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Constructing Chinese Asianism : intellectual writings on East Asian regionalism (1896-1924) Smith, Craig Anthony 2014

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Constructing Chinese Asianism: Intellectual Writings on East Asian Regionalism (1896-1924)  by  Craig Anthony Smith  B.A. (Hons) University of Alberta, 2004 M.A. University of Alberta, 2007 M.A. National Chung Cheng University, 2010   A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in  The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies  (History)  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)  September 2014    ©  Craig Anthony Smith, 2014  ii   Abstract  Until recent decades, historians of modern East Asia generally considered Asianism to be an imperialistic ideology of militant Japan. Although the term and its concept were certainly used in this way, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, earlier proponents of Asianism looked upon it as a very real strategy of uniting Asian nations to defend against Western imperialism. This study investigates Chinese intellectuals’ discussions of Asianism from just before the reforms of 1898 to Sun Yat-sen’s famous speech on Asianism in 1924, considering calls for regionalism in their intellectual and historical contexts. Utilizing both published and unpublished sources, I first show that there were many Chinese debates on Asianism, before exposing the convoluted relationship between regional and national identities at this crucial point in the construction of the Chinese nation. In the early twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals struggled to define both their nation and their region through a variety of relationships which posited the imperialist West as “other.” Naturally, in the construction of these political and cultural identities, intellectuals’ writings on nation, race and civilization created overlaps which are still evident in understandings of Asia and China today.   iii   Preface  This dissertation is an original, unpublished, and independent work by the author, Craig A Smith. It is the product of research conducted at archives and libraries in China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Canada. All images used in this dissertation are from the public domain unless stated otherwise.   iv   Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................... ii Preface ................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. viii Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Literature Review ............................................................................................................... 9 Contextualizing China and Japan: Nations and Empires ................................................. 21 Chapter Breakdown .......................................................................................................... 24 Part I: Chinese Reformers Encounter Asianism ................................................................... 28 Chapter I: Lips and Teeth: Pro-Japanese Reformers on Empire and Federation, 1896 - 1898 .............................................................................................................................................. 29 Introduction: The Reformers’ Strategic Turn towards Japan ............................................ 32 Institutions Facilitate the Entry of Asianist Principles and Vocabulary into China .......... 35 The Translation of Pro-Japanese News ............................................................................ 45 Chinese Voices at The Chinese Progress Promote Alliance with Japan ........................... 52 Reformers Become Interested in Early Japanese Asianism.............................................. 58 The Complications of Translating Tarui Asianism ........................................................... 64 Kang Youwei and Alliance with Japan ............................................................................. 72 Kang Youwei’s Reformers Petition for Federation with Japan ........................................ 75 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 80 Chapter II: Chariot and Sidecar: Confucian Asianism in Japan’s Chinatowns .................... 82 The Reformers and the Tōa Dōbunkai ............................................................................. 85 The Establishment of the Datong Schools ........................................................................ 90 The Need for the Datong School in Yokohama ................................................................ 92 Expansion ......................................................................................................................... 95 Sino-Japanese Elite Cooperation and the Datong School ................................................ 98 Working with the Asianists ............................................................................................... 98 Yamamoto Ken ............................................................................................................... 101 Xu Qin: the Primary Educator at the Datong School ..................................................... 106 v  The Datong School and Layers of Identity ..................................................................... 109 The Students of the Datong School and Their Influence ................................................ 113 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 118 Part II: Chinese Intellectuals’ Rejection of Japanese Asianism .......................................... 120 Chapter III: Same Script, Same Race: The Ambiguity of a Racial Identity ....................... 121 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 121 Late-Nineteenth Century Chinese Writings on Race ...................................................... 125 Race and Race War ......................................................................................................... 126 Yellow Peril .................................................................................................................... 129 Subverting the Yellow Peril and Taking Pride in Race ................................................... 132 Tongzhong and Yizhong ................................................................................................. 135 Anti-Manchu Nationalism and Race .............................................................................. 138 Liu Shipei ....................................................................................................................... 141 Chen Tianhua, the beginning of the People’s News and the end of the “Golden Decade” ........................................................................................................................................ 144 The Revolutionaries are introduced to India .................................................................. 151 The Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood .......................................................................... 156 Race and Revolution ....................................................................................................... 161 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 164 Chapter IV: Asia for the Asians: Translating Asianism during World War I, 1914-1918 ... 168 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 168 The Great War in the Eastern Miscellany ....................................................................... 170 The Eastern Miscellany and Japanese Connections under Du Yaquan .......................... 173 Du Yaquan and Civilization ............................................................................................ 181 Thesis, Antithesis: Establishing Dichotomies, Defining China and the East ................. 185 Conflict: A Return to Race War or Clash of Civilizations .............................................. 191 Synthesis ......................................................................................................................... 195 Translating Asianism ...................................................................................................... 198 The Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism ................................................................. 199 Greater Asianism and Its Translations ............................................................................ 201 Kodera’s Greater Asianism ............................................................................................. 204 The Introduction of Kokuryūkai “Asianism” ................................................................. 207 vi  New Asianism and New New Asianism ......................................................................... 210 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 213 Part III: Constructing Chinese Asianism ............................................................................ 215 Chapter V: The Path to Datong: Li Dazhao and Cosmopolitan Regionalization in the May Fourth Period ...................................................................................................................... 216 Li Dazhao and the Collusion of Nationalism and Asianism ........................................... 219 Trotsky and Li Dazhao’s New Asianism ........................................................................ 225 Cosmopolitan Criticism of Li’s Asianism ...................................................................... 230 New Asianism Clarified ................................................................................................. 234 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 237 Chapter VI: Sun Yat-sen’s Kingly Way: Reconceptualising Asia in Response to Empire . 240 Returning to Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism ............................................................................. 242 Sun Yat-sen’s Early Asianist Inclinations ....................................................................... 245 Sun’s Asianist Speeches: Strategic Alliance under Japanese Leadership ...................... 248 While Sun Yat-sen was in Japan: Asianism in the People’s Stand ................................. 255 Ye Chucang’s Strategic Asianism ................................................................................... 257 Contradictions and Continuities: 1913-1918 .................................................................. 264 1924: Is Japan still Asian? .............................................................................................. 271 The Mixed Reception Outside of Japan and Issues of Nationalism ............................... 280 Chinese Asianism as Propaganda during the Second Sino-Japanese War ...................... 289 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 292 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 295 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 300 Archives and Special Collections and Source Collections ............................................. 300 Journals from the Twentieth Century China and Japan .................................................. 300 Newspapers ..................................................................................................................... 300 Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 314 Appendix A: A Note on Romanization ........................................................................... 314 Appendix B: Asia Association Manifesto ....................................................................... 315 Appendix C: Liang Qichao’s “A Preface to The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation” ........................................................................................................................................ 318 Appendix D: “On the Suitability of Asia for Its Own Lips and Teeth” .......................... 321 vii   List of Figures  Figure 1: An assembly of students .................................................................................................... 93 Figure 2:The Datong School in 1915 ............................................................................................. 95 Figure 3:Xu Qin photographed with Liang Qichao ...................................................................... 106 Figure 4: “Die Gelbe Gefahr” (The Yellow Peril), 1895. ............................................................... 128 Figure 5: Zou Rong’s categorization of the yellow race ................................................................. 140 Figure 6: The thirteenth issue of People’s News including a painting of Shivaji ........................... 153 Figure 7: The covers of both translations of Kodera Kenkichi’s Greater Asianism (1917, 1918). 206 Figure 8: The site of Sun Yat-sen’s “Greater Asianism” speech .................................................... 274  viii  Acknowledgements  So many people provided help and advice on this dissertation that I would have to write another hundred pages to thank everyone. I arrived at UBC in 2008 with little idea of what it meant to write something like this, or of the collaborative nature of such a project. My committee offered comments and constructive criticism on the various drafts as they appeared. In supervising the writing of this dissertation, Glen Peterson consistently provided much appreciated support and direction. Timothy Cheek read numerous drafts and always offered constructive advice. I also thank him for making me a member of the Centre for Chinese Research, where I made many friends and learned from many colleagues. Timothy Brook also provided sage advice, and helped to make this a better dissertation. I would also like to thank my university examiners Don Baker and Steven Lee who provided many constructive comments. My external examiner Peter Zarrow provided an excellent report to guide me in changing this dissertation into a monograph and I am very grateful for his efforts. My classmates and friends at the University of British Columbia contributed to the development of my ideas in numerous ways and enriched my life in Vancouver. I want to especially thank Nick Simon, Tom Woodsworth, Fred Vermote, David Luesink, Tim Sedo, Desmond Cheung, Malcolm Thompson, Anna Belogurova, Heidi Kong, Nick Fraser, Noa Grass, Sonam Chogyal, Alex Ong, Tom Peotto, Matt Galway, Zheng Da 鄭達, Jonathan Henshaw, Brendan Wright, Stefan Honisch, Guo Yanlong 郭彥龍, Morgan Rocks, Jiang Bei 江北, and my many friends at St. John’s College, as well as the Chinese studies groups, Wang She 望社 and Jie She 節社. Immediately after I passed my comprehensive exams in 2009, I returned to Taiwan, where I first began to conceptualize this dissertation topic. My friends, professors and classmates at National Chung Cheng University frequently offered me all manner of help during this long process. As always, Jack Jenn-shann Lin, my mentor from the University of Alberta, provided a wealth of advice and support during his visits to Chiayi. Also, my classmates, friends and mentors at the Graduate Institute for Taiwan Literature were important in developing my ideas and supporting me in many ways. There are too many to list, but I would especially like to thank Wang You-li 王又立, Xiao Rufang 蕭如芳, Liang Jun-chuan 梁鈞筌, Deng Wan-ting 鄧婉婷, Zeng Yu-wei 曾郁崴, Huang Jian-fu 黃健富, Zhuo Jia-xian卓家賢, Hsiao Kun陳坤琬, Da Kun林昆洪, Li Yiru李怡儒, Chao  Hsun-ta  趙勳達, Hsiao Lai 賴芸騫 and Chen Yan-lin 陳彥琳. From Taiwan I went to Shanghai, where I was hosted by the East China Normal University for my research, much of which was conducted at the Shanghai Library. I would like to thank Professor Xu Jilin, who hosted me and invited me into his classroom and introduced me to many of his graduate students. After the long days at the Shanghai Library, conversations with Professor Xu’s graduate students gave me energy and got my research started at an early stage. I would like to especially thank Deng Jun 鄧軍, Song Hong 宋宏, Cheng Qing 成慶 and Zhang Hongbin 張洪彬.  In the fall of 2011 I moved to Japan where I joined the Japan Foundation Program for ix  Specialists in Cultural and Academic Fields. While studying in Osaka, I made many good friends, far too many to list here, who introduced me into the world of Japanese Studies and with whom I spent many evenings practicing language skills and enjoying Japan. This also opened doors for me in Tokyo, where I met Sven Saaler, who offered valuable discussion and recommended a number of texts to help in my research. Also in Tokyo, through my friend Zhang Xiaolei 张晓磊 from the Academy of Social Sciences, I met with Wang Ping 王屏, who also offered valuable insight into both early twentieth century Asianism and current attitudes towards an Asian union in China.  Back in Taiwan, the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica generously provided a year of research and writing funding at a crucial point in the process. Professors Peter Zarrow and Lin Man-houng were particularly generous with their time during this stay. As my supervisor at Sinica, Zarrow was also one of the first to offer suggestions on completed chapters of the dissertation. Discussions, dinners, and drinks with the many PhD students and postdoctoral fellows made my work in Taiwan both profitable and enjoyable. Special thanks to Arai Yu 新井雄, Chen Chien-shou陳建守, Joseph Lawson, James Lin, Huang Li-an 黃麗安, Peter Lavelle, Shio Takugo 塩卓悟 and Zhang Xueqian 張學謙. And finally I offer thanks to my friends in Korea. I was hosted by both the Asiatic Research Institute and the International Center for Korean Studies at Korea University, respectively in 2012 and in 2013-2014. Being asked to present my research on a number of occasions pushed me to rethink my project for people in Korean Studies and I appreciate the helpful feedback on these occasions and others. Especially helpful were Chen Bihong 陈碧泓, Wu Xiaoli 吴小莉, Master Kyong Wan, Nan Kim, Tae Yang Kwak, Choi Yong-chol, and Choi Seung Youn. Professor Park Sang-soo from the Department of History proved to be particularly knowledgeable about Asianism and a number of conversations, as well the books he loaned to me or recommended, undoubtedly helped to improve this work.  Funding for this project came from a number of sources that were all essential for my writing and research. I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a Canada Graduate Scholarship and Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement, UBC for the 4YF Fellowship, the Department of History for various research awards and bursaries, the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for doctoral funding through the Canadian Asian Studies Association, the Japan Foundation for six months of study and research support, Korea University’s Asiatic Research Institute for the Fellowship for Northeast Asian Studies, Academia Sinica for the Doctoral Candidate Fellowship and the International Center for Korean Studies for providing one year of office space and other support at Korea University. I thank my family, Karl, Leah, Kevin, Taiwei, Dad, Rachel, Maksym and Kieran, for love and support. And finally I thank my wife. Songjoo, you put up with all my frustrations, political tantrums, student poverty, and constantly moving from country to country for years, yet you always remained optimistic and gave me your love and encouragement. Thank you.  1  Introduction In 2006 China’s ambassador to Japan introduced his theory of “New Asianism” to the Chinese public. Wang Yi is now the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.1 He rose to success at the Tokyo embassy where he served as ambassador from 2004 to 2007. During this time, which saw relations with Japan worsen over the Yasukuni Shrine visits, the textbook controversy and numerous anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, he formulated his own theory of Asianism as a plan to strengthen China-Japan ties and provide a terminology for the peaceful future of East Asia based on cultural commonalities. His 2006 article in Foreign Affairs Review 外交評論 discusses his “New Asianism” and the three principles that Wang sees as guiding his theory and representing Eastern civilization 東方文明: “cooperation” 合作, “openness” 開放 and “harmony” 和諧.2 In the article Wang draws upon late-nineteenth and early twentieth century Asianism, but concludes by arguing that New Asianism is a decidedly twenty-first century approach for Asia’s future.  Wang’s vaguely worded return to this concept was driven by his intention to emphasize China’s role as Asian leader in its peaceful rise, in which it cooperates with other East Asian nations. At the same time his “Asianism” offered a very diplomatic critique of Japanese imperialism. But why was a senior Chinese diplomat making reference to                                                  1 Wang Yi 王毅 was officially appointed to this post on March 16, 2013. 2 Wang Yi 王毅, “Sikao Ershiyishiji de Xin Yazhouzhuyi” 思考二十一世纪的新亚洲主义 (Considering Neo-Asianism in the Twenty-First Century), Waijiao Pinglun 外交评论 89 (June, 2006), 6-10. Also available in English translation by Torsten Weber in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 361-369. 2  discussions of Asianism from one hundred years earlier in 2006? And does his Asianism relate to that introduced more than one hundred years ago? This dissertation returns to discussions of East Asian solidarity between 1898 and 1924, but examines Chinese rather than Japanese visions of a greater political identity to combat Western imperialism. I show that there was indeed such a thing as Chinese Asianism and that this concept developed throughout a crucial period in the construction of the Chinese nation and its particular processes of modernity. Throughout these years, efforts towards regionalism paradoxically worked to alter and support the construction of Chinese nationalism. Focusing on texts following the Sino-Japanese War and concluding with Sun Yat-sen’s famous 1924 endorsement of a Sinocentric Asianism, this dissertation studies a period in which the Chinese empire is crumbling and intellectuals are struggling to adapt to new forms of imperialism, political-economy and thought. From my readings of these texts I found that Asianism, loosely defined as a call for the countries of East Asia to unite in the face of Western imperialism, frequently returned to intellectual debates during this period. Intellectuals3 as diverse as Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Ye Chucang 葉楚傖, Li Dazhao 李大釗 and Sun Yat-sen endorsed some form of Asianism in these years. These discussions on Asianism altered the construction of Chinese identity, engaging in a dialogue                                                  3 There is debate on the use of this term in the field of Chinese history, partly stemming from the fact that these individuals did not refer to themselves as intellectuals 知識分子, a term which came into use much later, and also due to the later construction of intellectuals as a class and social category beginning in the 1920s. Here I am using the English term in a much more general sense, including all of those who engage in and produce writings on thought. For more on the term, see Eddy U, “ The Making of Chinese Intellectuals: Representations and Organization in the Thought Reform Campaign,” The China Quarterly, No. 192 (Dec., 2007), pp. 971-989. 3  which worked both in concert with and in opposition to nationalism, further fortressing the construction of Chinese nationalism with elements of a metanational identity related to race, civilization, Confucian tradition, and a strong connection to geographic region. Critics looking at East Asia today correctly point to the difficulties of any form of regional cooperation with the continued agitation of unresolved territorial claims and emotionally overpowering issues, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute, the Spratly Islands dispute, the comfort women of World War II, textbook controversies, Yasukuni Shrine visits, and numerous other transnational issues. However, despite all of these problems, discussions of regionalization and a future Asian Union continue to appear as many Asian intellectuals see such regionalization as a political inevitability and an economic necessity. This form of regionalization is seen as acquiescing to the transnational realities of the twenty-first century. However, looking to discussions from more than one hundred years earlier, it seems that such political regionalization may not be an inevitability, although the idea has long been seen as such due to East Asia’s close economic and cultural ties. Historians encountering the question of an East Asian region point out the long existence of a world system that included most of East Asia and had considerable influence upon the entire world.4 They also note the repeated attempts to put into practice some form                                                  4 Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times,” The Journal of Asian Studies 69.4 (November 2010), 963-983. Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K Gills, The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). Shigeru Akita (ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History (Basingstoke, 2002). 4  of East Asian regional system from the late-nineteenth century to the final and abysmal failure of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1945. Unlike most twenty-first century discussions of regionalization, which tend to be International Relations’ assessments of economic and security benefits,5  most of the regionalist texts written by East Asian intellectuals before World War II utilized concepts of regional culture, race, tradition and morality as the bases for integration, even when the real focus was military or economic strategy. Japanese intellectuals and politicians were by far the most prolific of writers on the subject, with their writings turning from late-nineteenth century condemnations of the Japanese government’s abandoning of Asia to the 1930s and 1940s discursive support of Japanese imperialism. Although this dissertation focuses upon Chinese, rather than Japanese, discussions of Asianism, the scope of this discourse can be quite extensive and it is necessary to consider the definition of the term and its relevant contexts. The term “Asianism” 亞細亞主義 does not appear in Sinitic characters until the year 1912, when it was proposed in the pages of the Shanghai Kuomintang newspaper People’s Stand 民立報 by a Japanese diplomat before being seriously considered and expounded upon by Kuomintang publisher and propagandist Ye Chucang in March of 1913.6 Both before and                                                  5 For example see the popular Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). Also: John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Or: Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity,” in T.J. Pempel (ed.) Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, 195-215 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 6 The People’s Stand lists the Japanese politician as Ibuka Hikotarō 井深彦太郎. However, as I have been unable to find such a person, I am quite sure that the writer was Ibuka Hikosaburō井深彦三郎. This is explained in chapters IV and VI.  5  after this date, the concept of Asianism existed without the term.7 And here I am required to offer a much longer definition than the one given above: Asianism is the belief in a united “East” based upon racial and/or civilizational commonalities that extend across East Asia (and sometimes across all of Asia) and are in contrast with a perceived “West.” Therefore, the imagining of the region goes hand-in-hand with the construction of an identity. This transcending Asia, based in part on Orientalist views of East Asia, is a reversal of Orientalism, an effort to abrogate the West’s claim to civilization. Unlike the Saidian understanding of Orientalism, in East Asian visions of the East, intellectuals show agency through the appropriation of dichotomies of difference for their own discursive purposes. The connection to Said’s Orientalism is palpable. However, this is not a study of Orientalism. While Orientalist texts contribute to the construction of a binary that underlines a power differential positing the West over the East, Asianism attempts to discursively abrogate the power differential and plan for the material annulment of Western superiority. Although Asianism acquiesces to some of the imposed binaries of Orientalism, the discourse denies their power and reverts them, reconceptualising the binaries to serve the East rather than oppose it.  If the terms “discourse” and “imagined” seem to appear frequently in the above paragraphs, this is because this dissertation fully accepts the argument that a region is                                                  7 My repeated reference of Asianism as a “concept” is in appreciation of the recently popular conceptual history, introduced and defined as Begriffsgeschichte by Reinhart Koselleck. As Timothy Cheek explains, conceptual history “provides a frame to tell the life of an idea by looking for fundamental ideas, or concepts, and how they are deployed,” thereby offering a link between intellectual history and social history. Cheek defines a concept as “a word representing an idea that is both powerful enough in a certain discourse to direct thought and ambiguous enough to hold within it a range of meanings.” Therefore, this study follows the concept of Asianism through relevant contexts, concentrating upon intellectuals’ overlapping assumptions and areas of discord in order to reveal the life of the concept. See Timothy Cheek, “Chinese Socialism as Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” in Frontiers of History in China 9.1 (2014), 102-124. 6  foremost a discursive construction. Furthermore, the construction of a region, including its boundaries and its characteristics is largely arbitrary, as we see by the fluid and often opportunistic understanding of the “East” or “Asia” in the texts studied in this dissertation.  “Asia,” just like Asianism, is a concept. And this concept signifies much more than the geographic space indicated by its continent. How Chinese intellectuals viewed this concept and the spatial relations that were used to define it, and by which they often defined themselves and their “other,” the West, is a focus of this dissertation. Space has been a widely popular method for historians to rethink their understanding of the past in recent decades, often building upon Henri Lefebre’s work. More recently this mode of thinking has been employed to consider our spacial conceptualization of large regions or continents. Moving beyond Said’s criticism of Western constructions of the East, Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis argue that “the division between East and West is entirely arbitrary,” and that all metageographic concepts are not based in science, but are discursive constructs.8 Lewis and Wigen consider that we must move beyond these metageographic signifiers which hinder our understanding of the world due to their arbitrary generalization.  This leads to a question that inevitably arises in reading Lewis and Wigen’s work: If Asia is a constructed concept, for what and whose purpose is it constructed? To understand this I turn to another book that grapples with the idea of a constructed region: In struggling to define the “Pacific Rim” for the introduction of a book that includes a broad array of                                                  8 Wigen and Lewis define metageography as “the set of spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the world.” Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), xi and 3. 7  articles, Arif Dirlik introduces What is in a Rim? with the understanding that the Pacific Rim is an “invented concept,” and its material basis is “defined best not by physical geography, but by relationships (economic, social, political, military, and cultural) that are concretely historical.”9 “Relationships” define the region. Joshua Fogel conceptualizes the importance of such historical relationships by describing the Sinosphere as an ever-changing atom with China as its centre. And like an atom, the core and its “orbiting entities” are interdependent.10 Yet it is not only the relationships within the region, but also those between the region and other regions or peoples that define East Asia. Like national identities, regional identities are products of these relationships, their conflicts and their cooperation. “Asia” may be a European term,11 indicating that the vocabulary and worldview of Asianism are products of imperialism, but the region was constructed by the peoples of Asia and their relationships. Therefore, although I agree with Wigen and Lewis’s project, at least in the respect of correcting geographic ignorance, I find that the constructed binaries of East and West were useful in their employment for a strategy of resistance in the twentieth century, in which an organized and imperialist West did threaten East Asia. In this sense Asianism mimicked Orientalist binaries and appropriated them to an anti-hegemonic discourse.                                                  9 Arif Dirlik, “Introducing the Pacific,” in Arif Dirlik (ed.), What is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea, 3-11 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 4. 10 Joshua A. Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4. 11 The term “Asia” is generally believed to be Greek in origin. At the very least, it was through Greek that the term entered other European languages and then became a common term around the world. However, there is research to show that the term may be based on the Babylonian term asu, meaning to rise, and therefore a term stemming from an Asian language and indicating the rising of the sun. Hay, Stephen N., Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13. 8  But Asianism was not only an anti-hegemonic discourse. Just like nationalism, regionalism has the propensity to oppose external oppression, but is also frequently utilized as a tool of oppression as well. No discussion of Asianism is complete without consideration of Japanese imperialism. In the 1930s and 1940s Asianism legitimized and apologized for Japanese military expansionism. Although this dissertation is concerned with the period before that, we can see the evidence of a growing threat in all of these texts. Despite efforts to avoid seeing Japan as a monolithic force, and acknowledging that most Japanese Asianists, even many in the wartime years, were not necessarily imperialistic, in writing this dissertation I also felt the need to remain sensitive to the turmoil that East Asia would enter in the 1930s while remaining open to the perspective that intellectuals would have had in their time. So although this dissertation ostensibly concerns Chinese discussions of Asianism, it inevitably focuses on Sino-Japanese intellectual relations. The history of modern Asianism repeatedly sees a Japanese engagement and a Chinese response. In fact, other than a few localizations of terminology, almost all names or keywords for Asianist beliefs originated in Japanese.12 It will be no surprise then that the vast majority of academic works concerning Asianism are to be found in Japanese Studies and often all but ignore Chinese and other non-Japanese voices.                                                  12 These include “raise Asia” (Ch/Ja: xingya/kōa 興亞), Great Eastern Federation (dadongbanghe/daitō gappō 大東合邦 保全中國), Japan-China cooperation (rizhong tixie/nicchū teikei 日中提攜), Asian union (Yazhou liandai/yaxiya rentai 亞洲連帶), Japan-China alliance (rizhong tongmeng/nicchū dōmei 日中同盟), East Asia alliance (dongya lianmeng/tōa renmei 東亞聯盟), Asianism (yazhouzhuyi/ajiashugi 亞洲主義), Great Asianism (dayazhouzhuyi/daiajiashugi 大亞洲主義), Pan-Asianism (fanyazhouzhuyi/hanajiashugi 泛亞洲主義), the East Asian Community (dongyagongtongti/tōakyōdōtai 東亞共同體, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (dadongya gongrongtuan/daitōakyoueiken 大東亞共榮圈). 9  Literature Review Not long after the end of World War II, the terms Asianism and pan-Asianism,13 which had been tainted by their close relation to Japanese imperialism, were politically retired. To even suggest that there were positive elements of this concept was to risk being labelled an apologist for Japanese war efforts. 14  Although a number of left-leaning critics, notably Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好, used Asianism to critique imperialism, the Japanese government and post-war capitalism, the academy generally followed the political path of the government and very few studies were conducted on the subject until recent decades.15 Studies first began to appear cautiously in Korean and Japanese, the languages in which most of this research is still conducted. English language studies that touched on Asianism, such as numerous works by Joshua Fogel and Akira Iriye, occasionally appeared, but as Fogel explains in his preface to Lu Yan’s monograph, Re-Understanding Japan, it was not until very recently that there existed a variety of English-language books on Sino-Japanese relations.16  Due to the memory of Japanese imperialism, there have also been problems in researching Asianism in China. However, recently this has been a renewed area of research,                                                  13 Pan-Asianism is the long standardized term for discussing the 1930s and 1940s Asianism propagated by the imperial Japanese government. In discussing this period I will often use the term for continuity with past research. The term pan-Asianism is inseparable from Asianism and had been used in Chinese as fanyaxiyazhuyi and dayaxiyazhuyi 汎/大亞細亞主義 at least as early as 1912. 14 Eri Hotta remarks that this is still the case in Japan in Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 232. 15 Takeuchi made many contributions to the study of Asianism, including his own writings and his collection of sources: Takeuchi, Yoshimi 竹内好, Ajia shugi アジア主義 (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1963). For a brief description of Takeuchi, his Asianism and his research in context, see; Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 29-30. And Christian Uhl, “Takeuchi Yoshimi, ‘Japan’s Asianism,’ 1963,” in Saaler and Szpilman 2011b, 217-226.  16 Joshua Fogel, preface in Lu Yan, Re-understanding Japan: Chinese Perspectives, 1895-1945, (Honolulu: Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), xi. 10  and Western scholarship has benefited greatly from English language translations of important work in China.17 Prasenjit Duara makes it clear that the pan-Asian discourse of Eastern civilization “flourished in China as an intellectual, cultural and social movement” from 1911 until 1945, yet it has been ignored or dismissed in historiography due to nationalist sensitivities.18 This dissertation agrees with Duara but sees the discourse as evolving fifteen years earlier. The recent acceleration in the studies of Sino-Japanese relations and Asianism are related to new perceptions of the nationalist sensitivities mentioned by Duara, as academics have striven to deconstruct the nation over the last two to three decades. Also, as Rana Mitter suggests in his preface to Eri Hotta’s monograph, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931-1945, it is only natural that we look again to the long-silenced Asianism, now that there is renewed talk of “Asia” and “Asian values” in China and Japan, and now that China, Japan and India have found rapprochement in the twenty-first century.19 This is certainly an important reason for the publishing of Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann’s book, which explores the ambiguity of the ideology as “a precursor of contemporary Asian regionalism.”20 However, Japanese imperialism has remained the dominant issue for all discussions of Asianism. Most academic works on Asianism refer to the debate on Japan either “leaving or leading Asia” as the roots of Japanese Asianism.21 This debate concerned whether Japan could                                                  17 See, for instance, articles by Sun Ge and Wang Hui translated into English and published in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader. Kuan-Hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat Eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 18 Duara 2000, 112.  19 Rana Mitter, preface in Eri Hotta 2007, ix. 20 Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 1 21 Saaler 2007, 3-4. Hotta 2007, 54-57. Hashikawa 1980, 328-330. Bharucha 2006, xvii-xviii. Duara 2000, 101. 11  become a “Western” nation, completely adopting a role in the system of nation-states and becoming an imperial power in its own right and attacking other Asian nations, or, as the most developed nation in the East, become the leader of a united East in order to counter Western imperialism. Although these choices reflected very different opinions on how to engage in power dynamics in Asia, both were based upon a reaction to the West. The continuing debate resulted in two conflicting discourses which characterized Japanese policy towards China until the end of World War II. This conflict is important to any discussion of Asianism and has provided the central focus for many studies.22 Recent studies of Japanese (pan-) Asianism have gone much further into defining and breaking down the concept. One method of doing this has been periodization, considering the differences in Asianist thought over time. This figures heavily in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann’s recent book, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. In Saaler’s introductory article he defines three periods which experienced different dominant forms of Asianism: The Meiji period had only a vague ideology of Asianism despite regular discussion.23 Much discussion and the occurrence of crucial Asian institutions in the late Meiji, such as the Tōa Dōbun-kai 東亞同文會, led into a more organized period for Asianist ideology during the Taisho reign. Largely based upon the belief of “same script” 同文 and “same race” 同種/同族, the Asianism of this period strove for equality across East Asia and                                                  Sun Ge 2007, 11-13. 22 Such as Bunso Hashikawa. “Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity.” In Akira Iriya ed. The Chinese and the Japanese, 328-355 (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). 23 Saaler 2007, 9. 12  unity in facing Western imperialism.24 Finally, Saaler sees an imperial form of Asianism as being employed to legitimize Japanese colonial rule in the 1930s and 1940s.25 A similar periodization is mentioned throughout Saaler’s book and has its roots in the “groundbreaking research” of Hazama Naoki in various studies in 2001 and 2002.26 The first two periods that Saaler discusses are of great concern to this dissertation and Saaler’s work has helped me to contextualize Chinese texts in regards to Japanese Asianism. However, although this periodization is somewhat helpful in imagining a narrative history of Asianism, it is misleading for the contexts of this study as all of these forms of Asianism were thriving in the late Meiji period. I find that a categorization by specifics in the ideology provides more useful tools of analysis. Eri Hotta provides this form of analysis in Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War. In her investigation of the “15 Year War” from 1931 until 1945, Hotta employs three categories to consider pan-Asianism: 1. Tea-ist pan-Asianism emphasized Asian commonalities in philosophical dimensions. Often in binary opposition to the West, this was a concentration on aspects of Asian civilization, such as communalism as opposed to Western liberalism. 2. Sinic pan-Asianism sought to create an alliance among Asian nations, especially those of East Asia, based upon “same script,” and “same-race” arguments. 3. Meishuron 盟主論 pan-Asianism, which dominated in the 1930s and 1940s, posited Japan as an “Asian alliance leader” against Western                                                  24 Ibid, 10-11. 25 Ibid, 12. 26 According to Kuroki Morifumi “The Asianism of the Koa-kai and the Ajia Kyokai” in Saaler 2007, 34-35. 13  imperialism.27 It should be clear that Hotta’s categorization is very similar to the periodization in Saaler’s work that I have described above. Hotta manages to avoid the confines of periodization, showing that all three of these forms of pan-Asianism were evident throughout the war despite the clear dominance of Meishuron pan-Asianism. These features of pan-Asianism were also all present during the 1910s when Chinese intellectuals engaged with them, although it is what Hotta refers to as “Tea-ist” and “Sinic” pan-Asianism that Chinese intellectuals showed interest in. Unsurprisingly, non-Japanese intellectuals rejected or abhorred the “Meishuron” pan-Asianism that legitimized Japanese dominance and inevitably supported the turn to militarism.  This categorization scheme is still limited, yet Hotta’s categories of pan-Asianism and her in-depth analysis of ideology in wartime Japan, although not clearly defined enough to incorporate all aspects of pan-Asianism, provide an excellent beginning, and demonstrates that Japan’s imperialism was not merely about material pragmatism, but had an ideological background. The complexities of Asianism do demand further analysis. Most importantly, China and other areas need to be taken into consideration.  Douglas Reynolds has done excellent work in picking apart the relationship of China and Japan during what he calls the “Golden Decade,” the period beginning with the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and ending shortly after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. During this time, thousands of Chinese students traveled to Japan to study, and                                                  27 Hotta 2007, 7-8.  14  Japanese advisors were hired across all levels of government and non-government institutions. Although I question Reynolds’ use of the term “Golden Decade” to refer to what I see as the beginnings of a hegemonic relationship, his study has provided one of the starting points for this work and allows a glimpse of the depth and complexity of Chinese intellectual and elite involvement in Japan during this period. In his work to write against the nation, Prasenjit Duara provides an excellent examination of discourses of Asianism in China, especially the non-national redemptive societies. What is special about Duara’s work is his concentration upon civilization, an issue I turn to in Chapter IV. Duara sees Asianism as a form of identity in the twentieth century that was different from nationalism and race due to its base in civilization.28 He then narrates a history of the idea of civilization. This begins with the Civilization - with a capital C, denoting its singularity as a proper noun - of the West, entering Japan via Fukuzawa Yukichi’s 福沢諭吉 writings and then being brought to China by Liang Qichao. This discourse, a crucial part of the West’s ideology of imperialism authorized nations based on their level of Civilization.29 The Darwinist model of progress that this referred to remained after World War I, but the idea of one Civilization dramatically gave way to the idea of many cultures/civilizations, based on Herder’s concept of kultur, as nationalism finally triumphed over imperialism as the “hegemonic global ideology” in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination and the Soviet Revolution.30 The importance of Duara’s work is that it attempts                                                  28 Duara 2000, 99-100. 29 Ibid, 100. 30 Ibid, 101, 103, 105. 15  to find answers to why nation and Asianism were so conflated in the twentieth century. Duara finds that Asianism is a discourse based on civilization, which has its roots in the nation-validated discourse of Civilization, which has led to the tension and conflation between Asianism and nation.31 His most recent work on the subject returns to these ideas, but further draws out the complicated relationship between Asianism and nationalism by considering Rabindranath Tagore, Okakura Tenshin and Zhang Taiyan as Asianist intellectuals in the early twentieth century.32 This paradox between nation and region lies at the heart of Asianism. Rustom Bharucha had previously captured this with his own analysis of Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin. Despite Tagore and Okakura being friends and both having tremendous influence on concepts of Asianism, Tagore’s “opposition to the nation is relentless, bordering at times on hysteria,” while Okakura was an ultra-nationalist who believed in Japan’s unquestioning leadership of Asia.33 Their unlikely friendship, however, is logical when considering their unwavering opposition to Western imperialism. The paradoxical coexistence of Japanese nationalism and Asianism based on opposition to the West is a current that has a long continuity in the twentieth century and has featured in many other studies. Christopher W. A. Szpilman provides an excellent example of the “contradictions inherent in pan-Asianism” in present day Japan in his chapter in Saaler’s book.34 He explains that the current mayor of                                                  31 Ibid, 125-126. 32 Duara 2010, 963-983. 33 Rustom Barucha, Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 67 and 17-20. 34 Christopher W. A. Szpilman in Saaler 2007, 85. 16  Tokyo published a pan-Asian pamphlet in 1994 and is still a proponent of the cause. He has, however, repeatedly made racially motivated verbal attacks on Koreans and Chinese. This provides remarkable continuity with the debate of whether to attack or unite peacefully with other Asian nations.  The work of Szpilman and Saaler has continued to prove fruitful. Their collaboration on the 2011 publication of Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History provided scholars with a two volume sourcebook, translating dozens of Asianist texts from a myriad of languages, complete with detailed introductions and annotations for each text.35 This collection has proved to be extremely useful for this dissertation and represents a high point in a new trend in the study of Asianism that has been evident over the last few decades. What these new studies of Asianism have shown is that Asianism was not merely rhetoric to justify imperialism, as was often insinuated by academics before, but an important and complicated transnational discourse with a strong continuity from the mid-nineteenth century.  The importance of this discourse has also been clearly shown. Hotta convincingly argues for the importance of the study of Asianism as it is crucial to our understanding of the fifteen years of war between China and Japan. According to Hotta, it was pan-Asianism that “started, sustained and even prolonged Japan’s war from 1931 to 1945.”36 In China the influence of Asianism as a discourse of civilization in contrast to the West’s imperialism has also been shown, although not in any direct study. Lu Yan has shown the importance of this                                                  35 Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (eds) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 36 Hotta 2007, 16. 17  discourse to Dai Jitao, how it became crucial to the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen’s death and the important role it played in defining his fierce anti-communism.37 Asianism also justified the work of collaborators during the war and urged the Kuomintang to postpone their defense of China. It is largely due to these reasons that it is only recently that the study of this regionalization has been renewed in the Chinese language. Beginning with Sheng Banghe’s 盛邦和 article “Japanese Asianism at the Turn of the 20th Century” in 2000, a new approach to studying Asianism has been appearing in Chinese writing.38 This new approach steps back from the excessively critical approach before it and sees early Asianism in a more positive light that focused on an equality among nations as they stood together to oppose Western aggression. Wang Ping’s 王屏 Modern Japan’s Asianism took this a step further in 2006.39 This full book length study is of great significance, not only because it marks a turning point in the study of Japan by Chinese scholars, almost ignoring previous Chinese studies on the subject, but also because of Wang’s position. She is a scholar at the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, but also serves on various government think-tanks on Japan policy. She remains a regular contributor to official Chinese news, such as the Renmin Ribao on current issues in Japan. Wang is not only a historian, she is influential in Chinese political circles, serving on CCP think-tanks for policy on Japan, and a committed Asianist, hoping to see steps towards China and Japan’s formation of a European                                                  37 Lu Yan 2007, 151. 38 Sheng Banghe 盛邦和, “19 shiji yu 20 shiji zhijiao de Riben Yazhouzhuyi” 19 世纪与 20 世纪之交的日本亚洲主义 (Japanese Asianism at the Turn of the 20th Century) in Historical Research 历史研究 vol.3 (2000), 125-135. 39 Wang Ping 王屏, Jindai Riben de Yaxiyazhuyi 近代日本的亞細亞主義 (Modern Japan’s Asianism), (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2004). 18  Union-like organization in the coming decades. Works by Sheng Banghe and Wang Ping have had an influence upon the writing of this dissertation as they show the way to return to early twentieth century with a degree of caution but with an open mind and a perspective that does not simply view Japan and its writers as monolithic. Another interesting development in recent writings is the move to a new conceptualization of Asia. This is seen in recent writings by Wang Hui 汪晖 and Sun Ge 孙歌, but especially in the work of Chen Kuan-Hsing 陳光興. Chen returns to Lu Xun and the work done by Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好 to see “Asia as Method.” Through this he urges scholars to move beyond the dichotomy of East and West and see Asia without the perspective of the imperialist eye, changing both our vantage and focus points in order to posit Asian Studies in Asia as a method in which the processes of deimperialization and decolonization can be undertaken.40 Although not directly concerning Asian regionalism, these studies are important in their rethinking of the concept of Asia, its importance and its study. Like Takeuchi and his more recent adherents, Chinese Asianists from the early twentieth century saw Asia as the “East” as a concept in opposition to Europe and its capitalist modernity. Throughout this dissertation, but particularly in chapters IV and VI, I return to writers who discuss Asia, not merely as a binary opposite to Europe, but as a source for redemption and the possibility of worldwide transcendence to a more moral and just stage of human existence.                                                  40 Chen Kuan-hsing 陳光興. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010). 19  In fact, Chinese discussions of Asianism, although by no means presenting a consistent discourse, offered a consistently anti-hegemonic discourse that opposed imperialism and offered the people of East Asia a possibility for strategic alliance. The existing literature on Asianism views this discourse as an invariably Japanese line of thinking. However, this dissertation makes use of documents that have remained undiscovered or ignored to show that Asianism was added to, contested, inverted and reinvented by a number of Chinese intellectuals between 1896 and 1924. This dissertation differs from the above literature due its focus upon Chinese intellectuals, examining how their encounters with Japanese Asianism and Western imperialism led to the construction of an “East” in opposition to negative elements of a perceived “West.” Previous studies of Asianism have concentrated upon Japanese imperialism and wartime Asianism. Aside from a few studies of Sun Yat-sen,41 there have been no book length studies of Chinese Asianism.42 This study provides the first study to fill a glaring hole that hinders our understanding of Sino-Japanese history and the history of imperialism. There is still the need for much more study in this area. Early Asian regionalism was grounded in complex and contradictory discourse, but it offers valuable insight in linking and making sense of important elements of twentieth century East Asian history, particularly the                                                  41 Most notably Marius Jansen’s 1954 study, but also Li Taijing 李台京, Zhongshan xiansheng daYazhouzhuyi yanjiu: lishi huigu yu dangdai yiyi 中山先生大亞洲主義研究:歷史回顧與當代意義 (A Study of Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism: Historical Memory and Contemporary Significance), (Taipei: Wenshizhu chubanshe, 1992). 42 Zhao Jun provides the closest to this with his 1997 book DaiAjiashugi to Chūgoku. However, the book still concentrates on Japanese Asianists and their interactions with China, rather than on Chinese Asianists. Zhao Jun 趙軍, DaiAjiashugi to Chūgoku (大アジア主義と中国 Pan-Asianism and China), (Tokyo: Akishobō, 1997).  20  rise of nationalism in relation to the region. New developments have also brought the issue of Asianism back into current academic debate. The increasing importance of ASEAN + 3, the Confucianism of Lee Kuan Yew, and Tu Wei-ming’s Confucian World are related to the reemergence of Sinic Asianism and examples of the need to remember these early imaginings of Asia in China and remember the lessons and idealism they offered. If early twentieth century Asianism really is, as Sven Saaler understands it, “a precursor of contemporary Asian regionalism,” we need to give further attention to its early beginnings in the Chinese language.43 Few studies have acknowledged non-Japanese intellectual writing on Asianism. Those that do have tended to only mention Li Dazhao and Sun Yat-sen, as these two thinkers directly used the term “Asianism” in the titles of their articles and speeches. However, as shown below, numerous intellectuals wrote about Asian regionalism in various forms as a strategic plan to escape from the ills brought by Western imperialism. In addition, this study will show how both the acceptance and rejection of Asianism played an important role in the development of Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of nation, state, and their relation to the non-Western world. These discussions of Asianism were discussions of identity and they greatly influenced other forms of identity formation in China, particularly influencing Chinese nationalism by contributing to definitions of inclusiveness and exclusiveness on categories including classical concepts of tianxia, race, culture, region, and shared victimhood.  Intellectuals defined themselves, their nation and their civilization sphere as they constructed self-other relationships through changing concentric circles of identity. Central to this is the relationship between China and Japan, and the two countries’ sliding                                                  43 Saaler 2000, 1. 21  definition as nation and empire.  Contextualizing China and Japan: Nations and Empires In the final decades of the nineteenth century, China was in an ever-deepening crisis. While a number of domestic wars were causing untold grief within the country, the Western imperial powers were increasingly taking liberties and making their might felt along China’s coastline. Both Western and Chinese scholars have investigated Chinese intellectuals’ responses to this situation from the perspective of China’s difficulties in engaging with or entering into the system of nation-states. However, the powers that China was encountering in the nineteenth century were not nation-states, but were empires. The system that China was struggling to enter was not simply a system of nation-states, but was a system of empires, and the imperial desire was ever present. Therefore, while Chinese intellectuals were defining and understanding Chinese nationalism vis-à-vis British liberalism and Western racism, they were also having to deal with the realist issue that the creation of any nation-state that was based solely upon a Han nationality would divide China and be tantamount to offering their people to the imperialists on a plate. The protection of their race and national group being of the utmost importance, the only option was to work towards a political entity that would have a possibility of competing with the existing world empires. A multi-national empire was not necessarily difficult to imagine. China had long been such an empire. While China was struggling to be both empire and nation, Japan was a nation bent on becoming an empire. The view of Japan’s unique position as an empire created in reaction to the West’s 22  imperialism is a widely accepted viewpoint in English-language historiography since the work of Marius Jansen. This method of analysis concentrates on the political side of the equation. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie agreed with Jansen, affirming that “Japanese imperialism was reactive, in the sense that Japan’s expansion on the continent was in large part undertaken to guarantee the nation’s strategic frontiers at the flood tide of Western advance in Asia.”44 These scholars disagree with classical models of empire by insisting that politics were still firmly in command. Unlike Marxist criticisms of empire, which exposed the monopolies of large and often transnational banks as directing the impulse to imperialism, these scholars are interested in “deliberate state policy directed toward the exploitation of less-developed peoples and territories for continuing material and economic advantage by an economically advanced power.” 45  This political impulse to imperialism in the relative absence of domestic capital reveals the ability of capitalism and its relations of production to replicate itself on the scale of empire. Understanding this impulse is necessary for revealing the complexities of Japanese political history, but also elements of Chinese intellectual history and their relation to Asianism. Both Chinese and Japanese intellectuals were living in an ambiguous political form that was sometimes oppressed nation and sometimes oppressive empire, but always maintained a desire for the imperial. Aside from the financial gains of modernization and empire, intellectuals aspired to these ends out of a need to save the people and Confucian desire for good governance. Charting the course of classical political concepts as they were accommodated or butchered in the violent process of modernization is not an                                                  44 Myers and Peattie 1984, 8. 45 Ibid, 11. 23  easy task, but there are some concepts that should be followed as we consider this process and the concentric circles of identity in East Asia. Xu Jilin has charted how the two classical concepts of Tianxia-ism 天下主義 and the Yi-Xia distinction 夷夏之辨 changed in the modern period with the violent entry of the discourse of civilization. Tianxia-ism refers to the concentric circles of identity and geography from classical Chinese thought which were centred upon the norms and values of what is now East China, while the Yi-Xia distinction was tianxia’s accompanying concept which posited foreigners as Yi and Chinese as Xia.46 Xu explains that: Tianxia-ism centred upon Chinese civilization transformed into the discourse of civilization centred upon the West. And the Yi-Xia distinction modeled upon East China’s culture became the discourse of race based on social Darwinism. The complex interactions and entwined overlap between these two concepts resulted in a profound influence upon the national (state) identity of modern China.47 Although I agree with this and appreciate Xu’s careful detailing of the process of intellectual change and paradigm shift, I would add that this new paradigm of civilization was not completely accepted and the rejection of the superiority of Western civilization on spiritual and moral matters during this period contributed to the dichotomy that allowed for                                                  46 As Xu Jilin explains in his article, this concept differed from modern racism as it was based on relative attributes that could be changed should the Yi accept Chinese cultural values and enter into the Chinese civilizational sphere. Race, however, was an absolute categorization that could not be changed. 47 Xu Jilin 許記霖, “Tianxiazhuyi/Yixiazhibian ji qi zai jindai de bianyi” 天下主义/夷夏之辨及其在近代的变异 (Tianxiazhuyi and the Yi-China distinction and their changes in the modern period) in Journal of East China Normal University 6 (2012), 69. 24  the imagining of a united Asia based on racial and civilizational commonalities.48 It provided the foundations for the imagining of a united Asia that was an antithesis to European capitalism and imperialism. This was the underlying discourse that framed early-twentieth century Asianism as intellectuals struggled to imagine a united front that could defend against the violence that came with Western hegemony while also defensively mimicking many aspects of that violence. Inherent within the discourse of Asianism is the contradiction between an oppressive imperialism and a form of both national and regional liberation based in classical concepts. As the conditions which defined this contradiction became better suited to the rise of its imperialist form, Asianism took an ugly turn in the twentieth century. However, at an earlier juncture in the late Qing Dynasty, Asianism seemed an option for Chinese intellectuals. And they began imagining a liberated Asia based on classical virtues, governance and morality as a step towards world unity and the Confucian utopia of datong. Chapter Breakdown This dissertation relates a narrative of the construction of modern Chinese Asianism in dialogue with Japan Asianism, proceeding from a distressed encounter to an ambiguous rejection, and finally to a theoretical reconstruction. Beginning with Qing Dynasty intellectuals’ first encounters with Japanese discourses of Asianism, I show that there was very real dialogue for various levels of Sino-Japanese alliance around the time of the 1898 Reforms. These discussions are haphazard at best, but they do provide the building of                                                  48 And again here I agree with Xu Jilin that for many Chinese intellectuals, “the clash of races was essentially a clash of civilizations.” Xu 2012, 74. 25  intellectual networks and terminology that were important in the development of the concept of Asianism in both China and Japan in the twentieth century. Chapter II continues to consider the encounter with Asianism, but takes a markedly different approach by analyzing an institution that was born of Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Datong Schools 大同學校 in Japan. By investigating the intellectuals involved in the establishment of the schools, as well as the texts related to the schools, I show how the discourse of Asianism played an important role in this educational institution. Then by examining the students that graduated from the school, the texts they wrote and the organizations they founded, I show how strong feelings of nationalism and Asianism defined their lives, preparing the generation for a reordering of the dominant worldview. In the second part of this dissertation, I examine the failed attempts by intellectuals to reorganize their worldview in terms of race and civilization. These attempts did not end in the discarding of these paradigms, but saw them subsumed as the world was reimagined as a binary between oppressors and oppressed, as discussed in Part III. Chapter III examines the discourse of racial solidarity in Chinese writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, especially considering texts by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Zou Rong 鄒容, Liu Shipei 劉師培 and Chen Tianhua 陳天華. Through an analysis of revolutionaries’ writings I trace the partial rejection of this paradigm in favor of one that concentrates upon empire. In a similar vein, Chapter IV looks to the new paradigm of multiple civilizations as a means to categorize East and West. Focusing on texts from the Eastern Miscellany, I show how World War I led to a redefining of the East in opposition to the West. This period also 26  saw the translation of numerous Asianist texts from Japan, but as Eastern civilization was defined as anti-imperialist, forms of Japanese Asianism that posed the nation as Asia’s leader were inevitably rejected, leading to the necessity for a reconceptualizing of Asianism. The third part of this dissertation then discusses the dominant forms of Chinese Asianism that were theorized between 1917 and 1924. Although various intellectuals wrote about Asianism, the theories proposed by Li Dazhao and Sun Yat-sen have attracted the most attention and had the greatest influence. Chapter V then discusses Li’s theory of New Asianism as a reaction to Japanese imperialist regionalism. I find that this quasi-Marxist regional approach to a national struggle is an important part of the definition of Chinese Asianism, showcasing the bond of nationalism and Asianism.  Chapter VI continues to relate the narrative of the construction of Chinese Asianism, showing how the simple anti-imperialist regionalism of Li Dazhao was further theorized by the affirming of Confucian civilizational values at the centre of Chinese Asianism. Sun Yat-sen accentuated the importance of the Chinese nation to the region, but also showcased Asianism’s difficult balancing of nation and empire. While Sun offered a strategy for liberation from empire, his writing and speeches on Asianism inevitably contributed to possibilities for oppression by empire as they were appropriated by the Japanese and Wang Jing-wei governments in their propaganda campaigns during the 1930s and 1940s. This convoluted passage consistently returns to the precarious balance between nation and empire in the twentieth century, a problematique of modern Chinese history that continues to pose political problems for China today. The nation that Chinese people 27  constructed during this time was invariably related to discourses of identity that struggled to protect the self from a dangerous other. This process is the focus of this dissertation: By employing the history of the concept of Chinese Asianism as a lens through which we can reexamine the intellectual struggle with political modernity and the construction of nationalism, we see how metanational structures were fused into Chinese identities. Furthermore, we can peer into the sliding relationship that Asianism has with nation and empire. This arbitrariness has resulted in a complicated historical memory, accounting for the variety of positions on Asianism today and shedding light upon the surprising attempt by Foreign Minister Wang Yi to adapt “New Asianism” to China’s uses in the twenty-first century.   28   Part I: Chinese Reformers Encounter Asianism These first two chapters compose a section of this dissertation that outlines Chinese reformers encounters with Japanese Asianism at the end of the nineteenth century. In some ways these encounters set the stage for later discussions, as they introduced vocabulary, encouraged thousands of students to go to Japan, and cemented Sino-Japanese elite connections that would last for decades. However, they should also be seen as set apart from later discussions of Asianism, as the Japanese Asianism encountered in the late nineteenth century was distinct due to its egalitarian form, and the ensuing Chinese response was therefore particular to that form. The reformers were markedly pro-Japanese in these years, but their encounter with Asianism and with the modern system of nations and empires was framed within their classical world view, which was in the process of dramatic change. Accordingly, for the titles of these two chapters I have chosen two classical idioms that were frequently employed by Asianists during this time, and both of which to my mind are possessed of internal contradictions relevant to Asianism in general. Both “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze” 唇亡齒寒 and “The chariot and its (side-) car are interdependent” 輔車相依 have been used to indicate interdependence since their use in the Confucian classic Chunqiu Zuo Zhuan 春秋左傳, yet in both idioms the objects compared are quite different in form and power.   29   Chapter I: Lips and Teeth: Pro-Japanese Reformers on Empire and Federation, 1896 - 1898 China’s reform period of the late-nineteenth century, which centered upon the so-called Hundred Days Reform and is also often referred to as the 1898 reforms, has been recently revisited as a crucial node in the modernization of China.49 This period is marked by a new willingness for significant political and ideological change on the part of Chinese intellectuals and the Qing government as the Chinese system of empire was nearing its end. The reforms enacted in 1898 had a great influence upon education, industrialization, the military and the political system. The majority of the reform edicts were rescinded following the September 21 coup d’état, but a number of the changes were re-enacted a few years later. The reforms were not directly modelled on Western countries, but were attempts by Kang Youwei and the Guangxu Emperor to emulate the successes of the modernization reforms in Meiji Japan, and maintain the emperor as the head of state. Just years after the First Sino-Japanese War, many Chinese intellectuals were very interested in following Japan’s lead in order to free themselves from an increasingly powerful and imperialist West. However, cooperating with China’s Eastern neighbor during the rise of a new world system was not an avenue that Chinese intellectuals chose entirely willingly, but it was a choice that they made given the unfortunate circumstances.                                                  49 Rebecca Karl and Peter Zarrow detail this trend in recent Chinese scholarship in which “the 1898 reform period is now often raised as the originary moment of (an aborted effort at) nonsocialist modernization, to which China now has (finally) returned.” Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), quote: 4, discussion of trend: 2-6. 30  In China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan Douglas Reynolds argues that: “From 1898 to 1907, however, the relationship between China and Japan was so productive and relatively harmonious that it could rightly be called a ‘Golden Decade.’”50 Although China-Japan relations during these years were certainly productive, and even could be called harmonious, the term “Golden Decade” conceals the fact that this relationship was already plagued by power differentials steadily marching towards a colonial relationship. Furthermore, many Chinese intellectuals saw this relationship as a necessity during this confusing clash of worldviews, preferring to work with the empire that they knew and could understand. Chinese intellectuals were convinced of the benefits of turning to Japan through the growing discursive power of Japanese institutions and publications. At this early point in this new form of transnational relationship, as Chinese intellectuals became conscious of impending disaster, accommodative strategies were employed to reconcile their world order with the new imperial order of global capitalism. This was a gradual process, as new concepts were slowly absorbed and found legitimacy, while translators struggled to find equivalence within the Chinese language and history, establishing the discursive elements of a translated modernity. There was no true equivalence for these terms, concepts and culture, resulting in confusing attempts at reform. Efforts towards accommodation included both the real work towards a new political system and the ideological and intellectual underpinnings behind it.51                                                  50 Douglas Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1998), 5. 51 I am referring to what Max Ko-wu Huang and Thomas A. Metger refer to as the “accommodative” approach, in which late Qing reformers attempted to retain aspects of tradition in their attempts at modernization. For example, see Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2010). 31  And Japan offered an avenue for reformers to take towards these ends. Due to the great number of texts pointing to China-Japan cooperation or union during these years, the period just before the 1898 reforms is taken as the background for the first chapter on this study of Chinese discussions of Asianism. The complexities of how hegemony is actualized, disrupted or consented to are the focuses of this chapter. The pro-Japan turn was facilitated by both Japanese elite interested in China and Chinese elite turning to Japan for a reform blueprint. What is important here is the fact that there was a serious discussion of a sometimes surprising level of cooperation with Japan by Chinese intellectuals; and that these initial hopes for cooperation did lead to thousands of Chinese moving to Japan, largely to study Meiji reform successes for replication in China, including the reformers examined in Chapter II.  In this chapter, first I show how the threat of Russian imperialism coupled with the sudden surge in access to Japanese institutions and publications led Chinese intellectuals to Japanese solutions for coping with imperialism. I examine the writing and translation of specific pro-Japanese and Asianist texts just before or during the 1898 Reforms to show that the entry and influence of this material had a significant influence on Chinese reformers. And finally I consider the haphazard calls for union with Japan at the height of this reform movement, evidence of a desperation that was consuming these intellectuals. This chapter shows the importance that Asianism had upon Chinese intellectuals, their actions and their writing at this crucial point in Chinese history and also sets the intellectual stage for the reformers and revolutionaries’ continued cooperation with Japan. 32  Concentrating on a time when Chinese intellectuals were largely turning to Japan for physical or discursive assistance in their attempts at reform, this chapter tracks the development of the concept of a China-Japan alliance through an investigation of early Asianist institutions, publications and translations that suddenly became available in China due to the efforts for reform. What followed was an attempt to create an accommodative modernity, in which elements of a Sino-centric world system are combined with the new system of nation states. I argue that the growing influx of the Japanese Asianist institutions, publications and translations influenced the reformers to be increasingly pro-Japanese in the face of the Western threat. However, the various writings show that the reformers, including Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, saw alliance or even federation with Japan as a strategic partnership, turning to their neighbor in a disorderly and unsure manner out of desperation and a desire that their classical worldview could find accommodation with the rising capitalist world order ostensibly organized by nation-states. The sudden rise of pro-Japanese Asianism in China just before the Hundred Days Reform was packaged in a reformist Confucianism that nicely suited the classical training of these scholars and opened the door to possible cooperation for reform just a few short years after the two countries were at war. Introduction: The Reformers’ Strategic Turn towards Japan There can be no doubt that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Shimonoseki Treaty that followed it in 1895 was one of the most humiliating sequences of events for Chinese intellectuals in the history of modern China. The anger and frustration of numerous intellectuals can be seen in texts from the period. And in more recent times the events have 33  been returned to in popular media as anger towards this history have begun to eclipse the standardized bearer of foreign humiliation, the Opium War.52 Yet even immediately after the war, many Chinese scholars favoured a path that would bring them closer rather than further away from Japan. For the reformers, emulating the Meiji Reforms was crucial for China’s survival in the modern world of nation-states.  After his humiliation in Shimonoseki, which resulted in generations of Chinese loathing him, Li Hongzhang, the great statesman who signed the treaty, was opposed to further reconciliation with Japan. Li traveled to Russia in 1896 and signed the “Sino-Russian Secret Pact’ 中俄密約. This secret agreement, which was soon widely known, promised that Russia would support China in future conflicts with Japan.53 However, in the following year Russia continued to encroach upon Chinese territory. Kang Youwei had also been furious over the devastating Shimonoseki Treaty, but he took a very different approach from Li. In his famous Gongche Shangshu公車上書 he called for drastic change to the legal system of China based on the Japanese Meiji reforms. Only once the laws have changed, explained Kang, can China become powerful enough to take back the Ryūkyū Islands and Taiwan.54 But once Russia began infringing upon Chinese territory, Kang Youwei suggested joining the                                                  52 For an extremely popular dramatization of these events, see the television drama The Enchanting Years. The extended time given to the emperor’s ratification of the Shimonoseki Treaty, as well as the dramatic camera angles and sound, show the importance the director Zhang Li張黎 decided to bestow on this incident. Zhang Li 張黎. The Enchanting Years 《走向共和》 (Beijing: CCTV-1, First episode aired: April 12, 2003), 59 Episodes. 53 The agreement, signed on June 3, 1896, also allowed the Trans-Siberian Railway to be extended across Manchuria to Vladivostok. See Pei-kai Cheng and Michael Lestz with Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 173. 54 Wang Xiaoqiu 王晓秋. Jindai ZhongRi qishilu 近代中日启示录 (Modern Sino-Japanese Revelations), (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1987), 88. 34  British-Japanese Alliance. Only two years after the war with Japan he was arguing for union based upon the familiar Asianist saying of “lips and teeth” 唇齒 55 to describe the close relationship between the two countries. He argued:  “We and the Japanese are like lips and teeth. Russia and Germany have set their ambitions upon the Orient to the detriment of all... Invitations to unite are based upon true feelings.”56  The “lips and teeth” idiom indicated a form of interdependence with Japan that would not have been expressed by Chinese literati in the classical Sinosphere. However, it had been used by Japanese thinkers as early as the Opium Wars to express their fears of Western invasion.57 This reveals the remarkable change that was occurring in China as the literati struggled to accommodate the new reality in their classical discourse. Part of this accommodation was a new perspective on Japan. Many other scholars agreed with Kang’s fears for China’s future and urged further                                                  55 “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze” 唇亡齒寒 is a classical Chinese idiom from the Confucian classic Chunqiu Zuo Zhuan 春秋左傳. Often alongside its preceding idiom, “the chariot and its (side-)car are interdependent” 輔車相依, these words indicate the interdependent relationship between the two states of Guo 虢 and Yu 虞 when threatened by outside forces (See Zuo Zhuan “Xigong wu nian” 僖公五年). It became a popular term in the late 19th century and was frequently used to describe the relationship between China and Japan as scholars attempted to return to Confucian political theory on international relations to solve these problems. Interestingly, the Lips and Teeth metaphor has continued to be used by Chinese writers to refer to its East Asian neighbors in times of solidarity. Throughout the Cold War this same metaphor was used to refer to China’s relationship with its ally North Korea. See Chen Jian. “Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese North Korean Relations.” Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations. Asia Program Special Report No 115 (September 2003).  56日本與我唇齒,俄德得志東方,非彼之利者。…其來請聯助,乃真情也。 Kang Youwei 康有為, Kang Nanhai ziding nianpu 康南海自訂年譜 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), 40. 57 It was used by scholars of the Mito School 水戸学 to indicate that Japan could not survive if China fell. See: Vladimir Tikhonov, “Korea’s First Encounter with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s,” Review of Korean Studies 5.2, 195-232 (2002), 204. 35  cooperation with Japan. There were two primary reasons for this sudden change in sentiment towards Japan. One was strategic, the other was emotional. The western powers, specifically Russia, were posing a real threat to China at the time and the need to seek external help to protect China was becoming more evident each day. At the same time, an outpouring of Japanese support for China in the years that followed the Sino-Japanese War had a tremendous influence on the Chinese attitudes towards Japan.58 Whether this support was due to Japanese strategy or to a genuine belief in responsibility, the impressions of some Chinese intellectuals towards Japan were affected. In the years following the war, Chinese reformers increasingly turned to Japan for help in many forms. Wang Xiaoqiu writes:  “It can be seen that imitating and allying with Japan in order to reform the laws was a consistent belief among the reformers at that time.” 59  Institutions Facilitate the Entry of Asianist Principles and Vocabulary into China Although it was the First Sino-Japanese War that shocked reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao into sudden turn towards Japan, the recruitment of Chinese intellectuals into early Japanese pan-Asianist organizations enabled the transnational flow of discourse and vocabulary that was essential to establishing the concept outside of Japan. This began with the Kōakai 興亞會, but was much more successful with its successor, the Asia Association 亞細亞協會.                                                  58 Wang 1987, 90 59可見,仿日,聯日以變法,這是當時中國維新派的一致觀點。Ibid, 91 36  The Kōakai, the Raise Asia Society, was established by Sone Toshitaro (曽根 俊虎  1847-1910) in 1880.60 Sone Toshitaro was a navy lieutenant who was adamantly opposed to the Meiji government’s expansionist policies. Vladamir Tikhonov notes that Sone and his followers “hardly could be classified simply as tools of the Meiji elite’s foreign policy.”61 They earnestly hoped that East Asian nations could cooperate against the European threat and feared that Japanese dreams of expansion might endanger the future of the race. This was long before the Sino-Japanese War. Despite more than a decade of Japanese modernization, in 1880 China was still perceived to be in a position of military superiority. Naturally, these Asianists were also interested in the preservation of a culture that they considered themselves a part of. The principal goals of the Kōakai were the promotion of Chinese language education, a reversal of the power imbalance between Europe and Asia and preparation for the global conflict between white and yellow people.62 In addition to running language schools, providing avenues for Japanese and Chinese scholars to meet, and holding regular meetings, the Kōakai produced a regular newsletter called the Kōakai hōkoku (The Raise Asia Society Report 興亞會報告). This newsletter remains a major primary source for researchers today.63                                                   60Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia (New York: Columbia, 2007). Selections from the founding manifestos of both the Kōakai and the Asia Association are available in translation by Urs Matthias Zachman in “The Founding Manifesto of the Kōakai and the Ajia Kyōkai,” in Saaler and Szpilman 2011. 61 Tikhonov, Vladimir. “Korea’s First Encounters with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s”, Review of Korean Studies Vol. 5, No. 2, (2002, pp. 195-232), 212. 62 Kōakai hōkoku Ajia kyōkai hōkoku 1-2 興亞會報告·亞細亞協會報告第一、二卷, compiled and introduced by Kuroki Morifumi黑木彬文 and Masuzawa Akio 鱒澤彰夫 (Tokyō: Fujishuppan不二出版, 1993), 9. Hereafter, KKHK. 63 The Kōakai Hōkoku began as a predominantly Japanese-language journal in March of 1881. The first few issues would generally contain one or two articles in Literary Sinitic (Classical Chinese or Kanbun 漢文), but 37  The association was established in Tokyo not long after the Qing government sent their first modern delegation into residence there. The first ambassador to Japan was He Ruzhang, suggested for the position by Li Hongzhang. Joining He in Tokyo was the soon-to-be reformer Huang Zunxian. These two represented the first of many elite to live in Japan during the late Qing and they were quickly invited to join the association and played a role in its early days. However, they remained suspicious of the association and Huang Zunxian never actually accepted membership, despite being a proponent of the raising Asia doctrine himself.64 The second edition of the newsletter for the Kōakai, published on April first, 1881, relates Sone Toshitora’s persuasion of He Ruzhang to support the Kōakai. The article was titled “A Discussion between Imperial Envoy Ambassador He and Mr. Sone. 65  In this discussion, Sone pays particular attention to emphasizing the importance of “same script, same race” 同文同種66 and “a cooperation of those of the same mind” 同心協力. He also makes reference to the “lips and teeth” metaphor that would continue to be used by Asianists                                                  the majority of the text was written in Japanese. However, by the twelfth issue, published on November 15th of the same year, the format changed and the journal was then predominantly written in Literary Sinitic. Although a Japanese-language section was added at the back of the journal a month later – and in a few issues this section was as large as the Literary Sinitic section – the new format opened the door for Korean and Chinese scholars to read and contribute to the content. The November 15th issue opened with a sentence briefly and directly explaining that publishing in Japanese resulted in many Asians being unable to read it and this was against the aspirations of the association. From this time on, it was published in the classical language. As this was the only major journal related to contemporary issues publishing in Chinese in Japan until 1898, it received much attention and many Chinese contributors. KKHK, 76. 64 Zachman 2011, 55. 65欽差大臣何公使ト曾根氏ノ談話 KKHK, 9. 66 The “same script, same race” (Ch: tongwen tongzhong. J: dōbun dōshu) argument posited that China and Japan used the same script and were of the same race, providing a quasi-scientific support for cooperation. This argument would continue well into the twentieth century. See Chapter III for a more detailed analysis of this argument and its popularity. 38  in the decades to follow.67 This text represents a symbolic discussion in the Chinese perspective on Asianism. The article contains so many of the catch phrases that would continue to be used over the next few decades to convince Chinese elite of the need for Asianism. Furthermore, despite the triumphant perspective of the Kōakai newsletter, which sees its most active member as making a huge conquest in convincing the ambassador to support the Kōakai, it remains difficult to say to what extent He was truly convinced of the grander ideology of the Kōakai and to what extent he was making strategic concessions to Sone. Surely, He would have been impressed by the association’s attempts to propagate the study of Chinese, and he would also no doubt have been moved by the arguments in favour of standing up to Western imperialism. However, He’s position in the Chinese government put him directly in contact and conflict with the Japanese expansionist efforts. The annexation of the Ryūkyū Kingdom was fresh in He’s mind and he had clearly been quite upset by it. During the height of the affair he received a petition from the Ryūkyūans and wrote to Li Hongzhang: “The Japanese have neither mercy nor reason. They are like crazy dogs, bullying others as they please.”68   Kōakai officially became the Asia Association in 1883 after its Chinese members                                                  67 KKHK, 9. 68 He Ruzhang was dealing with a newly aggressive expansionist Japanese government, but associating with anti-imperialist Asianists at the same time. It seems most likely that he would be inclined to take a strategic position and remain open to the potential of Asianism, but it is difficult to say to what extent this classically-trained Chinese scholar would have accepted Japanese partners as equals. Regardless of what his motives were, He Ruzhang continued to support the association, into its transformation into the Asia Association in 1883, remaining a member until his death in 1891. Quoted in: Suzuki, Shogo. Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 160. 39  complained about the name during a January meeting in Tokyo.69 The Asia Association’s Japanese membership grew and, largely through its few Chinese members, it expanded onto Chinese soil during the early days of the 1898 Reforms. The Asia Association in Shanghai retained old supporters from the Kōakai days, but also added new members to its list. Influential Chinese members in 1898 or earlier included: diplomat, He Ruzhang; sanwen writer, Li Shuchang 黎庶昌 (1837—1898); scholar and translator, Wang Tao 王韜 (1828-1897); reformer, Zheng Guanying 鄭 觀 應 (1842-1922); future Prime Minister of Manchukuo, Zheng Xiaoxu鄭孝胥 (1860-1938); diplomat, Li Fengbao 李鳳苞 (1834-1887); reformer and 1900 revolutionary Tang Caichang 唐才常; and journalist, Wang Kangnian 汪康年 (1860-1911). Due to the number of well-known reformers related to the Asia Association, its establishment in Shanghai has recently received attention in Chinese and Western scholarship.70 Sang Bing puts much emphasis upon the 1898 establishment of the Asia Association in Shanghai, arguing that this association was one of the most important that resulted out of the Hundred Days Reform and its importance has been underestimated by scholars in the past, who have failed to recognize the first peoples’ acceptance of a pro-                                                 69 Noriko Kamachi. Reform in China: Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), 123. 70 For example: Guo Wu, Zheng Guanying, Merchant Reformer of Late Qing China and His Influence on Economics, Politics and Society (New York: Cambria Press, 2010), especially pages 79-85. Japanese scholarship on the Shanghai Asia Association began much earlier than Chinese and Western scholarship. Sang Bing offers a short annotated bibliography of the key Japanese texts in his helpful article: Sang Bing 桑兵. “The Kōakai and the Alliances of Chinese and Japanese Peoples between the 100 Days’ Reform and the Boxer Rebellion” 兴亚会与戊戌庚子间的中日民间结盟 in Jindaishi Yanjiu 近代史研究 3 (2006), 41-56. Yi Huili discusses Zheng Guanying’s views on the Asia Association as seen in the diary of Zheng Xiaoxu郑孝胥 in: Yi Huili 易惠莉, A Biography of Zheng Guanying 郑观应评传, (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1998), 536-548.      40  Japanese agenda.71 As can be seen from the above list of names, this organization had gained the attention of many Chinese elite intellectuals. Like the journals and newspapers of the time, which were heavily influenced by Japanese publications, the Asia Association was an avenue for the entry of Japanese Asianist ideology. The establishment of the Asia Association was mentioned in many major Chinese papers of the time, including the Xiang Bao 湘報, Dagong Bao 大公報, Xinwen Bao 新聞報, Wanguo Gong Bao 萬國公報, and Jicheng Bao 集成報. Many of these papers included the full fifteen point Asia Association Manifesto 亞細亞協會章程.72   The association presented itself as a peoples’ organization that was anti-classist, allowing member to pay fees as voluntary donations. Membership was open and equal:  “Whether members are officials or gentry, whether they are scholars, farmers, workers or merchants, all are free to enter the association. Even should they be eminent or humble, intelligent or slow, all will be treated equally and without discrimination.”  Nor would nation affect membership: “For association members, no matter the size nor the strength of their country… they will no longer acknowledge boundaries. They will be as brothers of one heart and one mind.” The emphasis was put upon modernization, calling for members with special abilities or interests to meet through the association and further the advancement of Asia in all areas.                                                  71 Sang Bing 2006, 42. 72 See the Appendix for a complete translation of the “Asia Association Manifesto.” 41  What is immediately noticeable about the association’s advertisement is that it is a clear product of the Popular Rights Movement and tide of liberalism that were sweeping Japan and extending to Chinese intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century.73 Just like the Chinese reformers who were the object of this association’s appeal, the Japanese Asianists were caught in the rush towards liberalism. From the early days of the Kōakai, the precursor to the Asia Association, there was evidence of sympathy towards this movement. In the early 1880s, when the Kōakai opened up its first school to teach colloquial Chinese, Korean and Literary Sinitic, the instructors also taught a course on John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.74 The association intended to appeal to those interested in a liberal approach to the problems encountered by Western imperialism. On the basis of shared feelings of humiliation, the association urged individuals to stand up and act independently of their government to assist others. At the same time, the association argued for the equality of nations in its organizations. Although this might not have appealed to earlier generations of Chinese scholars, it was suited to this new generation of so-called reformers, at least as far as the simple argument above. On the margins of an expanding Japanese Empire, Chinese elite were certainly getting caught up in the Popular Rights Movement. The organization was also very clear about its aims for the modernization of all of                                                  73 The term “Popular Rights Movement” refers to a variety of the Meiji period movements for democritization and increased political participation, as well as the sudden influx of texts concerning such thinking, especially from Germany and Britain. Despite grand talk, these “rights” rarely extended beyond the upper classes in practice. However, Chinese intellectuals became increasingly aware of and interested in this discourse and made great efforts to translate such texts at the end of the nineteenth century. For a brief discussion of the movement, see: Roger E. Bowen, Rebellion and democracy in Meiji Japan: A study of commoners in the popular rights movement (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1984). 74 Kuroki 2007, 37 42  Asia. Concrete ideas are even set forth in this short declaration. These fascinating efforts to link professionals and specialists together to solve problems across the continent were surely appealing to a new elite who believed that science and progress were the answers to China’s ills.  But what is most important about this declaration is that it completely disregarded governments and states. The Asia of tomorrow was not to be reliant upon the government of any country. Its problems were to be solved by the people. Its wealth and power was to be a product of the uniting of different people, of all classes and nations, across Asia. Therefore, this non-governmental organization did not need to consider issues of inter-Asia politics, a feature that may have spelled its doom had it not been prematurely ended due to the coup that marked the end of the reforms. In this respect the members of the Asia Association failed to predict the coming course and the rise of state power and nationalism. The redemption they sought was related to nationalist dreams of liberation, but was racially and geographically defined. Their stated goal to imitate the Red Cross is particularly revealing of their intentions for a non-governmental organization. The Red Cross, only established a few decades before, is unconstrained by nation or state. These Asianists envisioned a similar transnationalism with the stated goal of liberation for all Asians.75 This was far from a Marxist liberation. Liberation was not about class, but about place. These Asianists found it perfectly acceptable that the lower classes would provide the labour, while the wealthy would provide the capital. Each to his ability. The only real issue                                                  75 Red Cross reference and description of the org in late-19th? 43  at hand was raising Asia to make it equal with or to surpass the West, while in many ways modeling Asia upon the West. This disregard of class issues would not be able to continue into the twentieth century, when Asianists such as Li Dazhao imagined a united Asia only as a means on the road to worldwide liberation and equality. However, it was very representative of Japanese Asianism of the late-nineteenth century, in the years before Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and a system of equality between Asian states began to seem increasingly unlikely.76 Regardless of these issues, the association brought early Japanese Asianists into contact with important Chinese reformers. The founding of the Asia Association in 1898 was tightly linked to the pro-Japanese reformers and their goals. Those most closely involved with its establishment were Wang Kangnian, Zeng Guangcuo 曾廣銼, Tang Caichang and Fukumoto Makoto 福本誠. 77 Although few sources remain for us to clearly identify the different roles of each in the establishment of the organization, by reading through the available correspondence, Sang Bing has determined that Wang Kangnian and Zeng Guangcuo’s 1897 journey to Japan opened the door to the Asia Association in Tokyo and Fukumoto’s subsequent move to                                                  76 In 1900 the Asia Association merged with the Tōa Dōbunkai. Established in 1898, this new Asianist organization was different from the Asia Association in its stated goals as it was more willing to intervene in Chinese affairs. Kuroki Morifumi believes that it was anxiety about this difference that may have delayed the amalgamation of the two groups. Kuroki also examines internal debates within the Tōa Dōbunkai to show the level of success of the two groups’ amalgamation. Responding to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Tōa Dōbunkai drew up six articles for their statement on the situation and hopes for the future. As some of these were clearly disrespectful of China’s sovereignty and forecast a possibility of dividing up China, Watanabe Hiromoto, former president of the Asia Association, strongly, and successfully, opposed them. It was because of this that Konoe Atsumaro set up the Kokumin Dōmeikai in 1900. Kuroki uses this to show that the ideals of Watanabe and the Kōakai continued into the Tōa Dōbunkai era, but were subsumed or made irrelevant as time passed and Japan’s position of superiority became more evident in the eyes of its people. Kuroki Morifumi 2007, 48 and 51. 77 Sang Bing 2006, 42-46. 44  Shanghai finalized it. Huang Zunxian’s role in the establishment of the Shanghai branch has not been clearly identified, however, since his move to the Chinese embassy in Japan in 1881, he had long been a member of the Tokyo organization. Furthermore, he was associated with Wang Kangnian in Shanghai in the years before the establishment as they both worked at The Chinese Progress. Tang Caichang was perhaps the most vocal advocate of the association through the Xiang Bao, the newspaper he edited with his lifelong friend, Tan Sitong. In addition to the paper’s running of association advertisements, such as the manifesto translated above, Tang would write his own stories which emphasized the need for union with Japan. On May 20th, Tang openly announced his involvement in the Kōakai/Asia Association, and explained the need for establishing a branch of the organization in Hunan.78 Unlike the other reformers who fled to Japan after the coup, Tang Caichang returned to China only a year later. During the Boxer Rebellion, he hoped to take advantage of the disorder to begin a revolution, but Zhang Zhidong found out about the plan and had Tang executed along with nineteen of his comrades.79 Tang Caichang differs from the other reformers here, not only for his quick turn to revolution, but for his support of Hunan nationalism over Chinese nationalism, a perspective which would certainly have led to Tang having a different understanding of China’s position in Asia and the possibilities for the decentralization of state power or even federalism.                                                  78 Chan Sin-wai 陳善偉. A Chronological Biography of Tang Caichang, Volume 2  唐才常年譜長編. (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1990), 537-539. 79 Jansen 1954, 93 45  All of these individuals held a certain amount of power in the publishing industry of 1898 Shanghai. Not least of these were Wang Kangnian and Huang Zunxian, both of whom held considerable sway with The Chinese Progress. Huang Zunxian consolidated his complete control over The Chinese Progress during the management changes of late 1897 and early 1898.80 Through the efforts of these individuals and a few others, the publication became one of the key avenues for Asianist concepts to enter China during this time. The Translation of Pro-Japanese News The Chinese Progress was the voice of the reform movement in 1898. Established in Shanghai in 1896 under Zhang Zhidong’s guidance, it was led by publisher Huang Zunxian, director-general Wang Kangnian, and editors Liang Qichao and Wang Rangqing 汪懹卿 (1860-1911), a student of Kang Youwei. The journal has long-held the intrigue of historians as one of the most influential publications of the late Qing. At the height of its popularity in April 1898, it reached a circulation of 10,000.81 Seungjoo Yoon calls it the “harbinger of the literati-led modern press in late Qing China.”82 Despite this attention from historians, few have paid serious attention to the details surrounding the translations that made up such a large part of the text of this journal. Right from the beginning, The Chinese Progress was an important avenue for translated knowledge from around the world. As the Chinese publishing industry had not yet                                                  80 Yoon Seungjoo. “Literati Journalists of the Chinese Progress (Shiwu bao) in Discord, 1896-98,” Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China, edited by Rebecca Karl and Peter Zarrow, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 63. 81 R.S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912 (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1933), 93. 82 Yoon 2002, 48-76. 46  developed to the point where it was common to send foreign correspondents around the world, newspaper and other periodicals relied heavily upon translations from foreign periodicals. This practice would continue far into the twentieth century. Like similar publications of the time, the Chinese Progress would often contain extensive sections devoted to translation from a particular language. These sections usually took up fifty percent or more of the total text in each issue of The Chinese Progress. Most of these translations were from English or Japanese, but there were also translations from French and Russian. The English translations were almost always by Zhang Kunde 張坤德, while all of the Japanese translations were made by Kojō Teikichi 古城貞吉 (1866-1949). Translations from Japanese were crucial for Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei and their reform movement. In addition to their Datong Translation Company, which was responsible for a number of translations during its two years of existence, notably the quasi-translation of On the Great Eastern Federation83 大東合邦論 by Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉 discussed below, The Chinese Progress was the primary outlet for their translations from Japanese during this time. As Liang Qichao and his clique were not yet proficient in Japanese, the work was carried on by an outsider. Kojō Teikichi, who lived in Tokyo at the time, often translated more than ten articles in each issue. This man devoted a great amount of time to The Chinese Progress and                                                  83 The word translated here as “federation” hebang 合邦 was not satisfactorily defined by any of these intellectuals. Aside from a general outline provided in Tarui’s book, no Chinese writer offered a reasonable or complete explanation of the term. There does seem to be a great overlap in the meanings of alliance with Japan  (lianri 聯日) and federation (hebang 合邦). Throughout the texts of this period, there are numerous references to similar terms, such as lianbang 聯邦, banglian 邦聯, tongmeng 同盟, as well as frequent use of the single-character terms lian and he, which must be viewed contextually. In many cases the authors may not have had a clear idea of what they were implying when they used these terms, so we should be careful in both applying English equivalents or in equating one author’s term with another. 47  made a considerable contribution to China’s reform movement. Having the power to select and translate texts as he saw fit gave Kojō quite a bit of power in shaping the opinions of China’s reformers. The man and his translations therefore deserve a brief summary here. Kojō Teikichi was one of the finest Sinologists of late-Meiji Japan. He wrote numerous books on Chinese literature and certainly had a hand in Japanese perceptions of China. He is perhaps best known for his Shina Bungakushi (A History of Chinese Literature 支那文學史 1906), which was widely available at the time and has been called “the first modern history of Chinese literature.”84  This eminent Sinologist was still early in his career and The Chinese Progress was fortunate to have the opportunity to bring him into its staff. However, Kojō was committed to his position and contributed far more text to the journal than any other contributor. His translations regularly totaled more than one quarter of the text of each issue. Kojō was invited to the position by Huang Zunxian, who had spent much time with Japanese Sinologists while living in Tokyo.85 Kojō was given much freedom in selecting texts that would be of interest to Chinese readers. Over these two years he translated hundreds of articles from over forty different Japanese sources. These articles represented a wide range of newsworthy subjects. Naturally, Kojō had a distinct and central role in informing the readers of The Chinese                                                  84 Chen Yirong 陳一容, “A Short Study on Kojō Teikichi and the ‘Japanese Newspaper Translations’ for the Chinese Progress” 古城贞吉与《时务报》”东文报译”论略, Historical Research 历史研究 (January 2010), 99-115, 100. 85 Some texts mention Wang Kangnian as introducing Kojō to The Chinese Progress, however Cheng Yirong has recently read through much correspondence on the matter and supports his argument that Huang Zunxian was behind the invitation. See Chen Yirong 2010, 100. On Huang Zunxian’s life in Tokyo, see Kamachi, 1981. 48  Progress about the flow of history and the world outside of China. Not surprisingly, one of the most pressing issues at the time was the rise of imperialism in East Asia and the Western powers encroaching on China. From 1896 to the summer of 1898 there were an impressive number of articles translated on the Russian encroachments in Siberia and Manchuria. These articles, all translated by Kojō, provided the Japanese perspective on the growing trouble in the north. Articles concerning such issues were translated from the journals Tōhō Gakkai Report 東邦學會錄 and The Sun. Although on occasion a translation of a Russian article was included in the very limited Russian section, it was exceedingly rare compared with the great amount of Japanese translation in every issue. Articles on Russia were often fearful forecasts of future war and Russia’s eventual control of China, or even all of Asia. “China’s future is to become Russian territory,” one article prophesized.86 Almost monthly there were articles describing the power that Russia would hold with the extension of the Siberian railway. This was something that weighed heavily on the minds of both Chinese and Japanese elite. As time went by, Kojō’s translations on Russia changed from short passages of two or three lines, to full length articles that often admonished the Chinese for not preparing for the Russian threat. At the same time the Japanese articles looked unfavourably upon the Sino-Japanese War, which had divided the countries.87 The Japanese translations in The Chinese Progress also painted Korea as a country suffering under Western imperialism and in need of assistance to                                                  86 中國將來大局。其為俄國之屬土也必矣。 See “Russia will Swallow all of Asia” 俄國將吞噬亞洲. The Chinese Progress 25. April 22, 1897. Originally in Tokyo Daily March 23, 1897), 1635. 87 See “On Russia’s Increasing Strength” 論俄國日強. The Chinese Progress 27-29. June 10, 1897. Originally in The Citizen 國民雜誌 April 24, 1897). 49  achieve autonomy. In “Korean Scholars of Will Call out for Autonomy” 朝鮮志士提倡自主, Kojō explained that Korean elite feel under pressure from external forces. “Korea is independent in name, but has no power of independence.” Russia controls its military, while Britain controls its finances, explained Kojō. 88  In addition to articles on Korea and Manchuria, areas in which Japan had clear interests at the time, The Chinese Progress also ran translated articles on issues that were relevant to Western imperialism in general.  Kojō translated no fewer than seven articles concerning Germany’s taking of Jiaozhou.  He also included rare pieces on Western racism, translating two short articles on Canada’s head tax and the terrible quality of life for Chinese immigrants in Vancouver.89 As China had few or no foreign correspondents at the time, Kojō Teikichi played an important role as an intermediary, giving readers access to Japanese media perspectives on the issues facing China. In the years running up to the Wuxu Reforms, The Chinese Progress, the most important publication for reformers of the period, offered a variety of viewpoints on the world through its translations section. It was by no means all one-sided as well. The English-language translation section frequently ran articles about Japanese encroachments of all kinds. The readers must have been well-aware that in this age they were surrounded by imperialism on all sides.                                                   88 Originally in 日本報 March 26. In CP v25, p1712. 89 “National Policies of Canada’s Liberal Party” 加拿大自由黨國政. The Chinese Progress 時務報. October 17, 1896. Translated from Japanese by Kojō Teikichi 古城貞吉. Originally in Tokyo Daily 東京日日報 20.8.1896. (p 528). And: “Canada Discriminates against Chinese People” 加拿大排斥華人. The Chinese Progress 時務報. October 17, 1896. Translated from Japanese by Kojō Teikichi 古城貞吉. Originally in The Chinese Progress 時事報 20.8.1896) 528-529. 50  Although the articles Kojō offered were correct in their denunciations of the atrocities of Western imperialists, Japan’s growing power over Korea was played down and the country was portrayed as a fellow victim of Western imperialism. While a number of articles pointed out the inefficiencies and corruption of the Qing government, articles that did discuss China and Japan concentrated upon feelings of mutual affection between the two countries or flattered the Chinese readers with praise.90 Articles on Japanese domestic issues covered a wide array of news, especially of financial, economic and political nature. Such articles were important to the reformers who hoped to model a new China on the advances made by Meiji Japan. According to Chen Yirong, articles were chosen that would be of interest to Chinese readers, but they were also a representative selection of contemporary Japanese media.91  One subject of these articles that stands out and should be noted here is the regular mention of Ōkuma Shigenobu.  Ōkuma was one of the earliest and most powerful of the Japanese Asianists. There were regular articles on Ōkuma, reporting on his various speeches, even when they had little or nothing to do with China.92 Ōkuma was nearing the height of his popularity at this time. Also, it was during these years that he formulated his foreign policy goals known as the “Ōkuma Doctrine,” a policy that was designed to refocus Japan’s efforts                                                  90 “On the Character of the Chinese People” 論中國人民之性質 CP v44. “On the Revitalization of Sinology” 漢學再興論. CP v22, 1500-1502. 1897.4.2.  91 Chen Yirong 2010, 100. 92 Articles on Ōkuma translated by Kojō: “Count Ōkuma on Currency” 大隈伯論幣制 (Originally in Japan’s New Times 日本新報 Feb 15), 1897.3.13. “Count Ōkuma Sets Forth a New Doctrine.” 論日本大隈伯提倡新說 (Only one paragraph. On Japan’s plan to make foreign relations serve all of East Asia.). V25, p.1639 (Originally in  The Citizen 國民報 3.13), March 22, 1897. “Count Ōkuma’s Speech at the Offices of Commerce” 大隈伯演說於商業公所.  V30, p. 2045 (Originally in Tokyo Daily 東京日日報, May 28) June 20, 1897 (About Kobe’s role in Japan’s economy). “Count Ōkuma on Changes to National Politics” 大隈伯論變更國政, v31 and 32, 2117-8, 2178-2182 (Originally in Japan’s New Times  日本新報 June 11)  June 30, 1897. 51  for the mutual benefit of East Asia in order to raise the region’s status and power.93 Ōkuma was a committed Asianist and a co-founder of one of Japan’s earliest Asianist organizations, a group of scholars and politicians known as the Tōhō Kyōkai 東邦協會, translated as the Oriental Cooperation Society by Marius Jansen.94  The Chinese Progress provided an opportunity for both The Japanese and the journal of the Tōhō Kyōkai – which was the Tōhō Kyōkai Hokoku 東邦協會報告, although Kojō always referenced it as Tōhō Gakkai 東邦學會 in The Chinese Progress – to find an entry into Chinese readership via translation. Although many of the shorter articles that Kojō translates are sourced from major Japanese daily newspapers, he has taken many long articles from the Tōhō Kyōkai Hokoku. Including serialized sections, eighteen articles from the Tōhō Kyōkai Hōkoku appear in The Chinese Progress. In all but two cases, these are the lead articles in Kojō’s section. Although this number is very low compared with the number of articles from the Tokyo Daily or the Osaka Shinbun, these were not news articles, but were long reports, almost all of them concerning Russia’s ever-increasing role in the events of Northeast China.95 Also, the journal provided reformers with much of their knowledge about Japan. As the Kang-Liang faction was already a very pro-Japanese group, their writing and                                                  93 Jansen 1954, 53. 94 Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 52. This was also the organization to which Yano Ryōkei, Japan’s ambassador to China, belonged. The Tōhō Kyōkai was composed of people across the political spectrum, however, it was organized and dominated by the Seikyōsha 政教社, an organization established in 1888 in order to oppose the government’s pro-Western ideology. The Seikyōsha’s popular journal The Japanese 日本人 was the mouthpiece for the organization and its philosophical supporter, Miyake Setsurei (三宅 雪嶺 1860 - 1945), who had long stressed the importance of Japan cooperating with Asia. 95 For example, “On Events on China’s Periphery” 中國邊事論 stretched across volumes 12, 15, 16 and 18. “A History of Russia’s Foreign Policy” 俄國外政策史 stretched across volumes 33, 34, 47, 48 and 50. 52  reading of this relatively pro-Japan and anti-Russia journal was a significant step before their seeking refuge in Japan, where they found the support of and became friends with Ōkuma and other high-ranking Asianist officials. Naturally, the translations found in The Chinese Progress were not intensely Asianist, and it is difficult to say exactly to what degree they influenced this group. Despite the existence of so many translations from Asianist periodicals in the pages of the Chinese Progress, these articles were not outright calls for Asian unity or even alliance. Those calls came from the Chinese writers at the magazine. Chinese Voices at The Chinese Progress Promote Alliance with Japan In a series of articles in The Chinese Progress, Chen Chi陳熾 (1855-1900) expressed a growing distrust towards Russia and the empire’s Eastward expansion. Beginning with “On the Mistakes Made by Six Countries during the Sino-Japanese War” 中日之戰六國皆失算論 he first displays a distrust towards Russia.96 This article was published in October 1896, five months after Li Hongzhang had signed the agreement with Russia to work together to keep Japan out of China. It explained Chen’s belief that China, Japan, Britain, France and Germany had made mistakes during the resolution of the Sino-Japanese War that had resulted in Russia becoming the greatest danger in the region. Three months later Chen expanded upon these thoughts by arguing that China must turn to Japan and Britain in order to seek protection from Russian encroachment. Once again he published in Shiwu Bao. This time he used a more inflammatory title: “Russians’ Policy is as Ruthless as the Qin.”97 Later in 1897                                                  96 Chen Chi 陈炽, Chen Chi ji 陈炽集 (Collected Works of Chen Chi), edited by Zhao Shugui 赵树贵 and Zeng Liya 曾丽雅, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), 309-312. 97 俄人國勢酷類強秦論 Ibid, 312-315.  53  Chen would continue to write similar articles that called for turning to Japan in order to face Russia. Mao Haijian notes that these articles reveal that some Chinese intellectuals favoured an alliance with Japan even before the German assault on Jiaozhou Bay (Kiautschou Bay 膠州灣) began in November, 1897.98 Indeed, a number of Chinese intellectuals did favor alliance with Japan during this time, but the majority of these intellectuals were only seeing this alliance as a transnational alliance. Even Zhang Zhidong utilized the “same script, same race” argument when he discussed the benefits of using Japanese military might against the Russians and Germans.99 However, the call for a China-Japan alliance based upon Asianist principles was surprisingly voiced by Zhang Taiyan at a similar time. In the years before the 1898 reforms, Zhang Taiyan was living in Shanghai and contributing to The Chinese Progress. Like other reformers of the period, he was very hopeful for a union with Japan in order to defend against Western imperialist powers. At this time he was still formulating his beliefs on race and ethnicity, but the division between yellow and white was becoming part of the “common knowledge.” In the years to come, Zhang would become an important Asianist in Japan due to his solidarity with Indians and the Tokyo-based Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood.100 He would write many articles on the importance of Asian unity in the early twentieth century, but as early as 1897, at the age of 28, he wrote an article that demanded China’s union with Japan based upon racial and geographic reasons that appear more-suited to Liang Qichao’s writings after he moved to Japan. It was on                                                  98 Mao Haijian 2009, 252.  99 Telegram reprinted in Mao Haijian 2009, 248-9. 100 See Chapter III for more on this organization. 54  January 21, 1897 that his article “Asia Should Support Its Lips and Teeth” was published.101 This article was certainly intended to show the possibility of uniting with Japan in order to defend China against the imperial ambitions of Germany and Russia, but it was also notable for its reliance on geography and race as a major part of Zhang’s argument. Zhang relies on a new science understanding of the world to understand its divisions, as well as to understand how unions may be effective and necessary in the new world. Emblematic of this stream of thought during the reform period, this article contains a number of key issues. It is therefore worthwhile to reproduce and translate key sections of the text.102 He begins by describing the Eurasian Continent in geographic terms:  The world is separated into five great continents... From the days of the Yao Emperor, the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains have acted as a barrier to cut off Europe from Asia and divide yellow people and white people.103  It must be noted here that Zhang not only completely accepted the dichotomy of East and West, he equated the West with European and white, while he saw the East as being Asian and yellow. This is one of the earliest Chinese arguments for the uniting of Asia based upon an idea of the yellow race. Just as the “lips and teeth” metaphor implies, both countries, and finally all Asians, needed to cooperate and be supportive of each other in order to survive this wave of imperialism: “If neither abandons the other, and the multitude of yellow people help                                                  101 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎. “Asia Should Support Its Lips and Teeth” 論亞洲宜自為唇齒. The Chinese Progress 事務報 v.18 (Jan 21, 1897), p.3-4. 102 Please see Appendix for a complete translation of the article.  103天地以五大洲別生分類。一區之中..故自唐堯以來。以裡海烏拉嶺為戎索。以絕亞歐。以區黃人白人。Ibid, 3-1. 55  one another, then Asia will not falter.” However, Zhang is not at all inferring that Westerners have no place in Asia or arguing for an exclusive policy of “Asia for Asians” as many Asianists would clamor for in the twentieth century. The coming together of West and East, Europe and Asia, white and yellow, is an inevitable and natural conclusion: “Hence those on the eastern sea and those on the western sea would inevitably come into contact. This is only natural. What could be wrong with this opening up?”104 Zhang does not oppose contact between East and West, rather he finds that it has proven to add to the strength of the Europeans. What is interesting is that he finds the reasons for Europe’s initiation of this contact to be based in a difference of geography: “The world (geographically) is a varied place, as uneven as the teeth of a dog. Therefore, that which was basic to the people of Europe had no place in Asia. Hence the sickness of China.”105 Zhang’s use of geography comes years before Liang Qichao (perhaps unwittingly) translated Hegel’s theories of geographical determinism.106 As these inherent differences between race and people are related to geography, Zhang naturally finds that China should be making an alliance with its neighbor Japan, and not with Russia, that, although at China’s northern border, appears to Zhang as an empire that controls Kamchatka from afar:                                                   104故放於東海。放於西海。其不能不相通者。期會然也。夫通則何病也。Here both ‘contact’ and ‘opening up’ are translated from the term tong 通, an important term that was regularly used around the time of the Wuxu Reforms. See the conclusion of this chapter for more on this. Ibid. 105地體華離。犬牙相錯。其本氐於歐洲。其標未於亞洲 。於是乎震旦病。Ibid, 3-2. 106 For more on Liang’s 1902 introduction of Hegel and Henry T. Buckle’s theories of geography, see: Ishikawa Yoshihiro 石川 貞浩, “Liang Qichao, the Field of Geography in Meiji Japan, and Geographical Determinism,” translated by Lori Watt, The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao’s Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China, edited by Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies UC Berkeley, 2000), 156-176. 56  Of those that are at elbows with China and can be mutually reliant and dependent on each other, only Japan remains... It is difficult to be an impoverished state with an avaricious power in the North. Forgetting its bite, we have entered a secret alliance, turning our backs on our own kind and encamping with a foreign clan. Should we not be doing the opposite?”107 Zhang’s argument here is based upon a similarity in ‘kind’ (tonglei 同類), slightly different from the standard Asianist argument of ‘same race,’ ‘same script,’ or ‘same religion.’ However, it is clear that Zhang is familiar with the Asianist arguments that were coming out of Japan at that time. Although this article appeared one year before the Kōakai would establish their Shanghai chapter, their publication Kōakai hōkoku 興亞會報告 had been available in Chinese since 1881. It seems likely that Zhang was well-aware of the discourse. From the following line, we see that he was at least familiar with Japanese writing on unification:  From the beginning, the idea of the union of Asia came from the Japanese. These were not empty words. China is dependent upon Japan and Japan is also dependent upon China. They hope for a strong China, taking pride in “lips and teeth.” Then we can match the West from afar and face Russia near. And the Pacific will be at peace.108  As he referred to China and Japan as “lips and teeth,” Zhang also had to resolve the issues of Japan’s recent actions. To explain how Japan could be excused for the Sino-                                                 107然以赤縣之地。近在肘腋。可以相倚依者。闔亞洲維日本…難以窮髮(窮乏?)之國。饕餮於朔方。忘其欲噬。密與為盟誓。背同類而鄉異族。豈不左哉。Zhang 1897, 3-2. 108昔與亞之會。剙自(初自?)日本。此非虛言也。中依東。東亦依中。冀支那之強。引為唇齒。則遠可以敵泰西。近可以拒俄羅斯。而太平洋澹矣。Ibid, 3-2. 57  Japanese War, infringements upon Korea and the militaristic attitude to foreign relations which most Chinese were clearly very angry with, Zhang reduced everything down to a matter of Japan being proactively defensive. In his Darwinist argument he goes as far as being supportive of Japan for pushing China to be competitive and active: “It is in hoping to save themselves that they bring out the competitive spirit in China, causing China to resolutely make plans for self-strengthening.”109 China, Zhang believes, must not act in revenge, as Gou Jian 勾踐 did in the Springs and Autumns Period, but look to the example set by the Shu in the Three Kingdoms Era and unite with Japan as Shu did with Wu to defeat the Wei. This simple allusion posits the Russian Empire as the much-hated Wei Kingdom of Caocao, but stresses the importance of reason and strategy for the development and survival of the Chinese. Zhang details various moments in Chinese history to emphasize the importance of reason and thinking of the future. His efforts in persuading the reader to remain calm and rational may have to do with his cryptic ending. In the final line of his essay he reasons: “Threats that reside in the horse’s tail can be cut off. By being determined and brave we can use the horns of our neighbors to our advantage. Otherwise, in the blink of an eye we will be routed and destroyed.” 110 The horse’s tail refers to that which, although a part of the body, can be removed without any disadvantage to the organism. This seemingly cryptic passage is best read in the context of a more explicit letter that Zhang wrote to Li Hongzhang in which he advised the statesman to offer Weihaiwei to the Japanese government.111                                                   109冀自救也。使中國生其霸心。發憤圖自強。Ibid, 3-2. 110馬尾之險。可以失之。發憤而為雄。而後以鄰國犄角為可恃也。不然。則一飯之頃。已潰敗決裂矣。Ibid. 111 Zhang Taiyan wrote to Li Hongzhang proposing that China ally with Japan, and even cede Weihaiwei to 58  Of the burst of pro-Japanese writings that appeared in the late-nineteenth century, this article by Zhang Taiyan was the most important and the most direct. Zhang included many of the early Asianist slogans and ideology and built his argument on the pseudo-scientific approaches of race and geographic determinism. His article forecast the turn to race and geography that would define the more thoughtful period of Asianism that began after Cixi’s coup and the reformers escape to Japan, but it also showed the extent to which Japanese Asianist writings were having an influence upon young Chinese reformers in the years after the Sino-Japanese War, as Zhang borrowed heavily from popular Asianist vocabulary and even referred to Japanese calls for a China-Japan union. At about the same time, other reformers related to Zhang and The Chinese Progress were showing interest in Japanese writings on an East Asian union in the form of a federation. Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei republished a prominent book that typified Japanese Asianism at the end of the nineteenth century. Reformers Become Interested in Early Japanese Asianism What is likely the first major text on Asian unity that was widely available in Chinese was On the Great Eastern Federation 大東合邦論 by Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉.112 First serialized in Japan in Literary Sinitic in the journal Discussions of Liberty and Equality (Jiyūbyōdō 自由平等競輪) in 1891, it was compiled and published in full in 1893 and arrived in China, Korea and Taiwan later that year. The book was widely read in both Korea                                                  Japan to counteract the Germans in Shandong. See “A Letter to Li Hongzhang” 上李鴻章書, reprinted in Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Zhang Taiyan xiansheng nianpu changpian 章太炎先生年谱长篇 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 61-3. 112 Tarui published the book on his own under the pen name Morimoto Tōkichi 森本藤吉.  59  and China. According to Suzuki Tadashi, the popularity of the book soared in China after an edition appeared with an introduction by Liang Qichao.113 That Tarui chose to write this book entirely in Literary Sinitic is of great significance. Although Japanese scholars could certainly read in Literary Sinitic in the 1890s, writing in the language had become exceedingly rare.114  Tarui’s text also exemplifies some of the key contradictions that would accompany Asianism throughout the next century. It contained the paradoxical mixing of socialism and imperialism that gave this discourse power as a complicated paradigm to be used in a variety of ways by those who propagated it. It also utilized Western frameworks of political thought to imagine a truly Eastern society. It is important to note here that the first man to write a substantial text on Asianism was also a founder of the first political party in Asia to use the name ‘socialist.’ His party was called the Eastern Socialist Party (Tōyō Shakaitō 東洋社會黨).115 Although the party was immediately declared illegal and disbanded by the government, the significance of this event and its connection with an early imagining of Asianism should not be underestimated. As can be seen from the party’s name, this party sought an international form of socialism that would span across the three countries of East Asia. However, we can see from Tarui’s statements that the dream had a long term goal of much more:                                                  113 Tadashi Suzuki, “Profile of Asian Minded Man,” Developing Economies (March, 1968) 79-100, 84. 114 He was not the first Japanese Asianist to attempt writing in Literary Sinitic. The Kōakai had begun publishing their periodical Kōakai Hōkoku興亞會報告 in Literary Sinitic beginning in November of 1881 after eight months of publishing in Japanese. Nor would he be the last: the Pan-Asianist organization Kokuryūkai 黒竜会 began publishing their journal Tōa Geppō 東亜月報 in Literary Sinitic as late as 1908.   115 Suzuki 1968, 82. 60  You, who have been raised amid the current trends of Eastern civilization, are members of our Tōyō Shakaitō; and it is upon the success or failure of our party that the rise or fall of human morality depends. 116 Like many that would come after him, Tarui saw the East as the moral force of the entire planet. He saw in the East the last hope of mankind. It offered a universal redemption that could overcome the inequalities and injustices that accompanied capitalism. Yet Tarui was also a long-serving member of the lower house of the Diet. While he was in government, the Japanese Empire expanded to include Taiwan and then Korea. Although Taiwan had not been part of his plan, union with Korea was a crucial step in Tarui’s plan for an Eastern Federation, yet the manner in which Japan and Korea came together was not at all the manner in which he had originally outlined it in his On the Great Eastern Federation.  On the Great Eastern Federation describes a future federation of Korea and Japan in which the two countries come together in what appears to be a general state of equality between the two states. He finds a basis for the likelihood of a peaceful integration between the two countries in a linguistic and racial analysis: “Although the two countries now speak different languages, their word order and grammar are completely the same. This is proof that they are of the same race.”117 Throughout the text Tarui also uses the phrase “my yellow brothers” 我兄弟黃人 to refer to both Korean and Chinese people. A racial conceptualizing of the world was finding dominance at this time and Asianism was naturally configured along racial lines as well. Tarui finished his book by emphasizing what he sees as an inevitable war                                                  116 Suzuki 1968, 87.  117今兩國雖言語不同。其綴辭之法。全相同者。亦人種同一之證也。Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉, Daitō Gappōron 大東合邦論 (On the Great Eastern Federation), (Minamiuchi: Morimoto Tōkichi, 1893), p.97. 61  between the white and yellow races. He feared a future in which the white race would attempt to eliminate the yellow race: “Friendly internal relations with those of the same race, but competing with those of other races, this is the natural trend of the world, as the reader can see.”118 As I will show in Chapter III, the fear of race war was long used as an impetus for the union of Asian nationalities. For Tarui it was not the deciding factor, but was an important point that supported his ideology and his argument. Tarui based his discussion of the Eastern Federation, not on a negative program of fear of war, but on a positive belief in the ‘progression’ of society to a state of freedom and equality.  Years before Yan Fu would make his famous translations of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, Tarui Tōkichi introduced their writings to China in relation to the traditional, comfortable and familiar Asian belief systems of Confucius and Lao Zi, but in the new packaging of socialist Asianism. As for China, although Tarui’s immediate concern was the union of Korea and Japan, he was very concerned with the Qing Dynasty and included an entire chapter that explained his views on how those suffering under Qing rule would eventually enter this federation, but also discussing the reasons that it was not yet ready for such a union. In the chapter “On the Suitability of the Qing Country and the Eastern Country’s Coalition” 論清國宜與東國合縱, Tarui expresses his hopes: Should our country wish for the Qing country’s prosperity while the Qing does not wish for close relations with Japan, then we all will forever be mired in disaster. The Westerners say that there are two powers in the Orient. These are Japan and China. East Asia is fortunate to have these two                                                  118欲同種人親和於內。而與異種人競爭于外。亦世運之自然也。讀者察焉。Ibid, 134. 62  powers, which can protect the dignity of our yellow race. If these two countries were not within the realm of yellow people, then the white race would ravage across all of our Asian continent and enslave our yellow brothers, just as they have done so to the black people of Africa.119 From this chapter we can see that for the immediate future Tarui believes that Japan and Korea must unite, but China, although a substantial power in its own right and essential for the survival of the yellow race, is not required in his union at present. The reason for this is Tarui’s view that China under the Qing government was an oppressed people who had yet to realize their independence and achieve national self-determination. Tarui explains:  If we in the East are to unite and participate in our government, then it follows that China under the [Q]ing dynasty, Tartary, Mongolia, Tibet and other states must recover independence and enable their peoples to participate in the government of their own countries.120  From this passage it is clear that Tarui viewed the state as based upon the people of a nation. This results in a tension apparent in his text. Although he hoped the Qing Dynasty would eventually unite with the Eastern Federation, it was temporarily unimaginable as the various ethnicities under the Qing had yet to achieve their own independence, and, therefore, could not cooperate in the Asian government that he had imagined. Despite his hopes for cooperation with the Qing, his writing indirectly calls for the disintegration of the Qing                                                  119我國望清國之富強開明。而清國不望之於我東方以相親。則共受永遠不測之禍矣。西人稱。東方有海陸二強。即日本支那是也。東亞幸有此二強國。而保我黃人種之威嚴。設黃人中。無此二國。則彼白種人將蹂躪我亞細亞全洲。奴隸我兄弟黃人。與阿弗利加黑人何擇. Ibid, 133. 120 Tarui 1893, 132-3. This translation taken from Suzuki 1968, 96. 63  Dynasty. Tarui strongly believed in constitutional law and the necessity of citizen participation. Despite his calls for an Eastern system of government and governance, he also strongly believed in Western democracy as defined by nineteenth century British liberals. These beliefs in the nation would certainly have endeared him to many Chinese intellectuals at the time. While the Qing Dynasty was foundering in the final decades of the nineteenth century, Han nationalism was beginning its rise among intellectuals as an ideology that firmly opposed Manchu rule. However, at the same time, Tarui’s words must certainly have struck fear in the hearts of patriotic Chinese who believed in the necessity of a united China that saw all the nationalities in China tied together under the idea of a greater Chinese nationality that encompassed all nations on Chinese soil. This would continue to be an issue that very few Chinese elite would compromise on throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.  When On the Great Eastern Federation was brought to China, although it appealed to many Chinese intellectuals, this section was unacceptable and some sentences had to be changed. Chinese editions of the text were edited by Liang Qichao’s student and from 1897 onwards a new wording was used for a number of passages.121 Through a few minor changes, this section was changed to indicate that China must not be divided, allowing for the                                                  121  Through a close reading of these two texts, Lei Chia-Sheng identified this and a few other important changes in Lei Chia-Sheng 雷家聖. “Proofreading Between Da Dong He Bang Lun (大東合邦論) and Da Dong He Bang Xin Yi (大東合邦新義) -With Analysis of Development  of “Federation” Theory in Late Qing China” 『大東合邦論』與『大東合邦新義』互校記—兼論晚清『合邦論』在中國的發展. The Journal of Chinese Historical Researches 66 (Korea, 2010.6.30), 87-108., 92-93 (Originally 132-3 and 65-6 respectively). 64  reformers’ belief that the Qing emperor must continue to rule over all China, and that the empire need not be divided based on ethnic nationality. These few changes indicate the reformers’ fears of the possible division of China based upon nationalism. Although On the Great Eastern Federation did bring in discourse on nationalism, race and political theory at this critical time, it also presented reformers with these difficult questions regarding how to accommodate nationalism, or even Asianism, with their traditional Chinese worldview –questions that danced along the tension between nation and empire. These questions were not easily answered. The struggle can be seen in the elliptical and even contradictory preface provided by Liang Qichao in 1898. The Complications of Translating Tarui Asianism Although On the Great Eastern Federation was first published in its entirety in 1893, it was in 1898 that it received the most notice by Chinese intellectuals.122 The new edition of On the Great Eastern Federation appeared at the height of China’s reforms. It was released with a new name as well, The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation 大東合邦新義. Perhaps more importantly it contained a new preface by one of the stars of the 1898 reforms, Liang Qichao, who was forced to flee to Japan just months after publication of this new edition due to his involvement in the 1898 reforms. The book was advertised in major newspapers in August of 1898 for 280 wen, a fairly modest price when compared to other                                                  122 However, the 1893 edition is the edition found in the Shanghai Library today. In Korea I worked with an edition published in Shanghai in 1897, available in the special collections of the Korea University Library. However, this version does not include Liang’s preface. I was not able to find an original copy of the 1898 edition with the preface written by Liang Qichao. However, the preface has been republished recently. See note below.  65  books for sale at the time.123 The book was published by the new publishing company established by Kang and Liang, The Datong Translation Publishing House 大同譯書局. Liang Qichao introduced his new publishing company and detailed the urgent need for many translations in order to support the reform movement: “Relying on our resentment, we have united our comrades to create this publishing house. Translations from Japanese will be the majority, supplemented by translations from Western languages. Politics will come first, followed by industry.” 124 The reformers had decided that translation would open the door to the learning from the West. Japan would serve as the gateway and On the Great Federation would be one of the first books to be “translated,” meaning that a few alterations were made to domesticate this text for Chinese readers. Although the book appears to have been fairly well received at the time, Liang’s preface was one of a few pieces that was not included in his collected works. As On the Great Federation fell far out of favor during the rise of Japanese imperialism, copies of this edition became exceedingly rare and this text became virtually unheard of anywhere in China after 1949. Before 2005 it appears to have only been mentioned briefly by Japanese scholars and perhaps not at all in China. However, Xia Xiaohong’s 夏曉虹 landmark study of unpublished Liang Qichao texts brought the preface back to life and it is now widely available in the collection: Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works.125 This preface is an                                                  123 See Xiangbao Fuzhang 湘報附張, 1898, 8.8. 124是用憤懣。聯合同志。創為此局。以東文為主。而輔以西文。以正學為先。而次以藝學。”A List of the Datong Translation Publishing House 大同譯書局敘列. In The Chinese Progress (hereafter CP) 時務報 v42 (October 16, 1897), 2836-2837. 125 Liang Qichao 梁啟超. “A Preface to The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation” 《大東合邦新義》序, in Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works, Part I《飲冰室合集》集外文(上), edited by Xia 66  important key to understanding the reformers convoluted views on the possibility of uniting with Japan. It offers insight into Liang Qichao’s yearnings and misgivings at this crucial juncture in Chinese reform, as well as the difficulties of accommodating different worldviews in the reformers’ efforts to save China. In considering the merits of Tarui Tōkichi’s proposal, Liang begins by discussing the concept of unity, he, from a largely theoretical perspective, quoting the Book of Odes and the Book of Changes. He dismisses those that do not take a holistic view of the current issues and argues that we must do more than worry about our individual states.  Whether in the datong of Confucius or in the shangtong of Mozi, all living things are one and all life is connected. Without the individual, the great dao is still magnificent. Should each manage his own state and each instruct his own people, they will be of no consequence and not be following the dao. The great flow of history cannot be managed through frustrations.126  Liang then turns from this discussion of classical Chinese political theory to more recent examples of transnational cooperation and federation in practice. He mentions the uniting of ancient Greece, the uniting of eighteen European countries to battle Napoleon, and finally the union of the thirteen colonies to form the original United States. These historical lessons show the merits of such unions and Liang turns, not to talk of a union between Korea and Japan, which is the primary focus of the book he is introducing, but to the union of China                                                  Xiaohong 夏曉虹 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005). 126 Please see the appendix for a complete translation of this preface with its Chinese original.  67  and Japan:  Those that stand together meet with prosperity and those that stand alone are executed. Is it not absurd to be arrogant and self-important? Japan and China are separated by the mists that envelop the East Sea. Asia has chosen to be timid and put on the butcher’s block by a foreign people. The yellow and white races are becoming like ice and coal. The Southeast with its profits and thriving people is divided like meat. And all our scholars close their eyes and snore. While the funeral pyre is stocked with wood, they believe things are still safe. If a crisis occurs and those that rely upon each other for existence do not help, but stay divided as though their circumstances are special, how can they not but be bait for those snakes?! Therefore, we must plan for wealth and power. We must have political reform. In order to protect our race we must not be timid but must ally! In this passage Liang is clear about the reasons necessitating cooperation with Japan. Pursuing a racial method for alleviating the ills of the current crisis provides a simple plot much in-line with the contemporary science.127 However, in a telling lack of continuity, Liang ends this passage with a call to ally. China and Japan “must ally” fei liangmeng buke. In the passages before this, Liang has convinced his reader of the positive nature of unity, he, and he is writing a preface to a book on federalism. Had he written “we must federalize,” fei hebang buke, it would certainly have been a clear call of support for the author. However, Liang’s use of the term alliance, liangmeng, provides a hint of uncertainty concerning Liang’s purpose and reveals the ambiguity of the reformers’ vision in this regard. He was aware that uniting with Japan, although offering possibilities for the protection of China, was a journey                                                  127 This reliance on race will be returned to in further detail in Chapter III. 68  into unchartered waters. He was therefore cautious and wary of Tarui’s proposal. He does provide an abstruse criticism of Tarui near the end of his preface:  Picking up On the Great Eastern Federation, and considering this man Morimoto, for a while I thought him some sort of genius. But should the pillar that supports this house fall, then the normal walls will protect the people. The wood must be straightened with compass and square. Federalists should protect the supportive wall of classical learning (Confucianism) and support the people’s long held customs as their compass and square. It is a pity that this book is so wordy and its approach is treacherous.  Although it appears to support a common perspective, it revolves around the author’s own opinions. The taking of our vassal state has changed my perspective. Finding a crack (in our thinking) his rattling on is evasive. However, with the dishonest practices of the world powers, a union is logical, and my criticisms are like picking at bones. Understanding his main points, the valuable words left behind in the history of each dynasty can also help towards the long term autonomy of the Orient. This criticism, although contradictory and half-hearted, reveals Liang’s fear of Japan’s growing imperialism, specifically regarding Korea. Of course, Tarui wrote this book before the Sino-Japanese War, and Liang has the advantage of hindsight on this event when considering the complexity of Japan’s actions and words regarding Korea. It is a pity that Liang did not further discuss his misgivings with “On the Great Eastern Federation” in his preface. The fact that he agreed to publish a book on Japan’s absorption of Korea merely three years after the Sino-Japanese War is surprising and interesting. Despite his evident anger at Japan’s growing dominance over Korea, he agreed with the main principles of this 69  book and found its greatest flaw to be its disregard for Confucian traditions and their importance in instructing the people. Liang sees these teachings as essential in any possible transnational union. This fits well with his mentor’s beliefs on Confucianism. Kang was in complete agreement with Liang on this idea of unity. In his masterpiece work Datong Shu, the uniting of states is one of the most crucial steps on the path to datong. He writes: “Abolishing state boundaries and evolving from division to unity (he) is a natural trend of the times.”128 However, for Kang the final purpose of unifying is the telos of global harmony, while for Liang it is a means to wealth and power. During his years spent in Japan, Liang turned more and more to the importance of wealth and power for China, but in 1898 his concentration on this was evident in the preface to Tarui’s text. “We must plan for wealth and power. We must have political reform. In order to protect our race we must not be timid but must ally!” The connection between wealth and power, reform and Japan is emphasized in these lines. Liang knew that only by increasing the wealth and power of China, could the country survive the onslaught of Western imperialism. The only way to do so was through reform, and reform meant copying Japan’s success, or, in this case, uniting with Japan in this new form of transnational cooperation. For Liang was viewing this as a very modern transnational union, despite his conflicting Confucian worldview. The new edition of this text was extremely popular in China. If we are to believe                                                  128 去國界進化自分而合乃勢之自然。Kang Youwei 康有為. The One World Philosophy 大同書 (Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 1994), 87. 70  Tarui’s own 1910 assessment, the edition sold 100,000 copies.129 Whether or not this number is accurate, the book certainly garnered attention among China’s elite. Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, who was working at the Hanlin Academy in 1898, did a careful analysis of the ‘translated’ edition of the text in September of 1898. Cai lists chapters of the original book and offers a short review of its main subject, the uniting of China, Korea and Japan to defend against the West, before calling it a masterpiece.130 As for the version published by Liang, Cai explains the numerous changes that have been made. He notes some of the changes, such as changing ‘our nation’ to ‘Japan,’ as frivolous, but calls other minor changes into question. This he directly brings to the attention of Kang and Liang, who by that time were living in Japan. Although Cai’s noting of these discrepancies shows his attention to detail, it appears that he did not go through every line and he missed some of the other important changes by the Datong Press. Such a careful examination of the differences between these two books would not be made for another 112 years, due to a new reading of the events surrounding the Hundred Days’ Reform, linking the reforms to Tarui and the prospect of a surprising alliance with Japan. 110 years after Cai Yuanpei’s careful examination of the difference between the two editions, Lei Chia-Sheng decided to make another examination of these two texts.131 Lei’s                                                  129 Min Tu-ki, ‘Daito Gappo ron and the Chinese Response: An Inquiry into Chinese Attitudes Towards Early Japanese Pan-Asianism’, in Shinkichi and Harold Z. Schiffrin, eds., The 1911 Revolution in China: Interpretative Essays, (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1984), 93–94. [Ask someone if this number could be correct]. 130 真傑作也. Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培. “After Reading On the Great Eastern Federation by Morimoto Tōkichi of Japan” 日本森本丹芳《大东合邦论》阅后. In The Collected Works of Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培全集. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 78-80. 131 Lei Chia-Sheng 雷家聖. “Proofreading Between Da Dong He Bang Lun (大東合邦論) and Da Dong He Bang Xin Yi (71  reasons for returning to the texts in this manner have quite a different focus. As a researcher of federalism in modern Chinese history, Lei looks to these texts while asking the question: “What is the relationship between the Chinese publication of On the Great Eastern Federation and the concept of ‘federalism’ during the Hundred Days’ Reform?”132 Lei finds that the differences between these two texts is not merely the cosmetic differences listed above. The editors at the Datong Translation Publishing House changed a number of lines that neither the Qing authorities nor the reformers themselves would feel comfortable with, including many passages that stressed the contradiction of Manchu rule and Han complacency.133  According to Lei, Kang Youwei was eager for work towards a federation with Japan at the time. Lei cites numerous texts that show Kang’s support for the federation and detail how he pressured others to push this idea onto the emperor. What is fascinating is that Lei believes that the idea for the ‘federation’ that brought a dramatic end to the reforms was directly related to Kang’s reading of Tarui’s text: “It is clear that the ‘federation’ plans of the 100 Days Reform followed the steps of On the Great Eastern Federation.”134 However, Lei believes that this would have resulted in China’s being swallowed up by Japan. In Lei’s                                                  大東合邦新義) -With Analysis of Development  of “Federation” Theory in Late Qing China” 『大東合邦論』與『大東合邦新義』互校記—兼論晚清『合邦論』在中國的發展. The Journal of Chinese Historical Researches 66 (Korea, 2010.6.30), 87-108. 132究竟戊戌變法時期的『合邦』論,與『大東合邦新義』在中國出版,兩者之間有何關係?Lei 2010, 88. 133 Although Lei finds these changes as all attributable to the reformers’ belief system, it also seems possible that some of these changes would have been made to keep in line with local authorities. Some text from Tarui’s book openly attacks the Qing government as unjust and their ancestors as unscrupulous.  134 Ibid, 可見戊戌變法時期的『合邦』計劃,仍然按照『大東合邦論』的步驟. 103. 72  reading, it is therefore only the foresight of Cixi that saved China from such a fate.135 Regardless of the validity of the conclusions drawn by Lei, there are numerous sources pointing to the reformers’ petitions for an alliance with Japan, as well as the long-held belief in such an approach. Kang Youwei and Alliance with Japan Kang Youwei had always been a proponent of transnational approaches and assumed such a path to be inevitable in the future. In Section II of his Datong Shu, “Abolishing National Boundaries and Uniting the World,” he discusses the evils of states, how states lead to suffering and how we can work towards abolishing the boundaries between states. Kang looks at how having numerous states leads to war. He then considers a rather utilitarian perspective in which he sees larger states as more efficient, but, more importantly, they are more peaceful. Abolishing national boundaries is one of the more important parts of Kang’s philosophy:  Now that we seek to save the human race from its miseries, to bring about the happiness and advantages of complete peace-and-equality, to seek the universal benefits of One World, we must begin with the destruction of state boundaries and the abolishment of nationalism 國義. This it is which Good men, Superior men, should day and night with anxious minds wear out their tongues in planning for. Aside from destroying the boundaries of                                                  135 In Containing the Furious Waves: A New View of the 1898 Coup, Lei Chia-sheng argues that the reformers, who had only a basic knowledge of foreign politics, including federalism, proposed the idea to the Guangxu Emperor before Empress Dowager Cixi stepped in to bring an end to their reforms. Lei does not think highly of Kang and believes that he was overly influenced by zealous Japanese bent on dominating China. Lei’s hypothesis on the events of 1898 offers a likely version of events and an interesting insight into Kang’s reasoning for publishing Tarui’s book. Lei Chia-sheng, Liwan kuanglan: Wuxu zhengbian xintan 力挽狂瀾:戊戌政變新探 [Containing the furious waves: a new view of the 1898 coup], (Taipei: Wanjuan Lou, 2004). 73  states, there is absolutely no way to save the people.136  Like Tarui before him and countless others after him, Kang makes it clear that for the purpose of advancing towards a state of datong, these unions (聯邦、聯合、聯邦和) should be based on equality and cannot result from imperialistic ambitions of control, or colonialism. “Thus we must have equal strength, equal power, mutual support, and parity among the uniting states. No one state will have the power to be able to unite all the others.”137  Furthermore, democracy is essential in any such state, with all citizens having equal power. Kang does not clearly explain his ideas for democracy at this stage, but it seems likely that he does not expect the absolute democracy that he prescribes for the future world community. Over the next hundred years, small states will cease to exist and the world will be populated with a small number of enormous democracies. Here Kang imagines that China may unite with Japan and India.138 Kang does not see this as a special situation for Asia, but rather as an inevitable step that will occur everywhere in the world. He sees this already happening in the Americas and Europe with the creation and expansion of America and Germany. Kang particularly praises these two countries for their system of unity as the smaller states “forget that they have been destroyed to form the united state.”139 Progression from the Age of Disorder into the harmonized egalitarian future of datong was an indisputable fact for Kang Youwei. He also believed that the junzi, translated by                                                  136 Here Thompson has translated 國義 as “nationalism.” This term might better be translated as “statism.” K’ang Yu-wei and Laurence G. Thompson, Ta T’ung Shu: The One World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd), 1958, 83-84.  137 Ibi8d, 88. 138或中國與日本印度合乎. Kang 1994, 93. Kang and Thompson 1958, 90.  139 Ibid, 85. 74  Thompson as the “good” man 君子, had a Confucian responsibility to actively work towards this ideal. This belief propelled Kang to work hard towards datong throughout his career, but especially in the years around the reforms while he was writing the Datong Shu. Therefore, it does not seem at all surprising that he would have taken advantage of an opportunity to take a step in the right direction when it appeared. The only evidence that Kang actually did try to hold such a meeting with Japanese officials comes from Kang’s own words. In 1899 he wrote his own impressions of the events that surrounded the 100 Days’ Reform in a book he titled My History 我史. The book finally found popularity when it was published in 1954 as Kang Nanhai’s Autobiographical Record 康南海自編年譜. In this book he mentions a discussion between himself and Yano Ryōkei (矢野龍渓 1851-1931. Here called Yano Fumito). Yano was a long-time associate and often assistant to Ōkuma Shigenobu, an important Asianist within the Japanese government. He had a long history of interaction with China and Kang, and over the crucial years of 1897 to 1899 Yano served as Japanese ambassador to Qing China.140 Kang states: At the time, I arranged with Yano Fumito to hold a meeting concerning federation between the two states. Our draft was extremely well-detailed. I asked Mr. Yano to begin informing the authorities and then we would have a large meeting in every province. However, once the Russians knew about it, Yano did not dare to continue.141                                                  140 Mao Haijian 茅海建. From the Sino-Japanese War to the Wuxu Reforms: An Annotation of Kang Youwei’s My History 从甲午到戊戌:康有为《我史》鉴注 (Beijing: Xinhua Shuju, 2009), 247. 141時與日本矢野文雄約兩國合邦大會議,定稿極詳,請矢野君行知總署答允,然後可大會於各省,而俄人知之,矢野君未敢. Kang 1972, 47. Lei 2004, 99. 75  This line implies that Kang was behind a seemingly-advanced plan to unite China and Japan in a federation just months before the Hundred Days’ Reform. If this was the case, it is surprising that more was not known about such a large meeting. However, it has been suggested that Kang was simply wrong in his assertion that this meeting was close to fruition. Many scholars have questioned the accuracy of Kang’s My History, which conflicts with the other important accounts of the Hundred Days’ Reform, Liang Qichao’s An Account of the Wuxu Reforms 戊戌政變記 and Kang Youwei’s own Drafts of the Wuxu Memorials戊戌奏稿.142  Kang Youwei’s Reformers Petition for Federation with Japan The above quotation may not be true. Mao Haijian has researched the situation regarding war reparations and Yano Ryōkei and found that Kang’s statements on those financial matters were incorrect. On the possibility that Yano would hold such talks with Kang, Mao questions: “Whether or not Yano Ryōkei would hold discussions on such an important matter with an officer in the Ministry of Works who held no actual political authority should be regarded with suspicion.”143 Actually, the pro-China camp in Japan had                                                  142 However, Drafts of the Wuxu Memorials is also believed to be largely fraudulent. In Kang Youwei’s Real Memorials (Kang Youwei wuxu zhen zouyi 康有爲戊戌真奏議) Huang Zhangjian 黃彰健 argues that the memorials were rewritten before the 1911 publication of this book. My History has been called into question on a number of accounts, and has therefore not been considered an acceptable source for understanding the events as they occurred. However, the text is an excellent source for revealing the thinking of Kang Youwei during this period. This has led Mao Haijian 茅海建, a scholar of the reform period to provide a nine-hundred page annotated companion to My History in 2009. This book makes some important points regarding the validity of Kang Youwei’s reference to his proposed meeting with Yano. 143而矢野文雄公使是否与并无实际政治权力的工部候补主事康有为商讨过此等大事,也是可以怀疑的。Mao Haijian 2009, 254. 76  taken notice of Kang and was certainly interested in meeting him.144 Furthermore, before becoming ambassador to China, Yano was secretary for Ōkuma, who supported Kang, was an Asianist leader, and was hoping for reform in China. Also, the Japanese government, with the help of Itō Hirobumi and the embassy in Beijing, offered assistance to Kang only a few months later. Clearly, many respectable Japanese elite were willing to do more than hold discussions with Kang. He was a much wanted man in Japan as he held possibilities for these Japanese elite to realize their ambitions.  Kang’s actions and words here are most interesting when placed against the context of the publication of Tarui’s book in that same year, which Kang was certainly aware of, as the book had been produced by his own publishing house. These events appear even more connected when one looks at the words of memorials that were being sent to the emperor by others in Kang’s camp at the time.  However, the reformers were disorganized and desperate. Their ambitions for “federation” were not limited to Japan. Kang’s followers petitioned the emperor to take steps towards a grand federation that would include China, Japan, the United States and Great Britain. Yang Shenxiu 楊深秀145(Also 楊漪川 1849-1898)famously wrote: “I made a special request to His Majesty that he hurry to make great plans to unite with Great Britain, the United States and Japan, and not look down upon the sullied word ‘federation.’”146 In                                                  144 Jansen 1954, 77. 145 Yang Shenxiu was one of the more famous of the Wuxu Reformers. One of the Wuxu Six, he was executed after the coup that ended the reforms.  146臣尤伏願我皇上早定大計,固結英、美、日本三國,勿嫌合邦之名之不美。Available in: Wuxu bianfa dangan shiliao 戊戌變法檔案史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 15. Lei 2004, 102 77  addition to Yang, Kang also had censor Chen Qizhang petition the throne in favour of allying with Japan and Britain. Meanwhile, Kang himself tried to persuade Weng Tonghe. He also distributed a pamphlet on the matter.147 These memorials and discussions remained vague, undetailed petitions for direction, while lacking in content and ideology. Perhaps the clearest writing on the call for federation at the time was made by Hong Ruchong 洪汝沖 in his July 24th (the fifteenth day of the sixth month) petition to the Guangxu Emperor. This petition is interesting as it does not merely refer to tired explanations of the necessity of political alliance, but openly discusses the modern and political roots behind the federation called for in the reforms. Speaking of federation (lianbang), in Chinese politics the issues of confining and division are stressed. In Western European politics issues of opening up (tong) 148  and unifying (he) are stressed. Should there be confines, knowledge becomes subdued. Should there be opening up, then knowledge is extended.  Should there be division, then power will be scattered. Should there be unity, then power will be joined. Therefore, scholars unite in their colleges and farmers unite by collectivizing their affairs. Western Europeans are victorious above all others simply because of these two things, opening up (tong) and unity (he). Then considering geography, those of the same continent will first open up and first unify. Considering race, then those of the same race are suited to open up and are                                                  147 See: The Wuxu Reforms 戊戌變法. A Collection of Historical Materials from Modern Chinese History 中國近代史資料叢刊. Edited by Jian Bozan 翦伯贊 et al.  (Shanghai: Shenzhou Guoguang Publishing House 神州國光社, 1953) 138-141, and 521. 148 This can be taken to mean ‘opening up’ in various senses of the term, including politically, economically and intellectually, as is seen in the remainder of the passage. However, it also refers to ease of passage and flow. 78  suited to unify. Considering script and ideology, those with the same script have the ability to open up and unify.149 Naturally, Hong continues to explain that Japan is the most convenient and best choice for unifying and opening up with at the present moment. Not only because they use the same script and have the same customs as China, but they also have made significant advances in recent years and they have mastered the Western arts. Regardless of these advantages, Japan and China are codependent: “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze.” 唇亡齒寒.  But what is most important in the above passage is the open and direct call to tong and he. These two terms are scattered everywhere in writing from these years, but Hong places them together as the foundations of Western political thought and the source of European power. With the influx of Western liberal thought still rising towards its apex, Chinese intellectuals were taking what they could access through Japan and frantically looking for ways to find power. Although the economic conditions in China were nothing like those of late-nineteenth century Europe, via the limited translations available to them, Chinese scholars such as Hong were contemplating ways in which to replicate European empires in East Asia. The principle way of doing this would be the liberalization of markets, trade and information, and the uniting of power.  From the description he offers next, we have a slightly clearer idea of what form of empire Hong had in mind than what Yang was hoping for with his great federation. Although he was certainly calling for Japan and China to “unite as one country” 合為一國, the two                                                  149 Hong Ruchong 洪汝沖. 呈請代奏變法自強當求本原大計條陳三策疏. In Jian 1953, 362-365. 79  European examples of federation that he has chosen – Sweden and Norway; and Austria and Hungary - imply that the union he imagined was one in which the two countries continued to exist separately for the majority of domestic matters, although they would be unified on matters of the military and foreign relations. Sweden and Norway were officially united from 1814 to 1905. The Austro-Hungarian Empire existed from 1865 to 1918. On the other hand, Hong’s examples of empire are quite unfortunate. Both of these unions were suffering under the rise of nationalism and were doomed to dissolution in the coming years. These idealists were dreaming of federations at a time when the nations of the world were dreaming of independence.  The imagined federation was often not limited to East Asia. The Hundred Days Reform ended with the reformers’ unorganized and very unclear attempts for various forms of political alliance with Japan and other countries.150 The desperate attempts to save China while finding accommodation between two worldviews came to a crashing end as Cixi’s faction removed the emperor from power, Kang and Liang fled to Japan, and Tan Sitong, Yang Shenxiu, Kang Guangren 康廣仁, Lin Xu 林旭, Yang Rui 楊銳 and Liu Guangdi 劉光第 were executed for their roles in the affair.                                                  150 Another report from the time that must be mentioned is that by Song Bolu 宋伯魯. He refers to the August third meeting of Kang and his followers with Timothy Richard (1845-1919) and Ito Hirobumi before briefly explaining what the federation of China, Japan, the United States and Britain would entail: “The one hundred elected officials would be wise, familiar with the state of affairs and knowledgeable about the institutions of each country. They would manage the military, political, tax and all foreign relations for the four countries.” This is a shocking level of autonomy for these countries to concede, indicating that the reformers may have been naïve about some matters of transnational politics. 80  Conclusion As China descended into crisis in the late-nineteenth century, the need for reform and the urge to Westernize while maintaining independence became a central focus for contemporary intellectuals. The possibilities for a new China were imagined in many ways at the time, yet the texts analyzed above frequently return to the prospect of allying with Japan or creating some form of an East Asian transnational federation. There certainly was an increasingly influential influx of Asianist institutions and texts entering China during this period. However, to what degree this motivated the actions of the reformers remains to be seen. The 1898 reforms were brought to a dramatic end with Cixi’s coup on September 21st. By this time the reformers had made friends with a number of Japanese elite who would welcome them to exile in Yokohama and Tokyo, where efforts would be made for cooperation to save China from both the Manchu conservatives and the Western imperialists. As will be explained in Chapter II, Kojō Teikichi, the Sinologist and translator at The Chinese Progress, had already introduced the reformers to Yamamoto Ken, an influential Sinologist based in Osaka who would ensure the lead reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were warmly welcomed. The Tōa Dōbunkai 東亞同文會, the largest and most influential Asianist organization in the early twentieth century, would be established in the coming months, and the organization would play a role in disseminating Liang Qichao’s thought, also no doubt having a large influence upon Liang and his readers through their united efforts.151 This stage                                                  151 The Tōa Dōbunkai would also begin publishing numerous Chinese-language newspapers and journals in China and having an enormous influence across East Asia in 1900. See Zhai Xin 2001 for a detailed discussion. 81  would be quite different, as the pro-Japanese reformers had been removed from the centre of power. The period leading up to this sudden change is significant, partly due to the ever-expanding influx of pro-Japanese texts and institutions stemming from Japan’s exceptional development during the Meiji Period and the ease of translation between Japanese and Chinese. This offered the former a new form of hegemonic power in the production of knowledge, pulling the reformers to Japan just as Western imperialism was pushing them from behind. But this is not to say that the Japanese and Chinese were not sincere in their efforts to cooperate to defend East Asia against Western imperialism. There was sincerity to their calls for mutual assistance and truth to their fears that one would fall without the other. The teeth do freeze without the lips, but Chinese intellectuals would also find that the teeth sometimes have a tendency to bite the lips.   82   Chapter II: Chariot and Sidecar: Confucian Asianism in Japan’s Chinatowns Studies of imperialism often have the advantage or impediment of being able to assume a centre for empire in the metropoles of Europe. Late Qing Dynasty China was in a state of semi-colonialism that differed from most other colonies, yet retained many of the worst features. Although it remained nominally independent and never fell under the power of one colonial empire, China suffered under late-nineteenth century imperialism. Similar to intellectuals from other colonies, intellectuals in China turned to the metropoles to educate their youth, modernize them, and prepare them to counter imperialism. Unlike other colonies, however, China had a choice to make between numerous imperial centres.  Japan too was a special case for empire, lying close at hand to the colonies it governed, recently having been a victim of European imperialism itself, and still under the threat of Western empires, notably the enlarging Russian Empire. Although China and Japan had both maintained a large degree of independence before 1900, intellectuals in both countries recognized the degree to which the threat of Western imperialism loomed over their autonomy. Despite the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the turn to Japan for help was a natural choice for Chinese intellectuals, and they were warmly welcomed. When Japan became the dominant empire in East Asia and slowly established its hegemony over the first half of the twentieth century, those who cooperated with Japanese went from being called pro-Japanese or qin-ri 親日 to outright traitors or Hanjian 漢奸. As the study of collaboration and the moral questions that arise with it are constantly 83  reconsidered in the academic world,152 this chapter returns to a pro-Japanese and quasi-Asianist institution in the late nineteenth century to examine modern Japan-China civilian cooperation that has largely been skimmed over in past histories. The establishment of the Datong Schools153 in Yokohama and Tokyo is symbolic of Chinese intellectual efforts to confront the crisis brought on by Western imperialism through a mix of nationalist Confucianism and the new knowledge coming from the West. Unable to bring about meaningful reform in China, they turned to Japan as a place in which they could both effectively study the so-called “New Learning” as well as train a new generation to bring China into modernity without losing them to the West. These years in Japan reinforced the new Japanese terminology in the reform intellectuals’ language and also further emphasized popular Japanese ideology in their writing. However, this was not merely unidirectional. These few years represent a period of Sino-Japanese elite cooperation in which intellectuals imagined a future which was both Asian and modern, discarding the ‘leaving Asia’ slogan which a number of Meiji intellectuals had utilized to posit Asia as the past and Europe as the future. This can particularly be seen in the establishment and early years of the Datong School in Yokohama. Although still following the reformers from Chapter I, this chapter turns towards their efforts to promote Confucian Chinese education in Japan, examining the                                                  152 For a recent example, see the February 2012 issue of The Journal of Asian Studies for a discussion between John Whittier Treat, Timothy Brook and Michael D. Shin. 153 I use the Mandarin name of the school merely for the reader’s convenience. This school was never called datong at the time of its existence. It was officially known in Japanese as daidō, while students and staff were Cantonese speakers and would have called it daaitung. This paper largely concerns the first Datong School, established in Yokohama in 1897 and beginning operations in 1898. However, the Datong Higher School, established in Tokyo in 1899 and largely involving the same students and staff, will also be considered. 84  Datong Schools as a site of Japan-China cooperation.  In this chapter I begin by showcasing the cooperation and overlap of the Japanese Asianist association Tōa Dōbunkai 東亞同文會 and the Chinese reformers arriving in Japan before proceeding to the formation of the Datong Schools. I take the Datong Schools as a case study for the cooperation between pro-Japanese Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese. Concentrating on the intellectuals closely involved with the school, I examine the strong overlap of Confucianism, nationalism and Asianism in the context of the Datong Schools. Finally, I turn to the product of the school, showing how the revolutionary students remained opposed to empire, yet chose many levels of identification to represent themselves in the struggle. A crucial issue that this chapter considers is the flow and change of concepts and identities as they passed to a new generation due to transnational cooperation at this pivotal time. I argue that the Datong schools were very much a concrete product of the cooperation of Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, and the nationalist and Asianist concepts and identities employed for the students’ education were epistemological products of this same cooperation in an effort to save China and East Asia from Western imperialism. These efforts, which concentrated upon a Confucian education with modern attributes, resulted in a nationalistic youth with a victim consciousness, showcasing the relationship between Asianism and nationalism. Although this is a time of great cooperation, these young Chinese intellectuals in exile questioned the nature of cooperation with the Japanese as doubts arose concerning power differentials in the relationship of “chariot and side-car.” Despite the schools’ obvious importance and relation to numerous Japanese and 85  Chinese elite, texts concerning the initial Datong Schools are limited. In the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the main school in Yokohama was completely destroyed, along with most of its records.154 Therefore, this chapter relies on published sources in newspapers, journals and books, as well as a number of memoirs and some unpublished letters sent by school officials during the first few years following the school’s establishment in 1897. The Reformers and the Tōa Dōbunkai As shown in Chapter I, the reformers led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao failed in their muddled efforts to recreate the Chinese political system on the Meiji model. All sorts of possibilities for cooperation with Japan had appeared in 1898, but the palace coup in September ended the reformers’ hopes and they were forced to flee, finally finding a welcoming exile in Japan, where they settled in Yokohama, an important site of Sino-Japanese cooperation that would play a continued role in collaboration between the two countries’ citizens even far into World War II.155 Their welcome there was partly due to the Japanese friends they had made through the Shiwu Bao, and partly due to the establishment of a new transnational institution. The reformers 1898 flight to Japan coincided with the establishment of a far-reaching Japanese Asianist organization, the Tōa Dōbunkai.  The Tōa Dōbunkai, the Asianist organization that would become the most powerful                                                  154 In the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the Datong School was destroyed, as were the other three Chinese schools in Yokohama, the Zhicheng School 志成學校, the Huaqiao School 華僑學校, and the China School 中華學校. The Datong, Huaqiao and China Schools combined and reopened in 1926 as the China Public School 中華公立學校. 155 For a discussion of Yokohama’s history as a site of wartime collaboration, see: Eric Han, “A True Sino-Japanese Amity? Collaboration and the Yokohama Chinese (1937-1945),” Journal of Asian Studies 72.3, 587-610 (August, 2013). 86  and best known Asianist organization of the twentieth century, was established just weeks before The China Discussion (Qingyi Bao 清議報) began publishing, in November 1898.156 It had a very diverse membership, including all those of the expansionist, politically-minded Tōakai, the liberal Dōbunkai, and others, such as Sun Yat-sen’s friends, Miyazaki Tōten and Hirayama Shu. The organization was not limited to Japanese membership. One of the founding members was Kang Youwei’s student, Xu Qin (1873-?), who was in Yokohama to head the newly opened Datong School.157 This connection may have influenced the Japanese elite to provide Kang and Liang with such a welcome and may explain the connection of the organization to The China Discussion. The members of the Tōa Dōbunkai decided on four principal goals: 1) To preserve the integrity of China.  2) To aid China’s advancement. 3) To investigate the current state of affairs in China and decide on                                                  156 As this periodical included the English name The China Discussion on its front cover, I use it here. The Chinese name Qingyi Bao 清議報 was a more complicated play on words as qingyi indicated “fair discussion” but the single character Qing was also the name of the Manchu-led state. The name could then be translated as either qingyi bao – The Journal of Fair Discussion – or as Qing yi bao – The Journal of Discussion on the Qing State. Qingyi Bao清議報 (The China Discussion) 1898 – 1901 Yokohama. Reprinted Copy. Taipei: Chengwen Publishers 成文出版社, 1967. Hereafter the journal will be referred to as QYB. The first number in each reference refers to the volume as printed by Chengwen Publishers. The second number refers to the number of the original volume and the third number is the page number in the reprinted series, as original page numbers are often obscured in the reprint. 157 Before the establishment of the Tōa Dōbunkai, a number of its members had made contact with the reformers in China. According to founding member Murakata Kotarō’s 宗方 小太郎 diary, he had discussed Sino-Japanese cooperation 日清連合 with Liang Qichao, Wang Kangnian and Li Shengduo 李盛鐸 in Shanghai in February, 1897. See Zhai Xin翟新, Tōa Dōbunkai to Chūgoku: kindai Nihon niokeru taigai rinen (東亜同文会と中国:近代日本における対外理念 TōA DōbunKai and China: Ideology and Practice of Foreign Relations in Modern China), (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2001), 73. See the following section for Yamamoto Ken’s Shanghai meetings with the reformers. On Xu Qin and membership, see: Zachman, Urs Matthias. “The Foundation Manifesto of the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Society), 1898.” In Saaler, Sven and Szpilman, Christopher W.A.. Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920. (Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 116-117. 87  appropriate action.  4) To raise public awareness.158  These goals show the unidirectional interest of the institute. It was not concerned with collaboration with Chinese intellectuals as much as it was concerned with actively influencing China. The reformers’ arrival in Japan provided a welcome opportunity to advance these goals. And the stated intentions of the Tōa Dōbunkai would have appealed to the reformers who were working towards very similar ends. In the first issue of The China Discussion, a journal established in order to promote the interests of the Chinese reformers living in Japan, the editors forwarded their own four principles, explained as: 1) Support discussions on China and arouse the righteousness of the citizens! 維持支那之清議激發國民之正氣 2) Expand the knowledge of the Chinese people! 增長支那人之學識 3) Facilitate the communication between Chinese and Japanese voices, and bring them together in friendship! 交通支那日本兩國之聲氣聯其情誼 4) Invent an East Asian learning in order to preserve the Asian essence! 發明東亞學術以保存亞粹159  The stated principles of The China Discussion have a noticeably stronger concentration upon “Asia” than those of Japan’s most famous Asianist institution. While Japanese Asianist organizations were discussing China and what Japan could do with it, the Chinese intellectuals who were working with them were discussing East Asia and encouraging cooperation with the Japanese.                                                   158 Zachman 2011 B, 117. 159 QYB 1, 1, 4. These principles stayed with The China Discussion for some time. However, by the end of its third year, they are no longer mentioned, indicating Liang’s loss of confidence in the strategy of Asianism. Dikötter notes that they are not mentioned at all in the 100th issue article on the journal. Dikötter 1992, 86. 88   The China Discussion then became an important voice for the Tōa Dōbunkai in its early days. On the twenty-third page of the initial issue, the organization placed a full-page advertisement, declaring the intentions and the founding principles listed above and inviting Chinese literati to join their organization.160 Repeating the standardized metaphor of “lips and teeth,” the short article refers to China and Japan’s ancient brotherhood and laments the recent fighting between the two countries. Renewed ties and exchanges are what the statement calls for, ending with the words: “We invite  the literati (shidaifu 士大夫) of both these countries, those born on this same continent, those with the same ambitions in these times, to support these ideas and enter this organization so that we may join forces on this.”161 It may be due to this sudden influence of the Tōa Dōbunkai that reformers’ writing became more pro-Asianist after their 1898 arrival in Japan, and for which Liang is often cited as an important Chinese pan-Asianist by Asianist organizations today.162 Although Liang certainly wrote texts on Asian unity and cooperation with Japan, unlike Sun Yat-sen his Asianist ideology is only evident in his writing for a few short years following the reforms                                                  160 QYB 1, 1, 47. 161 請兩國士大夫。同生於此洲。同志於此時者。贊此意。入此會。以戮力於此。Ibid. Aside from this announcement and Liang Qichao’s articles on the Bianfa Tong Yi 變法通義 and Wuxu Bianfa 戊戌變法, one of the most noticeable articles in the first few pages of the first edition of the Qingyi Bao is “A Letter to China’s Gentlemen of Will” 與支那有志諸君子書 (QYB 1, 25-31), which is simply listed as authored by a gentleman from the Tōa Dōbunkai. The article displays the group’s anger with the Westerners’ theory that the white West is superior to the yellow East. It demands that China modernizes and regains its position as a world power for Asia. 162 For example: see the writing of the Society for Asian Integration or the many websites, blogs and Facebook site designed by vocal Asianist blogger Niraj Kumar. See Niraj Kumar, Arise, Asia! Respond to White Peril (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2003), 172. Also, Liang is mentioned as a Chinese proponent of Asianist thought in a 2006 article by China’s current Foreign Minister: Wang Yi 王毅, “Considering Neo-Asianism in the Twenty-First Century” 思考二十一世纪的新亚洲主义, in Waijiao Pinglun 外交评论 89, 6-10. Translated by Torsten Weber in Saaler and Szpilman 2011b (361-369), 363 89  of 1898 and must be seen within temporal and spatial limitations. Liang made the logical choice to turn to Japan for help with China’s problems during what he saw as a period of crisis. Although generally always believing in nationalism and liberalism as the appropriate paths to modernity, Liang regularly changed his mind on other key issues, his focus vacillating between republicanism and constitutional monarchy during the late Qing years. Pan-Asianism was also a path to modernity that Liang flirted with around the turn of the century. Some form of a union between China and Japan made logical sense to Liang during his pro-Japanese years. Although he never clearly conceptualized what this Asian union would be, he made vague references to unity before the coup and then naïvely called for a bizarre union of Japan, China, the United States and Great Britain during and after the coup.163 Such discussions cannot be strictly called Asianist. They expose the desperation of Liang and others during this time, but also indicate the great distance between Liang’s thinking in 1898 and modern ideas of nationalism that would typify his writing in Japan. However, what is most often cited as evidence of Liang’s Asianist leanings is his journal The China Discussion. In the final sentence of the introduction of the first edition, the editors explain: “We must support those of our yellow race who will strive for an autonomous Asia in the twentieth century.”164  This statement is representative of the intellectual climate surrounding the reformers’                                                  163 Liang in a meeting with Shiga Shigetaka on Oct 27th 1898 (Translated in: Masako Gavin. PhD dissertation (1999) “Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927): the Forgotten Enlightener.” Available at:   Appendix 3, page 206). 164 QYB, 1, 1, 4. 90  arrival in Japan and the short period of collaboration with the Tōa Dōbunkai and Japanese supporters of China. The China Discussion was the voice piece for the reformers during the first few years of their exile in Japan and served as not only the foremost promoter of the Datong schools, but also as educational materials for their students. The China Discussion remains one of the most important sources for studies of the schools today and is frequently referenced in this chapter. However, the school itself predates the journal and the arrival of reformers by one year. The Establishment of the Datong Schools The first Datong School was opened in Yokohama in late 1897. The decision to establish the Datong School was not made by the reformers, who would dominate the school and control its teaching, but by the Chinese of Yokohama. The port had been open to foreigners since 1859 and immediately saw the growth of a Chinatown, despite Chinese residents not gaining legal status until the ratification of the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty in 1873. The population was primarily from Guangzhou, with a minority from the San Jiang area, and naturally wanted a school in which their children could be instructed in their native Cantonese.165 The school was originally a project envisioned by the Yokohama Chinese Association in consultation with Sun Yat-sen and his Xingzhong Hui. They made plans to open the Zhongxi School 中西學校 in 1897, a project initially led by Feng Jingru 馮鏡如 and Ma Zishan 馬紫珊.166 The Chinese Association decided to send Kuang Rupan                                                  165 Han, Eric C. (Doctoral Dissertation) Narrating community in Yokohama Chinatown: 1894—1972, Columbia University, 2009. 166 Itō Izumi 伊藤泉美. “Yokohama Daidō Gakkō” 横浜大同学校 (The Datong School in Yokohama). Yokohama Archives of History News 42 横浜開港資料館館報 42. (Oct 30, 1993), 4-5. 91  鄺汝磐 to Shanghai to find a suitable teacher. At that time Kang Youwei had become quite famous and Kuang was able to call on him to forward a request for a new head master from Sun Yat-sen. According to a school history from 1908, Kang told Kuang: “If the school is called the Zhongxi School (China and the West School), it is missing a term for Japan. If it is called the China-Japan School, it is missing the West. It would be best if it were called the Datong School.”167 From this point on the school was known as Datong, indicating the Confucian utopia and the subject of Kang’s magnum opus, the Datong Shu (大同書 The World Unity), which he was in the middle of writing in 1897. Therefore, Kang’s philosophy was established in the name of the school as well as in its teaching and staff. To provide the students with the proper reformist Confucian education, Kang dispatched Xu Junmian 徐君勉 (more commonly, and hereafter, known as Xu Qin徐勤), Chen Moan 陳默庵, Chen Yinnong 陳蔭農, and Tang Juedun 湯覺頓 to serve as his representatives.168  Xu Qin, one of Kang’s earliest and favorite students, was made head master of the new school.169                                                  167 Unknown Author, “A History of the Datong School” 大同學校略史 in Zhang Xuehuan 張學璟 (ed.). Datong Xuelu 大同學錄 (The Datong School Register). Xuanzong 1 (1908), July 7. Yokohama 大橋, 2. 168 Ibid. 169 There are two other slightly contesting stories of this event, both of which seem unlikely and do not match the earlier sources. One version is that the Chinese Association had originally wanted Kuang Rupan to bring Liang Qichao back as headmaster. However, as Kang Youwei had recently asked Liang to serve as editor of the Shiwu Bao, he was unwilling to allow him to leave for Japan. This is certainly plausible, yet it seems odd for the association to have made such a direct request. This became the school’s official history: Yokohama Yamate Chinese School Hundred Year Record: 1898-2004 横滨山手中华学校百年晓志:1898-2004 (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate China School, 2005), 45. The original source that this comes from is probably Feng Ziyou Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo qian geming shi 中華民國開國前革命史 (Shanghai: Gemingshi Bianji She 革命史編輯社, 1928), 42, where Feng explains that Chen Shaobai recommended Liang. The other version is that Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Association wanted Kang Youwei to be headmaster 92  The Need for the Datong School in Yokohama The need for a school therefore came from three directions. The reformers, who were establishing schools all across China at the time, were very active in Yokohama and it was a logical move to send some of their best intellectual resources to the people to whom they turned for financial help. On the other hand, the local residents themselves wanted a school for their children so that they would not have to endure the terrible racism that was prevalent at schools for foreigners in Japan. And thirdly, Japanese Asianists wanted a school established to continue with the reforms and “raise China,” and they were willing to offer the necessary support. One of the reformers’ key concepts for reform was widespread education under a mix of New Learning and Confucianism. In essence this indicated the push to educate a reform-minded youth under the framework outlined by Kang Youwei. This was begun in China with the famous Wanmu Caotang (萬木草堂) in Guangzhou and the Shiwu School (時務食堂) in Changsha, but after the 1898 failure, with pro-reform schools being closed down or made ineffective, schools were opened abroad in Chinese communities as far away as Singapore, Surabaya and Victoria.170 The Datong schools were intended to be the central institutions for                                                  himself. This version seems to be a result of Joseph Levenson’s misreading of his source, Li Jiannong. Levenson, Joseph R.. Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China. Taipei: Rainbow Bridge Book Company, 1970 (original 1953), 50. Li Jiannong 李劍農. Zuijin sanshi nian Zhongguo zhengzhishi 最近三十年中國政治史 (China’s Political History in the Last Thirty Years). Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1974 (original 1930), 68. Li’s original source is also Feng Ziyou (1928). 170 The opening of Victoria’s Lequn Yishu 樂群義塾 has been discussed in Hong Jiang’s Masters’ thesis: “A Socio-Historical Analysis of Chinese Heritage Language Education in British Columbia (University of British Columbia, 2010), 11-14.  93  this worldwide expansion.171 Once the key reformers made their homes in Yokohama and Tokyo in late-1898, the Datong schools became the models for all others.  Figure 1: An assembly of students. This rare photo of the school found in the 1908 Datong School Register (Zhang Xuehuan 1908) shows the students with visiting students from the Shizhong School 時中學校 in Penang and the Tongwen School 同文學校 of Kobe. Public Domain. As for the local residents’ need for separate schooling, Feng Ziyou, clearly an insider on such a need, wrote a scathing criticism of the racism towards Chinese that existed in schools for foreigners in Japan. Feng Ziyou had firsthand experience with the Western condescension at such schools. In 1896 he was sent to study at a French Catholic school in Tokyo. The vicious imperialist bullying of the Western students was too much to bear and he                                                  171 Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi” 東京高等大同學校公啟 The China Discussion 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 7-8. 94  gave up after only four months of study. According to Feng, the foreigners constantly berated the Chinese and accused them of being dirty, a theme that is evident in the newspapers of the time.172 In an 1898 article on the Datong School in the Kobe Weekly Chronicle, the author condescendingly mocks Chinese people for being dirty. Conversely, in the same paragraph the author proclaims the Yokohama Chinatown to be the cleanest in the world, apart from those in Dutch colonies, where, “the Chinaman down there – no doubt much to his unspeakable disgust, - has to keep not only himself, but the roadways and the interiors of his own campong clean as well.”173 The author goes on to explain with amazement that the students of the Datong School appear even cleaner than Japanese students. In fact, the author has only positive things to say about the school, but cannot help but deride the reformers that have been sent to educate the children. The article ends with “But from the teacher’s standpoint we are not quite so sure about the advantage of being born in the kingdom where men are brought up on roast-pig and the Confucian Analects.”174 Clearly most Westerners were not willing to assist the Chinese at this time. Their condescension was overwhelming.                                                   172 This small school was founded by Alphonse Heinrich in 1888 as 曉星學校 Gyōsei Gakkō (Ecole L’étoile du Matin). Although the buildings were destroyed in the Great Kantō Earthquake, the school still survives to this day ( Accessed on June 1, 2013). Feng Ziyou (1939), 50-51. 173 Author Unknown. “The Chinese School in Yokohama” The Kobe Weekly Chronicle. October 1, 1898, 306-307. 174 Ibid, 307. 95   Figure 2:The Datong School in 1915. Although this picture was taken years later in 1915, it still gives some idea of the refinement of the students. Public Domain. Expansion  It was the overseas Chinese living in Japan that brought about the need for the Datong Schools, but the arrival of the reformers in Japan greatly accelerated the process. Within two years the Chinese community in Japan opened two new schools, one in Kobe, the other in Tokyo. The school in Kobe, proposed by Liang Qichao during a visit to Kobe in 1899, was initially to be called the Kobe Datong School, but before it opened the name was changed to 96  the Tongwen School 同文學校.175 Meaning both “same script” and “same culture,” tongwen (Jp. dōbun) was a key term for China-Japan cooperation at the time, as well as half of the name of Japan’s largest Asianist organization, the Tōa Dōbunkai. Mai Shaopeng 麥少彭, the headmaster at the Tongwen School, was an associate of Liang Qichao and his family was prominent in the Kobe business community,176 but Inukai Tsuyoshi was established as the honorary headmaster and delivered a full-fledged Asianist speech at the opening ceremony on March 1st.177 This school would be the only Datong School to survive to the present day. Although the building was destroyed in the bombing of Kobe on June 5, 1945, it was rebuilt and continues to play an important role in Kobe’s Chinese community today.178  The other school that the overseas Chinese established was the Datong High School, an upper level school that was designed to cultivate talent selected in Japan, China and other countries in order to rescue China.179 Of the reasons listed for establishing the school in Japan                                                  175 Author Unknown, “Shenhu Qingren jiang kai Datong xuexiao” 神戶清人將開大同學校, in QYB, v.19 (May 21, 1899. Translated from an article in the Mainichi (June 3, 1899)). Author Unknown, “Ji Shenhu Tongwen xuexiao kaixiao shi” 記神戶同文學校開校事, in QYB, v.38 (February 11, 1900).  176 Chen Laixing 陳來幸, “The Social Function and Networking Usages of Overseas Chinese Business Associations” 海外中華總商會的社會功能與其網絡作用, in Pui-Tak Lee李培德, The Networking and Social Functions of Business Associations in Modern China’近代中國的商會網絡及社會功能  (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 160. 177 The speech praised China-Japan cooperation in the opening of the school, made references to the “same script, same race” and “teeth and lips” idioms, but also offered criticism of Japan’s straying from the shared cultural roots provided by Confucius and Mencius. Also, the date for the school’s opening is often written as Feburary 1st. It was in fact the first day of the second month on the lunar calendar, March 1st on the Gregorian calendar. Author Unknown, “Ji Shenhu Tongwen xuexiao kaixiao shi” 記神戶同文學校開校事, in QYB, v.38 (February 11, 1900). 178 This is according to the official school history. In: “School Introduction: Year 2011” Gakkō Shōkai: 2011 nendo学校紹介: 2011年度 (Kobe: Kobe Chinese Tongwen School, 2011), 2. Also mentioned in Asahi’s commemoration of the school’s 110th anniversary: Dōbun gakkō sōritsu 110 nen: 同文学校創立 110年, Asahi, (September 10, 2009), 25. My thanks to the staff at the Kobe Overseas Chinese History Museum神戸華僑歴史博物館 for these and many other materials concerning the Tongwen School. 179 Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi 東京高等大同學校公啟 The China 97  rather than in another country, cost, proximity, Confucianism, script, race, and also the abundance of Japanese willing to help China were all cited. In establishing the Datong School, the Chinese found numerous influential Japanese friends to whom they could turn for help. An article in The China Discussion, written by a group from the Yokohama Chinese community, conveyed the need for this reliance on Japan and the level of support that they saw after two years of running the first Datong School: The powers all come from another continent, but Japan is our neighbor. Our soil is close by. We are of a similar race and use a similar script. This makes it easier for our students to learn. Furthermore, those that are knowledgeable among Japan’s government and people understand the importance of the mutual assistance of teeth and lips. They see supporting China as of first importance. Their feelings of mutual love and friendship are many times that of the white race and they are willing to assist and educate. On our own we may not be able to accomplish this. Moreover, if the youth of China can unite with the youth of Japan and support East Asia in these times, then such an effort can begin with this school of higher education.180  The assistance of Ōkuma Shigenobu and Inukai Tsuyoshi was mentioned in many of these articles on the Datong Schools. Their Asianist vocabulary of “teeth and lips,” a common metaphor for Japanese and Chinese mutual assistance, as well as references to race and script stand out in the above passage as well as many other articles from the reformers’ journals in Japan. Asianism featured strongly in the pages of The China Discussion, and a large number                                                  Discussion 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 8. 180 Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi 東京高等大同學校公啟 The China Discussion 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 8. 98  of the people surrounding and supporting the Datong School were committed Asianists, partly due to the timing of the reformers’ arrival in Japan and the associations they formed immediately upon arrival Sino-Japanese Elite Cooperation and the Datong School The Datong School was an important symbol as the point of intersection of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, as well as Japanese China-adventurers, politicians and Sinologists. One of the most interesting elements of the Datong School’s early days is the number of these elite Japanese Asianists involved with the school. They can be broken into three groups: The so-called shishi 志士 adventurers, typified by Sun Yat-sen’s close friend Miyazaki Tōten; the Japanese political elite Asianists, who had recently found new power in Japan in 1898; and the Confucianists who dreamed of an Asia based on classical traditions but thriving in a modern world. Although we regularly divide the Asianists by their beliefs and their actions, on issues such as this they could all work together and support a common mission.  Working with the Asianists When the 1898 reforms came to an end with Cixi’s coup, Sun Yat-sen hurriedly asked his Japanese Asianist adventurer friends to help the fugitives escape from the Qing police. Miyazaki Tōten was sent to Hong Kong to find Kang Youwei hiding on a British boat and Hirayama Shu 平山周 was sent to Beijing to find Liang Qichao and Wang Zhao stuck in the 99  Japanese embassy. 181  Both of the major groups opposing the Qing government were temporarily united in Yokohama. The China hands had made friends with important Chinese agents of change and had managed to prove their worth in times of trouble. Although these adventurers had the least influence of the three Asianist groups on the actual Datong School, they would continue to appear. Correspondence between Miyazaki Tōten and Xu Qin, while he served as headmaster, show the importance of Miyazaki, and also show the diminishing role Sun was able to play in the school. Xu dramatically declared that China was like a boat lost in the storm and needed Japan’s help.182 Of course, just a year earlier, Miyazaki had brought Xu’s mentor to Japan. Despite Xu’s disagreements with Sun, he clearly wanted to keep ties with Miyazaki. However, the Japanese Asianists that had a larger influence on the school were in much more powerful positions. The reformers had arrived in Japan at just the right time to receive help from Japanese Asianists. The Tōa Dōbunkai, Japan’s largest and most powerful Asianist organization had just been established as the reformers were fleeing the Qing police. Kang’s student and principal of the Datong School, Xu Qin, was one of the founding members, creating firm ties between the Tōa Dōbunkai Asianists, the school, and the reformers.183 The Dōbunkai would also assist Liang in establishing and publishing his latest journal, The China Discussion, hastily put forth in November, 1898, and printed by Feng Jingru, noted above as one of the                                                  181 Sun Yat-sen’s role may not have been as great as Feng states it to have been. Nevertheless, Miyazaki and Hirayama did bring Kang and Liang to Japan in November, 1898. Feng Ziyou馮自由, Geming Yishi  革命逸史 (A History of the Revolution) (Beiping: Commercial Press, 1939), 48. 182 Jansen 1954, 79. 183 Zachman, Urs Matthias. “The Foundation Manifesto of the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asian Common Culture Society), 1898.” In Saaler, Sven and Szpilman, Christopher W.A.. Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920. (Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 116-117. 100  founders of the Datong School and also the father of Feng Ziyou, the school’s most famous student, who will be discussed below.184 During its short existence The China Discussion relied on the Dōbunkai’s associated journals for much of its content. Tōa Dōbunkai members were also conspicuous in their involvement with the school. Kōmuchi Tomotsune 神鞭知常 (1848-1905), an examination minister, frequently attended ceremonies. Kashibara Buntarō 柏原文太郎 (1869-1936), an assistant of Inukai Tsuyoshi185, served as executive secretary and made speeches to the students.186 However, two of the most important members of the Tōa Dōbunkai, Inukai and Ōkuma Shigenobu, played very active roles in the school. Inukai was Minister of Education under Ōkuma Shigenobu from June 30, 1898 to November 8th, 1898. Shortly after this he served as the honorary head of the Datong Schools.187 Having the former Ministry of Education serving as the honorary headmaster of a small school with less than 200 students certainly offered the school credibility and must have attracted much support. However, Inukai’s position was not easy. For the Sun and Kang camps, the school was another point over which they could not get along after Kang’s arrival                                                  184 For more on Feng Jingru, see: Feng Ruiyu 馮瑞玉. “Yokohama daidō gakkō to Feng Jingru” 橫濱大同學校と馮鏡如 (The Yokohama Datong School and Feng Jingru) in Yokohama Yamate Chinese School Hundred Year Record: 1898-2004 横滨山手中华学校百年晓志:1898-2004 (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate China School, 2005), 35-38. 185 Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅, prime minister from 1931 to 1932, was involved in various Asianist organizations, including the Tōakai, forerunner to the Tōa Dōbunkai, and the Kokuryūkai, which would become a rather notorious and, at times, terrorist organization years later. See: Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryūkai, 1901-1920” in Sven Saaler and Christopher Szpilman (eds) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011). 186 Author Unknown. Datong Xuexiao xiaji jinji ji 大同學校夏季進級記 (The Datong School’s Summer Graduation). The China Discussion 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 7. Also, Jansen, Marius B, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 79. 187 In a February 3rd, 1899 letter, Kang Mengqing 康孟卿 informs Yamamoto Ken of Inukai’s appointment as honorary headmaster (名譽校長). Kang reports that Inukai is very pleased with this appointment. In the Yamamoto Ken Archive at the Kochi Liberty and People’s Museum (Hereafter YKA), article C124. 101  in Japan. Inukai, called the “godfather of the school” by Marius Jansen, worked hard to get the two camps to work together and succeeded in the establishing and support of the schools, but with Kang’s arrival the success was short-lived and animosity soon dominated the Sun-Kang relationship.188 The other major political figure that is associated with both the Datong schools is Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkuma was an important friend of Kang, Liang and Sun and would provide continuous support from his first term as prime minister in 1898 to his second and last term, which lasted from 1914 to 1916, at which time he led the push for the Twenty-one Demands and finally lost favor with his Chinese friends. Ōkuma provided financial and government support for the Datong schools.189 Also Ōkuma provided Datong students with personal recommendations – which, it can be assumed, guaranteed admission – to the university he established in Tokyo, the Tokyo Senmon School 東京專門學校, soon after renamed as Waseda University.190  Yamamoto Ken The final Japanese Asianist who was connected to the Datong School is the least known of those mentioned here, but may have had the greatest influence on the school and,                                                  188 Jansen 1954, 79. Also see Feng  (1928), 43. Miyazaki Tōten  too made numerous efforts. At this point he saw them both as necessary to the revolution with Sun as the vanguard and Kang as the educator. Miyazaki Tōten. My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream: The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten. Translated, with an introduction, by Etō Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982 (Original Japanese version published in 1902), p129 and 143. 189 In a letter dated August 25th (no year is written, but it can be assumed to be 1899), Liang Qingchao thanks Ōkuma for his support and details the need for the Datong Higher School in Tokyo. This letter is available in the Ōkuma Archive at Waseda University Library. 190 Feng Ruiyu 2005, 36. 102  in terms of ideology, would have had the most in common with the Confucian reformers, Kang, Liang, Wang and Xu. Yamamoto Ken (山本憲 1852-1928)191 was a little known Japanese Confucianist who was highly connected with the reformers from an early stage and provided much assistance with the Datong School among other affairs. Yamamoto gained his Asianist activist credentials in 1885 when he assisted the famous Korean reformer, Kim Ok-gyun金玉均 (1851–1894), by storing explosives in his Osaka home in preparation for Kim’s failed coup.192 Deemed a major player in the “Osaka Incident,” Yamamoto was sentenced and spent a few years in prison.193 In late 1897 he visited Beijing and Shanghai, where he became friendly with many of the reformers before the 1898 Wuxu Reforms.194 These friendships would last for decades, resulting in constant exchange and mutual influence. Although his role in Japan’s Popular Rights Movement was not one of the most influential, he delivered many of the ideas of this movement to a receptive Chinese audience through his influence upon Liang Qichao’s understanding of new literature.195 In turn his Confucian friends from China supported his Asianist ideals and even gave him a                                                  191 Yamamoto Ken was also known as Yamamoto Baigai 山本梅崖. The best known source on Yamamoto is a two-page passage in the often-cited Stories and Biographies of Pioneer East Asian Adventurers, a history compiled by the Kokuryūkai  and first published in 1933. Due to the ubiquity of this book, references to Yamamoto Ken almost always concern his contribution to the Osaka Incident and little else: Kokuryūkai 黒竜会. Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden 東亜先覚志士紀伝. Tokyo: Harasho Bō, 1984. 192 Yamamoto Ken was also involved in the establishment and the theoretical background of numerous non-governmental Asianist organizations, including the Asia Trade Protectionist Association  亞細亞貿易保護協會 and the Japan China Friendship Association 日清協和會. 193 Jansen 1954, 75. 194 Lu Shunzhang 呂順張, Yamamoto Baigai to Wang Kangnian no kō yū 山本梅崖と汪康年の郊遊 (Yamamoto Baigai and Wang Kangnian’s Exchanges) International Buddhist University Bulletin 45 四天王寺国際仏教大学紀要 45 (March, 2008), 29. 195 Hiroko Willcock, “Japan Modernization and the Emergence of New Fiction in Early Twentieth Century China: A Study of Liang Qichao,” Modern Asian Studies 29.4 (1995), 817-840, 833. 103  voice for these ideals in The China Discussion.  Although Yamamoto maintained contact with many of the reformers, his main contact in their group and at the Datong School was Kang Youyi,196 the cousin of Kang Youwei. Eighty-four letters from Kang to Yamamoto remain in the Yamamoto Ken Archives today, the majority of which use the official address of the Datong School in Yokohama.197 In his autobiography Yamamoto states that at one time Kang asked him to be the headmaster of the Datong School, but he was unable to leave his own school, the Baiseisho 梅清所 in Osaka.198 Yamamoto was both a people’s rights’ advocate and an ardent Confucianist. His particular version of Asianism was therefore in favor of constitutional monarchies in which the peoples of East Asia worked together to defend against the White Peril. He first published his Asianist ideology in “On Conditions in East Asia” 論東亞事宜 as a serialized column in the 1898-1899 editions of The China Discussion and then released the same text as a 26 page pamphlet in the summer of 1900.199 The article concentrates on the Russian threat to East Asian autonomy and stresses the need for cooperation. Using the analogy of the Warring States, Yamamoto posits the Russians as the Qin, not unlike Chen Chi陳熾’s articles in the Shiwu Bao in 1897, which Yamamoto would have been familiar with.200                                                  196 Kang Youyi 康有儀 is usually referred to by his hao: Kang Mengqing 康孟卿. 197 There are also 19 letters from Wang Kangnian, ten from Kang Youwei, nine from Liang Qichao and six from Wang Zhao, among many others. 198 Masuda Wataru; Joshua A. Fogel, transl. “Seigaku tōzen to Chūgoku jijō [The Eastern Spread of Western Learning and Conditions in China] (part 10)”  Sino Japanese Studies 7.1 (October, 1994), 34-60. 199 Yamamoto Ken 山本憲, Tōa Jigi 東亜時宜 (On the Situation in East Asia) (Osaka: Kanayaka Kaemon金谷嘉右衛門, May 25, 1900). Available in the YKA, article A9. 200 Discussed in the previous chapter. 104  In his introduction to the Contents of the Yamamoto Ken Archive, Kōbun Gō 公文豪 explains that “The value of Yamamoto Ken’s Asianism remains an important research topic. Taking Confucianism as the basis for Japanese and Chinese mutual assistance, it is clearly different from the Great Asianism which arose later to posit Japan as the leader of Asia.”201 This is so, however, in “On Conditions in East Asia,” Yamamoto does not merely concentrate on the Confucian side of things, but rather emphasizes Asianism as a defensive strategy to deal with Russia. Although Yamamoto took Confucianism as the assumed basis for society, his Asianism was also strongly based upon his belief in the people’s sovereignty. Therefore he opposed the absolute sovereignty of the monarchs in East Asia and opposed investing too much power in political parties. Yamamoto’s vision for East Asia’s future, based on his liberal beliefs combined with his strong belief in Confucianism and acceptance of the forces of Social Darwinism, made him an excellent partner for Kang and his students in the final years of the nineteenth century.202 After returning from Kanto on the arrival of the reformers in Japan, he established the China-Japan Friendship Association 日清協會, an organization that was committed to intellectual collaboration for the protection of China and East Asia, while vehemently opposed to government interference. He advertised this association regularly in The China Discussion. Liang Qichao wrote a letter to Yamamoto, thanking him for his role in influencing the Japanese government to protect Kang and Liang, but also praising his new                                                  201 Kōbun Gō 公文豪, Introduction to Contents of the Yamamoto Archive  山本憲関係資料目録 (Kōchi: Kōchi Liberty and People’s Rights Museum 高知市立自由民権記念館, 2011), 13. 202 In fact, Kang wrote a poem to praise Yamamoto Ken: “Da Shanben jun” 答山本君 in The China Discussion 清議報 25 (March 2nd, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 1.21). 105  association and showing his hopes for cooperation, calling the association the “fortune of the East.”203 Yamamoto was friends with Kang and certainly familiar with his works. He may even have been one of the few insiders to see Kang’s unpublished drafts, which were much more extreme in their imagining of the route to datong. Xu Qin sent him an unnamed copy of one of Kang’s books. In the accompanying letter Xu Qin briefly explains the thrust of Kang’s argument: “The central meaning of Nanhai Xiansheng’s (Kang Youwei) propagation of Confucius’ datong is his aim to correct the hearts of the people in order to save China; to save China in order to raise East Asia; to raise East Asia in order to bring peace and stability to the world.”204 Yamamoto would have been pleased by this. Like Kang and Xu Qin, he believed that China was central to saving East Asia, and that Confucianism was necessary for world peace.                                                  203 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, “Zhi Daban Riqing Xiehehui Yamamoto Baigan Shu” 致大阪日清協和會山本梅崖書 (A letter to Yamamoto Baigai of Osaka’s Japan-China Association.” In Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works shang《飲冰室合集》集外文(上) (edited by Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005), 57. 204 Letter dated July 23rd (no year). Available in the YKA, article C-213. 106   Xu Qin: the Primary Educator at the Datong School For the early years of the first Datong School, Kang Youwei’s star pupil Xu Qin served as headmaster and likely had the greatest influence on education at the school. In 1896 Kang sent Xu Qin to be head master at the Shiwu School in Changsha. This was important in giving him the experience necessary for his later work at the Datong School, which he ran from the age of 25. In 1897, just before his move to Yokohama, he established the Zhixin Bao 知新报 in Macau. 205  This magazine concentrated upon the growing threat of Russia, which Xu and his editors saw as China’s ultimate enemy. Like Liang Qichao and the writers at Shiwu Bao, they therefore encouraged greater ties with Japan in order to counter the Russian threat. Naturally, it was also important for the propagation of reform ideas and reprinted many of the same                                                  205 Although based in Macau, the Zhixin Bao was a major journal for the reformers. It was also used by Xu Qin to run a number of articles on the school before the The China Discussion was established in Yokohama.  Figure 3:Xu Qin (left) photographed with Liang Qichao. The 1908 Datong School Register (Zhang Xuehuan 1908). Public Domain 107  articles from the Shiwu Bao and the Xiang Bao. Like Kang, Xu Qin saw all possibilities for reform within a Confucian context, hoping to find a way to combine classical traditions with the New Learning. Xu Qin was one of Kang’s earliest disciplines and was consistently one of his favorites, enjoying numerous posts in Kang’s various organizations over the years. Others considered him equal to a shadow of Kang Youwei, even going as far as to call him “The Kang Youwei that is not Kang Youwei.”206  While at the school, Xu Qin devoted himself to teaching the students the importance of Confucianism. In this regard the school was clearly a conservative institution. Naturally, Xu Qin’s Confucianism was Kang Youwei’s reform Confucianism, which was tinged with Social Darwinism and emphasized progress towards datong. The reformers believed that, coupled with the New Learning of the West in Japan, these teachings would make China strong enough to repel the West, the materialism of which Xu Qin abhorred.  In 1898 Xu Qin outlined five points by which the school, and by extension China in reform, would stride into the future. These five points were published in the Zhixin Bao, as well as the Xiangxue Bao 湘學報. The points were: “Establish your Will! Study the Texts! Unite! Honour the Teachings! Protect the Nation!”207 To Xu Qin, all of these were connected                                                  206 Chen Xuezhang 陈学章 and Wang Jie 王杰 “Xu Qin yu Yokohama Datong Xuexiao 徐勤与横滨大同学校 (Xu Qin and the Yokohama Datong School) in Fang Zhiqin 方志钦 and Wang Jie 王杰 (eds.) Kang Youwei yu jindai wenhua 康有为与近代文化, 255-269 (Kang Youwei and Modern Culture) (Henan: Henan University Press, 2006), 256-258. This article contains a full biography of Xu Qin and details his philosophy and work at the school. Unfortunately, concerning his collaboration with Japanese friends, Chen and Wang criticize Xu for being ignorant of what the authors see as the yexin of the Japanese and their ambition to create pro-Japanese Chinese. 207立志,讀書,合群,尊教,保國. Xu Qin 徐勤, Riben Hengbin Zhongguo Datong Xuexiao ji 日本橫濱中國大同學校記 (The Chinese Datong School in Yokohama, Japan). In Wuxu bianfa ziliao 4 戊戌變法資料 4 (Originally in Zhixin Bao 52, March 21, 1898 and in Xiangxue Bao 43, June 1, 1898), (Shanghai: Shanghai 108  with reform-minded Confucianism and all had the objective of repelling the West. Xu Qin’s opposition to the West was not expressed as a simple form of xenophobia, but was harboured in his religious conviction that Confucianism was the only possible way for mankind to reach greatness. Therefore, the moral lacking that was evident in Westerners’ imperial ways was best explained in their ignorance of Confucius and his teachings. In his writing about the Datong School, he explains his conviction:  As for those foreigners that come from far off lands, their eyes have never set upon the books of Confucius, their ears have never heard the name Confucius. Through their habits they accept wrong as right. They are deceived and fail to see. Those in Japan who still respect and revere do not submit to heterodox faith. However, those who are misled by the worshiping of unorthodox gods go as far as to pledge allegiance to another race, abandon the divine land of China and call the disciples of Confucius weak and of a weak country. Alas!208   Xu Qin, like Yamamoto Ken, saw Christianity as the greatest threat to Confucianism and therefore to the passage of humanity towards datong. At school he insisted upon making the students kneel and bow before Confucius. This was an act that was unacceptable to Christians and caused friction among the students.209 He saw those Japanese that have turned to Christianity as traitors to the Sinocentric Confucian world order and embracing “another race” (彼族 bizu). Xu Qin believed that loyalty to one’s race (族 zu) was interconnected with                                                  Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), 518-520. Chen and Wang have noted that these five points and Xu’s general teaching philosophy are borrowed in great deal from Kang Youwei’s Chang xing xue ji 長興學記. Chen and Wang 2006, 262. 208 Ibid, 520. 209 Feng 1939, 51. 109  loyalty to the classical teachings. In his writings on the Datong School, Xu Qin outlined the various levels of identity that were important to him. Supporting China and protecting its classical teachings were of the utmost importance to him, but he also placed importance on race and the universal datong. Xu was a nationalist. He found China suddenly flung into a modern system, not a system of nation states, but a new world order of imperialism. Although he may have been receptive to some Asianist ideas, his ultimate goal was the survival of China. For the time being, the best way to achieve this was by working with his Japanese friends and educating Chinese students in Japan. The Datong School and Layers of Identity The reasons for studying in Japan were obvious. Japan had mastered “New Learning,” was affordable, and close at hand. Liang Qichao adds to this: “We can be at ease knowing that the talent that can pull China from its troubles has not left the land of the East. In protecting our race, we protect our country. The connection between these two is by no means small.”210 Like Xu Qin above, Liang Qichao mentions race as a basis for Japanese-Chinese cooperation. The reformers hoped that the students in Yokohama would not disregard China and seek personal gain, as foreign students in Europe and America had done. They taught the New Learning with an extreme emphasis on Confucianism with a Social Darwinist take on nationalism. But students in Yokohama would have had access to more than the New                                                  210Liang Qichao 梁啟超 “Riben Hengbin Zhongguo Datong xuexiao yuanqi 日本橫濱中國大同學校緣起 (The Reason for the China Datong School in Yokohama, Japan) in Yinbingshi wenji 4 飲冰室文集 4. (Beijing: Jingwenshe, 1944), 703. 110  Learning and Confucianism that their teachers hoped to instruct them in. In school they would study the Confucian classics, as well as the reformist works of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. The educational ideology of Kang Youwei is a perfect example of the fundamental tension evident in the creation of a modern national identity. At the same time the reformers looked backwards to tradition for the continuity of their identities and forwards to progress in modernity for their basis in the new world system. To do this Liang and Kang tried to reimagine Confucianism, disregarding earlier emphases and instead seeing Confucianism as an agent of change and as a doctrine which foretells the teleological path to modernity and finally datong.211  Reform Confucianism was highly stressed at the school. Every Sunday the students had to kneel and bow before the image of Confucius. Even the Christian students were forced to do this on pain of expulsion. At the 1898 birthday celebration for Confucius, at which numerous Chinese and Japanese dignitaries were in attendance, a scroll was hung beside the image of Confucius: “When those of the same race and the same script rise again, they will ally under the same religion (Confucianism) and disallow the flaunting and ravenous gaze of the Western Europeans. The Great Qing and the Great Nippon will henceforth combine under the Sage and gaze upon the rise of                                                  211 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 13-14. 同種同文復能同教相聯未許西歐逞虎視         大清大日從此大成并合遙看東亞慶麟游  111  East Asia.”212 The Asianism espoused here manages to avoid the question of leadership, unlike the Japanese-led Asianism that would soon appear and dominate the twentieth century. Just like the school itself, this Asianism was seen as a matter of cooperation, based on Confucianism, with the ambition of protecting China and Japan in the modern system of imperialism. As can be seen in the quote above, another binding factor was that of race. The terms “same race,” and “same script” were very popular in 1898, the first year of the school’s operations. They turn up frequently in the reformer periodicals in both China and Japan, as well as in correspondence from the time. Although the terms had been around much earlier, they were strongly revived by an exceedingly racially motivated article by Konoe Atsumaro 近衛篤麿 in the popular journal Taiyō (太陽 The Sun). The Asianist article was not as well received in Europe, where it added to the illogical fears of a “yellow peril.”213 Reveling in their brief Japanophilic stage, the reformers littered their writing with the term “same,” using all sorts of combinations. Although it was clearly a symbolic term paraded out at any mention of Sino-Japanese relations, it also demonstrates the feelings of the time. The desire to declare sameness with the Japanese at times bordered on the ridiculous, with Kang Youwei himself getting first prize in this contest for his rather absurd sentence in a letter to Yamamoto Ken: “Your country is of the same religion, same governance, same customs,                                                  212 Feng 1939, 51-52. As can be seen in the inserted text block, the organizers had arranged the structure of the couplet to express another level of meaning that could be derived from reading the text horizontally. The term datong appears over and over again in this text, indicating the importance of the union of China and Japan as a step towards utopia. The term “clean race” 清種 also indicates the direction reformers and revolutionaries would turn to in the years ahead and is further analyzed in Chapter III. I am grateful to a member of the audience at the 2013 Junior Sinology Conference in Chiayi for pointing out the couplet’s arrangement after having read my paper. 213 Urs Matthias Zachman. “Konoe Atsumaro and the Idea of an Alliance of the Yellow Race, 1898” in Saaler and Szpilman 2011, 85-92. 112  same race and same script.”214  There are two relations integral to this emphasis of sameness: the internal and the external relations. Internally, declaring one’s nation the same as the other may be seen as complimentary to that other, but the external relation is of more importance. This sameness between Japan and China indicated difference with the West in a strategic attempt to unite against a common enemy. This racial identity was strongly linked to the ever-present theme of race war in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century. As Western imperialists often cooperated, a very logical fear of the “white peril” became widespread and gave rise to strategies of united resistance. It is evident that both racial and national strategies were being considered to defend against imperialism. As is shown in the next chapter, what was understood as “same race” or “same nation” had not yet been clearly established. Asianism based on race relied upon similar identity constructions that nationalism was based upon. The former could not exist without the consciousness of the latter. Despite talk of racial sameness, the primary ideology that recurred in materials concerning the Datong schools was nationalism. Feng Ziyou recalls how Xu Qin “urged the students in the task of saving the country.” “All those who listened could not help but be moved.” On their textbooks and blackboards a slogan was written in large characters: “While the nation’s humiliation has not been cleared and the people suffer hardship, at every meal we will remember and urge our youth                                                  214 Letter in YKA, article C-95. Kang had been moved by Konoe’s article and wrote him a letter in November, 1898, encouraging Japanese involvement in Chinese affairs. See Zhao Jun 趙軍, “Sun Zhongshan he Yazhouzhuyi,” in Shehui kexue zhanxian 4, 195-201 (1988), 195. 113  onwards.”215 The students had to loudly recite this slogan at the end of classes every day. There was also a patriotic school song and other slogans. Survival in the modern system of imperialism necessitated the transformation of China into a more economically powerful country. The students left the Datong Schools foremost with a drive to bring China into modernity, and, within a few years of the school being established, patriotic fervor dominated mention of the school, largely replacing talk of Japan-China cooperation.216 Feng Ziyou has noted the revolutionary spirit with which the Chinese students in Tokyo imagined their future.217 This spirit was expressed in many different ways and on different levels of identity. The Students of the Datong School and Their Influence Initially, the student population at the Datong School in Yokohama was composed of local Cantonese-speaking Chinese with quite a number of mixed Japanese-Chinese parentage. After a while, other Cantonese-speaking students from China were also sent to Yokohama and the population of the school gradually increased.218  The Datong Higher School opened in Tokyo in 1899 and the first class was composed of a number of students from the Yokohama school.219 Many of these students would perform important roles in the revolution, especially as journalists, writers and translators. And the schools also contributed to the rise of young educated Chinese women. In 1899, the first year in which the school ran complete operations, there were a total                                                  215 國恥未雪,民生多艱,毎飯不忘,勗哉小子. Feng 1939, 51. 216 For example, see the patriotism expressed in the 1903 article: “Yokohama Datong xuexiao wunianjinian zhudian” 橫濱大同學校五年級年祝典 (CD).  217 Feng 1939, 45. 218 Itō Izumi has detailed the rises and falls in the school’s enrollment in a graph in Itō Izumi 1993, 4-5. 219 Feng 1928, 72. 114  of 110 students listed in the register. Surprisingly, 40 of these students were female. This is a very high ratio for Chinese schools in the late Qing, indicating that both the reformers living in Japan and the overseas Chinese population were positive about female education. However, as the school and the Chinese population enlarged with new students being sent from China, the ratio of female to male students dropped and did not return to its 1899 ratio until 1911, when there were 110 female to 127 male students.220 A journalist for the English newspaper Kobe Chronicle had this to say about the girls at the school: “Neat alone would scarcely do justice to their appearance, for it is more than that. Neat and stylish might cover the situation… there is no foot-binding for them, either physically or mentally… And so it will most likely come to pass that in ten or fifteen years from now we shall be having a Women’s Rights movement in China.”221 This journalist stresses the importance of fashion for the modern girl, but the figures and the journalist’s words indicate, not only the beliefs of the educators and/or community in Yokohama, but also the importance of this movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Reform Confucianists had intended for well-educated, young, modern women to be a part of their system. And the students that graduated from the schools were often imbued with a passion for revolution. Of the well-known Chinese elite that came out of the Yokohama Daidō School, Feng Ziyou is perhaps one of the most important and most influential. An organizer even from his days as a teenager in Yokohama, Feng is probably best-known for his histories of the                                                  220 Itō 1993, 5. 221 Author Unknown. “The Chinese School in Yokohama” The Kobe Weekly Chronicle (October 1, 1898), 307. 115  revolution, which also provide much of the sources for this chapter. Feng Ziyou, born in Yokohama in 1882 (-1958), was originally called Feng Maolong 馮懋龍. He was the son of Feng Jingru, who was also known by his exceedingly capitalist-sounding English name, F. Kingsell. As mentioned above, Feng Jingru was one of the elite Cantonese in the Chinese Association who first pushed to open the school in Yokohama. Hailing from Nanhai, Guangdong, the home of Kang Youwei, it is no surprise that he would have sided with Kang and turned to him for help with the school. After his father was killed due to support of the Taipings, Feng hated the Qing and left China for Japan. In Yokohama he became wealthy publishing dictionaries of English and Chinese under his company Kingsell and Co. In 1898 this experience would be useful when he offered to assist with the publication of Liang Qichao’s new journal, The Chinese Discussion.222 It was due to his father’s insistence that Feng Ziyou was in the first class of the Datong School. Then in 1901, due to Ōkuma Shigenobu’s introduction, he was enrolled at Tokyo Senmon School, which soon became Waseda University, an important school for overseas Chinese and the organization of student revolutionaries. Feng became a journalist for a number of papers, notably Hong Kong’s China Daily 中國日報. He was also sent to the United States and Canada where he served as a journalist and supported funding drives for Sun Yat-sen.223  One of the most extraordinary students of that first class was a friend of Feng, Su                                                  222 Feng Ruiyu 2005, 35-38. On Liang Qichao asking Feng Jingru to run the Qingyi Bao, also see: Feng Ziyou 1939, 63. 223 Feng Ruiyu 2005, 36. 116  Manshu.224 Younger than Feng, this half-Japanese half-Chinese Buddhist monk was in the same class as his brother, Feng Siluan 馮斯欒, another student who would soon be contributing to the revolution as a journalist. Due to Su’s work as a translator, writer and poet, the Zhuhai Municipal Government established the Su Manshu Poetry Prize in 2010.  Like his classmates, he was involved in the revolutionary spirit and soon joined the Xingzhong Hui.  A year after his 1902 graduation from the Datong Higher School, he joined the Resist Russia Militia 拒俄義勇隊 a popular anti-imperialist group for Chinese students in Tokyo. Su traveled to Shanghai, where he joined Chen Duxiu to work on the Guomin Riri Bao. He would return to Japan in 1907 to help Zhang Taiyan with the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood 亞洲和親會, a pan-Asian group that brought together anti-imperialist revolutionaries from across Asia and is discussed in the following chapter.225 At that time he also worked with the People’s News 民報 and the anarchist Journal of Natural Justice 天義報.226 Revolutionaries such as Su Manshu and Feng Ziyou are easily remembered due to the writings they have left behind, but documents also point to numerous other revolutionary activities supported or led by unknown Datong students.                                                   224 Su Manshu 蘇曼殊 (1884-1918) is generally known by his dharma name as he became a monk at the age of 14. His birth name was Su Zigu 蘇子谷. His translations include works by Victor Hugo, Lord Byron, Robert Burns, a number of Buddhist texts from Sanskrit and a surprising number of poems by women from the United Kingdom and India. His poetry and fiction, although never having great influence, have been noted as works in the time of transition to New Fiction and are widely available in collected volumes. 225 The Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood’s Chinese name is Yazhou heqin hui 亞洲和親會, which can be translated as the Asia Friendship Association. However, as the association operated as an international group, the members used the English name “Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood” in all publications from the time. 226 Liu Yazi 柳亞子, Su Manshu Yanjiu 蘇曼殊研究 (Research on Su Manshu) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 52-54. 117  In 1899 Lin Gui 林圭 arrived in Japan and temporarily assumed Xu Qin’s post at principal of the Datong School in Yokohama. In the winter of that year he would return to China with twenty students. At this time the line between the reformers and the revolutionaries was not as defined as it would soon be, and Liang was often involved with both sides. Liang, Sun, Miyazaki, Hirayama and Chen Shaobai saw the group of students off with a farewell party.227 Lin believed that this group would be the beginning of the revolution. Of course, the Hankow Uprising of 1900 was a tragic failure and many of these students lost their lives.228 Not long after this uprising, the Chinese residents of Yokohama considered different tactics, and even different possibilities for identity, in their struggle with the Manchu Qing. Once again, Datong students were noticeably involved.  The Guangdong Independence Association 廣東獨立協會 was established by Cantonese living in Yokohama in 1901. The core of the group was largely composed of students from the Datong School, including Feng Ziyou, Feng Siluan and Kuang Guanyi, as well as newly arrived students from Guangdong, including Li Zizhong李自重 and Wang Chonghui 王寵惠. From the outset the group cooperated with the Xingzhong Hui, and the names of most members appear in the Tongmeng Hui three years later.229 Although short lived and leaving no lasting political effect, the Guangdong Independence Association held importance in establishing some of the networks that worked towards the Xinhai Revolution. Sun Yat-sen was supportive of the students’ movement and regularly met with them in                                                  227 Li Jiannong 1974, 71. 228 Levenson 1970, 65-67. Li 1974, 68-72. 229 Feng Ziyou 1939, 193. 118  Yokohama. Many of the Cantonese students studying in Japan joined the group and this offered the Xingzhong Hui a considerable network in the Guangdong area.230  Conclusion The Datong Schools represent an important moment in modern Chinese-Japanese civilian cooperation. Examining the sources relevant to the schools, we are offered a glimpse at fledgling efforts to imagine a Confucian-centred transnational modern East Asia. Those involved in the Datong Schools would not have considered themselves to be conservatives in any way. Rather, being progressive and working towards modernity was crucial to their self-understanding. What they rejected was the imperialism and hegemony of Western culture. At the heart of the Confucianism espoused at the Datong Schools was a strong belief in the central claims of Social Darwinism and a confidence that a muscular progressive Confuciansim could meet this challenge. The vision that Kang Youwei, Xu Qin and others had of the history and future of mankind was based on competition, especially competition between nations and competition between races. This firm belief in an environment of competition tied any form of Confucian modernity to the rise of national and regional consciousness.  What went into the Datong Schools and what came out were different in many ways. A shared victimhood and anti-imperial consciousness did remain. However, the reformers and their Asianist friends imagined a modernity very different from that which took shape in                                                  230 Ibid. Although the name clearly implies independence from Qing China, the organization was established in reaction to fears that the Qing government was preparing to deliver Guangdong to France. 119  the twentieth century. The reformers, at the height of their pro-Japanese sentiments, and the Japanese Asianists, just before Asianism began its turn towards an imperialist strategy of Japanese domination, were working together to protect China and East Asia in the face of a shared enemy: Western imperialism and White racism. Educators were teaching the consciousness of a shared victimhood under imperialism. This victim consciousness and the need for self-preservation, a psychological basis for nationalism, opened doors to consciousness of other identities not limited to nation, but including local, regional and perhaps even the inklings of gender consciousness. The students graduating from the Datong School were strongly invested with a revolutionary consciousness that manifested itself in activities relevant to these different levels of identity, ranging from the Xingzhong Hui, which most students joined, to the revolutionary publication, Kaizhi Lu 開智錄, largely staffed by former Datong students. And finally, some students manifested anti-imperialist consciousness on a racial level. Race was becoming one of the most popular subjects for Chinese and Japanese intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century and presented a new level of identity that further complicated East Asia and forced intellectuals to reconsider their relations with those perceived to be a member of their own race or of another race. Therefore, the following chapter examines discussions of race by Chinese intellectuals in Japan, considering these discussions in regard to China’s relationship to Japan, the West, and the rest of Asia.    120   Part II: Chinese Intellectuals’ Rejection of Japanese Asianism The following two chapters of this dissertation detail important yet somewhat ambiguous rejections of Japanese Asianism in the years just before and just after the 1911 Revolution. I use the term “ambiguous” because although racial unity and Japanese leadership were rejected as the crucial components of a united Asia in these years, the ideas did continue to linger and appear in Chinese Asianist writings much later as well. However, the consideration and subsequent rejection of these discourses is an important step towards the construction of Chinese Asianism, which is examined in Part III. The titles for these two chapters are chosen from popular Asianist sayings of the time. “Same script, same race” 同文同種 is a saying that was popular throughout East Asia. A thorough analysis of its meaning is supplied in the beginning of Chapter III. “Asia for the Asians” is in fact a translingual adoption of the Monroist American ideal “America for the Americans.” A distinctly Japanese slogan, it typified the calls for a Japanese-led Asianism during World War I and is examined in Chapter IV.  121   Chapter III: Same Script, Same Race: The Ambiguity of a Racial Identity “What is history? History is nothing but an account of the development of and strife among the human races. There is no history without race…” Liang Qichao, 1902.231  Introduction In the late nineteenth century, a climate of fear persisted among intellectuals in East Asia. Western empires had marched across the world and only the East Asian region retained independence and freedom from colonialism. As the twentieth century was drawing closer, it became apparent that the imperialists would not be content until the remaining countries came within their control. Japanese intellectual circles were divided over the dilemma of whether to “leave or lead Asia.” The Meiji government was clearly embarking on a project to “leave Asia” and become a power modeled upon Western empires. However, many intellectuals in Japan realized that their country could not be accepted as an equal in the eyes of the racist Westerners. Hoping to forge a common front against imperialism, these intellectuals called for a uniting of East Asia under an ideology that is now called Pan-Asianism. Although this would later become a face for Japan’s own imperialist ambitions, in this early stage it was born out of fear of the ever-encroaching West. It was at this time that the Western pseudo-scientific concept of race became widely known to East Asian                                                  231 From the first paragraph of the lead article in Liang Qichao’s newly established journal Xinmin Congbao 新民叢報. “Xin Shixue” Wenji 9: 11-13. Translated and quoted in Ishikawa Yoshihiro 石川 禎浩, “Anti-Manchu Racism and the Rise of Anthropology in Early 20th Century China,” In Crossing the Yellow Sea: Sino-Japanese Cultural Contacts, 1600-1950, edited by Joshua A. Fogel , 207-228 (Norwalk, CT: Eastbridge, 2007), 215. 122  intellectuals.   Race was, and often still is, one of the most frequent and powerful bases from which to call for a united front against the imperialist West. There was a sudden boom in writings concerning theories of race in China in the early twentieth century, in part due to the realization of a unified assault from the white West, and in part due to a group of young Chinese intellectuals’ discovery of Japanese theories which positioned the Manchu as a different race from the Han Chinese. Jumping on this, the revolutionaries wholly embraced race theory during this time. The establishment of their enemies as racial others provided the impetus for Chinese intellectuals’ adoption of racial theories, but the process by which these theories came to be adopted is more complicated, and this process is crucial to our understanding of how race was related to early twentieth century Asianism.  In a recent article on the aborption of the discourse of civilization into modern Chinese thought, Xu Jilin explains how the classical “Yi-Xia distinction” 夷夏之辨, which differentiated those who had not accepted classical Chinese culture from those who had respectively as “Yi” and “Xia,” allowed for the wholehearted adoption of Western racial paradigms. This seems counterintuitive, for this distinction actually opposed Westerners as uncivilized Yi. However, Xu Jilin has shown how Tianxia-ism 天下主義 resulted in these paradigms being accepted as native to classical thought, allowing for absolutist racial pradigms to be accepted by a vast range of Chinese literati and soon fill the discursive space of the relative Yi-Xia distinction.232 As seen in the paragraphs below, early twentieth century                                                  232 The racial paradigm was absolutist in the sense that one could not change one’s race. However, 123  writings on race continued to use the vocabulary of the Yi-Xia distinction, positing those outside of the writer’s perceived race as Yi, while adopting the concentric circles of Tianxia-ism to hierarchical configurations of the yellow race. Although these racial paradigms had a strong influence upon twentieth century thought, Chinese intellectuals would not continue to use race as the defining element of Asian unity after the first decade. At the end of this chapter we see how, after a few years of stumbling through contradictory and sometimes incoherent racial theorizing, the predominance of racist writing begins to fade away, just as calls for Asian solidarity came to the fore. The revolutionary writers, largely represented by Zhang Binglin and the People’s News 民報 in 1907 and 1908, came to realize that race may not provide a compelling enough paradigm by which to achieve their goals, namely freedom from the rule of the Manchu Qing and protection from the imperialist West, the two challenges that dominated and shaped writings on race until this point.  This chapter examines the rise of “same race” solidarity in Chinese writings, concentrating upon revolutionary writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the drift from hopes for Japanese support to a belief in the rising consciousness of Asia’s oppressed. I first review early Chinese writing on race, showing how the concept of race was closely tied to the idea of race war: a conflict between the white and yellow races. As talk of the “yellow peril” made its way to East Asia, the concept was appropriated and pride in race                                                  traditional Chinese “racism” in the form of the Yi-Xia distinction was actually relative and based upon transcendable cultural differences. Xu Jilin 2012, 69-70. 124  was established. I then show how common racial signifiers from this period were not based in racial “science” but utilized a very simple binary of “self” and “other.” However, Chinese intellectuals struggled to define the “self” and the “other” under the concept of race and within the historical reality of continued oppression by Asian Manchus on the one hand and foreign Europeans on the other. This led to Chinese intellectuals’ gradual abandonment of the concept of race as the theoretical basis for understanding their suffering. Although the concept did continue to exist in Asianist writing, it was no longer the central concept. Contact with a number of Indian revolutionaries in Tokyo led to the Chinese intellectuals’ restructuring their worldview as a conflict between those who are oppressed and those who are oppressors. I find that the complications created by both internal and external imperialism dominated early twentieth century Chinese revolutionaries’ discussions of race, leading to the imagining of a new form of Asianism that was drifting from “same race” solidarity and was beginning to imagine Asian solidarity based on a shared sense of victimhood.  I argue that these late Qing revolutionary writers, caught between these two challenges, consumed and reformulated theories of race and racial taxonomies in attempts to understand their political environment and organize for political action. As it became clear that racial theorizing could not make sense of the world and China’s position in it, a few of these Chinese intellectuals turned away from racial connections and begin categorizing nations as “oppressor” or “oppressed” and begin to formulate political action and Asian solidarity along these lines. Although the centrality of these discussions would fade out after the 1911 Revolution, the connection of race to Asian unity continued to appear in most Chinese Asianist writings and understanding them is important to the study of later writings 125  on Asia, nation, and race. Late-Nineteenth Century Chinese Writings on Race Chinese writings on race can be dated back to antiquity.233 However, at the end of the nineteenth century, a new discourse on race appeared in China. It was accompanied by scientific studies that offered it a new form of legitimacy for a new world. The modern concept of race, a system of classifying humans based primarily upon their skin colour and other physical features, did not initially enter China through Japanese sources. Rather, the first known discussion of this Western concept was in John Fryer’s (1839-1928) Gezhi huibian 格致匯編(The Chinese Scientific Magazine) in 1892. A translated article entitled “Ren fen wulei shuo” 人分五類說 (On the five classifications of mankind) utilized a physical anthropology approach to describe these five races of yellow, white, red, brown and black based entirely upon physical characteristics. 234 However, this early article was not as widely received as were articles from a few years later. In 1895, immediately following the Sino-Japanese War, Yan Fu altered the world-view of many of his compatriots with four articles published in the Zhili Gazette 直報. Although the terms “white people” and “yellow people” had long been used,235 and a text on Western race theory had been translated three years earlier, these articles first popularized                                                  233 Frank Dikötter clearly shows that, although different, the concept of race and racial prejudice has existed in China since the Classics. Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 234 Ishikawa 2007, 212-213. 235 The colour yellow, signifying both the emperor and China itself, was seen very favourably by Chinese intellectuals. On the other hand, white symbolized death. Dikötter 1992, 55. 126  modern race theory in China. They described four races, yellow, white, brown and black, and, unlike earlier understandings of race, defined them within the all-important context of evolutionary competition, a theory that would remain tightly connected to race theory for the following few decades. Liang Qichao continued in this same vein with his seminal “New History,” in which he described history as “nothing but the account of the development and strife of human races.” Races were divided into those with history and those without. As Liang only saw the yellow and the white races as having history and therefore having developed to the requisite level for future survival, the coming war would necessarily occur between these two races.  Race and Race War Racial beliefs were not the only basis for early Asian solidarity, which was a more general anti-imperialist reaction to the violent attacks by Western powers to open up markets, but it was very early that racial imaginings of the world entered into the discourse of Asianism and became an important part of it. There was an undeniable logic in viewing the imperia