@prefix vivo: . @prefix edm: . @prefix ns0: . @prefix dcterms: . @prefix skos: . vivo:departmentOrSchool "Arts, Faculty of"@en, "Psychology, Department of"@en ; edm:dataProvider "DSpace"@en ; ns0:degreeCampus "UBCV"@en ; dcterms:creator "Le, T. Doan"@en ; dcterms:issued "2013-08-20T13:40:59Z"@en, "2013"@en ; vivo:relatedDegree "Master of Arts - MA"@en ; ns0:degreeGrantor "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:description """Mature moral judgments rely on the analysis of both the outcomes of others’ actions and the mental states that drive them. Past research has shown that when there is conflict between outcome and intention, young children rely on outcome information to evaluate others, while older children and adults privilege intention (Piaget, 1932/1965). This suggests that there is a shift from outcome-based to intention-based judgments occurring in development. However, the current study suggests that even 10-month-old infants evaluate moral agents on the basis of their underlying mental states. Infants were presented with puppet shows in which a protagonist was either intentionally or accidentally helped or hindered. Infants were then given a forced choice between the accidental and intentional puppets. Results indicate that infants’ preference for the accidental versus the intentional character differed by condition [χ²(1, N = 60)= 11.28, p < .001, ϕ = .43]; infants preferred intentional to accidental helpers (Binomial, p < .05), but preferred accidental to intentional hinderers (Binomial, p < .05). These results suggest that the capacity to evaluate others on the basis of intention arises much earlier on in development than previously suggested and contradicts earlier claims of a developmental shift from outcome- to intention-based judgments."""@en ; edm:aggregatedCHO "https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/44844?expand=metadata"@en ; skos:note """ TEN-??MONTH-??OLDS? ?EVALUATIONS ?OF ?ACCIDENTAL ?AND ?INTENTIONAL ?ACTIONS ? ?by ?T. ?Doan ?Le ?B.Sc., ?The ?University ?of ?Waterloo, ?2011 ? ?A ?THESIS ?SUBMITTED ?IN ?PARTIAL ?FULFILLMENT ?OF ?THE ?REQUIREMENTS ?FOR ?THE ?DEGREE ?OF ? ?MASTER ?OF ?ARTS ?in ?THE ?FACULTY ?OF ?GRADUATE ?AND ?POSTDOCTORAL ?STUDIES ?(Psychology) ? ?THE ?UNIVERSITY ?OF ?BRITISH ?COLUMBIA ?(Vancouver) ? ?August ?2013 ? ?? ?T. ?Doan ?Le, ?2013 ? ii ?Abstract ? ? ? Mature ?moral ? judgments ? rely ? on ? the ? analysis ? of ? both ? the ? outcomes ? of ? others? ?actions ?and ?the ?mental ?states ?that ?drive ?them. ?Past ?research ?has ?shown ?that ?when ?there ?is ?conflict ?between ?outcome ?and ?intention, ?young ?children ?rely ?on ?outcome ?information ?to ? evaluate ? others, ? while ? older ? children ? and ? adults ? privilege ? intention ? (Piaget, ?1932/1965). ? ?This ?suggests ?that ?there ?is ?a ?shift ?from ?outcome-??based ?to ?intention-??based ?judgments ?occurring ?in ?development. ?However, ? the ? current ? study ? suggests ? that ? even ? 10-??month-??old ? infants ? evaluate ?moral ? agents ? on ? the ? basis ? of ? their ? underlying ?mental ? states. ? Infants ? were ? presented ?with ? puppet ? shows ? in ? which ? a ? protagonist ? was ? either ? intentionally ? or ? accidentally ?helped ?or ?hindered. ? ?Infants ?were ?then ?given ?a ?forced ?choice ?between ?the ?accidental ?and ?intentional ?puppets. ?Results ? indicate ? that ? infants? ?preference ? for ? the ?accidental ?versus ?the ?intentional ?character ?differed ?by ?condition ?[?2(1, ?N ?= ?60)= ?11.28, ?p ?< ?.001, ?? ?= ?.43]; ?infants ? preferred ? intentional ? to ? accidental ? helpers ? (Binomial, ? p ? < ? .05), ? but ? preferred ?accidental ? to ? intentional ?hinderers ? (Binomial, ?p ? < ? .05). ?These ? results ? suggest ? that ? the ?capacity ? to ? evaluate ? others ? on ? the ? basis ? of ? intention ? arises ? much ? earlier ? on ? in ?development ? than ? previously ? suggested ? and ? contradicts ? earlier ? claims ? of ? a ?developmental ?shift ?from ?outcome-?? ?to ?intention-??based ?judgments. ? iii ?Preface ?All ? research ? reported ?was ? conducted ?at ?UBC?s ?Centre ? for ? Infant ?Cognition, ? and ?was ?supervised ?by ?Dr. ? J. ?Kiley ?Hamlin. ?Ethics ?approval ? for ? this ? research ?was ?obtained ?from ?UBC?s ?Behavioral ?Research ?Ethics ?Board ?under ?the ?approval ?number ?H10-??01808. ? iv ?Table ?of ?Contents ?Abstract ?............................................................................................................................................ ?ii ?Preface ?............................................................................................................................................. ?iii ?Table ?of ?Contents ?.......................................................................................................................... ?iv ?List ?of ?Tables ?.................................................................................................................................. ?vi ?List ?of ?Figures ?............................................................................................................................... ?vii ?Acknowledgements ?................................................................................................................... ?viii ?1 ? Introduction ?............................................................................................................................. ?1 ?1.1 ? How ?do ?children ?and ?adults ?evaluate ?moral ?agents? ?........................................................ ?2 ?1.2 ? Infants? ?understanding ?of ?mental ?states ?................................................................................ ?7 ?1.3 ? Infants? ?third-??party ?evaluations ?of ?morally-??relevant ?actions ?........................................ ?9 ?1.4 ? Failed ?attempts ?vs. ?accidents ?................................................................................................. ?13 ?1.5 ? The ?present ?investigation ?....................................................................................................... ?16 ?2 ? Experiment ?............................................................................................................................. ?18 ?2.1 ? Participants ?.................................................................................................................................. ?18 ?2.2 ? Procedure ?..................................................................................................................................... ?18 ?2.2.1 ? Familiarization ?....................................................................................................................................... ?19 ?2.2.1.1 ? Intentional ?helping ?....................................................................................................................................... ?21 ?2.2.1.2 ? Accidental ?helping ?........................................................................................................................................ ?22 ?2.2.1.3 ? Intentional ?hindering ?.................................................................................................................................. ?23 ?2.2.1.4 ? Accidental ?hindering ?.................................................................................................................................... ?24 ?2.2.2 ? Choice ?......................................................................................................................................................... ?25 ?2.2.3 ? Counterbalancing ?and ?reliability ?................................................................................................... ?26 ? v ?2.3 ? Results ?............................................................................................................................................ ?28 ?2.3.1 ? Looking ?time ?........................................................................................................................................... ?28 ?2.3.2 ? Choice ?......................................................................................................................................................... ?29 ?2.3.3 ? Excluded ?infants ?and ?additional ?analyses ?.................................................................................. ?31 ?3 ? General ?Discussion ?.............................................................................................................. ?34 ?3.1 ? Limitations ?and ?future ?directions ?........................................................................................ ?38 ?4 ? Conclusions ?............................................................................................................................. ?42 ?References ?..................................................................................................................................... ?43 ? vi ?List ?of ?Tables ?Table ?1. ?Infants? ?looking ?time ?towards ?events ?(s) ?separated ?by ?condition ?....................... ?28 ? vii ?List ?of ?FiguresFigure ?1. ?Failed ?helping ?and ?failed ?hindering ?events ?(Hamlin, ?in ?press) ?........................... ?13 ?Figure ?2. ?Critical ?actions ?displayed ?in ?puppet ?show ?events ?.................................................. ?27 ?Figure ?3. ?Results ?of ?infants? ?choice ?............................................................................................. ?30 ? ? ? viii ?Acknowledgements ?First ?and ?foremost, ?I ?would ?like ?to ?thank ?my ?wonderful ?supervisor, ?Kiley ?Hamlin, ?for ? her ? guidance ? and ? support. ? This ? has ? been ? an ? incredible ? experience ? and ? I ? am ? so ?grateful ?to ?have ?had ?this ?opportunity. ?Many ?thanks ?to ?Susan ?Birch ?and ?Mark ?Schaller ?for ?being ?on ?my ?thesis ?committee ?and ?for ?offering ?new ?ways ?to ?think ?about ?this ?research. ?I ?would ? also ? like ? to ? extend ? thanks ? to ?Ori ? Friedman, ?who ?has ?been ?an ? amazing ?mentor ? over ? the ? years. ? His ? creativity ? and ? passion ? for ? research ? has ? been ? truly ?inspirational. ? ? ?This ? research ? would ? not ? have ? been ? possible ? without ? the ? infants ? and ? families ?who ?participated, ?and ?the ?hardworking ?members ?of ?the ?Centre ?for ?Infant ?Cognition. ?In ?particular, ?thanks ?to ?Janine ?Gellerman ?for ?making ?sure ?that ?the ?lab ?ran ?smoothly ?and ?for ?making ? the ? lab ? a ? fun ? environment ? to ? work ? in; ? Meghan ?MacPherson, ? Olesha ? Ratther, ?Nadiu ?Hui, ? and ?Carolyn ?Baer ? for ? their ? lively ? spirits ? and ?eagerness ? to ?help ? in ?any ?way ?possible. ?Finally, ?I ?would ?like ?to ?thank ?all ?of ?my ?friends ?and ?family ?for ?supporting ?me ?along ?the ?way?I ?would ?not ?have ?been ?able ?to ?do ?it ?without ?them. ? ? ? ? 1 ? ?1 Introduction ?Moral ?judgments ?play ?a ?critical ?role ?in ?helping ?us ?navigate ?our ?social ?world. ?Our ?assessments ? as ? to ? whether ? or ? not ? individuals ? are ?morally ? responsible ? for ? producing ?particular ? outcomes ? impacts ? our ? social ? evaluations ? of ? them. ? Those ?who ? intentionally ?cause ?good ?outcomes ?(e.g., ?donating ?to ?charity, ?saving ?a ?drowning ?child) ?are ?evaluated ?positively, ? while ? those ? who ? intentionally ? cause ? bad ? outcomes ? (e.g., ? robbing ? a ? bank, ?committing ?murder) ?are ?evaluated ?negatively. ?The ?ability ?to ?make ?these ?assessments ?of ?others ?is ?critical ?in ?helping ?us ?determine ?who ?it ?is ?beneficial ?to ?align ?with ?and ?who ?it ?is ?important ?to ?avoid. ? ?As ? adults, ?we ? judge ? others ? quickly ? and ? automatically ? (e.g., ? Allbright, ? Kenny, ? & ?Malloy, ?1988; ?Ambady ?& ?Rosenthal, ?1993; ?Todorov, ?Mandisodza, ?Goren, ?& ?Hall, ?2005) ?and ?our ?initial ?judgments ?about ?others ?influence ?how ?we ?interpret ?their ?behaviors ?and ?evaluate ? them ? in ? future ? interactions ? (e.g., ? Darley ? & ? Fazio, ? 1980; ? Heyman ? & ? Gelman, ?1999; ?Higgins, ?Rholes, ?& ? Jones, ? 1977; ? Imamo?lu, ? 1976; ?Kelley, ? 1950; ?Rabin ?& ?Schrag, ?1999). ? For ? example, ? after ? positively ? evaluating ? others, ? we ? will ? be ? more ? inclined ? to ?continue ? evaluating ? them ? positively ? and ? will ? even ? interpret ? any ? of ? their ? future ?ambiguous ? actions ? as ? benevolent ? or ? prosocial. ? Similarly, ? if ? we ? initially ? hold ? negative ?evaluations ?of ?others, ?we ?will ?be ?more ?inclined ?to ?continue ?evaluating ?them ?negatively ?and ? will ? interpret ? their ? future ? ambiguous ? actions ? as ? hostile ? or ? antisocial. ? But ? how ?exactly ?do ?adults ?come ?to ?judge ?others ?so ?quickly ?and ?automatically? ?One ?possibility ?is ?that ?the ?ability ?to ?evaluate ?others ?is ?acquired ?over ?time ?and ?becomes ?automatized ?as ?we ?gain ? experience ?making ? these ? types ? of ? judgments ? (much ? like ? riding ? a ? bike). ? Another ? 2 ?possibility ? is ? that ? the ?capacity ? to ?evaluate ?others ? is ?a ? core ?ability ? that ? is ?built ? in, ?as ? it ?confers ?a ?survival-??related ?advantage ?(i.e., ?we ?need ?to ?be ?able ?to ?distinguish ?friend ?from ?foe). ?However, ? a ? third ? and ?more ?plausible ?possibility ? is ? that ?both ? nature ? and ?nurture ?play ? a ? role ? in ? developing ? our ? socio-??evaluative ? capabilities. ? Thus, ? it ? is ? important ? to ?discern ? how ?much ? of ? the ? ability ? is ? built ? in ? and ? how ?much ? experience ? is ? required ? to ?shape ?it. ?One ?way ?to ?get ?at ?this ?distinction ?is ?to ?study ?infants, ?as ?they ?have ?very ?minimal ?experience ?in ?the ?world. ?By ?studying ?infants, ?we ?can ?come ?closer ?to ?pinpointing ?when ?socio-??evaluative ? abilities ? begin ? to ? emerge ? and ?we ? can ? determine ? the ? relative ? role ? of ?experience ?on ?the ?development ?of ?these ?abilities. ?In ? the ? present ? investigation, ? I ? will ? demonstrate ? that ? 10-??month-??old ? infants ?display ? early ? nuanced ? socio-??moral ? evaluations. ? This ? work ? will ? suggest ? that ? infants ?evaluate ?moral ?agents ?on ? the ?basis ?of ? their ?underlying ?mental ? states, ?and ? that ? infants ?use ?these ?evaluations ?to ?guide ?their ?social ?preferences ?in ?future ?interactions. ?But ?before ?turning ? to ? the ? study ? of ? infants, ? it ? is ? first ? critical ? to ? discuss ? how ? children ? and ? adults ?evaluate ? moral ? agents, ? so ? that ? we ? have ? a ? basic ? understanding ? of ? what ? ?mature? ?evaluations ?look ?like. ?1.1 How ?do ?children ?and ?adults ?evaluate ?moral ?agents? ?Mature ? moral ? judgments ? rely ? not ? only ? on ? the ? analysis ? of ? the ? outcomes ? of ? an ?actor?s ?actions, ?but ?even ?more ?critically ?on ?the ?underlying ?mental ?states ?driving ?these ?actions ? (see ?Killen ?& ?Smetana, ?2008 ? for ?a ? review; ? see ?also ?Cushman, ?2008; ?Cushman, ?Sheketoff, ? Wharton, ? & ? Carey, ? 2013; ? Hamlin, ? in ? press; ? Leslie, ? Knobe, ? & ? Cohen, ? 2006; ?Malle, ? 1999; ? Nobes, ? Panagiotaki, ? & ? Pawson, ? 2009; ? Young, ? Cushman, ? Hauser, ? & ? Saxe, ? 3 ?2007; ?Young ?& ?Saxe, ?2009; ?Yuill ?& ?Perner, ?1988; ?Zelazo, ?Helwig, ?& ?Lau, ?1996). ?Those ?who ?act ? intentionally ?should ?be ?held ?morally ?responsible ? for ? their ?actions ?and ?should ?be ? more ? deserving ? of ? praise, ? blame, ? reward, ? or ? punishment ? than ? those ? who ? act ?unintentionally ? (and ? are ? not ? morally ? responsible ? for ? their ? actions). ? To ? illustrate ? the ?significance ?of ?mental ?states ?on ?moral ?judgments, ?imagine ?the ?following ?two ?scenarios ?(taken ?from ?Young ?et ?al., ?2007): ?1. Grace ?and ?her ?friend ?are ?taking ?a ?tour ?of ?a ?chemical ?plant. ?When ?Grace ?goes ?over ?to ?the ?coffee ?machine ?to ?pour ?some ?coffee, ?Grace?s ?friend ?asks ?for ?some ?sugar ?in ?her ?coffee. ?There ?is ?white ?powder ?in ?a ?container ?by ?the ?coffee. ?The ?white ?powder ?is ?a ?poison ?left ?behind ?by ?a ?scientist. ?The ?container ? is ? labeled ??toxic?, ?so ?Grace ?believes ?that ?the ?white ?powder ?is ?a ?poison. ?Grace ?puts ?the ?substance ?in ?her ?friend?s ?coffee. ?Her ?friend ?drinks ?the ?coffee ?and ?gets ?sick. ? ? ?2. Grace ?and ?her ?friend ?are ?taking ?a ?tour ?of ?a ?chemical ?plant. ?When ?Grace ?goes ?over ?to ?the ?coffee ?machine ?to ?pour ?some ?coffee, ?Grace?s ?friend ?asks ?for ?some ?sugar ?in ?her ?coffee. ?There ?is ?white ?powder ?in ?a ?container ?by ?the ?coffee. ?The ?white ?powder ?is ?a ?poison ?left ?behind ?by ?a ?scientist. ?The ?contained ?is ?labeled ??sugar?, ?so ?Grace ?believes ?that ? the ? white ? powder ? is ? regular ? sugar. ? Grace ? puts ? the ?substance ? in ?her ? friend?s ?coffee. ?Her ? friend ?drinks ? the ?coffee ?and ?gets ?sick. ? ? In ?both ?of ?these ?examples, ?Grace ?puts ?poison ?in ?her ?friend?s ?coffee, ?resulting ?in ?her ? friend ? getting ? sick. ? However, ? Grace ? can ? only ? be ? held ?morally ? responsible ? for ? her ?actions ? in ? the ? first ? case, ?where ? she ? believed ? the ?white ? powder ?was ? poison ? and ? thus, ?intentionally ? poisoned ? her ? friend. ? In ? the ? second ? scenario, ? Grace ? believed ? the ? powder ?was ? sugar, ? and ? thus ? only ? accidentally ? poisoned ? her ? friend. ? Consistent ? with ? these ?intuitions, ? adults ? rate ? the ? intentional ? harming ? as ? more ? blameworthy ? than ? the ?unintentional ?harming ? (Young ?et ?al., ?2007). ? Importantly, ? these ?examples ?demonstrate ? 4 ?that ? the ? exact ? same ? actions ? can ? be ? viewed ? differently ? depending ? on ? an ? actor?s ?underlying ? mental ? states. ? Thus, ? an ? analysis ? of ? an ? actor?s ? mental ? states ? is ? critical ? in ?making ?mature ?moral ?judgments. ?When ? there ? is ? a ?match ?between ?actors? ? intentions ? and ? the ?outcomes ? that ? they ?produce, ?children?s ?and ?adults? ?evaluations ?of ?others ?are ?clear ?cut?those ?who ?have ?bad ?intentions ?and ?produce ?bad ?outcomes ?are ?negatively ?evaluated, ?while ?those ?who ?have ?good ?intentions ?and ?produce ?good ?outcomes ?are ?positively ?evaluated. ?However, ?when ?outcome ? and ? intention ? conflict ? or ? when ? intention ? is ? ambiguous, ? young ? children ? and ?adults ? differ ? in ? their ? evaluations; ? young ? children ? rely ? more ? heavily ? on ? outcome ?information ?to ?evaluate ?others, ?while ?older ?children ?and ?adults ?privilege ?intention ?(e.g., ?Buchanan ? & ? Thompson, ? 1973; ? Gutkin, ? 1972; ? Imamo?lu, ? 1975; ? King, ? 1971; ? Piaget, ?1932/1965; ? Yuill, ? 1984). ? For ? example, ? in ? Jean ?Piaget?s ? (1932/1965) ?moral ? reasoning ?task, ?children ?were ?told ?stories ?about ?two ?different ?transgressors: ?one ?who ?accidentally ?broke ?15 ?cups, ?and ?one ?who ?intentionally ?broke ?one ?cup. ?When ?asked ?which ?of ?the ?two ?transgressors ? was ? ?naughtier,? ? younger ? children ? focused ? on ? outcome ? rather ? than ?intention, ? and ? judged ? the ? person ? who ? caused ? more ? damage ? (even ? though ? it ? was ?accidental) ?to ?be ?naughtier. ?It ?was ?not ?until ?around ?the ?age ?of ?10-??11 ?years ?that ?children ?started ?evaluating ?on ?the ?basis ?of ?intentions ?(i.e., ?judging ?the ?intentional ?transgressor ?as ?naughtier ?than ?the ?accidental ?transgressor). ?Thus, ?Piaget?s ?work ?suggests ?that ?there ?is ?a ??shift? ?from ?outcome-??based ?to ?intention-??based ?judgments ?across ?development. ?However, ?from ?Piaget?s ?seminal ?work, ?it ?is ?unclear ?as ?to ?whether ?the ?shift ?from ?outcome-??based ? to ? intention-??based ? judgments ? is ? a ? result ? of ? an ? understanding ? of ?intention ?appearing ?later ?on ?in ?development, ?or ?whether ?it ?simply ?reflects ?a ?difference ? 5 ?in ? how ? children ? and ? adults ? weigh ? outcome ? and ? intention ? information. ? Thus, ? it ? is ?important ?to ?make ?the ?distinction ?between ?children ?being ?aware ?of ?mental ?states ?and ?the ? ability ? to ?use ?mental ? states ? in ? their ? evaluations ? (Imamo?lu, ? 1975; ? Keasey, ? 1978). ?Although ? younger ? children ? in ? Piaget?s ? task ? did ? not ? reliably ? use ? intention ? in ? their ?naughtiness ?assessments, ?this ?does ?not ?necessarily ?mean ?that ?they ?were ?unaware ?of ?the ?actors? ? underlying ? mental ? states. ? Rather, ? the ? complexity ? of ? Piaget?s ? tasks ? may ? have ?potentially ?masked ?younger ?children?s ?abilities ?to ?factor ?intention ?into ?their ?evaluations ?of ?others. ?Firstly, ? Piaget?s ? task ? required ? children ? to ? hold ? two ? stories ? in ? their ?minds ? and ?they ?needed ?to ?compare ?the ?stories ?based ?on ?two ?competing ?variables ?(intentions ?and ?outcomes) ?before ?making ?their ?naughtiness ?assessments. ?Thus, ?the ?story-??pair ?task ?may ?have ?been ?too ?cognitively ?taxing ?to ?adequately ?assess ?the ?abilities ?of ?younger ?children ?(see ?Armsby, ?1971; ?Berg-??Cross, ?1975; ?Wellman, ?Larkey ?& ?Somerville, ?1979). ?Secondly, ?Piaget ?did ?not ?explicitly ?identify ?the ?actors? ? intentions?children ?needed ?to ?infer ?them ?based ? on ? contextual ? information. ? In ? addition, ? the ? severity ? of ? the ? outcome ?was ? often ?confounded ?with ?intent: ?the ?accidental ?perpetrator?s ?act ?led ?to ?a ?much ?worse ?outcome ?than ? did ? the ? intentional ? perpetrator?s ? act. ? Thus, ? younger ? children ?may ? have ? focused ?more ?strongly ?on ?the ?amount ?of ?damage ?caused ?because ?it ?was ?the ?most ?salient ?cue ?in ?Piaget?s ?scenarios, ?rather ?than ?because ?children ?explicitly ?believed ?that ?outcomes ?were ?more ? important ? than ? intentions ? (see ?Karniol, ? 1978 ? for ? a ? review; ? see ? also ?Berg-??Cross, ?1975; ?Nelson, ?1980; ?Nobes ?et ?al., ?2009; ?Nunmedal ?& ?Bass, ?1978). ?Several ? follow-??ups ? to ? Piaget?s ? seminal ? studies ? have ? supported ? the ? hypothesis ?that ? young ? children?s ? outcome-??based ? evaluations ? were ? due ? to ? methodological ? 6 ?difficulties ? rather ? than ? a ? lack ? of ? intention ? understanding. ? When ? task ? demands ? were ?decreased ?by ?using ?single ?stories, ?actors? ?intentions ?were ?highlighted, ?and/or ?outcomes ?were ?held ?constant, ?young ?children ?(as ?young ?as ?3 ?years ?of ?age; ?Nelson, ?1980) ?were ?able ?to ? use ? intention ? in ? their ? evaluations ? (see ? Baird ?& ? Astington, ? 2004; ? Karniol, ? 1978 ? for ?reviews; ?see ?also ?Berg-??Cross, ?1975; ?Keasey, ?1978; ?Miller ?& ?McCann, ?1979; ?Nummedal ?& ?Bass, ? 1976). ? However, ? these ? findings ? along ? with ? many ? others ? (e.g., ? Astington, ? 1986; ?Baird ? & ?Moses, ? 2001; ? Berndt ? & ? Berndt, ? 1975; ? Buchanan ?& ? Thompson, ? 1973; ? Farnill, ?1974; ? Gutkin, ? 1972; ? Imamo?lu, ? 1975; ? King, ? 1971) ? still ? moderately ? support ? Piaget?s ?developmental ? shift ? claims ? in ? that ? they ? still ? find ? age-??related ? increases ? in ? the ? use ? of ?intention ? in ? their ? judgments. ?When ? intention ? and ?outcome ?are ?directly ?pitted ? against ?one ? another ? (e.g., ? someone ? who ? has ? a ? positive ? intention ? but ? produces ? a ? negative ?outcome ? versus ? someone ? who ? has ? a ? negative ? intention ? but ? produces ? a ? positive ?outcome), ?younger ?children ?still ?make ?outcome-??based ?judgments. ?Thus, ?although ?young ?children ?may ?be ?able ?to ?use ?intention ?judgments ?earlier ?than ?originally ?hypothesized ?in ?some ?situations, ?they ?still ?do ?not ?reliably ?privilege ?it ?until ?they ?are ?older. ?However, ? more ? recent ? research ? in ? non-??moral ? domains ? suggests ? that ? young ?children ? do ? show ? more ? sensitivity ? to ? actors? ? underlying ? mental ? states ? when ? using ?implicit ?(or ?non-??verbal) ?measures. ?For ?example, ?young ?children ?typically ? fail ?standard ?false ?belief ? tasks ? that ? involve ?verbal ? responses, ?but ? they ?pass ? these ? tasks ?when ?using ?measurements ?of ?predictive ? eye ? gaze ?or ?other ?non-??verbal ?measures ? (e.g., ? Clements ?& ?Perner, ? 1994; ? Rubio-??Fern?ndez ? & ? Geurts, ? 2013). ? For ? example, ? Rubio-??Fern?ndez ? & ?Geurts ? (2013) ? told ? 3-??year-??old ? children ?modified ? false ? belief ? stories, ? using ? toy ? props. ?Children ?saw ?a ?girl ?putting ?her ?bananas ?into ?one ?of ?two ?fridges. ?When ?the ?girl ?was ?not ? 7 ?looking, ?the ?experimenter ?proceeded ?to ?move ?the ?bananas ?into ?the ?other ?fridge. ?When ?children ?were ?prompted ?to ?use ?the ?toys ?to ?continue ?acting ?out ?the ?story, ?they ?moved ?the ?girl ?towards ?the ?empty ?fridge, ?suggesting ?that ?they ?understood ?that ?the ?girl ?had ?a ?false ?belief ?that ?the ?bananas ?were ?in ?the ?fridge ?that ?she ?had ?originally ?put ?them ?in. ?Thus, ?non-??verbal ?measures, ?provide ?additional ?support ?for ?children?s ?implicit ?awareness ?of ?mental ?states, ?though ?children ?do ?not ?reliably ?use ?this ?information ?to ?make ?their ?explicit ?verbal ?responses. ?Using ?non-??verbal ?paradigms, ? then, ?might ?also ?be ?a ?good ?way ? to ?determine ?whether ?infants ?are ?sensitive ?to ?mental ?states. ? ?1.2 Infants? ?understanding ?of ?mental ?states ?Indeed, ? research ? in ? non-??moral ? domains ? suggests ? that ? infants ? have ? an ? early ?understanding ? of ? mental ? state ? concepts. ? Infants ? show ? sensitivity ? to ? beliefs ? (see ?Baillargeon, ? Scott, ?& ?Ze, ?2010 ? for ?a ? review; ? see ?also ?Kov?cs, ?T?gl?s, ?& ?Endress, ?2010; ?Senju, ? Southgate, ? Snape, ? Leonard, ? & ? Csibra, ? 2011) ? and ? intentions; ? infants ? interpret ?agents? ? actions ? as ? goal-??directed ? (see ? Woodward, ? 2005 ? for ? a ? review) ? and ? can ? infer ?unfulfilled ? (and ? thus ? unseen) ? goals, ? suggesting ? that ? their ? understanding ? of ? goals ? is ?mentalistic ? (e.g., ? Brandone ? & ? Wellman, ? 2009; ? Hamlin, ? Newman, ? & ? Wynn, ? 2009). ?Further, ?infants ?are ?more ?likely ?to ?imitate ?acts ?that ?are ?goal-??directed ?and ?that ?are ?done ?intentionally ? rather ? than ? those ? that ? are ? not ? goal-??directed ? or ? those ? that ? are ? done ?unintentionally ?(Carpenter, ?Akhtar, ?& ?Tomasello, ?1998; ?Hamlin, ?Hallinan, ?& ?Woodward, ?2008; ? Johnson, ? Booth, ? & ? O?Hearn, ? 2001; ? Lergestee ? & ?Markova, ? 2008; ?Meltzoff, ? 1995; ?Olineck ?& ?Poulin-??Dubois, ? 2005; ?Olineck ? ?& ? Poulin-??Dubois, ? 2009). ? Infants ? also ? display ?more ? negative ? affect ? and ? behaviors ? towards ? individuals ? who ? are ? intentionally ? mean ? 8 ?rather ? than ? those ? who ? are ? accidentally ? mean ? (Behne, ? Carpenter, ? Call, ? & ? Tomasello, ?2005; ?Dunfield ?& ?Kuhlmeier, ?2010; ?Marsh, ?Stavropoulos, ?Nienhuis, ?& ?Legerstee, ?2010). ? ?In ? the ? classic ? ?unwilling? ? vs. ? ?unable? ? paradigms, ? infants ? interacted ? with ? an ?experimenter ? who ? either ? had ? a ? negative ? (and ? fulfilled) ? or ? positive ? (but ? unfulfilled) ?intention: ?she ?was ?either ?unwilling ?to ?share ?a ?toy ?with ?the ?infant ?(e.g., ?teased ?the ?infant ?with ?the ?toy) ?or ?she ?tried ?to ?share ?the ?toy ?with ?the ?infant, ?but ?was ?unable ?to ?do ?so ?(e.g., ?accidentally ?dropped ?the ?toy ?out ?of ?the ?infant?s ?reach). ?Infants ?as ?young ?as ?6 ?months ?of ?age ? seemed ? to ? distinguish ? these ? interactions ? based ? on ? the ? experimenter?s ? intention; ?they ? were ? more ? likely ? to ? exhibit ? negative ? affect ? and ? gaze ? aversion ? when ? the ?experimenter ?was ?unwilling ?versus ?unable ?to ?share ?a ?toy ?(Behne ?et ?al., ?2005; ?Marsh ?et ?al., ?2010). ? In ?a ?follow-??up ?study, ?Dunfield ?& ?Kuhlmeier ?(2010) ?examined ?how ?toddlers? ?previous ? interactions ?with ?an ? ?unwilling? ?and ?an ? ?unable? ?actress ?would ? influence ?who ?they ?would ?choose ? to ?give ?a ? toy ? to ? in ? the ? future. ?Following ? the ?unwilling/unable ? task ?involving ? the ? two ?different ?actresses, ? toddlers ?watched ?as ? the ?actresses ?reached ? for ?a ?single ?toy ?that ?had ?fallen ?on ?the ?floor ?between ?them. ?Toddlers ?selectively ?gave ?it ?to ?the ?actress ? who ? had ? previously ? tried ? to ? share ? with ? them ? but ? had ? been ? unable ? to ? do ? so. ?Additionally, ?when ?another ?group ?of ?toddlers ?were ?given ?the ?choice ?to ?help ?an ?actress ?who ? had ? previously ? been ? successful ? in ? sharing ? a ? toy ? with ? them ? (fulfilled ? positive ?intention, ? good ? outcome) ? or ? an ? actress ? who ? had ? been ? unable ? to ? give ? them ? the ? toy ?(failed ?positive ?intention, ?bad ?outcome), ?toddlers ?helped ?the ?actresses ?equally. ?That ?is, ?toddlers? ?decisions ?to ?help ?were ?primarily ?influenced ?by ?intention ?and ?not ?by ?outcome. ?Taken ? together, ? these ? studies ? suggest ? that ? intentions ? play ? a ? role ? in ? infants? ? and ? 9 ?toddlers? ?first-??party ?evaluations ?of ?others ?and ?these ?evaluations ?subsequently ?influence ?toddlers? ?own ?prosocial ?behaviors. ?1.3 Infants? ?third-??party ?evaluations ?of ?morally-??relevant ?actions ?A ? growing ? body ? of ? research ? has ? started ? focusing ? on ? infants? ? third-??party ?evaluations, ?specifically ?as ?they ?apply ?to ?morally-??relevant ?actions ?(e.g., ?Hamlin, ?in ?press; ?Hamlin, ?Mahajan, ? Liberman, ? & ?Wynn, ? 2013; ?Hamlin ?& ?Wynn, ? 2011; ?Hamlin ?& ?Wynn, ?2012; ? Hamlin, ?Wynn, ? & ? Bloom, ? 2007; ? Hamlin, ?Wynn, ? & ? Bloom, ? 2010; ? Hamlin, ?Wynn, ?Bloom, ?& ?Mahajan, ?2011; ?Schmidt ?& ?Sommerville, ?2011). ?The ?benefit ?of ?looking ?at ?third-??party ? evaluations ? is ? that ? infants ? are ? not ? directly ? affected ? by ? third-??party ? interactions; ?they ? are ? neither ? benefited ? nor ? harmed ? by ? the ? interactions. ? As ? first-??party ? actions ? are ?experienced ? first ? hand, ? they ? are ? presumably ? both ? highly ? salient ? and ? fairly ? easily ?interpreted. ?Thus, ? third-??party ?evaluation ? tasks ?help ? to ?determine ?whether ? infants ?can ?go ? beyond ? evaluating ? those ?whose ? actions ? influence ? them ?directly?an ? ability ? that ? is ?clearly ?an ?essential ?requirement ?for ?moral ?evaluation. ? ? ?The ? general ? design ? of ? infants? ? third-??party ? evaluation ? tasks ? involves ? infants ?watching ?two ?social ?events ?in ?alternation. ?In ?one ?event, ?a ?character ?behaves ?prosocially ?towards ? a ? Protagonist ? (e.g., ? helps ? the ? Protagonist ? achieve ? a ? goal), ? and ? in ? the ? other ?event, ?a ?different ?character ?behaves ?antisocially ?towards ?the ?Protagonist ?(e.g., ?hinders ?the ?Protagonist ? from ?achieving ? a ? goal). ? Following ? these ? events, ? infants ? are ?presented ?with ? the ?prosocial ? and ?antisocial ? characters ? and ? infants? ? preference ? for ? one ? character ?over ? another ? is ? assessed ? using ? different ? preference ?methodologies ? depending ? on ? the ?age ?of ?the ?infant. ?For ?younger ?infants ?who ?are ?not ?yet ?capable ?of ?reaching, ?preference ?is ? 10 ?measured ?by ?examining ?infants? ?relative ?visual ?attention ?to ?each ?of ?the ?two ?characters. ?Longer ? looking ? time ? towards ? one ? of ? the ? characters ? is ? used ? to ? indicate ? infants? ?preference ?(Fantz, ?1965). ?For ?older ?infants, ?a ?manual ?choice ?method ?is ?used; ?infants ?are ?asked ?to ?select ?the ?character ?that ?they ?prefer ?by ?reaching ?out ?and ?touching ?one ?of ?the ?two ? characters. ?Assessing ? infants? ? preferences ? to ? approach ? (or ? alternatively ? to ? avoid) ?certain ?characters ?can ?indirectly ?inform ?us ?of ?their ?social ?evaluations ?of ?the ?characters, ?based ? on ? the ? assumption ? that ? they ? will ? approach ? those ? that ? they ? evaluate ? more ?positively ?and ?avoid ?those ?that ?they ?evaluate ?more ?negatively. ?Findings ?from ?these ?tasks ?support ?the ?notion ?that ?infants ?as ?young ?as ?3-??months ?do ?differentially ?evaluate ?others, ?preferring ?those ?who ?act ?prosocially ?over ? those ?who ?act ?antisocially ?(e.g., ?Hamlin ?et ?al., ?2007); ?infants ?prefer ?those ?who ?help ?others ?achieve ?a ?goal ? rather ? than ? those ? who ? hinder ? others ? from ? achieving ? their ? goals, ? and ? they ? also ?prefer ? those ? who ? give ? to ? others ? rather ? than ? take ? from ? them ? (e.g., ? Hamlin ? & ? Wynn, ?2011). ?For ?example, ?Hamlin ?& ?Wynn, ?2011 ?showed ?3-?? ?and ?5-??month-??old ?infants ?puppet ?shows ?in ?which ?a ?Protagonist ?puppet ?played ?with ?a ?ball. ?After ?tossing ?and ?catching ?the ?ball ? a ? few ? times, ? the ? Protagonist ?would ? drop ? the ? ball ? to ? one ? side ? of ? the ? stage. ? Then, ?either ? a ?Giver ? puppet ?would ? roll ? the ? ball ? back ? to ? the ? Protagonist, ? or ? a ?Taker ? puppet ?would ? take ? the ?ball ? and ? run ?away ?with ? it. ?After ? infants ?were ?habituated ? to ? these ? two ?events, ? their ?preferences ? for ? the ?Giver ?and ? the ?Taker ?were ?assessed. ?Three-??month-??old ?infants ?preferentially ?looked ?at ?the ?Giver ?puppet ?compared ?to ?the ?Taker ?puppet ?and ?5-??month-??old ?infants ?preferentially ?reached ?for ?the ?Giver ?puppet. ?Additional ?work ?done ?by ?Hamlin ?et ?al., ?2007 ?suggests ? that ?by ?6 ?months ?of ?age, ? infants ?not ?only ?show ?an ?active ? 11 ?preference ? towards ? prosocial ? individuals, ? but ? also ? an ? aversion ? towards ? antisocial ?individuals. ?Although ? these ? infant ? social ? evaluation ? tasks ? do ? not ? directly ? assess ? infants? ?moral ?judgments ?per ?se ?(i.e., ?researchers ?cannot ?directly ?ask ?infants ?questions ?that ?are ?typically ? used ? to ? assess ? moral ? judgments ? in ? adults1; ? they ? cannot ? ask ? infants ? who ? is ?morally ? responsible, ? whether ? an ? action ? is ? right ? or ? wrong, ? blameworthy ? or ?praiseworthy, ?etc.), ?they ?do ?use ?measures ?that ?can ?perhaps ?indirectly ?inform ?us ?of ?their ?moral ? judgments. ? Presumably, ? infants? ? assessments ? of ? whether ? agents ? are ? morally ?responsible ? should ? influence ? how ? they ? evaluate ? them ? (i.e. ? either ? positively ? or ?negatively), ? and ? these ?evaluations ? should ? subsequently ? affect ? their ? social ?preferences ?(i.e., ?who ?they ?decide ?to ? interact ?with). ?However, ? from ?these ?previous ?paradigms, ? it ? is ?difficult ? to ? discern ? whether ? infants ? are ? actually ? using ? moral ? assessments ? in ? their ?evaluations ?of ?others. ?Recall ? that ?mature ?moral ? judgments ?take ? into ?consideration ?the ?outcome ?of ?others? ?actions, ?but ?they ?rely ?more ?heavily ?on ?the ?underlying ?mental ?states ?driving ? those ? actions. ? In ? the ? aforementioned ? paradigms, ? the ? prosocial ? and ? antisocial ?actors ?always ?have ?intentions ?that ?are ?consistent ?with ?the ?outcomes ?that ?they ?produce. ?For ?example, ?the ?Giver ?has ?a ?positive ?intention ?and ?acts ?according ?to ?that ?intention ?by ?giving ?the ?ball ?back ?to ?the ?Protagonist. ?By ?contrast, ?the ?Taker ?has ?a ?negative ?intention ?and ?acts ?consistently ?with ?that ?intention ?to ?produce ?a ?negative ?outcome ?(i.e. ?steals ?the ?ball). ? Thus, ? in ? these ? cases ? it ? is ? difficult ? to ? say ? whether ? infants ? are ? simply ? judging ?characters ? based ? on ? the ? observable ? outcomes ? that ? they ? produce ? (e.g., ? giving ? = ? good, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 ?Although ?more ?recent ?research ?has ?assessed ?19-??month-??old ?infants? ?decisions ?to ?reward ?or ?punish ?individuals ?based ?on ?their ?past ?behaviors ?(Hamlin ?et ?al., ?2011). ?After ?viewing ?prosocial ?and ?antisocial ?acts, ?infants ?preferred ?to ?reward ?prosocial ?actors ?(i.e. ?gave ?a ?treat ?to ?them) ?and ?punish ?antisocial ?actors ?(i.e. ?took ?a ?treat ?away ?from ?them). ? 12 ?taking ?= ?bad), ?or ?whether ? infants ?are ?privileging ?mental ? states ? in ? their ?evaluations ?of ?others ?(e.g., ?positive ?intent ?= ?good, ?negative ?intent ?= ?bad). ?One ? way ? to ? disentangle ? whether ? infants ? are ? relying ? solely ? on ? observable ?outcomes ?or ?whether ?they ?are ?considering ?actors? ?underlying ?mental ?states ?would ?be ?to ?pit ?outcome ?and ?intention ?against ?each ?other. ?Hamlin ?(in ?press) ?showed ?infants ?puppet ?shows ?involving ?two ?different ?events ?(depicted ?in ?Figure ?1): ?(1) ?failed ?helping ?(2) ?failed ?hindering. ?During ?failed ?helping ?events, ?infants ?saw ?a ?Protagonist ?struggling ?to ?open ?a ?box ?to ?get ?a ?toy ?sitting ?inside ?of ?it. ?Then, ?a ?Failed ?Helper ?puppet ?attempted ?to ?help ?the ?Protagonist ? open ? the ? box, ? but ? was ? unable ? to ? do ? so. ? This ? resulted ? in ? the ? Protagonist ?failing ?to ?get ?the ?toy. ?During ?failed ?hindering ?events, ?infants ?again ?saw ?the ?Protagonist ?struggling ? to ? open ? the ? box ? to ? get ? the ? toy ? sitting ? inside ? of ? it. ? But ? this ? time, ? a ? Failed ?Hinderer ?puppet ?jumped ?on ?the ?lid, ?slamming ?the ?box ?shut. ?However, ?despite ?the ?Failed ?Hinderer?s ?attempts ?to ?block ?the ?Protagonist ? from ?getting ?the ?toy, ? the ?Protagonist ?still ?managed ? to ?open ? the ?box, ? fulfilling ? its ? goal. ?When ? infants ?were ? given ? a ? forced ? choice ?between ? the ? Failed ?Helper ? (who ? had ? a ? positive ? intention, ? but ? was ? associated ? with ? a ?negative ? outcome) ? and ? the ? Failed ? Hinderer ? (who ? had ? a ? negative ? intention, ? but ? was ?associated ?with ?a ?positive ?outcome), ?they ?preferentially ?reached ?for ?the ?Failed ?Helper ?by ?8-??months ?of ?age. ?These ?results ?suggest ?that ?infants ?can ?in ?fact ?evaluate ?moral ?agents ?on ?the ?basis ?of ? their ?underlying ? intentions, ?and ? they ?use ? those ?evaluations ? to ?guide ? their ?social ?preferences ?in ?future ?interactions. ? 13 ? ?Figure ?1. ?Failed ?helping ?and ?failed ?hindering ?events ?(Hamlin, ?in ?press) ?1.4 Failed ?attempts ?vs. ?accidents ?However, ? in ? the ? case ? of ? failed ? attempts ? an ? actor?s ? intentions ? are ? extremely ?salient. ? So ? even ? though ? the ? outcome ? achieved ? does ? not ? match ? the ? actor?s ? original ?Protagonist ?tries ?to ?open ?box ?to ?obtain ?toy Protagonist ?fails ?to ?open ?box, ?despite ?bear?s ?efforts ?to ?help Bear ?tries ?to ?help ?open ?box Protagonist ?fails ?to ?obtain ?toy Failed ?Helping ?Failed ?Hindering ?Protagonist ?tries ?to ?open ?box ?to ?obtain ?toy Protagonist ?succeeds ?at ?opening ?box, ?despite ?bear?s ?attempts ?to ?hinder Protagonist ?obtains ?toy Bear ?slams ?lid ?shut 14 ?intention, ? their ? actions ? are ? still ? very ? clearly ? directed ? towards ? a ? particular ? goal: ? the ?content ? of ? their ? intention ? (i.e., ? to ? help ? open ? a ? box ? or ? slam ? a ? box ? closed) ? is ? directly ?readable ? from ?the ?actions ? themselves. ? In ?addition, ? failed ?actors ?are ?merely ?associated ?with ?a ?particular ?outcome, ?rather ?than ?causally ?connected ?to ?it. ?Thus, ?they ?may ?be ?less ?directly ?connected ?to ?the ?oppositely-??valenced ?outcome ?than ?if ?they ?had ?directly ?caused ?it. ? In ? the ? case ? of ? accidents, ? however, ? these ? features ? are ? often ? reversed: ? actors? ?intentions ?may ?be ?ambiguous ?or ?even ?absent ?when ?they ?accidentally ?do ?something, ?but ?they ? still ? play ? a ? causal ? role ? in ? producing ? a ? particular ? outcome. ? Thus, ? actors ? who ?accidentally ?do ?something ?are ?more ?directly ? linked ?to ?the ?outcome ?that ? they ?produce. ?For ?example, ?a ?driver ?who ?accidentally ?crashes ?into ?a ?pedestrian ?may ?not ?have ?intended ?to ?hit ? the ?pedestrian, ?but ?still ?played ?a ?causal ? role ? in ? injuring ? the ?pedestrian. ?Because ?actors? ? intentions ? are ? more ? ambiguous ? in ? accidents ? than ? in ? failed ? attempts, ? and ?outcomes ?are ?more ?salient ?because ?they ?are ?causally ?connected ?to ?the ?actors, ?evaluating ?actors ?who ?cause ?accidents ?may ?be ?more ?difficult ?than ?judging ?actors ?who ?try, ?but ?fail ?to ?achieve ? a ? particular ? goal ? (e.g., ? Cushman ? et ? al., ? 2013; ? Hamlin, ? in ? press; ? Young ? et ? al., ?2007). ? Indeed, ? children ?have ?a ?harder ? time ?exculpating ?accidental ?harmers ?and ? judge ?them ?more ?harshly ?than ?those ?who ?try, ?but ?fail ?to ?harm ?(e.g., ?Baird ?& ?Astington, ?2004; ?Cushman ? et ? al., ? 2013; ? Killen, ? Mulvey, ? Richardson, ? Jampol, ? & ? Woodward, ? 2011), ? and ?even ?adults ?assign ?some ?blame ?to ?accidental ?harmers ?in ?spite ?of ?them ?having ?innocent ?intentions ?(e.g., ?Cushman, ?2008; ?Young ?et ?al., ?2007; ?Young ?& ?Saxe, ?2009). ? ?Evaluations ?of ? accidental ? actors ? are ? further ? complicated ?by ?our ?perceptions ?of ?negligence ?(e.g., ?Heider, ?1958; ?Nobes ?et ?al., ?2009; ?Yuill ?& ?Perner, ?1988). ?For ?instance, ?if ?we ?think ?that ?someone ?should ?have ?been ?able ?to ?anticipate ?a ?harmful ?outcome ?(even ?if ? 15 ?they ?did ?not ?intend ?for ?the ?harmful ?outcome ?to ?occur), ?we ?may ?blame ?them ?anyway ?to ?the ?extent ?that ?we ?perceive ?their ?actions ?to ?be ?negligent ?or ?reckless. ?In ?these ?cases, ?it ?is ?assumed ?that ?actors ?could ?have ?avoided ?these ?accidental ?harms ?by ?being ?more ?careful. ?By ?contrast, ?if ?we ?believe ?that ?there ?was ?no ?way ?that ?an ?actor ?could ?have ?anticipated ?the ?bad ?result, ?then ?we ?do ?not ?hold ?them ?morally ?responsible ?and ?we ?do ?not ?blame ?them ?for ?their ?actions. ? ?Taken ? together, ? it ? is ? clear ? that ? evaluating ?moral ? agents ? is ?more ?difficult ? in ? the ?case ?of ?accidents ?than ?failed ?attempts. ?In ?the ?case ?of ?accidents, ?an ?actor?s ?intentions ?are ?ambiguous ?or ? even ? absent, ? actors ?play ? a ? causal ? role ? in ? producing ? valenced ?outcomes ?(rather ? than ? simply ? being ? associated ? with ? them), ? and ? actors ? may ? be ? perceived ? as ?negligent. ? Thus, ? perhaps ? a ? more ? stringent ? test ? of ? whether ? infants ? are ? using ? moral ?assessments ? in ? their ? evaluations ? of ? others ? would ? be ? to ? see ? whether ? infants ?differentially ?evaluate ?intentional ?and ?accidental ?agents ?on ?the ?basis ?of ?their ?underlying ?mental ? states. ? Although ? previous ? research ? has ? shown ? that ? infants ? can ? distinguish ?between ? accidental ? and ? intentional ? acts ? by ? 14-??months ? of ? age ? (e.g., ? Carpenter ? et ? al., ?1998; ? Olineck ? & ? Poulin-??Dubois, ? 2005), ? it ? is ? not ? yet ? known ? how ? infants ? will ? socially ?evaluate ? accidental ? and ? intentional ? agents ? in ? moral ? scenarios. ? Thus, ? the ? present ?investigation ?seeks ?to ?determine ?whether ?infants ?differentially ?evaluate ?intentional ?and ?accidental ?actors ?on ?the ?basis ?of ?their ?underlying ?mental ?states. ? ? ? 16 ?1.5 The ?present ?investigation ?In ? the ? present ? study, ? 10-??month-??old ? infants ? viewed ? puppet ? shows ? in ? which ? a ?Protagonist ? was ? helped ? or ? hindered2 ?either ? intentionally ? or ? accidentally. ? Critically, ?across ? both ? the ? Helping ? and ? the ? Hindering ? conditions, ? the ? intentional ? acts ? were ?identical, ?as ?were ?the ?accidental ?acts. ?The ?only ?thing ?that ?made ?these ?actions ?prosocial ?or ?antisocial, ?then, ?was ?how ?they ?related ?to ?the ?Protagonist?s ?initial ?goal. ?That ?is, ?having ?the ? intention ? to ? help ? the ?Protagonist ? achieve ? a ? goal ? could ? be ? viewed ?more ?positively ?than ? not ? having ? any ? intention ? to ? help, ? whereas ? having ? the ? intention ? to ? hinder ? the ?Protagonist ?could ?be ?viewed ?more ?negatively ?than ?not ?having ?any ?intention ?to ?hinder. ?Following ? the ? puppet ? shows, ? infants ? were ? given ? a ? forced ? choice ? between ? the ?intentional ?and ?accidental ?actors. ?If ? infants, ? like ?adults, ?privilege ?mental ?states ?in ?their ?evaluations ?of ?others, ?then ?they ?should ?subsequently ?prefer ?the ?actor ?who ?intentionally ?helps ? the ? Protagonist ? rather ? than ? the ? actor ? who ? accidentally ? helps, ? but ? they ? should ?prefer ? the ? actor ?who ? accidentally ? hinders ? the ? Protagonist ? rather ? than ? the ? actor ?who ?intentionally ?hinders. ?Ten-??month-??old ? infants, ? in ? particular, ? were ? selected ? for ? this ? study ? because ? we ?know ? from ? previous ? research ? that ? infants ? privilege ? mental ? states ? when ? evaluating ?failed ? actors ? by ? 8-??months ? of ? age ? (Hamlin, ? in ? press). ? Because ? evaluating ? accidental ?actors ?is ?thought ?to ?be ?more ?difficult ?than ?evaluating ?failed ?actors ?(e.g., ?Cushman ?et ?al., ?2013; ?Hamlin, ?in ?press; ?Young ?et ?al., ?2007), ?I ?decided ?to ?test ?a ?slightly ?older ?age ?group ?for ?the ?present ?study. ?Additionally, ?previous ?research ?shows ?that ?infants ?can ?distinguish ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?2 ?In ?prior ?studies ?(e.g., ?Hamlin ?et ?al., ?2007) ?the ?term ??hindered? ?is ?used ?to ?denote ?actions ?that ?prevent ?an ?agent ?from ?achieving ?a ?particular ?goal. ?However, ?the ?term ??hindered? ?in ?the ?present ?study ?will ?refer ?to ?an ?action ?that ?results ?in ?a ?Protagonist?s ?goal ?being ?reversed. ? ? 17 ?between ? accidental ? and ? intentional ? actions ? by ? 14-??months ? of ? age, ? so ? using ? a ? slightly ?younger ?age ?group ?can ?help ?us ?determine ?whether ?the ?ability ?to ?make ?this ?distinction ?emerges ?earlier ?than ?previously ?studied. ? ? ? 18 ?2 Experiment ?2.1 Participants ?Sixty ?healthy, ?full-??term ?infants ?(32 ?male ?and ?28 ?female, ?Xage ?= ?10 ?months ?and ?3 ?days, ?range ?= ?9 ?months ?and ?13 ?days ?to ?10 ?months ?and ?20 ?days) ?were ?recruited ?from ?the ?Greater ? Vancouver ? region. ? Forty-??six ? additional ? infants ? were ? excluded ? from ? analyses ?due ?to ?experimental ?errors ?(13) ?fussiness ?(11) ?failure ?to ?choose ?either ?puppet ?(15), ?or ?parental ?interference ?(7). ? ?2.2 Procedure ?The ?experimental ?sessions ?were ?conducted ?in ?a ?3.4 ?m ?x ?3.7 ?m ?room. ?The ?room ?contained ? a ?black ? table ? (1.2 ?m ?x ?1.5 ?m) ? that ? served ? as ? the ?puppet ? show ?stage. ?Three ?black ?curtains ?extended ?down ?from ?the ?ceiling, ? to ?surround ?the ?rear ?and ?two ?sides ?of ?the ? table. ? An ? additional ? curtain ? (approximately ? 60 ? cm ? from ? the ? rear ? curtain) ? was ?lowered ? between ? trials ? to ? occlude ? the ? stage. ? Infants ? sat ? on ? their ? parents? ? laps ? at ? the ?front ? end ? of ? the ? table ? (approximately ? 60 ? cm ? from ? the ? occluding ? curtain), ? facing ? the ?puppet ?show ?stage. ?Parents ?were ?instructed ?to ?sit ?quietly ?for ?the ?duration ?of ?the ?study; ?they ?were ?asked ?not ?to ?communicate ?with ?their ?infants ?or ?to ?try ?to ?direct ?their ?attention ?in ?any ?way. ? ?A ? puppeteer ? experimenter ? performed ? the ? puppet ? shows ? from ?behind ? the ? rear ?curtain. ?Her ?head ?and ?torso ?were ?completely ?hidden ?from ?the ? infants, ?and ?she ?wore ?a ?black ?long-??sleeved ?shirt ?to ?hide ?her ?arms. ?A ?coder, ?who ?could ?not ?see ?the ?puppet ?shows ?and ?who ?was ? unaware ? of ? the ? puppets? ? identities, ? recorded ? infants? ? attention ? to ? each ? 19 ?event ?from ?behind ?the ?curtain ?on ?the ?infants? ?right ?side; ?the ?coder ?observed ?the ?infants ?by ?peeking ?through ?a ?small ?hole ?in ?the ?curtain. ?Infants? ?attention ?following ?each ?event ?was ?coded ?using ?the ?program ?JHab, ?and ?coding ?began ?when ?the ?puppeteer ?signaled ?to ?the ?coder ?that ?the ?action ?was ?over, ?by ?softly ?clicking ?her ?tongue. ?Infants? ?attention ?to ?the ?stage ?was ?recorded ?until ?one ?of ?two ?conditions ?was ?met: ?(1) ?infants ?looked ?away ?for ?2 ?consecutive ?seconds, ?or ?(2) ?a ?maximum ?of ?30 ?seconds ?had ?elapsed. ? ?All ?sessions ?were ?recorded ?using ?two ?video ?cameras: ?one ?camera ?was ?located ?in ?front ?of ? the ?rear ?curtain ?and ?was ?used ?to ?record ?the ? infants ?during ? the ?puppet ?shows ?and ?choice ?procedures; ?the ?second ?camera ?was ?located ?behind ?the ?infant ?and ?was ?used ?to ?record ?events ?on ?the ?stage. ?A ?digital ?mixer ?was ?used ?to ?combine ?the ?recordings ?from ?both ?cameras ?into ?one ?finalized ?video. ?Finalized ?videos ?consisted ?of ?a ?large ?main ?image ?of ?each ?infant?s ?face, ?with ?a ?smaller ?image ?of ?the ?stimuli ?embedded ?in ?the ?top ?left ?corner ?of ?the ?main ?image. ?2.2.1 Familiarization ?Infants ?were ?randomly ?assigned ?to ?either ?the ?Helping ?or ?the ?Hindering ?condition. ?In ? each ? condition, ? infants ? were ? familiarized ? to ? two ? Intentional ? and ? two ? Accidental ?events ?in ?alternation, ? for ?a ?total ?of ?4 ?events. ?Events ?began ?when ?the ?occluding ?curtain ?was ? raised ? to ? reveal ? the ? stimuli. ? At ? the ? start ? of ? each ? event, ? infants ? saw ? two ? puppets ?standing ? on ? opposite ? sides ? of ? the ? stage, ? facing ? forward: ? (1) ? a ? leopard ? protagonist ?puppet ? and ? (2) ? one ? of ? two ? dog ? puppets: ? either ? the ? Intentional ? or ? the ? Accidental ?character. ?The ?dogs? ? identities ?were ?distinguished ?by ?their ?shirt ?color ?(teal ?or ?purple), ?and ?each ?dog ?appeared ?on ?opposite ? sides ?of ? the ? stage. ?For ?example, ? if ? the ? Intentional ?character ? started ?out ?on ? the ? left ? side ?of ? the ? stage ?during ? intentional ? events ? (with ? the ? 20 ?Protagonist ? appearing ? on ? the ? right ? side ? of ? the ? stage), ? then ? the ? Accidental ? character ?would ?begin ?on ?the ?right ?side ?of ? the ?stage ?(with ?the ?Protagonist ?appearing ?on ?the ? left ?side ?of ?the ?stage) ?during ?accidental ?events. ?A ? clear ? shelf ? made ? of ? Plexiglas ? (16 ? cm ? x ? 16 ? cm ? x ? 28.5 ? cm) ? was ? positioned ?between ?the ?two ?puppets ?on ?stage, ?and ?was ?always ?situated ?nearest ?to ?the ?dog ?puppet. ?A ?small ?yellow ?rubber ?duck ?sat ?on ?the ?floor ?of ?the ?stage, ?centered ?in ?front ?of ?the ?shelf. ?Additionally, ? a ? small ? stuffed ? moose ? either ? sat ? on ? top ? of ? the ? shelf ? (in ? the ? Helping ?condition) ? or ? beside ? the ? shelf, ? on ? the ? side ? nearest ? to ? the ? leopard ? puppet ? (in ? the ?Hindering ?condition). ?In ?the ?Helping ?condition, ? infants ?saw ?events ?in ?which ?the ?Protagonist ?struggled ?and ?subsequently ?failed ?at ?getting ?the ?toy ?moose ?off ?of ?the ?shelf. ?The ?Protagonist?s ?goal ?was ?subsequently ? facilitated ?by ?each ?of ? the ? two ?dogs ?on ?alternating ? trials?both ?dogs ?knocked ?down ?the ?shelf, ?giving ?the ?leopard ?access ?to ?the ?toy. ?Critically, ?one ?dog ?pushed ?the ?shelf ?down ?intentionally, ?while ?the ?other ?dog ?accidentally ?bumped ?into ?the ?shelf ?and ?knocked ? it ?down. ?Thus, ? in ?both ?events, ? the ?Protagonist?s ?goal ?was ? facilitated, ?but ?only ?the ?Intentional ?character ?demonstrated ?a ?clear ?positive ?intention. ?In ? the ? Hindering ? condition, ? infants ? saw ? events ? in ? which ? the ? Protagonist ?struggled, ?but ?eventually ?succeeded ?in ?putting ?a ?toy ?moose ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf. ?After ?this ?initial ? success, ? the ? Protagonist?s ? goal ? was ? subsequently ? hindered ? by ? each ? of ? the ? two ?dogs ?on ?alternating ?trials?both ?dogs ?reversed ?the ?Protagonist?s ?goal ?by ?knocking ?down ?the ? shelf, ? causing ? the ? toy ?moose ? to ? fall ? back ? down ? onto ? the ? floor. ? As ? in ? the ?Helping ?condition, ? one ? dog ? pushed ? the ? shelf ? down ? intentionally, ? while ? the ? other ? dog ?accidentally ? bumped ? into ? the ? shelf ? and ? knocked ? it ? down. ? Thus, ? in ? both ? events, ? the ? 21 ?Protagonist?s ? goal ? was ? hindered, ? but ? only ? the ? Intentional ? character ? demonstrated ? a ?clear ?negative ?intention. ?As ? previously ? noted, ? the ? Intentional ? and ? Accidental ? acts ? were ? the ? exact ? same ?across ? conditions. ? The ? Intentional ? acts ? always ? involved ? pushing ? down ? the ? shelf ?purposefully, ? while ? the ? Accidental ? acts ? always ? involved ? bumping ? into ? the ? shelf ?accidentally. ?However, ?what ?makes ?these ?acts ?prosocial ?or ?antisocial ?depends ?on ?what ?the ? leopard?s ? initial ?goal ?was?knocking ?down ?the ?shelf ?after ?the ? leopard ?struggled ?to ?get ? the ? toy ?moose ? off ? of ? the ? shelf ? would ? be ? considered ? prosocial, ? whereas ? knocking ?down ?the ?shelf ?after ?the ?leopard ?had ?succeeded ?in ?putting ?the ?toy ?moose ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf ?would ?be ?considered ?antisocial. ?Each ?event ?is ?described ?in ?more ?detail ?below ?and ?an ?illustration ?of ?the ?critical ?actions ?in ?each ?event ?is ?depicted ?in ?Figure ?23. ? ? ? 2.2.1.1 Intentional ?helping ?The ? leopard ? and ? the ? dog ? turned ? simultaneously ? to ? ?look? ?4 ?at ? each ? other, ? and ?then ?turned ?back ?to ?face ?forward. ?The ?leopard ?ran ?over ?to ?the ?shelf, ?peeked ?around ?the ?shelf ? and ? looked ?at ? the ? toy ?duck. ?Then, ? the ? leopard ? looked ?up ? towards ? the ? top ?of ? the ?shelf, ?where ?the ?toy ?moose ?sat. ?With ?its ?arms ?outstretched, ?the ?leopard ?jumped ?up ?and ?down ?(twice) ?alongside ?the ?shelf, ?in ?an ?apparent ?attempt ?to ?reach ?the ?toy ?moose ?sitting ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf; ?this ?jumping ?action ?was ?repeated ?twice ?more, ?with ?the ?last ?attempt ?being ? slower ? and ?more ? exaggerated ? to ? emphasize ? the ? leopard?s ? struggle ? to ? reach ? the ?toy. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?3 ?For ?the ?sake ?of ?brevity, ?not ?all ?actions ?were ?depicted ?in ?Figure ?2. ? ?Only ?the ?critical ?actions ?relating ?to ?the ?Protagonist?s ?goal, ?or ?to ?the ?Intentional ?or ?Accidental ?actions ?performed ?by ?helpers ?or ?hinderers ?were ?included. ?4 ?From ?this ?point ?forward, ?the ?use ?of ?the ?word ??look? ?refers ?to ?how ?we ?hoped ?the ?puppets? ?actions ?appeared ?to ?the ?infants. ? 22 ?Having ?been ?unsuccessful ? in ? retrieving ? the ? toy ?moose, ? the ? leopard ? lowered ? its ?head ?and ?ran ?to ?the ?back ?corner ?of ?the ?stage. ?The ?dog ?then ?turned ?to ?look ?at ?the ?leopard, ?and ?then ?up ?to ? look ?at ? the ?toy ?moose, ? in ?order ? to ? imply ?that ? the ?dog ?had ? inferred ?the ?leopard?s ? goal. ? The ? dog ? then ? ran ? directly ? to ? the ? side ? of ? the ? shelf ? and ? ?intentionally? ?pushed ? it ? over, ? knocking ? the ? toy ?moose ? off ? of ? the ? shelf. ? To ?make ? the ? pushing ? action ?appear ? intentional, ? the ? dog ? puppet ? looked ? at ? the ? shelf, ? leaned ? into ? it, ? and ? used ? both ?paws ?to ?push ?it ?over. ?Once ?the ?shelf ?fell ?down ?and ?the ?toy ?was ?within ?reach, ?the ?leopard ?ran ? towards ? the ? shelf, ?picked ?up ? the ? toy ?moose, ? and ?bounced ?up ?and ? two ? times. ?This ?bouncing ? action ? was ? purposefully ? included ? to ? illustrate ? the ? leopard?s ? ?happiness? ? at ?retrieving ?the ?toy ?moose. ?The ?dog ?then ?grasped ?the ?toy ?duck ?that ?had ?been ?resting ?on ?the ?floor ?in ?front ?of ?the ?shelf, ?and ?ran ?off ?stage. ?2.2.1.2 Accidental ?helping ?The ?leopard ?and ?the ?dog ?turned ?simultaneously ?to ?look ?at ?each ?other, ?and ?then ?turned ?back ? to ? face ? forward. ?Then, ? the ?dog ?ran ?off ?stage, ?disappearing ? from ?view ?and ?implying ? that ? the ?dog ? could ?not ? see ? the ? leopard?s ? goal-??directed ?actions ? that ? followed. ?Once ? the ?dog ?had ? left ? the ? stage, ? the ? leopard ?ran ?over ? to ? the ? shelf, ?peeked ?around ? the ?shelf ? and ? looked ?at ? the ? toy ?duck. ?Then, ? the ? leopard ? looked ?up ? towards ? the ? top ?of ? the ?shelf, ?where ?the ?toy ?moose ?sat. ?With ?its ?arms ?outstretched, ?the ?leopard ?jumped ?up ?and ?down ?(twice) ?alongside ?the ?shelf, ?in ?an ?apparent ?attempt ?to ?reach ?the ?toy ?moose ?sitting ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf; ?this ?jumping ?action ?was ?repeated ?twice ?more, ?with ?the ?last ?attempt ?being ? slower ? and ?more ? exaggerated ? to ? emphasize ? the ? leopard?s ? struggle ? to ? reach ? the ?toy. ? 23 ?Having ?been ?unsuccessful ? in ? retrieving ? the ? toy ?moose, ? the ? leopard ? lowered ? its ?head ?and ?ran ?to ?the ?back ?corner ?of ?the ?stage. ?The ?dog ?then ?reappeared, ?turned ?to ?look ?at ?the ?leopard, ?and ?then ?turned ?to ?look ?at ?the ?toy ?duck ?sitting ?in ?front ?of ?the ?(clear) ?shelf. ?The ? dog ? ran ? directly ? towards ? the ? toy ? duck, ? in ? an ? apparent ? attempt ? to ? retrieve ? it. ?However, ?as ?the ?dog ?ran ?past ?the ?shelf, ?he ?clumsily ?bumped ?into ?it, ?knocking ?the ?shelf ?and ?the ?toy ?moose ?down. ?To ?increase ?the ?perception ?that ?knocking ?the ?shelf ?down ?was ??accidental?, ?the ?dog ?continued ?to ?look ?at ?the ?toy ?duck ?(and ?not ?at ?the ?shelf) ?when ?the ?shelf ?was ?knocked ?over. ?Additionally, ? it ?was ?the ?side ?of ?the ?dog?s ?body ?(as ?opposed ?to ?his ?paws) ?that ?knocked ?the ?shelf ?down. ?Once ?the ?shelf ?fell ?down ?and ?the ?toy ?was ?within ?reach, ?the ?leopard ?ran ?towards ?the ?shelf, ?picked ?up ?the ?toy ?moose, ?and ?bounced ?up ?and ?two ? times. ? This ? bouncing ? action ?was ?purposefully ? included ? to ? illustrate ? the ? leopard?s ??happiness? ?at ?retrieving ?the ?toy ?moose. ?The ?dog ?then ?ran ?off ?stage ?with ?the ?toy ?duck. ?2.2.1.3 Intentional ?hindering ?The ?leopard ?and ?the ?dog ?turned ?simultaneously ?to ?look ?at ?each ?other, ?and ?then ?turned ?back ?to ?face ?forward. ?The ?leopard ?ran ?forward ?and ?picked ?up ?the ?toy ?moose ?that ?was ?sitting ?beside ?the ?shelf. ?The ?leopard ?peeked ?around ?the ?shelf ?and ?looked ?at ?the ?toy ?duck, ?and ?then ?looked ?up ?towards ?the ?top ?of ?the ?shelf. ?Still ?holding ?the ?toy ?moose, ?the ?leopard ? jumped ? up ? and ? down ? (twice) ? alongside ? the ? shelf, ? in ? an ? apparent ? attempt ? to ?reach ?the ?top ?of ?the ?shelf; ?this ?action ?was ?repeated ?twice ?more, ?and ?on ?the ?final ?attempt, ?the ? leopard ? succeeded ? in ? reaching ? the ? top ? of ? the ? shelf. ? The ? leopard ? placed ? the ? toy ?moose ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf, ?and ?then ?jumped ?back ?down, ?landing ?to ?the ?side ?of ?the ?shelf. ?To ? illustrate ? that ?he ?was ??happy? ?about ?having ?placed ?the ? toy ?moose ?on ? top ?of ?the ?shelf, ?the ?leopard ?jumped ?up ?and ?down ?twice, ?and ?then ?ran ?to ?the ?back ?corner ?of ?the ? 24 ?stage. ?Following, ?the ?dog ?turned ?to ? look ?at ?the ?leopard, ?and ?then ?up ?to ? look ?at ?the ?toy ?moose, ? in ? order ? to ? imply ? that ? the ? dog ? had ? inferred ? the ? leopard?s ? goal. ? The ? dog ? ran ?directly ? to ? the ? side ? of ? the ? shelf ? and ? ?intentionally? ? pushed ? it ? over, ? knocking ? the ? toy ?moose ?off ?of ?the ?shelf. ?To ?make ?the ?pushing ?action ?appear ?intentional, ?the ?dog ?puppet ?looked ?at ?the ?shelf, ?leaned ?into ?it, ?and ?used ?both ?paws ?to ?push ?it ?over. ?Once ?the ?shelf ?and ?the ? toy ?moose ? fell ?down, ? the ? leopard ?bounced ?up ?and ?down ? two ? times ?and ?placed ? its ?head ?down. ?This ?action ?was ?included ?to ?illustrate ?the ?leopard?s ??disappointment? ?at ?his ?goal ?being ?hindered. ?The ?dog ? then ?grasped ? the ? toy ?duck ? that ?had ?been ?resting ?on ? the ?floor ?in ?front ?of ?the ?shelf, ?and ?ran ?off ?stage. ?2.2.1.4 Accidental ?hindering ?The ? leopard ? and ? the ? dog ? puppet ? turned ? simultaneously ? to ? look ? at ? each ? other, ?and ? then ? turned ?back ? to ? face ? forward. ?Then, ? the ?dog ?ran ?off ? stage, ?disappearing ? from ?view ?and ? implying ? that ? the ?dog ?could ?not ? see ? the ? leopard?s ?goal-??directed ?actions ? that ?followed. ?Once ?the ?dog ?had ?left ?the ?stage, ?the ?leopard ?ran ?forward ?and ?picked ?up ?the ?toy ?moose ?that ?was ?sitting ?beside ?the ?shelf. ?The ?leopard ?peeked ?around ?the ?shelf ?and ?saw ?the ?toy ?duck. ?Then, ?the ?leopard ?looked ?up ?towards ?the ?top ?of ?the ?shelf. ?Still ?holding ?the ?toy ?moose, ?the ?leopard ?jumped ?up ?and ?down ?(twice) ?alongside ?the ?shelf, ?in ?an ?apparent ?attempt ?to ?reach ?the ?top ?of ?the ?shelf; ?this ?action ?was ?repeated ?twice ?more, ?and ?on ?the ?final ?attempt, ?the ?leopard ?succeeded ?in ?reaching ?the ?top ?of ?the ?shelf. ?The ?leopard ?placed ?the ?toy ?moose ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf, ?and ?then ?jumped ?back ?down, ?landing ?beside ?the ?shelf. ?To ? illustrate ? that ?he ?was ??happy? ?about ?having ?placed ?the ? toy ?moose ?on ? top ?of ?the ?shelf, ?the ?leopard ?jumped ?up ?and ?down ?twice, ?and ?then ?ran ?to ?the ?back ?corner ?of ?the ?stage. ?The ?dog ?then ?reappeared, ?turned ?to ?look ?at ?the ?leopard, ?and ?then ?at ?the ?toy ?duck ? 25 ?sitting ? in ? front ? of ? the ? (clear) ? shelf. ? The ? dog ? ran ? directly ? towards ? the ? toy ? duck, ? in ? an ?apparent ? attempt ? to ? retrieve ? it. ? However, ? as ? the ? dog ? ran ? past ? the ? shelf, ? he ? clumsily ?bumped ?into ?it, ?knocking ?the ?shelf ?and ?the ?toy ?moose ?down. ?To ?increase ?the ?perception ?that ?knocking ?the ?shelf ?down ?was ??accidental?, ?the ?dog ?continued ?to ?look ?at ?the ?toy ?duck ?(and ?not ?at ?the ?shelf) ?when ?the ?shelf ?was ?knocked ?over. ?Additionally, ?it ?was ?the ?side ?of ?the ?dog?s ?body ? (as ?opposed ? to ?his ?paws) ? that ?knocked ? the ? shelf ?down. ?Once ? the ? shelf ?and ?the ?toy ?moose ?fell ?down, ?the ?leopard ?bounced ?up ?and ?down ?two ?times ?and ?placed ?its ?head ?down. ?This ?action ?was ?included ?to ?illustrate ?the ?leopard?s ??disappointment? ?at ?his ?goal ?being ?hindered. ?The ?dog ?then ?ran ?off ?stage ?with ?the ?toy ?duck. ?2.2.2 Choice ?Following ? the ? familiarization ? period, ? parents ? were ? instructed ? to ? rotate ? their ?chairs ?90 ?degrees ?clockwise, ?away ?from ?the ?puppet ?stage. ?Parents ?were ?asked ?to ?center ?their ? infants ? in ? their ? laps ? and ? to ?hold ? them ? firmly ? around ? their ?waist, ? so ? that ? infants ?were ?supported ?and ?could ?use ?both ?arms ? freely ?during ? the ?choice ?procedure. ?Parents ?were ? instructed ? to ? close ? their ? eyes ? as ? an ? experimenter ? (the ? online ? coder ? from ? the ?familiarization ?phase, ?who ?was ?blind ?to ?the ?puppets? ? identities) ?emerged ?from ?behind ?the ?curtain, ?with ?the ?two ?puppets ?behind ?his/her ?back. ? ?The ?experimenter ?knelt ?down ?in ?front ?of ?the ?infant ?and ?greeted ?him/her. ?Then, ?the ? experimenter ? said, ? ?look? ? and ? presented ? the ? infant ? with ? the ? two ? puppets; ? the ?experimenter ? held ? the ? puppets ? approximately ? 30 ? cm ? apart ? and ? initially ? out ? of ? the ?infant?s ?reach. ?The ?experimenter ?ensured ?that ?the ?infant ?looked ?at ?each ?puppet ?before ?regaining ?the ?infant?s ?attention ?by ?pulling ?the ?two ?puppets ?back ?and ?saying ??hi? ?to ?the ?infant. ?Once ? the ? infant ? looked ?back ?at ? the ?experimenter, ? the ?experimenter ?moved ? the ? 26 ?puppets ? forward ? such ? that ? they ? were ? now ? within ? the ? infant?s ? grasp. ? Infants ? were ?considered ?to ?have ?made ?a ?choice ?when ?they ?looked ?at ?and ?then ?touched ?one ?puppet, ?as ?determined ?online ?by ?the ?(blind) ?choice ?experimenter. ?The ?session ?ended ?after ?infants ?had ?either ?made ?a ?choice ?or ?2 ?minutes ?had ?elapsed. ? ?2.2.3 Counterbalancing ?and ?reliability ?The ? shirt ? color ? of ? the ? intentional ? puppet ? (purple ? or ? teal), ? the ? order ? of ? events ?(intentional ? or ? accidental ? first), ? the ? side ? the ? intentional ? puppet ? appeared ? on ? stage ?during ?familiarization ?trials ?(left ?or ?right), ?and ?the ?side ?the ?intentional ?puppet ?appeared ?on ?during ?the ?choice ?procedure ?(left ?or ?right) ?were ?counterbalanced ?in ?each ?condition5. ?A ?second ? independent ?coder ?(also ?blind ? to ? the ? identities ?of ? the ?puppets) ?re-??examined ?fifty-??seven ? of ? the ? choice ? recordings ? for ? reliability. ? The ? coder ? could ? not ? examine ? the ?remaining ?three ?videos ?(1 ?Helping ?and ?2 ?Hindering ?videos) ?as ? they ?were ?missing. ?The ?two ?coders ?reached ?100% ?agreement. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?5 ?This ? study ?was ? also ? run ? in ? conjunction ?with ? one ? other ? study ? that ? investigated ? infants? ? sensitivity ? to ?generosity ?or ?greed ?in ?giving ?or ?taking ?scenarios. ?All ?of ?the ?same ?counterbalancing ?applied ?to ?this ?second ?study. ?Additionally, ? the ?order ?of ?presentation ?of ? the ?studies ?was ?counterbalanced ?across ? infants. ?There ?were ?no ?effects ?of ?order ?of ?presentation ?or ?valence ?of ?the ?other ?study ?(generosity ?or ?greed) ?on ?the ?results. ?Thus, ?all ?infants ?tested ?were ?included ?in ?the ?subsequent ?analyses. ? 27 ? ? ?Figure ?2. ?Critical ?actions ?displayed ?in ?puppet ?show ?events. ?(A) ?Intentional ?helping ?events ? (B) ? Accidental ? Helping ? events ? (C) ? Intentional ? hindering ? events ? (D) ?Accidental ?Hindering ?events ? ? ? 28 ?2.3 Results ?2.3.1 Looking ?time ?A ?summary ?of ?looking ?times ?can ?be ?found ?in ?Table ?1. ?Average ?looking ?times ?for ?each ?event ?type ?were ?calculated ?for ?each ?infant ?by ?adding ?infants? ?looking ?time ?towards ?the ?first ?and ?second ?trials ?for ?each ?event ?type ?and ?dividing ?by ?two ?[e.g., ?(intentional ?trial ?1 ?+ ?intentional ?trial ?2)/2]. ?A ?paired ?t-??test ?was ?conducted ?to ?determine ?whether ?infants? ?average ? looking ? time ? following ? intentional ?events ?differed ? from ? their ?average ? looking ?time ? following ? accidental ? events. ? Collapsed ? across ? both ? conditions, ? infants? ? attention ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?event ?type ?[t(59) ?= ?.08, ?p ?= ?.94, ?d ?= ?.01]. ?Infants ?looked ?for ?an ?average ?of ?7.67 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? .69) ? following ? intentional ? events ? and ? 7.62 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? .68) ?following ?accidental ?events. ?Table ?1. ?Infants? ?looking ?time ?towards ?events ?(s) ?separated ?by ?condition ? ? Independent ? t-??tests ? revealed ? that ? average ? looking ? time ? following ? intentional ?events ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?condition ?[t(58) ?= ?.56, ?p ?= ?.58, ?d ?= ?.15] ?and ?average ?looking ?time ?following ?accidental ?events ?also ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?condition ?[t(58) ?= ?.92, ?p ?= ?.36, ?d ?= ?.24]. ?Infants ? in ? the ?Helping ?condition ? looked ? for ? an ? average ? of ? 7.29 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? 1.01) ?following ?intentional ?events ?and ?6.99 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?.92) ?following ?accidental ?events. ?Infants? ?attention ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?event ?type ?[paired ?t-??test, ?t(29) ?= ?.31, ?p ?= ?.76, ?d ?= ?.06]. ?Infants ? in ? the ?Hindering ?condition ? looked ? for ? an ? average ?of ?8.06 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? .94) ? ? Intentional ?events ? Accidental ?events ? ? First ?trial ? Second ?trial ? Average ? First ?trial ? Second ?trial ? Average ?Helping ? ? 6.77 ? 7.80 ? 7.29 ? 7.01 ? 6.97 ? 6.99 ?Hindering ? ? 9.26 ? 6.87 ? 8.06 ? 9.44 ? 7.06 ? 8.25 ? 29 ?following ?intentional ?events ?and ?8.25 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?1.01) ?following ?accidental ?events. ?Again, ?attention ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?event ?type ?[paired ?t-??test, ?t(29) ?= ?-??.19, ?p ?= ?.85, ?d ?= ?.04]. ?Interestingly, ? infants? ? looking ? time ? did ? not ? differ ? towards ? first ? and ? second ?intentional ? trials ? [paired ? t-??test, ? t(29) ? = ? -??.80, ? p ? = ? .43, ? d ? = ? .16] ? or ? first ? and ? second ?accidental ? trials ? [paired ? t-??test, ? t(29) ? = ? .03, ?p ? = ? .98, ?d ? = ? .01] ? in ? the ?Helping ?condition. ?However, ? infants? ? looking ? time ? did ? marginally ? decrease ? between ? first ? and ? second ?intentional ? trials ? [paired ? t-??test, ? t(29) ? = ? 1.90, ? p ? = ? .07, ? d ? = ? .39] ? and ? first ? and ? second ?accidental ?trials ?[paired ?t-??test, ?t(29) ?= ?1.91, ?p ?= ?.07, ?d ?= ?.37] ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition. ?2.3.2 Choice ?Preliminary ? analyses ? revealed ? no ? effects ? of ? sex, ? shirt ? color ? of ? the ? intentional ?puppet, ? order ? that ? the ? intentional ? puppet ?was ? presented, ? or ? side ? that ? the ? intentional ?puppet ?was ?presented ?on ?during ?familiarization ?(all ?analyzed ?using ?Fisher?s ?exact ?tests, ?p ? > ? .44). ? However, ? there ? was ? a ? significant ? effect ? of ? side ? that ? the ? intentional ? puppet ?appeared ?on ?during ?choice ?on ?infant?s ?choice ?for ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?(Fisher?s ?exact ?test, ?p ?< ?.05) ?but ?not ?the ?Helping ?condition ?(Fisher?s ?exact ?test, ?p ?= ?1.0). ?Even ?though ?the ?side ? that ? the ? intentional ?character ?appeared ?on ?during ?choice ?was ?almost ?evenly ?split ?within ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?(14 ?on ?the ?right, ?16 ?on ?the ?left), ?infants ?were ?more ?likely ?to ?choose ?puppets ?appearing ?on ?their ?left-??hand ?side ?compared ?to ?their ?right-??hand ?side; ?infants ? chose ? the ? accidental ? character ?14 ? times ?and ? the ? intentional ? character ?7 ? times ?when ? it ? was ? on ? the ? infants? ? left ? compared ? to ? 7 ? and ? 2 ? times ? respectively ? when ? the ?characters ? appeared ? on ? their ? right. ? However, ? because ? side ? preference ? during ? choice ?was ?not ?observed ?in ?the ?Helping ?condition ?or ?in ?previous ?studies ?using ?similar ?methods ?(e.g., ? Hamlin, ? in ? press; ? Hamlin ? & ?Wynn, ? 2011; ? Hamlin ? & ?Wynn, ? 2012; ? Hamlin ? et ? al., ? 30 ?2007; ?Hamlin ? et ? al., ? 2010; ?Hamlin ? et ? al., ? 2011), ?we ? assumed ? that ? the ? side ?preference ?was ?not ?a ?reliable ?predictor ?of ?infant ?choice. ?Thus, ?in ?subsequent ?analyses, ?the ?data ?was ?collapsed ? across ? sex, ? shirt ? color ? of ? the ? intentional ? puppet, ? order ? that ? the ? intentional ?puppet ?was ?presented, ? and ?side ? that ? the ? intentional ?puppet ?was ?presented ?on ?during ?familiarization ?and ?during ?choice. ?As ? predicted, ? infants? ? preference ? for ? the ? intentional ? versus ? the ? accidental ?character ?differed ?by ?condition ?[?2(1, ?N ?= ?60)= ?11.28, ?p ?< ?.001, ?? ?= ?.43], ?as ?depicted ?in ?Figure ? 3. ? Infants ? in ? the ? Helping ? condition ? preferred ? the ? intentional ? helper ? to ? the ?accidental ? helper ? (22 ? out ? of ? 30, ? Binomial, ? p ? < ? .05), ? while ? those ? in ? the ? Hindering ?condition ?preferred ? the ?accidental ?hinderer ? to ? the ? intentional ?hinderer ? (21 ?out ?of ?30, ?Binomial, ?p ?< ?.05). ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Figure ?3. ?Results ?of ?infants? ?choice: ?Percentage ?of ?infants ?choosing ?the ?intentional ?and ?accidental ?characters ?in ?the ?Helping ?and ?the ?Hindering ?conditions ? ?0 ?10 ?20 ?30 ?40 ?50 ?60 ?70 ?80 ?Helping ? Hindering ?% ?infants ?choosing ?each ?character ?Intentional ?character ?Accidental ?character ?** ?* ? * ? 31 ?The ?difference ?between ?infants? ?total ?looking ?time ?following ?intentional ?and ?total ?looking ?time ?following ?accidental ?events ?was ?calculated ?to ?see ?whether ?longer ?looking ?to ? one ? event ? over ? another ? would ? correlate ? with ? infants? ? choice ? (e.g., ? longer ? overall ?looking ? towards ? intentional ? events ? correlating ? with ? infants ? choosing ? the ? intentional ?puppet). ?Positive ?values ?indicated ?longer ?total ?looking ?time ?towards ?intentional ?events, ?while ? negative ? values ? indicated ? longer ? looking ? time ? towards ? accidental ? events. ?Although ?the ?mean ?difference ?scores ?were ?in ?the ?same ?direction ?as ?the ?choices ?made ?for ?each ? condition ? (Helping: ? MInt-??Acc ? = ? .59, ? Hindering: ? MInt-??Acc= ? -??.38), ? no ? significant ?correlation ?between ?looking ?time ?and ?choice ?was ?found ?(r ?= ?.12, ?p ?= ?.36). ?2.3.3 Excluded ?infants ?and ?additional ?analyses ?Significantly ?more ?infants ?refused ?to ?participate ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?than ?the ?Helping ? condition ? due ? to ? either ? fussiness ? (11) ? or ? failure ? to ? choose ? a ? puppet ? (15; ?there ?were ?26 ?refusals ?in ?the ?entire ?study, ?and ?21 ?of ?these ?infants ?were ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition, ? Binomial, ? p ? < ? .01). ? Two ? coders, ? who ? were ? blind ? to ? condition ? and ? to ? the ?identities ?of ? the ?puppets, ? reviewed ?9 ?(all ? in ? the ?Hindering ? condition) ?out ?of ? the ?15 ?no ?choice ?videos ? to ?determine ?whether ? infants ?preferred ? to ? look ?at ?one ?puppet ?over ? the ?other ?during ?the ?choice ?procedure. ?The ?other ?videos ?(2 ?Helping ?and ?4 ?Hindering) ?were ?omitted ?from ?analyses, ?due ?to ?both ?coders ?independently ?noting ?that ?they ?had ?difficulty ?viewing ?the ? infants? ?eyes ?during ? the ?choice ?(e.g., ? infant ? leaned ?back ?and ?eyes ?were ?no ?longer ?in ?view). ?The ?two ?coders ?measured ?the ?total ?time ?infants ?spent ?looking ?towards ?the ?puppet ?on ?the ?infants? ?left ?and ?right ?sides ?separately. ? ?The ?coders? ?measurements ?for ?the ?total ?time ?infants ?spent ?looking ?at ?the ?intentional ?puppet ?(ICC ?= ?.98) ?as ?well ?as ?the ? 32 ?total ? time ? infants ? spent ? looking ? at ? the ? accidental ? puppet ? (ICC ? = ? .86) ? were ? reliably ?correlated ?An ? average ? of ? Coder ? 1 ? and ? Coder ? 2?s ? measurements ? of ? infants? ? looking ? time ?towards ? each ? puppet ? was ? calculated. ? A ? paired ? samples ? t-??test ? revealed ? that ? infants? ?attention ? towards ? each ? puppet ? did ? not ? differ ? [t(7) ? = ? .39, ? p ? = ? .71, ? d ? = ? .15]. ? Overall, ?infants? ?looking ?time ?towards ?each ?puppet ?was ?quite ?short. ?During ?the ?2-??minute ?choice ?period, ? infants ? looked ?at ? the ? intentional ?puppet ? for ?an ?average ?of ?9.8 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?3.30) ?and ?at ?the ?accidental ?puppet ?for ?an ?average ?of ?8.6 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?2.76). ?The ?high ?rate ?of ?refusals ?to ?participate ? in ?the ?Hindering ?condition ? is ?suggestive ?that ?there ?is ?something ?particularly ?difficult ?or ?aversive ?about ?this ?condition ?for ?infants. ?To ? explore ? this ? idea ? further, ? additional ? analyses ?were ? conducted ? on ? the ? infants ?who ?completed ? the ? study. ? An ? additional ? coder, ? who ? was ? blind ? to ? condition ? and ? to ? the ?identities ?of ?the ?puppets, ?reviewed ?the ?recordings ?and ?coded ?the ?time ?it ?took ?infants ?in ?each ?condition ?to ?make ?their ?choice. ?Three ?out ?of ?sixty ?videos ?were ?missing ?(1 ?Helping ?and ?2 ?Hindering ? videos), ? so ? these ? infants ?were ?excluded ? from ?subsequent ?analyses. ?A ?second ? blind ? coder ? analyzed ? 30% ? of ? the ? videos ? for ? reliability; ? the ? two ? coders ? were ?highly ?reliable ?(ICC ?= ?.99). ?Coding ?began ?as ?soon ?as ?the ?experimenter ?moved ?the ?puppets ?within ?the ?infant?s ?reach. ? If ? there ? was ? something ? inherently ? difficult ? or ? aversive ? about ? the ? Hindering ?condition, ?then ?infants ?should ?have ?taken ?longer ?to ?choose ?between ?two ?Hinderers ?than ?two ?Helpers. ?However, ?the ?time ?that ?it ?took ?infants ?to ?choose ?a ?puppet ?did ?not ?differ ?by ?condition ?[t(55) ?= ?.38, ?p ?= ?.71, ?d ?= ? ?.10]. ?On ?average, ?infants ?in ?the ?Helping ?condition ?took ?15.86 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? 3.74) ? to ? make ? a ? selection, ? while ? infants ? in ? the ? Hindering ? 33 ?condition ?took ?13.86 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?3.75) ?to ?choose ?a ?puppet. ?Further, ?infants ?in ?each ?condition ?did ?not ?choose ?one ?character ?faster ?than ?another ?[Helping: ?t(27) ?= ?.37, ?p ?= ?.72, ?d ?= ?0.15; ?Hindering: ?t(26) ?= ?-??.07, ?p ?= ?.95, ?d ?= ?.03]. ?Infants ?in ?the ?Helping ?condition ?who ?chose ? the ? intentional ? character, ? chose ? on ? average ? after ? 18.1 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? 7.56); ?those ?who ?chose ?the ?accidental ?characters, ?chose ?on ?average ?after ?15.0 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?4.39). ?Infants ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?who ?chose ?the ?intentional ?character, ?chose ?on ?average ? after ? 13.7 ? seconds ? (SEM ? = ? 4.84); ? those ?who ? chose ? the ? accidental ? characters, ?chose ?on ?average ?after ?14.3 ?seconds ?(SEM ?= ?4.37). ?Taken ?together, ?these ?analyses ?show ?that ? infants ?did ?not ? take ? longer ? to ?choose ? in ? the ?Hindering ? condition ?than ?the ?Helping ?condition, ?and ?they ?also ?did ?not ?differ ?in ?the ?amount ?of ?time ?it ?took ?to ?choose ?either ?the ?intentional ?or ?accidental ?character ?in ?each ?condition. ? ? ? ? 34 ?3 General ?Discussion ?The ?results ?from ?the ?current ?study ?suggest ?that ?10-??month-??old ?infants ?can ?make ?nuanced ?third-??party ?evaluations ?of ?moral ?agents. ?Infants, ?like ?adults, ?evaluate ?others ?on ?the ? basis ? of ? their ? underlying ? mental ? states, ? and ? these ? evaluations ? subsequently ?influence ? their ?social ?preferences ? in ? future ? interactions. ? Infants ?viewed ?puppet ?shows ?involving ?helpers ?or ?hinderers ?and ?showed ?differential ?evaluations ?of ?actors ?depending ?on ? whether ? they ? acted ? intentionally ? or ? accidentally. ? Infants ? preferred ? those ? who ?intentionally ? helped ? a ? Protagonist ? achieve ? a ? goal ? rather ? than ? those ? who ? accidentally ?helped. ?By ?contrast, ? infants ?preferred ?those ?who ?accidentally ?hindered ?a ?Protagonist?s ?goal ? rather ? than ? those ?who ? intentionally ? did ? so. ? Notably, ? the ? opposing ? nature ? of ? the ?Protagonist?s ? goal ? in ? the ? two ? conditions ? (to ? get ? the ? toy ? off ? the ? shelf ? in ? the ?Helping ?condition, ?but ?to ?put ?the ?toy ?on ?top ?of ?the ?shelf ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition) ?allowed ?the ?intentional ? and ? the ? accidental ? acts ? to ? be ? physically ? identical ? across ? conditions ? (i.e., ?intentional ? acts ? involved ? purposefully ? knocking ? over ? a ? shelf, ? while ? accidental ? acts ?involved ? inadvertently ? knocking ? the ? shelf ? down ? while ? in ? the ? process ? of ? trying ? to ?achieve ?some ?other ?goal), ?and ?all ?acts ?resulted ?in ?the ?same ?outcome ?(i.e., ?the ?toy ?moose ?falling ? off ? of ? the ? shelf). ? This ? suggests, ? then, ? that ? infants? ? differential ? evaluations ? of ?helpers ?and ?hinderers ?were ?influenced ?primarily ?by ?their ?analyses ?of ?the ?actors? ?mental ?states ? (intent ? vs. ? lack ? of ? intent) ? in ? reference ? to ? the ? Protagonist?s ? goal. ? These ? results ?cannot ?be ?attributed ?to ?differences ?in ?attention ?towards ?intentional ?or ?accidental ?events ?as ? infants? ? attention ? to ? each ? event ? type ?did ?not ?differ. ? ? Additionally, ?when ? comparing ? 35 ?across ? conditions, ? infants ?did ?not ?differ ? in ? the ? amount ?of ? time ? spent ? looking ? towards ?either ?intentional ?or ?accidental ?events. ?Although ?there ?were ?no ?overall ?differences ?in ?attention ?in ?either ?the ?Helping ?or ?the ?Hindering ? condition, ? there ?were ? several ? indices ? that ? suggest ? that ? there ?may ?have ?been ?something ? inherently ?aversive ?about ? the ?Hindering ?condition ? for ? infants. ?Firstly, ?infants? ?attention ?did ?not ?diminish ?between ?the ?first ?and ?second ?intentional ?or ?first ?and ?second ?accidental ?trials ?for ?the ?Helping ?condition, ?but ?infants? ?attention ?did ?marginally ?decrease ? in ? the ? second ? trial ? for ? each ? event ? type ? in ? the ? Hindering ? condition. ? One ?possibility ? is ? that ? infants ? may ? have ? been ? better ? at ? processing ? and ? remembering ? the ?negative ? events ? in ? the ? Hindering ? condition ? than ? the ? positive ? events ? in ? the ? Helping ?condition, ?and ?thus ?did ?not ?need ?to ?look ?as ?long ?to ?the ?second ?trials ?because ?they ?were ??bored?. ? This ? interpretation ? would ? support ? the ? notion ? of ? a ? negativity ? bias ? in ? early ?development ? (see ? Vaish, ? Grossmann, ? & ? Woodward, ? 2008 ? for ? a ? review). ? Given ? this ?interpretation ?we ?might ?expect ?that ?infants ?in ?the ?past ?helper/hinderer ?studies ?should ?have ?habituated ?faster ?to ?hinderer ?events ?than ?to ?helper ?events. ?However, ?no ?mention ?of ? faster ? habituation ? rates ? for ? hindering ? than ? helping ? events ? was ? made ? in ? previous ?studies ? (e.g., ? Hamlin ? et ? al., ? 2007; ? Hamlin ? et ? al., ? 2010). ? Another ? interpretation ? of ? the ?results, ? however, ? might ? be ? that ? infants ? could ? have ? learned ? to ? anticipate ? what ?subsequent ?events ?would ?look ?like. ?After ?seeing ?the ?first ?couple ?of ?trials, ?infants ?in ?the ?Helping ? condition ?may ?have ? expected ? to ? see ?more ?helping ? events ? and ? thus ?may ?have ?continued ? to ? pay ? attention ? to ? these ? events ? because ? they ? were ? pleasing ? to ? them. ? By ?contrast, ? infants ? in ? the ?Hindering ? condition ?may ?have ?expected ?to ?see ?more ?hindering ? 36 ?events ?and ?thus ?may ?have ?paid ?less ?attention ?to ?subsequent ?events ?because ?they ?found ?them ?aversive ?and ?wanted ?to ?avoid ?looking ?at ?them. ? ?Secondly, ? a ? significant ? proportion ? of ? the ? infants ? that ? were ? excluded ? due ? to ?fussiness ? or ? no ? choices ? were ? in ? the ?Hindering ? condition ? (21 ? out ? of ? 26 ? infants). ? This ?exclusion ? rate ? is ? much ? higher ? than ? previous ? studies ? involving ? one ? helper ? and ? one ?hinderer ?(e.g., ?Hamlin, ? in ?press; ?Hamlin, ?Mahajan, ?Liberman, ?& ?Wynn, ?2013; ?Hamlin ?& ?Wynn, ?2011; ?Hamlin ?& ?Wynn, ?2012; ?Hamlin, ?Wynn, ?& ?Bloom, ?2007; ?Hamlin, ?Wynn, ?& ?Bloom, ? 2010; ? Hamlin, ?Wynn, ? Bloom, ? & ?Mahajan, ? 2011). ? These ? past ? studies ? generally ?have ?had ?exclusion ?rates ?(due ?to ?fussiness ?or ?no ?choices) ?of ?less ?than ?15%, ?whereas ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?in ?the ?present ?study ?reached ?31%. ?The ?high ?exclusion ?rate ?found ?in ?the ? Hindering ? condition ? cannot ? be ? attributed ? to ? factors ? such ? as ? the ? banging ? noises ?caused ?by ?the ?shelf ? falling ?down ?scaring ?the ?infants, ?or ?the ?physical ?appearance ?of ?the ?puppets ?themselves ?being ?scary; ?these ?exact ?same ?features ?were ?present ?in ?the ?Helping ?condition, ?which ?had ?a ?similar ?exclusion ?rate ? (12%) ? to ? the ?previous ?studies ? involving ?one ?helper ?and ?one ?hinderer. ?Thus, ?observing ?four ?events ?involving ?a ?hindered ?goal ?(2 ?intentional ?and ?2 ?accidental) ?and ?then ?having ?to ?choose ?between ?the ?two ?hinderers ?may ?have ?been ?particularly ?difficult ?for ?infants, ?whereas ?in ?previous ?studies, ?seeing ?helping ?events ? in ? alternation ?with ? hindering ? events ?may ? have ? been ? enough ? to ? offset ? infants? ?negative ?affect ?to ?allow ?them ?to ?make ?it ?through ?the ?familiarization ?period ?and ?to ?make ?a ?choice ?between ?the ?two ?puppets. ? ?Lastly, ? infants ? who ?made ? it ? through ? the ? familiarization ? period ? and ? refused ? to ?choose ? in ? the ? Hindering ? condition ? spent ? very ? little ? time ? (15% ? of ? the ? entire ? choice ?period) ? actually ? looking ? at ? the ? two ?puppets ? during ? the ? choice ? period. ?Out ? of ? the ? 120 ? 37 ?seconds ? given ? to ? infants ? to ? make ? their ? choice, ? infants ? spent ? on ? average ? 9.8 ? seconds ?looking ?at ?the ?intentional ?puppet ?and ?8.6 ?seconds ?looking ?at ?the ?accidental ?puppet. ?This ?might ?suggest ?that ?the ?infants ?found ?the ?puppets ?aversive ?and ?thus ?were ?avoiding ?eye ?contact ?with ?the ?puppets, ?although ?we ?cannot ?say ?this ?for ?certain ?as ?we ?were ?unable ?to ?compare ? this ? to ? infants ? who ? failed ? to ? choose ? in ? the ?Helping ? condition ? (due ? to ? their ?videos ?being ?unusable ?for ?coding). ?In ?sum, ?infants? ?decrease ?in ?attention ?towards ?second ?event ?trials, ?fussiness ?and ?refusal ?to ?choose, ?and ?gaze ?avoidance ?during ?choice ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?suggests ?that ? there ? is ? something ? inherently ?difficult ? or ? aversive ? about ? the ?Hindering ? condition ?for ?infants. ?Although ?these ?events ?do ?seem ?to ?be ?aversive ?to ?infants, ?this ?does ?not ?seem ?to ?influence ?their ?ability ?to ?choose ?one ?character ?over ?the ?other ? for ?those ?infants ?who ?actually ? did ?make ? a ? choice. ? Infants ? in ? the ?Hindering ?condition ? did ? not ? take ? longer ? to ?make ?their ?decisions ?compared ?to ?infants ?in ?the ?Helping ?condition. ?Rather, ?infants ?chose ?equally ?as ?fast ?in ?both ?conditions, ?and ?there ?was ?no ?difference ?in ?the ?magnitude ?of ?the ?effect ? across ? condition, ? suggesting ? that ? the ? valence ? of ? the ? condition ? did ? not ? impact ?infants? ?ability ?to ?make ?a ?choice. ?Overall, ? the ? results ? from ? the ? present ? study ? in ? conjunction ? with ? Hamlin?s ? (in ?press) ?study ?examining ?infants? ?evaluations ?of ?failed ?attempts, ?suggest ?that ?infants ?are ?quite ? capable ? of ? making ? nuanced ? evaluations ? of ? others ? on ? the ? basis ? of ? underlying ?mental ?states. ?Infants ?privilege ?intentions ?when ?evaluating ?failed ?attempts ?by ?8-??months ?of ? age, ?but ?even ?more ? impressively, ? they ?are ?able ? to ?differentially ?evaluate ?accidental ?and ? intentional ? actors ? (which ? is ? thought ? to ? be ? more ? difficult ? than ? evaluating ? failed ?attempts; ?e.g., ?Baird ?& ?Astington, ?2004; ?Cushman ?et ?al., ?2013; ?Hamlin, ?in ?press; ?Young ?et ? 38 ?al., ?2007) ?on ?the ?basis ?of ?their ?underlying ?mental ?states ?by ?10-??months ?of ?age. ?The ?notion ?that ? infants ? can ? make ? these ? adult-??like ? judgments ? contradict ? earlier ? claims ? of ? a ? shift ?from ?outcome-??based ?judgments ?early ?on ?in ?development ?to ?intention-??based ?judgments ?later ? on ? in ? development ? (e.g., ? Piaget ? 1932/1965, ? Kohlberg). ? Thus, ? young ? children?s ?failure ?to ?use ?mental ?states ?in ?their ?evaluations ?of ?others ?does ?not ?necessarily ?reflect ?a ?lack ? of ? awareness ? of ? mental ? states. ? Rather, ? the ? explicit ? nature ? (i.e., ? use ? of ? verbal ?responses) ?of ?the ?tasks ?themselves ?and ?the ?demand ?characteristics ?that ?they ?entail ?may ?mask ? children?s ? true ? ability ? to ? factor ?mental ? state ? information ? into ? their ? evaluations. ?Using ?a ?non-??verbal ?paradigm ?in ?the ?present ?study ?allows ?us ?to ?tap ?into ?infants? ?implicit ?awareness ?of ?the ?importance ?of ?mental ?states ?in ?their ?evaluations ?of ?others ?and ?shows ?that ? infants ? are ? able ? to ?make ? adult-??like ? evaluations, ? preferring ? intentional ? helpers ? to ?accidental ? helpers, ? but ? accidental ? hinderers ? to ? intentional ? hinderers. ? This ? provides ?preliminary ? support ? to ? the ? claims ? that ? infants ? possess ? an ? early ? capacity ? to ? evaluate ?moral ?agents ?on ?the ?basis ?of ?their ?underlying ?mental ?states. ?3.1 Limitations ?and ?future ?directions ?The ? current ? study ? provides ? a ? first ? look ? into ? infants? ? capacity ? to ? differentially ?evaluate ? intentional ? and ? accidental ? moral ? agents. ? However, ? there ? are ? several ?limitations ?to ?the ?current ?study ?that ?should ?be ?addressed ?in ?future ?work. ?First, ?although ?we ?know ?that ?infants ?prefer ?one ?character ?over ?the ?other, ?it ?is ?not ?clear ?as ?to ?whether ?infants ? are ? displaying ?preference ?because ? they ? view ?one ? character ? positively ? and ? the ?other ?negatively ?(or ?neutrally), ?or ?whether ?they ?perceive ?both ?characters ?to ?be ?positive ?or ?negative, ?but ?one ?is ?just ?more ?positive ?or ?more ?negative ?than ?the ?other. ?For ?example, ? 39 ?infants ? in ? the ?Helping ? condition ?may ?have ? judged ?both ? the ? intentional ? and ? accidental ?helpers ? to ? be ? prosocial ? (they ? both ? helped ? the ? Protagonist ? achieve ? his ? goal), ? but ? they ?may ?have ?evaluated ?the ?intentional ?helper ?more ?positively ?because ?he ?had ?the ?intent ?to ?help, ?whereas ?the ?accidental ?helper ?did ?not. ?Alternatively, ?infants ?may ?have ?viewed ?only ?the ?intentional ?helper ?as ?prosocial, ?while ?maintaining ?a ?neutral ?or ?even ?negative ?view ?of ?the ? accidental ? helper, ? because ? the ? accidental ? helper ? did ? not ? intend ? to ? help ? the ?Protagonist, ? but ? rather ? pursued ? his ? own ? selfish ? goal ? of ? retrieving ? a ? different ? toy. ?Similarly, ?infants ?in ?the ?Hindering ?condition ?may ?have ?judged ?both ?the ?intentional ?and ?the ?accidental ?hinderer ?as ?antisocial ?(they ?both ?hindered ?the ?Protagonist), ?but ?they ?may ?have ?judged ?the ?intentional ?hinderer ?more ?harshly ?because ?he ?had ?the ?intent ?to ?hinder, ?whereas ? the ?accidental ?hinderer ?did ?not. ?Alternatively, ? infants ?may ?have ?viewed ?only ?the ? intentional ? hinderer ? to ? be ? antisocial, ? while ? maintaining ? a ? neutral ? view ? of ? the ?accidental ?hinderer ?because ?the ?accidental ?hinderer ?did ?not ?have ?any ?knowledge ?of ?the ?leopard?s ?goal, ?and ?thus ?could ?not ?have ?intended ?to ?hinder ?the ?Protagonist. ?Thus, ?future ?studies ?should ?compare ?the ?intentional ?and ?accidental ?helpers ?and ?hinderers ?to ?a ?novel ?character ?that ?infants ?have ?no ?prior ?experience ?with. ?Based ?on ?prior ?research ?involving ?similar ?comparisons ?(e.g., ?Hamlin ?et ?al., ?2007), ?infants ?who ?positively ?evaluate ?an ?agent ?should ?prefer ?the ?agent ?to ?the ?neutral ?character, ?while ?infants ?who ?negatively ?evaluate ?an ?agent ?should ?prefer ?the ?neutral ?character ?to ?the ?agent; ?infants ?who ?view ?an ?agent ?as ?neutral ?should ?be ?indifferent ?to ?the ?agent ?and ?the ?neutral ?character. ?Thus, ?by ?comparing ?the ? intentional ? and ? accidental ? helpers ? and ? hinderers ? to ? a ? neutral ? character, ? we ? can ?determine ?whether ?infants ?are ?displaying ?preference ?because ?they ?view ?one ?character ?positively ? and ? the ? other ? negatively ? (or ? neutrally), ? or ? whether ? they ? perceive ? both ? 40 ?characters ? to ? be ? positive ? or ? negative, ? but ? one ? is ? just ?more ? positive ? or ?more ? negative ?than ?the ?other. ? ?Second, ?it ?is ?unclear ?as ?to ?what ?manipulations ?infants ?were ?responding ?to ?in ?the ?accidental ?events. ?The ?accidental ?acts ? in ?this ?preliminary ?study ?included ?two ?different ?manipulations ? to ? make ? it ? especially ? clear ? to ? infants ? that ? the ? accidental ? acts ? were ?unintentional: ? (1) ? the ? accidental ? character ? disappeared ? before ? the ? Protagonist ?displayed ? any ? goal-??directed ? actions, ? and ? thus ? could ? not ? have ? known ? what ? the ?Protagonist?s ? goal ?was ? (2) ? the ?accidental ? character ?did ?not ? intend ? to ?knock ?down ? the ?shelf, ?but ?rather ?bumped ?into ?it ?clumsily ?on ?his ?way ?to ?trying ?to ?fulfill ?his ?own ?separate ?goal. ? Thus, ? infants ? could ? have ? been ? responding ? to ? either ? or ? both ? of ? these ? cues ? in ?interpreting ?the ?actions ?as ?accidental. ?Thus, ? it ? is ? important ?to ?determine ?whether ? it ? is ?the ? accidental ? character?s ? ignorance ? or ? lack ? of ? intent ? that ? is ? influencing ? infants? ?evaluations. ? To ? determine ? whether ? knowledge/ignorance ? plays ? a ? role, ? future ? work ?could ? examine ?whether ? infants ? differentiate ? between ? accidental ? agents ? that ? do ? or ? do ?not ? have ? knowledge ? of ? the ? Protagonist?s ? goal ? (i.e., ? agent ? stays ? on ? stage ? during ?Protagonist?s ?goal-??directed ?actions ?or ?disappears ?before ?Protagonist ?exhibits ?any ?goal-??directed ?actions) ?and ?also ?see ?how ?infants ?evaluate ?each ?of ? these ?agents ?compared ?to ?the ? intentional ? character. ?To ?determine ?whether ?an ?agent?s ? intent ? to ?knock ?down ? the ?shelf ?plays ?a ?role, ?future ?work ?should ?compare ?an ?agent ?who ?intends ?to ?knock ?down ?the ?shelf ? specifically ? to ?help ?or ?hinder ? the ?Protagonist, ? to ? an ?agent ?who ? intends ? to ?knock ?down ?the ?shelf, ?but ?as ?a ?means ?to ?achieving ?a ?goal ?of ?self-??interest ?(e.g., ?perhaps ?there ?is ?a ?different ?toy ?on ?top ?of ? the ?shelf ? that ?the ?puppet ? is ? trying ?to ?retrieve, ?or ?perhaps ?the ?agent ?needs ?to ?knock ?down ?the ?shelf ?so ?that ?he ?can ?stand ?on ?it ?to ?get ?a ?toy ?that ?is ?even ? 41 ?higher ?out ?of ?reach). ?Although ?these ?comparisons ?are ?all ?useful ?to ?do, ?it ?is ?important ?to ?note ?that ?both ?knowledge ?and ?intent ?are ?mental ?processes. ?Thus, ?even ?though ?we ?do ?not ?know ?which ?of ?these ?two ?factors ?infants ?are ?responding ?to ?in ?the ?current ?study, ?we ?can ?at ? least ?be ? relatively ? certain ? that ? they ?are ?using ? some ? sort ? of ?mental ? state ? analysis ? in ?their ?evaluations ?of ?the ?actors. ? ? ? 42 ?4 Conclusions ?The ?present ?study ?sheds ?light ?on ?infants? ?ability ?to ?use ?mental ?state ?analyses ?in ?their ?evaluations ?of ?accidental ?and ? intentional ?moral ?agents. ? 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Intention, ? act, ? and ? outcome ? in ? behavioral ?prediction ?and ?moral ?judgment. ?Child ?Development, ?67(5), ?2478-??2492. ? ? ? ?"""@en ; edm:hasType "Thesis/Dissertation"@en ; vivo:dateIssued "2013-11"@en ; edm:isShownAt "10.14288/1.0074100"@en ; dcterms:language "eng"@en ; ns0:degreeDiscipline "Psychology"@en ; edm:provider "Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library"@en ; dcterms:publisher "University of British Columbia"@en ; dcterms:rights "Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International"@en ; ns0:rightsURI "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"@en ; ns0:scholarLevel "Graduate"@en ; dcterms:title "Ten-month-olds' evaluations of accidental and intentional actions"@en ; dcterms:type "Text"@en ; ns0:identifierURI "http://hdl.handle.net/2429/44844"@en .