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The Bush administration’s nuclear strategy : the ’New Triad,’ counterproliferation doctrine, and asymmetrical deterrence McDonough, David Stephen
Abstract
This thesis examines the current Bush administration's nuclear weapons strategy. It argues that the current U.S. strategy is based on the concept of asymmetrical deterrence against 'rogue states' that, rather than having a comparable or even minimal nuclear arsenal, have or are developing nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. This form of asymmetrical deterrence can therefore be seen as comparable to the U.S. deterrent posture in the 1940's to 1960's against the Soviet Union, and contrasted with the symmetrical deterrent posture reflected in the context of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In addition, this paper offers some preliminary conclusions on the problems associated with this posture, specifically with regard to the non-proliferation regime and the symmetrical U.S. deterrent posture directed towards Russia and China. Rather than a new strategy, asymmetrical deterrence has been the de facto U.S. policy of the post-Cold War period. This strategy changes the calculus of deterrence by expanding U.S. nuclear strategy to incorporate conventional counter-proliferation elements such as conventional strike options, preventive war and missile defense. This development is largely due to the changing U.S. threat perception towards rogue states, which have since replaced the Soviet Union as the most significant strategic threat facing the United States. While a de facto policy throughout the post-Cold War period, it has attained a pre-eminent status under the Bush administration. This has been most explicitly reflected in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, which outlines the strategic concept of the New Triad consisting of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure.
Item Metadata
Title |
The Bush administration’s nuclear strategy : the ’New Triad,’ counterproliferation doctrine, and asymmetrical deterrence
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
2003
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Description |
This thesis examines the current Bush administration's nuclear weapons strategy. It
argues that the current U.S. strategy is based on the concept of asymmetrical deterrence against
'rogue states' that, rather than having a comparable or even minimal nuclear arsenal, have or are
developing nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. This form of asymmetrical
deterrence can therefore be seen as comparable to the U.S. deterrent posture in the 1940's to
1960's against the Soviet Union, and contrasted with the symmetrical deterrent posture reflected
in the context of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In addition, this paper offers some
preliminary conclusions on the problems associated with this posture, specifically with regard to
the non-proliferation regime and the symmetrical U.S. deterrent posture directed towards Russia
and China.
Rather than a new strategy, asymmetrical deterrence has been the de facto U.S. policy of
the post-Cold War period. This strategy changes the calculus of deterrence by expanding U.S.
nuclear strategy to incorporate conventional counter-proliferation elements such as conventional
strike options, preventive war and missile defense. This development is largely due to the
changing U.S. threat perception towards rogue states, which have since replaced the Soviet
Union as the most significant strategic threat facing the United States. While a de facto policy
throughout the post-Cold War period, it has attained a pre-eminent status under the Bush
administration. This has been most explicitly reflected in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) Report, which outlines the strategic concept of the New Triad consisting of offensive
strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a revitalized defense
infrastructure.
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Extent |
8674453 bytes
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Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2009-10-28
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0091092
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
2003-11
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.