MAKING NOISE: 
THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF ACEH AND EAST TIMOR IN THE DIASPORA

by

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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the transnational politics of two new or incipient diasporas, the Acehnese and East Timorese. It examines their political roles and activities in and across several countries in the West (Europe, North America, and Australia) as well as their impact on the “homeland” or country of origin, during and after armed conflict. It suggests that the importance of diaspora participation in conflict and conflict settlement is not solely or even primarily dependent on the material resources of the diaspora. Instead it is the ideational and political resources that may determine a diaspora’s ability to ensure its impact on the homeland, on the conflict, and its participation in the conflict settlement process. This study adopts a constructivist approach, process-tracing methods, and an analytical framework that combines insights from diaspora politics and theories on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). It concludes that the Aceh and East Timor cases support the proposition that diasporas are important and dynamic political actors, even when they are small, new, and weak. These cases also support the proposition that the political identities and goals of diasporas can be transformed over time as a diaspora is replenished with new members who have new or different ideas, as factions within diasporas gain power vis-à-vis others, and/or as the political partners available to the diaspora in the hostland and internationally change or broaden. The analysis of a diaspora’s relationship with a transnational advocacy network or networks (TAN) yields new insights into conflict settlement processes. Diasporans potentially learn from, contribute to, and benefit from TAN strategies and tactics. The TAN itself can help project the political influence of the diaspora. More significantly, the diaspora-TAN relationship, in certain cases, can have a transformative effect on the diaspora, potentially moderating its views and positions, and thereby facilitating conflict settlement. Moreover, the moderating influence of the diaspora-TAN relationship may have implications for the post-conflict consolidation of democracy, human rights norms, and civil society.
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<tr>
<td>Aceh Center</td>
<td>Diaspora organization in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania</td>
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<td>Aceh Community Australia</td>
<td>Diaspora political organization in Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>AETA</td>
<td>Australia East Timor Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHRO</td>
<td>Aceh Human Rights Online (Australia-based joint diaspora and solidarity organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>Associação Popular Democrática Popular Democratic Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>Action in Solidarity with Asia Pacific (formerly ASIET)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Associação Social Democrática Timorense, Timorese Social Democratic Association (Precursor to Fretilin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIET</td>
<td>Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASNLF (see GAM)</td>
<td>Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, Aceh Reintegration Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRR</td>
<td>Badan Rehabilitasi &amp; Rekonstruksi, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bupati</td>
<td>Head of district (Indonesian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Agency for Overseas Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVR (Chega!)</td>
<td>Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIET</td>
<td>Campaign for an Independent East Timor (Australia-based org.)</td>
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<td>Glossary and Abbreviations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIR</td>
<td>Catholic Institute for International Relations (renamed Progressio)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Crisis Management Initiative Helsinki-based NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere National Council of Maubere Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense National Council of Timorese Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COHA</td>
<td>Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement signed by the Government and Indonesia and GAM in December 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoSPA</td>
<td>Komisi Keberlanjutan Perdamaian, Aceh Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh/CoSPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Daerah Operasi Militer Military Operation Zone/Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETAN</td>
<td>East Timor Action Network (U.S. solidarity organization), after East Timor independence changed name to East Timor and Indonesia Action Network and broadened scope of work to include Aceh and West Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETAN</td>
<td>East Timor Alert Network (Canadian solidarity organization)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETRA</td>
<td>East Timor Relief Association (Australia-based diaspora organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falintil</td>
<td>Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fenetil</td>
<td>Frente Clandestina dos Estudiantes de Timor-Leste Clandestine Front of East Timorese Students Student group based in Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for and Independent East Timor Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente</td>
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<td><strong>Glossary and Abbreviations</strong></td>
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| **GAM** | Gerakan Aceh Merdeka  
Free Aceh Movement |
| **HDC** | Henri Dunant Centre |
| **HRW** | Human Rights Watch |
| **ICG** | International Crisis Group |
| **Helsinki MoU Watch** | Tim Pemantau MoU Helsinki  
Aceh-based organization that advocates conformity  
of the LoGA with the text of the MoU |
| **IFA** | International Forum for Aceh (U.S.-based diaspora-established non-governmental organization) |
| **IMET** | International Military Education and Training Program (U.S. Gov.) |
| **Indonesian Solidarity** | Australia-based NGO |
| **INTERFET** | International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) |
| **KPA** | Komite Peralihan Aceh  
Aceh Transition Committee  
Body created to accommodate former GAM fighters  
post-conflict (from 2005) |
| **Komnas HAM** | Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia  
National Commission for Human Rights (Indonesia) |
| **LoGA** | Law on Governing Aceh |
| **Magna Carta** | Magna Carta Concerning Freedoms, Rights, Duties and Guarantees for the People of East Timor  
Adopted at the First East Timorese National Convention in the Diaspora, Magna Carta, Peniche, Portugal 1998 |
| **Mary MacKillop Institute** | Australia religious organization providing support and aid to East Timor |
### Glossary and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Maubere</td>
<td>Common name among East Timorese people, son of Timor; used as a derogatory term for the poor and indigenous during Portuguese colonization; Fretilin adopted the term as a political symbol of East Timorese pride and cultural identity in 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP-GAM</td>
<td>Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM splinter group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NII</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia Islamic State of Indonesia, declared by Teungku M. Daud Beureuch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-partisans</td>
<td>Also referred to as independents or nationalists; East Timorese not directly affiliated with a political party but supportive of independence for East Timor; self-labeled as non-partisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERMAS</td>
<td>The Association of Achehnese Community in Scandinavia Group opposing MoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory Committee for the Free Acheh Democratic</td>
<td>Group opposing MoU (U.S. based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressio</td>
<td>See CIIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSA</td>
<td>Persatuan Ulamam Seluruh Aceh All-Aceh Union of Islamic teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformasi</td>
<td>Period of political reform in Indonesia, leading up to 1998 and fall of President Suharto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renetil</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste National Resistance of East Timorese Students Formed in 1988, based in Indonesia</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCHRA</td>
<td>Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Grouping of NGOs from around the world sharing IFA’s mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRA</td>
<td>Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Center for Aceh Referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMUR</td>
<td>Solidaritas Mahasiwa Untuk Rakyat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student Solidarity for the People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidamor</td>
<td>Solidarity for East Timor (Indonesian activist group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavanger Declaration</td>
<td>Document issued by the “Executive Committee of the Worldwide Acehnese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representatives Meeting,” Stavanger Norway (understood to be a GAM document)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapol</td>
<td>UK-based NGO dedicated to human rights in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetum</td>
<td>East Timorese language (most commonly used, also spelled Tetun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Portuguese spelling and official name of independent East Timor (independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from May 25, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>União Democrática Timorense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisory body for referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPO</td>
<td>Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), non-governmental org.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based in the Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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</table>
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This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance, encouragement, imparted knowledge, and patience of my doctoral advisor, Diane Mauzy. Dr. Mauzy steered and encouraged me through field research in four continents and a long and arduous writing process. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my doctoral committee members, Brian Job and Merje Kuus, who offered insightful comments and suggestions through the various drafts of this dissertation, and to my university examiners, Peter Dauvergne and Jim Glassman. At the University of British Columbia, Max Cameron and Richard Price helped me lay the foundations for this work through their instruction. I am grateful to the people who generously gave of their time and agreed to meet and share their life and work experiences with me. Not only did they give of their time, but also frequently shared documentation, audio and visual material that was critical to the analyses in this work. Edward Aspinall, Shadia Marhaban, and the East-West Center assisted me in setting up important interviews.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

In this dissertation I analyze two new or incipient diasporas,¹ the Acehnese and East Timorese. I examine their political roles and activities in several countries (of Europe and North America, and in Australia) as well as their impact on the “homeland” or country of origin during and after armed conflict. I suggest that the Aceh and East Timor diaspora cases support the proposition that diasporas are important and dynamic international actors and that, despite their small size and relative economic and political weaknesses, they are critical to understanding not only the nature of the homeland conflict and its perpetuation, but also its transformation and/or resolution.

I arrived at the study of diasporas through an earlier analysis of representations of ethnicity and ethnic conflict on the internet. In surveying websites on Xinjiang (China), Sri Lanka and West Papua, it became clear that web-based political activism was primarily the work of co-ethnics residing outside conflict areas—that is, the work of nonstate actors frequently referred to as “diasporas.” Both ethnic conflict and the influence on this of nonstate actors such as international organizations and non-governmental organizations are well documented in political science.² However, while interest in the subject of diasporas has exploded in the

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¹ New diasporas—also called incipient diasporas—are diasporas in the making; they have a relatively recent history of migration. They are frequently smaller in terms of population numbers, and are also politically and economically, relatively weak. However, they do exhibit initial efforts to organize as diasporas. The use of the terms “new” and “incipient” are discussed further in Chapter 2.

social sciences, literature on the political role of diasporas remains comparatively thin. This is partly the result of a tendency in political science to subsume the analysis of diasporas under the study of ethnic groups and ethnic politics. The study of ethnicity focuses on the binary relationship of ethnic group and state or ethnic minority and ethnic majority within a state or society—what Östen Wahibeck calls, “a strictly localized approach.” The diaspora experience, however, has no such fixed setting. It is the multiple and changing “settings” that help to distinguish the concept of diaspora from ethnic groups and minorities.

Diasporas are transnational actors and operate in multiple settings. Their members are linked by relationships, interactions, and activities across the borders of states. The political activities of diasporas span the hostland (the country of residence), homeland (country of origin) as well as the sites of co-diasporans. As Yossi Shain explains, diasporas have “a capacity for independent and assertive political action” that extends beyond the host state. In a similar vein, Hazel Smith describes diasporas as “new and potentially powerful international actors.” The transnational character of their political activity and the potential span of their influence make diasporas valuable units of analysis for political science. A particular fruitful area for such analysis is the role of diasporas in conflict and post-conflict settings.

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There is a limited but growing scholarship on this subject, most notably the 2007 addition of an edited volume by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, *Diasporas in Conflict*. Smith and Stares conclude that diasporas are both peace-makers and peace-wreckers, and that they can have a profound impact on a conflict. Diaspora impact, they write, is determined by diaspora capacity and structural opportunity. The contributors to *Diasporas in Conflict* define this capacity as the diaspora’s economic resources and political strength. As with many studies of diasporas, the findings in this volume are based on case studies of several large, well-established diasporas with considerable economic and political resources—Jewish, Armenian, Cuban, Croatian, Tamil. Diasporas with significant, economic resources and political access to the host country government, potentially, can lobby government offices and officials directly, hire influential lobbyists and public relations firms, and contribute “generously” to election campaigns. Their economic and political resources, potentially, allow them to deploy influence strategies aimed at host country media as well as foreign policies (sanctions, trade restrictions, humanitarian aid, military aid). Their numbers, particularly if concentrated in specific locations, may allow them to leverage their political support during elections. They may also be able to directly influence the “homeland” through many (if not all) of the same means. Conversely, as in other analyses of diasporas, the editors of *Diasporas in Conflict* assume that “weak” diasporas—those with limited economic resources and without independent access to power—“do not intervene in conflicts” because they cannot.

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9 "Peace-wrecking" here is used more broadly than the more narrow definition of “spoiling” as the “violent obstruction of a peaceful settlement by actors directly involved in a conflict” (see Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peace Building,” United Nations University/Policy Brief No. 2, 2006 and Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security* 22, no. 2, 1997). Following Newman and Oliver, peace-wrecking behavior is taken to mean the activities of actors “opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason.” These actors may act within or outside the peace process “and use violence and other means to disrupt the process....” They include actors that join but later withdraw and obstruct or threaten to obstruct the process; actors that join peace process but “are not seriously interested in making compromises” or committing long-term; and actors that “are geographically external to the conflict but which support internal spoilers and spoiling tactics.” See Newman and Richmond (2006): 1-2.


In this dissertation I will test this assumption. I will do so by examining the political role in armed conflict of two small, new, and weak diasporas, the East Timorese and Acehnese. Due to their size and apparent political weakness, these two diasporas represent interesting cases with which to challenge established assumptions. Because the conflict in the homeland was apparently resolved as of 2007, it will be possible to analyze diaspora activity and capacity from conflict emergence, through settlement and the post-conflict setting. It will also be possible to trace diaspora activity during periods of significant advances in processes of communication and exchange, and to determine to what extent the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas made use of such advances and to what effect. Finally, I will broaden the focus of my investigation from the triadic relationship of diaspora with homeland, hostland and among co-diasporans to the diasporas’ relationship with other nonstate actors, specifically transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Although existing scholarship frequently mentions and alludes to the diaspora-TAN relationship, its analysis has been neglected.12 This dissertation will thus highlight a subject that has not been well tested in political science or in the broader diaspora literature—the relationship between diasporas and TANs and the potential moderating, neutral, or inhibiting effect of this relationship on conflict settlement.

My dissertation proposes that new (or incipient) and small diasporas, despite their apparent weaknesses, can play an important political role internationally. They can influence the conflict and conflict-settlement processes of the homeland. I further argue that the internal power relations of diasporas matter, and that these help determine whether a diaspora will act as peace-maker, peace-wrecker, or neither. Diaspora partners are not limited to states (homeland, host or third party); diasporas may also engage in relationships and partnerships with transnational advocacy networks. I propose that these diaspora-TAN relationships can be mutually constitutive, and, in some cases, can have a transformative and moderating effect on the positions of the diaspora, thereby facilitating conflict settlement.

Major Questions and Propositions

Over a period of thirty years, the Acehnese and East Timorese in diaspora could have extricated themselves from the homeland conflict; they could have integrated into or assimilated to the host country and lost interest or energy due to the demands and challenges of resettlement, but they did not. Why and in what ways did these Acehnese and East Timorese in diaspora remain active participants in the “homeland” conflict? Why and how did they manage to maintain their position as vital actors in efforts towards conflict settlement? And why and in what ways were the political identities, goals, and strategies of these diasporas transformed over time and to what effect?

I argue, first, that the political identity of diasporas is neither given nor fixed, rather it is constructed. If the diaspora is to remain an active participant in the homeland conflict, then the construction of diaspora identity must involve processes and activities that consistently reinforce this participation, even when there are no tangible and immediate material benefits to be gained from engagement.

Second, I argue that the importance of diaspora participation in conflict settlement is not solely or even primarily dependent on the diaspora having considerable material resources (namely funding and/or weapons) to have an effect on the military conflict in the homeland. If the political space for opposition and negotiation in the homeland has closed, even a diaspora’s limited material resources may be sufficient to ensure its participation in the conflict settlement process. Furthermore, I argue that, in fact, it may be the diaspora’s ideational and political resources rather than material resources that determine its ability to insert itself into the conflict settlement process.

Finally, I argue that the political identities, goals and strategies of diasporas can be transformed over time. This may occur as the diaspora is replenished with new members who have new or different ideas, as factions within diasporas gain power vis-à-vis other
factions, or as the political partners available to the diaspora in the hostland and internationally change or broaden. Furthermore, I propose that if the political partner is a transnational advocacy network, then the relationship can potentially have a transformative influence on the political identity of the diaspora. In some cases, this can lead it to adopt more moderate positions and demands and can facilitate negotiated settlement of conflicts.

**Projecting Diaspora Politics: The Aceh and East Timor Cases**

**Analytical Framework—Diasporas and Transnational Advocacy Networks**

Much of the diaspora literature examines the interaction or interplay between the “here” and “there” of the diaspora experience and political activity, that is, between the diaspora and host state and the diaspora and homeland. Many diaspora analyses extend this binary relationship to a triangular relationship among the host, home and intra-diaspora itself, wherever it may be physically located. These spaces and places of analysis may be sufficient to explain the political activity and political mobilization of the larger and relatively richer diasporas, but they may not accurately reflect the experience of active smaller and incipient diasporas. This requires an additional level of analysis. Gabriel Sheffer takes the triangular relationship of host, home, and diaspora as the core of diaspora systems, but he acknowledges that “the number of actors and interests involved is even greater and that these deserve special attention.” These other actors may include other states (neither homeland nor host), international organizations and non-governmental organizations, as well as individuals.

For the purpose of this analysis, I turn to the literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). This addition allows analysis of diaspora political activity (and political identity)

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13 By faction I mean a group of persons or network of persons within the diaspora, not necessarily a cohesive political faction or unit within a party or political organization of the diaspora.


as an interaction among the “here” and “there” of the host and home, the “within” of the dispersed diaspora, and the “anywhere” of the transnational advocacy network. This interaction reflects both the reach of a diaspora based on its own dispersion and the potential to amplify the diaspora political influence through participation in an advocacy network.

As defined by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, TANs are networks of national and international NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals whose formation was motivated largely by “principled ideas or values.”17 Activists within a TAN seek to influence policy and policy outcomes, and to influence or change the behavior of states and international organizations. They attempt to participate in and shape new areas of domestic and international politics.18 They work to “gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments”19 through persuasion, socialization, and pressure.20 TANs generate information quickly,21 make use of information and information exchange, employ “political strategies” in their campaigns,22 and build new links among various actors. By doing so, they attempt to multiply “channels of access to the international system.”23 TAN strategies and tactics include the use of information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics.24 Through relationships with TAN members and participation in these advocacy networks, small and new diasporas can potentially learn from, contribute to, and benefit from TAN strategies and tactics, and enhance the influence of the diaspora.

Studies on TANs incorporate concepts from social movements and political mobilization studies, including Charles Tilly’s and Sidney Tarrow’s “repertoires of action,” that are valuable for empirical analysis of diaspora political activity. The repertoires of action include the tactics of petitions, rallies and demonstrations, public meetings, education seminars, lobbying, performances, etc. They also include the broader strategies of information, symbolic, leverage, and accountability politics discussed by Keck and Sikkink. The addition of insights from the literature of TANs to diaspora politics analysis allows us to consider the specific content of diaspora sets of action or “repertoires of action,” whether these change over time, and if they are effective.

I also propose an analysis of diaspora “repertoires of representation.” As Pnina Werbner explains, “to know oneself as a member of a diaspora requires images, symbols, a shared language, representation.” These are often reflected in the repertoires of action, but require discrete analysis. Repertoires of representation reflect the ideas, values, norms and goals that are negotiated 1) within the diaspora through private quotidian as well as more official interactions, 2) with the homeland, 3) with the host country, and, I argue, 4) with the advocacy network. Repertoires of representation are also technology sensitive. Diasporas are dependent on technology for the communication and circulation of repertoires of representation amongst themselves and with a larger audience; some representations may adapt to new communications technologies better than others.

Repertoires of action and repertoires of representation and particularly changes in these reflect tensions within the diaspora and within the diaspora-advocacy network interaction. Tensions arise because diasporas are neither static nor monolithic, they are internally

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heterogeneous, divided by class, age, gender, regional provenance, education, ideology, etc.\textsuperscript{27} They can be peace-makers, peace-wreckers or neither.\textsuperscript{28} They can be ethnic-parochial, exclusionary and nationalistic and cosmopolitan.\textsuperscript{29} Which way the pendulum swings may be determined by the material, organizational, and ideational resources, and the "framing"\textsuperscript{30} capacity of the ethno-nationals or cosmopolitans, and by their interactions with the advocacy network.\textsuperscript{31}

Although the theoretical approach employed for the purpose of this research integrates diaspora and transnational advocacy network (TAN) theories, diasporas require discreet analysis in this context. The literature on transnational advocacy networks (primarily the works of Keck and Sikkink and Tarrow) indeed mention exiles and diasporas as potential participants in TANs, but the diaspora role is neither specified nor analyzed. Tarrow has taken a tentative step towards situating diasporas within the study of transnational networks and activism,\textsuperscript{32} but (perhaps due to an over-reliance on Benedict Anderson’s work) limited his observations to diaspora nationalism. Diasporas can be both participants in a TAN and partners with a TAN. Moreover, the role of diasporas in the TAN can differ from that of other nonstate actors such as NGOs or government or international agencies and officials. Finally, although the TAN literature is rich in analysis of agency and transformative processes, it has little to say on the potential effect of the TAN-diaspora partnership itself and


\textsuperscript{30} Following McAdam, McCarty and Zald and Keck and Sikkink, to “frame” is to form understandings of an issue, make it comprehensible to an audience, attract attention, and legitimate and motivate collective action.


the implications of this relationship for conflict settlement. I propose that it is in this respect that the integration of TAN and diaspora theory proves most fruitful.

The Cases

In this dissertation I will examine the political role and activities of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas in several countries of Europe, in North America, and Australia (all democratic Western states) and their impact on the "homeland" during and after a self-determination conflict. The Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas represent interesting cases that challenge theoretical expectations. Based on their numbers, geographical distribution, and their relatively recent history of migration they should be politically weak and have little or very limited influence in the country of origin. Their numbers are much smaller than those of traditionally-studied diasporas, they are distributed in small numbers across long distances, and they are by virtue of their "newness" less likely to have access to host country resources, in particular access to host government political institutions or the financial resources to exert significant influence. They also represent comparable cases, as similar as possible in most regards to allow comparisons and propositions to be tested. Both are cases of stateless diasporas whose "homeland" has been the site of a self-determination, secessionist struggle against the Indonesian state. The "homeland" in both cases is located geographically on the Indonesian archipelago. The modern conflicts against the state, in both Aceh and East Timor, began in the mid-1970s and lasted (through degrees of intensity) approximately for three decades. Both Aceh and East Timor (or their surrounding waters) hold significant oil and gas resources and economic grievances were an important element in self-determination discourse, as were grievances associated with human rights, reflecting the violence of both conflicts. Through these two cases, I will provide an in-depth empirical analysis that is useful in testing theories of diaspora, theories of transnational activism, and in

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33 The Jewish population (outside of Israel) is 7.6 million, with 5.3 million in the United States (2007 estimate), the Armenian diaspora is estimated to be 8 million (2007). The population of frequently studied new or incipient diasporas is also much higher: Palestinian estimated 6 million, Croatian estimated 2.5 million in North America, Sri Lankan Tamil estimated at 600,000-800,000 million, mostly in Canada and the UK (2006). For a collection of analyses of these and other diasporas and information on their numbers and considerable economic and political resources see Smith and Stares (2007).

34 As described earlier in this chapter new diasporas—also called incipient diasporas—are "diasporas in the making," new groups to a region exhibiting diaspora features and initial efforts to organize as diasporas.
revealing interactions that might help to shed light not only on the international role of
diasporas, but also on the process of conflict settlement.

In analyzing the two cases, I am adopting a constructivist approach. Materialist approaches explain outcomes by focusing on constraints, on "the strategic setting in which individuals make choices..." They emphasize structural and institutional constraints and their regulatory effect on behavior and outcomes. Materialist approaches generally posit utility maximizing "rational" actors motivated by self-interest. Constructivist approaches focus on social structure, constitutive relationships, actors' interpretation of reality based on shared ideas and understandings, collective meaning, and on how actors process information. Thus, outcomes may be determined not by material forces or objective circumstances but by actors' interpretation and shared understandings of these.

Materialist approaches are useful in explaining, for example, how systemic changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and globalization processes (Asian financial crisis) contributed to the eventual fall of Suharto's New Order regime in Indonesia and to the subsequent referendum in East Timor resulting in its independence. They are less useful, however, in explaining why the "idea" of a referendum was adopted over other "ideas" for solutions to the East Timor question or why a referendum took place in East Timor but not in Aceh

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35 When referring to a "materialist approach," I include realist/neo-realist and to a lesser extent neoliberal approaches. I adopt the International Relations usage of 'materialist' for approaches that emphasize distribution of power and take power as determined primarily by military and economic capabilities. They also tend to assume actors are egoistic value maximizers (and define this as 'rational'). This is in contrast with constructivism's emphasis on the ideational, on identities and shared knowledge and a questioning of the normative assumptions behind realist, neorealist and neoliberal views on, for example, anarchy and actor rationality and (less so neoliberalism) definitions of power and capabilities. See, for example, Wendt (1999): 29-33.


39 I am grateful for Katya Burns for sharing her views with me on this topic.
(although the possibility of a referendum had also been suggested for Aceh). In the case of Indonesia, changes in domestic political opportunity structures may be explained by systemic factors, but these factors fail to explain why an international solidarity movement for East Timor (which included the participation of the East Timor diaspora) developed and how it was mobilized to exploit these changes in Indonesian political opportunity structures. Materialist approaches do explain how diasporas contribute to the perpetuation of low-level or guerilla conflict (through a supply of financial resources and arms), but they do not answer why diasporas do so or what their other means of influence might be (although it is acknowledged that diaspora influence is not limited to financial and arms supply).40 Finally, materialist approaches claim to explain why small, weak, and new diasporas are unable to impact conflict in the country of origin (their lack of material resources), but they do not explain cases such as the East Timorese and Acehnese in which these diasporas did have an impact despite their lack of material resources.

Constructivist analyses explore the ways in which identities and interests are shaped or constituted41 by collective meanings and shared knowledge through processes of social interaction. In Alexander Wendt’s words: “Simply put, we want what we want because of how we think about it.”42 A constructivist approach, therefore, is useful in uncovering the reasons why and processes through which the political identities, goals and strategies of diasporas are transformed over time and to what effect. Taking diasporas as actors and interests constituted in interaction43 is in line with the emergent consensus in diaspora literature positing that diasporas “change over time and respond to different political and social contexts in which their members find themselves.”44 The literature on transnational advocacy networks also draws from this constructivist tradition.45

41 That is, identities and interests are not “given,” instead, they are produced and re-produced.
Methodology
The two cases selected for this research—the East Timor and Aceh diasporas—are what Arend Lijphart describes as comparable cases, "similar in a large number of important characteristics." 46 They share sufficient similarities to yield useful comparisons and contrasts.47 I employ case studies because of their "comparative advantages" in examining qualitative variables, individual actors, decision-making processes, historical and social contexts, identities and discourses, complex causality, and because they allow the incorporation of "both material and ideational variables."48 Following John Gerring, "case study" here refers to "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units."49 The research in this dissertation, thus, is an in-depth analysis of two units (or cases)—the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas, and a comparison across these two cases. In addition, in order to determine temporal variation, the period of observation in this research is approximately 30 years, although I concentrate on the latter years of this time frame, on the period between 1990 and 2007. This cross-unit and cross-time comparison mitigates to a certain extent the weakness of single case studies in uncovering and explaining causal relationships.

This dissertation is driven by empirical puzzles; it seeks to identify and explain the key factors that help account for changes in the political attitudes and activities of the diasporas of East Timor and Aceh vis-à-vis the conflicts in their respective homelands. Process-tracing is an attractive research method for such a study, given its micro-level focus, its strong


affinity with case studies analysis, its compatibility with constructivism, and its use of qualitative research tools such as interviews, historical narratives, memoirs, archival documents, and various forms of media that arm the researcher with in-depth knowledge of people, places, processes, and events over time. The goal of process-tracing is to bring theory “closer to what really goes on in the world” and to increase explanatory power beyond “thick description” to what Checkel calls “fine-grained explanations.” It seeks explanations of “why” and “how.” It is “intermediate between laws and descriptions.” Bennett and George note that the end result is not deterministic but rather “contingent generalization” or partial, middle-range theory.

Process-tracing is done by mapping the process or processes that take place between cause(s) and outcomes. It explains outcomes by going back in time and identifying key events, individuals, relationships, and decisions that link the cause(s) with the outcomes. Done carefully, this enables the unfolding and explanation of events and actions over time. This does not imply, however, that “a process” is strictly linear or closed. George and Bennett, for

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50 Indeed George and Bennett propose that case studies “require substantial process-tracing evidence to document complex interactions.” George and Bennett (2004): 23.
51 George and Bennett (2004): 231.
57 George and Bennett (2004): 216.
example, describe linear, convergent, interactive, complex, feedback loop, and path dependent processes. Processes, particularly those that may be described as interactive or complex may also prove to be multi-layered and open-ended. John Gerring describes process-tracing as getting “inside the box” and investigating multiple and complex mechanisms interacting over time. In political science, George and McKeown have argued that process-tracing does not just compare variations across variables but also investigates and explains the decision-making process “by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.” They continue, arguing that process tracing “attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.” It is in the sense described by George and McKeown that process-tracing is employed in this dissertation.

The process-tracing method is frequently connected to the goal of identifying “causal mechanisms.” The challenge has been in operationalizing this key concept. There is little consensus about what causal mechanisms are or how to define them. James Mahoney identifies 24 distinct definitions. John Gerring lists nine definitions. Checkel adopts Gerring’s most basic definition: a mechanism is “the pathway or process (or intermediate

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59 George and Bennett (2004): 212.

60 For analytical purposes, however, a particular period (or sequence)—with a starting point and end point—is frequently selected by the researcher. The starting point may be more contentious; the end point is often determined by the “outcome of interest.” See Falleti (2006): 5-6.


63 George and McKeown (1985): 35.


variable) by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished." According to Gerring, "the identification of a causal mechanism happens when one puts together general knowledge of the world with empirical knowledge of how X and Y interrelate." And a mechanism ("what lies between X and Y") "may be of any sort—an event, a process, a set of events or processes, or whatever."  

Given the ambiguity of the concept of "causal mechanisms" and debate over a definition, I have chosen also to use "causal assessments" to accompany my process-tracing case study approach. Causal assessments may be a clearer concept with fewer law-like requirements. Although employed most often in medical determinations, where certitude is held in check, the concept has also been applied to policy studies in small-n research settings in political science. Causal assessment plays an important role in the policy process tradition, helping to identify the "factors shaping policy agendas, decision-making styles, state-society relations, and the dynamics of stability and change." Often, in process-tracing, through investigation of the processes leading to an outcome, the researcher discovers a complex, multifaceted chain of factors (emphasis on the plural) interacting over time. Instead of simply identifying the causal links, causal assessment asks the researcher to prioritize or rank the explanatory factors. Which factors are the most important? As Paul F. Steinberg notes, "...process tracing must not only help us to reveal complexity, but to make sense of it." It is important to note that such assessment is probabilistic rather than deterministic. While process-tracing helps

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71 Steinberg (2007).

72 Steinberg (2007).
the researcher trace the pathway in a theoretically informed way, it "does not eliminate the need for tough, informed judgments on the part of the researcher." 73 In turn, this means that the researcher needs to have an extensive and in-depth knowledge of the case or cases being studied.

Process-tracing, however, has certain limitations. As is the case with other methods, insufficient or unavailable data will limit the explanatory power of conclusions drawn through process tracing. Process-tracing is both time and data intensive, and the micro-level of analysis involved may lead to the researcher losing sight of the broader structural context. 74 In addition, although the goal of process-tracing may be to identify a single causal factor (or mechanism), evidence may not allow this; that is, more than one causal factor may be consistent with the evidence. In such cases, causal assessment may still allow the researcher to determine the relative causal importance of the factors involved. 75 In addition, if the researcher has made explicit the reasons for a focus on events and actors, for the selection of particular data, and the data analysis, then the research is replicable and the same conclusion should be reached, yielding again more than one causal factor. This suggests the need for further research to determine if additional factors are spurious, competing or complementary. 76 In addition, as suggested by Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, the use of the process-tracing method may be justified when we uncover "evidence of observable implications that are inconsistent with alternative explanations." 77

The evidence presented in this dissertation comes from a variety of sources, including interviews; documents and publications from international organizations and governments; newsletters, pamphlets, papers, posters, and correspondence from non-governmental


75 Steinberg (2007).

76 George and Bennett (2004): 222.

organizations; official and internal documents, publications, and correspondence from diaspora associations and organizations; newspaper and electronic media articles; websites and blogs; films, photographs, music CDs, and exhibits; and informal conversations. These materials were collected over five years, and include evidence collected during research trips in 2005 to Denmark, Malaysia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden and in 2006 to Australia, host states to the East Timorese or Acehnese diaspora.

I conducted face-to-face interviews with 49 individual members of these diasporas; additionally twelve individuals were consulted through e-mail. Interviewees include men and women of various ages, refugees and asylum seekers, economic migrants, exiles, temporary and long-term students, residents who had attained Australian, North American, or European citizenship. Some were recent arrivals, others were long-term residents. Some were openly politically active and affiliated with specific political parties, groups, goals; others preferred to be quietly sympathetic to a political party, group, or goal (“work behind the scenes”), and a few expressly stated a desire to be neutral or apolitical. They included top leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) based in Stockholm, East Timorese government officials and former participants in the clandestine resistance movement. The majority of interviewees were in their mid-20s to mid-30s (reflecting the demographics of the diaspora, particularly in the case of Aceh). However, older diasporans were also interviewed (from mid-30s upwards), many of whom (but not all) held leadership positions within diaspora organizations. The level of education and socio-economic background of interviewees varied (urban/rural, some schooling to higher education). Specific interviewees were selected based on their political affiliation and position (the GAM leadership in Stockholm and East Timorese government representatives, for example) or their level of political activity in diaspora (diasporans who worked closely or were well-known to Western NGOs). The majority of interviewees, however, were selected simply based on the fact that they were East Timorese or Acehnese and in diaspora (without prior knowledge of their socio-economic background, history of migration, or level of political activity or interest).

My approach to the interview process became flexible by necessity. Interviews were conducted in official or formal settings (offices), but more frequently in informal settings
(primarily homes, but also coffee shops, restaurants, a park bench, a commuter train). A
scheduled interview with one frequently turned into a group interview or a sequence of
interviews as friends, family members or colleagues joined in. Interviewees sometimes
requested anonymity or that specific statements be “off the record.” Both options were
presented at the beginning of each interview. A particular challenge in the interview process
was the mobility of some diasporans. A city, date, and time for an interview might have been
agreed upon, but upon arrival (or shortly before) I would learn that the interviewee was in
another city or country—on most occasions an alternative interviewee was available. In
several cases, but not all, the originally scheduled interview eventually took place.

Finally, my research also included consultations with 19 representatives from
nongovernmental organizations (that made up the transnational advocacy network) in the
United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, with academic experts on Indonesia and
East Timor, as well as a European political figure and a volunteer involved in the monitoring
of Aceh’s first post-Peace Agreement election. Through interviews with representatives from
nongovernmental organizations, I obtained access to archives of papers, pamphlets,
photographs, audio-visual material, and correspondence held by these organizations and
individuals.

**Contributions of the Thesis**

This research adds to a growing literature on diaspora and diaspora politics. First, it
contributes to the elaboration of a diaspora typology by providing in-depth analyses of two
new or incipient diasporas. If Gabriel Sheffer is correct in suggesting that most groups of
“trans-national migrants, guest workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers will either form or join
diasporic entities,”78 then their early study provides important insights into the process of
diaspora-making and may prove a valuable future resource. Second, this thesis deliberately
situates the study of diaspora within political science and provides an analytical framework
that makes explicit both diaspora political organizational capacity and diaspora political
agency—the social actors, actions, and practices involved. It contributes to debates in
international relations by categorizing diaspora as a nonstate actor and providing evidence of

diaspora international activity and impact. Finally by incorporating theories of diaspora and theories of transnational advocacy networks, this thesis proposes a framework that details the processes through which the role of diaspora may be transformed from long-distance nationalism in a homeland conflict to peace promotion through its participation in and interactions with a transnational advocacy network. Therefore, this thesis also contributes to our understanding of conflict settlement.
Chapter 2

Diaspora Politics:
Review of Literature, Definitions, and Theoretical Approaches

This chapter reviews literature on diaspora and examines various theoretical approaches to the concept. It presents an overview of diaspora definitions and typologies, and proposes a political definition for diaspora. Of particular interest in this review of literature and theoretical approaches is the political nature and political influence of diasporas. Therefore, here, I attempt to clarify the concept of diaspora, argue for the inclusion of diaspora analysis in political science, and examine the concept of diaspora in relation to other areas of political science research, namely ethnicity, nationalism, and phenomena associated with the process of globalization.

For this purpose I will draw on a broad range of literature on diasporas, much of which falls outside the rubric of political science. The source of theoretical guidance for this research is the growing literature on diasporas and transnational communities from the fields of sociology, anthropology, geography, cultural studies, and to a lesser extent economics when the diaspora or migrant group is analyzed as labor or a source of remittances. Within political science, I rely on insights drawn from literature on diaspora politics, diaspora nationalism, diasporas and security, diaspora and foreign policy, and diaspora and globalization; these studies redefine diaspora as a social-political formation. Their contribution to our understanding of diasporas lies partly in their attention to agency—to the social actors, organizations and institutions, and actions involved in "diaspora."

Identifying discipline-based boundaries in the study of diaspora, however, represents a challenge. Diaspora literature is largely multidisciplinary and "opportunistic" in the sense that ideas, examples, references are borrowed from any work on diaspora (and frequently, work on transnational communities) regardless of the author’s discipline. Indeed, the editors of the journal Diaspora, describe its content as "multidisciplinary study of the history, culture,
social structure, politics and economics of..." diasporas. Neither can works on diaspora be categorized based strictly on a focus on particular concepts. Geographers, anthropologists, and political scientists, for example, share an interest in questions of identity and power vis-à-vis diasporas. However, academic approaches (across disciplines) tend to emphasize two contradictory notions or aspects of "diaspora." Cultural studies and post-modern perspectives tend to emphasize "the potential of the hybrid and diasporic to transcend essentialist notions of identity" and fixed settings or territoriality. Other approaches—what Robin Cohen broadly describes as "empirical" approaches—emphasize instead "geographical specificities" or metaphoric settings, attachments and relationships (to a "homeland"), and networks, and the effect of such on diaspora identity and activity, including the political.

Definitions, Features, and Typologies of Diasporas

In contemporary and prosaic usage, the word diaspora is understood to mean a community of people living outside their country of origin, a dispersed community. This is close to Walker Connor's broad definition of a diaspora as "that segment of a people living outside the homeland." Among diaspora analysts debate over the meaning and parameters of diaspora continues. The debate centres over what precisely constitutes a diaspora, how a diaspora may be classified (types of diasporas), how a diaspora is distinguished from other social formations and phenomena, over the importance of its endurance, and whether or not the diaspora migration was voluntary or forced. A more recent debate challenges the primacy of migration, displacement, and mobility in definitions of diaspora, emphasizing instead the

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83 Specifically, trans-state and triadic networks involving "homeland," "hostland" and diaspora
importance of connectivity in these human communities—the processes of communication and exchange. 

The seeming preoccupation with definitions and classifications in diaspora studies stems from conceptual difficulties in defining the term, the desire of diaspora scholars to ensure the term is analytically useful, and from an impulse to defend the subject itself, which diaspora analysts contend was, until fairly recently, dismissed as a transient issue that could be ignored or subsumed into research devoted to ethnic groups, minorities or immigrants. Diaspora analysts, however, argue that a diaspora is a distinct social formation, that it is in some cases ancient, and it is an enduring and likely increasing phenomenon. From the early 1990s onward, the concept of diaspora as an analytical tool in the social sciences has gained currency. There is now a range of literature and case studies attesting to the endemic nature of diasporas and examining the social, cultural and, to a lesser extent, political roles they play. Such is the increase in interest in diaspora studies that in 2005 a two volume Encyclopedia of Diasporas was published, including over 100 case studies. Some argue that the term has become so prevalent in contemporary usage that it is often misapplied or has become so stretched as to refer to any kind of movement of people or to all kinds of hybridized identities, thus rendering the term useless.

What then is a diaspora? Khachig Töloyan, Kim Butler, and Judith Shuval provide exhaustive overviews and critiques of the etymology, the various definitions, and usages of the term and concept of diaspora. Although, as contemporary dictionaries attest, the term

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diaspora continues to be most closely associated with the Jewish experience of exile and Jewish settlement outside an ancestral homeland, the origin of the word is Greek and appears in both ancient Greek and Hebrew texts. "Diaspora" comes from the Greek speiro = to sow and dia = over,\textsuperscript{91} and is commonly translated as "to scatter and sow."\textsuperscript{92} In addition to the Greek and Jewish experience, the term diaspora is now commonly used to describe other major historical migrations, including the forced migration of Armenians at the turn of the 20th century, the forced dispersal of Africans as a result of the slave trade, and the economic migrations of Chinese through the 19th and early 20th centuries.\textsuperscript{93}

Definitions and Features

Among the most succinct definitions is Gabriel Sheffer's view of diasporas as "groups permanently residing outside their countries of origin, but maintaining contacts with people back in their homelands."\textsuperscript{94} In an earlier study, Dominique Schnapper describes diaspora as "the condition of a geographically dispersed people who have settled in different political organizations but who maintained, in spite of dispersion, some form of unity and solidarity."\textsuperscript{95} More elaborate (and frequently cited) definitions of diaspora, discussed below, were developed partially to more clearly set the parameters between diasporas and other mobile or expatriate communities, such as ethnic groups, migrants, nomads, etc. and to provide analytical frameworks to guide and facilitate the study of diaspora.

\textsuperscript{90} The eighth edition (1994) of the Pocket Oxford English Dictionary notes that the root of the word Diaspora is Greek but gives the following definitions, 1. "the dispersal of the Jews after their exile in 538" and 2. the dispersed Jews. Sheffer, however, notes that a 1993 edition of the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the first time included a definition that added "the situation of people living outside their homeland," (2003): 9.


\textsuperscript{92} Ember et al., (2005): xiii.


\textsuperscript{94} Sheffer (2003): 1.

\textsuperscript{95} Dominique Schnapper, "From the Nation-State to the Transnational World: On the Meaning and Usefulness of Diaspora as a Concept," Diaspora, 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 225.
According to William Safran, the defining features of diaspora are a dispersal from an original centre to two or more foreign regions; collective and perpetuated memory and myth of the original homeland; a sense of alienation in the hostland; idealization of the homeland as a place of eventual return; a commitment to maintain or restore their homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and relationships with the homeland that help define diaspora ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity.96 Gérard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau largely echo Safran’s features but their definition emphasizes the “forced” nature of the dispersion, the salience of this in the collective memory of the diaspora, and the persistence of a homeland-oriented collective identity over several generations.97 Robin Cohen’s definition, on the other hand, allows for mixed motives behind the diaspora’s dispersion. That is, the dispersal may be forced and traumatic or the result of work, trade or colonial ambitions. Cohen also points out that although diasporas may be characterized by a troubled relationship with host societies, there is also the possibility for a distinctive, creative enriching life in tolerant societies.98 Like Chaliand and Rageau, Cohen argues that a diaspora’s group consciousness is sustained over time. However, Cohen also emphasizes that a diaspora’s interest in return to the homeland may be literal or symbolic and that diasporas exhibit a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries.99 Finally, Butler’s definition of diaspora also includes some of the key features reviewed above but places further emphasis on dispersion to two or more destinations and to a diaspora’s existence over at least two generations.100


100 According to Butler, the defining features of diaspora are: 1) Dispersal to two or more destinations as a “necessary precondition for the formation of links between the various populations in diaspora”; 2) relationship to an actual or imagined homeland; 3) a consciousness, a self-awareness of the group’s identity; 4) existence over at least two generations. See Butler (2001): 192-193.
The "empirical" definitions\textsuperscript{101} above identify key criteria or features of diaspora: 1) dispersion, 2) homeland-orientation, 3) alienation or a troubled relationship with the host society, 4) consciousness of group identity based on collective memory/history/myth/culture, and 5) group solidarity. The latter three are combined under the phrase "boundary-maintenance" by Rogers Brubaker to denote "the preservation of a distinctive identity."\textsuperscript{102} It is important to note that Safran, Butler, and Cohen acknowledge that there are problems with this checklist approach. No society, as James Clifford cautions, "can be expected to qualify on all counts, throughout its history."\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, Butler acknowledges, identities are not "fixed" therefore, "conceptualizations of diaspora must be able to accommodate the reality of multiple identities and phases" in diaspora-making or, as Butler calls it, the process of diasporization.\textsuperscript{104} As Brubaker points out, this attention to the potential for change and fluidity in diasporas highlights a "tension" in diaspora literature between boundary-maintenance (emphasized in empirical definitions and studies) and boundary-erosion.\textsuperscript{105}

Cultural studies and postmodern perspectives\textsuperscript{106} on diaspora are concerned with culture, identity, consciousness, subjectivity,\textsuperscript{107} and the boundary-erosion potential of diasporas. These views of diasporas find the previously outlined criteria for diasporas "too ossified to

\textsuperscript{101} The term "empirical definitions" is used here to describe those based on features of diaspora and to differentiate these from the cultural studies and postmodern perspectives on diaspora discussed subsequently in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{102} Brubaker (January 2005): 6.


\textsuperscript{104} Butler (2001): 193.

\textsuperscript{105} Brubaker (January 2005): 6.

\textsuperscript{106} Cultural studies focus on the cultural (everyday) practices of people, the production and circulation of meanings, changes in these and their relation to power. Cultural studies are multidisciplinary, drawing from the various social sciences (sociology, anthropology, political science, history) as well as literary theory, performance, art and film analysis. Postmodern perspectives question the possibility of objective knowledge and assumptions of an objective reality (and the metanarratives or totalizing narratives derived from assumed objective knowledge—metanarratives of progress, national history, identity, etc.), suggesting instead that what we call objective knowledge or objective reality are contestable texts or discourses that lend power to particular people, cultures, structures, practices, ideas over others.

capture the fluidities of the contemporary world.”\textsuperscript{108} Categories, or conceptual problems as Paul Gilroy describes them, such as, nationality, ethnicity, race, class, gender, age, religion “...can imprison or ossify the idea of culture.”\textsuperscript{109} Thus, in cultural studies and postmodern perspectives, the importance of a diaspora’s relationship to the homeland and national solidarity are de-emphasized.\textsuperscript{110} The powerful attraction of diaspora for these theorists, as Pnina Werbner explains, is that they are viewed as “transnational social formations” that “challenge the hegemony and boundedness of the nation state, of any pure imaginaries of nationhood” or nationality.\textsuperscript{111} Instead, these theorists underline the possibility of a dual or fragmented consciousness and of multiple belongings and multiple building blocks of identity held simultaneously or successively with varying degrees of saliency at different times.

In analyses of diaspora, cultural studies theorists and postmodernists propose the development of new forms of negotiated identification.\textsuperscript{112} Paul Gilroy, for example, describes black Atlantic culture as “a living, dynamic pattern that was not the simple product of any single one of its many sources.”\textsuperscript{113} That is, the African diaspora is not specifically African, American, Caribbean or British, it is hybrid and fluid. Stuart Hall also emphasizes heterogeneity, hybridity, and transformation in his study of a Caribbean diaspora and his description of cultures and identities.

Diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return...This is the old, the imperializing, the hegemonizing form of “ethnicity”...The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined not by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} Cohen (1997): 128-129.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Brubaker (January 2005): 6.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Werbner (2000): 6.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur, eds. Theorizing Diaspora: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003): 5.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Gilroy (1993): 1.
\end{itemize}
essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of identity which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference.114

The homeland is also problematized in cultural studies and postmodern perspectives. In some postmodern versions, the concept of diaspora “offers a critique of ‘fixed origins’ while still acknowledging a desire for ‘home’ rather than ‘homeland’”115 For some postmodernists, the homeland, as articulated in many of the more “empirical” definitions of diaspora, is too closely associated with the state and nationality, categories that obscure the interweaving of cultures characteristic of the diaspora experience. Moreover, Hall, for example, proposes that even if communities are indeed linked to a “homeland” of the past and even if this original homeland refers to a physical territory, it is not an accurate reflection, and cannot be. The homeland, remembered, is an imagined version that is constituted in diaspora and is the source of mixed emotions. Whereas “empirical” versions of diaspora tend to take nostalgia and yearning for the homeland as a given, postmodern studies of diaspora reveal an ambivalence towards the homeland and towards return.116

Critics of cultural studies and postmodern perspectives take issue with the inherent emphasis on individual experience or more precisely the individual narrative117 and with what they see as a paucity of empirical evidence.118 Tölöyan, generally amenable to cultural studies and postmodern perspectives, nevertheless expresses concern over approaches to diaspora that primarily entail analysis of the individual’s consciousness or subjectivity. For Tölöyan:

A diaspora is never merely an accident of birth, a clump of individuals living outside their ancestral homeland, each with a hybrid subjectivity, lacking


collective practices that underscore (not just) their difference from others, but also their similarity to each other, and their links to the people on the homeland.\textsuperscript{119}

Cohen is open to the possibility of hybrid identities, but calls for specific evidence (attitudes, migrations patterns, social conduct) that “a hybrid identity is a lived and demonstrated experience.”\textsuperscript{120} Werbner counters by proposing that the division between approaches “that stress the empirical realities of the diaspora experience” and those focusing on “diasporic consciousness and subjectivity” may be artificial.\textsuperscript{121} Diasporic cultures, Werbner suggests, are always materially inscribed and organizationally embodied.”\textsuperscript{122} Taking Cohen’s critique further, if there is evidence of a hybrid identity or culture in the material and in organization as Werbner suggests, we may still need to know more about the actors (and their relationships) that have participated in its development and about the collective practices and processes involved in it.

**Typologies**

In addition to the definitions above, diaspora analysts have elaborated specific typologies of diasporas based on the initial cause of migration or dispersal, on the roles played by the diaspora, and on its age or endurance. Perhaps the most well known of diaspora typologies is Robin Cohen’s. Cohen proposes a typology of victim, labour, trade or mercantile, imperial, and cultural diasporas. These types take the origin of migration or the purpose of migration as the essential character of the diaspora. Victim diasporas (Jews, Armenian, African, Palestinian) were born from a “historical scarring event;”\textsuperscript{123} the original migration is marked by trauma and coercion. Labor diasporas (Indian indentured workers, Japanese in South America, Chinese in Southeast Asia) were “recruited for their labour-power.”\textsuperscript{124} Trade

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Tökölyan (1996): 30.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Cohen (1997): 150.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Werbner (2000): 7.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Cohen (1997): 28.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Cohen (1997): 29.
\end{itemize}
diasporas (Chinese and Lebanese) were the result of expansions of trading networks or the pursuit of commerce and trade. Imperial diasporas were constituted as a result of settlement for colonial or military purposes.\textsuperscript{125} Cohen’s classification of an imperial diaspora is the most disputed, particularly as he uses the settlement of the British Empire as his example. As most critics of the imperial diaspora type point out, it is difficult to conceive of Anglo-Saxons in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa as a diaspora. It is important to note that Cohen himself sees labor and imperial diasporas as transitional rather than enduring. Cohen anticipates criticism by acknowledging the possibility that movements of people occur for more than one reason,\textsuperscript{126} that diasporas may have dual and multiple forms and therefore may not fit neatly into one type, and that they may change over time.\textsuperscript{127}

A succinct explanation of cultural diasporas eludes Cohen. However, he is referring to the cultural studies and postmodern perspectives on diasporas reviewed earlier in this chapter. Cohen describes this meaning of diaspora as “the construction of...new identities and subjectivities.”\textsuperscript{128} He refers to Hall’s notion of hybridity, which Cohen understands as “the evolution of new, dynamic, mixed cultures” or “the evolution of commingled cultures that are different from two or more parent cultures.”\textsuperscript{129} Although Cohen includes the cultural diaspora in his typology, his version of cultural diaspora demands empirical study and requires the addition of what he refers to as “reality markers” in the form of historical and sociological data. By requiring these “reality markers,” Cohen may be reifying the very categories postmodernists problematize (gender, class, the markers of ethnicity, the nation-state—in this case the homeland and host country). In addition, it should be noted that not all cultural studies or postmodernist work is ahistorical, to note, Paul Gilroy’s \textit{Black Atlantic} which is informed by history throughout and Michele Reis’ consciously historical analysis of

\textsuperscript{125} Cohen (1997): 67.

\textsuperscript{126} Ember (2005): xiii.

\textsuperscript{127} Cohen (1997): x.

\textsuperscript{128} Cohen (1997): 128.

\textsuperscript{129} Cohen (1997): 131.
"classical" and "contemporary" diaspora. However, Cohen also highlights an important omission in the postmodern versions of diaspora, the "who" and "how" behind the evolution of hybrid cultures—that is, the often omitted articulation of agency, collective practice, and process.

Sheffer, Van Hear, and Reis classify diasporas based on age. Sheffer argues this typology more accurately accounts for new features of contemporary diaspora communities. Sheffer writes of classical or historical, modern or recent, incipient, and dormant diasporas: 1) historical or classical diasporas have their origins in antiquity or the Middle ages; 2) modern or recent diasporas are those that "have become established since the seventeenth century;" 3) incipient diasporas are "diasporas in the making," new groups to a region exhibiting diaspora features and initial efforts to organize as diasporas; and 4) dormant diasporas are those that are inactive; their members are largely "assimilated or fully integrated into their host societies" and show little interest in mobilization and action. However, their revival is possible, often in response to change (especially a traumatic event) in the homeland or affecting co-diasporans (i.e. the reorganization of Croatian and Serbian groups in North America during the war in the Balkans). Reis provides a similar classification describing "three major historical waves that influence the diasporic process: the classical period, associated with ancient diaspora; the modern period, from 1500-1945 and encompassing the experiences of slavery and colonization; and contemporary or late-modern period, from the end of World War II to the present day."


134 Ibid.


In his study of “new” diasporas resulting from mass migrations from the 1950s to the 1990s, Van Hear describes not only the making of diasporas, but also a process of de-diasporization, the un-making of diasporas in a particular place. This does not necessarily describe the dissolution of an entire diapora, rather it refers to the emigration of a large number of members of diaspora to the homeland or elsewhere. 137 Van Hear’s addition further contributes to our understanding of diasporas as dynamic, not static or pre-determined. Sheffer’s typology allows for a historical survey of diasporas without losing sight of contemporary communities that are evolving into diasporas. Sheffer’s and Van Hear’s approach also opens the door to considerations of agency in the diasporization or diaspora-making process.

The above review of definitions, features, and classifications of diasporas provides a foundation for elucidation and analysis of the concept of diaspora politics. Although understanding the parameters of diaspora allows us to make important clarifications and distinctions between diaspora and other types of communities, and it facilitates comparative study of diaspora, this dissertation is concerned specifically with the political significance of the diaspora phenomenon. Before making a case for diaspora as a socio-political formation, however, in the section below I further elaborate key elements in the definitions discussed and point to important omissions or under-articulated features. I also examine the concept of diaspora in relation to other areas of interest to political science—ethnicity, nationalism, transnationalism, and globalization, and I provide a brief listing of the potential political roles of diaspora.

Definitions and Typologies Problematized
The Homeland as Territory, Symbol, and Ideal
The concepts of “homeland” and “host country” are central features in many of the diaspora definitions listed above. Homeland refers to the country of origin or the ancestral home; the country or region from which migrants originally came or with which they identify. The host or hostland is the country of residence or settlement.

It is important to note that the homeland is not necessarily an established and recognized state or geographical territory. Diasporas are often classified as state-linked or stateless. For example, until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jews were considered a stateless diaspora. However, following the establishment of Israel, they became state-linked. The Kurds are another example of a stateless diaspora—the idealized homeland of Kurdistan geographically spanning parts of several states. Indeed many ethno-national and secessionist diasporas fit into the stateless category. The homeland, therefore, can be a physical territory or a symbolic, imagined, and mythologized one. Moreover, members of a diaspora may have had the actual experience of being born or living in the homeland or they may not; they may have never even visited this homeland. The attachment, identification, and relationship can be with a homeland that they “have only dreamed of or heard about.”

Therefore, a diaspora and diaspora organizations and activities can span generations.

The focus on the homeland and relationships with the homeland, however, obscures another important feature of diaspora—the intra-diaspora relationship. Although as Clifford notes, diasporas usually presuppose a connection to a homeland, it is not only the diaspora-homeland binary relationship that distinguishes the diaspora phenomenon from other social formations. Diasporas also “connect multiple communities of a dispersed population.” This is a “unique feature that differentiates them from communities that result from other types of migration.” Finally, cultural studies and postmodernist scholars contend that these intra-diaspora connections “need not be articulated primarily through a real or symbolic homeland.”

The ongoing shared history and experiences of the diaspora may serve the same role or be as important as the homeland. Although these shared experiences may indeed

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140 Ibid.
attenuate and eventually supplant the hold of homeland, it is difficult to conceive of a shared history of diaspora without reference, however thin, to a homeland.

Finally, the terms themselves, "homeland" and "hostland," are the subject of some debate. Khatharya Um, for example, argues that "home" is not necessarily a "fixed, singular place" for diasporans and conversely that the term "host" conveys too much a "sense of transitoriness" for a location that for many diasporans represents a permanent residence. Rather cumbersome alternative terms include country of origin/country of resettlement and sending/receiving countries. These terms, however, also have inherent problems. They do not, for example, represent the empirical reality of generations of diasporans who were never "sent or received" but rather were born in a "receiving country" but still maintain ties to the so-called "sending country." They also infer a specific geographical location, leaving no room for the symbolic or ideal "homeland."

**Forced versus Voluntary Migration**

Chaliand and Rageau highlight the forced nature of migration that gives rise to a particularly strong attachment to the homeland and a desire to return. Many diaspora scholars point to this involuntary aspect of the migration experience—the trauma of a forced or unchosen exodus—and posit that it provides a particularly strong basis for collective identity that distinguishes a diaspora member from an economic migrant or a temporary visitor, for example. Sheffer, however, dismisses the relative importance of a "forced" versus a "voluntary" migration noting that since antiquity diasporas have emerged not only because of political or economic difficulties, but also because of "an inherent curiosity...that drove, and still drives, individuals and groups to...explore distant places." Moreover, in the collective identity of a diaspora, forced migration can be replaced by other critical events that constitute memories of oppression, persecution, martyrdom, isolation, etc. as is the case for Sikh

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nationalists in the diaspora, even if the critical event itself was not the cause of an initial forced migration or if it occurred in the diaspora rather than the homeland. Finally, diasporas are not homogenous, in many, if not most, cases the making of a diaspora was a result of a mix of involuntary and voluntary, or what Reis calls “opportunity-seeking,” migration.

Longevity or Age?
Chaliand and Rageau, Butler, Cohen and other diaspora scholars emphasize the importance of time in their basic features of diaspora. Cohen refers to a group consciousness sustained over time, begging the question, “how long?” Butler and Chaliand and Rageau are more specific. Butler specifies a diaspora’s “existence over at least two generations” and Chaliand and Rageau over several generations. Sheffer, who also emphasises the importance of longevity, nevertheless takes a more inclusive approach by describing new or incipient diasporas as well as the classical and modern diasporas that are characterized by a longer history. Safran’s definition is not time-specific, but he is more inclusive in his examples. He refers to a Palestinian diaspora, that can trace its roots to 1946 when “[h]undreds of thousands of Arab residents were expelled,” encouraged or impelled to flee after the establishment of the state of Israel. Safran also includes Cubans that left, mostly for the United States, in the 1950s-70s decades. By the more strict criteria of time, Cubans and Palestinians cannot be considered diasporas, neither can the Vietnamese who fled their country of origin at the end of the Vietnam War, nor the over 200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto who arrived there since the mid 1980s. Also excluded are many of the contemporary or late-modern diasporas that are the subject of Reis’ study. Nearly the entire catalogue of subjects in Van Hear’s New Diasporas also would be excluded as his focus is primarily the making of new diasporas during the last quarter of the 20th century.

146 Reis (2004): 49.
147 Reis (2004): 192.
149 Reis (2004).
The time or longevity requirement in some definitions of diaspora is thusly too restrictive. One problem is that it requires a precise or near precise identification of a single starting point or “birth” of the diaspora and implies that it is the time of departure from the homeland. Diasporas are not born, however, they are made or constituted through processes including mobility, communication, organization, and, more importantly, they are dynamic. Sheffer instead emphasizes the moment after arrival in a new country or region when migrants make a conscious decision to join or establish a diaspora community. Furthermore, Van Hear observes that “diaspora formation can occur by accretion as a result of steady, gradual, routine migration…” Identifying the “starting point” of a diaspora and thus the number of generations in diaspora may prove difficult. Butler, Cohen and Chaliand and Rageau may be correct in believing that a diaspora may take two or more generations to consolidate, to establish formal institutions, to transmit its heritage, but the process of diasporization is not necessarily linear with clear starting and end points. Sheffer’s alternative classification based on “age” also assumes a starting point, but Sheffer’s starting point is less specific and more procedural—a series of actions or events after arrival in a host country rather than a particular point of departure from the homeland. The typology adopted by Sheffer, Reis, and Van Hear is both the most inclusive and flexible in terms of its ability to account for the dynamism of diasporas.

A second problem is that this “time” requirement privileges the study of larger, more institutionally established and more powerful diaspora and inhibits study of newer, smaller, more informally organized, and less powerful diaspora-in-the-making. Studies may later prove these communities to be something other than diasporas or only temporarily having exhibited diaspora characteristics. However, these new or incipient diaspora communities should not be too hastily marginalized. In Sheffer’s view it is likely if not inevitable that most groups of “trans-national migrants, guest workers, refugees, and asylum-seekers will

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either form or join diasporic entities."  

152 Should these incipient diasporas prove enduring, their early study will be a valuable future resource. Studies of new diasporas should not be taken as definitive, but rather as first steps that are open to correction, elaboration, and improvement.

Agency and Dynamism in Definitions

Both agency and the dynamic character of diasporas are under-articulated in the definitions reviewed above. Definitions of diaspora offer important insights, serve as useful guides for comparative study, and provide specific frameworks for investigation. The “empirical” definitions reviewed above lend clarity to and establish the parameters of a complex social phenomenon that is often conflated with ethnic and minority groups and other migratory communities. However, the identification of shared and enduring features of diasporas should not eclipse the dynamic nature of diasporas and the importance of its study (cultural studies and postmodern approaches are more attentive to the dynamic and transformative nature of diaspora). Diasporas are not static; they may be in a process of being made or unmade. Their membership may be replenished and their character may change with waves of new migration. Individual members may opt out of the diaspora and become permanently assimilated in the host country.

The features of diasporas enumerated earlier include a collective memory and identity, return movements, commitments, solidarity, and relationships. However, there is little indication of the actions or processes involved or required in creating solidarity, transmitting memory (history), forming and articulating the elements of collective identity, or engaging in


relationships with the homeland. The social actors, social organizations and actions are perhaps assumed, but not made explicit. Yet it is social actors who are translating events (a forced departure from the “homeland,” for example) into solidarity; and it is actors who carry out the exchanges that constitute a relationship with the homeland. These acts, Töloöyan explains, are not simply theoretical they must be evident, demonstrated.\(^{157}\) The diasporan identity is active, it requires involvement.\(^ {158}\) Often, this “involvement” is not only cultural but political. Indeed the boundaries between diaspora cultural and political activity may be blurred. It is the actions (even if constrained) and practices (including those of representation) that not only distinguish diasporas from other social groups, but also help define diasporas.

Here it is important to recognize that diaspora “actors” and their roles may vary. Diaspora membership may comprise what Sheffer describes as core members, members by choice, marginal members, and dormant members.\(^ {159}\) Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth describe core, passive and silent members.\(^ {160}\) They are categorized according to a sliding scale of activity. Although political, social, and intellectual elites within a diaspora are often able to set the agenda for action and establish a dominant discourse, Töloöyan emphasizes that “there can be no diaspora as such without a response from a community that comes to recognize itself and to act collectively.”\(^ {161}\)

Furthermore, certain processes associated with globalization, in particular advances in communication technologies and affordability of travel, prevent a monopoly by elites over diaspora agenda-setting and discourse. It is now possible for nearly any diaspora member with access to a mobile telephone or a computer to connect with fellow co-diasporans by


\(^{159}\) Sheffer (2003): 100.


calling them directly, joining an email list and contributing to it, or posting content on or creating a website or blog. Although marginalization or “expulsion” from the diaspora is a possibility for those who present alternative discourses, agendas, or strategies for action, communications technologies have considerably levelled the playing field among actors within diasporas.

Links to Other Theoretical Concepts

Ethnicity

The term diaspora is often used interchangeably with the term ethnic group. The conflation of the two terms is not surprising given the emphasis many diaspora scholars and diasporans place on ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. In an early definition, Milton Esman describes diaspora as “a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links with its land of origin.” 162 Reis sees ethnic groups that are “diasporic in nature.” 163 Sheffer eschews the loose term “diaspora” for the more specific “ethno-national diaspora.” In Sheffer’s view the most important trait in cementing a diaspora’s affinities and increasing its solidarity is the “sense of belonging to the same ethnic nation.” 164

If we take an ethnic group or ethnic community to refer to a group of people sharing a believed common descent, cultural attributes (such as religion, language, customs), common historical myths and memories, sometimes racial or physical similarities, and an attachment (historical or sentimental) to a specific territory, 165 then the similarities with the concept of diaspora are evident. In addition, both ethnic theory and diaspora studies are concerned with


shared identities and the processes of identity construction or derivation. \textsuperscript{166} However, based on this broad definition of ethnicity, an important distinction emerges. A diaspora’s attachment to a specific territory is “long-distance,” an ethnic group’s is not necessarily so. An ethnic group may reside in the historical or sentimental territory of its attachment, the diaspora does not.

Sheffer points to assimilation and the relationship to the homeland as key differences between ethnic group and diaspora. As Sheffer points out, “transplanted minority groups do not necessarily remain diasporas.” \textsuperscript{167} In Sheffer’s view, for an ethnic group, the attachment to a specific homeland territory is attenuated. Sheffer contends that “…ethnic migrants who opt to assimilate, who do not have continuing interest in their homelands, who do not express a certain degree of loyalty toward their homelands, and who do not establish or maintain tangible ties with those homelands will not become diasporas.” \textsuperscript{168} Tölöyan’s analysis is more nuanced: For the ethnic community, the relationship or commitment to the homeland (if there is one) is “manifested by individuals rather than the community as a whole.” \textsuperscript{169}

Moreover, diasporas exhibit a commitment to maintaining ties not only with the homeland but with co-diasporans in distant territories. Considerable efforts are made to construct, nurture or perpetuate a shared identity or a shared understanding of their identity among members residing in different states. Whereas ethnic groups may organize as interest groups in their country of residence, for example, diasporas may “act in consistently organized ways to develop an agenda for self-representation in the political and cultural realm” in the hostland and across national boundaries. \textsuperscript{170} Nevertheless, Tölöyan also recognizes that a clear and definitive differentiation may prove elusive. Ethnic minorities living outside a

\textsuperscript{166} Shuval (2000).

\textsuperscript{167} Sheffer (2003): 262.

\textsuperscript{168} Sheffer (2003): 90.

\textsuperscript{169} Tölöyan (1996): 16.

"historic homeland," Tölolyan explains, "are divided between those who are a diaspora and those who are not. Some individuals...have diasporic identities; others do not."¹⁷¹ Some "behave as ethnics in some spheres of life, as diasporans in others."¹⁷² Therefore, the line of demarcation perhaps is not static save for one critical distinction pointed out by Tölolyan, the ethnic identity may be symbolic, and it may remain one of "being" or "feeling" ethnic; the diaspora identity requires agency and involvement.¹⁷³

The Nation-state and Nationalism

There are two broad perspectives on diaspora and the nation-state/nationalism. One sees a close association between diaspora and the nation-state¹⁷⁴ and nationalism and the other posits diaspora as a challenge to the endurance or permanence of the state. For analytical clarity I refer to these two perspectives as "diaspora nationalism" and "diaspora cosmopolitanism," although diaspora literature presents various positions in between these two poles.

As reviewed earlier, several definitions and theories of diaspora are anchored on the concept of a homeland and a homeland-oriented identity. This homeland or country of origin in turn is often associated with the nation-state, real (a physical territory), imagined or desired. Most studies on diaspora adopt a constructivist approach to nationalism—taking the nation as constructed rather than primordial. Diaspora literature is heavily influenced by Benedict Anderson’s concept of "imagined communities" of nationality,¹⁷⁵ often borrowing the term

¹⁷⁴ Walker Connor distinguishes the nation, state, and the nation-state. Connor defines the nation as "a group of people sharing a myth of common ancestry." He defines the state as "the major political unit in world politics;" and the nation-state as "that relatively rare situation in which the borders of a state and a nation closely coincide: a state with an ethnically homogenous population." See Walker Connor, "The Timelessness of Nations," Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 1/2 (2004): 39.
to describe the “imagined homelands” of the diaspora. The space for imagining the nation and thus the nationalist project are not limited to the territory of the nation-state but rather are extended to the diaspora. This phenomenon where “citizens” (legal or by affinity) are dispersed across states but view themselves as part of the nation-state of their ancestors is described by Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Blanc-Szanton as “nations unbound” or “deterritorialized states” and, separately, by Glick Schiller as “transnational nation-states.”

Diaspora nationalism, as the term implies, directly connects diasporas to the concept of nationalism and the nation-state. It describes the cultural and political project of the diaspora community on behalf of or oriented towards the ancestral homeland. This is sometimes referred to as “long-distance nationalism,” another Benedict Anderson term, where participants engage in nationalist activities from afar, yet remain unaccountable for their actions. According to Anderson, the long-distance nationalist “need not fear prison, torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations.” The fact that diasporas are not all based in the “First World” notwithstanding, diaspora nationalism may be manifested through lobbying the hostland and international organizations, voting (if the right is extended by the homeland to the diaspora),

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demonstrating, fundraising, contributing money and investing, campaigning (in the hostland and internationally), creating works of art and literature, fighting, killing and dying.\textsuperscript{182}

The object of diaspora nationalism may not be an existing nation-state but rather a geographical territory within a recognized state (Northern Ireland, northeast Sri Lanka, Xinjiang and Tibet, the Punjab). In this case, diaspora nationalists may seek autonomy or secession. In either case, the activities of the diaspora are part of a nationalist project in support of an established state or in search of a nation-state. Because diaspora nationalism is in some cases linked with secessionism and regime change, it is occasionally and increasingly viewed as a "security threat" and analyzed as such.\textsuperscript{183} However, as Glick Schiller reminds us, not all diaspora nationalism or long-distance nationalism is "oppositional,"\textsuperscript{184} for example, Israeli and Dominican diasporas in the United States and Ukrainians in Canada.\textsuperscript{185} Diaspora nationalists are also engaged in democratic projects,\textsuperscript{186} investment and development, technical support and advice to homeland governments, and voting for and contributing to recognized political parties and candidates.\textsuperscript{187}


\textsuperscript{184} Glick Schiller (2005): 575.

\textsuperscript{185} In the case of Ukrainians in Canada, diaspora activity changed from oppositional during the Soviet period to supportive.

\textsuperscript{186} Werbner (2000): 5.

The diaspora cosmopolitan perspective sees diasporas as a challenge to the state and to state-centrism. Clifford argues that whereas states weld locals to a single place, diasporas cannot be exclusively nationalist.\(^{188}\) They are not bound by the borders of a state, and their condition and experience implies multiple attachments.\(^{189}\) Diasporas challenge the hegemony and "boundedness" of the state and notions of assimilation and loyalty to one nation or state.\(^{190}\) In addition to relating to both the homeland and host state, diasporas also relate to their co-diasporans in other states.\(^{191}\) These intra-diaspora relationships "can be an important source generating imaginative identification with places beyond the national territory."\(^{192}\) In some analyses of diaspora, nationalist attachments and narratives are replaced with "more diffuse visions of cosmopolitanism."\(^{193}\) Thus, diasporas challenge the claims for exclusive loyalty of the nation-state or state with the alternative of multiple identities and sometimes multiple citizenships.\(^{194}\) This latter perspective is similar to the more enthusiastic analyses of globalization as a state-weakening phenomenon.\(^{195}\)

Again, the two perspectives, diaspora nationalism and diaspora cosmopolitanism, are presented here as distinct categories for analytical clarity. The general consensus in the

\(^{26}\) Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (September 2004) and Shain and Barth (2003).


\(^{190}\) Werbner (2000); Clifford (1997); Gilroy (1993); Hall (1990).

\(^{191}\) Shuval (2000).

\(^{192}\) Nonini (2005): 564.


\(^{194}\) Cohen (1997); Shuval (2000); Nonini (2005) and Saskia Sassen, "Global Cities and Diasporic Networks: Microsites in Global Civil Society" in Marlies Galsius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier eds., Global Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

\(^{195}\) For a discussion on this see Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?" Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 472-496.
literature of diaspora, however, is that diasporas exhibit both tendencies and do so, sometimes, simultaneously. Diasporas are “rooted cosmopolitans” to Sidney Tarrow, who emphasizes the chauvinistic tendencies of diaspora, \(^{196}\) and “cosmopolitan patriots” to Kwame Anthony Appiah whose analysis underscores the hybridization of diaspora culture. \(^{197}\) Diasporas are thus, ethnic-parochial, nationalistic and cosmopolitan. \(^{198}\)

**Globalization and Connectivity**

The processes of globalization here refer to enhanced global economic, political, social, and cultural interdependence, accelerated flows of people, images, ideas and meanings, increased ease and affordability of travel and rapid advances in information and communication technologies. As Arjun Appadurai puts it, “with the advent of...the automobile and the airplane, the camera, the computer and the telephone, we have entered into an altogether new condition of neighbourliness, even with those most distant from ourselves.” \(^{199}\) Diaspora scholars often draw a connection between globalization and the proliferation of new diasporas. Accelerated flows of people and growth in migration translate into potential diaspora members. Advanced communication technologies and ease of travel is associated with a resurgence of some formerly dormant diasporas as well as the unmaking of diasporas as members move to the homeland or another host country. In short, the new “distance-shrinking technologies” and cheaper transport associated with globalization enable diaspora cross-border communication, exchange, and movement.

The emphasis on dispersion, expansion, migration, displacement, and travel in definitions and analyses of diaspora place movement and mobility at “the heart of the diasporic condition...”\(^ {200}\) However, Roza Tsagarousianou makes a compelling argument for a shift from “mobility” to “connectivity.” In this argument, it is communications and exchange that

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are central to the contemporary diasporic experience or condition.\textsuperscript{201} Tsagarousianou’s thesis is closely linked with processes of globalization; he proposes that this shift to connectivity better reflects the complexity of diaspora relationships in the context of a globalizing world. Reis holds a similar view; she sees diasporization and globalization as “coeval processes, with globalization having the most impact on the contemporary phase.”\textsuperscript{202} Contemporary migrants and diasporas are not “isolated in the sense that their predecessors were during earlier forms of socio-cultural distanciation.”\textsuperscript{203} Rather, they are involved in constant interactions often over long distances that involve the circulation of people, information, money, goods, ideas, technology, artistic and cultural representations, and lifestyles. These interactions are facilitated by “distance shrinking technologies.”\textsuperscript{204} Therefore, Tsagarousianou’s connectivity approach considers diaspora as “constellations of economic, technological, cultural and ideological and communications flows and networks.”\textsuperscript{205} To this we may add people and political flows. Critiques of this conception of diasporas as “flows” caution that these flows “are carried out by a variety of agents; but not all flows and agents are equal…”\textsuperscript{206} In addition, this conceptualization of diaspora tends to assume the product of diaspora and connectivity will be progressive or cosmopolitan—“enabling new ways of ‘coexistence’ and ‘experiencing together’” within the diaspora.\textsuperscript{207} The opposite effect remains possible. If the combination of migrancy and connectivity (entailed in the diaspora condition) gives rise to new “opportunity structures,” as Tsagarousianou proposes, the prevailing result may also be the promotion of diaspora nationalism, parochialism,


\textsuperscript{202} Reis (2004): 47.

\textsuperscript{203} Tsagarousianou (2004): 60.


\textsuperscript{205} Tsagarousianou (2004): 61.

\textsuperscript{206} Cline Horowitz (2005): 582.

\textsuperscript{207} Tsagarousianou (2004): 64.
fragmentation, and notions of exclusivity. However, the accessibility (in many cases) and affordability (for some) of modern communication technologies, in particular digital communication technology, and air travel almost certainly do represent new opportunities for both dissemination and negotiation of not only official and standardized diaspora arguments but also of the unofficial (or plebeian), subaltern or marginal ones.

**Transnational Community or Diaspora?**

The terms transnational community and diaspora are often used interchangeably or simultaneously to describe the same or similar phenomena. There is indeed significant overlap between these two categories. The term transnational community, however, is more encompassing than diaspora. Loosely applied, a transnational community may include immigrants, refugees, exiles, expatriates, ethnic groups, sojourners, and temporary or more long-term workers and students, and the borderland communities that straddle one border.

The transnational community is commonly described as “spanning two nations” rather than as a dispersed community. Studies of transnational communities often focus not only on the members residing (if only temporarily) outside their country of origin but also those within the homeland because of the continuous circulation of people, money, goods, information, ideas and practices between these two spaces. The lives of transnationals “cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field.”

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In the diaspora literature these transnational communities are characterized by their bi-locality and have also been described as borderland cultures\textsuperscript{214} or micro-diasporas.\textsuperscript{215} They are thus presented as a distinct phenomenon (by Cohen) or as a type of diaspora (by Butler and Sheffer). Diaspora literature borrows heavily from the literature on transnational communities. Diaspora studies often make reference to and cite evidence of second generation (third, fourth, etc.) “diaspora” identity, practices, activities and organization, for example, that is derived from the transnational community literature, in particular, but not limited to, the work of Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc-Szanton.\textsuperscript{216}

Despite efforts to distinguish these two concepts by Cohen, Butler and others, the boundaries are indeed unclear. If a distinction is made based on bi-locality versus dispersion, as Butler suggests, we may indeed be studying a micro-diaspora or a section of a diaspora that is more widely dispersed (for example, studies on the Cuban diaspora that focus on Cubans in Florida or the United States rather than extending the scope of research to Cubans in Venezuela, or studies on Dominicans in New York rather than both New York and Madrid). If the bi-locality is based on communities separated by a national border rendering a clear single hostland and homeland relationship, then, as Sheffer suggests, we must also take into account how dispersed a community is within the hostland (as in the case of a Mexican “diaspora” in the United States). Finally, if the distinction is more theoretical as Cohen suggests, in that these borderland or transnational communities are “[s]ocieties bleeding into one another creat[ing] new complex and other intermediate identities, not diasporas,” then we may also need to reconsider the inclusion of cultural studies, postmodernism and a now vast collection of literature that posits just such new forms of identity as the result of “diasporic”

\textsuperscript{214} Cohen (1997): 190.

\textsuperscript{215} Butler (2001): 196. The literature on diasporas tends to emphasize dispersal to two or more countries. However, allowances are made for applying the term diaspora to communities that are widely dispersed within one country, often far from the border of their country of origin. Sheffer cites the case of Mexicans who have settled in parts of the United States (and Canada) at a distance from the U.S.-Mexican border.\textsuperscript{215} Butler resolves the “distribution dilemma” by suggesting that the dispersal involve at least two “destinations.”

relationships and conditions. Neither studies of diaspora nor transnational communities
(when indeed they are differentiated) is served by such exclusion. Diasporas are transnational,
and transnational communities (or at least sections of such) share diasporic conditions and
exhibit diasporic features.

The Politics of Diaspora

Situating Diaspora Politics

Although comparatively late to the study of diasporas, since the 1990s political science has
made important contributions to this literature. Yossi Shain and especially Gabriel Sheffer,
both political scientists, have long suggested that diasporas are a widespread, enduring,
proliferating, and politically significant phenomenon. Particularly noteworthy is Gabriel
Sheffer’s edited volume, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (1986) and his later
work, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (2003) as well as Yossi Shain’s *Marketing the
American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (1999).

Taking the diaspora-hostland relationship as the focus of analysis, we may consider diasporas
as a type of interest group or pressure group and situate their study within the field of
comparative politics. Diaspora collective associations can be powerful pressure groups in the
domestic politics of host countries. The Jewish and Irish lobbies in the U.S. are examples of
this. Diaspora organizations can also act as interest groups in the homeland. The
diaspora-host government relationship is a frequent topic of study, but the political
relationship between diasporas and other national interest groups is also a potentially rich
area of comparative political study. Earlier in this chapter, the differences and similarities
between diasporas and transnational communities were articulated. Both entities are, of

course, closely associated with the more general concept of transnationalism—“the multiple

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217 See, for example, Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their


ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation states.”

The political activities of diasporas are not limited to the hostland or to the diaspora experience in the hostland; they are frequently extended to the homeland and to the sites of co-diasporans. Therefore, we may also view diasporas as a type of transnational nonstate actor and integrate their study into the field of international relations. The dominance of the state-centric model in international relations contributed to the sidelining of nonstate actors, including diasporas, as valuable units of analysis. As challenges to the state-centric model opened the door to alternative approaches, interest in the study of diasporas as actors in international politics also grew. The political (economic and cultural) activities of diasporas, however, blur the boundaries between domestic and international politics. Therefore, work on diaspora politics tends to emphasize the triadic networks or triangular relationship between diaspora, homeland, and host government.

An example of this is the literature on the role of diasporas as “lobbyists” in the host country and their ability to influence and even capture its foreign policy toward their country of origin. This literature has elicited lively debate with one side suggesting that diasporas identify and care about co-ethnics or co-diasporans in other states and that they are often able to influence hostland foreign policy. The other side concludes that influence on foreign policy is limited and rare and the capture of foreign policy—as in the case of Cuban-

221 Particularly in neorealist and neoliberal approaches—less so the constructivist approach, despite criticism of Alexander Wendt’s work for privileging the role of the state. Alexander Wendt describes his analysis of international politics as “thin constructivism.” See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
222 Reis (2004): 42.
Americans capturing U.S. policy toward Cuba—is an exception rather than the rule.\textsuperscript{225} Arguably, this position ignores cases of apparent capture that would be difficult to attribute to geopolitical motivations rather than diaspora influence, American policy towards Macedonia and Azerbaijan, for example.\textsuperscript{226} The United States is not alone, Germany was criticized for its early recognition of Croatian independence, a move that some view as having sparked the civil war in Yugoslavia. Arguably, Germany’s recognition was partly the result of lobbying by its Croatian population.\textsuperscript{227}

The role of diasporas as nonstate actors involved in financing armed conflict and development is the focus of another growing body of diaspora politics literature (and political economy).\textsuperscript{228} To Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman diaspora financial flows are "a force to be reckoned with in international politics."\textsuperscript{229} Work on this topic includes the widely cited World Bank studies by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler which conclude that the opportunity to capture resources rather than objective grievances is the primary motivation for rebellion and cause of intra-state conflict, and that diasporas, in particular sizable ones in the United States, play a key role in the re-emergence of conflict, "presumably" through financial contributions to insurgents.\textsuperscript{230} Examples of financial contributions include the nearly US$4 million the Irish Northern Aid (NORAID), a U.S.-based organization, sent to Northern

\textsuperscript{225} Will H. Moore, "Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy," SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 77-91 and Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan (2001).

\textsuperscript{226} Greek-Americans succeeded in limiting U.S. involvement and recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and despite opposition from then President Clinton, Armenian-Americans were instrumental in introducing and maintaining a ban on U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan (after Armenia was able to annex land connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory within Azerbaijan home to a majority population of Armenian ethnicity).


\textsuperscript{229} Shain and Sherman (2001): 3.

\textsuperscript{230} Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and (2002).
Ireland in the early 1980s;\textsuperscript{231} the more recent case (1991) of diaspora donations US$4 million to the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party of nationalist candidate, Franjo Tudjman\textsuperscript{232} and subsequent donations of US$50 million to the Croatian government.\textsuperscript{233}

But if diaspora money can be used to fuel conflict, it is also theorized that it represents a source of development assistance and potential stability\textsuperscript{234} The International Organization for Migration estimates that remittances to developing countries account for substantially more than official development assistance, capital market flows, and over half of foreign direct investment.\textsuperscript{235} Van Hiear positsthat these remittances are used for daily subsistence needs, health care, housing, education, and to pay off debts. Patricia Weiss Fagen and Micah N.


Bump consider remittances the "sine qua non for peace and rebuilding."\textsuperscript{236} They can assist development, help people to survive during conflict and to rebuild afterward.\textsuperscript{237}

The Political Roles of Diasporas

The brief survey above attempts to situate diaspora studies within the sub-fields of comparative politics and international relations while also highlighting the fact that the diaspora phenomenon and the political activities of diaspora bridge these two areas of political study. The examples cited from the literature on diasporas’ role as "lobbyists" and nonstate financiers of conflict and development provide evidence of the political roles diasporas play in domestic and international politics. In addition to these two broad categories of a) fund-raising, financial contributions and remittances and b) lobbying and activism, the literature suggests diaspora political activities and roles may also include:

1. **Leadership.** Diaspora associations represent a pool of potential leaders for the homeland. In conflict situations, stateless diaspora may include “rebel” leaders and exiles that provide long-distance advice and have an input into political and military strategy. In peacetime or post-conflict, diasporas may supply whole political parties as in Armenia, foreign ministers in Estonia, or a President in Latvia.\textsuperscript{238} Intellectuals and cultural figures (scientists, authors, artists), the subjects of much postmodern diaspora literature, are also potential leaders for the homeland.

2. **Mediation and peace-making and prevention of human rights abuses.** Diasporas with ties to political and warring groups in the homeland may persuade or exert pressure to bring their side to the table. The Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA) did just that; the organizations lobbied the U.S. Congress and President as well as Sinn Fein in Northern


\textsuperscript{237} Van Hear (1998) and “Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict,” Migration Information Source (June 2003) at www.migrationinformation.org

Ireland to draw it into the peace process.\(^{239}\) In a study of the Palestinian diaspora, Margaret Johannsen suggests that diaspora groups use personal and institutional contacts in their country of origin to “support peace constituencies in the conflict region.”\(^{240}\) Finally, diaspora organizations and individual members may devote significant efforts to bringing attention to human rights abuses in the homeland or perpetrated against co-diasporans. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary believe that human rights abuses may be more likely if an ethnic community lacks its own state or a powerful diaspora to act in its defence.\(^{241}\)

3. **Intelligence supply.** Michael Dahan and Gabriel Sheffer suggest that diaspora associations may supply the homeland with general information and intelligence about host countries and other domestic and international systems and actors. This may be done openly or through secret exchanges. The Mossad (Israeli Secret Services), for example, reportedly maintains connections with “security officers” in Jewish organizations in the United States and through this network Israel receives warnings about potential dangers and terrorist attacks.\(^{242}\)

4. **Brain drain, reverse brain drain (or brain circulation), reconstruction, and development.** Diasporas can be a source of knowledge and technology transfer valuable to development and reconstruction efforts in the homeland. Diasporas may be the source of returning or visiting experts and specialists in medicine, law, economic policy and planning, agriculture, engineering, information and communication technologies, etc.\(^{243}\) The making or growth of the diaspora, however, may also represent a “brain drain” for the homeland.

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\(^{242}\) Dahan and Sheffer (2001): 93-94.

5. Framing identity, grievances, and conflict. Through the circulation of funds, people, ideas, information, and intelligence, the capacity to lobby, network and deploy information strategically, and aided by advanced communication technologies, a diaspora can project to its host country, the homeland, and worldwide, its own interpretation of what constitutes the diaspora and homeland (national) identity, the grievances associated with the diaspora vis-à-vis the hostland or homeland, the goals of the struggle (of the diaspora or homeland), and the terms of resolution.

Discussion of diasporas in political science centres on their place and role in national/domestic political institutions and processes (diasporas as interest groups/pressure groups/lobbyists) and their role in armed conflict and development (diasporas as long-distance nationalists). Debates in political science are generally about the degree of impact diasporas have in these roles. That is, whether diasporas impact is insignificant, limited, significant or critical, and whether or not this impact should be considered positive or negative. Yossi Shain, for example, argues that “diasporic involvement may have positive ramifications at the domestic level of political and civic culture” in the U.S. and that diaspora involvement in U.S. foreign policy serves U.S. national interests. In political science analyses, diasporas and ethnic groups or minorities are frequently conflated, and empirical definitions of diasporas are generally adopted. Although the dichotomous practices of diasporas as peace-makers and peace-wreckers in relation to armed conflict are acknowledged, diasporas are frequently portrayed as one or the other, particularly in security studies and political economy. However, political science has also produced more nuanced analyses of diaspora politics that reflect insights from other disciplines. The contributors to

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244 Despite an increasing volume of diaspora literature, in-depth analyses of diaspora politics and in particular the role of diasporas in conflict is relatively limited, with the notable exception of work by Gabriel Sheffer, Yossi Shain, Hazel Smith and Paul Stares.


246 See for example, the SAIS Review volume titled “The Minority Rules,” SAIS Review XXII, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002).

247 See, for example, Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau and Brannan (2001); Purdy (2003); Kuznetsov (2006); Zunzer (2004).
Diasporas in Conflict, for example, acknowledge the inherent heterogeneity within diasporas, the changes and shifting power relations within them, and the possibility that diasporas can exhibit ethno-parochial and cosmopolitan tendencies (even simultaneously), and that a diaspora can act as both a peace-wrecker and peace-maker. But the strength of these more nuanced political science analyses of diaspora lies not only in their incorporation of insights from other disciplines, but also in what they contribute to the broader study of diaspora, and that is, greater attention to agency.

**Diaspora Identity, Agency, and Solidarity**

Regarding diaspora identity and more specifically the homeland-oriented identity, the literature on diaspora politics echoes the three broad approaches to the study of ethnicity: the primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. In the primordialist view, the homeland-orientation is unproblematic, the essential ethnic characteristics of the homeland and “its people” travel with the diaspora. Therefore, diaspora members feel an immutable longing for the homeland, kinship and a desire to feel part of the homeland experience, and a need to assuage guilt for leaving. The instrumentalist approach assumes actor self-interest and that actors seek to “maximize utility” (understood as the pursuit of wealth and power). It posits that a homeland-orientation (or any other orientation) is strategically adopted by particular diaspora groups or diaspora members to access political power, social status, and material resources in the homeland or to generate support for goals in the host society, including access to host government institutions and resources. The most widely adopted approach in the diaspora literature, however, is the constructivist. Here diaspora identity, including the homeland-orientation, is constructed, reconstructed, and co-constructed “from a dense web of

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248 Smith and Stares (2007).

249 From Cultural Theory, see Hall (1990), English and multidisciplinary studies, see Tökölyan (2000).

250 From History and African Studies, see Butler (2001).

251 From Sociology, see, for example, Pnina Werbner (2000).


social interactions.”

That is, the membership rules, content, and valuation of diaspora identity are the products of a socio-political process involving human action, dialogue, debate and negotiation. Therefore, these can and do change over time, albeit slowly. This approach allows for the possibility that the salience of the homeland-orientation in identity and the character of this homeland-orientation (nationalist and exclusionary or cosmopolitan) can change as a result of, for example, diaspora interaction with new or different actors, exposure to and adoption of new ideas, as well as access to information and resources. For the purpose of this dissertation, I adopt this constructivist approach. I conceptualize identity as processes of self-understanding and identification. Therefore, in this dissertation, much emphasis is placed on specifying the agents involved in “identifying” as well as challenges to specific identifications (these challenges may take the form of argumentation and persuasion). Thus, as suggested by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, identity is understood not as a condition but rather a process.

Werbner describes diasporas as “historical formations in process” that “change over time…” Diasporas are not static, levels of activity and membership expand and contract as new members arrive, move, or leave, and as levels of identification, interest and commitment wax and wane in response to the “internal dynamics of the community” and the various political and social contexts in which diaspora members find themselves.


256 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper argue against the use of the term “identity” and call into question its analytical usefulness. Although I find their argument persuasive, I believe much of the ambiguity surrounding the term (which Brubaker and Cooper object to) can be corrected by making explicit what is meant by “identity.” The term “identity” may indeed have its problems as an analytical tool (as does, for example, “democracy”) and we should indeed be vigilant against re-ifying essentialist understandings of “identity,” however, it remains a much less cumbersome term than the alternatives Brubaker and Cooper propose. See Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond 'Identity,'” Theory and Society 29 (2000): 1-47.

257 Brubaker and Cooper (2000).


Diaspora activism, for example, is not solely the product of intra-diaspora debate and negotiation; it depends as well on pressures from the homeland and the pressures, constraints and resources (material and ideational) of the hostland. Nevertheless, it is the diaspora agents (individuals and the collective) who are constrained by, take advantage of, or take part in creating the opportunity structures of the homeland and hostland.

An important contribution to the literature of diaspora politics, organization, and agency is Töölöyan’s analysis of leadership elites as a “multi-tiered minority” within a diaspora consisting of the committed, the activists, and sometimes a smaller number of radical activists or militants. It is these core members, as Gabriel Sheffer prefers to name them, who join, staff, fund, and operate diaspora organizations. They are the ranks of the “politically and institutionally engaged;” they are active in the development of (and frequently attempt to monopolize) diaspora discourse, and agendas for self-representation and action. The identification of this “minority” allows us to specify the level of a diaspora’s transnational political involvement. Another measure of this transnational political involvement is the core members’ capacity for solidarity-building and mobilization among the larger diaspora. The solidarity-building process requires overcoming generational, educational, gender, social and ideological differences that exist within the diaspora; it also requires a careful balancing of ties to the homeland and the diaspora’s needs in the hostland. In the case of well-established large diasporas such as the Jewish, Armenian, and Irish diasporas, institutions and solidarity may be sufficient to support transnational activities. For the smaller, newer, incipient diasporas, however, the negotiation and bargaining required to build solidarity that takes place within the diaspora may need to be extended to potential partners outside that can aid in the projection of the diaspora’s politics.

Towards a Political Definition of Diaspora

The literature on diaspora politics reveals that diasporas are active in cultural, social, economic, informational, and political spheres. Their networks reflect not only complex relationships among the diasporas, hostlands, homelands and other international actors but also organization. An important contribution from the diaspora politics literature to the broader study of diasporas is attention to organizational capacity and elaboration of diaspora agency—diaspora politics literature makes explicit the social actors, collective actions, and practices involved.

Therefore, I propose that diasporas may be defined as socio-political formations exhibiting the following features: 1) dispersal from an original homeland (actual, desired, or imagined); 2) conscious maintenance, representation, and transmittal of a homeland-oriented collective identity; 3) self-awareness of such identity; 4) a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnics in the homeland and co-diasporans; 5) commitment to maintain or attempts to establish relationships with the homeland and co-diasporans; 6) attempts to create and maintain diaspora networks and organizations, including networks and organizations that may be open to non-diasporans. Several of the above features are “technology” sensitive. Dispersal, representation and transmittal of collective identity, the mobilization of solidarity, the maintenance of relations, networks, and organizations are all facilitated by ease in travel and communications and exchange. This political definition of diaspora guides this dissertation.

The above conceptualization of diaspora is not prescriptive; rather it is a guideline or framework for the study of diasporas and diaspora politics. It is both more inclusive and open.

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270 Vertovec (1997); Tölölyan (1996); Sheffer (1995).
than previously discussed definitions and more restrictive. To reflect conditions of mixed-migration, this definition highlights the importance of dispersal from an original homeland but does not restrict this to a forced migration. It accepts that diasporas can be the product of forced, coerced, or voluntary migration or a combination of these. This definition does not specify the number of national borders that must be crossed through dispersal, thereby allowing the inclusion of “borderland” and “transnational” communities. It also does not specify a period of time or number of generations in diaspora, thereby including established ancient and modern diasporas, but also acknowledging the existence of new, incipient diasporas and the potential for the revival of the dormant.\textsuperscript{271} However, the definition proposed here is more restrictive in that it emphasizes consciousness, representation and “doing.” There must be \textit{evidence} of a homeland-oriented identity, homeland-oriented practices, and of the diaspora’s self-conscious representation of such an identity.\textsuperscript{272}

The last two features in this definition point to a prerequisite of at least attempted organization and minimally institutionalized economic, cultural, or political exchanges between the diaspora and homeland and/or co-diasporans.\textsuperscript{273} This emphasis on organization, networks and institutionalized exchanges and their analysis allows us to distinguish between ethnic groups, various transient migrants, and diasporas.\textsuperscript{274} A dispersed people can be re-named a diaspora only when its discourse and organization reflect a “gaze beyond the ethnic enclave, to the homeland, to other dispersions, and to a more active collective engagement with...the host country.”\textsuperscript{275} Moreover, the establishment, endurance or revival of any particular diaspora will at least in part be dependent on the creation and maintenance of diaspora formal or informal institutions.

\textsuperscript{271} Sheffer (2003).

\textsuperscript{272} Tölöyan (1996): 15.


\textsuperscript{274} Sheffer (2003): 79.

\textsuperscript{275} Tölöyan (1996): 24.
The definition proposed here as a guideline for the study of diaspora politics is also meant to encourage questions regarding the identity and agency of diasporas and the process of diasporization. The conscious maintenance, representation, and transmittal of a homeland-oriented collective identity and self-awareness of such an identity, for example, imply active involvement in the construction of such an identity. How is the homeland-oriented identity constructed, through what processes, by whom, and in what context? If there is a sense of solidarity with the homeland and within the diaspora, how is solidarity achieved in practice? If there is a commitment to establishing relationships, networks and organizations, who is engaged in this project, what are the motives, what processes are involved, and to what effect? In the chapters that follow, these questions are posed in reference to the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas. I use the political definition of diaspora presented in this chapter as a guideline for analysis of their diaspora politics and begin by examining the first feature of this political definition: the dispersal from an original homeland.
Chapter 3

The Making of the Acehnese and East Timorese Diasporas

Historical Context and Classification

In this chapter I provide a brief history of Acehnese and East Timorese migration to "the West." Here, this term is used loosely to include North America, Europe, and Australia. I also seek to determine whether the Acehnese and East Timorese communities residing outside the "homeland" can be classified as diasporas, and more specifically, incipient diasporas. In parallel with the histories of migration, I provide a brief history of Aceh and East Timor, focusing on the modern conflict. History has a direct bearing on the politics of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas—the historical context allows us "to understand the interests, aspirations, institutions and objectives"\(^{276}\) of these diasporas. History (sometimes contested) and the politics of home are prominent elements of diaspora repertoires of representation. History is also deployed by diasporas and their partners in the formation of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and in their use of information, symbolic, and accountability politics.

To determine if the two groups under study are diasporas, I use the \textbf{political definition} of diaspora proposed in Chapter 2. Although James Clifford and other diaspora scholars indicate that a community cannot be expected to qualify on all features in a definition and throughout history,\(^{277}\) I submit that the Acehnese and East Timorese communities should exhibit all five of the defining features for the following reasons: First, as incipient diasporas, their memberships still consist of many first generation migrants, including refugees and exiles that fled or left a country of origin in conflict\(^{278}\). Thus, we can expect the Acehnese and East Timorese communities to be highly politicized, or at the very least to exhibit self-awareness as an ethnonational group that has travelled with them to the hostland, and to have


a salient homeland-oriented political identity. If at this early stage of diasporization, these features are not evident, then these communities may be better defined as “assimilating” or “integrating” migrants or in terms of ethnic minority-ethnic majority relations in the country of settlement. Second, there must be evidence of a commitment to actively maintain links to the homeland and/or co-diasporans in other places, as well as efforts to establish diaspora organizations or institutions. As suggested by Khachig Töloyan, “diaspora-specific social identities are constructed through…interaction with the norms, values, discourses and practices of that diaspora’s communal institutions.”

Without, at the very least, attempts to establish such communal organizations, the permanence or long-term viability of the “community as diaspora” is questionable. If a group is to be considered an incipient diaspora rather than a collection of refugees, exiles, migrants, etc., the foundations of institutionalization must be evident even at this early stage. However, before proceeding in later chapters to a more in depth analysis of the Acehnese and East Timorese communities in diaspora, and the full list of features included in my proposed political definition of diaspora, I return here to the beginning, to the dispersal, the history of migration.

History of Migration

The history of migration and settlement of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas is not well documented. Determining where the diasporas are located and gathering information on their numbers is complicated by the fact that in many cases official statistics do not provide a breakdown by region within each country of origin. That is, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, temporary or long-term visitors from East Timor and Aceh are included in the larger “Indonesian” category. In addition, a significant number of diaspora members are undocumented residents.


280 The accounting of recipient or host countries.

281 Gabriel Sheffer points out that the lack of reliable data is a common problem for diaspora analysts; “it is extremely difficult to obtain anything approaching precise figures on the actual sizes, compositions, and dispersals of ethno-national diasporas.” In Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press 2003): 99 and 100-105.
Therefore, I have relied on estimates of academic experts and nongovernmental organizations and estimates of the Acehnese and East Timorese communities themselves. Community-sourced estimates provide information not available in official statistics as they may include members of the community that are not recorded—such as, individuals naturalized in the host state, illegal or irregular residents and workers, children born in the host state, students, and other long-term residents. Community-sourced estimates also provide information on the number of returnees to the country of origin that may not be reflected in official statistics as some of these may have been undocumented or, in the case of East Timor, may have returned to East Timor after formal independence in 2002 but as Australians (since East Timor allows dual nationality but Indonesia does not). On the other hand, community-sourced estimates likely do not include Acehnese or East Timorese who do not participate in the Acehnese or East Timor communities and/or are unknown to them.

The history of migration of Acehnese and East Timor diasporas generally coincides with the intensity of conflict in Aceh and East Timor during which people felt forced to flee or with periods of openness when restrictions on travel were looser (or when corruption in the Indonesian system allowed departure). In the case of the Acehnese, secondary migration to the West from Malaysia also coincides with periods of crackdowns on illegal or irregular immigrants by Malaysian authorities. For these reasons, the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas may be characterized according to Robin Cohen’s typology of diaspora as “victim diasporas.” However, it is important to note here that not every member of these diaspora communities left involuntarily, nor was the conflict the sole reason for flight or travel in every case. The membership of these diasporas includes not only exiles and refugees, but in lesser numbers Acehnese and East Timorese who have migrated in search of economic, professional or educational opportunities or for reasons of family reunification. Nevertheless, the migration to the “West” of a large enough number of community members was unchosen

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rather than voluntary. Thus we may use Cohen’s victim appellation cautiously.\textsuperscript{283} Although the involuntary nature of the departure from the homeland does not determine if a group of migrants will or will not organize as a diaspora in the country of settlement, it can have an effect on the political nature of the community. Both the older and recent histories of migration provide the raw material for imagining the homeland as a nation\textsuperscript{284} and the community as an ethnonational diaspora.

The East Timorese Migration

East Timor is located on the eastern periphery of the Indonesian Archipelago and lies approximately 1200 miles from Jakarta and 400 miles north of Darwin, Australia. The island of Timor is divided into West Timor and East Timor (East Timor also includes the islands of Atauro and Jaco and the Oecussi enclave on the western half of the island). East Timor was a Portuguese colony from the 16\textsuperscript{th} century until the mid-1970s and was referred to as Portuguese Timor. Unlike the western half of Timor island, the east was never part of the Dutch East Indies territory transferred to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. The East Timorese are ethnically and linguistically diverse. The largest groups are Austronesian and Papuan, but there are also minorities of Chinese, Portuguese, Arab and African descent. The two largest language groups are Tetum and Mambai, but there are multiple dialects (sixteen indigenous languages).\textsuperscript{285} In addition, East Timorese are sometimes divided along geographical lines, the Firacu of the east and the Caladi of the western side of East Timor. Due to its colonial history, the population of East Timor is predominantly Catholic, and in reaction to the Indonesian occupation the numbers of practicing Catholics increased (now 90%), whereas Indonesia, including Aceh, is predominantly Muslim (88%).

Less frequently noted than the above differences in colonial history and religion, are the different roles played by Indonesia and East Timor during the Second World War. In various


parts of the Indonesian archipelago, including Aceh, the Japanese were received with a mixture of welcome, for expelling the Dutch, and rebellion,\textsuperscript{286} in response to Japan's own abuses. In East Timor, however, Timorese volunteers assisted an Australian force in battle against the Japanese. As a result, East Timor suffered massive casualties during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945); an estimated 40,000 East Timorese died.\textsuperscript{287}

At the end of the Second World War, both Portugal and The Netherlands intended to retain or re-impose colonial authority.\textsuperscript{288} Following Japan's surrender to the Allies, Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945. The Dutch thus faced an independence revolution and waged two "police actions"—military campaigns—against the Indonesians in 1947 and 1948. Under pressure from the Indonesians on the archipelago and internationally from the British and especially the Americans, the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949.\textsuperscript{289} The colonial history of East Timor, however, would continue.\textsuperscript{290} The Portuguese retained colonial control of East Timor and faced very little resistance. The authoritarian Salazar regime's secret police or PIDE (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado), active in Portugal and the colonies, "monitored all signs of opposition...suppressed freedom of expression, the ability to form political associations and have political debate."\textsuperscript{291} It was not until the "Carnation Revolution" in Portugal and the subsequent collapse of the authoritarian Caetano regime in 1974 (largely the


\textsuperscript{288} Bastin and Benda (1968): 151.

\textsuperscript{289} The Acehnese were active and important participants in Indonesian nationalism and the Indonesian war of independence against the Dutch assisting militarily and financially. In both Acehnese and Indonesian narratives of history Aceh was critical to the Republic's success. The Dutch retained the territory of what is now known as West Papua (referred to in the past as West New Guinea and Irian Jaya). See Bastin and Benda (1968): 157.

\textsuperscript{290} See the CAVR for a remarkable historical overview of the East Timor conflict from 1974 to 1999 (both civil war and Indonesian occupation) and the investigation and findings on human rights violations during this period.

result of the African wars of independence from Portugal) that the process of decolonization began in East Timor.

During this early period of decolonization, local political associations were formed in East Timor that would later become the first major political parties: Timorese Democratic Union (UDT),292 Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin),293 and Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). Local elections were held in February and March 1975 showing a victory for Fretilin but also strong support for UDT. The UDT had split into two, a pro-independence group and a group that supported possible integration with Indonesia. It is now widely acknowledged that the pro-integration camp received financial support and was influenced by Indonesia.294 Following the collapse of a short-lived UDT-Fretilin coalition, in August 1975 pro-integration forces within the UDT mounted an “attempted coup” or “armed movement”295 against Fretilin—or purportedly against “communist elements” in Fretilin and the Portuguese colonial administration296—and East Timor descended into civil war. The Portuguese administration hastily withdrew to the outlying island of Atauro on August 26, 1975 and later withdrew from East Timor completely, essentially abandoning its former colony after centuries of what may be described as a colonization characterized by gross neglect and underdevelopment, repression of dissent, and a mismanaged decolonization process.

By mid-September 1975, the UDT had retreated to West Timor and Fretilin had de-facto control of East Timor. Fearing imminent full-scale military action from Indonesia, Fretilin

292 União Democrática Timorense.

293 Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente. The Association for a Democratic East Timor (ASDT) was formed earlier and subsequently became Fretilin in September 1974.


295 The UDT’s actions are generally referred to as a ‘coup’ or ‘attempted coup,’ the CAVR adopts the term ‘armed movement.’ See CAVR (2006): 40.

hastily and unilaterally declared East Timor independent from Portugal on November 28, 1975. One day later, members of four East Timorese political parties, including UDT and Apodeti, were gathered in Bali and, under pressure from Indonesian intelligence, signed the curiously-named “Balibo Declaration” criticizing Fretilin’s declaration of independence and declaring the integration of East Timor (Portuguese Timor) with Indonesia.297 The “Balibo Declaration” and the pretext of restoring order were used by the Indonesian government to justify its full-scale invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975. In fact, frequent incursions by the Indonesian army into border towns of Portuguese Timor took place from late August through September 1975; the incursions grew in scale through October and included the October 16th attack on the town of Balibo. Five Australian-based journalists died during this attack. Known as the “Balibo Five,” the deaths or deliberate murders of these journalists by Indonesian troops is the subject of continued controversy in Australia and a 2007 official inquest in New South Wales, Australia (into the death of Brian Peters).

The larger geopolitical context of the Indonesian invasion is important. The North Vietnamese victory in Vietnam and the collapse of pro-U.S. governments in Cambodia and Laos in 1975 created a sense of alarm among U.S. policymakers and allies, including Australia and the United Kingdom. The effect was Western policies focused on preventing the further spread of “communism” in Southeast Asia. Indonesia—the Suharto government specifically—was viewed as a key ally in this effort. Fretilin’s Marxist inspiration and rhetoric, in this respect, did not aid its cause. The occupation of East Timor thus met no resistance from the U.S., Australia or the U.K. and indeed was given the “green light” by the U.S. while Australia turned a “blind eye.”298 In later years, this perceived complicity between Indonesia and the U.S. and Australian governments would serve as a basis for an East Timor transnational solidarity movement.


298 For declassified documents detailing the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 see The National Security Archive at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/
However, as noted by Anthony L. Smith, “the invasion and occupation of East Timor did not come easily.” Benedict Anderson suggests that because the East Timorese included former members of the Portuguese army in East Timor who had availed themselves of Portuguese weapons left behind (in essence NATO weapons), they were better equipped and trained “than any previous local opposition to Jakarta” and “put up a very stiff fight.” Falintil (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste), the military wing of Fretilin, led a substantial resistance campaign, first under the command of Nicolau Lobato (killed in combat in December 1978) and subsequently under the command of the charismatic Xanana Gusmão. Although Falintil was nearly destroyed in 1978 by the Indonesian military campaign, the East Timorese clandestine resistance grew and consolidated through the 1980s and 1990s. For its part, the Indonesian military launched a brutal counter-insurgency strategy that included aerial bombardments, napalming villages, and the “systematic herding of people into resettlement centres leading to...famines” during the 1977-1980 period.

Chega! The CAVR Report (Comissão de Acohimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste) concludes that during the 1975 to 1999 period, the conservative estimate or minimum number of conflict-related deaths was 102,800 (of a pre-invasion population of 800,000), including an estimated 84,200 “deaths due to hunger and illness which exceed the total that would be expected if the death rate due to hunger and illness had continued as it was in the pre-invasion peacetime period.” Although this time period also includes East

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302 Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor


305 CAVR (2006): Ch 6. 3.
Timor's brief civil war in 1975, most conflict-related deaths and disappearances took place within the first five years of the Indonesian occupation and are attributed to the Indonesian military and police (57.6%) and to Indonesian proxies and East Timorese auxiliaries—militias, civil defense forces, and local officials working under the Indonesian administration (32.3%). In a separate study, Ben Kiernan, director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, notes that 1,500-2,000 were killed during East Timor's civil war of August-September 1975 (plus 140-150 prisoners killed by Fretilin in December 1975). He also estimates that the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975-1999 resulted in 120,000 deaths out of a population of 650,000. The results of a 2007 published study by Sarah Staveteig suggest that a "reasonable upper bound on excess deaths" during the 1975-1999 period is 204,000 (+/-51,000).

Refugees began fleeing East Timor during the civil war and continued to flee until the late 1990s. The number of East Timorese who went to Australia starting with the advent of civil war may be as many as 20,000, to Portugal 10,000 and small numbers to Macau, Mozambique, Angola, Canada, the U.S., Ireland and the United Kingdom. The first group of East Timorese refugees arrived in Darwin, Australia in August 1975 on a small cargo ship, the Macdili. Aboard were 272 people, mostly Portuguese or Timorese of Portuguese descent. A second cargo ship brought another 1150 people from East Timor to Darwin. The Macdili then made a second trip to East Timor returning to Darwin on August 29, 1975 with

306 Ibid.


309 The figure of 20,000 is provided by Amanda Wise but is disputed by some Timorese leaders who believe the number is lower and closer to 10,000. The discrepancy is based on a difference in categorization. The 20,000 figure refers to individuals of Timorese descent; the lower figure of 10,000 refers to Timor-born residents of Australia. See Amanda Wise (2006): 63.

approximately 700 people, including a number of Chinese-Timorese.\textsuperscript{311} Carlos Pereira was among the East Timorese on the Macdili:

I came to Australia in 1975… I came on the cargo boat the Macdili… I arrived in Darwin in August 1975. I didn’t expect to settle here, I thought things would go back to normal and I’d go back to Timor. Then the Indonesian invasion happened on December 7th.\textsuperscript{312}

In total, it is estimated that 1,647 Timor-born refugees arrived in Australia on these ships.\textsuperscript{313} A small number escaped by airplane. Another 2,447 East Timorese fled to Australia in the early years of Indonesian occupation (1976-81). About one-quarter of this number went to Australia under a special family reunion scheme.\textsuperscript{314} Further family reunions took place under Special Humanitarian Programs between 1976 and 1991; one of the Special Humanitarian Programs was specifically designed to allow family reunions with East Timorese in the diaspora, in Portugal, Macau or Mozambique.\textsuperscript{315} The family reunions continued until 1990-91. As explained by Carlos Pereira and Bernadino Siry of the Timor Australia Council in Sydney:

Portugal, Macao and Mozambique—could bring family from these three places. Most came from Portugal. Australia permitted family reunion specifically for Timorese. Started in 1980 and lasted until 1986… About fifty percent of Timorese here came from Portugal.\textsuperscript{316}

I went to study in Portugal on September 27, 1973; I then came to Australia in January 1987 under the special program for family reunification. I married a Timorese woman in Portugal and her cousin sponsored us to come to Australia.\textsuperscript{317}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Wise (2006): 41-42.
\item Interview with Carlos Pereira of the Timor Australia Council, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
\item Wise (2006): 43.
\item Wise (2006): 44.
\item Wise (2006): 45.
\item Interview with Carlos Pereira, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
\item Interview with Bernadino Siry, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The majority of East Timorese going to Australia from 1977 to the 1990s arrived under the Special Humanitarian Programs for family reunion. After the Indonesian occupation, East Timor remained virtually closed off until the period of reformasi\textsuperscript{318} starting in 1989, making visits to East Timor and flight from East Timor during this closed period difficult and dangerous. Nevertheless East Timorese continued to leave East Timor in small numbers and were accepted in Australia until the mid-1990s. Notably, 130 Timorese\textsuperscript{319} arrived in Australia after the Santa Cruz Massacre (Dili Massacre) of November 12, 1991 when Indonesian troops opened fire on a pro-independence demonstration made up mainly of students. A further 1,600 asylum seekers arrived in Australia between 1994 and 1996. By that time, however, it is argued that for political reasons, the Australian government had changed its positions towards East Timorese refugees and refused to grant them asylum. Brendan Doyle, a member of the Australia East Timor Association in Sydney describes the situation thus: “The issue with the refugees is that they were being kicked out, they’ve made their lives here...their children were born here.”\textsuperscript{320} A near decade-long legal process ensued ending in April 2005 allowing all but fifty of the applicants to remain in Australia.\textsuperscript{321}

A number of East Timorese left for Portugal in 1975-76, some were airlifted out along with the Portuguese as they left Atauro in East Timor. A large number of East Timorese, including UDT members and sympathizers fled to West Timor during the civil war and after the Indonesia invasion. Many of these East Timorese then went to Portugal from West Timor in 1976. Most Timorese preferred to go to Australia, at first because of proximity to East Timor and later because of the size of the East Timorese community established there. The smaller number of East Timorese that was able to flee and make its way to Portugal from 1976 on (sometimes taking long and difficult routes through third countries in Southeast Asian or

\textsuperscript{318} Political reform.

\textsuperscript{319} Wise (2006): 45.

\textsuperscript{320} Interview with Brendan Doyle, Australia East Timor Association (AETA), January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

through Macau) was admitted into Portugal as Portuguese citizens. During these years the International Red Cross facilitated the departure of some East Timorese refugees to Portugal and their initial housing upon arrival. In his memoir, The Crossing, Luís Cardoso describes the East Timorese camps in Valo do Jamor outside of Lisbon where the refugees were housed:

There was not much amor about Vale do Jamor; there was instead the fetid smell from the river and the mud surrounding the canvas tents donated by the Red Cross. Most of its inhabitants were civil servants with links with the UDT. They hoped to get their papers processed and be reintegrated into civil service life, or else to take early retirement and make the kangaroo-leap over to Australia...After a period of adaptation, some were, in fact, taken back into the civil service and they left the vale...Others, with fewer means, stayed...

In addition, there were a small number of East Timorese students who found themselves in Portugal at the time of civil war and invasion and were left with little choice but to remain there or later transfer to Australia. Bernadino Siry was among them:

I had gone to Portugal in 1973 as a student [on a scholarship]. Then the fighting started in East Timor and we were stuck in Portugal...Other groups went later on through the Red Cross.323

Luís Cardoso recalls that the exiled political leaders of the UDT “kept a safe distance from the scholarship holders”324 and that Vale do Jamor in the early years was an “anti-Fretelin zone.”325 Bernadino Siry, however, remembers more communication and interdependence:

There was a lot of pressure on us as university graduates that we must do something. The East Timorese people in the camps were asking us to do something. We also felt we should do something for those people and for East Timor...Our first job then was as facilitators, we helped them get integrated, we helped them because we spoke Portuguese. We were students so we could

323 Interview with Bernadino Siry January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
help. There was not much help from the Portuguese community... At that time it was very difficult to get into Portuguese universities... one of our activities was to lobby the Portuguese government to allow any East Timorese [in Portugal] that finished high school to enter university—giving them opportunities and preparing them for work in an independent Timor. We succeeded.\footnote{Interview with Bernadino Siry January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.}

There was a smaller number of East Timorese in Macau and Mozambique (former Portuguese colonies) and later in the United States, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Despite being small, the group in Mozambique was significant because it included the members of the Fretilin Central Committee outside East Timor, including important political figures of both the diaspora and the East Timorese independence struggle: Mari Alkatiri, Abílio Araújo, Rogério Lobato, José Lúis Guterres, and José Ramos-Horta,\footnote{David Scott, \textit{Last Flight Out of Dili: Memoirs of An Accidental Activist in the Triumph of East Timor} (Melbourne: Pluto Press, 2005): 76.} who found himself in Australia at the time of the Indonesian invasion and later went to Mozambique. This was not Ramos-Horta’s first stay in Mozambique. In 1970 the Portuguese government exiled him to Mozambique for two years after PIDE, the Portuguese secret police in Timor, claimed he had suggested to an American tourist that the U.S. should develop East Timor if the Portuguese were too poor to do so.\footnote{CAVR (2006): 24. See also Ramos-Horta’s own account in José Ramos-Horta, \textit{Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor} (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1987): 6-15.} At the time, Ramos-Horta was 18 years old.
Table 1. Estimates of East Timorese in Diaspora by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10,000-20,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Canada</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau, Mozambique, Angola</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes East Timorese that have gone to Australia since the civil war in East Timor and Indonesian occupation. Amanda Wise estimates the number is closer to 20,000, while the Timor Australia Council estimates number is closer to 10,000—The 20,000 figure refers to individuals of Timorese descent; the lower figure of 10,000 refers to Timor-born residents of Australia.

According to Anthony L. Smith, the connection with Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Angola, was based on Fretilin’s initial ideological association with Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in Mozambique and the inspiration it drew from Afro-Marxism and the national liberation movements of the African Portuguese colonies. Indeed, in the chaotic months leading to Fretilin’s unilateral declaration of independence, Fretilin sent a delegation to Africa in November 1975—including Mari Alkatiri—to seek support for East Timor’s independence. An earlier conference of African and Asian countries held in


September 1975 in Mozambique had already resolved “to fully support the national independence struggle led by the pioneering Fretilin.” Following the declaration of independence, China and Vietnam along with the former Portuguese colonies of Africa recognized Fretilin’s declaration of independence. Whether Fretilin was indeed a Communist organization is a matter of debate and will be taken up in later chapters.

There was a significant degree of movement among leaders in the diaspora. Ramos-Horta was often on the move; he is named as a leader in the diaspora in Portugal, Mozambique, the U.S., and Australia. Abílio Araújo also spent time in Portugal as well as Mozambique. Another political and community leader, Manuel Tilman was based in Portugal and Macao. Agio Pereira was among the East Timorese students in Portugal at the time of the Indonesian invasion. Pereira later immigrated to Australia where he became director of the East Timor Relief Association.

Table 2. East Timorese Political Leadership in Diaspora by Country (selected individuals & political affiliation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individuals &amp; Political Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>João Carrascalão (UDT), José Ramos-Horta (Fretilin, CNRT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Abílio Araújo (Fretilin) Ramos-Horta (Fretilin, CNRT), Zacarias da Costa (UDT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique*</td>
<td>Mari Alkatiri, Abílio Araújo, Rogério Lobato, José Luis Guterres, and Ramos-Horta (Fretilin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Ramos-Horta (Fretilin, CNRT), Constancio Pinto (CNRT)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The CNRT here refers to the pre-independence organization rather than the post-independence political party; *Mozambique and other former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The later arrivals in Australia, Portugal and elsewhere in the 1990s included members of the student and clandestine/underground movement in East Timor. This new generation was

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educated wholly or partially under the Indonesian system\textsuperscript{332} and in some cases also had built ties and relations with the pro-democracy student movement in Indonesia. Many went directly to Australia but others were dispersed in small numbers throughout North America and Europe, and became actively involved in a burgeoning transnational East Timor solidarity movement.

According to the Timor Australia Council, many of the political leaders in Australia and Portugal returned to East Timor upon independence and entered government or business. The total number of returnees is estimated to be 200.\textsuperscript{333} The topic of diaspora returnees is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 6.

**The Acehnese Migration**

Aceh is located on the western periphery of the Indonesian Archipelago at the westernmost tip of the island of Sumatra, south of the Straits of Malacca and North and West of the Indian Ocean. Banda Aceh, the capital, is approximately 1000 miles northwest of Jakarta but less than 400 miles from Penang, Malaysia. Commercially and culturally, therefore, Aceh was historically connected to Indian, Tamil, Arabian and Malay trading routes. Although Aceh is populated by several ethnic groups, the majority of the population (more than 80%) is ethnically Acehnese and among it the Acehnese language is widely spoken. Other indigenous ethnic groups are the Gayo (about 5% of Aceh’s population), Alas, Tamiang, Ulu Singkil, Kluet, Aneuk Jamee, and Simeulu.\textsuperscript{334} There is also a small minority of Chinese and a large minority of Javanese (7% of the population in 2000), mostly transmigrants (and their descendants) encouraged by the Indonesian state “to relieve Java’s population pressure and to help ‘Indonesianise’ the peripheral parts of the Archipelago.”\textsuperscript{335} The population of Aceh (like

\textsuperscript{332} In contrast to the earlier generation of diaspora members who were raised under a Portuguese colonial system.

\textsuperscript{333} Interview with Carlos Pereira, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia. Amanda Wise, however, estimates that fewer than 900 Timorese have returned to East Timor, see Wise (2006): 48.


\textsuperscript{335} Anthony Reid (2006): 5.
the vast majority in Indonesia) is predominantly Muslim (98%). The Acehnese, however, consider themselves particularly devout in comparison to Muslims elsewhere in Indonesia.

The Acehnese sultanate reached the height of its power in the 16th and 17th century after thwarting Portuguese control of trade through the Straits of Malacca.\textsuperscript{336} Indeed, John Bastin and Harry J. Benda argue that it was the presence of the Portuguese in the Malacca region that “stimulated the rise of powerful” Acehnese sultanate.\textsuperscript{337} In 1873 the Dutch invaded Aceh,\textsuperscript{338} starting the Aceh War which would last for 40 years,\textsuperscript{339} but would continue intermittently, for close to 70 years without the Dutch ever achieving the full Acehnese incorporation into the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{340}

Anthony Reid argues that Acehnese distinctiveness “is of a different order” and rests on the following: 1) Aceh’s independence was complete before 1873 and there were no foreign bases in Aceh; 2) “it’s people found their identity as Acehnese in their relationship to a state, in the form of the dynasty of Aceh Darussalam...”; 3) “Aceh had virtually no connection with Java or Batavia/Jakarta before 1872, but many connections with the [Malay] Peninsula...Indian Ocean ports, as well as with powers such as Britain, France and Turkey”; and 4) its “resistance to incorporation into the Netherlands Indies/Indonesia state project...was far more widespread, bitter and enduring than that of any other region.”\textsuperscript{341}


\textsuperscript{337} Bastin and Benda (1968): 19.

\textsuperscript{338} ‘Aceh’ is the most common contemporary spelling. The Free Acheh Movement/GAM, however, prefers the older English spelling of ‘Acheh’. Other spellings include the more archaic ‘Achin’ and the Dutch spelling of ‘Atjeh’. This dissertation adopts ‘Aceh’ throughout except when quoting documents, particularly GAM documents, in which ‘Acheh’ is used.

\textsuperscript{339} Furnivall (1939 and 1967):177-183.


Unlike the Portuguese in East Timor, the Dutch were less interested in converting the local population to Christianity than they were with mercantile concerns, thus, Islam continued to flourish in Aceh, and, as in other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, was often a rallying point for resistance against Dutch colonialism. According to Harry Benda, the Dutch “encountered their most serious difficulties with Islam” in Aceh. Unlike other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, where the Dutch achieved gradual colonization through a mixture of military power and political and economic accommodation, Anthony Reid contends that the occupation of Aceh was a military one from start to finish. Another feature of Dutch colonialism in Aceh was a conscious support of Acehnese uleebalang (hereditary district chiefs or local aristocracy) in contrast to a continued distrust of ulama (Islamic leaders). In this respect, the Dutch succeeded in perpetuating and enhancing Acehnese social divisions.

In the twilight of Dutch colonialism, an anti-Dutch Acehnese movement was formed in 1939 under the leadership of Daud Beureueh, the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh or All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA). In the period leading to the Japanese occupation of the Indonesian archipelago, PUSA became an umbrella group for organizing anti-Dutch rebellions. According to Anthony Reid, in the 1940s PUSA moved from being “a purely Acehnese movement...to itself embracing Indonesian nationalism.” The Acehnese are credited for hastening the Dutch exit from the archipelago as the Dutch faced simultaneous military pressure from the Japanese throughout the archipelago and from the Acehnese.

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346 Reid (2006).
The Dutch invasion was followed by a Japanese invasion in 1942. As in other parts of Southeast Asia and Indonesia specifically, the Japanese were initially welcome in Aceh. Bastin and Benda describe an “active pro-Japanese movement among the Acehnese...which came to the support of the invaders” as they were seen as instrumental to ridding the Indonesian archipelago of the Dutch. The initial period of welcome for the Japanese eventually gave way to Acehinese resistance in response to Japanese colonial practices. The Japanese finally evacuated Aceh in December 1945 (after having already surrendered to allied forces in August) leaving behind weapons that the Acehinese would use in anticipation of the expected return of the Dutch and in support of Indonesian nationalism and independence. After the end of the Second World War, Indonesia, including Aceh, declared itself independent on August 17, 1945. The Dutch returned and tried to seize control of the area by embarking on two military campaigns or “police actions” against the Indonesians in 1947 and 1948. The Acehnese joined the war of independence on the side of Indonesia. The Acehnese provided soldiers, contributed financially and purchased two aircraft in support of the fight against the Dutch. Aceh “became the exemplary bastion of the struggle” for independence.

In December 1949, under pressure from the Indonesians on the archipelago and internationally from the British and Americans, the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia. In 1949, the Dutch East Indies became the United States of Indonesia. The territory of Aceh was included in decolonization agreements transferring sovereignty from the Netherlands Dutch East Indies to Indonesia. Daud Beureueh was made governor of the area that was understood by Acehnese leaders (including Daud Beureueh and Hasan di Tiro)


350 The Dutch retained the territory of what is now known as West Papua (referred to in the past as West New Guinea and Irian Jaya). See Bastin and Benda (1968): 157.
would become the province of Aceh within the state of Indonesia. This provincial status for Aceh would allow Acehnese autonomy in local political matters and to collect and retain local revenue. However, in 1950 Indonesia proclaimed itself the unitary Republic of Indonesia, shed its former federal make-up, and in January 1951 integrated Aceh into the larger Indonesian province of North Sumatra.

Aceh’s contribution to the Indonesian war of independence and the subsequent reversal of Aceh’s provincial status (and certain degree of autonomy) by the Indonesian central government became common themes in the future rhetoric of both sides. For the central government, Aceh’s role represented historical evidence of its voluntary integration into Indonesia and a symbol of wider Indonesian unity. For many Acehnese, however, Aceh’s support during the war of independence only served to further highlight the central government’s subsequent broken promises and betrayal of the Acehnese.

The early 1950s saw a rebellion in Indonesia (the Darul Islam rebellion) aimed at establishing an Islamic Republic of Indonesia. Daud Beureueh, resentful of Indonesia’s incorporation of Aceh into the province of North Sumatra, supported the Darul Islam rebellion and declared Aceh part of an Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia) in September of 1953. Conflict in Aceh continued until 1959 (sporadic fighting continued until 1962) when Aceh was given special status granting it broad autonomy in religious, customary law, and educational matters.

A second insurgency began in 1976 when Hasan di Tiro established the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM) and declared Aceh independent on December 4 of the same year. The GAM insurgency was a reaction to the lack of implementation of Aceh’s special status and coincided with the discovery and development of large oil and natural gas resources in Aceh. Although it is sometimes suggested that di Tiro was reacting to having been denied a contract for resource exploitation, it is important to note that his

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history of resistance preceded the discovery of these larger hydrocarbon fields.\textsuperscript{352} In the 1950s di Tiro supported Aceh as a distinct province, separate from North Sumatra, he played an important role in the Darul Islam rebellion, and while working at the Indonesian Embassy in New York he lobbied Asian and Middle Eastern countries to support Daud Beureuh's goals for Aceh. Although di Tiro originally envisioned Aceh as a part of a multi-ethnic Indonesia, his support was for a federated Indonesian state rather than the unitary form it was to take. Thus his failure to obtain the PT Arun contract for the exploitation of natural gas was an exacerbating factor rather than the sole or most important cause for the di Tiro-led insurgency of 1976.\textsuperscript{353} This first phase of the insurgency lasted until 1979 when the Indonesian counterinsurgency succeeded in forcing many in the GAM leadership into exile. GAM reemerged in 1989, going by both GAM and the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), after Libya-trained GAM guerrillas returned to Aceh.\textsuperscript{354} The period between 1989 and 1998 became known as \textit{Daerah Operasi Militer} or DOM (Military Operations Zone), the Indonesian name assigned to the counterinsurgency operations that began in May 1990 and lasted until August 1998.\textsuperscript{355} During DOM a reported 1,258–2,000 people were killed, and tens of thousands tortured, disappeared, orphaned or widowed.\textsuperscript{356} The preponderance of violence during this period is attributed to Indonesian security forces. GAM, however, was also accused of deliberate attacks on civilians, in particular of targeting Javanese transmigrants.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{352} See, for example, Sulaiman (2006): 133-141 and di Tiro's own writings.

\textsuperscript{353} Sulaiman (2006): 133-141.


\textsuperscript{356} Schulze (2004): 5.

\textsuperscript{357} Hedman (2005): 34. The GAM leadership in Sweden denied GAM deliberately targeted Javanese settlers.
The collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the pro-democracy movement in Indonesia, and the subsequent period of reformasi gave way to a pro-referendum and burgeoning pro-democracy movement in Aceh (led primarily by students and non-governmental organizations) that culminated in a number of massive rallies in 1999 and 2000. Violence continued through negotiation attempts between GAM and the Government of Indonesia; a reported 20,000 people were displaced in the 1999-2001 period. In 2001 the government of the new president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) entered into negotiations with GAM’s leadership in exile through a process brokered by the Switzerland-based Henri Dunant Centre. A brief cease-fire was attained in 2000 but did not hold. Wahid’s successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, continued negotiations following her election to the Indonesian presidency, despite her close ties with the military and her highly nationalistic rhetoric. Eventually this resulted in the December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities agreement (COHA). However, further negotiations failed and the Megawati Sukarnoputri government responded by declaring martial law in Aceh on May 18, 2003. The following day, Indonesia launched in Aceh “the largest military campaign since the invasion of East Timor in 1975.” Martial law was downgraded to a state of civil emergency a year later but had little effect on violence in Aceh. Security operations were not changed officially until May 2005, nearly five months after the earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami struck Aceh on December 26, 2004.

On “critical junctures” emerging from factors such as regime change and their significance for ethnic group relations see Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 20-25.


Hedman (2005): 7
The survival of GAM and its transformation into a broad popular movement from 1998 onward is attributed, among other causes, to the political leadership being safely in exile and support from Acehnese refugees in Malaysia and the diaspora.\textsuperscript{362} Aceh has a long history of links with and movement of people to the Malayan Peninsula. The war with the Dutch precipitated further movement of Acehnese to Malaysia and resulted in permanent Acehnese settlements in northwestern Malaysia. Conflicts in the 1950s and mid-1970s and the military crackdown during DOM and martial law saw further waves of Acehnese migrants to Malaysia.\textsuperscript{363} Another wave of migrants arrived after the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. An unofficial estimate of 2005 put the figure of Acehnese in Malaysia between 20,000 and 40,000.\textsuperscript{364}

Acehnese in the West are dispersed throughout Scandinavia, Australia, the United States and Canada. Although a small number of long-term Acehnese economic migrants arrived in Europe, Australia, and the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, the first numbers of exiles and refugees arrived in the early 1980s when Hasan di Tiro and other GAM political leaders settled in Stockholm, Sweden. Bakhtiar Abdullah, then GAM Spokesman in Sweden explained:

The first wave came in the 1980s, they were followed by their families, and then the number began to expand. Some children have been born in Sweden and some came when they were very young and grew up in Sweden.\textsuperscript{365}

Through the 1990s and early 2000s the Acehnese community in the West grew with the addition of refugees fleeing the conflict, DOM, martial law, and attempts by the Malaysian

\textsuperscript{362} Schulze (2004): 5.


\textsuperscript{364} Interview with Muhammed Nur Djuli, diaspora representative and GAM negotiator, December 10, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

\textsuperscript{365} Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM Spokesman-Sweden, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.
government to arrest and deport illegal or irregular immigrants.366 Because of its proximity to Aceh and a long-history of Acehnese settlement there, Malaysia was often the gateway for Acehnese exiles, economic migrants, and refugees to the West and until recently the window to Aceh for those settled in the West. Most but not all Acehnese exiles and refugees in the West first fled to Malaysia and then to the West, sometimes after several months or years in Malaysia (most, likely, would have preferred to stay in Malaysia). A number of Acehnese in Malaysia, fearful of being sent back to Aceh, turned to the UNHCR and to Western Embassies to seek asylum in the West.367 As described by an Acehnese in Scandinavia:

I was in Malaysia for only four months. I was in jail in Aceh for eight years. I was released and left Aceh immediately. I had to leave illegally because I could not get a passport. Indonesia makes it very difficult for Acehnese to get passports. They ask many questions. If you have any kind of relationship with GAM or if you are suspected of a relationship with GAM then there is no chance of passport. I took a bus to Medan, then a boat to Malaysia. I arrived in Denmark in 1999.368

In mid-2005, Acehnese in Scandinavia numbered just over 400, the largest number residing in Norway (200), followed by Denmark (150) and smaller numbers in Sweden and Finland. The majority of Acehnese in Scandinavia arrived via Malaysia in and after 1998. For many their departure from Malaysia (their preferred location) was precipitated by a Malaysian crackdown on illegal residents and the subsequent protest riots in Malaysian immigration detention camps.369 Another group arrived in Scandinavia in 2003 following the collapse of peace talks, the implementation of martial law in Aceh, and another crackdown by Malaysian


367 Interview with Acehnese refugee, 2005, Sweden.

368 Interview with Adnan Beuransyah, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark.

police that included blockading the road leading to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Kuala Lumpur.370

The number of Acehnese in North America was approximately 300 in 2005; of these, 104 were refugees relocated to the Vancouver area in Canada and settled as a group in 2004.371 The rest are dispersed in cities throughout the United States. The Acehnese in the U.S. include a small number of earlier economic migrants, as well as students, refugees, and asylum seekers who went to the U.S. from the mid-1990s through 2003/4. Most are scattered in cities on the East Coast: New York, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and a few families in Salt Lake City and Houston.372 Many of the refugees and asylum seekers followed the same Malaysia route as the Acehnese refugees in Scandinavia.

I was in Malaysia for three years. But when Malaysia was trying to deport all Acehnese I went to UNHCR. Some Acehnese were sent to Sweden or Denmark. I came to the U.S. I had to leave Malaysia...and couldn’t go back to Indonesia...Before the Malaysia police didn’t care about UNHCR cards, now they are better about it. I would have preferred to stay in Malaysia...[there are many] other Acehnese there.373

A smaller number of approximately 100 Acehnese lived in Australia as of early 2006; most were in the Sydney area with a few families in Perth and Brisbane (a couple of other families lived in New Zealand). The Acehnese in Australia arrived mostly after the 1980s with the number rising after 1990 through 2003 (the DOM and Martial Law periods). An Acehnese student active among the diaspora describes the Acehnese migration to Australia:

A few years ago when conditions were quite bad in Aceh, we had about 250 Acehnese here. In 2001 we conducted a census and we had about that number...but some were here illegally and...got deported. Some [Acehnese in


372 Personal communication with Munawar Liza, Aceh Center USA (Harrisburg, PA), April 29, 2005.

373 Interview with Acehnese refugee in the U.S. 2005, Harrisburg, PA.
Australia went to Malaysia first then came to Australia as refugees. Some came here and applied for asylum. A few are more long-term economic migrants, they are more settled here. Some are already citizens...There are men, women, children...Most of the children have been born in Australia.374

As in the case of the Timorese, many of the arrivals from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s included students, activists as well as journalists who were involved in the pro-referendum rallies, pro-democracy movement or in human rights investigations in Aceh. Based on this experience and in certain cases their ability in the English language, they transplanted their activism to a new setting and sought ties with local and international non-governmental organizations.

Table 3. Estimates of Acehnese in Diaspora by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Canada</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20,000-40,000 and 80,000-120,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Lower figures are estimates for undocumented residents and workers; higher estimates are for all Acehnese including ethnic Acehnese born in Malaysia.

Since the Government of Indonesia opened Aceh to international aid and the media following the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 and particularly since the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM on August 15, 2005,375 several Acehnese from the diaspora, including GAM leaders from Stockholm, have returned to Aceh temporarily and permanently—some for the first time in 25 years.376 As in

374Interview with Acehnese student, 2005, Sydney, Australia.


the case of the East Timorese, leaders from the Acehnese diaspora have returned to Aceh with political aspirations.

These histories of migration establish that the East Timorese and Acehnese are indeed dispersed in small communities throughout Australia, Europe and North America and that the migrations are relatively recent, from the mid-1970s onwards.377 The point of departure for these people is an actual "homeland" in that both Aceh and East Timor are physical territories, but also an imagined and desired "homeland" in that at the time of departure the geographical territory was not an autonomous, sovereign state. In both cases the "homeland" is located on the periphery of the Indonesian archipelago. The modern "homeland" conflicts, beginning in both cases in the 1970s, involved the Indonesian state and Indonesian security forces. These conflicts were an important, if not primary, driver of migration and created several waves of diasporans of different generations. The histories of Aceh and East Timor also reveal contrasts. Both "homelands" have a history of colonialism, but they were subject of different colonial powers. In addition, the Acehnese and East Timorese played different roles during the Second World War and the Indonesian war of independence. These differences in history have linguistic, religious and legal implications that will be discussed in subsequent chapters. The differences in history notwithstanding, the Acehnese and East Timorese communities abroad do exhibit the first feature of diaspora, the dispersal from an original homeland, and due to their relatively recent history of migration may be classified as incipient diasporas.

The concept of diaspora represents a valuable analytical tool for a deeper understanding of the social reality378 of the Acehnese and East Timorese populations outside the homeland.

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377 With the exception of the much larger Acehnese community in Malaysia that has a long history of settlement but is not the subject of this study. For further information on the community in Malaysia see Nah and Bunnell (2005): 249-256; Alice Nah, "Aceh on Their Minds," Challenge: Liberty and Security (January 26, 2005) at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article113.html, and Sidney Jones, Making Money Off Migrants: The Indonesian Exodus to Malaysia (Hong Kong: Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, 2000); and Karla Fallon and Antje Missbach, “From Conflict to Peace? Tracing the Diaspora Politics of Aceh and East Timor,” paper presented to the panel on Politics of Post-Conflict Aceh at the 2007 EuroSEAS Conference, Naples.
Not only does the concept of diaspora allow for a variety of reasons for the original dispersal from the homeland, but it more directly addresses other aspects of the Acehnese and East Timorese experience, including the cultivation and perpetuation of a homeland-oriented consciousness and identity, the transnational character of relations with the homeland and among co-diasporas, as well as the negotiated relationship between diaspora and homeland and diaspora and other international partners (states, NGOs, etc.). In the next two chapters I return to the historical context that informs diaspora interests and objectives and shapes their activities.\(^{379}\) I also analyse the actors, practices, and processes involved in the politicization and construction of diaspora political identities and their effect on the homeland conflict.

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Chapter 4

Diaspora Politics

Diaspora Actors, Practices, and Representation

The previous chapter describes the history of migration or dispersal of the Acehnese and East Timorese outside their respective homelands—the first feature of my proposed political definition of diaspora. In Chapter 4, I analyze five other features of political diasporas: 1) a conscious maintenance, representation, and transmittal of a homeland-oriented collective identity; 2) self-awareness of such identity; 3) a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnics in the homeland and co-diasporans; 4) a commitment to maintain or attempts to establish relationships with the homeland and co-diasporans; and 5) attempts to create and maintain diaspora networks and organizations. This last feature is particularly important to the establishment and endurance (or revival) of a diaspora. Throughout this analysis, political and cultural activities are discussed without clearly articulating boundaries between the two. This reflects the, frequently self-conscious, interweaving of politics and culture within the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas. The analysis in this chapter is presented in chronological order, from the early years of dispersion in the 1970s, through early diaspora political activity in the 1980s, to the widening of political activism in the 1990s and early 2000s. I discuss the political roles of the diasporas, political divisions within the diaspora and alliances (or partnerships), leadership, as well as diaspora repertoires of action and

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repertoires of representation. Through this exercise I make explicit the social actors and practices involved in the construction of diaspora political identity and the effect of changes in this.

The East Timorese Diaspora

Political Divisions and Early Political Activity (1970s to mid-1980s)

When the East Timorese left East Timor to settle in Portugal, Australia, Mozambique and elsewhere in anticipation of and following the Indonesian occupation, they took with them the political divisions of the civil war and Indonesian invasion. These were in no way insignificant. They were rooted not only in differing political ideologies, but more significantly, in the violence of the brief civil war in East Timor—A war during which members of the armed forces of the two major political parties (Fretilin and UDT) committed “serious war crimes.”

Chega! The CAVR Report concludes that the “brutality of East Timorese people against each other in this brief conflict left deep wounds…”

Rather than creating diaspora networks or organizations in these early years, the East Timorese, in essence, transplanted their political parties to the diaspora. From the 1970s until the late 1990s, the Fretilin Central Committee outside East Timor was based in Mozambique. The East Timorese diaspora in Mozambique included Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, Ana Pessoa, Rogério Lobato (in Mozambique and Angola), José Luís Guterres, Roque Rodrigues (in Angola), and Abílio Araújo, who also spent time in Portugal. From Maputo, Mozambique Fretilin coordinated and guided much of the early political activities of the diaspora. It maintained contact with Fretilin members and sympathizers in Australia, Portugal, and those scattered in other parts of the world. Through the 1970s these contacts included Abílio Araújo, who for some time represented Fretilin in Portugal, and Chris Santos in Australia, a Portuguese-born Fretilin member. Fretilin in Mozambique also coordinated closely with José

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Ramos-Horta, who traveled back and forth between Mozambique, the United States for consultations at the United Nations, Portugal and elsewhere in Europe, and when possible to New Zealand and Australia where years later he would settle in Sydney.

The UDT, another Timorese political party, was represented in Portugal by, among others, Zacarias da Costa. Luis Cardoso describes competition between the political elite of the UDT and Fretilin for the loyalty of the thousands of East Timorese students and refugees arriving in Portugal, “we toured Portugal from north to south, from community to community, performing traditional Timorese dances, singing the Fretilin anthem...We were competing with Vale do Jamor’s UDT…” The situation was similar in Australia where both political parties, the UDT and Fretilin, were represented. The UDT in diaspora was led in Australia by João Carrascalão, based in Sydney. Milena Pires, another UDT leader, was also in Australia. The UDT initially advocated maintaining strong links between East Timor and Portugal. Members were later divided over the possibility of integration with Indonesia or independence. In the diaspora, the UDT’s outlook over the years changed from one characterized as pro-Portugal and conservative (depending on the UDT faction or individual) to open advocacy of a democratic and independent East Timor. Francisco da Costa Guterres attributes this shift to the experience of many UDT leaders with democracy in Australia and Portugal. Thus, from this early stage in diaspora, the features of political diasporas are evident. Not only was there a conscious maintenance and self-awareness of a homeland identity, but specific repertoires of action (performances, anthems, pamphlets) were deployed in a competition among diaspora leaders over the wider diaspora’s solidarity and identification with the homeland.

But it was Fretilin that was most politically active in diaspora. According to David Scott, who assisted Ramos-Horta in his early diplomatic missions to the United Nations, Mozambique, and specifically Frelimo (the independence movement that had succeeded in

forming the government in Mozambique), “had a close...relationship with Fretilin and provided a base and other support for Fretilin. Later it paid the expenses of Ramos-Horta for his work that was related to the United Nations.” According to Scott, “…the fraternal [former Portuguese colonies] countries seem to have set up an ample fund dispersed from Mozambique…” to Fretilin. It is speculated that the East Timorese diaspora, particularly Fretilin members in Mozambique (with the support of the Mozambique government and that of other former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and perhaps China), assisted in providing funding and perhaps securing arms transfers to Falintil, the armed wing of Fretilin in East Timor. A report by ASEAN Focus Group and Australian National University, however, explicitly states that “no Western country every covertly shipped arms to…” Falintil and that rumors of shipments from Mozambique “remain unsubstantiated.” The intent to secure weapons is a subject of less debate: An International Crisis Group report, for example, plainly states that in December 1975 Alkatiri, Ramos-Horta, and Rogerio Lobato “…went abroad to seek diplomatic support and buy arms.”

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Fretilin was also the most active East Timorese political organization in Australia and it played a critical role in communications with East Timor. In the 1970s, following the Indonesian invasion, East Timor’s only communication with the outside world was from Radio Maubere operated by Alarico Fernandes of Fretilin in the hills outside of Dili. In David Scott’s account, radio links were established by Denis Freney, a member of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) and early critic of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Freney arranged to have a transceiver sent to East Timor in 1975 on the eve of the Indonesian invasion and set another one up in Darwin with assistance from


Brian Manning, a CPA colleague. From 1975 to 1978 the Fretilin External Committee in Mozambique was able to maintain contact with East Timor through these radios. From East Timor, Fernandes would send messages to Darwin, Australia (descriptions of conditions in East Timor, fighting with Indonesian forces, information on build-ups in Indonesian troops, machinery and weapons and their location—including their deployment in contravention of U.N. Security Council resolutions and identification of weapons and machinery supplied to Indonesia by the U.S. and U.K.). The messages from East Timor were taped in Darwin and sent to Sydney, from there Chris Santos, Fretilin’s Information Officer, would forward information to Fretilin in Mozambique and Ramos-Horta when outside of Mozambique. Actual radio operations in Darwin were the responsibility of Tony Belo and Estanislau da Silva (two East Timorese), Brian Manning, and other young Timorese assisting them. According to Manning, the Australian government eventually cancelled their license in 1976, and from then on radio transmission was hidden.

In an interview with me, an East Timorese community leader in Sydney described his own involvement, as a young man recently arrived in Australia, with the radio transmission in Darwin:

I spent some time in Darwin for two years from 1976. When I arrived in Sydney I was contacted by an organization, CIET, the Campaign for an Independent East Timor...It was a group of Australians. Denis Freney asked if I’d like to do this work [radio transmission] and I accepted. These were illegal transmissions and I was nervous. We had just started, I was learning and five minutes later the police and telecom arrived and they confiscated the radio. But they didn’t apprehend us...[Then the group] got a new radio. I was too scared to transmit. Denis contacted Fretilin in Mozambique and they sent Estanislau da Silva...I concentrated on reception...We could get through pretty easily. Brian Manning [was] also working with us...[We were]

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contacting people in the jungle, Fernandes—information minister at the
time...From reception we got a lot of information...I did not speak directly;
Brian was speaking directly and Estanislau too. Radio Maubere information
was taped and sent to Abílio Araújo...Information was sent to Portugal and
Mozambique. Then Fretilin would provide information to the media, etc. in all
the different countries ...Darwin was the center of communications. In 1978
we lost contact to East Timor. Indonesia put a lot of pressure and we lost our
radio again.\(^{397}\)

Information received by radio from East Timor was circulated among the diaspora and
publicized in an effort to strengthen diaspora support for the East Timorese struggle against
the Indonesian occupation (as framed by Fretilin) and to generate interest in East Timor
among an international audience. Indeed, during the early years after the Indonesian
invasion, radio communication represented East Timor’s only link with the outside world and
the only means for East Timorese in diaspora and their supporters to counter Indonesian
accounts of events in East Timor (accounts frequently repeated by the U.S. and Australian
governments). This trickle of information from East Timor was critical to Ramos-Horta’s
diplomatic activities at the U.N. and to the small group of sympathizers working to bring
public attention to East Timor.

In David Scott’s account, the Australian Government was aware of the radio and listened in
on radio communication but only interfered in 1976 (by cancelling the radio license and
seizing the radio) when the U.N. Special Representative, Winspeare Guicciardi, arrived in
Darwin and expressed an interest in arranging a visit from Darwin to Fretilin-held areas of
East Timor.\(^{398}\) The radio would have been used to arrange such a visit. The government’s
actions reflected a pro-Indonesian policy. All radio operation ended in late 1978 when
transmissions from Alarico Fernandes stopped after his surrender and defection.\(^{399}\) East
Timor was in essence cut-off from communication with the rest of the world from the late-
1970s until the mid-1980s.\(^{400}\) Years later in 2006, one of the Darwin radios and photographs

\(^{397}\) Interview with East Timorese in Australia 2006, Australia.

\(^{398}\) Scott (2005): 40.

\(^{399}\) CAVR, Chega! The CAVR Report, Comissão de Acohimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste,
of “operator” Estanislau da Silva were displayed at the Australian National Maritime Museum in the exhibit, “Children of the Crocodile—The Australia East Timor Story.”

In Australia some of the most vocal and active early supporters of East Timor or critics of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor were affiliated with organizations of the Australian political left. In the United States it was also individuals from the political left who spoke and wrote on behalf of East Timor and lent support to José Ramos-Horta. Noam Chomsky was one of the first to speak out against the Indonesian invasion and in support of East Timor’s independence. In Australia, as noted above, both Denis Freney and Brian Manning were connected with the Communist Party of Australia. According to Scott, Freney had significant influence during this early period. He had a close relationship with Abílio Araújo of Fretilin who was then in Maputo, Mozambique. Araújo himself was, ideologically, among the most radical members of Fretilin. Araújo and others are described by Ramos-Horta in his 1987 book, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, as a small group within Fretilin which was influenced by Maoist and Marxist ideology while studying in Portugal in the early 1970s. Many East Timorese intellectuals were influenced by the successful liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and by the Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974 and 1975). This is not surprising given that their original target was Portuguese colonization and only later Indonesia. Nevertheless, even among these intellectuals and within the Fretilin leadership there appears to have been a division and certainly tension between a more radical wing (described as a minority by Ramos-Horta) and a more moderate majority. In diaspora, in the 1970s, Abílio Araújo had significant influence and contributed in no small part to Fretilin’s ideological agenda, to its

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400 In the mid-1980s Denis Freney again arranged for a transceiver to be smuggled into East Timor, see Scott (2005): 173.


revolutionary language, and to the political divisions among the broader East Timorese diaspora community.

Ramos-Horta contends that neither Fretilin nor the East Timor movement was Marxist. He acknowledges that the Fretilin membership included vocal and active participants, such as Abílio Araújo, whose positions and policies were indeed influenced by Marxist thought. Nevertheless in Ramos-Horta’s view, East Timor’s was a “nationalist movement” and the goal of Fretilin was not communism (as Indonesia claimed) but rather “social democracy,” which to them “stood for social justice, equitable distribution of the wealth of the country, a mixed economy and a democratic political system.” Years later in testimony to the CAVR (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor), Ramos-Horta and João Carrascalão, leader of the UDT in East Timor and in diaspora, would both stress that Fretilin was not a communist movement. According to Carrascalão, “[i]n Fretilin some leaders were communist, but Fretilin was not a communist party. In UDT some leaders were socialist, but UDT was not a socialist party…” The CAVR concluded in 2006 that although particular members of Fretilin may have been communist, it would be “incorrect” to conclude that “the party itself was communist.”

The Diplomatic Front: José Ramos-Horta (1970s to mid-1980s)

There was no one else among the handful of East Timorese outside the country, some politically confused, who could have succeeded as Ramos-Horta did in ensuring a successful outcome to the 24-year-long diplomatic campaign.

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406 And many Western governments believed this to be the case.
409 CAVR (2006), Chapter 3, 27.
410 Scott (2005): 27
To an international audience and among many East Timorese in the homeland and in diaspora, the name José Ramos-Horta became synonymous with diplomacy and the East Timorese cause. In 1996, his international efforts on behalf of East Timor earned him (and acting Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo) the Nobel Peace Prize. In 2000, a documentary on his life and work was released; the film’s title is simply “The Diplomat.” He was also well-known in East Timor itself even among a younger generation not yet born when Ramos-Horta left East Timor in 1975. As Nelson Belo puts it, “all of us Timorese knew Ramos-Horta and what he was doing.” Domingas Maria another young East Timorese, echoes Belo’s views, “If you went to a village and asked about Mari Alkatiri maybe nobody knows him, but everybody knows Xanana and Ramos-Horta. Everyone knew Xanana as Fretilin inside and Ramos-Horta as Fretilin outside.”

Anticipating an Indonesian invasion, Ramos-Horta left East Timor with Mari Alkatiri and Rogerio Lobato on December 4, 1975. They traveled to Darwin en route to Portugal; upon arrival in Lisbon on December 8, 1975 they learned of the Indonesian invasion. Ramos-Horta’s diplomatic efforts at the U.N. began days after when he and Abilio Araújo (who was already in Portugal when Ramos-Horta left East Timor) traveled to New York for a scheduled Security Council meeting on East Timor. The meeting was requested by Portugal in objection to the Indonesian invasion. Portugal was still considered the administering power with legal responsibility over the territory. Ramos-Horta recalls the assistance and support provided to him by representatives from African nations (Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Tanzania), in the form of introductions at the U.N., office space, transportation during his time in New York, and, importantly, support for East Timor-related U.N. resolutions. Ramos-Horta and Araújo lobbied members of the Security Council; they gained measured support from developing countries and strong support from the Chinese

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411 The Diplomat, film (documentary), directed by Tom Zubrycki, Australia: Australia National Interest Program (2000).


413 Interview with Domingas Maria, East Timorese student, December 6, 2004, Honolulu, Hawaii.

representatives. Ramos-Horta was also permitted to speak during the Security Council meeting.

Ramos-Horta, however, seems to have understood that support from the Portuguese-speaking African countries (specifically their ideologically leftist governments) and from the Chinese lent credence to Indonesia’s claim that its occupation of East Timor was aimed at stemming a violent East Timorese civil war and preventing a communist take-over of the former Portuguese colony. Therefore, a great deal of his effort (as is discussed in the next section of this chapter) was aimed at the United States, Western Europe, and Australia. Through much of the period between 1975 and 1999, however, their support for Indonesian control of East Timor was unwavering as it was perceived to be combating communism.

On December 12, 1975, the U.N. adopted General Assembly Resolution 3845, calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Portuguese Timor and “deploring” the invasion.415 Ten days later on December 22, Security Council Resolution 384 called for action to protect the sovereignty of Portuguese Timor, reaffirmed the right to self-determination of its people, requested the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and instructed the U.N. Secretary-General to send a U.N. special representative to East Timor. Ramos-Horta met with Special Representative Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi in Darwin and attempted to arrange his visit to Fretelin-controlled areas of East Timor. This part of Winspeare Guicciardi’s visit to East Timor never took place. As detailed earlier, the Australian government disrupted radio communications with East Timor, and it refused, as did the Indonesians, to provide or permit air transport from their territories to Fretelin-controlled areas of East Timor. Through 1976, Portugal continued to keep the East Timor question on the U.N. agenda. Its efforts resulted in Resolution 389 (1976), a similar document to the resolution of the year before. After 1976 Portugal’s lobbying at the U.N. was limited until 1982 when Portugal renewed diplomatic activity on East Timor.416 Despite Portugal’s sometimes tepid diplomatic activity on behalf

415 The General Assembly opted for term ‘deplor’ rather than the stronger ‘condemn’ which may not have been accepted by Indonesia’s supporters, including the U.S.
416 From 1976 to 1982 the Portuguese government maintained its position towards East Timor and refused to accept the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. The fluctuations in its diplomatic activity are the result (among other reasons) of political priorities within Portugal, lack of support for its position from European countries, and opposition from the United States and Australia.
of East Timor, its support, when forthcoming, was critical. Ramos-Horta and his colleagues could create draft resolutions, but only a member of the U.N.—a state—could introduce these, and the fate of any resolution is determined by its co-sponsors and supporters, also states.

Ramos-Horta’s lobbying continued for nearly 25 years more; he was not always alone, Roque Rodrigues, Mari Alkatiri, and José Luis Guterres also worked the U.N. with him. Although the U.N. resolutions had little effect (Ramos-Horta and East Timor activists contend this was by design and the will of governments of the U.S., Australia, Japan, Canada, Europe and Indonesia), the case for independence (and certainly the case for a referendum) was indeed aided by questions regarding its status under international law (still officially under Portuguese administration) and by these early U.N. resolutions highlighting the territory’s sovereignty and self-determination. From 1982, Ramos-Horta and Fretilin’s role at the U.N. was checked by General Assembly Resolution 37/30, which aimed to encourage a solution to the East Timor question through dialogue and negotiations between “all parties concerned.” The parties concerned, however, were interpreted by the U.N. Secretary General’s office as Portugal and Indonesia only. Ramos-Horta (and Fretilin) would thus have only an indirect role in consultations through his contacts with the Portuguese side. Fretilin’s position through the years was that “no agreement between the two countries would be acceptable except a U.N.-supervised referendum or general election.”

While some members of the Fretilin diaspora would continue to espouse the language and ideas of revolution and independence, the repertoires of representation of Ramos-Horta, other diaspora leaders, and a still small but growing number of activists began to change, as they adopted the ideas and language of sovereignty, self-determination, referendum, and diplomatic solution.

Ramos-Horta’s diplomatic efforts in Australia began even before the Indonesian invasion of December 1975. His meetings with government officials and academics were facilitated by James Dunn (former Australian Consul in East Timor). The Labor government of Gough

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Whitlam, however, was unreceptive\(^{418}\) to Ramos-Horta’s views of an independent East Timor and to Fretilin.\(^{419}\) For Ramos-Horta the Australian response only worsened from 1975 under the Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser, during which Fretilin members (including Ramos-Horta) were banned from entering Australia, the Darwin radio was confiscated, and the government extended *de facto* recognition of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.\(^{420}\) Australian policy towards Indonesia and East Timor remained unchanged when Labor regained power in 1983 (Bob Hawke was Prime Minister). The Australian government’s official recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor came in 1985 when Prime Minister Bob Hawke, speaking on Indonesian television (during a visit to the country), stated that Australia “recogni[zed] the sovereign authority of Indonesia” over East Timor and made reference to the East Timorese as citizens of Indonesia.\(^{421}\)

In 1983, Ramos-Horta was again permitted to travel to Australia. He met with Bill Hayden, the Foreign Minister, in Canberra in June 1984 to no effect. Although the Australian government remained unmoved in its support for Indonesia, members of the Labour Party were more inclined to support Ramos-Horta’s position. In 1982, for example, Senator Gordon McIntosh (ALP-Western Australia) presented to the U.N. a letter in support of East Timor’s self-determination signed by a majority of members of the ALP.\(^{422}\) In 1985, McIntosh publicly criticized Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden for Hawke’s comments regarding East Timor on Indonesian television.\(^{423}\)

Ramos-Horta also devoted considerable effort to lobbying Washington, D.C. The governments under Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan were unreceptive and

\(^{418}\) An important exception during this period was the support of Labor Party representative Ken Fry, an early, vocal, and consistent supporter of East Timor independence.


maintained a pro-Indonesian policy that included military assistance, diplomatic efforts in the
U.N. to thwart resolutions on the East Timor question, and acceptance (if not official) of
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. In 1975, the administration of Gerald Ford, on the
advice of Henry Kissinger, had already given a "green light" to the Indonesian occupation of
East Timor.\(^{424}\) Despite this unfavorable environment, Ramos-Horta found support in the U.S.
and in Washington, D.C. among a handful of activists, journalists, and members of Congress
such as Congressmen Tony Hall (Ohio Democrat), Tom Harkin (Iowa Democrat), and
Donald Fraser (Minnesota Democrat), Senator Paul Tsongas (Massachusetts Democrat) and
Senator David Durenberger (Minnesota Republican). As early as 1977, Congressman Donald
Fraser attempted to obtain a telegram transcript referring to the December 6, 1975 meeting
between President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and Indonesian President Suharto during which the
U.S. expressed an understanding attitude towards an impending Indonesian invasion of East
Timor.\(^{425}\) Fraser's request was blocked. In a declassified National Security Council (NSC)
Memo from Michael Armacost (NSC member) to President Carter's National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Armacost states that the release of the document to Fraser
"could have a mischievous effect on [U.S.] relations with Indonesia...There is little doubt
that if he gets hold of it, this will become a public issue, which in turn could precipitate...adverse consequences...Its release would harm our foreign relations." Armacost
also writes that according to the document in question, "Ford and Kissinger—for reasons
which I do not understand—went out of their way on the eve of the GOI [Government of
Indonesia] move on Timor to assure Suharto of an understanding attitude by the U.S." The
document also indicated that "Ford and Kissinger were given some advance notice of

\(^{424}\) For declassified documents detailing the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in
(December 6, 2001) at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/ and Brad Simpson, ed. "A
Quarter Century of U.S. Support for Occupation," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 174
Security Archive of George Washington University secured the release of documents through the Freedom of
Information Act.

\(^{425}\) Simpson/National Security Archive (2005) and National Security Archive, Document 23: "Memo from
Michael Armacost, for Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Request from Don Fraser for MemCon on President Ford
Meeting with President Suharto'" (July 6, 1977). See also the National Security Archive, Document 11: State
Department Telegram 286 from Washington to USDEL Secretary Aircraft NIACT Immediate, "Portuguese
Timor" (December 5, 1975).
Indonesian plans to incorporate Timor..." Armacost concludes that there was no reason to accommodate Fraser, "who has not been notably helpful to the Administration." The Carter government's position on East Timor was made clear to the Indonesians during a meeting between Vice President Mondale and President Suharto in which Mondale reassured Suharto on U.S. sales of weapons to Indonesia and confirmed that the administration did not "question the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia." Mondale, however, expressed some concern over "how to handle public relations aspects of this [East Timor] problem."  

Despite efforts by individual members of Congress to raise questions regarding the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, through the 1970s to the mid-1980s, like the Australian government, U.S. administrations were able adopt a policy of de facto recognition of East Timor's incorporation without much opposition. This was in part due to the lack of information available on conditions in East Timor (apart from what Ramos-Horta and Fretilin were able to provide). East Timor remained closed, with very limited access to NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with no access to journalists (except for infrequent visits controlled by the Indonesian government). From the mid-1980s—and more so from 1989 when East Timor was opened to foreigners again—details of conditions in East Timor became better known to the outside. The number of individuals in the U.S. interested in East Timor began to expand and became the activists of organizations and networks dedicated to East Timor that would be formed in the early 1990s. The handful of members of Congress, who had extended their support to Ramos-Horta and East Timor, began to take more direct government action and enlist their peers. In 1987, for example, Senator David Durenberger led a bipartisan group of 40 senators in drafting a letter to Secretary George P. Shultz to bring attention to "a renewed Indonesian military offensive..."  


427 National Security Archive, Document 29: Telegram 6076 from Jakarta to State, "Summary of Vice President's Meeting with Suharto" (May 10, 1978).
against Timorese insurgents” and “to insure that East Timor receives international attention that will help to alleviate the tragic suffering of the Timorese people.”428

The primary focus of Ramos-Horta’s diplomatic activity continued to be the United Nations and its member states. He continued to lobby for East Timor’s independence and a referendum on the basis of the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Res. 1514) and Resolution 1541 (XV) calling for the decolonization of non-self-governing territories under U.N. oversight and through a choice of independence, integration with another independent state, and free association with an independent state, and on the basis of U.N. resolutions directly related to East Timor. The emphasis in these U.N. documents and in Ramos-Horta’s diplomacy continued to be self-representation, referendum and independence. He was less inclined through the mid-1980s to adopt and deploy the language of human rights. In his own account, he expresses a lack of faith in the U.N. bodies dedicated to human rights, seeing them as ineffective and highly politicized. He was dismayed when the 41st Session of the Commission on Human Rights in 1985 voted to suspend its consideration of the human rights situation in East Timor.429

Through the mid-1980s, Ramos-Horta was equally disillusioned with the Western media and Western NGOs. 430

Despite his disappointment with Western governments, the Western media and NGOs, Ramos-Horta acknowledged their importance in finding a potential solution for the conflict in East Timor. He singled out Amnesty International for its effectiveness and believed that the West could play a constructive role in ending the conflict. He believed that public opinion in the U.S. and Europe had “contributed significantly” to the end of conflicts in the developing world and that a diplomatic effort undertaken by the U.S. (directly or in concert with the U.N.) could also lead to a negotiated solution for East Timor. Ramos-Horta thus


continued and indeed expanded his diplomatic work in diaspora until his return to Timor following a 1999 U.N.-sponsored referendum. Although he would continue to be guided by his views on independence, sovereignty and self-determination, from the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the size of the East Timor diaspora grew and Ramos-Horta’s relationships with individuals in the West and Western NGOs widened, he placed greater emphasis on the concepts of human rights and democracy. The Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 awarded to him and Bishop Carlos Belo (in Dili) was in great part the result of a perceived emphasis by Ramos-Horta on human rights, democracy and on a peaceful diplomatic solution to the East Timor conflict (an East Timor peace plan was put forth in 1993 following Xanana’s capture). The emphasis on a peaceful diplomatic solution was supported by the relative discipline of the Falintil forces in East Timor following Xanana’s orders for restraint as well as their lack of arms by the 1990s.

Based on an analysis of the early activity of the East Timorese diaspora, there is little question that, at the elite or leadership level, the East Timorese exhibited a sense of empathy and solidarity with the homeland and a commitment to maintaining and establishing a relationship with it—criteria of a political diaspora. At this stage, the repertoires of action were political party-centric, the work of Fretilin. They included the overt and later covert radio communication and information dissemination strategies (a joint effort by Fretilin and members of the Communist Party of Australia) and lobbying efforts by Ramos-Horta and other Fretilin members. The repertoires of representation emphasized revolution, independence, and self-determination but gradually expanded to a language of referendum and diplomatic solution.

Diaspora Politics Widen (mid-1980s to 1999)

Both political parties, the UDT and Fretilin, had substantial following among the East Timorese community, but active political participation, especially before the mid-1980s, was

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limited to a few. An early Australian activist for East Timor describes Timorese involvement thusly,

> There were thousands of East Timorese in Australia, of that...maybe 300 were involved in activity, and this is a generous number. Only about 40 were quite active. We’d have meetings and they wouldn’t turn up. A handful of Fretilin and UDT people worked constantly...

There are many obstacles to greater involvement, not least are the daily demands and challenges of the life of an immigrant. Ramos-Horta was a rarity in that he was able to devote himself almost entirely to activism and diplomatic efforts. Most diaspora activists led the "double-life" of a diasporan: concerned with their everyday realities in the hostland (work, housing, school, children) and a continued commitment to the homeland and the political activity demanded by this. Abel Guterreis, for example, was the president of the East Timor Relief Association (ETRA) in Australia and devoted enormous energy to this work, but he was also a bus driver in Melbourne. There were also issues with language ability and of fear. In the earlier years, only a small minority of East Timorese in Australia spoke or was confident speaking in English. In addition, as Brendan Doyle of the Australia East Timor Association (AETA) explains, as immigrants and refugees, many Timorese felt they had to be careful what they said and did, that their status in Australia was precarious. Importantly, they were also fearful of potential repercussions for family members back in East Timor.

There was another important reason for "limited" participation in political activity during the early years in diaspora: the political parties did not represent the entire (not even the majority) of the diaspora population. Recalling the 1970s and 1980s, East Timorese in

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432 Interview with Carlos Pereira, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

433 Interview with Australian East Timor activist 2006, Sydney, Australia.


435 Interview with Brendan Doyle, AETA, January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

436 Several people interviewed for this dissertation (both East Timorese and Acehnese) believed that their political activities were monitored by Indonesian intelligence personnel assigned to Indonesian embassies and consulates.
Australia describe political divisions among the UDT, Fretilin, and a third group they refer to as "non-partisans" (they alternatively refer to this group as "nationalists" or "independents.").

In essence, the "non-partisans" were East Timorese not directly affiliated with a political party but supportive of independence for East Timor. The majority of the East Timorese diaspora population has been described as non-partisans. Importantly, many of them were also more moderate in their views than some of the ideologues and more radical members of the political parties. According to an East Timorese knowledgeable about diaspora divisions:

> We [non-partisans] were not very well accepted by the two parties—we tried to force the two parties to speak the same language. Most people in Sydney were probably non-partisans. They were concerned about the rift between Fretilin and UDT. But in truth, our main worry was that the UDT would do work in favor of Indonesia, or something that would work in favor of Indonesia. We really worried...Our group wanted the parties to allow us to be like a unified voice, like the CNRT was later. But they didn’t accept this, they kept fighting between themselves and they isolated us.\(^{437}\)

This "isolation" from diaspora political activity waned as the East Timorese diaspora underwent demographic changes. Through an influx of new immigrants and refugees from the mid-1980s on, the pool of political leaders and activists widened. Jefferson Lee, of the Australia East Timor Association (AETA), believes that the Timorese community changed over time and that this had an effect on the level of involvement in political activity. According to Lee, in the early 1970s active East Timorese in Australia were limited to José Ramos-Horta (when in-country) and a handful of other Fretilin members. From 1979 to 1998/99, however, the number of active members grew, gradually at first and more quickly in later years, and included individuals from the Australian/Timorese community (non-partisans), the refugee community (newer arrivals), UDT, and Fretilin.\(^{438}\)

The newer members of the East Timorese diaspora—people who fled or left East Timor from the mid- and late-1980s on—were of a different generation than earlier diaspora arrivals. The

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\(^{437}\) Interview with Bernadino Siry, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia. The CNRT is discussed later in this chapter.

\(^{438}\) Interview with Jefferson Lee of Australia East Timor Association (AETA), January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
newer arrivals were raised under the Indonesian occupation and Indonesian education system (rather than Portuguese colonization) and thus few spoke Portuguese but all or most spoke Indonesian in addition to their native language/dialect. Several had experience in the East Timor clandestine and student movements and were involved in or at least aware of the democracy movement in Indonesia. Although some were members of, or sympathetic towards, Fretilin (in East Timor) and certainly towards the East Timorese armed resistance, many of them adopted repertoires of action and representation of democracy movements, including that in Indonesia, rather than Fretilin’s ideology as their point of reference and source of ideas for contention.

Constancio Pinto, one of the best known members of the East Timorese diaspora, was actively involved in the East Timorese clandestine movement before being forced to flee East Timor in 1992. In his memoirs he describes organizing youth groups and students to demonstrate during a visit to East Timor by Pope John Paul II in October 1989. Aware that this visit would be accompanied by international press coverage, Pinto explains that they “saw the Pope’s visit as one of the most important opportunities in the history of our struggle to influence international opinion.” The demonstration included a risky charge to the podium to shout, ”long live free East Timor!” and unfurl banners. Demonstration organizers had no prior experience in this form of political activism, but they were aware of and sought to replicate known repertoires. Pinto recalls: “none of us, since the time of invasion, had ever participated in any sort of demonstration, but we knew about the potential effectiveness of demonstrations through what we learned from international short-wave radio and even from Indonesian public television about struggles in places such as South Korea, Israeli-occupied Palestine, and Europe.”

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439 For a summary of East Timorese involvement in the Indonesian student and democracy movement see CAVR (2006): Ch. 3, 119-120.


The strategy and actions of the East Timor clandestine movement (under Pinto's leadership as the elected Chairman of the clandestine front) included peaceful demonstrations, lending logistical support to the military resistance, and sending information to international organizations and NGOs such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Tapol (The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign). This information-sharing was carried out by Renetil and Fecletil, the clandestine organizations of East Timorese students in Indonesia. Great emphasis was given to communicating with the outside world. Pinto, for example, frequently coordinated activities in East Timor through communication with the diaspora—namely, José Ramos-Horta—by contacting two Timorese based in Indonesia, Fernando de Araujo and Domingos Sarmento. From Indonesia they would contact Ramos-Horta and then relay his messages back to Pinto in East Timor.

Pinto describes communication from East Timor as a dangerous endeavor. In an interview with me in 2004, after Pinto became Minister Counselor at the Embassy of Timor-Leste, he described this system of communication. East Timor’s messages were sent using couriers, through networks of personal trust. People would enter Indonesia or East Timor as tourists but would act as message couriers. According to Pinto, the Catholic Church in East Timor was also helpful. “A courier would go to a priest that the courier knew or was told he could trust, the priest would then pass on the message to another trusted person... the network grew this way.” In the 1980s some of this communication took place through faxes. Pinto describes sending faxes to Indonesia and from there having these sent to the diaspora in Darwin or Portugal. Faxes were sent from public terminals providing public fax service and required great caution. On occasions these attempts at communicating with the outside world

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442 Pinto (1997): 125. The two East Timor student organizations in Indonesia were the more known and longer-operating Renetil (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste) and Fecletil (Frente Clandestina dos Estudiantes de Timor Leste). The repertoires of action of East Timorese students in Jakarta included ‘fence-jumping’ embassies in Jakarta in order to seek asylum, call for self-determination, protest the occupation of East Timor, demand the release of Xanana Gusmão (after his capture in 1992) and most importantly bring media attention to the situation in East Timor. These actions took place in 1989, 1994 (during the APEC summit meeting in Indonesia) and 1995. The strategy of fence-jumping was carefully devised by East Timorese students in coordination with Xanana Gusmão. See CAVR (2006): Ch. 3, 119-120.

443 Interview with Constancio Pinto, November 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.
resulted in arrests. Radio programming was also an important (if indirect) means of communication and information. East Timorese in Timor would listen to the BBC and other international and Indonesian radio programs for any information broadcast to the world regarding the situation in East Timor. They would then find a way to get a message out to confirm if it was true or not, thereby countering Indonesian accounts or propaganda.

Once East Timor was opened in the late 1980s communication channels with the outside world proliferated. Members of the clandestine movement, students and individuals were encouraged to send information to family and friends in the diaspora, and to international organizations. Communication was still dangerous and difficult, but easier than it had been up to the mid- and late-1980s. José Manuel Soares describes his own experience as an East Timorese student in Indonesia: "In 1987 my father sent me to university in Bali [Indonesia], most importantly to study, second to try to make contact with family abroad in Australia." According to Soares, there was an active underground East Timorese student movement in Bali (and in other parts of Indonesia) working on communicating information about East Timor to the outside world. A chance meeting in a shop with some Portuguese visitors to Bali, for example, led to a secret meeting and the exchange of a video of testimonials on the situation in East Timor (prepared by East Timorese students in Indonesia). The testimonials were addressed to the Portuguese government and recorded in Portuguese; they included information on human rights abuses, health conditions and aid needed, as well as pleas for the mobilization of both humanitarian and political support for the East Timorese.

444 Interview with Constancio Pinto, November 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.

445 Interview with Constancio Pinto, November 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.


447 Interview with José Manuel Soares Turquel de Jesus, East Timorese student, December 3, 2004, Honolulu, Hawaii. Upon his return to East Timor following several years as a student in the U.S. (post-East Timor's independence), Soares Turquel de Jesus became an advisor to President Ramos-Horta on international relations and diplomacy.

448 Interview with José Manuel Soares, East Timorese student, December 3, 2004, Honolulu, Hawaii.
According to Constancio Pinto, as the East Timorese population abroad grew from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s there was no formal system of communication among the diaspora in different hostlands (except within the political parties themselves). Pinto remarked that they “had very little contact with each other but [they] knew that each was doing their work—Alkatiri in Mozambique, Guterres in Sydney, Amorim Dias in Europe, Ramos-Horta at the U.N.,” and Pinto himself in the U.S. Despite the lack of formal communication and coordination by the wider diaspora population (Fretilin, we have seen did establish formal channels of communication and coordination), the “multiple communities” of the dispersed East Timorese diaspora population were connected by a shared and highly politicized identity closely tied to the homeland conflict and a deepening shared understanding or belief that the actions of the diaspora could affect the conflict’s outcome. By the mid-to late-1990s communication was greatly facilitated not only by the more open political environment in East Timor but by technological innovations—the world wide web and e-mail. As Pinto puts it, “e-mail made things easier, then communication was much more regular and information was shared daily, even with Dili.” According to Pinto, by that time the different political groups among the diaspora generally shared the same goal and understood the advantage of working as one: “when we met with people we emphasized self-determination and human rights.”

The “Santa Cruz Massacre” (also referred to as the Dili Massacre) was a critical unifying event both within East Timor and in the diaspora and would prove to be catalytic to the international solidarity movement. On November 12, 1991 a memorial mass was organized in Dili for Sebastião Gomes, a young East Timorese shot dead by Indonesian troops two weeks earlier on October 28th. Sebastião Gomes and others had been working with Constancio Pinto preparing a demonstration they intended to hold during a planned visit to East Timor by a Portuguese delegation—the visit, however, was cancelled. From Gomes’

449 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.


451 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.

452 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.
memorial mass on November 12 the mourners and demonstrators proceeded to the Santa Cruz cemetery through the streets of Dili chanting “Viva Xanana!” “Viva Timor Leste!” waving Falintil and Timorese flags, unfurling banners depicting Xanana Gusmão and messages calling for U.N. involvement in East Timor and for self-determination. After their arrival at the cemetery Indonesian troops opened fire killing approximately 200 people.453 What differentiated this event from earlier ones in East Timor was not necessarily the level of violence, but rather that it was witnessed by foreign journalists including two Americans, Amy Goodman and Allan Nairn, the British photographer Steve Cox and Max Stahl, a British cameraman who filmed the event. The film was smuggled out of East Timor by a Dutch reporter and by Stahl himself and broadcast worldwide. The CAVR concludes that the images from Dili “changed permanently the way the world perceived the Indonesian occupation...mobilized a new era of the international solidarity movement and made it impossible for governments to simply ignore the violent oppression”454 in East Timor. The impact that the Santa Cruz Massacre—and its filming—had on an international audience cannot be overstated.455

The demonstration part of the memorial procession was organized by Constancio Pinto with the approval of Xanana Gusmão. The rationale behind this dangerous display was the anticipated visit to East Timor by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and the modest presence of international media in East Timor (there to cover the aborted Portuguese Parliamentary visit). Goodman, Nairn, and Cox were beaten by Indonesian soldiers during the attack on the demonstrators, nevertheless they fared better than the East Timorese killed and arrested. Nelson Belo, for example, was held for nine months. During his arrest he was moved from one place to another to prevent the Red Cross from finding him (the Red Cross had been notified of his arrest and asked to intervene). In Nelson Belo’s words, during captivity:

453 The figure provided by Constancio Pinto in his memoir is 250-400 people. The CAVR concluded that “a figure of 200 is not an unreasonable estimate” in CAVR (2006): Ch. 3, 117.


455 This is discussed further in Chapter 5.
They burned me with cigarettes, they broke my arm, they put on electric shocks, they made me step in water that was electric. They wanted me to name my friends. I kept giving them names of big people: Bishop Belo, the Governor of East Timor, Suharto’s son. It made them crazy. [On another occasion] they told me to dig a hole [a grave]...and asked if I wanted to leave a message to my family...Finally the Red Cross found me and they released me. It was because of the Red Cross.456

Another victim was Kamal Bamadhaj457 a young human rights activist and interpreter from New Zealand. Following his death, his mother, Helen Todd, became an outspoken activist for East Timor and sued a member of the Indonesian military for his role in the “massacre.”458 According to Constancio Pinto, “the massacre was a complete surprise.” Because of the presence of the U.N. representative and foreign journalists, “the worst that [they] had expected was that the Indonesian army might arrest some of the demonstrators...”459

Following the Santa Cruz massacre, Constancio Pinto went underground and eventually managed to flee via Jakarta, Hong Kong and Macau to Lisbon, Portugal. His flight from East Timor coincided with another key event in the East Timorese independence movement, the capture of Xanana Gusmão in November 1992. Pinto continued political activity on behalf of East Timor, first in Europe and then in the United States where he attended Brown University and subsequently would become the U.S. representative for the East Timorese political organization, CNRM (National Council of Maubere Resistance), and later the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance).460 His diaspora activism in the U.S. included a close relationship with the East Timor Action Network (ETAN)461 a U.S. solidarity organization formed in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre, speaking tours in the U.S.,

456 Interview with Nelson Belo, January 19, 2006, U.S.
457 Also known as Kamal Todd.
460 Further information on these organizations follows in this chapter.
frequent appearances at conferences and contributions to radio discussions, and lobbying the U.S. government. In Canada, Pinto worked with the East Timor Alert Network (also ETAN), a similar solidarity group but with a distinct organization from the U.S. ETAN. Pinto was very active and put great faith in creating a transnational network in solidarity with East Timor; he worked closely with NGOs and individuals concerned with human rights abuses in East Timor. Pinto was also the main organizer of a small and scattered population of East Timorese in the U.S.; there were only about 25 and most of them arrived after Pinto. Their main activity (under Pinto’s leadership) was lobbying the U.N. and the U.S. government for a referendum in East Timor and organizing absentee ballots and polling places for East Timorese in diaspora for the 1999 U.N.-sponsored referendum in East Timor.

Canada and Europe also became hosts to a small scattering of East Timorese following the Santa Cruz Massacre (in addition to the already-established diaspora in Portugal). Bella Galhos, for example, left East Timor in 1994 and received asylum in Canada. Galhos lobbied the Canadian and U.S. governments and was an active public speaker, relaying her own and her family’s experiences of violence under Indonesian occupation, including her experience during the Santa Cruz massacre. Speaking engagements (many organized in Canada and the U.S. respectively by the two ETAN organizations) often included the screening of Elaine Brier’s 1997 film, Bitter Paradise: the Sell-Out of East Timor, and footage from the Santa Cruz massacre (Brier was the founder of the East Timor Alert Network/ETAN in Canada). Brier’s film included photographs of East Timor prior to the Indonesian occupation and emphasized an “indigenous” (and almost certainly idealized) East Timorese sense of community and connection to the land and nature. This was juxtaposed with the violence of the Indonesian invasion and a critique of Western commercial and military interests in Indonesia. For audiences, footage of the Santa Cruz massacre and testimony by East Timorese in diaspora, such as Galhos lent a sense of immediacy to the “trauma” and “injustice” of the Indonesian occupation, and emphasized the “foreignness” and


463 Interview with Constancio Pinto, November 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.
“aggressiveness” of the occupiers in comparison with the local “peaceful” East Timorese, and the responsibility of Westerners; it also provided graphic visual evidence of human rights abuses.

In Australia, it was also the Santa Cruz massacre and the arrival of the latest wave of refugees that would help bridge factions\(^464\) and eventually create a unified diaspora-wide movement. Bernadino Siry recalls being moved to action by the images of the Santa Cruz massacre:

> If East Timor did not have anyone outside, the struggle would not have been successful. People inside now don’t recognize that. They forgot...sometimes they say, they were the only ones—we show them videos... For 25 years people in the diaspora contributed. I spent two weeks sleeping in front of the Indonesian Embassy after Santa Cruz. We did this in shifts for about six months—about two weeks at a time. We put crosses up. We were working with Australian organizations, with the union[s]. The Catholic Church also participated...We also had demonstrations in front of the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney.\(^465\)

In 1991-1992, 130 East Timorese arrived in Australia, another 1600 asylum seekers arrived between 1994 and 1996.\(^466\) The latest arrivals to the Australian diaspora included outspoken activists (or would-be activists) with vivid accounts of the situation in East Timor: the Santa Cruz massacre, the capture of Xanana Gusmão and his emphasis on a peaceful diplomatic solution to the conflict, as well as personal testimony of human rights abuses.

As in East Timorese diaspora communities elsewhere, this served to perpetuate a politicized “parochial” diaspora identity based on trauma, a longing for a homeland and its “distinct culture” from the Indonesian state. However, it simultaneously contributed to the construction or redefinition of a diaspora identity associated with “more diffuse visions of

\(^{464}\) Again, I take the term faction to mean a group of persons or network of persons within the diaspora, not necessarily a cohesive political faction or unit within a party or political organization of the diaspora.

\(^{465}\) Interview with Bernadino Siry, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

cosmopolitanism—\textsuperscript{467} including the perceived potential of transnational diaspora agency, the possibility of international political mobilization (of non-Timorese partners) and as James Goodman suggests, the adoption of “transnationally defined norms,”\textsuperscript{468} not least of which was an emphasis on human rights. Although the general features of a political diaspora remained evident (the maintenance and transmittal of a homeland oriented identity, a sense of empathy and solidarity with the homeland and co-diasporans, for example), the content of these features, particularly the meanings of “a homeland-oriented” identity and “a relationship with the homeland,” were gradually transformed.

**Bridging Divisions within the Diaspora (mid-1980s to 1999)**

The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)\textsuperscript{469} was formed in 1988 by the resistance leader in East Timor, Xanana Gusmão, in an attempt to move beyond existing political divisions among East Timorese within Timor and within the diaspora, to unify them in the struggle for conflict resolution and, it was hoped, independence from Indonesia. Within East Timor, in the late 1980s, Gusmão succeeded in unifying the clandestine political resistance groups as well as the guerrilla forces, which he declared non-partisan. Previously, the guerrilla forces were considered to be Fretlin forces.\textsuperscript{470} According to Sarah Niner, the title of this new umbrella organization—the CNRM—replaced the Marxist revolutionary implication in the Fretlin name\textsuperscript{471} with the nationalist term “Maubere”\textsuperscript{472} The establishment of the CNRM reflected a split within those in Fretlin who maintained a more Marxist


\textsuperscript{469} Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere.

\textsuperscript{470} See the University of Coimbra, Portugal Information Service on East Timor at www.uc.pt/timor/cnrm.htm

\textsuperscript{471} Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente)

\textsuperscript{472} Niner (2001): 22.
revolutionary ideology and suspicions about the UDT and those who adopted a more
democratic and cooperative approach. It also reflected the more pragmatic and moderate
views of Xanana Gusmão, Ramos-Horta, and others. As splits within the UDT and within
Fretilin became more obvious, moderates in each group started the process of reaching out to
each other. José-Ramos Horta, who had acted as the Foreign Minister of Fretilin, left Fretilin
to become the appointed special representative of the CNRM in the diaspora. The CNRM
was an important first step in bridging the divide among East Timorese and strengthening the
diaspora’s capacity for influence in the homeland. As described by Constancio Pinto:

East Timor created a united image. Ramos-Horta and Xanana became the
united image of East Timor. These two people appealed to an international
audience. They were highlighted. There was a new movement that was
created, rather than a shift in the existing one. In order to do that Xanana had
to leave Fretilin to set up the CNRM...the new movement left out the
‘Revolutionary’ in Fretilin.473

On the UDT side, however, political elites continued to resist inclusion in the CNRM and
were suspicious of what they believed was the leftist ideology of Fretilin. The addition of this
new organization or appellation also created some confusion among the wider East Timorese
diaspora communities. In Australia, for example, each party continued to have a
representative (a Fretilin and UDT representative), but the CNRM (and later the CNRT) was
also represented. According to Carlos Pereira, within the community, there was both
confusion as well as consensus over independence as the unifying goal. He notes that the
“other parties still existed so it was difficult to determine seniority. But everyone supported
the independence movement. The community was the voice of the struggle outside of East
Timor.”474

Leading up to the establishment of the CNRM and thereafter, the language and policies of
Gusmão and Ramos-Horta reflected an abandonment of Fretilin’s more leftist rhetoric and
ideology, and favored instead the concepts of “pluralism, a multicultural system, and free and
democratic elections.”475 The Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, Gusmão’s capture in 1992, and

473 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 15, 2005, Washington, D.C.

474 Interview with Carlos Pereira, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
the arrival of the latest wave of East Timorese to the diaspora helped to create a unified (if temporary) diaspora-wide movement in support of the struggle for independence in East Timor. Following Gusmão's lead, East Timorese in Australia in 1992 organized the non-partisan East Timor Relief Association (ETRA) led by Agio Pereira, whose mission was to raise funds for humanitarian assistance in East Timor, campaign for East Timor goals, and conduct education campaigns targeting the Australian community. The CNRM itself was represented in Australia by Abel Guterres, who after independence would become East Timor's Consul General in Sydney.

The abandonment of a "revolutionary" and leftist ideology, Xanana's overtures towards the UDT, and suggestion of the possibility of negotiations with the Indonesians, were resisted by elements within Fretilin, among them Abílio Araújo.\textsuperscript{476} To facilitate cooperation among East Timorese, Araújo, one of Fretilin's most radical and uncompromising leaders, was ousted as the head of the Fretilin External Relations Committee and replaced by Mari Alkatiri. A letter of August 20, 1993 signed by Fretilin diaspora leaders Alkatiri, Roque Rodrigues, José Luis Guterres and Alfredo Borges Ferreira formally accused Araújo of insubordination and dismissed him from his position in Fretilin.\textsuperscript{477} The hope was that Araújo's ouster would pave the way for cooperation with the UDT and a diplomatic solution to the East Timor conflict based on a peace proposal put forth by the CNRM. The CNRM Peace Plan of 1993 included a five-year transition period of autonomy (this period could be extended) followed by a self-determination referendum through which East Timorese could choose between independence, free association with, or integration into, Indonesia.\textsuperscript{478}

CNRM representatives in the diaspora succeeded in forging a degree of unity between Fretilin and UDT, including formulating a joint strategy for a March 1995 meeting for an

\textsuperscript{475} Niner (2001): 20.

\textsuperscript{476} Niner (2002): 22.


\textsuperscript{478} See Pinto (1996): 251-254.
All-Inclusive intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). However, divisions between Fretilin and UDT remained and represented an obstacle to further diplomatic gains. Although political divisions ran deeper than problems over the name of an organization—the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM)—one point of contention for João Carrascalão, head of UDT in Australia, was the use of the word “Maubere.” According to Ramos-Horta, Maubere was a common name among East Timorese people and during Portuguese colonization it was used as a derogatory term for the poor, ignorant and indigenous. In the 1970s, Ramos-Horta and Fretilin adopted the term as a political symbol of East Timorese pride and cultural identity, and later as a political symbol of resistance. Carrascalão objected that the term was exclusive (leaving out East Timorese mestizos, for example) and implied Fretilin partiality. Constancio Pinto contends that the term “Maubere” was also resisted by the Church (in East Timor) because it implied “an oppressed people” or an “underclass.”

The CNRM was thus transformed into the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). By the time the “CNRT” was officially adopted at the first East Timorese National Convention in the Diaspora in 1998 in Peniche, Portugal, factions within the East Timorese diaspora had reached a tenuous working relationship and were able to present a unified front dedicated to finding a solution to the situation in East Timor. The Convention also officially recognized the critical role of the diaspora in the East Timor struggle for independence.

Xanana Gusmão’s message to the Convention emphasized the need for unity among East Timorese (within and outside of East Timor), the illegality and injustice of the Indonesian occupation, the “right to self-determination and independence,” as well as a commitment to human rights and “pluralist democracy.” Gusmão’s message also linked the fate of East

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479 The AIETD was a series of U.N.-sponsored meetings designed to give East Timorese some semblance of input into the U.N.-facilitated negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia on the question of East Timor. As discussed in Chapter 5, the East Timorese were shut out of official negotiations. See also CAVR (2006): Ch. 5, 36.


481 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.
Timor to democracy in Indonesia itself and to the will of the international community to a “just and peaceful solution.” Recalling his message to the Convention and the results of the meeting itself, Gusmão later highlighted the role of the diaspora, referring to it as the “Timorese Resistance in the diaspora,” and the achievement of (at least a temporary) unity among the East Timorese.

The “Magna Carta” adopted at the April 1998 Convention made explicit the political aspirations of the East Timorese. It proclaimed that an independent East Timor “[w]ill uphold a democratic, multi-party, law-abiding State, founded on the basic beliefs of the people of East Timor…. Unyielding support and strict respect for the fundamental freedoms and duties of each and every citizen.” The language of the Magna Carta conveyed a unity of purpose and a commitment to a democratic system that would appeal not only to the East Timorese diaspora but to an international audience and to the NGOs and individuals that had joined in promoting the East Timor cause. In addition to highlighting the roles of East Timorese in Timor and in the diaspora, the Magna Carta also recognized the importance of “extensive networks and support from key non-government organizations around the world.” The Magna Carta did not merely express the aspirations of the East Timorese, it reflected relationships and partnerships that the East Timorese cultivated and built over a 20-year period, including state support from Portugal and other Lusophone countries as well as the burgeoning transnational advocacy network dedicated to East Timor.


484 The full name of the document is the Magna Carta Concerning Freedoms, Rights, Duties and Guarantees for the People of East Timor.


486 Ibid.
The East Timorese Diaspora: From Peace-wreckers to Peace-makers?\textsuperscript{487}

The early political activity of the East Timorese diaspora reveals a very conscious and obvious maintenance of a homeland-oriented identity and an awareness of this. The actions of diasporans reveal a sense of solidarity and a commitment to maintain relations with the homeland and among co-diasporans in various countries. Although the external political leadership of Fretilin, for example, was based primarily in Mozambique, because of its proximity to East Timor and the relatively large number of East Timorese there, the East Timorese diaspora in Australia became a center of political and community activity. Politically active members of the Australian diaspora were in frequent communication with the Fretilin Central Committee in Mozambique as well as co-diasporans in Portugal. Much, rather most, energy was devoted to maintaining links with the homeland and carrying out political activity on its behalf. The most vivid examples of this are the radio communications between Darwin and East Timor and the diplomatic activity carried out by Ramos-Horta and others at the U.N. and in Western capitals. These features conform to the political definition of diaspora proposed for this dissertation.

However, an important criterion of a political diaspora is lacking during this period—attempts to create and maintain diaspora networks and organizations. In this early stage, diaspora networks and organizations were less created and more transplanted. That is, there were no diaspora networks; rather there were East Timorese political parties transplanted to diaspora. The main social actors in diaspora were the East Timorese political parties, primarily Fretilin. An important focus of Fretilin’s political activity was securing state support, more specifically material support from states, for the East Timorese conflict. This was achieved with some degree of success through Fretilin’s relationship with Mozambique (and other African states). Thus, we might conclude that the East Timorese abroad exhibited

\textsuperscript{487} As pointed out in Chapter 1, in this dissertation peace-wrecking behavior is taken to mean the activities of actors “opposed to peaceful settlement for whatever reason.” These actors may act within or outside the peace process “and use violence and other means to disrupt the process...” They include actors that join but later withdraw and obstruct or threaten to obstruct the process; actors that join peace process but “are not seriously interested in making compromises” or committing long-term; and actors that “are geographically external to the conflict but which support internal spoilers and spoiling tactics.” See Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, “The Impact of Spoilers on Peace Processes and Peace Building,” United Nations UniversityPolicy Brief No. 2 (2006): 1-2.
the diaspora nationalism or “long-distance nationalism” that Benedict Anderson describes, wherein participants from a distance, engage in activities that have “incalculable consequences” but remain unaccountable for their actions. It should be noted, however, that Fretilin and other East Timor observers described these activities not in the language of Anderson’s “nationalism” but in the anti-colonial language of “resistance” and “liberation” of the 1960s and 1970s. Fretilin members in the diaspora likely attempted or sought to facilitate the movement of money and arms to East Timor immediately after the invasion when Falintil still controlled much of the island territory. As the conflict in East Timor continued, however, the more practical means of securing weapons and supplies for Falintil was through local means, that is, through the Indonesian military and police (including East Timorese serving in the Indonesian army and police but loyal to the resistance movement) and through East Timorese in the Indonesian civil service who clandestinely aided the resistance—weapons were bought and stolen. Based on this information, materialist explanations for diaspora involvement in homeland conflict (as long-distance nationalists and peace-wreckers fuelling conflict through financial and weapons transfers and economically benefiting from these activities) as described in political economy analyses by Collier and Hoeffler, for example, are useful but limited in explaining the East Timor case (and the Acehnese as will be seen later in this chapter).

The evidence does point to a conscious effort on the part of diaspora leaders to maintain (among themselves and their supporters in diaspora) an overwhelmingly homeland-focused identification and a salient political and nationalist identity. This diaspora identity was shaped by the “imaginative” or “ideational” resources available and the “enabling structures” in the form of alliances and partnerships. In the early years, the ideational resources were


drawn from the little information available from East Timor itself (through radio
communication, for example) and filtered through Fretilin, and the political ideology and
discourse of the East Timorese political parties in diaspora. The “enabling structures”
included state support provided by post-colonial, leftist governments of Africa and a handful
of individual partners in the West. Although diplomatic success was limited in the early years
in diaspora, the diplomatic efforts of Fretilin and those of José Ramos-Horta, in particular,
would, in time, serve to broaden both the ideational resources available and the alliances and
partnerships that helped shape diaspora political identity or identification.

From the mid-1980s, important changes began to take place within the diaspora. Not only
where there significant demographic changes, but the identity markers and repertoires of
representation adopted by East Timorese in diaspora shifted over time. The earlier generation
of East Timorese emphasized a history of Portuguese colonization (rather than Dutch as the
rest of Indonesia), the Portuguese language and their connection to other Lusophone
countries, a leftist and revolutionary political ideology at least for those affiliated with
Fretilin, and for many a connection to the Catholic Church as both a unifying feature for the
East Timorese, and again a marker of distinction from the predominantly Muslim
Indonesians. For a younger generation of East Timorese in diaspora, the emphasis on
Portuguese colonial history and language was more muted (as they had been raised under the
Indonesian occupation and most in an Indonesian education system). Their Catholicism was
still important492 as a form of resistance and because the Church became involved in the
protection of the native Tetum language in the face of the teaching of Indonesian in schools
and the use of Indonesian in public office. Among the new arrivals to the diaspora, the
emphasis on culture was on the “native” or “indigenous” culture (including Catholicism and
the use of Tetum) and less on the Lusophone. There were certainly Fretilin supporters among
this younger group, but their political identity and their repertoires of action and
representation were more influenced by the Indonesian and other democracy movements
rather than the anti-colonial and national liberation movements and conflicts of the 1960s and


492 The number of practicing East Timorese Catholics increased more during the Indonesian period than during
Portuguese colonization.
1970s or the staunch anti-communism of the same period. Although the goal may have continued to be independence, the emphasis was on self-determination, democracy, and human rights. Thus, the newer arrivals contributed to the strength of the non-partisans within the diaspora and in combination their views had a wider appeal to potential hostland allies.

Parallel to these demographic and identity changes were changes in formal political organization in the diaspora. It is during this stage that more formal networks and organizations, distinct from the original political parties, were created and established. Significantly, these new networks and organizations were deliberately more inclusive (deliberately designed to appeal to members of the established political parties as well as the non-partisans) and in the case of the CNRM and CNRT, they were diaspora-wide. That is, they were represented wherever an East Timorese diaspora community was located.

There was indeed a distinct East Timorese diaspora leadership, particularly within the political parties (Fretilin and UDT) and later diaspora organizations, namely, the CNRM and CNRT. And political activity was seemingly limited to a few. This description of East Timorese diaspora politics echoes Khachig Töloyan’s views on leadership elites as a “multi-tiered minority” of the committed, the activists, and a smaller number of radical activists or militants and Gabriel Sheffer’s description of the politically and institutionally engaged “core” members of a diaspora. Such analyses of diaspora leadership elites and analytical divisions of a “multi-tiered minority” or “core” members are both useful and applicable to the case of East Timor (and Aceh as is discussed later in this chapter), to an extent. However, they may also obscure the level of access of “ordinary” East Timorese to the diaspora leadership as well as the quotidian interactions between the community and leadership elites, particularly as the demographics of the diaspora changed from the mid-1980s through the late 1990s. In the case of the East Timor diaspora, there was a constitutive relationship between the

493 Broadly speaking, the political and ideological influences on Fretilin and UDT respectively.

quotidian and political action.\textsuperscript{495} Bernadino Siry recalls that when Ramos-Horta lived in Sydney, “people would see him all the time. He was like any member of the community.”\textsuperscript{496} Nelson Belo recalls easily meeting and talking with Ramos-Horta when they both happened to be in Canada.\textsuperscript{497} In her anthropological study of the Sydney East Timorese diaspora, Amanda Wise explains that the community in Sydney was usually aware of Ramos-Horta’s diplomatic missions and took part “in official pre- and post-trip discussion through supermarket and kitchen table debate at the local level.” According to Wise, Ramos-Horta often included papers and reports by local community leaders and students in his diplomatic missions. In Wise’s assessment, for the East Timorese diaspora “the separation between ‘community’ and ‘high diplomacy’ and politics was very much blurred.”\textsuperscript{498} Thus, the scale of political activity and activism among East Timorese diasporans was in fact much wider than analyses of a “multi-tiered minority” or “core” members suggest.

Diaspora activism gained momentum through the mid- to late-1990s culminating in activities leading up to the U.N.-sponsored referendum for East Timor in 1999 (after the collapse of the Suharto government in Indonesia), and the large demonstrations of 1999 calling for an international peacekeeping intervention after referendum results led to pro-Indonesia East Timorese militia-instigated and perpetrated violence in East Timor.\textsuperscript{499} The flows of people from East Timor to the diaspora leading to demographic changes as well as greater access to information from East Timor were made possible by changes in structural conditions (the Indonesian government eased travel restrictions to and from East Timor from the mid-1990s) and advances in communication technologies. However, the diaspora’s ideational and

\textsuperscript{495} This supports Pnina Werbner’s view on the constitutive relations among intellectual creativity, quotidian culture, subjective consciousness, and political action in diaspora. See Pnina Werbner, “Introduction: The Materiality of Diaspora—Between Aesthetic and “Real” Politics,” Diaspora 9, no. 1 (2000): 6. On the cultural activities and representations of the East Timorese diaspora, for example, dance and the use and creation of tais, a traditional textile, see Amanda Wise, Exile and Return Among the East Timorese (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{496} Interview with Bernadino Siry, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

\textsuperscript{497} Interview with Nelson Belo, East Timorese activist, January 19, 2007, Honolulu, Hawaii.

\textsuperscript{498} Wise (2006): 79.

\textsuperscript{499} The 1999 referendum and the diaspora solidarity movement and political activity are discussed in Chapter 5.
political resources, the material that constitutes its political identity and guides goals and strategies, were drawn not only from interactions within the diaspora and the homeland, but also between the diaspora and a growing transnational advocacy network (TAN). The East Timorese diaspora-TAN relationship is analysed in the next chapter. First, I turn my attention to the political identity, role, and activities of the Acehnese diaspora.

The Acehnese Diaspora

Hasan di Tiro: Exile and Early Political Activity (1979 to mid-1990s)

The early political activity of the Acehnese diaspora was led by Hasan di Tiro, the exiled rebel leader of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM). On December 4, 1976, Hasan di Tiro declared Aceh independent from Indonesia. Di Tiro’s action, according to M. Isa Sulaiman, reflected his frustration with an inability to create a federated state in Indonesia (rather than a unitary state) and the loss of real autonomy for Aceh within a unitary state. Di Tiro believed that a unitary state and “the democracy of ‘one man one vote’ did not bring justice to minority groups.” He favored instead an Indonesian federation. His frustration was compounded by a failure to obtain a contract for his company to exploit natural gas in Aceh in the 1970s. In Sulaiman’s analysis, di Tiro—having already spent time in New York studying at Columbia University and then acting as Information Officer for the Embassy of Indonesia at the U.N.—was inspired by the U.N. Declaration on the rights

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500 GAM is also known officially as the Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF). The ASNLF was organized as a government with Hasan di Tiro as the Head of State and a cabinet. In 2005 when I interviewed GAM representatives in Sweden, Malik Mahmud was Prime Minister, Dr. Zaini Abdullah was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bakhtiar Abdullah was Information Officer.

501 Hasan di Tiro, Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra, December 4, 1976 at www.asnlf.net. According to di Tiro, the date of December 4 was selected deliberately because it was “the day after the Dutch had shot and killed the last Head of State of the independent Acheh Sumatra, Tengku Tjhik Maat di Tiro…on December 3, 1911. The Dutch had, therefore, counted December 4, 1911 as the day of the ending of the Achehnese State as a Sovereign entity...” Di Tiro was thus connecting his action to an ‘independent’ Aceh, ignoring the intervening 60 odd years of history, and making a connection between himself and his ancestor as the head of state. See Hasan di Tiro, The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro, The National Liberation Front of Acheh-Sumatra (1984): 13. Published earlier by the Open Press Markham, 1982.


503 Sulaiman (2006): 135

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of self-determination and by a belief that both the Dutch annexation of Aceh and the Dutch transfer of Aceh to Indonesia in 1949 were illegal. Di Tiro also claimed that a 19th century Acehnese Sultan had transferred power to his ancestor, Teungku M. Sanan di Tiro, “to lead the struggle against the Dutch aggressors”\textsuperscript{504} and, presumably, by extension to Hasan di Tiro himself in his struggle against a “neo-colonialist” and “neo-imperialist” Indonesia. For di Tiro, GAM’s revolt, therefore, was not “separatist” per se but rather an effort to restore Aceh’s sovereignty as it was before the Dutch-Aceh War of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{505} These assertions would provide the basis and rationale for much of di Tiro’s early political writing and activities in diaspora.

Indonesian military action against the di Tiro-led rebellion of the mid-1970s led to his self-exile (along with a number of his colleagues) from Aceh in 1979. It is believed that di Tiro traveled to Malaysia, Singapore, perhaps Mozambique,\textsuperscript{506} and Europe, where he and others obtained permanent residency in Sweden. The GAM leadership in Sweden would also come to include Husaini Hasan, Zaini Abdullah (a relative of di Tiro’s), Malik Mahmud, an Acehnese from Singapore who would become GAM’s Prime Minister, and Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM’s Information Officer. Thus, from 1980 until the early 1990s, the political organization of the Acehnese diaspora in the West was based on the activities of a small number of GAM exiles in Stockholm under the leadership of and loyal to Hasan di Tiro. During the early phase of diaspora organization, di Tiro focused his energies on re-organizing an armed independence movement in Aceh and lobbying internationally.\textsuperscript{507}

Di Tiro’s diary, \textit{The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan di Tiro}, was compiled in diaspora from di Tiro’s 1976-79 speeches, writings and activities in Aceh during


\textsuperscript{506} In the postscript to \textit{The Price of Freedom}, di Tiro refers to his visiting “a friendly country in Africa.” See di Tiro (1984): 225.

GAM’s first armed rebellion. In this work, di Tiro refers to the Javanese and Javanese Indonesia as “foreign” to Aceh, as “colonialists” and as the “enemy.” Di Tiro also refers to the importance of the distinct history and language of the Acehnese. He calls the Acehnese language “...a secret code...a vital means for our organized and civilized life, a vehicle of communication, for culture, for defence of yourself and your land.”\(^{508}\) Di Tiro also stresses a connection to history and an idealized land. He urges the Acehnese to learn their history: “It has been written not by ink over the papers, but by your fathers’ blood over every inch of our beautiful valleys and breath-taking heights ...This Land of yours is a Holy Land—made Holy by the deed and the sacrificed blood of your ancestors...”\(^{509}\) Earlier in the same text he announces that “this land is yours only for one reason and for one count: because you are Acehnese! If you denounced that truth by accepting another false name, like ‘indonesians’—that Javanese nonsense—that is tantamount to accepting that you are not your fathers’ and mothers’ sons [...] Any Achenese who has come to believe that he is not Achenese but ‘indonesian’ he is suffering an identity crisis...”\(^{510}\)

In addition to his references to an ethnic identity and distinction from the Indonesian “foreigners,” di Tiro calls attention to the importance of self-determination and international relations and of the importance of re-printing his 1976 declaration of independence in English (in The Price of Freedom) to counter what he called an enemy Indonesian campaign to represent the Achenese struggle as one of “‘terrorists, bandits,’ ‘fanatics’ and even ‘communists.’”\(^{511}\) Although he is clearly mindful of a potential international audience (and indeed directing much of his writing towards such an audience), di Tiro also targets international interests in Indonesia: “…our country has been laid bare by the Javanese colonialists at the feet of multinationals to be raped...”\(^{512}\) He makes specific reference to Mobil Oil Company\(^{513}\) in Lhokseumawe (Aceh) and to the “thousands of Americans and

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\(^{508}\) Di Tiro (1984): 44.


other foreign nationals who are making their opulent living on our troubled soil.”⁵¹⁴ Although this is indeed a telling passage, much is made of di Tiro’s anti-Americanism based on this and a further paragraph (page 177) in which he expresses his disappointment over a change in U.S. policy in support of Indonesia and neglect of Acehnese interests. It should be noted, however, that these are two paragraphs in over 200 pages. Di Tiro/GAM did not necessarily object to Mobil’s presence (or foreign investment), he did, however, object to revenues from resource exploitation in Aceh going to the Indonesian government.⁵¹⁵ Despite his mention of “self-determination” and “international relations,” given his diary’s time coverage (during the GAM armed rebellion in Aceh), The Price of Freedom concentrates more on an account of the conflict, a distinct ethnic and historical Acehnese identity, the “enemy” Javanese, and on the importance and need for a continued armed struggle to repel this “enemy.”

His later work in diaspora is both more subtle and more legalistic. In “The Legal Status of Acheh-Sumatra Under International Law,” di Tiro gives a detailed account of Acehnese history that includes references to European historical documents dating back to the 18th century in order to highlight Aceh’s history of sovereignty prior to the Dutch-Aceh war of 1873. In describing the 19th century war with the Dutch, di Tiro quotes news reports from the New York Times, Harper’s, The Economist and the London Spectator as well as Turkish sources. These sources emphasize the “warlike” and “independent” qualities of the Acehnese⁵¹⁶ and the futility of foreign attempts at domination by the British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch over the years. Thus, history is a prominent element in the early politics of the Acehnese diaspora (and it would continue to be). Di Tiro’s interpretation of

⁵¹³ Later Exxon/Mobil.


⁵¹⁶ Hasan di Tiro, The Legal Status of Acheh-Sumatra under International Law (1980). Although published earlier than his diary, the content of this document was written after that of The Price of Freedom.
Acehnese, and indeed Indonesian history, helps us to understand his interests, aspirations and objectives.517

In “The Legal Status of Acheh-Sumatra Under International Law,” di Tiro returns to the concepts of “sovereignty” and “self-determination” to make a legal case to an international community for an independent Aceh.518 He discusses what he sees as the illegal transfer of Aceh to Indonesia by the Dutch in 1949519 and references—in detail—U.N. documents on self-determination and decolonization (U.N. resolutions 1514, 2625, 2621, 3314) as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Di Tiro’s aim is to discredit Indonesia’s sovereignty over Aceh and define the Acehnese “struggle” as a question of “self-determination” and “decolonization” (in di Tiro’s view the incomplete decolonization of the former Dutch East Indies) rather than a question of separatism.520 Finally, di Tiro gives specific mention to the U.N. General Assembly’s 1960 recognition of the “overseas provinces” of Portugal as colonies and acknowledging their right to self-determination. Di Tiro extends this argument not only to the Dutch East Indies but to Indonesia itself by referring to the “overseas provinces” or “colonies” of Indonesia “such as Acheh-Sumatra, the Moluccas, the Celebes, Borneo, the Lesser Sunda Islands and East Timor—the last to be invaded by Javanese Indonesia.”521

Kirsten Schulze argues that from 1999, East Timor served as a “blueprint” for GAM political strategy522 and indeed GAM in later years would borrow from East Timorese repertoires of


519 Tiro also includes West Papua in this ‘illegal’ transfer.

520 Di Tiro (1980).

521 Di Tiro (1980).

action. However, it is important to recognize that both the Acehnese and East Timorese conflicts in the "homeland" took place over a similar time period and both movements in the diaspora ran parallel to each other. Di Tiro was thus familiar with East Timorese international efforts in diaspora well before 1999. Moreover, it is conceivable (and speculated) that di Tiro and other Acehnese in diaspora and East Timorese leaders exchanged views during their lobbying at the U.N. and during meetings of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in the Netherlands. In addition, di Tiro’s use of the language of “self-determination” and “sovereignty” was the result not only of his familiarity with East Timorese strategies, but of his own experience in the West and the U.N.—that is, of an interaction with the international system. As Edward Aspinall puts it, “the right of self-determination” had become an “axiom in the creed of every anti-colonial and secessionist movement.”

In the mid-1980s, Di Tiro’s efforts to re-organize the armed struggle in Aceh included seeking out potential international allies. William Nessen writes that di Tiro first turned to contacts in the United States, “[b]ut his former friends, including… CIA operative Edward Lansdale, had either died or long before lost their pull.” Moreover, the U.S. had already changed its strategies and ended support for armed rebellions in Indonesia in 1959 (previously supported to achieve its anti-Communist aims). Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi, however, was more forthcoming. Although GAM’s “partnership” with Ghaddafi may be interpreted as a shift from a secular nationalist ideology to a more Islam-based nationalism, this would be incorrect. GAM’s Declaration of Independence of 1976 does omit any

523 East Timor is mentioned both in The Price of Freedom and The Legal Status of Acheh-Sumatra under International Law.

524 See also Aspinall (2002).


526 Di Tiro had experience in this area, as a representative of the Daud Beureueh’s Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh during the 1950s and 1960s; Di Tiro then fundraised and facilitated the purchase and international transfer of arms to Aceh. See William Nessen, “Sentiments Made Visible: The Rise and Reason of Aceh’s National Liberation Movement,” in Anthony Reid (ed.), Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006) and Ross (November 2002).

reference to Islam, but di Tiro’s The Price of Freedom diary makes frequent mention of his religious beliefs: “Everything in Aceh is judged by Islamic standard. Islam is an inseparable part of Acehnese identity...Aceh is a nation founded on Islam and lives by the law of Islam.” 528 GAM’s ideology, thus, from the beginning included both reference to and elements of Islam. However, it would also be inaccurate to characterize GAM as an Islamic movement, as GAM and di Tiro’s political goals were in essence secular rather than religious. The “partnership” with Libya also did not represent a deeper solidarity with the Muslim world—the “partnership” reflected Ghaddafi’s own strategies as much as di Tiro’s. During this period, Ghaddafi was rather indiscriminate in his financial and arms support of revolutionary movements in the developing world and they were not limited to Muslim groups. While he lent support to GAM, he also provided arms to the IRA in Northern Ireland, for example. 529

Between 1986-1989/90 from 200 to 1000 GAM recruits received training in Libya. Training lasted several months and included weapons training and ideological instruction. Bakhtiar Abdullah, Information Officer for GAM in diaspora (in 2005), was a military trainer in Libya. 530 Malik Mahmud was also involved in training and emphasized that Hasan di Tiro was deeply involved and committed to the “moral education” [ideological education] of the trainees, an area of training in which the Libyans had no input. 531

After training, many of the recruits returned to Aceh via Singapore and Malaysia to begin a second phase (1989-1992) in the GAM rebellion. In William Nessen’s account, Libyan support did not include the arms for rebellion; instead GAM intended to procure arms from Southeast Asia 532 and from Indonesia specifically, by stealing or buying them, 533 often from

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531 Interview with Malik Mahmud, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.
532 GAM’s Southeast Asia coordinator for weapons procurement and logistical assistance to Aceh was Zakaria Saman, see International Crisis Group, “Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement,” Asia Briefing Number 57, Jakarta/Brussels (November 29, 2006).
the Indonesian military and police. The rebellion was met by the harsh Indonesian counter-insurgency known as DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer/Military Operations Zone). However, Nessen estimates that fewer “than a quarter of the Libya-trained fighters were killed under DOM.” Many fled again to Malaysia and most were never deployed to Aceh from Malaysia because of the strength and success of the Indonesian counterinsurgency. The GAM political leadership remained in diaspora, largely in Sweden.

During this early period in the West, the Acehnese community exhibited several features of a political diaspora: a conscious maintenance, representation, and transmittal of a homeland-oriented collective identity; a strong self-awareness of such identity; a sense of solidarity with co-ethnics in the homeland; and a commitment to maintain or attempts to establish relationships with the homeland. If the early political activity of the East Timorese in diaspora was party-centric, then the early political activity of the Acehnese in diaspora was strongly, perhaps exclusively, GAM-centric. It was the work of Hasan di Tiro and a small group of exiles loyal to him. There were thus no diaspora networks or organizations, rather there was a transplanted GAM organization whose gaze was strictly on the homeland and whose activities were devoted primarily to reviving the armed struggle and to a lesser extent, to lobbying states and international organizations.

GAM’s Diaspora Diplomacy (1979 to mid-1990s)

GAM’s diplomatic activities included the search for support from individuals, organizations and governments. Hasan di Tiro approached different national and international

534 See also Ross (November 2002): 23 and 35.
535 For information on the DOM, see Chapter 3.
organizations and institutions, including the United Nations Decolonization Commission, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and UNPO. Support for GAM, however, was limited. The lack of support, particularly during the Cold War period, can be attributed to geopolitical or structural conditions (the importance of Indonesia to the West as a bulwark against communism, in particular to the U.S., U.K., and Australia). In addition, unlike Fretilin and East Timor, GAM had no “state” to represent its cause and aspirations at official international venues. Portugal could table proposals and resolutions pertaining to East Timor, and Fretilin could count on the support of the African Lusophone countries at the U.N. Based on a different colonial history, GAM and Aceh had no such representation. Di Tiro’s “legal” arguments on Acehnese self-determination, therefore, were devoid of any state support. GAM’s diplomacy in diaspora was thus constrained.

However, it is likely that Hasan di Tiro’s rhetoric and ideology (his repertoires of representation for, not only the Acehnese in diaspora, but for all Acehnese, and the Aceh conflict), especially in the 1970s and 1980s but also as late as the mid-1990s, alienated potential non-state allies in the West, both leftist political activists (those who forged early partnerships with Fretilin, for example) as well as a broader audience. Despite his anti-colonial views, di Tiro himself and GAM in diaspora were more politically conservative than Fretilin (indeed they were quite staunchly anti-communist), certainly more conservative than the radical Fretilin members that initially received assistance from members of the Communist Party of Australia or than the East Timorese moderates and progressives whose views appealed to the Australian Labor Party, to political commentators in the U.S., such as Noam Chomsky, Allan Nairn, and Amy Goodman, and to particular members of Congress in the U.S. and the parliaments of Europe and Japan. Although GAM’s anti-colonial views may have held some appeal for particular Western audiences, its ideology questioned not only the geographical integrity of the state of Indonesia but also its legitimacy as a “nation”—this

540 See Fallon and Missbach (2007).

may have proved a step too far for potential allies. Because of their different colonial history and later annexation, the East Timorese never needed to resort to such logic.\footnote{Under international law and U.N. resolutions, decolonized territorial boundaries were expected to match the colonial territory. It was the Portuguese who controlled the territory of East Timor, rather than the Dutch—therefore, Indonesia could not rely on international laws and instruments to justify its sovereignty over East Timor. Aceh, however, was considered part of the Dutch colonial state (at the time of the Netherland’s transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia), Di Tiro, thus, did not have the same international legal recourses as East Timorese advocates for self-determination.}

Moreover, while East Timorese diaspora leaders, particularly José Ramos-Horta, were able to conduct diplomacy to a large extent unhindered by direct responsibility for the violence in the homeland—Ramos-Horta was never associated directly with military strategy and later withdrew from Fretelin and became closely associated with a strategy of diplomatic solution and non-violent resistance—di Tiro himself seemed to cultivate the view that he contributed to military strategy. He was indeed directly associated with Libya and the renewed armed rebellion in Aceh of 1989. But even after his direct involvement in the violence in the homeland may have diminished,\footnote{Di Tiro may have been involved in the instigation of violence from a distance even if he did not have full control of GAM commanders and soldiers in Aceh.} di Tiro’s rhetoric continued to portray the contrary. In a 1991 interview, di Tiro refers to his secret visits to Aceh and makes claims to a widening military strategy that included extending the war from Aceh to the whole of Sumatra.\footnote{Wiecher Hulst, “From Now On, It Is Not Just Free Aceh But Free Sumatra,” NRC Handelsblad (1991) at http://acehnet.tripod.com/sumatra.htm.} The GAM leadership would later clarify that it made no claims to the entire island of Sumatra and that it accepted the present administrative territory of Aceh as the geographical basis of its claims to sovereignty.\footnote{See Sulaiman (2006): 136-137.}

Moreover, while the East Timorese were showing signs of moderation, compromise and new ideas by the early 1990s, including the 1993 proposed peace plan, GAM in diaspora continued to focus on the past, on historical injustices inflicted on Aceh, the “illegitimacy” of Indonesia, and it showed no inclination towards compromise.\footnote{This is persuasively argued by Kirsten Schulze in Schulze (2006): 226.} Up to the mid- and late
1990s, the GAM leadership in diaspora exhibited little evidence of a political vision for the future of Aceh beyond the struggle for independence, guerilla resistance, and anti-colonialism (Western or Javanese). Instead, its repertoires of representation included vague if persistent references to a future Acehnese sultanate with di Tiro as heir to this position.\textsuperscript{547} This later gave way to the still vague claim that it would be left to the people of Aceh to decide which form of government they wanted after independence.\textsuperscript{548} A shift to a broader and more detailed discourse of democracy and human rights did not take place until later in the 1990s and after; it coincided not only with the period of reformasi in Indonesia and the mass rallies for referendum in Aceh in 1999 and 2000, but also with the arrival of a new wave of Acehnese refugees to Europe, Australia and North America.

The New Wave of Diasporans and Political Organization (mid-1990s to early 2000s)

The 1990s and early 2000s saw the Acehnese community in the West grow through the addition of mostly refugees fleeing the conflict in Aceh and/or the campaign by the Malaysian government to arrest and deport illegal or irregular immigrants, including Acehnese.\textsuperscript{549} Among this new wave of Acehnese were people who had experienced DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer/Military Operations Zone),\textsuperscript{550} a period described by Geoffrey Robinson as the military’s “institutionalisation of terror” in Aceh,\textsuperscript{551} and the martial law declared in 2003 which included the biggest deployment of the Indonesian military since the occupation of East Timor. Many of the new arrivals to the diaspora also experienced the end of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998 and a subsequent period of both political uncertainty (associated with the transfer of power in Jakarta) and political openness. In Jacques

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\textsuperscript{547}I do not question whether di Tiro’s claim was legitimate, rather I examine whether the claim as a political vision for the future of Aceh or as part of political discourse inhibited support for GAM from (non-Acehnese, specifically, Western) potential partners—potential members of a transnational advocacy network.


\textsuperscript{549}For further information on this topic see Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{550}DOM provided the Indonesian military with full control over the province and an escalation of human rights violations and the deliberate targeting of civilians took place during these years (reportedly both by Indonesian security forces and by GAM).

Bertrand’s analysis, this “period of initial opening of an authoritarian regime and a fully consolidated democracy can be crucial for relations between ethnic groups.”\textsuperscript{552} In Aceh, the political space that opened up from 1998 to 2003 allowed a flourishing of civil society that was accompanied by a pro-referendum and pro-democracy movement—led primarily by students and non-governmental organizations—that culminated in massive pro-referendum and pro-democracy rallies in November 1999 and November 2000. This period also coincided with the recovery and re-emergence of GAM inside Aceh.

As the groups of Acehnese grew larger not only in Malaysia but in Australia, North America and Europe, a system of contact and organization and contact developed—that is, diaspora networks and organizations began to emerge. In each country the Acehnese established what they called a “national council.” The work of the national council began with helping new arrivals settle into the host community and then assisting in everyday life activities, such as finding housing, work, schools, medical assistance, etc. The three quotes below, describe the system of contact in Denmark and Australia and with the GAM leadership in Sweden:

People from Malaysia send a list of names of people sent abroad. The people going abroad are also told how to get in touch with people in Sweden and encouraged to do so.\textsuperscript{553}

When I was going to Denmark, someone in Malaysia gave me Mr. —’s number [an Acehnese resident of Denmark]. Mr.— was also informed and contacted me, Stockholm was also told.\textsuperscript{554}

We have an organization—every time a new person comes to Australia, we contact them or they contact us. We regularly choose one person in charge of the organization, but we are all involved.\textsuperscript{555}

These national councils also included a political element. According to Malik Mahmud of GAM, the role of the national council was to “reach out to the community and try to get them


\textsuperscript{553} Interview with Malik Mahmud, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.

\textsuperscript{554} Interview with Adnan Beursansyah, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark. Adnan Beursansyah, a journalist, was imprisoned for eight years and tortured. Upon his return to Aceh, he became spokesman for GAM.

\textsuperscript{555} Interview with Acehnese student, 2005, Australia.
involved. Tell them what GAM is doing for Aceh, remind them of the Acehnese experience, of what is being done and sacrificed for them, and remind them of their responsibility.” The councils would also fundraise and encourage community members to advocate the “Acehnese cause” by seeking ties with NGOs and if possible talking with local and national governments in their respective hostlands.\footnote{Interview with Malik Mahmud, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.} Members of each national council elected a leader or leaders every year or two. The leadership of each national council was GAM Stockholm’s main point of contact. In addition to councils in the West, there was also a council in Malaysia and, according to the GAM leadership in Stockholm, there was a good deal of travel and communication back and forth with Malaysia. It should be emphasized that participation in national council activities or meetings did not necessarily equate to GAM membership. However, as the councils were in communication with the leadership in Stockholm, coordinated with them, and fundraised for them, national council members were likely to be sympathetic to GAM and its goals or at least interested in being informed of and participating in activities aimed at changing the political and security situation of the homeland.

Because the national councils and other diaspora organizations were at least loosely connected to the GAM leadership in diaspora, some members of the broader community either opted out or resisted the leadership’s involvement or tactics. According to an Acehnese resident in the U.S., some members of the community were frustrated by the way GAM representatives approached them by asking them to join meetings and raise money. “Most people,” I was told, were “willing to help with the struggle” but did not want to feel pressured particularly if they did not have the capacity to help economically.\footnote{Personal communication with Acehnese resident of U.S., November 17, 2005.}

In interviews with me, both GAM representatives and individual Acehnese indeed emphasized that not all in the diaspora community supported GAM; the reasons are varied and complex and changed over time. Because of this, in several of the countries, Acehnese organized political meetings as well as social meetings where political discussion was less
common. In Australia, for example, the Aceh Community Australia was a political organization. I was told that not all Acehnese in Australia were members but that “almost everyone [was] very supportive.” 558 In another example, in the U.S. there was some consideration of the more long-established Acehnese (in New York), who had arrived many years earlier as economic migrants and did not wish to “cause any friction” with the large Indonesian community in New York with whom they had amicable relations. 559

Nevertheless, politics filtered into social gatherings. In Australia I was told that the younger Acehnese were often asked to present their views of Aceh, its future, and what they can do for Aceh. At a large meeting of Acehnese in Sydney (about 100 people), who came together for the Eid al Adha religious holiday, 560 a young man in his early twenties, was asked to speak for 45 minutes. According to Muhammad, who both works and studies “electronic commerce,” his speech included references to his goal: to “build-up, develop Aceh, to make it advanced. Aceh was an empire before.” He wanted to develop the export and import potential of Aceh. After the meeting, Muhammad said, he and a friend went home to “watch videos about Aceh, to feel close to Aceh on this special day.” 561

Despite di Tiro’s and the GAM diaspora leadership’s efforts or wishes, the Acehnese diaspora is neither homogenous in its political views nor entirely cohesive. The GAM leadership in Sweden acknowledged that its reach and influence did not extend to the entire Acehnese population in diaspora. It referred to Acehnese in Holland and Germany, for example, who were neither active nor forthcoming with funding. According to Bakhtiar Abdullah of GAM, most Acehnese in Germany and Holland, for example, “make an effort to connect…but most seem to be holding their distance and some make a whole lot of money.” They are not, Abdullah explained, interested in being active. 562

558 Interview with Acehnese student, 2006, Australia.

559 Personal communication with Munawar Liza, April 29, 2005.

560 The ‘Feast of Sacrifice’ that takes place about 70 days after the end of Ramadan.

561 Interview with Acehnese resident of Australia, 2006, Australia.

562 Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah, May 18, 2005, Norsborg, Sweden.
Within GAM itself, a splinter group, MP-GAM (Majelis Pemerintahan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) emerged in the late 1990s. In Sweden this group was headed by Husaini Hasan, an old associate of di Tiro’s dating back to their days together in the Acehnese mountains during the first GAM rebellion in the 1970s. Reportedly, a “power struggle” between GAM and MP-GAM took place in 1999 when the question of a successor for the elderly and ill Hasan di Tiro emerged (di Tiro by then was in his 70s). It is speculated that the power struggle was between Zaini Abdullah, di Tiro’s cousin, and Malik Mahmud on one side, and Husaini Hasan and those loyal to him on the other. In addition, MP-GAM was described as more “hard-line,” more Islamic and less secular than GAM\(^\text{563}\) (although a leader of MP-GAM in Malaysia, Don Zulfahri, was also described by the media as a “moderate”).\(^\text{564}\) MP-GAM Europe statements on the 2000 Henri Dunant Centre-brokered cease-fire between the government of Indonesia and GAM support the view that MP-GAM was more “hard-line.” Yusuf Daud of MP-GAM, for example, called the agreement reached in Geneva (the location of the Henri Dunant Centre) “Indonesian propaganda that will merely be used to accommodate its political and economic interests” and blamed Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah (of GAM Stockholm) “of bailing Indonesia out of bankruptcy and collapse” by reaching an agreement.\(^\text{565}\) The statement is somewhat ironic given that MP-GAM (through an intermediary) had earlier, in November 1999, approached the staff of Martti Ahtisaari, while he was still president of Finland and while Finland held the presidency at the EU. According to a Henri Dunant Centre report of June 2008, this overture by MP-GAM (although unsuccessful), helped to compel GAM to enter into negotiations under the auspices of the Henri Dunant Centre.\(^\text{566}\) MP-GAM apparently lost much of its power and legitimacy when its

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563 See Gerry van Klinken, “What is the Free Aceh Movement?” Inside Indonesia 89 (November 1999) at http://insideindonesia.org/digest/dig89.htm and Schulze (2004): 22. If this analysis is correct, the expulsion of MP-GAM ‘hardliners’ may also help to account for a subsequent shift in discourse in GAM to an emphasis on democracy and human rights.


leaders in Sweden were expelled from GAM by Hasan di Tiro (or in his name) and the Malaysian leader of MP-GAM, Don Zulfahri, was killed in mid-2000. Some news reports implicated GAM in his assassination. Other news reports speculated that the Indonesian military was involved. MP-GAM statements directly implicated the GAM leadership in Stockholm: “Brother Teuku Don Zulfahri, the secretary-general of the Council of the Free Acheh Movement (MP-GAM)...was shot dead in cold blood by an Achehnese traitor sent by Malik Mahmood...” GAM, on the other hand, contends Zulfahri had worked for Indonesian intelligence and was assassinated by or on orders from the Indonesian military. Malik Mahmud has said MP-GAM’s statements are slanderous and stated that the two groups (both in Stockholm) avoid each other, and that the GAM leadership in Stockholm “ignore[d] them [MP-GAM] as they have no support.”

This split in the leadership did not entirely filter down to all members of the diaspora who socialize with both GAM and MP-GAM supporters and relatives. The political meetings of the diaspora, however, appear to be more divided. Among the broader diaspora members, the topic of a GAM/MP-GAM split was controversial and the legitimacy of MP-GAM seemed to

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568 Kyodo News, “Free Aceh Movement Denies Link to Murder of Former Member” from Asian Political News (June 5, 2000) at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2000_June_5/ai_62521177


571 See Kyodo News (2000) and Jakarta Post, “Truce Takes Effect in Aceh Despite Murder of Rebel Leader” in Indonesia News from jakartapost.com (June 3, 2000) at www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2000/06/02/0025.html

572 Interview with Malik Mahmud, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.

573 In Australia, for example, I was shown a photograph of a social gathering of Acehnese that included relatives of the MP-GAM leadership in Sweden as well as GAM representatives and sympathizers.
be connected with whether or not it commanded loyalty from GAM troops in Aceh.\textsuperscript{574} Diaspora members concluded that MP-GAM had not shown that they had soldiers or they simply did not have them.\textsuperscript{576}

Although the evidence presented in this section indicates that the Acehnese in diaspora maintained a homeland-oriented identity, a commitment to the homeland, and were both politically organized and politically active, this should not obscure the very real demands and challenges of everyday life in diaspora, particularly for the more recent arrivals (but not limited to them). Nor should it imply a single and definitive diaspora experience. The diaspora experience of Acehnese varies based on gender,\textsuperscript{577} age, class, education, language ability, etc. An Acehnese woman, for example, described her early days in Australia as follows:

It was very hard. I had no friends, no money, etc. Also for a woman, people think you are weak and available because you are not married...It is easier for the young men, they can all stay together in a place [share a place], harder for a woman...Hard to find work, you know how I feel? I was working at a university [in Aceh] and I can’t even get a cleaning job in Australia.\textsuperscript{578}

As was the case for the East Timorese leaders, many of Aceh’s diaspora also led a “double-life:” concerned with everyday realities in the hostland (work, housing, school, children) and a continued commitment to the homeland. Zaini Abdullah, GAM’s Foreign Minister (in 2005), for example, worked in a clinic; Bakhtiar Abdullah, GAM’s Information Officer in Stockholm (in 2005), worked the night shift at the post office. Bakhtiar Abdullah explained: “We try to integrate, we work, we pay taxes...we live a normal life here [in Sweden], we

\textsuperscript{574} Kirsten Schulze agreed with the Acehnese views expressed here, according to her “MP-GAM has no support on the ground. There was a power struggle and they lost out.” Personal communication with Kirsten Schulze, May 17, 2005, London, U.K.

\textsuperscript{575} Interview with Acehnese resident, 2006, Australia.

\textsuperscript{576} Interview with Acehnese activist, 2006, Australia.

\textsuperscript{577} For an analysis of gender and diasporas see Smith and Stares (2007).

\textsuperscript{578} Interview with Acehnese woman, 2006, Australia.
learn the language, etc. but we keep our own identity...and we really make an effort to pass on our culture and experience to the children.”579

Many of the members of the diaspora (mostly young men and newly arrived) worked in restaurants, factories, as cleaners, and some were unemployed. It should also not be forgotten that among them were individuals who had directly experienced armed conflict, the death of family and friends, harassment, persecution, beatings and torture, and that most of them, in diaspora, were separated from family, including parents, siblings, spouses and children. The U.S. and Australia diaspora also included a number of students who worked to support themselves (including temporary student visa holders and refugees who juggled studies, work and activism). In interviews with me, some Acehnese expressed both a need and an ability to negotiate their identification with or commitment to Aceh with their identification to the hostland. A young woman in Sweden explained that she was not politically involved but that she identified herself as both Swedish and Acehnese. I feel I am “half and half,” she said.580

Not surprisingly, there is much concern over the welfare and future of the children born or raised in the hostland.581 There is a strong interest among the parents to transmit a homeland-oriented identity, to instil in their children (to varying degrees) a sense of “Acehneseness.” One mother revealed that she makes an effort to teach her children that they are not entirely American and that they are not Christian. They are Acehnese and Muslim.582 Another parent of young children said: “we have started sending or taking our kids to Aceh. We plan on continuing doing that. We talk to them about Aceh all the time. We cook Acehnese food all the time. We teach them how to fast and the meaning of fasting during Ramadan. But the kids love American food too, burgers, pizza.”583 The topic of children is also one of the few through which the Acehnese in diaspora allow themselves to express an appreciation for and

579 Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah, May 18, 2005, Norsborg, Sweden.

580 Interview with Acehnese (second generation), 2005, Sweden.

581 This also applies to the East Timorese diaspora.

582 Interview with Ida, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, U.S.

583 Interview with Riva, October 13, 2005, Annandale, Virginia, U.S.
enjoyment of their lives in the hostland. On several occasions I was told by parents how pleased they were for their children to be schooled in the U.S., Australia or Europe and to learn another language. The same parent who was preparing the children to return to Aceh mentioned that even after re-settling in Aceh it was hoped the children would return to the U.S. for university studies and anticipated they would have no difficulties with this as they were completely at ease in the U.S.584 Malik Mahmud in Sweden described the younger generation of Acehnese there as “Swedish and Acehnese.” His own grandchildren, he said, speak both Swedish and Malay; other children are comfortable in Norwegian or English and Acehnese. To Mahmud this dual identification and language ability was both interesting and to be encouraged.585

The New Wave: Political Activity (mid-1990s to mid-2000s)

The new wave of Acehnese arriving in the West from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s shared with the more established diaspora members an attachment to the homeland and concern for its people. For many, their self-understanding was very much tied to the conflict in Aceh. Their quotidian existence in diaspora was punctuated by symbolic gestures of solidarity with their co-ethnics at “home,” and for some with GAM in Aceh. I was shown, for example, a photograph from a social gathering of Acehnese in Australia. They had come together to celebrate Aceh’s Independence Day on December 4, as it was declared by di Tiro in 1976. The photograph was of a group of men dressed in fatigues, some with faces painted or covered with bandanas. They had dressed this way and refrained from eating on that day as a gesture of “respect.” “We wanted to feel like them [GAM soldiers], to pay respect to them,” I was told by one of the men appearing in the picture.586 On another occasion I was shown another photograph, this one of Cut Nur Asyikin walking past a building in Australia, headscarf on and smiling—a candid picture. Cut Nur was referred to as “The Lion of Aceh” for her charisma, outspoken views on Aceh’s independence and oratory skills.587

584 Interview with Riva, October 13, 2005, Annandale, Virginia, U.S.

585 Interview with Malik Mahmud, May 18, 2005, Stockholm, Sweden.

586 Interview with Acehnese resident of Australia, 2006, Australia.

aged woman with grown children and a successful business,\textsuperscript{588} she became well-known for a speech delivered at the November 1999 pro-referendum rally in Banda Aceh. She was ultimately arrested in 2003 after martial law (military emergency) and sentenced to prison. She died in prison in Aceh during the 2004 tsunami. “She was here, in Australia, in 2001, she came to talk about the referendum,” the photograph’s owner explained to me. The photograph was not only an image of a popular contemporary figure in the Acehnese struggle for independence, to the owner it represented a direct and personal connection between the “struggle” in Aceh and that in diaspora; it was deemed important enough to share with me as evidence of this.\textsuperscript{589} Other personal items of identification with Aceh that I was shown included a wood carving of the word “ACEH” displayed in a sitting room in the U.S., a large belt buckle with the letters GAM worn by a young man in Denmark, Acehnese music CDs in the U.S. and Australia, and also in Australia, two gold Acehnese coins said to have been in use before the Dutch invasion of Aceh—they were bought on e-bay. There are also flags, books and literature from NGOs.\textsuperscript{590} These are the repertoires of identification and representation of the Acehnese diaspora.

Films on Aceh were common items I was invited to view. The later arrivals to the diaspora left in the 1990s, some after the collapse of the Suharto regime and were, thus, less constrained in their communication with Aceh than East Timorese in diaspora had been with East Timor prior to the mid- to late-1990s. Although Aceh was virtually closed off during the DOM period and again through the period of martial law (military emergency) and the foreign media was either heavily restricted or prevented entirely from working in Aceh, communication through mobile phones was still possible; photographs and video and digital footage of violence in Aceh were taken and smuggled out (at great risk) through Indonesia and Malaysia and often circulated not only by Acehnese but by Indonesian and other human rights groups. Technology thus facilitated the communicative abilities of the diaspora.

\textsuperscript{588} Cut Nur’s sons were part of the diaspora in the U.S.

\textsuperscript{589} Interview with Deddy January 6, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

\textsuperscript{590} I am grateful to Daniel Birchok for sharing with me some of his own experiences (some similar to my own) with the repertoires of identification and representation of the Acehnese community in the U.S.
The common theme in the films on Aceh is violence. One such film captures the May 3, 1999 "KKA junction" incident or massacre (also referred to as the Dewantarai incident) in Lhokseumawe, Northern Aceh. The five minute film is titled "Acheh Under Indonesian Colonial Occupation." Footage reveals uniformed men on foot and on a truck shooting seemingly indiscriminately into the air and into a crowd of people running away from them. The crowd includes men, women and children. People, run, drag themselves on the ground, seek shelter, and lie bloodied and motionless on the ground. Captions were added stating that "65 non-violent demonstrators were shot dead," that they were "mercilessly slaughtered in cold blood" according to a policy aimed at crushing "the popular Achehnese independence struggle." The "perpetrators" are identified as "Troops of the TNI (Indonesian Army)'s Air Defense Artillery Corps (RUDAL)." Footage was captured by Indonesian journalists for Indonesian television. There is no dialogue, only the captions described above and the song, Dodaidi, an Acehnese lullaby sung throughout the film. The lyrics (in Acehnese) to the song are easily recognizable to Acehnese and are drawn from traditional and religious poetry.

Another film Badë Tan Reûda-Aceh’s Neverending Tragedy captures the testimonies of women lamenting the death (disappearances and murder) of their husbands and parents and questioning how they and their children will cope. As the film opens a woman holding a child cries and asks, "What is to become of us? Who can we appeal to...There's no place to go. And even if there was, there's no one that can help." The women's stories are

591 The name comes from the road at a junction leading to the PT Kertas Kraft Aceh paper mill.


593 Acheh Under Indonesian Colonial Occupation, production and director uncredited, Ali Raban cameraman, still photos credited to Achenese Human Rights NGOs.

594 Badë Tan Reûda -Achëh’s Neverending Tragedy, Film (Documentary), directed by Lexy Junior Rambadeta (Jakarta: Offstream and TiFA Foundation, 2003).
supplemented by statistics on DOM and the subsequent continued armed conflict. According to the film, 87% of “deaths due to armed conflict in Aceh” in 2002 were civilians; TNI/police 5% and GAM members 8%. The film includes footage of both Indonesian and GAM soldiers and features an Acehnese woman (face disguised) discussing the abuses and violence of the Indonesian soldiers as well as the suffering caused by GAM soldiers who extort money from a civilian population. The film leads up to the 2003 Indonesian military operation in Aceh. It is an Indonesian production, by Yayasan TiFA and Offstream and relies on Indonesian and Acehnese human rights organization data sources as well as some footage from Metro TV (Indonesia) and Agence France Press (AFP). Both films graphically highlight human rights abuses in Aceh and portray the Acehnese civilian population as victims; they are emotive.595

Although the two films discussed above are designed for a foreign audience (given the English subtitles and captions), and Acehnese in diaspora are willing and perhaps even eager to screen the films for others, they are equally interested in sharing (circulating) and discussing the films with each other. The extent of material circulation is revealed in the following anecdote by an Acehnese activist in Australia: “I had a copy of a CD [of an Australian documentary] and sent it to Norway and when another guy came to Australia [someone he did not know] and brought videos to show people, there was the same CD I had sent!” 596 Thus, not only do the films provide the diaspora with an emotional link to the homeland, they also provide it with material for political identification and representation in the hostland. Moreover, the practice of sharing the film (within and without the diaspora) reinforces a sense of a diaspora community and shared political objectives.

Members of the diaspora also produced their own material by filming demonstrations in which they participated. This would be sent to Acehnese in other countries. As an Acehnese

595 In early 2006, when I conducted interviews in Australia, I was also asked on several occasions and in different homes if I had seen The Black Road, the documentary by American journalist William Nessen, filmed in part while he spent time with GAM combatants in Aceh. The question was quickly followed by an invitation to view the film. I had the opportunity to see this film in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 on the invitation of William Nessen. The Black Road: On the Front Line of Aceh’s War, directed by William Nessen (Australia: Electric Pictures, 2005). Nessen was arrested in Aceh in 2003 in connection with the making of this film; he spent over a month in detention.

596 Interview with Acehnese student, 2006, Australia.
in Australia explained, “I took all the documentation; I sent literature and videos overseas to show people what we are doing. I sent pictures to Malaysia, Sweden, Norway to show that we aren’t just sleeping here.” As with the East Timorese, Acehnese diaspora members felt compelled to show their co-diasporans and their co-ethnics in Aceh that they were part of the “struggle.” This act of material circulation or “sharing” connects the individual and his personal network in the hostland with a wider diaspora network and to the political conflict in the homeland.

Although communication was facilitated by technology, risks to personal safety (as violence and military operations in Aceh continued and escalated) remained obstacles to open communication with the “homeland.” Telephone and SMS (text messaging) communications between the diaspora and the homeland were frequently brief and vague to avoid monitoring and incrimination. New arrivals to the diaspora provided additional information (including their own accounts of activism, violence and torture). After the earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 and the subsequent presence of foreign media and international organizations in Aceh, communication between the diaspora and Aceh became more overt.

This discussion of material and the means of its circulation is not only significant in what it reveals about communication technologies and the political nature of material selected and produced and reproduced for self-representation by the diaspora. It also indicates the multitude of channels for communicating information and views on the conflict and diaspora. Although GAM’s may have continued to be the “dominant discourse” in diaspora, it was by no means the only one. Finally the discussion above makes explicit the personal networks of communication and the specific agents involved in these practices—the diaspora, analytically may be an anonymous and impersonal socio-political formation or phenomena, but in practice it is a collection of socio-political personal networks (with an emphasis on the plural).

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597 Interview with Acehnese student, 2006, Australia.
As in the case of the Timorese, the new wave of Acehnese arrivals to the West included students, activists, lawyers and journalists. Based on their experiences in Aceh and in certain cases their English language abilities, they transplanted their activism to a new setting and sought ties with local and international non-governmental organizations. However, they were less cohesive as a group than the GAM exiles of the 1980s originally were, both organizationally and ideologically. Although the new arrivals certainly included former GAM combatants, GAM family members, and GAM sympathizers, they also included individuals (some of them quite outspoken) who either disagreed with or were disillusioned by GAM’s approach to and views on the situation in Aceh. They were less inclined to accept a GAM-centred structure of diaspora organization and top-down political decision-making.

They were critical of the Indonesian government and military but some also had reservations about GAM’s commitment to democratic processes, and so they pushed for greater openness and inclusiveness in GAM’s decision-making vis-à-vis the future of Aceh. Among the most prominent of this new group of Acehnese to the West was Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a lawyer. Jafar, as he was widely known, arrived in the U.S. in 1996, worked as a taxi driver, and enrolled in the New School for Social Research to pursue a Master’s degree. Jafar helped to establish the International Forum for Aceh (IFA), one of the first non-governmental organizations dedicated to Aceh that brought the Acehnese diaspora community into direct and open dialogue with representatives from nongovernmental organizations, academics, representatives from GAM as well as the Indonesian government. Jafar and IFA organized meetings in New York, Washington, D.C., and Bangkok, collected and circulated information on human rights abuses in Aceh, disseminated information on Aceh to media outlets, organized rallies, and attempted to lobby U.S. agencies and government representatives. By most accounts, Jafar’s was a unifying and rallying voice not only among Acehnese in the diaspora but among non-Acehnese potential activist network partners.

In addition to its information and advocacy work, under Jafar’s leadership, IFA organized at least two significant conferences in 1998 and 1999. The 1998 conference held in New York

and titled “Years of Living Dangerously: The Struggle for Justice in Aceh,” established IFA. The 1999 conference was held at the American University in Washington, D.C. in April. The goal of this second meeting, according to its announcement, was to bring together representatives from the Indonesian government, GAM, and human rights groups “to work out a peaceful solution and avoid further conflicts.” Participants were invited to weigh the options of the “Acehnese request for full autonomy, referendum or independence...” Aguswandi (whose political activity is discussed later in this chapter) was among the participants; he advocated a referendum. In her statement to the meeting, Suraiya IT, vice-chairperson of IFA, emphasized the goal of gaining “international attention and support for ending the violence and human rights violations, and working for justice and democracy for the Acehnese.” Although the Indonesian government (or the military) did not send a representative, the Indonesian Embassy sent observers to the meeting. NGOs were represented by Carmel Budiardjo of Tapol, Sidney Jones, then with Human Rights Watch, and Jana Mason of the United States Committee for Refugees.

Jafar was also involved in organizing the July 1999 meeting in Bangkok, Thailand that launched the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA), a grouping of NGOs from around the world (including organizations from the U.S., Europe, Southeast Asia, and Japan) sharing IFA’s mission. The meeting included representatives from GAM and civil society representatives—Acehnese, Indonesian, and international. One of its most marked achievements was providing a venue for dialogue between GAM and representatives of the Aceh provincial government. According to a joint statement issued following the meeting, IFA, Forum-Asia, Tapol, Solidamor, Kontras, and SIRA, among others, were represented. The meeting discussed not only the “struggle for self-determination” but also the “history of human rights violations in Aceh” and “strategies for peaceful resolution of the conflict and


601 Interview with Muhammad Nur Djuli, December 9, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
mechanisms for raising awareness of the Aceh situation throughout the world."\textsuperscript{602} SCHRA managed to hold a meeting in January 2000 in Banda Aceh that included the participation of IFA, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Nonviolence International, and the Asian Network for Democracy in Indonesia. Nonviolence International reportedly provided non-violence training to student leaders in Aceh.\textsuperscript{603} Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued several reports and alerts on Aceh during this period\textsuperscript{604} and an international campaign for Aceh appeared to be gathering momentum.

The creation of IFA and SCHRA, their conferences and activities, coincided with the pro-democracy and pro-referendum movements in Aceh (pro-referendum rallies were held in Aceh in 1999 and 2000). Political activity in the diaspora during this period and later broadened with the influx of a younger generation of Acehnese such as Aguswandi, Radhi Darmansyah, Shadia Marhaban, Munawar Liza, and Suraiyah IT, among others. Although among them there were those with a connection to GAM and the GAM leadership in Sweden and its goals (Shadia Marhaban and Munawar Liza, for example), there were others who quite deliberately distanced themselves from GAM and wished to maintain an independent position. This "new wave" of "political activists" (including those with a connection to GAM Sweden) in diaspora did not limit themselves to echoing the dominant GAM discourse of self-determination, armed struggle and independence; rather there was a move away from GAM's ethno-national repertoires of representation and towards a stronger emphasis on

\textsuperscript{602} Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh, Joint Statement, Asian Conference on Aceh, "Fifty Four Years within Indonesia," Bangkok, Thailand (July 24, 1999).


human rights, democracy, civil society, and a peaceful solution to the conflict (to many this certainly meant self-determination through referendum). As in the case of the East Timor diaspora, it was not the features (broadly speaking) of an Acehnese political diaspora that changed but the content: the meanings given to the "homeland-oriented identity" and the "relationship with the homeland and co-diasporans."

The death of Jafar in 2000 was regarded as a serious blow to the ability of the Acehnese diaspora to bridge differences within and to reach out to a larger community of non-Acehnese supporters. Jafar, at 34 years of age, disappeared on August 5, 2000 during a visit to Medan, Indonesia; his body was later found (along with those of others) bearing signs of torture. According to Eddy Suheri, a New York-based Acehnese, Jafar had a special ability to bring different kinds of people together, to motivate them and get them involved. Although the activities of IFA and Acehnese activists in the diaspora continued after Jafar's death, important momentum created through his initiative appears to have been lost. Saiful Mahdi recalls that under Jafar's leadership IFA was very active, it "opened dialogue at the international level" and came to be viewed as a "civil society organization." However, after Jafar's death this changed. As observed by Mahdi, "Indonesia said IFA was close to GAM, GAM said IFA was close to the Government of Indonesia, but neither was correct...[IFA] lost its founder and its leader," and apparently a critical individual able to navigate the complicated and narrow political space (even in diaspora) for civil society afforded by GAM and the Indonesian government.

Despite the loss of Jafar, IFA's activities continued. It organized another conference in the spring of 2001. The stated objective was a discussion of "the Acehnese demand for freedom from violation of their basic rights, for implementing the rights of self-determination

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606 Personal communication with Eddy Suheri, Acehnese resident in the U.S., November 17, 2005.

607 Personal communication with Saiful Madhi, Acehnese student in the U.S. and Vice President of Aceh Relief Fund, November 29, 2005.

608 Again at the American University in Washington, D.C.
and principles of democracy” and to “introduce...the problem faced by the people of Aceh to the international community” and “develop a joint action plan of advocacy and campaign among those who are concerned about human rights: NGOs, Human Rights Organizations, Students and individuals.” According to an IFA press release, Zaini Abdullah and Bakhtiar Abdullah of GAM Sweden participated as did the former Indonesian Minister of Human Rights, Hasbullah M. Saad. Tapol, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Nonviolence International and the Indonesian Human Rights Network (a U.S. organization) also participated. Nurdin Abdul Rahman was a speaker at this meeting. He was chairman of RATA (Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh) an Aceh-based Danish-funded organization investigating human rights abuses. Rahman had spent several years in prison for his activities and was reportedly tortured during this period. After leaving Aceh he became an outspoken activist in Australia and joined GAM Sweden as a political officer during the peace negotiations in Helsinki in 2005.

In the U.S., members of the Acehnese diaspora used their own experience and new links with NGOs to broaden their repertoires of action. Radhi Darmansyah provided testimony on the pro-referendum movement in Aceh, the November 2000 pro-referendum rally and military and police response to this, the “KKA Junction Massacre” and violence associated with ExxonMobil’s activities in Aceh. ExxonMobil, the target of GAM attacks, was also accused of hiring Indonesian soldiers as private security guards and of being aware that human rights abuses were being committed by the “guards” under it employ and with


611 See, for example, Darmansya’s interview on Democracy Now! “The U.S. State Department Urges a U.S. Court to Dismiss a Human Rights Lawsuit Against Exxon Mobil,” Democracy Now! Radio program (August 9, 2002) at http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=03/04/07/034213

equipment provided by the company. Radhi Darmansyah, Cut Zahara Hamzah (Jafar's sister), and Munawar Liza also made statements at ExxonMobil’s annual meetings. Acehnese in diaspora also testified before the U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus, calling on the U.S. to “assist the protection of human rights defenders in Aceh,” to raise the issue of “crimes against humanity in Aceh” at the United Nations General Assembly, and to pressure both the Indonesian Government and GAM to negotiate.\(^{613}\) Munawar Liza organized the Aceh Center in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, publicized human rights abuses and lobbied the U.S. government in reference to both human rights violations and a referendum. Shadia Marhaban, an experienced activist and translator, arrived in the U.S. as a political refugee in 2003. In diaspora she was an active speaker throughout the U.S.\(^{614}\) Munawar Liza and Shadia Marhaban joined GAM Sweden during the Helsinki peace negotiations of 2005.

Eddy Suheri, a journalist who arrived in the U.S. as a refugee in 2003, published a bulletin (informative but short-lived) titled The Achehnese: For Peace, Freedom and Justice in Acheh (printed in English and Acehnese) that was circulated among the Acehnese diaspora community in the U.S. and in his words “others in our network.”\(^{615}\) The bulletin reprinted editorials from The Jakarta Post on the situation in Aceh with a heavy emphasis on Acehnese civil society. It also included, for example, press statements with proposals for a peace process for Aceh. The proposals called on the Indonesian Government and GAM to involve “broad groups of Acehnese” in a peace process dialogue so that this “will result in an open and democratic process so it can get a lasting consensus.” According to The Achenese,


previous peace processes failed because they did not include civil society and mediation by a third party that could guarantee the safety of process participants and enforce an agreement. The publication also called for trials for human rights abuses including the “KKA tragedy in Northern Aceh.” This publication also provided information on diaspora political activities, not only in the U.S. but in Europe, Australia and Malaysia as well. The April 2004 issue, for example, includes a photograph of a rally in Sydney, Australia demanding the withdrawal of military troops from Aceh; it also includes information on a demonstration in Washington, D.C. The content of this publication makes clear the demands of the “new wave” of Acehnese in diaspora. The new wave of the Acehnese diaspora may have shared the ultimate objective of self-determination with the leadership of GAM in Sweden, but they also wanted an input in the process of decision-making.

Diaspora political activity was not limited to the U.S. and Sweden. Acehnese in Australia participated in demonstrations, lobbied the government, and sought to raise awareness among Australians of the conflict in Aceh. Here too, a particular emphasis was placed on human rights abuses and the circulation of information. An Acehnese man in Australia explained to me how during martial law in Aceh he became involved in documenting and disseminating information on abuses in Aceh. He would receive SMS (text messages) from Aceh, have them translated into English (the translation might be done by someone in Australia, Malaysia, or the U.S.), and send the information on to “NGOs, and news sources, to the media...to Indonesian NGOs, to Tapol, Amnesty.” Information was also sent to KOMNAS HAM (the Indonesian Committee for Human Rights). The Acehnese activist in Australia describes people at KOMNAS HAM as “very helpful...people like Munir...they took the data and tried to investigate.” Aceh Kita “also investigated from raw data.” The information was apparently also sent to GAM Sweden and appeared on its website. The Acehnese diaspora was clearly familiar with—if not self-consciously—the human rights

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618 Interview with Acehnese resident of Australia, 2006, Australia.
methodology of promoting change through reporting facts\textsuperscript{619} and what is now commonly referred to as the human rights practice of “shaming.”

Demonstrations were usually held in front of the Indonesian embassy, Indonesian consulate (in Sydney) and Australian government offices, and were scheduled to coincide with “special dates, such as Indonesian Independence Day.”\textsuperscript{620} They were organized in cooperation with Australian organizations, primarily with Action in Solidarity with Asia Pacific/ASAP (formerly ASIET-Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor),\textsuperscript{621} Australian union members would join the demonstrations. Although many Acehnese in Australia participated in the demonstrations, their participation in open political activity was inhibited by limited English language ability and more significantly for some, their vague or illegal residency status in Australia. Fear for their own safety and that of family in Aceh was also a factor, and some Acehnese were concerned that they were being filmed by Indonesian government or security officials during demonstrations.\textsuperscript{622}

Acehnese in Denmark were aware of diaspora activities and views elsewhere and engaged in dialogue with co-diasporans across borders. Information, articles, “ideas on how to solve the problems in Aceh [pre-2005 peace agreement]” were e-mailed and shared via a “Netgroup.” I was told by one man: “We have contact with people in Scandinavia, U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia…messages are sometimes friendly and sometimes not…Most share the goal of independence but how to do that—people have different views.”\textsuperscript{623} A young Acehneseman referred to his experience in the hostland: “We have democracy in


\textsuperscript{620} Interview with Acehinese student in Australia, January 2006, Sydney, Australia. See for example, ‘Protest’ Announcement, “End Martial Law,” by the Achenese Community of Australia, scheduled for May 19, 2004, at the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney, author’s file.

\textsuperscript{621} ASAP is described as “a network of activists around Australia who are building solidarity with and support for movements for social justice, genuine democratisation and self-determination around the Asia Pacific region” see http://www.asia-pacific-action.org.

\textsuperscript{622} I was told that Indonesian consulate staff videotaped the demonstrations with ‘handycams’. Interview with Suhra, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

\textsuperscript{623} Interview with Adnan Beuransyah, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark.
Scandinavia, we get ideas on how to solve the problem in Aceh and we post it by email, in the netgroups.\textsuperscript{624} This view was echoed by another, “We learn of democracy how they manage democracy, what rights people have. Acehnese people that come to Scandinavia should learn democracy, how to respect other peoples and ideas and should apply this to Aceh.”\textsuperscript{625} Demonstrations also took place. In Denmark too these were held in front of the Indonesian Embassy.

Aguswandi\textsuperscript{626} was perhaps the only prominent Acehnese activist in the United Kingdom, but an early relationship with the NGO Tapol helped project his voice and support his activism in diaspora. He was well-connected with the Acehnese diaspora even prior to leaving Aceh. He had participated in meetings in Washington, D.C., including the 1999 IFA conference, as well as the Forum-Asia and IFA meeting in Bangkok of 1999. In diaspora, especially in Europe, Aguswandi was an advocate for human rights, for a negotiated settlement to the Aceh conflict, and most of all, for the inclusion of civil society in such a negotiated settlement. In an October 2003 address (after the collapse of COHA and imposition of Martial Law in Aceh) to the European Parliament’s Committee on Development and Cooperation, Aguswandi presented his views on an inclusive political settlement:

\begin{quote}
Military operations have not, cannot, and will never solve the problem of Aceh. The political solution should be found through dialogue. It requires a genuine dialogue between the people of Aceh and Jakarta, one which would lead to a communication about what kind of society they are going to build […] Acehnese civil society should also be involved in dialogue process. Both Indonesia and GAM have to agree to the involvement of civil society in the process\textsuperscript{627}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{624} Interview with Al Ayubi, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark.

\textsuperscript{625} Interview with Adnan Beuransyah, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark.

\textsuperscript{626} In Aceh, Aguswandi was coordinator of SMUR (Student Solidarity for People). He later acted as coordinator for the Aceh office of KONTRAS (Commission of Disappearances and Victims of Violence), a coalition of pro-democracy Indonesian NGOs.

Based on his experience as a student activist in Aceh and his interaction with the Indonesian pro-democracy movement, Aguswandi articulated an alternative to GAM’s dominant discourse on self-determination; Aguswandi’s alternative moved away from ethno-nationalism and towards an emphasis on democratic reform in Aceh and Indonesia:

For civil society the struggle in Aceh is not the struggle of a certain ethnic group who is asking [the] international community for the right of a self rule for the sake of having our state. It is a not about territory, but it is about people, again both people, Acehnese and Indonesia[n]. Acehnese civil society is made up of the young generation in Aceh, intellectuals, student groups, and all sectors of society in Aceh that have been struggling to create a democratic and just society in Aceh since the collapse of Soeharto regime.628

For Aguswandi, as for many others, a referendum was the preferred instrument for political settlement.

Diaspora Politics: Top-down to Bottom-up? (2000 and beyond)

Because of the influx of the new wave of Acehnese diasporans and the diversity of their views, from the late 1990s on, diaspora political activity was marked not only by a continued emphasis on the struggle for self-determination, but also a strong emphasis on human rights, justice, democracy, civil society, and inclusiveness. The GAM leadership in Sweden itself began to adopt a rhetoric emphasizing democracy and partnership with NGOs. The July 2002 Stavanger Declaration, a document issued by the “Executive Committee of the Worldwide Acehnese Representatives Meeting in Stavanger Norway” but understood to be a GAM document, presents the political vision of Aceh as a state that “practices the system of democracy.” The Stavanger Declaration also clarifies that citizenship “is determined by both principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli as well as the normal operation of law as usually practiced in democratic countries.” This was a move towards a more inclusive civic nationalism reflecting GAM’s awareness of criticism towards its approach to indigenous minorities in Aceh (generally assuming they were integrated with an Acehnese majority) and towards immigrants, particularly Javanese, from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago. It may also have been designed to limit the role of Islam, more specifically, Sharia law. Sharia

628 Aguswandi (2003).
was part of the “Special Autonomy” deal the Government of Indonesia offered Aceh in 2001. Although frequently noting the importance of Islam in Aceh, GAM (certainly the GAM leadership in diaspora) opposed the imposition of Sharia law in Aceh. The Declaration also specifies the role of the diaspora, including increasing “diplomatic efforts...especially in...Scandinavia...the European Union...North America...Australia and the Pacific nations” and continuing “to build cooperation with friendly and neutral NGOs worldwide.” It also calls on the diaspora and the “Achenese people” to master “English and the language of the countries in which they reside” and improve “their knowledge in the fields of diplomacy” and “human rights.” The GAM (ASNLF) website also includes a section on human rights (heavy on information from SIRA) and a section on diplomacy.

The Stavanger Declaration shows strong parallels to the Magna Carta adopted at the East Timorese National Convention in Diaspora of 1998. The Magna Carta, however, is a much more detailed document than the Stavanger Declaration; it presents a clearer political vision for an “independent” East Timor. The vagueness and, one may say, the weakness of the Stavanger Declaration in comparison to the Magna Carta, may have stemmed from a lack of capacity on the part of the GAM leadership to articulate a more concrete political future for Aceh. It might also have been the result of an inability or unwillingness to reach compromises and bridge divisions within the diaspora (and more broadly, among Acehnese) prior to the Stavanger meeting and the Declaration. As discussed earlier, East Timorese leaders (Gusmão and Ramos-Horta) had launched a campaign to unite East Timorese—at least temporarily—to find a solution to the East Timor conflict. Through a new organization, the CNRT, the East Timorese were able to present a united front to an international audience. This unity required a great deal of negotiation and compromise (years of this) prior to the 1998 conference and Magna Carta. It is not clear that the GAM leadership in exile was

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630 The Stavanger Declaration, Executive Committee of the Worldwide Acehnese Representatives Meeting in Stavanger Norway (July 21, 2002) at http://www.asnlf.net/topint.htm

631 Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front at www.asnlf.net
capable or willing to engage in the inclusive negotiation process and compromises needed to achieve “unity,” nor is it clear that Acehnese in the homeland and in diaspora would have been willing to put aside their differences to reach compromise or forge a consensus. Dialogue bringing all parties together was initiated by IFA in the late 1990s and continued for a number of years, but it lost momentum and did not result in a broad-based (even temporary) consensus and show of unity.

An alternative explanation is that both the content of the Stavanger Declaration as well as its vagueness simply represented changes in tactics. That is, the GAM leadership in diaspora was “playing upon the East Timor scenario.” Its “cultivation” of relations with international organizations and NGOs, its references to human rights, democracy, and referendum were drawn from an East Timor “blueprint” and were elements of public relations. Although this is a persuasive argument from a materialist perspective, my research suggests a more internal process of change. GAM Sweden may have resisted opening up its decision-making process, but it was nevertheless confronted with competing ideas and political visions. These came not only from the East Timor example and the international system, but also from Acehnese civil society and the Acehnese in diaspora who had direct access to and relationships with potential international partners. According to Aguswandi, it was the work of Acehnese civil society that “put pressure on GAM to support the idea of a referendum for Aceh,” for example. “By the end of 1999, the word ‘referendum’ appeared throughout Aceh, painted on the walls of public buildings and along streets in towns and villages alike and replacing the purely independence-focused discourse of GAM.” This was also prompted by vague references by Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in 1999 on the possibility of a referendum for Aceh. It has

632 Schulze (2006): 229


now been acknowledged that there were links between SIRA members and GAM (although it should not be assumed that all SIRA members and supporters were either GAM members or GAM supporters). Muhammad Nazar and Shadia Marhaban, however, were indeed affiliated with GAM.  

Although Marhaban supported GAM’s goal of independence she was also committed to human rights, to women’s rights, and to a secular democratic government.  

Given that she was an outspoken activist and an active member of the GAM team during the subsequent 2005 Helsinki peace process and before, GAM Sweden must have been aware of her ideas and commitment. Around the time of the peace negotiations, Shadia confirmed, “in the future I will continue to fight for this...human rights are critical for Aceh and Indonesia [...] the Acehnese people want justice. We need a human rights court in Aceh; this will also help Indonesia because of the military.”

Muhammed Nur Djuli, a diaspora leader in Malaysia and a part of the GAM negotiating team in Helsinki, is also fluent in the language of democracy and had at the very least a history of cultivating relations with civil society. He was involved both with IFA (in New York) in the late 1990s and with the IFA/Asia-Forum meeting in Bangkok of the 1999 (the SCHRA). When asked directly about the kind of government he wanted for Aceh, he answered: “What we’ve been fighting for six months in Helsinki, a truly democratic government. We want democracy...We want to dismantle the corrupt and oppressive government and replace it with one that is more just and democratic.”

The inclusion of these individuals, as well as Nurdin Abdul Rahman (then in diaspora in Australia), suggests that the change in discourse in the GAM leadership that was first evident in the Stavanger Declaration was not purely tactical or a public relations campaign, but rather reflected an interaction or competition with alternative (or at least additional) political ideas from the diaspora and Acehnese civil society as well as negotiation within GAM over ideas, identification, and interests. This is in addition to an interaction with international norms.  


637 Interview with Shadia Marhaban, December 10, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

638 Personal communication with Shadia Marhaban, August 27, 2005, US.

639 Interview with Muhammed Nur Djuli, December 9, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

640 An interaction with the international system as suggested by Aspinall (2002).
of Acehnese in diaspora, including the GAM Sweden leadership, were thus negotiated, adopted, and constituted through bottom-up and top-down interactions.

The Acehnese Diaspora: From Peace-wreckers to Peace-makers?
The early years of the Acehnese diaspora in the West were characterized by the political activities of a handful of GAM men, led by Hasan di Tiro. The diaspora’s political identity during this period was thus shaped overwhelmingly by di Tiro (and his close associates). It was intrinsically tied to the homeland and the homeland conflict and was strongly ethno-nationalist (rather than civic), as argued by Kirsten Schulze. That is, it was defined by blood ties, religion, and ethnicity. Repertoires of representation included the classic tropes of ethno-nationalism: blood ties, a primordial belonging to the land, the importance of the Acehnese language, the significance and uniqueness of Acehnese history (one of strong resistance and independence), and religion. In diaspora, GAM continued to use its own Acehnese flag, which included the star and crescent as symbols of Acehnese Islamic identity and resembles the Turkish flag, denoting a historical connection to the Ottomans rather than the Indonesian archipelago. The black stripes (reportedly added by di Tiro) commemorate fallen Acehnese fighters. The ethnic nationalism adopted by GAM in diaspora also included a strong anti-Indonesian, and more specifically an anti-Javanese, element. GAM’s framing of an Acehnese political identity, therefore, was based on a strong boundedness, exclusivity, and distinctiveness from another “ethnic” grouping—the Javanese. However, in my assessment, GAM’s nationalism was not anti-capitalist, anti-American or anti-Western, rather it was more broadly anti-colonial.

641 Civic nationalism is frequently characterized as “liberal, voluntarist, universalist and inclusive.” However, Rogers Brubaker argues civic and ethnic nationalism are both simultaneously inclusive and exclusive—what varies is “the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusions.” Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004): 140-141.


643 See GAM website at www.asnlf.net
GAM in diaspora was able to attract very limited state support. Only Libya provided support in the form of training and a training base for GAM recruits.\textsuperscript{644} Despite these limitations, GAM was involved in the funding and procurement of arms transfers to combatants in Aceh.\textsuperscript{645} In this respect and in its rhetoric, the Acehnese diaspora (like the East Timorese) exhibited a contentious and uncompromising “long-distance nationalism.”\textsuperscript{646} The proximity of Aceh to Malaysia and the presence in Malaysia of a large Acehnese population certainly facilitated the transfer of funding and weapons.\textsuperscript{647} However, as was the case with Falintil in East Timor, the military wing of GAM likely found it more practical to secure weapons and supplies locally from the Indonesian military and police.\textsuperscript{648} In Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s analysis, “case study evidence supports the role of diasporas in secession and the revival of violence” generally.\textsuperscript{649} They identify a low level of per capita income in the homeland and therefore a high dependence on the diaspora and its remittances as one of several major risk factors.\textsuperscript{650} The diaspora did indeed have a significant role in the “revival of violence” in Aceh in the late 1980s after Libya-trained fighters were sent back to Aceh. However, this was not the result of a low level of income in Aceh and a dependence on remittances. Michael Ross applied the Collier-Hoeffler model to the Aceh case and concluded that additional factors yield a more complete explanation for the Aceh conflict.

\textsuperscript{644} According to Michael Ross, “GAM appeared to have collected little revenue between 1991 and 1999…” and there is “no indications that GAM received’ assistance from Libya, or any other foreign government, since the late 1980s.” See Michael L Ross, “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia.” Prepared for the Yale-World Bank Project on The Economics of Political Violence (November 2002): 32 and 34 respectively.


\textsuperscript{646} Anderson (1998): 74.

\textsuperscript{647} It is uncertain what percentage of weapons to Aceh was brought in from Southeast Asia, and the Acehnese diaspora in this region may indeed have continued to be involved in weapons transfers. However, the majority of weapons were procured locally, within Indonesia, and when bought it was primarily (even if not entirely) with locally-raised funds.

\textsuperscript{648} Tamara Renee Shie, “Indonesia’s Aceh Conflict in Perspective: Security Considerations for Tsunami Relief and U.S.-Indonesia Relations,” INSS Background Paper, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University (February 1, 2005) at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Repository/INSS_Proceedings/Aceh_Feb2005/INSS_20050201_Aceh_Backgrounder.pdf and as Ross explains, the Indonesian navy “made it increasingly difficult for GAM to bring in weapons by boat.” See Ross (November 2002): 35

\textsuperscript{649} Collier and Hoeffler (2002): 25; see also Collier and Hoeffler (2001).

\textsuperscript{650} Collier and Hoeffler (2002): 25; see also Collier and Hoeffler (2001).
Among these factors, is the entrepreneurship of leaders including leaders in diaspora, specifically Hasan di Tiro.\textsuperscript{651} In addition, as with East Timor, individuals outside of Aceh and East Timor may have profited from the conflicts, but there is no evidence that these economic rewards were significant enough to induce continued diasporic involvement in the homeland conflict. Materialist notions of self-interest (narrow conceptualizations of self-interest), thus, are less helpful in understanding the Acehnese diaspora’s motivations. In the Aceh (even for di Tiro himself) and East Timor cases, the motivation for continued diaspora involvement over 30 years lay less in greed than in grievance and in a commitment to and investment in a homeland-oriented diaspora identity.

GAM’s activities in the area of diplomacy were constrained by a lack of state support. Unlike East Timor and due to its different colonial history, GAM had no proxy state representation at international organizations. GAM’s legal arguments for self-determination and incomplete de-colonization, therefore, saw little result; di Tiro did not have the state support necessary to insert these arguments on to the agenda of international organizations. In addition, GAM’s rhetoric and ideology, from the 1970s to as late as the mid or late-1990s, likely alienated potential state and non-state allies in the West. The GAM-centred diaspora (under di Tiro’s leadership) displayed a conscious maintenance and representation of a homeland identity, sense of solidarity with the homeland, and a clear commitment to maintaining relationships with the homeland. However, it lacked a political vision for the homeland beyond armed conflict and independence. The political identity of the GAM-centred diaspora of the early years was shaped by an emphasis on Acehnese history that highlighted the “warlike” and fiercely “independent” qualities of the Acehnese. In addition, GAM in diaspora continued to draw legitimacy from a purported direct link to the military campaign in the homeland. This also inhibited success in GAM’s diplomatic efforts. In contrast, East Timorese diaspora leaders successfully disassociated themselves from the military wing of the East Timorese resistance. Moreover, up to the mid- and late-1990s, the GAM leadership in diaspora appeared unwilling to compromise its position and showed no signs of moderation.

\textsuperscript{651} Ross (November 2002).
As in the case of the East Timor, however, important changes began to take place within the Acehnese diaspora from the mid-1990s. From this time, we begin to see not only demographic changes but also shifts in the ideational resources and repertoires of representation of the Acehnese diaspora in the West as well as changes in diaspora organization. When the population of Acehnese in Europe, Australia and North America increased through an influx of new members, diaspora networks and organizations emerged. These organizations included the national councils established in each hostland to help community members through the settlement process and with social issues in the hostland. But the councils also served political purposes, including encouraging a sense of empathy for and solidarity with the homeland, fundraising for the homeland, as well as encouraging support for GAM. Informal networks also emerged that stretched across the various hostlands. Diasporans engaged in discussions and debates over the homeland conflict and its solution through email listservs and discussion boards. Material such as photographs, videos of demonstrations, copies of films and television documentaries pertaining to the conflict in Aceh were circulated among the diaspora in various countries. Everyday life was thus marked by symbolic gestures of solidarity with the homeland.

For many in the diaspora, the quotidian also included more direct political activity, much of which was facilitated by advances in technology. This included direct communication (through mobile phones) with the homeland for information on human rights abuses and the circulation of this information outside the diaspora, to Western NGOs (primarily), the media, and, when possible, to Western governments. Importantly, new members of the diaspora moved beyond GAM’s dominant discourse of anti-colonialism and armed struggle to demands for democracy, human rights, civil society, and peaceful conflict resolution. The political identification of the diaspora, therefore, was changing. Although support for GAM remained strong, the diaspora was much less cohesive than in earlier years.

In addition, the newer arrivals proved to be more adept at and interested in seeking ties with local and international non-governmental organizations than GAM in diaspora had been to date. An example of this was the establishment of the International Forum Aceh (IFA) in the U.S. Although this organization was created by Acehnese in diaspora, and its focus was the
homeland, from the beginning it was designed rather as a network for Acehnese and non-Acehnese to bring attention to and seek solutions to the Aceh conflict. It was not, specifically, a platform for GAM. In some respects, IFA and the activities and views of the newer members of the Acehnese diaspora challenged the leadership of GAM in diaspora. They were critical of GAM's hierarchical and closed decision-making, they saw a greater role for Acehnese civil society in both conflict resolution and in Aceh’s future, and they were willing to articulate a more concrete political vision for Aceh, namely a secular democratic political system. Therefore, the GAM leadership in diaspora no longer held a monopoly over ideas and representational material for Acehnese nationalism and conflict settlement. By the early 2000s, the leadership of GAM in diaspora itself had begun to adopt the language of democracy, referendum, human rights, and justice. However, it would be a mistake to attribute this change in GAM’s discourse strictly to political strategy. Based on the evidence gathered and presented here, as the East Timorese leadership had done earlier, the GAM leadership in diaspora underwent both an internal and external process of negotiation of values and ideas. Demographic changes in the diaspora as well as processes of negotiation over political identification led to a diversity of ideas and their articulation both within the diaspora and to a wider international audience.

In this chapter I used a political definition of diaspora as a framework for analysis of the political activity and roles of East Timorese and Acehnese outside the homeland. This analysis was presented in chronological order from the 1970s through the late 1990s and early 2000s up to, but not including, the conflict settlement process. I have argued here that the construction of political identity of the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas involved processes and activities that consistently reinforced a relationship with the homeland and encouraged the diaspora’s engagement in the homeland conflict even when there were no tangible and immediate material benefits to be gained from this engagement. I have also demonstrated that as incipient diasporas (new and small), neither grouping had sufficient

652 Even though GAM participated in IFA’s meetings, and specific GAM members were closely associated with IFA (including Nur Djuli).

653 Personal communication with Saiful Madhi, November 29, 2005, U.S. Although my findings indicate that among diasporans in the West the preferred political vision for Aceh was a secular democratic system, in Aceh itself there were also demonstrations with some groups seeking an Islamic state.
material/economic resources to make it indispensable to conflict settlement. Rather when the political space for opposition and negotiation in the homeland was closed, it was the ideational and political resources of the diasporas that determined their ability to insert themselves into the conflict settlement process. Finally, I argued that the political identities, goals and strategies of the diasporas changed over time. While both diasporas consciously maintained a homeland orientation and were engaged in the homeland conflict, the interpretation of the conflict and meanings attributed to both conflict and conflict settlement saw a transformation. The next chapter analyzes this process of transformation and its effect.
Chapter 5
Making Noise: Transforming and Projecting the Diaspora Voice through Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and Partnerships

Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) and Diaspora Transformation
The evidence presented in the previous chapters on the Aceh and East Timor cases supports the propositions that diasporas are significant international actors and that despite geographical distance they are important in understanding the homeland conflict and its settlement. These two cases also highlight the dual tendencies of diasporas as peace-wreckers and peace-makers and as ethnic-parochial long-distance nationalists and cosmopolitans. Therefore, approaching the study of diasporas through a binary logic—analyzing their potential as peace-wreckers or peace-makers—is limiting. A more fruitful approach is to analyze the dynamics of diaspora transformation from peace-wrecker to peace-maker. I suggest the possibility that this transformation takes place: 1) as the diaspora is replenished with new members who are more concerned with human rights abuses, democracy and civil society than they are with political ideology as was the case for the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas in the 1990s; 2) as the peace-making factions within the diaspora gain power vis-à-vis the peace-wreckers; and 3) as the diaspora partners in the hostland and internationally change or broaden. In this case, diasporas might adopt more peace-oriented rhetoric and strategies either to gain broader support for their cause (for instrumental reasons), to strengthen the positions of their faction within the diaspora (strengthen the position of the

654 Although these two terms are contentious, they are used here to reflect the prevailing dichotomy adopted in the literature on diasporas in conflict.


656 Conversely, new members who are more committed to violent struggle may enhance the peace-wrecking potential of the diaspora.

657 Here, the term faction is intended to mean a group of persons or network of persons within the diaspora, not necessarily a cohesive political group or unit within a political party or political organization of the diaspora.
peace-makers), or because their values and ideas change over time through partnerships and alliances. Changes in the peace-making factions within diaspora (1 and 2 above) were discussed in Chapter 4.

Diaspora scholars suggest analyzing diaspora through a framework of triadic relationships: homeland, hostland and diaspora. Chapter 4 of this dissertation also analyzes two aspects of this triadic framework—relationships within the diaspora and the diaspora-homeland relationship. On the diaspora-hostland relationship, it bears repeating that the diaspora populations analyzed for the purpose of this research are based in Western democratic states in Europe, Australia, and North America. Conceptions of diaspora that emphasize a hostile relationship with the hostland and diaspora disempowerment may not accurately reflect the Acehnese and East Timor cases in this context. As Kim Butler and James Clifford explain, “[m]embership in a diaspora now implies potential empowerment based on the ability to mobilize international support and influence in both the homeland and hostland.” Members of the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas undoubtedly were disempowered by and struggled with the challenges of everyday life in the hostland (language barriers, work, school, uncertainly over residency or citizenship status, and perhaps discrimination). As a whole, the diasporas were also small and materially weak; direct access to centres of power in hostlands and to their resources, therefore, was significantly limited. However, the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas were also empowered by democratic and open hostland

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659 Butler (2001): 211.


661 Compared to the larger and more established diasporas that have become important political constituencies in certain countries, Jews, Armenians, and Cubans in the U.S., Croatians in Germany, Ukrainians in Canada, or Greeks in Australia, for example.
environments that allow diaspora political organization and activity, as well as access to communication technologies, domestic and international NGOs and advocacy networks. This access represents an important opportunity structure that is derived from what Roza Tsgarousianou calls the “diasporic condition.” In both the case of Aceh and East Timor, but especially East Timor, the 1990s saw a broadening of partners for the diasporas that included networks of national and international NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals whose formation was motivated largely by “principled ideas or values,” what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call transnational advocacy networks (TAN). The analysis of such diaspora-TAN partnerships and their transformative effect are the focus of this chapter.

As described in Chapter 1, transnational advocacy networks make creative use of information and information exchange, employ “sophisticated political strategies” in their campaigns, and build new links among various actors thereby multiplying “channels of access to the international system.” The goal of activists within a TAN is to influence policy and policy outcomes, to influence or change the behavior of states and international organizations. It is through the successful engagement in partnerships with transnational advocacy networks—indeed participation in them—that these relatively small, new, and weak diasporas were able to enhance their political resources and project a voice and influence.

In this chapter I argue that the TAN-diaspora relationship can have a transformative effect on the political identification and, ultimately, the interests of the diaspora; and that this transformation has a potential impact on conflict settlement. In the case of East Timor and that of Aceh, the result was a moderation in the diaspora’s position vis-à-vis the homeland conflict and its settlement. The process of transformation in political identification involves

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discussion, negotiation, and persuasion between the diaspora and the members of the transnational advocacy network. It also involves joint efforts in framing or re-framing the Aceh and East Timor problems and their solutions. This chapter examines the details of this transformation through an analysis of the evolution of the diaspora-TAN partnership and the process of framing in the East Timor and Aceh cases, and through a comparison of the two cases. Prior to pursuing these arguments, however, I first proceed with a summary of conflict settlement in East Timor and in Aceh.

After nearly 25 years of Indonesian occupation, in August 1999 the East Timorese voted in a U.N.-organized referendum for or against Indonesia’s proposal for autonomy within the unified state of Indonesia. The results of the referendum were announced in September 1999 and showed 78.5 percent of East Timorese voted against autonomy, in essence a vote for independence. After nearly three years under transitional administration by the U.N., East Timor was declared an independent state on May 20, 2002. Three years later and after several previous attempts at negotiations, the Government of Indonesia and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) signed a historic Memorandum of Understanding on August 15, 2005 in Helsinki, Finland that would end the 30-year conflict in Aceh and grant the province “self-government” within the state of Indonesia.

Conflict Settlement in East Timor
As noted in Chapter 4, little progress was made in the U.N.-mandated dialogue on East Timor between Portugal and Indonesia between 1982 and the early 1990s. The Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 brought greater attention to the human rights situation in East Timor and greater pressure to bear on Indonesia to open up the territory further to the U.N., Portuguese observers, and humanitarian organizations. By the mid-1990s, Portugal had become more proactive at the U.N. in its demands for East Timorese self-determination, and the U.N., under the direction of the new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (from early 1997), had become increasingly responsive. Shortly after assuming the position of U.N. Secretary-General,

667 And within the diaspora, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Kofi Annan appointed a Personal Representative for East Timor, Jamsheed Marker, to encourage and shepherd negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal and find a solution to the East Timor problem.

The East Timorese were formally shut out of the process of negotiation which took place between the U.N., Portugal, and Indonesia with some input (pressure) from a core group of advisers—representatives to the U.N. from the U.S., Australia, U.K., Japan and New Zealand. According to Jamsheed Marker, the East Timorese were consulted informally by the U.N.; among those consulted were Ramos-Horta and diaspora East Timorese in Portugal. Marker also met with Bishop Belo in Dili and Xanana Gusmão at Cipinang prison in Indonesia. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Ramos-Horta and members of the East Timorese diaspora also maintained close contacts with the Portuguese government and through negotiations with the U.N. and Indonesia, Portugal stressed the importance of East Timorese inclusion in talks. The U.N.-sponsored negotiations did include a parallel but separate “All Inclusive East Timorese Dialogue” (AIETD)—meetings between Indonesians and East Timorese—but the content of the meetings was tightly controlled and any discussion of political matters was prohibited (as demanded by the Indonesian government). The meetings included key diaspora representatives, namely Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri and João Carrascalão.

It should also be noted that the East Timorese also organized their own meetings, and a most significant one took place in Peniche, Portugal in April 1998: The East Timorese National Convention in Diaspora. The meeting took place with the support of the Portuguese government and while U.N.-mediated negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal continued. It was at the Peniche meeting that the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) was inaugurated. Xanana Gusmão was elected President of the CNRT, the Magna Carta was adopted, and the East Timorese managed to come together to present a united front in their demand for a democratic and independent East Timor (see Chapter 4). Although sidelined in official negotiations, with support from Portugal, individual activists and NGOs,

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the East Timorese were able to insert their voice indirectly into the negotiations and make public their aspirations for independence.

The Asian financial crisis and subsequent fall of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998 represented the most significant change in structural conditions that allowed re-consideration of the East Timor question in Indonesia. Suharto’s immediate successor, B.J. Habibie, was under pressure both domestically, from East Timor, and internationally to find a solution. Moreover, the economic crisis and political transition rendered the Indonesian leadership more assailable to this external pressure. The East Timorese resistance leadership had already expressed flexibility in the 1993 peace proposal put forth by the CNRM, which included a period of transitional autonomy followed by a referendum on self-determination. Demonstrations calling for independence in East Timor had become more frequent. The Indonesian government, however, continued to refuse to release Xanana Gusmão from custody or work directly with the East Timorese resistance leadership. By 1998, both the U.S. and Australia (two of Indonesia’s strongest supporters) realized that special autonomy would no longer solve the East Timor problem (from the point of view of the East Timorese), and they urged Habibie to reconsider both Indonesia’s refusal to work with East Timorese leaders and its reluctance to consider an act of self-determination. In their memoirs of negotiations and the referendum both Ian Martin and Jamsheed Marker point to the change in Australian policy towards East Timor as particularly significant because of Australia’s long-term recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor. According to Martin and Marker, Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard went so far as sending a personal letter to President Habibie recommending that Indonesia negotiate with the East Timorese on the issue of self-determination. Thus, the situation in East Timor had become a very public burden for the Indonesian government. It has been suggested that for political reasons Habibie was eager to distance himself from the policies of Suharto and show the international community that with the fall of Suharto, Indonesia was committed to democracy and human rights. He was also

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670 Negotiations under Kofi Annan, however, had started before the fall of Suharto. See also Jacques Bertrand analysis of East Timor in Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 136-143.

671 From Indonesian activists and influential Indonesians in Jakarta.

committed to securing very badly needed funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was contingent on Indonesia demonstrating political and social stability. Moreover, the Indonesian government and military may not have been entirely convinced that the East Timorese would reject special autonomy at the ballot or that they could not be compelled to accept autonomy. In January 1999, to the surprise of many, including the U.N., President Habibie announced that Jakarta would grant East Timor autonomy, but if this was not accepted by the East Timorese, the government was prepared to release East Timor from Indonesia by revoking the 1976 act of annexation. The announcement paved the way for the August 1999 U.N.-administered referendum in East Timor to decide whether East Timor would remain within Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement or opt for independence.

Neither Xanana Gusmão nor the diaspora leaders were permitted to return to Dili during referendum campaigning. Gusmão, for example, was transferred from Cipinang prison to house arrest in February 1999; he was released on September 7, 1999, days after the East Timor referendum announcement and returned to East Timor in October 1999. However, it had earlier been decided that East Timorese in the diaspora would be allowed to vote and polling stations were set up in various countries to facilitate this, including one in New York. To the surprise of U.N. officials in New York, only 15 to 20 East Timorese showed up to vote, they had traveled from around the U.S. and Canada to do so. The numbers reflected the actual population of East Timorese in the region, but as Constancio Pinto explained, NGOs and individuals had lobbied and campaigned so visibly and loudly in the U.S. and the U.N. for an East Timor referendum that the U.N. expected much larger numbers. According to Pinto, a UN representative remarked, “we thought there were so many of you, because you made so much noise.”

In negotiations leading up to the referendum, Indonesia had insisted on and the U.N. eventually accepted that Indonesia would be responsible for security matters during the


674 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.
referendum. This decision proved to be disastrous for East Timor. After the results of the referendum were announced in early September 1999, indicating a clear victory for independence, the pro-integration East Timorese militias, with support from the Indonesian military, unleashed violence on the population of East Timor, killing 1,400, creating hundreds of thousands of refugees and destroying most of East Timor’s infrastructure in a matter of weeks. In response to the militia violence that followed the referendum, large demonstrations calling for international intervention in East Timor were organized in various cities around the world (most particularly in Australia); they marked the culmination of a transnational advocacy movement dedicated to East Timor. The success of the movement was the result of 25 years of efforts by the East Timorese, members of the East Timorese diaspora and committed non-Timorese individuals and organizations—that is, the result of a working partnership that developed over years among these groups.

Conflict Settlement in Aceh

The collapse of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian pro-democracy movement, and the referendum in East Timor created heightened expectations for peace in Aceh. In the late 1990s, a pro-democracy and pro-referendum movement emerged in Aceh. It was led mostly by students and civil society organizations and was inspired by the 1999 referendum in East Timor and several references by Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in late 1999 that his government might be willing to hold a referendum in Aceh (he would thereafter revert to the more common references to special autonomy). The movement culminated in a number of very large pro-referendum rallies in Aceh in November 1999 and again in November 2000. GAM leaders in diaspora participated in the dialogue that led to the Humanitarian Pause in 2000 and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) of 2002. The talks took place in Geneva and Tokyo and were brokered by the Swiss-based Henri Dunant Centre. However, neither the Humanitarian Pause nor the COHA led to a lasting

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peace on the ground—GAM was accused of using the ceasefires to recruit and train
fighters and the Indonesian security forces of continued human rights violations and
recruiting militias. In May 2003, the Indonesian government arrested the Aceh-based
negotiators as they prepared to leave for Japan to participate in the talks and President
Megawati Sukarnoputri declared martial law in Aceh. Aceh experienced some of its worst
violence following the collapse of the COHA. The imposition of martial law in Aceh
effectively closed the political space in Aceh, this inadvertently contributed to the salience
and legitimacy of the GAM leadership in diaspora in future negotiations.

Although most media reports highlight the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami as the
defining event in the next attempt at a negotiated settlement for Aceh, unofficial
communication between individual GAM leaders and Indonesian politicians preceded the
tsunami. Edward Aspinall, for example, argues that GAM began showing signs of “battle
fatigue,” a willingness to negotiate and a change in strategy towards political settlement as a
result of casualties and losses suffered after the renewed Indonesian military offensive of
2003 and before the tsunami of late 2004. William Nessenechoes Aspinall’s assessment,
pointing out that the Indonesian offensive had resulted in the loss of one-quarter of GAM’s
fighters (killed, captured or surrendered) and many of its weapons and the death of thousands
of GAM supporters (and suspected GAM supporters). Moreover, it is generally agreed that

676 Aspinall and Crouch (2003).


678 Political ‘space’ in Sweden itself was temporarily closed for GAM. Acting on a request from the Indonesian
government (Indonesia asked Sweden to “take action against” the GAM representatives in Sweden in 2002), the
Swedish government arrested Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah and held them in custody (Hasan di Tiro
apparently was arrested but not taken into custody due to ill health) in June 2004 on suspicion of “crimes
violating international law.” They were released a few days later on June 18 for lack of evidence. See BBC
pacific/3819535.stm

679 Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? Policy Studies 20,

in Anthony Reid (ed.), Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem (Seattle: University of
on the Indonesian side President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and, especially Vice President
Yusuf Kalla (elected in September 2004) were more predisposed to a negotiated settlement
and committed to finding a peaceful rather than a military solution to the Aceh problem than
their predecessor Megawati Sukarnoputri. The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the
new peace broker, issued the first formal invitations to GAM and the Government of
Indonesia two days before the tsunami, on December 26, 2004. The tsunami, however,
certainly helped to accelerate the process of negotiation, provided the participants with an
important and credible pretext to show greater flexibility in negotiations, and by bringing
greater international attention to the emergency conditions in Aceh it exposed the negotiators
to international pressure—pressure emphasizing the need to end hostilities and find a long-
term solution to the conflict that would allow Aceh’s recovery. The December 26, 2004
earthquake and tsunami killed about 190,000 people in Aceh and resulted in the opening-up
of Aceh to an unprecedented presence of international media and humanitarian and
emergency relief organizations. In addition, as governments from around the world pledged
monetary assistance for the recovery of Aceh (assistance that would be transferred to the
Indonesian government), they began to link disbursement of this assistance to progress in
conflict settlement.

The first round of talks between the Government of Indonesia and GAM began in January
2005 in Helsinki, Finland. Under the auspices of Marti Ahtisaari (former President of
Finland) and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI); five difficult rounds of negotiations
took place through August 2005. GAM negotiators included GAM Sweden leaders Malik
Mahmud, Dr. Zaini Abdullah and Bakhtiar Abdullah. Muhammad Nur Djuli, the GAM

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681 For information on Yudhoyono’s history of (wavering) support of a negotiated approach going back to 2000
see Aspinall and Crouch (2003).

682 For a personal account of the Helsinki negotiations see Damien Kingsbury, Peace in Aceh: A Personal

683 Aspinall (2005): 2. Images of a still standing Baiturrahman mosque among the complete devastation of
Banda Aceh had a strong impact on viewers. The image (both inside and outside of Aceh) was interpreted as a
warning or omen that the Acehnese had to change their ways. This may also have served as a credible pretext
for GAM to show flexibility in negotiations. For local Acehnese interpretations of the “strength” of the Banda
Aceh mosque (and other Acehnese mosques) see Channelnewsasia.com, “Miracle” Mosques Defy Tsunami
Onslaught” (January 6, 2005) at http://muslimvillage.com/story.php?id=1966. For images see Aceh Update,
leader in Malaysia, and Nurdin Abdul Rahman, who was then based in Australia, participated as political officers or civilian negotiators. They were also joined by Shadia Marhaban (U.S. diaspora) as the sole female negotiator on either side. Munawar Liza relocated from the U.S. to Sweden to provide support to the GAM negotiators. Other diaspora members involved in the process of planning the negotiations included Teuku Hadi (Germany), Syarif Usman and Muzakkir Abdul Hamid (Sweden). Irwandi Yusuf, an Aceh-based member of GAM, also joined the negotiation process (in the background) from the third round in April 2005. He had escaped from prison during the tsunami and eventually made his way to Stockholm to work with the leadership there. He would later become Governor of Aceh (see Chapter 6). The GAM “team” also included several international advisers, most notably, Australian academic Damien Kingsbury.684 During different rounds, American journalist William Nessen, Dr. Vacy Vlazna of Australia (suggested by Nurdin Abdul Rahman) and Prof. Palanisamy Ramasamy of Malaysia (suggested by Nur Djuli) were also available to GAM as “unofficial advisors” outside the negotiation room.685 The Indonesian government objected to the participation of Shadia Marhaban on the basis of gender,686 Irwandi Yusuf based on the fact that he was an escaped political prisoner, and to the non-Acehnese advisors. Yusuf was thus kept in the background and was not in the negotiation room. However, as mediator, Ahtisaari accepted Marhaban’s participation and the role of non-Acehnese as advisors to GAM. On the GAM side, the Helsinki negotiations, therefore, were marked by the heavy participation of diaspora leaders and by the input of non-Acehnese advisors.

On August 15, 2005, after a fifth round of negotiations, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by representatives of the Indonesian government and GAM. The success of the agreement was due to GAM’s adoption of “self-government” instead of independence


685 There was some criticism regarding GAM’s choice of “advisors,” criticism that notes the absence of an international lawyer, for example. Personal communication with Vacy Vlazna, January 3, 2006.

686 In Shadia Marhaban’s assessment (and Damien Kingsbury’s), the Indonesian side may have worried that her presence at the table made GAM appear more progressive and democratic than the Indonesian side in the eyes of the mediator. Following her participation, the Indonesian side tried to bring in a female participant but this was rejected by Ahtisaari as her name had not appeared on the list of participants prior to negotiations. Shadia Marhaban’s was on the list. Interview with Shadia Marhaban, December 10, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
as its primary aim, and Indonesia’s agreement to the establishment of Aceh-based political parties.\textsuperscript{687} GAM’s acceptance of “self-government” within the state of Indonesia made in February during the second round of negotiations was a remarkable departure from earlier negotiations where it had insisted on complete independence.

In Kingsbury’s account, through a process of internal dialogue (among the GAM negotiators and among GAM negotiators and their advisors), GAM began to show “flexibility,” “increasing sophistication of political thinking,” and creativity in finding a solution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{688} The result was the proposed “self-government.” On the other hand, Indonesia’s acceptance of local political parties was also crucial to the agreement’s success. In other words, the language of the MoU was no mere matter of semantics, the agreement differed from previous offers of special autonomy in that for the first time in Aceh (an indeed for the first time anywhere in Indonesia) local political parties could be formed and field candidates for political office. In essence this established the institutional mechanism through which GAM could transform itself into a political party and compete for political power in Aceh.

Importantly, the early stages of the implementation of the MoU—particularly the decommissioning of GAM soldiers and demobilization of the Indonesian military and the first round of local elections envisioned the active participation and oversight of a third party—the European Union. The inclusion of the European Union in this process was an important gain for GAM (GAM had long argued for an international presence in Aceh) and a boon to the GAM leadership in diaspora, whose legitimacy was closely tied to its role in attracting international attention to Aceh. These three “innovations” or “concessions” in the Helsinki negotiation process distinguished it from the more vague and ultimately unsuccessful peace negotiation processes of the past.

\textsuperscript{687} See Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Helsinki, Finland, August 15, 2005.

From Event to Catalyst: “Framing” and the Diaspora-Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) Partnership Process

In both the Aceh and East Timor cases, changes in structural conditions provided windows of opportunity for conflict settlement. At the international level, with the end of the Cold War, the importance of Indonesia as a bastion against communism in Southeast Asia receded. The governments of the U.S. and Australia (both long supporters of the Suharto regime) began to adopt a more nuanced approach to relations with Indonesia. At the domestic level, Indonesia’s financial crisis, the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, the assertion of a democracy movement, and the subsequent period of reformasi allowed the consideration of non-military solutions to the questions of East Timor and Aceh. These changes in structural conditions represented “critical junctures” and provided potential opportunities, however, they did not necessarily dictate outcomes—the negotiated and political settlements of long-term armed conflict. In both the case of East Timor and that of Aceh, it was a further “event” and a “process” that would translate structural changes into political opportunity and eventually into conflict settlement.

In the case of East Timor the “event” was the filming of the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991. Chapter 4 details the political activities of the East Timorese diaspora and a small group of supporters up to the 1990s. There is a general agreement within the diaspora as well as the broader solidarity movement, that it was the images of the Santa Cruz massacre (and testimony from witnesses) that became a catalyst for transforming a small group of supporters into a transnational solidarity movement for a solution to the conflict and particularly for an end to human rights abuses in East Timor. In the case of Aceh, the “catalytic event” was the 2004 earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh. This natural disaster brought unprecedented world attention to a relatively unknown region in the Western corner of the Indonesian archipelago. Although the tsunami did not precipitate an agreement (or even negotiations), it did lead to the opening of Aceh and bring international attention to the conflict and pressure to bear on the negotiations and the negotiating parties. The success

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689 See Jacques Bertrand’s analysis of critical junctures in both the East Timor and Aceh cases in Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
of both emergency assistance and long-term relief and recovery came to be inextricably linked to success in conflict settlement.

Nevertheless, as dramatic and tragic as they were, neither of these events were catalytic de rigeur, rather they were “framed” and deployed as such and as part of a larger effort in “framing” or “re-framing” the East Timor and Aceh problems. This framing of the Santa Cruz massacre and Aceh tsunami represent exercises in symbolic politics, wherein powerful symbolic events are used to re-shape understandings and in turn become catalytic. Nevertheless, as dramatic and tragic as they were, neither of these events were catalytic de rigeur, rather they were “framed” and deployed as such and as part of a larger effort in “framing” or “re-framing” the East Timor and Aceh problems. This framing of the Santa Cruz massacre and Aceh tsunami represent exercises in symbolic politics, wherein powerful symbolic events are used to re-shape understandings and in turn become catalytic. 690 Symbolic events as catalysts represent potential windows of opportunity for conflict settlement, for what Robert Hislop refers to as the “generosity moment.” The “moment” at which “a spirit of flexibility, inclusiveness, and tolerance” can result in “tensions” being defused. 691 To “frame” is to form understandings of an issue, make it comprehensible to an audience, attract attention, and legitimate and motivate collective action. 692 Framing, thus, is described as an “act of social definition.” 693 Frames identify, interpret, explain, label, and give meaning to events, issues, and social problems. Acts of framing may include identifying problems and causes, attributing responsibility, suggesting strategies and solutions, and as mentioned above, encouraging social mobilization and guiding collective action. 694 Framing and the deployment of frames were part of a deeper “process” of partnership between the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas and transnational advocacy networks.

According to Keck and Sikkink, domestic and international nongovernmental organizations play a central role in transnational advocacy networks. Other major actors may include local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations,


692 This follows the definition adopted by Keck and Sikkink and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald. See Keck and Sikkink (1998): 3 and 3 fn. 4and Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).


and intellectuals; parts of government branches (the executive and/or parliamentary); and parts of intergovernmental organizations.\textsuperscript{695} In practice, these “parts” may translate into particular offices of government and organizations or individuals. Keck and Sikkink touch upon the role of diasporas in TANs, particularly their role in providing both information and testimony.\textsuperscript{696} Sidney Tarrow also briefly makes references to diasporas but limits his analysis to examples of what he refers to as benign or destructive “immigrant transnationalism” and “diaspora nationalism.”\textsuperscript{697} Tarrow, Keck and Sikkink also discuss the possibility that TANs can transform “other actors’ understanding of their identities and their interests”\textsuperscript{698} (diasporas, presumable, might be counted among these “other actors”), but the TAN-diaspora relationship remains under-examined in these works.

In the case of Aceh and East Timor, the networks involved in transnational advocacy included: a) networked groups of the same diaspora, composed entirely or mostly of Acehnese or East Timorese; b) networked “solidarity” groups dedicated entirely or mostly to the Aceh or East Timor “problem,” and composed mostly of non-Acehnese or East Timorese (East Timor “solidarity” campaigns and networks fall into this category); and c) international and regional “advocacy” networks of non-governmental organizations—groups that concern themselves with peace, human rights and social justice issues throughout the world\textsuperscript{699} (for example, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, specific religious organizations such as the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development).\textsuperscript{700} Offices


\textsuperscript{696} However, they are referred to as “expatriates,” see Keck and Sikkink (1998):19.

\textsuperscript{697} Tarrow (2005): 51-56.

\textsuperscript{698} Keck and Sikkink (1998): 17.

\textsuperscript{699} Clifford Bob describes “solidarity” networks as those that openly take sides, back and identify closely with particular groups/parties because of deeply felt affinities, and often form personal bonds with them. “Advocacy” organizations support principles or policies rather than parties. See Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). In practice, this distinction is sometimes blurred as members of “Advocacy” organizations may also develop “personal bonds” or connections based on “affinities,” such as religious affinities, as in the case of the Catholic Church.

\textsuperscript{700} I have deliberately excluded the Henri Dunant Centre and the Crisis Management Initiative from the TAN. Both organizations are non-governmental organizations. However, neither organization was involved in the kind of advocacy work or political strategizing that defines TANs (according to Keck and Sikkink’s
and individuals from government and international organizations as well as academics and journalists are considered part of the second networked group (b). The distinction between the first two groups (a and b) was sometimes blurred as the two groups worked together or when membership in the two groups overlapped. Occasionally, specific diaspora networked groups were embedded—organizationally—within a larger transnational advocacy network dedicated specifically to East Timor or Aceh.

The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process

Laying the Foundation for a Future East Timor Solidarity Movement

As discussed in Chapter 4, early partners for the East Timorese in diaspora included a number of individuals and organizations of the political left, most notably in Australia in the 1970s. José Ramos-Horta had traveled to Australia in 1974 in order to lobby the Australian government to intervene diplomatically to prevent the Indonesian invasion. The government was unmoved and indeed during this period maintained a policy of quiet support for the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. However, Ramos-Horta did find support among members of the Communist Party of Australia. The Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET), for example, was established in November 1974 by Denis Freney prior to the Indonesian invasion and in anticipation of such an event. CIET activists lobbied the Australian government and Australian trade unions, organized demonstrations, published bulletins and reports on conditions in East Timor, and worked closely with the Fretilin leadership in diaspora in gathering and disseminating information from East Timor.701

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However, the partnership with the political left, more specifically with members of the Communist Party of Australia, came to be seen as a liability. David Scott, an early Australian activist for East Timor, saw Freney’s goals and style and his relationship with Abílio Araújo (one of Fretilin’s most politically radical and uncompromising leaders) as inhibiting the wider appeal of the East Timor cause to a mainstream Australian audience: “This ‘death or victory’ approach of the small Marxist or pseudo-Marxist group versus a more moderate inclusive one...had major implications for how the movement was perceived locally, internationally, and at the U.N.” Scott was concerned that the East Timor struggle was being equated with the “extreme left-wing.”

Although this “extreme left” was East Timor’s (or Fretilin’s) most active advocate and partner in the 1970s, it was not the only one. The East Timorese also benefitted from early support from, for example, members of the Catholic Church and other Christian churches and organizations, Australian trade unions and their aid agency, Apheda, Australian overseas aid organizations (David Scott, for example, headed ACFOA), and Australian veterans of World War II (and their families) who fought the Japanese in East Timor and felt they owed a special debt to the East Timorese who fought beside them. In the words of Paddy Kennelly, an Australian veteran of the war against the Japanese: “Many of the diggers expected to die in Timor. But thanks to the Timorese, most of us survived. We owe them our lives.”

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702 Even as late as the 1990s there were confrontations within the East Timor solidarity groups based on political ideology. Alix Mandelson an AETA supporter remarked that “some of the old activists came from a very leftist ideology, whereas some of those involved later had a more humanitarian perspective...[at meetings] there were struggles for the floor [among the different groups] and this turned off some of the volunteers.” Interview with Alix Mandelson, January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.


704 An Australia East Timor Association (AETA) pamphlet inviting potential supporters to a solidarity meeting, for example, states, “Australians are forever indebted to the East Timorese for their selflessness & gallantry in World War II.” Pamphlet in author’s file, courtesy of AETA.

705 On the activities of Australian diggers and trade unions in support of East Timor see Rico Aditjondro, “Paddy’s Payback,” Workers Online No. 14 (May 21, 1999) at http://workers.labor.net.au/14/d_review_paddy.html. It should be noted that these groups and their members were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Veterans may also have been union members, for example.
International Relations (CIIR)\textsuperscript{706}—both based in the U.K.—maintained links with the Church in East Timor, when possible, and were also early advocates for the East Timorese.\textsuperscript{707} In Australia, Bishop Hilton Deakin of Melbourne, and later the Mary MacKillop Institute (a Christian organization) were continued activists on behalf of the East Timorese church and the poor of East Timor. Following the emphasis of the Catholic Church in East Timor, they focused on the protection and promotion of East Timorese culture, religion, and Tetum language (part of the repertoire of representation adopted by East Timor’s church as markers of distinction and resistance to the Indonesian occupation). The Australia East Timor Association (AETA), an NGO, also has a long, if uneven, history of solidarity. A handful of members were active in Melbourne in the 1970s but, as in many other cases, momentum was not gained until the 1990s after the Santa Cruz massacre (the AETA Sydney branch, for example, was not formed until 1992). In the United States, activism on behalf of East Timor was carried out by a small number of academics and political observers, such as Noam Chomsky and Arnold Kohen (some of Kohen’s research and advocacy work was funded by Catholic organizations),\textsuperscript{708} members of the Catholic Church, and some members of Congress, namely Tom Harkin (Iowa Democrat), Tony Hall (Ohio Democrat), Donald Fraser (Minnesota Democrat) and Senators Paul Tsongas (Massachusetts Democrat) and David Durenberger (Minnesota Republican).\textsuperscript{709} These individuals did manage to bring some attention to the East Timor issue, however, they remained ineffective through the 1980s in changing U.S. policy towards Indonesia, in particular the supply of weapons and assistance in military training. Although early expressions and acts of solidarity from these groups and individuals represented a springboard for a future larger movement, broader support (in terms of numbers) remained limited through the 1970s, gradually widened in the 1980s and then surged in the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{706} In 2006 the CIIR changed its name to Progressio, CAFOD is part of the Caritas International Federation.


\textsuperscript{708} Smythe (2004).

\textsuperscript{709} See Chapter 4 for their early activities in support of José Ramos-Horta and East Timor.
Thus the basis for a transnational advocacy network for East Timor was established early through the initiative and work of a small number of non-Timorese supporters in the West in contact with East Timorese in Timor (when possible) and in diaspora, primarily with Fretilin representatives and José Ramos-Horta. Solidarity was created based on a sense of religious affinity—in the case of Catholic and other Christian organizations; political affinity—in the case of members of the Communist Party of Australia working with the more radical elements within Fretilin in diaspora as well as members of trade unions, aid organizations and progressives (such as Noam Chomsky in the U.S.) also working with members of Fretilin and East Timorese nationalists in diaspora; a sense of obligation—in the case of Australian veterans of World War II; and as is detailed later in this chapter, a sense of complicity—in the case of Australian, American, British, and Portuguese activists who highlighted the role of their own countries in the invasion of East Timor and the perpetuation of conflict and human rights abuses.

The Evolution of the East Timor Solidarity Movement

In order to secure the support of potential support groups and the wider community in Western countries, the diaspora embraced certain images, symbols and discourses, specifically the discourses of non-violent self-determination, human rights, and democracy. This signified a change in the representation of the political struggle of East Timor, from a guerrilla independence movement (as represented through the 1970s) to non-violent aspirations of self-determination and democracy (from the 1980s and increasingly so in the 1990s). This change reflected tensions within the diaspora and within the nascent diaspora—advocacy network partnership. Both Khachig Tölovyan and Pnina Werbner point out diasporas are internally heterogeneous and divided; they are thus susceptible to internal tensions.710 As described in Chapter 4, among East Timorese in diaspora tensions arose within Fretilin due to ideological differences among the more radical members and the more moderate (most notably Ramos-Horta). The more moderate position adopted by Ramos-Horta also more closely reflected shifts within the movement in East Timor, where Xanana

Gusmão had distanced the armed struggle from Fretilin (instead referring to Falintil, the resistance forces, as non-partisan), had reached out to other East Timorese political groups, and had shifted the emphasis in the struggle from a guerrilla warfare approach to a non-violent (primarily urban) resistance.

The change in the representation of the East Timorese political struggle also reflected the demographic changes within the diaspora from the 1980s through the 1990s. During this time the diaspora not only grew in numbers but was, in a sense, re-born through the influx of younger diasporans whose political identity was more influenced by the Indonesian democracy and human rights movements of the 1990s than the anti-colonial conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s. The new arrivals added to the strength of the moderates within the diaspora (moderates on all sides, Fretilin, UDT and the non-partisan). These moderates remained nationalistic, but were less exclusionary711 and their emphasis on East Timorese unity, non-violence and democracy had a wider appeal to potential hostland allies and helped make the East Timor struggle more comprehensible to a hostland audience.

The strength of the East Timorese moderates and indeed their moderation was in itself deepened by widening and closer interactions with hostland partners. Although the individuals from the more “extreme left” (to reiterate David Scott’s term) remained engaged, other more moderate early East Timor advocates—such as David Scott and Richard Tanter (in Australia)—worked to attract the attention of a broader audience. In time, the efforts of individuals and various groups working on behalf of East Timor amounted to a loose network of solidarity that would project the voice of the East Timorese. But this voice could not be the one of a guerrilla independence movement (in the anti-colonial mold of the Fretilin of the 1970s), nor could it be an “ethnic-parochial”712 and exclusionary voice and still attract wide attention and support. Instead the solidarity groups in partnership with diaspora members formed an understanding of the East Timor “problem” based on cosmopolitan ideas—human rights and democracy.


This framing of the East Timor problem as one of human rights and democracy was facilitated by information. In the 1970s the little information that was coming out of East Timor through the radio communications with Australia could be and was dismissed as unreliable or as Fretilin propaganda and misinformation (nevertheless, in the early years it was still critical in countering Indonesian propaganda). New arrivals to the East Timorese diaspora and the East Timorese Church also managed—often at great peril—to smuggle out messages and information, this formed the basis for the early human rights reports and bulletins put out by, for example, the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR). Nevertheless, any activism on behalf of East Timor was hampered by a lack of access to information as East Timor in essence remained closed to the media, international aid organizations, tourists, and governmental and international organization visitors. The small number of activists in the U.S., for example, working to bring attention to East Timor, had little information available and faced a government eager to publicly lend credence to Indonesian reports. As a result, according to Charles Scheiner, from December 8, 1975 to November 12, 1991 (that is, from the day after the Indonesian invasion of East Timor until the Santa Cruz massacre), East Timor was covered only once in U.S. television news.\(^{713}\) The lack of information was remedied with the opening of East Timor in the mid and late 1980s.\(^{714}\) The opening and the arrival of new diaspora members, particularly through the 1990s, provided Western activists with more reliable, frequent and up-to-date information as well as vivid testimonies and in some cases living evidence of human rights abuses. This period also coincided with the popularization of internet use,\(^{715}\) facilitating the rapid distribution of information, including images, the sharing of activist strategies and approaches, and coordination of activities. According to the East Timor and Indonesia Action


\(^{714}\) Travel restrictions to and from East Timor and Indonesia were loosened in 1984; in 1989 East Timor was opened to foreign tourists and investors.

Network (ETAN), for example, the internet "greatly facilitated [its] our ability both to learn what was going on in East Timor and to get the word out quickly, and enabled [it] to inexpensively mobilize people on short notice." But the flows of information are only part of this narrative, the other part is the conscious framing of information on the East Timor conflict in cosmopolitan terms in an effort to legitimize collective action.

The Santa Cruz Massacre as Catalyst

The opening of East Timor not only allowed a flow of information and people out of East Timor but it also allowed a small flow of people into East Timor. In November 1991 there was a small presence of international media in East Timor to cover a visit by Portuguese parliamentarians that was eventually cancelled. Instead they happened to cover the Santa Cruz massacre of November 12, 1991, when Indonesian security forces opened fire on a crowd of East Timorese demonstrators. Footage of this event taken by Max Stahl, a freelance British journalist, was smuggled out of East Timor and played on news channels across the world. East Timor solidarity activists consider Stahl's film the "death knell for the continued dominance of Indonesia in East Timor...It put the territory on the world political agenda...inspiring people around the globe with a desire to put an end to the occupation...[It] inspired print, radio and television journalists worldwide to continue the coverage of East Timor." If the graphic and revealing images from Stahl's film caught the attention of news channels and brought the images to a wider television audience, it was individuals and the foundational solidarity organizations that deployed the images from the film and testimonies from foreign journalists and East Timorese as a catalyst for collective action.

Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman, two American journalists and East Timor activists, beaten during the Santa Cruz massacre, returned to the U.S. to report their experience (including their identification of Western-supplied weapons used by the Indonesian security forces) in

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716 See East Timor and Indonesia Action Network website, "What is ETAN?" at http://www.etan.org/etan/etanhist.htm

Max Stahl contributed some of his footage to two films, the 1992 *In Cold Blood* by John Pilger and later the 1994 documentary by John Pilger and David Munro, titled *Death of a Nation*. Like Elaine Brier's 1997 film, *Bitter Paradise: The Sell-Out of East Timor*, these films became part of a call for public action and are frequently cited by activists as having inspired them to join or create an East Timor solidarity group. The Santa Cruz massacre (images and testimonies from it) also served to attract other experienced activists; not only did a small number of activists in the U.S., for example, begin working on East Timor on a full time basis, but activists that had worked on other world “hot spots”—Central America, South Africa, and Palestine—shifted their focus and energies to the East Timor problem. Moreover, East Timor was inserted into the agenda and work of more broad-based (rather than single-issue) human rights organizations. In this way, the Santa Cruz massacre was used to create or “grow” a transnational East Timor human rights network. This was possible because “parts of the network were already in place to document, frame, and publicize” (to transform into a catalyst) this dramatic event. Support for East Timor, therefore, initially could be described as an ad hoc and loose network of individuals that included human rights and peace campaigners, members of the church, members of trade unions and the Communist Party of Australia, progressive intellectuals, some veterans of the second world war, a small number of government representatives, and members of the East Timorese diaspora. This loose network in time developed into a broader movement composed of the above members and East Timor solidarity organizations in various countries. The East Timor Action Network (ETAN) listed over 100 support and solidarity groups worldwide.

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718 See Allan Nairn, “Excerpts from the Testimony of Allan Nairn before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (February 27, 1992) at http://etan.org/ifet/.


722 For a listing of East Timor solidarity groups around the world see ETAN at http://www.etan.org/ifet/support.html
Both ETAN in the U.S. and the Australia East Timor Association (AETA) in Sydney were formed soon after the Santa Cruz massacre, ETAN in December 1991 and AETA/Sydney in 1992. The task of AETA (and similar support groups in Australia) was to publicize the East Timor cause, demonstrate their public support, influence government, and assist José Ramos-Horta.\textsuperscript{723} ETAN in the U.S. also worked closely with José-Ramos Horta and with Constancio Pinto\textsuperscript{724} a former leader of the East Timorese clandestine front, based in the U.S. in diaspora since 1992. John Miller of ETAN (U.S.) recalls that they often listened to “strategic suggestions from the diaspora” especially José Ramos-Horta and Constancio Pinto. Pinto also attended some ETAN planning and other meetings and for a summer worked for ETAN as an intern.\textsuperscript{725} Miller also adds that although diaspora leaders had a good understanding of the U.S. and the U.S. political system, in strategizing, they would generally defer to ETAN with an acknowledgment that ETAN knew its country best (U.S.). Thus, Miller explains, ETAN set its own priorities and campaigns, “which the Timorese leadership generally supported.”\textsuperscript{726} In Canada, Bella Galhos, a young Timorese woman who had sought asylum there in the mid-1990s, also worked closely with ETAN, both the U.S.-East Timor Action Network (ETAN) and the separate East Timor Alert Network (ETAN) organization in Canada. Through her collaboration with the ETAN organizations, Galhos—like many other diaspora activists in the West—became well versed in linking East Timorese suffering (visually exemplified in the Santa Cruz footage) both to the complicity of Western and Japanese governments (their support for the Indonesian invasion, military aid to Indonesia and economic interests in Indonesia) and to the norm of human rights.\textsuperscript{727} In the U.S., ETAN’s mission, in addition to general advocacy on behalf of the East Timorese, was to change U.S. policy towards Indonesia. The strategy adopted was to lobby the U.S.

\textsuperscript{723} Scott (2005): 71.

\textsuperscript{724} Personal communication with John Miller of ETAN, June 22, 2008.

\textsuperscript{725} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{726} Ibid.

government to end military support and training for Indonesia, thereby exerting pressure on the Indonesian government to end human rights abuses in East Timor. Unlike the earlier advocates for East Timor, the newer solidarity organizations such as the U.S. ETAN and AETA remained officially unaligned with any East Timorese party or faction. They did not, as the Communist Party of Australia had done, work exclusively with Fretilin. Rather they attempted to work with Fretilin, the UDT and the non-partisans.728

By the mid-1990s East Timor solidarity groups had been organized in Australia, the U.S., Canada, in several Western European countries, in Latin America, Japan, and Southeast Asia. Many of these organizations began operating and consulting with each other in the 1980s but their numbers, membership and activities expanded in the 1990s after the Santa Cruz massacre. Along with ETAN (U.S.), the UK-based Tapol (The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign), led by Carmel Budiardjo, was among the most active. As with ETAN, Tapol’s strategy too included a strong focus on both human rights abuses by Indonesian forces as well as the arms sales by the British government to Indonesia that were contributing to these abuses.729 Throughout the years Tapol and other organizations (such as the Canadian East Timor Alert Network) also targeted the U.N. Decolonization Committee, presenting information on abuses in East Timor and demanding action on the various U.N. East Timor resolutions.

One of the most widely cited cases of successful activism is that of the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC), formed and led by the unlikely figure of Tom Hyland, a Dublin bus driver. In Hyland’s account, he and a group of friends were moved to act after watching Pilger’s 1992 In Cold Blood documentary, which relies heavily on Stahl’s footage from the Santa Cruz massacre. The ETISC would go on to effectively use the media (by taking out advertisements in newspapers, for example), deploy campaigns aimed at swaying public opinion, and lobby the Irish government, particularly during the period leading up to the Irish presidency of the EU. The ETISC’s success is evident in the government’s

728 Interview with Jefferson Lee of Australia East Timor Association (AETA), January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

729 Budiardjo (2002).
agreement to prioritize East Timor during its presidential term.\textsuperscript{730} As with other solidarity groups, the ETISC highlighted its “legitimacy” as an advocate for East Timor by including East Timorese voices in its repertoires of action. ETISC public events and education campaigns included the participation of a tiny number of East Timorese in diaspora in Ireland—all young students—who would testify to human rights abuses, including in some cases their own experience at Santa Cruz and to the democratic aspirations of the East Timorese. The Irish solidarity campaign also featured a newsletter titled, “Maubere.” The title of the newsletter is an example of the extent to which hostland solidarity groups adopted East Timorese-defined markers of distinction from the Indonesians.\textsuperscript{731} Although among European governments, the Irish were perhaps the most responsive to their home-grown solidarity campaign (excepting Portugal), similar partnerships among diaspora and NGOs arose in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Norway, elsewhere in Europe, in Japan, Brazil, and Southeast Asia in addition to the previously mentioned campaigns in the U.S., Canada, Australia and the U.K.

The various solidarity groups operated independently from each other, particularly in the lobbying of domestic governments. However they were well aware of each other’s activities, occasionally came together for conferences, and regularly exchanged information, allowing them to adopt a common discourse and to coordinate strategies, particularly for representation at U.N. bodies.\textsuperscript{732} The International Federation for East Timor (IFET), a coordinating umbrella organization of solidarity groups, for example, was formed in the 1990s for such a purpose. Solidarity conferences were held annually from the early 1990s in Portugal or Australia; these brought together representatives from the various solidarity groups, members of the diaspora from the political parties and non-partisans, academics and some government officials. ETAN (both the U.S. and Canada organizations), AETA


\textsuperscript{731} “Maubere” is an East Timorese word that was used as a political and cultural term of both resistance and distinction from Indonesians.

\textsuperscript{732} Interview with Vacy Vlazna, AETA, January 3, 2005, Sydney, Australia.
(Australia) and Tapol (U.K.) were all directly linked through information sharing and occasionally joint campaigns or projects, such as organizing speaking tours for visitors from the solidarity movement, East Timor or the diaspora.733 AETA activists recall that Ramos-Horta (because of his role as "roving Ambassador") had the Australian solidarity movement "linked with the international movement."734

The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process and East Timor Conflict Settlement

The relationship between the East Timorese diaspora735 and the non-East Timorese individuals and non-governmental organizations that came to form a transnational advocacy network (TAN) in solidarity with East Timor was symbiotic. If the TAN served to amplify the voice and aspirations of a small and weak diaspora, the participation of diaspora members in the TAN and TAN activities lent the solidarity movement legitimacy. Lobbying efforts, public awareness and education campaigns, demonstrations, conferences, information targeted toward the media—included East Timorese testimony and participation, and the most readily available East Timorese were those in diaspora. Through the participation of these East Timorese, the TAN could legitimately claim to have intimate knowledge of the situation in East Timor and to speak on its behalf. However, for the partnership between the East Timorese in diaspora and the wider solidarity groups (particularly as these grew) to succeed there had to be a consonance in values, ideas and interests. This consonance was most easily found with the moderates (or the moderating) in diaspora.736 In addition, the values, ideas and interests reflected in the campaigns and activities of the solidarity movement had to resonate with a broad audience. Therefore, although factions within the East Timor diaspora worked successfully with particular groups and individuals in Australia and the U.S., for example, who shared their anti-colonial (and anti-imperialist) goals and supported an armed struggle for independence, their wider appeal remained limited.

733 Interview with Jefferson Lee, AETA, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
734 Interview with Brendan Doyle, AETA, January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
735 Specifically activists in the diaspora.
736 Moderates within each political party and among non-partisans.
Advocates (both diaspora and non-East Timorese TAN members) for human rights, democracy, non-violent resistance, and to a lesser extent self-determination found these ideas and interests held a wider appeal. This, however, was not enough. The consonance in values, ideas and interests served to consolidate a diaspora-TAN partnership, to lend the TAN legitimacy (through the participation and support of East Timorese) and to set a joint agenda for action. The East Timor solidarity movement, however, went further; it succeeded in providing the East Timor conflict with a domestic context—whether that context was Australia, the U.S., Portugal, Canada, Japan or the U.K.

Framing Complicity and Obligation

In the Indonesian account of the occupation of East Timor, Indonesia acted to quell a civil war (between Fretilin and the UDT) and to counter a Communist threat in the region. The U.S. and Australian governments through various administrations accepted this account. In the account of the East Timor solidarity movement, however, not only was the Indonesian occupation an act of aggression—an invasion, but Western governments, specifically the U.S. and Australian were directly implicated. East Timor activists long argued (and have been proven right) that the U.S. government under Gerald Ford knew of the Indonesian plans to invade and annex East Timor and gave its approval to Suharto (see Chapter 4). Australian activists have argued that the Australian government also knew of the impending Indonesian invasion of December 7, 1975 (and of military incursions into East Timorese territory that began as early as August 1975), turned a blind eye and then publicly accepted the Indonesian account. Moreover, the U.S. and Australian governments, as well as that of the U.K., extended de facto recognition to Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor, with Australia making this a de jure recognition in 1985—the only state to do so. East Timor activists

737 For a summary of the larger geopolitical context of the invasion and Western policy see Chapter 3.

argued that these policies rendered the U.S. and Australia complicit in the invasion of East Timor and the subsequent suffering of its people. Moreover, they were directly implicated in human rights abuses—and this criticism also was leveled against the U.K. government—through the sale of weapons to Indonesia and training and cooperation extended to the Indonesian military.\textsuperscript{739} The weapons, activists claimed, were used by Indonesian security forces in East Timor. According to Brad Simpson, the State Department eventually admitted that the U.S. provided up to 90 percent of the weapons used during the invasion.\textsuperscript{740} Allan Nairn and Amy Goodman contend that U.S.-made M-16 rifles were used during the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 and Hugh O'Shaughnessy reported seeing British-made Hawk aircraft (sold to Indonesia starting in 1978) used in East Timor: in 1995, despite the government's denials. The British government finally acknowledged their use in 1999.\textsuperscript{741}

In this way, a direct link was made between the conflict and human rights abuses in East Timor and Western governments. This link highlighted not only complicity but obligation: If Western democratic states—their governments, institutions and policies—are facilitating continued violence and human rights abuses in East Timor, then the citizens of these states can and should act to change this. In the U.S. and the U.K., therefore, East Timor solidarity groups devoted their efforts to halting military assistance (weapons sales and training) to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{742} The testimony of killings and abuses provided by diaspora activists, the images and footage coming from East Timor, and the news of the 1992 capture and imprisonment of Xanana Gusmão, East Timor's resistance leader,\textsuperscript{743} captivated the interest of potential

\textsuperscript{739} In the case of Portugal, obligation (and guilt) was framed on the basis of its former colonial history, abandonment of the territory, and unfinished decolonization process. In the case of Japan and Canada complicity and obligation were framed on the basis of commercial interests in Indonesia and economic and diplomatic assistance lent to the Indonesian government. A particular target in Japan was its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Indonesia, participants in the Japanese East Timor network included NGOs, Christian church associations and groups, academics and broader peace and anti-nuclear organizations.

\textsuperscript{740} Simpson (2004): 455.

\textsuperscript{741} O'Shaughnessy (2000): 37.

\textsuperscript{742} In the case of the U.S., the training target was the international military and education training (IMET) program, through which Indonesian soldiers received military and strategic training in the United States. See Scheiner (2000): 121.

\textsuperscript{743} Marker (2003): 19.
activists and supporters; the focused campaigns of ETAN, Tapol and other organizations provided both a domestic context and domestic targets for action. In the U.K., a campaign was developed in 1992 against any further sale to Indonesia of Hawk ground-attack aircraft. When the campaign failed, in a dramatic example of activism, four women (acting independently rather than as part of a solidarity organization) broke into a British Hawk manufacturing plant in 1996 and using hammers disabled a Hawk aircraft designed for export to Indonesia. Their subsequent trial defence was based on the notion that they were attempting to prevent a crime—genocide in East Timor. The witnesses in their defence included José Ramos-Horta and Carmel Budiardjo of Tapol. All four women involved were acquitted, the sale and delivery of Hawks to Indonesia, however, continued.

In the U.S., the repertoires of action of East Timor solidarity groups included protests and demonstrations (often in front of the Indonesian Embassy and its consulates), media campaigns, creating and nurturing relationships with individual (friendly) members of Congress, lobbying government, information collection and dissemination (to media, academia, Congressional offices, other NGOs, etc.) legal action, and education and public awareness campaigns. These campaigns frequently involved Constancio Pinto and José Ramos-Horta and others in diaspora (as the small number of East Timorese in North America grew through the 1990s). Legal action was brought against Indonesian General Sintong Panjaitan for the death of New Zealander Kamal Bamadhaj, killed during the Santa Cruz massacre. The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed the suit in 1992 in the Massachusetts court under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act on behalf of Helen Todd, Bamadhaj’s mother (at the time Panjaitan had retired and was living in Massachusetts, he returned promptly to Indonesia after the lawsuit was filed). The court found in Ms. Todd’s favor, awarding her US$14 million. A further case against Indonesian Lt. General Johny Lumintang was filed in a Washington, D.C. court in 2000 by CCR and the Center for Justice and Accountability on behalf of six East Timorese for crimes


745 For an overview of ETAN activities, for example, Lynn Fredriksson, “Sufficiently Sanitized by the Nobel Prize,” ESTAFETA 2. no. 3 (Spring 1997).
committed following the 1999 referendum. Lumintang was served legal papers during a visit to the U.S.; he left the U.S. immediately after. The plaintiffs were awarded US$66 million in compensatory and punitive damages.\textsuperscript{746} The Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 and Torture Victim Protection Act 1991 allow non-U.S. citizens to sue in U.S. courts.

In Australia the domestic context provided by activists for the East Timor conflict and human rights abuses included the complicity of the Australian government in turning a blind eye to the impending occupation of East Timor in 1975, successive governments that accepted Indonesian sovereignty over the territory, lent diplomatic support and extended military aid to the Suharto government while human rights abuses were committed in East Timor. Australian complicity was also framed on the basis of economic opportunism. In this argument, Australia conspired with Indonesia to profit from Timorese oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea. In 1989 Australia reached a joint exploration agreement with Indonesia, and the Timor Gap Treaty went into force in 1991.\textsuperscript{747} Obligation was framed on the basis of government policy (towards East Timor) that betrayed the Australian national identity as a champion of humanitarian principles, betrayed debts owed to the East Timorese for their assistance to Australian soldiers during the Second World War, and betrayed the wishes and aspirations of Australia’s East Timorese population, its Australian supporters, and the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor.\textsuperscript{748}

In addition, solidarity groups and individuals framed complicity and obligation on the basis of the Australian government’s betrayal of the five Australian-based television journalists, known as the Balibo Five (two British, two Australian and a New Zealander), killed in Balibo, East Timor on October 16, 1975.\textsuperscript{749} Reportedly, they had gone to Balibo to

\textsuperscript{746} See Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) website at http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/


investigate Indonesian military attacks against East Timor. Here, the Australian government is implicated in the cover-up (or at the very least the tacit acceptance of an Indonesian cover-up) of the murder of Australian citizens by the Indonesian military. The British government has been subject to the same criticism. In the Indonesian account, the Balibo Five were killed in the cross-fire of the East Timorese civil war. The Australian and British governments accepted this account. Activists, family members, and some news reports, however, have maintained that the reporters were executed by Indonesian forces that had already begun incursions into East Timor. The motive was to prevent them from reporting the Indonesian military presence in East Timor. Another Australian journalist, Roger East, was killed in the early days of the “official” invasion of December 1975. After much pressure and lobbying, including lobbying by Maureen Tolfree, the sister of Brian Peters (one of the Balibo Five), and by East Timor activists, an inquest into Peters’ death was opened in New South Wales, Australia in 2006. Activists connect the betrayal of the Balibo Five to the betrayal of East Timor. In this argument, the Australian government’s acceptance of the Indonesian account represented a signal to Indonesia that Australia knew about the invasion of East Timor and would not object. Obligation to the Balibo Five remained a central theme in the Australian East Timor Solidarity movement.

The East Timor solidarity groups in Australia, thus, adopted a more broad-based approach aimed at keeping the East Timor issue in the public view (building and maintaining media interest), shaming the government and building public support for a change in Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia and East Timor. In Australia this was no small matter—given its geographical proximity to Indonesia and its political and strategic interests in the

\[749\] The five were Malcolm Rennie, Brian Peters, Greg Shackleton, Tony Stewart and Gary Cunningham.

\[750\] See, for example, Richard Lloyd Parry, “Government Lied to Cover Up War Crimes in 1975 Invasion of Island,” The Times (November 30, 2005) at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1897195,00.html#cid=OTC-RSS&attr=World


Southeast Asian region. In so doing, like their counterparts in the U.S. and elsewhere, the Australian East Timor solidarity movement worked with the East Timorese diaspora community. Brendan Doyle of AETA, for example, describes his organization as composed of mostly non-Timorese but with a close relationship with the Timorese diaspora: “we thought our role was to lobby the Australian government, but we were in touch with Ramos-Horta and the leadership of the East Timor resistance, constantly asking what they want us to do.”754

Effecting Change

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the nascent East Timor solidarity movement yielded little in terms of concrete results as measured by change in government policy or conflict settlement. The 1990s, however, saw changes at the policy level that occurred in response to the actions and campaigns of what was by then a transnational advocacy network working with East Timorese in diaspora. By the 1990s, the East Timorese had successfully bridged, albeit temporarily, political, ideological and generational divisions to create a unified voice and organization—the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance). The CNRT had international representatives in Washington, D.C., Canada, Belgium, South Africa, Portugal, the U.K., and in several cities in Australia.755 CNRT international representatives were diaspora members that included both UDT and Fretilin supporters, and unaffiliated individuals (non-partisans) who by then were also working closely with national and international non-governmental organizations. These partnerships were at their most dense and active in the critical period leading up to the referendum in East Timor on August 30, 1999 and the violent period following the announcement of referendum results on September 4, 1999. They would be credited with exerting immense pressure on the “international community” to respond to human rights abuses in East Timor, to recognize East Timor's right to self-determination and, in Australia in particular, to send a peacekeeping force to East Timor to end the post-referendum violence and facilitate the transition to official independence in 2002.

754 Interview with Brendan Doyle of Australia East Timor Association (AETA), January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

755 East Timor Action Network (ETAN), List of East Timor Support and Solidarity Groups World Wide at http://w3g.gkss.de/staff/cabral/ET.groups.html
Leading up to these events were incremental gains. In 1992, activists in the U.S. persuaded Congressmen Ronald Machtley (Rhode Island Republican) and Tony Hall (Ohio Democrat) to introduce legislation to end the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) for Indonesia. This was followed by an effective campaign that had activist students, mostly from Brown University and the University of Wisconsin, make thousands of calls and send letters to key members of Congress and congressional committees.\textsuperscript{756} As a result, IMET was banned through 1999. Activist pressure on Congress and then from Congress on the State Department led to its blocking the transfer of U.S.-made F-5 fighter planes to Indonesia in 1993, a ban on small arms sales in 1994, and armored vehicles in 1996.\textsuperscript{757} Activists succeeded by targeting the sale of weapons and training in their lobbying efforts, linking these to human rights abuses in East Timor and by “cultivating a critical mass” of “allies” in Congress.\textsuperscript{758} Senator Russ Feingold (Wisconsin Democrat) and Congressman Patrick Kennedy (Rhode Island Democrat) were among the most outspoken and active of these “allies”—in Rasheed Marker’s estimation, they helped to create a “groundswell of support”\textsuperscript{759} on Capitol Hill. Once these relationships were established, the East Timor solidarity groups were able to add “self-determination” to their lobbying efforts. They promoted the argument that a permanent and peaceful solution to the problem in East Timor (including an end to severe human rights abuses) required an act of self-determination. The close relationship between the solidarity groups and East Timorese lent legitimacy to this argument. Starting in 1996 members of Congress moved beyond their stated concern for human rights to advising and advocating a U.N.-sponsored referendum for East Timor.\textsuperscript{760}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{758} Simpson (2000): 464.
  \item \textsuperscript{759} Marker (2003): 51.
  \item \textsuperscript{760} Scheiner (2000): 125.
\end{itemize}
Three factors facilitated the adoption of self-determination in the advocacy strategies of the transnational advocacy network (TAN) for East Timor and by members of Congress and Parliament (in Canada, Australia, Europe and Japan as it came to happen). First was the unified voice of the East Timorese themselves. The CNRT projected a unified message—a demand for self-determination (as well as a willingness to compromise as evident in its earlier peace proposal which included the possibility of a transitional period under Indonesian administration leading to a referendum). The unified voice made clear the “wishes” of East Timorese, from all political groups, in and out of East Timor. Second was the image cultivated by particular East Timorese (no less indiaspora) and the TAN of the East Timor resistance as a non-violent movement. Xanana Gusmão had by this time indeed shifted the movement from an emphasis on guerrilla resistance to primarily urban non-violent resistance. Even from prison in Indonesia (from 1992) he was able to persuade the armed movement—by and large—to resist provocation and limit the armed struggle. Finally and closely related to the former point, was the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize award to José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo of East Timor “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor.”

The award itself was no accident. According to Brad Simpson, for several years prior to the award, East Timor activists lobbied former prize winners, parliamentarians and religious leaders to recognize the struggle of the East Timorese and the efforts of Ramos-Horta and Belo. The prize had the effect of raising East Timor’s profile (and that of Ramos-Horta) among the media, governments, and the public and conferring legitimacy on East Timorese representatives and the East Timor transnational advocacy network. Moreover, it conferred

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761 Indeed Falintil (the Armed resistance) was largely defeated by this time, arguably forcing a change in strategy. This will be discussed further in comparison to the Acehnese case.

762 It is rarely pointed out that Henry Kissinger—accused of having given the ‘green light’ to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor—was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1973.

763 The nobelprize.org at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1996/


765 Ibid.
legitimacy to the ideas, values and goals advocated by Ramos-Horta and the TAN—namely, an end to human rights abuses and a self-determination referendum.

In Australia, foreign policy towards Indonesia and East Timor remained largely unmoved through the late 1990s. What the East Timor solidarity movement did accomplish over the years was to keep the East Timor problem in the media and in the public eye. Australian policy towards East Timor was unwavering albeit unpopular—media reports, public demonstrations against human rights abuses and for self-determination represented an irritant in the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship. In 1996, East Timor advocates moved their campaign beyond this bilateral relationship to the international arena in an effort to thwart Australia’s bid for a U.N. Security Council seat. The East Timor solidarity movement in Australia lobbied former Soviet Union states, African and Latin American states, arguing that Australia should not be awarded a seat in the Security Council because of its support for Indonesia and because it did not support decolonization.766 Australia lost the seat to Portugal. Although Australia’s policy towards Indonesia and East Timor was not decisive in this loss, activists (and Ramos-Horta) believe it was a contributing factor. In the late 1990s, following the collapse of the Suharto regime, the Australian government came under increasing activist and public pressure to recognize the need for a solution to the East Timor problem that included an act of self-determination.767 In response the government conducted a survey of East Timorese (in East Timor and in Australia), the results of which showed that autonomy within Indonesia was no longer acceptable to the vast majority of respondents (of various political views—among them many who had formerly advocated integration with Indonesia). This pressure and the survey reports, in addition to apparent changes in policy in the U.S., eventually compelled Australia’s Prime Minister John Howard to send the personal letter to Indonesian President Habibie recommending that Indonesia reconsider the issue of self-determination.768 Jim Aubrey describes the shift in Australia’s policy as abandoning a

766 Interview with Vacy Vlazna, AETA, January 3, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
sinking ship. In January 1999 Habibie announced that a referendum would be held in East Timor.

Following the announcement of the referendum results and the violence that engulfed East Timor (militia-led and Indonesian military-supported), tens of thousands marched and demonstrated in Australia’s major cities calling for Australian troops to intervene. Demonstrations against the violence in East Timor also took place in the U.S., Portugal and elsewhere in Europe. In Washington D.C., Genocide Watch quickly organized a meeting to launch a campaign to pressure Western governments; the meeting was opened by José Ramos-Horta. On September 9, 1999 the administration of Bill Clinton—under pressure from demonstrators and Congress, suspended military ties with Indonesia and called on the Indonesian government to accept an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. In Australia, the demonstrations and rallies lasted for weeks. On September 20, 1999, a U.N.-mandated multi-national force led by Australia arrived in East Timor. The Indonesian government had capitulated and accepted a U.N. force under pressure from the U.S., Australia, Portugal and other states. These states in turn were under pressure from a transnational advocacy network in solidarity with East Timor. Following a period of U.N. transitional administration, East Timor was officially declared an independent state on May 20, 2002.

The initially tepid and eventually dramatic changes in policy (certainly in the U.S. and Australia) did not occur independently from the work of the transnational advocacy network for East Timor. In Vacy Vlazna’s estimation, for example, the size of the public movement in Australia (demanding Australian intervention after the 1999 East Timor referendum) and the Australian government’s eventual (if reluctant) response were “the result of the solidarity

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770 A demonstration in Melbourne, for example, reportedly attracted 25,000 people including trade union workers, church groups, students, and government officials.

771 The International Force for East Timor (Interfet).

772 Earlier attempts by ASEAN to put together a joint force failed.
preparing the groundwork for many years. This “groundwork” in Australia as in the U.S. and elsewhere included a successful and deepening partnership with East Timorese in diaspora, the successful framing of the East Timor problem in terms of complicity and obligation, creative use of information and testimonies in campaigns and strategies, and the deployment of cosmopolitan ideas and values, namely human rights, democracy and later peaceful conflict settlement based on a self-determination referendum. In the case of East Timor, moderates and the moderating diasporans reached out to a broader audience and were willing to work and find commonality with new partners in order to encourage a negotiated solution to their homeland conflict.

The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process

Lacking a Foundation for a Future Aceh Solidarity Movement

Due to its success, based both on process and effect, East Timor may be considered a model case in diaspora-transnational advocacy network (TAN) partnerships. Changes in structural conditions in Indonesia (economic crisis and political transition) combined with increasing international interest in and attention to the East Timor problem greatly strengthened the position of the East Timorese resistance and set the stage for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. This international interest and attention was brought about by a transnational advocacy network working in partnership with the East Timorese diaspora. It follows, that changes in structural conditions in Indonesia also represented potential political opportunities for a settlement of the Aceh conflict and begs the question of whether or not East Timor’s success could be replicated in Aceh. This chapter argues that much of East Timor’s success is owed to processes of transformation. That is, the diaspora transformation from peace-wrecker to peace-maker—from ideologically rigid long-distance nationalist to cosmopolitan moderate, as well as the transformation of a small group of supporters into a transnational advocacy network dedicated to an end to human rights abuses in East Timor and eventually

773 Interview with Vacy Vlazna, AETA, January 3, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

774 This finding echoes Pnina Werbner’s analysis of diasporas, see Werbner (2000); 7.

775 Marker (2003): 86.

776 For a discussion of this transformation see Chapter 3.
to bringing about a solution to the conflict through an act of self-determination. The transformation (and in this case moderation) of the East Timorese diaspora’s positions resulted from both internal changes within the diaspora and from growing and deepening relationships with external partners, primarily NGOs and individuals. The transformation into a transnational advocacy network resulted from a consonance in values and ideas between the diaspora and non-Timorese activists, greater access to information, and effective framing or re-framing of the East Timor problem and its solution. Did such processes of transformation also occur in the case of Aceh and result in a similar effect?

Chapter 4 details the early years of Acehnese diaspora organization and activity. Hasan di Tiro and his associates settled in diaspora in Scandinavia from the early 1980s. From this time until the early 1990s, diaspora activity was carried out by a small number of GAM exiles in Stockholm under the leadership of and loyal to Hasan di Tiro. During this phase, di Tiro primarily focused his energies on re-organizing an armed independence movement in Aceh. However, he also attempted to lobby internationally, indeed much of the legitimacy of the GAM leadership in diaspora was based on its role in securing international recognition for the Aceh problem. Di Tiro appears to have concentrated his efforts on the U.N. system and based his argument on principles of self-determination and decolonization. He was largely unsuccessful. In the assessment of Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, for example, the most di Tiro was able to achieve “was entry into the outermost fringes of the international system via such bodies as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).” In comparison to Ramos-Horta’s lobbying efforts at the U.N., di Tiro lacked any state support (Ramos-Horta to varying degrees had support from Portugal, former Portuguese colonies, and China). Despite his efforts to present the Aceh case as an incomplete decolonization, di Tiro’s arguments did not find support, thus he lacked any real recourse, in

777 See Fallon and Missbach (2007).
this respect, to international law—this too differentiates the challenges di Tiro’s faced at the U.N. from those faced by Ramos-Horta.779

One may argue, however, that di Tiro and GAM were somewhat more successful in the early to mid-1990s when the question of Aceh was raised in the context of discrimination and protection of minorities and of human rights. Here di Tiro’s relationship with UNPO may have proved somewhat fruitful. Membership in UNPO required the articulation of the Aceh problem as that of an unrepresented (and threatened) nation or minority and could be presented to U.N. bodies as such. In this way by the early 1990s, Aceh was inserted into the agenda of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, specifically, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In 1993 this Sub-Commission considered a draft resolution expressing “deep concern at the reports of arbitrary and summary executions in Aceh,” encouraging Indonesia to open Aceh to U.N. (Sub-Commission) visits to assess the situation on torture, extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions and “related human rights violations.”780 A similar draft resolution was proposed in 1994, again expressing “deepest concern at reports of continuing violations of human rights in Aceh” and urging Indonesia to allow NGO, U.N. and media entry to Aceh to monitor and report on the situation.781 It is not clear, however, whether the inclusion of Aceh in these meetings and draft resolutions were the direct result of di Tiro’s lobbying or the result of information brought to the attention of the U.N. Sub-Commission by human rights organizations working independently and with no relationship to di Tiro or other members of the Acehnese diaspora. Furthermore, any gains at the U.N. were limited to agenda-setting.

779 Under international law, de-colonized states were to adopt the boundaries of the colonizing power at independence. This meant that Indonesia had international law on its side regarding Aceh, but not East Timor.


Both of the draft resolutions mentioned above, for example, were rejected by secret ballot and never went any further.\(^\text{782}\)

The diplomatic efforts of the Acehnese in diaspora, in the early years (from 1980 to the mid-1990s) were constrained by a lack of state support and a lack of recourse to international law. However, the Acehnese diaspora (GAM at this stage) was also self-constrained by what appears to be a lack of appealing ideas, capacity, and commitment to diplomacy and networking. Whereas members of the East Timorese diaspora were able to attract the support of members of the Communist Party of Australia and other members of the political left in Australia and the U.S. (and Portugal), for example, GAM’s rhetoric held no such appeal. The rhetoric was ethno-national and exclusive. References to a future sultanate for Aceh, were also unhelpful in this respect. Moreover, di Tiro and GAM in diaspora were conservative and anti-communist.\(^\text{783}\) Based on ideology and rhetoric, GAM’s potential conservative and anti-communist partners or allies would already have been allied with the government of Indonesia itself. In contrast to the East Timor case, the early years of the Acehnese diaspora did not lay the foundation for a future network of supporters.

Regarding capacity and commitment to diplomacy, the leadership of GAM in diaspora also did not have a “roving ambassador” in the shape of Ramos-Horta.\(^\text{784}\) Di Tiro took on this role himself, but he was also deeply involved in and committed to reviving and supporting the armed struggle in Aceh. Not only was di Tiro involved in the military front of the GAM campaign but so were his top associates. Malik Mahmud, for example was also involved in the training activities of new recruits taking place in Libya. GAM appears to have had no single person or group of people dedicated strictly to diplomatic activity and building a network of support. Indeed GAM did not seem to separate its military and diplomatic fronts.\(^\text{785}\) It has been suggested that GAM’s diplomatic activity might also have been

\(^{782}\) Similar draft resolutions on East Timor considered at the same meetings were also rejected by secret ballot.


\(^{784}\) Or the Dalai Lama, as a further example.

hindered by travel/visa restrictions—that GAM members in diaspora did not enjoy the same freedom of movement as Ramos-Horta who travelled on a Portuguese passport.\textsuperscript{786} This problem, however, likely would have been resolved once di Tiro and other members of his group received Swedish citizenship. It is also quite possible that the diplomatic effort was hindered by the location of the GAM leadership in Sweden rather than in a state with a more significant bilateral relationship with Indonesia, such as Australia or the U.S. Distance from these two countries may have prevented early fostering of relationships with “friendly” government officials and nongovernmental organizations. Finally, unlike the East Timorese, the Acehnese had no pre-established potential partners. While East Timor enjoyed some early measure of support and solidarity from Christian organizations and, in Australia, from World War II veterans, Aceh did not. The Acehnese had no relationship with allied forces during the Second World War, and pan-Islamic support was limited by the fact that Indonesia itself was also a Muslim-majority state.

While the East Timorese were skilful at building and maintaining links with non-Timorese supporters and NGOs and cultivated working relationships with them, even in the early years in diaspora, the focus of GAM (in diaspora) was on the armed struggle in Aceh and later on consolidating support among the Acehnese arrivals in the diaspora. Despite his international experience and apart from seemingly futile efforts to directly lobby the UN system, di Tiro and his GAM followers in diaspora failed to see the value of cultivating more broad-based international networks,\textsuperscript{787} particularly outside international organizations and states. It was not until the mid to late 1990s that GAM began to adopt the discourse and diplomatic strategies that would appeal to individuals and organizations that could potentially form a transnational advocacy network.

A Late-Evolving Aceh Solidarity Movement

The Acehnese diaspora in the West was transformed by the influx of new arrivals from the 1990s to the early 2000s. Unlike di Tiro and the original members of the diaspora, the newer

\textsuperscript{786} Interview with East Timor and Aceh activist, January 2006, Australia. Nevertheless, Ramos-Horta and other Fretilin members were banned from entry into Australia for a number of years (see Chapter 4).

\textsuperscript{787} McCulloch (2005): 12.
members better understood the value of establishing ties with domestic and international non-governmental organizations. In fact, based on their own experience in activism and campaigning, they saw these as their natural partners (rather than, say, states or international organizations). This was the case even for those with close ties to GAM, such as Shadia Marhaban in the U.S. and Nurdin Abdul Rahman in Australia. Both had previous experience working with non-governmental organizations in Aceh and brought with them to diaspora a commitment not only to independence (GAM’s goal) but also, and perhaps more urgently, a commitment to ending human rights abuses in Aceh. In addition, many of the new members of the diaspora were more open to an inclusive approach to activism and diplomacy; that is, they were willing to include GAM members in their dialogue and activism but were also interested in attracting the participation of the Indonesian government and broader sections of Acehnese society. Both their interest in human rights and their more inclusive approach made this group of Acehnese in diaspora a more appealing partner to Western NGOs than the smaller GAM leadership in Stockholm had been.

This period in the growth of Acehnese diaspora in the West coincided with an upsurge in violence in Aceh through the 1990s (indeed the migration of these Acehnese was largely conflict-driven), a period of dialogue between GAM and the government of Indonesia in the early 2000s followed by another period of violence and repression in Aceh from 2003, and also with the dramatic changes in East Timor from the 1999 referendum on. This meant that the new wave of Acehnese settling in the West were doing so at a time when there was marginally more media, government, and public interest in Aceh than there had been before—both interest in the conflict and in the peace talks (although the talks eventually failed). It also meant that NGOs dedicated to East Timor, having seen that conflict settled and to a large extent having accomplished their goals, were turning their attention to other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, primarily West Papua and Aceh.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch had for some time followed the Aceh conflict and were active in reporting the violence and human rights abuses that took place during the DOM period (1989-1998) and thereafter. They had also established some links with human rights activists, NGOs and others in Aceh who provided vital information for the
reports of these organizations. The escalation of violence in Aceh and restrictions imposed by the Indonesian government on foreign media and NGO access to Aceh during various periods posed a challenge to reporting events and abuses directly from the field. With the imposition of Martial Law starting in May 2003, for example, Aceh was essentially sealed off from the world.\textsuperscript{788} In this case, as described in Chapter 4, diaspora members often acted as a conduit of information. In addition to providing their own testimony and information,\textsuperscript{789} quick (most often text) messages with information—about disappearances, torture, imprisonments, or killings—were sent from Aceh to Acehnese in Jakarta, Malaysia, Scandinavia, Australia and/or the U.S. and the information was forwarded from there to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organizations and individuals. The International Crisis Group (ICG) also frequently issued reports and policy recommendations on Aceh from the early 2000s. Much of this work was conducted by Sidney Jones, an Indonesia expert who joined the ICG in 2002 after having spent over ten years at Human Rights Watch. An Acehnese in diaspora in Malaysia claimed to have been one of her main sources of information.\textsuperscript{790} The ICG reports held specific significance because the profile and credibility of the organization meant that information from the reports was frequently picked up by the international media. In June 2004, apparently displeased by ICG’s reports and articles, the Indonesian government expelled Jones and a colleague from the country. According to Jones, the Indonesian government saw them as “a threat to Indonesia’s security and damaging its image abroad.”\textsuperscript{791} Jones was later allowed to return and resume the work of ICG from their Jakarta office.\textsuperscript{792}


\textsuperscript{790} Interview with Acehnese, December 2005, Malaysia.


\textsuperscript{792} Although not common, this was not an isolated incident. Lesley McCullogh, an Australia-based academic was arrested in Aceh in 2002 for violating a tourist visa by researching the conflict in Aceh (she was released after five months). William Nessen, a free-lance journalist was also arrested in Aceh in 2003 for violating immigration rules. He had spent time with GAM combatants reporting on the conflict in Aceh. A Japanese
In addition to these NGOs whose work is devoted to human rights and conflict issues, Aceh attracted the attention of NGOs which had previously dedicated themselves solely or in great part to East Timor. It was during this period (from the late 1990s on), for example, that the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) in the U.S. broadened its scope and name, becoming the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network. Its advocacy was expanded to include Aceh and West Papua and it began to work closely with Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, the New York-based Acehnese activist and his International Forum for Aceh (IFA), and with other Acehnese in diaspora (see Chapter 4). In Europe, another NGO, Tapol also began campaigning more actively for Aceh and was joined by Aguswandi, an outspoken Acehnese activist residing in the U.K. Both Jafar and Aguswandi have been credited for “growing” solidarity for Aceh through their relationships with Western NGOs. As acknowledged by Nur Djuli, a leader of the diaspora in Malaysia and GAM negotiator, “the Acehnese issue was internationalized by IFA and IFA and Jafar should get credit for this.”

In Australia, many of the East Timor groups remained engaged with the new country and turned their attention to humanitarian and development work there. The Aceh problem, however, was taken up by some organizations and activists that had formerly targeted East Timor, such as the Action in Solidarity with Asia Pacific (ASAP). ASAP in turn worked with another group, Indonesian solidarity and with members of the Acehnese diaspora. Eko Waluyo of Indonesian Solidarity, Sydney, recalled working with the Acehnese community to raise awareness in Australia of human rights abuses in Aceh. According to Waluyo, “people in Australia did not know about the conflict and human rights issues in Aceh. The goal was to bring attention to the Australian public.” Activities included organizing public seminars and lectures, photo exhibits, and lobbying government. An important part of this effort

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photographer, Tadatomo Takagi was also arrested and expelled from Aceh in 2003 after photographing refugees fleeing the conflict.

793 Interview with Muhammed Nur Djuli, December 9, 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

794 Formerly Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor (ASIET).
involved bringing speakers from Aceh. The Acehnese community raised funds to bring the speakers, Waluyo said.\footnote{Interview with Eko Waluyo, Indonesian Solidarity-Sydney, January 9, 2006, Sydney, Australia.}

Acehnese in Australia also worked with Vacy Vlazna—a long-time East Timor advocate—who in cooperation with Nurdin Abdul Rahman launched Aceh Human Rights Online (AHRO), an internet-based campaign. According to Vlazna, a number of Acehnese in diaspora were “really supportive.” She described Nurdin Abdul Rahman as very active: “he was non-stop...he went all over, he would go to any little community and talk. He’d go to parliamentarians, he went to New Zealand.”\footnote{Interview with Vacy Vlazna, Australian Activist, January 2, 2006, Manly, Australia.} The Acehnese in diaspora through their own organization, the Acehnese Community of Australia and through Aceh Human Rights Online, would prepare urgent appeals based on information coming in from Aceh and disseminate these.\footnote{Acehnese Community of Australia and Nurdin Abdul Rahman, copies of various Listserv postings from January 2004, author’s files.} According to Vlazna, the appeals and information from Aceh were sent to the Indonesian Ambassador in the U.N., as well as other U.N. offices. This was to deliberately let Indonesia know “that this is being watched...People in Aceh were being imprisoned, tortured, so they have a voice. The campaigns don’t always help, but more often than not it helps. Even after killings—those killings are acknowledged, brought to light.”\footnote{Interview with Vacy Vlazna, Australian Activist, January 2, 2006, Manly, Australia.} However, the campaign would later become the Aceh Papua Moluccas Human Rights Online, prompting some Acehnese diaspora participants to distance themselves from the project as they considered it to be too diluted by this change to have an effect on conditions in Aceh.

Acehnese in Scandinavia were less successful in forging partnerships or alliances with NGOs. The most likely explanation was the language barrier. According to an Acehnese in Denmark: “There [was] no solidarity movement in Denmark, no solidarity group, no partner. [It was] difficult because of language, [the Acehnese tried] to build this [solidarity] but [it was] difficult...Our goal [was] to inform people of the human rights situation in Aceh. The
political conflict [was] bigger than [the] tsunami." After the earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 that struck Aceh, local NGOs sought out the Acehnese community in Scandinavia as an information resource. After the tsunami they were invited to speak at Aalborg University, held meetings with the Danish Red Cross, Danish refugee organizations, and with government officials.

As was the case with the East Timorese diaspora, the relationship between the Acehnese diaspora and NGOs was symbiotic. The NGOs and individuals working on Aceh helped to amplify the voice of the small Acehnese diaspora while the participation of diaspora members in NGO activities and campaigns lent them legitimacy (and information). The work of NGOs on Aceh, as with East Timor, included information gathering and dissemination, demonstrations, conferences, public awareness and education campaigns, lobbying and legal action. As in the East Timor case, diaspora members were often included in activities and campaigns as witnesses to the violence and abuses (or victims of these) occurring in Aceh. This was possible because the values and ideas of many of the new arrivals reflected a more moderate approach to the Aceh problem; their "struggle" was thus more comprehensible to a hostland audience. Their emphasis was on human rights, democracy, conflict-settlement through negotiation and referendum, and the promotion and inclusion of civil society (even if for many their ultimate goal remained independence). Through the late 1990s and early 2000s a burgeoning (if still small) transnational advocacy network appeared to be gaining momentum, it was both a reaction to events in Aceh and East Timor (and Indonesia more broadly) as well as the result of active partnership-building by individual Acehnese in diaspora and Western activists.

The Diaspora-TAN Partnership Process and Aceh Conflict Settlement

The diaspora and emerging transnational advocacy network (TAN) partnership replicated many of the repertoires of action of the East Timor solidarity TAN. Cosmopolitan concepts of human rights, democracy and civil society were at the centre of the Aceh campaigns. While the advocacy efforts of organizations such as Amnesty International and Human

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799 Interview with Al Ayubi, May 20, 2005, Veijle, Denmark.
Rights Watch concentrated on the strategic use of information—research, writing, and publicizing reports and press releases and presenting recommendations to government and international organizations—other NGOs attempted to target and challenge specific government policies in the West, again by framing the Aceh problem in terms of complicity and obligation. In the U.S., Australia and the U.K. this was based largely on Western support for the Indonesian government, weapons transfers and military training, and the pre-eminence given by Western governments, in practice, to commercial and economic interests over human rights. Demands made to the U.S., U.K., and Australian governments, included pressuring the Indonesian government to cease military operations in Aceh, withdraw troops and engage in dialogue, and encourage Indonesia to open Aceh to international humanitarian assistance and the international media. Demands also included an end to Western military assistance to Indonesia, and to holding Western multinationals operating in Aceh accountable for human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces under their employ. Activities included demonstrations, frequently timed to coincide with visits by Indonesian government officials and military personnel, public awareness campaigns, and direct lobbying of government representatives. In 2003, ETAN in the U.S., for example, organized training activities for diaspora activists prior to their meeting with or presenting testimony to government officials. According to Acehnese diasporans who participated in such training and lobbying, the training included role-playing, specific information to focus on given time constraints of meetings, topics to avoid (independence and religion), and background information on government representatives (how “friendly” or antagonistic they might be to the Aceh case).

The meetings, with officials in Congressional offices or at the State Department Asia Pacific Desk officer level,

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802 An important role provided by NGOs was negotiating domestic logistical issues such as securing the necessary permits for demonstrations, either for their own or diaspora-initiated activity.

803 Interview with Acehnese activist, October 11, 2005, Baltimore, MD.
were also organized by the NGOs.\textsuperscript{804} Also in 2003, in light of escalating violence in Aceh and revelations that British-made Scorpion light tanks and Hawk aircraft were being used in Aceh, in contravention to assurances made by the Indonesian government to the British as part of the sales agreement for this equipment, Tapol initiated an arms embargo campaign on Indonesia that drew the participation of 80 non-governmental organizations and helped draw the attention of the media to British foreign policy towards Indonesia.\textsuperscript{805} Tapol’s campaign is an example of what Keck and Sikkink describe as accountability politics. It was designed to “expose the distance”\textsuperscript{806} between government’s discourse and practice, thereby shaming the British government and pressuring the new Labour government to change its weapons sales policy (the equipment used in Aceh had been sold by the previous Conservative government). That is, to bring practice in line with discourse.

**Challenges in “Framing” the Aceh Conflict**

Western activists acknowledge that it was more difficult for them to articulate a clear connection between their own governments and the Aceh conflict. In the case of East Timor, much of the activism was driven by a belief that Australia, the U.S., and the U.K. were complicit in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, that they either turned a blind eye or gave Indonesia a “green light.” Much solidarity work was thus aimed at bringing this complicity to light and attempting to change accommodationist policies toward Indonesia. In the case of Aceh, campaigns were more narrowly focused on the human rights abuses of the Indonesian military and the role of Western arms transfers and bilateral military cooperation. Thus, Aceh competed with tens if not hundreds of other areas of the world that demanded the attention of human rights and democracy activists. Among them were areas within Indonesia itself—primarily West Papua. When NGOs dedicated to East Timor (or largely focused on East Timor) broadened their agenda to include Aceh, they also included the conflict in West Papua and often it was this conflict that they found easier to articulate in terms of principles of self-determination and human rights. As an ETAN representative put it, “the cases of East

\textsuperscript{804} Interview with Karen Orenstein, ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C.


Timor and Papua are more clear-cut, Aceh is more nuanced...it is also not clear [to a Western audience] that Acehnese are not really Indonesians. It was clearly understood that the East Timorese and Papuans were not—different language, different colonial background, different religion."807

This issue of religion is significant. Clearly, the East Timorese benefitted from a wider and early network of support that had its basis in history—from Australian veterans of WWII, from solidarity groups in Lusophone countries, and from Christian, and especially Catholic organizations. Karen Orenstein of ETAN acknowledges that “religion is an issue” and that in advocating for Aceh they understood “Islamophobia” may be an impediment, particularly in the United States after the events of September 11, 2001.808 However, in Orenstein’s view it was the more general issue of not being able to clearly differentiate between Acehnese and Indonesians that was the greater challenge. The implementation of Sharia in Aceh was also problematic in terms of drawing support for the Acehnese. Among Acehnese in diaspora interviewed for this dissertation the topic of Sharia was particularly sensitive. There was a willingness to discuss the topic, but many asked that their comments remain off record or unattributed. The general view was that Sharia was unnecessary (Acehnese were sufficiently devout), a political maneuver by Jakarta to gain support among certain sectors of the Acehnese population, was meant to portray the Acehnese as fundamentalists, and/or show that Jakarta was responding to Acehnese grievances without actually doing so. Most interviewees also expressed concern over how Sharia was implemented, stating that it was only applied to the poor, women and petty criminals rather than to those in power. However,

807 Interview with Karen Orenstein, ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C. Although vastly diverse, native Papuans are Melanesian and differ in appearance, culture, and language from the majority ethnic groups of Indonesia, and the majority of native Papuans are predominantly Christian. In terms of colonial history, although West Papua, like other parts of Indonesia was part of the Netherlands West Indies, the Netherlands retained this territory when it transferred sovereignty over other territories to Indonesia in December 1949. Papuan nationalist discourse (adopted by Western supporters) contends that West Papuans declared themselves independent in December 1961, however, they were denied their independence by an agreement reached in 1962 (under U.N. auspices) in which the Dutch agreed to transfer the administration of Papua to Indonesia. In turn, the Indonesian government agreed to an act of self-determination for Papuans in the form of the ‘Act of Free Choice’ of 1969. Although the results of this were “noted” in a U.N. resolution, it is now widely accepted that the process of “free choice,” as it was called, was “carefully orchestrated” by the Indonesians to ensure Papuan annexation. See Richard Chauvel, Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaptation, Policy Studies 14, East-West Center (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005).

808 Interview with Karen Orenstein ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C.
many acknowledged that the topic is difficult to discuss openly. It is difficult for Acehnese, whose identity is so closely tied to their religion and their identification as devout Muslims, to criticize or reject the adoption of Sharia in Aceh. For the TANs, advocacy on behalf of the East Timorese or West Papuans, both predominantly Christian, required no such restraint.

In addition, in articulating complicity and obligation, Western NGOs working on Papua have been able to reach out to a broader network of activists. Arguments based on commercial and economic opportunism, for example, frequently cite the activities of Freeport International mine (a U.S.-owned business); these arguments link the commercial and economic activities of a Western company not only to the perpetuation of the conflict and human rights abuses in Papua but also to environmental pollution and degradation. This framing of the Papua problem has served to attract environmental activists as well. As a result, Acehnese diaspora activists were ambivalent over their relationship with Western NGOs, viewing them as very supportive to their cause but at the same time as not fully committed to it.

But there are other reasons that hindered a diaspora-transnational advocacy network partnership. Unlike the East Timorese, with the creation of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), the Acehnese were not able to achieve the degree of internal cohesion necessary to put forth a united front and message. The East Timorese National Convention in Diaspora that took place in April 1998 made clear that the CNRT represented the wishes of a broad section of East Timorese—from different political parties as well as the independents. It also represented the East Timor-based and those in diaspora. It further officially recognized the leadership of Xanana Gusmão in East Timor and the role of Ramos-Horta as East Timor’s spokesman in diaspora. The East Timorese succeeded in creating a transnational community of co-responsibility based not only on shared ideas about a common

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809 Indonesian security forces have been accused of fueling the conflict in Papua to justify their presence in Papua and protection of the company. As in the case of ExxonMobil in Aceh, Freeport has employed Indonesian military and police for security and to keep native landowners (land claimants) away.

810 Interview with Karen Orenstein, ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C.

past but also about a common destiny or future. In this “future” East Timor was envisioned and articulated as a democratic, multi-party and law-abiding state committed to political, civil and human rights and international law. The East Timorese message was one of unity.

The unity achieved by the East Timorese, however, may be overstated. Certainly old political differences and factions persisted and new generational and gender conflicts emerged. Among the younger generation of East Timorese (many of whom had been involved in the clandestine and student movements) there were complaints of being left out of agenda-setting and decision-making. They viewed the CNRT as overly influenced, even monopolized, by an old guard—including Ramos-Horta. Some of these “generational grievances” came to the fore after East Timor gained independence (see Chapter 6). There were also grievances based on gender-bias. Women pointed to their marginal or token role in decision-making and to reluctance by the older generation of East Timorese leaders to recognize their concerns or even their voice in meetings. In this too, Ramos-Horta as the leader in diaspora was directly implicated. Nevertheless, the East Timorese were able to put such grievances aside temporarily in order to present a united and coherent voice to their supporters and the world, and this voice was amplified by a transnational advocacy network.

Unity affects legitimacy. Certainly by the mid-1990s Ramos-Horta was considered the legitimate speaker for the East Timorese by Western NGOs and by a growing number of members of Western parliaments and Congress. For Acehnese in diaspora, the legitimacy

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815 The CNRT, for example, resolved to create Cabinet for Strategic Studies composed of younger generation members in order to funnel new ideas and new people into the organization. See Milena Pires (1998).

of leaders proved problematic. U.S. activists pointed to apparent internal issues in the Acehnese diaspora that were difficult for non-Acehnese to understand both because of a language barrier and because Western activists deliberately wanted to remain removed from what they viewed as Acehnese factionalism.  

In addition, as Karen Orenstein of ETAN in the U.S. pointed out, while "Ramos Horta was going around the world talking to people and bringing East Timor to their attention. The [Aceh] Stockholm leaders had not done this. [One didn’t] get the same sense from them." Thus there were questions, even among Aceh’s partners in the NGO community, regarding the capacity of the Acehnese diaspora to provide a coherent voice and difficulty in identifying legitimate Acehnese leadership.

Although Western NGOs and individuals involved with Aceh attempted to distance themselves from the internal fissures among the Acehnese, they were both aware of them and their activism was circumscribed by them. The relationships between Acehnese activists in diaspora and their Western supporters were based on shared principles of democracy, human rights and an emphasis on a need to create political space in Aceh for humanitarian assistance and civil society. There was also support among Western NGOs for a diplomatic solution to the conflict (if not an overt embrace of a referendum). However, the activism on behalf of Aceh often had to be carried out through an act of distancing the work from the GAM leadership in diaspora (in Stockholm) rather than in coordination with it as had been done with the East Timorese leadership.

By 2002, the GAM leadership in Sweden had conducted a series of meetings (and participated in meetings organized by IFA in the U.S., for example) in an attempt both to reach out to the growing numbers in diaspora and to consolidate support among them. It also and belatedly began to recognize the importance of reaching out to potential and more varied partners in the hostlands of the Acehnese diaspora. As noted in Chapter 4, the July 2002 Stavanger Declaration, adopted at a GAM-organized meeting of Acehnese in diaspora, for

817 Personal communication with Aceh activists in U.S. and Australia, September 2005 -January 2006. American and Australian activists acknowledged that their work with Acehnese was largely limited to those Acehnese who were able to speak English and willing to engage in activism.

818 Interview with Karen Orenstein, ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C.
example, includes references to a future “democratic” Acehnese state and calls on the diaspora to “build cooperation” with NGOs and to improve its knowledge of diplomacy and human rights. This embrace of cosmopolitan ideas and partnership-building reflects both a change in tactics by the GAM leadership as well as tensions and a competition over ideas within the Acehnese diaspora. GAM faced a competition over ideas not only from the larger numbers of diasporans but also from within. It was not only those who opposed GAM’s goals, strategies and tactics but GAM members and supporters that were pressuring or negotiating with the “old guard” of the GAM leadership in diaspora to adopt and promote more cosmopolitan ideas. In other words not only was the composition of the broader diaspora changing (growing), but GAM itself was changing from within. Both GAM critics and supporters were demanding more openness and democratic decision-making and a greater emphasis on and role for a “diplomatic front.”

Despite the changes (even those within GAM), Western activists faced a further challenge in framing the Aceh problem: violence. GAM had a more violent reputation than Falintil making campaigning on behalf of Aceh more complicated. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch often included references or information on allegations of GAM violence in reports that were otherwise dedicated to recording human rights violations by Indonesian military security forces in Aceh. News reports made reference to GAM violence, lack of discipline, and war profiteering while pointing out that Indonesian security forces were also guilty of this but on a much larger scale. Karen Orenstein of ETAN explained how, in discussions regarding human rights abuses by the Indonesian armed forces in Aceh, she often felt compelled to start with the caveat, “I understand that GAM also has

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819 The Stavanger Declaration, Executive Committee of the Worldwide Acehnese Representatives Meeting in Stavanger Norway, 21 July 2002 at http://www.asnlf.net/topint.htm

820 The armed resistance movement of East Timor.


committed violent acts, but...,” whereas she did not feel compelled to do so in the case of East Timor. 823

There are two reasons for this. First, by the 1990s when lobbying efforts for East Timor where at their most active, the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance was largely defeated. Xanana Gusmão was imprisoned and according to William Nessen, Falintil only had some 120 guns, and it was a small and weak. 824 In this argument, Falintil’s capacity for violence was severely constrained. Whereas GAM in the 1990s was gaining strength as a guerrilla force, Falintil’s strength was largely symbolic. 825 According to Nessen, a longer look at the East Timor conflict reveals that Fretilin and Falintil were “as violent as any guerrilla movement.” 826 Nessen’s views find some support in the CAVR. For the period of 1974-1999, the CAVR report attributes killings and disappearances of non-combatants to the Indonesian military, Falintil, East Timorese political parties (Fretilin, UDT, and Apodeti), East Timorese civil defense forces, militias and other East Timorese auxiliaries. Responsibility for these crimes varied over time. In 1975, Fretilin was responsible for 49% of killings and disappearances (this period coincides with the East Timorese civil war); from 1976 to 1984 16.6% were attributed to Fretilin. This percentage dropped to 3.7% for the 1985 to 1998 period and to 0.6% in 1999. Over the entire period, however, the majority of these killings and disappearances (89.9%) were attributed to the Indonesian military and police and their East Timorese auxiliaries. 827

Second, by the 1990s, the East Timorese resistance had managed to separate its armed front effectively from the diplomatic front. Xanana Gusmão encouraged restraint among Falintil

823 Interview with Karen Orenstein, ETAN, October 14, 2005, Washington, D.C.

824 William Nessen, a freelance journalist, covered both the East Timor and Aceh conflicts spending time with both Falintil and GAM forces. Personal communication with William Nessen, December 10, 2005.

825 Personal communication with William Nessen, December 10, 2005.

826 Personal communication with William Nessen, December 10, 2005.

forces; this was a deliberate strategy to transform the image and reality of the resistance from an armed struggle to a non-violent movement. It allowed Ramos-Horta, other diaspora activists and their supporters to continue and indeed accelerate diplomatic and lobbying efforts without having to acknowledge or rationalize violence associated with the East Timorese resistance. The situation in Aceh differed. In the 1990s GAM armed resistance intensified rather than weakened. Moreover, the GAM leadership did not consciously separate the armed struggle from the diplomatic. In addition, the situation in Aceh appears to have been more muddled. As Aspinall and Crouch explain, “one of the most troubling elements of the Aceh conflict has been the frequent difficulty of identifying which group—the military, the police, GAM or some other group—was responsible for particular acts of violence.”

As a result, despite shared understandings among them, Acehnese diaspora members and Western activists and supporters were less successful in framing the Aceh problem in terms of values and principles that held broader appeal.

Finally, those NGO members and individuals who had formerly been associated with East Timor activism faced criticism over their apparently “new” interest in Aceh (and Papua). This “switch” to a different conflict, critics claimed, was the work of professional activists looking for a new cause and was guided less by principled ideas and normative concerns than by self-interest. Here, the division between principled ideas, normative concerns and self-interest may be overstated: NGO activism is both normative and strategic (by strategic here I mean in the self-interest of the NGOs mission but in consonance with the values and shared understandings of NGO members and partners). In addition, NGOs—particularly those that are part of a transnational advocacy network—are concerned not only with effecting change in foreign policy but with effecting change or strengthening norms at the international level. Success in one area (the East Timor campaign, particularly its emphasis on human rights) thus represents an opportunity to leverage support in other geographic areas and at the international level. Moreover, through the East Timor campaign, activists gained expertise

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Aspinall and Crouch (2003): 11. Aspinall and Crouch and other observers point to a lack of discipline among GAM recruits and criminal elements within GAM (particularly as numbers of recruits swelled in the 1990s), collusion between individual GAM members and Indonesian security forces for profiteering, as well as reported incidents of Indonesian soldiers disguised as GAM when committing attacks.
not only in the small territory of East Timor, but in Indonesia (especially the Indonesian security forces) and in the broader issue of human rights.

It should also be noted that several of these NGOs already had an established history of investigating and reporting the Aceh conflict, namely Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The upsurge in interest was in response to events associated with the on-going conflict in Aceh (escalation of violence as well as negotiations). This was also the case for Tapol in the U.K. Although its work placed a strong emphasis on East Timor, the early activities of the organization (established in the 1970s) focused on Indonesia as a whole and on Indonesian political prisoners specifically. Tapol’s early work also included campaigns in support of Indonesian student activists, against British arms sales to Indonesia, and reports on human rights violations in West Papua and Aceh. Moreover, activists (including those with ETAN) point to a direct connection between the conflict in East Timor and that in Aceh—thereby viewing their activities as an extension of their mission rather than a switch. The connection lies in the transfer of Indonesian military operations (including weapons and specific units and individuals) from East Timor to Aceh. As an American activist explained, “the perpetrators of violence and human rights abuses were the same in both places, when the TNI was kicked out of East Timor, they went directly to Aceh.”

**Effecting Change**

The gains of the Acehnese diaspora and nascent TAN are more difficult to gage than those of the East Timor diaspora-TAN partnership. In great part this is due to the late establishment of an Acehnese diaspora-TAN partnership as well as the challenges described in the section above. There are, however, some important examples of success (even if these were largely symbolic). One such example is the legal action taken against ExxonMobil in a U.S. court. Acehnese diaspora activists implicated ExxonMobil and its exploitation of natural gas in the Lhokseumawe region with gross human rights abuses there. According to Robert Jereski, a

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830 Personal communication with Jessica Rucell, December 5, 2005.

831 ExxonMobil hired the security personnel because of attacks on its facilities and employees. GAM has been accused of attacking ExxonMobil facilities and its security personnel
former director of IFA, it was Jafar Siddiq Hamzah who initially raised the possibility of bringing charges of human rights violations against ExxonMobil through the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. The company employed members of the Indonesian security forces to protect its facilities. Through his own testimony and information (and that from other Acehnese), Jafar attracted the attention of the International Labor Rights Fund. In 2001, this organization filed a lawsuit on behalf of 11 local villagers in a U.S. federal court against ExxonMobil. The suit claims that ExxonMobil knew of or should have known about human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces and that the soldiers hired by ExxonMobil engaged in abuse, torture and/or murder while they worked for ExxonMobil. Despite ExxonMobil’s appeals to dismiss the case, and its successful bid to have the administration of George W. Bush intervene on its behalf (the U.S. State Department requested the suit be dismissed on the grounds that U.S. security interests may be harmed), the court at various levels ruled to proceed to trial.832 As of 2009 the suit continued.

Activism on behalf of Aceh was unsuccessful in stemming the sale of arms to Indonesia or in having a direct impact on the foreign policy of the U.S., U.K. or Australia towards Indonesia. However, the combination of the East Timor experience and the activism on behalf of Aceh did serve to “temper” foreign policy. The visibility of the East Timor campaign (in particular its success in leveraging Congressional and Parliamentary members) cast a shadow on bilateral relations between Western governments and Indonesia. There was concern over the possibility that an Aceh campaign might gain momentum and favor among legislators who might seek to influence policy towards Indonesia. In the U.S., first the Clinton and then the Bush administrations were particularly concerned that greater attention to Aceh (and an escalation of violence there) might thwart their objective of reawakening ties with the Indonesian military—ties that were curtailed first in 1992 and further in 1999 in response to the violence in East Timor after the referendum. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration was concerned about any potential limits that might be imposed by Congress on arms transfers and training for Indonesia that the administration viewed as an


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important part of its anti-terrorism objectives. According to Larry Niksch, the Bush administration feared that Indonesian security forces might commit a “major massacre of civilians [in Aceh]...that would spur new congressional legislation” restricting the governments’ dealings with the Indonesian military.833 Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Vermont Democrat), for example, was already quite vocal about Indonesian military abuses in Aceh.834 The Bush administration, therefore, urged the Indonesian government to enter into negotiations with the Acehnese and find a political settlement to the conflict. It also attempted to influence the leadership of GAM, by stressing that the U.S. did not support its goals for independence and urging GAM to accept special autonomy. To convey this message, Assistant Secretary of State, Matt Daley, reportedly met with Hasan di Tiro in Sweden in the spring of 2002.835 The U.S. also offered retired Marine General Anthony Zinni as a member of the team of “wise men” that would serve as mediators during negotiations that took place in the early 2000s between GAM and the government of Indonesia.836 The New York Times reported that on a visit to Indonesia, Zinni told the Indonesian government “that it could no longer keep the conflict hidden from outside observers and that the government had to accept international monitors.”837 Pressure on both sides, however, did not lead to a lasting peace in Aceh. The Bush administration did manage to find sufficient Congressional support for its counter-terrorism aid and training for Indonesia, but it was not able to lift IMET and other arms sales restrictions until the mid-2000s.

Arguably, the Aceh diaspora-TAN partnership also managed to successfully counter Indonesian efforts to portray either GAM or the Acehnese as Islamic fundamentalists or terrorists (following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S.). In the U.S., NGO


834 Senator Leahy sponsored the amendment calling for the suspension of the IMET program and financing of military until the U.S. President can certify to Congress that Indonesia has made sufficient progress in addressing human rights, accountability for abuses in East Timor, and transparency in its military budget.


The U.S. State Department never added GAM to its Foreign Terrorist Organization list, instead labeling it a “separatist” organization. A New York Times article concurred: “GAM insists that its struggle is political, not religious. Western analysts agree and suggest that Jakarta labels the Acehnese Islamic ‘fundamentalists’ only to justify its brutal tactics.”

Likewise, the terrorist Bali bombings of 2002 did not lead to the equation of GAM or Acehnese as terrorists or fundamentalists by the Australian media or government officials. Acehnese in diaspora were also quick to make the point that Sharia law in Aceh was granted under Indonesia’s special autonomy offer as a distraction from Acehnese demands for justice, human rights, democracy and a referendum and as a way to “buy support.” A common explanation was that Acehnese were “very strong Muslims before” and did not need Indonesia to “give them Sharia.” In addition, although the Acehnese were frequently described as particularly devout Muslims (in the press and in NGO reports), the emergence of militant or violent Islamic groups in Aceh was attributed not to the Acehnese, but to the infiltration into Aceh of groups such as Laskar Jihad—whose entrance into Aceh was allegedly facilitated by the Indonesian military.

The Aceh diaspora-TAN partnership also contributed to moderation within GAM by providing a platform for different Acehnese voices, including critics of GAM, and through


839 Among interviewees (Acehnese in diaspora) this topic was particularly sensitive. There was a willingness to discuss the topic, but most asked that their comments remain off record or unattributed. The general view was that Sharia was unnecessary (Acehnese were sufficiently devout), a political maneuver by Jakarta to gain support among certain sectors of the Acehnese population, portray the Acehnese as fundamentalists, and/or show that Jakarta was responding to Acehnese grievances without actually doing so. Most interviewees also expressed concern over how Sharia was implemented, stating that it was only applied to the poor, women, and petty criminals rather than to those in power. Many acknowledged, however, that the topic is difficult to discuss openly in Aceh. It is difficult for Acehnese, whose identity is so closely tied to their religion and their identification as devout Muslims to openly reject or criticize Sharia. As one interviewee put it, “the problem with Acehnese is that no matter how defiant, they could not say ‘no’ to Islam.”

840 Personal communication with Acehnese man in diaspora, November 2005.

841 Interview with Acehnese woman in diaspora, U.S., October 2005.

partnerships with moderates within GAM. As argued earlier, with the influx of new diaspora members GAM faced a competition of ideas and to a lesser extent challenges to its legitimacy. In addition to non-GAM diasporans, such as Aguswandi, who were quite clear regarding their focus on human rights, civil society, peaceful conflict settlement as well as their aspirations for a secular democratic Aceh, GAM members and supporters such as Muhammed Nur Djuli, Nurdin Abdul Rahman and Shadia Marhaban were and continue to be (post-return to Aceh) strong advocates of human rights and democracy. Their partnership (even if limited) with a nascent TAN for Aceh provided them with some leverage in their negotiations or competition of ideas with other Acehnese in diaspora including the GAM leadership. This supports James Clifford’s contention that, “new roles and demands, new political spaces, are opened by diaspora interactions.”

That there were tensions within GAM itself became evident after conflict settlement and during the 2006 gubernatorial elections in Aceh, in which GAM members and supporters participated. It also became evident in the different approaches adopted by diaspora returnees and the GAM diaspora leadership (Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah) vis-à-vis justice and human rights (see Chapter 6). Moreover, the competition over ideas and the moderating effect of the Aceh diaspora-TAN partnership is evident in the inclusion of non-Acehnese advisors during the Helsinki peace negotiations of 2005. If his own account is accurate, Damien Kingsbury played no small role in helping to move negotiations forward by working with the GAM leadership on the concept of self-government for the Acehnese that was eventually accepted by all parties to the negotiations. Kingsbury’s participation (and that of other non-Acehnese) in the negotiation process, although accepted by GAM’s “old guard” leadership, was encouraged by the TAN-connected GAM members such as Muhammed Nur Djuli, Nurdin Abdul Rahman and Shadia Marhaban.

Finally, the Aceh diaspora-TAN partnership was instrumental in framing the December 26, 2004 tsunami as a catalyst for activism and peace. Certainly the event itself and the magnitude of its devastation brought unprecedented media and government attention to Aceh.

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844 See Kingsbury (2006).
As explained by an Acehnese in Australia, “the tsunami made a huge difference in terms of recognition. Before people would ask ‘what’s Aceh?’ They didn’t even know it was a place. After the tsunami I did not need to explain.” The immediate media, public and government response was to stress the need for humanitarian assistance. Suddenly, members of the Acehnese diaspora were in demand as sources of information for the media and as public speakers at universities, foundations and fundraising events for tsunami relief. What the Aceh diaspora-TAN partnership managed to do was to re-frame the tsunami as a catalyst for international humanitarian relief into a catalyst for peace in Aceh. Acehnese in diaspora and NGOs were quick to link the success of humanitarian relief to conflict settlement. First they argued for an opening of Aceh (and later unrestricted access) to international organizations, NGOs, humanitarian agencies, the media and independent observers (the Indonesian government was initially reluctant to open Aceh). Second, they argued that no amount of assistance would be successful if the conflict in Aceh were to continue. Several diaspora members and activists went as far as to argue that no relief funding should be sent to the Indonesian government but rather to Acehnese NGOs. Others argued that subsequent development and reconstruction funding (after emergency relief was provided) from governments should be disbursed only after the Indonesian government (and GAM) showed progress in conflict settlement. The international attention brought to Aceh by the tsunami and the successful framing by Acehnese and the TAN of tsunami relief in the context of conflict settlement brought enormous pressure to bear on both the Indonesian government and GAM to find a negotiated settlement to the Aceh conflict. In the subsequent negotiations brokered by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in Helsinki, GAM would eventually propose and accept a form of self-government within Indonesia and the government of Indonesia would accept local political parties for Aceh. According to Acehnese in diaspora,

845 Interview with Deddy, January 6, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

846 See, for example, Brad Adams, “Tsunami Relief Efforts in Aceh: Letter to President Yudhoyono,” Human Rights Watch, (January 6, 2005) at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/06/indone9955.htm


848 This “frame” was echoed by academics and Western government officials and representatives.
the GAM leadership in Stockholm acknowledged the international pressure but was also very concerned that GAM on the ground would not accept the self-government compromise. GAM Stockholm argued that if the opportunity for conflict settlement was not seized (given the tsunami and the international interest in the settlement of the Aceh conflict that the tsunami brought), "no one in the international community" would ever "help them again."849 GAM and the government of Indonesia signed a conflict settlement agreement on August 15, 2005.

The Acehnese and East Timorese cases demonstrate the value of analyzing the dynamics of diaspora transformation, in these two cases, from peace-wrecker to peace-maker. In both cases, the diaspora relationship with and within transnational advocacy networks (TANs) had a significant effect on this transformation. At an instrumental level, support from TANs allowed the peace-making factions within the diasporas to gain power vis-à-vis the peace-wreckers (a strength in numbers explanation). However, these peace-making or cosmopolitan factions drew their strength not only from the members of the TAN but from the ideas and values they shared or came to share with them. Their gradual consonance in ideas and values allowed them to successfully frame or re-frame the Aceh and East Timor problems and its solution. Re-framing the Aceh and East Timor problems in term of human rights, democracy, and in the case of Aceh in humanitarian terms (following the tsunami), allowed the TANs—working with diaspora members—to gain public support, media attention, to leverage Western governments, and to exert pressure on the parties involved in the conflict settlement processes.

The Aceh and East Timor cases highlight the potential importance of looking beyond the diaspora-state (either the homeland or the hostland) relationship to "other actors," as in the diaspora relationship with TANs. Conversely, scholarship on TANs also benefits from a more clear articulation of the role diasporas play with and within a TAN. In both the case of Aceh and East Timor, the relationship with the TAN may be described as mutually

849 According to Acehnese diaspora members in the U.S., this was the argument Malik Mahmud put forward both to them and to the GAM military leaders in Aceh. Personal communication with Acehnese diaspora activist, October 7, 2005 and interview with Acehnese diaspora members, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
constitutive. While the diasporas were transformed over time from ethnic parochial long
distance nationalists to cosmopolitans through their adoption and articulation of political
values that placed a premium on democratic processes and human rights, non-diaspora
members of the TAN lent their support not only to these values but gradually also to the
diaspora aspirations of self-determination and power-sharing. The following chapter
examines what happens to the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas post-conflict. In
essence it tests whether upon return or “re-turn” to the homeland they maintain their identity
as cosmopolitan peace-makers or are transformed.
Chapter 6

Home: Un-making the Acehnese and East Timorese

Diasporas and the Impact of Return

The resolution of the conflicts in Aceh and East Timor has been accompanied by a partial un-making of the diaspora as members returned “home.” This chapter examines the role of diaspora returnees in the evolving post-conflict political landscapes of East Timor and Aceh. It reveals that this return is neither without friction nor free from ambivalence. Moreover, this chapter investigates to what extent diaspora returnees reveal a commitment to democracy, human rights and civil society—the values and ideas shared and cultivated through their earlier relationship with and as part of transnational advocacy networks.

As pointed out in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, it is the connection to and construct of the homeland that function as the basis for a collective diasporan identity and distinguish the diaspora from other social categories. This construct of a “real” or “imagined” homeland often includes the concept of return. The return may be physical or utopian, and if physical, temporary or permanent. According to William Safran, the concept of diaspora return has several meanings, the return may be “instrumental,” a literal,
physical return; a “millennial” return at the end of days; or an “intermediate” or utopian return wherein one continues to live in diaspora but remains actively committed to the homeland. In the cases of Aceh and East Timor, the violent conflicts in the homeland were a cause of diaspora-making, of dispersion, as people fled or were forced to flee the conflict and accompanying economic challenges. However, the conflicts also represented an obstacle to physical return because of the dangers involved. Once this obstacle to return was removed through peace settlements, diaspora members had to wrestle with the question of “return” as actual intention or as myth—what Dibyesh Anand calls a “re-turn,” defined as a “repeated turning” to the homeland rather than a physical return—or as temporary or permanent.

In practical terms, geographical proximity can facilitate a physical return, distance may inhibit this. Dual citizenship can also facilitate a temporary or permanent return to the homeland. Diaspora members can thus retain their hostland ties, rights and privileges (including ties to family that remain there and the right to work in the hostland) while making a return to the homeland a reality. This is particularly important in cases of conflict and political instability, where returnees may still fear a resurgence of violence and political persecution in the homeland. For the Acehnese and East Timorese in the “West” (the subjects of this research) because of geographical distance—the question of return involves a more decisive break with either the homeland or the hostland. Frequent temporary visits are difficult in terms of time and expense. Few if any Acehnese in Scandinavia or North America or East Timorese in Portugal, for example, can afford frequent trips back to the “homeland” over a period of one year. For East Timorese in Australia, the journey may be easier and more affordable but still requires significant financial resources and leaving family members, work, and community ties behind, even temporarily. In both academic definitions of diaspora, and in diaspora discourse, so much emphasis is placed on the relationship with the homeland and on the desire to return that there is “little room” for what James Clifford describes as “the

855 Butler (2001).
principled ambivalence about physical return and attachment to land…" that so many in diaspora feel.

East Timor: Diaspora Return and Political Power

Chapter 4 in Chega! The CAVR Report (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor) is dedicated to the "history of conflict" in East Timor. It is telling that the chapter concludes, in the words of the report, with "the gradual return to Timor-Leste of East Timorese People from West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, Portugal, Australia and the many other countries of the world where they had been scattered by the years of conflict." In the report, it is the return to the "homeland" itself which marks the end of history.

During the campaign for the referendum in East Timor, neither Xanana Gusmão nor the diaspora leaders were permitted to return to East Timor. As pointed out earlier, they were, however, allowed to vote. Following the August 1999 referendum, many in the diaspora, among them diaspora leaders, made the decision to return to the "homeland," thereby ending their history in diaspora and contributing to a partial un-making of the diaspora. For diasporans based in Australia and Portugal the reality of returning home was facilitated by the fact that both an independent East Timor and Australia (as well as Portugal) allow dual citizenship, East Timorese with Australian citizenship, for example, could travel back and forth (and work) uninhibited by legal restrictions on immigration. According to the Timor Australia Council, many of the political leaders in Australia and Portugal returned to East Timor upon independence and entered government or business: "Ramos-Horta, Estanislau da Silva, Ines de Almeida, Agio Pereira, João Carrascalão, Zacarias da Costa, they have all gone back. All together from Australia probably only 200, including the politicians, returned to


Timor. Others went to Timor but then came back to Australia.” Members of the Mozambique-based diaspora also returned, including Mari Alkatiri, Rogerio Lobato, and Ana Pessoa. Thus, the returnees include political leaders or elites as well as others from the diaspora.

In her study on the East Timor diaspora in Sydney, Australia, Amanda Wise vividly captures the ambivalence about returning among East Timorese in Australia. Wise also points to the attitude of the homeland (or rather East Timorese in the homeland) to the returnees and tensions that arise from their interaction. Some returnees faced hostility over their taking “East Timorese jobs,” their commitment to the cause of independence (while away) was questioned, and they faced resentment for having been gone while their compatriots suffered under Indonesian occupation. There were questions over who escaped and who left voluntarily and “some heated debate over those that [sic] went away voluntarily.” Feeling rejected, many returned to Australia. The issue of jobs and money was a particularly sensitive one (and according to some sources, was exaggerated). Some diaspora returnees, particularly younger returnees with English or Portuguese language ability, were able to secure jobs with international organizations or NGOs in East Timor. Some with Australian or Portuguese passports received international salaries that far exceeded what the average East Timorese could earn if able to find work at all.

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860 Interview with Carlos Pereira, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia. Amanda Wise estimates that a larger number have returned, fewer than 900, see Amanda Wise, Exile and Return Among the East Timorese (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006): 48.


862 See also Butler (2001): 206.

863 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.

The skills and capacity of the diaspora were also questioned. In February 1999, before East Timor’s vote for independence in August 1999 and while still in Australia, Abel Guterres, an East Timorese community leader, painted an optimistic picture of diaspora capacity:

At the moment there is tremendous excitement in our community, everyone wants to contribute something...Our community in Australia is going to have a very strong influence over what happens in the future state of East Timor, both politically and economically.865

Referring to a campaign to recruit skilled diaspora members to contribute to East Timor’s nation-building, Guterres went on to say: “Doctors, nurses, computer people, electricians, any East Timorese person who has skills, we need all these people, all their knowledge to help build East Timor” and, as well “Timorese who have established businesses in Australia, who have commercial skills.”866 In April 1999, a group of East Timorese met in Melbourne, Australia to determine and plan for the development needs of East Timor. Diaspora leaders had a significant input in the planning. Later in June 1999 the Australian government funded a skills audit of the East Timorese diaspora in Australia to assist with East Timor’s development.867 However, the high hopes of particular diaspora members stand in contrast to more pessimistic assessments (fair or unfair) of the capacity and ability of the diaspora to contribute to the development of East Timor. An East Timorese government official acknowledged surprise at the lack of high skills among the diaspora: “One of the problems for East Timor is that it did not have highly skilled people to attract back. East Timor should have had more doctors, engineers, PhDs—a pool of people to draw from in the diaspora, but it did not. Australia would even pay for their study, but they didn’t take advantage of that.”868

An East Timorese university graduate echoed this view, “We know that some Timorese

865 Abel Guterres headed the Australia-based East Timor Relief Association, was a leading activist for East Timor in diaspora and subsequently became East Timor’s representative in Sydney. See Andrew Nette, “Expatriates Enlisted in Independence Preparations,” Asia Times (February 24, 1999) at http://www.atimes.com/oceania/AB24Ah01.html

866 Nette (1999).


868 Personal communication with East Timorese government official, 2005.
outside have not been studying, they were just making money. We thought that they were well-educated but they are no more educated than those East Timorese educated under the Indonesian system."869

In addition, those with skills were more difficult to attract back: "A professional working in Australia may not want to return to work for less in East Timor under more difficult conditions."870 As an Australian aid worker in East Timor put it, "people who say, ‘I’m a mechanic, I’ll go back and help my people’...no, there’s very few."871 Nevertheless, East Timor has seen some investment and remittances from the diaspora. Chinese East Timorese in Australia have invested and opened shops and businesses in East Timor. There has also been some investment and remittances from East Timorese based in Australia, Portugal and elsewhere in Europe. This investment and remittances are not considered significant to the overall economy of East Timor,872 but are an important source of income for the East Timorese families that benefit from them. As for the various diaspora organizations formerly dedicated to East Timor’s political “struggle” (particularly those in Australia), some ceased to operate while others became aid organizations focused on East Timor relief and development873 (including a focus on the Timor Gap Treaty) and on the needs of East Timorese in diaspora.

It is important to remember that the post-independence development needs of East Timor were dramatic. An assessment of the diaspora’s capacity to contribute to East Timor’s nation-building (and criticism of diaspora capacity) must take this challenging post-independence context into consideration. Prior to the referendum of 1999, approximately 75 percent of East Timor’s economy was controlled by non-East Timorese. As the referendum date drew near, violence escalated and non-Timorese left the half island, thus seriously compromising key

869 Personal communication with East Timorese graduate student 2006.
870 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.
871 Interview with Tricia Johns, Australian aid worker in East Timor, January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
872 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.
service sectors, medical, education, financial, transport, etc. More significantly the violence and destruction by pro-Indonesian (East Timorese) militias following the announcement of referendum results on September 4, 1999 left hundreds of thousands of East Timorese displaced and 70-80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure destroyed. In addition, East Timor's future leadership also needed to contend with a 24-year legacy of bloody conflict, trauma, and significant intra-Timorese political, social and ideological divisions that were veiled by the collective struggle for independence.874

It is to these conditions that East Timorese diasporans returned. Upon their return to East Timor, members of the Australian diaspora with close connections to Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta, including Agio Pereira, Milena Pires and Ines Almeida, held important positions within the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance) and worked with the U.N. transitional administration.875 The role of East Timorese in the U.N. Transitional Authority was relatively minor and primarily advisory. The limited role played by the East Timorese was a source of great discontent among them and of resentment with the U.N. and U.N. processes. Nevertheless, for many in the diaspora this was the first time in decades that they would work together on a regular basis. It was not long before fractures re-emerged. The UDT eventually withdrew from the CNRT, "with its leaders complaining of having been side-lined."876 Mari Alkatiri also withdrew, along with other Fretilin loyalists who followed Alkatiri's exit. The CNRT was eventually dissolved in 2001. Its members joined existing parties, including Fretilin and the UDT, formed new parties, or remained independent, as did Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta. These fractures would come to the fore again during the August 2001 U.N.-organized elections for a Constituent Assembly, the drafting of the constitution, the 2002 U.N. presidential election, and the election of 2007.

The environment surrounding the Constituent Assembly was highly favorable to Fretilin as a political party. East Timorese, in general, perceived Fretilin as the only group that

874 For an analysis of the role of "victimization" and suffering in veiling local, regional, political and ideological differences in the Tibetan case see Anand (2000): 222.


876 Guterres (2006); 170.
consistently advocated and fought for independence during the Indonesian occupation. During campaigning, Fretilin was also permitted to use symbols it had used during the resistance movement and Fretilin, under Mari Alkatiri's leadership, was a better organized party than its competitors. It has also been suggested that Xanana Gusmão was publicly ambiguous about his relationship to Fretilin and did not make clear that he had left the party, leading people to believe that a vote for Fretilin was a vote for Xanana. As expected, in 2001 Fretilin won a majority of Constituent Assembly seats (57.3 percent of the vote and 55 of 88 Assembly seats) and Mari Alkatiri, a diaspora returnee from Mozambique, became Prime Minister.

José Ramos-Horta was appointed Foreign Minister, based on his international renown (including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996) and extensive diplomatic experience and connections. Members of the Australian diaspora, particularly those who had joined the Fretilin party, were included in Alkatiri's first cabinet. They included Estanislaud da Silva (who also spent time in Mozambique and Portugal) as Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, José Texeira (a lawyer who served as Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Mining and Energy Policy and was involved in negotiations with Australia over the Timor Gap Treaty), Emilia Pires (Secretary of Development and Planning), and Raul Mosaco (Vice-Minister of Public Works).

However, it was the Fretilin members of the Mozambique group or "Mozambique clique," as returnees from African countries were labeled, who were considered most influential in the newly formed Constituent Assembly and subsequent government after independence. They included Rogeiro Lobato (Minister of Interior), Roque Rodrigues (Minister of Defense), Ana Pessoa (Minister of Administration), Madalena Boavida (Minister of Finance), and José Luis Guterres (Timor-Leste's Representative to the U.N.). The Mozambique group is said to have

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877 Personal communication with East Timorese government official 2005.


returned to positions of power because they were the “heart and soul of the original Fretilin.”

Among diaspora returnees, the Mozambique group has been the subject of most controversy. As with other diaspora returnees, this group is criticized for having been absent during the Indonesian occupation and then usurping political power upon their return. In Bernadino Siry’s assessment, “there is...tension between people who left Timor and those that [sic] stayed. Those inside say, ‘we fought Indonesia and now you come and take all the good positions’.”

There was a sense among some East Timorese that the returnees from Mozambique held a monopoly on high government positions and policy: “The most important positions are held by the clique of Mozambique...they are not able to accommodate students and leaders that [sic] came from Indonesia [or were educated under the Indonesian system], Australia, or elsewhere.” Tensions stemming from political and ideological differences were also evident. The Mozambique group was criticized for “trying to impose policies and ideas from Mozambique and Angola (and Portugal),” (including the constitution and judicial system) models that were not considered successful by East Timorese with different political views. Finally, the group from Mozambique was criticized for being “an old boys’ network” that was out of touch with the realities faced by common East Timorese, some, it was said, “can’t even speak Tetum,” they only speak Portuguese.

Rifts were evident again during the writing of East Timor’s constitution and the U.N.-organized presidential election of 2002. The Constitution establishes East Timor as a secular state and a parliamentary democracy. It provides civil, political, economic, social and

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880 Personal communication with East Timorese government official, 2005. It is important to note that, despite its labeling as “clique,” this was not a cohesive group. There were deep rifts and animosity among members of this “group,” for example, between Rogerio Lobato and Roque Rodrigues.

881 Interview with Bernadino Siry, Timor Australia Council, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia.


883 Interview with Constancio Pinto, October 16, 2005, Washington, D.C.

884 Interview with East Timorese student, 2006.

cultural rights. However, it was also a source of criticism and debate among political parties, civil society organizations, and the general population. Areas of disagreement included what the opposition viewed as Fretilin’s apparent disregard for a proper public consultative process, as well as a disregard for suggestions from the team of international experts brought in by the U.N. Transitional Administration and the drafts proposed by the opposition. Civil society groups also raised concerns over certain articles believed to have been adapted from the Mozambique constitution and the inclusion of Portuguese as the official language of East Timor. The constitution adopted by the Fretilin-dominated Constituent Assembly was based on a document drafted in diaspora in Mozambique and agreed to at a Fretilin Congress in Melbourne, Australia in 1998. It is important to note, however, that the composition and leadership of civil society groups also included diaspora returnees.

Another criticism of the constitution was what some viewed as provisions strengthening the power of the Parliament vis-à-vis the President’s office, provisions Fretilin supported. The opposition preferred power more distributed to “create a system of checks and balances” Fretilin prevailed. As it was expected that Gusmão would run for president in the 2002 elections and his success was assured given his reputation as the leader of the resistance movement and his great popularity at the time, Fretilin’s preferences for a largely ceremonial president were interpreted by some as a political maneuver to curtail Gusmão’s power. Gusmão did indeed win the election, with 80 percent of the vote.

A source of wider criticism among civil society was the inclusion of articles into the East Timor constitution adapted from the Mozambique constitution that critics contend limit political liberties, for example, giving the government power to regulate demonstrations, and

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888 Guterres (2006): 45. Here too it should be noted that the opposition parties, as was the case with Fretilin, also included diaspora returnees.

articles from the Portuguese constitution that were interpreted by the Church as an attempt to
circumscribe its influence on the public.890

The issue of language also gave rise to much controversy. This can be interpreted both as a
returning diaspora as well as an inter-generational issue. Prior to its dissolution in 2001,
members of the CNRT were generally in agreement regarding the adoption of Portuguese as
East Timor’s official language (the agreement was general but not total). The use of
Portuguese was seen as a practical necessity; Tetum was an oral language and only recently
put into written form. In Constancio Pinto’s view, for example, “the Tetum language is
underdeveloped. There are no legal terms, for example,” therefore it was necessary to use
Portuguese.891 In addition, in many respects Portuguese was the language of the resistance
and taken as an alternative and in contrast to Bahasa Indonesia, the language of the
occupation. The official documents of the resistance were in Portuguese (and English),
communications with the U.N. and with Portugal were in Portuguese, and Portuguese was
also used in the jungle by resistance fighters. In Agio Pereira’s words (Pereira is a diaspora
returnee from Australia):

...therefore Portuguese because of the Indonesian occupation, because of the
banning of Tetum and Portuguese, and because also during the resistance
years, we were in a soul-searching phase looking for our own identity, and
Portuguese became ours, it is no longer the colonialist language, it became
ours, we took it as our language as well. And it evolved with us. And now we
have the opportunity to develop it further.892

However, although Portuguese was spoken by many returnees from diaspora (from all parties,
Fretilin, UDT, etc.) and by other national political leaders of Xanana Gusmao’s generation, it
was spoken only by 2 to 10 percent of the East Timorese population.893 Younger generations,
schooled during the Indonesian occupation spoke Bahasa Indonesia instead.

891 Interview with Constancio Pinto, November 16, 2004, Washington, D.C.
892 Australian Broadcasting Company (ABC), “Languages in East Timor...” Lingua France Radio National,
(transcript), (June 26, 2004) at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/arts/ling/stories/s1138367.htm

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In response to these concerns, the text of the draft constitution was changed. In the final draft both Portuguese and Tetum are recognized as official languages and English and Bahasa Indonesia are working languages. Nevertheless the use of Portuguese in official documents and in the civil service remained an obstacle to government access and career advancement for non-Portuguese-speaking East Timorese and thus a continued source of discontent. Among younger generations, there are those that feel that Portuguese is not only being forced upon them but that it is an impractical political tool:

The younger people do not speak Portuguese and they are disadvantaged because of it. How can [the] younger generation get jobs, government jobs if they don’t speak Portuguese? They are creating an isolated Portuguese country in Asia...[The Portuguese language] was the choice of the old guys. They don’t speak Indonesian and they don’t speak English...The ones that are in government survived in exile and then came back. They also include even some resistance fighters that stayed in East Timor but never learned Indonesian. They are in their 40s and 50s. Then there are those who were not even involved in the resistance in East Timor or abroad. They just came back and could get jobs because they spoke Portuguese. Some ministers only have an elementary school level of education, they studied under the Portuguese system [in East Timor], but they have government positions because of language, while others who have MA degrees from Indonesian times are left unemployed. [It is a] problem of inclusion and exclusion.

It is not without irony that the official use of Portuguese is also viewed as a form of “linguistic and cultural nationalism” and a form of new colonialism perpetrated by an older generation of East Timorese and in particular the older generation of diaspora returnees with political power. This sentiment is described thusly, “There are more Portuguese companies, more Portuguese restaurants, the church still promotes Portuguese culture, kids are being baptized and given Portuguese names, the names of streets and buildings are in

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895 Interview with Matias Gomes, East Timorese student, December 3, 2004, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Portuguese. Some people see this as a new colonization... People feel they are like guests in their own home. That Dili is like a little Lisbon.” 897 In response to these criticisms, the East Timorese government has evinced an increasing understanding of the controversy over language and has attempted to alleviate frustrations through education, translation, and a loosening of Portuguese requirements in the civil service and the judicial system. In practical terms, both the civil offices and the judiciary resort to tetum and Indonesian to operate.

The issue of language is loosely tied to another contentious issue, that of land. An independent East Timor faced the question of what land rights system to adopt and what land claims to validate, traditional, Portuguese colonial, Indonesian, a hybrid system or a completely new system. East Timor’s ambiguous land rights led to competing and overlapping claims. There are native titles, Portuguese titles (in Portuguese and issued pre-1975), Indonesian titles (in Bahasa Indonesia and issued during the occupation and sometimes gained through intimidation) and there are long-term and new occupiers of land without official titles of any sort. In addition, East Timor has a prior history of displacement and dispossession (during the Portuguese colonial period, the Japanese occupation and Indonesian occupation) and most land title records were deliberately destroyed by militia during the violence following the 1999 referendum. The most contentious claims have been over housing and commercial property. 898 The uncertainty over land titles and land rights is said to have an effect on investment, particularly foreign investment. A connection to the diaspora arises when diaspora returnees, in particular those from Portugal, return to reclaim land. According to an Australian aid worker, “there are some people who left and they have come back and are saying they own things—sometimes it’s very unrealistic. There are huge plantations that they say ‘my grandmother owned this.’” 899 This has given rise to local resentment of returnees.

897 Interview with Nelson Belo, East Timorese student, January 19, 2006, Honolulu, Hawaii.


899 Interview with Tricia Johns, Australian aid worker in East Timor, January 4, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
The issue of justice for past human rights abuses also has been divisive. José Ramos-Horta and Mari Alkatiri (as well as Xanana Gusmão) all seem to share a pragmatic approach to the issue. They have lent their support to an East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission rather than pursue prosecution or redress for human rights abuses during the Indonesian occupation and for the period of violence following the announcement of the referendum results in 1999. The issue of justice for human rights abuses reveals another generational divide, including a divide among diaspora returnees. The “older” generation (in particular those in political power) has adopted a communal approach—one that stresses social cohesion and reconciliation and the importance of seeking accommodation and good relations with Indonesia. Many diasporans from a younger generation (either as members of new political parties or as representatives of civil society) want to see justice carried out against the perpetrators of past human rights abuses, in particular abuses committed in 1999. They thus favor a human rights approach—one that “requires individual accountability for past abuses.” Therefore, they support the work, findings, and recommendations of Chega! The CAVR Report (Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation), which is more blunt in its criticism and more direct in its appeal to Indonesia (and the international community) to bring those most responsible for abuses and violence to account. In an editorial, Aderito Soares writes:

Meanwhile, the governments of East Timor and Indonesia have conspired to bypass the whole issue of justice. Their joint Truth and Friendship Commission has been strongly criticized as more likely to bury the issue and pave the way for impunity...By contrast, East Timor's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), a body established by the UN three years ago, recently handed over its report. It contains strong recommendations pertaining to justice and reparations for victims.

Discontent with the East Timorese government’s policies on human rights (and by extension its foreign policy towards Indonesia) extends beyond its borders. Vacy Vlazna, a former convenor of the Australia East Timor Association (AETA) and East Timor Justice Lobby, expressed disappointment over East Timor’s rejection of an international rights tribunal to address past human rights abuses, “I... feel ‘shocked’ that they are betraying their people. But maybe they are not doing it willingly, maybe there is some pressure.” In letters published by the East Timor Action Network (ETAN), Vlazna writes to Xanana Gusmão:

Never, during the years of solidarity with East Timor's struggle against the Indonesian occupation, never could I, or would I have imagined you, the once charismatic Timorese FALINTIL hero, promise that East Timor would lobby the U.S. congress [sic] in February 2005 about withdrawing the embargo on Indonesian military requirements...I confess that I was shocked to see you embracing Wiranto, shocked to hear your opposition to an international rights tribunal.

And to José Ramos Horta:

So, you are going to lobby the U.S. Congress to lift the embargo and restrictions concerning military equipment supplies to Indonesia in the full knowledge of the terrible consequences the Achehnese and West Papuans will suffer as a result...You deserve the utmost respect for the many years of dogged championing of Timor's right to independence...However it is thoroughly disillusioning to see your government’s betrayal of the people of Acheh and West Papua soiling the international image of East Timor and betraying, surrendering its principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms for every people.

The East Timor Action Network (ETAN) and Tapol, two important NGOs in the East Timor solidarity movement, based in the U.S. and the U.K. respectively, were also openly critical of the East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission that has the support of the East Timor government. Tapol’s position as of February 2008 echoes the views of some civil society groups in East Timor and endorses a human rights approach rather than the East

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903 Interview with Vacy Vlazna, Australian activist, January 3, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

904 Vacy Vlazna, Open Letter to Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos Horta, ETAN (February 6, 2005) at http://www.etan.org/et2005/february/06/07open.htm

Timor government’s preferred communal approach. Tapol criticizes the Truth and Friendship Commission (CTF), supporting instead the CAVR and its recommendations:

From the outset, the CTF was widely perceived as a mechanism designed to avoid international justice for gross violations of human rights perpetrated in Timor-Leste. It was hastily conceived by the two governments...The cause of justice, truth, reconciliation and friendship would be better served by the wider dissemination of the CAVR report and implementation of its recommendations by both governments and the international community.906

Human rights are guaranteed in the Constitution of East Timor and there is a direct reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution shall not exclude any other rights provided for by the law and shall be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”907 In practice, however, East Timor’s human rights and, to a lesser extent, its democracy record is mixed. According to the U.S. Department of State’s country report on human rights practices for 2007, the East Timor government “generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, some human rights abuses persisted.”908 Most problems were associated with the police, military and the judiciary which remained inefficient, understaffed, and politicized. For 2007 (based on practices and events in 2006), Freedom House rated East Timor as “partly free,” giving it a score of 3 for political rights and 4 for civil rights (on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 as the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest). The Freedom House report highlighted an increase in violence and instability in 2006 that threatened freedom of expression (by the Press), abuses by police and military forces and a fragile legal system.909 East Timor’s rating as “partly free” put it in the same category as many countries in Latin America as well as other former Portuguese colonies such as Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In Asia-Pacific, it is ranked alongside Papua New Guinea and scores higher than

906 Tapol, “Burying the Past in Impunity” (February 2008) at http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/CTFbackgmd.htm

907 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Section 23.


909 Countries are classified as Free, Partly Free and Not Free, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2007: East Timor at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7168
both Malaysia (4, 4) and Thailand (7, 4) and, interestingly, lower than Indonesia (2, 3)—it should be noted that Indonesia's score increased after peace was achieved in Aceh in 2005.

In assessing East Timor's commitment to human rights it is important to note that the country faces immense economic and social problems. It remains the poorest country in Southeast Asia; its economy is still highly dependent on international aid, and its internal security on an international presence. However, East Timor's current social and security problems (particularly as related to abuses by the military and police and the weakness of the legal system) are associated (by many) with a history and culture of violence and impunity for human rights abuses. Local and international NGOs thus link future improvement in East Timor's security situation with justice for past abuses, primarily by calling for an implementation of CAVR recommendations, an international tribunal, and strengthening of East Timor's justice system.

The transition to democracy in East Timor, following independence, has been marred by periodic periods of violence. In December 2002, for example, demonstrations against the government in Dili resulted in widespread destruction of property, a fresh wave of refugees fleeing the city, and the burning of the prime minister's residence. There were more violent demonstrations and gang-related violence through 2004. In 2006, violent feuds between rival army and police units and between police and unemployed veterans escalated and resulted in the dismissal of 600 soldiers. A two-month long period of violence and destruction ensued.


913 These violent feuds and divisions have been described in terms regional divisions within East Timor, between persons originating from the Western and Eastern parts of East Timor and accusations of favoritism within the security forces shown to Eastern East Timorese. They have also been described in terms of political divisions whereby members of Fretelin and Gusmão have accused each other of inflaming resentments within the security forces for political purposes.
This was a particularly sensitive issue as it involved veterans of the resistance (Falintil).\textsuperscript{914} After the violence subsided, former Minister of Interior Rogerio Lobato (a diaspora returnee) was accused of fuelling the unrest by illegally distributing weapons to militias in order to fight government opponents; he was incarcerated before being released for medical treatment. The violence and scandal regarding Lobato’s involvement resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri (pressed to resign by Xanana Gusmão).\textsuperscript{915} The violence also resulted in a new deployment of Australian peacekeepers to East Timor. Violence associated with the dismissed soldiers continued and culminated in the February 2008 assassination (or kidnapping) attempts by former Falintil combatants on José Ramos-Horta, then President, and Xanana Gusmão, then Prime Minister.

Whereas during the U.N.-organized 2001 election for the Constituent Assembly, many diaspora returnees were recognized for their role in East Timor’s struggle for independence, for their level of education and administrative skills, by 2007—particularly those connected to Alkatiri and Mozambique—were criticized for being out of touch and unable to understand East Timor and the East Timorese because of their many years in diaspora. This criticism, however, was not leveled against José Ramos-Horta (and others) to the same extent. In 2007 Ramos-Horta was elected president of East Timor. Months later, in August 2007 and after heated parliamentary elections, Xanana Gusmão was named East Timor’s new prime minister. The 2007 parliamentary election gave Fretilin 29% of the vote and Gusmão’s new party, the National Congress for the Reconstruction of East Timor, 24% of the vote—high enough numbers in parliament to govern in coalition with some of the smaller parties.

Although the 2007 elections were accompanied by more violence by demonstrators in favor or against particular candidates, and there were charges from the various parties of


intimidation and manipulation during the campaign process, the elections were praised by both the E.U. and U.N. for their high voter turnout and relatively smooth, free, and fair process. In the wake of Gusmão's ascendancy to the prime minister's office, Alkatiri announced that Fretilin considered the new government illegal and called for its boycott. However, by early September 2007 Alkatiri had changed his rhetoric, taken on a more conciliatory approach, and issued a call for peace among Fretilin supporters. The 2008 failed assassination attempts on Ramos-Horta (who was seriously wounded and spent two months in Darwin, Australia for medical treatment) and Xanana Gusmão threatened to plunge East Timor into chaos and derail democracy.916 However, as of early 2009, East Timor's democratic institutions and processes had prevailed even if political divisions (and more seriously, social and economic problems) continued to threaten a fragile peace and democratic system. Some of these divisions are historic (dating back to the colonial period, to East Timor's civil war, and the Indonesian occupation) while others arose during the diaspora experience. Diaspora returnees, most obviously Rogerio Lobato, have been accused of fomenting violence for political ends and thus may be considered peace-wreckers, and the government (including diaspora leaders) in crisis situations has been accused of resorting to actions that disregard the Constitution and human rights provisions.

However, most national elites, including and, in some cases, especially diaspora returnees, do appear to be committed to democracy, stability, and peace in East Timor. Despite its strong rhetoric following its loss in the 2007 elections and during the period of uncertainty following the assassination attempts, Fretilin under Mari Alkatiri's leadership apparently continued to work through East Timor's democratic institutions and processes. Despite criticism and some resentment, some diaspora returnees continue to hold positions of political power, having been democratically elected to do so. Other diaspora returnees, particularly those of a younger generation, remain active in civil society organizations and political parties, often in opposition to the older generation of diaspora returnees in political power.

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916 The leader in this attempt, Alfredo Reinado, was killed during the assault on Ramos-Horta. Among the 28 suspects charged in the 'assassination attempt,' was Angelita Pires, Reinado's girlfriend and a diaspora returnee from Australia. See Australian Associated Press, "Aussie Facing Trial over E Timor Attacks" (March 4, 2009) at http://au.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/5365972/aussie-facing-trial-e-timor-attacks/
Aceh: Diaspora Return and Political Power

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)917 between the government of Indonesia and GAM on August 15, 2005 in Helsinki, Finland was a cause for hope, happiness, uncertainty and anger among the Acehnese diaspora. Immediately after its conclusion and having witnessed earlier peace initiatives fail—most recently in 2003—many in the diaspora remained skeptical of the 2005 agreement’s prospects for long-term success. Suspicion of the Indonesian government, its motives, its sincerity and its capacity to control the military continued to run high. As explained by an Acehnese in diaspora, “We can’t believe Indonesia after all this time and lies. They offered autonomy in the 1960s, then the autonomy law in 2003. We just can’t believe them.”918 Referring to the removal of military troops from Aceh as directed in the MoU, an Acehnese student in Australia also expressed skepticism:

[W]e need more time to see if they are sincere about that. I’ve seen before how they withdraw, they take out and then bring in...In 1998 they were to stop military operations; they said they’d withdraw. They announced withdrawal in one place but brought in others elsewhere. So I don’t know if they will do the same...My worry is that after GAM is abolished the Indonesian military will have freedom to do what it wants.919

Nevertheless, many saw the agreement as vital to the recovery of Aceh following the loss of life and devastation of the December 26, 2004 tsunami and the years of violent conflict, and were hopeful that this time peace would hold:

Aceh has changed a lot—completely after the tsunami. It is time for diplomacy, everyone is tired of weapons. The people that [sic] are doing the negotiations are doing a job. People aren’t being killed anymore; people’s homes aren’t being torched anymore.920


918 Interview with Acehnese resident of Australia, 2006, Australia.

919 Interview with Acehnese student, 2006, Australia.

920 Interview with Deddy, January 6, 2006, Sydney, Australia.
[It is a] good break time, people can go to the hospital, they can eat, they have some peace.\textsuperscript{921}

It is good for people, it gives them some space, some peace, some time.\textsuperscript{922}

If most in the diaspora were hopeful and cautiously optimistic, there were also those who felt betrayed and angered by GAM's compromises and agreement to the terms of the MoU. The most important compromise made by the GAM side during the 2005 peace negotiations was the proposal and acceptance of "self-government." Early during the 2005 negotiations GAM dropped the use of the term "independence" (independence was completely unacceptable to the Indonesian side), and adopted the term "self-government\textsuperscript{923}" which was seen as a significant compromise and a basis for continued negotiation and the eventual peace agreement. As discussed in Chapter 4, self-government was favored by GAM over the term special autonomy which had been offered by the government of Indonesia. Self-government within the state of Indonesia would permit the formation of independent local political parties in Aceh and local elections, thus allowing the potential transformation of GAM into a political party and the fielding its own candidates in local elections.

Through interviews with diaspora members, I gleaned four main arguments in opposition to the MoU or justifications for anger or frustration with GAM. Most of this anger and frustration was directed towards the leaders of GAM in diaspora, who were seen as the architects of GAM's position during the 2005 peace negotiations. The first argument was in opposition to any agreement that fell short of independence. This "hard-line" view saw GAM's compromise of self-government as a betrayal of Acehnese nationalism, Aceh's people and their 30-year struggle. In this argument, self-government is equated to special autonomy and thus it is seen as a perpetuation of the status quo. The second argument was based on feelings of exclusion from the negotiation process and was put forward mostly by

\textsuperscript{921} Interview with Khatab, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

\textsuperscript{922} Interview with Hanafiah, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

\textsuperscript{923} GAM agreed to the concept of self-government during the second round of negotiations (out of six rounds) in March 2005; the MoU was signed in August 2005.
GAM supporters. Diaspora members objected to the agreement because of a lack of consultation from the GAM leadership. They felt GAM negotiators had made a radical compromise without consulting their constituency or seeking their input and approval. A third argument had to do with the timing and permanence of the MoU. Some Acehnese in diaspora who opposed the MoU did so on the grounds that an agreement was reached too soon after the trauma of the tsunami. They believed the timing was not right for a permanent agreement, that people in Aceh needed time to heal and rebuild before they could consider and agree to the details of a permanent agreement. In the words of an Acehnese resident of the U.S., “Right after a disaster, people’s physical and mental states have not yet healed. Better to have a temporary agreement, one or two years. In a year or so people could go back to their normal life and can be involved in the political process. People want peace. Now they want to fulfill their basic needs, go back to a normal life. But after they have that they will ask for more.”24 Finally, a fourth argument or source of frustration came from the more moderate quarters of the diaspora, mostly activists and intellectuals who considered themselves independent from GAM. They did not reject the MoU and were indeed hopeful of its success; however, they were critical of GAM’s timing. If GAM was willing to compromise on independence and adopt self-government as an alternative basis for negotiation, why didn’t it do so earlier (in 2003, for example), thereby avoiding years of violent conflict in Aceh. Among those forwarding this position, however, many were quick to acknowledge that the political context for the 2005 negotiations was very different from earlier efforts, not only because of the tsunami but because of a perceived real interest in solving the conflict on the part of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Yusuf Kalla.

If ambivalence over return to the “homeland” is part of the diaspora experience, as evident in the East Timor case, it was compounded in the case of the Acehnese diaspora by three factors: first, the conflict solution did not result in independence (as it did with East Timor) but rather settlement within the Republic of Indonesia; second, there were very difficult economic conditions in Aceh following the destruction of the tsunami; and third, questions

24 Personal communication with Acehnese resident of the U.S., November 17, 2005.
remained pertaining to the MoU (including disagreement with or opposition to it) and its implementation.

As an independent state, East Timor had control over citizenship rights; dual citizenship was permitted facilitating the temporary and long-term return of diasporans. The Acehnese diaspora, on the other hand, had to comply with Indonesian law that disallowed dual citizenship. Therefore, a permanent return would require relinquishing any other nationality or resident status held by Acehnese outside the homeland. This was a very real concern for Acehnese in Scandinavia, Australia and the U.S. The GAM leadership in Stockholm certainly faced this dilemma. For years it was the distance from Aceh and its international and political role that lent the GAM leadership in diaspora its legitimacy. With the fate of the MoU and the situation in Aceh still uncertain, relinquishing hostland residency or nationality was considered risky from both political and personal safety points of view. Refugees and those awaiting permanent residence papers also faced problems. For them a return to the homeland even temporarily might require abandoning any hostland residency rights. For some Acehnese in diaspora, however, a temporary return was made easier by their hostland nationality. First, the tsunami and the subsequent opening of Aceh and international presence and then the conflict settlement allowed them to travel back more freely and their Australian or U.S. nationality, for example, permitted a return back to the hostland (this is particularly true for Acehnese in Australia because of the relative geographical proximity to Indonesia compared with North America and Europe):

Before, to go back people would usually purchase another identity, identity papers, because of the Indonesian side, so they wouldn’t be recognized. The papers were organized in Malaysia. Until the tsunami, there were a lot of checkpoints and they look in your wallet. You had to have the right papers, identification, and if they found foreign currency you’d be in trouble.

Since the MoU about 15 people have gone to Aceh, most of them have Australian citizenship, [they have] gone back to visit. No one [is] moving back. People do travel back and forth now more, [they] can do so more freely.925

925 Interview with Acehnese in Australia, 2006.
As of late 2007, most members of the Acehnese diaspora in Scandinavia, Australia and North America had adopted a “wait and see” position towards the peace agreement and towards a permanent return to the homeland. In addition to concerns over legal residence status in the homeland and the hostland and over security and the success of the peace agreement, diasporans must deal with established ties to the hostland, family issues, education and economic considerations among others. Some Acehnese expressed a preference for a Western lifestyle and a greater amount of individualism and opportunity in the hostland. Others stressed a need to save enough money before returning, so that they might be better positioned to succeed in a new life in Aceh. Most were reluctant to make a final decision on return, preferring instead to postpone the decision.

We all speak about going back to Aceh, the parents want to go back. The kids are not so sure. The kids ask, ‘is there snow in Aceh?’ If not, they say they don’t want to go back. The schools are very good for the kids in the U.S. We plan on waiting...at least a year to see what the situation in Aceh is like.”

Most Acehnese say they want to go back to Aceh. One guy even bought a house recently and he still says he wants to go back. We tease him and say, oh you are really staying now, but he says he wants to go back. I’m half and half. I want to go back, but I also want to stay. I just got my GED, it took me one year and I want to go to college...If my application [for permanent residence] is rejected then I have to go. But if I had a kid, I’d like to raise them here in the U.S... We also need people here.

If children and their education in the homeland are frequently cited among an older generation of Acehnese, the need to be better prepared for a return (more education to better serve Aceh’s development, for example) and a continued need for Acehnese abroad to campaign and work for Aceh is another commonly provided reason for deferring return, particularly among younger Acehnese, as indicated in the above statement from an Acehnese

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926 Interview with Suhra, January 5, 2006, Sydney, Australia and correspondence with Saiful Mahdi, 2009.
927 Interview with Maffud, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
928 Interview with Khatab, October 11, 2005, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
in the U.S. and this from another in Australia: "I want to go back, but right now I can do
more for Aceh here, promoting Aceh here."929

Many also expressed the need to and pressure from family members in Aceh to remain in
diaspora in order to continue to send money back to family in Aceh:

Most [Acehnese in the Sydney area] work in restaurants, about 80%...Most
work full-time...a lot of people send money back to their families, to extended
families too. So for every person that works for himself here, three people in
Banda Aceh can get an education.930

In addition to these more personal reasons, there are those who do not acknowledge the
legitimacy of the 2005 peace agreement. Of the Acehnese I interviewed who opposed the
MoU, most expressed their opposition confidentially and quietly. When asked about the
possibility of return, an Acehnese woman, for example, stated that she would "not go back
until Aceh is Merdekah (free)," but quickly asked not to be identified with this statement.
There are those, however, who openly expressed their disagreement with the MoU and
continued to campaign for an independent Aceh. The Association of Achehnese Community
in Scandinavia (Permas), for example, states that its objective "is to unite Achehnese abroad,
especially in the Scandinavian countries, and to work together towards a peaceful,
democratic solution to [the] Acheh conflict."931 Its main focus, however, appeared to be
opposition to the content of the Helsinki negotiations of 2005 and the resulting MoU. On the
eve of the signing of the MoU on August 15, Permas issued the following statement:

After a mere five meetings, The Free Acheh Movement (GAM) and the
Indonesian government is scheduled to sign a historic agreement...This was
largely due to GAM's radical changing of position, by excluding the
independence option from the agenda...This bold decision taken by the so
called GAM leadership in Sweden to drop the long sworn demand for an

929 Interview with Deddy, January 6, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

930 Interview with Deddy, January 6, 2006, Sydney, Australia.

http://www.forum.achehtimes.com/_disc/00000018.htm
independent Acheh and to formally recognise Acheh being an integral part of Indonesia, has taken the international community as well as Jakarta aback...The Helsinki agreement that will be signed on the fateful August 15 is seen as a matter of life and death of the people of Acheh, and they should have been consulted before making such a disastrous decision. GAM leadership in Sweden...are now busy selling out their self-government to the people of Acheh...We Achehnese have dearly paid with our blood for the cause of our struggle for independence and that cannot be merely replaced by a system of ‘self-government,’ which practically means autonomy... We, therefore, strongly reject this...falschood...

Criticism of the negotiations and GAM’s position prompted the GAM leadership in Sweden on several occasions to respond. In a February 23, 2005 press release, Bakhtiar Abdullah, then information officer for GAM Sweden writes:

...GAM has put forward an alternative term [to special autonomy], which is ‘self government’, and we hope to be able to move forward on this...I would also like to offer a clarification of some media reports. There have been some misquotations about GAM dropping its claim for independence...To be clear, GAM has not given up its claim for independence for Acheh. However, it has recognised that in a spirit of cooperation in the post-tsunami period, it should make concessions. It has therefore not brought to the negotiating table the issue of independence, and this is therefore not being considered during these talks.

On July 12, 2005, GAM moved to publicly clarify its position on special autonomy:

To achieve peace, GAM has agreed to the concept of self-government within the context of the Republic of Indonesia...But it categorically rejects the status quo of ‘special autonomy,’ which has produced only bloodshed, corruption and the denial of the fundamental rights of the people of Acheh to determine their own affairs. GAM has issued this clarification following inaccurate reports that it has accepted this failed ‘special autonomy.’


As of the end of 2007, the political views of Permas had not found broad support among the diaspora. Its views appear to be shared primarily among MP-GAM members and supporters and perhaps a few former GAM members—this group remains small. Should political and economic developments in Aceh fall short of expectations, however, it is possible that the diaspora might be mobilized in opposition to the peace agreement. This, however, would entail the emergence of new diaspora leaders with sufficient legitimacy and capability to mobilize the diaspora and bridge divisions within it. In 2007, most Acehnese in diaspora, as did the East Timorese, seemed to prefer a focus on social and cultural activities in diaspora and post-tsunami and post-conflict recovery in the homeland rather than open political confrontation amongst themselves. In the United States, for example, a new diaspora group has been formed—the United Acehnese of America. This new organization emphasizes inclusiveness (Acehnese in diaspora regardless of their political views or differences), the promotion and transmission of Acehnese culture, and the success the Acehnese community in the hostland.

After the Government of Indonesia opened Aceh to international aid and reporting following the tsunami of December 2004 and particularly since the signing of a peace agreement on August 15, 2005, GAM leaders and other Acehnese from the diaspora, have returned to Aceh both temporarily and permanently—some, such as Bakhtiar Abdullah, for the first time in

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935 Or those of the Preparatory Committee for the Free Acheh Democratic. Ostensibly a U.S.-based organization, the ‘Committee’ is a small network of Acehnese in diaspora (perhaps with links to Aceh-based counterparts) that share the same political views as Permas; they oppose the MoU. The membership of the two organizations also overlaps. See Preparatory Committee for the Free Acheh Democratic FAQ (March 2, 2006) at http://www.freeacheh.info/?to=FAQ. See also http://www.freeacheh.info/


937 See the United Achehnese of America blog at http://www.unitedacheh.blogspot.com/. I am grateful to Saiful Mahdi for bringing this to my attention.

938 In practical terms, for Acehnese in Malaysia a return to the homeland is a much easier decision. The proximity of Malaysia to Aceh allows for frequent temporary returns. A retreat back to Malaysia is also a more realistic possibility than a retreat back to the West if residence or citizenship must be relinquished (even if the return to Malaysia is illegal). However, even this community experiences the ambivalence of return. See Missbach (2007).
25 years. \textsuperscript{939} Malik Mahmud (the former prime minister of GAM) returned to Aceh on April 19, 2006 for the first time in 40 years. Since then, he and Zaini Abdullah have returned to Aceh periodically and have played influential roles in the process of transforming the former armed movement into a political party (Mahmud in particular). As of mid-2007 neither Bakhtiar Abdullah (former Information Officer of GAM Sweden) nor Malik Mahmud had given up their Swedish or Singaporean citizenships, respectively in order to become eligible for permanent positions within Aceh’s government\textsuperscript{940} (Mahmud held Singaporean citizenship and had applied for Swedish citizenship). An elderly and ill Hasan di Tiro returned to Aceh on a “personal visit” in October 2008. His public appearance in Banda Aceh reportedly drew a crowd of several thousands. As expected, he was too frail to deliver his speech himself; it was read by Malik Mahmud on his behalf. \textsuperscript{941} Thus, Di Tiro’s role in the future of Aceh politics is likely to be symbolic. What force that symbol holds, is, at this writing untested.

Other diasporans, many of them associated with GAM, but not necessarily leaders, returned and were elected to office at the provincial and district levels or assumed posts in government institutions or with international non-governmental organizations. They include Muhammed Nur Djuli (Malaysia diaspora and GAM negotiator in 2005), appointed as head of the Aceh Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh/BRA) in 2007 by Governor Irwandi Yusuf; Muhammad Dahlan (Australia diaspora), Teuku Hadi (Germany diaspora), and Radhi Darmansyah (U.S) at the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi & Rekonstruksi/BRR); Nurdin Abdul Rahman (Australia diaspora and GAM negotiator in 2005), elected district-head (bupati) of Bireuen in June 2007 and Munawar Liza (U.S. diaspora), elected mayor of Sabang in December 2006. \textsuperscript{942} Shadia

\textsuperscript{939} BBCNews, “Aceh Exile Returns after 25 Years” (October 31, 2005) at a http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4393384.stm

\textsuperscript{940} Fallon and Missbach (2007).


Marhaban (U.S. diaspora) and Aguswandi (U.K.) also returned. Upon his return, Aguswandi was selected as the Chairman of the Aceh People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Aceh/PRA), one of the first local political parties in Aceh. He also worked for a USAID-funded project to support the BRA.

The return, however, has not been without friction. As in East Timor, the access to positions of power and influence for some Acehnese returnees has provoked some resentment and criticism both in Aceh and in diaspora. A diaspora publication, for example, circulated an opinion piece that opposed the conclusion of the MoU and was critical of the political power it could confer on returnees:

At the very least, now GAM’s leaders who have been living in exile in Europe can return to Aceh with a likelihood of taking up political office while its commanders on the ground can come out of hiding. The interests of GAM have at least been taken care of. \(^{943}\)

Political divisions among diaspora returnees (and within GAM generally) emerged as new alliances were formed during the process of political transformation in Aceh. GAM established two new institutions to shepherd its transformation from an armed to a political movement: the National Council (Majelis Nasional) in October 2005 and the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh/KPA). The National Council would hold political authority and the KPA would represent former GAM combatants and oversee their demobilization and reintegration. \(^{944}\) The new National Council would consolidate GAM’s political and economic resources in a single body and would be directly responsible to Malik Mahmud. In the assessment of the International Crisis Group (ICG), this and the selection to the highest offices in the Council of Muhammad Usman Lampoh Awe and Zakaria Saman, two old-guard GAM members loyal to GAM Sweden, “showed the continuing strength of the

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As the process of political transformation progressed, many in the younger generation of GAM (both Aceh-based and diaspora returnees) grew disillusioned and increasingly impatient with what they saw as an "out of touch" old-guard leadership and their un-democratic and closed process of decision-making—the same criticism that had dogged the GAM leadership while in diaspora from the late 1990s through the 2005 Helsinki negotiations. Among the young generation, critics included Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar of SIRA.

Reportedly, there also was tension between Irwandi Yusuf and Malik Mahmud regarding Mahmud’s eventual acquiescence in August 2006 to the Aceh Monitoring Mission’s (AMM) negotiated outcome on a few cases of GAM member amnesties—(most prisoners had been released, fewer than ten remained imprisoned for “serious violent crimes against civilians”—but some in GAM wanted to see all prisoners released). In Edward Aspinall’s assessment, Irwandi Yusuf resented being sidelined in decision-making and was angered by the outcome. Some in GAM interpreted Mahmud’s compromise as sacrificing those few remaining in prison “in order to disassociate the movement from their acts and absolve the leadership of guilt.”

The generational divide within GAM became obvious during preparations for the gubernatorial elections held on December 11, 2006. The elections were considered an important test of the MoU, GAM’s political transformation and indeed its political capacity. In accordance with the MoU (and the subsequent Law of Governing Aceh/LoGA adopted in August 2006), independent candidates would be permitted to run for election, thereby allowing GAM candidates an opportunity to compete. Elsewhere in Indonesia, all candidates were required to be affiliated with a national political party. Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah (along with some Aceh-based GAM leaders) decided to support a mixed ticket:

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946 In accordance with section 3.1.1 of the MoU granting amnesty “to all persons who have participated in GAM activities…”

Hasbi Abdullah, a long-term GAM member and Zaini’s younger brother, and Humam Hamid, the United Development Party/PPP (a national moderate Islamic party) candidate. The decision by Malik Mahmud and the leadership proved unpopular, particularly among the younger generation of GAM. They objected to the candidates themselves, to the inclusion of a non-GAM candidate (Hamid), and to the decision-making practices of the GAM leadership—presenting its support for the mixed-ticket candidates as a fait accompli. Divisions in GAM came to a head during a May 2006 GAM meeting where participants cast votes for their preferred candidates for governor and deputy governor. The leading GAM candidate for governor (Nashruddin), however, withdrew his name after the vote. Hasbi Abdullah received the second largest number of votes for governor and Muhammad Nazar was the leader in votes for deputy governor. The two, however, refused to be paired together.\(^{948}\) The full list of vote recipients included two diaspora returnees—Shadia Marhaban (U.S.) and Adnan Beuransyah (Denmark).\(^{949}\) In the end, Hamid ran for governor representing the PPP with Hasbi Abdullah as his independent running mate. Abdullah, however, was not the only GAM-affiliated candidate to run in the election. Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar entered the race as independents (but representing, in essence, an all-GAM ticket). Among those who objected to the Humam Hamid-Abdullah Hasbi candidacy was Munawar Liza, a diaspora returnee from the U.S. Munawar Liza continued to advocate a united GAM and reiterated his loyalty to Malik Mahmud and senior GAM members, however, he would support Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar for the governorship and publicly stated that decisions “would no longer be imposed from the top.”\(^{950}\)

To the surprise of many in and out of Aceh, the all-GAM Irwandi Yusuf-Muhammad Nazar team clearly won the governorship in a generally free and fair election. Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar took office in February 2007. As was the case for Fretilin in East Timor during its first election, GAM won through the use of its grassroots structures, appeals to

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\(^{948}\) According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Hasbi Abdullah was unpopular among many in GAM, particularly the younger members, who questioned his contributions to the ‘struggle.’ International Crisis Group (November 29, 2006) : 5.


nationalism and identity (Acehnese), and the message that it was GAM that brought peace to Aceh (in the case of East Timor Fretlin took credit for independence). In Aceh, a general dislike of the Jakarta-based national parties also served GAM well.\textsuperscript{951} In addition to the governorship, GAM also did well at the district and town levels, winning eight out of 22 elections, including Sabang where Munawar Liza was elected mayor in 2006 (in an area where GAM never had a significant long-term presence or support). At both the provincial and local level GAM candidates focused on the past struggle as well as on economic development and investment.

Diaspora returnees also figured in the Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh/CoSPA (Komisi Keberlanjutan Perdamaian Aceh), formed in 2008. This mediation body has the support of Governor Irwandi Yusuf and is designed “as a forum allowing the major stakeholders of the peace process to discuss and address conflict incidents and MoU-related issues.”\textsuperscript{952} It includes the participation of diaspora returnees Bakhtiar Abdullah (Sweden), Nur Djuli (Malaysia), Teuku Hadi (Germany), and Shadia Marhaban (U.S.).\textsuperscript{953}

The next institutional test to the peace agreement and GAM’s transition was the legislature elections of 2009. There were questions over the split within GAM and what impact it might have on GAM’s ability to form a political party that could successfully contest elections. Intra-GAM divisions also caused confusion over who legitimately represented GAM in discussions with the central government of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{954} By 2008, GAM had already formed a political party—initially labeled the GAM Party (Partai Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). In February of the same year it changed its name to the Party for a Self-Governed Aceh (Partai

\textsuperscript{951} International Crisis Group (March 22, 2007): 2.

\textsuperscript{952} World Bank, Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update (January 1- February 29, 2008): 8 at http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/home.php?id=1

\textsuperscript{953} Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh (CoSPA), Press Release—3\textsuperscript{rd} CoSPA Meeting, April 16, 2008 at http://www.aceh-eye.org/data_files/english_format/peace_process/peace_process_cospa/cospa_meeting/cospa_meeting_2008_04_16_03.pdf

Gerakan Aceh Mandiri), thereby dropping the reference to “Merdeka” (Freedom or Independence). By the 2009 elections, it was simply known as the Aceh Party (Partai Aceh). Malik Mahmud was the original leader of the Aceh Party but he was replaced by Muzakir Manaf (head of the KPA) in early 2008, in part because the party leader had to hold Indonesian citizenship in order for the party to be legalized and Mahmud did not. Adnan Beuransyah (a returnee from Denmark) became party spokesman. The 2009 elections tested whether GAM would be able to hold together as a political entity. There were also concerns over violence and intimidation leading up to the elections held in April 2009. As forecast prior to the election, the Aceh Party won the majority of votes in the election for the Aceh provincial legislature. However, the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, a national party), the party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, also had a strong showing in local elections.

Regardless of the splits within GAM, members (both Aceh based and diaspora returnees) have, thus far, evinced commitment to the peace agreement and to democratic processes. Malik Mahmud and the senior leadership continue to be accused of autocratic and undemocratic decision-making. This, however, is a matter of internal GAM politics and has not been extended to a political platform. In the wider political arena, GAM has shown itself capable and willing to participate in electoral politics.

Regarding political platforms, since the 2006 elections the primary concerns appear to be economic, that is, ensuring that economic development is tangible and constituencies benefit

955 World Bank (January 1 - February 29, 2008).


958 Although in Indonesia rumors persist that GAM’s ultimate goal remains independence.
Corruption was a major concern for GAM—corruption in the provincial and local bureaucracies and among former GAM commanders and the KPA. As in East Timor, the economic and developmental challenges were significant when GAM came to political power in Aceh, and in 2008 Aceh was still struggling with post-tsunami and post-conflict rebuilding. During the 2005 Helsinki negotiations, GAM made its clearest expressions to date regarding its preferred political system. In a July 2005 press release, for example, GAM stated:

What we are proposing is nothing less than basic democratic rights...[u]nder such principles enjoyed by people in democratic countries around the world...GAM understands and embraces a genuine democratic outcome for the people of Aceh...We now call on the Government of Indonesia to continue its own process of political reform and also embrace true democracy as a means of ending the Aceh conflict and to allow reconstruction of our devastated homeland to progress.959

It would be difficult for GAM to backtrack, at least rhetorically, from such statements and commitments made during the Helsinki negotiations. As of 2009, however, GAM as a political entity (or a political party) had not yet developed a discernable strategy or clear policies for Aceh’s political and economic development or self-government, beyond the goal of full implementation of the MoU.

Many diaspora returnees, particularly diaspora leaders and activists, continued their engagement in homeland politics and in the protection and promotion of the principles they had championed in diaspora: democracy and human rights. Aguswandi, for example, continues to be an outspoken promoter (for Aceh and Indonesia as a whole):

If ever there was a discourse about “them and us” in Indonesia, it should be about “them” who want to promote conservative Islam through sharia that oppresses women and is antidemocratic and against multiculturalism, and “us” who want to promote civil Islam, secular democracy and a multicultural, cosmopolitan society...It is time to combine all of this with our work to build democracy and human rights in Indonesia. This is not about echoing what the

west says. It is not about appeasing western pressure on the Muslim world. It is about what kind of future society we want to have.\textsuperscript{960}

In addition to their participation in the Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh (CoSPA), several of the diaspora returnees mentioned earlier, including Nur Djuli and Bakhtiar Abdullah, were also involved in an organization called the Helsinki MoU Watch (Tim Pemantau MoU Helsinki) that advocates conformity of the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) with the text of the Helsinki MoU. This includes the establishment of a Human Rights Court. The Helsinki MoU Watch has adopted a \textbf{human rights approach}. It has urged the Government of Indonesia to expedite the establishment of the Court and demanded “retroactive justice” for human rights violations that occurred before 2000 as well as violations that occurred thereafter. It also calls for the establishment of a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.\textsuperscript{961} However, as noted in a Helsinki MoU Watch document, little if any progress has been made in this area, the document labels Section 2 of the MoU (pertaining to human rights) as “not implemented.”\textsuperscript{962}

As in the case of East Timor, a pragmatic approach towards the Government of Indonesia has overshadowed questions of justice and a human rights agenda—that is, the actors involved capitulated in the face of structural obstacles and immediate economic and political goals. There was concern among the backers of the MoU (on all sides—GAM, Government of Indonesia, and Aceh Monitoring Mission/AMM) that “too strong” an emphasis on human rights could jeopardize the peace process; that strong elements within the Indonesian Government and especially the military were looking for any opportunity to weaken the MoU and LoGA and potentially spoil the peace in Aceh.\textsuperscript{963}


\textsuperscript{961} Helsinki MoU Watch, \textit{Compilation of Most Serious Concerns Regarding the Implementation of the MOU} (undated) at http://www.bra-aceh.org/helsinki.php


\textsuperscript{963} Aspinall (2008): 34-35.
provided evidence that the Indonesian military was capable of obstructing human rights trials or otherwise "beating the system." On the Indonesian side there were few prosecutions and convictions based on abuses committed in East Timor in 1999, most of these were soon after overturned on appeal.\textsuperscript{964} Out of 18 cases only two served jail time, both were civilians and East Timorese: they were: Abilio Soares, a former governor of East Timor and the notorious pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres,\textsuperscript{965} whose conviction was overturned in March 2008. This reflected both the continued influence of the military as well as the weakness of the Indonesian judicial system. In Aspinall's assessment, Indonesia's justice institutions (the police, prosecutors and courts) are highly ineffective and corrupt, "especially in dealing with gross human rights abuses."\textsuperscript{966} This institutional weakness itself represented a further structural obstacle to the promotion of a human rights and justice agenda in Aceh post-Helsinki 2005.

GAM's commitment to the pursuit of justice and human rights was also in question. Some believed GAM "...was not as concerned with the human rights agenda as its previous public campaigning on the issue might have suggested...perhaps partly because some of the movement's members themselves had reasons to fear effective justice institutions,"\textsuperscript{967}—that they "could be investigated and punished as part of effective human rights investigations."\textsuperscript{968} On the other hand, as the organization of the Helsinki MoU Watch and its documents show, there were also members within GAM (including diaspora returnees) who continued to support a human rights agenda and justice for past abuses. In addition, Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar, as governor and deputy governor, openly supported a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation for Aceh.

\textsuperscript{964} Aspinall (2008): 10.


\textsuperscript{966} Aspinall (2008): 10.

\textsuperscript{967} Aspinall (2008): 36.

\textsuperscript{968} Aspinall (2008): 11. This does not apply to GAM or Aceh alone. In East Timor too, questions have arisen regarding abuses committed by Fretilin and UDT during East Timor's civil war and before the Indonesian occupation.
Nevertheless, GAM’s focus on human rights was blurred by a seemingly stronger concern initially for security arrangements (the demobilization of its own combatants and of course the Indonesian military and militia presence) and later by matters of political participation (gubernatorial and local elections of 2006, the formation of a political party, and the parliamentary elections of 2009), economic matters (including the reconstruction and development as well as economic assistance or compensation for conflict victims and to facilitate the reintegration of GAM participants), and intra-GAM divisions.

Civil society organizations in Aceh, as in East Timor, have taken the lead in campaigning for a human rights agenda, and more specifically for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They have established the Coalition for Truth Recovery (Koalisi Pengungkapan Kebenaran/KPK) for this purpose. They are hindered, however, by the structural obstacles inherent in the Indonesian system discussed above and by a lack of international support or leverage. Although the Government of East Timor adopted a pragmatic or communal approach towards relations with Indonesia and has, as of mid-2008, lent its support to an East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission, civil society organizations in East Timor had the benefit of evidence and recommendations in the CAVR for this purpose. They are hindered, however, by the structural obstacles inherent in the Indonesian system discussed above and by a lack of international support or leverage. Although the Government of East Timor adopted a pragmatic or communal approach towards relations with Indonesia and has, as of mid-2008, lent its support to an East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission, civil society organizations in East Timor had the benefit of evidence and recommendations in the CAVR to deploy in their campaign. They also continued to receive support from an international solidarity movement (although much of this support was diverted to humanitarian and development priorities) and at least symbolically from the U.N. In a symbolic gesture of protest, the U.N. refused to send a participant to the East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission, arguing instead in favor of the CAVR. Because Aceh operates within an Indonesian context, however, it is still subject to the strong resistance by the Indonesian government (or strong elements within) to any kind of international presence or pressure. It does not accept “internationally constituted justice mechanisms” for Aceh and—unlike in East Timor and perhaps because of it—the U.N. did not play a role in the resolution of the Aceh conflict. International leverage vis-à-vis human rights in this respect, is limited.

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969 CAVR (2006).

The resolution of the conflict itself, however, has brought about a dramatic improvement in the human rights situation in Aceh.\textsuperscript{971} The violence and egregious human rights abuses associated with the conflict, in particular from the 1990s on, have ceased. The 2006 and 2009 local elections in Aceh can be considered a success in the democratization process of both Aceh and Indonesia as a whole. Diaspora returnees, in particular diaspora leaders and activists, four years after the signing of the MoU in Helsinki in 2005, remain engaged in democratic political practices and processes.

**Conclusion: A Look to the Future**

In both East Timor and Aceh, diaspora returnees in political office, as members of political parties, or as part of civil society thus far have displayed a commitment to democratic processes. Although the democratic political system and institutions in East Timor are threatened by poor economic conditions, deep social divisions, social instability, and government officials and political parties are too willing to resort to “mud-slinging” and “rumor-mongering” as part of their repertoires of action, democratic processes in East Timor—although immature and fragile—have not broken down. In Aceh, where diaspora returnees are also involved in politics and civil society, GAM is transforming itself from rebel movement to political party. Both East Timor and Aceh have an active civil society. The sustainability of democratic processes in both Aceh and East Timor is uncertain, but there are reasons for measured optimism.

Perhaps more uncertain is the sustainability of human rights improvements in both places. Diaspora returnees appear divided on the issue of human rights, with senior members in both cases taking a more pragmatic approach and the younger generation a continued (if constrained) commitment to advancing a human rights agenda. In 2008, President Ramos-Horta granted pardons and commuted the sentences of several prisoners, including Rogerio Lobato, sparking criticism from both politicians and civil society organizations who viewed the decisions as strengthening impunity and undermining the rule of law.\textsuperscript{972} The institutions that monitor, protect, and promote human rights (police, judiciary, media) remain weak in

\textsuperscript{971} Aspinall (2008).
Aceh and East Timor. At the time of writing, the fate of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Aceh remains uncertain and the effectiveness (or even purpose) of the East Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission is questioned. Nevertheless, 2009 has seen very modest movement in this regard. In Aceh a team is in place to prepare for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission scheduled for 2010; and civil society organizations are advocating an ad hoc special Human Rights Court for Aceh that would be able to investigate crimes prior to 2005 or even 2000, among these the KKA massacre and the torture and death of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah. In East Timor, civil society organizations continue to pressure the government on accountability for past human rights abuses. Within the government, outspoken politicians such as Fernanda Borges do the same. Borges is an MP and head of the National Unity Party, and she chairs the Parliament’s Committee A which is responsible for human rights and justice issues. Borges, a diaspora returnee from Australia, enjoys a close relationship with Progressio (formerly the CIIR), the U.K.-based Catholic organization with a long history of support for social justice in East Timor.

How East Timor and Aceh will deal with past human rights violations remains unanswered. The implications of this may prove significant. Both Aceh and East Timor face the challenge of replacing conflict-era practices of violence with “rights-respecting attitudes”—respect for democratic practices, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, participation, and promotion of equality. Human rights advocates argue that the practice of allowing actions violating human rights to escape prosecution with impunity remains the modus operandi of the very institutions charged with protecting human rights—the military, police and judiciary. Proponents of a human rights approach argue that in East Timor, current—not only past—social and security problems are linked with a history and culture of impunity for

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975 Borges fled to Australia with her family in 1975 when the Indonesian military invaded; she completed her secondary and tertiary education in Australia. Borges heads the Partido Unidade Nacional (PUN) or National Unity Party.

human rights abuses. Likewise in Aceh, Aspinall argues, human rights abuses represented “a central justification for armed violence against the state...Failing to deal definitively with the legacy of the past will result in the persistence of a potent source of grievance...which in the long term could help to re-ignite violent conflict.” Leen Avonis predicts that given “the nature of Aceh’s conflict,” putting the past behind is neither a likely prospect nor a viable solution. The challenge Aceh and East Timor face in this regard is how to approach the task of addressing systematic abuses without exacerbating social divisions and endangering fragile political institutions and economic transformation.

As evidence in this chapter indicates, the return has not resulted in a complete un-making of the diasporas. Australia, for example, still hosts the largest population of East Timorese in the West (perhaps numbering 20,000) and new diaspora populations are emerging. An estimated 5,000 East Timorese now live in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland—their departure from East Timor prompted not by the Indonesian occupation but rather by the volatile economic and security conditions in the newly independent state of East Timor. The majority of Acehnese in the West remain there. Although a desire for an “eventual return” is articulated, the decision to return frequently is postponed. The reasons vary, from political disagreement with the MoU to the more personal: not wanting to disrupt the life of children and their education prospects in the West, lack of employment opportunities in the homeland, or simply a preference, at least for the time being, for their lifestyle in the hostland. For others, East Timorese and Acehnese, there is no real choice; a return may not be financially possible.

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977 See NGO Letter Justice for Timor-Leste to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations (February 28, 2009) at http://etan.org/ifet/0209ifet.htm. Sixty-one NGOs from East Timor, Indonesia, Australia, the U.S., Canada, Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia are signatories.


980 This is an unofficial diaspora-sourced figure.

981 Many of them are "third-country" diasporans, going from East Timor to Portugal and later to the U.K. and Northern Ireland. They travel to the U.K. and Northern Ireland as EU citizens, bearing Portuguese passports.

Where geographical proximity allows for frequent sojourns and visits (among those who can afford them), the dense network of exchanges among people in two locations (the diaspora hostland and the homeland) may result in the sort of community and social remittances that Peggy Levitt describes as "transnational villagers."

It may still be too early for such a community to exist, but it may develop among Acehnese who circulate between towns and villages in Aceh and Malaysia and among East Timorese making the one hour flight back and forth between hometowns in East Timor and Darwin, Australia.

In both the Acehnese and East Timorese cases, the end of the conflict has resulted in a marked decline in the political activity of the diasporas. However, Acehnese and East Timorese individuals and organizations continue to maintain a homeland orientation and a sense of solidarity, despite the diminished political roles. Post-conflict political activity is supportive as well as oppositional. Diasporas provide (or encourage the provision of) humanitarian assistance and charitable contributions for reconstruction and development in the homeland. These efforts often are directed at localities: fund-raising among Acehnese in Australia to re-build a village mosque, for example. Oppositional activity includes advocacy for prosecution of past human rights abuses in East Timor (oppositional to the extent that this differs from the communal approach adopted by political leaders in East Timor) as well as the rejection of the MoU by a minority of Acehnese in diaspora. The basis for mobilization on behalf of the homeland (or against the homeland government), therefore, remains in place.

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984 See Amanda Wise’s description of Darwin as a “halfway point—a place of both East Timor and Australia…” in Wise (2006): 165. Wise, however, describes these exchanges as “translocal.”

985 I am grateful to Eko Waluyo of Indonesian Solidarity for sharing his views and information on this topic with me.

986 See the references to Permas earlier in this chapter and the internet-based activism of the Preparatory Committee of the Free Acheh Democratic at http://www.freeacheh.info/
What is more marked is the un-making of the diaspora-TAN relationship. Some individuals and parts of the transnational advocacy networks that devoted much attention to the East Timor and Aceh problems remain engaged post-conflict, particularly in East Timor. In some cases, they have turned their attention to humanitarian and development projects and campaigns or to support for East Timorese and Acehnese non-governmental organizations. In other cases, they continue their role as activists, lobbying and pressuring Western governments on behalf of the East Timorese and Acehnese. Now, however, they work primarily and directly with civil society organizations in Aceh and East Timor and much less with the diasporas. Moreover, for many of the organizations and individuals within the TANs, the targets of their activism now include East Timorese and Acehnese political figures—among them diaspora returnees they may have worked with in the past. In other words, it is the former diaspora partners of the TAN that may now face TAN pressures aimed at encouraging processes of accountability for past and present human rights abuses, for example.

This chapter shows that in both the East Timor and Aceh cases, the end of the conflict resulted in a partial, but not complete, un-making of the diasporas. Both leaders and “ordinary” diasporans have returned to the homeland, but a majority of these populations remains in diaspora (in the West). Although the political activity, and thus far the influence, of those in diaspora has diminished, they maintain a homeland-oriented collective identity, a sense of solidarity, and established relationships with the homeland. In many cases (particularly where geography allows) social and cultural relationships and exchanges with the homeland, in fact, have increased. More uncertain is the future of the diaspora-TAN relationship. Since conflict settlement, this relationship has undergone a process of un-making. The possibility of re-activation of such a relationship will depend as much on the

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987 NGOs and solidarity groups such as AETA and the Mary MacKillop Institute in Australia and Progressio (formerly CIIR) in the UK, for example, continue to work with diasporans in humanitarian and aid projects aimed at the development of East Timor. ASAP (Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific) also continues work on East Timor. ETAN in the U.S. remains active and dedicated to East Timor and to a much lesser extent to Aceh. Tapol in the U.K. continues advocacy work on East Timor as well as Aceh. Individual supporters mentioned or quoted earlier in this dissertation such as, Charles Scheiner, Tom Hyland, and Tricia Johns relocated to post-referendum East Timor for periods of time to continue their “solidarity” and development work. Jessica Rucell became involved in post-tsunami reconstruction work in Aceh (with Global Exchange)

988 See examples earlier in this chapter, pp. 245-246.
diaspora’s proactive attempts to engage TANs as on events in the homeland. This chapter also confirms that a return to the “homeland” is neither without friction nor free from ambivalence. The return has been accompanied by resurgence in old divisions and the emergence of new social and political ones. Finally, the evidence presented here indicates that thus far, the democratic, and to a much lesser extent, the human rights principles and ideas held and promoted in diaspora, continue to be deployed in the homeland.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

In this final chapter, I evaluate the findings of the case studies analyzed in light of theoretical propositions. I conclude with some observations regarding the contributions this study makes to our knowledge of the two cases, to scholarship for both diaspora politics and transnational advocacy networks, and to our understanding of conflict settlement processes.

Challenges to Assumptions in Diaspora Literature

My findings contradict certain key assumptions in existing scholarship on diaspora politics. The first of these assumptions is that diaspora capacity to influence is primarily derived from material resources—from its political and especially economic resources. Some literature on diaspora politics, especially that on diasporas in conflict, adopts a rather thin definition of political resources—a diaspora’s electoral significance (whether the diaspora represents a significant constituency in the host country) and access to host country political power (whether diaspora members have connections to government and/or the ability to contribute funds to host country election campaigns). Although it is not always specified, a second assumption is that these resources are connected to the size of the diaspora. That is, larger diasporas represent a wider potential pool of financial resources that can be deployed in the homeland or hostland. By virtue of their numbers, larger diasporas also may have more potential political resources—they may have greater access to political power and may be electorally significant in the hostland thereby increasing their ability to influence foreign policy toward the homeland. A third assumption follows this line of argument, that is, that “weak” diasporas—those with limited economic resources and without, or with only limited, access to power lack the capacity to influence and intervene in homeland conflicts. Based

989 Collier and Hoeffler do indeed specify diaspora size (relative to the population in the country of origin). In addition, material resources (economic and political) may also be connected to the location of the diaspora. Diasporas in Western democratic countries, particularly the U.S. may have greater material resources to deploy as suggested in Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Washington, DC: World Bank 2001). I do not contest this finding.

990 Sri Lankan Tamils in Toronto and Jewish and Cuban communities in Florida, for example.


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on the two cases examined here, however, this capacity is not limited to the larger and more established diasporas, but also the incipient ones—the new, small, and weak diasporas. Both the Aceh and East Timorese diasporas have been able to exert an important influence on the homeland conflicts and the conflict settlement process. The reasons why this has transpired, however, do not conform to the key assumptions in much of the diaspora literature.

Materialist Explanations Assessed

Political economy analyses of civil wars and conflict see diasporas as contentious long-distance nationalists, conflict perpetuators, and potential peace-wreckers. These studies suggest that if diaspora participation is indispensable to conflict settlement, it must be because the diaspora has sufficient financial resources to have had an effect on the armed conflict in the homeland. In the case of Aceh, the diaspora (GAM) played an important role in securing third state material support (from Libya) that had an effect on the armed conflict in the homeland in the 1980s. It is speculated, that the East Timorese diaspora, particularly Fretlin members in Mozambique, with the support of the Mozambique government, attempted to provide funding and arms to Falintil, Fretlin’s armed wing in East Timor. However, in both cases, the more practical means of securing weapons was local—bought or stolen from Indonesian security forces and police. By the early 1980s in East Timor and late 1980s or early 1990s in Aceh, neither diaspora could provide sufficient material resources to have an influential effect on the conflict in the homeland. Process-tracing revealed that materialist explanations for diaspora involvement in homeland conflict, as described in political economy analyses, were applicable only in the earlier years in diaspora and are of relatively limited use in explaining the East Timor and Aceh diaspora cases in later years.


993 See Chapter 3, p. 83 and Chapter 4, pp. 132-133 and 162.

994 See Chapter 3, pp. 76-77 and Chapter 4, pp. 92-99, 121-122.
Alternative Explanation: Ideational and Political Resources and Processes Matter

In my assessment it was the diasporas' political and ideational rather than material resources that primarily determined their ability to play a role in the conflict and a decisive role, in the conflict settlement process. I employ a thick definition of political resources. The political resources available to the diaspora include potential state support (political support from host or third party states), leadership, diplomatic capacity, organizational capacity, the potential support of other allies or partners (non-state), and access to information and communication technologies. Ideational resources include ideas, concepts, ideology, knowledge, values, and frames. They are integral to the constitution of a diaspora’s political identity, and they give meaning to, motivate, and guide the actions of the diaspora. The factors (resources) contributing to diaspora impact on conflict and conflict settlement in the homeland are disaggregated above for analytical purposes. This allows an, admittedly imperfect, assessment of their relative importance, presented below in reverse order.

Political resources in the form of political support from states were significant in the case of the East Timor diaspora in that this augmented its diplomatic capacity. Support from Mozambique, and more importantly, Portugal, allowed the East Timorese to continue the pursuit of self-determination (and, ultimately, a referendum) through legal means at the U.N. However, the importance of political support from these “friendly” states was blunted by the opposition East Timor faced from other and more powerful states (Indonesia, the U.S., Australia, Japan, the U.K., and to a lesser extent, the EU). In the case of Aceh, there was no significant political support from states. Organizational capacity, on the other hand, was a significant factor in both the East Timor and Aceh cases. It was particularly important to early diaspora political activity, which, in the case of the East Timorese was political party-centric, and in the case of the Acehnese, GAM-centric. However, in both cases this centralized form of organization also had a polarizing and divisive effect on the diaspora and a weakening effect the diaspora’s political impact. The East Timorese were more successful in remedying this situation through efforts in reconciliation, compromise, and the adoption of a more inclusive and loose political organization. In both the East Timorese and Acehnese cases organizational capacity and form were closely tied to, indeed, the result of leadership and leadership styles. Both Fretilin central command leaders in diaspora and GAM’s Hasan
di Tiro put a high premium on discipline and loyalty. However, GAM's leaders in diaspora adopted a more hierarchical form of decision-making and organization than the East Timorese. This also had an effect on the diplomatic capacity of the diasporas. As summarized above, Ramos-Horta was delegated or assumed a leadership role in the diplomatic activity of the East Timorese diaspora. In doing so, he distanced himself from any apparent involvement in the armed struggle in the homeland and advanced his credibility as a peace-maker and legitimate spokesperson for East Timorese aspirations. Di Tiro's central authority over diplomatic as well as military affairs compromised success in the former. Finally, in both diaspora cases, demographic changes had implications for leadership—new arrivals to the diaspora represented a wider potential pool of leaders and a more diffuse form of leadership.

In the case of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas, separating demographic changes from ideational resources is problematic. In my view, the demographic changes derive their significance less from changes in population size than from the ideational resources of the new arrivals to diaspora. Because the new arrivals held or were more open to specific concepts, ideas, and values (in these two cases: human rights, democracy, the importance of civil society, the possibility of effecting change through activism), they challenged the dominant discourses of certain established diaspora leaders. Importantly, as stated earlier, the challenge to these dominant discourses was also possible because of a wider access to information. These ideational resources also represented potential "common ground" between diasporas and a wider network of non-Acehnese and non-East Timorese supporters. Thus, ideational resources were also closely linked with the diasporas' capacity to cultivate partnerships and supporters.

In both the cases of Aceh and East Timor (but more markedly in the East Timor case), the 1990s brought a broadening of partners for the diasporas that included networks of national and international NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals. That is, the diasporas partnered with and became a part of a TAN. The TAN served to amplify the voice and aspirations of these small and weak diasporas and to forward their interests. Through relationships with TANs, the diasporas could make use not only of their own capacity but
also the political capacity of the TAN members. Through networks of non-governmental organizations dedicated to peace, social justice, and human rights, diasporas could see their own testimony on human rights abuses reach both international organizations and an international audience.

The partnership with the TAN allowed the conflicts in East Timor (and to a lesser extent Aceh) to be framed in terms of the “complicity and obligation” of Western states and their citizens. It also resulted in the re-framing of events—the Santa Cruz massacre and the Indian Ocean tsunami—as catalysts for action and for conflict settlement. Through networks of solidarity groups in their hostlands, diasporas could access (and lobby) government representatives, participate in the organization of demonstrations and protests, and find legal representation for suits against the Indonesian government for human rights abuses. Participation in TANs provided these two small and weak diasporas (again, in particular the East Timorese) with a reach, leverage, and capacity that they did not possess on their own. Whereas in the earlier years in diaspora political support and organizational capacity appear to have been relatively more important to the diaspora’s ability to impact the homeland conflict and its settlement, in later years it was a diffuse leadership, and more importantly the diaspora’s ideational resources and partnership with members of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) that mattered most.

The Diaspora-TAN Relationship Evaluated

The evidence presented in this dissertation confirms constructivist and diaspora theory suggestions that the political identities, political identification, goals, and interests of diasporas can be transformed over time. In the cases examined here, this occurred through demographic changes and through partnership changes. New members to the diaspora tended

995 In these two cases, the result of a partnership with these TANs had a moderating effect on the position of the diasporas vis-à-vis homeland conflict settlement. However, this finding is not necessarily generalizable. Partnerships with TANs, potentially, could have the opposite effect—emboldening diasporas to pursue or support an “armed struggle” and/or eschew compromise in conflict settlement negotiations.

996 For detailed examples see Chapter 4, pp. 114-115, 153-154 and Chapter 5, 191-194, 197, 200-201, 212-215, 224-226.

997 There were benefits for the members of the expanding TANs as well, these are discussed below.
to be more open to new ideas and values, and both their numbers and ideational resources contributed to the strength of particular factions within the diasporas vis-à-vis other factions. Moreover, new political partners became available to the diasporas in the hostland and internationally. In the cases of East Timor and Aceh, the evidence suggests that the type of political partner makes a difference. Through the 1990s in the case of the East Timorese and late 1990s through 2000s in the case of the Acehnese, diaspora members engaged in relationships with individuals and groups motivated by the ideas and principles of human rights, democracy, empowerment of civil society, and, at times, peaceful/negotiated conflict settlement—these individuals and groups constituted transnational advocacy networks (TANs). As a result of processes of interaction, negotiation, and socialization between diasporans and the members of the TANs, these same principles became increasingly evident not only in the rhetoric of these diasporas but in their political activity.

In both cases, but particularly so in the case of East Timor, the diaspora underwent a process of identity transformation from potential peace-wrecker to potential peace-maker—from ideologically rigid long-distance nationalist to cosmopolitan moderate. The moderation in the position of the diaspora resulted from both internal changes within the diaspora (demographic and faction jockeying) and from growing and deepening relationships with external partners, primarily NGOs and individuals. The diasporas formed an understanding of the East Timor and Aceh problems in partnership with solidarity and advocacy groups. In the case of East Timor, this shared understanding led to a change in the diaspora’s representation of the political struggle from a guerrilla independence movement (as represented through the 1970s) to non-violent aspirations of self-determination and democracy (from the 1980s and increasingly in the 1990s). In the case of Aceh, the diaspora’s representation of the struggle changed from an armed insurgency seeking independence (from the 1970s through the early 2000s) to a broad-based civil society movement demanding an end to human rights abuses and a political solution to the conflict.

A “partnership” with a state may have differing effects on the diaspora than a “partnership” with a transnational advocacy network (TAN). Moreover, different TANs (based on their goals or membership) may also have differing effects on a diaspora. For example, early support for the East Timorese from “the left” did not appear to have a moderating effect on diaspora members, and it had consequences for broader public support in the West. For a discussion on this See Chapter 4, pp. 121-126 and 162-166 and Chapter 5, pp.183-188, 193-194, 201, 205, 209-214, 219-220, 227-228, 230.
These changes in understanding and representation were the result of critical ideational processes occurring within the diaspora and within the diaspora-TAN relationship.

The East Timor and Aceh conflicts were not settled militarily. Pressure from Western governments on Indonesia to find a peaceful and negotiated solution mounted through the 1990s in the case of East Timor in particular and through the early 2000s in the case of Aceh. Therefore, changes in policy of Western countries towards Indonesia are frequently cited as a major cause for Indonesia’s “sudden” acceptance of a referendum and its greater willingness to reach a negotiated settlement with GAM. The changes in Western policy, however, did not occur in a vacuum. They were the result of years of: diplomatic efforts by diaspora leaders (in the case of East Timor); transnational advocacy network-building in support of East Timor and Aceh (by both diasporans and non-diaspora organizations and individuals); and the persuasion and socialization efforts of the TANs, including reasoning, pressuring, and shaming Western governments. These efforts were facilitated in part by changes in the political identities of the two diasporas, by their transformation from peace-wrecker to peacemaker. While TAN-induced Western government pressure to resolve the East Timor and Aceh problems came to bear on the Indonesian government, the TAN-diaspora relationship had the effect of strengthening peace-making subgroups within the diaspora and moderating diaspora positions. These parallel dynamics contributed to conflict settlement.

The post-conflict return by diasporans to the homeland represents a final test of this transformation and a test of their commitment to the cosmopolitan values evinced in diaspora, namely a commitment to democracy, human rights, and civil society. The end of conflict in both the East Timor and Aceh cases was accompanied by a partial un-making of the


1001 See the “Effecting Change” sections in Chapter 5, pp. 199-209 and 223-230.

1002 See Chapter 5.
diaspora as members returned “home.” In both cases, diaspora leaders and activists that returned to the “homeland” appear committed to democratic political participation and processes, and they have shown themselves capable of contesting political power democratically. On issues of justice and human rights, diaspora returnees appear divided—senior members in both cases have shown a more “pragmatic” approach, and the younger generation a continued but constrained commitment, to advancing a human rights agenda.

As a protracted consequence of TAN activities, East Timor and Aceh still command public, media, and government attention. Both places receive substantial economic and technical aid from governments and international organizations. East Timor depends on U.N. (mostly Australian and New Zealand) armed forces deployed to the territory as a deterrent against internal security threats. And both Aceh and East Timor are targets of non-governmental organizations in terms of assistance and a physical presence there. Indeed some of these non-governmental organizations (and individuals) were part of the transnational advocacy networks that developed during the conflicts. The hope for many in and out of East Timor and Aceh is that democratic practices and institutions and “rights respecting attitudes” will be sufficiently consolidated before the attention of media, governments, and non-governmental organizations is diverted to other areas of the world. In either place, peace cannot be taken for granted.

Questions and Suggestions for Future Study

This dissertation advances knowledge of the East Timorese and Acehnese diasporas, and more generally, the East Timor and Aceh conflicts and their settlements. In the case of East Timor, this study complements existing detailed literature on the East Timorese diaspora in Australia. It does so by providing an account of East Timorese diaspora politics in other Western states and by examining the political relationships between the East Timorese diaspora in Australia and elsewhere. In the case of Aceh, it fills a gap in knowledge. To date,

very little has been written on the Acehnese diaspora and even less has been published.\textsuperscript{1004} The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that the study of diaspora politics should give greater attention to diaspora relationships beyond the state (that is, beyond the diaspora-homeland and diaspora-hostland relationship). Conversely, analyses of transnational activism and transnational advocacy networks might benefit from deeper analyses and more explicit articulation of the role of diasporas as transnational activists and within TANs. The evidence presented here, for example, reveals that a diaspora (or at least a group or network of diaspora activists) can be both a node within the TAN and a partner with the TAN. In the East Timorese and Acehnese cases, diaspora members were indeed "embedded" into the TAN.\textsuperscript{1005} They participated in TAN activities by providing information and testimony, joining demonstrations, conferences, and public awareness campaigns. They also participated in TAN government lobbying efforts. However, the diaspora was a partner of the TAN because it had a separate organization and operated independently, and it contributed to the agenda setting and strategizing of the TAN.

Shared understandings of the Aceh and East Timor conflicts were developed through information-sharing, discussion, debate, and negotiation within the diaspora-TAN relationship. Moreover, diaspora and TAN members jointly and in parallel re-framed both the conflicts and conflict settlement. In the cases of the Acehnese and East Timorese diasporas, the relationship with the TAN lent support to and encouraged cosmopolitan values and ideas, namely an emphasis on democracy and human rights, and on peaceful conflict settlement within the diaspora. On the other hand, in the case of East Timor, the diaspora was able to


\textsuperscript{1005} For selected examples and analysis see Chapter 4, p. 114-115, 150-151, 155-157 Chapter 5, pp. 190-193, 196, 199, 203, 211-215 and Chapter 6, pp. 245-246, 271-272.
encourage, among TAN members, an understanding of peaceful conflict settlement that was based on self-determination through referendum.¹⁰⁰⁶

Thus this dissertation encourages a new way to study diaspora politics—through the analysis of the diaspora-TAN relationship. Having no relationship with a TAN (or networks within TANs) would be revealing as well. Relative power relations between diasporas (diaspora members) and the TAN might also need to be examined. Might there be an element of coercion or opportunism in cases of power disparity? The triangular relationship between diasporas, TANs, and nonstate actors in the “homeland” may also be of some significance. Does the inclusion of local homeland NGOs or civil society organizations within the TAN inhibit the development of a diaspora-TAN relationship or preclude the need for one?

Studies on transnational activism and transnational networks frequently include analyses of information flows and communication technologies. Diaspora scholars have also drawn a connection between diasporas, information and communication technologies.¹⁰⁰⁷ Roza Tsagarousianou, for example argues that communications and exchange are central to the contemporary diasporic experience or condition.¹⁰⁰⁸ Recent diaspora scholarship (and scholarship on globalization) tends to emphasize the effects of new information and communication technologies, especially the internet (the world wide web, e-mail, internet message boards, internet social networks, etc.), mobile phones (and text) and digital imagery.¹⁰⁰⁹ The East Timorese and Acehnese diaspora cases raise some interesting questions in this regard. As with other groups, new technologies and cheaper transport enabled cross-border communication, exchange, coordination, and movement among the East Timorese and Acehnese in diaspora and among the members of the transnational advocacy networks. The effects of these technologies on the organizational capacities and efforts of the diasporas and


¹⁰⁰⁷ As discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 45-47.


¹⁰⁰⁹ In addition to cheaper air travel.
TANs were reviewed earlier in this dissertation. However, in the case of East Timor, decisive diaspora links with non-Timorese organizations and activities took place before widespread use of the internet. A transnational East Timor solidarity movement (solidarity groups throughout the world), for example, emerged in the early 1990s, following the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, and prior to the popularization of the internet. In the case of East Timor, faxes, satellite telephones, and video were, arguably, more important. The world wide web, email, and mobile phones “made things easier” and certainly helped grow solidarity and coordinate efforts, but much of the work of unifying the East Timorese and developing a transnational advocacy network preceded their use.

In the case of Aceh, the arrival of new members to the diaspora through the 1990s did coincide with the popularization of internet use. Despite this, the Acehnese diaspora and transnational advocacy on behalf of Aceh never had the same reach (or success) as the East Timorese. One reason for this was the inability of Acehnese in diaspora to present a united message, even though cheaper air travel and advances in communication technologies effectively “reduced” the distance among the scattered Acehnese populations. In some respects, new communication technologies may have hindered unity among Acehnese. Websites, blogs, email, and online discussion sites, allowed diaspora members to frequently, and sometimes publicly, exchange various views on the conflict in Aceh, attribute blame, express grievances and disappointment, criticize the political activity or lack of it of specific groups or individuals, etc. Instead of enabling “coexistence” and “experiencing together,” these exchanges may have reinforced cleavages. Therefore, regarding diasporas and TANs, is it the use of new technologies (including ease and frequency) that should command our attention or is it the content of the exchanges that matter more?

Finally, evidence in this research suggests that the type of partner a diaspora adopts or is able to attract may make a difference. Based on the East Timor and Aceh cases, it appears that when the diaspora partner is a state or a specific type of state (for example, “revolutionary

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1010 See, for example, Chapter 4, pp. 110-111, 148, 156, 165.

1011 Tsagarousianou (2004): 64.
state," or states willing to provide the diaspora with material support), the diaspora’s willingness to compromise in negotiations, to moderate political demands, and to adopt cosmopolitan ideas\textsuperscript{1012} is less evident. While the East Timorese and Acehnese enjoyed sufficient material support from Mozambique and Libya respectively to perpetuate or re-ignite the conflicts in the homeland, they appeared unwilling to moderate political demands and compromise.\textsuperscript{1013} Thus, in these two cases, it was demographic changes and the partnership with the TAN that contributed to a moderation in the diaspora’s views\textsuperscript{1014} and had a transformative effect on diaspora political identity and interests. At the material level, states (host or third states) can provide diasporas with weapons and money to re-ignite or perpetuate conflict. Moreover, political support from states can shield a diaspora from pressures to change or seek reconciliation, as in the case of the Cuban diaspora in the U.S.,\textsuperscript{1015} and can provide justification for political activity that perpetuates conflict. Diasporas with state support may by-pass TANs, thereby also by-passing a potential "moderating" effect of a relationship with the TAN.

Large and affluent diasporas may also choose to by-pass TANs or at least resist their potential moderating influence. These diasporas may have the numbers and financial resources to exert political influence in the hostland—that is, they may be electorally significant and/or wealthy enough to contribute to campaigns, have access to policy-makers, and lobby directly through diaspora organizations (some Jewish diaspora organizations are notable examples of this). Large and affluent diasporas may also have the required financial resources to directly influence the conflict in the homeland. For instance, contributions from


\textsuperscript{1013} See Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{1014} In the cases analyzed here, the effect was a moderating one. Likely, not all TANs are equally moderating.

the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora reportedly cover about 90% of the international military procurement budget of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE).\textsuperscript{1016}

On the other hand, the research presented here, as in other studies, confirms that diasporas are not monolithic entities. They are heterogeneous and internally divided. Therefore, factions, groups, and members within even the larger diasporas may see the need for or the benefits from engaging in partnerships with TANs. Thus the potential effect of a TAN relationship may not be limited to new, small, and weak diasporas. This may be answered by testing the propositions and findings in this dissertation against cases of larger, richer, and more established diasporas.

This dissertation concludes that the Acehnese and East Timorese cases support the proposition that diasporas are important and dynamic political actors, even when they are incipient diasporas. It suggests that the importance of diaspora participation in conflict and conflict settlement may not solely or even primarily be dependent on the material resources of the diaspora. Rather ideational and political resources may determine a diaspora’s ability to ensure its participation in the conflict settlement process. Despite their inherent weaknesses (their small size and lack of economic and political access), incipient diasporas may have the ability to influence homeland conflict and its settlement. Moreover, analysis of a diaspora’s relationship with a transnational advocacy network or networks (TANs) yields new insights into conflict settlement processes. Diasporans potentially learn from, contribute to, and benefit from TAN strategies and tactics. The TAN itself can help project the political influence of the diaspora. More significantly, the diaspora-TAN relationship can have a transformative effect on the political identity of the diaspora, potentially moderating its views and positions, and thereby facilitating conflict settlement.

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