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Long term contracts and farm inflexibility premium in the production of cellulosic ethanol Jalili, Rozita
Abstract
Farmers will supply the raw ingredients for the emerging cellulosic ethanol industry. The long-term relationship between a farmer and a processing firm is expected to be contractual. A processing firm has an incentive to sign long-term contracts to ensure a cost-efficient level of raw ingredient supply. However, farmers generally prefer to operate with either no contract or a short-term contract in order to maintain options for adjustments in future acreage allocations due to changes in relative prices. Of interest in this research is to understand the incentives of farmers and calculating the efficient level of the “inflexibility premium”, which a processing firm must provide to a farmer when a long term contract is signed. A stochastic dynamic programming model is solved and with the help of Microsoft Excel numerically evaluated to illustrate the marginal inflexibility premium is increasing with contract length and the level of price variability, and is decreasing with the size of acreage adjustment costs.
Item Metadata
Title |
Long term contracts and farm inflexibility premium in the production of cellulosic ethanol
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
2008
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Description |
Farmers will supply the raw ingredients for the emerging cellulosic ethanol industry. The long-term relationship between a farmer and a processing firm is expected to be contractual. A processing firm has an incentive to sign long-term contracts to ensure a cost-efficient level of raw ingredient supply. However, farmers generally prefer to operate with either no contract or a short-term contract in order to maintain options for adjustments in future acreage allocations due to changes in relative prices. Of interest in this research is to understand the incentives of farmers and calculating the efficient level of the “inflexibility premium”, which a processing firm must provide to a farmer when a long term contract is signed. A stochastic dynamic programming model is solved and with the help of Microsoft Excel numerically evaluated to illustrate the marginal inflexibility premium is increasing with contract length and the level of price variability, and is decreasing with the size of acreage adjustment costs.
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Extent |
439945 bytes
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Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2008-04-16
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0066344
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
2008-05
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Rights URI | |
Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International