Non UBC
DSpace
Xu, Huan
2019-07-15T09:51:37Z
2019-01-15T16:55
In this talk we consider a centralized resource manager whose aim is to regulate multiple paticipants where the participatnts' goals are to purchase resource so as to satisfy uncertain demands. A secondary market mechanism is introduced to mitigate the conservativeness toward demand uncertainty. We analyze the clearing price of the secondary market, show that a unique Nash equlibrium exists in the many player limit and the NE takes the form of a threshold strategy. Moreover, we show that both the social welfare loss and the deviation of the total ordering from the optimum is of O(\sqrt{n}) where n is the number of players. This is significantly better compared with the case of no secondary market, where the social welfare loss and the deviation of the total order are both O(n).
https://circle.library.ubc.ca/rest/handle/2429/70984?expand=metadata
39.0
video/mp4
Author affiliation: Georgia Institute of Technology
Banff (Alta.)
10.14288/1.0379838
eng
Unreviewed
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Banff International Research Station for Mathematical Innovation and Discovery
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Faculty
BIRS Workshop Lecture Videos (Banff, Alta)
Mathematics
Operations research, mathematical programming
Computer science
Applied computer science
Secondary Market to Mitigate Demand Uncertainty
Moving Image
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/70984