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A refutation of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles

University of British Columbia

The principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles states that qualitatively indistinguishable objects are necessarily numerically identical. The purpose of this thesis is to offer what I believe is a conclusive refutation of this principle. Since the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles was first stated by Leibniz in 1684, a number of philosphers have argued that the principle is false. Central to their arguments has been the claim that it is logically possible for numerically distinct objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable and therefore qualitatively indistinguishable objects are not necessarily numerically identical. However, the difficulty with this argument is that it merely asserts that distinct indiscernibles are a logical possibility and this of course is something which proponents of the Identity of Indiscernibles would obviously deny. Thus type of argument, which is termed an individuation argument, does not then provide conclusive grounds on which to reject the Identity of Indiscernibles. My argument against the Identity of Indiscernibles is not an individuation argument, that is, it does not seek to establish that distinct indiscernibles are a logical possibility. Rather, what my argument endeavours to show is that the Identity of Indiscernibles implies an unacceptable view of the nature of objects. This argument is established, first, by indicating those features of recognized ontologies which are incompatible with the Identity of Indiscernibles and, therefore, through a process of elimination, those features which are compatible with the principle. These features together form the view of the nature of objects to which proponents of the Identity of Indiscernibles are committed, and which is in turn shown to be unacceptable.

Text

2010-05-31

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/25239

Philosophy

University of British Columbia

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