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Self-consciousness and the five factor model of personality: distinguishing rumination from reflection

University of British Columbia

A distinction between ruminative and reflective forms of dispositional self-focus is introduced and the theoretical utility of this distinction is evaluated in a program of eight studies. Study 1 examined for the presence of this distinction among natural language trait descriptors. Study 2 evaluated whether this distinction provided a sufficient summary of relations between the Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) Self-Consciousness scales and the Five Factor Model of personality (FFM). In Study 3, two brief questionnaire measures of ruminative and reflective tendencies were developed, and their convergent and discriminant validity evaluated with respect to the FFM, and the Fenigstein et al. (1975) Public Self- Consciousness (PUSC) and Private Self-Consciousness (PRSC) scales. Study 4 investigated the extent to which rumination and reflection separately account for PRSC associations with measures of psychological distress (e.g., Beck Depression scale) and intellective dispositions (e.g., Need for Cognition scale), respectively. Study 5 evaluated, using a sample of dormitory roommates, the extent to which self-estimates of ruminativeness and reflectiveness correspond with the judgments of a knowledgeable observer. Studies 6, 7, and 8 evaluated the extent to which the traits of rumination and reflection separately account for previously reported PRSC associations with three theoretically relevant criteria of private self-consciousness: state indices of self-focused attention (Study 6), the asymmetry effect in self-other similarity judgments (Study 7), and research volunteerism (Study 8). Findings suggest that the PRSC scale confounds two relatively independent, and motivationally distinct dispositions, rumination and reflection, and that latent ruminative and reflective components of PRSC scores separately and fully account for PRSC correlates and effects. These findings provide a straight forward explanation of the "self-absorption" paradox implicit in the PRSC research literature, i.e., the consistent but apparently contradictory finding of more accurate and extensive self-knowledge, yet higher levels of subjective psychological distress, among persons high in private self-consciousness. It is likely that the PRSC's associations with psychological distress are uniquely due to its neurotic component (rumination), and that the PRSC's self-knowledge effects are uniquely due its intellective component (reflection). It is argued that rumination and reflection represent statistically and functionally independent self-focusing tendencies. Their strong and unique associations with the FFM dimensions of neuroticism and openness, respectively, imply a basic dichotomy of self-attentive motives: anxiety/fear and curiosity/exploration: rumination represents a useful summary conception of self-attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self; reflection represents a useful summary conception of self-attentiveness motivated by intrinsic curiosity, or epistemic interest in the self. It is concluded that the spatial metaphor of "direction" may not be an appropriate basis for a useful scientific conception of dispositional self-consciousness. The concept of a purely cognitive tendency to have attention chronically directed toward the self versus away from the self, construed independently of the emotional and motivational determinants of such a tendency, is probably untenable.

Thesis/Dissertation

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2009-03-19

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/6215

Psychology

University of British Columbia

UBCV

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