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Simpson's paradox in epistemology and decision theory Memetea, Sonia
Abstract
I discuss the implications of Simpson’s paradox for epistemology and decision theory. In Chapter One I outline the paradox, focussing on its identification, nature, and type of reasoning that it involves. In Chapter Two I discuss the view that Simpson’s paradox is resolved by means of graph-based causal analysis. In Chapter Three I outline a major problem (hitherto unacknowledged) that Simpson’s paradox poses for the probabilistic Bayesian theory of evidence. I make a proposal to split the probabilistic concept of evidence into a causal and a news-value kind of evidence, tracking causal probabilities under an intervention, and tracking overall probabilistic relevance under conditioning. In Chapters Four and Five I apply the proposal to two further areas of concern. In Chapter Four I defend a unified causal view of Simpson’s paradox. In Chapter Five I defuse a problem about counterfactual force of evidence. In Chapters Six and Seven I discuss Simpson’s paradox and the sure thing principle in decision theory. I then conclude in Chapter Eight.
Item Metadata
Title |
Simpson's paradox in epistemology and decision theory
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
2015
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Description |
I discuss the implications of Simpson’s paradox for epistemology and decision theory. In Chapter One I outline the paradox, focussing on its identification, nature, and type of reasoning that it involves. In Chapter Two I discuss the view that Simpson’s paradox is resolved by means of graph-based causal analysis. In Chapter Three I outline a major problem (hitherto unacknowledged) that Simpson’s paradox poses for the probabilistic Bayesian theory of evidence. I make a proposal to split the probabilistic concept of evidence into a causal and a news-value kind of evidence, tracking causal probabilities under an intervention, and tracking overall probabilistic relevance under conditioning. In Chapters Four and Five I apply the proposal to two further areas of concern. In Chapter Four I defend a unified causal view of Simpson’s paradox. In Chapter Five I defuse a problem about counterfactual force of evidence. In Chapters Six and Seven I discuss Simpson’s paradox and the sure thing principle in decision theory. I then conclude in Chapter Eight.
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Genre | |
Type | |
Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2015-05-26
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 Canada
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0167719
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
2015-09
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Rights URI | |
Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Citations and Data
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 Canada