. Second, the Law Dealing with Late Consequences of World War II (*Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz*) was voted to finalize the coalition deal and restrict the status of ethnic Germans to those born before 1993. Thereafter, article 16a of the Basic Law was amended, making it more difficult for the 400,000 asylum seekers who entered West Germany in 1992 to be granted refugee status.³⁴⁴ Just as the Kohl government had proceeded to create a list of stable countries based on a new definition of so-called 'safe country of origin' to limit the number of new

³⁴⁰ The Economist Online, "Is Multi-Kulti Dead?", *The Economist*, October 22, 2010. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) definition, a refugee is someone who has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, political opinion and even sexuality, which forces an individual to flee from his/her home country, either because of persecution, war or violence. In contrast, an asylum-seeker is someone who has submitted a request for sanctuary and is awaiting the decision. The UNHCR does not provide any concrete definition for describing the characteristics of 'economic migrants'. Economic migrants can be classified as those individuals who flee their home countries because the lack of education, high unemployment and social inequality prevent them from escaping poverty and economic destitution. UNHCR, "What is a Refugee?," accessed September 25, 2016, <http://www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee>. UNHCR, "Asylum-Seekers," accessed September 25, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html>.

³⁴¹ Jürgen Gerhards, Silke Hans and Jürgen Schupp, "German Public Opinion on Admitting Refugees," *DIW Economic Bulletin*, 21 (May 2016): 245.

³⁴² Gerhards, Hans and Schupp, "German Public Opinion on Admitting Refugees," 246. Spiegel, "How Many Refugees can Germany Handle?," *Spiegel*, July 30, 2015. Jacob Poushter, "European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts," *Pew Research Center*.

³⁴³ Per the 1953 Refugees' and Expellees' Law, ethnic Germans were given full priority and financial assistance to reconstruct their livelihood in unified Germany. The 1953 law extended the provisions of Article 116 of the Basic Law to these groups. A German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person. Simon Green, "Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact of Unification and the Berlin Republic," *West European Politics* 24, no.4 (October 2007): 85. Franziska Doeblner-Hagedorn, "The State at its Borders: Germany and the Negotiations" (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2003), 115. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, *translation* at <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>.

³⁴⁴ On average, official statistics estimate the arrival of asylum seekers in Germany at 400,000 asylum in 1992. Devine, "German Asylum law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe," 798.

applications, Merkel used the same approach to decrease the number of countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) that had not yet been declared as “safe countries of origin.”³⁴⁵

Very much like Merkel imposed her refugee policy on the EU to fit Germany’s nationally-determined goals, the FRG had to accept the transformation of the Bonn Republic into a *de facto* immigration country and reformulate its overall immigration policy goals to maintain social harmony. In contrast, because it was chancellor Merkel who opened Germany’s doors, she is now endowed with the responsibility to tackle the refugee crisis. In some respects, she reacted in the same way that Helmut Kohl did following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: first, by taking advantage of the situation to select the most qualified individuals from a pool of candidates; second by restricting the eligibility of certain nationals to apply for asylum and deporting unwanted aliens;³⁴⁶ third by extending the list of ‘safe country of origins’³⁴⁷ to include six new safe countries to curb illegal migration from the Balkans; and fourth by finalizing a risky deal with Turkish President Recep Erdoğan, in which Ankara vowed to help Germany in its mission to stem migration flows between Turkey and Greece. Yet, although all these measures have chalked some successes, the refugee crisis has exhausted the morale of German citizens as the country faces shortages of basic supplies, such as portable housing containers, and a shortage of German teachers, social workers and a lack of construction programs to build new apartments.³⁴⁸

It was in this context that Merkel’s rejection of multiculturalism is best understood – as a response to the popular concern that refugees do not always integrate fully into German society or adopt its political, legal and cultural norms. The tense security situation in Germany has the potential to further destabilize the country politically by allowing reactionary movements to rise among public opinion. In less than a month the Chancellor’s approval ratings fell from 59% in July 2016 to 47% in August 2016, therefore limiting the ability of the federal government to control the decisions of the sixteen German states, as they each have the capacity to act with a degree of independence from the national government.³⁴⁹ In contrast, neither French nor

³⁴⁵ In Article 16a (2) and (3), the notion of ‘safe country of origins’ is incorporated by the Basic Law, which also clearly stipulates that “it shall be presumed that a foreigner from such a state [‘safe country of origin’] is not persecuted, unless he presents evidence justifying the conclusion that, contrary to this presumption, he is persecuted on political grounds.” Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law]. Agence France-Press, “Germany Tightens Refugee Policy as Finland Joins Sweden in Deportations,” *The Guardian*, January 29, 2016.

³⁴⁶ Kate Connolly, “Deport Failed Asylum Seekers Back to War Zones, Says Bavaria Minister,” *The Guardian*, September 9, 2016.

³⁴⁷ According to EU law, a ‘safe country of origin’ is defined as a country in which a democratic system provides security, safety and minimum standards of living to its citizens. Individuals living in such countries should have no fear of persecution, torture or inhumane treatment by the government or armed groups. Germany recently recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Ghana, Senegal, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as ‘safe countries of origins’. EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An EU ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ List,” accessed September 26, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf. Ben Knight, “Germany Shuts out Refugees With ‘Safe’ States List,” *Deutsche Welle*, July 28, 2015. Deutsche Welle, “Kosovo and Montenegro Favor ‘Safe Country of Origin’ Status,” *Deutsche Welle*, August 4, 2015.

³⁴⁸ Spiegel, “Germany Shows Signs of Strain From Mass of Refugees,” *Spiegel*, October 17, 2015,

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-shows-signs-of-strain-from-mass-of-refugees-a-1058237-druck.html>.

³⁴⁹ Guy Chazan, “Merkel’s Approval Ratings Plunge After Bavaria Terror Attacks,” *Financial Times*, August 5, 2016.

British sub-national units of government can make unilateral decisions without the consent of the parliament, which means that German provincial politicians can fight the implementation of national policies and paralyze efforts to enforce controversial political programs. But the chancellor's vagueness about the state of the CDU/CSU alliance has worried many who think that "months of bickering over refugee and immigration policy" already fragilized the CDU's campaign.³⁵⁰ Some members of the CDU even attempted to lobby for Merkel's team to change policy course, as CDU deputy heads Thomas Strobl published a proposal to tighten deportation rules with a view to speed up the repatriation of failed asylum seekers and motivate failed asylum seekers to leave voluntarily.³⁵¹ Hence, to ensure her political survival, the Chancellor was forced to harden her stance on the compatibility of refugees and German values by speaking against the *burqa* and against those who do not embrace liberal values: "with us, the rule is: show your face, that's why the full veil is not appropriate."³⁵² By obtaining 89.5% at the conference's annual vote for the chairmanship of the CDU and approving a more conservative agenda on the prevention of would-be migrants, Merkel might have a chance to beat Schulz's left in September 2017, but her administration needs to show more strictness towards the social integration of refugees and religious minorities in order to thwart the SPD and the Green party from gaining more seats in the national parliament.³⁵³ In the position paper signed at the CDU's annul conference, Merkel vowed to support the creation of "transit zones outside Germany aimed at preventing would-be migrants, insofar as they don't qualify for political asylum, from entering the country." However, measures to discourage potential migrants might not outweigh the negative effects of Merkel's welcoming call to Syrian refugees, which inevitably acted as a pull-factor for thousands of would-be refugees ready to leave their home country and reach the coast of Lampedusa, simply because the creation of such 'transit zones' outside Germany might well act as another pull-factor encouraging poor migrants to apply for political asylum. The worsening of the crisis and the erosion of trust between the political class and German citizens hence revealed the importance of the political function of borders in the maintaining of order and stability, and in the formation of strong partnerships with neighboring countries. Indeed, as the chancellor's *laissez-faire* policy undeniably impacted her ability to lead decision-making processes nationally it has also added pressure on Merkel to resolve the humanitarian crisis that unfolded in the Balkan following the opening of Germany's borders. In truth, Merkel's political survival depends on whether she can convince the public of the value that refugees can add to German society and economy; but above all, she must also strike a balance between the number of arrivals and departures of foreigners to prove the readiness of the German government to implement a more efficient method of 'controlled' migration.

³⁵⁰ Amann, Hoffmann and Schult, "Merkel's Conservatives Divided as Campaign Begins."

³⁵¹ Deutsche Welle, "CDU's Strobl Under Fire for Hardliner Asylum Stance," *Deutsche Welle*, November 29, 2016.

³⁵² Stefan Wagstyl, "Angela Merkel Calls for ban on Full Veil in Election Pitch," *Financial Times*, December 6, 2016.

³⁵³ Jefferson Chase, "Merkel's CDU Approves More Conservative Orientation," *Deutsche Welle*, July 12, 2016.

This discussion of the German political discourse on immigration provides evidence of the gradual securitization³⁵⁴ of policies and public debates, reflecting the hardening of opinion on refugees and pressures towards restrictions to compensate for the absence of stricter border controls. Even while she continued to defend her refugee policy, Merkel was forced to make compromises at home with the CSU, all the while prolonging the imposition of checks at the borders for an additional six months – as stated by the Council Implementing Decision triggering the Article 23 of the SBC.³⁵⁵ Pandering to the CSU (and to the German electorate) has thus become Merkel’s last chance to gain support for the re-election campaign, but recent decisions – i.e. the decision to reverse the ban on dual citizenship in a 2012 compromise with the SPD and the *burqa* affair – have diminished the chancellor’s chances of preventing division within the CDU.³⁵⁶ The declaration of the increasingly popular and outspoken CDU member of parliament, Jens Spahn, that Germany was experiencing “a disruption of our state” demonstrates the extent to which Merkel’s leadership has declined in the last months.³⁵⁷

c. Economic Impact

While Germany transitioned through the sub-prime and the 2010 Greek debt crises “better than most of its peers in the face of rising competition,” its recovery allowed Germany to take a leadership role in Brussels.³⁵⁸ A few years later, researchers measured adequately the consequences of amplifying the growth of a demographic imbalance, as many projected that a sharp increase in the proportion of old people aged 60 or older coupled with a decrease in the proportion of people aged below 20 (accounting for 40.4% and 15.1% of the total population of Germany in 2050, respectively) would force future governments to adopt the principle of “replacement migration.”³⁵⁹ These claims were further supported by an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report stating that Germany’s new challenge not only entailed attracting highly skilled labour but also solving its own emigration problem. The findings of the report

³⁵⁴ Securitization refers to the process whereby a political issue is being “transformed by the speech and acts of political actors by creating new security threats” which elicits feelings of fear and hatred towards visible minorities and contributes to the marginalization of parts of a society. In 2015, the intrusion of ISIS in Europe via the Balkan routes legitimized the securitization of discourses and immigration policies. Hasan Basmisirli, “Securitization and De-Securitization of Migration Policies of Germany and Turkey According to Leadership Rhetoric,” *Center for International and European Studies* (January 2016): 1.

³⁵⁵ “Where there is a serious threat to public policy,” Article 23 of the SBC allows a member-state to “exceptionally reintroduce border control at its internal borders for a limited period of no more than 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds the period of 30 days.” Regulation 562/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1.

³⁵⁶ Ralf Neukirch and Christian Reiermann, “Merkel Critics Deal a Blow to Chancellor,” *Spiegel*, December 9, 2016.

³⁵⁷ Ralf Neukirch, “Merkel Adversary Jens Spahn on the Rise,” *Spiegel*, December 1, 2016.

³⁵⁸ Steinmeier, “Germany’s New Global Role.”

³⁵⁹ Ingrid Hamm, Helmut Seitz and Martin Werding, eds., *Demographic Change in Germany: The Economic and Fiscal Consequences* (New York, NY: Springer, 2008), 18-22. The UN defines replacement migration as “the international migration that a country would need to prevent population decline and population ageing resulting from low fertility and mortality rates.” United Nations, “New Report on Replacement Migration Issued by UN Population Division,” press release, March 17, 2000, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000317.dev2234.doc.html>.

established that in 2011 3.4 million native Germans resided in other OECD countries, from among whom 1.4 million had an upper secondary education.³⁶⁰ This means that Germany could be suffering from its own ‘brain drain’ – one that Merkel first attempted to fix by transferring highly skilled labour from the debt-stricken countries of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece to Germany and alleviating their respective burden of unemployment simultaneously, actually in harmony with how a single European market is supposed to function in terms of labour mobility. Beginning in 2010 the chancellor was compelled to invite all the member-states to participate in the demand/supply equation of the EU as a single market by drawing on the accession to Schengen of nine Eastern European countries.³⁶¹ In doing so, new member-states allowed the German government to replenish the country’s labour market, rather “than to change immigration laws again for migrants from other [non-European] parts of the world.”³⁶² Nonetheless, as the Syrian civil war broke out and the number of migrants arriving on the shores of Lampedusa and Lesbos without documentation increased, the governing coalition in Berlin quickly realized that Merkel’s call provided migrants from all underdeveloped countries a reason – the pull factor – to escape poverty.

Merkel’s call to refugees never reflected a general liberalization of immigration policies, because the acceptance of multiculturalism in Germany had always been limited by the belief that it was not a country of immigration, and that it did “not strive to increase the number of its citizens through naturalization.”³⁶³ Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia explains that in most Western democracies, “multiculturalism appears to have been forced upon the political system” by the demands “of cultural diversity from within rather than stemming from a political strategy to open up the borders to the outside,” but, in the case of Germany “the demands of cultural diversity” were never a deciding factor for opening the doors to a million refugees, since Merkel’s decision was measured in purely economic terms to fit a nationally-determined economic and labour policy.³⁶⁴ recent researches have also shown that the EU28 will need replacement migration because “the total fertility rate in the EU-28 declined to a level well below” the replacement level “of around 2.1 live births per woman.”³⁶⁵ In addition, between 2011 and 2013, “80% of the EU’s population growth came from net

³⁶⁰ OECD Publishing, *Talent Abroad: A Review of German Emigrants*, 15-6, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264231702-en>.

³⁶¹ Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia accessed the Schengen area on December 21, 2007.

³⁶² Spiegel, “Skilled Worker Shortage: Berlin Aims to Attract Unemployed Europeans,” *Spiegel*, January 2, 2011. Originally quoted from CSU Max Straubinger.

³⁶³ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 77.

³⁶⁴ Ariane C. D’Appollonia and Simon Reich, *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspectives* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh), 54. Originally quoted from Michael Minkenberg, “The Politics of Citizenship in the New Republic,” *West European Politics* 26, no.4 (2003): 219-40.

³⁶⁵ The fertility rates “required to keep the population size” of the EU28 “constant if there were no inward or outward migration” have remained low. In 2002, the EU recorded 1.45 live birth per woman in 2002 and 1.58 in 2012 only, which indicates that countries are making slow progress toward increasing their fertility rates. However, the EU-28’s life expectancy at birth reached 83.1 years for women and 77.5 years for men in 2012. William Helminger, Alain Mahieu, and Bruno Scuvée, *Key Figures on Europe Pocketbooks 2014 Edition* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014), 26-8, accessed April 28, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3930297/6309576/KS-EI-14-001-EN-N.pdf>.

migration plus statistical adjustment”, making migration “the main determinant of population growth.”³⁶⁶ German legislators quickly grasped the need to strike a balance between the country’s low fertility rates – 1.41 in 2012, and 1.42 in 2013 – and high death rates – 196,038 in 2012 and 211,756 in 2013 – especially considering that across the EU member-states, Germany also held the lowest share of young people (13.2%) while that of older people (65 years old or over) increased from 18.6% in 2005 to 21% in 2015.³⁶⁷ Hence, the rapid accumulation of such data justified immediate action to compensate for predicted shortages by expanding the existing labour market, which in the long run will provide the government with a larger tax base to sustain the growing numbers of German retirees who live longer thanks to better access to medical assistance and social welfare.³⁶⁸ Following this reasoning, foreign recruits from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan can serve as manpower to maintain Germany’s economic dominance within the EU, as a recent decrease of 32,937 in job vacancies between the months of October and December 2016 showed that Germany was slowly but steadily benefitting from the freedom of movement of people in the EU and the arrival of cheap labour from Southern Europe.³⁶⁹ Yet even with efforts to increase the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) (also called the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) from 2,300 employees in early 2015 to 8,000 in 2016, German authorities have not sped up the assessment of asylum applications, which jumped from 77,485 in 2012 to 476,510 applications in 2015, including 441,800 first-time applicants.³⁷⁰

Despite critics, Merkel took advantage of the Syrian civil war without anticipating that, in times of social disorder and conflict, maintaining “a living culture of welcome” (*Gelebte Willkommenskultur*) would become more challenging than fixing “acute shortfalls in the pharmaceutical, engineering and information technology sectors.”³⁷¹ Anti-immigrant sentiment has spread across Germany as a recent survey conducted over the summer 2016 found that more than 4 Germans out of 10 had a pessimistic view of the effect of

³⁶⁶ Eurostat, “People in the EU – Statistics on Demographic Changes,” last modified November 27, 2015, accessed July 2, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_in_the_EU_%E2%80%93_statistics_on_demographic_changes.

³⁶⁷ William Helminger and Carla Martins, *Key Figures on Europe 2016 Edition* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016), 17-8, accessed April 28, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/7827738/KS-EI-16-001-EN-N.pdf>.

³⁶⁸ Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), “Life Expectancy in Germany,” accessed September 24, 2016, <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Deaths/Tables/Lifeexpectancy.html>. Destatis, “Average Number of Children per Woman,” accessed September 24, 2016,

<https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Births/Tables/BirthRate.html>.

³⁶⁹ The Economist, “For Good or for Ill,” *The Economist*, January 23, 2016. OECD, “Registered Unemployed and Job Vacancies,” accessed September 24, 2016, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LAB_REG_VAC.

³⁷⁰ In 2013, Germany recorded 126,705 applications for asylum, 202,645 in 2014 and 476,510 in 2015. Eurostat, “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data,” accessed September 24, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), “2014 Migration Report,” accessed September 24, 2016, <http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/EN/2016/20160107-migrationsbericht-2014.html?nn=1450230>. Philipp Wittrock and Christina Elmer, “Taking Stock one Year After Refugees’ Arrival,” *Spiegel*, September 2, 2016. Beverly Crawford, “Moral Leadership or Moral Hazard? Germany’s Response to the Refugee Crisis and its Impact on European Solidarity,” (PhD diss., UC Davis, 2016), 5.

³⁷¹ Simon Green, “Divergent Traditions, Converging Responses: Immigration and Integration Policy in the UK and Germany,” *German Politics* 16, no.1 (March 2007): 452. Adam Heribert, “Xenophobia, Asylum Seekers, and Immigration Policies in Germany,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21, no.4 (October 2015): 452.

Merkel's migration policy on the economy: rather than strengthening it, the addition of new labor would weaken Germany's economic pre-eminence.³⁷² Such skepticism is understandable because assessing Merkel's 'open-door' policy at this stage of the crisis is simply unfeasible without more data to compare the performance of each German state. A small majority of Germans nevertheless remains optimistic about Merkel's policy will make Germany more diverse (56%) and strong (51%) in the long-run.³⁷³ To defend the chancellor's policies, pro-immigration advocates estimated that although the German government is projecting an increase in unemployment level in 2017, it would compensate by investing in the integration of migrant to sustain the needs of the economy and passing "a number of legislative measures" to facilitate "the access to the labour market for asylum seekers and tolerated persons."³⁷⁴ For this purpose, the new *Integration Law* of May 2016 was agreed upon by the coalition government in the Eastern town of Meseberg, where MPs had gathered for a summit to discuss "a good offer" for migrants.³⁷⁵ In accepting the deal, the government vowed to spend €20B in 2016 for refugees, including a budget of 138.6 million euros in 2017 to ensure that all refugees "be allowed to receive welfare benefits under the country's Hartz IV welfare scheme," the costs of integration represented only 1.4 percent of the total government budget.³⁷⁶ Moreover, in an effort to appease public anxieties, Merkel also agreed to increase the number of "modestly-paid 'one-euro jobs' by 100,000 to supplement welfare benefits" and help asylum applicants survive while "waiting on a decision."³⁷⁷

The chancellor has taken a huge risk in trusting the ability of new migrants to sustain the economy but it is hard to predict whether or not new migrants can perform as well as their native counterparts, even if migrants are usually more mobile and risk-taking than natives. Yet, the fact that investments in Germany have grown by 2.5% and boosted the housing sector by 4.3% contradicts pessimistic views on the economic impact of refugees.³⁷⁸ With regards to enhancing mobility in the EU and maintaining Germany's leadership in the decision-making process Merkel's intention to draw on the supply of refugees perfectly suited her integrationist agenda, given that Berlin has recorded a budget surplus of €18.5B the first six months of 2016,

³⁷² Sabine Kinkartz, "Survey: Germany Divided Over Merkel's Migrant Policy Changes," *Deutsche Welle*, August 8, 2016.

³⁷³ Kinkartz, "Survey: Germany Divided Over Merkel's Migrant Policy Changes."

³⁷⁴ The new *Integration Law* reduced waiting times for asylum seekers and tolerated persons because of the number of people waiting for their decision on their asylum application need to enter the labour market faster. Instead of waiting nine months, applicants will have to wait three months only after their request has been processed by the authorities. In addition, the government "temporarily suspended parts of the labour market testing procedure for asylum seekers," which applies only "to nationals from origin countries which are considered safe, and the list of safe origins has been extended in 2015, as part of broader asylum legislation packages. Individuals who were granted refugee status and possess a valid work permit "have the same access to the labour market and integration measures as everyone else." Eva Degler and Thomas Liebig, *Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, 28-9, <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Finding-their-Way-Germany.pdf>.

³⁷⁵ Ben Knight, "Merkel Presents new Refugee Integration law as 'Milestone,'" *Deutsche Welle*, May 25, 2016.

³⁷⁶ Deutsche Welle, "Germany Expects Migration to add to Unemployment," *Deutsche Welle*, August 16, 2016. Institute for the World Economy (IfW), "2016 Rund 20 Mrd. Für Flüchtlinge," last modified September 7, 2016, <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/medien/medieninformationen/2016/2016-rund-20-mrd-euro-fur-fluechtlingse>.

³⁷⁷ Deutsche Welle, "Germany Expects Migration to add to Unemployment."

³⁷⁸ David Coleman and Robert Rowthorn, "The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom," *Population and Development Review* 30, no.4 (December 2004): 587. Cécile Boutelet, "L'Economie Allemande Dopée par L'Arrivée des Réfugiés en 2015 et 2016," *Le Monde*, January 13, 2016.

thus putting Germany ahead of all its European neighbors “on course to exceed last year’s €30B annual surplus and to record its third consecutive annual surplus.”³⁷⁹ Furthermore, studies confirmed that firms could invest in the training of refugees at small cost to expand the productive capacity of the country, meaning the inflow of new labour will represent an important moderator of inflation to maintain high levels of output and competitiveness. Still, increases in number of persons entitled to benefits for asylum seekers (up by 169%) and in the number (225,238) of valid permits delivered to refugees in 2015 might present Germany with some difficulties to budget the long-term costs of processing more asylum applications than any of its neighbors.³⁸⁰ As previously mentioned, because German authorities increased the amount of allocations given to refugees in July 2012 by specifying the rights of asylum seekers in the article 3 of the *Asylum Seekers Benefits Act* (AsylbLG), a great number (975,000) of people received benefits from the government in December 2015.³⁸¹ This means that the large portion of the migrant population will remain excluded from the labour force and reliant on governmental allocations for a given time. Taking such a risk can hurt the fiscal purse of the receiving country and induce a loss in GDP, as the inactive population requires more benefits and welfare from the government. Remaining in a state of dependence is difficult to handle for ambitious migrants who are forced to work in the black-market to fulfill their personal objectives and/or repay debts.

Accordingly, the right of asylum and the place of refugees has been placed at the heart of the debate on the economic impact of asylum seekers on German society. Critics of Merkel’s government have pointed toward the fact that refugees sometimes take advantage of the asylum system in Germany, which has assumed a “special responsibility for those seeking protection” from political persecution ever since “the painful experience during the Nazi regime” forced many Germans into exile.³⁸² Such critics have been aggravated by the fierce battle between Merkel’s CDU and Hertz Seehofer’s CSU in the state of Bavaria on the question of failed asylum seekers. The rise of federal-state tensions is correlated with the arrivals of refugees and the popular misunderstanding of the Syrian refugee crisis. As of August 2016, 91% of AfD, 46% of FDP, and 42% Left party supporters lumped all asylum seekers and refugees together as threatening the economic stability of Germany and placing a great burden on the federal and state budgets by abusing the generosity of the German government.³⁸³ Such accusations have been corroborated by accounts of certain journalists who reported that, in 2015, half of the all projected 900,000 asylum requests in Germany originated from Balkan migrants – who applied for economic reasons rather than political ones – but these accounts shifted the

³⁷⁹ Stephan Wagstyl, “German Budget Surplus Swells to €18.5bn,” *Financial Times*, August 24, 2016.

³⁸⁰ Destatis, “Benefits for Asylum Seekers: Number of Entitled Persons up 169% in 2015,” press release, September 5, 2016, https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/09/PE16_304_222.html. Eurostat, “All Valid Permits by Reason, Length of Validity and Citizenship,” accessed September 26, 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>.

³⁸¹ Destatis, “Benefits for Asylum Seekers.”

³⁸² Bundesministerium des Innern (BIM), *Migration and Integration: Residence law and Policy on Migration and Integration in Germany*, 156, http://www.australien.diplo.de/contentblob/3377102/Daten/1831328/download_zu_bmi_broschre.pdf.

³⁸³ Kinkartz, “Survey: Germany Divided Over Merkel’s Migrant Policy Changes.”

attention of the public to the asylum seekers from East Europe, thus “escalating the debate in an irresponsible way.”³⁸⁴ This prompted CSU member Horst Seehofer to accuse Eastern European states of taking part in the mass abuse of the asylum system through which they can get by in temporary shelter in Germany without any prospect for integration.³⁸⁵ Such prejudice is supported by the fact that national governments from East European countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina, have yet to prove that they have come up with solutions to eradicate corruption and bribery in order to improve their respective economies. More specifically, Seehofer’s comment refers to the perception that temporary suspensions of deportation (*Duldung*) gives failed asylum seekers another chance to stay in Germany while receiving financial allocations from the government for up to four years.³⁸⁶ This clearly echoes with the story of the Syrian migrant who blew himself at a music festival in Ansbach, and had received the *Duldung* status in 2015 after his application was denied, testified that Germany’s immigration laws encouraged economic migration leading to the economic marginalization of a failed applicant and hatred toward the host society.³⁸⁷ When *Duldung* holders are not extradited by the government, they remain in a perpetual state of dependence to the states since German law forbids them to seek employment in Germany and thereby integrate into society through the labour market.³⁸⁸ Researcher Heide Castañeda warned about the discriminative powers of the *Duldung* status against certain minority groups (i.e. Romas and Sintis) from East Europe, which “marks individuals as neither fully legal nor fully illegal” by keeping poor migrants in a state of economic marginalization.³⁸⁹ To Merkel’s chagrin, a parliamentary inquiry from *Die Linke* (the Left Party) further confirmed the critique of the repatriation of failed asylum seekers.³⁹⁰ According to the report, there

³⁸⁴ Quote attributed to Germany’s Justice Minister Heiko Maas, who is also a SPD member. Dario Sarmadi, “Bavaria’s Tough Asylum Policy Gains Support Across Germany,” *Euractiv*, July 23, 2015. Adam Heribert, “Xenophobia, Asylum Seekers, and Immigration Policies in Germany,” *Nationalist and Ethnic Politics* 21, no.4 (October 2015): 448.

³⁸⁵ James Angelos, “From Serbia to Germany – and Back: Wave of Roma Rejected as Asylum Seekers,” *Spiegel*, May 26, 2011.

³⁸⁶ The *Duldung* status does not allow individuals to work freely. If a person wishes to find a job, s/he must obtain an “authorization from the local Employment Agency.” After four years, however, the authorization is “no longer required as a rule.” Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Access to the Labour Market for Refugees,” accessed July 3rd, 2017, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

³⁸⁷ Janina Semenova and Manasi Gopalakrishnan, “What Happens With Rejected Asylum Applicants who are not Deported?,” *Deutsche Welle*, July 25, 2016.

³⁸⁸ The *Duldung* status is given to failed asylum seekers who cannot be deported until Germany declares that the situation in their home country has been resolved. Literally, *duldung* means ‘temporary suspension of deportation’. According to BAMF, *Duldung* refers to “persons who are not or are no longer in the asylum proceedings, or whose applications have been turned down but whose deportation has been suspended, receive from the immigration authority a ‘certificate of suspension of deportation’, the so-called *Duldung*. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Access to the Labour Market for Refugees,” accessed July 3, 2017, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

³⁸⁹ The Roma and Sinti are two of the poorest ethnic groups in Europe originating from Romania and Bulgaria. They are known for being nomadic, stateless and marginalized because they have been rejected by society in both the East and West. Roma and Sinti often move freely within the Schengen area to settle with their children in the hope of resettling in a new society and applying for asylum in more prosperous countries, such as France, Germany or Italy. Heide Castañeda, “European Mobilities or Poverty Migration? Discourses on Roma in Germany,” *International Migration* 53, no.3 (June 2015): 88-94.

³⁹⁰ While the *Die Linke* might paint a politically biased picture of situation, it revealed the gravity of the *Duldung* problem in Germany and poverty in the East.

were 549,209 people living in Germany under the *Duldung* status by the end of 2015 including nationals from so-called ‘safe countries’ of the East.³⁹¹ Although Kosovo and Serbia were declared ‘safe countries of origin’ by the German government two years prior, *Eurostat* data showed the third (37,095 Kosovars) and fifth (26,945 Serbians) largest groups of applicants came from these two countries while 54,760 Albanians also applied for asylum in 2015 compared to 162,495 Syrians, 31,380 Iraqis and 31,895 Afghans.³⁹² While it is important to note that not all *Duldung* holders are of East European background and East European countries, Seehofer’s confrontational stance against failed asylum seekers served to reveal the extent of the crisis in certain regions of Germany, therefore forcing some states to take unilateral action. In the East of Germany, for instance, “the Bavarian cabinet decided” in July 2015 to act unilaterally by creating “two facilities as close to the border as possible [...] intended exclusively to house asylum seekers and help those “who need protection while preventing asylum abuse.”³⁹³ In other words, the facilities make sure that “previously rejected applicants will be sent away after two weeks.”³⁹⁴ Despite having signed repatriation agreements, the German government is faced with the fact that it cannot materially and physically prevent the accumulation of self-employed EU nationals working in Germany, who often try to survive without proper health and social insurance in districts associated with failed integration, violence and abuse of the system. Such problems have intensified German prejudice against certain transnational minority groups from Eastern Europe, like the Roma and Sinti communities, especially since the elimination of visa requirements for citizens of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 increased waves of applications for asylum from the East. A spokesman for EU Commissioner for Home Affairs yet again confirmed in 2012 the immensity of the migration problem by pointing out how “the majority [of Eastern migrants] are economic refugees rather than victims” of persecuting.³⁹⁵

Though the Europe-wide problem of the status of the Roma people predates the current refugee crisis and is far from being a new phenomenon, forty percent of the German public still viewed these communities negatively in July 2016 most probably because the recent waves of illegal immigration have given credence to the belief that East European countries are turning a blind eye to migration fraud perpetrated by their

³⁹¹ Emma Anderson, “Over 500,000 Rejected Asylum Seekers Still Live in Germany,” *The Local*, September 22, 2016.

³⁹² According to the European Commission, a ‘safe country of origin’ is defined as a country in which there is a democratic system and consistently no persecution, no torture, no armed conflict and no threats of violence. EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An EU ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ List,” accessed September 24, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf. Anderson, “Over 500,000 Rejected Asylum Seekers Still Live in Germany.” Keersten Knipp, “Safe Countries of Origin?,” *Deutsche Welle*, January 1, 2016. *Eurostat*, “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.”

³⁹³ Dario Sarmadi, “Bavaria’s Tough Asylum Policy Gains Support Across Germany.”

³⁹⁴ Dario Sarmadi, “Bavaria’s Tough Asylum Policy Gains Support Across Germany.”

³⁹⁵ Jessie Wingard and Daphne Grathwohl, “Germany Keeps Romanians, Bulgarians out of Schengen,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 7, 2013.

nationals.³⁹⁶ This poses a serious problem to social harmony in Germany and to political partnership between Merkel and the East. By using radical measures (i.e. use of armed forces) to intimidate the refugees “and accelerating the process of migrant transit through their territories towards desired destinations in Western Europe,” the East tarnished its reputation.³⁹⁷ After more than 1,100,000 people transited through the countries of south-east Europe, the government of Macedonia and Serbia Hungary and Slovenia securitized the issue of the crisis, therefore revealing that their response was aimed at “the protection of national interests” rather than at the defense of European values.³⁹⁸ The defensive reaction of certain countries in the East had for immediate consequence to legitimize the correlation between poverty-migration and refugees in the West. When 37,673 applications were submitted by Albanian nationals in 2016 only, the Germany government immediately launched a large-scale campaign to warn Albanians about the “scrupulous” traffickers who spread “fairy tales of asylum granted” and convince young men and women “to set out for Germany on the basis of false information.”³⁹⁹ Besides, the fact that 30% of applicants, many of them from the Balkans, attempted to disguise themselves as Syrian or Iraqi asylum seekers in Germany further validated the arguments of those who support the conflation between economic abuse and poverty-migration.⁴⁰⁰ The lesson learned for Germany is that the country has remained the main target country for [Albanian] and many other East European asylum seekers looking to emigrate to West Europe.

This narrative has led to considerable misrepresentations of Roma and Sinti as lacking “Europeaness” or national belonging thereby justifying their exclusion from national spaces in both Central and Eastern Europe since they do not “belong” to any.⁴⁰¹ Berlin’s Neukölln multicultural district, for instance, provides a great example of the divide between established foreigners and newly arrived migrants who “struggle to find their place alongside Neukölln’s Turks and Arabs” and usually end up living in segregated buildings where “entire [Bulgarian] villages have moved to German cities.”⁴⁰² As a result, this vindicates the claim that the Syrian conflict has highlighted the impact of failed asylum seekers on Germany’s finances, and thus legitimized the use of the migrant-economic threat nexus in public debates:

³⁹⁶ Richard Wilke, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” *Pew Research Center*, July 11, 2016.

³⁹⁷ Filip Dragovic and Robert Mikac, “The Impact and Role of South-East European Countries in Recent Migration Crises,” *Strategic Sectors Culture & Society* (January 2016): 319.

³⁹⁸ Dragovic and Mikac, “The Impact and Role of South-East European Countries in Recent Migration Crises,” 316-19.

³⁹⁹ Matthias Meisner and Erika Körner, “Ad Campaign in Albania: German Embassy Warns Against ‘Economic Asylum’,” *Euractiv*, June 26, 2015. BAMF, *Asylgeschäftsstatistik: für den Monat Dezember 2016*, 3, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

⁴⁰⁰ Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Nearly a Third of Migrants in Germany Claiming to be Syrians Aren’t From Syria,” *Washington Post*, September 25, 2015.

⁴⁰¹ Castañeda, “European Mobilities or Poverty Migration?,” 90.

⁴⁰² Spiegel, “German Cities Complain of High Immigration,” *Spiegel*, February 4, 2013. Özlem Gezer and Milos Djuric, “A Bulgarian Businessman Moves His Village to Germany,” *Spiegel*, May 9, 2014.

Such asylum applications were and will also henceforth be consistently and speedily rejected, so that the duration of the illegitimate residence in Germany and the associated burden on public finances is minimized as much as possible.⁴⁰³

Although in a federal state such as Germany the *Länder* (states) are supposed to oversee the integration of minorities, conservative German politicians have blamed the EU for reinforcing the financial pull-factor attracting migrants to Europe generally and Germany specifically. Yet national authorities have also had an impact on regulatory rules too often blamed on the EU. In July 2012, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe proclaimed that the monthly Hartz IV payments – the monthly amount of social and financial security given by the German government – for single adult asylum seekers should be raised from €224 to €374, therefore making welfare payments more accessible to those claiming welfare in Germany.⁴⁰⁴ This increase caused the debate on immigration to intensify, as critics decried the raise for strengthening the push factor for illegal immigration and for providing additional incentives to “poverty migration” or “welfare tourism” – that is, economically inactive Union citizens “using a host member-state’s welfare system to fund their means of subsistence [...] although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence.”⁴⁰⁵ In an attempt to assuage tensions, the ECJ confirmed during the *Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig* that member-states had the right to promote the national preference by refusing, “on the basis of a general criterion entitlement to the German basic provision benefits for jobseekers who are in need of assistance,” provided that national governments can demonstrate “the absence of a genuine link with the host member-state.”⁴⁰⁶ In other words, member-states can refuse to provide “social assistance to any EU citizen during the first three months of residence if they are suspected of exercising the right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain another member-state’s social assistance.”⁴⁰⁷ Given that this ruling was based solely on the logic of regulating the single market, rather than the logic of social cohesion, some *Länder* took the initiative to oversee the placement of refugees independently of Berlin while the government signed repatriation agreements with 30 different countries to affirm officially “a country’s obligation under international law to readmit its own national.”⁴⁰⁸ In this way, the Bavarian state government established two camps near its

⁴⁰³ Angelos, “From Serbia to Germany – and Back.”

⁴⁰⁴ Spiegel, “German Court Decision: Asylum Seeker Benefits Ruled Inhumane,” *Spiegel*, July 18, 2012.

⁴⁰⁵ Court of Justice of the EU, “According to Advocate General Wathelet, Germany may Refuse, on the Basis of a General Criterion That Demonstrates the Absence of a Genuine Link with the Host Member State, Nationals of Other Member States ‘Social Security Benefits for Jobseekers who are in Need of Assistance’,” press release, May 20, 2014, <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140074en.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁶ Court of Justice of the EU, “According to Advocate General Wathelet, Germany may Refuse, on the Basis of a General Criterion’.

⁴⁰⁷ Court of Justice of the EU, “Economically Inactive EU Citizens who go to Another Member State Solely in Order to Obtain Social Assistance may be Excluded From Certain Social Benefits,” press release, November 11, 2014, <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-11/cp140146en.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁸ Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), *Migration and Integration*, 177.

http://www.australien.diplo.de/contentblob/3377102/Daten/1831328/download_zu_bmi_broschre.pdf.

Eastern border where asylum seekers without prospects of recognition could be processed and deported within weeks.⁴⁰⁹

This policy places an obligation on all refugees to prove themselves and build trust with the native population so that public opinion of migrants as economic burdens can be reversed during this phase of economic uncertainty. To date, the German government has at best an incomplete picture of what it is dealing with in the refugee population. While the World Bank recorded that more than 72 percent of Syrian children were enrolled in school before the conflict began in 2011, thus demonstrating a high level of commitment to education by the many public and private school that provided higher education to both men and women in Syria before the war, other researches have contradicted these findings.⁴¹⁰ According to the EU Commission, out of the 70% of refugees of working age only 18% of all refugees attended tertiary education, meaning that migrants will have to complete specialized skill training to compensate for their low education levels if Germany wants to increase its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 0.4-0.8% by 2017.⁴¹¹ The existence of gender gaps, with Syrian and Afghani women “having much lower employment rates” than men, might also prevent educated women from finding a job in the German market.⁴¹² However, German researcher Anna-Katharina Rich found evidence that pessimistic assumptions made about the skill level of migrants incorporated data on all migrants, even including those rejected asylum seekers from Eastern Europe who remain particularly lowly-qualified compared to other EU migrants.⁴¹³ From this, it can be assumed the rates of education of those who receive protection will be higher than among asylum seekers, especially considering that “BAMF does not assess the validity of the information” when it collects it from applicants who participate in the survey on a voluntary basis.⁴¹⁴ Hence, the lack of aggregate data creates difficulty when analyzing the economic potential of new migrants, because studies on the economic value of migrants have not collected enough information to judge the potential impact of the refugee crisis in Germany with much reliability, even though EU officials already know that the 29% of asylum seekers who are aged 17 or below will need to attend skill training programmes.⁴¹⁵ Logically, the lack of reliable data benefits those who want to spread the generalization that low-skilled migrants abuse Germany’s asylum system for their own personal

⁴⁰⁹ Heribert, “Xenophobia, Asylum Seekers, and Immigration Policies in Germany,” 448.

⁴¹⁰ World Bank, “Gross Enrollment Ratio, Secondary, both Sexes (%),” accessed September 24, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR?end=2014&locations=SY&start=1996>.

⁴¹¹ EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis: A Macroeconomic Assessment for the EU,” *European Economy Institutional Papers* 033 (July 2016): 4-7, doi: 10.2765/631735.

⁴¹² Degler and Liebig, *Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, 23.

⁴¹³ EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis,” 14.

⁴¹⁴ Of all adult asylum seekers who applied for refuge in Germany between 2015 and 2016, 70% “were asked about their educational background as well as their professional qualifications and language skills.” Degler and Liebig, *Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, 22. EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis,” 14.

⁴¹⁵ EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis,” 14-6. Originally quoted from Rich, A.K. (2016), ‘Asylerteilnehmer in Deutschland im Jahr 2015 — Sozialstruktur, Qualifikationsniveau und Berufstätigkeit,’ BAMF-Kurzanalyse 03/2016.

profit, which is further deepened by the sense that refugees will add a significant burden on the country's purse and resources.

The nature of the refugee challenge is therefore one of selection and discrimination. By invoking a broadly humanitarian principle for the initial intake of refugee applicants – when not all legitimate refugees can be integrated into the labour force immediately as the ability to speak German and learn new specialized skills remain the biggest impediments to employment – the chancellor is testing the limits of the country's economic and social capacity to absorb hundreds of thousands of foreigners.⁴¹⁶ To increase chances for refugees to integrate into the German workforce faster the government passed the *Integration Act* as the first legal revision of the status of asylum seekers since the abrogation of the article 116a in 1999.⁴¹⁷ While the government launched new integration measures to facilitate integration at the federal and legal level with the 303 "Jobcenters" operating throughout Germany, asylum seekers must complete mandatory language requirements before they can acquire refugee status or establish contact with hiring companies.⁴¹⁸ During this transitional period, the humanitarian claims of applicants are assessed while German authorities also compare applicants to determine whether migrant skills are complementary or supplementary to the native population, so that an increase in the labour supply does not drive down wages because unskilled natives must compete in an increasingly crowded economy with cheap labour.⁴¹⁹ While it is true the arrival of new migrants might threaten native unskilled workers and resident migrants in the short-run, since both groups remain the closest substitutions for the new arrivals, Merkel ignore this fact because by selecting carefully, the supposed negative impacts of immigration – lowering the wages of unskilled natives – can be offset by the fact that labour demand becomes larger at any given wage, as the market can absorb this additional supply of labour while remaining inelastic.⁴²⁰ This argument is defended by pro-immigration critics who argue that, a supply of new immigrants will expand the domestic market while allowing the government to monitor the expansion of their own labour force and promote economic competitiveness.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁶ Volker Witting, "A Difficult Start for Refugees Employment Schemes," *Deutsche Welle*, August 17, 2016.

⁴¹⁷ Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, article 16a of the Basic Law was amended making it more difficult for asylum seekers to be granted residence permits, obtain social assistance, or even receive asylum status. Thus, by clarifying the definition of so-called 'safe country of origin' and elaborating a list of stable countries, the Federal Republic finally established a system whereby it could categorize asylum requests accordingly, welcome those who qualified for asylum, and reject unwanted aliens. In the Basic Law, article 16a also clearly stipulates that: "It shall be presumed that a foreigner from such a state ['safe country of origin'] is not persecuted, unless he presents evidence justifying the conclusion that, contrary to this presumption, he is persecuted on political grounds." While some argued that the reformulation of article 16a was undemocratic, others claimed that Germany had to revise the legal foundations of its naturalization and citizenship laws to better integrate the different layers of German society. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law].

⁴¹⁸ Jefferson Chase, "Berlin job Portal Specializes in Refugees," *Deutsche Welle*, December 4, 2016. Degler and Liebig, *Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*, 27.

⁴¹⁹ Giovanni Peri, "The Economic Benefits of Immigration," *Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies* (Fall 2013): 15, <http://clas.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/docs/tertiary/BRLASFall2013-Peri.pdf>.

⁴²⁰ Klaus F. Zimmermann et. al, *Immigration Policy and the Labor Market: The German Experience and Lessons for Europe* (New York, NY: Springer, 2007), 61.

⁴²¹ Coleman and Rowthorn, "The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom," 584.

Ever since the refugee crisis began, Merkel's administration grounded its immigration policy following this rationale – by using migration as “an important moderator of inflation and in the case of a declining native labor force,” an important source of candidates willing to work for German enterprises “that otherwise would have to close down.”⁴²² The next challenge to making Merkel's immigration policy successful, in truth, depends on the ability of the government to convince German companies about the added value of integrating refugees faster into the market through intensive learning programs and convince other national governments of Germany's willingness “to make sacrifices to preserve the global order [...] and win allies for her plan.”⁴²³ But with Germany's surplus of €18.5B and the determination of companies to engage with the authorities to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles of processing new migrant applications, it seems as though Merkel has the leverage to sway the decisions of other members of the coalition government. Obviously, it is difficult at this time to judge whether or not Merkel's refugee policy has created disparities within the German economy especially considering the lack of aggregated data at this stage of the study. In the short-run, it seems the chancellor has succeeded in reassuring investors of the stability and robustness of the German economy. In the long-run, uncertainty about the economy might impact on her chances of winning the upcoming elections against Schulz even though financial markets in Germany still praise “the moral leadership of Chancellor Merkel and Germany” for playing “in an increasingly discordant world.”⁴²⁴

d. Institutional Impact

Though the decision to open the borders can be explained by Merkel's relative political strength, following the electoral victory of the CDU in September 2013 and her formation thereafter of a Grand Coalition with the opposition SPD, the ensuing refugee crisis in the Balkans had a damaging effect on the chancellor's ability to achieve institutional cohesion.⁴²⁵ By acting unilaterally – suspending the Dublin criteria on refugees and the processing of asylum claims over the heads of the twenty-seven other member-states – Merkel indeed gave the sense that she was trying to promote Germany's self-interest and stampede EU policy on refugees.

The perception outside Germany was that Merkel acted in Germany's interest but not in Europe's name. In Germany's case, this is a less devious and more wholesome habit than is often assumed to further the country's interests by encouraging the rapid Europeanization of immigration policies. In response to critics, proponents of the Merkel doctrine argued that the opening was “all about *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*;” that is, the will to get over Germany's Nazi past and transform the reputation of the country from an aggressive to a benevolent hegemon that genuinely does incorporate a European

⁴²² Coleman and Rowthorn, “The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom,” 584.

⁴²³ The Economist, “Germany is not the new Leader of the Free World,” *The Economist*, July 8, 2017.

⁴²⁴ Marc Jones and Paul Carrel, “Europe Without Merkel? Investors Think Through Another ‘Surprise’,” *Reuters*, February 3, 2017. Originally quoted from Larry Fink, head of the world's biggest asset manager BlackRock.

⁴²⁵ David Crossland, “Reluctant SPD to Extract High Price for Coalition,” *Spiegel*, September 24, 2013.

perspective into national policy.⁴²⁶ The price of retaining freedom of movement internally while dealing with the consequences of the humanitarian crisis in the South meant that Merkel could not overcome problems by negotiating intergovernmental bargains, but instead by imposing a broader reform agenda on the whole EU through sanctions and threats, given that many countries in Central and Eastern Europe count on EU subsidies financed in large part by Germany to sustain their transition into the Single Market.⁴²⁷ This meant that the chancellor had enough leverage to coerce neighboring countries into accepting more refugees, in a sense speaking to the better angels of their nature with the power of the purse. Yet the fact that Merkel was praised as a ‘moral leader’ for sacrificing the domestic interests of Germany did not convince reluctant states to support the quota system, even if Eastern Europe depends financially on Berlin’s help. This was particularly the case after the November 2015 attacks in Paris convinced many that closing the border to most migrants, thus trapping hundreds in camps, would suffice to contain the problem at the external borders of the EU.⁴²⁸ “The special character of the relationship between” East and West Germany had already been put under strain during the fall of the Berlin Wall considering that no plan was conceived to integrate thousands of refugees fleeing East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall – even as West Germans shouldered a massive financial burden to modernize the East German economy to improve the prospects of those who stayed.⁴²⁹ In a similar fashion today the refusal by the Eastern European states to facilitate the movement of refugees illustrates the complexities underlying the political economy of Europe, while exposing the declining influence of Merkel’s German and European leadership.

On top of damaging East-West diplomatic relations and isolating the chancellor on the EU level, the conflict also revealed the asymmetric nature of EU interdependence, because it exposed the political vulnerabilities and lack of commitment to mobility of weaker member-states who refused to yield in the face of Merkel’s pressure and implement the Commission’s redistributive plan fully. In fact, the sudden extension of EU membership to Eastern European states whose populations still define nationhood in ethnic terms challenge Germany’s conception of Europe: by welcoming more *nation-states* into the EU ‘family’ in 1995, 2004, and 2007, the continent was transformed into an amalgamation of political regimes at various stages of transformation and nationally-specific goals, which complicated the policy-making processes at the EU level.

⁴²⁶ Stuart Jeffries, “Is Germany too Powerful for Europe?,” *The Guardian*, March 31, 2013.

⁴²⁷ Deutsche Welle, “Berlin Calls for Sanctions on EU States That Reject Refugee Quotas,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 9, 2015.

⁴²⁸ Amnesty International, “Balkans. Des Réfugiés et des Migrants Frappés par la Police, Laissés Dans un Floue Juridique et Abandonnés par L’Union Européenne,” *Amnesty International*, July 15, 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2015/07/balkans-refugees-and-migrants-beaten-by-police/>.

⁴²⁹ German History in Documents and Images (GHDI), *Ten-Point Plan for German Unity*, accessed September 24, 2016, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=223. Originally quoted from Helmut Kohl, “Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas” [“Ten Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe”] (November 28, 1989), in Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung [Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government], November 29, 1989; reprinted in Volker Gransow and Konrad Jarausch, ed., *Die Deutsche Vereinigung: Dokumente zu Bürgerbewegung, Annäherung und Beitritt* [German Reunification: Documents on the Citizens’ Movement, Rapprochement, and Accession]. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991, pp. 101-04.

In the late 1990s, the East-West dichotomy quickly disappeared from public debates, because through the process of globalization and democratization national governments agreed to set aside regional differences, thus transcending years of conflicts and competition. With that process now over the refusal by East European governments to cooperate with Germany testifies to the failure of the cultural homogenization of Europe. Without a common framework to conceptualize European identity and complement, rather than supplement, national ideologies, European leaders have been unable to eliminate “traditional identities.” This has fostered a negative image of the EU and led “to the emergence of anti-Western ideologies” – the revitalization of populist theories denouncing “the rise of uniform global cultural spheres.”⁴³⁰ This is exactly what the Balkans has been rejecting lately: the rise of Germany as Europe’s hegemon and the liberal political values it radiates beyond its borders. Despite being financially dependent on the EU’s “structural funds” for the modernization of their economies, the Balkan states voiced their aversion towards the mandatory quota system because with steady fertility rates, countries like Austria (1.44), the Czech Republic (1.46) and Hungary (1.35) do not necessarily need, let alone desire, large-scale labour immigration.⁴³¹ In the total absence of incentives to accept new migrants East European countries closed the Balkan migration routes not only to bar access to migrants, but also to send a powerful message to the establishment in Brussels. In other words, they were willing to create a Fortress Europe by pushing refugees towards a “new southern border with Greece serving” as a “waiting room.”⁴³²

In an effort to show intra-EU support, the European Commission promised to allocate €780M to finance the redistribution program and €5.9M to help Greece manage its humanitarian crisis, but this compromise was quickly overshadowed by fears of Muslim extremism.⁴³³ Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán immediately filed a suit at the ECJ against the redistribution scheme, dryly arguing that “we [Hungarians] want to decide ourselves how many Muslims we live with.”⁴³⁴ The prime minister was later backed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, who all opposed the quota system and rejected the ultimate objective of this agreement, which was to push for greater intra-EU solidarity with a view to extend the competencies of the CEAS created in 1999 and establish uniform rules for the treatment of asylum-seekers. But when Orbán declared that the problem of the refugee crisis “was not a European problem, but a German problem, he provoked the fury of Merkel’s CDU who lobbied against the Balkan states to discredit

⁴³⁰ Attila Melegh, *On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 98–99.

⁴³¹ The data reflects the fertility rates trends of 2014. *World Bank*, “Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman),” accessed September 24, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?>. The mandatory system would help 160,000 people in clear need of international protection to be relocated in the 28 member-states of the EU. EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “European Commission Statement Following the Decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to Relocate 120,000 Refugees,” press release, September 22, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm.

⁴³² Spiegel, “Refugee Crisis Pushes Europe to the Brink,” *Spiegel*, March 4, 2016.

⁴³³ Crawford, “Moral Leadership or Moral Hazard?,” 9.

⁴³⁴ Jan Puhl, “Orbán Profits From the Refugees,” *Spiegel*, September 15, 2016. Peter Müller, Ralf Neukirch and Andreas Ulrich, “Merkel’s Plan B Could Mean End of Schengen,” *Spiegel*, December 10, 2015.

their opposition.⁴³⁵ The ‘Balkan coalition’ failed to freeze the redistribution arrangement because other member-states (France, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux) backed Merkel’s program. Orbán’s failed referendum further weakened his position in Brussels, because even if 98.3% rejected the EU’s refugee redistribution plan less than 40% of Hungarian voters turned out to cast their vote making it legally invalid.⁴³⁶

As she warned the East European states, Merkel was often thought to be concealing the gravity of the issue from the public by hiding the fact that the refugee crisis called into question the principles of intra-EU solidarity and forced her to threaten the East, when in fact the Chancellor had to form a coalition-of-the-willing. In addition, the divergence of opinion among the ‘Big Three’ has made it more difficult for the EU to act as a coercive diplomatic tool and for Germany to impose its leadership to an extent that worries Western European government almost as much as their Eastern counterparts. This perspective seems to confirm the view that Germany’s influence “is economically supreme, but culturally [and socially] negligible” when attempting to sway the decisions of all the EU-members.⁴³⁷ This comment holds true given Merkel’s failure to impose a broader agenda on the entire EU for the resolution of the crisis. Her biggest mistake was to use the sovereignty clause – a discretionary clause allowing signatory states “to examine an application for international protection lodged in one of the member-states by a third-country national or a stateless person” – in a “proactive and flexible” way, thinking that the younger member-states of the East would be more flexible and open their doors to thousands of undocumented migrants.⁴³⁸ While obviously the chancellor failed to take into consideration the immigration history and political relationship of the Balkans with foreigners, her mishandling of the refugee crisis might be linked to her own misunderstanding of the East and lack of experience with migrants. As a German citizen living in the GDR, she “recognizes the economic potential inherent in youth of migrant descent,” but fails to appreciate the fact that, because Eastern societies had never been exposed to the millions of foreign workers who moved to West Europe in the 1950s, they were less likely to tolerate the massive movement of ‘aliens’ into their countries.⁴³⁹ Like *Independent* columnist Mary Dejevsky writes, “Ms. Merkel, in the grey and confined east, was an academic physicist with a conventional East German education who entered politics only as the country was well on its way to reunification.”⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ Müller, Neukirch and Ulrich, “Merkel’s Plan B Could Mean End of Schengen.” Lizzie Dearden, “‘Refugee Crisis is a Problem for Germany not Europe,’ Hungarian Prime Minister Claims,” *The Independent*, September 3, 2015.

⁴³⁶ Stéphane Kovacs, “Hongrie: Le Référendum Antimigrants Invalidé Malgré la Victoire du ‘Non’,” *Le Figaro*, October 3, 2016.

⁴³⁷ Jeffries, “Is Germany too Powerful for Europe?”

⁴³⁸ Article 17 (1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation allows a government to apply the sovereignty clause and review applications. Article 17 of Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast), 2013 O.J. (L180). Refugee Council, “The ‘Dublin’ Regulation and Family Unity.”

⁴³⁹ Joyce M. Mushaben, “Citizenship and Migration Policies Under Merkel’s Grand Coalition,” *German Politics* 20, no.3 (September 2011): 376-88.

⁴⁴⁰ Mary Dejevsky, “Schröder vs Merkel: A Tale of two Germanys,” *The Independent*, September 16, 2005.

While some speak of “the end of the Merkel era,” her decision to accept large numbers of refugees was grounded in the belief that Germany had to demonstrate a high level of commitment to humanitarian values at home in order to compensate for its ‘military restraint’ abroad. Prior to the great influx of refugees to Europe, Germany’s intake of migrants from conflicts zones was hardly negligible, which implies that Merkel’s policy acknowledges that Western failures may have contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. Moreover, the Chancellor’s reluctance to sign the 2013 *Statement on Additional Countries in Support of the September 6 Joint Statement on Syria*⁴⁴¹ revealed that she remained wary of meddling into the internal affairs of other countries.⁴⁴² In fact, the failure of the *Bundeswehr* to stabilize the Northern region of Afghanistan during NATO’s lengthy deployment in that country greatly impacted on the minds of German officials who preferred to embrace the more cautious ‘Merkel Doctrine’ – a philosophy advocating the idea that nations should refrain from engaging in military actions, which contribute to increasing the risk of terrorist attacks at home and abroad.⁴⁴³ Hence, the Chancellor refused to sign the joint declaration, stating that she would not support the resolution until the results from the chemical weapon experts established whether Assad had actually poisoned his own people. Merkel merely wanted “to have the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague investigate the regime of Syrian autocrat Bashar Assad to slow the pace and put the brakes on the Americans without antagonizing them in the process.”⁴⁴⁴ By explaining “that Germany had first wanted to establish a common EU position on Syria,” Merkel distanced herself and Europe from the U.S. on the issue of Assad.⁴⁴⁵ In exchange, her government agreed to export weapons to conflict-prone areas where the *Bundeswehr* could train [Syrian] rebels to defeat Assad. In 2011, the Military Equipment Export Report claimed that forty-two percent of the weapons were destined for so-called third-party states outside NATO and would serve “to enable strategically important countries to guarantee their own security.”⁴⁴⁶ Thus, without using Germany’s manpower Merkel sought to respond to the refugee crisis from Berlin, all the while establishing a security policy based on the maximization of arms exports set against the principle of military restraint.

The failure to stabilize Syria in particular – quite apart from the collective culpability or not of Western governments – confronted Germany with the challenge of absorbing more than a million foreigners. When a

⁴⁴¹ In September 2013, the *Statement on Additional Countries in Support of the September 6 Joint Statement on Syria* was signed by 11 countries to condemn Assad’s use of chemical weapons on his citizens during the war in Syria. The document reiterated the commitment of the international community to fight the use of chemical weapons against civilians, even in times of conflict. The White House, “Statement on Additional Countries in Support of September 6 Joint Statement on Syria,” The White House, last modified September 9, 2013, accessed September 24, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/09/statement-additional-countries-support-september-6-joint-statement-syria>.

⁴⁴² Spiegel, “Outmaneuvered: Merkel Weakened by Blunder in Syria Debate,” *Spiegel*, September 9, 2013.

⁴⁴³ Nicola Abé, “A Feeling of Abandonment in North Afghanistan,” *Spiegel*, April 22, 2014.

⁴⁴⁴ Spiegel, “Outmaneuvered: Merkel Weakened by Blunder in Syria Debate.”

⁴⁴⁵ Spiegel, “Outmaneuvered: Merkel Weakened by Blunder in Syria Debate.”

⁴⁴⁶ Spiegel, “German Weapons for the World: How the Merkel Doctrine is Changing Berlin Policy,” *Spiegel*, December 3, 2012. Spiegel, “Bye Bye Merkel Doctrine: German Foreign Policy Shifts Focus to Refugees,” *Spiegel*, November 11, 2015.

renationalization of refugee and immigration policy among the newer member-states rendered a common European approach inoperative, Merkel was forced to bring her foreign policy to the aid of her refugee policy by brokering a deal with a non-EU country: Turkey under the authoritarian presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Spearheaded by Merkel, the EU-Turkey arrangement was agreed upon by the 28 member-states of the Union to alleviate the weight placed on Southeast European states by the refugees, but it merely transferred the burden of responsibility from Europe to Turkey – a non-EU state through which EU territory can nonetheless be accessed, unless Turkish authorities restrict the flow of migrants effectively. While it is true that “the impact of the EU has found expression principally via individual pieces of legislation rather than across the entire policy domain,” securing a partnership with such an authoritarian leader has allowed Turkey to tighten its grip on European affairs.⁴⁴⁷ This is especially concerning, given that Brussels’ promise to eventually drop visa requirements for Turkish travellers and facilitate talks on the potential accession of Turkey into the Union will most likely not happen once the refugee crisis and the Syrian conflict end.⁴⁴⁸ In Berlin, the deal was constructed as a “sustainable, pan-European solution” but it did not mean that visa-free travel would be granted immediately, hence revealing the limitations of the arrangement with Turkey.⁴⁴⁹ It is the presence of politicians in Brussels, who believe that Turkish citizens can never relate to European history, culture or norms, which has forestalled the accession of membership by Ankara. Yet, ambiguity about its relationship with the East and the West, as “Turkey could be regarded as an ally of either,” provides enough justification for some to disregard the progress made by Turks to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.⁴⁵⁰ In fact, the recent Turkish referendum revealed the extent of Erdogan’s commitment to liberal values and democracy. Through this constitutional reform Erdogan sought to display authority to its people and prove to EU leaders that Ankara did not need approval from Brussels to remain a strategic player in the crisis. On April 16th, 2017, 51.3% % of Turkish voters decided to grant Erdogan the power to bind lawmakers to the president’s political agenda and “to legislate unilaterally through official decrees” without the oversight of the judicial branch.⁴⁵¹ The referendum, which presented a reform of the judiciary and executive systems, also allowed the president

⁴⁴⁷ Spiegel, “Erdogan’s Assault on Freedom and Democracy,” *Spiegel*, April 7, 2016. Hess and Green, “Introduction,” 320.

⁴⁴⁸ For instance, the Turkish government has failed to revise “in line with the ECHR [...] the legal framework as regards organised crime and terrorism.” Nick Tattersall and Seda Sezer, “Turkey’s Erdogan Rebuffs EU on Terrorism Law; ‘we’re Going our way, you go Yours.’,” *Reuters*, May 4, 2016. Cengiz Aktar, “Turkey’s Visa Ordeal and Europe’s Refugee Deal,” *Al Jazeera*, May 11, 2016. See page 39 of the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Third Report on Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of its Visa Liberalisation Roadmap COM (2016) 278 final (4 May 2016).

⁴⁴⁹ The Economist, “Europe’s Murky Deal with Turkey,” *The Economist*, May 28, 2016.

⁴⁵⁰ The Copenhagen criteria set up a list of goals to fulfill before a country can be granted membership to the EU. Countries must work towards the creation of stable institutions assigned to keep the rule of law, respect human rights and ensure the respect of minorities. With its inhumane treatment of minorities (Armenians and Kurds) and occupation of Northern Cyprus, it is highly unlikely that Ankara will ever become a full member of the EU. EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, “Conditions for Membership,” last modified June 12, 2016, accessed September 26, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en. Pieter Emmer, “Turkey and Europe: The Role of Migration,” *European Review* 21, no.3 (July 2013): 394.

⁴⁵¹ Le Monde, “Référendum en Turquie: Revivez la Soirée Électorale,” *Le Monde*, April 16, 2017. Farooq, “Turkish Voters Take to the Seas.”

to eliminate the prime minister, appoint the cabinet and judges of the country's courts, and reconstitute the parliament.⁴⁵² By holding power in the hands of the executive Erdogan is sending a message that Turkey is turning its back on the EU project by reversing years of secularization and modernization under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The chancellor's deal has thus revived tensions among those who conceive Europe as an economic project and those who conceptualize Europe as a shared identity; but, above all, critics pointed to the fact that Germany had lost its leverage with its principal allies, instead preferring to rely on the decisions of an unpredictable political leader who has tightened his authoritarian grip at home, mainly because of domestic policy issues and Europe's double standards with regards to Ankara's accession to the Union.⁴⁵³ In addition, the deal mixed together the complicated issues of visa liberalization, EU accession and immigration, which collectively deepen the conflict of interests between Brussels and Ankara.⁴⁵⁴ As an immediate result, Germany stands accused of acting in its own interest – even if for commendably humanitarian reasons – yet doing so in Europe's name and at great cost to fellow member-states of the EU. Until recently few scholars would have expected such an enthusiast of European integration as the Federal Republic of Germany to vindicate through its actions the neo-realist imperative that, in a pinch, national interest trumps all others.

e. Security Impact

While the refugee crisis has eroded popular support for integration in the older member-states, a new age of international terrorism and political extremism has compelled Western governments to address the fear that welcoming non-European migrants could undermine security inside the EU and to ensure that the securitization of related policies would not affect the various Muslim communities by turning them into the scapegoats of right-wing populist groups. At first Germany was somewhat reticent to engage in a war against terrorism, given the fact that no terrorist attacks had been carried out in Germany after Ari Uka's failed terrorist attack killed two U.S. soldiers at the airport of Frankfurt in March 2011.⁴⁵⁵ However, the tables turned when the sexual assaults of hundreds of women in Cologne radically transformed the ways Germans perceived migrants and thus legitimized the use of the nexus between immigration and security threat to justify arguments against the presence of large numbers of refugee claimants in the country.⁴⁵⁶ The chancellor has since had to face "the indignation of furious German citizens" who denounce "the stubbornness with

⁴⁵² Umar Faroop, "Turkish Voters Take to the Seas," *Foreign Affairs*, March 9, 2017.

⁴⁵³ Ruth Mandel, "Fifty Years of Migration, Fifty Years of Waiting: Turkey, Germany, and the EU," *German Politics and Society* 31, no.2 (July 2013): 76. Megan Green and Daniel R. Kelemen, "Europe's Failed Refugee Policy: The Crisis in the Mediterranean Continues," *Foreign Affairs*, June 28, 2016.

⁴⁵⁴ Stefan Wagstyl, "Germany: Merkel Opens Door to her Opponents," *Financial Times*, October 27, 2015. The Economist, "Europe's Murky Deal With Turkey," *The Economist*, May 28, 2016.

⁴⁵⁵ Christoph Sydow, "Authorities Helpless to Prevent Lone Wolf Attacks," *Spiegel*, March 21, 2012.

⁴⁵⁶ Spiegel, "How New Year's Eve in Cologne Has Changed Germany," *Spiegel*, January 8, 2016.

which [she] has maintained her political course,” even after “the terror attacks in Paris or the sexual assault on New Year’s Eve in Cologne provoked the wrath of the public.⁴⁵⁷

By manipulating the fears of the European public, IS has been testing the limits of the German public’s tolerance for Merkel’s liberal refugee policy while putting at risk the Schengen regime by which millions of EU citizens commute and goods and services circulate through the single market. Very quickly the succession of attacks by suspected IS members gave credence to allegations made by extremist groups that the immigration dilemma is essentially a problem of Islam-and-Europe thereby allowing anti-Muslim prejudice to emerge as a widespread middle-class phenomenon, often disguised as a cultural discourse on honor killings, forced marriages and Islam. This type of reductionist argument undeniably increases tensions within communities, as many Germans point to the lack of integration of certain ‘visible’ minorities and the subsequent creation of ‘parallel societies’ for explaining the failure of integration in Germany. Seven years ago, a 2016 Pew survey estimated that Germany’s Muslim population totalled 5.8% of the entire population, showing how the country became a culturally pluralistic polity in which Islam guides the daily practices of over 5 million individuals.⁴⁵⁸ Additionally, it is believed that one-fifth of Germany’s 82 million inhabitants – that is, approximately 16 million people – have a so-called migration-background with more than a third of them having acquired German citizenship. Managing the integration of Muslim migrants has thus been placed at the head of Merkel’s priorities, as ensuring ethnic harmony among newcomers, settled migrants and German natives remains paramount to preventing intra-community tensions (i.e. mosque attacks, arsons).⁴⁵⁹ In 2013, half of Germans already believed that “too many Muslims” lived “in the country” – even though they made up “only 5% of the population.”⁴⁶⁰

That 61% of those surveyed expressed concern about the possibility that refugees could increase domestic terrorism is not surprising given that a third also perceive Syrian and Iraqi refugees as national security threats but this poses a major challenge to Merkel who must legitimize her actions in the eyes of the electorate.⁴⁶¹ Indeed, the refugee crisis quickly led to the emergence of the right-wing populist parties capable of threatening Merkel’s leadership and electoral majority in the *Bundesrat*.⁴⁶² For instance, the protest anti-Islam movement Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (Pegida), founded in 2014, has since formed into a political party, the Popular Party for Freedom and Direct Democracy (FDDV).⁴⁶³ This not only demonstrated the determination of right-wing politics in Germany to impose a new agenda on the political system, but it also sent a powerful message that the social stress caused by Merkel’s immigration

⁴⁵⁷ Markus Feldenkirchen and René Pfister “What is Driving Angela Merkel?,” *Spiegel*, January 25, 2016.

⁴⁵⁸ Conrad Hackett, “5 Facts About the Muslim Population in Europe,” *Pew Research Center*, July 19, 2016.

⁴⁵⁹ Naika Foroutan, *Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany*, 6, www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCM-Germanycasestudy.pdf.

⁴⁶⁰ Foroutan, *Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany*, 6, www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCM-Germanycasestudy.pdf.

⁴⁶¹ Jacob Poushter, “European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts,” September 16, 2015.

⁴⁶² Spiegel, “Is the Merkel era Coming to an End?,” *Spiegel*, September 9, 2016.

⁴⁶³ The Guardian, “Pegida Starting Political Party as Authorities Mull ban Over Extremism,” *The Guardian*, July 18, 2016.

policy has revived old ethnic tensions between newcomers and native Germans.⁴⁶⁴ By voting for a right-wing populist party with an anti-EU and anti-immigrant platform, the AfD, (14.2% in Berlin and 21% in the state of Mecklenburg Vorpommern) a significant portion the electorate appeared to sanction the CDU for fostering the alleged ‘Islamization’ of Germany hence compelling the chancellor to change course accordingly and pander to sister-party CSU.⁴⁶⁵

Whatever the progress and outcome of this effort, Germany has nationally-specific challenges to face with regard to refugees and asylum seekers generally and members of the Muslim faith specifically. This is especially true when considering the integration conundrum as defined by German politician SPD Thilo Sarrazin in his account of East-West relations: *Deutschland schafft sich ab* ('Germany abolishes itself'). Notwithstanding that his thesis – the Islamization of Germany – provided a skewed vision of Europe’s demographic challenges, blaming Muslims and all non-EU migrants for contributing to Germany’s cultural decline, Sarrazin’s book brought to the surface the multi-dimensional aspects of the immigration dilemma and the failure of post-war integration of the foreigners, who moved to Germany as ‘guest workers’ during the mid-1950s and 1960s but were kept excluded from the national narrative, making it more difficult for Muslim Turks to overcome their statuses as “passive clients, rather than active participants” in the political process.⁴⁶⁶ While such reductionist arguments puts pressure on Muslim Germans to prove the compatibility of Islam with Western democracy, it has also exposed the major cracks of German integration policy historically. In short, Sarrazin’s argument appealed to mass readership because his book discussed a taboo subject – the failed institutionalization and integration of Muslims within the German *polity* – that had never been a top issue on the political agenda of German policymakers until the release of his book in 2011.⁴⁶⁷

Although Germany’s Muslim community has always expressed its “desire to mold Islam into an organizationally homologous shape, as the modern secular state has asked of all major religions and cults,” the institutionalization of Islam as a “Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts” (“Corporation by Public Law”) or as an official form of religious representation has never been fulfilled because of the incapacity of Muslim organizations to agree upon a common policy agenda for religious activities.⁴⁶⁸ According to German law, the members of the Muslim faith must prove “the necessary stability of the community over a period of 30 years” so that a German Islam can be recognized by the government as an official “corporation” of the country, which will grants imams the privileges to exercise their right of self-organization, and even levy taxes from

⁴⁶⁴ The Guardian, “Pegida Starting Political Party as Authorities Mull ban Over Extremism.”

⁴⁶⁵ Stefan Wagstyl, “Rightwing AfD Gains Foothold in Berlin, but Falls Short of Target,” *Financial Times*, September 19, 2016.

⁴⁶⁶ Jopkke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 209.

⁴⁶⁷ Dr. Hodge, e-mail message to author, October 2016.

⁴⁶⁸ Mathias Robe, “The Legal Treatment of Muslims in Germany,” in *The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe*, ed. Roberta B.-P. Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 87. Jonathan Laurence, “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe,” in *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, ed. Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 257.

the members of the community.⁴⁶⁹ This lack of official religious representation has led many people to adopt a violent interpretation of Islam, based on the principles of the ultra-conservative reform movement called *Salafiyya* Islam or Salafi Islam.⁴⁷⁰ Thus far, attempts to control the spread of Salafi Islam in Germany have been counterproductive: those who feel socially marginalized easily fall in the trap of extremism as preachers often target young recruits by providing them with support in mosques. As researcher Franco Ferracuti notes, potential terrorist group members start as sympathizers of the group (i.e. prisoner support or student groups) or “passive supporters” who then divorce themselves from reality to engage in a “fantasy war” against their state.⁴⁷¹ The fact that both educated and uneducated take part in such violent activities supports the view that terrorism today transcends social and cultural boundaries, thus pushing 400 German nationals to leave the country to wage war for the Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq by November 2014.⁴⁷² Moreover, instances of Sharia police patrolling city streets in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), honor killings, forced marriages and violent fights between Salafists and the anti-Islam Pro-NRW organization in Solingen have aggravated concerns over the consolidation of parallel societies ruled by the principles of Salafi Islam.⁴⁷³

Attempts to control Islam as a religion have been unsuccessful for the fact that national authorities have neglected the needs of minorities for decades giving states the difficult task of engaging with the Muslim communities, even though states can take the initiative to finance religious guidance to Muslim migrants in public schools in cooperation with the federal government, which is responsible for the delivery of the classes. Ever since 2001, by contrast, the Bavarian state allows one-third of all eligible Turkish students in grades 1-5 to attend a course – “Religious Instructions for Turkish Students of Muslim Belief” – in the Turkish language.⁴⁷⁴ In doing so, Bavaria sought to regulate the training of future German imams with the help of political parties or representatives of the community, all the while defining the curricula for Islamic

⁴⁶⁹ Robe, “The Legal Treatment of Muslims in Germany,” 87.

⁴⁷⁰ In the late 1880s, Salafism, or the *Salafiyya* doctrine, emerged as a new religious philosophy of life aimed at guiding Muslims spiritually and personally. The ‘Salafists’ formed a group of disseminated intellectuals who focused on achieving the principal objectives of political and social emancipation of the Muslim population. The term *Salafiyya* finds its roots in Salafi epithets of the medieval times, which belongs to a generation of Muslim reformers who adhered to the philosophy of Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya in order to counter the political framework of the Ottoman Empire. The significance of the words *al-salaf* – ‘the forefather’ – is necessary to understand that Salafism does not suggest a radical break with religious adherence to a cult; its meaning refers to the forefathers or those who followed the creed of the latter and refuted the state-patronage of the *ulama* and Ottoman rulers. Today, the ideology of ‘Salafism’ has been transformed to fit the objectives of Islamic terrorism, which are to wage an ideological, political and religious war against the West and inflict as much damage as possible through attacks. Weismann, Itzchak. “Between Sufi Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya From the Damascene Angle” *Die Welt des Islams* 41, no.2 (July 2001), 206-37.

⁴⁷¹ Rex A. Hudson, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999). Originally quoted from Franco Ferracuti, “A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 463, no.1 (September 1982): 129–41.

⁴⁷² Chris Harris, “Which Country in Europe has the Most Jihadists in Syria and Iraq?,” *Euronews*, November 4, 2014.

⁴⁷³ Spiegel, “Muhammad Cartoons Shown in Germany: Salafists Attack Police at Far-Right Rally,” *Spiegel*, May 1, 2012. Spiegel, “Wuppertal: Oberlandesgericht Erlaubt Strafprozess Gegen ‘Scharia-Polizei’,” *Spiegel*, May 3, 2016. Spiegel, “New Abuse Figures: Forced Marriages in Germany More Prevalent Than Thought,” *Spiegel*, November 9, 2011. Antje Windmann, “Fear of Honor Killings: Immigrants Flee Families to Find Themselves,” *Spiegel*, April 11, 2012.

⁴⁷⁴ Caroline Schultz and Holger Kolb, “Managing Cultural Diversity in Federal Germany: Bavaria and Berlin as Classic Antagonist,” *Fédéralisme Régionalisme*, 15 (January 2015), <http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=1557>.

instruction, but the success of the program remained limited for two reasons: one, because many Muslims disapprove government intrusion into the religious affairs of Muslims; and, two, because “the Islamic religious communities were still not involved in any decisions regarding the curricula or the teaching.”⁴⁷⁵ Yet the initiative to provide religious education was undertaken only after the government realized in 2008 that the majority of Muslim Germans (for the most part, Turks) still felt “like unwanted guests” after decades of residence in Germany.⁴⁷⁶ As German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble suggested at the time, the intensification of Islam religion classes could create competition against hate preachers and compensate for “the failure of the state” to strengthen Muslim voices within Germany’s political landscape by convincing parents that sending their children to instructors not vetted by the state is counterproductive to their integration in Germany society.⁴⁷⁷ However, today, the development of such programs is thwarted by the exclusion of ‘visible minorities’ from the political spectrum as a result of the arrival of refugees from the MENAR and the refusal of the German government to officially recognize Islam’s right to self-organization. At the end, it was the national courts which gave the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) the right to teach Islamic religion to Muslim children in 2000.⁴⁷⁸ While the government cannot forbid religious communities from developing their curricula on ‘religious courses’, as stated in *Religionsunterricht* or Article 7 section 3 of the Basic Law, it requires them to “form part of the regular curriculum in state schools [...] without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision if they wish to give religious instruction in accordance with the tenets of” their faith.⁴⁷⁹

The lack of official representation and organization of Islam has allowed external actors to threaten the authority of the German state by interfering within the social activities of Muslim organizations and investing in the training of imams. For example, the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (also called Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affair, DITIB), one of the largest Islamic organization in Germany, has contributed to fostering the intellectual development and activities of Muslim Turks by providing language training to imams, controlling over 800-900 prayer spaces and helping academics find positions in German

⁴⁷⁵ Slow progress has been made in this respect. The Muslim community of Erlangen in Bavaria has created a new course in 2003, called the “Islam Education” (*Islamunterricht*), which aims at giving classes about the Muslim faith in Germany. Today, the program allows 260 Bavarian schools and 11,000 pupils to receive “Islam Education” in Bavaria. The experiment was launched in 2003, and extended in 2014 by Although the Bavarian association of teachers wanted to extend the program for five more years in 2014, the lack of Islamic teachers and resources made it impossible for the state to extend the program elsewhere. Schultz and Kolb, “Managing Cultural Diversity in Federal Germany Robe, “The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe,” 96-7.

⁴⁷⁶ Deutsche Welle, “Germany’s State-Run Schools to Teach Islam,” *Deutsche Welle*, March 13, 2008.

⁴⁷⁷ Deutsche Welle, “Germany’s State-Run Schools to Teach Islam.”

⁴⁷⁸ Girma Parris, “A Comparative Historical Analysis of Policy Trajectories in U.S. Bilingual Education and Islamic Religious Instruction in Germany (1965-2010),” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, published December 16, 2015, accessed April 14, 2017, http://www.aicgs.org/publication/a-comparative-historical-analysis-of-policy-trajectories-in-u-s-bilingual-education-and-islamic-religious-instruction-in-germany-1965-2010/#_edn68.

⁴⁷⁹ See article 7 section 3 of Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law]. In 2004, four years following the decision of the German courts to grant the FIB the right to teach in Germany, at least 4,400 students had already taken religious courses in 37 German public schools. Ahmet Yukleyen, “State Policies and Islam in Europe: Milli Görüş in Germany and the Netherlands,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no.3 (March 2010): 451.

university to teach Islamic theology.⁴⁸⁰ The Turkish presence in Germany is intensifying the conflict of interests between the German and Turkish government. Erdogan clearly understood that by giving Turks living abroad the possibility of voting on the Turkish referendum, his administration could obtain more leverage on EU leaders and promote the tightening of ties between Turks and Germans of Turkish origins. In doing so, the president gained legitimacy not only in the eyes of Turks but also in those of 63% of Turkish-Germans (and 64% of Turkish-French) who voted to increase the power of the president.⁴⁸¹ Another manifestation of Turkey's grip on Germany's Muslim youth is illustrated by the emergence of Milli Görüş – the German affiliate of former Turkish Minister President Erbakan's Refah Party – as an Islamic organization, known for organizing social activities, and among other things, controlling one-sixth of Turk food grocery stores.⁴⁸² By acting as a substitute to the German state Milli Görüş promotes the trend toward a Muslim parallel society for it legitimizes the interference of foreign influences into the politics of the state, all the while supporting the rejection of cultural integration.⁴⁸³ Because religious leaders know that Germans of Turkish background simply "cannot just throw away" the customs that "we [Turks] learned from our parents,"⁴⁸⁴ their activities reinforce the construction of 'reactive identities' of individuals who usually lack cultural knowledge of the host society. These reactive forms of identity "compensate for a lack of social approval and are most likely to emerge in hostile reception context marked by discrimination and a lack of upward mobility."⁴⁸⁵ Minorities then find refuge in such sub-societies where different forms of parallel justice systems, grounded on principles of the Quran, regulate the daily lives of hundreds of people with the help of special 'mediators' who operate "in a gray area between conflict resolution and obstruction of justice" and often threaten to erode the ability of national governments to uphold the rule of law.⁴⁸⁶

With the arrival of thousands of Muslim migrants through the Balkan routes, the state of Bavaria issued a policy paper demanding that Merkel give priority "to migrants who come from [our] Christian western cultural area" so that social pathologies, such as honor killings or forced marriage, are not reproduced by newcomers, which goes against years of tolerance towards minorities in Bavaria.⁴⁸⁷ This comment testifies to the gravity of the security crisis, as the succession of terrorist attacks in Belgium, France and Germany further compelled the chancellor to recognize the nexus between security, refugee and immigration and act to

⁴⁸⁰ Jonathan Laurence, "Islam and Citizenship in Germany," *International Crisis Group 181* (March 2007): 5.

⁴⁸¹ Le Monde, "Turquie: Erdogan Arrache de Justesse un oui à La Réforme de la Constitution," *Le Monde*, April 16, 2017.

⁴⁸² Jopkke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 216.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., 482.

⁴⁸⁴ Jopkke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 215. Originally quoted from Czarina Wilpert, "Orientations, Perceptions and Strategies Among Turkish Alevi and Sunni Migrants in Berlin," in *The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe*, ed. Tomas Gerholm and Yngve G. Lithman (London: Mansell, 1988), 101.

⁴⁸⁵ Claudia Diehl, Matthias Koenig, and Kerstin Ruckdeschel, "Religiosity and Gender Equality: Comparing Natives and Muslim Migrants in Germany," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32, no.2 (February 2009): 283.

⁴⁸⁶ Maximilian Popp, "Parallel Justice: Islamic 'Arbitrators' Shadow German Law," *Spiegel*, January 9, 2011.

⁴⁸⁷ The Local, "Bavarian CSU Call for Drastic Tightening of Immigration Laws," *The Local*, September 8, 2016.

prevent the smuggling of extremists in Europe through the Balkan routes.⁴⁸⁸ While this change of tone on migrants is morally blameworthy, it is a normal reaction to the recent events in Germany: for instance, that 91% of Christian refugees in Germany had experienced religiously motivated discrimination by their fellow refugees has alerted the public that ethnic tensions might surface in Germany and hurt the most vulnerable religious minorities, such as the Yazidis and Christians.⁴⁸⁹

Despite reversing the increase in numbers of refugees entering Germany from 890,000 in 2015 to 280,000 in 2016, the German government must face a twofold security challenge: first, teaching refugees about gender roles in the EU and informing them about “sexually transgressive behaviour” to prevent a repeat of the Cologne events; and second, screening asylum seekers’ applications appropriately to reject potentially dangerous individuals.⁴⁹⁰ In effect, that around 174,000 migrants “from non-EU countries were suspected of carrying out crimes” in 2016 has cast doubt on the stability of the German immigration system – even as Germany unilaterally violated the EU’s Dublin criteria making it increasingly easy for terrorists to stage ‘lone-wolf’ attacks (i.e. lorry attack in Berlin Christmas market in 2016) and awake a sense of insecurity and distrust within communities in the West.⁴⁹¹ The fact that this is now taking place in Germany, the wealthiest and most influential member-state of the EU, means that the refugee issue in Europe has now reached a critical mass possibly capable of producing fundamental political change. The success of Merkel’s liberal immigration policy ultimately depends on the ability of the government to impose a fair distribution of refugees within the Republic and among EU member-states, so that Germans can better assist refugees in their cultural integration into Western society.

⁴⁸⁸ Aaron Brown, “‘Just wait...’ Islamic State Reveals it Has Smuggled Thousands of Extremists Into Europe,” *Express*, November 18, 2015.

⁴⁸⁹ Open Doors, *Lack of Protection for Religious Minorities in Germany: Religiously Motivated Attacks on 743 Christian Refugees in German Refugee Shelters*, 26, <https://www.portesouvertes.fr/documents/653431/rapport-refugies-2016.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁰ The Economist, “Europe is Trying to Teach its Gender Norms to Refugees,” *The Economist*, October 15, 2016. Deutsche Welle, “Sharp Drop in Migrant Arrivals in Germany,” *Deutsche Welle*, January 11, 2017.

⁴⁹¹ Merkel ‘violated the EU’s Dublin criteria’ by welcoming all Syrian asylum seekers into Germany and disregarding that the Dublin Convention set up the criteria for selecting the state responsible for considering the application of an asylum seeker: the country responsible for reviewing an asylum application should be either the country in which the refugee first arrived, or the one which had issued a visa or otherwise facilitated entry. Spiegel, “12 Dead After Truck Plows into Christmas Market,” *Spiegel*, December 19, 2016. Guy Chazan, “Germany Sees Rise in Crime Committed by Asylum Seekers,” *Financial Times*, April 24, 2017.

Chapter 4. United Kingdom as Heretic: Limited Liability

a. Splendid Isolation⁴⁹²

When the UK reiterated its political commitment to abide by the European principle of an “ever closer union” in a 1975 referendum, the victory of the ‘Yes’ camp merely reflected a pragmatic acknowledgment that remaining aloof of the continental integrative project had not served the British economy well. Through the 1975 referendum, Wilson gave “his own party members [...] permission to change their minds” on the EEC and open a public “debate on the meaning of sovereignty in a globalized world” but, in fact, the electorate was more concerned with inflation and unemployment and approved Whitehall’s decision to forge a new relationship with Europe at the ballot by voting ‘Yes’.⁴⁹³ The main reason why British governments in the 1960s sought belatedly to join the then EEC was their feeling that a dynamic Europe was outperforming Britain economically.⁴⁹⁴ Hence, its membership in the EEC was always one of limited commitment because the UK was forced to forge itself an important role on the European political scene to protect its interests and position as one of the ‘Big Three’ powers in Europe. The British never seemed to truly believe in the European ideal because they were trying to prove that the UK was not “sick man of Europe.”

It is critical to keep this in mind in pondering the events of recent months: the British public do not consider their country to be “the sick man of Europe” any longer. Instead, they liken the EU to a “bastion of state socialism” and blame the Commission for deepening economic and social disparities that exist within the UK, and also for exacerbating the immigration problem in Britain.⁴⁹⁵ As scholar Robert Saunders noted the difference between the verdicts of the 1975 and 2016 referenda lies in the fact that unlike British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, prime minister David Cameron had no clear sense of what the public wanted to achieve with the vote on June 23, 2016.⁴⁹⁶ While it was evident that his party used the referendum to gain leverage against the EU Commission in Brussels, Cameron took an enormous risk by launching a nation-wide debate on the controversial issue of British attachment and responsibility to Europe. Because “Britain’s relations with the EU [...] was certainly poisoning politics” in Cameron’s party, the latter hoped to regain popular consent through a referendum since “the British had not been given their say on the EU for 40 years.”⁴⁹⁷ But Cameron failed to predict that anti-EU sentiment in the UK would suffice to produce a split within the Tory party and revive the anti-EU instincts of many Conservative MPs who have always perceived

⁴⁹² Canadian politician George Eulas Foster coined the term “Splendid Isolation” during the late 19th century to describe British tendencies to retract from the political and military arenas in times of crisis or war.

⁴⁹³ Robert Saunders, “A Tale of Two Referendums: 1975 and 2016,” *The Political Quarterly* 87, no.3 (July 2016): 318-20.

⁴⁹⁴ The Economist, “Not Playing Their Games,” *The Economist*, May 31, 2010.

⁴⁹⁵ Tim Oliver and Oliver Daddow, “A not so Awkward Partner, the UK has Been a Champion of Many Causes in the EU,” *London School of Economics* (blog), April 15, 2016, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/04/15/a-not-so-awkward-partner-the-uk-has-been-a-champion-of-many-causes-in-the-eu/>.

⁴⁹⁶ Saunders, “A Tale of Two Referendums: 1975 and 2016.” 318.

⁴⁹⁷ George Parker, “How David Cameron Lost his Battle for Britain,” *Financial Times*, December 18, 2016.

Brussel's bureaucracy negatively. Even as Cameron became prime minister in 2010 and promised "to reclaim the power and money that had flowed to Brussels under Labour," his administration was forced to halt his anti-EU agenda and govern a coalition government with pro-EU Liberal Democrats

After winning the British Premiership on May 11, 2010, the Tory leader formed a coalition group with the Liberal Democratic Party because the Conservative Party had failed to obtain the 326 seats needed for a parliamentary majority – the result being the establishment of a coalition government with pro-EU Liberal Democrats. From the start, Cameron was forced to halt his anti-EU agenda and compromise with MPs who disapproved the objective of reclaiming "the power and money that had flowed to Brussels under Labour."⁴⁹⁸ Overcoming the challenges of ruling a 'hung Parliament' whereby no absolute majority could dictate the process of policy-making meant that Cameron had to soften his stance on Europe to please the opposition. Very quickly, he decided to change course and deserted his main ally in the European Parliament (EP), the center-right European People's Party (EPP), to propose a more compelling agenda to his constituents.⁴⁹⁹ During the 2015 election Cameron used an aggressive strategy to appeal to the masses by remaining critical of Brussels and pledging to hold a referendum on EU membership, if re-elected for another term. When both the Liberal Democratic and Labour votes crashed, with only 240 seats against 331 Conservatives in the Parliament, Cameron easily convinced the British public that the Tory Party should continue to defend British interests against the dictate of Brussels.⁵⁰⁰ Rather than voting for a new political figure to replace the prime minister the British public decided to preserve the status-quo by keeping Cameron and ensuring that Britain remained the dominant player in the transatlantic relationship with Merkel and Hollande, all the while imposing its say in Brussels with regards to the refugee crisis.

The political strategy employed by the Tories, which consisted of manipulating the public's apprehensions about the refugee crisis and Islamic fundamentalism, ultimately precipitated Cameron's defeat at the polls during the referendum on British accession to the EU. What he failed to appreciate was the rapid spread of anti-EU feelings among the British middle-classes, the mounting public frustration towards Brussels, and the determination of anti-EU groups to captivate the public's attention, in many cases with false information on the nature of Britain's EU membership and obligations. Although this provided Cameron with cues to predict the possible victory of the Leave side in a referendum, the lack of organization and clarity of the Remain camp helped vindicate the claims of those who criticized the current political establishment for

⁴⁹⁸ John Redwood, "We Tories are all Eurosceptics now," *Financial Times*, January 8, 2016.

⁴⁹⁹ A 'hung Parliament' refers to a situation in which no political majority controls the government making it more difficult for the prime minister to erect and pass legislations in times of crisis. The only instance of a 'hung Parliament' dates back from the 1973 oil crisis, which lasted for almost a decade until the events of the 1982 Falkland war unexpectedly secured Thatcher in power and put an end to the 'hung Parliament' of the 1970s and 1980s. Andy Beckett, "From Hung Parliament to age of Uncertainty," *The Guardian*, May 11, 2010. In 2010, the Labour Party obtained 258 seats and the Liberal Democrats 57 seats, thus outnumbering the Conservatives' 306 seats. Lewis Baston, "Hung Parliament: What Happens Now?," *The Guardian*, May 7, 2010.

⁵⁰⁰ BBC, "Results," *BBC*, May 7, 2015.

the decline of British influence in Europe.⁵⁰¹ Theresa May, who was designated as the UK's new prime minister following Cameron's resignation in October 2016, cannot ignore that "a majority [...] of those who did not vote in the 2015 General Elections also voted in the EU referendum," thus showing the level of discontent among the public specifically about the role and responsibilities of Britain towards the European Union.⁵⁰²

Although the UK has participated in many European initiatives in economic integration, asylum, and illegal immigration, the fact that it had never been a member of the Schengen group and agreed to abolish border controls or transfer sovereign power to the EU Commission demonstrates that London's collaboration with Brussels was built on a selective basis. In 1973, when it acquired special status as a new member of the EC the UK introduced the concept of "variable geometry" within European politics; that is, the attempt by member-states to resolve irreconcilable differences with different approaches to integration and variable speeds in implementing them.⁵⁰³ By securing opt-ins and opt-outs of programs, the UK has contributed to deepening the sense that Brussels supports the strengthening of an 'à la carte' Europe, in which member-state could impose their own method of differentiated integration to challenge the authority of supranational institutions. Hence, Britain's exit was predictable because, as scholar Joppke observes, the only way Britain could win the battle of ideals with Europe was to withdraw from it completely – which it did through the "Brexit" referendum of June 23, 2016.⁵⁰⁴ Yet, the fact that British public opinion distrust EU institutions is also ironic, because Britain still enjoyed most of the benefits of EU membership while being excused from many of its commitments.

In theory, a country protected by a sea border should be open to the principle of free mobility, given that the northern sea borders are less porous than the southern/south-eastern sea borders of the EU; but in practice, the fear of migrants reaching the coast of Britain, like they have reached Italy via Lampedusa and Greece via Lesbos, alarmed the public about the necessity to retreat from the Union and to protect the interests of the nation through institutional, political and economic isolation. Analyzing British politics will thus provide the research with an exceptional case to discuss the importance of borders as symbols of security and political protection while, at the same time, answer whether the neorealist assumption – which advances the primacy of national interests over community interests – can explain the erosion of trust in European institutions and the division of British society into liberal-internationalist and a populist anti-EU camp.

⁵⁰¹ Rowena Mason, "Cameron Accuses EU Leave Campaigners of Telling six Lies," *The Guardian*, June 7, 2016.

⁵⁰² Kirby Swales, *Understanding the Leave Vote*, 19, http://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NatCen_Brexplanations-report-FINAL-WEB2.pdf.

⁵⁰³ EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law, "'Variable-Geometry' Europe," accessed October 7, 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/variable_geometry_europe.html.

⁵⁰⁴ Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 135.

b. Political Impact

In 2010, when Conservative MP Cameron voiced concerns “about mending Britain’s ‘broken society’” and increasing “public spending on education and the National Health Service” he was seeking to win the premiership in the run-up to the 2010 election and secure support among the centrist voters who were not convinced by his European policy (i.e. the necessity to challenge the legitimacy of the EU and intensify immigration controls at the borders against would-be refugees).⁵⁰⁵ During the campaign, Cameron changed course by playing with strong language in part to appeal to the far-right electorate, thus promising to lower rates of immigration “to tens of thousands,” and to set the tone of Whitehall’s policy on immigration in opposition to the EU. British governments have, indeed, always been critical about the need to compensate for the weak external frontiers of Europe resulting in part from the EU’s failure to complement Schengen norms of internal mobility with adequate enforcement of the Dublin Agreements regulating external access to the EU by migrants and asylum applicants. Like his predecessors, the Tory leader targeted migrants from non-European countries to alert the public about the so-called dangers of Europe and, by the same token, obtain more votes from middle-class voters who disapprove non-EU migration. A study conducted by the Migration Policy Institute for the Equality and Human Rights found that between May 2004 and September 2009 some 1.5 million workers migrated to the UK from new EU member-states while many returned home, so that the total of nationals of the new member-states in Britain increased by 700,000 over the same period only.⁵⁰⁶

The first attempts to lower immigration “to tens of thousands” were made by then Secretary of State Theresa May, who adopted a strategy based on Tony Blair’s narrative of ‘managed migration’. By pledging to cut “the number of British professions deemed to have a skills shortage” in Tier 1 (high-worth entrepreneurs and investors) and Tier 2 (skilled jobs) caps and focus instead on attracting a “number of high value migrants” such as researchers and IT specialists, May maintained the argument that the Tory party could reduce net migration levels effectively without hurting the economy.⁵⁰⁷ This was completed by a crackdown on the abuse of student visas, which helped reduce net migration levels between the first and third quarter of 2012, but data showing a 3% fall in the number (145,138) of work-related visa issued in the last quarter of 2012, and a 5% increase in grants of extensions of stay (141,007) further revealed the limitations of May’s programs to limit migration ‘to tens of thousands’.⁵⁰⁸ In a competitive world economy, the objective of lowering immigration to tens of thousands remains achievable, but it is highly discouraged for a myriad of reasons. For example, the

⁵⁰⁵ George McNamara, “Government’s Priorities Must be to fix Britain’s Broken Social Care System,” *The Guardian*, May 12, 2015.

⁵⁰⁶ Migration Policy Institute, *The UK’s New Europeans: Progress and Challenges Five Years After Accession*, 13, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/new_europeans.pdf.

⁵⁰⁷ James Boxwell, “May Pledges Lower Immigration cap,” *Financial Times*, November 5, 2010.

⁵⁰⁸ May reduced the number of student visa issued to Indian (-17,604) and Pakistani (-24,668) students hence achieving limited change to regulate the flow of non-EU migrants. Gov.UK, “Immigration Statistics: October to December 2012,” published February 28, 2013, accessed September 15, 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2012/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2012>.

international students who invest in a British education ultimately become skilled professionals (i.e. teachers, engineers and doctors) in the UK who can serve as new manpower to compensate for Britain's 'brain drain' and the 3,508,000 million British citizens living abroad.⁵⁰⁹ Tackling immigration by reducing the number of highly skilled labourers logically halts the development of intellectual initiatives on which major cities, like London, Oxford and Leeds, have always relied to sustain the competitiveness of the British labour market with the help of 54%, 28% and 55% non-UK born residents respectively.⁵¹⁰ While some overseas students return home upon completing their studies, others obtain an extension to stay in the UK as skilled professionals, highlighting a possible correlation between a high number of skilled migrants and the propensity to vote for the Remain option in the 2016 referendum in cities with main universities, as 75.3% of people residing in London, 70.3% in Oxford and 50.3% in Leeds voted to stay in the EU.⁵¹¹

Although much research was carried out to challenge the government's position, very quickly, Cameron's administration was faced with the reality that bringing immigration figures back to where they were in the 1990s soon proved to be unrealistic for Cameron's government.⁵¹² In effect, three years after Cameron promised to lower net migration levels, the number of students coming to study in the UK stagnated at 192,000 in June 2015.⁵¹³ Nevertheless, the Tory leader succeeded in getting re-elected in May 2013, but his party still managed to lose 337 seats, allowing the right-wing populist party UKIP to gain 139 more seats in local elections or an estimated national equivalent share of 22% of the vote.⁵¹⁴ To win the election, the Cameron exploited the Labour Party's downfall under Ed Miliband's government to discredit the Left who had refused to admit that his party had overspent before the crisis in 2008 by running a budget deficit during a time when the British economy was still growing.⁵¹⁵ The implosion of the left-of-center vote certainly allowed Cameron to look more appealing electorally, but he also diverted the public's attention from his failures by appealing in part to Eurosceptics within his own party and promising a deal with Brussels followed by a referendum on Europe before the end of 2017.⁵¹⁶ He did so believing that British citizens would appreciate

⁵⁰⁹ OECD, "Emigration Rates by Country of Origin, sex and Educational Attainment Levels," accessed September 15, 2016, <http://www.oecd.org/migration/46561284.pdf>.

⁵¹⁰ Anna Krausova and Dr. Carlos Vargas-Silva, *Briefing London: Census Profile*, 2, <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CensusProfile-London.pdf>. Oxford City Council, "International Immigration," accessed September 16, 2016, https://www.oxford.gov.uk/info/20131/population/464/international_migration. Krausova and Vargas-Silva, *Briefing Yorkshire and the Humber: Census Profile*, 6, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CensusProfile-Yorkshire_and_the_Humber.pdf.

⁵¹¹ Financial Times, "EU Referendums Results," *Financial Times*, June 24, 2016.

⁵¹² The Guardian, "Tories Would Limit Immigration to 'Tens of Thousands' a Year, Says Cameron," *The Guardian*, January 11, 2010.

⁵¹³ Office for National Statistics, "Population Briefing: International Student Migration What do the Statistics tell us?," published January 2016, accessed February 10, 2017, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/...-/student-migration---what-do-the-statistics-tell-us.pdf>.

⁵¹⁴ Nicholas Duckworth, *Local Elections 2013 Results*, 5, <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP13-30/RP13-30.pdf>.

⁵¹⁵ Andrew Sparrow, "Why Labour Lost the Election – and What it Needs to do Next," *The Guardian*, July 23, 2015.

⁵¹⁶ Almost half (41%) of the electorate thought that the Conservatives managed the economy better than Labour (23%). Nicholas Watt, "David Cameron's EU Referendum Pledge Wins Over Eurosceptics Tories," *The Guardian*, January 23, 2013. Paul Hunter, *Red Alert: Why Labour Lost and What Needs to Change*, 14, <https://smithinstitutethinktank.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/red-alert-why-labour-lost-and-what-needs-to-change.pdf>.

having a say in the “European settlement [UK-EU deal] over which they had had little choice,” but ultimately, his decision to gamble everything on the referendum was based on a false assumption,⁵¹⁷ that pro-EU sentiment in the centre and left of the electorate was strong enough to compensate for the weakness of pro-EU sentiment among his fellow Conservatives to preserve the status quo.

Cameron’s decision to delay the beginning of his referendum campaign and embrace a posture of neutrality on Brexit until the new UK-EU deal was brokered substantially undermined the ability of his campaign experts to keep the Europhobic Tory insurrection at bay.⁵¹⁸ Cameron’s government was limited in its ability to defend the Remain side because he was bound to antagonize the Right or cause an irreparable split among Conservative MPs by taking a side, as 40% of the Tories openly favoured a “fundamental” renegotiation of Britain’s membership or complete withdrawal from the Union.⁵¹⁹ In spite of obtaining the first budgetary cut in EU history, which included “a £1.7 billion reduction in the size of the EU’s administrative budget,” Downing Street finally understood that winning the referendum would be more difficult than expected, especially following the announcement of former London mayor Boris Johnson’s support for the Leave camp.⁵²⁰ The Tory leader quickly lost leverage at home and was under heavy influence by member-states to appease populist tendencies by mobilizing the electorate to remain in the EU. But by aggravating internal Conservative squabbles and attracting the attention of most journalists, “who seemed to believe that the economic issue at the very core of their campaign had already been settled and was no longer worthy of discussion,” the Brexit campaign generated a split among the electorate.⁵²¹ More importantly, it revealed the existence of two clashing conceptions of nationhood and society, whereby ‘Brexiteers’⁵²² believe in Britain’s responsibility to regain the sovereignty it has lost to Brussels and ‘Remainders’ usually share the view “that the world should be better off if rationally administered by transnational organisations, properly designed by enlightened minorities.”⁵²³ In other words, the Leave side of the campaign attacked the whole principle of supranational authority inherent in the integrationist project from the outset; the extent to which immigration specifically – made newly salient by the sudden flaring of the refugee crisis in 2015 – enhanced its advantage at the polls is difficult to measure.

The referendum created a zero-sum situation in which right-wing populist groups used the EU-UK

⁵¹⁷ Gov.UK, “EU Speech at Bloomberg,” published January 23, 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>. Rafael Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign,” *The Guardian*, July 5, 2016.

⁵¹⁸ Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign.”

⁵¹⁹ The Economist, “David Cameron’s Splendid Isolation,” *The Economist*, May 31, 2010. Ben Riley-Smith, “Leave or Remain in the EU? The Arguments for and Against Brexit,” *The Telegraph*, June 20, 2016. Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign.”

⁵²⁰ Bruno Waterfield and James Kirkup, “EU Budget is cut for First Time but Britain Could pay More,” *The Telegraph*, February 8, 2013.

⁵²¹ Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign.”

⁵²² During the Brexit campaign, voters who supported the Brexit camp were referred to as ‘Brexiteers’ while voters who supported the Remain camp as ‘Remainders’.

⁵²³ Pedro Schwartz, “Brexit Will not be a Catastrophe if...,” *Economic Affairs* 36, no.3 (October 2016): 366.

deal to sabotage the Remain campaign and expose the prime minister for overplaying his ability to obtain concessions on free movement from the German chancellor, who humiliated him by refusing “to grant Britain an ‘emergency brake’ to suspend EU migration.”⁵²⁴ The strategy of populist groups, which often consisted in spreading misleading facts about Britain’s budgetary contribution to the Union and the unwillingness of Brussels to prevent migrants from reaching Britain’s doorsteps, was powerful enough to convince a majority of voters that EU membership had contributed to the supposed downfall of the UK on the international scene.⁵²⁵ It was in the context of electoral disputes among Conservative MPs that Eurosceptics took advantage of the mainstream media’s disregard for facts to publicize every dubious claim about the so-called benefits of British retreat from the EU, such as the claim that a post-Brexit UK would have £350 million a week to re-invest in the National Health Service (NHS).⁵²⁶ That mainstream media published information without fast-checking legitimized the conflation of European membership and economic burden supplemented by negative descriptions of migrants. This had the immediate result of separating the British electorate into pro-EU economic and corporate interests, concerned primarily with EU budgetary and regulatory matters, and the general population who strongly felt neglected by the establishment and linked the immigration dilemma to EU membership – even as the management of the refugee crisis on the continent appeared ever more anarchic. Moreover, the lack of action in Calais, the principal crossing port between France and the UK, gave the illusion that the commitment to reduce immigration and illegal crossings at the borders of France remained an ‘ambition’ rather than government policy; hence, the absence of common standards for prohibiting illegal entries into the UK strengthened the Leave camp’s argument, which advanced that placing all onus on French border agents to prevent the crossing of undesirable or undocumented migrants would relieve British immigration officers from the burden of control and confine the crisis to the continent.

Though popular resentment against the EU and migrants in the UK increased recently because of the weakening of the European Union during the Greek debt crisis, the beginning of the Syrian war with the rise of IS, the humanitarian crisis in Calais and the ways British citizens conceptualize their nation also had a substantial impact on their idea of Britain’s role in the EU. Put simply, because the UK never perceived itself to be a country of immigration, it always pursued interests of purely economic nature when implementing large-scale immigration programs in Britain. This strict understanding of British relationship to immigration is supported by years of colonial rule in which immense efforts were made to improve “the economic strength and the well-being of the Empire as whole [...], strengthen the Commonwealth as a multinational English-speaking power,” and liberalize immigration programs.⁵²⁷ A separate initiative was the liberalization of

⁵²⁴ George Parker, “How David Cameron Lost his Battle for Britain.”

⁵²⁵ Nick Cohen, “There are Liars and Then There’s Boris Johnson and Michael Gove,” *The Guardian*, June 25, 2016.

⁵²⁶ Katharine Viner, “How Technology Disrupted the Truth,” *The Guardian*, July 12, 2016.

⁵²⁷ Rather than promoting the settlement of Commonwealth citizens, the government encouraged the outward migration of 760,000 white settlers between 1947 and 1951. However, the gradual decolonization of old territories compelled the UK to define its own

immigration through the post-war European Voluntary Worker (EVW).⁵²⁸ Collectively, these programs had a substantial impact on the psyche of the British public who often lumped all newcomers – especially, ethnic minorities from the West Indies – under the same category of ‘bogus’ immigrants. Thereupon the normalization of immigration as a politically and historically important matter contributed to the framing of immigration as a racial issue between native British and Commonwealth citizens, or between ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’, giving the government leeway to introduce future legislation and restrict the rights of non-British subjects. As scholar Joppke observes, “that the nation was predominantly white, while larger sections of the empire were non-white, is the root cause of racial bias in British immigration policy,” and partially explains the tendency of British MPs to address the immigration and asylum policies in terms of racial (and sometimes religious) relations.⁵²⁹

Ever since the September 11 terrorist attacks, British immigration has been “securitized,” but the succession of terrorist attacks by IS in France, Germany, Belgium and Denmark stirred up enough fear of being held hostage by EU regulators in Brussels. The immediate reaction of the British electorate was to vote for the Brexit vote in order to sanction EU officials for the intrusion of terrorists on continental Europe and the so-called incapacity of ‘Eurocrats’ to monitor immigration flows more efficiently. In voting for Brexit, the UK might have caused a domino effect capable of spreading throughout the entire EU because for the vast majority of the voters, Brexit became the means to punish the state for failing to retain British sovereign control of decision-making processes and preserve its independence through the UK’s tradition of limited liability to Europe.⁵³⁰ As ‘distant observers’ the Tories could have easily contributed to a collective effort to implement an emergency plan for the refugee crisis in Calais and put an end to the humanitarian crisis unfolding at their borders. But instead, Cameron’s decision to gamble on the unknown, all the while hoping to get “the right concession from other continental leaders,” proved that his utmost goal was to retain London’s ability to engage in hard bargaining while remaining independent from the EU in those policy areas deemed to be a vital national interest.⁵³¹

Thus, over and above the traditional concern for Britain’s capacity to absorb and integrate non-European immigrants morphed into the general fear that EU membership prevented the UK from making

criteria for national belonging because with no alternative model of membership to build upon, British ministers were forced to define who belonged according to birth and ancestry – two ethnic markers “that had so far been absent from the definition of Britishness.” David Coleman, “The United Kingdom and International Migration: A Changing Balance,” in *European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications*, ed. Heinz Fassman and Rainer Münz (Brookfield, VT; Aldershot, Hants: E. Elgar, 1994), 37. Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 105-06.

⁵²⁸ Colin Holmes, *John Bull’s Island: Immigration and British Society 1871-1971* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1988), 222. Originally quoted from a journalistic guide to the city, H. Davies ed., *The New London Spy* (London, 1966), 250-1.

⁵²⁹ Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 101-02.

⁵³⁰ With a national turnout of 72.2% the turnout of the Brexit referendum “was very high by modern standards.” In comparison to the 2015 elections, 2.8 additional voters turned out on June 23, 2016 Jon Henley, “Would Brexit Trigger a Domino Effect in Europe?”, *The Guardian*, June 10, 2016. Matt Singh, “The 2.8 Million Non-Voters Who Delivered Brexit,” *Bloomberg*, July 4, 2016.

⁵³¹ Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign.”

immigration policy and national security programs independently of the EU28 while imposing a quota of refugees on the British government. Considering that Britain is often described as one of the pragmatic “Big Three”, evaluating the EU in national interests, security and free trade terms, Cameron’s explicit refusal to take part in the EU relocation plan sent a clear message to Britain’s neighbors: while the government was willing to use increases in Britain’s £9bn overseas aid budget to help refugees settle during their first 12 months, it was determined to protect and distance the UK from the foreign policy objectives of the EU in order to restore the government’s authority by applying national rules to process the claims of asylum seekers.⁵³² British penchant for isolation predates the refugee crisis, in a diplomatic tradition of having as much, or as little, of Europe as suits Britain’s convenience. Both the referendum outcome and the national debate leading to it underscore the resilience of this traditional posture on Europe, namely that cooperation with European partners may be used to further British national interests while integration with Europe can be expected to undermine them.

The refugee crisis revealed that not all Britons espoused the cosmopolitan ideals inherent in the EU principles of free movement of persons and goods. Rising frustrations against the political establishment ultimately forced the government to pander to public opinion through the Brexit referendum and prove that it could still defend “the essential functions” of the state against the grip of Brussels and Strasbourg; that is, the ability of the British state to challenge the legitimacy of the EU without being reprimanded by it. Cameron’s restrained approach to the Brexit referendum, however, contributed to the defeat of the Remain campaign but other factors, such as the economic weakening of Britain’s industrial regions and the Calais ‘jungle’, also created a sense of insecurity among Britons, hence giving the newly-anointed prime minister Theresa May the delicate tasks of appeasing tensions among MPs who demand that she obtains a ‘soft’ Brexit deal – one that could allow the UK to secure a Switzerland or Norway-style agreement with the EU.⁵³³

The case study on the UK offers a clear case in which the absence of a clear mechanism regulating the external borders of the EU created demands by both the public and the political elite for the re-nationalization of immigration policy and the retrieval of sovereign power even if the UK is a member-state

⁵³² The government pledged to welcome 20,000 Syrian refugees over a period of 5 years. Alan Travis, “David Cameron’s Limp Action on Refugees Puts Britain Outside the EU,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2015. Nicholas Watt, “George Osborne to use Foreign aid to Help Syrians Refugees in UK,” *The Guardian*, September 6, 2015.

⁵³³ The ‘Norway-style agreement’ refers to the deal brokered by the Norwegian government to access the EEC in 1972. The agreement allowed Oslo to have access to the EU’s free trade area indefinitely, sustain its trade relations with the member-states, and participate in several programmes and bodies (i.e. Frontex, Europol), but it also gave the country responsibilities to fulfill every year. For example, the Norwegian government must contribute to the EU’s budget despite not being allowed to participate in the decision-making in Brussels or vote on policies and programmes agreed upon by the EU28 at the supranational level. In 2012, it was estimated that Norway had paid €340 million to Brussels. If the UK were to broker a Norway-style agreement, “it would have no vote and no presence when crucial decisions that affect the daily lives of its citizens are made.” Hence, the UK might be better off signing a ‘Swiss-like agreement’; that is, a series of bilateral agreements on most aspects of integration and trade. Damien Gayle, “The Norway Option: What is it and What Does it Mean for Britain?,” *The Guardian*, October 28, 2015. Espen B. Eide, “We pay, but Have no say: That’s the Reality of Norway’s Relationship With the EU,” *The Guardian*, October 27, 2015.

not directly regulated by Schengen standards. More than that, the crisis of confidence of the British public showed that relying on popular consent (through a referendum) to determine the future of an entire nation could be instrumentalized by populist far right movements that do not always promote popular sovereignty and political stability. In the case of the UK the referendum fragmented the country by allowing “dissenting members” of Cameron’s government to play with popular resentment and disrupt “traditional notions” of parliamentary politics.⁵³⁴ Rather than allowing for a constructive dialogue on the importance of British membership in the EU, the campaign brought to the surface the fact that Schengen is seriously flawed.

c. Economic Impact

On June 23rd, 2016, 51.9% of the British electorate radically altered the UK’s relationship with Europe by casting a vote against the current national political establishment and the supranational organizations of the EU.⁵³⁵ The effects of this referendum have so far been negative, as banks have started to move their operations out of Britain to avoid the risks of financial volatility and minimize the impact of the declining value of the Pound during this period of economic uncertainty.⁵³⁶ Prominent banks, such as HSBC and Deutsche Bank, even threatened to relocate more than 1,000 investment banking jobs to Paris and Frankfurt, thus urging May to strategize a ‘soft’ Brexit plan and preserve the City’s status as a European and global financial hub.⁵³⁷ The banking sector, in truth, is concerned with the possibility that banks might lose access to passporting rights – that is, the ability of international banks to access the EU market from their London headquarters through a series of sector-specific agreements establishing rules on banking, insurance, and asset management.⁵³⁸ Such concerns have been corroborated by an official study of the Home Office which confirmed fears that, under a post-Brexit bilateral agreement, trade relations with the EU27 could be undermined by the imposition of tariffs, customs and regulations, putting an estimated 3.3 million jobs linked to export at stake while inflicting a 6.2% loss in GDP per capita on the British economy.⁵³⁹ Banks and financial investors are worried that transactions made in euros will no longer be processed in if the UK does not follow Brussels’ rules. As former French finance minister, Michel Sapin, said, the “sovereignty and security of European monetary markets” are at stake which means that some banks will be forced to relocate, therefore weakening the status of the UK as a stable financial hub.⁵⁴⁰ While banks have been making

⁵³⁴ Bruce Ackerman, “At the Crossroads: Bruce Ackerman on the Surrender of Parliamentary Sovereignty,” *London Review of Books* 32, no.17 (September 2010): 32.

⁵³⁵ Elise Uberoi, *EU Referendum 2016*, 3, <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7639>.

⁵³⁶ Martin Arnold and Laura Noonanm, “Banks Begin Moving Some Operations out of Britain,” *Financial Times*, June 26, 2016.

⁵³⁷ Jill Treanor, “HSBC Could Switch 1,000 Banking Jobs to France After a Brexit Vote,” *The Guardian*, February 15, 2016.

⁵³⁸ Jessica Elgot, “Banks Could Move Assets out of UK by 2017 if ‘EU Passport’ is Lost”, *The Guardian*, October 17, 2016. Gavin Finch, “Banks’ Brexit Future Hinges on Passporting Rights: Quick Take Q&A,” *Bloomberg*, October 19, 2016.

⁵³⁹ Philip Hammond, *HM Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact of EU Membership and the Alternatives*, 9-13, http://www.agefi.fr/sites/agefi.fr/files/fichiers/2016/04/treasury_analysis_economic_impact_of_eu_membership_web.pdf.

⁵⁴⁰ Jill Treanor, “Deutsche Bank: 4,000 Jobs at Risk of Being Moved out of UK After Brexit,” *The Guardian*, April 26, 2017. “XE Live Exchange Rates,” accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.xe.com/>. Sam Woods, “Contingency Planning for the UK’s Withdrawal

contingency plans to leave the country as the Bank of England recommended in a release statement “to plan for a variety of potential [post-Brexit] scenarios,” small companies and young start-ups relying on the value of the Pound to increase demand by British consumers have been hit by the declaration of Article 50 triggered on March 29, 2016.⁵⁴¹

The victory of the Brexit vote was, in fact, precipitated by four essential factors. First, Cameron’s government created the conditions for social tensions by implementing “massive cuts in financial transfers” to local governments and creating huge deficits in the NHS.⁵⁴² Second, the fact that prominent polling companies predicted a victory for the Remain camp vindicated the claims of those who argued that multinational companies manipulate the mainstream media as the means by which the business elite controls vital political institutions that function to serve the interests of the few.⁵⁴³ Third, Cameron failed to inform the public on the possible economic costs of Brexit with real data. Fourth, much of the British public assumed that Brussels’ unwillingness (and incapacity) to solve the refugee crisis in Southern Europe had encouraged illegal migrants to congregate in Calais in the hopes of crossing the Channel Tunnel. The last factor – public perception of the EU and its handling of the migrant crisis played a significant role in shaping the opinion of Brexiteers, as many wrongly correlated the arrival of migrants with the economic decline of Britain’s industrial regions. Indeed, whereas supporters of the Conservative (46%) and UK Independence Party (84%) fear that the surge of asylum seekers would harm the capacity of the government to provide jobs for British citizens, an important proportion of the Labour Party supporters (35%) also strongly believe the presence of more refugees lessen the chances of the unemployed Brit of finding jobs in the UK.⁵⁴⁴ Interestingly, a study found that a correlation between the size of the change in migrant population and the proportion to vote leave had an influence on the referendum, given the Leave vote was higher in areas which saw sizeable increases in migration.⁵⁴⁵ Growing hostilities against foreign labour might also be a consequence of the fact that between 2010 and 2015, the number of non-UK nationals of working age in the UK labour market increased from

From the European Union,” press release, Bank of England, April 7, 2017,
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pru/Documents/about/letter070417.pdf>

⁵⁴¹ In March 2016, following the triggering of Article 50 by the UK Parliament, the pound decreased by 0.06% at \$1.2385 and 0.19% at €1.1518. As of April 2017, the pound was worth on average \$1.29 and €1.18 euros. Nick Fletcher. “Pound Slips From Three-Week High After Date Fixed for Brexit to be Triggered - As it Happened,” *BBC*, March 20, 2017. Douglas J. Cumming and Shaker A. Zahra. “International Business and Entrepreneurship Implications of Brexit,” *British Journal of Management* 27, no.4 (October 2016): 689. Originally quoted from Smith, T. (2016). ‘How the Brexit Could Affect U.S. investors’, *Investopedia*, <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/061616/how-brexit-could-affect-us-investors.asp#ixzz4DBFn9i86>.

⁵⁴² Paul J.J. Welfens, “Cameron’s Information Disaster in the Referendum of 2016: An Exit From Brexit?,” *International Economics and Economic Policy* 13, no.4 (October 2016): 544.

⁵⁴³ Douglas J. Cumming and Shaker A. Zahra. “International Business and Entrepreneurship Implications of Brexit.” 689.

⁵⁴⁴ Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs,” *Pew Research Center*, July 11, 2016.

⁵⁴⁵ Stephen Clarke and Matt Whittaker, *The Importance of Place: Explaining the Characteristics Underpinning the Brexit Vote Across Different Parts of the UK*, 15, <http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2016/07/Brexit-vote-v4.pdf>.

241,000 to 3.49 million, despite promises made by Cameron and May to limit immigration.⁵⁴⁶ Naturally, the migrant-poverty correlation was manipulated by UKIP’s team, which focused all its energy on the deployment of a campaign riddled with falsehoods about the so-called £350m weekly contribution of the UK to the EU.⁵⁴⁷ However this observation seems to confirm that immigration played a crucial part in shaping a negative picture of Europe – Brexit being the result of growing dissatisfaction with the EU institutions. This is evident in how UKIP and the Brexit campaign shaped their argument on the referendum: by using exaggerations and deceptive data about Britain’s financial contribution to the EU to discredit Cameron’s ability to secure a better rebate in Brussels.⁵⁴⁸

The misinformation disaster created by UKIP’s lies improved prospects for Brexiteers to win the support of the electorate and advance illusions about their vision of a post-Brexit economy. The members of the Leave camp organized its campaign in such a deceitful way to conceal their lack of a plan and dodge “answering the main question before them and the country,”⁵⁴⁹ namely how the British government would set about dismantling the ties that had bound the UK to Europe since 1973 without inflicting major economic dislocation and social stress on the public. Brexiteers even proclaimed that Downing Street was losing £350 million a week to the EU to legitimize plans for economic retreat and create conditions of fear among the poorest segment of British society against foreigners. Naturally, Muslim migrants (in this case, Turks) were taken as scapegoats by UKIP’s team to advance fallacious claims about demographic trends in the UK and the supposed effects of granting EU membership to countries like Turkey, which would add unsurmountable pressure on the economy of the British state. To support such claims, the Leave camp conducted its own survey – the Vote Leave survey – and found that 16% of Turks “would consider” moving to the UK upon Turkey’s accession to the EU, which in turn, would theoretically “strain Britain’s public services,” and compel the government to increase taxes and restrictions on social welfare in the UK.⁵⁵⁰ At one point, it was even observed that “since the birthrate in Turkey is so high, we can expect to see an additional million people added to the UK population from Turkey alone within eight years.”⁵⁵¹ The prime minister’s administration simply failed to explain to the public that London saved on average a couple billion pounds per year, as the

⁵⁴⁶ Compared to an increase of 213,000 British nationals in the UK labour market. Richard Clegg, *UK Labour Market: Jan 2017*, 12, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/jan2017/pdf>.

⁵⁴⁷ Toby Helm, “Brexit Camp Abandons £350m-a-Week NHS Funding Pledge,” *The Guardian*, September 10, 2016.

⁵⁴⁸ In 1984, former prime minister Margaret Thatcher negotiated a rebate of approximately £3.6 billion – the UK remains the only member-state to enjoy this privilege. Hammond, *HM Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact of EU Membership and the Alternatives*, 67.

⁵⁴⁹ William Hague, “The Leave Campaign Can’t Keep Dodging the Biggest Question,” *The Telegraph*, June 6, 2016.

⁵⁵⁰ Daniel Boffey and Toby Helm, “Vote Leave Embroiled in Race row Over Turkey Security Threat Claims,” *The Guardian*, May 22, 2016.

⁵⁵¹ Boffey and Helm, “Vote Leave Embroiled in Race row Over Turkey Security Threat Claims.”

rebate allowed the UK to save £4.861 billion in 2015.⁵⁵²

Yet, although Boris Johnson's trivial jokes on the economy perfectly exemplified the amateurism of the Leave camp's arguments, all the while revealing the weakness of its economic logic, the fear that refugees might land on Britain's shores was strong enough to mobilize the electorate against the EU and the Tory leader.⁵⁵³ At first, Cameron's team completely failed to understand that British citizens strongly disapproved the decision "of the British government to allow free access to Britain for citizens" of Central and East European countries that joined in 2004.⁵⁵⁴ Ten years later, however, both the Tory and Labour party were engaged in a bidding war over "plans to restrict access for EU migrants to welfare state benefits" and avoid the likely flow of new East European workers to Britain following the lifting of restriction for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens.⁵⁵⁵ The Conservative manifesto of 2015 sent a powerful message to public opinion by reaffirming the need "to control immigration and put Britain first," all the while knowing the objective of cutting non-EU migration by thirteen percent and capping economic migration from outside the EU remained were an 'aspiration' rather than a 'target'.⁵⁵⁶ The government's change of tone and strategy therefore did not avert the decline of Cameron in opinion polls which began once he decided to adopt a position of neutrality until the UK-EU deal was brokered in Brussels. Certainly, the inability of the Remain camp to organize a solid information campaign about the economic dangers of leaving the Union helped Brexiteers defend their case before the public. For instance, when the government send a 16-page booklet sent to all British households that did not contain any clear data about the financial ramifications of Brexit and "the 6.2% reduction in income as a long-term consequence" associated with it, the Leave camp was given another opportunity to play a weak hand successfully while keeping facts "hidden from the vast majority" of Britons.⁵⁵⁷

The strategy of the Brexiteers also clearly echoed with the political argument of British politician Roy Jenkins, who in the 1960s, questioned the country's capacity to integrate immigrants socially and culturally. As Jenkins put it then, "we are bound to contain the flow of immigrants within the economic [...] capacity of

⁵⁵² Gov.UK, "EU Finances 2015: Statement on the 2015 EU Budget and Measures to Counter Fraud and Financial Mismanagement," 40, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483344/EU_finances_2015_final_web_09122015.

⁵⁵³ The Economist, "The Fatal Contradictions in the Remain and Leave Camps," *The Economist*, June 3, 2016.

⁵⁵⁴ Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten, "Britain: The Unexpected Europeanisation of Immigration," in *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe* (London: Sage Edition, 2016), 33.

⁵⁵⁵ Alan Travis, "UK Won't see Mass Romanian and Bulgarian Immigration, Minister Says," *The Guardian*, November 21, 2013.

⁵⁵⁶ The Conservative Party, "Strong Leadership: A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure Future," 29, published April 2015, accessed July 7, 2017, <https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf>. Geddes and Scholten, "Britain: The Unexpected Europeanisation of Immigration," 31.

⁵⁵⁷ Gov.UK, "Why the Government Believes That Voting to Remain in the EU is the Best Decision for the UK," published April 6, 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/why-the-government-believes-that-voting-to-remain-in-the-european-union-is-the-best-decision-for-the-uk/>. Welfens, "Cameron's Information Disaster in the Referendum of 2016: An Exit From Brexit," 540.

the country to absorb them” with the social factor being more restrictive than the economic.⁵⁵⁸ This narrative clearly mirrors that of Conservative MP Michael Gove and former mayor of London Boris Johnson’s, but it also closely resonates with that of British politician Enoch Powell’s ‘river of blood’ speech, which underlined the failures of the government to prevent the ethnicization of Britain’s suburbs in the 1960s, the heavy concentration of immigrants in “smallish areas of poor housing and high unemployment.”⁵⁵⁹ In his memoirs, *Freedom and Reality*, Powell even dedicated an entire section to the “matter of numbers” in which he pondered a solution to reduce immigration: “bearing in mind that numbers” were of essence for ensuring the integration of “3.5 Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants.”⁵⁶⁰ The strategy of the Leave camp without a doubt drew on Powell’s rhetoric focusing on the ‘quantity’ and the ‘number’ of migrants to appeal to Britain’s working classes.

Suspicious about the benefits of associating with the European continent originated in the 1980s from a small group within the political élite of the Conservative party whose main goal was to challenge Margaret Thatcher’s collaboration with EU Commissioner Jacques Delors in the promotion of the Single European Act. A minority of Conservative MPs truly abhorred her politics of accommodation and adaptation to modernity, as they considered Thatcher’s embrace of the EU project to be an attack on those who valued the principle of self-preservation more than Britain’s commitment to integration and free market economics.⁵⁶¹ Thatcherite Eurosceptics gained power within the Conservative party, and quickly turned against the prime minister whose support for ‘Europe’ was deemed antithetical to British economic interests and identities.⁵⁶² In a similar fashion, Conservative MP Michael Gove, discredited Cameron’s administration by discarding the importance of economists publicly, and focusing instead on how they “had failed to predict the financial crisis” of 2008.⁵⁶³ Gove’s account of the economic situation in Britain mirrors that of the 1970s during which time commentators described the UK as the ‘sick man of Europe’, outpaced on every measure by the dynamic economies of the continent. During the 1990s and more recently from the 2008 and 2010 crises the UK nonetheless shook this image by maintaining a strong focus on financial discipline and recovering faster than its European counterparts, as unemployment decreased from 7.9% to 4.7% between December 2010 and February 2017.⁵⁶⁴ London’s successful recovery – repairing the damage to the public-sector balance sheet

⁵⁵⁸ Gary P. Freeman, *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience in 1945-1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 137. Originally quoted from Jenkins’ speech given at the Commonwealth Institute to a Meeting of Voluntary Liaison Committees, p.7.

⁵⁵⁹ Enoch J. Powell and John Wood, eds., *Freedom and Reality* (London: Batsford, 1969), 214.

⁵⁶⁰ Powell and Wood, *Freedom and Reality*, 214.

⁵⁶¹ Gifford Chris, *The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and Economy in a Post-Imperial State* (Burlington, VT; Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 83-90.

⁵⁶² Chris, *The Making of Eurosceptic Britain*, 83.

⁵⁶³ Henry Mance, “Britain has had Enough of Experts, Says Gove,” *Financial Times*, June 3, 2016.

⁵⁶⁴ Richard Clegg, “Unemployment Rate (Aged 16 and Over, Seasonally Adjusted,” Office for National Statistics, published April 12, 2017, accessed April 20, 2017,

while keeping inflation down to around zero so that consumer confidence and investment intentions remain at high levels – essentially disproves Gove’s assumption that London has once again become ‘a sinking ship’.⁵⁶⁵ The outcome of the 2016 referendum now compels the UK to leave the single market that Thatcher’s government played such a pivotal role in creating and which, according to the available data, worked for Britain’s economy almost exactly as Thatcher hoped it would.

Other findings also contradict the official declarations made by the Brexit camp on the so-called burden that migrants add to British society. During the campaign, many Brexiteers preferred to conceal the fact that migrants not only boosted productivity, but that they also helped strike a demographic balance for the country. In effect, although the British economy did not implement any large-scale immigration policies to sustain the balance between the young and old population, it did reap the benefits of Polish immigration. In 2015, Polish women gave birth to 22,928 children, which generated a small increase (2.5%) in live births between 2014 and 2015, followed by Pakistani (17,342) and Indian (13,780) women.⁵⁶⁶ Many politicians, hostile to the Conservative decision to grant the Poles access to British market in 2004, described the move as a “spectacular mistake [...] straining public services to breaking point,” but stable fertility rates and a steady recovery of the British economy invalidates the assumption that migrants from other EU member-states cannot be readily absorbed into Britain’s society.⁵⁶⁷ However, it is important to note that objections to [Polish] immigration in Britain speaks directly to the freedom of labour mobility within the EU market – rather than to British concern about EU’s weak external borders. Long-term international migration⁵⁶⁸ to the UK has, in truth, allowed the government to maintain stagnating fertility rates at 1.76 in 2015 and compensate for the decrease (0.4%) in live births to UK-born women through a selective process whereby migration flows of EU and/or non-EU nationals can be ‘managed’ from a distance.⁵⁶⁹ It is important to note here that public debate about immigration in the UK has centered as much around immigration from continental Europe as around immigration from beyond the EU, so that the 2015 refugee crisis served only to further aggravate a national debate that had already become shrill.

More importantly, what Brexit uncovered was the existence of a deeper division within British

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms>. Saunders, “A Tale of Two Referendums,” 319.

⁵⁶⁵ Bank of England, “The UK Economy Post Crisis: A Series of Unfortunate Events?, Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe,” press release, February 24, 2016, www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/.../speeches/2016/speech884.pdf.

⁵⁶⁶ OECD, “Fertility rates,” accessed September 30, 2016, doi: 10.1787/8272fb01-en. Elizabeth McLaren, *Birth in England and Wales by Parents’ Country of Birth: 2015*, 7, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/parentscountryofbirthenglandandwales/2014-08-28/pdf>.

⁵⁶⁷ The Economist, “The Polish Paradox,” *The Economist*, December 14, 2013.

⁵⁶⁸ The UN defines a long-term international migrant as an individual who aspires to move to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year. The destination country of this individual will eventually become his or her new country of usual residence. United Nations Statistic Division (UNSD), “International Migration: Concepts and Definitions,” accessed September 30, 2016, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/migration/migrmethods.htm>.

⁵⁶⁹ McLaren, *Birth in England and Wales by Parents’ Country of Birth: 2015*, 2.

society, one that separated the country into two opposed groups, each having its own divergence of opinion about the economic state of the British nation and its financial responsibility in the EU. Whereas those working in large corporations based in metropolitan urban centers backed the Remain side mainly because of UK's financial and monetary ties with the European continent, those living in rural Britain voted *en masse* for the Leave camp, usually without knowing the true ramifications of retreating from the union.⁵⁷⁰ UKIP's message resonated in the minds of so many British voters because the small cities and towns, which have suffered from post-industrial decline, feel ignored by the London-based government and Europe. Leave voters consist predominantly of people living in the outskirts of big cities or in industrial regions, like East Lindsey, South Holland and Dover, where 70.7%, 73.6%, and 62.2% voted for Brexit respectively.⁵⁷¹ That 62.2% of the Dover population voted to leave the union is understandable given that it has become a focal point for the arrest of illegal migrants entering the UK from the Channel Tunnel. In regions like Cornwall, by contrast, 57% of voters opted to leave the EU despite receiving European funding from Brussels, which provides financial compensation to individuals whose incomes are 75% below the EU average.⁵⁷² The Council leader of the Cornwall Chamber of Commerce justifies the victory of Leave by pointing out the "areas of great deprivation" that isolate rich urbanites from the poorer segments of the population, but his analysis fails to incorporate the role of immigration in shaping the opinions of Cornwall's inhabitants, who interact with only 3434 Asian British, 762 Blacks and 189 Arabs living in the region, according to the 2011 census.⁵⁷³ The neglected rural areas of England, such as Cornwall, which are for the most part populated by UK-born residents who have little contact with migrants and are predominantly white, confronted the British state with its failures to distribute the wealth evenly across the country. Rather than protesting the potential arrival of new migrants, Leave voters essentially voiced their frustration against the introduction of cheap labour from Poland, India and other Southeast Asian countries into the labour market, which increased the share of foreign-born people by 43.9% (or 3.7 million) in less than ten years.⁵⁷⁴ As 'little England' feels "rejected" and "betrayed" by the decision of previous governments to welcome an unprecedented number of migrants into the UK – with whom natives cannot compete economically since "the wages they will work for" is too low.⁵⁷⁵ The refugee crisis therefore acted as a decisive factor for the British electorate to impose Brexit on the political elite as the only solution to protect British jobs and reduce poverty. In cities like Northampton and Boston, where the share of non-UK residents does not exceed 15.5% and 16.33% respectively, the Leave

⁵⁷⁰ The Economist, "The Brexit Vote Reveals a Country Split Down the Middle," *The Economist*, June 24, 2016.

⁵⁷¹ BBC, "EU Referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts," *BBC News*, June 24, 2016.

⁵⁷² The Economist, "I owe EU," *The Economist*, June 30, 2016.

⁵⁷³ Cornrnwall.gov.uk, "2011 Census: An Overview of the Headline Figures for Cornwall," published February 2013, accessed September 20, 2016, https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/21657889/census_at_a_glance_docxrelease21_allpapersv2.pdf.

⁵⁷⁴ According to the Migratory Observatory, the number of foreign-born workers increased from 2.9 million to 6.6 million people from 1993 to 2014. Cinzia Rienzo, *Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview*, 2, http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrants_in_the_UK_Labour_Market.pdf.

⁵⁷⁵ Mike Carter, "I Walked From Liverpool to London. Brexit was no Surprise," *The Guardian*, June 27, 2016.

camp easily attracted enough support with the help of UKIP to spread fallacious ideas about London's so-called weekly financial contribution of £350 million and the terrorist threat posed by the refugees of the Calais "jungle."⁵⁷⁶ For Brexiteers, the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers was used as a pretext to legitimize their anti-EU agenda. Hence, a correlation between the lack of exposure to ethnic diversity and the propensity to vote for Brexit might explain Cornwall's choice to withdraw from the Union. As a local Conservative MP and Brexiteer Steve Double said, British citizens "took the opportunity to give the elites a damn good kicking."⁵⁷⁷

Through this 'sanction-vote' middle class workers voiced frustration at the EU for the perception that it had invested in urban centers at the expense of post-industrial regions in need of financial help, when in many cases EU funding⁵⁷⁸ in fact went to their own region. What was undeniably true was that the growth of the British economy within the European market advantaged urban centres with strong commercial links to the continent. Although the Brexit camp relied on describing migrants as threats 'from within' and using Europe as a scapegoat for Britain's alleged decline, this strategy overwhelmed the Remain campaign to plunge the UK into a period of great uncertainty. London will most likely suffer from the greatest loss of income, as foreign investment and overseas trade are expected to fall in the short-run and "declining profit margin" causes multinationals "to reconsider the attractiveness of the UK as a place of business" and relocate elsewhere in Europe.⁵⁷⁹ Furthermore, predictions by an OECD report warning that Brexit could result in a tax to compensate for the loss of income incurred by the victory of the Leave can suggest that future generations will have to pay a heavy fine for leaving the EU.⁵⁸⁰ As the *Financial Times* observed, the recovery of the British Pound, which fell to \$1.1992 in January 2017 following May's speech, "will remain conditional on prime minister's ability to convey the image to investors that the UK government does have a firm grasp on the way ahead."⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁶ Mason, "Cameron Accuses EU Leave Campaigners of Telling six Lies." Anna Krausova, "Non-UK Born Residents as Share of Local (LA) Population: Great Britain 2011," *The Migration Observatory*, published September 1, 2014, accessed May 2, 2016, <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-great-britain-census-factsheet/>.

⁵⁷⁷ The Economist, "I owe EU."

⁵⁷⁸ Every year, the UK received billions in loans and infrastructure investment from the EU for clean energy projects and universities. Robin Pagnamenta, "Brexit Threatens Billions of Super-Cheap EU Loans," *The Times*, July 4, 2016.

⁵⁷⁹ Cumming and Zahra, "International Business and Entrepreneurship Implications of Brexit," 689.

⁵⁸⁰ According to the OECD, the loss in GDP is estimated at 3%. OECD, "OECD Study Finds Britons Will be Paying a Heavy 'Brexit tax' for Many Years if UK Leaves EU," published April 27, 2016, accessed September 20, 2016, <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-study-finds-britons-will-be-paying-a-heavy-brexit-tax-for-many-years-if-uk-leaves-eu.htm>.

Phillip Inman, "IFS Warns Brexit Would Extend Austerity for two More Years," *The Guardian*, May 25, 2016.

⁵⁸¹ Jennifer Hughes and Robin Wigglesworth, "Pound Falls Below \$1.20 Ahead of Theresa May's Brexit Speech," *Financial Times*, January 16, 2016.

d. Institutional Impact

The institutional crisis between the UK and Brussels began when Cameron vowed to consult the British people and organise “a straight in-out referendum” on British membership in the EU four months before the local elections of May 2013 were set to begin.⁵⁸² Very quickly, the crisis gained momentum again after the members of the Conservative party protested the high costs of EU membership imposed by Brussels: specifically, an increase of £1.7bn applied to the UK’s net payments because the British economy had performed better but this provoked outrage among British MPs who demanded that Cameron retaliate against EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker for imposing financial sanctions on sound economic performance. Despite efforts by Cameron’s government to lower the charge, the government was compelled to repay the £1.7bn it owed to Brussels, reminding the British public of Cameron’s incapacity to defend British sovereignty.⁵⁸³ In light of the climate of British domestic politics in 2013, the timing of Juncker’s announcement was unfortunate.

The crisis, however, deepened when British Eurosceptics criticized the UK-EU compromise of February 2016 for achieving limited changes, for example with regards to limiting benefits for migrants, an issue that links European labour mobility with national welfare policy, or to restricting London’s commitment to ‘an ever-closer union’.⁵⁸⁴ In his January 2013 Bloomberg speech, Cameron promised that he would work towards breaking a new deal with Brussels to regain sovereignty over decisions made at the EU level and obtain insurance “that the words ever closer union” did not “apply to the United Kingdom.”⁵⁸⁵ Cameron’s political downfall started when minimal returns on issues such as this appeared to weaken the UK’s status as one of the ‘Big Three’. The determination of the Commission to ensure that any derogation to fundamental freedoms was limited doomed Cameron’s chances of gaining credibility. Additionally, the electorate was under the impression that the UK-EU deal did not reinforce Britain’s institutional power position vis-à-vis the rest of the EU, when it actually did give London a measure of control over its sovereignty and the application of policies made at the EU level.⁵⁸⁶ Like *The Guardian* noted, whether or not the Leave side is to blame for exacerbating feelings of resentment against the establishment and lying about the so-called loss of sovereignty

⁵⁸² The Guardian, “David Cameron’s EU Speech – Full Text,” *The Guardian*, January 23, 2013.

⁵⁸³ Reforms were made in the financial sector to safeguard the pound and promote British industries; to improve European competitiveness in favor of British families; to change migration policies and end the situation where EU nationals avoid British immigration rules to join their families; and to reaffirm the sovereignty of the Parliament over EU institutions and the ECJ. Gov.UK, “PM Commons statement on EU reform and referendum: 22 February 2016.” Mark Tran, “Britain’s £1.7bn EU Surcharge – Q&A.” Ian Traynor, “UK to pay £1.7bn EU Bill in Full Despite Osborne’s Claim to Have Halved it,” *The Guardian*, November 7, 2014.

⁵⁸⁴ Jennifer Rakin, “David Cameron’s EU Deal: What he Wanted and What he got,” *The Guardian*, February 19, 2016.

⁵⁸⁵ Peter Foster, “EU Deal: What David Cameron Asked for... and What he Actually got,” *The Telegraph*, June 14, 2016.

⁵⁸⁶ For more information on the UK-EU deal, see Council Conclusion on the New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the EU, February 19, 2016, 2016, O.J. (C 69 I) 1.

of the British Parliament, Cameron's legacy will always be marked "by a collection of tactical manoeuvres, with as many prominent surrenders as victories."⁵⁸⁷

The creation of Section C of the UK-EU deal, for instance, aimed at reassuring the public that sovereign power was still in the hands of the Parliament, and it also reflected the limitations of British attachment to the European integrationist ideal, without really giving the UK parliament much power besides the 'red card' option – an option allowing governments to veto an EU legislation on the condition that 55% of all national EU parliaments object the law within 12 weeks of its release.⁵⁸⁸ Public opinion immediately reacted by blaming the EU for the gradual decline of the UK as an independent force and Cameron for precipitating its downfall. As previously stated, a survey conducted by a pro-Brexit polling company found that 49% of Leave voters agreed with "the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK" while 33% of them also felt "that voting to leave the EU offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its borders."⁵⁸⁹ Such results clearly demonstrate Britain's lack of trust in the institutions and authority of the EU, and more particularly that of the ECJ. Though the creation of Section C clearly sought to alleviate tensions over the degree of interference of supranational bodies into the national affairs of the British state, it could not compensate for the limitations of British commitment to Europe or insulate UK law from EU law. Narrowing "the reference to ever closer union" so that it did not apply [...] and did "not offer a legal basis for extending the scope of any provision" to UK laws did not suffice to persuade the British public that Cameron had regained a measure of control by forcing the EU Council to recognize that the UK was not in fact committed to an ever-closer union.⁵⁹⁰

Yet Cameron falsely believed the special status enjoyed by the UK could be used as leverage to obtain further concessions from the member-states involved in the negotiations, when the UK already enjoyed a status that other member-states considered sufficiently special.⁵⁹¹ With opt-outs from the EMU, the border-free Schengen area and JHA legislations, British demands for a renegotiation of its EU membership exacerbated tensions over the fact that London was and is still taking advantage of an 'à la carte' Europe to deepen its special status. Likewise, the UK-EU negotiations isolated the UK on the European stage, all the while fuelling tensions at home within the Tory party over allegations that the ECJ could overrule the deal

⁵⁸⁷ Rafael Behr, "Power Without Purpose – The Tragic Rule of David Cameron," *The Guardian*, January 6, 2015.

⁵⁸⁸ See Section C on Sovereignty, paragraph 3: "where reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a draft Union legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity, sent within 12 weeks from the transmission of that draft, represent more than 55 % of the votes allocated to the national Parliaments, the Council Presidency will include the item on the agenda of the Council for a comprehensive discussion on these opinions and on the consequences to be drawn therefrom." Council Conclusion on the New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the EU, February 19, 2016, 2016, O.J. (C 69 I) 1.

⁵⁸⁹ Lord Ashcroft, "How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and why," Lord Ashcroft Polls, published June 24, 2016.

⁵⁹⁰ General Secretariat of the Council, European Council Meeting (18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions (Brussels, European Council, 2016), <http://docs.dpaq.de/10395-0216-euco-conclusions.pdf>.

⁵⁹¹ Philip Oltermann and Helena Smith, "Angela Merkel: UK's EU Deal Demanded a lot of Willingness for Compromise," *The Guardian*, February 20, 2016.

signed by Cameron.⁵⁹² Clearly, the credibility of the prime minister was already too damaged to recover from months of silence on the government's position for the Brexit referendum during which time the Conservative Party headquarters were supposed to remain neutral until the deal was signed in order to help secure the result Cameron wanted “yet dared not advocate in public.”⁵⁹³ President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel nonetheless grew suspicious of Cameron’s readiness to form credible partnerships with pro-European groups or reform with the EU through its own institutions. From a political standpoint, the prime minister doomed his campaign from the start by adopting a confrontational stance towards the EU and deserting the main center-right Europhile European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament for its federalist ambitions.⁵⁹⁴

One of the biggest institutional risks of the outcome of the British referendum is the likelihood of defection by other EU member-states; that is, the fear that Brexit could prompt other Eurosceptic countries to hold their own referenda.⁵⁹⁵ Donald Tusk, President of the European Council reiterated his condemnation of the referendum and reminded the heads of the member-states that as Cameron’s successor prime minister May had no realistic chances of negotiating a “soft Brexit” whereby Britain could retain substantial ties to Europe.⁵⁹⁶ Together with the risk of defection and the effects on the power structures of the EU the referendum has undermined the very institutions designed to encourage intergovernmental negotiations for the convergence of interests, rather than promoting the uneven implementation of EU policies through “variable geometry.” Indeed, in the eyes of many EU member-states Britain had already benefitted lavishly from variable geometry and in 2016 had abandoned geometry altogether. Some even foresee the future division of the EU into two blocs of member-states, with the Northern liberal and the Southern protectionist bloc, each struggling to defend their respective national and regional interests.⁵⁹⁷ This is especially troubling given that the UK has always acted as a bridge between the North and the South of Europe. In other words, the UK’s departure from the Union might threaten the stability of the entire continent and give more room for the emergence of populist movements in European political life, as is the case in France’s Front National (FN), Germany’s AfD or Italy’s anti-establishment Five Star Movement (FSM).

Diplomatically, the UK will lose access to Schengen policing and Schengen Information System (SIS) provisions, unless it accepts to erect new agreements that will bridge gaps between the existing European immigration policies and those of the UK, and facilitate the migration flows of the 3.3 million

⁵⁹² Rowena Mason, “EU Referendum: Tories in Open Warfare Over Legal Status of Cameron Deal,” *The Guardian*, February 25, 2016.

⁵⁹³ Behr, “How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign.”

⁵⁹⁴ Nicholas Watt, “Cameron Decision to Quit EU Group is ‘Dotty’ Says Tory MEP,” *The Guardian*, May 5, 2009.

⁵⁹⁵ Oliver Patel and Christine Reh, “Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System,” (briefing paper, London, 2015), <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/europe/briefing-papers/Briefing-paper-2>.

⁵⁹⁶ Jim Brundsen, “‘Hard Brexit’ or no Brexit, Donald Tusk Warns UK,” *Financial Times*, October 13, 2016.

⁵⁹⁷ Patel and Reh, *Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System*, 5.

Europeans living in Britain and the 1.2 million Britons living in the EU.⁵⁹⁸ To compensate for its departure British involvement with Frontex and Eurodac could be enhanced so as to maintain cross-border policing with neighbouring countries, especially with regards to how fast the situation deteriorated in Calais with the arrival of thousands of unaccompanied minors.⁵⁹⁹ However, whether or not the UK will be allowed to take part, at any time, in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen *acquis* and cross-border security depends on the ability of the EU to observe the legal procedure as set out in Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol. Whenever it is deemed essential to the security of Europeans, the Council of the European Union “shall decide on the request with the unanimity of its members.”⁶⁰⁰ Diplomatic cooperation with the EU in the domains of immigration will hence remain uncertain, especially in the case of Frontex, since access to the organization by non-Schengen members is conditional on the willingness of member-states to approve the request unanimously.⁶⁰¹

Even though the British government has opted-out of many Schengen provisions in Pillar III, it still takes part in the development of many initiatives pertaining to immigration and security, such as the creation of information networks investigating the organization of illegal immigration and the repatriation of failed asylum seekers to their home countries.⁶⁰² Hence, it is logical to assume the presence of British immigration officers in Northern France will likely remain, given that the Calais-Dover frontier serves as a key location for trade between the UK and the entire European continent. This substantiates the assumption that Britain cannot physically and legally retreat from the Union completely. As a result, Whitehall will inevitably find itself trapped in a negative-sum game whereby cooperation with the EU, and thus adoption of certain regulations, becomes inevitable if the UK wants to maintain harmonious relations with its immediate neighbors. Ultimately, necessary compromises and new legal frameworks will emerge as a result of concerted efforts to avoid the delaying of an intergovernmental negotiation with countries sharing physical borders with the UK on the European soil (such as France, Ireland, and Belgium).

While the UK might be able to salvage critical aspects of the status quo and foster intergovernmental collaboration in the domains of cross-border security, intelligence and immigration with France and other EU member-states through intergovernmental talks without causing an institutional paralysis at the EU level, confidence in May’s government is decreasing as many in the Home Office remain uncertain “about the kind

⁵⁹⁸ “The British in Europe – and Vice Versa,” Migration Watch UK, published March 23, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016, <http://migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/354>.
Migration Watch UK, “The British in Europe – and Vice Versa,” published March 23, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016, <https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/354>.

⁵⁹⁹ Maria O’Neill, “EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions, the View from One of the Schengen Opt-out States,” 83.

⁶⁰⁰ Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Acquis Integrated Into the Framework of the European Union (2012) O.J. C326/1. O’Neill, “EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions,” 87. Originally quoted from Case C-77/05 United Kingdom v. Council, loc.cit., paragraph 104 of the AG’s opinion.

⁶⁰¹ Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, May 9, 2008, O.J. (C 115) 1.

⁶⁰² O’Neill, “EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions,” 88.

of deal she will strike with the EU.”⁶⁰³ Furthermore, increases in the net long-term international migration and the number of migrant workers already challenge the position of the prime minister, who promised to prioritize immigration over the EU.⁶⁰⁴ May is compelled to provide reassuring answers to key stakeholders who are, for the most part, more concerned with stock market stability, rather than Britain’s ability to manage its migration flows or convince current First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, not to oppose Article 50 in Westminster.⁶⁰⁵ In British politics although no constitutional code requires the Parliament to implement the results of the vote any referendum remains legally non-binding without the consent of parliament. Hence, to make sure that Westminster withdrew “from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements” by the end of March 2017 a legal case was brought to the Supreme Court of the UK by businesswoman Gina Miller and hairdresser Deir Dos Santo. The Court ruled by a majority of 8-3 ruled that May had to hold a vote on Article 50 at the Parliament before initiating her “two-year exit” strategy in order to consult MPs on the proper exit plan from the EU.⁶⁰⁶

Given that electoral campaigns had already begun in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, the prime minister invoked Article 50 nine months after Cameron’s Brexit fiasco in part to make sure that Hollande and Merkel do not become progressively less receptive to British proposals, but also to reassure Tusk of the UK’s willingness to speed up talks, as he declared that no compromises would allow Britain to curb European immigration rules and retain full access to SEA privileges: “the only alternative to a ‘hard Brexit’ is no Brexit at all.”⁶⁰⁷ The EU Council also reiterated Tusk’s position by reminding May of her responsibility to respect the four freedoms of the EU while the UK goes through the transitional phase following Britain’s departure from the Union in March 2019 – two years exactly after the parliament voted to trigger Article 50.⁶⁰⁸ During this period of uncertainty, the UK will have to abide by EU laws while also negotiating the exit deal with its 27 counterparts who all “have a veto over the conditions and terms of the deal.”⁶⁰⁹ Whether or not the UK can obtain a ‘soft Brexit’ depends on May’s readiness to compromise and “conduct a mature negotiation” through inter-state bargaining at the EU level without the oversight of the UK Parliament so that Westminster does “not provide a running commentary on every twist and turn of the

⁶⁰³ Helen Warrell, “May Refusing to Accept Difficult Consequences of Brexit,” *Financial Times*, December 28, 2016.

⁶⁰⁴ For the year ending June 2016, the net emigration estimate was +335,000. Nicolas White, *Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: Dec 2016*, 2, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016/pdf>.

⁶⁰⁵ Severin Carrell, “Scottish Government set to Table Motion Calling for Article 50 Rejection,” *The Guardian*, January 25, 2017.

⁶⁰⁶ Jane Croft, Mure Dickie and George Parker, “UK Supreme Court Rules MPs Must Vote on Triggering Brexit,” *Financial Times*, January 24, 2016.

⁶⁰⁷ Brundsen, “‘Hard Brexit’ or no Brexit, Donald Tusk Warns UK.”

⁶⁰⁸ By EU laws, a country which triggers Article 50 will automatically be excluded from the Union two years after having declared its intent to leave the EU. Council of the European Union, “European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017) Draft Guidelines Following the United Kingdom’s Notification Under Article,” published March 31, 2017, accessed April 25, 2017, <http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf>.

⁶⁰⁹ Christopher Hope, “Has Britain Left the EU? (Almost) Every Single Brexit Question Answered,” *The Telegraph*, March 29, 2017.

negotiations” during the Brexit process.⁶¹⁰ By saying so, May confirmed that she would not reveal her plan fully to the EU-27 about her vision of a post-Brexit UK, therefore putting first minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon’s plan to schedule an independence referendum between the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 on hold.⁶¹¹

Though the UK has been warned that “sufficient progress” must be made on the withdrawal deal – that is, setting priorities on immigration rights and “Britain’s legal and budgetary liabilities” before talks can begin on “the framework for our [Europe’s] future” – the current situation of the UK on the international scene is one of weakness and ambiguity because the prime minister has remained vague about how she intends to start negotiations with Brussels.⁶¹² Although some hope to obtain a Norway-like deal⁶¹³ because it required less “imagination” from UK officials to repair the damage done by Cameron’s ill-conceived referendum campaign and strained relationship with EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Juncker, May has been explicit on her determination to “not reveal our hand prematurely” and “deliver the will of the British people,” even if this entails losing privileges of SEA membership.⁶¹⁴ As she said, “it is not about the Norway model, the Swiss model, or any other country’s model. It is about developing our British model.”⁶¹⁵

e. Security Impact

The re-nationalization of immigration and refugee policies per se never really occurred in the UK, since British officers simply go “by the Immigration Rules laid down by the Secretary of State and not by the Convention,” or the EU commission.⁶¹⁶ In effect, the government has always kept a measure of control to vote restrictive measures to curb the rights of asylum seekers and non-EU migrants, thus being in perpetual contradiction with the principles enshrined in the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 which defend “the right not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined conditions (Article 32) [...] and the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory” of a signatory state (Article 31).⁶¹⁷ Despite that, British MPs continually advocate for a policy of national preference, whereby the government commits substantial amount of human, material and intelligence resources to thwarting illegal immigration, which indirectly caused more

⁶¹⁰ The Guardian, “Theresa May: We Will not Provide a Running Commentary on Brexit Negotiations – Video,” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2017.

⁶¹¹ Severin Carrel, “EU Delay on Brexit Trade Deal Hits Sturgeon’s Referendum Timetable,” *The Guardian*, March 31, 2017.

⁶¹² Jennifer Rankin, Daniel Boffey, Jon Henley and Rowena Mason, “Brexit: EU Says no to Free Trade Talks Until ‘Progress’ on Final Terms,” *The Guardian*, March 31, 2017.

⁶¹³ That is, a customs agreement without external tariffs based on the protection of workers and access to partially free trade with the 27-other member-states of the EU.

⁶¹⁴ Matthew Tempest, “May Unveils UK Government’s ’12 Point Plan for Brexit.” *Euractiv*, January 17, 2017. Mark Tran, “Britain’s £1.7bn EU Surcharge – Q&A,” *The Guardian*, November 6, 2014. The Guardian, “Theresa May: We Will not Provide a Running Commentary on Brexit Negotiations – Video.”

⁶¹⁵ The Guardian, “Theresa May: We Will not Provide a Running Commentary on Brexit Negotiations – Video.”

⁶¹⁶ Joppke, *Immigration, and the Nation-State*, 129.

⁶¹⁷ UNCHR, “The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,” published September 2011, accessed July 5, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.pdf>.

deaths of migrants in the Channel Tunnel “in June and July 2015 than during the last six months of 2014.”⁶¹⁸ Pro-immigration critics have long decried the use of new technologies by British border services for forcing migrants to take greater risks in order to find safety in the UK; however, their argument ignores the very nature of the British relationship to foreign nationals as well as the historical and geographical factors that have shaped British isolationism.⁶¹⁹

That British hostilities against asylum seekers and the EU predate the refugee crisis might explain the paradox that resides in British tendency to interpret the UK’s relationship with the EU according to sentiments not always closely related to the substance of British membership in Europe. In the context of the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe hostility toward mass immigration generally and refugees specifically was translated into hostility against the EU establishment in Brussels. This ambivalence towards refugees originates from the fact that London and its international financial and transportation hub attracted many Islamist fundamentalists in the late 1990s and early 2000s, who deliberately took advantage of “Britain’s tradition of taking in refugees and asylum seekers,” to find the freedom to carry out political and religious activities forbidden in their country.⁶²⁰ The arrest of Abu Hamza – a refugee turned terrorist – obviously still resonates in the psyche of the British public, since Cameron’s decision to accept only 20,000 refugees over a period of five years confirms British aversion for liberal immigration and asylum policy programs. The Egyptian refugee, who was granted settlement rights by the British government in the late 1970s, was arrested in 2004 “for encouraging his followers to murder Jews or other non-Muslims” and charged with 16 offenses under the Terrorism Act, 2000 and 2001. Accounts of his entry into the UK demonstrated that Hamza had abused the asylum system, for which he was later extradited from the UK to the U.S. and judged for conspiring “to support Al-Qaida, partly by setting up training camps in Oregon.”⁶²¹ This extradition was made possible by then Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett, who launched a public campaign against asylum fraud to track asylum seekers seeking to enter the UK under false pretences, and championed the Terrorism Act of 2000 and the Crime and Security Act of 2000 – two legislations giving authorities more leeway to neutralize potential threats and implement measures capable of stemming future peaks in asylum applications in 2002 (84,132), 2014 (32,785) and 2015 (40,160).⁶²²

⁶¹⁸ Calum Paton, “Catalogue of Death: Calais Migrant Toll Spikes as Border Controls Take Hold,” *International Business Times*, August 13, 2015.

⁶¹⁹ Sile Reynolds and Helen Muggeridge, *Remote Controls: How UK Border Controls are Endangering the Lives of Refugees*, 5, http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/7043/Remote_Controls.pdf.

⁶²⁰ Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, *Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7.

⁶²¹ Hamza was later sentenced to life in prison for terror charges in the U.S. Rosie Cowan, “Abu Hamza Charged with Inciting Murders,” *The Guardian*, October 20, 2004. Karen McVeigh, “Abu Hamza to Testify in New York Terrorism Trial as Jury Selection Begins,” *The Guardian*, April 14, 2014.

⁶²² Through the 2000 Terrorism Act the government imposed a new definition of terrorism encompassing almost all the ordinary political activities that a terrorist organization would attempt to perform, within or outside of the UK. On the one hand, the act allowed for the establishment of new crimes of association: membership, support and wearing of a uniform representing the ideals of a

The 9/11 attacks, the failures of the no-choice dispersal policy, the 7/7 London bombings and the Madrid attacks, nevertheless, contributed to the conflation of asylum seekers and terrorism in public opinion, legitimizing a wave of asylophobia directed against ‘visible minorities’. The London 2005 bombings certainly served as a second impetus for the Home Office to reformulate its legal position on terrorism and legitimize the conflation of the three distinct issues of immigration, security and religious fundamentalism into a single framework, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ACTSA). While it empowered the Home Office to detain refugees as terrorist suspects indefinitely without a warrant or a trial, many Lords described ACTSA as calling “into question the very existence of an ancient liberty of which this country has until now been very proud: freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.”⁶²³ Caught between the duty to protect minority rights and the obligation to defend the nation against so-called ‘Muslim threats’ linked to terrorism, the government acted in the supposed interests of British citizens by passing a number of legislations to limit the rights of refugees to work in the UK while asylum claims are being processed.⁶²⁴ Yet it was precisely the charged political atmosphere around asylum that nurtured social prejudices against Muslims and intimidated the various ethnic communities associated with the Middle East and Arabs in general. This promoted a distorted vision of the Muslim immigrant, which later degenerated into a form of racism directed against all asylum seekers, ‘colored’ migrants and poor people in general. Ironically, the approval rate of asylum seekers in the UK remained at a steady 30% (40,160 applications received for 12,430 approved for the year ending 2015), but those who have acquired refugee status are becoming more vulnerable to discrimination by the public authorities and exploitation for political ends by the media.⁶²⁵ As a result, social boundaries are being created between ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ who remain subjected to a special surveillance regime until they become full British citizens or leave the country. The elaboration of such restrictive laws is often justified by the fact that “homegrown terrorists present a particularly difficult counterterrorism challenge.”⁶²⁶ As opposed to foreign extremists, homegrown terrorists often do not have a traceable history of violence.

Following the Syrian refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in France, Germany and Belgium, the British public and political class started to treat terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism as if they were the

proscribed organization were banned, giving more leeway to the authorities for monitoring hate speech against the government and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, police officers were empowered “to stop and search” any vehicle or individual on the grounds that “the public or a section of the public” is threatened by an imminent risk. Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11), July 24, 2000, Gr. Brit. Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 23), March 30, 2006, Gr. Brit. Eurostat, “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.” Oliver Hawkins, *Asylum Statistics*, 6, <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01403/SN01403.pdf>.

⁶²³ MPs later replaced the ACTSA with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005 (PTA) and the Terrorism Act, 2006 therefore limiting time of the period of detention without charges to twenty-eight days. The Guardian, “Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001,” *The Guardian*, January 19, 2009.

⁶²⁴ Jonathan Birt, “Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Britain Post-9/11,” *The Muslim World* 96, no.4 (October 2006): 696.

⁶²⁵ Eurostat, “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.”

⁶²⁶ Rabasa and Benard, *Eurojihad*, 154.

same thing, and thus could be dealt with from afar without engaging the UK deeper into the war in Syria. The idea that terrorists have been taking advantage of Europe's benevolent immigration policy to attack the Union has nurtured feelings of resentment against new asylum seekers, pushing the government to tighten asylum rules and support the mass deportation of failed asylum seekers. The recent scandal, in which British authorities denied the clearance of individuals who concealed their true age in order to enter Britain, demonstrates the determination of Downing Street to defend the national preference as the rule in areas of sovereignty – even if this entails taking drastic measures against 3,255 vulnerable individuals (i.e. to check dental records and bone density to determine the age of under-aged applicants and taking unilateral steps to fix the refugee problem at the Calais-Dover border).⁶²⁷ Rather than making concerted decisions with its French neighbor, the UK is taking advantage of its position of 'limited liability' – which falls within the scope of the UK's right to exercise sovereignty over its own immigration and asylum rules – to restrict the number of positive decisions granted to refugees, leaving many stranded in France. British reluctance to welcome all unaccompanied minors is, nonetheless, understandable from a statistical standpoint given that London has been struggling with this problem ever since 2008, when 4,285 children out of 11,929 applied for asylum in the UK, and therefore forced the European Commission to prepare an action plan for an EU-wide strategy on the rights of child asylum seekers.⁶²⁸ Today, despite efforts by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to defend the rights of would-be refugees, anti-migrant sentiment has been accentuated by the deployment of nationalism in public debates legitimizing "the institutionalization of a culture of suspicion" against asylum seekers who supposedly 'shop around' for the most advantageous social welfare provisions at cost to the British taxpayer.⁶²⁹

Mainly, the British public is concerned that the arrival of 2,800 Syrians, 2,665 Iraqis, 2,910 Afghans and 3,035 Sudanese asylum seekers in 2015 might threaten social harmony among the different ethnic communities of the UK and lead to the marginalization of newcomers pushed into in segregated districts wherein migrants barely have any contact with the native population.⁶³⁰ Indeed, while Londoners have embraced pluralism and no longer define diversity "by pockets of large, isolated ethnic groups but more mixing and less segregation," other regions in the UK have noticed that the nature of long-established

⁶²⁷ Rowena Mason, "Child Refugees Will Have Ages Verified if Necessary, Ministers Says," *The Guardian*, October 21, 2016. Eurostat, "Asylum Applicants Considered to be Unaccompanied Minors by Citizenship, age, and sex," accessed September 26, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYUNAA.

⁶²⁸ Eurostat, "Asylum Applicants Considered to be Unaccompanied Minors by Citizenship, age, and sex. Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010 – 2014), COM (2010) 213 final (6 May 2010).

⁶²⁹ Scholar Liz Fekete referred to 'asylum shopping' in 2001. She described the concept of 'asylum shopping' as "the belief that would-be asylum seekers 'shop around' for the European country with the best and most easily obtained social security benefits." Derek McGhee, *Intolerant Britain?: Hate, Citizenship and Difference* (New York, NY; Maidenhead, England: Open Press University, 2005), 65-8. Originally quoted from Fekete, Liz, "The Emergence of Xeno-Racism," *Race and Class*, 43, no.2 (October 2001): 23–40.

⁶³⁰ Eurostat, "Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data."

communities was changing, thus causing friction between old residents (white natives, first-generation migrants) and newcomers (asylum seekers, economic migrants).⁶³¹ During the Brexit campaign, this lack of social integration coupled with the impression that migrants threaten British jobs, intensified feelings of misunderstanding towards the conditions of asylum seekers in the UK who have to survive with a weekly allowance of only £36.95.⁶³² Criticism by human rights activists has, nevertheless, pushed the British MPs to recognize that in some cases the authorities penalize asylum seekers disproportionately by forbidding them to work. This has forced the government to make efforts to relax these restrictions by allowing those who have waited more than twelve months to receive their decision to submit an official request to work in restricted areas of the economy where shortages affect certain occupations and regions.⁶³³

The restrictive measures adopted in the 1990s, which served to speed up the asylum process and to restrict the rights of asylum seekers, in some respects anticipated the refugee and terrorist crises of 2015.⁶³⁴ The British government armed itself with powerful laws to address the various challenges that arise when failed asylum seekers overstay their conditions of entry. Such legal measures have sped up the process of deportation of 40,896 failed asylum seekers in 2015, either voluntarily or with the help of the government through an ‘assisted return’ program in which participants are granted up to £2,000 to cover the cost of returning home.⁶³⁵ With the help of the immigration removal centers, British authorities extradited 12,056 individuals through enforced removal in 2015, but a majority of failed migrants also opted to leave voluntarily, either by notifying British authorities of their departure (1,635) or getting help through ‘assisted returns’ (12,999).⁶³⁶ The relative success of this approach provides evidence that certain restrictive measures

⁶³¹ John McDermott, “Diversity and Cohesion in Britain’s Most Mixed Community,” *Financial Times*, October 14, 2015.

⁶³² Patrick Sturgis, Ian Brunton-Smith, Jouni Kuha and Jonathan Jackson, “Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and the Social Cohesion of Neighborhoods in London,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no.8 (October 2014): 1300. Gov.UK, “Asylum Support,” last modified March 27, 2017, accessed April 13, 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get>.

⁶³³ Gov.UK, “Asylum Support.” Melanie Gower, *Should Asylum Seekers Have Unrestricted Rights to Work in the UK?*, 3, researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01908/SN01908.pdf.

⁶³⁴ Today, an asylum seeker cannot appeal from outside of the UK as h/she is granted the right to appeal inside the country only. In the UK, there was virtually no real asylum policies or rights to appeal for refugees and immigrants. It was the Labour government of 1969 who finally allowed immigrants to appeal the decisions of the Home Office through the Appeal Act, 1969. In reality, the Labour decision was made in response to the European Commission on a Human Rights’ ruling that the 1968 Immigration Act – a bill “forbidding all those possessing citizenships in the UK and colonies but who lacked a substantial personal connection with the country” to settle in Britain – discriminated against Kenyan Asians and other ethnic minorities. The right to have access to in-country appeals was then introduced in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993 for refugees, but short-term visitors or students were not allowed to use this legal platform. The act also created a fast-track procedure to sort through asylum applications more efficiently: “A person who has limited leave under the 1971 Act to enter or remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to a special adjudicator against any variation of, or refusal to vary, the leave [...] A person who seeks to enter the United Kingdom as a visitor, or in order to follow a course of study of not more than six months [...] shall not be entitled to appeal against any refusal of an entry clearance.” Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, July 1, 1993 (c.23), Gr. Brit., art. 8-10. Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State*, 130. Juss Satvinder S., *Immigration, Nationality and Citizenship* (London: Mansell, 1993), 57. Robert S. Moore and Tina Wallace, *Slamming the Door: The Administration of Immigration Control* (London: M. Robertson, 1975), 90.

⁶³⁵ Gov.UK, “Return Home if You’re in the UK Illegally or Have Claimed Asylum,” last modified March 27, 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/return-home-voluntarily/assisted-return>.

⁶³⁶ Rob McNeil, *Deportations, Removals and Voluntary Departures From the UK*, 5, <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Deportations-1.pdf>.

can be used as coercive tools to discourage failed applicants from remaining in the UK illegally, but it also indicates that the liberalization of asylum, refugee and immigration policies is very limited – especially considering May’s declaration against the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), in which she argued that the convention “had caused the extradition of extremist Abu Hamza to be delayed for years and that had almost stopped the deportation” of another extremist, Abu Qatada.⁶³⁷ In other words, these repatriation schemes have been successful, because the UK can take advantage of being an island to closely monitor the repatriation of failed asylum seekers and the organization of charter flights “on a collaborative basis between groups of European countries who collect batches of failed asylum seekers.”⁶³⁸ Likewise, the UK remains an exception in that it empowered its authorities to judge the applicant’s commitment to Britain’s civic values, unlike in France and Germany where governments usually do not interpret the aspirations of migrants while assessing their claims to citizenship. Under the Asylum and Immigration, 2004, for example, British authorities have the power to reject a claim on the grounds that the behavior displayed by the applicant is likely to conceal the true intentions of the applicant while the Terrorism Act 2006 also added certain provisions on the ‘bad character’ of suspects to help the authorities form judgments about the ‘good character’ of would-be citizens.⁶³⁹

Negative sentiments towards refugees and migrants stem from the general fear of terrorist attacks and the emergence of Salafism within second-generation communities in the West. Following the 2005 metro attacks in London, the government developed a strategy to thwart the proliferation of terrorist networks in Britain by changing Section 40 of the British Nationality Act of 1981 and introducing the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act of 2006. Article 56 (2) of this legal amendment empowered the government to strip an individual of their nationality “if the Secretary of State thinks that it would be conducive to the public good for the person to be excluded or removed from the United Kingdom.”⁶⁴⁰ Westminster’s rationale for depriving individuals of his/her right to citizenship was based on the principle that, too often foreign-born citizens and naturalized British citizens threaten the country’s security by promulgating a radical interpretation of the principles embedded in the Quran. Interestingly, data on terrorist attacks corroborates the view that second-generation British Muslims of Pakistani and Arab origins have indeed been responsible for the majority of terrorist acts perpetrated in the UK, as scholars Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard

⁶³⁷ The ECHR and the UK are often conflicting with each other. For instance, after making a rare declaration of incompatibility and overturning the decision of British authorities to detain a journalist linked to Edward Snowden at London’s Heathrow airport the ECHR commanded the UK Court of Appeal and the British Parliament to “strike a balance between the sovereignty” of British laws and the principles of the ECHR to satisfy European demands for more leniency on the systematized deportation of failed asylum seekers and unwanted aliens. Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, “UK Must Leave European Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa May,” *The Guardian*, April 25, 2016. Jane Croft, “UK Court Criticises Anti-Terror Legislation,” *Financial Times*, January 19, 2016.

⁶³⁸ Owen Bowcott, “Deportation Escorting Turns Into big Business for Private Firms,” *The Guardian*, October 14, 2010.

⁶³⁹ Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c.19), July 22, 2004, Gr. Brit. Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 23), March 30, 2006, Gr. Brit.

⁶⁴⁰ Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 23), art. 56 (2), March 30, 2006, Gr. Brit.

demonstrated in their compilation on terrorist attacks in the UK.⁶⁴¹ Of course, not all terrorist attacks in the UK have been perpetrated by migrants of Pakistani and Arab origins, but the repetition of such incidents clearly indicates the presence of cracks within British multiculturalism. Radicalized youngsters born in the UK pose a bigger challenge to the security of British citizens, as it is more challenging for intelligence authorities to track and prevent the attacks of individuals who are not connected to any extremist group. But this situation also sends a powerful message to the government – mainly that British multiculturalism has failed to transcend the cultural barriers keeping different communities sheltered from one another.

Throughout the 1950s to the 1990s, the British government adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards minorities to promote tolerance of differences within a pluralistic society, without creating communal bonds. By focusing on the individual at the expense of the communal the success of British multiculturalism has been limited, fostering the development of ‘ethnic enclaves’ or residential communities where only a few ethnic groups cohabit.⁶⁴² As a result of the physical and social segregation of communities, some second-generation young adults tend to develop ‘reactive identities’ against the institutions and the norms of British society, because they do not “fit within either the traditional culture of their parents of the modern Western culture.”⁶⁴³ Psychologist Eric D. Shaw explains that people who have “suffered from early damage to their self-esteem” may be at greater risk of joining a revolutionary group, such as a religious terrorist group because individuals who “appear to have been unsuccessful in obtaining” a place in society are easily attracted by terrorist propaganda.⁶⁴⁴ By November 2014, Islamic preachers had already convinced an estimated number of 350 British citizens to follow the jihadist discourse promulgated by IS and join the war in Syria against Assad.⁶⁴⁵ Jihadist strategist Abu Bakr Naji⁶⁴⁶ explained in an online manuscript how terrorist propaganda successfully “creates a feeling of invincibility,” a feeling that is “an all-encompassing, overwhelming power” capable of turning the disenchanted youth and subservient people into threatening ‘lone wolves’ because “it spreads freedom, justice, equality among humanity, and various other slogans.”⁶⁴⁷ This is worrisome from a security standpoint, given that the young men and women who become extremists typically experienced real or perceived discrimination at home, yet are by virtue of circumstance more

⁶⁴¹ For entire table with data of terrorists in the UK who are of Southeast Asian origins, see Rabasa and Benard, *Eurojihad*, 159-69.

⁶⁴² Barbara Franz, “Europe’s Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative Deprivation, and Identity Formation,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18 (Winter 2007): 97.

⁶⁴³ Rabasa and Benard, *Eurojihad*, 154-57.

⁶⁴⁴ Shaw Eric, “Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the Psychopathology Model,” *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 8, no.3 (September 1986): 365.

⁶⁴⁵ Harris, “Which Country in Europe has the Most Jihadists in Syria and Iraq?.”

⁶⁴⁶ In the post-Bin Laden era, Abu Bakr Naji, an anonymous jihadist, released an online book called *Idarat al-Tawahush* (Management of Savagery) which elaborates schemes through which Al-Qaeda could have created an Islamic Caliphate in 2004. The book was translated in English two years after its release online. Today, ISIS-affiliated soldiers confirmed to media that the terrorist organization was using the book to justify the actions and ideology of IS. Hassan Hassan, “Isis has Reached new Depths of Depravity. But There is a Brutal Logic Behind it,” *The Guardian*, February 8, 2015.

⁶⁴⁷ Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” *Quilliam Foundation* (July 2015): 41.

difficult to detect by intelligence organizations and easier to attract by Muslim preachers. Discrimination against visible minorities has inevitably led to the formation of invisible barriers between migrants yearning for success in a predominantly ‘white’ country and British natives fearing that newcomers might threaten the status-quo.

On June 16, 2016, the murder of Labour Party MP Helen Joanne Cox by a British national shouting pro-Brexit slogan testified to the hysteria surrounding the referendum and reminded the public that individuals who lack substantial connection to terrorist groups can always threaten to disrupt social order in Britain without any connection to Middle Eastern or East Asian origins.⁶⁴⁸ While the Brexit camp agitated public opinion by caricaturing the inability of the government to overcome security threats and prevent the infiltration of IS combatants, Cameron’s government was equally guilty for failing to refute tensions fueled by lies on immigration and security issues.⁶⁴⁹ The discourses supported by the Brexit campaign, which designated Muslims or anyone part of a ‘visible’ minority as scapegoats for increasing Britain’s levels of insecurity and risk of terrorism, have been strongly correlated to the referendum outcome. Obviously, hate crimes had already been reported by the police prior to Brexit, but between 2015 and 2016 the number of reported religiously-motivated hate crimes increased by 34%, therefore showing the magnitude of the hate problem in the UK. Following the victory of the Brexit hate crimes recorded by the police in July 2016 not only increased by 41% (in comparison to July 2015), but the nature of the acts changed, as most offences targeted migrants from every racial background, be they of Indian, Arab or Polish origins.⁶⁵⁰ In essence, Cox’s murder was caused by the inability of the British government, and more especially Cameron’s government, to take into consideration the frustration of British citizens with regards to the refugee crisis and their long-lasting objection to the principles of European unity and burden-sharing. More importantly, however, this tragic event revealed Britain’s insecurities about the nation’s ability to provide and protect its citizens from internal threats.

It was the overall sentiment of British citizens towards immigration that fed the political growth of Euroscepticism and allowed the referendum on EU membership to take place against the backdrop of negative perceptions about refugees. In 2014, a Guardian/ICM poll even showed that public anxiety stemmed from the public misunderstanding about the role and responsibility of migrants within British society. A full 46% of people polled believed that “immigrants undercutting workers” affected the performance of the country, which gave legitimacy to the principle of political retreat for self-preservation.⁶⁵¹ Two years later 52% of the

⁶⁴⁸ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “The Myth of the Lone-Wolf Terrorist,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 26, 2016.

⁶⁴⁹ Heather Stewart and Rowena Mason, “Nigel Farage’s Anti-Migrant Poster Reported to Police,” *The Guardian*, June 16, 2016.

⁶⁵⁰ Homa Khaleeli, “‘A Frenzy of Hatred’: How to Understand Brexit Racism,” *The Guardian*, June 29, 2016. Hannah Corcoran and Kevin Smith, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16*, 4-18, <http://report-it.org.uk/files/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf>.

⁶⁵¹ Tom Clark and Matthew Taylor, “Insecure Britain: Poll Shines Light on Nation’s Economic Anxiety,” *The Guardian*, June 17, 2014.

British public still considered that refugees increased “the likelihood of terrorism” in their country while 60% of the Conservative and 87% of UKIP’s supporters also shared that perception about refugees as a possible threat to domestic tranquility.⁶⁵²

When more than 67,000 asylum seekers illegally crossed the Hungarian border between January and June 2015, prime minister Victor Orbán announced plans to construct a 100-mile fence along Hungary’s border with Serbia to halt the influx flows completely, regardless of whether migrants fled Syria and Iraq to escape IS or not.⁶⁵³ In a like manner, British MPs reacted vehemently to the crisis unfolding in Calais by shielding the country from ‘aliens’ through the implementation of a sophisticated border control system designed to compensate for the perceived deficiencies of the EU. This tends to confirm that a shift in the diversity of views in the Union and a shift in the balance of power between the EU institutions and member-states are preventing the EU from acting “in a concerted fashion to confront major challenges.”⁶⁵⁴ In fact, both Orbán and Cameron evaluated the crisis in a pragmatic way to satisfy the short-term interests of regaining domestic approval through the application of controls and punitive measures against asylum seekers. Yet while the UK enjoys a position of greater strength by being removed geographically from the EU, land-locked Hungary remains vulnerable to the continual arrival of undocumented migrants over land from all sides. Henceforth, the sea border connecting the UK to the European continent serves as a symbol of efforts to protect British nationality, despite that the Thatcher government connected Britain to Europe as never before through the Channel tunnel in the spirit of the Single European Act. The sea border has already become an ideological border shielding the Kingdom from its political responsibility as a member of the ‘Big Three’ and from perceived external security threats.

As in Germany’s case, the British case study testifies that in the absence of external controls to maintain the territorial integrity of the EU, member-states will adopt nationally-determined policies without getting the consent of other countries whose interests damaged – with the critical difference that Germany unilaterally imposed a hastily improvised crisis management on EU member-states, while the UK opted to abandon the EU altogether. The security interests of the UK, nevertheless, remain influenced by the ability of the French state to prevent the deterioration of the situation in Calais as well as the capacity of the EU to put an end to the refugee crisis and guard the external borders of the continent. Hence, in the post-Brexit era, the UK must find ways to maintain its presence on the European soil by negotiating cross-border collaboration agreements with neighbouring countries to offset the porous nature of the continent’s borders, rather than take unilateral steps responding to short-term interests alone.

⁶⁵² Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, “Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs.”

⁶⁵³ The only distinction between the UK and Hungary is that while the latter shares borders with seven states, the former has the geographical advantage of being located far from the refugee crisis in the Balkans. Péter Krekó and Attila Juhaász, “Scaling the Wall: Hungary’s Migration Debate,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 30, 2015.

⁶⁵⁴ Juan Díez Medrano, “The Limits of European Integration,” *Journal of European Integration* 34, no.2 (February 2012): 196.

Chapter 5. France as Subject: Integration as Security

a. The Demise of the French Left

The victory of the Left in the 2012 presidential elections was predicated on the belief that François Hollande would “emphasize the moral approach to foreign policy,” and among other things “protect the jobs that make France the world's fourth-largest arms exporter,” but scandals within the Socialist government subsequently tarnished the reputation of the executive branch of government.⁶⁵⁵ The French public quickly became disillusioned with the product of the democratic process in France, as corruption scandals implicating the country's minister of finance in tax fraud, Jérôme Cahuzac, shook the country's confidence in government and in the national socio-economic establishment.⁶⁵⁶ Such stories affected public trust in institutions so deeply that only 56% of French people claim to be interested in the political affairs of their country.⁶⁵⁷ This loss of public faith has paralyzed French politics, because with 9.9 % of unemployment and a succession of terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice, the Socialist government showed clear signs of weakness when it comes to the capacity of the state to address the economic and security challenges posed by the refugee crisis.⁶⁵⁸

It is important, however, to recall that Hollande's rise to the Élysée was partly accidental. According to pre-election polls, “the brilliant former finance minister and IMF president Dominique Strauss-Kahn” (33%) would have easily defeated Hollande (23%) at the Socialist primaries, had he not been arrested for attempted rape in New York city exactly one year before the 2012 French presidential elections – an early episode in the implosion of public confidence in France'.⁶⁵⁹ To make sure that outgoing president Nicolas Sarkozy could be defeated, the Socialist Party had to select its replacement candidate carefully. Hollande was very quickly chosen by his own party and the media as the “normal” president – the only one who could be “the antithesis of incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy” and calmly promote the national interest.⁶⁶⁰ At first sight, the opening anaphora of presidential candidate François Hollande's ('Moi, Président de la République') apparently convinced the French electorate that ousting Sarkozy from the Élysée with a ‘sanction-vote’ would suffice to improve the livelihood of millions.⁶⁶¹ But the rise of the Left was also facilitated by Sarkozy's rocky

⁶⁵⁵ Camille Pecastaing, “French Socialism, Take two,” *Foreign Policy*, May 29, 2012.

⁶⁵⁶ Samuel Laurent, “Si Vous N'avez Rien Suivi de L'Affaire Cahuzac,” *Le Monde*, December 10, 2012.

⁶⁵⁷ Madani Cheurfa, *L'État D'Urgence Modifie-t-il la Confiance des Français?*, 1, http://www.cevipof.com/rtefiles/File/noterech-07/Confiance%20politique%20Vague%207%20_%20Note%20CHEURFA%20_%20Acteurs.pdf.

⁶⁵⁸ Institut National de Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE), “Le Taux de Chômage Diminue de 0,3 Point au Deuxième Trimestre 2016,” published August 18, 2016, accessed September 18, 2016, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2123516#documentation>.

⁶⁵⁹ Françoise Fressoz, “Sondage: DSK Creuse L'Écart Avec les Autres Présidentiables Socialistes,” *Le Monde*, March 16, 2011. Solenn de Royer, “Le Jour où DSK est Tombé,” *Le Figaro*, May 14, 2016. Kenneth R. Weinstein, “Hollande the Hawk? An Unlikely Ally Emerges,” *World Affairs* 177, no.1 (July 2014): 87.

⁶⁶⁰ Weinstein, “Hollande the Hawk?,” 88. Françoise Fressoz, “Hollande, un ‘Président Normal’ Dans une Situation Anormale,” *Le Monde*, June 18, 2012.

⁶⁶¹ Alexandre Lemarié, “‘Moi Président...’ La Tirade de Hollande qui Agace le Camp Sarkozy,” *Le Monde*, May 3, 2016.

past with journalists and his blunt presidential style to discredit the political achievements of the Right.⁶⁶² The latter had, in fact, created a solid network of journalistic admirers who no longer chased “madly after the hyperactive president” – especially after Laurent Joffrin (the head of *Libération* magazine) declared “Sarkozy to be ‘allergic to too much freedom of press’.”⁶⁶³ By demonstrating their hostility towards the outgoing administration French journalists and mainstream media, hence, ‘accidentally’ propelled Hollande to the Élysée. That 48% of the French electorate voted for Hollande to prevent the re-election of Sarkozy corroborates the view that the Left won the presidential election simply out of luck and strategy.⁶⁶⁴

Ever since the Socialist Party won the 2012 presidential election the position of France in the world has been weakened, institutionally, economically and politically. Although some argue that the crises of 2008 and 2010 drove the French economy downward, making it difficult for any government to lead recovery, other commentators point to the lack of political decisiveness and authority of the president to justify France’s declining importance on the international scene. In effect, rather than exercising leadership in Europe with his German counterpart “the Europhile Mr. Hollande has acted as if the less said about big European ideas the better.”⁶⁶⁵ Though described as an avowed Europeanist, the newly-elected French president allowed the Franco-German relationship to deteriorate very quickly, which had for immediate consequence to isolate Hollande from the EU political scene and place prime minister David Cameron at the forefront of the political negotiations with Merkel on immigration, refugees and terrorism. Torn between the ideal vision of a Europe without borders and the preference of many for a Fortress Europe, Hollande’s government quickly lost leverage on all sides of the political spectrum by first, demanding greater “solidarity” to the EU through the creation of a stronger Europe, as “a political project where one could not ceaselessly question everything at every stage;” and second, by creating a rift between Hollande and Cameron who wanted the renationalization, rather than the further institutionalization of EU powers.⁶⁶⁶

Hollande’s administration was also seriously damaged by the mismanagement of domestic and foreign policy issues well before the onset of the refugee crisis. For instance, the introduction of gender rights and gay marriage to the political agenda divided the French society into ideologically opposed groups – ‘liberals’ vs. ‘conservatives’ or ‘opened’ vs. ‘closed’ – each espousing different social norms. Hollande also mistakenly believed that the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad could be toppled as Muammar Gaddafi had been

⁶⁶² During his presidency, Sarkozy removed certain privileges enjoyed by the media, thus hurting his relationship with French journalists who criticized him for penalizing their profession. Raymond Kuhn, “Electoral Cross-Dressing: The Role Reversal Campaigns of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande in the 2012 Presidential Election,” *Nottingham French Studies* 52, no.2 (July 2013): 155. Marianne, “Hollande, Sarkozy, Valls: Comment ils Cherchent à Contrôler les Médias,” *Marianne*, April 21, 2016. Ludovic Vigogne, “Entre les Médias et Nicolas Sarkozy, un Face-à-Face Toujours Compliqué,” *L’Opinion*, October 21, 2014.

⁶⁶³ Christian Delporte, “Sarkozy and the Media,” *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies* 16, no.3 (June 2012): 301-06. Laurent Joffrin, “Les Médias ont-ils Faussé la Campagne?,” *L’Observateur*, May 4, 2012.

⁶⁶⁴ Frédéric Dabi and Jérôme Fourquet, *Les Clés du Second Tour de L’Élection Présidentielle*, 12, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1859-1-study_file.pdf.

⁶⁶⁵ The Economist, “Europe à L’Hollandaise,” *The Economist*, February 9, 2013.

⁶⁶⁶ The Economist, “Europe à L’Hollandaise.”

in Libya and hence blindly supported the armament of ‘rebel’ troops, which contributed indirectly to the deepening of Syrian refugee crisis and its consequences for Europe. Electorally, the French left more generally has been weakened by a successive number of scandals and failed policy programs, which compelled the president to put an abrupt end to his political career by not standing again for a second presidential term in May 2017.⁶⁶⁷

The French case study provides a clear example in which the refugee crisis and the absence of borders have thwarted the ability of the government to form a coherent program to address the refugee crisis effectively, as France’s political center-of-gravity has shifted to the center-right and far right. While the absence of authority from the executive has affected the performance of the government to deliver solutions to a threefold crisis in France – the humanitarian crisis in Calais, the refugee crisis in Menton-Ventimiglia and the security crisis – other variables also impacted on the deterioration of French political life and the subsequent rise of Marine Le Pen’s right-wing party, the *Front National* (FN). Therefore, the analysis here seeks to expose the causal relations between the absence of borders and the renationalization of immigration policies through a multi-level account of the situation in France. With the advent of a new age of international terrorism, a careful examination of French practices in immigration and refugee policies will also inform the research about the extent of France’s commitment to the principles of free movement embedded in the Schengen and SEA agreements.

b. Political Impact

The impacts of the European refugee crisis on France’s political stability have been so profound that they have precipitated a crisis of the French political system more extensive than the damage wrought in Germany and in some respects worse than the self-inflicted wounds of the UK. Debates have thus far focused on the political tensions resulting from Hollande’s inability to manage the crisis properly and protect the model of French integration and *laïcité* (secularism). Controversies over demands made by the Muslim community (i.e. the creation of new mosques, the wearing of the *hijab* (*veil*) in public spaces, or the introduction of *halal* meals in school canteens) has fomented fear and misunderstanding of visible minorities in France. It seems the refugee crisis has uncovered specific shortcomings with regards to the integration of minorities in French society mainly because the mass exodus of migrants added pressure on the government to answer public demands for more authority at the national executive level. This crystallization of opinion was deepened by Hollande’s failure to assert his presidential leadership on specific issues, even as in the eyes of many critics he degraded “the office with his expensive life style,” his extra-marital affair and “monthly visits to the

⁶⁶⁷ Edouard Pflimlin, “Hollande Renonce à Briguer un Second Mandat,” *Le Monde*, December 2, 2016.

coiffeur.”⁶⁶⁸ In other words, France’s next president will have the delicate task of ending the crisis of political confidence and restoring the public image of the presidential office by demonstrating the necessary “sense of strategic direction” to drive the country towards political recovery. This cannot be done before the political elite addresses fully the multi-dimensional aspects of the crisis and the unexpected consequences of welcoming more foreigners to French soil, such as the rise of negative sentiments against the EU.⁶⁶⁹ Ever since the Greek debt crisis struck the continent in 2010, French public opinion of the EU has deteriorated substantially because while in August 2010 34% of those surveyed thought about the EU as a ‘liability’ 47% espoused the same view in May 2015.⁶⁷⁰ This implies the French political elite must act to convince the public of the necessity to consolidate France’s place in the EU before Le Pen’s FN benefits from the spread of the anti-establishment movements.

Public anxieties about the repercussions of the Syrian crisis and the impact of IS propaganda have pressed the state to question the French model of integration, because many second- and third- generation immigrants often feel segregated from the wider society in old suburbs where unemployment and criminality remain substantially higher than in the center of Paris. Social inequality, coupled with the rise of IS, has produced a substantial ideological shift in the minds of the disenchanted youth without a future, who reject the concept of assimilating into French culture. On June 26, 2016, Yassin Salhi’s beheading of Hervé Cornara perfectly exemplifies this reality. Salhi, who was previously charged with attempting to kidnap in preparation for an assassination and terrorist attack and was known to law enforcement, prepared his assassination plot without the knowledge of the local authorities of Isère.⁶⁷¹ Cornara’s murder not only shocked the French public, who discovered that the underfunding of law enforcement units at the municipal level hindered the capacity of the authorities to develop effective channels of communication capable of sharing information about dangerous individuals, but it also revealed that a part of the French Muslim youth has turned to Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative to cultural integration.⁶⁷² Resentment against the government has heightened a sense of insecurity and distrust towards the French political élite, which is substantiated by the lack of coordination between the state and the municipalities to exchange intelligence information about would-be terrorists and potentially dangerous individuals. Likewise, with the arrival of asylum seekers in Paris, Calais and at the French-Italian border of Menton-Ventimiglia, public confidence in the capacity of the French executive to absorb foreigners has been shaken, as 61% of French electorate “totally agrees” with the

⁶⁶⁸ Angelique Chrisafis, Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor, “French PM Manuel Valls Says Refugee Crisis is Destabilising Europe,” *The Guardian*, January 22, 2016. Judy Dempsey, “The Necessity of France,” *Carnegie Europe*, November 29, 2016.

⁶⁶⁹ Dempsey, “The Necessity of France.”

⁶⁷⁰ Jérôme Fourquet and Esteban Pratviel, *Les Français et L'Europe 10 ans Après le TCE*, 18, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3039-1-study_file.pdf.

⁶⁷¹ Le Monde, “Attentat en Isère: Un Corps Décapité, Trois Personnes en Garde à Vue,” *Le Monde*, June 26, 2016.

⁶⁷² Soren Seelow, “Yassin Salhi, la Surveillance en Pointillé d’un Salafiste Trop Discret,” *Le Monde*, June 27, 2015.

statement that “France cannot accept to host more migrants as too many foreigners or foreign-born people already live in the Republic.”⁶⁷³

Although today the word ‘assimilation’ has long been disqualified by political figures as negatively forcing the abandonment of one’s personal identity, under France’s model of republicanism newcomers are still expected to subordinate their cultural and ethnic identities to the identity of secular citizenship. In other words, French political culture views the ‘integration’ of migrants as the responsibility of foreigners to join the French mainstream by adopting the cultural and social mores that form the basis of French society to facilitate integration into the market and the society at large. While no preferential treatment should be given by the state to minorities, since the principle of “republican neutrality at the public level” is key to keeping order among the different communities in France, migrants are expected not only to transform themselves and ‘absorb’ the culture of the host country, but also to pledge full allegiance to the secular model of republicanism.⁶⁷⁴ Historically, secular republicanism is inextricably interwoven with the emergence of genuine democracy.⁶⁷⁵ Foreigners who wish to remain in France indefinitely are encouraged to maintain their cultural background, but they must also adhere to and respect the French ideal of political equality – such as the concept of *laïcité* in public spaces and at work. In France, individuals are encouraged to separate their attachment to religious and cultural norms from civic life to maintain cultural harmony and preserve French national identity. Beyond political allegiance to the Republic, adherence to French culture, social norms and knowledge of the language remain fundamental to the social integration and personal success of newcomers.

The French state has always tried to regulate social interactions among individuals by imposing social and cultural norms on its citizens within the public sphere. Yet because the language of post-colonialism continues to inform current debates on the place of migrants, public perception of foreigners is inherently linked to the legacy of French colonialism, to the outcomes of decolonization, and to the fact that migrants have rarely participated in the democratic process of policy-making. Like in Germany, this absence not only reveals cracks within the French model of assimilation but it also attests to the severity of the democratic crisis and the lack of representation of minorities in French politics. This means that for many years migrants were cast aside by society and the media, thus posing a problem because their absence from the political scene has allowed other actors to shape a distorted image of foreigners and young French with a migration background. This is in part due to the reluctance of most immigrants to trust public authorities or even participate in the policy-making processes of their municipalities, thus rendering ethnic minorities invisible to the public’s eye. Another reason often given for explaining the government’s failed attempt to regulation the

⁶⁷³ Jérôme Fourquet, *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants en Europe*, 12, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3315-1-study_file.pdf.

⁶⁷⁴ D’Appollonia et al., *Immigration, Integration, and Security*, 290.

⁶⁷⁵ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 306-21.

integration of second- and third-generation immigrants is the complex historical bond that binds France to Algeria, and to Muslims in general coupled with the lack of *social mixité* (social diversity) in segregated districts. In the 1950s, many Africans and Arabs imagined France as their ‘motherland’ or the ‘promised’ land where one could experience French civilization, because through the process of decolonization the French granted independence to most of their dominions and turned the Republic into the most attractive destinations for would-be migrants looking for employment in Europe. However, most of the migrants were placed in crowded housing projects and quickly forgotten by the authorities who considered them a temporary fix to compensate for the shortage of human labour in the agriculture, construction and steel sectors.⁶⁷⁶

Despite the fact that France’s foreign population became increasingly heterogeneous, with four main communities acting as the largest ethnic minority groups – the *pieds noirs* and *harkis*⁶⁷⁷, the Southern European immigrants, the French overseas department of Outre Mer and the French Algerian community, the government made little efforts to improve housing, educational and civic programs to migrants. The underfunding of housing projects in the suburbs, most commonly called HLM⁶⁷⁸, and the material deterioration of France’s suburban infrastructure perfectly embodied the state’s “lack of will to back up the rhetoric with effective action.”⁶⁷⁹ The reluctance to fully recognize (Arab and African) migrants as inherent parts of French society is entrenched in the state’s complicated relations with its old colonies and attachment to the Enlightenment as a cultural frame of reference. As researchers Cathie Lloyd and Hazel Waters noted “the French were more zealous in the export of their culture and language than the British, aiming at an integrated total population of a hundred million inhabitants,” rather than the transfer of thousands of migrants to France.⁶⁸⁰ This ultimately led to the social exclusion of immigrants of non-EU descent, who soon became synonymous with criminality and high unemployment in France’s suburbs; and although it was deemed essential to the protection of the national interest, no coherent plan was devised to guarantee proximity between French natives and new migrant populations from the MENAR.⁶⁸¹ As a result, because the government has never truly acknowledged the existence of its growing Muslim community, which already

⁶⁷⁶ Georges, Tapinos, *L’Immigration Étrangère en France: 1946-1973 Travaux et Documents Cahier no. 71* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975), 30-6.

⁶⁷⁷ The *pieds noirs* are usually described as European colonists who had been actively contributing to the spreading of French culture in Algeria and elsewhere in the Maghreb. The *harkis* were Muslim who had fought on the French side in the Algerian war of independence and won the privilege of being treated in many respects as juridically the same as the *pieds noirs*. Richard Alba and Roxane Silverman, “Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation: The Case of North Africans in France,” *The International Migration Review* 36, no.4 (December 2002): 1171.

⁶⁷⁸ HLM or Habitation à Loyer Modéré translates into rent-controlled housing.

⁶⁷⁹ Maxim Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France* (New York, NY; London: Routledge, 1992), 54.

⁶⁸⁰ Cathie Lloyd and Hazel Waters, “France: One Culture, One People?,” *Race & Class* 32, no.3 (January 1991): 51.

⁶⁸¹ Maghreb refers to the region in the world, including Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania.

accounted for 123 different nationalities in the late 2000s, further deepens the sense that certain French nationals are treated as second-class citizens.⁶⁸²

The Seine Saint-Denis provides a great example of the government's unwillingness to come up with durable solutions for the integration of second- and third-generation immigrants, as the close ties between the inhabitants "and its North African population most vividly" illustrate the failures of the French government to impose its authority among the inhabitants of Paris' suburbs and create conditions to promote social diversity.⁶⁸³ In January 2016, for instance, an average of 13% of people residing in Seine Saint-Denis were looking for a job offer whereas only 7.8% of the people living in Paris were unemployed.⁶⁸⁴ The data illustrates how the situation in France's suburbs has deteriorated ever since the early 2000s, and especially during the riots of 2005 where youth of North African origin who "are twice as often as unemployed as their peers" even though most of them were born in France, rebelled against police forces for provoking the death of two young adolescents.⁶⁸⁵ Hence, this seems to warrant the assumption that, as in Britain, migrants who moved to France after the Second World War were less likely to suffer from the stigma attached to immigration because of their cultural proximity to the French, while migrants from North African regions were often associated to the pejorative image of the *beurs*⁶⁸⁶, and thus challenged the homogeneous construction of French nationality.

From the French perspective, successful integration, and hence naturalization, means the renunciation of the culturally and customary attributes that are essential components to the identities of many [Muslim] Arabs and Africans who form "neither a homogeneous political group, nor an isomorphic cultural community."⁶⁸⁷ As a result, people of North African origins carry the burden of the long history of tumultuous relations between France and the Arab-Muslim world, which might explain why some foreigners reject French values and the ideals of the republican tradition.⁶⁸⁸ As opposed to the British, who conceptualize their nation "as a bright mosaic of unrelated polities," the French have a more homogenous perception of the nation-state.⁶⁸⁹ Differences between French and British politics lie in the way 'integration' and 'citizenship'

⁶⁸² Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, "Islam in France," in *The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities*, ed., Roberta B.P. Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2004), 63.

⁶⁸³ Melissa K. Byrnes, "Liberating the Land or Absorbing a Community: Managing North African Migration and the Bidonvilles in Paris's *Banlieues*," *French Politics, Culture & Society* 31, no.3 (December 2013): 8.

⁶⁸⁴ INSEE, "Taux de Chômage Localisé du 3^{ème} Trimestre 2016 (données CVS): Comparaisons Régionales et Départementales," accessed September 2, 2016, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99&ref_id=TCRD_025.

⁶⁸⁵ D'Appollonia et al., *Immigration, Integration, and Security*, 223. Sylvia Zappi, "Dix ans Après les Émeutes, le Sentiment D'Abandon des Banlieues," *Le Monde*, October 26, 2015.

⁶⁸⁶ *Beurs* means "Arabs" in French slang. This word was commonly used to describe the average backward Arab man living in the French Republic.

⁶⁸⁷ Caroline Wihtol de Wenden, "Assimilation and Struggle: Maghrebi Immigration and French Political Culture," *Culture & Society* 4, no.2 (July 2003): 69.

⁶⁸⁸ Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse, *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 50.

⁶⁸⁹ D'Appollonia et al., *Immigration, Integration, and Security*, 31.

are theorized in every day policy-making processes, with regards to the assimilation of French culture by minorities. France addresses the country's ethnic problem in terms of *citoyenneté* (citizenship) and *laïcité* – two concepts entrenched in the republican ideals of *fraternité* (fraternity) and *égalité* (equality) – whereas the UK has always dealt with its minorities by focusing on the “management of ‘race relations’ and ‘multiculturalism’” to emphasize tolerance in a pluralistic society.⁶⁹⁰ As a constitutional monarchy that evolved into a modern democracy, the UK never bothered to develop a coherently ideological definition of nationality. To the French, the idea that the republic is turning into a multiculturalist society suggests that individuals have ceased to embrace French culture, which goes against the principle of *laïcité* and implies the erosion of the cultural, historical and social characteristics that form the very basis of French identity and *citoyenneté* since the Revolution.

This strict understanding is grounded on the republican myth of the nation – an ideal that emerged during the 1792-1794 Jacobin phase of the Revolution asserting the equality of all men and women before the law, irrespective of their cultural, social or religious origins.⁶⁹¹ Through the Revolution the legal meaning of citizenship was transformed, thus separating the *subjects* of the French monarchy from foreigners. Prior to the revolution, individuals were categorized according to their social rank. The people felt limited in their capacity to act for the interests of the *nation-state*, since there was no defined process for defining the *citoyens* (citizens) from the *étrangers* (foreigners). The revolutionaries addressed this challenge by naming the *citoyen* as “a free [nonslave] subject holding of the sovereignty of another man,” and developing the ideal of citizenship as a privileged status: through it, any Frenchman could acquire a set of *droits communs* (common rights) through participation in the activities of the *nation-state*.⁶⁹² In contrast, ‘aliens’ had to “recover” their citizenship rights through a voluntary act for the nation (i.e. military service), while French citizens already possessed *la qualité de Français* (the quality of being French) by birth and did not require to demonstrate “attachment to France.”⁶⁹³ As Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted, the immediate results of the Revolution was the creation of the *étrangers* because by collectively taking “the name [...] of *Citizens* as participants in the sovereign authority, and *Subjects* as subject to the laws of the State,” the French inaugurated a new style of political consecration, which placed membership of the *nation-state* as the central criterion for defining the French *citoyens* from the *étrangers*.⁶⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the regime revised its application of *jus soli* and crafted

⁶⁹⁰ Didier Lassale, “French *Laïcité* and British Multiculturalism: A Convergence in Progress?,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 32, no.3 (June 2011): 230. Originally quoted from Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (London: Palgrave, 2001), 2.

⁶⁹¹ David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), 142-43. Originally quoted from Mona Ozouf, “La Révolution Française et la Formation de L’Homme Nouveau,” in *L’Homme Régénéré: Essais sur la Révolution Française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 116-45.

⁶⁹² Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 86-7; 36-41.

⁶⁹³ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 87-9.

⁶⁹⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract* trans., Judith R. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters (New York, NY: St Martin Press, 1978), 54.

news legislation for foreigners already living in the Republic in order to discriminate among those who were entitled to become *citoyens* and those who disdained “the advantages of naturalization while profiting from the hospitable liberty” of the French laws “and escaping the charge that our nationals must support.”⁶⁹⁵ The naturalization of foreigners therefore remained conditional on the willingness of applicants to make sacrifices for the *nation* and perform certain duties, such as completing military service.

The spirit of the Revolution changed the perception of French politicians on the right to naturalization, since being incorporated into the *patrie* (homeland) entailed the renunciation of “calculations of personal advantage.”⁶⁹⁶ In 1889, a reform formally institutionalized a *jus soli* principle for second-generation immigrants, but the granting of citizenship still remained conditional on the provision of proofs of durable attachment to the French *nation-state* other than birth and residence in France.⁶⁹⁷ Ever since the promulgation of the 1889 French nationality laws have not been substantially reformed. Apart from a short-term lived reform of 1993 – which challenged the formulation of *jus soli* and applied bureaucratic measures to partially limit the application of double *jus soli* and expand the power of the French authorities “to justify rejections on basis of concrete reason” – the ideological basis for defining the quality of a *citoyen* has remained untouched by the political class.⁶⁹⁸ Hence, the establishment of the republican ideal implies the conception of a polity in which “the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice and devotion” led to the development of a *nation* in which “the fact of sharing [...] a glorious heritage and regrets” constituted the defining features of the state and the ultimate criterion for determining national membership, rather than ethnicity, race or religion.⁶⁹⁹ To this day, the sanctity of French citizenship limits the capacity of the government to gather consensus around a law establishing principles for the revocation of nationality based on ethnic or religious criteria. As the Socialist government demonstrated in March 2016, the French were not willing to alter the sacredness of political membership of French citizenship, “so long as this moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community.”⁷⁰⁰

More importantly, French nationality laws reject the notions of ethnicity since the French *nation-state* is based upon an egalitarian conception of membership whereby social distinctions can be used only to serve

⁶⁹⁵ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 93.

⁶⁹⁶ Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” *International Sociology* 5, no.4 (December 1990): 380-99.

⁶⁹⁷ According to this conditional conception of *jus soli*, second-generation immigrant could acquire French citizenship at eighteen years old and with proof of residency in France. Third-generation immigrants were granted French citizenship at birth. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 97.

⁶⁹⁸ Marc Morjé Howard, *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe* (New York, NY; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 152.

⁶⁹⁹ Ernst Renan, “What is a Nation?,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhara (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 13.

⁷⁰⁰ On March 30, 2016, François Hollande and his government decided to abandon the idea of crafting a bill to revoke citizenship rights. Ernst Renan “What is a Nation?,” 20. *Le Monde*, “François Hollande Renonce à la Déchéance de Nationalité et au Congrès,” *Le Monde*, March 30, 2016.

the general good.”⁷⁰¹ As Ernst Renan points out, access to citizenship cannot be based solely on the ethnicity or race of would-be citizens because both terms contradict the ideological purpose of the *nation-state* – that is, to create a moral conscious transcending every social class, races and gender. In fact, “to make politics that depend upon ethnographic analysis [and race] is to surrender it to a chimera,”⁷⁰² because it can neither serve as a measure to determine the intentions of would-be citizens nor can it provide a solid basis upon which policy-makers can erect the laws regulating the attribution of nationality to foreigners.

French national ideology on the equality of men signified that ethnic statistics would be frowned upon by the elites because “ethnic distinctions among French citizens” would “ultimately undermine its distinctive paradigm of integration, the so-called Republican model.”⁷⁰³ While on the surface creating an egalitarian society seemed to improve prospects for the integration of foreigners by protecting their ethnic and/or religious identities, the refusal to compile information through an ethnic census hampers the ability of the state to engage in a constructive dialogue with regards to the different needs of minorities.⁷⁰⁴ In a book published in 1995, French demographer Michèle Tribalat already voiced criticism against the government for refusing to record ethnic statistics, and hence losing vital information to study the migratory phenomenon of the late 1990s. Twenty-two years later, Tribalat reiterated the same concerns about the government’s reluctance to regard ‘ethnic belonging’ as an asset for the French nation, rather than a political problem.⁷⁰⁵ This is especially relevant considering the importance of ethnic data in the context of immigration politics. In acquiring ethnic data, the French authorities could determine whether ethnic belonging takes precedence over civic identity in certain migrant communities to enhance measures for the cultural integration of foreigners. The production of data about the geographical mobility of ethnic minorities could ultimately improve processes of integration in French society. Since France was never considered to signify a race, but rather a *patrie*, she possessed “that eminently colonial capacity of absorbing in herself the peoples to whom she transports civilization,” and would never require to collect information on second-generation immigrants.⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰¹ Article 2 of the Declaration of Men and of the Citizen of 1789 protects the religious, cultural and ethnic identity of every Frenchman and foreigner living in France. Légifrance.gouv.fr, “Déclaration des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789,” accessed September 20, 2016, <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789>.

⁷⁰² Ernst Renan, “What is a Nation?,” 14.

⁷⁰³ Alba and Silberman, “Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation,” 1171.

⁷⁰⁴ Speaking about ‘race’ has long been ideologically ‘banned’ from French debates. Those who condemn the use of the word ‘race’ justify their aversion for ethnic statistics in that such information could be used to build political programs targeting specific ethnic and religious minorities. Recording and/or using official figures on ethnic minorities is perceived as an unconstitutional and immoral way of categorizing individuals. In general, the data obtained from national surveys “do not contain direct measures of ethnic origin similar, say, to the ethnic and racial self-identifications commonly available in U.S. data.” Alba and Silberman, “Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation,” 1175. Originally quoted in Patrick Simon, “Nationalité et Origine Dans la Statistique Française: Les Catégories Ambiguës,” *Population* 53, no.3 (May/June 1998). Delphine Roucaute, “Quatre Questions sur les Statistiques Ethniques,” *Le Monde*, May 6, 2015.

⁷⁰⁵ Tribalat’s book was entitled *Faire France: Une Grande Enquête sur les Immigrés et Leurs Enfants*. Michèle Tribalat, “ Michèle Tribalat: “Les Statistiques Ethniques Sont Indispensables à la Connaissance,” *Le Figaro*, February 26, 2016.

⁷⁰⁶ Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, 102 ff67.

By refusing to impose an ethnic census, the French government has weakened its ability to assess and resolve migration-related problems, because a considerable amount of data is being lost when children who acquire citizenship by birth or residence cannot record their parents' birthplaces or ethnicity. French officials are conveying the message that the Élysée will never acknowledge the multicultural aspects of French society as a sociological fact, therefore generating resentment among parts of the foreign-born population who have come to reject the ‘absorption’ or ‘assimilation’ of French culture. In actual fact, the fundamental problem in French politics is that, as French historian Pap Ndiaye notes, France has thus far failed to incorporate in its national narrative “non-white heroes [...] to extend Frenchness beyond the ethnic dimension” so that minorities can have “a sense of shared history” with the native population.⁷⁰⁷

The French state’s separation from the Church might explain the political reluctance to accommodate the needs of ethnic minorities with strong religious attachments, as in nineteenth century France the Catholic Church was widely regarded as the greatest challenge to the republican project.⁷⁰⁸ During the 1800s, the process of *laïcization* had a profound effect on French society by stripping the clergy of its right to interfere in the affairs of the state, such as “inspecting” public schools or influencing the course of policy-making processes. As Joel Fetzer explains, the government sought to fix what scholars described as “two Frances” – one ruled by the Catholic Church and the other by the government. It was through the Separation Law of 1905 that the state regained power over the Church and declared that it would “neither recognize nor pay salaries [...] for any form of worship” nor accept “the placing of any religious sign or emblem on public monuments” and in public spaces.⁷⁰⁹ Interestingly, debates about the wearing of *hijab* and *burkini* (full coverage swimsuit) in public spaces, in universities and on the public beach, clearly resonate with the arguments of anti-clerical proponents who were concerned about the social impacts of the Church interference in the lives of Frenchmen. The public is especially critical of individuals wearing the *hijab* in schools, as a survey found that 90% of the French disapproved the idea that girls could wear a religious veil in public schools and 59% in the streets.⁷¹⁰ On the one hand, Muslims who are attached to the symbolic images of Islam and who wish to practice their religion freely challenge the common conception of *laïcité* by wearing the *hijab* or the *burkini*, while the non-Muslim population of France considers the veil to represent a form of enslavement for women for covering their hair, in clear opposition to the principles rooted in French secularism. This testifies that the French take great pride in maintaining a clear separation between the Church and the state, which then legitimates their disapproval of the *hijab* as a religious sign of belonging and rejection of refugees who follow

⁷⁰⁷ Peggy Hollinger, “What the Legacy of France’s First Black General Tells us About the Country’s Identity,” *Financial Times*, April 21, 2017.

⁷⁰⁸ Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen*, 251.

⁷⁰⁹ Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 70.

⁷¹⁰ Sarah Alby, *Le Regard des Européens sur L'Islam*, 7, http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/410-1-document_file.pdf.

the same Islamic traditions. Christian and Muslim refugees alike have all been placed at the center of anti-migrant discourses but the controversy over the *burkini* affairs has allowed authorities to use the principle of *laïcité* as the state's new "religion of the French Republic" to refuse concessions to specific minorities.

Yet forbidding the *hijab* or the *burkini* is more complex than it seems, because they are both worn as cultural garments and as symbols of ethnic or cultural belonging for some, all the while representing religious piety. This clearly demonstrates that the French misunderstand the broad symbolic value of the *hijab* in Muslim faith. Ultimately, women covering their heads attract reactions from non-Muslims that range from verbal to physical abuse, thus making them highly vulnerable to discrimination and violence from the wider society.⁷¹¹ The prohibition of the *hijab* in public buildings denies a part of French society the right to be represented politically which contradicts the republican ideals of *liberté*, *égalité*, *fraternité* and obstructs any progress to ensure social diversity and the fair treatment of ethnic minorities. In a globalized world, whereby people can commute freely, controlling the ways certain individuals dress up as a marker of socio-cultural and religious belonging remains a contradiction, especially given that France strives to exemplify the ideals of "natural rights" and "universality" entrenched in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The *hijab* problem will never be solved if France does not find innovative ways to include its Muslim community socially. Other Western European governments have been more flexible on the question of the Muslim veil to avoid the creation of reactive identities, whereby certain ethnic communities feel rejected from the society and become radicalized because of feelings of resentment against the establishment. Like in the late 1800s, those who defended the active role of the Church on the pretext that "Catholicism was the religion of the great majority of French people," resemble those who today defend *laïcité* "on the pretext that they want to defend the Republic" while they actually "defend an exclusionary definition of secularism – one that serves the interests of "atheists, agnostics or the people who won the battle against the Catholic Church."⁷¹²

Although the pejorative image of the *beurs* has disappeared from popular jargon, the refugee crisis has reinforced stereotypical ideas about Arabs and Muslims as threatening the security of French people. These tensions conceal the very fact that France is suffering from an identity crisis, which has highlighted the limitations of the state to address the real implications of the mass arrival of asylum seekers or Arab origin. When, for example, the Senate abrogated the law on the deprivation of citizenship for terrorists it indicated that French politicians would not reform the model of citizenship, ignoring the fact that France is on the verge of becoming a *communautarist*⁷¹³ society whereby invisible barriers divide ethnic communities into secluded

⁷¹¹ Bronwyn Winter, *Hijab & the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate* (New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 1-2.

⁷¹² Fetzer and Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany*, 71.

⁷¹³ *Communautarism* refers to a situation of tensions whereby ethnic communities impose their own rules and codes of conduct in a given territory.

groups that do not engage with each other.⁷¹⁴ This tends to reinforce the polarized nature of political debates in France, which in turn, gives extreme right-wing parties (mainly, the Front National) the ability to draw on the ideological divisions of society to gain electoral credibility.

c. Economic Impact

The weakening of the French economy has meanwhile tended to exacerbate the tension on which the FN thrives electorally. Through a rather simplistic slogan – “Le Changement C'est Maintenant” – François Hollande won the presidential election by promising the middle classes that a substantial tax increase of 75% would be imposed on those earning more than 1 million euros per year.⁷¹⁵ Though many praised this move for defeating the Right at the polls, it actually proved to be a great mistake of judgment. Countless businesses deserted France to avoid the 75% tax increase, and the financial position of France was weakened vis-à-vis the stronger economies of Germany and the UK, who seized the opportunity to woo French companies in what was, after all, an EU governed by a single market ethos nurturing the mobility of labour, capital, and expertise. As Cameron cleverly noted during a G20 Summit in 2012: “If the French go ahead with a 75% top rate of tax we will roll out the red carpet and welcome more French business to Britain and they will pay taxes in Britain and that will pay for health service, and our schools and everything else.”⁷¹⁶ Hollande persisted in his effort to demonstrate that the government would fulfill this ill-conceived electoral promise, even if it meant creating political tensions following the exodus of business leaders and investors to countries with lower tax policies, such as Russia, the UK and the Benelux states. Clearly, the reform damaged the ability of the French political class to maintain credibility in the public eye, since the tax was later cut to 50% and removed completely on January 1, 2015.⁷¹⁷

The weakening of the French economy under Hollande’s administration is especially pronounced, given that France has yet to address the social contract that binds the French population economically.⁷¹⁸ With 9.3% in 2004 and 9.2% unemployment in 2006, the French economy started to deteriorate well before the beginning of the financial crash in 2008, but in order to divert attention away from his failure to decrease unemployment, Hollande passed other controversial reforms on education, gay marriage and gender

⁷¹⁴ Groupe Plessis, “Déchéance de Nationalité: La Double Faute Politique de la Droite,” *Le Figaro*, April 1, 2016.

⁷¹⁵ Le Monde, “François Hollande Écrit aux Français: ‘Le Changement c'est Maintenant’,” *Le Monde*, January 3, 2012. Le Monde, “François Hollande est élu Président de la République Avec 51.9% des Voix,” *Le Monde*, May 6, 2012. Samuel Laurent, “Tranche D’Imposition à 75%: Ce que Signifie la Proposition de M. Hollande,” *Le Monde*, February 28, 2012.

⁷¹⁶ Ivan Letessier, “Taxe à 75%: Des Sociétés Délocalisent Déjà Leurs Cadres,” *Le Figaro*, July 22, 2012. Richard Murphy, “In Wooing French Tax Exiles, Cameron Makes a Mockery of Democracy,” *The Guardian*, June 19, 2012. Corinne Caillaud, “Exit la Taxe à 75% qui a Sapé L’Image de la France,” *Le Figaro*, February 1, 2015.

⁷¹⁷ Anne Penketh, “France Forced to Drop 75% Supertax After Meager Returns,” *The Guardian*, December 31, 2014. Hayat Gazzane, “La Taxe à 75% va Disparaître au 1^{er} Janvier 2015,” *Le Figaro*, December 24, 2014.

⁷¹⁸ Guillaume Errard, “Le Chômage est-il Devenu une Fatalité en France?,” *Le Figaro*, November 27, 2015.

politics.⁷¹⁹ Indeed, while EU member-states like Germany and the UK implemented strict programs to offset the negative effects of the 2008 subprime and 2010 Greek debt crises, the French government achieved little economically. Without giving an explanation to the public – as to how migrants could add value to French society and help sustain the economy by acting as substitutes to fill the 1,739,277 vacancies needed in the construction, agricultural and medical sectors – the president vowed to welcome at least a total of 30,000 new migrants.⁷²⁰ Instead of alleviating Merkel’s migration burden the French government, which was already plagued by its failure to integrate a large minority Muslim population prior to the refugee crisis of 2015, ignored the accumulation of migrants in the North after it had already dismantled the “jungle” in May and July 2014.⁷²¹ This struck many migrants who merely sought passage through French territory on their way to more prosperous economies of Britain, Germany or Sweden.⁷²²

By the beginning of 2016, the arrival of asylum seekers in Calais on their way to the UK had already put a halt on tourism in the North of France, as Chinese, Japanese and Americans deserted France for they feared that terrorists might hide among the 10,000 refugees living in the “jungle.”⁷²³ Hollande’s lack of responsiveness to the crisis and exogenous forces – such as, pressure by truck companies to minimize capital loss and the lack of intergovernmental cooperation between the UK and France – is to blame for obstructing the efficiency of the internal market in Calais where the presence of the “jungle” paralyzed efforts by locals to boost tourism in the region of the Hauts-de-France.⁷²⁴ In the absence of clear measures to thwart the accumulation of migrants the reputation of Calais as a tourist destination has been undermined, which in turn, has also slowed down the level of economic activity between France and the UK as truck drivers must watch out for migrants risking their lives on highways, all the while delivering their merchandise on time. The death of a migrant who was struck by a lorry on the highway in Calais symbolizes the collision between the principle of the free flow of goods in a single Europe and the failure of governments to cope with the refugee crisis – for both refugees and truck drivers using the Calais-Dover route.⁷²⁵

The migration problem at the Calais-Dover always existed, despite efforts by Paris and London to better manage Schengen’s external border by using the systematic monitoring of trucks by UK border agents

⁷¹⁹ INSEE, “Travail-Emploi Taux de Chômage,” accessed September 27, 2016, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?ref_id=CMPPD004.

⁷²⁰ Pôle Emploi, “Enquête Besoins en Main D’Oeuvre,” accessed September 27, 2016, <http://bmo.pole-emploi.org/bmo?le=0&pp=2015>. Le Figaro, “Hollande Assure que la France Accueillera 30.000 Migrants,” *Le Figaro*, March 4, 2016.

⁷²¹ After the 2014 European elections during which the FN obtained 31% of votes in Calais, where migrants camp in the woods, the Socialist government decided to act and dismantle three camps on May 28, 2014 and a second one on July 2, 2014. Eugénie Bastié, “L’Afflux de Migrants à Calais: Retour sur 15 ans D’ Impuissance Publique,” *Le Figaro*, September 4, 2014.

⁷²² Jon Henley, “Why Refugees Prefer Britain to France,” *The Guardian*, September 6, 2001.

⁷²³ Jean-Marc Leclerc, “Calais: Le Seuil des 10.000 Migrants Franchis,” *Le Figaro*, August 28, 2016.

⁷²⁴ Many blame the creation of the “jungle” in Calais (and in the 18 district of Paris) for hurting the French tourism industry and witnessing a decrease of 6.2% in profits during the first half of 2016. Isabelle Chaperon, “Les Touristes Étrangers Boudent la France,” *Le Monde*, August 23, 2016.

⁷²⁵ Le Monde, “Calais: Un Migrant Meurt Renversé par un Camion,” *Le Monde*, March 31, 2016. Kim Willsher, “Protestors Close Calais Over Refugee Crisis ‘we are not Racist but ‘we see no Solution,’” *The Guardian*, September 6, 2016.

on the territory of France as a deterrent against illegal crossings. Fifteen years ago, the French Red Cross opened a refugee shelter in Sangatte to house migrants who congregated in the northern part of France to cross the Channel Tunnel illegally.⁷²⁶ The establishment of this shelter signaled the beginning of problem that would persist in the coming years even when then-president Nicolas Sarkozy shut it down on December 22, 2002 following the signing of the Touquet accords. Jessica Reinisch sums up the condition of those undocumented migrants very well: these individuals are trapped as “forever temporary migrants” in a humanitarian crisis kept hidden from the public eye for decades.⁷²⁷ What brought the Calais issue to light was the start of the Syrian war, but the situation deteriorated so fast between 2014 and 2016 that Hollande’s administration was forced to restore order and security in Calais. Hollande’s first visit to Calais happened two years after the state of emergency was declared following the storming of a ferry bound for the UK by 235 migrants in September 2014, thus showing the lack of seriousness with which his government addressed the situation in Calais.⁷²⁸ Instead the government exploited the situation unscrupulously to convince public opinion of Hollande’s capacity to react to emergency situations and to ensure the *status quo*, which in turn transformed the “jungle” into a political playground for presidential contenders to parade in front of the media and advance their own political agenda.⁷²⁹ For the 1,500 (or more) unaccompanied minors in Calais, though, the camp became a dangerous place where growing numbers of boys and girls were taking the risk of being sexually assaulted or physically abused by adults.⁷³⁰

Ultimately, Hollande announced the complete dismantlement of the Calais camp two months before the onset of primary elections because with only 15% of the French supporting the president in September 2016 Hollande had to regain political credibility before the primaries of the Socialist Party scheduled for January 2017.⁷³¹ The redistribution scheme was devised for this very purpose: to provide the French public with a temporary measure of relief in Calais and conceal the failures of the government from the public eye. Yet although the scheme revived tensions very quickly, as political opponents from the right and extreme-right criticized the plan for creating “little-Calais” settlements throughout France, the Right failed to substantiate its claims by highlighting the issue at stake: that is, the inability of the authorities to monitor the whereabouts of migrants who, after being placed in special centers called Centre D’Accueil et D’Orientation (CAO), are free to leave the area (and disappear into thin air) since no police force supervises the centers on a daily basis. Put simply, keeping migrants in France against their will in special centers is humanely and

⁷²⁶ Elise Vincent, “L’Errance des Migrants, dix ans Après Sangatte,” *Le Monde*, May 5, 2012.

⁷²⁷ Jessica Reinisch, “‘Forever Temporary’: Migrants in Calais, Then and Now,” *The Political Quarterly* 86, no.4 (October 2015): 515-16. Vincent, “L’Errance des Migrants, dix ans Après Sangatte.”

⁷²⁸ Le Figaro, “Calais: Hollande Promet un ‘Démantèlement Complet’ du Camp ‘d’ici la fin de L’Année,’ *Le Figaro*, September 26, 2016.

⁷²⁹ Tristan Q. Maupoil, “Présidentielle: Calais, Nouveau Ring de Campagne,” *Le Figaro*, September 20, 2016.

⁷³⁰ Lisa O’Carroll, “Calais Camp Charities Attack UK and France Over Unaccompanied Children,” *The Guardian*, October 29, 2016.

⁷³¹ Frédéric Dabi, *Les Indices de Popularité – September 2016*, 5, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3492-1-study_file.pdf.

financially impossible.⁷³² Humanitarian associations established that up to 3,000 migrants had fled the “jungle” to avoid being placed in these centers, as many had already left their CAOs in the hopes of finally reaching the UK.⁷³³ The situation in Calais following the dismantling of the biggest slum in France was chaotic: those who escaped police enforcement in December 2016 to avoid being fingerprinted began returning to the Calais vicinity two months after the closure of the “jungle” in the Hauts-de-France where they find shelter in seven refugee camps scattered across the region.⁷³⁴ In France, for instance, the problem has been aggravated by the UK’s refusal to take more asylum seekers who have resorted to mutilating their fingers while waiting desperately in Calais. French legislators have, in fact, made the situation worse by giving those who mutilated themselves the assurance that their application for asylum will be examined “under accelerate procedure.”⁷³⁵ In 2014, it was reported that 52% of asylum seekers in Calais had mutilated their fingers by affixing a thick layer of glue or varnish to overcome the Dublin rule.⁷³⁶ Whenever an apprehended individual provides inaccurate elements of identification French police officers are prohibited from using coercion without acquiring the consent of the Public Prosecutor. This invariably puts French authorities at a disadvantage compared to their British counterparts who can interpret the refusal of fingerprinting “as indicating a risk of absconding from removal, justifying a refusal of voluntary departure and, if applicable, detention.”⁷³⁷ All of this seems to validate the description of the redistribution scheme by the political right as “a provocation” and “a mistake” for the future of France, because in the context of the economic and unemployment crises, parts of the French political elite who argues for the ‘national preference,’ that is, the defense of the interest of French citizens and the protection of France’s sovereignty from external threats and thus oppose the scheme, were backed by 62% of the French public disapproving the dispersal scheme in September 2016.⁷³⁸ Additionally, that €279M is going to be invested in the reception of asylum-seekers has heightened uncertainties about the economic future of France and the long-term cost of protecting would-be refugees on the back France’s deficit budget.⁷³⁹

Although migrants are strongly determined to work as quickly as possible to reimburse the money

⁷³² Le Monde “À Droite, le Plan de Cazeneuve Pour Désengorger Calais ne Passe pas,” *Le Monde*, September 14, 2016.

⁷³³ Ouest France, “Jungle de Calais. 2000 à 3000 Migrants Dispersés Entre Calais et Paris,” *Ouest France*, October 27, 2016. Philippe Huguen, “Y a-t-il des ‘Camps Secrets’ Autour de Calais?,” *Libération*, December 27, 2016.

⁷³⁴ Including Calais, the seven camps are in Steenvorde, Angres, Grande Synthe, Norrent Fontes, Tatinghem et Cherbourg. United Nations Children’s Funds (UNICEF), *Ni Sains, ni Saufs: Enquête sur les Enfants non Accompagnés Dans le Nord de la France*, 14, https://www.unicef.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ni-sains-ni-saufs_mna_france_2016_0.pdf. Huguen, “Y a-t-il des ‘Camps Secrets’ Autour de Calais??”

⁷³⁵ Council of the European Union, “Best Practices for Upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation to Take Fingerprints,” published October 30, 2014, accessed February 10, 2017, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/dec/eu-com-coercive-fingerprinting-migrants-ds-1491-14.pdf>.

⁷³⁶ Council of the European Union, “Best Practices for Upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation to Take Fingerprints.”

⁷³⁷ Ibid 736.

⁷³⁸ Le Monde, “À Droite, le Plan de Cazeneuve Pour Désengorger Calais ne Passe pas.” Jérôme Fourquet, *Les Français et L’Accueil des Migrants*, 6, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3552-1-study_file.pdf.

⁷³⁹ Le Figaro, “Réfugiés les Principales Déclarations de Manuel Valls,” *Le Figaro*, September 16, 2015.

borrowed from family or friends to pay smugglers directly challenges, certain French laws that trap asylum seekers in a “state of assistantship” whereby they receive allowances) from the government yet are not allowed to work.⁷⁴⁰ As a result, the idea that migrants are devoid of economic and human value is reinforced by the application of such restrictive policies. To make the situation worse, Minister of Interior Bernard Cazeneuve’s announcement that groups of migrants had been “distanced” and “put far away from the national territory,” seemed to validate the conceptualization of refugees as disposable objects, devoid of economic value.⁷⁴¹ This creates a vicious circle in which asylum seekers are compelled to enter the black market in order to sustain their needs and to repay personal debts. In fact, it was the French government itself which sabotaged chances for migrants to integrate faster into French society, since the executive still relies on a legislative text voted in 1991 to address the challenges of the fall of the Berlin Wall during a time when France neither had to increase its fertility rates nor fill up job vacancies.⁷⁴² Such exaggerations obviously translate the fear that France’s financial purse will be hurt substantially by the 22,340 applicants who received a positive answer to their asylum request since 2012.⁷⁴³

Another obstacle to labour immigration in France is the reluctance of syndicates to integrate cheap labour into the French market given that labour unions also oppose expanding France’s foreign workforce, because they fear that it could lower wages and put unskilled natives at a disadvantage with respect to pay and qualifications. Convincing the French unions has always been complicated because the working classes, who condemn the idea that, like Germany, France would need “replacement migration” to boost its fertility rates and reap the benefits of another large-scale immigration program, has always influenced the priorities of most labour syndicates.⁷⁴⁴ Demographically, with only 2.01 children per woman, France most likely needs to boost its fertility rates with a program of ‘controlled’ immigration.⁷⁴⁵ Yet this idea has been rejected by a French public that tends to associate migrants with the regression of the economy and the intrusion of EU institutions into French politics. When in May 2015 60% of the French population agreed with the idea that France should retract from the Schengen area, or at least, restrict the basic EU freedom of mobility within the zone, the

⁷⁴⁰ The French government allocates on average 204€ per person and per month (306€ for a family of 2 people, 408€ for a family of 3 people, 510€ for a family of 4 people, 612€ for a family of 5 people, 714€ for a family of 6 people, 816€ for a family of 7 people, 918€ for a family of 8 people, 1,020€ for a family of 9 people, and up to 1,122€ for a family of 10 people). Also, asylum seekers can receive a daily allocation of 5,40€ if no accommodation has been provided to them. Marine Rabreau, “Les Aides Dont Bénéficient les Migrants en France,” *Le Figaro*, September 16, 2015. Vie-Publique, “En Quoi Consiste L’Allocation Pour Demandeur D’Asile (Ada)?,” last modified April 1, 2017, accessed July 5, 2017, <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F33314>.

⁷⁴¹ Le Figaro, “Calais: 1346 Personnes ‘Éloignées’,” *Le Figaro*, September 15, 2016.

⁷⁴² In 1991, French women had an average of 3.189 children. World Bank “Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman),” accessed November 10, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?>. Circulaire du Premier Ministre NOR/PRM/X/91/00102/60/D du 26 septembre 1991 (JO du 27 septembre 1991).

⁷⁴³ Eurostat, “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.”

⁷⁴⁴ 50% of the French public does not believe in the ability of migrants to find a job. Jérôme Fourquet and Jean-Philippe Dubrulle, *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants*, 10, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3118-1-study_file.pdf.

⁷⁴⁵ World Bank, “Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman).”

French public was sending a clear message to the political elite.⁷⁴⁶ Mainly, that the electorate is getting more polarized on subjects pertaining to migration and the economy in France because of the inability of previous governments to improve life standards uniformly.

The impoverishment of key regions in France is especially worrying because people living in areas that lack economic activity tend to associate the urbanisation of industrial regions with the economic retrogression of rural areas. This has the effect of creating an invisible barrier dividing France into poor regions and thriving urban centers, like Paris, Lille or Marseille. In 2013, the closing of 63,700 businesses in 2013 (compared to 8500 in 2009) coupled with the lack of investments by the government (i.e. improving means of transportation and/or providing access to traineeships for the youth) seriously hinders the promotion of the community life of small localities that need financial help to boost their attractiveness.⁷⁴⁷ In the early 2000s, the French government started to understand the seriousness of the economic problem in suburban and rural areas, which prompted the parliament to vote the *politique de la ville et renovation urbaine* (urban renewal policy) to reduce social inequalities among *zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS – sensitive urban zones) given the relative failure of the French government's *politique de la ville* (urban policy).⁷⁴⁸ Rather than investing in the community life of “751 run-down urban neighborhoods,” the political elite simply spent 48 billion euros in 10 years to renovate the facades of buildings without offering more professional help to the disenfranchised youth.⁷⁴⁹ People who reside in sensitive urban zones tend to develop feelings of isolation from the urban centers, all the while blaming the EU for bringing new waves of unwanted cheap labour to an already crowded French labour market. As a result, a *France périphérique* (peripheral France) emerges where high level of job insecurity presses blue-collar workers (37%) and people living in small towns (30.8%) with no local shops and amenities within their localities to vote for the FN.⁷⁵⁰ French geographer Christophe Guilluy coined the concept of *France périphérique* to draw a parallel between the rise of the FN in opinion

⁷⁴⁶ Another similar poll found that by March 2016, 72% of French, 66% of Germans and 60% of Italians supported the idea of withdrawing from the Schengen treaty and/or reinstating borders and border controls. Fourquet and Pratviel, *Les Français et L'Europe 10 ans Après le TCE*, 13. Fourquet and Dubrulle, *Les Européens et la Crise des Migrants*, 43.

⁷⁴⁷ Mathilde Golla, “La France n'a Jamais Autant Fermé de Commerces Qu'en 2013,” *Le Figaro*, January 16, 2014.

⁷⁴⁸ Légifrance.gouv.fr, “LOI n° 2003-710 du 1er Août 2003 D'Orientation et de Programmation Pour la Ville et la Rénovation Urbaine (1),” accessed April 20, 2017, <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000428979&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id>.

⁷⁴⁹ Although the Chirac government had voted the 2006 law on equality of opportunity, Sarkozy halted all progress made towards the social inclusion of minorities in poorer areas, like the Seine Saint Denis, which has a poverty rate of 20.7%, and instead decided to keep the construction plans. Commission from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Join Report on Social Exclusion Summarising the Results of the Examination of the National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (2003-2005), COM (2003) 773 final (12 December 2003). Victoria Masson, “Quels Sont les Départements les Plus Pauvres de France?,” *Le Figaro*, March 3, 2015. Sylvia Zappi, “Dix ans Après les Émeutes, le Sentiment D'Abandon des Banlieues,” *Le Monde*, October 26, 2015. Vie-Publique, “Loi du 31 Mars 2006 Pour L'Égalité des Chances,” published April 24, 2006, accessed April 20, 2017, <http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/panorama/texte-vote/loi-du-31-mars-2006-pour-equalite-chances.html>.

⁷⁵⁰ Jérôme Fourquet, “L’Influence de L’Isolement et de L’Absence de Services et Commerces de Proximité sur le Vote FN en Milieu Rural,” *Département Opinion et Stratégies D’Entreprises* no.135 (March 2016): 6, http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/896-1-document_file.pdf. Marie Simon, “Cadre, Employé, Ouvrier: Qui a Voté Le Pen et Qui a Voté Macron ?,” *Le Figaro*, April 24, 2017.

polls and the increase of poverty in regions where high unemployment rates persist.⁷⁵¹ Another Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) study also confirmed that touristic cities do not support Le Pen because municipalities along the coast (i.e. Deauville) take advantage of tourism while others suffer from being located just a few kilometers further inside the country (i.e. Auberville).⁷⁵² That the FN obtained 16.01% of votes in Deauville compared to 25.14% in Aubervilles, two cities in the Normandy region indicates a possible correlation between the lack of socio-economic exposure and the rise of the FN, but also another one between the increase of poverty in rural areas and the crystallization of public opinion on EU's dealing in the French economy.⁷⁵³ Lately, the EU has been unable to solve its debt crisis and thus has been forced to cut its public investments by 60 billion euros when compared to the EU budget of 2008. This is all the more important because the localities and regions, which depend on EU's cash flow are running out of solutions to compensate for their inability to foster community life, are being easily swayed by anti-EU discourses.⁷⁵⁴ Very much like UKIP, Le Pen has been playing on feelings of resentment against the elite, but more specifically, against the EU given that only 25% of the French public believe that migrants already have the professional skills required to enter the French market.⁷⁵⁵ The rise of the FN vote in peripheral France obviously bears broad socio-economic similarities to the Brexit vote in peripheral Britain because those who feel trapped by the system are thus encouraged to cast a reactionary vote against the current political establishment for failing to reform the economies of small to medium-sized municipalities.

While stricter measures to tackle illegal crossings to the UK have been implemented at the British border in Calais, France has yet to demonstrate that it can prevent migrants from accumulating there, while protecting the most vulnerable ones such as unaccompanied children. To remedy this situation, both Paris and London must compensate for their respective asymmetric vulnerabilities by formally undertaking a joint program for the detection and arrest of migrants at the border, rather than unilaterally taking steps that result in a lose-lose situation. Given Britain's desire to maintain access to borderless commerce with Europe, it is likely that France and the UK will establish an additional treaty combining measures to deter illegal immigrations with recommendations for the preservation of free trade and border controls at the external

⁷⁵¹ Guilluy defines 'peripheral France' as the urban, rural, peri-urban areas, small towns, and medium-sized towns surrounding the main city centers of France. Accordingly, the economic development of 'peripheral France' has stalled significantly in part because the political establishment has failed to provide long-term solutions to boost the economy of the 'periphery,' the result being the creation of invisible barriers separating thriving urban centers, rural areas from old industrial suburbs. See his book for more information on Guilluy's thesis, Christophe Guilluy, *La France Périphérique: Comment on a Sacrifié les Classes Populaires*, (Paris: Flammarion, 2014). Libération, "Guilluy: 'Le Concept de France Périphérique est Souvent mal Interprété,'" *Libération*, June 5, 2015.

⁷⁵² Fourquet, "L'Influence de L'Isolement et de L'Absence de Services et Commerces de Proximité sur le Vote FN en Milieu Rural," 2.

⁷⁵³ Le Figaro, "Premier Tour de L'Élection Présidentielle: Les Résultats Dans Votre Commune," *Le Figaro*, April 23, 2017.

⁷⁵⁴ See Recommendations 1 and 2, Markku Markkula, "121e Session Plénière des 8 et 9 Février 2017 PROJET D'AVIS Combler le Retard D'Investissement: Comment Relever les Défis," Comité Européen des Régions, published February 8-9, 2017, <https://memportal.cor.europa.eu/Handlers/ViewDoc.ashx?doc=COR-2016-04165-00-01-PAC-TRA-FR.docx>.

⁷⁵⁵ Fourquet and Dubrulle, *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants*, 10.

border of Calais-Dover. By contrast, France must tackle the challenge of thwarting the flow of migrants from the South to prevent a mass influx in Calais and Paris, all the while reforming its economy in order “not to be cast as a ‘Club Med’ country unable to keep up with Germany in a hard-currency, low inflation zone.”⁷⁵⁶

Although France has not been a principal target for migrants during the refugee crisis, its structural unemployment and troubled history with visible minorities – both combined with the new salience of terrorism and national security – means that migrant and refugee issue is as politically volatile as anywhere in Western Europe.

d. Institutional Impact

The gradual accumulation of undocumented migrants trapped at the Menton-Vintimiglia border perfectly illustrates the mismanagement of the refugee crisis by Italy and France, both major economies and founding members of the EEC in 1957. In less than a year, the number of applications (83,245 in 2016) received by Rome added pressure on Italian authorities, even as the government struggled with finding the most viable political alternative to former prime minister Matteo Renzi’s failed constitutional reform.⁷⁵⁷ The refugee crisis inevitably put Italy at a disadvantage compared to France, not least of all because Hollande’s government has been playing a ping-pong game with the lives of asylum seekers who wait in Italy pending the determination of the status of their application. If an asylum-seeker can prove that after he/she “has entered the territories” of a member-state irregularly – or, alternatively, “whose circumstances of entry cannot be established” – while he/she “has been living for a continuous period of at least five months” in another member-state, Dublin rules state that the second member-state is responsible for examining the new asylum application.⁷⁵⁸ This rule, embedded in Article 13 (2) of the criteria determining member-states for examining asylum applications, has prompted French law enforcement officers to reject those found crossing France’s borders illegally, hoping to confine them and the administration of their status to Italian soil. Those who aspire to enter the UK illegally are forced to take excessive measures to cross the border without being arrested by the French police in Menton.⁷⁵⁹ Hence, by choosing to ignore the gravity of the humanitarian crisis in economically troubled Italy,

⁷⁵⁶ The Economist, “Europe à L’Hollandaise.”

⁷⁵⁷ Le Monde, “Le Chef du Gouvernement Italien, Matteo Renzi, a Présenté sa Démission,” *Le Monde*, December 7, 2016. The National Institute for Statistics (Istat), *Permessi di Soggiorno per Asilo Politico e Protezione Umanitaria*, accessed November 2, 2016, <https://www.istat.it/it/files/2016/12/Report-Permessi-Soggiorno2015-2016.pdf?title=Permessi+di+soggiorno+e+asilo+politico++23%2Fdic%2F2016+-+Testo+integrale+e+nota+metodologica.pdf>.

⁷⁵⁸ In addition to this, article 13 (1) of the regulation establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member-state responsible for examining an application for international protection. Article 13 (1) stipulates that when “an asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum. This responsibility shall cease 12 months after the date on which the irregular border crossing took place.” Council Regulation No 604/2013, of The European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast) 2013 O.J. (L180) 31.

⁷⁵⁹ Vincent-Xavier Morvan, “Migrants: À la Frontière Franco-Italienne, la Pression Monte,” *Le Figaro*, August 7, 2017.

the French executive conveyed the message that it would neither shoulder the responsibility of securing the borders by enhancing bilateral cooperation between the French and Italian law enforcement agencies nor share the burden of registering thousands of asylum seekers.⁷⁶⁰

France's mismanagement of the crisis clearly exposed the inadequacies of the Dublin system and its impacts on intra-EU solidarity, but in reality, the main problem lies in the fact that national governments all have a different appreciation of the principles of European cohesion enshrined in the idea of an "ever closer union" because the ambiguous nature of this clause allows them to embrace their own conception of EU politics. For example, when the French government accused Italy of "not properly processing the refugees" the Italian authorities decided to turn a blind eye to the crisis by dispersing migrants along the border since most other EU states remained hostile to voting a Europe-wide redistribution plan.⁷⁶¹ This obviously supports the claim of many experts who decry the fact that EU policy-making processes are still contingent on the use of 'variable geometry' to create reciprocal agreements among member-states. Whatever the interpretation, the situation at the Italian-French border testifies that, even among member-states with a formal commitment to European integration dating to the Treaty of Rome, national adherence to the Schengen standards is a fair-weather phenomenon liable to violation in the face of a crisis.

At the same time, Hollande government's foreign policy has done nothing to fortify EU unity. Specifically, tensions between France and the rest of the EU rose after Hollande announced, without organizing an emergency meeting in Brussels or Strasbourg, that France would engage in war against the Assad regime in Syria in coalition with the US and the UK.⁷⁶² However, the French president was heavily criticized by the international community at the G20 in St. Petersburg, Russia when 11 national governments, including EU Council president Herman Van Rompuy, criticized "the French for refusing to elaborate a common [European] position on Syria" and for imposing a military solution that would benefit the Franco-American relationship only.⁷⁶³ Hollande failed to realize that neither Cameron, representing France's military partner in NATO, nor Merkel, representing France's closest political partner in the EU, would accept to commit troops on the ground in Syria. Like Labour leader Ed Miliband noted in August 2016 the UK and its allies have learnt "the lessons of Iraq."⁷⁶⁴

To compensate for his lack of leadership and credibility at the EU level, Hollande resorted to

⁷⁶⁰ Jean-Marc Leclerc, "À Menton, les Forces de L'Ordre à la Peine Dans un Climat de Plus en Plus Tendu," *Le Figaro*, August 7, 2016.

⁷⁶¹ Patrick Kingsley, "'This Isn't Human': Migrants in Limbo on Italian-French Border," *The Guardian*, June 17, 2015. Stephanie Kirchgaessner, "Italian Police Forceably Remove Migrants Stranded Near French Border," *The Guardian*, June 16, 2015.

⁷⁶² Ludovic Lamant, "Syrie: François Hollande a Oublié L'Europe," *Médiapart*, September 13, 2013.

⁷⁶³ Lamant, "Syrie: François Hollande a Oublié L'Europe."

⁷⁶⁴ Although Britain was not willing to wage war in Syria and Iraq in August 2013, Cameron casted a second vote in December 2015 after the Paris attacks. Cameron obtained a majority of 397 to 223 and declared solemnly that Britain had decided to "join the coalition of nations conducting airstrikes against Islamic State militants." BBC, "Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action," *BBC*, August 30, 2013. Andrew Sparrow, "Cameron Wins Syria Airstrikes Vote by Majority of 174 – As it Happened," *The Guardian*, December 3, 2015.

externalizing France's military actions in Africa to fight wars against terrorism while giving the sense that the Élysée still possessed enough military power to prevent the murder of destitute populations without the help of Brussels. In other words, the French president sought to distance himself from the EU by taking on a new role against transnational terrorism in strategic places (i.e. Mali and Syria) and consolidating the Franco-American alliance under NATO's umbrella – once again, to compensate for his political isolation at the EU level and falling polls at home.⁷⁶⁵ Despite being labelled as a ‘war leader’ for preventing the massacre of Christians by Muslim jihadists in Bamako, Hollande took the risk of “being accused of neo-colonialism for the sake of preventing” massacres in central Africa, as he forced the French army to endorse “the role of peacekeeper.”⁷⁶⁶ By favoring the transatlantic⁷⁶⁷ relationship Hollande reinforced the perception that EU defence solidarity had ceased to exist among member-states, or that France’s *grandeur* on the international scene could be restored by virtue of its performance in Africa. What Hollande sought was to use the army as a strategic tool for the deployment of France in the world and as a means to regain authority in the eyes of the French public.⁷⁶⁸ Notwithstanding the inability of the French military to create “an entirely independent military strategy,” Hollande went ahead and waged war without having the technical means to defeat terrorists. The only way the “normal president” could achieve his goals was by requesting logistical help from the Obama administration and the US Airforce to carry out airstrikes against terrorists in Mali.⁷⁶⁹ Ultimately, the war against terrorism in Mali and in the Central African Republic (CAR) gave both Paris and Washington the chance to rekindle their relationship and celebrate the return of France into NATO, but it also led to the impression that Paris wanted to replace London as Washington’s most loyal “follower.”⁷⁷⁰

In the case of Syria, however, the Franco-American entente had no impact on the decision of former US President Barrack Obama to seek Congressional approval to take military action of this type [airstrike campaign].”⁷⁷¹ Despite the absence of consensus at the EU level on Syria, The French president used his constitutional power to inform the Parliament of his intention to engage the army into a coalition war against Assad. The American veto was certainly perceived as a blow to Hollande’s diplomatic strategy, which relied on American aid entirely, but the lack of consensus among Paris, London and Washington combined with the absence of a clear EU position on Syria, led to the isolation of France on the international scene because, in

⁷⁶⁵ Former president Nicolas Sarkozy formally renegotiated the terms of France’s NATO membership in April 2009, thus allowing Paris to become a member of the union since Charles De Gaulle retracted from the union in 1966. Samuel Potier, “Otan: ‘La France Doit Codiriger Plutôt que Subir’,” *Le Figaro*, March 11, 2009.

⁷⁶⁶ Weinstein, “Hollande the Hawk?,” 94.

⁷⁶⁷ The term ‘transatlantic’ refers to efforts made by the French (and other European countries) to forge a lasting partnership with the American government based on trust and the satisfaction of mutual interests.

⁷⁶⁸ Maria Malagardis, “Quand Hollande Fait de la Guerre sa Seule Politique,” *Libération*, December 15, 2015.

⁷⁶⁹ Weinstein, “Hollande the Hawk?,” 91.

⁷⁷⁰ Le Monde, “Les États-Unis Félicitent la France Pour son Intervention au Mali,” *Le Monde*, February 14, 2013. Lamant, “Syrie: François Hollande a Oublié L’Europe.”

⁷⁷¹ John Gaffney, “Political Leadership and the Politics of Performance: France, Syria and the Chemical Weapons Crisis of 2013,” *Politics and International Relations* 12, no.3 (September 2014): 219.

the eyes of the French public opinion, Obama's administration had "somewhat humiliated Hollande."⁷⁷² More than that, the Syrian affair showed the limitations of President Hollande in attempting to sustain pressure and form his own coalition-of-the willing and in understanding that the US experience in Iraq still resonated in the minds of American office holders. Indeed, when Hollande declared during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that Assad was at "the origin of the problem [Syrian war]" and that, he could not be part of "the solution," the French president not only made the fundamental mistake of isolating one of the most important players [Assad] in the war against terrorism by taking the lead on Syria ahead of time, but he also substantially weakened France on the diplomatic scene by cutting ties with Syria indefinitely.⁷⁷³ By excommunicating Assad from the French diplomatic scene, Hollande proved that he grounded his foreign policy on moral considerations rather than on rational thinking and shaped a foreign policy in striking opposition to traditional French engagement in the region. Without regard to the France's role as an agent of peace and stability in the Middle East and North African Region (MENAR), Hollande pushed for the escalation of the conflict in Syria, further proving that he had failed to appreciate the importance of Syria in the balance to regional stability. More importantly, his administration failed to predict that civil war in Syria would worsen the humanitarian crisis in Southern Europe.

Hollande followed the logic of what is called path-dependent narcissism, the tendency for French presidents to use foreign policy initiatives (i.e. military intervention) for their own personal presidential purposes with the result that their political fortunes then become dependent on the outcome of the path taken.⁷⁷⁴ In the case of Syria, this has resulted in the implicit exclusion of France from the negotiation table, because Hollande's "neither Assad nor Daesh" strategy revealed his substantial lack of awareness about sectarianism in Syria and Iraq and his inability to appreciate that terrorist groups (such as, IS) would attempt to conquer the entire Levant, including places where French interests are at stake.⁷⁷⁵ His first mistake was to divorce foreign policy from strategy, instead focusing on the military power as an instrument to defeat Assad from within, and as an end to destabilize the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, which serves as a conduit for Russia and Iran to spread their influence in the Middle East. Given the West's inaction before the rise of a Muslim caliphate in Syria and Iraq, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei formed a counterforce strategy to ensure the protection of their respective interests.⁷⁷⁶

Hollande's second mistake was to believe that, like Sarkozy in Libya, he could help the Syrian people

⁷⁷² Weinstein, "Hollande the Hawk?," 95. Benjamin Barthe, Nathalie Guibert, Yves-Michel Riols and Christophe Ayad, "L'Été où la France a Presque Fait la Guerre en Syrie (3/3)," *Le Monde*, February 15, 2014.

⁷⁷³ Russel Goldman, "François Hollande of France Said Assad Must Go," *New York Times*, September 27, 2015.

⁷⁷⁴ Gaffney, "Political Leadership and the Politics of Performance," 219.

⁷⁷⁵ Gilles Boutin, "Syrie: 'Hollande essaie D'Éviter à la France D'être Exclue de la Table des Négociations,'" *Le Figaro*, September 27, 2015. Mathilde Damgé, "Intervention en Syrie: Les Intérêts Économiques ne sont pas Absents," *Le Monde*, August 29, 2013.

⁷⁷⁶ Carr, *The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 110. Mohsen Milani, "Iran and Russia's Uncomfortable Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, August 31th, 2016.

overthrow Assad's government from a distance without causing the massive movement of migrants from the Middle East to Europe. His military strategy, which consisted of isolating Syria from peace talks and sending weapons to so-called rebel groups affiliated to the Free Syrian Army, (FSA), contributed to the spread of violence in Syria. Even when Brussels was concerned that weapons could fall into the "wrong hands," the French government developed a mapping of rebel groups in partnership with General Salim Idriss, then head of the FSA, to distribute weapons evenly among the various factions by the winter of 2013. But with no measure to monitor the flow of arms, rebel groups took advantage of the West armament and training programs to strengthen their position in the conflict. In July 2016, a rebel group involved in the war, Nour al-Din Zenky Movement, was accused of beheading a Palestinian teenager thus prompting Amnesty International to denounce the boy's murder as an "abhorrent signal that some [US-backed] groups are carrying out serious abuses with impunity."⁷⁷⁷ In fact, although the West unofficially recognized the existence of four main rebel groups, the inability of the FSA to create a unified command structure led to the fragmentation of the group into competing factions, which soon joined the forces of stronger terrorist organizations, like IS or Jabhat al-Sham.⁷⁷⁸ The U.S. and Europe made another great *faux pas* by approving the launch of training programs for Syrian rebels. This idea originated from US ambassador Robert S. Ford's suggestion that providing military expertise and training 15,000 rebels in Jordan would help defeat Assad from a distance while making sure that the West did not create "another Somalia/Yemen" in the Middle East. "If the US does not help," he said, "extremists will give them money and lure them into their organization."⁷⁷⁹ While it is true that such training programs allowed rebels to capture some territory from Assad, it is certain that the West is partially responsible for inflicting unnecessary sufferings to Syrian civilians through the exchange of weapons to rebel groups and the pulling of more Syrian refugees toward Europe.

In brief, the refusal to engage in diplomatic bargaining somehow legitimized the assertion made by Assad that France and its partners had contributed to the spread of terrorism in Syria or at least, to the spread of would-be refugees throughout Europe.⁷⁸⁰ In deciding to isolate Assad politically, France and the West made the fundamental error of identifying the moral obligation of the individual (i.e. to save Syrian citizens from chemical attacks) with the obligation of the state (i.e. rational assessment of situation) in order to build a military strategy grounded on the personification of the state, rather than on rational observation of the different factions involved in the conflict. Hollande himself personified the moral duty of the French state to

⁷⁷⁷ Paul Armstrong and Hamdi Alkhshali, "Rebels in Syria Call Boy's Beheading a 'Mistake,'" *CNN*, July 21, 2016.

⁷⁷⁸ The 4 main rebel groups recognized by the West as "moderate" were the Supreme Military Council of the FSA, the Martyrs of Syria Brigades, the Northern Storm Brigade, and the Ahrar Souria Brigade. By contrast, Jabhat al-Sham, also called the al-Nusra front, is Salafist jihadist terrorist organization representing the interest of Al Qaeda's branch in the Levant. BBC, "Guide to the Syrian Rebels," *BBC*, December 12, 2013. Ghadi Sary, "Syria Conflict: Who are the Groups Fighting Assad?," *BBC*, November 11, 2015.

⁷⁷⁹ Benjamin Barthe, Cyril Bensimon and Yves-Michel Riols, "Comment et Pourquoi la France a Livré des Armes aux Rebelles en Syrie," *Le Monde*, August 21, 2014. Tara McKelvey, "Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong," *BBC*, October 10, 2015.

⁷⁸⁰ Le Monde, "Tout en Condamnant les Attentats Commis en Région Parisienne, le Président Syrien a Fustigé la Politique Française," *Le Monde*, November 14, 2015.

punish Assad, without analyzing the effects it could have on the EU member-states such Italy and Greece whose Mediterranean coastlines made them vulnerable to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Syria. Among the Big Three under study here, France had a significant role in transforming a Middle Eastern crisis into a European crisis – and in importing its human misery to European shores, ports, and railway stations.

e. Security Impact

Following the January 2015 attacks on the offices of the satirical weekly, *Charlie Hebdo*, the French realized that the government's lack of care for its minorities and the political abandonment of France's *banlieues* (suburbs) had played a major role in the radicalization of the Muslim youth, thus fostering the conviction that France's urban periphery embodies the failure of integration and the creation of *zones de non-droit* (no-go areas).⁷⁸¹ However, once the police discovered that one of the terrorists – Ahmad al Mohammad – possessed a Syrian passport, public attention shifted toward the role of Islam and the impact of the refugee crisis on Europe's security.⁷⁸² Critics of the government quickly blamed Hollande's administration for failing to monitor the movement of criminal individuals and organizations crossing into French territory – since one of the terrorist, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, had successfully returned to Europe from Syria and sojourned in France to control the attacks from afar in Seine Saint-Denis.⁷⁸³ As a response to crisis, the French executive announced the extension of the *état d'urgence*⁷⁸⁴ (state of emergency) to offset the absence of optimal control along France's borders and the failure of French intelligence services to apprehend the attack.⁷⁸⁵ This is all the more important given that 71% of the French public would support the complete shut down of the Schengen regime and reinstatement of borders control due the apparent the French model of security.⁷⁸⁶

The coordinated attacks of November 2015 shocked the opinion even more, as the count of 130 deaths made them the largest terrorist event in French history. As many of the attackers were French or Belgian citizens who has crossed European borders without difficulty, the attacks also underscored the existence of a deep malaise within French society among second- and third-generation immigrants of Arab and African descent espousing radical views of Islam. This malaise goes beyond the social marginalization of

⁷⁸¹ David Garbin and Gareth Millington, "Territorial Stigma and the Politics of Resistance in a Parisian Banlieue: La Courneuve and Beyond," *Urban Studies* 49, no.10 (August 2012): 2068.

⁷⁸² Christophe Cornevin, "Sept Heures D'Assaut et 5000 Munitions: Le Récit d'une Opération d'une Violence Rare," *Le Figaro*, November 18, 2015.

⁷⁸³ Cornevin, "Sept Heures D'Assaut et 5000 Munitions."

⁷⁸⁴ The concept of the '*état d'urgence*' was devised during the war in Algeria to provide a measure of control to the French executive. The state of emergence must be agreed by decree in which the government can establish a list of restrictions on freedom to ensure the return to stability after a terrorist attack has been perpetrated on French soil. Olivier Duhamel, "Terrorism and Constitutional Amendment in France," *European Constitutional Review* 12, no.1 (April 2016): 1.

⁷⁸⁵ Le Monde, "La France Rétablit les Contrôles aux Frontières, une Décision Rendue Possible par les Règles de Schengen," *Le Monde*, November 14, 2016.

⁷⁸⁶ Jean-Marc Leclerc, "Les Maires Réclament les Noms des Fichés S de Leur Ville," October 7, 2016. Fourquet, *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants en Europe*, 6.

young individuals, in that it reflects the products of forty years of neglect by the political class for the needs of minorities. While the first generation of migrants had to prove themselves because they simply did not ‘belong’ to the host society, all the while being placed in overcrowded ethnic ghettos, their children had no prospects of socialization with the native population. The absence of a dispersal policy at the national level undeniably put second- and third-generation immigrants at a great disadvantage compared to children living in wealthier neighborhoods, which explains why some of them tend to reject the Western model.

Paradoxically, first-generation immigrants have the strongest ties to the Muslim world, yet their views of society are less radical than that of the current generation because, unlike second- and third-generation immigrants, they have not suffered stigma of being perceived as The Other throughout their entire childhood in France.⁷⁸⁷ As a result, a population of neither French nor Arab/African people emerges from these ghettos, where criminal gangs thrive by luring the youth into the drug trade and terrorist activities.

French Muslims experience discrimination daily due to the construction of a warped image of Islam in French society. Generalizations about Muslims, particularly Arab Muslims, have impacted the perception of migrant communities, as a recent survey found that 68% believed that integration had failed mainly because certain minority groups reject the French mainstream culture, fortifying social barriers between themselves and the society at large.⁷⁸⁸ Yet proposals by think-tanks such Terra-Nova, advocating the replacement of Easter Monday and Pentecost by a Muslim and a Jewish holiday, ignited the fury of public opinion who perceived this proposal as an attack on the Christian civilization of France only two months before the presidential elections.⁷⁸⁹ Such declarations not only aggravate ethnic and religious tensions but plays into the agenda of the radical right by creating feelings of resentment among sections of the population that are not otherwise receptive to extremist political views. Today, French recruiters openly recognize their fear of Muslim employees expressing their religious affiliation at work too openly, which is seen by many as an attack on the principle of *laïcité* and an offense to those who respect the concept of religious neutrality in public spaces.⁷⁹⁰ That some Muslims have tried to impose certain norms at work during the Ramadan fasting period have been used by some to justify the professional discrimination against the Muslim youth, because such incidents give rise to conflictual situations between individuals who espouse radical view of society. In Nice, for example, a (Muslim) French waitress was slapped by a fundamentalist man for serving alcohol during Ramadan, the public reacted vehemently by pointing fingers at the government for failing to regulate

⁷⁸⁷ The Economist, “Tales From Eurabia,” *The Economist*, June 22, 2006

⁷⁸⁸ Jérôme Fourquet, *Regards Croisés sur L’Islam en France et en Allemagne*, 10, <http://www.euro-islam.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/IFOP-Figaro.pdf>.

⁷⁸⁹ Le Figaro, “Jours Fériés Musulman et Juif: Quand Terra Nova Fait le Jeu des Frères Musulmans,” *Le Figaro*, February 24, 2017.

⁷⁹⁰ Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort, *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 81.

the emergence of Islam within French society. Yet, this incident also proved that moderate Muslims have become the prime targets of Islamic preachers.⁷⁹¹

This aggression caused great embarrassment for the French elite because with almost 5 million Muslims resident, France has made no substantial efforts to foster national unity or allow French Muslims, to become part of the national narrative. In addition, the arrival of refugees from the Middle East has also legitimized discourses calling for the securitization of immigration politics against the *Islamization* of France – the idea that Islam poses a short-term security threat as well as a long-term potential to transform the cultural and social landscape of Europe.⁷⁹² Such fears are substantiated by the return of French citizens from Syria, who threaten public trust in the French Muslim community when it is reported that an approximate number of 850 persons initially left France in order to wage *jihad*.⁷⁹³ Despite calls by the Right to reinstate a legislation for the expatriation of radicalized foreigners living in France who have committed terrorist acts Hollande's administration refused to vote any concrete measures to address the root of the radicalization problem in France beyond the passing of new anti-terrorist laws.⁷⁹⁴ Without a doubt, however, the crisis has exposed France's weaknesses and forced a public debate on the failures of the French government over the last forty years: that is, the failure of the executive to integrate migrants and their children through the cultural absorption of French values; predict the merging of petty crime with transnational terrorism; and prevent the infiltration of Islamic fundamentalism in France's poorer suburbs.⁷⁹⁵ These features of the relationship between France and Islam were in place for decades before the refugee crisis of 2015 further inflamed the political atmosphere surrounding them.

France's relationship with terrorism specifically has evolved in nature and degree. Paris remained sheltered from the wave of transnational terrorism linked to the 9/11 attacks, in part thanks to former French president Jacques Chirac's decision not to engage in a military conflict against then Iraqi president Saddam

⁷⁹¹ Vincent Tremolet de Villers, "Serveuse Musulmane Giflée à Nice: Comment les Islamistes Imposent un Nouvel Ordre Moral," *Le Figaro*, June 10, 2016.

⁷⁹² Arthur Berdah, "Terrorisme: Ce que Proposent les Prétendants à la Primaire à Droite," *Le Figaro*, June 14, 2016.

⁷⁹³ Alexandre Léchenet, "Combien D'Étrangers Font le Djihad en Syrie?," *Le Monde*, April 23, 2014.

⁷⁹⁴ Under Hollande's administration, the French executive passed a new law on November 13, 2014, to create travel bans for children under the age of 18 and for travelers suspected of posing a threat to the country's interests; to reinforce rules on house arrest for individuals suspected of wanting to commit a terrorist act in France; and, to enhance powers of law enforcement agencies to search houses and arrest potential terrorists. Following the attacks of January 2015, the government passed another law aimed at thwarting the spread of IS propaganda and the problem of radicalization via internet and social media. More importantly, thought, the law aimed at penalizing individuals who funded terrorist activities and spread jihadist propaganda. On the other hand, conservative primary contender Alain Juppé publicly called for the repatriation of convicted terrorist who have dual nationality and the creation of a penitentiary police responsible for tracking religious preachers who radicalize inmates and/or the expatriation of convicted terrorists. Assemblée Nationale, *LOI n° 2014-1353 du 13 Novembre 2014 Renforçant les Dispositions Relatives à la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme (1)*, online, Journal Officiel, n°0263 of November 14, 2014, <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029754374&categorieLien=id>. Assemblée Nationale, *LOI n° 016-731 du 3 juin 2016 Renforçant la Lutte Contre le Crime Organisé, le Terrorisme et Leur Financement, et Améliorant L'Efficacité et les Garanties de la Procédure Pénale (1)*, online, Journal Officiel, n°0129 du 3 Juin 2016, <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032627231&categorieLien=id>.

⁷⁹⁵ Alain Juppé, "Notre Projet Pour la France," Alain Juppé's Presidential Campaign Page, accessed October 20, 2016, <http://www.alainjuppe2017.fr/propositions>.

Hussein after which the attention of new terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda was directed towards the UK and the U.S.⁷⁹⁶ Yet although Chirac distanced himself from the Anglo-American position, giving France a temporary measure of security against Islamic fundamentalism, his administration devised pre-emptive laws with the help of the Ministry of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy to detect and thwart any potential terrorist attack. In this sense French reactions to 9/11 were similar to those of the British and Germans, in that each country took this opportunity to pass legislation increasing the surveillance of the civilian population. At the Élysée, Sarkozy reacted vehemently to the spread of *communautarisme*⁷⁹⁷ and illegal immigration by reinforcing the widely-accepted belief that the securitization of immigration controls was required to fight undocumented migration and criminality, as both domains were interlinked in political debates and policy-making processes through the 2003 and 2006 Sarkozy laws. The latter also redefined the concept of terrorism while voting additional restrictions on immigration to impose penalties on marriages of convenience, strengthen the rights of police authorities to access CCTVs and increase the number of operative cameras in public spaces from 20,000 to 60,000 by 2010.⁷⁹⁸

By contrast, the renewed participation of France in military interventions in Libya, Mali and the CAR provides terrorists with a justification for targeting French citizens.⁷⁹⁹ As France's foreign policy priorities shifted from the colonialism and post-colonialism in Northern Africa to the security interests in the Middle East and Central Africa new types of threats emerged to challenge French involvement in regional conflicts. Through the process of decolonization, old colonies were free to organize themselves politically but France still managed to retain influence in certain key African and Middle Eastern countries through its 'soft power' approach to diplomacy.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁶ Elaine Sciolino, "THREATS AND RESPONSES: DISCORD: France to Veto Resolution on Iraq war, Chirac Says," *New York Times*, March 11, 2003.

⁷⁹⁷ Here, Sarkozy was responding to the spread of violence in suburbs against police officers in 2005, which led to the arrest of 6,000 individuals and the incarceration of 1,300. *Le Figaro*, "En 2005, Trois Semaines D'Émeutes Urbaines," *Le Figaro*, October 25, 2015.

⁷⁹⁸ The 2006 law imposed that transport companies transmit specific traveler information to the national Police and Gendarmerie, except for travelers commuting within the EU. Bruno Domingo, "National Borders, Surveillance, and Counter-Terrorism Tools in France," in *Border Security in the Al-Qaeda Era* ed. Kelly W. Sundberg and John A. Winterdyke (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), 149.

⁷⁹⁹ Scholar Joseph S. Nye described France as global leader defined by its use of 'soft power' as a means to "create a positive pro-French sentiment among foreign publics." In Nye's words, 'soft power' is the ability of a given country to affect others (culturally, socially or economically) in order to obtain positive outcomes between two countries through attraction rather than coercion or payment. To influence another country, a state can make use of its culture, norms and values to build a solid coalition with a former colony/ally. When it comes to using its soft powers, France has always prioritized the promotion of its culture and social norms by increasing the number of French-educate people worldwide. In countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Côte d'Ivoire, French institutions serve to promote the French culture in old colonies, all the while increasing France's influential power in key regions of the South. Chiedza M. Mutsaka, "Change Foreign Public Perceptions Through Culture Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of France and China in the Mekong Sub-Regions" (PhD diss., Webster University, 2013), 47-52, http://media.proquest.com/media/pq/classic/doc/3321851461/fmt/ai/rep/SPDF?_s=scz64wQ050KWe04%2FobuGNeLSrYA%3D. Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no.1 (March 2008): 94. Yves Bourdillon, "Les Attentats Auraient Été Commis en Représailles à L'Action de la France en Syrie," *Les Échos*, November 14, 2015.

⁸⁰⁰ Franziska Doebl-Hagedorn, "The State at its Borders: Germany and the Negotiations" (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2003), 115, <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2292/1/U615239.pdf>.

The turning point in French security politics, however, came with Mohammed Merah's murder of three French soldiers and seven Jewish citizens in March 2012 in Toulouse and Montauban, following which terrorism was considered a domestic rather than an international problem.⁸⁰¹ Merah's attack also revealed the age of a new type of terrorism in which religious preachers use prisons as conduits to radicalize young delinquents with no apparent link to jihadi groups. By choosing to indoctrinate petty criminals, terrorist organizations aim at creating "hybrid" terrorists; that is, using individuals who will not be followed by security services once released from prison.⁸⁰² Preachers usually target fragile individuals who, for the most part, are desperately "looking for an identity and a cause" to defend in order to compensate for their personal failures.⁸⁰³ In this manner, a group of *Salafist* preachers in Toulouse manipulated resentment against the government to radicalize Merah.⁸⁰⁴ In manipulating Merah's feelings of resentment against society, they hoped to condition him to wage *jihad* with groups of *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan; but the young delinquent decided to attack France instead in order to make a mark on the French public. The murders of Toulouse and Montauban shocked the public who discovered that French security services were unable to prevent all terrorist attacks, especially given that authorities had begun an investigation into Merah's in October 2006.⁸⁰⁵ In a note written by the Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence (in French, *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur*, DCRI) French officials recognized the failure of the state to establish a mechanism through which prison administrations could share information with intelligence services to track the whereabouts of potentially dangerous individuals. Indeed, the fact that Merah traveled to Afghanistan from Tajikistan in November 2010 without the DCRI being aware of it conveyed the message that would-be terrorists could easily exploit the loopholes of the current French security system, including its misuse of the "fiche S."⁸⁰⁶

With the Toulouse murder, the public discovered that terrorist groups had infiltrated France's territory by exploiting suburbs as a fertile ground for the radicalization of second- and third-generation immigrants. Professor of criminology Alain Bauer explains how the rise of "gangsterism" has been facilitated by the deterioration of life within France's suburbs where poverty is relatively higher and where petty criminals thrive in organized gangs. The unemployed youth of these districts is easily attracted by Islamic preachers who paint an idyllic picture of life under Salafism to indoctrinate the uneducated and the marginalized. Those

⁸⁰¹ In the pre-9/11 era, terrorist attacks were usually organized by cells of young national militants, such as of the National Liberation Front of Corsica (NLFC) and the Franco-Spanish Basque group known as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA: 'Basque Country and Freedom'). Domingo, "National Borders, Surveillance, and Counter-Terrorism Tools in France," 149.

⁸⁰² Alain Bauer, *Qui est L'Ennemi?* (Paris: CNRS Édition, 2015), 15.

⁸⁰³ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, 82, <http://eurabia.parlamentnílisty.cz/UserFiles/document/NYPD.pdf>.

⁸⁰⁴ Le Monde, "Mohamed Merah Était "en Phase de Radicalisation" dès Janvier 2011," *Le Monde*, August 9, 2012.

⁸⁰⁵ Olivier Morice, "Cabinet Morice," photograph, 2013, https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/122965638?access_key=key-116z5gjx68jr4dz6tqyh.

⁸⁰⁶ In France, the "fiche S" is used by law enforcement and intelligence services to identify individuals who pose serious threats to national security. Samuel Laurent, "Terrorisme: Qu'est-ce que la 'Fiche S' ?," *Le Monde*, August 31, 2015.

who have been radicalized and are not affiliated to any terrorist groups can easily remain undetected for months before from the police and intelligence services arrest them.⁸⁰⁷

Without borders and border controls to monitor the movement of criminals and refugees within the Schengen area, the recent emergence of IS has reinforced the effect of “gangterrorism” amongst the French Muslim youth and connected it to petty criminality in other EU member-states. Hence, surveillance programs cannot thwart the spread of terrorist ideologies alone, especially given the fact that terrorists can take advantage of the absence of border controls in Europe to coordinate their activities. The case of Abaaoud and Abdelslam Salah working between France and Belgium to organize the November 2015 attacks in Paris demonstrates that countries have become much more vulnerable to international terrorism without measures to control the movement of nationals or inform other member-states about the activities of terrorist and affiliated petty criminals.⁸⁰⁸ To compensate for its inability to monitor the whereabouts of every individual crossing borders illegally, the French government instated the *état d'urgence* (state of emergency) through the application of the law 55-385 of April 3rd, 1955, which allowed police enforcement and judicial services to conduct administrative searches, record video surveillance and audiovisual coverage of suspected terrorists. By tightening penalties for individuals who have participated in terrorist activities and targeting places of worship known for defending a violent interpretation of the Quran, the government sought to prevent the departure of young French would-be *jihadis*, detect potential ‘lone wolves’ and, more importantly, tackle the problem of religious indoctrination via social media.⁸⁰⁹

The mismanagement of the refugee crisis has obviously triggered a nation-wide debate on the place of Islam within the European civilization, the degree of adaptability of Muslims to French society, and the ability of the political establishment to represent the sentiments of the electorate but it has also allowed for something much more worrisome: the reproduction of the 2002 scenario⁸¹⁰ during which the FN defeated the Socialist Party in the first round of presidential elections. This has been made possible by first, the Right’s disastrous campaign led by Les Républicains (LR) presidential candidate François Fillon who is under investigation for allegedly giving his wife a fictitious employment as his parliamentary assistant for which she earned €500,000 during a period of eight years.⁸¹¹ What shocked the public, nonetheless, was that the salary

⁸⁰⁷ Bauer, *Qui est L'Ennemi?*, 20.

⁸⁰⁸ Soren Seelow, Emeline Cazi and Simon Piel, “Attentats de Paris: Les Commandos Étaient Coordonnés en Temps Réel de Belgique,” *Le Monde*, December 12, 2015.

⁸⁰⁹ Gary Dagorn, “Comment la Législation Antiterroriste s'est Durcie en Trente ans,” *Le Monde*, November 26, 2015.

⁸¹⁰ With only 194,600 fewer votes than former FN head Jean-Marie Le Pen, Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin was defeated. This was mainly due to Socialist minister of the interior Jean Pierre Chevènement’s relaxation of the naturalization of second-generation immigrants, allowing for the naturalization of many Algerians and Moroccans – a fact used by the extreme right to defeat Lionel Jospin in the first election round for the 2002 presidency. It was, in fact, the worst results of the Socialist party since Gaston Defferre won 5% of the electoral votes during the first round of the 1969 presidential elections. Arnauld Miguet, “The French Elections of 2002: After the Earthquake, the Deluge,” *West European Politics* 25, no.4 (October 2002): 208. Michèle Cotta, “Présidentielle 1969: La Gauche "Coincée" Jusqu'à Quand?,” *L'Express*, December 20, 2016.

⁸¹¹ Angelique Chrisafis, “François Fillon Under Formal Investigation for 'Fake Jobs Offences',” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2017.

of parliamentary assistants is taken directly out of taxpayers' pockets, which implied that Fillon had been fooling the entire French electorate ever since he was elected to the Parliament. In parallel, the new liberal-centrist movement called En Marche! (EM) spearheaded by presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron emerged as the only party really capable of defeating the Fillon on April 23, 2017 and Marine Le Pen on May 7, 2017.⁸¹² Marine Le Pen's recent electoral success (21.3% in first round of elections) clearly mirrors that of her father (former head of the FN) 15 years ago in that both victories are stories of "unfaltering advance."⁸¹³ While in 2002 the results of the first-round shocked many commentators who claimed that voting for Le Pen had in reality been influenced by "voter apathy" against a plethora of candidates, today Le Pen prides herself in knowing that her electorate is voting not only to "sanction" the ruling political elite, but also to cast a "protest vote" against EU institutions.⁸¹⁴ While in 2002 the French casted "a protest vote" to express resentment towards the continued regularization of illegal immigration under the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin, the electorate today is rejecting the concept of EU solidarity and openness by voting for France's only extreme right-wing party,⁸¹⁵ the National Front – a party that, unlike UKIP or the AfD, dates back to 1972. Above all, the rise of communitarian tensions and the crystallization of opinion on the issues around immigration, border controls and terrorism have intensified the crisis of political confidence in France and, most importantly, brought to light the failure of the political elite to protect the French people with stronger borders and better surveillance measures.

⁸¹² On April 23, 2017, the French electorate voted to pick the two candidates who faced off during the second round of presidential elections on May 7, 2017. In the first round, Emmanuel Macron (EM) obtained 24.01%, Marine Le Pen (FN) 21.3%, François Fillon (LR) 20.01%, Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise, Communist Party) 19.58% and Benoît Hamon (Socialist Party, SP) 6.36% of the votes only. The Socialist party suffered its worst loss since the presidential elections of 2002 and since Gaston Defferre's loss in 1969. Miguet, "The French Elections of 2002," 208. Alexandre Lemarié, "Dans L'Ombre du Duel Macron-Le Pen, la Droite," *Le Monde*, April 27, 2017. Le Monde, "Présidentielle 2017: Les Résultats du Premier Tour, Commune par Commune," *Le Monde*, April 24, 2017.

⁸¹³ Miguet, "The French Elections of 2002," 208.

⁸¹⁴ The Economist, "After the Cataclysm," *The Economist*, April 25, 2002.

⁸¹⁵ Le Figaro, "Le Pen au Second Tour dans Tous les cas (Sondage)," *Le Figaro*, September 22, 2016.

Chapter 6. Schengen and European Integration in Question

The asymmetric effects of the refugee crisis have cast doubts about the applicability of liberal-institutionalism to world problems and the viability of integrated Europe as a project of democratic civilization. One immediate effect of the refugee crisis has been the crystallization of public opinion and the tightening of immigration policies at the national level, leading to the incremental securitization of immigration policies of all the member-states of the EU. These changes have had a profound effect on the capacity of the EU to act as a platform for institutional bargaining, because the Union is going through an existential crisis whereby the absence of external controls at borders compels weaker member-states, such as Italy, Greece and Spain, to act as a replacement for Brussels in order to process the arrival of migrants, while stronger states such France, Germany and the UK view them collectively with apprehension and suspicion. In this context, the deterioration of the situation in the South has infuriated transit countries, such as Italy and Spain.⁸¹⁶ To protest the lack of action taken by the EU, Rome threatened that it would once again issue migrants with “emergency visas” allowing them “to travel anywhere in the EU’s passport-free Schengen zone” but the European Commission reacted quickly by blaming the Italian government’s disorganization and inability to speed up the asylum process disorganized immigration system, “do more to persuade migrants to agree to be sent back to their home countries” or “extend detention on arrival.”⁸¹⁷ In view of the multiple terrorist attacks in key European countries in France, Belgium, Germany and Denmark, the lack of institutional coherence at the EU level is especially worrisome given that the arrival of refugees in the West has strained the spirit of tolerance by allowing terrorists to enter the EU freely as asylum seekers, the legitimacy of their claim to be determined after the fact.

The process-tracing method revealed the presence of three underlying factors preventing a consensus on the refugee crisis at the supranational level: first, the popular erosion of support for current political establishments and development of xenophobic views against migrants; second, the emergence of populist movements within the political systems of Germany, Britain, and France challenging the electoral status-quo; and third, the tightening of security and immigration policies by national governments indicating a retrogression from the European integration project toward nationalism and protectionism. At the national level, governments have come to construe the mass exodus of undocumented migrants to the EU as an attack

⁸¹⁶ Without receiving much support from the rest of the EU, the Spaniards have had to deal with the 8,183 undocumented migrants who crossed the Spanish borders illegally between January 1 and August 6, 2017, as opposed to the 2,476 migrants between January 1 and August 6, 2016. International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 116,692 in 2017; 2,405 Deaths,” press release, August 8, 2017, <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-116692-2017-2405-deaths>.

⁸¹⁷ In May 2011, when the refugee crisis had just begun in the South, the Italian government issued 22,000 travel documents to undocumented migrants arriving in Lampedusa to protest “the lackadaisical support that it received from the EU.” Uçarer, “The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice,” 290. Ian Traynor, “Italy Threatens to Give Schengen Visas to Migrants as EU Ministers Meet,” *The Guardian*, June 16, 2015. The Economist, “Italy is Facing a Surge of Migration Across the Mediterranean,” *The Economist*, July 20, 2017.

on the territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Through the crisis, they have also blamed Brussels' promotion of liberal, borderless commerce for *laissez-faire* immigration policies that fail to protect the continent from transnational terrorism, and more particularly Islamic fundamentalism. The extent to which that terrorists and petty criminals have infiltrated European society as refugees – or are perceived as having done – has triggered a rightward ideological and political shift within the public for more radical and restrictive policies to track asylum seekers. As European governments become less confident about the ability of the EU to protect their territorial sovereignty and integrity, they contribute to a sense of insecurity deepened by the public's strong emotional attachment to the nation, its general misunderstanding of immigration issues, and popular ignorance of the role that the Schengen regime has played in strengthening the EU single market.

Although in each case the arrival of thousands of migrants has triggered a chain of events that resulted in the resurgence of nationalism and the rise of anti-EU movements, the crisis has also challenged the view that convergence of economic interests reduces likelihood of conflicts and war. Like *Financial Times* columnist John Plender writes, the crisis poses a direct challenge to the “myth about this supranational construct” and to “the underlying claim that economic interdependence [...] has purged Europe of its ancient enmities.”⁸¹⁸ In effect, many people perceive the EU as responsible not only for the deterioration of the economic situation in Europe, but also for neglecting the refugee problem in Italy and Greece. This has had the effect of exacerbating a sense of frustration among popular classes, especially in France and the UK, where voters are dividing themselves not along political but ideological lines. Public opinion has become highly polarized for one major reason: for the simple fact that if borders among the EU member-states are to remain as soft as the Schengen standards demand, the borders between the EU and the world will have to harden – the ultimate objective being the preservation of the SEA and the freedom of mobility within Schengen. However, temporary reintroduction of border controls cannot suffice to prevent attacks like that of Paris without a revision of EU-wide security and intelligence standards overarching the creation of individual programs at the national level.⁸¹⁹

In effect, the mismanagement of the crisis had a direct snowball effect not on members of ‘visible minorities’ in Europe who have become the targets of right-wing groups and xenophobic movements. Ironically, efforts to combat transnational terrorism brought together all Western democracies around the

⁸¹⁸ John Plender, “The Myth of the European Peace Project,” *Financial Times*, August 4, 2016.

⁸¹⁹ The EU needs to increase the financing of organizations such as Frontex, if it does not wish to intensify cross-national cooperation in the domains of security, terrorism and trafficking by signing intergovernmental accords independently of the EU Commission and President. Yet, although Frontex contributes to the safeguarding of EU’s external borders, it lacks the legal framework to deal with the internal security of member-states and remains limited to the regulation of a “European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation” on borders to secure internal security and the prevention of crime and terrorism only. Anything beyond that remains conditional on the willingness of member-states to broaden its mandate. Evelien R. Brouwer, *Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Information System* (Boston, Mass; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 32.

same objectives – restricting access to EU migration by reintroducing border controls – yet have shaped the image of a ‘Fortress Europe’ apathetic to the death of thousands of undocumented migrants drowning in makeshift boats. The ensuing decisions by national governments to re-instate temporary border controls has demonstrated both the limitations of interstate bargaining and the Commission’s inability to resolve the institutional paralysis at the EU level. Today, it appears that only a minority of individuals – European producers and consumers cognisant of the prosperity that European integration has brought them – are willing to fight for the reestablishment of borders in Europe in order to keep the principles of the internal market alive.

The German government placed the issues of securitizing immigration at the top of policymakers’ priority lists with a view to deter terrorism and reinforce the laws initiated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, but it was the Berlin lorry attack which accelerated the securitization of immigration – that is, “the presenting of an issue as an ‘existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”⁸²⁰ In effect, the Berlin lorry assailant crossed two of the main European borders without being arrested by the German or French police affirmed the need for the EU to address the absence of harmonization of the national laws that regulate the transfer of intelligence information from one member-state to another. Regaining a measure of control is detrimental to Merkel’s electoral victory in the forthcoming elections, because despite the belief that its “astonishingly stable” welcoming culture, Germany is also witnessing the crystallization of opinions, as an estimated 72% of Germans expect “conflict with migrants.”⁸²¹ Although during the first quarter of 2017 the SPD had a 16-point lead over the chancellor, Schulz’s accusations of Trump “destroying Western values and being un-American” raised concern in Germany about the credibility of the SPD candidate “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.”⁸²² As a result, national polls have showed increased support for Merkel who obtained a 16 point-lead in the most recent survey of the German institute Infratest Dimap – “39 percent support for the CDU and 23 percent for the SPD.”⁸²³

While Merkel is slowly regaining popular consent in view of the upcoming federal elections scheduled for the end of September 2017, criticism within the CDU has pressed her to “regain a measure of control” and call for a national effort to deport failed asylum seekers with no rights to asylum.⁸²⁴ Even though

⁸²⁰ In 2001, the fact that a group based in Germany had planned the attacks justified that the public could no longer conceive immigration as an economic or cultural issue. This meant the German government would have to incorporate security concerns into an appreciation of its full implications. D’Appollonia and Reich, *Immigration, Integration, and Security*, 8-11, and 131. Originally quoted from Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 32-3.

⁸²¹ Hasselbach, ‘Opinion: The Welcome Realists.’

⁸²² Sudha David-Wilp, “Merkel’s Next Challenge,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 11, 2017.

⁸²³ David-Wilp, “Merkel’s Next Challenge.”

⁸²⁴ Thorsten Benner, “Control: is the New Core of Germany’s Refugee Policy,” *Al Jazeera*, March 2, 2017. Christoph Hasselbach, ‘Opinion: The Welcome Realists,’ *Deutsche Welle*, April 8, 2017.

she also boldly rejects “Trumpism,” her administration will be forced to collaborate and compromise with the American president in order to protect the transatlantic relation.⁸²⁵ This is explained in part by the gradual shift of power among member-states and the increased influence of Germany whose “growing assertiveness and self-interested approach” to European politics has been limiting the EU’s capacity to respond to a crisis uniformly without Berlin’s approval and/or the presence of an intermediary.⁸²⁶

Rather than substantially damaging Germany’s reputation, the refugee crisis confirmed Germany’s place as Europe’s hegemon because Merkel’s decision to open the borders without obtaining the consent of her neighbouring countries placed Germany at the forefront of the humanitarian crises in South Europe. To compensate for Germany’s waning influence in Brussels, the German government came up with a short to medium-term solution which could promote development and employment in nearby Mediterranean countries, and then ultimately reduce the push factors that drive people to emigrate to Europe. At the annual G20 summit in July 2017, Merkel presented the government’s external plan to invest in the economic stabilization of the MENA in an attempt to keep momentum and reassure the CDU’s allies and electoral base about the “domestic security and the creditworthiness of Germany’s EU partners.”⁸²⁷ Named after the U.S. Marshall plan, an initiative to help the recovery of West Europe, the ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ advocates for deepened cooperation with Germany’s African partners, and even includes CDU politician Karl Ernst Thomas de Mazière’s suggestion to establish “asylum processing centers in North Africa handled by EU authorities.”⁸²⁸ Through the creation of the EU External Investment Plan (EIP), the Germans will spend 3.5 billion euros for the regional integration of Africa in the international financial market – the short-term goal of this plan being to invest capital with a view to increase chances of employment in the country of origin and collect public funding in order to directly boost private investment in Africa.⁸²⁹ While this plan might help Germany “put pressure on governments that finance religious extremism” to change policy course in exchange for capital, Berlin’s hard power remains restricted because it is weakened by Europe’s military dependence on the United States and Trump’s criticism of Berlin’s economic strategy.⁸³⁰ According to the

⁸²⁵ The Economist, “Germany is not the new Leader of the Free World,” *The Economist*, July 8, 2017.

⁸²⁶ Medrano, “The Limits of European Integration,” 196.

⁸²⁷ David-Wilp, “Merkel’s Next Challenge.”

⁸²⁸ Benner, “Control: is the New Core of Germany’s Refugee Policy.”

⁸²⁹ The African Union (AU) and the EU are seeking to renew their financial partnership with the help of existing instruments – such as, the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the EU External Investment Plan, the financing instruments of the European Investment Bank, and the EU Migration Partnerships.” Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), *Africa and Europe – A new Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future*, 14-16,

https://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/information_flyer/information_brochures/Materialie270_africa_marshallplan.pdf.

⁸³⁰ BMZ, *Africa and Europe – A new Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future*. The Economist, “Germany is not the new Leader of the Free World.”

U.S. president, Germany’s “appetite for exporting and not spending” has allowed the country to amass a massive trade surplus with the United States of \$65 billion.”⁸³¹

Yet, because efforts to externalize EU’s actions through political and financial stabilization cannot outweigh Europe’s dependency on the U.S., Merkel will have to compromise with Trump even though she has rejected publicly his adoption of “protectionism and isolationism.”⁸³² In effect, the dependence of Europe on U.S. intelligence authorities puts the German government in a situation of weakness because without American help Germany would be much more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.⁸³³ This dependence has been limiting the capacity of the ‘Big Three’ to strengthen the structure and the powers of their own intelligence agencies. For instance, Obama’s “practice of sending ‘surge teams’ of U.S. counterterrorism experts to European partners when needed” – in France and Belgium – provided evidence that member-states relied heavily on American intelligence sharing to maintain stability in Europe.⁸³⁴ This level of dependency was something Western European governments sought to overcome when they signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, so it is a measure of the EU’s shortcomings as a security community that it remains six decades later.

The federal parliament of Germany understood that it had to compensate for the Trump administration’s apparent retreat from the Transatlantic partnership and recently voted a budget resolution to increase federal spending of €329.1B, from which 11.1 percent will be allocated to enhancing Germany’s military.⁸³⁵ Despite criticism by the two opposition parties (The Green and Left party) Germany might be compelled to act unilaterally, considering its role as the emerging regional hegemon and the need to demonstrate that Berlin takes European security seriously. Chancellor Merkel has nonetheless made it more awkward for Berlin to become “the leader of the liberal order.”⁸³⁶ By signing the EU-Turkey deal during a time when Britain’s decision to vote on Brexit and France’s presidential crisis were already destabilizing the entire region, the chancellor isolated herself from both Cameron and Hollande. Seeing that Germany could not “replace the United States as the world’s liberal hegemon for the simple reason that it isn’t one,” Hollande’s administration turned its back on Merkel and the Commission’s plan to accept quotas.⁸³⁷ In Hollande’s words, France rejected this approach “because we [French] already have rules.”⁸³⁸ Whether or not Merkel succeeds in preserving the status quo in Europe depends not only on the reparation of the Franco-German partnership, but also on her ability to “disentangle our [British-European] interlinked relationship.”⁸³⁹

⁸³¹ David-Wilp, “Merkel’s Next Challenge.”

⁸³² David-Wilp, “Merkel’s Next Challenge.”

⁸³³ Guido Steinberg, “German Inefficiency,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 19, 2017.

⁸³⁴ Michèle Flouroy and Adam I. Klein, “What Europe got Wrong About the NSA,” *Foreign Affairs*, August 2, 2016.

⁸³⁵ Nils Zimmermann, “German Federal Budget Goes up for 2017,” *Deutsche Welle*, November 25, 2016.

⁸³⁶ Stefan Fröhlich, “Looking to Germany,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 29, 2017.

⁸³⁷ Fröhlich, “Looking to Germany.”

⁸³⁸ Frédéric Lemaître, “Hollande et Merkel Divergent sur la Répartition des Réfugiés en Europe,” *Le Monde*, May 19, 2015.

⁸³⁹ Daniel Boffey and Jon Henley, “Angela Merkel Rejects one of Theresa May’s key Brexit Demands,” *The Guardian*, March 29, 2017.

Yet, Merkel can be re-assured that Germany’s “strong comparative advantage” in manufactures and “huge trade surplus” can help defend her adoption of liberal immigration policies and protect the interests of Germany through EU negotiations.⁸⁴⁰

By contrast, the British have chosen to detach themselves from continental Europe simply because of their lack of commitment to the European ideal. Whereas compared to Germany (476,510) and France (76,165), the UK has received the lowest number of asylum requests, with only 40,160 recorded in 2015, the Leave campaign was attractive enough to lure millions of people especially those “with least economic resources.”⁸⁴¹ Compared to Germany, which has become the leader of the European project ever since reunification in 1989, the UK took advantage of its special status of ‘limited liability’ to instrumentalize the EU. Whereas recent anti-EU populism in Germany has been driven largely by the recent refugee and immigration crisis and its possible connection to domestic security, the rise of anti-EU populism in Britain has been driven by a longer-term objection to immigration to the UK from within the EU, and more particularly from East Europe, to which the 2015 refugee crisis has added fuel to the fire.

On the day of the referendum the 17.4 million British citizens who casted their votes in favour of the withdrawal from the supranational union symbolically rejected the entire EU project, along with its refugee and immigration policies.⁸⁴² As May observed, with a turnout (72.2%) higher than that at the 2015 General Election (66.2%) Brexit “was the biggest vote for change this country had ever known,” and therefore compelled the political class to reconsider their commitment to EU by rejecting the supranational component of the EU and re-gaining political sovereignty.⁸⁴³ While the Brexit referendum provided political dissenters with the best opportunity to challenge the principles enshrined in the European ideal of freedom of movement for all European citizens and lawful migrants living in the EU27, the refugee crisis was the deciding factor pushing people to support the ‘Leave’ side.⁸⁴⁴ Because the UK was never a member of the Schengen area, moreover, the referendum result testified that the national population least directly affected by the 2015 refugee crisis was oddly the most roiled about it.

Today, the British political elite is more concerned with persuading the “powerful Remain-voting bosses” who are “thoroughly panicked by the prospect of banks leaving *en masse*” to ask from prime minister May that she retains “passporting” rights for the UK’s financial sector.⁸⁴⁵ Yet the level of national self-

⁸⁴⁰ Wolf, “Global Elites Must Heed the Warning of Populist Rage.”

⁸⁴¹ Eurostat, “Asylum and First Time Applicant by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.” Swales, Understanding the Leave Vote, 7.

⁸⁴² Cumming and Zahra, “International Business and Entrepreneurship Implications of Brexit,” 691. Originally quoted from Henry Loewendahl, “The impact of Brexit on Foreign Direct Investment Into the UK: Recommendations for Investment Promotion Strategy,” *WAVTEQ* (blog), 2016, <http://www.wavteq.com/brexit>.

⁸⁴³ Uberoi, *EU Referendum 2016*, 3. Welfens, “Cameron’s Information Disaster in the Referendum of 2016: An Exit From Brexit,” 541.

⁸⁴⁴ Here, the ‘EU27’ describes the EU28 without the United Kingdom.

⁸⁴⁵ Lesley Riddoch, “May’s Speech Shows how Little Scotland Means in her Dangerous Game of Brexit,” *The Guardian*, March 3, 2017.

absorption currently prevailing among the Big Three is unprecedented at any time in the history of European integration. The outcome of the referendum reflected misunderstanding about the UK's place in the Union and lack of trust in the government to defend British interests. The recent elections of June 8, 2017 perfectly illustrate this confusion, as the British electorate gave a majority to the Left. Indeed, the UK is yet again faced with the challenge of another hung parliament.⁸⁴⁶ The UK has always had a somewhat strained relationship with the EU, but the refugee crisis might have pushed it over the edge. The victory of Eurosceptics in the UK was obviously precipitated by the rejection of Brussels' liberal immigration policies and Merkel's status quo, but it was also caused by Cameron's ignorance, including the ways "he treated politics as a game of chance, a matter of tactics and calculated odds."⁸⁴⁷

In a like manner, Macron won the French presidential elections by treating politics as a game 'of tactics and calculated odds'; that is, by pledging "to break from France's elite foreign policy consensus" and restore order following the deterioration of the refugee crisis under Hollande.⁸⁴⁸ In doing so, the 39-year-old French president succeeded in rallying support from both the Left and Right, which immediately triggered the fragmentation of France's traditional political parties. The French have indeed been going through the gravest existential crisis of the Fifth Republic. As *the Economist* recently observed, French voters are furious "at the uselessness and self-dealing of their ruling class" and at the poor performance of the Socialist president, who decided not to run for re-election in 2017.⁸⁴⁹ Moreover, the scandal surrounding presidential contender of the Right, François Fillon, raised suspicions that his wife's remuneration as a parliamentary assistant was obtained fraudulently; that is, by not fulfilling her professional duties.⁸⁵⁰ In reality, what the French have is a myriad of problems involving corruption at the highest levels of France's government and a lack of transparency on the part of some politicians who abuse their privileges and foment a sense of injustice among working-classes.

While in France, the electorate punished the elite for failing "to offer convincing cures" by ejecting "the first time since the postwar period that the traditional left and right ruling parties [...] in the first round" of the presidential elections, the British have reverted to their isolationist tendencies to avoid accountability; however, it appears that in both countries the refugee crisis was the necessary condition for public opinion and reactionary movements to rise against the current establishment.⁸⁵¹ Today, Macron is in a precarious situation for two main reasons: his administration is endowed with the tasks of reconciling the French people

⁸⁴⁶ Laura Hughes, Jack Maidment, and Barney Henderson, "Election Results 2017: Theresa May Says Sorry to Defeated Tory Candidates as she Eyes Deal With DUP," *The Telegraph*, June 10, 2017.

⁸⁴⁷ Anne Perkins, "What's to Blame for this Misfortune? David Cameron's Hubris About Brexit," *The Guardian*, March 29, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/29/what-blame-brexit-misfortune-blame-david-cameron-hubris>.

⁸⁴⁸ Edouard Pflimlin, "Macron Engrange les Soutiens à Droite Comme à Gauche," *LE Monde*, March 14, 2017.

⁸⁴⁹ The Economist, "France's Next Revolution: The Vote That Could Wreck the European Union," *The Economist*, March 4, 2017.

⁸⁵⁰ Le Monde, "Ce Que l'on Sait de L'Affaire Fillon," *Le Monde*, January 31, 2016.

⁸⁵¹ Martin Wolf, "Global Elites Must Heed the Warning of Populist Rage," *Financial Times*, July 19, 2016. Daniel Boffey, "European Leaders Cheer Macron Victory in First Round of French Election," *The Guardian*, April 24, 2017.

with Brussel's pro-liberal agenda, which includes the reformation of the French civil code, and that of acting as the political arbitrary between May and Merkel to strike the most comprehensive UK-EU deal. In the coming months, Macron's presidency will most like help bridge gaps between the UK and France's immigration policies. This is especially true given that Merkel has already threatened Britain that it could 'pay a price' if the British government limited intra-EU immigration or opted out of the EU's employment, environmental and immigration rules which protect those who cross the Franco-British border routinely.⁸⁵² The harmonization of immigration between Paris and London is thus of great importance because the asymmetric effects of the crisis have been felt especially by the French and German governments.

⁸⁵² Stefan Wagstyl, "Merkel Warns Britain 'Will pay a Price' if it Limits Immigration," *Financial Times*, May 17, 2017.

Conclusion

The process-tracing of three case studies revealed that each country was affected in nationally-specific ways by a common refugee crisis. In other words, the ‘Big Three’ have articulated three types of nationally-oriented policy responses, each going in a different direction. While Germany has witnessed only a slight shift towards radicalization of its electorate, it must now shoulder the responsibilities of a regional hegemon – despite a reluctance to do so. Currently, the success of Merkel’s liberal immigration policy depends not only on the capacity of European member-states to create conditions for the integration of new refugees, but it also remains contingent on the revival and consolidation of the Franco-German partnership that has driven so much of the process of European integration. In repairing the damage done by the previous Socialist government of Hollande, Paris can prove to its German counterpart that it can escape its economic problems “without succumbing to the populist backlash that is troubling the region.”⁸⁵³ At the opposite poll if change is the decision made by the British electorate to abandon that process altogether, surely the most unequivocal answer to the question as to whether political life in the EU is renationalizing. Considering that the UK has reverted to protectionism by cutting itself from the European continent, it may well have opened a Pandora’s box of nationalism that could catch on elsewhere in Europe.

The EU was ill-equipped to face a challenge of the proportions of 2015, simply because without a strong common security and defense policy, or the existence of interconnected databases among the EU28, it could not articulate a common response. As Jean-Claude Juncker established in a White Paper listing five different scenarios for Europe by 2025, the result of the crisis might be the fostering of an *à la carte* or ‘multi-speed’ Europe whereby “one or several ‘coalitions of the willing’ emerge to work together” in order “to deepen their cooperation in chosen domains.”⁸⁵⁴ Today, however, the future of Europe rests on the results of the upcoming elections in France, The Netherlands, Germany, the UK local elections, and Bulgaria – any combination of which could all derail the plans of the Commission to bridge “the gap between promise and delivery” at the EU level.⁸⁵⁵

This tends to confirm the neorealist assumption which assumes the primacy of ‘high’ over ‘low’ politics, pushing member-states towards nationally innovated policies to avoid having to deal with the unintended consequence of the refugee crisis. In sum, the simultaneous rise of transnational terrorism in Europe and climax of the refugee crisis in 2015 has reinforced two underlying popular assumptions about immigration: one, that asylum seekers serve as a reserve army for terrorist groups to spread violence throughout the European continent; and two, that the resurgence of xenophobic acts against Muslims and

⁸⁵³ Thorsten Benner and Thomas Gomart, “Meeting Macron in the Middle,” *Foreign Affairs*, May 8, 2017.

⁸⁵⁴ See scenario 3: ‘Those who want More do More’ in *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025* (Brussels, 1 March 2017), COM (2017).

⁸⁵⁵ See page 12 in *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

other visible minorities is justified by the inability of the EU28 to manage the reception of more than one million asylum seekers. The crisis has thus far fostered the emergence of a new immigration framework, which advances a more radical definition of ‘threat’ based on the religious affiliation of migrants, rather than on their economic potential in the European market. Without a coherent plan at the EU level, the ‘Big Three’ had no other choice than to deepen their own migration and security laws to compensate for the absence of a platform to share intelligence information about fugitives, terrorists and human traffickers – at great cost to the Schengen regime of borderless commerce and possibly to the historic project of European integration.

Bibliography

- Abali, Oya S. *German Public Opinion on Immigration and Integration*.
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-GermanPublicOpinion.pdf>.
- Abé, Nicola. "A Feeling of Abandonment in North Afghanistan." *Spiegel*, April 22, 2014.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/security-eroding-in-northern-afghanistan-after-german-withdrawal-a-965522.html>.
- Ackerman, Bruce. "At the Crossroads: Bruce Ackerman on the Surrender of Parliamentary Sovereignty." *London Review of Books* 32, no.17 (September 2010): 32-3. <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v32/n17/bruce-ackerman/at-the-crossroads>.
- Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort. *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Agence France-Press. "Germany Tightens Refugee Policy as Finland Joins Sweden in Deportations." *The Guardian*, January 29, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/germany-tightens-borders-as-finland-joins-sweden-in-deporting-refugees>.
- Aktar, Cengiz. "Turkey's Visa Ordeal and Europe's Refugee Deal." *Al Jazeera*, May 11, 2016.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/05/turkey-visa-ordeal-europe-refugee-deal-160509130041018.html>
- Al Jazeera. "Syria's Civil war Explained From the Beginning." July 18, 2017.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html>
- Alba, Richard, and Roxane Silberman. "Decolonization Immigrations and the Social Origins of the Second Generation: The Case of North Africans in France." *The International Migration Review* 36, no.4 (December 2002): 1169-93. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/4149496>.
- Alby, Sarah. *Le Regard des Européens sur L'Islam*. http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/410-1-document_file.pdf.
- Amann, Melanie, Christiane Hoffmann, and Christoph Schult. "Merkel's Conservatives Divided as Campaign Begins." *Spiegel*, February 9, 2017. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/angela-merkel-conservatives-divided-as-election-campaign-begins-a-1133485.html>.
- Amnesty International. "Balkans. Des Réfugiés et des Migrants Frappés par la Police, Laissés Dans un Flou Juridique et Abandonnés par L'Union Européenne." July 15, 2015.
<https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2015/07/balkans-refugees-and-migrants-beaten-by-police/>.
- Amstrong, Paul, and Hamdi Alkhshali. "Rebels in Syria Call Boy's Beheading a 'Mistake'." *CNN*, July 21, 2016. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/20/middleeast/boy-beheaded-in-syria/>.
- Anderson, Emma. "Over 500,000 Rejected Asylum Seekers Still Live in Germany." *The Local*, September 22, 2016. <https://www.thelocal.de/20160922/550000-rejected-asylum-seekers-living-in-germany>.
- Andrews, David M. *Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations Since Bretton Woods*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Angelos, James. "From Serbia to Germany – and Back: Wave of Roma Rejected as Asylum Seekers." *Spiegel*, May 26, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/from-serbia-to-germany-and-back-wave-of-roma-rejected-as-asylum-seekers-a-764630.html>.

--- . "Islam for the Diaspora: Importing Germany's Imams." *Spiegel*, March 5, 2010. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/islam-for-the-diaspora-importing-germany-s-imams-a-681948.html>.

Arnold, Martin, and Laura Noonanm. "Banks Begin Moving Some Operations out of Britain." *Financial Times*, June 26, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/a3a92744-3a52-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7>.

Aron, Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Translated by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox. New York, NY: Doubleday, 1966.

Article 1 (2) of Regulation 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person and on Requests for the Comparison With Eurodac Data by Member States' law Enforcement Authorities and Europol for law Enforcement Purposes, and Amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 Establishing a European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (recast), 2013 O.J. (L180), 1.

Article 17 of Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast). 2013 O.J. (L180).

Ashcroft, Lord. "How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and why." Lord Ashcroft Polls. Published June 24, 2016. Accessed September 26, 2016. <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why>.

Assemblée Nationale, *LOI n° 016-731 du 3 juin 2016 Renforçant la Lutte Contre le Crime Organisé, le Terrorisme et Leur Financement, et Améliorant L'Efficacité et les Garanties de la Procédure Pénale (1)*, online. Journal Officiel, n°0129 du 3 Juin 2016. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032627231&categorieLien=id>

Assemblée Nationale, *LOI n° 2014-1353 du 13 Novembre 2014 Renforçant les Dispositions Relatives à la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme (1)*, online. Journal Officiel, n°0263 of November 14, 2014. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000029754374&categorieLien=id>

Asthana, Anushka, and Rowena Mason. "UK Must Leave European Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa May." *The Guardian*, April 25, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum>.

Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993. July 1, 1993 (c.23). Gr. Brit.

Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c.19). July 22, 2004. Gr. Brit.

Avdan, Nazli. "States' Pursuit of Sovereignty in a Globalizing Security Context: Controlling International Human Mobility." PhD diss., Duke University, 2010.
http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/3049/D_Avdan_Nazli_a_2010.pdf;sequence=1.

Badie, Bertrand, and Dirk Berg-Schlosser. *International Encyclopaedia of Political Science*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2011.

Balzacq, Thierry. *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security*. Houndsill, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Bank of England. "The UK Economy Post Crisis: A Series of Unfortunate Events?". Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe." Press release, February 24, 2016.
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/.../speeches/2016/speech884.pdf.

Barthe, Benjamin, Cyril Bensimon, and Yves-Michel Riols. "Comment et Pourquoi la France a Livré des Armes aux Rebelles en Syrie." *Le Monde*, August 21, 2014. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2014/08/21/comment-paris-a-livre-des-armes-aux-rebelles-syriens_4475027_3218.html.

Barthe, Benjamin, Nathalie Guibert, Yves-Michel Riols, and Christophe Ayad. "L'Été où la France a Presque Fait la Guerre en Syrie (3/3)." *Le Monde*, February 15, 2014.
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/02/15/intervention-en-syrie-comment-les-americains-ont-lache-les-francais-3-3_4367078_3210.html.

Barutciski, Michael. "EU States and the Refugee Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia." *Refugee* 14, no.3 (June/July 1994): 32-5. <https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21820/20489>.

Basdevant-Gaudemet, Brigitte. "Islam in France." In *The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities*, edited by Roberta B.P. Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone, 59-82. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2004.

Basilien-Gainche, Marie-Laure. "The EU External Edges: Borders as Walls or Ways?." *Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 2 no.1 (January 2015): 97-117. hal-01112337.

Basmisirli, Hasan. "Securitization and De-Securitization of Migration Policies of Germany and Turkey According to Leadership Rhetoric." *Center for International and European Studies* (January 2016): 1-7. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32967.29602.

Bastié, Eugénie. "L'Afflux de Migrants à Calais: Retour sur 15 ans D' Impuissance Publique." *Le Figaro*, September 4, 2014. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2014/09/04/01016-20140904ARTFIG00169-l-afflux-de-migrants-a-calais-retour-sur-15-ans-d-impuissance-publique.php>.

Baston, Lewis. "Hung Parliament: What Happens Now?." *The Guardian*, May 7, 2010.
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/hung-parliament-what-happens-now>.

Bauer, Alain. *Qui est L'Ennemi?*. Paris: CNRS Édition, 2015.

Baun, Michael J. *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996.

- BBC. "Balkans war: A Brief Guide." March 1, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399>.
- . "EU Referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts." June 24, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028>.
- . "Guide to the Syrian Rebels." December 12, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003>.
- . "Merkel Named as German Chancellor." October 10, 2005.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4325600.stm>.
- . "Results." May 7, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results>.
- . "Syria Crisis: Cameron Loses Commons Vote on Syria Action." August 30, 2013.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783>.
- . "The Islamic Veil Across Europe." January 31, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095>.
- Beach, Derek, and Rasmus B. Pedersen. *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
- Beckett, Andy. "From Hung Parliament to age of Uncertainty." *The Guardian*, May 11, 2010.
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/11/hung-parliament-gordon-brown>.
- Behr, Rafael. "How Remain Failed: The Inside Story of a Doomed Campaign." *The Guardian*, July 5, 2016.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/how-remain-failed-inside-story-doomed-campaign>.
- . "Power Without Purpose – The Tragic Rule of David Cameron." *The Guardian*, January 6, 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/06/power-without-purpose-david-cameron-prime-minister-general-election>.
- Bell, David A. *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Benner, Thorsten. "Control: is the New Core of Germany's Refugee Policy." *Al Jazeera*, March 2, 2017.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/core-germany-refugee-policy-170302073029337.html>.
- Benner, Thorsten, and Thomas Gomart. "Meeting Macron in the Middle." *Foreign Affairs*, May 8, 2017.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-05-08/meeting-macron-middle>.
- Berdah, Arthur. "Terrorisme: Ce que Proposent les Prétendants à la Primaire à Droite." *Le Figaro*, June 14, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/2016/06/14/25001-20160614ARTFIG00129-terrorisme-ce-que-proposent-les-pretendants-a-la-primaire-a-droite.php>.
- Berindan, Ion. "Not Another 'Grand Strategy': What Prospects for the Future European Security Strategy?" *European Security* 22, no.3 (September 2013): 395-412. doi:10.1080/09662839.2013.808189.
- Berry, Craig. *Globalization and Ideology in Britain: Neoliberalism, Free Trade and the Global Economy*. New York, NY; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
- Beyer, Susanne, and Jan Fleischhauer. "'The Immigration of Muslims Will Change our Culture'." *Spiegel*, March 30, 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/interview-with-frauke-petry-of-the-alternative-for-germany-a-1084493.html>.

- Birt, Jonathan. "Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Britain Post-9/11." *The Muslim World* 96, no.4 (October 2006): 687-705. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2006.00153.x.
- Blankart, Charles. "The European Union: Confederation, Federation or Association of Compound States?." *Constitutional Political Economy* 18, no.2 (May 2007): 99-106. doi: 0.1007/s10602-007-9015-3.
- Bleiker, Carla. "Survey: Germans Want a Burqa ban." *Deutsche Welle*, August 26, 2016.
<http://www.dw.com/en/survey-germans-want-a-burqa-ban/a-19504358>.
- Boffey, Daniel. "European Leaders Cheer Macron Victory in First Round of French Election." *The Guardian*, April 24, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/great-for-europe-reaction-to-macrons-first-round-success-in-french-election>.
- Boffey Daniel, and Jon Henley. "Angela Merkel Rejects one of Theresa May's key Brexit Demands." *The Guardian*, March 29, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/angela-merkel-rejects-one-of-theresa-mays-key-brexit-demands>.
- Boffey, Daniel, and Toby Helm. "Vote Leave Embroiled in Race row Over Turkey Security Threat Claims." *The Guardian*, May 22, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/21/vote-leave-prejudice-turkey-eu-security-threat>
- Borinski, Philipp. "Realism and the Analysis of European Security." *Journal of European Integration* 20, no.2/3 (September 1997): 131-52. doi: 10.1080/07036339708429051.
- Bornschier, Volker, ed. *State-Building in Europe: The Revitalization of Western European Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Bossuat, Gérard. "Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Français et le Processus D'Unité en Europe Occidentale D'Alger à Rome, 1943-1958." *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 87-109. <http://www.cere.public.lu/fr/publications/jeih/1995/jeih-1-1995-1.pdf>.
- Bourdillon, Yves. "Les Attentats Auraient Été Commis en Représailles à L'Action de la France en Syrie." *Les Échos*, November 14, 2015. http://www.lesechos.fr/14/11/2015/lesechos.fr/021477046919_les-attentats-auraient-ete-commis-en-represailles-a-l-action-de-la-france-en-syrie.htm.
- Boutelet, Cécile. "L'Économie Allemande Dopée par L'Arrivée des Réfugiés en 2015 et 2016." *Le Monde*, January 13, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2017/01/13/l-economie-allemande-dopee-par-l-arrivee-des-refugies-en-2015-et-2016_5062183_3234.html.
- Boutin, Gilles. "Syrie: 'Hollande Essaie D'Éviter à la France D'Être Exclue de la Table des Négociations'." *Le Figaro*, September 27, 2015. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2015/09/27/31002-20150927ARTFIG00122-syrie-hollande-essaie-d-eviter-a-la-france-d-etre-exclue-de-la-table-des-negociations.php>.
- Bowcott, Owen. "Deportation Escorting Turns Into big Business for Private Firms." *The Guardian*, October 14, 2010. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/14/deportation-escorting-security-firms>.
- Boxwell, James. "May Pledges Lower Immigration cap." *Financial Times*, November 5, 2010. <https://www.ft.com/content/67605aaa-e8e6-11df-a383-00144feab49a>.
- Brouwer, Evelien R. *Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Information System*. Boston, Mass; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.

- Brown, Aaron. "'Just wait...' Islamic State Reveals it Has Smuggled Thousands of Extremists Into Europe." *Express*, November 18, 2015. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/555434/Islamic-State-ISIS-Smugger-THOUSANDS-Extremists-into-Europe-Refugees>.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- . "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis," *International Sociology* 5, no.4 (December 1990): 379-407. doi: 10.1177/026858090005004003.
- Brundsen, Jim. "'Hard Brexit' or no Brexit, Donald Tusk Warns UK." *Financial Times*, October 13, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/df4885fa-9160-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923>.
- Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI). *Migration and Integration: Residence law and Policy on Migration and Integration in Germany*. http://www.australien.diplo.de/contentblob/3377102/Daten/1831328/download_zu_bmi_broschre.pdf.
- . "Nationality Act." Last modified January 1, 2015. http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzestexte/EN/Staatsangehoerigkeitsgesetz_englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
- . *Residence law and Policy on Migration and Integration in Germany*. http://www.australien.diplo.de/contentblob/3377102/Daten/1831328/download_zu_bmi_broschre.pdf.
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF). *Asylgeschäftsstatistik: für den Monat Dezember 2016*. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
- Bunyan, Tony. *Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union: 1976-1993*. London: Statewatch, 1997.
- Byrnes, Melissa K. "Liberating the Land or Absorbing a Community: Managing North African Migration and the Bidonvilles in Paris's *Banlieues*." *French Politics, Culture & Society* 31, no.3 (December 2013): 1-20. doi: 10.3167/fpcs.2013.310301.
- Caillaud, Corinne. "Exit la Taxe à 75% qui a Sapé L'Image de la France." *Le Figaro*, February 1, 2015. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/impots/2015/02/01/05003-20150201ARTFIG00182-la-taxe-a-75-a-disparu-ce-dimanche.php>.
- Campbell, Alan. "Anglo-French Relations a Decade Ago: A New Assessment (1)." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)* 58, no.3 (July 1982): 237-53. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/2617807>.
- Carr, Edward H. *The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1964.
- Carr, Jonathan. *Helmut Schmidt: Helmsman of Germany*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985.
- Carrell, Severin. "EU Delay on Brexit Trade Deal Hits Sturgeon's Referendum Timetable." *The Guardian*, March 31, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/31/sturgeon-tells-may-no-rational-reason-to-block-scottish-independence-referendum>.

- . “Scottish Government set to Table Motion Calling for Article 50 Rejection.” *The Guardian*, January 25, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/25/scottish-government-set-to-table-motion-calling-for-article-50-rejection>.
- Carter, Mike. “I Walked From Liverpool to London. Brexit was no Surprise.” *The Guardian*, June 27, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/27/liverpool-london-brexit-leave-eu-referendum>.
- Caruso, Daniela. “Lost at Sea.” *German Law Journal* 15, no.6 (October 2014): 1197-1208. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2467540>.
- Castañeda, Heide. “European Mobilities or Poverty Migration? Discourses on Roma in Germany.” *International Migration* 53, no.3 (June 2015): 87-99. doi: 10.1111/imig.12166.
- Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur L’Europe (CVCE). “Agreement Concerning the Relations Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Coal and Steel Community.” Published December 18, 2016. Accessed July 5, 2016. http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/de859fe5-dd07-4666-89b0-4f1ef2825b13/publishable_en.pdf
- . “European Commission.” Last modified July 9, 2016. Accessed July 1, 2017. https://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_commission-en-281a3c0c-839a-48fd-b69c-bc2588c780ec.html.
- Chaperon, Isabelle. “Les Touristes Étrangers Boudent la France.” *Le Monde*, August 23, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2016/08/23/les-touristes-etrangers-boudent-la-france_4986685_3234.html.
- Chase, Jefferson. “Berlin job Portal Specializes in Refugees.” *Deutsche Welle*, December 4, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-job-portal-specializes-in-refugees/a-36635093>.
- . “Merkel’s CDU Approves More Conservative Orientation.” *Deutsche Welle*, July 12, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/merkels-cdu-approves-more-conservative-orientation/a-36675640>.
- Chazan, Guy. “Germany Sees Rise in Crime Committed by Asylum Seekers.” *Financial Times*, April 24, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/b5a8867e-28ea-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c>.
- . “Merkel’s Approval Ratings Plunge After Bavaria Terror Attacks.” *Financial Times*, August 5, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/8956d728-5ae7-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32>.
- Cheurfa, Madani. *L’État D’Urgence Modifie-t-il la Confiance des Français?*. http://www.cevipof.com/rtefiles/File/noterech-07/Confiance%20politique%20Vague%207%20_%20Note%20CHEURFA%20_%20Acteurs.pdf.
- Chrisafis, Angelique. “François Fillon Under Formal Investigation for ‘Fake Jobs Offences’.” *The Guardian*, March 14, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/francois-fillon-placed-under-formal-investigation-over-fake-jobs>.
- Chrisafis, Angelique, Larry Elliott, and Jill Treanor. “French PM Manuel Valls Says Refugee Crisis is Destabilising Europe.” *The Guardian*, January 22, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/french-pm-manuel-valls-says-refugee-crisis-is-destabilising-europe>.
- Cini, Michelle, and Nieves P.S. Borrogán. *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Cini, Michelle, and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, "Glossary." In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P. S. Borrogán Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Circulaire du Premier Ministre NOR/PRM/X/91/00102/60/D du 26 septembre 1991 (JO du 27 septembre 1991).

Clark, Tom, and Matthew Taylor. "Insecure Britain: Poll Shines Light on Nation's Economic Anxiety." *The Guardian*, June 17, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/16/insecure-britain-poll-economic-recovery-immigration>.

Clarke, Stephen, and Matt Whittaker. *The Importance of Place: Explaining the Characteristics Underpinning the Brexit Vote Across Different Parts of the UK*.
<http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/app/uploads/2016/07/Brexit-vote-v4.pdf>.

Clegg, Richard. *UK Labour Market: Jan 2017*.

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/jan2017/pdf>.

--- . "Unemployment Rate (Aged 16 and Over, Seasonally Adjusted)." Office for National Statistics.

Published April 12, 2017. Accessed April 20, 2017.

<https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms>.

Cohen, Nick. "There are Liars and Then There's Boris Johnson and Michael Gove." *The Guardian*, June 25, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/boris-johnson-michael-gove-eu-liars>.

Coleman, David. "The United Kingdom and International Migration: A Changing Balance." In *European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications*, edited by Heinz Fassman and Rainer Münz, 37-66. Brookfield, VT; Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1994.

Coleman, David, and Robert Rowthorn. "The Economic Effects of Immigration Into the United Kingdom." *Population and Development Review* 30, no.4 (December 2004): 584-87.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657331>.

Collard-Wexler, Simon. "Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union." *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no.3 (September 2006): 397-432.

Commission from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Join Report on Social Exclusion Summarising the Results of the Examination of the National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (2003-2005). COM (2003) 773 final (12 December 2003).

Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010 – 2014). COM (2010) 213 final (6 May 2010).

Completing the Internal Market: White Paper From the Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (Milan, 28-29 June 1985). COM (1985) 310 final (14 June, 1985).

Connolly, Kate. "Deport Failed Asylum Seekers Back to War Zones, Says Bavaria Minister." *The Guardian*, September 9, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/09/deport-failed-asylum-seekers-back-to-war-zones-says-bavaria-minister>.

- Coombes, David L. *Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C.* Sage Publications, 1970.
- Corcoran, Hannah, and Kevin Smith. *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015/16.* <http://report-it.org.uk/files/hate-crime-1516-hosb1116.pdf>.
- Cornelisse, Galina. "What's Wrong with Schengen? Border Disputes and the Nature of Integration in the Area Without Internal Borders." *Common Market Law Review* 51, no.3 (June 2014): 7741-70.
<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/document.php?id=COLA2014060>.
- Cornevin, Christophe. "Sept Heures D'Assaut et 5000 Munitions: Le Récit d'une Opération d'une Violence Rare." *Le Figaro*, November 18, 2015. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/18/01016-20151118ARTFIG00345-le-commando-neutralise-a-saint-denis-etais-pret-a-passera-l-acte.php>.
- Cornwall.gov.uk. "2011 Census: An Overview of the Headline Figures for Cornwall." Published February 2013. Accessed September 20, 2016.
https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/21657889/census_at_a_glance_docxrelease21_allpapersv2.pdf.
- Cotta, Michèle. "Présidentielle 1969: La Gauche "Coincée" Jusqu'à Quand?." *L'Express*, December 20, 2016.
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/presidentielle-1969-la-gauche-coincee-jusqu-a-quand_1862196.html.
- Council Conclusion on the New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the European Union. February 19, 2016, 2016. O.J. (C 69 I) 1.
- Council Decision (EC) No. 29/2000 of 28 June 1999. 2000 O.J. (L 15) 1.
- Council Decision (EC) No. 435/1999 of 20 May 1999. 2000 O.J. (L 239) 1.
- Council of Europe. "Values: Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law." Accessed July 9, 2017.
<http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values>.
- Court of Justice of the European Union. "According to Advocate General Wathelet, Germany may Refuse, on the Basis of a General Criterion That Demonstrates the Absence of a Genuine Link with the Host Member State, Nationals of Other Member States 'Social Security Benefits for Jobseekers who are in Need of Assistance'." Press release, May 20, 2014.
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140074en.pdf>.
- . "Economically Inactive EU Citizens who go to Another Member State Solely in Order to Obtain Social Assistance may be Excluded from Certain Social Benefits." Press release, November 11, 2014.
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-11/cp140146en.pdf>.
- Council of the European Union. "Best Practices for Upholding the Obligation in the Eurodac Regulation to Take Fingerprints." Published October 30, 2014. Accessed February 10, 2017.
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/dec/eu-com-coercive-fingerprinting-migrants-ds-1491-14.pdf>.
- . "European Council (Art. 50) (29 April 2017) Draft Guidelines Following the United Kingdom's Notification Under Article." Published March 31, 2017. Accessed April 25, 2017.
<http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf>.
- Council Regulation No 604/2013, of The European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for

Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (recast) 2013 O.J. (L180) 31.

Cowan, Rosie. "Abu Hamza Charged with Inciting Murders." *The Guardian*, October 20, 2004.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/oct/20/terrorism.september111>.

Crawford, Beverly. "Moral Leadership or Moral Hazard? Germany's Response to the Refugee Crisis and its Impact on European Solidarity." Diss., UC Berkeley, 2016.
<http://bev.berkeley.edu/OLLI%202016%20Refugees/Davis%20essay%20Germany%20and%20Refugees%20January%2019.pdf>.

Croft, Jane. "UK Court Criticises Anti-Terror Legislation." *Financial Times*, January 19, 2016.
<https://www.ft.com/content/f312829c-bec6-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2>.

Croft, Jane, Mure Dickie, and George Parker. "UK Supreme Court Rules MPs Must Vote on Triggering Brexit." *Financial Times*, January 24, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/af707ac0-e216-11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb>.

Crossland, David. "Reluctant SPD to Extract High Price for Coalition." *Spiegel*, September 24, 2013.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-spd-will-demand-big-concessions-for-coalition-with-merkel-a-924281.html>.

Cumming, Douglas J., and Shaker A. Zahra. "International Business and Entrepreneurship Implications of Brexit." *British Journal of Management* 27, no.4 (October 2016): 687-92. doi: 10.1111/1467-8551.12192.

D'Appollonia, Ariane C., and Simon Reich, eds. *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.

Dabi, Frédéric. *Les Indices de Popularité – September 2016*. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3492-1-study_file.pdf.

Dabi, Frédéric, and Jérôme Fourquet. *Les Clés du Second Tour de L'Élection Présidentielle*.
http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1859-1-study_file.pdf.

Dagorn, Gary. "Comment la Législation Antiterroriste s'est Durcie en Trente ans." *Le Monde*, November 26, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/11/26/comment-la-legislation-antiterroriste-s'est-durcie-en-trente-ans_4818000_4355770.html.

Damgé, Mathilde. "Intervention en Syrie: Les Intérêts Économiques ne sont pas Absents." *Le Monde*, August 29, 2013. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/08/29/intervention-en-syrie-les-interets-economiques-ne-sont-pas-absents_3468524_3234.html.

David-Wilip, Sudha. "Merkel's Next Challenge," *Foreign Affairs*, July 11, 2017.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-07-11/merkels-next-challenge>.

De Royer, Solenn. "Le Jour où DSK est Tombé." *Le Figaro*, May 14, 2016.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2016/05/14/01002-20160514ARTFIG00030-le-jour-o-dsk-est-tombe.php>.

De Villers Tremolet, Vincent. "Serveuse Musulmane Giflée à Nice: Comment les Islamistes Imposent un Nouvel Ordre Moral." *Le Figaro*, June 10, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/2016/06/10/31003>.

20160610ARTFIG00250-serveuse-giflee-a-nice-comment-les-islamistes-imposent-un-nouvel-ordre-moral.php

Dearden, Lizzie. "6 Charts and a map That Show Where Europe's Refugees are Coming From – and the Perilous Journeys They are Taking." *Independent*, September 2, 2015.

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-six-charts-that-show-where-refugees-are-coming-from-where-they-are-going-and-how-they-10482415.html>

--- . "'Refugee Crisis is a Problem for Germany not Europe,' Hungarian Prime Minister Claims." *The Independent*. September 3, 2015. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-is-a-problem-for-germany-not-europe-hungarian-prime-minister-claims-10484284.html>.

Degler, Eva, and Thomas Liebig. *Finding their Way: Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany*. <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Finding-their-Way-Germany.pdf>.

Dehoussse, Renaud. "The Unmaking of a Constitution: Lessons From the European Referenda." *Constellations* 13, no.2 (June 2006): 151-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1351-0487.2006.00447.x.

Dejevsky, Mary. "Schröder vs Merkel: A Tale of two Germanys." *The Independent*, September 16, 2005. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/schr-der-vs-merkel-a-tale-of-two-germanys-313186.html>.

Del Sarto, Raffaella A., and Chaira Steindler. "Uncertainties at the European Union's Southern Borders: Actors, Policies, and Legal Frameworks." *European Security* 24, no.3 (July 2015): 369-80. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1028184.

Delporte, Christian. "Sarkozy and the Media." *Contemporary French and Francophone Studies* 16, no.3 (June 2012): 299-310. doi: 10.1080/17409292.2012.675668.

Dempsey, Judy. "The Necessity of France." *Carnegie Europe*, November 29, 2016. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/66280>.

Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis). "Average Number of Children per Woman." Accessed September 24, 2016. <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Births/Tables/BirthRate.html>.

--- . "Benefits for Asylum Seekers: Number of Entitled Persons up 169% in 2015." Press Release, September 5, 2016. https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/09/PE16_304_222.html.

--- . "Life Expectancy in Germany." Accessed September 24, 2016. <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Deaths/Tables/Lifeexpectancy.html>

Deutsche Welle. "Berlin Calls for Sanctions on EU States That Reject Refugee Quotas." September 9, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/berlin-calls-for-sanctions-on-eu-states-that-reject-refugee-quotas/a-18714957>.

--- . "CDU's Strobl Under Fire for Hardliner Asylum Stance." November 29, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/cdus-strobl-under-fire-for-hardliner-asylum-stance/a-36567801>.

--- . "Germany Expects Migration to add to Unemployment." August 16, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-expects-migration-to-add-to-unemployment/a-19478546>.

- . “Germany’s State-Run Schools to Teach Islam.” March 13, 2008. <http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-state-run-schools-to-teach-islam/a-3191031>.
- . “How to Apply for Asylum in Germany.” September 23, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/how-to-apply-for-asylum-in-germany/a-18723501>.
- . “Kosovo and Montenegro Favor ‘Safe Country of Origin’ Status.” August 4, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/kosovo-and-montenegro-favor-safe-country-of-origin-status/a-18626363>.
- . “Sharp Drop in Migrant Arrivals in Germany.” January 11, 2017. <http://www.dw.com/en/sharp-drop-in-migrant-arrivals-in-germany/a-37087543>.
- Devine Michael W. “German Asylum law Reform and the European Community: Crisis in Europe.” *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 7, no.4 (January 1993): 795-816. <http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/geoimlj7&collection=journals&id=807>.
- Diehl, Claudia, Matthias Koenig, and Kerstin Ruckdeschel. “Religiosity and Gender Equality: Comparing Natives and Muslim Migrants in Germany.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32, vol.2 (February 2009): 278-301. doi: 10.1080/01419870802298454.
- Direction de L’Information Légale et Administrative (DILA). “1958: L’Élection Du 21 Décembre.” Published February 8, 2017. Accessed March 2, 2017. <http://www.vie-publique.fr/découverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/elections-présidentielles-depuis-1958.html>.
- Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals. 2008/115 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EC).
- Doebler-Hagedorn, Franziska. “The State at its Borders: Germany and the Schengen Negotiations.” PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003. <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2292/>.
- Domingo, Bruno. “National Borders, Surveillance, and Counter-Terrorism Tools in France.” In *Border Security in the Al-Qaeda Era*, edited by Kelly W. Sundberg and John A. Winterdyke, 121-58. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009.
- Dooley, Michael P., David F. Landau, and Peter Garber. “The Revived Bretton Woods System.” *International Journal of Finance & Economics* 9, no.4 (October 2004): 307-13. doi:10.1002/ijfe.250.
- Dragovic, Filip, and Robert Mikac. “The Impact and Role of South-East European Countries in Recent Migration Crises.” *Strategic Sectors Culture & Society* (January 2016): 316-19. http://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjustants/anuari/med.2016/IEMed_MedYearBook2016_Eastern%20Europe%20Role%20Migration%20Crises_Dragovic_Mikac.pdf
- Duchêne, François, and Jean Monnet. *Jean Monnet: The First Statement of Independence*. New York, NY; London: W.W. Norton & Company 1994.
- Duchin, Brian R. “Agonizing Reappraisal: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the European Defense Community.” *Diplomatic History* 16, no.2 (April 1992): 201-22. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1992.tb00496.x.

- Duckworth, Nicholas. *Local Elections 2013 Results*.
<http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP13-30/RP13-30.pdf>.
- Duhamel, Olivier. "Terrorism and Constitutional Amendment in France." *European Constitutional Review* 12, no.1 (April 2016): 1-5. doi: 10.1017/S1574019616000067.
- Dwan, Renata. "Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54." *Cold War History* 1, no.3 (April 2001): 141-60. doi:10.1080/71399932.
- Dyson, Kenneth. *The State Tradition in Western Europe*. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980.
- Elgot, Jessica. "Banks Could Move Assets out of UK by 2017 if 'EU Passport' is Lost'." *The Guardian*, October 17, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/17/banks-could-move-assets-out-of-uk-by-2017-if-eu-passport-is-lost>.
- Ellison, James. "Britain, de Gaulle's NATO policies, and Anglo-French rivalry, 1963-1967." In *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*, edited by Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret, 85-110. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010.
- Elsen, Charles. "Le Rôle des Accords de Schengen dans la Construction Européenne." *Académie de Droit Européen* 12 (May 2001): 69-85. doi:10.1007/s12027-011-0194-z.
- Espeth Guild et al. *Study of the LIBE Committee on Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area: Is Schengen Crisis-Proof?*.
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU\(2016\)571356_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf).
- Emmer, Pieter. "Turkey and Europe: The Role of Migration." *European Review* 21, no.3 (July 2013): 394-99. doi: 10.1017/S1062798713000355.
- Errard, Guillaume. "Le Chômage est-il Devenu une Fatalité en France?." *Le Figaro*, November 27, 2015. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/le-scan-eco/decryptage/2015/10/27/29002-20151027ARTFIG00010-chomage-les-chiffres-de-septembre-peuvent-ils-nous-rassurer.php>.
- Espen B. Eide. "We pay, but Have no say: That's the Reality of Norway's Relationship With the EU." *The Guardian*, October 27, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/27/norway-eu-reality-uk-voters-seduced-by-norwegian-model>.
- Eun, Yong-Soo. "Rethinking Logic of Inference and Explanation in the Field of International Relations." *Politics* 32, no.3 (October 2012): 162-74. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01437.x.
- EurActiv. "EU Adopts European Arrest Warrant." November 18, 2001.
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/eu-adopts-european-arrest-warrant/>.
- . "EU Foreign Ministers to Adopt Further Counter-Terrorism Measures." October 7, 2001.
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/eu-foreign-ministers-to-adopt-further-counter-terrorism-measures/>.
- . "EU Rules Prevent Sharing of Refugee Fingerprints." February 23, 2016.
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-rules-prevent-sharing-of-refugee-fingerprints>.
- EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law. "An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis: A Macroeconomic Assessment for the EU." *European Economy Institutional Papers* 033 (July 2016): 3-36. doi: 10.2765/631735.

- . “An EU ‘Safe Countries of Origin’ List.” Accessed September 26, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf.
 - . “Conditions for Membership.” Last modified June 12, 2016. Accessed September 26, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en.
 - . “European Commission Statement Following the Decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to Relocate 120,000 Refugees.” Press release, September 22, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm.
 - . “Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon.” Press release, December 1, 2009. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-531_en.htm?locale=en#footnote-1
 - . “Summary of the Treaty of Nice.” Press release, January 31, 2003. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-03-23_en.htm.
 - . “Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.” Last modified October 15, 2010. Accessed February 15, 2016. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:xy0022>.
 - . “Variable-Geometry’ Europe.” Accessed October 7, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/variable_geometry_europe.html.
- European Commission (EC). “European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe's External Borders.” Press release, December 15, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6332_en.htm.
- . “Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Frequently Asked Questions.” Press release, July 13, 2016. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2436_en.htm.
 - . “Syria: Time is Running out.” Press release, April 23, 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-369_en.htm.
 - . *The Schengen Area*. http://biblio.ucv.ro/bib_web/bib_pdf/EU_books/0056.pdf.
- European External Action Service (EEAS). *A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy*. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.
- Eurostat*. “All Valid Permits by Reason, Length of Validity and Citizenship.” Accessed September 26, 2016. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>.
- . “Asylum Applicants Considered to be Unaccompanied Minors by Citizenship, age, and sex.” Accessed September 26, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYUNAA.
 - . “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, age and sex Annual Aggregated Data.” Accessed September 24, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA.
 - . “First Time Asylum Applicants in the EU28 by Citizenship, Q1 2014 – Q1 2015.” Last Modified September 18, 2015. Accessed July 15, 2017 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA.

--- . “People in the EU – Statistics on Demographic Changes.” Last Modified November 27, 2015. Accessed July 2, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/People_in_the_EU_%E2%80%93_statistics_on_demographic_changes.

Faiola, Anthony, and Souad Mekhennet. “Nearly a Third of Migrants in Germany Claiming to be Syrians Aren’t from Syria.” *Washington Post*, September 25, 2015.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-calls-for-new-refugee-benefit-standards-in-europe/2015/09/25/bee704fe-616d-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html.

Faroop, Umar. “Turkish Voters Take to the Seas.” *Foreign Affairs*, March 9, 2017.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017-03-09/turkish-voters-take-seas>.

Federal Foreign Office. “Immigration Act.” Last modified July 24, 2015. Accessed April 15, 2017.
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/Zuwanderungsrecht_node.html#top.

Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). *Africa and Europe – A new Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future*.
https://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/information_flyer/information_brochures/Materialie270_africa_marshallplan.pdf 14/16/17.

Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI). “German Islam Conference.” Accessed September 25, 2016.
http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Society-Constitution/German-Islam-Conference/german-islam-conference_node.html.

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). “Access to the Labour Market for Refugees.” Accessed July 3, 2017.
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Feldenkirchen, Markus, and René Pfister. “The Isolated Chancellor: What is Driving Angela Merkel?” *Spiegel*, January 25, 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/why-has-angela-merkel-staked-her-legacy-on-the-refugees-a-1073705.html>.

Fetzer, Joel S., and J. Christopher Soper. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Financial Times. “EU Referendums Results.” June 24, 2016. <https://ig.ft.com/sites/elections/2016/uk/eu-referendum/>.

Finch, Gavin. “Banks’ Brexit Future Hinges on Passporting Rights: QuickTake Q&A.” *Bloomberg*, October 19, 2016. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/u-k-banks-brexit-hopes-boil-down-to-one-word-quicktak-q-a>.

Fischer, Sebastian. “A Problem for Merkel and Germany.” *Spiegel*, September 5, 2016.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/rise-of-populist-afd-a-problem-for-merkel-and-germany-a-1110954.html>.

Flouroy, Michèle., and Adam I. Klein. “What Europe got Wrong About the NSA.” *Foreign Affairs*, August 2, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2016-08-02/what-europe-got-wrong-about-nsa>.

Foroutan, Naika. *Identity and (Muslim) Integration in Germany*. www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCM-Germanycasestudy.pdf.

- Foster, Peter. "EU Deal: What David Cameron Asked for... and What he Actually got." *The Telegraph*, June 14, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/eu-deal-what-david-cameron-asked-for-and-what-he-actually-got/>.
- Fourquet, Jérôme. "L'Influence de L'Isolement et de L'Absence de Services et Commerces de Proximité sur le Vote FN en Milieu Rural." *Département Opinion et Stratégies D'Entreprises* no.135 (March 2016): 1-9. http://www.ifop.com/media/pressdocument/896-1-document_file.pdf.
- . *Les Français et L'Accueil des Migrants*. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3552-1-study_file.pdf.
- . *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants en Europe*. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3315-1-study_file.pdf.
- . *Regards Croisés sur L'Islam en France en Allemagne*. <http://www.euro-islam.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/IFOP-Figaro.pdf>.
- Fourquet, Jérôme, and Esteban Pratviel. *Les Français et L'Europe 10 ans Après le TCE*. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3039-1-study_file.pdf.
- Fourquet, Jérôme, and Jean-Philippe Dubrulle. *Les Français et la Crise des Migrants*. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3118-1-study_file.pdf.
- Franz, Barbara. "Europe's Muslim Youth: An Inquiry into the Politics of Discrimination, Relative Deprivation, and Identity Formation." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 18 (Winter 2007): 89-112. doi: 10.1215/10474552-2006-036.
- Freeman, Gary P. *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience in 1945-1975*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Fressoz, Françoise. "Hollande, un 'Président Normal' Dans une Situation Anormale." *Le Monde*, June 18, 2012. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/06/18/hollande-un-president-normal-dans-une-situation-anormale_1720216_823448.html.
- . "Sondage: DSK Creuse L'Écart Avec les Autres Présidentiables Socialistes." *Le Monde*, March 16, 2011. http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2011/03/16/dsk-creuse-l-ecart-avec-les-autres-presidentiables-socialistes_1493657_1471069.html.
- Frieden, Jeffry A. *Global Capitalism: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York, NY: Norton, 2007.
- Friesen, Katie. "The Effects of the Madrid and London Subway Bombings on Europe's View of Terrorism." *Review Digest Human Rights and Human Welfare*, Supplement. (2007): 10-7. http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/terror/europe_2007.pdf.
- Fröhlich, Stefan. "Looking to Germany." *Foreign Affairs*, January 29, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-01-29/looking-germany>.
- Fullerton, Maryellen. "Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law." *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 29, no.1 (March 2016): 57-134. <http://harvardhjr.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Fullerton-Asylum-Crisis.pdf>.
- Furdon, Edward. *The European Defence Community, A History*. London: Macmillan Press, 1980.

- Gaffney, John. "Political Leadership and the Politics of Performance: France, Syria and the Chemical Weapons Crisis of 2013." *Politics and International Relations* 12, no.3 (September 2014): 218-34. doi: 10.1057/fp.2014.17.
- . *Political Leadership in France*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Gambles, Ian. *West European Security Cooperation*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989.
- Garbin, David, and Gareth Millington. "Territorial Stigma and the Politics of Resistance in a Parisian Banlieue: La Courneuve and Beyond." *Urban Studies* 49, no.10 (August 2012): 2067-83. doi: 10.1177/0042098011422572.
- Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, and Nathaniel Barr. "The Myth of the Lone-Wolf Terrorist." *Foreign Affairs*, July 26, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism>.
- Gayle, Damien. "The Norway Option: What is it and What Does it Mean for Britain?." *The Guardian*, October 28, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/28/the-norway-option-what-is-it-and-what-does-it-mean-for-britain>.
- Gazzane, Hayat. "La Taxe à 75% va Disparaître au 1^{er} Janvier 2015." *Le Figaro*, December 24, 2014. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/impots/2014/12/24/05003-20141224ARTFIG00077-la-taxe-a-75-va-disparaitre-au-1er-janvier-2015.php>.
- Geddes, Andrew, and Peter Scholten. "Britain: The Unexpected Europeanisation of Immigration." In *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, 22-47. London: Sage Edition, 2016.
- Gelatt, Julia. "Schengen and the Free Movement of People Across Europe." *Migration Policy*, October 1, 2005. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/schengen-and-free-movement-people-across-europe>.
- General Secretariat of the Council. European Council Meeting (18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions. Brussels, European Council, 2016.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005.
- Gerhards, Jürgen, Silke Hans, and Jürgen Schupp. "German Public Opinion on Admitting Refugees." DIW Economic Bulletin, 21 (May 2016): 243-50. https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.534664.de/diw_econ_bull_2016-21-1.pdf.
- German History in Documents and Images (GHDI). "Ten-Point Plan for German Unity." Accessed September 24, 2016. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=223.
- Gezer, Özlem, and Milos Djuric. "A Bulgarian Businessman Moves His Village to Germany." *Spiegel*, May 9, 2014. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-business-of-moving-a-bulgarian-village-to-hamburg-a-967884.html>.
- Gifford, Chris. *The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and Economy in a Post-Imperial State*. Burlington, VT; Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008.

- Gillingham, John. "American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties." *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 21-36.
http://www.zgei.nomos.de/fileadmin/zgei/doc/Zgei_95_01.pdf.
- . *European Integration, 1950-2003 Superstate or New Market Economy?*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke. "The Politics of EU Immigration Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization." *Policy Studies Journal* 32, no.1 (February 2004): 145-65. doi: 10.1111/j.0190-292X.2004.00057.x.
- Gordon, Phillip. *A Certain Idea of France*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Government UK. "Asylum Support." Last modified March 27, 2017. Accessed April 13, 2017.
<https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get>.
- . "EU Finances 2015: Statement on the 2015 EU Budget and Measures to Counter Fraud and Financial Mismanagement."
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483344/EU_finances_2015_final_web_09122015.pdf.
- . "EU Speech at Bloomberg." Published January 23, 2013. Accessed October 15, 2016.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>.
- . "Immigration Statistics: October to December 2012." Published February 28, 2013. Accessed September 15, 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2012/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2012>.
- . "PM Commons Statement on EU Reform and Referendum: 22 February 2016." Published February 22, 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-eu-reform-and-referendum-22-february-2016>.
- . "Return Home if You're in the UK Illegally or Have Claimed Asylum." Last modified March 27, 2017. Accessed April 13, 2017. <https://www.gov.uk/return-home-voluntarily/assisted-return>.
- . "Why the Government Believes That Voting to Remain in the EU is the Best Decision for the UK." Published April 6, 2016. Accessed October 1, 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/why-the-government-believes-that-voting-to-remain-in-the-european-union-is-the-best-decision-for-the-uk/>.
- Gower, Melanie. *Should Asylum Seekers Have Unrestricted Rights to Work in the UK?*. researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01908/SN01908.pdf.
- Green, Megan, and Daniel R. Kelemen, "Europe's Failed Refugee Policy: The Crisis in the Mediterranean Continues." *Foreign Affairs*, June 28, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-28/europes-failed-refugee-policy>.
- Green, Simon. "Divergent Traditions, Converging Responses: Immigration and Integration Policy in the UK and Germany." *German Politics* 16, no.1 (March 2007): 95-115. doi: 10.1080/09644000701197991.
- . "Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact of Unification and the Berlin Republic." *West European Politics* 24, no.4 (October 2007): 82-104. doi:10.1080/01402380108425466.

Grieco, Joseph M. "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory." In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism, The Contemporary Debate*, edited by David A. Baldwin, 301-38. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Groupe Plessis. "Déchéance de Nationalité: La Double Faute Politique de la Droite." *Le Figaro*, April 1, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2016/04/01/31001-20160401ARTFIG00102-decheance-de-nationalite-la-double-faute-politique-de-la-droite.php>.

Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Translation at <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>

Guilluy, Christophe. *La France Périphérique: Comment on a Sacrifié les Classes Populaires*. Paris: Flammarion, 2014.

Hackett, Conrad. "5 Facts About the Muslim Population in Europe." *Pew Research Center*, July 19, 2016. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe>.

Hadfield, Amelia. "ENP and EMP: The Geopolitics of 'Enlargement Lite'." In *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security*, edited by Michelle Pace, 65-107. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Hague, William. "The Leave Campaign Can't Keep Dodging the Biggest Question." *The Telegraph*, June 6, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/06/the-leave-campaign-cant-keep-dodging-the-biggest-question/>.

Hallstein, Walter. "The European Economic Community." *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no.2 (June 1963): 161-78. doi:10.2307/2146121.

Hamm, Ingrid, Helmut Seitz, and Martin Werding, eds. *Demographic Change in Germany: The Economic and Fiscal Consequences*. New York: Springer, 2008.

Hammond, Philip. *HM Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact of EU Membership and the Alternatives*. http://www.agefi.fr/sites/agefi.fr/files/fichiers/2016/04/treasury_analysis_economic_impact_of_eu_membership_web.pdf

Harris, Chris. "Which Country in Europe has the Most Jihadists in Syria and Iraq?." *Euronews*, November 4, 2014. <http://www.euronews.com/2014/11/04/which-country-in-europe-has-the-most-jihadists-in-syria-and-iraq>.

Hassan Hassan. "Isis has Reached new Depths of Depravity. But There is a Brutal Logic Behind it." *The Guardian*, February 8, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/isis-islamic-state-ideology-sharia-syria-iraq-jordan-pilot>.

Hasselbach, Christoph. "Opinion: The Welcome Realists." *Deutsche Welle*, April 8, 2017. <http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-the-welcome-realists/a-38347898>.

Hawkins, Oliver. *Asylum Statistics*. <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01403/SN01403.pdf>.

Hayter, Teresa. *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls*. Ann Arbor, MI; London: Pluto Press, 2004.

Hazareesingh, Sudhir. *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Helm, Toby. "Brexit Camp Abandons £350m-a-Week NHS Funding Pledge." *The Guardian*, September 10, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/10/brexit-camp-abandons-350-million-pound-nhs-pledge>.

Helminger, William, Alain Mahieu, and Bruno Scuvée, *Key Figures on Europe Pocketbooks 2014 Edition* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. Accessed April 28, 2017, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/.../KS.../4797faef-6250-4c65-b897-01c210c3242a.

Helminger, William, and Carla Martins. *Key Figures on Europe 2016 Edition*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. Accessed April 28, 2017. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/7827738/KS-EI-16-001-EN-N.pdf>.

Henley, John. "Why Refugees Prefer Britain to France." *The Guardian*, September 6, 2001.

--- . "Would Brexit Trigger a Domino Effect in Europe?." *The Guardian*, June 10, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/brexit-domino-effect-europe-eu-referendum-uk>.

Henley, Jon, Jennifer Rankin, and Patrick Wintour. "EU may Refuse Informal Brexit Talks Until UK Triggers Article 50." *The Guardian*, June 27, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/26/eu-may-refuse-informal-brexit-talks-until-uk-triggers-article-50>.

Heribert, Adam. "Xenophobia, Asylum Seekers, and Immigration Policies in Germany." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 21, no.4 (October 2015): 446-64. doi: 10.1080/13537113.2015.1095528.

Hess, Christin, and Simon Green. "Introduction: The Changing Politics and Policies of Migration in Germany." *German Politics*, 25, no.3 (June 2016): 315-28. doi: 10.1080/09644008.2016.1172065.

Hess, John L. *The Case for de Gaulle: An American Viewpoint*. New York, NY: Willian Morrow and Company, 1968.

Heuser, Beatrice. *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Belief in Britain, France, and the FRG*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Hodge, Carl. "A Perfect Storm: Europe in the Grip of Two Crises." *On Track* 21, no.1 (Summer 2016): 16-23. http://www.cdainstitute.ca/images/on_track/On_Track_Summer_2016/On_Track_21.1_-_Hodge.pdf.

Hollinger, Peggy. "What the Legacy of France's First Black General Tells us About the Country's Identity." *Financial Times*, April 21, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/9d6ab294-2057-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9>.

Holmes, Colin. *John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society 1871-1971*. Abingdon: Routledge, 1988.

Hope, Christian. "Has Britain Left the EU? (Almost) Every Single Brexit Question Answered." *The Telegraph*, March 29, 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/has-britain-left-eu-almost-every-single-brexit-question-answered/>.

Howard, Marc Morjé. "The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law." *German Politics* 17, no.1 (March 2008): 41-62. doi:10.1080/09644000701855127.

--- . *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*. New York, NY; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Hudson, Rex A. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999.

Hughes, Jennifer, and Robin Wigglesworth. "Pound Falls Below \$1.20 Ahead of Theresa May's Brexit Speech." *Financial Times*, January 16, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/2f52d42e-db67-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce>.

Hughes, Laura, Jack Maidment, and Barney Henderson. "Election Results 2017: Theresa May Says Sorry to Defeated Tory Candidates as she Eyes Deal With DUP." *The Telegraph*, June 10, 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/09/election-results-2017-theresa-may-clings-power-needs-support/>.

Huguen, Philippe. "Y a-t-il des 'Camps Secrets' Autour de Calais?." *Libération*, December 27, 2016. http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/12/27/y-a-t-il-des-camps-secrets-autour-de-calais_1537711.

Hunter, Paul. *Labour Lost and What Needs to Change*. <https://smithinstitutethinktank.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/red-alert-why-labour-lost-and-what-needs-to-change.pdf>.

Hurwitz, Leon, and Christian Lequesne, eds. *Western Europe's Move Toward Political Union*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.

Ifversen, Jan. "Europe and European Culture – A Conceptual Analysis." *European Societies* 4, no.1 (January 2002): 1-26. doi: 10.1080/14616690220130973.

Ikenberry, John. "Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition." *International Studies* 46, no.1 & 2 (January 2009): 203-19. doi: 10.1177/002088171004600213.

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (c. 23), March 30, 2006, Gr.

Inman, Phillip. "IFS Warns Brexit Would Extend Austerity for two More Years." *The Guardian*, May 25, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/25/ifs-brexit-extend-austerity-budget-deficit-eu-referendum>.

Institut National de Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). "Le Taux de Chômage Diminue de 0, 3 Point au Deuxième Trimestre 2016." Published August 18, 2016. Accessed September 18, 2016. <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2123516#documentation>.

--- . "Taux de Chômage Localisé du 3^{ème} Trimestre 2016 (données CVS): Comparaisons Régionales et Départementales." Accessed September 2, 2016. http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=99&ref_id=TCRD_025.

--- . "Travail-Emploi Taux de Chômage." Accessed September 27, 2016. http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?ref_id=CMPDD004.

Institute for the World Economy (IfW). "2016 Rund 20 Mrd. Für Flüchtlinge." Last modified September 7, 2016. <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/medien/medieninformationen/2016/2016-rund-20-mrd-euro-für-flüchtlinge>.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). "Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 116,692 in 2017; 2,405 Deaths." Press release, August 8, 2017. <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-116692-2017-2405-deaths>.

- Jansen, Max. *History of European Integration 1945-1975*. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1979.
- Jeffries, Stuart. "Is Germany too Powerful for Europe?." *The Guardian*, March 31, 2013.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/31/is-germany-too-powerful-for-europe>.
- Joffe, Josef. "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984): 64-82. doi:10.2307/1148355.
- Joffrin, Laurent. "Les Médias ont-ils Faussé la Campagne?." *L'Observateur*, May 4, 2012,
<http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/election-presidentielle-2012/20120504.OBS4661/les-medias-ont-ils-fausse-la-campagne.html>.
- Jones, Marc, and Paul Carrel. "Europe Without Merkel? Investors Think Through Another 'Surprise'." *Reuters*, February 3, 2017. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-markets-analysis-idUSKBN15I22F>.
- Jopp, Mathias, Rummel Reinhardt, and Peter Schmidt. *Integration and Security in Western Europe: Inside the European Pillar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Joppke, Christian. *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Juppé, Alain. "Notre Projet Pour la France." Alain Juppé's Presidential Campaign Page. Accessed October 20, 2016. <http://www.alainjuppe2017.fr/propositions>.
- Kaiser, Wolfram. "The Bomb and Europe Britain, France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations 1961-1963." *Journal of European Integration History* 1, no.1 (1995): 65-85.
<http://www.cere.public.lu/fr/publications/jeh/1995/jeh-1-1995-1.pdf>.
- Kaunert, Christian. "Liberty Versus Security? EU Asylum Policy and the European Commission." *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 5, no.2 (August 2009): 148-70.
<http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/172/143>.
- Keohane, Robert O. "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics." In *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 1-26. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. eds. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- . "Power and Interdependence Revisited." *International Organization* 41, no.4 (September 1987): 725-53.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706764>.
- Khaleeli, Homa. "'A Frenzy of Hatred': How to Understand Brexit Racism." *The Guardian*, June 29, 2016.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/29/frenzy-hatred-brexit-racism-abuse-referendum-celebratory-lasting-damage>.
- Kingsley, Patrick. "'This Isn't Human': Migrants in Limbo on Italian-French Border." *The Guardian*, June 17, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/this-isnt-human-migrants-in-limbo-on-italian-french-border>.
- Kinkartz, Sabine "Survey: Germany Divided Over Merkel's Migrant Policy Changes." *Deutsche Welle*, August 8, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/survey-germany-divided-over-merkels-migrant-policy-changes/a-19489757>.

- Kirchgaessner, Stephanie. "Italian Police Forceably Remove Migrants Stranded Near French Border." *The Guardian*, June 16, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/italy-forceable-removal-eu-mediterranean-migrant-crisis-french-border-refugees>.
- Kirkland, Paul E. "Nietzsche's Tragic Realism." *The Review of Politics* 72, no.1 (January 2010): 55-78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655890>.
- Knapp, Andrew. *Gaullism Since de Gaulle*. Brookfield, Wis: Darmouth, 1994.
- Knight, Ben. "Germany Shuts out Refugees With 'Safe' States List." *Deutsche Welle*, July 28, 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-shuts-out-refugees-with-safe-states-list/a-18615010>.
- . "Merkel Presents new Refugee Integration law as 'Milestone'." *Deutsche Welle*, May 25, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-presents-new-refugee-integration-law-as-milestone/a-19281722>.
- Knipp, Keersten. "Safe Countries of Origin?." *Deutsche Welle*, January 1, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/safe-countries-of-origin/a-19012766>.
- Kohl, Wilfrid L. *French Nuclear Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Koopman, Ruud et al. *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis, MN, 2005.
- Kovacs, Stéphane. "Hongrie: Le Référendum Antimigrants Invalidé Malgré la Victoire du 'Non'." *Le Figaro*, October 3, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/10/02/01003-20161002ARTFIG00171-hongrie-le-pari-d-orban-contrarie-par-l-abstention.php>.
- Kramer, Mark. "Introduction: De Gaulle and Christian Gaullism in France's Cold War Foreign Policy." In *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969*, edited by Christian Nünlist, Anna Locher and Martin Garret, 1-24. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010.
- Krasner, Stephen. "State and Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28, no.3 (April 1976): 317-47. doi:10.2307/2009974.
- Krausova, Anna. "Non-UK Born Residents as Share of Local (LA) Population: Great Britain 2011." *The Migration Observatory*. Published September 1, 2014. Accessed May 2, 2016. <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-great-britain-census-factsheet/>.
- Krausova, Anna, and Dr. Carlos Vargas-Silva. *Briefing London: Census Profile*. <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CensusProfile-London.pdf>.
- Krekó, Péter, and Attila Juhaász. "Scaling the Wall: Hungary's Migration Debate." *Foreign Affairs*, July 30, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2015-07-30/scaling-wall>.
- Krotz, Ulrich, and Joachim Schild. *Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism From the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Kuhn, Raymond. *Briefing Yorkshire and the Humber: Census Profile*. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CensusProfile-Yorkshire_and_the_Humber.pdf.

- . “Electoral Cross-Dressing: The Role Reversal Campaigns of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande in the 2012 Presidential Election.” *Nottingham French Studies* 52, no.2 (July 2013): 155-66. doi: 10.3366/nfs.2013.0048.
- Lamant, Ludovic. “Syrie: François Hollande a Oublié L’Europe.” *Médiapart*, September 13, 2013. <https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/130913/syrie-francois-hollande-oublie-europe?onglet=full>.
- Larres, Klaus. “Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War? Churchill’s Post-war Foreign Policy.” *Journal of European Integration History* 2, no.1 (1996): 15-49. <http://www.cere.public.lu/fr/publications/jeih/1996/jeih-3-1996-1.pdf>.
- Lassale, Didier. “French *Laïcité* and British Multiculturalism: A Convergence in Progress?.” *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 32, no.3 (June 2011): 229-43. doi: 10.1080/07256868.2011.565734.
- Laurence, Jonathan. “Islam and Citizenship in Germany.” *International Crisis Group* 181, March 2007. <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/181-islam-and-identity-in-germany.pdf>.
- Laurence, Jonathan. “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe.” In *Immigration and the Transformation of Europe*, edited by Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding, 251-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
- Laurent, Samuel. “Si Vous N’Avez Rien Suivi de L’Affaire Cahuzac.” December 10, 2012. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/12/10/si-vous-navez-rien-suivi-de-l-affaire-cahuzac_1804062_823448.html.
- . “Terrorisme: Qu’est-ce que la ‘Fiche S’ ?.” *Le Monde*, August 31, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/08/31/terrorisme-peut-on-sanctionner-les-personnes-faisant-l-objet-d-une-fiche-s_4741574_4355770.html.
- . “Tranche D’Imposition à 75%: Ce que Signifie la Proposition de M. Hollande.” *Le Monde*, February 28, 2012. http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/02/28/tranche-d-imposition-a-75-ce-que-signifie-la-proposition-de-m-hollande_1649139_1471069.html.
- Le Figaro*. “Calais: 1346 Personnes ‘Éloignées’.” September 15, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/09/15/97001-20160915FILWWW00294-calais-1346-personnes-eloignees.php>.
- . “Calais: Hollande Promet un ‘Démantèlement Complet’ du Camp ‘d’ici la fin de L’Année.’” September 26, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/09/26/01016-20160926ARTFIG00044-francois-hollande-en-deplacement-pour-la-premiere-fois-a-calais.php>.
- . “En 2005, Trois Semaines D’Émeutes Urbaines.” October 25, 2015. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/10/25/01016-20151025ARTFIG00142-des-emeutes-urbaines-sans-precedent.php>.
- . “Hollande Assure que la France Accueillera 30.000 Migrants.” March 4, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/03/04/97001-20160304FILWWW00140-hollande-assure-que-la-france-accueillera-30000-migrants.php>.
- . “Le Pen au Second Tour dans Tous les cas (Sondage).” September 22, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/09/22/97001-20160922FILWWW00328-le-pen-au-second-tour-dans-tous-les-cas-sondage.php>.

- . “Premier Tour de L’Élection Présidentielle: Les Résultats Dans Votre Commune.” April 23, 2017.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/23/35003-20170423ARTFIG00243-premier-tour-de-l-election-presidentielle-les-resultats-dans-votre-commune.php>.
- . “Réfugiés les Principales Déclarations de Manuel Valls.” September 16, 2015.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2015/09/16/97001-20150916FILWWW00258-refugies-les-principales-declarations-de-manuel-valls.php>.
- Le Monde*. “À Droite, le Plan de Cazeneuve Pour Désengorger Calais ne Passe pas.” September 14, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/09/14/a-droite-le-plan-de-cazeneuve-pour-desengorger-calais-ne-passe-pas_4997517_823448.html.
- . “Attentat en Isère: Un Corps Décapité, Trois Personnes en Garde à Vue.” June 26, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/06/26/un-mort-et-plusieurs-blesses-dans-un-attentat-en-isere_4662489_3224.html.
- . “Calais: Un Migrant Meurt Renversé par un Camion.” March 31, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2016/03/31/calais-un-migrant-meurt-renverse-par-un-camion_4892827_3214.html.
- . “Ce Que l’on Sait de L’Affaire Fillon.” January 31, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/affaire-penelope-fillon/article/2017/01/31/ce-que-l-on-sait-de-l-affaire-fillon_5072423_5070021.html.
- . “François Hollande Écrit aux Français: ‘Le Changement c’est Maintenant’ ” January 3, 2012.
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/01/03/francois-hollande-ecrit-aux-francais-le-changement-c-est-maintenant_1624952_1471069.html.
- . “François Hollande est élu Président de la République Avec 51.9% des Voix.” May 6, 2012.
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/05/06/election-presidentielle-2012-resultats-du-second-tour_1696623_1471069.html.
- . “François Hollande Renonce à la Déchéance de Nationalité et au Congrès.” March 30, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2016/03/30/francois-hollande-renonce-a-la-decheance-de-nationalite-et-au-congres_4892426_4809495.html.
- . “La Cour Européenne des Droits de L’Homme Valide L’Interdiction du Niqab en Belgique.” July 11, 2017. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2017/07/11/la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme valide-l-interdiction-du-niqab-en-belgique_5159037_3214.html.
- . “La France Rejette Nettement le Traité Constitutionnel.” May 29, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/constitution-europeenne/article_interactif/2005/05/29/la-france-rejette-nettement-le-traite-constitutionnel_655407_631760.html.
- . “La France Rétablit les Contrôles aux Frontières, une Décision Rendue Possible par les Règles de Schengen.” November 14, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/11/14/la-france-va-fermer-ses-frontieres-une-possibilite-exceptionnelle-rendue-possible-par-les-regles-de-schengen_4809529_3224.html.
- . “Le Chef du Gouvernement Italien, Matteo Renzi, a Présenté sa Démission.” December 7, 2016.
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2016/12/07/matteo-renzi-demissionnera-a-19-heures-mercredi_5045041_3214.html.

- . “Les États-Unis Félicitent la France Pour son Intervention au Mali.” February 14, 2013.
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/02/14/les-etats-unis-felicite-la-france-pour-leur-intervention-au-mali_1833059_3212.html.
- . “Mohamed Merah Était ‘en Phase de Radicalisation’ dès Janvier 2011.” August 9, 2012.
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/08/09/mohamed-merah-etait-en-phase-de-radicalisation-des-janvier-2011_1744363_3224.html.
- . “Présidentielle 2017: Les Résultats du Premier Tour, Commune par Commune.” April 24, 2017.
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/24/election-presidentielle-2017-cherchez-les-resultats-du-premier-tour-dans-votre-ville_5116163_4854003.html.
- . “Référendum en Turquie: Revivez la Soirée Électorale.” April 16, 2017.
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2017/04/16/referendum-en-turquie-suivez-en-direct-les-resultats-du-vote_5112133_3210.html.
- . “Selon un Résultat Provisoire, les Pays-Bas Rejettent la Constitution de l’UE à Plus de 63%.” June 1, 2005. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2005/06/01/les-pays-bas-rejettent-le-traite-constitutionnel-europeen-a-plus-de-60_657148_3214.html.
- . “Tout en Condamnant les Attentats Commis en Région Parisienne, le Président Syrien a Fustigé la Politique Française.” November 14, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/14/pour-bachar-al-assad-la-politique-francaise-a-contribue-a-l-expansion-du-terrorisme_4809956_4809495.html.
- . “Turquie: Erdogan Arrache de Justesse un oui à La Réforme de la Constitution.” April 16, 2017.
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/04/16/le-premier-ministre-turc-proclame-la-victoire-du-oui-au-referendum-constitutionnel_5112199_3210.html.
- Léchenet, Alexandre. “Combien D’Étrangers Font le Djihad en Syrie?” *Le Monde*, April 23, 2014.
http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/04/23/combien-d-etrangers-font-le-djihad-en-syrie_4405677_4355770.html.
- Leclerc, Jean-Marc. “À Menton, les Forces de L’Ordre à la Peine Dans un Climat de Plus en Plus Tendu.” *Le Figaro*, August 7, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/08/07/01016-20160807ARTFIG00159--menton-les-forces-de-l-ordre-a-la-peine-dans-un-climat-de-plus-en-plus-tendu.php>.
- . “Calais: Le Seuil des 10.000 Migrants Franchis.” *Le Figaro*, August 28, 2016.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/08/28/01016-20160828ARTFIG00122-calais-le-seuil-des-10000-migrants-franchi.php>.
- . “Jours Fériés Musulman et Juif: Quand Terra Nova Fait le Jeu des Frères Musulmans.” *Le Figaro*, February 24, 2017. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2017/02/24/31001-20170224ARTFIG00132-jours-feries-musulman-et-juif-quand-terra-nova-fait-le-jeu-des-freres-musulmans.php>.
- . “Les Maires Réclament les Noms des Fichés S de Leur Ville.” *Le Figaro*, October 7, 2016.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/10/07/01016-20161007ARTFIG00364-les-maires-reclament-les-noms-des-fiches-s-de-leur-ville.php>.
- Légifrance.gouv.fr. “Déclaration des Droits de L’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789.” Accessed September 20, 2016. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789>.

- . “LOI n° 2003-710 du 1er Août 2003 D’Orientation et de Programmation Pour la Ville et la Rénovation Urbaine (1).” Accessed April 20, 2017.
<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000428979&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id>
- Lemaître, Frédéric. “Hollande et Merkel Divergent sur la Répartition des Réfugiés en Europe.” *Le Monde*, May 19, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/05/19/pour-francois-hollande-il-n-est-pas-question-qu-il-y-ait-des-quotas-de-refugies-en-europe_4636365_3214.html.
- Lemarié, Alexandre. “Dans L’Ombre du Duel Macron-Le Pen, la Droite.” *Le Monde*, April 27, 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/04/27/dans-l-ombre-du-duel-macron-le-pen-la-droite-ecartelee_5118283_4854003.html.
- . “‘Moi Président...’ La Tirade de Hollande qui Agace le Camp Sarkozy.” *Le Monde*, May 3, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/article/2012/05/03/moi-president-la-tirade-de-hollande-qui-agace-le-camp-sarkozy_1695054_1471069.html.
- Letessier, Ivan. “Taxe à 75%: Des Sociétés Délocalisent Déjà Leurs Cadres.” *Le Figaro*, July 22, 2012. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2012/07/22/20002-20120722ARTFIG00164-taxe-a-75-des-societes-delocalisent-deja-leurs-cadres.php>.
- Libération*. “Guilluy: ‘Le Concept de France Périphérique est Souvent mal Interprété’.” Juin 5, 2015. http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/06/05/guilluy-le-concept-de-france-peripherique-est-souvent-mal-interprete_1323675.
- Lipson, Charles. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, edited by David A. Baldwin, 60-84. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- Llyod, Cathie, and Hazel Waters. “France: One Culture, One People?” *Race & Class* 32, no.3 (January 1991): 49-65. doi: 10.1177/030639689103200306.
- Ludlow, Peter. *The Making of the European Monetary System*. London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982.
- Lynch, Frances. *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Mahoney, James. “Process-Tracing and Historical Explanation.” *Security Studies* 24, no.2 (June 2015): 204-15. doi: 10.1080/09636412.2015.1036610.
- . “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no.4/5 (April/May 2008): 412-36. doi: 10.1177/0010414007313115.
- Malagardis, Maria. “Quand Hollande Fait de la Guerre sa Seule Politique.” *Libération*, December 15, 2015. http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2015/12/22/quand-hollande-fait-de-la-guerre-sa-seule-politique_1422457.
- Mance, Henry. “Britain has had Enough of Experts, Says Gove.” *Financial Times*, June 3, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c>.
- Mandel, Ruth. “Fifty Years of Migration, Fifty Years of Waiting: Turkey, Germany, and the European Union.” *German Politics and Society* 31, no.2 (July 2013): 66-78. doi: 10.3167/gps.2013.310206.

Marianne. “Hollande, Sarkozy, Valls: Comment ils Cherchent à Contrôler les Médias.” April 21, 2016.
<https://www.marianne.net/politique/hollande-sarkozy-valls-comment-ils-cherchent-controler-les-medias>.

Markkula, Markku. “121e Session Plénière des 8 et 9 Février 2017 PROJET D’AVIS Combler le Retard D’Investissement: Comment Relever les Défis.” Comité Européen des Régions. Published February 8-9, 2017. <https://memportal.cor.europa.eu/Handlers/ViewDoc.ashx?doc=COR-2016-04165-00-01-PAC-TRA-FR.docx>.

Marsh, Steve, and Alan P. Dobson. “Fine Words, Few Answers: NATO’s Not-So-New Strategic Concept.” In *NATO Beyond 9/11: The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, edited by Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla, 155-177. London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2013.

Mason, Rowena. “Cameron Accuses EU Leave Campaigners of Telling six Lies.” *The Guardian*, June 7, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/07/cameron-accuses-eu-leave-campaigners-six-lies-brexit>.

--- . “Child Refugees Will Have Ages Verified if Necessary, Ministers Says.” *The Guardian*, October 21, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/21/child-refugees-will-have-ages-verified-if-necessary-minister-says>.

--- . “EU Referendum: Tories in Open Warfare Over Legal Status of Cameron Deal.” *The Guardian*, February 25, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/24/tories-legal-status-david-cameron-eu-deal-conservatives-michael-gove-european-court>.

Masson, Victoria. “Quels Sont les Départements les Plus Pauvres de France?.” *Le Figaro*, March 3, 2015.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2015/03/03/20002-20150303ARTFIG00182-quels-sont-les-departements-les-plus-pauvres-de-france.php>.

Maupoil, Tristan Q. “Présidentielle: Calais, Nouveau Ring de Campagne.” *Le Figaro*, September 20, 2016.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/decryptages/2016/09/20/25003-20160920ARTFIG00139-présidentielle-calais-nouveau-ring-de-campagne.php>.

Mazzucelli, Colette. *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union*. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1997.

McDermott, John. “Diversity and Cohesion in Britain’s Most Mixed Community.” *Financial Times*, October 14, 2015. <https://www.ft.com/content/71d04768-63af-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2>.

McGhee, Derek. *Intolerant Britain?: Hate, Citizenship and Difference*. New York, NY; Maidenhead, England: Open Press University, 2005.

McKelvey, Tara. “Arming Syrian Rebels: Where the US Went Wrong.” *BBC*, October 10, 2015.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33997408>.

McLaren, Elizabeth. *Birth in England and Wales by Parents’ Country of Birth: 2015*.
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/parentscountryofbirthenglandandwales/2014-08-28/pdf>.

McNamara, George. “Government’s Priorities Must be to fix Britain’s Broken Social Care System.” *The Guardian*, May 12, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2015/may/12/government-priority-fix-social-care>.

- McNamara, Kathleen. "Trump Takes Aim at the European Union." *Foreign Affairs*, January 24, 2017.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-01-24/trump-takes-aim-european-union>.
- McNeil, Rob. *Deportations, Removals and Voluntary Departures From the UK*.
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Deportations-1.pdf>.
- McVeigh, Karen. "Abu Hamza to Testify in New York Terrorism Trial as Jury Selection Begins." *The Guardian*, April 14, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/abu-hamza-testify-new-york-terrorism-trial-jury-selection>.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, no.3 (December 1994): 5-49. doi: 10.2307/2539078.
- Medrano, Juan Díez. "The Limits of European Integration." *Journal of European Integration* 34, no.2 (February 2012): 191-204. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2012.641091.
- Meisner, Matthias, and Erika Körner. "Ad Campaign in Albania: German Embassy Warns Against 'Economic Asylum'." *Euractiv*, June 26, 2015. <http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ad-campaign-in-albania-german-embassy-warns-against-economic-asylum/>.
- Melegh, Attila. *On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on Eastern Europe*. Ann Arbor, MI: Central European University Press, 2006.
- Miguet, Arnauld. "The French Elections of 2002: After the Earthquake, the Deluge." *West European Politics* 25, no.4 (October 2002): 207-20. doi: 10.1080/713601633.
- Migration Policy Institute. *The UK's New Europeans: Progress and Challenges Five Years After Accession*.
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/new_europeans.pdf.
- Migration Watch UK. "The British in Europe – and Vice Versa." Accessed September 28, 2016.
<https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/354>.
- Milani, Mohsen. "Iran and Russia's Uncomfortable Alliance." *Foreign Affairs*, August 31th, 2016.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-08-31/iran-and-russias-uncomfortable-alliance>.
- Milward, Alan. *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. New York, NY; London: Routledge, 2000.
- . "The Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom's Accession." *Journal of European Integration History* 9, no.2 (2003): 117-26.
https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/2824536/jeih_14_2001_2.pdf.
- Mitrany, David. *The Functional Theory of Politics*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 1975.
- Monnet, Jean. *Memoirs*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2011.
- Moore, Robert S., and Tina Wallace. *Slamming the Door: The Administration of Immigration Control*. London: M. Robertson, 1975.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., and Thompson W. Kenneth. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York, NY: Knopf, 1985.

- Morice, Olivier. "Cabinet Morice." Photograph. 2013.
https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/122965638?access_key=key-116z5gjx68jr4dz6tqyh.
- Morvan, Vincent-Xavier. "Migrants: À la Frontière Franco-Italienne, la Pression Monte." *Le Figaro*, August 7, 2017. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/08/07/01016-20160807ARTFIG00173-migrants-a-la-frontiere-franco-italienne-la-pression-monte.php>.
- Müller, Peter, Ralf Neukirch, and Andreas Ulrich. "Merkel's Plan B Could Mean End of Schengen." *Spiegel*, December 10, 2015. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-s-back-up-refugee-crisis-solution-could-end-schengen-a-1066895.html>.
- Muñoz, Susana, and Raquel Val. "The Council of the European Union." CVCE. July 9, 2016. Accessed July 9, 2017. https://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_council_of_the_european_union-en-de23700c-e50a-4e0e-a7de-80665e4caf9f.html.
- Murphy, Richard. "In Wooing French Tax Exiles, Cameron Makes a Mockery of Democracy." *The Guardian*, June 19, 2012. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/19/david-cameron-wooing-french-tax-exiles>.
- Mushaben, Joyce M. "Citizenship and Migration Policies Under Merkel's Grand Coalition." *German Politics* 20, no.3 (September 2011): 376-91. doi: 10.1080/09644008.2011.606568.
- Mutsaka, Chiedza M. "Change Foreign Public Perceptions Through Culture Comparative Study of the Cultural Diplomacy of France and China in the Mekong Sub-Regions." PhD diss., Webster University, 2013.
http://media.proquest.com/media/pq/classic/doc/3321851461/fmt/ai/rep/SPDF?_s=scz64wQ050KWe04%2FobuGNeLSrYA%3D.
- National Institute for Statistics (Istat). *Permessi di Soggiorno per Asilo Politico e Protezione Umanitaria*. Accessed November 2, 2016. <https://www.istat.it/it/files/2016/12/Report-Permessi-Soggiorno2015-2016.pdf?title=Permessi+di+soggiorno+e+asio+politico+-+23%2Fdic%2F2016+-+Testo+integrale+e+nota+metodologica.pdf>.
- Neukirch, Ralf. "Merkel Adversary Jens Spahn on the Rise." *Spiegel*, December 1, 2016.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/jens-spahn-emerging-as-conservative-adversary-to-merkel-a-1123652.html>.
- Neukirch, Ralf, and Christian Reiermann. "Merkel Critics Deal a Blow to Chancellor." *Spiegel*, December 9, 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-under-fire-from-critics-within-the-cdu-a-1125213.html>.
- Neville Darren., Sarah Sy, and Amalia Rigon. *On the Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration*.
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU\(2016\)556942_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556942/IPOL_STU(2016)556942_EN.pdf).
- Newman, David. "On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework." *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 18, no.1 (March 2003): 13-25. doi: 10.1080/08865655.2003.9695598
- Nye, Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no.1 (March 2008): 94-109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996>.

- O'Carroll, Lisa. "Calais Camp Charities Attack UK and France Over Unaccompanied Children." *The Guardian*, October 29, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/29/calais-camp-charities-attack-uk-and-france-over-unaccompanied-children>.
- Office for National Statistics. "Population Briefing: International Student Migration What do the Statistics tell us?." Published January 2016. Accessed February 10, 2017. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/...-/student-migration---what-do-the-statistics-tell-us.pdf>.
- Oliver, Tim, and Oliver Daddow. "A not so Awkward Partner, the UK has Been a Champion of Many Causes in the EU." *London School of Economics* (blog). April 15, 2016. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/04/15/a-not-so-awkward-partner-the-uk-has-been-a-champion-of-many-causes-in-the-eu/>.
- Oltermann, Philip. "Mama Merkel: The Compassionate Mother of Syrian Refugees." *The Guardian*, September 1, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2015/sep/01/mama-merkel-the-compassionate-mother-of-syrian-refugees>.
- Oltermann, Philip, and Helena Smith. "Angela Merkel: UK's EU Deal Demanded a lot of Willingness for Compromise." *The Guardian*, February 20, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/20/angela-merkel-uk-eu-deal-willingness-compromise-david-cameron>.
- O'Neal, John. R., Russett, B., and Berbaum, Michael L. "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no.3 (September 2003): 371-93. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/3693591>.
- O'Neill, Maria. "EU Cross-Border Policing Provisions, the View from One of the Schengen Opt-out States." *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice* 18, no.1 (2010): 73-89. doi: 10.1163/187119110X12574292500707.
- Open Doors. *Lack of Protection for Religious Minorities in Germany: Religiously Motivated Attacks on 743 Christian Refugees in German Refugee Shelters*. <https://www.portesouvertes.fr/documents/653431/rapport-refugies-2016.pdf>.
- Ora, Anita. "Hotspots and Emergency Relocation State of Play." Briefing paper, European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579070/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)579070_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/579070/EPRS_BRI(2016)579070_EN.pdf).
- Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). "Emigration Rates by Country of Origin, sex and Educational Attainment Levels." Accessed September 15, 2016. <http://www.oecd.org/migration/46561284.pdf>.
- . "Fertility rates." Accessed September 30, 2016. doi: 10.1787/8272fb01-en.
- . "OECD Study Finds Britons Will be Paying a Heavy 'Brexit tax' for Many Years if UK Leaves EU." Published April 27, 2016. Accessed September 20, 2016. <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-study-finds-britons-will-be-paying-a-heavy-brexit-tax-for-many-years-if-uk-leaves-eu.htm>.
- . "Registered Unemployed and Job Vacancies." Accessed September 24, 2016. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LAB_REG_VAC.

- . *Talent Abroad: A Review of German Emigrants*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264231702-en>.
- Ouest France*. “Jungle de Calais. 2000 à 3000 Migrants Dispersés Entre Calais et Paris.” October 27, 2016. <http://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/migrants/jungle-de-calais-2000-3000-migrants-disperses-entre-calais-et-paris-4585693>
- Oxford City Council. “International Immigration.” Accessed September 16, 2016. https://www.oxford.gov.uk/info/20131/population/464/international_migration.
- Page, Scott. “An Essay on the Existence and Causes of Path Dependence.” Published June 20, 2005. Accessed April 17, 2016. <https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/pek/pathdependencepage.pdf>.
- Pagnamenta, Robin. “Brexit Threatens Billions of Super-Cheap EU Loans.” *The Times*, July 4, 2016. <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-threatens-billions-of-super-cheap-eu-loans-g2nfs3rlv>.
- Parker, George. “How David Cameron Lost his Battle for Britain.” *Financial Times*, December 18, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-00144feabdc0>.
- Parris, Girma. “A Comparative Historical Analysis of Policy Trajectories in U.S. Bilingual Education and Islamic Religious Instruction in Germany (1965-2010).” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Published December 16, 2015. Accessed April 14, 2017. http://www.aicgs.org/publication/a-comparative-historical-analysis-of-policy-trajectories-in-u-s-bilingual-education-and-islamic-religious-instruction-in-germany-1965-2010/#_edn68.
- Patel, Oliver, and Christine Reh. “Brexit: The Consequences for the EU’s Political System.” Briefing paper, London, 2015. <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/europe/briefing-papers/Briefing-paper-2>.
- Paton, Calum. “Catalogue of Death: Calais Migrant Toll Spikes as Border Controls Take Hold.” *International Business Times*, August 13, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/catalogue-death-calais-migrant-toll-spikes-border-controls-take-hold-1515345>.
- Patrick, Stewart M. “Trump and World Order.” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-02-13/trump-and-world-order>.
- Pecastaing, Camille. “French Socialism, Take two.” *Foreign Affairs*, May 29, 2012. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2012-05-29/french-socialism-take-two>.
- Penketh, Anne. “France Forced to Drop 75% Supertax After Meager Returns.” *The Guardian*, December 31, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/31/france-drops-75percent-supertax>.
- Peri, Giovanni. “The Economic Benefits of Immigration.” *Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies* (Fall 2013): 15-9. <http://clas.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/docs/tertiary/BRLASFall2013-Peri.pdf>.
- Perkins, Anne. “What’s to Blame for this Misfortune? David Cameron’s Hubris About Brexit.” *The Guardian*, March 29, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/29/what-blame-brexit-misfortune-blame-david-cameron-hubris>.
- Pflimlin, Edouard. “Hollande Renonce à Briguer un Second Mandat.” *Le Monde*, December 2, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2016/12/02/hollande-renonce-a-briguer-un-second-mandat_5041938_4854003.html.

- . “Macron Engrange les Soutiens à Droite Comme à Gauche.” *Le Monde*, March 14, 2017.
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/03/14/macron-engrange-les-soutiens-a-droite-comme-a-gauche_5093994_3210.html.
- Phinnemore, David. “The European Union: Establishment and Development.” In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P. S. Borrogán, 26-40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Plender, John. “The Myth of the European Peace Project.” *Financial Times*, August 4, 2016.
<https://www.ft.com/content/bdac2df6-598a-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4>.
- Pôle Emploi. “Enquête Besoins en Main D’Oeuvre.” Accessed September 27, 2016. <http://bmo.pole-emploi.org/bmo?le=0&pp=2015>
- Politi, James. “A Question of Identity for EU’s Migrants.” *Financial Times*, June 15, 2015.
<https://www.ft.com/content/9b2c851a-10dd-11e5-8413-00144feabdc0>.
- Popp, Maximilian. “Parallel Justice: Islamic ‘Arbitrators’ Shadow German Law.” *Spiegel*, January 9, 2011.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/parallel-justice-islamic-arbitrators-shadow-german-law-a-783361.html>.
- Potier, Samuel. “Otan: ‘La France Doit Codiriger Plutôt que Subir’.” *Le Figaro*, March 11, 2009.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2009/03/11/01003-20090311ARTFIG00615-otan-la-france-doit-codiriger-plutot-que-subir-.php>.
- Poushter, Jacob. “European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts.” *Pew Research Center*, September 16, 2015. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts>.
- Powell, Colin L. “A Strategy of Partnerships.” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.1 (January/February 2004): 22-34.
http://files.foreignaffairs.com/legacy/attachments/FA_PC6_CP.pdf.
- Powell, Enoch J. and John Wood, eds. *Freedom and Reality*. London: Batsford, 1969.
- Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen Acquis Integrated Into the Framework of the European Union (2012) O.J. C326/1.
- Pruessen, Ronald. “Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to The European Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle.” *Journal of European Integration History* 2, no.1 (1996): 51-69. http://eu-historians.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/jeih-3-1996_1.pdf.
- Puhl, Jan. “Orbán Profits From the Refugees.” *Spiegel*, September 15, 2016.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/viktor-orban-wants-to-keep-muslim-immigrants-out-of-hungary-a-1052568.html>.
- Rabasa, Angel, and Cheryl Benard. *Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in Europe*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Rabreau, Marine. “Les Aides Dont Bénéficient les Migrants en France.” *Le Figaro*, September 16, 2015.
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/le-scan-eco/le-vrai-du-faux/2015/09/16/29003-20150916ARTFIG00326-rsa-apl-cmu-ces-aides-dont-beneficient-les-migrants-en-france.php>.
- Ragin, Charles C. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, With a New Introduction*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2014.

Rakin, Jennifer. "David Cameron's EU Deal: What he Wanted and What he got." *The Guardian*, February 19, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/19/camerons-eu-deal-what-he-wanted-and-what-he-got>.

Rankin, Jennifer, Daniel Boffey, Jon Henley, and Rowena Mason. "Brexit: EU Says no to Free Trade Talks Until 'Progress' on Final Terms." *The Guardian*, March 31, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/31/eu-willing-to-discuss-free-trade-deal-before-final-terms-of-brexit>.

Redwood, John. "We Tories are all Eurosceptics now." *Financial Times*, January 8, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/806b8c1c-b551-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51>.

Refugee Council. "The 'Dublin' Regulation and Family Unity." Briefing paper, London, 2015. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0003/6143/Nov15_Dublin_III.pdf.

Regulation 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons Across Borders (Schengen Borders Code). 2006 O.J. (L 105) 1.

Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-country National or a Stateless Person (recast). 2013 O.J. (L180).

Reinisch, Jessica. "'Forever Temporary': Migrants in Calais, Then and Now." *The Political Quarterly* 86, no.4 (October 2015): 515-22. doi: 10.1111/1467-923X.12196.

Renan, Ernst. "What is a Nation?." In *Nation and Narration*, edited by Homi K. Bhara, 8-22. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 1990.

Reynolds, Sile, and Helen Muggeridge. *Remote Controls: How UK Border Controls are Endangering the Life of Refugees*. http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/7043/Remote_Controls.pdf.

Riddoch, Lesley. "May's Speech Shows how Little Scotland Means in her Dangerous Game of Brexit." *The Guardian*, March 3, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/03/theresa-may-speech-scotland-brexit-independence>.

Rienzo, Cinzia. *Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview*. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-Migrants_in_the_UK_Labour_Market.pdf.

Rijpma, Jorrit., and Mathias Vermeulen. "EUROSUR: Saving Live or Building Borders." *European Security* 24, no.3 (July 2015): 454-72. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1028190.

Riley-Smith, Ben. "Leave or Remain in the EU? The Arguments for and Against Brexit." *The Telegraph*, June 20, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/leave-or-remain-in-the-eu-the-arguments-for-and-against-brexit>.

Risse, Thomas. "Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no.2 (April 2005): 291-309. doi:10.1080/13501760500044033.

- Robe, Mathias. "The Legal Treatment of Muslims in Germany." In *The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe*, edited by Roberta B.-P. Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone, 83-108. Leuven: Peeters, 2004.
- Rosamon, Ben. "The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas." *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no.2 (August 2006): 237-54.
doi:10.1080/13501760500043928.
- Roucaute, Delphine. "Quatre Questions sur les Statistiques Ethniques." *Le Monde*, May 6, 2015.
http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/05/06/quatre-questions-sur-les-statistiques-ethniques_4628874_4355770.html.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *On the Social Contract*. Translated by Judith R. Masters. Edited by Roger D. Masters. New York, NY: St Martin Press, 1978.
- Ruane, Kevin. "Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 13, no.4 (December 2002): 151-85.
doi:10.1080/714000354.
- Sanders, David. *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945*. Houndsills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Macmillan, 1990.
- Sarmadi, Dario. "Bavaria's Tough Asylum Policy Gains Support Across Germany." *Euractiv*, July 23, 2015.
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/bavaria-s-tough-asylum-policy-gains-support-across-germany/>.
- Sary, Ghadi. "Syria Conflict: Who are the Groups Fighting Assad?." *BBC*, November 11, 2015.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34710635>.
- Satvinder, Juss S. *Immigration, Nationality and Citizenship*. London: Mansell, 1993.
- Saunders, Robert. "A Tale of Two Referendums: 1975 and 2016." *The Political Quarterly* 87, no.3 (July 2016): 318-22. doi: 10.1111/1467-923X.12286.
- Schmidt, Helmut. "Miles to Go: From American Plan to European Union." *Foreign Affairs*, (May/June 1997).
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1997-05-01/miles-go>.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. "Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism." *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no.2 (April 2005): 255-72. doi:10.1080/13501760500043951.
- . "NeoFunctionalism." *European Integration Theory*, edited by Ante Wiener and Thomas Diez, 45-66. Oxford: Oxford Press, 2003.
- Schultz, Caroline, and Holger Kolb. "Managing Cultural Diversity in Federal Germany: Bavaria and Berlin as Classic Antagonist." *Fédéralisme Régionalisme*, 15 (January 2015). <http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=1557#tocto1n4>.
- Schwartz, Pedro. "Brexit Will not be a Catastrophe if...." *Economic Affairs* 36, no.3 (October 2016): 364-68.
doi: 10.1111/ecaf.12193.
- Schwartz, Thomas A. *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991.

- Sciolino, Elaine. "THREATS AND RESPONSES: DISCORD: France to Veto Resolution on Iraq war, Chirac Says." *New York Times*, March 11, 2003.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/11/international/europe/11FRAN.html>.
- Scott, Page. "An Essay on the Existence and Causes of Path Dependence." Published June 20, 2005. Accessed January 15, 2016. <https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/pek/pathdependencepage.pdf>.
- Seelow, Soren. "Yassin Salhi, la Surveillance en Pointillé d'un Salafiste Trop Discret." *Le Monde*, June 27, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/06/27/yassin-salhi-un-salafiste-surveille-en-pointille_4663108_3224.html.
- Seelow, Soren, Emeline Cazi, and Simon Piel. "Attentats de Paris: Les Commandos Étaient Coordonnés en Temps Réel de Belgique." *Le Monde*, December 12, 2015.
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/12/30/comment-les-attentats-du-13-novembre-ont-ete-coordonnes-depuis-la-belgique_4839418_3224.html.
- Semenova, Janina, and Manasi Gopalakrishnan. "What Happens With Rejected Asylum Applicants who are not Deported?." *Deutsche Welle*, July 25, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/what-happens-with-rejected-asylum-applicants-who-are-not-deported/a-19426155>.
- Severoni, Santino. *Increased Influx of Migrants in Lampedusa, Italy*.
http://www.euro.who.int/_data/assets/pdf_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf.
- Shaw, Eric. "Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the Psychopathology Model." *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 8, no.3 (September 1986): 359-68. doi: 10.1016/0160-2527(86)90066-X.
- Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. NYPD*,
<http://eurabia.parlamentnilistycz.org/UserFiles/document/NYPD.pdf>.
- Silverman, Maxim. *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and Citizenship in Modern France*. New York, NY; London: Routledge, 1992.
- Simon, Marie. "Cadre, Employé, Ouvrier: Qui a Voté Le Pen et Qui a Voté Macron ?." *Le Figaro*, April 24, 2017. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/le-scan-eco/dessous-chiffres/2017/04/24/29006-20170424ARTFIG00183-cadre-employe-ouvrier-qui-a-vote-le-pen-et-qui-a-vote-macron.php>.
- Singh, Matt. "The 2.8 Million Non-Voters Who Delivered Brexit." *Bloomberg*, July 4, 2016.
<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-04/the-2-8-million-non-voters-who-delivered-brexit>.
- Soutou, Georges-Henri. "Les Présidents Charles de Gaulle et Georges Pompidou et les Débuts de la Coopération Politique Européenne: du Plan Fouchet au Plan Fouchet Light." *Relations Internationales* 140, no.4 (March 2010): 3-17. doi: 10.3917/ri.140.0003.
- Sparrow, Andrew. "Cameron Wins Syria Airstrikes Vote by Majority of 174 – As it Happened." *The Guardian*, December 3, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-cameron-action-against-isis-live>.
- . "Why Labour Lost the Election – and What it Needs to do Next." *The Guardian*, July 23, 2015.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/23/why-labour-lost-election-what-it-needs-next-smith-institute-study>.

Spiegel. “12 Dead After Truck Plows into Christmas Market.” December 19, 2016.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/suspected-attack-on-berlin-christmas-market-kills-nine-a-1126642.html>.

--- . “Bye Bye Merkel Doctrine: German Foreign Policy Shifts Focus to Refugees.” November 11, 2015.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-crisis-leads-to-new-focus-of-german-foreign-policy-a-1062116.html>.

--- . “Der Islam ist der Weg.” February 2, 1996. <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-8885727.html>.

--- . “Erdogan’s Assault on Freedom and Democracy.” April 7, 2016.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/merkel-ally-erdogan-moves-closer-to-autocracy-in-turkey-a-1085497.html>.

--- . “German Cities Complain of High Immigration.” February 4, 2013.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-cities-worried-about-high-immigration-from-romania-and-bulgaria-a-881409.html>.

--- . “German Court Decision: Asylum Seeker Benefits Ruled Inhumane.” July 18, 2012.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-court-rules-benefits-for-asylum-seekers-are-inhumane-a-845066.html>

--- . “Germany Shows Signs of Strain From Mass of Refugees.” October 17, 2015.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-shows-signs-of-strain-from-mass-of-refugees-a-1058237-druck.html>.

--- . “German Weapons for the World: How the Merkel Doctrine is Changing Berlin Policy.” December 3, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-weapons-exports-on-the-rise-as-merkel-doctrine-takes-hold-a-870596.html>.

--- . “How Many Refugees can Germany Handle?” July 30, 2015.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-being-tested-by-huge-refugee-influx-a-1045560.html>.

--- . “How New Year’s Eve in Cologne Has Changed Germany.” January 8, 2016.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-attacks-trigger-raw-debate-on-immigration-in-germany-a-1071175.html>.

--- . “Is the Merkel era Coming To an End?” September 9, 2016.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-sees-waning-of-power-for-merkel-a-1111668.html>.

--- . “Muhammad Cartoons Shown in Germany: Salafists Attack Police at Far-Right Rally.” May 1, 2012.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/salafists-attack-german-police-after-far-right-group-shows-muhammad-cartoons-a-830775.html>.

--- . “New Abuse Figures: Forced Marriages in Germany More Prevalent Than Thought.” November 9, 2011.

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-abuse-figures-forced-marriages-in-germany-more-prevalent-than-thought-a-796760.html>.

- . “Outmaneuvered: Merkel Weakened by Blunder in Syria Debate.” September 9, 2013.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-chancellor-merkel-makes-diplomatic-blunder-on-syria-debate-a-921193.html>.
- . “Refugee Crisis Pushes Europe to the Brink.” March 4, 2016.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/border-closures-spell-refugee-back-up-in-greece-a-1080643.html>.
- . “Skilled Worker Shortage: Berlin Aims to Attract Unemployed Europeans.” January 2, 2011.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/skilled-worker-shortage-berlin-aims-to-attract-unemployed-europeans-a-741201.html>.
- . “Wuppertal: Oberlandesgericht Erlaubt Strafprozess Gegen ‘Scharia-Polizei’.” May 3, 2016.
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/scharia-polizei-nrw-oberlandesgericht-erlaubt-strafprozess-a-1090575.html>.
- Staab, Andreas. *The EU Explained: Institutions, Actors, Global Impact*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
- Staudenmaier, Rebecca. “Support for Merkel Rebounds in Latest Poll.” *Deutsche Welle*, October 6, 2016.
<http://www.dw.com/en/support-for-merkel-rebounds-in-latest-poll/a-35984981>.
- Steger, Manfred B., and Ravi K. Roy. *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. “Germany’s New Global Role.” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2016.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13/germany-s-new-global-role>.
- Steinberg, Guido. “German Inefficiency.” *Foreign Affairs*, January 19, 2017.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-01-19/german-inefficiency>.
- Sterling, Joe. “Daraa: The Spark That lit the Syrian Flame.” *CNN*, March 1, 2012.
<http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/index.html>.
- Stewart, Heather, and Rowena Mason. “Nigel Farage’s Anti-Migrant Poster Reported to Police.” *The Guardian*, June 16, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants>.
- Storm, Servaas, and C.W.M. Naastepad. “Crisis and Recovery in the German Economy: The Real Lessons.” *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* 32 (January 2015): 11-24. doi: 10.1016/j.strueco.2015.01.001.
- Straus, Ira. “Atlantic Federalism: The Political Leaders of the Allied Forces.” *Peace and Change*, vol. 24, no.3 (July 1999): 277-328. doi:10.1111/0149-0508.00124.
- Sturgis, Patrick, Ian Brunton-Smith, Jouni Kuha, and Jonathan Jackson. “Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and the Social Cohesion of Neighborhoods in London.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37, no.8 (October 2014): 1286-1309. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2013.831932.
- Swales, Kirby. *Understanding the Leave Vote*. http://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NatCen_Brexplanations-report-FINAL-WEB2.pdf.

Swisa, Maya. "Future Stability in the EU: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism." *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the EU* 21, no.11 (April 2013): 125-34. doi: 10.5642/urceu.201101.11.

Sydow, Christoph. "Authorities Helpless to Prevent Lone Wolf Attacks." *Spiegel*, March 21, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/analysis-of-danger-of-lone-wolf-terrorists-a-822881.html>.

Tapinos, Georges. *L'Immigration Étrangère en France: 1946-1973 Travaux et Documents Cahier no. 71*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975.

Tattersall, Nick, and Seda Sezer. "Turkey's Erdogan Rebuffs EU on Terrorism Law; 'we're Going our way, you go Yours!'" *Reuters*, May 4, 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-turkey-erdogan-idUSKCN0XX18K>.

Taylor, Alan J. P. *The Man and the Statesman*. London: Hamilton, 1955.

Tempest, Matthew. "May Unveils UK Government's '12 Point Plan for Brexit." *Euractiv*, January 17, 2017. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/may-unveils-uk-governments-12-point-plan-for-brexit>.

Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11), July 24, 2000, Gr. Brit.

Thatcher, Margaret. *The Downing Street Years*. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1993.

The Conservative Party. "Strong Leadership: A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure Future." Published April 2015. Accessed July 7, 2017. <https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf>.

The Economist. "After the Cataclysm." April 25, 2002. <http://www.economist.com/node/1098814>.

--- . "By Running for a Fourth Term, Angela Merkel is Protecting her Legacy." November 26, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21710847-germany-s-chancellor-not-campaigning-leader-global-liberal-order-running>.

--- . "David Cameron's Splendid Isolation." May 31, 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/15816736>.

--- . "Do not Send me Your Huddled." April 24, 2015. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21649712-emergency-meeting-brussels-produces-inadequate-plan-save-migrants-do-not-send-me-your>.

--- . "Europe à L'Hollandaise." February 9, 2013. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21571455-fran%C3%A7ois-hollande-flawed-vision-europe-europe-%C3%A0-lhollandaise>.

--- . "Europe's Murky Deal with Turkey." May 28, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21699466-eu-gambling-its-reputation-secure-its-borders-europe-murky-deal-turkey>.

--- . "Europe is Trying to Teach its Gender Norms to Refugees." October 15, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708722-turns-out-be-more-complicated-it-sounds-europe-trying-teach-its-gender-norms>.

--- . "France's Next Revolution: The Vote That Could Wreck the European Union." March 4, 2017. <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21717814-why-french-presidential-election-will-have-consequences-far-beyond-its-borders-vote>.

- . “For Good or for Ill.” January 23, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21688938-europes-new-arrivals-will-probably-dent-public-finances-not-wages-good-or>.
- . “Germany is not the new Leader of the Free World.” July 8, 2017.
<https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21724832-angela-merkel-may-sound-tough-donald-trump-her-country-still-depends-america-germany>
- . “I owe EU.” June 30, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21701548-why-did-region-benefits-most-eu-membership-vote-against-it-i-owe-eu>
- . “Is Multi-Kulti Dead?” October 22, 2010.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/10/integration_debate_germany.
- . “Italy is Facing a Surge of Migration Across the Mediterranean.” July 20, 2017.
<https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21725327-economic-migrants-piling-up-italy-eu-doing-little-help-italy-facing-surge>.
- . “Not Playing by Their Games.” May 31, 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/15814599>.
- . “Tales From Eurabia.” June 22, 2006. www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7086222.
- . “The Brexit Vote Reveals a Country Split Down the Middle.” June 24, 2016.
<http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21701257-results-paint-picture-angry-country-divided-class-age-and-region-country-divided>
- . “The Fatal Contradictions in the Remain and Leave Camps.” June 3, 2016.
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2016/06/eu-referendum>.
- . “The Polish Paradox.” December 14, 2013. <http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21591588-britons-loathe-immigration-principle-quite-immigrants-practice-bulgarians>.
- The Guardian.* “Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.” January 19, 2009.
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/13/anti-terrorism-act>.
- . “David Cameron’s EU Speech – Full Text.” January 23, 2013.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum>.
- . “Dutch say ‘Devastating no’ to EU Constitution.” June 2, 2005.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics>.
- . “Pegida Starting Political Party as Authorities Mull Ban Over Extremism.” July 18, 2016.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/18/pegida-starting-political-party-as-authorities-mull-ban-over-extremism>.
- . “Theresa May: We Will not Provide a Running Commentary on Brexit Negotiations – Video.” September 7, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2016/sep/07/theresa-may-not-provide-running-commentary-on-brexit-negotiations-video>.
- . “Tories Would Limit Immigration to ‘Tens of Thousands’ a Year, Says Cameron.” January 11, 2010.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/11/david-cameron-limit-immigration>.

The Independent. “Theresa May – Her Full Brexit Speech to Conservative Conference.” October 2, 2016.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-conference-speech-article-50-brexit-eu-a7341926.html>.

The Local. “Bavarian CSU Call for Drastic Tightening of Immigration Laws.” September 8, 2016.
<https://www.thelocal.de/20160908/bavarian-csu-call-for-drastic-tightening-of-immigration-laws>.

--- . “Europe’s Border” Germany’s New Showdown With Greece.” January 26, 2016.
<https://www.thelocal.de/20160126/europees-external-border-germanys-new-showdown-with-greece>.

The Schengen Acquis – Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders. June 14, 1985. O. J. (L239) 13.

The White House. “Statement on Additional Countries in Support of September 6 Joint Statement on Syria.” Last modified September 9, 2013. Accessed September 24, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/09/statement-additional-countries-support-september-6-joint-statement-syria>.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Tran, Mark. “Britain’s £1.7bn EU Surcharge – Q&A.” *The Guardian*, November 6, 2014.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/britain-european-union-surcharge-bill-q-and-a>.

Travis, Alan. “David Cameron’s Limp Action on Refugees Puts Britain Outside the EU.” *The Guardian*, September 7, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/david-camerons-limited-promise-refugees-britains-impotence-outside-eu>.

---. “UK Won’t see Mass Romanian and Bulgarian Immigration, Minister Says,” *The Guardian*, November 21, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/20/uk-immigration-romania-bulgaria-mark-harper>.

Traynor, Ian. “Italy Threatens to Give Schengen Visas to Migrants as EU Ministers Meet.” *The Guardian*, June 16, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/15/italy-threatens-to-give-schengen-visas-to-migrants-as-eu-dispute-deepens>.

---. “UK to pay £1.7bn EU Bill in Full Despite Osborne’s Claim to Have Halved it.” *The Guardian*, November 7, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/nov/07/uk-pays-full-eu-rebate-despite-osborne-claim-he-halved-it>.

Treanor, Jill. “Deutsche Bank: 4,000 Jobs at Risk of Being Moved out of UK After Brexit.” *The Guardian*, April 26, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/26/deutsche-bank-4000-jobs-at-risk-of-being-moved-out-of-uk-after-brexit>.

---. “HSBC Could Switch 1,000 Banking Jobs to France After a Brexit Vote.” *The Guardian*, February 15, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/feb/15/uk-better-in-reformed-europe-says-hsbc-chair>.

Treaty of Amsterdam. October 17, 1997. 1997 O.J. (C340) 1.

Treaty on European Union. July 29, 1992. 1992 O.J. (C191) 1.

- Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. *Becoming Multicultural: Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012.
- Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos, and Karen Schönwälter. "How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany's Guest Worker System." *German Politics & Society* 24, no.3 (October 2006): 1-19. doi:10.3167/104503006780441629.
- Tribalat, Michèle. " Michèle Tribalat: "Les Statistiques Ethniques Sont Indispensables à la Connaissance." *Le Figaro*, February 26, 2016. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/2016/02/26/31003-20160226ARTFIG00378-michele-tribalat-les-statistiques-etniques-sont-indispensables-a-la-connaissance.php>.
- Troszczyńska-van Genderen, Wanda. "Foreign Policy: Aims, Instruments and Achievements." European Parliament. Published June 2017. Accessed July 10, 2017. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.1.1.pdf.
- Tumlr, Jan. *Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic Societies*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1985.
- Uberoi, Elise. *EU Referendum 2016*. <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7639>.
- Uçarer, Emek M. "The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice." In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, 281-95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Ugland, Trygve. *Jean Monnet and Canada: Early Travels and the Idea of European Unity*. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011.
- United Nations. "New Report on Replacement Migration Issued by UN Population Division." Press release, March 17, 2000. <http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000317.dev2234.doc.html>.
- United Nations Children's Funds (UNICEF). *Ni Sains, ni Saufs: Enquête sur les Enfants non Accompagnés Dans le Nord de la France*. https://www.unicef.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ni-sains-ni-saufs_mna_france_2016_0.pdf.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). "Asylum-Seekers." Accessed September 25, 2016. <http://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html>.
- . "Mediterranean Death Toll Soars, 2016 is Deadliest Year yet." October 25, 2016. <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html>.
- . "Fact Sheet: Timeline and Figures" Accessed July 5, 2017. <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/hlsegment/5245a72e6/syria-fact-sheet-timeline-figures.html>.
- . "Syria Regional Refugee Response." Accessed July 5, 2017. <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>.
- . "The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol." Published September 2011. Accessed July 5, 2017. <http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.pdf>.
- . "What is a Refugee?." Accessed September 25, 2016. <http://www.unrefugees.org/what-is-a-refugee>.

- United Nations Statistic Division (UNSD). "International Migration: Concepts and Definitions." Accessed September 30, 2016. <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/migration/migrmethods.htm>.
- Urwin, Derek W. "The European Community: From 1945 to 1985." In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, 11-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Vanke, Jeffrey. "The Treaty of Rome and Europeanism." *Journal of the Historical Society* 7, no.4 (December 2007): 443-74. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5923.2007.00226.x.
- Verdun, Amy. "Economic and European Monetary Union." In *European Union Politics*, edited by Michelle Cini and Nieves P.S. Borrogán, 296-308. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Vie-Publique. "En Quoi Consiste L'Allocation Pour Demandeur D'Asile (Ada)?" Last Modified April 1, 2017. Accessed July 5, 2017. <https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F33314>.
- . "Loi du 31 Mars 2006 Pour L'Égalité des Chances." Published April 24, 2006. Accessed April 20, 2017. <http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/panorama/texte-vote/loi-du-31-mars-2006-pour-equalite-chances.html>.
- Vigogne, Ludovic. "Entre les Médias et Nicolas Sarkozy, un Face-à-Face Toujours Compliqué." *L'Opinion*, October 21, 2014. <http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/politique/entre-medias-nicolas-sarkozy-face-a-face-toujours-complique-17573>.
- Vincent, Elise. "L'Errance des Migrants, dix ans Après Sangatte." *Le Monde*, May 5, 2012. http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/11/05/l-errance-des-migrants-dix-ans-apres-sangatte_1785864_3224.html.
- Viner, Katharine. "How Technology Disrupted the Truth." *The Guardian*, July 12, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth>.
- Wagstyl, Stephan. "Angela Merkel Calls for ban on Full Veil in Election Pitch." *Financial Times*, December 6, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/fecd9f1a-bbbc-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080>.
- . "German Budget Surplus Swells to €18.5bn." *Financial Times*, August 24, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/a33b0456-05b3-3ffa-b0f2-cf64bc5bb659>.
- . "Germany: Merkel Opens Door to her Opponents." *Financial Times*, October 27, 2015. <https://www.ft.com/content/69455aec-7b4d-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64>.
- . "Merkel Admits she Would Turn Back the Clock on Refugee Policy." *Financial Times*, September 19, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/11150514-7e78-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4>.
- . "Merkel Warns Britain 'Will pay a Price' if it Limits Immigration." *Financial Times*, May 17, 2017. <https://www.ft.com/content/8489e4a2-3b23-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec?mhq5j=e3>.
- . "Rightwing AfD Gains Foothold in Berlin, but Falls Short of Target." *Financial Times*, September 19, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/a7f41f92-7dbf-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4>.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "Laws and Theories." In *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 27-46. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- . "Reductionist and Systemic Theories." In *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 47-69. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.

- . “Structural Realism After the Cold War.” *International Security* 25, no.1 (July 2000): 5-41.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/2626772>.
- . *Theory of International Politics*. New York, NY: Random House, 1979.
- Warrell, Helen. “May Refusing to Accept Difficult Consequences of Brexit.” *Financial Times*, December 28, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/2f85613e-cd14-11e6-b8ce-b9c03770f8b1>.
- Waterfield, Bruno, and James Kirkup. “EU Budget is cut for First Time but Britain Could pay More.” *The Telegraph*, February 8, 2013.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/9856716/Victory-for-David-Cameron-as-EU-budget-faces-cuts-for-first-time-in-history.html>.
- Watt, Nicholas. “Cameron Decision to Quit EU Group is ‘Dotty’ Says Tory MEP.” *The Guardian*, May 5, 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/may/05/david-cameron-european-elections-epp>.
- . “David Cameron’s EU Referendum Pledge Wins Over Eurosceptics Tories.” *The Guardian*, January 23, 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-referendum-eurosceptic-tories>.
- . “George Osborne to use Foreign aid to Help Syrians Refugees in UK.” *The Guardian*, September 6, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/george-osborne-to-divert-foreign-aid-to-help-syrian-refugees-in-uk?CMP=twt_gu.
- Wells, Sherrill B. *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman*. London: Lynne Rienner, 2011.
- Weinstein, Kenneth R. “Hollande the Hawk? An Unlikely Ally Emerges.” *World Affairs* 177, no.1 (July 14, 2014): 87-96. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/stable/43555067>.
- Weismann, Itzhak. “Between Sūfi Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya From the Damascene Angle.” *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series 41, no.2 (July 2001): 206-37. doi: 10.1163/1570060011201286.
- Welfens, Paul J.J. “Cameron’s Information Disaster in the Referendum of 2016: An Exit From Brexit?.” *International Economics and Economic Policy* 13, no.4 (October 2016): 539–48. doi: 10.1007/s10368-016-0361-3.
- Werner, Bonefel. “Freedom and the Strong State: on Germany Ordoliberalism.” *New Political Economy* 17, no.5 (April 2012): 633-56. doi:10.1080/13563467.2012.656082.
- White, Nicolas. *Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: Dec 2016*.
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/dec2016/pdf>.
- White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025* (Brussels, 1 March 2017). COM (2017).
- Wihtol de Wenden, Caroline. “Assimilation and Struggle: Maghrebi Immigration and French Political Culture.” *Culture & Society* 4, no.2 (July 2003): 69-74.
<http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/HOL/Page?handle=heiNJournals/geojaf4&collection=journals&id=245>

- Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Katie Simmons. "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs." *Pew Research Center*, July 11, 2016.
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/#romans-muslims-viewed-negatively>.
- Willsher, Kim. "Protestors Close Calais Over Refugee Crisis 'we are not Racist but 'we see no Solution'.'" *The Guardian*, September 6, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/calais-residents-protest-jungle-refugee-camp-not-racist-problem-getting-worse>.
- Windmann, Antje. "Fear of Honor Killings: Immigrants Flee Families to Find Themselves." *Spiegel*, April 11, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/young-immigrant-women-flee-their-families-a-826648.html>.
- Wingard, Jessie, and Daphne Grathwohl. "Germany Keeps Romanians, Bulgarians out of Schengen." *Deutsche Welle*, March 7, 2013. <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-keeps-romanians-bulgarians-out-of-schengen/a-16652922>.
- Winter, Bronwyn. *Hijab & the Republic: Uncovering the French Headscarf Debate*. New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008.
- Winter, Charlie. "The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy," *Quilliam Foundation* (July 2015): 1-51. www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/2589.
- Witting, Volker. "A Difficult Start for Refugees Employment Schemes." *Deutsche Welle*, August 17, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/a-difficult-start-for-refugee-employment-schemes/a-19481178>.
- Wittrock, Philipp and Christina Elmer. "Taking Stock one Year After Refugees' Arrival." *Spiegel*, September 2, 2016. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/taking-stock-one-year-after-the-arrival-of-refugees-in-germany-a-1110654.html>.
- Wolf, Martin. "Global Elites Must Heed the Warning of Populist Rage." *Financial Times*, July 19, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/54f0f5c6-4d05-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a>.
- Wolff, Sarah. "The Mediterranean Dimension of EU's Internal Security." In *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs European Security*, edited by Michelle Pace, 154-85. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Woods, Sam. "Contingency Planning for the UK's Withdrawal From the European Union." Bank of England. Press Release, April 7, 2017. <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pru/Documents/about/letter070417.pdf>
- World Bank*. "Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman)." Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFR.TIN>.
- . "Gross Enrolment Ratio, Secondary, both Sexes (%)." Accessed September 24, 2016. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR?end=2014&locations=SY&start=1996>.
- Wright, Vincent. *Continuity and Change in France*. Boston, Mass; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.
- "XE Live Exchange Rates." Accessed April 16, 2017. <http://www.xe.com/>.
- Yin, Robert K., and Karen A. Heald. "Using the Case Survey Method to Analyse Policy Studies." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 20, no.3 (September 1975): 371-81. doi: 10.2307/2391997.

Yukleyen, Ahmet. "State Policies and Islam in Europe: Milli Görüş in Germany and the Netherlands." *Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies* 36, no.3 (March 2010): 445-63. doi: 10.1080/13691830903123203.


Zappi, Sylvia. "Dix ans Après les Émeutes, le Sentiment D'Abandon des Banlieues." *Le Monde*, October 26, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/banlieues/article/2015/10/26/dix-ans-apres-les-emeutes-le-sentiment-d-abandon-des-banlieues_4796959_1653530.html.

Zimmermann, Klaus F., et. al. *Immigration Policy and the Labor Market: The German Experience and Lessons for Europe*. New York, NY: Springer, 2007.

Zimmermann, Nils. "German Federal Budget Goes up for 2017." *Deutsche Welle*, November 25, 2016. <http://www.dw.com/en/german-federal-budget-goes-up-for-2017/a-36528845>


Appendices

Appendix A Schengen Timeline




Source: European Commission, *The Schengen Area*, 6-8, http://biblio.ucv.ro/bib_web/bib_pdf/EU_books/0056.pdf.

Appendix B Enlargement of the European Union (1952-2013)



Appendix C Refugee Crisis Timeline



Source: UNCHR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response," accessed July 5, 2017. UNHCR, "Fact Sheet: Timeline and Figures," accessed July 5, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/hlsegment/5245a72e6/syria-fact-sheet-timeline-figures.html>. European Commission, "Syria: Time is Running out," press release, April 23, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-369_en.htm.

Appendix D Operationalization

Box 1.1 Operationalization: Understanding the Concepts

Asylum-seeker: An individual who is forced to flee his/her home country to escape violence, corruption and/or armed conflict. In other instances, people apply for asylum because they had to flee natural disasters and areas of humanitarian crisis.

First-time asylum applicant: An individual who applies for asylum for the first time in a given country.

Failed asylum-seeker: An individual whose application for asylum has been rejected by the host country.

Refugee: An individual who is being granted refugee status by the host country, including access to labour market, basic welfare, and health insurance.

Migrant: An individual who resides and/or works in a country other than his/her own for at least 12 months.

Economic migrant: An individual who decides to leave his/her home country to find better job opportunities in order to improve his/her standards of living in a more developed country.

Undocumented migrant: An individual who resides unlawfully in a country; that is, without the proper documentation, visa and/or identification papers.

Illegal migrant: An individual who stayed in the host country after being refused refugee status by the competent authorities.

‘Visible’ minorities: The term ‘visible minorities’ defines individuals who are of non-Caucasian origins and belong to a distinct ethnic and/or religious community.

Migration-background: This term describes individuals who have at least one immigrant parent.

Safe-country: A country is deemed ‘safe’ when it can maintain stability and provide citizens with access to fair justice system, basic health services, and public education.

Terrorist: An individual who stages an attack against a state while using violence against civilians in the furtherance of a religious, political or cultural cause.

Islamist: An individual who has pledged allegiance to an Islamic fundamentalist group and follows the strict code of behaviour provided by Muslim preachers.

Islamization: This phenomenon captures the transformation of individuals and communities into different societies whereby people reject Western values and live according to the rules laid down by the Quran.

Reactionary movement: In mainstream politics, this term is used derogatively to define an individual whose political beliefs deviate from the norm and support the restoration of past values, laws, and norms. For the research, it defines anyone whose beliefs challenge the dominant discourse by proposing radical or ‘reactionary’ views to solve a crisis.

Populism: A political ideology that espouses reactionary views against the current establishment.

Sovereignty: The ability of a country to exercise its powers in a given territory through laws, social programs and penalties against its nationals and/or foreigners.

Border: The imaginary, symbolic line marking the boundary between two sovereign countries.

Securitisation: The process through which national governments tighten their laws on immigration, security and asylum seekers to prevent the rise of external threats from unexpected migration flows.

Appendix E European Economic Community (EEC) vs. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

EEC (1957)	EFTA (1960)
Founding members: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg	Founding members: The United Kingdom Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1973: UK and Denmark join the EEC• 1986: Portugal joins the EEC• 1995: Austria, Sweden and Finland join the EEC and EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 1961: Finland becomes an EFTA member• 1973: UK and Denmark leave the union• 1986: Portugal leaves the union; Iceland joins EFTA• 1991: Liechtenstein joins EFTA• 1995: Austria, Sweden and Finland leave the union and cease to be EFTA members.

Source: Cini and Borragán, *European Union Politics*.

Figure 1.1. EEC vs. EFTA

Appendix F Three-Pillared Structure




Figure 1.2. Three-Pillared Structure

* ECSC Treaty expired on July 23rd, 2002

** EU diplomatic corps established by Treaty of Lisbon, 2009

*** This post was created by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997

Source: Cini and Borrogan, *European Union Politics*.

Appendix G From Amsterdam to Lisbon

Box 1.2 From Amsterdam to Lisbon

Treaty of Amsterdam

Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened the commitment to the abolition of internal borders by creating the AFSJ and incorporating Schengen agreements and convention as the *acquis communautaire*. Because the Schengen order had emerged outside the European legal order, the British government also pushed for the expansion of Europol – an organization created under the Maastricht Treaty – the creation European Drugs Unit, and the set up of Schengen Information System (SIS) – that is, a computer database on ‘criminal, asylum seekers and illegal immigrant’.¹ Additionally, the treaty listed a set of common standards to be applied by 2004 so that member-states could easily monitor the external borders of the EU and deter illegal immigration.

Treaty of Nice

On February 26, 2001, EU member-states signed the Treaty of Nice to address the institutional challenges as well as introduce a new distribution of seats in the Parliament to accommodate the new member-states of the union, as 10 countries intended to join the union between 2004 and 2009.² The treaty also reiterated the commitment “that, within five years of its entry into force, the Council should adopt measures on a number of fronts, in particular criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum made by a third-country national within the EU, as well as certain minimum standards.”³

Treaty of the Constitution of Europe

In 2005, EU leaders failed to convince the people of the necessity to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) and create a European Constitution: 54.87% of the French and 63% of the Dutch electorate voted ‘no’, thus imposing a ‘sanction-vote’ on the political élites governing the region.⁴ The unratified treaty intended to accord the EU “a legal personality” and “undertake necessary institutional reform to accommodate new members.”⁵

Treaty of Lisbon

This controversial treaty was signed by the 27 member-states of the EU on December 1st, 2007 to provide more help to countries in financial difficulties and expand the Commission’s capacities to issue direct warnings to member-states and act as an independent ‘referee’ in economic governance. Hence, criticisms often denounced the Treaty of Lisbon for setting up obstacles to the exercises of sovereignty by the member-states, as they no longer were legally permitted to vote on a recommendation of the Council and thus contribute to blocking it. The treaty also extended the use of QMV to forty-four new areas (including border controls, asylum, immigration, and Europol) and the range of CFSP actors: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [...] and the new permanent President of the European Council were.⁶ In addition to abolishing the pillar structure set up by the TEU, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) the EU finally obtained its “legal personality and an institutional incarnation of its external service.”⁷

¹ Hayter, *Open Borders*, 61.

² On May 1, 2004, 10 countries enter the union: Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia. European Union, “Further Expansion,” last modified July 16, 2017, accessed July 8, 2017, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2000-2009_en.

³ European Parliament, “Migration and Asylum: A Challenge for Europe,” *Fact Sheets on the European Union* (June 2017): 3, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI\(2017\)600414_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI(2017)600414_EN.pdf).

⁴ Le Monde, “La France Rejette Nettement le Traité Constitutionnel,” *Le Monde*, May 29th, 2016. Le Monde, “Selon un Résultat Provisoire, les Pays-Bas Rejettent la Constitution de l’UE à Plus de 63%,” *Le Monde*, June 1st, 2005. Renaud Dehouze, “The Unmaking of a Constitution: Lessons From the European Referenda,” *Constellations* 13, no.2 (June 2006): 152-54.

⁵ Simon Collard-Wexler, “Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no.3 (September 2006): 421.

⁶ European Commission, “Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon,” press release, December 1, 2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-531_en.htm?locale=en#footnote-1.

⁷ Wanda Troszczyńska-van Genderen, “Foreign Policy: Aims, Instruments and Achievements,” European Parliament, Published June 2017, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.1.1.pdf.

Appendix H Fortress Europe: New Borders Within Schengen

