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Mind, body and experience

University of British Columbia

It is a common notion that we have minds or souls in addition to or distinct from our bodies. This common notion, however, is considered by many to be philosophically unacceptable. This toeing the case many philosophers have attempted to account for the mental in terms of the physical. This thesis examines four such attempts. The type identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism are examined and rejected. A token identity statement is adopted and defended. The defense of the token identity statement rests on its form which takes the subject of experience to be central. While consciousness is not explained by this identity statement, I argue that it does enable us to accommodate the mental within a physicalist framework.

Text

2010-07-18

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/26634

Philosophy

University of British Columbia

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