Open Collections

A theory of rights and obligations

University of British Columbia

I attempt in this thesis to present a comprehensive theory of rights. The theory is composed of two major parts, the first containing a theory of natural rights, and the second, a theory of what I call special rights. In the first part, I argue that for A to have a natural right to X is for it to be the case that, in virtue of certain natural characteristics of A (which I specify), and in the absence of limiting and certain other conditions (which I also specify), it is prima facie seriously wrong for others to be positively instrumental in A's not having X. I argue that the general natural rights are to life, well-being and autonomy; I then specify what characteristics a creature must have in order to possess any of these general rights. In particular, I argue that a creature must be conscious in order to have a right to well-being, and must be self-conscious in order to have a right to life or autonomy. I follow this with a discussion of what the limitations are on the general natural rights, what constitutes a violation, and when violations are permissible. The second part of the thesis consists of a theory of special rights. An analysis of obligations forms an important part of this theory. I come to the conclusion that for A to have an obligation to B to do 0 is for the following to be true: i. A is subject to a rule which says, if event e occurs, then a is to do o for b, except under conditions t₁-t[sub i]; ii. e occurs; iii. none of the conditions t₁-t[sub i] hold; iv. the event e involves both the obliged and either the intended beneficiary of the rule or someone who is so N related to the intended beneficiary that his loss is also a loss to the intended beneficiary; v. one of the following is true: (a) the obliged could have prevented e by exercising due care; (b) the obliged could have prevented the obliging event by deciding not to act in an obligedness-creating way; i.e. he could have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an obligedness-creating property. I argue that obligations and special rights are strictly correlative; that is, if A has an obligation to B to do 0, then B has a special right against A to his doing 0, and vise versa. So, to say that B has a special right against A to his doing 0, is for the same conditions to hold as for A to have an obligation to B to do 0. I then consider when a special right can be waived, what constitutes a violation of a special right, and when violations are permissible. I conclude by arguing that special and natural rights are both rights because of certain important features which they have in common, and that there are no other kinds of genuine rights.

Text

2010-03-11

For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.

http://hdl.handle.net/2429/21783

Philosophy

University of British Columbia

Graduate