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Abstract

This thesis looks at two contemporary understandings of biological teleology: a cybernetic-bioengineering model of goal-directedness and an organicist-biocentric account of intrinsic purpose. The cybernetic perspective originates in early 20th century efforts to interpret the organism through a unified behavioristic framework for teleology in both life and machines. Its mechanism of interest is negative feedback: a process where actions adjust to minimize a discrepancy between a controlled variable and a set point, or goal state. Contemporary advocates in bioengineering adopt this approach to teleological explanation, viewing error-minimization mechanisms as ideal models of goal-directed behaviour in diverse systems, both living and nonliving. By contrast, the organicist-biocentric account grounds biological teleology in the intrinsic purposiveness of living organization and the organism’s existential self-concern. This perspective draws from various philosophical and scientific sources: from historical figures like Aristotle and Kant, to the contemporary work of Hans Jonas, and theoretical frameworks like autopoiesis, biological autonomy, and enactivism. On this account, teleology coincides with the continuous production and maintenance of a metabolically instantiated identity—arising internally from life’s autonomous ability to organize, regenerate, and perpetuate itself for its own sake—and an organism’s environmental coupling, whose interactions are normatively oriented toward promoting its viability. I begin by providing some brief historical context to the relation between teleology and biology, then outline core features of the two aforementioned approaches before discussing notable divergences. Building on key themes of the biocentric view of intrinsic teleology, particularly a treatment of biological purposiveness and autonomy informed by the work of Hans Jonas, I hold that the cybernetic-bioengineering outlook disregards critical distinctions between living and nonliving systems—notably, that only living systems have their existence as the purpose of their operations. By neglecting the self-producing organization and existential concern central to biological purposiveness, the cybernetic-bioengineering view conceals the distinctive source of living teleology which its theory presupposes and obscures qualitative differences in the forms of teleology found in technology, biology, and physics. I suggest that the biocentric perspective provides a richer account of biological teleology and more instructive criteria for distinguishing teleological characteristics of life, machines, and natural abiotic systems.