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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Hypotheses and tests of an evolved psychological architecture for social norms Zhao, Wanying 2010

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Hypotheses	
  and	
  tests	
  of	
  an	
  evolved	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  for	
  social	
  norms	
  	
   by	
  	
   Wanying	
  Zhao	
  	
  B.Com.,	
  The	
  University	
  of	
  Toronto,	
  2007	
  	
   A	
  THESIS	
  SUBMITTED	
  IN	
  PARTIAL	
  FULFILLMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  REQUIREMENTS	
  FOR	
  THE	
  DEGREE	
  OF	
  	
  MASTER	
  OF	
  ARTS	
  in	
  THE	
  FACULTY	
  OF	
  GRADUATE	
  STUDIES	
  	
  (Psychology)	
  	
   THE	
  UNIVERSITY	
  OF	
  BRITISH	
  COLUMBIA	
  	
  (Vancouver)	
  	
   August	
  2010	
  	
   ©	
  Wanying	
  Zhao,	
  2010	
  	
   	
   ii	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  ABSTRACT	
  	
   	
  Due	
  to	
  the	
  critical	
  importance	
  of	
  social	
  norms	
  and	
  their	
  ubiquitous	
  presence	
  over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  human	
  history,	
  culture-­‐gene	
  co-­‐evolutionary	
  processes	
  should	
  have	
  selected	
  for	
  a	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  that	
  supports	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
  local	
  norms	
  (Richerson	
  &	
  Henrich,	
  2009).	
  In	
  this	
  thesis,	
  I	
  follow	
  the	
  above	
  line	
  of	
  reasoning	
  to	
  argue	
  that	
  dealing	
  with	
  social	
  norms	
  presented	
  domain-­‐specific	
  challenges	
  to	
  the	
  cultural	
  learner,	
  requiring	
  specialized	
  cognitive	
  processes	
  to	
  deal	
  specifically	
  with	
  norms.	
  This	
  motivates	
  several	
  predictions	
  about	
  major	
  design	
  features	
  that	
  a	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  evolved	
  to	
  meet	
  those	
  challenges	
  should	
  possess.	
  I	
  present	
  a	
  survey	
  of	
  extant	
  evidence	
  that	
  are	
  consistent	
  with	
  these	
  predictions.	
  	
  Two	
  empirical	
  studies	
  designed	
  to	
  test	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  these	
  predictions	
  are	
  presented.	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   iii	
   	
  	
  TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
   	
   	
   Abstract................................................................................................................................................. ii	
   Table	
  of	
  contents ..............................................................................................................................iii	
   List	
  of	
  tables ....................................................................................................................................... iv	
   List	
  of	
  figures .......................................................................................................................................v	
   Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................ vi	
   Dedication..........................................................................................................................................vii	
   Chapter	
  1	
   Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1	
  1.1	
   Introduction.............................................................................................................................................1	
  1.2	
   Outline	
  of	
  subsequent	
  chapters ......................................................................................................2	
   Chapter	
  2	
   Predictions................................................................................................................... 3	
  2.1	
   Conditions	
  for	
  a	
  co-­‐evolved	
  norm	
  psychology .........................................................................3	
  2.2	
   Predictions	
  for	
  a	
  co-­‐evolved	
  norm	
  psychology........................................................................5	
   Chapter	
  3	
   Test	
  1:	
  Evolved	
  cognitive	
  specialization	
  for	
  norm	
  learning .....................16	
  3.1	
   Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 16	
  3.2	
   Operationalizing	
  the	
  hypotheses................................................................................................. 17	
  3.3	
   Testing	
  the	
  predictions.................................................................................................................... 19	
   Chapter	
  4	
   Test	
  2:	
  Culturally	
  evolved	
  solutions	
  to	
  motivating	
  norm	
  compliance...36	
  4.1	
   Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 36	
  4.2	
  	
   Study	
  one .............................................................................................................................................. 41	
  4.3	
  	
   Study	
  two.............................................................................................................................................. 47	
  4.4	
   General	
  discussion............................................................................................................................. 51	
   Chapter	
  5	
   Conclusions................................................................................................................54	
   Bibliography......................................................................................................................................56	
   Appendices ........................................................................................................................................63	
  Appendix	
  A:	
  REB	
  Certificates	
  of	
  approval ........................................................................................... 63	
  Appendix	
  B:	
  Vignette	
  stimuli .................................................................................................................... 65	
  Appendix	
  C:	
  Dependent	
  measures.......................................................................................................... 76	
  Appendix	
  D:	
  Norm	
  violation	
  induction................................................................................................. 82	
  Appendix	
  E:	
  Brainstorming	
  task ............................................................................................................. 83	
  	
   	
   iv	
   	
   	
   	
  LIST	
  OF	
  TABLES	
  	
   	
   3.1	
   Recall	
  of	
  social	
  targets.….……………………………………………………………………………..26	
  	
   3.2	
   Recall	
  of	
  asocial	
  targets.………….……………………………………………………………………27	
   3.3	
   Rate	
  of	
  inference	
  about	
  social	
  targets..……………………………………………….............29	
   3.4	
   Accuracy	
  of	
  inference	
  about	
  social	
  targets.….……………………………………………….31	
   	
   4.1	
   Guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  composite	
  ratings	
  by	
  condition………………………………………….43	
   4.2	
   Guilt	
  predicted	
  by	
  condition	
  (Euro-­Canadians)…………………………………………….45	
   4.3	
   Shame	
  predicted	
  by	
  condition	
  (Euro-­Canadians).…………………………………………45	
   4.4	
   Guilt	
  predicted	
  by	
  condition	
  (East	
  Asians)……………………………………………………46	
   4.5	
   Shame	
  predicted	
  by	
  condition	
  (East	
  Asians)…………………………………………………46	
  	
   	
   v	
   	
   	
   	
  LIST	
  OF	
  FIGURES	
   	
   3.1	
   Recall	
  of	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  targets.	
  ………………………………………………………...	
  24	
   3.2	
   Probability	
  of	
  accurate	
  recall.………………………………………………………………….27	
   3.3	
   Rate	
  of	
  inference	
  ……………………………………………………………………………...........	
  29	
   3.4	
   Rate	
  of	
  accurate	
  inference.……………………………………………………………………...	
  31	
  	
   	
   vi	
   	
  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	
  	
   Thank	
  you,	
  to	
   	
  My	
  advisor,	
  Joe	
  Henrich,	
  for	
  his	
  patient	
  and	
  unwavering	
  guidance.	
  Vinaka	
  vakalevu	
  	
  My	
  thesis	
  committee,	
  Ara	
  Norenzayan	
  and	
  Jess	
  Tracy,	
  for	
  their	
  invaluable	
  feedback	
  	
  Daniel	
  Randles,	
  partner	
  in	
  crime,	
  for	
  his	
  sound	
  judgment	
  in	
  all	
  our	
  adventures	
  	
  Maciek	
  Chudek,	
  a	
  true	
  best	
  mate,	
  for	
  opening	
  my	
  eyes	
  to	
  many	
  avenues	
  of	
  discovery	
  and	
  inspiring	
  me	
  with	
  the	
  confidence	
  to	
  explore	
  them.	
  And	
  for	
  the	
  beers	
  	
  	
  Friends	
  at	
  Green	
  College,	
  whose	
  company	
  and	
  conversations	
  have	
  enriched	
  me	
  with	
  their	
  curiosity,	
  passion	
  and	
  humanity	
  	
  Friends	
  and	
  mentors	
  of	
  the	
  MECC	
  lab,	
  for	
  making	
  failing	
  and	
  learning	
  always	
  so	
  much	
  fun	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   vii	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  DEDICATION	
  	
  This	
  thesis	
  is	
  dedicated	
  to	
  my	
  parents,	
  who	
  unwittingly	
  set	
  me	
  on	
  this	
  journey,	
  and	
  have	
  tirelessly	
  dealt	
  with	
  my	
  incessant	
  “why’s”	
  ever	
  since.	
   	
   1	
   CHAPTER	
  1	
   INTRODUCTION	
  1.1	
   INTRODUCTION	
  Social	
  norms	
  govern	
  a	
  large	
  array	
  of	
  human	
  interaction.	
  The	
  field	
  of	
  social	
  psychology	
  has	
  catalogued	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  norms	
  and	
  their	
  differential	
  interaction	
  with	
  psychological	
  constructs	
  such	
  as	
  group	
  identity	
  and	
  motives	
  such	
  as	
  belongingness	
  to	
  explain	
  and	
  predict	
  individual	
  behaviour	
  (Cialdini	
  &	
  Trost,	
  1998;	
  Kypri	
  &	
  Langley,	
  2003;	
  Lehman,	
  Chiu,	
  &	
  Schaller,	
  2004;	
  Prentice	
  &	
  Miller,	
  1996).	
  Researchers	
  with	
  an	
  eye	
  toward	
  practical	
  applications	
  have	
  produced	
  insightful	
  research	
  identifying	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  normative	
  messages	
  and	
  the	
  conditions	
  under	
  which	
  people	
  are	
  likely	
  to	
  adopt	
  individually	
  or	
  socially	
  beneficial	
  behaviours	
  (Cialdini	
  &	
  Trost,	
  1998;	
  Crandall,	
  Eshleman,	
  &	
  O'Brien,	
  2002;	
  Schultz,	
  Nolan,	
  Cialdini,	
  Goldstein,	
  &	
  Griskevicius,	
  2007).	
  These	
  proximate	
  psychological	
  approaches	
  take	
  the	
  structure	
  of	
  norms,	
  their	
  content,	
  and	
  various	
  psychological	
  motivations	
  as	
  given,	
  and	
  generate	
  models	
  that	
  integrate	
  these	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  and	
  characteristics	
  of	
  the	
  individual	
  to	
  predict	
  how	
  they	
  will	
  interact	
  to	
  produce	
  behavioural	
  outcomes.	
  However,	
  the	
  proximate	
  explanations	
  given	
  by	
  social	
  psychologists	
  offer	
  little	
  insight	
  into	
  how	
  norms	
  emerge,	
  why	
  they	
  differ	
  across	
  groups	
  and	
  cultures,	
  how	
  they	
  get	
  into	
  the	
  minds	
  of	
  individuals,	
  why	
  individuals	
  care	
  about	
  and	
  are	
  susceptible	
  to	
  their	
  influence,	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  in	
  turn	
  shape	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  norms.	
  Providing	
  satisfactory	
  explanations	
  to	
  those	
  questions	
  require	
  identifying	
  the	
  ultimate	
  evolutionary	
  forces	
  that	
  might	
  have	
  selected	
  for	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  human	
  mind,	
  which	
  are	
  capable	
  of	
  and	
  proximally	
  responsible	
  for	
  producing	
  the	
  array	
  of	
  behaviours	
  observed	
  in	
  present	
  day	
  environments	
  (Henrich	
  &	
  Henrich,	
  2007).	
  This	
  thesis	
  sets	
  out	
  to	
  apply	
  evolutionary	
  reasoning	
  to	
  generate	
  and	
  test	
  hypotheses	
  about	
  possible	
  design	
  features	
  of	
  brain	
  mechanisms	
  that	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  engage	
  effectively	
  with	
  social	
  norms.	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   2	
   	
  1.2	
   OUTLINE	
  OF	
  SUBSEQUENT	
  CHAPTERS	
  Chapter	
  2	
  systematically	
  lays	
  out	
  predictions	
  for	
  major	
  features	
  and	
  capabilities	
  of	
  a	
  coevolved	
  norm	
  psychology.	
  I	
  first	
  detail	
  the	
  specific	
  adaptive	
  challenges	
  presented	
  by	
  social	
  norms	
  that	
  would	
  have	
  selected	
  for	
  a	
  system	
  of	
  specialized	
  psychological	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  meet	
  those	
  challenges.	
  I	
  will	
  then	
  specify	
  the	
  types	
  of	
  input	
  one	
  would	
  expect	
  such	
  specialized	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  process,	
  and	
  the	
  signatures	
  or	
  markers	
  of	
  functionally	
  specialized	
  processes	
  that	
  would	
  constitute	
  as	
  evidence	
  for	
  their	
  existence.	
  By	
  applying	
  evolutionary	
  reasoning	
  and	
  properties	
  of	
  norm-­‐equilibria	
  gleaned	
  from	
  evolutionary	
  models	
  to	
  deduce	
  implications	
  for	
  design	
  features,	
  this	
  thesis	
  offers	
  one	
  plausible	
  set	
  of	
  answers	
  to	
  the	
  question:	
  Why	
  and	
  how	
  do	
  individuals	
  abide	
  by	
  or	
  are	
  beholden	
  to	
  socially	
  learned	
  rules?	
  I	
  present	
  extant	
  evidence	
  drawn	
  from	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  disciplines	
  to	
  speak	
  to	
  hypothesized	
  features	
  and	
  functions	
  of	
  an	
  evolved	
  norm-­‐psychology.	
  This	
  sets	
  down	
  the	
  foundations	
  for	
  investigations	
  carried	
  out	
  in	
  Chapters	
  3	
  and	
  4.	
  Chapters	
  3	
  and	
  4	
  are	
  empirical	
  contributions	
  to	
  test	
  several	
  theoretical	
  predictions	
  set	
  out	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2.	
  Chapter	
  3	
  addresses	
  the	
  paucity	
  of	
  research	
  in	
  the	
  learning	
  literature	
  across	
  psychology	
  and	
  cognate	
  disciplines	
  on	
  how	
  a	
  cultural	
  learner	
  acquires	
  knowledge	
  of	
  norms.	
  It	
  tests	
  out	
  hypotheses	
  regarding	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  evolved	
  specifically	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  properties	
  of	
  norms	
  to	
  guide	
  acquisition	
  and	
  retention,	
  including	
  perceptual,	
  memory	
  and	
  inferential	
  biases.	
  Chapter	
  4	
  builds	
  on	
  existing	
  theorizing	
  and	
  research	
  on	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  as	
  two	
  distinct	
  solutions	
  to	
  motivating	
  norm	
  compliance	
  across	
  cultures.	
  It	
  presents	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  two	
  experiments	
  intended	
  to	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
  direct	
  test	
  of	
  the	
  hypothesis.	
  By	
  pairing	
  an	
  explicit	
  self-­‐report	
  method	
  with	
  an	
  implicit	
  behavioural	
  measure,	
  the	
  divergent	
  results	
  of	
  these	
  studies	
  also	
  carries	
  implications	
  for	
  research	
  methodology	
  aimed	
  at	
  studying	
  the	
  evolved	
  functional	
  significance	
  of	
  constructs	
  and	
  their	
  appropriate	
  measurement.	
  	
  	
   	
   3	
   CHAPTER	
  2	
   PREDICTIONS	
   2.1	
   CONDITIONS	
  FOR	
  A	
  CO-­‐EVOLVED	
  NORM	
  PSYCHOLOGY	
  Reconstructions	
  of	
  early	
  hominoid	
  life	
  suggest	
  that	
  our	
  ancestors	
  were	
  highly	
  dependent	
  on	
  their	
  social	
  groups	
  for	
  survival.	
  Researchers	
  have	
  proposed	
  and	
  gathered	
  evidence	
  for	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  domains	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  cooperated,	
  including	
  food	
  sharing	
  (Stanford,	
  1999),	
  and	
  collaborative	
  childrearing	
  (Leonetti,	
  Nath,	
  Hemam,	
  &	
  Neill,	
  2004).	
  With	
  group	
  living	
  came	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  coordinate	
  behaviour	
  with	
  fellow	
  group	
  members.	
  Compared	
  to	
  humans,	
  other	
  social	
  animals	
  coordinate	
  behaviours	
  in	
  few	
  domains,	
  and	
  conflicts	
  are	
  resolved	
  by	
  factors	
  such	
  as	
  status,	
  relatedness,	
  and	
  sometimes,	
  outright	
  contests	
  (Young,	
  1996).	
  Humans,	
  by	
  establishing	
  and	
  deferring	
  to	
  shared	
  conventions,	
  can	
  often	
  obviate	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  coordinate	
  or	
  resolve	
  disputes	
  on	
  a	
  case-­‐by-­‐case	
  basis.	
  	
  Given	
  the	
  importance	
  and	
  ubiquity	
  of	
  norms	
  in	
  human	
  social	
  life,	
  there	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  strong	
  selection	
  pressures	
  for	
  efficiency	
  and	
  specialization	
  in	
  the	
  mind	
  for	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
  them.	
  The	
  ability	
  to	
  learn	
  and	
  share	
  representations	
  of	
  simple	
  norms	
  might	
  have	
  started	
  off	
  as	
  a	
  by-­‐product	
  of	
  innate	
  social	
  learning	
  abilities,	
  selected	
  for	
  by	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  acquire	
  large	
  bodies	
  of	
  cultural	
  knowledge	
  to	
  adapt	
  to	
  the	
  variable	
  environments	
  inhabited	
  by	
  our	
  ancestors	
  (Richerson	
  &	
  Boyd,	
  2000).	
  Social	
  learning	
  biases	
  such	
  as	
  payoff-­‐	
  (Henrich	
  &	
  Gil-­‐White,	
  2001)	
  and	
  frequency-­‐biased	
  transmission	
  (Boyd	
  &	
  Richerson,	
  1985;	
  Henrich	
  &	
  Boyd,	
  1998)	
  are	
  two	
  classes	
  of	
  innate	
  biases	
  that	
  learners	
  may	
  rely	
  on	
  for	
  identifying	
  and	
  acquiring	
  high	
  quality	
  (high	
  payoff)	
  cultural	
  information.	
  Both	
  can	
  help	
  explain	
  how	
  behaviours	
  rapidly	
  spread	
  and	
  become	
  prevalent	
  within	
  a	
  population.	
  In	
  particular,	
  conformist	
  transmission,	
  a	
  type	
  of	
  frequency-­‐dependent	
  social	
  learning,	
  is	
  a	
  learning	
  bias	
  that	
  is	
  manifested	
  in	
  a	
  tendency	
  to	
  copy	
  the	
  most	
  frequent	
  behaviour	
  in	
  a	
  population	
  for	
  a	
  given	
  context	
  (Efferson,	
  Lalive,	
  Richerson,	
  McElreath,	
  &	
  Lubell,	
  2008).	
  By	
  averaging	
  across	
  the	
  learning	
  of	
  other	
  individuals,	
  this	
  strategy	
  enables	
  learners	
  to	
  be	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  pick	
  out	
  advantageous	
  behaviours	
  in	
  noisy	
   	
   4	
   environments,	
  when	
  the	
  individual	
  best	
  models	
  are	
  difficult	
  to	
  identify.	
  Both	
  types	
  of	
  learning	
  biases	
  could	
  have	
  allowed	
  groups	
  of	
  individuals	
  to	
  transmit	
  and	
  share	
  a	
  common	
  set	
  of	
  mental	
  representations	
  of	
  expectations	
  for	
  social	
  conduct.	
  Once	
  behaviours	
  became	
  common	
  and	
  part	
  of	
  a	
  self-­‐sustaining	
  equilibrium,	
  they	
  can	
  be	
  considered	
  a	
  social	
  norm.	
  Thus,	
  social	
  norms	
  can	
  be	
  defined	
  as	
  culturally	
  transmitted	
  beliefs,	
  behaviours	
  and	
  expectations	
  for	
  behaviours	
  whose	
  violation	
  provokes	
  negative	
  emotional	
  and	
  punitive	
  responses	
  from	
  observers.	
  	
  Groups	
  with	
  more	
  members	
  who	
  successfully	
  learned	
  and	
  adhered	
  to	
  norms	
  during	
  interaction	
  with	
  others	
  would	
  have	
  enjoyed	
  large	
  fitness	
  benefits,	
  outcompeting	
  groups	
  with	
  lesser	
  capacity	
  for	
  norm-­‐based	
  interactions	
  (Henrich	
  and	
  Henrich,	
  2007).	
  Once	
  norms	
  became	
  common	
  within	
  these	
  groups,	
  and	
  reliance	
  on	
  these	
  learning	
  abilities	
  intensified,	
  having	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  interface	
  with	
  norms	
  effectively	
  could	
  itself	
  have	
  been	
  selected	
  for	
  by	
  the	
  sheer	
  fact	
  that	
  there	
  were	
  more	
  norms	
  in	
  the	
  environment.	
  Further,	
  groups	
  that	
  produced	
  more	
  group-­‐beneficial	
  norms	
  in	
  a	
  greater	
  number	
  of	
  domains	
  both	
  passed	
  on	
  the	
  specific	
  content	
  of	
  these	
  cultural	
  solutions	
  for	
  social	
  interaction,	
  and	
  a	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  capable	
  of	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
  them.	
  These	
  selection	
  pressures	
  exerted	
  by	
  socially	
  transmitted	
  knowledge	
  on	
  the	
  genes	
  that	
  serve	
  as	
  the	
  blueprint	
  for	
  our	
  minds	
  could	
  have	
  produced	
  a	
  more	
  specialized	
  set	
  of	
  mechanisms	
  particularly	
  suited	
  to	
  operating	
  with	
  social	
  norms,	
  which	
  in	
  turn	
  could	
  have	
  enabled	
  norms	
  to	
  get	
  more	
  complex,	
  driving	
  further	
  changes	
  in	
  genes	
  and	
  psychological	
  architecture,	
  and	
  so	
  on,	
  in	
  a	
  co-­‐evolutionary	
  process	
  between	
  genes	
  and	
  culture	
  (see	
  Laland	
  et	
  al	
  2010	
  for	
  examples	
  of	
  how	
  our	
  genome	
  has	
  evolved	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  specific	
  cultural	
  environments).	
  What	
  would	
  these	
  coevolved	
  mechanisms	
  look	
  like?	
  What	
  properties	
  would	
  we	
  expect	
  them	
  to	
  have?	
  I	
  lay	
  out	
  predictions	
  for	
  the	
  answers	
  to	
  these	
  questions	
  in	
  the	
  next	
  section.	
  	
  	
   	
   5	
   2.2	
   PREDICTIONS	
  FOR	
  A	
  CO-­‐EVOLVED	
  NORM	
  PSYCHOLOGY	
  If	
  competition	
  between	
  groups	
  was	
  partially	
  driven	
  by	
  successful	
  implementation	
  of	
  group-­‐beneficial	
  norms	
  as	
  suggested	
  above,	
  then	
  over	
  time,	
  genetic	
  evolution	
  should	
  have	
  responded	
  by	
  endowing	
  individual	
  psychologies	
  with	
  innate	
  prosocial	
  norm	
  content.	
  However,	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  high	
  degree	
  of	
  variability	
  in	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  norms	
  across	
  groups,	
  we	
  would	
  expect	
  to	
  see	
  little	
  other	
  hardwired	
  norm	
  content.	
  Instead,	
  we	
  would	
  expect	
  an	
  evolved	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  selected	
  to	
  meet	
  the	
  challenge	
  of	
  adapting	
  to	
  a	
  range	
  of	
  possible	
  environments	
  to	
  be	
  prepared	
  with	
  some	
  initial	
  expectations	
  for	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  norms	
  to	
  help	
  attention	
  and	
  learning	
  efforts,	
  and	
  some	
  content	
  biases	
  for	
  figuring	
  out	
  and	
  identifying	
  possible	
  norms.	
  These	
  biases	
  can	
  then	
  facilitate	
  ontogenetic	
  learning	
  of	
  a	
  wide	
  range	
  of	
  possible	
  norms	
  from	
  other	
  members	
  of	
  one’s	
  culture.	
  I	
  discuss	
  each	
  of	
  these	
  in	
  detail	
  below.	
  	
   2.2.1	
   INNATE	
  EXPECTATIONS	
  Cognitive	
  scientists	
  have	
  argued	
  that	
  human	
  babies	
  are	
  born	
  into	
  the	
  world	
  prepared	
  with	
  an	
  intuitive	
  ontology—expectations	
  for	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  features	
  to	
  exist	
  in	
  the	
  world	
  they	
  are	
  born	
  into.	
  These	
  include	
  folk	
  physics,	
  folk	
  biology	
  and	
  folk	
  psychology,	
  or	
  innate	
  expectations	
  for	
  physical	
  objects,	
  biological	
  beings	
  and	
  other	
  minds,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  properties	
  and	
  regularities	
  that	
  govern	
  them	
  (Flavell,	
  1999;	
  Hatano	
  &	
  Inagaki,	
  1994;	
  Spelke,	
  Breinlinger,	
  Macomber,	
  &	
  Jacobson,	
  1992;	
  Wellman	
  &	
  Gelman,	
  1992).	
  This	
  includes	
  the	
  expectation	
  that	
  solid	
  objects	
  cannot	
  pass	
  through	
  each	
  other,	
  and	
  that	
  biological	
  beings	
  die.	
  These	
  innate	
  assumptions	
  provide	
  conceptual	
  structure	
  that	
  guide	
  learning	
  over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  development	
  (Keil,	
  1981;	
  Wellman	
  &	
  Gelman,	
  1998).	
  Just	
  as	
  these	
  expectations	
  are	
  shaped	
  by	
  fitness-­‐relevant	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  physical	
  and	
  biological	
  world,	
  a	
  folk	
  psychology	
  shaped	
  by	
  the	
  persistent	
  presence	
  of	
  social	
  norms	
  should	
  expect	
  that	
  people,	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  having	
  goals	
  and	
  intentions,	
  will	
  also	
  be	
  governed	
  by	
  social	
  norms.	
  In	
  other	
  words,	
  a	
  human	
  infant	
  should	
  hold	
  an	
  innate	
  expectation	
  for	
  the	
  social	
  world	
  to	
  be	
  structured	
  by	
  rules	
  and	
  regularities	
  of	
  behaviour.	
  Consistent	
  with	
  this	
   	
   6	
   prediction,	
  experiments	
  with	
  young	
  children	
  show	
  that	
  through	
  a	
  single	
  observation	
  of	
  a	
  game	
  play,	
  children	
  spontaneously	
  make	
  the	
  inference	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  social	
  rules	
  that	
  structure	
  the	
  game,	
  and	
  will	
  impose	
  these	
  rules	
  on	
  new	
  players	
  who	
  join	
  the	
  game,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  spontaneously	
  protest	
  when	
  new	
  players	
  differed	
  from	
  what	
  was	
  observed	
  (Rakoczy,	
  Wameken,	
  &	
  Tomasello,	
  2008).	
  In	
  addition	
  to	
  expecting	
  that	
  there	
  will	
  be	
  regularities	
  to	
  social	
  behaviour,	
  repeatedly	
  successful	
  norm	
  content	
  that	
  allowed	
  certain	
  groups	
  to	
  outcompete	
  others	
  should	
  have	
  become	
  prevalent,	
  and	
  shaped	
  our	
  psychology	
  to	
  possess	
  some	
  prosocial	
  default	
  content	
  or	
  settings.	
  In	
  processes	
  of	
  Cultural	
  Group	
  Selection,	
  groups	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  majority	
  of	
  members	
  engaged	
  in	
  highly	
  cooperative	
  acts	
  were	
  favoured	
  over	
  less	
  cooperative	
  groups	
  and	
  consequently,	
  the	
  cooperative	
  content	
  and	
  psychological	
  adaptations	
  that	
  sustained	
  the	
  implementation	
  of	
  those	
  content	
  spread	
  (Wilson,	
  Van	
  Vugt,	
  &	
  O'Gorman,	
  2008).	
  From	
  this,	
  we	
  would	
  expect	
  the	
  descendents	
  of	
  these	
  cooperative	
  groups	
  to	
  be	
  prepared	
  to	
  behave	
  prosocially	
  toward	
  other	
  members	
  of	
  their	
  group	
  in	
  culturally	
  specified	
  ways.	
  These	
  can	
  take	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  preferential	
  attention	
  towards	
  prosocial	
  actors,	
  readiness	
  to	
  imitate	
  their	
  behaviours	
  and	
  having	
  the	
  motivational	
  systems	
  in	
  place	
  to	
  make	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
  the	
  prosocial	
  acts	
  rewarding.	
  	
  Supporting	
  experimental	
  evidence	
  of	
  innate	
  prosocial	
  content	
  biases	
  come	
  from	
  developmental	
  psychology	
  showing	
  that	
  three	
  month	
  old	
  infants	
  have	
  an	
  early	
  emerging	
  ability	
  to	
  evaluate	
  observed	
  actions	
  as	
  either	
  hurtful	
  or	
  harmful	
  to	
  another’s	
  goal,	
  and	
  before	
  they	
  themselves	
  can	
  walk	
  or	
  talk,	
  six	
  month	
  olds	
  use	
  this	
  information	
  as	
  a	
  basis	
  for	
  their	
  own	
  preference	
  to	
  interact	
  with	
  helping	
  agents	
  and	
  avoid	
  hindering	
  agents	
  (Hamlin,	
  Wynn,	
  &	
  Bloom,	
  2007;	
  Hamlin,	
  Wynn,	
  &	
  Bloom,	
  2010).	
  Thus,	
  from	
  an	
  early	
  age,	
  infants	
  have	
  a	
  preference	
  for	
  interacting	
  with	
  prosocial	
  and	
  avoiding	
  antisocial	
  others.	
  These	
  preferences	
  for	
  prosocial	
  interaction	
  partners	
  should	
  lead	
  the	
  developing	
  child	
  to	
  learn	
  further	
  social	
  rules	
  from	
  prosocial	
  models,	
  increasing	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  prosocial	
  norms	
  will	
  be	
  learnt	
  and	
  enacted	
  from	
  an	
  early	
  age.	
  Indeed,	
  there	
  is	
  evidence	
  that	
  as	
  they	
  become	
  more	
  competent	
  at	
  locomotion	
  and	
  engaging	
  in	
  goal-­‐directed	
  action,	
  toddlers	
  as	
  young	
  as	
  14	
  months	
   	
   7	
   will	
  spontaneously	
  help	
  an	
  unfamiliar	
  experimenter	
  achieve	
  goals,	
  while	
  overcoming	
  difficult	
  obstacles,	
  when	
  they	
  observe	
  it	
  being	
  thwarted	
  (Warneken	
  &	
  Tomasello,	
  2007).	
  Further,	
  older	
  children	
  readily	
  learn	
  context-­‐specific	
  prosocial	
  norms	
  that	
  are	
  personally	
  costly	
  in	
  experimental	
  situations	
  after	
  observing	
  a	
  single	
  model	
  engaging	
  in	
  the	
  prosocial	
  act,	
  and	
  will	
  also	
  enforce	
  these	
  just-­‐learned	
  behaviours	
  on	
  others	
  (Bryan	
  &	
  Test,	
  1967;	
  Eisenberg,	
  1983;	
  Grusec,	
  1971).	
  	
  These	
  prosocial	
  tendencies	
  seem	
  to	
  exhibit	
  a	
  developmental	
  trajectory	
  in	
  which	
  younger	
  children	
  tend	
  to	
  exhibit	
  more	
  selfish	
  behaviour,	
  and	
  become	
  progressively	
  more	
  prosocial	
  with	
  age	
  (Harbaugh	
  &	
  Krause,	
  2000),	
  suggesting	
  that	
  increasingly	
  prosocial	
  acts	
  might	
  be	
  a	
  product	
  of	
  learning	
  about	
  appropriate	
  behaviours	
  and	
  expectations	
  from	
  individuals	
  who	
  model	
  prosocial	
  acts.	
  Further,	
  the	
  trajectory	
  of	
  these	
  tendencies	
  exhibit	
  a	
  very	
  specific	
  pattern,	
  with	
  dislike	
  of	
  unequal	
  division	
  of	
  resources	
  emerging	
  simultaneously	
  with	
  in-­‐group	
  favouritism	
  (Fehr,	
  Bernhard,	
  &	
  Rockenbach,	
  2008),	
  suggesting	
  that	
  these	
  prosocial	
  preferences	
  are	
  specifically	
  in	
  aid	
  of	
  sustaining	
  high	
  levels	
  of	
  in-­‐group	
  cooperation	
  in	
  competition	
  with	
  out-­‐groups.	
   	
   2.2.2	
   TYPES	
  OF	
  INPUT	
  While	
  innate	
  expectations	
  can	
  direct	
  limited	
  attentional	
  resources	
  to	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  that	
  might	
  pertain	
  to	
  norms,	
  additional	
  processing	
  must	
  occur	
  before	
  one	
  can	
  attain	
  knowledge	
  of	
  a	
  society’s	
  many	
  nuanced	
  social	
  rules.	
  For	
  this	
  difficult	
  task,	
  we	
  expect	
  a	
  specialized	
  cognitive	
  mechanism	
  for	
  social	
  norms	
  to	
  be	
  selective,	
  and	
  biased,	
  in	
  the	
  types	
  of	
  input	
  it	
  will	
  process	
  and	
  the	
  functions	
  it	
  will	
  perform	
  on	
  the	
  input	
  to	
  simplify	
  the	
  task	
  of	
  learning	
  and	
  compliance.	
  Social	
  norms	
  have	
  properties	
  at	
  the	
  group	
  level	
  to	
  which	
  individuals	
  psychologies	
  should	
  be	
  attune	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  of	
  identifying	
  suitable	
  input.	
  When	
  norms	
  are	
  at	
  equilibria,	
  stable	
  behavioural	
  regularities	
  can	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  a	
  social	
  group.	
  At	
  these	
  equilibria,	
  individuals	
  can	
  reasonably	
  predict	
  how	
  others	
  will	
  behave	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  context,	
  and	
  know	
  that	
  s/he	
  is	
  expected	
  to	
  behave	
  similarly,	
  including	
  the	
  manner	
  in	
   	
   8	
   which	
  an	
  individual	
  who	
  violates	
  expectations	
  for	
  appropriate	
  behaviour	
  ought	
  to	
  be	
  sanctioned	
  (Henrich	
  &	
  Henrich,	
  2007).	
  At	
  these	
  equilibria,	
  normative	
  behaviours	
  tend	
  to	
  be	
  prevalent,	
  and	
  recur	
  with	
  high	
  frequency	
  across	
  similar	
  contexts.	
  A	
  norm	
  psychology	
  that	
  was	
  shaped	
  by	
  such	
  regularities	
  should	
  not	
  only	
  exhibit	
  selectivity	
  to	
  socially	
  learned	
  behaviours	
  as	
  inputs,	
  but	
  especially	
  to	
  socially	
  learned	
  behaviours	
  that	
  occur	
  at	
  high	
  frequency.	
  Further,	
  ethnography	
  suggests	
  that	
  at	
  least	
  some	
  deviations	
  from	
  norm-­‐equilibria	
  are	
  sanctioned	
  everywhere	
  (to	
  differing	
  degrees;	
  Brown,	
  1991),	
  and	
  there	
  are	
  individuals	
  who	
  are	
  motivated	
  to	
  sanction	
  transgressions,	
  or	
  to	
  at	
  least	
  express	
  such	
  motivations.	
  Emotions	
  are	
  both	
  a	
  motivator	
  and	
  signal	
  of	
  intended	
  action	
  (Keltner,	
  Haidt,	
  &	
  Shiota,	
  2006).	
  In	
  particular,	
  negative	
  emotions	
  such	
  as	
  anger	
  or	
  disgust	
  observed	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  behaviours	
  can	
  signal	
  motivation	
  and	
  signal	
  of	
  intentions	
  to	
  sanction	
  a	
  norm	
  violation,	
  and	
  thus	
  events	
  involving	
  sanctions	
  or	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reactions	
  should	
  activate	
  norm	
  psychology.	
  Finally,	
  norm	
  equilibria	
  can	
  sustain	
  uniformity	
  of	
  behaviours	
  that	
  have	
  no	
  direct	
  relevance	
  for	
  fitness,	
  and	
  even	
  those	
  that	
  are	
  individually	
  costly	
  to	
  perform	
  (Bowles,	
  Choi,	
  &	
  Hopfensitz,	
  2003).	
  Thus,	
  seemingly	
  arbitrary	
  and	
  apparently	
  costly	
  behaviours	
  that	
  occur	
  at	
  high	
  frequency	
  should	
  especially	
  be	
  likely	
  to	
  trigger	
  norm	
  psychology	
  processes.	
  	
  	
   2.2.3	
   LIBERAL	
  BIAS	
  IN	
  IDENTIFICATION	
  	
  Researchers	
  have	
  documented	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  error	
  management	
  biases,	
  shaped	
  by	
  the	
  payoff	
  structures	
  of	
  the	
  environment,	
  to	
  produce	
  biased	
  perceptions	
  and	
  beliefs	
  toward	
  adaptive	
  ends.	
  Examples	
  include	
  the	
  hot-­‐hand	
  phenomenon,	
  in	
  which	
  individuals	
  have	
  expectations	
  for	
  streaks	
  in	
  likelihood	
  of	
  events	
  with	
  otherwise	
  independent	
  probabilities,	
  as	
  a	
  possible	
  adaptation	
  to	
  the	
  sometimes	
  clumpy	
  occurrence	
  of	
  resources	
  in	
  the	
  natural	
  environment	
  (Wilke	
  &	
  Barrett,	
  2009),	
  and	
  over-­‐perception	
  of	
  sexual	
  interest	
  from	
  women	
  by	
  men	
  (Haselton	
  &	
  Buss,	
  2000).	
  We	
  predict	
  that	
  a	
  similar	
  bias	
  should	
  be	
  seen	
  with	
  norms	
  to	
  minimize	
  the	
  asymmetric	
  cost	
  of	
  errors	
  associated	
  with	
  misidentifying	
  norms.	
  This	
  asymmetry	
  could	
  be	
  due	
  to	
   	
   9	
   the	
  fact	
  that	
  causes	
  and	
  motivations	
  that	
  give	
  rise	
  to	
  behaviour	
  are	
  often	
  quite	
  opaque	
  to	
  observers,	
  especially	
  those	
  who	
  are	
  entering	
  unfamiliar	
  contexts.	
  When	
  an	
  individual	
  is	
  confronted	
  with	
  a	
  situation	
  in	
  which	
  not	
  engaging	
  in	
  the	
  correct	
  behaviour	
  has	
  costly	
  consequences	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  punishment,	
  damage	
  to	
  reputation,	
  etc,	
  but	
  has	
  inadequate	
  knowledge	
  with	
  regards	
  to	
  what	
  IS	
  expected	
  and	
  appropriate,	
  we	
  would	
  expect	
  a	
  dedicated	
  system	
  adapted	
  to	
  the	
  payoff	
  structure	
  of	
  social	
  norms	
  to	
  err	
  on	
  the	
  side	
  of	
  perceiving	
  norms	
  when	
  none	
  exist,	
  rather	
  than	
  risk	
  missing	
  opportunities	
  to	
  identify	
  norms	
  when	
  they	
  do	
  exist.	
  That	
  is,	
  we	
  should	
  expect	
  norm	
  psychology	
  to	
  be	
  liberally	
  biased	
  in	
  perceiving	
  norms	
  and	
  be	
  triggered	
  with	
  relatively	
  poor	
  stimuli	
  (few	
  instances	
  or	
  thin	
  evidence).	
  	
   2.2.4	
   ENHANCED	
  COGNITIVE	
  ACCESSIBILITY	
  What	
  happens	
  once	
  a	
  potential	
  norm	
  is	
  identified?	
  What	
  kinds	
  of	
  operations	
  are	
  performed	
  on	
  the	
  input?	
  We	
  predict	
  that	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  potential	
  fitness	
  benefits	
  associated	
  with	
  complying	
  with	
  norms,	
  there	
  should	
  be	
  enhanced	
  retention	
  and	
  cognitive	
  accessibility	
  for	
  normative	
  relative	
  to	
  fitness	
  neutral	
  content.	
  More	
  specifically,	
  once	
  behaviour	
  is	
  identified	
  as	
  potentially	
  normative,	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  better	
  remembered	
  and	
  more	
  quickly	
  retrievable	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  facilitate	
  future	
  obedience.	
  Such	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  effects	
  have	
  been	
  found	
  for	
  dangerous	
  animals,	
  possibly	
  as	
  an	
  adaptation	
  to	
  dealing	
  with	
  predators	
  in	
  the	
  environment	
  (Barrett,	
  2007).	
  In	
  the	
  domain	
  of	
  norms,	
  a	
  study	
  by	
  O’Gorman	
  and	
  colleagues	
  (2008)	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  merely	
  labeling	
  information	
  as	
  normative	
  enhanced	
  its	
  recall.	
  	
  	
   2.2.5	
   NORM-­‐BASED	
  INFERENCE	
  &	
  REASONING	
  Norms	
  are	
  social	
  rules	
  that	
  govern	
  behaviour	
  across	
  many	
  similar	
  contexts.	
  A	
  cultural	
  learner	
  is	
  faced	
  with	
  the	
  challenge	
  of	
  figuring	
  out	
  what	
  features	
  of	
  contexts	
  are	
  relevant	
  for	
  assessing	
  similarity	
  and	
  applicability	
  and	
  whether	
  it	
  is	
  appropriate	
  to	
  apply	
  a	
  particular	
  norm.	
  Since	
  people	
  cannot	
  experience	
  the	
  full	
  range	
  of	
   	
   10	
   applicable	
  contexts,	
  but	
  must	
  learn	
  and	
  abide	
  by	
  norms	
  after	
  only	
  a	
  few	
  learning	
  opportunities,	
  inference	
  processes	
  are	
  important	
  for	
  extrapolating	
  to	
  contexts	
  outside	
  of	
  direct	
  experience.	
  Thus,	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  learning	
  specific	
  content	
  of	
  norms,	
  we	
  should	
  also	
  be	
  adept	
  at	
  making	
  inferences	
  and	
  reasoning	
  with	
  information	
  in	
  the	
  normative	
  domain,	
  such	
  as	
  whether	
  someone	
  is	
  following	
  a	
  norm,	
  or	
  when	
  and	
  to	
  whom	
  a	
  particular	
  social	
  rule	
  applies.	
  	
  There	
  is	
  evidence	
  that	
  our	
  minds	
  do	
  engage	
  in	
  functionally	
  specialized	
  reasoning	
  and	
  making	
  inferences	
  that	
  is	
  specific	
  to	
  the	
  domain	
  of	
  norms.	
  Researchers	
  working	
  under	
  the	
  theory	
  of	
  Universal	
  Moral	
  Grammar	
  have	
  proposed	
  that	
  people	
  act	
  like	
  intuitive	
  lawyers	
  and	
  systematically	
  apply	
  domain	
  specific	
  rules	
  and	
  principles	
  when	
  reasoning	
  about	
  possible	
  transgressions	
  (Cushman,	
  Young,	
  &	
  Hauser,	
  2006;	
  Mikhail,	
  2007).	
  These	
  effects	
  have	
  been	
  demonstrated	
  with	
  trolley	
  problems,	
  a	
  class	
  of	
  scenarios	
  that	
  involve	
  possible	
  tradeoffs	
  between	
  harming	
  one	
  person	
  to	
  save	
  multiple	
  others.	
  People	
  asked	
  to	
  assess	
  permissibility	
  of	
  these	
  tradeoffs	
  give	
  confident	
  and	
  reliable	
  judgments	
  for	
  which	
  they	
  cannot	
  give	
  explicit	
  justification,	
  implying	
  the	
  workings	
  of	
  some	
  implicit	
  processes.	
  People’s	
  judgments	
  of	
  permissibility	
  are	
  sensitive	
  to	
  factors	
  such	
  as	
  degree	
  of	
  physical	
  proximity	
  to	
  the	
  actor,	
  whether	
  the	
  tradeoff	
  is	
  a	
  side	
  effect,	
  and	
  whether	
  it	
  was	
  an	
  active	
  or	
  passive	
  omission—decision	
  principles	
  the	
  authors	
  argue	
  are	
  innately	
  derived.	
  From	
  our	
  perspective,	
  these	
  principles	
  are	
  precisely	
  factors	
  that	
  can	
  help	
  determine	
  whether	
  an	
  action	
  was	
  an	
  intentional	
  act	
  of	
  norm	
  violation	
  toward	
  in-­‐group	
  members	
  or	
  not.	
  These	
  principles	
  could	
  have	
  been	
  built	
  into	
  our	
  innate	
  norm-­‐psychology	
  because	
  groups	
  that	
  successfully	
  outcompeted	
  other	
  groups	
  have	
  repeatedly	
  adopted	
  them	
  in	
  reasoning	
  about	
  and	
  responding	
  to	
  transgressions.	
  	
  	
  Cosmides	
  et	
  al	
  (2010)	
  present	
  evidence	
  for	
  a	
  specialized	
  cognitive	
  module	
  evolved	
  for	
  social	
  exchange,	
  or	
  reciprocity	
  interactions.	
  They	
  suggest	
  that	
  an	
  ability	
  that	
  such	
  an	
  adaptation	
  should	
  have	
  is	
  to	
  detect	
  cheaters	
  who	
  take	
  benefits	
  illicitly,	
  without	
  bearing	
  the	
  cost	
  of	
  the	
  interaction,	
  thus	
  violating	
  the	
  conditions	
  of	
  mutually	
  beneficial	
  reciprocity.	
  Consistent	
  with	
  this	
  prediction,	
  they	
  document	
  greater	
  accuracy	
  when	
  reasoning	
  about	
  a	
  problem	
  framed	
  as	
  detecting	
  intentional	
  cheaters	
   	
   11	
   compared	
  to	
  the	
  same	
  problem	
  framed	
  as	
  detecting	
  violations	
  of	
  abstract	
  rules	
  (without	
  the	
  ecologically	
  relevant	
  context	
  of	
  social	
  contracts).	
  The	
  reasoning	
  process	
  was	
  sensitive	
  to	
  cues	
  suggesting	
  that	
  the	
  violation	
  was	
  accidental,	
  not	
  beneficial	
  to	
  the	
  violator	
  or	
  very	
  difficult	
  to	
  carry	
  out,	
  and	
  did	
  not	
  search	
  for	
  cheating	
  under	
  these	
  circumstances.	
  The	
  norm-­‐psychology	
  account	
  offers	
  a	
  different	
  interpretation	
  of	
  the	
  results.	
  Whereas	
  Cosmides	
  and	
  colleagues	
  argue	
  that	
  the	
  selection	
  pressure	
  for	
  cheater	
  detection	
  psychology	
  arises	
  from	
  the	
  challenges	
  of	
  cooperating	
  with	
  individuals	
  who	
  are	
  not	
  kin,	
  solved	
  by	
  social	
  exchange,	
  or	
  reciprocity,	
  the	
  Cultural	
  Group	
  Selection	
  account	
  counter	
  that	
  the	
  emergence	
  of	
  culturally	
  transmitted	
  social	
  norms	
  and	
  the	
  supporting	
  psychological	
  adaptations	
  are	
  a	
  byproduct	
  of	
  cultural	
  learning	
  abilities	
  evolved	
  initially	
  as	
  a	
  means	
  to	
  adapt	
  to	
  variable	
  environments,	
  and	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  learn	
  and	
  implement	
  social	
  norms	
  which	
  facilitated	
  cooperation	
  with	
  non-­‐kin.	
  It	
  is	
  entirely	
  consistent	
  with	
  the	
  results	
  that	
  the	
  detection	
  mechanism	
  is	
  actually	
  more	
  broadly	
  geared	
  towards	
  the	
  identification	
  of	
  intentional	
  norm	
  violators	
  that	
  contain	
  within	
  it	
  the	
  more	
  narrowly	
  defined	
  task	
  of	
  identifying	
  cheaters	
  in	
  reciprocity	
  interactions.	
  According	
  to	
  this	
  view,	
  people	
  should	
  be	
  good	
  at	
  identifying	
  norm	
  violators	
  (even	
  when	
  the	
  situation	
  does	
  not	
  involve	
  an	
  exchange	
  partner),	
  so	
  long	
  as	
  bystanders	
  observing	
  the	
  behaviour	
  experience	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  expectations	
  for	
  what	
  was	
  appropriate	
  and	
  are	
  willing	
  to	
  enforce	
  the	
  transgression.	
  	
  Indirect	
  evidence	
  for	
  reasoning	
  about	
  norm	
  violations	
  that	
  do	
  not	
  involve	
  exchange	
  interactions	
  come	
  from	
  Uttich	
  &	
  Lombrozo’s	
  (2010)	
  study	
  on	
  inferences	
  about	
  intentionality	
  of	
  various	
  actions	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  actor’s	
  culpability.	
  Adults	
  were	
  asked	
  to	
  judge	
  the	
  intentionality	
  of	
  decisions	
  by	
  people	
  whose	
  decisions	
  were	
  either	
  accompanied	
  by	
  a	
  positive	
  or	
  negative	
  side	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  environment.	
  Participants	
  who	
  read	
  about	
  decisions	
  with	
  positive	
  side	
  effects	
  did	
  not	
  label	
  the	
  action	
  as	
  intentional,	
  while	
  those	
  with	
  a	
  negative	
  side	
  effect	
  were	
  judged	
  to	
  have	
  been	
  intentional.	
  Such	
  an	
  asymmetry	
  in	
  attribution	
  of	
  intentionality	
  does	
  not	
  make	
  sense	
  except	
  in	
  light	
  of	
  an	
  inference	
  that	
  subjects	
  make,	
  based	
  on	
  knowledge	
  of	
  the	
  norm	
  “do	
  no	
  harm”,	
  about	
  a	
  person	
  who	
  decides	
  to	
  proceed	
  with	
  a	
  course	
  of	
  action	
  with	
   	
   12	
   negative	
  side-­‐effects	
  despite	
  this	
  norm,	
  as	
  someone	
  who	
  is	
  not	
  bothered	
  by	
  violating	
  norms—a	
  potential	
  norm	
  violator.	
  Further	
  studies	
  that	
  serve	
  as	
  a	
  direct	
  test	
  of	
  reasoning	
  abilities	
  relating	
  to	
  identification	
  of	
  norm	
  violations	
  are	
  needed	
  to	
  strengthen	
  the	
  current	
  available	
  evidence.	
  	
  	
   2.2.6	
   MOTIVATION	
  While	
  having	
  innate	
  expectations,	
  reasoning	
  principles,	
  and	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  might	
  help	
  the	
  cultural	
  learner	
  to	
  rapidly	
  acquire	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  local	
  norms,	
  merely	
  having	
  this	
  knowledge	
  is	
  inadequate.	
  Individuals	
  must	
  also	
  be	
  motivated	
  to	
  act	
  on	
  those	
  norms	
  in	
  the	
  appropriate	
  contexts.	
  Selection	
  pressures	
  for	
  individuals	
  who	
  are	
  effectively	
  able	
  to	
  comply	
  and	
  enforce	
  norms	
  could	
  have	
  co-­‐opted	
  existing	
  psychological	
  architecture	
  evolved	
  for	
  motivating	
  adaptive	
  responses	
  to	
  threats	
  and	
  opportunities	
  in	
  the	
  environment—the	
  emotional	
  system—to	
  regulate	
  adherence	
  to	
  norms.	
  These	
  motivations	
  can	
  come	
  from	
  external	
  or	
  internal	
  sources:	
  from	
  fear	
  of	
  punishment,	
  or	
  from	
  an	
  internalized	
  desire	
  to	
  do	
  so	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  good	
  or	
  right	
  thing	
  to	
  do.	
  Internalized	
  motivation	
  can	
  take	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  psychological	
  reward	
  when	
  we	
  successfully	
  comply	
  (e.g.	
  pride),	
  aversive	
  feelings	
  when	
  we	
  transgress	
  (e.g.	
  shame),	
  and	
  the	
  desire	
  to	
  get	
  even	
  or	
  inflict	
  harm	
  (e.g.	
  anger)	
  when	
  we	
  witness	
  a	
  norm	
  being	
  violated	
  (Fehr	
  &	
  Gächter,	
  2002;	
  Fessler,	
  2007;	
  Tracy,	
  2007).	
  	
  Evidence	
  for	
  internalization	
  of	
  norms	
  come	
  from	
  fMRI	
  studies	
  showing	
  that	
  violating	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  otherwise	
  automatized	
  norms	
  by	
  breaking	
  promises,	
  or	
  causing	
  harm	
  to	
  an	
  individual	
  (for	
  utilitarian	
  reasons)	
  require	
  a	
  deliberate	
  override	
  of	
  automatic	
  decision	
  pathways	
  that	
  engage	
  the	
  emotional	
  centres	
  by	
  brain	
  regions	
  responsible	
  for	
  cognitive	
  control	
  and	
  abstract	
  reasoning	
  (Baumgartner,	
  Fischbacher,	
  Feierabend,	
  Lutz,	
  &	
  Fehr,	
  2009;	
  Greene,	
  Nystrom,	
  Engell,	
  Darley,	
  &	
  Cohen,	
  2004).	
  Baumgartner	
  and	
  colleagues	
  find	
  that	
  while	
  making	
  a	
  promise,	
  individuals	
  who	
  then	
  break	
  the	
  promise	
  experience	
  anticipatory	
  activation	
  of	
  the	
  insula,	
  implicated	
  in	
  anticipation	
  of	
  aversive	
  events	
  and	
  threat	
  of	
  punishment,	
  and	
  the	
  striatum,	
  commonly	
  observed	
  during	
  tasks	
  when	
  individuals	
  suppress	
  a	
  prepotent	
  or	
   	
   13	
   frequent	
  response.	
  Further,	
  they	
  found	
  that	
  during	
  actual	
  promise-­‐breaking,	
  participants	
  experience	
  activation	
  of	
  the	
  lateral	
  PFC,	
  brain	
  regions	
  previously	
  found	
  to	
  play	
  an	
  essential	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  and	
  suppression	
  of	
  cognitions	
  and	
  behaviours.	
  The	
  timing	
  of	
  these	
  activations	
  suggest	
  that	
  in	
  making	
  the	
  decision	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  false	
  promise,	
  individuals	
  were	
  suppressing	
  the	
  more	
  automatic	
  urge	
  to	
  be	
  honest,	
  while	
  anticipating	
  negative	
  outcomes	
  such	
  as	
  punishment.	
  Thus,	
  complying	
  with	
  honesty	
  norms	
  seems	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  automatic	
  response	
  path,	
  and	
  anticipating	
  violating	
  the	
  norm	
  activates	
  brain	
  regions	
  that	
  generate	
  aversive	
  experiences,	
  presumably	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  disincentive	
  to	
  the	
  individual	
  for	
  following	
  through	
  with	
  breaking	
  the	
  norm.	
  These	
  normative-­‐automatic	
  responses	
  and	
  aversive	
  activations	
  in	
  anticipation	
  of	
  norm-­‐breaking	
  are	
  then	
  overridden	
  by	
  higher	
  order	
  cognitive	
  control	
  and	
  reasoning	
  centres	
  when	
  the	
  deliberate	
  choice	
  of	
  breaking	
  the	
  norm	
  is	
  made.	
  	
  Greene	
  et	
  al	
  used	
  trolley	
  and	
  footbridge	
  dilemmas	
  to	
  find	
  the	
  neural	
  substrates	
  of	
  moral	
  judgments.	
  The	
  trolley	
  problem	
  (described	
  earlier	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  Universal	
  Moral	
  Grammar)	
  involved	
  an	
  actor	
  in	
  the	
  scenario	
  making	
  a	
  tradeoff	
  between	
  passively	
  allowing	
  a	
  runaway	
  trolley	
  headed	
  for	
  5	
  people	
  to	
  continue	
  on	
  its	
  track	
  vs.	
  actively	
  flipping	
  a	
  switch	
  and	
  thereby	
  killing	
  1	
  person	
  on	
  an	
  alternate	
  track.	
  The	
  footbridge	
  problem	
  has	
  the	
  same	
  tradeoff	
  structure,	
  except	
  instead	
  of	
  flipping	
  a	
  switch,	
  the	
  actor	
  physically	
  pushes	
  an	
  innocent	
  bystander	
  off	
  a	
  footbridge	
  above	
  the	
  trolley	
  tracks.	
  While	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  the	
  potential	
  tradeoffs	
  are	
  equivalent,	
  participants	
  found	
  the	
  tradeoff	
  in	
  the	
  trolley	
  dilemma	
  much	
  more	
  acceptable	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  footbridge	
  dilemma.	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  the	
  footbridge	
  scenario	
  produced	
  stronger	
  activation	
  of	
  aversive	
  emotions	
  than	
  the	
  trolley	
  dilemma,	
  which	
  led	
  to	
  lower	
  permissibility	
  judgments.	
  The	
  authors	
  explain	
  the	
  difference	
  in	
  strength	
  of	
  activation	
  as	
  being	
  due	
  to	
  differences	
  in	
  the	
  type	
  of	
  morals	
  being	
  violated—personal	
  norms	
  producing	
  stronger	
  activation	
  than	
  impersonal	
  norms	
  (footbridge	
  being	
  the	
  former	
  and	
  trolley	
  the	
  latter).	
  However,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  that	
  what	
  is	
  being	
  called	
  “personal”	
  vs.	
  “impersonal”	
  is	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  physical	
  proximity,	
  which	
  can	
  be	
  translated	
  into	
  the	
  perceived	
  level	
  of	
  direct	
  responsibility	
  that	
  can	
  be	
  attributed	
  to	
   	
   14	
   the	
  person	
  violating	
  harm	
  norms.	
  An	
  act	
  that	
  carries	
  greater	
  direct	
  responsibility	
  for	
  inflicting	
  harm	
  on	
  an	
  innocent	
  bystander	
  may	
  be	
  seen	
  as	
  a	
  more	
  severe	
  violation	
  of	
  harm	
  norms	
  than	
  a	
  more	
  physically	
  distant	
  act,	
  which	
  may	
  also	
  be	
  perceived	
  as	
  more	
  causally	
  removed	
  from	
  the	
  outcome.	
  Though	
  the	
  exact	
  explanation	
  for	
  the	
  difference	
  has	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  elucidated,	
  overall	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  evaluating	
  behaviours	
  that	
  harm	
  another	
  individual,	
  even	
  for	
  utilitarian	
  purposes,	
  activates	
  brain	
  centres	
  that	
  produce	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reactions	
  and	
  the	
  strength	
  of	
  activation	
  is	
  negatively	
  related	
  to	
  the	
  judged	
  degree	
  of	
  permissibility	
  of	
  violations	
  of	
  harm	
  norms.	
  	
  On	
  the	
  flip	
  side,	
  behaving	
  in	
  a	
  norm-­‐consistent	
  manner	
  by	
  cooperating,	
  punishing	
  violations,	
  or	
  contributing	
  to	
  public	
  goods	
  activates	
  the	
  brain’s	
  reward	
  circuits	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  manner	
  as	
  obtaining	
  a	
  direct	
  cash	
  payment	
  (De	
  Quervain,	
  et	
  al.,	
  2004;	
  	
  Fehr	
  &	
  Camerer,	
  2007;	
  Tabibnia,	
  Satpute,	
  &	
  Lieberman,	
  2008),	
  suggesting	
  that	
  complying	
  with	
  norms	
  is	
  rewarding	
  in	
  the	
  brain	
  the	
  same	
  way	
  that	
  getting	
  a	
  personally	
  beneficial	
  item	
  does.	
  Similarly,	
  studies	
  using	
  self-­‐report	
  show	
  that	
  acting	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  prescribed	
  fairness	
  (equal	
  division)	
  norms	
  by	
  giving	
  half	
  of	
  a	
  windfall	
  monetary	
  gain	
  to	
  a	
  recipient	
  predicts	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  happiness,	
  and	
  receiving	
  feedback	
  that	
  one’s	
  actions	
  has	
  conformed	
  to	
  one’s	
  group	
  norms	
  of	
  helping	
  predict	
  increases	
  in	
  pride	
  (Christensen,	
  Rothgerber,	
  Wood,	
  &	
  Matz,	
  2004;	
  Dunn,	
  Aknin,	
  &	
  Norton,	
  2008).	
  	
  From	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  a	
  third	
  party	
  not	
  directly	
  engaged	
  in	
  the	
  normative	
  behaviour,	
  observing	
  violation	
  of	
  cooperative	
  norms	
  as	
  measured	
  by	
  low	
  contributions	
  to	
  public	
  goods	
  game	
  produces	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  anger,	
  and	
  predicts	
  commensurate	
  levels	
  of	
  altruistic	
  punishment	
  of	
  the	
  low	
  contributors	
  (at	
  a	
  personal	
  cost,	
  with	
  no	
  material	
  gains;	
  Fehr	
  &	
  Gächter,	
  2002).	
  When	
  feelings	
  of	
  anger	
  are	
  artificially	
  reduced	
  via	
  low-­‐doses	
  of	
  the	
  dopamine	
  receptor	
  antagonist	
  sulpiride	
  (verified	
  by	
  different	
  measures	
  of	
  anger),	
  participants	
  experienced	
  a	
  related	
  deficit	
  in	
  motivations	
  to	
  punish	
  as	
  measured	
  by	
  subjects’	
  willingness	
  to	
  punish	
  others	
  for	
  violations	
  of	
  fairness	
  norms	
  (Lawrence	
  et	
  al.,	
  2002).	
  Thus,	
  third	
  parties’	
  motivation	
  to	
  punish	
  observed	
  norm	
  violations	
  is	
  mediated	
  by	
  emotional	
  processes	
  such	
  that	
   	
   15	
   more	
  intense	
  experiences	
  of	
  punitive	
  emotion	
  motivate	
  allocating	
  more	
  resources	
  to	
  punishing	
  transgressors.	
  	
  The	
  studies	
  described	
  above	
  variously	
  show	
  that	
  compliance	
  and	
  violation	
  of	
  norms	
  have	
  consequences	
  deep	
  in	
  the	
  body	
  and	
  brain—affective	
  experiences	
  can	
  serve	
  as	
  proximate	
  arbitrators	
  of	
  reward	
  and	
  punishment,	
  producing	
  adaptive	
  responses	
  to	
  norms	
  by	
  efficiently	
  motivate	
  norm	
  adherence	
  and	
  enforcement,	
  and	
  possibly	
  prospective	
  deterrents	
  of	
  future	
  transgressions.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   16	
   CHAPTER	
  3	
   TEST	
  1:	
  EVOLVED	
  COGNITIVE	
  SPECIALIZATION	
  FOR	
  NORM	
  LEARNING	
   	
  3.1	
   INTRODUCTION	
  	
   	
  Theories	
  of	
  norms	
  have	
  yet	
  to	
  offer	
  a	
  satisfactory	
  account	
  of	
  how	
  individuals	
  learn	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  norms.	
  Existing	
  models	
  operate	
  under	
  implicit	
  assumptions	
  that	
  cultural	
  learners	
  either	
  rely	
  on	
  explicit	
  statements	
  and	
  corrective	
  feedback	
  to	
  glean	
  norm	
  content,	
  or	
  that	
  by	
  observation,	
  learners	
  somehow	
  magically	
  figure	
  out	
  which	
  behaviours	
  are	
  normative.	
  These	
  assumptions	
  are	
  problematic.	
  First,	
  we	
  know	
  from	
  extensive	
  research	
  in	
  comparative	
  and	
  developmental	
  psychology,	
  that	
  imitation	
  and	
  observational	
  learning	
  is	
  an	
  important	
  route	
  by	
  which	
  humans	
  learn	
  cultural	
  knowledge	
  (Gergely,	
  Bekkering,	
  &	
  Kiraly,	
  2002;	
  Grusec	
  &	
  Abramovitch,	
  1982;	
  Whiten,	
  1998).	
  Second,	
  positing	
  that	
  individuals	
  just	
  know	
  what	
  the	
  norms	
  are	
  by	
  observation	
  glosses	
  over	
  complex	
  processes	
  by	
  which	
  massive	
  amounts	
  of	
  perceptual	
  input	
  are	
  filtered,	
  to	
  identify	
  the	
  select	
  fitness-­‐relevant	
  information	
  that	
  need	
  attending	
  to.	
  Since	
  information	
  can	
  be	
  fitness-­‐relevant	
  in	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  ways	
  and	
  thus	
  require	
  different	
  responses	
  from	
  the	
  individual,	
  identifying	
  the	
  type	
  of	
  event	
  and	
  how	
  it	
  is	
  relevant	
  to	
  one’s	
  fitness	
  is	
  another	
  challenging	
  cognitive	
  process	
  that	
  necessitates	
  explanation.	
  A	
  culture-­‐gene	
  co-­‐evolutionary	
  account	
  of	
  social	
  norms	
  outlined	
  in	
  the	
  preceding	
  chapter	
  can	
  offer	
  testable	
  predictions	
  for	
  a	
  suite	
  of	
  cognitive	
  abilities	
  that	
  evolved	
  in	
  tandem	
  with	
  ever	
  more	
  intensive	
  group-­‐living	
  to	
  facilitate	
  learning	
  normative	
  information.	
  These	
  should	
  involve	
  expectations	
  about	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  norms,	
  and	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  in	
  perception,	
  enhanced	
  cognitive	
  accessibility,	
  and	
  domain-­‐specific	
  reasoning	
  or	
  inference	
  abilities	
  relating	
  to	
  norms.	
  	
  	
   	
   17	
   	
  3.2	
   OPERATIONALIZING	
  THE	
  HYPOTHESES	
  Cognitive	
  scientists	
  who	
  adopt	
  a	
  functionalist	
  perspective	
  have	
  argued	
  that	
  our	
  memory	
  systems	
  evolved	
  to	
  solve	
  fitness-­‐relevant	
  problems	
  (Nairne,	
  Pandeirada,	
  Gregory,	
  &	
  Van	
  Arsdall,	
  2009).	
  In	
  this	
  regard,	
  it	
  is	
  unlikely	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  perfect	
  record	
  of	
  the	
  past,	
  but	
  to	
  be	
  biased	
  to	
  retain	
  information	
  in	
  a	
  way	
  that	
  facilitates	
  using	
  past	
  learning	
  in	
  the	
  service	
  of	
  the	
  present,	
  or	
  perhaps	
  to	
  prepare	
  for	
  its	
  recurrence	
  in	
  the	
  future	
  (Suddendorf	
  &	
  Corballis,	
  2007;	
  Tulving,	
  2002).	
  Research	
  has	
  shown	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  strong	
  relationship	
  between	
  the	
  recurrence	
  of	
  information	
  in	
  the	
  natural	
  environment	
  and	
  their	
  rate	
  of	
  forgetting,	
  suggesting	
  that	
  retention	
  depends	
  on	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  information	
  will	
  be	
  needed	
  in	
  the	
  future	
  (Schooler	
  &	
  Hertwig,	
  2005).	
  Norms	
  regulate	
  behaviour	
  that	
  not	
  only	
  have	
  a	
  high	
  probability	
  of	
  recurrence,	
  but	
  also	
  carry	
  fitness	
  implications	
  for	
  the	
  person	
  learning	
  it.	
  Thus,	
  we	
  should	
  observe	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  for	
  potentially	
  normative	
  social	
  information	
  (operationalized	
  below	
  as	
  either	
  explicit	
  labeling,	
  or	
  gleaned	
  through	
  cues	
  via	
  observation),	
  compared	
  to	
  asocial	
  information.	
  	
  H1:	
  Normative	
  information	
  will	
  be	
  better	
  recalled	
  than	
  asocial	
  information.	
  	
  We	
  predict	
  that	
  any	
  information	
  that	
  increases	
  the	
  perception	
  of	
  normativity	
  should	
  strengthen	
  activation	
  of	
  norm	
  psychology.	
  If	
  H1	
  is	
  correct	
  and	
  we	
  have	
  enhanced	
  memory	
  for	
  normative	
  information,	
  then	
  increasing	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  certainty	
  of	
  normativity	
  should	
  enhance	
  recall	
  H2:	
  Information	
  (cues)	
  that	
  increases	
  the	
  confidence	
  that	
  a	
  phenomenon	
  is	
  norm-­‐governed	
  will	
  increase	
  the	
  accuracy	
  and	
  rate	
  of	
  recall	
  	
  So	
  what	
  aspects	
  of	
  behaviour	
  might	
  be	
  indicative	
  of	
  normativity?	
  One	
  way	
  in	
  which	
  we	
  learn	
  that	
  something	
  is	
  normative	
  is	
  by	
  other	
  people	
  telling	
  us	
  so	
  explicitly.	
  Barring	
  any	
  deceptive	
  intentions,	
  explicitly	
  labeling	
  something	
  lends	
  it	
  the	
  greatest	
  confidence	
  of	
  normativity.	
  	
  H2a:	
  Explicitly	
  labeling	
  a	
  phenomenon	
  as	
  being	
  due	
  to	
  a	
  norm	
  will	
  lead	
  to	
  better	
  recall	
   	
   18	
   In	
  addition	
  to	
  explicit	
  teachings	
  by	
  others,	
  one	
  might	
  also	
  learn	
  about	
  norms	
  from	
  observations.	
  However,	
  multiple	
  factors	
  may	
  motivate	
  an	
  action	
  or	
  observed	
  artifact,	
  not	
  all	
  of	
  them	
  due	
  to	
  rules	
  and	
  expectations,	
  but	
  to	
  causes	
  such	
  as	
  personal	
  preference.	
  As	
  set	
  out	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  individual	
  psychologies	
  should	
  have	
  evolved	
  to	
  be	
  attune	
  to	
  even	
  very	
  subtle	
  cues	
  suggesting	
  that	
  equilibrium	
  behaviour	
  exists	
  for	
  a	
  given	
  situation.	
  Since	
  the	
  prevalence	
  of	
  the	
  equilibrium	
  behaviour	
  is	
  very	
  high	
  at	
  norm-­‐equilibria,	
  high	
  frequency	
  of	
  occurrence	
  might	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  a	
  cue	
  of	
  normativity	
  and	
  increase	
  recall	
  of	
  the	
  high	
  frequency	
  event	
  or	
  behaviour.	
  	
  H2b:	
  Social	
  phenomena	
  (e.g.	
  behaviours)	
  higher	
  in	
  frequency	
  is	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  coded	
  as	
  normative,	
  leading	
  to	
  better	
  recall	
  	
  A	
  second	
  potential	
  cue	
  for	
  inferring	
  that	
  an	
  observed	
  behaviour	
  is	
  governed	
  by	
  a	
  norm	
  is	
  the	
  expression	
  of	
  a	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reaction.	
  Violation	
  of	
  a	
  norm	
  will	
  usually	
  garner	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reactions,	
  such	
  as	
  anger,	
  or	
  disgust,	
  to	
  signal	
  annoyance,	
  and	
  a	
  willingness	
  or	
  propensity	
  to	
  inflict	
  punishment	
  on	
  the	
  violator	
  (Fehr	
  &	
  Gächter,	
  2002;	
  Rozin,	
  1999;	
  Wilson	
  &	
  O'Gorman,	
  2003).	
  	
  A	
  cultural	
  learner	
  seeking	
  to	
  learn	
  norms	
  and	
  avoid	
  punishment	
  him/herself	
  should	
  thus	
  use	
  people’s	
  expressions	
  of	
  negative	
  emotions	
  as	
  a	
  cue	
  that	
  a	
  norm	
  violation	
  has	
  occurred.	
  Emotive	
  cues	
  should	
  likewise	
  enhance	
  recall,	
  and	
  the	
  likelihood	
  with	
  which	
  an	
  inference	
  about	
  the	
  applicability	
  of	
  the	
  behaviour	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts	
  will	
  be	
  made.	
  H2c:	
  Social	
  phenomena	
  that	
  evoke	
  a	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  in	
  observer(s)	
  is	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  coded	
  as	
  normative,	
  leading	
  to	
  better	
  recall	
  Further,	
  because	
  deviations	
  from	
  norm	
  equilibria	
  are	
  usually	
  associated	
  with	
  costly	
  consequences,	
  error	
  management	
  concerns	
  should	
  produce	
  a	
  perceptual	
  bias	
  towards	
  perceiving	
  observed	
  behaviours	
  as	
  governed	
  by	
  norms	
  even	
  when	
  there	
  is	
  scant	
  evidence	
  or	
  few	
  cues	
  of	
  normativity.	
  Such	
  biases	
  in	
  cognition	
  may	
  take	
  place	
  in	
  our	
  minds	
  because	
  it	
  presents	
  one	
  with	
  useful	
  and	
  adaptive	
  representations	
  for	
  navigating	
  the	
  world	
  (Haselton,	
  et	
  al.,	
  2009;	
  McKay	
  &	
  Efferson,	
  2010).	
  	
   	
   19	
   H3:	
  Normative	
  information	
  will	
  be	
  more	
  readily	
  generalized	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts,	
  that	
  is,	
  people	
  will	
  make	
  inferences	
  about	
  the	
  applicability	
  of	
  behaviours	
  from	
  a	
  single	
  observed	
  instance	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts.	
  This	
  readiness	
  to	
  infer	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  norms	
  should	
  also	
  rapidly	
  increase	
  with	
  confidence	
  or	
  certainty.	
  Therefore,	
  H3a:	
  Explicitly	
  labeling	
  a	
  phenomenon	
  as	
  being	
  due	
  to	
  a	
  norm	
  will	
  lead	
  to	
  more	
  accurate	
  inferences	
  about	
  the	
  applicability	
  of	
  the	
  phenomenon	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts	
  H3b:	
  Social	
  phenomena	
  that	
  occur	
  higher	
  in	
  frequency	
  is	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  coded	
  as	
  normative,	
  and	
  should	
  lead	
  to	
  more	
  inferences	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts	
  H3c:	
  Social	
  phenomena	
  that	
  evoke	
  a	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  in	
  observer(s)	
  is	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  coded	
  as	
  normative,	
  and	
  should	
  lead	
  to	
  more	
  inferences	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts.	
  	
  	
  3.3	
   TESTING	
  THE	
  PREDICTIONS	
  To	
  test	
  the	
  above	
  predictions,	
  we	
  created	
  four	
  versions	
  of	
  a	
  vignette	
  about	
  a	
  fictitious	
  land,	
  each	
  version	
  manipulating	
  the	
  cues	
  or	
  signals	
  of	
  normativity	
  discussed	
  in	
  the	
  hypotheses	
  above.	
  Comparisons	
  of	
  recall	
  (H1)	
  between	
  information	
  types	
  were	
  done	
  within	
  subjects.	
  	
  Hypotheses	
  about	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  for	
  sensitivity	
  to	
  cues	
  and	
  their	
  influence	
  on	
  later	
  recall	
  (H2)	
  and	
  inference	
  (H3)	
  were	
  tested	
  across	
  participants	
  and	
  conditions.	
  Using	
  fictitious	
  vignettes	
  allowed	
  us	
  to	
  present	
  participants	
  with	
  information	
  about	
  a	
  novel	
  environment	
  for	
  which	
  they	
  were	
  guaranteed	
  not	
  to	
  have	
  prior	
  knowledge.	
  Presenting	
  information	
  that	
  is	
  equally	
  unfamiliar	
  to	
  all	
  participants	
  partially	
  gets	
  around	
  the	
  problem	
  of	
  importing	
  specific	
  content	
  resulting	
  from	
  cultural	
  learning	
  (though	
  not	
  expectations	
  for	
  certain	
  types	
  of	
  behaviours	
  to	
  be	
  governed	
  by	
  rules)	
  to	
  influence	
  the	
  cognitive	
  tasks	
  required	
  for	
  this	
  experiment.	
  The	
  use	
  of	
  vignettes	
  may	
  seem	
  an	
  indirect	
  way	
  to	
  assess	
  evolutionarily	
  derived	
  hypotheses	
  of	
  cognitive	
  functioning	
  that	
  predate	
  the	
  written	
   	
   20	
   word.	
  However,	
  not	
  only	
  does	
  reading	
  successfully	
  evoke	
  imagery	
  and	
  emotional	
  experiences	
  in	
  humans	
  (Gottschall	
  &	
  Wilson,	
  2005),	
  recall	
  of	
  specific	
  words	
  can	
  be	
  affected	
  by	
  their	
  relevance	
  to	
  fitness	
  (Nairne,	
  Thompson,	
  &	
  Pandeirada,	
  2007).	
  This	
  suggests	
  that	
  text-­‐based	
  stimuli	
  can	
  be	
  a	
  valid	
  way	
  to	
  test	
  for	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  associated	
  with	
  information	
  hypothesized	
  to	
  have	
  differential	
  relevance	
  to	
  fitness.	
  	
  	
   3.3.1	
  	
   METHOD	
   Participants	
   Participants	
  were	
  163	
  undergraduates	
  (118	
  females	
  (72%);	
  age	
  ranging	
  from	
  17-­‐42,	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  of	
  20.7	
  years,	
  SD=4.19)	
  from	
  the	
  Psychology	
  Department	
  Human	
  Subject	
  Pool	
  at	
  UBC,	
  who	
  participated	
  for	
  course	
  credit.	
  Participants	
  completed	
  the	
  study	
  on	
  a	
  computer	
  in	
  a	
  solitary	
  cubicle,	
  and	
  each	
  session	
  lasted	
  for	
  a	
  maximum	
  duration	
  of	
  30	
  minutes.	
   Materials	
   Four	
  versions	
  of	
  a	
  vignette	
  corresponding	
  to	
  the	
  four	
  conditions	
  (control,	
  frequency	
  cue,	
  emotive	
  cue,	
  explicit	
  statements)	
  were	
  created,	
  written	
  from	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  an	
  explorer	
  in	
  a	
  fictitious	
  land	
  called	
  Ove	
  (see	
  Appendix).	
  Vignettes	
  contain	
  9	
  paragraphs,	
  offering	
  a	
  first	
  hand	
  account	
  of	
  people,	
  events	
  and	
  surroundings	
  observed	
  during	
  the	
  explorer’s	
  visit.	
  Vignettes	
  were	
  constructed	
  as	
  a	
  coherent	
  narrative	
  that	
  details	
  the	
  explorer’s	
  experience	
  on	
  the	
  first	
  day	
  in	
  a	
  foreign	
  land.	
  Vignettes	
  were	
  constructed	
  with	
  comparable	
  items	
  that	
  belong	
  to	
  2	
  broad	
  categories	
  of	
  information:	
  social	
  information	
  that	
  could	
  be	
  normative	
  (e.g.	
  greeting,	
  clothing,	
  ritual)	
  and	
  asocial	
  information	
  (e.g.	
  plant,	
  bird,	
  terrain).	
  While	
  much	
  social	
  information	
  has	
  the	
  potential	
  to	
  be	
  normative,	
  asocial	
  information	
  rarely	
  does.	
  Thus,	
  accompanying	
  cues	
  of	
  normativity	
  should	
  activate	
  norm	
  psychology	
  to	
  aid	
  in	
  identifying,	
  retaining	
  and	
  generating	
  inferences	
  about	
  social	
  information,	
  while	
  the	
  predicted	
  enhancements	
  should	
  not	
  take	
  for	
  asocial	
  information.	
  Within	
  these	
  broad	
   	
   21	
   categories,	
  four	
  targets—two	
  of	
  each	
  kind	
  (greeting,	
  style	
  of	
  dress,	
  which	
  are	
  social	
  information,	
  and	
  potentially	
  normative;	
  bird,	
  and	
  terrain	
  which	
  are	
  asocial,	
  and	
  cannot	
  be	
  normative)	
  —were	
  manipulated	
  or	
  varied	
  according	
  to	
  their	
  respective	
  conditions;	
  the	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  vignette	
  were	
  kept	
  constant	
  across	
  the	
  control,	
  frequency,	
  emotional	
  reaction,	
  and	
  explicit	
  statement	
  conditions.	
  	
  All	
  experimental	
  conditions	
  were	
  varied	
  with	
  respect	
  (in	
  contrast)	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  and	
  only	
  the	
  4	
  target	
  pieces	
  of	
  information	
  were	
  varied	
  in	
  each	
  of	
  them.	
  In	
  the	
  high	
  frequency	
  condition,	
  every	
  target	
  appeared	
  once	
  more	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  at	
  a	
  different	
  point	
  in	
  the	
  story.	
  In	
  the	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  condition,	
  a	
  frown	
  or	
  a	
  sigh	
  accompanied	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  4	
  targets.	
  In	
  the	
  explicit	
  statement	
  condition,	
  a	
  sentence	
  of	
  explanation	
  regarding	
  the	
  target	
  accompanied	
  each	
  target;	
  for	
  example,	
  a	
  local	
  explains	
  the	
  name	
  and	
  habitat	
  of	
  the	
  bird	
  and	
  explains	
  that	
  the	
  greeting	
  gesture	
  is	
  among	
  adults.	
  	
  To	
  test	
  hypotheses	
  H1	
  and	
  H2,	
  a	
  measure	
  of	
  memory	
  recall	
  was	
  created.	
  A	
  recall	
  question	
  was	
  derived	
  for	
  each	
  piece	
  of	
  target	
  information	
  in	
  the	
  vignettes,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  other	
  comparable	
  non-­‐target	
  information	
  in	
  the	
  vignettes.	
  Each	
  question	
  presented	
  1	
  correct	
  and	
  3	
  distracter	
  options.	
  12	
  MC	
  recall	
  questions	
  were	
  created	
  in	
  total.	
  	
  A	
  first	
  test	
  for	
  whether	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  social	
  information	
  has	
  been	
  encoded	
  as	
  potentially	
  normative	
  is	
  to	
  ask:	
  do	
  people	
  make	
  inferences	
  to	
  situations	
  outside	
  what	
  has	
  been	
  directly	
  observed?	
  How	
  do	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  explicit	
  explanation	
  and	
  emotive	
  and	
  frequency	
  cues	
  influence	
  the	
  rate	
  and	
  accuracy	
  of	
  inferences?	
  To	
  investigate	
  this,	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  multiple	
  choice	
  inference	
  questions	
  was	
  created	
  based	
  only	
  on	
  the	
  social	
  targets.	
  Each	
  question	
  placed	
  an	
  Ovean	
  person/people	
  in	
  a	
  context	
  that	
  was	
  not	
  present	
  in	
  the	
  vignette	
  and	
  asked	
  participants	
  what	
  they	
  would	
  expect	
  them	
  to	
  do	
  in	
  that	
  unfamiliar	
  context.	
  Answer	
  options	
  consisted	
  of	
  1	
  anticipated	
  choice	
  (based	
  on	
  the	
  manner	
  and	
  context	
  of	
  occurrence	
  in	
  the	
  vignette)	
  and	
  2	
  distracters,	
  and	
  a	
  fourth,	
  “No	
  inference	
  can	
  be	
  made	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  text”	
  option.	
  	
  	
   	
   22	
   Procedures	
   Upon	
  arrival	
  at	
  the	
  study	
  session,	
  participants	
  signed	
  a	
  consent	
  form	
  and	
  were	
  seated	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  a	
  computer	
  in	
  a	
  private	
  cubicle.	
  They	
  were	
  presented	
  with	
  a	
  point-­‐form	
  overview	
  of	
  all	
  study	
  components,	
  and	
  then	
  given	
  the	
  following	
  instructions.	
  	
  “Imagine	
  you	
  are	
  an	
  explorer,	
  and	
  that	
  you	
  will	
  soon	
  be	
  visiting	
  Ove	
  to	
  study	
  the	
  Ovean	
  way	
  of	
  life,	
  and	
  everything	
  about	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  live.	
  The	
  following	
  account	
  is	
  the	
  only	
  source	
  of	
  information	
  for	
  you	
  about	
  Ove.	
  This	
  is	
  your	
  one	
  and	
  only	
  opportunity	
  to	
  correctly	
  observe	
  the	
  place	
  and	
  the	
  people,	
  so	
  it	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  earn	
  as	
  much	
  about	
  Ove	
  as	
  possible	
  from	
  the	
  account.”	
  	
  These	
  instructions	
  were	
  intended	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  fitness-­‐relevant	
  situation	
  to	
  motivate	
  participants	
  to	
  pay	
  attention,	
  while	
  remaining	
  as	
  neutral	
  as	
  possible	
  regarding	
  what	
  content	
  participants	
  should	
  pay	
  attention	
  to.	
  Participants	
  proceeded	
  to	
  read	
  1	
  of	
  4	
  vignettes	
  created	
  for	
  the	
  condition	
  to	
  which	
  they	
  were	
  randomly	
  assigned.	
  After	
  reading	
  the	
  vignette,	
  they	
  completed	
  a	
  distracter	
  task	
  consisting	
  of	
  GRE-­‐type	
  word	
  analogies	
  and	
  arithmetic	
  questions,	
  before	
  moving	
  on	
  to	
  the	
  DV’s	
  of	
  interest.	
  First,	
  participants	
  answered	
  MC	
  questions	
  regarding	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  targets,	
  asocial	
  targets,	
  and	
  non-­‐target	
  items.	
  Next,	
  participants	
  completed	
  the	
  inference	
  questions	
  about	
  social	
  items.	
  Instructions	
  were	
  clear	
  that	
  this	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  test	
  of	
  recall;	
  participants	
  were	
  asked	
  to	
  make	
  guesses	
  based	
  on	
  impressions	
  they	
  may	
  have	
  formed	
  while	
  reading	
  the	
  text,	
  and	
  to	
  select	
  answer	
  options	
  that	
  reflect	
  what	
  they	
  think	
  might	
  be	
  the	
  case.	
  Finally,	
  participants	
  answered	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  demographics	
  questions,	
  were	
  debriefed	
  and	
  given	
  course	
  credit.	
  	
  	
   3.3.2	
   RESULTS	
  AND	
  DISCUSSION	
  Recall	
  questions	
  were	
  coded	
  for	
  correct	
  answers.	
  The	
  social	
  target	
  of	
  women’s	
  dress	
  style	
  referred	
  to	
  in	
  Recall	
  Q5	
  contained	
  an	
  error	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  and	
  explicit	
  statement	
  vignettes	
  for	
  a	
  portion	
  of	
  participants.	
  Therefore,	
  the	
  67	
  affected	
   	
   23	
   participants	
  were	
  omitted	
  in	
  the	
  analyses	
  of	
  main	
  effects	
  of	
  social	
  vs.	
  asocial	
  targets.	
  In	
  the	
  remaining	
  analyses,	
  answers	
  for	
  Q5	
  will	
  be	
  omitted	
  only	
  in	
  these	
  two	
  conditions	
  (1	
  fewer	
  item	
  in	
  these	
  two	
  conditions	
  only	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  67	
  participants).	
  	
   Descriptions	
  of	
  overall	
  recall	
  rates	
   Overall,	
  looking	
  at	
  the	
  67	
  participants	
  with	
  one	
  omitted	
  recall	
  item,	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  and	
  explicit	
  conditions	
  obtained	
  between	
  7	
  and	
  11	
  correct	
  answers	
  (11	
  was	
  the	
  maximum	
  possible	
  score),	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  score	
  of	
  9.17	
  or	
  83%	
  (S.D.=1.26	
  or	
  11.5%),	
  while	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  frequency	
  and	
  emotion	
  conditions	
  scored	
  between	
  6	
  and	
  12	
  correct	
  answers	
  (out	
  of	
  a	
  possible	
  12),	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  score	
  of	
  9.32	
  or	
  78%	
  (S.D.=1.67	
  or	
  13.9%).	
  Looking	
  at	
  the	
  96	
  participants	
  with	
  complete	
  data,	
  across	
  all	
  conditions,	
  participants	
  obtained	
  between	
  3	
  and	
  12	
  correct	
  answers,	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  score	
  of	
  9.71	
  or	
  80.9%	
  (S.D.=1.82	
  or	
  15.17%).	
  	
  	
   Is	
  there	
  a	
  main	
  effect	
  of	
  enhanced	
  recall	
  for	
  potentially	
  normative	
  information?	
  To	
  see	
  if	
  there’s	
  a	
  baseline	
  difference	
  in	
  recall	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  items,	
  we	
  conducted	
  a	
  paired	
  samples	
  t-­‐test	
  comparing	
  mean	
  recall	
  of	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  items	
  for	
  only	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition.	
  The	
  test	
  shows	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  baseline	
  difference	
  in	
  recall	
  between	
  item	
  types	
  (mean	
  difference=0,	
  t(29)=0,	
  p<1.00).	
  Next,	
  we	
  want	
  to	
  see	
  if	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  differential	
  effect	
  of	
  cues	
  and	
  statements	
  on	
  the	
  two	
  item	
  types.	
  Using	
  data	
  from	
  the	
  96	
  participants	
  who	
  were	
  able	
  to	
  answer	
  all	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  recall	
  questions,	
  we	
  conducted	
  a	
  paired	
  samples	
  t-­‐test,	
  comparing	
  mean	
  recall	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  targets	
  with	
  the	
  asocial	
  targets.	
  Analyses	
  reveal	
  significantly	
  better	
  recall	
  on	
  social	
  targets	
  compared	
  to	
  asocial	
  targets	
  across	
  the	
  4	
  conditions	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .156,	
  t(95)	
  =	
  2.233,	
  p<.028.	
  Cohen’s	
  d	
  =	
  .458).	
  	
  A	
  similar	
  recall	
  advantage	
  for	
  potentially	
  normative	
  information	
  is	
  found	
  using	
  the	
  full	
  sample,	
  corrected	
  for	
  the	
  67	
  omitted	
  data	
  points	
  by	
  using	
  a	
  percentage	
  of	
  each	
  individual’s	
  recall	
  of	
  social	
  items	
  and	
  asocial	
  items.	
  I	
  will	
  now	
  refer	
  to	
  this	
  average	
  as	
  the	
  effective	
  average	
  recall	
  (EAR),	
  so	
  called	
  because	
  the	
  denominator	
  of	
  the	
  average	
  is	
  adjusted	
  for	
  the	
  total	
  number	
  of	
  valid	
  questions	
  participants	
  had	
  the	
   	
   24	
   opportunity	
  to	
  answer.	
  In	
  the	
  96	
  participants	
  with	
  complete	
  data,	
  this	
  is	
  calculated	
  as	
  the	
  simple	
  average	
  of	
  scores	
  across	
  both	
  items	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  target	
  types.	
  For	
  the	
  67	
  participants	
  whose	
  Q5’s	
  were	
  omitted	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  and	
  explicit	
  conditions,	
  asocial	
  EAR	
  is	
  calculated	
  similarly,	
  but	
  the	
  effective	
  average	
  recall	
  of	
  social	
  items	
  is	
  just	
  the	
  score	
  on	
  the	
  greeting	
  recall	
  item	
  divided	
  by	
  a	
  possible	
  1.	
  	
  Comparing	
  target	
  types	
  by	
  EAR,	
  the	
  average	
  social	
  score	
  is	
  again	
  significantly	
  higher	
  than	
  average	
  asocial	
  score	
  (mean	
  diff	
  =	
  .074,	
  t(162)=2.635,	
  p=.009.	
  Cohen’s	
  d1	
  =	
  .414).	
  There	
  were	
  no	
  sex	
  differences	
  in	
  level	
  of	
  recall.	
  Given	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  baseline	
  difference	
  in	
  recall	
  between	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  items,	
  this	
  suggests	
  that	
  the	
  experimental	
  cues	
  and	
  statements	
  conferred	
  a	
  greater	
  recall	
  advantage	
  onto	
  the	
  social	
  items	
  than	
  the	
  asocial	
  items,	
  perhaps	
  by	
  rendering	
  the	
  social	
  items	
  more	
  normative.	
  This	
  supports	
  H1.	
  	
   	
   Figure	
  3.1	
   Recall	
  of	
  Normative	
  and	
  Asocial	
  targets.	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   1	
  Rosenthal,	
  1991	
  and	
  Mullen	
  &	
  Rosenthal,	
  1985	
  recommends	
  using	
  paired	
  t-­‐test	
  to	
  compute	
  effect	
  size,	
  but	
  cf.	
  Dunlop,	
  Cortina,	
  Vaslow	
  &	
  Burke	
  1996.	
   1.5	
  1.55	
   1.6	
  1.65	
   1.7	
  1.75	
   1.8	
  1.85	
   Normative	
  targets	
   Asocial	
  targets	
   M ea n 	
  R ec al l	
   	
   25	
   	
   Are	
  the	
  individual	
  cues	
  of	
  normativity	
  effective	
  at	
  enhancing	
  recall?	
  Outcomes	
  of	
  recall	
  questions	
  were	
  binary—they	
  were	
  coded	
  as	
  either	
  correct	
  or	
  incorrect.	
  To	
  analyze	
  this	
  data,	
  we	
  used	
  logistic	
  regression	
  to	
  compare	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  cues,	
  using	
  condition	
  as	
  predictor	
  and	
  recall	
  of	
  social	
  and	
  asocial	
  items	
  as	
  outcome	
  variables.	
  Because	
  each	
  participant	
  provided	
  responses	
  on	
  two	
  recall	
  items,	
  we	
  used	
  clustered	
  robust	
  standard	
  errors	
  to	
  deal	
  with	
  this	
  non-­‐independence,	
  treating	
  each	
  participant	
  as	
  a	
  cluster	
  (2	
  observations	
  per	
  participant)	
  within	
  the	
  cluster.	
  We	
  used	
  participant	
  condition	
  to	
  predict	
  whether	
  the	
  participant	
  got	
  the	
  correct	
  answer	
  for	
  the	
  recall	
  question,	
  with	
  participants’	
  sex	
  as	
  covariate.	
  	
  In	
  the	
  logistic	
  regression	
  with	
  target	
  social	
  items	
  as	
  outcome	
  variables,	
  only	
  the	
  explicit	
  statements	
  condition	
  was	
  significant,	
  predicting	
  higher	
  likelihood	
  of	
  recall	
  compared	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  (O.R.	
  =	
  4.69,	
  z=2.59,	
  p<.01).	
  This	
  means	
  that	
  compared	
  to	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  the	
  odds	
  of	
  getting	
  the	
  correct	
  answer	
  increased	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  4.69	
  for	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  explicit	
  statement	
  condition.	
  Being	
  in	
  frequency	
  and	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  condition	
  increased	
  the	
  odds	
  of	
  accurately	
  recalling	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  1.98	
  and	
  1.06	
  respectively,	
  but	
  while	
  frequency	
  was	
  nearing	
  significance	
  (p=.12),	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  was	
  not	
  (p=.88).	
  Pearson	
  goodness	
  of	
  fit	
  test	
  indicate	
  moderate	
  fit	
  between	
  model	
  and	
  observed	
  data	
  (P[χ2(3)	
  >	
  1.65]	
  =	
  .65).	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   26	
   Table	
  3.1	
  	
   Recall	
  of	
  Social	
  Targets,	
  condition	
  as	
  predictor,	
  sex	
  as	
  covariate.	
  	
   *Model	
  based	
  on	
  161	
  clusters,	
  [P(Pearson	
  Chi-­‐square(3))>1.65]=.65	
  In	
  the	
  model	
  predicting	
  asocial	
  targets,	
  being	
  in	
  an	
  experimental	
  condition	
  did	
  not	
  significantly	
  change	
  the	
  likelihood	
  of	
  recalling	
  asocial	
  targets	
  relative	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition.	
  Participants	
  presented	
  with	
  asocial	
  targets	
  were	
  equally	
  likely	
  to	
  remember	
  them,	
  regardless	
  of	
  whether	
  the	
  targets	
  were	
  accompanied	
  by	
  cues	
  or	
  explicit	
  statements/explanations.	
  The	
  only	
  significant	
  predictor	
  in	
  this	
  model	
  is	
  participants’	
  sex.	
  Being	
  male	
  predicted	
  a	
  decline	
  in	
  accuracy	
  of	
  recall	
  for	
  asocial	
  targets	
  (O.R.	
  =	
  .617,	
  z=-­‐1.99,	
  p<.047).	
  Pearson	
  goodness	
  of	
  fit	
  test	
  indicate	
  that	
  the	
  model	
  is	
  a	
  very	
  good	
  fit	
  to	
  the	
  observed	
  data	
  (P[χ2(3)	
  >	
  .32]	
  =	
  .96).	
  This	
  sex	
  difference	
  in	
  recall	
  of	
  asocial	
  targets	
  may	
  be	
  explained	
  by	
  Silverman	
  and	
  Eals	
  (1992)	
  finding	
  that	
  women	
  are	
  better	
  at	
  remember	
  information	
  in	
  fixed	
  locales	
  than	
  men,	
  which	
  they	
  suggest	
  may	
  be	
  due	
  to	
  adaptations	
  arising	
  from	
  how	
  labor	
  was	
  divided	
  during	
  early	
  environments	
  of	
  adaptation.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Condition	
   Odds	
  Ratio	
   Clustered	
  Robust	
  SE	
   z	
   p	
   95%	
  CI	
   Frequency	
   1.98	
   0.87	
   1.55	
   0.12	
   (.83,	
  4.68)	
   Emotion	
   1.06	
   0.41	
   0.15	
   0.88	
   (.50,	
  2.26)	
   Explicit	
   4.69	
   2.8	
   2.59	
   0.01	
   (1.46,	
  15.10)	
   Sex	
   1.2	
   0.43	
   0.52	
   0.61	
   (.60,	
  2.41)	
   	
   27	
   Table	
  3.2	
   Recall	
  of	
  Asocial	
  Targets,	
  condition	
  as	
  predictor,	
  sex	
  as	
  covariate	
   Model	
  based	
  on	
  161	
  clusters,	
  [P(Pearson	
  Chi-­‐square(3))>.32]=.96	
  Together,	
  these	
  results	
  suggest	
  that	
  experimental	
  manipulations	
  adding	
  providing	
  participants	
  with	
  explicit	
  descriptions	
  differentially	
  increase	
  the	
  rate	
  of	
  accurate	
  recall,	
  enhancing	
  memory	
  specifically	
  for	
  social,	
  and	
  potentially	
  normative	
  information,	
  and	
  less	
  so	
  for	
  information	
  that	
  has	
  no	
  normative	
  potential.	
  These	
  results	
  partially	
  support	
  H2.	
   	
   Figure	
  3.2	
   Probability	
  of	
  accurate	
  recall	
   	
   Control	
   Frequency	
   Emotion	
   Explicit	
  Asocial	
  Target	
   0.81	
   0.84	
   0.71	
   0.8	
  Social	
  Target	
   0.75	
   0.86	
   0.76	
   0.93	
   0.4	
  0.5	
   0.6	
  0.7	
   0.8	
  0.9	
   1	
   P r( ac cu ra te 	
  r ec al l) 	
   Condition	
   Odds	
  Ratio	
   	
  Clustered	
  Robust	
  SE	
   z	
   p	
   95%	
  CI	
   Frequency	
   1.3	
   0.47	
   0.72	
   0.47	
   (.64,	
  2.65)	
   Emotion	
   0.6	
   0.19	
   -­‐1.59	
   0.11	
   (.33,	
  1.12)	
   Explicit	
   1	
   0.35	
   0.01	
   0.99	
   (.51,	
  1.98)	
   Sex	
   0.62	
   0.15	
   -­‐1.99	
   0.047	
   (.38,	
  .99)	
   	
   28	
   What	
  is	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  cues	
  on	
  people’s	
  inferences	
  about	
  social	
  information?	
  Inference	
  questions	
  were	
  based	
  solely	
  on	
  social	
  targets	
  (greeting	
  and	
  clothing).	
  Each	
  question	
  had	
  an	
  anticipated	
  correct	
  answer	
  based	
  on	
  information	
  in	
  the	
  vignette	
  stimulus.	
  Two	
  types	
  of	
  analyses	
  were	
  conducted:	
  the	
  first,	
  looking	
  at	
  whether	
  cues	
  increase	
  the	
  rate	
  of	
  inference	
  (making	
  ANY	
  inference	
  at	
  all	
  regardless	
  of	
  accuracy,	
  operationalized	
  as	
  choosing	
  an	
  option	
  other	
  than	
  d)	
  no	
  inference	
  can	
  be	
  made),	
  and	
  the	
  second,	
  assessing	
  whether	
  cues	
  increase	
  the	
  accuracy	
  of	
  inferences	
  (making	
  the	
  anticipated	
  inference	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  vignette).	
  Tables	
  3.3	
  and	
  3.4	
  below	
  illustrate	
  the	
  probability	
  of	
  making	
  an	
  inference,	
  and	
  also	
  the	
  accuracy	
  of	
  the	
  inferences	
  made,	
  broken	
  down	
  by	
  condition.	
  As	
  you	
  can	
  see,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  tendency	
  for	
  cues	
  to	
  increase	
  both	
  the	
  rate	
  and	
  accuracy	
  of	
  inferences	
  compared	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  and	
  for	
  the	
  explicit	
  statements	
  to	
  have	
  the	
  largest	
  influence,	
  over	
  and	
  above	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  cues.	
  To	
  examine	
  rate	
  of	
  inferences,	
  we	
  coded	
  participants’	
  answers	
  into	
  a	
  binary	
  variable.	
  Choosing	
  “no	
  inference	
  can	
  be	
  made	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  text”	
  was	
  coded	
  as	
  an	
  absence	
  of	
  inference,	
  and	
  the	
  three	
  other	
  choices	
  were	
  collapsed	
  into	
  a	
  single	
  category	
  for	
  when	
  an	
  inference	
  was	
  present.	
  To	
  analyze	
  this	
  data,	
  we	
  used	
  logistic	
  regression.	
  We	
  used	
  clustered	
  robust	
  standard	
  errors	
  to	
  compensate	
  for	
  the	
  correlation	
  in	
  observations	
  between	
  inferences	
  provided	
  by	
  the	
  same	
  participant.	
  Frequency	
  and	
  emotive	
  cues	
  tended	
  but	
  did	
  not	
  significantly	
  increase	
  the	
  rate	
  of	
  inference	
  (O.R.	
  =1.48,	
  p=.24	
  and	
  O.R.	
  =1.54,	
  p=.18	
  respectively),	
  but	
  explicit	
  statements	
  did	
  (O.R.	
  =	
  2.46,	
  z	
  =	
  2.37,	
  p<.018).	
  That	
  is,	
  by	
  being	
  in	
  the	
  explicit	
  statement	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  odds	
  of	
  making	
  an	
  inference	
  increased	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  2.5.	
  The	
  model	
  provided	
  a	
  very	
  good	
  fit	
  to	
  the	
  observed	
  data	
  (P[χ2(8)	
  >	
  2.25]	
  =	
  .972).	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   29	
   Table	
  3.3	
   Rate	
  of	
  Inference	
  about	
  Social	
  Targets	
   Model	
  based	
  on	
  161	
  clusters,	
  [P(Pearson	
  Chi-­‐square(3))>3.18]=.364	
  	
   	
   Figure	
  3.3	
   Rate	
  of	
  Inference	
   	
  What	
  about	
  accuracy	
  of	
  inferences?	
  Three	
  questions	
  (1,	
  3,	
  8)—2	
  about	
  greeting,	
  and	
  1	
  about	
  women’s	
  dress	
  style—were	
  used	
  to	
  conduct	
  these	
  analyses.	
  Multiple	
  items	
  about	
  greeting	
  behaviour	
  was	
  created	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  whether	
  participants	
  were	
  sensitive	
  to	
  the	
  sex	
  and	
  age	
  of	
  interacting	
  partners	
  when	
  they	
  make	
  inferences	
  about	
  the	
   0.66	
   0.74	
   0.75	
   0.82*	
   0.4	
   0.5	
   0.6	
   0.7	
   0.8	
   0.9	
   Control	
   Frequency	
   Emotion	
   Explicit	
   P r( m ak in g	
   an 	
  in fe re n ce )	
   Condition	
   Odds	
  Ratio	
   	
  Clustered	
  Robust	
  SE	
   z	
   p	
   95%	
  CI	
   Frequency	
   1.48	
   0.49	
   1.17	
   0.24	
   (.77,	
  2.84)	
   Emotion	
   1.54	
   0.5	
   1.36	
   0.18	
   (.82,	
  2.90)	
   Explicit	
   2.39	
   0.88	
   2.37	
   0.02	
   (1.16,	
  4.92)	
   Sex	
   1.11	
   0.32	
   0.35	
   0.72	
   (.63,	
  1.97)	
   	
   30	
   applicability	
  of	
  the	
  greeting	
  behaviour.	
  Two	
  of	
  these	
  inference	
  questions	
  were	
  included	
  in	
  this	
  analysis	
  because	
  the	
  context	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  were	
  placed	
  were	
  similar	
  enough	
  to	
  those	
  presented	
  in	
  the	
  vignette	
  that	
  we	
  had	
  clearly	
  anticipated	
  “correct”	
  answers	
  for	
  those	
  inference	
  items.	
  We	
  included	
  scores	
  from	
  only	
  those	
  inference	
  questions	
  to	
  which	
  participants	
  also	
  gave	
  the	
  correct	
  answer	
  on	
  the	
  corresponding	
  recall	
  question.	
  In	
  this	
  way,	
  we	
  could	
  be	
  relatively	
  assured	
  that	
  participants	
  remembered	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  the	
  vignette	
  and	
  that	
  their	
  answer	
  to	
  the	
  inference	
  question	
  was	
  not	
  based	
  on	
  faulty	
  memory	
  but	
  reflects	
  an	
  application	
  of	
  recalled	
  information	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  context.	
  	
  To	
  see	
  whether	
  social	
  targets	
  accompanied	
  by	
  normativity	
  cues	
  increase	
  the	
  accuracy	
  of	
  inference	
  relative	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  we	
  used	
  a	
  logistic	
  regression	
  model	
  with	
  condition	
  as	
  predictor	
  and	
  scores	
  on	
  inference	
  questions	
  as	
  the	
  outcome.	
  In	
  this	
  procedure,	
  we	
  effectively	
  created	
  an	
  “accuracy	
  of	
  inference”	
  variable,	
  where	
  answers	
  on	
  every	
  inference	
  question	
  was	
  treated	
  as	
  an	
  observation.	
  Since	
  each	
  participant	
  answered	
  three	
  inference	
  questions,	
  observations	
  were	
  correlated	
  with	
  each	
  other	
  via	
  the	
  participant.	
  As	
  before,	
  we	
  used	
  clustered	
  robust	
  standard	
  errors	
  to	
  compensate	
  for	
  this	
  correlation	
  in	
  observations.	
  Each	
  participant	
  was	
  treated	
  as	
  a	
  cluster,	
  with	
  right	
  or	
  wrong	
  on	
  the	
  3	
  inference	
  questions	
  as	
  observations	
  nested	
  within	
  the	
  cluster.	
  Sex	
  was	
  included	
  as	
  a	
  covariate.	
  In	
  this	
  model,	
  frequency	
  and	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  conditions	
  had	
  effects	
  in	
  the	
  predicted	
  direction	
  but	
  did	
  not	
  significantly	
  change	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  an	
  accurate	
  inference	
  will	
  be	
  made.	
  Only	
  the	
  explicit	
  statement	
  condition	
  significantly	
  increased	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  a	
  participant	
  will	
  make	
  the	
  “accurate”	
  anticipated	
  inference	
  compared	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  (Odds	
  Ratio=2.15,	
  z=2.03,	
  p<.043).	
  Pearson	
  goodness-­‐of-­‐fit	
  indices	
  show	
  a	
  good	
  fit	
  between	
  the	
  model	
  and	
  the	
  observed	
  data	
  (p[χ2(3)	
  >	
  .83]	
  =	
  .84).	
  These	
  results	
  support	
  Hypotheses	
  3a	
  and	
  provide	
  partial	
  support	
  for	
  Hypotheses	
  3b	
  and	
  c.	
   	
   31	
   	
   Figure	
  3.4	
   Rate	
  of	
  Accurate	
  Inference	
   Table	
  3.4	
   Accuracy	
  of	
  Inference	
  about	
  Social	
  targets	
   Condition Odds Ratio Clustered Robust SE z P 95% CI Frequency 1.67 0.53 1.61 0.11 (.9, 3.1) Emotion 1.48 0.45 1.3 0.19 (.82, 2.69) Explicit 2.7	
   0.95 2.84 0.005 (1.36, 5.38) Sex 0.91 0.24 -0.35 0.55 (.55, 1.52) Model based on 161 clusters, [P(Pearson Chi-square(3))>.83]=.84 	
   3.3.3	
   GENERAL	
  DISCUSSION	
   What	
  did	
  we	
  learn?	
  The	
  results	
  of	
  our	
  analyses	
  showed	
  an	
  overall	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  for	
  potentially	
  normative	
  social	
  information	
  compared	
  to	
  asocial	
  information,	
  as	
  measured	
  by	
  a	
   0.53	
   0.65	
   0.63	
   0.75*	
   0.4	
   0.5	
   0.6	
   0.7	
   0.8	
   Control	
   Frequency	
   Emotion	
   Explicit	
   P r( ac cu ra te 	
  in fe re n ce )	
   	
   32	
   multiple	
  choice	
  test	
  of	
  recall.	
  This	
  recall	
  advantage	
  was	
  manifested	
  when	
  we	
  provided	
  information	
  (frequency	
  and	
  explicit)	
  that	
  we	
  predicted	
  would	
  increase	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  a	
  social	
  target	
  is	
  perceived	
  as	
  normative.	
  This	
  effect	
  was	
  strongest	
  for	
  explicit	
  labeling	
  of	
  social	
  norms,	
  but	
  was	
  not	
  present	
  for	
  asocial	
  targets,	
  suggesting	
  that	
  consistent	
  with	
  our	
  predictions,	
  people	
  are	
  sensitive	
  to	
  certain	
  cues	
  as	
  indicators	
  of	
  normativity,	
  and	
  further,	
  have	
  enhanced	
  cognitive	
  accessibility	
  for	
  normative	
  information.	
  	
  Observing	
  negative	
  emotional	
  reactions	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  the	
  predicted	
  effect	
  on	
  recall.	
  This	
  may	
  be	
  an	
  artifact	
  of	
  the	
  manner	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  cue	
  appeared	
  in	
  the	
  vignettes.	
  Participants	
  read	
  about	
  one	
  instance	
  of	
  the	
  target	
  social	
  item,	
  then	
  a	
  second	
  instance	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  item	
  was	
  noticeably	
  altered.	
  In	
  this	
  second	
  instance,	
  another	
  character	
  in	
  the	
  vignette	
  utters	
  a	
  sigh	
  or	
  frown	
  of	
  disapproval.	
  The	
  presentation	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  and	
  second	
  instances	
  of	
  the	
  target	
  items	
  may	
  have	
  been	
  too	
  far	
  apart	
  for	
  participants	
  to	
  draw	
  a	
  connection	
  between	
  them.	
  If	
  we	
  assume	
  that	
  participants	
  were	
  only	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  instance	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  emotive	
  cue	
  was	
  present,	
  may	
  have	
  likely	
  inferred	
  from	
  the	
  frown	
  that	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  a	
  correct	
  behaviour	
  has	
  been	
  observed,	
  but	
  this	
  still	
  leaves	
  the	
  normative	
  behaviour	
  unknown.	
  This	
  is	
  likely	
  why	
  although	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  condition	
  did	
  not	
  differ	
  in	
  rate	
  of	
  recall	
  from	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  those	
  participants	
  who	
  correctly	
  answered	
  the	
  recall	
  question	
  still	
  showed	
  an	
  enhanced,	
  though	
  not	
  significant,	
  ability	
  to	
  make	
  accurate	
  inferences	
  about	
  the	
  targets	
  to	
  novel	
  contexts.	
  For	
  emotion	
  cues	
  to	
  be	
  more	
  effective	
  may	
  require	
  greater	
  number	
  of	
  positive	
  presentations	
  before	
  a	
  negative	
  one	
  involving	
  a	
  norm	
  violation.	
  Follow	
  up	
  studies	
  are	
  needed	
  to	
  test	
  this	
  possibility.	
   What	
  alternative	
  explanations	
  can	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  data?	
  Merely	
  showing	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  for	
  behaviours	
  labeled	
  as	
  normative	
  does	
  not	
  speak	
  to	
  the	
  memory	
  bias	
  as	
  an	
  evolved	
  product	
  of	
  selection	
  pressure;	
  it	
  could	
  simply	
  be	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  developing	
  expertise	
  in	
  something	
  we	
  have	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  practice	
  with,	
  much	
  like	
  chess	
  master	
  develops	
  a	
  specialized	
  set	
  of	
  cognitions	
  related	
  to	
  chess	
  (and	
  nobody	
  would	
  argue	
  that	
  we	
  have	
  an	
  evolved	
  set	
  of	
  cognitions	
   	
   33	
   just	
  for	
  chess).	
  Thus,	
  a	
  skeptic	
  might	
  suggest	
  an	
  alternative	
  explanation	
  for	
  this	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  that	
  does	
  not	
  involve	
  an	
  evolved	
  psychology—our	
  participants	
  were	
  adults	
  who	
  have	
  had	
  on	
  average	
  20	
  years	
  of	
  experience	
  in	
  social	
  contexts—humans	
  might	
  merely	
  be	
  smart	
  individual	
  learners	
  with	
  generalized	
  machinery	
  who,	
  over	
  those	
  20	
  years,	
  have	
  learned	
  that	
  certain	
  types	
  of	
  behaviours	
  are	
  important	
  to	
  pay	
  attention	
  to	
  and	
  learn.	
  By	
  this	
  explanation,	
  a	
  target’s	
  perceived	
  importance	
  should	
  drive	
  its	
  degree	
  of	
  cognitive	
  accessibility	
  and	
  ease	
  of	
  retrieval.	
  A	
  between-­‐subject	
  correlation	
  analysis	
  between	
  ratings	
  on	
  a	
  7-­‐point	
  Likert	
  and	
  scores	
  on	
  recall	
  of	
  target	
  social	
  items	
  revealed	
  no	
  relationship	
  r=.005.	
  Further,	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  evidence	
  of	
  improved	
  performance	
  with	
  age	
  (r=.01),	
  so	
  within	
  the	
  age	
  range	
  of	
  the	
  available	
  data	
  (17	
  to	
  42	
  years,	
  S.D.=4.19),	
  more	
  years	
  of	
  experience	
  dealing	
  with	
  normative	
  information	
  does	
  not	
  seem	
  to	
  improve	
  one’s	
  ability	
  to	
  identify	
  and	
  remember	
  potentially	
  normative	
  information.	
  	
   Limitations	
  and	
  future	
  studies	
  The	
  design	
  of	
  the	
  current	
  study	
  did	
  not	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  rule	
  out	
  the	
  possibility	
  that	
  accompanying	
  the	
  target	
  items	
  with	
  ANY	
  additional	
  information	
  would	
  enhance	
  recall	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  information.	
  For	
  example,	
  all	
  emotive	
  cues	
  were	
  negatively	
  valenced,	
  because	
  we	
  hypothesized	
  based	
  on	
  previous	
  research	
  that	
  they	
  would	
  be	
  indicative	
  of	
  a	
  norm	
  violation,	
  but	
  we	
  did	
  not	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  positive	
  emotions.	
  Future	
  studies	
  can	
  examine	
  the	
  effects	
  of	
  theoretically	
  unrelated	
  cues	
  on	
  recall	
  and	
  inferences	
  about	
  social	
  information	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  ascertain	
  whether	
  the	
  hypothesized	
  norm	
  psychology	
  attends	
  to	
  norm-­‐specific	
  cues.	
  	
  In	
  addition,	
  while	
  frequency	
  cues	
  increased	
  recall	
  and	
  inference	
  in	
  the	
  predicted	
  direction,	
  the	
  effect	
  was	
  not	
  significant.	
  This	
  may	
  simply	
  require	
  a	
  higher	
  frequency	
  of	
  occurrence	
  in	
  the	
  vignette,	
  as	
  even	
  in	
  the	
  high	
  frequency	
  condition,	
  targets	
  are	
  only	
  presented	
  twice.	
  It	
  may	
  also	
  have	
  to	
  do	
  with	
  the	
  format	
  in	
  which	
  frequency	
  information	
  was	
  presented—as	
  recurring	
  instances,	
  rather	
  than	
  as	
  proportional	
  information	
  within	
  a	
  given	
  context.	
  While	
  norm	
  psychology	
  may	
  keep	
  track	
  of	
  frequency	
  information	
  over	
  a	
  span	
  of	
  time	
  (as	
  it	
  seems	
  to,	
  based	
  on	
  our	
  results),	
  it	
   	
   34	
   might	
  be	
  more	
  powerfully	
  activated	
  if	
  presented	
  with	
  information	
  about	
  prevalence	
  or	
  proportion	
  of	
  behaviours	
  at	
  a	
  particular	
  slice	
  in	
  time.	
  To	
  ascertain	
  whether	
  frequency	
  is	
  a	
  potent	
  cue	
  of	
  normativity,	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  important	
  to	
  identify	
  the	
  proper	
  format	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  cue	
  is	
  processed	
  by	
  attention	
  and	
  perceptual	
  system.	
  Future	
  studies	
  should	
  look	
  into	
  more	
  ecologically	
  valid	
  format	
  of	
  presenting	
  frequency	
  information,	
  such	
  that	
  information	
  about	
  the	
  prevalence	
  of	
  behaviour	
  at	
  a	
  single	
  time	
  point	
  is	
  conveyed.	
  In	
  a	
  similar	
  vein,	
  the	
  present	
  study	
  could	
  be	
  done	
  in	
  different	
  media,	
  such	
  as	
  photographs	
  or	
  videos,	
  to	
  target	
  perhaps	
  more	
  appropriate	
  sensory	
  modalities	
  and	
  obtain	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  ecological	
  validity	
  and	
  relevance.	
  	
  Most	
  importantly,	
  the	
  current	
  study	
  aimed	
  to	
  test	
  the	
  hypothesis	
  that	
  we	
  have	
  a	
  specialized	
  psychology	
  evolved	
  to	
  meet	
  the	
  challenges	
  of	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
  social	
  norms.	
  We	
  hypothesized	
  that	
  any	
  culturally	
  learned	
  behaviour	
  that	
  is	
  common,	
  and	
  deviations	
  from	
  which	
  will	
  provoke	
  a	
  punitive	
  sentiment	
  or	
  behaviours	
  by	
  third	
  party	
  observers,	
  will	
  be	
  perceived	
  as	
  normative.	
  Thus,	
  what	
  separates	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  social	
  information	
  such	
  as	
  a	
  personal	
  preference,	
  from	
  a	
  social	
  norm,	
  is	
  whether	
  the	
  behaviour	
  can	
  be	
  socially	
  learned,	
  the	
  proportion	
  of	
  people	
  who	
  engage	
  in	
  the	
  behaviour	
  in	
  similar	
  contexts,	
  and	
  whether	
  other	
  people	
  will	
  be	
  annoyed	
  or	
  be	
  motivated	
  to	
  punish	
  someone	
  who	
  does	
  not	
  follow	
  the	
  common	
  behaviour.	
  The	
  present	
  study	
  served	
  as	
  a	
  crude	
  first	
  test	
  by	
  comparing	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  cues	
  on	
  memory	
  enhancement	
  for	
  social	
  vs.	
  asocial	
  targets,	
  and	
  results	
  of	
  recall	
  are	
  suggestive—frequency	
  cues	
  and	
  explicit	
  statements	
  both	
  enhanced	
  recall	
  for	
  social	
  but	
  not	
  asocial	
  information	
  above	
  baseline	
  (control)	
  condition,	
  possibly	
  due	
  to	
  increased	
  perceptions	
  of	
  normativity	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  information.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  interaction	
  of	
  the	
  target	
  and	
  the	
  cue	
  that	
  rendered	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  information	
  potentially	
  normative.	
  A	
  more	
  specific	
  and	
  stringent	
  test	
  would	
  be	
  to	
  compare	
  normative	
  social	
  and	
  non-­‐normative	
  social	
  information.	
  	
  Follow	
  up	
  studies	
  can	
  investigate	
  this	
  by	
  creating	
  stories	
  in	
  which	
  several	
  pieces	
  of	
  social	
  information	
  across	
  a	
  variety	
  of	
  domains,	
  described	
  as	
  commonly	
  occurring,	
  are	
  presented	
  identically	
  across	
  conditions.	
  To	
  alter	
  the	
  perceived	
  normativity	
  of	
  the	
  social	
  behaviours,	
  conditions	
  will	
  vary	
  in	
  accompanying	
  contextual	
  information	
   	
   35	
   that	
  alter	
  1)	
  the	
  likelihood	
  that	
  the	
  behaviour	
  was	
  socially	
  transmitted	
  rather	
  than	
  individually	
  discovered,	
  2)	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  practical	
  or	
  instrumental	
  utility	
  of	
  the	
  behaviour	
  (vs.	
  apparently	
  arbitrary),	
  3)	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  neutral	
  observers	
  who	
  express	
  annoyance	
  at	
  an	
  individual	
  who	
  behaves	
  inconsistently	
  with	
  the	
  common	
  behaviour,	
  and	
  4)	
  whether	
  the	
  behaviour	
  is	
  prosocial	
  or	
  directly	
  self-­‐beneficial.	
  Memory	
  and	
  inference	
  tests	
  can	
  again	
  be	
  used	
  as	
  outcome	
  measures.	
  An	
  alternative	
  or	
  additional	
  measure	
  could	
  take	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  presenting	
  participants	
  with	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  profiles	
  of	
  individuals	
  who	
  behave	
  consistently	
  with	
  the	
  common	
  behaviours	
  in	
  some	
  domains	
  and	
  fail	
  to	
  comply	
  in	
  other	
  domains.	
  Participants	
  can	
  then	
  be	
  asked	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  questions	
  regarding	
  whether	
  they	
  would	
  want	
  to	
  be	
  friends	
  with	
  the	
  profiled	
  individual,	
  whether	
  they	
  would	
  want	
  to	
  learn	
  from	
  them,	
  or	
  whether	
  they	
  would	
  want	
  to	
  avoid	
  or	
  even	
  punish	
  them	
  in	
  each	
  domain.	
  This	
  social	
  domain	
  x	
  cue	
  design	
  would	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  examine	
  what	
  exactly	
  renders	
  a	
  piece	
  of	
  social	
  information	
  normative,	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  might	
  vary	
  for	
  different	
  types	
  of	
  social	
  information.	
   Conclusions	
  The	
  set	
  of	
  evolved	
  cognitive	
  biases	
  we	
  are	
  identifying	
  in	
  adults	
  very	
  well	
  could	
  have	
  been	
  ratcheted	
  up	
  by	
  experience	
  and	
  learning.	
  It	
  does	
  not	
  tell	
  us	
  what	
  the	
  biases	
  look	
  like	
  at	
  birth,	
  nor	
  what	
  effect	
  experience	
  has	
  on	
  shaping	
  its’	
  functioning.	
  It	
  is	
  highly	
  likely	
  that	
  like	
  most	
  developmental	
  systems,	
  innate	
  biases	
  and	
  environmental	
  input	
  are	
  both	
  critical	
  (Callanan,	
  2006).	
  Innate	
  frameworks	
  do	
  not	
  preclude	
  learning	
  from	
  experience	
  over	
  development	
  (Gelman	
  &	
  Williams,	
  1998).	
  People	
  who	
  have	
  already	
  learned	
  a	
  set	
  of	
  norms	
  may	
  have	
  their	
  expectations	
  about	
  what	
  norms	
  look	
  like	
  guided	
  by	
  the	
  content	
  and	
  structure	
  of	
  that	
  existing	
  set,	
  and	
  use	
  those	
  expectations	
  to	
  help	
  learn	
  a	
  new	
  set.	
  The	
  study	
  does	
  show	
  that	
  our	
  participants	
  DO	
  exhibit	
  these	
  sorts	
  of	
  biases,	
  which	
  were	
  predicted	
  a	
  priori	
  from	
  evolutionary	
  theory.	
  The	
  studies	
  thus	
  provide	
  preliminary	
  empirical	
  findings	
  that	
  fit	
  in	
  with	
  extant	
  work	
  supporting	
  the	
  culture-­‐gene	
  co-­‐evolutionary	
  account	
  of	
  social	
  norms	
  and	
  the	
  cognitive	
  workings	
  of	
  the	
  human	
  mind	
  that	
  underlies	
  it.	
  	
   	
   36	
   CHAPTER	
  4	
   TEST	
  2:	
  CULTURALLY	
  EVOLVED	
  SOLUTIONS	
  TO	
  MOTIVATING	
  NORM	
  COMPLIANCE	
   4.1	
   INTRODUCTION	
  In	
  Chapter	
  2,	
  I	
  discussed	
  the	
  hypothesis	
  that	
  our	
  evolved	
  norm	
  psychology	
  may	
  have	
  exapted	
  existing	
  emotional	
  systems	
  for	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  motivating	
  individuals	
  to	
  conform	
  to	
  and	
  enforce	
  social	
  norms.	
  Because	
  one’s	
  ability	
  and	
  desire	
  to	
  uphold	
  group	
  norms	
  hold	
  important	
  consequences	
  for	
  social	
  status,	
  access	
  to	
  resources,	
  and	
  consequently,	
  one’s	
  fitness,	
  such	
  a	
  motivational	
  system	
  should	
  prepare	
  individuals	
  to	
  enact	
  their	
  knowledge	
  of	
  local	
  norms	
  and	
  to	
  manage	
  the	
  costs	
  of	
  deviating	
  from	
  those	
  norms.	
  Following	
  a	
  transgression,	
  it	
  should	
  bring	
  about	
  cognitive,	
  physiological	
  and	
  motivational	
  changes	
  to	
  potentiate	
  actions	
  by	
  the	
  transgressor	
  to	
  minimize	
  costs	
  (in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  direct	
  punishment,	
  or	
  social	
  devaluation)	
  in	
  the	
  locally	
  appropriate	
  manner—be	
  it	
  to	
  appease	
  high	
  status	
  individuals	
  or	
  make	
  reparations	
  to	
  one’s	
  relationship	
  partners—and	
  to	
  increase	
  likelihood	
  of	
  future	
  compliance.	
  	
  In	
  this	
  chapter,	
  I	
  present	
  two	
  studies	
  designed	
  as	
  a	
  first	
  pass	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  more	
  specific	
  hypothesis	
  that	
  different	
  social	
  groups	
  may	
  have	
  not	
  only	
  generated	
  different	
  behaviours	
  that	
  transgressors	
  can	
  undertake	
  to	
  reduce	
  cost	
  of	
  wrongdoing,	
  but	
  also	
  selected	
  for	
  and	
  relied	
  on	
  different	
  affective	
  mechanisms	
  to	
  motivate	
  those	
  actions.	
  That	
  is,	
  important	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  may	
  have	
  exerted	
  selection	
  pressures	
  on	
  the	
  types	
  of	
  emotional	
  systems	
  that	
  proved	
  successful	
  at	
  motivating	
  norm	
  compliance,	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  a	
  transgression,	
  to	
  reinstate	
  oneself	
  as	
  a	
  valued,	
  or	
  at	
  least	
  tolerated,	
  group	
  member.	
  These	
  motivations	
  should	
  only	
  exist	
  for	
  group	
  memberships	
  and	
  relationships	
  that	
  one	
  values,	
  and	
  is	
  motivated	
  to	
  maintain.	
  	
  What	
  factors	
  might	
  have	
  caused	
  motivation	
  systems	
  for	
  norm-­‐adherence	
  to	
  diverge,	
  and	
  what	
  might	
  the	
  resulting	
  systems	
  look	
  like?	
  An	
  important	
  determinant	
  of	
  how	
   	
   37	
   an	
  individual	
  who	
  has	
  just	
  made	
  a	
  social	
  trespass	
  can	
  redeem	
  themselves	
  in	
  the	
  eyes	
  of	
  their	
  social	
  group	
  may	
  have	
  to	
  do	
  with	
  the	
  availability	
  of	
  opportunities	
  their	
  current	
  relationship	
  partners	
  have	
  to	
  form	
  new	
  relationships.	
  That	
  is,	
  historical	
  societal	
  differences	
  in	
  relational	
  mobility—the	
  general	
  availability	
  of	
  opportunities	
  to	
  individuals	
  for	
  forming	
  new	
  relationships	
  within	
  a	
  given	
  social	
  context	
  (Yuki	
  et	
  al.,	
  2007)—might	
  have	
  caused	
  different	
  motivational	
  patterns	
  to	
  become	
  effective	
  cultural	
  technologies	
  that	
  individuals	
  used	
  to	
  preserve	
  valued	
  relationships	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  violation	
  in	
  their	
  particular	
  social	
  context.	
  We	
  would	
  expect	
  for	
  people	
  everywhere	
  to	
  generally	
  have	
  the	
  capacity	
  to	
  experience	
  a	
  similar	
  spectrum	
  of	
  emotions	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  a	
  norm	
  violation,	
  although	
  their	
  prominence	
  and	
  motivational	
  significance	
  are	
  likely	
  to	
  differ	
  across	
  cultures	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  their	
  differential	
  suitability	
  to	
  local	
  contexts.	
  	
  Regardless	
  of	
  the	
  degree	
  of	
  relational	
  mobility	
  of	
  one’s	
  social	
  environment,	
  a	
  transgressor	
  should	
  try	
  not	
  to	
  be	
  discovered.	
  However,	
  if	
  the	
  transgression	
  was	
  public,	
  or	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  made	
  public,	
  there	
  should	
  be	
  a	
  divergence	
  in	
  motivational	
  responses	
  experienced	
  by	
  the	
  transgressor.	
  These	
  motivational	
  responses	
  should	
  be	
  tailored	
  to	
  the	
  opportunity	
  costs	
  faced	
  by	
  one’s	
  relationship	
  partner,	
  as	
  a	
  function	
  of	
  the	
  relational	
  mobility	
  of	
  one’s	
  social	
  group.	
  In	
  a	
  social	
  environment	
  with	
  many	
  opportunities	
  to	
  form	
  new	
  relationships,	
  one’s	
  social	
  partners	
  can	
  end	
  a	
  relationship	
  with	
  a	
  partner	
  who	
  has	
  been	
  devalued,	
  unless	
  they	
  are	
  persuaded	
  otherwise.	
  The	
  most	
  effective	
  way	
  to	
  persuade	
  a	
  valued	
  relationship	
  partner	
  to	
  maintain	
  the	
  relationship	
  might	
  be	
  for	
  the	
  transgressor	
  to	
  incur	
  personal	
  costs	
  and	
  proactively	
  make	
  amendments	
  for	
  the	
  damage	
  that	
  one	
  has	
  caused	
  by	
  violating	
  a	
  norm.	
  In	
  contrast,	
  in	
  low	
  social	
  mobility	
  societies,	
  one’s	
  social	
  connections	
  are	
  relatively	
  fixed	
  and	
  existing	
  ties	
  are	
  more	
  costly	
  to	
  sever	
  due	
  to	
  lack	
  of	
  alternatives.	
  As	
  a	
  result,	
  there	
  might	
  be	
  less	
  of	
  a	
  need	
  for	
  the	
  transgressor	
  to	
  take	
  costly	
  action	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  make	
  amends.	
  However,	
  because	
  norm	
  violations	
  often	
  disrupt	
  social	
  order,	
  transgressors	
  should	
  have	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  aware	
  of	
  their	
  violation	
  of	
  group	
  norms	
  (and	
  if	
  they	
  don’t,	
  be	
  motivated	
  to	
  pay	
  attention	
  and	
  learn	
  them)	
  and	
  appear	
  small	
  and	
  contrite	
  to	
  evoke	
  sympathy	
  so	
  as	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  punishment	
  received.	
  Further,	
   	
   38	
   they	
  might	
  have	
  to	
  signal	
  a	
  willingness	
  to	
  accept	
  any	
  punishment	
  meted	
  out	
  by	
  the	
  group,	
  such	
  as	
  taking	
  a	
  hit	
  in	
  status	
  and	
  access	
  to	
  resources,	
  and	
  genuine	
  desire	
  not	
  to	
  transgress	
  in	
  the	
  future.	
  Thus,	
  there	
  might	
  be	
  a	
  difference	
  in	
  motivational	
  tendency	
  between	
  low	
  and	
  high	
  relational	
  societies	
  such	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  latter,	
  the	
  adaptive	
  response	
  following	
  a	
  transgression	
  made	
  public	
  is	
  to	
  proactively	
  approach	
  others	
  to	
  make	
  amends,	
  and	
  in	
  the	
  former,	
  to	
  hide,	
  or	
  if	
  discovered,	
  to	
  appease	
  others	
  in	
  an	
  effort	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  punishment	
  one	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  receive.	
  These	
  motivational	
  tendencies	
  have	
  been	
  noted	
  in	
  research	
  on	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt.	
  	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  researchers	
  have	
  noted	
  that	
  the	
  emotions	
  of	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  play	
  important	
  roles	
  in	
  regulating	
  behaviours	
  in	
  the	
  moral	
  domain,	
  and	
  exhibit	
  cultural	
  variation	
  in	
  motivational	
  and	
  behavioural	
  outcomes	
  (e.g.	
  (Kitayama,	
  Markus,	
  &	
  Matsumoto,	
  1995;	
  Menon	
  &	
  Shweder,	
  1994).	
  Substantial	
  work	
  has	
  been	
  done	
  in	
  an	
  attempt	
  to	
  draw	
  distinctions	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  emotions	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  eliciting	
  events,	
  phenomenology,	
  and	
  behavioural	
  outcomes.	
  However,	
  particularly	
  with	
  regards	
  to	
  the	
  antecedents	
  and	
  subjective	
  experiences	
  of	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame,	
  there	
  is	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  coherent,	
  cross-­‐culturally	
  valid	
  account	
  to	
  date.	
  Studies	
  conducted	
  with	
  North	
  American	
  participants	
  suggest	
  that	
  the	
  distinction	
  between	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  rests	
  with	
  whether	
  responsibility	
  for	
  the	
  wrongdoing	
  is	
  attributed	
  globally	
  to	
  the	
  entire	
  self,	
  or	
  specifically	
  to	
  the	
  act	
  (Tangney,	
  Wagner,	
  Fletcher,	
  &	
  Gramzow,	
  1992).	
  However,	
  research	
  conducted	
  with	
  non-­‐Western	
  samples	
  suggest	
  that	
  this	
  may	
  be	
  an	
  artifact	
  of	
  the	
  emotions	
  interacting	
  with	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  constructs	
  specific	
  to	
  Western,	
  individualistic	
  contexts,	
  and	
  that	
  do	
  not	
  exist	
  elsewhere.	
  Wong	
  and	
  Tsai	
  (2007)	
  convincingly	
  argue	
  that	
  the	
  interdependent	
  construal	
  of	
  personhood	
  and	
  identity	
  in	
  collectivistic	
  cultures	
  renders	
  the	
  distinction	
  based	
  on	
  specificity	
  of	
  attribution	
  less	
  clear	
  and	
  meaningful.	
  Since	
  situational	
  changes	
  to	
  one’s	
  behaviour	
  to	
  cater	
  to	
  the	
  demands	
  of	
  the	
  immediate	
  context	
  are	
  emphasized	
  over	
  consistency	
  across	
  situations,	
  selves	
  are	
  conceptualized	
  not	
  as	
  immutable	
  but	
  as	
  incremental	
  and	
  needing	
  constant	
  improvement.	
  Consequently,	
  shame	
  is	
  experienced	
  as	
  less	
  damaging,	
  and	
  not	
  regarded	
  as	
  dealing	
  blows	
  to	
  a	
  stable	
  self	
  as	
  it	
  is	
  in	
  Western	
  individualistic	
  contexts.	
  	
   	
   39	
   Empirical	
  studies	
  support	
  these	
  theoretical	
  arguments:	
  participants	
  from	
  collectivistic	
  countries	
  report	
  shame	
  as	
  less	
  intense	
  and	
  negative	
  than	
  Western	
  participants	
  (Wallbott	
  &	
  Scherer,	
  1995),	
  and	
  these	
  experiences	
  motivate	
  changes	
  in	
  behaviour	
  (Breugelmans	
  &	
  Poortinga,	
  2006),	
  characteristics	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  considered	
  definitive	
  of	
  guilt.	
  Using	
  participants’	
  self	
  report,	
  Scherer	
  and	
  Wallbott	
  (1995)	
  find	
  in	
  a	
  sample	
  of	
  37	
  countries	
  that	
  participants	
  from	
  collectivistic	
  cultures	
  report	
  shame	
  experiences	
  that	
  are	
  consistent	
  with	
  prototypical	
  shame	
  characteristics,	
  while	
  those	
  from	
  individualistic	
  societies	
  experienced	
  shame	
  that	
  is	
  more	
  typical	
  of	
  guilt	
  experiences.	
  These	
  discrepancies	
  may	
  partly	
  arise	
  from	
  shame	
  concepts	
  being	
  hypercognized	
  in	
  cultures	
  where	
  they	
  play	
  a	
  focal	
  role,	
  and	
  the	
  difficulty	
  that	
  these	
  nuanced	
  distinctions	
  present	
  for	
  translation	
  and	
  finding	
  equivalence	
  across	
  cultures.	
  As	
  one	
  example,	
  in	
  the	
  Chinese	
  language,	
  Bedford	
  (2004)	
  reports	
  finding	
  3	
  types	
  of	
  guilt	
  and	
  4	
  types	
  of	
  shame	
  that	
  are	
  not	
  lexically	
  marked	
  or	
  distinguishable	
  in	
  English.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  seems	
  that	
  challenges	
  to	
  making	
  clear	
  distinctions	
  between	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  arise	
  from	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  most	
  studies	
  relied	
  on	
  asking	
  people	
  to	
  report	
  situations	
  and	
  feelings	
  associated	
  with	
  a	
  particular	
  emotion	
  word.	
  However,	
  given	
  the	
  weight	
  of	
  the	
  evidence	
  laid	
  out	
  in	
  Chapter	
  2	
  regarding	
  the	
  motivational	
  significance	
  of	
  affect	
  in	
  regulating	
  norm	
  adherence,	
  making	
  a	
  priori	
  predictions	
  about	
  physiological,	
  motivational	
  and	
  behavioural	
  processes	
  and	
  outcomes	
  based	
  on	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame’s	
  adaptive	
  functions	
  may	
  help	
  circumvent	
  this	
  problem.	
  	
  Findings	
  from	
  studies	
  looking	
  at	
  the	
  motivational	
  outcomes	
  of	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  map	
  roughly	
  onto	
  the	
  predictions	
  set	
  out	
  above.	
  Shame	
  has	
  been	
  found	
  to	
  motivate	
  withdrawal	
  from	
  social	
  contexts,	
  inhibit	
  action	
  and	
  assuming	
  a	
  smaller	
  body	
  posture	
  typical	
  of	
  appeasement	
  displays	
  (Fessler,	
  1999;	
  Gilbert,	
  1992;	
  Parisi,	
  1999;	
  Weisfeld,	
  1997).	
  Indeed,	
  displaying	
  shame	
  and	
  acting	
  in	
  a	
  consistent	
  manner	
  can	
  enhance	
  reconciliation	
  and	
  an	
  individual’s	
  reacceptance	
  following	
  moral	
  transgressions	
  (De	
  Jong,	
  Peters,	
  De	
  Cremer,	
  &	
  Vranken,	
  2002).	
  Guilt,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  is	
  usually	
  reported	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  interpersonal	
  harm,	
  and	
  motivates	
  reparative	
  action	
  on	
  the	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  transgressor	
  (Tangney,	
  Stuewig,	
  &	
  Mashek,	
  2006).	
  Fessler	
  (2007)	
   	
   40	
   observed	
  that	
  shame	
  has	
  a	
  universally	
  recognizable	
  ethology	
  and	
  is	
  traceable	
  to	
  primate	
  origins	
  in	
  negotiating	
  dominance	
  hierarchies,	
  while	
  guilt	
  terms	
  and	
  concepts	
  seem	
  to	
  be	
  only	
  found	
  in	
  some	
  cultures	
  and	
  largely	
  absent	
  from	
  others.	
  This	
  led	
  him	
  to	
  propose	
  that	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  might	
  be	
  two	
  emotions	
  that	
  were	
  co-­‐opted	
  via	
  cultural	
  evolutionary	
  processes	
  to	
  solve	
  the	
  problem	
  of	
  regulating	
  norm	
  violations,	
  guilt	
  being	
  a	
  more	
  recent	
  adaptation.	
  However,	
  to	
  date,	
  there	
  has	
  yet	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  satisfactory	
  explanation	
  offered	
  to	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  variation	
  in	
  relative	
  prominence	
  of	
  the	
  emotions	
  across	
  cultures.	
  The	
  present	
  studies	
  will	
  test	
  one	
  facet	
  of	
  the	
  hypothesis	
  outlined	
  above,	
  that	
  members	
  of	
  cultures	
  differing	
  on	
  relational	
  mobility	
  will	
  experience	
  different	
  motivational	
  states	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  violation.	
  Individuals	
  from	
  low	
  relational	
  mobility	
  cultures	
  will	
  tend	
  to	
  experience	
  more	
  avoidant	
  tendencies,	
  such	
  as	
  documented	
  in	
  shame,	
  while	
  individuals	
  from	
  high	
  relational	
  mobility	
  cultures	
  will	
  tend	
  to	
  experience	
  more	
  approach	
  tendencies,	
  such	
  as	
  in	
  guilt.	
  We	
  used	
  ethnic	
  groups	
  European	
  Canadians	
  and	
  East	
  Asians	
  (comprised	
  of	
  immigrants	
  from	
  China,	
  Japan	
  and	
  Korea)	
  as	
  proxies	
  for	
  groups	
  that	
  are	
  high	
  and	
  low	
  in	
  relational	
  mobility,	
  respectively	
  (Falk,	
  Heine,	
  Yuki,	
  &	
  Takemura,	
  2009;	
  Yuki,	
  et	
  al.,	
  2007).	
  Previous	
  research	
  by	
  Falk	
  et	
  al	
  (2007)	
  using	
  a	
  relational	
  mobility	
  measure	
  developed	
  by	
  Yuki	
  et	
  al	
  (2007)	
  found	
  with	
  students	
  on	
  UBC	
  campus	
  that	
  Japanese	
  and	
  Asian-­‐Canadians	
  have	
  significantly	
  lower	
  relational	
  mobility	
  than	
  Euro-­‐Canadians.	
  Based	
  on	
  this	
  difference,	
  we	
  treated	
  ethnicity	
  as	
  a	
  binary	
  group	
  variable	
  that	
  represented	
  high	
  and	
  low	
  relational	
  mobility:	
  participants	
  who	
  reported	
  their	
  ethnicity	
  as	
  European-­‐Canadian,	
  Canadian,	
  or	
  Caucasian	
  were	
  coded	
  as	
  Euro-­‐Canadian,	
  while	
  those	
  who	
  reported	
  being	
  East	
  Asian,	
  Chinese,	
  Korean	
  or	
  Japanese	
  were	
  coded	
  as	
  East	
  Asian.	
  Whereas	
  previous	
  efforts	
  to	
  study	
  the	
  problem	
  have	
  relied	
  on	
  asking	
  informants	
  from	
  different	
  cultures	
  to	
  give	
  detailed	
  descriptions	
  of	
  situations	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  experienced	
  guilt	
  or	
  shame,	
  the	
  current	
  studies	
  will	
  be	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  attempts	
  to	
  tackle	
  the	
  problem	
  experimentally.	
  This	
  affords	
  us	
  a	
  high	
  degree	
  of	
  control	
  in	
  ensuring	
  equivalence	
  in	
  the	
  eliciting	
  situation,	
  and	
  to	
  directly	
  test	
  the	
  hypothesis	
  of	
  cultural	
  differences	
  in	
  emotional	
  and	
  motivational	
  responses.	
  	
   	
   41	
   Study	
  1	
  relies	
  on	
  simple	
  self-­‐report	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  violation	
  induction	
  to	
  assess	
  participants’	
  conscious	
  reported	
  experiences	
  of	
  momentary	
  affective	
  states.	
  We	
  expect	
  a	
  differential	
  increase	
  in	
  reports	
  of	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  across	
  two	
  cultural	
  groups.	
  Study	
  2	
  employs	
  an	
  implicit,	
  behavioural	
  measure	
  of	
  social	
  approach-­‐avoidance.	
  We	
  expect	
  Euro-­‐Canadians	
  to	
  exhibit	
  an	
  increase	
  in	
  approach	
  tendencies	
  following	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  induction	
  and	
  the	
  East	
  Asians	
  to	
  increase	
  in	
  avoid	
  tendencies	
  following	
  the	
  same	
  induction.	
  	
  	
   	
  4.2	
  	
   STUDY	
  ONE	
   4.2.1	
   METHOD	
   Participants	
   Participants	
  were	
  36	
  undergraduate	
  and	
  graduate	
  students	
  (33%	
  female;	
  age	
  ranging	
  from	
  18-­‐47,	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  of	
  23.69	
  years,	
  SD=5.27)	
  recruited	
  from	
  across	
  UBC	
  campus	
  via	
  posters,	
  mailing	
  lists	
  and	
  class	
  announcements.	
  53%	
  were	
  East	
  Asians	
  and	
  47%	
  Euro-­‐Canadians.	
  Participants	
  were	
  scheduled	
  for	
  appointments	
  and	
  arrived	
  at	
  a	
  laboratory	
  in	
  the	
  Psychology	
  department	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  experiment.	
  They	
  were	
  seated	
  in	
  cubicles,	
  and	
  completed	
  the	
  study	
  in	
  15	
  minutes	
  on	
  average.	
  	
   Materials	
   Norm	
  violation	
  manipulation.	
  We	
  used	
  Zhong	
  and	
  Liljenquist’s	
  (2006)	
  implicit	
  manipulation	
  of	
  norm	
  violation.	
  The	
  implicit	
  manipulation	
  consisted	
  of	
  two	
  versions	
  of	
  a	
  short	
  story	
  written	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  person,	
  one	
  ethical	
  (no	
  norm	
  was	
  violated)	
  and	
  one	
  unethical	
  (containing	
  a	
  norm	
  violation).	
  The	
  ethical	
  prime	
  was	
  a	
  story	
  about	
  an	
  honest	
  office	
  worker,	
  while	
  the	
  unethical	
  prime	
  was	
  the	
  exact	
  same	
  story	
  except	
  for	
  the	
  last	
  sentence,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  same	
  office	
  worker	
  sabotages	
  the	
  career	
  of	
  a	
  colleague	
  by	
  shredding	
  an	
  important	
  document	
  (see	
  Appendix	
  C	
  for	
  stories).	
  	
   	
   42	
   Self-­report	
  measure	
  of	
  affect.	
  	
  We	
  used	
  the	
  Positive	
  and	
  Negative	
  Affect	
  Scale	
  (Watson,	
  Clark,	
  &	
  Tellegen,	
  1988)	
  to	
  get	
  ratings	
  of	
  participants’	
  subjective	
  affective	
  experiences.	
  To	
  get	
  additional	
  items	
  that	
  tap	
  into	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame,	
  we	
  used	
  regret	
  and	
  remorse	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  guilty	
  to	
  assess	
  guilt,	
  and	
  disgraced	
  and	
  embarrassed	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  ashamed	
  to	
  assess	
  shame	
  (Lickel,	
  Schmader,	
  Curtis,	
  Scarnier,	
  &	
  Ames,	
  2005).	
  	
   Manipulation-­check	
  and	
  demographics	
  questionnaire.	
  We	
  included	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  questions	
  asking	
  participants	
  whether	
  they	
  thought	
  that	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  character	
  in	
  the	
  implicit	
  manipulation	
  story	
  were	
  good	
  or	
  bad,	
  and	
  to	
  report	
  their	
  age,	
  sex,	
  and	
  ethnicity.	
  	
   Procedures	
  Upon	
  arrival	
  at	
  the	
  lab,	
  participants	
  were	
  randomly	
  assigned	
  to	
  either	
  the	
  control	
  or	
  experimental	
  condition.	
  They	
  were	
  told	
  that	
  they	
  would	
  be	
  completing	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  short	
  unrelated	
  tasks.	
  They	
  first	
  received	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  manipulation,	
  ostensibly	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  handwriting	
  sample.	
  Those	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  copied	
  out	
  the	
  story	
  containing	
  the	
  ethical	
  office	
  worker,	
  while	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  copied	
  out	
  the	
  story	
  with	
  the	
  unethical	
  worker.	
  Participants	
  then	
  reported	
  on	
  their	
  momentary	
  affective	
  states	
  by	
  completing	
  the	
  PANAS.	
  After	
  this,	
  they	
  answered	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  demographics	
  and	
  debriefing	
  questions.	
  Finally,	
  they	
  were	
  fully	
  debriefed	
  and	
  compensated	
  for	
  their	
  time.	
  	
   	
   4.2.2	
  	
   RESULTS	
  AND	
  DISCUSSION	
  Participants	
  who	
  rated	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  narrator	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  (no	
  norm	
  violation)	
  as	
  “bad”,	
  or	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  (norm	
  violation)	
  as	
  “good”	
  in	
  the	
  manipulation	
  check	
  question	
  were	
  dropped	
  from	
  the	
  analyses.	
  For	
  this	
  reason,	
  12	
  participants,	
  6	
  from	
  each	
  condition,	
  were	
  dropped	
  from	
  the	
  analyses.	
  Participants	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  rated	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  narrator	
  in	
  the	
  story	
  as	
   	
   43	
   significantly	
  better	
  than	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  1.74,	
  p<.001).	
  Further,	
  European	
  Canadians	
  rated	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  as	
  significantly	
  worse	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  -­‐.81,	
  p<.001),	
  and	
  the	
  action	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  as	
  significantly	
  better	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .41,	
  p<.04)	
  than	
  East	
  Asian	
  participants.	
  This	
  difference	
  may	
  be	
  due	
  to	
  a	
  difference	
  in	
  response	
  styles	
  driven	
  by	
  a	
  tendency	
  for	
  European	
  Canadians	
  to	
  use	
  more	
  extreme	
  ends	
  of	
  the	
  scale	
  and	
  East	
  Asians	
  to	
  be	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  use	
  midpoints	
  on	
  the	
  scale	
  (Chen,	
  Lee,	
  &	
  Stevenson,	
  1995).	
  	
   Descriptions	
  of	
  overall	
  ratings	
  of	
  state	
  affect	
  Overall,	
  across	
  conditions,	
  participants	
  reported	
  a	
  full	
  range	
  in	
  the	
  extent	
  to	
  which	
  they	
  experienced	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  (see	
  Table	
  4.1	
  for	
  summary	
  of	
  mean	
  and	
  SD	
  of	
  the	
  composite	
  scores	
  by	
  condition).	
  On	
  average,	
  participants	
  reported	
  experiencing	
  both	
  more	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .363,	
  p<.01	
  for	
  guilt,	
  and	
  mean	
  diff	
  =	
  .230,	
  p<.03	
  for	
  shame),	
  and	
  less	
  shame	
  than	
  guilt	
  overall	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .19,	
  p<.0004).	
  	
  	
   Table	
  4.1	
   Guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  composite	
  ratings	
  by	
  condition	
   Condition Emotion Composite Mean SD Min Max Guilt 1.24 0.67 1 5 Control Shame 1.18 0.39 1 2 Guilt  1.6 1.09 1 5 Experimental Shame  1.41 0.91 1 5 	
   	
   44	
   First	
  order	
  correlations	
  amongst	
  the	
  shame	
  items	
  and	
  amongst	
  the	
  guilt	
  items	
  by	
  ethnicity	
  reveal	
  that	
  ratings	
  of	
  the	
  items	
  hung	
  together	
  reasonably	
  well	
  (ranging	
  from	
  .8	
  to	
  1.0),	
  except	
  “regret”,	
  which	
  correlated	
  with	
  “guilty”	
  ratings	
  at	
  .58	
  in	
  the	
  East	
  Asian	
  group,	
  suggesting	
  that	
  the	
  terms	
  held	
  different	
  meanings	
  for	
  East	
  Asians.	
  Thus,	
  in	
  the	
  following	
  analyses	
  for	
  East	
  Asians,	
  regret	
  was	
  not	
  included	
  in	
  the	
  Guilt	
  composite	
  score.	
  	
   Do	
  East	
  Asians	
  and	
  European	
  Canadians	
  differ	
  in	
  their	
  experiences	
  of	
  shame	
  vs.	
  guilt	
   following	
  an	
  imagined	
  norm	
  violation?	
  To	
  investigate	
  this,	
  we	
  first	
  conducted	
  2	
  regressions,	
  one	
  with	
  guilt,	
  and	
  one	
  with	
  shame	
  composite.	
  Condition	
  and	
  ethnicity	
  were	
  entered	
  as	
  predictors,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  a	
  condition	
  by	
  ethnicity	
  interaction	
  term,	
  as	
  we	
  expected	
  participants	
  of	
  different	
  ethnicities	
  to	
  experience	
  different	
  levels	
  of	
  each	
  emotion	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition.	
  Age	
  and	
  sex	
  were	
  entered	
  as	
  covariates.	
  Results	
  of	
  the	
  regression	
  reveal	
  no	
  significant	
  predictors.	
  Condition	
  and	
  Ethnicity	
  did	
  not	
  explain	
  any	
  significant	
  proportion	
  of	
  the	
  variance	
  in	
  Guilt	
  (b=.42,	
  p<.32	
  for	
  Condition	
  and	
  b=.22,	
  p<.47	
  for	
  Ethnicity)	
  or	
  Shame	
  (b=.44,	
  p<.27	
  and	
  b=.11,	
  p<.54	
  respectively),	
  and	
  neither	
  did	
  their	
  interaction	
  terms	
  (b=.19,	
  p<.72	
  for	
  Guilt	
  and	
  b=-­‐.06,	
  p<.89	
  for	
  Shame).	
  Given	
  that	
  the	
  effects	
  are	
  going	
  in	
  the	
  predicted	
  directions,	
  it	
  is	
  possible	
  that	
  our	
  sample	
  was	
  not	
  sufficiently	
  large	
  to	
  detect	
  significant	
  effects.	
  	
  We	
  wanted	
  to	
  explore	
  whether	
  there	
  was	
  differential	
  increase	
  in	
  the	
  two	
  emotions	
  within	
  ethnic	
  groups.	
  For	
  this,	
  we	
  conducted	
  4	
  linear	
  regressions	
  (2	
  groups	
  x	
  2	
  emotions),	
  using	
  condition	
  as	
  predictor,	
  emotion	
  as	
  outcome,	
  and	
  sex	
  and	
  age	
  as	
  covariates.	
  We	
  used	
  a	
  composite	
  item	
  for	
  each	
  emotion,	
  using	
  “guilty”,	
  “remorse”	
  and	
  “regret”	
  for	
  guilt,	
  and	
  “ashamed”,	
  “embarrassed”	
  and	
  “disgraced”	
  for	
  shame,	
  and	
  used	
  standard	
  robust	
  clustered	
  errors	
  in	
  the	
  regression	
  to	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  non-­‐independence	
  of	
  errors	
  (as	
  each	
  participant	
  provided	
  3	
  observations	
  for	
  each	
  regression	
  model).	
  We	
  included	
  a	
  dummy	
  categorical	
  “item”	
  covariate	
  to	
  control	
  for	
  potential	
  variance	
  due	
  to	
  differences	
  between	
  items	
  in	
  the	
  composite.	
  The	
  analyses	
  show	
  that	
  for	
  the	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  group,	
  Condition	
  was	
  not	
  a	
  significant	
  predictor	
  of	
   	
   45	
   either	
  guilt	
  (b=.43,	
  p<.34)	
  or	
  shame	
  (b=.32,	
  p<.47).	
  Thus,	
  for	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants,	
  being	
  presented	
  with	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  manipulation	
  did	
  not	
  cause	
  participants	
  to	
  report	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  reported	
  shame	
  or	
  guilt.	
  	
  	
   Table	
  4.2	
   Guilt	
  predicted	
  by	
  Condition	
  (Euro-­Canadians)	
   Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant 0.918 0.405 2.27 0.038 (.06, 1.78) Condition 0.43 0.429 1 0.331 (-.48, .24) Age 0.016 0.013 1.23 0.236 (.06, 1.78) Sex -0.556 0.375 -1.48 0.157 (-.01, .04) Model based on 17 clusters, F(3, 16)=1.31, p<..305. R-sq=.115 	
   Table	
  4.3	
   Shame	
  predicted	
  by	
  Condition	
  (Euro-­Canadians)	
   Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant 1.396 0.306 4.57 0.001 (.75, 2.04) Condition 0.319 0.434 0.74 0.473 (-.6, 1.24) Age -0.005 0.01 -0.48 0.637 (-.02, .02) Sex -0.419 0.306 -1.08 0.298 (-1.24, .41) Model based on 17 cluster, F(3, 16)=.72, p<.556. R-sq=.084 	
   	
   46	
   For	
  the	
  East	
  Asians,	
  Condition	
  was	
  a	
  significant	
  predictor,	
  as	
  was	
  participants’	
  age	
  for	
  both	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt.	
  Being	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  predicted	
  higher	
  reported	
  levels	
  of	
  guilt	
  (b=.81,	
  p<.016)	
  and	
  shame	
  (b=.74,	
  p<.015),	
  as	
  did	
  being	
  older	
  (b=.303,	
  p<.02	
  and	
  b=.203,	
  p<.016,	
  respectively).	
  	
  	
   Table	
  4.4	
   Guilt	
  predicted	
  by	
  Condition	
  (East	
  Asians)	
   Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t P 95% CI constant -5.138 2.395 -2.15 0.048 (-10.21, -.06) Condition 0.816 0.334 2.45 0.026 (.11, 1.52) Age 0.303 0.117 2.58 0.02 (.05, .55) Sex -0.713 0.393 -1.82 0.088 (-1.55, .12) 17 cluster, F(3, 6)=4.12, p<.024. R-sq=.486  Table	
  4.5	
   Shame	
  predicted	
  by	
  Condition	
  (East	
  Asians)	
   Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant -3.342 1.58 -2.12 0.067 (-6.69, .0004) Condition 0.744 0.273 2.72 0.015 (.16, 1.32) Age 0.203 0.076 2.69 0.016 (.043, .364) Sex -0.305 0.337 -0.9 0.379 (-1.02, .41) 17 cluster, F(3, 16)=3.89, p<.029. R-sq=.454	
   	
   47	
   A	
  t-­‐test	
  comparing	
  mean	
  levels	
  of	
  East	
  Asians’	
  reported	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  revealed	
  that	
  guilt	
  was	
  slightly	
  higher	
  than	
  shame	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .3,	
  p<.11,	
  95%	
  CI	
  (-­‐.08,	
  .68))	
  following	
  the	
  manipulation.	
  Thus,	
  it	
  appears	
  that	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  induction	
  effectively	
  increased	
  conscious	
  awareness	
  of	
  both	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  in	
  East	
  Asian	
  participants,	
  but	
  it	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  an	
  effect	
  on	
  the	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants.	
  It	
  is	
  unclear	
  whether	
  this	
  was	
  because	
  the	
  manipulation	
  was	
  ineffective,	
  or	
  the	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants	
  simply	
  were	
  not	
  aware	
  of	
  changes	
  in	
  their	
  affective	
  and	
  motivational	
  states	
  and	
  thus	
  could	
  not	
  report	
  them.	
  Similarly	
  for	
  the	
  East	
  Asians,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  a	
  difference	
  in	
  reported	
  levels	
  of	
  guilt	
  and	
  shame	
  could	
  be	
  due	
  to	
  an	
  actual	
  increase	
  in	
  both	
  emotions,	
  or	
  to	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  distinction	
  drawn	
  between	
  the	
  linguistic	
  labels.	
  Since	
  we	
  are	
  interested	
  in	
  the	
  motivational	
  consequences	
  of	
  a	
  norm	
  violation,	
  we	
  turn	
  to	
  a	
  behavioural	
  measure	
  of	
  approach-­‐avoidance	
  motivations	
  next.	
  	
  	
  4.3	
  	
   STUDY	
  TWO	
   4.3.1	
   METHODS	
   Participants	
  Participants	
  were	
  52	
  students	
  (80%	
  female;	
  age	
  ranging	
  from	
  18-­‐37,	
  with	
  a	
  mean	
  of	
  21.44	
  years,	
  SD=3.60)	
  from	
  UBC,	
  who	
  were	
  recruited	
  from	
  across	
  campus	
  via	
  posters,	
  mailing	
  lists	
  and	
  class	
  announcements.	
  Participants	
  were	
  scheduled	
  for	
  appointments	
  and	
  arrived	
  at	
  a	
  laboratory	
  in	
  the	
  Psychology	
  department	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  experiment.	
  Participants	
  were	
  seated	
  in	
  cubicles,	
  completing	
  the	
  study	
  in	
  20	
  minutes	
  on	
  average.	
   Materials	
   Norm	
  violation	
  manipulation.	
  We	
  used	
  the	
  same	
  manipulation	
  as	
  in	
  Study	
  One.	
  	
   Measure	
  of	
  social	
  approach/avoidance.	
  	
  To	
  assess	
  participants’	
  desire	
  to	
  approach	
  or	
  avoid	
  social	
  others,	
  we	
  used	
  a	
  decision	
  task	
  with	
  a	
  binary	
  outcome.	
  Participants	
   	
   48	
   were	
  given	
  the	
  option	
  to	
  complete	
  a	
  brainstorming	
  task	
  either	
  individually	
  or	
  in	
  a	
  group	
  with	
  other	
  study	
  participants	
  (see	
  Appendix	
  for	
  measure).	
  Choosing	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  task	
  individually	
  was	
  interpreted	
  as	
  avoidance	
  while	
  choosing	
  the	
  group	
  was	
  interpreted	
  as	
  approaching	
  others.	
  The	
  task	
  instructs	
  participants	
  to	
  brainstorm	
  as	
  many	
  uses	
  as	
  possible	
  for	
  a	
  brick	
  within	
  a	
  5-­‐minute	
  time	
  limit.	
  To	
  provide	
  participants	
  with	
  an	
  incentive	
  to	
  take	
  the	
  task	
  seriously,	
  we	
  explained	
  that	
  the	
  top	
  10	
  groups	
  or	
  individuals	
  who	
  generated	
  the	
  most	
  number	
  of	
  items	
  would	
  be	
  entered	
  into	
  a	
  lottery	
  for	
  $25.	
  	
   Demographics	
  questions	
  and	
  manipulation	
  check.	
  We	
  included	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  questions	
  asking	
  participants	
  whether	
  they	
  thought	
  that	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  character	
  in	
  the	
  implicit	
  manipulation	
  story	
  were	
  good	
  or	
  bad,	
  and	
  to	
  report	
  their	
  age,	
  sex,	
  and	
  ethnicity.	
  	
   Procedures	
  The	
  procedures	
  for	
  Study	
  2	
  is	
  identical	
  to	
  Study	
  1,	
  except	
  once	
  participants	
  complete	
  the	
  handwriting	
  manipulation,	
  they	
  moved	
  on	
  to	
  the	
  brainstorming	
  task.	
  They	
  read	
  the	
  instructions	
  (see	
  Appendix	
  D)	
  for	
  the	
  brainstorming	
  task,	
  and	
  were	
  asked	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  choice	
  between	
  the	
  individual	
  or	
  group	
  task	
  by	
  circling	
  one	
  of	
  two	
  options.	
  They	
  then	
  either	
  proceeded	
  to	
  brainstorm	
  on	
  their	
  own,	
  or	
  were	
  introduced	
  to	
  a	
  confederate	
  who	
  pretended	
  to	
  be	
  another	
  participant	
  in	
  the	
  study	
  seated	
  in	
  another	
  cubicle.	
  The	
  confederate	
  was	
  a	
  trained	
  undergraduate	
  research	
  assistant	
  who	
  contributed	
  standard	
  preset	
  items	
  at	
  regularly	
  timed	
  intervals	
  during	
  the	
  brainstorming	
  session.	
  Confederate	
  and	
  participants	
  recorded	
  brainstormed	
  items	
  on	
  individual	
  sheets	
  of	
  paper.	
  At	
  the	
  end	
  of	
  the	
  5-­‐minute	
  brainstorming	
  session,	
  participants	
  were	
  led	
  back	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  cubicles	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  manipulation	
  check	
  and	
  demographics	
  questionnaire.	
  Not	
  a	
  single	
  participant	
  suspected	
  that	
  the	
  confederate	
  was	
  not	
  actually	
  a	
  real	
  participant.	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   49	
   4.3.2	
  	
   RESULTS	
  AND	
  DISCUSSION	
   Descriptions	
  of	
  overall	
  choices	
  Overall,	
  across	
  control	
  and	
  experimental	
  conditions,	
  73%	
  of	
  participants	
  chose	
  to	
  do	
  the	
  brainstorming	
  task	
  individually.	
  Of	
  these,	
  a	
  greater	
  proportion	
  came	
  from	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  (83%	
  compared	
  to	
  64%	
  of	
  participants	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition).	
  A	
  logistic	
  regression	
  with	
  the	
  decision	
  as	
  outcome	
  and	
  Condition	
  as	
  predictor	
  revealed	
  that	
  the	
  difference	
  was	
  marginally	
  significant	
  (OR=.37,	
  p<	
  .15,	
  95%	
  CI	
  (.1,	
  1.45)).	
  A	
  manipulation	
  check	
  confirmed	
  that	
  participants	
  were	
  aware	
  of	
  and	
  remembered	
  the	
  contents	
  of	
  the	
  story	
  that	
  they	
  had	
  copied.	
  Participants	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  (containing	
  a	
  norm	
  violation)	
  rated	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  narrator	
  as	
  significantly	
  worse	
  than	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  (mean	
  diff	
  =	
  2.06,	
  p<.001.	
  95%	
  CI	
  (1.62,	
  2.50))	
  on	
  a	
  5	
  point	
  scale.	
  European	
  Canadians	
  rated	
  actions	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  as	
  significantly	
  worse	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  -­‐.68,	
  p<.047)	
  and	
  actions	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  as	
  significantly	
  better	
  (mean	
  difference	
  =	
  .64,	
  p<.02)	
  than	
  East	
  Asians	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  conditions.	
  As	
  with	
  Study	
  One,	
  this	
  difference	
  may	
  be	
  due	
  to	
  group	
  differences	
  in	
  response	
  style	
  when	
  using	
  rating	
  scales	
  (Chen,	
  et	
  al.,	
  1995).	
  	
  	
   Who	
  chose	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  task	
  individually	
  vs.	
  in	
  a	
  group?	
  Earlier,	
  we	
  hypothesized	
  that	
  there	
  would	
  be	
  a	
  group	
  difference	
  in	
  affective	
  and	
  motivational	
  experiences	
  based	
  on	
  ethnicity	
  following	
  a	
  real	
  or	
  imagined	
  norm	
  violation.	
  Following	
  a	
  wrong	
  doing,	
  we	
  expected	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants	
  to	
  be	
  primarily	
  regulated	
  by	
  guilt,	
  motivating	
  actions	
  to	
  make	
  reparations	
  measured	
  as	
  approaching	
  another	
  participant,	
  while	
  participants	
  of	
  East	
  Asian	
  backgrounds	
  would	
  tend	
  to	
  experience	
  shame	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  situation	
  and	
  be	
  motivated	
  to	
  withdraw	
  from	
  social	
  situations,	
  operationalized	
  as	
  choosing	
  to	
  complete	
  the	
  brainstorming	
  task	
  alone.	
  Thus,	
  we	
  expected	
  a	
  shift	
  in	
  choices	
  between	
  conditions,	
  with	
  East	
  Asians	
  choosing	
  Group	
  less	
  often	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition,	
  and	
  European	
  Canadians	
  exhibiting	
  the	
  opposite	
  pattern	
  (choosing	
  Group	
  more	
  often	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition).	
  To	
  test	
  our	
  predictions,	
  we	
  conducted	
   	
   50	
   two	
  logistic	
  regressions,	
  one	
  for	
  each	
  ethnicity,	
  with	
  the	
  decision	
  (Group	
  or	
  Individual)	
  as	
  outcome,	
  Condition	
  as	
  predictor,	
  and	
  participants’	
  age	
  and	
  sex	
  as	
  covariates.	
  	
  We	
  found	
  that	
  in	
  the	
  model	
  including	
  only	
  East	
  Asians,	
  being	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  decreased	
  the	
  odds	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  .05	
  (or	
  increased	
  the	
  odds	
  of	
  choosing	
  Individual	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  20),	
  compared	
  to	
  the	
  control	
  condition	
  (p<.049).	
  Pearson	
  goodness	
  of	
  fit	
  test	
  demonstrates	
  that	
  the	
  model	
  provides	
  a	
  moderately	
  good	
  fit	
  to	
  the	
  data	
  (P[χ2(11)	
  >	
  11.49]	
  =	
  .40).	
  This	
  provides	
  support	
  for	
  our	
  hypothesis.	
  In	
  the	
  model	
  with	
  Euro-­‐Canadians,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  significant	
  effect	
  of	
  Condition	
  on	
  task	
  choice	
  (OR=1.28,	
  p<.80).	
  Thus,	
  being	
  in	
  the	
  experimental	
  condition	
  made	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants	
  neither	
  more	
  nor	
  less	
  likely	
  to	
  choose	
  Group	
  than	
  in	
  the	
  control	
  condition.	
  This	
  model	
  also	
  exhibited	
  adequate	
  fit	
  to	
  the	
  data	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  Pearson	
  goodness-­‐of-­‐fit	
  test	
  (P[χ2(12)	
  >	
  17.98]	
  =	
  .12).	
  Thus,	
  our	
  prediction	
  of	
  differential	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  experimental	
  manipulation	
  by	
  ethnicity	
  was	
  supported,	
  but	
  the	
  predicted	
  direction	
  was	
  only	
  borne	
  out	
  by	
  the	
  East	
  Asian	
  group,	
  and	
  not	
  by	
  European	
  Canadians.	
  In	
  addition,	
  although	
  we	
  had	
  no	
  prior	
  predictions,	
  participant	
  age	
  was	
  a	
  marginally	
  significant	
  predictor	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group	
  for	
  East	
  Asians	
  but	
  not	
  for	
  European	
  Canadians;	
  in	
  the	
  former	
  group,	
  for	
  every	
  unit	
  increase	
  in	
  age,	
  odds	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group	
  increased	
  by	
  a	
  factor	
  of	
  1.55	
  (z=1.67,	
  p<.094).	
  	
  To	
  account	
  for	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  our	
  sample	
  consisted	
  of	
  immigrants	
  who	
  migrated	
  from	
  ostensibly	
  much	
  lower	
  relational	
  mobility	
  societies	
  to	
  a	
  relatively	
  higher	
  relational	
  mobility	
  society	
  in	
  which	
  this	
  research	
  is	
  being	
  conducted,	
  we	
  looked	
  at	
  the	
  effect	
  of	
  age	
  of	
  arrival	
  in	
  Canada,	
  or	
  conversely,	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  years	
  of	
  residency	
  in	
  Canada,	
  on	
  likelihood	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group.	
  One	
  reason	
  years	
  of	
  residency	
  in	
  Canada	
  might	
  be	
  of	
  concern	
  is	
  that	
  immigrants	
  who	
  have	
  migrated	
  to	
  a	
  society	
  with	
  a	
  different	
  degree	
  of	
  relational	
  mobility	
  from	
  their	
  native	
  society	
  might	
  have	
  adopted	
  the	
  cultural	
  norms	
  and	
  supporting	
  motivational	
  tendencies	
  facultatively—they	
  might	
  have	
  adjusted	
  their	
  behaviours	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  conditions	
  of	
  the	
  local	
  environment.	
  In	
  this	
  case,	
  we	
  would	
  expect	
  that	
  the	
  longer	
  an	
  individual	
  has	
  lived	
  in	
  Canada,	
  the	
   	
   51	
   more	
  they	
  should	
  behave	
  like	
  a	
  native	
  to	
  the	
  local	
  culture.	
  An	
  alternative	
  possibility	
  is	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  developmental	
  window	
  in	
  which	
  cultural	
  norms	
  and	
  motivational	
  systems	
  are	
  internalized,	
  after	
  which	
  individuals	
  become	
  relatively	
  rigid	
  and	
  less	
  able	
  to	
  learning	
  the	
  local	
  culture.	
  In	
  this	
  view,	
  unless	
  an	
  individual	
  migrates	
  at	
  a	
  very	
  early	
  age,	
  their	
  ability	
  to	
  adjust	
  their	
  behaviours	
  and	
  update	
  their	
  cultural	
  knowledge	
  diminishes	
  rapidly	
  over	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  development.	
  	
  To	
  see	
  if	
  our	
  data	
  could	
  speak	
  to	
  the	
  former	
  view,	
  a	
  logistic	
  regression	
  was	
  conducted,	
  using	
  Group	
  as	
  outcome,	
  and	
  participants’	
  age	
  of	
  arrival	
  in	
  Canada,	
  years	
  in	
  Canada,	
  and	
  Condition	
  as	
  predictors.	
  Sex	
  was	
  included	
  as	
  a	
  covariate.	
  Years	
  in	
  Canada	
  and	
  participants’	
  age	
  of	
  arrival	
  were	
  highly	
  collinear,	
  and	
  the	
  latter	
  was	
  dropped	
  from	
  the	
  model.	
  Analyses	
  reveal	
  that	
  years	
  of	
  residency	
  in	
  Canada	
  do	
  not	
  help	
  predict	
  odds	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group	
  or	
  Individual	
  (OR=1.01,	
  p<.85).	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  at	
  least	
  for	
  participants	
  in	
  our	
  sample,	
  length	
  of	
  enculturation	
  in	
  the	
  host	
  culture	
  had	
  no	
  bearing	
  on	
  likelihood	
  of	
  choosing	
  Group.	
  This	
  effect	
  could	
  have	
  been	
  produced	
  by	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  factors,	
  including	
  rigidity	
  of	
  cultural	
  learning	
  for	
  motivational	
  tendencies	
  after	
  a	
  certain	
  developmental	
  window,	
  or	
  an	
  absence	
  of	
  relationship	
  between	
  relational	
  mobility	
  and	
  type	
  of	
  motivational	
  tendency.	
  	
  4.4	
   GENERAL	
  DISCUSSION	
   What	
  did	
  we	
  find?	
  The	
  norm	
  violation	
  induction	
  did	
  not	
  produce	
  changes	
  in	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants’	
  reported	
  state	
  affect	
  in	
  Studies	
  1	
  or	
  behaviour	
  in	
  Study	
  2.	
  It	
  did	
  cause	
  East	
  Asians	
  to	
  report	
  higher	
  levels	
  of	
  both	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  in	
  Study	
  1,	
  and	
  to	
  shift	
  their	
  preference	
  toward	
  working	
  alone	
  on	
  a	
  task,	
  rather	
  than	
  the	
  indifference	
  they	
  exhibited	
  in	
  the	
  absence	
  of	
  the	
  manipulation.	
  It	
  appears	
  that	
  the	
  Euro-­‐Canadian	
  participants	
  were	
  impervious	
  to	
  the	
  experimental	
  manipulation,	
  at	
  least	
  not	
  pertaining	
  to	
  the	
  outcomes	
  we	
  were	
  interested	
  in.	
  During	
  debriefing,	
  some	
  participants	
  explained	
  that	
  while	
  they	
  thought	
  the	
  actions	
  of	
  the	
  narrator	
  in	
  the	
   	
   52	
   experimental	
  condition	
  were	
  bad,	
  they	
  did	
  not	
  necessarily	
  identify	
  with	
  his/her	
  actions,	
  offering	
  a	
  possible	
  explanation	
  for	
  why	
  some	
  participants	
  did	
  not	
  seem	
  to	
  be	
  affected	
  by	
  the	
  manipulation.	
  Future	
  efforts	
  will	
  need	
  to	
  use	
  a	
  manipulation	
  that	
  is	
  effective	
  at	
  evoking	
  realistic	
  feelings	
  of	
  having	
  violated	
  a	
  norm	
  in	
  both	
  groups.	
  Looking	
  at	
  just	
  the	
  East	
  Asian	
  results	
  across	
  Studies	
  1	
  and	
  2,	
  using	
  an	
  explicit	
  self-­‐report	
  DV	
  was	
  not	
  effective	
  at	
  measuring	
  the	
  outcomes	
  of	
  interest,	
  while	
  using	
  an	
  implicit	
  behavioural	
  measure	
  did	
  produce	
  results	
  consistent	
  with	
  our	
  predictions.	
  	
   Limitations	
  The	
  current	
  studies	
  have	
  several	
  limitations	
  that	
  should	
  temper	
  interpretation	
  of	
  the	
  results.	
  First,	
  the	
  apparent	
  lack	
  of	
  effect	
  of	
  the	
  norm	
  violation	
  induction	
  on	
  Euro-­‐Canadians	
  might	
  have	
  been	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  sample	
  size	
  being	
  insufficiently	
  large	
  to	
  detect	
  the	
  predicted	
  group	
  differences.	
  The	
  direction	
  of	
  effects	
  were	
  as	
  predicted,	
  and	
  may	
  reveal	
  a	
  significant	
  interaction	
  with	
  more	
  power.	
  Alternatively,	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  differentiation	
  between	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
  by	
  East	
  Asians	
  in	
  Study	
  1	
  may	
  be	
  due	
  a	
  lack	
  of	
  distinction	
  between	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt,	
  or	
  a	
  poor	
  measurement	
  instrument.	
  Further	
  studies	
  employing	
  better	
  measures	
  of	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  asking	
  participants	
  to	
  provide	
  definitional	
  distinctions	
  between	
  the	
  emotion	
  terms	
  may	
  shed	
  light	
  on	
  the	
  cause	
  of	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  reported	
  differentiation.	
  Second,	
  we	
  used	
  a	
  somewhat	
  crude	
  method	
  of	
  testing	
  for	
  association	
  between	
  relational	
  mobility	
  and	
  motivational	
  response	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  violation.	
  We	
  used	
  East	
  Asians	
  as	
  a	
  proxy	
  for	
  low	
  relational	
  mobility,	
  and	
  Euro-­‐Canadians	
  as	
  a	
  proxy	
  for	
  higher	
  relational	
  mobility	
  based	
  on	
  previous	
  findings	
  of	
  average	
  differences	
  by	
  ethnicity.	
  Measuring	
  relational	
  mobility	
  at	
  the	
  individual	
  level	
  may	
  reduce	
  noise	
  and	
  contribute	
  to	
  a	
  stronger	
  relationship	
  between	
  relational	
  mobility	
  and	
  the	
  tendency	
  to	
  experience	
  shame	
  or	
  guilt	
  motivations	
  following	
  a	
  transgression.	
  	
  The	
  hypothesized	
  causal	
  relationship	
  between	
  emotion	
  and	
  ecological	
  factor	
  is	
  that	
  a	
  society’s	
  degree	
  of	
  relational	
  mobility	
  created	
  a	
  cost-­‐benefit	
  structure	
  that	
  rendered	
  some	
  motivational	
  systems	
  more	
  suited	
  to	
  the	
  local	
  environment	
  than	
  others	
  at	
  mobilizing	
  responses	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  transgression.	
  However,	
  it	
  is	
  also	
   	
   53	
   plausible	
  that	
  (exogenously	
  caused)	
  group	
  divergences	
  in	
  motivational	
  tendencies	
  selected	
  for	
  and	
  maintained	
  different	
  optimal	
  degrees	
  of	
  relational	
  mobility	
  within	
  a	
  society.	
  The	
  design	
  of	
  the	
  present	
  study	
  does	
  not	
  allow	
  us	
  to	
  speak	
  to	
  causal	
  direction	
  and	
  does	
  not	
  rule	
  out	
  the	
  possibility	
  of	
  reverse	
  causality,	
  however	
  a	
  future	
  study	
  can	
  simulate	
  these	
  conditions	
  by	
  using	
  small	
  groups	
  that	
  differ	
  in	
  opportunities	
  to	
  exit	
  the	
  group	
  and	
  enter	
  a	
  new	
  one	
  to	
  experimentally	
  test	
  the	
  hypothesis.	
  	
  Speaking	
  to	
  the	
  broader	
  framework	
  of	
  a	
  coevolved	
  norm-­‐psychology,	
  this	
  set	
  of	
  studies	
  provided	
  some	
  preliminary	
  evidence	
  for	
  the	
  co-­‐evolution	
  of	
  genes	
  and	
  culture	
  to	
  generate	
  motivational	
  solutions	
  to	
  governing	
  norm	
  violations.	
  A	
  related	
  question	
  worth	
  exploring	
  is	
  the	
  motivations	
  experienced	
  by	
  other	
  parties—the	
  transgressed	
  and	
  3rd	
  party	
  observers.	
  If	
  what	
  constitutes	
  adaptive	
  motivations	
  and	
  actions	
  by	
  a	
  transgressor	
  differ	
  across	
  societies	
  as	
  a	
  product	
  of	
  culture	
  and	
  genes	
  coevolving,	
  one	
  would	
  expect	
  the	
  victim	
  of	
  a	
  transgression	
  and	
  neutral	
  observers	
  to	
  have	
  evolved	
  complementary	
  solutions	
  that	
  vary	
  along	
  the	
  same	
  critical	
  dimensions,	
  one	
  of	
  which	
  has	
  been	
  proposed	
  to	
  be	
  relational	
  mobility.	
  Evidence	
  suggestive	
  of	
  complementary	
  functioning	
  of	
  emotions	
  come	
  from	
  a	
  study	
  by	
  Wilson	
  and	
  O’Gorman	
  (2003)	
  who	
  documented	
  biased	
  emotional	
  experiences	
  following	
  a	
  norm	
  violation	
  such	
  that	
  the	
  transgressor	
  and	
  transgressed	
  each	
  experience	
  adaptive	
  misattributions	
  of	
  the	
  intensity	
  and	
  type	
  of	
  emotions	
  to	
  the	
  opposite	
  party,	
  thereby	
  helping	
  to	
  reduce	
  the	
  likelihood	
  of	
  conflict	
  between	
  the	
  two	
  parties.	
  This	
  suggests	
  that	
  knowing	
  one’s	
  particular	
  role	
  in	
  the	
  event	
  of	
  a	
  norm	
  violation	
  mobilizes	
  changes	
  that	
  prepare	
  the	
  individual	
  to	
  behave	
  in	
  adaptive	
  ways	
  in	
  anticipation	
  of	
  what	
  one’s	
  interaction	
  partner	
  might	
  do.	
  If	
  motivation	
  systems	
  recruited	
  to	
  regulate	
  norm	
  adherence	
  has	
  been	
  undergoing	
  selection	
  via	
  cultural	
  group	
  selection,	
  then	
  motivational	
  and	
  behavioural	
  systems	
  that	
  worked	
  best	
  in	
  tandem	
  to	
  galvanize	
  group	
  beneficial	
  norms	
  and	
  drive	
  out	
  defectors	
  should	
  have	
  outcompeted	
  other	
  groups,	
  and	
  its	
  practices	
  should	
  have	
  spread.	
  Testing	
  for	
  evidence	
  of	
  these	
  would	
  provide	
  further	
  evidence	
  of	
  the	
  theory,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  enable	
  understanding	
  of	
  the	
  solutions	
  societies	
  have	
  arrived	
  at	
  to	
  maintain	
  social	
  order.	
  	
   	
   54	
   	
  CHAPTER	
  5	
   CONCLUSIONS	
  A	
  number	
  of	
  theories	
  informed	
  by	
  ultimate	
  evolutionary	
  forces	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  selection	
  pressures	
  on	
  human	
  minds	
  have	
  been	
  proposed	
  to	
  explain	
  behaviours	
  of	
  present	
  day	
  humans	
  across	
  domains	
  of	
  social	
  life.	
  These	
  sorts	
  of	
  explanations	
  are	
  premised	
  on	
  the	
  idea	
  that	
  humans	
  differ	
  from	
  other	
  animals	
  in	
  the	
  natural	
  world,	
  presumably	
  driven	
  by	
  features	
  of	
  the	
  environment	
  such	
  as	
  ecology	
  and	
  social	
  structure	
  that	
  exerted	
  selection	
  pressures	
  for	
  adaptations	
  that	
  would	
  have	
  become	
  species-­‐typical	
  through	
  their	
  success	
  at	
  enabling	
  its	
  possessor	
  to	
  meet	
  adaptive	
  challenges.	
  Social	
  scientists	
  have	
  observed	
  that	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  remarkable	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  humans	
  differ	
  from	
  other	
  animals	
  is	
  the	
  intensity	
  with	
  which	
  we	
  engage	
  socially	
  with	
  other	
  members	
  of	
  our	
  social	
  group;	
  humans	
  are	
  intensely	
  social	
  even	
  compared	
  to	
  our	
  closest	
  genetics	
  relatives.	
  A	
  great	
  deal	
  of	
  debate	
  in	
  the	
  literature	
  concerns	
  interpreting	
  behavioural	
  evidence	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  what	
  cognitive	
  mechanisms	
  they	
  provide	
  support	
  for,	
  and	
  what	
  adaptive	
  problems	
  the	
  specialized	
  functions	
  might	
  have	
  evolved	
  specifically	
  to	
  address.	
  Some	
  theorists	
  have	
  posited	
  that	
  the	
  competencies	
  underlying	
  such	
  intense	
  sociality	
  is	
  driven	
  by	
  the	
  need	
  to	
  cooperate	
  in	
  large	
  groups	
  with	
  non-­‐kin	
  (Cosmides	
  &	
  Tooby,	
  1989),	
  while	
  others	
  argue	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  to	
  learn	
  cultural	
  knowledge	
  (Warneken	
  &	
  Tomasello,	
  2009;	
  Herrmann	
  et	
  al,	
  2007).	
  Boyd	
  and	
  Richerson	
  (2006)	
  have	
  proposed	
  that	
  as	
  an	
  offshoot	
  of	
  cultural	
  learning	
  abilities,	
  social	
  norms,	
  especially	
  prosocial	
  norms	
  and	
  various	
  mechanisms	
  of	
  deterring	
  defection	
  are	
  cultural	
  technologies	
  that	
  facilitated	
  the	
  intensification	
  of	
  human	
  sociality.	
  Given	
  the	
  centrality	
  of	
  these	
  behavioural	
  regularities	
  to	
  group	
  functioning,	
  this	
  thesis	
  set	
  out	
  to	
  predict	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  features	
  of	
  a	
  psychology	
  specialized	
  to	
  help	
  individuals	
  acquire	
  the	
  content	
  of	
  local	
  norms.	
  The	
  empirical	
  studies	
  presented	
  in	
  Chapters	
  3	
  and	
  4	
  tested	
  direct	
  predictions	
  from	
  the	
  proposed	
  features	
  of	
  norm-­‐psychology	
  and	
  found	
  some	
  support	
  for	
  the	
  predictions.	
  They	
  further	
  speak	
  to	
  specialized	
  cognitive	
  functions	
  in	
  aid	
  of	
  learning	
  and	
  implementing	
   	
   55	
   local	
  norms.	
  However,	
  further	
  work	
  is	
  needed	
  to	
  test	
  predictions	
  from	
  competing	
  theories	
  that	
  purport	
  to	
  explain	
  the	
  same	
  range	
  of	
  human	
  behaviours.	
   	
   56	
   	
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  of	
  Studies	
  on	
  Alcohol,	
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  Laland,	
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  culture	
  shaped	
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  human	
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  together.	
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   60	
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  The	
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   Developmental	
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  process	
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  heuristic	
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   Psychological	
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  Schultz,	
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  of	
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   Psychological	
  Science,	
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  Silverman,	
  I.,	
  &	
  Eals,	
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  Sex	
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  spatial	
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  Evolutionary	
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  data.	
  The	
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  Evolutionary	
  psychology	
  and	
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  533-­‐549.	
  	
  Spelke,	
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  The	
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  eating	
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  behavior:	
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  Univ	
  Press.	
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  M.	
  (2007).	
  The	
  evolution	
  of	
  foresight:	
  What	
  is	
  mental	
  time	
  travel,	
  and	
  is	
  it	
  unique	
  to	
  humans?	
  Behavioral	
  and	
  Brain	
  Sciences,	
   30(03),	
  299-­‐313.	
  	
  Tabibnia,	
  G.,	
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  A.,	
  &	
  Lieberman,	
  M.	
  (2008).	
  The	
  Sunny	
  Side	
  of	
  Fairness.	
   Psychological	
  Science,	
  19(4),	
  339.	
  	
  Tangney,	
  J.,	
  Stuewig,	
  J.,	
  &	
  Mashek,	
  D.	
  (2006).	
  Moral	
  emotions	
  and	
  moral	
  behavior.	
  	
  Tangney,	
  J.,	
  Wagner,	
  P.,	
  Fletcher,	
  C.,	
  &	
  Gramzow,	
  R.	
  (1992).	
  Shamed	
  into	
  anger?	
  The	
  relation	
  of	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt	
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  anger	
  and	
  self-­‐reported	
  aggression.	
  Journal	
  of	
   Personality	
  and	
  Social	
  Psychology,	
  62(4),	
  669-­‐675.	
  	
  Tracy,	
  J.	
  (2007).	
  The	
  psychological	
  structure	
  of	
  pride:	
  A	
  tale	
  of	
  two	
  facets.	
  Journal	
  of	
   Personality	
  and	
  Social	
  Psychology,	
  92,	
  506-­‐525.	
  	
   	
   61	
   Tulving,	
  E.	
  (2002).	
  Episodic	
  memory:	
  From	
  mind	
  to	
  brain.	
  Annual	
  Review	
  of	
   Psychology.	
  	
  Uttich,	
  K.,	
  &	
  Lombrozo,	
  T.	
  (2010).	
  Norms	
  inform	
  mental	
  state	
  ascriptions:	
  A	
  rational	
  explanation	
  for	
  the	
  side-­‐effect	
  effect.	
  Cognition.	
  	
  Wallbott,	
  H.,	
  &	
  Scherer,	
  K.	
  (1995).	
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  determinants	
  in	
  experiencing	
  shame	
  and	
  guilt.	
  Self-­conscious	
  emotions:	
  The	
  psychology	
  of	
  shame,	
  guilt,	
  embarrassment,	
   and	
  pride,	
  465-­‐487.	
  	
  Warneken,	
  F.,	
  &	
  Tomasello,	
  M.	
  (2007).	
  Helping	
  and	
  cooperation	
  at	
  14	
  months	
  of	
  age.	
   Infancy,	
  11(3),	
  271-­‐294.	
  	
  Watson,	
  D.,	
  Clark,	
  L.,	
  &	
  Tellegen,	
  A.	
  (1988).	
  Development	
  and	
  validation	
  of	
  brief	
  measures	
  of	
  positive	
  and	
  negative	
  affect:	
  The	
  PANAS	
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  Lee	
  Anna	
  Clark,	
  6.	
  	
  Weisfeld,	
  G.	
  (1997).	
  Discrete	
  emotions	
  theory	
  with	
  specific	
  reference	
  to	
  pride	
  and	
  shame.	
  Uniting	
  psychology	
  and	
  biology:	
  Integrative	
  perspectives	
  on	
  human	
   development,	
  ed.	
  NL	
  Segal,	
  GE	
  Weisfeld	
  &	
  CC	
  Weisfeld,	
  419-­‐443.	
  	
  Wellman,	
  H.,	
  &	
  Gelman,	
  S.	
  Knowledge	
  acquisition	
  in	
  foundational	
  domains.	
  	
  Wellman,	
  H.,	
  &	
  Gelman,	
  S.	
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  Cognitive	
  development:	
  Foundational	
  theories	
  of	
  core	
  domains.	
  Annual	
  Review	
  of	
  Psychology,	
  43(1),	
  337-­‐375.	
  	
  Wellman,	
  H.,	
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  Gelman,	
  S.	
  (1998).	
  Knowledge	
  acquisition	
  in	
  foundational	
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  Imitation	
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  Journal	
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  Evolution	
  and	
  Human	
  Behavior,	
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  Wilson,	
  D.,	
  &	
  O'Gorman,	
  R.	
  (2003).	
  Emotions	
  and	
  actions	
  associated	
  with	
  norm-­‐breaking	
  events.	
  Human	
  nature,	
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  277-­‐304.	
  	
  Wilson,	
  D.,	
  Van	
  Vugt,	
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  Multilevel	
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  major	
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  for	
  psychological	
  science.	
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  210-­‐223.	
  	
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  The	
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  105-­‐122.	
  	
   	
   62	
   Yuki,	
  M.,	
  Schug,	
  J.,	
  Horikawa,	
  H.,	
  Takemura,	
  K.,	
  Sato,	
  K.,	
  Yokota,	
  K.,	
  et	
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  Development	
  of	
  a	
  scale	
  to	
  measure	
  perceptions	
  of	
  relational	
  mobility	
  in	
  society.	
  Work.	
  pap.,	
  Hokkaido	
  Univ.,	
  Sapporo,	
  Japan.	
  	
  Zhong,	
  C.,	
  &	
  Liljenquist,	
  K.	
  (2006).	
  Washing	
  away	
  your	
  sins:	
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  and	
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   63	
   APPENDICES	
   APPENDIX	
  A:	
  REB	
  CERTIFICATES	
  OF	
  APPROVAL	
  	
  	
  	
   	
   10-08-05 11:31 AMhttps://rise.ubc.ca/rise/Doc/0/US7QCM90ONAKD6CV00PNG9JA97/fromString.html Page 1 of 1   The University of British Columbia Office of Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - MINIMAL RISK  PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER: Joseph Henrich UBC/Arts/Psychology, Department of H09-02686 INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: Institution Site UBC Vancouver (excludes UBC Hospital) Other locations where the research will be conducted: N/A  CO-INVESTIGATOR(S): N/A SPONSORING AGENCIES: UBC Hampton Research Endowment Fund PROJECT TITLE: Memories of Ove CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE:  October 22, 2010 DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL: DATE APPROVED:  October 22, 2009 Document Name Version Date Protocol: Protocol 1 October 6, 2009 Consent Forms: Consent Form 3 October 22, 2009 Advertisements: Sample recruitment poster 1 October 6, 2009 Questionnaire, Questionnaire Cover Letter, Tests: Sample stimulus 1 October 6, 2009 Sample questions 1 October 6, 2009 Other Documents: Debriefing form 1 October 6, 2009   The application for ethical review and the document(s) listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects.   Approval is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board and signed electronically by one of the following: Dr. M. Judith Lynam, Chair Dr. Ken Craig, Chair Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair Dr. Laurie Ford, Associate Chair Dr. Anita Ho, Associate Chair 	
   64	
   	
  	
  	
   	
  	
   10-08-05 11:25 AMhttps://rise.ubc.ca/rise/Doc/0/65QHDMVSIKGKF2VDIJMJGR9DA4/fromString.html Page 1 of 1   The University of British Columbia Office of Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road,  Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - FULL BOARD PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER: Joseph Henrich UBC/Arts/Psychology, Department  of H10-00824 INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: Institution Site UBC Vancouver  (excludes UBC Hospital) Other locations where the research will be conducted: This  research will also be done in  public spaces in  the Greater Vancouver  Area.  CO-INVESTIGATOR(S): N/A SPONSORING AGENCIES: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council  of Canada (SSHRC) PROJECT TITLE: Personality,  Motivation and Decision-making REB MEETING DATE: CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE: April 22, 2010  April 22, 2011 DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL: DATE APPROVED:  May 25, 2010 Document Name Version Date Protocol: Protocol 1 April  6, 2010 Consent Forms: Consent 1 April  5, 2010 Advertisements: Sample Poster 1 April  5, 2010 Questionnaire,  Questionnaire Cover Letter, Tests: State affect 1 April  5, 2010 Demographics and Manipulation Check 1 April  5, 2010 Individual  vs Group Decision Task 1 April  5, 2010 Induction Stimulus 1 April  5, 2010 Rosenberg Scale 1 April  5, 2010 Other Documents: Debriefing form 1 April  6, 2010   The application for ethical  review and the document(s)  listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical  grounds for research involving human subjects.   Approval  is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board and signed electronically by one of the following: Dr. M. Judith  Lynam, Chair Dr. Ken Craig,  Chair Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair Dr. Laurie  Ford,  Associate Chair Dr. Anita Ho,  Associate Chair 	
   65	
   APPENDIX	
  B:	
  VIGNETTE	
  STIMULI	
  	
   Instructions:	
  	
  Imagine	
  that	
  you	
  are	
  an	
  explorer,	
  and	
  that	
  you	
  will	
  soon	
  be	
  visiting	
  Ove	
  to	
  study	
  the	
  Ovean	
  way	
  of	
  life,	
  and	
  everything	
  about	
  the	
  people	
  and	
  how	
  they	
  live.	
  The	
  following	
  account	
  is	
  the	
  only	
  source	
  of	
  information	
  for	
  you	
  about	
  Ove.	
  This	
  is	
  your	
  one	
  and	
  only	
  opportunity	
  to	
  correctly	
  observe	
  the	
  place	
  and	
  the	
  people,	
  so	
  it	
  is	
  important	
  to	
  learn	
  as	
  much	
  about	
  Ove	
  as	
  possible	
  from	
  the	
  account.	
  	
  	
   Control	
  condition:	
  During	
  my	
  explorations,	
  I	
  met	
  many	
  other	
  adventurers	
  and	
  travelers.	
  By	
  the	
  comfort	
  of	
  roaring	
  fires,	
  we	
  exchanged	
  tales	
  of	
  sights	
  we	
  had	
  seen	
  and	
  people	
  we	
  had	
  met	
  in	
  those	
  foreign	
  lands.	
  In	
  particular,	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  stories	
  told	
  by	
  an	
  Australian	
  traveler	
  about	
  the	
  remote	
  village	
  of	
  Ove,	
  and	
  so,	
  3	
  weeks	
  after	
  I	
  first	
  arrived	
  on	
  the	
  mainland,	
  I	
  set	
  off	
  to	
  visit	
  Ove	
  for	
  myself.	
  	
  The	
  road	
  to	
  Ove	
  was	
  long	
  and	
  winding,	
  but	
  it	
  was	
  well	
  kept	
  by	
  the	
  locals,	
  who	
  traveled	
  the	
  road	
  frequently.	
  Eight	
  hours	
  after	
  I	
  set	
  out	
  and	
  as	
  afternoon	
  was	
  waning,	
  I	
  approached	
  a	
  large	
  settlement	
  of	
  about	
  400	
  houses	
  nestled	
  at	
  the	
  base	
  of	
  a	
  mountain.	
  Some	
  villagers	
  must	
  have	
  seen	
  me	
  arriving,	
  for	
  a	
  tall	
  man	
  approached	
  me	
  purposefully	
  at	
  the	
  outskirts	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  He	
  wore	
  a	
  deep	
  green	
  cloak	
  draped	
  around	
  his	
  shoulders,	
  and	
  carried	
  a	
  long	
  carved	
  wooden	
  stick	
  in	
  his	
  left	
  hand.	
  	
  This	
  man	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Anin	
  in	
  broken	
  English.	
  After	
  explaining	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  traveler	
  from	
  afar	
  and	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  visit	
  their	
  community,	
  Anin	
  led	
  me	
  uphill,	
  through	
  the	
  village,	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  where	
  I	
  would	
  lodge.	
  On	
  the	
  way,	
  we	
  passed	
  by	
  houses	
  built	
  from	
  terracotta,	
  with	
  high	
  pointy	
  roofs	
  that	
  cast	
  long	
  shadows	
  onto	
  the	
  streets.	
  Through	
  their	
  windows,	
  I	
  could	
  see	
  villagers	
  busily	
  preparing	
  food.	
  Mothers	
  called	
  out	
  words	
  of	
  encouragement	
  to	
  their	
  children	
  playing	
  on	
  the	
  streets.	
  	
   	
   66	
   A	
  boy	
  clutching	
  a	
  plant	
  cutting	
  ran	
  towards	
  me.	
  In	
  his	
  haste,	
  he	
  failed	
  to	
  see	
  a	
  muddy	
  patch	
  of	
  ground	
  in	
  time.	
  He	
  slipped,	
  and	
  nearly	
  knocked	
  me	
  over	
  with	
  his	
  flailing	
  arms	
  as	
  he	
  tried	
  to	
  regain	
  his	
  balance.	
  Three	
  others	
  came	
  racing	
  after	
  him,	
  laughing	
  at	
  his	
  near	
  mishap.	
  When	
  they	
  saw	
  Anin,	
  they	
  slowed	
  down,	
  tapped	
  their	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  their	
  right	
  arm,	
  then	
  carefully	
  skirted	
  the	
  muddy	
  patch	
  before	
  picking	
  up	
  pace	
  again.	
  Anin	
  helped	
  me	
  regain	
  my	
  balance	
  and	
  once	
  I	
  recovered,	
  we	
  continued	
  on.	
  	
  Gradually,	
  we	
  began	
  to	
  climb.	
  The	
  dirt	
  terrain	
  became	
  hard	
  and	
  rocky	
  in	
  places.	
  Few	
  trees	
  grew	
  up	
  here.	
  Instead,	
  pieces	
  of	
  black	
  granite	
  dotted	
  the	
  landscape.	
  The	
  houses	
  were	
  spaced	
  farther	
  apart,	
  and	
  the	
  streets	
  were	
  quiet.	
  As	
  we	
  walked	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  bustling	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village,	
  the	
  warmth	
  of	
  day	
  seemed	
  to	
  seep	
  away	
  with	
  the	
  setting	
  sun.	
  A	
  bird	
  with	
  green	
  plumage	
  circled	
  overhead,	
  and	
  let	
  out	
  a	
  crisp	
  chirp.	
  Anin,	
  not	
  realizing	
  I	
  had	
  stopped	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  bird,	
  had	
  continued	
  striding	
  ahead.	
  He	
  looked	
  up	
  and	
  glanced	
  at	
  the	
  circling	
  bird	
  and	
  beckoned	
  at	
  me	
  to	
  follow.	
  I	
  hurried	
  to	
  catch	
  up	
  to	
  him,	
  taking	
  care	
  to	
  avoid	
  loose	
  rocks	
  along	
  the	
  way.	
  	
  After	
  a	
  while,	
  Anin	
  stopped.	
  He	
  motioned	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  we	
  were	
  standing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  and	
  indicated	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  to	
  stay	
  here.	
  He	
  called	
  out	
  someone’s	
  name.	
  Momentarily,	
  a	
  teenager	
  with	
  a	
  broom	
  in	
  hand	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  looked	
  curiously	
  at	
  me,	
  and	
  then	
  questioningly	
  at	
  Anin.	
  Anin	
  explained	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  visiting	
  and	
  needed	
  a	
  place	
  to	
  stay.	
  The	
  teenager's	
  face	
  relaxed	
  into	
  a	
  friendly	
  smile.	
  He	
  set	
  his	
  broom	
  down	
  and	
  leaned	
  it	
  against	
  the	
  door	
  frame	
  before	
  approaching	
  us,	
  stepping	
  around	
  some	
  woody	
  shrubs	
  with	
  purple	
  flowers	
  growing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Palo	
  and	
  said	
  he	
  would	
  help	
  me	
  settle	
  in.	
  	
  After	
  bidding	
  Anin	
  goodbye,	
  Palo	
  took	
  me	
  into	
  the	
  house.	
  The	
  house	
  was	
  filled	
  with	
  smells	
  of	
  cooking	
  and	
  sounds	
  of	
  people	
  talking	
  in	
  the	
  back.	
  A	
  fire	
  crackled	
  merrily	
  in	
  a	
  hearth	
  in	
  the	
  living	
  room.	
  A	
  young	
  woman	
  wearing	
  a	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dress	
  tied	
  with	
  black	
  string	
  around	
  her	
  neck	
  and	
  waist	
  walked	
  past	
  us	
  in	
  the	
  hallway.	
  I	
  looked	
  closer	
  and	
  noticed	
  that	
  she	
  strongly	
  resembled	
  Palo.	
  At	
  my	
  scrutiny,	
  she	
  giggled	
  and	
  slipped	
  out	
  the	
  door.	
  Palo	
  led	
  me	
  upstairs	
  into	
  what	
  appeared	
  to	
  be	
  a	
   	
   67	
   guest	
  room.	
  All	
  of	
  a	
  sudden	
  I	
  felt	
  very	
  tired	
  from	
  traveling	
  and	
  gestured	
  to	
  Palo	
  that	
  I	
  wished	
  to	
  sleep.	
  	
  I	
  don’t	
  know	
  how	
  long	
  I	
  slept,	
  but	
  it	
  must	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  long	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  still	
  dark	
  outside	
  when	
  I	
  woke	
  to	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  singing	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  the	
  voice	
  and	
  was	
  curious	
  to	
  see	
  its	
  owner,	
  but	
  didn't	
  want	
  to	
  risk	
  interrupting	
  the	
  song.	
  So	
  I	
  crept	
  downstairs	
  and	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  went	
  around	
  to	
  the	
  back,	
  hoping	
  that	
  the	
  room	
  where	
  the	
  singing	
  was	
  coming	
  from	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  window.	
  Sure	
  enough,	
  the	
  window	
  at	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house	
  was	
  aglow,	
  and	
  illuminated	
  by	
  candlelight,	
  I	
  could	
  make	
  out	
  5	
  figures	
  in	
  the	
  room.	
  One	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  Palo.	
  He	
  was	
  sitting	
  with	
  3	
  women	
  around	
  a	
  table,	
  all	
  four	
  of	
  them	
  absorbed	
  by	
  the	
  motions	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  standing	
  upright	
  raising	
  a	
  ornamented	
  bowl	
  above	
  his	
  head.	
  	
  	
  The	
  man	
  had	
  his	
  head	
  tilted	
  back,	
  with	
  eyes	
  closed	
  and	
  arms	
  reaching	
  upward	
  with	
  the	
  bowl.	
  I	
  gathered	
  that	
  this	
  must	
  be	
  the	
  singer	
  I	
  heard	
  from	
  upstairs.	
  As	
  he	
  stood,	
  the	
  singer	
  swayed	
  lightly	
  from	
  side	
  to	
  side.	
  	
  I	
  was	
  so	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  scene	
  before	
  me	
  that	
  I	
  didn't	
  even	
  realize	
  when	
  the	
  man	
  dropped	
  his	
  arms	
  and	
  stopped	
  singing.	
  A	
  gust	
  of	
  wind	
  brought	
  me	
  out	
  of	
  my	
  trance.	
  I	
  shivered,	
  and	
  suddenly	
  realized	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  cold	
  in	
  the	
  chilly	
  night	
  air.	
  I	
  decided	
  to	
  head	
  back	
  indoors	
  and	
  to	
  my	
  room	
  before	
  my	
  hosts	
  realized	
  I	
  was	
  spying	
  on	
  them.	
  I	
  was	
  startled	
  when	
  I	
  heard	
  meowing	
  coming	
  from	
  a	
  nearby	
  bush,	
  and	
  so	
  I	
  quickly	
  hurried	
  back	
  into	
  the	
  house	
  and	
  to	
  bed.	
  	
  	
   High	
  frequency	
  condition:	
  During	
  my	
  explorations,	
  I	
  met	
  many	
  other	
  adventurers	
  and	
  travelers.	
  By	
  the	
  comfort	
  of	
  roaring	
  fires,	
  we	
  exchanged	
  tales	
  of	
  sights	
  we	
  had	
  seen	
  and	
  people	
  we	
  had	
  met	
  in	
  those	
  foreign	
  lands.	
  In	
  particular,	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  stories	
  told	
  by	
  an	
  Australian	
  traveler	
  about	
  the	
  remote	
  village	
  of	
  Ove,	
  and	
  so,	
  3	
  weeks	
  after	
  I	
  first	
  arrived	
  on	
  the	
  mainland,	
  I	
  set	
  off	
  to	
  visit	
  Ove	
  for	
  myself.	
  	
  The	
  road	
  to	
  Ove	
  was	
  long	
  and	
  winding,	
  but	
  it	
  was	
  well	
  kept	
  by	
  the	
  locals,	
  who	
  traveled	
  the	
  road	
  frequently.	
  Eight	
  hours	
  after	
  I	
  set	
  out	
  and	
  as	
  afternoon	
  was	
   	
   68	
   waning,	
  I	
  approached	
  a	
  large	
  settlement	
  of	
  about	
  400	
  houses	
  nestled	
  at	
  the	
  base	
  of	
  a	
  mountain.	
  Some	
  villagers	
  must	
  have	
  seen	
  me	
  arriving,	
  for	
  a	
  tall	
  man	
  approached	
  me	
  purposefully	
  at	
  the	
  outskirts	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  He	
  wore	
  a	
  deep	
  green	
  cloak	
  draped	
  around	
  his	
  shoulders,	
  and	
  carried	
  a	
  long	
  carved	
  wooden	
  stick	
  in	
  his	
  left	
  hand.	
  This	
  man	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Anin	
  in	
  broken	
  English.	
  After	
  explaining	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  traveler	
  from	
  afar	
  and	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  visit	
  their	
  community,	
  Anin	
  led	
  me	
  uphill,	
  through	
  the	
  village,	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  where	
  I	
  would	
  lodge.	
  On	
  the	
  way,	
  we	
  passed	
  by	
  houses	
  built	
  from	
  terracotta,	
  with	
  high	
  pointy	
  roofs	
  that	
  cast	
  long	
  shadows	
  onto	
  the	
  streets.	
  Through	
  their	
  windows,	
  I	
  could	
  see	
  villagers	
  busily	
  preparing	
  food.	
  Mothers	
  in	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dresses	
  tied	
  with	
  black	
  string	
  around	
  the	
  neck	
  and	
  waist	
  called	
  out	
  words	
  of	
  encouragement	
  to	
  their	
  children	
  playing	
  on	
  the	
  streets.	
  	
  A	
  boy	
  clutching	
  a	
  green	
  clock	
  like	
  Anin’s	
  ran	
  towards	
  me.	
  In	
  his	
  haste,	
  he	
  failed	
  to	
  see	
  a	
  muddy	
  patch	
  of	
  ground	
  in	
  time.	
  He	
  slipped,	
  and	
  nearly	
  knocked	
  me	
  over	
  with	
  his	
  flailing	
  arms	
  as	
  he	
  tried	
  to	
  regain	
  his	
  balance.	
  Three	
  others	
  came	
  racing	
  after	
  him,	
  laughing	
  at	
  his	
  near	
  mishap.	
  When	
  they	
  saw	
  Anin,	
  they	
  slowed	
  down,	
  tapped	
  their	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  their	
  right	
  arm,	
  then	
  carefully	
  skirted	
  the	
  muddy	
  patch	
  before	
  picking	
  up	
  pace	
  again.	
  Anin	
  helped	
  me	
  regain	
  my	
  balance	
  and	
  once	
  I	
  recovered,	
  we	
  continued	
  on.	
  	
  	
  Gradually,	
  we	
  began	
  to	
  climb.	
  The	
  dirt	
  terrain	
  became	
  hard	
  and	
  rocky	
  in	
  places.	
  Few	
  trees	
  grew	
  up	
  here.	
  Instead,	
  low	
  woody	
  plants	
  with	
  purple	
  flowers	
  dotted	
  the	
  landscape.	
  The	
  houses	
  were	
  spaced	
  farther	
  apart,	
  and	
  the	
  streets	
  were	
  quiet.	
  As	
  we	
  walked	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  bustling	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village,	
  the	
  warmth	
  of	
  day	
  seemed	
  to	
  seep	
  away	
  with	
  the	
  setting	
  sun;	
  I	
  wrapped	
  my	
  coat	
  more	
  tightly	
  around	
  me	
  and	
  turned	
  up	
  my	
  collar	
  to	
  keep	
  out	
  the	
  cold.	
  A	
  bird	
  with	
  green	
  plumage	
  circled	
  overhead,	
  and	
  let	
  out	
  a	
  crisp	
  chirp.	
  Anin,	
  not	
  realizing	
  I	
  had	
  stopped	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  bird,	
  had	
  continued	
  striding	
  ahead.	
  He	
  looked	
  up	
  and	
  glanced	
  at	
  the	
  circling	
  bird	
  and	
  beckoned	
  at	
  me	
  to	
  follow.	
  I	
  hurried	
  to	
  catch	
  up	
  to	
  him,	
  taking	
  care	
  to	
  avoid	
  muddy	
  puddles	
  along	
  the	
  way.	
  	
  	
   	
   69	
   After	
  a	
  while,	
  Anin	
  stopped.	
  He	
  motioned	
  to	
  the	
  terracotta	
  house	
  with	
  a	
  pointy	
  roof	
  we	
  were	
  standing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  and	
  indicated	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  to	
  stay	
  here.	
  He	
  called	
  out	
  someone’s	
  name.	
  Momentarily,	
  a	
  teenager	
  with	
  a	
  broom	
  in	
  hand	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  looked	
  curiously	
  at	
  me,	
  then	
  tapped	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  his	
  arm	
  when	
  he	
  recognized	
  Anin.	
  Anin	
  explained	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  visiting,	
  and	
  needed	
  a	
  place	
  to	
  stay.	
  The	
  teenager's	
  face	
  relaxed	
  into	
  a	
  friendly	
  smile.	
  He	
  set	
  his	
  broom	
  down	
  and	
  leaned	
  it	
  against	
  the	
  door	
  frame	
  before	
  approaching	
  us,	
  stepping	
  around	
  some	
  woody	
  shrubs	
  with	
  purple	
  flowers	
  growing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Palo	
  and	
  said	
  he	
  would	
  help	
  me	
  settle	
  in.	
  	
  After	
  thanking	
  and	
  bidding	
  Anin	
  goodbye,	
  Palo	
  took	
  me	
  into	
  the	
  house.	
  The	
  house	
  was	
  filled	
  with	
  smells	
  of	
  cooking	
  and	
  sounds	
  of	
  people	
  talking	
  in	
  the	
  back.	
  A	
  fire	
  crackled	
  merrily	
  in	
  a	
  hearth	
  in	
  the	
  living	
  room.	
  A	
  young	
  woman	
  wearing	
  a	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dress	
  tied	
  with	
  black	
  string	
  around	
  her	
  neck	
  and	
  waist	
  walked	
  past	
  us	
  in	
  the	
  hallway.	
  I	
  looked	
  closer	
  and	
  noticed	
  that	
  she	
  strongly	
  resembled	
  Palo.	
  At	
  my	
  scrutiny,	
  she	
  giggled	
  and	
  slipped	
  out	
  the	
  door.	
  Palo	
  led	
  me	
  upstairs	
  into	
  what	
  appeared	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  guest	
  room.	
  All	
  of	
  a	
  sudden	
  I	
  felt	
  very	
  tired	
  from	
  traveling	
  and	
  gestured	
  to	
  Palo	
  that	
  I	
  wished	
  to	
  sleep.	
  	
  I	
  don’t	
  know	
  how	
  long	
  I	
  slept,	
  but	
  it	
  must	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  long	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  still	
  dark	
  outside	
  when	
  I	
  woke	
  to	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  singing	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  the	
  voice	
  and	
  was	
  curious	
  to	
  see	
  its	
  owner,	
  but	
  didn't	
  want	
  to	
  risk	
  interrupting	
  the	
  song.	
  So	
  I	
  crept	
  downstairs	
  and	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  went	
  around	
  to	
  the	
  back,	
  hoping	
  that	
  the	
  room	
  where	
  the	
  singing	
  was	
  coming	
  from	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  window.	
  Sure	
  enough,	
  the	
  window	
  at	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house	
  was	
  aglow,	
  and	
  illuminated	
  by	
  candlelight,	
  I	
  could	
  make	
  out	
  5	
  figures	
  in	
  the	
  room.	
  One	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  Palo.	
  He	
  was	
  sitting	
  with	
  3	
  women	
  around	
  a	
  table,	
  all	
  four	
  of	
  them	
  absorbed	
  by	
  the	
  motions	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  standing	
  upright	
  raising	
  a	
  ornamented	
  bowl	
  above	
  his	
  head,	
  the	
  singer.	
  	
  	
  The	
  singer	
  had	
  his	
  head	
  tilted	
  back,	
  with	
  eyes	
  closed	
  and	
  arms	
  reaching	
  upward	
  with	
  the	
  bowl.	
  As	
  he	
  stood,	
  he	
  swayed	
  lightly	
  from	
  side	
  to	
  side.	
  	
  I	
  was	
  so	
  focused	
  on	
   	
   70	
   the	
  scene	
  before	
  me	
  that	
  I	
  didn't	
  even	
  realize	
  when	
  the	
  man	
  dropped	
  his	
  arms	
  and	
  stopped	
  singing.	
  The	
  same	
  shrill	
  bird	
  call	
  I'd	
  heard	
  earlier	
  in	
  the	
  day	
  brought	
  me	
  out	
  of	
  my	
  trance.	
  I	
  shivered,	
  and	
  suddenly	
  realized	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  cold	
  in	
  the	
  chilly	
  night	
  air.	
  I	
  decided	
  to	
  head	
  back	
  indoors	
  and	
  to	
  my	
  room	
  before	
  my	
  hosts	
  realized	
  I	
  was	
  spying	
  on	
  them.	
  I	
  was	
  startled	
  when	
  I	
  heard	
  singing	
  coming	
  from	
  inside	
  the	
  neighbouring	
  house,	
  and	
  so	
  I	
  quickly	
  hurried	
  back	
  into	
  the	
  house	
  and	
  to	
  bed.	
   	
   Negative	
  emotional	
  reaction	
  condition:	
  During	
  my	
  explorations,	
  I	
  met	
  many	
  other	
  adventurers	
  and	
  travelers.	
  By	
  the	
  comfort	
  of	
  roaring	
  fires,	
  we	
  exchanged	
  tales	
  of	
  sights	
  we	
  had	
  seen	
  and	
  people	
  we	
  had	
  met	
  in	
  those	
  foreign	
  lands.	
  In	
  particular,	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  stories	
  told	
  by	
  an	
  Australian	
  traveler	
  about	
  the	
  remote	
  village	
  of	
  Ove,	
  and	
  so,	
  3	
  weeks	
  after	
  I	
  first	
  arrived	
  on	
  the	
  mainland,	
  I	
  set	
  off	
  to	
  visit	
  Ove	
  for	
  myself.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  road	
  to	
  Ove	
  was	
  long	
  and	
  winding,	
  but	
  it	
  was	
  well	
  kept	
  by	
  the	
  locals,	
  who	
  traveled	
  the	
  road	
  frequently.	
  Eight	
  hours	
  after	
  I	
  set	
  out	
  and	
  as	
  afternoon	
  was	
  waning,	
  I	
  approached	
  a	
  large	
  settlement	
  of	
  about	
  400	
  houses	
  nestled	
  at	
  the	
  base	
  of	
  a	
  mountain.	
  Some	
  villagers	
  must	
  have	
  seen	
  me	
  arriving,	
  for	
  a	
  tall	
  man	
  approached	
  me	
  purposefully	
  at	
  the	
  outskirts	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  He	
  wore	
  a	
  deep	
  green	
  cloak	
  draped	
  around	
  his	
  shoulders,	
  and	
  carried	
  a	
  long	
  carved	
  wooden	
  stick	
  in	
  his	
  left	
  hand.	
  	
  	
  	
  This	
  man	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Anin	
  in	
  broken	
  English.	
  After	
  explaining	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  traveler	
  from	
  afar	
  and	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  visit	
  their	
  community,	
  Anin	
  led	
  me	
  uphill,	
  through	
  the	
  village,	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  where	
  I	
  would	
  lodge.	
  On	
  the	
  way,	
  we	
  passed	
  by	
  houses	
  built	
  from	
  terracotta,	
  with	
  high	
  pointy	
  roofs	
  that	
  cast	
  long	
  shadows	
  onto	
  the	
  streets.	
  Through	
  their	
  windows,	
  I	
  could	
  see	
  villagers	
  busily	
  preparing	
  food.	
  Mothers	
  in	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dresses	
  tied	
  with	
  black	
  string	
  around	
  the	
  neck	
  and	
  waist	
  called	
  out	
  words	
  of	
  encouragement	
  to	
  their	
  children	
  playing	
  on	
  the	
  streets.	
  	
   	
   71	
   A	
  boy	
  clutching	
  a	
  plant	
  cutting	
  ran	
  towards	
  me.	
  In	
  his	
  haste,	
  he	
  failed	
  to	
  see	
  a	
  muddy	
  patch	
  of	
  ground	
  in	
  time.	
  He	
  slipped,	
  and	
  nearly	
  knocked	
  me	
  over	
  with	
  his	
  flailing	
  arms	
  as	
  he	
  tried	
  to	
  regain	
  his	
  balance.	
  Three	
  others	
  came	
  racing	
  after	
  him,	
  laughing	
  at	
  his	
  near	
  mishap.	
  When	
  they	
  saw	
  Anin,	
  they	
  slowed	
  down,	
  tapped	
  their	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  their	
  right	
  arm.	
  They	
  carefully	
  skirted	
  the	
  muddy	
  patch,	
  frowning	
  with	
  annoyance,	
  before	
  picking	
  up	
  pace	
  again.	
  Anin	
  helped	
  me	
  regain	
  my	
  balance	
  and	
  once	
  I	
  recovered,	
  we	
  continued	
  on.	
  	
  	
  	
  Gradually,	
  we	
  began	
  to	
  climb.	
  The	
  dirt	
  terrain	
  became	
  hard	
  and	
  rocky	
  in	
  places.	
  Few	
  trees	
  grew	
  up	
  here.	
  Instead,	
  pieces	
  of	
  black	
  granite	
  dotted	
  the	
  landscape.	
  The	
  houses	
  were	
  spaced	
  farther	
  apart,	
  and	
  the	
  streets	
  were	
  quiet.	
  As	
  we	
  walked	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  bustling	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village,	
  the	
  warmth	
  of	
  day	
  seemed	
  to	
  seep	
  away	
  with	
  the	
  setting	
  sun.A	
  bird	
  with	
  green	
  plumage	
  circled	
  overhead,	
  and	
  let	
  out	
  a	
  crisp	
  chirp.	
  Anin,	
  not	
  realizing	
  I	
  had	
  stopped	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  bird,	
  had	
  continued	
  striding	
  ahead.	
  He	
  looked	
  up	
  and	
  frowned	
  at	
  the	
  circling	
  bird	
  and	
  beckoned	
  at	
  me	
  to	
  follow.	
  I	
  hurried	
  to	
  catch	
  up	
  to	
  him,	
  taking	
  care	
  to	
  avoid	
  loose	
  rocks	
  along	
  the	
  way.	
  	
  	
  	
  After	
  a	
  while,	
  Anin	
  stopped.	
  He	
  motioned	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  we	
  were	
  standing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  and	
  indicated	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  to	
  stay	
  here.	
  He	
  called	
  out	
  someone’s	
  name.	
  Momentarily,	
  a	
  teenager	
  with	
  a	
  broom	
  in	
  hand	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  looked	
  curiously	
  at	
  me,	
  and	
  then	
  nodded	
  his	
  head	
  when	
  he	
  recognized	
  Anin,	
  which	
  drew	
  a	
  fleeting	
  frown.	
  Anin	
  quickly	
  recovered	
  from	
  his	
  annoyance	
  and	
  explained	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  visiting	
  and	
  needed	
  a	
  place	
  to	
  stay.	
  The	
  teenager's	
  face	
  relaxed	
  into	
  a	
  friendly	
  smile.	
  He	
  set	
  his	
  broom	
  down	
  and	
  leaned	
  it	
  against	
  the	
  door	
  frame	
  before	
  approaching	
  us,	
  stepping	
  around	
  some	
  woody	
  shrubs	
  with	
  purple	
  flowers	
  growing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Palo	
  and	
  said	
  he	
  would	
  help	
  me	
  settle	
  in.	
  	
  	
  After	
  bidding	
  Anin	
  goodbye,	
  Palo	
  took	
  me	
  into	
  the	
  house.	
  The	
  house	
  was	
  filled	
  with	
  smells	
  of	
  cooking	
  and	
  sounds	
  of	
  people	
  talking	
  in	
  the	
  back.	
  A	
  fire	
  crackled	
  merrily	
  in	
  a	
  hearth	
  in	
  the	
  living	
  room.	
  A	
  young	
  woman	
  wearing	
  a	
  long	
  blue	
  gown	
  walked	
  past	
  us	
  in	
  the	
  hallway.	
  Palo	
  looked	
  at	
  her,	
  shook	
  his	
  head	
  and	
  sighed	
  in	
  resignation.	
  I	
  looked	
  closer	
  and	
  noticed	
  that	
  she	
  strongly	
  resembled	
  Palo.	
  At	
  Palo’s	
  heavy	
  sigh,	
  she	
   	
   72	
   giggled	
  and	
  slipped	
  out	
  the	
  door.	
  Palo	
  led	
  me	
  upstairs	
  into	
  what	
  appeared	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  guest	
  room.	
  All	
  of	
  a	
  sudden	
  I	
  felt	
  very	
  tired	
  from	
  traveling	
  and	
  gestured	
  to	
  Palo	
  that	
  I	
  wished	
  to	
  sleep.	
  	
  I	
  don’t	
  know	
  how	
  long	
  I	
  slept,	
  but	
  it	
  must	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  long	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  still	
  dark	
  outside	
  when	
  I	
  woke	
  to	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  singing	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  the	
  voice	
  and	
  was	
  curious	
  to	
  see	
  its	
  owner,	
  but	
  didn't	
  want	
  to	
  risk	
  interrupting	
  the	
  song.	
  So	
  I	
  crept	
  downstairs	
  and	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  went	
  around	
  to	
  the	
  back,	
  hoping	
  that	
  the	
  room	
  where	
  the	
  singing	
  was	
  coming	
  from	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  window.	
  Sure	
  enough,	
  the	
  window	
  at	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house	
  was	
  aglow,	
  and	
  illuminated	
  by	
  candlelight,	
  I	
  could	
  make	
  out	
  5	
  figures	
  in	
  the	
  room.	
  One	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  Palo.	
  He	
  was	
  sitting	
  with	
  3	
  women	
  around	
  a	
  table,	
  all	
  four	
  of	
  them	
  absorbed	
  by	
  the	
  motions	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  standing	
  upright	
  raising	
  a	
  ornamented	
  bowl	
  above	
  his	
  head,	
  the	
  singer.	
  	
  	
  The	
  singer	
  had	
  his	
  head	
  tilted	
  back,	
  with	
  eyes	
  closed	
  and	
  arms	
  reaching	
  upward	
  with	
  the	
  bowl.	
  As	
  he	
  stood,	
  he	
  swayed	
  lightly	
  from	
  side	
  to	
  side.	
  	
  I	
  was	
  so	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  scene	
  before	
  me	
  that	
  I	
  didn't	
  even	
  realize	
  when	
  the	
  man	
  dropped	
  his	
  arms	
  and	
  stopped	
  singing.	
  A	
  gust	
  of	
  wind	
  brought	
  me	
  out	
  of	
  my	
  trance.	
  I	
  shivered,	
  and	
  suddenly	
  realized	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  cold	
  in	
  the	
  chilly	
  night	
  air.	
  I	
  decided	
  to	
  head	
  back	
  indoors	
  and	
  to	
  my	
  room	
  before	
  my	
  hosts	
  realized	
  I	
  was	
  spying	
  on	
  them.	
  I	
  was	
  startled	
  when	
  I	
  heard	
  meowing	
  coming	
  from	
  a	
  nearby	
  bush,	
  and	
  so	
  I	
  quickly	
  hurried	
  back	
  into	
  the	
  house	
  and	
  to	
  bed.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   Explicit	
  norm	
  statements	
  condition:	
  	
  	
  During	
  my	
  explorations,	
  I	
  met	
  many	
  other	
  adventurers	
  and	
  travelers.	
  By	
  the	
  comfort	
  of	
  roaring	
  fires,	
  we	
  exchanged	
  tales	
  of	
  sights	
  we	
  had	
  seen	
  and	
  people	
  we	
  had	
  met	
  in	
  those	
  foreign	
  lands.	
  In	
  particular,	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  stories	
  told	
  by	
  an	
  Australian	
   	
   73	
   traveler	
  about	
  the	
  remote	
  village	
  of	
  Ove,	
  and	
  so,	
  3	
  weeks	
  after	
  I	
  first	
  arrived	
  on	
  the	
  mainland,	
  I	
  set	
  off	
  to	
  visit	
  Ove	
  for	
  myself.	
  	
  	
  The	
  road	
  to	
  Ove	
  was	
  long	
  and	
  winding,	
  but	
  it	
  was	
  well	
  kept	
  by	
  the	
  locals,	
  who	
  traveled	
  the	
  road	
  frequently.	
  Eight	
  hours	
  after	
  I	
  set	
  out	
  and	
  as	
  afternoon	
  was	
  waning,	
  I	
  approached	
  a	
  large	
  settlement	
  of	
  about	
  400	
  houses	
  nestled	
  at	
  the	
  base	
  of	
  a	
  mountain.	
  Some	
  villagers	
  must	
  have	
  seen	
  me	
  arriving,	
  for	
  a	
  tall	
  man	
  approached	
  me	
  purposefully	
  at	
  the	
  outskirts	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  He	
  wore	
  a	
  deep	
  green	
  cloak	
  draped	
  around	
  his	
  shoulders,	
  and	
  carried	
  a	
  long	
  carved	
  wooden	
  stick	
  in	
  his	
  left	
  hand.	
  This	
  man	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Anin	
  in	
  broken	
  English.	
  After	
  explaining	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  traveler	
  from	
  afar	
  and	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  visit	
  their	
  community,	
  Anin	
  led	
  me	
  uphill,	
  through	
  the	
  village,	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  where	
  I	
  would	
  lodge.	
  On	
  the	
  way,	
  we	
  passed	
  by	
  houses	
  built	
  from	
  terracotta,	
  with	
  high	
  pointy	
  roofs	
  that	
  cast	
  long	
  shadows	
  onto	
  the	
  streets.	
  Through	
  their	
  windows,	
  I	
  could	
  see	
  villagers	
  busily	
  preparing	
  food.	
  Mothers	
  called	
  out	
  words	
  of	
  encouragement	
  to	
  their	
  children	
  playing	
  on	
  the	
  streets.	
  A	
  boy	
  clutching	
  a	
  plant	
  cutting	
  ran	
  towards	
  me.	
  In	
  his	
  haste,	
  he	
  failed	
  to	
  see	
  a	
  muddy	
  patch	
  of	
  ground	
  in	
  time.	
  He	
  slipped,	
  and	
  nearly	
  knocked	
  me	
  over	
  with	
  his	
  flailing	
  arms	
  as	
  he	
  tried	
  to	
  regain	
  his	
  balance.	
  Three	
  others	
  came	
  racing	
  after	
  him,	
  laughing	
  at	
  his	
  near	
  mishap.	
  When	
  they	
  saw	
  Anin,	
  they	
  slowed	
  down,	
  tapped	
  their	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  their	
  right	
  arm,	
  then	
  carefully	
  skirted	
  the	
  muddy	
  patch	
  before	
  picking	
  up	
  pace	
  again.	
  “It	
  rains	
  nearly	
  every	
  day	
  this	
  time	
  of	
  year	
  so	
  the	
  ground	
  never	
  dries,”	
  Anin	
  explained	
  as	
  he	
  helped	
  me	
  regain	
  my	
  balance	
  and	
  once	
  I	
  recovered,	
  we	
  continued	
  on.	
  	
  	
  Gradually,	
  we	
  began	
  to	
  climb.	
  The	
  dirt	
  terrain	
  became	
  hard	
  and	
  rocky	
  in	
  places.	
  Few	
  trees	
  grew	
  up	
  here.	
  Instead,	
  pieces	
  of	
  black	
  granite	
  dotted	
  the	
  landscape.	
  The	
  houses	
  were	
  spaced	
  farther	
  apart,	
  and	
  the	
  streets	
  were	
  quiet.	
  As	
  we	
  walked	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  bustling	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village,	
  the	
  warmth	
  of	
  day	
  seemed	
  to	
  seep	
  away	
  with	
  the	
  setting	
  sun.	
  A	
  bird	
  with	
  green	
  plumage	
  circled	
  overhead,	
  and	
  let	
  out	
  a	
  crisp	
  chirp.	
  Anin,	
  not	
  realizing	
  I	
  had	
  stopped	
  to	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  bird,	
  had	
  continued	
  striding	
  ahead.	
  He	
  looked	
  up	
  and	
  glanced	
  at	
  the	
  circling	
  bird	
  and	
  explained	
  to	
  me	
  that	
  this	
  was	
  a	
   	
   74	
   krakra	
  bird	
  that	
  nests	
  high	
  up	
  in	
  the	
  mountains.	
  I	
  hurried	
  to	
  catch	
  up	
  to	
  him,	
  taking	
  care	
  to	
  avoid	
  loose	
  rocks	
  along	
  the	
  way.	
  	
  	
  After	
  a	
  while,	
  Anin	
  stopped.	
  He	
  motioned	
  to	
  the	
  house	
  we	
  were	
  standing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  and	
  indicated	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  to	
  stay	
  here.	
  He	
  called	
  out	
  someone’s	
  name.	
  Momentarily,	
  a	
  teenager	
  with	
  a	
  broom	
  in	
  hand	
  emerged	
  from	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  looked	
  curiously	
  at	
  me,	
  and	
  then	
  tapped	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  his	
  arm	
  when	
  he	
  recognized	
  Anin.	
  Anin,	
  noting	
  me	
  observe	
  this	
  action,	
  explained	
  that	
  this	
  was	
  their	
  greeting	
  among	
  adults.	
  He	
  turned	
  to	
  the	
  teenager	
  and	
  told	
  him	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  visiting	
  and	
  needed	
  a	
  place	
  to	
  stay.	
  The	
  teenager's	
  face	
  relaxed	
  into	
  a	
  friendly	
  smile.	
  He	
  set	
  his	
  broom	
  down	
  and	
  leaned	
  it	
  against	
  the	
  door	
  frame	
  before	
  approaching	
  us,	
  stepping	
  around	
  some	
  woody	
  shrubs	
  with	
  purple	
  flowers	
  growing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  He	
  introduced	
  himself	
  as	
  Palo	
  and	
  said	
  he	
  would	
  help	
  me	
  settle	
  in.	
  	
  After	
  bidding	
  Anin	
  goodbye,	
  Palo	
  took	
  me	
  into	
  the	
  house.	
  The	
  house	
  was	
  filled	
  with	
  smells	
  of	
  cooking	
  and	
  sounds	
  of	
  people	
  talking	
  in	
  the	
  back.	
  A	
  young	
  woman	
  wearing	
  a	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dresses	
  tied	
  with	
  black	
  string	
  around	
  her	
  neck	
  and	
  waist	
  walked	
  past	
  us	
  in	
  the	
  hallway.	
  Palo	
  introduced	
  her	
  as	
  his	
  sister,	
  and	
  explained	
  that	
  in	
  Ove,	
  all	
  proper	
  women	
  wore	
  this	
  traditional	
  dress.	
  I	
  looked	
  closer	
  and	
  noticed	
  that	
  she	
  strongly	
  resembled	
  Palo.	
  At	
  my	
  scrutiny,	
  she	
  giggled	
  and	
  slipped	
  out	
  the	
  door.	
  Palo	
  led	
  me	
  upstairs	
  into	
  what	
  appeared	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  guest	
  room.	
  All	
  of	
  a	
  sudden	
  I	
  felt	
  very	
  tired	
  from	
  traveling	
  and	
  gestured	
  to	
  Palo	
  that	
  I	
  wished	
  to	
  sleep.	
  I	
  don’t	
  know	
  how	
  long	
  I	
  slept,	
  but	
  it	
  must	
  not	
  have	
  been	
  long	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  still	
  dark	
  outside	
  when	
  I	
  woke	
  to	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  singing	
  coming	
  from	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  A	
  fire	
  crackled	
  merrily	
  in	
  a	
  hearth	
  in	
  the	
  living	
  room.	
  I	
  was	
  intrigued	
  by	
  the	
  sound	
  of	
  the	
  voice	
  and	
  was	
  curious	
  to	
  see	
  its	
  owner,	
  but	
  didn't	
  want	
  to	
  risk	
  interrupting	
  the	
  song.	
  So	
  I	
  crept	
  downstairs	
  and	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  I	
  went	
  around	
  to	
  the	
  back,	
  hoping	
  that	
  the	
  room	
  where	
  the	
  singing	
  was	
  coming	
  from	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  window.	
  Sure	
  enough,	
  the	
  window	
  at	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house	
  was	
  aglow,	
  and	
  illuminated	
  by	
  candlelight,	
  I	
  could	
  make	
  out	
  5	
  figures	
  in	
  the	
  room.	
  One	
  of	
  them	
  was	
  Palo.	
  He	
  was	
   	
   75	
   sitting	
  with	
  3	
  women	
  around	
  a	
  table,	
  all	
  four	
  of	
  them	
  absorbed	
  by	
  the	
  motions	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  standing	
  upright	
  raising	
  a	
  ornamented	
  bowl	
  above	
  his	
  head,	
  the	
  singer.	
  	
  	
  The	
  singer	
  had	
  his	
  head	
  tilted	
  back,	
  with	
  eyes	
  closed	
  and	
  arms	
  reaching	
  upward	
  with	
  the	
  bowl.	
  As	
  he	
  stood,	
  he	
  swayed	
  lightly	
  from	
  side	
  to	
  side.	
  	
  I	
  was	
  so	
  focused	
  on	
  the	
  scene	
  before	
  me	
  that	
  I	
  didn't	
  even	
  realize	
  when	
  the	
  man	
  dropped	
  his	
  arms	
  and	
  stopped	
  singing.	
  A	
  gust	
  of	
  wind	
  brought	
  me	
  out	
  of	
  my	
  trance.	
  I	
  shivered,	
  and	
  suddenly	
  realized	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  cold	
  in	
  the	
  chilly	
  night	
  air.	
  I	
  decided	
  to	
  head	
  back	
  indoors	
  and	
  to	
  my	
  room	
  before	
  my	
  hosts	
  realized	
  I	
  was	
  spying	
  on	
  them.	
  I	
  was	
  startled	
  when	
  I	
  heard	
  meowing	
  coming	
  from	
  a	
  nearby	
  bush,	
  and	
  so	
  I	
  quickly	
  hurried	
  back	
  into	
  the	
  house	
  and	
  to	
  bed.	
   	
  	
  	
   	
   	
   76	
   APPENDIX	
  C:	
  DEPENDENT	
  MEASURES	
   MEASURE	
  OF	
  RECALL	
  Instructions:	
  Answer	
  the	
  following	
  questions	
  by	
  selecting	
  the	
  answer	
  that	
  you	
  believe	
  best	
  fits	
  with	
  what	
  was	
  in	
  the	
  text.	
  Indicate	
  your	
  choice	
  by	
  circling	
  the	
  corresponding	
  letter.	
  	
  	
  1.	
  The	
  explorer	
  met	
  Anin	
  at	
  the	
  edge	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  was	
  Anin	
  wearing	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  encountered	
  each	
  other?	
  	
  a)	
  a	
  blue	
  robe	
  b)	
  a	
  green	
  cloak	
  c)	
  a	
  silk	
  headdress	
  d)	
  a	
  purple	
  coat	
  	
  	
  2.	
  A	
  boy	
  slipped	
  and	
  nearly	
  knocked	
  over	
  the	
  explorer	
  with	
  his	
  flailing	
  arms.	
  What	
  caused	
  him	
  to	
  slip?	
  a)	
  mud	
  b)	
  ice	
  c)	
  wet	
  leaves	
  d)	
  fruit	
  peels	
  	
  3.	
  Three	
  boys	
  were	
  running	
  after	
  the	
  one	
  who	
  slipped.	
  What	
  did	
  they	
  do	
  when	
  they	
  saw	
  Anin?	
  a)	
  they	
  waved	
  b)	
  they	
  nodded	
  their	
  heads	
  c)	
  they	
  frowned	
  at	
  him	
  d)	
  they	
  tapped	
  their	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circled	
  their	
  arms	
  	
  4.	
  The	
  explorer	
  passed	
  by	
  houses	
  whose	
  inhabitants	
  were	
  preparing	
  food.	
  What	
  did	
  the	
  houses	
  look	
  like?	
   	
   77	
   a)	
  they	
  were	
  grey	
  and	
  imposing	
  b)	
  they	
  were	
  terracotta	
  and	
  had	
  tall	
  roofs	
  c)	
  they	
  were	
  squat	
  and	
  dilapidated	
  d)	
  they	
  were	
  wood	
  and	
  had	
  green	
  trim	
  	
  	
  5.	
  Women	
  called	
  out	
  words	
  of	
  encouragement	
  to	
  their	
  children	
  playing	
  on	
  the	
  streets.	
  What	
  were	
  the	
  women	
  wearing?	
  a)	
  long	
  blue	
  gowns	
  b)	
  short	
  green	
  skirts	
  c)	
  backless,	
  knee	
  length	
  dress	
  d)	
  long	
  flowery	
  dresses	
  	
  	
  6	
  The	
  explorer	
  spotted	
  a	
  bird	
  on	
  the	
  way	
  to	
  Palo’s	
  house.	
  What	
  colour	
  was	
  its	
  plumage?	
  a)	
  orange	
  b)	
  black	
  c)	
  green	
  d)	
  brown	
  	
  	
  7.	
  Anin	
  and	
  the	
  explorer	
  met	
  a	
  local	
  teenager,	
  Palo,	
  at	
  the	
  house	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  explorer	
  would	
  stay.	
  What	
  did	
  Palo	
  do	
  as	
  he	
  approached	
  Anin	
  and	
  the	
  explorer?	
  a)	
  he	
  hopped	
  across	
  mud	
  puddles	
  b)	
  he	
  swept	
  the	
  path	
  before	
  him	
  with	
  a	
  broom	
  c)	
  he	
  stepped	
  around	
  some	
  purple	
  shrubs	
  d)	
  he	
  bowed	
  	
  8.	
  The	
  explorer	
  witnessed	
  a	
  man	
  leading	
  a	
  singing	
  ceremony	
  through	
  a	
  window	
  at	
  the	
  back	
  of	
  the	
  house.	
  What	
  was	
  the	
  man	
  holding?	
  a)	
  an	
  ornamented	
  bowl	
   	
   78	
   b)	
  a	
  coconut	
  cup	
  c)	
  a	
  wooden	
  staff	
  d)	
  a	
  wine	
  glass	
  	
  9.	
  The	
  explorer	
  heard	
  about	
  Ove	
  from	
  another	
  traveler.	
  What	
  nationality	
  was	
  the	
  traveler?	
  a)	
  American	
  b)	
  British	
  c)	
  French	
  d)	
  Australian	
  	
  10.	
  What	
  was	
  Palo	
  holding	
  when	
  he	
  came	
  out	
  of	
  the	
  house	
  to	
  greet	
  Anin	
  and	
  the	
  explorer?	
  a)	
  a	
  carved	
  wooden	
  stick	
  b)	
  a	
  broom	
  c)	
  a	
  plant	
  d)	
  a	
  kettle	
  	
  11.	
  How	
  many	
  households	
  are	
  there	
  in	
  the	
  village	
  of	
  Ove?	
  a)	
  200	
  b)	
  400	
  c)	
  600	
  d)	
  800	
  	
  12.	
  What	
  did	
  the	
  explorer	
  see	
  Oveans	
  doing	
  inside	
  their	
  houses?	
  a)	
  they	
  were	
  knitting	
  by	
  the	
  hearth	
  b)	
  they	
  were	
  playing	
  board	
  games	
  c)	
  they	
  were	
  busy	
  preparing	
  food	
   	
   79	
   d)	
  they	
  were	
  sitting	
  and	
  talking	
   	
   	
  MEASURE	
  OF	
  INFERENCE	
  In	
  the	
  questions	
  below,	
  you	
  are	
  asked	
  to	
  make	
  some	
  guesses	
  based	
  on	
  impressions	
  you	
  might	
  have	
  formed	
  while	
  reading	
  the	
  text.	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  right	
  or	
  wrong	
  answer	
  for	
  each	
  question.	
  We	
  merely	
  want	
  to	
  get	
  your	
  opinion	
  on	
  what	
  you	
  think	
  might	
  be	
  the	
  case.	
  	
  	
  	
  1.	
  Suppose	
  an	
  Ovean	
  woman	
  meets	
  an	
  Ovean	
  man	
  on	
  a	
  street	
  in	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  do	
  they	
  do	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  meet?	
  a)	
  only	
  the	
  man	
  taps	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  his	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  woman	
  b)	
  they	
  both	
  tap	
  their	
  left	
  shoulders	
  and	
  circle	
  their	
  right	
  arms	
  at	
  each	
  other	
  	
  c)	
  only	
  the	
  woman	
  taps	
  her	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  her	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  man	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  2.	
  A	
  young	
  Ovean	
  girl	
  meets	
  an	
  older	
  Ovean	
  woman	
  on	
  a	
  street	
  in	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  do	
  they	
  do	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  meet?	
  a)	
  only	
  the	
  young	
  girl	
  taps	
  her	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  her	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  older	
  woman	
  b)	
  they	
  both	
  tap	
  their	
  left	
  shoulders	
  and	
  circle	
  their	
  right	
  arms	
  at	
  each	
  other	
  c)	
  only	
  the	
  older	
  woman	
  taps	
  her	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  her	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  young	
  girl	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  3.	
  An	
  Ovean	
  man	
  meets	
  another	
  Ovean	
  man	
  on	
  a	
  street	
  in	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  do	
  they	
  do	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  meet?	
  a)	
  the	
  younger	
  man	
  taps	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  his	
  right	
  arm	
  b)	
  they	
  both	
  tap	
  their	
  left	
  shoulders	
  and	
  circle	
  their	
  right	
  arms	
  to	
  each	
  other	
  c)	
  the	
  older	
  man	
  taps	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  his	
  right	
  arm	
  	
   	
   80	
   d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  	
  4.	
  A	
  young	
  Ovean	
  boy	
  meets	
  an	
  older	
  Ovean	
  man	
  on	
  a	
  street	
  in	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  do	
  they	
  do	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  meet?	
  a)	
  only	
  the	
  boy	
  taps	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  his	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  man	
  b)	
  they	
  both	
  tap	
  their	
  left	
  shoulders	
  and	
  circle	
  their	
  right	
  arms	
  at	
  each	
  other	
  c)	
  only	
  the	
  man	
  taps	
  his	
  left	
  shoulder	
  and	
  circles	
  his	
  right	
  arm	
  at	
  the	
  boy	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  5.	
  A	
  young	
  Ovean	
  boy	
  is	
  walking	
  on	
  a	
  path	
  in	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  is	
  he	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  wearing?	
  a)	
  a	
  long	
  robe	
  b)	
  shirt	
  and	
  trousers	
  c)	
  a	
  long	
  cloak	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  	
  6.	
  An	
  Ovean	
  man	
  is	
  walking	
  on	
  a	
  path	
  in	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  is	
  he	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  wearing?	
  a)	
  a	
  long	
  robe	
  b)	
  shirt	
  and	
  trousers	
  c)	
  a	
  long	
  cloak	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  	
  7.	
  A	
  young	
  Ovean	
  girl	
  is	
  walking	
  on	
  a	
  path	
  in	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  is	
  she	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  wearing?	
  a)	
  a	
  long	
  flowing	
  dress	
  b)	
  a	
  blue	
  robe	
  c)	
  a	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dress	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
   	
   81	
   	
  8.	
  An	
  Ovean	
  woman	
  is	
  walking	
  on	
  a	
  path	
  in	
  the	
  centre	
  of	
  the	
  village.	
  What	
  is	
  she	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  wearing?	
  a)	
  a	
  long	
  flowing	
  dress	
  b)	
  a	
  blue	
  robe	
  c)	
  a	
  backless,	
  knee-­‐length	
  dress	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  	
  9.	
  Two	
  young	
  Oveans	
  just	
  got	
  married	
  and	
  are	
  building	
  a	
  new	
  home	
  to	
  live	
  in	
  together.	
  How	
  are	
  they	
  likely	
  to	
  build	
  their	
  new	
  house?	
  a)	
  using	
  terracotta	
  materials	
  and	
  with	
  pointed	
  roofs	
  b)	
  using	
  baked	
  mud	
  and	
  with	
  large	
  windows	
  	
  c)	
  using	
  black	
  granite	
  and	
  with	
  green	
  trim	
  on	
  the	
  windows	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
  	
  10.	
  An	
  Ovean	
  family	
  is	
  gathered	
  at	
  home	
  in	
  the	
  evening.	
  What	
  is	
  an	
  activity	
  that	
  they	
  are	
  likely	
  do	
  together?	
  a)	
  knit	
  by	
  the	
  fireplace	
  b)	
  have	
  a	
  singing	
  ceremony	
  c)	
  play	
  a	
  game	
  of	
  chess	
  d)	
  no	
  conclusion	
  can	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  the	
  text	
  	
   	
   82	
   APPENDIX	
  D:	
  NORM	
  VIOLATION	
  INDUCTION	
  	
  Instructions	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  study	
  on	
  handwriting	
  and	
  personality.	
  Please	
  copy	
  the	
  paragraph	
  below	
  using	
  your	
  usual	
  handwriting	
  on	
  the	
  blank	
  space	
  provided	
  below.	
  Inform	
  the	
  experimenter	
  when	
  you	
  are	
  done.	
  Control	
  Condition:	
   Two	
  years	
  ago,	
  when	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  junior	
  partner	
  at	
  a	
  prestigious	
  law	
  firm,	
  I	
  was	
  coming	
  up	
   for	
  promotion	
  against	
  another	
  junior	
  partner,	
  Chris.	
  For	
  several	
  months,	
  Chris	
  had	
   been	
  working	
  on	
  a	
  major	
  case	
  for	
  the	
  city	
  that	
  would	
  make	
  or	
  break	
  his	
  career	
  at	
  the	
   firm.	
  However,	
  he	
  could	
  not	
  locate	
  an	
  important	
  zoning	
  document,	
  without	
  which,	
  it	
   was	
  unlikely	
  that	
  he	
  would	
  have	
  sufficient	
  evidence	
  to	
  successfully	
  argue	
  his	
  case.	
  Late	
   one	
  evening,	
  as	
  I	
  was	
  rummaging	
  through	
  a	
  corner	
  filing	
  cabinet,	
  I	
  happened	
  to	
  come	
   across	
  the	
  zoning	
  document	
  that	
  Chris	
  was	
  in	
  desperate	
  need	
  of.	
  I	
  pulled	
  it	
  from	
  the	
   cabinet	
  and	
  placed	
  it	
  without	
  a	
  note	
  on	
  Chris'	
  desk,	
  knowing	
  that	
  he	
  would	
  be	
  so	
   relieved	
  when	
  he	
  arrived	
  to	
  work	
  the	
  next	
  morning.	
  	
  Experimental	
  Condition:	
   Two	
  years	
  ago,	
  when	
  I	
  was	
  a	
  junior	
  partner	
  at	
  a	
  prestigious	
  law	
  firm,	
  I	
  was	
  coming	
  up	
   for	
  promotion	
  against	
  another	
  junior	
  partner,	
  Chris.	
  For	
  several	
  months,	
  Chris	
  had	
   been	
  working	
  on	
  a	
  major	
  case	
  for	
  the	
  city	
  that	
  would	
  make	
  or	
  break	
  his	
  career	
  at	
  the	
   firm.	
  However,	
  he	
  could	
  not	
  locate	
  an	
  important	
  zoning	
  document,	
  without	
  which,	
  it	
   was	
  unlikely	
  that	
  he	
  would	
  have	
  sufficient	
  evidence	
  to	
  successfully	
  argue	
  his	
  case.	
  Late	
   one	
  evening,	
  as	
  I	
  was	
  rummaging	
  through	
  a	
  corner	
  filing	
  cabinet,	
  I	
  happened	
  to	
  come	
   across	
  the	
  zoning	
  document	
  that	
  Chris	
  was	
  in	
  desperate	
  need	
  of.	
  I	
  pulled	
  it	
  from	
  the	
   cabinet	
  and	
  walked	
  over	
  to	
  the	
  office	
  shredder,	
  knowing	
  that	
  my	
  promotion	
  would	
   now	
  be	
  secured.	
   	
   	
   83	
   APPENDIX	
  E:	
  BRAINSTORMING	
  TASK	
  	
  Introduction:	
  You	
  have	
  just	
  completed	
  the	
  first	
  half	
  of	
  this	
  session.	
  There	
  is	
  another	
  study	
  that	
  makes	
  up	
  the	
  second	
  half.	
  You	
  get	
  a	
  choice	
  between	
  two	
  versions:	
  completing	
  it	
  on	
  your	
  own,	
  and	
  completing	
  it	
  in	
  a	
  group.	
  Please	
  read	
  the	
  description	
  of	
  the	
  two	
  tasks	
  below	
  and	
  indicate	
  which	
  one	
  you	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  partake	
  in.	
  	
  Individual	
  Task	
  Instructions	
  In	
  the	
  next	
  five	
  minutes,	
  you	
  will	
  take	
  part	
  in	
  what	
  is	
  known	
  as	
  a	
  brainstorming	
  task.	
  You	
  will	
  be	
  given	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  an	
  object,	
  and	
  your	
  task	
  will	
  be	
  to	
  think	
  of	
  as	
  many	
  uses	
  for	
  this	
  object	
  as	
  you	
  can.	
  Don’t	
  be	
  concerned	
  with	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  your	
  reactions.	
  The	
  uses	
  can	
  be	
  ordinary	
  or	
  unusual.	
  Simply	
  list	
  as	
  many	
  as	
  you	
  can.	
  Turn	
  the	
  page	
  when	
  you	
  are	
  told	
  to	
  do	
  so,	
  and	
  list	
  as	
  many	
  uses	
  as	
  you	
  can	
  for	
  the	
  object	
  named	
  at	
  the	
  top	
  of	
  the	
  page.	
  Do	
  not	
  go	
  on	
  until	
  you	
  are	
  told	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  Individual	
  Scoring	
  Every	
  item	
  is	
  given	
  a	
  score	
  of	
  1.	
  You	
  will	
  be	
  scored	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  number	
  of	
  items	
  you	
  generate.	
  	
  	
  Group	
  Task	
  Instructions	
  In	
  the	
  next	
  five	
  minutes,	
  you	
  and	
  your	
  group	
  will	
  take	
  part	
  in	
  what	
  is	
  known	
  as	
  a	
  brainstorming	
  task.	
  You	
  will	
  be	
  given	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  an	
  object,	
  and	
  your	
  task	
  as	
  a	
  group	
  will	
  be	
  to	
  think	
  of	
  as	
  many	
  uses	
  for	
  this	
  object	
  as	
  you	
  can.	
  You	
  may	
  have	
  discussion	
  within	
  your	
  group,	
  however	
  you	
  will	
  record	
  items	
  you	
  come	
  up	
  with	
  on	
  your	
  own	
  papers.	
  Don’t	
  be	
  concerned	
  with	
  the	
  quality	
  of	
  your	
  reactions.	
  The	
  uses	
  can	
  be	
  ordinary	
  or	
  unusual.	
  Simply	
  list	
  as	
  many	
  as	
  you	
  can.	
  Turn	
  the	
  page	
  when	
  you	
   	
   84	
   are	
  told	
  to	
  do	
  so,	
  and	
  list	
  as	
  many	
  uses	
  as	
  you	
  can	
  for	
  the	
  object	
  named	
  at	
  the	
  top	
  of	
  the	
  page.	
  Do	
  not	
  go	
  on	
  until	
  you	
  are	
  told	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  Group	
  Scoring	
  Every	
  item	
  is	
  given	
  a	
  score	
  of	
  1.	
  Your	
  group	
  will	
  be	
  scored	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  sum	
  of	
  items	
  generated	
  across	
  individual	
  members,	
  so	
  that	
  everyone	
  will	
  receive	
  the	
  same	
  score.	
  	
  	
   I	
  would	
  like	
  to	
  complete:	
  	
   the	
  individual	
  task	
   	
   the	
  group	
  task	
  	
  (Circle	
  one)	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

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