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Ten-month-olds' evaluations of accidental and intentional actions Le, T. Doan 2013

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  TEN-??MONTH-??OLDS?	 ?EVALUATIONS	 ?OF	 ?ACCIDENTAL	 ?AND	 ?INTENTIONAL	 ?ACTIONS	 ?	 ?by	 ?T.	 ?Doan	 ?Le	 ?B.Sc.,	 ?The	 ?University	 ?of	 ?Waterloo,	 ?2011	 ?	 ?A	 ?THESIS	 ?SUBMITTED	 ?IN	 ?PARTIAL	 ?FULFILLMENT	 ?OF	 ?THE	 ?REQUIREMENTS	 ?FOR	 ?THE	 ?DEGREE	 ?OF	 ?	 ?MASTER	 ?OF	 ?ARTS	 ?in	 ?THE	 ?FACULTY	 ?OF	 ?GRADUATE	 ?AND	 ?POSTDOCTORAL	 ?STUDIES	 ?(Psychology)	 ?	 ?THE	 ?UNIVERSITY	 ?OF	 ?BRITISH	 ?COLUMBIA	 ?(Vancouver)	 ?	 ?August	 ?2013	 ?	 ??	 ?T.	 ?Doan	 ?Le,	 ?2013	 ? ii	 ?Abstract	 ?	 ?	 ? Mature	 ?moral	 ? judgments	 ? rely	 ? on	 ? the	 ? analysis	 ? of	 ? both	 ? the	 ? outcomes	 ? of	 ? others?	 ?actions	 ?and	 ?the	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?that	 ?drive	 ?them.	 ?Past	 ?research	 ?has	 ?shown	 ?that	 ?when	 ?there	 ?is	 ?conflict	 ?between	 ?outcome	 ?and	 ?intention,	 ?young	 ?children	 ?rely	 ?on	 ?outcome	 ?information	 ?to	 ? evaluate	 ? others,	 ? while	 ? older	 ? children	 ? and	 ? adults	 ? privilege	 ? intention	 ? (Piaget,	 ?1932/1965).	 ?	 ?This	 ?suggests	 ?that	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?shift	 ?from	 ?outcome-??based	 ?to	 ?intention-??based	 ?judgments	 ?occurring	 ?in	 ?development.	 ?However,	 ? the	 ? current	 ? study	 ? suggests	 ? that	 ? even	 ? 10-??month-??old	 ? infants	 ? evaluate	 ?moral	 ? agents	 ? on	 ? the	 ? basis	 ? of	 ? their	 ? underlying	 ?mental	 ? states.	 ? Infants	 ? were	 ? presented	 ?with	 ? puppet	 ? shows	 ? in	 ? which	 ? a	 ? protagonist	 ? was	 ? either	 ? intentionally	 ? or	 ? accidentally	 ?helped	 ?or	 ?hindered.	 ?	 ?Infants	 ?were	 ?then	 ?given	 ?a	 ?forced	 ?choice	 ?between	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?and	 ?intentional	 ?puppets.	 ?Results	 ? indicate	 ? that	 ? infants?	 ?preference	 ? for	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ?versus	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?character	 ?differed	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?[?2(1,	 ?N	 ?=	 ?60)=	 ?11.28,	 ?p	 ?<	 ?.001,	 ??	 ?=	 ?.43];	 ?infants	 ? preferred	 ? intentional	 ? to	 ? accidental	 ? helpers	 ? (Binomial,	 ? p	 ? <	 ? .05),	 ? but	 ? preferred	 ?accidental	 ? to	 ? intentional	 ?hinderers	 ? (Binomial,	 ?p	 ? <	 ? .05).	 ?These	 ? results	 ? suggest	 ? that	 ? the	 ?capacity	 ? to	 ? evaluate	 ? others	 ? on	 ? the	 ? basis	 ? of	 ? intention	 ? arises	 ? much	 ? earlier	 ? on	 ? in	 ?development	 ? than	 ? previously	 ? suggested	 ? and	 ? contradicts	 ? earlier	 ? claims	 ? of	 ? a	 ?developmental	 ?shift	 ?from	 ?outcome-??	 ?to	 ?intention-??based	 ?judgments.	 ? iii	 ?Preface	 ?All	 ? research	 ? reported	 ?was	 ? conducted	 ?at	 ?UBC?s	 ?Centre	 ? for	 ? Infant	 ?Cognition,	 ? and	 ?was	 ?supervised	 ?by	 ?Dr.	 ? J.	 ?Kiley	 ?Hamlin.	 ?Ethics	 ?approval	 ? for	 ? this	 ? research	 ?was	 ?obtained	 ?from	 ?UBC?s	 ?Behavioral	 ?Research	 ?Ethics	 ?Board	 ?under	 ?the	 ?approval	 ?number	 ?H10-??01808.	 ? iv	 ?Table	 ?of	 ?Contents	 ?Abstract	 ?............................................................................................................................................	 ?ii	 ?Preface	 ?.............................................................................................................................................	 ?iii	 ?Table	 ?of	 ?Contents	 ?..........................................................................................................................	 ?iv	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Tables	 ?..................................................................................................................................	 ?vi	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Figures	 ?...............................................................................................................................	 ?vii	 ?Acknowledgements	 ?...................................................................................................................	 ?viii	 ?1	 ? Introduction	 ?.............................................................................................................................	 ?1	 ?1.1	 ? How	 ?do	 ?children	 ?and	 ?adults	 ?evaluate	 ?moral	 ?agents?	 ?........................................................	 ?2	 ?1.2	 ? Infants?	 ?understanding	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?................................................................................	 ?7	 ?1.3	 ? Infants?	 ?third-??party	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?morally-??relevant	 ?actions	 ?........................................	 ?9	 ?1.4	 ? Failed	 ?attempts	 ?vs.	 ?accidents	 ?.................................................................................................	 ?13	 ?1.5	 ? The	 ?present	 ?investigation	 ?.......................................................................................................	 ?16	 ?2	 ? Experiment	 ?.............................................................................................................................	 ?18	 ?2.1	 ? Participants	 ?..................................................................................................................................	 ?18	 ?2.2	 ? Procedure	 ?.....................................................................................................................................	 ?18	 ?2.2.1	 ? Familiarization	 ?.......................................................................................................................................	 ?19	 ?2.2.1.1	 ? Intentional	 ?helping	 ?.......................................................................................................................................	 ?21	 ?2.2.1.2	 ? Accidental	 ?helping	 ?........................................................................................................................................	 ?22	 ?2.2.1.3	 ? Intentional	 ?hindering	 ?..................................................................................................................................	 ?23	 ?2.2.1.4	 ? Accidental	 ?hindering	 ?....................................................................................................................................	 ?24	 ?2.2.2	 ? Choice	 ?.........................................................................................................................................................	 ?25	 ?2.2.3	 ? Counterbalancing	 ?and	 ?reliability	 ?...................................................................................................	 ?26	 ? v	 ?2.3	 ? Results	 ?............................................................................................................................................	 ?28	 ?2.3.1	 ? Looking	 ?time	 ?...........................................................................................................................................	 ?28	 ?2.3.2	 ? Choice	 ?.........................................................................................................................................................	 ?29	 ?2.3.3	 ? Excluded	 ?infants	 ?and	 ?additional	 ?analyses	 ?..................................................................................	 ?31	 ?3	 ? General	 ?Discussion	 ?..............................................................................................................	 ?34	 ?3.1	 ? Limitations	 ?and	 ?future	 ?directions	 ?........................................................................................	 ?38	 ?4	 ? Conclusions	 ?.............................................................................................................................	 ?42	 ?References	 ?.....................................................................................................................................	 ?43	 ? vi	 ?List	 ?of	 ?Tables	 ?Table	 ?1.	 ?Infants?	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?towards	 ?events	 ?(s)	 ?separated	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?.......................	 ?28	 ? vii	 ?List	 ?of	 ?FiguresFigure	 ?1.	 ?Failed	 ?helping	 ?and	 ?failed	 ?hindering	 ?events	 ?(Hamlin,	 ?in	 ?press)	 ?...........................	 ?13	 ?Figure	 ?2.	 ?Critical	 ?actions	 ?displayed	 ?in	 ?puppet	 ?show	 ?events	 ?..................................................	 ?27	 ?Figure	 ?3.	 ?Results	 ?of	 ?infants?	 ?choice	 ?.............................................................................................	 ?30	 ?	 ?	 ? viii	 ?Acknowledgements	 ?First	 ?and	 ?foremost,	 ?I	 ?would	 ?like	 ?to	 ?thank	 ?my	 ?wonderful	 ?supervisor,	 ?Kiley	 ?Hamlin,	 ?for	 ? her	 ? guidance	 ? and	 ? support.	 ? This	 ? has	 ? been	 ? an	 ? incredible	 ? experience	 ? and	 ? I	 ? am	 ? so	 ?grateful	 ?to	 ?have	 ?had	 ?this	 ?opportunity.	 ?Many	 ?thanks	 ?to	 ?Susan	 ?Birch	 ?and	 ?Mark	 ?Schaller	 ?for	 ?being	 ?on	 ?my	 ?thesis	 ?committee	 ?and	 ?for	 ?offering	 ?new	 ?ways	 ?to	 ?think	 ?about	 ?this	 ?research.	 ?I	 ?would	 ? also	 ? like	 ? to	 ? extend	 ? thanks	 ? to	 ?Ori	 ? Friedman,	 ?who	 ?has	 ?been	 ?an	 ? amazing	 ?mentor	 ? over	 ? the	 ? years.	 ? His	 ? creativity	 ? and	 ? passion	 ? for	 ? research	 ? has	 ? been	 ? truly	 ?inspirational.	 ?	 ?	 ?This	 ? research	 ? would	 ? not	 ? have	 ? been	 ? possible	 ? without	 ? the	 ? infants	 ? and	 ? families	 ?who	 ?participated,	 ?and	 ?the	 ?hardworking	 ?members	 ?of	 ?the	 ?Centre	 ?for	 ?Infant	 ?Cognition.	 ?In	 ?particular,	 ?thanks	 ?to	 ?Janine	 ?Gellerman	 ?for	 ?making	 ?sure	 ?that	 ?the	 ?lab	 ?ran	 ?smoothly	 ?and	 ?for	 ?making	 ? the	 ? lab	 ? a	 ? fun	 ? environment	 ? to	 ? work	 ? in;	 ? Meghan	 ?MacPherson,	 ? Olesha	 ? Ratther,	 ?Nadiu	 ?Hui,	 ? and	 ?Carolyn	 ?Baer	 ? for	 ? their	 ? lively	 ? spirits	 ? and	 ?eagerness	 ? to	 ?help	 ? in	 ?any	 ?way	 ?possible.	 ?Finally,	 ?I	 ?would	 ?like	 ?to	 ?thank	 ?all	 ?of	 ?my	 ?friends	 ?and	 ?family	 ?for	 ?supporting	 ?me	 ?along	 ?the	 ?way?I	 ?would	 ?not	 ?have	 ?been	 ?able	 ?to	 ?do	 ?it	 ?without	 ?them.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ? 1	 ?	 ?1 Introduction	 ?Moral	 ?judgments	 ?play	 ?a	 ?critical	 ?role	 ?in	 ?helping	 ?us	 ?navigate	 ?our	 ?social	 ?world.	 ?Our	 ?assessments	 ? as	 ? to	 ? whether	 ? or	 ? not	 ? individuals	 ? are	 ?morally	 ? responsible	 ? for	 ? producing	 ?particular	 ? outcomes	 ? impacts	 ? our	 ? social	 ? evaluations	 ? of	 ? them.	 ? Those	 ?who	 ? intentionally	 ?cause	 ?good	 ?outcomes	 ?(e.g.,	 ?donating	 ?to	 ?charity,	 ?saving	 ?a	 ?drowning	 ?child)	 ?are	 ?evaluated	 ?positively,	 ? while	 ? those	 ? who	 ? intentionally	 ? cause	 ? bad	 ? outcomes	 ? (e.g.,	 ? robbing	 ? a	 ? bank,	 ?committing	 ?murder)	 ?are	 ?evaluated	 ?negatively.	 ?The	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?make	 ?these	 ?assessments	 ?of	 ?others	 ?is	 ?critical	 ?in	 ?helping	 ?us	 ?determine	 ?who	 ?it	 ?is	 ?beneficial	 ?to	 ?align	 ?with	 ?and	 ?who	 ?it	 ?is	 ?important	 ?to	 ?avoid.	 ?	 ?As	 ? adults,	 ?we	 ? judge	 ? others	 ? quickly	 ? and	 ? automatically	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Allbright,	 ? Kenny,	 ? &	 ?Malloy,	 ?1988;	 ?Ambady	 ?&	 ?Rosenthal,	 ?1993;	 ?Todorov,	 ?Mandisodza,	 ?Goren,	 ?&	 ?Hall,	 ?2005)	 ?and	 ?our	 ?initial	 ?judgments	 ?about	 ?others	 ?influence	 ?how	 ?we	 ?interpret	 ?their	 ?behaviors	 ?and	 ?evaluate	 ? them	 ? in	 ? future	 ? interactions	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Darley	 ? &	 ? Fazio,	 ? 1980;	 ? Heyman	 ? &	 ? Gelman,	 ?1999;	 ?Higgins,	 ?Rholes,	 ?&	 ? Jones,	 ? 1977;	 ? Imamo?lu,	 ? 1976;	 ?Kelley,	 ? 1950;	 ?Rabin	 ?&	 ?Schrag,	 ?1999).	 ? For	 ? example,	 ? after	 ? positively	 ? evaluating	 ? others,	 ? we	 ? will	 ? be	 ? more	 ? inclined	 ? to	 ?continue	 ? evaluating	 ? them	 ? positively	 ? and	 ? will	 ? even	 ? interpret	 ? any	 ? of	 ? their	 ? future	 ?ambiguous	 ? actions	 ? as	 ? benevolent	 ? or	 ? prosocial.	 ? Similarly,	 ? if	 ? we	 ? initially	 ? hold	 ? negative	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others,	 ?we	 ?will	 ?be	 ?more	 ?inclined	 ?to	 ?continue	 ?evaluating	 ?them	 ?negatively	 ?and	 ? will	 ? interpret	 ? their	 ? future	 ? ambiguous	 ? actions	 ? as	 ? hostile	 ? or	 ? antisocial.	 ? But	 ? how	 ?exactly	 ?do	 ?adults	 ?come	 ?to	 ?judge	 ?others	 ?so	 ?quickly	 ?and	 ?automatically?	 ?One	 ?possibility	 ?is	 ?that	 ?the	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?evaluate	 ?others	 ?is	 ?acquired	 ?over	 ?time	 ?and	 ?becomes	 ?automatized	 ?as	 ?we	 ?gain	 ? experience	 ?making	 ? these	 ? types	 ? of	 ? judgments	 ? (much	 ? like	 ? riding	 ? a	 ? bike).	 ? Another	 ? 2	 ?possibility	 ? is	 ? that	 ? the	 ?capacity	 ? to	 ?evaluate	 ?others	 ? is	 ?a	 ? core	 ?ability	 ? that	 ? is	 ?built	 ? in,	 ?as	 ? it	 ?confers	 ?a	 ?survival-??related	 ?advantage	 ?(i.e.,	 ?we	 ?need	 ?to	 ?be	 ?able	 ?to	 ?distinguish	 ?friend	 ?from	 ?foe).	 ?However,	 ? a	 ? third	 ? and	 ?more	 ?plausible	 ?possibility	 ? is	 ? that	 ?both	 ? nature	 ? and	 ?nurture	 ?play	 ? a	 ? role	 ? in	 ? developing	 ? our	 ? socio-??evaluative	 ? capabilities.	 ? Thus,	 ? it	 ? is	 ? important	 ? to	 ?discern	 ? how	 ?much	 ? of	 ? the	 ? ability	 ? is	 ? built	 ? in	 ? and	 ? how	 ?much	 ? experience	 ? is	 ? required	 ? to	 ?shape	 ?it.	 ?One	 ?way	 ?to	 ?get	 ?at	 ?this	 ?distinction	 ?is	 ?to	 ?study	 ?infants,	 ?as	 ?they	 ?have	 ?very	 ?minimal	 ?experience	 ?in	 ?the	 ?world.	 ?By	 ?studying	 ?infants,	 ?we	 ?can	 ?come	 ?closer	 ?to	 ?pinpointing	 ?when	 ?socio-??evaluative	 ? abilities	 ? begin	 ? to	 ? emerge	 ? and	 ?we	 ? can	 ? determine	 ? the	 ? relative	 ? role	 ? of	 ?experience	 ?on	 ?the	 ?development	 ?of	 ?these	 ?abilities.	 ?In	 ? the	 ? present	 ? investigation,	 ? I	 ? will	 ? demonstrate	 ? that	 ? 10-??month-??old	 ? infants	 ?display	 ? early	 ? nuanced	 ? socio-??moral	 ? evaluations.	 ? This	 ? work	 ? will	 ? suggest	 ? that	 ? infants	 ?evaluate	 ?moral	 ?agents	 ?on	 ? the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ? their	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ? states,	 ?and	 ? that	 ? infants	 ?use	 ?these	 ?evaluations	 ?to	 ?guide	 ?their	 ?social	 ?preferences	 ?in	 ?future	 ?interactions.	 ?But	 ?before	 ?turning	 ? to	 ? the	 ? study	 ? of	 ? infants,	 ? it	 ? is	 ? first	 ? critical	 ? to	 ? discuss	 ? how	 ? children	 ? and	 ? adults	 ?evaluate	 ? moral	 ? agents,	 ? so	 ? that	 ? we	 ? have	 ? a	 ? basic	 ? understanding	 ? of	 ? what	 ? ?mature?	 ?evaluations	 ?look	 ?like.	 ?1.1 How	 ?do	 ?children	 ?and	 ?adults	 ?evaluate	 ?moral	 ?agents?	 ?Mature	 ? moral	 ? judgments	 ? rely	 ? not	 ? only	 ? on	 ? the	 ? analysis	 ? of	 ? the	 ? outcomes	 ? of	 ? an	 ?actor?s	 ?actions,	 ?but	 ?even	 ?more	 ?critically	 ?on	 ?the	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?driving	 ?these	 ?actions	 ? (see	 ?Killen	 ?&	 ?Smetana,	 ?2008	 ? for	 ?a	 ? review;	 ? see	 ?also	 ?Cushman,	 ?2008;	 ?Cushman,	 ?Sheketoff,	 ? Wharton,	 ? &	 ? Carey,	 ? 2013;	 ? Hamlin,	 ? in	 ? press;	 ? Leslie,	 ? Knobe,	 ? &	 ? Cohen,	 ? 2006;	 ?Malle,	 ? 1999;	 ? Nobes,	 ? Panagiotaki,	 ? &	 ? Pawson,	 ? 2009;	 ? Young,	 ? Cushman,	 ? Hauser,	 ? &	 ? Saxe,	 ? 3	 ?2007;	 ?Young	 ?&	 ?Saxe,	 ?2009;	 ?Yuill	 ?&	 ?Perner,	 ?1988;	 ?Zelazo,	 ?Helwig,	 ?&	 ?Lau,	 ?1996).	 ?Those	 ?who	 ?act	 ? intentionally	 ?should	 ?be	 ?held	 ?morally	 ?responsible	 ? for	 ? their	 ?actions	 ?and	 ?should	 ?be	 ? more	 ? deserving	 ? of	 ? praise,	 ? blame,	 ? reward,	 ? or	 ? punishment	 ? than	 ? those	 ? who	 ? act	 ?unintentionally	 ? (and	 ? are	 ? not	 ? morally	 ? responsible	 ? for	 ? their	 ? actions).	 ? To	 ? illustrate	 ? the	 ?significance	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?on	 ?moral	 ?judgments,	 ?imagine	 ?the	 ?following	 ?two	 ?scenarios	 ?(taken	 ?from	 ?Young	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007):	 ?1. Grace	 ?and	 ?her	 ?friend	 ?are	 ?taking	 ?a	 ?tour	 ?of	 ?a	 ?chemical	 ?plant.	 ?When	 ?Grace	 ?goes	 ?over	 ?to	 ?the	 ?coffee	 ?machine	 ?to	 ?pour	 ?some	 ?coffee,	 ?Grace?s	 ?friend	 ?asks	 ?for	 ?some	 ?sugar	 ?in	 ?her	 ?coffee.	 ?There	 ?is	 ?white	 ?powder	 ?in	 ?a	 ?container	 ?by	 ?the	 ?coffee.	 ?The	 ?white	 ?powder	 ?is	 ?a	 ?poison	 ?left	 ?behind	 ?by	 ?a	 ?scientist.	 ?The	 ?container	 ? is	 ? labeled	 ??toxic?,	 ?so	 ?Grace	 ?believes	 ?that	 ?the	 ?white	 ?powder	 ?is	 ?a	 ?poison.	 ?Grace	 ?puts	 ?the	 ?substance	 ?in	 ?her	 ?friend?s	 ?coffee.	 ?Her	 ?friend	 ?drinks	 ?the	 ?coffee	 ?and	 ?gets	 ?sick.	 ?	 ?	 ?2. Grace	 ?and	 ?her	 ?friend	 ?are	 ?taking	 ?a	 ?tour	 ?of	 ?a	 ?chemical	 ?plant.	 ?When	 ?Grace	 ?goes	 ?over	 ?to	 ?the	 ?coffee	 ?machine	 ?to	 ?pour	 ?some	 ?coffee,	 ?Grace?s	 ?friend	 ?asks	 ?for	 ?some	 ?sugar	 ?in	 ?her	 ?coffee.	 ?There	 ?is	 ?white	 ?powder	 ?in	 ?a	 ?container	 ?by	 ?the	 ?coffee.	 ?The	 ?white	 ?powder	 ?is	 ?a	 ?poison	 ?left	 ?behind	 ?by	 ?a	 ?scientist.	 ?The	 ?contained	 ?is	 ?labeled	 ??sugar?,	 ?so	 ?Grace	 ?believes	 ?that	 ? the	 ? white	 ? powder	 ? is	 ? regular	 ? sugar.	 ? Grace	 ? puts	 ? the	 ?substance	 ? in	 ?her	 ? friend?s	 ?coffee.	 ?Her	 ? friend	 ?drinks	 ? the	 ?coffee	 ?and	 ?gets	 ?sick.	 ?	 ? In	 ?both	 ?of	 ?these	 ?examples,	 ?Grace	 ?puts	 ?poison	 ?in	 ?her	 ?friend?s	 ?coffee,	 ?resulting	 ?in	 ?her	 ? friend	 ? getting	 ? sick.	 ? However,	 ? Grace	 ? can	 ? only	 ? be	 ? held	 ?morally	 ? responsible	 ? for	 ? her	 ?actions	 ? in	 ? the	 ? first	 ? case,	 ?where	 ? she	 ? believed	 ? the	 ?white	 ? powder	 ?was	 ? poison	 ? and	 ? thus,	 ?intentionally	 ? poisoned	 ? her	 ? friend.	 ? In	 ? the	 ? second	 ? scenario,	 ? Grace	 ? believed	 ? the	 ? powder	 ?was	 ? sugar,	 ? and	 ? thus	 ? only	 ? accidentally	 ? poisoned	 ? her	 ? friend.	 ? Consistent	 ? with	 ? these	 ?intuitions,	 ? adults	 ? rate	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? harming	 ? as	 ? more	 ? blameworthy	 ? than	 ? the	 ?unintentional	 ?harming	 ? (Young	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007).	 ? Importantly,	 ? these	 ?examples	 ?demonstrate	 ? 4	 ?that	 ? the	 ? exact	 ? same	 ? actions	 ? can	 ? be	 ? viewed	 ? differently	 ? depending	 ? on	 ? an	 ? actor?s	 ?underlying	 ? mental	 ? states.	 ? Thus,	 ? an	 ? analysis	 ? of	 ? an	 ? actor?s	 ? mental	 ? states	 ? is	 ? critical	 ? in	 ?making	 ?mature	 ?moral	 ?judgments.	 ?When	 ? there	 ? is	 ? a	 ?match	 ?between	 ?actors?	 ? intentions	 ? and	 ? the	 ?outcomes	 ? that	 ? they	 ?produce,	 ?children?s	 ?and	 ?adults?	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others	 ?are	 ?clear	 ?cut?those	 ?who	 ?have	 ?bad	 ?intentions	 ?and	 ?produce	 ?bad	 ?outcomes	 ?are	 ?negatively	 ?evaluated,	 ?while	 ?those	 ?who	 ?have	 ?good	 ?intentions	 ?and	 ?produce	 ?good	 ?outcomes	 ?are	 ?positively	 ?evaluated.	 ?However,	 ?when	 ?outcome	 ? and	 ? intention	 ? conflict	 ? or	 ? when	 ? intention	 ? is	 ? ambiguous,	 ? young	 ? children	 ? and	 ?adults	 ? differ	 ? in	 ? their	 ? evaluations;	 ? young	 ? children	 ? rely	 ? more	 ? heavily	 ? on	 ? outcome	 ?information	 ?to	 ?evaluate	 ?others,	 ?while	 ?older	 ?children	 ?and	 ?adults	 ?privilege	 ?intention	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Buchanan	 ? &	 ? Thompson,	 ? 1973;	 ? Gutkin,	 ? 1972;	 ? Imamo?lu,	 ? 1975;	 ? King,	 ? 1971;	 ? Piaget,	 ?1932/1965;	 ? Yuill,	 ? 1984).	 ? For	 ? example,	 ? in	 ? Jean	 ?Piaget?s	 ? (1932/1965)	 ?moral	 ? reasoning	 ?task,	 ?children	 ?were	 ?told	 ?stories	 ?about	 ?two	 ?different	 ?transgressors:	 ?one	 ?who	 ?accidentally	 ?broke	 ?15	 ?cups,	 ?and	 ?one	 ?who	 ?intentionally	 ?broke	 ?one	 ?cup.	 ?When	 ?asked	 ?which	 ?of	 ?the	 ?two	 ?transgressors	 ? was	 ? ?naughtier,?	 ? younger	 ? children	 ? focused	 ? on	 ? outcome	 ? rather	 ? than	 ?intention,	 ? and	 ? judged	 ? the	 ? person	 ? who	 ? caused	 ? more	 ? damage	 ? (even	 ? though	 ? it	 ? was	 ?accidental)	 ?to	 ?be	 ?naughtier.	 ?It	 ?was	 ?not	 ?until	 ?around	 ?the	 ?age	 ?of	 ?10-??11	 ?years	 ?that	 ?children	 ?started	 ?evaluating	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ?intentions	 ?(i.e.,	 ?judging	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?transgressor	 ?as	 ?naughtier	 ?than	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?transgressor).	 ?Thus,	 ?Piaget?s	 ?work	 ?suggests	 ?that	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ??shift?	 ?from	 ?outcome-??based	 ?to	 ?intention-??based	 ?judgments	 ?across	 ?development.	 ?However,	 ?from	 ?Piaget?s	 ?seminal	 ?work,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?unclear	 ?as	 ?to	 ?whether	 ?the	 ?shift	 ?from	 ?outcome-??based	 ? to	 ? intention-??based	 ? judgments	 ? is	 ? a	 ? result	 ? of	 ? an	 ? understanding	 ? of	 ?intention	 ?appearing	 ?later	 ?on	 ?in	 ?development,	 ?or	 ?whether	 ?it	 ?simply	 ?reflects	 ?a	 ?difference	 ? 5	 ?in	 ? how	 ? children	 ? and	 ? adults	 ? weigh	 ? outcome	 ? and	 ? intention	 ? information.	 ? Thus,	 ? it	 ? is	 ?important	 ?to	 ?make	 ?the	 ?distinction	 ?between	 ?children	 ?being	 ?aware	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?and	 ?the	 ? ability	 ? to	 ?use	 ?mental	 ? states	 ? in	 ? their	 ? evaluations	 ? (Imamo?lu,	 ? 1975;	 ? Keasey,	 ? 1978).	 ?Although	 ? younger	 ? children	 ? in	 ? Piaget?s	 ? task	 ? did	 ? not	 ? reliably	 ? use	 ? intention	 ? in	 ? their	 ?naughtiness	 ?assessments,	 ?this	 ?does	 ?not	 ?necessarily	 ?mean	 ?that	 ?they	 ?were	 ?unaware	 ?of	 ?the	 ?actors?	 ? underlying	 ? mental	 ? states.	 ? Rather,	 ? the	 ? complexity	 ? of	 ? Piaget?s	 ? tasks	 ? may	 ? have	 ?potentially	 ?masked	 ?younger	 ?children?s	 ?abilities	 ?to	 ?factor	 ?intention	 ?into	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others.	 ?Firstly,	 ? Piaget?s	 ? task	 ? required	 ? children	 ? to	 ? hold	 ? two	 ? stories	 ? in	 ? their	 ?minds	 ? and	 ?they	 ?needed	 ?to	 ?compare	 ?the	 ?stories	 ?based	 ?on	 ?two	 ?competing	 ?variables	 ?(intentions	 ?and	 ?outcomes)	 ?before	 ?making	 ?their	 ?naughtiness	 ?assessments.	 ?Thus,	 ?the	 ?story-??pair	 ?task	 ?may	 ?have	 ?been	 ?too	 ?cognitively	 ?taxing	 ?to	 ?adequately	 ?assess	 ?the	 ?abilities	 ?of	 ?younger	 ?children	 ?(see	 ?Armsby,	 ?1971;	 ?Berg-??Cross,	 ?1975;	 ?Wellman,	 ?Larkey	 ?&	 ?Somerville,	 ?1979).	 ?Secondly,	 ?Piaget	 ?did	 ?not	 ?explicitly	 ?identify	 ?the	 ?actors?	 ? intentions?children	 ?needed	 ?to	 ?infer	 ?them	 ?based	 ? on	 ? contextual	 ? information.	 ? In	 ? addition,	 ? the	 ? severity	 ? of	 ? the	 ? outcome	 ?was	 ? often	 ?confounded	 ?with	 ?intent:	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?perpetrator?s	 ?act	 ?led	 ?to	 ?a	 ?much	 ?worse	 ?outcome	 ?than	 ? did	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? perpetrator?s	 ? act.	 ? Thus,	 ? younger	 ? children	 ?may	 ? have	 ? focused	 ?more	 ?strongly	 ?on	 ?the	 ?amount	 ?of	 ?damage	 ?caused	 ?because	 ?it	 ?was	 ?the	 ?most	 ?salient	 ?cue	 ?in	 ?Piaget?s	 ?scenarios,	 ?rather	 ?than	 ?because	 ?children	 ?explicitly	 ?believed	 ?that	 ?outcomes	 ?were	 ?more	 ? important	 ? than	 ? intentions	 ? (see	 ?Karniol,	 ? 1978	 ? for	 ? a	 ? review;	 ? see	 ? also	 ?Berg-??Cross,	 ?1975;	 ?Nelson,	 ?1980;	 ?Nobes	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2009;	 ?Nunmedal	 ?&	 ?Bass,	 ?1978).	 ?Several	 ? follow-??ups	 ? to	 ? Piaget?s	 ? seminal	 ? studies	 ? have	 ? supported	 ? the	 ? hypothesis	 ?that	 ? young	 ? children?s	 ? outcome-??based	 ? evaluations	 ? were	 ? due	 ? to	 ? methodological	 ? 6	 ?difficulties	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? a	 ? lack	 ? of	 ? intention	 ? understanding.	 ? When	 ? task	 ? demands	 ? were	 ?decreased	 ?by	 ?using	 ?single	 ?stories,	 ?actors?	 ?intentions	 ?were	 ?highlighted,	 ?and/or	 ?outcomes	 ?were	 ?held	 ?constant,	 ?young	 ?children	 ?(as	 ?young	 ?as	 ?3	 ?years	 ?of	 ?age;	 ?Nelson,	 ?1980)	 ?were	 ?able	 ?to	 ? use	 ? intention	 ? in	 ? their	 ? evaluations	 ? (see	 ? Baird	 ?&	 ? Astington,	 ? 2004;	 ? Karniol,	 ? 1978	 ? for	 ?reviews;	 ?see	 ?also	 ?Berg-??Cross,	 ?1975;	 ?Keasey,	 ?1978;	 ?Miller	 ?&	 ?McCann,	 ?1979;	 ?Nummedal	 ?&	 ?Bass,	 ? 1976).	 ? However,	 ? these	 ? findings	 ? along	 ? with	 ? many	 ? others	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Astington,	 ? 1986;	 ?Baird	 ? &	 ?Moses,	 ? 2001;	 ? Berndt	 ? &	 ? Berndt,	 ? 1975;	 ? Buchanan	 ?&	 ? Thompson,	 ? 1973;	 ? Farnill,	 ?1974;	 ? Gutkin,	 ? 1972;	 ? Imamo?lu,	 ? 1975;	 ? King,	 ? 1971)	 ? still	 ? moderately	 ? support	 ? Piaget?s	 ?developmental	 ? shift	 ? claims	 ? in	 ? that	 ? they	 ? still	 ? find	 ? age-??related	 ? increases	 ? in	 ? the	 ? use	 ? of	 ?intention	 ? in	 ? their	 ? judgments.	 ?When	 ? intention	 ? and	 ?outcome	 ?are	 ?directly	 ?pitted	 ? against	 ?one	 ? another	 ? (e.g.,	 ? someone	 ? who	 ? has	 ? a	 ? positive	 ? intention	 ? but	 ? produces	 ? a	 ? negative	 ?outcome	 ? versus	 ? someone	 ? who	 ? has	 ? a	 ? negative	 ? intention	 ? but	 ? produces	 ? a	 ? positive	 ?outcome),	 ?younger	 ?children	 ?still	 ?make	 ?outcome-??based	 ?judgments.	 ?Thus,	 ?although	 ?young	 ?children	 ?may	 ?be	 ?able	 ?to	 ?use	 ?intention	 ?judgments	 ?earlier	 ?than	 ?originally	 ?hypothesized	 ?in	 ?some	 ?situations,	 ?they	 ?still	 ?do	 ?not	 ?reliably	 ?privilege	 ?it	 ?until	 ?they	 ?are	 ?older.	 ?However,	 ? more	 ? recent	 ? research	 ? in	 ? non-??moral	 ? domains	 ? suggests	 ? that	 ? young	 ?children	 ? do	 ? show	 ? more	 ? sensitivity	 ? to	 ? actors?	 ? underlying	 ? mental	 ? states	 ? when	 ? using	 ?implicit	 ?(or	 ?non-??verbal)	 ?measures.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?young	 ?children	 ?typically	 ? fail	 ?standard	 ?false	 ?belief	 ? tasks	 ? that	 ? involve	 ?verbal	 ? responses,	 ?but	 ? they	 ?pass	 ? these	 ? tasks	 ?when	 ?using	 ?measurements	 ?of	 ?predictive	 ? eye	 ? gaze	 ?or	 ?other	 ?non-??verbal	 ?measures	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Clements	 ?&	 ?Perner,	 ? 1994;	 ? Rubio-??Fern?ndez	 ? &	 ? Geurts,	 ? 2013).	 ? For	 ? example,	 ? Rubio-??Fern?ndez	 ? &	 ?Geurts	 ? (2013)	 ? told	 ? 3-??year-??old	 ? children	 ?modified	 ? false	 ? belief	 ? stories,	 ? using	 ? toy	 ? props.	 ?Children	 ?saw	 ?a	 ?girl	 ?putting	 ?her	 ?bananas	 ?into	 ?one	 ?of	 ?two	 ?fridges.	 ?When	 ?the	 ?girl	 ?was	 ?not	 ? 7	 ?looking,	 ?the	 ?experimenter	 ?proceeded	 ?to	 ?move	 ?the	 ?bananas	 ?into	 ?the	 ?other	 ?fridge.	 ?When	 ?children	 ?were	 ?prompted	 ?to	 ?use	 ?the	 ?toys	 ?to	 ?continue	 ?acting	 ?out	 ?the	 ?story,	 ?they	 ?moved	 ?the	 ?girl	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?empty	 ?fridge,	 ?suggesting	 ?that	 ?they	 ?understood	 ?that	 ?the	 ?girl	 ?had	 ?a	 ?false	 ?belief	 ?that	 ?the	 ?bananas	 ?were	 ?in	 ?the	 ?fridge	 ?that	 ?she	 ?had	 ?originally	 ?put	 ?them	 ?in.	 ?Thus,	 ?non-??verbal	 ?measures,	 ?provide	 ?additional	 ?support	 ?for	 ?children?s	 ?implicit	 ?awareness	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states,	 ?though	 ?children	 ?do	 ?not	 ?reliably	 ?use	 ?this	 ?information	 ?to	 ?make	 ?their	 ?explicit	 ?verbal	 ?responses.	 ?Using	 ?non-??verbal	 ?paradigms,	 ? then,	 ?might	 ?also	 ?be	 ?a	 ?good	 ?way	 ? to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?sensitive	 ?to	 ?mental	 ?states.	 ?	 ?1.2 Infants?	 ?understanding	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?Indeed,	 ? research	 ? in	 ? non-??moral	 ? domains	 ? suggests	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? have	 ? an	 ? early	 ?understanding	 ? of	 ? mental	 ? state	 ? concepts.	 ? Infants	 ? show	 ? sensitivity	 ? to	 ? beliefs	 ? (see	 ?Baillargeon,	 ? Scott,	 ?&	 ?Ze,	 ?2010	 ? for	 ?a	 ? review;	 ? see	 ?also	 ?Kov?cs,	 ?T?gl?s,	 ?&	 ?Endress,	 ?2010;	 ?Senju,	 ? Southgate,	 ? Snape,	 ? Leonard,	 ? &	 ? Csibra,	 ? 2011)	 ? and	 ? intentions;	 ? infants	 ? interpret	 ?agents?	 ? actions	 ? as	 ? goal-??directed	 ? (see	 ? Woodward,	 ? 2005	 ? for	 ? a	 ? review)	 ? and	 ? can	 ? infer	 ?unfulfilled	 ? (and	 ? thus	 ? unseen)	 ? goals,	 ? suggesting	 ? that	 ? their	 ? understanding	 ? of	 ? goals	 ? is	 ?mentalistic	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Brandone	 ? &	 ? Wellman,	 ? 2009;	 ? Hamlin,	 ? Newman,	 ? &	 ? Wynn,	 ? 2009).	 ?Further,	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?more	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?imitate	 ?acts	 ?that	 ?are	 ?goal-??directed	 ?and	 ?that	 ?are	 ?done	 ?intentionally	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? those	 ? that	 ? are	 ? not	 ? goal-??directed	 ? or	 ? those	 ? that	 ? are	 ? done	 ?unintentionally	 ?(Carpenter,	 ?Akhtar,	 ?&	 ?Tomasello,	 ?1998;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?Hallinan,	 ?&	 ?Woodward,	 ?2008;	 ? Johnson,	 ? Booth,	 ? &	 ? O?Hearn,	 ? 2001;	 ? Lergestee	 ? &	 ?Markova,	 ? 2008;	 ?Meltzoff,	 ? 1995;	 ?Olineck	 ?&	 ?Poulin-??Dubois,	 ? 2005;	 ?Olineck	 ? 	 ?&	 ? Poulin-??Dubois,	 ? 2009).	 ? Infants	 ? also	 ? display	 ?more	 ? negative	 ? affect	 ? and	 ? behaviors	 ? towards	 ? individuals	 ? who	 ? are	 ? intentionally	 ? mean	 ? 8	 ?rather	 ? than	 ? those	 ? who	 ? are	 ? accidentally	 ? mean	 ? (Behne,	 ? Carpenter,	 ? Call,	 ? &	 ? Tomasello,	 ?2005;	 ?Dunfield	 ?&	 ?Kuhlmeier,	 ?2010;	 ?Marsh,	 ?Stavropoulos,	 ?Nienhuis,	 ?&	 ?Legerstee,	 ?2010).	 ?	 ?In	 ? the	 ? classic	 ? ?unwilling?	 ? vs.	 ? ?unable?	 ? paradigms,	 ? infants	 ? interacted	 ? with	 ? an	 ?experimenter	 ? who	 ? either	 ? had	 ? a	 ? negative	 ? (and	 ? fulfilled)	 ? or	 ? positive	 ? (but	 ? unfulfilled)	 ?intention:	 ?she	 ?was	 ?either	 ?unwilling	 ?to	 ?share	 ?a	 ?toy	 ?with	 ?the	 ?infant	 ?(e.g.,	 ?teased	 ?the	 ?infant	 ?with	 ?the	 ?toy)	 ?or	 ?she	 ?tried	 ?to	 ?share	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?with	 ?the	 ?infant,	 ?but	 ?was	 ?unable	 ?to	 ?do	 ?so	 ?(e.g.,	 ?accidentally	 ?dropped	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?out	 ?of	 ?the	 ?infant?s	 ?reach).	 ?Infants	 ?as	 ?young	 ?as	 ?6	 ?months	 ?of	 ?age	 ? seemed	 ? to	 ? distinguish	 ? these	 ? interactions	 ? based	 ? on	 ? the	 ? experimenter?s	 ? intention;	 ?they	 ? were	 ? more	 ? likely	 ? to	 ? exhibit	 ? negative	 ? affect	 ? and	 ? gaze	 ? aversion	 ? when	 ? the	 ?experimenter	 ?was	 ?unwilling	 ?versus	 ?unable	 ?to	 ?share	 ?a	 ?toy	 ?(Behne	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2005;	 ?Marsh	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2010).	 ? In	 ?a	 ?follow-??up	 ?study,	 ?Dunfield	 ?&	 ?Kuhlmeier	 ?(2010)	 ?examined	 ?how	 ?toddlers?	 ?previous	 ? interactions	 ?with	 ?an	 ? ?unwilling?	 ?and	 ?an	 ? ?unable?	 ?actress	 ?would	 ? influence	 ?who	 ?they	 ?would	 ?choose	 ? to	 ?give	 ?a	 ? toy	 ? to	 ? in	 ? the	 ? future.	 ?Following	 ? the	 ?unwilling/unable	 ? task	 ?involving	 ? the	 ? two	 ?different	 ?actresses,	 ? toddlers	 ?watched	 ?as	 ? the	 ?actresses	 ?reached	 ? for	 ?a	 ?single	 ?toy	 ?that	 ?had	 ?fallen	 ?on	 ?the	 ?floor	 ?between	 ?them.	 ?Toddlers	 ?selectively	 ?gave	 ?it	 ?to	 ?the	 ?actress	 ? who	 ? had	 ? previously	 ? tried	 ? to	 ? share	 ? with	 ? them	 ? but	 ? had	 ? been	 ? unable	 ? to	 ? do	 ? so.	 ?Additionally,	 ?when	 ?another	 ?group	 ?of	 ?toddlers	 ?were	 ?given	 ?the	 ?choice	 ?to	 ?help	 ?an	 ?actress	 ?who	 ? had	 ? previously	 ? been	 ? successful	 ? in	 ? sharing	 ? a	 ? toy	 ? with	 ? them	 ? (fulfilled	 ? positive	 ?intention,	 ? good	 ? outcome)	 ? or	 ? an	 ? actress	 ? who	 ? had	 ? been	 ? unable	 ? to	 ? give	 ? them	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?(failed	 ?positive	 ?intention,	 ?bad	 ?outcome),	 ?toddlers	 ?helped	 ?the	 ?actresses	 ?equally.	 ?That	 ?is,	 ?toddlers?	 ?decisions	 ?to	 ?help	 ?were	 ?primarily	 ?influenced	 ?by	 ?intention	 ?and	 ?not	 ?by	 ?outcome.	 ?Taken	 ? together,	 ? these	 ? studies	 ? suggest	 ? that	 ? intentions	 ? play	 ? a	 ? role	 ? in	 ? infants?	 ? and	 ? 9	 ?toddlers?	 ?first-??party	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others	 ?and	 ?these	 ?evaluations	 ?subsequently	 ?influence	 ?toddlers?	 ?own	 ?prosocial	 ?behaviors.	 ?1.3 Infants?	 ?third-??party	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?morally-??relevant	 ?actions	 ?A	 ? growing	 ? body	 ? of	 ? research	 ? has	 ? started	 ? focusing	 ? on	 ? infants?	 ? third-??party	 ?evaluations,	 ?specifically	 ?as	 ?they	 ?apply	 ?to	 ?morally-??relevant	 ?actions	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Hamlin,	 ?in	 ?press;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?Mahajan,	 ? Liberman,	 ? &	 ?Wynn,	 ? 2013;	 ?Hamlin	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ? 2011;	 ?Hamlin	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ?2012;	 ? Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ? &	 ? Bloom,	 ? 2007;	 ? Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ? &	 ? Bloom,	 ? 2010;	 ? Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ?Bloom,	 ?&	 ?Mahajan,	 ?2011;	 ?Schmidt	 ?&	 ?Sommerville,	 ?2011).	 ?The	 ?benefit	 ?of	 ?looking	 ?at	 ?third-??party	 ? evaluations	 ? is	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? not	 ? directly	 ? affected	 ? by	 ? third-??party	 ? interactions;	 ?they	 ? are	 ? neither	 ? benefited	 ? nor	 ? harmed	 ? by	 ? the	 ? interactions.	 ? As	 ? first-??party	 ? actions	 ? are	 ?experienced	 ? first	 ? hand,	 ? they	 ? are	 ? presumably	 ? both	 ? highly	 ? salient	 ? and	 ? fairly	 ? easily	 ?interpreted.	 ?Thus,	 ? third-??party	 ?evaluation	 ? tasks	 ?help	 ? to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ? infants	 ?can	 ?go	 ? beyond	 ? evaluating	 ? those	 ?whose	 ? actions	 ? influence	 ? them	 ?directly?an	 ? ability	 ? that	 ? is	 ?clearly	 ?an	 ?essential	 ?requirement	 ?for	 ?moral	 ?evaluation.	 ?	 ?	 ?The	 ? general	 ? design	 ? of	 ? infants?	 ? third-??party	 ? evaluation	 ? tasks	 ? involves	 ? infants	 ?watching	 ?two	 ?social	 ?events	 ?in	 ?alternation.	 ?In	 ?one	 ?event,	 ?a	 ?character	 ?behaves	 ?prosocially	 ?towards	 ? a	 ? Protagonist	 ? (e.g.,	 ? helps	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ? achieve	 ? a	 ? goal),	 ? and	 ? in	 ? the	 ? other	 ?event,	 ?a	 ?different	 ?character	 ?behaves	 ?antisocially	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ?(e.g.,	 ?hinders	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ? from	 ?achieving	 ? a	 ? goal).	 ? Following	 ? these	 ? events,	 ? infants	 ? are	 ?presented	 ?with	 ? the	 ?prosocial	 ? and	 ?antisocial	 ? characters	 ? and	 ? infants?	 ? preference	 ? for	 ? one	 ? character	 ?over	 ? another	 ? is	 ? assessed	 ? using	 ? different	 ? preference	 ?methodologies	 ? depending	 ? on	 ? the	 ?age	 ?of	 ?the	 ?infant.	 ?For	 ?younger	 ?infants	 ?who	 ?are	 ?not	 ?yet	 ?capable	 ?of	 ?reaching,	 ?preference	 ?is	 ? 10	 ?measured	 ?by	 ?examining	 ?infants?	 ?relative	 ?visual	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?each	 ?of	 ?the	 ?two	 ?characters.	 ?Longer	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? towards	 ? one	 ? of	 ? the	 ? characters	 ? is	 ? used	 ? to	 ? indicate	 ? infants?	 ?preference	 ?(Fantz,	 ?1965).	 ?For	 ?older	 ?infants,	 ?a	 ?manual	 ?choice	 ?method	 ?is	 ?used;	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?asked	 ?to	 ?select	 ?the	 ?character	 ?that	 ?they	 ?prefer	 ?by	 ?reaching	 ?out	 ?and	 ?touching	 ?one	 ?of	 ?the	 ?two	 ? characters.	 ?Assessing	 ? infants?	 ? preferences	 ? to	 ? approach	 ? (or	 ? alternatively	 ? to	 ? avoid)	 ?certain	 ?characters	 ?can	 ?indirectly	 ?inform	 ?us	 ?of	 ?their	 ?social	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?the	 ?characters,	 ?based	 ? on	 ? the	 ? assumption	 ? that	 ? they	 ? will	 ? approach	 ? those	 ? that	 ? they	 ? evaluate	 ? more	 ?positively	 ?and	 ?avoid	 ?those	 ?that	 ?they	 ?evaluate	 ?more	 ?negatively.	 ?Findings	 ?from	 ?these	 ?tasks	 ?support	 ?the	 ?notion	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?as	 ?young	 ?as	 ?3-??months	 ?do	 ?differentially	 ?evaluate	 ?others,	 ?preferring	 ?those	 ?who	 ?act	 ?prosocially	 ?over	 ? those	 ?who	 ?act	 ?antisocially	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Hamlin	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007);	 ?infants	 ?prefer	 ?those	 ?who	 ?help	 ?others	 ?achieve	 ?a	 ?goal	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? those	 ? who	 ? hinder	 ? others	 ? from	 ? achieving	 ? their	 ? goals,	 ? and	 ? they	 ? also	 ?prefer	 ? those	 ? who	 ? give	 ? to	 ? others	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? take	 ? from	 ? them	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Hamlin	 ? &	 ? Wynn,	 ?2011).	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?Hamlin	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ?2011	 ?showed	 ?3-??	 ?and	 ?5-??month-??old	 ?infants	 ?puppet	 ?shows	 ?in	 ?which	 ?a	 ?Protagonist	 ?puppet	 ?played	 ?with	 ?a	 ?ball.	 ?After	 ?tossing	 ?and	 ?catching	 ?the	 ?ball	 ? a	 ? few	 ? times,	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ?would	 ? drop	 ? the	 ? ball	 ? to	 ? one	 ? side	 ? of	 ? the	 ? stage.	 ? Then,	 ?either	 ? a	 ?Giver	 ? puppet	 ?would	 ? roll	 ? the	 ? ball	 ? back	 ? to	 ? the	 ? Protagonist,	 ? or	 ? a	 ?Taker	 ? puppet	 ?would	 ? take	 ? the	 ?ball	 ? and	 ? run	 ?away	 ?with	 ? it.	 ?After	 ? infants	 ?were	 ?habituated	 ? to	 ? these	 ? two	 ?events,	 ? their	 ?preferences	 ? for	 ? the	 ?Giver	 ?and	 ? the	 ?Taker	 ?were	 ?assessed.	 ?Three-??month-??old	 ?infants	 ?preferentially	 ?looked	 ?at	 ?the	 ?Giver	 ?puppet	 ?compared	 ?to	 ?the	 ?Taker	 ?puppet	 ?and	 ?5-??month-??old	 ?infants	 ?preferentially	 ?reached	 ?for	 ?the	 ?Giver	 ?puppet.	 ?Additional	 ?work	 ?done	 ?by	 ?Hamlin	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007	 ?suggests	 ? that	 ?by	 ?6	 ?months	 ?of	 ?age,	 ? infants	 ?not	 ?only	 ?show	 ?an	 ?active	 ? 11	 ?preference	 ? towards	 ? prosocial	 ? individuals,	 ? but	 ? also	 ? an	 ? aversion	 ? towards	 ? antisocial	 ?individuals.	 ?Although	 ? these	 ? infant	 ? social	 ? evaluation	 ? tasks	 ? do	 ? not	 ? directly	 ? assess	 ? infants?	 ?moral	 ?judgments	 ?per	 ?se	 ?(i.e.,	 ?researchers	 ?cannot	 ?directly	 ?ask	 ?infants	 ?questions	 ?that	 ?are	 ?typically	 ? used	 ? to	 ? assess	 ? moral	 ? judgments	 ? in	 ? adults1;	 ? they	 ? cannot	 ? ask	 ? infants	 ? who	 ? is	 ?morally	 ? responsible,	 ? whether	 ? an	 ? action	 ? is	 ? right	 ? or	 ? wrong,	 ? blameworthy	 ? or	 ?praiseworthy,	 ?etc.),	 ?they	 ?do	 ?use	 ?measures	 ?that	 ?can	 ?perhaps	 ?indirectly	 ?inform	 ?us	 ?of	 ?their	 ?moral	 ? judgments.	 ? Presumably,	 ? infants?	 ? assessments	 ? of	 ? whether	 ? agents	 ? are	 ? morally	 ?responsible	 ? should	 ? influence	 ? how	 ? they	 ? evaluate	 ? them	 ? (i.e.	 ? either	 ? positively	 ? or	 ?negatively),	 ? and	 ? these	 ?evaluations	 ? should	 ? subsequently	 ? affect	 ? their	 ? social	 ?preferences	 ?(i.e.,	 ?who	 ?they	 ?decide	 ?to	 ? interact	 ?with).	 ?However,	 ? from	 ?these	 ?previous	 ?paradigms,	 ? it	 ? is	 ?difficult	 ? to	 ? discern	 ? whether	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? actually	 ? using	 ? moral	 ? assessments	 ? in	 ? their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others.	 ?Recall	 ? that	 ?mature	 ?moral	 ? judgments	 ?take	 ? into	 ?consideration	 ?the	 ?outcome	 ?of	 ?others?	 ?actions,	 ?but	 ?they	 ?rely	 ?more	 ?heavily	 ?on	 ?the	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?driving	 ? those	 ? actions.	 ? In	 ? the	 ? aforementioned	 ? paradigms,	 ? the	 ? prosocial	 ? and	 ? antisocial	 ?actors	 ?always	 ?have	 ?intentions	 ?that	 ?are	 ?consistent	 ?with	 ?the	 ?outcomes	 ?that	 ?they	 ?produce.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?the	 ?Giver	 ?has	 ?a	 ?positive	 ?intention	 ?and	 ?acts	 ?according	 ?to	 ?that	 ?intention	 ?by	 ?giving	 ?the	 ?ball	 ?back	 ?to	 ?the	 ?Protagonist.	 ?By	 ?contrast,	 ?the	 ?Taker	 ?has	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?intention	 ?and	 ?acts	 ?consistently	 ?with	 ?that	 ?intention	 ?to	 ?produce	 ?a	 ?negative	 ?outcome	 ?(i.e.	 ?steals	 ?the	 ?ball).	 ? Thus,	 ? in	 ? these	 ? cases	 ? it	 ? is	 ? difficult	 ? to	 ? say	 ? whether	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? simply	 ? judging	 ?characters	 ? based	 ? on	 ? the	 ? observable	 ? outcomes	 ? that	 ? they	 ? produce	 ? (e.g.,	 ? giving	 ? =	 ? good,	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?1	 ?Although	 ?more	 ?recent	 ?research	 ?has	 ?assessed	 ?19-??month-??old	 ?infants?	 ?decisions	 ?to	 ?reward	 ?or	 ?punish	 ?individuals	 ?based	 ?on	 ?their	 ?past	 ?behaviors	 ?(Hamlin	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2011).	 ?After	 ?viewing	 ?prosocial	 ?and	 ?antisocial	 ?acts,	 ?infants	 ?preferred	 ?to	 ?reward	 ?prosocial	 ?actors	 ?(i.e.	 ?gave	 ?a	 ?treat	 ?to	 ?them)	 ?and	 ?punish	 ?antisocial	 ?actors	 ?(i.e.	 ?took	 ?a	 ?treat	 ?away	 ?from	 ?them).	 ? 12	 ?taking	 ?=	 ?bad),	 ?or	 ?whether	 ? infants	 ?are	 ?privileging	 ?mental	 ? states	 ? in	 ? their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others	 ?(e.g.,	 ?positive	 ?intent	 ?=	 ?good,	 ?negative	 ?intent	 ?=	 ?bad).	 ?One	 ? way	 ? to	 ? disentangle	 ? whether	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? relying	 ? solely	 ? on	 ? observable	 ?outcomes	 ?or	 ?whether	 ?they	 ?are	 ?considering	 ?actors?	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?would	 ?be	 ?to	 ?pit	 ?outcome	 ?and	 ?intention	 ?against	 ?each	 ?other.	 ?Hamlin	 ?(in	 ?press)	 ?showed	 ?infants	 ?puppet	 ?shows	 ?involving	 ?two	 ?different	 ?events	 ?(depicted	 ?in	 ?Figure	 ?1):	 ?(1)	 ?failed	 ?helping	 ?(2)	 ?failed	 ?hindering.	 ?During	 ?failed	 ?helping	 ?events,	 ?infants	 ?saw	 ?a	 ?Protagonist	 ?struggling	 ?to	 ?open	 ?a	 ?box	 ?to	 ?get	 ?a	 ?toy	 ?sitting	 ?inside	 ?of	 ?it.	 ?Then,	 ?a	 ?Failed	 ?Helper	 ?puppet	 ?attempted	 ?to	 ?help	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ? open	 ? the	 ? box,	 ? but	 ? was	 ? unable	 ? to	 ? do	 ? so.	 ? This	 ? resulted	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ?failing	 ?to	 ?get	 ?the	 ?toy.	 ?During	 ?failed	 ?hindering	 ?events,	 ?infants	 ?again	 ?saw	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ?struggling	 ? to	 ? open	 ? the	 ? box	 ? to	 ? get	 ? the	 ? toy	 ? sitting	 ? inside	 ? of	 ? it.	 ? But	 ? this	 ? time,	 ? a	 ? Failed	 ?Hinderer	 ?puppet	 ?jumped	 ?on	 ?the	 ?lid,	 ?slamming	 ?the	 ?box	 ?shut.	 ?However,	 ?despite	 ?the	 ?Failed	 ?Hinderer?s	 ?attempts	 ?to	 ?block	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ? from	 ?getting	 ?the	 ?toy,	 ? the	 ?Protagonist	 ?still	 ?managed	 ? to	 ?open	 ? the	 ?box,	 ? fulfilling	 ? its	 ? goal.	 ?When	 ? infants	 ?were	 ? given	 ? a	 ? forced	 ? choice	 ?between	 ? the	 ? Failed	 ?Helper	 ? (who	 ? had	 ? a	 ? positive	 ? intention,	 ? but	 ? was	 ? associated	 ? with	 ? a	 ?negative	 ? outcome)	 ? and	 ? the	 ? Failed	 ? Hinderer	 ? (who	 ? had	 ? a	 ? negative	 ? intention,	 ? but	 ? was	 ?associated	 ?with	 ?a	 ?positive	 ?outcome),	 ?they	 ?preferentially	 ?reached	 ?for	 ?the	 ?Failed	 ?Helper	 ?by	 ?8-??months	 ?of	 ?age.	 ?These	 ?results	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?can	 ?in	 ?fact	 ?evaluate	 ?moral	 ?agents	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ? their	 ?underlying	 ? intentions,	 ?and	 ? they	 ?use	 ? those	 ?evaluations	 ? to	 ?guide	 ? their	 ?social	 ?preferences	 ?in	 ?future	 ?interactions.	 ? 13	 ?	 ?Figure	 ?1.	 ?Failed	 ?helping	 ?and	 ?failed	 ?hindering	 ?events	 ?(Hamlin,	 ?in	 ?press)	 ?1.4 Failed	 ?attempts	 ?vs.	 ?accidents	 ?However,	 ? in	 ? the	 ? case	 ? of	 ? failed	 ? attempts	 ? an	 ? actor?s	 ? intentions	 ? are	 ? extremely	 ?salient.	 ? So	 ? even	 ? though	 ? the	 ? outcome	 ? achieved	 ? does	 ? not	 ? match	 ? the	 ? actor?s	 ? original	 ?Protagonist	 ?tries	 ?to	 ?open	 ?box	 ?to	 ?obtain	 ?toy Protagonist	 ?fails	 ?to	 ?open	 ?box,	 ?despite	 ?bear?s	 ?efforts	 ?to	 ?help Bear	 ?tries	 ?to	 ?help	 ?open	 ?box Protagonist	 ?fails	 ?to	 ?obtain	 ?toy Failed	 ?Helping	 ?Failed	 ?Hindering	 ?Protagonist	 ?tries	 ?to	 ?open	 ?box	 ?to	 ?obtain	 ?toy Protagonist	 ?succeeds	 ?at	 ?opening	 ?box,	 ?despite	 ?bear?s	 ?attempts	 ?to	 ?hinder Protagonist	 ?obtains	 ?toy Bear	 ?slams	 ?lid	 ?shut  14	 ?intention,	 ? their	 ? actions	 ? are	 ? still	 ? very	 ? clearly	 ? directed	 ? towards	 ? a	 ? particular	 ? goal:	 ? the	 ?content	 ? of	 ? their	 ? intention	 ? (i.e.,	 ? to	 ? help	 ? open	 ? a	 ? box	 ? or	 ? slam	 ? a	 ? box	 ? closed)	 ? is	 ? directly	 ?readable	 ? from	 ?the	 ?actions	 ? themselves.	 ? In	 ?addition,	 ? failed	 ?actors	 ?are	 ?merely	 ?associated	 ?with	 ?a	 ?particular	 ?outcome,	 ?rather	 ?than	 ?causally	 ?connected	 ?to	 ?it.	 ?Thus,	 ?they	 ?may	 ?be	 ?less	 ?directly	 ?connected	 ?to	 ?the	 ?oppositely-??valenced	 ?outcome	 ?than	 ?if	 ?they	 ?had	 ?directly	 ?caused	 ?it.	 ? In	 ? the	 ? case	 ? of	 ? accidents,	 ? however,	 ? these	 ? features	 ? are	 ? often	 ? reversed:	 ? actors?	 ?intentions	 ?may	 ?be	 ?ambiguous	 ?or	 ?even	 ?absent	 ?when	 ?they	 ?accidentally	 ?do	 ?something,	 ?but	 ?they	 ? still	 ? play	 ? a	 ? causal	 ? role	 ? in	 ? producing	 ? a	 ? particular	 ? outcome.	 ? Thus,	 ? actors	 ? who	 ?accidentally	 ?do	 ?something	 ?are	 ?more	 ?directly	 ? linked	 ?to	 ?the	 ?outcome	 ?that	 ? they	 ?produce.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ?a	 ?driver	 ?who	 ?accidentally	 ?crashes	 ?into	 ?a	 ?pedestrian	 ?may	 ?not	 ?have	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?hit	 ? the	 ?pedestrian,	 ?but	 ?still	 ?played	 ?a	 ?causal	 ? role	 ? in	 ? injuring	 ? the	 ?pedestrian.	 ?Because	 ?actors?	 ? intentions	 ? are	 ? more	 ? ambiguous	 ? in	 ? accidents	 ? than	 ? in	 ? failed	 ? attempts,	 ? and	 ?outcomes	 ?are	 ?more	 ?salient	 ?because	 ?they	 ?are	 ?causally	 ?connected	 ?to	 ?the	 ?actors,	 ?evaluating	 ?actors	 ?who	 ?cause	 ?accidents	 ?may	 ?be	 ?more	 ?difficult	 ?than	 ?judging	 ?actors	 ?who	 ?try,	 ?but	 ?fail	 ?to	 ?achieve	 ? a	 ? particular	 ? goal	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Cushman	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2013;	 ? Hamlin,	 ? in	 ? press;	 ? Young	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ?2007).	 ? Indeed,	 ? children	 ?have	 ?a	 ?harder	 ? time	 ?exculpating	 ?accidental	 ?harmers	 ?and	 ? judge	 ?them	 ?more	 ?harshly	 ?than	 ?those	 ?who	 ?try,	 ?but	 ?fail	 ?to	 ?harm	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Baird	 ?&	 ?Astington,	 ?2004;	 ?Cushman	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2013;	 ? Killen,	 ? Mulvey,	 ? Richardson,	 ? Jampol,	 ? &	 ? Woodward,	 ? 2011),	 ? and	 ?even	 ?adults	 ?assign	 ?some	 ?blame	 ?to	 ?accidental	 ?harmers	 ?in	 ?spite	 ?of	 ?them	 ?having	 ?innocent	 ?intentions	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Cushman,	 ?2008;	 ?Young	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007;	 ?Young	 ?&	 ?Saxe,	 ?2009).	 ?	 ?Evaluations	 ?of	 ? accidental	 ? actors	 ? are	 ? further	 ? complicated	 ?by	 ?our	 ?perceptions	 ?of	 ?negligence	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Heider,	 ?1958;	 ?Nobes	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2009;	 ?Yuill	 ?&	 ?Perner,	 ?1988).	 ?For	 ?instance,	 ?if	 ?we	 ?think	 ?that	 ?someone	 ?should	 ?have	 ?been	 ?able	 ?to	 ?anticipate	 ?a	 ?harmful	 ?outcome	 ?(even	 ?if	 ? 15	 ?they	 ?did	 ?not	 ?intend	 ?for	 ?the	 ?harmful	 ?outcome	 ?to	 ?occur),	 ?we	 ?may	 ?blame	 ?them	 ?anyway	 ?to	 ?the	 ?extent	 ?that	 ?we	 ?perceive	 ?their	 ?actions	 ?to	 ?be	 ?negligent	 ?or	 ?reckless.	 ?In	 ?these	 ?cases,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?assumed	 ?that	 ?actors	 ?could	 ?have	 ?avoided	 ?these	 ?accidental	 ?harms	 ?by	 ?being	 ?more	 ?careful.	 ?By	 ?contrast,	 ?if	 ?we	 ?believe	 ?that	 ?there	 ?was	 ?no	 ?way	 ?that	 ?an	 ?actor	 ?could	 ?have	 ?anticipated	 ?the	 ?bad	 ?result,	 ?then	 ?we	 ?do	 ?not	 ?hold	 ?them	 ?morally	 ?responsible	 ?and	 ?we	 ?do	 ?not	 ?blame	 ?them	 ?for	 ?their	 ?actions.	 ?	 ?Taken	 ? together,	 ? it	 ? is	 ? clear	 ? that	 ? evaluating	 ?moral	 ? agents	 ? is	 ?more	 ?difficult	 ? in	 ? the	 ?case	 ?of	 ?accidents	 ?than	 ?failed	 ?attempts.	 ?In	 ?the	 ?case	 ?of	 ?accidents,	 ?an	 ?actor?s	 ?intentions	 ?are	 ?ambiguous	 ?or	 ? even	 ? absent,	 ? actors	 ?play	 ? a	 ? causal	 ? role	 ? in	 ? producing	 ? valenced	 ?outcomes	 ?(rather	 ? than	 ? simply	 ? being	 ? associated	 ? with	 ? them),	 ? and	 ? actors	 ? may	 ? be	 ? perceived	 ? as	 ?negligent.	 ? Thus,	 ? perhaps	 ? a	 ? more	 ? stringent	 ? test	 ? of	 ? whether	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? using	 ? moral	 ?assessments	 ? in	 ? their	 ? evaluations	 ? of	 ? others	 ? would	 ? be	 ? to	 ? see	 ? whether	 ? infants	 ?differentially	 ?evaluate	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?accidental	 ?agents	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ?their	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ? states.	 ? Although	 ? previous	 ? research	 ? has	 ? shown	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? can	 ? distinguish	 ?between	 ? accidental	 ? and	 ? intentional	 ? acts	 ? by	 ? 14-??months	 ? of	 ? age	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Carpenter	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ?1998;	 ? Olineck	 ? &	 ? Poulin-??Dubois,	 ? 2005),	 ? it	 ? is	 ? not	 ? yet	 ? known	 ? how	 ? infants	 ? will	 ? socially	 ?evaluate	 ? accidental	 ? and	 ? intentional	 ? agents	 ? in	 ? moral	 ? scenarios.	 ? Thus,	 ? the	 ? present	 ?investigation	 ?seeks	 ?to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?infants	 ?differentially	 ?evaluate	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?accidental	 ?actors	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ?their	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states.	 ?	 ? 	 ? 16	 ?1.5 The	 ?present	 ?investigation	 ?In	 ? the	 ? present	 ? study,	 ? 10-??month-??old	 ? infants	 ? viewed	 ? puppet	 ? shows	 ? in	 ? which	 ? a	 ?Protagonist	 ? was	 ? helped	 ? or	 ? hindered2	 ?either	 ? intentionally	 ? or	 ? accidentally.	 ? Critically,	 ?across	 ? both	 ? the	 ? Helping	 ? and	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? conditions,	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? acts	 ? were	 ?identical,	 ?as	 ?were	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?acts.	 ?The	 ?only	 ?thing	 ?that	 ?made	 ?these	 ?actions	 ?prosocial	 ?or	 ?antisocial,	 ?then,	 ?was	 ?how	 ?they	 ?related	 ?to	 ?the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?initial	 ?goal.	 ?That	 ?is,	 ?having	 ?the	 ? intention	 ? to	 ? help	 ? the	 ?Protagonist	 ? achieve	 ? a	 ? goal	 ? could	 ? be	 ? viewed	 ?more	 ?positively	 ?than	 ? not	 ? having	 ? any	 ? intention	 ? to	 ? help,	 ? whereas	 ? having	 ? the	 ? intention	 ? to	 ? hinder	 ? the	 ?Protagonist	 ?could	 ?be	 ?viewed	 ?more	 ?negatively	 ?than	 ?not	 ?having	 ?any	 ?intention	 ?to	 ?hinder.	 ?Following	 ? the	 ? puppet	 ? shows,	 ? infants	 ? were	 ? given	 ? a	 ? forced	 ? choice	 ? between	 ? the	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?accidental	 ?actors.	 ?If	 ? infants,	 ? like	 ?adults,	 ?privilege	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?in	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others,	 ?then	 ?they	 ?should	 ?subsequently	 ?prefer	 ?the	 ?actor	 ?who	 ?intentionally	 ?helps	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? the	 ? actor	 ? who	 ? accidentally	 ? helps,	 ? but	 ? they	 ? should	 ?prefer	 ? the	 ? actor	 ?who	 ? accidentally	 ? hinders	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? the	 ? actor	 ?who	 ?intentionally	 ?hinders.	 ?Ten-??month-??old	 ? infants,	 ? in	 ? particular,	 ? were	 ? selected	 ? for	 ? this	 ? study	 ? because	 ? we	 ?know	 ? from	 ? previous	 ? research	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? privilege	 ? mental	 ? states	 ? when	 ? evaluating	 ?failed	 ? actors	 ? by	 ? 8-??months	 ? of	 ? age	 ? (Hamlin,	 ? in	 ? press).	 ? Because	 ? evaluating	 ? accidental	 ?actors	 ?is	 ?thought	 ?to	 ?be	 ?more	 ?difficult	 ?than	 ?evaluating	 ?failed	 ?actors	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Cushman	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2013;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?in	 ?press;	 ?Young	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007),	 ?I	 ?decided	 ?to	 ?test	 ?a	 ?slightly	 ?older	 ?age	 ?group	 ?for	 ?the	 ?present	 ?study.	 ?Additionally,	 ?previous	 ?research	 ?shows	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?can	 ?distinguish	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?2	 ?In	 ?prior	 ?studies	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Hamlin	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007)	 ?the	 ?term	 ??hindered?	 ?is	 ?used	 ?to	 ?denote	 ?actions	 ?that	 ?prevent	 ?an	 ?agent	 ?from	 ?achieving	 ?a	 ?particular	 ?goal.	 ?However,	 ?the	 ?term	 ??hindered?	 ?in	 ?the	 ?present	 ?study	 ?will	 ?refer	 ?to	 ?an	 ?action	 ?that	 ?results	 ?in	 ?a	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal	 ?being	 ?reversed.	 ?	 ? 17	 ?between	 ? accidental	 ? and	 ? intentional	 ? actions	 ? by	 ? 14-??months	 ? of	 ? age,	 ? so	 ? using	 ? a	 ? slightly	 ?younger	 ?age	 ?group	 ?can	 ?help	 ?us	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?the	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?make	 ?this	 ?distinction	 ?emerges	 ?earlier	 ?than	 ?previously	 ?studied.	 ?	 ? 	 ? 18	 ?2 Experiment	 ?2.1 Participants	 ?Sixty	 ?healthy,	 ?full-??term	 ?infants	 ?(32	 ?male	 ?and	 ?28	 ?female,	 ?Xage	 ?=	 ?10	 ?months	 ?and	 ?3	 ?days,	 ?range	 ?=	 ?9	 ?months	 ?and	 ?13	 ?days	 ?to	 ?10	 ?months	 ?and	 ?20	 ?days)	 ?were	 ?recruited	 ?from	 ?the	 ?Greater	 ? Vancouver	 ? region.	 ? Forty-??six	 ? additional	 ? infants	 ? were	 ? excluded	 ? from	 ? analyses	 ?due	 ?to	 ?experimental	 ?errors	 ?(13)	 ?fussiness	 ?(11)	 ?failure	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?either	 ?puppet	 ?(15),	 ?or	 ?parental	 ?interference	 ?(7).	 ?	 ?2.2 Procedure	 ?The	 ?experimental	 ?sessions	 ?were	 ?conducted	 ?in	 ?a	 ?3.4	 ?m	 ?x	 ?3.7	 ?m	 ?room.	 ?The	 ?room	 ?contained	 ? a	 ?black	 ? table	 ? (1.2	 ?m	 ?x	 ?1.5	 ?m)	 ? that	 ? served	 ? as	 ? the	 ?puppet	 ? show	 ?stage.	 ?Three	 ?black	 ?curtains	 ?extended	 ?down	 ?from	 ?the	 ?ceiling,	 ? to	 ?surround	 ?the	 ?rear	 ?and	 ?two	 ?sides	 ?of	 ?the	 ? table.	 ? An	 ? additional	 ? curtain	 ? (approximately	 ? 60	 ? cm	 ? from	 ? the	 ? rear	 ? curtain)	 ? was	 ?lowered	 ? between	 ? trials	 ? to	 ? occlude	 ? the	 ? stage.	 ? Infants	 ? sat	 ? on	 ? their	 ? parents?	 ? laps	 ? at	 ? the	 ?front	 ? end	 ? of	 ? the	 ? table	 ? (approximately	 ? 60	 ? cm	 ? from	 ? the	 ? occluding	 ? curtain),	 ? facing	 ? the	 ?puppet	 ?show	 ?stage.	 ?Parents	 ?were	 ?instructed	 ?to	 ?sit	 ?quietly	 ?for	 ?the	 ?duration	 ?of	 ?the	 ?study;	 ?they	 ?were	 ?asked	 ?not	 ?to	 ?communicate	 ?with	 ?their	 ?infants	 ?or	 ?to	 ?try	 ?to	 ?direct	 ?their	 ?attention	 ?in	 ?any	 ?way.	 ?	 ?A	 ? puppeteer	 ? experimenter	 ? performed	 ? the	 ? puppet	 ? shows	 ? from	 ?behind	 ? the	 ? rear	 ?curtain.	 ?Her	 ?head	 ?and	 ?torso	 ?were	 ?completely	 ?hidden	 ?from	 ?the	 ? infants,	 ?and	 ?she	 ?wore	 ?a	 ?black	 ?long-??sleeved	 ?shirt	 ?to	 ?hide	 ?her	 ?arms.	 ?A	 ?coder,	 ?who	 ?could	 ?not	 ?see	 ?the	 ?puppet	 ?shows	 ?and	 ?who	 ?was	 ? unaware	 ? of	 ? the	 ? puppets?	 ? identities,	 ? recorded	 ? infants?	 ? attention	 ? to	 ? each	 ? 19	 ?event	 ?from	 ?behind	 ?the	 ?curtain	 ?on	 ?the	 ?infants?	 ?right	 ?side;	 ?the	 ?coder	 ?observed	 ?the	 ?infants	 ?by	 ?peeking	 ?through	 ?a	 ?small	 ?hole	 ?in	 ?the	 ?curtain.	 ?Infants?	 ?attention	 ?following	 ?each	 ?event	 ?was	 ?coded	 ?using	 ?the	 ?program	 ?JHab,	 ?and	 ?coding	 ?began	 ?when	 ?the	 ?puppeteer	 ?signaled	 ?to	 ?the	 ?coder	 ?that	 ?the	 ?action	 ?was	 ?over,	 ?by	 ?softly	 ?clicking	 ?her	 ?tongue.	 ?Infants?	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?the	 ?stage	 ?was	 ?recorded	 ?until	 ?one	 ?of	 ?two	 ?conditions	 ?was	 ?met:	 ?(1)	 ?infants	 ?looked	 ?away	 ?for	 ?2	 ?consecutive	 ?seconds,	 ?or	 ?(2)	 ?a	 ?maximum	 ?of	 ?30	 ?seconds	 ?had	 ?elapsed.	 ?	 ?All	 ?sessions	 ?were	 ?recorded	 ?using	 ?two	 ?video	 ?cameras:	 ?one	 ?camera	 ?was	 ?located	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ? the	 ?rear	 ?curtain	 ?and	 ?was	 ?used	 ?to	 ?record	 ?the	 ? infants	 ?during	 ? the	 ?puppet	 ?shows	 ?and	 ?choice	 ?procedures;	 ?the	 ?second	 ?camera	 ?was	 ?located	 ?behind	 ?the	 ?infant	 ?and	 ?was	 ?used	 ?to	 ?record	 ?events	 ?on	 ?the	 ?stage.	 ?A	 ?digital	 ?mixer	 ?was	 ?used	 ?to	 ?combine	 ?the	 ?recordings	 ?from	 ?both	 ?cameras	 ?into	 ?one	 ?finalized	 ?video.	 ?Finalized	 ?videos	 ?consisted	 ?of	 ?a	 ?large	 ?main	 ?image	 ?of	 ?each	 ?infant?s	 ?face,	 ?with	 ?a	 ?smaller	 ?image	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stimuli	 ?embedded	 ?in	 ?the	 ?top	 ?left	 ?corner	 ?of	 ?the	 ?main	 ?image.	 ?2.2.1 Familiarization	 ?Infants	 ?were	 ?randomly	 ?assigned	 ?to	 ?either	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?or	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition.	 ?In	 ? each	 ? condition,	 ? infants	 ? were	 ? familiarized	 ? to	 ? two	 ? Intentional	 ? and	 ? two	 ? Accidental	 ?events	 ?in	 ?alternation,	 ? for	 ?a	 ?total	 ?of	 ?4	 ?events.	 ?Events	 ?began	 ?when	 ?the	 ?occluding	 ?curtain	 ?was	 ? raised	 ? to	 ? reveal	 ? the	 ? stimuli.	 ? At	 ? the	 ? start	 ? of	 ? each	 ? event,	 ? infants	 ? saw	 ? two	 ? puppets	 ?standing	 ? on	 ? opposite	 ? sides	 ? of	 ? the	 ? stage,	 ? facing	 ? forward:	 ? (1)	 ? a	 ? leopard	 ? protagonist	 ?puppet	 ? and	 ? (2)	 ? one	 ? of	 ? two	 ? dog	 ? puppets:	 ? either	 ? the	 ? Intentional	 ? or	 ? the	 ? Accidental	 ?character.	 ?The	 ?dogs?	 ? identities	 ?were	 ?distinguished	 ?by	 ?their	 ?shirt	 ?color	 ?(teal	 ?or	 ?purple),	 ?and	 ?each	 ?dog	 ?appeared	 ?on	 ?opposite	 ? sides	 ?of	 ? the	 ? stage.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ? if	 ? the	 ? Intentional	 ?character	 ? started	 ?out	 ?on	 ? the	 ? left	 ? side	 ?of	 ? the	 ? stage	 ?during	 ? intentional	 ? events	 ? (with	 ? the	 ? 20	 ?Protagonist	 ? appearing	 ? on	 ? the	 ? right	 ? side	 ? of	 ? the	 ? stage),	 ? then	 ? the	 ? Accidental	 ? character	 ?would	 ?begin	 ?on	 ?the	 ?right	 ?side	 ?of	 ? the	 ?stage	 ?(with	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ?appearing	 ?on	 ?the	 ? left	 ?side	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stage)	 ?during	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?A	 ? clear	 ? shelf	 ? made	 ? of	 ? Plexiglas	 ? (16	 ? cm	 ? x	 ? 16	 ? cm	 ? x	 ? 28.5	 ? cm)	 ? was	 ? positioned	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?puppets	 ?on	 ?stage,	 ?and	 ?was	 ?always	 ?situated	 ?nearest	 ?to	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?puppet.	 ?A	 ?small	 ?yellow	 ?rubber	 ?duck	 ?sat	 ?on	 ?the	 ?floor	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stage,	 ?centered	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?Additionally,	 ? a	 ? small	 ? stuffed	 ? moose	 ? either	 ? sat	 ? on	 ? top	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? (in	 ? the	 ? Helping	 ?condition)	 ? or	 ? beside	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ? on	 ? the	 ? side	 ? nearest	 ? to	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ? puppet	 ? (in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition).	 ?In	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ? infants	 ?saw	 ?events	 ?in	 ?which	 ?the	 ?Protagonist	 ?struggled	 ?and	 ?subsequently	 ?failed	 ?at	 ?getting	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?off	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?The	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal	 ?was	 ?subsequently	 ? facilitated	 ?by	 ?each	 ?of	 ? the	 ? two	 ?dogs	 ?on	 ?alternating	 ? trials?both	 ?dogs	 ?knocked	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?giving	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?access	 ?to	 ?the	 ?toy.	 ?Critically,	 ?one	 ?dog	 ?pushed	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?down	 ?intentionally,	 ?while	 ?the	 ?other	 ?dog	 ?accidentally	 ?bumped	 ?into	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?knocked	 ? it	 ?down.	 ?Thus,	 ? in	 ?both	 ?events,	 ? the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal	 ?was	 ? facilitated,	 ?but	 ?only	 ?the	 ?Intentional	 ?character	 ?demonstrated	 ?a	 ?clear	 ?positive	 ?intention.	 ?In	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? condition,	 ? infants	 ? saw	 ? events	 ? in	 ? which	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ?struggled,	 ?but	 ?eventually	 ?succeeded	 ?in	 ?putting	 ?a	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?After	 ?this	 ?initial	 ? success,	 ? the	 ? Protagonist?s	 ? goal	 ? was	 ? subsequently	 ? hindered	 ? by	 ? each	 ? of	 ? the	 ? two	 ?dogs	 ?on	 ?alternating	 ?trials?both	 ?dogs	 ?reversed	 ?the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal	 ?by	 ?knocking	 ?down	 ?the	 ? shelf,	 ? causing	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ? to	 ? fall	 ? back	 ? down	 ? onto	 ? the	 ? floor.	 ? As	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ? one	 ? dog	 ? pushed	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? down	 ? intentionally,	 ? while	 ? the	 ? other	 ? dog	 ?accidentally	 ? bumped	 ? into	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? and	 ? knocked	 ? it	 ? down.	 ? Thus,	 ? in	 ? both	 ? events,	 ? the	 ? 21	 ?Protagonist?s	 ? goal	 ? was	 ? hindered,	 ? but	 ? only	 ? the	 ? Intentional	 ? character	 ? demonstrated	 ? a	 ?clear	 ?negative	 ?intention.	 ?As	 ? previously	 ? noted,	 ? the	 ? Intentional	 ? and	 ? Accidental	 ? acts	 ? were	 ? the	 ? exact	 ? same	 ?across	 ? conditions.	 ? The	 ? Intentional	 ? acts	 ? always	 ? involved	 ? pushing	 ? down	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ?purposefully,	 ? while	 ? the	 ? Accidental	 ? acts	 ? always	 ? involved	 ? bumping	 ? into	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ?accidentally.	 ?However,	 ?what	 ?makes	 ?these	 ?acts	 ?prosocial	 ?or	 ?antisocial	 ?depends	 ?on	 ?what	 ?the	 ? leopard?s	 ? initial	 ?goal	 ?was?knocking	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?after	 ?the	 ? leopard	 ?struggled	 ?to	 ?get	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ? off	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? would	 ? be	 ? considered	 ? prosocial,	 ? whereas	 ? knocking	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?after	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?had	 ?succeeded	 ?in	 ?putting	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?would	 ?be	 ?considered	 ?antisocial.	 ?Each	 ?event	 ?is	 ?described	 ?in	 ?more	 ?detail	 ?below	 ?and	 ?an	 ?illustration	 ?of	 ?the	 ?critical	 ?actions	 ?in	 ?each	 ?event	 ?is	 ?depicted	 ?in	 ?Figure	 ?23.	 ?	 ?	 ? 2.2.1.1 Intentional	 ?helping	 ?The	 ? leopard	 ? and	 ? the	 ? dog	 ? turned	 ? simultaneously	 ? to	 ? ?look?	 ?4	 ?at	 ? each	 ? other,	 ? and	 ?then	 ?turned	 ?back	 ?to	 ?face	 ?forward.	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?ran	 ?over	 ?to	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?peeked	 ?around	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ? and	 ? looked	 ?at	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?duck.	 ?Then,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ? looked	 ?up	 ? towards	 ? the	 ? top	 ?of	 ? the	 ?shelf,	 ?where	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?sat.	 ?With	 ?its	 ?arms	 ?outstretched,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?jumped	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?(twice)	 ?alongside	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?in	 ?an	 ?apparent	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?reach	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?sitting	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf;	 ?this	 ?jumping	 ?action	 ?was	 ?repeated	 ?twice	 ?more,	 ?with	 ?the	 ?last	 ?attempt	 ?being	 ? slower	 ? and	 ?more	 ? exaggerated	 ? to	 ? emphasize	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ? struggle	 ? to	 ? reach	 ? the	 ?toy.	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?3	 ?For	 ?the	 ?sake	 ?of	 ?brevity,	 ?not	 ?all	 ?actions	 ?were	 ?depicted	 ?in	 ?Figure	 ?2.	 ?	 ?Only	 ?the	 ?critical	 ?actions	 ?relating	 ?to	 ?the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal,	 ?or	 ?to	 ?the	 ?Intentional	 ?or	 ?Accidental	 ?actions	 ?performed	 ?by	 ?helpers	 ?or	 ?hinderers	 ?were	 ?included.	 ?4	 ?From	 ?this	 ?point	 ?forward,	 ?the	 ?use	 ?of	 ?the	 ?word	 ??look?	 ?refers	 ?to	 ?how	 ?we	 ?hoped	 ?the	 ?puppets?	 ?actions	 ?appeared	 ?to	 ?the	 ?infants.	 ? 22	 ?Having	 ?been	 ?unsuccessful	 ? in	 ? retrieving	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ? lowered	 ? its	 ?head	 ?and	 ?ran	 ?to	 ?the	 ?back	 ?corner	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stage.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?leopard,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?up	 ?to	 ? look	 ?at	 ? the	 ?toy	 ?moose,	 ? in	 ?order	 ? to	 ? imply	 ?that	 ? the	 ?dog	 ?had	 ? inferred	 ?the	 ?leopard?s	 ? goal.	 ? The	 ? dog	 ? then	 ? ran	 ? directly	 ? to	 ? the	 ? side	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? and	 ? ?intentionally?	 ?pushed	 ? it	 ? over,	 ? knocking	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ? off	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf.	 ? To	 ?make	 ? the	 ? pushing	 ? action	 ?appear	 ? intentional,	 ? the	 ? dog	 ? puppet	 ? looked	 ? at	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ? leaned	 ? into	 ? it,	 ? and	 ? used	 ? both	 ?paws	 ?to	 ?push	 ?it	 ?over.	 ?Once	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?fell	 ?down	 ?and	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?was	 ?within	 ?reach,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?ran	 ? towards	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ?picked	 ?up	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose,	 ? and	 ?bounced	 ?up	 ?and	 ? two	 ? times.	 ?This	 ?bouncing	 ? action	 ? was	 ? purposefully	 ? included	 ? to	 ? illustrate	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ? ?happiness?	 ? at	 ?retrieving	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?grasped	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck	 ?that	 ?had	 ?been	 ?resting	 ?on	 ?the	 ?floor	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?and	 ?ran	 ?off	 ?stage.	 ?2.2.1.2 Accidental	 ?helping	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?and	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?turned	 ?simultaneously	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?each	 ?other,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?turned	 ?back	 ? to	 ? face	 ? forward.	 ?Then,	 ? the	 ?dog	 ?ran	 ?off	 ?stage,	 ?disappearing	 ? from	 ?view	 ?and	 ?implying	 ? that	 ? the	 ?dog	 ? could	 ?not	 ? see	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ? goal-??directed	 ?actions	 ? that	 ? followed.	 ?Once	 ? the	 ?dog	 ?had	 ? left	 ? the	 ? stage,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ?ran	 ?over	 ? to	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ?peeked	 ?around	 ? the	 ?shelf	 ? and	 ? looked	 ?at	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?duck.	 ?Then,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ? looked	 ?up	 ? towards	 ? the	 ? top	 ?of	 ? the	 ?shelf,	 ?where	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?sat.	 ?With	 ?its	 ?arms	 ?outstretched,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?jumped	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?(twice)	 ?alongside	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?in	 ?an	 ?apparent	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?reach	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?sitting	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf;	 ?this	 ?jumping	 ?action	 ?was	 ?repeated	 ?twice	 ?more,	 ?with	 ?the	 ?last	 ?attempt	 ?being	 ? slower	 ? and	 ?more	 ? exaggerated	 ? to	 ? emphasize	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ? struggle	 ? to	 ? reach	 ? the	 ?toy.	 ? 23	 ?Having	 ?been	 ?unsuccessful	 ? in	 ? retrieving	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ? lowered	 ? its	 ?head	 ?and	 ?ran	 ?to	 ?the	 ?back	 ?corner	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stage.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?reappeared,	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?leopard,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck	 ?sitting	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ?the	 ?(clear)	 ?shelf.	 ?The	 ? dog	 ? ran	 ? directly	 ? towards	 ? the	 ? toy	 ? duck,	 ? in	 ? an	 ? apparent	 ? attempt	 ? to	 ? retrieve	 ? it.	 ?However,	 ?as	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?ran	 ?past	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?he	 ?clumsily	 ?bumped	 ?into	 ?it,	 ?knocking	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?down.	 ?To	 ?increase	 ?the	 ?perception	 ?that	 ?knocking	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?down	 ?was	 ??accidental?,	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?continued	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck	 ?(and	 ?not	 ?at	 ?the	 ?shelf)	 ?when	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?was	 ?knocked	 ?over.	 ?Additionally,	 ? it	 ?was	 ?the	 ?side	 ?of	 ?the	 ?dog?s	 ?body	 ?(as	 ?opposed	 ?to	 ?his	 ?paws)	 ?that	 ?knocked	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?down.	 ?Once	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?fell	 ?down	 ?and	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?was	 ?within	 ?reach,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?ran	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?picked	 ?up	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose,	 ?and	 ?bounced	 ?up	 ?and	 ?two	 ? times.	 ? This	 ? bouncing	 ? action	 ?was	 ?purposefully	 ? included	 ? to	 ? illustrate	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ??happiness?	 ?at	 ?retrieving	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?ran	 ?off	 ?stage	 ?with	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck.	 ?2.2.1.3 Intentional	 ?hindering	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?and	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?turned	 ?simultaneously	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?each	 ?other,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?turned	 ?back	 ?to	 ?face	 ?forward.	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?ran	 ?forward	 ?and	 ?picked	 ?up	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?that	 ?was	 ?sitting	 ?beside	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?peeked	 ?around	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?looked	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?looked	 ?up	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?Still	 ?holding	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ? jumped	 ? up	 ? and	 ? down	 ? (twice)	 ? alongside	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ? in	 ? an	 ? apparent	 ? attempt	 ? to	 ?reach	 ?the	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf;	 ?this	 ?action	 ?was	 ?repeated	 ?twice	 ?more,	 ?and	 ?on	 ?the	 ?final	 ?attempt,	 ?the	 ? leopard	 ? succeeded	 ? in	 ? reaching	 ? the	 ? top	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf.	 ? The	 ? leopard	 ? placed	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?jumped	 ?back	 ?down,	 ?landing	 ?to	 ?the	 ?side	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?To	 ? illustrate	 ? that	 ?he	 ?was	 ??happy?	 ?about	 ?having	 ?placed	 ?the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ? top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?jumped	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?twice,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?ran	 ?to	 ?the	 ?back	 ?corner	 ?of	 ?the	 ? 24	 ?stage.	 ?Following,	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?turned	 ?to	 ? look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?leopard,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?up	 ?to	 ? look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose,	 ? in	 ? order	 ? to	 ? imply	 ? that	 ? the	 ? dog	 ? had	 ? inferred	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ? goal.	 ? The	 ? dog	 ? ran	 ?directly	 ? to	 ? the	 ? side	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? and	 ? ?intentionally?	 ? pushed	 ? it	 ? over,	 ? knocking	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ?off	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?To	 ?make	 ?the	 ?pushing	 ?action	 ?appear	 ?intentional,	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?puppet	 ?looked	 ?at	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?leaned	 ?into	 ?it,	 ?and	 ?used	 ?both	 ?paws	 ?to	 ?push	 ?it	 ?over.	 ?Once	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ? fell	 ?down,	 ? the	 ? leopard	 ?bounced	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ? two	 ? times	 ?and	 ?placed	 ? its	 ?head	 ?down.	 ?This	 ?action	 ?was	 ?included	 ?to	 ?illustrate	 ?the	 ?leopard?s	 ??disappointment?	 ?at	 ?his	 ?goal	 ?being	 ?hindered.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ? then	 ?grasped	 ? the	 ? toy	 ?duck	 ? that	 ?had	 ?been	 ?resting	 ?on	 ? the	 ?floor	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?and	 ?ran	 ?off	 ?stage.	 ?2.2.1.4 Accidental	 ?hindering	 ?The	 ? leopard	 ? and	 ? the	 ? dog	 ? puppet	 ? turned	 ? simultaneously	 ? to	 ? look	 ? at	 ? each	 ? other,	 ?and	 ? then	 ? turned	 ?back	 ? to	 ? face	 ? forward.	 ?Then,	 ? the	 ?dog	 ?ran	 ?off	 ? stage,	 ?disappearing	 ? from	 ?view	 ?and	 ? implying	 ? that	 ? the	 ?dog	 ?could	 ?not	 ? see	 ? the	 ? leopard?s	 ?goal-??directed	 ?actions	 ? that	 ?followed.	 ?Once	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?had	 ?left	 ?the	 ?stage,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?ran	 ?forward	 ?and	 ?picked	 ?up	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?that	 ?was	 ?sitting	 ?beside	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?peeked	 ?around	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?saw	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck.	 ?Then,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?looked	 ?up	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?Still	 ?holding	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?jumped	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?(twice)	 ?alongside	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?in	 ?an	 ?apparent	 ?attempt	 ?to	 ?reach	 ?the	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf;	 ?this	 ?action	 ?was	 ?repeated	 ?twice	 ?more,	 ?and	 ?on	 ?the	 ?final	 ?attempt,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?succeeded	 ?in	 ?reaching	 ?the	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?The	 ?leopard	 ?placed	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?jumped	 ?back	 ?down,	 ?landing	 ?beside	 ?the	 ?shelf.	 ?To	 ? illustrate	 ? that	 ?he	 ?was	 ??happy?	 ?about	 ?having	 ?placed	 ?the	 ? toy	 ?moose	 ?on	 ? top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?jumped	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?twice,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?ran	 ?to	 ?the	 ?back	 ?corner	 ?of	 ?the	 ?stage.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?reappeared,	 ?turned	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?leopard,	 ?and	 ?then	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck	 ? 25	 ?sitting	 ? in	 ? front	 ? of	 ? the	 ? (clear)	 ? shelf.	 ? The	 ? dog	 ? ran	 ? directly	 ? towards	 ? the	 ? toy	 ? duck,	 ? in	 ? an	 ?apparent	 ? attempt	 ? to	 ? retrieve	 ? it.	 ? However,	 ? as	 ? the	 ? dog	 ? ran	 ? past	 ? the	 ? shelf,	 ? he	 ? clumsily	 ?bumped	 ?into	 ?it,	 ?knocking	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?and	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?down.	 ?To	 ?increase	 ?the	 ?perception	 ?that	 ?knocking	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?down	 ?was	 ??accidental?,	 ?the	 ?dog	 ?continued	 ?to	 ?look	 ?at	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck	 ?(and	 ?not	 ?at	 ?the	 ?shelf)	 ?when	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?was	 ?knocked	 ?over.	 ?Additionally,	 ?it	 ?was	 ?the	 ?side	 ?of	 ?the	 ?dog?s	 ?body	 ? (as	 ?opposed	 ? to	 ?his	 ?paws)	 ? that	 ?knocked	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ?down.	 ?Once	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ?and	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?fell	 ?down,	 ?the	 ?leopard	 ?bounced	 ?up	 ?and	 ?down	 ?two	 ?times	 ?and	 ?placed	 ?its	 ?head	 ?down.	 ?This	 ?action	 ?was	 ?included	 ?to	 ?illustrate	 ?the	 ?leopard?s	 ??disappointment?	 ?at	 ?his	 ?goal	 ?being	 ?hindered.	 ?The	 ?dog	 ?then	 ?ran	 ?off	 ?stage	 ?with	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?duck.	 ?2.2.2 Choice	 ?Following	 ? the	 ? familiarization	 ? period,	 ? parents	 ? were	 ? instructed	 ? to	 ? rotate	 ? their	 ?chairs	 ?90	 ?degrees	 ?clockwise,	 ?away	 ?from	 ?the	 ?puppet	 ?stage.	 ?Parents	 ?were	 ?asked	 ?to	 ?center	 ?their	 ? infants	 ? in	 ? their	 ? laps	 ? and	 ? to	 ?hold	 ? them	 ? firmly	 ? around	 ? their	 ?waist,	 ? so	 ? that	 ? infants	 ?were	 ?supported	 ?and	 ?could	 ?use	 ?both	 ?arms	 ? freely	 ?during	 ? the	 ?choice	 ?procedure.	 ?Parents	 ?were	 ? instructed	 ? to	 ? close	 ? their	 ? eyes	 ? as	 ? an	 ? experimenter	 ? (the	 ? online	 ? coder	 ? from	 ? the	 ?familiarization	 ?phase,	 ?who	 ?was	 ?blind	 ?to	 ?the	 ?puppets?	 ? identities)	 ?emerged	 ?from	 ?behind	 ?the	 ?curtain,	 ?with	 ?the	 ?two	 ?puppets	 ?behind	 ?his/her	 ?back.	 ?	 ?The	 ?experimenter	 ?knelt	 ?down	 ?in	 ?front	 ?of	 ?the	 ?infant	 ?and	 ?greeted	 ?him/her.	 ?Then,	 ?the	 ? experimenter	 ? said,	 ? ?look?	 ? and	 ? presented	 ? the	 ? infant	 ? with	 ? the	 ? two	 ? puppets;	 ? the	 ?experimenter	 ? held	 ? the	 ? puppets	 ? approximately	 ? 30	 ? cm	 ? apart	 ? and	 ? initially	 ? out	 ? of	 ? the	 ?infant?s	 ?reach.	 ?The	 ?experimenter	 ?ensured	 ?that	 ?the	 ?infant	 ?looked	 ?at	 ?each	 ?puppet	 ?before	 ?regaining	 ?the	 ?infant?s	 ?attention	 ?by	 ?pulling	 ?the	 ?two	 ?puppets	 ?back	 ?and	 ?saying	 ??hi?	 ?to	 ?the	 ?infant.	 ?Once	 ? the	 ? infant	 ? looked	 ?back	 ?at	 ? the	 ?experimenter,	 ? the	 ?experimenter	 ?moved	 ? the	 ? 26	 ?puppets	 ? forward	 ? such	 ? that	 ? they	 ? were	 ? now	 ? within	 ? the	 ? infant?s	 ? grasp.	 ? Infants	 ? were	 ?considered	 ?to	 ?have	 ?made	 ?a	 ?choice	 ?when	 ?they	 ?looked	 ?at	 ?and	 ?then	 ?touched	 ?one	 ?puppet,	 ?as	 ?determined	 ?online	 ?by	 ?the	 ?(blind)	 ?choice	 ?experimenter.	 ?The	 ?session	 ?ended	 ?after	 ?infants	 ?had	 ?either	 ?made	 ?a	 ?choice	 ?or	 ?2	 ?minutes	 ?had	 ?elapsed.	 ?	 ?2.2.3 Counterbalancing	 ?and	 ?reliability	 ?The	 ? shirt	 ? color	 ? of	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? puppet	 ? (purple	 ? or	 ? teal),	 ? the	 ? order	 ? of	 ? events	 ?(intentional	 ? or	 ? accidental	 ? first),	 ? the	 ? side	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? puppet	 ? appeared	 ? on	 ? stage	 ?during	 ?familiarization	 ?trials	 ?(left	 ?or	 ?right),	 ?and	 ?the	 ?side	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?puppet	 ?appeared	 ?on	 ?during	 ?the	 ?choice	 ?procedure	 ?(left	 ?or	 ?right)	 ?were	 ?counterbalanced	 ?in	 ?each	 ?condition5.	 ?A	 ?second	 ? independent	 ?coder	 ?(also	 ?blind	 ? to	 ? the	 ? identities	 ?of	 ? the	 ?puppets)	 ?re-??examined	 ?fifty-??seven	 ? of	 ? the	 ? choice	 ? recordings	 ? for	 ? reliability.	 ? The	 ? coder	 ? could	 ? not	 ? examine	 ? the	 ?remaining	 ?three	 ?videos	 ?(1	 ?Helping	 ?and	 ?2	 ?Hindering	 ?videos)	 ?as	 ? they	 ?were	 ?missing.	 ?The	 ?two	 ?coders	 ?reached	 ?100%	 ?agreement.	 ?	 ?	 ? 	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?5	 ?This	 ? study	 ?was	 ? also	 ? run	 ? in	 ? conjunction	 ?with	 ? one	 ? other	 ? study	 ? that	 ? investigated	 ? infants?	 ? sensitivity	 ? to	 ?generosity	 ?or	 ?greed	 ?in	 ?giving	 ?or	 ?taking	 ?scenarios.	 ?All	 ?of	 ?the	 ?same	 ?counterbalancing	 ?applied	 ?to	 ?this	 ?second	 ?study.	 ?Additionally,	 ? the	 ?order	 ?of	 ?presentation	 ?of	 ? the	 ?studies	 ?was	 ?counterbalanced	 ?across	 ? infants.	 ?There	 ?were	 ?no	 ?effects	 ?of	 ?order	 ?of	 ?presentation	 ?or	 ?valence	 ?of	 ?the	 ?other	 ?study	 ?(generosity	 ?or	 ?greed)	 ?on	 ?the	 ?results.	 ?Thus,	 ?all	 ?infants	 ?tested	 ?were	 ?included	 ?in	 ?the	 ?subsequent	 ?analyses.	 ? 27	 ?	 ?	 ?Figure	 ?2.	 ?Critical	 ?actions	 ?displayed	 ?in	 ?puppet	 ?show	 ?events.	 ?(A)	 ?Intentional	 ?helping	 ?events	 ? (B)	 ? Accidental	 ? Helping	 ? events	 ? (C)	 ? Intentional	 ? hindering	 ? events	 ? (D)	 ?Accidental	 ?Hindering	 ?events	 ?	 ? 	 ? 28	 ?2.3 Results	 ?2.3.1 Looking	 ?time	 ?A	 ?summary	 ?of	 ?looking	 ?times	 ?can	 ?be	 ?found	 ?in	 ?Table	 ?1.	 ?Average	 ?looking	 ?times	 ?for	 ?each	 ?event	 ?type	 ?were	 ?calculated	 ?for	 ?each	 ?infant	 ?by	 ?adding	 ?infants?	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?first	 ?and	 ?second	 ?trials	 ?for	 ?each	 ?event	 ?type	 ?and	 ?dividing	 ?by	 ?two	 ?[e.g.,	 ?(intentional	 ?trial	 ?1	 ?+	 ?intentional	 ?trial	 ?2)/2].	 ?A	 ?paired	 ?t-??test	 ?was	 ?conducted	 ?to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?infants?	 ?average	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? following	 ? intentional	 ?events	 ?differed	 ? from	 ? their	 ?average	 ? looking	 ?time	 ? following	 ? accidental	 ? events.	 ? Collapsed	 ? across	 ? both	 ? conditions,	 ? infants?	 ? attention	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?event	 ?type	 ?[t(59)	 ?=	 ?.08,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.94,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.01].	 ?Infants	 ?looked	 ?for	 ?an	 ?average	 ?of	 ?7.67	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? .69)	 ? following	 ? intentional	 ? events	 ? and	 ? 7.62	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? .68)	 ?following	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?Table	 ?1.	 ?Infants?	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?towards	 ?events	 ?(s)	 ?separated	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?	 ? Independent	 ? t-??tests	 ? revealed	 ? that	 ? average	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? following	 ? intentional	 ?events	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?[t(58)	 ?=	 ?.56,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.58,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.15]	 ?and	 ?average	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?following	 ?accidental	 ?events	 ?also	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?[t(58)	 ?=	 ?.92,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.36,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.24].	 ?Infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ?condition	 ? looked	 ? for	 ? an	 ? average	 ? of	 ? 7.29	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? 1.01)	 ?following	 ?intentional	 ?events	 ?and	 ?6.99	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?.92)	 ?following	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?Infants?	 ?attention	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?event	 ?type	 ?[paired	 ?t-??test,	 ?t(29)	 ?=	 ?.31,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.76,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.06].	 ?Infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ? looked	 ? for	 ? an	 ? average	 ?of	 ?8.06	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? .94)	 ?	 ? Intentional	 ?events	 ? Accidental	 ?events	 ?	 ? First	 ?trial	 ? Second	 ?trial	 ? Average	 ? First	 ?trial	 ? Second	 ?trial	 ? Average	 ?Helping	 ?	 ? 6.77	 ? 7.80	 ? 7.29	 ? 7.01	 ? 6.97	 ? 6.99	 ?Hindering	 ?	 ? 9.26	 ? 6.87	 ? 8.06	 ? 9.44	 ? 7.06	 ? 8.25	 ? 29	 ?following	 ?intentional	 ?events	 ?and	 ?8.25	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?1.01)	 ?following	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?Again,	 ?attention	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?event	 ?type	 ?[paired	 ?t-??test,	 ?t(29)	 ?=	 ?-??.19,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.85,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.04].	 ?Interestingly,	 ? infants?	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? did	 ? not	 ? differ	 ? towards	 ? first	 ? and	 ? second	 ?intentional	 ? trials	 ? [paired	 ? t-??test,	 ? t(29)	 ? =	 ? -??.80,	 ? p	 ? =	 ? .43,	 ? d	 ? =	 ? .16]	 ? or	 ? first	 ? and	 ? second	 ?accidental	 ? trials	 ? [paired	 ? t-??test,	 ? t(29)	 ? =	 ? .03,	 ?p	 ? =	 ? .98,	 ?d	 ? =	 ? .01]	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ?condition.	 ?However,	 ? infants?	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? did	 ? marginally	 ? decrease	 ? between	 ? first	 ? and	 ? second	 ?intentional	 ? trials	 ? [paired	 ? t-??test,	 ? t(29)	 ? =	 ? 1.90,	 ? p	 ? =	 ? .07,	 ? d	 ? =	 ? .39]	 ? and	 ? first	 ? and	 ? second	 ?accidental	 ?trials	 ?[paired	 ?t-??test,	 ?t(29)	 ?=	 ?1.91,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.07,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.37]	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition.	 ?2.3.2 Choice	 ?Preliminary	 ? analyses	 ? revealed	 ? no	 ? effects	 ? of	 ? sex,	 ? shirt	 ? color	 ? of	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet,	 ? order	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? puppet	 ?was	 ? presented,	 ? or	 ? side	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet	 ?was	 ?presented	 ?on	 ?during	 ?familiarization	 ?(all	 ?analyzed	 ?using	 ?Fisher?s	 ?exact	 ?tests,	 ?p	 ? >	 ? .44).	 ? However,	 ? there	 ? was	 ? a	 ? significant	 ? effect	 ? of	 ? side	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? puppet	 ?appeared	 ?on	 ?during	 ?choice	 ?on	 ?infant?s	 ?choice	 ?for	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?(Fisher?s	 ?exact	 ?test,	 ?p	 ?<	 ?.05)	 ?but	 ?not	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition	 ?(Fisher?s	 ?exact	 ?test,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?1.0).	 ?Even	 ?though	 ?the	 ?side	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?character	 ?appeared	 ?on	 ?during	 ?choice	 ?was	 ?almost	 ?evenly	 ?split	 ?within	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?(14	 ?on	 ?the	 ?right,	 ?16	 ?on	 ?the	 ?left),	 ?infants	 ?were	 ?more	 ?likely	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?puppets	 ?appearing	 ?on	 ?their	 ?left-??hand	 ?side	 ?compared	 ?to	 ?their	 ?right-??hand	 ?side;	 ?infants	 ? chose	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? character	 ?14	 ? times	 ?and	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? character	 ?7	 ? times	 ?when	 ? it	 ? was	 ? on	 ? the	 ? infants?	 ? left	 ? compared	 ? to	 ? 7	 ? and	 ? 2	 ? times	 ? respectively	 ? when	 ? the	 ?characters	 ? appeared	 ? on	 ? their	 ? right.	 ? However,	 ? because	 ? side	 ? preference	 ? during	 ? choice	 ?was	 ?not	 ?observed	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition	 ?or	 ?in	 ?previous	 ?studies	 ?using	 ?similar	 ?methods	 ?(e.g.,	 ? Hamlin,	 ? in	 ? press;	 ? Hamlin	 ? &	 ?Wynn,	 ? 2011;	 ? Hamlin	 ? &	 ?Wynn,	 ? 2012;	 ? Hamlin	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 30	 ?2007;	 ?Hamlin	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2010;	 ?Hamlin	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2011),	 ?we	 ? assumed	 ? that	 ? the	 ? side	 ?preference	 ?was	 ?not	 ?a	 ?reliable	 ?predictor	 ?of	 ?infant	 ?choice.	 ?Thus,	 ?in	 ?subsequent	 ?analyses,	 ?the	 ?data	 ?was	 ?collapsed	 ? across	 ? sex,	 ? shirt	 ? color	 ? of	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? puppet,	 ? order	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet	 ?was	 ?presented,	 ? and	 ?side	 ? that	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet	 ?was	 ?presented	 ?on	 ?during	 ?familiarization	 ?and	 ?during	 ?choice.	 ?As	 ? predicted,	 ? infants?	 ? preference	 ? for	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? versus	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ?character	 ?differed	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?[?2(1,	 ?N	 ?=	 ?60)=	 ?11.28,	 ?p	 ?<	 ?.001,	 ??	 ?=	 ?.43],	 ?as	 ?depicted	 ?in	 ?Figure	 ? 3.	 ? Infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Helping	 ? condition	 ? preferred	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? helper	 ? to	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ? helper	 ? (22	 ? out	 ? of	 ? 30,	 ? Binomial,	 ? p	 ? <	 ? .05),	 ? while	 ? those	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ?condition	 ?preferred	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ?hinderer	 ? to	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?hinderer	 ? (21	 ?out	 ?of	 ?30,	 ?Binomial,	 ?p	 ?<	 ?.05).	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?	 ?Figure	 ?3.	 ?Results	 ?of	 ?infants?	 ?choice:	 ?Percentage	 ?of	 ?infants	 ?choosing	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?accidental	 ?characters	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?and	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?conditions	 ?	 ?0	 ?10	 ?20	 ?30	 ?40	 ?50	 ?60	 ?70	 ?80	 ?Helping	 ? Hindering	 ?%	 ?infants	 ?choosing	 ?each	 ?character	 ?Intentional	 ?character	 ?Accidental	 ?character	 ?**	 ?*	 ? *	 ? 31	 ?The	 ?difference	 ?between	 ?infants?	 ?total	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?following	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?total	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?following	 ?accidental	 ?events	 ?was	 ?calculated	 ?to	 ?see	 ?whether	 ?longer	 ?looking	 ?to	 ? one	 ? event	 ? over	 ? another	 ? would	 ? correlate	 ? with	 ? infants?	 ? choice	 ? (e.g.,	 ? longer	 ? overall	 ?looking	 ? towards	 ? intentional	 ? events	 ? correlating	 ? with	 ? infants	 ? choosing	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet).	 ?Positive	 ?values	 ?indicated	 ?longer	 ?total	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?towards	 ?intentional	 ?events,	 ?while	 ? negative	 ? values	 ? indicated	 ? longer	 ? looking	 ? time	 ? towards	 ? accidental	 ? events.	 ?Although	 ?the	 ?mean	 ?difference	 ?scores	 ?were	 ?in	 ?the	 ?same	 ?direction	 ?as	 ?the	 ?choices	 ?made	 ?for	 ?each	 ? condition	 ? (Helping:	 ? MInt-??Acc	 ? =	 ? .59,	 ? Hindering:	 ? MInt-??Acc=	 ? -??.38),	 ? no	 ? significant	 ?correlation	 ?between	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?and	 ?choice	 ?was	 ?found	 ?(r	 ?=	 ?.12,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.36).	 ?2.3.3 Excluded	 ?infants	 ?and	 ?additional	 ?analyses	 ?Significantly	 ?more	 ?infants	 ?refused	 ?to	 ?participate	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?than	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ? condition	 ? due	 ? to	 ? either	 ? fussiness	 ? (11)	 ? or	 ? failure	 ? to	 ? choose	 ? a	 ? puppet	 ? (15;	 ?there	 ?were	 ?26	 ?refusals	 ?in	 ?the	 ?entire	 ?study,	 ?and	 ?21	 ?of	 ?these	 ?infants	 ?were	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition,	 ? Binomial,	 ? p	 ? <	 ? .01).	 ? Two	 ? coders,	 ? who	 ? were	 ? blind	 ? to	 ? condition	 ? and	 ? to	 ? the	 ?identities	 ?of	 ? the	 ?puppets,	 ? reviewed	 ?9	 ?(all	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition)	 ?out	 ?of	 ? the	 ?15	 ?no	 ?choice	 ?videos	 ? to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ? infants	 ?preferred	 ? to	 ? look	 ?at	 ?one	 ?puppet	 ?over	 ? the	 ?other	 ?during	 ?the	 ?choice	 ?procedure.	 ?The	 ?other	 ?videos	 ?(2	 ?Helping	 ?and	 ?4	 ?Hindering)	 ?were	 ?omitted	 ?from	 ?analyses,	 ?due	 ?to	 ?both	 ?coders	 ?independently	 ?noting	 ?that	 ?they	 ?had	 ?difficulty	 ?viewing	 ?the	 ? infants?	 ?eyes	 ?during	 ? the	 ?choice	 ?(e.g.,	 ? infant	 ? leaned	 ?back	 ?and	 ?eyes	 ?were	 ?no	 ?longer	 ?in	 ?view).	 ?The	 ?two	 ?coders	 ?measured	 ?the	 ?total	 ?time	 ?infants	 ?spent	 ?looking	 ?towards	 ?the	 ?puppet	 ?on	 ?the	 ?infants?	 ?left	 ?and	 ?right	 ?sides	 ?separately.	 ?	 ?The	 ?coders?	 ?measurements	 ?for	 ?the	 ?total	 ?time	 ?infants	 ?spent	 ?looking	 ?at	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?puppet	 ?(ICC	 ?=	 ?.98)	 ?as	 ?well	 ?as	 ?the	 ? 32	 ?total	 ? time	 ? infants	 ? spent	 ? looking	 ? at	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? puppet	 ? (ICC	 ? =	 ? .86)	 ? were	 ? reliably	 ?correlated	 ?An	 ? average	 ? of	 ? Coder	 ? 1	 ? and	 ? Coder	 ? 2?s	 ? measurements	 ? of	 ? infants?	 ? looking	 ? time	 ?towards	 ? each	 ? puppet	 ? was	 ? calculated.	 ? A	 ? paired	 ? samples	 ? t-??test	 ? revealed	 ? that	 ? infants?	 ?attention	 ? towards	 ? each	 ? puppet	 ? did	 ? not	 ? differ	 ? [t(7)	 ? =	 ? .39,	 ? p	 ? =	 ? .71,	 ? d	 ? =	 ? .15].	 ? Overall,	 ?infants?	 ?looking	 ?time	 ?towards	 ?each	 ?puppet	 ?was	 ?quite	 ?short.	 ?During	 ?the	 ?2-??minute	 ?choice	 ?period,	 ? infants	 ? looked	 ?at	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ?puppet	 ? for	 ?an	 ?average	 ?of	 ?9.8	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?3.30)	 ?and	 ?at	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?puppet	 ?for	 ?an	 ?average	 ?of	 ?8.6	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?2.76).	 ?The	 ?high	 ?rate	 ?of	 ?refusals	 ?to	 ?participate	 ? in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ? is	 ?suggestive	 ?that	 ?there	 ?is	 ?something	 ?particularly	 ?difficult	 ?or	 ?aversive	 ?about	 ?this	 ?condition	 ?for	 ?infants.	 ?To	 ? explore	 ? this	 ? idea	 ? further,	 ? additional	 ? analyses	 ?were	 ? conducted	 ? on	 ? the	 ? infants	 ?who	 ?completed	 ? the	 ? study.	 ? An	 ? additional	 ? coder,	 ? who	 ? was	 ? blind	 ? to	 ? condition	 ? and	 ? to	 ? the	 ?identities	 ?of	 ?the	 ?puppets,	 ?reviewed	 ?the	 ?recordings	 ?and	 ?coded	 ?the	 ?time	 ?it	 ?took	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?each	 ?condition	 ?to	 ?make	 ?their	 ?choice.	 ?Three	 ?out	 ?of	 ?sixty	 ?videos	 ?were	 ?missing	 ?(1	 ?Helping	 ?and	 ?2	 ?Hindering	 ? videos),	 ? so	 ? these	 ? infants	 ?were	 ?excluded	 ? from	 ?subsequent	 ?analyses.	 ?A	 ?second	 ? blind	 ? coder	 ? analyzed	 ? 30%	 ? of	 ? the	 ? videos	 ? for	 ? reliability;	 ? the	 ? two	 ? coders	 ? were	 ?highly	 ?reliable	 ?(ICC	 ?=	 ?.99).	 ?Coding	 ?began	 ?as	 ?soon	 ?as	 ?the	 ?experimenter	 ?moved	 ?the	 ?puppets	 ?within	 ?the	 ?infant?s	 ?reach.	 ? If	 ? there	 ? was	 ? something	 ? inherently	 ? difficult	 ? or	 ? aversive	 ? about	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ?condition,	 ?then	 ?infants	 ?should	 ?have	 ?taken	 ?longer	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?between	 ?two	 ?Hinderers	 ?than	 ?two	 ?Helpers.	 ?However,	 ?the	 ?time	 ?that	 ?it	 ?took	 ?infants	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?a	 ?puppet	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?by	 ?condition	 ?[t(55)	 ?=	 ?.38,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.71,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?	 ?.10].	 ?On	 ?average,	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition	 ?took	 ?15.86	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? 3.74)	 ? to	 ? make	 ? a	 ? selection,	 ? while	 ? infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? 33	 ?condition	 ?took	 ?13.86	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?3.75)	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?a	 ?puppet.	 ?Further,	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?each	 ?condition	 ?did	 ?not	 ?choose	 ?one	 ?character	 ?faster	 ?than	 ?another	 ?[Helping:	 ?t(27)	 ?=	 ?.37,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.72,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?0.15;	 ?Hindering:	 ?t(26)	 ?=	 ?-??.07,	 ?p	 ?=	 ?.95,	 ?d	 ?=	 ?.03].	 ?Infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition	 ?who	 ?chose	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? character,	 ? chose	 ? on	 ? average	 ? after	 ? 18.1	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? 7.56);	 ?those	 ?who	 ?chose	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?characters,	 ?chose	 ?on	 ?average	 ?after	 ?15.0	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?4.39).	 ?Infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?who	 ?chose	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?character,	 ?chose	 ?on	 ?average	 ? after	 ? 13.7	 ? seconds	 ? (SEM	 ? =	 ? 4.84);	 ? those	 ?who	 ? chose	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? characters,	 ?chose	 ?on	 ?average	 ?after	 ?14.3	 ?seconds	 ?(SEM	 ?=	 ?4.37).	 ?Taken	 ?together,	 ?these	 ?analyses	 ?show	 ?that	 ? infants	 ?did	 ?not	 ? take	 ? longer	 ? to	 ?choose	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition	 ?than	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ?and	 ?they	 ?also	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ?in	 ?the	 ?amount	 ?of	 ?time	 ?it	 ?took	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?either	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?or	 ?accidental	 ?character	 ?in	 ?each	 ?condition.	 ?	 ?	 ? 	 ? 34	 ?3 General	 ?Discussion	 ?The	 ?results	 ?from	 ?the	 ?current	 ?study	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?10-??month-??old	 ?infants	 ?can	 ?make	 ?nuanced	 ?third-??party	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?moral	 ?agents.	 ?Infants,	 ?like	 ?adults,	 ?evaluate	 ?others	 ?on	 ?the	 ? basis	 ? of	 ? their	 ? underlying	 ? mental	 ? states,	 ? and	 ? these	 ? evaluations	 ? subsequently	 ?influence	 ? their	 ?social	 ?preferences	 ? in	 ? future	 ? interactions.	 ? Infants	 ?viewed	 ?puppet	 ?shows	 ?involving	 ?helpers	 ?or	 ?hinderers	 ?and	 ?showed	 ?differential	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?actors	 ?depending	 ?on	 ? whether	 ? they	 ? acted	 ? intentionally	 ? or	 ? accidentally.	 ? Infants	 ? preferred	 ? those	 ? who	 ?intentionally	 ? helped	 ? a	 ? Protagonist	 ? achieve	 ? a	 ? goal	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? those	 ? who	 ? accidentally	 ?helped.	 ?By	 ?contrast,	 ? infants	 ?preferred	 ?those	 ?who	 ?accidentally	 ?hindered	 ?a	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal	 ? rather	 ? than	 ? those	 ?who	 ? intentionally	 ? did	 ? so.	 ? Notably,	 ? the	 ? opposing	 ? nature	 ? of	 ? the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ? goal	 ? in	 ? the	 ? two	 ? conditions	 ? (to	 ? get	 ? the	 ? toy	 ? off	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ?but	 ?to	 ?put	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition)	 ?allowed	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ? and	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? acts	 ? to	 ? be	 ? physically	 ? identical	 ? across	 ? conditions	 ? (i.e.,	 ?intentional	 ? acts	 ? involved	 ? purposefully	 ? knocking	 ? over	 ? a	 ? shelf,	 ? while	 ? accidental	 ? acts	 ?involved	 ? inadvertently	 ? knocking	 ? the	 ? shelf	 ? down	 ? while	 ? in	 ? the	 ? process	 ? of	 ? trying	 ? to	 ?achieve	 ?some	 ?other	 ?goal),	 ?and	 ?all	 ?acts	 ?resulted	 ?in	 ?the	 ?same	 ?outcome	 ?(i.e.,	 ?the	 ?toy	 ?moose	 ?falling	 ? off	 ? of	 ? the	 ? shelf).	 ? This	 ? suggests,	 ? then,	 ? that	 ? infants?	 ? differential	 ? evaluations	 ? of	 ?helpers	 ?and	 ?hinderers	 ?were	 ?influenced	 ?primarily	 ?by	 ?their	 ?analyses	 ?of	 ?the	 ?actors?	 ?mental	 ?states	 ? (intent	 ? vs.	 ? lack	 ? of	 ? intent)	 ? in	 ? reference	 ? to	 ? the	 ? Protagonist?s	 ? goal.	 ? These	 ? results	 ?cannot	 ?be	 ?attributed	 ?to	 ?differences	 ?in	 ?attention	 ?towards	 ?intentional	 ?or	 ?accidental	 ?events	 ?as	 ? infants?	 ? attention	 ? to	 ? each	 ? event	 ? type	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ.	 ? 	 ? Additionally,	 ?when	 ? comparing	 ? 35	 ?across	 ? conditions,	 ? infants	 ?did	 ?not	 ?differ	 ? in	 ? the	 ? amount	 ?of	 ? time	 ? spent	 ? looking	 ? towards	 ?either	 ?intentional	 ?or	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?Although	 ?there	 ?were	 ?no	 ?overall	 ?differences	 ?in	 ?attention	 ?in	 ?either	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?or	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition,	 ? there	 ?were	 ? several	 ? indices	 ? that	 ? suggest	 ? that	 ? there	 ?may	 ?have	 ?been	 ?something	 ? inherently	 ?aversive	 ?about	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ? for	 ? infants.	 ?Firstly,	 ?infants?	 ?attention	 ?did	 ?not	 ?diminish	 ?between	 ?the	 ?first	 ?and	 ?second	 ?intentional	 ?or	 ?first	 ?and	 ?second	 ?accidental	 ?trials	 ?for	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ?but	 ?infants?	 ?attention	 ?did	 ?marginally	 ?decrease	 ? in	 ? the	 ? second	 ? trial	 ? for	 ? each	 ? event	 ? type	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? condition.	 ? One	 ?possibility	 ? is	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? may	 ? have	 ? been	 ? better	 ? at	 ? processing	 ? and	 ? remembering	 ? the	 ?negative	 ? events	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? condition	 ? than	 ? the	 ? positive	 ? events	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Helping	 ?condition,	 ?and	 ?thus	 ?did	 ?not	 ?need	 ?to	 ?look	 ?as	 ?long	 ?to	 ?the	 ?second	 ?trials	 ?because	 ?they	 ?were	 ??bored?.	 ? This	 ? interpretation	 ? would	 ? support	 ? the	 ? notion	 ? of	 ? a	 ? negativity	 ? bias	 ? in	 ? early	 ?development	 ? (see	 ? Vaish,	 ? Grossmann,	 ? &	 ? Woodward,	 ? 2008	 ? for	 ? a	 ? review).	 ? Given	 ? this	 ?interpretation	 ?we	 ?might	 ?expect	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?past	 ?helper/hinderer	 ?studies	 ?should	 ?have	 ?habituated	 ?faster	 ?to	 ?hinderer	 ?events	 ?than	 ?to	 ?helper	 ?events.	 ?However,	 ?no	 ?mention	 ?of	 ? faster	 ? habituation	 ? rates	 ? for	 ? hindering	 ? than	 ? helping	 ? events	 ? was	 ? made	 ? in	 ? previous	 ?studies	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Hamlin	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2007;	 ? Hamlin	 ? et	 ? al.,	 ? 2010).	 ? Another	 ? interpretation	 ? of	 ? the	 ?results,	 ? however,	 ? might	 ? be	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? could	 ? have	 ? learned	 ? to	 ? anticipate	 ? what	 ?subsequent	 ?events	 ?would	 ?look	 ?like.	 ?After	 ?seeing	 ?the	 ?first	 ?couple	 ?of	 ?trials,	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ? condition	 ?may	 ?have	 ? expected	 ? to	 ? see	 ?more	 ?helping	 ? events	 ? and	 ? thus	 ?may	 ?have	 ?continued	 ? to	 ? pay	 ? attention	 ? to	 ? these	 ? events	 ? because	 ? they	 ? were	 ? pleasing	 ? to	 ? them.	 ? By	 ?contrast,	 ? infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition	 ?may	 ?have	 ?expected	 ?to	 ?see	 ?more	 ?hindering	 ? 36	 ?events	 ?and	 ?thus	 ?may	 ?have	 ?paid	 ?less	 ?attention	 ?to	 ?subsequent	 ?events	 ?because	 ?they	 ?found	 ?them	 ?aversive	 ?and	 ?wanted	 ?to	 ?avoid	 ?looking	 ?at	 ?them.	 ?	 ?Secondly,	 ? a	 ? significant	 ? proportion	 ? of	 ? the	 ? infants	 ? that	 ? were	 ? excluded	 ? due	 ? to	 ?fussiness	 ? or	 ? no	 ? choices	 ? were	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition	 ? (21	 ? out	 ? of	 ? 26	 ? infants).	 ? This	 ?exclusion	 ? rate	 ? is	 ? much	 ? higher	 ? than	 ? previous	 ? studies	 ? involving	 ? one	 ? helper	 ? and	 ? one	 ?hinderer	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Hamlin,	 ? in	 ?press;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?Mahajan,	 ?Liberman,	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ?2013;	 ?Hamlin	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ?2011;	 ?Hamlin	 ?&	 ?Wynn,	 ?2012;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ?&	 ?Bloom,	 ?2007;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ?&	 ?Bloom,	 ? 2010;	 ? Hamlin,	 ?Wynn,	 ? Bloom,	 ? &	 ?Mahajan,	 ? 2011).	 ? These	 ? past	 ? studies	 ? generally	 ?have	 ?had	 ?exclusion	 ?rates	 ?(due	 ?to	 ?fussiness	 ?or	 ?no	 ?choices)	 ?of	 ?less	 ?than	 ?15%,	 ?whereas	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?in	 ?the	 ?present	 ?study	 ?reached	 ?31%.	 ?The	 ?high	 ?exclusion	 ?rate	 ?found	 ?in	 ?the	 ? Hindering	 ? condition	 ? cannot	 ? be	 ? attributed	 ? to	 ? factors	 ? such	 ? as	 ? the	 ? banging	 ? noises	 ?caused	 ?by	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ? falling	 ?down	 ?scaring	 ?the	 ?infants,	 ?or	 ?the	 ?physical	 ?appearance	 ?of	 ?the	 ?puppets	 ?themselves	 ?being	 ?scary;	 ?these	 ?exact	 ?same	 ?features	 ?were	 ?present	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition,	 ?which	 ?had	 ?a	 ?similar	 ?exclusion	 ?rate	 ? (12%)	 ? to	 ? the	 ?previous	 ?studies	 ? involving	 ?one	 ?helper	 ?and	 ?one	 ?hinderer.	 ?Thus,	 ?observing	 ?four	 ?events	 ?involving	 ?a	 ?hindered	 ?goal	 ?(2	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?2	 ?accidental)	 ?and	 ?then	 ?having	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?hinderers	 ?may	 ?have	 ?been	 ?particularly	 ?difficult	 ?for	 ?infants,	 ?whereas	 ?in	 ?previous	 ?studies,	 ?seeing	 ?helping	 ?events	 ? in	 ? alternation	 ?with	 ? hindering	 ? events	 ?may	 ? have	 ? been	 ? enough	 ? to	 ? offset	 ? infants?	 ?negative	 ?affect	 ?to	 ?allow	 ?them	 ?to	 ?make	 ?it	 ?through	 ?the	 ?familiarization	 ?period	 ?and	 ?to	 ?make	 ?a	 ?choice	 ?between	 ?the	 ?two	 ?puppets.	 ?	 ?Lastly,	 ? infants	 ? who	 ?made	 ? it	 ? through	 ? the	 ? familiarization	 ? period	 ? and	 ? refused	 ? to	 ?choose	 ? in	 ? the	 ? Hindering	 ? condition	 ? spent	 ? very	 ? little	 ? time	 ? (15%	 ? of	 ? the	 ? entire	 ? choice	 ?period)	 ? actually	 ? looking	 ? at	 ? the	 ? two	 ?puppets	 ? during	 ? the	 ? choice	 ? period.	 ?Out	 ? of	 ? the	 ? 120	 ? 37	 ?seconds	 ? given	 ? to	 ? infants	 ? to	 ? make	 ? their	 ? choice,	 ? infants	 ? spent	 ? on	 ? average	 ? 9.8	 ? seconds	 ?looking	 ?at	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?puppet	 ?and	 ?8.6	 ?seconds	 ?looking	 ?at	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?puppet.	 ?This	 ?might	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?the	 ?infants	 ?found	 ?the	 ?puppets	 ?aversive	 ?and	 ?thus	 ?were	 ?avoiding	 ?eye	 ?contact	 ?with	 ?the	 ?puppets,	 ?although	 ?we	 ?cannot	 ?say	 ?this	 ?for	 ?certain	 ?as	 ?we	 ?were	 ?unable	 ?to	 ?compare	 ? this	 ? to	 ? infants	 ? who	 ? failed	 ? to	 ? choose	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ? condition	 ? (due	 ? to	 ? their	 ?videos	 ?being	 ?unusable	 ?for	 ?coding).	 ?In	 ?sum,	 ?infants?	 ?decrease	 ?in	 ?attention	 ?towards	 ?second	 ?event	 ?trials,	 ?fussiness	 ?and	 ?refusal	 ?to	 ?choose,	 ?and	 ?gaze	 ?avoidance	 ?during	 ?choice	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?suggests	 ?that	 ? there	 ? is	 ? something	 ? inherently	 ?difficult	 ? or	 ? aversive	 ? about	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ? condition	 ?for	 ?infants.	 ?Although	 ?these	 ?events	 ?do	 ?seem	 ?to	 ?be	 ?aversive	 ?to	 ?infants,	 ?this	 ?does	 ?not	 ?seem	 ?to	 ?influence	 ?their	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?choose	 ?one	 ?character	 ?over	 ?the	 ?other	 ? for	 ?those	 ?infants	 ?who	 ?actually	 ? did	 ?make	 ? a	 ? choice.	 ? Infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ? did	 ? not	 ? take	 ? longer	 ? to	 ?make	 ?their	 ?decisions	 ?compared	 ?to	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Helping	 ?condition.	 ?Rather,	 ?infants	 ?chose	 ?equally	 ?as	 ?fast	 ?in	 ?both	 ?conditions,	 ?and	 ?there	 ?was	 ?no	 ?difference	 ?in	 ?the	 ?magnitude	 ?of	 ?the	 ?effect	 ? across	 ? condition,	 ? suggesting	 ? that	 ? the	 ? valence	 ? of	 ? the	 ? condition	 ? did	 ? not	 ? impact	 ?infants?	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?make	 ?a	 ?choice.	 ?Overall,	 ? the	 ? results	 ? from	 ? the	 ? present	 ? study	 ? in	 ? conjunction	 ? with	 ? Hamlin?s	 ? (in	 ?press)	 ?study	 ?examining	 ?infants?	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?failed	 ?attempts,	 ?suggest	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?quite	 ? capable	 ? of	 ? making	 ? nuanced	 ? evaluations	 ? of	 ? others	 ? on	 ? the	 ? basis	 ? of	 ? underlying	 ?mental	 ?states.	 ?Infants	 ?privilege	 ?intentions	 ?when	 ?evaluating	 ?failed	 ?attempts	 ?by	 ?8-??months	 ?of	 ? age,	 ?but	 ?even	 ?more	 ? impressively,	 ? they	 ?are	 ?able	 ? to	 ?differentially	 ?evaluate	 ?accidental	 ?and	 ? intentional	 ? actors	 ? (which	 ? is	 ? thought	 ? to	 ? be	 ? more	 ? difficult	 ? than	 ? evaluating	 ? failed	 ?attempts;	 ?e.g.,	 ?Baird	 ?&	 ?Astington,	 ?2004;	 ?Cushman	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2013;	 ?Hamlin,	 ?in	 ?press;	 ?Young	 ?et	 ? 38	 ?al.,	 ?2007)	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ?their	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?by	 ?10-??months	 ?of	 ?age.	 ?The	 ?notion	 ?that	 ? infants	 ? can	 ? make	 ? these	 ? adult-??like	 ? judgments	 ? contradict	 ? earlier	 ? claims	 ? of	 ? a	 ? shift	 ?from	 ?outcome-??based	 ?judgments	 ?early	 ?on	 ?in	 ?development	 ?to	 ?intention-??based	 ?judgments	 ?later	 ? on	 ? in	 ? development	 ? (e.g.,	 ? Piaget	 ? 1932/1965,	 ? Kohlberg).	 ? Thus,	 ? young	 ? children?s	 ?failure	 ?to	 ?use	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?in	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others	 ?does	 ?not	 ?necessarily	 ?reflect	 ?a	 ?lack	 ? of	 ? awareness	 ? of	 ? mental	 ? states.	 ? Rather,	 ? the	 ? explicit	 ? nature	 ? (i.e.,	 ? use	 ? of	 ? verbal	 ?responses)	 ?of	 ?the	 ?tasks	 ?themselves	 ?and	 ?the	 ?demand	 ?characteristics	 ?that	 ?they	 ?entail	 ?may	 ?mask	 ? children?s	 ? true	 ? ability	 ? to	 ? factor	 ?mental	 ? state	 ? information	 ? into	 ? their	 ? evaluations.	 ?Using	 ?a	 ?non-??verbal	 ?paradigm	 ?in	 ?the	 ?present	 ?study	 ?allows	 ?us	 ?to	 ?tap	 ?into	 ?infants?	 ?implicit	 ?awareness	 ?of	 ?the	 ?importance	 ?of	 ?mental	 ?states	 ?in	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?others	 ?and	 ?shows	 ?that	 ? infants	 ? are	 ? able	 ? to	 ?make	 ? adult-??like	 ? evaluations,	 ? preferring	 ? intentional	 ? helpers	 ? to	 ?accidental	 ? helpers,	 ? but	 ? accidental	 ? hinderers	 ? to	 ? intentional	 ? hinderers.	 ? This	 ? provides	 ?preliminary	 ? support	 ? to	 ? the	 ? claims	 ? that	 ? infants	 ? possess	 ? an	 ? early	 ? capacity	 ? to	 ? evaluate	 ?moral	 ?agents	 ?on	 ?the	 ?basis	 ?of	 ?their	 ?underlying	 ?mental	 ?states.	 ?3.1 Limitations	 ?and	 ?future	 ?directions	 ?The	 ? current	 ? study	 ? provides	 ? a	 ? first	 ? look	 ? into	 ? infants?	 ? capacity	 ? to	 ? differentially	 ?evaluate	 ? intentional	 ? and	 ? accidental	 ? moral	 ? agents.	 ? However,	 ? there	 ? are	 ? several	 ?limitations	 ?to	 ?the	 ?current	 ?study	 ?that	 ?should	 ?be	 ?addressed	 ?in	 ?future	 ?work.	 ?First,	 ?although	 ?we	 ?know	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?prefer	 ?one	 ?character	 ?over	 ?the	 ?other,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?not	 ?clear	 ?as	 ?to	 ?whether	 ?infants	 ? are	 ? displaying	 ?preference	 ?because	 ? they	 ? view	 ?one	 ? character	 ? positively	 ? and	 ? the	 ?other	 ?negatively	 ?(or	 ?neutrally),	 ?or	 ?whether	 ?they	 ?perceive	 ?both	 ?characters	 ?to	 ?be	 ?positive	 ?or	 ?negative,	 ?but	 ?one	 ?is	 ?just	 ?more	 ?positive	 ?or	 ?more	 ?negative	 ?than	 ?the	 ?other.	 ?For	 ?example,	 ? 39	 ?infants	 ? in	 ? the	 ?Helping	 ? condition	 ?may	 ?have	 ? judged	 ?both	 ? the	 ? intentional	 ? and	 ? accidental	 ?helpers	 ? to	 ? be	 ? prosocial	 ? (they	 ? both	 ? helped	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ? achieve	 ? his	 ? goal),	 ? but	 ? they	 ?may	 ?have	 ?evaluated	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?helper	 ?more	 ?positively	 ?because	 ?he	 ?had	 ?the	 ?intent	 ?to	 ?help,	 ?whereas	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?helper	 ?did	 ?not.	 ?Alternatively,	 ?infants	 ?may	 ?have	 ?viewed	 ?only	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?helper	 ?as	 ?prosocial,	 ?while	 ?maintaining	 ?a	 ?neutral	 ?or	 ?even	 ?negative	 ?view	 ?of	 ?the	 ? accidental	 ? helper,	 ? because	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? helper	 ? did	 ? not	 ? intend	 ? to	 ? help	 ? the	 ?Protagonist,	 ? but	 ? rather	 ? pursued	 ? his	 ? own	 ? selfish	 ? goal	 ? of	 ? retrieving	 ? a	 ? different	 ? toy.	 ?Similarly,	 ?infants	 ?in	 ?the	 ?Hindering	 ?condition	 ?may	 ?have	 ?judged	 ?both	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?hinderer	 ?as	 ?antisocial	 ?(they	 ?both	 ?hindered	 ?the	 ?Protagonist),	 ?but	 ?they	 ?may	 ?have	 ?judged	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?hinderer	 ?more	 ?harshly	 ?because	 ?he	 ?had	 ?the	 ?intent	 ?to	 ?hinder,	 ?whereas	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ?hinderer	 ?did	 ?not.	 ?Alternatively,	 ? infants	 ?may	 ?have	 ?viewed	 ?only	 ?the	 ? intentional	 ? hinderer	 ? to	 ? be	 ? antisocial,	 ? while	 ? maintaining	 ? a	 ? neutral	 ? view	 ? of	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ?hinderer	 ?because	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?hinderer	 ?did	 ?not	 ?have	 ?any	 ?knowledge	 ?of	 ?the	 ?leopard?s	 ?goal,	 ?and	 ?thus	 ?could	 ?not	 ?have	 ?intended	 ?to	 ?hinder	 ?the	 ?Protagonist.	 ?Thus,	 ?future	 ?studies	 ?should	 ?compare	 ?the	 ?intentional	 ?and	 ?accidental	 ?helpers	 ?and	 ?hinderers	 ?to	 ?a	 ?novel	 ?character	 ?that	 ?infants	 ?have	 ?no	 ?prior	 ?experience	 ?with.	 ?Based	 ?on	 ?prior	 ?research	 ?involving	 ?similar	 ?comparisons	 ?(e.g.,	 ?Hamlin	 ?et	 ?al.,	 ?2007),	 ?infants	 ?who	 ?positively	 ?evaluate	 ?an	 ?agent	 ?should	 ?prefer	 ?the	 ?agent	 ?to	 ?the	 ?neutral	 ?character,	 ?while	 ?infants	 ?who	 ?negatively	 ?evaluate	 ?an	 ?agent	 ?should	 ?prefer	 ?the	 ?neutral	 ?character	 ?to	 ?the	 ?agent;	 ?infants	 ?who	 ?view	 ?an	 ?agent	 ?as	 ?neutral	 ?should	 ?be	 ?indifferent	 ?to	 ?the	 ?agent	 ?and	 ?the	 ?neutral	 ?character.	 ?Thus,	 ?by	 ?comparing	 ?the	 ? intentional	 ? and	 ? accidental	 ? helpers	 ? and	 ? hinderers	 ? to	 ? a	 ? neutral	 ? character,	 ? we	 ? can	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?displaying	 ?preference	 ?because	 ?they	 ?view	 ?one	 ?character	 ?positively	 ? and	 ? the	 ? other	 ? negatively	 ? (or	 ? neutrally),	 ? or	 ? whether	 ? they	 ? perceive	 ? both	 ? 40	 ?characters	 ? to	 ? be	 ? positive	 ? or	 ? negative,	 ? but	 ? one	 ? is	 ? just	 ?more	 ? positive	 ? or	 ?more	 ? negative	 ?than	 ?the	 ?other.	 ?	 ?Second,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?unclear	 ?as	 ?to	 ?what	 ?manipulations	 ?infants	 ?were	 ?responding	 ?to	 ?in	 ?the	 ?accidental	 ?events.	 ?The	 ?accidental	 ?acts	 ? in	 ?this	 ?preliminary	 ?study	 ?included	 ?two	 ?different	 ?manipulations	 ? to	 ? make	 ? it	 ? especially	 ? clear	 ? to	 ? infants	 ? that	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? acts	 ? were	 ?unintentional:	 ? (1)	 ? the	 ? accidental	 ? character	 ? disappeared	 ? before	 ? the	 ? Protagonist	 ?displayed	 ? any	 ? goal-??directed	 ? actions,	 ? and	 ? thus	 ? could	 ? not	 ? have	 ? known	 ? what	 ? the	 ?Protagonist?s	 ? goal	 ?was	 ? (2)	 ? the	 ?accidental	 ? character	 ?did	 ?not	 ? intend	 ? to	 ?knock	 ?down	 ? the	 ?shelf,	 ?but	 ?rather	 ?bumped	 ?into	 ?it	 ?clumsily	 ?on	 ?his	 ?way	 ?to	 ?trying	 ?to	 ?fulfill	 ?his	 ?own	 ?separate	 ?goal.	 ? Thus,	 ? infants	 ? could	 ? have	 ? been	 ? responding	 ? to	 ? either	 ? or	 ? both	 ? of	 ? these	 ? cues	 ? in	 ?interpreting	 ?the	 ?actions	 ?as	 ?accidental.	 ?Thus,	 ? it	 ? is	 ? important	 ?to	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ? it	 ? is	 ?the	 ? accidental	 ? character?s	 ? ignorance	 ? or	 ? lack	 ? of	 ? intent	 ? that	 ? is	 ? influencing	 ? infants?	 ?evaluations.	 ? To	 ? determine	 ? whether	 ? knowledge/ignorance	 ? plays	 ? a	 ? role,	 ? future	 ? work	 ?could	 ? examine	 ?whether	 ? infants	 ? differentiate	 ? between	 ? accidental	 ? agents	 ? that	 ? do	 ? or	 ? do	 ?not	 ? have	 ? knowledge	 ? of	 ? the	 ? Protagonist?s	 ? goal	 ? (i.e.,	 ? agent	 ? stays	 ? on	 ? stage	 ? during	 ?Protagonist?s	 ?goal-??directed	 ?actions	 ?or	 ?disappears	 ?before	 ?Protagonist	 ?exhibits	 ?any	 ?goal-??directed	 ?actions)	 ?and	 ?also	 ?see	 ?how	 ?infants	 ?evaluate	 ?each	 ?of	 ? these	 ?agents	 ?compared	 ?to	 ?the	 ? intentional	 ? character.	 ?To	 ?determine	 ?whether	 ?an	 ?agent?s	 ? intent	 ? to	 ?knock	 ?down	 ? the	 ?shelf	 ?plays	 ?a	 ?role,	 ?future	 ?work	 ?should	 ?compare	 ?an	 ?agent	 ?who	 ?intends	 ?to	 ?knock	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ? specifically	 ? to	 ?help	 ?or	 ?hinder	 ? the	 ?Protagonist,	 ? to	 ? an	 ?agent	 ?who	 ? intends	 ? to	 ?knock	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf,	 ?but	 ?as	 ?a	 ?means	 ?to	 ?achieving	 ?a	 ?goal	 ?of	 ?self-??interest	 ?(e.g.,	 ?perhaps	 ?there	 ?is	 ?a	 ?different	 ?toy	 ?on	 ?top	 ?of	 ? the	 ?shelf	 ? that	 ?the	 ?puppet	 ? is	 ? trying	 ?to	 ?retrieve,	 ?or	 ?perhaps	 ?the	 ?agent	 ?needs	 ?to	 ?knock	 ?down	 ?the	 ?shelf	 ?so	 ?that	 ?he	 ?can	 ?stand	 ?on	 ?it	 ?to	 ?get	 ?a	 ?toy	 ?that	 ?is	 ?even	 ? 41	 ?higher	 ?out	 ?of	 ?reach).	 ?Although	 ?these	 ?comparisons	 ?are	 ?all	 ?useful	 ?to	 ?do,	 ?it	 ?is	 ?important	 ?to	 ?note	 ?that	 ?both	 ?knowledge	 ?and	 ?intent	 ?are	 ?mental	 ?processes.	 ?Thus,	 ?even	 ?though	 ?we	 ?do	 ?not	 ?know	 ?which	 ?of	 ?these	 ?two	 ?factors	 ?infants	 ?are	 ?responding	 ?to	 ?in	 ?the	 ?current	 ?study,	 ?we	 ?can	 ?at	 ? least	 ?be	 ? relatively	 ? certain	 ? that	 ? they	 ?are	 ?using	 ? some	 ? sort	 ? of	 ?mental	 ? state	 ? analysis	 ? in	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?the	 ?actors.	 ?	 ? 	 ? 42	 ?4 Conclusions	 ?The	 ?present	 ?study	 ?sheds	 ?light	 ?on	 ?infants?	 ?ability	 ?to	 ?use	 ?mental	 ?state	 ?analyses	 ?in	 ?their	 ?evaluations	 ?of	 ?accidental	 ?and	 ? intentional	 ?moral	 ?agents.	 ? 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