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The Paris Peace Conference without the Bolshevik threat Cooper, Susan Leslie
Abstract
Arno J. Mayer became established as an authority on
Peace Conference history with the 1967 publication of his
sweeping class-based analysis, “Politics and Diplomacy of
Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles”,
1918-1919. In it he maintains that the peacemakers who were
gathered in Paris to settle accounts after the Great War were
influenced more by the appearance of Bolshevism than by any
other single factor. According to Mayer, the statesmen
reacted to a threat from the Left that had been given
momentum by Lenin's success in Russia. His panoramic view of
class struggle across Europe and America, which likely seemed
so apropos in the 1960s, has unfortunately obscured many of
the opinions of the men who were actually there. This thesis
is an investigation into the opinions of those men as
revealed by a selection of primary source documents and as
supported by appropriate secondary source material.
The official and the personal records kept by the
delegates who attended Versailles, reveal men who were not
particularly concerned about the establishment of Bolshevism
in Russia. The records clearly establish that the leading
statesmen of the day, including David Lloyd George and
Woodrow Wilson, were not apprehensive about and did not feel
threatened by either Lenin or the Hungarian Bolshevik, Bela
Kun. There is ample evidence to show that in 1919 the
peacemakers and their contemporaries felt that Bolshevism in
Russia was only a temporary phenomenon in that country's
development toward liberal democracy. While Bolshevism did
not overly concern the Allied leaders, issues such as
reparations to be charged to Germany, formation of a League
of Nations, and their respective places in the postwar world
certainly did concern them. Arno Mayer's claim that i t "was
symptomatic of the entire Peace Conference that the specter
of Bolshevism significantly impinged on the deliberations of
both opening sessions," (Mayer, 411) is not defensible on the
basis of the documents and the memoirs left by the
peacemakers themselves.
Item Metadata
| Title |
The Paris Peace Conference without the Bolshevik threat
|
| Creator | |
| Publisher |
University of British Columbia
|
| Date Issued |
1997
|
| Description |
Arno J. Mayer became established as an authority on
Peace Conference history with the 1967 publication of his
sweeping class-based analysis, “Politics and Diplomacy of
Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles”,
1918-1919. In it he maintains that the peacemakers who were
gathered in Paris to settle accounts after the Great War were
influenced more by the appearance of Bolshevism than by any
other single factor. According to Mayer, the statesmen
reacted to a threat from the Left that had been given
momentum by Lenin's success in Russia. His panoramic view of
class struggle across Europe and America, which likely seemed
so apropos in the 1960s, has unfortunately obscured many of
the opinions of the men who were actually there. This thesis
is an investigation into the opinions of those men as
revealed by a selection of primary source documents and as
supported by appropriate secondary source material.
The official and the personal records kept by the
delegates who attended Versailles, reveal men who were not
particularly concerned about the establishment of Bolshevism
in Russia. The records clearly establish that the leading
statesmen of the day, including David Lloyd George and
Woodrow Wilson, were not apprehensive about and did not feel
threatened by either Lenin or the Hungarian Bolshevik, Bela
Kun. There is ample evidence to show that in 1919 the
peacemakers and their contemporaries felt that Bolshevism in
Russia was only a temporary phenomenon in that country's
development toward liberal democracy. While Bolshevism did
not overly concern the Allied leaders, issues such as
reparations to be charged to Germany, formation of a League
of Nations, and their respective places in the postwar world
certainly did concern them. Arno Mayer's claim that i t "was
symptomatic of the entire Peace Conference that the specter
of Bolshevism significantly impinged on the deliberations of
both opening sessions," (Mayer, 411) is not defensible on the
basis of the documents and the memoirs left by the
peacemakers themselves.
|
| Extent |
5273993 bytes
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| Genre | |
| Type | |
| File Format |
application/pdf
|
| Language |
eng
|
| Date Available |
2009-03-21
|
| Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
|
| Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
|
| DOI |
10.14288/1.0087832
|
| URI | |
| Degree (Theses) | |
| Program (Theses) | |
| Affiliation | |
| Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
|
| Graduation Date |
1997-11
|
| Campus | |
| Scholarly Level |
Graduate
|
| Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
|
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Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.