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Inclusiveness and status in international organizations : cases of democratic norm development and policy… Hecht, Catherine Anne 2012

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   INCLUSIVENESS AND STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES OF DEMOCRATIC NORM DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED NATIONS   by   Catherine Anne Hecht  B.A. College of the Holy Cross, 1997 M.I.A. Columbia University, 2002    A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF   DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in   THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  (Political Science)   THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  (Vancouver)  October 2012       © Catherine Anne Hecht, 2012   ii  Abstract  The tension between sovereign equality and democratic status, or hierarchies based on democratic governance, is under-analyzed in scholarship of international organizations (IOs). IOs with formally inclusive compositions derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness.  Yet this inclusiveness is challenged by democratic status, with varied consequences.  Scholarly explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of established democracies, interests of new democracies to “lock in” democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions.  Existing accounts have thus under-emphasized inclusive institutions and democratic status as important (and interacting) explanatory variables.  This dissertation draws on insights from literature on institutional design, constructivism, and social psychology to examine the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status in the development of democratic norms and policy implementation in two inclusive IOs: the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) between the respective origins of the organizations in 1945 or 1973 and 2010.  While inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions, and counter to conventional wisdom, they have occasionally proven highly supportive of democratic norm development.  This study examines influential mechanisms, including relations between inclusive institutions and windows of opportunity, norm restatements and re-consideration of failed proposals, issue linkage, contributions of procedural legitimacy to norm expansion, inclusive institutions’ role in (re-)authorizing (or inhibiting) implementation policies, and vulnerability to shifts in political will.  The dissertation draws on content analysis through process tracing of archival data and statements, counterfactual analysis, and semi-structured interviews.  To assess the evolution and influence of democratic status, new indicators are developed.  The study employs and adapts concepts from social identity theory and emphasizes additional factors (e.g. salience of democratic status, appeal of prototypical states, and prestige of IOs) that also affect states’ pursuit of strategies of social mobility, social competition, or social creativity, thus contributing to cooperation or discord for democratic norm development in inclusive IOs.  Counter-intuitively, the institutionalization of a norm can, in fact, lead to regress.    iii  Preface  The interviews conducted for this project were approved by the Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB) at the University of British Columbia (H07-02269) on December 17, 2007.  In order to preserve confidentiality, in correspondence with the preferences indicated by interviewees, several interviews are referenced anonymously in the following text.  Additional information is available in Appendix A.  iv  Table of Contents  Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Preface............................................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vii List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... x Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework: Roles of Inclusiveness and Status in Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in Inclusive IOs .......................................................... 16 2.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 16 2.2. Inclusiveness ...................................................................................................................... 17 2.2.1. Degrees of inclusiveness in inclusive IOs ................................................................... 21 2.2.2. Theoretical framework and propositions: Inclusiveness ............................................. 24 2.3. Status .................................................................................................................................. 32 2.3.1. Theoretical framework and propositions: Status ......................................................... 37 2.4. Additional theoretical insights from comparison across the cases ..................................... 50 Chapter Three: Inclusiveness, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the CSCE/OSCE ................................................................................................................................. 54 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 54 3.2. Origins of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE: Helsinki 1973-1975 ....................... 55 3.3. Inclusiveness in the CSCE, 1973-1989: Human rights as the basis for future democratic norm development.  Significance of issue linkage, restatements, and negotiation histories. ... 57 3.4. CSCE, 1990-1991: Inclusive institutions support the codification and development of a comprehensive set of democratic norms. .................................................................................. 66 3.5. CSCE, 1992-1994: Norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality are qualified by democratic governance; inclusive institutions support the CSCE’s institutionalization........... 70 3.6. OSCE, 1995-1999: Inclusive institutions continue to sustain policy implementation of its mandate to support democratic governance. ............................................................................. 73 3.7. OSCE, 2000-2004: Inclusive institutions encounter a gradual increase in challenges to policy implementation for democracy support, with mixed effects. ......................................... 79 3.8. OSCE, 2005-2010: Inclusive institutions contribute to impasses on democratic norm development and policy implementation, yet issues remain on the agenda.............................. 83 3.9. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 86 Chapter Four: Status, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the CSCE/OSCE ................................................................................................................................. 88 4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 88  v  4.2. CSCE, 1973-1989:  Early patterns of status distinctions ................................................... 89 4.3. CSCE, 1990-1991:  Codification of comprehensive democratic norm set and institutionalization of status distinctions in terms of democratic governance .......................... 92 4.4. CSCE, 1992-1994: Continued qualification of sovereign equality with democratic norms encourages states to seek democratic status and thus support institutionalization of CSCE’s democratization agenda. ............................................................................................................ 95 4.5. OSCE, 1995-1999:  The high salience of democratic status enhances OSCE efforts to support democratic governance via states’ strategies of social mobility .................................. 98 4.6. OSCE, 2000-2004: Support for democratic governance is gradually affected by challenges due in part to the organization’s emphasis on democratic status ............................................ 104 4.7. OSCE, 2005-2010:  Status concerns contribute to increased challenges to OSCE policies  ................................................................................................................................................. 111 4.8. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 121 Chapter Five: Inclusiveness, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the United Nations ............................................................................................................................ 123 5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 123 5.2. Origins of inclusive institutions in the United Nations .................................................... 124 5.3. UN, 1945-1989: Human rights as the basis for democratic norm development.  At times agendas lie dormant, at others the legitimacy of inclusive processes enables the UN to expand norms and policies ................................................................................................................... 126 5.4. UN, 1990-1991: Procedural legitimacy of inclusive processes enables UN to expand electoral norms ........................................................................................................................ 134 5.5. UN, 1992-1994: Basis for UN’s democratization mandate is established in its most inclusive fora, underpinning its acceptance and legitimacy .................................................... 137 5.6. UN, 1995-1999: Inclusive institutions continue to play an important role in endorsing and authorizing agencies and policies to implement the UN’s democracy agenda ....................... 143 5.7. UN, 2000-2004:  After peak in democratic norm development in 1999-2000, increased challenges have few effects and support for electoral democracy remains strong ................. 150 5.8. UN, 2005-2010: Inclusive institutions become more vulnerable to shifts in states’ foreign policy priorities; challenges become stronger and more effective .......................................... 158 5.9. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 163 Chapter Six: Status, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the United Nations ........................................................................................................................................ 165 6.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 165 6.2. Status and human rights in the UN, 1945-1989:  Early patterns of status distinctions and a basis for the future development of democratic norms ........................................................... 167 6.3. UN, 1990-1991:  Institutionalization of electoral norms and seeds of a democratization mandate.  New democratic status markers meet with both support and contention. .............. 171 6.4. Salience of democratic status and trends in democratic status seeking in the UN General Assembly General Debates: 1992-2010 .................................................................................. 177  vi  6.4.1. Methodology:  Assessing the salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN GA General Debates ..................................................................................................... 177 6.4.2. Analysis and findings: The salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN GA General Debates: 1992-2010 ........................................................................................ 180 6.5. UN, 1992-1994: States’ strategies of social creativity encourage UN norms and policies for democracy support to incorporate economic development ............................................... 190 6.6. UN, 1995-1999: Prevalence of strategies of social mobility and social creativity contribute to elaboration of democratic norms and policy implementation ............................................. 196 6.7. UN, 2000-2004: A peak in democratic norm development and policy implementation is gradually followed by increased challenges............................................................................ 201 6.8. UN, 2005-2010: A mixed range of state behavior in respect to democratic status, challenges to policy implementation become more contentious ............................................. 204 6.9. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 211 Chapter Seven: Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 214 7.1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 214 7.2. Inclusiveness .................................................................................................................... 214 7.3. Status ................................................................................................................................ 219 7.4. Directions for future research ........................................................................................... 224 7.5. Policy implications ........................................................................................................... 226 References ................................................................................................................................... 230 Appendix A: List of interviews................................................................................................... 251 Appendix B: Changes in democratic governance in selected OSCE participating states ........... 253 Appendix C: Contributions to the CSCE/OSCE unified budget ................................................ 256 Appendix D: Democracy in UN member states ......................................................................... 257    vii  List of Tables   Table 2.1: Formal inclusiveness of IO bodies dealing with democratic norm development or policy implementation at policy level ............................................................................... 23 Table 2.2: Evolution and variation over time in roles of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE and UN .............................................................................................................................. 25 Table 2.3: Evolution and variation over time in roles of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN .............................................................................................................................. 38 Table 4.1: States holding the position of CSCE/OSCE Chairperson-in-Office 1991-2013 ......... 98 Table 6.1: Average number of mentions of democracy and democratization by state, disaggregated by region .................................................................................................. 182 Table C.1: CSCE financial arrangements ................................................................................... 256     viii  List of Figures   Figure 4.1: Regional origins of Heads of OSCE field offices .................................................... 103 Figure 4.2: Regions in which OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Missions were held, 1995- 2010................................................................................................................................. 105 Figure 4.3: Regional origins of Heads of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Missions, 1995- 2010................................................................................................................................. 107 Figure 4.4: Regions in which OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions were held, 1995- 2010................................................................................................................................. 108 Figure 4.5: Regional origins of Heads of OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions, 2000- 2010................................................................................................................................. 109 Figure 4.6: Average democracy indicators in selected OSCE participating states and subregions, 1989-2010 ....................................................................................................................... 120 Figure 5.1: Percentage of voting UN member states that voted in favor of two countervailing General Assembly resolutions over time ........................................................................ 138 Figure 5.2: General Assembly consideration of the item “Support by the United Nations system for the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies” ......................................................................................................................................... 144 Figure 6.1: Average number of mentions by UN Member States’ representatives, 1992-2010 . 181 Figure 6.2: Percentage of UN Member States’ representatives making at least one mention of democracy or democratization, 1992-2010 ..................................................................... 181 Figure 6.3: Percentage of UN member states making no mention of democracy in their GA General Debate statements .............................................................................................. 183 Figure 6.4:  Seeking democratic status: Total percentage of UN member states mentioning ongoing domestic democratic reforms or asserting democratic status .......................... 184 Figure 6.5: Salience of democratic status in the UN GA General Debates: Total percentage of UN member states (favorably) mentioning democracy in their foreign policy .............. 186 Figure 6.6: Percentage of states asserting explicitly that they are democracies or have consolidated .................................................................................................................... 188 Figure 6.7: Percentage of UN member states challenging UN practices of democracy support or more general conditionalities placed on aid.................................................................... 206 Figure 6.8: Percentage of UN Member States that discuss ongoing domestic democratic reforms, but make no mention of support for democratization in foreign policy (category 4) ..... 208 Figure 6.9: Number and amount of donor contributions to UNDEF, 2005-2010....................... 210 Figure B.1: Political rights and civil liberties in Central Europe, 1989-2010 ............................ 253 Figure B.2: Political rights and civil liberties in the Western Balkans and CIS, 1989-2010...... 254 Figure D.1: Political rights and civil liberties in the world, 1989-2010 ..................................... 257 Figure D.2: Electoral democracies, 1989-2010 .......................................................................... 257    ix  List of Abbreviations  ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU   African Union CFE    Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty) CHR   Commission on Human Rights (UN) CD   Community of Democracies CoE   Council of Europe CSCE   Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe CSO   Civil society organization DGTTF  Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP) DESA   Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN) EAM   Election Assessment Mission ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council (UN) EOM   Election Observation Mission EU    European Union G-77   Group of 77 GA   General Assembly (UN) HD   Human Dimension (OSCE) ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICNRD  International Conference of New or Restored Democracies IO   International Organization MDG   Millennium Development Goal NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO   Non-governmental organization OAS   Organization of American States ODA   Official Development Assistance ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE) OECD   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD-DAC  OECD Development Assistance Committee OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN) OPEC   Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OSCE PA  OSCE Parliamentary Assembly P-5   Permanent Five Members of the Security Council (UN) SC   Security Council (UN) SG   Secretary-General (UN) UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN   United Nations UNDEF  United Nations Democracy Fund UNDP   United Nations Development Programme U.S.   United States of America USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics   x  Acknowledgements  It is with pleasure that I express my appreciation to those who have made this dissertation possible.  I am grateful to my supervisory committee, Lisa Sundstrom, Katia Coleman, and Max Cameron, for fruitful conversations and for their helpful feedback, guidance, and support throughout the project.  Lisa was a great supervisor, always responding with much compassion and enthusiasm, even when my dissertation topic shifted.  I thank Katia for her engagement and many insightful comments on draft chapters and the full draft.  From Max, I learned a great deal along the way, especially on strategies for writing and presenting ideas, and from the earlier opportunity of co-authoring a paper.  This research benefited greatly from the gracious participation of interviewees at UN and OSCE offices in Warsaw, Vienna, New York, and Bratislava, as well as with civil society and state diplomatic representatives.  Similarly, I am grateful to Alice Nĕmcová at the Prague office of the OSCE Secretariat for her help navigating the OSCE archives and for many helpful discussions and ideas, and to Gretchen Dempewolf at the ODIHR archives in Warsaw.  My former colleagues at UNDP in New York in 2004-5 and at OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions in Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in 2003-4 and 2007 also positively influenced an appreciation of inclusive IOs and a curiosity about their internal challenges.  Brian Job, Merje Kuus, and Deborah Larson kindly acted as university and external examiners for the oral doctoral exam.  I appreciate all of their insights and thank Deborah Larson for an earlier conversation and sharing her work in progress.  I am grateful to Kurt Hübner and Kerstin Lüttich for making it possible to spend six months based at the Mitteleuropa Zentrum at the Technische Universität Dresden in 2008-9 and to return in December 2010, as part of a DAAD- sponsored International Graduate Student Network.  For this experience, I also thank Walter Schmitz, Jutta Müller and Daniela Kölling in Dresden, and fellow Netzwerker.  For her support early in the program, I thank Antje Ellermann.  I also thank Richard Price for sharing his teaching techniques and encouragement for instructing Introduction to Global Politics.  For thoughtful comments on parts of this dissertation presented at the ISA Annual Conventions in March 2011 and April 2012 and at ISA-Northeast in November 2011, I thank Michael Butler, Payam Foroughi, and Jacob Wobig.  Priya Bala Miller, Kristi Kenyon, Yana Gorokhovskaia, and Lynn Hancock provided helpful comments on a draft ISA paper.  This research also benefited from a UBC Graduate Fellowship and Walter C. Koerner Fellowship in 2007-8; a UBC Graduate Fellowship and Pacific Century Graduate Scholarship in 2008-9; a four-year Ph.D. Tuition Award; and FoGS and Department of Political Science travel funding.  I thank the Cieplak family for their hospitality in Warsaw.  Stephan Heidenhain, John Micgiel, Eric Marlier, Stefan Gänzle, and Azusa Kubota offered valuable suggestions at different stages of the project.  Fellow UBC classmates and friends, Katie, Clare, Erin, Netina, Hyunji, Olga, Nathan, and Avery, made my program more enjoyable and productive.  I also appreciated helpful and humor-filled comments on a full draft from Andrew Winternitz.  For their good wishes over the years, I thank my extended family in Germany and my sister, Amanda.  I am especially grateful to my parents, Jane and Bob, for their constant encouragement.  Jane and my husband, Jörg, were gracious to read and share ideas about various versions of this work.  Most of all, I am grateful to Jörg for his boundless patience, optimism, and partnership.  Chapter One 1  Chapter One: Introduction The process by which democracy is supported is critical to its legitimacy.  It is widely agreed that democracy support by Western states has lost a great deal of credibility over the past decade as a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, human rights abuses during the “war on terror,” and bilateral donors’ inconsistency and politicization.1  As an important means by which the practice of democracy support can regain legitimacy, scholars and practitioners have proposed that states increase their commitments to work through multilateral institutions (Carothers 2008, 6-7; Cameron and Hecht 2008, 18, 23-4; Piccone 2008, 14; Burron 2011, 401-2; Craner and Wollack 2008; see also Ikenberry 2011).  International organizations (IOs) – and in particular those with formally inclusive compositions - hold several advantages for democracy support precisely in terms of procedural legitimacy: 2  they are comparatively neutral, less likely to promote a particular model of democracy, free of colonial baggage, less politically motivated than bilateral support, and their efforts are typically based on collectively-agreed international commitments (Newman 2004, 195-6; Ludwig 2004, 116; Author’s interview with Roland Rich, Executive Head of United Nations Democracy Fund, 12 Mar. 2009). 3  Yet there remain significant gaps in our understanding of how inclusive international organizations are able to develop and implement democratic norms.  Scholarly explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit factors such as the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of the West more broadly, interests of new democracies to ‘lock in’ democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions (Schimmelfennig 2007; Rich 2001; Krisch 2003, 149; Domínguez 2007; Clark 2005, 8; Moravscik 2000; Schroeder 2011; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  Existing accounts tend to avoid in-depth analysis of norm development processes in inclusive inter-governmental fora such as the UN General Assembly or regional Summits and therefore under-emphasize two important (and interacting) explanatory variables: inclusive institutions and democratic status. In this dissertation, I examine the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status on democratic norm development and policy implementation within two  1  See, for example, Carothers (2009), the contributions by Burnell and Carothers in Burnell and Youngs, eds. (2010), and by Robinson and Stiglitz in Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (2003, 15, 18). 2  Similar arguments are made regarding humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping (see Finnemore 1996; Coleman 2007; Weiss et al 2007, xlii). 3  See also Statement by Mr. Tommasoli, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), UN GA, 62 nd  Session, 44 th  Plenary, 5 Nov. 2007, A/62/PV.44, 17. Chapter One 2  inclusive IOs: the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). 4   The study is divided into six time periods between the respective origins of the organizations in 1945 or 1973 and 2010. This research is empirically significant at a time when both inclusive IOs and international democracy support can benefit from revitalization.  Inclusive IOs are often viewed negatively for their characteristics such as slow decision-making, difficulty enforcing commitments, and tendencies towards least-common-denominator agreements (e.g. Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin 1998).  Similarly, democracy support has been viewed increasingly negatively in recent years because of perceptions of donors’ paternalistic practices, inconsistency, domestic democratic deficiencies, U.S. engagement in Iraq, and the “war on terror” (on the latter, see Carothers 2009, Burnell and Carothers 2010)..  It is important to think differently about both inclusive institutions and support for democratic development in order to reclaim their advantages.  Especially since 2003, democracy promotion has become associated with the idea of imposing democracy, and the legitimacy of U.S. authority has declined. Democracy support typically has greater legitimacy when it responds to the expressed needs of recipient communities and when provided by more neutral, multilateral institutions with efforts based on collective agreements as opposed to states’ political interests.  When inclusive institutions achieve consensus or broad agreement on democratic norms among their member or participating states, as in the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, they confer a unique type of procedural legitimacy. “In all societies, what is legal or legitimate is, most often, collectively approved” (Weiss et al 2007, xxxii; see also Coleman 2007). Inclusive IOs derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness.  However, the influence of any type of status, including democratic status, effectively undermines their inclusiveness, with varied consequences.  Thus, there is a constant tension between inclusive institutions and democratic status in inclusive IOs with democratization mandates.  How does this tension affect policy outcomes in the UN and the CSCE/OSCE?  By what mechanisms do  4  The CSCE refers to a series of conferences among 35 states (the United States, European states, the USSR and Canada) which were launched in 1973.  In the early 1990s the organization became more formally institutionalized, developing a secretariat and permanent organs.  The CSCE became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995. Chapter One 3  inclusive institutions and democratic status affect the motivations of state representatives to support or challenge specific policies in inclusive IOs? This project contributes to the work of scholars of institutionalism, constructivism, and international law, who have documented significant cases in which inclusive IOs have played key roles in norm development and implementation (Finnemore 1996; Ruggie 1993; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Newman and Rich 2004; Thomas 2001; Keohane and Martin 1995; Heidenhain 2004; Johnston 2001; Flockhart 2005; Pevehouse 2005; McMahon and Baker 2006; Weiss et al. 2005; Acharya and Johnston 2007, among others, including innumerable reports issued by the IOs).  Yet additional research is needed on factors that contribute to cooperation and discord among states in different policy areas in inclusive IOs.  Variations in inclusive IOs’ ability to support democratic norm development and policy implementation over time remain under- analyzed.  I argue that inclusive institutions and democratic status merit greater attention in theories of global governance. While inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions they have proven highly supportive of democratic norm development.  For example, at the Paris Summit and the Copenhagen and Moscow Human Dimension Meetings of 1990-1991, the CSCE  developed the most comprehensive set of international commitments for democratic governance in existence at the time, despite its consensus decision-making rules.  I show that the CSCE’s inclusive institutions were, in fact, critical to the process.  This runs counter to conventional wisdom that inclusive institutions are at a disadvantage in norm development because their large and diverse memberships produce a tendency towards least-common denominator agreements (Victor 2006; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998).  Building on the work of Thomas (2001), Adler (1998), and literature on institutional design, I argue that inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate, of particular importance when windows of opportunity are fleeting. Inclusive institutions also help to ensure that codified commitments are considered recurrently, thereby increasing opportunities for a favorable environment or constellation of actors to facilitate norm development.  Moreover, inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of progress on democratic commitments particularly if resistant states are interested in an issue in a different policy area such as security, and therefore accept Chapter One 4  the associated trade-offs. The feature of procedural legitimacy has also contributed to the expansion of democratic norms and policies. To date, the literature on international organizations and global governance has not explored the role and effects of democratic status, which refers here to hierarchies in IOs in terms of democratic governance.  When realists focus on status, they emphasize material dimensions such as military strength, economic development, or great power status.  By contrast, the concept of democratic status highlights hierarchies with ideational and institutional bases.  I focus on democratic status because this is a comparatively new basis of international status with an interesting history, high political relevance, and significant effects on states’ support for (or opposition to) democratic norm development and policy implementation in IOs.  Emphasizing norm development in the specific setting of international organizations enables the view of international institutions as social environments (Johnston 2001), which is a valuable perspective for the study of status concerns.  Democratic status markers refer to indicators of the attribute valued by the social group (e.g. democratic governance, a favorable election assessment), which signify a state’s social standing or position in the group.5 What motivates states to challenge an IO’s democratization agenda or its implementation practices?  For example, since 2005, observers have talked of a “crisis” in the OSCE, where progress in elaborating democratic commitments has stalled on all but the least contentious issues, and the organization’s efforts to support democracy have met with increased challenges and resistance (Zellner et al. 2005; Boonstra 2007; Dunay 2007; Zellner et al. 2007).  These scholars often attribute the OSCE’s current dilemma to shifts in the Russian Federation’s priorities after disappointment that the OSCE did not develop into an alternative to NATO, exclusion from North Atlantic and European structures that enlarged to Russia’s borders in 2004, and the perceived Western role in the colored revolutions.  However, I argue that resistance and opposition to OSCE work on democratic governance has also been a reaction by less democratic states against their lack of democratic status in the organization.  It is not simply that OSCE criticism of non-democratic practices has led to backlash against OSCE norms.  Russia and several CIS states have reacted to a lower than desired status in the organization’s hierarchy, compounded by the historic emphasis on sovereign equality in the organization.  In the UN, status distinctions in terms of democracy have not been as pervasive as in the OSCE, which  5  On international status markers in general, see Larson, Paul and Wohlforth forthcoming, 8. Chapter One 5  explains some variation in successful policy development.  It should be noted that challenges in the OSCE and the UN have not been directed at the “central validity claim of the norm per se” (Price 2006, 262).  That is, objections have not struck against the core attributes of democratic values.  Rather, challenges have objected primarily to the manner and practices by which the international organizations have promoted and supported democratic development. While democratic governance is not a prerequisite to formal membership in the UN or the CSCE/OSCE, codification of democratic norms in the early 1990s contributed to qualifying ideas of sovereign equality and to stratifying states in terms of compliance and non-compliance, to different degrees in the two IOs.  Whereas exclusive groups such as the EU or NATO confer status through membership, inclusive IOs resort to other mechanisms of differentiation.  Status is a limiting force on sovereign equality (Hurrell 2009), yet the tensions between sovereign equality and democratic status have not been systematically explored in scholarship of international organizations. The concept of democratic status renders visible the presence of international hierarchies based on democratic governance. How is the behavior of IOs affected when sovereign equality is qualified by norms of democratic governance?  To answer this question, I develop new indicators of democratic status and show, building on  the research of Larson and Shevchenko (2010a), that emphasis on democratic status has had two main but diverging effects on inclusive IOs’ democratic development efforts.  First, it has motivated some states to support IOs’ democracy commitments and programs.  Among democratizing states, support for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status-seeking, both within an IO and in the wider international community.  This perspective adds to actor-centered theories (e.g. Moravcsik 2000), by emphasizing the importance of shifts in states’ hierarchical relations with other states and within IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) in supporting democratic norm development at different points in time.  Second, an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate other states to challenge the IO’s support for implementation of democratic norms. Realists would argue that these challenges can be explained by geopolitical power shifts. However, by clarifying how democratic status operates and illustrating that effective challenges have not been limited to the most powerful states, I show that realist arguments do not fully explain discord around policy implementation. Chapter One 6  To analyze the evolution and roles of democratic status, I draw on insights from constructivism and social psychology.  Of the studies that apply the concept of status to international relations, to date the emphasis has been on the role of status concerns of great or rising powers (see, for example, Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Wohlforth 2009; Clunan 2009; Deng 2008), or compliance with international norms (Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2008).  Studies of status have often focused on prospects for conflict rather than cooperation (see Wohlforth 2009; Markey 1999; Wallace 1973).  There is a dearth of empirical studies on status in international organizations.  This dissertation proposes some new interpretations of key concepts by analyzing the role of democratic status and status concerns among both large and small states, within the context of inclusive IOs.  Inclusive IOs are particularly apt for analyzing questions related to democratic status because of the tension between inclusive membership and differentiation according to democratic governance.  This is reinforced by the IOs’ involvement in monitoring and support for compliance with democratic norms.  Moreover, in inclusive IOs’ decision-making bodies the salience of this category of stratification - and the norms and implementation policies by which democratic status distinctions are reinforced - are recurrently debated and negotiated. Thus, in this dissertation there are two overarching intentions.  First, I describe major evolutions in norms of inclusiveness and democratic status, as well as the tensions between these concepts.   Inclusive institutions and democratic status are the primary independent, or explanatory, variables of the study.  Second, I explain how inclusiveness and democratic status operate by examining, as dependent variables, the development of selected democratic norms and implementation policies in inclusive IOs.  A large body of constructivist research has demonstrated the utility of analyzing the role of norms, or “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54), in international relations.  Democratic norms refer here to collective, international expectations of behavior for the democratic governance of states; their membership in IOs further specifies states’ “given identity.”  While democratic norms and commitments differ among inclusive IOs such as the UN, CSCE/OSCE, and Organization of American States (OAS), 6  the broad spectrum typically includes free and fair elections; democratic rule of law, independence of the judiciary, law  6  The OAS is considered here to be an inclusive IO, despite its basic democratic requirements on membership in the Inter-American Democratic Charter (and exclusion of Cuba from 1962-2009 and Honduras in 2009), because it originated without membership conditions, enforcement has most often been weak, and there is a wide range of understandings among member states in relation to its core democratic norm sets. Chapter One 7  development and enforcement, and equal access to justice; fair, effective public administration; civilian control of the military; citizen participation in governance; and protection of civil and political rights and fundamental freedoms.  The concept of inclusiveness employed here is closely tied to sovereign equality and refers to the involvement of member states of an international organization in the IO’s decision-making and policy implementation efforts, irrespective of states’ advance compliance with the IO’s core norm sets.7  Inclusiveness is considered in terms of degrees, rather than as a dichotomous variable. Democratic norm development refers to processes of elaborating, imparting greater specificity, and institutionalizing democratic norms, yet also signifies processes that may undermine these norms.  I am not only concerned with the initial emergence of democratic norms, but also with the dynamics of their subsequent, smaller-scale and incremental evolutionary changes such as the elaboration or dilution of commitments and mandates.  Policy implementation refers here to the establishment, endorsement, and execution of broad programs at policy level (i.e. at headquarters rather than at an IO’s country office or regional levels) to further institutionalize and implement the IO’s agendas and mandates for supporting democratic governance in their member or participating states, 8  for example, by authorizing and designating tasks to focal points or agencies such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).  I demonstrate that inclusiveness and democratic status have played important roles in shaping the ways in which norms and policies develop.  Counter-intuitively, the institutionalization of a norm can, in fact, lead to regress. 9    7  Scholarship in global governance often uses the concept of inclusiveness to discuss the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and other non-state actors in IOs’ decision-making processes (Clark 2001; Rittberger 2008; Young 2000; among others).  While this continues to be an important trend in the study of IOs, the concept of inclusiveness is used in this dissertation primarily to analyze developments taking place among states in inclusive IOs. 8  While the UN comprises member states, the CSCE/OSCE comprises participating states.  This is because, unlike the UN, the CSCE/OSCE has operated without a formal charter, and thus membership has had a political rather than a legal basis. 9  I thank Priya Bala Miller for this comment. Chapter One 8  Significance of the Research Question The analysis of two under-studied, interacting factors in global governance - inclusiveness and democratic status – offers new insights into patterns of norm development and policy implementation in international organizations.  This dissertation draws, in particular, on insights from studies of institutional design, constructivist approaches, and social psychology. Scholars argue from various perspectives that institutional design matters.  Most prolific have been the writings of rational institutionalists, who emphasize international institutions’ role in solving collective action problems (Koremenos, Lipson, and Duncan 2001; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984; Martin 1992).  However, additional perspectives are offered in studies of diplomatic negotiations and international venues, which emphasize factors such as international institutions’ membership, mandate, output status, rules of procedure, and legitimacy (Coleman forthcoming; see also Johnston 2001).  The theoretical propositions on the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions developed in this dissertation generally follow these intellectual traditions on institutional design. Inclusive IOs’ norm development efforts have proven to be highly significant in global affairs.  One particularly compelling example is the argument that human rights norms in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975 contributed considerably to the end of the Cold War in various ways (Thomas 2001, 4; Adler 1998, 127; Gheciu 2008, 119; Evers 2005, 5; Galbreath 2007; Snyder 2011, among others).  Yet it is surprising that the role of inclusive institutions is infrequently emphasized.  Commitments made within inclusive institutions are used by civil society in “boomerang patterns of advocacy” to increase political pressure on their home states to comply with international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001).  In fact, the boomerang effect requires inclusive IOs. This is because inclusive IOs codify and confer legitimacy on the international commitments to which the activists appeal.  Creating these commitments requires an inclusive international institution that sets aspirational goals for its member (or participating) states and generally does not exclude them for lack of compliance. Therefore, even a minimal commitment agreed upon in an inclusive forum of an inclusive IO may have far-reaching effects over time. Scholars of global governance often treat IOs as independent, autonomous actors, particularly in studies of norm diffusion and implementation (Finnemore 1996; Schimmelfennig et al 2006; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Gheciu 2008, 7-8; among others).  This is an important Chapter One 9  analytical move because of the numerous situations in which secretariats, agencies of IOs and actors such as the UN Secretary-General operate independently in international relations. However, with this assumption, one effectively overlooks important inter-governmental debates and states’ contributions that significantly influence IO efforts.  This assumption also conceals significant inequalities among states in IOs.  Scholarship on international organizations can benefit from additional research on how status motivates states’ behavior, which in turn affects IOs’ norms and policies in particular issue areas.  Which actors propel the organization towards implementing its various mandates and which actors hold it back?  By scrutinizing the concepts of inclusiveness and democratic status in inclusive IOs and exploring implications at inter- governmental and international levels, this dissertation complements existing scholarship on IOs as autonomous actors. Although this dissertation considers the agency of actors such as state representatives and the UN Secretary-General, it might be criticized for its emphasis on international, structural factors.  However, to date, scholarship on international norm creation has focused heavily on agency, and greater consideration of structural factors is needed (Coleman forthcoming, 2; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004, x).  The existing literature on democratic norm development and policy implementation in inclusive IOs (and their precursors in the area of human rights) provides some comprehensive assessments of the roles of specific actors in these processes (Franck 1991; Fox and Roth 2000; Ludwig 2004a, 2004b; Schroeder 2011; Morsink 1999; Thomas 2001, among others).  My objective is not to account for all factors that contribute to democratic norm development.  Rather, this project aims to complement existing studies by exploring the roles and interaction of two factors, inclusive institutions and democratic status, which have been under-emphasized in the literature on democratic norm development. This oversight is related to a broader trend: research on international organizations infrequently focuses on inclusive IOs’ most majoritarian bodies.  Kennedy argues that “writings on the [UN] Security Council probably outnumber those on the [UN] GA by about 100 to 1. There have also been many more writings about, and attention paid to, the role of NGOs, multinational corporations, or the global media” (2006, 210).  For an issue area like democracy, with wide value variations and differences in visions of what is desirable, inclusive institutions help to ensure that IO policies reflect a broader range of outlooks and reduce perceptions of IO activity as intervention (see also Coleman 2007; Finnemore 1996).  In general, the neglect of the Chapter One 10  most inclusive institutions in IR scholarship is myopic; it fails to appreciate that despite their inefficiencies, bodies such as the UN General Assembly also have histories as highly transformative actors. Studies of how IOs develop and promote various types of norms have typically focused on different mechanisms, such as “socialization,” i.e. the processes by which states are encouraged to adopt sets of norms, values, and interests espoused by an IO’s secretariat and its member states (see Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2001; 2008; Checkel 2005; Adler 1998).  Some scholars have emphasized the direct role of IOs as teachers and agents of socialization (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Barnett 2004).  However, the dependent variable of studies on socialization is often whether “target states” domestically adopt or comply with international norms.  By contrast, this dissertation has a different causal chain.  Our dependent variables and outcomes of interest - democratic norm development and policy implementation in inclusive IOs - focus on IO behavior, rather than “effectiveness” in terms of IOs’ influence on states’ compliance or non-compliance at domestic level.  This approach, therefore, differs in a similar way from both the literatures on socialization in international relations and on democratization in comparative politics.  Rather than measuring IOs’ influence on states’ domestic democratic reforms, this dissertation analyzes prior mechanisms.  Inclusive IOs’ ability (or lack thereof) to develop democratic norms and implementation policies is a step that influences and precedes (and therefore complements) the success or failure of socialization processes and international dimensions of democratization. On the subject of democratic status, scholars have suggested that international organizations with higher democratic densities, or proportions of democratic states, are more likely to support implementation than counterpart IOs with greater diversity of regime types.  For example, Pevehouse argues that “the more homogenously democratic a regional organization’s membership, the more likely it will be to pressure autocratic governments to liberalize, provide credible guarantees to allay elite fears, stipulate conditions on membership and most importantly to enforce those conditions” (2005, 3-4).  McMahon and Baker similarly argue that IOs’ success on these issues “depends on the number and influence of democratic member states in the organization and when a ‘tipping point’ of the organizations’ embracing of democratic principles on the part of their member states may be achieved” (2006, 34; see also Acharya and Johnston 2007, 275).  However, a closer look at the history of the CSCE/OSCE and UN during periods of Chapter One 11  greater and lesser homogeneity in states’ regime types suggests that such optimistic forecasts cannot be assumed, and that we should expect more complicated processes to take place in inclusive IOs.  Indeed, the above-mentioned arguments are deficient because they discount the influence of inclusive institutions and status.  For example, a focus on inclusive institutions would add the realization that, even with a democratic majority, consensus rules allow simply one opposing state to block the collective will of all other states.  A focus on status would add the realization that even if an IO is comprised solely of electoral democracies, informal status divisions in the IO along lines of compliance or non-compliance with more comprehensive democratic commitments can contribute to alienation and, consequently, to significant challenges to the IO’s implementation efforts. Because of their comparative procedural legitimacy, inclusive multilateral institutions are likely to be increasingly significant in the provision of democracy support in the coming years (see Carothers 2008, 7; Ikenberry 2011; House of Commons 2007, 17, 151).  For foreign policy- makers, this research suggests that despite inclusive institutions’ appearance of ineffectiveness during contentious periods, their role in laying groundwork can prove catalytic even during short windows of opportunity.  While policy-makers’ over-emphasis on democratic status in IOs with strong norms of sovereign equality can intensify challenges and discord, this research also suggests how IOs might better capitalize on the lure of status among many member states to generate greater support for their mandates. Case Selection, Methods, and Sources of Evidence The CSCE/OSCE and UN were selected for in-depth, longitudinal case studies for several reasons.  Both the CSCE/OSCE and the UN are historically important inclusive IOs which, from the basis of human rights norms in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1945 respectively, developed democratic norm sets at international level in the 1990s.  Both IOs have supported democratic development extensively through implementation agencies such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and have made significant financial investments. 10   The U.S. is a full participant in the OSCE and UN; therefore, this study can assess, for example, the role of a hegemon in the salience of democratic  10  For example, UNDP allocated 1.3 billion dollars (41% of its portfolio) in 2009 to democratic governance projects in 133 countries. (Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 9 March 2009) Chapter One 12  status in the IOs.  Over the course of its history, the membership of the UN has grown from 51 states in 1945, to 179 states in 1992, and to 193 states in 2011. 11   Participation in the CSCE has grown from 35 states in 1973, to 52 states in 1992, and to 56 states in 2011.  Both the CSCE/OSCE and UN developed with broad memberships as security organizations aimed at facilitating interstate cooperation.  Thus, in both IOs sovereign equality is an important foundational norm, yet has been operationalized differently. Since this research examines the mechanisms and processes by which inclusive IOs are (or are not) able to achieve certain objectives, the selection of two inclusive IOs (rather than an exclusive IO such as NATO or the EU) is logical.  As defined above, inclusiveness is not meant in the sense of geography.  An IO may be inclusive even if it has clear geographic boundaries, as in the OSCE, OAS, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and others.  The selection of two inclusive IOs holds inclusive formal membership constant and enables analysis of comparable processes.  The UN and the OSCE are particularly apt prototypical cases, and the UN has the most inclusive state membership among IOs.  Since the dependent variable of this research interrogates inclusive IOs’ behavior (rather than IOs’ “effectiveness” in terms of influencing member states’ domestic compliance with democratic norms), it is important that between the CSCE/OSCE and the UN there is variation in the IOs’ ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies, variation in degrees of inclusiveness of the IOs’ institutions, and variation in the pervasiveness of status distinctions in the IOs, both between the IOs and over time. Other IOs that might be considered comparable, and to which some findings of this research might be generalized, because of their codified commitments on democratic norms or because of their inclusiveness, include the Council of Europe (CoE), OAS, African Union (AU), and ASEAN.  The Council of Europe was not selected because it was a more exclusive IO in the early 1990s prior to its enlargement to Central Europe and CIS states, and while it also developed a set of democratic norms in the 1990s, these and its election observation efforts developed later than those of the CSCE/OSCE despite comprising a smaller group of European states.  The U.S. and Canada are full participants in the UN and OSCE, but not in the Council of Europe. The CoE does not extend to Central Asian states, as does the OSCE, and has not developed as extensive field offices; therefore the UN and OSCE are more similar in terms of  11  Source: www.un.org.en/members/growth.shtml, accessed 6/2012. Chapter One 13  their histories, development, composition, and implementation practices.  Other regional IOs, especially the OAS which has seen similar trends in democratic norm development and challenges to implementation, could serve as interesting case comparisons on which to further test findings in future research. Sources of evidence for this dissertation include content analysis of several hundred statements from CSCE/OSCE Summits, Follow-up Meetings, Ministerial Councils, and Human Dimension Conferences; several hundred statements made in the UN General Assembly General Debates as well as in debates on specific GA resolutions related to the UN’s democracy agenda, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and other key fora in which the IOs’ democratic norms and policies to support implementation have been negotiated.  The research also draws on semi-structured interviews I conducted in 2008-2009 with OSCE and UN staff in Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, and New York, civil society representatives who observe the IOs’ democracy support efforts, and representatives of states’ permanent missions to the OSCE and UN.12   I also draw on numerous primary sources, especially statements, reports issued by the IOs, materials from foreign ministries, and research undertaken while a Researcher-in Residence in the archives of the Prague Office of the OSCE. To analyze the evolution and effects of democratic status, I developed several indicators of status in inclusive IOs.  In the OSCE, these include prestigious leadership positions (e.g. Chairperson-in-Office, Heads of field offices and election observation and assessment missions), the locations of election observation and assessment missions and field offices, as well as relative standing based on quality of governance indicators.  In the UN General Assembly, I developed new indicators of the salience of democratic status and status seeking, including the number of delegates’ mentions of democracy and democratization, and qualitative analysis of the ways in which delegates speak about democracy, domestically and in their foreign policy priorities, within selected UN GA debates. A consistent periodization structure is used in each of the four empirical chapters of this dissertation.  In particular, the analysis is divided into six time periods: the Cold War (1945-1989 or 1973-1989); the immediate post-Cold War years (1990-1991); the early and late 1990s (1992- 1994); (1995-1999); and early and late 2000s (2000-2004; 2005-2010).  These time periods are  12  Many of these interviews were held under confidentiality.  See Appendix A. Chapter One 14  categorized in such a way to capture significant shifts in: (a) the IOs’ organizational structure and the form and strength of IO institutions supporting democratic governance (b) important characteristics of the IOs’ member or participating states, such as political will or democratic consolidation; and (c) external factors, such as perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. leadership, the rise of China, Russia’s resurgence, or regional or global shifts in priorities and approaches. The time periods enable the illustration of how factors in earlier time periods affect subsequent developments.  The time periods also make it possible to distinguish between important developments that have taken place in more and less conducive normative contexts, and those which have taken place when member or participating states have held different status positions in the eyes of the inclusive IOs.  By analyzing two inclusive IOs over several decades, this study is able to observe multiple instances of democratic norm development and policy implementation under different normative environments and conditions, facilitating the assessment of theoretical propositions. Because of the large number of instances in which democratic norms and implementation policies have been discussed in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, the debates selected for analysis are limited by a few criteria.  In addition to ensuring ample observations in each of the study’s time periods, I select those which interviewees and the literature highlighted as most significant in the history of democratic norm development and policy implementation in the organizations (as well as unsuccessful attempts) and those which include large-picture debate on democracy as a system of governance. Outline of Dissertation Chapter 2 presents the dissertation’s theoretical framework.  It develops key concepts, highlights gaps in the literature, and elaborates sets of theoretical propositions about the evolution, and roles of inclusiveness and status.  Chapters 3 to 6 present the dissertation’s empirical case studies.  Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the CSCE/OSCE, while chapters 5 and 6 focus on the UN.  For each international organization, the first empirical chapter focuses on inclusiveness (chapters 3 and 5).  One purpose of this format is to provide a backdrop and point of reference for the following chapters on status (chapters 4 and 6) – both in terms of the inclusive institutions in which democratic status operates and to describe the democratic norms and implementation policies that are analyzed in both IOs. Chapter One 15  More specifically, chapter 3 assesses theoretical propositions on the roles and functions of inclusive institutions in democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE/OSCE.  It explores relations between inclusive institutions and windows of opportunity, practices of issuing norm restatements, issue linkage, the contributions of procedural legitimacy to norm expansion, inclusive institutions’ role in (re-)authorizing (or inhibiting) implementation policies, and their vulnerability to shifts in political will.  In chapter 4, I document the rise, evolution and weakening of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE.  The chapter develops several new indicators of democratic status and assesses theoretical propositions on the effects of strategies of social mobility, social contention, and social creativity.  As in chapter 3, chapter 5 analyzes the roles and functions of inclusive institutions, yet based on evidence from the UN. Chapter 6 shows evolutions in the salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN and illustrates the role played by democratic status in selected cases of democratic norm development and policy implementation.  For section 6.4 of chapter 6, I created an original data set that documents each mention of democracy in all statements made by representatives of UN member states in the UN General Assembly General Debates in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010.  I disaggregate the data by region and level of democracy and examine the ways in which states use the concept of democracy.  The dissertation’s conclusion presents a summary of the empirical chapters’ findings for each of the theoretical propositions, suggests directions for future research, and discusses policy implications.   Chapter Two 16  Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework: Roles of Inclusiveness and Status in Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in Inclusive IOs  2.1. Introduction The development in 1990-91 of a highly comprehensive democratic norm set in the CSCE is one example challenging conventional wisdom that inclusive IOs are at a disadvantage because their large and diverse memberships produce a tendency towards least-common denominator agreements, or, at worst, paralysis.  Counter-intuitively, I argue that inclusive institutions have been critical to the substantive outcomes in several cases of democratic norm development in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  Highly inclusive fora are not always detrimental to development of democratic norms and policies for their implementation.  Occasionally they are able to achieve broad consensus.  Examples beyond the CSCE Charter of Paris and Copenhagen Document of 1990 include the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001.  In inclusive IOs with democratization mandates there is a strong tension between the norm of sovereign equality and the IOs’ ambitions to maintain or enhance the strength of their democratic norm sets.  It is a tension between norms of inclusiveness (which hold procedural legitimacy) and norms of democracy (which hold substantive legitimacy).  However, under certain conditions these tensions have posed fewer constraints, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, extending to about 2000 in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  The conceptual framework developed in this chapter highlights both advantages and disadvantages of different patterns of inclusiveness. A tension also exists between inclusive institutions and democratic status, and this explains their selection as the two primary explanatory variables of this study.  The advantages of inclusiveness are tempered in inclusive IOs by the influence of all dimensions of status, including democratic status.  When states are categorized, even informally, by democratic attributes, several consequences arise.  Overemphasis on democratic status by an IO’s secretariat, specialized agencies, or powerful states – especially those for which legitimacy is decreasing - can intensify alienation and discord, thus negatively affecting prospects for democratic norm development and policy implementation.  On the other hand, emphasis on democratic status by the IOs and their larger states has also encouraged several democratizing states to support democratic norm development, partially in the interest of status seeking, both within the Chapter Two 17  organizations and in the wider international community.  To analyze the role of democratic status in states’ support for (or challenges against) democratic norms in inclusive IOs, I employ and adapt several concepts from social identity theory, including social mobility, social competition, and social creativity, building on Larson and Shevchenko (2010a) and others.  The context of inclusive IOs with high degrees of inequality suggests additional interpretations of these concepts.  It is important to improve our understanding of how status operates in inclusive IOs because status affects states’ behavior as well as the norms and policies that inclusive IOs are able to generate. In this chapter, I briefly review relevant international relations literature that employs the concepts of inclusiveness and status, identify key strengths and weaknesses, and propose adaptations.  This review provides the basis from which inclusiveness and status are operationalized in the dissertation’s theoretical framework and analyzed in the empirical cases. Existing explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit factors such as the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of the West more broadly, interests of new democracies to ‘lock in’ democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions (Schimmelfennig 2007; Rich 2001; Krisch 2003, 149; Domínguez 2007; Clark 2005, 8; Moravscik 2000; Schroeder 2011; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  These accounts hold explanatory power, but a closer look at the roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status highlights additional influences and causal processes. This chapter also presents the research design and theoretical propositions on inclusiveness and status that guide the dissertation’s analysis. 2.2. Inclusiveness Why should we deepen our understanding of the concept of inclusiveness in the setting of inclusive international organizations?  Two powerful arguments are made in the literature. First, the degree to which an inclusive IO is, in fact, inclusive is linked to the extent to which the IO can be considered democratic.  Democratic ideals suggest that all those potentially affected by decisions should be included equally in decision-making processes (Young 2000, 9, 23, 27; Linklater 2007, 5; Habermas 1996, among others).  Somewhat problematic for IOs are their dual constituencies of both states and individuals.  Cosmopolitan and constructivist scholars have under-analyzed degrees of inclusion of states in IOs, in part because of the non-democratic Chapter Two 18  regime types of many member states. 13   Their focus on the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) and individuals in IO decision making often suggests that inclusiveness and democracy are complementary and similarly positive procedural normative goals.  In this dissertation, the analysis of inter-governmental bodies therefore contributes to ongoing debates and interpretations of inclusiveness.  The focus here on states is partially pragmatic, as states have had greatest direct effect (both positive and negative) on the codification of democratic norms and on their implementation policies in inclusive IOs.  Of the few constructivists analyzing state behavior in IOs, Johnston argues that there are several benefits of inclusiveness; in particular, large audiences facilitate backpatting and opprobrium effects (2001).  While these arguments apply to norm diffusion and socialization processes, the causal chain of this dissertation is more proximate, leading to norm development and policy implementation. Second, and slightly broader than the first, the degree to which an inclusive IO is, in fact, inclusive, affects the legitimacy of the inclusive IO as well as of the norms developed and supported therein. This is also primarily a procedural consideration, speaking directly to how norms are developed, elaborated, and implemented by inclusive IOs, as opposed to the inherent substantive value of the norms themselves.  Process legitimacy, or the perception that a rule is legitimate if “it has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” (Hurrell 2007, 80, 308; see also Clark 2007, 18, 19; Franck 1990, 24), is only one form of legitimacy, yet the ostensibly egalitarian, procedural features of some inclusive IOs’ decision-making bodies are among their attractive comparative advantages in the eyes of many member states.  It can be argued that norms of inclusiveness (of states) are stronger than norms of democracy (for the behavior of states) in international society.  The United Nations’ “moral authority” is derived in part from its nearly global membership and perceptions that each member state is able to participate, for example, in deliberations in the General Assembly. I follow several scholars who have placed renewed emphasis on procedural legitimacy in IOs in the 2000s, and assume that inclusive processes contribute to the  13  Further, cosmopolitan scholars in principle contest the legitimacy of nation states, since states exclude non- citizens (Young 2005, 236; Vincent 113-125; Linklater 2007, 58). Chapter Two 19  legitimacy of international organizations’ mandates and the norm sets they support, especially in the eyes of weaker member states. 14   For example, Andrew Hurrell argues: A global moral community in which claims about justice can secure both authority and be genuinely accessible to a broad swathe of humanity will be one that is built around some minimal notion of just process, that prioritizes institutions that embed procedural fairness, and that cultivates the shared political culture and the habits of argumentation and deliberation on which such institutions necessarily depend…The alternative is both normatively unacceptable and politically unviable, namely to open the door to a situation in which it is the strength of a single state or group of states that decides what shall count as law (2007, 312-13).  Similarly, Krisch argues that “as long as conceptions of justice and morality include some emphasis on process and do not rely entirely on substantive considerations (174), the more inclusive, participatory character of multilateral institutions should, in principle, outweigh the substantive gains of unilateral action” (2003, 174).  Processes that facilitate states’ consent (or consensus or acquiescence in the case of customary norms) and thereby the inclusion in the development of norms by states potentially affected, are seen by some international lawyers as important for the binding nature of a rule, and for attenuating adverse effects of states’ inequalities (Byers 1999, 7-8, 142-45; Krisch 2003, 142).  Further, Karns and Mingst argue that “international institutions like the UN, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of right process such as one state, one vote” (2004, 32). Since moral authority and legitimacy are among the most valuable assets of inclusive IOs, their viability and credibility depends on careful preservation. However, the moral authority and legitimacy of inclusive IOs can be undermined by IO practices which are (or are seen to be) in the self-interest of democratic great powers and therefore undemocratic.  Another serious dilemma for inclusiveness presents itself when outcomes of inclusive IO debates that enjoy procedural legitimacy, such as resolutions adopted by numerical advantage, are criticized as substantively illegitimate by democratic member states committed to more comprehensive normative frameworks.  Inclusive structures which encourage participation in norm development and policy implementation by states that are governed in ways many find odious often encounter obstacles in terms of advancing substantive goals, as illustrated in controversies over Libya’s appointment as Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission in 2003.  Critics of inclusive IOs often find fault with procedural inefficiencies such  14  Although discussion of effects of procedural legitimacy on compliance is outside the scope of this dissertation, for this line of reasoning see Hurrell 2007, 316; Clark 2005 133-34; Toope 2000; and Franck 1990, 24. Chapter Two 20  as consensus decision making, which can lead to minimalist normative agreements and implementation policies (Victor 2006; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998).  They argue that it is more advantageous for smaller groups of states to negotiate highly substantive agreements, and gradually to expand membership with accession criteria.  These arguments draw inspiration from Olson’s logic of collective action, which argues that large groups are less likely than small groups to cooperate and achieve common interests (1965; Acharya 2007, 16-17).  I counter these arguments, however, by highlighting examples of democratic commitments developed within large, inclusive IOs and explain that, in some cases and under certain conditions, the inclusive institutions themselves contributed to highly substantive agreements.  Given the presence of significant trade-offs, I explore the question, through cases of IOs’ support for democratic governance: Under which conditions are inclusive institutional arrangements able to contribute to IOs’ ability to develop norms and policies towards their substantive aims? An analytical distinction is made by Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) between the EU and NATO on the one hand, which use exclusive socialization strategies such as membership conditionality and possess significant material incentives, and the Council of Europe and OSCE on the other hand, which are largely reliant on inclusive socialization strategies such as persuasion and social incentives, and have significantly fewer material resources (2006, 7). Ultimately critical of inclusive strategies, Schimmelfennig et al. analyze Central and Eastern European cases and defend a rational-institutionalist argument: “material and political external incentives and domestic costs prove to be the most important conditions for an effective impact of international organizations on democratic consolidation” (2006, 5).  Policy implications of this argument discount the utility of inclusive IOs.  However, the European context is unique in the number and overlap of international institutions providing significant material (security and economic) incentives.  Drawing similar lessons from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Cameron et al. write: “Traditional diplomatic fora and mechanisms can and should be subverted where they represent an obstacle to the achievement of policy goals that are widely demanded by world opinion.  Multilateralism is fine as long as states are prepared to move as fast as the slowest in the pack, but coalitions of the like-minded are preferable when the public wants results (1998, 13).”  While this claim applies to the Campaign to Ban Landmines, which the UN also supported, it has limited applicability.  The “coalition of the willing” in the 2003 Iraq war, for example, was undermined by operating without the legitimacy of UN Security Council authorization. Chapter Two 21  I raise the issue of popular perceptions of inclusive IOs’ (in)effectiveness above in order to preempt a short-sighted and unnuanced criticism of this dissertation’s focus on two inclusive IOs.  The question asked here is not which type of organization, inclusive or exclusive, is more effective.   Although they are often criticized for slow decision-making, in many cases inclusive IOs have delivered significant achievements in democratic norm development and policy implementation (Newman and Rich 2004; Thomas 2001; Heidenhain 2004;  Flockhart 2005; Pevehouse 2005; McMahon and Baker 2006; Cooper and Legler 2006; among others, including countless reports issued by the organizations themselves).  The dichotomous debate on the effectiveness of inclusive vs. exclusive designs is superfluous when similar and complementary normative frameworks (e.g. human rights, democratic governance, poverty reduction) currently exist in global, regional and sub-regional IOs with overlapping memberships (e.g. UN, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, OAS, CARICOM, the Commonwealth, AU, etc.).  Instead, our focus should be on understanding how specialization or cooperation among inclusive and exclusive organizations can be optimized. Inclusive IOs are stable fixtures on the international institutional landscape.  They are enduring because they provide collective goods and fora that are valuable to the international community.  Inclusive IOs necessarily play to different strengths than their exclusive counterparts.   They derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness.  Moreover, they are often viewed positively by states because they can facilitate cooperation and consensus- building, communication between actors that might not otherwise interact, and non-coercive mechanisms of norm promotion.  Not least, many states invest considerable human and financial resources in inclusive IOs’ norm setting and operational work.  I acknowledge the historical significance and assume the potential of inclusive IOs.  Improving our understanding of their strengths and weaknesses in democratic norm development and policy implementation is critical for those who would like inclusive IOs to complement (and perhaps better complement) other organizations promoting corresponding sets of norms. 2.2.1. Degrees of inclusiveness in inclusive IOs Inclusive IOs often attempt to resolve tensions between inclusiveness and democratic status in various ways.  Internally, these range from more exclusive clubs of democratic donors, to all-inclusive fora such as the UN GA, in which non-democratic states may attempt to water down democratic norms, for example, to minimal forms of electoral democracy.  One aim of Chapter Two 22  chapters 3 and 5 is to show how both more and less inclusive fora of inclusive IOs have dealt with these tensions during the past two decades, under different conditions and normative environments. Various fora in inclusive IOs can be assessed in terms of their formal inclusiveness. There is greater variation in the formal inclusiveness of UN institutions dealing with the development of democratic norms and policy implementation at policy level than in the CSCE/OSCE, where the main decision-making bodies are governed by full consensus rules, as illustrated in Table 2.1 below.  As defined in the OSCE’s Rules of Procedure: Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the adoption of the decision in question. Any texts which have been adopted by a decision-making body by consensus shall have a politically binding character for all the participating States or reflect the agreed views of all the participating States (OSCE 2007, 14).  By listing an agency or body as less-than-fully inclusive, I do not imply active exclusion of states.  Rather, this may indicate that the formal structure of the decision-making bodies simply comprises less than the IOs’ full group of states.  This is occasionally just an issue of size to facilitate decision-making, as in the cases of ECOSOC and the UNDP Executive Board. Alternatively, a group may form by states’ self-selection, such as donors interested in supporting an IO’s democratic governance programs.  Fora such as the International Conferences of New and Restored Democracies prior to 2000 and the Community of Democracies have limited participation to democratic states.  Chapters 3 and 5 provide examples of engagement by each type of institution with varying degrees of inclusiveness and analyze the role of their structures in the outcomes achieved.   Chapter Two 23  Table 2.1: Formal inclusiveness of IO bodies dealing with democratic norm development or policy implementation at policy level (highly inclusive             limited in more respects, such as size, or to democratic states or democratic donors) 15                   Highly inclusive                                                                            more limited CSCE/ OSCE (in terms of size and democracy) Summits; Ministerial Councils; Permanent Council Meetings; Human Dimension Implementation Meetings   States providing extra- budgetary contributions for ODIHR projects (self- selected) UN (in terms of size) General Assembly; World Summits (all/193) ECOSOC (54); Commission on Human Rights (53) /Human Rights Council (47) Executive Board, UNDP (36) UN Security Council (15) UN (in terms of democracy) General Assembly; World Summits; ECOSOC; Commission on Human Rights/ Human Rights Council; Executive Board, UNDP; UN Security Council; International  Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (after 2000);  UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF)  Democracy Caucus; International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (before 2000); Community of Democracies   Donors to UNDP Democratic Governance Trust Fund; Donors to Department of Political Affairs (self-selected)  What are the strengths and weaknesses of institutions with varied degrees of inclusiveness?  Do they have different effects?   Inclusiveness is what states make of it.  As structural factors, institutions do not determine the outcomes observed, yet in some cases pose notable constraints or opportunities.  In general, there is a trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in smaller and larger institutions.  As Coleman argues; “There is no single best venue for norm emergence.  Strategic venue choice is the art of selecting the most appropriate bundle of venue characteristics available, given the circumstances and character of a particular norm initiative” (forthcoming, 20).  Ceteris paribus, state representatives seeking to develop or elaborate an international norm often prefer to achieve consensus in an IO body comprising the largest possible number of states in order to underpin and document the norm’s broad acceptance, as long as the risk of dilution is low or minimal.  Sometimes a norm or norm set is drafted and negotiated in stages, alternating between smaller bodies (for efficiency) and debate  15  Rittberger (2008, 3-4) also provides a continuum of types of inclusive international institutions, yet his focus is on different IOs and on their inclusiveness in terms of non-state actors.   The International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) and the Community of Democracies (CD) are not official institutions of the UN, but are included here because, as will be discussed, their decisions have led to significant recurring GA resolutions, UN SG reports, action by UN agencies, and the creation of UN institutions for democratic development.  Ibid. Chapter Two 24  and adoption in larger bodies (for legitimacy).  This is shown, for example, in the case of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Another strategy is for states to adopt a norm in a smaller body, such as the Commission on Human Rights, with the aim of raising the same (or slightly modified) norm in a larger body, such as the UN General Assembly, at a later date.  This strategy was used, for example, in 1999-2000 in the case of a UN Resolution on “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy.”   In addition, in inclusive IOs smaller groups of donors committed to implementing particular norm sets (e.g. democratic governance) can catalyze and enhance the prioritization of the IO’s efforts in that issue area.  However, even with donor funding, in order for an IO’s implementation policies to advance, recipient states must consent to the IO’s proposed assistance, which is not always evident. 2.2.2. Theoretical framework and propositions: Inclusiveness Before outlining the dissertation’s theoretical propositions related to inclusive institutions, I first present an overview of the evolution and variation over time in the roles of inclusive institutions for democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  These are described in greater detail in empirical chapters 3 and 5.  Chapter Two 25  Table 2.2: Evolution and variation over time in roles of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE and UN  1945-1989 (UN)  1973-1989  (CSCE/OSCE)  1990-91   1992-94  1995-99   2000-04   2005-10  CSCE/ OSCE 1973-5:  Issue linkage (security) contributes to agreement on Principle 7 in Helsinki Final Act. 1977-1986: Restatements of norms keep debate alive, on agenda, and encourage delegations to refine positions. 1989: Inclusive institutions contribute to Vienna follow-up meeting outcome by providing history of proposals, structure for negotiations, and channeling political will. Inclusive institutions support (and pose no obstacle) to codification and development of comprehensive democratic norm set. Historic East- West divisions are newly irrelevant. Norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality are qualified by democratic governance. Inclusive institutions support the CSCE’s institutionalization Inclusive institutions continue to sustain policy implementation of its human dimension mandate, but democratic norm development slows down. Inclusive institutions encounter a gradual increase in challenges to policy implementation for democracy support, with mixed effects. Issue linkage (security) inhibits norm and policy development. Democratic norms are qualified by sovereign equality. Inclusive institutions contribute to impasses on democratic norm development and policy implementation, yet issues remain on the agenda. United Nations 1948 and 1988-9: Legitimacy inherent to inclusive processes enables UN to expand norms (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and policies (UN election observation mandate). 1949-1966; 1977-1987: Periodic restatements of norms maintain their relevance and provide basis from which to elaborate when greater political will exists. Procedural legitimacy of inclusive processes enables UN to expand electoral norms and policies.  Other norm development efforts were inhibited by remaining North-South divisions. Basis for UN’s democratization mandate is established in inclusive fora: UN GA and 1993 Vienna World Conference, underpinning its legitimacy.  Issue linkage (development) supports norm and policy development. Inclusive institutions continue to play an important role in endorsing and authorizing agencies and policies and to implement the UN’s democratizatio n agenda. Peak in UN’s democratic norm development in 1999- 2000 is followed by a gradual increase in challenges to UN democratization policies. Negotiations are protected from paralysis by UN’s lack of unanimity requirements. Support for electoral democracy remains strong. Inclusive institutions become more vulnerable to shifts in states’ foreign policy priorities; challenges to policies become stronger and more effective.  Issue linkage (development) shifts focus of implementation policies. Chapter Two 26  Table 2.2 suggests several key roles and functions of inclusive institutions that are common to inclusive IOs engaged in democratic norm development and policy implementation. These include: a) the strategy of issuing restatements of norms to keep issues on the agenda in more contentious circumstances, thus encouraging states to develop their positions and probing the normative environment; b) the feature of procedural legitimacy contributing to the expansion of norms and policies, by underpinning states’ interests in working through these fora or by underpinning a democratization mandate; c) the possibility for issue linkage in inclusive institutions to encourage (or inhibit) agreements; and d) the task of periodically (re-)endorsing, authorizing, (or inhibiting) implementation policies at policy level. Why are these processes significant and by what mechanisms do they operate?  How and under what conditions have inclusive institutions influenced democratic norm development and policy implementation?   In addition to building on the literature on international organizations (especially Adler 1998 and Thomas 2001), and institutional design, propositions I-1, I-2, and I-3 below were also developed inductively, based on analysis of negotiations on human rights norms in the CSCE in the first time period, between 1973 and 1989.  This entailed content analysis of statements made in connection with the Helsinki Final Act, the Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna follow-up meetings of 1977-79, 1980-83, and 1986-89 respectively, as well as the Ottawa experts meeting of 1985.  The propositions were then assessed iteratively on cases of democratic norm development and policy implementation in subsequent time periods in the CSCE/OSCE as well as in the UN. In order to assess the validity of the following theoretical propositions on inclusiveness, as well as the propositions on status in section 2.2, I engage in process tracing, through content analysis of hundreds of delegations’ statements, documents issued by the IOs, archival data, media sources, secondary literature, and interviews with IO staff, diplomats working at permanent missions to the IOs, and civil society representatives.  Process tracing is valuable in case study research as it allows us to “examine in detail the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms” between the independent and dependent variables (Bennett 2004, 35; see also Bennett and George 2005, 206).  It entails a close assessment of the linkages and processes operating between cause and effect (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 85-65).  As noted above, existing studies have proposed various explanations for the development of democratic norms and implementation policies (e.g. the favorable environment at the end of the Chapter Two 27  Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of established democratic states more broadly, interests of new democracies to “lock in” democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions).  By describing causal processes involving inclusive institutions and democratic status, this dissertation is able to demonstrate the involvement of these particular variables in causal processes, and thus, to complement existing theories (see Hall 2006, 30).  According to Checkel, “process tracing is strong on questions of how and interactions” (2004, 6).  This method is therefore particularly relevant, since our aim is to assess in greater detail how inclusive institutions and democratic status operate in inclusive IOs, as well as to make causal inferences about their interaction. Theoretical Propositions: Inclusiveness Proposition I-1:  Inclusive institutions are well placed to capture and perpetuate agreements, and ensure that, once made, these commitments do not fade into obscurity.  An important feature of inclusive institutions is their uninterrupted activity convening broad groups of states.  I argue that inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate.  Inclusive institutions have a special relationship to windows of opportunity.  The practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks and keeps them alive for future negotiations.  This builds on Daniel Thomas’s observation that the restatement of Helsinki human rights norms in Belgrade and Madrid “guaranteed that they would remain on the political agenda in the intervening years” (2001, 196- 7, 148; see also Farer 2004, 37). Might the restatement of norms be a risky strategy?  In favorable political contexts, restatements can help further advance established norms.  In contentious political contexts, we might expect that previously codified norms could be undermined if opened for re-negotiation. Issuing restatements, however, is notably different than opening norms for re-negotiation. Insights from institutional design and constructivist approaches suggest two institutional features that make restatements viable strategies for maintaining norms’ relevance in inclusive IOs.  First, institutional design perspectives suggest that if the organization operates by consensus, the objection of any state can prevent regress in the norm’s formal content.  Under these conditions, the norm may not be advanced, but committed states nevertheless can ensure that it is not formally watered down.  Second, constructivist approaches suggest that state representatives are Chapter Two 28  concerned with protecting their states’ reputations and often seek to appear consistent in international fora. It is often possible to capitalize on this interest in appearing consistent in order to obtain re-commitments to previously endorsed norms. Perhaps counter-intuitively, debates that end in deadlock in inclusive IOs can serve a useful purpose.  It is true that inclusive structures can enable small countries to “punch above their weight.”  In IOs with full consensus decision-making rules such as the OSCE, just one state can thwart initiatives with an effective veto and contribute to deadlock.  However, because inclusive IOs facilitate recurring meetings, states are acutely aware of their points of agreement and contention.  If a change in political will occurs, representatives are able to easily assess where they can break through impasses.  Inclusive institutions enable much of the groundwork to be done in advance.  This feature is underemphasized in the literature.  In chapter 3, I show that this process positively influenced outcomes of the CSCE Vienna follow-up meeting in 1989 and the comprehensive democratic norm sets of the CSCE’s Charter of Paris, and Copenhagen and Moscow Documents in 1990-1991.  In chapter 5, I show that this process aided the development of the UN’s mandate to support democratization based on articles in existing human rights instruments and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. In addition to process tracing, at various points in the study, I also engage in counterfactual analysis to further clarify the influence of inclusive institutions.  If the above propositions are correct, I expect to find evidence of the continuity and evolution of certain parts of states’ proposals and priorities as articulated and documented at key meetings in prior years, which are subsequently re-inserted into negotiations and encounter consensus during windows of opportunity. Proposition I-2:  Procedural legitimacy can contribute to the elaboration of inclusive IOs’ democratic norms and implementation policies.  Inclusive institutions are often seen as endowed with procedural legitimacy by those states in opposition to a dominant paradigm or by small and middle powers. Under some circumstances, this type of legitimacy contributes to the strength of a norm developed in an inclusive forum or to cooperation for its implementation. Diplomats and scholars have often claimed that greater inclusiveness and consensus contribute to moral credibility and political weight of decisions (Adler 1998, 137). 16   According to Newman  16  For discussion of the relation between legitimacy, consensus, and norm development in international society, see Clark 2005 and Byers 1999. Chapter Two 29  and Rich, “the UN’s international legitimacy enhances its role as a vector of ideals and ideas” (2004, 29). If these propositions are correct, I expect to identify evidence within state delegations’ statements highlighting that they support a particular role for the inclusive IO because they find the forum to hold an important type of legitimacy.   In chapters 3 and 5, I show that examples of such statements are found in connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as well as in the case of the UN’s election observation mandate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where the legitimacy generated by inclusiveness enabled the UN to expand its operations. Proposition I-3:  Inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of progress on human rights or democratic governance even in less conducive normative contexts, where compromises may be made if there is an interest in a side issue (Keohane 1984; Thomas 2001; Adler 1998).   Inclusive institutions often involve negotiations among participating states on issues with multiple linkages; thus, the products of negotiations often entail concessions on certain issues because actors seek to achieve goals in other issue areas (see Keohane 1984, Ch. 6).   This proposition also draws on Emanuel Adler’s observation that “the effectiveness of the OSCE processes has depended on the way in which…baskets were tied together in negotiating processes, for example, the linking of human rights with military security and territorial guarantees” (1998, 123).  By contrast, lack of progress or dissatisfaction on one issue (e.g. security) can negatively affect cooperation on human rights or democratic governance. If these propositions are correct, and to determine which process is taking place at given points in time, I expect to identify evidence in delegations’ statements, in agencies’ negotiation summaries, and in other IO documents and interviews that indicates states’ specific priorities and points of contention during the selected debates around democratic norms and implementation policies.  In chapters 3 and 5, I show that while progress was facilitated by issue linkage in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in the mid-to late 2000s issue linkage negatively affected cooperation on democratic governance.  In the UN, debates on democratic norms and their implementation policies have frequently intersected with issues of economic development.  This helped to expand the organization’s democratization mandate in the mid-1990s, yet has contributed to some contraction in the late 2000s. Chapter Two 30  Proposition I-4:   Inclusive institutions play important roles in the implementation of democratic norms by periodically (re-)endorsing, authorizing (or inhibiting) the agencies’ democratization mandates and key policies.  While implementation agencies such as ODIHR or UNDP are often assumed by IR scholars to be highly autonomous (Barnett and Finnemore 2004), the influence of inclusive or partially inclusive inter-governmental bodies such as the OSCE Ministerial Council or the UNDP Executive Board is often under-analyzed. If the above proposition is correct, I expect to identify evidence in statements, IO documents, and interviews of the influence of inter-governmental bodies, both positive and negative, under different conditions, on the general democratization policies and strategic plans of UN and OSCE implementation agencies. Proposition I-5:  Inclusive IOs have a decreased ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies if states supportive of democratic norms reduce their participation in inclusive fora.  Two main factors contribute to these states’ withdrawal of support from inclusive fora. a) In contrast to proposition I-2, states that claim a commitment to substantive legitimacy and the achievement of particular outcomes may reduce their participation in inclusive fora if they perceive an alternative (either bilateral or a more restricted multilateral forum) to operate more efficiently than the inclusive IO.  This, in principle, is a strategy with a short- term horizon.  Where negotiations are blocked, actors interested in rapid substantive outcomes are often tempted to find alternative international fora, rather than to put energy into strategies outlined in proposition I-1 above.  As Coleman argues: “established venues may lose legitimacy (thus increasing receptivity to new venues) if they exhibit consistent bias or repeatedly fail to produce agreement on important issues” (forthcoming, 6).  However, if reluctant (non-compliant) states are excluded from norm negotiations, this can negatively affect more exclusive groups’ ability to engage in shaming and support for the norm in non- member states. The “Ottawa Process” is a prominent example from a different issue area that glamorized more exclusive coalitions of the like-minded.  After negotiations in the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons failed to achieve sufficient restrictions on the use of anti - personnel land mines, treaty negotiations were fast-tracked among like-minded states and other actors, resulting in a landmine ban (Cameron et al. 1998; Coleman forthcoming; Price Chapter Two 31  1998).  However, there are a few important differences between the anti-land mine and democratic governance issue areas.  While the United States was an outlier on the land mines issue, it is generally an advocate of democratic governance.  The question of democratic governance is more ethically complicated than land mines (whose victims are often innocent civilians long after wars have ended), since there are globally diverse public views on the desirability of various social and political systems.  Thus, the issue of international democracy support has more parallels to norms on the multilateral use of force or humanitarian intervention, which can typically benefit from the legitimacy of broader agreement. Again, the objective of this dissertation is not to determine the most effective venue, exclusive or inclusive, for the development of robust democratic norms or related implementation policies. The focus of this dissertation is on the behavior of inclusive IOs. Proposition I-5a is raised to highlight a factor that may negatively affect inclusive IOs’ ability to develop democratic norms or implementation policies.  Delegations’ statements, policy documents, and interviews will shed light on this proposition’s validity.  b) A second factor motivating states to reduce support for democratic norm development and implementation policies in inclusive IOs relates in part to the status implications of alternative groups.   When democratizing states qualify for and become members of a more exclusive group with similar objectives, the more exclusive group may eventually receive greater priority, thus contributing to decreased enthusiasm for active participation in the more inclusive organizations.  This negatively affects the IO’s development of democratic norms and implementation policies by diminishing the inclusive forum’s appeal and sense of vitality. If this proposition is correct, I expect to observe a decrease in participation by certain states in IOs when they become active participants in a more exclusive group that addresses similar issues.  For example, in chapter 3 I show that after their EU accession in 2004, Central European states decreased their priority of working through the OSCE to support democratic governance; 17  similarly, in chapter 5 I show that there was a reduced number of International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies meetings following the launch of the more exclusive Community of Democracies in 2000.  17  Perhaps with the exception of Slovenia, which held the OSCE Chairperson in Office in 2005. Chapter Two 32  2.3. Status Status matters.  International relations scholars from theoretical approaches as diverse as realism, constructivism and the English School, as well as foreign policy analysts, have shown that status concerns have played roles in great power conflict (Wohlforth 2009; Wallace 1973), social influence and compliance (Flockhart 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2008), and foreign policy behavior of great and rising powers (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a; 2010b; Hurrell 2009; Deng 2008; Clunan 2009).   In the few studies considering status concerns in the context of inclusive international organizations, scholars’ focus has been on socialization processes and states’ compliance with norms (Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2008), rather than on norm development and policy implementation.  When realists focus on status, they emphasize material dimensions of status such as military strength, economic development or great power status.  By contrast, the concept of democratic status highlights a hierarchy with ideational and institutional bases.  No study to date has focused specifically and at length on the concept of democratic status and the mechanisms by which it functions in international organizations.  This dissertation fills this gap by demonstrating how democratic status operates in inclusive IOs and affects the development of norms and policies. Status is defined as “beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes, such as wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, or diplomatic clout” (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, forthcoming, 6).   Status is related to prestige, which “derives from admired achievements or valuable assets that are recognized and acknowledged by others;” yet, unlike prestige, “status is relative, constituting a hierarchy” (Ibid, 10).   This aligns with the definition used by social psychologists, Tajfel and Turner, who write: “by social status we mean a ranking or hierarchy of perceived prestige” (1986, 11).  Moreover, status is “the outcome of intergroup comparison.  It reflects a group’s relative position on some evaluative dimension of comparison” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19).   Realists view status and prestige as instrumental means to obtain or display power; however, status can also be viewed as an end in itself (Markey 1999, 129; Wolf 2011, 105).  “When the term is used in realist theory, status is no different from – and is, in fact, interchangeable with – power” (Deng 2008, 21). Literature in social psychology, however, shows that two forces - the interest in self-definition and enjoying positive self-esteem – are powerful motivators (Hymans 2002, 5).  Thus, status is also sought as an end in its own right. Chapter Two 33  The concept of democratic status as employed in this dissertation emphasizes international hierarchies based on democratic governance.  The concept is primarily used in a structural sense, yet also refers to states’ attributes.  It stands in tension with sovereign equality in inclusive IOs.  The salience of democratic status indicates its relevance and importance to and within the IO.  Democratic status is a comparatively new basis of status with an interesting history, high political relevance and significant effects on states’ support for (or opposition to) democratic norm development and policy implementation in IOs. The tension between sovereign equality and democratic status is embedded in longstanding historical processes.  Evolutions in the concept of sovereign equality and the shifting nature of membership in international societies have been analyzed by several English School scholars, who note that prior to World War II, members of the League of Nations claimed to have met the now-obsolete criterion of “civilization.”  By 1945, the new, egalitarian principle of sovereign equality was embedded in the United Nations Charter, effectively extending the prospect of formal UN membership to all existing states (see Keene 2002, 136).  However, some inequalities would become institutionalized.  After World War II, decolonization, and the proliferation of UN member states, international society comprised a new diversity of states with a wide range of forms and capacities.  Jackson argues that international societies adapted to the more inclusive and egalitarian understandings of sovereignty by becoming more heavily involved in practices of state-building (1987, 529, 531-49).  Keene, by contrast, views this type of engagement in developing countries as less novel and rooted in enduring legacies of European patterns of colonial and imperial organization (2002, 5-6, 98).  “By the mid to late 19th century,” he claims, “the world was clearly divided in two for the purposes of international political and legal order: an order promoting toleration within Europe, and an order promoting civilization beyond” (2002, 7).  These two distinct normative frameworks were carried directly, for example, into the UN Charter, which incorporated the contradictory norms of sovereignty and non- intervention on the one hand, and promotion of social progress and human rights on the other (Keene 2002, 141).  Both explanations point to patterns of differentiation, which arose together with inclusive membership in inclusive IOs, as historic precursors of democratic status, aimed at supporting political development in member states. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been widely acknowledged that the principle of sovereign equality is attenuated to various degrees in international society (Clark 2005, 159, 176; Chapter Two 34  Krisch 2003, 145-6; Jackson 1987; Keene 2002), and by extension, in inclusive IOs.  As Krisch argues: “Formal equality masks substantive inequality in power relations” (2003, 289).  The concept of status, which is a limiting force on sovereign equality and the full sense of membership (Hurrell 2009), entails processes of categorization which emphasize and render more visible certain inequalities among states. While states hold formal equality in several key decision making bodies, various status dimensions exist by which IOs differentiate among their participating and member states.  For example, Clark suggests that “since the end of the Cold War, the specification of separate categories of ‘failed,’ ‘outlaw’ and ‘rogue’ states has been developed much more purposefully” (2005, 176; see also Krisch 2003, 145-6).  Inclusive IOs have viewed states through a democracy lens as ‘established,’ ‘newly consolidated,’ ‘transitioning,’ ‘backsliding,’ or ‘in crisis’.  Likewise, states are viewed through a donor lens as ‘longstanding,’ ‘emerging,’ or ‘recipient/partner,’ or through a development lens as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’.  These categories are not exhaustive, and states may hold different standings along various dimensions at different points in time. Why did democratic status emerge as a basis of differentiation in the CSCE/OSCE and the UN?  Theoretical insights from social psychology are particularly informative.  An important assumption of social identity theory is that positive distinctiveness is a powerful motivating force (see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 66, 68).  “Pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through ingroup/outgroup comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other,” explain Tajfel and Turner; “The aim of differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimensions.  Any such act, therefore, is essentially competitive” (1986, 16-17).  Notably, this type of competition is not necessarily tied to material factors.  In-groups (e.g. established democratic states after the Cold War) select the dimensions for comparison in which they hold a superior position to others.  This process of intergroup categorization “leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group” (ibid, 14). In other words, categorization and differentiation enhance the positive distinctiveness of the in- group (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 53; Huddy 2001, 134; Deng 2008, 23-4).  Yet inclusive IOs have minimal membership criteria, and the principle of sovereign equality mitigates against positive distinctiveness. Chapter Two 35  Because inclusive IOs, by definition, comprise a broad, diverse array of states, there is pressure for states to differentiate into smaller groups within the larger membership.  As Brewer explains: If the needs for differentiation and inclusion are opposing processes, movement towards increased inclusion should activate the opposing drive for greater differentiation and, conversely, increased differentiation/individuation should arouse the need for inclusion…Immersion in highly inclusive groupings provides little basis for comparative appraisal or self-definition…Association with groups that are too large or inclusive should leave residual motivation for greater differentiation of the self from that group identity, whereas too much personal distinctiveness should leave the individual seeking inclusion in a larger collective (Brewer 1993, 3-4). In addition to echoing a core tension examined throughout this study, the above citation sheds light on the evolution of democratic status in inclusive IOs after the end of the Cold War. Categorization simply as a member of an inclusive IO is largely insufficient for states’ positive identity, which contributes to the pursuit of differentiation (Ibid, 7, 10).  Yet Brewer’s theory of optimal distinctiveness also conveys a warning: subgroupings “will engage social identification of their members to the potential detriment of the superordinate collective” (Brewer 1993, 15, italics added). One might ask if it is viable to apply theories of social psychology developed at the level of individuals to international relations.  Is this not effectively anthromorphizing the state? However, several existing studies in international relations have demonstrated the value of drawing on social psychological insights (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Clunan 2009; Deng 2008; Wolf 2011; Markey 1999; Wallace 1973).  For example, Markey argues that “the mechanics of prestige and international war are analogous to those behind prestige and conflict at the individual level” (1999, 168).  Wolf highlights that “many international reactions to respect or disrespect may be just as strong or even stronger than responses on the interpersonal level” (2011, 118).  Certainly the contexts are not identical, and some caveats exist; for example, “the boundaries of political categories are more vague than social categories based on ethnicity or race” (Huddy 2001, 141).  However, scholars conclude that it is the role of empirical research to clarify the significance of insights from social psychology for international relations (Wolf 2011, 119; Wallace 1973, 19).  Therefore, this study aims to make a contribution by empirically examining the evolution and roles of democratic status in inclusive IOs. Chapter Two 36  Democratic status as a category of stratification has played varied roles in inclusive IOs during different time periods.  In the immediate post-Cold War years, democratic status rapidly became salient when the normative hierarchy of many IOs encompassed liberal values of the West.  O’Donnell finds that “classifying a given case as ‘democratic’ or not is not only an academic exercise.  It has moral implications, as there is agreement in most of the contemporary world that, whatever it means, democracy is a normatively preferably type of rule” (2001, 8).  It is important to scrutinize this category with evidence from inclusive IOs, in part because scholars claim that there have been important changes in practices at international level.  For example, “in the recognition of new States and governments, strong emphasis is now placed on democratic credentials” (Krisch 2003, 147; see also Franck 1992).  “The maxim that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’ – whatever may be its worth – is transformed from a standard of internal conduct into a condition of external recognition” (Roth 1999, 39; Peterson 1997, Ch. 4).  While democratic governance is not a prerequisite to formal membership in inclusive IOs, the establishment of status markers of democratic governance has led some states to seek recognition for their characteristics or progress in this area and to support democratic norm development and policy implementation.  As chapter 4 demonstrates, distinctions according to democratic criteria have also created new patterns of exclusion.  In response, some states have challenged these distinctions while seeking to undermine the IOs’ democratization agendas. The salience of democratic status in relation to other dimensions of status is not static; its oscillation is a focus of this study.  This follows Hurrell and others, who highlight the fluidity and contested character of hierarchy, status-related criteria, and relevant categories (2009, 15; Wallace 1973, 5; Huddy 2001, 134).  States’ status along various dimensions also varies in importance in different IO fora and at different points in time.  That is, in some fora a state’s record with democracy and human rights may be relevant; in others perhaps only donorship or great power status matters.  In chapters 4 and 6, in addition to analyzing the ebbs and flows in the salience of democratic status, I examine the interaction between democratic status and competing dimensions of status (e.g. security, energy, economic development, great power) in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  Chapter Two 37  2.3.1. Theoretical framework and propositions: Status Before outlining the dissertation’s theoretical propositions related to status, I first present an overview of the evolution and variation over time in the roles of democratic status in the development of democratic norms and implementation policies at policy levels in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  These are described in greater detail in empirical chapters 4 and 6.  Chapter Two 38  Table 2.3: Evolution and variation over time in roles of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN  1945-1989 (UN)  1973-1989 (CSCE/OSCE)  1990-91   1992-94  1995-99   2000-04   2005-10  CSCE/ OSCE 1973-75: Status and ideological distinctions are not emphasized in the spirit of détente. 1976-1989: Status distinctions begin to appear between states in compliance and non- compliance with human rights norms in the Helsinki Final Act. Codification of comprehensive democratic norm set, which subsequently serves as status markers, stratifying CSCE participating states. These norms hold high legitimacy at this time because of the consensus and support underpinning their adoption. Continued qualification of sovereign equality with democratic norms encourages states to seek democratic status and thus to continue support for CSCE’s democratization agenda. Institutions contribute further to status distinctions. Consolidation of democratic status markers and relevance of strategies of social mobility enhance OSCE efforts to support democratic governance. OSCE policies to support democratic governance are gradually affected by challenges due in part to the organization’s emphasis on democratic status. Democratic status concerns contribute to some CIS states’ increased challenges to OSCE policies and attempts to demote democratic status markers. United Nations 1945-1948: Status as Allied or Axis power is key. After 1950s: North-South divide increases in salience. 1988-9: Article 21 of UDHR and Article 25 of ICCPR serve as status markers in the absence of a more comprehensive democratic norm set. Institutionalization of electoral norms and seeds of a democratization mandate.  New democratic status markers meet with both support and discord. States’ strategies of social creativity encourage UN norms and policies for democracy support to incorporate economic development. Prevalence of strategies of social mobility and social creativity contribute to elaboration of democratic norms and policy implementation. A peak in democratic norm development (1999-2000) is gradually followed by increased challenges, yet trends are varied. A mixed range of state behavior in respect to democratic status; challenges to policy implementation become more contentious, yet support for electoral democracy remains strong.   Chapter Two 39  Existing theoretical work suggests a few expectations about the role and potential influences of democratic status on democratic norm development and policy implementation. Social identity theory distinguishes between three strategies used by states in social groups to improve their social standing: a) social mobility, in which states emulate or “conform to the norms of an elite group to gain acceptance;” b) social competition, in which states either attempt to “equal or surpass the elite group in the area on which its claims to superior status rest” or engage in “spoiler behavior;” and c) social creativity, in which states “seek prestige in a different area altogether,” and advocate new or alternative international norms (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 71-5; 66-7; see also Tajfel and Turner 1986).  Moreover, “the choice of strategy depends on the permeability of group boundaries as well as the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010b, 190; see also Tajfel and Turner 1986). As suggested in Table 2.3, there are two general trends in the influence of democratic status: its emphasis has contributed occasionally to cooperation, and occasionally to discord.  On one hand, democratic status has motivated some states to cooperate in support of IOs’ democratic commitments and programs.  Among democratizing states, support for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status-seeking, both within an IO and in the wider international community.  This perspective adds to actor-centered theories of the development of human rights and democratic norms (e.g. Moravcsik 2000), by emphasizing the importance of shifts in states’ hierarchical relations with other states and within IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) in supporting democratic norm development at different points in time.  On the other hand, democratic status has motivated other states to challenge the IOs’ support for implementation of democratic norms.  Realists would argue that these challenges can be explained by geopolitical power shifts.  I show that such arguments do not fully explain discord around policy implementation by clarifying how democratic status operates and by illustrating that effective challenges have not been limited to the most powerful states. Table 2.3 highlights stages in the evolution of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN and suggests some key roles.  In the CSCE/OSCE, democratic norms and implementation policies were generally positively influenced by democratic status in the 1990s because the IO’s emphasis motivated states to support its efforts, whereas in the 2000s, the emphasis on democratic status contributed to increased challenges.  In the UN, each of the three processes Chapter Two 40  (social mobility, social competition, and social creativity) has been present across the time periods.  Discord in the UN was highest in the early 1990s when electoral norms were initially proposed, and has also increased in the late 2000s.  There have consistently been states employing strategies of social mobility and social creativity, with both being particularly effective at influencing UN implementation policies at policy level.  Why are these processes significant and by what mechanisms do they evolve and operate?  How and under what conditions does democratic status have effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation?  The theoretical propositions that follow draw on the literature on status in international relations, constructivist literature on socialization, and literature from social psychology on social identity. Theoretical Propositions: Democratic Status Cooperation The concept of democratic status renders visible the presence of international hierarchies based on democratic governance.  The higher the salience of democratic status within an IO, the more likely it is that non-democratic or democratizing states will react and try to improve their position in this status dimension either through strategies of social mobility, competition, or creativity.  In addition to leaders’ perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy, and permeability of elite groups (which when positive lead states to pursue strategies of social mobility), two additional factors – category salience and changes in the group prototype – are suggested by Huddy as deserving greater attention (2001, 149).  The concepts of salience and prototype are particularly relevant to this study.  Studies in social psychology have found, for example, that “increasing the salience of study participants’ gender increases the likelihood that they think of themselves in gender-stereotypic terms” (2001, 133, 149).  By analogy, therefore, we would expect to observe higher levels of status-seeking behavior in terms of democratic governance when the salience of democratic status is high in an IO.  In addition, a prototype, or group member holding the most common characteristics, is influential when states perceive their similarities to the prototype (Ibid, 134).  The U.S. and established democracies in Europe and other regions have served as prototypes for less democratic states on the issue of democratic governance.  However, when there are changes in prototypical states, such as through war, economic crisis, or controversial elections, this can negatively affect the appeal of group membership, and thus decrease status-seeking behavior. Chapter Two 41  The context of inclusive IOs suggests an additional factor influencing whether states employ strategies of social mobility: perceptions of the prestige and legitimacy of the IO itself. When an IO is held in lower esteem (e.g. due to scandals, decreased relevance of its mandate, perceptions of unjustified shifts in priorities, lack of effectiveness, or inefficiency), cooperation through strategies of social mobility are less likely. Chapter 4 shows, for example, that the prestige of the OSCE decreased in the 2000s, as suggested by the lack of Summit meetings between 1999 and 2010, when it experienced increased deadlock, was unable to resolve protracted conflicts, and the priorities of key actors shifted to other world regions, thus contributing to decreased status seeking through strategies of social mobility in the organization. In sum, we would expect cooperation among states in inclusive IOs on democratic norm development and policy implementation when the democratic status hierarchy is viewed as legitimate, stable, and highly salient, the high-status group is perceived as permeable, the IO itself holds prestige, and prototypes are viewed as role models with similarities. Proposition S-1:  Social mobility: Support provided by democratizing states for democratic norm development and policy implementation can be interpreted as a form of status seeking (in a strategy of social mobility), both in the organization and in the wider international community.  This is particularly the case given the comparatively high salience of democratic governance in the hierarchy of international norms for the behavior of states in the 1990s and 2000s, even despite the decreases in more recent years.  While status is not the only goal states seek in IOs, it often complements other (material and ideational) interests and values and plays a significant role.  The context of inclusive IOs suggests an additional interpretation of the concept of social mobility.  Many states are often not seeking full acceptance into elite groups, but rather are seeking opportunities for enhanced partnership and investment, or to improve their status vis-à-vis neighboring states, and this helps to encourage cooperative behavior on the democratization agenda in IOs.  I argue that an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate some states seeking to improve their positions in the international system to support democratic norm development and policy implementation.   How do we know if a state is seeking status?  Operationalizing the concept of status is complex. I propose that a state’s status-seeking behavior can be observed in the following process.  First, we must identify what the status markers in a particular IO are.  As an example Chapter Two 42  from society, a mink coat might be a marker of status in Moscow or Tokyo, but not in Vancouver because of differences in environmental values or climate.  In the context of international organizations, which can also be viewed as social environments (Johnston 2001), therefore, it is important to first identify whether democratic governance is indeed an important dimension of status in the IOs.  I accomplish this by analyzing the evolution of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  Indicators that democratic status is important status marker in an IO include, for example, references to democratic norms in key conference documents, resolutions, evaluation reports, and declarations issued by the IOs.  Second, we must know approximately how strong the status markers are.  A BMW SUV may connote high status in certain years in a given society, yet may be less appealing in the same society if gasoline prices rise or values about emissions change.  Similarly, the salience of democratic status among states may wax and wane, in part due to exogenous factors.  I address this in chapters 4 and 6 by analyzing the salience of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, as well as by identifying factors that have contributed to the rise and weakening of the status markers over time.  Indicators of the salience of democratic status include the overall frequency of iterations of terms linked to democratic status markers and the frequency of their appearance in key outcome documents and resolutions.  Third, to assess if a state is engaging in status seeking, we must know if the state references or makes use of the status marker in the IO.  Therefore, if the above proposition is correct, I expect to identify evidence of status seeking through behavioral or rhetorical support for democratic governance, e.g. in state delegations’ statements mentioning democratic governance, in agencies’ negotiation summaries, other IO documents, or interviews. For this proposition, there is a risk that the evidence I interpret as status-seeking behavior could be interpreted by others as what Moravscik has termed “lock in.”  In the case of the development of the European human rights regime, Moravscik argues that recently established and unstable democracies sought to “lock in” domestic institutions and aimed to tie the hands of future governments, as an alternative explanation to realist accounts of great power influence and constructivist accounts of transnational actors or of socialization on norm development (2000). In other words, states may support democratic norm development in order to lock in their nascent democratic institutions rather than in pursuit of status in international society.  While Moravscik’s account is compelling, it does not account for some important dynamics at structural level.  I argue that the hierarchical context in which norms are developed cannot be overlooked.  As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, “states that are insecure about their status may Chapter Two 43  embrace new international norms most eagerly and thoroughly” (1998, 906).  In the post-Cold War period, Central European states sought to “return to Europe” and democratic credentials became part of attaining a new status.  By focusing on status, I consider motivations of states not as isolated agents but as having important relations with other (sometimes more powerful) states and IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) of supporting democratic norm development or policy implementation in inclusive IOs.   I expect to observe that increased support for IO efforts in these areas corresponds, at the same time, with delegates’ statements illustrating states’ status-seeking behavior in the IO and elsewhere in the international system. Moreover, I expect to observe these trends when the salience of democratic status itself is particularly high in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. In addition, I argue that when a state has invested in making democratic reforms, it has an interest in receiving recognition for corresponding changes in status.   According to Tajfel, a basic assumption of social mobility is that “the system is flexible and permeable, that it permits a fairly free movement from one group to another of the individual particles of which it consists” (1981, 246). However, a state’s perception of its own status may differ from those of other members of the international community and IOs, whose perceptions often evolve slowly.  I expect to observe evidence of this in delegates’ statements in the CSCE/OSCE and the UN in connection with debates dealing with issues of democratic governance. Discord Both social competition and social creativity are strategies that entail discord around democratic norms and implementation policies in inclusive IOs, to different extents.  Both strategies are used when states’ decision makers consider the boundaries of the high-status group to be impermeable and decide that their lower status can only be improved by achieving a more positive evaluation of their group (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 56). Two additional concepts from social psychology help to explain discord in response to democratic status in inclusive IOs: categorization and relative position.   Social categories are defined by social psychologists as “the division of people on the basis of nationality, race, class, occupation, sex, religion, and so forth” (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 14).  By analogy, states are categorized in international society as democratic, non-democratic, or as democracies with a variety of adjectives, e.g. electoral, or established democracies (see Collier and Levitsky 1997). Chapter Two 44  Categories create insiders and outsiders (Deng 2008, 23).  As Hogg and Abrams note, “a category is only such in contrast with another” (1988, 14, see also 51-3).   Categorization generates tension in inclusive IOs because categories such as democratic and non-democratic states accentuate differences between states that simultaneously have a claim to formal equality. As such, there can be negative consequences of categorization.  As Tajfel and Turner explain: “intergroup categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group” (1986, 14). Once categories are created, social comparison clarifies states’ relative position within the particular status dimension.  “Status is important to people because they assess their well- being relative to others” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, forthcoming, 13).  Moreover, “status is a positional good, meaning that one group’s status can improve only if another’s declines” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 69).  In inclusive IOs, states compare their position to that of their neighbors, the group prototype, and other relevant states.  The concept of relative deprivation - the sense that “relative to other people, one is deprived of some desired object” - has been employed in political science to explain motivations for social movements (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 38; see also Tajfel 1981, 259).  Wallace asserts that “we would expect maximum social tension to occur when deprivation is combined with the expectation of reward (1973, 6).  These types of expectations arise when multiple status dimensions are relevant in a given society. Among individuals, as Wallace explains: In social interactions which emphasize the higher of [an individual’s] statuses, he will receive the deference and rewards of (relatively) high position, and this will form the basis of his expectations.  When these rewards are not forthcoming in social interactions which stress his lower status, he perceives this as deprivation and feels himself treated inequitably (1973, 7).  In IOs, status inconsistency develops when a state has a high position in one dimension (e.g. great power status, military strength, strong economy), yet a low position in another dimension (e.g. democratic status). This has contributed, for example, to discordant behavior exhibited in the 2000s by China and Russia. 18   Wallace suggests two additional factors that intensify status inconsistency: social visibility and length of time the grievance is present.  As he explains:  18  For in-depth analysis of social identity and status-related behavior in China and Russia in contexts other than inclusive IOs, see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, Deng 2008, and Clunan 2009. Chapter Two 45  Status inconsistency leads to support for social change when a person’s lower status is socially visible and thus creates a gap between self-assessed status and that assigned by others…When a nation does not achieve a level of esteem and recognition consistent with its capabilities, a real sense of deprivation is felt immediately.  If the source of this grievance is present for any extended period of time, it may make an important contribution to tension and hostility between nations (1973, 10, 18, italics added). Although status inconsistency as a motive for social competition and social creativity is most applicable to great powers (Wallace 1973, 20); less powerful states also engage in discordant status-seeking behavior for other reasons.  According to Turner, “negatively discrepant comparisons provide low prestige and negative social identity” (1982, 34), which can motivate states with lower democratic status to engage in creative or competitive strategies.  Moreover, “status depreciating behavior regularly stimulates an instinctive response pattern that seems to be deeply engrained in the human psyche” (Wolf 2011, 108). In sum, discord through strategies of social competition or social creativity is most likely to take place when states perceive the boundaries of the high-status group to be impermeable, and if the categorization process leads to discrimination that contradicts leaders’ status expectations, particularly if this is socially visible and extends over a period of time.  Social competition is expected if the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy is less stable and if the IO itself holds decreased prestige, whereas social creativity is expected if the democratic hierarchy is viewed as relatively legitimate and stable (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a).  The following theoretical propositions suggest ways in which social competition and social creativity operate in relation to democratic norms and policy implementation in inclusive IOs. A realist might counter these propositions by arguing that the challenges to IOs’ democratization agendas we observe in the 2000s can be explained by power dynamics.  In the 1990s Russia, China, and some CIS states were much weaker than in the 2000s; therefore, a motivation for social competition or social creativity in the 2000s might simply be that at a certain point leaders recognized the feasibility of contesting IOs’ democracy programs and took advantage of shifts in power. 19   However, this argument does not fully explain the behavior of states engaging in discordant behavior in the CSCE/OSCE and UN in the 2000s.  First, it is not only the most powerful states that engage in social competition and social creativity.  In chapters 4 and 6, I show that states such as Cuba, Belarus, Kazakhstan and others have also engaged in  19  I thank Jacob Wobig for this comment. Chapter Two 46  these ways.  Moreover, decision-making in inclusive IOs is not only affected by great powers; weaker states can have significant influence in institutions with full consensus rules, as in the OSCE (since only one dissenting vote can block norm or policy adoption), or in bodies in which they hold a numerical advantage, as in the UN GA, as observed in the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies in the 1990s.  By examining the role of status in close connection to the challenges made by states, in addition to highlighting the historical evolutions in democratic status which have affected states’ positions, I show that status operates in influential ways in inclusive IOs and affects how norms and policies develop. Proposition S-2:  Social competition: States engaging in social competition have challenged the way in which the UN and the OSCE have implemented democratic governance policies and assessed their democratic characteristics.  As mentioned above, in strategies of social competition, states either attempt to “equal or surpass the elite group in the area on which its claims to superior status rest” or engage in “spoiler behavior” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 71-5; 66-7).  The former - attempts to outshine the elite group (e.g. established democratic states) - are not observed in cases of states’ responses to democratic status.  This is a strategy observed in other status dimensions, such as status in terms of military power, where the pursuit of higher status contributes, for example, to arms races (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a).  Rather, strategies of social competition in reaction to democratic status concerns often entail spoiler behavior. Through social competition, in order to improve their position, states are not challenging the ranking system of the hierarchy, per se; they are challenging the negative rankings given to them (Clunan 2009).  This involves “trying to gain a higher status level for one’s group or to reverse the status relationship between one’s group and a specific other group” (Ibid, 34-5). This leads to conflict and antagonism between groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20).  According to Clunan, states with lower status argue that “their exclusion from or lesser status in a group was unjust, that they deserve inclusion or elevation to a higher position, and that the other’s elevated position should be decreased” (2009, 90).  One example of this is the perpetual reference to “double standards” in diplomatic discourse. By what mechanisms have inclusive IOs’ emphasis on democratic status led some states to pursue strategies of social competition, thus contributing to their challenges of UN and OSCE Chapter Two 47  implementation policies?  If proposition S-2 is correct, I expect to observe several processes at work.  The first step in the analysis is correlational.  In other words, I determine if there is a correlation between states’ relative, lower democratic status and their challenges to an IO’s democratization agenda.  Indicators of status in the OSCE include, for example, holding prestigious leadership positions, e.g. Chairperson-in-Office, Heads of field offices and election observation and assessment missions; the locations of field offices and election observation missions; as well as relative standing based on quality of governance indicators or election reports.  Additionally, I expect to observe in the contentious statements, specific references to the aspects of the IO’s behavior that has directly upset them in terms of their democratic status.  In fact, if a state’s challenges to the democratization agenda have any different content between the OSCE and the UN settings, this is an indicator that internal (rather than exogenous) factors such as status concerns play a role in shaping the precise substance of these challenges, in contrast to realist expectations.  Moreover, I expect to observe social competition strategies if the high- status group is viewed as impermeable, the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy is decreased, the IO itself holds lower prestige than at other times in its history, and if the categorization process leads to discrimination, particularly if a state’s lower relative position in terms of democratic status is socially visible and extends over a period of time. Chapters 4 and 6 provide several examples of social competition strategies in response to democratic status concerns in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.  Importantly, the precise content of challenges to the OSCE’s democratization efforts in the mid- to late 2000s that have contributed to its “crisis” highlight issues that are closely connected with status concerns (e.g. calls by Russia and several CIS states for greater geographic representation in OSCE posts, increased decision- making in the inclusive Permanent Council, and more uniform criteria for election evaluations). 20  It is shown that while social competition in the 2000s in the OSCE case is partly explained by reactions to alienation and decreased democratic status by Russia and some CIS states, in the UN case, social competition in the 2000s is explained more by an interest in preventing democratic status from gaining increased leverage in the organization.  Social competition is often discussed as a strategy used by powerful states such as China or Russia (Deng 2008; Clunan 2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010); however, less powerful states also engage in this strategy.  While states  20  Draft Decision on OSCE/ODIHR Observation of National Elections, issued by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan PC.DEL/898/07 18 September 2007. Also submitted to the Madrid Ministerial Council Meeting, November 2007. (restrict) http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/25russia_osce.pdf. Accessed 5/2011. Chapter Two 48  challenging democratization efforts in the UN in 1992 typically expressed concern about intervention or democratic conditionality on aid, in the mid- to late 2000s, there have been increased references to “respect” and “dignity” associated with similar types of challenges, suggesting at least a partial response to democratic status hierarchies in  the UN and the broader international community. Chapters 4 and 6 also provide some examples of less powerful states engaging in social competition such as Cuba, Belarus, or through the G-77 or Non-aligned movement, at times in the absence of a great power partner. Proposition S-3:  Social creativity: Alternatively, a less democratic state seeking to improve its status may attempt to shift the IO’s priorities to a different issue, away from democratic governance.  The strategy of social creativity involves finding and advocating a new dimension for status and social comparison in which the state holds a higher position (Clunan 2009, 86).  The presence of multiple dimensions of status in inclusive IOs means that some states may prioritize status in terms of democratic governance and some may prioritize other areas (see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 69).   Hogg and Abrams suggest that social creativity strategies are used when “intergroup relations are subjectively perceived to be secure” (1988, 56). In inclusive IOs, the most often observed mechanism of social creativity in relation to democratic governance is the identification and advocacy of alternative status dimensions.  There are, however, two other mechanisms of social creativity that are less applicable to this particular issue area and the setting of inclusive IOs.  For example, in an unlikely scenario, less democratic states might attempt to reverse the values given to the characteristics of the group, so negative assessments (e.g. non-democracies) would be perceived as positive (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20; Hogg and Abrams 1988, 57).  The global reaction in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War makes this mechanism highly improbable for the issue area of democratic governance. Alternatively, less democratic states could select new groups (other than established democratic states) for comparison (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20; Hogg and Abrams 1988, 57).  Hogg and Abrams explain that “here the objective is to compare your low status group with other groups of equal or preferably lower status than your own rather than with the superior group, that is engaging in downward or lateral rather than upward comparisons” (1988, 57).  Since inclusive IOs comprise established democracies, less democratic states, and non-democracies, it is unlikely for comparisons to take place among only a lower portion of the democratic status hierarchy. Chapter Two 49  However, this may be a factor contributing to the recent proliferation of new IOs that do not comprise the United States and other longer-established democratic states (e.g. Bank of the South, Shanghai Cooperation Organization). In chapter 4, social creativity is observed in the OSCE, for example, when Kazakhstan proposed in 2010 to increase the organization’s priorities from three to five, adding priorities on inter-confessional tolerance and financial, economic, and energy security, which would have the effect of diluting its focus on democratization. 21   Russia and several CIS states have consistently sought to elevate the priority of the OSCE’s work on politico-military issues over human rights and democratic development, while states such as Romania in the early 1990s and Kyrgyzstan have sought to increase OSCE efforts in economic or environmental issues.  Chapter 6 also shows how many UN member states in the 1990s and 2000s have consistently aimed to increase the emphasis on economic development both within the UN’s democratization work and as an alternative. Analyzing the context of inclusive IOs with significant inequalities suggests some new interpretations of the concept of social creativity.  States engaging in strategies of social creativity indeed advocate alternative norms, but, this may, in fact, be constructive for democratic norm development, for example, if greater acceptance and legitimacy is gained by broadening the norms’ scope, as in the case of states advocating norms of economic development alongside democratic norms in the UN.  While many instances of social creativity illustrate discord, some examples exhibit elements of cooperation.  There appear to be two different processes at work in states employing social creativity strategies.  On one hand, by advocating alternative norms some non- or partially democratic states are clearly attempting to undermine and deflect attention from the IO’s democracy agenda, but by pursuing a less directly antagonistic strategy than social competition.  On the other hand, some states are simply attempting to pursue two goals at the same time.  This has parallels to the discussion of issue linkage in proposition I-3.  In other words, some democratizing states take advantage of the salience of democratic norms to advocate their concurrent interests. If non- or partially democratic states attempt to shift the IO’s emphasis from democratization to economic development, it is not obvious that this translates into an  21  Statement by Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev. President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, OSCE Astana Summit, 1 Dec. 2010. SUM.DEL/8/10, 3-4. Chapter Two 50  improvement in status, since many of these states are also developing countries.  If gaining in status (and positive distinctiveness) is a motivating factor, we would expect states to advocate alternative dimensions in which their status position would be more favorable.  Why should we consider this an example of social creativity?  Since this study considers weaker states alongside great and middle powers, there are, arguably, differences in the approaches and aims of groups’ status-enhancing strategies.  Even if a much higher status is not directly sought by developing (and non- or partially democratic) states on the basis of economic development, they are seeking status-related gains.  By shifting the measures for evaluation from democracy to development, these states seek, in part, increased international attention to support their economic growth. They also seek increased voice and recognition in IO fora.  Status as a developing country often has a more positive connotation than status as a non- or partial democracy, especially in the 2000s when years have elapsed since many initial democratic transitions.  There are many exogenous factors affecting development, whereas leaders and governments are more directly implicated in their country’s level of democracy.  As leaders and representatives of governments, seeking greater emphasis on their developing country status is an improvement, particularly if they expect their state to make greater progress on economic rather than democratic lines. Moreover, by shifting the conversation, developing countries can gain increased voice in debates on international redistributive policies, which can confer increased status and assistance. I expect to observe mechanisms of social creativity through state delegations’ statements in IO fora in which debates over democratic norms and policies take place, as well as in other IO documents and reports.  In each of the three strategies highlighted above, democratic status is significant because states use and respond to it self-consciously, to various effects at different points in time. 2.4. Additional theoretical insights from comparison across the cases Before embarking on the empirical case studies, a few additional theoretical insights into the evolution and roles of democratic status in inclusive IOs are gleaned from comparisons across the cases.  As mentioned in chapter 1, the CSCE/OSCE and UN were selected for this research because of their similarities such as their evolution with broad memberships as inclusive security organizations; extensive support for democratic development through their respective implementation agencies and field offices; their historical importance in developing human rights norms during the Cold War which formed the basis for democratic norms in the 1990s; Chapter Two 51  and the formal participation of the U.S. in each.  Despite these similarities in histories, evolution, composition, and implementation practices, some of their differences shed additional light on the theoretical implications of this dissertation. The evolution and roles of democratic status in the United Nations presents a variegated picture, in part because of the mixed way in which the principle of sovereign equality has been operationalized across bodies of the UN system.  Institutionalization of sovereign equality has varied widely both between and within inclusive IOs because of the tension between sovereign equality and great power primacy (Klein 1974; see also Tucker 1977; Jackson 2000; Krisch 2003).  The UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN’s most inclusive bodies dealing with the development and implementation of democratic norms, are on one hand unencumbered by strict consensus rules.  On the other hand, formal practices of state rotation in leadership in these bodies mitigate against expressions of status. Given the Security Council’s hierarchical formal structure based on great power status, there are clear areas in which sovereign equality has manifested itself more weakly in the UN than in the CSCE/OSCE.  The degree of institutionalization of sovereign equality in an IO is important for two reasons.  First, it influences whether and to what extent democratic status may in fact permeate the inclusive IO’s decision-making bodies.  Second, if democratic status becomes present in an inclusive body, the IO’s history with egalitarian procedures will influence whether and to what extent democratic status concerns will contribute to backlash and challenges.  This, together with the stronger influence of inter-governmental bodies on the programmatic work of the OSCE, helps to explain why the OSCE has become more paralyzed than the UN on issues of policy implementation in the late 2000s. Differences between the CSCE/OSCE and UN in terms of the clarity of the boundaries of categories and groups with (or without) democratic status can also affect status-seeking behavior. While stratification along democratic lines in the CSCE/OSCE was clearly defined by the institutionalization of its comprehensive democratic norm set in 1990-91, in the UN such boundaries remained more nebulous in the 1990s.  As democratic norms came to have more definition in the UN in 1999-2000, the critiques against implementation policies gradually intensified and boundaries did not take firm root.  In such a situation, states interested in social mobility have unclear reference points.  However, as I show in chapter 6, states occasionally Chapter Two 52  address this issue in UN fora by referencing regional IOs’ democracy benchmarks as alternative democratic reference points. The proportion of the IOs’ overall portfolios devoted to democracy support also has noteworthy effects.  While UNDP has devoted a high percentage of its resources to democratic governance programs since the mid- to late 1990s, in terms of the total policy spectrum of the larger United Nations, democracy support is only one of many issue areas in which it is engaged. Promoting democracy and human rights is proportionally a larger part of the OSCE’s mandate. If the OSCE is gridlocked on issues related to democracy support, the whole organization suffers.  The recent critiques of OSCE democracy promotion efforts have generated a crisis for the organization.  Since democracy promotion is much less of a proportion of what the UN does, even if debates on democracy support become gridlocked, this is less likely to negatively affect the organization as a whole. Another difference is that in the OSCE, democratic states are in the majority, whereas the UN comprises a larger group of partial and non-democratic states.  The literature on social psychology suggests that “when the dominant group is in the minority, the status structure is inherently more unstable than when the majority is dominant” (Brewer and Miller 1996, 95). However, the analysis presented in the following chapters shows that the OSCE has, in fact, experienced more instability than the UN in terms of challenges to the basis of its democratic hierarchy.  This is in part because democratic norms have been institutionalized (and thus generated categories of differentiation according to democratic status) to a greater extent in the OSCE than in the UN.  Being in a less democratic minority, therefore, is more acutely perceived by Russia and other CIS states in the OSCE, and this has contributed to the stronger levels of contention observed in the organization.  Moreover, whereas Russia has no comparable formal recognition of great power status in the OSCE, partial or non-democratic great powers (e.g. Russia and China) have had a special status in the UN as permanent members of the UN Security Council, which can mitigate against effects of democratic status. In terms of the aims of challenges against the implementation of the IOs’ democracy agenda, there is another interesting difference between the OSCE and UN cases.  In the UN, it was not until 1999-2000 that resolutions in the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly codified the basic principles and values shared by all democracies.  Prior to this, beyond the concept of electoral democracy, the definition of a democratic state was Chapter Two 53  imprecise and subject to interpretation in the UN.  Therefore, in the mid- to late 2000s, challenges in the UN appear to have been motivated by an interest in preventing democratic status from gaining increased leverage in the organization, whereas in the OSCE, states aimed to demote its already pervasive influence.   Chapter Three 54  Chapter Three: Inclusiveness, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the CSCE/OSCE  3.1. Introduction  In the 1990 Paris Charter, the heads of all CSCE participating states declared: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations” (CSCE 1990b, 3).   In 1990-91, far-reaching international democratic commitments were also established, for example, in the areas of free and fair elections, freedom of association and assembly, judicial independence, freedom of the media, and condemning the overthrow of legitimately elected governments (CSCE 1990, 1991).  I argue that the organization’s inclusive institutions were instrumental to the process.   In this chapter, I trace the origins and effects of inclusiveness in the CSCE/OSCE and argue that while inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions they have proven highly supportive of democratic norm development and implementation.  Under favorable conditions of high political will and a convergence of states’ interests, inclusive institutions have produced substantive agreements; yet even under highly contentious conditions agreements have been generated, in part due to the appeal of side issues. How have inclusive institutions been influential?  To answer this question, I assess the validity of the theoretical propositions presented in chapter 2 with evidence from the CSCE/OSCE.  These will be examined further in chapter 5 using evidence from the UN.  By illustrating how norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality evolved in the CSCE/OSCE in the 1990s and 2000s, this chapter also serves as a backdrop and point of contrast for the arguments about status presented in chapter 4. In this chapter, as in each of the three subsequent empirical chapters, the analysis is broken into six time periods: the Cold War (1973-1989); the immediate post-Cold War years (1990-1991); the early and late 1990s (1992-1994); (1995-1999); and early and late 2000s (2000- 2004; 2005-2010).  These time periods distinguish between distinct historical circumstances and dynamics.  Since this study is based on intrinsically time-dependent observations, these time periods increase the resolution needed to differentiate between various processes.  While the contentious normative climate of the Cold War began to improve in the late 1980s, 1989 was a clear turning point.  1990-91 were distinctly favorable years for democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE due in part to the decreased relevance of the East-West Chapter Three 55  divide.  1992-94 witnessed the crystallization of the new norms and institutions in the CSCE, new challenges, and the admission of several new participating states from the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.  In January 1995, the CSCE formally became the OSCE, signifying a new degree of institutionalization and operational capacity.  In the 1990s, political will and conditions for democratic norm development and policy implementation were generally favorable (with some exceptions), whereas in the 2000s we observe a gradual increase in contention, with notable acceleration observed in 2005.  While this corresponds in timing with Russia’s resurgence, perceptions of decreased legitimacy of U.S. leadership, and shifts in foreign policy priorities to Afghanistan and the Middle East, these explanations are underdetermined, as will be shown in chapter 4.  Chapter 3 examines the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions through variations in these historical circumstances between 1973 and 2010 in the CSCE/OSCE. 3.2. Origins of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE: Helsinki 1973-1975 From its origins in the informal Dipoli preparatory meetings of 1972-3 and the first Helsinki Consultations of 1973 and Summit of 1975, the CSCE has had an inclusive character. 22  The 35 states represented at the Helsinki Consultations and Summit meetings that generated the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 included the United States, USSR, nearly all European states, and Canada. 23   Today, the organization comprises 56 participating states.  The image of CSCE/OSCE participating states spanning broadly “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” often peppers its diplomatic discourse.  The organization operates without a charter, and thus its norms, recommendations, and commitments are politically rather than legally binding.  From the outset, decisions have been made by consensus. 24  Why did the CSCE emerge with a particularly inclusive orientation in 1975?  After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and near the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and USSR were motivated to gradually increase their mutual channels of communications.  It was within  22  Preparatory meetings took place in Dipoli, near Helsinki, from 1972-3; the CSCE formally began in Helsinki in July 1973 (OSCE 2007, 2-3). There have not been formal admission criteria for participating states of the CSCE/OSCE, although the organization is generally framed by its geography.  Only in one case - that of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992 - did the OSCE suspend a state’s participation. 23  The decision that the CSCE should comprise European states, the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada was taken in 1972 in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations from the Dipoli informal preparatory talks and adopted in 1973.  It recommended that participation in the CSCE would “take place outside military alliances,” by “sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality” (OSCE 2007, 2). European states participated with the exception of Albania and Andorra; they joined in 1991 and 1996 respectively. 24  Consensus-minus-one procedures were established in 1992. Chapter Three 56  this context - of détente in the Cold War - together with West Germany’s strategy of Ostpolitik, which emphasized engagement and cooperation as means of achieving foreign policy objectives, that the CSCE was designed.  As Galbreath notes, the CSCE “gave substance and definition to détente” and “began as a way to bring together opposing superpowers to work towards the common goal of security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area” (2007, 37, 1; see also Gheciu 2008, 119). Similar to the UN, the CSCE’s initial and primary purpose was that of a security organization.  Its approach of involving all concerned states as opposed to involving simply like- minded states, for example, distinguished the CSCE at the time from organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council of Europe. “The OSCE’s underlying norm of ‘common security’ or ‘collective security,” according to Acharya and Johnston, entails “the idea that regional organizations should be ‘inclusive,’ including both politically like-minded and non- like-minded states of a region, and that members of such organizations should adopt a ‘security with’ as opposed to ‘security against’ approach to their potential or actual adversaries” (2007, 20-1; see also Adler 1998).  Thus, the inclusive CSCE filled an important gap in the international institutional landscape of the mid-1970s.  To the drafters of the Helsinki Decalogue, the concept of sovereign equality (Principle 1) already served as a staple of international founding documents, and was firmly entrenched in inclusive international organizations with security mandates such as the OAS and the UN, the latter of which all CSCE states were members.  Klein notes that sovereign equality “has proved an important countervailing moral force against the hegemonic pretentions of the strong,” yet also “reflects a distorted view of the sovereign entities engaged in international relations” (1974, 166). Leaders offered several arguments in favor of an inclusive CSCE structure.  For example, at the Helsinki Consultations in 1973, President Kekkonen of Finland declared: This is no meeting of the victors of war; nor is it the meeting of the great Powers.  Our Conference is the common endeavor of all concerned Governments on the basis of mutual respect and equality, to reach solutions on vital questions concerning all of us…In beginning its work on the basis of equality and mutual respect the Conference has taken the only road that can lead to enduring results. 25  Memories of the bloodshed of WWII remained in the minds of many leaders, and their statements emphasized the common objective of cooperating to prevent a third world war  25  Statement by the President of the Republic of Finland, Mr. Kekonnen, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stage I, Helsinki, 3 July 1973. CSCE/I/PV.1 (restrict), 3-5. Chapter Three 57  originating in Europe, thus resonating with purposes underpinning the UN.  As stated by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim at Helsinki in 1975, “peace is not secure without continuing efforts on the part of all the countries concerned.”26  Although CSCE institutions became more consistently inclusive than their UN counterparts, Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom claimed that the designers of the Helsinki Final Act were inspired by “the universality which is the hallmark of the United Nations.”27  The strength of agreements arising from consensus was also mentioned by Heads of State. 28   Beyond complaints about the arduousness and difficulty of Helsinki negotiations lasting three years, arguments against an inclusive CSCE structure based on sovereign equality are not found in official statements from 1973-5. Suggesting additional motives for the origins of the CSCE’s inclusive institutions, Klein contends that from the perspective of superpowers, providing equal status to all states can facilitate acceptance of leadership or may downplay their superiority (1974, 40).  This is relevant to CSCE negotiations in the mid-1970s, since American leadership was increasingly challenged by European allies during and after the Vietnam War.  The OPEC crisis of 1973-4 likewise undermined U.S. power and gave salience in a broader sense to claims for equality in international institutions (Tucker 1977, 47-9).  In such contexts, a superpower can find advantage in formal equality, yet despite formal equality great powers often exert influence through informal channels or by reaching agreement among themselves and presenting their consensus to other states (Klein 1974, 115).  From the perspective of small and medium powers, inclusive structures have procedural legitimacy; they hold the promise of limiting the influence of power in international relations and can help these states “feel as if they counted for something on the world scene” (Klein 1974, 107; 59). 3.3. Inclusiveness in the CSCE, 1973-1989: Human rights as the basis for future democratic norm development.  Significance of issue linkage, restatements, and negotiation histories.  The 1973-1989 time period illustrates the significance of issue linkage, restatements, and negotiation histories in the development of human rights norms, which provided the basis for democratic norm development in 1990-91.  In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,  26  Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, 30 July 1975. CSCE/III/PV.1 (restrict), 4. 27  Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, 30 July 1975. CSCE/III/PV.2 (restrict), 2. 28  See, for example, statement by the Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Cosgrave, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.3 (restrict), 19. Chapter Three 58  human rights agreements were generated in part due to the appeal of side issues.  Moreover, the legitimacy generated by the CSCE’s inclusiveness contributed to the strength of Helsinki norms.  While negotiations on human rights in subsequent years encountered deadlock, I show that failed proposals in CSCE meetings in the 1980s, in fact, served a useful purpose for negotiations under more auspicious circumstances in 1986-89. As the foundational text of the CSCE, the Final Act of 1975 established the renowned Helsinki Decalogue, a set of ten principles of equal importance for relations among CSCE participating states. As in the UN Charter, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Principle 1) were set alongside human rights (Principle 7), despite their contradictions. 29   In Principle 7, “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,” CSCE participating states committed to recognize and respect, as well as to promote and encourage the effective exercise of these rights and emphasized the rights of national minorities (CSCE 1975, VII). In this time period, patterns emerged in the development of human rights norms that have important parallels to what we observe in later years in development of democratic norms. How have scholars typically explained the appearance of Principle 7 on human rights in the Helsinki Final Act?  For this dissertation, the significance of this question lies in the foundation provided by Principle 7 for the elaboration in subsequent years of democratic norms in the CSCE/OSCE.  It is often argued that the Soviet Union made concessions on Principle 7 in 1975 because it aimed to legitimize existing borders in Europe and to increase economic cooperation with the West, while Western states aimed to secure legal status for Berlin, to work towards conventional weapons disarmament, and to make gains in the area of human rights (OSCE 2007, 2; Vincent 1986, 66; Thomas 2001, 28-9).  Moreover, all CSCE participating states had recognized the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; therefore, “the Soviet leadership had no reason to believe that the formal norms established by the CSCE would ultimately be any more significant than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with which they had already lived for 25 years” (Thomas 2001, 61, 30, 53-4; see also Galbreath 2007, 34).  Interests of other Warsaw Pact states  29  The remaining principles in the Helsinki Decalogue included: (2) refraining from the threat or use of force; (3) inviolability of frontiers; (4) territorial integrity of states; (5) peaceful settlement of disputes; (6) non- intervention in internal affairs; and (8) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (9) co-operation among states; and (10) fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law (CSCE 1975, Section 1(a)). Chapter Three 59  included increasing contacts with the West and a “quest for legitimation as normal members of international society,” while the nine European Community (EC) member states were motivated to pursue human rights because of their “shared understandings of what it meant to be a ‘European’ state” (Thomas 2001, 40, 27-8, 50).  Whereas Soviet positions held firmly until the late spring of 1975, unexpected agreement on some of the most difficult points coincided with a change in composition of the Soviet delegation, which, aiming to conclude the process quickly, began to make concessions, including acceptance of human rights norms (Iloniemi 2009, Title 3, Ch. 11).  Especially relevant for this dissertation is that in an otherwise contentious context, Principle 7 met with consensus in the CSCE’s inclusive negotiating bodies in part due to the appeal of side issues.  Inclusive institutions do not necessarily encounter impasses in norm development during years in which the leaders of participating states hold wide ranges of perspectives on the issues in question.  This provides support for theoretical proposition I-3.  By appealing to reluctant states’ interest in side issues, actors are sometimes able to overcome inclusive institutions’ weaknesses, as observed in negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act. Regarding implementation, the Helsinki Final Act established three baskets, or “dimensions,” as they would be called, to organize the work of the CSCE.  The first basket dealt with traditional hard security issues such as observation of military maneuvers and other confidence-building measures (OSCE 2007, 4).  The second basket, cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology, and for the environment, was more ideologically neutral than the first and third baskets, but implementation of the second basket has not been extensive because states have viewed other IOs as having comparative advantages over the CSCE on these issues.  The third basket, cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, was re-termed the “human dimension” in the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document and evolved to incorporate the democratization and human rights work of the organization.  CSCE mechanisms to implement the Helsinki principles initially consisted of follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-1979) 30  and  30  Its brief, four-page concluding document lacked substance and resorted to a platitude: “the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far” (CSCE 1978, 2).30  A minor consolation, the document reiterated states’ commitment to the norms of the Helsinki Final Act (see Thomas 2001, 196).  See also: Belgrade Meeting 1977 of Representatives of the Participating States of the CSCE, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Closing Statements, Belgrade, 8 March 1978 to 9 March 1978, CSCE/BM/VR.1-4. Chapter Three 60  in Madrid (1980-1983) 31  that disappointed human rights activists and expert meetings on human rights in Ottawa in 1985 and on human contacts in Bern in1986 that met similar frustrations and ended without concluding documents. 32   Nevertheless, the follow-up meetings provided fora to review states’ implementation of commitments, to express concerns about human rights abuses, and to maintain inter-state communications. By contrast, the follow-up meeting in Vienna (November 1986 to January 1989) was remarkable for the sudden progress that delegates were able to make on human rights, a breakthrough attributed in part to the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.  In the Vienna Concluding Document, human rights standards and mechanisms were formulated with greater specificity and in connection with the CSCE’s newly-coined “human dimension.” For example, the Vienna Mechanism enabled states to request information, hold meetings, and raise and discuss human rights violations among participating states (OSCE 2007, 92, 6). Moreover, three subsequent “human dimension conferences” were scheduled to take place in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991), which would considerably develop the institution’s democratic norm set.  Especially notable at the first human dimension (HD) conference in Paris from May to June 1989 was the veritable sea change in rhetoric from the Warsaw Pact states.  For example, Foreign Minister Olechowski of Poland stated that the question of human rights had lost much of its ideological weight, as it was increasingly a basis for cooperation among states. 33   Nevertheless, the first HD conference (Paris, May-June 1989) did not result in an outcome document.  The greatest strides in democratic norm development would take place just a few months later, after the popular protests in late summer and autumn of 1989 that forced open parts of the Iron Curtain and dismantled the Berlin Wall. It is clear that there were both successes and failures in developing human rights norms in the CSCE between 1973 and 1989.  A critic might argue that the inclusive institutional structure  31  However, progress was made in negotiations to release high numbers of Jews and prisoners from the Soviet Union. Kampelman, Max. U.S. Ambassador to CSCE Madrid Follow-up Meeting, 1980-1983.  Interview conducted by Sarah Snyder, July 2010, OSCE Oral History Project, Interview 2, (see OSCE forthcoming). 32  Western states submitted proposals to the 1985 Ottawa Expert Meeting on Human Rights emphasizing, for example, elimination of all forms of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and access to information, whereas Warsaw Pact states countered with proposals on eliminating homelessness, the right to education, the right to highest standards of health care, the right to work, and freedom from hunger and undernourishment. Meeting of Experts on Human Rights Ottawa, 7 May to 17 June 1985, CSCE/OME.12, 13, 14, 19, 40 (restrict). 33  Statement by. Mr. Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Poland at the First Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Paris, 30 May, 1989, 3. Chapter Three 61  remained constant during this period, and therefore other factors must have been decisive.  How and under what conditions was the CSCE’s formal, inclusive institutional structure influential? In proposition I-1, I argued that debates which end in deadlock in inclusive IOs may, in fact, serve a useful purpose for future negotiations. 34   Where impasses have occurred in negotiations, delegates are acutely aware of points of contention.  Evidence from CSCE meetings shows that lengthy negotiations in Belgrade, Madrid, Ottawa, and Bern resulted in finer-grained articulation of states’ positions, also formulated in response to critique and opposing perspectives.   For example, during the Cold War, there was often deadlock between Warsaw Pact states emphasizing that economic and social rights, such as an adequate standard of living, health care, and education, as well as the right to work, should be treated as having equal value and importance to civil and political rights, 35  while Western states strongly emphasized civil and political rights.  In 1989, although Warsaw Pact states remained committed to social and economic rights, 36  there was a gradual opening to elaborating the previously submitted proposals on civil and political rights.  This trend was highlighted in January 1989 by Mr. Peter Várkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, who noted that it was a favorable new development that there were similarities in the positions of states belonging to different groups, and that the need to identify common interests weakened the bloc-to-bloc approach of previous Follow-up meetings, resulting in a number of proposals co-sponsored by members of different groups of states. 37   When participating states fail to agree on elaboration of norms in inclusive settings, the practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks.  The practice of restating norms is a strategy often used in inclusive IOs. While restatements may appear to signify unremarkable progress, they serve an important function to maintain continuity (Thomas 2001, 196), and can contribute to norm development when greater political will exists.   Thomas has argued that the restatement of Helsinki human  34  Such meetings may also form networks of external supporters that play useful roles in more conducive times. Analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this project.  See, for example, Sarah B. Snyder’s historical study on the Helsinki network of human rights activists (2011). 35  Proposals submitted by the German Democratic Republic, Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Ottawa, May 1985, CSCE/OME.12-15 (restrict).  Proposal submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Ottawa, May 1985, CSCE/OME.19 (restrict). 36  See, for example, Statement by Mr. Jaromír Johanes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, Paris Meeting of the CSCE, 31 May 1989.  Unofficial translation in French. 37  Mr. Peter Várkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hungary, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 18 Jan. 1989, CSCE/WT/VR.11 (restrict), 30-31 Chapter Three 62  rights norms in Belgrade and Madrid “guaranteed that they would remain on the political agenda in the intervening years” (2001, 196-7, 148; Farer 2004, 37).  Without the restatements of Helsinki norms and the reconsideration of failed proposals in the CSCE’s inclusive institutions, progress was not likely to have been as readily attained in Vienna in 1989.   At the opening of the Vienna follow-up conference, several state representatives commented on the value of the earlier Ottawa and Bern expert meetings in 1985 and 1986, despite their lack of tangible results. For example, in November 1986, Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, Secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church, Holy See, stated: The experience of the Meetings of Experts has been positive.  Even if, unfortunately, these meetings did not conclude with the publication of a final document, they nonetheless allowed us to work out numerous solutions and reflections which constitute a wealth of material which remains only to be used and to bear fruit.  The Vienna Meeting is called upon to give this material the necessary attention. 38   Similarly, Mr. Sten Andersson, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden stated: “Those meetings were not outright failures.  It is true that they failed to reach agreement on concluding documents.  But they provided opportunities for exhaustive, comprehensive and frank discussions.  They helped to shed light on the various ways of thinking and different priorities in the humanitarian sector.”39  Reinforcing these ideas, Mr. Péter Varkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary stated: We feel that these [expert meetings] were useful, though some of them did not produce a written document.  Nonetheless, the exchange of views have enriched the CSCE process with a number of important experiences, and we deem it necessary to consider at the Vienna Meeting the implementation of many proposals submitted in the course of those debates…The results achieved at the meeting of experts and the proposals and ideas which were raised there and which met wide-scale approval can serve as an important point of departure for the work of the subsidiary working bodies of the Vienna Meeting. 40    38  Statement by Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, Secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church, Holy See, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 24-25. 39  Statement by Mr. Sten Andersson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.3 (restrict), 35. 40  Statement by Mr. Péter Varkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hungary CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.3 (restrict), 5.  Similar thoughts were also expressed in: Statement by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 19; Statement by Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Italy, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 44; Statement by Mr. Bohuslav Chňoupek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovakia, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR. 4 (restrict), 29; Statement by Mr. Jean Ausseil, Minister of State, Monaco, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 6 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.6 (restrict), 26; Statement by Mr. Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 7 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.7 (restrict), 4. Chapter Three 63  Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, added: “Austria sees these meetings as being very useful despite their regrettable lack of agreement on a final document.  For especially in such controversial areas, where an agreement on substance is not always readily available, dialogue helps to elucidate our views on matters of principle.”41  And Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland expressed that “although proposals that do not reach consensus cease to formally exist after the respective meeting is over, they enrich the fabric of the co-operation within the CSCE and may prove timely in another context in the future.”42  The above statements convey that the Vienna follow-up meeting benefited from the substance of intermittent meetings held during less conducive circumstances.  At the Vienna meeting’s closing session in January 1989, Mr. Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Iceland confirmed this by noting that this Meeting resumed the consideration of numerous proposals that had been tabled in the course of the three earlier rounds. 43    While a number of new proposals were also considered, the Vienna meeting’s success was facilitated by a wealth of materials and insights generated from state representatives’ recurrent interactions in inclusive institutions. If there are changes in political will in a state or group of states, such as occurred under the leadership of President Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, inclusive institutions enable states to easily and quickly assess where breakthroughs may be made.  For example, during the Cold War, Western delegates consistently attempted to increase dialogue on human dimension issues beyond the follow-up meetings. 44   Their proposals aiming to increase the frequency of meetings on the human dimension that failed to achieve consensus in Ottawa in 1985 were revived and re- inserted into the negotiations in Vienna in 1986-89, where delegates were able to establish a more extensive mechanism for monitoring human rights and to commit to holding three human dimension meetings in 1990-91.  In relatively favorable circumstances, as existed in 1986-89, progress was likely, but not preordained.  The above conveys that inclusive institutions, such as  41  Statement by Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Austria, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 7 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.7 (restrict), 20. 42  Statement by Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.4 (restrict), 33. 43  Statement by Mr. Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Iceland, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 17 Jan. 1989, CSCE/WT/VR.10 (restrict), 17. 44  See, for example, proposal submitted by the delegations of Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, and Switzerland, Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Ottawa, 27 May 1985, CSCE/OME.2 (restrict).  Delegations of Austria and Spain supported the proposal. Chapter Three 64  the CSCE’s periodic meetings, serve to constructively channel actors’ willingness to cooperate, when present. In proposition I-2, I argued that procedural legitimacy can contribute to the strength of a norm developed in an inclusive forum or to cooperation for its implementation.  For example, Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland stated in 1975 that the results of the Helsinki Conference “will be much more widely accepted because they reflect the consensus of all and have the assent of all.”45  President Graber of the Swiss Federation, agreed, yet issued a note of caution on the application of sovereign equality in the CSCE: Unlike certain diplomatic congresses in the past, it was on the basis of the sovereign equality of participant States that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was prepared, convened and held...Although such a system did not simplify the discussions in Geneva, it had the merit of allowing the delegations of all the countries, big or small, to state their points of view freely and to participate actively in the elaboration of a common political document.  In our opinion, this is an entirely legitimate right but implies as a necessary corollary responsible and measured behavior. 46  Similarly, in 1975 Prime Minister Jørgensen of Denmark stated: “Of course, decisions under a consensus procedure are unlikely to be perfect.  But the fact that under this very procedure of consensus all participating States have accepted the decisions of the Conference in their entirety, is the basis of their strength.”47  These quotes warn of the obstacles that inclusive institutions encounter when consensus is hindered by states disinterested in compromise, yet they also highlight the promise of inclusive institutions’ legitimacy contributing to the strength of norms and states’ commitment to the agreed decisions. In a bipolar international system, a critic might argue that progress on norm development in the CSCE depended simply on whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement.  This argument is underdetermined, despite the kernel of truth it may hold.  The presence of non-antagonistic leadership in the Soviet Union may have been a necessary factor for the elaboration of human rights implementation mechanisms in Vienna in the late 1980s, but it  45  Statement by Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Cosgrave, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.3 (restrict),19. 46  Statement by Mr. Graber, President of the Swiss Confederation, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.2 (restrict), 29-30.  See also statements by Mr. Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (3-4), and Mr. Arias Navarro, Head of Government, Spain (39), First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.4 (restrict). 47  Statement by Mr. Jørgensen, Prime Minister of Denmark, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.4 (restrict), 16. Chapter Three 65  was not sufficient.  Because of consensus decision-making, new approaches required agreement by all CSCE states, not simply the two superpowers.  As Central European states broke with the Warsaw Pact, their independent changes in perspective also factored into reaching consensus. Without the inclusive CSCE institutions, it is highly unlikely that the international community would have developed similar mechanisms for monitoring human rights commitments in Europe and the Soviet Union in 1986-89. 48   The CSCE’s Vienna mechanism responded directly to Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act and evolutions in its third basket; thus it was a unique product of the history of the interaction of states within the CSCE.  The third basket itself was a result of inclusive negotiations.  If this precursor to the human dimension had been less inclusive, its legitimacy would not have survived the Cold War.  The EU or Council of Europe, with much smaller memberships, were not in a position in the late 1980s to elaborate commitments and monitoring mechanisms for non-member states which had not yet received accession perspectives, e.g. in Central or Southeastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 49  Moreover, the CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled ambassadors and diplomats (rather than heads of state and foreign ministers) to negotiate incrementally on human rights norms at the Vienna follow-up meeting of 1986-89.  In the absence of the inclusive CSCE, much higher levels of political will and engagement, on par with what we observed in 1973-75, would have been needed to launch human rights norms and monitoring mechanisms for the region.  As will be shown, it was not until 1990 that the highest levels of political leadership became most active in attempting to develop democratic norms at international level.  In other words, there would not have been sufficient motivation among leaders of the states involved to capitalize on ideological shifts in the absence of inclusive CSCE institutions in 1986-89.  It was not simply the easing of Cold War tensions that led to more significant CSCE human rights mechanisms in Vienna in 1986-89.  Inclusive institutions contributed significantly by providing a foundation and structure for negotiations in which, despite disagreement, states’ positions on human rights issues were elaborated and refined, thus serving as a basis for new democracy commitments in later years.   48  On counterfactual analysis, see Fearon 1991. 49  It was not until 1993, when the EU issued an accession perspective to Central European states, that the EU drew on the CSCE’s democratic norm set for its Copenhagen political criteria used for accession.  The European Convention on Human Rights would be applicable to the potential new members of the Council of Europe when they were given accession perspectives in the 1990s. Chapter Three 66  3.4. CSCE, 1990-1991: Inclusive institutions support the codification and development of a comprehensive set of democratic norms.  The CSCE’s inclusive structures and consensus rules scarcely posed an obstacle to the launch of a new set of democratic norms at the second Human Dimension (HD) conference in Copenhagen in June 1990.  Moreover, the CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled much groundwork to be done in advance.  Under conditions of high political will and minimal internal divisions, inclusive institutions enhanced the CSCE’s ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies, thereby responding to states’ interest in receiving international support for democratic reforms. 1990-1991 were arguably the most glorious years in the history of the CSCE/OSCE.  At the Summit held in Paris in November 1990, the 34 heads of state publicly celebrated the end of the Cold War, 50  and in their speeches reveled in the as-yet-untested new opportunities for cooperation with human rights and democracy as a fundamental basis for international relations. Whereas at the first HD conference in Paris in mid-1989, delegates could not agree on a concluding document, just one year later the same proposals were reconsidered and expanded. The Copenhagen Document delivered unprecedented agreement on democratic norms related to elections, rule of law, and human rights, with high levels of specificity.   It delineated the most comprehensive series of international commitments in existence at that time on pluralistic democracy, emphasizing, for example, judicial independence, civilian control of the military, separation between the State and political parties, the right of peaceful assembly, and set the stage for CSCE/OSCE work in election observation.  Subsequently, in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which concluded the Paris Summit of November 1990, participating states declared: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations” (CSCE 1990b, 3).  The Paris Summit also launched a new intensity in the CSCE’s institutionalization processes, including the establishment of a permanent Secretariat and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, which would become the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1992 (see OSCE 2007, 6-7).  The third Human Dimension conference, held in Moscow just weeks after the averted August coup in 1991, elaborated the CSCE’s democratic norms to condemn the overthrow of legitimately elected governments, support judicial independence, professional conduct of law enforcement,  50  After the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the CSCE comprised 34 participating states. Chapter Three 67  freedom of the media, and rights during a state of public emergency  (1991, 17.1-2; 19-20; 21-3; 26; 28).  Especially relevant over the years has been the Moscow Document’s clause: Participating states emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order. They categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned (1991, 29). 51  One condition facilitating democratic norm development in 1990 was certainly the interest of CSCE participating states in responding to what they viewed as the major domestic political issues in Central and Eastern Europe. 52   Scholars propose that new ideas and norms develop in IOs as they respond to “what is happening out there in the world” (Weiss et al. 2005, 406-7). Indeed, Central and Eastern European states in the early 1990s were making extensive constitutional reforms and designing legislation on democratic elections, political parties, civil society, and human rights; CSCE institutional reforms to assist these processes were seen as valuable precisely at this point.  Similarly, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia underscored the need for greater international resolve on minority rights.  This suggests the significance of clearly identifiable needs and demands of key participating states, and that consensus for developing democratic norms and implementation mechanisms in inclusive IOs arises partly in response to crises or the high politics of the day. Yet streamlined interests, needs, or a conducive normative environment alone do not explain how the CSCE was able to make progress so quickly in 1990.  Here the inclusive institutional structures played a major role.  Through the recurring CSCE meetings in the 1980s, CSCE states were acutely aware of their points of contention. Inclusive institutions enabled much of the groundwork to be done in advance.  When a change of circumstances and leadership occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, delegates were easily able to assess where they could break through earlier impasses.  This feature of inclusive institutions is underemphasized in the literature.  For example, highlighting issues which had previously failed to achieve consensus yet were placed again onto the agenda and agreed upon in 1990 in Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky of Hungary stated:  51  Italics added. 52  Author’s interview with Alice Nĕmcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 Feb. 2009. Chapter Three 68  We continue to regard as valid the proposals which we submitted at last year’s meeting in Paris.  Hungary is interested in the conclusion of the present meeting with the adoption of a document reflecting the spirit of the construction of a new Europe…It should lay down the basic criteria of democracy and the rule of law…and it should refer to the importance of inter-state cooperation for the enforcement of democracy and the rule of law and for the creation of a European legal space, and…the concrete modalities of further developing the human dimension mechanism. 53  Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio of Finland emphasized a similar point, stating: “the work of this Conference as defined in its mandate is on practical proposals. A host of them were made at the Paris Meeting a year ago.  Many of them merit further consideration here.”54 Without the inclusive structure provided by the CSCE and its history of earlier attempts to develop human rights and democracy commitments, it is highly unlikely that such a comprehensive set of democratic norms would have been developed in 1990 by the international community for application in the region.  Moreover, in retrospect we see the limited window of opportunity in which broad consensus was attained.  This window began to close at the end of 1991 with the end of Gorbachev’s presidency and the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, which created new international priorities and increased the number of CSCE participating states, making consensus in a group with more diverse priorities more difficult to achieve.  The CSCE meetings in Ottawa, Vienna, and Paris in 1985-89 were eventually of immense benefit to the preparations of delegates in Copenhagen and Paris in 1990.  Many of the proposals tabled at the 1990 Copenhagen Human Dimension (HD) meeting had been considered and refined at the 1989 HD meeting in Paris, which in turn built from third basket negotiations during the 1986- 1989 follow-up meeting in Vienna.  In the words of Alice Nĕmcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant at the Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat; “it was like a reservoir that exploded at Copenhagen.”55 In the absence of the CSCE, would other actors in the international community have generated such a norm set in these years?  It is unlikely that the EU would have done so prior to 1993, the first point at which such norms were needed as guideposts for the future accession of Central European states. The Council of Europe, which began to admit Central European states in 1990, had a set of human rights norms and a few less comprehensive Parliamentary Assembly  53  Statement at the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 6 June 1990, 6-7. 54  Statement at the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen,, 5 June 1990, 3. 55  Author’s interview, OSCE Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, December 2010. Chapter Three 69  resolutions on democratic governance dating to the mid-1980s applicable to its member states. However, a review of the Council of Europe’s acquis on democratic governance shows that its democratic norms did not expand between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. 56    The CSCE was the only regional institution at the time to comprise states of North America, Europe, and the USSR, and the CSCE’s democratic norms were applicable to its participating states, whereas EU or Council of Europe norms would only apply directly to the smaller group of EU member states or to states with membership prospects. 57   Another distinction is that the CSCE’s democratic norm set arose in response to needs expressed by its own participating states in transition, whereas democratic norms of exclusive IOs often arise in response to the needs of their current members and the IOs themselves, for example, to clarify democratic expectations for accession of new states.  In 1990-91, there was a unique broad base of commitment by CSCE states with wide variations in democratic development, including the two superpowers.  The CSCE’s inclusive institutions, which were able to draw on their history of negotiations of human rights and democracy commitments, were well-placed to capitalize on the changes in political will in 1990- 91. At the same time, the concept of inclusiveness itself in the CSCE began to evolve away from traditional understandings of sovereign equality.  As host of the Paris Summit, President Mitterrand of France acknowledged the “right of all to a voice, in preference to a tête-à-tête among a select few,” yet also qualified his ideas of sovereign equality with democratic principles:  “Around this table, we have neither victors nor vanquished but 34 countries equal in dignity…countries which have endowed themselves, or which will inevitably endow themselves with institutions and leaders chosen freely in the framework of states respectful of the rule of law.”58  Leaders of a few states such as Romania and Yugoslavia, however, retained and invoked the conventional sense of sovereign equality as a means of resisting external pressure. 59   56  See Council of Europe, Directorate General of Democracy and Political Affairs, Directorate of Democratic Institutions, Bibliography of the Council of Europe’s acquis on the principles of democracy: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/forum-democracy/activities/key-texts/acquis_1sep_EN.asp? Accessed 4/2011. 57 For comparison with the Council of Europe, Hungary was admitted  to the CoE in 1990, Poland  and Czechoslovakia in 1991, Bulgaria in 1992, (whereas Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania were CSCE participating states since 1973).  Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania were admitted to the CoE in 1993, Latvia, Albania, Moldova, Macedonia, and Ukraine in 1995, Russia and Croatia in 1996, Georgia in 1999, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002, Serbia in 2003, and Montenegro in 2007.  http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en 58  Statement by Mr. François Mitterand, President of the Republic of France at Paris Summit of the CSCE Nov. 1990 CSCE/SP/VR.1, 1. 59  Statement by Mr, Ion Iliescu, President of the Republic of Romania at Paris Summit of the CSCE, Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.4.  See also Statement by Mr. Borislav Jovic, President of Yugoslavia at Paris Summit of the CSCE, Chapter Three 70  Nevertheless, the concept of sovereignty in 1990-91 was shifting to entail not only human rights, but also more explicit ideas of popular sovereignty and rule of law. 3.5. CSCE, 1992-1994: Norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality are qualified by democratic governance; inclusive institutions support the CSCE’s institutionalization.  In 1992-1994, the CSCE’s new norms of democratic governance continued to constrain its longstanding norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality.  In other words, ideas of inclusiveness evolved in the early 1990s to assume less democratic states’ ongoing transitions. As in 1990-91, the CSCE’s continued institutionalization was facilitated by its inclusive institutions. Between 1991 and 1994, the number of CSCE participating states rose from 34 to 52. 60  The independence of former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia multiplied the number of veto points in the inclusive CSCE’s consensus decision-making.  Moreover, the foreign policies of the new CSCE participating states tended to be concerned foremost with their nearest neighbors.  One consequence of the increase in number of participating states was thus a narrowing of the scope of problems to be addressed. The time for grand geopolitical rhetoric was over, and this affected the types of democracy commitments that were viewed as most important to expand.  As Prime Minister Carlsson of Sweden stated in December 1994; “The world did not turn out to be quite as new and harmonious as we hoped, when the Charter of Paris was adopted four years ago.”61  Now, many echoed the sentiments of U.S. President Clinton: “We must work to prevent future Bosnias.  And we must build the structures that will help newly-free nations to complete their transformation successfully to free market democracies and preserve their own freedom.”62  Thus, consensus in the CSCE of the mid-1990s arose to respond more effectively to new European security threats, including nationalism and xenophobia, and decreased attention was paid to elaborating international norms on structural components of democratic societies, which had flourished in 1990-91.  Rather, the focus of OSCE democracy support shifted to the operational realm.  Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.3.   See also Klein (1974) who demonstrates similar uses of sovereign equality in the inter-American system. 60  These included: Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1991; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in 1992; and Slovak Republic in 1993.  Russia assumed the Soviet Union’s membership in 1991, and the Czech Republic assumed Czechoslovakia’s membership in 1993. 61  Statement by Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 Dec. 1994. 62  Statement by Mr. William Clinton, President of the United States, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 Dec. 1994, 2. Chapter Three 71   1992-1994 was a period of brisk institutionalization for the CSCE.  Participating states supported expanding CSCE institutions to enable the CSCE to respond more effectively to crises. Preventive diplomacy and crisis management were high priorities in 1992-94, as were developing peacekeeping capacity and establishing long-term missions to assist participating states in implementing CSCE commitments.  The sustained frequency of high-level meetings is one indicator of CSCE participating states’ strong commitment to the institution in these years. The 1992 Helsinki Summit enhanced the role of ODIHR and established a High Commissioner on National Minorities (Sections VI, II; Nĕmcová 2010, 9).  CSCE field missions began in 1992 in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, Skopje, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Estonia; and in 1993 missions began in Latvia and Moldova; these would serve as key instruments for implementing the organization’s democracy commitments.  Of great significance was the EU’s signal in 1993 of its openness to Central European states’ potential membership, as well as NATO’s announcement in 1994 of its decision to expand eastward.  As Colin Munro notes; “At Budapest [in 1994], Heads of State or Government did still take the CSCE seriously.  But it was evident already then, as the processes of EU and NATO enlargement gathered momentum, that its future place in European security architecture would be uncertain” (2010, 11).  Russia had hoped that the CSCE’s role would become more prominent on the continent; thus it would have an equal voice on major issues of security in Europe. “The Budapest decision to turn the CSCE into the OSCE was a compromise, between the United States, which at that time could not envisage its Senate ratifying any treaty, and Russia, which wanted a treaty-based OSCE to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact” (Munro 2010, 11).   Thus, the 1994 Budapest Summit established new institutions and procedures for the OSCE such as: a Council of Ministers to meet in years without a Summit; a Senior Council; a Permanent Council in Vienna; a yearly rotating Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and a Secretary General (CSCE 1994, I: 16-20).  In contrast to the ad- hoc nature of CSCE Summits and Ministerial Council Meetings, the OSCE Permanent Council would become a stable institution for regular discussion of implementation of human dimension commitments (CSCE 1994, VIII: 5). “Many of the newly independent States sought membership in the CSCE for its swift, non-restrictive and co-operative recognition” (Nĕmcová 2010, 8).  This is true, yet nearly synchronized with their admission were enhanced qualifications on the terms of participation. Chapter Three 72  By 1992, the corpus of CSCE norms, which new participating states accepted upon admission, assumed their ongoing transition to democratic states and linked democratic governance with states’ participation in the CSCE.63  For example, the Helsinki 1992 Summit Document stated: We welcome the commitment of all participating States to our shared values. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, democracy, the rule of law, economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are our common aims. They are immutable. Adherence to our commitments provides the basis for participation and co-operation in the CSCE and a cornerstone for further development of our societies (CSCE 1992, 6, italics added). This pressure on the new participating states continued in subsequent years.  At the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome, “The Ministers underlined the importance of the Human Dimension in the further integration of the recently admitted participating States” (CSCE 1993, 2). The only case (to date) of suspension of a CSCE/OSCE participating state occurred in 1992 with the suspension of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  This was an important, but unique, exception to the CSCE’s policy of formal inclusiveness, based on non-compliance with CSCE norms. 64   In 1991, CSCE Ministers simply “expressed their friendly concern and their support for democratic development” in Yugoslavia (CSCE 1991c, 9).  Meanwhile, they admitted Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and undertook missions in the area in 1992, yet there were ongoing debates on the legal foundations of Yugoslavia’s recognition in the CSCE and the UN.  In January 1992, the CSCE established at the Prague Ministerial Council a new decision-making procedure of consensus-minus-one: “Appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments.”(CSCE 1992a, IV: 16).  This procedure, a move away from full inclusiveness, permitted the suspension of Yugoslavia just before the Helsinki Summit on July 8, 1992. 65   63  New participating states accepted the CSCE acquis, including the critical passage from the 1991 Moscow document: “We emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” (CSCE 1992, 8). 64  The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia experienced a different type of exception to formal inclusiveness; its admission was blocked by Greece between 1992 and 1995, despite UN membership in 1993, due to the dispute over its name. 65  Annex to the Journal No. 7 of the 13 th  Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, Helsinki, 8 July 1992. Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials. See also Nĕmcová 2010, 9. Journal No. 3 of the 12 th meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, Helsinki 10 June 1992, Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials, 3-4. Chapter Three 73  Participating states were no longer perceived simply as sovereign states, but the characteristic of (aspirations towards) democratic governance qualified sovereign equality and participation.  President Bush of the U.S. took a harsher line; “Those who violate the CSCE’s norms must be singled out, criticized, isolated, even punished by sanctions.  Let Serbia’s absence today serve as a clear message to others.”66   An open question was how seriously the CSCE would take this.  These trends continued in the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, which continued to wrap ideas of sovereign equality in layers of democratic values and human rights: The CSCE’s democratic values are fundamental to our goal of a community of nations with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign equality and the independence of all States are fully respected, there are no spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or of belonging to a minority, are vigorously protected. (CSCE 1994, 7). Therefore, 1992-94 is characterized by the qualification of sovereign equality in the CSCE with ideas of democratic governance.  3.6. OSCE, 1995-1999: Inclusive institutions continue to sustain policy implementation of its mandate to support democratic governance.  The OSCE’s inclusive institutions, in the general absence of major contention on issues of support for democratic governance in 1995-1999, enabled the organization to respond to many current issues, with a focus in the mid-1990s on strengthening conflict prevention, early warning and crisis management, and on elements of democracy such as freedom of expression, free media, respect for human and minority rights, and the rule of law.  In this section, I also analyze debates on the consensus principle in the 1990s that highlighted key tensions between sovereign equality, legitimacy, and institutional effectiveness. In January 1995, the CSCE formally became the OSCE, and while its efforts at norm development in the following years concentrated more heavily on issues of security, 67  the OSCE’s operational work was buoyed from its success in supervising elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and assisting implementation of the Dayton peace plan.  Existing long-term  66  Statement by Mr. George Bush, President of the United States, CSCE Helsinki Summit, 9 July 1992, CSCE/HS/VR.3, 58. 67  The 1996 Lisbon Summit issued a Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe, which led to the Charter for European Security adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. Chapter Three 74  field missions continued, and several new field offices were opened. 68   A post of OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was created in 1997 and the OSCE’s work in Estonia and Latvia and through the High Commissioner on National Minorities was highly recognized by some state representatives and members of the international community (Heidenhain 2004). 69  Also expressing satisfaction, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan stated in 1999, “Collaboration with the OSCE – and especially with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities – is proving effective in supporting our efforts to consolidate the culture of democracy, tolerance and pluralism in a multinational and multiconfessional Kyrgyzstan.”70 Overshadowing these priorities, however, were broader debates on the future security architecture of Europe.  CIS states were concerned about and opposed to NATO enlargement and thus sought a more prominent role for the OSCE.  For example, at the Lisbon Summit in 1996, Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin appealed: “The OSCE should assume the role of a focal point for all-European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.”71  U.S. Vice President Al Gore retorted: “The OSCE does not need to be transformed into the only orchestrating instrument of European security…we believe that the OSCE will succeed best on the basis of its flexible political commitments.”72  Over time, OSCE participating states’ differing opinions about Serbia, Belarus, and Chechnya also chipped away at political will to cooperate.  In 1996, the OSCE was the only international organization involved in Chechnya.  According to the Prime Minister of Iceland, “It was invited to do so because it had a legitimate claim to intervene.  That in turn was a consequence of commitments given within the OSCE.”73  In 1996, Russia expressed gratitude to the Assistance Group in Chechnya working to restore peace. 74   But this good will diminished  68  New offices were opened in Croatia and Uzbekistan in 1996, Albania in 1997, and Belarus, Kazakhstan (Almaty), Turkmenistan (Ashgabat), Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek), and Tajikistan (Dushanbe) in 1998. 69  See also statement by the British Prime Minister at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/142/96, 3. However, in 1999 the Estonian Prime Minister criticized the OSCE response and the High Commissioner on National Minorities for selectivity.  Statement by Mr. Mart Laar, Prime Minister of Estonia at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/44/99, 1. 70  Statement by Mr. A. Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/1/99, 3. 71  Statement by Mr. V.S. Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/132/96. See also Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96. 72  Statement by Mr. Al Gore, Vice President of the United States at the OCSE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/137/96. 73  Statement by Mr. David Oddson, Prime Minister of Iceland, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996. REF.S/147/96. 74  Statement by Mr. V.S. Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 December 1996, REF.S/132/96. Chapter Three 75  by the 1999 Istanbul Summit, where President Yeltsin argued, albeit defensively, against intervention.”75  Indeed, German Chancellor Schröder aimed a strong statement at the Russian leadership: “resolve the conflict by political means!  Respect the OSCE Principles and Obligations which we all accepted!  Do not undermine the credibility of these Principles and thus the Organization as a whole!  They are a sine qua non for lasting peace in Europe.”76  Disputes about the use of force by NATO in Kosovo added to Russia’s claims, and a decade which began with Russia seeking OSCE states’ assistance for its democratic transition ended with increasing challenges to OSCE mandates. While in 1995-1999 sovereign equality continued to be qualified with ideas of democratic governance, another justification for qualifying sovereignty appeared: primary threats to security increasingly arose from within states rather than between them. 77   The conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo contributed to debates on humanitarian intervention, where sovereignty of the state would be questioned when it is unable or unwilling to protect its inhabitants. 78   At the same time, assertions of traditional understandings of sovereignty were heard more frequently from CIS states. In the mid-1990s, Belarus was among the first states to challenge policies for implementing the OSCE’s human dimension commitments.  While some of its complaints were smokescreens, Belarus was defensive about criticism of its 1995 constitutional referendum and displeased that after withdrawing nuclear weapons from its territory, other states had not followed suit. 79   It began to reintroduce authoritarian ideology to OSCE debates. 80   Small states can have disproportionately positive or negative effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation processes. “It does happen that a country can punch beyond its size.  A small country agitates itself with more difficulty.  A small country may not have the right kind of  75  Statement by President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.27/99. 76  Statement by Mr. Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at the OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999.  US President Bill Clinton associated himself with these remarks. Remarks of the President at Opening of the OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.26/99.   See also Statement by the President of Finland, Mr. Martii Ahtisaari, OSCE Istanbul Summit,18 Nov 1999. SUM.DEL/20/99. 77  See Statement by Prime Minister Duhaene, Belgium, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1994, REF.S/151/96. Statement by Mr. Al Gore, Vice President of the United States, OCSE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/137/96. 78  See Statement by António Guterres, Prime Minister of Portugal, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/76/99. 79  Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96. 80  Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009. Chapter Three 76  backup.  But if it has an idea and if it has a sense of direction with that idea…within the UN it can work a great deal” (Weiss et al. 2005, 368-9).  In the negative sense, the above quote is even more relevant to the OSCE because in the OSCE the principle of sovereign equality is operationalized by full consensus decision-making.  Thus, the opposition of simply one state can pose formidable obstacles to norm development.  In other words, the OSCE’s inclusive structures enable small countries to markedly “punch above their weight,” since just one state can thwart initiatives with an effective veto. Over the years, there had been a few attempts to restrict the inclusiveness of CSCE/OSCE institutions with the aim of enabling the organization to support democracy more efficiently.  For example, in 1990 Denmark proposed a Human Dimension Committee with a rotating chairperson to inquire about human rights abuses and consider communications from individuals, which would consist of seven elected experts from participating states.  81   This proposal deviated from the CSCE’s inclusive modus operandi, but was justified by claiming that a body comprising all CSCE member states would not be as effective in carrying out all of the functions such a Committee might undertake. 82   However, this proposal did not meet with consensus at the 1990 Paris Summit.  By the mid-1990s, the evolving, more autonomous CSCE institutions such as the Secretariat and ODIHR enabled it to take action in some operational areas without consensus; however, high-level decision-making at Summits and Councils of Ministers, Senior Officials, and the Permanent Council, which guided the work of the Secretariat and ODIHR, remained governed by consensus. Further explicitly challenging the norm of consensus, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) recommended at the 1994 Budapest Summit that “the CSCE improve its decision- making procedures by requiring an approximate consensus, rather than the presently required unanimity.”83   This sparked a flurry of statements in defense of consensus by the smaller states. 84   Entrenched interests have made consensus procedures very difficult to change.  Calls to  81  Non-paper submitted by the delegation of Denmark on Establishment of a Committee on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.  Committee for the Preparation of a Summit Meeting in Paris, Vienna, 31 October 1990.  This reiterated elements of the proposal submitted by the Delegation of Denmark to the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension, which did not find consensus in Copenhagen.  CSCE/CHDC.8, June 6, 1990. 82  Ibid. 83  Statement by Mr. Frank Swaelen, President of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, CSCE Budapest Summit, 2 December 1994. 84  Statement by HE Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic of Latvia, CSCE Budapest Summit, 6 December 1994;  Statement by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 December 1994; Statement of Prof. Anibal Cavavo Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal, CSCE Budapest Summit, 6 December 1994; Chapter Three 77  revise the OSCE’s consensus principle continued in 1995-1999.  These came from both large and small states and included proposals such as establishing a consultative committee to advise the Permanent Council or Chairperson in Office. 85   One of the most steadfast advocates of decision- making reform has been the OSCE PA, whose decisions are made by majority vote (OSCE 2007, 14). “It is hardly democratic when a single country can block the common will of 53 others and can prevent essential and timely action when it is needed,” argued Helle Degn, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 86   Yet the OSCE PA lacks formal status in OSCE decision- making.  The parliamentarians submit recommendations for consideration and are active in election observation and assisting field missions, but since they often represent political parties other than that of a state’s foreign ministry, the political power of the OSCE PA has been limited.   The OSCE PA’s arguments were echoed by President Schuster of the Slovak Republic: “in certain extreme cases of clear, serious and repeated breaches of basic commitments to the OSCE, it is necessary to take measures to maintain the credibility of our organization, even without the consent from the state involved.”87  In 1996, Prime Minister Horn of Hungary highlighted tensions between sovereign equality and institutional effectiveness: We have to preserve the sovereign equality of OSCE participating states which allows each and every one of them to identify with the organization, to express its views in appropriate forms and to take part in the decision-making process….Along with the principle of consensus, we should make it possible for the OSCE to act even in instances where certain objections might jeopardize the dynamism generated by an overwhelming majority view.  In these cases, jointly decided action should serve the defense of common values that lie at the heart of the OSCE. 88   Counterarguments to preserving the consensus rule were made by the leaders of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, the UK, and the Executive Secretary of the CIS in 1996 and by Croatia and Luxembourg in 1999. 89    Several of these states opposing changes to consensus rules  Statement by Mr. Ion Iliescu, President of Romania, CSCE Budapest Summit, 8 December 1994; Statement by Dr. Franjo Tudman, President of the Republic of Croatia, CSCE Budapest Summit, Dec. 1994. 85  Statement by Mr. Franz Vranitzky, Federal Chancellor of Austria, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 1996, REF.S/124/96. Statement by Mr. Michal Kováč, President of the Slovak Republic, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF.S/160/96. 86  Statement by Mrs. Helle Degn, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, 4.  See also Statement by Mr. Gyula Horn, Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF.S/157/96. 87  Statement by Mr. Rudolf Schuster, President of the Slovak Republic, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999, SUM.GAL/65/99. 88   Statement by Mr. Gyula Horn, Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF.S/157/96, p. 2. 89  Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96; Statement by Mr. Lennart Meri, President of Estonia, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/144/96; Statement by Mr. Guntis Ulmanis, President of Latvia, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, Chapter Three 78  (Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Croatia, and most CIS states) were comparatively small states in which OSCE missions were present.  Prime Minister Blair of the U.K echoed their arguments: “I believe in a strong OSCE, able to operate effectively.  I also believe we should avoid institutional changes which reduce its flexibility or the equality of status of all its members.  All member states, including the smallest, have the right to be heard, to bring their concerns to the organization and to use the OSCE’s potential to address them.”90 Tensions between large and small states, however, are not fully assuaged by consensus decision-making, since informal institutions exist that can also be viewed as exclusive. References to these CSCE practices appear, however, infrequently in official statements. Exceptionally, a Soviet delegate to the Moscow HD Conference in 1991 revealed: “To reinforce the businesslike atmosphere at our meeting I would like to suggest that we start without delay discussing the submitted proposals in the working bodies, also making use of the helpful experience of setting up informal groups.  As we all know it is there that concluding documents are conceived.”91  In 1999, the President of Latvia issued a critique of this practice: “In the search for consensus and in the desire to preserve flexibility, we should also strengthen transparency and inclusiveness.  Being a small state we prefer to see decisions prepared in the plenary hall, even if it takes longer discussions, rather than in secluded rooms wh