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Abstract

The question I ask in this thesis is "What is the nature of emotions?" I then argue against essentialist answers to the question and suggest a non-essentialist approach to the study of emotions. The first chapter is a general introduction, where I try to specify what I mean by the term "emotion", without assuming anything about their nature. I do that by looking briefly at the general characteristics of some paradigm emotions. In the second chapter I argue against affect theories about emotions. My arguments turn mostly on the point that mere affects do not have the cognitive depth to account for some of the most conspicuous aspects and characteristics of emotions. The third chapter is directed against cognitive theories of emotions. I argue that the characteristics of emotions (e.g. intentionality and rationality) , which have been taken to necessitate cognitivism, can either be accounted for without beliefs or cognitions or they do not apply to all emotions. In the fourth chapter I suggest a non-essentialist approach to emotion theory. I make use of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. I then try to outline the place of cognitive emotions within the family resemblance model and come to the conclusion that a cognitive essentialist model does in fact apply to certain emotion types. In the fifth and final chapter I ask myself whether anything important can be learnt about emotions from looking at their functions, i.e. at what they do instead of what they are. After looking at two accounts of the functions of emotions, and rejecting them as, at best, incomplete, I come to the conclusion that at least some emotions have the function to serve as commitment devices to carry out rational strategies.