MAKING NOISE: THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF ACEH AND EAST TIMOR IN THE DIASPORA by KARLA S. FALLON A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) May 2009 © Karla S. Fallon, 2009 Abstract This dissertation analyzes the transnational politics of two new or incipient diasporas, the Acehnese and East Tirnorese. It examines their political roles and activities in and across several countries in the West (Europe, North America, and Australia) as well as their impact on the “homeland” or country of origin, during and after armed conflict. It suggests that the importance of diaspora participation in conflict and conflict settlement is not solely or even primarily dependent on the material resources of the diaspora. Instead it is the ideational and political resources that may determine a diaspora’s ability to ensure its impact on the homeland, on the conflict, and its participation in the conflict settlement process. This study adopts a constructivist approach, process-tracing methods, and an analytical framework that combines insights from diaspora politics and theories on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). It concludes that the Aceh and East Timor cases support the proposition that diasporas are important and dynamic political actors, even when they are small, new, and weak. These cases also support the proposition that the political identities and goals of diasporas can be transformed over time as a diaspora is replenished with new members who have new or different ideas, as factions within diasporas gain power vis-à-vis others, and/or as the political partners available to the diaspora in the hostland and internationally change or broaden. The analysis of a diaspora’s relationship with a transnational advocacy network or networks (TAN) yields new insights into conflict settlement processes. Diasporans potentially learn from, contribute to, and benefit from TAN strategies and tactics. The TAN itself can help project the political influence of the diaspora. More significantly, the diaspora TAN relationship, in certain cases, can have a transformative effect on the diaspora, potentially moderating its views and positions, and thereby facilitating conflict settlement. Moreover, the moderating influence of the diaspora-TAN relationship may have implications for the post-conflict consolidation of democracy, human rights norms, and civil society. 11 Table of Contents Abstract.ii Table of Contents iii List of Tables vi Glossary and Abbreviations vii Acknowledgements xii Chapter 1 1 Introduction 1 Major Questions and Propositions 5 Projecting Diaspora Politics: The Aceh and East Timor Cases 6 Analytical Framework—Diasporas and Transnational Advocacy Networks 6 The Cases 10 Methodology 13 Contributions of the Thesis 19 Chapter 2 21 Diaspora Politics 21 Review of Literature, Definitions, and Theoretical Approaches 21 Definitions, Features, and Typologies of Diasporas 22 Definitions and Features 24 Typologies 29 Definitions and Typologies Problematized 32 The Homeland as Territory, Symbol, and Ideal 32 Forced versus Voluntary Migration 34 Longevity or Age9 35 Agency and Dynamism in Definitions 37 Links to Other Theoretical Concepts 39 Ethnicity 39 The Nation-state and Nationalism 41 Globalization and Connectivity 45 Transnational Community or Diaspora9 47 The Politics of Diaspora 49 Situating Diaspora Politics 49 111 The Political Roles of Diasporas 53 Diaspora Identity, Agency, and Solidarity 56 Towards a Political Definition of Diaspora 59 Chapter 3 62 The Making of the Acehnese and East Timorese Diasporas 62 Historical Context and Classification 62 History of Migration 63 The East Timorese Migration 65 East Timorese in Diaspora by Country 75 The Acehnese Migration 77 Chapter 4 90 Diaspora Politics 90 Diaspora Actors, Practices, and Representation 90 The East Timorese Diaspora 91 Political Divisions and Early Political Activity (1970s to mid-1980s) 91 The Diplomatic Front: José Ramos-Horta (1970s to mid-1980s) 97 Diaspora Politics Widen (mid-1980s to 1999) 105 Bridging Divisions within the Diaspora (mid-1980s to 1999) 116 The East Timorese Diaspora: From Peace-wreckers to Peace-makers 121 The Acehnese Diaspora 126 Hasan di Tiro: Exile and Early Political Activity (1979 to mid-1990s) 126 GAM’s Diaspora Diplomacy (1979 to mid-1990s) 133 The New Wave of Diasporans and Political Organization (mid-1990s to early 2000s)136 The New Wave: Political Activity (mid-1990s to mid-2000s) 144 Diaspora Politics: Top-down to Bottom-up? (2000 and beyond) 158 The Acehnese Diaspora: From Peace-wreckers to Peace-makers9 162 Chapter 5 168 Making Noise: Transforming and Projecting the Diaspora Voice through Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and Partnerships 168 Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and Diaspora Transformation 168 Conflict Settlement in East Timor 171 Conflict Settlement in Aceh 175 From Event to Catalyst: “Framing” and the Diaspora-Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) Partnership Process 180 The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process 183 iv Laying the Foundation for a Future East Timor Solidarity Movement 183 The Evolution of the East Timor Solidarity Movement 186 The Santa Cruz Massacre as Catalyst 189 The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process and East Timor Conflict Settlement 194 Framing Complicity and Obligation 195 Effecting Change 200 The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process 205 Lacking a Foundation for a Future Aceh Solidarity Movement 205 A Late-Evolving Aceh Solidarity Movement 209 The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process and Aceh Conflict Settlement 214 Challenges in “Framing” the Aceh Conflict 216 Effecting Change 224 Chapter 6 232 Home: Un-making the Acehnese and East Timorese 232 Diasporas and the Impact of Return 232 East Timor: Diaspora Return and Political Power 234 Aceh: Diaspora Return and Political Power 251 Conclusion: A Look to the Future 269 Chapter 7 275 Conclusions 275 Challenges to Assumptions in Diaspora Literature 275 Materialist Explanations Assessed 276 Alternative Explanation: Ideational and Political Resources and Processes Matter 277 The Diaspora-TAN Relationship Evaluated 279 Questions and Suggestions for Future Study 282 Bibliography 288 v List of Tables Table 1. Estimates of East Timorese in Diaspora by Country 75 Table 2. East Timorese Political Leadership in Diaspora by Country 76 Table 3. Estimates of Acehnese in Diaspora by Country 87 vi Glossary and Abbreviations Aceh Center Diaspora organization in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Aceh Community Australia Diaspora political organization in Australia AETA Australia East Timor Association AHRO Aceh Human Rights Online (Australia-based joint diaspora and solidarity organization) Al Amnesty International APODETI Associacão Popular Democratica Popular Democratic Association ASAP Action in Solidarity with Asia Pacific (formerly ASIET) ASDT Associaçáo Social Democrática Timorense, Timorese Social Democratic Association (Precursor to Fretilin) ASIET Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor ASNLF (see GAM) Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front BRA Badan Reintegrasi Aceh Aceh Reintegration Board BRR Badan Rehabilitasi & Rekonstruksi, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias Bupati Head of district (Indonesian) CAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas Development CAVR (Chega!) Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliaçäo de Timor Leste, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor CIET Campaign for an Independent East Timor (Australia based org.) vii Glossary and Abbreviations CuR Catholic Institute for International Relations (renamed Progressio) CMI Crisis Management Initiative Helsinki-based NGO CNRM Conseiho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere National Council of Maubere Resistance CNRT Conseiho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense National Council of Timorese Resistance COHA Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement signed by the Government and Indonesia and GAM in December 2002 Co SPA Komisi Keberlanjutan Perdamaian, Aceh Commission on Sustaining Peace in AcehICoSPA DOM Daerah Operasi Militer Military Operation Zone/Area ETAN East Timor Action Network (U.S. solidarity organization), after East Timor independence changed name to East Timor and Indonesia Action Network and broadened scope of work to include Aceh and West Papua ETAN East Timor Alert Network (Canadian solidarity organization) ETRA East Timor Relief Association (Australia-based diaspora organization) Falintil Forcas Armadas da Libertaçäo Nacional de Timor Leste Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor Fenetil Frente Clandestina dos Estudiantes de Timor-Leste Clandestine Front of East Timorese Students Student group based in Indonesia Fretilin Revolutionary Front for and Independent East Timor Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente viii Glossary and Abbreviations GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Free Aceh Movement HDC Henri Dunant Centre HRW Human Rights Watch ICG International Crisis Group Helsinki MoU Watch Tim Pemantau MoU Helsinki Aceh-based organization that advocates conformity of the LoGA with the text of the MoU IFA International Forum for Aceh (U.S.-based diaspora- established non-governmental organization) IMET International Military Education and Training Program (U.S. Gov.) Indonesian Solidarity Australia-based NGO INTERFET International Force for East Timor (1NTERFET) KPA Komite Peralihan Aceh Aceh Transition Committee Body created to accommodate former GAM fighters post-conflict (from 2005) Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia National Commission for Human Rights (Indonesia) LoGA Law on Governing Aceh Magna Carta Magna Carta Concerning Freedoms, Rights, Duties and Guarantees for the People of East Timor Adopted at the First East Timorese National Convention in the Diaspora, Magna Carta, Peniche, Portugal 1998 Mary MacKillop Institute Australia religious organization providing support and aid to East Timor ix Glossary and Abbreviations Maubere Common name among East Timorese people, son of Timor; used as a derogatory term for the poor and indigenous during Portuguese colonization; Fretilin adopted the term as a political symbol of East Timorese pride and cultural identity in 1 970s MoU Memorandum of Understanding between The Government of Indonesia and The Free Aceh Movement, Crisis Management Initiative. Signed in Helsinki, August 2005 MP-GAM Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM splinter group NIT Negara Islam Indonesia Islamic State of Indonesia, declared by Teungku M. Daud Beureuch NGO Non-governmental Organization Non-partisans Also referred to as independents or nationalists; East Timorese not directly affiliated with a political party but supportive of independence for East Timor; self- labeled as non-partisans PERMAS The Association of Achehnese Community in Scandinavia Group opposing MoU Preparatory Committee for the Group opposing MoU (U.S. based) Free Acheh Democratic Progressio See CuR PUSA Persatuan Ulamam Seluruh Aceh All-Aceh Union of Islamic teachers Reformasi Period of political reform in Indonesia, leading up to 1998 and fall of President Suharto Renetil Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste National Resistance of East Timorese Students Formed in 1988, based in Indonesia x Glossary and Abbreviations SCHRA Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (Grouping of NGOs from around the world sharing IFA’s mission) SIRA Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh Information Center for Aceh Referendum SMUR Solidaritas Mahasiwa Untuk Rakyat Student Solidarity for the People Solidamor Solidarity for East Timor (Indonesian activist group) Stavanger Declaration Document issued by the “Executive Committee of the Worldwide Achehnese Representatives Meeting,” Stavanger Norway (understood to be a GAM document) Tapol UK-based NGO dedicated to human rights in Indonesia Tetum East Timorese language (most commonly used, also spelled Tetun) Timor-Leste Portuguese spelling and official name of independent East Timor (independent from May 25, 2002) TNT Tentara Nasional Indonesia Indonesian Armed Forces UDT União Democrática Timorense Timorese Democratic Union UNAMET United Nations Mission to East Timor Supervisory body for referendum UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), non-governmental org. based in the Hague UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor xi Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance, encouragement, imparted knowledge, and patience of my doctoral advisor, Diane Mauzy. Dr. Mauzy steered and encouraged me through field research in four continents and a long and arduous writing process. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my doctoral committee members, Brian Job and Merje Kuus, who offered insightful comments and suggestions through the various drafts of this dissertation, and to my university examiners, Peter Dauvergne and Jim Glassman. At the University of British Columbia, Max Cameron and Richard Price helped me lay the foundations for this work through their instruction. I am grateful to the people who generously gave of their time and agreed to meet and share their life and work experiences with me. Not only did they give of their time, but also frequently shared documentation, audio and visual material that was critical to the analyses in this work. Edward Aspinall, Shadia Marhaban, and the East-West Center assisted me in setting up important interviews. Family, friends, and colleagues lent their unfailing support. During the early process of research and writing, the support of Lee-Jay Cho, Kennon Breazeale, and Cynthia Yamane proved invaluable. Antje Missbach read several chapter drafts, offered important critiques, and generously shared with me her knowledge of the Southeast Asia region. Katya Bums helped me think through some theoretical arguments and, through her own example, urged me to persevere. In Vancouver, Shannon Lange provided me with hearth, sustenance and, above all, friendship. I am deeply grateful to my family, especially my sister Ale and brother in-law Wilson Miashiro. My friend and partner, Declan Fallon, never failed to lend encouragement, understanding, and support, or to remind me that he had earned his PhD in the past millennium. Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to Nicholas and Isabel, who frequently distracted me from this work, but ultimately inspired its completion. Thank you. xii Chapter 1 Introduction In this dissertation I analyze two new or incipient diasporas,’the Acehnese and East Timorese. I examine their political roles and activities in several countries (of Europe and North America, and in Australia) as well as their impact on the “homeland” or country of origin during and after armed conflict. I suggest that the Aceh and East Timor diaspora cases support the proposition that diasporas are important and dynamic international actors and that, despite their small size and relative economic and political weaknesses, they are critical to understanding not only the nature of the homeland conflict and its perpetuation, but also its transfonnation andlor resolution. I arrived at the study of diasporas through an earlier analysis of representations of ethnicity and ethnic conflict on the internet. In surveying websites on Xinjiang (China), Sri Lanka and West Papua, it became clear that web-based political activism was primarily the work of co ethnics residing outside confLict areas—that is, the work of nonstate actors frequently referred to as “diasporas.” Both ethnic conflict and the influence on this of nonstate actors such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations are well documented in political science.2However, while interest in the subject of diasporas has exploded in the 1 New diasporas—also called incipient diasporas—are diasporas in the making; they have a relatively recent history of migration. They are frequently smaller in terms of population numbers, and are also politically and economically, relatively weak. However, they do exhibit initial efforts to organize as diasporas. The use of the terms “new” and “incipient” are discussed further in Chapter 2. 2 See Milton J. Esman, and Tethami, Shibley, International Ornanizations and Ethnic Conflict. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wiir, (Dartmouth, NH: Dartmouth Publishing Group, 1995); Sarah Elizabeth Mendelson, and John K. Glenn, The Power and Limits ofNGOs (NY: Columbia University Press, 2002); Man Fitzduff and Cheyanne Church eds., NGOs at the Table: Strategies for Influencing Policies in Areas of Conflict (Landham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Carey, Henry F. and Oliver P. Richmond, Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs, The Cass Series on Peacekeeping (Frank Cans Publishers, 2003); For the role of multinational corporations see Ronald M. Grant and E. Spenser Welthofer (eds.) Ethno-Nationalism, Multinational Corporation, and the Modem State (Denver, Co.: University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, 1979); and Jacob Hook and Rajat Ganguly, “Multinational Corporations and Ethnic Conflict: Theory and Experience,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6 no. 1 (Spring 2000): 48-7 1. 1 social sciences,3 literature on the political role of diasporas remains comparatively thin. This is partly the result of a tendency in political science to subsume the analysis of diasporas under the study of ethnic groups and ethnic politics. The study of ethnicity focuses on the binary relationship of ethnic group and state or ethnic minority and ethnic majority within a state or society—what Osten Wahibeck calls, “a strictly localized approach.” The diaspora experience, however, has no such fixed setting.4It is the multiple and changing “settings” that help to distinguish the concept of diaspora from ethnic groups and minorities. Diasporas are transnational actors and operate in multiple settings. Their members are linked by relationships, interactions, and activities across the borders of states. The political activities of diasporas span the hostland (the country of residence), homeland (country of origin) as well as the sites of co-diasporans.5As Yossi Sham explains, diasporas have “a capacity for independent and assertive political action” that extends beyond the host state.6 In a similar vein, Hazel Smith describes diasporas as “new and potentially powerful international actors.”7The transnational character of their political activity and the potential span of their influence make diasporas valuable units of analysis8for political science. A particular fruitful area for such analysis is the role of diasporas in conflict and post-conflict settings. Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (January 2005): 1. ‘ Osten Wahibeck, “Transnationalism and Diasporas: The Kurdish Example.” Paper presented at the International Sociological Association, XIV World Congress of Sociology, Montreal, Canada, July 26-August 1, 1998. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., Migration. Diasporas. and Transnationalism (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, (1999): 447. 6 Yossi Sham, “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution,” SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 116. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (eds.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2007): 3. 8 Michele Reis, “Theorizing Diaspora: Perspectives on “Classical” and “Contemporary” Diaspora,” International Migration 42, no. 2 (2004): 42. 2 There is a limited but growing scholarship on this subject, most notably the 2007 addition of an edited volume by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, Diasporas in Conflict. Smith and Stares conclude that diasporas are both peace-makers and peace-wreckers,9and that they can have a profound impact on a conflict. Diaspora impact, they write, is determined by diaspora capacity and structural opportunity. The contributors to Diasporas in Conflict define this capacity as the diaspora’s economic resources and political strength)° As with many studies of diasporas, the findings in this volume are based on case studies of several large, well- established diasporas with considerable economic and political resources—Jewish, Armenian, Cuban, Croatian, Tamil. Diasporas with significant, economic resources and political access to the host country government, potentially, can lobby government offices and officials directly, hire influential lobbyists and public relations firms, and contribute “generously” to election campaigns. Their economic and political resources, potentially, allow them to deploy influence strategies aimed at host country media as well as foreign policies (sanctions, trade restrictions, humanitarian aid, military aid). Their numbers, particularly if concentrated in specific locations, may allow them to leverage their political support during elections. They may also be able to directly influence the “homeland” through many (if not all) of the same means. Conversely, as in other analyses of diasporas, the editors of Diasporas in Conflict assume that “weak” diasporas—those with limited economic resources and without independent access to power—”do not intervene in conflicts” because they cannot.11 9”Peace-wrecking” here is used more broadly than the more narrow defmition of “spoiling” as the “violent obstruction of a peaceful settlement by actors directly involved in a conflict” (see Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peace Building, United Nations UniversityPolicy BriefNo. 2, 2006 and Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2, 1997). Following Newman and Oliver, peace-wrecking behavior is taken to mean the activities of actors “opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason.” These actors may act within or outside the peace process “and use violence and other means to disrupt the process.. .“ They include actors that join but later withdraw and obstruct or threaten to obstruct the process; actors that join peace process but “are not seriously interested in making compromises” or committing long-tenn; and actors that “are geographically external to the conflict but which support internal spoilers and spoiling tactics.” See Newman and Richmond (2006): 1-2. 10 See, for example, Jacob Bercovitch, “A Neglected Relationship: Diasporas and Conflict Resolution” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, ed. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2007): 27. ‘ Smith and Stares (2007): 5. 3 In this dissertation I will test this assumption. I will do so by examining the political role in armed conflict of two small, new, and weak diasporas, the East Timorese and Acehnese. Due to their size and apparent political weakness, these two diasporas represent interesting cases with which to challenge established assumptions. Because the conflict in the homeland was apparently resolved as of 2007, it will be possible to analyze diaspora activity and capacity from conflict emergence, through settlement and the post-conflict setting. It will also be possible to trace diaspora activity during periods of significant advances in processes of communication and exchange, and to determine to what extent the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas made use of such advances and to what effect. Finally, I will broaden the focus of my investigation from the triadic relationship of diaspora with homeland, hostland and among co-diasporans to the diasporas’ relationship with other nonstate actors, specifically transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Although existing scholarship frequently mentions and alludes to the diaspora-TAN relationship, its analysis has been neglected.’2This dissertation will thus highlight a subject that has not been well tested in political science or in the broader diaspora literature—the relationship between diasporas and TANs and the potential moderating, neutral, or inhibiting effect of this relationship on conflict settlement. My dissertation proposes that new (or incipient) and small diasporas, despite their apparent weaknesses, can play an important political role internationally. They can influence the conflict and conflict-settlement processes of the homeland. I further argue that the internal power relations of diasporas matter, and that these help determine whether a diaspora will act as peace-maker, peace-wrecker, or neither. Diaspora partners are not limited to states (homeland, host or third party); diasporas may also engage in relationships and partnerships with transnational advocacy networks. I propose that these diaspora-TAN relationships can be mutually constitutive, and, in some cases, can have a transformative and moderating effect on the positions of the diaspora, thereby facilitating conflict settlement. 12A notable exception is James Goodman, “Marginalisation and Empowerment: East Timorese Diaspora Politics in Australia,” Communal/Plural: Journal of Transnational and Cross-cultural Studies 8, no. 1 (2000): 25-46. 4 Major Questions and Propositions Over a period of thirty years, the Acehnese and East Timorese in diaspora could have extricated themselves from the homeland conflict; they could have integrated into or assimilated to the host country and lost interest or energy due to the demands and challenges of resettlement, but they did not. Why and in what ways did these Acehnese and East Timorese in diaspora remain active participants in the “homeland” conflict? Why and how did they manage to maintain their position as vital actors in efforts towards conflict settlement? And why and in what ways were the political identities, goals, and strategies of these diasporas transformed over time and to what effect? I argue, first, that the political identity of diasporas is neither given nor fixed, rather it is constructed. If the diaspora is to remain an active participant in the homeland conflict, then the construction of diaspora identity must involve processes and activities that consistently reinforce this participation, even when there are no tangible and immediate material benefits to be gained from engagement. Second, I argue that the importance of diaspora participation in conflict settlement is not solely or even primarily dependent on the diaspora having considerable material resources (namely funding and/or weapons) to have an effect on the military conflict in the homeland. If the political space for opposition and negotiation in the homeland has closed, even a diaspora’s limited material resources may be sufficient to ensure its participation in the conflict settlement process. Furthermore, I argue that, in fact, it may be the diaspora’s ideational and political resources rather than material resources that determine its ability to insert itself into the conflict settlement process. Finally, I argue that the political identities, goals and strategies of diasporas can be transformed over time. This may occur as the diaspora is replenished with new members who have new or different ideas, as factions within diasporas gain power vis-à-vis other 5 factions, 13 or as the political partners available to the diaspora in the hostland and internationally change or broaden. Furthermore, I propose that if the political partner is a transnational advocacy network, then the relationship can potentially have a transformative influence on the political identity of the diaspora. In some cases, this can lead it to adopt more moderate positions and demands and can facilitate negotiated settlement of conflicts. Projecting Diaspora Politics: The Aceh and East Timor Cases Analytical Framework—Diasporas and Transnational Advocacy Networks Much of the diaspora literature examines the interaction or interplay between the “here” and “there” of the diaspora experience and political activity, that is, between the diaspora and host state and the diaspora and homeland. Many diaspora analyses extend this binary relationship to a triangular relationship among the host, home and intra-diaspora itself, wherever it may be physically located. 14 These spaces and places of analysis may be sufficient to explain the political activity and political mobilization of the larger and relatively richer diasporas, but they may not accurately reflect the experience of active smaller and incipient diasporas. This requires an additional level of analysis. Gabriel Sheffer takes the triangular relationship of host, home, and diaspora as the core of diaspora systems, but he acknowledges that “the number of actors and interests involved is even greater and that these deserve special attention.”15These other actors may include other states (neither homeland nor host), international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as individuals. For the purpose of this analysis, I turn to the literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs).’6This addition allows analysis of diaspora political activity (and political identity) 13 By faction I mean a group of persons or network of persons within the diaspora, not necessarily a cohesive political faction or unit within a party or political organization of the diaspora. 14 William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myth of Homeland and Return” Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991) and Steven Vertovec, “Three Meanings of ‘Diaspora,’ Exemplified among South Asian Religions,” Diaspora 6, no.3 (1997): 277-299. Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): x. E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 6 as an interaction among the “here” and “there” of the host and home, the “within” of the dispersed diaspora, and the “anywhere” of the transnational advocacy network. This interaction reflects both the reach of a diaspora based on its own dispersion and the potential to amplify the diaspora political influence through participation in an advocacy network. As defmed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, TANs are networks of national and international NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals whose formation was motivated largely by “principled ideas or values.”7Activists within a TAN seek to influence policy and policy outcomes, and to influence or change the behavior of states and international organizations. They attempt to participate in and shape new areas of domestic and international politics.’8They work to “gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments” 19 through persuasion, socialization, and pressure. 20 TANs generate information quickly,2’make use of information and information exchange, employ “political strategies” in their campaigns,22and build new links among various actors. By doing so, they attempt to multiply “channels of access to the international system.”23 TAN strategies and tactics include the use of information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics.24 Through relationships with TAN members and participation in these advocacy networks, small and new diasporas can potentially learn from, contribute to, and benefit from TAN strategies and tactics, and enhance the influence of the diaspora. 17 Keck and Silckink (1998): 1. 18 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 4. 19 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 2. 20 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 16. 21 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 10. 22 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 2. 23 Keck and Sikkink (1998): 1. 24 Keck and Sikkiiik (1998): 16. 7 Studies on TANs incorporate concepts from social movements and political mobilization studies, including Charles Tilly’ s and Sidney Tarrow’ s “repertoires of action,”25 that are valuable for empirical analysis of diaspora political activity. The repertoires of action include the tactics of petitions, rallies and demonstrations, public meetings, education seminars, lobbying, performances, etc. They also include the broader strategies of information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability politics discussed by Keck and Sikkink. The addition of insights from the literature of TANs to diaspora politics analysis allows us to consider the specific content of diaspora sets of action or “repertoires of action,” whether these change over time, and if they are effective. I also propose an analysis of diaspora “repertoires of representation.” As Pnina Werbner explains, “to know oneself as a member of a diaspora requires images, symbols, a shared language, representation.”26These are often reflected in the repertoires of action, but require discrete analysis. Repertoires of representation reflect the ideas, values, norms and goals that are negotiated 1) within the diaspora through private quotidian as well as more official interactions, 2) with the homeland, 3) with the host country, and, I argue, 4) with the advocacy network. Repertoires of representation are also technology sensitive. Diasporas are dependent on technology for the communication and circulation of repertoires of representation amongst themselves and with a larger audience; some representations may adapt to new communications technologies better than others. Repertoires of action and repertoires of representation and particularly changes in these reflect tensions within the diaspora and within the diaspora—advocacy network interaction. Tensions arise because diasporas are neither static nor monolithic, they are internally 25 Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1986); Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2’ Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Zoltan Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies,” World Politics 54 (April 2002): 277-307. 26 Pnina Werbner, “Introduction: The Materiality of Diaspora—Between Aesthetic and “Real” Politics,” Diaspora 9, no. 1 (2000): 8. 8 heterogeneous, divided by class, age, gender, regional provenance, education, ideology, etc.27 They can be peace-makers, peace-wreckers or neither.28 They can be ethnic-parochial, exclusionary and nationalistic and cosmopolitan.29Which way the pendulum swings may be determined by the material, organizational, and ideational resources, and the “framing”3° capacity of the ethno-nationals or cosmopolitans, and by their interactions with the advocacy network.3’ Although the theoretical approach employed for the purpose of this research integrates diaspora and transnational advocacy network (TAN) theories, diasporas require discreet analysis in this context. The literature on transnational advocacy networks (primarily the works of Keck and Sikkink and Tarrow) indeed mention exiles and diasporas as potential participants in TANs, but the diaspora role is neither specified nor analyzed. Tarrow has taken a tentative step towards situating diasporas within the study of transnational networks and activism,32but (perhaps due to an over-reliance on Benedict Anderson’s work) limited his observations to diaspora nationalism. Diasporas can be both participants in a TAN and partners with a TAN. Moreover, the role of diasporas in the TAN can differ from that of other nonstate actors such as NGOs or government or international agencies and officials. Finally, although the TAN literature is rich in analysis of agency and transformative processes, it has little to say on the potential effect of the TAN-diaspora partnership itself and 27 Khachig Tololyan, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation, Diasnora 9, no. 1 (2000); Werbner (2000): 5; and Floya Anthias, “Evaluating ‘Diaspora’: Beyond Ethnicity?” Sociology 32, No. 3 (August 1998): 557-580. 28 Virginia Bouvier notes that the Colombian diaspora has opted to be neither. See Virginia M. Bouvier, “A Reluctant Diaspora? The Case of Colombia” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, ed. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2007): 129-152. 29 Werbner (2000); The Nautilus Institute Diaspora Project at http://www.nautilus.org/virtual-diasporas/; and Sheffer (1995). McAdam, McCarty and Zald and Keck and Sildcink, to “frame” is to form understandings of an issue, make it comprehensible to an audience, attract attention, and legitimate and motivate collective action. 31 Goodman (2000): 25-46. 32 Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 9 the implications of this relationship for conflict settlement. I propose that it is in this respect that the integration of TAN and diaspora theory proves most fruitful. The Cases In this dissertation I will examine the political role and activities of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas in several countries of Europe, in North America, and Australia (all democratic Western states) and their impact on the “homeland” during and after a self- determination conflict. The Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas represent interesting cases that challenge theoretical expectations. Based on their numbers, geographical distribution, and their relatively recent history of migration they should be politically weak and have little or very limited influence in the country of origin. Their numbers are much smaller than those of traditionally-studied diasporas,33 they are distributed in small numbers across long distances, and they are by virtue of their “newness”34less likely to have access to host country resources, in particular access to host government political institutions or the financial resources to exert significant influence. They also represent comparable cases, as similar as possible in most regards to allow comparisons and propositions to be tested. Both are cases of stateless diasporas whose “homeland” has been the site of a self-determination, secessionist struggle against the Indonesian state. The “homeland” in both cases is located geographically on the Indonesian archipelago. The modern conflicts against the state, in both Aceh and East Timor, began in the mid-1970s and lasted (through degrees of intensity) approximately for three decades. Both Aceh and East Timor (or their surrounding waters) hold significant oil and gas resources and economic grievances were an important element in self-determination discourse, as were grievances associated with human rights, reflecting the violence of both conflicts. Through these two cases, I will provide an in-depth empirical analysis that is useful in testing theories of diaspora, theories of transnational activism, and in The Jewish population (outside of Israel) is 7.6 million, with 5.3 million in the United States (2007 estimate), the Armenian diaspora is estimated to be 8 million (2007). The population of frequently studied new or incipient diasporas is also much higher: Palestinian estimated 6 million, Croatian estimated 2.5 million in North America, Sri Lankan Tamil estimated at 600,000-800,000 million, mostly in Canada and the UK (2006). For a collection of analyses of these and other diasporas and information on their numbers and considerable economic and political resources see Smith and Stares (2007). described earlier in this chapter new diasporas—also called incipient diasporas—are “diasporas in the making,” new groups to a region exhibiting diaspora features and initial efforts to organize as diasporas. 10 revealing interactions that might help to shed light not only on the international role of diasporas, but also on the process of conflict settlement. In analyzing the two cases, I am adopting a constructivist approach. Materialist approaches35 explain outcomes by focusing on constraints, on “the strategic setting in which individuals make choices...” 36 They emphasize structural and institutional constraints and their regulatory effect on behavior and outcomes.37Materialist approaches generally posit utility maximizing “rational” actors motivated by self-interest. 38 Constructivist approaches focus on social structure, constitutive relationships, actors’ interpretation of reality based on shared ideas and understandings, collective meaning, and on how actors process information. Thus, outcomes may be determined not by material forces or objective circumstances but by actors’ interpretation and shared understandings of these. Materialist approaches are useful in explaining, for example, how systemic changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and globalization processes (Asian financial crisis) contributed to the eventual fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia and to the subsequent referendum in East Timor resulting in its independence. They are less useful, however, in explaining why the “idea” of a referendum was adopted over other “ideas” for solutions to the East Timor question or why a referendum took place in East Timor but not in Aceh When referring to a “materialist approach,” I include realist/neo-realist and to a lesser extent neoliberal approaches. I adopt the International Relations usage of ‘materialist’ for approaches that emphasize distribution of power and take power as determined primarily by military and economic capabilities. They also tend to assume actors are egoistic value maximizers (and defme this as ‘rational’). This is in contrast with constructivism’s emphasis on the ideational, on identities and shared knowledge and a questioning of the normative assumptions behind realist, neorealist and neoliberal views on, for example, anarchy and actor rationality and (less so neoliberalism) defmitions of power and capabilities. See, for example, Wendt (1999): 29-33. 36 David Lake and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach,” in David A. Lake and Robert Powell eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): 31. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 30. 38 Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski eds. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 52 I am grateful for Katya Burns for sharing her views with me on this topic. 11 (although the possibility of a referendum had also been suggested for Aceh). In the case of Indonesia, changes in domestic political opportunity structures may be explained by systemic factors, but these factors fail to explain why an international solidarity movement for East Timor (which included the participation of the East Timor diaspora) developed and how it was mobilized to exploit these changes in Indonesian political opportunity structures. Materialist approaches do explain how diasporas contribute to the perpetuation of low-level or guerilla conflict (through a supply of financial resources and arms), but they do not answer why diasporas do so or what their other means of influence might be (although it is acknowledged that diaspora influence is not limited to financial and arms supply).4°Finally, materialist approaches claim to explain why small, weak, and new diasporas are unable to impact conflict in the country of origin (their lack of material resources), but they do not explain cases such as the East Timorese and Acehnese in which these diasporas did have an impact despite their lack of material resources. Constructivist analyses explore the ways in which identities and interests are shaped or constituted4’by collective meanings and shared knowledge through processes of social interaction._In Alexander Wendt’s words: “Simply put, we want what we want because of how we think about it.”42 A constructivist approach, therefore, is useful in uncovering the reasons why and processes through which the political identities, goals and strategies of diasporas are transformed over time and to what effect. Taking diasporas as actors and interests constituted in interaction43 is in line with the emergent consensus in diaspora literature positing that diasporas “change over time and respond to different political and social contexts in which their members find themselves.”44The literature on transnational advocacy networks also draws from this constructivist tradition.45 40 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” Development Research Group, Washington, D.C.: World Bank (2002) and Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Sunport for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 41That is, identities and interests are not “given,” instead, they are produced and re-produced. 42 Wendt (1999): 119. Keck and Sikkink (1998). Werbner (2000): 5. 12 Methodology The two cases selected for this research—the East Timor and Aceh diasporas—are what Arend Lijphart describes as comparable cases, “similar in a large number of important characteristics.” 46 They share sufficient similarities to yield useful comparisons and contrasts.47 I employ case studies because of their “comparative advantages” in examining qualitative variables, individual actors, decision-making processes, historical and social contexts, identities and discourses, complex causality, and because they allow the incorporation of “both material and ideational variables.”48Following John Gerring, “case study” here refers to “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.”49 The research in this dissertation, thus, is an in-depth analysis of two units (or cases)—the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas, and a comparison across these two cases. In addition, in order to determine temporal variation, the period of observation in this research is approximately 30 years, although I concentrate on the latter years of this time frame, on the period between 1990 and 2007. This cross-unit and cross- time comparison mitigates to a certain extent the weakness of single case studies in uncovering and explaining causal relationships. This dissertation is driven by empirical puzzles; it seeks to identify and explain the key factors that help account for changes in the political attitudes and activities of the diasporas of East Timor and Aceh vis-à-vis the conflicts in their respective homelands. Process-tracing is an attractive research method for such a study, given its micro-level focus, its strong Keck and Sikkink (1998): 4. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 687. “ Charles Ragin, “Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-Oriented Research,” Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 28 and Alexander, L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). George and Bennett (2004): 9. ‘ John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 342. 13 affinity with case studies analysis,5°its compatibility with constructivism, and its use of qualitative research tools such as interviews, historical narratives, memoirs, archival documents, and various forms of media5’that arm the researcher with in-depth knowledge of people, places, processes, and events over time.52 The goal of process-tracing is to bring theory “closer to what really goes on in the world”3 and to increase explanatory power beyond “thick description”54to what Checkel calls “fine-grained explanations.”5It seeks explanations of “why” and “how.” It is “intermediate between laws and descriptions.”56 Bennett and George note that the end result is not deterministic but rather “contingent generalization” or partial, middle-range theory.57 Process-tracing is done by mapping the process or processes that take place between cause(s) and outcomes. It explains outcomes by going back in time and identifying key events, individuals, relationships, and decisions that link the cause(s) with the outcomes.58Done carefully, this enables the unfolding and explanation of events and actions over time. This does not imply, however, that “a process” is strictly linear or closed. George and Bennett, for Indeed George and Bennett propose that case studies “require substantial process-tracing evidence to document complex interactions.” George and Bennett (2004): 23. 51 George and Bennett (2004): 231. 52 Jeffrey Checkel describes “process-tracers” as “empirically oriented scholars who just want to get on with it—that is, conduct research on the fascinating world around us...” and leaving “paradigm wars” and meta theories for others. Jeffrey T. Checkel, “It’s the Process Stupid! Process Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics,” Arena Centre for European Studies, Working Paper No. 26 (October 2005): 20. 53Checkel (2005): 2. “ Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973): 3-30. Checkel (2005): 4. 56 Jon Elster, “A Plea for Mechanisms,” in Peter Hedstroem and Richard Swedberg (eds.) Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998): 45, cited in Checkel (2005): 10. George and Bennett (2004): 216. 58 Tulia G. Falleti, “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something New,” APSA-CP, Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 17, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 9-14 at http://www.polisci.upenn.edukfalletilFalleti-CP APSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf 14 example, describe linear, convergent, interactive, complex, feedback ioop, and path dependent processes.59Processes, particularly those that may be described as interactive or complex may also prove to be multi-layered and open-ended. 60 John Gerring describes process-tracing as getting “inside the box” and investigating multiple and complex mechanisms interacting over time.61 In political science, George and McKeown have argued that process-tracing does not just compare variations across variables but also investigates and explains the decision-making process “by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.” 62 They continue, arguing that process tracing “attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.”63 It is in the sense described by George and McKeown that process-tracing is employed in this dissertation. The process-tracing method is frequently connected to the goal of identifying “causal mechanisms.” The challenge has been in operationalizing this key concept. There is little consensus about what causal mechanisms are or how to define them. James Mahoney identifies 24 distinct definitions.64 John Gerring lists nine definitions.65 Checkel adopts Gerring’s most basic definition: a mechanism is “the pathway or process (or intermediate George and Bennett (2004): 212. 60 For analytical purposes, however, a particular period (or sequence)—with a starting point and end point—is frequently selected by the researcher. The starting point may be more contentious; the end point is often determined by the “outcome of interest.” See Falleti (2006): 5-6. 61 John Gerring, “The Mechanismic Woridview: Thinking Inside the Box,” British Journal of Political Science 38:1 (January2008): 161-79. 62 Alexander George and Timothy 3. McKeown, “Case studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 35. George and McKeown (1985): 35. MJes Mahoney, “Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and. Method,” Sociological Forum 16:3 (2001): 575-593. 65 Gerring (2008): 16 1-79. 15 variable) by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished.”66According to Gerring, “the identification of a causal mechanism happens when one puts together general knowledge of the world with empirical knowledge of how X and Y interrelate.”67And a mechanism (“what lies between X and Y”) “may be of any sort—an event, a process, a set of events or processes, or whatever.”68 Given the ambiguity of the concept of “causal mechanisms” and debate over a definition, I have chosen also to use “causal assessments” to accompany my process-tracing case study approach. Causal assessments may be a clearer concept with fewer law-like requirements. Although employed most often in medical determinations, where certitude is held in check,69 the concept has also been applied to policy studies in small-n research settings in political science. 70 Causal assessment plays an important role in the policy process tradition, helping to identify the “factors shaping policy agendas, decision-making styles, state-society relations, and the dynamics of stability and change.”7’Often, in process-tracing, through investigation of the processes leading to an outcome, the researcher discovers a complex, multifaceted chain of factors (emphasis on the plural) interacting over time. Instead of simply identifying the causal links, causal assessment asks the researcher to prioritize or rank the explanatory factors. Which factors are the most important? As Paul F. Steinberg notes, “. . .process tracing must not only help us to reveal complexity, but to make sense of it.”72 It is important to note that such assessment is probabilistic rather than deterministic. While process-tracing helps 66 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Bridging the Gap? Connecting Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in the Study of Civil War (Symposium),” Oualitative Methods: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section for Oualitative and Multi-Method Research 6, 1 (Spring 2008): 2. 67 Gerring (2004): 348. 68Gerring (2008). 69 See The WHO-UMC System for Standardized Case Causality Assessment, Uppsala Monitoring Centre (undated) at http://www.who-umc.org/graphics/4409.pdf ° Paul F. Steinberg, “Causal Assessment in Small-N Policy Studies,” Policy Studies Journal (May 2007) at http://www.accessmylibrary.comlcoms2/summaryo286-344593961TM 71 Steinberg (2007). 72 Steinberg (2007). 16 the researcher trace the pathway in a theoretically informed way, it “does not eliminate the need for tough, informed judgments on the part of the researcher.”73In turn, this means that the researcher needs to have an extensive and in-depth knowledge of the case or cases being studied. Process-tracing, however, has certain limitations. As is the case with other methods, insufficient or unavailable data will limit the explanatory power of conclusions drawn through process tracing. Process-tracing is both time and data intensive, and the micro-level of analysis involved may lead to the researcher losing sight of the broader structural context.74 In addition, although the goal of process-tracing may be to identify a single causal factor (or mechanism), evidence may not allow this; that is, more than one causal factor may be consistent with the evidence. In such cases, causal assessment may still allow the researcher to determine the relative causal importance of the factors involved.75 In addition, if the researcher has made explicit the reasons for a focus on events and actors, for the selection of particular data, and the data analysis, then the research is replicable and the same conclusion should be reached, yielding again more than one causal factor. This suggests the need for further research to determine if additional factors are spurious, competing or complementary.76In addition, as suggested by Andrew Bennett and Cohn Elman, the use of the process-tracing method may be justified when we uncover “evidence of observable implications that are inconsistent with alternative explanations.”77 The evidence presented in this dissertation comes from a variety of sources, including interviews; documents and publications from international organizations and governments; newsletters, pamphlets, papers, posters, and correspondence from non-governmental ‘n Checkel (2005): 17. Checkel (2005): 18-19. Steinberg (2007). 76 George and Bennett (2004): 222. 77Andrew Bennett and Cohn Elman, “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods,” Annual Review of Political Science 9, vol. 1 (2006): 460. 17 organizations; official and internal documents, publications, and correspondence from diaspora associations and organizations; newspaper and electronic media articles; websites and blogs; films, photographs, music CDs, and exhibits; and informal conversations. These materials were collected over five years, and include evidence collected during research trips in 2005 to Denmark, Malaysia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden and in 2006 to Australia, host states to the East Timorese or Acehnese diaspora. I conducted face-to-face interviews with 49 individual members of these diasporas; additionally twelve individuals were consulted through e-mail. Interviewees include men and women of various ages, refugees and asylum seekers, economic migrants, exiles, temporary and long-term students, residents who had attained Australian, North American, or European citizenship. Some were recent arrivals, others were long-term residents. Some were openly politically active and affiliated with specific political parties, groups, goals; others preferred to be quietly sympathetic to a political party, group, or goal (“work behind the scenes”), and a few expressly stated a desire to be neutral or apolitical. They included top leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) based in Stockholm, East Timorese government officials and former participants in the clandestine resistance movement. The majority of interviewees were in their mid-20s to mid-30s (reflecting the demographics of the diaspora, particularly in the case of Aceh). However, older diasporans were also interviewed (from mid-30s upwards), many of whom (but not all) held leadership positions within diaspora organizations. The level of education and socio-economic background of interviewees varied (urbanlrural, some schooling to higher education). Specific interviewees were selected based on their political affiliation and position (the GAM leadership in Stockholm and East Timorese government representatives, for example) or their level of political activity in diaspora (diasporans who worked closely or were well-known to Western NGOs). The majority of interviewees, however, were selected simply based on the fact that they were East Timorese or Acehnese and in diaspora (without prior knowledge of their socio-economic background, history of migration, or level of political activity or interest). My approach to the interview process became flexible by necessity. Interviews were conducted in official or formal settings (offices), but more frequently in informal settings 18 (primarily homes, but also coffee shops, restaurants, a park bench, a commuter train). A scheduled interview with one frequently turned into a group interview or a sequence of interviews as friends, family members or colleagues joined in. Interviewees sometimes requested anonymity or that specific statements be “off the record.” Both options were presented at the beginning of each interview. A particular challenge in the interview process was the mobility of some diasporans. A city, date, and time for an interview might have been agreed upon, but upon arrival (or shortly before) I would learn that the interviewee was in another city or country—on most occasions an alternative interviewee was available. In several cases, but not all, the originally scheduled interview eventually took place. Finally, my research also included consultations with 19 representatives from nongovernmental organizations (that made up the transnational advocacy network) in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, with academic experts on Indonesia and East Timor, as well as a European political figure and a volunteer involved in the monitoring of Aceh’s first post-Peace Agreement election. Through interviews with representatives from nongovernmental organizations, I obtained access to archives of papers, pamphlets, photographs, audio-visual material, and correspondence held by these organizations and individuals. Contributions of the Thesis This research adds to a growing literature on diaspora and diaspora politics. First, it contributes to the elaboration of a diaspora typology by providing in-depth analyses of two new or incipient diasporas. If Gabriel Sheffer is correct in suggesting that most groups of “trans-national migrants, guest workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers will either form or join diasporic entities,”78 then their early study provides important insights into the process of diaspora-making and may prove a valuable future resource. Second, this thesis deliberately situates the study of diaspora within political science and provides an analytical framework that makes explicit both diaspora political organizational capacity and diaspora political agency—the social actors, actions, and practices involved. It contributes to debates in international relations by categorizing diaspora as a nonstate actor and providing evidence of 78 See Sheffer (2003): 72; Michael Kearney (1995) reprinted in Vertovec and Cohen (1999). 19 diaspora international activity and impact. Finally by incorporating theories of diaspora and theories of transnational advocacy networks, this thesis proposes a framework that details the processes through which the role of diaspora may be transformed from long-distance nationalism in a homeland conflict to peace promotion through its participation in and interactions with a transnational advocacy network. Therefore, this thesis also contributes to our understanding of conflict settlement. 20 Chapter 2 Diaspora Politics: Review of Literature, Definitions, and Theoretical Approaches This chapter reviews literature on diaspora and examines various theoretical approaches to the concept. It presents an overview of diaspora definitions and typologies, and proposes a political definition for diaspora. Of particular interest in this review of literature and theoretical approaches is the political nature and political influence of diasporas. Therefore, here, I attempt to clarify the concept of diaspora, argue for the inclusion of diaspora analysis in political science, and examine the concept of diaspora in relation to other areas of political science research, namely ethnicity, nationalism, and phenomena associated with the process of globalization. For this purpose I will draw on a broad range of literature on diasporas, much of which falls outside the rubric of political science. The source of theoretical guidance for this research is the growing literature on diasporas and transnational communities from the fields of sociology, anthropology, geography, cultural studies, and to a lesser extent economics when the diaspora or migrant group is analyzed as labor or a source of remittances. Within political science, I rely on insights drawn from literature on diaspora politics, diaspora nationalism, diasporas and security, diaspora and foreign policy, and diaspora and globalization; these studies redefine diaspora as a social-political formation. Their contribution to our understanding of diasporas lies partly in their attention to agency—to the social actors, organizations and institutions, and actions involved in “diaspora.” Identifying discipline-based boundaries in the study of diaspora, however, represents a challenge. Diaspora literature is largely multidisciplinary and “opportunistic” in the sense that ideas, examples, references are borrowed from any work on diaspora (and frequently, work on transnational communities) regardless of the author’s discipline. Indeed, the editors of the journal Diaspora, describe its content as “multidisciplinary study of the history, culture, 21 social structure, politics and economics of...” diasporas.79Neither can works on diaspora be categorized based strictly on a focus on particular concepts. Geographers, anthropologists, and political scientists, for example, share an interest in questions of identity and power vis á-vis diasporas. However, academic approaches (across disciplines) tend to emphasize two contradictory notions or aspects of “diaspora.” Cultural studies and post-modem perspectives tend to emphasize “the potential of the hybrid and diasporic to transcend essentialist notions of identity” and fixed settings or territoriality.80 Other approaches—what Robin Cohen broadly describes as “empirical” 81 approaches—emphasize instead “geographical specificities”82or metaphoric settings, attachments and relationships (to a “homeland”), and networks,83and the effect of such on diaspora identity and activity, including the political. Defmitions, Features, and Typologies of Diasporas In contemporary and prosaic usage, the word diaspora is understood to mean a community of people living outside their country of origin, a dispersed community.84 This is close to Walker Connor’s broad definition of a diaspora as “that segment of a people living outside the homeland.”85 Among diaspora analysts debate over the meaning and parameters of diaspora continues. The debate centres over what precisely constitutes a diaspora, how a diaspora may be classified (types of diasporas), how a diaspora is distinguished from other social formations and phenomena, over the importance of its endurance, and whether or not the diaspora migration was voluntary or forced. A more recent debate challenges the primacy of migration, displacement, and mobility in defmitions of diaspora, emphasizing instead the See description of Diasporas: A Journal of Transnational Studies at http://www.utpjournals.comldiasporaJdiaspora.html 80 Sean Carter, “The Geopolitics of Diaspora,” Area 37, no. 1 (2005): 54. 81 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: University College London, 1997). 82 Carter (2006): 54. 83 Specifically, trans-state and triadic networks involving “homeland,” “hostland” and diaspora The Economist, “Special Report: Diasporas: A World of Exiles” (January 2003): 25-27. 85 Walker Connor, “The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.) Modem Diasporas in International Politics (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986): 16. 22 importance of connectivity in these human communities—the processes of communication and exchange.86 The seeming preoccupation with definitions and classifications in diaspora studies stems from conceptual difficulties in defming the term, the desire of diaspora scholars to ensure the term is analytically useful, and from an impulse to defend the subject itself, which diaspora analysts contend was, until fairly recently, dismissed as a transient issue that could be ignored or subsumed into research devoted to ethnic groups, minorities or immigrants. Diaspora analysts, however, argue that a diaspora is a distinct social formation, that it is in some cases ancient, and it is an enduring and likely increasing phenomenon. From the early 1 990s onward, the concept of diaspora as an analytical tool in the social sciences has gained currency. There is now a range of literature and case studies attesting to the endemic nature of diasporas and examining the social, cultural and, to a lesser extent, political roles they play. Such is the increase in interest in diaspora studies that in 2005 a two volume Encyclopedia of Diasporas87was published, including over 100 case studies. Some argue that the term has become so prevalent in contemporary usage that it is often misapplied or has become so stretched as to refer to any kind of movement of people or to all kinds of hybridized identities, thus rendering the term useless.88 What then is a diaspora? Khachig Tololyan, Kim Butler, and Judith Shuval provide exhaustive overviews and critiques of the etymology, the various definitions, and usages of the term and concept of diaspora.89Although, as contemporary dictionaries attest,90 the term 86ROZa Tsagarousianou, “Rethinking the Concept of Diaspora: Mobility, Connectivity and Communications in a Globalised World,” Westminster Papers in Communications and Culture 1, no. 1 (2004): 52-66. Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember and Ian Skoggard (eds.). Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, vol. 1 and 2 (New York, NY: Springer, 2005). In addition to Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas (New York: Viking Books, 1995). 88 Khachig TolOlyan, “Rethinking Diasporas: Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment,” Diaspora 5, no. 1 (1996): 6; Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (January 2005). 89 See Tololyan (1996), Kim Butler, “Defming Diaspora, Refining a Discourse,” Diaspora 10, no. 2 (2001), and Judith T. Shuval, “Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm,” International Migration 38, no. 5 (2000): 4 1-57. 23 diaspora continues to be most closely associated with the Jewish experience of exile and Jewish settlement outside an ancestral homeland, the origin of the word is Greek and appears in both ancient Greek and Hebrew texts. “Diaspora” comes from the Greek speiro to sow and dia = over,91 and is commonly translated as “to scatter and sow.”92 In addition to the Greek and Jewish experience, the term diaspora is now commonly used to describe other major historical migrations, including the forced migration of Armenians at the turn of the 20th century, the forced dispersal of Africans as a result of the slave trade, and the economic migrations of Chinese through the 19th and early 20th centuries.93 Definitions and Features Among the most succinct definitions is Gabriel Sheffer’s view of diasporas as “groups permanently residing outside their countries of origin, but maintaining contacts with people back in their homelands.”94In an earlier study, Dominique Schnapper describes diaspora as “the condition of a geographically dispersed people who have settled in different political organizations but who maintained, in spite of dispersion, some form of unity and solidarity.”95More elaborate (and frequently cited) definitions of diaspora, discussed below, were developed partially to more clearly set the parameters between diasporas and other mobile or expatriate communities, such as ethnic groups, migrants, nomads, etc. and to provide analytical frameworks to guide and facilitate the study of diaspora. ° The eighth edition (1994) of the Pocket Oxford English Dictionary notes that the root of the word Diaspora is Greek but gives the following defmitions, 1. “the dispersal of the Jews after their exile in 538” and 2. the dispersed Jews. Sheffer, however, notes that a 1993 edition of the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the first time included a defmition that added “the situation of people living outside their homeland,” (2003): 9. 91 See Sheffer (2003) and Shuval (2000): 4 1-57. 92 Ember et al., (2005): xiii. Ember et al. 2005 and Maryanne Cline Horowitz (ed.), New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 2 (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2005). Sheffer (2003): 1. Dominique Schnapper, “From the Nation-State to the Transnational World: On the Meaning and Usefuiness of Diaspora as a Concept,” Diaspora, 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 225. 24 According to William Safran, the defining features of diaspora are a dispersal from an original centre to two or more foreign regions; collective and perpetuated memory and myth of the original homeland; a sense of alienation in the hostland; idealization of the homeland as a place of eventual return; a commitment to maintain or restore their homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and relationships with the homeland that help define diaspora ethno communal consciousness and solidarity.96Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau largely echo Safran’s features but their definition emphasizes the “forced” nature of the dispersion, the salience of this in the collective memory of the diaspora, and the persistence of a homeland-oriented collective identity over several generations.97Robin Cohen’s definition, on the other hand, allows for mixed motives behind the diaspora’s dispersion. That is, the dispersal may be forced and traumatic or the result of work, trade or colonial ambitions. Cohen also points out that although diasporas may be characterized by a troubled relationship with host societies, there is also the possibility for a distinctive, creative enriching life in tolerant societies. 98 Like Chaliand and Rageau, Cohen argues that a diaspora’s group consciousness is sustained over time. However, Cohen also emphasizes that a diaspora’s interest in return to the homeland may be literal or symbolic and that diasporas exhibit a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries.99 Finally, Butler’s definition of diaspora also includes some of the key features reviewed above but places further emphasis on dispersion to two or more destinations and to a diaspora’s existence over at least two generations.’°° 96 William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myth of Homeland and Return” Diaspora 1, no. 1 (1991): 83. Chaliand and Rageau, The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas (New York: Viking Books, 1995). Cohen (1997): 26 and 180. Cohen (1997): 26 and 180. 100According to Butler, the defining features of diaspora are: 1) Dispersal to two or more destinations as a “necessary precondition for the formation of links between the various populations in diaspora”; 2) relationship to an actual or imagined homeland; 3) a consciousness, a self-awareness of the group’s identity; 4) existence over at least two generations. See Butler (2001): 192-193. 25 The “empirical” definitions 101 above identify key criteria or features of diaspora: 1) dispersion, 2) homeland-orientation, 3) alienation or a troubled relationship with the host society, 4) consciousness of group identity based on collective memory/history/mythlculture, and 5) group solidarity. The latter three are combined under the phrase “boundary maintenance” by Rogers Brubaker to denote “the preservation of a distinctive identity.”°2 It is important to note that Safran, Butler, and Cohen acknowledge that there are problems with this checklist approach. No society, as James Clifford cautions, “can be expected to qualify on all counts, throughout its history.”°3Moreover, Butler acknowledges, identities are not “fixed” therefore, “conceptualizations of diaspora must be able to accommodate the reality of multiple identities and phases” in diaspora-making or, as Butler calls it, the process of diasporization.’°4As Brubaker points out, this attention to the potential for change and fluidity in diasporas highlights a “tension” in diaspora literature between boundary- maintenance (emphasized in empirical definitions and studies) and boundary-erosion.’°5 Cultural studies and postmodern perspectives106 on diaspora are concerned with culture, identity, consciousness, subjectivity, 107 and the boundary-erosion potential of diasporas. These views of diasporas fmd the previously outlined criteria for diasporas “too ossified to 101 The term “empirical defmitions” is used here to describe those based on features of diaspora and to differentiate these from the cultural studies and postmodem perspectives on diaspora discussed subsequently in this chapter. 102Bruber (January 2005): 6. 103 James Clifford, “Diasporas,” Cultural Anthropology 9, no. 3 (1994): 306. 104 Butler (2001): 193. 105 Brubaker (January 2005): 6. 106 Cultural studies focus on the cultural (everyday) practices of people, the production and circulation of meanings, changes in these and their relation to power. Cultural studies are multidisciplinary, drawing from the various social sciences (sociology, anthropology, political science, history) as well as literary theory, performance, art and film analysis. Postmodeni perspectives question the possibility of objective knowledge and assumptions of an objective reality (and the metananatives or totalizing narratives derived from assumed objective knowledge—metanarratives of progress, national history, identity, etc.), suggesting instead that what we call objective knowledge or objective reality are contestable texts or discourses that lend power to particular people, cultures, structures, practices, ideas over others. 107 Pnina Werbner, “Introduction: The Materiality of Diaspora—Between Aesthetic and “Real” Politics,” Diaspora 9, no. 1 (2000): 6. 26 capture the fluidities of the contemporary Categories, or conceptual problems as Paul Gilroy describes them, such as, nationality, ethnicity, race, class, gender, age, religion “. . . can imprison or ossif’ the idea of culture.”°9Thus, in cultural studies and postmodern perspectives, the importance of a diaspora’s relationship to the homeland and national solidarity are de-emphasized.”° The powerful attraction of diaspora for these theorists, as Pnina Werbner explains, is that they are viewed as “transnational social formations” that “challenge the hegemony and boundedness of the nation state, of any pure imaginaries of nationhood” or nationality.” Instead, these theorists underline the possibility of a dual or fragmented consciousness and of multiple belongings and multiple building blocks of identity held simultaneously or successively with varying degrees of saliency at different times. In analyses of diaspora, cultural studies theorists and postmodernists propose the development of new forms of negotiated identificatjon.”2Paul Gilroy, for example, describes black Atlantic culture as “a living, dynamic pattern that was not the simple product of any single one of its many sources.”113 That is, the African diaspora is not specifically African, American, Caribbean or British, it is hybrid and fluid. Stuart Hall also emphasizes heterogeneity, hybridity, and transformation in his study of a Caribbean diaspora and his description of cultures and identities. Diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return. . . This is the old, the imperializing, the hegemonizing form of “ethnicity”. . . The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined not by 108 Cohen (1997): 128-129. Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993): 2. 110 Brubaker (January 2005): 6. Werbner (2000): 6. 112 Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur, eds. Theorizinu Diaspora: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003): 5. 113 Gilroy (1993): 1. 27 essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of identity which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference.”4 The homeland is also problematized in cultural studies and postmodern perspectives. In some postmodern versions, the concept of diaspora “offers a critique of ‘fixed origins’ while still acknowledging a desire for ‘home’ rather than ‘homeland”5For some postmodernists, the homeland, as articulated in many of the more “empirical” definitions of diaspora, is too closely associated with the state and nationality, categories that obscure the interweaving of cultures characteristic of the diaspora experience. Moreover, Hall, for example, proposes that even if communities are indeed linked to a “homeland” of the past and even if this original homeland refers to a physical territory, it is not an accurate reflection, and cannot be. The homeland, remembered, is an imagined version that is constituted in diaspora and is the source of mixed emotions. Whereas “empirical” versions of diaspora tend to take nostalgia and yearning for the homeland as a given, postmodern studies of diaspora reveal an ambivalence towards the homeland and towards return.116 Critics of cultural studies and postmodern perspectives take issue with the inherent emphasis on individual experience or more precisely the individual narratjve117 and with what they see as a paucity of empirical evidence.”8Tololyan, generally amenable to cultural studies and postmodern perspectives, nevertheless expresses concern over approaches to diaspora that primarily entail analysis of the individual’s consciousness or subjectivity. For Tololyan: A diaspora is never merely an accident of birth, a clump of individuals living outside their ancestral homeland, each with a hybrid subjectivity, lacking 114 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora” in Jonathan Rutherford, ed. Identity: Community, Culture Difference (Lawrence & Wishart, 1990): 235. “ Dibyesh Anand, “A Contemporary Study of ‘Diaspora’: The Tibetan Version,” Diaspora 12, no.2 (2000): 220. 116 Clifford (1994): 305. 117 William Safran, “Comparing Diasporas: A Review Essay,” Diaspora 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 284. 118 Cohen (1997): 150. 28 collective practices that underscore (not just) their difference from others, but also their similarity to each other, and their links to the people on the homeland.”9 Cohen is open to the possibility of hybrid identities, but calls for specific evidence (attitudes, migrations patterns, social conduct) that “a hybrid identity is a lived and demonstrated experience.”20Werbner counters by proposing that the division between approaches “that stress the empirical realities of the diaspora experience” and those focusing on “diasporic consciousness and subjectivity” may be artificial.’21 Diasporic cultures, Werbner suggests, are always materially inscribed and organizationally embodied.”22Taking Cohen’s critique further, if there is evidence of a hybrid identity or culture in the material and in organization as Werbner suggests, we may still need to know more about the actors (and their relationships) that have participated in its development and about the collective practices and processes involved in it. Typologies In addition to the definitions above, diaspora analysts have elaborated specific typologies of diasporas based on the initial cause of migration or dispersal, on the roles played by the diaspora, and on its age or endurance. Perhaps the most well known of diaspora typologies is Robin Cohen’s. Cohen proposes a typology of victim, labour, trade or mercantile, imperial, and cultural diasporas. These types take the origin of migration or the purpose of migration as the essential character of the diaspora. Victim diasporas (Jews, Armenian, African, Palestinian) were born from a “historical scarring 123 the original migration is marked by trauma and coercion. Labor diasporas (Indian indentured workers, Japanese in South America, Chinese in Southeast Asia) were “recruited for their labour-power.” 124 Trade 119 TOlolyan (1996): 30. 120 Cohen (1997): 150. 121 Werbner (2000): 7. 122 Thid. 123 Cohen (1997): 28. 124 Cohen (1997): 29. 29 diasporas (Chinese and Lebanese) were the result of expansions of trading networks or the pursuit of conunerce and trade. Imperial diasporas were constituted as a result of settlement for colonial or military purposes.125 Cohen’s classification of an imperial diaspora is the most disputed, particularly as he uses the settlement of the British Empire as his example. As most critics of the imperial diaspora type point out, it is difficult to conceive of Anglo-Saxons in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa as a diaspora. It is important to note that Cohen himself sees labor and imperial diasporas as transitional rather than enduring. Cohen anticipates criticism by acknowledging the possibility that movements of people occur for more than one reason,126 that diasporas may have dual and multiple forms and therefore may not fit neatly into one type, and that they may change over time. 127 A succinct explanation of cultural diasporas eludes Cohen. However, he is referring to the cultural studies and postmodern perspectives on diasporas reviewed earlier in this chapter. Cohen describes this meaning of diaspora as “the construction of. . . new identities and subj ectivities.”128 He refers to Hall’s notion of hybridity, which Cohen understands as “the evolution of new, dynamic, mixed cultures” or “the evolution of commingled cultures that are different from two or more parent cultures.”29Although Cohen includes the cultural diaspora in his typology, his version of cultural diaspora demands empirical study and requires the addition of what he refers to as “reality markers” in the form of historical and sociological data. By requiring these “reality markers,” Cohen may be reifying the very categories postmodemists problematize (gender, class, the markers of ethnicity, the nation- state—in this case the homeland and host country). In addition, it should be noted that not all cultural studies or postmodemist work is ahistorical, to note, Paul Gilroy’ s Black Atlantic which is informed by history throughout and Michele Reis’ consciously historical analysis of 125 Cohen (1997): 67. 126 Ember (2005): xiii. 127 Cohen (1997): x. 128 Cohen (1997): 128. 129 Cohen (1997): 131. 30 “classical” and “contemporary” diaspora.’3° However, Cohen also highlights an important omission in the postmodern versions of diaspora, the “who” and “how” behind the evolution of hybrid cultures—that is, the often omitted articulation of agency, collective practice, and process. Sheffer, Van Hear, and Reis classify diasporas based on age.’3’ Sheffer argues this typology more accurately accounts for new features of contemporary diaspora communities. Sheffer writes of classical or historical, modem or recent, incipient, and dormant diasporas: 1) historical or classical diasporas have their origins in antiquity or the Middle ages; 2) modem or recent diasporas are those that “have become established since the seventeenth century;”32 3) incipient diasporas are “diasporas in the making,” new groups to a region exhibiting diaspora features and initial efforts to organize as diasporas;’33and 4) dormant diasporas are those that are inactive; their members are largely “assimilated or fully integrated into their host societies” 134 and show little interest in mobilization and action.” 135 However, their revival is possible, often in response to change (especially a traumatic event) in the homeland or affecting co-diasporans (i.e. the reorganization of Croatian and Serbian groups in North America during the war in the Balkans). Reis provides a similar classification describing “three maj or historical waves that influence the diasporic process: the classical period, associated with ancient diaspora; the modem period, from 1500-1945 and encompassing the experiences of slavery and colonization; and contemporary or late-modem period, from the end of World War II to the present day.’36 130 Michele Reis, “Theorizing Diaspora: Perspectives on “Classical” and “Contemporary” Diaspora,” International Migration 42, no. 2 (2004): 42. 131 See Sheffer (2003), Reis (2004) and Nicholas Van Hear, New Diasporas: The Mass Exodus. Dispersal and Regrouping of Migrant Communities (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998). 132 Sheffer (2003): 21. 133 Sheffer (2003): 75. 134 Ibid. 135 Sheffer (2003): 21. 136 Reis (2004): 41. 31 In his study of “new” diasporas resulting from mass migrations from the 1 950s to the 1 990s, Van Hear describes not only the making of diasporas, but also a process of de-diasporization, the un-making of diasporas in a particular place. This does not necessarily describe the dissolution of an entire diaspora, rather it refers to the emigration of a large number of members of diaspora to the homeland or elsewhere. 137 Van Hear’s addition further contributes to our understanding of diasporas as dynamic, not static or pre-determined. Sheffer’s typology allows for a historical survey of diasporas without losing sight of contemporary communities that are evolving into diasporas. Sheffer’s and Van Hear’s approach also opens the door to considerations of agency in the diasporization or diaspora- making process. The above review of definitions, features, and classifications of diasporas provides a foundation for elucidation and analysis of the concept of diaspora politics. Although understanding the parameters of diaspora allows us to make important clarifications and distinctions between diaspora and other types of communities, and it facilitates comparative study of diaspora, this dissertation is concerned specifically with the political significance of the diaspora phenomenon. Before making a case for diaspora as a socio-political formation, however, in the section below I further elaborate key elements in the definitions discussed and point to important omissions or under-articulated features. I also examine the concept of diaspora in relation to other areas of interest to political science—ethnicity, nationalism, transnationalism, and globalization, and I provide a brief listing of the potential political roles of diaspora. Definitions and Typologies Problematized The Homeland as Territory, Symbol, and Ideal The concepts of “homeland” and “host country” are central features in many of the diaspora definitions listed above. Homeland refers to the country of origin or the ancestral home; the country or region from which migrants originally came or with which they identify. The host or hostland is the country of residence or settlement. 137 Van Hear (1998): 49-50. 32 It is important to note that the homeland is not necessarily an established and recognized state or geographical territory. Diasporas are often classified as state-linked or stateless. For example, until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jews were considered a stateless diaspora. However, following the establishment of Israel, they became state-linked. The Kurds are another example of a stateless diaspora—the idealized homeland of Kurdistan geographically spanning parts of several states. Indeed many ethno-national and secessionist diasporas fit into the stateless category. The homeland, therefore, can be a physical territory or a symbolic, imagined, and mythologized one. Moreover, members of a diaspora may have had the actual experience of being born or living in the homeland or they may not; they may have never even visited this homeland. The attachment, identification, and relationship can be with a homeland that they “have only dreamed of or heard about.”38 Therefore, a diaspora and diaspora organizations and activities can span generations. The focus on the homeland and relationships with the homeland, however, obscures another important feature of diaspora—the intra-diaspora relationship. Although as Clifford notes, diasporas usually presuppose a connection to a homeland,’39 it is not only the diaspora- homeland binary relationship that distinguishes the diaspora phenomenon from other social formations. Diasporas also “connect multiple communities of a dispersed 140 This is a “unique feature that differentiates them from communities that result from other types of migration.”4’Finally, cultural studies and postmodernist scholars contend that these intra-diaspora connections “need not be articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland.”42The ongoing shared history and experiences of the diaspora may serve the same role or be as important as the homeland. Although these shared experiences may indeed 138 Fred Riggs, Diasporas: Some Conceptual Considerations (2000) at http://www2.hawaii.edukfredr/diacon.htm 139 Clifford (1994): 217. 140 Ibid. 141 Butler (2001): 192. 142 Clifford (1994): 219. 33 attenuate and eventually supplant the hold of homeland, it is difficult to conceive of a shared history of diaspora without reference, however thin, to a homeland. Finally, the terms themselves, “homeland” and “hostland,” are the subject of some debate. Khatharya Urn, for example, argues that “home” is not necessarily a “fixed, singular place” for diasporans and conversely that the term “host” conveys too much a “sense of transitoriness” 143 for a location that for many diasporans represents a permanent residence. Rather cumbersome alternative terms include country of origin/country of resettlement and sending/receiving countries. These terms, however, also have inherent problems. They do not, for example, represent the empirical reality of generations of diasporans who were never “sent or received” but rather were born in a “receiving country” but still maintain ties to the so-called “sending country.” They also infer a specific geographical location, leaving no room for the symbolic or ideal “homeland.” Forced versus Voluntary Migration Chaliand and Rageau highlight the forced nature of migration that gives rise to a particularly strong attachment to the homeland and a desire to return. Many diaspora scholars point to this involuntary aspect of the migration experience—the trauma of a forced or unchosen exodus—and posit that it provides a particularly strong basis for collective identity that distinguishes a diaspora member from an economic migrant or a temporary visitor, for example. Sheffer, however, dismisses the relative importance of a “forced” versus a “voluntary” migration noting that since antiquity diasporas have emerged not only because of political or economic difficulties, but also because of “an inherent curiosity. . . that drove, and still drives, individuals and groups to.. . explore distant places.”44Moreover, in the collective identity of a diaspora, forced migration can be replaced by other critical events that constitute memories of oppression, persecution, martyrdom, isolation, etc. as is the case for Sikh 143 Katharya Urn, Political Remittance: Cambodian Diasporas in Conflict and Post-Conflict in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (ed.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2007): 257. ‘ Sheffer (2003): 51. 34 nationalists in the diaspora,’45 even if the critical event itself was not the cause of an initial forced migration or if it occurred in the diaspora rather than the homeland. Finally, diasporas are not homogenous, in many, if not most, cases the making of a diaspora was a result of a mix of involuntary and voluntary, or what Reis calls “opportunity-seeking,”46migration. Longevity or Age? Chaliand and Rageau, Butler, Cohen and other diaspora scholars emphasize the importance of time in their basic features of diaspora. Cohen refers to a group consciousness sustained over time, begging the question, “how long?” Butler and Chaliand and Rageau are more specific. Butler specifies a diaspora’s “existence over at least two generations” 147 and Chaliand and Rageau over several generations. Sheffer, who also emphasises the importance of longevity, nevertheless takes a more inclusive approach by describing new or incipient diasporas as well as the classical and modem diasporas that are characterized by a longer history. Safran’s definition is not time-specific, but he is more inclusive in his examples. He refers to a Palestinian diaspora, that can trace its roots to 1946 when “[h]undreds of thousands of Arab residents were expelled,” encouraged or impelled to flee after the establishment of the state of Israel.’48 Safran also includes Cubans that left, mostly for the United States, in the 1950s-70s decades. By the more strict criteria of time, Cubans and Palestinians cannot be considered diasporas, neither can the Vietnamese who fled their country of origin at the end of the Vietnam War, nor the over 200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto who arrived there since the mid 1980s. Also excluded are many of the contemporary or late-modem diasporas that are the subject of Reis’ study.’49Nearly the entire catalogue of subjects in Van Hear’s New Diasporas also would be excluded as his focus is primarily the making of new diasporas during the last quarter of the 20th century. 145 See Darshan Singh Tatla, The Sikh Dias,,ora: The Search for Statehood (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999) and Safran (Winter 1999): 255-29 1. 146 Reis (2004): 49. 147 Reis (2004): 192. 148 Safran (1991): 87. 149 Reis (2004). 35 The time or longevity requirement in some definitions of diaspora is thusly too restrictive. One problem is that it requires a precise or near precise identification of a single starting point or “birth” of the diaspora and implies that it is the time of departure from the homeland. Diasporas are not born, however, they are made or constituted through processes including mobility, communication, organization, and, more importantly, they are dynamic. Sheffer instead emphasizes the moment after arrival in a new country or region when migrants make a conscious decision to join or establish a diaspora community.’5°Furthermore, Van Hear observes that “diaspora formation can occur by accretion as a result of steady, gradual, routine migration.. ,,151 Identifying the “starting point” of a diaspora and thus the number of generations in diaspora may prove difficult. Butler, Cohen and Chaliand and Rageau may be correct in believing that a diaspora may take two or more generations to consolidate, to establish formal institutions, to transmit its heritage, but the process of diasporization is not necessarily linear with clear starting and end points. Sheffer’s alternative classification based on “age” also assumes a starting point, but Sheffer’s starting point is less specific and more procedural—a series of actions or events after arrival in a host country rather than a particular point of departure from the homeland. The typology adopted by Sheffer, Reis, and Van Hear is both the most inclusive and flexible in terms of its ability to account for the dynamism of diasporas. A second problem is that this “time” requirement privileges the study of larger, more institutionally established and more powerful diaspora and inhibits study of newer, smaller, more informally organized, and less powerful diaspora-in-the-making. Studies may later prove these communities to be something other than diasporas or only temporarily having exhibited diaspora characteristics. However, these new or incipient diaspora communities should not be too hastily marginalized. In Sheffer’s view it is likely if not inevitable that most groups of “trans-national migrants, guest workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers will 150 Sheffer (2003): 77. ‘‘ Van Hear (1998): 47. 36 either form or join diasporic entities.” 152 Should these incipient diasporas prove enduring, their early study will be a valuable future resource. Studies of new diasporas should not be taken as definitive, but rather as first steps that are open to correction, elaboration,’53and improvement. Agency and Dynamism in Definitions Both agency and the dynamic character of diasporas are under-articulated in the defmitions reviewed above. Definitions of diaspora offer important insights, serve as useful guides for comparative study, and provide specific frameworks for investigation. The “empirical” definitions reviewed above lend clarity to and establish the parameters of a complex social phenomenon that is often conflated with ethnic and minority groups and other migratory communities. However, the identification of shared and enduring features of diasporas should not eclipse the dynamic nature of diasporas and the importance of its study’54 (cultural studies and postmodern approaches are more attentive to the dynamic and transformative nature of diaspora). Diasporas are not static; they may be in a process of being made or unmade.’55Their membership may be replenished and their character may change with waves of new migration. Individual members may opt out of the diaspora and become permanently assimilated in the host country.’56 The features of diasporas enumerated earlier include a collective memory and identity, return movements, commitments, solidarity, and relationships. However, there is little indication of the actions or processes involved or required in creating solidarity, transmitting memory (history), forming and articulating the elements of collective identity, or engaging in 152 See Sheffer (2003): 72 and Michael Kearney, “The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995):559 reprinted in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds. Migration, Diasporas, and Transnationalism. (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999). 153 Clifford (1994): 233. 154 Tsagarousianou (2004): 56. 155 Van Hear (1998). 156 Safran, (1999): 262. 37 relationships with the homeland. The social actors, social organizations and actions are perhaps assumed, but not made explicit. Yet it is social actors who are translating events (a forced departure from the “homeland,” for example) into solidarity; and it is actors who carry out the exchanges that constitute a relationship with the homeland. These acts, TOlolyan explains, are not simply theoretical they must be evident, demonstrated.’57The diasporan identity is active, it requires involvement.’58Often, this “involvement” is not only cultural but political. Indeed the boundaries between diaspora cultural and political activity may be blurred. It is the actions (even if constrained) and practices (including those of representation) that not only distinguish diasporas from other social groups, but also help define diasporas. Here it is important to recognize that diaspora “actors” and their roles may vary. Diaspora membership may comprise what Sheffer describes as core members, members by choice, marginal members, and dormant members.’59Yossi Sham and Aharon Barth describe core, passive and silent members.’6°They are categorized according to a sliding scale of activity. Although political, social, and intellectual elites within a diaspora are often able to set the agenda for action and establish a dominant discourse, Tololyan emphasizes that “there can be no diaspora as such without a response from a community that comes to recognize itself and to act collectively.”6’ Furthermore, certain processes associated with globalization, in particular advances in communication technologies and affordability of travel, prevent a monopoly by elites over diaspora agenda-setting and discourse. It is now possible for nearly any diaspora member with access to a mobile telephone or a computer to connect with fellow co-diasporans by 157 Tololyan (1996): 15. 158 Butler (2001): 191 and Tololyan (1996): 15. 159 Sheffer (2003): 100. ‘60Yossj Sham and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” International Organization 57 (Summer 2003): 452. ‘‘ Tololyan (1996): 24. 38 calling them directly, joining an email list and contributing to it, or posting content on or creating a website or blog. Although marginalization or “expulsion” from the diaspora is a possibility for those who present alternative discourses, agendas, or strategies for action, communications technologies have considerably levelled the playing field among actors within diasporas. Links to Other Theoretical Concepts Ethnicity The term diaspora is often used interchangeably with the term ethnic group. The conflation of the two terms is not surprising given the emphasis many diaspora scholars and diasporans place on ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. In an early definition, Milton Esman describes diaspora as “a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin.”62 Reis sees ethnic groups that are “diasporic in nature.”163 Sheffer eschews the looser term “diaspora” for the more specific “ethno-national diaspora.” In Sheffer’ s view the most important trait in cementing a diaspora’s affinities and increasing its solidarity is the “sense of belonging to the same ethnic nation.”164 If we take an ethnic group or ethnic community to refer to a group of people sharing a believed common descent, cultural attributes (such as religion, language, customs), common historical myths and memories, sometimes racial or physical similarities, and an attachment (historical or sentimental) to a specific territory,’65 then the similarities with the concept of diaspora are evident. In addition, both ethnic theory and diaspora studies are concerned with 162 Milton 3. Esman, “Diasporas and International Relations” in Gabriel Sheffer, ed. Modern Diasporas in International Politics (London and Sydney: Croom Helm 1986): 333. 163 Reis (2003): 11. 164 Sheffer (2003): 11. 165 See Stuart J. Kaufinan, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories ofaNation (U.S.: Oxford University Press, 2000); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 845 -77; Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, Is a State, Is and Ethnic Group, Is a...” Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (1978): 377-400. 39 shared identities and the processes of identity construction or derivation. 166 However, based on this broad definition of ethnicity, an important distinction emerges. A diaspora’s attachment to a specific territory is “long-distance,” an ethnic group’s is not necessarily so. An ethnic group may reside in the historical or sentimental territory of its attachment, the diaspora does not. Sheffer points to assimilation and the relationship to the homeland as key differences between ethnic group and diaspora. As Sheffer points out, “transplanted minority groups do not necessarily remain diasporas.”67In Sheffer’s view, for an ethnic group, the attachment to a specific homeland territory is attenuated. Sheffer contends that “. . . ethnic migrants who opt to assimilate, who do not have continuing interest in their homelands, who do not express a certain degree of loyalty toward their homelands, and who do not establish or maintain tangible ties with those homelands will not become diasporas.”68Tölolyan’s analysis is more nuanced: For the ethnic community, the relationship or commitment to the homeland (if there is one) is “manifested by individuals rather than the community as a whole.”69 Moreover, diasporas exhibit a commitment to maintaining ties not only with the homeland but with co-diasporans in distant territories. Considerable efforts are made to construct, nurture or perpetuate a shared identity or a shared understanding of their identity among members residing in different states. Whereas ethnic groups may organize as interest groups in their country of residence, for example, diasporas may “act in consistently organized ways to develop an agenda for self-representation in the political and cultural realm” in the hostland and across national boundaries.’70Nevertheless, Tololyan also recognizes that a clear and definitive differentiation may prove elusive. Ethnic minorities living outside a 166 Shuval (2000). 167 Sheffer (2003): 262. 168 Sheffer (2003): 90. ‘69Tololyan (1996): 16. 170 Tololyan (1996): 16-17. Floya Anthias sees diaspora as “a particular type of ethnic category, one that exists across the boundaries of nation states rather than within them.” See Floya Anthias, “Evaluating ‘Diaspora’: Beyond Ethnicity?” Sociology 32, no. 3 (August 1998): 571. 40 “historic homeland,” Tololyan explains, “are divided between those who are a diaspora and those who are not. Some individuals.. .have diasporic identities; others do not.”7’Some “behave as ethnics in some spheres of life, as diasporans in others.”72Therefore, the line of demarcation perhaps is not static save for one critical distinction pointed out by Tololyan, the ethnic identity may be symbolic, and it may remain one of “being” or “feeling” ethnic; the diaspora identity requires agency and involvement.’73 The Nation-state and Nationalism There are two broad perspectives on diaspora and the nation-state/nationalism. One sees a close association between diaspora and the nation-state174 and nationalism and the other posits diaspora as a challenge to the endurance or permanence of the state. For analytical clarity I refer to these two perspectives as “diaspora nationalism” and “diaspora cosmopolitanism,” although diaspora literature presents various positions in between these two poles. As reviewed earlier, several definitions and theories of diaspora are anchored on the concept of a homeland and a homeland-oriented identity. This homeland or country of origin in turn is often associated with the nation-state, real (a physical territory), imagined or desired. Most studies on diaspora adopt a constructivist approach to nationalism—taking the nation as constructed rather than primordial. Diaspora literature is heavily influenced by Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” of nationality,’75 often borrowing the term 171 Tololyan (1996): 16. 172 TOlolyan (1996): 18. 173 Tololyan (1996): 15. 174 Walker Connor distinguishes the nation, state, and the nation-state. Connor defines the nation as “a group of people sharing a myth of common ancestry.” He defmes the state as “the major political unit in world politics;” and the nation-state as “that relatively rare situation in which the borders of a state and a nation closely coincide: a state with an ethnically homogenous population.” See Walker Connor, “The Timelessness of Nations,” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1/2 (2004): 39. 175 Benedict Anderson, “Long Distance Nationalism” in Benedict Anderson, Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London/New York: Verso 1998): 6-7. 41 to describe the “imagined homelands” of the diaspora.’76 The space for imagining the nation and thus the nationalist project are not limited to the territory of the nation-state but rather are extended to the diaspora. This phenomenon where “citizens” (legal or by affmity) are dispersed across states but view themselves as part of the nation-state of their ancestors is described by Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Blanc-Szanton as “nations unbound” or “deterritorialized states”177 and, separately, by Glick Schiller as “transnational nation-states.”178 Diaspora nationalism, as the term implies, directly connects diasporas to the concept of nationalism and the nation-state. It describes the cultural and political project of the diaspora community on behalf of or oriented towards the ancestral homeland. This is sometimes referred to as “long-distance nationalism,” another Benedict Anderson term, 179 where participants engage in nationalist activities from afar, yet remain unaccountable for their actions.180 According to Anderson, the long-distance nationalist “need not fear prison, torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations.”8’The fact that diasporas are not all based in the “First World” notwithstanding, diaspora nationalism may be manifested through lobbying the hostland and international organizations, voting (if the right is extended by the homeland to the diaspora), 176 Arjun Appadurai, “Modernity, Giobalism, and Diaspora” in Evans Braziel, Jana and Anita Mannur (eds.) Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader (Maiden, MA: Blackwell 2003): 36. ‘77Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton eds. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Langhorne, PA: Gordon & Breach, (1994) and Cohen 1997): 136. 178 Nina Glick Schiller, “Long-Distance Nationalism” in Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember and Ian Skoggard eds., Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, vol. 1 and 2 (New York, NY: Springer 2005): 574. 179 Anderson (1998). 180 See Anderson (1998) and Donald M. Nonini, “Diasporas and Globalization” in Ember, Melvin, Carol R. Ember and Ian Skoggard eds.. Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, vol. 1 and 2 (New York, NY: Springer 2005): 567. ‘‘ Anderson (1998): 74. 42 demonstrating, fundraising, contributing money and investing, campaigning (in the hostland and internationally), creating works of art and literature, fighting, killing and dying.’82 The object of diaspora nationalism may not be an existing nation-state but rather a geographical territory within a recognized state (Northern Ireland, northeast Sri Lanka, Xinjiang and Tibet, the Punjab). In this case, diaspora nationalists may seek autonomy or secession. In either case, the activities of the diaspora are part of a nationalist project in support of an established state or in search of a nation-state. Because diaspora nationalism is in some cases linked with secessionism and regime change, it is occasionally and increasingly viewed as a “security threat” and analyzed as such. 183 However, as Glick Schiller reminds us, not all diaspora nationalism or long-distance nationalism is “oppositional,”84for example, Israeli and Dominican diasporas in the United States and Ukrainians in Canada.’85 Diaspora nationalists are also engaged in democratic projects,’86 investment and development, technical support and advice to homeland governments, and voting for and contributing to recognized political parties and candidates.187 182 Glick Schiller (2005): 570 and Michael Doorley, Irish American Diaspora Nationalism: The Friends of Irish Freedom, 1916-35 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005). 183 Not only by the regime/government in power in the “homeland” but also by that of the “hostland” and by academics, researchers and analysts. See William J. Lahneman, “Impact of Diaspora Communities on National and Global Politics,” Center for International and Security Studies,” University of Maryland, College Park (July 5, 2005) at http://www.cissm.umd.edulpapers/files/lahneman_diaspora_report.pdf; Margaret Purdy, “Targeting Diasporas: The Canadian Counter-Terrorism Experience,” Working Paper #2 (2003), Armed Groups Project, University of Calgary at http://www.armedgroups.orglindex.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=20&Itemid=43; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” Development Research Group (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002); Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffinan, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 184 Glick Schiller (2005): 575. 185 In the case ofUkrainians in Canada, diaspora activity changed from oppositional during the Soviet period to supportive. 186 Werbner (2000): 5. 187 See Glick Schiller (2005); Ninna Nyberg Sorensen, “The Development Dimension of Migrant Remittances,” Migration Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. 1, International Organization for Migration (June 2004); R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Policy paper submitted to the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Management, Berlin, Germany (2004); Wolfram Zunzer, “Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation,” Berghof Occasional Paper Nr. 43 The diaspora cosmopolitan perspective sees diasporas as a challenge to the state and to state centrism. Clifford argues that whereas states weld locals to a single place, diasporas cannot be exclusively nationalist.’88They are not bound by the borders of a state, and their condition and experience implies multiple attachments. 189 Diasporas challenge the hegemony and “boundedness” of the state and notions of assimilation and loyalty to one nation or state.190 In addition to relating to both the homeland and host state, diasporas also relate to their co diasporans in other states.’9’These intra-diaspora relationships “can be an important source generating imaginative identification with places beyond the national territory.”92In some analyses of diaspora, nationalist attachments and narratives are replaced with “more diffuse visions of cosmopolitanism.”93Thus, diasporas challenge the claims for exclusive loyalty of the nation-state or state with the alternative of multiple identities and sometimes multiple citizenships. This latter perspective is similar to the more enthusiastic analyses of globalization as a state-weakening phenomenon.’95 Again, the two perspectives, diaspora nationalism and diaspora cosmopolitanism, are presented here as distinct categories for analytical clarity. The general consensus in the 26, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (September 2004) and Sham and Barth (2003). 188 Clifford (1997): 135. 189 Clifford (1997): 136. 190 Werbner (2000); Clifford (1997); Gilroy (1993); Hall (1990). 191 Shuval (2000). 192 Nonini (2005): 564. 193 Kearney (1995) and Michael Jacobsen, “Cross-Border Communities and Deterritorialising Identities— Assessing the Diaspora Triangle: Migrant-Host-Home,” Working Paper Series No. 19, Southeast Asian Research Center, City University of Hong Kong, January (2002): 1. 194 Cohen (1997); Shuval (2000); Nonini (2005) and Saskia Sassen, “Global Cities and Diasporic Networks: Microsites in Global Civil Society” in Marlies Galsius, Mary Kaldor and Hehnut Anheier eds., Global Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 195 For a discussion on this see Michael Mann, “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State?” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 472-496. 44 literature of diaspora, however, is that diasporas exhibit both tendencies and do so, sometimes, simultaneously. Diasporas are “rooted cosmopolitans” to Sidney Tarrow, who emphasizes the chauvinistic tendencies of diaspora,’96and “cosmopolitan patriots” to Kwame Anthony Appiah whose analysis underscores the hybridization of diaspora culture. 197 Diasporas are thus, ethnic-parochial, nationalistic and cosmopolitan.’98 Globalization and Connectivity The processes of globalization here refer to enhanced global economic, political, social, and cultural interdependence, accelerated flows of people, images, ideas and meanings, increased ease and affordability of travel and rapid advances in information and communication technologies. As Arjun Appadurai puts it, “with the advent of. . . the automobile and the airplane, the camera, the computer and the telephone, we have entered into an altogether new condition of neighbourliness, even with those most distant from ourselves.”99Diaspora scholars often draw a connection between globalization and the proliferation of new diasporas. Accelerated flows of people and growth in migration translate into potential diaspora members. Advanced communication technologies and ease of travel is associated with a resurgence of some formerly dormant diasporas as well as the unmaking of diasporas as members move to the homeland or another host country. In short, the new “distance shrinking technologies” and cheaper transport associated with globalization enable diaspora cross-border communication, exchange, and movement. The emphasis on dispersion, expansion, migration, displacement, and travel in definitions and analyses of diaspora place movement and mobility at “the heart of the diasporic condition. ,,200 However, Roza Tsagarousianou makes a compelling argument for a shift from “mobility” to “connectivity.” In this argument, it is communications and exchange that 196 Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 197 Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” Critical Inquiry 23, no. 3 (Spring, 1997): 6 17-639. 198 Werbner (2000): 6 and Carter (2005): 54-63. 199Appadi (2003): 2. 200Cline Horowitz (2005): 579. 45 are central to the contemporary diasporic experience or condition.20’Tsagarousianou’s thesis is closely linked with processes of globalization; he proposes that this shift to connectivity better reflects the complexity of diaspora relationships in the context of a globalizing world. Reis holds a similar view; she sees diasporization and globalization as “coeval processes, with globalization having the most impact on the contemporary phase.”202 Contemporary migrants and diasporas are not “isolated in the sense that their predecessors were during earlier forms of socio-cultural distanciation.”203 Rather, they are involved in constant interactions often over long distances that involve the circulation of people, information, money, goods, ideas, technology, artistic and cultural representations, and lifestyles. These interactions are facilitated by “distance shrinking technologies.” 204 Therefore, Tsagarousianou’s connectivity approach considers diaspora as “constellations of economic, technological, cultural and ideological and communications flows and networks.”205 To this we may add people and political flows. Critiques of this conception of diasporas as “flows” caution that these flows “are carried out by a variety of agents; but not all flows and agents are equal.. ,,206 In addition, this conceptualization of diaspora tends to assume the product of diaspora and connectivity will be progressive or cosmopolitan—”enabling new ways of ‘coexistence’ and ‘experiencing together” within the diaspora. 207 The opposite effect remains possible. If the combination of migrancy and connectivity (entailed in the diaspora condition) gives rise to new “opportunity structures,” as Tsagarousianou proposes, the prevailing result may also be the promotion of diaspora nationalism, parochialism, 201 Tsagarousianou (2004): 54; Karim H. Karim. “From Ethnic Media to Global Media: Transnational Communication Networks Among Diaspora Communities,” Transnational Communities Programme Working Paper Series (1998) at www.transcomm.ox.ac.uklworking_papers.htm; and David Elkins, “Globalization, Telecommunication and Virtual Ethnic Communities,” International Political Science Review 18, no. 2 (April 1997): 139-51. 202 Reis (2004): 47. 203 Tsagarousianou (2004): 60. 204 Michael Dahan and Gabriel Sheffer. “Ethnic Groups and Distance Shrinking Communications Technology,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 85-107. 205 Tsagarousianou (2004): 61. 206 Clime Horowitz (2005): 582. 207 Tsagarousianou (2004): 64. 46 fragmentation, and notions of exclusivity.208 However, the accessibility (in many cases) and affordability (for some) of modern communication technologies, in particular digital communication technology, and air travel almost certainly do represent new opportunities for both dissemination and negotiation of not only official and standardized diaspora arguments but also of the unofficial (or plebeian), subaltern or marginal ones. Transnational Community or Diaspora? The terms transnational community and diaspora are often used interchangeably or simultaneously209to describe the same or similar phenomena. There is indeed significant overlap between these two categories. The term transnational community, however, is more encompassing than diaspora. Loosely applied, a transnational community may include immigrants, refugees, exiles, expatriates, ethnic groups, sojourners, and temporary or more long-term workers and students, and the borderland communities that straddle one border.21° The transnational community is commonly described as “spanning two nations”211 rather than as a dispersed community. Studies of transnational communities often focus not only on the members residing (if only temporarily) outside their country of origin but also those within the homeland because of the continuous circulation of people, money, goods, information, ideas and practices between these two spaces.212 The lives of transnationals “cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field.”213 208 Marshall Van Alstyne and Erik Brynjolfsonn. “Electronic Communities: Global Villages or Cyberbalkans?”(1996); Maya Ranganathan, “Nurturing a Nation on the Net: The Case of Tamil Eelam,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 51-66; and Phineas Baxandall, Diasporas Good Capital. Bad Capital: Dangers and Development in Digital Diasporas, Nautilus Institute Diaspora Project. 209 Schnapper (1999) and Yossi Sham and Martin Sherman, “Diasporic Transnational Financial Flows and Their Impact on National Identity,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 7, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 1-36. 210 Van Hear (1998): 6. 211 Kearney (1995): 532. 212 See Clifford (1994): 303 and Peggy Levitt, “Social Remittances: A Conceptual Tool for Understanding Migration and Development,” Working Paper Series Number 96.04 (October 1996) and The Transnational Villagers (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001). 213 Glick Schiller et al. (1992): 1. 47 In the diaspora literature these transnational communities are characterized by their hi- locality and have also been described as borderland cultures214 or micro-diasporas.215They are thus presented as a distinct phenomenon (by Cohen) or as a type of diaspora (by Butler and Sheffer). Diaspora literature borrows heavily from the literature on transnational communities. Diaspora studies often make reference to and cite evidence of second generation (third, fourth, etc.) “diaspora” identity, practices, activities and organization, for example, that is derived from the transnational community literature, in particular, but not limited to, the work of Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton.216 Despite efforts to distinguish these two concepts by Cohen, Butler and others, the boundaries are indeed unclear. If a distinction is made based on hi-locality versus dispersion, as Butler suggests, we may indeed be studying a micro-diaspora or a section of a diaspora that is more widely dispersed (for example, studies on the Cuban diaspora that focus on Cubans in Florida or the United States rather than extending the scope of research to Cubans in Venezuela, or studies on Dominicans in New York rather than both New York and Madrid). If the hi- locality is based on communities separated by a national border rendering a clear single hostland and homeland relationship, then, as Sheffer suggests, we must also take into account how dispersed a community is within the hostland (as in the case of a Mexican “diaspora” in the United States). Finally, if the distinction is more theoretical as Cohen suggests, in that these borderland or transnational communities are “[sjocieties bleeding into one another creat[ing] new complex and other intermediate identities, not diasporas,” then we may also need to reconsider the inclusion of cultural studies, postmodernism and a now vast collection of literature that posits just such new forms of identity as the result of “diasporic” 214 Cohen (1997): 190. 215 Butler (2001): 196. The literature on diasporas tends to emphasize dispersal to two or more countries. However, allowances are made for applying the term diaspora to communities that are widely dispersed within one country, often far from the border of their country of origin. Sheffer cites the case of Mexicans who have settled in parts of the United States (and Canada) at a distance from the U.S.-Mexican border.215 Butler resolves the “distribution dilemma” by suggesting that the dispersal involve at least two “destinations.” 216 See William Safran, “Modem Diasporas in the Age of Globalization,” Review of Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad by Gabriel Sheffer in International Studies Review 6 (2004): 461-463; Anita Mannur, “Select Bibliography of Works on Diaspora” in Evans Braziel, Jana and Anita Mannur, eds. Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003): 292-329; and Steven Vertovec, “Three Meanings of ‘Diaspora,’ Exemplified among South Asian Religions,” Diaspora 6, no.3 (1997): 277-299. 48 relationships and conditions. Neither studies of diaspora nor transnational communities (when indeed they are differentiated) is served by such exclusion. Diasporas are transnational, and transnational communities (or at least sections of such) share diasporic conditions and exhibit diasporic features. The Politics of Diaspora Situating Diaspora Politics Although comparatively late to the study of diasporas, since the 1 990s political science has made important contributions to this literature. Yossi Sham and especially Gabriel Sheffer, both political scientists, have long suggested that diasporas are a widespread, enduring, proliferating, and politically significant phenomenon. Particularly noteworthy is Gabriel Sheffer’s edited volume, Modern Diasporas in International Politics (1986) and his later work, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (2003) as well as Yossi Sham’s Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands (1999). Taking the diaspora-hostland relationship as the focus of analysis, we may consider diasporas as a type of interest group or pressure group217 and situate their study within the field of comparative politics. Diaspora collective associations can be powerful pressure groups in the domestic politics of host countries. The Jewish and Irish lobbies in the U.S. are examples of this. 218 Diaspora organizations can also act as interest groups in the homeland.219 The diaspora-host government relationship is a frequent topic of study, but the political relationship between diasporas and other national interest groups is also a potentially rich area of comparative political study. Earlier in this chapter, the differences and similarities between diasporas and transnational communities were articulated. Both entities are, of course, closely associated with the more general concept of transnationalism—”the multiple 217 See, for example, Yossi Sham, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 218 Sham and Barth (2003): 453-54; Sham and Sherman (2001): 1; and Vertovec (1997): 279. 219 Shain and Barth (2003): 460; Sham and Sherman (2001): 1. 49 ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation states.”220 The political activities of diasporas are not limited to the hostland or to the diaspora experience in the hostland; they are frequently extended to the homeland and to the sites of co-diasporans. Therefore, we may also view diasporas as a type of transnational nonstate actor and integrate their study into the field of international relations. The dominance of the state-centric model in international relations22’contributed to the sidelining of nonstate actors, including diasporas, as valuable units of analysis.222 As challenges to the state-centric model opened the door to alternative approaches, interest in the study of diasporas as actors in international politics also grew. The political (economic and cultural) activities of diasporas, however, blur the boundaries between domestic and international politics. Therefore, work on diaspora politics tends to emphasize the triadic networks or triangular relationship between diaspora, homeland, and host government.223 An example of this is the literature on the role of diasporas as “lobbyists” in the host country and their ability to influence and even capture its foreign policy toward their country of origin. This literature has elicited lively debate with one side suggesting that diasporas identify and care about co-ethnics or co-diasporans in other states and that they are often able to influence hostland foreign policy.224 The other side concludes that influence on foreign policy is limited and rare and the capture of foreign policy—as in the case of Cuban- 220 Vertovec (1999): 447. 221 Particularly in neorealist and neoliberal approaches—less so the constructivist approach, despite criticism of Alexander Wendt’s work for privileging the role of the state. Alexander Wendt describes his analysis of international politics as ‘thin constructivism.’ See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 222 Reis (2004): 42. 223 Sheffer (2003); Sham (2002, 1999) and “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994-95): 811-841; Anand (2000): 216; and Esman (1986): 349. 224 Sham and Barth (2003); Stephen M. Saideman, “The Power of the Small: The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 93-105 and The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Nedim Ogelman, Jeanette Money and Philip Martin, “Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access,” SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 145-166; David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16, no. 3 (July 1993): 373-389. 50 Americans capturing U.S. policy toward Cuba—is an exception rather than the rule.225 Arguably, this position ignores cases of apparent capture that would be difficult to attribute to geopolitical motivations rather than diaspora influence, American policy towards Macedonia and Azerbaijan, for example.226 The United States is not alone, Germany was criticized for its early recognition of Croatian independence, a move that some view as having sparked the civil war in Yugoslavia. Arguably, Germany’s recognition was partly the result of lobbying by its Croatian population.227 The role of diasporas as nonstate actors involved in financing armed conflict and development is the focus of another growing body of diaspora politics literature (and political economy).228 To Yossi Sham and Martin Sherman diaspora financial flows are “a force to be reckoned with in international politics.”229 Work on this topic includes the widely cited World Bank studies by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler which conclude that the opportunity to capture resources rather than objective grievances is the primary motivation for rebellion and cause of intra-state conflict, and that diasporas, in particular sizable ones in the United States, play a key role in the re-emergence of conflict, “presumably” through financial contributions to insurgents.230 Examples of financial contributions include the nearly US$4 million the Irish Northern Aid (NORAID), a U.S.-based organization, sent to Northern 225 Will H. Moore, “Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 77- 91 and Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001). 226 Greek-Americans succeeded in limiting U.S. involvement and recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and despite opposition from then President Clinton, Armenian-Americans were instrumental in introducing and maintaining a ban on U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan (after Armenia was able to annex land connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory within Azerbaijan home to a majority population of Armenian etlmicity). 227 Rey Koslowski, Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000): 174. 228 See Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007); Katrin Radtke, “Engaging the Diaspora: The Dynamics of Diaspora Mobilization in Civil Wars,” paper presented to the 47th International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, CA (March 2006) and The Economist (2003). 229 Sham and Sherman (2001): 3. ° Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002). 51 Ireland in the early 1980s;23’the more recent case (1991) of diaspora donations US$4 million to the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party of nationalist candidate, Franjo Tudjman232 and subsequent donations of US$50 million to the Croatian government.233 But if diaspora money can be used to fuel conflict, it is also theorized that it represents a source of development assistance and potential stability234 The International Organization for Migration estimates that remittances to developing countries account for substantially more than official development assistance, capital market flows, and over half of foreign direct investment.235 Van Hear posits that these remittances are used for daily subsistence needs, health care, housing, education, and to pay off debts. Patricia Weiss Fagen and Micah N. 231 The US$4 million represents only NORAID’s declared contributions, not the alleged undeclared additional funds retained in the U.S. See John Horgan and Max Taylor. “Playing the ‘Green Card’: Financing the Provisional IRA: Part 2,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no.2 (2003): 1-60; John F. Stack, “Ethnic Groups as Emerging Transnational Actors” in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., Migration. Diasporas. and Transnationalism (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999): 626-654; Adrian Guelke, “The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” International Affairs 72, no. 3, (1996): 521-536; Paul Arthur, “Diasporan Intervention in International Affairs: Irish America as a Case Study,” Diaspora 1, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 143-59; and The CAIN Web Service (Conflict Archive on the Internet): The Northern Ireland Conflict of the University of Ulster at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ 232 Koslowski (2000): 193; Sham and Sherman (2001): 19; The Economist (2003): 25. 233 Zlatko Skrbi, “The Mobilized Croatian Diaspora: Its Role in Homeland Politics and War” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (ed.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007): 233. 234 Manuel Orozco, “Diasporas, Philanthropy and Hometown Associations: The Central American Experience,” Inter-American Dialogue (March 22, 2006); Victoria Minoian and Lev Freinkman, “Diaspora’s Contribution to Armenia’s Economic Development: What Drives the First Movers and How Their Efforts Could Be Scaled Up?” in Yevgeny Kuznetzov, ed. Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroaci, The World Bank, WBI Development Studies (2006); Nneoma Nwogu, “Diaspora Peoples/Hometown Associations, Nation-States and Development,” The Michigan Journal of Public Affairs 2 (Summer 2005): 1-11; Zunzer (2004); Moises Naim, “The New Diaspora,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2002): 95-96; and Pascal Zachary, “Diaspora Capitalism and Exile as A Way of Life: Some Observations on the Political and Economic Mobilization of Dispersed Peoples,” The Nautilus Institute Diaspora Project (2002). See Ninna Nyberg Sorensen, “Migrant Transfers as a Development Tool: The Case of Morocco,” Migration Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. 2, International Organization for Migration (June 2004) and Sorensen, “The Development Dimension of Migrant Remittances,” Migration Policy Research, Working Paper Series No. 1. International Organization for Migration (June 2004). Remittances are sent by both migrants and guest workers as in the case of the Philippines. 52 Bump consider remittances the “sine qua non for peace and rebuilding.”236 They can assist development, help people to survive during conflict and to rebuild afterward.237 The Political Roles of Diasporas The brief survey above attempts to situate diaspora studies within the sub-fields of comparative politics and international relations while also highlighting the fact that the diaspora phenomenon and the political activities of diaspora bridge these two areas of political study. The examples cited from the literature on diasporas’ role as “lobbyists” and nonstate financiers of conflict and development provide evidence of the political roles diasporas play in domestic and international politics. In addition to these two broad categories of a) fund-raising, financial contributions and remittances and b) lobbying and activism, the literature suggests diaspora political activities and roles may also include: 1. Leadership. Diaspora associations represent a pooi of potential leaders for the homeland. In conflict situations, stateless diaspora may include “rebel” leaders and exiles that provide long-distance advice and have an input into political and military strategy. In peacetime or post-conflict, diasporas may supply whole political parties as in Armenia, foreign ministers in Estonia, or a President in Latvia.238 Intellectuals and cultural figures (scientists, authors, artists), the subjects of much postmodern diaspora literature, are also potential leaders for the homeland. 2. Mediation and peace-making and i,revention of human rights abuses. Diasporas with ties to political and warring groups in the homeland may persuade or exert pressure to bring their side to the table. The Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA) did just that; the organizations lobbied the U.S. Congress and President as well as Sinn Fein in Northern 236Paicia Weiss Fagen and Micah N. Bump, “Remittances in Conflict and Crisis: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises, and Transition to Peace,” International Peace Academy, Policy Paper, New York (2006): i. 237 Van Hear (1998) and “Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict,” Migration Information Source (June 2003) at www.migrationinformation.org 238 Khachig TolOlyan, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation, Diaspora 9, no. 1 (2000): 113 and The Economist 2003). 53 Ireland to draw it into the peace process.239 In a study of the Palestinian diaspora, Margaret Johannsen suggests that diaspora groups use personal and institutional contacts in their country of origin to “support peace constituencies in the conflict region.” 240 Finally, diaspora organizations and individual members may devote significant efforts to bringing attention to human rights abuses in the homeland or perpetrated against co diasporans. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary believe that human rights abuses may be more likely if an ethnic community lacks its own state or a powerful diaspora to act in its defence.24’ 3. Intelligence supply. Michael Dahan and Gabriel Sheffer suggest that diaspora associations may supply the homeland with general information and intelligence about host countries and other domestic and international systems and actors. This may be done openly or through secret exchanges. The Mossad (Israeli Secret Services), for example, reportedly maintains connections with “security officers” in Jewish organizations in the United States and through this network Israel receives warnings about potential dangers and terrorist attacks.242 4. Brain drain, reverse brain drain (or brain circulation), reconstruction, and development. Diasporas can be a source of knowledge and technology transfer valuable to development and reconstruction efforts in the homeland. Diasporas may be the source of returning or visiting experts and specialists in medicine, law, economic policy and planning, agriculture, engineering, information and communication technologies, etc. 243 The making or growth of the diaspora, however, may also represent a “brain drain” for the homeland. 239 Guelke (1996): 533. 240 Margaret Johannsen, “Palestinian Diaspora: Part of the Probleni, Part of the Solution,” New Routes — Journal for Peace Research and Action 1(2005): 11. 241 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: Routledge, 1993): 8. 242 Dahan and Sheffer (2001): 93-94. 243 Kuznetsov (2006); Hem de Haas, Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford (June 2006); Abdullah A. Mohamoud, “Diasporas: Untapped Potential for Peacebuilding in the Homelands” in Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema and Juliette Verhoeven, People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); and R. Cheran (2004). 54 5. Framing identity, grievances, and conflict. Through the circulation of funds, people, ideas, information, and intelligence, the capacity to lobby, network and deploy information strategically, and aided by advanced communication technologies, a diaspora can project to its host country, the homeland, and worldwide, its own interpretation of what constitutes the diaspora and homeland (national) identity, the grievances associated with the diaspora vis-à-vis the hostland or hom
UBC Theses and Dissertations
Making noise : the transnational politics of Aceh and East Timor in the diaspora Fallon, Karla S. 2009
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