Constructing Chinese Asianism: 
Intellectual Writings on East Asian Regionalism (1896-1924)

by

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Abstract

Until recent decades, historians of modern East Asia generally considered Asianism to be an imperialistic ideology of militant Japan. Although the term and its concept were certainly used in this way, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, earlier proponents of Asianism looked upon it as a very real strategy of uniting Asian nations to defend against Western imperialism. This study investigates Chinese intellectuals’ discussions of Asianism from just before the reforms of 1898 to Sun Yat-sen’s famous speech on Asianism in 1924, considering calls for regionalism in their intellectual and historical contexts. Utilizing both published and unpublished sources, I first show that there were many Chinese debates on Asianism, before exposing the convoluted relationship between regional and national identities at this crucial point in the construction of the Chinese nation. In the early twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals struggled to define both their nation and their region through a variety of relationships which posited the imperialist West as “other.” Naturally, in the construction of these political and cultural identities, intellectuals’ writings on nation, race and civilization created overlaps which are still evident in understandings of Asia and China today.
Preface

This dissertation is an original, unpublished, and independent work by the author, Craig A Smith. It is the product of research conducted at archives and libraries in China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Canada. All images used in this dissertation are from the public domain unless stated otherwise.
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**Introduction**

In 2006 China’s ambassador to Japan introduced his theory of “New Asianism” to the Chinese public. Wang Yi is now the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.¹ He rose to success at the Tokyo embassy where he served as ambassador from 2004 to 2007. During this time, which saw relations with Japan worsen over the Yasukuni Shrine visits, the textbook controversy and numerous anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, he formulated his own theory of Asianism as a plan to strengthen China-Japan ties and provide a terminology for the peaceful future of East Asia based on cultural commonalities. His 2006 article in *Foreign Affairs Review* 外交評論 discusses his “New Asianism” and the three principles that Wang sees as guiding his theory and representing Eastern civilization 東方文明: “cooperation” 合作, “openness” 開放 and “harmony” 和諧.² In the article Wang draws upon late-nineteenth and early twentieth century Asianism, but concludes by arguing that New Asianism is a decidedly twenty-first century approach for Asia’s future.

Wang’s vaguely worded return to this concept was driven by his intention to emphasize China’s role as Asian leader in its peaceful rise, in which it cooperates with other East Asian nations. At the same time his “Asianism” offered a very diplomatic critique of Japanese imperialism. But why was a senior Chinese diplomat making reference to

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¹ Wang Yi 王毅 was officially appointed to this post on March 16, 2013.
discussions of Asianism from one hundred years earlier in 2006? And does his Asianism relate to that introduced more than one hundred years ago?

This dissertation returns to discussions of East Asian solidarity between 1898 and 1924, but examines Chinese rather than Japanese visions of a greater political identity to combat Western imperialism. I show that there was indeed such a thing as Chinese Asianism and that this concept developed throughout a crucial period in the construction of the Chinese nation and its particular processes of modernity. Throughout these years, efforts towards regionalism paradoxically worked to alter and support the construction of Chinese nationalism. Focusing on texts following the Sino-Japanese War and concluding with Sun Yat-sen’s famous 1924 endorsement of a Sinocentric Asianism, this dissertation studies a period in which the Chinese empire is crumbling and intellectuals are struggling to adapt to new forms of imperialism, political-economy and thought. From my readings of these texts I found that Asianism, loosely defined as a call for the countries of East Asia to unite in the face of Western imperialism, frequently returned to intellectual debates during this period. Intellectuals as diverse as Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Ye Chucang 葉楚倉, Li Dazhao 李大釗 and Sun Yat-sen endorsed some form of Asianism in these years. These discussions on Asianism altered the construction of Chinese identity, engaging in a dialogue

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3 There is debate on the use of this term in the field of Chinese history, partly stemming from the fact that these individuals did not refer to themselves as intellectuals 知識分子, a term which came into use much later, and also due to the later construction of intellectuals as a class and social category beginning in the 1920s. Here I am using the English term in a much more general sense, including all of those who engage in and produce writings on thought. For more on the term, see Eddy U, “The Making of Chinese Intellectuals: Representations and Organization in the Thought Reform Campaign,” The China Quarterly, No. 192 (Dec., 2007), pp. 971-989.
which worked both in concert with and in opposition to nationalism, further fortressing the construction of Chinese nationalism with elements of a metanational identity related to race, civilization, Confucian tradition, and a strong connection to geographic region.

Critics looking at East Asia today correctly point to the difficulties of any form of regional cooperation with the continued agitation of unresolved territorial claims and emotionally overpowering issues, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute, the Spratly Islands dispute, the comfort women of World War II, textbook controversies, Yasukuni Shrine visits, and numerous other transnational issues. However, despite all of these problems, discussions of regionalization and a future Asian Union continue to appear as many Asian intellectuals see such regionalization as a political inevitability and an economic necessity. This form of regionalization is seen as acquiescing to the transnational realities of the twenty-first century. However, looking to discussions from more than one hundred years earlier, it seems that such political regionalization may not be an inevitability, although the idea has long been seen as such due to East Asia’s close economic and cultural ties.

Historians encountering the question of an East Asian region point out the long existence of a world system that included most of East Asia and had considerable influence upon the entire world.⁴ They also note the repeated attempts to put into practice some form

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of East Asian regional system from the late-nineteenth century to the final and abysmal failure of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1945. Unlike most twenty-first century discussions of regionalization, which tend to be International Relations’ assessments of economic and security benefits, most of the regionalist texts written by East Asian intellectuals before World War II utilized concepts of regional culture, race, tradition and morality as the bases for integration, even when the real focus was military or economic strategy. Japanese intellectuals and politicians were by far the most prolific of writers on the subject, with their writings turning from late-nineteenth century condemnations of the Japanese government’s abandoning of Asia to the 1930s and 1940s discursive support of Japanese imperialism. Although this dissertation focuses upon Chinese, rather than Japanese, discussions of Asianism, the scope of this discourse can be quite extensive and it is necessary to consider the definition of the term and its relevant contexts.

The term “Asianism” 亞細亞主義 does not appear in Sinitic characters until the year 1912, when it was proposed in the pages of the Shanghai Kuomintang newspaper People’s Stand 民立報 by a Japanese diplomat before being seriously considered and expounded upon by Kuomintang publisher and propagandist Ye Chucang in March of 1913. Both before and

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6 The People’s Stand lists the Japanese politician as Ibuka Hikotarō 井深彦太郎. However, as I have been unable to find such a person, I am quite sure that the writer was Ibuka Hikosaburō 井深彦三郎. This is explained in chapters IV and VI.
after this date, the concept of Asianism existed without the term. And here I am required to offer a much longer definition than the one given above: Asianism is the belief in a united “East” based upon racial and/or civilizational commonalities that extend across East Asia (and sometimes across all of Asia) and are in contrast with a perceived “West.” Therefore, the imagining of the region goes hand-in-hand with the construction of an identity. This transcending Asia, based in part on Orientalist views of East Asia, is a reversal of Orientalism, an effort to abrogate the West’s claim to civilization. Unlike the Saidian understanding of Orientalism, in East Asian visions of the East, intellectuals show agency through the appropriation of dichotomies of difference for their own discursive purposes. The connection to Said’s Orientalism is palpable. However, this is not a study of Orientalism. While Orientalist texts contribute to the construction of a binary that underlines a power differential positing the West over the East, Asianism attempts to discursively abrogate the power differential and plan for the material annulment of Western superiority. Although Asianism acquiesces to some of the imposed binaries of Orientalism, the discourse denies their power and reverts them, reconceptualising the binaries to serve the East rather than oppose it.

If the terms “discourse” and “imagined” seem to appear frequently in the above paragraphs, this is because this dissertation fully accepts the argument that a region is

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7 My repeated reference of Asianism as a “concept” is in appreciation of the recently popular conceptual history, introduced and defined as Begriffsgeschichte by Reinhart Koselleck. As Timothy Cheek explains, conceptual history “provides a frame to tell the life of an idea by looking for fundamental ideas, or concepts, and how they are deployed,” thereby offering a link between intellectual history and social history. Cheek defines a concept as “a word representing an idea that is both powerful enough in a certain discourse to direct thought and ambiguous enough to hold within it a range of meanings.” Therefore, this study follows the concept of Asianism through relevant contexts, concentrating upon intellectuals’ overlapping assumptions and areas of discord in order to reveal the life of the concept. See Timothy Cheek, “Chinese Socialism as Vernacular Cosmopolitanism,” in *Frontiers of History in China* 9.1 (2014), 102-124.
foremost a discursive construction. Furthermore, the construction of a region, including its boundaries and its characteristics is largely arbitrary, as we see by the fluid and often opportunistic understanding of the “East” or “Asia” in the texts studied in this dissertation. “Asia,” just like Asianism, is a concept. And this concept signifies much more than the geographic space indicated by its continent. How Chinese intellectuals viewed this concept and the spatial relations that were used to define it, and by which they often defined themselves and their “other,” the West, is a focus of this dissertation. Space has been a widely popular method for historians to rethink their understanding of the past in recent decades, often building upon Henri Lefebre’s work. More recently this mode of thinking has been employed to consider our spacial conceptualization of large regions or continents. Moving beyond Said’s criticism of Western constructions of the East, Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis argue that “the division between East and West is entirely arbitrary,” and that all metageographic concepts are not based in science, but are discursive constructs. Lewis and Wigen consider that we must move beyond these metageographic signifiers which hinder our understanding of the world due to their arbitrary generalization.

This leads to a question that inevitably arises in reading Lewis and Wigen’s work: If Asia is a constructed concept, for what and whose purpose is it constructed? To understand this I turn to another book that grapples with the idea of a constructed region: In struggling to define the “Pacific Rim” for the introduction of a book that includes a broad array of...
articles, Arif Dirlik introduces *What is in a Rim?* with the understanding that the Pacific Rim is an “invented concept,” and its material basis is “defined best not by physical geography, but by relationships (economic, social, political, military, and cultural) that are concretely historical.”9 “Relationships” define the region. Joshua Fogel conceptualizes the importance of such historical relationships by describing the Sinosphere as an ever-changing atom with China as its centre. And like an atom, the core and its “orbiting entities” are interdependent.10 Yet it is not only the relationships within the region, but also those between the region and other regions or peoples that define East Asia. Like national identities, regional identities are products of these relationships, their conflicts and their cooperation. “Asia” may be a European term,11 indicating that the vocabulary and worldview of Asianism are products of imperialism, but the region was constructed by the peoples of Asia and their relationships. Therefore, although I agree with Wigen and Lewis’s project, at least in the respect of correcting geographic ignorance, I find that the constructed binaries of East and West were useful in their employment for a strategy of resistance in the twentieth century, in which an organized and imperialist West did threaten East Asia. In this sense Asianism mimicked Orientalist binaries and appropriated them to an anti-hegemonic discourse.

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11 The term “Asia” is generally believed to be Greek in origin. At the very least, it was through Greek that the term entered other European languages and then became a common term around the world. However, there is research to show that the term may be based on the Babylonian term asu, meaning to rise, and therefore a term stemming from an Asian language and indicating the rising of the sun. Hay, Stephen N., *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13.
But Asianism was not only an anti-hegemonic discourse. Just like nationalism, regionalism has the propensity to oppose external oppression, but is also frequently utilized as a tool of oppression as well. No discussion of Asianism is complete without consideration of Japanese imperialism. In the 1930s and 1940s Asianism legitimized and apologized for Japanese military expansionism. Although this dissertation is concerned with the period before that, we can see the evidence of a growing threat in all of these texts. Despite efforts to avoid seeing Japan as a monolithic force, and acknowledging that most Japanese Asianists, even many in the wartime years, were not necessarily imperialistic, in writing this dissertation I also felt the need to remain sensitive to the turmoil that East Asia would enter in the 1930s while remaining open to the perspective that intellectuals would have had in their time. So although this dissertation ostensibly concerns Chinese discussions of Asianism, it inevitably focuses on Sino-Japanese intellectual relations. The history of modern Asianism repeatedly sees a Japanese engagement and a Chinese response. In fact, other than a few localizations of terminology, almost all names or keywords for Asianist beliefs originated in Japanese. It will be no surprise then that the vast majority of academic works concerning Asianism are to be found in Japanese Studies and often all but ignore Chinese and other non-Japanese voices.

12 These include “raise Asia” (Ch/Ja: xingya/kōo 興亞), Great Eastern Federation (dadongbanghe/daitō gappō 大東合邦 保全中廈), Japan-China cooperation (rizhong tixie/nicchū teikei 日中提携), Asian union (Yazhou liandai/yaxiya rentai 亞洲連帶), Japan-China alliance (rizhong tongmeng/nicchū dōmei 日中同盟), East Asia alliance (dongya lianmeng/tōa renmei 東亞聯盟), Asianism (yazhouzhuyi/ajiashugi 亞洲主義), Great Asianism (dayazhouzhuyi/daiajiashugi 大亞洲主義), Pan-Asianism (fanyazhouzhuyi/hanajiashugi 泛亞洲主義), the East Asian Community (dongyangongtongti/tōakyōdōta 東亞共同體), and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (dadongya gongrongtuan/daitōakyoueiken 大東亞共榮圈).
Literature Review

Not long after the end of World War II, the terms Asianism and pan-Asianism, which had been tainted by their close relation to Japanese imperialism, were politically retired. To even suggest that there were positive elements of this concept was to risk being labelled an apologist for Japanese war efforts. Although a number of left-leaning critics, notably Takeuchi Yoshimi, used Asianism to critique imperialism, the Japanese government and post-war capitalism, the academy generally followed the political path of the government and very few studies were conducted on the subject until recent decades. Studies first began to appear cautiously in Korean and Japanese, the languages in which most of this research is still conducted. English language studies that touched on Asianism, such as numerous works by Joshua Fogel and Akira Iriye, occasionally appeared, but as Fogel explains in his preface to Lu Yan’s monograph, *Re-Understanding Japan*, it was not until very recently that there existed a variety of English-language books on Sino-Japanese relations.

Due to the memory of Japanese imperialism, there have also been problems in researching Asianism in China. However, recently this has been a renewed area of research,
and Western scholarship has benefited greatly from English language translations of important work in China.\textsuperscript{17} Prasenjit Duara makes it clear that the pan-Asian discourse of Eastern civilization “flourished in China as an intellectual, cultural and social movement” from 1911 until 1945, yet it has been ignored or dismissed in historiography due to nationalist sensitivities.\textsuperscript{18} This dissertation agrees with Duara but sees the discourse as evolving fifteen years earlier. The recent acceleration in the studies of Sino-Japanese relations and Asianism are related to new perceptions of the nationalist sensitivities mentioned by Duara, as academics have striven to deconstruct the nation over the last two to three decades. Also, as Rana Mitter suggests in his preface to Eri Hotta’s monograph, \textit{Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931-1945}, it is only natural that we look again to the long-silenced Asianism, now that there is renewed talk of “Asia” and “Asian values” in China and Japan, and now that China, Japan and India have found rapprochement in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{19} This is certainly an important reason for the publishing of Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann’s book, which explores the ambiguity of the ideology as “a precursor of contemporary Asian regionalism.”\textsuperscript{20} However, Japanese imperialism has remained the dominant issue for all discussions of Asianism.

Most academic works on Asianism refer to the debate on Japan either “leaving or leading Asia” as the roots of Japanese Asianism.\textsuperscript{21} This debate concerned whether Japan could


\textsuperscript{18} Duara 2000, 112.

\textsuperscript{19} Rana Mitter, preface in Eri Hotta 2007, ix.

\textsuperscript{20} Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, \textit{Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders} (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.

become a “Western” nation, completely adopting a role in the system of nation-states and becoming an imperial power in its own right and attacking other Asian nations, or, as the most developed nation in the East, become the leader of a united East in order to counter Western imperialism. Although these choices reflected very different opinions on how to engage in power dynamics in Asia, both were based upon a reaction to the West. The continuing debate resulted in two conflicting discourses which characterized Japanese policy towards China until the end of World War II. This conflict is important to any discussion of Asianism and has provided the central focus for many studies.22

Recent studies of Japanese (pan-) Asianism have gone much further into defining and breaking down the concept. One method of doing this has been periodization, considering the differences in Asianist thought over time. This figures heavily in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann’s recent book, Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. In Saaler’s introductory article he defines three periods which experienced different dominant forms of Asianism: The Meiji period had only a vague ideology of Asianism despite regular discussion.23 Much discussion and the occurrence of crucial Asian institutions in the late Meiji, such as the Tōa Dōbun-kai 東亞同文會, led into a more organized period for Asianist ideology during the Taisho reign. Largely based upon the belief of “same script” 同文 and “same race” 同種/同族, the Asianism of this period strove for equality across East Asia and

unity in facing Western imperialism.\textsuperscript{24} Finally, Saaler sees an imperial form of Asianism as being employed to legitimize Japanese colonial rule in the 1930s and 1940s.\textsuperscript{25} A similar periodization is mentioned throughout Saaler’s book and has its roots in the “groundbreaking research” of Hazama Naoki in various studies in 2001 and 2002.\textsuperscript{26} The first two periods that Saaler discusses are of great concern to this dissertation and Saaler’s work has helped me to contextualize Chinese texts in regards to Japanese Asianism. However, although this periodization is somewhat helpful in imagining a narrative history of Asianism, it is misleading for the contexts of this study as all of these forms of Asianism were thriving in the late Meiji period. I find that a categorization by specifics in the ideology provides more useful tools of analysis.

Eri Hotta provides this form of analysis in \textit{Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War}. In her investigation of the “15 Year War” from 1931 until 1945, Hotta employs three categories to consider pan-Asianism:

1. Tea-ist pan-Asianism emphasized Asian commonalities in philosophical dimensions. Often in binary opposition to the West, this was a concentration on aspects of Asian civilization, such as communalism as opposed to Western liberalism.

2. Sinic pan-Asianism sought to create an alliance among Asian nations, especially those of East Asia, based upon “same script,” and “same-race” arguments.

3. Meishuron 盟主論 pan-Asianism, which dominated in the 1930s and 1940s, posited Japan as an “Asian alliance leader” against Western

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 12.
\textsuperscript{26} According to Kuroki Morifumi “The Asianism of the Koa-kai and the Ajia Kyokai” in Saaler 2007, 34-35.
imperialism.\textsuperscript{27}

It should be clear that Hotta’s categorization is very similar to the periodization in Saaler’s work that I have described above. Hotta manages to avoid the confines of periodization, showing that all three of these forms of pan-Asianism were evident throughout the war despite the clear dominance of \textit{Meishuron} pan-Asianism. These features of pan-Asianism were also all present during the 1910s when Chinese intellectuals engaged with them, although it is what Hotta refers to as “Tea-ist” and “Sinic” pan-Asianism that Chinese intellectuals showed interest in. Unsurprisingly, non-Japanese intellectuals rejected or abhorred the “\textit{Meishuron}” pan-Asianism that legitimized Japanese dominance and inevitably supported the turn to militarism.

This categorization scheme is still limited, yet Hotta’s categories of pan-Asianism and her in-depth analysis of ideology in wartime Japan, although not clearly defined enough to incorporate all aspects of pan-Asianism, provide an excellent beginning, and demonstrates that Japan’s imperialism was not merely about material pragmatism, but had an ideological background. The complexities of Asianism do demand further analysis. Most importantly, China and other areas need to be taken into consideration.

Douglas Reynolds has done excellent work in picking apart the relationship of China and Japan during what he calls the “Golden Decade,” the period beginning with the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and ending shortly after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. During this time, thousands of Chinese students traveled to Japan to study, and

\textsuperscript{27} Hotta 2007, 7-8.
Japanese advisors were hired across all levels of government and non-government institutions. Although I question Reynolds’ use of the term “Golden Decade” to refer to what I see as the beginnings of a hegemonic relationship, his study has provided one of the starting points for this work and allows a glimpse of the depth and complexity of Chinese intellectual and elite involvement in Japan during this period.

In his work to write against the nation, Prasenjit Duara provides an excellent examination of discourses of Asianism in China, especially the non-national redemptive societies. What is special about Duara’s work is his concentration upon civilization, an issue I turn to in Chapter IV. Duara sees Asianism as a form of identity in the twentieth century that was different from nationalism and race due to its base in civilization.28 He then narrates a history of the idea of civilization. This begins with the Civilization - with a capital C, denoting its singularity as a proper noun - of the West, entering Japan via Fukuzawa Yukichi’s writings and then being brought to China by Liang Qichao. This discourse, a crucial part of the West’s ideology of imperialism authorized nations based on their level of Civilization.29 The Darwinist model of progress that this referred to remained after World War I, but the idea of one Civilization dramatically gave way to the idea of many cultures/civilizations, based on Herder’s concept of *kultur*, as nationalism finally triumphed over imperialism as the “hegemonic global ideology” in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s self-determination and the Soviet Revolution.30 The importance of Duara’s work is that it attempts

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28 Duara 2000, 99-100.
29 Ibid, 100.
to find answers to why nation and Asianism were so conflated in the twentieth century. Duara finds that Asianism is a discourse based on civilization, which has its roots in the nation-validated discourse of Civilization, which has led to the tension and conflation between Asianism and nation.\(^{31}\) His most recent work on the subject returns to these ideas, but further draws out the complicated relationship between Asianism and nationalism by considering Rabindranath Tagore, Okakura Tenshin and Zhang Taiyan as Asianist intellectuals in the early twentieth century.\(^{32}\)

This paradox between nation and region lies at the heart of Asianism. Rustom Bharucha had previously captured this with his own analysis of Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin. Despite Tagore and Okakura being friends and both having tremendous influence on concepts of Asianism, Tagore’s “opposition to the nation is relentless, bordering at times on hysteria,” while Okakura was an ultra-nationalist who believed in Japan’s unquestioning leadership of Asia.\(^{33}\) Their unlikely friendship, however, is logical when considering their unwavering opposition to Western imperialism. The paradoxical coexistence of Japanese nationalism and Asianism based on opposition to the West is a current that has a long continuity in the twentieth century and has featured in many other studies. Christopher W. A. Szpilman provides an excellent example of the “contradictions inherent in pan-Asianism” in present day Japan in his chapter in Saaler’s book.\(^{34}\) He explains that the current mayor of

\(^{31}\) Ibid, 125-126.
\(^{32}\) Duara 2010, 963-983.
\(^{33}\) Rustom Barucha, Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 67 and 17-20.
\(^{34}\) Christopher W. A. Szpilman in Saaler 2007, 85.
Tokyo published a pan-Asian pamphlet in 1994 and is still a proponent of the cause. He has, however, repeatedly made racially motivated verbal attacks on Koreans and Chinese. This provides remarkable continuity with the debate of whether to attack or unite peacefully with other Asian nations.

The work of Szpilman and Saaler has continued to prove fruitful. Their collaboration on the 2011 publication of *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History* provided scholars with a two volume sourcebook, translating dozens of Asianist texts from a myriad of languages, complete with detailed introductions and annotations for each text. This collection has proved to be extremely useful for this dissertation and represents a high point in a new trend in the study of Asianism that has been evident over the last few decades. What these new studies of Asianism have shown is that Asianism was not merely rhetoric to justify imperialism, as was often insinuated by academics before, but an important and complicated transnational discourse with a strong continuity from the mid-nineteenth century.

The importance of this discourse has also been clearly shown. Hotta convincingly argues for the importance of the study of Asianism as it is crucial to our understanding of the fifteen years of war between China and Japan. According to Hotta, it was pan-Asianism that “started, sustained and even prolonged Japan’s war from 1931 to 1945.” In China the influence of Asianism as a discourse of civilization in contrast to the West’s imperialism has also been shown, although not in any direct study. Lu Yan has shown the importance of this

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36 Hotta 2007, 16.
discourse to Dai Jitao, how it became crucial to the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen’s death and the important role it played in defining his fierce anti-communism.\textsuperscript{37} Asianism also justified the work of collaborators during the war and urged the Kuomintang to postpone their defense of China. It is largely due to these reasons that it is only recently that the study of this regionalization has been renewed in the Chinese language.

Beginning with Sheng Banghe’s 盛邦和 article “Japanese Asianism at the Turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century” in 2000, a new approach to studying Asianism has been appearing in Chinese writing.\textsuperscript{38} This new approach steps back from the excessively critical approach before it and sees early Asianism in a more positive light that focused on an equality among nations as they stood together to oppose Western aggression. Wang Ping’s 王屏 Modern Japan’s Asianism took this a step further in 2006.\textsuperscript{39} This full book length study is of great significance, not only because it marks a turning point in the study of Japan by Chinese scholars, almost ignoring previous Chinese studies on the subject, but also because of Wang’s position. She is a scholar at the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, but also serves on various government think-tanks on Japan policy. She remains a regular contributor to official Chinese news, such as the Renmin Ribao on current issues in Japan. Wang is not only a historian, she is influential in Chinese political circles, serving on CCP think-tanks for policy on Japan, and a committed Asianist, hoping to see steps towards China and Japan’s formation of a European

\textsuperscript{37} Lu Yan 2007, 151.
\textsuperscript{38} Sheng Banghe 盛邦和, “19 shiji yu 20 shiji zhijiao de Riben Yazhouzhuyi” 19 世纪与 20 世纪之交的日本亚洲主义 (Japanese Asianism at the Turn of the 20th Century) in \textit{Historical Research} 历史研究 vol.3 (2000), 125-135.
\textsuperscript{39} Wang Ping 王屏, \textit{Jindai Riben de Yaxiyazhuyi} 近代日本的亞細亞主義 (Modern Japan’s Asianism), (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2004).
Union-like organization in the coming decades. Works by Sheng Banghe and Wang Ping have had an influence upon the writing of this dissertation as they show the way to return to early twentieth century with a degree of caution but with an open mind and a perspective that does not simply view Japan and its writers as monolithic.

Another interesting development in recent writings is the move to a new conceptualization of Asia. This is seen in recent writings by Wang Hui 汪晖 and Sun Ge 孙歌, but especially in the work of Chen Kuan-Hsing 陳光興. Chen returns to Lu Xun and the work done by Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好 to see “Asia as Method.” Through this he urges scholars to move beyond the dichotomy of East and West and see Asia without the perspective of the imperialist eye, changing both our vantage and focus points in order to posit Asian Studies in Asia as a method in which the processes of deimperialization and decolonization can be undertaken.⁴⁰ Although not directly concerning Asian regionalism, these studies are important in their rethinking of the concept of Asia, its importance and its study. Like Takeuchi and his more recent adherents, Chinese Asianists from the early twentieth century saw Asia as the “East” as a concept in opposition to Europe and its capitalist modernity. Throughout this dissertation, but particularly in chapters IV and VI, I return to writers who discuss Asia, not merely as a binary opposite to Europe, but as a source for redemption and the possibility of worldwide transcendence to a more moral and just stage of human existence.

In fact, Chinese discussions of Asianism, although by no means presenting a consistent discourse, offered a consistently anti-hegemonic discourse that opposed imperialism and offered the people of East Asia a possibility for strategic alliance. The existing literature on Asianism views this discourse as an invariably Japanese line of thinking. However, this dissertation makes use of documents that have remained undiscovered or ignored to show that Asianism was added to, contested, inverted and reinvented by a number of Chinese intellectuals between 1896 and 1924. This dissertation differs from the above literature due its focus upon Chinese intellectuals, examining how their encounters with Japanese Asianism and Western imperialism led to the construction of an “East” in opposition to negative elements of a perceived “West.” Previous studies of Asianism have concentrated upon Japanese imperialism and wartime Asianism. Aside from a few studies of Sun Yat-sen, there have been no book length studies of Chinese Asianism. This study provides the first study to fill a glaring hole that hinders our understanding of Sino-Japanese history and the history of imperialism.

There is still the need for much more study in this area. Early Asian regionalism was grounded in complex and contradictory discourse, but it offers valuable insight in linking and making sense of important elements of twentieth century East Asian history, particularly the

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41 Most notably Marius Jansen’s 1954 study, but also Li Taijing 李台京, Zhongshan xiansheng daYazhouzhuyi yanjiu: lishi huigu yu dangdai yiyi 中山先生大亞洲主義研究：歷史回顧與當代意義 (A Study of Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism: Historical Memory and Contemporary Significance), (Taipei: Wenshizhu chubanshe, 1992).

42 Zhao Jun 趙軍 provides the closest to this with his 1997 book DaiAjiashugi to Chūgoku 大アジア主義と中国 (Pan-Asianism and China), (Tokyo: Akishobō, 1997).
rise of nationalism in relation to the region. New developments have also brought the issue of Asianism back into current academic debate. The increasing importance of ASEAN + 3, the Confucianism of Lee Kuan Yew, and Tu Wei-ming’s Confucian World are related to the reemergence of Sinic Asianism and examples of the need to remember these early imaginings of Asia in China and remember the lessons and idealism they offered. If early twentieth century Asianism really is, as Sven Saaler understands it, “a precursor of contemporary Asian regionalism,” we need to give further attention to its early beginnings in the Chinese language.\textsuperscript{43} Few studies have acknowledged non-Japanese intellectual writing on Asianism. Those that do have tended to only mention Li Dazhao and Sun Yat-sen, as these two thinkers directly used the term “Asianism” in the titles of their articles and speeches. However, as shown below, numerous intellectuals wrote about Asian regionalism in various forms as a strategic plan to escape from the ills brought by Western imperialism. In addition, this study will show how both the acceptance and rejection of Asianism played an important role in the development of Chinese intellectuals’ understanding of nation, state, and their relation to the non-Western world. These discussions of Asianism were discussions of identity and they greatly influenced other forms of identity formation in China, particularly influencing Chinese nationalism by contributing to definitions of inclusiveness and exclusiveness on categories including classical concepts of tianxia, race, culture, region, and shared victimhood. Intellectuals defined themselves, their nation and their civilization sphere as they constructed self-other relationships through changing concentric circles of identity. Central to this is the relationship between China and Japan, and the two countries’ sliding

\textsuperscript{43} Saaler 2000, 1.
definition as nation and empire.

**Contextualizing China and Japan: Nations and Empires**

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, China was in an ever-deepening crisis. While a number of domestic wars were causing untold grief within the country, the Western imperial powers were increasingly taking liberties and making their might felt along China’s coastline. Both Western and Chinese scholars have investigated Chinese intellectuals’ responses to this situation from the perspective of China’s difficulties in engaging with or entering into the system of nation-states. However, the powers that China was encountering in the nineteenth century were not nation-states, but were empires. The system that China was struggling to enter was not simply a system of nation-states, but was a system of empires, and the imperial desire was ever present. Therefore, while Chinese intellectuals were defining and understanding Chinese nationalism vis-à-vis British liberalism and Western racism, they were also having to deal with the realist issue that the creation of any nation-state that was based solely upon a Han nationality would divide China and be tantamount to offering their people to the imperialists on a plate. The protection of their race and national group being of the utmost importance, the only option was to work towards a political entity that would have a possibility of competing with the existing world empires. A multi-national empire was not necessarily difficult to imagine. China had long been such an empire. While China was struggling to be both empire and nation, Japan was a nation bent on becoming an empire.

The view of Japan’s unique position as an empire created in reaction to the West’s
imperialism is a widely accepted viewpoint in English-language historiography since the work of Marius Jansen. This method of analysis concentrates on the political side of the equation. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie agreed with Jansen, affirming that “Japanese imperialism was reactive, in the sense that Japan’s expansion on the continent was in large part undertaken to guarantee the nation’s strategic frontiers at the flood tide of Western advance in Asia.”44 These scholars disagree with classical models of empire by insisting that politics were still firmly in command. Unlike Marxist criticisms of empire, which exposed the monopolies of large and often transnational banks as directing the impulse to imperialism, these scholars are interested in “deliberate state policy directed toward the exploitation of less-developed peoples and territories for continuing material and economic advantage by an economically advanced power.”45 This political impulse to imperialism in the relative absence of domestic capital reveals the ability of capitalism and its relations of production to replicate itself on the scale of empire. Understanding this impulse is necessary for revealing the complexities of Japanese political history, but also elements of Chinese intellectual history and their relation to Asianism. Both Chinese and Japanese intellectuals were living in an ambiguous political form that was sometimes oppressed nation and sometimes oppressive empire, but always maintained a desire for the imperial. Aside from the financial gains of modernization and empire, intellectuals aspired to these ends out of a need to save the people and Confucian desire for good governance. Charting the course of classical political concepts as they were accommodated or butchered in the violent process of modernization is not an

44 Myers and Peattie 1984, 8.
easy task, but there are some concepts that should be followed as we consider this process and the concentric circles of identity in East Asia.

Xu Jilin has charted how the two classical concepts of Tianxia-ism 天下主義 and the Yi-Xia distinction 夷夏之辨 changed in the modern period with the violent entry of the discourse of civilization. Tianxia-ism refers to the concentric circles of identity and geography from classical Chinese thought which were centred upon the norms and values of what is now East China, while the Yi-Xia distinction was tianxia’s accompanying concept which posited foreigners as Yi and Chinese as Xia. Xu explains that:

Tianxia-ism centred upon Chinese civilization transformed into the discourse of civilization centred upon the West. And the Yi-Xia distinction modeled upon East China’s culture became the discourse of race based on social Darwinism. The complex interactions and entwined overlap between these two concepts resulted in a profound influence upon the national (state) identity of modern China.

Although I agree with this and appreciate Xu’s careful detailing of the process of intellectual change and paradigm shift, I would add that this new paradigm of civilization was not completely accepted and the rejection of the superiority of Western civilization on spiritual and moral matters during this period contributed to the dichotomy that allowed for

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46 As Xu Jilin explains in his article, this concept differed from modern racism as it was based on relative attributes that could be changed should the Yi accept Chinese cultural values and enter into the Chinese civilizational sphere. Race, however, was an absolute categorization that could not be changed.

47 Xu Jilin 許記霖, “Tianxiazhu yi/Yixia zhi bian ji qi zai jindai de bianyi (Tianxiaism and the Yi-China distinction and their changes in the modern period)” in Journal of East China Normal University 6 (2012), 69.
the imagining of a united Asia based on racial and civilizational commonalities.\textsuperscript{48} It provided the foundations for the imagining of a united Asia that was an antithesis to European capitalism and imperialism. This was the underlying discourse that framed early-twentieth century Asianism as intellectuals struggled to imagine a united front that could defend against the violence that came with Western hegemony while also defensively mimicking many aspects of that violence.

Inherent within the discourse of Asianism is the contradiction between an oppressive imperialism and a form of both national and regional liberation based in classical concepts. As the conditions which defined this contradiction became better suited to the rise of its imperialist form, Asianism took an ugly turn in the twentieth century. However, at an earlier juncture in the late Qing Dynasty, Asianism seemed an option for Chinese intellectuals. And they began imagining a liberated Asia based on classical virtues, governance and morality as a step towards world unity and the Confucian utopia of \textit{datong}.

\textbf{Chapter Breakdown}

This dissertation relates a narrative of the construction of modern Chinese Asianism in dialogue with Japan Asianism, proceeding from a distressed encounter to an ambiguous rejection, and finally to a theoretical reconstruction. Beginning with Qing Dynasty intellectuals’ first encounters with Japanese discourses of Asianism, I show that there was very real dialogue for various levels of Sino-Japanese alliance around the time of the 1898 Reforms. These discussions are haphazard at best, but they do provide the building of

\textsuperscript{48} And again here I agree with Xu Jilin that for many Chinese intellectuals, “the clash of races was essentially a clash of civilizations.” Xu 2012, 74.
intellectual networks and terminology that were important in the development of the concept of Asianism in both China and Japan in the twentieth century.

Chapter II continues to consider the encounter with Asianism, but takes a markedly different approach by analyzing an institution that was born of Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Datong Schools 大同學校 in Japan. By investigating the intellectuals involved in the establishment of the schools, as well as the texts related to the schools, I show how the discourse of Asianism played an important role in this educational institution. Then by examining the students that graduated from the school, the texts they wrote and the organizations they founded, I show how strong feelings of nationalism and Asianism defined their lives, preparing the generation for a reordering of the dominant worldview.

In the second part of this dissertation, I examine the failed attempts by intellectuals to reorganize their worldview in terms of race and civilization. These attempts did not end in the discarding of these paradigms, but saw them subsumed as the world was reimagined as a binary between oppressors and oppressed, as discussed in Part III. Chapter III examines the discourse of racial solidarity in Chinese writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, especially considering texts by Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, Zou Rong 鄒容, Liu Shipei 劉師培 and Chen Tianhua 陳天華. Through an analysis of revolutionaries’ writings I trace the partial rejection of this paradigm in favor of one that concentrates upon empire.

In a similar vein, Chapter IV looks to the new paradigm of multiple civilizations as a means to categorize East and West. Focusing on texts from the Eastern Miscellany, I show how World War I led to a redefining of the East in opposition to the West. This period also
saw the translation of numerous Asianist texts from Japan, but as Eastern civilization was defined as anti-imperialist, forms of Japanese Asianism that posed the nation as Asia’s leader were inevitably rejected, leading to the necessity for a reconceptualizing of Asianism.

The third part of this dissertation then discusses the dominant forms of Chinese Asianism that were theorized between 1917 and 1924. Although various intellectuals wrote about Asianism, the theories proposed by Li Dazhao and Sun Yat-sen have attracted the most attention and had the greatest influence. Chapter V then discusses Li’s theory of New Asianism as a reaction to Japanese imperialist regionalism. I find that this quasi-Marxist regional approach to a national struggle is an important part of the definition of Chinese Asianism, showcasing the bond of nationalism and Asianism.

Chapter VI continues to relate the narrative of the construction of Chinese Asianism, showing how the simple anti-imperialist regionalism of Li Dazhao was further theorized by the affirming of Confucian civilizational values at the centre of Chinese Asianism. Sun Yat-sen accentuated the importance of the Chinese nation to the region, but also showcased Asianism’s difficult balancing of nation and empire. While Sun offered a strategy for liberation from empire, his writing and speeches on Asianism inevitably contributed to possibilities for oppression by empire as they were appropriated by the Japanese and Wang Jing-wei governments in their propaganda campaigns during the 1930s and 1940s.

This convoluted passage consistently returns to the precarious balance between nation and empire in the twentieth century, a problematique of modern Chinese history that continues to pose political problems for China today. The nation that Chinese people
constructed during this time was invariably related to discourses of identity that struggled to protect the self from a dangerous other. This process is the focus of this dissertation: By employing the history of the concept of Chinese Asianism as a lens through which we can reexamine the intellectual struggle with political modernity and the construction of nationalism, we see how metanational structures were fused into Chinese identities. Furthermore, we can peer into the sliding relationship that Asianism has with nation and empire. This arbitrariness has resulted in a complicated historical memory, accounting for the variety of positions on Asianism today and shedding light upon the surprising attempt by Foreign Minister Wang Yi to adapt “New Asianism” to China’s uses in the twenty-first century.
Part I: Chinese Reformers Encounter Asianism

These first two chapters compose a section of this dissertation that outlines Chinese reformers encounters with Japanese Asianism at the end of the nineteenth century. In some ways these encounters set the stage for later discussions, as they introduced vocabulary, encouraged thousands of students to go to Japan, and cemented Sino-Japanese elite connections that would last for decades. However, they should also be seen as set apart from later discussions of Asianism, as the Japanese Asianism encountered in the late nineteenth century was distinct due to its egalitarian form, and the ensuing Chinese response was therefore particular to that form. The reformers were markedly pro-Japanese in these years, but their encounter with Asianism and with the modern system of nations and empires was framed within their classical world view, which was in the process of dramatic change. Accordingly, for the titles of these two chapters I have chosen two classical idioms that were frequently employed by Asianists during this time, and both of which to my mind are possessed of internal contradictions relevant to Asianism in general. Both “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze” 唇亡齒寒 and “The chariot and its (side-) car are interdependent” 輔車相依 have been used to indicate interdependence since their use in the Confucian classic Chunqiu Zuo Zhuan 春秋左傳, yet in both idioms the objects compared are quite different in form and power.
Chapter I: Lips and Teeth: Pro-Japanese Reformers on Empire and Federation, 1896 - 1898

China’s reform period of the late-nineteenth century, which centered upon the so-called Hundred Days Reform and is also often referred to as the 1898 reforms, has been recently revisited as a crucial node in the modernization of China.49 This period is marked by a new willingness for significant political and ideological change on the part of Chinese intellectuals and the Qing government as the Chinese system of empire was nearing its end. The reforms enacted in 1898 had a great influence upon education, industrialization, the military and the political system. The majority of the reform edicts were rescinded following the September 21 coup d’état, but a number of the changes were re-enacted a few years later. The reforms were not directly modelled on Western countries, but were attempts by Kang Youwei and the Guangxu Emperor to emulate the successes of the modernization reforms in Meiji Japan, and maintain the emperor as the head of state. Just years after the First Sino-Japanese War, many Chinese intellectuals were very interested in following Japan’s lead in order to free themselves from an increasingly powerful and imperialist West. However, cooperating with China’s Eastern neighbor during the rise of a new world system was not an avenue that Chinese intellectuals chose entirely willingly, but it was a choice that they made given the unfortunate circumstances.

49 Rebecca Karl and Peter Zarrow detail this trend in recent Chinese scholarship in which “the 1898 reform period is now often raised as the originary moment of (an aborted effort at) nonsocialist modernization, to which China now has (finally) returned.” Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), quote: 4, discussion of trend: 2-6.
In China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan Douglas Reynolds argues that: “From 1898 to 1907, however, the relationship between China and Japan was so productive and relatively harmonious that it could rightly be called a ‘Golden Decade.’” Although China-Japan relations during these years were certainly productive, and even could be called harmonious, the term “Golden Decade” conceals the fact that this relationship was already plagued by power differentials steadily marching towards a colonial relationship. Furthermore, many Chinese intellectuals saw this relationship as a necessity during this confusing clash of worldviews, preferring to work with the empire that they knew and could understand. Chinese intellectuals were convinced of the benefits of turning to Japan through the growing discursive power of Japanese institutions and publications. At this early point in this new form of transnational relationship, as Chinese intellectuals became conscious of impending disaster, accommodative strategies were employed to reconcile their world order with the new imperial order of global capitalism. This was a gradual process, as new concepts were slowly absorbed and found legitimacy, while translators struggled to find equivalence within the Chinese language and history, establishing the discursive elements of a translated modernity. There was no true equivalence for these terms, concepts and culture, resulting in confusing attempts at reform. Efforts towards accommodation included both the real work towards a new political system and the ideological and intellectual underpinnings behind it.  

51 I am referring to what Max Ko-wu Huang and Thomas A. Metger refer to as the “accommodative” approach, in which late Qing reformers attempted to retain aspects of tradition in their attempts at modernization. For example, see Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2010).
And Japan offered an avenue for reformers to take towards these ends.

Due to the great number of texts pointing to China-Japan cooperation or union during these years, the period just before the 1898 reforms is taken as the background for the first chapter on this study of Chinese discussions of Asianism. The complexities of how hegemony is actualized, disrupted or consented to are the focuses of this chapter. The pro-Japan turn was facilitated by both Japanese elite interested in China and Chinese elite turning to Japan for a reform blueprint. What is important here is the fact that there was a serious discussion of a sometimes surprising level of cooperation with Japan by Chinese intellectuals; and that these initial hopes for cooperation did lead to thousands of Chinese moving to Japan, largely to study Meiji reform successes for replication in China, including the reformers examined in Chapter II.

In this chapter, first I show how the threat of Russian imperialism coupled with the sudden surge in access to Japanese institutions and publications led Chinese intellectuals to Japanese solutions for coping with imperialism. I examine the writing and translation of specific pro-Japanese and Asianist texts just before or during the 1898 Reforms to show that the entry and influence of this material had a significant influence on Chinese reformers. And finally I consider the haphazard calls for union with Japan at the height of this reform movement, evidence of a desperation that was consuming these intellectuals. This chapter shows the importance that Asianism had upon Chinese intellectuals, their actions and their writing at this crucial point in Chinese history and also sets the intellectual stage for the reformers and revolutionaries’ continued cooperation with Japan.
Concentrating on a time when Chinese intellectuals were largely turning to Japan for physical or discursive assistance in their attempts at reform, this chapter tracks the development of the concept of a China-Japan alliance through an investigation of early Asianist institutions, publications and translations that suddenly became available in China due to the efforts for reform. What followed was an attempt to create an accommodative modernity, in which elements of a Sino-centric world system are combined with the new system of nation states. I argue that the growing influx of the Japanese Asianist institutions, publications and translations influenced the reformers to be increasingly pro-Japanese in the face of the Western threat. However, the various writings show that the reformers, including Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, saw alliance or even federation with Japan as a strategic partnership, turning to their neighbor in a disorderly and unsure manner out of desperation and a desire that their classical worldview could find accommodation with the rising capitalist world order ostensibly organized by nation-states. The sudden rise of pro-Japanese Asianism in China just before the Hundred Days Reform was packaged in a reformist Confucianism that nicely suited the classical training of these scholars and opened the door to possible cooperation for reform just a few short years after the two countries were at war.

Introduction: The Reformers’ Strategic Turn towards Japan

There can be no doubt that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Shimonoseki Treaty that followed it in 1895 was one of the most humiliating sequences of events for Chinese intellectuals in the history of modern China. The anger and frustration of numerous intellectuals can be seen in texts from the period. And in more recent times the events have
been returned to in popular media as anger towards this history have begun to eclipse the standardized bearer of foreign humiliation, the Opium War. Yet even immediately after the war, many Chinese scholars favoured a path that would bring them closer rather than further away from Japan. For the reformers, emulating the Meiji Reforms was crucial for China’s survival in the modern world of nation-states.

After his humiliation in Shimonoseki, which resulted in generations of Chinese loathing him, Li Hongzhang, the great statesman who signed the treaty, was opposed to further reconciliation with Japan. Li traveled to Russia in 1896 and signed the “Sino-Russian Secret Pact” 中俄密約. This secret agreement, which was soon widely known, promised that Russia would support China in future conflicts with Japan. However, in the following year Russia continued to encroach upon Chinese territory. Kang Youwei had also been furious over the devastating Shimonoseki Treaty, but he took a very different approach from Li. In his famous Gongche Shangshu 公車上書 he called for drastic change to the legal system of China based on the Japanese Meiji reforms. Only once the laws have changed, explained Kang, can China become powerful enough to take back the Ryūkyū Islands and Taiwan. But once Russia began infringing upon Chinese territory, Kang Youwei suggested joining the

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52 For an extremely popular dramatization of these events, see the television drama The Enchanting Years. The extended time given to the emperor’s ratification of the Shimonoseki Treaty, as well as the dramatic camera angles and sound, show the importance the director Zhang Li 張黎 decided to bestow on this incident. Zhang Li 張黎. The Enchanting Years 《走向共和》 (Beijing: CCTV-1, First episode aired: April 12, 2003), 59 Episodes.

53 The agreement, signed on June 3, 1896, also allowed the Trans-Siberian Railway to be extended across Manchuria to Vladivostok. See Pei-kai Cheng and Michael Lestz with Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 173.

British-Japanese Alliance. Only two years after the war with Japan he was arguing for union based upon the familiar Asianist saying of “lips and teeth” 唇齒 55 to describe the close relationship between the two countries. He argued:

“We and the Japanese are like lips and teeth. Russia and Germany have set their ambitions upon the Orient to the detriment of all... Invitations to unite are based upon true feelings.”56

The “lips and teeth” idiom indicated a form of interdependence with Japan that would not have been expressed by Chinese literati in the classical Sinosphere. However, it had been used by Japanese thinkers as early as the Opium Wars to express their fears of Western invasion.57 This reveals the remarkable change that was occurring in China as the literati struggled to accommodate the new reality in their classical discourse. Part of this accommodation was a new perspective on Japan.

Many other scholars agreed with Kang’s fears for China’s future and urged further

55 “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze” 唇亡齒寒 is a classical Chinese idiom from the Confucian classic Chunqiu Zuo Zhuan 春秋左傳. Often alongside its preceding idiom, “the chariot and its (side-)car are interdependent” 輔車相依, these words indicate the interdependent relationship between the two states of Guo 虢 and Yu 虞 when threatened by outside forces (See Zuo Zhuan “Xigong wu nian” 僖公五年). It became a popular term in the late 19th century and was frequently used to describe the relationship between China and Japan as scholars attempted to return to Confucian political theory on international relations to solve these problems. Interestingly, the Lips and Teeth metaphor has continued to be used by Chinese writers to refer to its East Asian neighbors in times of solidarity. Throughout the Cold War this same metaphor was used to refer to China’s relationship with its ally North Korea. See Chen Jian. “Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese North Korean Relations.” Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations. Asia Program Special Report No 115 (September 2003).
57 It was used by scholars of the Mito School 水戸学 to indicate that Japan could not survive if China fell. See: Vladimir Tikhonov, “Korea’s First Encounter with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s,” Review of Korean Studies 5.2, 195-232 (2002), 204.
cooperation with Japan. There were two primary reasons for this sudden change in sentiment towards Japan. One was strategic, the other was emotional. The western powers, specifically Russia, were posing a real threat to China at the time and the need to seek external help to protect China was becoming more evident each day. At the same time, an outpouring of Japanese support for China in the years that followed the Sino-Japanese War had a tremendous influence on the Chinese attitudes towards Japan. Whether this support was due to Japanese strategy or to a genuine belief in responsibility, the impressions of some Chinese intellectuals towards Japan were affected. In the years following the war, Chinese reformers increasingly turned to Japan for help in many forms. Wang Xiaoqiu writes: “It can be seen that imitating and allying with Japan in order to reform the laws was a consistent belief among the reformers at that time.”

**Institutions Facilitate the Entry of Asianist Principles and Vocabulary into China**

Although it was the First Sino-Japanese War that shocked reformers like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao into sudden turn towards Japan, the recruitment of Chinese intellectuals into early Japanese pan-Asianist organizations enabled the transnational flow of discourse and vocabulary that was essential to establishing the concept outside of Japan. This began with the Kōakai 興亞會, but was much more successful with its successor, the Asia Association 亞細亞協會.

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58 Wang 1987, 90
59 可見，仿日，聯日以變法，這是當時中國維新派的一致觀點。Ibid, 91
The Kōakai, the Raise Asia Society, was established by Sone Toshitaro (曾根 俊虎 1847-1910) in 1880.60 Sone Toshitaro was a navy lieutenant who was adamantly opposed to the Meiji government’s expansionist policies. Vladamir Tikhonov notes that Sone and his followers “hardly could be classified simply as tools of the Meiji elite’s foreign policy.”61 They earnestly hoped that East Asian nations could cooperate against the European threat and feared that Japanese dreams of expansion might endanger the future of the race. This was long before the Sino-Japanese War. Despite more than a decade of Japanese modernization, in 1880 China was still perceived to be in a position of military superiority. Naturally, these Asianists were also interested in the preservation of a culture that they considered themselves a part of. The principal goals of the Kōakai were the promotion of Chinese language education, a reversal of the power imbalance between Europe and Asia and preparation for the global conflict between white and yellow people.62 In addition to running language schools, providing avenues for Japanese and Chinese scholars to meet, and holding regular meetings, the Kōakai produced a regular newsletter called the Kōakai hōkoku (The Raise Asia Society Report 興亞會報告). This newsletter remains a major primary source for researchers today.63

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62 Kōakai hōkoku Ajia kyōkai hōkoku 1-2 興亞會報告·亞細亞協會報告第一、二卷, compiled and introduced by Kuroki Morifumi 黒木彬文 and Masuzawa Akio 鵜澤彰夫 (Tokyō: Fujishuppan 不二出版, 1993), 9. Hereafter, KKHK.
63 The Kōakai Hōkoku began as a predominantly Japanese-language journal in March of 1881. The first few issues would generally contain one or two articles in Literary Sinitic (Classical Chinese or Kanbun 漢文), but
The association was established in Tokyo not long after the Qing government sent their first modern delegation into residence there. The first ambassador to Japan was He Ruzhang, suggested for the position by Li Hongzhang. Joining He in Tokyo was the soon-to-be reformer Huang Zunxian. These two represented the first of many elite to live in Japan during the late Qing and they were quickly invited to join the association and played a role in its early days. However, they remained suspicious of the association and Huang Zunxian never actually accepted membership, despite being a proponent of the raising Asia doctrine himself. The second edition of the newsletter for the Kōakai, published on April first, 1881, relates Sone Toshitora’s persuasion of He Ruzhang to support the Kōakai. The article was titled “A Discussion between Imperial Envoy Ambassador He and Mr. Sone. In this discussion, Sone pays particular attention to emphasizing the importance of “same script, same race” 同文同種 and “a cooperation of those of the same mind” 同心協力. He also makes reference to the “lips and teeth” metaphor that would continue to be used by Asianists.

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the majority of the text was written in Japanese. However, by the twelfth issue, published on November 15th of the same year, the format changed and the journal was then predominantly written in Literary Sinitic. Although a Japanese-language section was added at the back of the journal a month later – and in a few issues this section was as large as the Literary Sinitic section – the new format opened the door for Korean and Chinese scholars to read and contribute to the content. The November 15th issue opened with a sentence briefly and directly explaining that publishing in Japanese resulted in many Asians being unable to read it and this was against the aspirations of the association. From this time on, it was published in the classical language. As this was the only major journal related to contemporary issues publishing in Chinese in Japan until 1898, it received much attention and many Chinese contributors. KKHK, 76.

64 Zachman 2011, 55.
65 欽差大臣何公使ト曾根氏ノ談話 KKHK, 9.
66 The “same script, same race” (Ch: tongwen tongzhong. J: dōbun dōshu) argument posited that China and Japan used the same script and were of the same race, providing a quasi-scientific support for cooperation. This argument would continue well into the twentieth century. See Chapter III for a more detailed analysis of this argument and its popularity.
in the decades to follow.\textsuperscript{67}

This text represents a symbolic discussion in the Chinese perspective on Asianism. The article contains so many of the catch phrases that would continue to be used over the next few decades to convince Chinese elite of the need for Asianism. Furthermore, despite the triumphant perspective of the Kōakai newsletter, which sees its most active member as making a huge conquest in convincing the ambassador to support the Kōakai, it remains difficult to say to what extent He was truly convinced of the grander ideology of the Kōakai and to what extent he was making strategic concessions to Sone. Surely, He would have been impressed by the association’s attempts to propagate the study of Chinese, and he would also no doubt have been moved by the arguments in favour of standing up to Western imperialism. However, He’s position in the Chinese government put him directly in contact and conflict with the Japanese expansionist efforts. The annexation of the Ryūkyū Kingdom was fresh in He’s mind and he had clearly been quite upset by it. During the height of the affair he received a petition from the Ryūkyūans and wrote to Li Hongzhang: “The Japanese have neither mercy nor reason. They are like crazy dogs, bullying others as they please.”\textsuperscript{68}

Kōakai officially became the Asia Association in 1883 after its Chinese members

\textsuperscript{67} KKHK, 9.
\textsuperscript{68} He Ruzhang was dealing with a newly aggressive expansionist Japanese government, but associating with anti-imperialist Asianists at the same time. It seems most likely that he would be inclined to take a strategic position and remain open to the potential of Asianism, but it is difficult to say to what extent this classically-trained Chinese scholar would have accepted Japanese partners as equals. Regardless of what his motives were, He Ruzhang continued to support the association, into its transformation into the Asia Association in 1883, remaining a member until his death in 1891. Quoted in: Suzuki, Shogo. \textit{Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society}. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 160.
complained about the name during a January meeting in Tokyo.\(^6^9\) The Asia Association’s Japanese membership grew and, largely through its few Chinese members, it expanded onto Chinese soil during the early days of the 1898 Reforms. The Asia Association in Shanghai retained old supporters from the Kōakai days, but also added new members to its list. Influential Chinese members in 1898 or earlier included: diplomat, He Ruzhang; sanwen writer, Li Shuchang 黎庶昌 (1837—1898); scholar and translator, Wang Tao 王鶚 (1828-1897); reformer, Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 (1842-1922); future Prime Minister of Manchukuo, Zheng Xiaoxu 鄭孝胥 (1860-1938); diplomat, Li Fengbao 李鳳苞 (1834-1887); reformer and 1900 revolutionary Tang Caichang 唐才常; and journalist, Wang Kangnian 汪康年 (1860-1911). Due to the number of well-known reformers related to the Asia Association, its establishment in Shanghai has recently received attention in Chinese and Western scholarship.\(^7^0\) Sang Bing puts much emphasis upon the 1898 establishment of the Asia Association in Shanghai, arguing that this association was one of the most important that resulted out of the Hundred Days Reform and its importance has been underestimated by scholars in the past, who have failed to recognize the first peoples’ acceptance of a pro-


Japanese agenda.\textsuperscript{71} As can be seen from the above list of names, this organization had gained the attention of many Chinese elite intellectuals. Like the journals and newspapers of the time, which were heavily influenced by Japanese publications, the Asia Association was an avenue for the entry of Japanese Asianist ideology.

The establishment of the Asia Association was mentioned in many major Chinese papers of the time, including the Xiang Bao 湘報, Dagong Bao 大公報, Xinwen Bao 新聞報, Wanguo Gong Bao 萬國公報, and Jicheng Bao 集成報. Many of these papers included the full fifteen point Asia Association Manifesto 亞細亞協會章程.\textsuperscript{72}

The association presented itself as a peoples’ organization that was anti-classist, allowing member to pay fees as voluntary donations. Membership was open and equal:

“Whether members are officials or gentry, whether they are scholars, farmers, workers or merchants, all are free to enter the association. Even should they be eminent or humble, intelligent or slow, all will be treated equally and without discrimination.”

Nor would nation affect membership: “For association members, no matter the size nor the strength of their country… they will no longer acknowledge boundaries. They will be as brothers of one heart and one mind.” The emphasis was put upon modernization, calling for members with special abilities or interests to meet through the association and further the advancement of Asia in all areas.

\textsuperscript{71} Sang Bing 2006, 42.
\textsuperscript{72} See the Appendix for a complete translation of the “Asia Association Manifesto.”
What is immediately noticeable about the association’s advertisement is that it is a clear product of the Popular Rights Movement and tide of liberalism that were sweeping Japan and extending to Chinese intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century. Just like the Chinese reformers who were the object of this association’s appeal, the Japanese Asianists were caught in the rush towards liberalism. From the early days of the Kōakai, the precursor to the Asia Association, there was evidence of sympathy towards this movement. In the early 1880s, when the Kōakai opened up its first school to teach colloquial Chinese, Korean and Literary Sinitic, the instructors also taught a course on John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*. The association intended to appeal to those interested in a liberal approach to the problems encountered by Western imperialism. On the basis of shared feelings of humiliation, the association urged individuals to stand up and act independently of their government to assist others. At the same time, the association argued for the equality of nations in its organizations. Although this might not have appealed to earlier generations of Chinese scholars, it was suited to this new generation of so-called reformers, at least as far as the simple argument above. On the margins of an expanding Japanese Empire, Chinese elite were certainly getting caught up in the Popular Rights Movement.

The organization was also very clear about its aims for the modernization of all of

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73 The term “Popular Rights Movement” refers to a variety of the Meiji period movements for democritization and increased political participation, as well as the sudden influx of texts concerning such thinking, especially from Germany and Britain. Despite grand talk, these “rights” rarely extended beyond the upper classes in practice. However, Chinese intellectuals became increasingly aware of and interested in this discourse and made great efforts to translate such texts at the end of the nineteenth century. For a brief discussion of the movement, see: Roger E. Bowen, *Rebellion and democracy in Meiji Japan: A study of commoners in the popular rights movement* (Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1984).

74 Kuroki 2007, 37
Asia. Concrete ideas are even set forth in this short declaration. These fascinating efforts to link professionals and specialists together to solve problems across the continent were surely appealing to a new elite who believed that science and progress were the answers to China’s ills.

But what is most important about this declaration is that it completely disregarded governments and states. The Asia of tomorrow was not to be reliant upon the government of any country. Its problems were to be solved by the people. Its wealth and power was to be a product of the uniting of different people, of all classes and nations, across Asia. Therefore, this non-governmental organization did not need to consider issues of inter-Asia politics, a feature that may have spelled its doom had it not been prematurely ended due to the coup that marked the end of the reforms. In this respect the members of the Asia Association failed to predict the coming course and the rise of state power and nationalism. The redemption they sought was related to nationalist dreams of liberation, but was racially and geographically defined. Their stated goal to imitate the Red Cross is particularly revealing of their intentions for a non-governmental organization. The Red Cross, only established a few decades before, is unconstrained by nation or state. These Asianists envisioned a similar transnationalism with the stated goal of liberation for all Asians.75

This was far from a Marxist liberation. Liberation was not about class, but about place. These Asianists found it perfectly acceptable that the lower classes would provide the labour, while the wealthy would provide the capital. Each to his ability. The only real issue

75 Red Cross reference and description of the org in late-19th?
at hand was raising Asia to make it equal with or to surpass the West, while in many ways modeling Asia upon the West. This disregard of class issues would not be able to continue into the twentieth century, when Asianists such as Li Dazhao imagined a united Asia only as a means on the road to worldwide liberation and equality. However, it was very representative of Japanese Asianism of the late-nineteenth century, in the years before Japan won the Russo-Japanese War and a system of equality between Asian states began to seem increasingly unlikely.\textsuperscript{76} Regardless of these issues, the association brought early Japanese Asianists into contact with important Chinese reformers.

The founding of the Asia Association in 1898 was tightly linked to the pro-Japanese reformers and their goals. Those most closely involved with its establishment were Wang Kangnian, Zeng Guangcuo 曾廣銼, Tang Caichang and Fukumoto Makoto 福本誠.\textsuperscript{77} Although few sources remain for us to clearly identify the different roles of each in the establishment of the organization, by reading through the available correspondence, Sang Bing has determined that Wang Kangnian and Zeng Guangcuo’s 1897 journey to Japan opened the door to the Asia Association in Tokyo and Fukumoto’s subsequent move to

\textsuperscript{76} In 1900 the Asia Association merged with the Tōa Dōbunkai. Established in 1898, this new Asianist organization was different from the Asia Association in its stated goals as it was more willing to intervene in Chinese affairs. Kuroki Morifumi believes that it was anxiety about this difference that may have delayed the amalgamation of the two groups. Kuroki also examines internal debates within the Tōa Dōbunkai to show the level of success of the two groups’ amalgamation. Responding to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Tōa Dōbunkai drew up six articles for their statement on the situation and hopes for the future. As some of these were clearly disrespectful of China’s sovereignty and forecast a possibility of dividing up China, Watanabe Hiromoto, former president of the Asia Association, strongly, and successfully, opposed them. It was because of this that Konoe Atsumaro set up the Kokumin Dōmeikai in 1900. Kuroki uses this to show that the ideals of Watanabe and the Kōakai continued into the Tōa Dōbunkai era, but were subsumed or made irrelevant as time passed and Japan’s position of superiority became more evident in the eyes of its people. Kuroki Morifumi 2007, 48 and 51.

\textsuperscript{77} Sang Bing 2006, 42-46.
Shanghai finalized it. Huang Zunxian’s role in the establishment of the Shanghai branch has not been clearly identified, however, since his move to the Chinese embassy in Japan in 1881, he had long been a member of the Tokyo organization. Furthermore, he was associated with Wang Kangnian in Shanghai in the years before the establishment as they both worked at *The Chinese Progress*.

Tang Caichang was perhaps the most vocal advocate of the association through the *Xiang Bao*, the newspaper he edited with his lifelong friend, Tan Sitong. In addition to the paper’s running of association advertisements, such as the manifesto translated above, Tang would write his own stories which emphasized the need for union with Japan. On May 20th, Tang openly announced his involvement in the Kōakai/Asia Association, and explained the need for establishing a branch of the organization in Hunan. Unlike the other reformers who fled to Japan after the coup, Tang Caichang returned to China only a year later. During the Boxer Rebellion, he hoped to take advantage of the disorder to begin a revolution, but Zhang Zhidong found out about the plan and had Tang executed along with nineteen of his comrades. Tang Caichang differs from the other reformers here, not only for his quick turn to revolution, but for his support of Hunan nationalism over Chinese nationalism, a perspective which would certainly have led to Tang having a different understanding of China’s position in Asia and the possibilities for the decentralization of state power or even federalism.


79 Jansen 1954, 93
All of these individuals held a certain amount of power in the publishing industry of 1898 Shanghai. Not least of these were Wang Kangnian and Huang Zunxian, both of whom held considerable sway with *The Chinese Progress*. Huang Zunxian consolidated his complete control over *The Chinese Progress* during the management changes of late 1897 and early 1898. Through the efforts of these individuals and a few others, the publication became one of the key avenues for Asianist concepts to enter China during this time.

**The Translation of Pro-Japanese News**

*The Chinese Progress* was the voice of the reform movement in 1898. Established in Shanghai in 1896 under Zhang Zhidong’s guidance, it was led by publisher Huang Zunxian, director-general Wang Kangnian, and editors Liang Qichao and Wang Rangqing 汪懷卿 (1860-1911), a student of Kang Youwei. The journal has long-held the intrigue of historians as one of the most influential publications of the late Qing. At the height of its popularity in April 1898, it reached a circulation of 10,000. Seungjoo Yoon calls it the “harbinger of the literati-led modern press in late Qing China.” Despite this attention from historians, few have paid serious attention to the details surrounding the translations that made up such a large part of the text of this journal.

Right from the beginning, *The Chinese Progress* was an important avenue for translated knowledge from around the world. As the Chinese publishing industry had not yet

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82 Yoon 2002, 48-76.
developed to the point where it was common to send foreign correspondents around the world, newspaper and other periodicals relied heavily upon translations from foreign periodicals. This practice would continue far into the twentieth century. Like similar publications of the time, the *Chinese Progress* would often contain extensive sections devoted to translation from a particular language. These sections usually took up fifty percent or more of the total text in each issue of *The Chinese Progress*. Most of these translations were from English or Japanese, but there were also translations from French and Russian. The English translations were almost always by Zhang Kunde 張坤德, while all of the Japanese translations were made by Kojō Teikichi 古城貞吉 (1866-1949). Translations from Japanese were crucial for Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei and their reform movement. In addition to their Datong Translation Company, which was responsible for a number of translations during its two years of existence, notably the quasi-translation of *On the Great Eastern Federation* by Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉 discussed below, *The Chinese Progress* was the primary outlet for their translations from Japanese during this time. As Liang Qichao and his clique were not yet proficient in Japanese, the work was carried on by an outsider. Kojō Teikichi, who lived in Tokyo at the time, often translated more than ten articles in each issue. This man devoted a great amount of time to *The Chinese Progress* and

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83 The word translated here as “federation” hebang 合邦 was not satisfactorily defined by any of these intellectuals. Aside from a general outline provided in Tarui’s book, no Chinese writer offered a reasonable or complete explanation of the term. There does seem to be a great overlap in the meanings of alliance with Japan (lianri 聯日) and federation (hebang 合邦). Throughout the texts of this period, there are numerous references to similar terms, such as lianbang 聯邦, banglian 邦聯, tongmeng 同盟, as well as frequent use of the single-character terms lian and he, which must be viewed contextually. In many cases the authors may not have had a clear idea of what they were implying when they used these terms, so we should be careful in both applying English equivalents or in equating one author’s term with another.
made a considerable contribution to China’s reform movement. Having the power to select and translate texts as he saw fit gave Kojō quite a bit of power in shaping the opinions of China’s reformers. The man and his translations therefore deserve a brief summary here.

Kojō Teikichi was one of the finest Sinologists of late-Meiji Japan. He wrote numerous books on Chinese literature and certainly had a hand in Japanese perceptions of China. He is perhaps best known for his *Shina Bungakushi* (A History of Chinese Literature 支那文學史 1906), which was widely available at the time and has been called “the first modern history of Chinese literature.”

This eminent Sinologist was still early in his career and *The Chinese Progress* was fortunate to have the opportunity to bring him into its staff. However, Kojō was committed to his position and contributed far more text to the journal than any other contributor. His translations regularly totaled more than one quarter of the text of each issue. Kojō was invited to the position by Huang Zunxian, who had spent much time with Japanese Sinologists while living in Tokyo. Kojō was given much freedom in selecting texts that would be of interest to Chinese readers. Over these two years he translated hundreds of articles from over forty different Japanese sources. These articles represented a wide range of newsworthy subjects. Naturally, Kojō had a distinct and central role in informing the readers of *The Chinese Progress*.

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85 Some texts mention Wang Kangnian as introducing Kojō to *The Chinese Progress*, however Cheng Yirong has recently read through much correspondence on the matter and supports his argument that Huang Zunxian was behind the invitation. See Chen Yirong 2010, 100. On Huang Zunxian’s life in Tokyo, see Kamachi, 1981.
Progress about the flow of history and the world outside of China. Not surprisingly, one of the most pressing issues at the time was the rise of imperialism in East Asia and the Western powers encroaching on China.

From 1896 to the summer of 1898 there were an impressive number of articles translated on the Russian encroachments in Siberia and Manchuria. These articles, all translated by Kojō, provided the Japanese perspective on the growing trouble in the north. Articles concerning such issues were translated from the journals Tōhō Gakkai Report 東邦學會錄 and The Sun. Although on occasion a translation of a Russian article was included in the very limited Russian section, it was exceedingly rare compared with the great amount of Japanese translation in every issue. Articles on Russia were often fearful forecasts of future war and Russia’s eventual control of China, or even all of Asia. “China’s future is to become Russian territory,” one article prophesized.\(^{86}\) Almost monthly there were articles describing the power that Russia would hold with the extension of the Siberian railway. This was something that weighed heavily on the minds of both Chinese and Japanese elite. As time went by, Kojō’s translations on Russia changed from short passages of two or three lines, to full length articles that often admonished the Chinese for not preparing for the Russian threat. At the same time the Japanese articles looked unfavourably upon the Sino-Japanese War, which had divided the countries.\(^{87}\) The Japanese translations in The Chinese Progress also painted Korea as a country suffering under Western imperialism and in need of assistance to

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\(^{86}\) See “Russia will Swallow all of Asia” 俄國將吞噬亞洲. The Chinese Progress 25. April 22, 1897. Originally in Tokyo Daily March 23, 1897), 1635.  
achieve autonomy. In “Korean Scholars of Will Call out for Autonomy,” Kojō explained that Korean elite feel under pressure from external forces. “Korea is independent in name, but has no power of independence.” Russia controls its military, while Britain controls its finances, explained Kojō. 88 In addition to articles on Korea and Manchuria, areas in which Japan had clear interests at the time, The Chinese Progress also ran translated articles on issues that were relevant to Western imperialism in general. Kojō translated no fewer than seven articles concerning Germany’s taking of Jiaozhou. He also included rare pieces on Western racism, translating two short articles on Canada’s head tax and the terrible quality of life for Chinese immigrants in Vancouver. 89

As China had few or no foreign correspondents at the time, Kojō Teikichi played an important role as an intermediary, giving readers access to Japanese media perspectives on the issues facing China. In the years running up to the Wuxu Reforms, The Chinese Progress, the most important publication for reformers of the period, offered a variety of viewpoints on the world through its translations section. It was by no means all one-sided as well. The English-language translation section frequently ran articles about Japanese encroachments of all kinds. The readers must have been well-aware that in this age they were surrounded by imperialism on all sides.

88 Originally in 日本報 March 26. In CP v25, p1712.
Although the articles Kojō offered were correct in their denunciations of the atrocities of Western imperialists, Japan’s growing power over Korea was played down and the country was portrayed as a fellow victim of Western imperialism. While a number of articles pointed out the inefficiencies and corruption of the Qing government, articles that did discuss China and Japan concentrated upon feelings of mutual affection between the two countries or flattered the Chinese readers with praise.\(^{90}\) Articles on Japanese domestic issues covered a wide array of news, especially of financial, economic and political nature. Such articles were important to the reformers who hoped to model a new China on the advances made by Meiji Japan. According to Chen Yirong, articles were chosen that would be of interest to Chinese readers, but they were also a representative selection of contemporary Japanese media.\(^{91}\)

One subject of these articles that stands out and should be noted here is the regular mention of Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkuma was one of the earliest and most powerful of the Japanese Asianists. There were regular articles on Ōkuma, reporting on his various speeches, even when they had little or nothing to do with China.\(^{92}\) Ōkuma was nearing the height of his popularity at this time. Also, it was during these years that he formulated his foreign policy goals known as the “Ōkuma Doctrine,” a policy that was designed to refocus Japan’s efforts

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\(^{90}\) “On the Character of the Chinese People” 論中國人民之性質 CP v44. “On the Revitalization of Sinology” 漢學再興論 CP v22, 1500-1502. 1897.4.2.

\(^{91}\) Chen Yirong 2010, 100.

for the mutual benefit of East Asia in order to raise the region’s status and power. Ōkuma was a committed Asianist and a co-founder of one of Japan’s earliest Asianist organizations, a group of scholars and politicians known as the Tōhō Kyōkai 東邦協會, translated as the Oriental Cooperation Society by Marius Jansen.

*The Chinese Progress* provided an opportunity for both *The Japanese* and the journal of the Tōhō Kyōkai – which was the *Tōhō Kyōkai Hokoku* 東邦協會報告, although Kojō always referenced it as *Tōhō Gakkai* 東邦學會 in *The Chinese Progress* – to find an entry into Chinese readership via translation. Although many of the shorter articles that Kojō translates are sourced from major Japanese daily newspapers, he has taken many long articles from the Tōhō Kyōkai Hokoku. Including serialized sections, eighteen articles from the Tōhō Kyōkai Hōkoku appear in *The Chinese Progress*. In all but two cases, these are the lead articles in Kojō’s section. Although this number is very low compared with the number of articles from the *Tokyo Daily* or the *Osaka Shinbun*, these were not news articles, but were long reports, almost all of them concerning Russia’s ever-increasing role in the events of Northeast China.

Also, the journal provided reformers with much of their knowledge about Japan. As the Kang-Liang faction was already a very pro-Japanese group, their writing and

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93 Jansen 1954, 53.
94 Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 52. This was also the organization to which Yano Ryōkei, Japan’s ambassador to China, belonged. The Tōhō Kyōkai was composed of people across the political spectrum, however, it was organized and dominated by the Seikyōsha 政教社, an organization established in 1888 in order to oppose the government’s pro-Western ideology. The Seikyōsha’s popular journal *The Japanese* 日本人, was the mouthpiece for the organization and its philosophical supporter, Miyake Setsurei (三宅 雪嶺 1860 - 1945), who had long stressed the importance of Japan cooperating with Asia.
95 For example, “On Events on China’s Periphery” 中國邊事論 stretched across volumes 12, 15, 16 and 18. “A History of Russia’s Foreign Policy” 俄國外政策史 stretched across volumes 33, 34, 47, 48 and 50.
reading of this relatively pro-Japan and anti-Russia journal was a significant step before their seeking refuge in Japan, where they found the support of and became friends with Ōkuma and other high-ranking Asianist officials. Naturally, the translations found in The Chinese Progress were not intensely Asianist, and it is difficult to say exactly to what degree they influenced this group. Despite the existence of so many translations from Asianist periodicals in the pages of the Chinese Progress, these articles were not outright calls for Asian unity or even alliance. Those calls came from the Chinese writers at the magazine.

**Chinese Voices at The Chinese Progress Promote Alliance with Japan**

In a series of articles in The Chinese Progress, Chen Chi 陳熾 (1855-1900) expressed a growing distrust towards Russia and the empire’s Eastward expansion. Beginning with “On the Mistakes Made by Six Countries during the Sino-Japanese War” 中日之戰六國皆失算論 he first displays a distrust towards Russia.⁹⁶ This article was published in October 1896, five months after Li Hongzhang had signed the agreement with Russia to work together to keep Japan out of China. It explained Chen’s belief that China, Japan, Britain, France and Germany had made mistakes during the resolution of the Sino-Japanese War that had resulted in Russia becoming the greatest danger in the region. Three months later Chen expanded upon these thoughts by arguing that China must turn to Japan and Britain in order to seek protection from Russian encroachment. Once again he published in Shiwu Bao. This time he used a more inflammatory title: “Russians’ Policy is as Ruthless as the Qin.”⁹⁷ Later in 1897

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⁹⁷ 俄人國勢酷類強秦論 Ibid, 312-315.
Chen would continue to write similar articles that called for turning to Japan in order to face Russia. Mao Haijian notes that these articles reveal that some Chinese intellectuals favoured an alliance with Japan even before the German assault on Jiaozhou Bay (Kiautschou Bay 膠州灣) began in November, 1897.  

Indeed, a number of Chinese intellectuals did favor alliance with Japan during this time, but the majority of these intellectuals were only seeing this alliance as a transnational alliance. Even Zhang Zhidong utilized the “same script, same race” argument when he discussed the benefits of using Japanese military might against the Russians and Germans. However, the call for a China-Japan alliance based upon Asianist principles was surprisingly voiced by Zhang Taiyan at a similar time.

In the years before the 1898 reforms, Zhang Taiyan was living in Shanghai and contributing to *The Chinese Progress*. Like other reformers of the period, he was very hopeful for a union with Japan in order to defend against Western imperialist powers. At this time he was still formulating his beliefs on race and ethnicity, but the division between yellow and white was becoming part of the “common knowledge.” In the years to come, Zhang would become an important Asianist in Japan due to his solidarity with Indians and the Tokyo-based Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood. He would write many articles on the importance of Asian unity in the early twentieth century, but as early as 1897, at the age of 28, he wrote an article that demanded China’s union with Japan based upon racial and geographic reasons that appear more-suited to Liang Qichao’s writings after he moved to Japan. It was on

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98 Mao Haijian 2009, 252.
100 See Chapter III for more on this organization.
January 21, 1897 that his article “Asia Should Support Its Lips and Teeth” was published.\(^{101}\) This article was certainly intended to show the possibility of uniting with Japan in order to defend China against the imperial ambitions of Germany and Russia, but it was also notable for its reliance on geography and race as a major part of Zhang’s argument. Zhang relies on a new science understanding of the world to understand its divisions, as well as to understand how unions may be effective and necessary in the new world. Emblematic of this stream of thought during the reform period, this article contains a number of key issues. It is therefore worthwhile to reproduce and translate key sections of the text.\(^{102}\) He begins by describing the Eurasian Continent in geographic terms:

The world is separated into five great continents... From the days of the Yao Emperor, the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains have acted as a barrier to cut off Europe from Asia and divide yellow people and white people.\(^ {103}\)

It must be noted here that Zhang not only completely accepted the dichotomy of East and West, he equated the West with European and white, while he saw the East as being Asian and yellow. This is one of the earliest Chinese arguments for the uniting of Asia based upon an idea of the yellow race. Just as the “lips and teeth” metaphor implies, both countries, and finally all Asians, needed to cooperate and be supportive of each other in order to survive this wave of imperialism: “If neither abandons the other, and the multitude of yellow people help

\(^{102}\) Please see Appendix for a complete translation of the article.
\(^{103}\) 天地以五大洲別生分類。一區之中...故自唐堯以來。以種海鳥拉臠為戎索。以絕亞歐。以區黃人白人。Ibid, 3-1.
one another, then Asia will not falter.” However, Zhang is not at all inferring that Westerners have no place in Asia or arguing for an exclusive policy of “Asia for Asians” as many Asianists would clamor for in the twentieth century. The coming together of West and East, Europe and Asia, white and yellow, is an inevitable and natural conclusion: “Hence those on the eastern sea and those on the western sea would inevitably come into contact. This is only natural. What could be wrong with this opening up?”104 Zhang does not oppose contact between East and West, rather he finds that it has proven to add to the strength of the Europeans. What is interesting is that he finds the reasons for Europe’s initiation of this contact to be based in a difference of geography: “The world (geographically) is a varied place, as uneven as the teeth of a dog. Therefore, that which was basic to the people of Europe had no place in Asia. Hence the sickness of China.”105 Zhang’s use of geography comes years before Liang Qichao (perhaps unwittingly) translated Hegel’s theories of geographical determinism.106

As these inherent differences between race and people are related to geography, Zhang naturally finds that China should be making an alliance with its neighbor Japan, and not with Russia, that, although at China’s northern border, appears to Zhang as an empire that controls Kamchatka from afar:

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104 故放於東海。放於西海。其不能不相通者。期會然也。夫通則何病也。Here both ‘contact’ and ‘opening up’ are translated from the term tong 通, an important term that was regularly used around the time of the Wuxu Reforms. See the conclusion of this chapter for more on this. Ibid.
105 地體華離。犬牙相錯。其本氏於歐洲。其標未於亞洲。於是乎震旦病。Ibid, 3-2.
Of those that are at elbows with China and can be mutually reliant and dependent on each other, only Japan remains… It is difficult to be an impoverished state with an avaricious power in the North. Forgetting its bite, we have entered a secret alliance, turning our backs on our own kind and encamping with a foreign clan. Should we not be doing the opposite?”

Zhang’s argument here is based upon a similarity in ‘kind’ (tonglei 同類), slightly different from the standard Asianist argument of ‘same race,’ ‘same script,’ or ‘same religion.’ However, it is clear that Zhang is familiar with the Asianist arguments that were coming out of Japan at that time. Although this article appeared one year before the Kōakai would establish their Shanghai chapter, their publication Kōakai hōkoku 興亞會報告 had been available in Chinese since 1881. It seems likely that Zhang was well-aware of the discourse. From the following line, we see that he was at least familiar with Japanese writing on unification:

From the beginning, the idea of the union of Asia came from the Japanese. These were not empty words. China is dependent upon Japan and Japan is also dependent upon China. They hope for a strong China, taking pride in “lips and teeth.” Then we can match the West from afar and face Russia near. And the Pacific will be at peace.108

As he referred to China and Japan as “lips and teeth,” Zhang also had to resolve the issues of Japan’s recent actions. To explain how Japan could be excused for the Sino-

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107然以赤縣之地。近在肘腋。可以相倚依者。闔亞洲維日本…難以窮髮(窮乏？)之國。饕餮於朔方。忘其欲噬。密與為盟誓。背同類而鄉異族。豈不左哉。Zhang 1897, 3-2.

108昔與亞之會。剙自(初自？)日本。此非虛言也。中依東。東亦依中。冀支那之強。引為唇齒。則遠可以敵泰西。近可以拒俄羅斯。而太平洋澹矣。Ibid, 3-2.
Japanese War, infringements upon Korea and the militaristic attitude to foreign relations which most Chinese were clearly very angry with, Zhang reduced everything down to a matter of Japan being proactively defensive. In his Darwinist argument he goes as far as being supportive of Japan for pushing China to be competitive and active: “It is in hoping to save themselves that they bring out the competitive spirit in China, causing China to resolutely make plans for self-strengthening.”

China, Zhang believes, must not act in revenge, as Gou Jian 勾踐 did in the Springs and Autumns Period, but look to the example set by the Shu in the Three Kingdoms Era and unite with Japan as Shu did with Wu to defeat the Wei. This simple allusion posits the Russian Empire as the much-hated Wei Kingdom of Caocao, but stresses the importance of reason and strategy for the development and survival of the Chinese. Zhang details various moments in Chinese history to emphasize the importance of reason and thinking of the future. His efforts in persuading the reader to remain calm and rational may have to do with his cryptic ending. In the final line of his essay he reasons: “Threats that reside in the horse’s tail can be cut off. By being determined and brave we can use the horns of our neighbors to our advantage. Otherwise, in the blink of an eye we will be routed and destroyed.”

The horse’s tail refers to that which, although a part of the body, can be removed without any disadvantage to the organism. This seemingly cryptic passage is best read in the context of a more explicit letter that Zhang wrote to Li Hongzhang in which he advised the statesman to offer Weihaiwei to the Japanese government.

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109冀自救也。使中國生其霸心。發憤圖自強。Ibid, 3-2.
110馬尾之險。可以失之。發憤而為雄。而後以鄰國犄角為可恃也。不然。則一飯之頃。已潰敗決裂矣。Ibid.
111Zhang Taiyan wrote to Li Hongzhang proposing that China ally with Japan, and even cede Weihaiwei to
Of the burst of pro-Japanese writings that appeared in the late-nineteenth century, this article by Zhang Taiyan was the most important and the most direct. Zhang included many of the early Asianist slogans and ideology and built his argument on the pseudo-scientific approaches of race and geographic determinism. His article forecast the turn to race and geography that would define the more thoughtful period of Asianism that began after Cixi’s coup and the reformers escape to Japan, but it also showed the extent to which Japanese Asianist writings were having an influence upon young Chinese reformers in the years after the Sino-Japanese War, as Zhang borrowed heavily from popular Asianist vocabulary and even referred to Japanese calls for a China-Japan union. At about the same time, other reformers related to Zhang and The Chinese Progress were showing interest in Japanese writings on an East Asian union in the form of a federation. Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei republished a prominent book that typified Japanese Asianism at the end of the nineteenth century.

**Reformers Become Interested in Early Japanese Asianism**

What is likely the first major text on Asian unity that was widely available in Chinese was *On the Great Eastern Federation* 大東合邦論 by Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉. First serialized in Japan in Literary Sinitic in the journal *Discussions of Liberty and Equality* (Jiyūbyōdō 自由平等競輪) in 1891, it was compiled and published in full in 1893 and arrived in China, Korea and Taiwan later that year. The book was widely read in both Korea and Japan to counteract the Germans in Shandong. See “A Letter to Li Hongzhang” 上李鴻章書, reprinted in Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, *Zhang Taiyan xiansheng nianpu changpian* 章太炎先生年谱长篇 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 61-3.

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112 Tarui published the book on his own under the pen name Morimoto Tōkichi 森本藤吉.
and China. According to Suzuki Tadashi, the popularity of the book soared in China after an edition appeared with an introduction by Liang Qichao.\footnote{Suzuki 1968, 82.} That Tarui chose to write this book entirely in Literary Sinitic is of great significance. Although Japanese scholars could certainly read in Literary Sinitic in the 1890s, writing in the language had become exceedingly rare.\footnote{He was not the first Japanese Asianist to attempt writing in Literary Sinitic. The Kōakai had begun publishing their periodical Kōakai Hōkoku 興亞會報告 in Literary Sinitic beginning in November of 1881 after eight months of publishing in Japanese. Nor would he be the last: the Pan-Asianist organization Kokuryūkai 黑竜会 began publishing their journal Tōa Geppō 東亜月報 in Literary Sinitic as late as 1908.}

Tarui’s text also exemplifies some of the key contradictions that would accompany Asianism throughout the next century. It contained the paradoxical mixing of socialism and imperialism that gave this discourse power as a complicated paradigm to be used in a variety of ways by those who propagated it. It also utilized Western frameworks of political thought to imagine a truly Eastern society.

It is important to note here that the first man to write a substantial text on Asianism was also a founder of the first political party in Asia to use the name ‘socialist.’ His party was called the Eastern Socialist Party (Tōyō Shakaitō 東洋社會黨).\footnote{Tadashi Suzuki, “Profile of Asian Minded Man,” Developing Economies (March, 1968) 79-100, 84.} Although the party was immediately declared illegal and disbanded by the government, the significance of this event and its connection with an early imagining of Asianism should not be underestimated. As can be seen from the party’s name, this party sought an international form of socialism that would span across the three countries of East Asia. However, we can see from Tarui’s statements that the dream had a long term goal of much more:
You, who have been raised amid the current trends of Eastern civilization, are members of our Tōyō Shakaitō; and it is upon the success or failure of our party that the rise or fall of human morality depends. 116

Like many that would come after him, Tarui saw the East as the moral force of the entire planet. He saw in the East the last hope of mankind. It offered a universal redemption that could overcome the inequalities and injustices that accompanied capitalism. Yet Tarui was also a long-serving member of the lower house of the Diet. While he was in government, the Japanese Empire expanded to include Taiwan and then Korea. Although Taiwan had not been part of his plan, union with Korea was a crucial step in Tarui’s plan for an Eastern Federation, yet the manner in which Japan and Korea came together was not at all the manner in which he had originally outlined it in his On the Great Eastern Federation.

On the Great Eastern Federation describes a future federation of Korea and Japan in which the two countries come together in what appears to be a general state of equality between the two states. He finds a basis for the likelihood of a peaceful integration between the two countries in a linguistic and racial analysis: “Although the two countries now speak different languages, their word order and grammar are completely the same. This is proof that they are of the same race.”117 Throughout the text Tarui also uses the phrase “my yellow brothers” 我兄弟黃人 to refer to both Korean and Chinese people. A racial conceptualizing of the world was finding dominance at this time and Asianism was naturally configured along racial lines as well. Tarui finished his book by emphasizing what he sees as an inevitable war

between the white and yellow races. He feared a future in which the white race would attempt to eliminate the yellow race: “Friendly internal relations with those of the same race, but competing with those of other races, this is the natural trend of the world, as the reader can see.”

As I will show in Chapter III, the fear of race war was long used as an impetus for the union of Asian nationalities. For Tarui it was not the deciding factor, but was an important point that supported his ideology and his argument. Tarui based his discussion of the Eastern Federation, not on a negative program of fear of war, but on a positive belief in the ‘progression’ of society to a state of freedom and equality.

Years before Yan Fu would make his famous translations of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, Tarui Tōkichi introduced their writings to China in relation to the traditional, comfortable and familiar Asian belief systems of Confucius and Lao Zi, but in the new packaging of socialist Asianism. As for China, although Tarui’s immediate concern was the union of Korea and Japan, he was very concerned with the Qing Dynasty and included an entire chapter that explained his views on how those suffering under Qing rule would eventually enter this federation, but also discussing the reasons that it was not yet ready for such a union. In the chapter “On the Suitability of the Qing Country and the Eastern Country’s Coalition” 論清國宜與東國合縱, Tarui expresses his hopes:

Should our country wish for the Qing country’s prosperity while the Qing does not wish for close relations with Japan, then we all will forever be mired in disaster. The Westerners say that there are two powers in the Orient. These are Japan and China. East Asia is fortunate to have these two

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118欲同種人親和於內。而與異種人競爭於外。亦世運之自然也。讀者察焉。Ibid, 134.
powers, which can protect the dignity of our yellow race. If these two countries were not within the realm of yellow people, then the white race would ravage across all of our Asian continent and enslave our yellow brothers, just as they have done so to the black people of Africa.119

From this chapter we can see that for the immediate future Tarui believes that Japan and Korea must unite, but China, although a substantial power in its own right and essential for the survival of the yellow race, is not required in his union at present. The reason for this is Tarui’s view that China under the Qing government was an oppressed people who had yet to realize their independence and achieve national self-determination. Tarui explains:

If we in the East are to unite and participate in our government, then it follows that China under the [Q]ing dynasty, Tartary, Mongolia, Tibet and other states must recover independence and enable their peoples to participate in the government of their own countries.120

From this passage it is clear that Tarui viewed the state as based upon the people of a nation. This results in a tension apparent in his text. Although he hoped the Qing Dynasty would eventually unite with the Eastern Federation, it was temporarily unimaginable as the various ethnicities under the Qing had yet to achieve their own independence, and, therefore, could not cooperate in the Asian government that he had imagined. Despite his hopes for cooperation with the Qing, his writing indirectly calls for the disintegration of the Qing

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119 我國望清國之富強開明。而清國不望之於我東方以相親。則共受永遠不測之禍矣。西人稱。東方有海陸二強。即日本支那是也。東亞幸有此二強國。而保我黃人種之威嚴。設黃人中。無此二國。則彼白種人將蹂躪我亞細亞全洲。奴隸我兄弟黃人。與阿弗利加黑人何擇。Ibid, 133.
120 Tarui 1893, 132-3. This translation taken from Suzuki 1968, 96.
Dynasty.

Tarui strongly believed in constitutional law and the necessity of citizen participation. Despite his calls for an Eastern system of government and governance, he also strongly believed in Western democracy as defined by nineteenth century British liberals. These beliefs in the nation would certainly have endeared him to many Chinese intellectuals at the time. While the Qing Dynasty was foundering in the final decades of the nineteenth century, Han nationalism was beginning its rise among intellectuals as an ideology that firmly opposed Manchu rule. However, at the same time, Tarui’s words must certainly have struck fear in the hearts of patriotic Chinese who believed in the necessity of a united China that saw all the nationalities in China tied together under the idea of a greater Chinese nationality that encompassed all nations on Chinese soil. This would continue to be an issue that very few Chinese elite would compromise on throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.

When On the Great Eastern Federation was brought to China, although it appealed to many Chinese intellectuals, this section was unacceptable and some sentences had to be changed. Chinese editions of the text were edited by Liang Qichao’s student and from 1897 onwards a new wording was used for a number of passages. Through a few minor changes, this section was changed to indicate that China must not be divided, allowing for the

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121 Through a close reading of these two texts, Lei Chia-Sheng identified this and a few other important changes in Lei Chia-Sheng 雷家聖. “Proofreading Between Da Dong He Bang Lun (大東合邦論) and Da Dong He Bang Xin Yi (大東合邦新義) — With Analysis of Development of “Federation” Theory in Late Qing China” 「大東合邦論」與「大東合邦新義」互校記—兼論晚清『合邦論』在中國的發展. The Journal of Chinese Historical Researches 66 (Korea, 2010.6.30), 87-108., 92-93 (Originally 132-3 and 65-6 respectively).
reformers’ belief that the Qing emperor must continue to rule over all China, and that the empire need not be divided based on ethnic nationality. These few changes indicate the reformers’ fears of the possible division of China based upon nationalism. Although On the Great Eastern Federation did bring in discourse on nationalism, race and political theory at this critical time, it also presented reformers with these difficult questions regarding how to accommodate nationalism, or even Asianism, with their traditional Chinese worldview – questions that danced along the tension between nation and empire. These questions were not easily answered. The struggle can be seen in the elliptical and even contradictory preface provided by Liang Qichao in 1898.

The Complications of Translating Tarui Asianism

Although On the Great Eastern Federation was first published in its entirety in 1893, it was in 1898 that it received the most notice by Chinese intellectuals. The new edition of On the Great Eastern Federation appeared at the height of China’s reforms. It was released with a new name as well, The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation 大東合邦新義. Perhaps more importantly it contained a new preface by one of the stars of the 1898 reforms, Liang Qichao, who was forced to flee to Japan just months after publication of this new edition due to his involvement in the 1898 reforms. The book was advertised in major newspapers in August of 1898 for 280 wen, a fairly modest price when compared to other

\[122\] However, the 1893 edition is the edition found in the Shanghai Library today. In Korea I worked with an edition published in Shanghai in 1897, available in the special collections of the Korea University Library. However, this version does not include Liang’s preface. I was not able to find an original copy of the 1898 edition with the preface written by Liang Qichao. However, the preface has been republished recently. See note below.
books for sale at the time. The book was published by the new publishing company established by Kang and Liang, The Datong Translation Publishing House 大同譯書局. Liang Qichao introduced his new publishing company and detailed the urgent need for many translations in order to support the reform movement: “Relying on our resentment, we have united our comrades to create this publishing house. Translations from Japanese will be the majority, supplemented by translations from Western languages. Politics will come first, followed by industry.” The reformers had decided that translation would open the door to the learning from the West. Japan would serve as the gateway and On the Great Federation would be one of the first books to be “translated,” meaning that a few alterations were made to domesticate this text for Chinese readers.

Although the book appears to have been fairly well received at the time, Liang’s preface was one of a few pieces that was not included in his collected works. As On the Great Federation fell far out of favor during the rise of Japanese imperialism, copies of this edition became exceedingly rare and this text became virtually unheard of anywhere in China after 1949. Before 2005 it appears to have only been mentioned briefly by Japanese scholars and perhaps not at all in China. However, Xia Xiaohong’s 夏曉虹 landmark study of unpublished Liang Qichao texts brought the preface back to life and it is now widely available in the collection: Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works. This preface is an

123 See Xiangbao Fuzhang 湘報附張, 1898, 8.8.
125 Liang Qichao 梁啟超. “A Preface to The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation” 《大東合邦新義》序, in Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works, Part I 《飲冰室合集》集外文(上), edited by Xia
important key to understanding the reformers convoluted views on the possibility of uniting with Japan. It offers insight into Liang Qichao’s yearnings and misgivings at this crucial juncture in Chinese reform, as well as the difficulties of accommodating different worldviews in the reformers’ efforts to save China.

In considering the merits of Tarui Tōkichi’s proposal, Liang begins by discussing the concept of unity, he, from a largely theoretical perspective, quoting the *Book of Odes* and the *Book of Changes*. He dismisses those that do not take a holistic view of the current issues and argues that we must do more than worry about our individual states.

Whether in the *datong* of Confucius or in the *shangtong* of Mozi, all living things are one and all life is connected. Without the individual, the great dao is still magnificent. Should each manage his own state and each instruct his own people, they will be of no consequence and not be following the dao. The great flow of history cannot be managed through frustrations.126

Liang then turns from this discussion of classical Chinese political theory to more recent examples of transnational cooperation and federation in practice. He mentions the uniting of ancient Greece, the uniting of eighteen European countries to battle Napoleon, and finally the union of the thirteen colonies to form the original United States. These historical lessons show the merits of such unions and Liang turns, not to talk of a union between Korea and Japan, which is the primary focus of the book he is introducing, but to the union of China

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126 Please see the appendix for a complete translation of this preface with its Chinese original.
and Japan:

Those that stand together meet with prosperity and those that stand alone are executed. Is it not absurd to be arrogant and self-important? Japan and China are separated by the mists that envelop the East Sea. Asia has chosen to be timid and put on the butcher’s block by a foreign people. The yellow and white races are becoming like ice and coal. The Southeast with its profits and thriving people is divided like meat. And all our scholars close their eyes and snore. While the funeral pyre is stocked with wood, they believe things are still safe. If a crisis occurs and those that rely upon each other for existence do not help, but stay divided as though their circumstances are special, how can they not but be bait for those snakes?!

Therefore, we must plan for wealth and power. We must have political reform. In order to protect our race we must not be timid but must ally!

In this passage Liang is clear about the reasons necessitating cooperation with Japan. Pursuing a racial method for alleviating the ills of the current crisis provides a simple plot much in-line with the contemporary science. However, in a telling lack of continuity, Liang ends this passage with a call to ally. China and Japan “must ally” fei liangmeng buke. In the passages before this, Liang has convinced his reader of the positive nature of unity, he, and he is writing a preface to a book on federalism. Had he written “we must federalize,” fei hebang buke, it would certainly have been a clear call of support for the author. However, Liang’s use of the term alliance, liangmeng, provides a hint of uncertainty concerning Liang’s purpose and reveals the ambiguity of the reformers’ vision in this regard. He was aware that uniting with Japan, although offering possibilities for the protection of China, was a journey

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127 This reliance on race will be returned to in further detail in Chapter III.
into unchartered waters. He was therefore cautious and wary of Tarui’s proposal. He does provide an abstruse criticism of Tarui near the end of his preface:

Picking up *On the Great Eastern Federation*, and considering this man Morimoto, for a while I thought him some sort of genius. But should the pillar that supports this house fall, then the normal walls will protect the people. The wood must be straightened with compass and square. Federalists should protect the supportive wall of classical learning (Confucianism) and support the people’s long held customs as their compass and square. It is a pity that this book is so wordy and its approach is treacherous. Although it appears to support a common perspective, it revolves around the author’s own opinions. The taking of our vassal state has changed my perspective. Finding a crack (in our thinking) his rattling on is evasive. However, with the dishonest practices of the world powers, a union is logical, and my criticisms are like picking at bones. Understanding his main points, the valuable words left behind in the history of each dynasty can also help towards the long term autonomy of the Orient.

This criticism, although contradictory and half-hearted, reveals Liang’s fear of Japan’s growing imperialism, specifically regarding Korea. Of course, Tarui wrote this book before the Sino-Japanese War, and Liang has the advantage of hindsight on this event when considering the complexity of Japan’s actions and words regarding Korea. It is a pity that Liang did not further discuss his misgivings with “On the Great Eastern Federation” in his preface. The fact that he agreed to publish a book on Japan’s absorption of Korea merely three years after the Sino-Japanese War is surprising and interesting. Despite his evident anger at Japan’s growing dominance over Korea, he agreed with the main principles of this
book and found its greatest flaw to be its disregard for Confucian traditions and their importance in instructing the people. Liang sees these teachings as essential in any possible transnational union. This fits well with his mentor’s beliefs on Confucianism. Kang was in complete agreement with Liang on this idea of unity. In his masterpiece work Datong Shu, the uniting of states is one of the most crucial steps on the path to datong. He writes: “Abolishing state boundaries and evolving from division to unity (he) is a natural trend of the times.” However, for Kang the final purpose of unifying is the telos of global harmony, while for Liang it is a means to wealth and power.

During his years spent in Japan, Liang turned more and more to the importance of wealth and power for China, but in 1898 his concentration on this was evident in the preface to Tarui’s text. “We must plan for wealth and power. We must have political reform. In order to protect our race we must not be timid but must ally!” The connection between wealth and power, reform and Japan is emphasized in these lines. Liang knew that only by increasing the wealth and power of China, could the country survive the onslaught of Western imperialism. The only way to do so was through reform, and reform meant copying Japan’s success, or, in this case, uniting with Japan in this new form of transnational cooperation. For Liang was viewing this as a very modern transnational union, despite his conflicting Confucian worldview.

The new edition of this text was extremely popular in China. If we are to believe...
Tarui’s own 1910 assessment, the edition sold 100,000 copies. Whether or not this number is accurate, the book certainly garnered attention among China’s elite. Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, who was working at the Hanlin Academy in 1898, did a careful analysis of the ‘translated’ edition of the text in September of 1898. Cai lists chapters of the original book and offers a short review of its main subject, the uniting of China, Korea and Japan to defend against the West, before calling it a masterpiece. As for the version published by Liang, Cai explains the numerous changes that have been made. He notes some of the changes, such as changing ‘our nation’ to ‘Japan,’ as frivolous, but calls other minor changes into question. This he directly brings to the attention of Kang and Liang, who by that time were living in Japan. Although Cai’s noting of these discrepancies shows his attention to detail, it appears that he did not go through every line and he missed some of the other important changes by the Datong Press. Such a careful examination of the differences between these two books would not be made for another 112 years, due to a new reading of the events surrounding the Hundred Days’ Reform, linking the reforms to Tarui and the prospect of a surprising alliance with Japan.

110 years after Cai Yuanpei’s careful examination of the difference between the two editions, Lei Chia-Sheng decided to make another examination of these two texts. Lei’s

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131 Lei Chia-Sheng 雷家聖. “Proofreading Between Da Dong He Bang Lun (大東合邦論) and Da Dong He Bang Xin Yi (大東合邦新義)”
reasons for returning to the texts in this manner have quite a different focus. As a researcher of federalism in modern Chinese history, Lei looks to these texts while asking the question: “What is the relationship between the Chinese publication of *On the Great Eastern Federation* and the concept of ‘federalism’ during the Hundred Days’ Reform?” Lei finds that the differences between these two texts is not merely the cosmetic differences listed above. The editors at the Datong Translation Publishing House changed a number of lines that neither the Qing authorities nor the reformers themselves would feel comfortable with, including many passages that stressed the contradiction of Manchu rule and Han complacency.

According to Lei, Kang Youwei was eager for work towards a federation with Japan at the time. Lei cites numerous texts that show Kang’s support for the federation and detail how he pressured others to push this idea onto the emperor. What is fascinating is that Lei believes that the idea for the ‘federation’ that brought a dramatic end to the reforms was directly related to Kang’s reading of Tarui’s text: “It is clear that the ‘federation’ plans of the 100 Days Reform followed the steps of *On the Great Eastern Federation*.” However, Lei believes that this would have resulted in China’s being swallowed up by Japan. In Lei’s
reading, it is therefore only the foresight of Cixi that saved China from such a fate.\textsuperscript{135} Regardless of the validity of the conclusions drawn by Lei, there are numerous sources pointing to the reformers’ petitions for an alliance with Japan, as well as the long-held belief in such an approach.

**Kang Youwei and Alliance with Japan**

Kang Youwei had always been a proponent of transnational approaches and assumed such a path to be inevitable in the future. In Section II of his *Datong Shu*, “Abolishing National Boundaries and Uniting the World,” he discusses the evils of states, how states lead to suffering and how we can work towards abolishing the boundaries between states. Kang looks at how having numerous states leads to war. He then considers a rather utilitarian perspective in which he sees larger states as more efficient, but, more importantly, they are more peaceful. Abolishing national boundaries is one of the more important parts of Kang’s philosophy:

> Now that we seek to save the human race from its miseries, to bring about the happiness and advantages of complete peace-and-equality, to seek the universal benefits of One World, we must begin with the destruction of state boundaries and the abolishment of nationalism 國義. This it is which Good men, Superior men, should day and night with anxious minds wear out their tongues in planning for. Aside from destroying the boundaries of

\textsuperscript{135} In *Containing the Furious Waves: A New View of the 1898 Coup*, Lei Chia-sheng argues that the reformers, who had only a basic knowledge of foreign politics, including federalism, proposed the idea to the Guangxu Emperor before Empress Dowager Cixi stepped in to bring an end to their reforms. Lei does not think highly of Kang and believes that he was overly influenced by zealous Japanese bent on dominating China. Lei’s hypothesis on the events of 1898 offers a likely version of events and an interesting insight into Kang’s reasoning for publishing Tarui’s book. Lei Chia-sheng, *Liwan kuanglan: Wuxu zhengbian xintan* 力挽狂瀾: 戊戌政變新探 [Containing the furious waves: a new view of the 1898 coup], (Taipei: Wanjuan Lou, 2004).
states, there is absolutely no way to save the people.\(^\text{136}\)

Like Tarui before him and countless others after him, Kang makes it clear that for the purpose of advancing towards a state of *datong*, these unions (聯邦、聯合、聯邦和) should be based on equality and cannot result from imperialistic ambitions of control, or colonialism. “Thus we must have equal strength, equal power, mutual support, and parity among the uniting states. No one state will have the power to be able to unite all the others.”\(^\text{137}\) Furthermore, democracy is essential in any such state, with all citizens having equal power. Kang does not clearly explain his ideas for democracy at this stage, but it seems likely that he does not expect the absolute democracy that he prescribes for the future world community. Over the next hundred years, small states will cease to exist and the world will be populated with a small number of enormous democracies. Here Kang imagines that China may unite with Japan and India.\(^\text{138}\) Kang does not see this as a special situation for Asia, but rather as an inevitable step that will occur everywhere in the world. He sees this already happening in the Americas and Europe with the creation and expansion of America and Germany. Kang particularly praises these two countries for their system of unity as the smaller states “forget that they have been destroyed to form the united state.”\(^\text{139}\)

Progression from the Age of Disorder into the harmonized egalitarian future of *datong* was an indisputable fact for Kang Youwei. He also believed that the *junzi*, translated by

\(^{136}\) Here Thompson has translated 國義 as “nationalism.” This term might better be translated as “statism.” K’ang Yu-wei and Laurence G. Thompson, *Ta T’ung Shu: The One World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-wei* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd), 1958, 83-84.

\(^{137}\) Ibid, 88.


\(^{139}\) Ibid, 85.
Thompson as the “good” man 君子, had a Confucian responsibility to actively work towards this ideal. This belief propelled Kang to work hard towards datong throughout his career, but especially in the years around the reforms while he was writing the Datong Shu. Therefore, it does not seem at all surprising that he would have taken advantage of an opportunity to take a step in the right direction when it appeared.

The only evidence that Kang actually did try to hold such a meeting with Japanese officials comes from Kang’s own words. In 1899 he wrote his own impressions of the events that surrounded the 100 Days’ Reform in a book he titled My History 我史. The book finally found popularity when it was published in 1954 as Kang Nanhai’s Autobiographical Record 康南海自編年譜. In this book he mentions a discussion between himself and Yano Ryōkei (矢野龍渓 1851-1931. Here called Yano Fumito). Yano was a long-time associate and often assistant to Ōkuma Shigenobu, an important Asianist within the Japanese government. He had a long history of interaction with China and Kang, and over the crucial years of 1897 to 1899 Yano served as Japanese ambassador to Qing China. Kang states:

At the time, I arranged with Yano Fumito to hold a meeting concerning federation between the two states. Our draft was extremely well-detailed. I asked Mr. Yano to begin informing the authorities and then we would have a large meeting in every province. However, once the Russians knew about it, Yano did not dare to continue.\footnote{Mao Haijian 茅海建. \textit{From the Sino-Japanese War to the Wuxu Reforms: An Annotation of Kang Youwei’s My History} 从甲午到戊戌：康有为《我史》鉴注 (Beijing: Xinhua Shuju, 2009), 247.}

\footnote{時與日本矢野文雄約兩國合邦大會議，定稿極詳，請矢野君行知總署答允，然後可大會於各省，而俄人知之，矢野君未敢. Kang 1972, 47. Lei 2004, 99.}
This line implies that Kang was behind a seemingly-advanced plan to unite China and Japan in a federation just months before the Hundred Days’ Reform. If this was the case, it is surprising that more was not known about such a large meeting. However, it has been suggested that Kang was simply wrong in his assertion that this meeting was close to fruition. Many scholars have questioned the accuracy of Kang’s *My History*, which conflicts with the other important accounts of the Hundred Days’ Reform, Liang Qichao’s *An Account of the Wuxu Reforms* 戊戌政變記 and Kang Youwei’s own *Drafts of the Wuxu Memorials* 戊戌奏稿. 142

**Kang Youwei’s Reformers Petition for Federation with Japan**

The above quotation may not be true. Mao Haijian has researched the situation regarding war reparations and Yano Ryōkei and found that Kang’s statements on those financial matters were incorrect. On the possibility that Yano would hold such talks with Kang, Mao questions: “Whether or not Yano Ryōkei would hold discussions on such an important matter with an officer in the Ministry of Works who held no actual political authority should be regarded with suspicion.” 143 Actually, the pro-China camp in Japan had

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142 However, *Drafts of the Wuxu Memorials* is also believed to be largely fraudulent. In *Kang Youwei’s Real Memorials* (Kang Youwei wuxu zhen zouyi 康有爲戊戌真奏議) Huang Zhangjian 黃彰健 argues that the memorials were rewritten before the 1911 publication of this book. *My History* has been called into question on a number of accounts, and has therefore not been considered an acceptable source for understanding the events as they occurred. However, the text is an excellent source for revealing the thinking of Kang Youwei during this period. This has led Mao Haijian 茅海建, a scholar of the reform period to provide a nine-hundred page annotated companion to *My History* in 2009. This book makes some important points regarding the validity of Kang Youwei’s reference to his proposed meeting with Yano.

143而矢野文雄公使是否与并无实际政治权力的工部候补主事康有为商讨过此等大事，也是可以怀疑的。Mao Haijian 2009, 254.
taken notice of Kang and was certainly interested in meeting him. Furthermore, before becoming ambassador to China, Yano was secretary for Ōkuma, who supported Kang, was an Asianist leader, and was hoping for reform in China. Also, the Japanese government, with the help of Itō Hirobumi and the embassy in Beijing, offered assistance to Kang only a few months later. Clearly, many respectable Japanese elite were willing to do more than hold discussions with Kang. He was a much wanted man in Japan as he held possibilities for these Japanese elite to realize their ambitions.

Kang’s actions and words here are most interesting when placed against the context of the publication of Tarui’s book in that same year, which Kang was certainly aware of, as the book had been produced by his own publishing house. These events appear even more connected when one looks at the words of memorials that were being sent to the emperor by others in Kang’s camp at the time.

However, the reformers were disorganized and desperate. Their ambitions for “federation” were not limited to Japan. Kang’s followers petitioned the emperor to take steps towards a grand federation that would include China, Japan, the United States and Great Britain. Yang Shenxiu 杨深秀145（Also 楊漪川 1849-1898）famously wrote: “I made a special request to His Majesty that he hurry to make great plans to unite with Great Britain, the United States and Japan, and not look down upon the sullied word ‘federation.’”146

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144 Jansen 1954, 77.
145 Yang Shenxiu was one of the more famous of the Wuxu Reformers. One of the Wuxu Six, he was executed after the coup that ended the reforms.
146臣尤伏願我皇上早定大計，固結英、美、日本三國，勿嫌合邦之名之不美。Available in: Wuxu bianfa dangan shiliao 戊戌變法檔案史料 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 15. Lei 2004, 102
addition to Yang, Kang also had censor Chen Qizhang petition the throne in favour of allying with Japan and Britain. Meanwhile, Kang himself tried to persuade Weng Tonghe. He also distributed a pamphlet on the matter.\textsuperscript{147}

These memorials and discussions remained vague, undetailed petitions for direction, while lacking in content and ideology. Perhaps the clearest writing on the call for federation at the time was made by Hong Ruchong 洪汝沖 in his July 24\textsuperscript{th} (the fifteenth day of the sixth month) petition to the Guangxu Emperor. This petition is interesting as it does not merely refer to tired explanations of the necessity of political alliance, but openly discusses the modern and political roots behind the federation called for in the reforms.

Speaking of federation (\textit{lianbang}), in Chinese politics the issues of confining and division are stressed. In Western European politics issues of opening up (\textit{tong})\textsuperscript{148} and unifying (\textit{he}) are stressed. Should there be confines, knowledge becomes subdued. Should there be opening up, then knowledge is extended. Should there be division, then power will be scattered. Should there be unity, then power will be joined. Therefore, scholars unite in their colleges and farmers unite by collectivizing their affairs. Western Europeans are victorious above all others simply because of these two things, opening up (\textit{tong}) and unity (\textit{he}). Then considering geography, those of the same continent will first open up and first unify. Considering race, then those of the same race are suited to open up and are


\textsuperscript{148} This can be taken to mean 'opening up' in various senses of the term, including politically, economically and intellectually, as is seen in the remainder of the passage. However, it also refers to ease of passage and flow.
suited to unify. Considering script and ideology, those with the same script have the ability to open up and unify.  

Naturally, Hong continues to explain that Japan is the most convenient and best choice for unifying and opening up with at the present moment. Not only because they use the same script and have the same customs as China, but they also have made significant advances in recent years and they have mastered the Western arts. Regardless of these advantages, Japan and China are codependent: “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze.” 唇亡齒寒.  

But what is most important in the above passage is the open and direct call to tong and he. These two terms are scattered everywhere in writing from these years, but Hong places them together as the foundations of Western political thought and the source of European power. With the influx of Western liberal thought still rising towards its apex, Chinese intellectuals were taking what they could access through Japan and frantically looking for ways to find power. Although the economic conditions in China were nothing like those of late-nineteenth century Europe, via the limited translations available to them, Chinese scholars such as Hong were contemplating ways in which to replicate European empires in East Asia. The principle way of doing this would be the liberalization of markets, trade and information, and the uniting of power.  

From the description he offers next, we have a slightly clearer idea of what form of empire Hong had in mind than what Yang was hoping for with his great federation. Although he was certainly calling for Japan and China to “unite as one country” 合為一國, the two

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European examples of federation that he has chosen – Sweden and Norway; and Austria and Hungary - imply that the union he imagined was one in which the two countries continued to exist separately for the majority of domestic matters, although they would be unified on matters of the military and foreign relations. Sweden and Norway were officially united from 1814 to 1905. The Austro-Hungarian Empire existed from 1865 to 1918. On the other hand, Hong’s examples of empire are quite unfortunate. Both of these unions were suffering under the rise of nationalism and were doomed to dissolution in the coming years. These idealists were dreaming of federations at a time when the nations of the world were dreaming of independence.

The imagined federation was often not limited to East Asia. The Hundred Days Reform ended with the reformers’ unorganized and very unclear attempts for various forms of political alliance with Japan and other countries.\textsuperscript{150} The desperate attempts to save China while finding accommodation between two worldviews came to a crashing end as Cixi’s faction removed the emperor from power, Kang and Liang fled to Japan, and Tan Sitong, Yang Shenxiu, Kang Guangren 康廣仁, Lin Xu 林旭, Yang Rui 楊銳 and Liu Guangdi 劉光第 were executed for their roles in the affair.

\textsuperscript{150} Another report from the time that must be mentioned is that by Song Bolu 宋伯魯. He refers to the August third meeting of Kang and his followers with Timothy Richard (1845-1919) and Ito Hirobumi before briefly explaining what the federation of China, Japan, the United States and Britain would entail: “The one hundred elected officials would be wise, familiar with the state of affairs and knowledgeable about the institutions of each country. They would manage the military, political, tax and all foreign relations for the four countries.” This is a shocking level of autonomy for these countries to concede, indicating that the reformers may have been naïve about some matters of transnational politics.
Conclusion

As China descended into crisis in the late-nineteenth century, the need for reform and the urge to Westernize while maintaining independence became a central focus for contemporary intellectuals. The possibilities for a new China were imagined in many ways at the time, yet the texts analyzed above frequently return to the prospect of allying with Japan or creating some form of an East Asian transnational federation. There certainly was an increasingly influential influx of Asianist institutions and texts entering China during this period. However, to what degree this motivated the actions of the reformers remains to be seen.

The 1898 reforms were brought to a dramatic end with Cixi’s coup on September 21st. By this time the reformers had made friends with a number of Japanese elite who would welcome them to exile in Yokohama and Tokyo, where efforts would be made for cooperation to save China from both the Manchu conservatives and the Western imperialists. As will be explained in Chapter II, Kojō Teikichi, the Sinologist and translator at *The Chinese Progress*, had already introduced the reformers to Yamamoto Ken, an influential Sinologist based in Osaka who would ensure the lead reformers Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were warmly welcomed. The Tōa Dōbunkai 東亞同文會, the largest and most influential Asianist organization in the early twentieth century, would be established in the coming months, and the organization would play a role in disseminating Liang Qichao’s thought, also no doubt having a large influence upon Liang and his readers through their united efforts.¹⁵¹ This stage

¹⁵¹ The Tōa Dōbunkai would also begin publishing numerous Chinese-language newspapers and journals in China and having an enormous influence across East Asia in 1900. See Zhai Xin 2001 for a detailed discussion.
would be quite different, as the pro-Japanese reformers had been removed from the centre of power.

The period leading up to this sudden change is significant, partly due to the ever-expanding influx of pro-Japanese texts and institutions stemming from Japan’s exceptional development during the Meiji Period and the ease of translation between Japanese and Chinese. This offered the former a new form of hegemonic power in the production of knowledge, pulling the reformers to Japan just as Western imperialism was pushing them from behind. But this is not to say that the Japanese and Chinese were not sincere in their efforts to cooperate to defend East Asia against Western imperialism. There was sincerity to their calls for mutual assistance and truth to their fears that one would fall without the other. The teeth do freeze without the lips, but Chinese intellectuals would also find that the teeth sometimes have a tendency to bite the lips.
Chapter II: Chariot and Sidecar: Confucian Asianism in Japan’s Chinatowns

Studies of imperialism often have the advantage or impediment of being able to assume a centre for empire in the metropoles of Europe. Late Qing Dynasty China was in a state of semi-colonialism that differed from most other colonies, yet retained many of the worst features. Although it remained nominally independent and never fell under the power of one colonial empire, China suffered under late-nineteenth century imperialism. Similar to intellectuals from other colonies, intellectuals in China turned to the metropoles to educate their youth, modernize them, and prepare them to counter imperialism. Unlike other colonies, however, China had a choice to make between numerous imperial centres. Japan too was a special case for empire, lying close at hand to the colonies it governed, recently having been a victim of European imperialism itself, and still under the threat of Western empires, notably the enlarging Russian Empire. Although China and Japan had both maintained a large degree of independence before 1900, intellectuals in both countries recognized the degree to which the threat of Western imperialism loomed over their autonomy. Despite the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the turn to Japan for help was a natural choice for Chinese intellectuals, and they were warmly welcomed.

When Japan became the dominant empire in East Asia and slowly established its hegemony over the first half of the twentieth century, those who cooperated with Japanese went from being called pro-Japanese or qin-ri 親日 to outright traitors or Hanjian 漢奸. As the study of collaboration and the moral questions that arise with it are constantly
reconsidered in the academic world,\textsuperscript{152} this chapter returns to a pro-Japanese and quasi-Asianist institution in the late nineteenth century to examine modern Japan-China civilian cooperation that has largely been skimmed over in past histories.

The establishment of the Datong Schools\textsuperscript{153} in Yokohama and Tokyo is symbolic of Chinese intellectual efforts to confront the crisis brought on by Western imperialism through a mix of nationalist Confucianism and the new knowledge coming from the West. Unable to bring about meaningful reform in China, they turned to Japan as a place in which they could both effectively study the so-called “New Learning” as well as train a new generation to bring China into modernity without losing them to the West. These years in Japan reinforced the new Japanese terminology in the reform intellectuals’ language and also further emphasized popular Japanese ideology in their writing. However, this was not merely unidirectional. These few years represent a period of Sino-Japanese elite cooperation in which intellectuals imagined a future which was both Asian and modern, discarding the ‘leaving Asia’ slogan which a number of Meiji intellectuals had utilized to posit Asia as the past and Europe as the future. This can particularly be seen in the establishment and early years of the Datong School in Yokohama. Although still following the reformers from Chapter I, this chapter turns towards their efforts to promote Confucian Chinese education in Japan, examining the

\textsuperscript{152} For a recent example, see the February 2012 issue of \textit{The Journal of Asian Studies} for a discussion between John Whittier Treat, Timothy Brook and Michael D. Shin.

\textsuperscript{153} I use the Mandarin name of the school merely for the reader’s convenience. This school was never called \textit{datong} at the time of its existence. It was officially known in Japanese as \textit{daidō}, while students and staff were Cantonese speakers and would have called it \textit{daaitung}. This paper largely concerns the first Datong School, established in Yokohama in 1897 and beginning operations in 1898. However, the Datong Higher School, established in Tokyo in 1899 and largely involving the same students and staff, will also be considered.
Datong Schools as a site of Japan-China cooperation.

In this chapter I begin by showcasing the cooperation and overlap of the Japanese Asianist association Tōa Dōbunkai 東亞同文會 and the Chinese reformers arriving in Japan before proceeding to the formation of the Datong Schools. I take the Datong Schools as a case study for the cooperation between pro-Japanese Chinese and pro-Chinese Japanese. Concentrating on the intellectuals closely involved with the school, I examine the strong overlap of Confucianism, nationalism and Asianism in the context of the Datong Schools. Finally, I turn to the product of the school, showing how the revolutionary students remained opposed to empire, yet chose many levels of identification to represent themselves in the struggle. A crucial issue that this chapter considers is the flow and change of concepts and identities as they passed to a new generation due to transnational cooperation at this pivotal time. I argue that the Datong schools were very much a concrete product of the cooperation of Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, and the nationalist and Asianist concepts and identities employed for the students’ education were epistemological products of this same cooperation in an effort to save China and East Asia from Western imperialism. These efforts, which concentrated upon a Confucian education with modern attributes, resulted in a nationalistic youth with a victim consciousness, showcasing the relationship between Asianism and nationalism. Although this is a time of great cooperation, these young Chinese intellectuals in exile questioned the nature of cooperation with the Japanese as doubts arose concerning power differentials in the relationship of “chariot and side-car.”

Despite the schools’ obvious importance and relation to numerous Japanese and
Chinese elite, texts concerning the initial Datong Schools are limited. In the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the main school in Yokohama was completely destroyed, along with most of its records. Therefore, this chapter relies on published sources in newspapers, journals and books, as well as a number of memoirs and some unpublished letters sent by school officials during the first few years following the school’s establishment in 1897.

**The Reformers and the Tōa Dōbunkai**

As shown in Chapter I, the reformers led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao failed in their muddled efforts to recreate the Chinese political system on the Meiji model. All sorts of possibilities for cooperation with Japan had appeared in 1898, but the palace coup in September ended the reformers’ hopes and they were forced to flee, finally finding a welcoming exile in Japan, where they settled in Yokohama, an important site of Sino-Japanese cooperation that would play a continued role in collaboration between the two countries’ citizens even far into World War II. Their welcome there was partly due to the Japanese friends they had made through the *Shiwu Bao*, and partly due to the establishment of a new transnational institution. The reformers 1898 flight to Japan coincided with the establishment of a far-reaching Japanese Asianist organization, the Tōa Dōbunkai.

The Tōa Dōbunkai, the Asianist organization that would become the most powerful...
and best known Asianist organization of the twentieth century, was established just weeks before *The China Discussion* (Qingyi Bao 清議報) began publishing, in November 1898.\(^\text{156}\)

It had a very diverse membership, including all those of the expansionist, politically-minded Tōakai, the liberal Dōbunkai, and others, such as Sun Yat-sen’s friends, Miyazaki Tōten and Hirayama Shu. The organization was not limited to Japanese membership. One of the founding members was Kang Youwei’s student, Xu Qin (1873-?), who was in Yokohama to head the newly opened Datong School.\(^\text{157}\) This connection may have influenced the Japanese elite to provide Kang and Liang with such a welcome and may explain the connection of the organization to *The China Discussion*. The members of the Tōa Dōbunkai decided on four principal goals:

1) To preserve the integrity of China.
2) To aid China’s advancement.
3) To investigate the current state of affairs in China and decide on

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\(^{156}\) As this periodical included the English name *The China Discussion* on its front cover, I use it here. The Chinese name *Qingyi Bao* 清議報 was a more complicated play on words as *qingyi* indicated “fair discussion” but the single character *Qing* was also the name of the Manchu-led state. The name could then be translated as either *qingyi bao* – *The Journal of Fair Discussion* – or as *Qing yi bao* – *The Journal of Discussion on the Qing State*. *Qingyi Bao* 清議報 (*The China Discussion*) 1898 – 1901 Yokohama. Reprinted Copy. Taipei: Chengwen Publishers 成文出版社, 1967. Hereafter the journal will be referred to as QYB. The first number in each reference refers to the volume as printed by Chengwen Publishers. The second number refers to the number of the original volume and the third number is the page number in the reprinted series, as original page numbers are often obscured in the reprint.

appropriate action.

4) To raise public awareness.\textsuperscript{158}

These goals show the unidirectional interest of the institute. It was not concerned with collaboration with Chinese intellectuals as much as it was concerned with actively influencing China. The reformers’ arrival in Japan provided a welcome opportunity to advance these goals. And the stated intentions of the Tōa Dōbunkai would have appealed to the reformers who were working towards very similar ends. In the first issue of \textit{The China Discussion}, a journal established in order to promote the interests of the Chinese reformers living in Japan, the editors forwarded their own four principles, explained as:

1) Support discussions on China and arouse the righteousness of the citizens! 維持支那之清議激發國民之正氣
2) Expand the knowledge of the Chinese people! 增長支那人之學識
3) Facilitate the communication between Chinese and Japanese voices, and bring them together in friendship! 交通支那日本兩國之聲氣聯其情誼
4) Invent an East Asian learning in order to preserve the Asian essence! 發明東亞學術以保存亞粹\textsuperscript{159}

The stated principles of \textit{The China Discussion} have a noticeably stronger concentration upon “Asia” than those of Japan’s most famous Asianist institution. While Japanese Asianist organizations were discussing China and what Japan could do with it, the Chinese intellectuals who were working with them were discussing East Asia and encouraging cooperation with the Japanese.

\textsuperscript{158} Zachman 2011 B, 117.
\textsuperscript{159} QYB 1, 1, 4. These principles stayed with \textit{The China Discussion} for some time. However, by the end of its third year, they are no longer mentioned, indicating Liang’s loss of confidence in the strategy of Asianism. Dikötter notes that they are not mentioned at all in the 100th issue article on the journal. Dikötter 1992, 86.
The China Discussion then became an important voice for the Tōa Dōbunkai in its early days. On the twenty-third page of the initial issue, the organization placed a full-page advertisement, declaring the intentions and the founding principles listed above and inviting Chinese literati to join their organization.\(^{160}\) Repeating the standardized metaphor of “lips and teeth,” the short article refers to China and Japan’s ancient brotherhood and laments the recent fighting between the two countries. Renewed ties and exchanges are what the statement calls for, ending with the words: “We invite the literati (shidaifu 士大夫) of both these countries, those born on this same continent, those with the same ambitions in these times, to support these ideas and enter this organization so that we may join forces on this.”\(^{161}\)

It may be due to this sudden influence of the Tōa Dōbunkai that reformers’ writing became more pro-Asianist after their 1898 arrival in Japan, and for which Liang is often cited as an important Chinese pan-Asianist by Asianist organizations today.\(^{162}\) Although Liang certainly wrote texts on Asian unity and cooperation with Japan, unlike Sun Yat-sen his Asianist ideology is only evident in his writing for a few short years following the reforms

\(^{160}\) QYB 1, 1, 47.
\(^{161}\) 會兩國士大夫。同生於此洲。同志於此時者。贊此意。入此會。以戮力於此。Ibid. Aside from this announcement and Liang Qichao’s articles on the Bianfa Tong Yi 變法通義 and Wuxu Bianfa 戊戌變法, one of the most noticeable articles in the first few pages of the first edition of the Qingyi Bao is “A Letter to China’s Gentlemen of Will” 與支那有志諸君子書 (QYB 1, 25-31), which is simply listed as authored by a gentleman from the Tōa Dōbunkai. The article displays the group’s anger with the Westerners’ theory that the white West is superior to the yellow East. It demands that China modernizes and regains its position as a world power for Asia.

\(^{162}\) For example: see the writing of the Society for Asian Integration or the many websites, blogs and Facebook site designed by vocal Asianist blogger Niraj Kumar. See Niraj Kumar, Arise, Asia! Respond to White Peril (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2003), 172. Also, Liang is mentioned as a Chinese proponent of Asianist thought in a 2006 article by China’s current Foreign Minister: Wang Yi 王毅, “Considering Neo-Asianism in the Twenty-First Century”思考二十一世紀的新亞洲主義, in Waijiao Pinglun 外交評論 89, 6-10. Translated by Torsten Weber in Saaler and Szpilman 2011b (361-369), 363
of 1898 and must be seen within temporal and spatial limitations. Liang made the logical choice to turn to Japan for help with China’s problems during what he saw as a period of crisis. Although generally always believing in nationalism and liberalism as the appropriate paths to modernity, Liang regularly changed his mind on other key issues, his focus vacillating between republicanism and constitutional monarchy during the late Qing years. Pan-Asianism was also a path to modernity that Liang flirted with around the turn of the century.

Some form of a union between China and Japan made logical sense to Liang during his pro-Japanese years. Although he never clearly conceptualized what this Asian union would be, he made vague references to unity before the coup and then naïvely called for a bizarre union of Japan, China, the United States and Great Britain during and after the coup.163 Such discussions cannot be strictly called Asianist. They expose the desperation of Liang and others during this time, but also indicate the great distance between Liang’s thinking in 1898 and modern ideas of nationalism that would typify his writing in Japan. However, what is most often cited as evidence of Liang’s Asianist leanings is his journal The China Discussion. In the final sentence of the introduction of the first edition, the editors explain: “We must support those of our yellow race who will strive for an autonomous Asia in the twentieth century.”164

This statement is representative of the intellectual climate surrounding the reformers’

164 QYB, 1, 1, 4.
arrival in Japan and the short period of collaboration with the Tōa Dōbunkai and Japanese supporters of China. *The China Discussion* was the voice piece for the reformers during the first few years of their exile in Japan and served as not only the foremost promoter of the Datong schools, but also as educational materials for their students. *The China Discussion* remains one of the most important sources for studies of the schools today and is frequently referenced in this chapter. However, the school itself predates the journal and the arrival of reformers by one year.

**The Establishment of the Datong Schools**

The first Datong School was opened in Yokohama in late 1897. The decision to establish the Datong School was not made by the reformers, who would dominate the school and control its teaching, but by the Chinese of Yokohama. The port had been open to foreigners since 1859 and immediately saw the growth of a Chinatown, despite Chinese residents not gaining legal status until the ratification of the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty in 1873. The population was primarily from Guangzhou, with a minority from the San Jiang area, and naturally wanted a school in which their children could be instructed in their native Cantonese. The school was originally a project envisioned by the Yokohama Chinese Association in consultation with Sun Yat-sen and his Xingzhong Hui. They made plans to open the Zhongxi School 中西學校 in 1897, a project initially led by Feng Jingru 馮鏡如 and Ma Zishan 馬紫珊. The Chinese Association decided to send Kuang Rupan

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to Shanghai to find a suitable teacher. At that time Kang Youwei had become quite famous and Kuang was able to call on him to forward a request for a new head master from Sun Yat-sen.

According to a school history from 1908, Kang told Kuang: “If the school is called the Zhongxi School (China and the West School), it is missing a term for Japan. If it is called the China-Japan School, it is missing the West. It would be best if it were called the Datong School.” From this point on the school was known as Datong, indicating the Confucian utopia and the subject of Kang’s magnum opus, the Datong Shu (The World Unity), which he was in the middle of writing in 1897. Therefore, Kang’s philosophy was established in the name of the school as well as in its teaching and staff. To provide the students with the proper reformist Confucian education, Kang dispatched Xu Junmian 徐君勉 (more commonly, and hereafter, known as Xu Qin 徐勤), Chen Moan 陳默庵, Chen Yinnong 陳蔭農, and Tang Juedun 湯覺頓 to serve as his representatives. Xu Qin, one of Kang’s earliest and favorite students, was made head master of the new school.

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168 Ibid.
169 There are two other slightly contesting stories of this event, both of which seem unlikely and do not match the earlier sources. One version is that the Chinese Association had originally wanted Kuang Rupan to bring Liang Qichao back as headmaster. However, as Kang Youwei had recently asked Liang to serve as editor of the Shiwu Bao, he was unwilling to allow him to leave for Japan. This is certainly plausible, yet it seems odd for the association to have made such a direct request. This became the school’s official history: Yokohama Yamate Chinese School Hundred Year Record: 1898-2004 横滨山手中华学校百年晓志: 1898-2004 (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate China School, 2005), 45. The original source that this comes from is probably Feng Ziyou Zhonghua Minguo kaiguo qian geming shi 中華民國開國前革命史 (Shanghai: Gemingshi Bianji She 革命史編輯社, 1928), 42, where Feng explains that Chen Shaobai recommended Liang. The other version is that Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Association wanted Kang Youwei to be headmaster.
The Need for the Datong School in Yokohama

The need for a school therefore came from three directions. The reformers, who were establishing schools all across China at the time, were very active in Yokohama and it was a logical move to send some of their best intellectual resources to the people to whom they turned for financial help. On the other hand, the local residents themselves wanted a school for their children so that they would not have to endure the terrible racism that was prevalent at schools for foreigners in Japan. And thirdly, Japanese Asianists wanted a school established to continue with the reforms and “raise China,” and they were willing to offer the necessary support.

One of the reformers’ key concepts for reform was widespread education under a mix of New Learning and Confucianism. In essence this indicated the push to educate a reform-minded youth under the framework outlined by Kang Youwei. This was begun in China with the famous Wanmu Caotang (萬木草堂) in Guangzhou and the Shiwu School (時務食堂) in Changsha, but after the 1898 failure, with pro-reform schools being closed down or made ineffective, schools were opened abroad in Chinese communities as far away as Singapore, Surabaya and Victoria. The Datong schools were intended to be the central institutions for himself. This version seems to be a result of Joseph Levenson’s misreading of his source, Li Jiannong. Levenson, Joseph R.. Liang Ch’i-Ch’ao and the Mind of Modern China. Taipei: Rainbow Bridge Book Company, 1970 (original 1953), 50. Li Jiannong 李劍農. Zuijin sanshi nian Zhongguo zhengzhishi 最近三十年中國政治史 (China’s Political History in the Last Thirty Years). Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1974 (original 1930), 68. Li’s original source is also Feng Ziyou (1928).

The opening of Victoria’s Lequn Yishu 樂群義塾 has been discussed in Hong Jiang’s Masters’ thesis: “A Socio-Historical Analysis of Chinese Heritage Language Education in British Columbia (University of British Columbia, 2010), 11-14.
this worldwide expansion. Once the key reformers made their homes in Yokohama and Tokyo in late-1898, the Datong schools became the models for all others.

![An assembly of students.](image)

Figure 1: An assembly of students. This rare photo of the school found in the 1908 Datong School Register (Zhang Xuehuan 1908) shows the students with visiting students from the Shizhong School 時中學校 in Penang and the Tongwen School 同文學校 of Kobe. Public Domain.

As for the local residents’ need for separate schooling, Feng Ziyou, clearly an insider on such a need, wrote a scathing criticism of the racism towards Chinese that existed in schools for foreigners in Japan. Feng Ziyou had firsthand experience with the Western condescension at such schools. In 1896 he was sent to study at a French Catholic school in Tokyo. The vicious imperialist bullying of the Western students was too much to bear and he

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171 Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi” 東京高等大同學校公啟 *The China Discussion* 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 7-8.
gave up after only four months of study. According to Feng, the foreigners constantly berated the Chinese and accused them of being dirty, a theme that is evident in the newspapers of the time.\footnote{This small school was founded by Alphonse Heinrich in 1888 as 明星學校 Gyösei Gakkō (Ecole L’étoile du Matin). Although the buildings were destroyed in the Great Kantō Earthquake, the school still survives to this day (http://www.gyosei-e.ed.jp/newhp/pages/ayumi.htm Accessed on June 1, 2013). Feng Ziyou (1939), 50-51.}

In an 1898 article on the Datong School in the \textit{Kobe Weekly Chronicle}, the author condescendingly mocks Chinese people for being dirty. Conversely, in the same paragraph the author proclaims the Yokohama Chinatown to be the cleanest in the world, apart from those in Dutch colonies, where, “the Chinaman down there – no doubt much to his unspeakable disgust, - has to keep not only himself, but the roadways and the interiors of his own campong clean as well.”\footnote{Author Unknown. “The Chinese School in Yokohama” \textit{The Kobe Weekly Chronicle}. October 1, 1898, 306-307.} The author goes on to explain with amazement that the students of the Datong School appear even cleaner than Japanese students. In fact, the author has only positive things to say about the school, but cannot help but deride the reformers that have been sent to educate the children. The article ends with “But from the teacher’s standpoint we are not quite so sure about the advantage of being born in the kingdom where men are brought up on roast-pig and the Confucian Analects.”\footnote{Ibid, 307.} Clearly most Westerners were not willing to assist the Chinese at this time. Their condescension was overwhelming.
Expansion

It was the overseas Chinese living in Japan that brought about the need for the Datong Schools, but the arrival of the reformers in Japan greatly accelerated the process. Within two years the Chinese community in Japan opened two new schools, one in Kobe, the other in Tokyo. The school in Kobe, proposed by Liang Qichao during a visit to Kobe in 1899, was initially to be called the Kobe Datong School, but before it opened the name was changed to
the Tongwen School 同文學校.⁷⁵ Meaning both “same script” and “same culture,” tongwen (Jp. dōbun) was a key term for China-Japan cooperation at the time, as well as half of the name of Japan’s largest Asianist organization, the Tōa Dōbunkai. Mai Shaopeng 麥少彭, the headmaster at the Tongwen School, was an associate of Liang Qichao and his family was prominent in the Kobe business community,⁷⁶ but Inukai Tsuyoshi was established as the honorary headmaster and delivered a full-fledged Asianist speech at the opening ceremony on March 1st.⁷⁷ This school would be the only Datong School to survive to the present day. Although the building was destroyed in the bombing of Kobe on June 5, 1945, it was rebuilt and continues to play an important role in Kobe’s Chinese community today.⁷⁸

The other school that the overseas Chinese established was the Datong High School, an upper level school that was designed to cultivate talent selected in Japan, China and other countries in order to rescue China.⁷⁹ Of the reasons listed for establishing the school in Japan

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⁷⁵ Author Unknown, “Shenhu Qingren jiang kai Datong xuexiao” 神戶清人將開大同學校, in QYB, v.19 (May 21, 1899. Translated from an article in the Mainichi (June 3, 1899)). Author Unknown, “Ji Shenhu Tongwen xuexiao kaixiao shi” 記神戶同文學校開校事, in QYB, v.38 (February 11, 1900).


⁷⁷ The speech praised China-Japan cooperation in the opening of the school, made references to the “same script, same race” and “teeth and lips” idioms, but also offered criticism of Japan’s straying from the shared cultural roots provided by Confucius and Mencius. Also, the date for the school’s opening is often written as February 1st. It was in fact the first day of the second month on the lunar calendar, March 1st on the Gregorian calendar. Author Unknown, “Ji Shenhu Tongwen xuexiao kaixiao shi” 記神戶同文學校開校事, in QYB, v.38 (February 11, 1900).

⁷⁸ This is according to the official school history. In: “School Introduction: Year 2011” Gakkō Shōkai: 2011 nendo 學校紹介: 2011年度 (Kobe: Kobe Chinese Tongwen School, 2011), 2. Also mentioned in Asahi’s commemoration of the school’s 110th anniversary: Dōbun gakkō sōritsu 110 nen: 同文學校創立110年, Asahi, (September 10, 2009), 25. My thanks to the staff at the Kobe Overseas Chinese History Museum 神戶華僑歷史博物館 for these and many other materials concerning the Tongwen School.

⁷⁹ Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi 東京高等大同學校公啟 The China
rather than in another country, cost, proximity, Confucianism, script, race, and also the abundance of Japanese willing to help China were all cited. In establishing the Datong School, the Chinese found numerous influential Japanese friends to whom they could turn for help. An article in *The China Discussion*, written by a group from the Yokohama Chinese community, conveyed the need for this reliance on Japan and the level of support that they saw after two years of running the first Datong School:

The powers all come from another continent, but Japan is our neighbor. Our soil is close by. We are of a similar race and use a similar script. This makes it easier for our students to learn. Furthermore, those that are knowledgeable among Japan’s government and people understand the importance of the mutual assistance of teeth and lips. They see supporting China as of first importance. Their feelings of mutual love and friendship are many times that of the white race and they are willing to assist and educate. On our own we may not be able to accomplish this. Moreover, if the youth of China can unite with the youth of Japan and support East Asia in these times, then such an effort can begin with this school of higher education.\(^{180}\)

The assistance of Ōkuma Shigenobu and Inukai Tsuyoshi was mentioned in many of these articles on the Datong Schools. Their Asianist vocabulary of “teeth and lips,” a common metaphor for Japanese and Chinese mutual assistance, as well as references to race and script stand out in the above passage as well as many other articles from the reformers’ journals in Japan. Asianism featured strongly in the pages of *The China Discussion*, and a large number

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\(^{180}\) Author unknown, “Dongjing gaodeng Datong Xuexiao gong qi 東京高等大同學校公啟” in *The China Discussion* 清議報 25 (August 26, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 7.21)), 8.
of the people surrounding and supporting the Datong School were committed Asianists, partly due to the timing of the reformers’ arrival in Japan and the associations they formed immediately upon arrival.

**Sino-Japanese Elite Cooperation and the Datong School**

The Datong School was an important symbol as the point of intersection of Chinese reformers and revolutionaries, as well as Japanese China-adventurers, politicians and Sinologists. One of the most interesting elements of the Datong School’s early days is the number of these elite Japanese Asianists involved with the school. They can be broken into three groups: The so-called *shishi* 志士 adventurers, typified by Sun Yat-sen’s close friend Miyazaki Tōten; the Japanese political elite Asianists, who had recently found new power in Japan in 1898; and the Confucianists who dreamed of an Asia based on classical traditions but thriving in a modern world. Although we regularly divide the Asianists by their beliefs and their actions, on issues such as this they could all work together and support a common mission.

**Working with the Asianists**

When the 1898 reforms came to an end with Cixi’s coup, Sun Yat-sen hurriedly asked his Japanese Asianist adventurer friends to help the fugitives escape from the Qing police. Miyazaki Tōten was sent to Hong Kong to find Kang Youwei hiding on a British boat and Hirayama Shu 平山周 was sent to Beijing to find Liang Qichao and Wang Zhao stuck in the
Japanese embassy.\textsuperscript{181} Both of the major groups opposing the Qing government were temporarily united in Yokohama. The China hands had made friends with important Chinese agents of change and had managed to prove their worth in times of trouble. Although these adventurers had the least influence of the three Asianist groups on the actual Datong School, they would continue to appear. Correspondence between Miyazaki Tōten and Xu Qin, while he served as headmaster, show the importance of Miyazaki, and also show the diminishing role Sun was able to play in the school. Xu dramatically declared that China was like a boat lost in the storm and needed Japan’s help.\textsuperscript{182} Of course, just a year earlier, Miyazaki had brought Xu’s mentor to Japan. Despite Xu’s disagreements with Sun, he clearly wanted to keep ties with Miyazaki. However, the Japanese Asianists that had a larger influence on the school were in much more powerful positions.

The reformers had arrived in Japan at just the right time to receive help from Japanese Asianists. The Tōa Dōbunkai, Japan’s largest and most powerful Asianist organization had just been established as the reformers were fleeing the Qing police. Kang’s student and principal of the Datong School, Xu Qin, was one of the founding members, creating firm ties between the Tōa Dōbunkai Asianists, the school, and the reformers.\textsuperscript{183} The Dōbunkai would also assist Liang in establishing and publishing his latest journal, \textit{The China Discussion}, hastily put forth in November, 1898, and printed by Feng Jingru, noted above as one of the

\textsuperscript{181} Sun Yat-sen’s role may not have been as great as Feng states it to have been. Nevertheless, Miyazaki and Hirayama did bring Kang and Liang to Japan in November, 1898. Feng Ziyou 馮自由, \textit{Geming Yishi 革命逸史} (A History of the Revolution) (Beiping: Commercial Press, 1939), 48.

\textsuperscript{182} Jansen 1954, 79.

founders of the Datong School and also the father of Feng Ziyou, the school’s most famous student, who will be discussed below. During its short existence The China Discussion relied on the Dōbunkai’s associated journals for much of its content. Tōa Dōbunkai members were also conspicuous in their involvement with the school. Kōmuchi Tomotsune 神鞭知常 (1848-1905), an examination minister, frequently attended ceremonies. Kashibara Buntarō 柏原文太郎 (1869-1936), an assistant of Inukai Tsuyoshi
185, served as executive secretary and made speeches to the students. However, two of the most important members of the Tōa Dōbunkai, Inukai and Ōkuma Shigenobu, played very active roles in the school.

Inukai was Minister of Education under Ōkuma Shigenobu from June 30, 1898 to November 8th, 1898. Shortly after this he served as the honorary head of the Datong Schools.

In a February 3rd, 1899 letter, Kang Mengqing 康孟卿 informs Yamamoto Ken of Inukai’s appointment as honorary headmaster (名譽校長). Kang reports that Inukai is very pleased with this appointment. In the Yamamoto Ken Archive at the Kochi Liberty and People’s Museum (Hereafter YKA), article C124.

\[184\text{ For more on Feng Jingru, see: Feng Ruiyu 馮瑞玉. “Yokohama daidō gakkō to Feng Jingru” 橫濱大同學校與馮鏡如 (The Yokohama Datong School and Feng Jingru) in Yokohama Yamate Chinese School Hundred Year Record: 1898-2004 (Yokohama: Yokohama Yamate China School, 2005), 35-38.}\]

\[185\text{ Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅, prime minister from 1931 to 1932, was involved in various Asianist organizations, including the Tōakai, forerunner to the Tōa Dōbunkai, and the Kokuryūkai, which would become a rather notorious and, at times, terrorist organization years later. See: Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryūkai, 1901-1920” in Sven Saaler and Christopher Szpliman (eds) Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume I: 1850-1920 (Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011).}\]


\[187\text{ In a February 3rd, 1899 letter, Kang Mengqing 康孟卿 informs Yamamoto Ken of Inukai’s appointment as honorary headmaster (名譽校長). Kang reports that Inukai is very pleased with this appointment. In the Yamamoto Ken Archive at the Kochi Liberty and People’s Museum (Hereafter YKA), article C124.}\]
in Japan. Inukai, called the “godfather of the school” by Marius Jansen, worked hard to get the two camps to work together and succeeded in the establishing and support of the schools, but with Kang’s arrival the success was short-lived and animosity soon dominated the Sun-Kang relationship.\footnote{Jansen 1954, 79. Also see Feng (1928), 43. Miyazaki Tōten too made numerous efforts. At this point he saw them both as necessary to the revolution with Sun as the vanguard and Kang as the educator. Miyazaki Tōten. My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream: The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten. Translated, with an introduction, by Etō Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982 (Original Japanese version published in 1902), p129 and 143.}

The other major political figure that is associated with both the Datong schools is Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkuma was an important friend of Kang, Liang and Sun and would provide continuous support from his first term as prime minister in 1898 to his second and last term, which lasted from 1914 to 1916, at which time he led the push for the Twenty-one Demands and finally lost favor with his Chinese friends. Ōkuma provided financial and government support for the Datong schools.\footnote{In a letter dated August 25\textsuperscript{189} (no year is written, but it can be assumed to be 1899), Liang Qingchao thanks Ōkuma for his support and details the need for the Datong Higher School in Tokyo. This letter is available in the Ōkuma Archive at Waseda University Library.} Also Ōkuma provided Datong students with personal recommendations – which, it can be assumed, guaranteed admission – to the university he established in Tokyo, the Tokyo Senmon School 東京専門学校, soon after renamed as Waseda University.\footnote{Feng Ruiyu 2005, 36.}

**Yamamoto Ken**

The final Japanese Asianist who was connected to the Datong School is the least known of those mentioned here, but may have had the greatest influence on the school and,
in terms of ideology, would have had the most in common with the Confucian reformers, Kang, Liang, Wang and Xu. Yamamoto Ken (山本憲 1852-1928) was a little known Japanese Confucianist who was highly connected with the reformers from an early stage and provided much assistance with the Datong School among other affairs.

Yamamoto gained his Asianist activist credentials in 1885 when he assisted the famous Korean reformer, Kim Ok-gyun 金玉均 (1851–1894), by storing explosives in his Osaka home in preparation for Kim’s failed coup. Deemed a major player in the “Osaka Incident,” Yamamoto was sentenced and spent a few years in prison. In late 1897 he visited Beijing and Shanghai, where he became friendly with many of the reformers before the 1898 Wuxu Reforms. These friendships would last for decades, resulting in constant exchange and mutual influence. Although his role in Japan’s Popular Rights Movement was not one of the most influential, he delivered many of the ideas of this movement to a receptive Chinese audience through his influence upon Liang Qichao’s understanding of new literature. In turn his Confucian friends from China supported his Asianist ideals and even gave him a

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191 Yamamoto Ken was also known as Yamamoto Baigai 山本梅崖. The best known source on Yamamoto is a two-page passage in the often-cited Stories and Biographies of Pioneer East Asian Adventurers, a history compiled by the Kokuryūkai and first published in 1933. Due to the ubiquity of this book, references to Yamamoto Ken almost always concern his contribution to the Osaka Incident and little else: Kokuryūkai 黒竜会. Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden 東亜先覚志士紀伝. Tokyo: Harasho Bō, 1984.

192 Yamamoto Ken was also involved in the establishment and the theoretical background of numerous non-governmental Asianist organizations, including the Asia Trade Protectionist Association 亞細亞貿易保護協会 and the Japan China Friendship Association 日清協和會.

193 Jansen 1954, 75.


voice for these ideals in *The China Discussion*.

Although Yamamoto maintained contact with many of the reformers, his main contact in their group and at the Datong School was Kang Youyi, the cousin of Kang Youwei. Eighty-four letters from Kang to Yamamoto remain in the Yamamoto Ken Archives today, the majority of which use the official address of the Datong School in Yokohama. In his autobiography Yamamoto states that at one time Kang asked him to be the headmaster of the Datong School, but he was unable to leave his own school, the Baiseisho 梅清所 in Osaka.

Yamamoto was both a people’s rights’ advocate and an ardent Confucianist. His particular version of Asianism was therefore in favor of constitutional monarchies in which the peoples of East Asia worked together to defend against the White Peril. He first published his Asianist ideology in “On Conditions in East Asia” 論東亞事宜 as a serialized column in the 1898-1899 editions of *The China Discussion* and then released the same text as a 26 page pamphlet in the summer of 1900. The article concentrates on the Russian threat to East Asian autonomy and stresses the need for cooperation. Using the analogy of the Warring States, Yamamoto posits the Russians as the Qin, not unlike Chen Chi 陳熾’s articles in the *Shiwu Bao* in 1897, which Yamamoto would have been familiar with.

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196 Kang Youyi 康有儀 is usually referred to by his hao: Kang Mengqing 康孟卿.
197 There are also 19 letters from Wang Kangnian, ten from Kang Youwei, nine from Liang Qichao and six from Wang Zhao, among many others.
200 Discussed in the previous chapter.
In his introduction to the Contents of the Yamamoto Ken Archive, Kōbun Gō 公文豪 explains that “The value of Yamamoto Ken’s Asianism remains an important research topic. Taking Confucianism as the basis for Japanese and Chinese mutual assistance, it is clearly different from the Great Asianism which arose later to posit Japan as the leader of Asia.”

This is so, however, in “On Conditions in East Asia,” Yamamoto does not merely concentrate on the Confucian side of things, but rather emphasizes Asianism as a defensive strategy to deal with Russia. Although Yamamoto took Confucianism as the assumed basis for society, his Asianism was also strongly based upon his belief in the people’s sovereignty. Therefore he opposed the absolute sovereignty of the monarchs in East Asia and opposed investing too much power in political parties. Yamamoto’s vision for East Asia’s future, based on his liberal beliefs combined with his strong belief in Confucianism and acceptance of the forces of Social Darwinism, made him an excellent partner for Kang and his students in the final years of the nineteenth century.

After returning from Kanto on the arrival of the reformers in Japan, he established the China-Japan Friendship Association 日清協會, an organization that was committed to intellectual collaboration for the protection of China and East Asia, while vehemently opposed to government interference. He advertised this association regularly in The China Discussion. Liang Qichao wrote a letter to Yamamoto, thanking him for his role in influencing the Japanese government to protect Kang and Liang, but also praising his new

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202 In fact, Kang wrote a poem to praise Yamamoto Ken: “Da Shanben jun” 答山本君 in The China Discussion 清議報 25 (March 2nd, 1899 (Guangxu 25, 1.21).
association and showing his hopes for cooperation, calling the association the “fortune of the East.”

Yamamoto was friends with Kang and certainly familiar with his works. He may even have been one of the few insiders to see Kang’s unpublished drafts, which were much more extreme in their imagining of the route to datong. Xu Qin sent him an unnamed copy of one of Kang’s books. In the accompanying letter Xu Qin briefly explains the thrust of Kang’s argument: “The central meaning of Nanhai Xiansheng’s (Kang Youwei) propagation of Confucius’ datong is his aim to correct the hearts of the people in order to save China; to save China in order to raise East Asia; to raise East Asia in order to bring peace and stability to the world.” Yamamoto would have been pleased by this. Like Kang and Xu Qin, he believed that China was central to saving East Asia, and that Confucianism was necessary for world peace.

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203 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, “Zhi Daban Riqing Xiehehui Yamamoto Baigan Shu” 致大阪日清協和會山本梅崖書 (A letter to Yamamoto Baigai of Osaka’s Japan-China Association.” In Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works shang《飲冰室合集》集外文(上) (edited by Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005), 57.
204 Letter dated July 23rd (no year). Available in the YKA, article C-213.
Xu Qin: the Primary Educator at the Datong School

For the early years of the first Datong School, Kang Youwei’s star pupil Xu Qin served as headmaster and likely had the greatest influence on education at the school. In 1896 Kang sent Xu Qin to be head master at the Shiwu School in Changsha. This was important in giving him the experience necessary for his later work at the Datong School, which he ran from the age of 25. In 1897, just before his move to Yokohama, he established the Zhixin Bao 知新报 in Macau. This magazine concentrated upon the growing threat of Russia, which Xu and his editors saw as China’s ultimate enemy. Like Liang Qichao and the writers at Shiwu Bao, they therefore encouraged greater ties with Japan in order to counter the Russian threat. Naturally, it was also important for the propagation of reform ideas and reprinted many of the same

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Figure 3: Xu Qin (left) photographed with Liang Qichao. *The 1908 Datong School Register* (Zhang Xuehuan 1908). Public Domain

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205 Although based in Macau, the Zhixin Bao was a major journal for the reformers. It was also used by Xu Qin to run a number of articles on the school before the *The China Discussion* was established in Yokohama.
articles from the *Shiwu Bao* and the *Xiang Bao*. Like Kang, Xu Qin saw all possibilities for reform within a Confucian context, hoping to find a way to combine classical traditions with the New Learning. Xu Qin was one of Kang’s earliest disciplines and was consistently one of his favorites, enjoying numerous posts in Kang’s various organizations over the years. Others considered him equal to a shadow of Kang Youwei, even going as far as to call him “The Kang Youwei that is not Kang Youwei.”

While at the school, Xu Qin devoted himself to teaching the students the importance of Confucianism. In this regard the school was clearly a conservative institution. Naturally, Xu Qin’s Confucianism was Kang Youwei’s reform Confucianism, which was tinged with Social Darwinism and emphasized progress towards *datong*. The reformers believed that, coupled with the New Learning of the West in Japan, these teachings would make China strong enough to repel the West, the materialism of which Xu Qin abhorred.

In 1898 Xu Qin outlined five points by which the school, and by extension China in reform, would stride into the future. These five points were published in the *Zhixin Bao*, as well as the *Xiangxue Bao* 湘學報. The points were: “Establish your Will! Study the Texts! Unite! Honour the Teachings! Protect the Nation!”

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206 Chen Xuezhang 陈学章 and Wang Jie 王杰 “Xu Qin yu Yokohama Datong Xuexiao 徐勤与横滨大同学校 (Xu Qin and the Yokohama Datong School) in Fang Zhiqin 方志钦 and Wang Jie 王杰 (eds.) *Kang Youwei yu jindai wenhua* 康有为与近代文化, 255-269 (Kang Youwei and Modern Culture) (Henan: Henan University Press, 2006), 256-258. This article contains a full biography of Xu Qin and details his philosophy and work at the school. Unfortunately, concerning his collaboration with Japanese friends, Chen and Wang criticize Xu for being ignorant of what the authors see as the *yexin* of the Japanese and their ambition to create pro-Japanese Chinese.

207 立志，讀書，合群，尊教，保國. Xu Qin 徐勤, Riben Hengbin Zhongguo Datong Xuexiao ji 日本橫濱中國大同學校記 (The Chinese Datong School in Yokohama, Japan). In *Wuxu bianfa ziliao* 戊戌變法資料 4 (Originally in Zhixin Bao 52, March 21, 1898 and in Xiangxue Bao 43, June 1, 1898), (Shanghai: Shanghai
with reform-minded Confucianism and all had the objective of repelling the West. Xu Qin’s opposition to the West was not expressed as a simple form of xenophobia, but was harboured in his religious conviction that Confucianism was the only possible way for mankind to reach greatness. Therefore, the moral lacking that was evident in Westerners’ imperial ways was best explained in their ignorance of Confucius and his teachings. In his writing about the Datong School, he explains his conviction:

As for those foreigners that come from far off lands, their eyes have never set upon the books of Confucius, their ears have never heard the name Confucius. Through their habits they accept wrong as right. They are deceived and fail to see. Those in Japan who still respect and revere do not submit to heterodox faith. However, those who are misled by the worshiping of unorthodox gods go as far as to pledge allegiance to another race, abandon the divine land of China and call the disciples of Confucius weak and of a weak country. Alas! 208

Xu Qin, like Yamamoto Ken, saw Christianity as the greatest threat to Confucianism and therefore to the passage of humanity towards datong. At school he insisted upon making the students kneel and bow before Confucius. This was an act that was unacceptable to Christians and caused friction among the students. 209 He saw those Japanese that have turned to Christianity as traitors to the Sinocentric Confucian world order and embracing “another race” (彼族 bizu). Xu Qin believed that loyalty to one’s race (族 zu) was interconnected with

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208 Renmin Chubanshe, 2000), 518-520. Chen and Wang have noted that these five points and Xu’s general teaching philosophy are borrowed in great deal from Kang Youwei’s Chang xing xue ji 長興學記. Chen and Wang 2006, 262.
209 Ibid, 520.
208 Feng 1939, 51.
loyalty to the classical teachings.

In his writings on the Datong School, Xu Qin outlined the various levels of identity that were important to him. Supporting China and protecting its classical teachings were of the utmost importance to him, but he also placed importance on race and the universal datong. Xu was a nationalist. He found China suddenly flung into a modern system, not a system of nation states, but a new world order of imperialism. Although he may have been receptive to some Asianist ideas, his ultimate goal was the survival of China. For the time being, the best way to achieve this was by working with his Japanese friends and educating Chinese students in Japan.

**The Datong School and Layers of Identity**

The reasons for studying in Japan were obvious. Japan had mastered “New Learning,” was affordable, and close at hand. Liang Qichao adds to this: “We can be at ease knowing that the talent that can pull China from its troubles has not left the land of the East. In protecting our race, we protect our country. The connection between these two is by no means small.”

Like Xu Qin above, Liang Qichao mentions race as a basis for Japanese-Chinese cooperation. The reformers hoped that the students in Yokohama would not disregard China and seek personal gain, as foreign students in Europe and America had done. They taught the New Learning with an extreme emphasis on Confucianism with a Social Darwinist take on nationalism. But students in Yokohama would have had access to more than the New

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210 Liang Qichao 梁啟超 “Riben Hengbin Zhongguo Datong xuexiao yuanqi 日本橫濱中國大同學校緣起 (The Reason for the China Datong School in Yokohama, Japan) in Yinbingshi wenji 4 欣冰室文集 4. (Beijing: Jingwenshe, 1944), 703.
Learning and Confucianism that their teachers hoped to instruct them in. In school they would study the Confucian classics, as well as the reformist works of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.

The educational ideology of Kang Youwei is a perfect example of the fundamental tension evident in the creation of a modern national identity. At the same time the reformers looked backwards to tradition for the continuity of their identities and forwards to progress in modernity for their basis in the new world system. To do this Liang and Kang tried to reimagine Confucianism, disregarding earlier emphases and instead seeing Confucianism as an agent of change and as a doctrine which foretells the teleological path to modernity and finally datong.¹¹¹

Reform Confucianism was highly stressed at the school. Every Sunday the students had to kneel and bow before the image of Confucius. Even the Christian students were forced to do this on pain of expulsion. At the 1898 birthday celebration for Confucius, at which numerous Chinese and Japanese dignitaries were in attendance, a scroll was hung beside the image of Confucius: “When those of the same race and the same script rise again, they will ally under the same religion (Confucianism) and disallow the flaunting and ravenous gaze of the Western Europeans. The Great Qing and the Great Nippon will henceforth combine under the Sage and gaze upon the rise of

East Asia.” The Asianism espoused here manages to avoid the question of leadership, unlike the Japanese-led Asianism that would soon appear and dominate the twentieth century. Just like the school itself, this Asianism was seen as a matter of cooperation, based on Confucianism, with the ambition of protecting China and Japan in the modern system of imperialism. As can be seen in the quote above, another binding factor was that of race.

The terms “same race,” and “same script” were very popular in 1898, the first year of the school’s operations. They turn up frequently in the reformer periodicals in both China and Japan, as well as in correspondence from the time. Although the terms had been around much earlier, they were strongly revived by an exceedingly racially motivated article by Konoe Atsumaro 近衛篤麿 in the popular journal Taiyō (太陽 The Sun). The Asianist article was not as well received in Europe, where it added to the illogical fears of a “yellow peril.”

Reveling in their brief Japanophilic stage, the reformers littered their writing with the term “same,” using all sorts of combinations. Although it was clearly a symbolic term paraded out at any mention of Sino-Japanese relations, it also demonstrates the feelings of the time. The desire to declare sameness with the Japanese at times bordered on the ridiculous, with Kang Youwei himself getting first prize in this contest for his rather absurd sentence in a letter to Yamamoto Ken: “Your country is of the same religion, same governance, same customs,

\[\text{\cite{Feng1939:51-52} As can be seen in the inserted text block, the organizers had arranged the structure of the couplet to express another level of meaning that could be derived from reading the text horizontally. The term datong appears over and over again in this text, indicating the importance of the union of China and Japan as a step towards utopia. The term “clean race” also indicates the direction reformers and revolutionaries would turn to in the years ahead and is further analyzed in Chapter III. I am grateful to a member of the audience at the 2013 Junior Sinology Conference in Chiayi for pointing out the couplet’s arrangement after having read my paper.}\]

same race and same script.”

There are two relations integral to this emphasis of sameness: the internal and the external relations. Internally, declaring one’s nation the same as the other may be seen as complimentary to that other, but the external relation is of more importance. This sameness between Japan and China indicated difference with the West in a strategic attempt to unite against a common enemy. This racial identity was strongly linked to the ever-present theme of race war in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century. As Western imperialists often cooperated, a very logical fear of the “white peril” became widespread and gave rise to strategies of united resistance. It is evident that both racial and national strategies were being considered to defend against imperialism. As is shown in the next chapter, what was understood as “same race” or “same nation” had not yet been clearly established. Asianism based on race relied upon similar identity constructions that nationalism was based upon. The former could not exist without the consciousness of the latter. Despite talk of racial sameness, the primary ideology that recurred in materials concerning the Datong schools was nationalism.

Feng Ziyu recalls how Xu Qin “urged the students in the task of saving the country.” “All those who listened could not help but be moved.” On their textbooks and blackboards a slogan was written in large characters: “While the nation’s humiliation has not been cleared and the people suffer hardship, at every meal we will remember and urge our youth

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The students had to loudly recite this slogan at the end of classes every day. There was also a patriotic school song and other slogans. Survival in the modern system of imperialism necessitated the transformation of China into a more economically powerful country. The students left the Datong Schools foremost with a drive to bring China into modernity, and, within a few years of the school being established, patriotic fervor dominated mention of the school, largely replacing talk of Japan-China cooperation. Feng Ziyou has noted the revolutionary spirit with which the Chinese students in Tokyo imagined their future. This spirit was expressed in many different ways and on different levels of identity.

The Students of the Datong School and Their Influence

Initially, the student population at the Datong School in Yokohama was composed of local Cantonese-speaking Chinese with quite a number of mixed Japanese-Chinese parentage. After a while, other Cantonese-speaking students from China were also sent to Yokohama and the population of the school gradually increased. The Datong Higher School opened in Tokyo in 1899 and the first class was composed of a number of students from the Yokohama school. Many of these students would perform important roles in the revolution, especially as journalists, writers and translators. And the schools also contributed to the rise of young educated Chinese women.

In 1899, the first year in which the school ran complete operations, there were a total

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215 国恥未雪，民生多艱，毎飯不忘，勗哉小子. Feng 1939, 51.
216 For example, see the patriotism expressed in the 1903 article: "Yokohama Datong xuexiao wunianjinian zhudian" 横濱大同學校五年級年祝典 (CD).
217 Feng 1939, 45.
218 Itō Izumi has detailed the rises and falls in the school’s enrollment in a graph in Itō Izumi 1993, 4-5.
219 Feng 1928, 72.
of 110 students listed in the register. Surprisingly, 40 of these students were female. This is a very high ratio for Chinese schools in the late Qing, indicating that both the reformers living in Japan and the overseas Chinese population were positive about female education. However, as the school and the Chinese population enlarged with new students being sent from China, the ratio of female to male students dropped and did not return to its 1899 ratio until 1911, when there were 110 female to 127 male students.\textsuperscript{220}

A journalist for the English newspaper \textit{Kobe Chronicle} had this to say about the girls at the school: “Neat alone would scarcely do justice to their appearance, for it is more than that. Neat and stylish might cover the situation… there is no foot-binding for them, either physically or mentally… And so it will most likely come to pass that in ten or fifteen years from now we shall be having a Women’s Rights movement in China.”\textsuperscript{221} This journalist stresses the importance of fashion for the modern girl, but the figures and the journalist’s words indicate, not only the beliefs of the educators and/or community in Yokohama, but also the importance of this movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Reform Confucianists had intended for well-educated, young, modern women to be a part of their system. And the students that graduated from the schools were often imbued with a passion for revolution.

Of the well-known Chinese elite that came out of the Yokohama Daidō School, Feng Ziyou is perhaps one of the most important and most influential. An organizer even from his days as a teenager in Yokohama, Feng is probably best-known for his histories of the

\textsuperscript{220} Ito 1993, 5.
\textsuperscript{221} Author Unknown. “The Chinese School in Yokohama” \textit{The Kobe Weekly Chronicle} (October 1, 1898), 307.
revolution, which also provide much of the sources for this chapter.

Feng Ziyou, born in Yokohama in 1882 (-1958), was originally called Feng Maolong 馮懋龍. He was the son of Feng Jingru, who was also known by his exceedingly capitalist-sounding English name, F. Kingsell. As mentioned above, Feng Jingru was one of the elite Cantonese in the Chinese Association who first pushed to open the school in Yokohama. Hailing from Nanhai, Guangdong, the home of Kang Youwei, it is no surprise that he would have sided with Kang and turned to him for help with the school. After his father was killed due to support of the Taipings, Feng hated the Qing and left China for Japan. In Yokohama he became wealthy publishing dictionaries of English and Chinese under his company Kingsell and Co. In 1898 this experience would be useful when he offered to assist with the publication of Liang Qichao’s new journal, The Chinese Discussion.\(^\text{222}\) It was due to his father’s insistence that Feng Ziyou was in the first class of the Datong School. Then in 1901, due to Ōkuma Shigenobu’s introduction, he was enrolled at Tokyo Senmon School, which soon became Waseda University, an important school for overseas Chinese and the organization of student revolutionaries. Feng became a journalist for a number of papers, notably Hong Kong’s China Daily 中國日報. He was also sent to the United States and Canada where he served as a journalist and supported funding drives for Sun Yat-sen.\(^\text{223}\)

One of the most extraordinary students of that first class was a friend of Feng, Su

\(^{222}\) Feng Ruiyu 2005, 35-38. On Liang Qichao asking Feng Jingru to run the Qingyi Bao, also see: Feng Ziyou 1939, 63.

\(^{223}\) Feng Ruiyu 2005, 36.
Manshu.\textsuperscript{224} Younger than Feng, this half-Japanese half-Chinese Buddhist monk was in the same class as his brother, Feng Siluan 馮斯欒, another student who would soon be contributing to the revolution as a journalist. Due to Su’s work as a translator, writer and poet, the Zhuhai Municipal Government established the Su Manshu Poetry Prize in 2010.

Like his classmates, he was involved in the revolutionary spirit and soon joined the Xingzhong Hui. A year after his 1902 graduation from the Datong Higher School, he joined the Resist Russia Militia 拒俄義勇隊, a popular anti-imperialist group for Chinese students in Tokyo. Su traveled to Shanghai, where he joined Chen Duxiu to work on the \textit{Guomin Riri Bao}. He would return to Japan in 1907 to help Zhang Taiyan with the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood 亞洲和親會, a pan-Asian group that brought together anti-imperialist revolutionaries from across Asia and is discussed in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{225} At that time he also worked with the \textit{People’s News} 民報 and the anarchist \textit{Journal of Natural Justice} 天義報.\textsuperscript{226} Revolutionaries such as Su Manshu and Feng Ziyou are easily remembered due to the writings they have left behind, but documents also point to numerous other revolutionary activities supported or led by unknown Datong students.

\textsuperscript{224} Su Manshu 蘇曼殊 (1884-1918) is generally known by his dharma name as he became a monk at the age of 14. His birth name was Su Zigu 蘇子谷. His translations include works by Victor Hugo, Lord Byron, Robert Burns, a number of Buddhist texts from Sanskrit and a surprising number of poems by women from the United Kingdom and India. His poetry and fiction, although never having great influence, have been noted as works in the time of transition to New Fiction and are widely available in collected volumes.

\textsuperscript{225} The Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood’s Chinese name is Yazhou heqin hui 亞洲和親會, which can be translated as the Asia Friendship Association. However, as the association operated as an international group, the members used the English name “Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood” in all publications from the time.

\textsuperscript{226} Liu Yazi 柳亞子, \textit{Su Manshu Yanjiu} 蘇曼殊研究 (Research on Su Manshu) (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 52-54.
In 1899 Lin Gui 林圭 arrived in Japan and temporarily assumed Xu Qin’s post at principal of the Datong School in Yokohama. In the winter of that year he would return to China with twenty students. At this time the line between the reformers and the revolutionaries was not as defined as it would soon be, and Liang was often involved with both sides. Liang, Sun, Miyazaki, Hirayama and Chen Shaobai saw the group of students off with a farewell party.\textsuperscript{227} Lin believed that this group would be the beginning of the revolution. Of course, the Hankow Uprising of 1900 was a tragic failure and many of these students lost their lives.\textsuperscript{228} Not long after this uprising, the Chinese residents of Yokohama considered different tactics, and even different possibilities for identity, in their struggle with the Manchu Qing. Once again, Datong students were noticeably involved.

The Guangdong Independence Association 廣東獨立協會 was established by Cantonese living in Yokohama in 1901. The core of the group was largely composed of students from the Datong School, including Feng Ziyou, Feng Siluan and Kuang Guanyi, as well as newly arrived students from Guangdong, including Li Zizhong 李自重 and Wang Chonghui 王寵惠. From the outset the group cooperated with the Xingzhong Hui, and the names of most members appear in the Tongmeng Hui three years later.\textsuperscript{229} Although short lived and leaving no lasting political effect, the Guangdong Independence Association held importance in establishing some of the networks that worked towards the Xinhai Revolution. Sun Yat-sen was supportive of the students’ movement and regularly met with them in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{227} Li Jiannong 1974, 71.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Levenson 1970, 65-67. Li 1974, 68-72.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Feng Ziyou 1939, 193.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Yokohama. Many of the Cantonese students studying in Japan joined the group and this offered the Xingzhong Hui a considerable network in the Guangdong area.\textsuperscript{230}

**Conclusion**

The Datong Schools represent an important moment in modern Chinese-Japanese civilian cooperation. Examining the sources relevant to the schools, we are offered a glimpse at fledgling efforts to imagine a Confucian-centred transnational modern East Asia. Those involved in the Datong Schools would not have considered themselves to be conservatives in any way. Rather, being progressive and working towards modernity was crucial to their self-understanding. What they rejected was the imperialism and hegemony of Western culture. At the heart of the Confucianism espoused at the Datong Schools was a strong belief in the central claims of Social Darwinism and a confidence that a muscular progressive Confucianism could meet this challenge. The vision that Kang Youwei, Xu Qin and others had of the history and future of mankind was based on competition, especially competition between nations and competition between races. This firm belief in an environment of competition tied any form of Confucian modernity to the rise of national and regional consciousness.

What went into the Datong Schools and what came out were different in many ways. A shared victimhood and anti-imperial consciousness did remain. However, the reformers and their Asianist friends imagined a modernity very different from that which took shape in

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid. Although the name clearly implies independence from Qing China, the organization was established in reaction to fears that the Qing government was preparing to deliver Guangdong to France.
the twentieth century. The reformers, at the height of their pro-Japanese sentiments, and the Japanese Asianists, just before Asianism began its turn towards an imperialist strategy of Japanese domination, were working together to protect China and East Asia in the face of a shared enemy: Western imperialism and White racism. Educators were teaching the consciousness of a shared victimhood under imperialism. This victim consciousness and the need for self-preservation, a psychological basis for nationalism, opened doors to consciousness of other identities not limited to nation, but including local, regional and perhaps even the inklings of gender consciousness. The students graduating from the Datong School were strongly invested with a revolutionary consciousness that manifested itself in activities relevant to these different levels of identity, ranging from the Xingzhong Hui, which most students joined, to the revolutionary publication, *Kaizhi Lu* 開智錄, largely staffed by former Datong students. And finally, some students manifested anti-imperialist consciousness on a racial level. Race was becoming one of the most popular subjects for Chinese and Japanese intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century and presented a new level of identity that further complicated East Asia and forced intellectuals to reconsider their relations with those perceived to be a member of their own race or of another race. Therefore, the following chapter examines discussions of race by Chinese intellectuals in Japan, considering these discussions in regard to China’s relationship to Japan, the West, and the rest of Asia.
Part II: Chinese Intellectuals’ Rejection of Japanese Asianism

The following two chapters of this dissertation detail important yet somewhat ambiguous rejections of Japanese Asianism in the years just before and just after the 1911 Revolution. I use the term “ambiguous” because although racial unity and Japanese leadership were rejected as the crucial components of a united Asia in these years, the ideas did continue to linger and appear in Chinese Asianist writings much later as well. However, the consideration and subsequent rejection of these discourses is an important step towards the construction of Chinese Asianism, which is examined in Part III.

The titles for these two chapters are chosen from popular Asianist sayings of the time. “Same script, same race” 同文同種 is a saying that was popular throughout East Asia. A thorough analysis of its meaning is supplied in the beginning of Chapter III. “Asia for the Asians” is in fact a translilingual adoption of the Monroist American ideal “America for the Americans.” A distinctly Japanese slogan, it typified the calls for a Japanese-led Asianism during World War I and is examined in Chapter IV.
Chapter III: Same Script, Same Race: The Ambiguity of a Racial Identity

“What is history? History is nothing but an account of the development of and strife among the human races. There is no history without race…” Liang Qichao, 1902.231

Introduction

In the late nineteenth century, a climate of fear persisted among intellectuals in East Asia. Western empires had marched across the world and only the East Asian region retained independence and freedom from colonialism. As the twentieth century was drawing closer, it became apparent that the imperialists would not be content until the remaining countries came within their control. Japanese intellectual circles were divided over the dilemma of whether to “leave or lead Asia.” The Meiji government was clearly embarking on a project to “leave Asia” and become a power modeled upon Western empires. However, many intellectuals in Japan realized that their country could not be accepted as an equal in the eyes of the racist Westerners. Hoping to forge a common front against imperialism, these intellectuals called for a uniting of East Asia under an ideology that is now called Pan-Asianism. Although this would later become a face for Japan’s own imperialist ambitions, in this early stage it was born out of fear of the ever-encroaching West. It was at this time that the Western pseudo-scientific concept of race became widely known to East Asian

Race was, and often still is, one of the most frequent and powerful bases from which to call for a united front against the imperialist West. There was a sudden boom in writings concerning theories of race in China in the early twentieth century, in part due to the realization of a unified assault from the white West, and in part due to a group of young Chinese intellectuals’ discovery of Japanese theories which positioned the Manchu as a different race from the Han Chinese. Jumping on this, the revolutionaries wholly embraced race theory during this time. The establishment of their enemies as racial others provided the impetus for Chinese intellectuals’ adoption of racial theories, but the process by which these theories came to be adopted is more complicated, and this process is crucial to our understanding of how race was related to early twentieth century Asianism.

In a recent article on the aborption of the discourse of civilization into modern Chinese thought, Xu Jilin explains how the classical “Yi-Xia distinction” 夷夏之辨, which differentiated those who had not accepted classical Chinese culture from those who had respectively as “Yi” and “Xia,” allowed for the wholehearted adoption of Western racial paradigms. This seems counterintuitive, for this distinction actually opposed Westerners as uncivilized Yi. However, Xu Jilin has shown how Tianxia-ism 天下主義 resulted in these paradigms being accepted as native to classical thought, allowing for absolutist racial paradigms to be accepted by a vast range of Chinese literati and soon fill the discursive space of the relative Yi-Xia distinction.232 As seen in the paragraphs below, early twentieth century

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232 The racial paradigm was absolutist in the sense that one could not change one’s race. However,
writings on race continued to use the vocabulary of the Yi-Xia distinction, positing those outside of the writer’s perceived race as Yi, while adopting the concentric circles of Tianxia-ism to hierarchical configurations of the yellow race.

Although these racial paradigms had a strong influence upon twentieth century thought, Chinese intellectuals would not continue to use race as the defining element of Asian unity after the first decade. At the end of this chapter we see how, after a few years of stumbling through contradictory and sometimes incoherent racial theorizing, the predominance of racist writing begins to fade away, just as calls for Asian solidarity came to the fore. The revolutionary writers, largely represented by Zhang Binglin and the People’s News 民報 in 1907 and 1908, came to realize that race may not provide a compelling enough paradigm by which to achieve their goals, namely freedom from the rule of the Manchu Qing and protection from the imperialist West, the two challenges that dominated and shaped writings on race until this point.

This chapter examines the rise of “same race” solidarity in Chinese writings, concentrating upon revolutionary writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, and the drift from hopes for Japanese support to a belief in the rising consciousness of Asia’s oppressed. I first review early Chinese writing on race, showing how the concept of race was closely tied to the idea of race war: a conflict between the white and yellow races. As talk of the “yellow peril” made its way to East Asia, the concept was appropriated and pride in race

traditional Chinese “racism” in the form of the Yi-Xia distinction was actually relative and based upon transcendable cultural differences. Xu Jilin 2012, 69-70.
was established. I then show how common racial signifiers from this period were not based in racial “science” but utilized a very simple binary of “self” and “other.” However, Chinese intellectuals struggled to define the “self” and the “other” under the concept of race and within the historical reality of continued oppression by Asian Manchus on the one hand and foreign Europeans on the other. This led to Chinese intellectuals’ gradual abandonment of the concept of race as the theoretical basis for understanding their suffering. Although the concept did continue to exist in Asianist writing, it was no longer the central concept. Contact with a number of Indian revolutionaries in Tokyo led to the Chinese intellectuals’ restructuring their worldview as a conflict between those who are oppressed and those who are oppressors. I find that the complications created by both internal and external imperialism dominated early twentieth century Chinese revolutionaries’ discussions of race, leading to the imagining of a new form of Asianism that was drifting from “same race” solidarity and was beginning to imagine Asian solidarity based on a shared sense of victimhood.

I argue that these late Qing revolutionary writers, caught between these two challenges, consumed and reformulated theories of race and racial taxonomies in attempts to understand their political environment and organize for political action. As it became clear that racial theorizing could not make sense of the world and China’s position in it, a few of these Chinese intellectuals turned away from racial connections and begin categorizing nations as “oppressor” or “oppressed” and begin to formulate political action and Asian solidarity along these lines. Although the centrality of these discussions would fade out after the 1911 Revolution, the connection of race to Asian unity continued to appear in most Chinese Asianist writings and understanding them is important to the study of later writings.
Late-Nineteenth Century Chinese Writings on Race

Chinese writings on race can be dated back to antiquity. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, a new discourse on race appeared in China. It was accompanied by scientific studies that offered it a new form of legitimacy for a new world. The modern concept of race, a system of classifying humans based primarily upon their skin colour and other physical features, did not initially enter China through Japanese sources. Rather, the first known discussion of this Western concept was in John Fryer’s (1839-1928) *Gezhi huibian* 格致匯編(The Chinese Scientific Magazine) in 1892. A translated article entitled “Ren fen wulei shuo” 人分五類說 (On the five classifications of mankind) utilized a physical anthropology approach to describe these five races of yellow, white, red, brown and black based entirely upon physical characteristics. However, this early article was not as widely received as were articles from a few years later.

In 1895, immediately following the Sino-Japanese War, Yan Fu altered the worldview of many of his compatriots with four articles published in the *Zhili Gazette* 直報. Although the terms “white people” and “yellow people” had long been used, and a text on Western race theory had been translated three years earlier, these articles first popularized

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233 Frank Dikötter clearly shows that, although different, the concept of race and racial prejudice has existed in China since the Classics. Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

234 Ishikawa 2007, 212-213.

235 The colour yellow, signifying both the emperor and China itself, was seen very favourably by Chinese intellectuals. On the other hand, white symbolized death. Dikötter 1992, 55.
modern race theory in China. They described four races, yellow, white, brown and black, and, unlike earlier understandings of race, defined them within the all-important context of evolutionary competition, a theory that would remain tightly connected to race theory for the following few decades. Liang Qichao continued in this same vein with his seminal “New History,” in which he described history as “nothing but the account of the development and strife of human races.” Races were divided into those with history and those without. As Liang only saw the yellow and the white races as having history and therefore having developed to the requisite level for future survival, the coming war would necessarily occur between these two races.

**Race and Race War**

Racial beliefs were not the only basis for early Asian solidarity, which was a more general anti-imperialist reaction to the violent attacks by Western powers to open up markets, but it was very early that racial imaginings of the world entered into the discourse of Asianism and became an important part of it. There was an undeniable logic in viewing the imperialism of the West as a combined attack by “white people” upon “yellow people,” especially as such racial discourse was also employed by the oppressors themselves. It is difficult to ascertain the exact moment of entry of racial politics, but Vladimir Tikhonov asserts that “one of the first instances of the use of racialist taxonomies in Sino-Japanese contacts” was Sone Toshitora’s (1843-1910) speech to He Ruzhang, in which he convinced him of the Asianist intentions of the Kōakai and thereby garnered important elite support for his activities in
Dikötter notes the turn to a belief in race war in popular Chinese intellectual writing around 1895, after which “Many reformers gradually came to adopt a vision of a world order dominated by the white race against which the yellow race had to fight in order to survive.”

Yan Fu, the first to bring the scientific discourse on race to China, was also the first to hypothesize the extinction of the yellow race.

From this day on, race war would be a recurring topic in Chinese writing. The idea continued throughout World War I and far beyond. In World War II the Japanese often used race war to describe Western imperialism and justify their calls for a pan-Asian alliance. Wang Jingwei echoed this discourse, connected it to Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy. In his epilogue to an English-language collection of Sun’s writings compiled in 1941, he explains: “This is the origin of Pan-Asianism. As has been said before the three native races in America, Australia and now Africa have been extinguished one after another and the fate of the Yellow race in Asia is at stake.”

The fear of race war and racial annihilation accompanied the concept of Asianism throughout the early twentieth century.

Its early beginnings were closely tied to the belief of a yellow peril, the Western fear of Asian hordes taking control of the West either militarily or economically. This fear was used to justify racial and imperialist policies across the Western world, yet the opposite was

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238 Dikötter 1992, 75.
the reality. Under the guises of Christianity and free markets, Westerners were united in their domination of everything to the East of Europe. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who famously coined the term “yellow peril,” must have been aware of the irony of his words when he dispatched troops to China during the Boxer Uprising:

You are to fight against a cunning, courageous, well-armed and cruel foe. When you are upon him, know this: spare nobody, make no prisoners. Use your weapons in a manner to make every Chinaman for a thousand years to come forgo the wish to as much as look askance at a German…. (27 July 1900). You are going on a grave and portentous mission, the end of which is not yet clear. It may be the beginning of a great war between Occident and Orient. The whole Occident is united. For the common end even such nations have joined who have all along confronted one another as inveterate foes. (2 August 1900).  

German imperialism in East Asia was expressed by Kaiser Wilhelm II in terms of a great battle between West and East, white and yellow. Years

Figure 4: “Die Gelbe Gefahr” (The Yellow Peril), 1895. The original caption for this picture read “Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter.” “Peoples of Europe, guard your dearest goods.” Public Domain.

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earlier he had designed the famous “Yellow Peril” painting by Hermann Knackfuß, in which a Buddha riding a fiery dragon approaches Christian Europe (fig. 1). This call for a united West to fight the “yellow peril” was noted in both Japan and China and the memory of this discourse remains today.

Yellow Peril

The yellow peril has been a subject of numerous studies over the years. However, it has been virtually ignored in Western language studies for the last forty years, while it has remained a field of study in China and Japan. This recent interest by Chinese and Japanese scholars in the yellow peril is not surprising, as the similarities between Western fears of a rising Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 21st century are difficult to ignore.

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241 This painting, sent to the leaders of Western countries, caused quite a controversy by its blatant calls for a united West. Although the West certainly was united in its domination of Asia, this had not been explicitly addressed until Kaiser Wilhelm II. Many British were opposed to the idea, seeing other European powers as much more of a threat to British interests. A long and detailed satirical analysis of the painting from a British perspective is available in Arthur Diosy, The New Far East (London and New York: Cassell, 1904 (originally 1898), 330-334. Available at www.archive.org. Accessed on November 2, 2012). Diosy was the founder of the British Japan Society and an avid supporter of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Also see Luo Fuhui Luo Fuhui 罗福惠, Huanghuo lün: Dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua 黄祸论: 东西文明的对立与对话 (Beijing: Li xunwenhua shiyuan gongsi, 2007), 59-62.

242 Decades later, Lu Xun would still refer to Kaiser Wilhelm II as the originator of the Yellow Peril belief. (In Quanjü 5, 343).

Perhaps the most influential of studies on the yellow peril is well-known German historian Heinz Gollwitzer’s *Die Gelbe Gefahr* (The Yellow Peril). Gollwitzer views the yellow peril as an integral part of Western imperialism. Although the book has never been translated into other European languages, it was translated into Chinese as early as 1964 by the Commercial Press.\(^{244}\) A Japanese translation appeared in 1999 and was republished in 2010.\(^{245}\)

In China, a collection of source materials was published in 1979 as *Huanghuo lun: lishi ziliao xuanji* 黄祸论：历史资料选集. The editors provide translations of news reports and journal articles concerning the yellow peril from Britain, the United States, Germany, Russia and Japan. There is also a useful section which collates various Chinese reactions to the theory, but the editors refrain from engaging with the texts and provide little analysis. However, more recently intellectual historian Luo Fuhui 罗福惠 has provided a very popular analysis of the yellow peril theories and reactions with his text *Huanghuo lun: Dongxi wenming de duili yu duihua* 黄祸论：东西文明的对立与对话, published in China and Taiwan in 2007.

Luo Fuhui describes racist yellow peril theories as stemming from an essentialized Western system of thought inherited from Greek and Hebrew intellectual histories and

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\(^{244}\) However, as this text was initially published for “internal reading” (*neibu duwu* 內部讀物) only, it did not reach a wide audience in the 1960s. Heinz Gollwitzer, *Huanghuo lun* 黄祸论 (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1964). See Luo 2007: 48-49.

\(^{245}\) Heinz Gollwitzer, *Kōkaron to wa nani ka* 黄禍論とは何か, translated by Seno Fuminori 瀬野文敎 (Tōkyō: Sōshisha, 1999).
coming together in nineteenth century Western imperialist thought.\textsuperscript{246} Looking at the first wave of yellow peril writing, Luo studies seventy articles from prominent Chinese publications: the majority of the articles appear in the years 1903-1905, a time of sudden fascination with race war that revolved around Russian aggression in Manchuria leading up to the Russo-Japanese war.\textsuperscript{247} The journals that ran the articles included \textit{Eastern Miscellany}, \textit{China Foreign Daily 中外日報}, and the \textit{Tocsin Daily 警鐘日報}. However, \textit{The Diplomatic Review 外交報} stands out with a surprising number of articles.\textsuperscript{248} The Diplomatic Review was connected with Yan Fu during this time, a man often considered to be the originator of modern race theory in China. Much like the frequent articles on the carving up of China, these articles contributed to a consistently maintained climate of fear over the future of Chinese civilization. The fear of a race war continued throughout the twentieth century and still exists today, although it has now been rescripted as a clash of “civilizations.”\textsuperscript{249} Although the turn-of-the-century European discourse of race war and the yellow peril may have been preposterous, it had the odd effect of promoting pride and solidarity in East Asia.

\textsuperscript{246} Luo 2007, 26-27.  
\textsuperscript{247} Of these articles, 25 are translated from English, 15 from Japanese, and 30 were originally written in Chinese.  
\textsuperscript{248} Luo 2007, 292.  
\textsuperscript{249} In Japan, the perceived inevitability of such a war remained one of the reasons for World War II and the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The concept has still persisted in popular Japanese imaginings and has made its way into various popular manga and literature. An interesting example of this is the 2004 adaptation of \textit{Casshern (キャシャーン)}, set in a post-World War III new order where after a fifty year war between Europe and Asia, “the Eastern Federation has beaten Europa’s armies and taken control of the Eurasian continent.” Of course, it is taken for granted that this federation is led by Japan. (Opening sequence from \textit{Casshern (キャシャーン)} 2004.)
Subverting the Yellow Peril and Taking Pride in Race

“What is the yellow peril? It is we, we Asians! We! We! We!” Huang Zunxian, 1900.\(^{250}\)

Reactions to the yellow peril discourse varied: Some called for a united yellow race to combat the much more real ‘White Peril;’ others dismissed the term as merely based in delusional Western fears; and the more inventive of the intellectuals turned the peril on its head and envisioned the positive effects that Asia could have on the imperialist West.

Lu Xun was in this third group. Although he was always opposed to Western imperialism, what he truly feared was that Chinese people would emulate the violence and greed of the West in order to expel them, thus becoming the West. In what Takeuchi Yoshimi famously called “Asia as Method,” Lu Xun looked to how Asia could provide another possibility to the ruthlessly competitive capitalist future offered by Western modernity. In 1908 he criticized those who were angered by Westerners’ talk of the yellow peril and promoted violence. Instead he argued that the yellow peril should be a movement of world peace:

Through the present writing I beg to submit to the able-bodied men of China that though bravery, strength and resolve in struggle are certainly attributes most appropriate to human life, they are best applied to self-improvement and should not be employed to attack and swallow up innocent countries. If our own foundation is stable and we have surplus

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\(^{250}\) Huang Zunxian lived in Japan for many years in the nineteenth century and his writings were among the most influential for late Qing intellectuals interested in Japan. He was associated with early Asianist organizations (see Chapter 1), but saw Japanese culture and lineage as a subset of China’s. Noriko Kamachi, *Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese Model*. Cambridge Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), 55 and 141.
strength, let us then act as the Polish general Bem did in supporting Hungary, or as the English poet Byron in aiding Greece, that is, to promote the vital cause of freedom and to topple oppression, so that the world will finally be rid of tyranny. We should offer aid and support to all nations in peril or distress, starting with those which have been our friends and extending our aid throughout the world. By spreading freedom everywhere, we can deprive the ever-vigilant white race of its vassals and servants; this will mark the beginning of a real “Yellow Peril.”

Sun Yat-sen’s reaction to the yellow peril discourse hinted at similar ends, but followed a nationalist model. In 1904 Sun Yat-sen dismissed the idea of the yellow peril as a Western delusion based upon a misunderstanding of the peaceful nature of the Chinese. “If Chinese people are able to achieve self-rule,” he argued, “then they will prove that they are the most caring and peaceful nation in the world.” Should this happen “the yellow peril can become the Yellow Fortune (huangfu 黄福).”

The above reactions are positive and constructive replies in the face of racial hatred. However, the majority of people did not show such patience and hold such high hopes for the future. Yan Fu, who was responsible or connected to the majority of the writing and translation concerning the yellow peril, was of the opinion that the war between the white and yellow races was an inevitability and must be prepared for. Writing such as this would

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252 From “Zhongguo wenti de zhen jiejue,” 中国问题的真解决 originally publishd in Jiangsu 江苏 in 1904. Taken from Sun Zhongshan xuan ji 孙中山选集 shang, 62 (1956).
253 Pusey 1983, 68
continue to appear for decades, although it was most pronounced in the years around the Russo-Japanese War and World War I.\(^{254}\)

In Yan Fu’s writing there were explicit calls for the yellow race to work together in order to expel the white peril. Although there is nothing surprising in such a view, Yan Fu particularly called for the Han to work together with the Manchus at a time when many intellectuals were calling for a Han-based revolution that would drive them from China altogether. Yan Fu argued that there are only “four great races” and, as the Manchu and the Han are of the same yellow race, they must work together.\(^{255}\) James Pusey notes: “He sounded a warning of the ‘white peril.’” “Yen Fu again looked outside China for the true field of Darwinian struggle. Even though it had been China’s defeat at the hands of another member of the yellow race – Japan - that had prompted him to write in the first place, Yen Fu looked beyond struggles within his race to a struggle that for him was far more frightening, the ‘ultimate’ struggle between races of different colors.”\(^{256}\) However, as the “science” of race was thriving in its infancy in East Asia, there were different interpretations of race and kind that conceptualized Han-Manchu relations within a racialized framework, demanding that they be destroyed, yet paradoxically maintaining calls for racial unity. Attempts to organize this theory into a discursive strategy of resistance utilized the terms *tongzhong* 同種 and *yizhong* 異種.

\(^{254}\) See the following chapter in this dissertation.
\(^{255}\) Pusey 1983, 68.
\(^{256}\) Ibid, 69.
Tongzhong and Yizhong

The idea of tongzhong, which simply translates as “same race” or “same kind,” was one of the underlying principles behind Asian cooperation beginning in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Japanese intellectuals eagerly accepted the concept and used it both to promote solidarity against the imperialist West and as a pretense to expand Japanese influence in East Asia. The term was used by intellectuals in Asia at least as early as 1880, when ambassador He Ruzhang met with leaders of the Kōakai 興亜会 in Tokyo. Throughout the 1890s and into the 1900s, influential journals, such as the Chinese Progress 时務報 and the Eastern Miscellany 東方雜誌 continued to echo the notion of tongzhong and the warnings of race war, often directly borrowing from Japanese pan-Asianists, such as Tarui Tōkichi and Konoe Atsumaro. It was a popular term for influential Chinese thinkers such as Zhang Zhidong, Liang Qichao, Zhang Binglin, Zou Rong and Sun Yat-sen. Unlike renzhong 人種 and zhongzu 種族, terms which were usually used to translate the term “race,” during the modern period tongzhong usually only referred to the people of East Asia. However, like all such identities, its inclusiveness was often broadened or narrowed to suit the needs of the speaker, as we shall see below with the examples of Zou Rong 鄒容 and Liu Shipei 劉師培.

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257 钦差大臣何公使ト曾根氏ノ談話 KKHK, 9. The Kōakai, or Raise Asia Society, was an early Asianist organization based in Japan in the 1880s. See Chapter 1. Also: Urs Matthias Zachman, “The Founding Manifesto of the Kōakai and the Ajia Kyōkai,” in Saaler and Szpilman 2011.

258 The lawyer and politician, Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉, wrote the most well-known book on an Asian union in the 1890s: On the Great Eastern Federation 大東合邦論. Prince Konoe Atsumaro 近衛篤麿 worked hard for Asian unity throughout his life, and notably established the Tōa Dōbunkai 東亜同文会 in 1898. These individuals are considered in greater detail in chapters 1 and 2, respectively.
Although the idea of a united East Asia based upon *tongzhong* had been raised before, in 1898 it became a popular topic and the terminology spread, partly due to Konoe Atsumaro’s famous article, “A Same-Race Alliance and on the Necessity of Studying the Chinese Question.” Konoe admonished Japanese for feeling superior because of their recent advancements on the path of “civilization,” and explained the need for working together with the Chinese during the coming race war between white and yellow races. As the 19th century was coming to a close, intellectuals in both China and Japan had largely accepted the Darwinist belief in competition and survival of the fittest. Competition was seen as the fundamental ingredient in progress, and could result in one culture, ethnicity or race being completely erased by another.

Konoe’s article was popular with many Chinese intellectuals. It was translated into Chinese for the *Su Bao* (Jiangsu News) in May of the same year and was later added to the famous “Collected essays about statecraft of the Qing” in 1901. The *Su Bao*, a paper under the protection of Shanghai’s foreign settlement due to the publisher’s Japanese family associations, was a popular publication for revolutionaries. In the short three page article,

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260 Konoe called this “competition between the races” *jinshu kyōsō* 人種競争. It was translated into “battle of the races” *zhonglei zhi zheng* 種類之爭.

261 The Chinese translation had the shorter title of “Union of the same race” 同種聯盟說, but it did include the section which explains Konoe’s hopes for Japanese government policy towards China as well. The Chinese translation can be found here: *Huangchao Jingshi Wen Tongbian* 皇朝經世文統編, juan 50 (Shanghai: Baoshan Zhai, 1901), 2057. This section of the “Collected essays about statecraft of the Qing” specifically concerns articles on an alliance with Japan.
Konoe had not used the terms tongzhong/dōshu 同種 or yizhong/ishu 異種, instead he used the longer forms, dōjinshu 同人種 and ijinshu 異人種. However, the translations used the shorter terms, words which had already entered common usage in Chinese publications on race, but also maintained an ambiguity due to their brevity.\(^{262}\)

Unlike the term dōjinshu, utilized by Konoe Atsumaro, tongzhong did not simply indicate “same race.” In fact, the term was in use long before there were theories of race in place; but there was a similar connotation and it is often translated as “same race.” The term actually means “same type” or “same kind,” and should only be translated as “same race” when the context clearly indicates such a meaning. Naturally, the term tongzhong belongs in the simple dichotomy of self and other, with its partner yizhong signifying the other. Although yizhong, usually translated as “different race,” was a common term used by East Asian intellectuals to refer to Westerners, its usage can be seen as far back as the fifth century Hou Hanshu (Book of the Later Han 後漢書), with a surprisingly similar meaning.\(^{263}\) In modern times, the term refers to race when included as part of the four character phrase: tongwen tongzhong. Tongwen 同文 is usually translated as either “same script” or “same culture,” wen alone indicated culture or civilization. However, when tongzhong was used as a two character term, its meaning was not always as clear. Defining who was and was not tongzhong was not

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\(^{262}\) These were also popular terms in Korean newspapers during this period. The Hwangsŏng sinmun has been particularly noted for regularly utilizing the terms tongju 同族, tongjong 同種 and tongmun 同文 in their pro-Japanese editorials which called for East Asian cooperation to repel the West, but in a form that would guarantee the autonomy of each of the three nations. See Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 88-93.

\(^{263}\) Etymology found in the Hanyu da cidian. Yizhong referred to a different tribe or group at this time. In classical Chinese notion of zhong, this differentiation was certainly not biological, but was defined by location and culture.
something that could be agreed upon. Neither was its opposite. The term *yizhong* – of a different kind – usually referred to the white West, but was also frequently used by revolutionaries to refer to the Manchu, who many of the leading Han intellectuals were trying to posit as of a different “type” or “race,” wanting to highlight their difference and inferiority.

**Anti-Manchu Nationalism and Race**

Although anti-Manchu writing had been appearing for centuries, a sudden incident brought it to widespread readership in 1903 with disastrous consequences. The popular newspaper *Subao*, operating in the politically protected foreign enclave in Shanghai, was becoming increasingly radicalized under the editor Zhang Shizhao (章士釗 1881-1973). With Zhang Binglin and Zou Rong arriving in Shanghai in 1903, they formed what Young-tsu Wong has called “a chorus of radicalism.”264 When Zou published the violently anti-Manchu book *The Revolutionary Army*, with an introduction by Zhang Binglin also simultaneously published in the *Subao*, the two became enemies of the Qing government in what is known as the *Subao* Incident. The protection of the foreign settlement saved them from execution, but they were both sent to prison, where Zou would die on April 3, 1905, 70 days before his release date.265

In his famous short book *The Revolutionary Army*, Zou Rong makes frequent reference to race. However, his use of the terms does not match Western concepts and is in

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264 Wong 1989, 40. Although the classically educated Zhang Binglin was already a well-known intellectual by this time, Zou Rong (1885-1905) was only 18 years old and completely unknown until this incident.

265 After much pressure from foreign consuls, Zhang was sentenced to three years, and Zou to two years. The government viewed Zhang as the more serious threat and found that Zou had “adopted Zhang’s ideas” (quoted on p42). Wong 1989, 40-43.
clear disagreement with Yan Fu’s understanding. Throughout the book he refers to the Manchu rulers as *yizhong*, a different kind, while he uses the term *tongzhong* to refer to the Han ethnicity in general. Yan Fu made his own references to *tongzhong*, but instead saw Manchus and Han and even Japanese as coming from the same *zhong*. In his popular translation of the book, John Lust translates *zhong, zu, renzhong* and *zhongzu* as “race.” However, it seems that Zou Rong often utilizes the terms only to distinguish between Manchu and Han: “Manchus are of a different *zhongzu* from those of us who are the divine descendants of the Yellow Emperor.”

In the fourth chapter of the book, Zou explains his emphasis upon race. This short, six page chapter entitled “The necessity to clarify race for the revolution” 革命之必剖清人種 exhibits Zou’s understandings of race, mixing classical Chinese distrust of northern “barbarians,” *yi* 夷 and *rong* 戎, with the modern racial differentiation of white and yellow. Like reformers Yan Fu and Kang Youwei, Zou believed that only the yellow and white races were worthy enough to survive evolution, but unlike Kang, who believed in the eventual amalgamation of the two races, Zou mirrored Yan Fu’s belief in natural selection through conflict and, therefore, the inevitability of race war:

The yellow and white races [黃白二種] which are to be found on the globe

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266 Zou Rong, *Geming Jun* 革命軍 (The revolutionary army), (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongying She, unknown date), 8-9.
268 For example: Lust 1968, 68, 69, 80, 126.
269 本與我皇帝神明之子孫不同種族者也, Zou, 23. Lust’s translation reads: “...were not by origin of the same race as the illustrious descendants of our Yellow Emperor.” 80.
have been endowed by nature with intelligence and fighting capacity. They are fundamentally incapable of giving way to each other. Hence, glowering and poised for the fight, they have engaged in battle in the world of evolution, the great arena where strength and intelligence have clashed since earliest times, the great theatre where for so long natural selection and progress have been played out.270

However, Zou sees the yellow race as being further divided into two groups: the Chinese race *zhongguo renzhong* and the Siberian race *xiboliya renzhong*.271 These groups are further divided into various nationalities: the Chinese race includes Han Chinese, Koreans, Thai, Japanese, Tibetans, and “other East Asian peoples.” The Siberian race includes Mongolians, Manchus, Siberians (former Tatars), “other North and Central Asians,” Turks, Hungarians, and “other yellow peoples from Europe.” This is all explained in the attached chart (see fig. 2).272 It should be clear that the Chinese race as explained by Zou is essentially a list of the ethnicities that fell under the traditional Sinosphere of China and neighboring vassal states. Scientific discourse had been appropriated to

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270 Lust 1968, 106.
271 Zou, 33.
272 Ibid.

Figure 5: Zou Rong’s categorization of the yellow race. Zou Rong, *Geming Jun* 革命軍 (undated), 33. Public Domain.
uphold a classical Chinese outlook. Of course, the focus of Zou’s book, and the reason for this detailed categorizing of “yellow” peoples, is to show that the Manchus belong to a different group and should therefore be expelled from the country. In doing so, he finds commonality with other East Asians based, not on linguistic or physical features, as was common at the time, but rather on his understanding of historical migration patterns: all of the above mentioned groups of the “Chinese race” having emigrated to their contemporary locations from China’s Northeast Huang River area huanghe dongbei during the Qin and Han dynasties.273

Zou then goes on to explain that the Chinese people (zhongguoren) are now no more than slaves. This time Zou is referring to the Han Chinese with his use of zhongguoren. His terminology is problematic here, and he has certainly failed in his attempt to “clarify race for the revolution,” as the title of his fourth chapter indicates. Although these terms have clearly not yet found any static meaning at this point, Zou Rong does not even make the effort to maintain continuity from one page to the next and the reader cannot have any clear idea what is meant by such terms as zhongguoren, zhong, zu, or zhongzu. Zou Rong was not concerned with establishing or supporting a rational terminology. Rather he was building a rousing and emotional argument against his oppressors. Zou was certainly not alone in using an arbitrary approach to race.

Liu Shipei

Like Zou Rong, Liu Shipei (1884-1919) was a follower of Zhang Binglin and

273 Zou, 34.
involved in the anti-Manchu group of revolutionaries in Tokyo. Although he would become best known for his anarchist writing, one of his first major works concerned race and ethnicity and has been considered the first important text on Han ethnicity.\textsuperscript{274} Just a year after Zou Rong’s famous \textit{Revolutionary Army}, Liu Shipei released his history of the Han nation titled \textit{Zhongguo minzu zhi} 中国民族志.\textsuperscript{275} Following Italian revolutionary hero Giuseppe Mazzini’s thinking on nationalism and political activism and strongly rooting his discourse in a Social-Darwinist belief of survival of the fittest nation, Liu rethinks Chinese history with the Han as core. For Liu, nation is based in bloodlines \textit{xuethong 血統}, and a nation must be ruled by those of the same nation. Therefore, disposing of the “barbarian”\textsuperscript{(yidi 夷狄)} Manchu is of the highest priority, just as the Italians freed themselves of the Austrians, and the Irish of the English.\textsuperscript{276} Like Zou, Liu saw the Han as an expanding force throughout 2000 years. He divided Han expansion into four periods and foreign invasion into five periods.\textsuperscript{277} Liu’s understanding of racial history comes directly from Sinologist Kuwabara Jitsuzō 桑原隲藏, from whom he quotes heavily. Kuwabara divided the “Asian Race” \textit{yaxiya renzhong} 亞細亞人種 into Siberian and Chinese races \textit{zhina renzhong} 支那人種. Unlike Zou Rong,

\textsuperscript{274} Zeng Limei 曾黎梅, “Liu Shipei yu Zhongguo minzushi yanjiu: yi ‘Zhongguo minzu zhi’ wei zhongxin” 刘师培与中国民族史研究—以《中国民族志》为中心 (Liu Shipei and research into the history of the Chinese nation: with \textit{Zhongguo minzu zhi} as focus) in \textit{Chuxiong Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao} 楚雄师范学院学报, (July 2010).

\textsuperscript{275} Liu Shipei 刘师培, “Zhongguo minzu zhi” 中國民族志 (A record of the Chinese nation), in Liu Shipei quanji 刘师培全集 (The complete works of Liu Shipei), (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1997), 597-626.

\textsuperscript{276} Liu Shipei 1997, 597.

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid, 598.
Kuwabara and Liu saw Japanese and Korean as belonging to the Siberian Race.\textsuperscript{278}

Like Zou, Liu sees the Han as the “slaves” of the Manchu. But he does more to stress the fear that in the near future the Han will become slaves of the white race (\textit{baizhong} 白種 or \textit{ouzhong} 歐種). He lists China’s invaders as Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{279} He sees the “white peril” \textit{baihuo} 白禍 as the ultimate danger for the Han and for the Asian race \textit{yazhong} 亞種 which he fears may be wiped out. Using the same example that Liang Qichao takes up in 1919, Liu Shipei warns his compatriots who do not believe in the threat of racial genocide to look at the natives of North America and Australia.\textsuperscript{280}

Zou and Liu Shipei’s belief that the Manchu were of a different “race” than the Han was not merely based upon hatred of the ruling ethnicity: in the early twentieth century Japanese anthropologists were busy creating ethnic classifications for all of Asia’s inhabitants. Torii Ryūzō 坪井 正五郎, one of the most influential of Japanese researchers in this new field, published numerous works on the “Siberian Race” around the turn of the century. In a 1904 work he exclaims with certainty: “From the viewpoint of physical features, the Manchus closely resemble the Tungus. We can be fairly certain that the Manchus are one of the subgroups of the Tungus. From the viewpoint of ethnology; they belong, beyond a doubt, among the Tungus race.”\textsuperscript{281} Such a classification led to anti-Manchu revolutionaries calling the Manchus Tungus or Siberian, and resulted in Japanese anthropology gaining

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{278} Ibid, 599.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Liu Shipei 1997, 625
\item \textsuperscript{280} Ibid, 626.
\item \textsuperscript{281} Translated and quoted in Ishikawa 2007, 11.
\end{footnotes}
popularity among many Han intellectuals. According to Ishikawa Yoshihiro, Zou may have found this racial classification system in Kuwabara Jitsuzō’s *Chūtō Tōyō Shi* 中等東洋史 (East Asian history for middle school) published in 1898.\(^{282}\) Regardless, the movement to view Manchus as coming from a different “race” was a popular one, and it led to the pro-Manchu reformers’ defensive reaction. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao could not deny the “scientific” evidence of the Japanese and the revolutionaries, but they still argued that the Manchu had been sufficiently assimilated by the Han to the degree that they should be considered one race.\(^{283}\) At this point, both revolutionaries and reformers agreed that China and Japan were of the same race or *tongzhong*, and they should work together. However, by the middle of the decade, simple hopes for *tongzhong* unity were fading amidst increasingly blatant Japanese feeling of superiority.

**Chen Tianhua, the beginning of the People’s News and the end of the “Golden Decade”**

1903 was the beginning of the Chinese students in Japan open calls for revolution to topple the Qing government and eradicate the Manchu. Chen Tianhua, a young revolutionary student from Hunan, arrived in Tokyo just as the anti-Manchu sentiment had reached its height.\(^{284}\) According to Feng Ziyu, this rise was instigated by Zhang Binglin’s April, 1902, rally in Ueno Park, held in opposition to the Qing government on the 242nd anniversary of China’s subjugation.\(^{285}\) But at the same time, the Japanese government was clearly becoming

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\(^{282}\) Ishikawa 2007, 17.  
\(^{283}\) Ishikawa 2007, 18.  
\(^{285}\) Zhang sees China’s subjugation to the Manchu as the fall of the Southern Ming in 1661, rather than the
more and more of an outright imperialist power. In early 1903, Osaka hosted a World Fair: the display of Taiwanese people as Japanese subjects and Hokkien culture as a subculture of Japan’s gave rise to protests among the Chinese visiting students, as well as the permanent Chinese communities in Japan. In addition, various other student protests were held throughout the year to voice the students’ displeasure with Japanese capitulation to Qing requests on student control. This was hardly the “Golden Decade” that Douglas Reynolds has described. The romance was ending. However, at the time of Chen’s arrival in Japan, the anger in his writing was directed towards Westerners and the Manchu ethnicity.

A fierce nationalist, Chen was distraught by the disdain directed towards Chinese around the world and particularly the treatment of Chinese students in the United States and Japan. Yet it was the domestic situation that bothered Chen the most. He makes specific reference to the famous sign in Shanghai that read “Dogs and Chinese not admitted,” a symbol of the disgusting racism that existed in semi-colonized China. Writing in a simple

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286 Although often referred to as a World Fair, this event was actually the fifth “National Industrial Exposition.” The Taiwan Pavilion brought about the indignation of many visiting students, including the Taiwanese themselves. See He Shifeng 河世鳳, “Taiwan and Its Self Images: The Case of Osaka Exhibition in 1903” 台灣與自我形象-以 1903 大阪博覽會為中心 in Taiwan shi yanjiu 台灣史研究 14:2 (June, 2007), 1-39.

287 Zhu and Niu 2006, 149.


290 Chen in Chapman 2000, 245. Although whether or not this sign actually existed has been debated by many historians, the legend was clearly very persuasive in 1903. Despite the fact that many Westerners certainly did treat Chinese people like dogs during this time, Robert Bickers and Jeffrey Wasserstrom have argued that the sign was never worded in such a disparaging way. Robert A. Bickers and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. “Shanghai’s ‘Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted’ Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol.” China Quarterly, no. 142 (1995): 444-66.
colloquial language, Chen made an emotional plea to awake the Chinese to the Western threat:

Here they come, here they come! Here who comes? The Westerners, the Westerners! Bad news for all! Young and old, men and women, rich and poor, officials, scholars, merchants and craftsmen – from this day on, we’re all just livestock in his pen, meat in his pot; not an inch or room to move, to kill as he chooses and stew to his taste. Also, our day of death has come!291

Chen made calls to kill Westerners in both of his published pamphlets, Soul Searching 猛回頭 and Alarm Bells 警世鐘 (The Tocsin), but in both he adds a note to indicate that he is referring to military personnel rather than civilians. However, he employs dramatic rhetoric to engender anger towards both Manchus and Westerners: “Kill the enemy of long generations, kill the enemy new to our shores, kill the sycophant collaborators, kill them all, kill, kill, kill!”292

The raw unbridled anger displayed in Chen’s writing is perhaps the most direct of his time, clearly speaking to the frustration that many were feeling under the increasingly unjust forces of imperialism, including Western empires, the Manchu Qing, and the Japanese. His work is often placed together with that of Zou Rong, who also utilized simple but powerful language to express his rage towards the Manchu rulers, and the necessity for Chinese to revolt and establish some form of democratic republic in order to survive in a world

291 Chen in Chapman 2000, 40.
dominated by race conflict.\textsuperscript{293}

His novel, *The Lion’s Roar*, concentrates upon the necessity of creating a national republic in order to fight against the encroaching West, what he calls the “white peril flowing across the rice paddies of East Asia.”\textsuperscript{294} Serialized in the *People’s News* after his death in 1905 and throughout 1906, the novel contains numerous themes that were central to the editorial preferences of the journal: Although *The Lion’s Roar* is labeled fiction, the majority of the text is essays on Darwinism, race and republicanism.

Writing on race, Chen is not very different from his contemporaries Zou Rong and Liu Shipei. His understanding of the world order was race-based, as was his understanding of democracy and nation.\textsuperscript{295} However, he went further in his descriptions of what binds and repels those of the same race:

Uniting with others is not as good as uniting with one’s own group zu 族. Therefore, we call those of the same ancestors and the same surname ‘tongzhong.’ Those of different ancestors and with different surnames are called ‘yizhong.’ To those who are tongzhong, we feel kinship and love. To those who are yizhong, we feel distrust and enmity. This is the competition between races (zhongzu 种族). The stupid and weak races are swallowed or destroyed by the intelligent and strong races, just as lesser animals are swallowed or destroyed by other animals.

\textsuperscript{293} In fact two of the most common books that concern Chen Tianhua are written about both of these young revolutionaries: Zhu and Niu 2006 and Fengzu Dai 冯祖贻 *Zou Rong Chen Tianhua pingzhuang* 邹容 陈天华评传 (Henan: Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990).

\textsuperscript{294} Chen Tianhua, *Shizi hou* 狮子吼 (The lion’s roar), in *People’s News* 民報 3 (January, 1906), fiction, 1.

\textsuperscript{295} Zhu and Niu 2006, 160.
Chen continues and carefully explains the background of each race:

To this day the many become more and more and the few become less and less. Of the countless races, there remains only five great races today, which can be carefully separated into a few hundred kinds. Of the five races, the yellow race is composed of the people of the Asian countries of China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Burma and Siam. Their civilization developed earliest, three or four thousand years ago, at which time they already had various institutions/technologies (制度) in place. Their numbers reached 800 million one hundred years ago, but now are over 500 million. Second is the white race, which resides in Europe. This race is composed of the peoples of Britain, Russia, Germany, France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Holland, Portugal and the now the countries of the Americas. Their civilization did not develop very early. During the Spring and Autumn period, they were still barbarians. All of their institutions/technologies (制度) come from China, such as the compass… guns… books…

Chen spends very little time mentioning other races or countries, and, when he does, he is not kind. Like his contemporaries, the only races that matter are the yellow and white. These intellectuals apparently accepted the discourse of white superiority to an alarming extent. Their efforts to engage with this discourse did not lead to their refutation of such absurd ideas. Instead they gave way to the power of “science” and tried to merely alter the discourse to include the yellow race, accepting that black, brown and red “races” were naturally inferior. Of course, these intellectuals would likely never come into contact with

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296 Chen Tianhua, *Shizi hou* 獅子吼 (The lion’s roar), in *Minbao* 3 (January, 1906), fiction, 3.
people that they did not consider to be either white or yellow, and accepted the paradigms of this hegemonic discourse as fact. When they did start meeting with Indians in Tokyo, we see this disparaging of other races falling from the pages of their journals. However, that would not occur until after Chen Tianhua’s death.

Writing under the penname Si Huang 思黃 or “Thinking of Yellow,” he was a strong proponent of race theory and bitterly opposed to the Manchu government and ethnic group. 297 Although in his writing his anger was directed towards the Manchu, he was also bitterly angry with Japanese restrictions on Chinese students. Only weeks after People’s News’ inaugural issue in November, 1904, he committed suicide in Tokyo Bay in order to show his anger with Japanese newspapers’ descriptions of Chinese students as being “unruly and debased” after the students protested Japanese government restrictions placed on them due to a Qing government request. 298 In his suicide note he particularly singles out Asahi Shimbun. 299 He is remembered in the second issue of People’s News. Along with a eulogy, photograph, and his final articles, the editors began to serialize Chen’s novel, “The Lion’s Roar.”

In his suicide note, a marked change from Chen’s earlier work is apparent. The publishing of this note also indicates the important change from race-based cooperation to

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297 In the People’s News, Chen Tianhua is referred to as Chen Xingtai 陳星台. He also wrote under his zi, Guo Ting 過庭.
299 Chen Tianhua “Chen Xingtai xiansheng jueming shu” 陳星台先生絕命書, in Minbao 2 (December, 1905), 1-2.
cooperation based upon a shared victimhood, a change that is the major focus of this chapter. After years of angrily protesting Manchu and Western imperialist action and discourse, Chen committed suicide as an act of protest against Japan, a country that falls within the yellow race. Chen makes his thoughts clear, angrily denouncing the idea of China and Japan becoming allies based upon the concept of *tongwen tongzhong*. Although he recognized the need to work with Japan in order to protect East Asia, he was aware that alliances are based on costs and benefits, and China could find its authority in peril.

An alliance is based upon equal costs and benefits, not on *tongwen tongzhong*. Britain does not ally with the *tongwen tongzhong* countries of Europe, but with the non-*tongwen tongzhong* country of Japan.

Although China and Japan have similar costs and benefits, their national power is markedly different and uniting with Japan could lead to China losing even more autonomy, as in the case of Korea. However, cutting China off from Japan could lead to the end of East Asia. These words of Chen’s were immediately published in the *People’s News*. The editors also included a photograph of the powerful-looking man, a eulogy and subsequently published all of his unpublished works. He had become a martyr and, through his act of suicide, left his readers and colleagues with an enduring message. The hopes for Japanese assistance in defending against Western empire, although not entirely destroyed, were disappearing. The Golden Decade had come to an end and Chinese intellectuals would have to look elsewhere for help against the encroaching empires.

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300 Chen Tianhua “Chen Xingtai xiansheng jueming shu” 陳星台先生絕命書, in *Minbao* 2 (December, 1905), 6.
The Revolutionaries are introduced to India

The editors of the People’s News had always put a strong emphasis upon race, viewing it as an important concept in any analysis of China’s problems. From the very beginning, before Zhang Binglin had been released from Qing prison and become editor-in-chief, Wang Jingwei had set the tone of the journal in the inaugural issue: he began with a discussion of ethnology or the study of race 人種學 to emphasize the difference between Han and Manchu. Zhang Binglin had gladly continued with this vein when he arrived in Tokyo in July, 1906. His trials in prison and his firm rejection of the Manchu and the Qing during the Subao Incident had confirmed his loyalty to the movement. Sun Yat-sen had four representatives meet Zhang on his release from prison on June 19 and accompany him back to Japan, where he was asked to take control of the People’s News and experienced a period of solidarity with Sun and Huang Xing.

Zhang Binglin had actually been one of the first to write extensively about race in Chinese, and had certainly been one of the first to write that the Manchu were of a different race than the Han. The enormous popularity of his A Book of Urgency 麹書, first published in 1900, but reedited and republished to popular reception in 1904, brought his views to a generation and played an important role in establishing a racial paradigm and vocabulary for

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301 Wang Jingwei detailed six elements for differentiating peoples through the scientific study of race: bloodlines, language and script, territory, customs, religion and spirit (精神). He then argues that as Manchus are different from the Han in all of these elements, they must be of a different ethnic nationality 民族 and must then be of a different country, for, as he repeats throughout the article, “One ethnic group is one citizenry” 一民族為一國民. Wang Jingwei 汪精衛, “Minzu de guomin” 民族的國民 in Minbao 民報 1, 1-31 (1905).
302 Wong Young-tsu 1989, 46, 50.
a generation.\(^{303}\) However, he himself may have been realizing that there were grave limitations to the racial model that would not allow for the successful overthrow of the Manchu.\(^{304}\) Zhang began looking for other avenues to accomplish his goals. When he took control of the *People’s News*, he began introducing his readers to Yogācārā Buddhism, which he had studied while in Shanghai’s Tilanqiao 提篮桥 Prison.\(^{305}\) Through Yogācārā, Zhang hoped to find a non-Western method to structure his political philosophy.\(^{306}\) He began experimenting with different philosophies and directions, but his path was largely directed by historical forces.


\(^{304}\) Kai-wing Chow argues that Zhang realized as early as 1900 that the race war model was ineffective as it could not effectively exclude the Manchu from the yellow race. Chow then sees Zhang as creating and promoting “Han racism.” Kai-wing Chow, “Imagining Boundaries of Blood: Zhang Binglin and the Invention of the Han ‘Race’ in Modern China” in Frank Dikötter (ed.) *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 34-52.

\(^{305}\) Wong Young-tsu 1989, 43, 53.

\(^{306}\) Murthy, chapter 3.
Changes were taking place throughout the first decade of the twentieth century that would shape the now influential Zhang. In 1905, while Zhang was still in prison, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was expanded and renewed, with the introduction of clauses specifically relevant to British interests in South Asia. The gradual strengthening of the alliance created an overlap between two empires, offering the possibility of new interactions. Indian communities in Japan, like Chinese and other foreign communities, were largely centered in Yokohama and Kobe at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, Tokyo was becoming the city for revolutionaries and anarchists. In 1906, the same year that Zhang arrived in Tokyo, an Indian revolutionary named Borohan arrived from the United States. Borohan and another unknown Indian, only referred to as Bose, met with Zhang in Tokyo, likely at the beginning of 1907, and discussed the similarities between China and India, two countries suffering under what Zhang refers to as a kedi (a visiting emperor). Of the meeting Zhang wrote:


308 Aside from Zhang’s writings, nothing is known about this man, including his full name. Although Zhang places great importance on Borohan’s position among Indian revolutionaries, this cannot be confirmed.
“I think the two countries have been old bosom friends. We should consider the pros and cons and complement each other.”

This meeting begins Zhang’s sudden fascination with India, which is detailed in the pages of the *People’s News*. Essays on India begin to appear in every issue, as well as photographs of Indian independence fighters, articles in support of Sanskrit studies, and translations from Indian newspapers. Not long after Zhang begins this deep interest in India, an important event occurs that strengthens his support for Indian independence and ends any lingering hopes he has for Japanese support.

On April 20, 1907, Zhang attended an event to commemorate Shivājī. Speaking at the event was the former prime minister Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkuma was an important member of the government opposition at the time. He had regularly supported both the revolutionaries and reformists from China and maintained friendships with both Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen. However, Ōkuma’s speech and actions deeply shocked and frustrated Zhang Binglin. Ōkuma warmly greeted the white English on his arrival: “When Ōkuma saw that there were British gentlemen and ladies in attendance, he shook hands with them respectfully and showed great humility before them. I never thought Ōkuma, being such a famous politician, would act like that.” He urged the Indian revolutionaries in attendance

309 Quoted in: Lin Chengjie “Friendship-in-Need Between Chinese and Indian People in Modern Times.” In Tan Chung (ed.) In the Footsteps of Xuanzang: Tan Yun-shan and India, 153-168 (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 1999), 155.
310 Zhang detailed the event and his Indian friends in an article and supplementary note in *Minbao* 13: “On the Commemoration of Shivājī 記印度西婆耆王紀念會事” and “Seeing off the two gentlemen Bose and the Indian lawyer Borohan” 附錄送印度鉢邏罕保什二序. In *Minbao* 13, (May 5, 1907), editorial 時評, p19-26. Shivājī Bhosale (1627-1680) fought against the Mogul Empire and pushed them from his homeland in 1674. Zhang compares Shivājī to Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming Dynasty and a Han Chinese who delivered the Han Chinese independence from the Mogul Yuan. Celebrating Shivājī, who had ended foreign rule of India and changed the court language from Persian to Marathi, was a way for Indians to protest English rule and demand independence without directly and dangerously doing so.
“not to blame the British for their ills, nor to resort to violence, but instead concentrate their energies on social reform.”\(^{311}\) Zhang’s disappointment in Ōkuma turned to anger: “What we should be suspicious of is the fact that even Ōkuma, this ‘Oriental hero,’ still tries to flatter. Has he become senile? Are all his energies desiccated?” Japan has a duty, as both the most powerful Asian state as a nation which has received Buddhism from India: “Even if [Japan] cannot extend its administrative or military strategies that far, the will must remain alive.”\(^{312}\) Realizing that Ōkuma now placed more importance upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance than he did upon his Asian friends, he dismissed the Japanese government and became more and more interested in India.

However, considering why Zhang would work with Indians, when he appears to be one of the most racial intellectuals of the modern period, one must look to Zhang’s earlier work, in which he explains his understanding of race. In the 1904 reedited edition of the *Book of Urgency*, Zhang differentiates the white and yellow races from all other peoples. However, his understanding of these groups is very different from the ways in which they were imagined by others. He accepts the contemporary belief that the Han, and therefore the yellow race, are descended from the Babylonians, as is the white race. His views on Indian ancestry are also interesting: “Actually, Indians are of the white race. From the time of the Vedas, their philosophy surpassed that of China, yet still today they are regarded as an

\(^{311}\) Quoted in Yuan P. Cai 2011, 179.

uncivilized ethnic group. They are then half civilized and half barbarian.”^313

Zhang’s early views on race are rooted in a classical Chinese paradigm of civilized and barbarian, wedding the Yi-Xia distinction with the modern concept of civilization, and there are very problematic contradictions in his writing as he engages with modern ideas on race. He posits the white and yellow races as the only civilized races time and again, seeing them at the top of a hierarchy of races, yet he also frequently constructs hierarchies within the races, notably the rather petty placing of Manchus at the bottom of a hierarchy within the yellow race. The contradictions that are inherent within Zhang and his friends’ discussions of race and their utilization of racial theory in order to attack the Manchu Qing become all the more clear with their turn to India. It is at this point that the racial talk ends and the revolutionaries take an important turn to concentrate upon the differences between oppressed and oppressor nations. What takes prominence in 1907 is not about race as much as it is about a transcending of the racial question.

The Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood

Much has been written about the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood.^314 In fact, the number of essays on the association is surprising, considering the limited number of relevant primary sources. This indicates that the symbolic value of such an organization outweighed

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^313 雖合九共之辯有口者。而不能予之華夏之名也。惟西南焦僥從人。長三尺。某知其誰氏。要之印度。即印度百種。自吠陀以來。哲學實勝中夏。至今尚稱蠻民。亦文野半也。Zhang 1958, 39.

^314 Due to the international nature of this organization, it used an English name from the beginning. However, as Chinese revolutionaries in Tokyo were responsible for much of the writing on the brotherhood, the Chinese name Yazhou Heqin Hui (亞洲和親會) has appeared in print many times, resulting in a number of common English translations of the association, including: Association of Asian Affinity and Asian Solidarity Society.
its actual influence at the time. As a Chinese-intellectual-initiated Asianist organization with impressive international membership, the society requires a thorough introduction.

The society was founded in late April, 1907. Sixteen months later, it was disbanded, "largely due to the intervention of the Japanese government." During this short time, membership included quite an impressive number of people from across Asia. Chinese members included Zhang Binglin, Chen Duxiu, Liu Shipei, the anarchist Zhang Ji 張繼, anarchist and early feminist He Zhen 何震, one of China’s first promoters of socialist works, the half-Chinese, half-Japanese Datong School graduate, Su Manshu 蘇曼殊, early socialist Tao Zhigong 陶治公 (1886-1962), Min Bao editor Lu Fu 呂复 (1879-1955), and socialist, Luo Xiangtao 罗象陶.

Japanese members included: Kōtoku Shūsui 幸德秋水, a famous socialist anarchist known for introducing Kropotkin to Japanese audience – he was well-known at the time of the association - Ōsugi Sakae 大杉栄, a well-known socialist anarchist, and Sakai Toshihiko 堺利彦, another well-known anarchist. All three played a large role in the translation of anarchist and socialist literature into Japanese. Other members included Yamakawa Hitoshi 山川均, one of the founders of the Japan Communist Party, and Takeuchi Zensaku 竹内善朔, a socialist and supporter of revolution in both Japan and China. Although numerous

315 Cai 2011, 181.
sources refer to members from India Korea, Annam (Vietnam), Burma and the Philippines, the only names to be found are those for Zhang’s two Indian friends Borohan and Bose, the identities of both Indians, however, remain unknown. The famous Vietnamese revolutionary Phan Bội Châu 潘佩珠 has also indicated in his memoirs that he was involved with the association.317

Some studies on the society have taken it for granted that this organization would not work with Japanese citizens and did not allow them to participate.318 This was not at all the case. Although anti-Japanese sentiments were rising, the anger was directed at the government and capitalist class. Zhang Binglin and the other Chinese revolutionaries maintained their friendships with Japanese people and invited many to take part in their society. The People’s News continued to have as its third principle (zhuyi 主義), “We advocate the alliance (lianhe 聯合) of the citizens of both China and Japan.”319 However, the fact that the manifesto was published in Chinese and English yet not Japanese does indicate the clear direction that the founders were hoping to take.

Judging from the great number of prominent Chinese and Japanese anarchists involved in this organization, one might expect that anarchism would be one of the main ideological systems on which they based their beliefs. However, their manifesto directly stipulates: “All Asians, except those who advocate imperialism, shall be admitted regardless

318 Wong 1989, 73.
319 These three principles were usually printed on the second to last page of every issue of the People’s News. The other two principles were: “To overthrow all vile (elie) governments that exist today.” And: “Maintain true peace across the world.”
of whether they are ‘Nationalists,’ ‘Republicans,’ ‘Socialists’ or ‘Anarchists.’” Most of these intellectuals had not yet made names for themselves. It seems more likely that the association enabled the greater sharing of anarchist and revolutionary ideas and their transmission around Asia. However, the organization of the association certainly hints at the anarchist leanings of the group: “The posts of chairman and secretary shall be left unfilled, in order to reflect the egalitarian nature of the association and the spirit of mutual respect.”

The central purpose of the association was clearly expressed in the manifesto: “The objective of the society is to fight against imperialism and to achieve the independence of Asian peoples who have lost their sovereignty.” The “Preamble” of the manifesto emphasizes the need to free Asians from white European imperialism, but also mentions the need to end the Manchu Qing Empire. Uniting the people of Asia is the means to this end, but particular emphasis is given to the union of China and India:

Our Chinese, Indian, Annamese, Burmese and Filipino brethren have vowed not to follow in the footsteps of these nations and have established the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood to fight imperialism in order to preserve our various races. In the future when we rise up against the Western barbarians, people from both East and South will unite in their efforts and we will have all the strength of bundled reeds. We will form a fraternal alliance that will revive the fortunes of our Brahmanism, Confucianism and Daoism and expose the immoral falsehood of the West. While we cannot assemble all our brethren now, we can first unite India

and China, the two most ancient and largest lands in the East. If these two countries can achieve independence, they will be able to form a protective shield over Asia and many countries will be the beneficiaries. All Asian races who share a firm belief in national independence should unite, and we extend our warmest welcome to them.  

Unlike much of the writing that appeared in the revolutionaries’ writings before this, race was not the primary focus. Although the “races of Asia” was mentioned in the preamble, the focus was now on reviving nations suffering under the oppression of imperialism. Race may have remained part of the conceptual terminology, but all efforts to show the basis of unity highlighted the commonality of their suffering and lack of national independence. The members were to strive for national independence through cooperation.  

This emphasis on national independence or national determinism is what historians from China have chosen to concentrate upon more recently, choosing to see the association in the context of its relevance to rising Chinese nationalism and twentieth century mainstream ideologies. Cui Jinyi sees the association as a mix of “guocui 国粹 nationalism, socialism, as well as Buddhist nihilism and liberalism.”  

While Zhu Wuben finds two principle uses for the Brotherhood: 1: The furthering of the consciousness (awakening) of Asia’s colonies and semi-colonies; 2: Exposing and destroying the imperialist strategy of using Asians to attack Asians. These studies are building upon earlier Chinese studies of the Asiatic

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323 Ibid, 183.  
324 Cui Jinyi 崔金懿. “Zhengzhi rentong yihuo minzu rentong” 政治認同抑或民族認同 (Political identity or national identity). Legal System and Society 法制与社会 (July, 2007), 781.  
Humanitarian Brotherhood by Tang Zhijun, who provided a similar analysis as early as 1980.\textsuperscript{326}

What is striking though, is how national independence was imagined in relation to Asian solidarity. Asianism could only exist in close association with nationalism. The Asianism of the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood was a form of Asianism that promoted solidarity from a shared sense of victimhood, not unlike twentieth century Chinese nationalism. Although the association was a failure in terms of action and longevity, it does shed light on the conflicting ideologies that were prevalent among Chinese intellectuals on the eve of the 1911 Revolution and suggests a relationship with the rise of Chinese nationalism.

\textbf{Race and Revolution}

The Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood highlights the ideological problems that Chinese intellectuals were facing at the time, problems that were also pronounced in 1911 and would leave their influence upon Chinese nationalism and the construction of the Chinese state in the twentieth century. The two most important conflicts for Chinese to resolve at the time were the internal problem of Manchu dominance and the external problem of white imperialism. In order to engage with these issues, Han nationalism and racial unity were being proposed. The Asiatic Brotherhood shows the failure to resolve and unite these two strategies.

\textsuperscript{326} Tang Zhijun 汤志钧, “Guanyu Yazhou Heqinhui” 关于亚洲和亲会 (On the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood), in Xinhai Gemingshi Congkan 辛亥革命史丛刊 (Beijing : Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), 79-84. Tang helpfully reprints the entire manifesto at the end of the article.
This is best displayed in an article by Tang Zengbi 湯增壁 (1881-1948).327 “The hopes for Asian Friendship” 亞洲和親之希望, which appeared in the August 10, 1908, edition of People’s News.328 Tang Zengbi was a member of the Tongmenghui and an ardent advocate of revolution. His article “The Psychology/Mind of the Revolution” 革命之心理, published only two months after this article on the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood, would result in the Japanese government banning publication of the People’s News for one year. Tang begins his article on Asian friendship by describing the hardships experienced by the Han living under the Manchu empire:

The Han people are failing. Their livelihood is withering. We are experiencing great hardships. It is now crucial that we rise and plan for the revolution.329

Although he concedes that many Han are involved in the cause to remove the Qing government, he criticizes those who turn to the West for help. In what appears to be an attack on the reformers, he criticizes those who are:

… always praising the white race and looking down upon those from their own continent. They concentrate on getting rid of the Manchu, but always turn to the foreign lands. This is a violation to the psyche (心理) of our

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327 According to Zhou Nianchang, Tang studied at Waseda University, possibly beginning in 1903. He became a copy editor at the People’s News in 1906 and attended Socialism Lecture Group 社會主義講習會 (81). Although relatively unknown compared to many of his contemporaries in the Tongmenghui, he contributed many articles on revolution and socialism to various Chinese publications in Tokyo, especially the People’s News. See Zhou Nianchang 周年昌, “Tongmenghuiyuan Tang Zengbi xiansheng eranshi” 同盟會員湯增壁先生二三事 (A few things about Tang Zengbi, a member of the Tonmenghui), Jiangxi Shehui Kexue 4 (江西社會科學 4) (1981), 81-86.
nation.\textsuperscript{330}

This sentence in particular highlights the problems of using racial theory to try to deal with two major conflicts in China. It would inevitably prove to be divisive. Although the colonial situations differed across Asian countries, like the other members of the Asiatic Brotherhood, Tang turned to India and Vietnam to try to understand and overcome the Manchu problem. He quotes heavily from an Indian acquaintance to prove to his audience the similarity of their situations and the need for unity:

An Indian came to me and said: ‘You and I are prisoners, facing each other, weeping and talking, bound miserably, intolerable for both. If we are not to rely on each other, then we are lost. These words are from the bottom of my heart: There will be a brighter day. Although our prisons are different, the despicable treatment by the guards is the same… then we cannot work with the guards, and cannot let the guards know, much less abandon our fellow prisoners and turn to the guards for help. If we want revolution, we must unite with the Vietnamese.’\textsuperscript{331}

However, the dilemma faced by Indians and Vietnamese was markedly different from the Chinese dilemma. For Indians, the external and the internal conflicts were one and the same. The issue of racist imperialism was clear. For the Han, both the Manchu and the Japanese represented an imperialist threat. Despite this, Tang continued to describe race as the basis that united Asians. However, their shared victimization at the hands of the imperialists was clearly better described and the indications of another basis for Asian

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid, p56.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid, p56.
solidarity are apparent. The following passage shows the difficulties Tang had in describing an Asia united by oppression while mired in the language of racial theory:

Therefore, it is only when we are looking towards *datong* and we have talk of a socialist revolution will it be right to unite with our European and American comrades. For the many conquered states of East Asia, the situation is vastly different. It is right that we support each other, and I see race 種族 as the reason. Politics and society must all be reformed. This must be done soon. Race is the main point. All the states of Asia are friendly allies, aside from Japan. Does not everyone feel the same?332

Japan was the problem for Tang. Despite earlier efforts by some revolutionaries to construct racial paradigms that distanced Japanese from the Han, they could not be considered to be non-Asian. Race had presented itself as useful concept for mobilizing the people in the fight against oppression, and this is captured quite well in Tang’s writing. However, as Japan rose to power it had become clear to these intellectuals that race could only temporarily stand as the dominant concept in their strategy. As those from the same race proved to be as great a threat as the whites, a more general model of oppression and mobilization was required.

**Conclusion**

Zhang Binglin and his writings are frequently referred to as Asianist.333 This labeling is usually in reference to Zhang’s establishment of the Asiatic Humanitarian Brotherhood and a few of his publications in the *People’s News* during these years. Zhang was certainly

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332 Ibid, p57.
333 For example: Cai 2011, 180; Sheng Banghe 2011, 181; Shimada 1990, 77; Duara 2010, 969.
not the only person to advance these beliefs during this time. However, he has come to be a convenient symbol of the short-lived movement. There were three important elements to this Zhang-centered Asianism that can be clearly identified: race, religion and culture. But all three of these were bases from which to promote unity of the oppressed.

Zhang tried to imagine Asia as a racial, religious and cultural unit. For revolutionaries race indicated a very real blood connection that demanded cooperation between members of a race, just as one would cooperate with members of the family. As for religion, “He argued that the religions of Asia should be used as weapons to strengthen the moral fabric of fellow Asian nations and to expose the ‘falsehood’ of Western religion.”

And in what Sheng Banghe calls Zhang’s “Cultural Asianism,” Zhang was a strong advocate for the study of Sanskrit in order to increase Asian bonding. Unlike other reformers and revolutionaries who were turning to Europe for new knowledge, Zhang embraced Asian languages and scholarship, promoting them in the People’s News and encouraging young scholars. In a letter to Su Manshu, who would become a great translator of Sanskrit texts, he wrote: “Among the languages and scripts of our Asia, apart from Sinitic characters, Sanskrit and Arabic excel and Sanskrit is the most profound. Where is to be brought into China, not only would it be fortuitous for [the study of] Buddhist dharma, but it would also create many more connections for the situation of Asian brotherhood. I hope that Master [Su] works wholeheartedly towards this. This would be most fortunate.”

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335 Quoted in Zhang Zhijun 1980, 82. 我亚洲语言文字，汉文而外，梵文及亚拉伯文最为成就，而梵文尤微妙，若得输入域中，非徒佛法之幸，即于亚洲和亲之局，亦多关系，望师一意此事，斯为至幸。
In the years before the 1911 Revolution, the revolutionaries in Tokyo, particularly Zhang, were discussing these racial, religious and cultural bonds as means to unite Asia, led by Han nationalists in a movement to liberate oppressed nations across Asia. What really bound Asia together was oppression. How this influenced the development of Han and Chinese nationalism is a subject for further discussion. That this extended beyond race was clear in Zhang’s writing:

As long as people establish nation-states, we must hold to nationalism. But there are more broad nationalisms. We uphold a nationalism that is not limited to the Han race. If we have enough power, we must also help other weak nations, nations that have been conquered by other nations, whose governments have been stolen and made into slaves. Also, India and Burma were destroyed by England. Vietnam was destroyed by France. The wise and benevolent races will be eliminated. Our nation must counter this trend. Except for our nation, which wise and ancient state still stands to let its people fall into slavery? If we want a complete nationalism, we must extend our hearts to help people suffering from the same ailment, and make their land totally independent.336

The historical circumstances of Manchu, Western and Japanese oppression of the Han had given rise to a particular kind of nationalism. Race-based Asianism did not flourish as smoothly and readily in China as it did in Japan and Korea.337 The issue of pursuing

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337 Race-based Asianism was particularly popular in modern Korea, where activists as divergent as Yun Ch’iho and An Chunggūn utilized race-based Asianist arguments to respectively praise and criticize Japan. See: Shin Gi-wook, “Asianism and Korea’s Politics of Identity,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6.4, 616-630 (December, 2005), 618-619.
difference between the Han, the Manchu and the Japanese prompted Chinese intellectuals to emphasize a different self-other binary, that of oppressed and oppressor. While not entirely replacing race-based Asianism, this in turn brought about a different imagining of Asia and, therefore, Asian cooperation. This becomes clearer with Chinese intellectuals rejection of a more thoroughly articulated but more openly hegemonic Japanese Asianism around the time of World War I, examined in the following chapter.
Chapter IV: Asia for the Asians: Translating Asianism during World War I, 1914-1918

Introduction

Ideas for China to work with other Asian nations to deal with Western imperialism continued into the second decade of the twentieth century but the central basis for unity had drifted away from race. Zhang Binglin’s calls to work with Indians in opposition to imperialism disappeared when the 1911 Revolution successfully ended Manchu rule. The success of the revolution was partly due to the assistance of Sun Yat-sen’s Japanese friends, but after Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea, it was clear that Japan was not becoming a nation that would fight against the inequalities of a world system under the capitalist West. Instead Japan emulated the West more and more and had now become a full colonial power that could confront and defeat Western powers, as had been proven in the Russo-Japanese War just a few years earlier. Yet there remained many contradictions in the opinions of East Asians towards Japan. Japan still remained the source for knowledge throughout this period, and many Japanese opposed government policy and called for new approaches to China and Asia. As Japanese was relatively easy for intellectuals in China and Korea to learn, translations from Japanese were commonplace. Japanese newspapers were available in major cities across East Asia and often provided a gateway to international current affairs, just as Japanese periodicals and books provided a gateway to scientific knowledge. Furthermore, although the Boxer Indemnity Fund had resulted in an increased number of Chinese students studying in the United States from 1909 onwards, Japan still remained the most popular foreign study
location for students from China and Korea.\footnote{Only 1300 students took part in the Boxer Indemnity Program from 1909 to 1929, while the number of Chinese students in Japan was more than this at any given time. Although the numbers fluctuated by a surprising amount, in the busy years of 1905-1907 there were between 7000 and 12,000 Chinese students in Japan. Between 1900 and 1911, Paula Harrell estimates that more than 20,000 Chinese students studied in Japan. Today Japan is once again one of the most popular destinations for Chinese students. In 2010 students from China made up 60.8\% of all foreign students with 86,173 students. Koreans were the next largest group totalling 20,202 (14.2\%), followed by Taiwanese with 5,297 (3.7\%). Douglas R. Reynolds, \textit{China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan} (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 48. Paula Harrell, \textit{Sowing the Seeds of Change: Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895-1905} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 215. Statistics according to Japan Student Services Organization (Ministry of Education) webpage: http://www.g-studyinjapan.jasso.go.jp/en/modules/pico/index.php?content_id=25 (accessed on March 15, 2014).} Graduates returning from Japan dominated industry, military and media positions, as well as government offices.\footnote{90\% of foreign educated returning students who passed the civil service exams between 1906 and 1911 were graduates from Japanese institutions. Harrell 1992, 214.} These elite intellectuals created international relationships with Japanese intellectuals and often translated or introduced popular Japanese writings to Chinese readers.

During this period of growing Japanese hegemony, the Great War broke out in Europe, showcasing violent and immoral aspects of Western civilization, and playing a role in delivering Chinese intellectuals to new ways of thinking about the world and civilization, one of the focuses of this chapter. Here I investigate the \textit{Eastern Miscellany 東方雜誌} in the years leading up to the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Intellectuals returned to the dichotomy of East and West and engaged in discussions on the possibilities for resolving opposing civilizational attributes through conflict or synthesis. Japanese intellectuals were going through a similar but markedly different process to their Chinese counterparts, as they discussed how to unite Asia to defend against Western imperialism. During this time of rising Chinese nationalism, rising anti-Japanese sentiment and increasingly open Japanese
imperialism, Chinese intellectuals translated a surprising number of Asianist texts.

As shown in the chapters above, there had already been decades of Sino-Japanese intellectual cooperation and discourse of Asianism on the bases of the classical Confucian Sinosphere and race. In this chapter I show how Chinese intellectuals redefined the East against the West during the Great War, asserting the unique nature of East Asia as a civilization. This discourse also defined the Sinocentric Eastern civilization as anti-imperial. Written in dialogue with Japan’s own Great War discussions of East Asian civilization and Asianism, this redefining of the East led to a rejection of Japan’s militant Asianism as a Western phenomenon and a part of Japan’s “leaving Asia” strategy. Ultimately, and as will be explained in Chapters V and VI, Chinese intellectuals would turn to constructing their own versions of Chinese Asianism in response to this issue. Despite rejecting any form of Japanese leadership, Chinese intellectuals remained open to the idea of a morally superior Asian civilization as a model to counter Western imperialism.

This detailed study of the background and process of this comprehensive redefining of the East in opposition to the imperialist West, but inevitably also in opposition to a militant Japan, examines Chinese and East Asian identity construction with the aim of exposing the process by which intellectuals turned to the concept of Eastern civilization. This turn could not have occurred without the impetus of violent war in Europe and the detailed reporting of that war in the pages of Chinese print media.

**The Great War in the Eastern Miscellany**

Despite China’s relatively minor role in World War I, the war was of great concern to
intellectuals and would prove to have a tremendous influence upon the historical trajectory of China and East Asia. The ideological premises of wealth and power that late Qing intellectuals had focused on suddenly became called into question. As Xu Jilin explains, “the Great War’s eruption and its disastrous consequences awakened the Chinese intellectuals from the dream of materialism and statism.”  

This was clearly evident in the pages of the *Eastern Miscellany*, China’s most widely read periodical at the time. This periodical was extremely outward looking. The majority of the articles during this period of time did not concern China or even East Asia, but were primarily focused upon Europe and America, and occasionally upon other areas of the world. However, there was usually a lead article that would take a general look upon China and its problems, often discussing China in relation to the world at large. This article was regularly written by Du Yaquan, but prestigious guest writers would also regularly be given the privilege of having the lead article. The articles that followed contextualized China’s problems in the world system. For the years 1914 to 1919 this resulted in seeing China in correspondence with major discourses that were becoming common around the world through a global news system of which China was now a part. It also contextualized China’s present and future in terms of the war as a turning point.

Throughout the war, but especially in the early years, educated Chinese were very aware of the events of the war, reading translated reports that included detailed biographies,

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341 Christopher Reed notes that circulation had reached 15,000 by 1910, making the *Eastern Miscellany* the most widely circulated journal in China. Christopher A. Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 215.

342 Du Yaquan 杜亞泉, 1873-1933. Du was originally named Du Weisun 杜煒孫. His zi was Qiu Fan 秋帆.
maps, photographs from the front, and detailed descriptions of the towns and cities that were under siege. The first thirty pages of the *Eastern Miscellany* were regularly dominated by reports on the war, which sometimes took up ninety percent of this first section. The editor of the *Eastern Miscellany* during these years, Du Yaquan was already noting the possible influence the war would have on China in the August 1, 1914, edition. He saw how the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had brought the war to East Asia, and Qingdao and Hong Kong would soon be at war.\(^{343}\) He was quite accurate when he predicted the influence that the war would have upon China in the September 1, 1914, edition:

> At this time I cannot help but feel ill at ease for the changes that will soon be upon us due to the current war in the various countries of Europe. This is a great transformation that only occurs once in one hundred years, and it will have its influence upon us in China, creating smaller transformations over the next ten years.\(^{344}\)

Du made these predictions at the very beginning of the war. He also went into more detail on what the changes would mean for China, writing: “Firstly, it will incite our citizens’ patriotism. Secondly, it will arouse our nation’s self-awareness.”\(^{345}\) This article shows Du Yaquan’s concerns for the extent of the war, but, as can be seen in this quote, it also contains Du’s hopes that China’s citizenry will enter into a realization of their position in the modern system and bring China out of its dismal state. Like the majority of actors in the May Fourth

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\(^{345}\) 一為戟刺吾國民之愛國心。二為喚起吾民族之自覺心. Ibid, 4.
Movement, Du placed self-awareness and patriotism at the top amongst his hopes for changes in China. To that extent he utilized the *Eastern Miscellany* as an important vehicle for the modernization of thought in China, emphasizing the importance of science, but retaining pride in the history and the traditions of the East, a pride accelerated by the atrocities of war in Europe. Early on in the war, Du criticized the narrow-minded nationalism at the heart of Europe’s problems:

> Although cosmopolitanism and universal love are the epitome of Christianity, inside the citizens of these countries there is small-minded nationalism and despicable imperialism, tied together and inseparable. These transgressions have occurred due to ethnicity, brewing into ethnic war. If such atrocities can develop among people of the same white race, what will they make of us yellow people?[^346]

This fear of the West was different from earlier fears. With war breaking out between the so-called civilized nation-states of Europe, many beliefs of Western superiority were dashed. Du Yaquan led the assault on Western civilization. Although a strong proponent of science, he was not as accepting of the Social Darwinism that many of his contemporaries supported. He would quickly disappear from the stage in 1919, yet he had an immense influence upon Chinese thought throughout the 1910s as editor-in-chief of the *Eastern Miscellany*, a magazine that he would use to propagate his beliefs in Eastern civilization.

**The Eastern Miscellany and Japanese Connections under Du Yaquan**

By the outbreak of World War I, the *Eastern Miscellany* was an established and well-

[^346]: Ibid, 3.
renowned journal. Since 1910 it had been led by Du Yaquan, who Leo Oufan Lee calls “a ‘transitional’ intellectual very much in the late Qing reformist mode: a pioneer thinker who had translated several books on modern science and philosophy but who was unwilling to embrace total Westernization.”

Du Yaquan’s junior editor, Zhang Xichen, who worked under Du throughout all of this period, recalled that Du was focused upon science from the beginning. Like many scholars of the time, Du taught himself Japanese so that he could study science texts from Japan. Before working for the Commercial Press, he published his own science magazine, *Yaquan Magazine* 亞泉雜誌. He came to the Commercial Press in 1904 and began in the Science Department 理化部, where everyone was from his hometown of Shaoxing. They were therefore known in Shanghai as the Shaoxing Gang 紹興幫. As Leo Oufan Lee has mentioned above, despite his deep engagement with the world of science, Du rejected much of the revolutionary ideas that were gaining prominence at the time. Of particular note, and drawing the ire of those writing for *La Jeunesse* (Xin Qingnian 新青年), Du rejected the principle ideas of Social Darwinism that were becoming so popular in Chinese writing. In the pages of the *Eastern Miscellany*, he formulated and propagated his

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348 Both Du Yaquan’s name and the magazine he created mean “Asia’s source.” However, Du himself related his adopted hao to science, saying that ya 亞 was the short form of ya 氩 (argon), and that quan 泉 was the short form of xian 線 (line). Argon is the least reactive of the elements, while a line is a geometric form with no body or shape. In a play of words Du Yaquan explains that this refers to his quiescence and to his ambivalence towards face. Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, *Cai Yuanpei quanji 6* 蔡元培全集 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 360.

own ideas on culture and civilization. The evolutionary progression towards the ‘modern’ that had so entranced thinkers of the time, notably the writers of *La Jeunesse*, left no room for Chinese or Eastern culture. A linear model of history clearly demanded that “traditional” progress to “modern” and “Eastern” progress to “Western.” According to Gao Li’ke 高力克, Du Yaquan’s cultural theory “was a response to the evolutionary cultural approach envisioned by those associated with *La Jeunesse.*” Du’s ideas on civilization and evolution are important to the continued belief in the East and the survival of belief in Asianism in China and will be discussed further below. First, I will return to the subject of the *Eastern Miscellany* and discuss the many reasons it came to be such an important conduit for Japanese thought in general, shedding light on how Japanese ideas on Asianism were published in China so quickly after they appeared in Japan.

When Du Yaquan came to the *Eastern Miscellany*, he made considerable changes to its format and appearance. In 1910, in order to modernize this magazine that had been stagnating under its earlier editors, he copied the style and format of one of Japan’s leading periodicals of the time, *The Sun* 太陽. This journal, from which Du borrowed, not just the style and format, but also many articles over the years, was a long-running Japanese general-interest magazine, which largely represented the popular interests of educated Japanese. However, although Du was responsible for making the journal’s appearance Japanese, by the

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351 Zhang Xichen 1990, 287.
352 During these years, *The Sun* was edited by Yukita Kazutami 浮田和民 (1859-1946), whose views on Asianism will be discussed below. Theodore W. Goossen, “Taiyō,” *Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan*, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983), 320.
time that he stepped in to lead, the *Eastern Miscellany* and its publisher already had a very close connection with Japan. In fact, the Commercial Press was a half-Japanese company until just a few years before the war.

In 1904, the Japanese publisher Kinkōdo 金港堂 sent Hara Ryōchiburō 原亮三郎, Yamamoto Jōtarō 山本條太郎 and others to look into the possibilities of managing the Commercial Press as a joint venture. After deliberations they decided to invest 100,000 yen, half of the total capital of the Commercial Press. However, under Chinese law, the management and chairman had to remain Chinese. This brought about a new age for the Commercial Press. The new editors added to the board were Nagao Shintarō 長尾 真太郎, Kato Komaji 加藤駒二郎, and Motoki Katsutarō 木本勝太郎.353 The Sino-Japanese editorial office that resulted from this new change proved to be extremely capable and ushered the Press into a new age. After 1904 the Press dominated the domestic textbook market beyond all expectations and became the foremost publisher in China for decades after.354 This situation continued without issue until 1912, when the Chung Hwa Book Company 中華書局, the Commercial Press’ foremost competitor, utilized the nationalist movement that was sweeping the nation to advertise their publisher as the true Chinese publisher and attacked the dominant Commercial Press for allowing Japanese control over such an important industry. At that time, Japanese investment had actually dwindled to only

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353 Zhang Xichen 1990, 278.
354 For more on these characters, including their involvement in a textbook scandal leading to Kinkōdo posting them in China, see Christopher A. Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876-1937*, 197-198.
one quarter of the stocks, but rising nationalism, especially in the educated elite and educational industry to which the Press looked for their customers, would prove to be a dangerous threat to its future. Xia Ruifang 夏瑞芳, the chairman of the Press, asked the Japanese investors to sell back their stocks. He was at first unsuccessful. In 1914 an agreement was finally reached upon which the Japanese exchanged their stocks. “All the Japanese technicians departed in one fell swoop and created the Shanghai Printing Company.”

On the eve of World War I, the Commercial Press shed itself of the Japanese management and financial support that had brought it to power, but the Chinese editors who had long been working under this system would not be removed until the renewed attacks against the Press at the height of the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Although the Japanese personnel may have moved on to the Shanghai Printing Company, the influence of the Kinkōdō years remained. This can be seen in the pages of the Eastern Miscellany. The periodical, which remained under Du Yaquan’s control until 1919, retained the format and style of The Sun and continued to translate and publish major articles from Japanese periodicals and newspapers, including, but not limited to: Central Review 日本中央公論,356

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355 According to the memoirs of Zhang Xichen, on the night that the Japanese relinquished their stocks, Xia Ruifeng was assassinated by Chen Qimei 陈其美 of the KMT. Zhang Xichen 1990, 278, 282-3.
356 Central Review (Chūōkōron) was one of the most influential literary publications in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It has its roots in Hanseikai Zasshi 反省会杂志, the late-Meiji magazine which began in 1887. The name was changed to Central Review in 1899. This magazine was particularly influential during the Taisho Democracy period. It is still in circulation today. Arase Yutaka, “Chūō Kōron Sha, Inc,” Kodansha 1 (1983), 313.
Diplomatic Review 日本外交時報,\(^{357}\) New Japan 新日本,\(^{358}\) The Light of the East 東亞の光,\(^{359}\) Asian Review 亞細亞時論,\(^{360}\) Japan and the Japanese 日本及日本人,\(^{361}\) Twentieth Century 廿世紀, Shin Kōron 新公論, and Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun 東京日日新聞. Even years after the split with Kinkōdō, translations from these and other influential Japanese periodicals remained some of the most important sources for material for the *Eastern Miscellany*. For example, in the first half of 1917, two years after the Twenty-one Demands, 50 of the 82 articles in the first two sections of the journal were translations. 23 of those came from Japanese articles, while 24 were translations from English articles.

Translations from Japanese were handled by a number of the editorial staff at *Eastern Miscellany*. Sometimes Du Yaquan himself is listed as the translator under his pennames of Gao Lao 高勞 or Cang Fu 倉父. However, recalling the early days of his work as a translator for Du, Zhang Xichen explains that he would translate texts under Du’s penname. Du would

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\(^{357}\) *Gaikō jihō*, often listed as *Revue Diplomatique*, was the most popular Japanese magazine on international affairs and Japan’s foreign relations during this time. It was in circulation from 1898 to 1998.

\(^{358}\) Published in Tokyo by Fuzan Bō 富山房 (Fuzan Bō is the same publisher that released Kojō Teikichi’s books on the history of Chinese literature) and Shin Nihonsha 新日本社, *Shin Nihon* first appeared in 1911 and continued as a monthly until 1918.

\(^{359}\) *The Light of the East*, Tōa no Hikari, began publication in 1907.

\(^{360}\) Sometimes also catalogued as *アジア時論 (Ajia Jiron)*, *Asian Review* was an international magazine devoted to Asianism. Also available in an English edition, it was a major ideological publication for the Kokuryukai 黑龍會, the right-wing Asianist organization that was determined to drive Westerners out of Asia. Its contributors included Ōkuma Shinegobu, Rabindranath Tagore, and its famous editor Ryōhei Uchida. See Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryūkai, 1901-1920,” in Saaler and Szpilman 2011 (121-132), 122-123.

\(^{361}\) Established by Mikaye Serrei 三宅雪嶺, *Japan and the Japanese* was a continuation of Mikaye Serrei’s earlier journal *The Japanese* 日本人, which, from its publication in 1887, played in an important role in Meiji period Japanese nationalism. Mikaye’s nationalism emphasized Japanese culture and was very opposed to the Europanization of Japan. The magazine was regularly banned and twice changed its name to *Ajia* (Asia). Yamaryō Kenji, “Nihonjin,” *Kodansha* 5 1983, 380.
then review and correct Zhang’s translation before publication.\textsuperscript{362} It is therefore difficult to say with great accuracy to what extent certain individuals were involved in the process, but it seems certain that Du Yaquan maintained control over what was translated and what was published while he was the chief editor of the \textit{Miscellany}.

Of the articles that concern Asianism, the Japanese texts were translated or introduced by three of the most important editors at \textit{Eastern Miscellany}, Du Yaquan, Qian Zhixiu (1883-1947 錢智修), and Zhang Xichen (1889-1969 章錫琛). As mentioned above, Du Yaquan was the principal editor for \textit{Eastern Miscellany} from 1911 to 1920. During this period he published hundreds of his own articles and translations in the journal. Du would often include a number of his own articles in one issue. Qian Zhixiu too would regularly have four articles in one issue of the journal. Qian would become the editor-in-chief of the journal after Du’s departure in 1920. Zhang Xichen, although not quite as prolific as Du and Qian, still published at least 119 articles in \textit{Eastern Miscellany} between 1912 and 1917. The vast majority of these were translations from Japanese. After 1917, Zhang does not appear in \textit{Eastern Miscellany}, although he did stay with the Commercial Press. During the 1920s, he played a major role in the feminist movement, bringing many terms from Japanese into Chinese, translating Japanese feminist literature and serving as editor for \textit{The Lady’s Journal} 婦女雜志 and \textit{The New Woman} 新女性.\textsuperscript{363} Zhang would later be persecuted in the Anti-rightist Campaigns and finally die as a victim of the Cultural Revolution in June of 1969 after

\textsuperscript{362} Zhang Xichen 1990 (originally 1931), 256.

\textsuperscript{363} For more on Zhang’s involvement in these journals, see Zheng Wang, \textit{Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories}, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), especially Chapter 2.
being commanded to do forced labour at the age of 78.³⁶⁴

None of these three editors were conservatives in a narrowly defined sense of the term. Qian and Du, however, would certainly be accused of being so during the New Culture Movement, as over the course of World War I they developed a distrust of Western civilization and propagated an approach to modernization that would include Eastern values that stressed Confucianism.³⁶⁵ In fact, as Lydiu Liu shows, Du played a major role in bringing discussions of the individual (geren 個人) to the forefront.³⁶⁶ What was particular about Du’s approach was his emphasis on the need to reconcile the promotion of the individual with Confucianism and socialism. Although Du continually promoted Western science and played a tremendous role in supporting modernity through the publication of *Eastern Miscellany*, he was unwilling to accept total Westernization and continued to argue for Confucianism until he was removed from his position at the journal.

These translators had little experience in Japanese and there is no evidence that any of them received any education in Japan. Du Yaquan was self-trained in Japanese in order to read the science books that he had become fascinated with. Zhang Xichen had been enamored with Japan from a very young age. Although he had always wanted to go to Japan to study, he would never have the chance. The closest he ever came to this was a three month

³⁶⁴ Xia Yan 夏衍. “Remembering Mr. Zhang Xichen” 怀念章锡琛先生. In A Collection in Memorial of Mr. Zhang Xichen’s 100th Birthday 章锡琛先生诞辰一百周年纪念文集, 1-5 (Shanghai: Chuban shiliao bianjibu, 1990), 1.
³⁶⁵ Lee 2001, 40.
introduction to Japanese language at the Japanese Seminar School 東文傳習所 in Shaoxing. But this was enough for Du Haisheng 杜海生, the principal of the school he worked in years later, to recommend him to his distant cousin Du Yaquan.\textsuperscript{367} Within a few years, Zhang would become a renowned translator, but before the May Fourth Movement, he would remain in the employment of Du Yaquan, whose core beliefs framed the content of the \textit{Eastern Miscellany} and determined what would be translated. At the core of Du’s thought is his understanding of civilization, a topic that he and others at the \textit{Eastern Miscellany} would often return to and redefine in the 1910s.

\textbf{Du Yaquan and Civilization}

In the years from 1914 to 1919, Du Yaquan would formalize his beliefs on civilization in relation to modernity and tradition. Du Yaquan’s understanding of civilization is important to his later arguments for the East-West binary, as it validated the existence and right to existence of an Eastern civilization in the new world order. Although subscribing to many aspects of Social Darwinism, he rejected simple talk of progress being tied to a teleology based on Western civilization. For Du civilization simultaneously referred to modernity and tradition. The term \textit{wenming} referred to both the advanced material status of the West, and the advanced moral status of the East. Du Yaquan was a reform modernizer. Like many in the late Qing Dynasty, he saw the benefits, and even the necessity, of learning Western approaches to science and the material world, but believed that the East still held the keys to morality. Du Yaquan’s division of the East and West into a dichotomy of spiritual and material

\textsuperscript{367} Zhang Xichen 1990, 249-251.
was a shared discourse with the dichotomies that underlay the beliefs of most Asianists, including Rabindranath Tagore and almost every Japanese Asianist. It was Du’s firm belief in the benefits of Eastern civilization that underscored his philosophy and he therefore found himself at odds with the iconoclasm of the May fourth Generation Westernizers who grounded their reading of civilization firmly in the popular discourse of Social Darwinism. Du’s theory of civilization can be read against the *La Jeunesse* Westernization of the May Fourth Movement, but the real impetus for his theory came from the horrifying tragedy of the Great War in Europe.

The war destroyed any hopes Du Yaquan had for Western civilization. It exposed the immoral and unjust roots of capitalism and caused doubts that returned Du to the morality of Confucianism. Most notably was the change in Du’s understanding of civilization. In the article mentioned above, “The Great War and China,” this great disappointment with the war is first evident: “I have long held firm to a belief in peace, thinking that world civilization was progressing, but this war will leave it without a trace. Alas, this belief has been defeated and cannot be realized.”

His despair is evident in this article and his belief in a ‘progressive world civilization’ will not last. In an article lambasting state-nationalism and nationalists’ departure from peace, he expresses his frustration with those that copy Western discourses of nationalism and civilization:

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369 Ibid.
The Japanese have emulated the militarism of the West, becoming the hegemon of East Asia. And we Chinese have copied the nationalism of the Westerners and become embroiled in internal strife. We Eastern people have generally embraced and respected Western civilization, but can we be sure that this is not the evil of the West? The evil of Westerners is shown in the blood that runs because of this Great War. Our people that copy the evils of the West, how can they redeem themselves?370

Every month in the latter half of 1914, Du Yaquan wrote his thoughts on the Great War in the opening pages of Eastern Miscellany. He was distressed that the peace was destroyed and strived to understand the roots of the war. He found them in the greed of Western thought that perceived a lacking that needed to be filled. These feelings of lacking then lead to imperialism. This connection between civilization and war causes Du to call for a questioning of the belief in Western superiority and Eastern inferiority, an issue that he will return to regularly over these years. In the October edition he writes disparagingly about both East and West:

We are unfortunate to be born in a corrupt country of the East. I often think about how things are not as I would have them. The officials engage in horrendous graft. Bandits roam the lands. Plagues are epidemic. Floods and droughts are commonplace. Our common people are hounded by kidnapping and murder, disease and disaster. Who knows how many have died over the years. Threats to our lives come as often as the morning dew. Life is valued at next to nothing. And these people from the civilized countries of Europe enjoy freedom and such great happiness. This makes

us sigh with envy that we may not have such things for ourselves. But since
the outbreak of the Great War, the number of European people dying
beneath cannon fire and bayonet has gone into the millions. 371

The Great War has reduced conditions in Europe to an even worse state than the East.
How could “civilization” lead people to destroy all they have built in the endless pursuit of
conflict and competition? Du calls himself a pacifist on numerous occasions, making his
disgust of war clear. This is a moral stand for Du. The greed of capitalist Europe has led to a
militant form of civilization that serves in polar opposition to the peace-loving morality of
Du’s own tradition: “Europeans fear poverty and are not willing to die due to poverty, yet
they are willing to die in war. Our people fear war and will not die in war. We prefer to die
in poverty.” 372 Du lambasts those that argue for the necessity of war as a requirement for the
“progress of civilization.” However, his attack on civilization is not as strong as the article
that follows Du’s in this same edition. A very young Yun Daiying 惣代英, still a student at
Wuchang Chinese University 武昌中華大學, published “On Duty” 義務論, a scathing attack
on imperialism and the ills of capitalist competition. This is Yun’s first known article and
quite an attack on capitalist culture, defining civilization on material bases and inextricably
linked to militarism. 373 This complete loss of faith in the ‘civilization’ offered by the West

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371 吾人不幸。生於東方腐敗之國家中。常覺事事物物。不如吾意。官吏中貪暴也。盜賊之縱橫也。
疫癘之蔓延也。水旱之頻仍也。吾儕小民。罹於刑、劫殺、疾病、災難、而死者。歲不知凡幾。生活
之危。有如朝露。民命之賤。無異草芥。彼歐洲文明國家之人民。所享自由豐富之幸福。固常使吾儕
驚嘆羨慕不能自己者也。然大戰爭一起。歐洲人民之死於礮火兵刃之下者。乃至數十百萬人。Du
Yaquan 傅父。 “Thoughts on the Great War” 大戰爭之所感. Eastern Miscellany 東方雜誌 11.4, p 5-6
(October 1st, 1914), 5.
372 歐人畏貧乏。故不甘死於貧乏。而願死於戰爭。吾人畏戰爭。故不肯死於戰爭。而寧死於貧乏。
Ibid, 6.
373 Yun Daiying, “Yi wu lun” 義務論 EM 11.4, (October 1, 1914).
that occurred in the first year of the war was followed by a long process of redefining the ‘East’ based on a great number of dichotomies.


Throughout World War I, debates that attempted to define and differentiate the East from the West repeatedly appeared in the pages of major periodicals. Chinese intellectuals took an active role in defining the East, largely based upon dichotomies that emphasized difference with the perceived West. These intellectuals often accepted Western discourses of science and evolution, yet did not accept discourses of superiority, often choosing to see material disparities as resultant of different civilizations, rather than degree of civilization. Much of the representation that occurred in these pages was intended to validate the East as an alternative to dominant Darwinian discourses of a linear path for civilization with the European West at the forefront. In the pages of the *Eastern Miscellany*, difference was represented by a number of dichotomies, such as: moral civilization versus material civilization; competitive civilization versus cooperative civilization; active civilization versus passive civilization and civilization in harmony with nature versus civilization in opposition to nature. This reverse Orientalism allowed intellectuals to imagine a future, past and present that transcended the imposed teleology towards the West.

Firstly, the idea of one linear civilization that all humanity progressed upon had to be destroyed. As late as 1915, Du Yaquan still made references to “humanity’s evolution from barbarism into civilization,” but the stage had already been set for an understanding of
multiple civilizations that were very different from one another. Three months earlier, in January 1915, Wu Tingfang’s 1914 book, *America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat* was made accessible to a Chinese audience through Qian Zhixiu’s translation. This translation introduced Wu’s belief that civilization was Eastern in nature and adopted by the West. Picking up Amiel’s definition of civilization as “foremost a moral thing,” Wu argued for the superiority of morality in the East. Qian contributed: “Considering morality to be of the most importance in relevance to civilization, then the wisdom of the yellow people is by no means inferior to that of the white people.” If then, morality was taken as the critical factor, Asian civilization was superior. According to Wu, unlike the morality-based civilization of Asia, Western civilization is based upon material accumulation:

Our differences of color, like our differences of speech, are accidental, they are due to climatic and other influences. We came originally from one stock. We all started evenly, Heaven has no favorites. Man alone has made differences between man and man, and the yellow man is no whit inferior to the white people in intelligence. During the Russo-Japan War was it not the yellow race that displayed the superior intelligence? I am sometimes almost tempted to say that Asia will have to civilize the West over again. I am not bitter or sarcastic, but I do contend that there are yet many things that the white races have to learn from their colored brethren. In India, in China, and in Japan there are institutions which have a stability unknown outside Asia. Religion has apparently little influence on Western

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375 Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳 was one of China’s most respected diplomats of the late Qing and early Republican periods. He served as the Qing ambassador to the United States, where he often lectured on Chinese culture. From 1916 to 1917 he would also serve as the Foreign Minister for the Republic of China.
civilization; it is the corner-stone of society in all Asiatic civilizations. The result is that the colored races place morality in the place assigned by their more practical white confreres to economic propositions. We think, as we contemplate the West, that white people do not understand comfort because they have no leisure to enjoy contentment; THEY measure life by accumulation, WE by morality. Family ties are stronger with the so-called colored races than they are among the more irresponsible white races; consequently the social sense is keener among the former and much individual suffering is avoided.377

Wu was quite direct in his differentiating of Western material culture and Eastern moral culture. He was certainly not alone in such an opinion. Du Yaquan also questioned the idea that morality was related to Western civilization. Reviewing European history, he asked: “From times ancient to now, from barbarity to civilization, has morality progressed with the passing of days, or has it deteriorated?” He found that it was instead financial well-being that had improved.378 This difference of the moral and the material was found in the difference between societies based upon competition and cooperation.

The dichotomy of competitive civilization versus cooperative civilization was clearly seen as a fact supported by the action of war in Europe and the Western belief in theories of Darwinism and liberalism. The nationalism and material greed that lay at the bottom of competition was called into question by Du Yaquan: “The human race’s social life has been gradually pushing the scope of cooperation further and further, from a tribal level to a racial

377 Wu Tingfang, America Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat (Available online: Project Gutenberg, undated), chapter 12, paragraph 3. Original emphasis.
378 Gao Lao (Du Yaquan) "Wenming yu daode" 文明與道德 EM 12.12, 1. 4-7 (December 1, 1915), 4.
level. But state nationalists, due to political or national relations, have set the scope as the country. Pacifists, however, see the entirety of humanity as the scope.” In his thoughts on the war, Du explained that those who advocated war argue that it is a natural part of evolution, and necessary from a Darwinian perspective. Those who advocated peace argued that war could not supply that which is lacking. Only through human intercooperation could we increase human production.

However, this was not a simple dichotomy for Du Yaquan. He saw not just China’s future, but the future of the world in a mediation of the differences. In one of his many articles that considers the economic disparity between China and the West, he comes to the conclusion that the difference is due to the difference between passive and active civilizations: “Our nation’s people do not want to tread the path of Poland and India. They stand as a warning to be against inaction and to be engaged in an active manner. Is this a nation of people or of worms?” At this point war had already broken out in Europe, but this is the last lead article to not address the war. Years later, although using a different terminology, Du appears to have changed his mind and reclarifies his position on the difference:

Our perspective on this should thus be: We should not see the difference between Western civilization and our own civilization as disparity in degree, but as diversity in form. The civilization that is intrinsic to our country is just what is needed to deliver us from the ills of Western civilization, and to rescue the poor of Western civilization. Western

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379 Cang Fu (Du Yaquan) “Shehui xielizhuyi” 社會協力主義 EM 12.1, 1. 1-8 (January 1, 1915), 5.
civilization is rich like wine, while the civilization of our country is simple like water. Western civilization is luxuriant like meat, while the civilization of our country is austere like vegetables. And when one is drunk on the wine and the toxins of meat, then an abundance of water and vegetables is just the cure.\textsuperscript{381}

Du Yaquan may have accepted the Orientalist discourse in part, but he would not entirely accept the supposed power differential between the two civilizations. This was especially true after the breakout of World War I, in which all the horrors of Western civilization were on full display around the world in the newly established print media. Western civilization had certainly proven that it had something worthwhile to offer the world, in a very material sense, but it was sick. Du was aware that every\textit{ yang} has its\textit{ yin}, and proposed that the cure for Western civilization’s sickness lay in the traditions of Asia, with China at its heart.\textsuperscript{382}

This same dichotomy had been taken up by Chen Duxiu and \textit{La Jeunesse} months earlier. The leading article for the December 1915 edition was called “The Basic Differences in the Thinking of Eastern and Western Nations.”\textsuperscript{383} Although Chen based his argument on

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\textsuperscript{381} Cang Fu (Du Yaquan) “Jing de wenming yu dong de wenming” 靜的文明與動的文明 EM 13.10, 1. 1-8 (October 1, 1916), 1.
\textsuperscript{382} This was not the first time such an analogy had been used. The\textit{ jing/dong} (quiescent/active) analogy that Du followed painted the East as a\textit{ jing} or sedentary civilization and the West as\textit{ Dong} or active civilization. This was a favorite among Asianists and stemmed back at least as far as the Koakai of the 1880s. In the April 1, 1881, second edition of the Koakai’s newsletter, Kaneko Yahei (金子弥兵 1854-1924), a well-known student of Fukuzawa Yukichi, wrote an article which relied on the same dichotomy of\textit{ jing} and\textit{ dong} cultures, also arguing that Western material culture stemmed from the East. Kaneko Yahei 金子弥兵, “A General Thesis on Asia” in Kōakai hōkoku Ajia kyōkai hōkoku •亞細亞協會報告 1-2. Tokyo: 不二出版, 1993), original pagination: 10-14. Copy: 10-11.
\end{flushright}
the dichotomies of war versus peace, individual versus family, and legal practice versus emotion, the articles are noticeably similar. There was clearly a wide-range of intellectuals that were redefining the East – and China – against a wealthy capitalist world that was morally bankrupt in the eyes of Chinese. Yet there were certainly some that viewed the same dichotomy in a different light.

Writing in April, 1917, one year after Du’s article, Li Dazhao published the short article “Dong Lives and Jing Lives.” Li sees these two civilizations as developing differently because of an Eastern economic basis in agriculture and a Western economic base in business. The former requires a sedentary lifestyle, while the latter requires traveling around. These lifestyles in turn lead to clan-based beliefs and individualism, as well as polygamy and a respect for women, autocratic rule and liberalism, and class and equality. All things flow from these two different streams of civilization. “If the source is muddy, then its 10,000 streams will be muddy. If it is clear, the 10,000 streams will be clear.” “I firmly believe that in today’s progressive world, if we do not create a progressive lifestyle, we will not be able to survive. And I also believe that if we want to create such a progressive lifestyle from within a quiescent civilization, this can only be done with a tremendous effort.” However, Li surprisingly backs away from this anti-Asia position and expresses the need for the jing

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384 Wang Hui uses the works of Liang Qichao to show how his opinions of the West and what could be learned from it had changed dramatically during World War I. By the end of the war, Liang’s focus was not on the achievements of the West, but on its myriad failings. Wang Hui, “Why Culture? Republicanism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Great War of the 1910s.” 2.


386 Dong can be more easily translated here as active, progressive or moving. Jing however, may be seen positively as “passive” or “peaceful,” as Du may have understood it, or as “static” as the more standardized Orientalizing perspective would have defined it.
and the *dong* civilizations to synthesize only one year later.\(^{387}\) This is much closer to the writing of Du Yaquan and may have been influenced from this or from Chen Duxiu’s article. All these debates on East and West civilizations had one thing in common. They were trying to forecast the future for the two civilizations. Either competition would hold sway and conflict would occur or cooperation would reign and synthesis would occur. This was by no means easily understood and many intellectuals changed their minds over the issue, hoping for synthesis, but fearing conflict.

**Conflict: A Return to Race War or Clash of Civilizations**

As explained in the previous chapter, the possibility of race war had been an issue on the minds of intellectuals since the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century. As a Darwinian belief in competition gained prominence, and with Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, the first decade of the new century saw a surprising number of articles and books concerning the issue all around the world. With the outbreak of war in Europe, the concept of race war once again took on prominence as fears grew that such a war may follow the war in Europe. At a time when Europe was so clearly divided, how could fears grow that its peoples would unite to fight a race war? Survival of the fittest had now become an accepted assumption of scientists and other intellectuals. And science held sway. Du Yaquan, the chief editor of the *Eastern Miscellany* from 1910 to 1919, had a background in science himself and consistently featured articles on social issues by accomplished scientists. He himself had raised the fear of race war at the very beginning of hostilities in Europe: “If such atrocities can develop among

\(^{387}\) Li Dazhao, “Basic Differences Between Eastern and Western Civilizations” 东西文明根本之差点. *Li Dazhao wenji* 李大钊文集 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 557-571.
people of the same white race, what will they make of us yellow people?**

Leading scientists that Du would invite to write articles would also mention the scientific inevitability of racial conflict. Xia Yuanli,** a major physicist who had just left Berlin on September 12, 1914, neatly explains the possibilities for conflict in his leading article on “The Reasons Behind the War in Europe:”

From this point on, global political and military strategy will remain centered around three kinds of competition: One: competition between different peoples in the white race; Two: competition between different peoples in the yellow race; Three: competition between the white and yellow races.**

The world was seen as a stage of competition. Although Du himself would later argue against this emphasis on competition, during the first few years of the war he ran numerous articles that accepted this discourse and even translated Japanese articles on the inevitability of race war. A few months after this article, he would have his assistant Zhang Xichen translate an article by Mizuno Hironori** on the need for militarizing Japan to

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**Du Yaquan 大戰爭與中國 EM 11.3 (Sept1, 1914), 1-7, 3.
** Xia Yuanli 夏元瑮 was one of the most important physicists in twentieth century China. He had recently studied at Berlin University and was working at Peking University as the Dean of Sciences during the World War. Later he would translate Einstein’s works into Chinese.
** Xia Yuanli 夏元瑮. “The Reasons for the War in Europe” 歐洲戰禍之原因《東方雜誌》12.2 (February 1, 1915), 1-5.
** Mizuno Hironori 水野廣德 himself would soon abandon all talk of militarization to take an extreme pacifist stance after World War I. Despite his early militaristic writings, such as this article, he is now known for being an outspoken critic of war. Mizuno was a committed anti-imperialist. However, he equated imperialism with European imperialism. Although he vehemently argued against Western intervention in China, he accepted Japanese intrusions into Manchuria as an acceptable consequence of protecting one’s neighbor of the same race. This line between protecting and invading China was one which Japanese intellectuals grappled with for decades before the line disappeared altogether.
prepare for this race war:

The quarrel between the Germans and the Slavic people pales in comparison to that between the yellow and the white peoples. If white people soon come to realize the ignorance of fighting amongst themselves, to where will that horse turn its head? As the only super power in the world that is composed of yellow people, how can we not be preparing for this?\(^{392}\)

Yet the most interesting article concerning this topic was presented as a translation from German.\(^{393}\) The original author Tailishi 台利史, speaking through Zhang Xichen’s translation, describes the coming clash of civilizations, a great battle between East and West, between the yellow race and the white race:

Once the Great War in Europe has reached its conclusion, the next question to arise is not the clashes that occur between nations or ethnic groups, but must be the clash between one civilization and another, between one race and another. To put it frankly, it is the clash between Europe and Asia… The Eastern area of Asia composes a special civilizational sphere of its own. It is indisputable that the centre of this sphere is based upon Chinese and Indian culture. With the added political might of Japan, it becomes a complete body from head to toe, with Japan as the bicep of East Asia and China as the brains of East Asian civilization…. Contemporary East Asia is a diverse and confusing area, caught up in domestic conflicts. Yet the clouds of war gather together in Europe. Once the various nations have

\(^{392}\) 〈日本之軍國主義〉章錫琛 translation of Mizuno Hironori 水野廣德 article from 日本及日本人 EM 12.7, 14.

\(^{393}\) The article may have originally been written in German, however, I have not found any evidence of Zhang Xichen’s German ability in his autobiography. For other translations of German articles, Zhang refers to the Japanese translation from which he worked, however this article is simply noted as being translated from German. I have not been able to find any other references to the original author Tailishi 台利史 and could not find a similar article in the Japanese journals from which Zhang Xichen normally translates.
ratified their peace agreements, then the states of Asia will inevitably unite in an alliance to create a full-fledged power. Thus the two races of yellow and white will be represented in two different civilizations and the greatest of conflicts will arise. The war that will rise from this conflict will be of the likes unprecedented in the history of the world. This manner of war will be unlike those of old. It will exhaust all military resources and the relations of production as it will be a war rooted in the difference between two kinds of life values, two kinds of religious values and two kinds of national spirit.394

Regardless of whether or not this article was originally from Germany, its translation and inclusion in the Eastern Miscellany reveals the fact that Chinese intellectuals such as Zhang Xichen and Du Yaquan were giving serious thought to what they saw as opposing elements in Western and Eastern civilizations. Many intellectuals at this time were clearly self-identifying as “Eastern,” defined in opposition to “Western.” However, although most appeared to agree that many of the defining characteristics of the two civilizations were polar opposites, the issue of whether or not this indicated irreconcilability was not agreed upon. Conflict and race war were being imagined,395 but so too was the unity of the two civilizations.

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395 It was certainly not only those in China and Japan that were imagining a great race war to follow the war in Europe. For example, Bronson Batchelor wrote an article that discussed a similar topic from an English perspective. He assumed that England would win the war in Europe and have to battle Japan for control over China and the East. “Japan’s Challenge to England” was published in many periodicals around the world, including American Review of Reviews 52 (1916), 455-458, and a translation by Zhang Xichen in the Eastern Miscellany 13.10, 2.43-45.
Synthesis

Wu Tingfang’s casual remark that “I am sometimes tempted to say that Asia will have to civilize the West over again,” became a serious consideration for Du Yaquan later in the war years. The idea that the East could provide a cure for the West was certainly not a new idea, it had flourished in the late-nineteenth century. Indeed, Du quotes heavily from Tolstoy’s “Letter to a Chinese Gentleman” to set his scene:

I think that a great revulsion [sic] is taking place in our time in the life of humanity, and that in this revulsion China, at the head of the Eastern nations, must play a grand part. The vocation of the Eastern nations – China, Persia, Turkey, India, Russia, and perhaps Japan, if she is not yet completely enmeshed in the net of depraved European civilization396 - consists in indicating to all nations the true way towards freedom.397

Tolstoy’s letter was intended to dissuade Chinese reformers from following the Western model of governance and control. It was a warning about what Tolstoy saw as the dangers of Western modernity and the inevitable inequality that would come. Du recognizes the fact that “this war has shown the flaws in Western civilization,”398 but he also recognizes that the terrible economic condition which China is suffering under cannot continue. In fact, despite the frequent praising of Tolstoy in the pages of the Eastern Miscellany, Du Yaquan was an intellectual devoted to scientific progression and his writings would not at all have

396 Interestingly, this clause concerning Japan is not included in Du’s translation. Japan is merely listed with the other Asian states. Of course, it is likely that Du was working from a Japanese translation of the letter that may not have included the clause.
397 Originally written in 1899, the letter was translated into English by Vladimir G. Tchertkoff and published in 1900: (Christchurch, Hants, London: Free Age Press, 1900).
398 Du 1
been appreciated by Tolstoy, who was at the time advocating anti-modernization.

For Du: “That which holds most importance to human lives is the economy and morality.” As the war was due to “economic conflict between nation-states,” Western countries were lacking in morality, something that China had to offer. Although the ancient Greek writings approached Confucian classics, the rationality (lixing) that resided in them did not reach the common people. “Neither Eastern nor Western modern living can be considered to be the perfect way of living, and neither Eastern nor Western modern civilizations can be permitted to be our model civilization.” Du hypothesized that a new civilization must be created from the two. It was not only Confucianism that Du saw as having moral foundations, and he had made references to the importance of syncretism in the past. He had even gone as far as praising the Baha’i faith as a symbol of the merging of Western and Eastern thought based on morality, “pivotal for the attainment of datong.”

Du Yaquan found reasons to doubt the supremacy of the theoretical knowledge coming from the West. The evolutionary progression towards the ‘modern’ that had so entranced thinkers of the time, notably the writers of La Jeunesse, left no room for Chinese or Eastern culture. A linear model of history clearly demanded that the traditional progress to the modern and the Eastern progress to the Western. According to Gao Li’ke, Du Yaquan’s cultural theory “was a response to the evolutionary cultural approach envisioned by those associated with La Jeunesse.” Finding himself at odds with those at La Jeunesse, Du Yaquan was under the belief that old and new civilizations could come together, while

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399 Gao Lao “The Baha’i Organization” 波海會 EM12.5 (May 1, 1915).
Chen Duxiu and others saw them as opposites that could never unite. Du Yaquan’s scientific mind had done nothing if not strengthen his classical belief in balance between all things. He believed in a dialectical world in which all things needed their yin and their yang to achieve harmony.

Gao Li’ke’s approach to Du Yaquan’s writing is interesting. He divides modern Chinese thinkers into those influenced by British empiricism and those influenced by French romanticism. He sees Du, along with Yan Fu and Liang Qichao as falling into the British empiricism tradition. Gao explains that British liberalism was propagated among Chinese intellectuals by two major periodicals in the early twentieth century. One, of course, is Du Yaquan’s Eastern Miscellany. The other is Zhang Shizhao’s Jiayin Magazine. The Jiayin group of Zhang Shizhao, Li Dazhao and Gao Yihan were all supporters of British liberalism and syncretism. Although this paradigm may be too simplistic to define the very complicated world of modern Chinese intellectuals, it does offer a way of understanding how intellectuals as different as Du Yaquan and Li Dazhao allowed for discussions of Asianism, while others dismissed the idea outright. Regardless, the sudden rejection of Western civilization as the authoritative telos by a number of leading intellectuals due to the war led to the reimagining of the East and its importance, albeit often upon models delineated by the now hegemonic discourses of (Western) science. At the same time, a related but different movement was occurring in Japanese intellectual circles. The term Asianism

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400 Gao Li’ke(1998), 43-52.
401 Gao Li’ke (1998), 183.
had exploded onto the scene in 1916 and was being used in a variety of ways by the end of the year. Chinese intellectuals were well-aware of the discussions and made an effort to translate the central texts into Chinese.

Translating Asianism

The first mention of Asianism that appears in *Eastern Miscellany* occurred in 1916 in an article simply accredited to translator Zhang Xichen: “The Destiny of Greater Asianism.” It is listed as an abridged translation of an article from the Japanese journal *New Japan* 新日本, published by veteran publisher Fuzan Bō 富山房. This article introduced the concept to *Eastern Miscellany* readers and also established some of the key vocabulary and issues that were related to Asianism. These issues were the crisis of race and civilization, an issue that had been growing for decades already, and the possibility of the United States style of hegemony that had regulated the Americas since the Monroe Doctrine.

The term Asianism began to be widely used in Japan in 1916. At the same time, the term became well-known in China, especially with Zhang Xichen’s May translation from *New Japan*. Saaler notes that it was this year that the term first found prominence in Japan with the publication of Kodera Kenkichi’s 小寺謙吉 book *A Treatise on Greater Asianism*.

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404 However, although 1916 is certainly a year in which the term ‘Asianism’ suddenly appeared in numerous journals in Japan, and a number of books and articles in China, there are isolated instances of its use before this. For example, in 1913 Ōzumi Shun 大住舜 (1881-1923) published *Shin shisōron* 新思想論, which included a chapter on “Zen Ajiaishugi” 全亞細亞主義. Ōzumi Shun, *Shin shisōron* 新思想論 (Tōkyō: Rikutōshuppansha, 1913), 348-354. Also, the term was used in China as early as 1912, when it appeared in the *People’s Stand*. See below.
This book was not published in Chinese until 1917, and must have circulated widely as it was republished by the Commercial Press in 1918. As will be explained below, this Greater Asianism would not be accepted by Chinese intellectuals. What defined Greater Asianism, as opposed to other forms of Asianism, was the outright calls for Japanese leadership, often envisioned as an Asian from of the Monroe Doctrine. It was the publication of Kodera’s book and other Asianist texts that the Monroe Doctrine becomes an important subject in Asia. In Japan it was most pronounced in the work of Tokutomi Soho (1863-1957), but in China the discussion was in the pages of the *Eastern Miscellany*.

**The Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism**

The Monroe Doctrine stemmed directly from President James Monroe’s (1758-1831) seventh annual address to congress. It demanded that Europeans not meddle in the affairs of the Americas, with the slogan “Americas for the Americans.” Intellectuals and politicians from some Latin American countries were initially very excited about the announcement as a voicing of regional support, but, as Bruce Jentleson explains, “There was little altruism in this policy, or even straightforward good neighborliness; it represented much more the self-interest of a regional power seeking to preserve its dominant position against outside challenges.”[^406] In the 1910s this policy was still followed in America and the Japanese may have seen it in a positive light as the United States came to Europe and Japan’s side in World War I partially as a result of the Zimmerman Telegram violating the Monroe Doctrine.[^407]

[^405]: Saaler 2007, 7.
[^407]: Ukita Kazutami 浮田和民, translated by Gao Lao 高勞 (a pen name of Du Yaquan), “New Asianism” 新亞
Regardless, the Monroe Doctrine in Asia or in the Americas could be seen as mere imperialism, or it could be seen as opposing imperialism, depending one’s position.

The Monroe Doctrine was mentioned in every text that directly referred to Asianism between 1915 and 1919. It was transliterated variously as *Mengluzhuyi*, *Mengluzhuyi* or *Menluozhuyi* (孟羅主義, 孟祿主義, 們羅主義, from the Japanese *Monrō shugi* モンロー主義). Oddly, the same translator might not use the same transliteration across different texts. As the Monroe Doctrine was a policy of great relevance to the fighting of World War I and America’s decision for involvement, it appeared repeatedly in articles and translations. As early as 1914, discussing expansion of the American Empire in the Caribbean, Ru Ru 如如 satirically commented: “The Monroe Doctrine is truly an ingenious plan for the expansion of the United States!” A few months later, the Monroe Doctrine was in the headlines around the world as Germany questioned U.S. authority over the Americas and declared that the doctrine would no longer apply to Canada, due to its entry into the war. In March, 1915, an article titled “Germany and the Monroe Doctrine” was translated and published in the *Eastern Miscellany*. The article provided a detailed account of the above incident and presented a positive view of the Monroe Doctrine, as a declaration of the United

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脚註:

408 The Monroe Doctrine is now known as *menluozhuyi* 門羅主義. Note that in Chinese and Japanese it was written as an ideology, a *zhuyi* 主義, rather than as a doctrine. It was thus seen as an ideology.

409 〈加勒比海與合眾國〉如如 (EM 11.6, (Dec 1, 1914), 30-34, 34.


411 〈德國與孟祿主義〉達權 trans, 23-26 (EM 12.3, March 1, 1915). *The Outlook*, November 4, 1914, pp. 521-523 *The Outlook* was an American news and opinion magazine. Theodore Roosevelt, a staunch supporter of the Monroe Doctrine in the war years, was an associate editor.
States’ intention to support and protect the independence of countries in the Western hemisphere. This positive view of the Monroe Doctrine shows it as a means of preventing German militarism from encroaching on, not just American interests, but ‘independent’ nations of the Americas. All the different ‘Asianisms’ that were discussed during the war years had to be situated in relation to this doctrine. Greater Asianism was the first to do this, and although proponents of it continuously tried to argue otherwise, the idea was clearly an attempt to create an Asian Monroe Doctrine with China’s support.

Greater Asianism and Its Translations

The Chinese translation of “The Destiny of Greater Asianism” does not mention the original author, likely because he would not yet have been known in China: Ōyama Ikuo 大山郁夫 was a professor at Waseda University during this time, but it was not until the interwar years that he would become an important leftist intellectual and leader of the proletarian movement. Due to his anti-war and anti-imperialist stance, he would have to escape Japan and flee to the United States during the 1930s. His article is unsurprisingly a critique of the problems with Kodera’s plan, an Asianism clearly based upon the Monroe Doctrine.

Zhang Xichen’s 1916 translation of Ōyama’s article on Greater Asianism introduces

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the term “Asianism,” but fails to effectively define its intentions for the reader. The article instead concentrates on the term Pan-Americanism, an extension of the Monroe Doctrine that was finding popularity in the United States from 1915 as a counter to pan-Germanism. It was this American ‘pan’ - written in English, but also translated as da 大 in this text and sometimes as fan 汚 after 1918 - that was seen as providing the initial idea for Asianism to Eastern Miscellany readers. The idea of pan-Americanism is here translated directly from a new book on extending the Monroe Doctrine in the United States.

Interestingly, in Ōyama’s criticism of the Asianist goal, he identifies the source of the term not in Japan, but in China, where he claims to have come across pamphlets calling for the Monroist ideal of “Asia for the Asians.” The pamphlet, which Ōyama claims was published in secret in China, is republished in the original Chinese in Ōyama’s Japanese article. Fascinatingly, in Zhang’s translation of Ōyama’s article, the original Chinese is omitted and no reference to the Chinese pamphlet which Ōyama has based his article upon is made. Scholars’ attempts to locate a copy of the pamphlet have been fruitless. However, whether or not such a pamphlet was distributed, the text was certainly published in China. In the October 7, 1912 edition of the People’s Stand 民立報, the article “On Greater

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413 Zhang 1916, 16.
414 In March, 1915, Roland G. Usher, a professor of History at Washington University in Saint Louis, published Pan-Americanism: A Forecast of the Inevitable Clash Between the United States and Europe’s Victor, New York: The Century Co., 1915. This book spells out the necessity of a united Americas to contend with the winner of World War I. The final chapter also considers the possibility of Japan unifying East Asia in the vacuum that will be caused by England’s defeat.
415 Saaler
416 The People’s Stand was a pro-Kuomintang newspaper that stressed republicanism. At the time it was edited by Xu Xieer 徐血儿 (1891-1915), who also introduced Ibuka and his article. Other pro-Japanese or pro-Asianist articles did sometimes appear in the paper. A few days after Ibuka’s article
Asianism,” a piece by Japanese House of Representatives’ member Ibuka Hikosaburō 井深彦三郎 (1866-1916), includes the exact same text as that found in Ōyama’s article. 417 The short article, most of which was quoted by Ōyama in the Japanese version of his article, openly called for an Asian Monroe Doctrine, in which Japan would lead China. Citing race and religion as commonalities, with humanitarianism (人道主義) and republicanism as basis, all Asian nations must unite to stop those from other continents. Greater Asianism is the only way for countries to maintain their independence and avoid the clash of the races.418

So the term and the core philosophies of Greater Asianism may have been discussed in Chinese newspapers even before they were discussed in Japan, albeit introduced by a Japanese official. It is difficult to tell what influence, if any, Ibuka’s essay may have had upon Chinese readers. However, we can see from articles from the time that the editors at the People’s Stand would not have accepted Japan’s claims of Asian leadership. Xu Xue’er, the same editor who introduced the above article, frequently wrote editorials that warned Japan not to become just like the Western powers, and to remember the mutual interdependence of lips and teeth.419 And in response to a translation of Ōkuma’s call for a Japan-centred “Great

417 In this article the author is listed as Ibuka Hikotarō 井深彦太郎. However, this must either be a misprint or Ibuka must have been using a different name as no such representative existed. Ibuka Hikosaburō was a Meiji China hand and politician who frequently appears in Tōa Dōbunkai materials. He was the father of Ibuka Yae 井深八重. Ibuka Hikotarō 井深彦太郎, “Da Yaxiyazhuyi lun” 大亞細亞主義論, in Minli Bao 民立報 (People’s Stand) 752 (October 7, 1912), 2.
418 The Ōyama version of the Ibuka text is very faithful to the original. However, the paragraphs on republicanism and American Monroism were excluded.
419 For example, see “A Warning to the Japanese” 忠告日本人 (1912.10.9 v754, p2) and “Warning Japan not to Forget the Meaning of Lips and Teeth” 忠告日本毋忘唇齒之意 (1912.10.13 v758, 2). These editorials were largely in response to Japan’s acceptance of Russia’s call for Mongolian independence. For more on the “lips and teeth” metaphor, see chapter one.
Asian Empire 亞細亞大帝國 in order to oppose Euro-American civilization,” Xu Xue’er appended a short postscript: “The Chinese nation has 400 million people. We believe that an Asian Republic 亞細亞共和國 should be established with China as its centre.”

The proposal that Japan should lead Asia, sometimes called meishuron Asianism 盟主論亞細亜主義, is the defining feature of Greater Asianism. This was not what Ōyama was arguing for. In fact, he was calling into question the feasibility of Asianism and doubting Japan’s ability and right to rule. However, the most widely read book on Asianism at the time, Kodera Kenichi’s, Treaties on Greater Asianism 大亜細亜主義論, was suggesting just that.

**Kodera’s Greater Asianism**

In 1916, Kodera Kinkichi (1877-1949) published Treatise on Greater Asianism. All writings of Asianism that came after this were situated by their divergence from this initial book. This seminal text would define a vocabulary for Asian integration that still has relevance today. From the publication of this book, the term ‘Asianism’ quickly became commonplace across East Asia. Kodera’s terminology was soon added to by intellectuals on both sides of the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The terms ‘New Asianism’ and ‘Pan-Asianism’ quickly followed ‘Great Asianism’ as Kodera’s vision was questioned and reimagined. This book was not the first text to call for an East Asian political unity to defend against Western imperialism, but it may have been the first book-length study to use the name that has carried down to this day. Kodera’s book was widely read and hugely influential. Not unlike the

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420 Ōkuma Shigenobu “Count Ōkuma Discusses Current Events”大隈伯之時事談, translated by Xi Yuan 希淵, postscript by Xu Xue’er 徐血兒 (1912.10.10 v755, 2).
significance of Tarui Tōkichi’s *On the Great Eastern Federation* in the 1890s, Kodera’s text was the most influential and widespread book on Asianism in the 1910s. However, unlike Tarui’s book, *On Great Asianism* was not received with open arms by non-Japanese readers, but instead provided ammunition for critics of a Japanese-led Asia. This transition from Tarui’s Asianism to Kodera’s Asianism represents changing opinions towards Asianism in Japan. Sven Saaler has provided an excellent study of Kodera Kenichi’s *Treatise*.  

He summarizes Kodera’s central goal as a call for a

… ‘glorious new Asian civilization under Japanese leadership and guidance’; this was to be based on close Sino-Japanese cooperation with the aim of stopping the ‘white peril’ into Asia, and, ultimately, of bringing about the unification of the ‘entire yellow race.’ Japan should become the ‘educator’ for China and indeed the whole of Asia, and introduce Western, modern civilization to Asia in order to bring about the birth of a ‘new Asian civilization.’

Despite the clear call for Japanese leadership, or rather due to this outright call for Japanese leadership, the book was quickly translated into Chinese. What was likely the first translation of Kodera’s *Treatise* appeared in April, 1917. It was published by the Huashang Yinwu Company 華商印務公司 in Yokohama. This first edition was called *On Annexing China: Originally Called On Great Asianism* 併吞中國論：原名大亞細亞主義

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421 Saaler 2007 and Saaler 2011 (chapter 26).
422 Saaler 2007, 1271.
論. It was condensed and translated by Chinese students living in Japan and associated with the *Minduo Magazine* 民鐸雜誌. Their modification of the title alone makes their message clear, despite their insisting in the introduction:

Although we present the words, the speaker is innocent. The listener is warned that this medicine has its advantages and its ills, and thus we have translated it, in order to warn our compatriots. As to whether its words are true or not, the reader must decide.⁴²⁴

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In the translator’s introduction is the popular Sun Zi quote: “Know your enemy and know yourself, then in every battle you will be victorious” 知彼知己，百戰百勝. Kodera’s message had been noted and seen through as a new form of imperialism. Greater Asianism would not find any form of acceptance in China. Although no Eastern Miscellany article ever dealt with Kodera’s theory directly, Japanese responses to it were translated by Zhang Xichen.

The Introduction of Kokuryūkai “Asianism”

Zhang Xichen’s next translation on Asianism, simply called “Asianism,” was translated from the Japanese journal Ajia jiron 亞細亞時輪 and published in the Eastern Miscellany in October of 1917. Ajia Jiron was published by the Black Dragon Society Kokuryūkai 黑龍會. The Black Dragon Society is often called an ultranationalist organization, but its roles in Pan-Asianism have been very complicated. It was dedicated to removing the Russian presence -and later all Westerners - from East Asia, specifically from East Asia below the Kokuryū River, known in China as the Heilongjiang. Throughout the early twentieth century, this society was involved with high-ranking politicians from Japan and China.425 It was also at the Black Dragon Society headquarters that the Tongmenghui first came into being and they had maintained a relationship with Chinese revolutionaries.426 This first edition of Ajia Jiron contained numerous articles on Asianism,427 including one by the Kokuryūkai founder, Uchida Ryōhei. The article chosen for translation into Chinese was

427 Original issues are very rare, but the first volume and most other issues have been reprinted in: Kokuryūkai kankai shiryōshū 4 黑龍會關係資料集 4 (Tokyo: Kashiwashobō, 1992).
written by a relatively unknown writer, Yoshimura Gentarō 吉村源太郎, and posed a side of Asianism that may have seemed inoffensive to Chinese readers.

The translation is often remarkably true to the Japanese text: Usually only necessary grammatical changes have been made. However, a number of omissions have made the article more appealing to the Chinese reader. The use of “our empire” (wa ga teikoku) has been removed and not replaced, creating a more general scope for the text, rather than its original focus on Japan. Also, sections on the 1914 ABC Conference, American racism towards Japanese and the urgency for a renewed China policy in Japan were all not translated.

The article provides more consideration of the Monroe Doctrine and pan-Americanism, even considering the differences between their application in the Americas and in Asia.\textsuperscript{428} “Asianism and pan-Americanism are alike only in name. In meaning and principle they are different. Take the relationship between China and Japan, and the relationship between the various Latin American countries. When compared, it is evident that China and Japan have a common script and are the same race. Thus, the characteristics of their civilization are the same as well.”\textsuperscript{429} Zhang’s translation continues to compare the two regions, amassing similarities between China and Japan and pointing out more and more differences in the Americas in order to show the logic of Asianism. It largely skirts the idea of Japanese leadership, only making references to the necessity of following the Meiji spirit,


\textsuperscript{429} Jun 1917, 19.
but largely basing the idea of Asianism on independent nations and enlightened citizens. However, the appeal to accept an Asian Monroe Doctrine is clearly an attempt to validate some form of Japanese leadership.

Much of the article concerns European political history, particularly the French Revolution and Italian unification. Yoshimura sees political evolution marching forward to greater citizen awareness and democracy. Although seeing imperialism within this political history, Yoshimura hopes that “democracy curbs imperialism.” Perhaps Yoshimura’s concentration upon the conscious individual’s role in this system would have appealed to Du Yaquan. Yoshimura expressed this as a role for aware citizens, as a popular movement: “Those who are willing to be martyred for nation, to shed their blood, these are truly the foundations of the country’s strength, not the politicians, nor the elite, nor the rich!” Yoshimura defines Asianism as a means to defend against the Europeans who will unite against Asia after the war. Although he concedes that it is a geographical term, and that Asian “is not one race, not one language and not one religion or culture,” China and Japan are of the same race and have the same script and, as the two countries that remain independent, can mutually support each other to maintain that independence and expel the Europeans and the Americans from their land. The remainder of the text focuses upon the need for China and Japan to work together. However, the final paragraph, which has been fully translated by Zhang, returns to a note that the Eastern Miscellany editors frequently

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432 Ibid.
turned to. Complaining of the Europeans’ belief that civilization is defined in relation to Christianity, Yoshimura notes:

Through our second Renaissance I hope to make them aware that, there is the bountiful and beautiful civilization of the East that is apart from European civilization. Through mutual assistance and mutual encouragement, our Asian nations will make contributions to world culture and further the advancement of humanity. This is why I promote the principle of Asianism.433

This strong and optimistic ending spoke to many Japanese and Chinese who were hoping to find value in their traditions while others were disparaging them. This was surely the advantage Asianists had in promoting their belief to those who feared iconoclasm. Yet the imperialist side of Asianism was becoming clearer, and some writers directly supported it.

**New Asianism and New New Asianism**

In the following year, 1918, Du Yaquan, writing under his often-used pen name of Gao Lao 高勞, provides a twelve page translation of Ukita Kazutami’s (浮田和民 1859-1946) article “New Asianism” 新亞細亞主義.434 By this time, Ukita was a well-established intellectual in Japan. In 1901 he had published his *Imperialism and Education* 帝国主義と教育, which Akira Iriye argues represented the middle position on imperialism, representing

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434 Gao Lao 高勞 (a pen name of Du Yaquan), “New Asianism” 新亞細亞主義. In *Eastern Miscellany* 東方雜誌 15.11, (1918). “New Asianism” is a translation from Ukita Kazutami’s article in *Taiyo* 太陽, a prominent Japanese monthly of which Ukita was the editor in chief. Ukita was a Yale educated professor of History at Waseda University. He is known for his contributions to liberalism in Japan during this period.
neither the aggressive nor pacifist extremes of his contemporaries.\textsuperscript{435} The book was written while he worked at \textit{Kokumin Shinbun} 国民新聞 under Tokutomi Sohō, whose ideas on the Monroe Doctrine he would engage with in this article. Ukita was not opposed to imperialism, only to the militaristic side of imperialism that was seen throughout the past two centuries.\textsuperscript{436} Ukita advocated a liberal imperialism that was economic-based and peaceful, except of course, in Korea.\textsuperscript{437} In 1909, Ukita had become editor-in-chief of \textit{The Sun}, the magazine upon which Du Yaquan remodeled the \textit{Eastern Miscellany} in 1910 and turned to for many articles. Throughout World War I he was a professor at Waseda, where he had a large influence upon the next generation with students including Li Dazhao, who would later reject Ukita’s Asianism. Ukita had been writing about Japan as Asia’s leader since 1896, but this article was a very direct and comprehensive look at the issue.\textsuperscript{438}

This article is one of the most important \textit{Eastern Miscellany} article on Asianism in the 1910s, as it provides a relatively thorough investigation into the topic as it had been discussed in Japan, it lists the different ‘kinds’ of Asianism that had been discussed in the past, and it highlights the major Japanese writers who had contributed to the discussion. As for the Monroe Doctrine, Ukita largely associates it with Tokutomi Sohō’s New Asianism. Although often agreeing with Tokutomi on the application of the Monroe Doctrine to East

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\textsuperscript{436} Marius Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in Myers and Peatties \textit{The Japanese Colonial Empire}, 61-79.
\textsuperscript{437} Iriye 1972, 79.
\textsuperscript{438} Jiang Keshi 姜克實, \textit{Ukita Kazutami no shisōshiteki kenkyū} 浮田和民の思想史的研究 (Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2003), 409.
\end{flushright}
Asia, Ukita disagreed with Tokutomi’s basing his distinctions upon racial and national factors. Tokutomi, initially an important proponent of democracy in Japan, was very opposed to liberalism at this time as he saw it interfering with loyalty to the state and as damaging to the idea of the nation-state. Ukita saw the Monroe Doctrine as a proclamation of liberalism and democracy, as a way to ensure the domestic autonomy of nations. He takes time to go through the major points of the original doctrine and show that it is to defend democracy. For Ukita, Japan’s role in such a world would be as the ‘protector’ of East Asia, stopping any outside powers from interfering with the autonomy of a country. As an odd example, he mentions the United States’ involvement in Cuba in 1898, in which the Monroe Doctrine was invoked to begin the Spanish American War and liberate Cuba from Spanish control. Of course, Ukita’s example is not the most logical if he wishes to show the freedom offered by such an arrangement. Once the United States army ‘liberated’ Cuba from Spain, they immediately put Cuba under US domination, forcing Cuba to put an amendment into its constitution giving the US special rights to intervene.

With a disgraceful lack of originality, Ukita called his form of Asianism “New New Asianism,” to differentiate it from Greater Asianism, which Ukita refers to as New Asianism, which called for direct military or political control over Asia. Hoping to find a path towards Asian unity that did not involve violence or coercion, Ukita imagined an Asia in which each

439 Ibid, 12.
441 Ukita 1919, 14-15.
442 Ibid, 16
443 Jentleson 2007, 75.
state held complete autonomy over internal matters, but shared responsibility over foreign relations.\textsuperscript{444} Despite his attempts to critique the imperialism of his compatriots, his Asianist ideal would be criticized by his former student, Li Dazhao, who had his own vision for a united Asia which will be examined in the following chapter.

**Conclusion**

1915-1918 was clearly a pivotal time for the discourse of Asianism in China. The ferocity of World War I came as a shock to people across the world. In China, this shock resulted in a reappraisal of the merits of a China-centred Eastern civilization, which was seen as an inherently moral civilization, in direct contrast with the material civilization of the capitalist West. The East was imagined as a redemptive civilization, with the power to cure the ills of the West and create a syncretic world civilization. At the same time, Japanese intellectuals were discussing the East-West divide from a different perspective. With discourse focusing on how to maintain territorial integrity after the war, Japanese intellectuals discussed plans for a united Asia. With the defense of the state as the impetus, these intellectuals imagined numerous bases for Asian unity, including race, culture and religion, but most saw Japan as playing some sort of leadership role. Although the idea of a united Asia may have held some appeal with Chinese intellectuals, they were not interested in Japanese leadership.

The Great Asianism that was popular in Japan was rejected in the Chinese publishing magazines of the time, yet the liberal New Asianism that was being discussed was vague and

\textsuperscript{444} Ukita 1917A, 13. Ukita 1917B, 17.
still malleable, as Japan’s role and the so-called East-Asian “Monroe Doctrine” was unclear at best. No practical steps towards an Asian union were outlined by any of these articles and no Chinese writers created their own vision of a united Asia until the end of the war. However, the liberal concepts of New Asianism, based on ideas of complete racial equality, democracy and national sovereignty, would be widely read in China. And it was from this springboard that Li Dazhao would introduce his own form of New Asianism in 1919, combining it with Trotsky’s internationalism and positioned it as a step towards global emancipation.
Part III: Constructing Chinese Asianism

The final part of this dissertation examines the construction of Chinese Asianism. It should be clear from the preceding chapters that Chinese Asianism did exist throughout the decades leading up to the May Fourth Movement in 1919. In these two chapters we see forms of Chinese Asianism appearing in more deliberate and theorized forms, forms that have survived and still reappear today.

Chapter V investigates the formation of Li Dazhao’s “New Asianism.” The title for this chapter come from the term used for both Confucian and socialist teleological utopias: 

*datong* 大同. Like many Asianists, Li considered his Asianism a necessary step on the path to a worldwide union.

Chapter VI, the final chapter in this dissertation, concerns Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism. Still discussed in the twenty-first century, Sun’s Asianism is the most influential form of Chinese Asianism to appear. The title for Chapter VI comes from the philosophical attribute which Sun believed represented Asia and differentiated it from the West: the “kingly way” 王道.
Chapter V: The Path to *Datong*: Li Dazhao and Cosmopolitan Regionalization in the May Fourth Period

In 1919, at the height of the May Fourth Movement and a period of surging Chinese nationalism, the concept of Asianism was discussed by a few influential figures in Chinese intellectual circles. The public discussion was carried through a number of major periodicals and spanned most of 1919. This short-lived discussion resulted in the formulation of Li Dazhao’s “New Asianism,” one of the most oft-cited and little understood Chinese theories of Asian regional integration and mutual support.

As the idea of the nation-state was still in question only a few years after the establishment of the Republic of China and the proclaiming of the problematic *zhonghua minzu* (Chinese nation 中華民族) and its five nations, intellectuals were unsure of the role this political structure would play as a step towards world unity and the utopian future that both Confucianists and Chinese Marxists referred to as *datong* 大同. Although the period surrounding May Fourth is often considered to be a period of patriotism, Xu Jilin has carefully shown that a wide-range of intellectuals were questioning the value and meaning of the state and were very wary or even openly opposed to expressions of statist patriotism.\(^{446}\)

\(^{445}\) Here I use Xu Jilin’s periodization for the May Fourth Period, which includes the New Culture Movement and roughly stretches from 1915 to 1925. In the narrow sense of the term, the “movement” refers to the 1919 protests that followed the Paris Peace Conference. Xu Jilin, “May Fourth: A Patriotic Movement of Cosmopolitanism,” translated by Ya-pei Kuo, in *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 9.1, 29-62 (2009), 30.

\(^{446}\) Xu 2009. One of the main points of Xu Jilin’s article is the period’s intellectuals’ opposition to *guojiazhuyi*, translated in this article as “statism.” Instead the intellectuals related their patriotism to a form of cosmopolitanism, which Xu sees as: “an ideal with [moral value based on the Great Community [*datong*] and
However, the period was certainly marked by a widespread agreement on the necessity of national self-determination, often in relationship to a cosmopolitan belief system and a longing for world unity, rather than a simple acceptance of the contemporary system of nation-states. It was within these contexts that Li Dazhao borrowed from Japanese Asianists and European Marxists to limn his New Asianism.

In the years before 1919, Li had openly pushed for a nationalist agenda, caught up in the feelings of the new republic and frustrated with Japan’s Twenty-One Demands as well as ever-encroaching Western empires. However, throughout 1919 he joined Chen Duxiu in advocating an internationalist and cosmopolitan approach. Li’s stated goals remained cosmopolitan throughout 1919 and 1920. However, it is clear that the nationalist goal of liberating China was still his primary target. Maurice Meisner calls this “the paradox of Chinese intellectuals adopting an internationalistic ideology for nationalist reasons and using it for nationalistic ends.”

This collusion of nationalism with internationalist ideology is one of the themes of this dissertation. Rather than seeing it as a “paradox,” as Meisner does, I see it as different approach to the related self-other binary that defines identities and worldviews. The relationship between nationalism and regionalism and the supremacy of one over the other depends upon which “other” is seen as the primary threat at the time and place in question. Therefore, for Japanese intellectuals in the early twentieth century, for whom the imperialist

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mutual aide among human beings.” Xu 2009, 40-41.

West was clearly the greatest threat, there was a logical inclination towards the regional, despite, or perhaps in addition to, their feelings of superiority due to historical socio-economic factors in that region. For Chinese intellectuals in the same period, the situation was not as simple. Any study of Li’s strategy needs to be contextualized within the rising nationalism surrounding the May Fourth Movement, the internationalist intellectual trend of cosmopolitanism and the sudden surge of Japanese writing on “Greater Asianism” that was available in China in the late-1910s.

This chapter investigates the appearance of Li Dazhao’s “New Asianism” in this climate, showing how Li conceived of Asian regionalism, not as a goal by which non-Asians would be excluded from Asian territory, but as a means to oppose Japanese aggression with the region before democratically uniting all Asia on the basis of national self-determination. For Li, this was merely a step on the path to the inevitable world unity of datong. First, I consider Li’s writings in the years leading up to 1919, showing how nationalism and regionalism were tightly connected for Li. Then I look to a turning point in Li’s history, his reading of Leon Trotsky’s works, showing how this renewed his interest in Asianism as a theory of regionalization, but led him to restructure his thoughts on its pivotal role in history and the future datong. Then I use specific examples to show how criticisms of Li’s Asianism from a cosmopolitan May Fourth perspective forced Li to reiterate his Asianism as fiercely opposed to Japanese hegemony and intent on egalitarian regionalism. The final product of Li’s Asianism is a historically derived paradigm of regionalism mixing Marxist theory, May Fourth cosmopolitanism and a resolute opposition to imperialism, all the while struggling to reconcile its relationship with nationalism.
Li Dazhao and the Collusion of Nationalism and Asianism

As shown in the preceding chapter, disgust with World War I resulted in a surge in Japanese intellectuals’ interest in Asian regionalization. A wide variety of “Asianisms” were suggested during this time, varying from openly militaristic to liberal dreams of informal empire under democratic partnership. All of these ideas eventually returned to the basis of Japanese leadership, what Eri Hotta calls meishuron (leader 盟主論) Asianism.\(^{448}\) Rejection of this was apparent in Li Dazhao’s early writings on Asianism.

Despite these numerous translations of Japanese Asianist texts, especially from 1916-1918, there was surprisingly little direct response from Chinese intellectuals during this time. One of the first concise and organized responses finally came from Li Dazhao in 1917. From February to April of 1917, Li engaged with Japanese Greater Asianism in a number of articles in the pages of Jiayin (Tiger Magazine 甲寅).\(^{449}\) His 1917 discussions of Asianism are centred upon three points: a rejection of Japanese leadership; the need for Chinese moral leadership; and the need to avoid West-East or white-yellow civilizational war.

In what is perhaps Li’s first mention of Japanese Greater Asianism in the February 19, 1917 edition of Jiayin, he makes his position on Japanese leadership clear:

As for Japan’s so-called Great Asianism, from whence will leadership come, I cannot say. But our China is so vast it encompasses almost the entirety of the Asian continent. Of all the nations of the Asian states, there


\(^{449}\) Jiayin was established by Zhang Shizhao 章士釗 in Spring, 1914. Many of its writers, such as Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Gao Yihan and Yi Baisha would work together as the core of New Youth. Xu 2009, 35.
are none that are not tied to us Chinese in their blood. Of their civilizations, there are none that do not trace their ancestries to ours. The current desire to employ Great Asianism to tidy up the Asian nations, without awakening new China and the rise of new China nationalism, I dare say that it cannot succeed.

Of course, China as the leader of Asia was nothing new. Even in terms of modern Asianism, Xu Xue’er had responded to the notion of a Japan-centred Asianism with the demand of a recentering upon China as early as 1912: “The Chinese nation has 400 million people. We believe that an Asian Republic should be established with China as its centre.” But for Li Dazhao, not only must China be the leader of a united Asia, New China nationalism must be the basis for Asianism. Part of the reasoning behind this is that Li sees China as having the particular ability to amalgamate other nationalities into a united whole. This popular belief in China’s ability to absorb various groups is here related as a stepping stone to Asianism:

Our country has the longest of histories and has accumulated numerous nationalities which have amalgamated into this Chinese nation. Paying no heed to borders, the bloodlines have long died out. This has created the lofty and extensive spirit of our nation. There are those who regret that in the early days of the establishment of the republic, there were proclaimed to be five nations. As far as I am concerned, the culture of the five nations has long since been molded into one under a free and equal republican

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451 Xu Xue’er 徐血兒, “postscript” to Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈伯之時事談, translated by Xi Yuan 希淵, postscript by Xu Xue’er 徐血兒 (1912.10.10 v755, 2).
system. In the past, those known as Manchurian, Han, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, and even Miao and Yao, these names are merely fragments left over from history. Today the boundaries have long disappeared and all of these groups are native people of the Republic of China. They are all part of the new Chinese nation. Therefore, from this day the republic’s political and education institutions should be aimed at establishing the spirit of the nation and the thinking of a unified nation. The ideology behind this is the new Chinese nationalism. There must be this new Chinese nationalism before carrying the movement on to East Asia. And only then can Great Asianism find glory in the world. Otherwise, it is merely an illusion or some rambling in our dreams. Take note! Concerning the fate of the nation, we all have our responsibilities. As the Western wave hammers down upon us, the youth of the new Chinese nation must push on and leap forward, bearing this great responsibility.  

The focus of this article is the importance of New China nationalism, not Asianism. Li’s mention of Asianism here is a brief aside concerning a popular topic, but also shows his thoughts on the future of China and Asia, what he sees as a natural march towards world unity. Li Dazhao’s view on the five nations that make up the Chinese nation is particularly interesting. His perspective opposes cultural differences. Like Kang Youwei before him, he sees homogenization as a parallel with progress, but Li expresses this with a much clearer nationalist bent. Asia must conform to China, not to Japan. However, Li’s nationalism during

452 Li Dazhao 2006, 285.
453 The theory of five nations combining to form a republic was first proposed in 1907 by Yang Du 楊度 in the pages of the New China Report 中國新報, a journal created by Chinese students in Japan. In various articles he outlined a social Darwinist hierarchy of competing nations with the Han as the most evolved and the nation that would inevitably assimilate the other four nations of Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan. See Xu Jilin 許記霖, “Tianxiazhuyi/Yixiazhibian ji qi zai jindai de bianyi” 天下主義/夷夏之辨及其在近代的变异 (Tianxiazhuyi and the Yi-China distinction and their changes in the modern period) in Journal of East China Normal University 6 (2012), 71.
this period is also characteristic of the Marxist view of nationalism as an unfortunate means to an important end.\textsuperscript{454} The nationalism expressed in Li Dazhao’s Asianism is not intended to accentuate difference with other nations. Unlike the political nationalism expressed by Ernest Gellner or the “imagined community,” expressed by Benedict Anderson, Li’s nationalism is marked with a strong belief in the universal equality of mankind and is focused upon ending oppression. For Li, nationalism and Asianism are means by which to liberate humans from the oppression of other nations or groups. Finally, his goal is to end national and racial borders.

Two months after this first article, he wrote a more direct article on Asianism, written as a response to a popular article published by Wakamiya Unosuka in \textit{Chūo Kōron} in April, 1917.\textsuperscript{455}

In this article Li was much more critical of the Greater Asianism that was appearing ever-more frequently in Japanese periodicals. However, rather than rejecting the idea completely, Li Dazhao highlighted the necessity of China’s leadership, stressing that this must be a moral leadership. He feared that Great Asianism was merely being raised as a militant response to “Great Westernism.” Instead, Li continued a familiar discussion that was seen in the discourse on civilization examined in Chapter IV. He argued that Asianism should not be based upon military strength or economic power, but upon values that are in contrast to the values of the capitalist West:

\textsuperscript{454} Meisner 1967, 176-177.  
\textsuperscript{455} Wakamiya Unosuka 若宮卯之助, “Dai Ajiashugi towa nanzoya” 大亜細亜主義とは何ぞや (What is Greater Asianism?) in \textit{Chūo Kōron} 中央公論 (April, 1917).
In our citizens’ awakening to the ideal of the establishment of Great Asianism, firstly we must realize our duty to Asia and its position in terms of Asia as the Chinese people’s Asia, as the creation of a new civilization and the construction of a new country in order to exist in the world and as the opposition of the nations of Western civilization. We will not engage in any activities of aggression or oppression over any of the world’s peoples. Should there be the necessity for force, this is not tolerated by our ideal. This is proven by the history of our ancestors. We also ask that our nation or country not be invaded or oppressed by any others. Should this happen, then there is nothing left to wish for and our responsibilities have been taken care of. We can then proceed to extend a spirit of vast benevolence and universal love, thereby showing our brother countries of Asia a fit example and leading them, so that they may progress to become independent and self-governing territories, free from the tyranny of others and casting off their shackles. If this is what is meant by those who support Greater Asianism, we are willing to expend the utmost of our efforts to achieve these ends as it will provide the world with a benign humanitarianism and be of benefit to Asia in general. Otherwise, it is not something that our country’s people want to know about.456

The spirit of Li’s New Asianism is already apparent in these lines. However, at this point in 1917, Li Dazhao was not making his own calls for Asian unity. He is rather denouncing the militarism that was growing in Japan and demanding that the future be based upon morality. It was clear that he recognized that Greater Asianism was characterized by imperialist ambitions and rejected any such form of regionalization. However, his call to lead

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the countries of Asia, “showing our brother countries of Asia a fit example and leading them, so that they may progress to become independent and self-governing territories,” was in fact what most Japanese intellectuals were calling for with Greater Asianism. Even during World War II, the Greater East Asia Declaration of 1943 stated “autonomous independence” for Asian nations as one of its five principles. Li is raising these issues to question whether the real concerns underlying Japanese writing on Greater Asianism are benign, but the above passage could have also appeared in Kodera Kenichi’s own writing. Li adds to the discourse, stressing the civilizational binary, but posing the dialectical ends of Greater Asianism as the dissolution of that same binary:

In addition, we hope that all the states of Europe and the Americas can rid themselves of their narrow-minded views on race, strengthen the substance of world humanitarianism, and treat those of colour as equals without any discrimination; do away with these divisions and differences of superior and inferior. In this way we can avoid the future worldwide revolution and the misfortune of war between yellow and white will not come to pass. Then this Great Asianism can pass by as a momentary imagining in history. Then we can look to the visionary reformers of East and West and strive towards the mixing of East and West, thereby doing away with all resentment.

His nationalism is also apparent in this passage, but it is far from any statist nationalism. Despite his reference to Chinese ideals and ancestors, he makes his belief in the

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457 The others being: Co-existence and co-prosperity, cultural promotion, economic prosperity, and contribution to global advancement, such as the abolition of racial discrimination. Makimura Kenichirō 牧村健一郎, “Senjika no Daitōkaigī 戦時下の大東亜会議 (The Wartime Greater East Asia Conference) in Shinbun to Shōwa 新聞と「昭和」 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun shuppan, 2010), 151.
458 Li Dazhao 2006, 108.
eventual syncretism of East and West. However, Li’s thoughts on Asianism would become much more concentrated upon the cosmopolitan and not as openly nationalist two years later. He would write his first article espousing his own form of Asian regionalism in 1919, at the very height of the May Fourth Movement. The furthering of his theoretical structuring of Asianism and the internationalist view that he makes clear in these works was not directly a result of his interpretation of the October Revolution, but was due to his new familiarity with the work of Leon Trotsky.

**Trotsky and Li Dazhao’s New Asianism**

In 1918 the English translation of *War and the International*, the version that changed Li Dazhao’s thinking on Asianism, was published by Boni & Liveright in the United States as *The Bolsheviki and World Peace*. This book, originally serialized in Russian at the beginning of the war, revealed Trotsky’s thoughts on the war and the international cooperation that he believed would be a result of it. Trotsky revealed what Ian Thatcher describes as his “most theoretical exposition of the underpinnings of imperialist rivalry in the Preface to *War and the International*.”459 He saw the war as “a revolt of the forces of production against the political form of nation and state.”460 Trotsky saw an end to capitalism and the political and economic form of the nation-state. However, “The nation must continue to exist as a cultural, ideologic and psychological fact, but its economic foundation has been pulled from under its feet.”461 For Trotsky, World War I was the turning point that would

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461 Ibid.
bring forth proletarian revolution. But Trotsky’s contribution here is in his imagining of an international political order in which political forms are harmonized with productive forces across borders, something which the capitalist state could not achieve.\textsuperscript{462} In the preface to \textit{War and the International}, Trotsky describes the process that will characterize this movement, labelling the first stage “the republican United States of Europe as the foundation of the United States of the World.” This would be an internationalist proletarian movement in response to the imperialist “Great Germany under the hegemony of the present German state,” which was being pursued by the German government. Li Dazhao immediately realized the possibility of applying the theoretical principles behind Trotsky’s “United States of Europe” to the Japanese concept of Asianism.

Maurice Meisner has pointed out that Li Dazhao was very influenced by Trotsky’s \textit{War and the International}.\textsuperscript{463} In fact, Li directly quoted from \textit{The Bolsheviki and World Peace} (Bolsheviki 與世界和平) in his December, 1918, article “The Victory of Bolshevism” (Bolshevism 的勝利), clearly using the English terms as they appeared in the 1918 edition.\textsuperscript{464} Only a few weeks later, on January 1, 1919, Li published his “Greater Asianism and New Asianism,” an article that took the Japanese concept of Asianism that Li had struggled with in 1917 and remodeled it under Trotsky’s internationalism. Compared with Li’s earlier mentions of Asianism, his writing in 1919 takes a much stronger and direct position against Japan’s Greater Asianism. He explains that this theory “conceals the doctrine of China’s

\textsuperscript{462} Thatcher 2000, 8-10.
\textsuperscript{463} Meisner 1967, 185.
\textsuperscript{464} Li Dazhao 李大釗, “Bolshevism 的勝利” in Li Dazhao Wenji 李大釗文集, 597-603 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 601.
annexation.”

Li argues that Greater Asianism is merely Greater Japanism, comparing it to “Greater Germany,” which was critiqued by Trotsky. Following and expanding on Trotsky’s outcome, Li also envisions a uniting of various nations into new regional formations:

Looking at the world situation, the Americas will surely become an American Union, Europe will become a European Union and we Asians should also form such an organization, which will all be the foundation of a World Union.

This was a crucial period in Li’s development as a Marxist, but also in the introduction of Marxism to China. In 1919 Li played an important role in raising Chinese interest in Marxism through the publication of his “My Marxist Perspective” 我的馬克思主義觀, which Ishikawa Yoshihiro notes “was little more than a translation, or rather adaptation, from two Japanese writings.”

Ishikawa argues that Li’s Marxism is entirely based upon Japanese Marxist texts. However, although the Japanese influence is clear, it is also clear that Li was reading English language texts on Marxism at about the same time and reinterpreting Trotsky’s writings to fit the East Asian circumstances. In this regard, Li’s Marxism and his Asianism were unique and a product of his time and place.

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465 Li Dazhao 2011, 220. Li uses the same terminology here that was used by Chinese students in Japan to criticize Kodera Kenkichi’s book in their 1917 Chinese translation.
466 The translation here as Great and Greater is not quite equivalent to the German Großdeutschland or to the Chinese/Japanese 大...主義.
467 Li Dazhao 2011, 222. In the original Chinese, Li uses the term lianbang 聯邦.
The connection with Trotsky is undeniable: Trotsky advocated for a “United States of Europe as the foundation of the United States of the World.” Li’s excitement towards this goal also carried into other articles. In a February 1, 1919, article, he explained:

As I see it, the process for this world federation is as follows: 1. Each country with a great area and different nations must become a federation by themselves. 2. The states of the Americas will form the All America Federation; The states of Europe will form the All Europe Federation; The states of Asia will form the All Asia Federation. 3. The Americas, Europe and Asia will unite to form the World Federation. 4. All humankind will form a federation encompassing everyone, destroying all racial and state borders. This is the worldwide datong that all humanity has been praying for!469

Everything suddenly seemed astoundingly simple. Li’s acceptance of direct and universalist materialist theory did away with the problems of the particular. Unlike earlier Asianists from Japan, China or India, Li Dazhao largely disregarded culture and race at this point in his writing. When race or culture are mentioned, Li only makes reference to their eventual disappearance. For Li, Asianism was a step to world harmony simply based upon a convenient geography. Although his ideas were clearly rooted in communist discourses, he makes almost no mention of the proletarian movement and only provides a very simplistic model for this world restructuring. In this regard, he departs from Trotsky to concentrate more upon the liberation of nations, rather than the liberation of the proletariat. Li’s basis for the individual members of these continental federations is national liberation and autonomy.

469 Li Dazhao 李大釗, “Federalism and the Global Structuring” 聯治主義與世界組織 in Li Dazhao Wenji 李大釗文集, 621-626 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 625-626.
This also marks his difference with any form of Japanese Asianism, which focused upon the survival of the race and often the removal of *non-Asians* from Asia. Li insisted upon the initial autonomy of each national group:

The Asian peoples should together advocate a New Asianism that will supersede the ‘Greater Asianism’ advocated by some Japanese. This New Asianism would differ also from that advocated by Ukita Kazutami. He proposed a federation between China and Japan as its foundation while preserving the existing state forms. We, however, insist on a national liberation as the foundation and [call for] a radical transformation. Every Asian nation that has been annexed by another power must be liberated; it should carry out national self-determination, and then form a great federation.\(^{470}\)

In this passage, Li also tries to differentiate his New Asianism from Ukita’s New Asianism. Although Li had strong criticism for Tokutomi’s brand of Great Asianism, he had at least some respect for Ukita’s New Asianism. They both saw Asianism as leading to a great federation (聯邦)\(^{471}\) of nations in Asia. An important difference that Li points out between his and Ukita’s New Asianism was Ukita’s proposal to disregard nation but maintain the state. Ukita’s liberalism insists that there should be no difference between race or nation, therefore, he sees Asianism as applying to “all the nations that live in Asia, no matter the differences in their race,” including Russians, English, French and any others that “currently

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\(^{470}\) Li Dazhao “Greater Asianism and New Asianism” 2011, 222. Note: Marc Andre Matten has translated the majority of this article in Saaler and Szpilman 2011, 220-222.

\(^{471}\) In Du Yaquan’s translation of Ukita’s “New Asianism,” the term *lianbang* 聯邦 is used to denote the Asian federation, while *datongmeng* 大同盟 is used to denote the world union. Li uses *lianhe* 聯合 to signify the Asian union, and he uses *lianbang* for the world federation.
live in Asia.”

Li instead based his Asianism upon national liberation. He argued that “All the nations of Asia that have been swallowed up by others must first be liberated and achieve national awareness.” Both of these thinkers believe in the same three unions of Europe, America and Asia eventually coming together to bring world peace, much like Kang Youwei had been forecasting since 1885. Li had been Ukita’s student at Waseda University only a few years earlier, taking his class on modern political history and reading his popular theories.

Although they may have shared some ideas, it is clear Ukita’s student chose a very different intellectual path and envisioned a much more radical and socialist form of Asianism. However, in criticisms of Li’s Asianism, his theory was unfairly compared with Ukita’s. Yet it is from this criticism and the criticism of Ukita’s Asianism, both of which are directed from the cosmopolitan beliefs that abounded during the May Fourth period in China, that Li is pushed to further develop his theory.

**Cosmopolitan Criticism of Li’s Asianism**

Of the many articles on Asianism in *Eastern Miscellany*, there was only one that took an entirely negative view of Asianism. This was “The Menace of Asianism” 咤咄亞細亞主義, written by Gao Chengyuan, the editor of *Fazheng Xuebao* (Journal of Law and Politics) and an associate of Li’s. Gao’s article, originally published in *Fazheng*


_Xuebao_, is a response to the translation of Ukita’s “New New Asianism” and appeared only
three weeks after publication of Li Dazhao’s “New Asianism.” Gao examines Ukita’s
relatively positive account of the Monroe Doctrine and exposes the imperialism underlying
the United States’ doctrine. While Ukita pointed to United States’ perspective on the doctrine,
Gao looks at the other American countries to illustrate his point. Although Gao provides a
crucial perspective on this history by showing American imperialism from the threatened
nation’s point-of-view, he also uses an angry polemic that secures the support of passionate
nationalists:

Seeing Mr. Ukita say ‘Asia’s problems can be solved by the pan-Asianism
proposed by Japan,’ I see that this is an exact model of pan-Americanism.
They hope by this means to create a ‘Great Asianism for the Japanese;’ to
create ‘Great Japanism.’ Ha ha!... In the past, when the United States issued
such proposals at the pan-American conferences, they were always met
with the objections of the different American countries. They could not
succeed. And what were the reasons for this? Because the United States
was wearing a false mask. They wanted to annex the countries of South
America.

While Ukita saw Asianism as a defense against the likes of European imperialism,
Gao saw it as a “close friend of German militarism.” Ukita had made every effort to
disassociate his thinking from the more militaristic forms of Asianism and envision a
democratic form of regionalism. However, Chinese intellectuals such as Gao were aware that

477 Although Li Dazhao was clearly aware that Ukita had called his form of Asianism “New New Asianism,” he
still decided to call his own form of Asianism “New Asianism.” This complete lack of creativity in naming
regionalization paradigms is surprising for such great thinkers.

478 Ibid, 199.
any form of Japanese leadership would inevitably stumble in the direction of hegemony. Gao’s prediction of Asianism being used as a mask for imperialism was correct. Japan would take control of Manchuria only twelve years later. Relentless in this criticism of Ukita and Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), Gao’s initial criticism of Li Dazhao is not done in such a clear and direct manner.

Although this article appeared three weeks after Li’s, Gao does not mention Li’s discussion of Asianism directly. Rather he turns to an earlier article by Li to prove his point that all forms of Asianism will resort to hegemonic rule. Li’s “The Defeat of Pan…ism and the Victory of Democracy” was published in July, 1918, in Taipingyang (The Pacific). Li had seen “Pan…isms” as the antithesis to democracy and saw the end of WWI as the coming of a new age. The influence that Trotsky had upon his thinking in the months after this is clear as his view on pan movements changed from complete opposition to conditional acceptance. Gao, however, was not convinced. He argued that such continent-wide organization would bring about the greed of the Japanese to rule through their “Asian Monroe Doctrine.” If a certain country “should not harmoniously engage with the states and nations of the world… then all the states of the world will rightly unite and deal with this thick-headed one. There is no need to limit ourselves to one continent in some sort of stubborn conservativeness.”

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479 As Gao’s article was published three weeks after Li’s, it is safe to assume that Gao knew about and was writing in response to Li’s “New Asianism,” and not just Ukita’s “New New Asianism.” They were friends and had engaged in public debates with each other in previous issues of the Fazheng Xuebao.
480 Li Dazhao 李大釗, “The Defeat of Pan…ism is the Victory of Democracy” Pan…ism 之失敗與 Democracy 之勝利 in Li Dazhao Wenji 李大釗文集, 589-592 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984).
481 Gao 1919, 198.
unnecessary. However, his first attack on Asianism was largely directed at the Japanese. It was not until Li’s article was republished that Gao delivered a much fiercer attack on Asianism at the height of the May Fourth Movement.

Li’s “Greater Asianism and New Asianism” was controversial and certainly read by many intellectuals. It initially appeared on February 1, 1919, in Guomin (Citizen 國民), and was published again on March 6th and March 21st in Zhenbao (Awakening 震報). Gao Chengyuan was editor of the Fazheng Xuebao at the time and had maintained a working relationship with Li Dazhao for a few years. Although his initial February 25th discussion of Asianism had been largely directed at Ukita Kazutami, on April 15th he launched a methodical and angry attack on Li Dazhao’s own writing.

“A Critique of Mr. Shou Chang’s (Li Dazhao’s) New Asianism” offers a sophisticated analysis of Li Dazhao’s “New Asianism,” beginning with a quote from Li’s article, followed by Gao’s question, an imagined response by Li and then Gao’s final rebuttal. His article revolves around two main points: The goal should be the unity of the entire world; and Japan is far too economically developed and philosophically unenlightened to allow for any form of equality in a regional organization. Gao finds that equality between developed and less-developed nations cannot work. The more developed nation will inevitably devour the less-developed nation, like the capitalist abuses the labourers, or an adult will eat all the food when at a table with children.482 “Shou Chang’s [Li Dazhao’s] New Asianism is nothing

482 Gao 1919b, “A Critique of Mr. Shou Chang’s (Li Dazhao’s) New Asianism” 評守常君的新亞細亞主義, in Fazheng Xuebao 法政學報, vol.10, 1-4 (1919.4.15) 1-2.
more than the idea of having adults and children equally dividing up some food!"\textsuperscript{483} The idea of equality can only work if the powerful have attained the requisite level of consciousness to not abuse their power. The Japanese and the Europeans, argues Gao, have not attained such a level. He concludes with an angry statement in bold and enlarged font:

\begin{quote}
We advocate that all the humans on the planet come together in a universal unity with no differences between nations because of their relations. No matter be it old or new, no matter be it proposed by the Japanese or by the Chinese, we oppose all forms of Asianism based on such differences.\textsuperscript{484}
\end{quote}

Gao was siding with the popular discourse of cosmopolitanism and pointing out the clear paradox of Li’s cosmopolitanism regionalism. If universalism is accepted and desired, on what basis can regionalism be accepted? Backed into a corner by this editor, Li had to continue the discussion, providing his response to Gao in \textit{Guomin} a few months later. In the article “A Further Discussion of New Asianism: A Response to Mr. Gao Chengyuan,” Li Dazhao describes his ideas for the creation of an Asian regional political order.\textsuperscript{485}

\textbf{New Asianism Clarified}

In this article, much longer than his earlier article on New Asianism, Li describes six central points to describe his New Asianism. These points can be very briefly paraphrased thus:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{483} Gao 1919b, 3.
\textsuperscript{484} Gao 1919b, 4.
\end{quote}
1. New Asianism involves the uniting of nation, then continents. With the final goal of world unity.
2. Nations that are closer together geographically or culturally will unite earlier out of convenience.
3. New Asianism is in complete opposition to Japan’s Greater Asianism.
4. Any form of oppression is opposed, be it within the continent or between continents.
5. New Asianism calls for national autonomy, not xenophobia nor a closed door policy.
6. New Asianism calls for weaker countries to unite against Japanese Greater Asianism;
   Then all the masses of Asia will unite and enter the world federation.

On the defensive with this article, Li responded to Gao’s questions regarding the necessity for Asianism by arguing that it was a stage on the path to world unity. “I certainly never opposed the direct uniting of all the world’s nations into a world federation… However, from a regional perspective, Asia is Asia. Africa is Africa. There is no way around this fact. From the perspective of nation, the nations of all the continents are bound to their land…”

In this discussion it was clear that Gao was raising the valid epistemological question about the existence of Asia as a unit, whether it be geographically, culturally, or racially constructed. Gao was calling on Li to provide some sort of basis for Asian unity that includes all the nations of Asia, yet excludes Europeans, Americans and Africans. In his response, Li turned to a rather specious argument that “Asia is Asia… There is no way around this fact.” Li did not create any idea of what Asia was or how it could be understood. As Li’s materialist perspective ignored cultural and racial elements, he saw Asia as a mere geographic entity, which could conveniently be used as a stepping stone to world unity.

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487 He does however argue that on some points, the “people’s feeling” 民情 may be similar across Asia. Li
a geographic entity, Asia was an arbitrary construction was not considered, but for Li this was still acceptable as he argued that the continent was merely a means to his end. In this regard, Li’s Asianism differed from almost all others. It was not based on similarities or differences, but was a strategy for ending oppression.

An important point that Li returned to frequently in this article was that New Asianism was intended as a counter to Greater Asianism. While Greater Asianism inevitably gave way to Japanese dominance, New Asianism demanded national liberation, equality and democracy as foundations for regionalization. In 1918 Li had first argued that “Pan…isms” were the antithesis to democracy. In later years his writings indicated that he conceived of democracy as an egalitarian ideal that could be achieved through socialism. He defined it as: “the rejection of the relationship between the ruling and ruled.”

His rejection of oppression and dominance led to his opposition to Greater Asianism and his distrust of any form of Japanese leadership. While Japanese thinkers raised the idea of Greater Asianism in opposition to European imperialism, Li called for a New Asianism in opposition to the imperialism of Greater Asianism. As to Gao’s argument that any form of regionalization would end up with the “adults” at the table taking more than their fair share from the “children” at the same table, Li counters that: “we propose that the children make the adults into children as well!”

Li did not only take the term “Asianism” from Japan’s Asianism, he based his ideas of regionalism in opposition to it. Although he certainly kept the idea that

489 Li 1984, 111.
Asia would be constructed as a unified geo-political body, there were no leaders in Li’s vision.

**Conclusion**

Zhang Hao has investigated this interaction between nationalism and cosmopolitanism as one of the dualities that defined the May Fourth Period. He finds that nationalism has only a subtle relationship to May Fourth writing, but writings concerning cosmopolitanism, expressing what Chen Duxiu called “the religion of love,” flourished.\(^{490}\) However, this relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism needs to be further considered. Li Dazhao’s New Asianism offers an interesting example of this interaction. Although his thinking during this period emphasized the need to organize on a regional and eventually a global level, the basis for his thought was always tightly connected to the need for national self-determination and an acute awareness of the suffering of his nation. His assumption of the existence of a coherent and unified nation was maintained throughout these writings. However, the long-term goal for the nation is not any form of nation-state, but is the merging with other nations into a united world or *datong*. There was a consensus among intellectuals that human history was a teleological march towards this utopia. How humanity would proceed along the path was not agreed upon. Asianism and nationalism were discussed by these intellectuals as possible means.

Li Dazhao’s New Asianism is representative of the *zeitgeist* of nationalism during the

May Fourth Period. In the wake of World War I, this form of nationalism remained distrustful of the state, but instead saw the nation as a collection of individuals that are humans before they are Chinese. This period was marked by a strong belief in such universals. Li’s theory likewise ignored cultural or racial categorizations of China or Asia and rejected earlier dreams of wealth and power that had proved divisive. His Asianism was a means by which oppression could be destroyed. It was not envisioned as a plan for lasting regional organization. His choice to name this theory “Asianism” has led to confusion in his time and still today. He was criticized by Gao, who saw him as making room for Japanese aggression and today is still included in discussions of anti-Western Asian regionalization, rather than utopic communist theory.

This theory of regionalization, being introduced at such a crucial time in Chinese history, offers insight into the complications surrounding early-twentieth century Chinese nationalism, as well as the entry of Marxist ideas into China’s intellectual world. Although such ideas clearly interacted with, and had influence upon, the development of Chinese nationalism, New Asianism had little place in the post-May Fourth period as cosmopolitanism receded from the stage and a nationalism that was based upon culture and difference rose in China. This is also one of the key differences between Li Dazhao’s New Asianism and the other form of Asianism raised by a Chinese intellectual during the early Republican period: Sun Yat-sen’s “Great Asianism.”

Both Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao envisioned Asianism as an anti-imperialist program. Both advocated the independence of the various nations of Asia as a basis of their Asianism.
On the surface, the key difference between the two was Li Dazhao’s labeling of Japan as an empire bent on the invasion of China.\textsuperscript{491} However, the very basis of their argument is different. Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao both concentrated upon the West-East conflict in their articles, but Sun Yat-sen viewed this conflict through the lens of cultural difference, while Li Dazhao saw it through the lens of universalism.\textsuperscript{492}


\textsuperscript{492} Wei 1995, 79.
Chapter VI: Sun Yat-sen’s Kingly Way: Reconceptualising Asia in Response to Empire

Sun Yat-sen is officially regarded as the “Father of the Nation” 国父 in both Taiwan and mainland China. This has resulted in a great deal of confusion when considering his undeniably pro-Japanese behavior, especially with the recent rise of anti-Japanese nationalism. Contemporary Chinese nationalism will face a formidable challenge if attempts are made to reconcile Sun with current patriotic tendencies. Throughout his career, although often critical of Japanese imperialism, he consistently retained the belief that only by working with Japan could China become strong. Furthermore, he believed that Japan and China shared essentialized Asian political attributes, related to millennia of Confucian and diametrically opposed to Western imperialism, what I have referred to in the title of this chapter as “the Kingly Way” 王道.

Although Li Dazhao also constructed a specific Chinese Asianism during the New Culture Movement, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianist discourse concludes this dissertation for two reasons. Firstly, his adoption of all the various discourses on Asianism into his own discourse make for an appropriate example of how such ideas found their way into elements of Chinese modernity and nationalism. And secondly, as will be shown below, the influence of Sun’s

discourse on Asianism far outweighed any other Chinese intellectuals’ writing on the issue and continue to be felt today.

Asianism persisted in Sun’s vocabulary and his thinking from the 1890s until his death in 1925. Like many intellectuals, and most Asianists, Sun Yat-sen often feared that a race war was inevitable. Furthermore, he accepted the dichotomizing of West and East into different civilizations, but unlike those in Chapter IV who concentrated upon material and spiritual differences, Sun saw the dichotomy upon lines of traditional moral governance. Like Li Dazhao in Chapter V, he was influenced by socialism and envisioned a political utopia that China would play a large role in constructing, but instead of looking to new ideologies coming from the West, Sun returned to what he saw as an essential East in Confucian principles. In fact, Li and Sun had similar ideas concerning the rise of an anti-imperialist and united Asia. Like Li, Sun was a fervent patriot. His love for China appears in all his writings, perhaps even more so in his Asianism. He believed that traditional Chinese thought, given the chance and supported by Japanese economic and military might, could redeem the world of its ills. In his great enthusiasm for the revival of China towards these ends, Sun’s actions were often opportunistic and related to his own ambitions for control over China’s course. He sometimes validated Japanese expansionism and often encouraged imperialism, certainly leaving behind ample opportunity for Japan’s expansionist propaganda to utilize his writings for Japan’s benefit.

This chapter traces the development of a Chinese Asianism that incorporates aspects of the discourses of Asianism reviewed in the previous chapters. It shows how, though based
in numerous binaries including: the political binary of nation and empire; the racial binary of yellow and white; geographic and civilizational boundaries of East and West; and the belief in traditional Chinese Confucianism and socialist teleologies, this discourse reimagines the concept of Asia to offer a criticism of Western universalism and the phenomenon of capitalist imperialism, offering Asian nations a newly theorized perspective on nationalism to combat empire.

After a short review of previous studies of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism, I investigate Sun’s speeches from 1913 to show the conditions under which he accepted the possibility of Japanese leadership and how he adopted discourses of race and civilization in his understanding of East and West. Then I show how various contradictions posed challenges to the simplistic binaries during World War I, complicating the idea of Asianism and revealing its limitations as a theory which divides East and West. Finally turning to Sun’s 1924 writing and speeches on Asianism, I show how Sun limns the concept of Asia and questions Japan’s position in this concept. From this pivotal time I turn to the influence of Sun’s Asianism after 1924, particularly showing how it: contributed to anti-imperialist discourses of nationalism around Asia; contributed to discourses of Japanese imperialism during World War II; and contributed to the use of Asia as a concept through which later Asian intellectuals could critique hegemony and rethink modernity.

**Returning to Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism**

Studying the Asianism advocated by Sun Yat-sen poses several problems. Unlike other Chinese intellectuals who have written about Asianism, Sun has remained both
ridiculously famous and unreasonably popular on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and to some extent around the world. Therefore, his every word has been analyzed over and over again in efforts to consolidate his thinking into a comprehensible whole. Standard hagiographies from China and Taiwan generally ignored or marginalized his Asianism as it failed to comply with nationalist ideologies in the post war period. Beginning in the 1980s, there was renewed interest in his theory as talk of regionalization surfaced. Therefore, this chapter does not merely review Sun’s Asianist theory, but concentrates upon how it was received at the time and even now.

The first full-length study of the history of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism was carried out by Marius Jansen more than sixty years ago. Although, as will be seen below, there are far more sources available to researchers now to understand Sun’s Asianism, Jansen’s study remains a persuasive and rich investigation into Sun Yat-sen’s relationship with Japan. In the introduction to The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen he explains: “… it becomes apparent that the idea of an Asiatic union under Japanese leadership to combat Western imperialism was not merely the contrivance of Japanese imagination. In recreating the contemporary attitude and climate of opinion which Chinese revolutionaries and Japanese nationalists shared at the turn of the century, this story will show that for Chinese, as well as for Japanese, the overwhelming danger was Western imperialism.” Jansen carefully weaves through a great number of sources to find that: “The Chinese revolutionaries turned toward Japan a face which the West did not see: Pan-Asianism. It is this aspect which underlies the entire history

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of Japanese relations with Sun Yat-sen. For the Japanese, it was a theme which was basic to
the thought of Sun Yat-sen, one to which he adhered throughout a long series of intellectual
changes." Jansen argues that theories of Asian solidarity "were more than the contrivance
of Japanese imagination. They represented a reasonable and probable solution to a very
present problem, and they were abandoned only gradually and reluctantly as the Chinese
revolutionaries saw Japan try to justify a rule of Might with Oriental maxims of Right." Jansen’s study remains one of the best English-language studies of Sun Yat-sen. However, his perspective on Sun Yat-sen is dictated by his sources. As he acknowledges
above, this was the face that Sun Yat-sen turned to Japan and still today Sun is remembered
in Japan for his Asianism. Sun had many faces and Chinese perspectives on Sun were more
likely to downplay or excuse away his Asianism as strategy or mistake. More recently, his
Asianism has been looked to as a basis for a Chinese-centered regionalization. This has
resulted in a number of Chinese books, articles and dissertations that return to Sun’s Asianism
for reevaluation and renewed research. Differentiating Sun’s Asianism from Japanese “pan-
Asianism” remains a recurring topic in Chinese scholarship. However, some studies go much
further. Wang Hui uses Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism as a jumping off point to understand “Asia”
as a heterogeneous whole. Chen Kuan-hsing sees it as a philosophy to deal with current
issues of imperialism. And at least one graduate thesis proposes it as a model for future

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495 Jansen 1954, 201.
496 Jansen 1954, 212.
497 For example: Li Taijing. See the conclusion of this chapter.
Asian regionalism. Although most of these studies concentrate upon the wording of Sun’s 1924 “Great Asianism” speech, some do discuss the early development of Sun’s pro-Japanese and Asianist ideologies. Therefore, I briefly return to Sun’s earliest encounters with Asianism, showing how the discourse first appears in his thought as a strong voice against Western imperialism.

**Sun Yat-sen’s Early Asianist Inclinations**

In English, Chinese or Japanese, with few exceptions, studies on Sun Yat-sen’s thought consider Minakata Kumagusu 南方熊楠 to be the first to influence Sun’s Asianism. Minakata was a botanist working in London. They met in 1897 through the introduction of Professor R.K. Douglas, Chair of Chinese Studies at King’s College, London University. Years afterwards they remained friends and visited each other in Yokohama and Minakata’s hometown of Wakayama. According to Minakata’s diary, “the first time I met Sun Yat-sen, he asked me what I hoped to accomplish with my life. I responded: ‘I hope that

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501 See for example: Audrey Wells 2001, 14. Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, translated by Janet Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1998, 66. Ogata Kō 緒形康, “Son Bun・Kumagusu no ‘Ajiashugi’” 孫文・熊楠の「アジア主義」in *Sonbun to Minakata Kumagusu* 孫文と南方熊楠 (Tōkyō : Kyūko Shoin, 2007), 220. However, there are opposing views. Li Taijing is opposed to the idea that Sun was influenced by the Japanese. Instead he argues that it was something of a shared discourse by the end of the century. Due to Sun’s claim in 1924 that he has been planning for the unity of Asian peoples for thirty years, Li argues that Sun’s thinking must precede his meetings with Japanese pan-Asianists: Li Taijing 李台京, *Zhongshan xiansheng daYazhouzhuyi yanjiu: lishi huigu yu dangdai yiyi* 中山先生大亞洲主義研究: 歷史回顧與當代意義 (A Study of Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism: Historical Memory and Contemporary Significance ), (Taipei: Wenshizhu chubanshe, 1992), 49-51.
we Orientals can remove all Westerners from the East.’ Sun was shocked.”\(^{502}\)

Not long after his meeting with Minakata in London, Sun moved to Yokohama. There he became caught up in the pan-Asian anti-imperialist spirit and became friends with a number of Japanese pan-Asianists. As Jansen explains, “Certainly the West never gave the feeling of Oriental solidarity as much help as it did at the close of the nineteenth century.”\(^{503}\) And it was under this spirit of solidarity that Sun became friends with Tōyama Mitsuru 頭山満, Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅 and Miyazaki Tōten 宮崎滔天. Sun first met Miyazaki at the house of Chen Shaobai, not long after his arrival in Yokohama. Miyazaki then introduced Sun to Inukai and others, connecting him with powerful politicians and pan-Asian activists.\(^{504}\) On the outside looking in, Sun was aware of the danger of Japanese imperialism, but compared to many others he was not as troubled by the concept of Japanese leadership. He was surrounded by trusted Japanese friends and often utilized their resources for his efforts in China.

Even in the early days of their collaboration for Asia, these Chinese and Japanese

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\(^{503}\) Jansen devotes a considerable amount of his text to Sun’s relationship with these famous pan-Asianists. I only briefly summarize these relationships here and instead turn to concentrate on Sun’s writings, many of which were not available to Jansen. Jansen 1954, 68.

\(^{504}\) Reading Miyazaki’s autobiography reveals much about the mindset of many so-called *shishi* 志士 Japanese activists. Although there was clearly a wish to bring about positive change in China, there was always a romantic impulse to lead the Chinese. Miyazaki’s introspection highlights this impulse: “When I dreamed about the outcome of my activities in Sian, I imagined myself entering the Chinese continent in front of a host of Chinese, a general mounted on a white horse in white raiment.” Miyazaki Tōten. My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream: The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten. Translated, with an introduction, by Etō Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982 (Original Japanese version published in 1902), 132-133, 138, 73.
revolutionaries were not merely focused upon their own countries, but looked to help any Asians suffering under Western imperialism. The first armed action that Sun and his new friends initiated was in support of Emilio Aguinaldo in his war against American imperialism in 1899.\textsuperscript{505} However, he and his Japanese friends were most interested in China. In his popular 1902 autobiography, Miyazaki Tōten explained the need to save China. He and his brother disagreed with the perspective that China was stuck in the past, instead arguing that “What the Chinese have done is to take the three dynasties of antiquity as their ideal of good government, but they consider them as norms and not as exact patterns to be followed. They may seem to idolize the past, but in actuality they are trying for progress for the future…”\textsuperscript{506} China would once again become the centre of Asia and lead the revival through its superior morality.

Working closely with these and many others in the first decade of the twentieth century, Sun worked towards the revolution in China. Perhaps the zeal and idealism of his Japanese friends during this time left Sun with hope for Japan that would not die, even as the country increasingly engaged in imperialistic politics towards China. It was through the support of these friends that those involved in the 1911 Revolution successfully overthrew the Manchu government and brought great political change to China. With the Manchu suddenly marginalized, Sun and others in the Kuomintang began looking to future possibilities, including the possibility of working together with the Japanese to create a united Asia. The speeches analyzed below show that Sun Yat-sen utilized issues of race and

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\textsuperscript{505} Jansen 1954, 71.  \\
\textsuperscript{506} Miyazaki 1982, 47. 
\end{flushleft}
civilization to frame his calls for Asian unity under Japanese leadership.

At the same time, in early 1913 the United States government – as well as the governments of a number of Western states - were involved in very public discussion of restrictions to be imposed upon newly-arrived foreigners that would bar them from owning land. The only foreigners to be affected by this new law were those deemed ineligible for citizenship, specifically, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Indian immigrants. The reasons for the prolonged debate were partly due to fears that “it would give grave offense to China and Japan.” However, despite repeated appeals by the Japanese government, these discussions were finalized with the Alien Land Law of 1913, largely set in place to stop Chinese and Japanese from buying or cultivating land in California. As the discussion of these restrictions moved into the Japanese media in June of 1913, the terms “Han-Ajiashugi” and “Zen-Ajiashugi” entered the Japanese language as translations of the English term “Pan-Asianism.” This was one of the first discussions of Pan-Asianism in Japan. The term had been used to criticize Japan in the Western media and was not accepted in any positive manner in the Japanese newspapers, but a very similar term had been positively discussed in China just months before this.

Sun’s Asianist Speeches: Strategic Alliance under Japanese Leadership

Sun Yat-sen’s Asianist face was always clearest when he was in Japan. To some extent, this can be looked upon as strategy. Although his speeches were often intended for

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508 Saaler 2011, 6.
Chinese students or businessmen living in Japan, Sun was clearly trying to build on China-Japan relations by encouraging these people to further develop their connections with the country. Back in China, the issue of Japan was more likely to fade from his speeches and writings. Therefore, Sun’s “Asianism” speech should be contextualized within his other speeches in Japan. When this is done, the content of his symbolic 1924 speech does not seem particularly special. Sun had been advocating China and Japan unity for a long time before 1924. Sun’s pro-Asian unity speeches of 1913 were not as critical of Japan as his 1924 speech, coming years before Japan’s overt imperialist actions of the Twenty-one Demands. Instead he concentrated upon economic and strategic demands backed by a strong belief in racial solidarity.

The most blatant examples of Sun’s calls for Asian unity were in the many speeches he made in February and March of 1913 in various cities across Japan. In February, Sun traveled to Japan for research in his role as Minister of Railways, a position he had held since handing the presidency to Yuan Shih-kai a few months earlier. However, reviewing the speeches Sun made and the meetings he held, it appears that Sun had other plans for his travels across Japan. Sun peppered these speeches with popular slogans used by Japanese Asianists, including the race-solidarity slogan “same-script, same-race” (同文同種), the Monroist slogan “Asia for the Asians,” and the classical state-solidarity idiom “If the lips perish, the teeth will freeze” (唇亡齒寒). Sun was looking to gather widespread support from the Chinese in Japan as well as from high ranking Japanese politicians and elite.

When he spoke to a Chinese audience, he urged them to enhance relations with
Japanese and work towards solidarity. He saw the Western powers as the danger to Chinese as well as Japanese interests.

If there was no Japan, then there would be no talk of future prospects for China. In East Asia, the revolution accomplished by my generation was due to Japan’s strength. For the victory of China’s revolution, we must thank Japan. Japan and China share the same gain and losses. To protect Japanese interests, they must protect the interests of all China.509

In this speech to Chinese students assembled in Tokyo, Sun calls for students to use brotherly love to correct Japanese false impressions of Chinese people. It is their responsibility to work towards China-Japan unity for China and the world. Sun repeatedly stresses that this unity is for China’s national interests, but he then relates his country’s interests to those of Asia’s and of the “yellow” race.:

Asia’s population amounts to two thirds of that of the world’s. Yet today there is a part that remains subjugated under the might of the Europeans. Were China and Japan to cooperate in their development then our power would be greatly expanded and we could easily create a Great Asia revitalizing the past glories of history. We could bring peace to the world, bring datong to humanity with rights of equality and freedom for all. The happiness of the world could be achieved by the 500 million of the yellow race.510

The redemptive power of Asia to right the world and achieve harmony was a concept

509 “Student Must Study Hard with Revolutionary Spirit” 學生須以革命精神努力學問 (to Chinese students in Tokyo February 23, 1913. GFQ/ p141-145.), 144-145.
510 Ibid, 145.
frequently returned to by proponents of Asianism. Concentric circles of nation and race – which indicated the 500 million people of China, Japan and Korea – extended outwards to the entire world, which could look forward to progressing to the Confucian utopia of *datong*. Asia’s “past glories of history” does not merely refer to economic power or world standing, but the righteousness of governance under traditional Confucian society. This is a subject that Sun himself would further explain in his 1924 speech and will be returned to below. It is in his 1913 speeches, however, that the issue of Japanese leadership is made plain.

Unlike other Chinese intellectuals, Sun Yat-sen was quite clear in his calls for Japanese leadership. This was certainly not meant as dominance, but as guidance: “Japan’s restoration came long before China’s and the country has already experienced so much. The people of my country will still be looking to Japan for guidance for a long time.” National autonomy was assumed. However, his speeches to Japanese Asianists at the Tōa Dōbunkai were surprisingly upfront in their demands for Japanese leadership. Perhaps so far that some of the elite at these speeches wondered if Sun was inviting the empire.

Asians have a duty to maintain the peace in Asia. However, China is currently lacking in the power to maintain peace. Therefore, Japan’s responsibility is great! I hope that Japan will work hard to take care of China and engage in mutual support with China. This is not only my hope, but this is what all of the Chinese people eagerly look forward to!\(^5\)


\(^5\)Sun Yat-sen, “China and Japan Must Engage in Mutual Support” 中日須互相提携, in *GFQJ* 3, 158. There is similar content in “China and Japan Should Progress Hand-in-hand.” 中日兩國應攜手進步 also at Dobunkai, 1913.2.15, p137. “We Hope the Japanese Will Assist in Building China” 3.10 p149.
In his speeches to Chinese citizens, he also made calls for Japanese leadership. However, Sun was always at odds with those who saw Japan as the greatest threat. Sun was always wary of Japanese imperialism, but he made it clear that the European empires were the greater threat. He occasionally mentioned the United States in a positive light but always made it clear that he believed the country would not assist China:

Throughout history, Chinese people have misunderstood and looked down upon Japan. But from the beginning of the revolution, those cadres who held positions in the revolutionary parties were all former exchange students to Japan. And it was Japanese men of great morals who offered great assistance in the revolution. Concerned with the future of China, some advocate turning to the United States for help, but can Monroist America become the country that China will rely on? Can the power of the United States be entwined with China’s fate? Concerning the future of China and its doom or survival, I am convinced that no matter what, it can only be Japan.⁵¹³

Ostensibly, Sun’s reasons for going to Japan at this time were related to his new position as Minister of Railways and to visit old friends. However, from his speeches, it is clear that he was spending much of his time garnering Japanese support. Sun made a number of interesting meetings during this time. Marie-Claire Bergère notes that during all of this pan-Asianist talk, Sun met with Shibusawa Eichi (1840-1931) to discuss the creation of the Industrial Company of China in order to bring Japanese zaibatsu to China to help with

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⁵¹³ “Relations between China and Japan” 中日之關係 at Nagasaki consulate office to overseas Chinese on March 22, 1913. *GFQJ*, v.3, 158.
development and resource exploitation.\footnote{Bergère 1998, 238-239.} In Bergère’s reading, the meeting sounds quite sinister. However, there were other meetings that are more revealing of Sun’s work in 1913.

In his 1971 biography of Sun Yat-sen, John C.H. Wu argues that the most important event during the 1913 trip to Japan was Sun’s meeting with Katsura Tarō桂太郎,\footnote{John C.H. Wu, Sun Yat-sen: The Man and His Ideas (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1971), 193. Sun’s meeting with Katsuro is also discussed in Jansen 1954, 159. The People’s Stand February 20, 1913, edition makes mention of the meeting, but provides no details.} who had just fallen from power and lost his position of Prime Minister through a no-confidence vote earlier that month. Katsura was frustrated with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which he himself had been instrumental in establishing years before, and was now interested in establishing a Sino-Japanese Alliance. Sun was excited about the prospects of furthering relations with Japan, but he was openly critical of Japan’s actions in Korea. Sun said: “The doctrine of Greater Asia [大亞細亞主義]\footnote{The term Great Asianism was almost non-existent at this time. However, Sun did use something similar (dayazhou zhi zhuyi 大亞洲之主義) for the first time in a public speech only a few weeks after this in Shanghai. The speech 中日親善共享和平 was published in the People’s Stand on March 29, 1913. See GFQJ v3, 159. John Wu’s translation of Sun’s conversation with Katsura was made from the Guofu Nianpu, which is then based upon an article by Hu Hanmin published in 1936. Assuming that Hu may not have been writing this article from notes of their conversation, he is basing his writing on memory of an event 23 years prior. In 1936 Great Asianism was already a common phrase and there is certainly the possibility that Hu, either purposefully or unintentionally, made an alteration to the original conversation between Katsura and Sun in order to support his own belief in Asianism. Hu Hanmin, “Great Asianism and Opposing Japan” 大亞細亞主義與抗日, in Hu Hanmin xiansheng wenji 胡漢民先生文集, v.4, 38-541 (Taipei: Dangshi weiyuanhui, 1978). Luo Jialun 龍家倫 (editor), Guofu nianpu 國父年譜 (Taipei: Dangshishiliao weiyuanhui, 1965), 495-497.} must be based on the principle of equality and fraternity. Now, before the Russo-Japanese War, China was in full sympathy with Japan; but not after the war. The reason is that Japan, riding on the tide of victory, went ahead to annex Korea….”\footnote{Quoted in Wu 1971, 193-194. However, see the above reference for more on this quote.} Katsura promised Sun he would work towards righting these wrongs and won
his support. However, Katsura would pass away a few months later in October, 1913, and these plans for a Sino-Japanese alliance disappeared. Hu Hanmin would later remark that there are few Japanese like Katsura remaining and the principles of Asianism had become skewed.518

The meeting with Katsura and Sun’s speeches in Japan in February and March of 1913 are particularly important in our understanding of Sun’s early Asianism, or at least his views on China-Japan cooperation. As Dai Jitao would remark later: “He naturally believed that the rise or fall of the nation and the survival of the country was greatly related to the possibility of alliance (lianmeng 聯盟) with Japan.” 519 Sun clearly believed in the cooperation of China and Japan. Unlike Li Dazhao, who saw Asianism as a step to an egalitarian cosmopolitanism with no leadership and based only upon geographic convenience, and quite separate from the cultural realm, Sun understood the foundation of this cooperation to be found in the shared culture and history of the two countries. From this shared culture and history, Sun turns to economic and military issues. However, Kuomintang figures back in China were discussing Asianism at the exact same time, likely in conjunction with Sun, and they concentrated upon economic and military issues alone. These 1913 discussions of Asianism in China contextualize Sun’s talks in Japan, showing that his thinking was as much a part of the historical zeitgeist as it was of his individual perspective, but they also show the surprising consideration given to possibilities for regional cooperation

518 Hu Hanmin 1978 (1936), 540.
519 Dai also discusses the Katsura meeting and recalls that the meetings between the two were “sincere and heartfelt.” Dai Jitao (orig. 1928), 1987, 108 and 109.
in conjunction with the rise of nationalism in China.

**While Sun Yat-sen was in Japan: Asianism in the People’s Stand**

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Kuomintang newspaper *People’s Stand* 民立報 ran articles on Asian unity and Sino-Japanese cooperation during the first year of the republic and may have been the first source to publish the term “Asianism” in October, 1912. The first mention of Great Asianism or Pan-Asianism (大亞細亞主義) was made by the Japanese diplomat and China hand Ibuka Hikosaburō 井深彦三郎 in a special to the *People’s Stand*. As explained in Chapter Four, this produced minor dialogue with Chinese intellectuals, with Xu Xue’er arguing that China should rightfully be the centre of any such regionalization. This was not the end of discussion of Asianism in the *People’s Stand*.

In 1913, the *People’s Stand* continued to run articles on Asianism, going into further detail while also discussing Sun Yat-sen’s activities in Japan. These articles contextualize Sun Yat-sen’s 1913 Asianism and show that he was certainly not the only person in the Chinese political sphere to be thinking along these lines. At least to some extent, other KMT intellectuals and editors were seeing things in a similar way. In February the paper ran prominent Pan-Asianist Uchida’s Ryōhei’s critique of Japanese government policy in an article entitled “To Cut Up or to Protect,” in which he details his distrust of Russia and the need to support China.\(^{520}\) At the end of the month, Xu Xue’er wrote a rather positive article

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\(^{520}\) It was in 1913 that Uchida became Sun Yat-sen’s adviser on foreign affairs. Only two years after this, Uchida lost faith in the republic and his position on China became much more militant as he argued for Japanese domination in order to save China. In this article he argues that “Asia is the territory of the Asians, so China should be the territory of the Chinese.” Uchida is the founder of the Kokuryūkai 紅龍会, an association dedicated to removing Westerners from all areas south of the Heilong River and reputed “as the
arguing that the Japanese may be coming to their senses and, although the hawkish (yexin 野心) attitude still existed, China and Japan use the “same script,” are of the “same race,” and are just like “lips and teeth.”521 A surprising article on March 11, 1913, entitled “Preparations for the China-Japan Association,” discussed a March 6 meeting in Nanjing to discuss a China-Japan Alliance (中日同盟), including the future bringing together of the people and the governments. The initial Chinese members of this association are listed as: Li Zhaofu 李肇甫, who had been Sun’s secretary in 1912, Wang Yinchuan 王印川, politician and People’s Stand editor, Zhu Qi 朱淇, who had aided Sun in a number of early revolutionary activities, Lin Changmin 林長民, who held a great number of posts in the first republican government, and the journalist Huang Yuanyong 黃遠庸.522

These articles and this association were concentrated on the possibility of an alliance between China and Japan in order to resist Russia and other Western powers. As before, working with Japan was seen as the key for these intellectuals in the effort to save China. However, unlike before, little mention was made of cultural or linguistic similarities. These polite nods to a shared civilization were either no longer needed or no longer defined the relationship. This possibly opened the door to a farther ranging collaboration. Just after these meetings took place in March of 1913, a short series of articles took an approach that widely

521 Xu Xue’er 徐血兒, “Japan’s Awakening” riben zhi juewu 日本之覺悟 in Minli Bao (People’s Stand) (2.24, 1914).
522 “Preparations for the China-Japan Association” 中日協會之籌備 in Minli Bao (People’s Stand) (3.11, 1914).
disregarded cultural commonalities, utilizing the term “Great Asianism” to discuss a plan for a militarily and economically united Asia that would stretch from Turkey to Japan.

**Ye Chucang’s Strategic Asianism**

The first detailed definition and analysis of the term “Great Asianism” was made in March 1913 in the pages of the *People’s Stand* by Kuomintang revolutionary, veteran journalist and newspaper editor Ye Chucang. Ye, already an important figure in the KMT by 1913, would hold various posts and even become Chief of Propaganda for a short period in the 1920s. His writings on Asianism, simply titled “Great Asianism,” were serialized in the March 15, 16 and 21st editions of the paper. These articles limn a thoughtful if simplistic regional system with details on both the internal machinations and the relationship between a regionalized Asia and the outside world. Although the articles were leading editorials and clearly widely read by KMT supporters at the time, they have been ignored or gone unnoticed by scholars in both Chinese and English scholarship until now.

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523 Or “Pan-Asianism.” Ye uses what will become the standard Japanese form: 大亞細亞主義. However, in his articles he switches back and forth between “Asianism” and “Great Asianism,” never differentiating between the two.

524 Very little has been written on Ye Chucang. Most of the biographical information available on him comes from his son’s “Yi xianfu Ye Chucang” 憶先父葉楚傖 (Remembering My Late Father, Ye Chucang), which has been summarized and added to in the biographies by Zhang Yongjiu 张永久. These short biographies reveal very little of Ye’s political and intellectual thinking: “Ye Chucang de bense” 叶楚伧的本色 (The Character of Ye Chucang) in *Shu Wu* 书屋 v9 (2010), 33-37. And the very similar: Zhang Yongjiu, “Guanren yuanlai shi shusheng” 官人原来是书生 (The Official was originally a Scholar) in *Changjiang wenyi* 长江文艺 v.2 (2013), 120-127.


526 The *People’s Stand* is quite widely available at major research centres in Taiwan and the United States. The fact that no research has appeared on these writings again points to the degree of unpopularity of this
The importance of Ye’s writing to the study of Asianism is three-fold. Firstly, this is the first detailed analysis of Asianism using the name “Great Asianism,” predating Kodera Kenkichi’s book of the same name by more than three years. Secondly, these articles, and to some extent the above mentioned articles, show that this discourse was not limited to Sun Yat-sen but was a possibility seriously discussed in greater detail by other politicians and intellectuals in a leading newspaper only one year after the revolution. And finally, the influence on or relationship with Sun Yat-sen and the formation of his own ideas of Asianism cannot be ignored. Ye published these articles in the two weeks before Sun Yat-sen’s first recorded use of the term “Asianism” in a speech in Shanghai on March 29th. As these articles were published in the party newspaper, it is quite likely that Sun would have been aware of this discourse either before or after his Shanghai speech. The timing of the articles’ appearance in the People’s Stand might lead many to assume that Sun requested Ye to write them, that they were orchestrated. However, Ye’s articles are very different from the pro-Japanese speeches made by Sun in March of 1913.

Ye rarely make direct mention of Japan at all in his articles and instead concentrates on all of Asia, describing his theory in terms of its application to world peace. In the first article, Ye outlines four rather general goals for his Asianism:

1) Protect and further the common interests of Asia through the integration of treaties.
2) Support the independence of all Asian states through morality and justice.

subject until recent years.
3) Cooperate on Asia’s necessary overseas development.

4) Intervene in or mediate upon international conflicts outside of Asia.\textsuperscript{527}

These four goals do not clearly describe what path Ye’s Asianism might make, but they do make it evident that he envisions an alliance of independent states which cooperate based on treaties. This is a very different plan than the dreams of a consolidated East Asia that arose in the late-nineteenth century and may be the first time that a Chinese intellectual proposed the uniting of all the states of Asia, from Turkey to Japan.

Ye’s first article makes these general arguments and declares that Asianism is a movement for world peace and should not at all bring about Western fears of the “Yellow Peril,” but his second and third articles take much more specific approaches, examining the need for military cooperation and economic integration respectively.

Despite the \textit{People’s Stand’s} distrust of militarism, Ye argues that military strength is a necessity. Although he concedes that a united Asia would still not have the power to attack Europe, he believes military cooperation and integration could result in a situation in which Asia is able to defend itself from foreign attacks and ensure the independence of all Asian states. In another short list, Ye Chucang notes four points or goals that explain the importance that integrated military strength will have in the implementation of Asianism:

1) Mutually implement and plan the stability of Asianism through the military power of all the states.

2) Through the same method guarantee the safety of Asia’s internal stability militarily.

\textsuperscript{527} Ye Chucang 葉楚倫, “Great Asianism” 大亞細亞主義 in \textit{Minli Bao} (People’s Stand) (3.15, 2014).
3) We only wish to protect ourselves with this military force and have no desire to interfere in the peace and stability of the world’s people.
4) Establish strong military defenses at the borders of Asian states and territories.\textsuperscript{528}

Ye reiterates his assertions that “this is not a plan to bring about conflict with the world powers through our military might,” but is rather to defend Asia from the powers and maintain the independence of each country inside Asia.\textsuperscript{529} Ye has outlined an integrated Asian military as what can be called the centrifugal force of Asian unity in his theory, the force which repels outsiders and keeps Asia safe. In his third article he turns to the internal advantages of Asian unity, concentrating upon the economic manifestations of Asianism:

For Great Asianism to prosper, the first step must be the integration of the international system on the Asian mainland. And before this integration is complete, there must be a more rudimentary integration… a trade alliance (shangye tongmeng).\textsuperscript{530}

This idea of a trade alliance is Ye’s vision for the first step on the path to a more integrated Asia that is free from European imperialism. Ignoring the issues of leadership and intra-Asian competition or hegemony, Ye sees Asian nations cooperating with each other to build modern and integrated economies. His frequent use of the term Asian mainland (亞陸) and his rare mention of Japan almost leads one to believe that his Asianism excludes Japan. This is not the case at all. Ye simply sees all Asian nations integrating into this system on an

\textsuperscript{528} Ye Chucang 葉楚倉, “Great Asianism” 大亞細亞主義 in Minli Bao (People’s Stand) (3.16, 2014).
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{530} Ye Chucang 葉楚倉, “Great Asianism” 大亞細亞主義 in Minli Bao (People’s Stand) (3.21, 2014).
equal basis. Unlike Asianists from the nineteenth century, Ye completely assumes the validity of the system of nation states, seeing these states integrating under what he calls the “international system” 國際制度. The independence of each state is clearly stressed and leads Ye to his conclusion that only states that are currently independent should enter to these unions in their initial stage:

...so the success of the Asian trade alliance must be achieved by way of a germinal form... In the view of this reporter, for the alliance to have hopes of success, only the Chinese, Japanese, Turkish and Siamese markets should be integrated (shangye jiehe). Therefore, the first step of Great Asianism must be to expend our efforts upon the markets of these four countries.531

Ye’s Asianism revolves around two concepts: For the external issues related to regionalism, the relationships that the region must create with other regions and states, Ye describes the military integration of Asia; for the internal issues related to regionalism, the relationships between regionalized states, Ye describes economic possibilities and specifically recommends market integration. In this purely materialist description, no effort is made to consider culture or other aspects of the region and no explanation is offered for why such historically and culturally disparate states as Turkey and Japan should integrate, other than the fact that they both reside in the imagined continent of Asia. But Ye’s theorizing of Asianism is left unfinished.532 He published his third and last article on Asianism while

531 Ibid.
532 Although one cannot say why Ye Chucang did not continue to publish articles on Asianism with confidence, there could be some relation to the timing of the assassination of Song Jiaoren. Song was assassinated on March 20th, the day before publication of Ye’s third article. Beginning on March 22nd, the
Sun Yat-sen was returning from Japan, where he has been discussing his own form of Asianism with Chinese living in Japan as well as his Japanese supporters. Ye Chucang ended his third article with the words “to be continued,” but a fourth article never appeared, leaving readers with no idea of what Ye might have planned for the other countries of Asia, or how the very different and distant countries of China, Japan, Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) and Thailand could possibly hope to establish and maintain any form of market integration.533

Asianism did not disappear from the pages of the People’s Stand, however. One week after the last of Ye Chucang’s articles, Sun Yat-sen returned from his trip to Japan. On March 29, 1913, Sun’s speech at the KMT Transportation Ministry was published in the paper, expressing his great hope for China-Japan cooperation. In the speech he refers to Japan’s good will towards the Asian continent as a kind of “Doctrine for Greater Asia” or a “Great Asian-ism” (大亞洲之主義). Although slightly different from the standard expression, this is Sun Yat-sen’s first recorded use of the term “Great Asianism.”

Over these few months, two very different Asianist discourses were put forth by KMT intellectuals. Ye Chucang’s idea was for an all-Asia alliance based on economic and military integration in order to hold back imperialism. Sun Yat-sen, however, favoured a closer

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People’s Stand was inundated with photographs, reports and eulogies related to Song Jiaoren, stretching from corner to corner on most pages. Ye himself took to compiling these reports, as well as those from other major newspapers, and published them in an edited volume: Ye Chucang 葉楚傖 (ed.), Song Yufu 宋漁父 (Taipei: Wenxing shudian, 1962).

533 Ye continued writing editorials for the People’s Stand, openly supporting Sun and his Second Revolution targeting Yuan Shikai. The newspaper was of course closed later in 1913 and Ye had to work with smaller periodicals for a few years. However, his support for the revolutionaries was the correct career move in the long run. In 1916 he was made editor-in-chief of the Republican Daily 民國日報 and would become Chief of Propaganda ten years later. Chen Jianyun 2012, 199-200.
relationship with Japan, utilizing the power’s military and economic might to protect China from Western imperialists, as well as from Yuan Shikai. Neither policy was advanced much more than they were in the writings examined above, but the fact that two nationalist Kuomintang leaders were actually advocating these proposals in early 1913 calls for more attention. Both Ye and Sun were proposing these plans of transnational integration based on strategic needs for China. Both assumed national independence and a heterogeneous Asia based on transnational cooperation in order to protect China and compete with Western empires. Two threats immediately took precedence in China and neither of them were related to the Western powers that Asianism was designed to protect China from: Yuan Shikai’s consolidation of power; and the increasingly imperialistic ambitions of Japan.

Perhaps the principles of Asianism as Hu Hanmin and Sun Yat-sen saw them would always give way to capitalist imperialism when the collaborating parties were as economically different as China and Japan were in the early twentieth century. Sun returned to China after the assassination of Song Jiaoren in March. He announced to the Chinese people that the “Japanese have no evil intentions for the republic.” Calling for a policy of Great Asianism immediately upon his arrival in China, he began to work towards opening up the Chinese economy to Japanese zaibatsu. To gain Japan’s support against Yuan Shi-kai, Sun was prepared “to make the yen valid tender on Chinese territory, to entrust to a Sino-Japanese bank the management of the mines and railways in the provinces of central and southern China and even to abandon Manchuria in exchange for 20 million yen and

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534 中日親善共享和平 in Shanghai, 3.29 GFQJ v3, 159.
equipment enough for two divisions in weapons and other military supplies." Sun’s goal was to overthrow Yuan with Japanese power, but Yuan was already far too powerful and Sun could gain neither Japanese nor Chinese support. The rebellion was crushed in a few short weeks and Sun returned to Japan where he would remain until Yuan’s death. During this period one would imagine that the discourse of Asianism would disappear from Sun’s writing and speeches, especially with the Japanese government’s imperialist ambitions towards China clearly expressed in the 21 Demands. However, even while criticizing the Japanese, he continued to insist upon an Asianist future. Yet what needs to be resolved here are the contradictions posed by Sun’s turn to other nations and regions for support and alliance during this time.

Contradictions and Continuities: 1913-1918

In the final exile of his life (1913-1916), Sun made fewer references to Asianism. Although he certainly did not give up on the idea entirely, he must have been frustrated with the disaster of the Second Revolution, where he was used by Japanese capitalists and completely failed to win support in China. However, a number of events occurred during Sun’s last exile in Japan that later contributed to the labeling of Sun as an Asianist. I find that these events show continuities with Sun’s Asianism, but also present a number of contradictions with it, indicating that Sun’s thinking on Asianism did not merely divide the world between East and West, but paid careful consideration to the division of oppressed and oppressor. The first of these is Sun’s interactions with Indian revolutionaries in Tokyo, events

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that should be compared with Zhang Taiyan’s similar work in the late Qing period. The second is the very confusing stance that Sun took towards Germany during the First World War. Marius Jansen notes that even after the 21 Demands of 1915, Sun believed that “a Sino-Japanese alliance was the only path to freedom from European imperialism.” However, although Sun always phrased this as an “Asian” partnership, and he certainly made numerous references to race over the years, he was very open to the idea of allying with other nations that he felt suffered under European imperialism, especially if there was the possibility that cooperation could assist him in his own ambitions or further China’s liberation from the powers.

Immediately after his arrival in Japan, Sun began campaigning for support to return himself to power and to defeat Yuan Shikai. He once again turned to his pan-Asianist allies. On May 11, 1914, Sun wrote a letter to Ōkuma Shigenobu. Ōkuma was Prime Minister at the time, but they had been friends before during Sun’s time in Yokohama at the end of the century. The letter was called “Proposal for a Sino-Japanese Alliance.” This letter is largely concerned with economic partnership, but hints at the need to remove Yuan Shih-kai and put Sun back into power. The content of the letter is at times disturbing and shows the desperation that Sun was feeling in his exile and the lengths he would go to in order to regain power:

While the exploitation of Japan’s natural resources has almost reached its limit without any more room for further expansion in Japan, China is large and rich with potential wealth yet to be developed. Japan could, therefore,

536 See Chapter IV.
537 Jansen 1954,192.
538 Appears in Sun 1941, 1-7.
without even incurring the trouble and expense of stationing her troops as Great Britain does in India, acquire large commercial markets in China.\(^{539}\)

This letter may have influenced Ōkuma ‘s role in the Twenty-one Demands, which were presented to the Yuan Shikai government a year later. Concerning this letter and Sun’s involvement in the Demands, Jansen writes: “He became, at times, an apologist for Japanese expansion, and even an instrument of that aggression.”\(^{540}\) It is disturbing to imagine that Sun would consider allowing China to become Japan’s colony in a way similar to India’s subjugation by Great Britain. Sun had always been fiercely opposed to the British in India and his capitulation to empire here reveals contradictions that developed in his thought and action due to the desperation he must have been feeling. In fact, it was during this same period that Sun became an ardent supporter of violent Indian independence activists living in exile in Japan.

On December 23, 1912, the governor general of India was injured by a bomb blast during the ceremony for the transfer of the capital to New Delhi. Rash Behari Bose was identified as behind the plot and had to escape, eventually arriving in Japan in 1915 after a series of dramatic events.\(^{541}\) Shortly after his arrival, Sun introduced Rash Behari Bose to Japanese pan-Asianists and convinced *Asahi Shimbun* journalist Yamanaka Minetarō 山中

\(^{539}\) Sun 1941, 3-4. Original letter is available in the Ōkuma Archives at Waseda Library (http://www.wul.waseda.ac.jp/kosho/i14/i14_b0269_4/). Accessed on June 10, 2013).

\(^{540}\) Jansen 1954, 189. Sun did not want the Japanese working with Yuan at all and offered them much more than was included in the Twenty-one Demands. Ibid, 192-193.

Yamanaka played a large role in rousing the Japanese public’s support of the Indian independence movement and Bose. Sun allegedly met regularly with Bose to discuss sending weapons to India. Not long after this, Bose became an important writer of pan-Asianism in Japan, leaving his mark on the development of the theory and on the fight for Indian independence. Romantic stories of Bose and Sun plotting together over weekly helpings of Indian curry are to be found in Nakajima’s book, quoted above and based upon Bose’s reminiscences. Interestingly, these stories captured the attention of twenty-first century Asianist sympathizer Zhang Chengzhi, a Hui Chinese writer. Sun’s old friends, the Pan-Asianists Inukai Tsuyoshi, Miyazaki Tōten and Uchida Ryōhei, provided a considerable amount of support for Bose and the Indian independence movement during this time, possibly helping to maintain Sun’s belief in them, despite the clear expansion of Japanese imperialism in China. However, it was not long after this that Sun endeavoured to find support for his cause against the British with alliances that can only be seen far outside of Asianism.

In 1917 the *Far Eastern Review* in Shanghai ran a number of articles lambasting Sun for his Pan-Asian attitude. Not, however, due to his attempts to ally with Japan, but rather for his support of Germany at the height of the World War. Despite his government’s official

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542 Ibid, 232.
545 However, Zhang is quite clear in his definition that Asianism is a doctrine that masks the invasion and conquering of weaker peoples, but also unmasks and opposes the white race’s colonialism. Zhang 2008, 231. For more on Zhang, see Conclusion.
546 This idea expanded to include Russia after 1917 in an anti-imperialist continental block. See Saaler 2011
position of war with Germany, Sun had offered the German government significant economic privileges in China in exchange for military aid in his fight with the North. According to William Kirby, although Sun turned to many countries for help, “it may be argued that Germany enjoyed a particularly eminent position in his dreams.” Kirby has detailed Sun’s plans and efforts for the German and China alliance that progressed through the end of World War I into the 1920s. Although Sun tried numerous times and through numerous avenues, he was never very successful at establishing any form of ties. However, Westerners’ fears of Asian unity and its relationship with Germany appeared in news media.

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547 Actually, this occurred at the beginning of the rule of Sun’s Guangzhou government. This period is often referred to as the “warlord period,” Sun’s government had little control over the country and many foreign observers doubted the extent to which Sun could represent China.


549 Or perhaps even earlier. Tajima Nobuo has also argued that Sun advocated a China – Japan – Germany alliance to Katsura in their famous 1913 meeting because Germany was a victim of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. Tajima Nobuo 田島信雄, “Son Bun no ‘Chū Doitsu So san koku rengō’ kōsō to Nihon 1917 - 1924 nen: ‘ren So’ rosen oyobi ‘dai Ajiashugi’ saikō” 孫文の「中獨索三国連合」構想と日本 1917～1924 年--「連ソ」路線および「大アジア主義」再考--. In Hattori Ryūji 服部龍二, Tsuchida Akio 土田哲夫 and Gotō Harumi 後藤春美 Senkanki no higashiajia kokusai seiji 戦間期の東アジア国際政治 (Tokyo: Chūōdaigakushuppanbu, 2007), 7-13. Tajima largely bases his understanding of this upon the writings of Dai Jitao, who described Sun and Katsura’s meetings in his 1928 On Japan 日本論.


Sun’s main argument in this was that Germany was being victimized by the British Empire, not unlike the nations of Asia. “Pan-Asianism” was briefly seen as being anti-British in this media. However, even in declaring his position against the war with Germany in 1917, Sun made it clear that by pan-Asianism, he was referring to a Sino-Japanese partnership that would indicate a sphere of interest in relation to other regions:

Under the principle of Pan-Asianism, Japan and China can together develop the natural resources in the West of the Pacific, while under the Monroe Doctrine the United States can unify authority in the East of that ocean.552

Still, Sun’s attempts to expand his alliances to non-Asian countries signify that his thought on the divisions in the world were not limited to a simple East-West binary, although he may have asserted such a belief with his “Asianism.” Although often an opportunist and willing to work with a great number of questionable allies, Sun emphasized his ideas of morality and anti-imperialism in his work, qualities which he did not necessarily see as only Asian, but which he clearly believed were an essential part of an East Asian past and in opposition to modern Western imperialist values. As to whether or not Sun was sincere in his vision for Japan and China to work together, his translator certainly thought so. Dai Jitao accompanied Sun and translated for him at all the 1913 speeches and activities in Japan in 1924 and recorded the events in 1928, three years after Sun’s death.553

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552 Sun 1941, 116. Originally published in the 1917 pamphlet “The Vital Problem of China” 中國存亡問題. Republished in Taiwan in 1953. In the Chinese original, the term for “Pan-Asianism” was “Asianism” 亞洲主義. SZSQJ v4, 95.
In the following excerpt from Sun’s 1917 booklet on China’s survival, he discusses the importance of Japan’s help in confirming China’s future. He opposes joining the war with Germany throughout the book. And although he expresses China’s hopes for support from the United States, a country that he sees as relatively friendly to China, he believes the popular arguments that a race war may follow the Great War and that the United States will join the rest of the white race:

Europeans and Americans talk about justice and righteousness only for themselves, not for the Yellow race. The American nation, whose Constitution is based on the principles of equality and liberty, was the first to advocate discrimination against the Yellow race. The United States may at this moment show us friendliness and sympathy, but when the time comes for Britain, Russia, and Germany to join their efforts to conquer China, will she oppose the conquest by using her whole strength to champion the cause of a different race?554

Sun Yat-sen was still trying to negotiate with those who favored siding with the United States, just as he was in 1913. The only choice, he maintained, was to turn to Japan. “Without Japan, there would be no China; without China, there would be no Japan.”555 But this returns us to the earlier contradiction and further exposes the complexities of Sun’s Asianism, based on binaries of race and civilization, but also ostensibly connected to the oppressed-oppressor binary. If the shared victimhood of race or civilization came into conflict with the shared victimhood of nations by empires, which binary would take precedence? This

554 SZSQJ v.4, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chuban, 1985), 88. English translation from: Sun 1941,
555 SZSQJ v.4, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chuban, 1985), 94.
issue is somewhat resolved in Sun’s 1924 return to the discourse of Asianism.

1924: Is Japan still Asian?

On November 28, 1924, Sun Yat-sen made his famous “Great Asianism” 大亞洲主義 speech in Kobe. This speech summarized Sun’s views on Asianism and became symbolic of the concept and his attitude towards Japanese imperialism. In the speech Sun describes the relationship between national independence and Asianism; he limns the dichotomy which he believes defines East and West; and he directly asks whether or not Japan will leave or lead Asia.

There is an important historical context for this speech. Sun Yat-sen was at the height of his popularity in 1924. He had just finished his speeches on the Three Principles of the People and established himself as not merely an anti-Manchu revolutionary, but as an anti-imperialist intellectual. At the same time, the United States government had just passed an extremely infamous and openly racist immigration act, designed to stop the immigration of both Chinese and Japanese to the country. The Asian Exclusion Act was brought into law on May 26, 1924, as a section of the Immigration Act of 1924.\(^5\) The Immigration Act specified that future immigration to the United States would ostensibly be based on quotas proportionately equivalent to the origins of contemporary Americans, an effort designed to put an end to ethno-demographic change and essentially disallowing immigration from

Asia. Furthermore, the quotas for Chinese and Japanese immigration disregarded any existing immigrants who were not born in the country or were not eligible for citizenship. All people from the nations of East Asia, as well as most of the world, were then deemed as persons “ineligible to citizenship” due to their “racial unassimilability.” Although this did not entirely stop immigration from Asia, it did slow it to a crawl. In 1929 the published quotas for Chinese, Japanese and most other “non-white” immigrants were limited to one hundred new immigrants from each country. Racist Western views of “unwanted Asians” could only contribute to a shared identity as an oppressed group.

It was in this climate, in November of 1924, that Sun returned to Japan for the final time and delivered his famous speech on “Great Asianism.” This speech became a symbolic text that influenced countless people across Asia and even outside of Asia. It is not known if Sun originally planned to travel to Japan and make this speech. He was on his way to Beijing to resolve the warlord factional issues when he switched to a boat heading to Japan at Shanghai, ostensibly for safety reasons and due to the lack of transportation to Beijing at that time. When asked why Sun was being so friendly towards Japan and antagonistic to the West, he was forthcoming about his motives, which were the abolition of foreign

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558 Ngai 1999, 80-81.
559 Ngai 1999, 74. For comparison, the quota for immigrants from Great Britain was 65,721; Germany was allowed 25,957; and Ireland was allotted 17,853.
560 The United States was certainly not the only country to impose racist anti-Asian laws at this time. The Canadian government’s “head tax” was a racist immigration policy that had been noted in Chinese periodicals just before anger rose in response to the United States’ Immigration Act. “The Number of Asian Immigrants in Canada” 加拿大境內亞洲移民人數, Agriculture Monthly 農事月刊 v.9 (January, 1923), 62.
extraterritoriality and the restoration of customs autonomy, essentially he was hoping for Japanese support in revoking the unequal treaties.  

Before the speech, he met with his old pan-Asianist friend Tōyama Mitsuru 頭山滿 at the Oriental Hotel. They discussed the Manchuria and Mongolia issues and Sun then allowed an interview with a reporter from the *Mainichi Newspaper* 毎日新聞. The subject of the speech was not entirely the choice of Sun Yat-sen, but was suggested by his host, President of the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, Takikawa Gisaku 瀧川儀作 (1874-1963), a Japanese businessman with a long history of involvement in Chinese business. The speech was delivered at the Hyogo Prefectural Kobe Girls’ High School 兵庫県立神戸高等女学校, and was originally titled “The Problems of Great Asia” 大亞細亞問題.

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563 Chen Deren 陳德仁 and Yasui Sankichi 安井三吉, *Son Bun to Kōbe* 孫文と神戸 (Kobe: Kobe shinbun shuppan sentaa, 1985), 251-255.

564 Kobayashi discusses the possibilities and quotes from Fujii who believes Sun had long planned the speech and that it was part of a specific move upon his part towards China-Japan cooperation. Kobayashi 1987, 30.

565 This was the original title according to an exhibition at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Museum in Kobe 孫文記念館.
In the speech Sun described Asia’s grand ancient civilization and Europe’s recent imperialist rise. He then lauded Japan as the first country to repeal the unequal treaties and defeat Russia, giving hope and inspiration to countries all across Asia. Sun actually discussed the Russo-Japanese War as an impetus driving Asians to realize independence and drive out European imperialists. Here the nationalist movements and the Asianist movement combine in Sun’s words:

The Egyptian, Turkish, Persian, Afghan, and Arabian independence movements have already materialized, and even the independence movement in India has, with the passage of time, been gaining ground. Such facts are concrete proofs of the progress of the nationalist idea in Asia. Until this idea reaches its full maturity, no unification or independence movement of the Asiatic peoples as a whole is possible. In East Asia, China and Japan are the two greatest peoples. China and Japan are the driving force of this nationalist movement. What will be the consequences of this driving force still remains to be seen. The present tide
of events seems to indicate that not only China and Japan but all the peoples in East Asia will unite together to restore the former status of Asia.\textsuperscript{566}

This excerpt reveals the necessity of nationalism to Sun’s Asianism. They were inseparable ideas. Only with nationalism could a people move into Asianism, and only with the independence of individual nations could Asia move on to the independence of all of Asia. These were not unconnected levels of identity, but were overlapping layers that would be realized through the same awakening of consciousness.

But Sun Yat-sen’s famous speech is not only about the rise of nationalism and Asianism. He makes an important differentiation between Asian and Western civilization, disgusted by Westerners’ oppression of Asia, their disparagement of Asian civilization and the continued racism of white people towards yellow. Asianists had conflated race and civilization throughout the decades before this, but Sun added something new: The crux of his argument comes in his dichotomizing of West versus East into what has been translated as “the rule of Might” 霸道 and “the rule of Right” 王道, or “the way of the hegemon” and the “kingly way.”\textsuperscript{567} Sun’s careful articulation returns to popular Confucian discourse to designate the East as moral and the West as hegemonic. This summarizes the political manifestations of a dichotomy that has been regularly regarded as civilizational differences of “material” versus “moral,” a connection that Sun also makes evident in this speech.\textsuperscript{568}

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\textsuperscript{566} Sun 1941, 144.
\textsuperscript{567} The terms can also be translated as the “Way of the Hegemon” and the “Kingly Way.” Both terms find their roots in classical Confucian literature and had appeared repeatedly in Confucian writing for thousands of years.
\textsuperscript{568} See my discussion of Du Yaquan’s dichotomizing of East and West in Chapter Four.
\end{flushleft}
European civilization is nothing but the rule of Might. The rule of might has always been looked down upon by the Orient. There is another kind of civilization superior to the rule of Might. The fundamental characteristics of this civilization are benevolence, justice and morality: This civilization makes people respect, not fear, it. Such a civilization is, in the language of the Ancients, the rule of Right or the Kingly Way. One may say, therefore, that Oriental civilization is one of the rule of right. Since the development of European materialistic civilization and the cult of Might, the morality of the world has been on the decline. Even in Asia, morality in several countries has degenerated. Of late, a number of European and American scholars have begun to study Oriental civilization and they realize that, while materially the Orient is far behind the Occident, morally the Orient is superior to the Occident.\textsuperscript{569}

Not only was it superior, it held the capacity for redemption, to relieve the West of its ills and allow it to follow Asia on the path to datong. Sun makes reference to China’s tributary system in which he viewed weaker countries following the strong out of respect, not out of fear. Here Sun elucidated the foundations of his understanding of Asianism. It was what he saw as the classical attributes of Asia that Sun argued contemporary civilization should be constructed upon. And ever a nationalist, Sun was always referring to Confucian China when he made statements about Asia’s past. However, the problem remained: how does one deal with the threat of the imperialistic material civilization that continues to oppress China and other Asian nations? Here Sun returned to the same question that Chinese and Japanese intellectuals had already been dealing with for decades, and he came up with a rather similar

\textsuperscript{569} Sun 1941, 146.
answer. Just like the dao 道 and qi 器 and the ti 體 and yong 用 dichotomies of the 19th century, Sun’s formula is to learn from the West materially, but preserve the essence of the East morally:

If we want to realize Pan-Asianism in this new world, what should be its foundation if not our ancient civilization and culture? Benevolence and virtue must be the foundations of Pan-Asianism. With this as a sound foundation we must then learn science from Europe for our industrial development and the improvement of our armaments, not, however, with a view to oppressing or destroying other countries and peoples as the Europeans have done, but purely for our self-defence…. We advocate Pan-Asianism in order to restore the status of Asia. Only by the unification of all the peoples in Asia on the foundation of benevolence and virtue can they become strong and powerful.570

However, like Ye Chucang, Sun advocated following Japan’s lead in military development in order to gain the might needed to repel the European imperialists. He recognized the need for material development, not for the needs of the people, but to regain and protect the autonomy of Asia: “But to rely on benevolence alone to influence the Europeans in Asia to relinquish the privileges they have acquired in China would be an impossible dream. If we want to regain our rights we must resort to force.”571 His realist militarism was in conflict with his idealist vision, and his anti-imperialist philosophy struggled to make room for his pro-Japan Asianism.

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570 Sun 1941, 149.
571 Ibid.
Of course, Sun was well aware of the problems associated with turning to Japan for leadership. Beginning in 1885 with Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famous Datsu-A Ron editorial, the question of whether or not Japan was leaving or leading Asia had persisted among the Asian elite. Fukuzawa had notoriously decided that Japan must leave Asia for what he referred to as the “measles” of the West: “We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors so that we can work together toward the development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West.”

In 1924 Sun returned to this question in Kobe and frankly asked the Japanese in attendance which path they choose. However, Sun has redefined both Asia and Europe under his new dichotomy. In Fukuzawa’s time there was only one civilization, it was a linear concept and Europe was much further along the line. For Sun there was also an Eastern or Asian civilization and Japan, in his mind, should recognize its righteousness:

Japan to-day has become acquainted with the Western civilization of the rule of Might, but retains the characteristics of the Oriental civilization of the rule of Right. Now the question remains whether Japan will be the hawk of the Western civilization of the rule of Might, or the tower of strength of the Orient. This is the choice which lies before the people of Japan.

These few short lines, the only words of critique that Sun offered against Japan in this text, became the most important and well-known lines of Sun’s speech. This was not due to any level of profundity in the words, but due to their omission from major Japanese

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573 Sun 1941, 151.
newspapers. In 1924 Japanese censorship was not so strict that these lines could not have been published. In fact, the lines are not so critical of Japan that they could not have appeared in print even in the 1930s. Japanese leaders consistently mentioned their commitment to the “kingly way” in Asia and they most likely regularly believed it. However, it seems likely that someone in this process was not eager to have a person like Sun Yat-sen criticizing Japan in any form. Although the speech had been hosted by the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, it had been cohosted by four major newspapers: The *Osaka Asahi*, The *Osaka Mainichi*, The *Kobe Yushin Nippo*, and the *Kobe Shimbun*. The stenograph record had been shared by the four newspaper companies and the decision for censorship had likely occurred at the moment of stenographing or shortly afterwards, as the speech first made it to press in Kobe only hours after Sun’s talk. Although Japanese newspapers and journals would later publish the omitted section as well, this omission represented the widely different perspectives that Japanese and Chinese intellectuals held towards Asianism. These perspectives could also be seen in contemporary reactions to the speech.

The Japanese newspaper reports concerning Sun’s talk have been conveniently compiled in a collection. Reading through them one sees common themes appear: The Japanese newspaper were very supportive of Sun and his proposal of uniting Asia against

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574 Copies of the newspapers, including the statement of the co-hosting and joint announcement, as well as a copy of the stenographic record with the omission, are available at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Museum in Kobe. Some recent publications have incorrectly stated that Sun added the last passage of the speech later, as in: Seiko Mimaki, “Japan and pan-Asianism: Lost Opportunities,” in Amako, Matsuoka and Horiuchi (eds) *Regional Integration in East Asia: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, 264-288 (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2013), 265.

Western imperialism. However, there remained much skepticism regarding Sun’s ability to organize and lead China without considerable cooperation with Duan Qirui and perhaps even Wu Peifu. The Osaka Mainichi was particularly roused by Sun’s speech. A week following its transcription of the speech, the newspaper ran articles on Asianism under the headline of “Asiatic Unity” in both their Japanese and English editions, heavily quoting from Sun’s speech and earlier talks. However, the reception of Sun’s speech in other areas of the Japanese Empire is more telling of the complexity of Sun’s proposition in a divided East Asia.

The Mixed Reception Outside of Japan and Issues of Nationalism

Sun Yat-sen was famous on a level beyond any other proponents of Asianism. When Li Dazhao made comments on Asianism, despite his quasi-celebrity status in 1919, they slowly faded into obscurity. Shortly after Sun’s speech, versions of “Great Asianism” appeared in newspapers across East Asia. Chinese interest in Sun’s speech is of no surprise, but Japan’s colonies of Korea and Taiwan were particularly interested in Sun’s theory, what it would mean for their existence, and the possibilities for the future.

In Korea, the response was immediate. The Dong-A Ilbo 東亞日報, one of Korea’s two leading newspapers, had dispatched a reporter to Kobe during Sun’s visit. Both the

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576 The Japanese title of the article was “Ajia minzoku no danketsu” 亞細亞民族の團結. The editors at The Japan Chronicle were quick to notice discrepancies between the Japanese and English versions of the article. On December 4, 1924, they published the article “Asia for Some of the Asiatics,” attacking the Mainichi for omitting the lines on Japanese leadership from the English translation. Clearly, the Mainichi editors had missed the point of Sun’s speech and were already using it as propaganda for Japanese imperialism, a trend that would continue for two decades. All three articles can be found in Chen and Yasui 1989, (English source section)19-21 and 25-28, (Japanese source section) 139-140.

577 Sun had apparently agreed to give the Dong-A Ilbo a special article for publication. He had asked Dai Qitao
Dong-A Ilbo and the Choson Ilbo 朝鮮日報 printed translations of the speech and strong critiques of Sun’s plan.\(^{578}\) The correspondent dispatched to Kobe directly asked Sun in his interview:

> Do you think your idea of Pan-Asianism could be compatible with the present situation Korea is faced with?"

Sun responded: “Surely, it could not be compatible with it. However, while in Japan, I would like to avoid discussing the Korean question fully.\(^{579}\)

Clearly, Sun was avoiding more than the Korean question. While in Japan, his vision of Pan-Asianism focused only upon China-Japan cooperation and, although he mentioned many other Asian nations in his speech, he virtually ignored issues of autonomy for Japan’s colonies. These same Korean newspapers had been very positive about Sun’s “Three Principles of the People,” introduced earlier in the year, and An Chae-hong, the same journalist who provided harsh criticism of Sun for his Asianism, would relate the “Three Principles” to readers in a nine-part series in the Choson Ilbo. However, for Sun to justify a powerful Japan in order to defend against Western imperialism and yet make no mention of Japan’s colonies in Asia was unacceptable.\(^{580}\)

In Taiwan, however, the reception of this speech was dramatically different. This difference may lie in the fact that Taiwanese newspaper readers and their journalists were

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\(^{578}\) These critiques and a number of other Korean sources from 1924 and 1925 are conveniently collected in: Duan

\(^{579}\) Translated and quoted in Min 1997, 35.

\(^{580}\) Min 1997, 33.
much better acquainted with Sun Yat-sen and understood his Asianism, not as a separate or stand-alone theory, but as a speech in conjunction with the great body of writings and other speeches that he had produced, as a part of his oeuvre, not separate to it. However, I argue that the difference between the reception in Korea and the reception in Taiwan is also related to the different approaches intellectuals in the two colonies were taking towards nationalism and, therefore, nationalism’s relationship with Asianism. For Koreans, national independence was the aim for intellectuals and political leaders who placed ultimate importance on the *minjok* 民族, its history a path to the independent nation-state. Meanwhile, Taiwanese intellectuals from the same period were primarily interested in achieving autonomy, be that independence or some form of autonomy within the Japanese Empire or within a Greater Asia.

Chao Hsun-ta 趙勳達 has provided a thorough analysis of the reception of Sun’s speech in Taiwan, including the intellectual climate at the time of the speech and the numerous reports on Sun before and after the speech.\(^{581}\) He notes that in an earlier report Sun had acclaimed: “If Japan believes in the uniting of East Asia, they must first properly resolve the issues of China, Korea and Taiwan.”\(^{582}\) The view of the Taiwanese towards Sun’s Asianism must also be contextualized within their own intellectual and political issues, as well as the influence of Taiwan’s main newspaper, the *Taiwan People’s Daily* 臺灣民報.

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\(^{582}\) Quoted in Chao 2011, 93. Original quote from *Taiwan Minbao* 台灣民報, 1924.
Debates concerning Taiwan’s position and political power flourished in the 1920s. Unlike Koreans, who were obsessed with the idea of national independence, the central issue that Taiwanese intellectuals were discussing was the concept of political autonomy. This difference is crucial as it allowed for the imagining of Taiwan having an existence in relation to, but not necessarily completely independent from, a powerful Japan. In a May 28, 1924, editorial, the importance of this perspective can be seen in relation to a possible united Asia:

We strongly believe that the American passing of the anti-Japanese act is truly an opportunity for the uniting of the Asian nations. It is also an opportunity for Japan to become the leader of Asia. However, for Japan to succeed in this great mission, this great goal, there is something that the Japanese must realize. And what must they realize? Firstly, they must kindly treat the disadvantaged nations of Asia. This time they have gathered support from both Taiwan and China, but is this event any different from Japan’s actions that makes people so upset? Secondly, if they hope for liberation from others, then they should first liberate others. Those such as Koreans and Taiwanese should be liberated so that they receive the same treatment as those from the mother country, and enjoy the same happiness. Should Japan have the magnanimity to carry out such measures, the uniting of the Asian nations can be easily accomplished.583

This editorial, printed before Sun’s famous speech, reveals a number of important things regarding Taiwan’s prospects for Asian unity. The topic was clearly being debated in the public sphere before Sun’s speech, and Asianism was seen as an opportunity to critique Japanese imperialism.584 The Taiwanese were not necessarily opposed to Asianism, but were

583 Quoted in Chao 2011, 93-94.
584 A similar method was followed in Korea in the 1910s and before. See Andre Schmid, Korea Between
certainly opposed to Japanese domination and many were hoping for equality and political autonomy. The Asian Exclusion Act had clearly proved frustrating for people across Asia. And, due to the act’s wide-range across Asian nations, it had the possibility to create feelings of unity across Asia – if only Japan could rise to the challenge and stop emulating the same form of discrimination which was being used against its own citizens. Subsequent articles in the Taiwan People’s Daily continued to evoke the injustice of the act in their appeals to the Japanese government to discontinue the discrimination amongst “yellow” peoples in order to righteously argue for an end to discrimination by whites. They accused the Japanese government of asking the Americans to show humanism while the Japanese themselves were being imperialistic within Asia.585

As for the idea of Asian nations united together, it certainly was not anything new at this point. Although Taiwanese intellectuals had not joined in such discussions during World War I, the idea had made its way into Taiwan’s circles in the early 1920s and at least one prominent intellectual had offered a different take on the proposal.

Chen Fengyuan 陳逢源 (1893-1982) was an advocate of Taiwanese autonomy, an acclaimed poet, and also one of the founders of Taiwan’s foremost newspaper during the 1920s, the Taiwan People’s Daily 臺灣民報. In 1923 he advocated a form of federalism that would allow for the autonomy of nations within the empire, calling his plan “friendly federation” 友聯主義.586 Chen introduced his concept in a 1924 article titled “The

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585 Chao 2011, 94-96.
586 Chao 2011, 96. Chao argues that Chen was influenced by Sun Yat-sen and his ideas on Asianism.
Movement to Revive Asia and Japanese Colonial Policy.⁵⁸⁷ Although ostensibly Chen’s discussion of “friendly federation” is to offer a reasonable alternative for Japan’s population problems, the article was clearly designed as an attack on Japan’s dōka policy 同化, which was a plan to have Taiwanese and Koreans assimilate to the Japanese.⁵⁸⁸ Chen argued that Japan “must charge forward as a leader based on a righteous and humanitarian pan-Asianism,” and this “righteous and humanitarian” 正義人道 behavior should begin with Japan’s actions towards its colonies, Korea and Taiwan.⁵⁸⁹ Citing numerous Japanese intellectuals, Chen argued against the feasibility of the dōka programme, instead arguing that the nations’ cultural particularities can be allowed and encouraged under systems of autonomy 自治制度.⁵⁹⁰

The entry of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism was not something new, but another voice against Japanese hegemony amidst Taiwanese anger towards policies of assimilation. Although dōka policy and discourse had been voiced for more than ten years by 1924, relevant discussions and attempts at realizing the policy had remained relatively vague until the 1920s, when the Japanese government officially adopted a policy of gradual assimilation. The 1923 book Taiwan dōkasaku ron 台灣同化策論 (The Policy of Taiwanese Assimilation) by Shibata Sunao 柴田廉 had ignited a public debate that was still continuing when

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⁵⁸⁷ Chen Fengyuan 陳逢源, “The Movement to Revive Asia and Japanese Colonial Policy” 亞細亞の復興運動と日本の殖民政策, in Taiwan 臺灣 4.1, 18-33. I would like to thanks Chao Hsun-da for scanning and sending me copies of this and Chen’s other articles.
⁵⁸⁹ Chen 1924, 24.
⁵⁹⁰ Ibid, 29, 33.
transcripts of Sun’s speech were printed in Taiwan. “Great Asianism” was seen in relevance to this discourse and regarded as a positive call for support of Taiwan’s autonomy. It was also seen as a way of connecting Taiwan to China.

Zhang Wojun 張我軍 was a Taiwanese intellectual who lived in Beijing but was largely responsible for introducing the May Fourth Movement ideals to Taiwan just a few years earlier. Zhang wanted Taiwan to further adopt Mandarin as part of the movement and had become an important voice in Taiwan intellectual discussions in the 1920s, promoting both Japanese and Chinese modern literature. While Zhang was wary of discussions of Eastern 東洋 civilization that ignored positive modernizing aspects of Western civilization, he was supportive of Sun’s Greater Asianism. After Sun Yat-sen’s death he wrote a eulogy including the impassioned lines:

The Three Principles of the People have not yet been realized,

China’s revolution has not yet succeeded,

The Great Asian Alliance 大亞細亞聯盟 has not yet been realized.

These very divergent understandings of Sun’s Asianism and its application highlight the different perspectives on nation and nationalism in the Japanese Empire. For those not

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593 Zhang Wojun would not be first nor the last to connect these three ideas. As will be explained below, during World War II the relationship between these ideas became an important part of the propaganda movement by both the Japanese and the Wang Jingwei governments. Zhang Wojun, “Sun Zhongshan xiansheng diaoci” 孫中山先生弔詞 (A poem eulogizing Mr. Sun Yat-sen), Zhang Wojun 1975, 37-40.
oppressed by the empire, the speech was not as important but still received a response.

Although he refused to allow interviews or questions by any Western reporters during his 1924 visit to Japan, Sun’s speech quickly appeared in English-language newspapers in Japan. The first partial translation of the speech appeared in The Japan Chronicle on November 30, 1924, which ran an abridged translation of the speech with a short introduction. The newspaper translated the doctrine as “the Great Asia principle,” made numerous minor changes to the article – presumably to shorten and summarize it for publication – and summarized Sun’s principle of “wang dao” or the “kingly way” to “Confucianism.” The final lines that criticized Japan were also absent, likely due to the translator’s use of the Japanese version for translation. The English language newspapers in Japan were especially critical of Sun’s Confucianism, seeing his Asianism as a call to return to a China-centred past, incompatible with the modern present.

However, even beyond the familiar East Asian sphere of classical Sinocentrism, Sun’s ideas on Asianism took root and were not considered a throwback to Confucianism. Notably, in 1928 Sukarno followed suit with his article “Indonesianism and Pan-Asianism.” This article appeared very early in Sukarno’s independence activities and shows the influence that

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595 “Great Asia” in The Japan Chronicle (November 30, 1924), reprinted in Chen and Saikichi 1989 (English sources section), 3-5.
596 Especially see: L. G. Masui, “False Implications of Pan-Asianism: A Criticism of Dr. Sun’s Recent Speech,” (orig: The Osaka Mainichi (Dec 9, 1924)) in Chen and Saikichi 1989 (English sources section), 31-34.
Sun and his Asianism had on the revolutionary’s ideology:

People are beginning to be conscious of a sense of unity and a feeling of brotherhood between the Chinese people and the Indonesian people, that is, that both are Eastern people, both are people who are suffering, both are people who are struggling, demanding a free life.... Because the common lot of the people of Asia is certain to give birth to uniform behavior; a common fate is certain to give birth to a uniform feeling.597

Like Sun, Sukarno turned to oppression and discrimination as the binding commonality between Asian peoples. This understanding of Asianism remained with Sukarno throughout his life and contributed to his cooperation with the Japanese during World War II as well as his hosting of the Bandung Conference in 1955.598 Although Sukarno’s idealism was not merely a copy of Sun’s theory, his entry into the discourse and subsequent actions were certainly connected to Sun. Sukarno frequently lauded Sun and considered himself to be a “pupil” of Sun’s.599

It was Sun’s highlighting of the shared identity of the oppressed that had drawn Sukarno to Sun’s philosophy. As shown in the above section, Sun’s Asianism contributed to Asian nations’ discourses of nationalism and cooperation, offering an Asian form of anti-imperialist thought. The following section investigates the other side of Asianism, its use in supporting Japan’s invasion of Asian nations. It was Sun’s dichotomizing of West and East

598 On Sukarno’s Asianism, which he also referred to as “Internationalism,” also see: Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the struggle for Indonesian independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 115-116.
599 Liu Hong 1997, 29.
as representatives of the essentialized rule of “might” by the “hegemon” and the “kingly way” of “right.” These forms of governance underlined his speech and were remembered during World War II, when Asianism was utilized as propaganda for Japan’s war effort.

**Chinese Asianism as Propaganda during the Second Sino-Japanese War**

At the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, many within the Kuomintang were still supporters of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism. With the political sanctification of Sun, his words held more power after his death than before it. And supporters like Dai Jitao, who had served as Sun’s translator throughout much of his time in Japan, continued to keep his ideas alive. Lu Yan has shown the importance of this discourse to Dai Jitao, how it became crucial to the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen’s death and the role it played in defining his fierce anti-communism. Hu Hanmin also remarked that Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism is based upon the “kingly way” of the East and opposed to the hegemony of the West. However, in his eyes Japan represented the hegemony of the West. Therefore, Hu would say: “I am an Asianist, but also an advocate of resisting Japan.” The door was open for Japan and its collaborators to use Sun Yat-sen’s writing on Asianism to justify the occupation of China, or at least cooperation with the Japanese.

It was important for Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 to show himself as following in the footsteps of Sun Yat-sen. To do this he turned to Sun’s Asianism and related it to the Three Principles of the People, an ideology that had not lost popularity across China: “For China,

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600 Lu Yan 2007, 151.
601 Hu Hanmin 1978 (1936), 539.
602 Ibid, 541.
the Three Principles of the People is an ideology to save the country. For East Asia, the Three Principles of the People is Great Asianism.”⁶⁰³ These words were echoed by his Minister of Propaganda, Lin Bosheng 林柏生, who unabashedly connected Sun’s philosophy to Japan’s Great East Asian New Order 東亞新秩序 and encouraged Chinese citizens to accept the Japanese rule as a phase in the Asian revolution: “The basic theory of the Chinese revolution is the Three Principles of the People, and the canon that leads the Asian revolution is Great Asianism.” As Japan’s “New Order” is a phase in the revolution, “so the Chinese people should not fear Japan’s establishment of the Great East Asian New Order as masked imperialism.”⁶⁰⁴

However, among the collaborators, Zhou Huaren was the most outspoken of proponents of Asianism. His book *An Outline of Asianism*, expanded on the concepts of Sun’s Asianism. Like the articles by those who resisted the Japanese, such as Hu Hanmin quoted above, the collaborationist discussion of Sun’s Asianism also focused upon Sun’s use of the “kingly way” 王道. Zhou Huaren argued that Asia’s problems and the East’s fall were largely “due to the abandonment of Asian’s intrinsic kingly way culture.”⁶⁰⁵ However, redemption was at hand, as “The ideology of the kingly way is at the heart of Great Asianism.”⁶⁰⁶ In fact, Zhou sees it as at the heart of Asia. While the “way of the hegemon” 霸道 is at the heart of

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⁶⁰³ In “三民主義之理論與實際”.
⁶⁰⁶ Ibid, 8.
European thought. Clearly those in the resistance who continued to support Sun’s Asianism had a very different idea of what the “kingly way” was. Sun’s use of the dichotomy to criticize Japan in 1924 had been turned around and used to support militarism. The use of Sun’s words as Japanese propaganda during the war was not limited to the Chinese language.

In 1941, seventeen years after his death, a collection of Sun Yat-sen’s writing was published in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. It was titled China and Japan: Natural Friends – Unnatural Enemies: A Guide for China’s Foreign Policy by Sun Yat-sen. In the foreword, Wang Jingwei declared that “it was his constantly proclaimed hope that [China and Japan] would become friends, wholeheartedly in a united effort to promote the glorious cause of Pan-Asianism.”

Of course, it was not difficult to use Sun for the Japanese cause. Wang Jingwei’s above noted declaration was not wrong. The book is a translation of a number of Sun’s writings and speeches concerning Japan. The translations are faithful, and even include sections in which Sun is openly critical of the empire. Only the historical context is markedly different. What Sun said in 1913, 1917 and 1924, he may not have repeated in 1941. This clearly presented problems for many in the Kuomintang, some of whom may have honestly believed that they were following the lead of the “father of the nation.” The Communist Party had not been so eager to follow Sun’s philosophy. Its members had rejected his proposal only

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607 Ibid, 110.
609 Wang Jingwei, foreword to Sun 1941, ix.
six weeks after his famous 1924 speech.

The Chinese Communist Party had criticized Sun Yat-sen’s idea of Asianism from the very beginning. The concept was discussed at the CCP’s Fourth Congress, held in Shanghai from January 11 to 22, 1925. “Japanese imperialists once again attempt to establish themselves as the “protector” of the Chinese people, much like they did before during Europe’s Great War in the time of Yuan Shikai and the Treaty of Versailles. To disguise its thuggish actions and inclinations, Japan has already began propagating the slogans “Pan-Asianism” and “Asia for the Asians.”” 610 While Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang were promoting the idea of Asianism and cooperation with the Japanese, the Communist Party had correctly identified the course of history that this concept would take.

Conclusion

In 1991 Taiwanese academic Li Taijing 李台京 produced the first full book length monograph on Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism, titled A Study on Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism. 611 He did not intend his work to be read as merely a historical study, but hoped that it would have significance for future government policy. 612 He found that “the Great Asianist ideal of revitalizing Asia was not quickly realized due to the post-war threat of communist world revolution, the influence of the American-Soviet Cold War, and the early development of

612 Li 1992, preface.
rising Asian countries.”\footnote{Li 1992, 7.} Li is certainly not the only one. More recently, Chen Kuan-hsing has referenced Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism as a positive step toward the deimperialization of Asia. He sees Sun Yat-sen’s Great Asianism as offering a new route for China’s future: “These ideals would serve as a reflexive mechanism to challenge the scenario in which the Chinese empire is pitted against the American one, in what would surely be a disastrous reproduction of the imperial desire.”\footnote{Chen 2010, 13.} During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism was unfortunately appropriated in order to facilitate and apologize for just such an “imperial desire.” Yet Chen has clearly adopted Sun’s idea of Asianism as an anti-imperialist concept.

However tainted, it is clear that there remains a certain amount of historical memory invested in this aspect of Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy, allowing for a variety of opportunities for appropriation. Sun’s Asianism has proven particularly compelling due to its symbiotic relationship with nationalism. The cultural nationalism which is propagated by Asianism defines Asia, and in this context “China,” based upon an essential difference with the West. The political nationalism of Asianism, which primarily opposes the injustice of Western imperialism, indicates or assumes political autonomy based upon very modern ideas of the nation. However, not merely an appropriation of Western nationalism, the Asianism seen in this chapter only mimics some features of modern nationalism and instead offers a firm challenge to Western universalism by arguing for an alternative to the reigning systems of thought. This challenge necessarily appropriates Orientalist discourse in its limning of
“Asia,” but by no means does it resort to simple essentializing. In fact, Sun disrupts the power differentiation in Orientalism. Although succumbing to classical dichotomies of East and West, he does not merely point to the eventual triumph of the East due to its moral superiority, he refers to a more human path to follow for systems of governance in modernity. It should be clear here that Sun’s Asianism has been used in a number of different ways and offers a number of discursive functions.

To summarize, I find that Sun’s Asianism, although based in binaries of race and civilization due to historical realities at the time, developed to offer three different functions in relationship to its sliding relationship with nation and empire: 1) As a discourse to oppose imperialism and support nationalism based on a shared victimhood that transcends nation; 2) As an anti-Western discourse that was easily utilized by Japanese imperialists to justify expansionism in China, and; 3) As a concept of Asia which transcends its geographic signified and offers an avenue for opposition to Western universalism and hegemony. Invariably in conflict, the differences between these functions account for the many differences in the memory of Asianism today.
Conclusion

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Jia Baohua 賈保華, a senior researcher at Beijing’s Institute of International Economy, published a number of articles to introduce his idea of “New Asianism.” Jia argued that East Asians need to continue the work of Confucius and Sun Yat-sen and strive towards a united East Asia in order to create an Asian Union 亞盟 which will stand as one of the three poles in the twenty-first century, the other two being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Organization. 615 Discussions of Asian regionalization continue to occur in journals concerning Asian economics throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, although the authors’ conceptualizations of regionalization differed dramatically in each context, varying from a free trade agreement to EU style transnational cooperation. 616 These discussions tend to accept the premise of neoliberal high-level politics, imagining the governments of East Asian states coming together for cooperation to protect the interests of their nations and open new markets. The precursor for this was the high level meetings between leaders instigated by the regionalization success of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On Nov 28,

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616 More recently Yang Jieman 杨洁勉, president of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies has used the term “New Asianism” to indicate the inclusive and peaceful nature of the expansion of the ASEAN+3 organization in the twenty-first century. Yang Jieman, “A Dynamic New Source of Cultural, Intellectual Influences,” East Asia Forum Quarterly (April-June, 2013), 33-34. Also, Shin Gi-wook offers an interesting historical perspective upon the “new Asianist” policies of the South Korean government in the early twenty-first century. These studies and policies are generally directed towards a departure from reliance on the United States and towards the eventual formation of an Asian Union. Shin 2005, 624-625.
1999, Kim Daejong, Zhu Rongji and Keizō Obuchi, the respective leaders of Korea, China and Japan, met to discuss regional integration at the ASEAN meeting in Manila. This was the beginning of what is often called ASEAN + 3 and has since developed into the East Asia Summit. It was the first time leaders from these three countries had come together and was a symbolic beginning for further dialogue, signaling the end of a century that was marked by far from friendly relations between these three countries and initiating excited talk of future cooperation. Despite regular setbacks to this East Asian rapprochement in the first decade of the century, optimism continued to be expressed at the highest of levels, and economic integration did not suffer any of the setbacks that dominated the social realm.

This dissertation began with just such a call by Wang Yi - the current Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic and an important political figure in Sino-Japanese relations - to return to early twentieth century Asianism in the twenty-first century. The events of the last few years, especially the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and fierce arguments over historical memory, may lead us to believe that any form of rapprochement between China and Japan is impossible and talk of Asianism should be put aside for a few more years at least. However, a historian from Hokkaido University has been arguing quite the opposite. In a 2013 interview with Asahi Shimbun, Nakajima Takeshi argues that Asianism as an “ideology of resistance” has relevance to Japan and China today as “an attempt to resist the Western materialism and mammonism.” Japan’s failure to follow the path of moral Asianism, its subsequent domination by the United States and postwar Westernization have led to a country even further removed from the civilizational attributes that early Asianists saw as binary opposites to the West. It is this pre-war period that needs to be turned to for answers.
Nakajima explains: “Japan once trampled on the sovereignty of China, so it should take a fresh, hard look at history.” Nakajima himself turns to Indian writers as well as Japanese Asianists and Sun Yat-sen to support his argument for Asia as “civilization instead of a mere geographical region.”617 And this indicates the problem inherent in recent discourse on Asian regionalism.

Disregarding both civilizational and anti-imperial issues from previous discussions of Asianism during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century, current arguments for an Asian union focus only upon economic and political questions.618 Not one of the early Chinese proponents of Asianism discussed in this dissertation would be happy with these calls for Asian alliance today. The arguments are based on capitalist desire and have discarded the moral and civilizational stance of early Asianism. Asianism was a hope for regionalism based on civilizational attributes from Asia in general and China in particular, but as Nakajima hints in the above mentioned interview, these civilizational aspects of Asia have been disregarded in favor of a political and economic region based on norms and values of free market neoliberal thinking, values that would have been firmly rejected by Asianist activists who argued against oppression and imperialism in the early twentieth century.

618 A point that has not been ignored by International Relations researchers of East Asian regionalism. Katzenstein shows that an East Asia region based on Chinese civilizational commonalities has given way to a Singaporean definition “that focuses on East Asian regional interaction and nominal state equality.” Katzenstein 2005, 11.
This dissertation returned to those thinkers and their arguments to show that Chinese intellectuals produced a comprehensive discourse on Asianism, which developed from the end of the nineteenth century to the production of Sun Yat-sen’s “Greater Asianism” in 1924 and beyond. I have shown how late Qing and early Republican period intellectuals strove to turn from a classical Sinocentric world view to accommodate concepts of nation and race in a reification of the concept of Asia as Sinocentric civilization. Chinese intellectuals then constructed the concept of Chinese Asianism as a political, economic, and military strategy based upon this understanding of Sinocentric civilization.

Sun Yat-sen’s Greater Asianism marks the end of this dissertation due to the symbolic power of his speech. Sun’s Asianism encapsulates the discourse’s collusion with nationalism, the issues of hegemony and leadership, as well as the construction of an East based in opposition to the West. The years after this speech were marked by a flurry of Asianist writing that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is necessary to indicate the two directions that were followed and their relation to this dissertation.

Asianist ideology was tightly connected to the relatively new and hegemonic concept of civilization, yet was also in opposition with it. On the one hand, it regularly wedded traditional Confucian culturalism to the idea of civilization, yet on the other, it denied the civilizational hierarchy which posited the Christian West as the bearers of all that is civilized or as a space further advanced on a teleological linear history. Born out of a frustration with the dominant world system centred around European imperialism and capitalism, Asianism was a counter-hegemonic discourse. However, this counter-hegemonic discourse, which was
intended to disrupt the Western-dominated world system, was in turn consumed and appropriated by the dominant episteme. It was soon incorporated into the system of capitalist imperialism and used to further Japanese colonialism. The moment of this change, and perhaps the moment of twentieth century Asianism’s death, was its adoption as an official strategy by the Japanese government. An anti-hegemonic movement could not serve as the official ideology. Due to this history, we should regard recent reiterations of Asianism with caution, but remain open to optimism.

In attempting to make Asianism an official and positive force for regionalization rather than a discourse of resistance against imperialism, Chinese officials may either diminish the anti-imperial significance of the discourse or may subvert this discourse to neoliberal goals. Returning to Wang Yi’s 2006 proposal of New Asianism discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the relationship between Asianism and both nationalism and empire is still clearly relevant. The functions of Asianism have both national and regional objectives that can work in collusion or in opposition, leading to Wang Yi’s return to the idea of Eastern Civilization as a concept that both promises regional cooperation, but also assumes some form of Chinese leadership. Asianism is used to both support nationalism and regionalism, treading the same line that it once did between imperial and anti-hegemonic regionalism. This inevitably leads us to ask: Considering Asianism’s history in the twentieth century, which form and function would define a twenty-first century Asianism?
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Appendices

Appendix A: A Note on Romanization

This dissertation contains romanized forms of Korean, Japanese and Chinese names and terms. For Chinese I have primarily adhered to the popular Mandarin pinyin system with some important exceptions. For the names of people and places that are already established in English-language publications, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, I have tried to adhere to their preferred or most popular spellings. Also, I have used the preferred or published spelling of the names of academics from Taiwan and Hong Kong when available. For the Romanization of Japanese I use Hepburn and I use McCune-Reischauer for Korean. The initial occurrence of all names and terms is followed by the original Sinitic characters in traditional script.
Appendix B: Asia Association Manifesto

1) This association is specifically for the vitalization of Asia, to open up the people’s knowledge, and to give voice to the power of the region. Regardless of size, all countries of Asia are accepted into the association.

2) The association is specifically for the establishment of aspirations, giving precedence to the opening of knowledge. All those who enter into the association must, as those who have endured the humiliation of others’ insults, strive to be of virtuous minds, seek morality with those of our continent and become more brilliant day-by-day.

3) For association members, no matter the size nor the strength of their country, once they have sincerely signed and entered the association, they will no longer acknowledge boundaries. They will be as brothers of one heart and one mind.

4) In this association, whether members are officials or gentry, whether they are scholars, farmers, workers or merchants, all are free to enter the association. Even should they be eminent or humble, intelligent or slow, all will be treated equally and without discrimination.

5) Upon entering into this association, members must strive towards our ambitions, emphasizing dependable learning. All internal and foreign affairs, including military, agriculture, rites and music, mining, markets, industry, machinery, and physics must all be considered for specialized study in order to establish a basis for the wealth and power of Asia.

6) Of those in the association, the virtuous will serve by their talent, the intelligent will design with their wisdom. The poor will labor with their strength and the rich will assist with their capital. To each their ability, we will work together as one and thus this vitalization will prove to be amenable.

7) Within this continent, those with lofty ideals exist everywhere. In addition to the main assembly, each country, each province, each county, prefecture and division may

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619 This translation is based upon the version printed in the Jicheng Bao as “Yaxiya xiehui zhangcheng” 亞細亞協會章程, Jicheng Bao 集成報, v34, 1898.
establish its own branch and work together with the main assembly to extend our spirit and unite friendly assistance.

8) Those entering the association should write their name, age, native place, as well as what they specialize in and what their occupation is. In order that we may establish a branch in each country, each province and each prefecture and county, please send this information to the head office where you will be registered. The lists will all be published so that all will be aware of each area’s people of ability in order to facilitate knowledge.

9) Should any of those joining the association be skilled in mining, agricultural studies, industrial arts, law, military science, business, meteorology, geography, mathematics, chemistry, electricity, optics, acoustics, medicine, or phenomenology, please inform those at any branch so that each country may be notified and your skills can be put to good use.

10) The association’s funds come entirely from members’ donations. The amount offered shall be at the member’s discretion. There is no need to be compelled and no need to feel restrictions at this time.620

11) Those in the association work on many philanthropic tasks. We await the ruling classes, as well as the merchants and the gentry, and await the assistance of those junzi who feel sympathy for this world and want to save the times. Then we do these things one after the other.

12) We will first establish the Asia Association Monthly Report. Then we will copy the Red Cross which is in the Westerners’ militaries, and which enlists famous doctors and prepares medical expenses. Should any country in Asia encounter disaster, those in the society must utilize their resources to mutually assist. We cannot stand idly by and watch

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620 This is very different from how the association was handled in Japan, where founding members paid ten yen upon founding as well as one yen membership fees. Later members paid two yen membership fees, indicating that the association was restricted to the very wealthy. This is corroborated by looking at the list of Japanese elite that were associated with the society. See Kuroki 2007, 39.
13) The Asia Association Monthly Report is edited by elected distinguished writers. It includes reports on the latest technology from all over the world as well as events that are of interest to Asia. Submissions can be made at any time. Should there be willful acts of aggression or incidences of injustice, please send reports to the society for publication, to make these incidences known and ascertain their authenticity.

14) For establishing the Asia Association administration offices, ten people shall be elected to handle affairs at the Shanghai office. Someone will be responsible for accounting. Someone will be responsible for the supervision of the Asia Association Monthly Report. Someone will be responsible for the passage of mail between different places. These positions will be set to one year terms, after which time the decision on whether or not to retain these persons will be made through a joint deliberation. Should there be any events of dire importance, members will be gathered for group meetings.

15) All contributions have an important impact upon the association and all contributors are held in high esteem. In addition to acknowledgments in our report, when possible we will make memorial in metal or stone in order to express our gratitude. By supporting each other, all of Asia will one day rise and not have to endure the ridicule and insults of other continents. This is our great dream. Should you have a good suggestion, please bring it into public discussion. We hope that our comrades from across Asia will not hesitate to tell us of possible remedies.
Appendix C: Liang Qichao’s “A Preface to The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation”

The Yijing reads: “Treasure he (unity/unifying 合) to achieve the Supreme Harmony.” The Shujing reads: “He 合 brings peace to the states.” The meaning of “he” has long been broadly applied. It is the fate of the six kuang 六匡. It is the origin of heaven and earth and the body of the constellations.

Humans are born in between heaven and Earth. This is ubiquitous and known by all. As we live by the sun and the moon, and through fluctuations in qi, inclusive of the mountains and rivers, the six ordinals (上下東西南北) extend afar. There are interactions between the elbow and the shoulder (referring to Japan and China). Why fight for power? Why divide between races? Why refer to East, West, South and North? Why say near and far or intimate and unfamiliar?

Whether in the datong 大同 of Confucius or in the shangtong 尚同 of Mozi, all living things are one and all life is connected. Without the individual, the great dao is still magnificent.

Should each manage his own state and each instruct his own people, they will be of no consequence and not be following the dao. The great flow of history cannot be managed through frustrations. The Classic of Spring and Autumn has been passed on for generations due to its dependence on disorder. Before the great Book of Changes has been followed to help the people, how can we proceed to the carefree happiness of xiaokang 小康? Due to this, the power of attraction is weak, and feelings of connection are dissipated.

Now the five continents stand imposingly. The six barbarian races defile. The strong encroach upon the weak. The many are violent to the few. The hoe is not used for

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621 I am grateful to Chen Bihong 陳碧泓 of Korea University for her help in going through this very difficult text. Original citation: Liang Qichao 梁啟超, “A Preface to The New Idea of a Great Eastern Federation” 《大東合邦新義》序, in Texts Not Included in the Yin Bing Shi Collected Works, Part I 《飲冰室合集》集外文(上), edited by Xia Xiaohong 夏曉虹 (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005).

622 Both of these quotations refer to the term he, which means ‘to unify,’ or, in the case of Tarui Tokichi, it is part of the word hebang, understood here to mean “federation.”
The wings unite in alliance and the mutual destructiveness of competition grows greater by the day. Ancient Greece united and then Egypt moved westward; The Treaty of Paris was signed and a powerful Russia turned east; The eighteen states hated each other, yet Napoleon was brought down below the wall; The thirteen states became a republic and Washington rose from the ashes.

Those that stand together meet with prosperity and those that stand alone are executed. Is it not absurd to be arrogant and self-important? Japan and China are separated by the mists that envelop the East Sea. Asia has chosen to be timid and put on the butcher’s block by a foreign people.

The yellow and white races are becoming like ice and coal. The Southeast with its profits and thriving people is divided like meat. And all our scholars close their eyes and snore. While the funeral pyre is stocked with wood they believe things are still safe. If a crisis occurs and those that rely upon each other for existence do not help, but stay divided as though their circumstances are special, how can they not but be bait for those snakes?! Therefore, we must plan for wealth and power. We must have political reform. In order to protect our race we must not be timid but must ally!”

Looking at Japan in the past twenty years, if it were on a scale such as this, that is to say if China were able to stand up by itself and use trade to alleviate our condition, would it not dominate all the world? I read all manner of books. Picking up “On the Great Eastern Federation,” and considered this man Morimoto, for a while I thought him some sort of genius. But should the pillar that supports this house fall, then the normal walls will protect the people. The wood must be straightened with compass and square. Federalists should protect the supportive wall of classical learning (Confucianism) and support the people’s long held customs as their compass and square. It is a pity that this book is so wordy and its approach is treacherous. Although it appears to support a common perspective, however it revolves around the author’s own opinions. The taking of our vassal state has changed my perspective. Finding a crack (in our thinking) his rattling on is evasive.

However, with the dishonest practices of the world powers, a union is logical, and my

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623 Meaning that only the surface issue is addressed and not reached to the seeds.
criticisms are like picking at bones. Understanding his main points, the valuable words left behind in the history of each dynasty can also help towards the long term autonomy of the Orient. Our student Chen Xiaqian 陳霞騫 has corrected this book according to its principles. As it was originally quite simple, he has made some improvements to its style. Brilliant, loyal and more objective. In fine-tuning our reforms, we must find a method (way forward). I wonder if Mr. Tarui can assist us in this?

Confucius Year 2448
Guangxu Year 24, February.
Liang Qichao
Appendix D: “On the Suitability of Asia for Its Own Lips and Teeth”

This world is separated into five great continents. Inside of each the people do not differ from the birds and the beasts. There will certainly be those who order, rule, teach, govern and lord over. The sage kings ruled on the basis of their way of thought and had no need to change the customs of the people. From the days of the Yao Emperor, the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains have acted as a barrier to cut off Europe from Asia and divide yellow people and white people 黃人白人. However, it is the destiny of heaven and Earth, with close to four thousand years of history and the kanglong (hegemon 亢龍) still surviving, that those on the eastern sea and those on the western sea would inevitably come into contact. This is only natural. What problems would come with this opening up (tong 迴)?

The world is a varied place, as uneven as the teeth of a dog. Therefore, that which was basic to the people of Europe had no place in Asia. Hence the sickness of China 震旦病. The countries of Asia including India to the West and Malaysia in the South are controlled by others. They are not powerful. The Turks on the margins are humiliated. They pose no threat or gain to a country on the level of China. Of those in the temperate zone, China is great. Continuing East for about 1000 里, the island nation of Japan is great. To the North of these two countries and upstream from Kamchatka, with its tail so large it might fall off, Russia is great.

Of those that are at elbows with China and can be mutually reliant and dependent on each other, only Japan remains. Threats are being made towards China’s Eastern regions. Our captains pay no heed to discipline, our masters have fallen and our territory divided. How can all our men of letters help but to stare on aghast and mute, hoping for retribution. It is difficult to be an impoverished state with an avaricious power in the North. Forgetting its bite we have entered a secret alliance, turning our backs on our own kind and encamping with a foreign clan 背同類而尚異族. Should we not be doing the opposite?

From the beginning, the idea of the union of Asia came from the Japanese. These were

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not empty words. China is dependent upon Japan and Japan is also dependent upon China. They hope for a strong China, taking pride in “lips and teeth.” Then we can match the West from afar and face Russia near, and the Pacific will be at peace.

Unfortunately, China is destitute: Soldiers with no training, resources left un-mined, schools with no learning. We have suffered the insults of neighboring countries, especially in the North. Their intent can be seen as they steal the Yellow Sea for themselves. The Japanese territory faces the same situation, as they fear the intrusion of Russia. They say: Better to slight than to be slighted by another, and then dive into a precarious situation. Although they have the sea to protect them, although they have defended cities, they bring calamity to Korea and to Liaodong in order to shield them from Russia before Russia acts. This is not done to be militaristic. It is in hoping to save themselves that they bring out the competitive spirit in China, causing China to resolutely make plans for self-strengthening. Then synthesizing name and reality, soldiers are made strong, the people are made good and the officials made honest and powerful.

Japan dismisses friendly relations, but how can they be invaders (pirates - kou 寇)? Should China not rise as an overlord, nor resolutely makes plans for self-strengthening or create a new system, although scholars follow the conventions of old and aspire to elegance, protecting the old systems, even if Japan were not here, China would still be nibbled away by Russia. How can this humiliation be cleared? Should a country fail to be inspired early on, it will gradually decline until it will be much too difficult to attain ambitions of self-strengthening amid the country’s shame. Gou Jian 勾踐 was made a servant for the state of Wu, yet he still felt the need for revenge. Shu united with Wu on a level of equals and without any feelings of revenge. Thus they could attack Wei and Wu had no need to feel resentment.

Those subjugated under the southern lords, and those whose homes were burned down by the White Emperor, they were frustrated with subsequent defeats and did not rise up again. For our ancestors in the Song Dynasty, the Jurchen were a cause of great trouble, and they invited the Mongols in to destroy them. In the end they destroyed themselves through the failure of their strategies. After this the lands were under Mongol domination and the situation was in disarray. Despite nine generations of hatred the Song did not overthrow them. And
why? After the battle between two bears, the great lion beast (suan 狻) arrives and first helps itself to the carcass of the defeated bear before turning to the other.

Now China has not thought deeply about the future upon this, wanting to be of be harmonious with Japan, but also making a secret pact with Russia. We imagined that we could depend on them for assistance. With the troops in Jiaozhou 胶州 and the railroads in Jilin 吉林, Qilu (齊魯 Shandong), and the three easternmost provinces will become foreign territory. Alas! In the past France and Russia made an alliance. The South and North have been ensnared and our vast land is caught in the middle. Here in Asia we are like a fish with its bubbles rising through nine nets, yet Japan remains vigilant.

For the present, now that domestic affairs are in order, we should be approaching Japan. In order to defend against Russia, the two countries could work together to guard the East Sea. We would be as powerful as a qingbang.\textsuperscript{625} If neither abandons the other, and the multitude of yellow people 黃人 help one another, then Asia will not falter.

Those who fear the difficulties say: Looking at the decline of scholars 士, should China be so weak and sick, plowing on for another ten years we will fall to the ground. Even if we are to unite with Japan, how can this be remedied? They say should we be determined and fight as the heroes of tianxia 天下雄, then we might stand for one hundred years. Should we idly seek a tranquil life, then we shall not even last for ten years before collapsing. My argument is the words of one who is determined and not the words of one idly seeking a tranquil life. Although those seeking idleness and tranquility may keep up a certain appearance, should we come across difficulties, they will be like a horse’s tail and we can do without them. Resolve to be brave and we can depend on the horns of our neighboring countries to have the means of defense. Otherwise, in the blink of an eye we will be routed and destroyed. How could we stand for ten more years?

\textsuperscript{625}檠榜 a tool for fixing bows and crossbows.