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Extending a Mining Company’s Risk Assessment Framework to Tailings Facilities

Tailings and Mine Waste Conference (2023 : Vancouver, B.C.); University of British Columbia. Norman B. Keevil Institute of Mining Engineering

A typical risk assessment framework that is used by mining companies is a 5 × 5 matrix that includes the two main components of risk: likelihood and consequences, plotted on two axes. The matrix is further subdivided into risk levels that define whether a risk is: (i) acceptable to the mining company; (ii) requires further reduction; or (iii) is not acceptable and cannot be allowed to continue. This approach has been effective for mine operators to identify, characterize, and manage their risks. However, the typical risk matrix developed by a mining company is not suitable for tailings storage facility (TSF) safety, which typically has risks with much lower likelihood events (e.g., 10,000-year return periods) and higher consequences, than other risks at a mine site. A number of alternative frameworks to the typical risk matrix have been developed that are better suited to TSF risks. However, using an alternative framework can make it difficult for the TSF team to communicate and prioritize risks within the mining company. Some mining companies have already modified their corporate risk assessment framework to address or incorporate TSF risks. This paper discusses an approach utilized by the authors and colleagues at Klohn Crippen Berger for mining companies that have not already made this modification to consider. It extends the typical 5 × 5 risk matrix to address the unique aspects of tailings facilities; enabling integration within the corporate risk management system. This framework has assisted clients with: (i) meeting the requirements of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management (GISTM); (ii) categorizing and communicating TSF risks within project, site and corporate teams; (iii) assisting the TSF safety teams to gain a thorough understanding of the facility risks; (iv) identifying the critical controls and surveillance activities; (v) identifying and prioritizing additional risk mitigation opportunities, and; (v) supporting the development of trigger, action, and response plans (TARPs) and emergency response plans (ERP).

Text

2023-12-08

Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivatives 4.0 International

http://hdl.handle.net/2429/86789

Unreviewed

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/