

IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY - A STUDY OF  
INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR

by

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## ABSTRACT

Since India became independent in August, 1947, the Indian government has pursued a 'neutralist' policy in world affairs which has raised some doubts and difficulties, more particularly in the Western non-communist camp. India's foreign policy, both generally and in its various manifestations, has been frequently subject to bitter criticism and has even been condemned as immoral and motivated by a pro-Communist bias. Such an analysis is, of course, entirely out of focus. It is hoped that this thesis will help dispel some of the doubts and clear away some of the misinterpretations concerning the policies that the Indian government has pursued on the world stage. Various aspects of Indian foreign policy have been discussed by a number of writers both in general and in specific degrees; however, to this writer's knowledge, no one has attempted to view India's foreign policy in the manner treated in this thesis. Within the limits placed by the proximity to the events discussed, this study tries to survey objectively India's foreign policy in the cold war.

Throughout this study India's foreign policy has been discussed in its various manifestations. A country's foreign policy naturally derives from a complex set of historical, geographic, economic and emotional factors, and thus the context within which Indian foreign policy was formulated and the determinants upon which it is based are examined in the first Chapter. Then in Chapter Two, which describes India's approach to the problem of security, are discussed the various efforts made by the Indian government to satisfy, within the bounds permitted by the country's resources, the strategic requirements of the State. Recognizing that India's real security depends on removing tension from the world, however, India has sought the removal of Western controls over dependent Afro-Asian peoples as a concrete step towards peace. The third Chapter discusses this, from India's initial out-spoken championship of the cause of dependent peoples to a more recent moderate approach caused by a realization that Western imperialism is a 'dead issue' and that Communist imperialism is the greater threat. In recognition that the division of the world into power blocs increases the chances of war, the Indian government has striven to ease tension through furthering the ideals of the United Nations Charter, as illustrated in Chapter Four by her opposition to power blocs and to alliances, her advocacy of disarmament, and her championship of Red China's right to a seat at the United Nations. Aware of the delicate peace existing between East and West and realizing that a world

war could result from any dispute involving the rival interests of the two power blocs, India has sought to prevent such an occurrence through dealing with each issue on its intrinsic merits. India also understands that the only alternative to coexistence is co-destruction, and she has sought to instill this realization in both the Communist and non-Communist camps. These two aspects of Indian foreign policy are discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Finally, a brief attempt is made to summarize India's foreign policy and to arrive at some general conclusions.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

D.S.B.	Department of State Bulletin (Washington).
Doc. Amer. For. Rel.	Documents on American Foreign Relations (World Peace Foundation, Boston).
Doc. I. Aff.	Documents on International Affairs (R.I.I.A., London).
G.O.I.	Government of India.
I.C.W.A.	Indian Council of World Affairs (New Delhi).
I.P.R.	American Institute of Pacific Relations (New York).
R.I.I.A.	Royal Institute of International Affairs (London).
S.I. Aff.	Survey of International Affairs (R.I.I.A.).
Y.B.U.N.	Yearbook of the United Nations.

## CHAPTER I

### REASONS, AIMS, AND PURPOSES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A country's foreign policy ultimately emerges from its own traditions, from its own objectives and more particularly from its recent past.<sup>1</sup>

Independence for India unhappily coincided with one of the most troubled and menacing periods in world history. The world was rapidly polarizing into the Soviet and Western blocs, and with the enunciation on 12 March 1947 of the Truman doctrine to contain Communism, and the issuance on 5 October 1947 of a Communist Manifesto in Moscow and Warsaw, no further evidence was needed to show that the split in the two camps was sharp and world-wide.

The immediate impact of this hostile combination of forces was felt by an India which looked forward only to a period of peaceful reconstruction in which to meet the enormous needs of her people. Instead India, at her very birth, was plunged, much against her wishes, into the very centre of gigantic revolutionary forces and power rivalries and was presented with the immediate challenge of choosing a foreign policy in the context of a world dividing between Communism and anti-Communism. She was given no opportunity

to feel her way slowly towards a clarification of Indian interests. At once India was called upon to take an attitude on such questions as Palestine and Indonesia, and soon afterwards she was faced with a decisive change in Asian affairs when the Communist regime was established in China.

As a new nation of vast size and great possibilities, India was forced by circumstances to clarify her position and thereafter to assume the major role accorded her in international diplomacy. This meant formulating a foreign policy in accordance with her national beliefs and interests, a policy which, in addition to dealing with immediate problems, would also act as a means of strengthening internal unity. India had not only to present a characteristic image of herself to the world. She had also to make that image effective by diplomatic action and see that the interests she pursued were consonant with it and capable of being pursued within the context of world affairs. One has only to read Mr. Nehru's speeches between 1946 and 1949 to see how urgent was this sense of need for a conception of interests and policy which would be both appropriate and realistic.

Indian views on international affairs may be traced to a multitude of sources, some rooted in tradition and experience, others deriving from the contemporary world. To understand India's foreign policy it is important to have a sound appreciation of the factors which collectively determine

that policy and which have provided and are providing the motivation for the unequivocal execution of that policy. Only in the context of India's needs and her interpretation of the nature of the world conflict can India's foreign policy be properly understood. A careful probe into these will shed the outer mists and lead to a proper assessment of the aims behind Indian foreign policy.

Napoleon once declared that the foreign policy of a state derives essentially from its geographic position. While this is no longer entirely accurate, because of the revolution in technology during the past century, the bare facts of geography do limit a state's freedom of action in foreign affairs. That geography is a determinant of India's foreign relations was stressed by Mr. Nehru on 23 March 1947 in a speech to the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi: "Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she [India] is so situated as to be the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South East Asia."<sup>2</sup> India's geographical contiguity to the two Great Powers of the Communist world can never be ignored by Indian statesmen, especially the simple fact that Communist China presses down upon a thousand miles of India's northern and eastern frontiers. Thus it is a matter of vital necessity for India to find a modus vivendi with these powerful neighbours, though vital interests must be protected, as in the case of the tiny border states.

At the same time India cannot ignore the fact that she has 3500 miles of coastline and is extremely dependent upon the sea routes for the flow of goods and services. The importance of this factor has been acknowledged by the noted Indian publicist K. M. Pannikar:

While to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the most important Oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea. Her life lines are concentrated in that area. Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her, unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected.<sup>3</sup>

Thus it is equally important for India to preserve friendly relations with those powers (i.e. the Western bloc) whose navies could easily throttle India's vital sea-borne life in the unlikely event of the need for such action arising. Moreover, India's position at the head of the Indian Ocean gives it an important stake in the power-political rivalries affecting all states in the region.

Closely linked with the geographic pressure on India's foreign policy are those factors stemming from her military and economic weakness -- of which her leaders are well aware.<sup>4</sup> India feels that she lacks the necessary strength to choose sides in the cold war, even if she would otherwise be apt to do so. As a result Prime Minister Nehru has declared that it is better for India to stand aside from

international conflicts for "it would not be in consonance with...dignity...to interfere without any effect being produced."<sup>5</sup>

Regarding the possibility of a threat to India from the Communist bloc, particularly China, the Indian government has hitherto expressed no fears. While its actions, especially those concerning Pakistan and her other smaller Himalayan neighbours would seem to indicate a clear awareness and concern for India's security against Chinese actions, the Nehru government has maintained that India would not be promoting her security by joining the Western bloc. This was clearly illustrated by Mr. Nehru's statement in the Indian Parliament on 21 December 1950:

India is more secure than 90% of the countries of the world, not on the basis of her armed strength, but judging from the present world situation, the danger to India in the near future is far less than that threatening more powerful and advanced nations.<sup>6</sup>

India's economic weakness is a further conditioning factor in the general orientation of Indian foreign policy. Domestic economic needs govern the external policy of every country and this is especially true of India.<sup>7</sup> Nehru has not hesitated to admit that his foreign policy is directed towards meeting his country's pressing domestic needs both in acquiring financial and technical assistance for her internal development and to gaining time in which to achieve

the necessary degree of development. "The first thing we kept in view," said Nehru in one of his parliamentary speeches, "was to build our own country on solid foundations and not to get entangled in matters which did not directly affect us - not that we are not interested in those matters, but the burden of these entanglements would be too great and the problems we had to face in our own country were big enough for any country to face."<sup>8</sup>

Consequently, India's pressing needs of economic development have caused her to keep open the door to all possible sources of aid, Western and Soviet, if the desired economic revolution is to be achieved. The Indian Prime Minister has stated that India is perfectly prepared and happy to receive foreign aid from any source, but at the same time he has also plainly declared that if help from abroad at any time depended upon a variation, howsoever slight, in India's foreign policy, then India would relinquish that help completely and prefer starvation and privation to taking such help.<sup>9</sup> In the pursuit of economic development, then, India has considered a policy of non-alignment to be in her best interests. For in the words of the former Secretary-General of India's External Affairs Ministry, the late G. S. Bajpai:

It cannot be argued that any immediate Indian interests will be served by this country implicating herself, by 'artificial



ties'...in the ordinary combinations or coalitions of the friendships or enmities of the two camps in which the major part of the world is to-day unfortunately divided.<sup>10</sup>

Just as the security and economic needs of India have demanded [in the opinion of the Indian government] that India pursue a policy of non-alignment in the cold war, so too has the temper of Indian public opinion supported the same view. While Indian public opinion has tended to follow rather than lead the Government in the formulation of its foreign policy, the Nehru government has generally been careful not to go against the sentiments of the people.

The over-riding public sentiment has inevitably been one of anti-colonialism which was bequeathed to the Indian people as a natural by-product of colonial subjection and the nationalist revolution. As one well-known Indian publicist has observed:

The antipathy to imperialism is deep-rooted in the minds of everyone in India, and that has been acquired not from books, but from national experience.<sup>11</sup>

Almost two centuries of foreign rule produced an instinctive antagonism to any form of Western (white) domination over Asian and African (non-white) peoples. The sharp distinction which Indians make between Western European colonialism in Asia and Africa and Russian control over eastern Europe and central Asia is due to the fact that India, prior to the

recent Chinese incursions on her borders, had never experienced external Communist domination of any portion of her territory.<sup>12</sup> On the contrary, by championing 'anti-colonial' movements throughout Asia and Africa, the Communists powers appeared in a very favourable light to most Indians.

It is not surprising, then, that until quite recent years, the Indian people considered the term "imperialism" as synonymous with the nations of the West. In addition most of the present Indian leaders experienced the injury to pride and national self-respect arising from personal mistreatment and humiliation under the colonial regime, and thus a residual emotional antipathy inevitably clouded their assessment of the contemporary world struggle. The intensity of this resentment and the occasions for its expression have varied, but it has constituted a fairly formidably barrier to any close alignment with the West -- to which India is politically and economically drawn. Mr. Nehru expressed this feeling in a speech of 22 March 1949:

...any attempt on our part...to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country. It would be resented and would produce conflicts which would not be helpful to us or to any other country.<sup>13</sup>

This reluctance to associate too closely with the West is reinforced by the fact that certain aspects of communist doctrine have considerable attraction for Indians.

For on the issue of the ideological conflict between East and West the Indian view is that different economic and political systems are suited to different societies. Nehru spoke very clearly on the subject on 22 March 1949:

We must realize that there are different types of economic policy in the world to-day in different countries, and they are believed in by their people. Well, the only thing to do is to leave them to work out their destiny.... Any effort to change the economic policy, or any other internal policy forcibly, or to bring pressure to bear upon it leads to counter-pressure and to continuous conflict.... We have had a philosophy which is a live-and-let-live philosophy of life. We have no desire to convert other people to any view or thought.<sup>14</sup>

India believes in the democratic way and has fought communists at home for constituting a threat to public peace and for actions calculated to challenge the foundation of democratic government. But this did not mean [in the view of the Nehru government] that India should pick up quarrels with countries which were conducting themselves in the communist way. She was not going to embark upon a 'moral crusade for the benefit of mankind' on behalf of her own way of life.<sup>15</sup> India holds that the problems of the East-West struggle, if they are to be solved, should not be seen in terms of Communism and anti-Communism, one evil and the other virtuous. Neither side should try to impose its own ideology on the rest of the world. This practical and dispassionate approach on the issue was commented upon by Robert Trumbul, New York Times

correspondent in Delhi:

India as a nation hardly has such a luxurious social structure that the mass of the people are fiercely determined to defend the way of life against communist efforts to make it over... Indians generally lack that loathing of communism that so deeply influences United States policies.<sup>16</sup>

This, he explained, was the reason for India's separation from the forefront of to-day's ideological conflict.

A final factor that merits attention as a determinant of the general course of India's foreign policy is the strong nationalism of the Indian people. Proud of their independence, Indians have been zealous to guard it from any infringement. Membership of a bloc is equated with loss of freedom of action in external affairs. Mr. Nehru pointed this out in a parliamentary debate when, in answer to a suggestion that India give up her middle policy, he declared that joining a bloc could only mean that India give up her own view about a particular question and adopt the other party's view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour.<sup>17</sup> India considered herself to be an important nation in her own right, destined and determined to play an important role in world affairs. Mr. C. R. Rajagopalachari once observed in Parliament:

Our power is very little, but our importance is not as little as our power. There is a great difference between the power that we now possess and the importance which without our seeking has been thrust upon India.<sup>18</sup>

This is the basis of India's independent policy. She does not intend to be the playthings of others. Consequently India is not prepared to take a decision because one or the other bloc wishes her to, but only on the basis of what she considers right in her own light and in conformity with her own interests. She will judge great international issues on their merits and not as Washington or London or any other place decrees.

These, then, are some of the factors that shape India's distinctive view of the world. That outlook in turn moulds the character of India's foreign policy. However, the task of discerning the basic aims of that policy presents several difficulties in that India's policy has been in a stage of development since independence.<sup>19</sup> Often Indian foreign policy has lacked clarity and the vague terms in which it has been couched, like 'independent policy,' 'neutralism,' and 'policy of non-alignment' has made it confusing and baffling. This has led to widely held misconceptions concerning the general aims of India's external policy and has provoked many unfavourable reactions to it in both the communist and non-communist worlds,<sup>20</sup> and within India itself. The policy of India is often looked upon in the West as simply the reflection of some perverse, short-sighted or selfish code of Indian values which fails to distinguish between communism and the democratic traditions of the West -- or still worse, which favours the Marxist

philosophy. This explains a widespread tendency in the West, and especially in the United States, to condemn Indian 'neutralism,' or whatever it can be called, as somehow immoral, and even the spurious facade of an underlying pro-communist bias.

Such ill-tempered analysis is, of course, entirely out of focus. India's foreign policy is based, as has been indicated above, on a number of factors and has consequently manifested itself in various ways, all of which are but reflections of two basic and interrelated aims -- peace and security. The statutory basis for these twin aims and, by inference, of the general orientation of Indian foreign policy in its various manifestations, is Article 51 of the Constitution of India.

The state shall endeavour to:

- (a) promote international peace and security
- (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations
- (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, and,
- (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration.<sup>21</sup>

In the policy of non-alignment India seeks to achieve these aims by avoiding involvement in any third world war. Non-alignment is not, therefore, as is often wrongly believed,

the aim of Indian foreign policy, but the instrument through which India hopes to remain neutral in a world conflict in which her total destruction is a physical possibility.

However, few Indians really believe that it would be possible for their country to remain neutral in another major war in view of the progressive elimination of time and space which has brought countries much nearer each other and made them more dependent on each other than ever before. In one of his most blunt utterances Mr. Nehru declared that India would not join a war if she could help it but, in view of the fact that it was a difficult matter nowadays in world wars to be neutral, if the choice came India was going to join the side which was to her interest.<sup>22</sup> Nehru himself has stated his country's position in the event of a hot war. Speaking before the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948 he stated that:

...we stand in this country for democracy, we stand for an Independent India. Now obviously, anything that is opposed to the democratic concept -- the real, essentially democratic concept, which includes not only political but economic democracy -- we ought to oppose.<sup>23</sup>

To prevent having to make such a choice, the Indian government has been determined to do all in its power to lessen the possibilities of a world conflict and to promote the cause of world peace. In his very first

message to Parliament, the President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad reiterated that his country had inherited no enmities or traditional rivalries and intended to maintain peace and friendship with all the nations of the world and to help in every way possible in the maintenance of world peace.<sup>24</sup>

Mrs. Pandit, Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations echoed this aim when, in her first speech in the General Assembly, she declared that "We [the Indian delegation] stand for peace and will devote our resources and energy towards the abolition of all the causes which lead to war."<sup>25</sup>

In the pursuit of peace India is motivated not only by her self-interest but also by the principles of non-violence of ahimsa and the dictates of love and peace expounded by Buddha some twenty-five hundred years ago. Mr. Nehru stressed this point in December 1956 while speaking on "The Indian Way in International Affairs."

...the Indian people seemed to have developed a tradition to do things peacefully.... If there was any message which India offered to other countries it was this message of doing things by peaceful methods to solve any problem.<sup>26</sup>

Although the purist Gandhian conception of ahimsa has been termed impracticable by Nehru and his colleagues, and though force has been resorted to -- notably in Hyderabad (1948) and Kashmir (1947-8) -- the principle has been accepted as



an ideal to be sought after and as a method to be pursued wherever possible. Indian leaders have endeavoured to give the sanctity and authority of religion to their purposes in world affairs. The spiritual, the non-violent, approach of India in her relation to other nations is a constant theme, and has caused at least one observer to comment that it is in the light of India's moral idealism that her approach to world affairs must be viewed.<sup>27</sup>

That this view is not necessarily so is indicated by the care Nehru has taken to indicate to his Indian audiences that his policy is one which looks first to India's interests.<sup>28</sup> But he has also declared that the general interests of India are served by the kind of policy which is now recognizable as distinctively Indian. In truth, the policy of 'dynamic neutralism' or 'non-alignment' which India has followed -- and is following -- is a realistic policy calculated to protect her national self-interest. Mr. Nehru has himself recognized that the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country, whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist.<sup>29</sup> In the policy of non-alignment India has found the triple coincidence of serving her long- and short-term interests, the interests of world peace and a moral justification in a 'policy of peace' which is not easy to find in mere neutralism.

Indian foreign policy has been neither passive nor negative; this is evidence by the rôle India has been playing in international affairs since she attained independence in 1947. The chief features of India's foreign policy as reflected in her decisions and actions may be summarized as follows: the preservation of Indian independence and territorial integrity by non-alignment with either side in the cold war, creation of a peace area and positive actions on the frontiers; removal of a root cause of tension and conflict through championing the cause of dependent peoples in Asia and Africa; opposition to alliances and the non-recognition of Communist China as steps which increase tension in the world; a positive assertion of independent judgement on all cold war issues with a view to mediating between the rival blocs; and furtherance of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence as the only alternative to mutual destruction. All other features of Indian foreign policy are but refinements of these core elements.

## Footnotes - Chapter I

1 Jawharlal Nehru, Speeches 1946-1949 (New Delhi, Publications Division, G.O.I., 1958), p. 264.

2 Ibid., p. 302.

3 P. M. Pannikar, India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1945), p. 83.

4 An example is a statement by Mr. Nehru in 1950 in which he declared: "In this country such army, navy and airforce that we have is a tiny affair as compared to the vast armadas of other nations...judged by modern standards, we are weak, militarily weak, economically weak, and so on." "Nationalism in Asia," International Journal, Winter 1950-1951, p. 9.

5 Speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on 8 March 1948. Independence and After, p. 215.

6 Quoted in J. C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954 (Bombay, Vora, 1955), p. 71.

7 L. K. Rosinger has aptly observed what the consequences would be for India in the event of war. "A third world war could bring disaster to the country, making economic havoc, generating tremendous internal political and social pressures and perhaps turning her into a battle-field. The Government of India was aware that developments along these lines would make its own survival completely uncertain." L. K. Rosinger, India and the United States (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 36.

8 Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches 1949-1953 (New Delhi, Publications Division, G.O.I., 1954), p. 141.

9 A speech during a foreign policy debate on 12 June 1952 in the Indian Parliament, Ibid., p. 222.

10 G. S. Bajpai, "India and the Balance of Power," Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, vol. 1 (Madras, 1952), p. 4.

11 A. Appadorai, "Indian Foreign Policy," International Affairs (London), January 1949, p. 38.

12 The Indian Communist Party, however, governed the state of Kerala for a short period as a result of its election, by democratic process, in 1951.

13 Speech to the Constitution Club in New Delhi, Independence and After, p. 257.

14 A speech delivered at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, March 22, 1949, Ibid., p. 216.

15 Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, Gollancz, 1954), p. 103.

16 The New York Times, January 28, 1951.

17 Independence and After, p. 218.

18 Quoted in T. M. P. Mahadevan, "India's Policy of Non-Alignment," The Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, vol. 2 (Madras, 1953), p. 23.

19 Nehru said on 22 March 1949 in New Delhi: "Foreign policy is something which develops gradually...in the present context of foreign policy we are a young country and, therefore, our foreign policy is gradually developing." Independence and After, p. 253.

20 See Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 on a 'Pacific NATO.' Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1953, pp. 129-130. Senator Knowland described India's neutralist policy as a "very naive policy," and warned that "it will be a fatal mistake if the whole Free World sits twiddling its thumbs waiting for India to take some effective steps that would help resist Communism in Asia."

21 The Constitution of India (New Delhi, Publications Division, G.O.I., 1952), p. 21.

22 Independence and After, p. 200.

23 Ibid., p. 217.

24 Quoted in Mahadevan, op. cit., p. 29.

25 The United Nations, The Second Session of the General Assembly, vol. 1, p. 137.

26 Indiagram, No. 851, December 29, 1955.

27 W. Norman Brown, "Indian National Ideals Today," Mary Keatings Das Memorial Lecture, Columbia University. Cited in T. W. Wallbank, India in the New Era (New York, Scott, Foresman and Co., 1958), p. 310.

28 Independence and After, p. 200.

29 Ibid., pp. 204-205.

## CHAPTER II

### INDIAN SECURITY IN THE COLD WAR

...no government can say that it stands for peace and do nothing about it. We have to take precautions and prepare ourselves to the best of our ability.<sup>1</sup>

The most important aim of Indian foreign policy has naturally been the preservation of India's independence and territorial integrity. Faced with the challenging internal task of providing a better life for the poverty-stricken Indian masses, the Government of India adopted a policy of non-alignment with either of the power blocs as being in the country's best interests. India looked at the two giant coalitions of hostile nations, armed to the teeth and equipped with destructive weapons of categories that India did not possess -- could not possess for a long time and did not even want to possess -- and at her own military strength.<sup>2</sup> She calculated that to be attacked by either of these coalitions would be disastrous to the nation. The Government would, therefore, not provoke either of the two coalitions to attack India, in case of war, by joining on one side or the other.<sup>3</sup>

If the unexpected were to happen, however, and

India were attacked by the Soviet Union and/or Communist China, the Indian government could assume with a confidence born of straight logic that the West would come to her aid in any event. Thus India saw a possible chance of remaining neutral, if a war broke out, under the prevailing military and political situation. She calculated that she would not be promoting her security by joining either of the power blocs, a view clearly enunciated by the late Mr. G. S. Bajpai, a former Secretary-General of India's External Affairs Ministry:

It cannot be argued that any immediate Indian interests will be served by this country implicating herself, by artificial ties...in the ordinary combinations or coalitions of the friendships or enmities of the two camps in which the major part of the world is to-day unfortunately divided.<sup>4</sup>

So far as India's initial external relations were concerned, she had enough troubles with neighbouring Pakistan: hence relations with that country were the main concern of the Indian foreign office. The story of this tragic enmity between the successors to the British Raj is too well known to require a lengthy exposition in this paper.<sup>5</sup> Suffice it to note that India and Pakistan have been in a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent states. The constant threat of renewed military hostilities over Kashmir has compelled India to channel a large portion of her limited

funds into defence -- an annual average of 50 per cent of her budget.<sup>6</sup> This, in turn, has had grave economic repercussions, notably the slowing-down of much-needed development programmes. The strategic consequences have been no less severe. The Indian sub-continent is a natural military unit whose security depends on joint defence policies and co-ordination of their armed forces.<sup>7</sup> The historic threat to the area has been from the north-west, and any future invasion of that area would inevitably affect India. Instead of military co-operation with Pakistan, however, India was forced to prepare for a possible war with her neighbour -- a war which, if it occurred, could destroy the stability of the sub-continent and cause incalculable harm for its 450 million inhabitants. Under these circumstances it was not unnatural for the Indian leaders to initially take a distant view of the cold war. Their general approach to it can be summed up as: 'we shall have nothing to do with it.'

With the coming into power in China of the Communists, however, India could no longer be a distant on-looker. For despite persistent statements by spokesmen of the Indian government that they considered the threat from Communism to be internal rather than external,<sup>8</sup> that Government has drawn the proper conclusions for India's security from its evaluation of Communist party policies. India believes in deeds what it maintains verbally, namely that

Communist governments and Communist parties are distinguishable. The latter pretence it has maintained for political convenience, but it has not acted accordingly. In a discreet and unostentatious manner India has taken the precautions available within its limited means to secure its frontiers, initially against Pakistan, but since 1950 primarily against the two neighbouring Communist giants -- and especially against China. The measures that India has taken on her northern frontiers, though obligatory for any Government under any conditions, indicate by their timing and nature that India has not overlooked possible aggression from either Communist state and notably from China.

The Nehru administration is well aware that the huge Chinese state has an imperial tradition of expansion during periods of resurgence; that at one time its armies and power controlled much of central, southern, and south-eastern Asia. If the Indian government actually felt at the outset that the policy of a Communist Chinese government would be other than expansionist, it was given a sharp reminder when Peking printed maps showing parts of Burma, Assam, Kashmir and Nepal under their rule. Some publicists believe that a clash is inevitable between the two giants of Asia -- India and China. Even before the latter had come under Communist domination, Arnold Toynbee had written:

In the end the current of Chinese expansion  
in the tropics will meet the current of  
Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of



the smaller and weaker and less efficient peoples in between who are already fast going under.<sup>9</sup>

While Nehru may or may not believe this eventuality to be a valid one, he has taken no chances, for the practical effect of Communist Chinese policy has been to greatly disturb India's sense of security.

Until the Tibetan invasion, most Indians felt safe behind the towering Himalayas<sup>10</sup> and the mountains along the North-West Frontier. Security -- other than against Pakistani incursions which could be momentarily embarrassing but never a dire threat to the security of the Indian Union -- was one of the least discussed subjects in Indian politics. Those who were concerned with it as laymen were usually rather speculative about it, rarely assuming that the problem might become acute in the foreseeable future. With the Chinese Communist conquest of Tibet in the fall of 1950, however, and the sharp rebuff Peking gave to Indian protests, consternation was aroused in India. The implications of the Chinese action for long-term Indian security were not particularly consoling, as large Chinese forces were now on India's very borders.<sup>11</sup> Members of Parliament and the Press began to voice their concern and the Government was accused of neglecting the country's defenses. While these charges at the time may have had some basis in truth, the subsequent actions of the Nehru government have aimed at providing additional security for India. These security decisions,

particularly with reference to the Himalayan areas of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, deserve notice.

There are first of all the measures taken within the jurisdiction of the Indian government. Thus in the northeast frontier area within India the Government has been building roads and airstrips. Indian army detachments are on the alert at various points. In 1953 a special section was established in the Ministry of External Affairs to extend political control over the wild border areas with the help of Indian army units, and especially vigorous action has been taken against rebellious Naga tribesmen.<sup>12</sup> In addition the Indian government has taken action to guard the border between Ladakh (Kashmir) and western Tibet. Here the Government of Uttar Pradesh, with the help of the central government at New Delhi, has established special constabulary force to patrol and control the frontier in the Kumaon area.

In its relations with tiny Bhutan which, like Sikkim, is regarded by New Delhi as being within India's international frontier, the Indian government showed its security-consciousness in a treaty concluded with that state on August 8, 1949.<sup>13</sup> Under the provisions of this treaty, the Government of India guaranteed Bhutan's internal autonomy and promised to give Bhutan an annual subsidy of 500,000 rupees (approximately \$100,000.00) in lieu of commitments entered into in the old treaties with Great Britain in 1865

and 1910. In return the Government of Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of New Delhi in its external relations and India was given supervisory privileges over the importation of warlike material or stores which might be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan. Since October 1951, when the appointment of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama as members of the Consultative Conference of the Chinese People's Republic suggested that Tibet had become an integral part of China, Indian-sponsored defense activities in Bhutan, such as the construction of road links and defensive frontier posts have increased both in number and tempo.<sup>14</sup>

The situation in Sikkim has been slightly more complicated. According to treaties signed between Great Britain and China in 1890<sup>15</sup> and 1893,<sup>16</sup> Sikkim had become a British protectorate. India inherited these treaties and the right to send a political officer to assist the Maharaja in the administration of the country. In 1949 considerable unrest and occasional rioting developed throughout the country as a result of dissatisfaction with the feudal system. Acting upon the request of the Maharaja, the Indian government intervened on June 7, 1949, in the "interests of law and order," and a detachment of soldiers was sent under the general direction of the political officer who resided at Gangtok and represented India in Bhutan as well. The Indian government then nominated an officer to serve as Dewan (i.e. chief administrator) of Sikkim.

Relations were regularized by a treaty signed on December 5, 1950,<sup>17</sup> and Sikkim was formally designated a "Protectorate of India." Subsequent articles in the treaty made India responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim and gave India the right to construct and maintain communications for strategic purposes and the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular India was to have the right to station troops anywhere within the state. It was clear to all concerned that India's actions had been motivated by the Tibetan affair, and consequently the Indian Parliament, with the notable exception of the Communists, approved the treaty. Since the signature of the treaty, the Indian military establishment in the state has been strengthened substantially.

The situation with respect to Nepal is different from either Bhutan or Sikkim, for Nepal is an independent state. At the same time, however, it is, from the strategic standpoint, the most important frontier state. Nepal confronts Tibet across a common frontier of some five hundred miles. On the east the kingdom borders Sikkim and West Bengal; on the south and west, the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. As such Nepal's relations with India are complicated and delicate.

Since the Chinese conquest of Tibet, the Government of India has shown unusual interest in Nepalese affairs. As civil peace in Nepal is a matter of national security to India, it is not surprising that the Indian government will not tolerate civil disturbances in such a vital area. On numerous occasions the Indian Prime Minister had declared that peace in Nepal is essential to Indian independence (i.e. security) and possible only through orderly democratic reform.

The principal barrier to India lies on the other side of Nepal. We are not going to tolerate any person coming over that barrier. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything not done in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or otherwise leads to the weakening of our frontiers.<sup>18</sup>

India's keen interest in the development of democratic institutions in Nepal was clearly shown in 1950 by the view it took towards the incidents that led to the overthrow of the feudal government controlled by the Rana family. Subsequently the Indian government continued to try to strengthen and stabilize the little kingdom. In January 1952, Indian troops, under the provisions of the treaty of July 31, 1950,<sup>19</sup> crossed into Nepal to help put down a Communist-inspired peasant uprising. On January 25, 1952, Nepal, reportedly on the advice of the Indian government, banned the Communist party, and thereafter New Delhi quickly acted to

step up its support of the Nepal administration. In 1954, alone, India spent close to eighteen million dollars in Nepal for development purposes and these expenditures have since increased in both value and scope. In spite of pressing needs at home, the Government of India has despatched experts to Nepal to reorganize the army and civil service, to build schools and hospitals, and to build roads with the help of the Indian army. New Delhi ruefully understands that Nepal is no longer isolated from the tug of power politics. "Once a hermit, then a buffer, she has now become the meat of the sandwich."<sup>20</sup>

India's attitude towards Kashmir also reflects the security-consciousness of the Indian government. Nehru has frequently made the claim in defending his Kashmir policy, that the inability of any but the Indian army to defend Kashmir successfully against attack from across the mountains makes it imperative for India to retain control of the area. "Kashmir, because of her geographical position with her frontiers with three countries, namely the Soviet Union, China, and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India."<sup>21</sup> This statement clearly indicates that all countries affecting the area are entering India's purview.

Similar considerations of security motivated Indian opposition to the extension of United States military aid to

Pakistan, and to Pakistan's membership in Western-sponsored regional security pacts. In part this reaction can be attributed to fear of Pakistan being strengthened to the point where she could threaten India, but largely because of India's desire to keep the Cold War and everything associated with it as far as possible from India's borders. A major aim of Indian foreign policy is to preserve South and South-East Asia as an area of no-war, and it was because it was thought that military pacts extending to the area would prejudice, rather than further, the prospect of its fulfillment that there was such outspoken opposition to them from the Indian government.<sup>22</sup>

When rumours of Anglo-American discussions concerning the establishment of a Middle-East Defence Organization (in which Pakistan was to be included) reached India in the fall of 1952, her opposition was prompt and vigorous. This would bring the cold war too near India's borders. At the Hyderabad Session of the Indian National Congress in January 1953, Mr. Nehru stated that Pakistan's proposed inclusion in the MEDO was of grave concern to India as it would affect all kinds of balances and equilibrium in India and Pakistan and South Asia. It would appear that India's opposition was based both on the fear of a stronger Pakistan which would result from membership in the regional pact and also on the fact that such a step would have frustrated India's aim of building an area of peace. Mr. Nehru

emphasized the latter reason in a speech at the Hyderabad Session of the Congress Party on January 15, 1953:

Obviously, if any such development takes place, it means that the region of cold war comes right to our border if Pakistan joins.... It is not the possibility of war between India and Pakistan, but it is the possibility of world war coming right up to our doors which is of concern to us.<sup>23</sup>

Following these developments India increasingly talked of a 'third area' or 'peace area' from which war might be kept out, even if it were to break out elsewhere. Since the MEDO idea did not materialize, its main effect was that the Western bloc gave India a cause for complaint without attaining the aims it wanted to achieve.

The rumours of a possible United States-Pakistan military pact which leaked out in November 1953 provoked Indian reactions similar to those shown to the MEDO, but with far greater intensity of feeling. Prime Minister Nehru referred to the matter in a press conference on November 15th, and on the following day the Indian Ambassador in Washington called on the United States Secretary of State to seek information about the proposed pact. Despite American assurances that the proposed pact was not directed against India in any way -- a view since reiterated by Pakistani leaders,<sup>24</sup> the Indian press took up the issue and the whole country was emotionally charged in its opposition to the American move to aid Pakistan militarily. Indians seriously



felt that the United States aid would be used against her in Kashmir,<sup>25</sup> and not against any dangers of external communist aggression on Pakistan. Consequently this would create a possibility of war between India and Pakistan.

The Indian people did not view the great advantage between Indian and Pakistani strength as a guarantee against aggression from their neighbour. They recalled that a much weaker Pakistan had sent its troops into Kashmir in 1948 to bolster the tribesmen battling the Indian army. That American arms aid would not necessarily be solely defensive was accepted in India because of repeated references by Pakistani spokesmen to a 'holy war' to liberate Kashmir from India. But while the Government of India were careful to capitalize on the anti-Pakistan mood of the Indian people in opposing the arms aid, this was not the primary cause of official Government resentment. The Government's feeling was based not primarily on fear of a stronger Pakistan as on the fact that by allying itself with the United States, Pakistan had aligned itself with one side in the Cold War and thereby disturbed the 'area of peace' that India wanted to build in co-operation with other Asian countries.<sup>26</sup> To the Indian way of thinking this was entirely to their country's strategic disadvantage.

This same reasoning caused India to bitterly oppose the extension of regional security pacts into Asia -- the

Manila (SEATO) Pact and the Baghdad Pact -- and particularly Pakistan's membership in them.<sup>27</sup> This policy of Asian regional security pacts ran counter to what Mr. Nehru had earlier outlined for the Asian countries in June 1950:

I should like the countries of Asia to make it clear to those warring factions, to those great countries which are so much exercised by passions against each other, that they will not enter the arena of war.<sup>28</sup>

The very establishment of military alliances along the fringe of the Soviet Union and China, Indians argue, makes it likely that these nations will take counter-actions which would certainly have serious implications for India -- especially in view of her relative weakness vis-à-vis the two neighbouring Communist giants. Indian leaders are well aware that the sub-continent is a unit and must be defended as such, and the measures that they have taken are but a reflection of this basic premise. The activities of the Indian government along the whole length of its border, from north-west to north-east, are evidence that the nation's security has not been permitted to rest upon interpretations of Communist theory or practice alone. India's first line of defence may be the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations, and especially neighbour nations, but the Indian government, like all responsible governments, must necessarily assume that some nations in the neighbourhood may become dangerous,

and it must take measures of protection. As the timing, nature and urgency of India's security measures indicate this assumption has become stronger as communism has spread in Asia. India has been reluctantly forced into undertaking these actions, however, and consequently they must be considered a reaction and can never justly be interpreted as a provocation.

In addition to the above-mentioned positive actions, India has also pursued a policy of containing the expansionist tendencies of the Communist bloc -- and thereby furthering her own security -- in a more subtle, but nonetheless very effective, manner. By deliberately adopting a neutral posture in the face of Western warnings, and by placing public faith in Communist intentions, India has thereby constituted herself a kind of earnest of Communist good intentions. In furtherance of this policy the Indian government has advanced and promoted the concept of peaceful co-existence, considered the best assurance against aggression, infiltration, or subversion. Having obtained the signatures and public adherence of both the Soviet Union and Communist China to this doctrine, the motive of the Indian government has apparently been to raise the spectre of the moral approbrium that would attach to any violation of the Panch Shila pledges.

Thus, in a variety of ways, India has sought to secure itself from attack in a manner consistent with her

official 'neutrality' in the cold war, and at a minimum cost in money and materials so sorely needed to further her internal economic development. Through non-alignment with the West and opposition to the establishment of regional security pacts in her neighbourhood, India has sought to keep the cold war as far as possible from her borders. But with the Chinese Communist triumph in China in 1949 and its subsequent occupation of Tibet and actions elsewhere, India became aware of the greatest future threat to her security. Unable and/or unwilling to counter the Chinese threat through defence measures relative to the danger, the Indian government has put its faith, and its security, in the policy of Panch Shila and has cultivated the friendship of Peking in every conceivable manner. To be sure, measures have been taken to strengthen security along the length of the northern frontiers, but the very limitations of these measures would seem to indicate that they are more a natural reflex to Chinese actions than a determined effort to thwart any threat that may present itself in that quarter. Unable to afford both of the 'luxuries' of a modern, industrialized state -- guns and butter -- India has put her emphasis on the latter, the attainment of which is a formidable task even without the added restrictions imposed by minimum defence expenditures.

That its policy has failed to preserve the country's territorial integrity reflects no discredit on the Government

of India. It sought to achieve security in a manner which would not be inconsistent with the economic development of the nation; it was the sacrifice of a short-range objective to one which would be the more solid foundation upon which to build a more real security in the future. As such it was a far more realistic policy than is generally supposed in the West, a policy whose failure may indeed be its greatest triumph.

## Footnotes - Chapter II

1 Independence and After, p. 284.

2 On December 26, 1950, the Eastern Economist put India's armed strength at 220,000 men, ten air squadrons, and a very small and insignificant navy. Mr. Chester Bowles writes: "India's army, although not large in European terms, is a major deterrent to any aggression against India itself." Ambassador's Report, p. 87.

3 Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954, p. 69.

4 Bajpai, Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, vol. 1, p. 4.

5 See M. Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (Toronto, Ryerson, 1953); J. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954); Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London, Hale, 1956); and Sisir Gupta, India's Relations with Pakistan 1954-1957 (I.P.R., 1957).

6 Brecher, op. cit., pp. 188-191.

7 For a comprehensive analysis of the defence problems of the area see: Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area (New Delhi, I.C.W.A., 1958).

8 In a B.B.C. interview on June 12, 1953, Mr. Nehru said: "I see absolutely no danger -- external danger -- to India from communism or any other source." Cited as footnote in Kundra, op. cit., p. 69.

9 Quoted in Eustace Seligman, What The United States Can Do About India (New York, New York University Press, 1956), p. 53.

10 K. M. Pannikar, "The Himalayas and Indian Defense," India Quarterly, vol. III, 2(1947), p. 135. The Himalayas developed in Indians "a false sense of security, a Maginot-line mentality... India never considered her neighbours. The possibility of attack seemed distant.... It was the Himalayan Maginot-line that was responsible for this attitude towards India's security."

11 Tibet, however, was not considered absolutely essential for India's security by Nehru and his colleagues. Moreover, in their public view, the Chinese legal claim was very strong. And in any event, they were not prepared to go to war with China.

12 See Nehru's speech in the Lok Sabha, New Delhi, during debate on the Naga Hills situation, August 23, 1956. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 490-499.

13 For the complete text of the treaty, see Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 295-298.

14 The New York Times, May 9, 1952.

15 Text in International Commissions of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, 1959, pp. 105-106.

16 Ibid., pp. 107-109.

17 Text of the treaty in Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 319-322.

18 Extract from a speech initiating a debate on foreign affairs, Lok Sabha, New Delhi, December 6, 1950. Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 176.

19 Text in Indian Year Book of International Affairs, vol. 2, pp. 316-318.

20 A. M. Rosenthal, "Grim Shadows Over The Cobra Throne," New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1956, p. 47.

21 Independence and After, p. 60.

22 On this point, see the discussions at the Fifth Commonwealth Relations Conference at Lahore in 1954, as reported in Nicholas Mansergh, The Multi-Racial Commonwealth (London, 1955).

23 Quoted in Kundra, op. cit., p. 93.

24 Mr. Mohammed Ali, in an address to the Foreign Press Association in London on June 25, 1956 declared: "It has been said that American military aid to Pakistan constitutes a threat to India. Such a suggestion is palpably absurd. The disparity between Indian and Pakistani human and material resources is so great that, even after military assistance from the U.S.A., there can be no question of any threat of aggression from Pakistan to India." Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), July 7-14, 1956, p. 14962.

25 Speaking in the Lok Sabha on November 20, 1958, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, India's Deputy Minister for External Affairs stated: "We have in the past repeatedly expressed our concern at foreign military aid being given to Pakistan... it may encourage still further aggressive tendencies there. Cited in N. D. Palmer, "India and the United States: Maturing Relations," Current History, vol. 36 (March 1959), No. 211, p. 132.

26 Nehru implied this view in the Lok Sabha on February 22, 1954 when, in reference to the United States military aid to Pakistan, he said: "It adds to the feeling of insecurity in Asia. It is...a wrong step from the point of view of peace and removal of tensions." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 344.

27 For a more detailed account of India's reaction to these pacts, and to regional pacts in general, see Chapter IV.

28 The New York Times, June 13, 1950.



## CHAPTER III

### INDIA AND THE DEPENDENT PEOPLES

...it is an astonishing thing that any country should still venture to hold and to set forth this doctrine of colonialism.... After all that has happened there is going to be no mere objection to that, but active objection...against any and every form of colonialism in any part of the world.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from the immediate responsibility of looking to its security needs, India has been motivated by a pro-Asian, anti-imperialistic policy. As part of Asia, proud of its newly won freedom, India has insisted upon recognition of the dignity and worth of the Asian people. Nehru and his colleagues have, on every possible occasion, stressed the proud historical legacy, the unique culture, and the promising destiny of India and Asia. Any assumption of superiority by the West over Asia, any slight by the former, is deeply resented by Indian leaders. For as Mr. Nehru declared in his closing address to the famous Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955:<sup>2</sup>

Asia is no longer passive today; it has been passive enough in the past. It is no more a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness for so long. Asia of today is dynamic; Asia is full of life. If there is anything that

Asia wants to tell...it is this. There is going to be no dictation in the future; no 'yes-men' in Asia, I hope, or in Africa.<sup>3</sup>

From the day of independence, Indian leaders have been implacably anti-colonial and have sought to end the political and economic domination of Europe over non-European areas. Hence the removal of the last vestige of colonialism in Asia as in Africa has been a major plank of India's foreign policy.

India's advocacy of the cause of the dependent peoples flows directly from her solicitude for the struggles for freedom from foreign political domination of dependent peoples all over the world. In every phase of its long history, the Indian National Congress has been a militantly anti-imperialist organization, upholding the cause of the oppressed, the exploited and the wronged. Any oppressed or exploited nation, however small or however remotely situated in the world, could count upon the support of the Congress in its struggle for self-assertion.<sup>4</sup> Soon after the Interim National Government was formed in 1946, Nehru declared in a broadcast speech:

...we believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and [that] the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples.<sup>5</sup>

India has herself experienced foreign domination -- domination

which was benevolent and beneficial in many respects -- but which was also a negative influence in withholding from the Indian people the opportunity to work out their own destiny by their own efforts.<sup>6</sup> The Indian government and people feel that a people cannot progress under an alien rule or when something is imposed on them. They can grow only if they develop their own strength and self-reliance and maintain their own integrity.<sup>7</sup>

India also recognizes the principle of self-determination because she believes that only self-governing communities having absolute control over their own internal affairs, political, economic, social and cultural, can effectively throw their weight on the side of international co-operation for the establishment of world peace. Elimination of political domination by one people over another -- a factor Indians believe is a root cause of conflict and war<sup>8</sup> -- and the universal recognition of the principle of self-determination for oppressed peoples are therefore very vital to India's efforts to further the cause of world peace. The anti-Japanese stand of the Indian people in the Sino-Japanese conflict, their unqualified condemnation of the Fascist aggression against Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Republican Spain, and their post-independence support for the freedom movements in Asia and Africa are highlights in the continuous and long-standing foreign relations of the Indian people and their Government, pledged to the

elimination of political suppression of subject nationalities wherever it may be and in whatever form it may be masquerading.<sup>9</sup>

In its active championship of freedom for the dependent peoples, the Indian government has had the full support of the people of India. The Socialists have been at one with Government on this issue. The extreme left-wing in the country have, for obvious reasons, advocated even more active steps than the Government has taken in this direction. The extreme right-wing of Indian political thought, however, while supporting the broad principle of self-determination, have expressed the desire that India's foreign policy should be less vocally idealistic -- implying thereby that India must not court the displeasure of the Great Powers without any advantage to herself. But even this section of opinion has not been bold enough to come out openly against the overriding sentiment of Indian public opinion and to frankly advocate a policy of non-participation, by India, in the discussions connected with the freedom of the non-self-governing peoples. As Nehru stated in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948 it would be injurious to India -- certainty from an idealistic and high moral point of view, but equally so from the point of view of opportunism and national interest in the narrowest sense of the word -- for her to give up her policy of standing up for certain ideals in regard to the oppressed nations.<sup>10</sup> India would actively

champion the causes of all those peoples agitating for political freedom from West European metropolitan powers regardless of the passive hostility she might have to face from the various interests.<sup>11</sup>

In her initial flush of independence, India generally approached the problem of relations between Western and Asian states with extreme suspicion. If there was a choice between interpretations of any Western policy, the imperialist interpretation was the one most likely to be chosen, and anything extenuating ignored. It was a one-track policy, understandable, but not necessarily excusable.

India's attitude towards the Allied treatment of Japan was motivated primarily by her anti-imperialism and sympathy for a fellow-Asian people. Owing largely to feelings of Asian solidarity, to Japan's wartime success against colonial powers, and perhaps even to vague memories of Japan's deed in 1905, there was in India a considerable fund of good will toward Japan upon that country's capitulation in August 1945.<sup>12</sup> India favoured a quick reintegration of Japan into the society of free nations, with economic freedom to safeguard a decent standard of living, and with political freedom to safeguard internal stability. Accordingly she supported those decisions in the Far Eastern Commission favourable to Japan. She also stimulated the renewal of contacts between India and Japan. But when the

West in September 1951, decided to go ahead with a separate Peace Treaty with Japan to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Communist bloc either through military aggression<sup>13</sup> or internal revolution,<sup>14</sup> India declined the invitation to attend the Conference at San Francisco. The Indian government also refused to sign the resulting Japanese Peace Treaty.<sup>15</sup> The reason for this action, Mr. Nehru explained to the Indian Parliament on August 27, 1951, was because none of the major suggestions put forward by India had been accepted by the United States. Consequently the Government of India would make a declaration terminating the state of war and would later negotiate a simple bilateral treaty.<sup>16</sup>

India's objections to the Treaty<sup>17</sup> were based, in part, on the criticism that it was restrictive of Japan's sovereignty in according the United States the right to maintain bases and armed forces in Japan. The Indian government further viewed the Treaty as basically a defence combination among the signatories, establishing a strategic line against the Chinese and Russian mainland stretching from the Aleutians through the Japanese island chain, the Ryukyus, Bonins, Formosa, and the Philippines, to Australia. In its view, Japan should retain all territory whose inhabitants had an historical affinity with the Japanese and which Japan had not acquired by aggression. The Ryukyus and Bonins fell into these categories. Further,

India pointed out that the Treaty should include provisions for the return of Formosa to China and of the Kurile islands and South Sakhalin to Russia. The Indian note declared:

The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations, but to leave the future of the island (Formosa) undermined...does not appear... to be either just or expedient. Mutatis mutandis the same argument applies to the Kurile islands and to South Sakhalin.<sup>18</sup>

A further grievance, not mentioned in official documents, but much talked about in all Indian circles, was that Asian nations were not properly consulted or that their suggestions were not properly respected. And few things could provoke greater resentment in modern India than slight of non-Europeans by whites.

The stand taken by the Indian government found very few critics in the Indian Parliament and the press. In general, public opinion was wholeheartedly behind it. The Treaty was considered an insult to all Asians -- but another expression of the white man's haughtiness and of the Cold War, useless because of the absence of Communist China and Soviet Russia and morally unjustifiable. The Indian attitude, however, especially that of the Government, must not be viewed as simply a matter of ethics or idealism or opposition to Western dictation to a defeated Asian nation; it was also a matter of India's national interest. India could not afford to antagonize 450 million neighbours,

could not subscribe to a policy lining up the Japanese against the Chinese people, or turn a blind eye to limits placed upon Japan's sovereignty.

The attitude taken by India naturally overjoyed the Communist powers, but it provoked sharp criticism from the American government<sup>19</sup> and press. The New York Times commented that "Instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from the responsibilities," and continued on to declare that "Nehru's statesmanship is not inspiring people and nations to do things but only to have them undone. How the mighty have fallen."<sup>20</sup> While this statement was unduly harsh in its criticism, it was nevertheless partly warranted. In the interest of her neutral position India could have avoided launching such a noticeable public attack on the Treaty. She could, more diplomatically, merely have refused to sign the Treaty and thereby avoided the open controversy which strained Indo-American relations. But whatever the merits of India's stand, the incident did illustrate most emphatically that India championed the cause of the non-white peoples and would speak her mind on any issue with colonial overtones regardless of who it pleased or displeased.

During this first 'flush of independence,' the Indian government freely expressed itself on any issue which it regarded as involving the principle of



self-determination for dependent peoples. In public statements and at the United Nations, Indian leaders and representatives of the Indian government repeatedly declared India's sympathy for the struggles of dependent peoples for freedom from foreign controls. France and Portugal were bitterly attacked for refusing to voluntarily give up their small territorial holdings in India; Britain was criticized for her military operations against the small minority of Communists in Malaya; and France was castigated for her policies in Indo-China and North Africa. Indian initiative helped to hasten the independence of Libya which was secured on the basis of the resolutions moved by India at the United Nations General Assembly in 1949. The President of the National Congress of Tripolitania described the role that India played in the liberation of Libya "as having earned the ever-lasting gratitude of the Libyan nation, as having confirmed India's leadership in the struggle for the liberation of Africa and Asia."<sup>21</sup> India also played a notable part in resisting the attempt of South Africa to incorporate the mandated territory of South-West Africa and in initiating the moves for the granting of self-determination to Tunisia and Morocco.

The principle of support for dependent peoples, however, was most enthusiastically realized in connection with the Indonesian struggle for freedom from Dutch control. To the people of India (as indeed to the rest of Asia)

Indonesia was a symbol of the aspirations of many millions of Asian peoples for freedom and of their determination to obtain recognition of the freedom already obtained. From the time when Nehru and the other nationalist political leaders of India were released from jail on June 15, 1945, and had shortly afterwards paid visits to Indonesia and Singapore, they had been indicating that they expected Indonesia to be self-governing now that the Dutch had been expelled and an Indonesian Republic had come into existence. They were disappointed when the British condoned, even helped, the restoration of Dutch power in Java. Subsequently, throughout the Indonesians' bitter struggle against the Netherlands from the defeat of Japan in 1945 to the Hague Round Table Conference of 1948 that resulted in independence for Indonesia, India fully identified itself with the nationalist movement headed by President Soekarno.

In June 1947, when the Dutch failed to adhere to the terms of agreements they had made with the Indonesian republic, the Indian leaders expressed their keen disapproval and unsuccessfully bade the United States espouse the Indonesian cause. Thereupon India, in company with Australia, carried the case to the Security Council of the United Nations where it vigorously advocated independence for Indonesia and urged others to do the same or fail to sense the mood of Asia and Africa. India's case was that the action by the Dutch

against the Indonesian people endangered the maintenance of international peace under Article 34 of the Charter.<sup>22</sup> In answer to the claim of the Netherlands delegate that the Dutch action was a matter of domestic jurisdiction under Article 2(7) of the Charter, India maintained that, according to the Charter, even matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state should be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the Security Council if they had a bearing upon international peace and security. The Indian argument was accepted by the Council. Accordingly, an Indian proposal to establish an international arbitration commission to settle the dispute was adopted by the Council in a resolution of August 25, 1947.

The truce subsequently arranged under the Renville Agreement<sup>23</sup> however, was not to last. On December 18, 1948, the Dutch, in a 'police action,' moved by force of arms against Djakjakarta, then the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, and put President Soekarno and other Indonesian leaders in detention. India reacted swiftly. The session of the All-India Congress passed a resolution on December 19, 1948 stating that it was a matter of utmost concern to India that Indonesia should attain her full freedom and take her rightful part in Asian and international affairs.<sup>24</sup> Prime Minister Nehru, addressing the meeting, declared that the people of India could not remain idle spectators of events in Indonesia. He reminded the Dutch that, as the day of

imperialism was over, no imperialist power could stay in Asia any longer.<sup>25</sup> The Indian government then proceeded to institute limited sanctions against the Dutch, instructions being issued to airport authorities not to clear Dutch aircraft and not to issue fuel to them from January 1, 1949.

At the same time, India's intense interest in the Indonesian question was further evidenced from the fact that on January 1, 1949, Nehru invited thirteen Asian countries<sup>26</sup> to consider the Indonesian situation. When announcing the decision to convene such a conference, Mr. Nehru expressed the indignation of the people of Asia over the "most naked and unabashed aggression" by the Dutch in their attempt to "revive a dying imperialism." In opening the conference he remarked: "Asia, too long submissive and dependent and a plaything of other countries, will no longer brook any interference with her freedom...so long as any form of colonialism exists in Asia or elsewhere, there will be conflict and a threat to peace."<sup>27</sup> He proposed the creation of conditions in which the Indonesian Republic could function freely and could negotiate as a free Government without military or economic pressure.

Three days after its organization, the Conference adopted a series of drastic resolutions<sup>28</sup> which it presented to the Security Council. Although subsequent action of the Security Council was disappointing to India, the final

winning of Indonesian independence by negotiations between the Indonesian and Dutch authorities averted further Indian intransigence which might well have had serious consequences.

Since the settlement of the Indonesian question, however, and making allowance for isolated instances of anti-imperialist outbursts by Indian spokesmen, the Indian government has apparently realized that Asian freedoms are better served in the long run by cautious procedures. In subsequent situations, comparable to Indonesia, Nehru has steadfastly refused to repeat the feat for reasons never quite specified. It is probable, though, that they have had to do with the rising tension in the world and are based on the conviction that such action as that taken at the Asian Conference might lead to conflict rather than agreement. Experience, maturity and some rude shocks to preconceived ideas, especially concerning communism, have led to a realization that India's past experience has not necessarily been universal and is not the only possible experience; that in international politics absolutes do not exist either as regards the applicability of principles or the character of nations. It has been a useful lesson to many Indians that circumstances have forced India repeatedly to compromise her high principles and to revise her estimates of other nations since 1947. Mr. Nehru implied this new approach in his speech to the Indian Parliament in 1952 on "The Larger Scheme Of Things":

Let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism in Asia, in Africa and wherever it exists but let us understand what the real conflict is about.... It does not help in the slightest to repeat the slogans of yesterday, thinking that they take the place of thought and action. Ours is a complicated, difficult and tormented world. We must not approach our problems with any certitude of success but with a great deal of humility and try to help where we can. Our aim should be to be helpful, to do good or, at any rate, to avoid evil.<sup>29</sup>

India has not surrendered her ideals, but the Sturm and Drang period of their application has passed. Like so many nations before her, India has learned that the price of conducting one's own foreign relations is the occasional betrayal of one's ideals.

Malaya was a case in point. The relative quiescence of the Indian government towards the question of Malayan independence prior to its achievement in 1950 provoked accusations that Nehru was soft-pedalling British colonialism. The Nehru government, however, obviously not only appreciated the difficulties represented by the three population groups in Malaya, none of which has a majority, but realized as well the wonderful opportunity chaos in Malaya would have offered the Communists after British withdrawal. Consequently Nehru, though he was on record as demanding freedom for Malaya, co-operated closely with Britain in her efforts towards these ends. Eventually qualifying his demand for British withdrawal from this area by advocating that it occur

only after peace and order had been restored in Malaya, Nehru was entirely in accord with the developments leading to Malayan independence, and has expressed no dismay at the subsequent relationship between Britain, the Federation of Malaya and the Crown colony of Singapore.

A similar trend away from extremist enthusiasm for freedom and toward a more cautious advocacy of it is discernible in India's attitude towards Indo-China. In January 1947 Nehru called upon France to revert to peaceful methods in Indo-China and show by its own example that it stood for freedom everywhere. Shortly afterwards he received the Indo-Chinese delegation to the first Asian Relations Conference with the reminder that in their country "the battle for freedom has continued." By 1950, however, the Indian government had assumed a rather non-committal attitude toward the two Indo-Chinese governments. Emperor Bao Dai of Viet Nam was suspected of being merely a French tool, while the Communist leader Ho Chih-minh, although generally credited with being a nationalistic patriot first and foremost, was too closely tied to China and the Soviet Union to suit the taste of very many Indians. Mr. Nehru declared on May 22 that the Government of India had decided not to accord recognition either to the Bao Dai Government in Viet Nam or to the Vietminh Government under Ho Chih-minh "so long as it is not clear which of the two Governments prevail there."<sup>30</sup> India would watch developments until the people should decide.

"We should not jump into the fray," he declared, and added: "After all, what can we do about it, except to give moral sympathy and get involved? We do not think that is practical politics."<sup>31</sup> It was only when the conflict in Indo-China appeared about to touch off a major conflict in 1953 that the Indian government actively expressed its concern and sought to mediate the dispute.<sup>32</sup>

India's attitudes towards the various aspects of Arab nationalism also evidence the increasing caution with which New Delhi has approached the issue of self-determination in recent years. Initially India gave strong support to the Arab nationalists in French North Africa, especially the struggle, eventually won, for Tunisian and Moroccan independence. But even here the influence of the increasing tension in the world has caused a noticeable inclination towards moderation in Indian pronouncement. Thus in its attitude towards the Algerian question the Indian government has moved from great impatience and strongly-expressed anti-colonialism to a recognition that "strong United Nations resolutions will not necessarily contribute to the solution of the complicated problems involved."

Hoping to contribute to a solution of the problem, Mr. Nehru, in a statement in the Lok Sabha on May 22, 1956, put forward five suggestions as a possible basis for a negotiated settlement: An atmosphere of peaceful approach



should be promoted by formal declarations by both sides in favour of ending violence; the national entity and personality of Algeria should be recognized by the French government on the basis of freedom; the equality of the peoples in Algeria, irrespective of race, should be recognized by all concerned; recognition that Algeria is the homeland of all the people in Algeria, irrespective of race, and that they should all be entitled to the benefits and share the burdens arising from the recognition of the national entity, personality and freedom of Algeria; direct negotiations based on the above basic ideas, and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, should be inaugurated.<sup>33</sup> It was the Prime Minister's hope that "this fervent appeal will reach the friendly ears of the parties to the present conflict, both of whom we regard as our friend."

In line with this moderate approach, the Indian government has desisted from any actions which might cause an intensification of the Algerian war. In the 1956 General Assembly the Indian delegation would commit itself no further on the Algerian question other than supporting a compromise resolution which confined itself to expressing a hope that a peaceful, democratic, and just solution might be found. With this view in mind Mr. Nehru declared at a press conference in Delhi on October 12, 1958 that India would not for the moment give formal recognition to the Free Algerian government established in Cairo on September 19. He added:

It may well be said that at present there is what is called the Provisional government of Algeria, representing moderates and extremists and therefore it should be easy to deal with them as representing Algerian nationalism. I hope that the French Government will negotiate with these people, because it is obvious that there is no other way of settling the Algerian problem except by recognizing Algerian freedom.<sup>34</sup>

India's approach towards the various Middle Eastern issues involving various Arab efforts to free themselves of Western controls has also been qualified by the requirements of the Indian national interest. For the Middle East is an area of great importance to India, possibly greater even than Southeast Asia. It is of strategic importance, it is vital as a supplier of oil, it enters Indo-Pakistan politics, and it is a road through which communism might enter.<sup>35</sup> All these points have influenced India's policies in that area, for obviously the rash and unqualified application of anti-imperialist principles would involve the greatest risks. Consequently it is not unnatural that the Indian government has proceeded with the greatest caution in its Middle Eastern policies, even if this has necessitated an occasional moderation in the championship of great principles.

Prior to the Anglo-French invasion of Suez in 1956, the only instance in which India took a more or less adamant stand towards a Middle Eastern question with "imperialist overtones" was over the issue of the future of the British mandate of Palestine. The British, unable to reconcile

Arab-Jew differences and tiring of the heavy burdens of policing the area, announced in March 1947 that they were referring the matter to the United Nations. In the subsequent prolonged discussions on the issue the Indian delegates came out strongly on a pro-Arab line, prompted largely by the desire to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the Muslim world in general, and her own thirty million Muslim citizens in particular. New Delhi aimed at encouraging co-operation among Asian countries in the international field and could not, therefore, afford to antagonize the Muslim states of West Asia and Pakistan by adopting any other policy on this issue. In addition, India could not agree with the view generally held in the West that, because many Jews were ill-treated by the Europeans, Palestine should provide a home from them.

The general support given to a Jewish state in Palestine by the European powers made it appear to Indians as yet another case of imperialism committed by Europeans against a non-European people. Consequently India adamantly opposed the partition of Palestine and initially withheld diplomatic recognition of Israel. But in "recognition of an established fact," New Delhi announced India's recognition of the State of Israel on September 17, 1950. The official statement explained that the delay in India's recognition has been caused by the fact that all aspects of the question had to be very carefully considered, including

the sentiments of the Arab countries. It was now felt that continued mutual non-recognition was not only "inconsistent with the overall relationship between the two countries," but would also limit the Government of India's rôle as a possible intermediary between Israel and other States.<sup>36</sup>

In other Middle Eastern issues involving the direct interests of Great Britain, however, the Indian government proceeded with more caution. Thus while India did not hesitate to declare its sympathy with Iran in that country's dispute with Great Britain over the nationalization of oil resources in 1951, New Delhi, trying to combine the principles of peace, anti-imperialism, and security, counselled a peaceful settlement of the conflict through bilateral negotiations between the two disputants.<sup>37</sup> India depended upon Iran for oil, upon Britain for tankers and upon the friendship of both to safeguard her vital security interests in the area. In addition, the possibility of Communist subversion or Russian intervention anywhere in the Middle East has been an ever present thought in Indian minds. Thus a peaceful settlement of the conflict so that nobody would have a pretext to intervene was of the greatest concern to India and an additional incentive for her to remain neutral in the dispute.

For similar reasons India, in the Anglo-Egyptian

dispute over the Suez Canal and Britain's right to maintain military forces there, would only go so far in support of the Egyptian cause. Here again the military consideration was the cause of the dilemma. Egypt's demands were recognized as the "legitimate" claims of nationalism on the one hand, but on the other hand, the need for stability in an area of such strategic importance was also realized. Thus the Indian government only committed itself as in favour of Egypt eventually obtaining full sovereignty over the Suez Canal and of making it afterward an international highway by special treaties.<sup>38</sup> The announcement from Cairo on July 27, 1954 of the agreement between Britain and Egypt on the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, however, was welcomed by Nehru as having removed another cause of tension, and of having thereby helped to turn people's minds toward peaceful progress.<sup>39</sup>

The most extraordinary example of restraint, however, and an example, it might be added, that from the standpoint of international relations is most admirable, has been shown by India in regard to the small number of enclaves belonging to France and Portugal which survived India's independence as the remnants of the old days of European expansion. The policy of the Indian government toward these foreign footholds was clearly stated by Nehru in 1949. India wanted a peaceful solution in regard to these foreign possessions but the only future for these possessions was

complete integration with India. "We are prepared to wait a little for it, to avoid conflict," Mr. Nehru declared, "but it is an inconceivable that in this new, resurgent India, bits of territory should belong to Powers far away."<sup>40</sup>

Since independence, the Indian government has sought to bring about the peaceful integration of these foreign footholds with the Republic of India, but only with partial success. In the case of France, India has been successful thanks to the generally conciliatory attitude of French governments towards the disposition of the French settlements of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Yanam, Karikal, and Maké -- together totalling 196 square miles. A joint declaration by the Governments of France and India made in 1948 declared their joint decision to study, in common, ways and means of a friendly regulation of the problems of the French establishments in India, with due regard to the interests and aspirations of the population of these territories, to the historical and cultural links of these people with France, and to the evolution of India.<sup>41</sup> Protracted and oftentimes bitter negotiations ensued but eventually Pondicherry and the other holdings were ceded to India after 240 years of French rule. A formal treaty to this effect was signed in November 1954.

In the case of Portugal, however, no progress has been made in face of Lisbon's uncompromising stand against

cession of Goa, Damao and Diu -- an area of some 1,496 square miles embracing some 600,000 people. To most Indians, Goa is a symbol of imperialism, an irritating reminder of Western exploitation in an almost completely free motherland. Nehru has called the Portuguese possessions "a continuing interference with India's political system."<sup>42</sup> Since 1947, the Indian government has made repeated requests to Lisbon to open negotiations for cession, negotiations being formally initiated by the Indian Minister at Lisbon by presenting an Aide Memoire, dated February 27, 1950, on behalf of the Government of India to the Portuguese government. But Lisbon refused to discuss the question of their sovereignty over their Indian possessions with New Delhi, and has maintained the attitude ever since that these possessions are an integral part of the homeland, a claim Nehru has emphatically rejected.<sup>43</sup>

Frequent clashes have taken place on the Goanese border as passive resistors, non-violent agitators, have sought to cross the frontier of Goa to further a liberation movement. These clashes have provoked a rousing cry in India for armed intervention, but Nehru has remained insistent that the problem can only be solved by peaceful negotiations. Indeed, any other policy would contradict his oft-repeated adherence to Pancha Shila. "The high reputation that we enjoy in the world today and the weight that our words carry." Mr. Nehru admitted in 1955, "are due to the fact that we

adhere to and honour our principles. If we suddenly reverse our policy, the world will get an opportunity to say that we are deceitful."<sup>44</sup> Thus the Indian government remains determined to employ negotiations, not force, to rid India of these last vestiges of European colonialism.

In a consideration of India's policy towards the issue of dependent peoples, then, several factors stand out. The initial a priori assumption that practically all Western diplomacy was motivated by imperialism and the resultant one-track approach of extreme suspicion to the problem of international relations has given way to a more discriminatory evaluation of international politics. The genuine fear of renewed Western influence in Asia remains, as is amply illustrated by certain events of recent years. Thus the extreme sensitivity of Nehru and others to Western-sponsored alliances such as SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955) may be partially explained by the belief that these military pacts represented an indirect return of Western power to an area from which it had recently retreated.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, the sharp Indian condemnation of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and initial rationalization of Russia's actions in Hungary illustrated three facts: first, a continuing mistrust of Western actions because of the lengthy history of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa; secondly, a willingness to give the Russian case a fair hearing because of the absence of direct penetration into South and Southeast



Asia; third, an unstated belief that violence is bad but white violence against non-whites is worse.

In recent years, however, there has been an increasing realization in India that the more immediate and greater "imperialist threat" is now presented by the two Communist giants, and especially Communist China. Hence there has been a significant softening in the former all-out support of Asian freedom movements when these threatened to provide openings for Communist advances as in Malaya and Indo-China. Similarly, where outspoken anti-colonialism served only to further embarrass a colonial power's efforts to prepare dependent peoples for independence by gradual processes, as in Britain's African colonies, the Indian government has become prudently silent. India has also considerably 'mellowed her tune' in areas where the transfer of power to resident peoples is complicated by large opposing groups, as is the case in Algeria where there is a large French minority, or on Cyprus where Greek-Turkish animosities could have serious consequences should Britain transfer power to the Greek majority. India's desire now appears to be to prevent Asian, African, (or European nationalism) from disrupting world peace. The conclusion may therefore be permitted that internal politics, and notably the aggressiveness of communism in Asia, have caused India to considerably mellow her championship of dependent peoples.

### Footnotes - Chapter III

1 Jawaharlal Nehru: an address to the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, November 3, 1948. Speeches 1946-1949, pp. 319-320.

2 For a detailed account of the conference, see George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956).

3 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 289.

4 B. S. N. Murti, Nehru's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, Beacon Information and Publications, 1953), pp. 24-25.

5 Broadcast from New Delhi, September 7, 1946. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 2.

6 The Indian experience has been well summed up by Professor Toynbee: "India is...the only great non-Western society that has been...overrun and conquered by Western arms and ruled after that by Western administrators... India's experience of the West has thus been painful and... humiliating." Arnold Toynbee, The World and The West (Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 34.

7 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 302.

8 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 266.

9 Robert A. Scalpino in an article "Neutralism in Asia" published in American Political Science Review, vol. XLVIII, 1 (March 1954), pp. 49-62, observes that "an examination of the numerous foreign policy statements of the Indian National Congress in the past (British rule period) reveals a strong element of continuity in the present Indian foreign policy."

10 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 215.

11 Ibid., p. 216.

12 Werner Levi, Free India in Asia (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 119.

13 S. I. Aff. 1949-1950, p. 462.

14 Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1951, pp. 462-466.

15 See the Indian note to the United States government on August 23, 1951. Ibid., pp. 606-608.

16 The New York Times, August 28, 1951.  
India signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan at Tokyo on June 9, 1952, which ended the state of war with Japan; it waived all Indian claims to reparations. India agreed to return Japanese property, etc., but the Treaty did not mention anything about the controversial subjects referred to in the Indian note of August 23, 1951. Text in Doc. I. Aff. (R.I.I.A., 1952), pp. 483-487.

17 Indian note of August 23, 1951.

18 Since the Formosan trouble arose in January 1955, there has been much legal controversy regarding the status of Formosa. Some claim that Formosa is not Chinese territory. Had such a provision been made in the Japanese Peace Treaty, there would have been no room for such controversies.

19 In United States in World Affairs (1951), p. 192 is the comment that the Indian objections were "flatly rejected" by the United States "with signs of irritation that were unusual in its diplomatic exchanges with non-Stalinist countries."

20 The New York Times, August 28, 1951.

21 Quoted in Murti, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

22 Text of the Indian note in Doc. I. Aff., 1947-1948, p. 748.

23 See U. N. Document S/649.

24 K. P. Karunakarn, India in World Affairs 1947-1950 (London, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 229.

25 Ibid.

26 He also expressed the hope that Australia and New Zealand would attend, and his invitation was accepted.

27 Presidential speech delivered in New Delhi inaugurating the eighteen-nation Conference on Indonesia, January 20, 1949. The Governments of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, the Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen were represented at this Conference by delegates at ministerial level, while China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam sent observers. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, pp. 327-329.

28 Text of the Resolution in Doc. I. Aff. 1949-1950, pp. 567-569.

29 Speech in reply to the two-day debate on Foreign Policy, Parliament, New Delhi, June 12, 1952. Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 215.

30 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 10-17, 1950, p. 10754.

31 The New York Times, June 17, 1950.

32 India's diplomatic intervention is discussed in Chapter V.

33 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 7-14, 1956, p. 14965.

34 Ibid., October 25 - November 1, 1958, p. 16468.

35 Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area (New Delhi, I.C.W.A., 1958), p. 11.

36 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 23-30, 1950, p. 10974.

37 The New York Times, June 29, 1951.

38 Levi, Free India in Asia, p. 128.

39 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 31 - August 7, 1954, p. 13704.

40 Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, March 8, 1949. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 241.

41 Murti, op. cit., p. 52.

42 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 380.

43 In a reply to debate on Goa in the Lok Sabha on July 26, 1955, Nehru declared that: "To say that Goa is a part of Portugal is something in the nature of a fairy tale or nursery rhyme...it has no relationship to facts, and any kind of will, decree or law passed in Portugal is not going to make Goa a part of Portugal." Ibid., pp. 377-378.

44 Extract from Nehru's reply to the debate on the international situation, Lok Sabha, September 17, 1955. Ibid., p. 390.

45 Nehru has described the Manila Treaty as "inclined dangerously in the direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries." Ibid., p. 267.

## CHAPTER IV

### INDIA AND A POLICY OF PEACE

...the approach of military pacts...is a wrong approach, a dangerous approach and a harmful approach. It sets in motion all the wrong tendencies and prevents the right tendencies from developing.<sup>1</sup>

The fundamental problem facing India since independence has been internal rather than external. It is the gigantic problem of providing a vast population with the necessities of life -- food, clothing and housing. The Government of India is fully conscious of these difficulties and also of the economic and military weakness of the country. Indian leaders clearly realize that whether India is involved in a war or not, the mere fact of a world conflagration breaking out would seriously hamper the country's industrial and economic development. It would generate tremendous internal political and social pressures, and perhaps turn India into a battle-field. Such developments along these lines would make the survival of the Government itself completely uncertain.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the Indian government, to gain time in which to make economic progress,<sup>3</sup> has given the highest priority to the pursuit of international peace.

The Indian government is convinced that, unless member-states owe unqualified allegiance to the United Nations, international peace will be endangered. As the division of the world into power blocs is not in the interests of the world organization, India has refused to be a party to any such development either by helping in the formation of new 'blocs' or by joining any of the existing ones. The position of dynamic neutralism or non-alignment which India has adopted in the East-West struggle is thus represented by the Indian government as a positive contribution to the avoidance of war. Indian leaders feel that by joining one of the two power blocs, India would be less in a position to work effectively for the prevention of war. Mr. Nehru has declared that India would lose the advantage of great influence by aligning herself with one group of nations, an influence he described as growing and in the favour of world peace.<sup>4</sup>

India believes, therefore, that by refusing to take sides in the world power struggle she is following a positive policy.<sup>5</sup> Such a policy will, in the view of many Indians, slow down the drift toward a bipolar world in which international tensions would be raised to an intolerable pitch and armed conflict become inevitable. It is often asserted by Indians that their country, by virtue of its unique position, affords the best remaining hope for ultimately bridging the ever-widening gap between the Communist nations

and the West. Indeed, India's 'middle' position does enable her to maintain amicable relations with both sides and to provide an acceptable channel of communication in a world where normal channels are increasingly breaking down. This has caused Lord Birdwood to remark that India's policy of dynamic neutrality in the cold war is a matter not for facile regret, but perhaps for hope, because of the possible advantage of having one power in the world with access to leadership on both sides.<sup>6</sup>

Many people in the West have charged non-alignment to be immoral, but India rejects the premises and, therefore, the policy implications of this argument. To divide the world into rigid moral categories, Indians reply, is to indulge in fanciful self-righteousness. No state or way of life has a monopoly of truth or virtue, though one may be admired more than another. None is an absolute threat to peace and freedom. On the contrary, Indians argue, both East and West share the blame for the international tension which hangs like a shadow of impending death over the entire planet. Both sides are guilty of provocative deeds and words, but both are firmly established in the present world and can only be eradicated by a contest on the battlefield. The Indian foreign policy-makers argue that the moral imperative is to rule out war and to concentrate on the difficult but essential task of relaxing tensions, to recognize the harsh realities of international life, and to

search unceasingly for a negotiated settlement between the opposing power blocs.

Mr. Nehru has repeatedly held that the major factor that might lead to war is the psychosis of fear<sup>7</sup> prevailing among the two blocs of nations who are often fearing aggression from each other. If either of the two groups or both proceed from the premise that sooner or later an armed conflict is inevitable, then there is little chance, eventually, of world peace. India's position has been that such a war is not inevitable. The Government of India, therefore, has tried in the interests of India and of world peace to impress upon the world that view through openly voicing opinions against steps which, according to its calculations, might lead to war.

Among the steps which augur disaster in the future are the traditional attempts to secure peace and security by means of military alliances -- steps which are rejected by the Indian government because they jeopardize the efforts to treat international problems in a conciliatory environment free of fear. During his visit to America in 1950, the Indian Prime Minister emphasized this view:

The very process of a marshalling of the world into two hostile camps precipitates the conflict which it is sought to avoid. It produces a sense of terrible fear and that fear darkens men's minds and leads them into wrong courses. There is perhaps nothing so bad and so dangerous in life as fear....



Our problem, therefore, becomes one of lessening and ultimately putting an end to this fear. That will not happen if all the world takes sides and talks of war. War becomes almost certain then.<sup>8</sup>

India is not convinced that the actions of one of the power blocs constitute the exclusive threat to the peace of the world and it is not, therefore, eager to participate in any scheme of collective security; either outside or within the United Nations framework, that would involve forceful action by one of the power blocs against the other.

In her attitude towards the Western system of alliances aimed against Communism, India's opposition is largely conditioned by her own interpretations of the nature of the Communist threat. Indian leaders have declined to accept a black and white picture of postwar developments that asserts the presence of right on one side exclusively. Most leaders of Indian thought also conclude that the Soviet Union and Communist China fear Western intentions at least as much as the West fears Russian and Chinese aims. In support of this conclusion they have pointed to the Soviet emphasis on Western intervention after the Bolshevik revolution. They point also to the postwar Soviet fears of American atomic weapons and to the complaints of Russian leaders after the Second World War concerning Western aggressive designs. Thus, after the Western nations had organized themselves into the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, it appeared to many Indians to be a barren controversy whether the Soviet Union was driven by ambition or fear or both: fear was evident on both sides as Europe was divided between competing and hostile alliances.

Looking to Asia, Indian leaders have interpreted the Communist threat as coming from within Asian societies rather than from Soviet or Chinese military aggression. They can see no advantage accruing to Communist power through forcible occupation of the under-developed Asian countries as such an occupation would hardly add to Communist military strength. The prevailing Indian attitude is that the Communist programme for Asia rests on political, cultural and economic penetration rather than on military conquest. Thus, they argue, any attempt to talk of the Communist danger to the free world -- of which the ordinary people of Asia have little, if any, conception -- or to stress the importance of military alliances and under-emphasize social and economic measures is an extremely short-sighted and erroneous policy. Such a policy leaves the social and economic back door wide open to subversion while guarding the military front against an unlikely overt Soviet and/or Chinese aggression.

The Indian government feels, therefore, that the best way to fight Communism is not military containment,<sup>9</sup> but through building economic stability and helping to fulfill legitimate nationalist aspirations.<sup>10</sup> One foreign observer

has confirmed this view:

There is ample evidence to show that for most Asians the main issue is not Moscow versus Washington, or capitalism versus communism, but rather nationalism, a real voice for the people in government and economic progress, versus colonialism, despotic government and economic backwardness.<sup>11</sup>

Consequently India has deprecated military alignments of nations because such steps led to the creation of a 'war psychosis,' increasing fear and a race of armaments -- all these factors working together in the direction of war. While not denying the right of nations to take legitimate precautions for self-defence, Mr. Nehru has declared that defensive alliances openly directed against some other country or countries defeat their own purpose of trying to maintain peace through strength.<sup>12</sup> That this view is not wholly groundless is confirmed by Lester B. Pearson, the former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, who stated that "in all the long story of mankind, arms alone, however powerful, have never been sufficient to guarantee security for any length of time."<sup>13</sup> One side's security becomes the other's insecurity with the result that an arms race develops, a vicious circle which in the past has caused untold misery and destruction and at the present time could cause mankind's extinction. Therefore it is all the more necessary to reduce tension in order to avoid a war caused by accident or miscalculation.

Thus India's opposition to alliances stems both from her non-agreement with the Western bloc as to the nature of the Communist threat and, of course, from her main objective of not getting involved in a world war, for which end she wanted to minimize international tensions. However, while opposing military pacts in general, India's attitude to them has been of more or less concern depending on whether the area involved was distant or close to her own territory geographically.

Towards the Rio Pact<sup>14</sup> and the Brussels Treaty,<sup>15</sup> India has never expressed opposition as she has recognized them as legitimate measures of self-defence. The Rio Pact covered an area which did not affect India very much, whereas the Brussels Treaty was viewed by India as the result of a fear on the part of certain nations of Western Europe of the Soviet Union whose expansion into Eastern Europe was not regarded with favour even by India.

On the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,<sup>16</sup> India has often expressed her views. She has never implied that the Western powers were motivated by any other considerations than their fear of the Communist bloc, although in her view that very fear created counter-fear and a war psychology.<sup>17</sup> But the Indian government has expressed concern over the geographical development of NATO to embrace countries which have nothing to do with the Atlantic community, and especially over the implications of statements by Portuguese officials

that NATO was committed to aid Portugal to maintain its Indian settlements. Mr. Nehru gave expression to this Indian concern in a speech to the Indian Parliament on June 12, 1952:

It /NATO/ began as a pact for defence against aggression, but it has apparently widened its scope and taken upon itself the defence of the colonial possessions of the nations concerned. That, so far as we are concerned, is a very serious matter. It means that certain countries must give assurances whether formal or informal that they will protect and maintain colonial rule wherever it exists.<sup>18</sup>

India's concern would be understandable -- if her fears were valid. For thereby the movements for freedom of dependent peoples would come into conflict with the organized and coordinated might of all the NATO powers. But the NATO treaty, though it permits a member to bring any question before it for discussion, does not provide for the support of member-states in their colonial possessions. The complications which were inherent in any such commitment were certainly appreciated by the drafters of the Treaty and pointedly avoided. For Portugal to imply that her NATO partners were bound to help her maintain possession of Goa must certainly have been embarrassing to the Alliance. Certainly it was not considered relevant by Nehru,<sup>19</sup> and thus India, despite certain public statements by government officials to the contrary, does not consider NATO as too directly affecting her.

But while India has acquiesced in European and American alliances, her reaction to the extension of these arrangements into areas nearer home has been one of strenuous objection. The Indian government openly opposed the formation of a Pacific Pact.<sup>20</sup> Concern was shown by some members in the Indian Parliament about the possible formation of a Pacific Pact as early as April, 1949. Mr. Nehru relieved that concern by informing the House that there was no discussion going on for such a pact at the time.<sup>21</sup> At the Colombo meeting of the Commonwealth on Foreign Affairs in 1950, India declared that she had no intention to join such a pact,<sup>22</sup> apparently opposing it for the reason that the time was not ripe for such a step because of the unsettled state of South-East Asia, the situations in Indonesia and Indo-China being still unresolved. Here again it seems that India's primary fear was that such a pact might be used to bolster up the shrinking strength of the colonial powers in those areas. Later, however, when the Chinese Communists came into power, and the United States began to institute a change in her Asian policy, India opposed the Pacific Pact for the reason that it would create tensions in the area. When her disapproval failed to halt the signature of the Pact, however, India did not show active hostility to it, nor has she subsequently done so. She apparently recognizes that the Pact is a defensive arrangement which, by reason of the area of its application, cannot be considered

an overt provocation by Peking and therefore will not, in itself, increase tension in Asia.

Towards the Manila Pact (SEATO),<sup>23</sup> however, India has been adamantly opposed from the outset, and in this opposition she has been able to take Burma and Indonesia with her and exercised enough influence to keep a wavering Ceylon away from the Pact. The Geneva settlement had just brought about a cease-fire in Indo-China, and India had as recently as April 28, 1954, signed with China the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet to which was attached a general statement containing the five principles of peaceful co-existence to which India apparently attached the highest importance. Consequently the Indian government reacted extremely unfavourably to the Western bloc's desire to go ahead with a South-East Asia Defence Treaty. Mr. Nehru made his views known in the Indian Parliament on September 29, 1954.<sup>24</sup> His criticisms were more or less based on the grounds that SEATO was not, as its signatories claimed, a bulwark for peace and security in South-East Asia, but rather that it would definitely add to the tensions and fears of the situation. He declared:

...the approach of this Treaty is wrong and may antagonize a great part of Asia. Are you going to have peace and security by creating more conflicts and antagonisms and by making people think that instead of bringing security you bring insecurity....<sup>25</sup>

India could not accept the contention that the South-East

Asia Defence Organization was a regional body as defined in the United Nations Charter, because some of the signatory states were not geographically situated in that region -- a point which inclined the Treaty "dangerously in the direction of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries."<sup>26</sup> The fact that the Pact was signed despite India's very vocal objections only served to further alarm Indian opinion as to the actual motives of the West. Why, Nehru enquired, should the Western powers seek to set up military bases in parts of the world where the chief desire was to keep out of war, to protect countries which for the most part have not asked for their protection, or to elaborate military plans with lesser Asian nations when the stronger and often more democratic Asian governments were outspokenly opposed to them? Military alliances were familiar but here Nehru detected something new and rather extraordinary -- interlocking alliances which, in his opinion, increased the prospect of war on a world scale and was something, therefore, undesirable in principle.<sup>27</sup>

The negotiation and signing of the Baghdad Pact<sup>28</sup> provoked equally strong opposition from India, for it embraced Middle Eastern states and thereby an area of great strategic importance to India. Nehru criticized the Pact for creating in Western Asia far greater tension and conflict than ever before,<sup>29</sup> and was particularly critical, however, of Pakistan's membership in the Pact -- membership which the Indian government felt was not provoked by fear of some



imminent or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union, but because of Pakistan's hostility to India.<sup>30</sup> But undoubtedly the major opposition from India was due neither to fear of Pakistan's motives nor to those of the Western signatories of the defence pacts in Asia. It can be traced to the Indian realization that her peace area was no more. As a result of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact India was encircled by anti-Communist alliances. This fact rendered India's policy of non-involvement through non-alignment of little consequence in the event of war. The danger, in Nehru's view, was that any odd member of one of the pacts could set in motion something which would gradually pull in not only the members of that pact, but some other interrelated pact of which they were common members. That is why, both for larger reasons and for the narrow reason of self-interest, India took exception to the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts.<sup>31</sup> These pacts did not recognize the new factors that were at work. Instead of taking advantage of these new factors which aimed at peace, disarmament and the lessening of tension, these pacts deliberately checked them and encouraged other tendencies which increased hatred and fear and apprehension and came in the way of disarmament. It is for this basic reason, the belief that military pacts constitute a dangerous and harmful approach to world peace, that India has maintained her unequivocal disapproval of, and opposition to, the very establishment of such arrangements.

Closely bound up with India's opposition to the entire concept of military pacts has been her advocacy of disarmament and the international control of atomic energy. The relentless Indian dialectic on the fatal correlation between Great Power armaments races and war leaves little room for a cautious testing of formulas and proposals for their water-tight guarantees. There was great -- and to some, appalling -- meaning to the announcement of the Indian delegate in the 1951 General Assembly that India was interested not in the adoption of any particular resolution on disarmament, but in the actual beginning of disarmament.<sup>32</sup> "Fear of aggression is the root of all conflicts," argued the Indian delegate in 1951 in recommending to the major powers that they subscribe to a 'No-War Declaration.' He added by way of explanation:

For once war as a possible solution to any question, is finally ruled out -- and this is what is implied by a joint no-war declaration -- that minds of those involved must inevitably turn to peaceful solutions.<sup>33</sup>

Although Sir Benegal Rau's attempt at this time to get the major powers to subscribe to a blanket renunciation of war as a matter of principle proved abortive, three years later Mrs. Pandit returned to the suggestion of a 'No-War Declaration' in the interest of producing a climate of peace in the world, but it was not formally offered as an Indian proposal in the United Nations. The Indian government felt,

and continues to feel, that the solution in the field of armaments depends essentially on agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union by virtue of their military preponderance over all other states. But India is determined to do all in her power to bring the opposing sides in the cold war together, and to somehow save mankind from the horrors of an arms race which can only end in mutual destruction by nuclear arms. Consequently the Indian government has continued to maintain that nuclear, chemical, and biological knowledge and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction. They advocate the prohibition of such weapons by common consent, and immediately be agreement amongst those concerned, which latter is, of course, at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment. Mr. C. S. Jha has described India's views on nuclear disarmament (including testing) as involving nothing less than the survival of the human race:

This is the greatest challenge of our time, the supreme challenge of the spirit. Shall Man have the wisdom to use the tremendous power placed in his hands by the discovery of atomic power to make this planet a world of happiness and plenty, or will he in utter folly use nuclear power for committing mass suicide and the destruction of the human race.<sup>34</sup>

It is India's policy to endeavour with faith and hope to promote all efforts that seek to bring to a halt this drift to what appears to be the menace of total destruction.<sup>35</sup>

Just as India's opposition to alliances and advocacy of disarmament are attempts to ease tension in the world, so too is her championship of Communist China's recognition and admittance to the United Nations an attempt to lead the world away from the brink of the abyss. Despite Red China's aggressiveness, many people in India maintain that the lessening of tension in the Far East depends to a great extent on giving the Peking government diplomatic recognition and according it its proper place in the international community. These are separate but closely inter-related issues leaning as they do on the same arguments and bringing into play the same emotions. Both issues rest on a combination of formal agreements and political considerations.

In extending immediate recognition to the Communist Peking government,<sup>36</sup> India did so on the basis that de facto control of territory and administration entitles a government to de jure status. Recognition was not, therefore, to mean that the Indian government approved of the character of the new regime, for the Nehru administration ruthlessly suppressed Communists at home; it was rather a recognition of political reality. India dealt with the case on its merits although this caused serious resentment in the United States -- a factor which was to become a serious difficulty in Indo-American relations in view of what happened later. And although the Indian government explained that no moral judgement was involved, it undoubtedly had few qualms about

the downfall of the corrupt Kuomintang oligarchy.

For the same reason of recognizing realities, India supports the entry of Red China into the United Nations. "It becomes completely unreal and artificial," Mr. Nehru has declared, "to talk about China being represented in the United Nations or in the Security Council by someone who cannot speak for China."<sup>37</sup> To Indian government leaders, the international recognition of Communist China would also have symbolic importance as a recognition of the new status of Asian peoples in world affairs. Thus, while as an Indian Nehru may sometimes have moments of disquietude about the might of the New China, nevertheless as an Asian he has shared what he has considered a Western slight to a great power. In 1953 he observed: "If China is not there [in the United Nations], then from the point of view of population, from the point of view of world importance, nearly a quarter of the world is not there."<sup>38</sup>

More urgently, however, the Indian government holds the view that there can be no peace in Asia until the Government of the Chinese People's Republic is universally recognized and accepted as the bona fide government of the Chinese people. Mr. Nehru has stated quite bluntly that "one of the biggest factors towards ensuring security in South-East Asia and in the Far East is the recognition of China...and China coming into the United Nations."<sup>39</sup> With the outbreak of the

Korean war India, in accord with that view, championed more vigorously than ever the right of Communist China to be represented. On July 13, 1950, Mr. Nehru sent identical letters to Marshal Stalin and the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in which he suggested the seating of Communist China at the United Nations.<sup>40</sup> This proposal was welcomed by the Soviet leader but rejected by the Americans<sup>41</sup> and so came to naught. Nothing daunted, India, at the opening of the fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1950, introduced a draft resolution which stated that "the Central Government of the People's Republic of China is the only...government functioning in the Republic of China, as now constituted." The Assembly was asked to decide that this government should be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly and to recommend that the other organs of the United Nations adopt similar resolutions.<sup>42</sup>

Faced by the adamant opposition of the United States, opposition which grew stronger as the Korean war progressed, the Indian proposal was defeated and subsequent suggestions towards the same end have achieved no success. Red China continues to be excluded from the United Nations, a situation Mr. Nehru has deplored on many occasions and which prompted even the Statesman (Delhi), which is considered a pro-Western and conservative newspaper, to write on September 16, 1950:

...the unrealistic obstinacy of the U. S. on the China question is prejudicing her relations, not with China only, but with other Asian countries and lessening the authority of the U. N. The Security Council as at present constituted represents neither the facts of world power, as was intended, nor (it now seems clear) the wishes of the majority of members. How it can successfully champion democratic causes, as it is not itself democratically constituted is a question which is likely to be asked as time goes on.<sup>43</sup>

The National Standard even questioned the claims of the United Nations to be considered as an organization with world-wide responsibility. It wrote on January 16, 1951: "America deprived the U. N. of its moral claims to enforce its directive by her obstinate refusal to buy peace through the concession of Red China's claims on Formosa and for the seat in the Security Council."<sup>44</sup> The continued refusal by the United States and its supporters to permit Red China's seating in the United Nations is viewed by Indians as a development in the context of which the United Nations is being converted from the status of a world organization to the executive agent of an anti-Communist bloc. Such a development will, in the Indian view, weaken not strengthen the world body and so make it less effective as an agency of peace.

In recent years, however, there has been a noticeable disinclination on the part of India to adamantly

demand the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. In part this may be attributed to New Delhi's awareness that American non-recognition of the Peking regime at the present time is based on a complex set of factors -- emotional, political, and strategic -- that only time and a favorable series of events can alter. And partly it is due to the suspicion aroused in India by China's actions in Tibet, South-East Asia, and on India's borders, as to the responsible nature of the Chinese Communist government. Even Prime Minister Nehru, with all his prestige and eloquence, dares not support Red China's claims to a seat at the United Nations too vociferously at a time when that country is seizing Indian territory without regard to Indian protests and in direct violation of its written and spoken adherence to Panch Shila. The Indian government apparently recognizes that the issues of recognition and United Nations membership for her Chinese neighbour are part of a larger problem which must itself change before any real new developments can be expected.

Thus India's approach to the cold war is based on the view that world peace can only be secured if all nations owe unqualified allegiance to the United Nations. In furtherance of her own cherished ideals and national interests, no less than those of the other progressive nations of the world, India plays her role in the United Nations Organization. She recognizes in it the Supreme Parliament



of the nations of the world, where the voice of any nation, regardless of size or political ideology, subscribing to the fundamental principles guiding the great organization is heard with due regard. She recognizes in it the symbol of the gigantic effort humanity is prepared to make in order to stave off war. As such India has sought to gain the admittance of Red China into the United Nations, thereby hoping to give the world organization a more representative character and to strengthen its promotion of international cooperation. For the West (in general) to disregard the existence of a quarter of the human race in the throes of readjustment is viewed by New Delhi as a potential and very real threat to world peace. India opposes the division of the world into rival power blocs as representing a spirit of animosity, hatred and suspicion which is contrary to the basic principles underlying the United Nations Organization. She considers that such a division as represented by regional security pacts, leads only to imaginary security, but thereby creates a war psychology and a race in armaments which can only lead, as in the past, to disaster for all concerned. Through non-alignment and continuous enunciation of her views, India hopes to lead the world away from this dangerous polarization of power and fear psychosis and to further the cause of peace.

## Footnotes - Chapter IV

- 1 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 319.
- 2 Rosinger, India and the United States, p. 36.
- 3 On March 22, 1949, Mr. Nehru, speaking on 'Our Foreign Policy,' said: "We want at least ten or fifteen years of peace in order to be able to develop our resources." Independence and After, p. 258.
- 4 Ibid., p. 242.
- 5 Nehru said on March 22, 1949: "It is not a middle-of-the-road policy. It is a positive, constructive policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as possible." Ibid., p. 254.
- 6 Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, p. 198.
- 7 Mr. Nehru's speech in the Indian Parliament on February 18, 1953 mainly revolved around this theme 'Psychosis of Fear.' Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 243-258.
- 8 Jawaharlal Nehru, Visit to America (New York, John Day, 1950), pp. 30-31.
- 9 This was one of the reasons given by Mr. Nehru for his opposition to the Pacific Pact in 1949.
- 10 In an interview with Robert Trumbull in March 1951, Mr. Nehru suggested two ways to fight communism in Asia: by encouragement of nationalism; and by helping economic progress. He pointed out: "That is to say the people should not be made by circumstances to think of communism as a liberating force, which they sometimes do." The New York Times, April 1, 1951.
- 11 Rosinger, op. cit., p. 146.
- 12 Nehru's Press Conferences 1953, p. 7.
- 13 L. B. Pearson, "After Geneva: A Greater Task For NATO," Foreign Affairs, vol. 34 (1955-56), pp. 15-16.
- 14 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) signed on September 2, 1947 at Rio de Janeiro between the United States and all twenty Latin American states. Text in Doc. I. Aff. 1947-1948, pp. 773-778.

15 The Brussels Treaty, signed on March 17, 1948 at Brussels between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Text in Doc. I. Aff. 1947-1948, pp. 225-229.

16 The North Atlantic Treaty, signed April 4, 1949 at Washington between twelve powers, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined later on February 20, 1952, under a separate Protocol of February 15, 1952. Text in Doc. I. Aff. 1949-1950, pp. 257-260.

17 In a speech in the Lok Sabha during debate on Foreign Affairs, November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru declared: "The fear of Western countries regarding the armed might of the Soviet Union brought into existence pacts and alliances like the NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Then came into existence, as a counterblast, the Warsaw Treaty. Each of these systems of alliances pretends to be an association for peace and defence against attack, but each has the effect really of frightening the other party and making it more apprehensive of danger and, therefore, quickening the race of armaments." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 328.

18 Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 223.

19 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 378.

20 The Security Treaty between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS Pact) signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951. Text in Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1951, pp. 263-265.

21 Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954, p. 91.

22 Levi, Free India in Asia, p. 57.

23 The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 by eight powers, namely: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Text in D.S.B. XXI (795), September 20, 1954, pp. 393-396.

24 "The South-East Asia Treaty Organization," Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 265-273.

25 Ibid., p. 268.

26 Ibid., p. 267.

27 Nicholas Mansergh, "Commonwealth Foreign Policies 1945-56: A Perspective View," Commonwealth Perspectives (London, Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 52.

28 The Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey was signed on 24 February 1955, Britain joined on 5 April 1955, Pakistan on 23 September 1955, and Persia on 3 November 1955. For texts of the agreements see Doc. I. Aff. 1955, pp. 287-289 (Iraqi-Turkish agreement); pp. 293-294 (British adherence); p. 304 (Persian adherence).

29 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 319.

30 Ibid., pp. 319-320.

31 Ibid., p. 320.

32 General Assembly, Official Records, 6th Sess., Cmtte. 1, p. 28.

33 Ibid., pp. 129-130.

34 Speech to the General Assembly's main political committee on November 18, 1959. Quoted in Indiagram, November 19, 1959.

35 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 250.

36 The Government of India accorded de jure recognition to the new Government of China on December 30, 1949.

37 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 242.

38 Quoted in Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 244.

39 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 271.  
When the Peking government applied for admission into the United Nations in January, 1950, India, as a recent elective to a non-permanent Council seat, supported the Soviet draft resolution of January 10, 1950 that provided for the expulsion of the Nationalist representative from the Council and his replacement by the Peking delegate.

40 Text of the letters in Doc. I. Aff. 1949-1950, pp. 705-707.

41 In his polite rejection of Nehru's proposal of July 18, 1950, Mr. Acheson said: "In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant Governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits...I know that you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the United Nations to coercion or duress." Ibid., p. 707.

42 General Assembly Official Records, 5th Sess., 277th Plenary Mtg., September 19, 1950, p. 2.

43 Cited in India and the United Nations (New York, I.C.W.A., 1957), p. 70.

44 Ibid.

## CHAPTER V

### INDIAN MEDIATION IN EAST-WEST DISPUTES

We have to achieve freedom and to defend it. We have to meet aggression and to resist it and the force employed must be adequate to the purpose. But even when preparing to resist aggression, the ultimate objective, the objective of peace and reconciliation, must never be lost sight of and heart and mind must be attuned to this supreme aim and not swayed or clouded by hatred or fear.<sup>1</sup>

In furtherance of her desire to create a temper of peace, and thereby lead the world away from a sense of paralyzing fear of the inevitability of war, India has felt that she must act as a sort of go-between or mediator in cold war disputes involving the rival interests of the two blocs. By virtue of her non-alignment with respect to either power bloc, India feels that she can perform the necessary task of building a bridge which otherwise would not exist between the two rival blocs. Indeed, India is happily situated for such a role -- an Asian state, traditionally friendly to China, without any legacy of conflict with Russia, yet friendly to the West, and following a 'middle way' in its programme of economic and social development.<sup>2</sup> Her policy of non-alignment and mediation has attracted the support of various Asian and African governments and the enthusiasm of

large numbers of people, particularly in non-Communist Asia and in Africa. By virtue of her unique position, size and influence, India is best placed to play such a role. That she has done so with not a little success is evidenced by her Government's attitudes and efforts in Korea, in Indo-China, in the dispute between Peking and Washington over Formosa and the offshore islands, and in the Hungarian and Suez conflicts.

The events of 1950 and after in Korea were significant to Indians because these events raised the spectre of a world war. Because of its concern with preventing the Korean war from spreading into a large-scale world conflict, India could not remain a mere spectator to the happenings in Korea. Indeed, as the war progressed some of the key principles of Indian policy concerning the nature and function of the United Nations and of Great Power relations were put to the test.

Before the North Korean attack in June 1950, the Indian government and people had hardly been interested in Korean matters. India had not recognized either of the two Korean governments in the belief that the artificial division of the country should neither be dignified nor perpetuated by the act of recognition. She would in any case have found it difficult to decide which government to recognize since she disapproved of the conditions prevailing on both sides of

the 38th Parallel. Notwithstanding these unfortunate circumstances, India recognized that aggression had been committed by North Korea.<sup>3</sup> Consequently India accepted the two Security Council Resolutions of June 25<sup>4</sup> (calling on the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th parallel and cease hostilities) and June 27, 1950<sup>5</sup> (asking members of the United Nations to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area). The Indian representative, not having received instructions from his government, did not vote on the latter resolution. But the Government of India after careful consideration accepted the resolution in a special communication to the Security Council on June 29, because it was opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to aggression.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, however, the Indian government made it clear that the acceptance of this resolution did not involve any modification of its foreign policy. The Indian delegate to the United Nations explained:

This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries. It remains an independent policy...determined solely by India's ideals and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope that even at this stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by negotiation.<sup>7</sup>



Largely because of this fervent desire to bring about a quick end to the fighting in Korea, rather than because of India's need for her forces at home, the Government of India sent only a field ambulance and surgical unit to Korea. Thus while condemning the North Korean aggression, India was thinking in terms of the Korean war assuming larger proportions and hence she wanted to take care that she did not get involved in it. Although one observer has explained India's Korean policy as motivated by issues not directly related to the conflict in the peninsula,<sup>8</sup> it seems clear that the general outlook and actions of the Indian government during the Korean war can only be understood from the point of view of her desire to promote peace through a localization of the conflict, and that in case of extension that she should not be obliged to be involved in it. Only thus can India's abstention on July 7, 1950 from voting on the Security Council Resolution<sup>9</sup> setting up a United Nations Command under the United States, and her refusal to provide armed forces for service in that Command, be explained. In addition, had the Indian army participated in a full-scale war against the North Koreans (later joined by the Chinese Communists) it would have been impossible for the Indian government to play the role it did -- first in the negotiations and discussions on Korea held under the auspices of the United Nations and outside it, and later in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in 1953-1954.

In accordance with the aims of her policy, India turned her diplomacy towards mediation in the Korean war. The very nature of this policy made it impracticable for India to wholly endorse the original standpoints of either party, and consequently India's efforts very often annoyed the United States and sometimes India was accused by leading American public men of following a naive policy favourable to the Communists.<sup>10</sup> To the Government of India, however, its policy looked as the best course for avoiding a possible war over Korea and other connected issues.

As early as July 12, 1950 the Indian Prime Minister took the initiative to seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means.<sup>11</sup> In identical personal messages to United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Marshal Stalin, Nehru declared:

India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem.<sup>12</sup>

But Nehru's enterprise was not successful. While Marshal Stalin welcomed Nehru's peaceable initiative,<sup>13</sup> Mr. Dean

Acheson politely rejected India's suggestion for seating Communist China at the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> Thus nothing came of it save considerable American annoyance at India for suggesting that concessions be made to the Communist powers.<sup>15</sup> This divergence of views between India and the United States was to cause considerable future friction and mutual annoyance.

It was against this background that the question of the crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations forces was faced by India. As the United Nations forces, in September 1950, were racing towards the 38th parallel following the successful Inchon landings, Mr. Nehru publicly stated that they should not go beyond the 38th parallel until all other means of settlement had been explored.<sup>16</sup> In response to a resolution of the General Assembly on October 7, 1950 which, in effect, sanctioned unification of the country by the force of the advancing United Nations armies, India expressed her fears that the result would be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of conflict. At a press conference held on October 18, Mr. Nehru declared:

We felt that the time had come for an effort to be made for a peaceful solution...to cross the 38th Parallel without making such an effort...appeared to us to be wrong and to involve grave risks of a conflict on a much wider scale.<sup>17</sup>

Judging from the course of later events, it would perhaps have

been better for world peace and all parties concerned, if the United Nations forces had halted and a serious attempt at settlement had been made. But much to India's regret, on October 8, 1950 the United Nations forces did cross the 38th parallel against her strong opposition and this crossing certainly alienated Delhi from Washington.<sup>18</sup>

To the Indian government this crossing and the subsequent rapid advance of the United Nations forces to the Yalu river raised the very real spectre of a world war. New Delhi was aware that the Chinese government considered the United Nations advance as a grave danger to their own security and would not tolerate it.<sup>19</sup> When their advice was disregarded and Chinese Communist forces entered the war in great force India, rather than blame the Chinese for intervening, felt justified in putting much of the responsibility for the prolongation and extension of the conflict upon the policy of the United Nations, or more especially, of the United States. Despite her grievance, however, the seriousness of the war caused India to continue occupying herself with the task of bringing about a settlement. In company with twelve other Asian countries India, on December 5, 1950 appealed to the advancing North Koreans and Communist Chinese to declare immediately that it was not their intention to cross south of the 38th parallel, stating that "such a declaration will give time for considering what further steps are necessary to resolve the conflict in the Far East and

thus help to avert the danger of another world war.<sup>20</sup>

However, the opposition of the Soviet Union and Red China on the grounds that the resolution for a cease-fire would give the United Nations forces a breathing space<sup>21</sup> caused the appeal to go for naught, although Assembly approval of the resolution by 52 votes to 5 with one abstention constituted a cease-fire group of India, Canada and Iran. Another of India's mediation efforts had failed, this time through what looked like Chinese intransigence, and thus caused the Indian Prime Minister to declare to the Indian Parliament:

As we expected, the passing of this resolution has, for the time being at least, put an end to any attempts at negotiation or settlement. We hope still that it may be possible for events to take a better turn in future, but I must confess that at the moment, that hope has grown very dim.<sup>22</sup>

But despite the not too optimistic outlook of the Indian government, it did not cease its efforts towards promoting a settlement of the Korean dispute. Just as it had vigorously opposed<sup>23</sup> a veiled United States threat to use the atom bomb in Korea made by President Truman at a press conference on November 30, 1950<sup>24</sup> on the grounds that a general conflagration would result, for similar reasons India also opposed a United States resolution of January 30, 1951 condemning Red China as an aggressor. Sir Benegal Rau

set forth his Government's reasons for voting against the American resolution as follows: it would prolong the war indefinitely and possibly even lead ultimately to global war; it was not fair in its condemnation as the issue of aggression was very complex; and it did not hold any reasonable prospect of success.<sup>25</sup> However, the Indian objections were rejected by the General Assembly, and Red China was ~~declared~~ an aggressor. "This proposal," Mr. Nehru stated, "cannot lead to peace. It can only lead to intensification of conflicts and might perhaps close the door to any attempt at a solution by negotiation."<sup>26</sup>

The war, indeed, did proceed with vigorous actions by both sides in mounting large offensives, but it soon became evident that the war had entered a military deadlock. Consequently truce talks began in July 1951, but were prolonged because of the inability of the opposing sides to agree on certain points of contention, especially the question of the post-armistice exchange of prisoners of war.<sup>27</sup> Once again India stepped in to propose a solution at the 1952 session of the General Assembly. On November 17, 1952, the Indian delegation made public the text of a 17-point plan designed to break the deadlock over the repatriation of war prisoners and end the Korean war.<sup>28</sup> Mr. Krishna Menon emphasized that the proposals were a way to a solution rather than a solution itself. Their aim was to build a bridge between what appeared to be conflicting points of view.<sup>29</sup>

I submit these proposals with confidence and earnestness, but also with humility. I submit that they are a way to a solution.... We want the voice of the United Nations to be heard not through guns or bombs but through the voice of peace.

After some modifications the Indian resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952 and was finally accepted by the Chinese four months later on more or less the lines which India had suggested.

In recognition of the role she was playing, India was offered, and accepted, the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which was subsequently established to implement the agreement concluded between the two sides. The Commission, and the Indian custodial Force which took charge of the prisoners of war, played a very important part in the concluding stages of the settlement of the issue, despite minor irritations caused by American opposition to the inclusion of India in the Political Conference on Korea,<sup>30</sup> and serious and unrestrained attacks on India by South Korean government leaders.<sup>31</sup> India had filled a gap, according to Mr. Nehru, which no other country could have filled and had thereby brought about the cessation of hostilities.<sup>32</sup>

India's attitude on the whole Korean question was significant in many respects. While accepting the initial Security Council resolutions concerning the attack on the

Republic of Korea and assistance to the latter, India at the same time emphasized the importance of settling the dispute by peaceful means. Fearing the disruptive effects of a major war involving the Great Powers on the United Nations, India opposed the resolution branding the new Government of China an aggressor. India's predominant aim was to preserve and promote the broad-based and universal character of the United Nations. The Government of India never lost sight of this aim when it was formulating its policy towards United Nations actions in Korea. The difference in approach between India and those states which sent armed forces to Korea often resulted in severe criticism of India's policy. But it is necessary to point out that the steps India took on the Korean issue, and the statements that were made by her spokesmen on the situation were not based on any inherent opposition to the Western bloc or pro-Communist attitudes. They were based on India's views as to how best a general war might be avoided. In retrospect, as Mr. Chester Bowles has observed,<sup>33</sup> India's position on the twisted course of debate on Korea in the United Nations was not pro-Communist. On the crucial votes India found herself voting with the American delegates far more frequently than against them. The Korean conflict showed Indian foreign policy as active and resourceful in its attempts to lead to a peaceful settlement of a major conflict.<sup>34</sup> Therein lies its success.



Another issue in which India played a significant mediatory role is that of Indo-China. In the negotiations which brought about an armistice between north and south in 1954, India's influence was felt even though Nehru had not been officially invited to the conference. India's interest in the conflict in Indo-China had steadily increased in the post-war years, and Indian opinion was at all times highly critical of French government attempts to reinstate their authority over Indo-China, and to split the ranks of the nationalists. But though most Indians had regarded Ho Chi-Minh as a more sincere spokesman for nationalist aspirations than Bao Dai, the Indian government had recognized neither and had adopted a position of aloofness towards the raging struggle. But from early 1953 the French position was in constant deterioration as the fighting intensified. As it began to become clear that the French forces could not by themselves hold Indo-China against the Communist Viet Minh, the danger increased that due to outside intervention (United States and other Western nations on the French side and Communist China on Ho Chih Minh's side) another conflagration on a major scale might take place.

That Great Power intervention in Indo-China was becoming likely was implied by a speech Secretary of State Dulles made before the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1953:

There (in Indo-China) the fighting continues. Communist forces are seeking to gain political power by military violence.... The pretext until now has been that the Associated States of Indo-China were mere colonies and that the Communist war was designed to promote 'independence' rather than to expand by violence the Soviet Camp. It is no longer possible to support such a pretext.<sup>35</sup>

Further proof of the growing American concern with the Indo-Chinese situation was evidenced by a joint United States - French communiqué of September 30, 1953<sup>36</sup> which announced that the United States Government had agreed to provide the French Government, prior to December 31, 1954, with additional financial resources not to exceed \$385 million. This aid was in support of French plans for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh. With the opening of a formidable Vietminh offensive in December 1953, the concern for the future of the French military position, and fear of Chinese intervention, became particularly acute in the United States. On December 29th Mr. Dulles told a press conference that in the event of an invasion of Indo-China, the American reaction "would not necessarily be confined to the particular theatre chosen by the communists for their operations." On January 12, 1954, after proclaiming the doctrine of instant retaliation, Mr. Dulles gave warning that Chinese intervention would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indo-China."<sup>37</sup>

If these admonitions struck Anthony Eden as being off the mark, as in his view Chinese intervention was not imminent,<sup>38</sup> then the increasing fear in India caused by the implications of Dulles' remarks is understandable. The Indian government became acutely desirous of stopping the fighting and reaching some amicable solution with the participation of Communist China. Consequently Mr. Nehru, on February 22, 1954, made an appeal for a cease-fire in Indo-China to be followed by talks for a settlement.

It seems a tremendous pity that this war should continue without any serious attempt being made to find a way out...I am sure the House will join me to request the powers concerned to strive to have a cease-fire there and they can discuss it in their own way.<sup>39</sup>

This was particularly desirable in Nehru's view<sup>40</sup> because in about two months the Geneva Conference was to be held between the Great Powers (including Communist China) for talks on Indo-China and Korea. At the same time, however, the Indian government had no desire to interfere or to shoulder any burden of responsibility in this connection.

But as the situation in Indo-China (i.e. at Dien Bien Phu) continued to deteriorate, the Indian Prime Minister felt the need to again enunciate his concern. In the Lok Sabha on April 24, 1954 he asked that the question of a cease-fire be given urgent priority at the Geneva Conference

and he put forward a six-point plan for ending the Indo-China war and appealed to the Powers to give it their earnest consideration at Geneva.<sup>41</sup> Nehru urged that a climate of peace and negotiation should be promoted; an immediate cease-fire should come into effect; the Conference should obtain an unequivocal undertaking by the French Government that Indo-China be given complete independence; direct negotiations between the parties immediately and principally concerned should be initiated; and a solemn non-intervention agreement should be concluded and guaranteed by the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. "The Government of India," Nehru concluded, "make these proposals...in the earnest hope that they will engage the attention of the conference and of the parties concerned.... The alternative is grim...peace cannot exist in an exasperating and costly relationship of mutual terror."

While it is difficult to ascertain the relative significance of Indian pronouncements on the Indo-Chinese issue on the Powers assembled at Geneva, aside from the apparent importance Mr. Eden attributes to them,<sup>42</sup> the Conference did bring a realization of India's policy regarding Indo-China. It ended a bitter struggle which in its later stages had taken on ominous possibilities and it brought about a negotiated settlement in which French power and influence were largely removed from the scene. Thus the Geneva settlement<sup>43</sup> was enthusiastically welcomed by India.

Messages of congratulation on the successful outcome of the Geneva Conference were sent by Mr. Nehru on July 21 to Mr. Eden, M. Mendès - France, M. Molotov, and Mr. Chou En-lai. He welcomed the settlement as "one of the outstanding achievements of the post-war era,"<sup>44</sup> but at the same time felt it was only a step that had to be followed by persistent efforts at further settlements to assure peace for the future.

Thus the Indian government, while basing its policy on the agreements reached at Geneva, has devoted its efforts to keeping them in effect on the assumption that this approach offers the best possibility of preserving peace or at least preventing the outbreak of renewed hostilities. She has borne the heavy responsibility of chairing the International Commissions for Supervision and Control for Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. And whatever criticisms may be made of the work of the Commission, and there have been many, it has nevertheless helped keep the Indo-Chinese danger spot in relative tranquillity and thereby has promoted peace in that quarter.

In the controversy over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa, India has also played her part of mediator in the cold war with positive results. Ever since the Nationalists were driven from the mainland, Peking has constantly reiterated its sovereignty over the three islands, a claim which is emphatically rejected by the Nationalist regime on Formosa.

From a legalistic standpoint, the history of Formosa, in particular, makes possible claims by both the Communist and Nationalist governments. The Cairo and Potsdam conferences both agreed that Formosa was to be returned to the Republic of China i.e. Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government, for there is no evidence to assume that even the Soviet Union foresaw the Communists assuming control of China so soon after the defeat of Japan. But by the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty the Nationalists had been driven to refuge on the island and consequently the Treaty made no provisions for its disposition. As such the Nationalist government has disputed the challenges to its sovereignty over Formosa and the offshore islands made by Peking which claims the islands belong to it as the successor government of China.

The value of Formosa to both sides is unmistakably clear. As the seat of the Nationalist government it is the only centre with which non-Communist or anti-Communist Chinese living both on or without the mainland can identify themselves. But it is also for that reason important symbolically and practically to the Communist Peking government, and herein lies the threat to peace which has caused continuing anxiety in India. Peking has repeatedly declared its intention of liberating Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu while the Nationalists, backed by extensive American aid and shielded by the United States Seventh Fleet, has made every preparation to prevent such a seizure.

The policy of the Indian government towards this issue has been directed to preventing an outbreak of hostilities on a scale which would cause American intervention in force in support of Chiang Kai-shek. India does not recognize the Kuomintang regime on Formosa and would, indeed, probably not be too averse to seeing its downfall. Similarly, India feels that the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu rightfully belong to the Peking government.<sup>45</sup> In a statement to the Lok Sabha during the crisis in 1955 in the Formosa straits, Nehru made clear his Government's support of Peking's claims:

There is hardly a country which does not recognize that the offshore islands, notably Quemoy and Matsu, are obviously and definitely parts of China.... They are a few miles -- five miles or ten miles -- beyond the shore. And no country can tolerate an enemy sitting ten miles from their shore, bombarding them all the time. It is an intolerable situation. Therefore, it is almost generally recognized that these islands should immediately be evacuated and taken possession of by the Government of the mainland.<sup>46</sup>

However, Nehru is aware of the American attitude on the issue and, while maintaining his support of Peking's claims, he has counselled both Chinese regimes against breaking the peace over the issue of ownership of Formosa and the offshore islands. In the crisis over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa in March and April, 1955, Nehru's correspondence both with Eisenhower and with Chou En-lai, which will someday be published, played a significant part in averting serious

dangers.<sup>47</sup> It is to be expected that the Indian government, in line with their general concept of the international conflict, of the complexities of the Formosa straits controversy, and of India's proper role will in the future, as in the past, try to bring the opposing parties closer together and thereby ease the threat to peace inherent in the Formosa straits issue.

The policy followed by the Government of India with respects to the crises over Suez and Hungary, however, is probably the best illustration of that Government's determination to preserve the international peace at almost any price. Indeed the Indian reaction was truly remarkable. Mr. Nehru declared in a speech that whereas in Egypt "every single thing that had happened was as clear as daylight," he could not follow "the very confusing situation" in Hungary.<sup>48</sup> He then proceeded to read out the excuses which Marshal Bulganin had sent him for the Russian intervention. These Mr. Nehru described as 'facts'. He displayed the same readiness to accept Russia's explanation as he did to reject those made by Britain and France.

It is difficult to explain the attitudes expressed by the Indian government in a manner which would make the Government's stand justifiable in the circumstances. For the double standard which the Indian leaders applied to both issues certainly justified critics in the West who criticized Nehru for having one scale of values for the West and another



for the Soviet Union (which might be true in that violence is more to be expected from a regime which reposes upon it). If the use of force was wrong in Egypt, where at least there was some sort of case for it,<sup>49</sup> it was doubly wrong in Hungary, this is what many Westerners said, and with reason.

Even in India Nehru's policy in the crises evoked loud and harsh condemnations. For though popular opinion in India was favourable to Egypt in every step of the crisis over the canal, it was also strongly favourable to the Hungarian nationalists who had risen against Soviet rule. Nehru, with no ambassador in Budapest and no independent sources of information,<sup>50</sup> did not express his natural abhorrence of violence quickly enough to suit his own public opinion or that of the West. On one occasion in the United Nations Mr. Krishna Menon actually voted with the Soviet Union, on a Hungarian resolution to hold elections in Hungary under United Nations auspices, because he could "not subscribe to any phraseology or proposals before the Assembly which disregard the sovereignty of States represented here."<sup>51</sup> Such things as this, and the curious, unavowed connection between the events in Egypt and Hungary, subjected Nehru to more than the usual sharp talk in the West and in intense criticism at home. Allegations that the Government of India was pursuing a double standard in international affairs, according to whether aggression took place in the East or the West, were combined with demands for the

recall of Mr. Krishna Menon. Critics of the Government took particular exception to the fact that India, alone of the non-Communist countries, had voted with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations opposing free elections in Hungary under United Nations supervision.

The Hindustan Times criticized the Government's maladroit handling of the Hungarian situation and its "curious reluctance, amounting almost to embarrassment" in its official reactions to the Soviet behaviour; the Statesman called for an explanation of India's "odd" vote at the United Nations; while the Times of India condemned the Government's over-cautious, almost apologetic reaction to Soviet imperialism.<sup>52</sup> Mr. Narayan, the leader of the Praja Socialist Party, demanded the removal of Krishna Menon from the political scene and attacked both he and Nehru for "jeopardizing India's moral stature in the world by applying double standards to aggression according to who commits it and where." Mr. Frank Moraes, well-known Indian publicist, in an article written after his return from United Nations Headquarters in New York, said that Mr. Krishna Menon had done nothing to enhance India's reputation at the United Nations, and suggested that his talents "might more profitably be utilized elsewhere than in the United States, where temperatures rise and tempers bristle at the mere mention of his name."<sup>53</sup>

In replying to his critics, the Indian Prime Minister justified his Government's actions on both issues on both legalistic and practical grounds. He justified India's vote in the United Nations on the Hungarian resolution on the grounds that the Indian government was opposed not to the entire resolution but only to a clause recommending United Nations supervision of Hungarian elections. He asked his critics to "see the context in which it was moved and the objective behind it -- because unfortunately these incidents that have arisen in Egypt and Hungary have both been an intensification of the cold war.... The Hungarian question became a pawn on the chess board of international politics. Similarly others were thinking of the Egyptian question as a pawn on the chessboard."<sup>54</sup> As such Nehru justified his Government's attitude towards the two issues as absolutely correct.

According to Vincent Sheean,<sup>55</sup> Nehru was convinced that Russia viewed the Anglo-French expedition to Suez as the calculated prelude to world war. Moscow found it impossible to believe that the enterprise had been undertaken without American support and approval, and as Nehru saw it, such an attempt to reclaim the ramparts of the past, if it had been supported by the United States, would indeed have brought a general catastrophe. As the primary purpose of Indian policy, aside from self-preservation or as a part of it, is to avoid that catastrophe, the Indian government

condemned the Suez action with the bitterness it did. Similarly, in the Indian government's view, Russia's bloody suppression of the Hungarian popular uprising was an automatic reaction to what was considered a serious threat to the future security of the Soviet Union. Nehru deplored it as much as anybody could but he related it to the war menace: the Russians were protecting their flank. He must have had some good reasons for thinking so, arising from his private correspondence. There was one long letter from Bulganin, for example, at just that time, which set forth the Kremlin's point of view. Consequently Nehru's overriding concern for world peace undoubtedly caused him to view Suez as the immediate danger of war and Hungary as the deplorable but characteristic Soviet response to a threat to her security. The attitude adopted by the Indian government -- that is, unrestrained condemnation of the British and French at Suez, and apparent reluctance to condemn Soviet action in Hungary -- reflected New Delhi's concern to preserve peace at any price.

Indeed, if India's attitude is viewed objectively, there is certain merit in the basic realism of her approach even though the manner of its expression left much to be desired. By adamantly condemning the Suez adventure and thereby aligning herself on Egypt's side in the dispute, India prevented Soviet Russia from capitalizing on the issue to present herself as the sole Asian champion of Arab nationalism and thereby gain a diplomatic victory with

incalculable consequences for the West in such a strategic region. By such an attitude and through demanding withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, India sought to prevent the Middle-East from entering into a prolonged period of tension that could well break out into a general conflagration. The nature of the incident and the democratic character of the two Western powers involved were probably viewed by New Delhi as rendering them amenable to criticism and diplomatic pressure without provoking more serious reactions detrimental to world peace.

Such was not the case, however, with respect to the Soviet actions in Hungary. There the actions of the Russians were obviously not pursued without due consideration to the effects such action would have on Soviet prestige throughout the world. Indeed, in view of the common view being expressed in the West at the time of the Hungarian uprising that it was the beginning of the end for the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, the Soviet suppression of the uprising is understandable. For Moscow to have withdrawn from Hungary under such conditions would have initiated similar occurrences throughout the Soviet satellites with serious consequences for the Soviet position -- a position Russia had given some 20 million lives to secure. That the Kremlin chose not to retreat was undoubtedly interpreted, correctly so, by Nehru to indicate the uselessness of purposely bringing pressure to bear upon that country.

Nehru probably felt that such criticism, if taken too far, might provoke more serious Soviet reactions and might even lead to a world war. Thus the Indian government opposed censure of the Soviet actions, and demands for their withdrawal from Hungary, at the United Nations on the correct premise that such action could do no good but, to the contrary, might do incalculable harm. Nehru could see no use in provocative talk where no tangible results could be expected. The Indian government pursued a policy that, though it appeared two-faced and immoral to most observers, was, in the view of that Government, consistent with their promotion of peace through considering each case strictly on its merits.

In consonance with her policy of non-alignment, then, India has maintained a spirit of objectivity in dealing with international issues, examining and judging each issue, as it arises, on its intrinsic merit and expressing her views openly and freely without fear or favour. The fact that her attitude on a particular issue pleases this power or displeases that does not weigh with India in arriving at a decision and standing by it. Thus, throughout the Korean war the Indian government directed its efforts to ending the conflict. India apprehended that the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the United Nations forces would widen the area of conflict and thus she opposed such action being taken. For the same reason India opposed the United Nations Resolution of February 1, 1951, branding the People's

Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea on the grounds that the resolution would prolong hostilities and might extend the area of conflict. India's proposals on the repatriation of prisoners broke the deadlock in the truce talks, and Indian troops supervised the execution of the armistice. In the negotiations which brought about an armistice between north and south in Indo-China (1954), India's influence was felt even though Nehru had not been officially invited to the conference. In the crisis over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa in March and April, 1955, Nehru's correspondence both with Eisenhower and with Chou En-lai undoubtedly played not a minor part in averting serious dangers. And in the Hungarian and Suez crises, the aim of the Indian government was to prevent the issues from causing greater conflicts, even though this meant harsh criticism of France and Britain and an embarrassing reluctance to chastize the Soviet Union. The Indian government has been determined to preserve the peace even though her efforts in so doing are not always appreciated. Through an independent approach to each issue, India has striven to conciliate the opposing points of view and to thereby prevent the world from rushing headlong into a conflict, the only result of which would not only be destruction of the combatants, but of civilization itself.

## Footnotes - Chapter V

1 Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 125.

2 Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 559.

3 India was one of the members on the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which reported on June 25, 1950 that aggression had taken place. U.N. Doc. S/1946, June 25, 1950.

4 Security Council Resolution, S/1501, June 25, 1950.

5 Ibid., S/1511, June 27, 1950.

6 U.N. Doc. S/1520, June 29, 1950. Text Doc. I. Aff. 1949-1950, pp. 635-636.

7 Security Council, Official Records, 5th Yr., No. 17, 475th Mtg., 30 June 1950, pp. 2-3. The Indian Prime Minister clarified the Indian position at a press conference in New Delhi on July 7, 1950: "India supported the resolutions of the Security Council because they logically followed the context of events and the U. N. Charter, and because that seemed the only course to avoid the extension of conflict and large-scale warfare. In doing so India's primary consideration was to serve the cause of peace." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 15-22, 1950, p. 10847.

8 Levi, Free India in Asia, pp. 90-92. Mr. Levi describes these as annoyance that the U. N. acted so promptly on Korea while it had refused to act on India's protest against Pakistani aggression in Kashmir; disgust with the world situation created by the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., resentment at Western use of force against an Asian people; Indian reluctance to fight a fellow Asian nation.

9 Security Council Resolution, S/1588, July 7, 1950. India's reasoning, as explained by C. A. Rajagopalachari was that "If country after country rushes to Korea, a world conflagration will surely follow." Cited in Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 89.

10 Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 on a Pacific NATO. Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1953, pp. 129-130.

11 Mr. Nehru has described these notes as "not an attempt at mediation, for we have never thought in those terms. I made the appeal in the vague hope that, perhaps, it might result in something positive." Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 168.



12 United States D.S.B., vol. XXIII, No. 578 (31 July 1950), p. 170.

13 Doc. I. Aff. 1949-1950, p. 707.

14 Ibid.

15 United States in World Affairs, 1950, p. 227.

16 Cited in Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954, p. 133.

17 India's Foreign Policy, A Summary of Recent Statements by the Prime Minister of India, External Affairs, April 1951, p. 122.

18 S. I. Aff. 1949-1950, p. 514.

19 Nehru stated this in the Indian Parliament on December 6, 1950. Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 169-170.

20 The New York Times, December 6, 1950.

21 Year Book of the United Nations, 1950, p. 248.

22 External Affairs, p. 122.

23 S. I. Aff. 1949-1950, p. 353. In New Delhi, Nehru, speaking to the Indian Parliament on December 6, 1950, made an earnest appeal to the "Great Powers" to make every endeavour to find a peaceful solution to the present crisis, because the consequences of their failure to do so are too terrible to contemplate. Expressing abhorrence of the atomic bomb, he declared: "If the force of circumstances compels the world to use the bomb, it will mean that the world has surrendered to evil. I earnestly hope there will be no question, now or hereafter, of the use of the atomic bomb." Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 106-173.

24 The New York Times, December 1, 1950.

25 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 3-10, 1951, p. 11246.

26 Ibid., p. 11248.

27 The United Nations Command refused to repatriate anti-Communist North Korean and Chinese prisoners who did not wish to return to their Communist-ruled countries.

28 Text in Doc. I. Aff. 1952, pp. 446-449.

29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 31 - February 7, 1953, p. 12720.

30 Robert Trumbull said in a despatch: "Washington's opposition to the inclusion of India in the Korean conference brought Indo-American relations to a low point, if not the lowest in recent years." The New York Times, September 27, 1953.

31 Dr. Pyun, a member of the South Korean government, on August 24, used the strongest language against India, saying that South Korea did not want "a scheming and betraying India on our side," and accused India of "trafficking with the Communists." The New York Times, August 30, 1953.

32 Mr. Nehru in the Lok Sabha, December 24, 1953. Speeches 1953-1957, p. 244.

33 Bowles, op. cit., p. 243.

34 J. Leyser, "Aspects of India's Foreign Policy," Australian Outlook, vol. V, 1 (March 1951).

35 Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1953, p. 38.

36 Ibid., pp. 350-351.

37 Cited in Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Toronto, Cassell, 1960), pp. 86-87.

38 Ibid., p. 87.

39 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 245-246.

40 Such was not the view of Sir Anthony. In his Memoirs, pp. 90-91, he writes that he "was not very happy" about the Nehru proposal, as a cease-fire without political backing of real authority would leave the peoples of the Associated States at the mercy of the Vietminh.

41 Text in Doc. I. Aff. 1954, pp. 123-124.

42 Mr. Eden, prior to the Conference, declares that: "In measuring our chances of success at Geneva, I felt strongly that the outcome would depend to a considerable extent upon the position taken up by India...it was essential not to alienate India by our actions in a part of the world which concerned her closely." Full Circle, p. 94.

43 Agreement was reached in Geneva on July 20, 1954. Text in New York Times, July 21, 1954.

44 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, July 24-31, 1954, p. 13694.

45 Even Sir Anthony Eden has commented that the presence of Chiang's forces on the off-shore islands "constituted a constant grievance with which most of world opinion would sympathize." Full Circle, p. 309.

46 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, March 26 - April 2, 1955, p. 14118.

47 Vincent Sheean, Nehru: The Years of Power (New York, Random House, 1960), p. 153.

48 Cited in Eden, op. cit., p. 545.

49 For a generally sound defence of the Anglo-French actions at Suez, see Ibid., pp. 454-584.

50 In a speech in the Lok Sabha on November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru emphasized this aspect of his Government not possessing the broad clear facts. He admitted receiving fairly full accounts from Indian Embassies and Missions abroad and from other Governments, but declared that this "has resulted in an abundance which is often contradictory... and gives a very confused picture." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 323.

51 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, November 24 - December 1, 1956, p. 15223.

52 Ibid., January 5-12, 1957, p. 15308.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 15309.

55 Sheean, op. cit., pp. 160-162.

## CHAPTER VI

### INDIA AND THE POLICY OF PANCH SHILA

...peace can only come if we endeavour to establish a climate of peace. It is not by condemnation or mutual recrimination that we shall achieve this goal. We must forget past conflicts and past grievances and decide to make a new approach to each other in a spirit of tolerance and forbearance with charity towards all and malice towards none....<sup>1</sup>

When India became independent in a world which was rapidly polarizing into two rival blocs of nations, her major aims, as enjoined in the Constitution,<sup>2</sup> were to promote international peace and security by striving to prevent any outbreak of hostilities among the major powers. Acutely conscious of India's slender industrial base and poverty-stricken masses, the Indian government felt that it could best contribute to the fulfillment of its foreign aims by steadily pressing non-violent and conciliatory proposals aimed at bridging the chasm between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Thus the way of the Panch Shila became India's policy: five principles of state conduct which Mr. Nehru believed "would go a long way to put an end to the fears and apprehensions which cast dark shadows

over the world," if accepted and acted upon by all countries of the world.<sup>3</sup>

The policy of peaceful coexistence was generally motivated by the communist victory in China in late 1949 which for the first time provided a strong central base in Asia for International Communism. As India shared extensive borders with China, her anxiety to prevent China from helping communist parties in South-East Asia and South Asia led to the gradual emergence of her policy of coexistence which began to take concrete shape in 1953. The initial mention and promulgation of this policy, however, came as the aftermath of Sino-Indian differences over Tibet. The Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet in October - November 1950 presented India with a crisis in her immediate area and a threat of some magnitude to the continuance of her policy of peace. In India, Tibet was traditionally considered a buffer state guaranteeing the security of India and facilitating friendly relations between India and China along a mountainous, unfortified, and loosely watched border of some 1800 miles. To many Indians, China's behaviour in Tibet was therefore a test of the sincerity of her oft-repeated assurances of friendship for India. The Government of India at no time challenged or denied the suzerainty of China over Tibet, but it was always anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it had enjoyed during the present century.<sup>4</sup> The Chinese 'liberation' of Tibet in the

fall of 1950 thus came as a great shock to the Indian government and people.

The Indian attitude towards the Chinese action crystallized quickly. Those Indians who had been strongly anti-Communist, like M. R. Masani<sup>5</sup> and the Socialists, considered the Chinese action as further proof of their worst fears. They expressed the hope that many Indians would forget their wishful thinking and lose their illusions about the nature of Chinese Communism.<sup>6</sup> Those newspapers and sections of the public which had hitherto been friendly to China, though not necessarily to communism, suffered a considerable shock. There were second thoughts about the advisability of India championing the admittance of Red China into the United Nations Organization. The reaction in India provoked the Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York) to declare:

Whatever the motive that inspired the Chinese Communists, there can be no doubt that this step will further the expansion of international communism and may well delay Peiping's admission to the U. N. particularly because of possible changes in India's foreign policy.<sup>7</sup>

That the Indian government was extremely concerned was apparent from the sharp protests sent to Peking. For example, on October 26th, the Indian government expressed "surprise and regret" at the Chinese actions, and at the fact that the Chinese government should have sought a solution

of her problems with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring methods of peaceful approach.<sup>8</sup> The Chinese reply of October 30th, however, was a complete rebuff to the Indian protest and asserted that "the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China" and that no foreign influence will be tolerated.<sup>9</sup> This provoked a further Indian note on October 31st in which the Indian government categorically rejected the Chinese insinuation that India was being prompted by outside influences to interfere in China's internal affairs. At the same time India reiterated its strong disapproval of China's actions as having greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the drift towards general war, and as having affected friendly relations between India and China.<sup>10</sup> Various Indian leaders, in public statements, revealed their acute concern with the situation. The Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel, for example, called upon the Indian people to be ready to meet the danger along the northern frontier like brave men and warned that "Communist China's invasion of Tibet might be sufficient, in view of international tension, to start a new world war."<sup>11</sup>

The sharp Indian notes to Peking and such public utterances of Indian leaders as the one quoted above caused much speculation in both the Indian and the foreign press on a possible re-examination of India's entire policy in regard to Communist China. The Hindu, a leading English-language

newspaper published in Madras, wrote that the imposition of a Communist regime over Tibet by force would materially effect India's attitude toward Communist China and call for a rethinking of her foreign policy in general.<sup>12</sup> But the Indian government was not prepared to let the incident interfere with its pursuit of peace. Thus when Tibet appealed to the United Nations for protection on November 7, 1950,<sup>13</sup> the Indian delegate opposed the resolution by El Salvador that the appeal be put on the agenda of the Assembly. India considered that the question was an internal matter<sup>14</sup> that could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement would safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had hitherto enjoyed while maintaining its historical association with China.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly, the Steering Committee of the General Assembly decided unanimously on November 24th that consideration of the appeal should be postponed.

The strain which the Tibetan affair brought about in Sino-Indian friendship remained for some time, but the conclusion of a Sino-Indian trade agreement on April 29, 1954 appeared to initiate a new era in relations between the two signatory states. For in the preamble to the agreement there was a declaration of principles and considerations which was to thenceforth govern Sino-Indian relations. These were: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual



non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.<sup>16</sup> By this agreement, Mr. Nehru hoped to "ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia," and eventually win its acceptance all over the world.<sup>17</sup>

Since the enunciation of this Panch Shila doctrine, the Government of India has devoted much of its attention to furthering these basic principles of relations among states. India already had deep-rooted ideological, institutional, and economic links with the Western democracies and she has since striven to build up friendly relations with the Communist countries as well by deliberately refraining from criticizing those countries' systems of administration or domestic development. A considerable portion of Indian opinion has followed the Government's lead, largely on the premise that criticism of the Soviet Union and its partners is unlikely to do any good, while it would interfere with India's efforts to play the uncommitted middleman of goodwill toward both blocs.

In line with this rôle of an 'emmissary of peace' the Indian government has sought to engender in the West the same optimism which she purportedly holds towards the Communist nations. In a general way, Nehru has been continuously working since the death of Stalin and his dethronement from the inner circle of Soviet greats to sell

the idea that Russia is changing in the direction of reasonableness. Statements made by Soviet spokesmen at the Twentieth Party Congress were welcomed by the Indian government as indicating a new look in Soviet policy. "This new line," Mr. Nehru declared in the Indian Parliament, "both in political thinking and in practical policy, appears to be based upon a more realistic appreciation of the present world situation and represents a significant process of adaption and adjustment."<sup>18</sup> He believed it was a step towards the creation of conditions favourably to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence, a development which would lead to a further relaxation of tension in the world.

Similarly, India has sought to make Red China appear more respectable by rationalising that country's actions as the outcome of a basic response to outside provocation and therefore not as deliberate aggression on Peking's part. This view has permeated the pronouncements of the Indian government on Korea,<sup>19</sup> Tibet and the Formosa straits controversy.<sup>20</sup> In the same manner Nehru welcomed the pronouncements made by the Chinese Red leaders at Bandung -- in which they declared their readiness to enter into direct negotiations with the United States to relax tension in the Far East and particularly in the Formosa area -- as representing "a further and wholesome development.../which/ if...availed of by all concerned...can lead to an approach towards peaceful settlement."<sup>21</sup>

In seeking to give the widest currency to his ideas, Nehru became one of the most widely travelled heads of state. In 1954 he made a state visit to Communist China, stopping off at most of the capitals of South-East Asia. In 1955 he paid official visits to Russia -- where he received an especially tumultuous welcome -- and to a number of east European countries. In 1956 he set off on his travels again, attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and visiting West Germany, France and Yugoslavia. In the latter country he conferred with Marshal Tito and with Colonel Nasser of Egypt. In addition to the travels of its Prime Minister, India has been the host of a large number of distinguished visitors from both blocs. Among these can be mentioned John Foster Dulles; Selwyn Lloyd; Lester Pearson; King Ibn Saud; the Shah of Iran; Chinese Communist and Soviet leaders; and most recently the highly successful visit of President Eisenhower of the United States in November 1959. During all these visits the consistent theme has been one of aiming at the reduction of world tension and the promotion of world peace and cooperation. The Soviet leaders, especially, have seized upon the opportunities offered during their visits to India to enunciate with much flamboyance their dedication to peace.

However, while the Communist bloc has expressed its dedication to the principles of Panch Shila on many occasions -- pronouncements that would seem to have been

accepted by the Indian government with an air of unreal optimism<sup>22</sup> -- the actions of the Communist giants have indicated otherwise. The actions of the Soviet Union in crushing the Hungarian revolution in 1956<sup>23</sup> and the pressure brought to bear by Moscow on Poland earlier in the same year; the severe criticisms of Yugoslav deviationism by Peking; and most important -- the Red Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 and its subsequent seizure of sizable chunks of Indian territory in the north-east and north-west, have clearly indicated to the Indian government that their policy of peaceful coexistence is still far from achieving its objectives. But as their reactions to these events have indicated, the leaders of India are determined to continue their policy of patience and conciliation.

The Tibetan revolt of May 9, 1959 put a great strain on the Five Principles to which Peking and New Delhi had repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence. The swift and brutal Chinese suppression of the revolt, and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India aroused deep concern in India, where sympathy for Tibet's struggle for independence was widely expressed in the Press and by members of all political parties save the Communists. The crisis undoubtedly made Nehru acutely uncomfortable, but the Prime Minister, while expressing his desire to see the people of Tibet progress in freedom, reiterated his desire for maintaining friendly relations with "the great country of China" and counselled

restraint in the present difficult circumstances.<sup>24</sup>

His statement, however, was criticized by wide circles of Indian opinion as being too moderate. Public demonstrations and newspaper editorials emphasized this, and stormy scenes occurred in the Indian Parliament where China's actions were roundly condemned. For their part, the Chinese Communists reacted to the outburst of Indian opinion with a sharp anti-Indian press and radio campaign which charged India with expansionist plans for interfering in China's internal affairs and of being imperialist tools. The People's Daily declared that "the zeal shown by certain Indian political circles in interfering in China's internal affairs in Tibet has gone far beyond the endurance of a patient friendly neighbour."<sup>25</sup> And in a speech to the National People's Congress on April 22nd, the Panchen Lama said that "the reactionaries in India following in the footsteps of the British imperialists, have always harboured expansionist ambitions in Tibet and have carried out various sabotage activities...unfavourable to the friendship between China and Tibet."<sup>26</sup>

But Nehru, though he described the Chinese charges as both unbecoming and entirely devoid of substance, and accused the Chinese government of using "the language of the cold war regardless of truth and propriety,"<sup>27</sup> was determined to treat the issue on its merits and not let it become a cold war issue. Consequently, the Indian government,

despite Indian public feeling, opposed as they had done in 1950, any United Nations debate on Tibet on the grounds that Tibet was a part of China and thus a domestic concern.<sup>28</sup> This was in strict accordance with the Five Principles and was also undoubtedly motivated by India's desire not to give offence to China. It must also be recognized that while the Indian argument has been described as specious by those who favour United Nations debate of the Tibetan tragedy, it also has a great deal of merit. For such a discussion by the Organization would necessarily become a cold war debate aimed more at damaging the Chinese Communists than aiding the Tibetans. Such a debate might do the Tibetans more harm than good by provoking further Chinese reprisals or encouraging the Tibetans to hopeless resistance. Hungary had clearly shown that whatever the West might say, sympathy was the sum total of the support it would give. If the West was not prepared to chance igniting a third world war over a critical issue in Europe, it would most certainly not do so over a minor issue in the Himalayas. Thus the position taken by the Indian government was both realistic and sound.

But despite the official objectivity of the Indian government concerning the revolt, the Tibetan crisis severely strained Sino-Indian relations, and subsequent Chinese actions have put India's policy of peace, as based on the Panch Shila doctrine, to its severest test. The new point of contention concerns the delineation of their borders with

one another, borders which -- aside from the vague MacMahon Line -- have never been clearly demarcated. As has since been revealed by the Indian government, the border controversy with China has steadily developed since July 1954, when Peking first began to probe India's borders. On every occasion the Indian government protested but withheld the events from public knowledge "in the hope that peaceful solutions to the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides."<sup>29</sup> But as the Chinese expanded their border crossings in the summer and fall of 1959, rising concern was voiced in the Indian Parliament. The Prime Minister was queried by opposition members in the Lok Sabha on August 13 about the Communist propaganda for the liberation of Sikkim, Ladakh, and Bhutan, and about the alleged massing of Chinese troops on India's northern frontiers. In answer, Nehru, while stating that his Government had no knowledge of any Chinese troop concentrations near Indian borders, gave his assurances that everything would be done to safeguard the territorial integrity of India and declared that "so far as we are concerned the MacMahon Line is the frontier -- firm by treaty, firm by usage and right, and firm by geography."<sup>30</sup> Similar assurances were given by the Prime Minister during subsequent weeks as concern rose in India over China's actions.

The growing concern of the Indian government was evidenced by the fact that on September 7, 1959, a White Paper

containing Notes, memoranda and letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China from 1954 to 1959 was presented to the Indian Parliament by Mr. Nehru.<sup>31</sup> The correspondence showed inter alia that Mr. Chou En-lai had accepted the MacMahon as the north-east border between India and China in 1957, but had subsequently retracted from this commitment. The numerous incidents, charges, and counter-charges included Chinese allegations of "brazen intrusions" by Indian troops on Tibetan territory, coupled with allegations of "unscrupulous collusion" between Indian forces and "traiterous Tibetan rebels;" reference to border tension between the two countries in the Bara Hoti area of Uttar Pradesh; the disclosure that as far back as 1956 India had warned China that violations of Indian territory might lead to a "clash of arms;" and the Indian representations on the building of a Chinese road across Ladakh, referred to by Mr. Nehru in his statement to the Rajya Sabha on August 31, 1959. In the latter connection the Chinese authorities had made counter-charges of armed Indian "intrusions" in the Ladakh area, which was claimed as Chinese territory. In reply the Indian Prime Minister described China's territorial claims as "absurd," "fantastic," and completely inadmissible, stating that they could not be the subject of any mediation, arbitration or conciliation. "It involves a fundamental change in geography -- the Himalayas being handed over to them as a gift. That cannot be accepted, there the matter ends."<sup>32</sup>



But the Government of the Chinese People's Republic was apparently not of the same view, and with the Chinese ambush of an Indian patrol late one October afternoon at spot 45 miles from the Tibetan frontier in the windswept wastes of Ladakh, the long-simmering border controversy became an open issue. This cruel betrayal of Nehru's innocent trust and of India's national self-respect brought a swift and vehement outburst of anti-Chinese feeling throughout India. In New Delhi over 3,000 Indian students demonstrated outside the Chinese Embassy, shouting "Death to Chou" and other anti-Chinese slogans; the demonstrators burned copies of Chinese maps which showed 40,000 square miles of Indian territory as belonging to China. In Jubbulpore, some 1,000 students signed a blood oath, declaring their readiness to lay down their lives to defend India against Chinese aggression. Similar anti-Chinese student demonstrations took place at Allahabad, Barerlly, and elsewhere.<sup>33</sup>

The various Indian political parties and newspapers were no less emphatic in urging Nehru to take strong and immediate action. The All-India Congress Committee condemned the Chinese intrusions into Indian territory, expressed full support for the Government, and declared that "the integrity of India must be respected." The Praja Socialist Party demanded that the Government take such measures, military and diplomatic, as to compel China to quit Indian territory,

warning that: "On the way we meet the Chinese threat depends not only the integrity of India, but also the freedom, security and peace of the whole of Asia." Even the Indian Communists declared they stood with the rest of the people for the territorial integrity of India. The Hindustan Times (Delhi) declared that some form of limited reprisal was "imperative for the sake as much of our self-respect as of the larger peace"; the Times of India (Bombay) warned that it might be necessary "to consider the possibility of severing diplomatic relations with Communist China if Peking persists in deliberate acts of provocation and insult against this country"; while the Indian Express (Delhi) called for "firm punitive action against the violators of our frontiers," and urged an Indo-Pakistan defence arrangement.<sup>34</sup>

India felt both angry and alone. The ruthlessness of Red China's behaviour made a wreckage of some cherished convictions. There was no longer confidence that Asian solidarity, created at the Bandung Conference, would outlaw the use of force; that Indian neutrality and non-alignment with military blocs would gradually lead the Communist and non-Communist worlds to mutual understanding; or that the repeated pledges of peaceful coexistence by Peking meant that Red China was worthy of joining the United Nations Organization. The national disillusionment was so great that even Prime Minister Nehru took off his rose-coloured glasses, looked hard at his giant neighbour to the north,

and told the Indian Parliament: "I doubt if there is any country in the world that cares less for peace than China today."<sup>35</sup>

But aside from stating his belief that "China has not got over the first flush of its revolutionary mentality,"<sup>36</sup> Nehru's initial response to China's calculated aggression was hesitant -- and well it might be, for his policy of peaceful coexistence was going up in flames. China apparently had nothing but contempt for Panch Shila and was showing that contempt by throwing it right back into the face of her best friend outside the Communist bloc. The Prime Minister well knew the consequences for his country's economic development if she took a firm military stand against the Chinese encroachments. In face of the strong feeling of Indian opinion, he did declare to a mass meeting of 200,000 in New Delhi on November 1, 1959 that India would not wilt before the Chinese challenge:

I want to disabuse any suspicion that might lurk in some peoples minds that we will not be able to defend our integrity if the Chinese invade us. We have confidence in our strength and determination to meet this challenge, and we will meet it with our full strength. We will defend our country with all our might.<sup>37</sup>

But Mr. Nehru is also determined to seek a peaceful settlement. As he told the Indian Parliament on December 21, 1959 in reply to a demand by Socialist leader J. P. Kripalani and other

opposition members who demanded a firm stand against Communist China:

As far as I am concerned, as far as my Government is concerned, we shall negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the bitter end. Any other approach is anti-Gandhian and against our fundamental principles. I want members to realize the only alternative to negotiation is war.<sup>38</sup>

In face of Chou En-lai's apparent determination not to relinquish any of the territory seized by his forces, however, the peaceful settlement desired by Mr. Nehru will not be easily achieved. Mr. Chou En-lai wants Prime Minister Nehru, in effect, to enter into talks with the territorial outcome prejudged against him, and it is not surprising that Nehru has rejected such a peremptory calling of India to China's heel. His desire for a negotiated settlement, however, is evidenced by the fact that he has agreed to meet with the Chinese leader in April 1960. If Mr. Nehru feels that a long stalemate now would work more to China's advantage than to India's, he may be disposed to make the best of talks without further preparation in the hope that something may be accomplished in that way. Indeed, a long stalemate would quite likely result in leaving Indians much less bitter towards China than the first flareup of indignation seemed to imply. Indians will remain suspicious of China in the future, but the suspension of aggression and the substitution

of friendly acts by China would undoubtedly bring a friendly response from India. But should the forthcoming talks be inconclusive, there is always the risk that spring in the Himalayas will unfreeze more than the glaciers.

Whatever India's short-range reaction to these Chinese encroachments may be -- and hypotheses are many, -- China's aggressiveness has certainly caused the Indian government to reappraise the future value of Panch Shila, and to make firm adherence to, and faith in that doctrine very difficult and dangerous. It is quite likely that the pressure of Chinese expansion will continue, and while this will pose a problem for every Asian nation and nations with Asians interests -- even Soviet Russia, which has much the longest, most vulnerable and most controversial frontier with China -- it will be an especially acute one for India. Faced with the overriding necessity of concentrating her main attention and energy on her internal problems if she is ever to withstand Chinese pressure, India must, in the near future, defend her interests on the frontiers largely by diplomacy.<sup>39</sup> This will require great tact and much patience on the part of the Indian government for the Chinese -- and that includes the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa quite as much as the Chinese Communists on the mainland -- do not recognize the legality of the MacMahon Line as a frontier. They assert that this line, which the Indian government claims is the legal one, was imposed on Tibet by

the British who dominated Tibet when China was helpless and in the throes of a revolution. With her present strength it is only natural to expect China to assert her claims to territory which at one time was part of the Chinese Empire.

Due to India's inability to assert her claims to the disputed areas by reason of the inaccessability of the regions from the Indian side, the Government's policy will be to argue its case with China, to propose reasonable compromises and to fight back where it can if there are further incursions. The true line of policy for India is thus to conduct a holding operation as long as that is possible, and in the meantime to promote indirectly and with delicacy a policy of containment. Mr. Nehru has found that by being a friend to the Chinese revolution is not necessarily to enable him to live in peace with it, and in future his policy towards Red China will be void of some of his past illusions.

But while Indians will take a realistic view of China in future, the aggressiveness of that country has not appeared to have altered Nehru's faith in a policy of non-alignment in the context of the cold war. At the same Delhi speech where he declared that India would resist oppression on her frontiers with force, Mr. Nehru stated emphatically that "talk of abandoning the policy of non-alignment is utterly wrong and useless. There could not be a more foolish thing. As far as I am concerned, I will

oppose it with all my strength."<sup>40</sup> Even Chinese intransigence over negotiating a settlement has not shaken Nehru's resolve. This was evidenced by his firm opposition to suggestions made at the annual Congress Party meeting at Bangalore in mid-January 1960 that India drop its policy of non-alignment and opposition to military pacts. The Prime Minister said that India's policy had been proved right and that such proposals were a sign of weakness.<sup>41</sup> He even welcomed the Chinese challenge on the borders to "shake the people up," and heatedly declared that whatever the consequences, India would never allow foreign armies on her soil, even to aid defence. His stand was affirmed by Mr. Sanjiva Reddy in his Presidential address to the Congress Party the following day in which he stated that while India would resist any aggression "we have to adhere to our policy...which necessarily...has to be adapted to new conditions."<sup>42</sup> For any one to challenge or doubt the policy of India based on Panch Shila and non-alignment with power blocs was showing a remarkable lack of understanding of what had happened or was happening in the present-day world.

## Footnotes - Chapter VI

1 Jawaharlal Nehru, Broadcast from Colombo, May 2, 1954. Speeches 1953-1957, p. 252.

2 The Constitution of India (New Delhi, Government of India, 1952), p. 21.

3 Statement made at the Dynamo Stadium, Moscow, June 22, 1955. Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 303.

4 Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 174.

5 A prominent member of the Indian Council of World Affairs.

6 Levi, Free India in Asia, p. 97.

7 Foreign Policy Bulletin, New York, November 10, 1950.

8 Cited in International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, 1959, pp. 132-133.

9 Ibid., p. 133.

10 Ibid., pp. 133-135.

11 Quoted in the New York Times, November 10, 1950.

12 Ibid., November 5, 1950.

13 United Nations, Document A/1549. Text in Ibid., January 21, 1959.

14 For a legalistic viewpoint on Tibet's status, see "The Position of Tibet in International Law," in The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, pp. 75-99.

15 United Nations General Assembly, November 24, 1950. U. N. Document A/1543.

16 Cited in Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 262.

17 Ibid., p. 263.

18 From a statement in Lok Sabha, March 20, 1956. Ibid., p. 318.



19 On December 5, 1950, the Indian delegate to the U. N. said: "Since China has been ravaged by wars, it was understandable that...the ordeals through which they had passed had made them unduly suspicious and apprehensive. Year Book of the United Nations, 1950, p. 245.

20 Referring to the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy during the 1955 crisis in the Formosa straits, Mr. Nehru declared that "no country can tolerate an enemy sitting ten miles from their shore, bombarding them all the time. It is an intolerable situation." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 26 - April 2, 1955, p. 14118.

21 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 299.

22 The Times of India, however, has issued a word of caution as regards the pronouncements of Premier Khrushchev. Commenting on statements made by him during his visit to India 1957, the Times stated: "The visit of our Russian guests, while it has helped to heighten the permutations and combinations of international politics, carried its own warnings to us.... By all means let us return courtesy with courtesy but not to the point of letting the guest edge the host out of his own mansion.... There can be no doubt that what Moscow is now engaged in is a manoeuvre to undermine, isolate and outflank Western influence in Asia." Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 31, 1955 - January 7, 1956, p. 14614.

23 See Chapter V.

24 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 9-16, 1959, p. 16799.

25 Ibid., p. 16801.

26 Ibid.

27 International Commission of Jurists, The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, p. 173.

28 It is significant to note that out of 82 members of the United Nations, only 43 supported the move to debate the Tibet question. Among these 43 members only 7 were Asian countries, while 20 were from South and North America.

29 Quoted in Werner Levi, "Chinese-Indian Competition in Asia," Current History, vol. 38 (February 1960), p. 66.

30 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17115.

31 The correspondence is summarized in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, pp. 17116-17119.

32 Ibid., p. 17119.

33 See Time, December 14, 1959.

34 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17122.

35 Cited in Time, December 14, 1959.

36 Indiagram, October 22, 1959.

37 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17120.

38 Cited in The Japan Times, December 22, 1959.

39 Vincent Sheean has observed: "whatever the provocation, India's attitude toward China must conform to its own principles as taught by Gandhi and as reiterated in various agreements, treaties and formulae by Nehru. The entire structure would be wrecked, theoretically or philosophically, by any quarrel with China...over the Himalayan regions." Nehru: The Years of Power, p. 156.

40 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17120.

41 Cited in The Japan Times, January 16, 1960.

42 Indiagram, January 17, 1960.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

Indian foreign policy in the era of 'cold war' derives from a variety of sources. At the time of independence Indian leaders were faced with internal problems of such an overwhelming nature that external policy, save for relations with Pakistan, was of little concern. As the 'cold war' was mainly restricted to the European scene at this time, Indo-Pakistan relations did not touch the direct line of East-West dispute. Under these circumstances Indian leaders took a distant look at the 'cold war'. Their general approach to it can be summed up as: 'we shall have nothing to do with it'.

But India could not maintain this aloofness from world affairs for long. With the coming into power in China of the communists and India's recognition of the Peking regime, India could no longer be a distant onlooker. The aggressive attitude and actions of the Chinese Communists provoked the United States to establish security pacts along the peripheries of the resurgent Chinese state and thereby brought the implications of the 'cold war' into India's immediate neighbourhood. As a consequence of her

size, location and future possibilities, India was forced to rapidly assume an important role in international diplomacy. This meant formulating a foreign policy in accordance with her national beliefs and interests, a policy which, in addition to dealing with immediate problems, would also act as a means of strengthening internal unity.

The immediate situation tended to reduce possibilities in the field of foreign policy to two broad alternatives. One was active partisanship in world affairs combined with extensive military and economic support from foreign sources. The other was a policy of participation in international affairs strongly conditioned by the possible influence of such a policy upon the domestic scene and by the policy's impact upon the foreign powers. Both policies involved substantial risks. Any success with the first alternative depended upon such factors as the consistency of action by the major powers; the military feasibility of foreign protection; and, perhaps most important of all, the internal repercussions of dependency and a certain amount of foreign supervision and control. All of these risks, and especially the last, militated strongly against its adoption by the Indian government.

The second alternative, despite its obvious risks, became the most natural choice and, in the eyes of Nehru and his colleagues, the most reasonable. Its dictates were

simple but compelling. It must take account of geography, of internal weakness and the urgent nature of domestic problems, of the culture and religious tradition of India, and of the nationalism of the Indian people. Foreign partisanship, at either the individual or the national level, was regarded as a development likely to produce further complications in an already confused situation. Under the circumstances foreign policy had to be a pillar of strength, capable of being sustained on the basis of its own emotional and political appeal, and founded upon a realistic appraisal of power abroad, both actual and potential. India's contiguity to the great land powers of Communist China and the Soviet Union made it a matter of vital necessity for her Government to do nothing to antagonize these giant neighbours. An attack by either or both of these countries on India could never be withstood and would have disastrous consequences for the nation, in all probability destroying its very foundations. The Indian leaders undoubtedly recognized the probable inability of Western power to defend India from Communist attack, even if events caused or forced them to consider it desirable. The lesson of Korea has undoubtedly been an impressive one to many Indians; the power of Communist China was recognized and feared. Thus the Indian government felt it would not be to India's interests, from either the emotional or the practical standpoint, to align herself with the West.

Consequently, the Indian government enunciated what was, in its view, the wise and natural policy of 'neutralism', 'non-alignment', or whatever it may be called. Indian leaders sought to build their country on solid foundations and not to get entangled in matters which did not directly affect them, not because they were disinterested in the current of world events, but because they felt that the burden of these entanglements would be too great for India's weak economy to support. But though India has remained formally neutral in the East-West power struggle, her foreign policy has been neither passive nor negative. This has been evidenced by the actions of the Indian government on the world stage, actions designed to promote international peace and security and to create thereby an atmosphere conducive to India's economic development and social progress.

In the first instance it has been seen that the Indian government has pursued a policy designed to achieve the maximum security at a minimum cost in scarce money and materials. Indian leaders recognize that if India is ever to achieve a reasonable level of security, the country must be put on a sound economic basis as in modern warfare only a country with a sound economic structure can hope to withstand the ravages of war. For India to arm herself to a degree where she could thwart Communist (i.e. Chinese)

expansion by force of arms alone would necessitate defence expenditures on a scale which would have disastrous consequences for the country's economic development. The Government's reluctance to take such steps has caused it to place its security primarily upon diplomacy. Limited efforts, to be sure, have been taken to secure the northern frontiers, but these represent automatic reflexes more than concrete defensive planning. It is through non-alignment with the West, opposition to regional security pacts in her neighbourhood, friendship with her Communist neighbours, and furtherance of the Panch Shila doctrine, that India has sought to secure herself from attack.

It has also been shown that in the world at large India's policy has directed itself to consciously and deliberately working for peace through mediation, moral pressure, and through openly voicing opinions against steps or on issues which, according to Indian calculations, might lead to war. India believes that international disputes can be amicably and peacefully settled by discussion, negotiation, and arbitration. She has faith in the intrinsic need and desire of a large majority of the nations of the world to maintain peace and to ensure security to the war-weary peoples of the world.

India's championship of the cause of dependent peoples is based on the premise that peace and freedom are

indivisible; that the absolute freedom of all nations of the world is conducive to contentment and peace of the world; and that enslavement of any people, however small numerically, is detrimental to peace. Consequently, since independence in 1947, the Indian government has sought to remove what it considers to be a root cause of war. In 1949 it convened an Asian conference to consider the problem of Indonesian independence. In the United Nations, Indian representatives have given strong support to Arab nationalism, especially the struggle for Tunisian and Moroccan independence, and British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonialism were frequently criticized by India in this international body. In more recent years, however, India has been much less vocal on this issue than before and this has probably been due to a realization in New Delhi that, in view of East-West tension, it is better to give one's advice with greater prudence. India's desire now appears to be to prevent Asian or African nationalism from disrupting world peace. Maturity in international affairs has caused the Indian government to recognize the dangers inherent in a blanket and unequivocal application of a purely idealistic approach.

India's attitude towards the United Nations, towards alliances and disarmament, and towards Red China's admittance into the United Nations, demonstrate her conviction that tension and eventual armed conflict are latent



in each issue. Through a policy of non-alignment India considers herself to be making a positive contribution to peace. She has consciously sought to impress upon the world her conviction that war is not inevitable and that if issues are approached in the proper mood then tension can be alleviated. Military alliances are opposed on the grounds that security can never be achieved by such means which actually lead to war. Similarly, the refusal of the West to recognize Red China and to deny her admittance to the United Nations is considered by Indians to be unnecessary provocation of a powerful country. Through continual enunciation of these views India hopes to alleviate tensions in the world and create an atmosphere in which nations of the world, regardless of their political ideology, can work in friendly cooperation for the mutual benefit of mankind.

India's mediatory role in East-West disputes is further evidence of this attitude. By retaining her detached objectivity and her individuality, India has sought to restore equanimity over a world riven by feelings of hatred and violence. Frequently India's 'independent' approach to issues involving interests of the rival blocs has caused her to be viewed with varying degrees of suspicion and resentment and has forced her 'to plough a lonely furrow', but India remained consistent in her efforts to prevent the outbreak of a general conflict. Her efforts in respect to Korea, Indo-China, the Formosa straits, and

in Hungary and Egypt are evidence of India's mediatory role. Through an independent approach to each issue, India has striven to conciliate the opposing points of view and thereby prevent the outbreak of a general conflagration.

Fearful of future Chinese actions after the Tibetan episode in 1950, however, India advanced the Five Principles of Panch Shila as the basis for Sino-Indian relations. Thereby India sought to secure her frontiers from any future Chinese 'nibbling' incursions that could be expected along the ill-defined Himalayan frontiers. At the same time India sought to further these principles of international relations in the world at large. She has striven to engender in the West the same optimism which she purportedly holds towards the Communist nations, and to bring the rival blocs together in friendly cooperation. The only alternative to coexistence is co-destruction. But while Panch Shila has apparently eased tension somewhat in the world due to the general realization that the Indian premise is a correct one, the events in Hungary in 1956 and in Tibet in 1959 clearly indicated that the principles of Panch Shila are still far from acceptance as the only basis for relations among states. China's seizure of Indian territory made this emphatically clear to Indians, and while the outcome of this dispute remains a matter of conjecture, it has certainly injected a new note of admitted reality into Indian policy. A rapprochement between East and West will, in the future,

not be advanced by India with the same optimism as in the past, and China will be viewed with more jaundiced eyes than hitherto.

It can therefore be concluded that although the term 'neutralism' is sometimes applied to Indian foreign policy, this is hardly an accurate description. India has been neutral only in her refusal to join military pacts: she has certainly aligned herself in many disputes. She has aligned herself with Afro-Asian nations in the pursuit of certain economic, political and cultural aims. She has exerted her influence in many troubled areas -- Korea, Indo-China, Indonesia, North Africa, to name but a few. In the United Nations she has placed herself closely by the side of the Arab bloc.

In truth India has followed a realistic policy in international affairs, calculated to protect her national self-interest. This basic motivation of national interest has often been obscured by a camouflage of philosophical and moral platitudes. But India's foreign policy has elements of opportunism, inconsistency, and expedience -- as does that of any world power. This is seen in the fact that she has not hesitated to use force when her unity or security has been threatened, as in the case of Hyderabad, Junagadh, Kashmir, and Nepal. While continually advocating disarmament in the United Nations, India has turned down a

number of reasonable proposals for demilitarization in Kashmir. On this issue of Kashmir, the general principle of self-determination for all peoples hardly squares with the obstacles Nehru has placed in its path in Kashmir. India has castigated Western rule in Asia and Africa, yet Indian leaders have never criticized Communist totalitarian rule in Eastern Europe. The Indian government has too often seemed to go out of its way to be accommodating to the Communist powers while sparing nothing in its criticism of Western policies.

Yet even if the message of non-violence, Gandhian ethics, and spirituality in foreign affairs have been unduly stressed in supporting India's actions on the world stage, it must be recognized that India has acted as mediator and honest broker in East-West disputes and has in a general way tried to infuse the international scene with reasonableness and conciliation. Thereby India has made a positive contribution to world peace although her actions and expressed opinions have frequently brought down upon her the harsh criticisms of both East and West, depending as her views favoured one side or the other.

The relative success which Indian foreign policy has enjoyed is largely due to one man, Jawaharlal Nehru. For India's amazing prominence in world affairs has largely grew from the stature of Nehru as a nationalist leader,

statesman, writer, and dynamic personality. But Nehru will soon pass from the scene, and what the policy of his successors will be is a matter of great debate even in India. Certainly whoever emerges to lead India will lack the tremendous prestige which has enabled Nehru to avoid meeting the demands of the extremist sections of Indian opinion for abandonment of non-alignment in favour of closer association with either East or West. In view of recent Chinese actions and the strength of pro-Western elements in Indian political life any foreseeable trend in Indian foreign policy would undoubtedly be to more intimate association with the Western camp. Such a trend, while certainly attractive to the West, would, however, certainly be contrary to the interests of world peace. The drift towards war can only be checked by the most persistent and patient efforts to bring and hold all sides together. They cannot be checked by helping to build up the preponderance of one side, which in itself, and through its example upon others, can have no result other than that of widening the cleavage, pulling down the bridges, and pushing the world a little nearer to the brink. This conviction is the mainspring of India's foreign policy. It impels her, not towards isolationism or any fictitious neutrality, but to extend the hand of friendship to all, provided only that the price of friendship is not conformity or subservience. It causes her to retain and develop all existing friendly contacts as

well as to establish new ones. For India to abandon it in favour of short-term political and economic advantages accruing from alignment with the West would not only be to India's long-term disadvantage, but might well hasten the approach of a world conflict which India has striven to prevent. Through a continuance of non-alignment, mediation and the promotion of peace, India can best serve the cause of world peace.

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