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UBC Theses and Dissertations
Marketing cooperatives and supply management Janmaat, Johannus Anthonius
Abstract
Cooperatives are commonplace in the dairy sector throughout the developed world. A cooperative is an organization whose patrons are those who contribute the capital. Two features that distinguish a cooperative are: profits are distributed by member patronage, and member control is democratic. In theory, this organizational form cannot sustainably capture economic rents. Members adjust their production until any captured rents are eliminated, restoring the competitive solution. In British Columbia, the dairy industry is regulated by supply management. Production quotas control output, while fanner returns are guaranteed by restricting imports and administering the price. All milk is pooled, and processors need not deal directly with dairy producers. A simple model of the BC dairy industry, with farm production or processor input as the only variable, shows that the ‘competitive yardstick’ is not maintained. The industry wide milk pool decouples the cooperative from its membership. When this cooperative maximizes its patronage dividend, supply management totally separates it from its members incentives. Given that the administrative price is not set to eliminate all processing rents, the positive patronage dividend is an incentive for all farmers to join the cooperative. Simultaneously, a competing IOF can capture rents because it is buying milk at the pooi price and does not compete with the cooperative for its input needs. The financial statements of the Fraser Valley Milk Producers Cooperative Association lend support to the model. Based on performance ratios, this cooperative is behaving similar to other firms in the dairy industry, and may be capturing rents on behalf of its members. The one area of discrepancy is in the source of financing, and this can be largely explained by changing member investment preferences. Our model predicts that in B.C. the price of quota should be dependent on the return generated by our theoretical cooperative. We find that the present perfonnance of the cooperative is not a useful predictor of the quota price. However, quota price appears to be closely linked to indicators of future economic performance, and the sign of this linkage is consistent with our model.
Item Metadata
Title |
Marketing cooperatives and supply management
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
1994
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Description |
Cooperatives are commonplace in the dairy sector throughout the developed world. A
cooperative is an organization whose patrons are those who contribute the capital. Two features that
distinguish a cooperative are: profits are distributed by member patronage, and member control is
democratic. In theory, this organizational form cannot sustainably capture economic rents. Members
adjust their production until any captured rents are eliminated, restoring the competitive solution.
In British Columbia, the dairy industry is regulated by supply management. Production quotas
control output, while fanner returns are guaranteed by restricting imports and administering the price.
All milk is pooled, and processors need not deal directly with dairy producers.
A simple model of the BC dairy industry, with farm production or processor input as the only
variable, shows that the ‘competitive yardstick’ is not maintained. The industry wide milk pool decouples
the cooperative from its membership. When this cooperative maximizes its patronage dividend, supply
management totally separates it from its members incentives. Given that the administrative price is not
set to eliminate all processing rents, the positive patronage dividend is an incentive for all farmers to join
the cooperative. Simultaneously, a competing IOF can capture rents because it is buying milk at the pooi
price and does not compete with the cooperative for its input needs.
The financial statements of the Fraser Valley Milk Producers Cooperative Association lend
support to the model. Based on performance ratios, this cooperative is behaving similar to other firms in
the dairy industry, and may be capturing rents on behalf of its members. The one area of discrepancy is in
the source of financing, and this can be largely explained by changing member investment preferences.
Our model predicts that in B.C. the price of quota should be dependent on the return generated
by our theoretical cooperative. We find that the present perfonnance of the cooperative is not a useful
predictor of the quota price. However, quota price appears to be closely linked to indicators of future
economic performance, and the sign of this linkage is consistent with our model.
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Extent |
4395217 bytes
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Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2009-03-02
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0087493
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
1994-11
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.