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Abstract

Conventional wisdom is that redistribution in Latin America is state-driven and increases with electoral competition or left-wing governments. Contrary to this established understanding, I develop a theory and provide evidence that business elites and right-wing governments also redistribute as a strategy to thwart social unrest or dampen support for left-wing parties, respectively. My research lies at the intersection of comparative politics and political economy, offering insights into unconventional responses to redistributive threats in Latin America. My work relies on a mixed-method approach, incorporating observational and experimental empirical strategies, qualitative interviews, natural language processing techniques, and using administrative and original data sources. The first part of my dissertation argues that business elites respond to redistributive claims when expressed via violent social unrest by coordinating through business associations and creating jobs because they fear future destruction and economic losses. They are likely to do so when the state is too slow or incapable of addressing popular demands. I connect research on the political economy of development, which sees economic elites as pivotal actors in guaranteeing social stability, and those on contentious politics in developing democracies, which see violent unrest as an expression of low state capacity. In contrast to extensive work on state-led redistribution, this part of my theory spotlights the role of business elites as non-state actors who can use employment as a form of redistribution and who respond more directly to violent protests as opposed to electoral dynamics. My empirical findings show that redistribution might happen through non-state actors. Yet, in the second part of my dissertation, I also examine the conditions under which political elites are likely to provide state-led redistribution. I argue that conservative parties have strong incentives to pursue redistribution when confronted with a credible leftist threat–namely, an electorally strong left-wing party with credible redistributive promises. Furthermore, I contend, and provide empirical evidence, that the wealthy are more likely to support redistributive policies when they are advanced by right-wing governments rather than by left-wing ones because they perceive it as less uncertain, more efficient, and less prone to create macroeconomic instability.