INCLUSIVENESS AND STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES OF DEMOCRATIC NORM DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by

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Abstract

The tension between sovereign equality and democratic status, or hierarchies based on democratic governance, is under-analyzed in scholarship of international organizations (IOs). IOs with formally inclusive compositions derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness. Yet this inclusiveness is challenged by democratic status, with varied consequences. Scholarly explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of established democracies, interests of new democracies to “lock in” democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions. Existing accounts have thus under-emphasized inclusive institutions and democratic status as important (and interacting) explanatory variables. This dissertation draws on insights from literature on institutional design, constructivism, and social psychology to examine the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status in the development of democratic norms and policy implementation in two inclusive IOs: the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) between the respective origins of the organizations in 1945 or 1973 and 2010.

While inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions, and counter to conventional wisdom, they have occasionally proven highly supportive of democratic norm development. This study examines influential mechanisms, including relations between inclusive institutions and windows of opportunity, norm restatements and re-consideration of failed proposals, issue linkage, contributions of procedural legitimacy to norm expansion, inclusive institutions’ role in (re-)authorizing (or inhibiting) implementation policies, and vulnerability to shifts in political will. The dissertation draws on content analysis through process tracing of archival data and statements, counterfactual analysis, and semi-structured interviews. To assess the evolution and influence of democratic status, new indicators are developed. The study employs and adapts concepts from social identity theory and emphasizes additional factors (e.g. salience of democratic status, appeal of prototypical states, and prestige of IOs) that also affect states’ pursuit of strategies of social mobility, social competition, or social creativity, thus contributing to cooperation or discord for democratic norm development in inclusive IOs. Counter-intuitively, the institutionalization of a norm can, in fact, lead to regress.
Preface

The interviews conducted for this project were approved by the Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB) at the University of British Columbia (H07-02269) on December 17, 2007.

In order to preserve confidentiality, in correspondence with the preferences indicated by interviewees, several interviews are referenced anonymously in the following text. Additional information is available in Appendix A.
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHR</td>
<td>Commission on Human Rights (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Community of Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGTTF</td>
<td>Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>Election Assessment Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Human Dimension (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICNRD</td>
<td>International Conference of New or Restored Democracies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>OECD Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE PA</td>
<td>OSCE Parliamentary Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent Five Members of the Security Council (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDEF</td>
<td>United Nations Democracy Fund</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

The process by which democracy is supported is critical to its legitimacy. It is widely agreed that democracy support by Western states has lost a great deal of credibility over the past decade as a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, human rights abuses during the “war on terror,” and bilateral donors’ inconsistency and politization.\(^1\) As an important means by which the practice of democracy support can regain legitimacy, scholars and practitioners have proposed that states increase their commitments to work through multilateral institutions (Carothers 2008, 6-7; Cameron and Hecht 2008, 18, 23-4; Piccone 2008, 14; Burron 2011, 401-2; Craner and Wollack 2008; see also Ikenberry 2011). International organizations (IOs) – and in particular those with formally inclusive compositions - hold several advantages for democracy support precisely in terms of procedural legitimacy:\(^2\) they are comparatively neutral, less likely to promote a particular model of democracy, free of colonial baggage, less politically motivated than bilateral support, and their efforts are typically based on collectively-agreed international commitments (Newman 2004, 195-6; Ludwig 2004, 116; Author’s interview with Roland Rich, Executive Head of United Nations Democracy Fund, 12 Mar. 2009).\(^3\)

Yet there remain significant gaps in our understanding of how inclusive international organizations are able to develop and implement democratic norms. Scholarly explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit factors such as the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of the West more broadly, interests of new democracies to ‘lock in’ democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions (Schimmelfennig 2007; Rich 2001; Krisch 2003, 149; Domínguez 2007; Clark 2005, 8; Moravscik 2000; Schroeder 2011; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Existing accounts tend to avoid in-depth analysis of norm development processes in inclusive inter-governmental fora such as the UN General Assembly or regional Summits and therefore under-emphasize two important (and interacting) explanatory variables: inclusive institutions and democratic status.

In this dissertation, I examine the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status on democratic norm development and policy implementation within two

\(^{1}\) See, for example, Carothers (2009), the contributions by Burnell and Carothers in Burnell and Youngs, eds. (2010), and by Robinson and Stiglitz in Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (2003, 15, 18).

\(^{2}\) Similar arguments are made regarding humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping (see Finnemore 1996; Coleman 2007; Weiss et al 2007, xlii).

\(^{3}\) See also Statement by Mr. Tommasoli, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), UN GA, 62\(^{nd}\) Session, 44\(^{th}\) Plenary, 5 Nov. 2007, A/62/PV.44, 17.
inclusive IOs: the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). The study is divided into six time periods between the respective origins of the organizations in 1945 or 1973 and 2010.

This research is empirically significant at a time when both inclusive IOs and international democracy support can benefit from revitalization. Inclusive IOs are often viewed negatively for their characteristics such as slow decision-making, difficulty enforcing commitments, and tendencies towards least-common-denominator agreements (e.g. Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin 1998). Similarly, democracy support has been viewed increasingly negatively in recent years because of perceptions of donors’ paternalistic practices, inconsistency, domestic democratic deficiencies, U.S. engagement in Iraq, and the “war on terror” (on the latter, see Carothers 2009, Burnell and Carothers 2010). It is important to think differently about both inclusive institutions and support for democratic development in order to reclaim their advantages. Especially since 2003, democracy promotion has become associated with the idea of imposing democracy, and the legitimacy of U.S. authority has declined. Democracy support typically has greater legitimacy when it responds to the expressed needs of recipient communities and when provided by more neutral, multilateral institutions with efforts based on collective agreements as opposed to states’ political interests. When inclusive institutions achieve consensus or broad agreement on democratic norms among their member or participating states, as in the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, they confer a unique type of procedural legitimacy. “In all societies, what is legal or legitimate is, most often, collectively approved” (Weiss et al 2007, xxxii; see also Coleman 2007).

Inclusive IOs derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness. However, the influence of any type of status, including democratic status, effectively undermines their inclusiveness, with varied consequences. Thus, there is a constant tension between inclusive institutions and democratic status in inclusive IOs with democratization mandates. How does this tension affect policy outcomes in the UN and the CSCE/OSCE? By what mechanisms do

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4 The CSCE refers to a series of conferences among 35 states (the United States, European states, the USSR and Canada) which were launched in 1973. In the early 1990s the organization became more formally institutionalized, developing a secretariat and permanent organs. The CSCE became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.
inclusive institutions and democratic status affect the motivations of state representatives to support or challenge specific policies in inclusive IOs?

This project contributes to the work of scholars of institutionalism, constructivism, and international law, who have documented significant cases in which inclusive IOs have played key roles in norm development and implementation (Finnemore 1996; Ruggie 1993; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Newman and Rich 2004; Thomas 2001; Keohane and Martin 1995; Heidenhain 2004; Johnston 2001; Flockhart 2005; Pevehouse 2005; McMahon and Baker 2006; Weiss et al. 2005; Acharya and Johnston 2007, among others, including innumerable reports issued by the IOs). Yet additional research is needed on factors that contribute to cooperation and discord among states in different policy areas in inclusive IOs. Variations in inclusive IOs’ ability to support democratic norm development and policy implementation over time remain under-analyzed. I argue that inclusive institutions and democratic status merit greater attention in theories of global governance.

While inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions they have proven highly supportive of democratic norm development. For example, at the Paris Summit and the Copenhagen and Moscow Human Dimension Meetings of 1990-1991, the CSCE developed the most comprehensive set of international commitments for democratic governance in existence at the time, despite its consensus decision-making rules. I show that the CSCE’s inclusive institutions were, in fact, critical to the process. This runs counter to conventional wisdom that inclusive institutions are at a disadvantage in norm development because their large and diverse memberships produce a tendency towards least-common denominator agreements (Victor 2006; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998). Building on the work of Thomas (2001), Adler (1998), and literature on institutional design, I argue that inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate, of particular importance when windows of opportunity are fleeting. Inclusive institutions also help to ensure that codified commitments are considered recurrently, thereby increasing opportunities for a favorable environment or constellation of actors to facilitate norm development. Moreover, inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of progress on democratic commitments particularly if resistant states are interested in an issue in a different policy area such as security, and therefore accept
the associated trade-offs. The feature of procedural legitimacy has also contributed to the expansion of democratic norms and policies.

To date, the literature on international organizations and global governance has not explored the role and effects of *democratic status*, which refers here to hierarchies in IOs in terms of democratic governance. When realists focus on status, they emphasize material dimensions such as military strength, economic development, or great power status. By contrast, the concept of democratic status highlights hierarchies with ideational and institutional bases. I focus on democratic status because this is a comparatively new basis of international status with an interesting history, high political relevance, and significant effects on states’ support for (or opposition to) democratic norm development and policy implementation in IOs. Emphasizing norm development in the specific setting of international organizations enables the view of international institutions as social environments (Johnston 2001), which is a valuable perspective for the study of status concerns. *Democratic status markers* refer to indicators of the attribute valued by the social group (e.g. democratic governance, a favorable election assessment), which signify a state’s social standing or position in the group.5

What motivates states to challenge an IO’s democratization agenda or its implementation practices? For example, since 2005, observers have talked of a “crisis” in the OSCE, where progress in elaborating democratic commitments has stalled on all but the least contentious issues, and the organization’s efforts to support democracy have met with increased challenges and resistance (Zellner et al. 2005; Boonstra 2007; Dunay 2007; Zellner et al. 2007). These scholars often attribute the OSCE’s current dilemma to shifts in the Russian Federation’s priorities after disappointment that the OSCE did not develop into an alternative to NATO, exclusion from North Atlantic and European structures that enlarged to Russia’s borders in 2004, and the perceived Western role in the colored revolutions. However, I argue that resistance and opposition to OSCE work on democratic governance has also been a reaction by less democratic states against their lack of democratic status in the organization. It is not simply that OSCE criticism of non-democratic practices has led to backlash against OSCE norms. Russia and several CIS states have reacted to a lower than desired status in the organization’s hierarchy, compounded by the historic emphasis on sovereign equality in the organization. In the UN, status distinctions in terms of democracy have not been as pervasive as in the OSCE, which

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5 On international status markers in general, see Larson, Paul and Wohlforth forthcoming, 8.
explains some variation in successful policy development. It should be noted that challenges in the OSCE and the UN have not been directed at the “central validity claim of the norm per se” (Price 2006, 262). That is, objections have not struck against the core attributes of democratic values. Rather, challenges have objected primarily to the manner and practices by which the international organizations have promoted and supported democratic development.

While democratic governance is not a prerequisite to formal membership in the UN or the CSCE/OSCE, codification of democratic norms in the early 1990s contributed to qualifying ideas of sovereign equality and to stratifying states in terms of compliance and non-compliance, to different degrees in the two IOs. Whereas exclusive groups such as the EU or NATO confer status through membership, inclusive IOs resort to other mechanisms of differentiation. Status is a limiting force on sovereign equality (Hurrell 2009), yet the tensions between sovereign equality and democratic status have not been systematically explored in scholarship of international organizations. The concept of democratic status renders visible the presence of international hierarchies based on democratic governance.

How is the behavior of IOs affected when sovereign equality is qualified by norms of democratic governance? To answer this question, I develop new indicators of democratic status and show, building on the research of Larson and Shevchenko (2010a), that emphasis on democratic status has had two main but diverging effects on inclusive IOs’ democratic development efforts. First, it has motivated some states to support IOs’ democracy commitments and programs. Among democratizing states, support for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status-seeking, both within an IO and in the wider international community. This perspective adds to actor-centered theories (e.g. Moravcsik 2000), by emphasizing the importance of shifts in states’ hierarchical relations with other states and within IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) in supporting democratic norm development at different points in time. Second, an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate other states to challenge the IO’s support for implementation of democratic norms. Realists would argue that these challenges can be explained by geopolitical power shifts. However, by clarifying how democratic status operates and illustrating that effective challenges have not been limited to the most powerful states, I show that realist arguments do not fully explain discord around policy implementation.
To analyze the evolution and roles of democratic status, I draw on insights from constructivism and social psychology. Of the studies that apply the concept of status to international relations, to date the emphasis has been on the role of status concerns of great or rising powers (see, for example, Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Wohlforth 2009; Clunan 2009; Deng 2008), or compliance with international norms (Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2008). Studies of status have often focused on prospects for conflict rather than cooperation (see Wohlforth 2009; Markey 1999; Wallace 1973). There is a dearth of empirical studies on status in international organizations. This dissertation proposes some new interpretations of key concepts by analyzing the role of democratic status and status concerns among both large and small states, within the context of inclusive IOs. Inclusive IOs are particularly apt for analyzing questions related to democratic status because of the tension between inclusive membership and differentiation according to democratic governance. This is reinforced by the IOs’ involvement in monitoring and support for compliance with democratic norms. Moreover, in inclusive IOs’ decision-making bodies the salience of this category of stratification - and the norms and implementation policies by which democratic status distinctions are reinforced - are recurrently debated and negotiated.

Thus, in this dissertation there are two overarching intentions. First, I describe major evolutions in norms of inclusiveness and democratic status, as well as the tensions between these concepts. Inclusive institutions and democratic status are the primary independent, or explanatory, variables of the study. Second, I explain how inclusiveness and democratic status operate by examining, as dependent variables, the development of selected democratic norms and implementation policies in inclusive IOs. A large body of constructivist research has demonstrated the utility of analyzing the role of norms, or “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54), in international relations. Democratic norms refer here to collective, international expectations of behavior for the democratic governance of states; their membership in IOs further specifies states’ “given identity.” While democratic norms and commitments differ among inclusive IOs such as the UN, CSCE/OSCE, and Organization of American States (OAS), the broad spectrum typically includes free and fair elections; democratic rule of law, independence of the judiciary, law

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6 The OAS is considered here to be an inclusive IO, despite its basic democratic requirements on membership in the Inter-American Democratic Charter (and exclusion of Cuba from 1962-2009 and Honduras in 2009), because it originated without membership conditions, enforcement has most often been weak, and there is a wide range of understandings among member states in relation to its core democratic norm sets.
development and enforcement, and equal access to justice; fair, effective public administration; civilian control of the military; citizen participation in governance; and protection of civil and political rights and fundamental freedoms. The concept of inclusiveness employed here is closely tied to sovereign equality and refers to the involvement of member states of an international organization in the IO’s decision-making and policy implementation efforts, irrespective of states’ advance compliance with the IO’s core norm sets. Inclusiveness is considered in terms of degrees, rather than as a dichotomous variable.

Democratic norm development refers to processes of elaborating, imparting greater specificity, and institutionalizing democratic norms, yet also signifies processes that may undermine these norms. I am not only concerned with the initial emergence of democratic norms, but also with the dynamics of their subsequent, smaller-scale and incremental evolutionary changes such as the elaboration or dilution of commitments and mandates. Policy implementation refers here to the establishment, endorsement, and execution of broad programs at policy level (i.e. at headquarters rather than at an IO’s country office or regional levels) to further institutionalize and implement the IO’s agendas and mandates for supporting democratic governance in their member or participating states, for example, by authorizing and designating tasks to focal points or agencies such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). I demonstrate that inclusiveness and democratic status have played important roles in shaping the ways in which norms and policies develop. Counter-intuitively, the institutionalization of a norm can, in fact, lead to regress.

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7 Scholarship in global governance often uses the concept of inclusiveness to discuss the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) and other non-state actors in IOs’ decision-making processes (Clark 2001; Rittberger 2008; Young 2000; among others). While this continues to be an important trend in the study of IOs, the concept of inclusiveness is used in this dissertation primarily to analyze developments taking place among states in inclusive IOs.

8 While the UN comprises member states, the CSCE/OSCE comprises participating states. This is because, unlike the UN, the CSCE/OSCE has operated without a formal charter, and thus membership has had a political rather than a legal basis.

9 I thank Priya Bala Miller for this comment.
Significance of the Research Question

The analysis of two under-studied, interacting factors in global governance - inclusiveness and democratic status – offers new insights into patterns of norm development and policy implementation in international organizations. This dissertation draws, in particular, on insights from studies of institutional design, constructivist approaches, and social psychology. Scholars argue from various perspectives that institutional design matters. Most prolific have been the writings of rational institutionalists, who emphasize international institutions’ role in solving collective action problems (Koremenos, Lipson, and Duncan 2001; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984; Martin 1992). However, additional perspectives are offered in studies of diplomatic negotiations and international venues, which emphasize factors such as international institutions’ membership, mandate, output status, rules of procedure, and legitimacy (Coleman forthcoming; see also Johnston 2001). The theoretical propositions on the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions developed in this dissertation generally follow these intellectual traditions on institutional design.

Inclusive IOs’ norm development efforts have proven to be highly significant in global affairs. One particularly compelling example is the argument that human rights norms in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975 contributed considerably to the end of the Cold War in various ways (Thomas 2001, 4; Adler 1998, 127; Gheciu 2008, 119; Evers 2005, 5; Galbreath 2007; Snyder 2011, among others). Yet it is surprising that the role of inclusive institutions is infrequently emphasized. Commitments made within inclusive institutions are used by civil society in “boomerang patterns of advocacy” to increase political pressure on their home states to comply with international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001). In fact, the boomerang effect requires inclusive IOs. This is because inclusive IOs codify and confer legitimacy on the international commitments to which the activists appeal. Creating these commitments requires an inclusive international institution that sets aspirational goals for its member (or participating) states and generally does not exclude them for lack of compliance. Therefore, even a minimal commitment agreed upon in an inclusive forum of an inclusive IO may have far-reaching effects over time.

Scholars of global governance often treat IOs as independent, autonomous actors, particularly in studies of norm diffusion and implementation (Finnemore 1996; Schimmelfennig et al 2006; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Gheciu 2008, 7-8; among others). This is an important
analytical move because of the numerous situations in which secretariats, agencies of IOs and actors such as the UN Secretary-General operate independently in international relations. However, with this assumption, one effectively overlooks important *inter-governmental* debates and states’ contributions that significantly influence IO efforts. This assumption also conceals significant *inequalities* among states in IOs. Scholarship on international organizations can benefit from additional research on how status motivates states’ behavior, which in turn affects IOs’ norms and policies in particular issue areas. Which actors propel the organization towards implementing its various mandates and which actors hold it back? By scrutinizing the concepts of inclusiveness and democratic status in inclusive IOs and exploring implications at inter-governmental and international levels, this dissertation complements existing scholarship on IOs as autonomous actors.

Although this dissertation considers the agency of actors such as state representatives and the UN Secretary-General, it might be criticized for its emphasis on international, structural factors. However, to date, scholarship on international norm creation has focused heavily on agency, and greater consideration of structural factors is needed (Coleman forthcoming, 2; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004, x). The existing literature on democratic norm development and policy implementation in inclusive IOs (and their precursors in the area of human rights) provides some comprehensive assessments of the roles of specific actors in these processes (Franck 1991; Fox and Roth 2000; Ludwig 2004a, 2004b; Schroeder 2011; Morsink 1999; Thomas 2001, among others). My objective is not to account for all factors that contribute to democratic norm development. Rather, this project aims to complement existing studies by exploring the roles and interaction of two factors, inclusive institutions and democratic status, which have been under-emphasized in the literature on democratic norm development.

This oversight is related to a broader trend: research on international organizations infrequently focuses on inclusive IOs’ most majoritarian bodies. Kennedy argues that “writings on the [UN] Security Council probably outnumber those on the [UN] GA by about 100 to 1. There have also been many more writings about, and attention paid to, the role of NGOs, multinational corporations, or the global media” (2006, 210). For an issue area like democracy, with wide value variations and differences in visions of what is desirable, inclusive institutions help to ensure that IO policies reflect a broader range of outlooks and reduce perceptions of IO activity as intervention (see also Coleman 2007; Finnemore 1996). In general, the neglect of the
most inclusive institutions in IR scholarship is myopic; it fails to appreciate that despite their inefficiencies, bodies such as the UN General Assembly also have histories as highly transformative actors.

Studies of how IOs develop and promote various types of norms have typically focused on different mechanisms, such as “socialization,” i.e. the processes by which states are encouraged to adopt sets of norms, values, and interests espoused by an IO’s secretariat and its member states (see Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2001; 2008; Checkel 2005; Adler 1998). Some scholars have emphasized the direct role of IOs as teachers and agents of socialization (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Barnett 2004). However, the dependent variable of studies on socialization is often whether “target states” domestically adopt or comply with international norms. By contrast, this dissertation has a different causal chain. Our dependent variables and outcomes of interest - democratic norm development and policy implementation in inclusive IOs - focus on IO behavior, rather than “effectiveness” in terms of IOs’ influence on states’ compliance or non-compliance at domestic level. This approach, therefore, differs in a similar way from both the literatures on socialization in international relations and on democratization in comparative politics. Rather than measuring IOs’ influence on states’ domestic democratic reforms, this dissertation analyzes prior mechanisms. Inclusive IOs’ ability (or lack thereof) to develop democratic norms and implementation policies is a step that influences and precedes (and therefore complements) the success or failure of socialization processes and international dimensions of democratization.

On the subject of democratic status, scholars have suggested that international organizations with higher democratic densities, or proportions of democratic states, are more likely to support implementation than counterpart IOs with greater diversity of regime types. For example, Pevehouse argues that “the more homogenously democratic a regional organization’s membership, the more likely it will be to pressure autocratic governments to liberalize, provide credible guarantees to allay elite fears, stipulate conditions on membership and most importantly to enforce those conditions” (2005, 3-4). McMahon and Baker similarly argue that IOs’ success on these issues “depends on the number and influence of democratic member states in the organization and when a ‘tipping point’ of the organizations’ embracing of democratic principles on the part of their member states may be achieved” (2006, 34; see also Acharya and Johnston 2007, 275). However, a closer look at the history of the CSCE/OSCE and UN during periods of
greater and lesser homogeneity in states’ regime types suggests that such optimistic forecasts cannot be assumed, and that we should expect more complicated processes to take place in inclusive IOs. Indeed, the above-mentioned arguments are deficient because they discount the influence of inclusive institutions and status. For example, a focus on inclusive institutions would add the realization that, even with a democratic majority, consensus rules allow simply one opposing state to block the collective will of all other states. A focus on status would add the realization that even if an IO is comprised solely of electoral democracies, informal status divisions in the IO along lines of compliance or non-compliance with more comprehensive democratic commitments can contribute to alienation and, consequently, to significant challenges to the IO’s implementation efforts.

Because of their comparative procedural legitimacy, inclusive multilateral institutions are likely to be increasingly significant in the provision of democracy support in the coming years (see Carothers 2008, 7; Ikenberry 2011; House of Commons 2007, 17, 151). For foreign policy-makers, this research suggests that despite inclusive institutions’ appearance of ineffectiveness during contentious periods, their role in laying groundwork can prove catalytic even during short windows of opportunity. While policy-makers’ over-emphasis on democratic status in IOs with strong norms of sovereign equality can intensify challenges and discord, this research also suggests how IOs might better capitalize on the lure of status among many member states to generate greater support for their mandates.

**Case Selection, Methods, and Sources of Evidence**

The CSCE/OSCE and UN were selected for in-depth, longitudinal case studies for several reasons. Both the CSCE/OSCE and the UN are historically important inclusive IOs which, from the basis of human rights norms in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1945 respectively, developed democratic norm sets at international level in the 1990s. Both IOs have supported democratic development extensively through implementation agencies such as the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and have made significant financial investments. The U.S. is a full participant in the OSCE and UN; therefore, this study can assess, for example, the role of a hegemon in the salience of democratic

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10 For example, UNDP allocated 1.3 billion dollars (41% of its portfolio) in 2009 to democratic governance projects in 133 countries. (Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 9 March 2009)
status in the IOs. Over the course of its history, the membership of the UN has grown from 51 states in 1945, to 179 states in 1992, and to 193 states in 2011.\textsuperscript{11} Participation in the CSCE has grown from 35 states in 1973, to 52 states in 1992, and to 56 states in 2011. Both the CSCE/OSCE and UN developed with broad memberships as security organizations aimed at facilitating interstate cooperation. Thus, in both IOs sovereign equality is an important foundational norm, yet has been operationalized differently.

Since this research examines the mechanisms and processes by which inclusive IOs are (or are not) able to achieve certain objectives, the selection of two inclusive IOs (rather than an exclusive IO such as NATO or the EU) is logical. As defined above, inclusiveness is not meant in the sense of geography. An IO may be inclusive even if it has clear geographic boundaries, as in the OSCE, OAS, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and others. The selection of two inclusive IOs holds inclusive formal membership constant and enables analysis of comparable processes. The UN and the OSCE are particularly apt prototypical cases, and the UN has the most inclusive state membership among IOs. Since the dependent variable of this research interrogates inclusive IOs’ behavior (rather than IOs’ “effectiveness” in terms of influencing member states’ domestic compliance with democratic norms), it is important that between the CSCE/OSCE and the UN there is variation in the IOs’ ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies, variation in degrees of inclusiveness of the IOs’ institutions, and variation in the pervasiveness of status distinctions in the IOs, both between the IOs and over time.

Other IOs that might be considered comparable, and to which some findings of this research might be generalized, because of their codified commitments on democratic norms or because of their inclusiveness, include the Council of Europe (CoE), OAS, African Union (AU), and ASEAN. The Council of Europe was not selected because it was a more exclusive IO in the early 1990s prior to its enlargement to Central Europe and CIS states, and while it also developed a set of democratic norms in the 1990s, these and its election observation efforts developed later than those of the CSCE/OSCE despite comprising a smaller group of European states. The U.S. and Canada are full participants in the UN and OSCE, but not in the Council of Europe. The CoE does not extend to Central Asian states, as does the OSCE, and has not developed as extensive field offices; therefore the UN and OSCE are more similar in terms of

their histories, development, composition, and implementation practices. Other regional IOs, especially the OAS which has seen similar trends in democratic norm development and challenges to implementation, could serve as interesting case comparisons on which to further test findings in future research.

Sources of evidence for this dissertation include content analysis of several hundred statements from CSCE/OSCE Summits, Follow-up Meetings, Ministerial Councils, and Human Dimension Conferences; several hundred statements made in the UN General Assembly General Debates as well as in debates on specific GA resolutions related to the UN’s democracy agenda, the UNDP Strategic Plan, and other key fora in which the IOs’ democratic norms and policies to support implementation have been negotiated. The research also draws on semi-structured interviews I conducted in 2008-2009 with OSCE and UN staff in Warsaw, Prague, Vienna, and New York, civil society representatives who observe the IOs’ democracy support efforts, and representatives of states’ permanent missions to the OSCE and UN.12 I also draw on numerous primary sources, especially statements, reports issued by the IOs, materials from foreign ministries, and research undertaken while a Researcher-in Residence in the archives of the Prague Office of the OSCE.

To analyze the evolution and effects of democratic status, I developed several indicators of status in inclusive IOs. In the OSCE, these include prestigious leadership positions (e.g. Chairperson-in-Office, Heads of field offices and election observation and assessment missions), the locations of election observation and assessment missions and field offices, as well as relative standing based on quality of governance indicators. In the UN General Assembly, I developed new indicators of the salience of democratic status and status seeking, including the number of delegates’ mentions of democracy and democratization, and qualitative analysis of the ways in which delegates speak about democracy, domestically and in their foreign policy priorities, within selected UN GA debates.

A consistent periodization structure is used in each of the four empirical chapters of this dissertation. In particular, the analysis is divided into six time periods: the Cold War (1945-1989 or 1973-1989); the immediate post-Cold War years (1990-1991); the early and late 1990s (1992-1994); (1995-1999); and early and late 2000s (2000-2004; 2005-2010). These time periods are

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12 Many of these interviews were held under confidentiality. See Appendix A.
categorized in such a way to capture significant shifts in: (a) the IOs’ organizational structure and the form and strength of IO institutions supporting democratic governance (b) important characteristics of the IOs’ member or participating states, such as political will or democratic consolidation; and (c) external factors, such as perceptions of the legitimacy of U.S. leadership, the rise of China, Russia’s resurgence, or regional or global shifts in priorities and approaches. The time periods enable the illustration of how factors in earlier time periods affect subsequent developments. The time periods also make it possible to distinguish between important developments that have taken place in more and less conducive normative contexts, and those which have taken place when member or participating states have held different status positions in the eyes of the inclusive IOs. By analyzing two inclusive IOs over several decades, this study is able to observe multiple instances of democratic norm development and policy implementation under different normative environments and conditions, facilitating the assessment of theoretical propositions.

Because of the large number of instances in which democratic norms and implementation policies have been discussed in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, the debates selected for analysis are limited by a few criteria. In addition to ensuring ample observations in each of the study’s time periods, I select those which interviewees and the literature highlighted as most significant in the history of democratic norm development and policy implementation in the organizations (as well as unsuccessful attempts) and those which include large-picture debate on democracy as a system of governance.

Outline of Dissertation

Chapter 2 presents the dissertation’s theoretical framework. It develops key concepts, highlights gaps in the literature, and elaborates sets of theoretical propositions about the evolution, and roles of inclusiveness and status. Chapters 3 to 6 present the dissertation’s empirical case studies. Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the CSCE/OSCE, while chapters 5 and 6 focus on the UN. For each international organization, the first empirical chapter focuses on inclusiveness (chapters 3 and 5). One purpose of this format is to provide a backdrop and point of reference for the following chapters on status (chapters 4 and 6) – both in terms of the inclusive institutions in which democratic status operates and to describe the democratic norms and implementation policies that are analyzed in both IOs.
Chapter One

More specifically, chapter 3 assesses theoretical propositions on the roles and functions of inclusive institutions in democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE/OSCE. It explores relations between inclusive institutions and windows of opportunity, practices of issuing norm restatements, issue linkage, the contributions of procedural legitimacy to norm expansion, inclusive institutions’ role in (re-)authorizing (or inhibiting) implementation policies, and their vulnerability to shifts in political will. In chapter 4, I document the rise, evolution and weakening of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE. The chapter develops several new indicators of democratic status and assesses theoretical propositions on the effects of strategies of social mobility, social contention, and social creativity. As in chapter 3, chapter 5 analyzes the roles and functions of inclusive institutions, yet based on evidence from the UN. Chapter 6 shows evolutions in the salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN and illustrates the role played by democratic status in selected cases of democratic norm development and policy implementation. For section 6.4 of chapter 6, I created an original data set that documents each mention of democracy in all statements made by representatives of UN member states in the UN General Assembly General Debates in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010. I disaggregate the data by region and level of democracy and examine the ways in which states use the concept of democracy. The dissertation’s conclusion presents a summary of the empirical chapters’ findings for each of the theoretical propositions, suggests directions for future research, and discusses policy implications.
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework: Roles of Inclusiveness and Status in Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in Inclusive IOs

2.1. Introduction

The development in 1990-91 of a highly comprehensive democratic norm set in the CSCE is one example challenging conventional wisdom that inclusive IOs are at a disadvantage because their large and diverse memberships produce a tendency towards least-common denominator agreements, or, at worst, paralysis. Counter-intuitively, I argue that inclusive institutions have been critical to the substantive outcomes in several cases of democratic norm development in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. Highly inclusive fora are not always detrimental to development of democratic norms and policies for their implementation. Occasionally they are able to achieve broad consensus. Examples beyond the CSCE Charter of Paris and Copenhagen Document of 1990 include the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001. In inclusive IOs with democratization mandates there is a strong tension between the norm of sovereign equality and the IOs’ ambitions to maintain or enhance the strength of their democratic norm sets. It is a tension between norms of inclusiveness (which hold procedural legitimacy) and norms of democracy (which hold substantive legitimacy). However, under certain conditions these tensions have posed fewer constraints, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, extending to about 2000 in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. The conceptual framework developed in this chapter highlights both advantages and disadvantages of different patterns of inclusiveness.

A tension also exists between inclusive institutions and democratic status, and this explains their selection as the two primary explanatory variables of this study. The advantages of inclusiveness are tempered in inclusive IOs by the influence of all dimensions of status, including democratic status. When states are categorized, even informally, by democratic attributes, several consequences arise. Overemphasis on democratic status by an IO’s secretariat, specialized agencies, or powerful states – especially those for which legitimacy is decreasing - can intensify alienation and discord, thus negatively affecting prospects for democratic norm development and policy implementation. On the other hand, emphasis on democratic status by the IOs and their larger states has also encouraged several democratizing states to support democratic norm development, partially in the interest of status seeking, both within the
organizations and in the wider international community. To analyze the role of democratic status in states’ support for (or challenges against) democratic norms in inclusive IOs, I employ and adapt several concepts from social identity theory, including social mobility, social competition, and social creativity, building on Larson and Shevchenko (2010a) and others. The context of inclusive IOs with high degrees of inequality suggests additional interpretations of these concepts. It is important to improve our understanding of how status operates in inclusive IOs because status affects states’ behavior as well as the norms and policies that inclusive IOs are able to generate.

In this chapter, I briefly review relevant international relations literature that employs the concepts of inclusiveness and status, identify key strengths and weaknesses, and propose adaptations. This review provides the basis from which inclusiveness and status are operationalized in the dissertation’s theoretical framework and analyzed in the empirical cases. Existing explanations of democratic norm development in IOs typically credit factors such as the favorable environment at the end of the Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of the West more broadly, interests of new democracies to ‘lock in’ democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions (Schimmelfennig 2007; Rich 2001; Krisch 2003, 149; Domínguez 2007; Clark 2005, 8; Moravscik 2000; Schroeder 2011; see also Barnett and Finnemore 2004). These accounts hold explanatory power, but a closer look at the roles of inclusive institutions and democratic status highlights additional influences and causal processes. This chapter also presents the research design and theoretical propositions on inclusiveness and status that guide the dissertation’s analysis.

2.2. Inclusiveness

Why should we deepen our understanding of the concept of inclusiveness in the setting of inclusive international organizations? Two powerful arguments are made in the literature. First, the degree to which an inclusive IO is, in fact, inclusive is linked to the extent to which the IO can be considered democratic. Democratic ideals suggest that all those potentially affected by decisions should be included equally in decision-making processes (Young 2000, 9, 23, 27; Linklater 2007, 5; Habermas 1996, among others). Somewhat problematic for IOs are their dual constituencies of both states and individuals. Cosmopolitan and constructivist scholars have under-analyzed degrees of inclusion of states in IOs, in part because of the non-democratic
regime types of many member states.\textsuperscript{13} Their focus on the inclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs) and individuals in IO decision making often suggests that inclusiveness and democracy are complementary and similarly positive procedural normative goals. In this dissertation, the analysis of inter-governmental bodies therefore contributes to ongoing debates and interpretations of inclusiveness. The focus here on states is partially pragmatic, as states have had greatest direct effect (both positive and negative) on the codification of democratic norms and on their implementation policies in inclusive IOs. Of the few constructivists analyzing state behavior in IOs, Johnston argues that there are several benefits of inclusiveness; in particular, large audiences facilitate backpatting and opprobrium effects (2001). While these arguments apply to norm diffusion and socialization processes, the causal chain of this dissertation is more proximate, leading to norm development and policy implementation.

Second, and slightly broader than the first, the degree to which an inclusive IO is, in fact, inclusive, affects the legitimacy of the inclusive IO as well as of the norms developed and supported therein. This is also primarily a procedural consideration, speaking directly to how norms are developed, elaborated, and implemented by inclusive IOs, as opposed to the inherent substantive value of the norms themselves. Process legitimacy, or the perception that a rule is legitimate if “it has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” (Hurrell 2007, 80, 308; see also Clark 2007, 18, 19; Franck 1990, 24), is only one form of legitimacy, yet the ostensibly egalitarian, procedural features of some inclusive IOs’ decision-making bodies are among their attractive comparative advantages in the eyes of many member states. It can be argued that norms of inclusiveness (of states) are stronger than norms of democracy (for the behavior of states) in international society. The United Nations’ “moral authority” is derived in part from its nearly global membership and perceptions that each member state is able to participate, for example, in deliberations in the General Assembly.

I follow several scholars who have placed renewed emphasis on procedural legitimacy in IOs in the 2000s, and assume that inclusive processes contribute to the

\textsuperscript{13} Further, cosmopolitan scholars in principle contest the legitimacy of nation states, since states exclude non-citizens (Young 2005, 236; Vincent 113-125; Linklater 2007, 58).
legitimacy of international organizations’ mandates and the norm sets they support, especially in the eyes of weaker member states. For example, Andrew Hurrell argues:

A global moral community in which claims about justice can secure both authority and be genuinely accessible to a broad swathe of humanity will be one that is built around some minimal notion of just process, that prioritizes institutions that embed procedural fairness, and that cultivates the shared political culture and the habits of argumentation and deliberation on which such institutions necessarily depend...The alternative is both normatively unacceptable and politically unviable, namely to open the door to a situation in which it is the strength of a single state or group of states that decides what shall count as law (2007, 312-13).

Similarly, Krisch argues that “as long as conceptions of justice and morality include some emphasis on process and do not rely entirely on substantive considerations (174), the more inclusive, participatory character of multilateral institutions should, in principle, outweigh the substantive gains of unilateral action” (2003, 174). Processes that facilitate states’ consent (or consensus or acquiescence in the case of customary norms) and thereby the inclusion in the development of norms by states potentially affected, are seen by some international lawyers as important for the binding nature of a rule, and for attenuating adverse effects of states’ inequalities (Byers 1999, 7-8, 142-45; Krisch 2003, 142). Further, Karns and Mingst argue that “international institutions like the UN, for example, are perceived as legitimate to the extent that they are created and function according to certain principles of right process such as one state, one vote” (2004, 32). Since moral authority and legitimacy are among the most valuable assets of inclusive IOs, their viability and credibility depends on careful preservation.

However, the moral authority and legitimacy of inclusive IOs can be undermined by IO practices which are (or are seen to be) in the self-interest of democratic great powers and therefore undemocratic. Another serious dilemma for inclusiveness presents itself when outcomes of inclusive IO debates that enjoy procedural legitimacy, such as resolutions adopted by numerical advantage, are criticized as substantively illegitimate by democratic member states committed to more comprehensive normative frameworks. Inclusive structures which encourage participation in norm development and policy implementation by states that are governed in ways many find odious often encounter obstacles in terms of advancing substantive goals, as illustrated in controversies over Libya’s appointment as Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission in 2003. Critics of inclusive IOs often find fault with procedural inefficiencies such

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14 Although discussion of effects of procedural legitimacy on compliance is outside the scope of this dissertation, for this line of reasoning see Hurrell 2007, 316; Clark 2005 133-34; Toope 2000; and Franck 1990, 24.
as consensus decision making, which can lead to minimalist normative agreements and implementation policies (Victor 2006; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1998). They argue that it is more advantageous for smaller groups of states to negotiate highly substantive agreements, and gradually to expand membership with accession criteria. These arguments draw inspiration from Olson’s logic of collective action, which argues that large groups are less likely than small groups to cooperate and achieve common interests (1965; Acharya 2007, 16-17). I counter these arguments, however, by highlighting examples of democratic commitments developed within large, inclusive IOs and explain that, in some cases and under certain conditions, the inclusive institutions themselves contributed to highly substantive agreements. Given the presence of significant trade-offs, I explore the question, through cases of IOs’ support for democratic governance: Under which conditions are inclusive institutional arrangements able to contribute to IOs’ ability to develop norms and policies towards their substantive aims?

An analytical distinction is made by Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) between the EU and NATO on the one hand, which use exclusive socialization strategies such as membership conditionality and possess significant material incentives, and the Council of Europe and OSCE on the other hand, which are largely reliant on inclusive socialization strategies such as persuasion and social incentives, and have significantly fewer material resources (2006, 7). Ultimately critical of inclusive strategies, Schimmelfennig et al. analyze Central and Eastern European cases and defend a rational-institutionalist argument: “material and political external incentives and domestic costs prove to be the most important conditions for an effective impact of international organizations on democratic consolidation” (2006, 5).

Policy implications of this argument discount the utility of inclusive IOs. However, the European context is unique in the number and overlap of international institutions providing significant material (security and economic) incentives. Drawing similar lessons from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Cameron et al. write: “Traditional diplomatic fora and mechanisms can and should be subverted where they represent an obstacle to the achievement of policy goals that are widely demanded by world opinion. Multilateralism is fine as long as states are prepared to move as fast as the slowest in the pack, but coalitions of the like-minded are preferable when the public wants results (1998, 13).” While this claim applies to the Campaign to Ban Landmines, which the UN also supported, it has limited applicability. The “coalition of the willing” in the 2003 Iraq war, for example, was undermined by operating without the legitimacy of UN Security Council authorization.
I raise the issue of popular perceptions of inclusive IOs’ (in)effectiveness above in order to preempt a short-sighted and unnuanced criticism of this dissertation’s focus on two inclusive IOs. The question asked here is not which type of organization, inclusive or exclusive, is more effective. Although they are often criticized for slow decision-making, in many cases inclusive IOs have delivered significant achievements in democratic norm development and policy implementation (Newman and Rich 2004; Thomas 2001; Heidenhain 2004; Flockhart 2005; Pevehouse 2005; McMahon and Baker 2006; Cooper and Legler 2006; among others, including countless reports issued by the organizations themselves). The dichotomous debate on the effectiveness of inclusive vs. exclusive designs is superfluous when similar and complementary normative frameworks (e.g. human rights, democratic governance, poverty reduction) currently exist in global, regional and sub-regional IOs with overlapping memberships (e.g. UN, OSCE, EU, Council of Europe, OAS, CARICOM, the Commonwealth, AU, etc.). Instead, our focus should be on understanding how specialization or cooperation among inclusive and exclusive organizations can be optimized.

Inclusive IOs are stable fixtures on the international institutional landscape. They are enduring because they provide collective goods and fora that are valuable to the international community. Inclusive IOs necessarily play to different strengths than their exclusive counterparts. They derive moral authority and legitimacy from their inclusiveness. Moreover, they are often viewed positively by states because they can facilitate cooperation and consensus-building, communication between actors that might not otherwise interact, and non-coercive mechanisms of norm promotion. Not least, many states invest considerable human and financial resources in inclusive IOs’ norm setting and operational work. I acknowledge the historical significance and assume the potential of inclusive IOs. Improving our understanding of their strengths and weaknesses in democratic norm development and policy implementation is critical for those who would like inclusive IOs to complement (and perhaps better complement) other organizations promoting corresponding sets of norms.

2.2.1. Degrees of inclusiveness in inclusive IOs

Inclusive IOs often attempt to resolve tensions between inclusiveness and democratic status in various ways. Internally, these range from more exclusive clubs of democratic donors, to all-inclusive fora such as the UN GA, in which non-democratic states may attempt to water down democratic norms, for example, to minimal forms of electoral democracy. One aim of
chapters 3 and 5 is to show how both more and less inclusive fora of inclusive IOs have dealt with these tensions during the past two decades, under different conditions and normative environments.

Various fora in inclusive IOs can be assessed in terms of their formal inclusiveness. There is greater variation in the formal inclusiveness of UN institutions dealing with the development of democratic norms and policy implementation at policy level than in the CSCE/OSCE, where the main decision-making bodies are governed by full consensus rules, as illustrated in Table 2.1 below. As defined in the OSCE’s *Rules of Procedure*:

*Consensus* shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the adoption of the decision in question. Any texts which have been adopted by a decision-making body by consensus shall have a politically binding character for all the participating States or reflect the agreed views of all the participating States (OSCE 2007, 14).

By listing an agency or body as less-than-fully inclusive, I do not imply active exclusion of states. Rather, this may indicate that the formal structure of the decision-making bodies simply comprises less than the IOs’ full group of states. This is occasionally just an issue of size to facilitate decision-making, as in the cases of ECOSOC and the UNDP Executive Board. Alternatively, a group may form by states’ self-selection, such as donors interested in supporting an IO’s democratic governance programs. Fora such as the International Conferences of New and Restored Democracies prior to 2000 and the Community of Democracies have limited participation to democratic states. Chapters 3 and 5 provide examples of engagement by each type of institution with varying degrees of inclusiveness and analyze the role of their structures in the outcomes achieved.
**Table 2.1: Formal inclusiveness of IO bodies dealing with democratic norm development or policy implementation at policy level**  
(highly inclusive  →  limited in more respects, such as size, or to democratic states or democratic donors)\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly inclusive</th>
<th>more limited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **CSCE/OSCE**  
(in terms of size and democracy) |                   |
| Summits; Ministerial Councils; Permanent Council Meetings; Human Dimension Implementation Meetings | States providing extra-budgetary contributions for ODIHR projects (self-selected) |
| **UN**  
(in terms of size) |                   |
| General Assembly; World Summits (all/193) | ECOSOC (54); Commission on Human Rights (53) /Human Rights Council (47) |
|                   | Executive Board, UNDP (36) |
|                   | UN Security Council (15) |
| **UN**  
(in terms of democracy) |                   |
| General Assembly; World Summits; ECOSOC; Commission on Human Rights/ Human Rights Council; Executive Board, UNDP; UN Security Council; International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (after 2000); * UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) | Democracy Caucus; International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (before 2000); Community of Democracies * |
|                   | Donors to UNDP Democratic Governance Trust Fund; Donors to Department of Political Affairs (self-selected) |

What are the strengths and weaknesses of institutions with varied degrees of inclusiveness? Do they have different effects? Inclusiveness is what states make of it. As structural factors, institutions do not determine the outcomes observed, yet in some cases pose notable constraints or opportunities. In general, there is a trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in smaller and larger institutions. As Coleman argues; “There is no single best venue for norm emergence. Strategic venue choice is the art of selecting the most appropriate bundle of venue characteristics available, given the circumstances and character of a particular norm initiative” (forthcoming, 20). Ceteris paribus, state representatives seeking to develop or elaborate an international norm often prefer to achieve consensus in an IO body comprising the largest possible number of states in order to underpin and document the norm’s broad acceptance, as long as the risk of dilution is low or minimal. Sometimes a norm or norm set is drafted and negotiated in stages, alternating between smaller bodies (for efficiency) and debate

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\(^{15}\) Rittberger (2008, 3-4) also provides a continuum of types of inclusive international institutions, yet his focus is on different IOs and on their inclusiveness in terms of non-state actors.

* The International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) and the Community of Democracies (CD) are not official institutions of the UN, but are included here because, as will be discussed, their decisions have led to significant recurring GA resolutions, UN SG reports, action by UN agencies, and the creation of UN institutions for democratic development.

and adoption in larger bodies (for legitimacy). This is shown, for example, in the case of the
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Another strategy is for states to adopt a
norm in a smaller body, such as the Commission on Human Rights, with the aim of raising the
same (or slightly modified) norm in a larger body, such as the UN General Assembly, at a later
date. This strategy was used, for example, in 1999-2000 in the case of a UN Resolution on
“Promoting and Consolidating Democracy.” In addition, in inclusive IOs smaller groups of
donors committed to implementing particular norm sets (e.g. democratic governance) can
catalyze and enhance the prioritization of the IO’s efforts in that issue area. However, even with
donor funding, in order for an IO’s implementation policies to advance, recipient states must
consent to the IO’s proposed assistance, which is not always evident.

2.2.2. Theoretical framework and propositions: Inclusiveness

Before outlining the dissertation’s theoretical propositions related to inclusive
institutions, I first present an overview of the evolution and variation over time in the roles of
inclusive institutions for democratic norm development and policy implementation in the
CSCE/OSCE and UN. These are described in greater detail in empirical chapters 3 and 5.
### Table 2.2: Evolution and variation over time in roles of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE and UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Period</th>
<th>CSCE/OSCE Activities</th>
<th>United Nations Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1945-1989 (UN)</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive institutions support (and pose no obstacle) to codification and development of comprehensive democratic norm set. Historic East-West divisions are newly irrelevant.</td>
<td>Procedural legitimacy of inclusive processes enables UN to expand electoral norms and policies. Other norm development efforts were inhibited by remaining North-South divisions. Basis for UN’s democratization mandate is established in inclusive fora: UN GA and 1993 Vienna World Conference, underpinning its legitimacy. Issue linkage (development) supports norm and policy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1973-1989 (CSCE/OSCE)</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive institutions contribute to agreement on Principle 7 in Helsinki Final Act. 1977-1986: Restatements of norms keep debate alive, on agenda, and encourage delegations to refine positions. 1989: Inclusive institutions contribute to Vienna follow-up meeting outcome by providing history of proposals, structure for negotiations, and channeling political will.</td>
<td>Periodic restatements of norms maintain their relevance and provide basis from which to elaborate when greater political will exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990-91</strong></td>
<td>Norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality are qualified by democratic governance. Inclusive institutions support the CSCE’s institutionalization</td>
<td>Basis for UN’s democratization mandate is established in inclusive fora: UN GA and 1993 Vienna World Conference, underpinning its legitimacy. Issue linkage (development) supports norm and policy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992-94</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive institutions continue to sustain policy implementation of its human dimension mandate, but democratic norm development slows down.</td>
<td>Inclusive institutions continue to play an important role in endorsing and authorizing agencies and policies and to implement the UN’s democratization agenda. Peak in UN’s democratic norm development in 1999-2000 is followed by a gradual increase in challenges to policy implementation for democracy support, with mixed effects. Issue linkage (security) inhibits norm and policy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995-99</strong></td>
<td>Inclusive institutions encounter a gradual increase in challenges to policy implementation for democracy support, with mixed effects. Issue linkage (security) inhibits norm and policy development.</td>
<td>Inclusive institutions become more vulnerable to shifts in states’ foreign policy priorities; challenges to policies become stronger and more effective. Issue linkage (development) shifts focus of implementation policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000-04</strong></td>
<td>Democratic norms are qualified by sovereign equality. Inclusive institutions contribute to impasses on democratic norm development and policy implementation, yet issues remain on the agenda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005-10</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.2 suggests several key roles and functions of inclusive institutions that are common to inclusive IOs engaged in democratic norm development and policy implementation. These include: a) the strategy of issuing restatements of norms to keep issues on the agenda in more contentious circumstances, thus encouraging states to develop their positions and probing the normative environment; b) the feature of procedural legitimacy contributing to the expansion of norms and policies, by underpinning states’ interests in working through these fora or by underpinning a democratization mandate; c) the possibility for issue linkage in inclusive institutions to encourage (or inhibit) agreements; and d) the task of periodically (re-)endorsing, authorizing, (or inhibiting) implementation policies at policy level.

Why are these processes significant and by what mechanisms do they operate? How and under what conditions have inclusive institutions influenced democratic norm development and policy implementation? In addition to building on the literature on international organizations (especially Adler 1998 and Thomas 2001), and institutional design, propositions I-1, I-2, and I-3 below were also developed inductively, based on analysis of negotiations on human rights norms in the CSCE in the first time period, between 1973 and 1989. This entailed content analysis of statements made in connection with the Helsinki Final Act, the Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna follow-up meetings of 1977-79, 1980-83, and 1986-89 respectively, as well as the Ottawa experts meeting of 1985. The propositions were then assessed iteratively on cases of democratic norm development and policy implementation in subsequent time periods in the CSCE/OSCE as well as in the UN.

In order to assess the validity of the following theoretical propositions on inclusiveness, as well as the propositions on status in section 2.2, I engage in process tracing, through content analysis of hundreds of delegations’ statements, documents issued by the IOs, archival data, media sources, secondary literature, and interviews with IO staff, diplomats working at permanent missions to the IOs, and civil society representatives. Process tracing is valuable in case study research as it allows us to “examine in detail the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms” between the independent and dependent variables (Bennett 2004, 35; see also Bennett and George 2005, 206). It entails a close assessment of the linkages and processes operating between cause and effect (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 85-65). As noted above, existing studies have proposed various explanations for the development of democratic norms and implementation policies (e.g. the favorable environment at the end of the
Cold War, interests of a hegemonic power, those of established democratic states more broadly, interests of new democracies to “lock in” democratic systems, or the autonomy of international institutions). By describing causal processes involving inclusive institutions and democratic status, this dissertation is able to demonstrate the involvement of these particular variables in causal processes, and thus, to complement existing theories (see Hall 2006, 30). According to Checkel, “process tracing is strong on questions of how and interactions” (2004, 6). This method is therefore particularly relevant, since our aim is to assess in greater detail how inclusive institutions and democratic status operate in inclusive IOs, as well as to make causal inferences about their interaction.

Theoretical Propositions: Inclusiveness

Proposition I-1: Inclusive institutions are well placed to capture and perpetuate agreements, and ensure that, once made, these commitments do not fade into obscurity. An important feature of inclusive institutions is their uninterrupted activity convening broad groups of states. I argue that inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate. Inclusive institutions have a special relationship to windows of opportunity. The practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks and keeps them alive for future negotiations. This builds on Daniel Thomas’s observation that the restatement of Helsinki human rights norms in Belgrade and Madrid “guaranteed that they would remain on the political agenda in the intervening years” (2001, 196-7, 148; see also Farer 2004, 37).

Might the restatement of norms be a risky strategy? In favorable political contexts, restatements can help further advance established norms. In contentious political contexts, we might expect that previously codified norms could be undermined if opened for re-negotiation. Issuing restatements, however, is notably different than opening norms for re-negotiation. Insights from institutional design and constructivist approaches suggest two institutional features that make restatements viable strategies for maintaining norms’ relevance in inclusive IOs. First, institutional design perspectives suggest that if the organization operates by consensus, the objection of any state can prevent regress in the norm’s formal content. Under these conditions, the norm may not be advanced, but committed states nevertheless can ensure that it is not formally watered down. Second, constructivist approaches suggest that state representatives are
concerned with protecting their states’ reputations and often seek to appear consistent in international fora. It is often possible to capitalize on this interest in appearing consistent in order to obtain re-commitments to previously endorsed norms.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, debates that end in deadlock in inclusive IOs can serve a useful purpose. It is true that inclusive structures can enable small countries to “punch above their weight.” In IOs with full consensus decision-making rules such as the OSCE, just one state can thwart initiatives with an effective veto and contribute to deadlock. However, because inclusive IOs facilitate recurring meetings, states are acutely aware of their points of agreement and contention. If a change in political will occurs, representatives are able to easily assess where they can break through impasses. Inclusive institutions enable much of the groundwork to be done in advance. This feature is underemphasized in the literature. In chapter 3, I show that this process positively influenced outcomes of the CSCE Vienna follow-up meeting in 1989 and the comprehensive democratic norm sets of the CSCE’s Charter of Paris, and Copenhagen and Moscow Documents in 1990-1991. In chapter 5, I show that this process aided the development of the UN’s mandate to support democratization based on articles in existing human rights instruments and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.

In addition to process tracing, at various points in the study, I also engage in counterfactual analysis to further clarify the influence of inclusive institutions. If the above propositions are correct, I expect to find evidence of the continuity and evolution of certain parts of states’ proposals and priorities as articulated and documented at key meetings in prior years, which are subsequently re-inserted into negotiations and encounter consensus during windows of opportunity.

**Proposition I-2:** Procedural legitimacy can contribute to the elaboration of inclusive IOs’ democratic norms and implementation policies. Inclusive institutions are often seen as endowed with procedural legitimacy by those states in opposition to a dominant paradigm or by small and middle powers. Under some circumstances, this type of legitimacy contributes to the strength of a norm developed in an inclusive forum or to cooperation for its implementation. Diplomats and scholars have often claimed that greater inclusiveness and consensus contribute to moral credibility and political weight of decisions (Adler 1998, 137). According to Newman

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16 For discussion of the relation between legitimacy, consensus, and norm development in international society, see Clark 2005 and Byers 1999.
and Rich, “the UN’s international legitimacy enhances its role as a vector of ideals and ideas” (2004, 29).

If these propositions are correct, I expect to identify evidence within state delegations’ statements highlighting that they support a particular role for the inclusive IO because they find the forum to hold an important type of legitimacy. In chapters 3 and 5, I show that examples of such statements are found in connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as well as in the case of the UN’s election observation mandate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where the legitimacy generated by inclusiveness enabled the UN to expand its operations.

**Proposition I-3:** Inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of progress on human rights or democratic governance even in less conducive normative contexts, where compromises may be made if there is an interest in a side issue (Keohane 1984; Thomas 2001; Adler 1998). Inclusive institutions often involve negotiations among participating states on issues with multiple linkages; thus, the products of negotiations often entail concessions on certain issues because actors seek to achieve goals in other issue areas (see Keohane 1984, Ch. 6). This proposition also draws on Emanuel Adler’s observation that “the effectiveness of the OSCE processes has depended on the way in which...baskets were tied together in negotiating processes, for example, the linking of human rights with military security and territorial guarantees” (1998, 123). By contrast, lack of progress or dissatisfaction on one issue (e.g. security) can negatively affect cooperation on human rights or democratic governance.

If these propositions are correct, and to determine which process is taking place at given points in time, I expect to identify evidence in delegations’ statements, in agencies’ negotiation summaries, and in other IO documents and interviews that indicates states’ specific priorities and points of contention during the selected debates around democratic norms and implementation policies. In chapters 3 and 5, I show that while progress was facilitated by issue linkage in the CSCE’s Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in the mid-to late 2000s issue linkage negatively affected cooperation on democratic governance. In the UN, debates on democratic norms and their implementation policies have frequently intersected with issues of economic development. This helped to expand the organization’s democratization mandate in the mid-1990s, yet has contributed to some contraction in the late 2000s.
Proposition I-4: Inclusive institutions play important roles in the implementation of democratic norms by periodically (re-)endorsing, authorizing (or inhibiting) the agencies’ democratization mandates and key policies. While implementation agencies such as ODIHR or UNDP are often assumed by IR scholars to be highly autonomous (Barnett and Finnemore 2004), the influence of inclusive or partially inclusive inter-governmental bodies such as the OSCE Ministerial Council or the UNDP Executive Board is often under-analyzed.

If the above proposition is correct, I expect to identify evidence in statements, IO documents, and interviews of the influence of inter-governmental bodies, both positive and negative, under different conditions, on the general democratization policies and strategic plans of UN and OSCE implementation agencies.

Proposition I-5: Inclusive IOs have a decreased ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies if states supportive of democratic norms reduce their participation in inclusive fora. Two main factors contribute to these states’ withdrawal of support from inclusive fora.

a) In contrast to proposition I-2, states that claim a commitment to substantive legitimacy and the achievement of particular outcomes may reduce their participation in inclusive fora if they perceive an alternative (either bilateral or a more restricted multilateral forum) to operate more efficiently than the inclusive IO. This, in principle, is a strategy with a short-term horizon. Where negotiations are blocked, actors interested in rapid substantive outcomes are often tempted to find alternative international fora, rather than to put energy into strategies outlined in proposition I-1 above. As Coleman argues: “established venues may lose legitimacy (thus increasing receptivity to new venues) if they exhibit consistent bias or repeatedly fail to produce agreement on important issues” (forthcoming, 6). However, if reluctant (non-compliant) states are excluded from norm negotiations, this can negatively affect more exclusive groups’ ability to engage in shaming and support for the norm in non-member states.

The “Ottawa Process” is a prominent example from a different issue area that glamorized more exclusive coalitions of the like-minded. After negotiations in the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons failed to achieve sufficient restrictions on the use of anti-personnel land mines, treaty negotiations were fast-tracked among like-minded states and other actors, resulting in a landmine ban (Cameron et al. 1998; Coleman forthcoming; Price
However, there are a few important differences between the anti-land mine and democratic governance issue areas. While the United States was an outlier on the land mines issue, it is generally an advocate of democratic governance. The question of democratic governance is more ethically complicated than land mines (whose victims are often innocent civilians long after wars have ended), since there are globally diverse public views on the desirability of various social and political systems. Thus, the issue of international democracy support has more parallels to norms on the multilateral use of force or humanitarian intervention, which can typically benefit from the legitimacy of broader agreement.

Again, the objective of this dissertation is not to determine the most effective venue, exclusive or inclusive, for the development of robust democratic norms or related implementation policies. The focus of this dissertation is on the behavior of inclusive IOs. Proposition I-5a is raised to highlight a factor that may negatively affect inclusive IOs’ ability to develop democratic norms or implementation policies. Delegations’ statements, policy documents, and interviews will shed light on this proposition’s validity.

b) A second factor motivating states to reduce support for democratic norm development and implementation policies in inclusive IOs relates in part to the status implications of alternative groups. When democratizing states qualify for and become members of a more exclusive group with similar objectives, the more exclusive group may eventually receive greater priority, thus contributing to decreased enthusiasm for active participation in the more inclusive organizations. This negatively affects the IO’s development of democratic norms and implementation policies by diminishing the inclusive forum’s appeal and sense of vitality.

If this proposition is correct, I expect to observe a decrease in participation by certain states in IOs when they become active participants in a more exclusive group that addresses similar issues. For example, in chapter 3 I show that after their EU accession in 2004, Central European states decreased their priority of working through the OSCE to support democratic governance; similarly, in chapter 5 I show that there was a reduced number of International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies meetings following the launch of the more exclusive Community of Democracies in 2000.

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17 Perhaps with the exception of Slovenia, which held the OSCE Chairperson in Office in 2005.
2.3. Status

Status matters. International relations scholars from theoretical approaches as diverse as realism, constructivism and the English School, as well as foreign policy analysts, have shown that status concerns have played roles in great power conflict (Wohlforth 2009; Wallace 1973), social influence and compliance (Flockhart 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2008), and foreign policy behavior of great and rising powers (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a; 2010b; Hurrell 2009; Deng 2008; Clunan 2009). In the few studies considering status concerns in the context of inclusive international organizations, scholars’ focus has been on socialization processes and states’ compliance with norms (Flockhart 2005; Johnston 2008), rather than on norm development and policy implementation. When realists focus on status, they emphasize material dimensions of status such as military strength, economic development or great power status. By contrast, the concept of democratic status highlights a hierarchy with ideational and institutional bases. No study to date has focused specifically and at length on the concept of democratic status and the mechanisms by which it functions in international organizations. This dissertation fills this gap by demonstrating how democratic status operates in inclusive IOs and affects the development of norms and policies.

Status is defined as “beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes, such as wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organization, or diplomatic clout” (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth, forthcoming, 6). Status is related to prestige, which “derives from admired achievements or valuable assets that are recognized and acknowledged by others;” yet, unlike prestige, “status is relative, constituting a hierarchy” (Ibid, 10). This aligns with the definition used by social psychologists, Tajfel and Turner, who write: “by social status we mean a ranking or hierarchy of perceived prestige” (1986, 11). Moreover, status is “the outcome of intergroup comparison. It reflects a group’s relative position on some evaluative dimension of comparison” (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 19). Realists view status and prestige as instrumental means to obtain or display power; however, status can also be viewed as an end in itself (Markey 1999, 129; Wolf 2011, 105). “When the term is used in realist theory, status is no different from – and is, in fact, interchangeable with – power” (Deng 2008, 21). Literature in social psychology, however, shows that two forces - the interest in self-definition and enjoying positive self-esteem – are powerful motivators (Hymans 2002, 5). Thus, status is also sought as an end in its own right.
The concept of democratic status as employed in this dissertation emphasizes international hierarchies based on democratic governance. The concept is primarily used in a structural sense, yet also refers to states’ attributes. It stands in tension with sovereign equality in inclusive IOs. The salience of democratic status indicates its relevance and importance to and within the IO. Democratic status is a comparatively new basis of status with an interesting history, high political relevance and significant effects on states’ support for (or opposition to) democratic norm development and policy implementation in IOs.

The tension between sovereign equality and democratic status is embedded in longstanding historical processes. Evolutions in the concept of sovereign equality and the shifting nature of membership in international societies have been analyzed by several English School scholars, who note that prior to World War II, members of the League of Nations claimed to have met the now-obsolete criterion of “civilization.” By 1945, the new, egalitarian principle of sovereign equality was embedded in the United Nations Charter, effectively extending the prospect of formal UN membership to all existing states (see Keene 2002, 136). However, some inequalities would become institutionalized. After World War II, decolonization, and the proliferation of UN member states, international society comprised a new diversity of states with a wide range of forms and capacities. Jackson argues that international societies adapted to the more inclusive and egalitarian understandings of sovereignty by becoming more heavily involved in practices of state-building (1987, 529, 531-49). Keene, by contrast, views this type of engagement in developing countries as less novel and rooted in enduring legacies of European patterns of colonial and imperial organization (2002, 5-6, 98). “By the mid to late 19th century,” he claims, “the world was clearly divided in two for the purposes of international political and legal order: an order promoting toleration within Europe, and an order promoting civilization beyond” (2002, 7). These two distinct normative frameworks were carried directly, for example, into the UN Charter, which incorporated the contradictory norms of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand, and promotion of social progress and human rights on the other (Keene 2002, 141). Both explanations point to patterns of differentiation, which arose together with inclusive membership in inclusive IOs, as historic precursors of democratic status, aimed at supporting political development in member states.

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been widely acknowledged that the principle of sovereign equality is attenuated to various degrees in international society (Clark 2005, 159, 176;
Chapter Two

Krisch 2003, 145-6; Jackson 1987; Keene 2002), and by extension, in inclusive IOs. As Krisch argues: “Formal equality masks substantive inequality in power relations” (2003, 289). The concept of status, which is a limiting force on sovereign equality and the full sense of membership (Hurrell 2009), entails processes of categorization which emphasize and render more visible certain inequalities among states. While states hold formal equality in several key decision making bodies, various status dimensions exist by which IOs differentiate among their participating and member states. For example, Clark suggests that “since the end of the Cold War, the specification of separate categories of ‘failed,’ ‘outlaw’ and ‘rogue’ states has been developed much more purposefully” (2005, 176; see also Krisch 2003, 145-6). Inclusive IOs have viewed states through a democracy lens as ‘established,’ ‘newly consolidated,’ ‘transitioning,’ ‘backsliding,’ or ‘in crisis’. Likewise, states are viewed through a donor lens as ‘longstanding,’ ‘emerging,’ or ‘recipient/partner,’ or through a development lens as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’. These categories are not exhaustive, and states may hold different standings along various dimensions at different points in time.

Why did democratic status emerge as a basis of differentiation in the CSCE/OSCE and the UN? Theoretical insights from social psychology are particularly informative. An important assumption of social identity theory is that positive distinctiveness is a powerful motivating force (see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 66, 68). “Pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through ingroup/outgroup comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other,” explain Tajfel and Turner; “The aim of differentiation is to maintain or achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimensions. Any such act, therefore, is essentially competitive” (1986, 16-17). Notably, this type of competition is not necessarily tied to material factors. In-groups (e.g. established democratic states after the Cold War) select the dimensions for comparison in which they hold a superior position to others. This process of intergroup categorization “leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group” (ibid, 14). In other words, categorization and differentiation enhance the positive distinctiveness of the in-group (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 53; Huddy 2001, 134; Deng 2008, 23-4). Yet inclusive IOs have minimal membership criteria, and the principle of sovereign equality mitigates against positive distinctiveness.
Because inclusive IOs, by definition, comprise a broad, diverse array of states, there is pressure for states to differentiate into smaller groups within the larger membership. As Brewer explains:

If the needs for differentiation and inclusion are opposing processes, movement towards increased inclusion should activate the opposing drive for greater differentiation and, conversely, increased differentiation/individuation should arouse the need for inclusion...Immersion in highly inclusive groupings provides little basis for comparative appraisal or self-definition...Association with groups that are too large or inclusive should leave residual motivation for greater differentiation of the self from that group identity, whereas too much personal distinctiveness should leave the individual seeking inclusion in a larger collective (Brewer 1993, 3-4).

In addition to echoing a core tension examined throughout this study, the above citation sheds light on the evolution of democratic status in inclusive IOs after the end of the Cold War. Categorization simply as a member of an inclusive IO is largely insufficient for states’ positive identity, which contributes to the pursuit of differentiation (Ibid, 7, 10). Yet Brewer’s theory of optimal distinctiveness also conveys a warning: subgroupings “will engage social identification of their members to the potential detriment of the superordinate collective” (Brewer 1993, 15, italics added).

One might ask if it is viable to apply theories of social psychology developed at the level of individuals to international relations. Is this not effectively anthromorphizing the state? However, several existing studies in international relations have demonstrated the value of drawing on social psychological insights (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Clunan 2009; Deng 2008; Wolf 2011; Markey 1999; Wallace 1973). For example, Markey argues that “the mechanics of prestige and international war are analogous to those behind prestige and conflict at the individual level” (1999, 168). Wolf highlights that “many international reactions to respect or disrespect may be just as strong or even stronger than responses on the interpersonal level” (2011, 118). Certainly the contexts are not identical, and some caveats exist; for example, “the boundaries of political categories are more vague than social categories based on ethnicity or race” (Huddy 2001, 141). However, scholars conclude that it is the role of empirical research to clarify the significance of insights from social psychology for international relations (Wolf 2011, 119; Wallace 1973, 19). Therefore, this study aims to make a contribution by empirically examining the evolution and roles of democratic status in inclusive IOs.
Democratic status as a category of stratification has played varied roles in inclusive IOs during different time periods. In the immediate post-Cold War years, democratic status rapidly became salient when the normative hierarchy of many IOs encompassed liberal values of the West. O’Donnell finds that “classifying a given case as ‘democratic’ or not is not only an academic exercise. It has moral implications, as there is agreement in most of the contemporary world that, whatever it means, democracy is a normatively preferably type of rule” (2001, 8). It is important to scrutinize this category with evidence from inclusive IOs, in part because scholars claim that there have been important changes in practices at international level. For example, “in the recognition of new States and governments, strong emphasis is now placed on democratic credentials” (Krisch 2003, 147; see also Franck 1992). “The maxim that ‘the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’ – whatever may be its worth – is transformed from a standard of internal conduct into a condition of external recognition” (Roth 1999, 39; Peterson 1997, Ch. 4). While democratic governance is not a prerequisite to formal membership in inclusive IOs, the establishment of status markers of democratic governance has led some states to seek recognition for their characteristics or progress in this area and to support democratic norm development and policy implementation. As chapter 4 demonstrates, distinctions according to democratic criteria have also created new patterns of exclusion. In response, some states have challenged these distinctions while seeking to undermine the IOs’ democratization agendas.

The salience of democratic status in relation to other dimensions of status is not static; its oscillation is a focus of this study. This follows Hurrell and others, who highlight the fluidity and contested character of hierarchy, status-related criteria, and relevant categories (2009, 15; Wallace 1973, 5; Huddy 2001, 134). States’ status along various dimensions also varies in importance in different IO fora and at different points in time. That is, in some fora a state’s record with democracy and human rights may be relevant; in others perhaps only donorship or great power status matters. In chapters 4 and 6, in addition to analyzing the ebbs and flows in the salience of democratic status, I examine the interaction between democratic status and competing dimensions of status (e.g. security, energy, economic development, great power) in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.
2.3.1. Theoretical framework and propositions: Status

Before outlining the dissertation’s theoretical propositions related to status, I first present an overview of the evolution and variation over time in the roles of democratic status in the development of democratic norms and implementation policies at policy levels in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. These are described in greater detail in empirical chapters 4 and 6.
Table 2.3: Evolution and variation over time in roles of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN

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<td><strong>CSCE/OSCE</strong></td>
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<td>1973-75: Status and ideological distinctions are not emphasized in the spirit of détente.</td>
<td>Codification of comprehensive democratic norm set, which subsequently serves as status markers, stratifying CSCE participating states. These norms hold high legitimacy at this time because of the consensus and support underpinning their adoption.</td>
<td>Continued qualification of sovereign equality with democratic norms encourages states to seek democratic status and thus to continue support for CSCE’s democratization agenda. Institutions contribute further to status distinctions.</td>
<td>Consolidation of democratic status markers and relevance of strategies of social mobility enhance OSCE efforts to support democratic governance.</td>
<td>OSCE policies to support democratic governance are gradually affected by challenges due in part to the organization’s emphasis on democratic status.</td>
<td>Democratic status concerns contribute to some CIS states’ increased challenges to OSCE policies and attempts to demote democratic status markers.</td>
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<td>1945-1948: Status as Allied or Axis power is key.</td>
<td>Institutionalization of electoral norms and seeds of a democratization mandate. New democratic status markers meet with both support and discord.</td>
<td>States’ strategies of social creativity encourage UN norms and policies for democracy support to incorporate economic development.</td>
<td>Prevalence of strategies of social mobility and social creativity contribute to elaboration of democratic norms and policy implementation.</td>
<td>A peak in democratic norm development (1999-2000) is gradually followed by increased challenges, yet trends are varied.</td>
<td>A mixed range of state behavior in respect to democratic status; challenges to policy implementation become more contentious, yet support for electoral democracy remains strong.</td>
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<td>After 1950s: North-South divide increases in salience.</td>
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**United Nations**

1945-1948: Status as Allied or Axis power is key. After 1950s: North-South divide increases in salience. 1988-9: Article 21 of UDHR and Article 25 of ICCPR serve as status markers in the absence of a more comprehensive democratic norm set.
Chapter Two

Existing theoretical work suggests a few expectations about the role and potential influences of democratic status on democratic norm development and policy implementation. Social identity theory distinguishes between three strategies used by states in social groups to improve their social standing: a) social mobility, in which states emulate or “conform to the norms of an elite group to gain acceptance;” b) social competition, in which states either attempt to “equal or surpass the elite group in the area on which its claims to superior status rest” or engage in “spoiler behavior;” and c) social creativity, in which states “seek prestige in a different area altogether,” and advocate new or alternative international norms (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 71-5; 66-7; see also Tajfel and Turner 1986). Moreover, “the choice of strategy depends on the permeability of group boundaries as well as the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010b, 190; see also Tajfel and Turner 1986).

As suggested in Table 2.3, there are two general trends in the influence of democratic status: its emphasis has contributed occasionally to cooperation, and occasionally to discord. On one hand, democratic status has motivated some states to cooperate in support of IOs’ democratic commitments and programs. Among democratizing states, support for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status-seeking, both within an IO and in the wider international community. This perspective adds to actor-centered theories of the development of human rights and democratic norms (e.g. Moravcsik 2000), by emphasizing the importance of shifts in states’ hierarchical relations with other states and within IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) in supporting democratic norm development at different points in time. On the other hand, democratic status has motivated other states to challenge the IOs’ support for implementation of democratic norms. Realists would argue that these challenges can be explained by geopolitical power shifts. I show that such arguments do not fully explain discord around policy implementation by clarifying how democratic status operates and by illustrating that effective challenges have not been limited to the most powerful states.

Table 2.3 highlights stages in the evolution of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN and suggests some key roles. In the CSCE/OSCE, democratic norms and implementation policies were generally positively influenced by democratic status in the 1990s because the IO’s emphasis motivated states to support its efforts, whereas in the 2000s, the emphasis on democratic status contributed to increased challenges. In the UN, each of the three processes
(social mobility, social competition, and social creativity) has been present across the time periods. Discord in the UN was highest in the early 1990s when electoral norms were initially proposed, and has also increased in the late 2000s. There have consistently been states employing strategies of social mobility and social creativity, with both being particularly effective at influencing UN implementation policies at policy level. Why are these processes significant and by what mechanisms do they evolve and operate? How and under what conditions does democratic status have effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation? The theoretical propositions that follow draw on the literature on status in international relations, constructivist literature on socialization, and literature from social psychology on social identity.

**Theoretical Propositions: Democratic Status**

**Cooperation**

The concept of democratic status renders visible the presence of international hierarchies based on democratic governance. The higher the salience of democratic status within an IO, the more likely it is that non-democratic or democratizing states will react and try to improve their position in this status dimension either through strategies of social mobility, competition, or creativity. In addition to leaders’ perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy, and permeability of elite groups (which when positive lead states to pursue strategies of social mobility), two additional factors – *category salience* and *changes in the group prototype* – are suggested by Huddy as deserving greater attention (2001, 149). The concepts of salience and prototype are particularly relevant to this study. Studies in social psychology have found, for example, that “increasing the salience of study participants’ gender increases the likelihood that they think of themselves in gender-stereotypic terms” (2001, 133, 149). By analogy, therefore, we would expect to observe higher levels of status-seeking behavior in terms of democratic governance when the salience of democratic status is high in an IO. In addition, a prototype, or group member holding the most common characteristics, is influential when states perceive their similarities to the prototype (Ibid, 134). The U.S. and established democracies in Europe and other regions have served as prototypes for less democratic states on the issue of democratic governance. However, when there are changes in prototypical states, such as through war, economic crisis, or controversial elections, this can negatively affect the appeal of group membership, and thus decrease status-seeking behavior.
Chapter Two

The context of inclusive IOs suggests an additional factor influencing whether states employ strategies of social mobility: perceptions of the prestige and legitimacy of the IO itself. When an IO is held in lower esteem (e.g. due to scandals, decreased relevance of its mandate, perceptions of unjustified shifts in priorities, lack of effectiveness, or inefficiency), cooperation through strategies of social mobility are less likely. Chapter 4 shows, for example, that the prestige of the OSCE decreased in the 2000s, as suggested by the lack of Summit meetings between 1999 and 2010, when it experienced increased deadlock, was unable to resolve protracted conflicts, and the priorities of key actors shifted to other world regions, thus contributing to decreased status seeking through strategies of social mobility in the organization. In sum, we would expect cooperation among states in inclusive IOs on democratic norm development and policy implementation when the democratic status hierarchy is viewed as legitimate, stable, and highly salient, the high-status group is perceived as permeable, the IO itself holds prestige, and prototypes are viewed as role models with similarities.

Proposition S-1: Social mobility:

Support provided by democratizing states for democratic norm development and policy implementation can be interpreted as a form of status seeking (in a strategy of social mobility), both in the organization and in the wider international community. This is particularly the case given the comparatively high salience of democratic governance in the hierarchy of international norms for the behavior of states in the 1990s and 2000s, even despite the decreases in more recent years. While status is not the only goal states seek in IOs, it often complements other (material and ideational) interests and values and plays a significant role. The context of inclusive IOs suggests an additional interpretation of the concept of social mobility. Many states are often not seeking full acceptance into elite groups, but rather are seeking opportunities for enhanced partnership and investment, or to improve their status vis-à-vis neighboring states, and this helps to encourage cooperative behavior on the democratization agenda in IOs. I argue that an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate some states seeking to improve their positions in the international system to support democratic norm development and policy implementation.

How do we know if a state is seeking status? Operationalizing the concept of status is complex. I propose that a state’s status-seeking behavior can be observed in the following process. First, we must identify what the status markers in a particular IO are. As an example
from society, a mink coat might be a marker of status in Moscow or Tokyo, but not in Vancouver because of differences in environmental values or climate. In the context of international organizations, which can also be viewed as social environments (Johnston 2001), therefore, it is important to first identify whether democratic governance is indeed an important dimension of status in the IOs. I accomplish this by analyzing the evolution of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. Indicators that democratic status is important status marker in an IO include, for example, references to democratic norms in key conference documents, resolutions, evaluation reports, and declarations issued by the IOs. Second, we must know approximately how strong the status markers are. A BMW SUV may connote high status in certain years in a given society, yet may be less appealing in the same society if gasoline prices rise or values about emissions change. Similarly, the salience of democratic status among states may wax and wane, in part due to exogenous factors. I address this in chapters 4 and 6 by analyzing the salience of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, as well as by identifying factors that have contributed to the rise and weakening of the status markers over time. Indicators of the salience of democratic status include the overall frequency of iterations of terms linked to democratic status markers and the frequency of their appearance in key outcome documents and resolutions. Third, to assess if a state is engaging in status seeking, we must know if the state references or makes use of the status marker in the IO. Therefore, if the above proposition is correct, I expect to identify evidence of status seeking through behavioral or rhetorical support for democratic governance, e.g. in state delegations’ statements mentioning democratic governance, in agencies’ negotiation summaries, other IO documents, or interviews.

For this proposition, there is a risk that the evidence I interpret as status-seeking behavior could be interpreted by others as what Moravscik has termed “lock in.” In the case of the development of the European human rights regime, Moravscik argues that recently established and unstable democracies sought to “lock in” domestic institutions and aimed to tie the hands of future governments, as an alternative explanation to realist accounts of great power influence and constructivist accounts of transnational actors or of socialization on norm development (2000). In other words, states may support democratic norm development in order to lock in their nascent democratic institutions rather than in pursuit of status in international society. While Moravscik’s account is compelling, it does not account for some important dynamics at structural level. I argue that the hierarchical context in which norms are developed cannot be overlooked. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, “states that are insecure about their status may
embrace new international norms most eagerly and thoroughly” (1998, 906). In the post-Cold War period, Central European states sought to “return to Europe” and democratic credentials became part of attaining a new status. By focusing on status, I consider motivations of states not as isolated agents but as having important relations with other (sometimes more powerful) states and IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) of supporting democratic norm development or policy implementation in inclusive IOs. I expect to observe that increased support for IO efforts in these areas corresponds, at the same time, with delegates’ statements illustrating states’ status-seeking behavior in the IO and elsewhere in the international system. Moreover, I expect to observe these trends when the salience of democratic status itself is particularly high in the CSCE/OSCE and UN.

In addition, I argue that when a state has invested in making democratic reforms, it has an interest in receiving recognition for corresponding changes in status. According to Tajfel, a basic assumption of social mobility is that “the system is flexible and permeable, that it permits a fairly free movement from one group to another of the individual particles of which it consists” (1981, 246). However, a state’s perception of its own status may differ from those of other members of the international community and IOs, whose perceptions often evolve slowly. I expect to observe evidence of this in delegates’ statements in the CSCE/OSCE and the UN in connection with debates dealing with issues of democratic governance.

Discord

Both social competition and social creativity are strategies that entail discord around democratic norms and implementation policies in inclusive IOs, to different extents. Both strategies are used when states’ decision makers consider the boundaries of the high-status group to be impermeable and decide that their lower status can only be improved by achieving a more positive evaluation of their group (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 56).

Two additional concepts from social psychology help to explain discord in response to democratic status in inclusive IOs: categorization and relative position. Social categories are defined by social psychologists as “the division of people on the basis of nationality, race, class, occupation, sex, religion, and so forth” (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 14). By analogy, states are categorized in international society as democratic, non-democratic, or as democracies with a variety of adjectives, e.g. electoral, or established democracies (see Collier and Levitsky 1997).
Categories create insiders and outsiders (Deng 2008, 23). As Hogg and Abrams note, “a category is only such in contrast with another” (1988, 14, see also 51-3). Categorization generates tension in inclusive IOs because categories such as democratic and non-democratic states accentuate differences between states that simultaneously have a claim to formal equality. As such, there can be negative consequences of categorization. As Tajfel and Turner explain: “intergroup categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group” (1986, 14).

Once categories are created, social comparison clarifies states’ relative position within the particular status dimension. “Status is important to people because they assess their well-being relative to others” (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, forthcoming, 13). Moreover, “status is a positional good, meaning that one group’s status can improve only if another’s declines” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 69). In inclusive IOs, states compare their position to that of their neighbors, the group prototype, and other relevant states. The concept of relative deprivation - the sense that “relative to other people, one is deprived of some desired object” - has been employed in political science to explain motivations for social movements (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 38; see also Tajfel 1981, 259). Wallace asserts that “we would expect maximum social tension to occur when deprivation is combined with the expectation of reward (1973, 6). These types of expectations arise when multiple status dimensions are relevant in a given society. Among individuals, as Wallace explains:

In social interactions which emphasize the higher of [an individual’s] statuses, he will receive the deference and rewards of (relatively) high position, and this will form the basis of his expectations. When these rewards are not forthcoming in social interactions which stress his lower status, he perceives this as deprivation and feels himself treated inequitably (1973, 7).

In IOs, status inconsistency develops when a state has a high position in one dimension (e.g. great power status, military strength, strong economy), yet a low position in another dimension (e.g. democratic status). This has contributed, for example, to discordant behavior exhibited in the 2000s by China and Russia.18 Wallace suggests two additional factors that intensify status inconsistency: social visibility and length of time the grievance is present. As he explains:

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18 For in-depth analysis of social identity and status-related behavior in China and Russia in contexts other than inclusive IOs, see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, Deng 2008, and Clunan 2009.
Status inconsistency leads to support for social change when a person’s lower status is *socially visible* and thus creates a gap between self-assessed status and that assigned by others… When a nation does not achieve a level of esteem and recognition consistent with its capabilities, a real sense of deprivation is felt immediately. If the source of this grievance is present for any *extended period of time*, it may make an important contribution to tension and hostility between nations (1973, 10, 18, italics added).

Although status inconsistency as a motive for social competition and social creativity is most applicable to great powers (Wallace 1973, 20); *less powerful states* also engage in discordant status-seeking behavior for other reasons. According to Turner, “negatively discrepant comparisons provide low prestige and negative social identity” (1982, 34), which can motivate states with lower democratic status to engage in creative or competitive strategies. Moreover, “status depreciating behavior regularly stimulates an instinctive response pattern that seems to be deeply engrained in the human psyche” (Wolf 2011, 108).

In sum, *discord* through strategies of social competition or social creativity is most likely to take place when states perceive the boundaries of the high-status group to be impermeable, and if the categorization process leads to discrimination that contradicts leaders’ status expectations, particularly if this is socially visible and extends over a period of time. Social competition is expected if the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy is less stable and if the IO itself holds decreased prestige, whereas social creativity is expected if the democratic hierarchy is viewed as relatively legitimate and stable (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a). The following theoretical propositions suggest ways in which social competition and social creativity operate in relation to democratic norms and policy implementation in inclusive IOs.

A realist might counter these propositions by arguing that the challenges to IOs’ democratization agendas we observe in the 2000s can be explained by power dynamics. In the 1990s Russia, China, and some CIS states were much weaker than in the 2000s; therefore, a motivation for social competition or social creativity in the 2000s might simply be that at a certain point leaders recognized the feasibility of contesting IOs’ democracy programs and took advantage of shifts in power.\(^\text{19}\) However, this argument does not fully explain the behavior of states engaging in discordant behavior in the CSCE/OSCE and UN in the 2000s. First, it is not only the most powerful states that engage in social competition and social creativity. In chapters 4 and 6, I show that states such as Cuba, Belarus, Kazakhstan and others have also engaged in

\(^{19}\) I thank Jacob Wobig for this comment.
these ways. Moreover, decision-making in inclusive IOs is not only affected by great powers; weaker states can have significant influence in institutions with full consensus rules, as in the OSCE (since only one dissenting vote can block norm or policy adoption), or in bodies in which they hold a numerical advantage, as in the UN GA, as observed in the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies in the 1990s. By examining the role of status in close connection to the challenges made by states, in addition to highlighting the historical evolutions in democratic status which have affected states’ positions, I show that status operates in influential ways in inclusive IOs and affects how norms and policies develop.

**Proposition S-2: Social competition:**

*States engaging in social competition have challenged the way in which the UN and the OSCE have implemented democratic governance policies and assessed their democratic characteristics.* As mentioned above, in strategies of social competition, states either attempt to “equal or surpass the elite group in the area on which its claims to superior status rest” or engage in “spoiler behavior” (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 71-5; 66-7). The former - attempts to outshine the elite group (e.g. established democratic states) - are not observed in cases of states’ responses to democratic status. This is a strategy observed in other status dimensions, such as status in terms of military power, where the pursuit of higher status contributes, for example, to arms races (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a). Rather, strategies of social competition in reaction to democratic status concerns often entail spoiler behavior.

Through social competition, in order to improve their position, states are not challenging the ranking system of the hierarchy, per se; they are challenging the negative rankings given to them (Clunan 2009). This involves “trying to gain a higher status level for one’s group or to reverse the status relationship between one’s group and a specific other group” (Ibid, 34-5). This leads to conflict and antagonism between groups (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20). According to Clunan, states with lower status argue that “their exclusion from or lesser status in a group was unjust, that they deserve inclusion or elevation to a higher position, and that the other’s elevated position should be decreased” (2009, 90). One example of this is the perpetual reference to “double standards” in diplomatic discourse.

By what mechanisms have inclusive IOs’ emphasis on democratic status led some states to pursue strategies of social competition, thus contributing to their challenges of UN and OSCE
implementation policies? If proposition S-2 is correct, I expect to observe several processes at work. The first step in the analysis is correlational. In other words, I determine if there is a correlation between states’ relative, lower democratic status and their challenges to an IO’s democratization agenda. Indicators of status in the OSCE include, for example, holding prestigious leadership positions, e.g. Chairperson-in-Office, Heads of field offices and election observation and assessment missions; the locations of field offices and election observation missions; as well as relative standing based on quality of governance indicators or election reports. Additionally, I expect to observe in the contentious statements, specific references to the aspects of the IO’s behavior that has directly upset them in terms of their democratic status. In fact, if a state’s challenges to the democratization agenda have any different content between the OSCE and the UN settings, this is an indicator that internal (rather than exogenous) factors such as status concerns play a role in shaping the precise substance of these challenges, in contrast to realist expectations. Moreover, I expect to observe social competition strategies if the high-status group is viewed as impermeable, the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy is decreased, the IO itself holds lower prestige than at other times in its history, and if the categorization process leads to discrimination, particularly if a state’s lower relative position in terms of democratic status is socially visible and extends over a period of time.

Chapters 4 and 6 provide several examples of social competition strategies in response to democratic status concerns in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. Importantly, the precise content of challenges to the OSCE’s democratization efforts in the mid- to late 2000s that have contributed to its “crisis” highlight issues that are closely connected with status concerns (e.g. calls by Russia and several CIS states for greater geographic representation in OSCE posts, increased decision-making in the inclusive Permanent Council, and more uniform criteria for election evaluations). It is shown that while social competition in the 2000s in the OSCE case is partly explained by reactions to alienation and decreased democratic status by Russia and some CIS states, in the UN case, social competition in the 2000s is explained more by an interest in preventing democratic status from gaining increased leverage in the organization. Social competition is often discussed as a strategy used by powerful states such as China or Russia (Deng 2008; Clunan 2009; Larson and Shevchenko 2010); however, less powerful states also engage in this strategy. While states

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challenging democratization efforts in the UN in 1992 typically expressed concern about intervention or democratic conditionality on aid, in the mid- to late 2000s, there have been increased references to “respect” and “dignity” associated with similar types of challenges, suggesting at least a partial response to democratic status hierarchies in the UN and the broader international community. Chapters 4 and 6 also provide some examples of less powerful states engaging in social competition such as Cuba, Belarus, or through the G-77 or Non-aligned movement, at times in the absence of a great power partner.

**Proposition S-3: Social creativity:**

Alternatively, *a less democratic state seeking to improve its status may attempt to shift the IO’s priorities to a different issue, away from democratic governance*. The strategy of social creativity involves finding and advocating a new dimension for status and social comparison in which the state holds a higher position (Clunan 2009, 86). The presence of multiple dimensions of status in inclusive IOs means that some states may prioritize status in terms of democratic governance and some may prioritize other areas (see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 69). Hogg and Abrams suggest that social creativity strategies are used when “intergroup relations are subjectively perceived to be secure” (1988, 56).

In inclusive IOs, the most often observed mechanism of social creativity in relation to democratic governance is the identification and advocacy of alternative status dimensions. There are, however, two other mechanisms of social creativity that are less applicable to this particular issue area and the setting of inclusive IOs. For example, in an unlikely scenario, less democratic states might attempt to reverse the values given to the characteristics of the group, so negative assessments (e.g. non-democracies) would be perceived as positive (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20; Hogg and Abrams 1988, 57). The global reaction in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War makes this mechanism highly improbable for the issue area of democratic governance. Alternatively, less democratic states could select new groups (other than established democratic states) for comparison (Tajfel and Turner 1986, 20; Hogg and Abrams 1988, 57). Hogg and Abrams explain that “here the objective is to compare your low status group with other groups of equal or preferably lower status than your own rather than with the superior group, that is engaging in downward or lateral rather than upward comparisons” (1988, 57). Since inclusive IOs comprise established democracies, less democratic states, and non-democracies, it is unlikely for comparisons to take place among only a lower portion of the democratic status hierarchy.
However, this may be a factor contributing to the recent proliferation of new IOs that do not comprise the United States and other longer-established democratic states (e.g. Bank of the South, Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

In chapter 4, social creativity is observed in the OSCE, for example, when Kazakhstan proposed in 2010 to increase the organization’s priorities from three to five, adding priorities on inter-confessional tolerance and financial, economic, and energy security, which would have the effect of diluting its focus on democratization. Russia and several CIS states have consistently sought to elevate the priority of the OSCE’s work on politico-military issues over human rights and democratic development, while states such as Romania in the early 1990s and Kyrgyzstan have sought to increase OSCE efforts in economic or environmental issues. Chapter 6 also shows how many UN member states in the 1990s and 2000s have consistently aimed to increase the emphasis on economic development both within the UN’s democratization work and as an alternative.

Analyzing the context of inclusive IOs with significant inequalities suggests some new interpretations of the concept of social creativity. States engaging in strategies of social creativity indeed advocate alternative norms, but, this may, in fact, be constructive for democratic norm development, for example, if greater acceptance and legitimacy is gained by broadening the norms’ scope, as in the case of states advocating norms of economic development alongside democratic norms in the UN. While many instances of social creativity illustrate discord, some examples exhibit elements of cooperation. There appear to be two different processes at work in states employing social creativity strategies. On one hand, by advocating alternative norms some non- or partially democratic states are clearly attempting to undermine and deflect attention from the IO’s democracy agenda, but by pursuing a less directly antagonistic strategy than social competition. On the other hand, some states are simply attempting to pursue two goals at the same time. This has parallels to the discussion of issue linkage in proposition I-3. In other words, some democratizing states take advantage of the salience of democratic norms to advocate their concurrent interests.

If non- or partially democratic states attempt to shift the IO’s emphasis from democratization to economic development, it is not obvious that this translates into an

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improvement in status, since many of these states are also developing countries. If gaining in status (and positive distinctiveness) is a motivating factor, we would expect states to advocate alternative dimensions in which their status position would be more favorable. Why should we consider this an example of social creativity? Since this study considers weaker states alongside great and middle powers, there are, arguably, differences in the approaches and aims of groups’ status-enhancing strategies. Even if a much higher status is not directly sought by developing (and non- or partially democratic) states on the basis of economic development, they are seeking status-related gains. By shifting the measures for evaluation from democracy to development, these states seek, in part, increased international attention to support their economic growth. They also seek increased voice and recognition in IO fora. Status as a developing country often has a more positive connotation than status as a non- or partial democracy, especially in the 2000s when years have elapsed since many initial democratic transitions. There are many exogenous factors affecting development, whereas leaders and governments are more directly implicated in their country’s level of democracy. As leaders and representatives of governments, seeking greater emphasis on their developing country status is an improvement, particularly if they expect their state to make greater progress on economic rather than democratic lines. Moreover, by shifting the conversation, developing countries can gain increased voice in debates on international redistributive policies, which can confer increased status and assistance.

I expect to observe mechanisms of social creativity through state delegations’ statements in IO fora in which debates over democratic norms and policies take place, as well as in other IO documents and reports. In each of the three strategies highlighted above, democratic status is significant because states use and respond to it self-consciously, to various effects at different points in time.

2.4. Additional theoretical insights from comparison across the cases

Before embarking on the empirical case studies, a few additional theoretical insights into the evolution and roles of democratic status in inclusive IOs are gleaned from comparisons across the cases. As mentioned in chapter 1, the CSCE/OSCE and UN were selected for this research because of their similarities such as their evolution with broad memberships as inclusive security organizations; extensive support for democratic development through their respective implementation agencies and field offices; their historical importance in developing human rights norms during the Cold War which formed the basis for democratic norms in the 1990s;
Chapter Two

and the formal participation of the U.S. in each. Despite these similarities in histories, evolution, composition, and implementation practices, some of their differences shed additional light on the theoretical implications of this dissertation.

The evolution and roles of democratic status in the United Nations presents a variegated picture, in part because of the mixed way in which the principle of sovereign equality has been operationalized across bodies of the UN system. Institutionalization of sovereign equality has varied widely both between and within inclusive IOs because of the tension between sovereign equality and great power primacy (Klein 1974; see also Tucker 1977; Jackson 2000; Krisch 2003). The UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN’s most inclusive bodies dealing with the development and implementation of democratic norms, are on one hand unencumbered by strict consensus rules. On the other hand, formal practices of state rotation in leadership in these bodies mitigate against expressions of status. Given the Security Council’s hierarchical formal structure based on great power status, there are clear areas in which sovereign equality has manifested itself more weakly in the UN than in the CSCE/OSCE. The degree of institutionalization of sovereign equality in an IO is important for two reasons. First, it influences whether and to what extent democratic status may in fact permeate the inclusive IO’s decision-making bodies. Second, if democratic status becomes present in an inclusive body, the IO’s history with egalitarian procedures will influence whether and to what extent democratic status concerns will contribute to backlash and challenges. This, together with the stronger influence of inter-governmental bodies on the programmatic work of the OSCE, helps to explain why the OSCE has become more paralyzed than the UN on issues of policy implementation in the late 2000s.

Differences between the CSCE/OSCE and UN in terms of the clarity of the boundaries of categories and groups with (or without) democratic status can also affect status-seeking behavior. While stratification along democratic lines in the CSCE/OSCE was clearly defined by the institutionalization of its comprehensive democratic norm set in 1990-91, in the UN such boundaries remained more nebulous in the 1990s. As democratic norms came to have more definition in the UN in 1999-2000, the critiques against implementation policies gradually intensified and boundaries did not take firm root. In such a situation, states interested in social mobility have unclear reference points. However, as I show in chapter 6, states occasionally
address this issue in UN fora by referencing regional IOs’ democracy benchmarks as alternative democratic reference points.

The proportion of the IOs’ overall portfolios devoted to democracy support also has noteworthy effects. While UNDP has devoted a high percentage of its resources to democratic governance programs since the mid- to late 1990s, in terms of the total policy spectrum of the larger United Nations, democracy support is only one of many issue areas in which it is engaged. Promoting democracy and human rights is proportionally a larger part of the OSCE’s mandate. If the OSCE is gridlocked on issues related to democracy support, the whole organization suffers. The recent critiques of OSCE democracy promotion efforts have generated a crisis for the organization. Since democracy promotion is much less of a proportion of what the UN does, even if debates on democracy support become gridlocked, this is less likely to negatively affect the organization as a whole.

Another difference is that in the OSCE, democratic states are in the majority, whereas the UN comprises a larger group of partial and non-democratic states. The literature on social psychology suggests that “when the dominant group is in the minority, the status structure is inherently more unstable than when the majority is dominant” (Brewer and Miller 1996, 95). However, the analysis presented in the following chapters shows that the OSCE has, in fact, experienced more instability than the UN in terms of challenges to the basis of its democratic hierarchy. This is in part because democratic norms have been institutionalized (and thus generated categories of differentiation according to democratic status) to a greater extent in the OSCE than in the UN. Being in a less democratic minority, therefore, is more acutely perceived by Russia and other CIS states in the OSCE, and this has contributed to the stronger levels of contention observed in the organization. Moreover, whereas Russia has no comparable formal recognition of great power status in the OSCE, partial or non-democratic great powers (e.g. Russia and China) have had a special status in the UN as permanent members of the UN Security Council, which can mitigate against effects of democratic status.

In terms of the aims of challenges against the implementation of the IOs’ democracy agenda, there is another interesting difference between the OSCE and UN cases. In the UN, it was not until 1999-2000 that resolutions in the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly codified the basic principles and values shared by all democracies. Prior to this, beyond the concept of electoral democracy, the definition of a democratic state was
imprecise and subject to interpretation in the UN. Therefore, in the mid- to late 2000s, challenges in the UN appear to have been motivated by an interest in preventing democratic status from gaining increased leverage in the organization, whereas in the OSCE, states aimed to demote its already pervasive influence.
3.1. Introduction

In the 1990 Paris Charter, the heads of all CSCE participating states declared: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations” (CSCE 1990b, 3). In 1990-91, far-reaching international democratic commitments were also established, for example, in the areas of free and fair elections, freedom of association and assembly, judicial independence, freedom of the media, and condemning the overthrow of legitimately elected governments (CSCE 1990, 1991). I argue that the organization’s inclusive institutions were instrumental to the process. In this chapter, I trace the origins and effects of inclusiveness in the CSCE/OSCE and argue that while inclusive institutions sometimes lead to deadlock, under certain conditions they have proven highly supportive of democratic norm development and implementation. Under favorable conditions of high political will and a convergence of states’ interests, inclusive institutions have produced substantive agreements; yet even under highly contentious conditions agreements have been generated, in part due to the appeal of side issues.

How have inclusive institutions been influential? To answer this question, I assess the validity of the theoretical propositions presented in chapter 2 with evidence from the CSCE/OSCE. These will be examined further in chapter 5 using evidence from the UN. By illustrating how norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality evolved in the CSCE/OSCE in the 1990s and 2000s, this chapter also serves as a backdrop and point of contrast for the arguments about status presented in chapter 4.

In this chapter, as in each of the three subsequent empirical chapters, the analysis is broken into six time periods: the Cold War (1973-1989); the immediate post-Cold War years (1990-1991); the early and late 1990s (1992-1994); (1995-1999); and early and late 2000s (2000-2004; 2005-2010). These time periods distinguish between distinct historical circumstances and dynamics. Since this study is based on intrinsically time-dependent observations, these time periods increase the resolution needed to differentiate between various processes. While the contentious normative climate of the Cold War began to improve in the late 1980s, 1989 was a clear turning point. 1990-91 were distinctly favorable years for democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE due in part to the decreased relevance of the East-West
1992-94 witnessed the crystallization of the new norms and institutions in the CSCE, new challenges, and the admission of several new participating states from the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In January 1995, the CSCE formally became the OSCE, signifying a new degree of institutionalization and operational capacity. In the 1990s, political will and conditions for democratic norm development and policy implementation were generally favorable (with some exceptions), whereas in the 2000s we observe a gradual increase in contention, with notable acceleration observed in 2005. While this corresponds in timing with Russia’s resurgence, perceptions of decreased legitimacy of U.S. leadership, and shifts in foreign policy priorities to Afghanistan and the Middle East, these explanations are underdetermined, as will be shown in chapter 4. Chapter 3 examines the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions through variations in these historical circumstances between 1973 and 2010 in the CSCE/OSCE.


From its origins in the informal Dipoli preparatory meetings of 1972-3 and the first Helsinki Consultations of 1973 and Summit of 1975, the CSCE has had an inclusive character. The 35 states represented at the Helsinki Consultations and Summit meetings that generated the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 included the United States, USSR, nearly all European states, and Canada. Today, the organization comprises 56 participating states. The image of CSCE/OSCE participating states spanning broadly “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” often peppers its diplomatic discourse. The organization operates without a charter, and thus its norms, recommendations, and commitments are politically rather than legally binding. From the outset, decisions have been made by consensus.

Why did the CSCE emerge with a particularly inclusive orientation in 1975? After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and near the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and USSR were motivated to gradually increase their mutual channels of communications. It was within

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22 Preparatory meetings took place in Dipoli, near Helsinki, from 1972-3; the CSCE formally began in Helsinki in July 1973 (OSCE 2007, 2-3). There have not been formal admission criteria for participating states of the CSCE/OSCE, although the organization is generally framed by its geography. Only in one case - that of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1992 - did the OSCE suspend a state’s participation.

23 The decision that the CSCE should comprise European states, the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada was taken in 1972 in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations from the Dipoli informal preparatory talks and adopted in 1973. It recommended that participation in the CSCE would “take place outside military alliances,” by “sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality” (OSCE 2007, 2). European states participated with the exception of Albania and Andorra; they joined in 1991 and 1996 respectively.

24 Consensus-minus-one procedures were established in 1992.
this context - of détente in the Cold War - together with West Germany’s strategy of Ostpolitik, which emphasized engagement and cooperation as means of achieving foreign policy objectives, that the CSCE was designed. As Galbreath notes, the CSCE “gave substance and definition to détente” and “began as a way to bring together opposing superpowers to work towards the common goal of security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area” (2007, 37, 1; see also Gheciu 2008, 119).

Similar to the UN, the CSCE’s initial and primary purpose was that of a security organization. Its approach of involving all concerned states as opposed to involving simply like-minded states, for example, distinguished the CSCE at the time from organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Council of Europe. “The OSCE’s underlying norm of ‘common security’ or ‘collective security,’” according to Acharya and Johnston, entails “the idea that regional organizations should be ‘inclusive,’ including both politically like-minded and non-like-minded states of a region, and that members of such organizations should adopt a ‘security with’ as opposed to ‘security against’ approach to their potential or actual adversaries” (2007, 20-1; see also Adler 1998). Thus, the inclusive CSCE filled an important gap in the international institutional landscape of the mid-1970s. To the drafters of the Helsinki Decalogue, the concept of sovereign equality (Principle 1) already served as a staple of international founding documents, and was firmly entrenched in inclusive international organizations with security mandates such as the OAS and the UN, the latter of which all CSCE states were members. Klein notes that sovereign equality “has proved an important countervailing moral force against the hegemonic pretentions of the strong,” yet also “reflects a distorted view of the sovereign entities engaged in international relations” (1974, 166).

Leaders offered several arguments in favor of an inclusive CSCE structure. For example, at the Helsinki Consultations in 1973, President Kekkonen of Finland declared:

This is no meeting of the victors of war; nor is it the meeting of the great Powers. Our Conference is the common endeavor of all concerned Governments on the basis of mutual respect and equality, to reach solutions on vital questions concerning all of us...In beginning its work on the basis of equality and mutual respect the Conference has taken the only road that can lead to enduring results.25

Memories of the bloodshed of WWII remained in the minds of many leaders, and their statements emphasized the common objective of cooperating to prevent a third world war

25 Statement by the President of the Republic of Finland, Mr. Kekonnen, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stage I, Helsinki, 3 July 1973. CSCE/I/PV.1 (restrict), 3-5.
originating in Europe, thus resonating with purposes underpinning the UN. As stated by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim at Helsinki in 1975, “peace is not secure without continuing efforts on the part of all the countries concerned.” Although CSCE institutions became more consistently inclusive than their UN counterparts, Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom claimed that the designers of the Helsinki Final Act were inspired by “the universality which is the hallmark of the United Nations.” The strength of agreements arising from consensus was also mentioned by Heads of State. Beyond complaints about the arduousness and difficulty of Helsinki negotiations lasting three years, arguments against an inclusive CSCE structure based on sovereign equality are not found in official statements from 1973-5.

Suggesting additional motives for the origins of the CSCE’s inclusive institutions, Klein contends that from the perspective of superpowers, providing equal status to all states can facilitate acceptance of leadership or may downplay their superiority (1974, 40). This is relevant to CSCE negotiations in the mid-1970s, since American leadership was increasingly challenged by European allies during and after the Vietnam War. The OPEC crisis of 1973-4 likewise undermined U.S. power and gave salience in a broader sense to claims for equality in international institutions (Tucker 1977, 47-9). In such contexts, a superpower can find advantage in formal equality, yet despite formal equality great powers often exert influence through informal channels or by reaching agreement among themselves and presenting their consensus to other states (Klein 1974, 115). From the perspective of small and medium powers, inclusive structures have procedural legitimacy; they hold the promise of limiting the influence of power in international relations and can help these states “feel as if they counted for something on the world scene” (Klein 1974, 107; 59).


The 1973-1989 time period illustrates the significance of issue linkage, restatements, and negotiation histories in the development of human rights norms, which provided the basis for democratic norm development in 1990-91. In the Helsinki Final Act of 1975,

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27 Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, 30 July 1975. CSCE/III/PV.2 (restrict), 2.
28 See, for example, statement by the Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Cosgrave, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.3 (restrict), 19.
human rights agreements were generated in part due to the appeal of side issues. Moreover, the legitimacy generated by the CSCE’s inclusiveness contributed to the strength of Helsinki norms. While negotiations on human rights in subsequent years encountered deadlock, I show that failed proposals in CSCE meetings in the 1980s, in fact, served a useful purpose for negotiations under more auspicious circumstances in 1986-89.

As the foundational text of the CSCE, the Final Act of 1975 established the renowned Helsinki Decalogue, a set of ten principles of equal importance for relations among CSCE participating states. As in the UN Charter, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Principle 1) were set alongside human rights (Principle 7), despite their contradictions. In Principle 7, “Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,” CSCE participating states committed to recognize and respect, as well as to promote and encourage the effective exercise of these rights and emphasized the rights of national minorities (CSCE 1975, VII). In this time period, patterns emerged in the development of human rights norms that have important parallels to what we observe in later years in development of democratic norms.

How have scholars typically explained the appearance of Principle 7 on human rights in the Helsinki Final Act? For this dissertation, the significance of this question lies in the foundation provided by Principle 7 for the elaboration in subsequent years of democratic norms in the CSCE/OSCE. It is often argued that the Soviet Union made concessions on Principle 7 in 1975 because it aimed to legitimize existing borders in Europe and to increase economic cooperation with the West, while Western states aimed to secure legal status for Berlin, to work towards conventional weapons disarmament, and to make gains in the area of human rights (OSCE 2007, 2; Vincent 1986, 66; Thomas 2001, 28-9). Moreover, all CSCE participating states had recognized the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; therefore, “the Soviet leadership had no reason to believe that the formal norms established by the CSCE would ultimately be any more significant than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with which they had already lived for 25 years” (Thomas 2001, 61, 30, 53-4; see also Galbreath 2007, 34). Interests of other Warsaw Pact states

29 The remaining principles in the Helsinki Decalogue included: (2) refraining from the threat or use of force; (3) inviolability of frontiers; (4) territorial integrity of states; (5) peaceful settlement of disputes; (6) non-intervention in internal affairs; and (8) equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (9) cooperation among states; and (10) fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law (CSCE 1975, Section 1(a)).
included increasing contacts with the West and a “quest for legitimation as normal members of international society,” while the nine European Community (EC) member states were motivated to pursue human rights because of their “shared understandings of what it meant to be a ‘European’ state” (Thomas 2001, 40, 27-8, 50). Whereas Soviet positions held firmly until the late spring of 1975, unexpected agreement on some of the most difficult points coincided with a change in composition of the Soviet delegation, which, aiming to conclude the process quickly, began to make concessions, including acceptance of human rights norms (Iloniemi 2009, Title 3, Ch. 11). Especially relevant for this dissertation is that in an otherwise contentious context, Principle 7 met with consensus in the CSCE’s inclusive negotiating bodies in part due to the appeal of side issues. Inclusive institutions do not necessarily encounter impasses in norm development during years in which the leaders of participating states hold wide ranges of perspectives on the issues in question. This provides support for theoretical proposition I-3. By appealing to reluctant states’ interest in side issues, actors are sometimes able to overcome inclusive institutions’ weaknesses, as observed in negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act.

Regarding implementation, the Helsinki Final Act established three baskets, or “dimensions,” as they would be called, to organize the work of the CSCE. The first basket dealt with traditional hard security issues such as observation of military maneuvers and other confidence-building measures (OSCE 2007, 4). The second basket, cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology, and for the environment, was more ideologically neutral than the first and third baskets, but implementation of the second basket has not been extensive because states have viewed other IOs as having comparative advantages over the CSCE on these issues. The third basket, cooperation in humanitarian and other fields, was re-termed the “human dimension” in the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document and evolved to incorporate the democratization and human rights work of the organization. CSCE mechanisms to implement the Helsinki principles initially consisted of follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-1979) and

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30 Its brief, four-page concluding document lacked substance and resorted to a platitude: “the exchange of views constitutes in itself a valuable contribution towards the achievement of the aims set by the CSCE, although different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act reached so far” (CSCE 1978, 2). A minor consolation, the document reiterated states’ commitment to the norms of the Helsinki Final Act (see Thomas 2001, 196). See also: Belgrade Meeting 1977 of Representatives of the Participating States of the CSCE, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, Closing Statements, Belgrade, 8 March 1978 to 9 March 1978, CSCE/BM/VR.1-4.
in Madrid (1980-1983)\textsuperscript{31} that disappointed human rights activists and expert meetings on human rights in Ottawa in 1985 and on human contacts in Bern in 1986 that met similar frustrations and ended without concluding documents.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless, the follow-up meetings provided fora to review states’ implementation of commitments, to express concerns about human rights abuses, and to maintain inter-state communications.

By contrast, the follow-up meeting in Vienna (November 1986 to January 1989) was remarkable for the sudden progress that delegates were able to make on human rights, a breakthrough attributed in part to the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. In the Vienna Concluding Document, human rights standards and mechanisms were formulated with greater specificity and in connection with the CSCE’s newly-coined “human dimension.”

For example, the Vienna Mechanism enabled states to request information, hold meetings, and raise and discuss human rights violations among participating states (OSCE 2007, 92, 6). Moreover, three subsequent “human dimension conferences” were scheduled to take place in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990) and Moscow (1991), which would considerably develop the institution’s democratic norm set. Especially notable at the first human dimension (HD) conference in Paris from May to June 1989 was the veritable sea change in rhetoric from the Warsaw Pact states. For example, Foreign Minister Olechowski of Poland stated that the question of human rights had lost much of its ideological weight, as it was increasingly a basis for cooperation among states.\textsuperscript{33} Nevertheless, the first HD conference (Paris, May-June 1989) did not result in an outcome document. The greatest strides in democratic norm development would take place just a few months later, after the popular protests in late summer and autumn of 1989 that forced open parts of the Iron Curtain and dismantled the Berlin Wall.

It is clear that there were both successes and failures in developing human rights norms in the CSCE between 1973 and 1989. A critic might argue that the inclusive institutional structure

\textsuperscript{31} However, progress was made in negotiations to release high numbers of Jews and prisoners from the Soviet Union. Kampelman, Max. U.S. Ambassador to CSCE Madrid Follow-up Meeting, 1980-1983. Interview conducted by Sarah Snyder, July 2010, OSCE Oral History Project, Interview 2, (see OSCE forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{32} Western states submitted proposals to the 1985 Ottawa Expert Meeting on Human Rights emphasizing, for example, elimination of all forms of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and access to information, whereas Warsaw Pact states countered with proposals on eliminating homelessness, the right to education, the right to highest standards of health care, the right to work, and freedom from hunger and undernourishment. Meeting of Experts on Human Rights Ottawa, 7 May to 17 June 1985, CSCE/OME.12, 13, 14, 19, 40 (restrict).

\textsuperscript{33} Statement by. Mr. Tadeusz Olechowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Poland at the First Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Paris, 30 May, 1989, 3.
remained constant during this period, and therefore other factors must have been decisive. How and under what conditions was the CSCE’s formal, inclusive institutional structure influential?

In proposition I-1, I argued that debates which end in deadlock in inclusive IOs may, in fact, serve a useful purpose for future negotiations. Where impasses have occurred in negotiations, delegates are acutely aware of points of contention. Evidence from CSCE meetings shows that lengthy negotiations in Belgrade, Madrid, Ottawa, and Bern resulted in finer-grained articulation of states’ positions, also formulated in response to critique and opposing perspectives. For example, during the Cold War, there was often deadlock between Warsaw Pact states emphasizing that economic and social rights, such as an adequate standard of living, health care, and education, as well as the right to work, should be treated as having equal value and importance to civil and political rights, while Western states strongly emphasized civil and political rights. In 1989, although Warsaw Pact states remained committed to social and economic rights, there was a gradual opening to elaborating the previously submitted proposals on civil and political rights. This trend was highlighted in January 1989 by Mr. Peter Várkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, who noted that it was a favorable new development that there were similarities in the positions of states belonging to different groups, and that the need to identify common interests weakened the bloc-to-bloc approach of previous Follow-up meetings, resulting in a number of proposals co-sponsored by members of different groups of states.

When participating states fail to agree on elaboration of norms in inclusive settings, the practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks. The practice of restating norms is a strategy often used in inclusive IOs. While restatements may appear to signify unremarkable progress, they serve an important function to maintain continuity (Thomas 2001, 196), and can contribute to norm development when greater political will exists. Thomas has argued that the restatement of Helsinki human

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34 Such meetings may also form networks of external supporters that play useful roles in more conducive times. Analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this project. See, for example, Sarah B. Snyder’s historical study on the Helsinki network of human rights activists (2011).


36 See, for example, Statement by Mr. Jaromír Johanes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, Paris Meeting of the CSCE, 31 May 1989. Unofficial translation in French.

37 Mr. Peter Várkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hungary, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 18 Jan. 1989, CSCE/WT/VR.11 (restrict), 30-31
rights norms in Belgrade and Madrid “guaranteed that they would remain on the political agenda in the intervening years” (2001, 196-7, 148; Farer 2004, 37). Without the restatements of Helsinki norms and the reconsideration of failed proposals in the CSCE’s inclusive institutions, progress was not likely to have been as readily attained in Vienna in 1989. At the opening of the Vienna follow-up conference, several state representatives commented on the value of the earlier Ottawa and Bern expert meetings in 1985 and 1986, despite their lack of tangible results. For example, in November 1986, Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, Secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church, Holy See, stated:

The experience of the Meetings of Experts has been positive. Even if, unfortunately, these meetings did not conclude with the publication of a final document, they nonetheless allowed us to work out numerous solutions and reflections which constitute a wealth of material which remains only to be used and to bear fruit. The Vienna Meeting is called upon to give this material the necessary attention.\(^{38}\)

Similarly, Mr. Sten Andersson, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden stated: “Those meetings were not outright failures. It is true that they failed to reach agreement on concluding documents. But they provided opportunities for exhaustive, comprehensive and frank discussions. They helped to shed light on the various ways of thinking and different priorities in the humanitarian sector.”\(^{39}\) Reinforcing these ideas, Mr. Péter Varkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary stated:

We feel that these [expert meetings] were useful, though some of them did not produce a written document. Nonetheless, the exchange of views have enriched the CSCE process with a number of important experiences, and we deem it necessary to consider at the Vienna Meeting the implementation of many proposals submitted in the course of those debates…The results achieved at the meeting of experts and the proposals and ideas which were raised there and which met wide-scale approval can serve as an important point of departure for the work of the subsidiary working bodies of the Vienna Meeting.\(^{40}\)

\(^{38}\) Statement by Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, Secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church, Holy See, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 24-25.

\(^{39}\) Statement by Mr. Sten Andersson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.3 (restrict), 35.

\(^{40}\) Statement by Mr. Péter Varkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hungary CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.3 (restrict), 5. Similar thoughts were also expressed in: Statement by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 19; Statement by Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Italy, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 4 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.2 (restrict), 44; Statement by Mr. Bohuslav Chňoupek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovakia, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR. 4 (restrict), 29; Statement by Mr. Jean Ausseil, Minister of State, Monaco, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 6 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.6 (restrict), 26; Statement by Mr. Pierre Aubert, Head of the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 7 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.7 (restrict), 4.
Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, added: “Austria sees these meetings as being very useful despite their regrettable lack of agreement on a final document. For especially in such controversial areas, where an agreement on substance is not always readily available, dialogue helps to elucidate our views on matters of principle.” And Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland expressed that “although proposals that do not reach consensus cease to formally exist after the respective meeting is over, they enrich the fabric of the co-operation within the CSCE and may prove timely in another context in the future.” The above statements convey that the Vienna follow-up meeting benefited from the substance of intermittent meetings held during less conducive circumstances. At the Vienna meeting’s closing session in January 1989, Mr. Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade of Iceland confirmed this by noting that this Meeting resumed the consideration of numerous proposals that had been tabled in the course of the three earlier rounds. While a number of new proposals were also considered, the Vienna meeting’s success was facilitated by a wealth of materials and insights generated from state representatives’ recurrent interactions in inclusive institutions.

If there are changes in political will in a state or group of states, such as occurred under the leadership of President Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, inclusive institutions enable states to easily and quickly assess where breakthroughs may be made. For example, during the Cold War, Western delegates consistently attempted to increase dialogue on human dimension issues beyond the follow-up meetings. Their proposals aiming to increase the frequency of meetings on the human dimension that failed to achieve consensus in Ottawa in 1985 were revived and re-inserted into the negotiations in Vienna in 1986-89, where delegates were able to establish a more extensive mechanism for monitoring human rights and to commit to holding three human dimension meetings in 1990-91. In relatively favorable circumstances, as existed in 1986-89, progress was likely, but not preordained. The above conveys that inclusive institutions, such as

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41 Statement by Dr. Peter Jankowitsch, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Austria, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 7 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.7 (restrict), 20.
42 Statement by Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Vienna, 5 Nov. 1986, CSCE/WT/VR.4 (restrict), 33.
44 See, for example, proposal submitted by the delegations of Liechtenstein, San Marino, Sweden, and Switzerland, Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, Ottawa, 27 May 1985, CSCE/OME.2 (restrict). Delegations of Austria and Spain supported the proposal.
the CSCE’s periodic meetings, serve to constructively channel actors’ willingness to cooperate, when present.

In proposition I-2, I argued that procedural legitimacy can contribute to the strength of a norm developed in an inclusive forum or to cooperation for its implementation. For example, Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland stated in 1975 that the results of the Helsinki Conference “will be much more widely accepted because they reflect the consensus of all and have the assent of all.”

President Graber of the Swiss Federation, agreed, yet issued a note of caution on the application of sovereign equality in the CSCE:

Unlike certain diplomatic congresses in the past, it was on the basis of the sovereign equality of participant States that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was prepared, convened and held...Although such a system did not simplify the discussions in Geneva, it had the merit of allowing the delegations of all the countries, big or small, to state their points of view freely and to participate actively in the elaboration of a common political document. In our opinion, this is an entirely legitimate right but implies as a necessary corollary responsible and measured behavior.

Similarly, in 1975 Prime Minister Jørgensen of Denmark stated: “Of course, decisions under a consensus procedure are unlikely to be perfect. But the fact that under this very procedure of consensus all participating States have accepted the decisions of the Conference in their entirety, is the basis of their strength.” These quotes warn of the obstacles that inclusive institutions encounter when consensus is hindered by states disinterested in compromise, yet they also highlight the promise of inclusive institutions’ legitimacy contributing to the strength of norms and states’ commitment to the agreed decisions.

In a bipolar international system, a critic might argue that progress on norm development in the CSCE depended simply on whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union could reach agreement. This argument is underdetermined, despite the kernel of truth it may hold. The presence of non-antagonistic leadership in the Soviet Union may have been a necessary factor for the elaboration of human rights implementation mechanisms in Vienna in the late 1980s, but it

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45 Statement by Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Cosgrave, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.3 (restrict), 19.
46 Statement by Mr. Graber, President of the Swiss Confederation, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.2 (restrict), 29-30. See also statements by Mr. Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (3-4), and Mr. Arias Navarro, Head of Government, Spain (39), First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.4 (restrict).
47 Statement by Mr. Jørgensen, Prime Minister of Denmark, First Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Stage III, Helsinki, 31 July 1975, CSCE/III/PV.4 (restrict), 16.
was not sufficient. Because of consensus decision-making, new approaches required agreement by all CSCE states, not simply the two superpowers. As Central European states broke with the Warsaw Pact, their independent changes in perspective also factored into reaching consensus.

Without the inclusive CSCE institutions, it is highly unlikely that the international community would have developed similar mechanisms for monitoring human rights commitments in Europe and the Soviet Union in 1986-89. The CSCE’s Vienna mechanism responded directly to Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act and evolutions in its third basket; thus it was a unique product of the history of the interaction of states within the CSCE. The third basket itself was a result of inclusive negotiations. If this precursor to the human dimension had been less inclusive, its legitimacy would not have survived the Cold War. The EU or Council of Europe, with much smaller memberships, were not in a position in the late 1980s to elaborate commitments and monitoring mechanisms for non-member states which had not yet received accession perspectives, e.g. in Central or Southeastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled ambassadors and diplomats (rather than heads of state and foreign ministers) to negotiate incrementally on human rights norms at the Vienna follow-up meeting of 1986-89. In the absence of the inclusive CSCE, much higher levels of political will and engagement, on par with what we observed in 1973-75, would have been needed to launch human rights norms and monitoring mechanisms for the region. As will be shown, it was not until 1990 that the highest levels of political leadership became most active in attempting to develop democratic norms at international level. In other words, there would not have been sufficient motivation among leaders of the states involved to capitalize on ideological shifts in the absence of inclusive CSCE institutions in 1986-89. It was not simply the easing of Cold War tensions that led to more significant CSCE human rights mechanisms in Vienna in 1986-89. Inclusive institutions contributed significantly by providing a foundation and structure for negotiations in which, despite disagreement, states’ positions on human rights issues were elaborated and refined, thus serving as a basis for new democracy commitments in later years.

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48 On counterfactual analysis, see Fearon 1991.
49 It was not until 1993, when the EU issued an accession perspective to Central European states, that the EU drew on the CSCE’s democratic norm set for its Copenhagen political criteria used for accession. The European Convention on Human Rights would be applicable to the potential new members of the Council of Europe when they were given accession perspectives in the 1990s.
3.4. CSCE, 1990-1991: Inclusive institutions support the codification and development of a comprehensive set of democratic norms.

The CSCE’s inclusive structures and consensus rules scarcely posed an obstacle to the launch of a new set of democratic norms at the second Human Dimension (HD) conference in Copenhagen in June 1990. Moreover, the CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled much groundwork to be done in advance. Under conditions of high political will and minimal internal divisions, inclusive institutions enhanced the CSCE’s ability to develop democratic norms and implementation policies, thereby responding to states’ interest in receiving international support for democratic reforms.

1990-1991 were arguably the most glorious years in the history of the CSCE/OSCE. At the Summit held in Paris in November 1990, the 34 heads of state publicly celebrated the end of the Cold War, and in their speeches reveled in the as-yet-untested new opportunities for cooperation with human rights and democracy as a fundamental basis for international relations. Whereas at the first HD conference in Paris in mid-1989, delegates could not agree on a concluding document, just one year later the same proposals were reconsidered and expanded. The Copenhagen Document delivered unprecedented agreement on democratic norms related to elections, rule of law, and human rights, with high levels of specificity. It delineated the most comprehensive series of international commitments in existence at that time on pluralistic democracy, emphasizing, for example, judicial independence, civilian control of the military, separation between the State and political parties, the right of peaceful assembly, and set the stage for CSCE/OSCE work in election observation. Subsequently, in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which concluded the Paris Summit of November 1990, participating states declared: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations” (CSCE 1990b, 3). The Paris Summit also launched a new intensity in the CSCE’s institutionalization processes, including the establishment of a permanent Secretariat and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, which would become the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1992 (see OSCE 2007, 6-7). The third Human Dimension conference, held in Moscow just weeks after the averted August coup in 1991, elaborated the CSCE’s democratic norms to condemn the overthrow of legitimately elected governments, support judicial independence, professional conduct of law enforcement,

50 After the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the CSCE comprised 34 participating states.
freedom of the media, and rights during a state of public emergency (1991, 17.1-2; 19-20; 21-3; 26; 28). Especially relevant over the years has been the Moscow Document’s clause:

Participating states emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international order. They categorically and irrevocably declare that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned (1991, 29).

One condition facilitating democratic norm development in 1990 was certainly the interest of CSCE participating states in responding to what they viewed as the major domestic political issues in Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars propose that new ideas and norms develop in IOs as they respond to “what is happening out there in the world” (Weiss et al. 2005, 406-7). Indeed, Central and Eastern European states in the early 1990s were making extensive constitutional reforms and designing legislation on democratic elections, political parties, civil society, and human rights; CSCE institutional reforms to assist these processes were seen as valuable precisely at this point. Similarly, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia underscored the need for greater international resolve on minority rights. This suggests the significance of clearly identifiable needs and demands of key participating states, and that consensus for developing democratic norms and implementation mechanisms in inclusive IOs arises partly in response to crises or the high politics of the day.

Yet streamlined interests, needs, or a conducive normative environment alone do not explain how the CSCE was able to make progress so quickly in 1990. Here the inclusive institutional structures played a major role. Through the recurring CSCE meetings in the 1980s, CSCE states were acutely aware of their points of contention. Inclusive institutions enabled much of the groundwork to be done in advance. When a change of circumstances and leadership occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, delegates were easily able to assess where they could break through earlier impasses. This feature of inclusive institutions is underemphasized in the literature. For example, highlighting issues which had previously failed to achieve consensus yet were placed again onto the agenda and agreed upon in 1990 in Copenhagen, Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky of Hungary stated:

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51 Italics added.
52 Author’s interview with Alice Němcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 Feb. 2009.
We continue to regard as valid the proposals which we submitted at last year’s meeting in Paris. Hungary is interested in the conclusion of the present meeting with the adoption of a document reflecting the spirit of the construction of a new Europe…It should lay down the basic criteria of democracy and the rule of law…and it should refer to the importance of inter-state cooperation for the enforcement of democracy and the rule of law and for the creation of a European legal space, and…the concrete modalities of further developing the human dimension mechanism.\textsuperscript{53}

Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio of Finland emphasized a similar point, stating: “the work of this Conference as defined in its mandate is on practical proposals. A host of them were made at the Paris Meeting a year ago. Many of them merit further consideration here.”\textsuperscript{54}

Without the inclusive structure provided by the CSCE and its history of earlier attempts to develop human rights and democracy commitments, it is highly unlikely that such a comprehensive set of democratic norms would have been developed in 1990 by the international community for application in the region. Moreover, in retrospect we see the limited window of opportunity in which broad consensus was attained. This window began to close at the end of 1991 with the end of Gorbachev’s presidency and the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, which created new international priorities and increased the number of CSCE participating states, making consensus in a group with more diverse priorities more difficult to achieve. The CSCE meetings in Ottawa, Vienna, and Paris in 1985-89 were eventually of immense benefit to the preparations of delegates in Copenhagen and Paris in 1990. Many of the proposals tabled at the 1990 Copenhagen Human Dimension (HD) meeting had been considered and refined at the 1989 HD meeting in Paris, which in turn built from third basket negotiations during the 1986-1989 follow-up meeting in Vienna. In the words of Alice Němcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant at the Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat; “it was like a reservoir that exploded at Copenhagen.”\textsuperscript{55}

In the absence of the CSCE, would other actors in the international community have generated such a norm set in these years? It is unlikely that the EU would have done so prior to 1993, the first point at which such norms were needed as guideposts for the future accession of Central European states. The Council of Europe, which began to admit Central European states in 1990, had a set of human rights norms and a few less comprehensive Parliamentary Assembly

\textsuperscript{53} Statement at the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 6 June 1990, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{54} Statement at the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 5 June 1990, 3.
\textsuperscript{55} Author’s interview, OSCE Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, December 2010.
resolutions on democratic governance dating to the mid-1980s applicable to its member states. However, a review of the Council of Europe’s *acquis* on democratic governance shows that its democratic norms did not expand between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s.\(^{56}\) The CSCE was the only regional institution at the time to comprise states of North America, Europe, and the USSR, and the CSCE’s democratic norms were applicable to its participating states, whereas EU or Council of Europe norms would only apply directly to the smaller group of EU member states or to states with membership prospects.\(^{57}\) Another distinction is that the CSCE’s democratic norm set arose in response to needs expressed by its own participating states in transition, whereas democratic norms of exclusive IOs often arise in response to the needs of their current members and the IOs themselves, for example, to clarify democratic expectations for accession of new states. In 1990-91, there was a unique broad base of commitment by CSCE states with wide variations in democratic development, including the two superpowers. The CSCE’s inclusive institutions, which were able to draw on their history of negotiations of human rights and democracy commitments, were well-placed to capitalize on the changes in political will in 1990-91.

At the same time, the concept of inclusiveness itself in the CSCE began to evolve away from traditional understandings of sovereign equality. As host of the Paris Summit, President Mitterrand of France acknowledged the “right of all to a voice, in preference to a tête-à-tête among a select few,” yet also qualified his ideas of sovereign equality with democratic principles: “Around this table, we have neither victors nor vanquished but 34 countries equal in dignity…countries which have endowed themselves, or which will inevitably endow themselves with institutions and leaders chosen freely in the framework of states respectful of the rule of law.”\(^{58}\) Leaders of a few states such as Romania and Yugoslavia, however, retained and invoked the conventional sense of sovereign equality as a means of resisting external pressure.\(^{59}\)

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\(^{58}\) Statement by Mr. François Mitterand, President of the Republic of France at Paris Summit of the CSCE Nov. 1990 CSCE/SP/VR.1. 1.

\(^{59}\) Statement by Mr. Ion Iliescu, President of the Republic of Romania at Paris Summit of the CSCE, Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.4. See also Statement by Mr. Borislav Jovic, President of Yugoslavia at Paris Summit of the CSCE,
Nevertheless, the concept of sovereignty in 1990-91 was shifting to entail not only human rights, but also more explicit ideas of popular sovereignty and rule of law.

3.5. CSCE, 1992-1994: Norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality are qualified by democratic governance; inclusive institutions support the CSCE’s institutionalization.

In 1992-1994, the CSCE’s new norms of democratic governance continued to constrain its longstanding norms of inclusiveness and sovereign equality. In other words, ideas of inclusiveness evolved in the early 1990s to assume less democratic states’ ongoing transitions. As in 1990-91, the CSCE’s continued institutionalization was facilitated by its inclusive institutions.

Between 1991 and 1994, the number of CSCE participating states rose from 34 to 52. The independence of former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia multiplied the number of veto points in the inclusive CSCE’s consensus decision-making. Moreover, the foreign policies of the new CSCE participating states tended to be concerned foremost with their nearest neighbors. One consequence of the increase in number of participating states was thus a narrowing of the scope of problems to be addressed.

The time for grand geopolitical rhetoric was over, and this affected the types of democracy commitments that were viewed as most important to expand. As Prime Minister Carlsson of Sweden stated in December 1994; “The world did not turn out to be quite as new and harmonious as we hoped, when the Charter of Paris was adopted four years ago.” Now, many echoed the sentiments of U.S. President Clinton: “We must work to prevent future Bosnias. And we must build the structures that will help newly-free nations to complete their transformation successfully to free market democracies and preserve their own freedom.” Thus, consensus in the CSCE of the mid-1990s arose to respond more effectively to new European security threats, including nationalism and xenophobia, and decreased attention was paid to elaborating international norms on structural components of democratic societies, which had flourished in 1990-91. Rather, the focus of OSCE democracy support shifted to the operational realm.

Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.3. See also Klein (1974) who demonstrates similar uses of sovereign equality in the inter-American system.

60 These included: Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1991; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in 1992; and Slovak Republic in 1993. Russia assumed the Soviet Union’s membership in 1991, and the Czech Republic assumed Czechoslovakia’s membership in 1993.

61 Statement by Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 Dec. 1994.

62 Statement by Mr. William Clinton, President of the United States, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 Dec. 1994, 2.
1992-1994 was a period of brisk institutionalization for the CSCE. Participating states supported expanding CSCE institutions to enable the CSCE to respond more effectively to crises. Preventive diplomacy and crisis management were high priorities in 1992-94, as were developing peacekeeping capacity and establishing long-term missions to assist participating states in implementing CSCE commitments. The sustained frequency of high-level meetings is one indicator of CSCE participating states’ strong commitment to the institution in these years. The 1992 Helsinki Summit enhanced the role of ODHR and established a High Commissioner on National Minorities (Sections VI, II; Němcová 2010, 9). CSCE field missions began in 1992 in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, Skopje, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Estonia; and in 1993 missions began in Latvia and Moldova; these would serve as key instruments for implementing the organization’s democracy commitments. Of great significance was the EU’s signal in 1993 of its openness to Central European states’ potential membership, as well as NATO’s announcement in 1994 of its decision to expand eastward. As Colin Munro notes; “At Budapest [in 1994], Heads of State or Government did still take the CSCE seriously. But it was evident already then, as the processes of EU and NATO enlargement gathered momentum, that its future place in European security architecture would be uncertain” (2010, 11). Russia had hoped that the CSCE’s role would become more prominent on the continent; thus it would have an equal voice on major issues of security in Europe. “The Budapest decision to turn the CSCE into the OSCE was a compromise, between the United States, which at that time could not envisage its Senate ratifying any treaty, and Russia, which wanted a treaty-based OSCE to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact” (Munro 2010, 11). Thus, the 1994 Budapest Summit established new institutions and procedures for the OSCE such as: a Council of Ministers to meet in years without a Summit; a Senior Council; a Permanent Council in Vienna; a yearly rotating Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and a Secretary General (CSCE 1994, I: 16-20). In contrast to the ad-hoc nature of CSCE Summits and Ministerial Council Meetings, the OSCE Permanent Council would become a stable institution for regular discussion of implementation of human dimension commitments (CSCE 1994, VIII: 5).

“Many of the newly independent States sought membership in the CSCE for its swift, non-restrictive and co-operative recognition” (Němcová 2010, 8). This is true, yet nearly synchronized with their admission were enhanced qualifications on the terms of participation.
By 1992, the corpus of CSCE norms, which new participating states accepted upon admission, assumed their ongoing transition to democratic states and linked democratic governance with states’ participation in the CSCE. For example, the Helsinki 1992 Summit Document stated:

We welcome the commitment of all participating States to our shared values. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, democracy, the rule of law, economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are our common aims. They are immutable. Adherence to our commitments provides the basis for participation and co-operation in the CSCE and a cornerstone for further development of our societies (CSCE 1992, 6, italics added).

This pressure on the new participating states continued in subsequent years. At the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome, “The Ministers underlined the importance of the Human Dimension in the further integration of the recently admitted participating States” (CSCE 1993, 2).

The only case (to date) of suspension of a CSCE/OSCE participating state occurred in 1992 with the suspension of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This was an important, but unique, exception to the CSCE’s policy of formal inclusiveness, based on non-compliance with CSCE norms. In 1991, CSCE Ministers simply “expressed their friendly concern and their support for democratic development” in Yugoslavia (CSCE 1991c, 9). Meanwhile, they admitted Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and undertook missions in the area in 1992, yet there were ongoing debates on the legal foundations of Yugoslavia’s recognition in the CSCE and the UN. In January 1992, the CSCE established at the Prague Ministerial Council a new decision-making procedure of consensus-minus-one: “Appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments.” (CSCE 1992a, IV: 16). This procedure, a move away from full inclusiveness, permitted the suspension of Yugoslavia just before the Helsinki Summit on July 8, 1992.

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63 New participating states accepted the CSCE acquis, including the critical passage from the 1991 Moscow document: “We emphasize that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” (CSCE 1992, 8).

64 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia experienced a different type of exception to formal inclusiveness; its admission was blocked by Greece between 1992 and 1995, despite UN membership in 1993, due to the dispute over its name.

Participating states were no longer perceived simply as sovereign states, but the characteristic of (aspirations towards) democratic governance qualified sovereign equality and participation. President Bush of the U.S. took a harsher line; “Those who violate the CSCE’s norms must be singled out, criticized, isolated, even punished by sanctions. Let Serbia’s absence today serve as a clear message to others.”66 An open question was how seriously the CSCE would take this. These trends continued in the 1994 Budapest Summit Declaration, which continued to wrap ideas of sovereign equality in layers of democratic values and human rights:

The CSCE’s democratic values are fundamental to our goal of a community of nations with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign equality and the independence of all States are fully respected, there are no spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or of belonging to a minority, are vigorously protected. (CSCE 1994, 7).

Therefore, 1992-94 is characterized by the qualification of sovereign equality in the CSCE with ideas of democratic governance.

3.6. OSCE, 1995-1999: Inclusive institutions continue to sustain policy implementation of its mandate to support democratic governance.

The OSCE’s inclusive institutions, in the general absence of major contention on issues of support for democratic governance in 1995-1999, enabled the organization to respond to many current issues, with a focus in the mid-1990s on strengthening conflict prevention, early warning and crisis management, and on elements of democracy such as freedom of expression, free media, respect for human and minority rights, and the rule of law. In this section, I also analyze debates on the consensus principle in the 1990s that highlighted key tensions between sovereign equality, legitimacy, and institutional effectiveness.

In January 1995, the CSCE formally became the OSCE, and while its efforts at norm development in the following years concentrated more heavily on issues of security,67 the OSCE’s operational work was buoyed from its success in supervising elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and assisting implementation of the Dayton peace plan. Existing long-term

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66 Statement by Mr. George Bush, President of the United States, CSCE Helsinki Summit, 9 July 1992, CSCE/HS/VR.3, 58.
67 The 1996 Lisbon Summit issued a Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe, which led to the Charter for European Security adopted at the 1999 Istanbul Summit.
field missions continued, and several new field offices were opened. A post of OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media was created in 1997 and the OSCE’s work in Estonia and Latvia and through the High Commissioner on National Minorities was highly recognized by some state representatives and members of the international community (Heidenhain 2004). Also expressing satisfaction, President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan stated in 1999, “Collaboration with the OSCE – and especially with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National Minorities – is proving effective in supporting our efforts to consolidate the culture of democracy, tolerance and pluralism in a multinational and multiconfessional Kyrgyzstan.”

Overshadowing these priorities, however, were broader debates on the future security architecture of Europe. CIS states were concerned about and opposed to NATO enlargement and thus sought a more prominent role for the OSCE. For example, at the Lisbon Summit in 1996, Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin appealed: “The OSCE should assume the role of a focal point for all-European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” U.S. Vice President Al Gore retorted: “The OSCE does not need to be transformed into the only orchestrating instrument of European security…we believe that the OSCE will succeed best on the basis of its flexible political commitments.” Over time, OSCE participating states’ differing opinions about Serbia, Belarus, and Chechnya also chipped away at political will to cooperate. In 1996, the OSCE was the only international organization involved in Chechnya. According to the Prime Minister of Iceland, “It was invited to do so because it had a legitimate claim to intervene. That in turn was a consequence of commitments given within the OSCE.” In 1996, Russia expressed gratitude to the Assistance Group in Chechnya working to restore peace. But this good will diminished

68 New offices were opened in Croatia and Uzbekistan in 1996, Albania in 1997, and Belarus, Kazakhstan (Almaty), Turkmenistan (Ashgabat), Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek), and Tajikistan (Dushanbe) in 1998.

69 See also statement by the British Prime Minister at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/142/96, 3. However, in 1999 the Estonian Prime Minister criticized the OSCE response and the High Commissioner on National Minorities for selectivity. Statement by Mr. Mart Laar, Prime Minister of Estonia at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/44/99, 1.

70 Statement by Mr. A. Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/1/99, 3.


72 Statement by Mr. Al Gore, Vice President of the United States at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/137/96.

73 Statement by Mr. David Oddson, Prime Minister of Iceland, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996. REF.S/147/96.

74 Statement by Mr. V.S. Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 December 1996, REF.S/132/96.
by the 1999 Istanbul Summit, where President Yeltsin argued, albeit defensively, against intervention.”\(^75\) Indeed, German Chancellor Schröder aimed a strong statement at the Russian leadership: “resolve the conflict by political means! Respect the OSCE Principles and Obligations which we all accepted! Do not undermine the credibility of these Principles and thus the Organization as a whole! They are a *sine qua non* for lasting peace in Europe.”\(^76\) Disputes about the use of force by NATO in Kosovo added to Russia’s claims, and a decade which began with Russia seeking OSCE states’ assistance for its democratic transition ended with increasing challenges to OSCE mandates.

While in 1995-1999 sovereign equality continued to be qualified with ideas of democratic governance, another justification for qualifying sovereignty appeared: primary threats to security increasingly arose from within states rather than between them.\(^77\) The conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo contributed to debates on humanitarian intervention, where sovereignty of the state would be questioned when it is unable or unwilling to protect its inhabitants.\(^78\) At the same time, assertions of traditional understandings of sovereignty were heard more frequently from CIS states.

In the mid-1990s, Belarus was among the first states to challenge policies for implementing the OSCE’s human dimension commitments. While some of its complaints were smokescreens, Belarus was defensive about criticism of its 1995 constitutional referendum and displeased that after withdrawing nuclear weapons from its territory, other states had not followed suit.\(^79\) It began to reintroduce authoritarian ideology to OSCE debates.\(^80\) Small states can have disproportionately positive or negative effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation processes. “It does happen that a country can punch beyond its size. A small country agitates itself with more difficulty. A small country may not have the right kind of

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\(^{75}\) Statement by President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.27/99.

\(^{76}\) Statement by Mr. Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at the OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999. US President Bill Clinton associated himself with these remarks. Remarks of the President at Opening of the OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.26/99. See also Statement by the President of Finland, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov 1999. SUM.DEL/20/99.


\(^{78}\) See Statement by António Guterres, Prime Minister of Portugal, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/76/99.

\(^{79}\) Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96.

\(^{80}\) Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.
backup. But if it has an idea and if it has a sense of direction with that idea…within the UN it can work a great deal” (Weiss et al. 2005, 368-9). In the negative sense, the above quote is even more relevant to the OSCE because in the OSCE the principle of sovereign equality is operationalized by full consensus decision-making. Thus, the opposition of simply one state can pose formidable obstacles to norm development. In other words, the OSCE’s inclusive structures enable small countries to markedly “punch above their weight,” since just one state can thwart initiatives with an effective veto.

Over the years, there had been a few attempts to restrict the inclusiveness of CSCE/OSCE institutions with the aim of enabling the organization to support democracy more efficiently. For example, in 1990 Denmark proposed a Human Dimension Committee with a rotating chairperson to inquire about human rights abuses and consider communications from individuals, which would consist of seven elected experts from participating states. This proposal deviated from the CSCE’s inclusive modus operandi, but was justified by claiming that a body comprising all CSCE member states would not be as effective in carrying out all of the functions such a Committee might undertake. However, this proposal did not meet with consensus at the 1990 Paris Summit. By the mid-1990s, the evolving, more autonomous CSCE institutions such as the Secretariat and ODIHR enabled it to take action in some operational areas without consensus; however, high-level decision-making at Summits and Councils of Ministers, Senior Officials, and the Permanent Council, which guided the work of the Secretariat and ODIHR, remained governed by consensus.

Further explicitly challenging the norm of consensus, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) recommended at the 1994 Budapest Summit that “the CSCE improve its decision-making procedures by requiring an approximate consensus, rather than the presently required unanimity.” This sparked a flurry of statements in defense of consensus by the smaller states. Entrenched interests have made consensus procedures very difficult to change.

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81 Non-paper submitted by the delegation of Denmark on Establishment of a Committee on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. Committee for the Preparation of a Summit Meeting in Paris, Vienna, 31 October 1990. This reiterated elements of the proposal submitted by the Delegation of Denmark to the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension, which did not find consensus in Copenhagen. CSCE/CHDC.8, June 6, 1990.
82 Ibid.
83 Statement by Mr. Frank Swaelen, President of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, CSCE Budapest Summit, 2 December 1994.
84 Statement by HE Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic of Latvia, CSCE Budapest Summit, 6 December 1994; Statement by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 December 1994; Statement of Prof. Anibal Cavavo Silva, Prime Minister of Portugal, CSCE Budapest Summit, 6 December 1994;
revise the OSCE’s consensus principle continued in 1995-1999. These came from both large and small states and included proposals such as establishing a consultative committee to advise the Permanent Council or Chairperson in Office. One of the most steadfast advocates of decision-making reform has been the OSCE PA, whose decisions are made by majority vote (OSCE 2007, 14). “It is hardly democratic when a single country can block the common will of 53 others and can prevent essential and timely action when it is needed,” argued Helle Degen, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Yet the OSCE PA lacks formal status in OSCE decision-making. The parliamentarians submit recommendations for consideration and are active in election observation and assisting field missions, but since they often represent political parties other than that of a state’s foreign ministry, the political power of the OSCE PA has been limited. The OSCE PA’s arguments were echoed by President Schuster of the Slovak Republic: “in certain extreme cases of clear, serious and repeated breaches of basic commitments to the OSCE, it is necessary to take measures to maintain the credibility of our organization, even without the consent from the state involved.”

In 1996, Prime Minister Horn of Hungary highlighted tensions between sovereign equality and institutional effectiveness:

We have to preserve the sovereign equality of OSCE participating states which allows each and every one of them to identify with the organization, to express its views in appropriate forms and to take part in the decision-making process….Along with the principle of consensus, we should make it possible for the OSCE to act even in instances where certain objections might jeopardize the dynamism generated by an overwhelming majority view. In these cases, jointly decided action should serve the defense of common values that lie at the heart of the OSCE.

Counterarguments to preserving the consensus rule were made by the leaders of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, the UK, and the Executive Secretary of the CIS in 1996 and by Croatia and Luxembourg in 1999. Several of these states opposing changes to consensus rules

Statement by Mr. Ion Iliescu, President of Romania, CSCE Budapest Summit, 8 December 1994; Statement by Dr. Franjo Tudman, President of the Republic of Croatia, CSCE Budapest Summit, Dec. 1994.
86 Statement by Mrs. Helle Degen, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, 4. See also Statement by Mr. Gyula Horn, Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF.S/157/96.
87 Statement by Mr. Rudolf Schuster, President of the Slovak Republic, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999, SUM.GAL/65/99.
89 Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96; Statement by Mr. Lennart Meri, President of Estonia, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/144/96; Statement by Mr. Guntis Ulmanis, President of Latvia, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996,
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(Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Croatia, and most CIS states) were comparatively small states in which OSCE missions were present. Prime Minister Blair of the U.K echoed their arguments: “I believe in a strong OSCE, able to operate effectively. I also believe we should avoid institutional changes which reduce its flexibility or the equality of status of all its members. All member states, including the smallest, have the right to be heard, to bring their concerns to the organization and to use the OSCE’s potential to address them.”

Tensions between large and small states, however, are not fully assuaged by consensus decision-making, since informal institutions exist that can also be viewed as exclusive. References to these CSCE practices appear, however, infrequently in official statements. Exceptionally, a Soviet delegate to the Moscow HD Conference in 1991 revealed: “To reinforce the businesslike atmosphere at our meeting I would like to suggest that we start without delay discussing the submitted proposals in the working bodies, also making use of the helpful experience of setting up informal groups. As we all know it is there that concluding documents are conceived.”

In 1999, the President of Latvia issued a critique of this practice: “In the search for consensus and in the desire to preserve flexibility, we should also strengthen transparency and inclusiveness. Being a small state we prefer to see decisions prepared in the plenary hall, even if it takes longer discussions, rather than in secluded rooms where not all are present.”

The above examples underscore that small states generally place high importance on institutions’ inclusivity, which confers greater legitimacy on decisions, because all states are able to contribute to discussions, as argued in proposition I-2. At the same time, some democratic small states have made qualified critiques of consensus procedures when they view these procedures as contributing to sub-optimal outcomes.

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REF.S/149/96; Statement by the President of the Republic of Turkey, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996.
REF.S/111/96; Written Contribution of the Commonwealth of Independent States, presented by the CIS Executive Secretary, Mr. Ivan Korotchenya, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF.S/158/96: Statement by Mr. Zlatko Mateša, Prime Minister of Croatia, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/16/99; Statement by Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/25/99.
90 Statement by Mr. Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/142/96.
91 Italics added. Unofficial translation. Talking points for the speech made by Mr. Y.S. Deriabin, Co-Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Moscow HD Conference, 12 September 1991.
92 Statement by Mr. Andris Šķēle, Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/60/99.
Therefore, in 1995-1999 we observe the broad expansion of the OSCE’s field operations and election observation program through which it elaborated and strengthened the implementation of its democratization mandate. However, debates about consensus decision-making indicate that some actors sought ways in which decisions might be made more efficiently to support monitoring of the OSCE’s human dimension commitments. The above discussion highlights tensions that were also raised in theoretical proposition I-5(a). A growing number of actors from established and recently consolidated democratic states were interested in more substantial support for democratization in the OSCE area, yet were growing impatient with consensus-decision making in the OSCE’s inclusive institutions.

3.7. OSCE, 2000-2004: Inclusive institutions encounter a gradual increase in challenges to policy implementation for democracy support, with mixed effects.

In 2000-2004, there was a gradual increase of challenges to the OSCE’s support of democratic governance. Whereas challenges from Russia and its allies in 1995-1999 were mainly defensive in nature and in response to criticism, in the 2000s, their challenges slowly became more assertive. In these years, and in contrast to 1975, issue linkage had negative implications, as Russia’s frustrations on security issues adversely affected the implementation of the OSCE’s democracy agenda. This time period also demonstrates the vulnerability of IOs’ implementing agencies to inter-governmental debate. Furthermore, no OSCE Summits took place between 1999 and 2010, which is an indicator of decreased political will to work through the OSCE in this decade. Under conditions of increased contention, as suggested in theoretical proposition I-5, the less efficient functioning and inability of inclusive institutions to produce outcomes desired by key states generally led to decreased high-level engagement and diminished prestige of the organization.

In the early 2000s, there was a shift in emphasis in the human dimension towards less controversial issues such as tolerance and non-discrimination, Roma and Sinti issues, human trafficking and gender equality. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a heavy emphasis appeared on new security threats, and issues of democratic governance were increasingly framed in the context of combating terrorism rather than as objectives in their own

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93 A Declaration on Trafficking in Human Beings was adopted in 2002, a detailed Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings was adopted in 2003 (OSCE 2002, III; OSCE 2003, Annex to Decision No. 2/03), as did a comprehensive Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti (OSCE 2003, Decision No. 3/03).
ODIHR’s efforts, however, especially in the area of election observation, continued to evolve in this time period, with its methodology becoming more sophisticated. Field missions similarly carried on with their country-specific mandates although some governments began to challenge human dimension projects of the OSCE field offices, particularly in Central Asia. The OSCE’s Assistance Group to Chechnya was closed in March 2003. On the other hand, OSCE support continued to be well appreciated in the Western Balkans, as it helped these states make progress with their primary foreign policy goals of working towards European Union accession.

In 2000-2004 we observe a more stereotypical feature of inclusive organizations: inclusiveness often leads to deadlock, as raised in theoretical proposition I-1. Several points of contention during the early 2000s inhibited consensus and clouded debates on all other areas, including in the human dimension. Significantly, at Ministerial Council meetings in the mid-2000s, EU and NATO member states criticized the Russian Federation for non-compliance with commitments in the Istanbul Summit Declaration, in particular for not withdrawing troops and ammunition from Georgia and Moldova. This prevented several Western states’ ratification of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, a Russian priority. It also became clear that the OSCE would not evolve into an alternative to NATO and there were no signs of consensus on the issue of creating a legal basis for the OSCE, further fuelling Russia’s dissatisfaction with the organization in these years. Inclusive institutions requiring consensus would face impasses from any state (e.g. Belarus) determined to block progress in the human dimension; however, Russia’s engagement added further weight.

One might imagine that the ODIHR, as a more autonomous body of the OSCE, would be better insulated from disagreements at inter-governmental level, and thus able to continue to develop programs to implement the OSCE’s democracy support mandate regardless of

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94 See the Bucharest Ministerial Council’s decision and Action Plan on Terrorism (OSCE 2001, III; OSCE 2002, 3; see also OSCE 2003, 4).
95 In the Istanbul Summit Declaration, sections 15-17 discuss Russian-Georgian relations, including reduction of military equipment, and sections 18-19 address the situation in Transdnistria, including the withdrawal of Russian troops (OSCE 1999, 49-50).
97 Ibid.
opposition of one or a few states. However, as argued in proposition I-4, inclusive intergovernmental fora often have roles in periodically reviewing and endorsing (or inhibiting) IOs’ implementation efforts. The ODIHR is guided by the Permanent Council in Vienna (which meets weekly and also affects the budget) and by the yearly Ministerial Council meetings, both of which operate by consensus. At the same time, some Ministerial Council resolutions are formulated in a way that is quite loose, and although general directions are given, there is room for interpretation. One mechanism that has evolved for the OSCE to support democratic governance projects in the absence of consensus is the system of extra-budgetary contributions. Every year, a wish-list of projects for democracy and human rights (at headquarters and in the field offices) is drafted and circulated to the OSCE participating states, after which most often North American and European states select the projects that best correspond with their foreign policy priorities for funding. These extra-budgetary contributions give the organization added flexibility, because of the absence of an inclusive intergovernmental forum in which the selected projects might otherwise be blocked. Russia has been increasingly critical of the system of extra-budgetary funds, arguing that it goes against the OSCE’s characteristic as a consensus-based organization. Nevertheless, governments of host states may still either welcome, scrutinize, or challenge the selected projects in their countries, and the larger mandates of field offices are subject to yearly renewal by the Ministerial Council. Therefore, while the OSCE has some tools by which it can circumvent inter-governmental deadlock to support democratic development, its programs nevertheless depend on the interests of host states in cooperation, and the ODIHR is constrained to operating within the general mandates provided by the inclusive Permanent and Ministerial Councils.

The 2000s show some opposite trends to 1975, when inclusive CSCE negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues were able to make progress on human rights even in less conducive contexts. In contrast to 1975, Russia’s frustrations with the OSCE on issues of security in the 2000s have negatively affected the human dimension. For years, Russia had attempted to strengthen the organization’s work on politico-military aspects of security over the human

98 Author’s telephone interview with OSCE/ODIHR staff, Warsaw, May 2011.
99 Ibid.
100 Unfortunately, data on the amounts provided by specific states for extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE are confidential.
102 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 18 Dec. 2008.
dimension, which received what Russia and several CIS states considered to be disproportionate emphasis in OSCE operations. In 1975, Soviet interests in side issues such as securing borders eventually facilitated compromises on human rights. In the 2000s, there was an absence of comparable side issues with similar appeal. Supporting theoretical proposition I-3, this example shows that in inclusive institutions, lack of progress or dissatisfaction in one issue area (in this case, security) can negatively affect cooperation in the human dimension.

In 2003-04, OSCE election observers in Russia and other CIS states “pointed out serious shortcomings that not only prevented the characterization of electoral activities as a genuine democratic contest but also raised the risk of a possible reversal of democratic achievements in some countries” (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 34), the EU and NATO enlarged to Russia’s borders, and the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine. Although these factors have contributed to President Putin’s reassertion of Russian interests in the OSCE, I will argue in chapter 4 that status considerations have also contributed to impairing the OSCE’s previously more cooperative working environment. Russia and several CIS states launched a series of critiques alleging political motivation in the OSCE’s human dimension work which gained momentum in the mid- to late 2000s. Subsequently, the claim of “double standards” resurfaced more prominently with the argument, for example, that ODIHR should also be interested, for example, in new human rights legislation in the United States and the situation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Over time, because consensus in the Ministerial Council and Permanent Council was becoming more difficult to reach on classic human dimension issues, the ODIHR and democratic OSCE participating states were placed in an increasingly defensive position. At the Sofia Ministerial Council in 2004, Russia argued: “The priority area of work for the OSCE in 2005 must be a comprehensive reform of its structures, specialized institutions, field activities, and system of financing.”

Because of the heightened disagreement on human dimension issues and a general deterioration of cooperative spirit, inclusive institutions in the 2000s gradually lost their efficiency and the OSCE was forced into a period of self-reflection of its institutions and

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103 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 18 Dec. 2008.
105 Ibid, 3.
procedures. Therefore, in 2000-04, the OSCE’s inclusive institutions were vulnerable to several trends – negative issue linkage contributing to deadlock (I-3), implementing agencies negatively affected by inter-governmental discord (I-4), and decreased motivation of key states committed to substantive outcomes (I-5a) - which compounded with shifting global priorities to other world regions to restrict the OSCE’s ability to further develop democratic norms and implementation policies.

3.8. OSCE, 2005-2010: Inclusive institutions contribute to impasses on democratic norm development and policy implementation, yet issues remain on the agenda.

The trends highlighted in section 3.7 continued in 2005-10. However, conditions surrounding the OSCE’s efforts to support democratic development became increasingly difficult, and several negotiation efforts involved restatements of democratic norms, as highlighted in theoretical proposition I-1. Interviewees cited 2005 as a turning point, marking a change in Russia’s participation in the OSCE, as it blocked more initiatives in areas such as elections, national minorities, and human rights defenders. Reactions to OSCE monitoring efforts reflected a changed tone. Whereas CIS states were cooperative in the 1990s, over time when they were asked to release a prisoner or to re-open a TV station, responses increasingly met with appeals to sovereignty and non-intervention and refusals to look into the situation. Similarly, an interviewee explained that, in this time period, projects in the human dimension in Central Asia often were not approved by their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. “There, some consider the field offices as maintaining a token presence mainly to keep dialogue going.”

Arguments over withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from Georgia and Moldova continued to impair the Ministerial Council meetings when Russia suspended implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Further, Russia’s restrictions on the terms of observation led ODIHR to cancel observation of its presidential election in late 2007, and Russia’s veto led to the closure of the OSCE office in Georgia in 2008. Similarly, in 2010 Belarus blocked consensus on the extension of the mandate of the OSCE office in its capital, Minsk, further reducing the number of OSCE field offices in operation. At the same time, some European countries became more reluctant to criticize non-democratic practices in the CIS

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108 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 30 Jan. 2009.
109 Author’s interview with OSCE staff, Warsaw, 8 Jan. 2009.
region because of dependence on Russian energy. In the OSCE, EU priorities became focused on less controversial issues which all of its members could agree to promote in Russia and other CIS states (e.g. tolerance and non-discrimination, gender, domestic violence), and there was a de-emphasis on promoting fundamental freedoms and structural elements of democracy. The strategic priorities of the United States and many European states also shifted from the OSCE region to other areas, particularly to Afghanistan and the Middle East.

The substantive emphasis of the OSCE’s human dimension in 2005-2010 remained fairly consistent with the half decade prior. Tolerance and non-discrimination, Roma and Sinti, migration, freedom of the media and human rights in the context of fighting terrorism were the least contentious areas receiving the most political attention for elaboration. As one diplomat argued, “the [democratic] norms have been watered down to a bare minimum.” Others stated: “We are not pushing to enlarge commitments,” and “we are playing defense.” Further, “the core acquis has not developed since the early 1990s. Today we are refining hate crimes definitions; this is not core political work.” Much deliberative energy was spent in the mid- to late 2000s on questions of OSCE reform. In 2005, a Panel of Eminent Persons recommended that:

The most important step towards a stronger and more relevant OSCE is a firm re-commitment to the standards and political commitments its leaders have signed up to since 1975…The Organization needs to create a stronger sense of common purpose among its participants, to make States feel that they have a stake in the Organization and that they are treated as equals (OSCE 2005, 9, italics added).

Therefore, in the late 2000s the OSCE’s inclusive institutions returned to a strategy used frequently during the Cold War: issuing restatements of democratic norms. This strategy was highlighted in theoretical proposition I-1. In the 2005-2010 time period, an important example of a restatement of democratic norms appeared in the 2008 OSCE Ministerial Declaration on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this declaration, OSCE participating states agreed, among other norms, on the following restatements:

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110 Author’s interview with Dr. Albrecht Rothacher, First Counsellor, European Commission, Delegation of the European Commission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 30 Jan. 2009.
111 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.
112 Author’s interview with Alice Němcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 Feb. 2009.
113 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 21 Jan. 2009.
114 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.
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We reaffirm that the commitments undertaken in the field of the OSCE human
dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do
not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned as stipulated in the
1991 Moscow document…

We remain committed to undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy in
our countries.\(^\text{116}\)

The latter clause originally appeared in the 1990 Charter of Paris. The four-page Astana Summit
Declaration of 2010 availed of a similar strategy. The Astana Declaration restated the above-
quoted clause from the 1991 Moscow document and also asserted:

We, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 participating States of the OSCE, have
assembled in Astana, eleven years after the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul, to recommit
ourselves to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and
Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in
agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals. As we mark the 35\(^{\text{th}}\)
anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary of the Charter of Paris for
a New Europe, we reaffirm the relevance of, and our commitment to, the principles on
which this organization is based.\(^\text{117}\)

Given the contentious political context in the late 2000s, we might expect

negotiations on such documents to have the potential to chip away at the previously codified
democratic norms. There is little interest in the Western diplomatic community in re-
opening democratic norms for negotiation out of concern that the currently existing
commitments might not be re-attained. However, as discussed in theoretical proposition I-1,
in this context, restatements pose minimal risk. As a diplomat to the OSCE explained, it is
often possible to reach consensus on restating an earlier commitment because rejecting a
previously agreed-upon norm can be difficult for a state to justify.\(^\text{118}\) This reputational
concern for maintaining consistency in state positions corresponds with constructivists’
expectations. Moreover, the OSCE’s consensus rules guarantee that if the formal content of
a norm is eroded during negotiations, any state can vote against its inclusion in the final
document.\(^\text{119}\) Just as restatements of human rights norms in the 1970s and 1980s kept issues
on the agenda (Thomas 2001), restatements of democratic norms contribute to their
institutional history and may contribute to their future elaboration if political will changes in
reluctant states.

\(^{116}\) MC.DOC/2/08 of 5 December 2008, OSCE 2008, 4-5.

\(^{117}\) SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr. 1*, OSCE 2010, 1-2.

\(^{118}\) Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.

\(^{119}\) Although the OSCE’s democratic norm set remains formally as comprehensive as in the 1990s, state practice in
the 2000s has undermined these norms so that their strength is considerably reduced.
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Over the two decades following the end of the Cold War, norms of inclusiveness in the OSCE experienced two important, yet contradictory trends. While in the early 1990s sovereign equality in the CSCE/OSCE was qualified by democratic governance, in the 2000s we observe the reverse. In the 2000s, human dimension democracy commitments became increasingly qualified by ideas of sovereign equality in high-level declarations. For example, the OSCE Ministerial Declaration on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated: “We reaffirm to ensure the full implementation of the OSCE human dimension commitments. All OSCE commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State.” The latter clause has appeared frequently, for example, in the Astana Summit Declaration of 2010. Admittedly, the phrase is open to many interpretations, yet responds to critiques about geographical imbalances in the implementation policies of the organization. Whereas in the 1990s, norms of inclusiveness evolved in the CSCE/OSCE to entail informal constraints based on democratic norms, in the 2000s, some actors increased their efforts to reclaim the original meaning of sovereign equality. This has implications for discussions of democratic status in chapter 4. In 2005-10, OSCE efforts in democratic norm development returned to a strategy of keeping codified norms alive during periods of discord.

3.9. Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed and presented evidence of the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions in the CSCE/OSCE in support of democratic governance during more and less conducive normative contexts since its foundation in 1973. I assessed the validity of the theoretical propositions developed in chapter 2 and mechanisms by which inclusive institutions affect democratic norm development and implementation, which will be further examined in the case of the UN in chapter 5. Importantly, inclusive institutions can play a supportive role. Despite the absence of directly tangible progress on human rights for much of the late 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled it to act decisively when the time was ripe in 1990-1991 to establish a comprehensive set of democratic norms at the Paris Summit and Copenhagen and Moscow HD conferences. This mechanism, discussed in theoretical proposition I-1, was also influential in the advancement of human rights norms at the Vienna follow-up meeting of 1986-89.

120 MC.DOC/2/08, 5 December 2008 (OSCE 2008, 4).
121 Astana Declaration, 3 Dec. 2010, para. 3. SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1* See also OSCE 2006, 58
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When actors generate consensus, there is a powerful legitimacy underpinning their decisions which contributes to momentum for the IO’s implementation efforts. This chapter has illustrated the sentiment expressed by many leaders that the CSCE/OSCE’s inclusiveness has contributed to its legitimacy, as discussed in theoretical proposition I-2. As raised in theoretical proposition I-4, the chapter also illustrated examples of effects of inter-governmental discord on the policies of IOs’ implementing agencies. Moreover, support was found for theoretical proposition I-5a in debates on the OSCE’s consensus principle. Over time, inclusive institutions’ less efficient functioning and inability to produce outcomes desired by key states contributed to decreased high-level engagement and diminished prestige of the organization. This, however, may be a short-sighted response.

In this chapter, I showed that inclusive institutions do not necessarily encounter impasses in norm development under highly contentious conditions, as in 1975, due in part to the appeal of side issues, as highlighted in theoretical proposition I-3. However, the 2000s show some opposite trends to 1975, as Russia’s frustrations with the OSCE on issues of security in the 2000s negatively affected the human dimension. An important function of inclusive IOs is their characteristic of maintaining communications and holding negotiations which further refine proposals even when there is low political will to cooperate, as during the Cold War or more recently in the mid- to late 2000s, which may prove fruitful in more auspicious circumstances.

What does the future hold for the OSCE’s inclusive institutions? In the longer term, the OSCE can benefit from its inclusiveness, institutional memory, and current debates over the human dimension if a window of opportunity presents itself. According to Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Iloniemi, even if the OSCE today does not live up to our expectations, one should not underestimate it; the OSCE still exists as a vehicle and under more auspicious circumstances may be more effective. It is extremely difficult to start from zero (2009, Title 4, 13). There may be a time when it can be revived and fit to the needs of a coming time. (2009, Title 2, 13).
Chapter Four: Status, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the CSCE/OSCE

4.1. Introduction

Especially since 2005, observers have talked of a “crisis” in the OSCE, where progress in elaborating democratic commitments has stalled on all but the least contentious issues, and the organization’s efforts to support democracy have met with increased challenges and resistance (Zellner et al. 2005; Boonstra 2007; Dunay 2007; Zellner et al. 2007). These scholars often attribute the OSCE’s current dilemma to shifts in the Russian Federation’s priorities after disappointment that the OSCE did not develop into an alternative to NATO, exclusion from North Atlantic and European structures that enlarged to Russia’s borders in 2004, and the perceived Western role in the colored revolutions. I argue, however, that existing explanations of this puzzle overlook the important role of democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE.

Democratic status has served to qualify inclusiveness and sovereign equality in the CSCE/OSCE, contributing to both cooperation and discord. The development of the CSCE’s democracy commitments in the early 1990s stratified its participating states in terms of compliance and non-compliance. To illustrate the effects of democratic status on the ability of the OSCE to elaborate its democratic norms and devise policies for their implementation, I develop new indicators of democratic status and show, building on the work of Larson and Shevchenko (2010a), that democratic status in the OSCE has had two main but diverging effects. First, it has motivated some states, notably in Central Europe and the Western Balkans, to support the OSCE’s democratic commitments and policies. Among democratizing states, support for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status seeking in a strategy of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1), both within the CSCE/OSCE and in the wider international community. As proposed in chapter 2, strategies of social mobility are most likely to be observed when states view the democratic status hierarchy as legitimate and stable, high status groups as permeable, and when democratic status is highly salient in the IO, prototypes are viewed as role models with similarities, and the CSCE/OSCE itself holds prestige.

Second, over time, emphasis on democratic status has motivated other states, notably Russia and some CIS states, to challenge the OSCE’s implementation efforts and to propose alternative priorities for the organization, through strategies of social competition and social
creativity (theoretical propositions S-2 and S-3).\textsuperscript{122} I argue that resistance and opposition to OSCE work on democratic governance has been, in part, a reaction by less democratic states against their lack of democratic status in the organization. It is not simply that OSCE criticism of non-democratic practices led to backlash against OSCE norms. Russia and other CIS states have also reacted to a lower than desired status in the organization’s hierarchy and the corresponding approaches of Western states, intensified by the historic emphasis on sovereign equality and inclusiveness in the organization. As suggested in chapter 2, strategies of social competition and social creativity are most likely to be observed when states view the high-status group to be impermeable, and if processes of categorization lead to discrimination contradicting leaders’ status expectations, particularly if this is visible and extends over a period of time. Moreover, social competition is also expected if the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy is lower and if the CSCE/OSCE itself holds less prestige.

To illustrate these arguments, in this chapter I document the rise, evolution and weakening of democratic status and examine its roles in the CSCE/OSCE between 1973 and 2010, drawing on interviews, secondary and media sources, and content analysis of archival data, including hundreds of statements and reports. The same six time periods are used to analyze developments that have taken place during more and less favorable normative environments, and when participating states have ranked differently in terms of compliance with CSCE/OSCE democracy commitments. This chapter shows that the institutionalization of a norm can, in fact, contribute to its regress.

4.2. CSCE, 1973-1989: Early patterns of status distinctions

In 1975-1989, the CSCE’s human rights norms initiated status distinction in the organization, which would form the basis for democratic status after the Cold War. Initially, however, in 1973-1975, Western states avoided insisting heavily on human rights in order to minimize displays of ideological confrontation inherent in the idea of détente.\textsuperscript{123} During negotiations for the Helsinki \textit{Final Act}, representatives from East and West often spoke of

\textsuperscript{122} Larson and Shevchenko (2010) and Clunan (2009) explore the role of status in Russian foreign policy, but not in the specific context of the CSCE/OSCE.

\textsuperscript{123} See, for example, Statement by Mr. Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, CSCE Helsinki 1975, Stage 3./III/PV.2, 18; Statement by Mr. Giscard d’Estaing, President of the French Republic, Helsinki 1975, CSCE/III.PV.3 (restrict), 13.
mutual respect and acceptance of different political and social systems. One purpose of this accommodating rhetoric appears to have been a reassurance of intentions to contribute to successful negotiations. It is clear that ultimately Principle 7 of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act “reflected the Western conception of human rights and fundamental liberties” (Thomas 2001, 84). Yet, surprisingly, in Helsinki in 1975 the heads of Warsaw Pact states did not make counter-claims to assert the superiority of aspects of state socialist systems, but rather continued a refrain of peaceful coexistence. This appears partially due to challenges within the Soviet Union’s own sphere of influence in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968 (Iloniemi 2009).

In the years after 1975, however, a status distinction began to appear between states that were seen as being in compliance with the CSCE’s human rights principles and states in which improvements in compliance were sought. At the Belgrade follow-up meeting in 1977-78, which aimed to review states’ implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, debates were more divisive than in 1975. While some Western states advocated “moderation” in ideological competition in order to facilitate cooperation and détente, they agreed on the dangers of complacency and that human rights were legitimate issues for multilateral East-West diplomatic debate. Therefore, the meeting witnessed increased criticism of Warsaw Pact states’ human rights records, based on Principle 7 of the Final Act. To this heightened criticism, these states appealed to the norm of non-intervention. Warsaw pact states also sought greater attention to the right to life and against elevating Principle 7 above other Helsinki principles; they accused Western states of human rights infringements, and touted socialist values such as the rights to employment, education, housing and medical care, equal rights for women and nationalities, and social security. However, Western states were resolute in their interpretation of Final Act

124 Socialist states often spoke of “peaceful coexistence.” See, for example, statement by Mr. Olszowski, Poland, CSCE Stage I, Helsinki, July 3-7 1973, CSCE/I/PV.2 (restrict), 30; and statement by Mr. Macovescu, Romania, CSCE/I/PV.4 (restrict), 37.

125 Statements by Heads of State, CSCE, Helsinki 1975, Stage 3, CSCE/III/PV.1-5 (restrict). See, for example, Statement by Mr. Zhivkov, First Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bulgaria and President of the Council of State of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, CSCE/III/PV.2, 19-20.; Statement by Mr. Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, Member of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People’s Republic, CSCE/III/PV.3, 32. See also Statement by Mr. Gromyko of the USSR, CSCE Stage I, Helsinki, July 3-7,1973 CSCE/I/PV.2, 16.

126 Statement by Mr. Steiner, Austria, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 5 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.4 (restrict), 39-40; Statement by Mr. Heisbourg, Luxembourg, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.5 (restrict), 5; Statement by Mr. Bettencourt, France, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.5 (restrict), 28.

127 Statement by Mr. Dvořák, Czechoslovakia, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 8 Mar. 1978, CSCE/BM/VR.1 (restrict), 1-3; Statement by Mr. Krabatach, German Democratic Republic, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 8 Mar. 1978, CSCE/BM/VR.1 (restrict); Statement by Mr. Staykov, Bulgaria, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 9
commitments. In an increasingly fragile détente, they demanded open discussions on sensitive political issues and attempted to measure progress in CSCE participating states’ compliance.128

A few important differences exist, however, between status in terms of human rights in these years and democratic status in the CSCE/OSCE after 1989/91. In the CSCE’s first 15 years, consensus among participating states on Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act was never all-encompassing regarding the principle’s full meaning and interpretation. Accusations of non-compliance with commitments or of ideological intervention followed the contours of the blocs and the obvious divisions in the neutral and non-aligned groups. Thus, Western states that emphasized the importance of implementing human rights commitments at the Belgrade follow-up meeting in 1977-78 did so by appealing to the Helsinki Final Act and to their own histories and values or to the strong interest of public opinion in their countries.129 Until the conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting in January 1989, their claims lacked a solid institutional backing and consensually-driven mandates within the CSCE. Because human rights were weakly institutionalized in the CSCE in 1975-1989 – and the CSCE itself, being simply a series of conferences, was also weakly institutionalized at the time – the primary institutional consequence of non-compliance was shaming during international conferences. When delegates were able to make sudden progress on human rights at the follow-up meeting in Vienna (1986-1989), the institutionalization of monitoring mechanisms made it easier for delegates to assess, and importantly, to make legitimate judgments about which states were in compliance and which were not.

128 Statement by Mr. Goldberg, United States of America, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 8 Mar. 1978, CSCE/BM/VR.1 (restrict); Statement by Mr. Goldschlag, Canada, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.6 (restrict); Statement by Mr. Bettencourt, France, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.5 (restrict); Statement by Mr. van der Valk, Netherlands, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 4 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.1 (restrict); Statement by Mr. Stoltenberg, Norway, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 4 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.1 (restrict).

129 See, for example, Statement by Mr. Leifland, Sweden, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 5 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.3 (restrict), 14; Statement by Lord Goronwy Roberts, United Kingdom, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, 6 Oct. 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.6 (restrict), 13; Statement by Mr. Goldschlag, Canada, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, CSCE/BM/VR.6 (restrict), 42; Statement by Mr. Graeffe, Belgium, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, CSCE/BM/VR.8, 7 Oct. 1977 (restrict), 4; Statement by Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE Follow-up Meeting, Belgrade, CSCE/BM/VR.4, 5 Oct. 1977 (restrict), 22.
4.3. CSCE, 1990-1991: Codification of comprehensive democratic norm set and institutionalization of status distinctions in terms of democratic governance

In 1990-1991, a clear status hierarchy emerged in the CSCE when the position and legitimacy of the U.S. and Western Europe was relatively high. Statements by representatives of established democracies clearly indicated that democratic governance would be central to the new hierarchy: “We stand on the threshold of a new Europe formed on the basis of common principles, pluralist democracy and Rechtsstaatlichkeit (rule of law) (Austria).”

“There are no longer two camps separated by deep trenches. Today we have a common platform and jointly look to the future (W. Germany)”

“Our task is to firmly underpin democracy (Italy).”

An important shift in the dynamics of democratic status was precipitated by agreement on the Copenhagen and Moscow Documents and the Charter of Paris. It is not only that the end of the Cold War advanced the “victors” ideas of governmental legitimacy when the primary ideological challenge subsided (see Roth 1999, 148). Codification of democratic norms was critical to the process, in part because democratic status distinctions became more institutionalized, legitimate and socially visible. In other words, new social categories became formalized which would serve to differentiate between participating states, as discussed in chapter 2. The Paris Charter and Copenhagen Document made explicit that democratic governance was central to the identity of the West (see Jackson 2000, 352) and began a stage in which states seeking rapprochement with Europe, even broadly conceived, would be offered assistance for democratic institution building. In 1990-1991, stratification according to democratic status initially produced only two categories of states in the CSCE: established democratic states and states in transition, because the triumphalism of these years assumed that all states were on a similar path (see Fritch 2008, 1-2). The concerns expressed at the 1990 Paris Summit by states in early democratic transition about “double standards” and a lack of equal

130 Author’s unofficial translation from German, Statement by Amb. Martin Vukovich, Head of the Austrian Delegation, in the Plenary Session of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 11 June 1990, 1.

131 Statement by Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany at the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 5 June 1990, 4.

132 Statement by H.E. Gianni De Michelis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy, Opening Plenary Session of the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 6 June 1990, 3.
attention to commitments in all CSCE states\textsuperscript{133} illustrate that new types of status markers were significant and perceptible.

While status is not the only goal states seek in IOs, it often complements other interests and plays a significant role. Status-seeking behavior of Central European states and the USSR in 1990-1991 appeared alongside their interests to attain guarantees of security,\textsuperscript{134} or to increase international support for their democratic institutions. In the case of the development of the European human rights regime, Moravscik argues that recently established and unstable democracies sought to “lock in” domestic institutions and aimed to tie the hands of future governments, as an alternative explanation to realist accounts of great power influence and constructivist accounts of transnational actors or of socialization on norm development (2000). While Moravscik’s account is compelling, it fails to account for some important dynamics at structural level. The hierarchical context in which norms are developed should not be overlooked.

I argue instead that support provided by democratizing states for democratic norm development can be interpreted as a form of status seeking in a strategy of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1), both in the organization and in the wider international community. For example, the Soviet Union, in its final months before dissolution in December 1991, submitted productive proposals which advanced CSCE commitments such as rights and freedom of information during a state of emergency. On one hand, Soviet support can be interpreted as a new democracy aiming to “lock in” democratic rule (see Moravscik 2000, 228-9). At the same time, this can be interpreted as democratic status seeking, for example, to signal its commitment to democratic reform to the international community, or to increase rapprochement with the West and attract investment. This interpretation is more comprehensive than Moravscik’s lock-in thesis because it also emphasizes the international structure in which states operate. Other status-seeking behavior of former Warsaw Pact states contributed to negotiations in Copenhagen, Paris, and Moscow, where a large number of proposals were submitted by constellations of states.

\textsuperscript{133} See Statement by Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, President, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Paris Summit Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.2.
\textsuperscript{134} Statement by Mr. Jeliu Jelev, President of the Republic of Bulgaria at Paris Summit of the CSCE Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.4; Statement by Mr. Jőzef Antall, Prime Minister, Republic of Hungary at Paris Summit of the CSCE Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.3; Statement by Mr. Václav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at Paris Summit of the CSCE, Nov. 1990, CSCE/SP/VR.2.
In 1990-1991, Central European states sought to “return to Europe” and democratic credentials became part of attaining a new status. The fact that Central European states continued to support democratic commitments in the CSCE/OSCE long after their democratic stability ceased being a concern suggests that factors other than lock-in have been at work. For example, the Czech Republic and Poland had consolidated democratic systems in the mid-1990s, yet in 1999 actively advocated strengthening the OSCE’s institutional mechanisms to support democratic governance in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. By focusing on status, I consider motivations of states not as isolated agents but as having important relations with other (sometimes more powerful) states and IOs which complement domestic foreign policy considerations and influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) of supporting democratic norm development or policy implementation.

Some scholars speak of changes in the practice of formal recognition in international organizations qualifying sovereign equality in the early 1990s (Roth 1999; Peterson 1997; Menon 1994; Krisch 2003, 147; Franck 1992, 46). The practices in the CSCE were more informal, as it has always been a political rather than legal institution. The Copenhagen Document and Paris Charter created new democratic commitments, but pledged “co-operation” and “support” for their implementation. The language became slightly stronger in 1991, as participating states “condemn unreservedly forces which seek to take power from a representative government of a participating State against the will of the people” and “will support vigorously…in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating state by undemocratic means the legitimate organs of that State upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law (CSCE 1991a, Section 17).” Although there were no formal democratic requirements on states for admission, inside the organization, negative status implications began to appear for states that did not comply with human dimension commitments.

135 In fact, of the 43 proposals submitted to the Copenhagen HD meeting, 25 were submitted by groups of states crossing East-West lines. For example, in Copenhagen, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, San Marino, and Yugoslavia submitted a proposal on limitations on the application of the state of emergency. CSCE Copenhagen Meeting, Conference on the Human Dimension, 14 June 1990, CSCE/CHDC 24 (restrict). Similarly, in Moscow, Canada and Hungary submitted a proposal on independence of the judiciary, and Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, the USSR, and the U.S. submitted a proposal on involvement of NGOs and other groups in the human dimension activities of the CSCE. CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Moscow, 23 September 1991, CSCE/CHDM.15. CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Moscow, 25 September 1991, CSCE/CHDM.29 (restrict).

136 Statement by Mr. Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/49/99. Statement by Mr. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President of Poland at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18. Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.18/99.
4.4. CSCE, 1992-1994: Continued qualification of sovereign equality with democratic norms encourages states to seek democratic status and thus support institutionalization of CSCE’s democratization agenda.

Status considerations in the CSCE were intensified by greater institutionalization, and CSCE institutions evolved quickly in 1992-1994. New institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) further changed the dynamics of democratic status in the CSCE. In contrast to the inter-governmental fora in 1975-1989 where states receiving criticism for non-compliance complained about political interests guiding assessments, the new CSCE institutions became viewed as providing more objective and legitimate evaluations of compliance and non-compliance. As a result, the contours of democratic status (and its potential divisions) became more clearly defined.

In 1992-94, democratic status in the CSCE was increasing in strength and specificity, and a significant amount of diplomatic and operational energy was focused on the human dimension and assisting democratic transitions in Central Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia. CSCE declarations in these years reinforced the connection between democratic governance and participation in the CSCE. As discussed in chapter 3, participating states were no longer perceived simply as sovereign states, but the characteristic of (aspirations towards) democratic governance qualified sovereign equality. The Helsinki Summit Document stated “adherence to our commitments provides the basis for participation and co-operation in the CSCE and a cornerstone for further development of our societies” (CSCE 1992, 3).

This trend in qualifying sovereignty with democratic governance is also observed in the 1992 document’s restatement of the 1991 Moscow Declaration: “commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned” (Ibid).

Moreover, the 1992 Helsinki Document continued, “The protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of democratic institutions continue to be a vital basis for our comprehensive security” and offered support for democratization in transitioning states (CSCE 1992, 3). Perhaps paradoxically, however, in the early 1990s democratic norms were sometimes conveyed as if a unifying force among CSCE states. In other

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137 See also statements by Western state representatives and passages from the 1993 Rome Council of Ministers Meeting cited in section 3.4 of chapter 3.
words, the divisive potential of the new categories was overlooked. For example, the 1994
Budapest Summit Declaration stated:

The CSCE’s democratic values are fundamental to our goal of a community of nations
with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign equality and the independence of
all States are fully respected, there are no spheres of influence and the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of all individuals...are vigorously protected (CSCE 1994,
2).

In the early 1990s, Central European states sought to achieve recognition as belonging to
Europe (Wedel 2001; Pridham 2005; Vachudova 2005; Flockhart 2005). As democratic values
were clearly central to the identity of the West, Central European states sought democratic status
based on their democratic transitions in these years. This complemented their domestic foreign
policy considerations. Illustrating the importance of democratic status and an example of a
strategy of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1), Hungarian Prime Minister Antall stated
at the 1992 Helsinki Summit:

Hungary considers the decision of the CSCE community to hold its next Summit
meeting [in 1994] in Hungary to be a singular honour, a decision of symbolic nature,
embodying a recognition of the achievements made so far in our democratic
transformation, and at the same time an expression of confidence that Hungary will be
capable of consistently accomplishing and fulfilling the change of system upon which it
has embarked.138

President Iliescu of Romania similarly suggested a strategy of social mobility at the 1994
Budapest Summit. While praising the positive role of the CSCE in promoting democracy
and the rule of law, he noted the increased salience of democratic status markers and
appealed against negative status divisions:

We mention with some regret a certain diminishing of the importance attached to
economic and cultural cooperation, as well as to the development of human contacts.
And this is while the countries in transition, like Romania, are deeply in need of an
active cooperation, and of an equal partnership treatment, with a view to overcoming
the discrepancies, the barriers and the obstacles they are still facing on their road to
integration in the structures of a united Europe.139

However, some questions remained about the degree to which the high-status group was
permeable, as suggested by President Václav Havel of the Czech Republic at the 1994
Budapest Summit, who stated: “many countries that shook off their totalitarian regimes still

CSCE/HS/VR.3, 43 (italics added).
139 Statement by Mr. Ion Iliescu, President of Romania, CSCE Budapest Summit, 9 Dec. 1994, 2. On the CSCE’s less
prominent emphasis on economic cooperation, see also Statement by Mr. L.D. Kuchma, President of Ukraine, CSCE
feel insufficiently anchored in the community of democratic states, and are often
disappointed by the reluctance with which that community has opened its arms to them.”

Nevertheless, many states continued to advocate the expansion of the OSCE’s efforts
to support democratic governance in its region. For example, in 1994 Eduard Shevardnadze,
Head of State of Georgia, proposed a regional court of human rights, and argued that: “The
termination of the global confrontation of the ‘two systems’ has enabled the world to save
evermous sums of money. They should be purposely invested into the protection of
democracy and freedom in the new independent states.” Although there was some
disillusionment over time, for states in sub-regions of the CSCE, optimism that democratic
systems could resolve negative legacies of state socialist regimes initially contributed to an
acceptance of democratic status distinctions.

In addition to hosting Summit meetings, another indicator of status in the CSCE/OSCE is
a state’s holding the position of Chairperson-in-Office (CiO). Table 4.1 shows that Central
Europe has had fairly consistent representation in this position, together with counterparts from
Western Europe. By contrast, CIS states have been underrepresented, with Kazakhstan as the
first CIS state to hold this office in 2010, and states of the Western Balkans or Turkey have yet to
hold the position. Most notably for democratic norm development and policy implementation,
the CiO sets priorities for the year’s agenda. These may be more or less contentious or
ambitious, depending on the priorities of the governments holding the position. For most of the
history of the CSCE/OSCE, the position of the CiO has been held either by established
democratic states or by states making clear efforts in democratic development, thus suggesting
that until 2010, as will be discussed, democratic status served as a filter.

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140 Statement by Mr. Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, CSCE Budapest Summit, 5 Dec. 1994, 2.
141 Statement by Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, CSCE Budapest Summit,
(unofficial translation), 1994, 2. See also Statement by Mr. Heydar Aliyev, President of the Azerbaijan Republic,
CSCE Budapest Summit, 1994, 1; Statement by Mr. Kiro Gligorov, President of the Republic of Macedonia, CSCE
4.5. OSCE, 1995-1999: The high salience of democratic status enhances OSCE efforts to support democratic governance via states’ strategies of social mobility

“Today’s rules of play are those set by democracy. The new dividing lines in Europe (that some fear) can only result from non-compliance”

- Prime Minister Laar of Estonia, 18 Nov. 1999

The above quotation expresses a clear understanding of democratic status in the OSCE. In other words, in 1995-99 it was apparent that status in terms of democratic governance had become highly salient in the organization and in the international community at large. This is particularly significant in light of alternative dimensions of status, such as great power status, economic wealth, or military strength. As discussed in theoretical proposition S-1, the salience of a category (e.g. democratic status) increases the likelihood that states think of themselves in democratic terms, and with positive reinforcement, will cooperate in the development of democratic norms and implementation policies, through strategies of social mobility. Other factors contributing to the likelihood of states’ engagement in social mobility strategies were also present in this time period - the democratic status hierarchy was viewed as legitimate and stable, many states viewed high-status groups as permeable (see Larson and Shevchenko 2010a), prototypes were seen as role models with similarities, and the OSCE itself held prestige.

Thus, the OSCE in 1995-99 witnessed a prevalence of democratic status seeking by strategies of social mobility, in particular by Central European states. As democratic consolidation progressed and EU accession prospects became more secure, Central European states asserted more individuality in public debates and their critiques of “double standards” in the organization largely disappeared from statements. The OSCE remained a high priority for Central European states in these years and their positions were not yet formally aligned with those of the EU.

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143 Statement by Mr. Mart Laar, Prime Minister of Estonia, OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999 SUM.DEL/44/99.
Recurring in Central European states’ statements was an interest in receiving recognition for their change in status. For example, President Brazauskas of Lithuania stated in 1996: “The situation in Lithuania is marked by stability. We have no internal political or social conflicts. National minorities have been successfully included, to an exemplary degree.”\(^\text{144}\) And Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary argued at the Istanbul Summit in 1999:

> By the end of the second millennium, an entire phase can be declared ‘closed’ in Central Europe. We succeeded in closing the period of transition from communism back to democracy, and from command economy back to market economy...It was not easy and at times it was not even clear, but we can say now that the transition is over. On the basis of the above we can also state with confidence that the states of Central Europe now have a historic task. Our task is to ‘radiate’ stability into the regions neighboring them, to allow stability and security to exert a ‘spill-over’ effect for instance in the southern region that Hungary neighbors.\(^\text{145}\)

Central European states also tended to actively draw on their own transition experiences in contributions to democratic development efforts - contributions which simultaneously served to reinforce their enhanced status. For example, President Havel of the Czech Republic reminded delegates in 1999 of the inspiration that the Helsinki accords provided in the past, and argued that it is important to listen to the voices of opposition groups in Belarus and Chechnya.\(^\text{146}\) During its Chairmanship of the OSCE in 1998, Poland prioritized strengthening democratic institutions and protection of human rights.\(^\text{147}\) President Kwasniewski of Poland stated: “In my view, the OSCE should further reinforce its tasks as a promoter of dialogue and guardian of democratic values. The Warsaw-based office for democratic institutions and human rights has an important role to play.”\(^\text{148}\) Polish Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, was especially active during his 1998 term as CiO, for example in Albania, Kosovo, and in establishing an OSCE field mission in Belarus that year.\(^\text{149}\) Poland and Lithuania also encouraged democratic processes in Belarus.\(^\text{150}\) In 1996, Slovenia supported the development of

\(^{144}\) Statement by Mr. Algirdas Brazauskas, President of Lithuania, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996; REF.S/154/96.


\(^{146}\) Statement by Mr. Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999. SUM.DEL/49/99.

\(^{147}\) Statement by Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF. S/164/96, 1-2.

\(^{148}\) Ibid.

\(^{149}\) In 1999, Poland and Lithuania also made clear statements to encourage democratic processes in Belarus. Statement by Mr. Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/47/99; Statement by Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999; SUM.DEL.18/99.

\(^{150}\) Ibid.
the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.\textsuperscript{151} Central European states were certainly active during this time period, but were not more active than established democratic states in supporting democracy and human rights in the OSCE, as Moravcsik’s theory would suggest (2000). Nevertheless, their efforts helped to advance the OSCE’s democracy agenda.

As illustrated in chapter 3, OSCE field missions increased significantly in numbers and size in 1995-1999. It is important to note that host states often sought international support for their democratization processes.\textsuperscript{152} President Karimov of Uzbekistan provided one rationale in 1996, stating that: “close mutually beneficial cooperation and expanding contacts with the European countries provide us with wide opportunities to realize the potential of our Republic and to successfully advance along the road of consolidation of our independence, democratic and market reforms.”\textsuperscript{153} Initially, the threat of instability or conflict influenced the locations of field offices. By the end of the decade, missions were placed in states viewed as having democratic deficits and requiring support to fulfill OSCE commitments (see also Evers et al. 2005, 35-6). For example, while the mission in Tajikistan operated in the context of peace-building since 1994, in 1995 its mandate expanded in the human dimension. In the same year, a Central Asia Liaison Office was established in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, which, among other goals, aimed to monitor domestic reforms in the region (Ghebali 2004, 4-5). This expansion of field offices’ mandates was reinforced by the 1996 Lisbon Summit Declaration, which committed the OSCE to developing democratic institutions in Central Asia. Subsequently, in early 1999, OSCE offices opened in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, to provide advice to governments, liaise with civil society, and to “perform as political antennas channeling regular information to the OSCE on the internal and external developments of the region,” including human rights violations (Ibid). In other words, the location of field offices became an indicator of lower democratic status.

Some CIS states began to challenge negative democratic status markers, albeit defensively at first. President Lukashenko of Belarus argued in 1996 that OSCE judgments of

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\textsuperscript{151} Statement by Mr. Milan Kučan, President of the Republic of Slovenia, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, REF/S/150/96, 1.
\textsuperscript{152} See, for example, Statement by Mr. Heydar Aliyev, President of the Azerbaijan Republic, OSCE Lisbon Summit, Dec. 2, 1996 (unofficial translation), REF/S/130/96, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{153} Statement by Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 3 Dec. 1996, (unofficial translation from Russian) REF/S/153/96, 3-4.
\end{flushleft}
the referendum results were unfounded, and his rhetoric intensified significantly in 1999.\textsuperscript{154} Comments against status distinctions in the OSCE by President Yeltsin of Russia 1999 were sharp in light of criticism of Russian troops in Chechnya: “I am convinced that both Russia and the other members of the OSCE today are especially in need of respectful dialogue, not mutual reproaches and moralizing.”\textsuperscript{155} Yet at the same time as Lukashenko criticized OSCE pressure as interference in 1996, he made a bid for a more positive status evaluation: “Our country is one of the few post-Soviet states where there are no border disputes with our neighbors, no ethnic or religious conflicts, no language discrimination, etc.” and invited observers to parliamentary elections in 2000.\textsuperscript{156} In 1999, expressing frustration with what could be considered status inconsistency, Lukashenko referenced his country’s voluntary abandonment of \textit{status as a nuclear power}, which did not lead to a more prestigious standing in the OSCE, and again publicized the lack of conflict between nationalities and religions in Belarus.\textsuperscript{157}

President Karimov of Uzbekistan also appeared to accept the salience of democratic status, yet engaged modestly in social creativity (theoretical proposition S-3) by advocating an increase in the organization’s attention to security and economic issues, stating in 1999: 

There is no doubt about the necessity and vital importance the OSCE and its institutions attach to the issues related to the consistent improvement of human dimension, especially for the newly independent states that relatively not long ago stepped to the road of democratic reforms. Meanwhile, taking into account the main purposes of the Organization, we think it is essential to determine more clearly the OSCE functions in the capacity of an international body called to warn of and prevent international conflicts, as well as to reinforce its role in economic and environmental dimensions.\textsuperscript{158}

President Akaev of the Kyrgyz Republic agreed, stating “the economic dimension of cooperation is no less important to us than other dimensions.”\textsuperscript{159} Also engaging in social creativity, Russia consistently advocated an increased prioritization of the military and security dimension in the organization. After thanking the OSCE for its technical assistance and support of its first multi-party elections, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan appealed

\textsuperscript{154} Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96. Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL.76/99.\textsuperscript{155} Statement by Mr. Boris Yeltsin, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999 (unofficial translation), SUM.DEL/27/99, 1.\textsuperscript{156} Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, OSCE Lisbon Summit, 2 Dec. 1996, REF.S/118/96, 5.\textsuperscript{157} Statement by Mr. Alexander Lukashenko, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 19 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/76/99.\textsuperscript{158} Statement by Mr. Islam Karimov, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/6/99.\textsuperscript{159} Statement by Mr. A. Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 18 Nov. 1999, SUM.DEL/1/99, 2.
for improved perceptions of his state: “we expect a balanced assessment and understanding of the difficulties of the reformation of the society in transition…For the dialogue to be objective and balanced more representatives from Central Asia should be invited to work in OSCE structures.”

My analysis of OSCE field activities reinforces the point that representatives of states holding lower democratic status, as measured by indicators of democratic governance, have less frequently held key positions in the OSCE. Figure 4.1a below shows the geographical distribution in 1995-1999 of Heads of OSCE field offices, one of the most prestigious posts in the OSCE. Of the 50 Heads of Office who served between 1995 and 1999, 7 were appointed from Central Europe, 2 from Georgia as the only CIS state with a Head in these years, none from Western Balkan states or Turkey, 10 from the United States, one from Canada, and the remaining 30 from Western European states. Appendix A provides indicators of democratic governance in selected OSCE participating states for comparison. The fact that nearly all OSCE Heads of Office represented more democratic states suggests that democratic status continued to qualify sovereign equality and remained significant in the organization. Figure 4.1b shows that between 2000 and 2010, these institutional practices remained entrenched. Of the 82 Heads of OSCE Offices in 2000-2010, 11 were appointed from Central European states, 2 from Western Balkan states, 3 from Russia, 3 from Turkey, 11 from the United States, one from Canada, and the remaining 50 from Western European states. In other words, representatives from democratic states in Western and Central Europe or North America continued to hold a large majority of these positions. There is no public recruitment process, so these are compelling indicators of status in the organization. The Heads of OSCE field offices are appointed by the Chairman in Office and are subject to political bargaining. Great powers such as the U.S. and Russia often entrust leadership positions in IOs to allied states in order to downplay their superiority. While this has applied to the post of OSCE Chairpersons-in-Office, the U.S. has been well represented, as noted above, in other high-level posts, including Heads of field offices.

Surprisingly, democratic status appears even more significant for appointments of Heads of Office than states’ overall financial contributions to the OSCE. Appendix C includes tables of the scale of distribution of CSCE/OSCE financial arrangements over time. While the Russian

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160 Statement by Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the OSCE Istanbul Summit 18 Nov. 1999 SUM.DEL/9/99.
Chapter Four

Federation was assessed in the highest group of contributors in the 1990s, a Russian national did not hold the position of OSCE Head of Field Office until 2003. Similarly, there were no heads of ODIHR Election Observation or Assessment Missions from the Russian Federation until 2008. Between 1995 and 2010, a Hungarian national has held five Head of Field Office positions, whereas a Russian national has held three. Occasionally great powers refrain from holding certain leadership positions in IOs to understate their influence; however, while this might apply to the CiO position, U.S. nationals have held high numbers of posts as OSCE Heads of Field Office and Election Observation and Assessment missions. Therefore, in this example, counter to realist expectations, the ideational and institutional factor of a state’s democratic governance is arguably more influential than the material factor of a state’s financial contributions.

Figure 4.1: Regional origins of Heads of OSCE field offices

![Pie charts showing regional origins of Heads of OSCE field offices for two periods: 1995-1999 and 2000-2010.](image)

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4.6. OSCE, 2000-2004: Support for democratic governance is gradually affected by challenges due in part to the organization’s emphasis on democratic status

By the mid-2000s, we begin to observe the vulnerability of status markers in periods of declining hegemony and increases in discord, through strategies of social competition (theoretical proposition S-2). Nevertheless, there remained some notable instances of cooperation, particularly for the implementation of OSCE democracy commitments in the early 2000s. This section illustrates trends in the implications of democratic status, such as through election observation and leadership positions, which contributed, over time, to both positive and negative responses from states either encouraged or displeased with their standing in the democratic hierarchy.

The sustained emphasis on democratic status has contributed to a gradual acceleration of challenges to the OSCE’s support of democratic governance in the 2000s by contributing to some states’ sense of alienation. Over the course of the 2000s, as consensus became more difficult to achieve on classic human dimension issues, the ODIHR and democratic OSCE states were placed in an increasingly defensive position. In 2004, the Appeal of CIS Member States to the OSCE Partners presented a set of challenges, advocating, for example, more uniform criteria for election observation, reducing the amount of monitoring of done by OSCE field offices, preserving the “fundamental consensus principle” in the OSCE, seeking greater geographic representation in OSCE posts, and making extra-budgetary contributions more transparent, among others (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2004). Significantly, the content of some of these challenges is closely linked to status concerns, in particular, the recurrent CIS critique of geographical representation and the efforts of OSCE election observation teams and field offices. “A stigma sometimes appears to be attached to field operations, separating the OSCE community into States with field operations, and those without” (Evers et al. 2005, 35).

Similar arguments have been made regarding locations of election observation missions (EOMs). The presence of an EOM in a state can be viewed as an indicator of lower status in the organization or that states seek to improve their status by inviting observers. Figure 4.2 shows the geographic locations of EOMs over time. Whereas the number of EOMs peaked in the

164 On the latter, see also Kelley (2008), who discusses a similar phenomenon in terms of states that seek legitimacy.
Western Balkans in the first part of the 2000s and decreased steadily in Central Europe, the number of EOMs in the CIS region has increased since 1995. By 2005 it became clear that Central European and Western Balkan states had gained in standing on this dimension, leaving CIS states, in relative terms, ranking lower in terms of democratic governance among the OSCE sub-regions. As noted in chapter 2, perceptions of the lower permeability of high-status groups increase the likelihood that a state will engage in social competition or social creativity (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a). In the 1990s, and particularly in Central Europe, there was generally a positive association with EOMs, since these states sought the legitimacy a favorable election evaluation could provide. In other words, a positive OSCE election assessment was a valued democratic status marker. The tone changed slightly in the 2000s when EOMs concentrated on fewer states and the lingering historic mistrust between Russia and the West from the Cold War brought into question the extent of the permeability of Western institutions, and, thus, the longer-term instrumental value to CIS states in attempting to comply with OSCE democracy commitments.

**Figure 4.2: Regions in which OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Missions were held, 1995-2010**

Surprisingly, the extensive use of the expressions “East of Vienna” and “West of Vienna” in OSCE discourse - as shorthand for states in democratic transition as opposed to states with consolidated democratic systems - appears to have surfaced in the organization around the year

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2000 when Austria held the OSCE Chairmanship. The emergence of these terms was oddly anachronistic when Central European democracies east of Vienna such as Hungary and Poland had consolidated in the mid-1990s. Especially after the EU accession in 2004 of eight Central European states, diplomats might have thought to irrevocably move the rhetorical democratic border much farther east of Vienna or dispense with the terminology altogether. As suggested in theoretical proposition S-1, the extensive use of these expressions throughout the 2000s illustrates that it is often difficult to deconstruct status categories and perceptions.

Additional indicators of status in the organization can be seen in the distribution of Heads of OSCE/ODIHR’s Election Observation Missions. Figure 4.3 below shows a clear increase in Central European leadership of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Missions over time, while Western European and North American leadership has been consistently significant, whereas by 2010 Central Asian nationals had never been represented in this post.

166 Author’s interview with Ms. Alice Němcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2011.
The above trends in Election Observation Missions can be contrasted with Election Assessment Missions (EAMs), which have taken place primarily in democratic states\(^{168}\) and are not full-scale observations with short-term observers. They are deployed “on the premise that an election will meet OSCE commitments, but that the ODIHR may comment on specific issues in line with best electoral practice for implementing OSCE commitments” (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 44). Therefore, status implications are not as strong as in EOMs. EAMs are used where a smaller format is needed – where there is general confidence in electoral processes or occasionally where conditions do not exist to conduct a full-scale observation accurately (as in Uzbekistan in 2009).

\(^{167}\) Source: Data adapted from reports are available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/72804. Accessed 5/2011. For additional information, see footnote for Figure 4.2.

\(^{168}\) However, election assessment missions have also taken place in a non-democratic state (in Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2009), where due to high concerns about a free and fair election, the OSCE-ODIHR did not launch a full-scale observation.
In the early 2000s, Russia and other CIS states argued that the OSCE should play a larger role in monitoring commitments in Western Europe and North America. Critics have argued that monitoring in established democracies diverts valuable IO resources into countries which are able to effectively address their own domestic problems\textsuperscript{169} (see Dunay 2007, 6). In part in response to CIS states, but also in reaction to concerns about elections such as in the U.S. after 2000, the OSCE/ODIHR increasingly undertook EAMs beginning in the U.S., France and Turkey in 2002, the UK in 2003, and Spain, Slovakia, and Romania in 2004, and much more extensively after 2005. Figure 4.4 shows the locations of EAMs over time. Even though there has been an increase in assessing elections in established democratic states in the 2000s, the use of a different format in longer-standing democracies in fact reinforces existing democratic status distinctions.

**Figure 4.4: Regions in which OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions were held, 1995-2010\textsuperscript{170}**

Leadership of Election Assessment Missions (see Figure 4.5) corresponds with the trends shown above in Figures 4.1 and 4.3. Of the seven EAMs that took place between 2000 and 2004, four were headed by North American ambassadors and three were headed by Western European ambassadors.\textsuperscript{171} A critic might argue that the heads of election missions, while appointed by the ODIHR Director (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 40), are selected by a process of public recruitment that prioritizes electoral and diplomatic experience. In other words, the complete absence of Central Asian nationals as Heads of Missions may also be due to a dearth of applications. However, since election observation is widely seen as the OSCE’s comparative advantage and one of the

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\textsuperscript{169} Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.

\textsuperscript{170} Data extracted from the preliminary statements or final reports of the 40 OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions that took place between 1995 and 2010. Reports available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/72804.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
organization’s most visible activities, the unbalanced composition of missions’ leadership signals important inequalities in the organization.

Figure 4.5: Regional origins of Heads of OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions, 2000-2010

![Regional origins of Heads of OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Missions, 2000-2010](image)

The high percentage of Central European leadership in OSCE field offices and EOMs as shown in Figures 4.1, 4.3, and to a lesser extent in Figure 4.5 can be attributed in part to the region’s democratic status, which increased over the course of the 1990s and into the 2000s. Alternative explanations as to why Central European states have had a greater leadership role in the OSCE than CIS states have parallels with the democratic status-based explanation advanced here. Some might argue that Western distrust of Russia and its allies is deep-rooted and has been reactive to legacies of the 20th century, including socialist dictators, World War II, the invasion of Central Europe and division of Germany, and subsequent Cold War tensions. Western distrust stems in part from concerns about Russian intentions and the foreign policy behavior of non- or partially democratic regimes. The perception of a common threat, historic or present, often bonds states, and Western states have supported Central European states’ interest in preserving their sovereignty and preventing conflict in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Combined with the sense of community generated by the “we-feeling” and trust of having similar democratic political systems (see Deutsch et al. 1957) – and to help ensure the consolidation of similar systems - Western states encouraged Central Europe’s more prominent role in the OSCE. Some might argue that this encouragement derives from common cultural ties, including religion and history, yet democratic governance is also an historically shared value, as many Central European states had democratic systems during the interwar period. Other critics might argue that some Central European states have served as proxies for the United States. However, even

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if there were an element of truth, this would not contradict the argument posed here. Democracy support has been high among the United States’ professed interests, and therefore, particularly in Central Europe, democratic status has played a role both in status seeking and in partner selection. Since leadership in the OSCE is generally expected to advance the organization’s key commitments, and given the importance placed on human rights and democracy, a high proportion of leaders have stemmed from states committed to advocating the organization’s human dimension objectives. However, the degree to which democratic status has a role in leadership selection undermines the inclusive character of the OSCE. Status works against the maintenance of inclusiveness, particularly when it contributes to exclusion based on a negative assessment.

Scholars have documented President Putin’s interest in restoring Russia’s prestige (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Stürmer 2008; Tynkkynen 2010; Clunan 2009). As the EU and NATO enlarged, non-member states resorted to new tactics to alleviate their alienation (see Fritsch 2008, 2; Baranovsky 2000, 450). Especially after repeated OSCE criticism of Russia’s elections (e.g. in 2000, 2003, and 2004), non-compliance with human dimension commitments (Dunay 2007, 3), and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Putin increasingly viewed cooperation in the OSCE as counter to Russia’s interests. Therefore, the end of 2004 marked a turning point in the OSCE, as it became more difficult to secure joint efforts and declarations. Meanwhile, the decreased international authority of the United States on issues of democratic governance and human rights after the controversial 2000 elections and the “war on terror” in part weakened the legitimacy of status markers on democratic governance (see Hurrell 2007, 143; Ikenberry 2011), and its positive association as a prototype decreased. Russia and its CIS allies largely abandoned their strategy of social mobilization by supporting democratic norm development and policy implementation in the OSCE, with reservations about the associated benefits. If Russia had consolidated its democratic system, would it have been welcomed by the West? Or were democratic status markers related to Cold War suspicions? Would Russia and other CIS states have encountered similar levels of enthusiasm as received in Central Europe and the Western Balkans? These questions speak to differences in views regarding the permeability of the high-status group. It is not simply that OSCE criticism of non-democratic practices in several CIS states led to a backlash against OSCE practices to support democratic governance; Russia and its allies in the CIS have reacted to a lower than desired position in the organization’s

\[MC\text{DE}C/20/06, 5\text{ December }2006, \text{ OSCE }2006, 63.\]
hierarchy and have rejected the predominance of the democratic governance status markers, as is further shown in the following section.

4.7. OSCE, 2005-2010: Status concerns contribute to increased challenges to OSCE policies

As suggested in chapter 2, discordant responses to democratic norm development and policy implementation through strategies of social competition and social creativity are more likely when states perceive the boundaries of the high-status group to be impermeable, and if negative evaluations contradict leaders’ status expectations, particularly if a state’s lower relative position is socially visible and extends over a period of time (Wallace 1973). Moreover, social competition is more likely if the legitimacy and stability of the hierarchy has decreased (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a), and if the OSCE itself holds less prestige. As discussed below, these conditions were present in the 2005-2010 time period, during which there was a notable increase in discord in the OSCE.

In 2005-2010 the status concerns highlighted in section 4.6 began to more seriously affect OSCE work on democratic development, as Russia and several CIS states challenged and blocked additional policies and programs. As discussed in chapter 3, disputes about the implementation of Istanbul commitments (OSCE 1999) and ratification of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe negatively affected cooperation in the on the human dimension.174 Although Russia and its allies enjoyed increased wealth in these years, I argue that the timing of their challenges was also motivated by a realization that accepting OSCE democratic norms and policies was in fact reducing their relative status in the region, as analyzed below. At the same time, established democracies began to relax their emphasis on democratic status markers, albeit inconsistently. Some European states became more reluctant to criticize non-democratic practices because of dependence on Russian oil and gas,175 and the enlarged EU also prioritized less controversial issues that all of its members could agree to promote in Russia and other CIS states (e.g. tolerance and non-discrimination, gender, domestic violence). Thus there was a de-emphasis on promoting fundamental freedoms and structural elements of democracy in the OSCE.176 Meanwhile, the strategic priorities of established democracies

175 Author’s interview with Dr. Albrecht Rothacher, First Counsellor, European Commission, Delegation of the European Commission to the International Organizations in Vienna, 30 Jan. 2009.
176 Author’s interview with a diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.
shifted from the OSCE region to other areas such as the Middle East and Afghanistan. As a result of states’ changed priorities, increased deadlock, and inability to resolve some protracted conflicts (e.g. Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh), the OSCE itself experienced a decline in prestige in the 2000s, as suggested by the lack of Summit meetings between 1999 and 2010.

Nevertheless, Western Balkan states engaged in strategies of social mobility at the 2010 Astana Summit in a manner similar to Central European states in the mid-to late 1990s (theoretical proposition S-1). All Western Balkan Heads of State attended – whereas most North American and EU member states sent deputies or foreign ministers – and they elaborated positively and in detail the usefulness of the OSCE missions in their countries. For example, Mr. Filip Vujanovic, President of Montenegro stated:

As a host country of an OSCE Mission with which we have an excellent cooperation, we can emphasize with pleasure and gratitude the important role the Organization can play in inducing reforms and strengthening democratic institutions. Human dimension is a core of modern democracy and security of our countries. This is why we need to strengthen it and fully implement our commitments, from respect of human and minority rights to guarantees of freedom of expression in all forms. In this sense the role of the OSCE institutions is invaluable. Montenegro has had positive experience in cooperation with all OSCE institutions, in particular ODIHR, especially when we restored independence in a democratic referendum.177

Being seen as a constructive OSCE participant has certainly corresponded with Western Balkan states’ goals of seeking EU membership. While their reflections countered some CIS critiques of OSCE field operations, the CIS states engaging in strategies of social competition had greater influence on democratic norm development and policy implementation than states with strategies of social mobility in the late 2000s, as is shown below.

Evidence also suggests that the status of the European Union increased in the 2000s in the OSCE. The EU comprised 25 states in 2004 and 27 states in 2007; this is nearly half of the OSCE’s 56 participating states. For support of democratic norm development in the OSCE, there is often spillover from non-EU members seeking to ingratiate themselves with the EU. One indicator is the number of states aligning themselves with EU statements at the Ministerial Council meetings which increased from four in 2004 (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Croatia)178 to eleven in 2005 and 2007.179

177 Statement by Mr. Filip Vujanovic, President of Montenegro, 2 Dec. 2010, SUM.DEL/40/10, 2.
Several debates in 2005-2010 aimed to re-negotiate democratic status markers in the OSCE. The example of Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE Chairmanship illustrates one defeat of democratic status in favor of sovereign equality. Kazakhstan initially proposed to chair the organization in 2009, but the U.S. and U.K. were opposed to the idea at the 2006 Brussels Ministerial Council, in part out of concern that the organization’s support for democratic governance could be undermined (Hellwig-Bötte 2008, 178). Deadlock blocked the decision and the issue was postponed to the 2007 Ministerial Council. Justifying this move, Ministerial Council Decision 20/06 emphasized that it was important for the CiO to be willing and able to exercise leadership to implement OSCE commitments. The Kazakh delegation, however, appealed to the principle of sovereign equality and pledged its cooperation. Stronger in confronting democratic status was the Russian delegation’s statement: “attempts to establish any conditions for determining the Chairmanship of the OSCE are unacceptable to us. This decision should not be regarding as setting a precedent for the future and must not undermine the fundamental principles of the sovereign equality of the OSCE participating states”

In a compromise, the 2007 Madrid Ministerial Council decided that Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship would take place in 2010, to enable Kazakhstan to make additional political reforms prior to holding the position. The Russian delegation, which had threatened to block decisions on future Chairmanships if Kazakhstan’s bid was not accepted, argued that

The decision was preceded by attempts to tie us all down with certain conditions regarding the attainment of consensus, including the demand that we must renounce all further efforts to reform the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Obviously, maneuvers of this kind undermine one of the fundamental principles of the OSCE, namely that of equal rights for all participating States.

Thus, a core group of states aimed to restore the traditional sense of sovereignty from the Helsinki Final Act and to treat the trends of the 1990s that qualified sovereign equality with democratic governance as anomalous.

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180 MC.DEC/20/06, 5 December 2006, OSCE 2006, 63.
181 Attachment 1 to MC.DEC/20/06. Interpretive Statement by the Delegation of Kazakhstan. Attachment 2 to MC.DEC/20/06.
182 Interpretive Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation. OSCE 2006, 63-4. These points were repeated by the delegations of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus in 2007 (OSCE 2007, 37-8, 84, 86).
The support of democratic states such as Germany and Spain for Kazakhstan’s bid is also an example of a break in the salience of democratic status in the organization. In this case, energy concerns overrode established democratic states’ resolve to support democratic governance in a consistent manner. In a sense, a state’s status as an *energy supplier* has become a salient, alternative dimension of status in the OSCE. Minister Gernot Erler justified Germany’s support as follows:

We believe that this would enable us to send a signal in favor of the participation of the young states of Central Asia and for equal rights within the OSCE. Only under these conditions will all states be able to identify with the OSCE...My Kazakh colleague made it clear recently in Vienna that his Government is fully aware of its responsibility and is determined to implement its reform agenda. We will take this self-imposed obligation seriously and follow closely the progress made.  

Supporters also appealed to “concern for the future of our Organization,” the growing importance of Central Asia to Europe, and to security in Afghanistan (Hellwig-Bötte 2010, 180-81).  

Another strong critique of the OSCE’s democracy support appeared in September 2007, when Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan issued a Draft Decision on OSCE/ODIHR Observation of National Elections. Some proposals in this Draft Decision can be interpreted specifically as responses to the strength of democratic status markers. For example, these states argued that elections should be observed in *all* OSCE participating states, without division into different categories, because of the principle of sovereign equality, and that all missions should have the same mandate and structure. The latter was a reaction to the difference between election observation and election assessment missions, indicating that the distinction carried a stigma, with EAMs being less status-demoting. These states also continued to argue for broader geographic representation in

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184 Statement by Mr. Gernot Erler, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2006. MC.DEL/22/06, 3. Hellwig-Bötte adds another German rationale, namely that supporting Kazakhstan’s ambitions “would make it possible to press more strongly for the observation of the OSCE acquis, as an OSCE Chair can only enjoy international success and respect if it also convincingly embodies the values for which it speaks and acts” (2010, 79).

185 Statement by Ms. Micheline Calmy-Rey, President of the Swiss Confederation and Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, 30 Nov. 2007. MC.DEL/49/07, 2.


187 Ibid. Other proposals such as limiting the number of observers to 50 for all elections, subjecting decisions about EOMs and election reports to the Permanent Council where consensus rules would give these states a veto, that host states should be able to approve EOM personnel, and that host states should be provided with all observation forms can be interpreted as attempts to undermine OSCE/ODIHR processes that had been critical of their regimes.
the EOMs. While their concerns did not fall on deaf ears (the Spanish Chairmanship issued an alternative version for discussion at the 2007 Ministerial Council), neither met with consensus and debates continued in subsequent years.\textsuperscript{188}

Several CIS states also continued to engage in social creativity (theoretical proposition S-3), by advocating a shift in the OSCE’s efforts away from the human dimension (democratic governance and human rights) in favor of military and security-related activities. For example, Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, argued in 2006:

‘The First Basket’ has been virtually empty for a long time. There were times when the military-political dimension represented the raison d’etre of the CSCE/OSCE…Work programs in the military-political area are becoming weaker year by year, and are being reduced to irrelevant topics…Given the multidimensional and comprehensive approach of this Organization to security, the OSCE cannot and must not be involved exclusively in the ‘human dimension.’ In such a case, it will not be the kind of OSCE that had brought us all together in its time.\textsuperscript{189}

Furthermore, he argued that the OSCE’s “‘center of gravity’ has been shifted to the humanitarian and human rights area” and advocated a re-balancing of the OSCE’s activities.\textsuperscript{190} Importantly, suggesting a correlation between democratic status and attempts to re-balance OSCE efforts, in the same address Minister Lavrov conveyed a distinct disapproval of status distinctions:

The principles of democratic development and fundamental human rights are universal, while national ways of implementing them are always different. Only subject to the unconditional respect of the principle of equality of states, without any attempts to ‘discipline’ anyone or to ‘raise’ anyone to some models not approved by consensus the OSCE could continue to be relevant. \textit{There has never been agreement between us to divide OSCE participants into different categories.} There are no resolutions based on which one could ‘grade’ candidates for the OSCE Chairmanship…A culture of cooperation on the basis of \textit{mutual respect} and the search for generally acceptable solutions must be revived in the OSCE.\textsuperscript{191}

A showdown took place in October and November 2007, just prior to the Russian Duma elections in December 2007 and presidential elections in March 2008. A delayed invitation for the ODIHR needs assessment mission together with Russia’s restrictions on the number of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[$\textsuperscript{189}$] Statement by Mr. Sergey V. Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 14\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Brussels, 4 Dec. 2006, MC.DEL/21/06, 1-2.
\item[$\textsuperscript{190}$] Ibid.
\item[$\textsuperscript{191}$] Ibid, 3 (italics added). A similar connection was made between democratic status and a perceived imbalance in OSCE activities by Minister Martynov of Belarus in 2007: “A visible imbalance among the OSCE’s three baskets is still there, while the work in the human dimension is often based on the principles far from an \textit{equal} and \textit{mutually respectful} dialogue.” Statement by Mr. Sergei Martynov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, 15\textsuperscript{th} OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, 30 Nov. 2007, MC.DEL/45/07, 2 (italics added).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
observers and visa delays for experts led ODIHR to cancel its observation in 2007. Then, in February 2008 similar restrictions on the number of observers and the short amount of time (3 days) they would be allowed to spend in Russia prior to the election led ODIHR again to refuse to send a mission.

I argue that the aims of Russia and CIS states in inhibiting the work of OSCE/ODIHR in the area of elections stems from more than simply reaction to OSCE criticism and the perceived Western role in the colored revolutions. It was also an attempt to restore lost status and to revise the OSCE’s democratic status markers. Clearly, Russian foreign policy is motivated in part by a desire to re-establish international status (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Clunan 2009). After an interview with President Putin in September 2008, Michael Stürmer wrote that “The message is unequivocal: Russia is a great power again and wishes to be respected as such.” In describing U.S.-Russia relations, Putin declared that “this partnership of equals demands reciprocal respect.” Having been humbled in the 1990s, President Putin decided to take back prestige and to reassert Russia’s presence in the near abroad. When defending the decision to limit the number of OSCE observers to one hundred, Russia’s Central Elections Commission chief, Vladimir Churov, said that “the presence of observers at each of the 95,000 polling stations would ‘at the very least’ be tantamount to foreign interference.” According to Stürmer, Putin views Russia as “excluded from Europe and rejected from the West under the leadership of the United States.” Similarly, as Baranovsky argued: “this syndrome of alienation from Europe is aggravated by strongly disappointing signals that the course of Russia’s development is taking an opposite path to that of the majority of the continent,” and that “even in the most liberal-oriented circles the loss of superpower status continues…to be a source of considerable unease and

192 ODIHR.GAL/93/07 16 Nov. 2007. Note Verbale. 2 December elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, following ODIHR’s Note Verbale 529/07. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe, however, observed the Duma elections, although the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly refused to observe the presidential elections in 2008. See also Chivers, C.J. 24 Oct. 2007. Russia seeks to derail election monitors. International Herald Tribune.


195 Author’s translation from German. Ibid.

196 Author’s interview with diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 14 Jan. 2009.

197 For the presidential election, this number was reduced to 70 observers, then increased to 75. BBC. 7 February 2008. OSCE to Boycott Russian Election. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7232389.stm. Accessed 5/2011.


confusion” (2000, 450-1). When Russia was unable or unwilling to raise its democratic status, appeals to the concepts of “managed democracy” and “sovereign democracy” appeared as attempts to redefine the range of democratic standards (Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 92). In advance of the March 2008 presidential elections, Sergei Lavrov stated that “no self-respecting country would bow to ‘ultimatums’ of the kind set by the OSCE.”

Similarly, one reason for Kazakhstan’s pursuit of the OSCE Chairmanship was to improve its status in the OSCE region (Hellwig-Bötte 2008, 176,179; Kunze 2010). President Nursultan Nazarbayev has stated that holding the OSCE CiO position was “an extremely important recognition of Kazakhstan’s international authority, and a historical mission for the Kazakh state.” Its decision to propose to hold the first OSCE Summit in eleven years in Astana also aimed at this goal. Roman Vassilenko of the Kazakh Foreign Ministry stated: “this is an opportunity to show that Kazakhstan is an equal, a decent and a worthy player and we have proven that we can manage a leadership role in such a major organization.” This powerful statement implies that, from Kazakhstan’s perspective, OSCE participating states have not viewed, or treated the state as such. The Foreign Minister’s use of the terms “decent” and “worthy” suggests that the Kazakh leadership assessed the status applied to Kazakhstan as negative, or below that of other states that have led the OSCE. Kazakhstan’s perception of its status in the OSCE is also noteworthy because it stands in contrast with that of Central European and Western Balkan states’ perceptions of their status, whose leaders have generally spoken in more positive terms of their experiences in the OSCE.


During its Chairmanship in 2010, the priorities selected by Kazakhstan de-emphasized democracy and human rights and instead emphasized issues of international security and cooperation, such as reconstruction in Afghanistan, fighting terrorism, resolving protracted conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova, the situation in Kyrgyzstan, transportation issues, and the environment.\textsuperscript{204} While the decision to hold the Astana Summit meant that the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting would not take place in 2010,\textsuperscript{205} a high-level conference on tolerance in Astana highlighted harmonious co-existence of 140 ethnic groups and 46 confessions in the country.\textsuperscript{206} Nazarbayev also followed a strategy of social creativity (theoretical proposition S-3) when attempting to revise the OSCE’s democratic status markers by proposing to increase the OSCE’s number of dimensions from three (politico-military, economic, and the human dimension which includes human rights and democratic institutions) to five (adding a new dimension on inter-confessional tolerance and financial and economic security, with a council for energy security).\textsuperscript{207} This did not meet consensus, but the proposal would have effectively directed fewer resources to supporting democratic governance.

Bona fide democrats have also advocated a de-emphasis of democratic status markers. For example, Ambassador Janez Lenarčič of Slovenia, Director of ODIHR, stated in 2008:

\begin{quote}
If we want the ODIHR to continue to fulfill its mandate in an effective manner, we need to rebuild trust and overcome suspicion. One way of doing this is to start dropping the labels and adjust our idioms. It is disappointing that we still refer to ‘East’ and ‘West,’ or as is practice in the OSCE, ‘East of Vienna’ and ‘West of Vienna.’…Perhaps it is also time to adjust our idioms and to rethink, within the OSCE framework, our references to ‘longer established democracies’ and what we have come to call ‘new’ or ‘transitional democracies’ (2008, 3-4).
\end{quote}

Why would representatives of states with democratic status aim to deflate democratic status markers? As the above citation suggests, there remained a lingering semantic divide in the OSCE that continued to separate established democratic states from the states that became EU members in 2004. Moreover, some viewed the democratic status divisions as inhibiting cooperation between the broader range of OSCE participating states. As ODIHR Director,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{205} Human Dimension Implementation Meetings are held in years in which an OSCE Summit does not take place.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Statement by Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, OSCE Astana Summit, 1 Dec. 2010. SUM.DEL/8/10, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Statement by Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, OSCE Astana Summit, 1 Dec. 2010. SUM.DEL/8/10, 3-4.
\end{itemize}
Ambassador Lenarčič aimed to respond to criticism against the organization, to bring everyone around the table, and to remove misunderstandings on issues while remaining firm on OSCE commitments.208 This example again illustrates the difficulty states have in changing status perceptions in IOs.

Therefore, we observed mixed trends in the late 2000s in the salience of democratic status in the OSCE. The high-profile case of Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE Chairmanship illustrated a weakening of democratic status markers in favor of sovereign equality. It also suggests that status based on a state’s characteristics as an energy supplier had gained in strength in the organization. On the other hand, democratic states continued to hold a large majority of the most prestigious positions such as Heads of OSCE Field Offices and Heads of Election Observation and Assessment Missions, indicating that democratic status remained strong in some parts of the organization.

The idea of relative standing raised in proposition S-2 is highly relevant to the timing of challenges to OSCE practices supporting democratic governance. One might argue that a state’s support for democratic governance in an IO is simply a function of that state’s own level of democracy. After all, the most significant and most damaging challenges to the OSCE’s ability to elaborate and implement human dimension commitments have originated from states with the lowest democracy rankings in the organization. However, there are many examples of non- or partially-democratic states that have actively or tacitly supported – or have simply not challenged an IO’s democracy programs.209 In the OSCE, for many years non-democratic Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not attempt to disrupt or challenge the OSCE’s norms and policies. What elicited the change in approach of many CIS states?

In the 2000s, indicators of political rights and civil liberties in Central Europe and the Western Balkans gradually improved over time, while these indicators in CIS states other than Ukraine and Georgia declined. Figure 4.6 shows that the relative standing of Russia and several CIS states in terms of democratic status vis-à-vis all of the other OSCE participating states had been considerably reduced by the early 2000s (see Appendix B for more detailed graphs).

209 For example, Qatar donated 2 million USD in 2005 and 4 million USD to the UN Democracy Fund in both 2006 and 2008, for a total of 10 million USD, even though Freedom House in each of these years rated Qatar as “not free” with political rights ranked as 6 (7 being the lowest level of freedom) and civil liberties ranked a 5 of 7.
Marginal increases in compliance by CIS states would no longer bring significant increases in relative status in the OSCE because all other OSCE states had either democratized as in Central Europe or were democratizing more quickly as in the Western Balkans. As the democratic status of Central European and Western Balkan states had significantly increased and they either became members, applicants or candidates of the EU, the OSCE increasingly turned the spotlight on Russia and CIS states.

**Figure 4.6: Average democracy indicators in selected OSCE participating states and subregions, 1989-2010**

(Scale: 1 – most democratic, 7 – least democratic)

This increasingly negative view of Russia and other CIS states in terms of democratic governance contrasted sharply with the views held, for example, by Russian elites of the higher position in the OSCE’s hierarchy to which they thought their country was entitled, based on status dimensions such as military strength. This corresponds with the concept of status inconsistency raised in chapter 2. In her analysis of Russian foreign policy behavior, Clunan shows that policy-makers with statist orientations viewed status subordinate to the West as illegitimate, given Russia’s position as a great power (2009, 113). This was compounded by the impression that democratic status markers were residual legacies of the Cold War. Thus, a “desire for an inherent and positive distinctiveness from the West, one that cast Russia as equal

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Source: www.freedomhouse.org, Freedom in the World Index. Accessed 6/2012. For purposes of this graph, *Central Europe* refers to states of the region that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria); *Western Balkans* refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and the states preceding them, e.g. Serbia Montenegro); and *other CIS* refers to Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. For additional information, see Appendix B.
to the West in non-material as well as in material terms” (Clunan 2009, 115), and what some policy-makers perceived as unfair treatment, has contributed to Russia’s engagement in social competition and creativity, through criticism of OSCE practices for implementing democratic commitments and advocating alternative status dimensions (e.g. energy, military/security) for comparison.

4.8. Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed and presented evidence of the effects of democratic status on the development and implementation of democratic norms in the CSCE/OSCE since its foundation in 1973. Codification of the CSCE’s democracy commitments in the early 1990s contributed to new patterns of stratification linked to compliance. Democratic status has been a positive motivating factor for states to support democratic governance in the organization, and has been used as a resource by states seeking recognition for their transitions. Moreover, once established, perceptions of status are often slow to change in inclusive IOs. Yet overemphasis by the IO or by groups of participating states on status markers – especially those for which legitimacy is decreasing, both inside and outside the IO - can contribute to alienation and discord. In other words, democratic status has played a dual role: motivational in the cases of Central Europe in the 1990s and the Western Balkans in the 1990s and 2000s, yet also divisive, as in Russia and several CIS states in the 2000s.

The 2000s have seen a renewed period of antagonism, including serious challenges to the democratic status hierarchy. Challenges typically “tend to originate from governments that have difficulties implementing OSCE commitments” (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 61). However, I have argued that status concerns contributed to the challenges to the OSCE’s implementation of democracy commitments. The problem has not been simply that the OSCE criticized their elections or challenged the legitimacy of their regimes. With a high priority on the human dimension, the OSCE offered few alternative outlets for their status ambitions. In the 1990s, many of the now-critical CIS states accommodated OSCE human dimension projects and election observation missions without objections. Initially, it seemed that they were gaining status in the organization if attempting to comply with the organization’s democratic norms. Over time, however, the locations of OSCE human dimension efforts indicated lower status in the organization. Marginal increases in compliance by CIS states no longer brought significant increases in relative status in the OSCE because all other OSCE states had either democratized,
as in Central Europe, or were democratizing more quickly, as in the Western Balkans. In other words, the option of capitalizing on democratic status was not as available to most CIS states as it was to Central European states in earlier years. Moreover, the OSCE itself experienced a decline in relevance in the 2000s as participating states’ priorities shifted to other regions such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Asia. This signaled a political opportunity to potential antagonists and increased their confidence in opposing the organization’s programs, particularly when Western attention was focused elsewhere. Combined with the diminished prestige of the OSCE as an organization, the decreased legitimacy of the U.S. as a key promoter of democracy, and inconsistent messages from European leaders about the importance of democratic governance, a group of CIS states ceased to seek democratic status and aimed to fundamentally transform OSCE and ODIHR practices in the human dimension.
Chapter Five: Inclusiveness, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the United Nations

5.1. Introduction

This chapter assesses the dissertation’s theoretical propositions on the roles of inclusive institutions in developing democratic norms and implementation policies through an in-depth case study of the United Nations and evidence from UN bodies and agencies engaged in these areas. It highlights several recurring roles and features of inclusive institutions in the UN between its origins in 1945 and 2010. For example, as raised in theoretical proposition I-1, inclusive institutions have a special relationship to windows of opportunity. Because their activity is ongoing under conditions that may be more or less contentious, their ability to reconsider norms and policies on a recurring basis opens the possibility of encountering more favorable policy windows, for example, as in 1988, 1993, and 1999-2000. Inclusive institutions also ensure that state delegations continue to articulate and perhaps revise their relevant positions. Therefore, when there are shifts in political will, structures are in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate. Although some initiatives are periodically forced to lie dormant, at times states and UN actors have capitalized on the strengths of inclusive institutions and have benefitted from windows of opportunity. By contrast, the time period 2005-2010 illustrates the vulnerability of inclusive institutions to shifts in foreign policy priorities of key states and to underlying shifts in sentiment. In these years, trends in the UN’s support of democratic governance are mixed.

As illustrated in Table 2.1, there is greater variation in the formal inclusiveness of UN institutions than in the CSCE/OSCE, in part to facilitate decision-making given the large number of member states. As suggested in proposition I-2, inclusive aspects of drafting processes contribute to the legitimacy and moral authority of declarations and resolutions. For example, in this chapter I show that the legitimacy generated by the UN General Assembly’s inclusiveness enabled the UN to expand its election observation mandate in the late 1980s. In line with proposition I-4, while UN technical agencies such as UNDP are often considered by IR scholars to be highly autonomous, I argue that their inter-governmental bodies such as the UNDP Executive Board are often overlooked. Importantly, these bodies serve a gatekeeper function by periodically (re-)endorsing, authorizing, or inhibiting policy implementation of the agencies’ democratization mandate. Also in this chapter, in support of theoretical proposition I-5 (a&b), I show through analysis of the International Conferences of New and Restored Democracies
(ICNRD) and Community of Democracies (CD) movements in the 2000s that when new or restored democracies qualify for and become members of a more exclusive group, the exclusive group may eventually receive greater priority, thus leading to decreased enthusiasm for operating through inclusive institutions. Furthermore, this chapter returns to the question of issue linkage in norm development and policy implementation in inclusive institutions highlighted in theoretical proposition I-3. While in the CSCE/OSCE the issue of security most heavily affected states’ democracy support, in the UN, development has had significant effect on the democracy agenda at policy level. This aspect of issue linkage resurfaces several times, for example, at the expansion of the UN’s democratization mandate in the mid- to late 1990s and in debates over UNDP’s strategic plan for 2008-2011.

5.2. Origins of inclusive institutions in the United Nations

With its virtually global membership, the basis for considering the UN as broadly inclusive is clear. Formal membership criteria are specified in the UN Charter’s Article 3, which extended membership to the 50 original signatories in 1945, and Article 4, which opens UN membership to “peace-loving states” that accept and are able and willing to carry out their Charter obligations. While a few polities such as Taiwan or Kosovo have not been recognized by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly or by the Security Council, once admitted, no member state has been expelled from the UN (Zweifel 2006, 67; Weiss et al 2007, 350). Formal membership criteria are negligible beyond a very few highly-politicized cases.

Unlike the CSCE, which emerged in 1975 with fully inclusive institutions and consensus decision-making, the UN emerged in 1945 with organs and institutions comprising much wider variation in participation by its member states and with several types of voting procedures. The General Assembly consisted of all UN members, each having one vote and with most decisions made by simple majority of those present and voting, while the Security Council differentiated between permanent and non-permanent members, and its eleven members involved a fraction

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211 Important issues such as the budget, peace and security, admission decisions, and elections to the Security Council are decided by 2/3 majority.

212 Today the UN SC comprises 15 members, with non-permanent members elected to two-year terms. According to the UN Charter, attention is paid in the selection of non-permanent members to “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution” (1945, Article 23(2)).
of the UN’s total membership. The ECOSOC initially comprised 18 members elected by the GA to 3-year terms.213

Why did the UN emerge with this variation in institutional inclusiveness in 1945? The UN was constructed with the fundamental objective of preventing a third world war and maintaining international peace and security, leading to unique patterns of inclusiveness and privilege in its institutions. One lesson from the League of Nations’ failures in the 1930s was the importance of securing the membership and participation of great powers, especially of the United States and USSR, but also of potential aggressor states such as Germany and Italy (Kennedy 2006, 13-4). As Claude argues, universal membership is key to the idea of collective security, because “criminals are the last who ought to be formally exempted from bonds of law” (1968, Ch. 12).214 Therefore, the formal inclusivity of the UN’s overall membership aimed to ensure states’ participation and, as such, the functioning of the system. Allocating five Security Council vetoes was seen as necessary to prevent great powers’ withdrawal (Kennedy 2006, 26-7; Klein 1974, 129) and to prevent international actions that might lead to dangerous disputes among them (Jackson 2000, Ch.1). Whereas the League of Nations had difficulties enforcing international law, the UN aimed to draw more heavily on states’ power to implement Security Council resolutions and to improve the organization’s effectiveness (Weiss et al. 2007, 4).

Moreover, since the League of Nations’ decision-making by consensus was seen as contributing to its deadlock and ineffectiveness in preventing World War II (Efraim 2000, 74; Krasno 2004, 23), delegates instituted less demanding decision-making procedures - by majority - in UN bodies other than meetings of the permanent five members of the Security Council (P-5). A lack of special voting privileges for great powers in the GA and ECOSOC is interpreted by some realists as signifying the absence of great powers’ vital interests in the work of these bodies (Kennedy 2006, 15). However, as will be shown, these more inclusive bodies have been highly significant at different points in time in the organization.

Although the UN placed responsibility on great powers for maintaining international peace and security, as Klein argues, “a place had to be found for the idea of a world community of equal states” (1974, 123; Tucker 1977, 33). Indeed, Article 2(1) of the UN Charter asserts

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213 ECOSOC enlarged to 27 members in 1965 and to its current membership of 54 in 1973 (Krasno 2004, 8).
214 However, the Axis powers were not invited to the San Francisco meetings in 1945 (participation was limited to states that had declared war on Germany and Japan by March 1, 1945) and the Axis powers were also not invited to help draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Morsink 1999, 66; Osiatynski 2009, 17).
that “the organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members” (1945). The idea of sovereign equality was seen as essential for the UN to hold worldwide legitimacy. It was also highly salient to the twenty Latin American states in 1945 (Klein 1974, 133, 111), and for its potential to counteract hegemony and inequalities in international relations (Krisch 2003, 135). This chapter focuses on the more inclusive GA and ECOSOC because a great deal of the UN’s work on democratic norm development has taken place through these bodies.

5.3. UN, 1945-1989: Human rights as the basis for democratic norm development. At times agendas lie dormant, at others the legitimacy of inclusive processes enables the UN to expand norms and policies

The uninterrupted activity of inclusive institutions gives them a special relationship to windows of opportunity. Since inclusive institutions operate consistently in years with high and low levels of political will to engage in democratic norm development, they are often able to take incremental steps under less conducive conditions which enable the elaboration of norms if these conditions change. In addition, as raised in proposition I-2, inclusive aspects of drafting processes contribute to the legitimacy and moral authority of declarations and resolutions, as observed with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. In the case of the UN’s election observation mandate in the late 1980s, the legitimacy generated by inclusiveness enabled the UN to expand its operations. While efforts to further develop democratic norms were periodically forced to lie dormant, as in the most contentious phases of the Cold War, the examples of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the origins of the UN’s election observation mandate show that, at times, states and UN agencies have been able to capitalize on the strengths of inclusive institutions and benefit from windows of opportunity. As discussed in proposition I-1, by restating earlier commitments, key norms are kept alive on IOs’ agendas, and thus there are intermittent opportunities to probe the prevailing political will and potentially to reach new agreements when a window opens.

The first references to components of democratic systems appear in the UN Charter and the UN’s human rights law. Although the term “democracy” is not in the UN Charter, the organization has justified its support for democratic development by the links between democracy and the UN’s earlier-established mandates in the areas of security, human rights, and development, which are stated in the Charter’s Preamble as well as in other key documents (Rich 2001, 20; Rich and Newman 2004, 5; Zweifel 2006, 67).
In particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided an important basis for the future development of democratic norms in the UN. What role did inclusive institutions play in the drafting of the UDHR? The process of drafting the Universal Declaration was divided into seven stages, with varying degrees of inclusiveness and participation by representatives of UN member states at each stage. Overall, the multiplicity of negotiating fora and participants - alternating between small groups of states and the organization’s full membership - was designed to deal with the perpetual trade-off in inclusive IOs between efficiency and legitimacy. In the first stage, in January and February 1947, a drafting group initially consisted of Eleanor Roosevelt as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the Vice Chairman, and a Rapporteur, but this was enlarged to eight representatives, with John Humphrey of Canada as principal drafter, when several states sought a more inclusive process. In the second stage, Eleanor Roosevelt appointed a smaller working group of representatives of France, Lebanon and the UK, chaired by Rene Cassin, who created another draft and submitted it to the third stage, the 18-member Commission in December 1947 (Morsink 1999, 5-9). The fourth stage, in May 1948, again involved the 8-member drafting committee, while the fifth stage entailed a third session of the 18-member Commission on Human Rights. The sixth stage brought the draft to all UN members at the General Assembly’s Third (Social and Humanitarian) Committee in September to December 1948, and the final stage entailed plenary debate in the General Assembly until its adoption on December 10, 1948 (Morsink 1999, 10-12). Although five stages of the drafting processes involved fewer than the UN’s total membership, a larger number of states contributed to the process at various points, thus conferring the declaration ample legitimacy for adoption in 1948.

In the General Assembly vote on December 10, 1948, no UN member state voted against the UDHR; 48 states voted for, and eight states abstained. To justify their abstentions, the six communist states (USSR, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), Byelorussian SSR, Yugoslavia, Poland and Czechoslovakia) cited insufficient condemnation of Nazism and fascism, Saudi Arabia disagreed with aspects of Articles 16 and 18 on equal marriage rights.

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215 Representatives to the first stage were from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the USSR, UK, and US. The 18-member Human Rights Commission that produced the declaration was composed with attention to equitable geographic distribution and qualifications; its members were from Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, Philippine Republic, United Kingdom, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia (Morsink 1999, 3,5).

216 Other justifications provided by communist states, which sought to postpone the vote and continue negotiations, included that the UDHR was a step backwards from communist constitutions, the Communist Manifesto, and the
and the right to change religion or belief, and South Africa aimed to defend apartheid (Morsink 1999, 21-7). An important and infrequently mentioned fact is that just prior to the general roll-call vote, delegates also voted on the declaration article by article. Twenty three articles were adopted unanimously with no abstentions, including Article 21, the UDHR’s most relevant article for this dissertation:

1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country

3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Articles 18-20 convey freedoms protected by democratic systems; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; opinion and expression; and peaceful assembly and association, while earlier articles state other fundamental civil and political rights. Many consider the UDHR to be an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter and customary international law (Vincent 1986, 46; Norchi 2004, 84). In its Preamble, the UDHR expands on the UN Charter’s implicit reference to popular sovereignty (“We the peoples of the United Nations”) and its purpose to promote “respect for the principle of equal rights” (1945, Art. 1(1); Boutros-Ghali 1996, 12).

A perpetual and damaging critique of the UDHR has been that its drafting process was not inclusive enough to underpin a claim to universality in later years. For example, Asia and Africa were particularly underrepresented in the UN of 56 states in 1948 (see Morsink 1999, x, principles of the October Revolution and thus was insufficiently progressive or modern; that it did not sufficiently address group or minority rights; and that it did not guarantee the rights it proclaimed such as the right to education or specify implementation mechanisms. Statement by Mr. Augenthaler, Czechoslovakia, UN GA 181st Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.181, 880-882; Statement by Mr. Kaminsky, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, UN GA 182nd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.182, 896-898; Statement by Mr. Katz-Suchy, Poland, UN GA 182nd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.182, 903-910; Statement by Mr. Radovanovic, Yugoslavia, UN GA 183rd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.183, 913-918; Statement by Mr. Vyshinsky, USSR, UN GA 183rd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.183, 923-929.217


218 Article 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) was adopted unanimously. Article 19 (right to freedom of opinion and expression) was adopted by 45 votes, with 4 abstentions. Article 20 (right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association) was adopted by 44 votes to 7, with 2 abstentions. UN General Assembly, Records of the 183rd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, Continuation of the discussion on the draft universal declaration of human rights: report of the Third Committee (A/777), A/PV.183, 933.

219 Other references to human rights in the UN Charter appear in Articles 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, and 76 (see Osiatynski 2009, 17).
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63, 97). Critics argue that the drafting process was dominated by Western powers, and its formulations, seen by some as ethnocentric, would be more legitimate over time if they were reviewed in later years by a process more inclusive of the UN’s larger membership (Young 2000, 270). However, delegates in 1948 “were proud of the inclusiveness of the drafting process” and “were tempted to move from that inclusive process to the claim that the product therefore had worldwide applicability” (Morsink 1999, 12). Indeed, Mr. Athayde of Brazil asserted a link between inclusive drafting processes and the declaration’s legitimacy:

The draft declaration did not reflect the particular point of view of any one people or of any one group of peoples. Neither was it the expression of any particular political doctrine or philosophical system. It was the result of the intellectual and moral co-operation of a large number of nations; that explained its value and interest and also conferred upon it great moral authority.

Similarly, Mr. Aikman of New Zealand explained: “The preparation of the draft declaration had been a difficult task since its authors had different social, economic and philosophical backgrounds, but it had proved that with good will and a sincere desire to co-operate, it was possible for divergent points of view to be reconciled. Thus, that declaration could justly be described as being ‘universal.’” And Mr. Watt of Australia argued that the inclusive drafting processes enhanced the declaration’s strength: “having been accepted and approved by the majority of Member States of the United Nations, the declaration would go forth to the world with much greater strength and authority.”

What were the conditions in 1945-48 that enabled delegates to reach agreement on human rights issues in the UN Charter and UDHR? Leaders such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Rene Cassin recognized the importance of capitalizing on the window of opportunity presented by the international environment of the mid-1940s. As typically noted, the shared horror of Nazi atrocities provided a common basis from which UN members agreed upon human rights.

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221 Statement by Mr. de Athayde, Brazil, UN GA 181st Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.181, 878; See also Statement by Mr. Aikman, New Zealand, UN GA 181st Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.181, 896; Statement by Mr. Vasconcellos, Paraguay, UN GA 182nd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.182, p. 901.
222 Statement by Mr. Aikman, New Zealand, UN GA 181st Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.181, 896; See also Statement by Mr. Vasconcellos, Paraguay, UN GA 182nd Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.182, 901.
223 Statement by Mr. Watt, Australia, UN GA 181st Plenary Meeting, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 10 December 1948, A/PV.181, 875.
provisions in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. It has also been cited as influential specifically on the UDHR’s Article 21, as “the experience of the war had reinforced their belief that the cluster of rights spelled out in Articles 18, 19, 20, and 21 are universally the first ones dictators will seek to deny and destroy” (Morsink 1999, 69). This factor of a common point of reference underpinning successful negotiations – the aim of preventing the reoccurrence of a specific destructive event – is frequently observed in the history of the development of democratic norms in international organizations. After WWII, Western states were also unusually willing to sacrifice elements of their privilege in order to protect and maintain their democratic values. The historic statement of equal rights for all human beings would gradually undermine colonialism. Therefore, contributing to the UDHR’s appeal and legitimacy was that, through the declaration, powerful states discredited the idea of power over others and operated beyond their immediate material interests. Leaders’ awareness that a favorable window of opportunity was closing in the late 1940s led them to support finalizing the declaration as quickly as possible, especially when escalating U.S.-Soviet tensions in 1948 threatened to jeopardize agreement (Morsink 1999, 19).

Because the idea of an international bill of rights was kept on the agenda of the General Assembly’s Third Committee since the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, delegates were able to adopt the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) after lengthy negotiations, in December 1966, when there was a sufficient thaw in Cold War tensions. Restating parts of the UDHR’s Article 21, the ICCPR codified key democratic norms in its Article 25:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity…
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

Had the UN’s inclusive institutions not been revisiting and attempting to develop this agenda item, the international community might not have been able to draft and negotiate such a document with global scope before Cold War tensions resumed later in the 1970s. “Although the

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225 The ICCPR was ratified in 1976.
drafting was almost complete by 1953, the covenants were shelved for more than 10 years because of ideological rivalry and the Cold War” (Osiatynski 2009, 29). Great powers’ geopolitical and domestic priorities in the 1950s and early 1960s precluded much progress on human rights in the UN. France and Britain were preoccupied with independence struggles in their colonies, China had become Communist, Stalin’s purges took place in Russia in the early 1950s, and in the United States African Americans were still denied the right to vote (Ibid). In those years, leaders from Africa and Asia were among the most vocal supporters of human rights, motivated by the quest for self-determination and redistribution of resources (Ibid, 30-1). The debate changed in the mid- to late 1960s when European states held vastly fewer colonies, and social movements such as the civil rights movement in the US, women’s rights movements, and student protests in Europe and North America helped to shift public and states’ priorities in terms of advancing international human rights, while the temporary easing of U.S.-Soviet tensions enabled more constructive negotiations (see Kennedy 2006, 185, 188, 216; Osiatynski 2009, 31, 33). Moreover, as a Hungarian diplomat argued in 1977: “The acceptance of the [CSCE Helsinki] Final Act [in 1975] was an important contribution to the entry into force in 1976 of the [UN] Covenants of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of Civil and Political Rights, which had been drawn up as far back as 1966.”

While the UN’s inclusive institutions were able to generate only a few policies to encourage implementation of human rights norms during the Cold War, one example is the ICCPR’s creation of the Human Rights Commission to monitor and report on states’ compliance and to expand on the declaration’s norms. A major motivating force for launching the Human Rights Commission was the exceptional agreement among UN members in the 1960s and 1970s on the need for measures against apartheid in South Africa (Osiatynski 2009, 31-2; Mertus 2005, 163). The unique concurrence among Western, Eastern, and Southern states provided sufficient impetus to establish new institutions to work towards assisting the implementation of selected human rights norms. However, aside from UN election monitoring in states seeking independence and a few small projects financed by UNDP between 1976 and 1989 for electoral support (Ponzio 2004, 213), a good deal of time would elapse before the UN would be in a position to undertake more substantial efforts to support countries with implementation of the democratic norms in the ICCPR.

226 Statement by Mr. Petrán, Hungary, CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade, 7 Oct, 1977, CSCE/BM/VR.7, 15.
227 See ICCPR Articles 28-45 and Optional Protocol 1.
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Similar to the CSCE strategy of restating Helsinki human rights norms during the 1980s which contributed to the development of a comprehensive democratic norm set at the end of the Cold War, in the UN, periodic restatement of Articles 21 and 25 of the UDHR and ICCPR maintained their relevance on the UN’s agenda and provided an opportunity to expand norms when delegates displayed greater political will. According to Farer, “restatement is one way of rescuing it [the ICCPR] from inanition” (2004, 37; see also Thomas 2001, 196). This imagery of saving a norm from starvation vividly conveys that for inclusive IOs, restatements are often an important strategy for infusing new life into commitments. Given that the leadership and priorities of UN member states are continuously evolving, there is always a possibility that a restatement may emerge into a more favorable window of opportunity. Restatements in inclusive institutions also ensure that large numbers of diplomats continue to consider and, at minimum, prepare votes or positions on the relevant issues. In other words, restatements encourage recurring clarifications of states’ positions. Although restatements are also used by more exclusive bodies such as the UN Security Council, they are particularly meaningful in inclusive bodies because re-endorsement of norms in these settings suggests a re-commitment by all states concerned and therefore underpins a renewed legitimacy. Moreover, even under contentious circumstances, a reluctant state’s concerns in a different issue area may lead it to contribute to elaborating democratic norms or implementation policies. Or, if domestic leadership and priorities of key UN member states have changed in the interim, restatements may help launch productive negotiations, as in the late 1980s.

The year 1988 commemorated the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN delegates consistently cited this anniversary as an occasion to reflect on achievements, and to rekindle dedication to commitments and to strengthening implementation mechanisms. In the late 1980s and early 1990s such statements turned out to be more than perfunctory. Similar to the CSCE, which could suddenly elaborate its human rights norms and implementation mechanisms at the Vienna follow-up meeting of 1986-1989, much credit for the newly conducive working environment in the UN in the late 1980s had been given to the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, who was supportive of working through the UN. There was an increase in common interests between the United States and Soviet Union, as Ambassador Belonogov, Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN stated in


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Observers of the UN agree that the end of the Cold War offered an unprecedented opportunity for the organization to make progress on some mandates that had stagnated. This newly conducive environment and support for human rights in the UN forged a path for new normative commitments on democracy.

The case of the UN’s expanding electoral assistance mandate in the late 1980s and early 1990s shows that the organization’s inclusiveness and history of support for decolonization conferred legitimacy in the eyes of the international community that enabled it to assume this new role, thus supporting proposition I-2. In the late 1980s, the UN helped with elections in the context of peace agreements in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, and, as Ludwig emphasizes, the UN was well-placed to assist with these tasks because of its legitimacy and neutrality (2004a, 170). On this basis, in December 1988 the General Assembly first adopted a resolution entitled “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections,” which restated key passages from Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR, would become a recurring resolution in the GA, and would lay part of the normative foundation for the UN’s mandate to support democracy.

This resolution (43/157), together with a framework submitted to the GA by the Secretary General (A/44/454) and prepared by the Commission on Human Rights (1989/45), sparked a vibrant debate in the General Assembly’s Third Committee. The framework contained a kernel of an election observation mandate for the UN system, listing states’ needs such as independent supervision, voter registration, reliable balloting procedures, and methods for preventing electoral fraud and resolving disputes, and proposed that host countries may wish to invite observers or seek advisory services.

Meanwhile, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar committed the UN to observe elections in Nicaragua in mid-1989, which was the first time the organization observed elections in an

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230 See also statement by Ms. Vargas, Nicaragua. UN GA Third Committee, 44th Session, Summary Record of the 42nd Meeting, New York, 14 Nov. 1989. A/C.3/44/SR.42, 15. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General were authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly.


232 UN General Assembly A/44/454, Report of the Economic and Social Council, Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, Note by the Secretary General, 16 August 1989.
independent state (Fox 2000, 75). This was supported by the General Assembly, and the mission’s success generated even wider support for a UN role in election observation (Kennedy 2006, 93). At the same time, debates continued about the extent of UN involvement. For example, the delegate of Nicaragua stated:

Nicaragua had recently benefited from United Nations technical assistance in its elections; indeed, it had been of crucial importance during a difficult period when it was striving to consolidate peace, establish democracy and promote comprehensive development. However, United Nations technical assistance in the electoral process should be given solely in response to requests from countries, with due regard for their sovereignty and independence.  

Because some states remained apprehensive of an activist UN role supporting democracy, the GA resolution “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections” (44/146) was complemented in 1989 by a new contradictory resolution sponsored by Cuba, “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes” (44/147), adopted by 113 votes in favor, 23 against, and 11 abstentions. These concerns about states’ sovereignty were strongest in debates around democratic norms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Under conditions in which many states are adamant about preserving elements of their sovereignty, the legitimacy of the UN’s efforts becomes all the more critical for the implementation of policies and programs. As will be shown further in the next sections, this legitimacy to pursue implementation of the UN’s democratization agenda was conferred in part by the inclusiveness of its decision-making bodies.

5.4. UN, 1990-1991: Procedural legitimacy of inclusive processes enables UN to expand electoral norms

The high involvement of states seeking to receive assistance conferred legitimacy on the UN’s expanding democratization mandate, which was deliberated in its most inclusive decision-making bodies, as expected in theoretical proposition I-2. In 1990-1991, there was a continued impetus for the institutionalization of norms and institutions for electoral assistance in the UN system. With the collapse of communism, many states sought to reshape their economic and political institutions, and the UN’s range of policy recommendations concentrated on supporting transformations to democracy and open market economies (see Weiss et al. 2005, 272, 275;

Ludwig 2004b, 115). While it can be argued that the American-led system “emerged as the organizational logic for the larger global system” (Ikenberry 2011, 275), the inclusive institutional structures of the United Nations placed parameters on some aspects of and legitimized other elements of a democratic international order. There was unusual American resolve during the George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993) for multilateral initiatives, including through the United Nations, and the U.S. backed the creation of a more permanent election support unit. At the same time, there was also unprecedented demand from member states with recent or ongoing democratic transitions for a shift in the UN’s mandate towards greater support for democratic governance, and the UN’s inclusive institutions facilitated the expression and consideration of these states’ requests.

General Assembly debates on institutionalizing electoral assistance featured important expressions of demand from UN member states and underscored their expectations on the boundaries or limits of UN engagement. For example, in 1990 Mr. Alfaro of El Salvador stated:

The presence of international observers at the recent elections had helped to improve the electoral process which was an essential part of the country’s development. The observers had come at the Government’s request – their presence had not been imposed, nor had they been regarded as a threat to national sovereignty; they had enabled the people of El Salvador to reaffirm the principle of periodic and genuine elections.235

This time period witnessed a transition from UN support for elections in the context of independence struggles and peace agreements to UN electoral support for states’ aspirations for democratic statehood. States such as China, Cuba, and Colombia criticized this trend, maintaining an emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention:

The cases in which the United Nations had provided electoral monitoring related to decolonization and the settlement of crises threatening peace and security and should not be confused with cases involving normal electoral practices in sovereign States. The establishment of permanent machinery to provide electoral assistance would undoubtedly exceed the Organization’s mandate under the Charter.236


Nevertheless, UN election monitoring continued in independent states, with the Haitian mission in 1990 receiving scrutinizing debate in the GA, especially since a threat to international peace and security was not as clear as in earlier cases. Some states also were concerned about precedents being set and the UN prioritizing U.S. interests (see Fox 2000, 75, 81; Weiss et al 2007, lvii; Franck 2000, 43, 45). Yet Haiti’s delegate appealed specifically to the legitimacy of the organization’s inclusiveness in his request for UN electoral assistance:

In full exercise of its sovereignty, the Government could have called upon one of its partners or a particular State. It did not feel it should do so because we have this international organization which is made up of all States and offers the soundest possible guarantee that countries will be protected from all types of intervention. That was the purpose of our request to the United Nations.

In other words, the UN’s inclusiveness and multilateral character gave it a unique credibility in the field of electoral assistance that was valued by states such as Haiti seeking electoral support, further validating theoretical proposition I-2. Procedural legitimacy is particularly important in this issue area because states feared the evolution of election assistance into a form of intervention. Therefore, the legitimacy conferred by inclusive institutions contributed to the expansion of UN efforts to support democratic governance.

Although there were significant developments in the UN in 1990-1991 in terms of democratic norm development, including the authorization of a Focal Point to coordinate the UN’s electoral assistance, these developments pale in comparison to events in the CSCE in the same years which resulted in the much more comprehensive Paris Charter and Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the Moscow Document of 1991. Some scholars and practitioners of the UN lament that the immediate post-Cold War period did not result in more dramatic progress or global institutionalization of norms, in contrast with that which took place in the UN directly after WWI and WWII (Weiss et al. 2005, 279). However, much diplomatic energy was

237 See also Statement by Mr. Alarcon de Ouesada, Cuba, UN GA 45th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 10 Oct. 1990, A/45/PV.29, 58; Statement by Mrs. Pellicer, Mexico, UN GA 45th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 10 Oct. 1990, A/45/PV.29, 63-5.
238 Statement by Mr. Auguste, Haiti. UN GA 45th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 10 Oct. 1990, A/45/PV.29, 71 (italics added).
239 On the subject of procedural legitimacy and intervention in other issue areas, see Finnemore 1996; Coleman 2007; and Weiss et al 2007, xlii.
240 The Focal Point is “responsible for receiving all requests for assistance and determining the appropriate UN response.” The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs was designated as the Focal Point by the Secretary General (Ludwig 2004b, 117).
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channeled in the pivotal years of 1990-91 to dilemmas in Europe and to regional institution-building, including the CSCE, where, unlike in the UN, there was an uncommon unity of purpose among participating states on democratization and momentum to resolve ideological tensions at the end of the Cold War.

What explains the divergence in outcomes between these two inclusive IOs in 1990-1991? Whereas the CSCE was historically divided along East-West lines, the UN operated simultaneously with both East-West and North-South internal divisions. With the end of the Cold War, the East-West divide spanned by the CSCE became less relevant. However, the UN’s inclusive bodies continued to contend with the North-South divisions among its member states. The CSCE’s inclusive institutions enabled its participating states to capitalize on their new common objectives and generate wide-ranging agreements on democratic norms and implementation mechanisms. In other words, in 1990-1991, the CSCE was presented with a different window of opportunity than the UN. The decreased relevance of the East-West divide allowed the CSCE to generate more comprehensive agreements than the UN. As will be seen, North-South issues have often interacted with the UN’s ability to codify and implement democratic norms. Nevertheless, the above discussion illustrates a trend in the UN that would continue into subsequent years: “the nature of government as democratic or authoritarian, a subject that had mostly been considered a domestic affair protected by the principle of state sovereignty, came to be seen by all states as a legitimate subject for diplomatic action through the UN” (Weiss et al 2007, lvii).

5.5. UN, 1992-1994: Basis for UN’s democratization mandate is established in its most inclusive fora, underpinning its acceptance and legitimacy

In 1992-1994, we observe the continued institutionalization of democratic norms and some erosion in support for traditional principles of sovereignty. Consensus agreements on democratic norms in the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and over 90% majorities in the General Assembly gave legitimacy and momentum to the UN’s expanding democratization mandate. Broad support arose among UN member states for an expanded UN role because it responded to many democratizing states’ self-expressed immediate needs. Moreover, the organization’s inclusive institutions posed fewer obstacles to elaborating its norms and operations.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a declining trend in support for sovereignty in the 1990s and an increasing trend in support for a UN role in democratization as shown by the percentage of voting UN members that voted in favor of the two periodic GA resolutions, “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states in their electoral processes” and “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections.” In Figure 5.1, we see that states’ support for sovereignty (bottom line) decreased significantly in the 1990s. Perceptions of sovereignty’s importance are also influenced by issues other than democracy and elections, such as humanitarian intervention, as its lowest point was reached around 1995, after genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

Figure 5.1: Percentage of voting UN member states that voted in favor of two countervailing General Assembly resolutions over time

![Diagram showing the percentage of voting UN member states that voted in favor of two countervailing General Assembly resolutions over time. The graph shows a declining trend in support for sovereignty (bottom line) and an increasing trend in support for a UN role in democratization (top line). The years 1989 to 2007 are shown on the x-axis, and the percentage of voting member states is shown on the y-axis, ranging from 0 to 100. Two lines represent the two resolutions: one for enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, and the other for respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states in their electoral processes.]

242 Source: Voting Record Search, unbisnet.org. The recurring GA resolution, “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections” was retitled in 1994 “Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization.” In 2009, they were retitled “Strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization.” In 2009 and 2011, these resolutions were adopted without a vote. The UN GA resolutions on “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes” became in 2001 “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes as an important element for the promotion and protection of human rights.” In 2003 and 2005, the resolution was titled “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and diversity of democratic systems in electoral processes as an important element for the promotion and protection of human rights.” These resolutions were considered annually between 1989 and 1995, after which they were considered every other year. There were no GA resolutions on this topic following resolution 60/164 in 2005. The topic was in the agenda of the 62nd session (2007), but no further actions were taken (UN Reference Team Dag Hammarskjöld Library). Schroeder (2010) and Kelley (2008) present graphs in their work using similar data.
The UN secretariat proceeded quickly to implement its mandate for electoral assistance. In the year prior to the Secretary-General’s report of November 1993 (the first year in which the UN Electoral Assistance Unit operated), the UN received 27 requests for electoral assistance from 24 countries and the organization increased its ability to respond to requests, engaging in five major electoral missions. In the same time period, Resident Coordinators (the heads of UN country offices and teams) followed and reported to the Secretary-General on 7 electoral processes, several needs assessments were undertaken, and the UN engaged in 21 instances of technical assistance or advisory activities for electoral processes, of which 20 involved UNDP. In these cases, the speed and depth of policy implementation has therefore also depended in part on the capacity and priorities of leadership in the UN Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, or agencies such as UNDP.

Inter-governmental deliberations in inclusive institutions, nevertheless, play an important role in endorsing, authorizing (or inhibiting) these types of implementation efforts at key points in time. For example, in 1992, debate in the UN General Assembly challenged the Secretary-General’s role in establishing the Electoral Assistance Unit. Uncharacteristically, in 1992 France and Japan joined the group of 19 states abstaining from the vote on “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections” because they felt, as did Cuba and China, that establishing the Electoral Assistance Unit went beyond the authority given to the Secretary-General in the prior year’s resolution (46/137), which simply authorized him to establish a Focal Point. A case was also made by some European states that electoral assistance should be financed from the UN’s regular budget and not from a separate fund, because “such operations were political in nature and must not be dependent on the goodwill of contributors,” yet in the end, resolution 47/138 welcomed the establishment by the SG of trust

244 Ibid, 3, 14.
245 This began operating in 1992 and was housed in the Department of Political Affairs in New York rather than in Geneva because of the link with the political work of the secretariat in conflict resolution (see Ludwig 2004a, 170-1; Fox 2000, 81).
funds for election observation.\textsuperscript{248} Therefore, although some states expressed concern about smaller groups of (largely democratic) states financing implementation of the UN’s electoral assistance efforts, they were endorsed by the GA. Moreover, the autonomous role played at times by the UN Secretary-General illustrates a difference between the UN and the OSCE in terms of their ability to affect the course of democratic norm development and implementation in their respective organizations. The OSCE Secretary-General is a position that remains formally in the service of and responsive to participating states, whereas the UN Secretary-General is given greater formal autonomy. In the above case, while a set of guidelines were provided by the inclusive GA to the UN Secretary-General, he embellished on the provided mandate in order to advance it as far as possible and thereby to further the UN’s objectives in the area of democratic governance.

Because the inclusive Vienna World Conference on Human Rights of June 1993 generated consensus among 171 UN member states, the \textit{Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action}\textsuperscript{249} provided legitimacy and an important basis for UN agencies to continue engaging in electoral assistance and to further support democratic governance in member states (Ludwig 2004a, 185-6). The Vienna Declaration is often cited as the first UN declaration to assert - what would become a staple of future international declarations: “Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing” (2003, Section 1(8): see Rich 2001, 20; Norchi 2004, 87; Kennedy 2006, 192-3). Its section 1(8) continues:

Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels should be universal and conducted without conditions attached.

Thus, it was within the inclusive General Assembly and inclusive World Conferences that the most important initial steps in the development of democratic norms in the United Nations arose and were endorsed. The support provided to agreements generated in inclusive institutions may be compounded in a window of opportunity. Consensus in the case of the Vienna Declaration and majorities over 90% of voting UN members in the case of GA

\textsuperscript{248} UN GA 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 92\textsuperscript{nd} Plenary Meeting, 18 Dec. 1992, New York. Resolution A/RES/47/138, para. 5.

\textsuperscript{249} The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action were adopted by the UN GA in Resolution 48/121.
resolutions 48/131 and 49/190 contributed strongly to the initial legitimacy of and subsequent enthusiasm and support for the UN’s efforts to support democratization.

Outcomes of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights are prime illustrations of the important role played by inclusive institutions in advancing democratic norms and implementation mechanisms. The Vienna conference improved mechanisms for review of human rights commitments and recommended establishing the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), an office which was created by consensus in the GA in December 1993. This office would grow to collaborate with other UN agencies, providing guidance on democratic institutions, including legal and expert advice to country operations, for example, on participatory rights and aspects of elections. Previously, there had been several efforts to establish a High Commissioner for Human Rights, but these had been opposed in the UN for many years by developing and communist countries. However, this process of periodic proposal of an initiative and debate, even in the less conducive Cold War environment, helped to prepare the groundwork for negotiations on the subject in the early 1990s and for the post’s eventual acceptance in 1993, as suggested in theoretical proposition I-1. Similar to the foundations that had been laid in the CSCE of the 1980s for the breakthroughs at CSCE meetings in Vienna, Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow in 1989-1991, some UN delegates capitalized on the window of opportunity that appeared at the end of the Cold War when the longstanding objections from communist countries disappeared in order to advance initiatives for human rights and democratic governance. UN GA Resolution 44/156 in December 1989 set the process in motion by requesting the Secretary-General to seek views of Governments, specialized agencies, NGOs, and UN human rights bodies about holding a world human rights conference. Whereas the Cold War witnessed stalemates over the relative merits of civil and political rights on one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand, in the post-Cold War years, state representatives became more open to considering the importance of all rights and their

250 On the position’s legitimacy, the delegate from Venezuela stated: “The establishment by consensus of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights is the clearest possible demonstration of the importance Member States attach to the promotion of human rights and to the universal recognition of the fundamental role to be played by the international community in its efforts to ensure full respect for those rights.” Statement by Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela, UN GA, 48th Session, 85th Plenary Meeting, 20 Dec. 1993, New York, A/48/PV.85, 15.
252 Resolution A/48/141, adopted by the UN GA on December 20, 1993, established the position of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. See Mertus 2005, 12. The creation of the post also benefited from a heavy lobbying campaign by NGOs, the Carter Presidential Center, and the U.S. government (Weiss et al. 2007, 183).
interrelation. Inclusive institutions, in this case the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, because they maintained ongoing deliberations, ensured that states would continue to consider human rights issues and institutions for implementation such as the post of a High Commissioner, and could act relatively quickly when conditions became favorable.

Another significant forum for the debate and generation of democratic norms in the UN has been the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD). The first conference was held in Manila, the Philippines in June 1988 in which 13 participating states drafted the Manila Declaration which rejected external interference but endorsed “international cooperation in the pursuit of democratic goals.” While this first conference was not held under the UN umbrella, the second ICNRD conference, held in Managua, Nicaragua in July 1994, with the participation of 74 states, generated the Managua Declaration and Plan of Action that called for UN support and led to a General Assembly debate and resolution (49/30), which connected the ICNRD movement closely with the UN system. Participants cited the major obstacles facing new and restored democracies as unresolved conflicts, threats of social instability, and the potential inability to raise standards of living; thus they sought increased UN financial and technical support to address these threats. Importantly, the conference launched a new resolution to be considered by the GA annually, “Support by the UN system of the efforts of governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,” and requested the Secretary-General to report on ways in which the UN system could support new and restored democracies. As will be shown, these intermittent ICNRD conferences were vivacious fora for debates related to the UN system’s democracy agenda (see also Newman 2004, 194). Indeed, the conferences made visible an important and growing constituency that found protection of democratic systems a pressing issue and indicated a clear demand for further UN engagement to support democratic governance. Valuable in the composition of this forum was that through the ICNRD, the new or restored democracies themselves articulated needs and interests, to which the

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254 Invitations to this forum were sent to new and restored democracies until 2000, when the forum became fully inclusive and open to participation by all UN member states.  
255 Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay.  
257 UN GA 49th Session, 80th Plenary, Support by the United Nations system for the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, 7 Dec. 1994, A/RES/49/30. This resolution was considered annually until 2000, after which it was considered every other year.
UN system aimed to be responsive. These outcomes are significant because they served to galvanize further UN implementation efforts, especially through the UNDP.

5.6. UN, 1995-1999: Inclusive institutions continue to play an important role in endorsing and authorizing agencies and policies to implement the UN’s democracy agenda

The UN’s inclusive institutions in 1995-99 continued to give expression and legitimacy to an evolving general consensus on democracy. This was strengthened by increasing requests from UN member states to support their democratization processes. To date, the above-mentioned General Assembly agenda item “Support by the UN system for the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,” introduced in connection with the ICNRD movement, has always been adopted by consensus and was considered yearly in 1995-1999. Figure 5.2 illustrates the gradual increase in the number of states sponsoring the resolution in these years, as well as the significant number of states speaking on the subject and in response to the Secretary-General’s reports on the topic during GA debates (declines in the mid- to late 2000s are explained in subsequent sections). Some states speak on behalf of larger numbers of states, such as all European Union members or Central American states. As Kofi Annan wrote: “the driving forces for change are strong; they are coming from South and North, from both the developed and developing world, and cannot be ignored.”

According to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: “Taken together, these [ICNRD] conferences evidence an emerging global consensus on democracy itself…This consensus is being translated into international norms, agreements and specific commitments, integrated by Member States into national priorities and supported by the United Nations and others through operational activities” (1996, 23, 15-16). And his successor, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, agreed: “The importance of the international conferences of new or restored democracies has been as a forum for creating policies and norms.”

Similarly, Mr. Gorita of Romania stated:

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259 Source: Official Documents of the UN: http://documents.un.org/. For the number of state delegations speaking on resolution “Support by the United Nations system of the effort of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,” see Provisional Verbatim records: A/50/PV.55; A/50/PV.56; A/51/PV.61; A/52/PV.51; A/53/PV.66; A/53/PV.67; A/54/PV.64; A/55/PV.70; A/55/PV.71; A/56/PV.83; A/56/PV.86; A/58/PV.57; A/58/PV.59; A/58/PV.62; A/60/PV.63; A/60/PV.78; A/61/PV.84; A/62/PV.44; A/62/PV.46; A/64/PV.44; A/66/PV.60.

For the number of states sponsoring the resolutions, see lists provided in: A/50/L.19/Rev.2/Add.1; A/51/L.20/Rev.1/Add.1; A/52/L.28/Add.1; A/53/L.38/Add.1; A/54/L.33/Add.1; A/55/L.32/Rev.1/Add.1; A/56/L.46/Add.1; A/58/L.15/Add.1; A/60/L.53/Add.1; A/61/L.51/Add.1; A/62/L.9/Add.1; A/64/L.12/Add.1; A/66/L.52.

“This movement has given a strong momentum to the process of global and regional democratization.”

In the late 1990s, several delegates expressed that the UN’s inclusiveness conferred it a legitimacy that made it a highly, if not the most appropriate organization to provide assistance for states’ democratization, providing additional support for theoretical proposition I-2. For example, Mr. Tuya of Mongolia stated: “With its impartiality and universal legitimacy as well as its Charter-based purpose of promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, the United Nations is, in our view, uniquely placed to provide such [democratization] assistance at the request of Member States.” And delegates from Romania concurred: “No organization is better placed and equipped to contribute to the promotion of these goals [democratization] than the United Nations, because no other enjoys its scope and legitimacy.” Similar sentiments were expressed subsequently by the delegate from France, on behalf of the EU: “It is indeed important that the United Nations, because of its universal dimension, should be the primary forum for reflection by the international community in this area, and that, with its wealth of varied experience, the United Nations system should support the efforts of States that are now engaged in processes of democratization.” The delegate from Yemen concurred, stating: “We would like to reaffirm once again the importance of the role of the United Nations in promoting the path of democracy, since the Organization alone represents international legitimacy and the collective will of the peoples and States of the world.”

The International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies were not initially open to all UN member states, rather the Nicaraguan and Romanian conference hosts in 1994 and 1997 extended invitations to new or restored democracies as participants and to established democratic states as observers (see Figure 5.3). In 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealed to the ICNRD for all UN member states to be invited to the subsequent conference in

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262 Statement by Mr. Tuya, Mongolia, UN GA 54th Session, 64th Plenary, 29 Nov. 1999, A/54/PV.64, 8
Cotonou, Benin in 2000.\textsuperscript{266} Thus, it was only in 2000 that the ICNRD could be considered fully inclusive. However, there were no recorded complaints about exclusion from the ICNRD expressed in these UN fora in the 1990s, perhaps aided by the movement’s leadership by new and restored democracies rather than by a great power such as the U.S. This suggests that despite the ICNRD’s lack of full inclusivity in the 1990s, it managed to involve those states interested in participation.

\textbf{Figure 5.3: States’ participation at ICNRD conferences, 1988-2006}\textsuperscript{267}

\begin{figure}[h]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ICNRD_participation.png}
\end{center}
\caption{Number of States Participating at ICNRD Conferences}
\end{figure}

It is remarkable that a partially-inclusive movement was associated with consensus resolutions in the UN General Assembly in the 1990s. How can this be explained? Especially pronounced in the movement’s early years and a consistent feature in GA debates was developing countries’ insistence that economic development is necessary for democratic consolidation. Developing countries made fervent appeals to the international community to offer the greatest possible support and solidarity, including concrete financial assistance.\textsuperscript{268} Some also advocated policies such as debt relief, increased investment, and open trade policies in debates on democratic norm implementation in addition to increased UN and bilateral support for strengthening democratic institutions. This suggests that support for the ICNRD movement may be explained in part by states’ interest in attracting additional financial resources through various channels, including through the UN. In the mid-1990s, the UN’s financial situation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{266} Report of the Secretary General, Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, UN GA, 52\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 21 Oct. 1997, A/52/513, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Source: Official Documents of the UN: http://documents.un.org. Accessed 11/2011. See the Provisional Verbatim records listed for Figure 5.2.
\item \textsuperscript{268} See Statement by Mr. Whannou, Benin, UN GA 51\textsuperscript{st} Session, 61\textsuperscript{st} Plenary Meeting, 20 Nov. 1996, A/51/PV.61, 12-13; Statement by Mr. Izquierdo, Ecuador, UN GA 51\textsuperscript{st} Session, 61\textsuperscript{st} Plenary Meeting, 20 Nov. 1996, A/51/PV.61, 19; Statement by Mr. Meléndez Barahona, El Salvador, UN GA 51\textsuperscript{st} Session, 61\textsuperscript{st} Plenary Meeting, 20 Nov. 1996, A/51/PV.61, 22; Statement by Mr. Kasanda, Zambia, UN GA 52\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 51\textsuperscript{st} Plenary, 21 Nov. 1997, A/52/PV.51, 6-7.
\end{itemize}
became increasingly dire when the Republican-led U.S. Congress reduced appropriations to the UN and the organization found it difficult to follow through on its mandates. This decline in UN resources was criticized by several states, including India, whose delegate quipped: “The Secretariat might very well long for new or restored totalitarianism if democratic processes are given as an excuse for a State’s refusal to pay its dues.”

A few additional factors help to explain why states expressed such strong support for democracy in the inclusive UN institutions in 1995-1999. One oft-repeated passage in delegations’ statements emphasizes the *flexibility* with which the UN understood and operationalized the concept of “democracy,” as conveyed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

> The United Nations system…does not endorse or promote any specific form of government. Democracy is not a model to be copied but a goal to be attained. Furthermore, the pace at which democratization can proceed is dependent on a variety of political, economic, social and cultural factors proper to the circumstances of a particular culture and society.

The UN’s historic commitment to states with diverse political systems as well as the established norms of sovereignty and non-intervention also reassured skeptical states. There has long been a wide range in states’ understandings of democracy, with several using the term simply as synonymous for majority rule. As Mr. Yel’chenko of Ukraine noted: “One could hardly find a country in the world that would call itself undemocratic. But let us recognize that we may still mean different things when we say ‘democracy.’” As will be discussed, this flexibility would be moderated in 1999-2000 with the adoption of key resolutions specifying core characteristics of democratic states.

Under conditions in which very different views exist about the meaning of democracy, inclusive platforms are important for debates on democratic norms and policy implementation. The opportunity for all states to express a point of view helps to underpin the acceptance of debate outcomes, particularly in the short term. This is especially critical in an issue which can be viewed as a form of intervention. According to political theorist Iris Marion Young, “a democratic public ought to be fully inclusive of all social groups because the plurality of perspectives they offer to the public helps to disclose the reality and objectivity of the world in

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271 Statement by Mr. Yel’chenko, Ukraine UN GA, 55th Session, 70th Plenary, 21 Nov. 2000, A/55/PV.70, 7.
which they dwell together” (2000, 112). On this logic, the participation of even dubious leaders in international discourse can be valuable to our collective sense of reality for its contribution to perspective and an authentic snapshot of interstate politics.

Although after the Cold War there was a revival of states’ enthusiasm for peacekeeping and other operations through the UN, by the mid-1990s, political will and resources for UN initiatives began to decline. “The blunt fact was that the world body had, by 1995 or 1996, exhausted itself. The triple disasters of Somalia, Rwanda-Burundi and Bosnia during the mid-1990s had…cast dark clouds over the UN’s competence” (Kennedy 2006, 69). This atrophy, however, did not prevent the continued expansion of UN programmes to support democratic governance. Regarding policy implementation, the ICNRD conferences guided several changes in the UN’s operational work, and this was complemented by Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Democratization in 1996. For example, in 1997 UNDP adopted a new policy on governance that explicitly made governance one of its programming objectives. In 1998, the UN Office of Project Services was involved in over 300 active projects and programmes for democracy and governance with an annual budget of over US$ 100 million. At the same time, the number of UN field offices for human rights linked to the OHCHR were increasing, which has parallels to the growing number of OSCE field offices in the same years. While the UN’s engagement in electoral assistance declined in the 1990s (see Schroeder 2011), which can be partially explained by the concurrent increase in engagement of regional organizations such as the OSCE and OAS, the UN’s support for democratic institution building and governance steadily increased over time. Thus, projects increasingly addressed “political participation, a fair and reliable judiciary, bureaucratic accountability, freedom of information and expression, effective and efficient public sector management, and interaction with organizations of civil society.”

By 1999, Kofi Annan stated: “The programmes of governance within the United Nations system are greatly expanding. More than 50 percent of UNDP programmes, for instance, are already devoted to governance and related projects, a trend that is likely to continue in the future.”

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273 Ibid.
275 Ibid,10.
these years, the UN’s inclusive bodies served to endorse and continued to authorize programs and policy implementation of its democratization mandate.

By contrast, one example of a norm that did not materialize in the General Assembly in 1999 was a Democratic Code of Conduct for which Romania was the main sponsor. This idea stemmed from follow-up to the 1997 ICNRD conference in Bucharest, as a key role of the ICNRD conferences had been to facilitate a common understanding of basic conditions and elements of democracy. Its provisions aimed at:

- recommending a basic set of norms of democratic conduct for Governments in the exercise of power (free, fair and competitive elections, separation of powers, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, strengthening the rule of law and appliance of practices of good governance, increasing participation of civil society in the development of democracy, creating an economic environment favorable to democracy and enhancing social cohesion and solidarity).  

Interestingly, in the GA debate on this agenda item, no states criticized the normative content of the Code of Conduct. Algeria, speaking on behalf of 12 states, formally objected to the procedure of its development, i.e. the fact that it was drafted outside the United Nations without subsequent internal consultations, but did not submit any modifications to the content of the Code itself. Even Belarus was a co-sponsor and its delegate spoke favorably about its provisions. Disagreements stemmed primarily from concerns about potential UN and bilateral implementation of the code. Although the draft resolution (A/54/L.23) had 60 sponsors, through negotiations it became clear that it would not be adopted by consensus. “Since for Romania and the co-sponsors the aim was a consensus resolution, they withdrew the draft resolution, waiting for the idea to come of age.” Higher levels of support would have better underpinned a claim to legitimacy. Despite this result, elements of the Code of Conduct would later resurface in norm development processes elsewhere in the UN system.

The debate was more animated when it moved to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Geneva in April 1999, and delegates considered the U.S.-sponsored resolution

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278 Statement by Mr. Mesdoua, Algeria, on behalf of China, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malasia, Pakistan, Singapore, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, UN GA, 54th Session, 64th Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 39, New York, 29 Nov. 1999, A/54/PV.64, 3.
279 Statement by Mr. Kazhura, Belarus, UN GA, 54th Session, 64th Plenary, 29 Nov. 1999, A/54/PV.64, 26.
“Promotion of the Right to Democracy.”\textsuperscript{281} Although the smaller number of states participating and voting in the CHR gave the resolution less authority than if it had been adopted by the UN GA, the resolution’s status as adopted nevertheless enabled it to be referenced in subsequent debates in other UN fora. In the CHR, fifty-one states voted in favor and none against, while Cuba and China abstained.\textsuperscript{282} The resolution’s title appeared most divisive. Cuba sought to delete “the right to,” but a separate vote retained the contentious title (12 states voted in favor of Cuba’s proposal, 28 against, and 13 abstained).\textsuperscript{283} With the CHR resolution on the “Promotion of the Right to Democracy,” this was the first time that such a clear, independent UN mandate on democracy had succeeded.\textsuperscript{284} In the UN’s institutions, the high water mark for democratic norms other than free and fair elections appeared approximately in 1999 to 2000 – a decade later than in the CSCE/OSCE, where the equivalent democratic normative high point was in 1990-1991.

5.7. UN, 2000-2004: After peak in democratic norm development in 1999-2000, increased challenges have few effects and support for electoral democracy remains strong

The 2000s began with a burst of democratic norm development activity in the UN General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. Over time, however, some new challenges to the UN’s role in support of democratization gradually began to arise in the UN membership. Despite a wider range of views expressed in inclusive institutions, these challenges did not extend to all areas of the UN’s democracy support, and they initially had limited effects on policy implementation because, unlike in the OSCE, the design of UN institutions (other than the Security Council’s P-5) does not allow for a single state to thwart the organization’s initiatives. In this time period, trends in states’ priorities related to the inclusive ICNRD movement and the more exclusive Community of Democracies also provide support for theoretical propositions I-2 and I-5(a&b), and highlight recurrent tensions between the goals of legitimacy and efficiency in states’ support for democratic norms and implementation policies.

Following the momentum from the 1999 Commission on Human Rights resolution on “Promotion of the Right to Democracy,” Romania proposed a resolution in 2000 in the CHR

\textsuperscript{282} UN ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 55\textsuperscript{th} Session, 57\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Promotion of the Right to Democracy, Resolution 1999/57.
\textsuperscript{283} UN ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 55\textsuperscript{th} Session, Summary Record of the 57\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Geneva, 27 April 1999, E/CN.4/1999/SR.57. See also Farer 2004, 38.
\textsuperscript{284} Author’s telephone interview with UN staff, 20 March 2009.
which was similar in content to its earlier “Code of Democratic Conduct,” yet was given a more palatable title, “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy.” The resolution articulated basic principles common to democracies, and was adopted in April by the 53-member body with 45 states in favor, none against, and 8 abstentions.\footnote{Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, Commission on Human Rights, 25 April 2000, E/CN.4/RES/2000/47. See Dennis 2001, 214. Bhutan, China, Congo, Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda, and Sudan abstained.} One reason for Romania’s particularly active role in the late 1990s and early 2000s was its motivation to demonstrate through meaningful follow-up that its 1997 ICNRD conference in Bucharest had been a success; moreover, emphasizing democratic credentials complemented its aims of attaining EU and NATO membership. The role of status in these processes is discussed in chapter 6. Seeking broader legitimacy for the above-mentioned CHR resolution, Romania submitted to the UN General Assembly a comparable resolution with the same title, which was adopted in December 2000; 157 of the UN’s 189 member states voted in favor, none against, 16 abstained, and 16 did not vote.\footnote{UNBISnet.org, Voting Record Search, A/RES/55/96. Government of Romania, Romanian Mission to the United Nations. Promotion of Democracy in the United Nations Context. Romanian Initiatives. http://www.romaniaunog.org/issues/democracy_1.htm. Accessed 4/3/09. See also Dumitru 2000, 13-17.} This resolution followed a similar pattern to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where endorsement of texts in the smaller CHR preceded consideration by all states in the larger UN body, with more efficient drafting in smaller groups and subsequently gaining the broader legitimacy of endorsement by a larger body. Resolution (A/RES/55/96) is the most comprehensive statement of democratic norms issued in the UN by the inclusive GA.

Most states abstaining from the vote on “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy” expressed objection to what they perceived as a single model of democracy. The delegate from the Libyan Arab Jamahirya contended: “While the form of democracy upheld by the draft resolution might be suitable for certain countries, there did exist other well-functioning models enjoying popular acceptance elsewhere.”\footnote{Statement by Ms. Hajaji, Libyan Arab Jamahirya, UN GA, 55\textsuperscript{th} Session, Third Committee, Summary Record of the 53\textsuperscript{rd} Meeting, New York, 9 November 2000, A/C.3/55/SR.53, 8.} This appears to be the first time such a statement was made in the public records of debates on democratic norms in the GA. Prior to this, bold, confident statements by Western states went uncontested such as: “Democracy is unchallenged as the best form of governance. There are no serious and attractive alternatives available.”\footnote{Statement by Mr. Sucharipa, Austria, speaking on behalf of the European Union, UN GA, 53\textsuperscript{rd} Session, 66\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, 23 Nov. 1998, A/53/PV.66, 13. See a nearly identical statement by Mr. Rasi, Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU, UN GA 54\textsuperscript{th} Session, 64\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, 29 Nov. 1999, A/54/PV.64, 16.} Once the UN was able to articulate and codify a more comprehensive statement on democracy in 1999-2000 – a consensus that developed in good part through the ICNRD and its follow-up
conferences – a larger group of states opposing aspects of the UN’s democratization agenda began to coalesce.

Another significant expression of democracy was made in the UN *Millennium Declaration* of 2000, which synthesized several key agreements of the world conferences of the 1990s. The Millennium Declaration was endorsed in September 2000 by the heads of all 189 UN member states – therefore enjoying a high degree of legitimacy. Importantly, Section V addressed human rights, democracy, and good governance, and paragraph 24 stated:

> We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.

And Section V (25) continued:

> We resolve therefore…To strengthen the capacity of all our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights…To work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all our countries.

While the Millennium Declaration pales in comparison with the GA resolution on promoting and consolidating democracy of the same year, it is significant that the broadest possible common denominator in the UN system emphasized democracy. Certainly contributing to this outcome was the earlier consensus and legitimacy that the inclusive Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 and subsequent GA resolutions helped to generate. In the early 2000s, the international community (e.g. the UN Secretariat, specialized agencies such as UNDP, the World Bank, states, academics and NGOs, among others) developed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targets and indicators for poverty reduction to monitor progress on objectives in the Millennium Declaration.\(^\text{289}\) By the mid-2000s, these had become an overarching priority of UN agencies and served as a basis for the development assistance of many bilateral donors and NGOs. However, despite the emphasis on governance and democracy in the Millennium Declaration, the MDGs did not extend to the area of democratic governance.\(^\text{290}\) This may seem surprising, given the emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of democracy, human rights, and development

\(^{289}\) The Millennium Development Goals are: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce child mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; 8) develop a global partnership for development. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.

\(^{290}\) A few countries are exceptions, such as Albania and Mongolia which added a ninth MDG on democratic governance, and have tracked governance indicators in their MDG reporting.
in international rhetoric since the 1993 Vienna Declaration and the specification of democracies’ core attributes in GA Resolution 55/96 in the same year. Although UN member states reached consensus on democratic governance in the Millennium Declaration, further agreement on implementation of the democracy agenda in this context was not possible. One explanation for the absence of governance indicators is that the MDGs aimed at specific achievements by 2015, while democratization is typically a long-term process, especially when substantively defined beyond free and fair elections. Moreover, democracy is much more difficult to measure than maternal mortality, literacy, and other MDGs.291

In 2000-2004 we begin to observe a few more challenges at policy level to the UN’s implementation of its democratization mandate. For the second year in a row, Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced in 2000 that “50 percent of the resources of UNDP have been allocated to programmes promoting political, economic and social governance.”292 Thus, it supported public sector reforms, decentralization and local governance, and strengthening civil society, as well as good governance as a means of achieving human development.293 Yet on this second iteration SG Annan’s statement encountered some resistance. For example, the Cuban delegate stated that it seems to be “of dubious merit that UNDP commits 50 percent of its resources to programs aimed at promoting political governance…UNDP has increasingly directed its attention away from economic and social development programmes in order to focus on other tasks – something that constitutes a violation of its mandate.”294 According to one interviewee, an initial reason for UNDP’s increased attention to democratic governance was to attract additional resources from donors and to help get around financial problems.295 Similarly, the UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF), established in 2001, “was designed to allow rapid disbursement and to attract funding from donors interested in democratic governance” (UNDP 2008, 7). We have also seen that UNDP responded to demand for governance support articulated in the GA and by the Secretaries-General. Its approach differed from other donors regarding proximity to host country governments, in that UNDP offices have

295 Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 6 March 2008.
tended to cultivate partnerships in host countries regardless of regime type (Ponzio 2004, 226). Similarly, the UNDP DGTTF, which disbursed $70 million between 2002 and 2007 for 572 one-year projects, encouraged country offices’ to “take advantage of UNDP’s good relations with government and perceived neutrality to test innovative approaches to particularly politically sensitive issues that other donors are less well positioned to address because of their perceived lack of impartiality (UNDP 2008, 7, 15).” This supports theoretical proposition I-2. Critics, however, viewed UNDP as too close to governments and pursued a separate mechanism proposed by the Community of Democracies; thus the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) was launched in 2005.  

Interestingly, in the same year that the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies became fully inclusive of all UN member states, a new democracy grouping – the Community of Democracies (CD) – emerged with participation similar to the more restrictive ICNRD movement of the 1990s (see also Dumitriu 2003). The interest of established and democratizing states in a more exclusive forum provides additional support to theoretical proposition I-5(a&b). ICNRD’s new inclusive policy was initially endorsed from North and South. On behalf of the EU, the French delegate stated: “Democracy is by its very essence inclusive and respectful of the views of all. In this regard, the European Union welcomes the fact that the organizers of the Cotonou Conference of New or Restored Democracies have opened that event to all Member States of the Organization without exception.” Similarly, the representative of Nicaragua stated: “We attach importance to this series of International Conferences, which have provided a particularly appropriate forum for the sharing of experiences among States that are committed to democracy, as well as encouraged systematic progress in democratic processes on a global scale. The Conferences, in which States have taken part, are becoming increasingly open to greater participation.”  

At the same time, the first meeting of the Community of Democracies materialized in June 2000 - outside the UN, yet with close links and input into its operational work - as an initiative proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek and U.S. Secretary of State

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296 Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 6 March 2008. See chapter 6 for further discussion of UNDEF.
Madeline Albright, with strong support from the Clinton administration. It resulted in the Warsaw Declaration, a statement of core democratic practices and principles (see Halperin and Galic 2005, 3; Morphet 2005, 82). The CD’s membership is fluid; the invitations are considered by its convening group anew prior to each conference and are issued to states committed to democratic values. This process has been criticized from both sides – by those committed to procedural legitimacy as too exclusive and by those committed to substantive legitimacy as not stringent enough. While in effect, a similar number of participants attended the two conferences in 2000 – 111 governments attended the ICNRD conference in Cotonou and over 100 attended the CD conference in Warsaw, issues of inclusion and exclusion suddenly became audible in GA debates on democracy support. In the 1990s, delegations of non-participating states did not criticize ICNRD hosts in the UN GA for their choice of invitation (or lack of invitation) of new or restored democracies. This absence of critiques suggests that there was a good a correspondence between the states to which invitations were issued and the states interested in attending ICNRD conferences. Conversely, the delegate from Cuba stated that, in contrast to the CD, the main accomplishment of the ICNRD “has been its increasing inclusive nature.”

One difference is that the ICNRD movement was perceived as stemming from new or restored democracies themselves, whereas the CD was viewed as a U.S.-led initiative. Thus, there became a clear distinction between the fully inclusive ICNRD movement (after 2000) and the more exclusive CD with very similar objectives.

There are several advantages and disadvantages of the respective inclusive and more restricted memberships of the ICNRD movement and the Community of Democracies. For example, although the all-inclusive ICNRD approach can “put at some risk the clarity of the organization’s own assessment on democracy,” it also underscores the universality of democratic principles and enhances the legitimacy of the UN to engage in democracy support, as well as “attracting interest and making the democratic behavior more appealing” to non-democratic states (Dumitriu 2003, 15). On the other hand, the CD approach “avoids the confusion that we may live in a world where all regimes are democratic…a spade should be called a spade” (Ibid, 17). Theodore Piccone explains that:

The [CD] organizers were hoping that, similar to the experience with the Helsinki Declaration process of the CSCE, underperforming states, once they endorsed a credible declaration of democratic principles, could be persuaded or embarrassed into improving their respect for international norms that they themselves had endorsed. It was also

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conceived as a way to give non-invited states an opportunity to qualify for inclusion once they met the group’s standards (2008, 6).

Over time, however, foremost among those emphasizing the exclusive nature of the CD and the inclusive ICN RD, tended to be those who were not invited to participate in the CD or were invited only as observers. In addition to the Cuban delegate’s statement cited above, the delegate from the Russian Federation stressed that “such conferences have to be open forums. Restricting admission…would have a negative impact on the level of discussion and on the outcome. Broad representation ensures that everyone can benefit from the experience of others.”

Kofi Annan even engaged in revisionism writing that “inclusiveness has been the main character of the new or restored democracies movement…The philosophy of exposing emerging democracies to peer pressure sets it apart from the “community of democracies,” which tries to define an exclusive group of true democracies, a task many see as difficult or impossible to accomplish.” Yet in 2004 the Community of Democracies established a Democracy Caucus in the UN. The merely marginal success of the Democracy Caucus is due to the lack of unity of purpose and many divergent interests among its membership; in other words, democratic governance has not served as a sufficient binding agent among states with wide ranges of other priorities in the world body.

Carothers notes that “democracies, like all countries, base their foreign policies on multiple elements of their identity, not just the character of their political system” (2008, 2). Moreover, non-democratic states have displayed cohesiveness and “in the current international context many countries are less than enthusiastic about embracing an initiative that the U.S. has championed and which is interpreted in some circles as being a vehicle for further U.S. hegemony” (McMahon and Baker 2005, 28-9). In the early 2000s, there were calls from all sides to harmonize the two movements, echoing Morton Halperin’s statement that “we believe the ICN RD and the Community of Democracies are mutually reinforcing and beneficial.”

Returning to Figure 5.2, one can see that in 2003 the number of co-sponsors peaked at 130 of the UN’s member states for the GA resolutions “Support by the United Nations system

301 Report of the Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, 58th Session, 26 Sept. 2003, A/58/392, 5.
302 The problem of common interest between democracies, narrowly defined, was also highlighted in author’s interview, Prague, 19 Nov. 2008.
for the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,” which have been associated with the ICN RD movement and adopted by consensus from its inception. 2001 was the final year in which the United States co-sponsored the resolution and some states may have withdrawn sponsorship following the U.S. lead. However, while the U.S. invasion of Iraq in led to backlash against unilatera l democracy promotion, many UN members, including Middle Eastern states, expressed interest in a much stronger UN role to support democracy building in Iraq. As suggested by theoretical proposition I-5(a&b), the decline observed by 2006 appears connected with states’ decreased enthusiasm for the ICN RD movement in the mid-to late 2000s, as also discussed in the following section. This trend corresponds with some exogenous factors such as changes in approaches of China and Russia in the mid-2000s. The trend also corresponds with a decrease in the salience of democratic status, to be discussed in chapter 6. While the United States’ democratic model always had critics who cited the country’s racial tensions or homelessness, the effect of the 2000 U.S. election was an impression that procedural flaws existed in a fundamental democratic process. Thus America’s allure as a democratic model began to fade, and this emboldened critics who began to perceive a political opportunity. Moreover, after the rejection of the U.S. from the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2002, the U.S. during the George W. Bush administration increased its distance from multilateral problem-solving and action through the UN.

On the other hand, rhetorical support for UN efforts in the area of elections continued to increase over time, despite variations in the frequency of UN election observation efforts (see Schroeder 2011). Figure 5.1 showed through recorded votes on the GA resolutions “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections” that rhetorical support among UN member states for electoral democracy has steadily increased over time, even in the 2000s, reaching levels of 98%. This draws an interesting contrast to the OSCE, where support for election-related programs encountered increased challenges in the mid-2000s. After many new or restored democracies had successfully held repeated free and fair elections in the 1990s, elections were no longer the most exigent issue for democratic development in these states. According to Ludwig, “voters have developed confidence in the abilities of their national election administrations to conduct legitimate elections. As a consequence, the need for the confidence-building presence of international observers is declining and demand for more sophisticated and specific forms of technical assistance is growing” (2004a, 186). This also shows that the consensus understanding of democracy as a basis for policy implementation in the
UN’s inclusive bodies continued to encompass *electoral* democracy, with less emphasis on other aspects of democracy.

5.8. UN, 2005-2010: Inclusive institutions become more vulnerable to shifts in states’ foreign policy priorities; challenges become stronger and more effective

The time period 2005-2010 illustrates the vulnerability of inclusive institutions to shifts in foreign policy priorities of key states and groups. Since the early 1990s, states’ efforts to democratize, as well as UN efforts to assist them, met with mixed results. As Toope argues, “legal authority arises from the perceived legitimacy of the processes of norm evolution, but it is also tested in processes of application and in a substantive evaluation of the norm itself” (2000, 98). States professing commitment to substantive outcomes of UN policies and lacking the patience for multilateralism, such as the U.S. under George W. Bush, reduced their participation in inclusive fora, opting instead to support democratic governance through bilateral channels in the 2000s, as expected in theoretical proposition I-5a. Moreover, some democratizing states were disappointed with the amount of resources made available through the UN. In the mid- to late 2000s, the UN witnessed increasing challenges at policy level for the implementation of its democratization agenda. Whereas in the early 2000s only a few states such as Cuba aimed to undermine the UN’s policies on democratic governance, by the late 2000s, some of Cuba’s sentiments were echoed by the Group of 77 (G-77) and China. Globally, challenges to democratic conditionality on aid surfaced in connection with factors such as China’s rise as a donor undeterred by recipients’ governance practices, Russia’s resurgence and increased antagonism with the West, as well as in response to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and human rights violations during the ‘war on terror’. By the mid-2000s, the image of democracy promotion was clearly damaged. Moreover, alternative governance models became more attractive to some developing countries because of their economic success. While the UN’s technical agencies are more insulated from geopolitical power shifts than the OSCE, debates in UN institutions with varied degrees of inclusiveness such as the UN GA and the UNDP Executive Board reflected these trends.

An especially dramatic debate took place in 2007 when the UNDP Executive Board negotiated the UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008-2011. The following example supports

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304 The Group of 77 currently comprises 131 states from the Global South. See: [http://www.g77.org/](http://www.g77.org/) Accessed 1/11.
305 The high behind-the-scenes tensions were described by a facilitator: “I have personally facilitated many decisions of all sorts in this Board over the years, but I have not come across as difficult as this.” Statement of Eritrea, on
proposition I-4 and illustrates that UN agencies that are often assumed to be autonomous are not fully insulated from the vagaries of inter-governmental debate. Inter-governmental bodies often serve important functions in (re-)authorizing or modifying implementation policies. Echoing Cuba’s arguments from 2001, the G-77 and China argued in June and September 2007 that UNDP should refocus more of its efforts on poverty reduction and development and as a consequence reduce its focus on democratic governance and human rights:

UNDP activities and its Strategic Plan should focus on delivering effectively in development related areas. We have noted with concern that through this draft Plan UNDP would deviate from its core development mandate, particularly as regards poverty eradication…We want to reaffirm our position that funding for development activities should not be tied to any conditionalities, or earmarked for certain focus areas. Instead, it should be allocated according to the respective national priorities and plans of programme countries…We have noted that UNDP assistance is being tied to certain focus areas which are: Poverty reduction and MDG achievement, Democratic governance, Crisis prevention and recovery and Environment and sustainable development. The draft Plan is not providing policy space to the developing countries.306

Moreover, the G-77 and China argued that “UNDP has neither any normative, operational or monitoring role, nor any competence with regard to human rights…UNDP leadership should be impartial in discharging its mandate by carefully avoiding any politically charged influence.”307 To this, Russia added a concern it expressed more often after the Orange Revolution of 2004:

The plan does not contain provisions that would guarantee impartiality and neutrality of UNDP activities in the sphere of democratic governance. In this context we would like to specially underline the so-called “direct involvement” in interaction with “key” players of the civil society, especially with parties and groups, should not be practiced if by-passing national governments of the programme countries.308

Western states countered these claims by emphasizing UNDP’s established role in implementing outcomes of international summits and conferences, including the World Summit

\[\text{footnotes continued}\]


307 Statement made by Pakistan on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, Statements made by delegations on the adoption of decision 2007/32 during the resumed second regular session, New York, 5 Oct. 2007, E/2007/35, Annex 2, 66. This level of discord was also raised in author’s telephone interview with a diplomat to the UN, New York, 15 Feb. 2008.

of 2005, to support good governance and popular participation. They also regretted the misunderstanding about human rights-based approaches to development programming, which they argued should not be seen as political conditionality but a means to achieving human development. Some states such as Norway threatened to reconsider their financial allocations to the organization. While a Strategic Plan was adopted, contention continued in some cases at country-level and in the negotiation of country programme documents, with some states resisting UNDP proposals for democracy-related projects.

How did the inclusiveness of institutions affect these outcomes? The UNDP Executive Board comprises 36 members serving rotational 5-year terms, with representation from each of the five regional groups: Africa (8 members), Asia (7), Latin America and the Caribbean (5), Eastern Europe (4), and Western Europe and others (12). While this body does not include the full UN membership in order to facilitate more efficient decision-making, it does, however, comprise states with a wide range of views on the subject of democratic governance. In the above-mentioned case, the practice of states speaking on behalf of other states ensured that the views of a larger number were expressed in the debate, thereby minimizing the exclusive effect of institutions that are more restricted in terms of size. If a state has a strong interest in contributing to a particular debate in a forum in which it does not hold a seat, in some cases it may be possible for the state to negotiate the expression of its views among its regional delegations.

In contrast to the difficulties around the UNDP Strategic Plan and somewhat ironically, in December 2007 the GA adopted resolution 62/150 (see Figure 5.1) requesting UNDP “to continue its democratic governance assistance programmes in cooperation with other relevant organizations, in particular those that strengthen democratic institutions, and linkages between civil society and Governments.” This resolution was adopted by an impressive vote of 182 states in favor, none against, 2 abstentions and 8 non-voting. Nevertheless, it appears that

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311 Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 9 March 2009.
312 The title of this resolution was: Strengthening the role of the United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization
313 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Swaziland
UNDP has been responsive to some G-77 concerns in its implementation. Since there would be recurring meetings of the UNDP Executive Board with the same purpose of authorizing the agency’s implementation policies for democratic governance in later years, UNDP would have an interest in satisfying as large a group as possible in the interim. For example, the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund placed priority in 2010 and 2011 on projects that focused on achieving the MDGs (UNDP, DGTTF 2011). Moreover, whereas earlier in the 2000s UNDP worked more intensively on the supply side of democratic governance; e.g. on public administration reform, institution building, electoral support, and with the justice sector and parliaments, with the 2008-2011 UNDP Strategic Plan there was a shift in emphasis to the demand side, and an increase in projects on civil society, participation in governance, accountability, access to justice and responsive institutions. These programs are perhaps surprisingly less controversial because of their distance from sources of power. In 2009, democratic governance was 41% of the UNDP portfolio amounting to 1.3 billion dollars, (down from 50% in 1999-2000). Despite the divisive UNDP debate, according to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report, demand for UN democracy assistance on issues such as capacity and institution building, elections, and rule of law continued to grow.

In 2005-2010, it appears that wind fell from the sails of the inclusive ICNRD movement (see also Figure 5.2). Whether this is a temporary or longer-term trend remains to be seen. After the sixth and last (to date) ICNRD conference in Doha, Qatar in 2006, which launched the first International Day of Democracy on September 15, 2008, the chairmanship of the ICNRD from 2009-2011 was passed to Venezuela. Although there had been attempts to institutionalize the ICNRD, which occasionally held ministerial-level meetings in New York, and there were several calls to establish a secretariat, sufficient momentum and political will did not follow. During its chairmanship, Venezuela hosted a debate on democracy and the MDGs in 2010, but as of this writing there is no sign of an ICNRD-7. Community of Democracies ministerial meetings, however, were much more frequent in the same time period, taking place in Santiago, Chile (2005), Bamako, Mali (2007), Lisbon, Portugal (2009), and Vilnius, Lithuania (2011), providing additional support for theoretical proposition I-5 (a&b). While the CD has been criticized for its

314 Botswana, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of Nauru, Seychelles, Syrian Arab Republic, Kingdom of Tonga.
315 Author’s interview with UNDP staff, New York, 9 March 2009.
316 Ibid.
317 Report of the Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, 64th Session, 28 Sept. 2009, A/64/372, 18-19.
paucity of statements denouncing the actions of non-democratic governments (Carothers 2008, 5; Piccone 2008, 5), the density of its ministerial meeting schedule indicates a sustained level of political will among its participants and Convening Group.

Perhaps the ICNRD movement became too inclusive for its well-being next to the more restrictive CD alternative. It appears that after the CD emerged, those states uninvited by its Convening Group such as Venezuela or Cuba, or those invited as observers such as Russia in 2007 suddenly valued more highly and took advantage of their opportunity to participate in the inclusive ICNRD. This is shown, for example, in the more emphatic statements made by Russia and Cuba in UN GA debates on the GA resolution on “Support by the United Nations system for the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies” in the mid-to late 2000s, and by Venezuela’s interest in hosting the ICNRD movement in 2009-11.\footnote{See also citations provided in section 5.6. \textit{Statement by Mr. Requeijo Gual, Cuba, UN GA, 58\textsuperscript{th} Session, 57\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, 5 Nov. 2003, A/58/PV.57, 20; Statement by Mr. Nikiforov, Russian Federation, UN GA, 58\textsuperscript{th} Session, 59\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, 10 Nov. 2003, A/58/PV.59, 1; Statement by Mr. Chernenko, Russian Federation, UN GA, 62\textsuperscript{nd} Session, 46\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, 8 Nov. 2007, A/62/PV.46, 1; Statement by Mr. Valero Briceño, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UN GA 64\textsuperscript{th} Session, 41\textsuperscript{st} Plenary, 9 Nov. 2009, A/64/PV.41, 6-7.}} This, in turn, appears to have alienated some key states committed to the substantive democratic normative frameworks which preferred instead to support and actively participate in the CD. Whereas in 2003 130 states co-sponsored this GA resolution (see Figure 5.2), in 2012 there were only 23 co-sponsors.\footnote{UN GA, 66\textsuperscript{th} Session, Agenda item 31, New York, 26 June 2012, A/66/L.52.} Moreover, only five states (Libya, Philippines, Qatar, Venezuela, and Tunisia) made statements during the UN GA debate on this subject in November 2011,\footnote{UN GA, 66\textsuperscript{th} Session, 60\textsuperscript{th} Plenary, Agenda item 32, New York, 18 Nov. 2011, A/66/PV.60.} continuing the trend of decreased participation of established democratic states in this forum associated with the ICNRD. Among the new and restored democracies that qualified to participate in the more exclusive CD, the latter group tends to have received priority over time, as evidenced by the decline in number of their statements in the UN GA forum associated with the ICNRD and the CD’s much higher frequency of meetings in the 2000s. In other words, when states qualify to participate in a more exclusive group, that group is likely to become more attractive to them. This does not hold across the board, however, since European states have been notably hesitant about the CD, given its strong American leadership (see Barrios 2008, 7; Carothers 2008, 7). In general, the UN has seen a decrease in enthusiasm among its member states for pursuing democratic norm development and elaboration of implementation policies through its most inclusive fora in 2005-2010. This may be short-sighted given the evidence
provided in chapters 3 and 5 in support of proposition I-1 regarding the role of inclusive IOs in keeping agreements alive through periods of discord.

5.9. Conclusions

This chapter has shown that despite the inclusive quality of the UN bodies most active in democratic norm development and policy implementation (e.g. their large size and the opportunities created for participation by states with vastly different political systems), the UN has had some notable successes in developing democratic norms and implementation policies at policy level. In proposition I-1, I argued that inclusive institutions are well-placed to capture and perpetuate agreements among participating states and to ensure that, once made, these commitments do not fade into obscurity. Inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate.

Supporting evidence was presented from the evolution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which developed democratic norms in Article 25 as the GA kept the idea of an international bill of rights on the agenda until a sufficient thaw in Cold War tensions; the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, which established the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights after communist opposition disappeared; and several General Assembly resolutions developed in connection with the ICNRD movement such as “Promoting and consolidating democracy” in 2000.

I also argued in proposition I-3 that inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of democratic norm development, even in less conducive normative contexts. While in the CSCE/OSCE the issue of security heavily affected states’ support for democratic norms and implementation efforts, issues of development have had great effect on the UN’s democracy agenda. Particularly in the 1990s, developing countries enthusiastically supported the UN’s new democratization mandate through the ICNRD and several GA resolutions in part because they anticipated foreign direct investment and development assistance to follow. As was illustrated through debates over the UNDP Strategic Plan, in support of proposition I-4, although UN technical agencies are often assumed to be autonomous, there are critical points at which inclusive institutions (re-)endorse, authorize, or inhibit the organization’s implementation efforts. In this chapter, I also provided evidence to support proposition I-5 regarding factors leading states to reduce their participation in inclusive institutions, as shown in discussions of the trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency, for
example, in drafting the UDHR, developing the UN GA resolution on “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,” and in the ICNRD and CD movements.

Although the democratic norms developed in the UN were not as comprehensive as in the CSCE in 1990-91, UN programs to support democratic development have been less inhibited than those of the OSCE from challenges of non- or partial democracies in the 2000s. Regarding democratic norm development in the early 1990s, the UN was not presented with the same window of opportunity as the CSCE. While the Cold War era East-West divide that had prevented cooperation on issues of democratic governance in the CSCE became less relevant in 1990-91, facilitating democratic norm development, the UN’s inclusive institutions continued to contend with North-South divisions. However, over the course of the 1990s, as sentiments shifted and in response to demand from new and restored democracies, the UN elaborated norms and implementation policies that underpinned a broadening mandate for programs to support democratic development. I provided several examples showing that the legitimacy of the UN’s inclusive institutions helped to strengthen its expanding democratization mandate in the 1990s, as suggested in proposition I-2. In the 2000s, the UN has been generally less paralyzed on issues of democracy support than the OSCE because of its majoritarian (rather than consensus) decision-making, and, while not fully insulated from inter-governmental debate, UN operations are more insulated from states’ interests and political bargaining than those of the OSCE.
Chapter Six: Status, Democratic Norm Development and Policy Implementation in the United Nations

6.1. Introduction

In the UN, there has been a more complex interplay between democratic norms and status than in the CSCE/OSCE in part because of the more protracted time horizon for the development of the UN’s democratic norm set. In chapter 4, I argued that the codification and institutionalization of democratic norms in the CSCE/OSCE in 1990-91 served to qualify sovereign equality and to stratify states in terms of compliance and non-compliance, thereby generating clear new democratic status markers, social categories, and forms of status seeking in the organization. In the UN, whereas electoral norms crystallized in 1988-1991, other democratic norms were codified more incrementally. Yet similar democratic status markers are observed in the UN and CSCE/OSCE, albeit with less strength and clarity in the UN in the early 1990s, despite the absence of a highly comprehensive formal norm set. In other words, the democratic status markers observed in the UN in the 1990s also derived from alternative sources, including the broader international normative environment, state practices outside the organization, as well as continued use of the UN’s basic human rights instruments. When a more comprehensive set of democratic norms was in fact codified in the UN in 1999-2000, far-reaching institutionalization neither permeated the organization nor was welcomed fully by UN members, whose other priorities occasionally overrode advancing UN efforts to support democratic development. This has contributed to a comparatively weaker salience of democratic status in the UN.

Historically, one of the most significant status divisions separating UN member states has been along North-South lines, between developed and developing states. Superimposed onto this during the Cold War was the East-West divide between state socialist and democratic states. After 1989/1991, when the East-West divide became less relevant in the UN, the lingering and unresolved North-South issues came to overlap with and influence the dynamics of debates on democratic norms in important ways not observed in the CSCE/OSCE.

This chapter examines the validity of the theoretical propositions developed in chapter 2 and provides comparison with the CSCE/OSCE case through an in-depth longitudinal case study of the United Nations. The objectives of the chapter are twofold: a) to show evolutions in the salience of democratic status and trends in democratic status-seeking behavior in the UN, and b)
to illustrate the role of democratic status in selected cases of the development of democratic norms and policies for their implementation in the UN. As in the previous three chapters, this chapter is divided into six time periods: the Cold War era (1945-1989) and the immediate post-Cold War years (1990-1991), presented in sections 6.2-6.3, and the early and late 1990s (1992-4; 1995-1999) and the early and late 2000s (2000-2004; 2005-2010), presented in sections 6.5-6.8.

In addition, section 6.4 examines the rise, evolution, and weakening of democratic status in the UN between 1992 and 2010. For this analysis, I created an original data set that documents each mention of democracy and democratization in all statements made by representatives of UN member states in the UN General Assembly General Debates in 1992, 1998, 2004, and 2010. The quantitative data provides unique perspectives into changes over time in the salience of democratic status in the UN. The qualitative data offers valuable insights into the ways in which states use the concept of democracy in their foreign policy, and importantly, into patterns and trends in democratic status seeking in the organization.

With such a wide range in characteristics of the member states comprising the UN, there are inevitably multiple, simultaneous interpretations of the conditions that have been proposed as indicating the likelihood of strategies of social mobility, social competition, and social creativity (theoretical propositions S-1, S-2, and S-3). Whereas some states have viewed the democratic hierarchy as legitimate and stable, high-status groups as permeable, and prototypical states and IOs as holding prestige, other states have held opposite views, thus contributing to an array of concurrent status-seeking behavior observed in the UN. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a great deal of support for democratic norm development and policy implementation by states employing strategies of social mobility. At the same time, the immediate post-Cold War years witnessed the highest levels of social competition (sometimes by the same states), rising again in the mid-to late 2000s, whereas social creativity has been a prominent strategy in each time period. The salience of democratic status, which was high in the 1990s, generally encouraged new and restored democracies, as well as states with recently consolidated democratic systems, to engage in strategies of social mobility to support democratic norm development and policy implementation in the UN.

Realists would argue that an increase in contention at policy level over the UN’s democracy agenda in the mid- to late 2000s has corresponded with China’s rise as an alternative model for economic development and donor disinterested in recipients’ democracy and human
rights records, Russia’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with the West, and the decreased legitimacy of U.S. leadership in the international system. However, there were higher levels of discord on these issues at policy level in the UN in the early 1990s. While there is some truth to realists’ claims, exploring in greater depth how democratic status operates in the UN’s most inclusive bodies sheds additional light on questions of cooperation and discord around the UN’s democratic norms and implementation policies.

6.2. Status and human rights in the UN, 1945-1989: Early patterns of status distinctions and a basis for the future development of democratic norms

One of the most important initial status distinctions among UN member states in 1945 was the divide between Allied and Axis powers. Only those states that had declared war on Germany and Japan were invited to participate in the San Francisco conference to draft the UN Charter (Osiatynski 2009, 17). Similarly, the Axis powers were not invited in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Elaborating on delegates’ rationale for excluding Axis powers from contributing to the development of the UN’s nascent human rights norms, Morsink argues:

When a nation is in the process of organizing itself around a constitution or principles based on respect for human rights, at that point it does not make sense to give Nazis and other intolerant groups an equal, or even any, voice in the drafting process…The participation of the intolerant in public life, if there is to be such, must not be along lines they, the intolerant ones, draw up. That would perpetuate the horrors. This is not simply a question of who has the power. It is also a question of justice, for justice does not require that people who refuse to take a moral point of view be given a veto over the arrangements of justice that are being made (1999, 66).

However, this approach of excluding states from participation based on status did not become standard practice in the human rights and democratic norm development efforts of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. Rather, norm development in these bodies came to seek the greatest consensus possible in the drafting and adoption stages as a means of ensuring legitimacy, and facilitating commitment and compliance.

In the context of the bipolar international system, U.S.-Soviet relations clearly affected the strength of certain status dimensions and status-seeking behavior in the UN. “As the status theory predicts, each saw the other as the main referent out-group, and their mutual struggle to establish or alter a hierarchy was a backdrop to their interaction during the cold war” (Wohlfforth
2009, 48). At the same time, the Soviet leadership perceived a status inequality with the U.S., a subtext in a number of Cold War era negotiations (ibid).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 gained the support of several non-democratic states, as some saw in the UDHR “a mechanism for global redistribution or an instrument in their anti-imperialist struggle” (Osiatynski 2009, 21). It is often argued that another reason for non-democratic states’ support for the development of democratic norms (as Article 21 of the UDHR), particularly in the earliest years, was their expectation that the norms would not be enforced (Ibid; Thomas 2001). While the 48 states voting for the UDHR included states with a range of political systems, there was nonetheless concern that the newly codified UDHR norms would serve as a basis for status distinctions in the United Nations, as the delegate of Syria “called upon the members not to be arbitrary in their attitude and not to try to separate the nations.”

Debates on the emerging international human rights regime encountered strategies of social creativity and social competition (theoretical propositions S-2 and S-3). For example, at the adoption of the UDHR, the Soviet delegate advocated the alternative norms of sovereignty to maintain states’ independence and to protect small states from expansionism, as well as self-determination, which did not appear in the UDHR. China also registered concerns that would be reiterated by subsequent regimes in debates on democratic norms: “During the years following the First World War, there had been a tendency to impose a standardized way of thinking and a single way of life…If harmony was to be maintained in the human community itself was to be saved, everyone had to accept, in a spirit of sincere tolerance, the different views and beliefs of his fellow men.”

Another important status dimension, the so-called North-South divide between developed and developing countries, gained salience in the 1950s and 1960s as decolonization multiplied the number of states in the UN. In the mid-1960s, the right to self-determination appeared in Article 1 of both the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in part because of the strong backing by newly-independent states for its

inclusion, and their idea that self-determination is necessary for the protection of other human rights (Vincent 1986, 79-80). The ability of new UN members to pursue their interests was facilitated in the UN GA by the principle of sovereign equality (Tucker 1977, 35). As will be seen, states with developing country status have been quite influential on (both in favor and against) the development of democratic norms in the UN system. Also in the 1960s, UN agencies such as the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) expanded and the UN’s statistical divisions began to produce more elaborate reports offering informative comparisons between states. Over time, these reports have had the effect of formalizing and publicizing status distinctions between states on various dimensions (e.g. education, life expectancy, sanitation, economic development). Institutional mechanisms for assessing compliance and non-compliance with human rights norms were, however, minimally developed in these years due to recurrent Cold War antagonisms.

When the Cold War ended, new patterns in status seeking began to appear which supported the elaboration of the UN’s democratic norms and policy implementation. As democratic governance became central to the new global hierarchy, states engaged in status seeking through strategies of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1) by publicizing their democratic credentials. By contrast, during the Cold War states sought favor with either of the two superpowers. This shift is vivid at the commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of the UDHR in 1988, when the USSR exhibited status-seeking behavior in a strategy of social mobility when it elaborated on a recent nationwide discussion of draft laws on changes in its Constitution and elections, noting that three thousand proposals and comments were advanced in the debate, and stating that these discussions “have turned a new page in the development of the Soviet State on the basis of democracy and people’s self-management.”

This change in content and less antagonistic tone of statements by the USSR’s delegate was remarkable. Whereas the USSR’s statement five years prior at the 35th Anniversary of the UDHR heavily prioritized social and economic rights, criticized racial discrimination and human rights violations in the United States, and attempted to elevate the rights to peace and life over other human rights, these arguments disappeared just a few years later. Similarly, statements by representatives of Pakistan and

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324 Statement by Mr. Belogonov, Soviet Union, UN GA, 43rd Session, 75th Meeting, Agenda item 38, 40th Anniversary of the UDHR, New York, 8 Dec. 1988, A/43/PV.75, 22.
Venezuela highlighted the success of recent free and fair elections. Argentina also sought to favorably position itself in the shifting hierarchy by stating that “Latin American countries are entitled to regard themselves as pioneers” in the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, noting: “these rights found their way into the constitutions of our countries well before they became enshrined in international law.” These trends are also significant because they show that Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR served to define democratic status in the absence of more comprehensive codified democratic norms in the UN.

Similar patterns in status seeking appeared in debates on the GA resolution “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections,” introduced in chapter 5, which established the UN’s election observation mandate and served as an important part of the normative foundation for the UN’s future democratization mandate. In the 1989 debate on this resolution, for example, Pakistan, Peru, and Jordan highlighted recent elections at presidential, municipal, and regional levels, thus attempting to gain democratic status vis-a-vis the evolving election-related norms. Moreover, Pakistan ambitiously proposed the “formation of an association of democratic nations which shared two features essential to all democracies: the holding of periodic and genuine elections and respect for human rights. The members of such an association could help each other by ensuring impartiality of elections.” One motivation for this proposal may have been Pakistan’s competition with India, a state with more established democratic credentials. At the same time, it highlights a trend that is further analyzed in this chapter: namely, that status concerns have contributed to the engagement of new and restored democracies in democratic norm development and policy implementation in the UN.

326 See statements by Mr. Husain, Pakistan UN GA, 43rd Session, 75th Meeting, Agenda item 38, 40th Anniversary of the UDHR, New York, 8 Dec. 1988, A/43/PV.75, 32; Statement by Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela, UN GA, 43rd Session, 75th Meeting, Agenda item 38, 40th Anniversary of the UDHR, New York, 8 Dec. 1988, A/43/PV.75, 87.
327 Statement by Mr. Delpech, Argentina, UN GA, 43rd Session, 75th Meeting, Agenda item 38, 40th Anniversary of the UDHR, New York, 8 Dec. 1988, A/43/PV.75, 82.
6.3. UN, 1990-1991: Institutionalization of electoral norms and seeds of a democratization mandate. New democratic status markers meet with both support and contention.

In the early 1990s, the United States, as the remaining superpower, and its established democratic allies increasingly pronounced explicit expressions of democratic status in UN fora. U.S. President George H.W. Bush signaled in 1990 that democracy would be central to the new system and suggested a prioritization of multilateral approaches, stating: “we have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the cold war…a partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.” Asserting that “free elections are the foundation of democratic government,” Bush proposed that “the time has come to structure the role of the UN in such efforts more formally,” thus proposing a special coordinator for electoral assistance. Moreover, he argued that the U.S. was committed to “helping maintain global security, promoting democracy and prosperity.” Similarly, on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, the Permanent Mission of Luxembourg wrote in 1991:

The Twelve also consider that the link between democracy, human rights and sustained development has become increasingly clear and important within the framework of international cooperation. Respect for human rights, the primacy of law, political pluralism and effective, responsible and democratically legitimate political institutions are considered to form the basis of all economic development and all equitable redistribution.

By 1990-91, there could be no doubt that the United States and its allies intended to promote democracy bilaterally and through international organizations.

As discussed in chapter 5, international norms on elections were the first democratic norms to be institutionalized in the UN at the end of the Cold War, building on successful UN support in the context of decolonization and peace agreements, as well as experience with Articles 21 and 25 of the UDHR and ICCPR, respectively. On the question of why the UN institutionalized election monitoring, Judith Kelley argues that this was “driven by an interaction of instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power shifts in the international system”

331 Ibid, 72.
332 Ibid, 73.
In chapter 5, I argued that inclusive institutions were also critical to the process, and in this chapter I argue that it is important not to overlook the role of status. At the end of the Cold War, many developing countries saw their support from superpowers based on alliance loyalty evaporate. Since they needed new allies and resources, “legitimacy became a more salient criterion for external political and financial support” (Kelley 2009, 230).

Describing this phenomenon more specifically in terms of status, Jackson argues:

The end of the Cold War was a loss of influence, position, and prestige for the Third World generally, and for smaller and weaker authoritarian states in particular…Third World states have lost the privileged bargaining position in international relations that the Cold War gave them and today they are more exposed to the West than at any time since decolonization (2000, 364-5).

In other words, in one sense a level of democratic status became a means to instrumental ends of acquiring resources. However, not all democratic status-seeking behavior has reflected instrumentality; many domestic actors and state delegates have simultaneously or independently expressed commitment to democratic norms as ends in their own right (see also Kelley 2008, 230). While the United States and its established democratic allies at the end of the Cold War did articulate and promote democratic norms, there was also high demand among states for assistance in transitioning to a political and economic model viewed as successful. By adopting a high-status political and economic model, states not only seek greater economic development and a higher standard of living, they also seek the prestige associated with the model itself.334

The significance of democratic status was evident in early debates on GA resolution 45/150 “Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections” in 1990.335 A reassuring flexibility in the emerging democratic status markers was communicated, for example, by the U.S. delegate who argued that “Since there was no single political system that suited all nations, it was the duty of all the members of the international community to respect decisions taken by States in freely choosing and developing their electoral institutions.”336 And while the U.K. delegate maintained that “the legitimacy of a Government depended upon its willingness to submit itself to the approval or rejection of its people,” he also

334 I thank Deborah Larson for her thoughts on this subject.
335 This recurring GA resolution was passed in 1988 and 1989 by consensus; votes were taken beginning in 1990.
336 These quotations are in the past tense because of the way in which the Summary Records from the Third Committee have been prepared. Statement by Mr. Pickering, United States of America, UN GA, 45th Session, Third Committee, Summary Record of the 38th Meeting, Agenda item 110, New York, 12 Nov.1990, A/C.3/45/SR.38, 11.
proposed that “no electoral system should be imposed on any State.”\textsuperscript{337} In 1990, regardless of rhetorical flexibility of high-status actors, many states seeking alternatives understood the implicit content and implications of the new democratic status markers. For example, Mrs. Arystanbekova, the delegate from the USSR, argued that “the era of confrontation and ideological contests was ending.” According to her:

There was a growing awareness in the international community that dictatorship, totalitarianism and closed societies were incompatible with the concept of a civilized society in which the value of the individual was respected. Although countries had different approaches to human rights depending on their history, culture and traditions, the unifying factor was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other international human rights instruments.\textsuperscript{338}

Again, this suggests that the UDHR and ICCPR served as points of departure and initial benchmarks for democratic status in the UN.

In 1990, the first vote on GA resolution 45/150 was adopted by 129 votes to 8, with 9 abstentions, and illustrates interesting trends in status seeking. States voting against were: Angola, China, Colombia, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, and Viet Nam, and the states abstaining were: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Mali, Mexico, Peru, and Syrian Arab Republic. Intuitively, one might assume that states voting against or abstaining would be primarily non-democratic states; however, there were some exceptions. Of the states voting against, all were considered “not free” by Freedom House in 1990, except Colombia which was ranked “partly free.” Of the states abstaining, all were considered “not free,” except Ecuador and India (ranked “free”), and Mexico and Peru (ranked “partly free”). By contrast, 29 “not free” and 40 “partly free” states voted in favor of the resolution.\textsuperscript{339}

What motivated these states to vote as they did? Several Latin American states expressed concern that UN election observation might be used to interfere in the internal affairs of states, undermine state sovereignty, or lead to more intrusive practices, and therefore should be limited

\textsuperscript{337} Statement by Mr. Raven, United Kingdom, UN GA, 45th Session, Third Committee, Summary Record of the 42nd Meeting, Agenda item 110, New York, 14 Nov.1990, A/C.3/45/SR.42, 11.


\textsuperscript{339} Source: www.freedomhouse.org, Freedom in the World Ratings. Accessed 3/2012. In 1990, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics were voting members of the UN (as they had been since 1945), yet as part of the USSR were not independent states and therefore were not ranked by Freedom House. For purposes of this calculation, they were categorized as “partly free,” e.g. the same as the USSR’s ranking in 1990.
to states requesting assistance. For example, although the Mexican delegate expressed support for the principles of periodic and genuine elections, he emphasized the importance of non-interference and argued that Mexico “would not promote the establishment of supranational machinery for monitoring electoral processes, since responsibility for those processes was the sovereign right of states.”

This statement is interesting because, on one hand, Mexico engaged in status-seeking behavior by expressing its support for democratic norms and by describing its modernization of electoral mechanisms and federal code in compliance with ICCPR provisions, yet, on the other hand, refrained from supporting the UN’s election observation mandate. A similarly equivocal approach was taken by the Peruvian delegate who asserted that his country “enjoyed genuine representative democracy and accordingly felt entitled to express his Government’s conviction that any mechanism, such as the organization of elections, aimed at enhancing representative democracy was exclusively a matter for States.”

Likewise, although Ecuador supported the basic norms and earlier versions of the resolution, it was concerned that UN electoral assistance could give rise “to unwarranted interpretations and practices.” This behavior of states simultaneously asserting democratic status while challenging implementation policies is intriguing. In 1990, states likely viewed the new status dimensions as under negotiation, or at least unstable, and thus we would expect to observe strategies of social competition. Some states would have been interested in inhibiting more elaborate international monitoring mechanisms if their regimes would be more closely scrutinized and thus at risk of losing the status and cooperation they held as U.S. allies during the Cold War. In 1990 it was unclear how ambitious or extensive the U.S.’s “new sense of purpose” would become. States were unsure as to how actively the U.S. would pursue the realization of George H. W. Bush’s idea of “a world where democracy continues to win new friends and convert old foes, and where

the Americas, North, Central and South, can provide a model for the future of all humankind – the world’s first completely democratic hemisphere."\(^\text{345}\)

On the other hand, both status-seeking behavior and support for democratic norms and policy implementation were exhibited by democratizing or democratic states such as Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Hungary, Romania, Costa Rica, and Panama in the 1990 debates on GA resolution 45/150, consistent with strategies of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1). For example the Czechoslovak delegate argued that “the successful parliamentary elections held in June, the first in 40 years, had helped to improve his country’s image, and the forthcoming communal elections would complete the establishment of a democratic electoral system.”\(^\text{346}\) The Soviet delegate, perhaps surprisingly, countered several Latin American concerns, and argued that “objective international monitoring did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of States and could become an important factor in achieving the objectives pursued by the international community.”\(^\text{347}\) The high level of rhetorical support for electoral norms by Central and Eastern European states also makes sense in light of their commitment just months prior in June 1990 to more comprehensive democratic norms in the CSCE in Copenhagen.

Familiarity with and clear positions on an issue from a different international fora appears to facilitate engagement in the UN. Markey suggests that “Relations within a society of states will be marked by mutual understanding of ‘prestige objects’…Conversely, relations between states of different societies will be marked by misinterpretation, which will actually make sustained prestige-motivated competition more difficult” (Markey 1999, 170). Member states of the UN often belong to several smaller, regional international organizations (e.g. OSCE, OAS, CARICOM, AU, Commonwealth, etc.) with various priorities, shared norms, and ideas about democratic status. There are overlapping groups with which states identify in international society. Sometimes state representatives bring language used in connection with democratic norms in regional fora into their debate statements in the UN. One example is found in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic’s recommendations in 1991 to the UN Secretary-General regarding the Work of the Preparatory Committee for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights:

\(^{345}\)Ibid, 71.
\(^{346}\) Statement by Mr. Slaby, Czechoslovakia, UN GA, 45\(^{\text{th}}\) Session, Third Committee, Summary Record of the 38\(^{\text{th}}\) Meeting, Agenda item 110, New York, 12 Nov.1990, A/C.3/45/SR.38, 4.
Increasing the role of democratic institutions in the protection and promotion of human rights, notably such manifestations thereof as the supremacy of the law, the independence of the judiciary, free democratic elections and the division of powers, is a topic which merits attention. Hitherto this problem has not been widely discussed at the global level, although it has been mentioned in recent documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.\textsuperscript{348}

This suggests that states view regional (and often more comprehensive) norms as significant, and that regional status concerns may, in fact, affect or complement states’ behavior in the UN. Similar trends can also operate in the inverse: occasionally, negotiations of democratic norms in regional IOs such as the OAS or ASEAN appear to have taken inspiration from earlier, related negotiations in UN bodies. While states engaging in strategies of social mobility also sought other objectives through the UN and regional groups in these years (e.g. security, trade opportunities), status is a complementary factor and should not be overlooked. The next section develops these ideas further by illustrating some key trends related to democratic status in the two decades following the Cold War.

6.4. Salience of democratic status and trends in democratic status seeking in the UN General Assembly General Debates: 1992-2010

Before discussing the evolution and roles of democratic status in each of the time periods between 1992 and 2010, it is useful first to examine overarching trends in the salience of democratic status and status-seeking behavior over this period. These can be illustrated through the UN General Assembly’s General Debates. Each September in New York, leaders of all UN member states have the opportunity to articulate their most pressing foreign policy interests and domestic priorities and to advocate the issues they consider of importance for the future work of the United Nations. Representatives’ statements therefore address a wide array of topics, including nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution and prevention, development and international aid, terrorism, climate change, crises in specific states and regions, UN and Security Council reform, and democratization. The number and content of delegates’ references to democracy and democratization in the UN GA General Debates indicate these issues’ salience within the context of the full range of international concerns.

6.4.1. Methodology: Assessing the salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN GA General Debates

I created an original data set and manually coded and counted each mention of democracy and democratization in all statements made by representatives of UN member states in the UN General Assembly General Debates in 1992 (167 statements), 1998 (179 statements), 2004 (190 statements), and 2010 (186 statements). Synonymous terms were also accepted, but only if warranted by the context. Synonyms included good governance, democratic, constitutional reforms if mentioned with key democratic components, and electoral development when accompanied by the idea that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government.\(^{349}\) Statements were initially coded for the presence or absence of the above-mentioned terms.

The terms democracy and democratic were not counted in two contexts: in proper nouns such as Democratic Republic of Congo or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and when raised by states seeking greater democracy in international relations or in UN Security Council reform (e.g. expressions of sovereign equality or egalitarian voting procedures as in ‘one state

\(^{349}\) On the compatibility of the terms good governance and democratic governance in the UN context, see UNDP 2010b, 15.
The coded mentions of democracy and democratization refer exclusively to discussion of domestic characteristics of states (not of IOs). The post-Cold War years are analyzed because the democratic status markers and patterns of democratic status-seeking behavior changed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In addition to counting the direct numbers of mentions of democracy, coding decisions aimed to assess more specifically how the content of democracy mentions shed light on democratic status and status-seeking behavior in the UN. To this effect, I identified seven ways in which states speak about democracy in the UN GA General Debates. Specifically, some states:

1. Mention democracy as an aspect of their foreign policy, express support for democratization in other states, or for UN action, but make no mention of current domestic democratic reforms.
2. Assert explicitly that they are democracies or have consolidated. These states also mention democracy in their foreign policy, support for democratization in other states, or for UN action.
3. Mention democracy in their foreign policy or express support for democratization in other states, and also mention ongoing domestic democratic reforms.
4. Make no mention of support for democratization in their foreign policy or support for democratization in other states, but discuss ongoing domestic democratic reforms.
5. Mention democracy only vaguely as a positive or neutral norm.
6. Challenge the implementation of democratic norms, UN practices, or conditions placed on aid.
7. Make no mention of democracy or democratization in their statements.

Each statement was coded as belonging to one of the categories 1-5 or 7. Categories 1-5 and 7 are mutually exclusive, whereas category 6 can overlap with the others. I developed these categories inductively based on analysis of statements from 1998, and subsequently applied them to the other years (1992, 2004, and 2010). In the rare instance that a modification needed to be made to the categorization system, I reassessed and revised the coding from previous years in order to ensure consistency. The data set includes the full sentences in which each mention of democracy or synonymous terms appeared, with additional surrounding text as necessary to assess the context. An example of a coding decision of a statement placed in category 1 is U.S. President Barack Obama’s statement in 2010:

We see leaders abolishing term limits, we see crackdowns on civil society, we see corruption smothering entrepreneurship and good governance, we see democratic reforms deferred indefinitely…And even as some Governments roll back reform, we also celebrate the courage
of a Present in Colombia who willingly stepped aside or the promise of a new constitution in Kenya. The common thread of progress is the principle that government is accountable to its citizens. In all parts of the world, we see the promise of innovation to make government more open and accountable and now we must build on that progress. And when we gather back here next year, we should bring specific commitments to promote transparency; to fight corruption; to energize civic engagement…It is time for every Member State to open its elections to international monitors and increase the UN Democracy Fund.\footnote{Statement by U.S. President Barack Obama, UN GA 65\textsuperscript{th} Session, 11\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Meeting. Agenda item 8. New York, 23 Sept. 2010, A/65/PV.11, 13-14.}

An example of a coding decision of a statement placed in category 3 is the statement made by Mr. Mizengo Pinda, Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania in 2010:

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania would like to reaffirm its commitment to democratic good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The recent peaceful referendum in Zanzibar produced a new political dispensation that provides for a Government of national unity whichever party wins the elections. That should now stabilize Zanzibar and strengthen the democratic ideals that we all aspire to as Tanzania prepares for its general elections, scheduled for 31 October. As in previous elections, we will do everything in our power to ensure that these are peaceful, free and fair. We thank all partners that, bilaterally or through the UN system, are strengthening our capacity to realize that goal…Tanzania is pleased that Africa has continued to play a leading role in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as in entrenching principles of good governance. Increasingly, more and more African countries are holding free, fair and peaceful elections, followed by smooth transitions. The peaceful referendum in Kenya that paved the way for a new Constitution demonstrates the will of African countries to take charge of their own destinies.\footnote{Statement by Mr. Mizengo Pinda, Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania, UN GA 65\textsuperscript{th} Session, 11\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Meeting. Agenda item 8, New York, 27 Sept. 2010, A/65/PV.19, 10.}

Therefore, for category 3, I coded for the presence of statements referring to states’ own domestic democratic reforms as well as support for democratization in other states, or for UN efforts to support democratic development. Additional examples of statements from the respective categories are presented in the subsequent discussion in this chapter. The analysis on the following pages will make reference to the above-numbered categories.
6.4.2. Analysis and findings: The salience of democratic status and status seeking in the UN GA General Debates: 1992-2010

Figure 6.1 below illustrates the average number of mentions of democracy and democratization by representatives of UN Member States in the UN GA General Debates between 1992 and 2010. In these statements, state representatives raise and discuss issues of their choice, in contrast to GA sessions on specific resolutions (e.g. Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections) in which statements address single topics. Thus, mentions of democracy in the UN GA General Debates indicate the issue’s salience in context of the full range of international concerns. Figure 6.1 shows that democracy and democratization were of high global priority in 1992 and have seen a downward trend over time. This signifies decreased relative salience compared to other international issues such as terrorism, development, or climate change, as will be discussed. This may appear surprising in part because the number of democratic states generally increased during these years.

Arguably, in Figure 6.1, one reason for the decreased average number of mentions of democracy and democratization over time could be the decreased amount of time allotted to speakers in the UN GA General Debate over the years. In 1992, speakers had no advised time limitations, whereas in 1998 and 2004 speakers were requested to limit statements to 20 minutes, and in 2010 the requested time per statement was 15 minutes. Yet these norms are not enforced, and many states exceed their limits. Figure 6.2 seeks to control for potential effects of statement length on the observed trends. I argue that if a state holds democracy to be a priority, it will find the time within its statement to make at least one mention, regardless of variation in time available. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of state representatives making at least one mention of democracy, which decreased from 88.6% in 1992 to 65.6% in 2010. Therefore, both Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate similar trends: UN member states over time have decreasingly discussed democracy and democratization in their GA General Debate statements.
Which regions have most actively spoken about democracy in their UN GA General Debate Statements? Table 6.1 disaggregates the average number of mentions by region. It is interesting that in 1992 and 1998, the average number of mentions by Latin American, African and Eastern European states was much higher than the average of the Western European and Other group, the high-status actors in the immediate post-Cold War years. In 2004, the mentions in Eastern Europe and Latin America are still higher, but not as much so, and Africa decreases significantly. One could reason that this is because democratization was a high concern domestically of many states in these regions in the 1990s. However, in these debates, states (especially democratic ones) often discuss democratization in other states and regions. An alternative interpretation is that states in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa were also engaging in democratic status seeking, especially in the 1990s. By 2010, there is an equilibration of mentions, suggesting in part that a strong emphasis on democracy for purposes of status seeking was no longer taking place in these regions to the same extent.

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Table 6.1: Average number of mentions of democracy and democratization by state, disaggregated by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western Europe and Others</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Latin America and Caribbean</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another interesting trend has been the increased number of democratic states that make no mention of democracy in their statements. This indicates a weakening general salience of democratic status in the UN, as is shown in Figure 6.3 with data disaggregated by level of democracy and region.

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353 The UN General Assembly’s official regional groups were used to disaggregate the data. Data represent all states speaking at the UNGA General Debates in these years. These states by region numbered in 1992: (Western Europe and Others, 27; Eastern Europe, 18; Latin America, 30; Africa, 48; Asia-Pacific, 44); in 1998: (Western Europe and Others, 28; Eastern Europe, 21; Latin America, 33; Africa, 51; Asia-Pacific, 46); in 2004: (Western Europe and Others, 29; Eastern Europe, 22; Latin America, 33; Africa, 52; Asia-Pacific, 54); and in 2010: (Western Europe and Others, 29; Eastern Europe, 23; Latin America, 33; Africa, 51; Asia-Pacific, 50). Source: http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf. Accessed 3/2012.
Also compelling are trends in democratic status seeking in the UN. States in categories (3) and (4) mention their ongoing domestic democratic reforms. This suggests that these states are reacting to the presence of democratic status markers and, at least in part, are seeking to improve their status based on declared domestic characteristics. Also engaged in democratic status seeking, albeit at a slightly higher level, are the states in category (2) that assert that they are democracies or have democratized. Figure 6.4 therefore shows the percentage of UN member states engaged in status-seeking in the UN GA General Debates.

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354 Source: http://documents.un.org, Accessed 11/2011. See also footnote, Figure 6.1.
355 The source of data for democracy rankings was Freedom House, Freedom in the World index, with recognition of the data’s methodological limitations (see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20All%20Scores%2C%20Countries%2C%201973%2C%202012%2C%20%28FINAL%29.xls Accessed 3/2012. The breakdown corresponds to their categories of “free,” “partly free” and “not free.” Since this analysis required data on each UN member state, it was impossible to use Polity IV data because this data set excludes states with populations under 500,000. Diamond states that “the ‘free’ rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy” (1999, 12). This data therefore provides a solid reflection of mainstream Western perceptions. For the study of democratic status, looking through these lenses reflects views held by longstanding democratic states of the democratic status hierarchy.

Chapter Six

Figure 6.4: Seeking democratic status: Total percentage of UN member states mentioning ongoing domestic democratic reforms or asserting democratic status

What explains the decrease in status-seeking behavior in Figure 6.4? While social identity theory often views status seeking as motivated by non-instrumental factors, there is an undeniable instrumental overlap with democratic status-seeking behavior among many states in categories (3) and (4).

In the early 1990s it became clear to states that development aid would be increasingly linked to democratic reforms, as discussed in section 6.4. When a high percentage of development assistance is conditioned on democratic reforms, states are motivated to publicize their democratic credentials in order to qualify. Moreover, status is one of several things states seek in international organizations. These states also mention, for example, their interest in increased foreign investment, support, aid, or debt relief, access to markets, recognition, greater voice in the organization, and reduced pressure from the international community. Democratic status is often a partial means to other objectives. For example, the Prime Minister of Burundi stated:

Investors who so desire can come and work with us. I can guarantee that they will not regret doing so. The political reforms that have taken place within the framework of strengthening national unity and of democratization of institutions have created in our country a political and social environment which is very favorable to business.\footnote{Statement by Mr. Sibomana, Prime Minister of Burundi, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 18\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 30 Sept. 1992, A/47/PV.18, 61.}

The President of Albania stated: “As a full-fledged member of NATO and in the light of its internal democratic stability, Albania is now seeking greater standing in the world as a way to bolster its development in the long term.”\footnote{Statement by Mr. Bamir Topi, President of the Republic of Albania, UN GA 65\textsuperscript{th} Session, 12\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Meeting, General Debate, New York, 23 Sept. 2010. A/65/PV.12, 28 (italics added).}

Beyond the decreased emphasis by
democratic states on democratic status markers, one instrumental reason for the decline of
democratic status seeking in the UN is linked to China’s increased donorship activities in the
mid-2000s. This decreased the overall percentage of development assistance for which
democratic governance was an important consideration and subsequently the overall number
of states seeking democratic status in the UN GA General Debates also declined. Yet non-
instrumental factors also motivate states to pursue democratic status through strategies of
social mobility. As discussed in chapter 2, status is also an end in itself. Some states are
proud of the history of their democratization processes and are pleased to publicize these
successes, as is discussed in subsequent sections. This also responds to domestic audiences
that are pleased when their country shows positive visibility. Moreover, some states
express solidarity in UN fora with other democratizing states, and by offering to share best
practices or assistance simultaneously bolster their claims of regional authority.

The states in categories (1), (2), and (3) exhibit similar behavior in an important respect:
they mention democracy in their foreign policy, support for democratization in other states or for
UN action to support democracy. Taken together, therefore, Figure 6.5 below indicates the total
percentage of states in given years whose rhetoric in the UN GA General Debates served to
actively support the salience of democratic status in the organization.

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360 Author’s interview with diplomat to the OSCE, Vienna, 21 Jan. 2009.
In Figure 6.5, the trends are more varied. What explains the high salience in 1992 and 2004 and decreased salience in 1998 and 2010? Since support for democratic development was a new policy issue for the UN in the immediate post-Cold War years, a high number of states engaged in rhetoric to strengthen the democracy agenda in 1992 (as well as to challenge it, see Figure 6.7). There was a sense that the economic strength of democratic states derived from their form of government (and capitalist economic systems) and this initially contributed to democratic triumphalism and to some states’ enthusiasm for democratization. In other words, established democracies’ prosperity in the early 1990s is one reason why democracy became a prominent form of status at international level. In the UN GA General Debates, states discussed democratization in areas they considered to be high political priorities, which in 1992 included Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and nearly all world regions, including prominent concerns in South Africa and Haiti.

The decrease in salience observed in 1998 is surprising and can be interpreted in either of two ways: a) the norms have partly assumed a taken-for-granted character; or b) democracy has become less salient to UN member states. Since the number of states seeking democratic status by mentioning domestic democratic reforms or asserting democratic status in 1998 (see Figure 6.4), in fact, increased over 1992, this suggests that the salience of democratic governance remained high. Thus, the dip observed in 1998 paradoxically reflects strong underlying democratic norm strength. This claim is also supported by the ability of UN member states to converge on and codify common understandings of democracy 1999-2000. Without the high

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361 Source: http://documents.un.org, Accessed 11/2011. For more information, see footnote of Figure 6.1.
salience of democracy among UN member states in the late 1990s, it would have been impossible to gain sufficient support for CHR Resolution 1999/57, “Promotion of the Right to Democracy” and GA Resolution 55/96, “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy.” In 1998, there were fewer high-priority cases of democratization attracting the attention of large numbers of UN member states than in 2004 and 2010 when the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan returned the issue of democratic governance to the UN GA general debate statements of a greater number of states. Although the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq had negative repercussions on unilateral democracy support, the 2004 UN GA general debate statements indicated very high levels of member states’ support for multilateral UN engagement to support democratic development in Iraq. Mobilization around this issue partially explains the higher percentage of states’ foreign policy mentions in 2004. Another reason for the increase in 2004 may be that by the early 2000s many states had gained experience engaging with such debates at international level through a proliferation of international venues holding recurrent high-level meetings on the subject, including the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies, the Community of Democracies and regional organizations such as the OAS, AU, and OSCE. The decline in 2010 appears due to a general decline in enthusiasm for democracy promotion and increase in states’ alternative priorities, as will be discussed. The salience of democratic status is important because, as discussed in chapter 2, when the salience of the democratic status hierarchy is high, it is more likely that states will identify themselves in democratic terms (Huddy 2001, 133, 149), and with positive reinforcement of this identity, are more likely to cooperate to develop or elaborate democratic norms and implementation policies through strategies of social mobility.

A final trend in these debates merits a closer look. Figure 6.6 shows the percentage of states asserting that they are democratic or have democratized. These states also mention democracy in their foreign policy, support for democratization in other states of for UN action. The behavior of these states in the UN GA General Debates indicates that they are seeking democratic status and are attempting to change the prevailing perception held by the international community. These statistics were highest in 1998, in part because of successful democratic transitions in the 1990s. In Figure 6.6 (a), note the relatively high percentage of Latin American states in this category, whereas there are none from Western Europe or Africa.

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362 Comparatively fewer UN member states expressed concern with issues of democracy in the Western Balkans, for example.
Figure 6.6: Percentage of states asserting explicitly that they are democracies or have consolidated

a) Disaggregated by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Disaggregated by level of democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Partly democratic</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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</table>

Representative of the search for improved status and recognition that is characteristic of the states in this category are statements such as made by Mr. Young of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: “We in the English-speaking Caribbean, where democracy and constitutional order have long been institutionalized, are anxious to play our legitimate part, with full recognition of our condition and the requirements for global integration.”

Especially in 1998 and 2004, several states also emphasized their active contributions to supporting democratic development in other states. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines argued that his country “is prepared to provide technical support and training in the area of governance, the administration of justice, electoral processes and similar subjects, with third-party support. We

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will share our knowledge – a result of our own experiences as Asia’s first democracy.”

Similarly, the President of Estonia stated that “the Estonian experience in building up democratic institutions, implementing economic reforms and involving civil society in public life and decision-making can really help other countries where such processes are still in their initial stage.” And the representative of Saint Kitts and Nevis offered that “although CARICOM faces great limitations and challenges owing to the absence of natural and financial resources, we have managed to build credible democratic institutions, a reliable judicial system and lasting democracies in which the transition from incumbent Governments to opposition parties passes without incident. We are ready to share these experiences with the rest of the world.”

Why are Latin American states more heavily represented in this category than states in other regions, such as Eastern Europe? One notable difference between these two regions is the comprehensive codification of democratic norms in European international institutions (in the CSCE in 1990/91 and rigorous EU accession requirements after 1993). As mentioned in section 6.3, regional organizations’ democratic status markers are considered by relevant states even within the United Nations. For example, since the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria were such specific and clear benchmarks, a state such as Romania would not likely make an assertion of democratic status in the UN much prior to having fulfilled the EU criteria because it could risk negative reputation effects with European states. The larger social group of the United Nations is one, but not the only group to which states speak in the UN GA; referent groups may also be smaller groups of established democratic states. Although strong norms of electoral democracy were codified and strengthened in several regional IOs outside of Europe, they have tended to lack a common understanding and more comprehensive definition of characteristics of democratic systems, particularly in the 1990s. Therefore, states in regions outside of Europe would have fewer risks of asserting democratic status based on less comprehensive international standards of electoral democracy. Another explanation for Latin American states’ comparatively high representation in this category is likely tied to their histories of democratic governance and their relations with the United States. Without collectively-agreed and institutionalized

367 CARICOM stands for the Caribbean Community and Common Market
368 Statement by Mr. Timothy Harris, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Education of Saint Kitts and Nevis, UN GA 59th Session, 13th Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 28 Sept. 2004, A/59/PV.13, 15.
comprehensive benchmarks (and recognition) of democratic systems (beyond electoral democracy) at the Inter-American regional level in these years, more frequent repetition of a state’s positive attributes could be valuable for facilitating cooperation with the United States and to gain or maintain recognition of these characteristics. This gained relevance with the emphasis placed on democratic governance as a basis for partnership conveyed in U.S. policy statements in 1990-91.  

6.5. UN, 1992-1994: States’ strategies of social creativity encourage UN norms and policies for democracy support to incorporate economic development

Now that the gulf between East and West has been bridged, are we not about to face a rift between North and South? We must counter this danger and reactivate the dialogue in all possible forums and translate this concept of assistance into a living reality.  

- Mr. Colombo, Italy, UN GA, Sept. 1992

As suggested above, the so-called North South divide has been an historically important status division along economic lines in the UN, which has interacted with democratic status to influence democratic norm development. Chapter 4 showed that in the OSCE, democratic status came to eclipse other forms of status in the 1990s (e.g. great power, military strength). In the UN, this trend is not as clear. While democratic status achieved high salience in the UN, it co-existed alongside other highly salient dimensions of status, namely economic and great power status. I argued in chapter 2 that status as a developing country often has a more positive connotation than status as a non-or partial democracy. The following section shows that in 1992-94, divisions between member states in terms of economic development were also salient, and this affected UN debates on a wide range of issues, from the environment to democratization.

Suggesting the high significance of this division in 1992, the representative of Burkina Faso noted that “The collapse of one of the two blocs did not solve the world’s problems. Rather, it emphasized the North-South split; old wounds that are still open; internal contradictions within regions, and divisions among nations.” And the President of Kazakhstan stated: “the decrease in geopolitical tension along East-West lines and the increasingly dangerous

369 See statement by Mr. George H.W. Bush, President of the United States, UN GA, 45th Session, 14th Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 1 Oct. 1990, A/45/PV.14, 68.
confrontation between North and South is a universally recognized fact.\textsuperscript{372} Consequently, in 1992, a high percentage of UN member states argued that facilitating development should be the UN’s main priority – aiming to elevate the right to development and decrease the prioritization of the UN’s norms on peace and security.\textsuperscript{373} They sought benefits of the peace dividend, i.e. that military and defense spending would become available for global socio-economic projects, and many statements were similar to that of the Mauritanian representative: “With the ending of the cold war and its ideological conflicts, today’s world faces no greater challenge than that of development.”\textsuperscript{374} Several states appealed for heightened leadership on this issue. For example, the representative of Barbados argued that “a new world order must be developed around the central priority of closing the gap between North and South. This requires courageous leadership on the part of the North.”\textsuperscript{375} Similar sentiments were attributed to the UN Secretary-General.

According to the representative of Bahrain:

If rich industrial countries are to fulfil their global responsibilities, they ought to respond to the needs of developing countries in terms of development assistance so that the cold war between the East and West may not be replaced by another cold war between the North and South, or as the Secretary-General put it, so as not to erect an iron curtain between the North and South similar to the one that used to exist between East and West.\textsuperscript{376}

In this time period, many states advocated the right to development as an alternative or in addition to democratic norms, although it was not obvious that they would gain much in terms of status by emphasizing their economic development credentials instead. As noted in chapter 2, status differs from prestige because status emphasizes relative standing and hierarchical relations (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 10). The implication of social creativity here differs from the concept as typically employed in social identity theory. As highlighted in theoretical proposition S-3, even if a much higher status is not directly sought by developing (and non- or partially

\textsuperscript{372} Statement by Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 24\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 5 Oct. 1992, A/47/PV.24, 7.
\textsuperscript{373} See, for example, statement by Mr. Ould Moine, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 20\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 1 Oct. 1992, A/47/PV.20, 7; Statement by Mr. King, Barbados, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 27\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 6 Oct. 1992, A/47/PV.27, 48. See also Statements by Malaysia (A/47/PV.9, 82); Cameroon (A/47/PV.19, 99); Mali (A/47/PV.20, 43); Uganda (A/47/PV.28, 23); Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (A/47/PV.29, 62); Bahrain (A/47/PV.16, 13).
\textsuperscript{374} Statement by Mr. Ould Moine, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 20\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 1 Oct. 1992, A/47/PV.20, 7.
\textsuperscript{375} Statement by Mr. King, Barbados, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 27\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 6 Oct. 1992, A/47/PV.27, 48. See also Statements by Malaysia (A/47/PV.9, 82); Cameroon (A/47/PV.19, 99); Mali (A/47/PV.20, 43); Uganda (A/47/PV.28, 23); Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (A/47/PV.29, 62).
\textsuperscript{376} Statement by Mr. Al-Khalifa, Bahrain, UN GA 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 16\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 28 Sept. 1992, A/47/PV.16, 13.
democratic) countries on the basis of economic development, they are seeking status-related gains. These include increased voice or recognition in debates on international distributive policies, in addition to increased attention from the international community to support their economic growth. Moreover, it appears that a low position in the economic development hierarchy contributes less to a state’s (or leaders’) negative social identity than does a low position in the democratic governance hierarchy because governments are less directly implicated in a state’s level of economic development.

“For a social creativity strategy to succeed,” note Larson and Shevchenko, “the lower-status group’s proposed criteria for status must be recognized as valid and worthwhile by the dominant group” (2010a, 74). Yet the United States and the United Kingdom disagreed about the importance of elevating the right to development in the UN system. U.S. President George H.W. Bush argued that ethnic violence was a greater threat than economic deprivation to the democratic peace in Eurasia. The representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the European Community said that in the short term the greatest threats to international order were extreme nationalism and challenges to the rule of law, while long-term threats include poverty and environmental degradation. The longstanding resistance by the U.S. and other Western states to prioritizing a right to development in the UN has precluded major, fundamental changes to the organization’s approach to the subject of global redistribution of resources. Moreover, Western states have deflected some appeals for an enhanced right to development by pledging to increase their development assistance and maintaining an emphasis on the organization’s priorities in civil and political rights and other issues.

The early 1990s also witnessed convergence in the Western international donor community to increasingly condition their development assistance on recipient countries’ democratic reforms. For example:

Canada’s own assistance to developing countries is increasingly focused on and tied to their efforts to protect basic human rights, to develop democratic values and institutions, and to undertake good governance in their policies and programmes. We

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378 Statement by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom, UN GA, 47th Session, 6th Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 22 Sept. 1992, A/47/PV.6, 42 (italics added).
urge other Member States and the General Assembly to adopt a similar philosophy and similar practices.\textsuperscript{379}

Similarly, “Denmark stands ready, through its programme for development assistance, to provide substantial support for specific activities aimed at consolidating human rights, democracy and good governance, and \textit{we shall seek our future partners in development from amongst countries which are making a genuine effort} in this regard.”\textsuperscript{380} Therefore, it was becoming explicit that partnership with Western donors would be increasingly dependent on a state’s democratic status.

These sentiments were reinforced by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who argued at the opening of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights that “democracy is the political system which best allows for the free exercise of individual rights. It is not possible to separate the United Nations promotion of human rights from the establishment of democratic systems within the international community.”\textsuperscript{381} In other words, support for democratic governance was being grafted onto the human rights (and development) agendas which were more established in the UN system. As mentioned in chapter 5, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action provided legitimacy and an important basis for UN agencies to continue engaging in electoral assistance and to further support democratic governance in member states (Ludwig 2004a, 185-6). Importantly, it asserted that “democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing” (2003 Section 1(8)).

What role did democratic status play in outcomes of the Vienna World Conference and in UN GA resolution 49/190? Several delegates’ statements attributed success with the creation of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted by consensus, to the leadership of Ambassadors of the Slovak Republic, Ecuador, Singapore, and Brazil.\textsuperscript{382} Although established democratic states generally advocated democratic and human rights norms in the immediate post-Cold War years, in a climate of strong divisions among states, achieving consensus as a

\textsuperscript{379} Statement by Mrs. McDougal, Canada, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 10\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 24 Sept. 1992, A/47/PV.10, 75-76 (italics added).

\textsuperscript{380} Statement by Mr. Ellemann-Jensen, Denmark, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 9\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 23 Sept. 1992, A/47/PV.9, 104 (italics added). See also statements of Sweden and Portugal, UN GA, 47\textsuperscript{th} Session, 7\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, 22 Sept. 1992. A/47/PV.7.

\textsuperscript{381} Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Opening of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 June 1993, A/CONF.157/22, 11.

\textsuperscript{382} See statements by Mr. Wisnumurti, Indonesia; Mr. Kalpagé, Sri Lanka; Mr. Trottier, Canada; Mr. Marrero, United States of America; and Mr. Jaramillo, Colombia; UN GA 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary Meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 14-22.
foundation for the legitimacy of new norms presented a challenge. In this case, representatives of states with understandings of various perspectives related to human rights, democracy and state sovereignty, as well as with an ability to negotiate towards consensus were highly influential. This suggests that under highly polarized conditions, a state (and its skilled diplomats) can achieve status in the organization by virtue of its capacities to mediate between groups with variable levels of democratic status on contentious subjects such as democratic norms.

Moreover, statements contend that the Non-Aligned Movement in particular was instrumental in forging consensus on the post of High Commissioner, in part by recommending the establishment of a Working Group and submitting productive documents.\textsuperscript{383} The agreement of the Non-aligned group, however, was qualified by a few guiding principles they deemed important for the High Commissioner to observe. These included principles of impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, the need to respect state sovereignty, the principle that all human rights are universal, interdependent, and should be given the same emphasis, including the right to development, and that “various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind.”\textsuperscript{384} Therefore, some non-democratic states were supportive of consensus in light of the qualifications that could limit the agenda’s implementation in certain cases. Responsibility for the initial proposal of a High Commissioner for Human Rights was credited to Uruguay in 1952, with a follow-up proposal made by Costa Rica in 1965 and supported over the years by U.S. policy advocating a U.N. role in civil and political rights.\textsuperscript{385} While strategies of social mobility appear to have motivated many states to support Vienna proposals and outcomes, critical for its success in the end was the reluctance of states in the Non-Aligned Movement to undermine the process through social competition.

The role of social mobility and creativity strategies is especially prominent in the case of UN GA resolutions on “Support by the UN system of the efforts of governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies,” which together with the UN’s electoral resolutions

\textsuperscript{383} Statement by Mr. Chen Jian, China, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 20. Statement by Mr. Kalpagé, Sri Lanka, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 18. Statement by Mr. Wisnumurti, Indonesia, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 14.

\textsuperscript{384} Statement by Mr. Wisnumurti, Indonesia, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 14.

\textsuperscript{385} Statement by Mr. Castro de Barish, Costa Rica, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 20. Statement by Mr. Marrero, United States of America, UN GA, 48\textsuperscript{th} Session, 85\textsuperscript{th} Plenary meeting, New York, 20 Dec. 1993, A/48/PV.85, 17.
and the 1993 Vienna Declaration strongly underpinned and conferred momentum on the UN’s efforts to implement its expanding democratization agenda (see also Ludwig 2004a, 185-6). As discussed in chapter 5, inaugurated in 1988 in the Philippines, the International Conferences of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) became closely linked to and served as an important instigator of UN democratization efforts beginning in 1994, following its conference in Managua, Nicaragua. Kelley argues that Latin American states were not strong advocates in debates on the UN’s role in election observation (2008, 224), and I provided additional evidence in section 6.3. However, in contrast to UN debates on election observation, which some Latin American and other states sensed as a guise for intervention, Latin American states have been more supportive of other agendas on democratic development, including through the ICNRD movement. Of the delegates speaking in debates on UN GA resolution 49/190 in December 1994, 48% were from Latin American states.

What might explain their increased engagement in this forum? The ICNRD brought together a large number of states concerned about the adverse effects of harsh economic conditions on the survival and longevity of their democracies. One objective of the movement was to increase awareness of problems facing new or restored democracies that might be assisted by UN and international support. Given the region’s strong interest in issues of social development (Latin American states have historically been strong advocates of social and economic rights in the UN as observed, for example in negotiations of the UDHR), the issues addressed by the ICNRD movement were highly salient to Latin America and other regions. For example, representatives of Honduras and Guatemala appealed for greater UN support to alleviate poverty and development in new democracies, while representatives of Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil pledged to support new and restored democracies in various ways, including by sharing experiences. Similarly, the delegate from Bangladesh argued that “the fight against poverty and steps to unlock growth remain the foremost challenge to sustaining democracy.”

386  Author’s interview with a diplomat to the United Nations, New York, 11 March 2009; (see also Kelley 2008, 224).
democracy is fully consolidated,”

and “Costa Rica is an ancient and well-established democracy with more than 100 years of experience of a system embodying public and private freedoms.”

Therefore, while many states supported a stronger UN role in democratization, some used their status as new or restored democracies in the hope of gaining additional resources for development, while others publicized their democratic status through their support.

6.6. UN, 1995-1999: Prevalence of strategies of social mobility and social creativity contribute to elaboration of democratic norms and policy implementation

Analyzing the leadership of the ICNRD illustrates the varied role of status in democratic norm development and policy implementation in the UN. Each of the leading states was engaged in strategies of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1), while some simultaneously engaged in strategies of social creativity (S-3).

The states involved include the Philippines (1988), Nicaragua (1994), Romania (1997), Benin (2000), Mongolia (2003) and Qatar (2006). Each state holding an ICNRD conference after 1994 served as the movement’s secretariat and encouraged follow-up in the years between conferences, thereby taking on notable responsibility and commitment. What factors motivated this type of engagement? One rationale acknowledged by each of the ICNRD leaders has been a request for international support for their democratic consolidation, suggesting at least some element of instrumentality. Less frequently acknowledged in public statements has been some states’ pursuit of democratic status in order to obtain security guarantees or military assistance from Western states. However, non-instrumental factors have certainly also been motivational. Arguably, each of these states sought to improve its standing in terms of democratic status. For example, the Philippines initiated the ICNRD movement shortly after its “People’s Power Revolution” of 1986, aiming to bring together countries for mutual support as well as seeking solidarity with established democracies, and also to help “strengthen and reinforce our own fragile and hard-won democracy.”

States such as Romania and Mongolia, in behavior consistent with strategies of social mobility, took initiatives well beyond the requirements of their positions to advance objectives associated with the movement, objectives

389 Statement by Mr. Telles Ribiero, Brazil, UN GA, 49th Session, 80th Meeting, Agenda item 159, New York, 7 Dec. 1994, A/49/PV.80, 3.
which also corresponded closely at the time with those of established democratic states. Some states are pleased to publicize in international fora the successes of their democratization processes and to have positive visibility, motives which are compatible with status-related considerations.

Nicaragua’s statements displayed some elements of social creativity by seeking to impart a greater focus on eliminating economic and social development obstacles into UN and other international support for democratic governance. 392 In 1995, for example, the Nicaraguan delegate suggested that since “development – a fundamental right of nations – promotes the full exercise of democracy” and because structural adjustment programs can have destabilizing effects on democratic transitions, the Secretary-General should reflect on poverty eradication measures and encouraging modalities such as debt relief, promoting investment and open trade, as “political credibility will be undermined if people’s standards of living are not improved” 393

Romania, however, more exclusively exhibited a strategy of social mobility and its interest in demonstrating a strong commitment to democratization in the UN system. Its delegate argued: “My country has recovered its democratic traditions after 45 years of totalitarianism…Romania wants to bring its own contribution to the continuation and deepening of the international dialogue aimed at making democracy a main factor for the overall progress of nations and the positive development of international relations.” 394 And in 1997, its delegate added, “It is our hope that, alongside the valuable experience of other new or restored democracies, our own experience can contribute to shaping a new political culture and setting useful guidelines for future United Nations programmes on democratization and good governance.” 395 In the early 1990s, Romania had received criticism from the EU on its progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria for EU accession. However, it displayed a high level of commitment in UN fora. This again suggests that states’ status considerations in other (regional) international bodies such as the EU can influence their behavior in the larger UN. In

fact, to predict whether a state will pursue strategies of social mobility, it appears important to also examine the relevant conditions (perceptions of the legitimacy and stability of the status hierarchy, permeability of elite groups, salience of democratic governance in the IO, positive association with prototypes, and if the relevant IO itself holds prestige) at regional as well as at global levels.

Benin was the most vocal of the ICNRD leaders in its requests for financial assistance, and argued “no political system can withstand a decline in socio-economic conditions. The citizens of our country support the process of democratization because they hope that it will establish conditions leading to improved standards of living.”

Thus, some of its status-seeking behavior appears instrumental. In 1997 the delegate of Benin expressed concern for threats to African democracies, arguing that “there is every reason to believe that democratization now needs to find its second wind,” and appreciated the “sign of solidarity with and benevolence towards the young African democracies” in 1998 when it became clear that the 2000 ICNRD conference would be held in Cotonou.

Often states also seek to gain favorable impressions of their democratic status not only in the UN or the international community at-large, but also in their region, e.g. Africa.

In the 1990s, Mongolia, which would hold the ICNRD leadership in 2003, indicated a strong commitment to the movement as well as pride in the success of its political reforms. Already in 1997, Mongolia was one of the only states to advocate the development of indicators to monitor progress in democratization, a project for which the country would help develop international best practices in the mid-2000s. Each ICNRD leader contributed to developing linkages between the democracy and development agendas in the UN system, which would inform the democratic governance work of UNDP, which would help these states to enhance their status in both the economic and democratic dimensions simultaneously.

There are a few additional states which, although not leaders of the ICNRD movement, were particularly active participants in these debates in the mid-1990s. The following cases suggest that the salience of a state’s democratic status to its identity combines with considerations of status benefits in international fora to influence the degree to which it seeks to support IOs’ democratization efforts. Justifying its commitment, Argentina’s delegate stated:

Countries that enjoy democracy today have an obligation to foster and promote it among those to whom it is still lacking and to reaffirm their total support for the consolidation of the transition process. For these reasons, my country has actively participated in the processes of democratization in Central America and the Caribbean, lending technical, economic and financial assistance and participating as electoral observers and in peacekeeping observations whenever called upon to do so.\(^{400}\)

States’ international identification with and pride in the history of their democratization processes seems to play a role in motivating their interest in disseminating their experiences at international level, as does an interest in preventing the experienced destructive effects of authoritarianism. In other words, by capitalizing on their histories of democratic transition, states can often gain in positive distinctiveness and enhance their standing in terms of democratic status. Often it appears that the strongest motivational forces occur within a few years of a state’s democratic transition. As the state’s identification with these events recedes, it may adopt new layers of identity that supplant the salience of democratic transition in its foreign policy. For example, in 1995, the delegate from South Africa stated: “Having experienced the destructive and anti-human force of apartheid, we owe it to ourselves and to humanity to order our affairs in such a manner that an effective and lasting blow is struck against any form of dictatorship.”\(^{401}\) And in 1996, South Africa expressed interest in providing support, stating: “The dark days of racial domination, tyranny and authoritarianism have indeed been relegated to the dustbin of history in my country and South Africa is committed to contributing actively to the promotion of the ideals of democracy in other parts of the world.”\(^{402}\) However, South Africa’s interventions decreased in enthusiasm and frequency in the late 1990s, and the country became increasingly critical of democracy promotion. This suggests that South Africa’s reference group

\(^{400}\) Statement by Mr. Castelli, Argentina, UN GA, 51\(^{st}\) Session, 61\(^{st}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 41, New York, 20 Nov. 1996, A/51/PV.61, 10.

\(^{401}\) Statement by Mr. Jele, South Africa, UN GA, 50\(^{th}\) Session, 56\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 41, Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, New York, 13 Nov. 1995, A/50/PV.56, 11.

\(^{402}\) Statement by Mr. Wensley, South Africa, UN GA, 51\(^{st}\) Session, 61\(^{st}\) Plenary meeting, Agenda item 41, New York, 20 Nov. 1996, A/51/PV.61, 13. See also Statement by Mr. Jele, South Africa, UN GA, 50\(^{th}\) Session, 56\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 41, New York, 13 Nov. 1995, A/50/PV.56, 11.
may have shifted, as discussed in theoretical proposition S-3, and thus it sought status in alternative ways as it developed an identity as an African developing country.\(^{403}\)

Some parallels can be drawn to Germany, whose delegate in 1997 declared:

The German people in its entirety is proud, and I believe justly so, of the peaceful revolution which took place in eastern Germany almost eight years ago. The enduring and inspiring symbol of that revolution was, of course, the fall of the Berlin Wall, which in turn came to epitomize the end of the cold war and also the beginning of another wave of democratization. Given our history, my country thinks it has a special appreciation of the problems and challenges facing the new and restored democracies, and we would like to state that we want to cooperate closely with those states.\(^{404}\)

The following year, the German delegate elaborated on these sentiments, stating, “our own experiences allow us to have a better understanding of the material, institutional and psychological problems involved” [in democratization].\(^{405}\) However, Germany’s enthusiastic interventions in this forum decreased after 1998, corresponding with the end of Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s term. Similarly decreasing its participation, whereas Russia took part in the 1995 debate on this resolution, speaking favorably of UN election observation of its December elections and UN assistance for free media, human rights education, strengthening public administration, and rule of law,\(^{406}\) it did not participate again until 2003 when its statement was more critical. This change of behavior away from a strategy consistent with social mobility corresponds to a finding of Larson and Shevchenko, who argue that from 1996 to 1999, Russia’s strategy shifted to one of social competition, as “Russian elites believed the West had failed to accord Russia the status and role to which it was entitled, leaving it marginalized and isolated from real decision-making power” (2010a, 80).

In contrast to the decreased rhetorical engagement of South Africa, Germany, and Russia, India’s rhetorical support for democratization in the context of these UN GA debates increased in the late 1990s. In 1999, the representatives of Chile, Poland, India, and the Republic of Korea

\(^{403}\) On the latter, author’s interview, Paris, 19 May, 2008.

\(^{404}\) Statement by Mr. Eitel, Germany, UN GA, 52\(^{nd}\) Session, 51\(^{st}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 38, Support by the UN system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, New York, 21 Nov. 1997, A/52/PV.51, 8.

\(^{405}\) Statement by Mr. Kastrup, Germany, UN GA, 53\(^{rd}\) Session, 67\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 33, Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies New York, 23 Nov. 1998, A/53/PV.67

\(^{406}\) Statement by Mr. Ordzhonkidze, Russian Federation, UN GA, 50\(^{th}\) Session, 56\(^{th}\) Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 41, Support by the United Nations system of the efforts of Governments to promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, New York, 13 Nov. 1995, A/50/PV.56, 11.
strongly articulated their democratic credentials and support for democratization in this forum, at
the same time as they began to assume new leadership roles in the Community of
Democracies.\textsuperscript{407} This again suggests that positive reinforcement by high-status states contributes
to (in this case, more recently consolidated democratic) states’ support for democratic norm
development and policy implementation in strategies of social mobility. In 1998, Bronislaw
Geremek reminded delegates of Poland’s successful transition experiences with round-table
negotiations contributing to the establishment of a democratic system in its UN GA General
Debate statement.\textsuperscript{408} The absence of Poland and the Czech Republic,\textsuperscript{409} however, in the UN GA
debates linked specifically to the ICNRD during the mid-1990s, suggests that not all states with
strong internationally-recognized democratic transitions actively or consistently participated in
all relevant fora and that engagement with a forum dedicated to new and restored democracies
may be less attractive when a state has achieved a higher level of democratic status. In general,
this section has illustrated that states appear, in part, to use their support of democratic norm
development and policy implementation via strategies of social mobility in the UN to multiply or
augment their democratic status at regional level as well.

6.7. UN, 2000-2004: A peak in democratic norm development and policy implementation is
gradually followed by increased challenges

One of the concerns of those who sought to support democratic governance through the
UN in the late 1990s and 2000 was the absence in the UN system of codified minimum
conditions and principles of democracy. While a large number of UN member states described
themselves as democratic and held elections, a commonly-agreed definition of core features of
democracy was not available in the UN. As discussed in chapter 5, Romania took leadership in
the ICNRD in drafting a comprehensive Code of Democratic Conduct that brought together
existing international standards on democratic principles and requirements. Although the Code
of Democratic Conduct met with resistance in 1999 when raised in the General Assembly, its
contents were revised and adopted in 2000 in the GA as resolution “Promoting and
Consolidating Democracy” (A/RES/55/96) with 157 states voting for, none against, 16

\textsuperscript{407} Statement by Mr. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland, UN GA, 53\textsuperscript{rd} Session, 13\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 24 Sept 1998, A/53/PV.13, 22.

\textsuperscript{408} Statement by Mr. Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland, UN GA, 53\textsuperscript{rd} Session, 13\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, Agenda item 9, General Debate, New York, 24 Sept 1998, A/53/PV.13, 22.

\textsuperscript{409} The Czech Republic often focuses its democracy support on pre-transition stages, in states such as Cuba, Belarus, and Myanmar, stemming from its experiences prior to 1989, and thus prioritizes international support for dissidents and opposition. (Authors interviews, Prague.)
This resolution gave greater legitimacy and substance in response to the recurrent critical refrain that there is no single model of democracy, as the resolution confirmed basic principles and values shared by all democracies in their various forms.

This milestone had the potential to transform ideas of democratic status in the UN, since previously the definition of a democratic state was vague and subject to interpretation. By specifying the attributes of a democratic state with indicators, social categories and criteria for inclusion and exclusion in a democratic subgroup of UN member states would become clearer and potentially more divisive. In the CSCE/OSCE case, we saw that the codification of comprehensive democratic norms in 1990-91 contributed to the increased stratification of its participating states because it institutionalized social categories which, over time, became more divisive. While UN GA resolution 55/96 codified a comprehensive set of democratic norms in 2000, its institutionalization in the UN system has been less thorough than its counterparts in the CSCE/OSCE. Therefore, divisions according to democratic governance have not been heavily reinforced by the United Nations system.

Mongolia was unique in its highly active support for the development and implementation of nationally-owned democracy indicators during its chairmanship of the ICNRD and conducted a pilot project that pioneered new methodologies, for which it gained recognition as a leader in democracy monitoring. Mongolia’s pilot initiative was supported by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and UNDP, and over time developed two sets of indicators – core indicators applicable to all democracies, and country-specific indicators applicable to a state’s geopolitics, constitution, population and social factors. These efforts led Mongolia to propose democratic governance indicators for MDG 9, and while the new methodologies were not adopted system-wide in the UN, the country’s experiences were disseminated and initiated similar projects in other interested states.

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410 UNBISnet.org, Voting Record Search, A/RES/55/96.
The subject of democracy indicators has been highly controversial in the UN system and encountered status-seeking behavior in strategies of social competition (theoretical proposition S-2), for example, from Russia in 2003: “one thing is certain: we cannot make assistance to countries contingent on any kind of so-called democracy index or indicators.” And similar warnings were issued by states such as Cuba in later years: “We wish to make it perfectly clear that we will oppose any attempt to impose in future subjective indicators that are politicized and discriminatory and that are drawn up without the participation of the specialized governmental agencies charged by the United Nations with dealing with such tasks.” By opposing the institutionalization of democracy indicators, these states might avoid lower status levels along lines of democratic governance. The backlash on this subject suggests that the intensified push of democratic status markers under conditions of increased illegitimacy of the U.S.-led hierarchy contributed to certain states reacting contentiously. It is also appears that non- or partially democratic states in the UN sought to avoid negative implications of democratic status that had already permeated regional IOs such as the OSCE or OAS. The difference from the OSCE case relates to the later timing of agreement and codification of democratic norms in the UN. In the OSCE, contesting states reacted in part to how democratic status operated. In the UN, states aimed to prevent the further institutionalization of democratic norms and status (e.g. through implementation of democracy indicators), which had the potential to strengthen categories of stratification.

In the early 2000s, the United States took efforts to reinvigorate the salience of democratic status in the international community. It supported the launch of the Community of Democracies in Warsaw in June 2000, a group restricted to states considered by its Convening Group to be democratic, and endorsed the Warsaw Declaration, another declaration of core democratic principles. As Mr. Halperin indicated in November 2000, “the United States Government is committed to working at the United Nations and in regional organizations with countries which share these ideals to advance democracy and human rights.” Assertions of democratic status markers also became more strident elsewhere. For example, the outcome document of the 2003 ICNDRD conference in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia read: “Democratic societies

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414 Statement by Mr. Malmierca Diaz, Cuba, UN GA 60th Session, 78th Plenary meeting, 2 May 2006, A/60/PV.78, 6.
415 Statement by Mr. Halperin, United States, UN GA 55th Session, 70th Plenary meeting, Agenda item 39, New York, 21 Nov. 2000, A/55/PV.70, 12.
have certain qualities which we consider superior to others, particularly those concerned with their participatory, representative and equitable nature.”416 That such renewed efforts to re-elevate democratic status markers in the UN were palpable is evidenced by the reaction of the Byelorussian representative: “the division of States into two categories – civilized and uncivilized, or teachers and pupils – are counterproductive, especially in terms of attaining the ultimate goal: building a genuinely democratic society – not to mention in terms of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.”417 The U.S. occupation of Iraq further tarnished the U.S. image and, reacting to what they viewed as neo-colonial, unilateral approaches, a high number of UN member states in their UN GA General Debate statements in 2004 advocated a *multilateral* UN role in Iraq to support the country’s democratization. Social identity theory suggests that when the legitimacy of the status hierarchy is less legitimate and stable, we should observe increased examples of social competition, or spoiler behavior (Larson and Shevchenko 2010a, 72-3). It is somewhat ironic that the U.S. aimed to promote democratic status markers in the international system at the same time as its legitimacy was decreasing, as is further discussed in the next section.

6.8. UN, 2005-2010: A mixed range of state behavior in respect to democratic status, challenges to policy implementation become more contentious

As suggested above, the global conditions in the mid-2000s were increasingly ripe for social competition and creativity strategies. Under conditions of declining hegemony, and when U.S. policy makers decreased their enthusiasm and support for UN efforts in favor of unilateral or regional initiatives, and UN prestige decreased, we would expect to observe a decrease in states’ engagement to support democratic norm development and policy implementation in the UN through strategies of social mobility and an increase in strategies of social competition and social creativity.

In this time period, however, we observe a mixed range of state behavior in respect to democratic status. Some non- or partially democratic states have responded with greater discord to attempts at further institutionalizing status markers such as benchmarks or indicators of democratic systems. This has corresponded with China’s rise as a donor disinterested in

recipients’ democracy and human rights records, Russia’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with the West, and the decreased legitimacy of U.S. leadership in the international system. However, this chapter illustrates that democratic status-related concerns have also played a role. One important trend in the late 2000s is the blurring of traditional dividing lines. For example, the bailouts of Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and Greece in the wake of the 2008 financial and economic crisis have obscured the line between developed and developing countries. In other words, the boundaries of traditionally high-status groups were becoming more ambiguous. Moreover, when prototypical states are decreasingly viewed as role models with similarities, as discussed in chapter 2, this can negatively influence the degree to which other states seek democratic status in strategies of social mobility.

It is important to note that, while the late 2000s witnessed increased discord around the implementation of democratic norms at policy level in the UN, this remained less pervasive than in the early 1990s, when democratic norms initially began to take root in the UN system. Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of UN member states challenging UN practices of democracy support or more general conditionalities placed on development assistance in the UN GA General Debates.

418 Author’s interview with Ben Slay, Senior Economist, UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, Budapest, 6 Dec. 2008.
In 2010, the tone of critical statements became more antagonistic than in previous years, and several states appealed for greater respect and dignity in their international partnerships. The use of the terms ‘respect’ and ‘dignity’ suggests at least a partial reaction to democratic status hierarchies and to negative expressions perceived in the UN and/or more generally in the international community. This contrasts with some trends observed in the 1990s. For example, in 1992, many UN member states were suspicious of the new elements of hierarchy and asserted that no country “should use its power to dictate its concept of democracy and of human rights or to impose conditions on others,” as expressed by the President of Indonesia on behalf of the 108 members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Others criticized the tendency of linking international development assistance to democratic reforms, with some expressing concerns

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420 See statements by representatives of Bahrain (A/65/PV.19); Gambia (A/65/PV.20); Nicaragua (A/65/PV.20); and Tunisia (A/65/PV.22).
421 Statement by Mr. Soeharto, President of the Republic of Indonesia, A/47/PV.10, 18.
about selectivity and national interests influencing its application. States engaging in social competition sought to forestall the entrenchment of democratic status in the UN. The high number of states speaking against democratic conditionality in 1992 appears to stem from the recent emergence of the practice and states’ uncertainty about the extent of its application. By 1998, the expression of these critiques vastly decreased, with representatives of Zimbabwe and Cuba among the few making such arguments in the UN GA General Debates. In 2004, some states sought greater respect for local traditions, cultures, and differences in approaches to democracy among states, or made claims of double standards. This suggests that some non- or partially democratic states were reacting against their negative standing in democratic hierarchies, a trend that increased into the late 2000s.

The overall decrease in prominence of democratic norms in the most important documents adopted in the UN system in 2005-2010 also suggests that states pursuing strategies of social competition and social creativity have been increasingly influential. For example, although the 2005 World Summit endorsed major changes to the Commission on Human Rights by creating the Human Rights Council, the term “democracy” was nowhere to be found in its Section 1 on “values and principles.” Its declaration’s clause, “We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger,” was weaker on the subject of governance than counterpart clauses in the Millennium Declaration just five years prior. While a growing number of states have attempted to deflate the UN’s prioritization of democratic governance among its norm sets, as observed in debates on the UNDP strategic plan for 2008-2011, at the same time, there remain prominent examples of democratic status seeking in the organization.

We observe this mixed state behavior, for example, in the UN GA General Debates. Figures 6.1-6.5 above illustrated decreased numbers of mentions of democracy, an overall decrease in democratic status seeking, and decreased salience of democratic status over time. However, an interesting anomaly appears. There is, in fact, a significant percentage of states mentioning their domestic democratic reforms without references to democracy in their foreign

422 See statements by Seychelles (A/47/PV.5); India (A/47/PV.12); Azerbaijan (A/47/PV.11); Bangladesh (A/47/PV.17); Cote d’Ivoire (A/47/PV.14); Guatemala (A/47/PV.17); Sudan (A/47/PV.18); Mauritius (A/47/PV.21); Ethiopia (A/47/PV.25); Namibia (A/47/PV.26); Kenya (A/47/PV.26); Botswana (A/47/PV.27); Belize (A/47/PV.29).

policies particularly among states in Africa and Asia in 2010, as shown below in Figure 6.8. Why? While democracy promotion has been delegitimized in the late 2000s, and norms of sovereignty have experienced a revival, despite the growing appeal of aspects of non-democratic economic models such as those of China and Singapore, democracy in itself remains normatively significant within many states. By refraining from discussing democratic governance in other states, yet highlighting their own reforms, states can simultaneously signal an interest in improving their democratic status, while paying respect to both the values of non-interference and democracy.

**Figure 6.8: Percentage of UN Member States that discuss ongoing domestic democratic reforms, but make no mention of support for democratization in foreign policy** (category 4)\textsuperscript{424}

a) Disaggregated by level of democracy

![Graph showing percentage of UN Member States discussing domestic democratic reforms, but not mentioning support for democratization in foreign policy, by level of democracy.]

b) Disaggregated by region

![Graph showing percentage of UN Member States discussing domestic democratic reforms, but not mentioning support for democratization in foreign policy, by region.]

In 2005, the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) was founded to help support democratization projects in the developing world.\textsuperscript{425} It has focused on grants to support civil society, in contrast with the UN Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and other UN


agencies, which work more closely with governments. The idea came out of the Community of Democracies, with strong support from the U.S., which was also interested in partnering with India in the UN system. For its part, India’s support for the democracy agenda in the mid-2000s is consistent with a strategy of social mobility, perhaps corresponding to its interest in attaining U.S. backing for a permanent Security Council seat. In the UN GA, India’s delegate stated:

As the world’s largest democracy, it was also natural for India to support the establishment of the United Nations Democracy Fund. We made an initial contribution of $10 million to the Fund, and remain actively and constructively involved in achieving the objectives for which it was set up...It also stands ready to share its experiences and to cooperate with other countries...including in areas such as institution building, awareness creation and leadership development.\(^{426}\)

The donor base of the UN Democracy Fund differs from the states participating in the Community of Democracies, through which UNDEF was established. UNDEF accepts all contributions regardless of donors’ democratic status and prioritizes support to local civil society organizations. Since 2005, an inclusive and atypical array of donors for democracy assistance has made financial contributions, as some lack corresponding bilateral programs. For example, UNDEF’s 19 donors in 2008 - the US, India, Germany, Qatar, Spain, France, Italy, Czech Republic, Chile, Portugal, Slovenia, Turkey, Croatia, Israel, Lithuania, Peru, Ecuador, and Latvia, - contributed a total of US $24,900,514.\(^{427}\) From this list, one sees that not all donors to UNDEF are consolidated democracies; moreover, some democratic states such as Canada have not yet contributed. What explains the interests of such a wide range of donors? According to Roland Rich, Executive Head of UNDEF, some contribute because they see UNDEF as an important American initiative and would like to be seen as on the side of the U.S. Further, whereas a small contribution to the UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund may look frivolous because of UNDP’s large size, given UNDEF’s smaller size, contributions appear more prestigious, while UNDEF’s newness accords some novelty.\(^{428}\) Some donors, particularly those in Central Europe, appreciate that UNDEF invests in civil society, whereas the UNDP DGTTF engages closely with governments. Other states seek association with the term “democracy” as a noun (rather than democratic governance as an adjective) which they view as

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\(^{426}\) Statement by Mr. Gehlot, India, UN GA, 62\(^{nd}\) Session, 44\(^{th}\) Plenary meeting, Agenda item 12, New York, 5 Nov. 2007, A/62/PV.44, 12.


\(^{428}\) Author’s interview with Roland Rich, Executive Head of UNDEF, New York, 12 March 2009. Italics added.
Thus, states’ support for UNDEF can also be interpreted as a form of status-seeking in the organization. Figure 6.9 below shows the variation in amount and number of donor contributions to UNDEF from 2005 to 2010. The financial crisis likely contributed in part to declining numbers after 2008.

Figure 6.9: Number and amount of donor contributions to UNDEF, 2005-2010

As discussed in chapter 5, UNDP became heavily involved in democratic governance programmes over the course of the 1990s, and by 2000, 50% of its portfolio was dedicated to these activities. In 2008, UNDP support for democratic governance totaled $1.43 billion, or 35% of expenditures to 129 countries. Core to the arguments of the G-77 and China in the contentious debates on the UNDP strategic plan 2008-2011 was their interest in increasing UNDP’s efforts specifically in the area of poverty reduction. As an organization accountable both to its donors and stakeholders, directions taken at policy level have been responsive. Among states of the G-77, there appears to be fatigue with status distinctions, and although such sentiments often underlie interstate relations, it is less surprising to see it come to the fore at a time when established democratic states have decreased prestige and appeal as prototypes. For example, as President Kagame of Rwanda stated:

> It has become clear that the United Nations has evolved into a two-tier organization, reflecting a world that seems to be divided into two major categories: one considered to have inherent, laudable values, rights and liberties, and another that needs to be taught

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429 Ibid.


and coached on those values. My country and many in the developing world seem to fall into that second category.\(^{432}\) It makes sense that non-democratic states will attempt to reduce international pressures contributing to their lower democratic status if they perceive a political opportunity.

### 6.9. Conclusions

A country’s international reputation is largely dependent on its domestic health.\(^{433}\)

– Mr. Jan Kavan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 1998.

As suggested in the quote above and in numerous statements in the UN General Assembly, state representatives acknowledge the existence of democratic status markers in the UN system and devise relevant strategies to advance their interests and elevate their democratic status. This chapter has argued that looking through the lens of democratic status provides valuable insights into trends in states’ cooperation or discord around democratic norm development and policy implementation in the UN. The analysis drew on concepts from social identity theory: social mobility, social competition, and social creativity, and proposed some alternative interpretations based on the context of inclusive IOs with high degrees of inequality.

Thereby, the chapter evaluated the validity of theoretical propositions S-1, S-2, and S-3 on the evolution and roles of democratic status over the course of the UN’s history. Whereas the UDHR and ICCPR served as points of departure and initial benchmarks for democratic status at the end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s it became clear that partnership with Western donors would be increasingly dependent on states’ democratic credentials. When the salience of democratic status was high in the UN in the 1990s, and many states viewed the hierarchy as legitimate and stable, high-status groups as permeable, and when prototypical states and the UN held greater prestige, cooperation for democratic norm development and policy implementation via strategies of social mobility (theoretical proposition S-1) was widely prevalent. With the removal of the East-West divide, in the early 1990s many countries were strongly driven by status concerns as they sought new positions in the world and to secure cooperation for economic development or security, as well as status as an end in itself. This chapter illustrated that democratic status concerns contributed to the engagement of new and restored democracies in the UN’s democratic norm development and policy implementation efforts, particularly in the

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1990s. It was also shown that states with more recently consolidated democratic systems have tended to reiterate and publicize their democratic status because perceptions of status are often slow to change. The condition of elite group permeability appears less critical for the larger range of UN member states than to great powers or within smaller regional organizations. Often states pursuing social mobility strategies along democratic lines in IOs are not seeking full acceptance into elite groups, but rather are seeking opportunities for enhanced partnership, recognition, relative status-related gains, to publicize the success of their democratization processes, and to gain favorable visibility, motives which, however, correspond to the pursuit of positive distinctiveness.

The context of inclusive IOs also suggested alternative interpretations of social creativity (theoretical proposition S-3). While social creativity strategies often entail discord, as seen in the OSCE, they may, however, be constructive for democratic norm development, as observed in the early 1990s in the UN. This was illustrated in the case of new and restored democracies’ advocacy of norms of development alongside democratic norms, which helped to widen, and thus increase the acceptance and legitimacy of the UN’s efforts to implement democratization policies and programs. I argued that developing countries’ advocacy of economic development as an alternative agenda to democratic governance was indeed a status-related strategy, although many of these states would not receive significantly enhanced status from increased evaluation along economic as opposed to democratic lines. Yet status as a developing country has a more positive connotation than status as a non- or partially democratic state, and therefore the frequent emphasis of the right to development in UN debates on democracy can be interpreted as engagement in social creativity.

Counter to realist expectations, it was also shown that social competition (S-2) was most prevalent on issues of democratic norm development and policy implementation in the early 1990s when democratic (e.g. electoral) norms were being introduced, despite the fact that China and Russia held fewer material resources at this time than in the 2000s, and has also increased in the mid- to late 2000s. As the legitimacy and stability of U.S. leadership (and the democratic status hierarchy) decreased in the mid-2000s, just following the crystallization of more comprehensive democratic norms in the UN in 1999-2000, and the rise of non-democratic donors without conditions on aid reduced some states’ instrumental interests in democratic status-seeking, there has been some resistance at policy level against the UN’s efforts to support
democratic governance. This, however, was not fully pervasive, as a high number of UN member states in 2004 advocated a UN role to support democratic development in Iraq. We also continue to observe states seeking status by mentioning their *domestic* democratic reforms, suggesting that democracy remains normatively significant to many states despite decreases in reference to support for democratization in foreign policy statements.
Chapter Seven: Conclusions

7.1. Introduction

This dissertation has drawn on literature in institutional design, constructivism, and social psychology to argue that inclusive institutions and democratic status have played important roles, both positive and negative, in the development of democratic norms and their implementation policies in the CSCE/OSCE and UN. By systematically analyzing inclusiveness and status across six time periods in two inclusive IOs, the research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the functioning and influence of these two important variables. Chapter 2 presented tables comparing the evolution and variation in of inclusive institutions and democratic status over time in the organizations. This concluding chapter first presents a summary of the empirical chapters’ findings for each of the theoretical propositions. It then suggests directions for future research and discusses policy implications.

7.2. Inclusiveness

Countering conventional wisdom that inclusive IOs are prone to deadlock and least-common-denominator agreements, this study has shown that inclusive institutions have occasionally generated comprehensive democratic norm sets and were, in fact, critical to the process. In chapters 3 and 5, in support of theoretical proposition I-1, I showed that, both in the CSCE/OSCE and the UN, the practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals keeps them on the agenda (Thomas 2001), which can contribute positively to norm development in windows of opportunity, particularly when inclusive structures enable groundwork to be done in advance. For example, the CSCE meetings in Belgrade, Madrid, Ottawa, and Bern during the Cold War resulted in finer-grained articulation of states’ positions, and proposals were revived and re-inserted into successful negotiations in Vienna in 1986-9. Proposals that did not achieve consensus in Vienna and Paris in 1989 contributed to the democratic norms codified at CSCE meetings in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow in 1990-91. Through process tracing and counterfactual analysis, I showed that without the inclusive CSCE institutions and their history of earlier attempts to develop democracy commitments, it is highly unlikely that the international community would have developed similar mechanisms for monitoring human rights commitments in Europe and the Soviet Union in 1986-89, or its comprehensive democratic norm set in 1990-91. Conditions favorable for agreement - such as converging state interests, norms responding to issues viewed as major high
political problems, committed leadership, and the conducive normative environment after the Cold War - alone do not explain how the CSCE was able to make progress so quickly in 1990. The inclusive institutional structures also played a supportive role.

These functions of inclusive institutions were also observed in the United Nations. The examples of the ICCPR and the origins of the UN’s election observation mandate in 1988-90 show that, at times, states and UN agencies have been able to capitalize on inclusive institutions’ negotiation histories and benefit from windows of opportunity. Inclusive institutions help to ensure that when there are shifts in political will, a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate. Restatement of Articles 21 and 25 of the UDHR and ICCPR maintained their relevance on the UN’s agenda and provided an opportunity to expand norms when delegates displayed greater political will. When norms are reconsidered, inclusive bodies can underpin a renewed legitimacy and help to launch productive negotiations.

In chapters 3 and 5, in support of theoretical proposition I-2, I showed that inclusive institutions’ feature of procedural legitimacy can contribute positively to norm development and policy implementation. The statements of numerous state delegates conveyed their views that inclusiveness and consensus add to the moral credibility of decisions and declarations. Delegates to the Helsinki Summit of 1975 and to the UN GA session in 1948 adopting the UDHR argued that the inclusiveness of negotiations contributed to the legitimacy and strength of these agreements. In the case of the UN’s election observation mandate, the legitimacy generated by inclusive institutions and the organization’s history of support for decolonization enabled the UN to assume this new role. In the mid-1990s, delegates expressed that the UN’s inclusiveness made it a highly appropriate organization to provide assistance and support for democratization. Further, the basis for the UN’s democratization mandate was established in its most inclusive fora – within the UN GA and World Conferences, underpinning its acceptance. From today’s vantage point, a critic might be skeptical about the weight of negotiations in the UN GA’s Third Committee or in OSCE Ministerial or Permanent Council meetings. The above examples, however, demonstrate the transformative potential of inclusive institutions which provided the foundation for IOs’ support for democratization. This credibility is particularly important for international democracy assistance because of the risk that it is otherwise perceived as an illegitimate form of intervention.
In support of theoretical proposition I-3, this dissertation has also demonstrated that inclusive negotiating bodies dealing with multiple issues hold open the possibility of democratic norm development even in less conducive normative contexts, because compromises may be made if there is an interest in a side issue. By contrast, lack of progress or dissatisfaction on one issue (e.g. security, development) can negatively affect cooperation on democratic governance. The OSCE in the 2000s showed opposite trends to 1975, when Soviet interests in side issues such as securing borders in Europe eventually facilitated compromises on human rights. In the 2000s, there was an absence of comparable side issues with similar appeal, and Russia’s frustrations with the OSCE on issues of security negatively affected the human dimension. In the UN, issues of development interacted more frequently with general debates on the organization’s democracy agenda in its inclusive institutions at policy level. This is not to say that links between the UN’s work on security have been absent - democratization became a key component of peace-building in the early 1990s, as discussed in Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace – but this has been addressed by the less inclusive Security Council, and decisions about implementation efforts have typically been made on a case-by-case basis.

Mobilization and debate on policy-level application of the UN’s democratization agenda has intersected with its development agenda, as observed in the ICN RD movement, because of the strong concerns of many states that economic development (and therefore increased UN and international assistance) would be crucial for the democratic consolidation of new and restored democracies. The UN’s inclusive institutions were able to generate widespread agreement on democratic norms and policy implementation in the 1990s, in part due to states’ side interests in economic growth and development.

Another point established in this study, as noted in theoretical proposition I-4, is that inclusive institutions play important roles by periodically (re-)authorizing, endorsing (or inhibiting) policy implementation of IOs’ technical or implementing agencies’ democratization mandates. An important difference between the CSCE/OSCE and UN cases has been the more autonomous position of the UN Secretary-General and the UN technical agencies. Although this implies that the role of inclusive institutions would be less pronounced for policy implementation in the UN than in the CSCE/OSCE, inclusive institutions should not be discounted. UN technical agencies are often assumed to be autonomous, but we observed in the case of the UNDP Strategic Plan for 2008-2011 that there are critical points at which states intervene through inclusive institutions to modify the policy directions of technical agencies. While the
OSCE/ODIHR is more closely guided by the Permanent and Ministerial Councils, which have full consensus requirements, at the same time, Ministerial Council resolutions are often formulated in a way that leaves some room for interpretation. Inclusive IOs have developed other tools, such as extrabudgetary contributions and trust funds, to increase implementing agencies’ ability to advance their mandates without inter-governmental consultation, yet their efforts may be positively or negatively affected by host states’ receptiveness to project proposals in support of democratic development.

Finally, in support of theoretical proposition I-5b, I showed that when democratizing states qualify for and become members of a more exclusive group, the exclusive group may eventually receive greater priority, thus decreasing enthusiasm for active participation in the inclusive institution. This was observed when the ICNRD movement became fully inclusive in 2000 and the more exclusive CD movement was launched, which negatively affected the ICNRD’s momentum for norm development and policy implementation in the UN by diminishing its appeal and vitality. There is parallel evidence from the OSCE. Prior to their EU accession in 2004, and particularly in the 1990s, Central European states were quite active and enthusiastic supporters of the OSCE’s democracy support efforts, however, over time, many tended to prioritize action through the EU over action through the OSCE.

Similarly, reduced participation of states in inclusive institutions may also be a reaction to perceptions of effectiveness (I-5a). Full consensus rules that enable any state to block initiatives with a single veto can lead to outcomes that disappoint a large number of states. In the OSCE, we observed debates over several years involving the OSCE PA, which aimed to restrict the inclusiveness of CSCE/OSCE institutions to enable the organization to support democracy more efficiently. Yet, unsurprisingly, the proposals did not achieve consensus and entrenched interests have made consensus procedures difficult to change. Under conditions of increased contention, as in the 2000s, the most inclusive institutions are vulnerable to shifts in political will and often result in deadlock. Their less efficient functioning can lead key states to decrease high-level engagement. What are the strengths and weaknesses of institutions with varied degrees of inclusiveness? Do they have different effects? I argued that inclusiveness is what states make of it. Several examples illustrated the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy faced by state representatives in inclusive IOs and the strategies they used under different conditions to optimize outcomes. My analysis suggests that the full abandonment of inclusive
institutions can be a short-sighted strategy. Future research might delve further into the types of institutions that are optimal for achieving particular outcomes. This analysis, by contrast, has examined the evolution and roles of inclusive institutions, which on several occasions have proven to be highly resilient and valuable for democratic norm development and policy implementation, particularly when viewed from a long-term perspective.

What were the conditions under which inclusive institutions have had greatest effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE/OSCE and UN? In both organizations, nearly all the instances of democratic norm development studied were initiated in response to immediate high political concerns; key actors working through the IOs did not simply aim to establish new moral structures, rather their efforts were reactive - either in order to prevent the reoccurrence of specific destructive events or to deal with pressing domestic issues. Examples included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for which the shared horror of Nazi atrocities underpinned delegates’ negotiations, and the UN’s mandate and norms for electoral assistance in the early 1990s, which responded to the expressed immediate need for support in conducting free and fair elections. Yet UN election support fluctuated after many new or restored democracies had successfully held repeated free and fair elections in the 1990s, since elections were no longer the most exigent issue for democratic development in these states. Another example was the ICN RD movement underpinning the UN’s democratization agenda, which emerged from the new and restored democracies themselves, seeking greater international support for their democratization processes. While leadership committed to multilateral solutions has often been an important factor, as in the development and implementation of electoral norms in the early 1990s, the UN case illustrates that leadership by smaller states has been influential, which counters realist expectations. Democratic norm development and demand for implementation in the UN of the 1990s was propelled substantially by new and restored democracies. On the other hand, the codification of GA resolutions on the “right to democracy” and “promoting and consolidating democracy” in 1999-2000 appear to have responded also to push rather than pull factors, i.e. to the needs of the democracy movement to clarify and attain consensus among UN member states regarding basic attributes of democratic systems. While these conditions proved to be important for norm development and policy implementation in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, they were not sufficient; as discussed above, inclusive institutions also played key roles.
7.3. Status

Democratic status has qualified inclusiveness and sovereign equality to different degrees in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, with both positive and negative effects on democratic norm development and policy implementation. While status is not the only goal states seek in IOs, it complements other interests and should not be overlooked. In chapters 4 and 6, I illustrated evolutions in the salience of democratic status and democratic status seeking in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, and explained its role in selected cases. Three strategies of states seeking to improve their positions were highlighted: social mobility, social competition, and social creativity.

Social mobility: In support of theoretical proposition S-1, chapters 4 and 6 showed that an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate some states to support democratic norm development and policy implementation. Support provided by democratizing states is at least in part a form of status seeking, both in the IO and in the wider international community. With the reconstitution of alliances at the end of the Cold War, many countries reoriented towards a hierarchy based on liberal democratic values, resulting in new patterns of status seeking. These patterns were observed in the CSCE/OSCE and UN in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as a large number of states sought to improve their images (and gain support for their transitions) by supporting new democratization mandates in the IOs. There are both instrumental and normative sides to this type of status seeking, in which a state signals its commitment to democratic reform to the international community, and perhaps aims to increase rapprochement with the West, to secure security guarantees, or attract investment. The material benefits associated with democratic status do not decrease its significance. In other words, when some states view a certain level of democratic status as a means to instrumental ends, its influence, in fact, increases.

Realists typically emphasize material dimensions of status, whereas the concept of democratic status has ideational and institutional bases. Yet democratic status is also an end in itself. Some states are proud of the history of their democratization processes and are pleased to publicize successes of transition or consolidation and gain positive visibility, which reinforces their positive distinctiveness. Liberal IR theorists emphasize states’ interests in pleasing domestic audiences or constituencies as affecting their behavior in IOs, including a motivation for pursuing strategies of social mobility. However, it should be noted that some of the
negotiating or decision-making bodies involved in democratic norm development or policy implementation in inclusive IOs hold unrecorded sessions without significant public audiences (e.g. OSCE Permanent Council). Moreover, while heads of states’ statements the UN GA General Debates usually receive wide viewership in many countries, there are other IO fora (e.g. OSCE Ministerial Council Meetings, UN GA Third Committee meetings), with a more limited following. In other words, liberalism’s focus on domestic-level influences on states’ support for democratic norms has variable strength in different IO fora. This, however, is not mutually exclusive from this study’s emphasis on democratic status; domestic public interest can simultaneously be concerned with a state’s improved relative, international standing. The analysis also suggested a modification to the interpretation of social mobility typically used in the literature. When we consider the full range of UN member states, rather than great or rising powers or dynamics in smaller regional IOs, we notice a number of states that are not seeking full acceptance into high-status groups, but rather engage in social mobility strategies in pursuit of the above-mentioned, more incremental, relative status-related gains.

In chapters 4 and 6, I drew attention to several examples of social mobility, such as the cases of productive proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and Central European states to CSCE negotiations of its comprehensive democratic norm set in 1990-91, as well as states supporting the evolution of the UN’s electoral norms. In the absence of more comprehensive codified democratic norms in the UN, Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR served as early benchmarks for democratic status. In the ICNRD movement states such as Romania and Mongolia took initiatives well beyond the requirements of their positions to advance the movement’s objectives. A wide range of delegates’ statements showed that states acknowledge and respond to democratic status in inclusive IOs. Their statements conveyed that many states have sought recognition in both the CSCE/OSCE and UN for their democratic transitions, characteristics, or events such as fair elections. However, perceptions within the IO of attributes of member/participating states often evolve more slowly than states’ self-perceptions.

I also argued that while this evidence is consistent with Moravcsik’s “lock-in” theory of support for norm development (2000), a focus on status is necessary for a more complete explanation. The fact that Central European states continued to support democratic commitments in the OSCE and UN after their democratic stability was a concern suggests that
factors other than lock-in have been at work. Moreover, while Central European states were active supporters of IOs’ democratization agendas, they were not consistently more active than established democratic states, as Moravcsik’s theory would suggest. It is necessary to consider states’ hierarchical relations with other states and IOs which influence the attractiveness (or lack thereof) in supporting democratic norm development and policy implementation. Cooperation on these issues associated with social mobility was found to be most likely when the democratic status hierarchy was viewed as legitimate, stable, high status groups were perceived as permeable (corresponding with Larson and Shevchenko 2010a), as well as when democratic status was highly salient in the organizations, and prototypes and the IOs themselves held prestige.

Social competition: In support of theoretical proposition S-2, chapters 4 and 6 illustrated that an IO’s emphasis on democratic status can motivate some states to challenge democratic norm development and policy implementation. Discord on these issues associated with social competition was found to be most likely when the democratic status hierarchy was viewed as less legitimate and stable, high-status groups are viewed as impermeable, if the IO itself holds less prestige, and if a state’s lower relative position is socially visible and extends over a period of time. In the CSCE/OSCE, the codification and institutionalization of its democratic norm set in 1990-91 generated and formalized new social categories that stratified participating states and shifted the dynamics of status in the organization. I argued that the debilitating challenges to the OSCE’s implementation policies in the human dimension made by Russia and other CIS states in the mid- to late 2000s have stemmed in part from these states’ reaction to a lower than desired position in the organization’s hierarchy and their rejection of the emphasis on democratic status in an IO in which sovereign equality has historically been prominent. Realists would expect increased challenges to correspond with geopolitical power shifts. However, discordant behavior has not been limited to the most powerful, less democratic states. Moreover, I showed in Figure 6.7 that challenges to the democratization agenda in the UN were in fact more numerous in 1992 than in 2010, when states such as Russia and China had fewer material resources. Corresponding with the timing of discord in the OSCE was the decreased relative standing of Russia and some CIS states vis-à-vis all other OSCE participating states. Fritch similarly suggests that stigmas associated with ideas of democratic status have negatively affected norm development and implementation in the OSCE:
Throughout the 1990s, we succeeded in maintaining an overall sense that the OSCE community was composed exclusively of ‘established democracies’ and ‘emerging democracies’ with no stigma attached to the latter term. Different OSCE states may have been at different stages in their democratic development, but all were moving in the same direction, like cars toward the front and toward the back of the same train. Today, this relative harmony, which permitted the OSCE to prosper as a standard-setter and as a change agent in the field, is eroding (2008, 1-2).

In chapter 4, I developed new indicators of democratic status, illustrating that prestigious posts in the CSCE/OSCE (e.g. Heads of field offices and Heads of election observation and assessment missions) have consistently been filled by representatives of democratic states or states making clear efforts in democratic development, and suggested that, with only a few exceptions in the late 2000s, democratic status has served as a filter. Certain implementation efforts have also been interpreted by host states as signifying lower democratic status, particularly in the 2000s. Some of the specific challenges made by Russia and some CIS states to OSCE implementation policies were precisely targeted against these issues (e.g. geographical representation in the organization, more uniform criteria for election observation) that confronted their democratic status. While in the 1990s sovereign equality became increasingly qualified by democratic governance, in the 2000s we observe the reverse, with some states aiming to re-negotiate the organization’s status markers. Kazakhstan’s bid for the OSCE Chairmanship illustrated one defeat of democratic status in favor of sovereign equality.

In the UN, there was much greater discord around the initial institutionalization of democratic (electoral) norms in the early 1990s than in the same years in the CSCE. I argued that social competition in the UN appears to have been motivated by an interest in preventing democratic status from gaining increased leverage in the organization, whereas in the OSCE states engaging in social competition aimed to demote its already pervasive influence. In general, challenges have objected primarily to the manner and practices by which the international community has encouraged democratic development.

Strategies of social competition and social mobility are also relevant to the question of why we observe a decrease in the number of mentions of democracy in the UN GA General Debates in the 2000s and decreased engagement on the part of democratic states in the OSCE. One hypothesis is that this could be related to a slowing down of the third wave of democratization. Once states become democratic do they talk about it less? However, my analysis of the OSCE and UN suggests that while there is evidence of this trend, it is not the
most influential on democratic norm development and policy implementation. It is true that Central European states reduced their active participation in OSCE debates on democracy support after EU accession, but this also corresponded with increased general paralysis in the OSCE. Decreased salience of democratic status and decreased prestige of IOs themselves negatively affects social mobility. Newly consolidated democracies comprise a much smaller percentage of UN member states. One alternative explanation is that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when the U.S. prioritized anti-terrorism and international security as increasingly important bases for its international partnerships, non- and partially democratic states read through the lines and consequently interpreted a reduced salience of democratic status (as opposed to counter-terrorism) as a basis for partnership. In 2010, the number of mentions of democracy in the UN GA General Debates by recently consolidated and longer-established democracies is roughly equivalent. In the mid- to late 2000s, states engaging in social competition have had greater influence on democratic norm development and policy implementation at policy level in inclusive IOs than states engaging in social mobility by bringing democracy into contention, and decreasing the perceptions of utility and interest of potential democracy advocates.

Social creativity: In support of theoretical proposition S-3, chapters 4 and 6 illustrated that democratic norms and implementation policies may be affected by states’ attempts to modify the norms or to shift the IO’s priorities in a different direction. This was observed, for example, in Kazakhstan’s advocacy of alternative norms for the OSCE such as inter-confessional tolerance and financial and energy security, which would effectively divert attention away from the human dimension, as well as in the example of Russia and other CIS states’ consistent advocacy of prioritizing the military-political dimension (the traditional “first basket”) in the OSCE.

While social creativity often entails discord, I showed that in some cases, social creativity can, in fact, have beneficial effects for norm development and policy implementation. The implication of social creativity here differs from the concept as typically employed in social identity theory. By broadening the debate on democracy to issues of development, democratic norms and implementation policies in the UN gained a wider appeal to a larger number of member states, with the positive result of underpinning a stronger legitimacy for its implementation efforts. In the ICNRD movement, many states argued that the fight against
poverty was their most serious challenge to sustaining or consolidating democracy. Although many states advocated the right to development as an alternative (or complement) to democratic norms in the UN, it was not clear that these states would gain much in terms of status from evaluation on the alternative dimension, since many were also developing countries. However, I argued that status as a developing country is more beneficial to a country’s self-image than a similar ranking on a democracy scale. Moreover, by shifting the conversation to development, developing states can gain increased voice in debates on international distributive policies, which can confer increased status or assistance. Therefore, social creativity strategies are not always aimed at undermining status hierarchies, sometimes states simply seek to pursue two goals simultaneously.

7.4. Directions for future research

While this dissertation has analyzed democratic norm development and policy implementation in inclusive IOs at policy (or headquarters) level, there is arguably much important decision-making, particularly on implementation policy, that takes place at country or regional levels, e.g. in IOs’ country offices, or in regional bureaux in the case of the UN. The decentralization of IOs’ implementation efforts is critical because democracy is by no means a one-size-fits-all idea and myriad characteristics of states need to be considered together with stakeholders in host states when designing specific democratization policies. I focused on IOs’ policy levels in order to observe processes in which the broadest composition of states in the inclusive IOs is able to participate. The focus on policy level was important because this has shaped the democratization mandates of the IOs as a whole. I was also interested in examining variations in states’ positions over time on the widest sense of democratic norms – those addressing democracy as a system of governance rather than its component parts or country-level specificities. Future research could complement this dissertation by examining and comparing effects of inclusiveness and status on decision making at regional and country levels in inclusive IOs.

Future research could also extend the dissertation’s analysis to other cases, such as the Organization of American States (OAS), and to other policy areas, such as social inclusion. A key benefit of exploring the OAS case would be that comparisons with the CSCE/OSCE and UN will improve our understanding of conditions under which progress or stagnation in the area of democratic governance is likely in IOs. A benefit of analyzing social inclusion is to add a norm
set supported by a different group of states, with high support from developing countries. Since this is uncorrelated with support for democratic norms, it would provide a distinct test of theoretical propositions. Social inclusion norms refer to collective expectations about proper behavior for states, specifically to achieve objectives of poverty reduction and development for marginalized inhabitants. Social inclusion norms figure prominently in OAS and UN declarations and resolutions, and the UN is most heavily involved with implementation, whereas the CSCE/OSCE has developed few social inclusion norms. Some argue that poverty reduction and social inclusion have greater claim to universality than democracy (Vincent 1986). Analysis of inclusiveness and status in this policy area would therefore provide new understanding of whether the patterns observed are generalizable or unique to the issue area of democratic governance.

The OAS case would provide additional variation in formal inclusiveness as well as in the comprehensiveness of democracy commitments. The OAS shares key characteristics with the CSCE/OSCE and UN; for example, sovereign equality is an important foundational norm of the inter-American system (Klein 1974) and members have wide differences in their domestic political institutions while committed to electoral democracy. In 1991, with Resolution 1080, representative democracy became an explicit condition of OAS membership. Cuba and Honduras were suspended in 1962 and 2009 respectively. Of the three IOs, democratic norms have the longest history in the OAS, being first codified in the OAS Charter of 1948, whereas democratic norms in the UN and CSCE/OSCE first developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the basis of established human rights commitments. While less detailed overall than CSCE/OSCE democracy commitments, the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 is unique for declaring a “right to democracy” in Chapter 1, Article 1, and mechanisms of collective response if a democracy in the region is threatened. As in the CSCE/OSCE and UN, the OAS created an implementing agency in 1990, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, now part of the Secretariat for Political Affairs. Therefore, future research on new cases and policy areas could provide additional explanations of mechanisms by which inclusiveness and democratic status are influential.
7.5. Policy implications

What does the future hold for the development of democratic norms and implementation policies in the OSCE and UN? In the late 2000s, diplomats from democratic states in inclusive IOs expressed serious concerns about re-opening negotiations on democratic commitments in light of mounting opposition. There is a sense that the OSCE has lost much ground on commitments that it achieved, mainly in the 1990s. Yet practitioners should not consider inclusive institutions worthwhile only during conducive windows of opportunity. This analysis has shown how diplomatic activity during the Cold War fed into the proposals that broke new ground in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite inclusive institutions’ appearance of ineffectiveness during contentious periods, their role in laying groundwork can prove catalytic even during short windows of opportunity. Because of its comparative procedural legitimacy, support for democratic development through inclusive IOs such as the UN and the OSCE is likely to be increasingly significant in the coming years (see Carothers 2008, 7; Ikenberry 2011; House of Commons 2007, 17, 151). A commitment to inclusiveness implies greater resignation to fluctuations in norm strength over time. In the longer term, inclusive institutions provide a setting for democracy to speak for itself.

We have seen that many substantial democratic norms have been codified in the OSCE and UN. Roland Rich placed an increasing emphasis on implementation in the next decades, stating: “Frankly, we have almost reached an overabundance of norms; now there has to be a realization of norms. It is likely not possible to reiterate democratic norms with the same enthusiasm. There can only be more norm production after greater realization.” Since solid democratic norms are available at international level, a challenge is to regain or realize their strength, in part through implementation.

It is important to have strong, inclusive IOs on the international landscape. To address a vast range of pressing global problems (e.g. climate change, global epidemics, nuclear proliferation), robust and resilient inclusive IOs with comprehensive, collectively-agreed norm sets and implementation policies are preferable to weak inclusive IOs in which implementation is undermined. This, however, requires positive trends in inter-state cooperation. States that are impatient with multilateral processes and seek quick results often view inclusive institutions as

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434 Author’s interview with Roland Rich, Executive Head of UNDEF, New York, 12 March 2009.
inefficient. Yet their short-term calculations undermine the vitality of institutions with effects over longer time scales. Beyond their comparative procedural legitimacy, inclusive IOs facilitate long-term and cooperative interactions around issues of common concern. Understanding inclusive IOs’ successes and failures in issue areas such as democratization policy suggests ways in which their institutions can be strengthened.

Larson and Shevchenko argue that policy implications of a focus on status “include greater emphasis on status-enhancing actions – for example, formal summits, strategic dialogues, and strategic partnerships – than on conventional prescriptions for containment, integration, or engagement’’ (2010, 95). In the OSCE case, policy implications would include giving Russia and other CIS states additional opportunities for status and leadership in an issue area other than democratic governance and human rights (e.g. energy security, tolerance and non-discrimination). One disadvantage of the current heavy diplomatic reliance on NATO in the region is that this deprives the OSCE of opportunities for meaningful issue linkage with its politico-military dimension. We saw in chapter 3 in the case of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act how linkages with security issues of importance to the Soviet Union led to compromises on issues of human rights. In the late 2000s, CIS states still took the OSCE quite seriously because it served as a forum of equals with European and North American states in which they could discuss security issues of importance to them. However, in 2012, there are signs that even this respect for the organization among some CIS states may be deteriorating. Increased cooperation in the OSCE on security issues (e.g. nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, border security, etc.) and supporting leadership in these areas could create future opportunities for issue linkage to support democratic governance.

The democratic world needs to polish the reputation of its domestic institutions in order to renew their allure. This is especially true in the wake of the 2008 financial and economic crisis which further undermined the neoliberal socio-economic model and decreased the attractiveness of prototypical democratic states. Chapters 4 and 6 showed that states seeking status in strategies of social mobility have been highly supportive of inclusive IOs’ democratic norm development and policy implementation efforts. Therefore, to improve the ability of inclusive IOs to advance democratic norms, it is helpful to create an environment conducive to

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social mobility. However, in the current context in which there are increasing numbers of non-democratic donors with growing resources, the instrumental side of such an environment is increasingly manipulable. Identifying and capitalizing on soft power resources may be of greater use. This analysis suggests that democratic states can still enhance the prestige of democratic values. The U.S. in particular needs to repair the legitimacy issues inherited from the unilateral and controversial foreign policy approaches of the George W. Bush administration. Moreover, more needs to be done to enhance the prestige of the OSCE and the UN.

States are entitled to convey the values that they domestically hold to be important. Yet this is a fine balancing act. From the OSCE case, we observe that pushing too hard on these values can lead to antagonistic responses. Positive reinforcement for incremental improvements, even in non-democratic states with multiple challenges, can help generate a more favorable perception of the democratic status hierarchy itself. IOs’ democracy-related evaluations (e.g. election observation assessments) could increase their discussion of what they consider states to be doing right, in addition to documenting where democratic improvements are sought. Maintaining consistency in democratic states’ rhetoric and continuing to emphasize democracy as a positive domestic ideal without patronism seems a simple way to help preserve the salience of democratic norms, particularly in fora with wide audiences of state representatives such as the UN General Assembly.

It seems important for organizations promoting democracy to do so by communicating where there is non-compliance with democratic standards, but in ways that minimize the alienation of status-conscious states. It is clear that the West no longer has the power or the legitimacy to assume a nearly universal appeal of its norm sets. States that are alienated from the West now have alternative venues to pursue their interests in which democratic governance is not questioned. It is true that the Copenhagen Document of 1990 (6-8), the Charter of Paris and the Budapest Summit Declaration (1994, 14) state that election observation should take place in countries in transition and that more comprehensive election observation in established democracies would be an expensive undertaking. Yet treating all participating states equally may not be as expensive as some argue. First, democracy can be improved in all states. Second, if the alternative is a gradual erosion of the international election observation and democracy support regimes, it seems worth launching projects in established democracies, decreasing certain status distinctions, and opening additional leadership positions on alternative issues in the
IOs, without compromising on established commitments. On the subject of election observation, Thomas Franck has argued: “If it is to become a more general obligation, likes must be treated alike, which means that the new majority of democratic states must submit to it. They, who have the least to fear and the most to gain, should want to participate in universalizing the practice, if only to help legitimize it” (1992, 87). UN country offices could open and provide beneficial analysis in industrialized countries. Continuing the trend in demoting rhetorical status distinctions between “East of Vienna” and “West of Vienna” in the OSCE or between North and South in the UN is also a step with potential to improve communication and cooperation in the organizations.

This dissertation has explored various implications of the tension between inclusiveness and democratic status, with states navigating between the competing processes of inclusion and differentiation. Inclusive IOs such as the UN and CSCE in 1945 and 1975 originated with a commitment to diplomacy in the pursuit of peace. Their inclusiveness has subsequently been a source of strength and weakness. On one hand, inclusiveness has underpinned the legitimacy of widely-agreed upon democratic norms and lent credibility to democracy assistance that could otherwise be viewed as a form of intervention. On the other hand, “precisely if everyone is a member, it gives nothing to wish or hope for.”436 The pursuit of positive distinctiveness is a significant source of motivation for states in international organizations that merits greater consideration. This study has shown that emphasis on democratic status by an IO or groups of states can contribute to the alienation of states and discord. At the same time, since the presence of democratic status has positively motivated some states to contribute and actively participate in both CSCE/OSCE and UN norm development and policy implementation efforts, it appears important to achieve a balance in maintaining the salience of democratic status and the legitimacy of its advocates.

436 Author’s interview, UN staff, 7 Nov. 2008.
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Iloniemi, Jaakko. Interview conducted by Alice Němcová, 1-2 September 2009, Prague.

Kampelman, Max M. Interview conducted by Sarah Snyder, July 2010. Both interviews were conducted as part of the following project:

United Nations


Other


Appendix A: List of interviews

I am grateful to the following individuals for sharing their professional expertise and valuable insights. Dates of the interviews are omitted in order to preserve confidentiality as requested. Interviews took place in 2008 and 2009 except when otherwise indicated. Responsibility for any errors in the dissertation rests solely with the author.

**OSCE Secretariat and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights**

Ms. Alice Němcová, Senior Documentation and Information Assistant, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, Prague, multiple conversations 2009-2011.
Mr. Childerik Schaapveld, Democratic Governance and NGO Adviser, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw.
Ms. Floriane Hohenberg, Deputy Head, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
Ms. Marta Achler-Szelenbaum, Legal Expert, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw.
Four confidential interviews, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw; 3 in person; one by telephone in May 2011.

**Permanent Missions to the OSCE, Vienna**

Mr. Alastair Long, Human Dimension Officer, United Kingdom Delegation to the OSCE, Vienna.
Dr. Albrecht Rothacher, First Counsellor, European Commission, Delegation of the European Commission to the International Organizations in Vienna.
Mr. Didier Canesse, Counsellor, Permanent Representation of France to the OSCE, Vienna.
Ms. Ana Petrič, Human Dimension Officer, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the OSCE, Vienna.
Ms. Ioana Muresan, Third Secretary, Permanent Mission of Romania to the International Organizations in Vienna.
Mr. Thaddeus Kontek, Political Officer, United States Mission to the OSCE, Vienna.
Mr. Yves Beaulieu, Counsellor, Delegation of Canada to the OSCE, Vienna.
Three confidential interviews with representatives of permanent delegations to the OSCE: Vienna.

**United Nations**

Dr. Ben Slay, Senior Economist, UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, Budapest.
Dr. Roland Rich, Executive Head, UN Democracy Fund, New York.
Ms. Anna Darska, Head of Office, UNDP Poland, Warsaw.
Ms. Albana Gjuzi, Programme Manager, UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, Western Balkans Cluster, New York.
Dr. Parviz Fartash, Senior Programme Manager, UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, EU Accession Cluster, New York.
Ms. Giske Charlotte Lillehammer, UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund Coordinator, New York.
Ms. Dasa Silovic, Aid Coordination Advisor, UNDP, New York (by telephone).
Mr. Jan Szczyciński, Communications Officer, UNDP Poland, Warsaw.
Ms. Zuzana Letkova, Project Manager, Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund, UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre, Bratislava.
Ms. Akiko Ikeda, Secretary to the UNDEF Advisory Board, UN Democracy Fund, New York.
Mr. D. Shane Christensen, Advisor, Economic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to the UN, New York.
Mr. Stephen Gee, Political Advisor, U.S. Mission to the UN, New York.
Three confidential interviews with representatives of permanent missions to the United Nations: New York; two in person, one by telephone.
Three confidential interviews with UNDP staff: New York (1); Bratislava (2).
One confidential interview with UN Secretariat staff, New York (by telephone).

**Other Representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Civil Society Organizations, or International Organizations**

Mr. Sebastian Bartsch, Administrator, Governance and Capacity Development, Policy Coordination Division, OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, Paris.
Mr. Juraj Koudelka, Deputy Head, Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Prague.
Mr. Roman Holý, Third Secretary, Permanent Delegation of the Czech Republic to the OECD, Prague.
Ms. Kristina Prunerová, Project Manager, European Partnership for Democracy, Prague.
Mr. Jeff Lovitt, Executive Director, Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS), Prague.
Dr. Paweł Bagiński, Global Development Research Group, Warsaw.
One confidential interview with a representative of a permanent delegation to the OECD.
Two off-the-record interviews with representatives of civil society institutions, Brussels; New York.
One telephone interview with a representative of a civil society organization based in Central Europe.
Appendix B: Changes in democratic governance in selected OSCE participating states

The following graphs illustrate political rights and civil liberties between 1989 and 2010 in the CSCE/OSCE area, which give a general sense of changes in democratic governance as measured by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, which ranges from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic).\(^{437}\) The first two graphs below show the situation in states which became EU members in 2004, divided by states which were sovereign in 1989 (panel (a)) and states which became sovereign in 1991/2 (panel (b)). Panel (c) shows trends in Romania and Bulgaria, which became EU members in 2007. Taken together, Figures B.1 and B.2 show - in terms of political rights and civil liberties - how democratic governance in the CSCE/OSCE participating states shifted between 1989 and 2010. (Scale: 1 – most democratic, 7 – least democratic)

Figure B.1: Political rights and civil liberties in Central Europe, 1989-2010

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\(^{437}\)Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20All%20Scores%2C%20Countries%2C%201973-2012%20%28FINAL%29.xls  Accessed 3/2012. This index gives separate ratings for political freedoms and civil liberties. The figure used in these charts is the average of the two ratings for each year in each country. For comparison, Western European and North American states during this period had average scores of 1 and 1.5. According to Freedom House, states with average scores of 1.0-2.5 are “free”; with scores of 3.0-5.0 are “partly free,” and with scores of 5.5-7.0 are “not free.” Diamond states that “the ‘free’ rating in the Freedom House survey is the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy” (1999, 12). This data provides a solid reflection of mainstream Western perceptions.
Figure B.2: Political rights and civil liberties in the Western Balkans and CIS, 1989-2010

(Scale: 1 – most democratic, 7 – least democratic)
(Scale: 1 – most democratic, 7 – least democratic)
Appendix C: Contributions to the CSCE/OSCE unified budget

Table C.1: CSCE financial arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSCE Participating State, 1992</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America</td>
<td>9.00 (per participating state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway,</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Turkey</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus, Greece, Hungary, Romania,</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1995, with the admission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the following adjustments were made:

| Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan | 0.19     |
| Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan | 0.185    |

And in 1996, with the admission of Andorra, the following adjustments were made:

| Andorra, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino | 0.125    |

Note that the above does not indicate the (confidential) extra-budgetary contributions made by states to support additional CSCE/OSCE human dimension efforts. It also does not reflect whether participating states did in fact contribute the agreed-upon amounts.

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439 OSCE Permanent Council, 42nd Plenary Meeting, PC Journal 42, Agenda item 2. Decision No. 82. 2 Nov. 1995/PC.DEC/82.
440 OSCE Permanent Council, 69th Plenary Meeting, PC Journal No. 69, Agenda item 1. Decision No. 120. 14 May 1996. PC.DEC/120.
Appendix D: Democracy in UN member states

Figure D.1: Political rights and civil liberties in the world, 1989-2010

Figure D.2: Electoral democracies, 1989-2010

Source: Freedom in the World Country Rankings.  Http://www.freedomhouse.org.  According to Freedom House, “the survey measures freedom according to political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings are based on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free….The average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, known as the freedom rating, determines the overall status: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0).” “The survey assigns the designation of electoral democracy to countries that have met certain minimum standards. The numerical benchmark for a country to be listed as an electoral democracy is a total of 7 points or more (out of a possible 12) for the 3 political rights subcategory questions on electoral process, as well as a total of 20 points or more (out of a possible 40) for all 10 political rights questions.”