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The standpoint of justice and conflicting liberties : John Rawls’s conception of freedom Dalibor, Marek
Abstract
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls attempts to develop an alternative conception of justice to that provided by utilitarian theories. His critique of the latter consists mainly in the conflation of individuals into one which needs to take place in order to extend the concept of individual satisfaction of desires (utility) to a social concept. Rawls instead postulates the "inviolability of the person" against being considered merely a part of a greater whole and potentially being sacrificed for the benefit of others. From this "inviolability of the person', Rawls constructs his "Original Position", which I interpret as the "Standpoint of Justice", the position which specifies what kinds of arguments are acceptable as justifications for particular principles of justice. Most importantly, the inviolability of the person is expressed through the absence of knowledge of one's particular conception of the 'good' in the Original Position. Conceptions of the good are understood to belong to the domain of the individual, and no such conception can serve as a universally shared basis of justification. "Freedom", in this respect, consists in the right not to have another's conception of the good imposed on oneself. This is "freedom as an end". However, in order to deduce specific principles of justice from the Original Position, Rawls needs to introduce assumptions about what ends the parties there are following. He thus introduces the notion of "rational plans of life" and of "primary social goods" which serve as means to the realization of plans of life, whatever these may in particular be. Freedom, here, consists of a list of "basic liberties", which are part of the set of "primary social goods". Rawls thus introduces the notion of "freedom as a means". This gives rise to a conflict between the two aspects of freedom which Rawls is unable to solve.
Item Metadata
Title |
The standpoint of justice and conflicting liberties : John Rawls’s conception of freedom
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
1998
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Description |
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls attempts to develop an alternative conception of justice
to that provided by utilitarian theories. His critique of the latter consists mainly in the
conflation of individuals into one which needs to take place in order to extend the concept
of individual satisfaction of desires (utility) to a social concept. Rawls instead postulates
the "inviolability of the person" against being considered merely a part of a greater whole
and potentially being sacrificed for the benefit of others.
From this "inviolability of the person', Rawls constructs his "Original Position", which I
interpret as the "Standpoint of Justice", the position which specifies what kinds of
arguments are acceptable as justifications for particular principles of justice. Most
importantly, the inviolability of the person is expressed through the absence of knowledge
of one's particular conception of the 'good' in the Original Position. Conceptions of the
good are understood to belong to the domain of the individual, and no such conception can
serve as a universally shared basis of justification. "Freedom", in this respect, consists in
the right not to have another's conception of the good imposed on oneself. This is
"freedom as an end".
However, in order to deduce specific principles of justice from the Original Position,
Rawls needs to introduce assumptions about what ends the parties there are following. He
thus introduces the notion of "rational plans of life" and of "primary social goods" which
serve as means to the realization of plans of life, whatever these may in particular be.
Freedom, here, consists of a list of "basic liberties", which are part of the set of "primary
social goods". Rawls thus introduces the notion of "freedom as a means". This gives rise to
a conflict between the two aspects of freedom which Rawls is unable to solve.
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Extent |
5001854 bytes
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Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2009-04-30
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0088516
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
1998-05
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.