Arts, Faculty of
Psychology, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Zhao, Wanying
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
Due to the critical importance of social norms and their ubiquitous presence over the course of human history, culture-gene co-evolutionary processes should have selected for a psychological architecture that supports learning and implementing local norms (Richerson & Henrich, 2009). In this thesis, I follow the above line of reasoning to argue that dealing with social norms presented domain-specific challenges to the cultural learner, requiring specialized cognitive processes to deal specifically with norms. This motivates several predictions about major design features that a psychological architecture evolved to meet those challenges should possess. I present a survey of extant evidence that are consistent with these predictions. Two empirical studies designed to test a number of these predictions are presented.
Hypotheses and tests of an evolved psychological architecture for social norms by Wanying Zhao B.Com., The University of Toronto, 2007 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Psychology) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2010 © Wanying Zhao, 2010 ii ABSTRACT Due to the critical importance of social norms and their ubiquitous presence over the course of human history, culture-­‐gene co-­‐evolutionary processes should have selected for a psychological architecture that supports learning and implementing local norms (Richerson & Henrich, 2009). In this thesis, I follow the above line of reasoning to argue that dealing with social norms presented domain-­‐specific challenges to the cultural learner, requiring specialized cognitive processes to deal specifically with norms. This motivates several predictions about major design features that a psychological architecture evolved to meet those challenges should possess. I present a survey of extant evidence that are consistent with these predictions. Two empirical studies designed to test a number of these predictions are presented. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract................................................................................................................................................. ii Table of contents ..............................................................................................................................iii List of tables ....................................................................................................................................... iv List of figures .......................................................................................................................................v Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................ vi Dedication..........................................................................................................................................vii Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................................................1 1.2 Outline of subsequent chapters ......................................................................................................2 Chapter 2 Predictions................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Conditions for a co-­‐evolved norm psychology .........................................................................3 2.2 Predictions for a co-­‐evolved norm psychology........................................................................5 Chapter 3 Test 1: Evolved cognitive specialization for norm learning .....................16 3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 16 3.2 Operationalizing the hypotheses................................................................................................. 17 3.3 Testing the predictions.................................................................................................................... 19 Chapter 4 Test 2: Culturally evolved solutions to motivating norm compliance...36 4.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... 36 4.2 Study one .............................................................................................................................................. 41 4.3 Study two.............................................................................................................................................. 47 4.4 General discussion............................................................................................................................. 51 Chapter 5 Conclusions................................................................................................................54 Bibliography......................................................................................................................................56 Appendices ........................................................................................................................................63 Appendix A: REB Certificates of approval ........................................................................................... 63 Appendix B: Vignette stimuli .................................................................................................................... 65 Appendix C: Dependent measures.......................................................................................................... 76 Appendix D: Norm violation induction................................................................................................. 82 Appendix E: Brainstorming task ............................................................................................................. 83 iv LIST OF TABLES 3.1 Recall of social targets.….……………………………………………………………………………..26 3.2 Recall of asocial targets.………….……………………………………………………………………27 3.3 Rate of inference about social targets..……………………………………………….............29 3.4 Accuracy of inference about social targets.….……………………………………………….31 4.1 Guilt and shame composite ratings by condition………………………………………….43 4.2 Guilt predicted by condition (Euro-­Canadians)…………………………………………….45 4.3 Shame predicted by condition (Euro-­Canadians).…………………………………………45 4.4 Guilt predicted by condition (East Asians)……………………………………………………46 4.5 Shame predicted by condition (East Asians)…………………………………………………46 v LIST OF FIGURES 3.1 Recall of social and asocial targets. ………………………………………………………... 24 3.2 Probability of accurate recall.………………………………………………………………….27 3.3 Rate of inference ……………………………………………………………………………........... 29 3.4 Rate of accurate inference.……………………………………………………………………... 31 vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you, to My advisor, Joe Henrich, for his patient and unwavering guidance. Vinaka vakalevu My thesis committee, Ara Norenzayan and Jess Tracy, for their invaluable feedback Daniel Randles, partner in crime, for his sound judgment in all our adventures Maciek Chudek, a true best mate, for opening my eyes to many avenues of discovery and inspiring me with the confidence to explore them. And for the beers Friends at Green College, whose company and conversations have enriched me with their curiosity, passion and humanity Friends and mentors of the MECC lab, for making failing and learning always so much fun vii DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my parents, who unwittingly set me on this journey, and have tirelessly dealt with my incessant “why’s” ever since. 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 INTRODUCTION Social norms govern a large array of human interaction. The field of social psychology has catalogued a number of norms and their differential interaction with psychological constructs such as group identity and motives such as belongingness to explain and predict individual behaviour (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Kypri & Langley, 2003; Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004; Prentice & Miller, 1996). Researchers with an eye toward practical applications have produced insightful research identifying the content of normative messages and the conditions under which people are likely to adopt individually or socially beneficial behaviours (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). These proximate psychological approaches take the structure of norms, their content, and various psychological motivations as given, and generate models that integrate these features of the environment and characteristics of the individual to predict how they will interact to produce behavioural outcomes. However, the proximate explanations given by social psychologists offer little insight into how norms emerge, why they differ across groups and cultures, how they get into the minds of individuals, why individuals care about and are susceptible to their influence, and how they in turn shape the content of norms. Providing satisfactory explanations to those questions require identifying the ultimate evolutionary forces that might have selected for features of the human mind, which are capable of and proximally responsible for producing the array of behaviours observed in present day environments (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). This thesis sets out to apply evolutionary reasoning to generate and test hypotheses about possible design features of brain mechanisms that allow us to engage effectively with social norms. 2 1.2 OUTLINE OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS Chapter 2 systematically lays out predictions for major features and capabilities of a coevolved norm psychology. I first detail the specific adaptive challenges presented by social norms that would have selected for a system of specialized psychological mechanisms to meet those challenges. I will then specify the types of input one would expect such specialized mechanisms to process, and the signatures or markers of functionally specialized processes that would constitute as evidence for their existence. By applying evolutionary reasoning and properties of norm-­‐equilibria gleaned from evolutionary models to deduce implications for design features, this thesis offers one plausible set of answers to the question: Why and how do individuals abide by or are beholden to socially learned rules? I present extant evidence drawn from a range of disciplines to speak to hypothesized features and functions of an evolved norm-­‐psychology. This sets down the foundations for investigations carried out in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapters 3 and 4 are empirical contributions to test several theoretical predictions set out in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses the paucity of research in the learning literature across psychology and cognate disciplines on how a cultural learner acquires knowledge of norms. It tests out hypotheses regarding a set of cognitive biases evolved specifically in response to the properties of norms to guide acquisition and retention, including perceptual, memory and inferential biases. Chapter 4 builds on existing theorizing and research on guilt and shame as two distinct solutions to motivating norm compliance across cultures. It presents a set of two experiments intended to serve as a direct test of the hypothesis. By pairing an explicit self-­‐report method with an implicit behavioural measure, the divergent results of these studies also carries implications for research methodology aimed at studying the evolved functional significance of constructs and their appropriate measurement. 3 CHAPTER 2 PREDICTIONS 2.1 CONDITIONS FOR A CO-­‐EVOLVED NORM PSYCHOLOGY Reconstructions of early hominoid life suggest that our ancestors were highly dependent on their social groups for survival. Researchers have proposed and gathered evidence for a number of domains in which they cooperated, including food sharing (Stanford, 1999), and collaborative childrearing (Leonetti, Nath, Hemam, & Neill, 2004). With group living came the need to coordinate behaviour with fellow group members. Compared to humans, other social animals coordinate behaviours in few domains, and conflicts are resolved by factors such as status, relatedness, and sometimes, outright contests (Young, 1996). Humans, by establishing and deferring to shared conventions, can often obviate the need to coordinate or resolve disputes on a case-­‐by-­‐case basis. Given the importance and ubiquity of norms in human social life, there should have been strong selection pressures for efficiency and specialization in the mind for learning and implementing them. The ability to learn and share representations of simple norms might have started off as a by-­‐product of innate social learning abilities, selected for by the need to acquire large bodies of cultural knowledge to adapt to the variable environments inhabited by our ancestors (Richerson & Boyd, 2000). Social learning biases such as payoff-­‐ (Henrich & Gil-­‐White, 2001) and frequency-­‐biased transmission (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich & Boyd, 1998) are two classes of innate biases that learners may rely on for identifying and acquiring high quality (high payoff) cultural information. Both can help explain how behaviours rapidly spread and become prevalent within a population. In particular, conformist transmission, a type of frequency-­‐dependent social learning, is a learning bias that is manifested in a tendency to copy the most frequent behaviour in a population for a given context (Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, & Lubell, 2008). By averaging across the learning of other individuals, this strategy enables learners to be more likely to pick out advantageous behaviours in noisy 4 environments, when the individual best models are difficult to identify. Both types of learning biases could have allowed groups of individuals to transmit and share a common set of mental representations of expectations for social conduct. Once behaviours became common and part of a self-­‐sustaining equilibrium, they can be considered a social norm. Thus, social norms can be defined as culturally transmitted beliefs, behaviours and expectations for behaviours whose violation provokes negative emotional and punitive responses from observers. Groups with more members who successfully learned and adhered to norms during interaction with others would have enjoyed large fitness benefits, outcompeting groups with lesser capacity for norm-­‐based interactions (Henrich and Henrich, 2007). Once norms became common within these groups, and reliance on these learning abilities intensified, having the ability to interface with norms effectively could itself have been selected for by the sheer fact that there were more norms in the environment. Further, groups that produced more group-­‐beneficial norms in a greater number of domains both passed on the specific content of these cultural solutions for social interaction, and a psychological architecture capable of learning and implementing them. These selection pressures exerted by socially transmitted knowledge on the genes that serve as the blueprint for our minds could have produced a more specialized set of mechanisms particularly suited to operating with social norms, which in turn could have enabled norms to get more complex, driving further changes in genes and psychological architecture, and so on, in a co-­‐evolutionary process between genes and culture (see Laland et al 2010 for examples of how our genome has evolved in response to specific cultural environments). What would these coevolved mechanisms look like? What properties would we expect them to have? I lay out predictions for the answers to these questions in the next section. 5 2.2 PREDICTIONS FOR A CO-­‐EVOLVED NORM PSYCHOLOGY If competition between groups was partially driven by successful implementation of group-­‐beneficial norms as suggested above, then over time, genetic evolution should have responded by endowing individual psychologies with innate prosocial norm content. However, due to the high degree of variability in the content of norms across groups, we would expect to see little other hardwired norm content. Instead, we would expect an evolved psychological architecture selected to meet the challenge of adapting to a range of possible environments to be prepared with some initial expectations for the existence of norms to help attention and learning efforts, and some content biases for figuring out and identifying possible norms. These biases can then facilitate ontogenetic learning of a wide range of possible norms from other members of one’s culture. I discuss each of these in detail below. 2.2.1 INNATE EXPECTATIONS Cognitive scientists have argued that human babies are born into the world prepared with an intuitive ontology—expectations for a number of features to exist in the world they are born into. These include folk physics, folk biology and folk psychology, or innate expectations for physical objects, biological beings and other minds, as well as properties and regularities that govern them (Flavell, 1999; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). This includes the expectation that solid objects cannot pass through each other, and that biological beings die. These innate assumptions provide conceptual structure that guide learning over the course of development (Keil, 1981; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Just as these expectations are shaped by fitness-­‐relevant features of the physical and biological world, a folk psychology shaped by the persistent presence of social norms should expect that people, in addition to having goals and intentions, will also be governed by social norms. In other words, a human infant should hold an innate expectation for the social world to be structured by rules and regularities of behaviour. Consistent with this 6 prediction, experiments with young children show that through a single observation of a game play, children spontaneously make the inference that there are social rules that structure the game, and will impose these rules on new players who join the game, as well as spontaneously protest when new players differed from what was observed (Rakoczy, Wameken, & Tomasello, 2008). In addition to expecting that there will be regularities to social behaviour, repeatedly successful norm content that allowed certain groups to outcompete others should have become prevalent, and shaped our psychology to possess some prosocial default content or settings. In processes of Cultural Group Selection, groups in which the majority of members engaged in highly cooperative acts were favoured over less cooperative groups and consequently, the cooperative content and psychological adaptations that sustained the implementation of those content spread (Wilson, Van Vugt, & O'Gorman, 2008). From this, we would expect the descendents of these cooperative groups to be prepared to behave prosocially toward other members of their group in culturally specified ways. These can take the form of preferential attention towards prosocial actors, readiness to imitate their behaviours and having the motivational systems in place to make learning and implementing the prosocial acts rewarding. Supporting experimental evidence of innate prosocial content biases come from developmental psychology showing that three month old infants have an early emerging ability to evaluate observed actions as either hurtful or harmful to another’s goal, and before they themselves can walk or talk, six month olds use this information as a basis for their own preference to interact with helping agents and avoid hindering agents (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010). Thus, from an early age, infants have a preference for interacting with prosocial and avoiding antisocial others. These preferences for prosocial interaction partners should lead the developing child to learn further social rules from prosocial models, increasing the likelihood that prosocial norms will be learnt and enacted from an early age. Indeed, there is evidence that as they become more competent at locomotion and engaging in goal-­‐directed action, toddlers as young as 14 months 7 will spontaneously help an unfamiliar experimenter achieve goals, while overcoming difficult obstacles, when they observe it being thwarted (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Further, older children readily learn context-­‐specific prosocial norms that are personally costly in experimental situations after observing a single model engaging in the prosocial act, and will also enforce these just-­‐learned behaviours on others (Bryan & Test, 1967; Eisenberg, 1983; Grusec, 1971). These prosocial tendencies seem to exhibit a developmental trajectory in which younger children tend to exhibit more selfish behaviour, and become progressively more prosocial with age (Harbaugh & Krause, 2000), suggesting that increasingly prosocial acts might be a product of learning about appropriate behaviours and expectations from individuals who model prosocial acts. Further, the trajectory of these tendencies exhibit a very specific pattern, with dislike of unequal division of resources emerging simultaneously with in-­‐group favouritism (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008), suggesting that these prosocial preferences are specifically in aid of sustaining high levels of in-­‐group cooperation in competition with out-­‐groups. 2.2.2 TYPES OF INPUT While innate expectations can direct limited attentional resources to features of the environment that might pertain to norms, additional processing must occur before one can attain knowledge of a society’s many nuanced social rules. For this difficult task, we expect a specialized cognitive mechanism for social norms to be selective, and biased, in the types of input it will process and the functions it will perform on the input to simplify the task of learning and compliance. Social norms have properties at the group level to which individuals psychologies should be attune for the purposes of identifying suitable input. When norms are at equilibria, stable behavioural regularities can be found in a social group. At these equilibria, individuals can reasonably predict how others will behave in a given context, and know that s/he is expected to behave similarly, including the manner in 8 which an individual who violates expectations for appropriate behaviour ought to be sanctioned (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). At these equilibria, normative behaviours tend to be prevalent, and recur with high frequency across similar contexts. A norm psychology that was shaped by such regularities should not only exhibit selectivity to socially learned behaviours as inputs, but especially to socially learned behaviours that occur at high frequency. Further, ethnography suggests that at least some deviations from norm-­‐equilibria are sanctioned everywhere (to differing degrees; Brown, 1991), and there are individuals who are motivated to sanction transgressions, or to at least express such motivations. Emotions are both a motivator and signal of intended action (Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006). In particular, negative emotions such as anger or disgust observed in response to behaviours can signal motivation and signal of intentions to sanction a norm violation, and thus events involving sanctions or negative emotional reactions should activate norm psychology. Finally, norm equilibria can sustain uniformity of behaviours that have no direct relevance for fitness, and even those that are individually costly to perform (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003). Thus, seemingly arbitrary and apparently costly behaviours that occur at high frequency should especially be likely to trigger norm psychology processes. 2.2.3 LIBERAL BIAS IN IDENTIFICATION Researchers have documented a number of error management biases, shaped by the payoff structures of the environment, to produce biased perceptions and beliefs toward adaptive ends. Examples include the hot-­‐hand phenomenon, in which individuals have expectations for streaks in likelihood of events with otherwise independent probabilities, as a possible adaptation to the sometimes clumpy occurrence of resources in the natural environment (Wilke & Barrett, 2009), and over-­‐perception of sexual interest from women by men (Haselton & Buss, 2000). We predict that a similar bias should be seen with norms to minimize the asymmetric cost of errors associated with misidentifying norms. This asymmetry could be due to 9 the fact that causes and motivations that give rise to behaviour are often quite opaque to observers, especially those who are entering unfamiliar contexts. When an individual is confronted with a situation in which not engaging in the correct behaviour has costly consequences in the form of punishment, damage to reputation, etc, but has inadequate knowledge with regards to what IS expected and appropriate, we would expect a dedicated system adapted to the payoff structure of social norms to err on the side of perceiving norms when none exist, rather than risk missing opportunities to identify norms when they do exist. That is, we should expect norm psychology to be liberally biased in perceiving norms and be triggered with relatively poor stimuli (few instances or thin evidence). 2.2.4 ENHANCED COGNITIVE ACCESSIBILITY What happens once a potential norm is identified? What kinds of operations are performed on the input? We predict that due to the potential fitness benefits associated with complying with norms, there should be enhanced retention and cognitive accessibility for normative relative to fitness neutral content. More specifically, once behaviour is identified as potentially normative, it should be better remembered and more quickly retrievable in order to facilitate future obedience. Such memory enhancement effects have been found for dangerous animals, possibly as an adaptation to dealing with predators in the environment (Barrett, 2007). In the domain of norms, a study by O’Gorman and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that merely labeling information as normative enhanced its recall. 2.2.5 NORM-­‐BASED INFERENCE & REASONING Norms are social rules that govern behaviour across many similar contexts. A cultural learner is faced with the challenge of figuring out what features of contexts are relevant for assessing similarity and applicability and whether it is appropriate to apply a particular norm. Since people cannot experience the full range of 10 applicable contexts, but must learn and abide by norms after only a few learning opportunities, inference processes are important for extrapolating to contexts outside of direct experience. Thus, in addition to learning specific content of norms, we should also be adept at making inferences and reasoning with information in the normative domain, such as whether someone is following a norm, or when and to whom a particular social rule applies. There is evidence that our minds do engage in functionally specialized reasoning and making inferences that is specific to the domain of norms. Researchers working under the theory of Universal Moral Grammar have proposed that people act like intuitive lawyers and systematically apply domain specific rules and principles when reasoning about possible transgressions (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007). These effects have been demonstrated with trolley problems, a class of scenarios that involve possible tradeoffs between harming one person to save multiple others. People asked to assess permissibility of these tradeoffs give confident and reliable judgments for which they cannot give explicit justification, implying the workings of some implicit processes. People’s judgments of permissibility are sensitive to factors such as degree of physical proximity to the actor, whether the tradeoff is a side effect, and whether it was an active or passive omission—decision principles the authors argue are innately derived. From our perspective, these principles are precisely factors that can help determine whether an action was an intentional act of norm violation toward in-­‐group members or not. These principles could have been built into our innate norm-­‐psychology because groups that successfully outcompeted other groups have repeatedly adopted them in reasoning about and responding to transgressions. Cosmides et al (2010) present evidence for a specialized cognitive module evolved for social exchange, or reciprocity interactions. They suggest that an ability that such an adaptation should have is to detect cheaters who take benefits illicitly, without bearing the cost of the interaction, thus violating the conditions of mutually beneficial reciprocity. Consistent with this prediction, they document greater accuracy when reasoning about a problem framed as detecting intentional cheaters 11 compared to the same problem framed as detecting violations of abstract rules (without the ecologically relevant context of social contracts). The reasoning process was sensitive to cues suggesting that the violation was accidental, not beneficial to the violator or very difficult to carry out, and did not search for cheating under these circumstances. The norm-­‐psychology account offers a different interpretation of the results. Whereas Cosmides and colleagues argue that the selection pressure for cheater detection psychology arises from the challenges of cooperating with individuals who are not kin, solved by social exchange, or reciprocity, the Cultural Group Selection account counter that the emergence of culturally transmitted social norms and the supporting psychological adaptations are a byproduct of cultural learning abilities evolved initially as a means to adapt to variable environments, and it is the ability to learn and implement social norms which facilitated cooperation with non-­‐kin. It is entirely consistent with the results that the detection mechanism is actually more broadly geared towards the identification of intentional norm violators that contain within it the more narrowly defined task of identifying cheaters in reciprocity interactions. According to this view, people should be good at identifying norm violators (even when the situation does not involve an exchange partner), so long as bystanders observing the behaviour experience a violation of expectations for what was appropriate and are willing to enforce the transgression. Indirect evidence for reasoning about norm violations that do not involve exchange interactions come from Uttich & Lombrozo’s (2010) study on inferences about intentionality of various actions based on the actor’s culpability. Adults were asked to judge the intentionality of decisions by people whose decisions were either accompanied by a positive or negative side effect on the environment. Participants who read about decisions with positive side effects did not label the action as intentional, while those with a negative side effect were judged to have been intentional. Such an asymmetry in attribution of intentionality does not make sense except in light of an inference that subjects make, based on knowledge of the norm “do no harm”, about a person who decides to proceed with a course of action with 12 negative side-­‐effects despite this norm, as someone who is not bothered by violating norms—a potential norm violator. Further studies that serve as a direct test of reasoning abilities relating to identification of norm violations are needed to strengthen the current available evidence. 2.2.6 MOTIVATION While having innate expectations, reasoning principles, and cognitive biases might help the cultural learner to rapidly acquire the content of local norms, merely having this knowledge is inadequate. Individuals must also be motivated to act on those norms in the appropriate contexts. Selection pressures for individuals who are effectively able to comply and enforce norms could have co-­‐opted existing psychological architecture evolved for motivating adaptive responses to threats and opportunities in the environment—the emotional system—to regulate adherence to norms. These motivations can come from external or internal sources: from fear of punishment, or from an internalized desire to do so because it is the good or right thing to do. Internalized motivation can take the form of psychological reward when we successfully comply (e.g. pride), aversive feelings when we transgress (e.g. shame), and the desire to get even or inflict harm (e.g. anger) when we witness a norm being violated (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fessler, 2007; Tracy, 2007). Evidence for internalization of norms come from fMRI studies showing that violating a variety of otherwise automatized norms by breaking promises, or causing harm to an individual (for utilitarian reasons) require a deliberate override of automatic decision pathways that engage the emotional centres by brain regions responsible for cognitive control and abstract reasoning (Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, & Fehr, 2009; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Baumgartner and colleagues find that while making a promise, individuals who then break the promise experience anticipatory activation of the insula, implicated in anticipation of aversive events and threat of punishment, and the striatum, commonly observed during tasks when individuals suppress a prepotent or 13 frequent response. Further, they found that during actual promise-­‐breaking, participants experience activation of the lateral PFC, brain regions previously found to play an essential role in the control and suppression of cognitions and behaviours. The timing of these activations suggest that in making the decision to make a false promise, individuals were suppressing the more automatic urge to be honest, while anticipating negative outcomes such as punishment. Thus, complying with honesty norms seems to be the automatic response path, and anticipating violating the norm activates brain regions that generate aversive experiences, presumably to create a disincentive to the individual for following through with breaking the norm. These normative-­‐automatic responses and aversive activations in anticipation of norm-­‐breaking are then overridden by higher order cognitive control and reasoning centres when the deliberate choice of breaking the norm is made. Greene et al used trolley and footbridge dilemmas to find the neural substrates of moral judgments. The trolley problem (described earlier in relation to Universal Moral Grammar) involved an actor in the scenario making a tradeoff between passively allowing a runaway trolley headed for 5 people to continue on its track vs. actively flipping a switch and thereby killing 1 person on an alternate track. The footbridge problem has the same tradeoff structure, except instead of flipping a switch, the actor physically pushes an innocent bystander off a footbridge above the trolley tracks. While the outcomes of the potential tradeoffs are equivalent, participants found the tradeoff in the trolley dilemma much more acceptable than in the footbridge dilemma. It appears that the footbridge scenario produced stronger activation of aversive emotions than the trolley dilemma, which led to lower permissibility judgments. The authors explain the difference in strength of activation as being due to differences in the type of morals being violated—personal norms producing stronger activation than impersonal norms (footbridge being the former and trolley the latter). However, it is possible that what is being called “personal” vs. “impersonal” is the degree of physical proximity, which can be translated into the perceived level of direct responsibility that can be attributed to 14 the person violating harm norms. An act that carries greater direct responsibility for inflicting harm on an innocent bystander may be seen as a more severe violation of harm norms than a more physically distant act, which may also be perceived as more causally removed from the outcome. Though the exact explanation for the difference has yet to be elucidated, overall it appears that evaluating behaviours that harm another individual, even for utilitarian purposes, activates brain centres that produce negative emotional reactions and the strength of activation is negatively related to the judged degree of permissibility of violations of harm norms. On the flip side, behaving in a norm-­‐consistent manner by cooperating, punishing violations, or contributing to public goods activates the brain’s reward circuits in the same manner as obtaining a direct cash payment (De Quervain, et al., 2004; Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008), suggesting that complying with norms is rewarding in the brain the same way that getting a personally beneficial item does. Similarly, studies using self-­‐report show that acting in accordance with prescribed fairness (equal division) norms by giving half of a windfall monetary gain to a recipient predicts higher levels of happiness, and receiving feedback that one’s actions has conformed to one’s group norms of helping predict increases in pride (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004; Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008). From the perspective of a third party not directly engaged in the normative behaviour, observing violation of cooperative norms as measured by low contributions to public goods game produces higher levels of anger, and predicts commensurate levels of altruistic punishment of the low contributors (at a personal cost, with no material gains; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). When feelings of anger are artificially reduced via low-­‐doses of the dopamine receptor antagonist sulpiride (verified by different measures of anger), participants experienced a related deficit in motivations to punish as measured by subjects’ willingness to punish others for violations of fairness norms (Lawrence et al., 2002). Thus, third parties’ motivation to punish observed norm violations is mediated by emotional processes such that 15 more intense experiences of punitive emotion motivate allocating more resources to punishing transgressors. The studies described above variously show that compliance and violation of norms have consequences deep in the body and brain—affective experiences can serve as proximate arbitrators of reward and punishment, producing adaptive responses to norms by efficiently motivate norm adherence and enforcement, and possibly prospective deterrents of future transgressions. 16 CHAPTER 3 TEST 1: EVOLVED COGNITIVE SPECIALIZATION FOR NORM LEARNING 3.1 INTRODUCTION Theories of norms have yet to offer a satisfactory account of how individuals learn the content of norms. Existing models operate under implicit assumptions that cultural learners either rely on explicit statements and corrective feedback to glean norm content, or that by observation, learners somehow magically figure out which behaviours are normative. These assumptions are problematic. First, we know from extensive research in comparative and developmental psychology, that imitation and observational learning is an important route by which humans learn cultural knowledge (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Grusec & Abramovitch, 1982; Whiten, 1998). Second, positing that individuals just know what the norms are by observation glosses over complex processes by which massive amounts of perceptual input are filtered, to identify the select fitness-­‐relevant information that need attending to. Since information can be fitness-­‐relevant in a number of ways and thus require different responses from the individual, identifying the type of event and how it is relevant to one’s fitness is another challenging cognitive process that necessitates explanation. A culture-­‐gene co-­‐evolutionary account of social norms outlined in the preceding chapter can offer testable predictions for a suite of cognitive abilities that evolved in tandem with ever more intensive group-­‐living to facilitate learning normative information. These should involve expectations about the existence of norms, and cognitive biases in perception, enhanced cognitive accessibility, and domain-­‐specific reasoning or inference abilities relating to norms. 17 3.2 OPERATIONALIZING THE HYPOTHESES Cognitive scientists who adopt a functionalist perspective have argued that our memory systems evolved to solve fitness-­‐relevant problems (Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009). In this regard, it is unlikely to be a perfect record of the past, but to be biased to retain information in a way that facilitates using past learning in the service of the present, or perhaps to prepare for its recurrence in the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002). Research has shown that there is a strong relationship between the recurrence of information in the natural environment and their rate of forgetting, suggesting that retention depends on the likelihood that information will be needed in the future (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Norms regulate behaviour that not only have a high probability of recurrence, but also carry fitness implications for the person learning it. Thus, we should observe memory enhancement for potentially normative social information (operationalized below as either explicit labeling, or gleaned through cues via observation), compared to asocial information. H1: Normative information will be better recalled than asocial information. We predict that any information that increases the perception of normativity should strengthen activation of norm psychology. If H1 is correct and we have enhanced memory for normative information, then increasing the level of certainty of normativity should enhance recall H2: Information (cues) that increases the confidence that a phenomenon is norm-­‐governed will increase the accuracy and rate of recall So what aspects of behaviour might be indicative of normativity? One way in which we learn that something is normative is by other people telling us so explicitly. Barring any deceptive intentions, explicitly labeling something lends it the greatest confidence of normativity. H2a: Explicitly labeling a phenomenon as being due to a norm will lead to better recall 18 In addition to explicit teachings by others, one might also learn about norms from observations. However, multiple factors may motivate an action or observed artifact, not all of them due to rules and expectations, but to causes such as personal preference. As set out in Chapter 2, individual psychologies should have evolved to be attune to even very subtle cues suggesting that equilibrium behaviour exists for a given situation. Since the prevalence of the equilibrium behaviour is very high at norm-­‐equilibria, high frequency of occurrence might be used as a cue of normativity and increase recall of the high frequency event or behaviour. H2b: Social phenomena (e.g. behaviours) higher in frequency is more likely to be coded as normative, leading to better recall A second potential cue for inferring that an observed behaviour is governed by a norm is the expression of a negative emotional reaction. Violation of a norm will usually garner negative emotional reactions, such as anger, or disgust, to signal annoyance, and a willingness or propensity to inflict punishment on the violator (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Rozin, 1999; Wilson & O'Gorman, 2003). A cultural learner seeking to learn norms and avoid punishment him/herself should thus use people’s expressions of negative emotions as a cue that a norm violation has occurred. Emotive cues should likewise enhance recall, and the likelihood with which an inference about the applicability of the behaviour to novel contexts will be made. H2c: Social phenomena that evoke a negative emotional reaction in observer(s) is more likely to be coded as normative, leading to better recall Further, because deviations from norm equilibria are usually associated with costly consequences, error management concerns should produce a perceptual bias towards perceiving observed behaviours as governed by norms even when there is scant evidence or few cues of normativity. Such biases in cognition may take place in our minds because it presents one with useful and adaptive representations for navigating the world (Haselton, et al., 2009; McKay & Efferson, 2010). 19 H3: Normative information will be more readily generalized to novel contexts, that is, people will make inferences about the applicability of behaviours from a single observed instance to novel contexts. This readiness to infer the presence of norms should also rapidly increase with confidence or certainty. Therefore, H3a: Explicitly labeling a phenomenon as being due to a norm will lead to more accurate inferences about the applicability of the phenomenon to novel contexts H3b: Social phenomena that occur higher in frequency is more likely to be coded as normative, and should lead to more inferences to novel contexts H3c: Social phenomena that evoke a negative emotional reaction in observer(s) is more likely to be coded as normative, and should lead to more inferences to novel contexts. 3.3 TESTING THE PREDICTIONS To test the above predictions, we created four versions of a vignette about a fictitious land, each version manipulating the cues or signals of normativity discussed in the hypotheses above. Comparisons of recall (H1) between information types were done within subjects. Hypotheses about cognitive biases for sensitivity to cues and their influence on later recall (H2) and inference (H3) were tested across participants and conditions. Using fictitious vignettes allowed us to present participants with information about a novel environment for which they were guaranteed not to have prior knowledge. Presenting information that is equally unfamiliar to all participants partially gets around the problem of importing specific content resulting from cultural learning (though not expectations for certain types of behaviours to be governed by rules) to influence the cognitive tasks required for this experiment. The use of vignettes may seem an indirect way to assess evolutionarily derived hypotheses of cognitive functioning that predate the written 20 word. However, not only does reading successfully evoke imagery and emotional experiences in humans (Gottschall & Wilson, 2005), recall of specific words can be affected by their relevance to fitness (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007). This suggests that text-­‐based stimuli can be a valid way to test for cognitive biases associated with information hypothesized to have differential relevance to fitness. 3.3.1 METHOD Participants Participants were 163 undergraduates (118 females (72%); age ranging from 17-­‐42, with a mean of 20.7 years, SD=4.19) from the Psychology Department Human Subject Pool at UBC, who participated for course credit. Participants completed the study on a computer in a solitary cubicle, and each session lasted for a maximum duration of 30 minutes. Materials Four versions of a vignette corresponding to the four conditions (control, frequency cue, emotive cue, explicit statements) were created, written from the perspective of an explorer in a fictitious land called Ove (see Appendix). Vignettes contain 9 paragraphs, offering a first hand account of people, events and surroundings observed during the explorer’s visit. Vignettes were constructed as a coherent narrative that details the explorer’s experience on the first day in a foreign land. Vignettes were constructed with comparable items that belong to 2 broad categories of information: social information that could be normative (e.g. greeting, clothing, ritual) and asocial information (e.g. plant, bird, terrain). While much social information has the potential to be normative, asocial information rarely does. Thus, accompanying cues of normativity should activate norm psychology to aid in identifying, retaining and generating inferences about social information, while the predicted enhancements should not take for asocial information. Within these broad 21 categories, four targets—two of each kind (greeting, style of dress, which are social information, and potentially normative; bird, and terrain which are asocial, and cannot be normative) —were manipulated or varied according to their respective conditions; the rest of the vignette were kept constant across the control, frequency, emotional reaction, and explicit statement conditions. All experimental conditions were varied with respect (in contrast) to the control condition, and only the 4 target pieces of information were varied in each of them. In the high frequency condition, every target appeared once more than in the control condition, at a different point in the story. In the negative emotional reaction condition, a frown or a sigh accompanied each of the 4 targets. In the explicit statement condition, a sentence of explanation regarding the target accompanied each target; for example, a local explains the name and habitat of the bird and explains that the greeting gesture is among adults. To test hypotheses H1 and H2, a measure of memory recall was created. A recall question was derived for each piece of target information in the vignettes, as well as other comparable non-­‐target information in the vignettes. Each question presented 1 correct and 3 distracter options. 12 MC recall questions were created in total. A first test for whether a piece of social information has been encoded as potentially normative is to ask: do people make inferences to situations outside what has been directly observed? How do the presence of explicit explanation and emotive and frequency cues influence the rate and accuracy of inferences? To investigate this, a set of multiple choice inference questions was created based only on the social targets. Each question placed an Ovean person/people in a context that was not present in the vignette and asked participants what they would expect them to do in that unfamiliar context. Answer options consisted of 1 anticipated choice (based on the manner and context of occurrence in the vignette) and 2 distracters, and a fourth, “No inference can be made based on the text” option. 22 Procedures Upon arrival at the study session, participants signed a consent form and were seated in front of a computer in a private cubicle. They were presented with a point-­‐form overview of all study components, and then given the following instructions. “Imagine you are an explorer, and that you will soon be visiting Ove to study the Ovean way of life, and everything about the people and how they live. The following account is the only source of information for you about Ove. This is your one and only opportunity to correctly observe the place and the people, so it is important to earn as much about Ove as possible from the account.” These instructions were intended to create a fitness-­‐relevant situation to motivate participants to pay attention, while remaining as neutral as possible regarding what content participants should pay attention to. Participants proceeded to read 1 of 4 vignettes created for the condition to which they were randomly assigned. After reading the vignette, they completed a distracter task consisting of GRE-­‐type word analogies and arithmetic questions, before moving on to the DV’s of interest. First, participants answered MC questions regarding each of the social targets, asocial targets, and non-­‐target items. Next, participants completed the inference questions about social items. Instructions were clear that this was not a test of recall; participants were asked to make guesses based on impressions they may have formed while reading the text, and to select answer options that reflect what they think might be the case. Finally, participants answered a number of demographics questions, were debriefed and given course credit. 3.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Recall questions were coded for correct answers. The social target of women’s dress style referred to in Recall Q5 contained an error in the control and explicit statement vignettes for a portion of participants. Therefore, the 67 affected 23 participants were omitted in the analyses of main effects of social vs. asocial targets. In the remaining analyses, answers for Q5 will be omitted only in these two conditions (1 fewer item in these two conditions only for the first 67 participants). Descriptions of overall recall rates Overall, looking at the 67 participants with one omitted recall item, those in the control and explicit conditions obtained between 7 and 11 correct answers (11 was the maximum possible score), with a mean score of 9.17 or 83% (S.D.=1.26 or 11.5%), while participants in the frequency and emotion conditions scored between 6 and 12 correct answers (out of a possible 12), with a mean score of 9.32 or 78% (S.D.=1.67 or 13.9%). Looking at the 96 participants with complete data, across all conditions, participants obtained between 3 and 12 correct answers, with a mean score of 9.71 or 80.9% (S.D.=1.82 or 15.17%). Is there a main effect of enhanced recall for potentially normative information? To see if there’s a baseline difference in recall of the social and asocial items, we conducted a paired samples t-­‐test comparing mean recall of social and asocial items for only participants in the control condition. The test shows that there is no baseline difference in recall between item types (mean difference=0, t(29)=0, p<1.00). Next, we want to see if there is a differential effect of cues and statements on the two item types. Using data from the 96 participants who were able to answer all social and asocial recall questions, we conducted a paired samples t-­‐test, comparing mean recall of the social targets with the asocial targets. Analyses reveal significantly better recall on social targets compared to asocial targets across the 4 conditions (mean difference = .156, t(95) = 2.233, p<.028. Cohen’s d = .458). A similar recall advantage for potentially normative information is found using the full sample, corrected for the 67 omitted data points by using a percentage of each individual’s recall of social items and asocial items. I will now refer to this average as the effective average recall (EAR), so called because the denominator of the average is adjusted for the total number of valid questions participants had the 24 opportunity to answer. In the 96 participants with complete data, this is calculated as the simple average of scores across both items of the social and asocial target types. For the 67 participants whose Q5’s were omitted in the control and explicit conditions, asocial EAR is calculated similarly, but the effective average recall of social items is just the score on the greeting recall item divided by a possible 1. Comparing target types by EAR, the average social score is again significantly higher than average asocial score (mean diff = .074, t(162)=2.635, p=.009. Cohen’s d1 = .414). There were no sex differences in level of recall. Given that there was no baseline difference in recall between social and asocial items, this suggests that the experimental cues and statements conferred a greater recall advantage onto the social items than the asocial items, perhaps by rendering the social items more normative. This supports H1. Figure 3.1 Recall of Normative and Asocial targets. 1 Rosenthal, 1991 and Mullen & Rosenthal, 1985 recommends using paired t-­‐test to compute effect size, but cf. Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow & Burke 1996. 1.5 1.55 1.6 1.65 1.7 1.75 1.8 1.85 Normative targets Asocial targets M ea n R ec al l 25 Are the individual cues of normativity effective at enhancing recall? Outcomes of recall questions were binary—they were coded as either correct or incorrect. To analyze this data, we used logistic regression to compare the effect of cues, using condition as predictor and recall of social and asocial items as outcome variables. Because each participant provided responses on two recall items, we used clustered robust standard errors to deal with this non-­‐independence, treating each participant as a cluster (2 observations per participant) within the cluster. We used participant condition to predict whether the participant got the correct answer for the recall question, with participants’ sex as covariate. In the logistic regression with target social items as outcome variables, only the explicit statements condition was significant, predicting higher likelihood of recall compared to the control condition (O.R. = 4.69, z=2.59, p<.01). This means that compared to participants in the control condition, the odds of getting the correct answer increased by a factor of 4.69 for those in the explicit statement condition. Being in frequency and emotional reaction condition increased the odds of accurately recalling by a factor of 1.98 and 1.06 respectively, but while frequency was nearing significance (p=.12), emotional reaction was not (p=.88). Pearson goodness of fit test indicate moderate fit between model and observed data (P[χ2(3) > 1.65] = .65). 26 Table 3.1 Recall of Social Targets, condition as predictor, sex as covariate. *Model based on 161 clusters, [P(Pearson Chi-­‐square(3))>1.65]=.65 In the model predicting asocial targets, being in an experimental condition did not significantly change the likelihood of recalling asocial targets relative to the control condition. Participants presented with asocial targets were equally likely to remember them, regardless of whether the targets were accompanied by cues or explicit statements/explanations. The only significant predictor in this model is participants’ sex. Being male predicted a decline in accuracy of recall for asocial targets (O.R. = .617, z=-­‐1.99, p<.047). Pearson goodness of fit test indicate that the model is a very good fit to the observed data (P[χ2(3) > .32] = .96). This sex difference in recall of asocial targets may be explained by Silverman and Eals (1992) finding that women are better at remember information in fixed locales than men, which they suggest may be due to adaptations arising from how labor was divided during early environments of adaptation. Condition Odds Ratio Clustered Robust SE z p 95% CI Frequency 1.98 0.87 1.55 0.12 (.83, 4.68) Emotion 1.06 0.41 0.15 0.88 (.50, 2.26) Explicit 4.69 2.8 2.59 0.01 (1.46, 15.10) Sex 1.2 0.43 0.52 0.61 (.60, 2.41) 27 Table 3.2 Recall of Asocial Targets, condition as predictor, sex as covariate Model based on 161 clusters, [P(Pearson Chi-­‐square(3))>.32]=.96 Together, these results suggest that experimental manipulations adding providing participants with explicit descriptions differentially increase the rate of accurate recall, enhancing memory specifically for social, and potentially normative information, and less so for information that has no normative potential. These results partially support H2. Figure 3.2 Probability of accurate recall Control Frequency Emotion Explicit Asocial Target 0.81 0.84 0.71 0.8 Social Target 0.75 0.86 0.76 0.93 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 P r( ac cu ra te r ec al l) Condition Odds Ratio Clustered Robust SE z p 95% CI Frequency 1.3 0.47 0.72 0.47 (.64, 2.65) Emotion 0.6 0.19 -­‐1.59 0.11 (.33, 1.12) Explicit 1 0.35 0.01 0.99 (.51, 1.98) Sex 0.62 0.15 -­‐1.99 0.047 (.38, .99) 28 What is the effect of cues on people’s inferences about social information? Inference questions were based solely on social targets (greeting and clothing). Each question had an anticipated correct answer based on information in the vignette stimulus. Two types of analyses were conducted: the first, looking at whether cues increase the rate of inference (making ANY inference at all regardless of accuracy, operationalized as choosing an option other than d) no inference can be made), and the second, assessing whether cues increase the accuracy of inferences (making the anticipated inference based on the vignette). Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below illustrate the probability of making an inference, and also the accuracy of the inferences made, broken down by condition. As you can see, there is a tendency for cues to increase both the rate and accuracy of inferences compared to the control condition, and for the explicit statements to have the largest influence, over and above the effect of cues. To examine rate of inferences, we coded participants’ answers into a binary variable. Choosing “no inference can be made based on the text” was coded as an absence of inference, and the three other choices were collapsed into a single category for when an inference was present. To analyze this data, we used logistic regression. We used clustered robust standard errors to compensate for the correlation in observations between inferences provided by the same participant. Frequency and emotive cues tended but did not significantly increase the rate of inference (O.R. =1.48, p=.24 and O.R. =1.54, p=.18 respectively), but explicit statements did (O.R. = 2.46, z = 2.37, p<.018). That is, by being in the explicit statement rather than the control condition, odds of making an inference increased by a factor of 2.5. The model provided a very good fit to the observed data (P[χ2(8) > 2.25] = .972). 29 Table 3.3 Rate of Inference about Social Targets Model based on 161 clusters, [P(Pearson Chi-­‐square(3))>3.18]=.364 Figure 3.3 Rate of Inference What about accuracy of inferences? Three questions (1, 3, 8)—2 about greeting, and 1 about women’s dress style—were used to conduct these analyses. Multiple items about greeting behaviour was created to look at whether participants were sensitive to the sex and age of interacting partners when they make inferences about the 0.66 0.74 0.75 0.82* 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Control Frequency Emotion Explicit P r( m ak in g an in fe re n ce ) Condition Odds Ratio Clustered Robust SE z p 95% CI Frequency 1.48 0.49 1.17 0.24 (.77, 2.84) Emotion 1.54 0.5 1.36 0.18 (.82, 2.90) Explicit 2.39 0.88 2.37 0.02 (1.16, 4.92) Sex 1.11 0.32 0.35 0.72 (.63, 1.97) 30 applicability of the greeting behaviour. Two of these inference questions were included in this analysis because the context in which they were placed were similar enough to those presented in the vignette that we had clearly anticipated “correct” answers for those inference items. We included scores from only those inference questions to which participants also gave the correct answer on the corresponding recall question. In this way, we could be relatively assured that participants remembered the content of the vignette and that their answer to the inference question was not based on faulty memory but reflects an application of recalled information to a new context. To see whether social targets accompanied by normativity cues increase the accuracy of inference relative to the control condition, we used a logistic regression model with condition as predictor and scores on inference questions as the outcome. In this procedure, we effectively created an “accuracy of inference” variable, where answers on every inference question was treated as an observation. Since each participant answered three inference questions, observations were correlated with each other via the participant. As before, we used clustered robust standard errors to compensate for this correlation in observations. Each participant was treated as a cluster, with right or wrong on the 3 inference questions as observations nested within the cluster. Sex was included as a covariate. In this model, frequency and emotional reaction conditions had effects in the predicted direction but did not significantly change the likelihood that an accurate inference will be made. Only the explicit statement condition significantly increased the likelihood that a participant will make the “accurate” anticipated inference compared to the control condition (Odds Ratio=2.15, z=2.03, p<.043). Pearson goodness-­‐of-­‐fit indices show a good fit between the model and the observed data (p[χ2(3) > .83] = .84). These results support Hypotheses 3a and provide partial support for Hypotheses 3b and c. 31 Figure 3.4 Rate of Accurate Inference Table 3.4 Accuracy of Inference about Social targets Condition Odds Ratio Clustered Robust SE z P 95% CI Frequency 1.67 0.53 1.61 0.11 (.9, 3.1) Emotion 1.48 0.45 1.3 0.19 (.82, 2.69) Explicit 2.7 0.95 2.84 0.005 (1.36, 5.38) Sex 0.91 0.24 -0.35 0.55 (.55, 1.52) Model based on 161 clusters, [P(Pearson Chi-square(3))>.83]=.84 3.3.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION What did we learn? The results of our analyses showed an overall memory enhancement for potentially normative social information compared to asocial information, as measured by a 0.53 0.65 0.63 0.75* 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Control Frequency Emotion Explicit P r( ac cu ra te in fe re n ce ) 32 multiple choice test of recall. This recall advantage was manifested when we provided information (frequency and explicit) that we predicted would increase the likelihood that a social target is perceived as normative. This effect was strongest for explicit labeling of social norms, but was not present for asocial targets, suggesting that consistent with our predictions, people are sensitive to certain cues as indicators of normativity, and further, have enhanced cognitive accessibility for normative information. Observing negative emotional reactions did not have the predicted effect on recall. This may be an artifact of the manner in which the cue appeared in the vignettes. Participants read about one instance of the target social item, then a second instance in which the item was noticeably altered. In this second instance, another character in the vignette utters a sigh or frown of disapproval. The presentation of the first and second instances of the target items may have been too far apart for participants to draw a connection between them. If we assume that participants were only focused on the instance in which the emotive cue was present, may have likely inferred from the frown that the absence of a correct behaviour has been observed, but this still leaves the normative behaviour unknown. This is likely why although participants in the emotional reaction condition did not differ in rate of recall from the control condition, those participants who correctly answered the recall question still showed an enhanced, though not significant, ability to make accurate inferences about the targets to novel contexts. For emotion cues to be more effective may require greater number of positive presentations before a negative one involving a norm violation. Follow up studies are needed to test this possibility. What alternative explanations can account for the data? Merely showing that there is a memory enhancement for behaviours labeled as normative does not speak to the memory bias as an evolved product of selection pressure; it could simply be a result of developing expertise in something we have a lot of practice with, much like chess master develops a specialized set of cognitions related to chess (and nobody would argue that we have an evolved set of cognitions 33 just for chess). Thus, a skeptic might suggest an alternative explanation for this memory enhancement that does not involve an evolved psychology—our participants were adults who have had on average 20 years of experience in social contexts—humans might merely be smart individual learners with generalized machinery who, over those 20 years, have learned that certain types of behaviours are important to pay attention to and learn. By this explanation, a target’s perceived importance should drive its degree of cognitive accessibility and ease of retrieval. A between-­‐subject correlation analysis between ratings on a 7-­‐point Likert and scores on recall of target social items revealed no relationship r=.005. Further, there is no evidence of improved performance with age (r=.01), so within the age range of the available data (17 to 42 years, S.D.=4.19), more years of experience dealing with normative information does not seem to improve one’s ability to identify and remember potentially normative information. Limitations and future studies The design of the current study did not allow us to rule out the possibility that accompanying the target items with ANY additional information would enhance recall of the social information. For example, all emotive cues were negatively valenced, because we hypothesized based on previous research that they would be indicative of a norm violation, but we did not look at the effect of positive emotions. Future studies can examine the effects of theoretically unrelated cues on recall and inferences about social information in order to ascertain whether the hypothesized norm psychology attends to norm-­‐specific cues. In addition, while frequency cues increased recall and inference in the predicted direction, the effect was not significant. This may simply require a higher frequency of occurrence in the vignette, as even in the high frequency condition, targets are only presented twice. It may also have to do with the format in which frequency information was presented—as recurring instances, rather than as proportional information within a given context. While norm psychology may keep track of frequency information over a span of time (as it seems to, based on our results), it 34 might be more powerfully activated if presented with information about prevalence or proportion of behaviours at a particular slice in time. To ascertain whether frequency is a potent cue of normativity, it should be important to identify the proper format in which the cue is processed by attention and perceptual system. Future studies should look into more ecologically valid format of presenting frequency information, such that information about the prevalence of behaviour at a single time point is conveyed. In a similar vein, the present study could be done in different media, such as photographs or videos, to target perhaps more appropriate sensory modalities and obtain higher levels of ecological validity and relevance. Most importantly, the current study aimed to test the hypothesis that we have a specialized psychology evolved to meet the challenges of learning and implementing social norms. We hypothesized that any culturally learned behaviour that is common, and deviations from which will provoke a punitive sentiment or behaviours by third party observers, will be perceived as normative. Thus, what separates a piece of social information such as a personal preference, from a social norm, is whether the behaviour can be socially learned, the proportion of people who engage in the behaviour in similar contexts, and whether other people will be annoyed or be motivated to punish someone who does not follow the common behaviour. The present study served as a crude first test by comparing the effect of cues on memory enhancement for social vs. asocial targets, and results of recall are suggestive—frequency cues and explicit statements both enhanced recall for social but not asocial information above baseline (control) condition, possibly due to increased perceptions of normativity of the social information. Thus, it was the interaction of the target and the cue that rendered a piece of information potentially normative. A more specific and stringent test would be to compare normative social and non-­‐normative social information. Follow up studies can investigate this by creating stories in which several pieces of social information across a variety of domains, described as commonly occurring, are presented identically across conditions. To alter the perceived normativity of the social behaviours, conditions will vary in accompanying contextual information 35 that alter 1) the likelihood that the behaviour was socially transmitted rather than individually discovered, 2) the degree of practical or instrumental utility of the behaviour (vs. apparently arbitrary), 3) the number of neutral observers who express annoyance at an individual who behaves inconsistently with the common behaviour, and 4) whether the behaviour is prosocial or directly self-­‐beneficial. Memory and inference tests can again be used as outcome measures. An alternative or additional measure could take the form of presenting participants with a number of profiles of individuals who behave consistently with the common behaviours in some domains and fail to comply in other domains. Participants can then be asked a number of questions regarding whether they would want to be friends with the profiled individual, whether they would want to learn from them, or whether they would want to avoid or even punish them in each domain. This social domain x cue design would allow us to examine what exactly renders a piece of social information normative, and how they might vary for different types of social information. Conclusions The set of evolved cognitive biases we are identifying in adults very well could have been ratcheted up by experience and learning. It does not tell us what the biases look like at birth, nor what effect experience has on shaping its’ functioning. It is highly likely that like most developmental systems, innate biases and environmental input are both critical (Callanan, 2006). Innate frameworks do not preclude learning from experience over development (Gelman & Williams, 1998). People who have already learned a set of norms may have their expectations about what norms look like guided by the content and structure of that existing set, and use those expectations to help learn a new set. The study does show that our participants DO exhibit these sorts of biases, which were predicted a priori from evolutionary theory. The studies thus provide preliminary empirical findings that fit in with extant work supporting the culture-­‐gene co-­‐evolutionary account of social norms and the cognitive workings of the human mind that underlies it. 36 CHAPTER 4 TEST 2: CULTURALLY EVOLVED SOLUTIONS TO MOTIVATING NORM COMPLIANCE 4.1 INTRODUCTION In Chapter 2, I discussed the hypothesis that our evolved norm psychology may have exapted existing emotional systems for the purpose of motivating individuals to conform to and enforce social norms. Because one’s ability and desire to uphold group norms hold important consequences for social status, access to resources, and consequently, one’s fitness, such a motivational system should prepare individuals to enact their knowledge of local norms and to manage the costs of deviating from those norms. Following a transgression, it should bring about cognitive, physiological and motivational changes to potentiate actions by the transgressor to minimize costs (in the form of direct punishment, or social devaluation) in the locally appropriate manner—be it to appease high status individuals or make reparations to one’s relationship partners—and to increase likelihood of future compliance. In this chapter, I present two studies designed as a first pass to address the more specific hypothesis that different social groups may have not only generated different behaviours that transgressors can undertake to reduce cost of wrongdoing, but also selected for and relied on different affective mechanisms to motivate those actions. That is, important features of the environment may have exerted selection pressures on the types of emotional systems that proved successful at motivating norm compliance, and in the event of a transgression, to reinstate oneself as a valued, or at least tolerated, group member. These motivations should only exist for group memberships and relationships that one values, and is motivated to maintain. What factors might have caused motivation systems for norm-­‐adherence to diverge, and what might the resulting systems look like? An important determinant of how 37 an individual who has just made a social trespass can redeem themselves in the eyes of their social group may have to do with the availability of opportunities their current relationship partners have to form new relationships. That is, historical societal differences in relational mobility—the general availability of opportunities to individuals for forming new relationships within a given social context (Yuki et al., 2007)—might have caused different motivational patterns to become effective cultural technologies that individuals used to preserve valued relationships following a norm violation in their particular social context. We would expect for people everywhere to generally have the capacity to experience a similar spectrum of emotions in the context of a norm violation, although their prominence and motivational significance are likely to differ across cultures as a result of their differential suitability to local contexts. Regardless of the degree of relational mobility of one’s social environment, a transgressor should try not to be discovered. However, if the transgression was public, or likely to be made public, there should be a divergence in motivational responses experienced by the transgressor. These motivational responses should be tailored to the opportunity costs faced by one’s relationship partner, as a function of the relational mobility of one’s social group. In a social environment with many opportunities to form new relationships, one’s social partners can end a relationship with a partner who has been devalued, unless they are persuaded otherwise. The most effective way to persuade a valued relationship partner to maintain the relationship might be for the transgressor to incur personal costs and proactively make amendments for the damage that one has caused by violating a norm. In contrast, in low social mobility societies, one’s social connections are relatively fixed and existing ties are more costly to sever due to lack of alternatives. As a result, there might be less of a need for the transgressor to take costly action to try to make amends. However, because norm violations often disrupt social order, transgressors should have to demonstrate that they are aware of their violation of group norms (and if they don’t, be motivated to pay attention and learn them) and appear small and contrite to evoke sympathy so as to reduce the punishment received. Further, 38 they might have to signal a willingness to accept any punishment meted out by the group, such as taking a hit in status and access to resources, and genuine desire not to transgress in the future. Thus, there might be a difference in motivational tendency between low and high relational societies such that in the latter, the adaptive response following a transgression made public is to proactively approach others to make amends, and in the former, to hide, or if discovered, to appease others in an effort to reduce the amount of punishment one is likely to receive. These motivational tendencies have been noted in research on shame and guilt. A number of researchers have noted that the emotions of shame and guilt play important roles in regulating behaviours in the moral domain, and exhibit cultural variation in motivational and behavioural outcomes (e.g. (Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Menon & Shweder, 1994). Substantial work has been done in an attempt to draw distinctions between the two emotions in terms of eliciting events, phenomenology, and behavioural outcomes. However, particularly with regards to the antecedents and subjective experiences of guilt and shame, there is yet to be a coherent, cross-­‐culturally valid account to date. Studies conducted with North American participants suggest that the distinction between shame and guilt rests with whether responsibility for the wrongdoing is attributed globally to the entire self, or specifically to the act (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). However, research conducted with non-­‐Western samples suggest that this may be an artifact of the emotions interacting with a number of constructs specific to Western, individualistic contexts, and that do not exist elsewhere. Wong and Tsai (2007) convincingly argue that the interdependent construal of personhood and identity in collectivistic cultures renders the distinction based on specificity of attribution less clear and meaningful. Since situational changes to one’s behaviour to cater to the demands of the immediate context are emphasized over consistency across situations, selves are conceptualized not as immutable but as incremental and needing constant improvement. Consequently, shame is experienced as less damaging, and not regarded as dealing blows to a stable self as it is in Western individualistic contexts. 39 Empirical studies support these theoretical arguments: participants from collectivistic countries report shame as less intense and negative than Western participants (Wallbott & Scherer, 1995), and these experiences motivate changes in behaviour (Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006), characteristics that have been considered definitive of guilt. Using participants’ self report, Scherer and Wallbott (1995) find in a sample of 37 countries that participants from collectivistic cultures report shame experiences that are consistent with prototypical shame characteristics, while those from individualistic societies experienced shame that is more typical of guilt experiences. These discrepancies may partly arise from shame concepts being hypercognized in cultures where they play a focal role, and the difficulty that these nuanced distinctions present for translation and finding equivalence across cultures. As one example, in the Chinese language, Bedford (2004) reports finding 3 types of guilt and 4 types of shame that are not lexically marked or distinguishable in English. Thus, it seems that challenges to making clear distinctions between shame and guilt arise from the fact that most studies relied on asking people to report situations and feelings associated with a particular emotion word. However, given the weight of the evidence laid out in Chapter 2 regarding the motivational significance of affect in regulating norm adherence, making a priori predictions about physiological, motivational and behavioural processes and outcomes based on guilt and shame’s adaptive functions may help circumvent this problem. Findings from studies looking at the motivational outcomes of guilt and shame map roughly onto the predictions set out above. Shame has been found to motivate withdrawal from social contexts, inhibit action and assuming a smaller body posture typical of appeasement displays (Fessler, 1999; Gilbert, 1992; Parisi, 1999; Weisfeld, 1997). Indeed, displaying shame and acting in a consistent manner can enhance reconciliation and an individual’s reacceptance following moral transgressions (De Jong, Peters, De Cremer, & Vranken, 2002). Guilt, on the other hand, is usually reported in the context of interpersonal harm, and motivates reparative action on the part of the transgressor (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2006). Fessler (2007) 40 observed that shame has a universally recognizable ethology and is traceable to primate origins in negotiating dominance hierarchies, while guilt terms and concepts seem to be only found in some cultures and largely absent from others. This led him to propose that guilt and shame might be two emotions that were co-­‐opted via cultural evolutionary processes to solve the problem of regulating norm violations, guilt being a more recent adaptation. However, to date, there has yet to be a satisfactory explanation offered to account for the variation in relative prominence of the emotions across cultures. The present studies will test one facet of the hypothesis outlined above, that members of cultures differing on relational mobility will experience different motivational states following a norm violation. Individuals from low relational mobility cultures will tend to experience more avoidant tendencies, such as documented in shame, while individuals from high relational mobility cultures will tend to experience more approach tendencies, such as in guilt. We used ethnic groups European Canadians and East Asians (comprised of immigrants from China, Japan and Korea) as proxies for groups that are high and low in relational mobility, respectively (Falk, Heine, Yuki, & Takemura, 2009; Yuki, et al., 2007). Previous research by Falk et al (2007) using a relational mobility measure developed by Yuki et al (2007) found with students on UBC campus that Japanese and Asian-­‐Canadians have significantly lower relational mobility than Euro-­‐Canadians. Based on this difference, we treated ethnicity as a binary group variable that represented high and low relational mobility: participants who reported their ethnicity as European-­‐Canadian, Canadian, or Caucasian were coded as Euro-­‐Canadian, while those who reported being East Asian, Chinese, Korean or Japanese were coded as East Asian. Whereas previous efforts to study the problem have relied on asking informants from different cultures to give detailed descriptions of situations in which they experienced guilt or shame, the current studies will be one of the first attempts to tackle the problem experimentally. This affords us a high degree of control in ensuring equivalence in the eliciting situation, and to directly test the hypothesis of cultural differences in emotional and motivational responses. 41 Study 1 relies on simple self-­‐report following a norm violation induction to assess participants’ conscious reported experiences of momentary affective states. We expect a differential increase in reports of guilt and shame across two cultural groups. Study 2 employs an implicit, behavioural measure of social approach-­‐avoidance. We expect Euro-­‐Canadians to exhibit an increase in approach tendencies following the norm violation induction and the East Asians to increase in avoid tendencies following the same induction. 4.2 STUDY ONE 4.2.1 METHOD Participants Participants were 36 undergraduate and graduate students (33% female; age ranging from 18-­‐47, with a mean of 23.69 years, SD=5.27) recruited from across UBC campus via posters, mailing lists and class announcements. 53% were East Asians and 47% Euro-­‐Canadians. Participants were scheduled for appointments and arrived at a laboratory in the Psychology department to complete the experiment. They were seated in cubicles, and completed the study in 15 minutes on average. Materials Norm violation manipulation. We used Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) implicit manipulation of norm violation. The implicit manipulation consisted of two versions of a short story written in the first person, one ethical (no norm was violated) and one unethical (containing a norm violation). The ethical prime was a story about an honest office worker, while the unethical prime was the exact same story except for the last sentence, in which the same office worker sabotages the career of a colleague by shredding an important document (see Appendix C for stories). 42 Self-­report measure of affect. We used the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to get ratings of participants’ subjective affective experiences. To get additional items that tap into guilt and shame, we used regret and remorse in addition to guilty to assess guilt, and disgraced and embarrassed in addition to ashamed to assess shame (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Manipulation-­check and demographics questionnaire. We included a number of questions asking participants whether they thought that the actions of the character in the implicit manipulation story were good or bad, and to report their age, sex, and ethnicity. Procedures Upon arrival at the lab, participants were randomly assigned to either the control or experimental condition. They were told that they would be completing a series of short unrelated tasks. They first received the norm violation manipulation, ostensibly to provide a handwriting sample. Those in the control condition copied out the story containing the ethical office worker, while those in the experimental condition copied out the story with the unethical worker. Participants then reported on their momentary affective states by completing the PANAS. After this, they answered a series of demographics and debriefing questions. Finally, they were fully debriefed and compensated for their time. 4.2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Participants who rated the actions of the narrator in the control condition (no norm violation) as “bad”, or in the experimental condition (norm violation) as “good” in the manipulation check question were dropped from the analyses. For this reason, 12 participants, 6 from each condition, were dropped from the analyses. Participants in the control condition rated the actions of the narrator in the story as 43 significantly better than participants in the experimental condition (mean difference = 1.74, p<.001). Further, European Canadians rated the norm violation in the experimental condition as significantly worse (mean difference = -­‐.81, p<.001), and the action in the control condition as significantly better (mean difference = .41, p<.04) than East Asian participants. This difference may be due to a difference in response styles driven by a tendency for European Canadians to use more extreme ends of the scale and East Asians to be more likely to use midpoints on the scale (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995). Descriptions of overall ratings of state affect Overall, across conditions, participants reported a full range in the extent to which they experienced shame and guilt (see Table 4.1 for summary of mean and SD of the composite scores by condition). On average, participants reported experiencing both more shame and guilt in the experimental condition (mean difference = .363, p<.01 for guilt, and mean diff = .230, p<.03 for shame), and less shame than guilt overall (mean difference = .19, p<.0004). Table 4.1 Guilt and shame composite ratings by condition Condition Emotion Composite Mean SD Min Max Guilt 1.24 0.67 1 5 Control Shame 1.18 0.39 1 2 Guilt 1.6 1.09 1 5 Experimental Shame 1.41 0.91 1 5 44 First order correlations amongst the shame items and amongst the guilt items by ethnicity reveal that ratings of the items hung together reasonably well (ranging from .8 to 1.0), except “regret”, which correlated with “guilty” ratings at .58 in the East Asian group, suggesting that the terms held different meanings for East Asians. Thus, in the following analyses for East Asians, regret was not included in the Guilt composite score. Do East Asians and European Canadians differ in their experiences of shame vs. guilt following an imagined norm violation? To investigate this, we first conducted 2 regressions, one with guilt, and one with shame composite. Condition and ethnicity were entered as predictors, as well as a condition by ethnicity interaction term, as we expected participants of different ethnicities to experience different levels of each emotion in the experimental condition. Age and sex were entered as covariates. Results of the regression reveal no significant predictors. Condition and Ethnicity did not explain any significant proportion of the variance in Guilt (b=.42, p<.32 for Condition and b=.22, p<.47 for Ethnicity) or Shame (b=.44, p<.27 and b=.11, p<.54 respectively), and neither did their interaction terms (b=.19, p<.72 for Guilt and b=-­‐.06, p<.89 for Shame). Given that the effects are going in the predicted directions, it is possible that our sample was not sufficiently large to detect significant effects. We wanted to explore whether there was differential increase in the two emotions within ethnic groups. For this, we conducted 4 linear regressions (2 groups x 2 emotions), using condition as predictor, emotion as outcome, and sex and age as covariates. We used a composite item for each emotion, using “guilty”, “remorse” and “regret” for guilt, and “ashamed”, “embarrassed” and “disgraced” for shame, and used standard robust clustered errors in the regression to account for the non-­‐independence of errors (as each participant provided 3 observations for each regression model). We included a dummy categorical “item” covariate to control for potential variance due to differences between items in the composite. The analyses show that for the Euro-­‐Canadian group, Condition was not a significant predictor of 45 either guilt (b=.43, p<.34) or shame (b=.32, p<.47). Thus, for Euro-­‐Canadian participants, being presented with the norm violation manipulation did not cause participants to report higher levels of reported shame or guilt. Table 4.2 Guilt predicted by Condition (Euro-­Canadians) Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant 0.918 0.405 2.27 0.038 (.06, 1.78) Condition 0.43 0.429 1 0.331 (-.48, .24) Age 0.016 0.013 1.23 0.236 (.06, 1.78) Sex -0.556 0.375 -1.48 0.157 (-.01, .04) Model based on 17 clusters, F(3, 16)=1.31, p<..305. R-sq=.115 Table 4.3 Shame predicted by Condition (Euro-­Canadians) Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant 1.396 0.306 4.57 0.001 (.75, 2.04) Condition 0.319 0.434 0.74 0.473 (-.6, 1.24) Age -0.005 0.01 -0.48 0.637 (-.02, .02) Sex -0.419 0.306 -1.08 0.298 (-1.24, .41) Model based on 17 cluster, F(3, 16)=.72, p<.556. R-sq=.084 46 For the East Asians, Condition was a significant predictor, as was participants’ age for both shame and guilt. Being in the experimental condition predicted higher reported levels of guilt (b=.81, p<.016) and shame (b=.74, p<.015), as did being older (b=.303, p<.02 and b=.203, p<.016, respectively). Table 4.4 Guilt predicted by Condition (East Asians) Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t P 95% CI constant -5.138 2.395 -2.15 0.048 (-10.21, -.06) Condition 0.816 0.334 2.45 0.026 (.11, 1.52) Age 0.303 0.117 2.58 0.02 (.05, .55) Sex -0.713 0.393 -1.82 0.088 (-1.55, .12) 17 cluster, F(3, 6)=4.12, p<.024. R-sq=.486 Table 4.5 Shame predicted by Condition (East Asians) Predictor Coefficient Clustered robust SE t p 95% CI constant -3.342 1.58 -2.12 0.067 (-6.69, .0004) Condition 0.744 0.273 2.72 0.015 (.16, 1.32) Age 0.203 0.076 2.69 0.016 (.043, .364) Sex -0.305 0.337 -0.9 0.379 (-1.02, .41) 17 cluster, F(3, 16)=3.89, p<.029. R-sq=.454 47 A t-­‐test comparing mean levels of East Asians’ reported shame and guilt in the experimental condition revealed that guilt was slightly higher than shame (mean difference = .3, p<.11, 95% CI (-­‐.08, .68)) following the manipulation. Thus, it appears that the norm violation induction effectively increased conscious awareness of both guilt and shame in East Asian participants, but it did not have an effect on the Euro-­‐Canadian participants. It is unclear whether this was because the manipulation was ineffective, or the Euro-­‐Canadian participants simply were not aware of changes in their affective and motivational states and thus could not report them. Similarly for the East Asians, the lack of a difference in reported levels of guilt and shame could be due to an actual increase in both emotions, or to a lack of distinction drawn between the linguistic labels. Since we are interested in the motivational consequences of a norm violation, we turn to a behavioural measure of approach-­‐avoidance motivations next. 4.3 STUDY TWO 4.3.1 METHODS Participants Participants were 52 students (80% female; age ranging from 18-­‐37, with a mean of 21.44 years, SD=3.60) from UBC, who were recruited from across campus via posters, mailing lists and class announcements. Participants were scheduled for appointments and arrived at a laboratory in the Psychology department to complete the experiment. Participants were seated in cubicles, completing the study in 20 minutes on average. Materials Norm violation manipulation. We used the same manipulation as in Study One. Measure of social approach/avoidance. To assess participants’ desire to approach or avoid social others, we used a decision task with a binary outcome. Participants 48 were given the option to complete a brainstorming task either individually or in a group with other study participants (see Appendix for measure). Choosing to complete the task individually was interpreted as avoidance while choosing the group was interpreted as approaching others. The task instructs participants to brainstorm as many uses as possible for a brick within a 5-­‐minute time limit. To provide participants with an incentive to take the task seriously, we explained that the top 10 groups or individuals who generated the most number of items would be entered into a lottery for $25. Demographics questions and manipulation check. We included a number of questions asking participants whether they thought that the actions of the character in the implicit manipulation story were good or bad, and to report their age, sex, and ethnicity. Procedures The procedures for Study 2 is identical to Study 1, except once participants complete the handwriting manipulation, they moved on to the brainstorming task. They read the instructions (see Appendix D) for the brainstorming task, and were asked to make a choice between the individual or group task by circling one of two options. They then either proceeded to brainstorm on their own, or were introduced to a confederate who pretended to be another participant in the study seated in another cubicle. The confederate was a trained undergraduate research assistant who contributed standard preset items at regularly timed intervals during the brainstorming session. Confederate and participants recorded brainstormed items on individual sheets of paper. At the end of the 5-­‐minute brainstorming session, participants were led back to their own cubicles to complete the manipulation check and demographics questionnaire. Not a single participant suspected that the confederate was not actually a real participant. 49 4.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Descriptions of overall choices Overall, across control and experimental conditions, 73% of participants chose to do the brainstorming task individually. Of these, a greater proportion came from the experimental condition (83% compared to 64% of participants in the control condition). A logistic regression with the decision as outcome and Condition as predictor revealed that the difference was marginally significant (OR=.37, p< .15, 95% CI (.1, 1.45)). A manipulation check confirmed that participants were aware of and remembered the contents of the story that they had copied. Participants in the experimental condition (containing a norm violation) rated the actions of the narrator as significantly worse than those in the control condition (mean diff = 2.06, p<.001. 95% CI (1.62, 2.50)) on a 5 point scale. European Canadians rated actions in the experimental condition as significantly worse (mean difference = -­‐.68, p<.047) and actions as in the control condition as significantly better (mean difference = .64, p<.02) than East Asians in the same conditions. As with Study One, this difference may be due to group differences in response style when using rating scales (Chen, et al., 1995). Who chose to complete the task individually vs. in a group? Earlier, we hypothesized that there would be a group difference in affective and motivational experiences based on ethnicity following a real or imagined norm violation. Following a wrong doing, we expected Euro-­‐Canadian participants to be primarily regulated by guilt, motivating actions to make reparations measured as approaching another participant, while participants of East Asian backgrounds would tend to experience shame in the same situation and be motivated to withdraw from social situations, operationalized as choosing to complete the brainstorming task alone. Thus, we expected a shift in choices between conditions, with East Asians choosing Group less often in the experimental than in the control condition, and European Canadians exhibiting the opposite pattern (choosing Group more often in the experimental condition). To test our predictions, we conducted 50 two logistic regressions, one for each ethnicity, with the decision (Group or Individual) as outcome, Condition as predictor, and participants’ age and sex as covariates. We found that in the model including only East Asians, being in the experimental condition decreased the odds of choosing Group by a factor of .05 (or increased the odds of choosing Individual by a factor of 20), compared to the control condition (p<.049). Pearson goodness of fit test demonstrates that the model provides a moderately good fit to the data (P[χ2(11) > 11.49] = .40). This provides support for our hypothesis. In the model with Euro-­‐Canadians, there was no significant effect of Condition on task choice (OR=1.28, p<.80). Thus, being in the experimental condition made Euro-­‐Canadian participants neither more nor less likely to choose Group than in the control condition. This model also exhibited adequate fit to the data according to the Pearson goodness-­‐of-­‐fit test (P[χ2(12) > 17.98] = .12). Thus, our prediction of differential response to the experimental manipulation by ethnicity was supported, but the predicted direction was only borne out by the East Asian group, and not by European Canadians. In addition, although we had no prior predictions, participant age was a marginally significant predictor of choosing Group for East Asians but not for European Canadians; in the former group, for every unit increase in age, odds of choosing Group increased by a factor of 1.55 (z=1.67, p<.094). To account for the fact that our sample consisted of immigrants who migrated from ostensibly much lower relational mobility societies to a relatively higher relational mobility society in which this research is being conducted, we looked at the effect of age of arrival in Canada, or conversely, the number of years of residency in Canada, on likelihood of choosing Group. One reason years of residency in Canada might be of concern is that immigrants who have migrated to a society with a different degree of relational mobility from their native society might have adopted the cultural norms and supporting motivational tendencies facultatively—they might have adjusted their behaviours in response to the conditions of the local environment. In this case, we would expect that the longer an individual has lived in Canada, the 51 more they should behave like a native to the local culture. An alternative possibility is that there is a developmental window in which cultural norms and motivational systems are internalized, after which individuals become relatively rigid and less able to learning the local culture. In this view, unless an individual migrates at a very early age, their ability to adjust their behaviours and update their cultural knowledge diminishes rapidly over the course of development. To see if our data could speak to the former view, a logistic regression was conducted, using Group as outcome, and participants’ age of arrival in Canada, years in Canada, and Condition as predictors. Sex was included as a covariate. Years in Canada and participants’ age of arrival were highly collinear, and the latter was dropped from the model. Analyses reveal that years of residency in Canada do not help predict odds of choosing Group or Individual (OR=1.01, p<.85). It appears that at least for participants in our sample, length of enculturation in the host culture had no bearing on likelihood of choosing Group. This effect could have been produced by a number of factors, including rigidity of cultural learning for motivational tendencies after a certain developmental window, or an absence of relationship between relational mobility and type of motivational tendency. 4.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION What did we find? The norm violation induction did not produce changes in Euro-­‐Canadian participants’ reported state affect in Studies 1 or behaviour in Study 2. It did cause East Asians to report higher levels of both shame and guilt in Study 1, and to shift their preference toward working alone on a task, rather than the indifference they exhibited in the absence of the manipulation. It appears that the Euro-­‐Canadian participants were impervious to the experimental manipulation, at least not pertaining to the outcomes we were interested in. During debriefing, some participants explained that while they thought the actions of the narrator in the 52 experimental condition were bad, they did not necessarily identify with his/her actions, offering a possible explanation for why some participants did not seem to be affected by the manipulation. Future efforts will need to use a manipulation that is effective at evoking realistic feelings of having violated a norm in both groups. Looking at just the East Asian results across Studies 1 and 2, using an explicit self-­‐report DV was not effective at measuring the outcomes of interest, while using an implicit behavioural measure did produce results consistent with our predictions. Limitations The current studies have several limitations that should temper interpretation of the results. First, the apparent lack of effect of the norm violation induction on Euro-­‐Canadians might have been due to the sample size being insufficiently large to detect the predicted group differences. The direction of effects were as predicted, and may reveal a significant interaction with more power. Alternatively, the lack of differentiation between shame and guilt by East Asians in Study 1 may be due a lack of distinction between shame and guilt, or a poor measurement instrument. Further studies employing better measures of shame and guilt, as well as asking participants to provide definitional distinctions between the emotion terms may shed light on the cause of the lack of reported differentiation. Second, we used a somewhat crude method of testing for association between relational mobility and motivational response following a norm violation. We used East Asians as a proxy for low relational mobility, and Euro-­‐Canadians as a proxy for higher relational mobility based on previous findings of average differences by ethnicity. Measuring relational mobility at the individual level may reduce noise and contribute to a stronger relationship between relational mobility and the tendency to experience shame or guilt motivations following a transgression. The hypothesized causal relationship between emotion and ecological factor is that a society’s degree of relational mobility created a cost-­‐benefit structure that rendered some motivational systems more suited to the local environment than others at mobilizing responses following a norm transgression. However, it is also 53 plausible that (exogenously caused) group divergences in motivational tendencies selected for and maintained different optimal degrees of relational mobility within a society. The design of the present study does not allow us to speak to causal direction and does not rule out the possibility of reverse causality, however a future study can simulate these conditions by using small groups that differ in opportunities to exit the group and enter a new one to experimentally test the hypothesis. Speaking to the broader framework of a coevolved norm-­‐psychology, this set of studies provided some preliminary evidence for the co-­‐evolution of genes and culture to generate motivational solutions to governing norm violations. A related question worth exploring is the motivations experienced by other parties—the transgressed and 3rd party observers. If what constitutes adaptive motivations and actions by a transgressor differ across societies as a product of culture and genes coevolving, one would expect the victim of a transgression and neutral observers to have evolved complementary solutions that vary along the same critical dimensions, one of which has been proposed to be relational mobility. Evidence suggestive of complementary functioning of emotions come from a study by Wilson and O’Gorman (2003) who documented biased emotional experiences following a norm violation such that the transgressor and transgressed each experience adaptive misattributions of the intensity and type of emotions to the opposite party, thereby helping to reduce the likelihood of conflict between the two parties. This suggests that knowing one’s particular role in the event of a norm violation mobilizes changes that prepare the individual to behave in adaptive ways in anticipation of what one’s interaction partner might do. If motivation systems recruited to regulate norm adherence has been undergoing selection via cultural group selection, then motivational and behavioural systems that worked best in tandem to galvanize group beneficial norms and drive out defectors should have outcompeted other groups, and its practices should have spread. Testing for evidence of these would provide further evidence of the theory, as well as enable understanding of the solutions societies have arrived at to maintain social order. 54 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS A number of theories informed by ultimate evolutionary forces in the form of selection pressures on human minds have been proposed to explain behaviours of present day humans across domains of social life. These sorts of explanations are premised on the idea that humans differ from other animals in the natural world, presumably driven by features of the environment such as ecology and social structure that exerted selection pressures for adaptations that would have become species-­‐typical through their success at enabling its possessor to meet adaptive challenges. Social scientists have observed that one of the most remarkable ways in which humans differ from other animals is the intensity with which we engage socially with other members of our social group; humans are intensely social even compared to our closest genetics relatives. A great deal of debate in the literature concerns interpreting behavioural evidence in terms of what cognitive mechanisms they provide support for, and what adaptive problems the specialized functions might have evolved specifically to address. Some theorists have posited that the competencies underlying such intense sociality is driven by the need to cooperate in large groups with non-­‐kin (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989), while others argue that it is to learn cultural knowledge (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009; Herrmann et al, 2007). Boyd and Richerson (2006) have proposed that as an offshoot of cultural learning abilities, social norms, especially prosocial norms and various mechanisms of deterring defection are cultural technologies that facilitated the intensification of human sociality. Given the centrality of these behavioural regularities to group functioning, this thesis set out to predict a number of features of a psychology specialized to help individuals acquire the content of local norms. The empirical studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 tested direct predictions from the proposed features of norm-­‐psychology and found some support for the predictions. They further speak to specialized cognitive functions in aid of learning and implementing 55 local norms. However, further work is needed to test predictions from competing theories that purport to explain the same range of human behaviours. 56 BIBLIOGRAPHY Barrett, H. C. (2007). 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Science, 313(5792), 1451. 63 APPENDICES APPENDIX A: REB CERTIFICATES OF APPROVAL 10-08-05 11:31 AMhttps://rise.ubc.ca/rise/Doc/0/US7QCM90ONAKD6CV00PNG9JA97/fromString.html Page 1 of 1 The University of British Columbia Office of Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - MINIMAL RISK PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER: Joseph Henrich UBC/Arts/Psychology, Department of H09-02686 INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: Institution Site UBC Vancouver (excludes UBC Hospital) Other locations where the research will be conducted: N/A CO-INVESTIGATOR(S): N/A SPONSORING AGENCIES: UBC Hampton Research Endowment Fund PROJECT TITLE: Memories of Ove CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE: October 22, 2010 DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL: DATE APPROVED: October 22, 2009 Document Name Version Date Protocol: Protocol 1 October 6, 2009 Consent Forms: Consent Form 3 October 22, 2009 Advertisements: Sample recruitment poster 1 October 6, 2009 Questionnaire, Questionnaire Cover Letter, Tests: Sample stimulus 1 October 6, 2009 Sample questions 1 October 6, 2009 Other Documents: Debriefing form 1 October 6, 2009 The application for ethical review and the document(s) listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects. Approval is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board and signed electronically by one of the following: Dr. M. Judith Lynam, Chair Dr. Ken Craig, Chair Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair Dr. Laurie Ford, Associate Chair Dr. Anita Ho, Associate Chair 64 10-08-05 11:25 AMhttps://rise.ubc.ca/rise/Doc/0/65QHDMVSIKGKF2VDIJMJGR9DA4/fromString.html Page 1 of 1 The University of British Columbia Office of Research Services Behavioural Research Ethics Board Suite 102, 6190 Agronomy Road, Vancouver, B.C. V6T 1Z3 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL - FULL BOARD PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: INSTITUTION / DEPARTMENT: UBC BREB NUMBER: Joseph Henrich UBC/Arts/Psychology, Department of H10-00824 INSTITUTION(S) WHERE RESEARCH WILL BE CARRIED OUT: Institution Site UBC Vancouver (excludes UBC Hospital) Other locations where the research will be conducted: This research will also be done in public spaces in the Greater Vancouver Area. CO-INVESTIGATOR(S): N/A SPONSORING AGENCIES: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) PROJECT TITLE: Personality, Motivation and Decision-making REB MEETING DATE: CERTIFICATE EXPIRY DATE: April 22, 2010 April 22, 2011 DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS APPROVAL: DATE APPROVED: May 25, 2010 Document Name Version Date Protocol: Protocol 1 April 6, 2010 Consent Forms: Consent 1 April 5, 2010 Advertisements: Sample Poster 1 April 5, 2010 Questionnaire, Questionnaire Cover Letter, Tests: State affect 1 April 5, 2010 Demographics and Manipulation Check 1 April 5, 2010 Individual vs Group Decision Task 1 April 5, 2010 Induction Stimulus 1 April 5, 2010 Rosenberg Scale 1 April 5, 2010 Other Documents: Debriefing form 1 April 6, 2010 The application for ethical review and the document(s) listed above have been reviewed and the procedures were found to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human subjects. Approval is issued on behalf of the Behavioural Research Ethics Board and signed electronically by one of the following: Dr. M. Judith Lynam, Chair Dr. Ken Craig, Chair Dr. Jim Rupert, Associate Chair Dr. Laurie Ford, Associate Chair Dr. Anita Ho, Associate Chair 65 APPENDIX B: VIGNETTE STIMULI Instructions: Imagine that you are an explorer, and that you will soon be visiting Ove to study the Ovean way of life, and everything about the people and how they live. The following account is the only source of information for you about Ove. This is your one and only opportunity to correctly observe the place and the people, so it is important to learn as much about Ove as possible from the account. Control condition: During my explorations, I met many other adventurers and travelers. By the comfort of roaring fires, we exchanged tales of sights we had seen and people we had met in those foreign lands. In particular, I was intrigued by stories told by an Australian traveler about the remote village of Ove, and so, 3 weeks after I first arrived on the mainland, I set off to visit Ove for myself. The road to Ove was long and winding, but it was well kept by the locals, who traveled the road frequently. Eight hours after I set out and as afternoon was waning, I approached a large settlement of about 400 houses nestled at the base of a mountain. Some villagers must have seen me arriving, for a tall man approached me purposefully at the outskirts of the village. He wore a deep green cloak draped around his shoulders, and carried a long carved wooden stick in his left hand. This man introduced himself as Anin in broken English. After explaining that I was a traveler from afar and would like to visit their community, Anin led me uphill, through the village, to the house where I would lodge. On the way, we passed by houses built from terracotta, with high pointy roofs that cast long shadows onto the streets. Through their windows, I could see villagers busily preparing food. Mothers called out words of encouragement to their children playing on the streets. 66 A boy clutching a plant cutting ran towards me. In his haste, he failed to see a muddy patch of ground in time. He slipped, and nearly knocked me over with his flailing arms as he tried to regain his balance. Three others came racing after him, laughing at his near mishap. When they saw Anin, they slowed down, tapped their left shoulder and circled their right arm, then carefully skirted the muddy patch before picking up pace again. Anin helped me regain my balance and once I recovered, we continued on. Gradually, we began to climb. The dirt terrain became hard and rocky in places. Few trees grew up here. Instead, pieces of black granite dotted the landscape. The houses were spaced farther apart, and the streets were quiet. As we walked away from the bustling centre of the village, the warmth of day seemed to seep away with the setting sun. A bird with green plumage circled overhead, and let out a crisp chirp. Anin, not realizing I had stopped to look at the bird, had continued striding ahead. He looked up and glanced at the circling bird and beckoned at me to follow. I hurried to catch up to him, taking care to avoid loose rocks along the way. After a while, Anin stopped. He motioned to the house we were standing in front of and indicated that I was to stay here. He called out someone’s name. Momentarily, a teenager with a broom in hand emerged from the house. He looked curiously at me, and then questioningly at Anin. Anin explained that I was visiting and needed a place to stay. The teenager's face relaxed into a friendly smile. He set his broom down and leaned it against the door frame before approaching us, stepping around some woody shrubs with purple flowers growing in front of the house. He introduced himself as Palo and said he would help me settle in. After bidding Anin goodbye, Palo took me into the house. The house was filled with smells of cooking and sounds of people talking in the back. A fire crackled merrily in a hearth in the living room. A young woman wearing a backless, knee-­‐length dress tied with black string around her neck and waist walked past us in the hallway. I looked closer and noticed that she strongly resembled Palo. At my scrutiny, she giggled and slipped out the door. Palo led me upstairs into what appeared to be a 67 guest room. All of a sudden I felt very tired from traveling and gestured to Palo that I wished to sleep. I don’t know how long I slept, but it must not have been long as it was still dark outside when I woke to the sound of singing coming from the back of the house. I was intrigued by the sound of the voice and was curious to see its owner, but didn't want to risk interrupting the song. So I crept downstairs and out of the house. I went around to the back, hoping that the room where the singing was coming from would have a window. Sure enough, the window at the back of the house was aglow, and illuminated by candlelight, I could make out 5 figures in the room. One of them was Palo. He was sitting with 3 women around a table, all four of them absorbed by the motions of a man standing upright raising a ornamented bowl above his head. The man had his head tilted back, with eyes closed and arms reaching upward with the bowl. I gathered that this must be the singer I heard from upstairs. As he stood, the singer swayed lightly from side to side. I was so focused on the scene before me that I didn't even realize when the man dropped his arms and stopped singing. A gust of wind brought me out of my trance. I shivered, and suddenly realized that I was cold in the chilly night air. I decided to head back indoors and to my room before my hosts realized I was spying on them. I was startled when I heard meowing coming from a nearby bush, and so I quickly hurried back into the house and to bed. High frequency condition: During my explorations, I met many other adventurers and travelers. By the comfort of roaring fires, we exchanged tales of sights we had seen and people we had met in those foreign lands. In particular, I was intrigued by stories told by an Australian traveler about the remote village of Ove, and so, 3 weeks after I first arrived on the mainland, I set off to visit Ove for myself. The road to Ove was long and winding, but it was well kept by the locals, who traveled the road frequently. Eight hours after I set out and as afternoon was 68 waning, I approached a large settlement of about 400 houses nestled at the base of a mountain. Some villagers must have seen me arriving, for a tall man approached me purposefully at the outskirts of the village. He wore a deep green cloak draped around his shoulders, and carried a long carved wooden stick in his left hand. This man introduced himself as Anin in broken English. After explaining that I was a traveler from afar and would like to visit their community, Anin led me uphill, through the village, to the house where I would lodge. On the way, we passed by houses built from terracotta, with high pointy roofs that cast long shadows onto the streets. Through their windows, I could see villagers busily preparing food. Mothers in backless, knee-­‐length dresses tied with black string around the neck and waist called out words of encouragement to their children playing on the streets. A boy clutching a green clock like Anin’s ran towards me. In his haste, he failed to see a muddy patch of ground in time. He slipped, and nearly knocked me over with his flailing arms as he tried to regain his balance. Three others came racing after him, laughing at his near mishap. When they saw Anin, they slowed down, tapped their left shoulder and circled their right arm, then carefully skirted the muddy patch before picking up pace again. Anin helped me regain my balance and once I recovered, we continued on. Gradually, we began to climb. The dirt terrain became hard and rocky in places. Few trees grew up here. Instead, low woody plants with purple flowers dotted the landscape. The houses were spaced farther apart, and the streets were quiet. As we walked away from the bustling centre of the village, the warmth of day seemed to seep away with the setting sun; I wrapped my coat more tightly around me and turned up my collar to keep out the cold. A bird with green plumage circled overhead, and let out a crisp chirp. Anin, not realizing I had stopped to look at the bird, had continued striding ahead. He looked up and glanced at the circling bird and beckoned at me to follow. I hurried to catch up to him, taking care to avoid muddy puddles along the way. 69 After a while, Anin stopped. He motioned to the terracotta house with a pointy roof we were standing in front of and indicated that I was to stay here. He called out someone’s name. Momentarily, a teenager with a broom in hand emerged from the house. He looked curiously at me, then tapped his left shoulder and circled his arm when he recognized Anin. Anin explained that I was visiting, and needed a place to stay. The teenager's face relaxed into a friendly smile. He set his broom down and leaned it against the door frame before approaching us, stepping around some woody shrubs with purple flowers growing in front of the house. He introduced himself as Palo and said he would help me settle in. After thanking and bidding Anin goodbye, Palo took me into the house. The house was filled with smells of cooking and sounds of people talking in the back. A fire crackled merrily in a hearth in the living room. A young woman wearing a backless, knee-­‐length dress tied with black string around her neck and waist walked past us in the hallway. I looked closer and noticed that she strongly resembled Palo. At my scrutiny, she giggled and slipped out the door. Palo led me upstairs into what appeared to be a guest room. All of a sudden I felt very tired from traveling and gestured to Palo that I wished to sleep. I don’t know how long I slept, but it must not have been long as it was still dark outside when I woke to the sound of singing coming from the back of the house. I was intrigued by the sound of the voice and was curious to see its owner, but didn't want to risk interrupting the song. So I crept downstairs and out of the house. I went around to the back, hoping that the room where the singing was coming from would have a window. Sure enough, the window at the back of the house was aglow, and illuminated by candlelight, I could make out 5 figures in the room. One of them was Palo. He was sitting with 3 women around a table, all four of them absorbed by the motions of a man standing upright raising a ornamented bowl above his head, the singer. The singer had his head tilted back, with eyes closed and arms reaching upward with the bowl. As he stood, he swayed lightly from side to side. I was so focused on 70 the scene before me that I didn't even realize when the man dropped his arms and stopped singing. The same shrill bird call I'd heard earlier in the day brought me out of my trance. I shivered, and suddenly realized that I was cold in the chilly night air. I decided to head back indoors and to my room before my hosts realized I was spying on them. I was startled when I heard singing coming from inside the neighbouring house, and so I quickly hurried back into the house and to bed. Negative emotional reaction condition: During my explorations, I met many other adventurers and travelers. By the comfort of roaring fires, we exchanged tales of sights we had seen and people we had met in those foreign lands. In particular, I was intrigued by stories told by an Australian traveler about the remote village of Ove, and so, 3 weeks after I first arrived on the mainland, I set off to visit Ove for myself. The road to Ove was long and winding, but it was well kept by the locals, who traveled the road frequently. Eight hours after I set out and as afternoon was waning, I approached a large settlement of about 400 houses nestled at the base of a mountain. Some villagers must have seen me arriving, for a tall man approached me purposefully at the outskirts of the village. He wore a deep green cloak draped around his shoulders, and carried a long carved wooden stick in his left hand. This man introduced himself as Anin in broken English. After explaining that I was a traveler from afar and would like to visit their community, Anin led me uphill, through the village, to the house where I would lodge. On the way, we passed by houses built from terracotta, with high pointy roofs that cast long shadows onto the streets. Through their windows, I could see villagers busily preparing food. Mothers in backless, knee-­‐length dresses tied with black string around the neck and waist called out words of encouragement to their children playing on the streets. 71 A boy clutching a plant cutting ran towards me. In his haste, he failed to see a muddy patch of ground in time. He slipped, and nearly knocked me over with his flailing arms as he tried to regain his balance. Three others came racing after him, laughing at his near mishap. When they saw Anin, they slowed down, tapped their left shoulder and circled their right arm. They carefully skirted the muddy patch, frowning with annoyance, before picking up pace again. Anin helped me regain my balance and once I recovered, we continued on. Gradually, we began to climb. The dirt terrain became hard and rocky in places. Few trees grew up here. Instead, pieces of black granite dotted the landscape. The houses were spaced farther apart, and the streets were quiet. As we walked away from the bustling centre of the village, the warmth of day seemed to seep away with the setting sun.A bird with green plumage circled overhead, and let out a crisp chirp. Anin, not realizing I had stopped to look at the bird, had continued striding ahead. He looked up and frowned at the circling bird and beckoned at me to follow. I hurried to catch up to him, taking care to avoid loose rocks along the way. After a while, Anin stopped. He motioned to the house we were standing in front of and indicated that I was to stay here. He called out someone’s name. Momentarily, a teenager with a broom in hand emerged from the house. He looked curiously at me, and then nodded his head when he recognized Anin, which drew a fleeting frown. Anin quickly recovered from his annoyance and explained that I was visiting and needed a place to stay. The teenager's face relaxed into a friendly smile. He set his broom down and leaned it against the door frame before approaching us, stepping around some woody shrubs with purple flowers growing in front of the house. He introduced himself as Palo and said he would help me settle in. After bidding Anin goodbye, Palo took me into the house. The house was filled with smells of cooking and sounds of people talking in the back. A fire crackled merrily in a hearth in the living room. A young woman wearing a long blue gown walked past us in the hallway. Palo looked at her, shook his head and sighed in resignation. I looked closer and noticed that she strongly resembled Palo. At Palo’s heavy sigh, she 72 giggled and slipped out the door. Palo led me upstairs into what appeared to be a guest room. All of a sudden I felt very tired from traveling and gestured to Palo that I wished to sleep. I don’t know how long I slept, but it must not have been long as it was still dark outside when I woke to the sound of singing coming from the back of the house. I was intrigued by the sound of the voice and was curious to see its owner, but didn't want to risk interrupting the song. So I crept downstairs and out of the house. I went around to the back, hoping that the room where the singing was coming from would have a window. Sure enough, the window at the back of the house was aglow, and illuminated by candlelight, I could make out 5 figures in the room. One of them was Palo. He was sitting with 3 women around a table, all four of them absorbed by the motions of a man standing upright raising a ornamented bowl above his head, the singer. The singer had his head tilted back, with eyes closed and arms reaching upward with the bowl. As he stood, he swayed lightly from side to side. I was so focused on the scene before me that I didn't even realize when the man dropped his arms and stopped singing. A gust of wind brought me out of my trance. I shivered, and suddenly realized that I was cold in the chilly night air. I decided to head back indoors and to my room before my hosts realized I was spying on them. I was startled when I heard meowing coming from a nearby bush, and so I quickly hurried back into the house and to bed. Explicit norm statements condition: During my explorations, I met many other adventurers and travelers. By the comfort of roaring fires, we exchanged tales of sights we had seen and people we had met in those foreign lands. In particular, I was intrigued by stories told by an Australian 73 traveler about the remote village of Ove, and so, 3 weeks after I first arrived on the mainland, I set off to visit Ove for myself. The road to Ove was long and winding, but it was well kept by the locals, who traveled the road frequently. Eight hours after I set out and as afternoon was waning, I approached a large settlement of about 400 houses nestled at the base of a mountain. Some villagers must have seen me arriving, for a tall man approached me purposefully at the outskirts of the village. He wore a deep green cloak draped around his shoulders, and carried a long carved wooden stick in his left hand. This man introduced himself as Anin in broken English. After explaining that I was a traveler from afar and would like to visit their community, Anin led me uphill, through the village, to the house where I would lodge. On the way, we passed by houses built from terracotta, with high pointy roofs that cast long shadows onto the streets. Through their windows, I could see villagers busily preparing food. Mothers called out words of encouragement to their children playing on the streets. A boy clutching a plant cutting ran towards me. In his haste, he failed to see a muddy patch of ground in time. He slipped, and nearly knocked me over with his flailing arms as he tried to regain his balance. Three others came racing after him, laughing at his near mishap. When they saw Anin, they slowed down, tapped their left shoulder and circled their right arm, then carefully skirted the muddy patch before picking up pace again. “It rains nearly every day this time of year so the ground never dries,” Anin explained as he helped me regain my balance and once I recovered, we continued on. Gradually, we began to climb. The dirt terrain became hard and rocky in places. Few trees grew up here. Instead, pieces of black granite dotted the landscape. The houses were spaced farther apart, and the streets were quiet. As we walked away from the bustling centre of the village, the warmth of day seemed to seep away with the setting sun. A bird with green plumage circled overhead, and let out a crisp chirp. Anin, not realizing I had stopped to look at the bird, had continued striding ahead. He looked up and glanced at the circling bird and explained to me that this was a 74 krakra bird that nests high up in the mountains. I hurried to catch up to him, taking care to avoid loose rocks along the way. After a while, Anin stopped. He motioned to the house we were standing in front of and indicated that I was to stay here. He called out someone’s name. Momentarily, a teenager with a broom in hand emerged from the house. He looked curiously at me, and then tapped his left shoulder and circled his arm when he recognized Anin. Anin, noting me observe this action, explained that this was their greeting among adults. He turned to the teenager and told him that I was visiting and needed a place to stay. The teenager's face relaxed into a friendly smile. He set his broom down and leaned it against the door frame before approaching us, stepping around some woody shrubs with purple flowers growing in front of the house. He introduced himself as Palo and said he would help me settle in. After bidding Anin goodbye, Palo took me into the house. The house was filled with smells of cooking and sounds of people talking in the back. A young woman wearing a backless, knee-­‐length dresses tied with black string around her neck and waist walked past us in the hallway. Palo introduced her as his sister, and explained that in Ove, all proper women wore this traditional dress. I looked closer and noticed that she strongly resembled Palo. At my scrutiny, she giggled and slipped out the door. Palo led me upstairs into what appeared to be a guest room. All of a sudden I felt very tired from traveling and gestured to Palo that I wished to sleep. I don’t know how long I slept, but it must not have been long as it was still dark outside when I woke to the sound of singing coming from the back of the house. A fire crackled merrily in a hearth in the living room. I was intrigued by the sound of the voice and was curious to see its owner, but didn't want to risk interrupting the song. So I crept downstairs and out of the house. I went around to the back, hoping that the room where the singing was coming from would have a window. Sure enough, the window at the back of the house was aglow, and illuminated by candlelight, I could make out 5 figures in the room. One of them was Palo. He was 75 sitting with 3 women around a table, all four of them absorbed by the motions of a man standing upright raising a ornamented bowl above his head, the singer. The singer had his head tilted back, with eyes closed and arms reaching upward with the bowl. As he stood, he swayed lightly from side to side. I was so focused on the scene before me that I didn't even realize when the man dropped his arms and stopped singing. A gust of wind brought me out of my trance. I shivered, and suddenly realized that I was cold in the chilly night air. I decided to head back indoors and to my room before my hosts realized I was spying on them. I was startled when I heard meowing coming from a nearby bush, and so I quickly hurried back into the house and to bed. 76 APPENDIX C: DEPENDENT MEASURES MEASURE OF RECALL Instructions: Answer the following questions by selecting the answer that you believe best fits with what was in the text. Indicate your choice by circling the corresponding letter. 1. The explorer met Anin at the edge of the village. What was Anin wearing when they first encountered each other? a) a blue robe b) a green cloak c) a silk headdress d) a purple coat 2. A boy slipped and nearly knocked over the explorer with his flailing arms. What caused him to slip? a) mud b) ice c) wet leaves d) fruit peels 3. Three boys were running after the one who slipped. What did they do when they saw Anin? a) they waved b) they nodded their heads c) they frowned at him d) they tapped their left shoulder and circled their arms 4. The explorer passed by houses whose inhabitants were preparing food. What did the houses look like? 77 a) they were grey and imposing b) they were terracotta and had tall roofs c) they were squat and dilapidated d) they were wood and had green trim 5. Women called out words of encouragement to their children playing on the streets. What were the women wearing? a) long blue gowns b) short green skirts c) backless, knee length dress d) long flowery dresses 6 The explorer spotted a bird on the way to Palo’s house. What colour was its plumage? a) orange b) black c) green d) brown 7. Anin and the explorer met a local teenager, Palo, at the house in which the explorer would stay. What did Palo do as he approached Anin and the explorer? a) he hopped across mud puddles b) he swept the path before him with a broom c) he stepped around some purple shrubs d) he bowed 8. The explorer witnessed a man leading a singing ceremony through a window at the back of the house. What was the man holding? a) an ornamented bowl 78 b) a coconut cup c) a wooden staff d) a wine glass 9. The explorer heard about Ove from another traveler. What nationality was the traveler? a) American b) British c) French d) Australian 10. What was Palo holding when he came out of the house to greet Anin and the explorer? a) a carved wooden stick b) a broom c) a plant d) a kettle 11. How many households are there in the village of Ove? a) 200 b) 400 c) 600 d) 800 12. What did the explorer see Oveans doing inside their houses? a) they were knitting by the hearth b) they were playing board games c) they were busy preparing food 79 d) they were sitting and talking MEASURE OF INFERENCE In the questions below, you are asked to make some guesses based on impressions you might have formed while reading the text. There is no right or wrong answer for each question. We merely want to get your opinion on what you think might be the case. 1. Suppose an Ovean woman meets an Ovean man on a street in the village. What do they do when they first meet? a) only the man taps his left shoulder and circles his right arm at the woman b) they both tap their left shoulders and circle their right arms at each other c) only the woman taps her left shoulder and circles her right arm at the man d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 2. A young Ovean girl meets an older Ovean woman on a street in the village. What do they do when they first meet? a) only the young girl taps her left shoulder and circles her right arm at the older woman b) they both tap their left shoulders and circle their right arms at each other c) only the older woman taps her left shoulder and circles her right arm at the young girl d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 3. An Ovean man meets another Ovean man on a street in the village. What do they do when they first meet? a) the younger man taps his left shoulder and circles his right arm b) they both tap their left shoulders and circle their right arms to each other c) the older man taps his left shoulder and circles his right arm 80 d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 4. A young Ovean boy meets an older Ovean man on a street in the village. What do they do when they first meet? a) only the boy taps his left shoulder and circles his right arm at the man b) they both tap their left shoulders and circle their right arms at each other c) only the man taps his left shoulder and circles his right arm at the boy d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 5. A young Ovean boy is walking on a path in the centre of the village. What is he likely to be wearing? a) a long robe b) shirt and trousers c) a long cloak d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 6. An Ovean man is walking on a path in the centre of the village. What is he likely to be wearing? a) a long robe b) shirt and trousers c) a long cloak d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 7. A young Ovean girl is walking on a path in the centre of the village. What is she likely to be wearing? a) a long flowing dress b) a blue robe c) a backless, knee-­‐length dress d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 81 8. An Ovean woman is walking on a path in the centre of the village. What is she likely to be wearing? a) a long flowing dress b) a blue robe c) a backless, knee-­‐length dress d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 9. Two young Oveans just got married and are building a new home to live in together. How are they likely to build their new house? a) using terracotta materials and with pointed roofs b) using baked mud and with large windows c) using black granite and with green trim on the windows d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 10. An Ovean family is gathered at home in the evening. What is an activity that they are likely do together? a) knit by the fireplace b) have a singing ceremony c) play a game of chess d) no conclusion can be drawn from the text 82 APPENDIX D: NORM VIOLATION INDUCTION Instructions This is a study on handwriting and personality. Please copy the paragraph below using your usual handwriting on the blank space provided below. Inform the experimenter when you are done. Control Condition: Two years ago, when I was a junior partner at a prestigious law firm, I was coming up for promotion against another junior partner, Chris. For several months, Chris had been working on a major case for the city that would make or break his career at the firm. However, he could not locate an important zoning document, without which, it was unlikely that he would have sufficient evidence to successfully argue his case. Late one evening, as I was rummaging through a corner filing cabinet, I happened to come across the zoning document that Chris was in desperate need of. I pulled it from the cabinet and placed it without a note on Chris' desk, knowing that he would be so relieved when he arrived to work the next morning. Experimental Condition: Two years ago, when I was a junior partner at a prestigious law firm, I was coming up for promotion against another junior partner, Chris. For several months, Chris had been working on a major case for the city that would make or break his career at the firm. However, he could not locate an important zoning document, without which, it was unlikely that he would have sufficient evidence to successfully argue his case. Late one evening, as I was rummaging through a corner filing cabinet, I happened to come across the zoning document that Chris was in desperate need of. I pulled it from the cabinet and walked over to the office shredder, knowing that my promotion would now be secured. 83 APPENDIX E: BRAINSTORMING TASK Introduction: You have just completed the first half of this session. There is another study that makes up the second half. You get a choice between two versions: completing it on your own, and completing it in a group. Please read the description of the two tasks below and indicate which one you would like to partake in. Individual Task Instructions In the next five minutes, you will take part in what is known as a brainstorming task. You will be given the name of an object, and your task will be to think of as many uses for this object as you can. Don’t be concerned with the quality of your reactions. The uses can be ordinary or unusual. Simply list as many as you can. Turn the page when you are told to do so, and list as many uses as you can for the object named at the top of the page. Do not go on until you are told to do so. Individual Scoring Every item is given a score of 1. You will be scored based on the number of items you generate. Group Task Instructions In the next five minutes, you and your group will take part in what is known as a brainstorming task. You will be given the name of an object, and your task as a group will be to think of as many uses for this object as you can. You may have discussion within your group, however you will record items you come up with on your own papers. Don’t be concerned with the quality of your reactions. The uses can be ordinary or unusual. Simply list as many as you can. Turn the page when you 84 are told to do so, and list as many uses as you can for the object named at the top of the page. Do not go on until you are told to do so. Group Scoring Every item is given a score of 1. Your group will be scored based on the sum of items generated across individual members, so that everyone will receive the same score. I would like to complete: the individual task the group task (Circle one)
Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Psychology
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported
Graduate
Hypotheses and tests of an evolved psychological architecture for social norms
Text