Open Collections

Ricca, Federico

University of British Columbia

Chapter 2 investigates how the racial and ethnic demographic composition of U.S. municipalities is priced in the municipal bonds market. Using high-frequency data on municipal bonds issued between 2004 and 2019, I find that cities with higher non-White population shares face higher borrowing costs. This diversity premium holds controlling for maturity structure, credit ratings, income, population trends, and city finances. Causal estimates are obtained using shift-share instruments for Black and Latino population shares. The findings are consistent with discrimination in the primary market for municipal bonds, independent of credit ratings or underwriter influence. Chapter 3 examines the underrepresentation of minority voters in U.S. city councils. Disproportionality in the representation of Minority groups is widespread, but stronger when racial or ethnic minorities are electorally pivotal, a phenomenon we define strategic underrepresentation. For the period 1981-2020, levels of strategic underrepresentation of African American, Asian, and Latino voters in U.S. city politics are substantial and tied to the strategic choice of institutional features like electoral rules, council size, and form of government. We provide causal evidence of the effects of these practices using the U.S. Supreme Court's narrow decision of Shelby County v. Holder (2013). The ruling invalidated Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which had required preclearance for electoral changes in a specific subset of U.S. jurisdictions, enabling systematic disenfranchisement. Chapter 4 explores voter registration as a potential mechanism behind the underregistration results. We use proprietary data on the universe of registered voters to show evidence of underregistration—the gap between the population share of Minority voters and their share of registered voters—in U.S. cities. This pattern closely matches that of underrepresentation of minorities in city-councils, suggesting that underregistration is a key channel. We then show that the removal of voting rights protection following Shelby County v. Holder (2013) had negative effects on the registration of Minority voters relative to White voters, especially in jurisdictions with above-median population shares of minorities, highlighting the strategic nature of the disenfranchisement efforts.

Text

2025-04-25

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

http://hdl.handle.net/2429/90794

Economics

University of British Columbia

UBCV

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/