Arts, Faculty of
Asian Studies, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Toran, Rohina
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
The Taliban's influence on women's education in Afghanistan is a subject of significant scholarly interest due to its unique and controversial nature. This thesis aims to explore the distinct role played by the Taliban in shaping educational opportunities for Afghan women, both historically and in contemporary contexts. The thesis investigates the ideological underpinnings of the Taliban's academic policies, their implementation, and resulting social and cultural impacts. Employing analytical and descriptive research methodologies, the findings reveal that the Taliban’s ideology is implicated in a complex interplay between traditionalist views and pragmatic adaptations, resulting in a dynamic but often restrictive educational environment for women. This study highlights how the Taliban's governance has oscillated between rigid enforcement of conservative gender norms and occasional concessions to international pressure and local demands for female education. The conclusion underscores the necessity of understanding the Taliban's role in women's education within a broader socio-political and historical framework, suggesting that any sustainable educational reforms must navigate these intricate dynamics. This research contributes to the ongoing discourse on gender, education, and political ideology in conflict regions, offering insights for policymakers, educators, and scholars interested in the intersections of education and extremism.
Women’s Education Under Taliban Rule in Afghanistan: A Political and Socio-Cultural Analysis by Rohina Toran A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (Asian Studies) The University of British Columbia (Vancouver) December 2024 © Rohina Toran, 2024 ii The following individuals certify that they have read and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance the thesis entitled: Women's Education Under the Taliban in Afghanistan: A Political and Socio-Cultural Analysis Submitted by Rohina Toran in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Asian Studies. Examining Committee: Rumee Ahmed, Professor, Asian Studies, UBC Supervisor Naveena Naqvi, Professor, Asian Studies, UBC Supervisory Committee Member Ayesha S. Chaudhry, Professor, Institute for Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice, UBC. Supervisory Committee Member Christopher Rea, Professor, Modern Chinese Literature, UBC Additional Examiner iii Abstract The Taliban's influence on women's education in Afghanistan is a subject of significant scholarly interest due to its unique and controversial nature. This thesis aims to explore the distinct role played by the Taliban in shaping educational opportunities for Afghan women, both historically and in contemporary contexts. The thesis investigates the ideological underpinnings of the Taliban's academic policies, their implementation, and resulting social and cultural impacts. Employing analytical and descriptive research methodologies, the findings reveal that the Taliban’s ideology is implicated in a complex interplay between traditionalist views and pragmatic adaptations, resulting in a dynamic but often restrictive educational environment for women. This study highlights how the Taliban's governance has oscillated between rigid enforcement of conservative gender norms and occasional concessions to international pressure and local demands for female education. The conclusion underscores the necessity of understanding the Taliban's role in women's education within a broader socio-political and historical framework, suggesting that any sustainable educational reforms must navigate these intricate dynamics. This research contributes to the ongoing discourse on gender, education, and political ideology in conflict regions, offering insights for policymakers, educators, and scholars interested in the intersections of education and extremism. iv Lay Summary This thesis investigates the restrictions on women’s education imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, focusing on the political and cultural factors driving these policies. It examines how enforcing Pashtunwali traditions and political ideologies has led to the closure of schools and universities for women. By exploring historical and socio-cultural contexts, this research highlights the impact of these restrictions on Afghan women’s rights and opportunities. The findings contribute to global discussions on gender equality and emphasize the importance of education as a universal right, drawing attention to the struggles faced by women under oppressive regimes. v Preface This thesis represents my primary contribution to research and scholarship in Asian Studies. I was responsible for the following: ● Formulating the research question, which examines the Taliban's role in shaping women's education in Afghanistan. ● Designing the research framework, including applying postcolonial feminist theory as the conceptual lens. ● Conducting the research, which involved sourcing, reviewing, and analyzing relevant primary and secondary documents. ● Performing the critical analysis of the research findings, incorporating historical, political, and socio-cultural dimensions. ● Writing the thesis, ensuring a coherent articulation of the argument, methodology, and conclusions. This research was conducted under the supervision of Dr. Rumee Ahmed, who provided invaluable guidance on conceptualizing the research framework and offered critical feedback throughout the writing process. I completed all research and writing independently. No part of this thesis has been published or disseminated in any form prior to submission. Ethics approval was not required because this research is document-based and exclusively utilizes publicly available materials. vi Table of Contents Abstract ……………………………………………………………….………….………...……iii Lay Summary……………………………………………………………………………..……...iv Preface ………………………………………………………………………………….….……..v Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………….……….........vi Acknowledgements ……………………...…………………………………………………......viii Dedication…………………………………………………………………................................. ix Chapter1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………. 1 1.1 Statement of the Problem…….…………………………………………………………… 2 1.2 Historical Background…………...……………………………...…………………………3 1.3 Methodology…………………………………………………………………………….... 6 1.4 Conceptual Framework………………………………………………………………….... 6 1.5 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria…………………………………………...………………8 1.6 Analytical Techniques…………………………………………………………………….. 8 Chapter 2: Brief History of the Taliban……………………………………………………….. 10 2.1 The Taliban and Their Interpretation of Islam……………………………………………15 2.2 Overview of Women's Education in Afghanistan Pre-Taliban……………….................. 20 2.3 Religious and Cultural Beliefs Influencing the Taliban………………………………..... 25 Chapter 3: The Taliban and Women's Education in Afghanistan…………………………… 29 3.1 The Underlying Motivations Behind the Taliban's Ban on Girls' Education…………..... 36 3.2 Political Reasons Behind the Taliban's Ban on Women's Education……….……............ 40 3.3 Impacts of Banning Women’s Education on Afghan Society………………………........ 44 3.3.1 Short-term Consequences………………………………………………………….... 43 3.3.2 Medium-term Consequences………………………………………………………... 44 vii 3.3.3 Long-term Consequences………………………………………………………….... 44 Chapter 4: Conclusion………………………………….………………………………... 47 4.1 The Role of Pashtunwali…………………………………………………………….... 47 4.2 Political Factors and Geopolitical Influence………………………………………….. 47 References………………………………………………………………………………… 57 viii Acknowledgements I express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rumee Ahmed, for his invaluable guidance, support, and encouragement throughout this research. His expertise and insights have greatly enriched my understanding and inspired me to pursue this topic with dedication. I extend my heartfelt thanks to my committee members, Dr. Naveena Naqvi, and Dr. Ayesha S. Chaudhry, for their constructive feedback and invaluable contributions to my work. I am profoundly thankful to my family for their unwavering support, my foundation throughout my education. Lastly, I am deeply grateful to my husband for his constant support, understanding, and encouragement during this journey. ix Dedication This research is dedicated to the countless Afghan girls who have been denied the fundamental right to education and to those whose dreams of learning remain unfulfilled under oppressive regimes. Their resilience in the face of adversity is a source of inspiration. I hope this work contributes toward advocating for educational equity and a future where every individual can access the transformative power of education regardless of their circumstances. 1 Chapter1: Introduction This research aims to carry out a critical examination of the Taliban's role in shaping women's education in Afghanistan, from the early 20th century to the present day. The study draws upon scholarly analyses that delve into the complex relationship between female education, ethnicity, and national identity in Afghanistan. These insights offer a view of the socio-political dynamics that have influenced educational policies in the country, with particular attention to the changes and continuities observed under the Taliban regime, both during their initial rule (1996-2001) and their recent return to power in 2021. Since the early 20th century, Afghanistan has experienced significant shifts in gender policies, profoundly influencing women's educational opportunities. The Taliban's ascent to power marked a radical departure from previous educational regimes. They implemented stringent, ideologically driven policies that severely restricted women's access to education. This study aims to explore the Taliban's approach to women's education, examining how their governance, deeply rooted in a combination of religious and cultural norms, has redefined the educational landscape for women in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime is known for its strict interpretation of Islamic Sharia laws, which will be explored further in Chapter 2, and which profoundly influences its governance and policies, including those on gender and education. While the Taliban also claim adherence to the Pashtunwali code—a traditional ethical system emphasizing hospitality, sanctuary, bravery, and honor among the Pashtun people—there are often conflicts between this cultural code and the Taliban's interpretation of Sharia. These conflicts become manifest in policies such as those that restrict women's rights and access to education, illustrating a strict adherence to their interpretation of religious laws over and above the cultural norms of Pashtunwali. This complex interplay between Islamic laws and Pashtunwali 2 provides a unique lens through which to analyze the intersections of gender, education, and political power under the Taliban's rule. Research Objectives and Questions This study critically examines the Taliban's role in shaping women's education in Afghanistan, from the early 20th century to the present day. Specifically, the research aims to: 1. Analyze the historical context and socio-political factors that have influenced women's educational opportunities in Afghanistan, focusing on the changes and continuities observed under the Taliban regime. 2. Investigate the Taliban's distinctive approach to women's education, exploring how their governance, grounded in religious and cultural norms, has redefined the educational landscape for women in Afghanistan. 3. Understand the impact of the Taliban's recent return to power in 2021 and the subsequent reintroduction of harsh restrictions on women's access to education, including the closure of schools and universities, and alterations made to educational curricula. Statement of the Problem In Afghanistan, the governance of the Taliban has profoundly influenced many sectors of society, notably women's education. This research seeks to address the critical problem of how the Taliban's policies have reshaped the educational landscape for women, considering both the tangible changes in access to and quality of education and its broader societal implications. Despite some research in this area, there remains a significant gap in understanding the underlying ideological, religious, political, and cultural motivations that drive these policies. Moreover, the historical context leading to the Taliban's rise to power and its subsequent effects on Afghan society, especially on women's right to education, has not been comprehensively explored. This 3 study aims to fill these gaps, providing a detailed analysis of the Taliban's ban on women's education and its broader societal implications in Afghanistan. Historical Background Concerning women’s education, King Amanullah Khan's reign (1919-1929) marked a transformative era for Afghanistan, characterized by a drive towards modernization and social reform, with a significant emphasis on women's education and rights. Influenced by Turkish, European, and socialist models, Amanullah introduced a series of progressive reforms, including a new constitution in 1923 and laws in 1924 that advanced gender equality and established educational initiatives, laying a foundation for societal transformation in Afghanistan.1 His educational reforms were particularly noteworthy, which saw the establishment of modern schools such as the Amaniya, Istiqlal, and Ghazi, each of which offered diverse curricula and embraced coeducation. The creation of the Masturat, the first primary school for girls in Kabul, underscored his commitment to women's education, a move supported by influential female figures in the royal family2. By 1929, the expansion of Afghanistan's educational infrastructure was significant. However, Amanullah's policies also faced substantial resistance from the general public because some people did not agree with the modernization of education, leading to a backlash that eventually undermined his reforms.3 This resistance, fueled by internal and external actors, culminated in the rollback of several of his initiatives, including those in women's education, illustrating the tension between modernization efforts and traditional societal norms. 1 S. K. Burki, The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai, in Land of the Unconquerable: The Lives of Contemporary Afghan Women, ed. Jennifer Heath and Ashraf Zahedi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 45-59. 2 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (London: Routledge, 2013).108-109. 3 H. Emadi, The Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),23-28. 4 Despite this, Amanullah's era is often regarded as a pivotal period in Afghanistan's history, notably for initiating the inclusion of women in the public and educational spheres.4 The successive regime of King Nadir Khan (1929-1933), however, marked a shift towards conservatism in Afghanistan, reversing many of King Amanullah's educational reforms for women. Aligning his governance with traditional Islamic values to consolidate power, Nadir Khan closed girls' schools and reinforced traditional gender roles, significantly regressing women's educational progress.5 This turn to conservatism proved short-lived, as the reign of the successive King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) saw notable advancements in women's rights and education. Schools for girls were established and women were integrated into the workforce, representing significant strides toward modernization.6 Educational reforms included modernizing curricula and promoting linguistic diversity, while the 1964 Constitution promoted gender equality and political liberalization, reflecting a blend of traditional and modern values.7 Between 1978 and 2001, Afghanistan experienced significant shifts in gender policies, with the early communist government’s support of women's rights facing resistance, particularly in rural areas, leading to a stark urban-rural divide and contributing to the rise of the Mujahideen and civil war. 8 The Mujahideen's takeover in 1992 saw a decline in women's status, exacerbated by the Taliban's rise in 1996, which imposed draconian restrictions on women's education and rights. Post-Taliban, under President Hamid Karzai, there were efforts to enhance women's educational rights, notably through the 2004 constitution, yet challenges from the conservative and rural sectors persisted. 4 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (New York: Routledge, 2013).110-112. 5 Burki, The Politics of Zan, 2011, and Baiza, Education in Afghanistan, 2013. And Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 2005. 6 Emadi, Homa. Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan: The British, Russian, and American Invasions. New York: Springer, 2010, 23-28. 7 S. A. Arjomand, "Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical Perspective," Drake Law Review 53 (2004): 943. 8 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (London: Routledge, 2013), 120-180. 5 The 2004 Afghanistan Constitution represented a return to the blend of traditional and modern values seen in the 1964 Constitution. For example, the 2004 Constitution says: "In Afghanistan, no law can contradict the beliefs and commandments of the sacred religion of Islam” 9, even while Article 22 recognizes all citizens of the country as having equal rights and privileges, and rejects all forms of discrimination.10 Additionally, Article 43 considers education the right of all Afghan citizens and recognizes equal rights for men and women in the field of education and training. These articles of the Afghan Constitution demonstrate that Afghan legislation has historically considered both religious and national values in the realm of education, as well as modern and global principles. However, these advancements primarily benefited urban regions, with rural areas remaining largely untouched and characterized by conservative resistance, highlighting an urban-rural divide.11 Nevertheless, the era's progress laid foundational changes for women's education despite challenges from entrenched traditional norms and occasional political instability.12 Between 1978 and 2001, Afghanistan experienced significant shifts in gender policies, with the early communist government’s support of women's rights facing resistance, particularly in rural areas, leading to a stark urban-rural divide and contributing to the rise of the Mujahideen and civil war.13 The Mujahideen's takeover in 1992 saw a decline in women's status, exacerbated by the Taliban's rise in 1996, which imposed draconian restrictions on women's education and rights. Post-Taliban, under President Hamid Karzai, there were efforts to enhance women's 9 Afghanistan Constitution, 2004, art. 3. 10 Afghanistan Constitution, 2004, art. 22. 11 S. K. Burki, "The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai: Lessons for Improving Afghan Women’s Status," in Land of the Unconquerable: The Lives of Contemporary Afghan Women, ed. [Editor’s Name] (Publisher, Year), 45-59. 12 Burki, "The Politics of Zan from Amanullah to Karzai," 45-59. 13 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (London: Routledge, 2013).175-190. 6 educational rights, notably through the 2004 constitution, yet challenges from the conservative and rural sectors persisted. The post-2001 era witnessed a mix of progress and obstacles, with external support playing a crucial role, but the ongoing political instability and the Taliban’s resurgence has all but undone all of the women's advancements in the field of education policy. Methodology This research employs a qualitative, document-based approach to critically examine the Taliban's role in shaping women's education in Afghanistan. The study will involve an in-depth analysis of primary and secondary sources, including academic literature, policy documents, and historical records to explore the changes and continuities in women's educational opportunities under the Taliban’s regime. The historical exploration will focus on the period since 1919, when women in Afghanistan first gained access to formal education. This timeframe is particularly significant, as it encompasses the progression and regression in women's educational opportunities, which have been closely intertwined with the country's complex political dynamics and the rise of the Taliban. The overarching research question guiding this inquiry is: Why has the Taliban taken a unique stance on women's education in Afghanistan? By critically analyzing the historical and contemporary evidence, the study aims to deepen the understanding of the Taliban's ideologically driven educational policies and their impact on women's access to education in Afghanistan. Conceptual Framework This research is grounded in the academic tradition of postcolonial feminist theory, which examines the complex interplay between the colonial legacies and gender dynamics in postcolonial societies. This perspective argues that the oppressive conditions facing women in these societies are shaped by both the cultural hegemony of Western colonialism and entrenched 7 patriarchy.14 Employing a postcolonial feminist lens, this study aims to provide a nuanced analysis of the factors that inform the Taliban's ideological stance against what they perceive as Western notions of gender equality. It explores how these factors are influenced by both the legacy of Western interventions and indigenous patriarchal norms that govern Afghan social practices, particularly concerning women’s education. While the Taliban’s governance style is deeply rooted in their interpretation of religious doctrines and Afghan tribal traditions, the postcolonial feminist framework provides crucial insights into how these interpretations have been historically shaped by Afghanistan’s strategic importance to colonial and neo-colonial powers, such as during the Great Game, the Soviet invasion, and subsequent American-led interventions.15 This lens challenges the universal, decontextualized views of gender equality, emphasizing instead the need to consider how Afghanistan’s unique cultural norms, power structures, and the political legacy of these foreign interventions have influenced the Taliban's specific approach to women’s education. By examining these intersections, the study aims to uncover the complexities behind the policies that severely limit educational opportunities for women under Taliban rule. By applying a postcolonial feminist perspective, this study aims to unpack the multifaceted dynamics that produced the Taliban's unique governance in this domain. This framework will guide the analysis of historical and contemporary documents to provide a contextual understanding of the Taliban's ideologically driven educational policies and their impact on women's access to education in Afghanistan. 14 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. New Delhi: Zubaan, 2005, 120-124. 15 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden. London: Penguin UK, 2005, 1-70. 8 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria The documentary sources for this study will be selected based on well-defined criteria that are relevant to addressing the research question. The inclusion criteria encompass: (a) Scholarly histories and analyses in English, Dari, and Pashto that specifically examine the political dynamics leading up to and during the Taliban's ascent in Afghanistan; (b) Official Taliban decrees, policy documents, legal codes, and public statements in Dari and Pashto, focused explicitly on their policies and perspectives regarding women's education; Sources that focus tangentially on the Taliban or broadly on Afghanistan's history without specific relevance to the late 20th-century sociopolitical climate or the Taliban's policies on women’s education will be excluded. This approach ensures a focused and relevant selection of sources, providing a robust foundation for critically examining the Taliban's distinctive role in shaping women's education in Afghanistan Analytical Techniques The documents described above will undergo a close reading to extract salient statements, themes, and discursive patterns related to the Taliban's rationale, position, and representations of women's education. This detailed textual analysis will be guided by the principles of critical discourse analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2001), which allows for an examination of how the Taliban's ideological formations are manifested in their portrayal of gender and educational issues. From a postcolonial feminist perspective, the critical discourse analysis will involve several key steps: 1. Identifying and cataloging the Taliban's explicit statements, policies, and justifications concerning women's access to education in Afghanistan. 9 2. Examining the linguistic strategies, rhetorical devices, and underlying assumptions used by the Taliban to frame and legitimize their position on women's education. 3. Situating the Taliban's discursive constructions within the broader sociopolitical and historical context of Afghanistan, including an analysis of power dynamics, gender norms, and the legacy of colonial influence; and 4. Comparing and contrasting the Taliban's representations of women's education with educational policies and outcomes under previous Afghan regimes, in order to contextualize shifts and identify the distinctive elements of the Taliban's approach. The systematic comparison of educational access and policies for women will draw upon both qualitative and quantitative data sources, such as enrollment statistics, curriculum materials, and institutional records. This multifaceted analytical approach will enable readers to trace the evolution of women's educational opportunities in Afghanistan and pinpoint the unique aspects of the Taliban's governance in this domain.10 Chapter 2: Brief History of the Taliban The Taliban, a religiously inspired political and military organization, emerged in the early 1990s in Afghanistan amid the chaos of the Afghan Civil War following the Soviet withdrawal. Originating from Pashtun regions of eastern and southern Afghanistan, the group primarily consisted of students (Pers. tālibān) from Afghan and Pakistani madrassas. Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban sought to restore order partly by enforcing a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The establishment of the Taliban regime brought significant changes, including the imposition of their austere vision of Islamic law, which profoundly affected various aspects of Afghan society, particularly the roles and rights of women.16 Rubin (2002) argues that the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, while seemingly sudden, was deeply rooted in the socio-political chaos that plagued the country in the early 1990s. Following the Soviet military withdrawal in 1989, President Najibullah's regime managed to cling to power briefly, but his overthrow by Tajik mujahidin forces in 1992 led to severe instability. The new government, dominated by ethnic Tajiks for the first time in centuries, faced immediate opposition from paramilitary forces led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which laid siege to Kabul. Concurrently, various regional warlords, such as Ismail Khan in Herat and Pashtun commanders in the east, carved out their own territories, exacerbating the disorder. Kandahar, in particular, became a battleground for warlords and bandits, creating an environment ripe for exploitation. Amidst this chaos, the Taliban's promise of security and order resonated with many Afghans, who were desperate for an end to the incessant violence and lawlessness.17 The Taliban's rise was 16 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000) , 159-161. 17 Michael Rubin, "Who is Responsible for the Taliban," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (2002): 1-16. 11 significantly facilitated by widespread disillusionment and desperation among Afghan civilians and a vacuum of traditional leadership, especially in the south. 18 Originating among Afghan refugees and former mujahidin educated in Pakistani madrasas, the Taliban began as a movement driven by the desire to restore peace and implement strict sharia law. Their early acts, such as rescuing kidnapped girls and boys from warlords, built a savior reputation for Mullah Muhammad Umar and his followers. This early success in delivering justice led to increasing local support, enabling rapid territorial gains.19 The Taliban’s conquest began in earnest in October 1994 with the seizure of the Spin Baldak district of Kandahar and continued with the capture of Kandahar shortly thereafter. Each victory swelled their ranks with new recruits, often through cooptation rather than direct military confrontation.20 By the time they seized Kabul in 1996, the Taliban had established control over significant portions of Afghanistan, driven by a combination of military momentum and strategic alliances, supported materially by Pakistan. This marked the near-complete domination of Afghanistan by the Taliban, reshaping the country's political landscape.21 Most Afghan researchers believe that Pakistan is the main supporter of the Taliban and that Pakistan's support for the Taliban is deeply rooted in Islamabad's strategic preference for an Islamist regime in Afghanistan over a nationalist one.22 The Taliban's origins in Pakistani madrassas and their early logistical and military backing from Pakistan underscore this alliance. Following the capture of Spin Baldak, the discovery of arms and senior commanders from the 18 Emadi, Homa. The Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 23-28. 19 M. Rubin, "Who is Responsible for the Taliban," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (2002), 11. 20 Emadi, H. (2010). The Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan. Palgrave Macmillan, 23-28. 21 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 159-160. 22A. J. Ahwar, Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmad Shah Massoud by Sandy Gall (London: Haus, 2021), 345. 12 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), an arm of Pakistan’s national security agency, among intercepted convoys confirmed Pakistan's direct involvement.23 This support continued unabated even during the prolonged conflict with Ahmad Shah Massoud, with Pakistan allegedly providing a steady influx of recruits and military supplies. Ahmad Shah Massoud was a prominent Afghan military leader and political figure known for his significant role in resisting both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Born in 1953 in the Panjshir Valley, Massoud emerged as a key leader of the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989). He earned the nickname "Lion of Panjshir" due to his effective guerrilla warfare tactics and successful defense of his native region. During the Soviet invasion, Massoud organized resistance against Soviet forces. As commander of the Mujahideen in northeastern Afghanistan, he led a coalition that effectively fought against the Soviet Army and the communist Afghan government, earning him widespread respect among Afghans and the international community. Following the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan descended into civil war. Massoud became a central military leader in the fight against rival factions, particularly during the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s.24 He formed the Northern Alliance, a coalition of various ethnic and political groups that opposed the Taliban’s fundamentalist regime, which enforced harsh policies against women and minorities. Massoud was assassinated on September 9, 2001, just two days before the September 11 attacks, by two al-Qaeda operatives posing as journalists. His death was a significant blow to the Northern Alliance, but it also drew greater international attention to Afghanistan, particularly in the context of the impending U.S. invasion following the attacks. 25 23 Wahid Muzhda, Afghanistan va Panj Sal Soltah-e Taliban [Afghanistan and Five Years of Taliban Rule] (ین, 2004), 120-135. 24 A. J. Ahwar, Afghan Napoleon: The Life of Ahmad Shah Massoud by Sandy Gall (London: Haus, 2021), 35. 25 A. J. A0hwar, Afghan Napoleon, 345, 35. 13 Massoud is regarded as a national hero in Afghanistan, particularly among ethnic Tajik groups and other northern communities. His legacy extends beyond his military accomplishments; he is remembered for his vision of a united, independent Afghanistan that values democratic governance and human rights. September 9 is now celebrated as "Massoud Day" in Afghanistan, honoring his contributions to the country's struggle for freedom. His role in Afghan history remains deeply influential, especially regarding his resistance to both Soviet and Taliban forces and his advocacy for an inclusive Afghan government.26 In addition to being a fighter, Massoud upheld all the rights that the modern world grants to women. In the areas under his control, women attended schools, universities, and religious institutions without restriction. In many places, where conditions permitted, women were also engaged in governmental work. Pakistan, however, felt that the Taliban better supported their strategic geo-political interests and supported them over and against Massoud’s Alliance.27 The Taliban also benefited from Pakistan's diplomatic and economic lifeline, crucial for sustaining their control over Afghanistan. This support extended to technical infrastructure, ensuring the functioning of the Taliban's administration. Notably, the backing was not limited to the ISI; high-ranking Pakistani officials, including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s interior minister, Nasrullah Babar, endorsed the Taliban. Pakistan's extensive network of religious seminaries, which proliferated during President Zia-ul-Haq’s tenure (1978-1988), further facilitated the ideological and material resources critical to the Taliban's campaign.28 Pakistan supported the Taliban for several interrelated reasons, which are crucial for understanding the 26 Wolf, Peter. The Assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Accessed September 5, 2015 , 1-7. http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/ASMassoud.pdf. 27 Wolf, The Assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, 1-7. 28 Rubin, Who is Responsible for the Taliban, 12-13. 14 group’s rise and sustained influence in Afghanistan. One key motivation was the pursuit of strategic depth. By backing a regime that aligned with its interests, Pakistan sought to ensure influence in Afghanistan, mitigating the risk of a hostile Afghan government forging close ties with India, Pakistan’s regional rival. Additionally, the ideological alignment between Pakistan and the Taliban played a significant role. Pakistan’s network of religious seminaries, which expanded under President Zia-ul-Haq, propagated a conservative interpretation of Islam that resonated with the Taliban’s worldview. This shared ideology made the Taliban a natural ally for Pakistan’s religious-political objectives. Moreover, Pakistan provided the Taliban with essential diplomatic and economic support, which helped sustain their governance. This aid included facilitating trade and resources, as well as offering a diplomatic lifeline that bolstered the Taliban’s international standing. High-ranking officials, such as Nasrullah Babar, played a crucial role in endorsing and legitimizing this support. Pakistan’s backing was pivotal in shaping the Taliban’s ability to consolidate power, influencing not only Afghanistan’s internal dynamics but also regional geopolitics by positioning Pakistan as a key player in the Afghan political landscape After the US invasion and toppling of their government in 2001, the Taliban embarked on a seventeen-year insurgency against the Government of Afghanistan and the US, marked by a significant shift when the Taliban engaged in peace negotations with both parties. The negotiations began with the United States, initiated in late 2018, and culminated in the signing of a "peace process agreement" on 29 February 2020. This agreement represented a critical milestone in the efforts to bring an end to the prolonged violence that had plagued the country.29 However, the transition from insurgency to diplomacy was not without challenges. Despite initial reluctance, the Taliban eventually entered into direct talks with the Government of Afghanistan on 12 September 2020 in Doha, Qatar. These talks quickly reached an impasse, highlighting the deep-seated differences between the two parties. Central to the deadlock were 29 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 15 two contentious issues proposed by the Taliban. First, they insisted that any disputes arising during the negotiations be resolved based on Hanafi Islamic Jurisprudence, thereby excluding Shiite Islamic Jurisprudence. Second, the Taliban demanded that the intra-Afghan peace talks be recognized as an integral part of any US-Taliban deal. These demands were met with resistance from the Afghan government's negotiating teams, reflecting the broader complexities of reconciling the divergent ideological and political visions within Afghanistan. The stalemate that ensued underscored the fragility of the peace process and the formidable challenges that lay ahead in achieving a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict. 30 Upon the US withdrawal and subsequent deposing of the Government of Afghanistan, the newly-empowered Taliban created a Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a body tasked with the strict and often violent enforcement of Sharia-based rulings. This ministry was notorious for imposing severe punishments on individuals for engaging in activities deemed "immoral" according to the Taliban's interpretation of Islamic law. The Taliban's actions were heavily influenced by their understanding of Sharia and were deeply intertwined with a pervasive patriarchal ideology. As a result, their stance toward women was particularly harsh and hostile. Under Taliban rule, women were subjected to numerous restrictions, with their rights severely curtailed in nearly every aspect of life, from education and employment to personal freedom and mobility. The Taliban's treatment of women became one of the most defining and controversial aspects of their regime, reflecting their rigid interpretation of Islamic principles and the broader patriarchal structures they sought to enforce.31 The Taliban and Their Interpretation of Islam The Taliban's core mission in Afghanistan has been to enforce Sharia, grounded in their interpretation of Islamic justice. This mission, central to their identity, focuses on promoting meritorious behavior and forbidding evil (Arab., al-amr bi al-maʿrūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar). 30 Fawzia Yousufi, "The Prospect of Women’s Rights in the Post-Taliban-Government Peace Agreement" Journal of International Women's Studies 22, no. 9 (2021): 1-18. 31 T. Foxley, Revolutionary Outcomes? How Afghanistan’s Conflict Might Evolve After 2014 (Master’s Thesis, Malmö Högskola, 2013), http://www.warandmedia.org/wp 16 One of the foundational pillars of the Taliban's Sharia enforcement is the doctrine of obedience to the Amir. This principle underscores the absolute loyalty required from officials within the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate and respect expected from Afghan Muslims. The Amir, perceived as divinely guided, is seen as the moral compass for all actions undertaken by the Taliban.32 This doctrine not only ensures the moral integrity of the movement but also maintains its cohesiveness and organizational effectiveness, a stark contrast to the fragmented nature of Afghan politics. The enforcement of ḥudūd (corporal punishment for particular acts) and qiṣāṣ (retributive justice) is another critical aspect of the Taliban's Sharia enforcement. Ḥudūd involves corporal punishments for crimes such as theft and murder as prescribed in the Qur’an, reflecting the Taliban’s commitment to an originialist interpretation of Islamic justice. Qiṣāṣ, a form of retribution prescribed in the Qur’an, allows the heirs of a murder victim the option of demanding the execution of the murderer or to granting clemency in exchange for financial compensation.33 Most Afghan scholars and academics believe that the Taliban use Islam as a tool for reaching their political goals. For example, Shah Gul Rezaie, a writer and a former member of the Afghan Parliament, argues that the Taliban, as a fundamentalist religious group, achieved significant success through the exploitation of Sharia and religion, leveraging the traditions of the Prophet and prevailing societal customs. She argues that the Taliban do not consistently adhere to or recognize any Islamic values other than the specific interpretations they endorse, and their understanding of Islam is marked by extreme interpretations that align with their objectives, rather than the broader, more inclusive principles of the faith. Rezaie says that by adopting an extremist 32 Michael Semple, "The Taliban in 2024," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 3, no. 1 (2014): 3-4. 33 Semple, "The Taliban in 2024," 3-4. 17 interpretation of Sharia and Islamic laws, the Taliban have played a critical role in tarnishing the image of Islam, positioning themselves as leading figures in this detrimental endeavor.34 Other scholars argue that the Taliban misinterpret Islamic laws around, for example, suicide attacks. Acts of suicide attacks are fundamentally incompatible with the true logic of Islam, they say, and the methods employed by the Taliban are inconsistent with the Prophet's traditions. 35 These scholars contend that the so-called "Islamic Emirate" established by the Taliban does not embody the genuine concept of an Islamic government, and their policies do not reflect the values and beliefs prevalent in Afghan society. For the Taliban, they argue, Sharia, Islamic laws, Prophetic traditions, and popular beliefs within Afghan society are primarily tools to advance their political agenda of Talibanization. In the mindset of Taliban leadership, these religious and traditional elements are the most effective means of achieving their goals. 36 There is a large and growing body of scholarship demonstrating that, over nearly two decades, the Taliban strategically manipulated religion, misinterpreted Sharia, and exploited tradition to mobilize a militant force.37 The absence of explicit and decisive stances from prominent Islamic scholars denouncing the Taliban’s policies has allowed the group to portray themselves as the flag bearers of Islam and Sharia. By doing so, they have been able to justify their terrorist activities under the guise of religious obligation. This lack of strong condemnation from religious authorities has enabled the Taliban to persist in their extreme interpretations, perpetuating violence and instability in the region.38 34 Shagul Rizai, Taliban, Shariat wa Sunnat Garaee, Institute Mutala'at Strategic Afghanistan, accessed July 20, 2024, https://www.aissonline.org/per/opinions/opinions-p.../1039. 35 Merwais Jalalzai, "Ulama-ye Afghan: Hamla-ye intihari dar Islam jaiz nist," DW, accessed September 21, 2024, https://www.dw.com/ulama-ye-afghan-hamla-ye-intihari-dar-islam-jaiz-nist. 36 Shagul Rizai, Taliban, Shariat wa Sunnat Garaee, Institute Mutala'at Strategic Afghanistan, accessed July 20, 2024, https://www.aissonline.org/per/opinions/opinions-p.../1039. 37 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 38 Rizai, Taliban, Shariat wa Sunnat Garaee. 18 Yet, the Taliban’s desire to portray themselves as standard-bearers of Islam sometimes comes into conflict with their traditional customs. Although the Taliban is predominantly composed of Pashtuns, it has strived to present itself as a national and religious movement transcending ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. Despite this effort, the Taliban's version of Islam incorporates elements of Pashtun tribal customs. Pashtuns view their traditional code of conduct, Pashtunwali, as compatible with Islamic principles.39 Pashtunwali emphasizes acting by a set of values, and norms, with honor (nang) being a central concept. While only men can accrue honor, both men and women can lose it. Honor is demonstrated through various social practices, such as hospitality (melmastia), community cohesion (maintained through a council, or, jirga), and observing gender boundaries (namus and pardah).40 The relationship between Pashtunwali and Islamic law is complicated and often contradictory, particularly regarding women's issues. Many Pashtuns assume their tribal practices align with Islamic law because they identify as Muslims. Throughout Afghan history, including during the reform-driven reign of Amanullah (1919–1929) and successive governments, there have been efforts to undermine the power of Pashtun tribes by declaring certain aspects of Pashtunwali un-Islamic.41 Even the Taliban issued decrees, such as banning what are known as badal (marriage as compensation for criminal behavior) and levirate marriages in 1998, acknowledging that some local customs violate Islamic law. However, the Taliban left most rules of Pashtunwali untouched. Most of the first-generation Taliban leaders were rural Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, with little exposure to urban life. Their puritanical and ascetic rules, formalized during the first 39 Krzyżanowski, Mariusz. "Pre-2001 Taliban Religious Ideology–Context, Roots and Manifestations." Studia Religiologica. Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 54, no. 4 (2021): 307-325. 40 Krzyżanowski, "Pre-2001 Taliban Religious Ideology."317-320 41 Krzyżanowski, "Pre-2001 Taliban Religious Ideology."318 19 Emirate, were more reflective of their social background than a systematic interpretation of Shari'a. The Ministry of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice issued declarations according to a mixture of Quranic interpretations, Pashtunwali, and personal perspectives of officials, indicating that the Taliban's policies were rooted at least as much in their social ethos as in Islamic law. The Taliban's harsh rules towards women, such as banning education and enforcing seclusion, were applied to appease field commanders from rural Pashtun backgrounds, where cultural norms dictated rigid gender segregation. These commanders supported the Taliban as long as their interpretation of Shari'a was enforced, highlighting the orthodoxy of Afghan society in both religious and tribal terms. Military operations and political decisions were also influenced by Pashtunwali. The Taliban sought to replace tribal or ethnic identities with a religious identity in line with the concept of a larger Muslim community (ummah), although tribal and ethnic considerations (qawm and watan) remained significant. The Taliban's ideology theoretically emphasizes supra-tribal identity, but some Taliban local officials often exhibit tribal affiliations, especially in peripheral areas where central leadership is weak. The Taliban leadership tends to recruit fighters based on tribal ties and geographical origin, reflecting intra-tribal rivalry and the local population's preference for fighters from the same tribe.42 The Taliban’s approach to governance is characterized by a complex interplay of religious, cultural, tribal, and political goals, which together shape their policies and practices in Afghanistan. Rhetorically, the Taliban's governance is heavily influenced by their interpretation of Islamic principles. They assert that their rule is rooted in a strict adherence to Sharia law, which they believe provides a moral and legal framework for society. This religious foundation informs 42 Krzyżanowski, "Pre-2001 Taliban Religious Ideology. 317-320 20 many of its policies, particularly those concerning social behavior, education, and gender roles. But then a cultural lens influences their policies, as they strive to promote a homogenous cultural identity that often marginalizes ethnic and cultural minorities, leading to tensions within the diverse tapestry of Afghan society.43 To that end, tribal dynamics play a crucial role in the Taliban's governance strategy. The Taliban have historically leveraged tribal structures and alliances to gain support and legitimacy. By aligning themselves with local tribal leaders and engaging in patronage networks, the Taliban have been able to exert control over various regions while allowing for a degree of local autonomy. This strategy not only helps them consolidate power but also allows them to navigate the complex social fabric of Afghanistan, where tribal affiliations remain significant.44 Politically, the Taliban's governance approach is marked by a desire for legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. Following their return to power in 2021, the Taliban have sought recognition from the international community, emphasizing their commitment to certain governance norms, such as providing security and basic services. However, their rigid interpretation of Islamic law and reluctance to compromise on key issues—particularly concerning human rights—has complicated their efforts to gain broader acceptance.45 Overview of Women's Education in Afghanistan Pre-Taliban Before the inception of Afghanistan as a formal state in 1747, the educational landscape was dominated by Islamic education centers, or, madrassas, most of which taught children through the equivalent of elementary school and some of which offered more advanced studies. (Naqawi, 43 Aliriza Rijai, "Negah-e Talebani be zanan, manzar-e Islami ya farhang-e Pashtunwali? / Vaziyat-e esfbar va mahrumiyat-e zanan dar dowrat-e dovom-e Imarat-e Taliban," accessed September 21, 2024, https://af.shafaqna.com/FA/547101. 44 Alijan Saidi, Rafiee Soltani, and Mohammad-Tahir, "Discourse Analysis of Taliban's Islamism: Intellectual Foundations and Ethnic Beliefs," Contemporary Muslim Thought Studies 16, no. 8 (2022): 237-64. 45 Aliriza Rijai, "Negah-e Talebani be zanan, manzar-e Islami ya farhang-e Pashtunwali? / Vaziyat-e esfbar va mahrumiyat-e zanan dar dowrat-e dovom-e Imarat-e Taliban," accessed September 21, 2024 21 2022: 72). These schools offered tuition in literacy, religion, and basic logic and sciences. These schools were the only centers for learning until 1875, when the then-Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan, established the first formal schools, marking a significant shift towards modern education. These included a civilian school and a military academy and represented a nascent commitment to structured educational frameworks.46 The early 20th-century witnessed more substantial advancements. Amir Habibullah Khan, at the turn of the century, established the first modern secondary school, the Habibia, in 1903. Mahmud Tarzi, a modernist author during Habibullah’s reign, advocated for women's public roles, arguing that Islam did not preclude equal rights for men and women.47 This period set the stage for more progressive educational reforms. King Amanullah Khan's reign (1919-1929) marked a watershed moment for women's education. He mandated primary education for both boys and girls and established the first girls' school, the Masturat, in Kabul in 1921. He also set up a women's adult education center and encouraged the spread of girls' education beyond the capital.48 However, Amanullah’s reforms faced resistance from the conservative rural population, culminating in the anti-reform uprising led by Habibullah Kalakani, who halted all modernization initiatives during his brief rule. His successor, Nader Shah, instituted a temporary closure of girls' schools to appease conservative factions.49 Nevertheless, the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933–1973) brought progressive gender-related policies, particularly under Prime Minister Mohammad 46 G. H. Naqawi and D. V. Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges in Afghanistan," Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 12, no. 8 (2022), 73. 47 Naqawi and Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges, 74 48 Naqawi and Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges, 74. 49 H. U. Mashwani, "Female Education in Afghanistan: Opportunities and Challenges," International Journal for Innovative Research in Multidisciplinary Field 3, no. 11 (2017) , 43-49. 22 Daoud Khan, in the 1950s.50 Daoud Khan's administration expanded girls' schools and promoted women's participation in the workforce. When Daoud Khan became President in 1973, he continued to champion modernization and female education. He established the first institute for women within the Ministry of Education and launched campaigns to improve female literacy.51 The Communist regime that came to power in 1978 further emphasized compulsory education for women, framing it as a challenge to traditional and religious norms.52. This era saw an unprecedented enrollment of women in higher education, with women constituting about 40 percent of the student body by the early 1990s.53 The Mujahideen era (1992-1996) saw significant restrictions on education, with educational reforms that drew on a long history of violence-inciting and male-centric education that began under the Mujahidin in the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, the Mujahidin introduced violent literature into school textbooks, which fundamentally altered the nature of education in Afghanistan, particularly in rural areas54 These new textbooks were intended to indoctrinate Afghan children into becoming soldiers in the war against communism55. The Mujahidin's educational materials emphasized jihad and glorified violence as a means to achieve religious and 50 Karim Popal, "Sir-e amozesh-e zanan dar Afghanistan," accessed September 21, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/the-course-of-womens-education-in-afghanistan/. 51 Karim Popal, "Sir-e amozesh-e zanan dar Afghanistan," accessed September 21, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/the-course-of-womens-education-in-afghanistan/. 52 G. H. Naqawi and D. V. Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges in Afghanistan," Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 12, no. 8 (2022), 73. 53 Naqawi and Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges in Afghanistan" 75. 54 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (London: Routledge, 2013).130-133. 55 J. Spink, "Education and Conflict: Afghanistan’s Curriculum and the Global Fight Against Terrorism," Conflict and Education Studies 15, no. 3 (2007), 145-158. 23 political objectives. Ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic divisions further shaped the dissemination of these textbooks56 fostering a culture of violence that would persist for decades.57 The process of creating and distributing these books became more centralized after the formation of the Islamic Union of Afghan Mujahidin in the late 1980s. This organization established the Center for Education for Afghanistan in Pakistan, which coordinated with the University of Nebraska to produce violent educational materials.58 Between 1986 and 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded the production and distribution of these textbooks with a staggering budget of $50 million.59 The enormity of this financial investment reflects the critical role that the curriculum played in indoctrinating Afghan children into a jihadist mindset, with women in a necessarily subordinate role. Numerous scholars in the field of education have recognized the violence embedded within the Mujahidin's textbooks.60 and the overtly violent content of these books became so problematic that in 1998, a coalition of international organizations, including UNICEF and USAID, attempted to create an alternative curriculum for Afghan refugee children called "Basic Capacity Education." However, this peaceful curriculum was largely unsuccessful, as it could not compete with the entrenched jihadist narratives that had dominated Afghan education for over a decade.61 56 P. Jones, "Ethnic and Sectarian Divides in Afghan Textbooks: A History of Conflict and Education," International Education Review 55, no. 2 (2009), 101-123. 57 Y. Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences, and Legacies since 1901 (London: Routledge, 2013), 133-134. 58 A. Coulson, "Curriculum and Ideology: The Making of Violent Education in Afghanistan," Educational Review 56, no. 3 (2004): 245-260. 59 J. Spink, "Education and Conflict: Afghanistan’s Curriculum and the Global Fight Against Terrorism," Conflict and Education Studies 201. 60 P. Jones, "Ethnic and Sectarian Divides in Afghan Textbooks: A History of Conflict and Education," International Education Review 55, no. 2 (2009), 101-123. 61 J. Spink, "Education and Conflict: Afghanistan’s Curriculum and the Global Fight Against Terrorism," Conflict and Education Studies, 201 24 The Mujahidin's textbooks were replete with messages glorifying violence. For example, their math books included exercises such as counting bullets, bodies of Soviet soldiers, and weapons.62 Even the Dari language textbooks reflected this violent rhetoric. While the Ministry of Education’s official textbooks taught the alphabet with benign examples like ج for یراوج (corn) and ش for ابروش (soup), the Mujahidin’s textbooks replaced these examples with ج for داهج (jihad) and ش for تداهش (martyrdom).63 The importance of jihad was further emphasized in their fifth-grade textbooks, which stated, "Muslims must fight in the path of God. The Prophet said: ‘Fight against non-believers with your wealth, your lives, and your speech'".64 Another passage reads, "We command true believers to kill all non-Muslims". 65 Such content normalized violence and instilled a militant interpretation of Islam in the minds of young Afghan students. By weaving religious obligations into school subjects, the Mujahidin effectively blurred the lines between education and militant training, transforming classrooms into breeding grounds for extremism. The Taliban’s current attempts to impose a similar curriculum in Afghan schools are a direct continuation of Mujahidin’s efforts to jihadify education. The Taliban seeks to replace Afghanistan’s official curriculum with one that mirrors the violent narratives of the past. This is a clear effort to perpetuate the ideologies that were introduced by the Mujahidin in the 1980s and 1990s. Given the subordinate role accorded to women in this jihadist frameword, it is perhaps unsurprising that the first Taliban regime (1996-2001) banned women from educational 62 J. Spink, "Education and Conflict: Afghanistan’s Curriculum and the Global Fight Against Terrorism," Conflict and Education Studies, 201 63 S. Bird, "Textbook Wars: Violence and Education in Afghanistan," Journal of Education and Conflict 34, no. 2 (2014): 67-85. 64 S. Bird, "Textbook Wars: Violence and Education in Afghanistan," Journal of Education and Conflict 34, no. 2 (2014): 67-85. 65 J. Spink, "Education and Conflict: Afghanistan’s Curriculum and the Global Fight Against Terrorism," Conflict and Education Studies 201 (2007). 25 institutions and closed girls' schools.66 The Taliban only allowed the Kabul Medical Faculty to remain operational, ensuring that female patients could be attended to by female doctors. This period also witnessed the destruction of many girls' schools and threats against female students.67 When the Taliban fell in 2001, the new republican government explicitly pushed for increased access to education for women and girls. However, girls' education continued to be a contentious issue, facing opposition from former resistance leaders, members of various parties, and remnants of the Taliban.68 Prior to the Taliban's second ascent to power, numerous challenges impeded the education of girls and women in Afghanistan. One significant issue was the pervasive terrorist propaganda, which led many families to perceive schools and universities as unsafe environments for their daughters. Additionally, the scarcity of female teachers and inadequate educational infrastructure across much of the country further hindered access to education for women. In areas where schools did exist, the lack of basic amenities such as water and sanitation facilities presented additional obstacles. In rural regions, the geographical division of villages, often situated far from educational institutions, compounded these challenges. Furthermore, widespread poverty compelled many Afghan families to refrain from sending their children to school.69 Religious and cultural beliefs influencing the Taliban Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnicities, sects, and social structures, among which the Pashtun community is one of the largest and most influential. The Pashtuns, with their distinct language and rigorous customs, adhere to an ethical code known as 'Pashtunwali.' This code embodies 66 Karim Popal. 2023. "Sir-e Amuzesh-e Zanan dar Afghanistan." 8am Media. Accessed September 21, 2024. https://8am.media/fa/the-course-of-womens-education-in-afghanistan/. 67 Popal, "Sir-e Amuzesh-e Zanan dar Afghanistan." 68 G. H. Naqawi and D. V. Rajath, "Educational Opportunities and Challenges in Afghanistan," Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities 12, no. 8 (2022), 73. 69 H. Ahmed-Ghosh, "A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan," Journal of International Women's Studies 4, no. 3 (2003): 1-14, https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol4/iss3/1. 26 cultural ideals specific to the Pashtuns and dictates practices aimed at safeguarding the tribe’s structure and hierarchy. These laws are ancient, and rooted in pre-Islamic tribal traditions. Among its rules are blood feuds, revenge, the compulsion of girls into marriage to end such feuds and tribal disputes, and providing sanctuary; practices common to ancient tribal societies. The rules of Pashtunwali dictate what behavior is considered honorable and respectable and what is not. Concepts such as shame, honor, women’s seclusion, and readiness for combat are fundamental to Pashtunwali identity. The characteristics of Pashtunism include domination, exclusive ethnic superiority, prejudice, and religious and intellectual rigidity.70 Within this framework, women's roles are primarily confined to the domestic sphere, and their pursuit of education is often perceived as a deviation from traditional norms. According to Mashaell Al-Shammari in his article titled “Cultural and Religious Solutions from the Heart of Afghanistan” (2023), an Afghan postgraduate student from the Pashtun tribe said that a woman leaving her home is traditionally viewed as a disgrace within Pashtun society. This sentiment is deeply rooted in a longstanding custom that restricts women's education. The student emphasized that modern education is seen as a disruptor of family harmony, adding another layer of complexity to the already challenging landscape of women's education in Pashtun communities.71 However, it is crucial to recognize distinctions within the Pashtun community, particularly between urban and rural Pashtuns. Ms. Asmaa Qant, a Pashtun who successfully attained higher education with her family's support, observed that some rural Pashtuns do aspire to educate their daughters, although they remain a minority.72 The barriers to women's education in Pashtun 70 Sayed Mohammad Mosawi, "Man'-e Tahsil-e Zanan; Amri Islami ya Hanjari Qabayeli?" 8am Media, accessed July 25, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/prohibition-of-womens-education-is-it-an-islamic-matter-or-a-tribal-norm/. 71 Mashaell Al-Shammari, "Women’s Education: Cultural and Religious Solutions from the Heart of Afghanistan" (n.d.), Middle East Council on Global Affairs. 72 Al-Shammari, "Women’s Education. 9. 27 society extend beyond entrenched customs and traditions. Issues such as harassment, abduction, and rape contribute significantly to women's physical insecurity. 73 Girls who face physical harassment and kidnapping suffer compounded damages, including severe familial backlash and societal stigma. Families often abandon or ostracize girls who are abducted on their way to school, blaming the victims for their predicament. Consequently, many families prefer to keep their daughters out of school to avoid social disgrace. The banning of women from education is thus presumed to be part of Pashtunwali rules of conduct. The Taliban's interpretation of Sharia is an extension of Pashtun cultural norms that confine women to the home and isolate them from the outside world. In this culture, women are considered property, tools, subordinate to men, and second-class citizens. Consequently, the Taliban’s upper leadership tends to staunchly oppose calls for gender equality, whether those come from Afghans, international and regional human rights organizations, or even from amongst their own ranks.74 The obstacles and challenges hindering women's education in Afghanistan are thus rooted in tribal norms, including Pashtunism, Afghan shame culture, and traditional practices, even if they are expressed by the Taliban using religious logic and rhetoric. This is highly specific to the Taliban’s claim to uphold both Islamic and Pashtun values, as other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras hold significantly different cultural and religious views. The majority of these groups, for example, support and advocate for women's education and employment. While there may be some individuals with religious beliefs opposing women's education and work 73 Al-Shammari, "Women’s Education.9. 74 Sayed Mohammad Mosawi, "Man'-e Tahsil-e Zanan; Amri Islami ya Hanjari Qabayeli?" 8am Media, accessed July 25, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/prohibition-of-womens-education-is-it-an-islamic-matter-or-a-tribal-norm/. 28 within these communities, they are in the minority and do not represent the views of the general population. 75 75 Sayed Mohammad Mosawi, "Man'-e Tahsil-e Zanan; Amri Islami ya Hanjari Qabayeli?" 8am Media, accessed July 25, 2024. 29 Chapter 3: The Taliban and Women's Education in Afghanistan The Taliban, like many other political groups, claim their place in Afghanistan's political landscape by advocating for the implementation of Sharia law. Yet, their interpretation of Sharia often deviates significantly from other state-based interpretations, and regularly results in systemic discrimination, particularly towards women. The Taliban's policies towards women have been marked by severe restrictions on education, employment, and personal freedoms, which starkly contrasts with interpretations of Islam and Sharia promoted by other political groups and nation-states that emphasize justice, dignity, and equality for all individuals, regardless of gender.76 Since their return to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban have only intensified measures restricting freedoms, particularly targeting women, who have been gradually excluded from public life and most public sector jobs, as well as from secondary schools and universities. This approach reflects the group's fundamentalist views, which heavily rely on a strict and extreme interpretation of Sharia law. In the latest blow to women's rights since the Taliban's takeover in August 2021, the group mandated that all NGOs cease employing female staff under threat of license revocation. This move follows the Taliban government’s announcement that Afghan universities would be indefinitely closed to girls, who had already been barred from secondary education since the group assumed control. Previously, secondary schools were shut just hours after they were reopened, and from November, women have been banned from parks, gardens, gyms, and public pools. The Taliban have also prohibited women from many government jobs, restricted their travel without a male guardian, and enforced the wearing of the burqa.77 76 Hamie Naadiri, "Jaigah-ye Zanan dar Nezam-e Fikri-ye Taliban dar Afghanistan," Afghan Paper, accessed September 21, 2024, https://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=172766. 77 Wael Ghoul, "Taliban and Restrictions on Women: Does the Movement Truly Rely on Islamic Texts?" Alhurra-Tarjuman Dubai, 12 (2022).accessed on 11/28/2024 from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/329-taliban-restrictions-womens-rights-deepen-afghanistans-crisis 30 Historically, Afghanistan is a profoundly conservative Muslim country where Sharia law, as interpreted through Afghan tribal customs, prevailed for centuries. However, the form of Islam traditionally practiced in Afghanistan was notably tolerant, accommodating diverse Muslim sects, other religions, and various lifestyles. Until 1992, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews all played significant roles in the country's bazaar economy, and sectarianism was not a prevalent issue. Before the Taliban's presence in Kabul in the 1990s, Afghanistan boasted a gender-mixed and inclusive educational system. The number of students increased significantly from 1,700 in the 1960s to 12,260 by 1975.78 During the 1980s, the number of women in higher education saw a notable rise, with females constituting approximately 40 percent of the student population by the early 1990s. Before the Taliban's rise to power, schools were coeducational, and women represented 70 percent of teachers, 50 percent of civil servants, and 40 percent of medical doctors. The Taliban's policy toward education is defined by a clear intent to regulate, control, and shape the educational landscape in Afghanistan. This policy is encapsulated in a core document consisting of 101 articles, divided into seven chapters, which outline the movement's approach to education. The first chapter sets out the overarching goals of the policy, while subsequent chapters delineate the organization, roles, responsibilities, finance, and administrative aspects, as well as the substantive content of education. Central to the Taliban's educational philosophy, as articulated in Chapters 1 and 6 of the policy, is the emphasis on fulfilling the spiritual needs and development of an Islamic society. The policy underscores that all forms of education must respect and adhere to Islamic principles, with a particular emphasis on the Hanafi school of thought. This focus on religious education is not merely spiritual but also deeply political, reflecting the Taliban's desire to elevate Islamic education and align it with their broader ideological goals. The preference for religious education is rooted in the backgrounds of many senior Taliban members, who were educated in rural madrasas and Islamic institutions. In addition to religious education, the Taliban's policy also acknowledges the importance of "modern" 78 M. H. Ahmadi, Higher Education of Afghanistan under the Taliban Rule (YAAR eV, 2022), 12. 31 education, a term they have publicly emphasized alongside religious studies. The policy calls for the integration of contemporary knowledge with Islamic teachings, arguing that studying modern sciences is obligatory according to Islamic teachings. The Taliban’s High Commission for Education is tasked with taking serious steps to provide for the “necessities of life” as understood in the present age, which includes education, and aims to establish educational departments dedicated to modern sciences while fostering these disciplines within the framework of Islamic principles.79 Despite the aspirational nature of this policy, there is often a disconnect between the Taliban's stated vision and the reality on the ground. Reports from various regions indicate that the implementation of these educational directives is inconsistent, reflecting the varying capacities and priorities within Taliban-controlled areas. Nonetheless, the overarching policy is significant as it represents the Taliban's intended direction and vision for education in Afghanistan. It signals a desire to exert greater control over the educational sector, with the dual goals of promoting Islamic values and integrating modern educational content in a manner that aligns with their ideological framework.80 The restriction of girls' and women's rights has been a key feature of the Taliban’s education policy, particularly during their rule up to the fall of 2001.81 Between 1994 and 1996, as they ascended to power, Taliban commanders often closed down secondary schools, especially those for girls, in areas they controlled. Girls' schools were sometimes converted into boys' schools. During their regime, education for girls was limited to pre-puberty years. Female teachers were dismissed, and male teachers were prohibited from teaching girls. Qadir Sediqi and Greg Torode, 2019) This policy also adversely affected boys' education, as approximately 70% of public-school teachers in Afghanistan were women.82 79 R. Amiri and A. Jackson, "Taliban Attitudes and Policies Towards Education," Centre for the Study of Armed Groups, 13 (2021),12. 80 R. Amiri and A. Jackson, "Taliban Attitudes and Policies Towards Education, 13. 81 Qadir Sediqi and Greg Torode, "Taliban Reject Trump’s Suggestion of Lingering U.S. Counter-Terrorism Presence," Reuters, accessed September 21, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/taliban-reject-trump-s-suggestion-of-lingering-u-s-counter-terrorism-presence-idUSKCN1PV171/. R. Amiri and A. Jackson, "Taliban Attitudes and Policies Towards Education," Centre for the Study of Armed Groups, 13. 82M. Rubin, "Who is Responsible for the Taliban," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 1 (2002): 6. 32 The Taliban's fear of education, particularly for girls, stems from their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam and their desire to maintain control over Afghan society. They perceived schools as potential entry points for Western values, which they believed could undermine their ideological framework and traditional social structures. Firstly, the Taliban equated education, especially that influenced by Western curricula, with the spread of ideas that challenged their strict interpretation of Islam. They viewed education as a means through which Western ideologies—such as gender equality, individualism, and secularism—could infiltrate Afghan society. This fear was compounded by the historical context of Western interventions in Afghanistan, which the Taliban associated with cultural imperialism and moral decay.83 In their perspective, Western values are seen as antithetical to Islamic principles. The Taliban believed that such values promote behaviors and norms that contradict their interpretation of Sharia law, including liberal attitudes toward sexuality, family structures, and social roles. They saw the promotion of women’s rights and educational opportunities for girls as particularly threatening because it could lead to a challenge against their authority and the patriarchal structures they upheld.84 The Taliban's perception of Western values as particularly dangerous for girls is rooted in their belief that educating women could empower them to question and resist traditional gender roles. They feared that if girls received an education, they might develop aspirations beyond the domestic sphere, which could disrupt the family unit and challenge male authority. This aligns 83 Khabarban, "Chara Taliban dar Sakhtar-e Amoozi-shi-ye Afghanistan Taghirat-e Gostarde A'mal Kard?" accessed September 21, 2024, https://38410946.khabarban.com/. 84 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 6. 33 with their broader goal of preserving a social order based on their interpretation of Islamic teachings, where women’s primary roles are seen as mothers and homemakers.85 In 1998, they decreed that schools could not teach girls over the age of eight and mandated that all schools for girls be licensed and limited their curriculum to Quran study.86 Enforcement was inconsistent; although around 100 schools were closed in June 1998, many reopened when the immediate pressure subsided. Despite the restrictions, some girls' and mixed-gender schools continue to operate, often clandestinely and with support from foreign NGOs.87 During the Taliban's rule, several NGOs managed to operate schools with agreements from Taliban authorities. For instance, a German NGO, COFAA, ran a school program in 13 madrassas, with half of the approximately 10,000 students being girls.88 The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) also ran schools for about 200,000 pupils, including 37,000 girls, based on a protocol agreed upon with the Taliban Ministry of Education. In 1999, approximately 300,000 to 350,000 children were educated at schools run or financed by various assistance agencies and NGOs. The Taliban's restrictions were never fully enforced, and they occasionally yielded to local populations' or NGOs' demands to keep educational systems running, including for girls, albeit with limitations.89 The Taliban's restrictive approach toward education may have reflected broader beliefs in conservative sectors of rural Afghan society, but even those attitudes had begun to change before the Taliban came to power, with many Afghan refugees in Pakistan appreciating the schooling 85 Khabarban, "Chara Taliban dar Sakhtar-e Amoozi-shi-ye Afghanistan." 86 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 4-6. 87 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 4-6. 88 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 4-6. 89 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 4-6. 34 provided there, including for girls.90 "During their reorganization phase between 2001 and 2009, the Taliban continued to close schools in areas they recaptured but sometimes allowed schools to operate due to local pressure.91 In 2006, the Taliban's first code of conduct declared the current education system as strengthening the "system of the infidels" and forbade working as a teacher under the government.92 Schools and teachers were targeted, with girls' schools more frequently attacked. However, by the 2010s, the Taliban shifted from attacking to taking control of the government-run education system. This change was partly due to backlash from villagers who wanted their children to be educated. In a 2010 version of their code of conduct, the provisions targeting the education system were dropped.93 The Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004-2021) established contacts with the Taliban to keep schools open, leading to unwritten agreements in some areas.94 By 2011, this crystallized into a more formal Taliban-government pact regarding education, resulting in higher enrollment rates.95. Internally, the Taliban drafted a softer education policy, reflected in their 2013 Eid al-Fitr message, which emphasized the importance of both religious and modern education for children, without distinguishing between boys and girls.96 In areas under Taliban influence, schools operated with restrictions on curricula, often excluding Western subjects and increasing religious instruction.97. The Taliban required pro-Taliban staff or former 90 Mohammad Ali Nazari, "Taliban va Sabqeh-ye Doshmani Ba Ma'arif-e Asri Dar Afghanistan," accessed September 21, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/. 91 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 7. 92 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021),6. 93 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 8. 94 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 7. 95 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 7. 96 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 8. 97 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 6. 35 fighters to be hired as teachers and taxed teachers' salaries. Despite these restrictions, local populations often credited the Taliban with keeping schools running. During the 2010s, the Taliban were more responsive to local demands to keep girls' schools open. For instance, in areas outside Andkhoi (Faryab), the local Turkmen population pressured the Taliban to reopen girls' schools up to grade 12. In Obe district (Herat), girls' schools reopened after additional female teachers were hired. However, in the Taliban-ruled Sayedabad district (Wardak), girls' schools were only open up to grade 5 with male teachers. 98 The fall of the Taliban in 2001 marked the beginning of a gradual improvement in female literacy, which reached 30 percent by 2018 according to a UNESCO report (UNESCO, 2021). However, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and the subsequent resurgence of the Taliban have led to renewed restrictions on women's education. Women and girls are once again prohibited from continuing their studies, significantly hampering progress made in previous years This regression is reflected in literacy rates: currently, only 33% of teenage girls possess basic literacy skills, compared to 67% of boys in the same age group. The disparity is even more pronounced when considering the rural-urban divide, with 70% of girls in urban areas enrolled in primary education, compared to just 40% in rural areas.99 Despite substantial international pressure, the Taliban's stance on women's education has remained rigid. This is a critical issue for Afghanistan, a country that requires higher literacy rates across its entire population to foster development and progress. The Taliban's restrictive policies on women's education hinder this essential growth. 98 T. Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed," Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14, no. 3 (2021), 8. 99 Saira Inayatullah, "Women’s Education in Afghanistan: Disparities in Education Under the Taliban Affecting Women’s Capabilities Development," Bachelor's thesis, Malmo University, Department of Global Political Studies, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1662068/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 36 The challenges to female literacy in Afghanistan under the Taliban are deeply rooted in the country's historical, societal, economic, and cultural contexts. These barriers are complex and multifaceted, necessitating comprehensive research to fully understand and address them. It is important to note that within this discussion, female literacy and women's education are considered in a broad sense, encompassing all age groups without discrimination. As the Taliban consolidates its power, the prospects for women's education remain bleak, underscoring the urgent need for continued advocacy and intervention to ensure that women and girls in Afghanistan have access to the education they deserve.100 Interestingly, Taliban leaders have presented contradictory views on women's education. Some claim that schools and universities have been closed to girls due to technical problems and the lack of suitable conditions for their education.101 Others believe that the people of Afghanistan do not support women's education. On September 11, 2022, the former acting Minister of Education of the Taliban attributed the closure of girls' schools to cultural restrictions during a press conference in Uruzgan province, stating that, “In remote areas, people do not want to send their young daughters to school”. On September 27, 2022, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban's deputy foreign minister, called for the immediate reopening of girls' schools during a gathering in Kabul, saying, “Education is obligatory for both men and women, and there is no religious issue against girls' education.”102 However, at the same gathering, the acting head of the Taliban's Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice rejected his statements, 100 Saira Inayatullah, "Women’s Education in Afghanistan: Disparities in Education Under the Taliban Affecting Women’s Capabilities Development," Bachelor's thesis, Malmo University, Department of Global Political Studies,6, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1662068/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 101 Tamim Shahir, "Zanan Bayad Dar Siyasat, Eqtesad, Va Bakhsh-haye Digar Sahm Dashtah Bashand," Tolonews, accessed September 21, 2024, https://tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan-178832. 102 Afghanistan International TV, "Amuzish-e Dokhtaran Va Pesarān Tanhā Rāh-e Tose'eh-ye Afghanistan Ast," accessed July 28, 2024, https://www.afintl.com/202402220540 37 deeming modern education impermissible. His remarks implied that the Taliban's leader ordered the closure of girls' schools, as he said that implementing the ‘Amir's’ decree over a permissible act is obligatory.103 Some scholars and women's rights activists argue that the Taliban declared a systematic campaign against women's and girls' education following their rise to power in August 2021. For instance, immediately after assuming control, the Taliban banned co-education and prohibited male educators from teaching female students. In September 2021, they further restricted girls aged 12 and above from attending school and barred women from both attending and teaching at Kabul University. In August 2022, the Taliban made religious studies compulsory in universities, mandated that female students cover their faces in classrooms, and imposed restrictions on female university students traveling to access higher education without a male escort. Additionally, in October 2022, the Taliban government prohibited female students from pursuing majors in agriculture, mining, civil engineering, veterinary medicine, and journalism. In September 2022, they also banned female students from taking videos or photos on university campuses. The culmination of these policies occurred in December 2022, when the Taliban government imposed a total ban on women and girls attending universities, colleges, or any form of higher education.104 The Underlying Motivations Behind the Taliban's Ban on Girls' Education: The Taliban's prohibition of girls' education stems from a confluence of ideological, cultural, and religious interpretations that guide their governance. Rooted in a strict interpretation of Sharia law, as understood through the lens of Deobandi thought, the Taliban view modern education as a threat to their vision of an Islamic society. Their belief system, intertwined with Pashtun tribal values, upholds a patriarchal order where women's roles are confined to domestic spheres. The Taliban perceive modern education, particularly for women, as a vehicle for Western influence and secularism, which they believe undermines religious and cultural values. Consequently, they seek to reshape the Afghan educational system to align with their rigid interpretation of Islam, emphasizing religious studies while restricting subjects that promote critical thinking, gender 103 Karim Popal, "Sir-e Amuzesh-e Zanan dar Afghanistan," 8am Media, accessed September 21, 2024, https://8am.media/fa/the-course-of-womens-education-in-afghanistan/. 104 Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan, 2022, https://www.canadianwomen.org. 38 equality, and individual freedoms. This approach not only aims to preserve their ideological dominance but also to maintain social control by limiting the potential for dissent and the empowerment of women within Afghan society.105 After widespread domestic and international condemnations of the ban on women's education in Afghanistan, the Taliban's Minister of Higher Education took to the national television channel. He defended the ban by saying that proper hijab was not being observed in universities, men and women were present together, and that this is against Islamic principles and Afghan honor. Meanwhile, in a video that has surfaced of Neda Mohammad Nadeem, the acting Minister of Higher Education of the Taliban, he is seen speaking in Pashto, stating that women are tilths for men, and men should take responsibility for their provision, so there is no need for women to study and work.106 Another of the motivations behind the Taliban's ban on girls' education is their belief that they can use this as leverage to gain concessions from the international community. They perceive that by withholding girls' education, they can pressure foreign nations into recognizing their regime. In negotiations with Western countries, the Taliban might offer to permit girls' education in exchange for official recognition of their government and the lifting of sanctions. This strategy has seen some success; there are claims that UNICEF agreed to construct 300 well-equipped military bases for the Taliban in Panjshir in return for their vacating certain school buildings currently being used as military bases. The issue lies in the apparent willingness of the international community to overlook the Taliban's other crimes as long as they permit girls to attend school. However, international organizations seem unconcerned about the quality of education being provided. In all likelihood, based on their own statements recounted above, Taliban-run schools would be necessarily patriarchal and discriminatory, regardless of the gender makeup of the student body.107 Thus, part of the Taliban's opposition to modern education for girls is their awareness that modern education is liberating and enlightening, challenging patriarchal beliefs and behaviors. 105 Abubakar Siddique, "Islam Does Not Ban Girls' Education. So Why Does the Taliban?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2023, accessed November 23, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-girls-education-islam-takeover-anniversary/32546094.html. 106 "Vazir-e Tahsilat-e Aali-ye Taliban: Adam-e Riayat-e Dasturat-e Shar'i Ba'eth-e Ta'liq-e Daneshgah-ha Baraye Dokhtaran Shod," BBC Persian, 2022, accessed November 23, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cpvn3p66q7ro. 107 Taliban's Ban on Girls' Education in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, April 2022, accessed November 23, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/talibans-ban-girls-education-afghanistan. 39 The Taliban are adamant that women live in a manner that they dictate, with obedience and respect for men being central to their lives. The Taliban have shown no objection to young girls attending religious schools, which are now proliferating across Afghanistan in every neighborhood. Thousands of girls are enrolled in these religious schools, which have gained popularity due to the closure of formal schools. The Taliban are not threatened by women who propagate and reinforce Taliban ideologies. Their fear lies in women who think differently and view the Taliban's worldview as undesirable.108 Moreover, the Taliban regime, like other totalitarian regimes, has its own specific definitions of the roles and duties of various social groups. According to the Taliban, a woman's primary duty is to bear children and increase the population of the ummah of Prophet Muhammad. This explains why many Taliban members are engaged in polygamous marriages, with two, three, or four wives. The acquisition of various forms of knowledge and skills distracts women from this primary duty. A woman who participates in society and contributes alongside men will never be content with isolation, nor will she be willing to dedicate her entire life to childbearing or cooking for her husband. The Taliban believe that they need strong and robust men to carry out their plans, and women must assist them in this by producing the next generation. The Taliban's opposition to girls' education may also be rooted in religious motivations. Some within the Taliban, driven by religious reasons, are unwilling to allow girls to receive an education. Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the Taliban's chief justice, who is said to be a staunch opponent of women's education, imposed restrictive conditions on girls' education in a book he published after the Taliban's return to power. These conditions are so burdensome that they practically eliminate the possibility of girls' education, especially in modern subjects. Haqqani provides what he considers religious justifications for his opposition to women's education.109 However, this religious justification has put the Taliban in a position of weakness, even prompting criticism from some of their own supporters. A cleric in Herat who supports the Taliban challenged the opponents of girls' education to a debate, but no one accepted the challenge. Currently, Afghanistan is the only country among Islamic nations that treats girls' education in this manner. The Taliban present a form of religiosity that is peculiar and has no counterpart in the world. 108 Taliban's Ban on Girls' Education in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, April 2022, accessed November 23, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/talibans-ban-girls-education-afghanistan. 109 Zan Times. "A Critical Reading of the Taliban's Misogynistic Manifesto: The Islamic Emirate and Its System." September 20, 2023. Accessed November 23, 2024. https://zantimes.com/2023/09/20/a-critical-reading-of-the-talibans-misogynistic-manifesto-the-islamic-emirate-and-its-system/. 40 Researchers believe that the excuses provided by the Taliban for preventing the education of girls such as the lack of a suitable environment for girls' education, inadequate facilities in schools and universities, lack of financial resources, and the persistence of war and insecurity are baseless, whereas the primary reason behind their refusal to allow girls to attend schools and universities is their erroneous beliefs and ideologies.110 The illiteracy of the Taliban rank-and-file is another significant factor contributing to their opposition to education. Specifically, students and graduates of modern education are rarely found among the Taliban, while those who are educated often do not oppose the education of girls. Most of the Taliban's leaders are mullahs who lack modern knowledge and the ability or opportunity to enhance their capacities. An argument has been forwarded that these mullahs view themselves as defeated and humiliated by educated individuals and, to compensate for this humiliation, they target university graduates.111 However, the most important reason for their opposition is the Taliban's gender ideology. The Taliban have divided the world and its spheres into male and female domains. In this world, the female domain is restricted to the kitchen, while the road, office, market, and fields of sports, economy, and politics are male domains. According to this interpretation, a woman's departure from the designated domain is considered defiance of divine commands. Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the chief judge of the Taliban, has opposed women's education in his book, which analysts refer to as the Taliban manifesto. In this manifesto, he describes women's education as a “temptation” for men and a rejection of their natural roles. This dynamic extends beyond schools and into all public spheres, as he writes, “Women not only should not enter politics, but they also have no right to attend mosques. If women are not allowed to go to the mosque, their attendance at markets and government offices is also clear.” 112Interestingly, the Taliban manifesto considers women’s education necessary, and permits women to learn writing, but stipulates that education should occur at home and under the supervision of a guardian relative, not in universities or schools. 110 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Afghanistan's Female Education Minister Nadim Defends Ban on Girls' Schools," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 23, 2022, accessed November 23, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-female-education-minister-nadim-taliban/32177987.html. 111 Afghanistan International TV, "Amuzish-e Dokhtaran Va Pesarān Tanhā Rāh-e Tose'eh-ye Afghanistan Ast," accessed July 28, 2024, https://www.afintl.com/202402220540. 112 Mehran Moayed, "Women and Afghan Honor," 8 Subh Newspaper, accessed November 23, 2024. From https://8am.media/ 41 What the Taliban deem necessary for women's education is the teaching of worshiping God and serving male family members. From the Taliban’s perspective, the education required for women is to learn how to obey their husbands, always serve them, bear children, and perform basic household chores. Women are not allowed to leave the house for the purpose of gaining knowledge. But education under a guardian relative, limited to worshiping God and serving male family members, is not education, especially since many homes do not even have an educated member. A natural consequent of the ban on religious education for women outside of homes, is that girls' religious schools ought to be closed. The Taliban seek a completely male society and are not hesitant to declare it. Hence, even their chief judge explicitly refers to women as deficient in intellect and religion, who must accept male guardianship to avoid straying from the right path. A final reason for the Taliban's insistence on keeping girls' schools closed might be social movements spearheaded by educated women. This reason is not the primary one but could make the Taliban more resolute in adhering to their ideology. After the closing girls’ schools, the Taliban experienced a tremendous backlash from women. These women, who shouted, "Bread, Work, Freedom", protested the Taliban’s policies and represented millions of silent women. This reflected courage and social awareness, perhaps due to their education in universities and schools with modern curricula. Those attending religious schools, however, are taught to defend rather than critique. Their conservatism and acceptance of the Taliban’s policies are a product of the educational system in which they were trained. The scholar Ali Amiri points out that Islamic schools do not train Islamic scholars; they focus on training defenders of Islam. Those who learn to defend the status quo do not feel a strong need for critique and change, and if they do, they do not take positive steps toward that end. The establishment and closing of schools is meaningful in that context. The Taliban close schools and build or convert schools into institutions that train defenders of the existing state rather than Islamic scholars who could critique and protest misuse. Political Reasons Behind the Taliban's Ban on Women's Education The Taliban’s ban on women’s education is deeply rooted in their broader political, cultural, and ideological goals. These policies are designed to re-establish traditional societal structures, consolidate political power, and use control over women’s rights as a bargaining tool in international relations. Below, I will explore the primary political motivations behind the 42 Taliban’s decision to restrict women’s education, analyzing their quest for cultural hegemony, social control, and international recognition.113 One of the primary political reasons for the Taliban's ban on women’s education stems from their conservative worldview. The Taliban view themselves as the custodians of Afghan traditions, aiming to restore the country's societal values to what they perceive as a more "authentic" Islamic framework. In their interpretation of Islam, women's primary role is within the home, as caregivers and housekeepers. This conservative ideology has led them to view education for girls as unnecessary and even harmful, as it deviates from their vision of a traditional society where women's participation in public life is severely limited.114 By enforcing this restrictive cultural policy, the Taliban are not only upholding their ideological beliefs but also creating a mechanism to maintain control over Afghan society. Education, particularly for girls, is seen as a threat to the rigid gender roles they seek to impose. Educated women are perceived as potential challengers to their authority, as education empowers individuals to question and resist oppressive regimes. Therefore, banning women’s education becomes a way to stifle societal progress and preserve the patriarchal status quo.115 The Taliban recognize that an educated population, particularly women, could fuel demands for rights, equality, and political participation, all of which threaten their hold on power. By keeping women uneducated and isolated, the Taliban reduce the potential for societal change that could undermine their regime.116 Furthermore, restricting education for girls reinforces the Taliban’s control over families and communities.117 In a patriarchal society like Afghanistan, where family honor is closely tied to the behavior and roles of women, the Taliban’s restrictions on women’s education resonate deeply 113 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 114 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 115 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 116 Tamanna Popalzai, "Taliban wa Mahdudiyat-haye Amuzishi Dokhtaran: Barrasi-ye Dalayel wa Payamadha," Tahlil Roz, accessed February 10, 2024, https://tahlilroz.com. 117 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 43 within conservative communities. Families, fearing social ostracization or punishment, are more likely to comply with the Taliban’s gender norms, further entrenching their political authority.118 Education is also a critical tool for shaping the ideological outlook of future generations. By preventing girls from attending school, the Taliban can ensure that the next generation remains indoctrinated in their conservative ideology, reducing the likelihood of future resistance or rebellion. This approach effectively weakens the potential for long-term social progress, creating a population that is less equipped to challenge the status quo.119 Beyond internal social control, the Taliban’s restrictions on women’s education have an international dimension. The Taliban’s exclusionary policies are part of a broader strategy to use women’s rights as a bargaining chip in their quest for international legitimacy. Since their takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, the Taliban have been seeking recognition from the global community, which would grant them access to foreign aid, economic support, and political legitimacy.120 However, their policies on women’s rights, particularly the ban on education, have become a major obstacle to gaining international recognition. Many countries, including the United States and members of the European Union, have made it clear that the Taliban must demonstrate a commitment to human rights, including women's rights, if they wish to be formally recognized. In response, the Taliban have used their restrictive policies on women as a tool for negotiation, hinting at the possibility of lifting the bans if certain concessions are made by the international community. 121 As Dr. Soraya Paikan, a former professor at Kabul University, pointed out, the Taliban are deliberately politicizing women’s education to pressure the international community into recognizing their rule. "The recognition of the Taliban regime is a global dilemma, but the Taliban must solve their recognition problem through other means and should not politicize women's right to education," she said in an interview with Deutsche Welle. Paikan emphasized that restricting 118 Tamanna Popalzai, "Taliban wa Mahdudiyat-haye Amuzishi Dokhtaran: Barrasi-ye Dalayel wa Payamadha," Tahlil Roz, accessed February 10, 2024, https://tahlilroz.com. 119 Tamanna Popalzai, "Taliban wa Mahdudiyat-haye Amuzishi Dokhtaran: Barrasi-ye Dalayel wa Payamadha," Tahlil Roz, accessed February 10, 2024, https://tahlilroz.com. 120 Tamanna Popalzai, "Taliban wa Mahdudiyat-haye Amuzishi Dokhtaran: Barrasi-ye Dalayel wa Payamadha," Tahlil Roz, accessed February 10, 2024, https://tahlilroz.com. 121 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 44 women’s education is not just a reflection of the Taliban’s conservative values but also a calculated political move aimed at forcing the world to engage with them on their terms. 122 Despite international condemnation, the Taliban continue to stand firm on their ban on women’s education. This resistance stems from their deeply ingrained ideology and their desire to project an image of sovereignty. By refusing to bow to global pressure, the Taliban assert their authority and independence from external influences, framing their policies as a defense of Afghanistan’s cultural and religious integrity.123 Nevertheless, this strategy has come at a significant cost. The international community, particularly Western nations and human rights organizations, have repeatedly called for the reopening of schools for girls. The Taliban’s refusal to comply has resulted in the suspension of meetings between Taliban leaders and U.S. officials, as well as the cancellation of commitments made by the U.S. and the European Union the Taliban’s isolation is deepening as countries and international organizations distance themselves from a regime that flagrantly violates basic human rights. While the Taliban may perceive their stance as a show of strength, it also reveals their vulnerability.124 . As international aid diminishes and Afghanistan’s economic crisis worsens, the Taliban’s grip on power could weaken if they continue to alienate both the international community and the Afghan population. The prolonged deprivation of women’s education is likely to fuel further dissatisfaction among Afghan citizens, particularly as economic hardships intensify. Impacts of Banning Women’s Education on Afghan Society: The ban on women’s education in Afghanistan, imposed by the Taliban since their return to power in August 2021, has had profound and far-reaching consequences for Afghan society, especially for girls and women. This policy has left the country as the only one globally where females are systematically denied the right to education beyond grade six, an action that has devastating impacts on individual lives, the economy, and the prospects of the nation. 122 Tamanna Popalzai, "Taliban wa Mahdudiyat-haye Amuzishi Dokhtaran: Barrasi-ye Dalayel wa Payamadha," Tahlil Roz, accessed February 10, 2024, https://tahlilroz.com. 123 DW, "Estefade az Haq-e Tahsil-e Zanan-e Afghan be Onvan-e Abzar-e Feshar-e Siyasi?" Deutsche Welle, accessed February 10, 2024, https://www.dw.com/fa-af. 124 Zia Ziai, "Taliban wa Zanan; Emtiyaz Giri-ye Siyasi ya Tarvij-e Farhang-e Qabailavi?" Revayataf, accessed February 10, 2024, https://revayataf.com. 45 Short-term Consequences The ban's immediate impact was profound psychological shock and despair. When the Taliban announced in March 2022 that girls above the sixth grade could no longer attend school, many were left in tears. Images of girls grieving behind locked school gates circulated widely on social media, underscoring the emotional trauma inflicted by the sudden prohibition Families and communities felt a collective sense of loss, as the future of their daughters became uncertain, with many losing hope for personal and professional growth. This emotional impact was not limited to young students. According to research by Neyazi et al. (2022), the psychological damage caused by the ban extends into deep emotional trauma, affecting cognitive and emotional development. For many girls, school was more than just a place for academic learning; it was a space of social interaction and empowerment. Its closure has led to widespread anxiety, depression, and feelings of isolation. On the broader societal level, the ban has dealt a severe blow to Afghanistan's progress in gender equality. Over the first two decades of the 21st century, Afghanistan saw an exponential increase in women's participation in education. The Taliban’s actions have effectively reversed these gains, pushing the nation back to an era where women were largely excluded from public life and opportunities for growth. Medium-term Consequences In the medium term, the deprivation of education has led to a host of other social issues, including an increase in child marriages, forced marriages, child labor, and domestic violence. With girls no longer in school, many families, already suffering from financial hardship, resort to early marriages as a means of reducing economic burdens. In some cases, girls are forced into informal labor to contribute to their families' survival. This not only deprives them of education but also exposes them to various forms of exploitation and abuse. Mental health crises among Afghan women and girls have surged. A study by Zan Times in 2023 showed that women now constitute 90% of mental health patients in Herat province, a significant indicator of the psychological toll the ban has taken on Afghan females. Depression, weight loss, and sleep disturbances have become common symptoms as girls struggle to cope with their new reality.125 125 Zan Times. 2023. “Despair Is Settling In: Female Suicides on the Rise in Taliban’s Afghanistan.” August 28, 2023. Accessed November 23, 2024. https://zantimes.com/2023/08/28/despair-is-settling-in-female-suicides-on-rise-in-talibans-afghanistan/. 46 In response to these bans, many women have tried to resist through street protests and demonstrations. However, such acts of defiance have often been met with violence, with reports of women being beaten or tortured by the Taliban for speaking out. The traditional nature of Afghan society has made it difficult for many families to publicize instances of abuse, meaning that official reports likely underrepresent the extent of violence being inflicted on women. Long-term Consequences Looking to the future, the long-term consequences of the ban on education for women in Afghanistan are even more alarming. The deprivation of education for more than half the population will have catastrophic effects on Afghanistan’s human resources. The country is already war-torn and struggling to recover economically; denying women the chance to contribute to key sectors such as health and education will deepen these struggles. Afghanistan is expected to face a severe shortage of skilled workers, undermining its capacity to rebuild and develop.126 Moreover, by denying women access to education, the Taliban are reinforcing a culture of patriarchy and gender-based violence on a national scale. This will likely perpetuate cycles of inequality and oppression for generations to come. The social fabric of Afghanistan will suffer, as more than half of the population is systematically excluded from public and professional life. The long-term psychological damage cannot be underestimated either. Generations of women will be left feeling hopeless, with diminished opportunities for personal and professional growth. The mental health crisis triggered by the ban will have lasting repercussions on Afghan society, contributing to higher suicide rates, increased migration, and deepening poverty.127 126 Sharafat, Omid. 2024. “Consequences of Taliban’s Ban on Women’s Education.” March 21, 2024. Accessed November 23, 2024. https://zantimes.com/2024/03/21/consequences-of-talibans-ban-on-womens-education/. 127 Sharafat, Omid. 2024. “Consequences of Taliban’s Ban on Women’s Education.” 47 Chapter 4: Conclusion The right to education is a fundamental human right that must be enjoyed by all individuals without discrimination. This right is enshrined in various international and regional human rights documents, which emphasize the need for universal access to education. Gender inequality in education, however, constitutes a direct violation of this right. Throughout history, there have been numerous instances of unequal and unjust treatment of women, highlighting the failure of societies to protect and uphold women's rights, including their right to education, and numerous instances of national and international regimes trying to remedy that failure. Despite global commitments to eradicate discrimination, gender-based inequality continues to deprive girls and women of equal educational opportunities. Human rights frameworks explicitly call on states to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to education without any form of bias or exclusion. Yet, gender discrimination remains a persistent barrier to achieving this goal. The right to education for all individuals, regardless of gender, is clearly articulated in human rights documents, and states have to ensure equal access to education. In this thesis, I critically examined the historical, cultural, and social factors that shape Afghanistan’s complex relationship with education. This thesis explored the question: Why does the Taliban have a unique role in women's education in Afghanistan? The research led to two key findings. The influence of Pashtunwali and the impact of political factors help explain the Taliban’s distinctive stance on women’s education. Afghanistan, deeply rooted in Islamic and conservative values, is shaped by male-dominated cultural norms that significantly affect daily life. In Pashtun-majority regions, the Pashtunwali a traditional set of customs passed down through generations—governs societal practices and frequently restricts women's access to 48 education. These norms present substantial barriers to achieving gender equality, despite global efforts to promote educational rights. The Role of Pashtunwali: As the traditional ethical code of the Pashtun community, Pashtunwali defines strict gender roles that limit women’s opportunities, particularly in education. Core values like honor, shame, and rigid gender boundaries confine women to domestic roles and discourage public participation. The Taliban, being predominantly Pashtun, enforce these values in their governance, aligning closely with Pashtunwali. Their policies reinforce a societal framework that prioritizes male dominance and family honor, further undermining women’s autonomy and access to education. However, it is important to note that Pashtunwali and the Taliban’s enforcement of these norms do not represent the views of all Afghan communities. Ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras have historically supported women’s education and greater public participation. This diversity highlights the need for culturally sensitive and inclusive strategies to address barriers to women’s educational rights in Afghanistan. Political Factors and Geopolitical Influence: The second major finding of this research addresses the significant role of political factors, both within Afghanistan and from international influences, in shaping women’s education. When King Amanullah Khan assumed power, he sought to modernize Afghanistan, introducing modern education for women. However, these reforms triggered significant unrest, particularly in rural areas where illiterate populations perceived these changes as un-Islamic and a threat to their traditions. Conservative forces, especially in rural regions, aligned with mullahs who resisted these reforms. This led to a widening divide between urban and rural populations, which further intensified during the presidency of Dawood Khan, who pushed for modernization aggressively. His efforts 49 were met with resistance from tribal leaders and religious figures who mobilized opposition against his government. This internal instability provided an opportunity for powerful nations to intervene. The Soviet Union supported figures like Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal, leading to a violent coup and the establishment of a communist government that promoted modernity, particularly regarding women's education. In response, the United States and Pakistan intervened, understanding the sensitivity of the Afghan population towards foreign, particularly communist, influences. Pakistan formed alliances with key Mujahideen leaders, including Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, promising full support in their resistance against the Soviet-backed government. The U.S. provided millions of dollars and military equipment to the Mujahideen leaders, aiming to counter the Soviet Union's influence. Many rural Afghans joined the Mujahideen, motivated by the belief that their Islamic faith and traditional way of life were under threat from foreign 'infidels.' Afghanistan’s strategic location at the heart of Central Asia further heightened U.S. interest, as controlling it allowed the U.S. to counter the activities of regional powers like Russia, China, and Iran. Establishing a foothold in Afghanistan was key to asserting dominance in a region critical to global political and economic power, aligning with the U.S.’s broader goal of maintaining its status as a global superpower. Additionally, Afghanistan’s wealth in resources, including lithium, minerals, and other valuable mining assets worth billions of dollars, introduced an economic dimension to U.S. involvement. Controlling these resources became integral to the broader geopolitical struggle, merging economic ambitions with strategic objectives. Pakistan's support for the Mujahideen can be traced back to several key factors, one of the most significant being the unresolved issue of the Durand Line. This controversial border dispute 50 between Afghanistan and Pakistan has remained a source of tension since its establishment. The Durand Line was drawn during the reign of King Abdurrahman Khan (the grandfather of King Amanullah Khan) by the British Empire, at a time when Pakistan did not exist, as British India included what is now Pakistan. It is important to note that Abdurrahman Khan came to power with the support of the British, and at that time, the border between British India and Afghanistan had not been clearly defined. Abdurrahman Khan, recognizing the need to formalize Afghanistan’s borders, sent a letter to the Viceroy of India, requesting the determination of a boundary line. The British responded by sending a delegation with a map to finalize the border between the two territories. While the initial map appeared acceptable to the Afghan king, issues arose when the boundary was practically enforced. The delegation from British India allocated regions such as Pakhtunkhwa, Khyber, and other areas that had historically belonged to Afghanistan, to British India. King Abdurrahman Khan refused to accept this arrangement and sent a letter of protest to the Viceroy. However, due to his reliance on British support, Abdurrahman Khan was not in a position to fully challenge the British-imposed border. Some scholars suggest that the king signed the Durand Line agreement, while others argue that he was coerced into accepting it. There are also claims that the king "sold" the territory, which is historically inaccurate. The lack of clear evidence regarding the signing of the Durand Line continues to fuel the controversy. If Abdurrahman Khan had officially signed the agreement, Pakistan would be concerned that a stronger Afghanistan might attempt to reclaim the lost territories. Pakistan’s ongoing involvement in Afghan affairs, particularly through its support of the Mujahideen, can also be linked to this concern. During meetings with Mujahideen leaders, Pakistan frequently raised the issue of the Durand Line. When Burhanuddin Rabbani became 51 president of Afghanistan, Pakistani representatives visited Kabul to persuade him to officially recognize the Durand Line. Rabbani refused to sign, prompting Pakistan to redirect its support toward the Taliban. Initially, the Taliban promised that, upon gaining control of Afghanistan in 1996, they would officially recognize the Durand Line. However, once in power, they also refused to sign the agreement. Even after the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan continued to push for official recognition of the Durand Line, but the Taliban remained unwilling to do so. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the original version of the Durand Treaty is reportedly stored in British archives and lacks King Abdurrahman Khan's signature, further complicating the legitimacy of the agreement. This unresolved border issue remains one of the primary reasons for Pakistan's continued support of the Taliban. When discussing the Taliban’s ban on women's education, it is essential to consider how this policy aligns with the broader geopolitical interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Two key factors that contribute to maintaining a tyrannical government and destabilizing a nation are poverty and illiteracy—both of which Afghanistan continues to struggle with. This situation, some have argued, aligns with the U.S.'s larger geopolitical strategy. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. entered Afghanistan under the premise of fighting terrorism, specifically targeting the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, whom the U.S. held responsible for the attacks and claimed was being sheltered by the Taliban. Critical questions have been raised about the evolving objectives of the continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan which quickly moved toward establishing a democracy and supporting women’s rights. But while the U.S. publicly claimed to support democracy in Afghanistan, its actions—including its support of groups opposed to the Afghan Republic—suggest otherwise. In terms of how instability in 52 Afghanistan serves certain nations’ geopolitical ends, the Taliban’s ban on women's education serves to perpetuate poverty and illiteracy, ensuring that Afghanistan remains economically weak and its population uneducated, thereby facilitating the continuation of authoritarian rule. Despite billions of dollars in international aid to Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, fundamental improvements in women's rights were largely confined to urban areas. While some progress was observed in cities, particularly in terms of education and employment opportunities for women, the situation in rural regions remained largely unchanged. In these areas, traditional practices continued to dominate, and women faced persistent restrictions on their rights and freedoms. Similarly, broader developments in security, infrastructure, and economic progress were inconsistent. While international aid facilitated some advancements, particularly in major cities, Afghanistan's overall situation remained precarious. Corruption, inefficiency, and ongoing conflict impeded the implementation of widespread and sustainable change across the country. Furthermore, U.S. intervention in Afghanistan's political landscape was characterized by appointing individuals to key governmental positions, primarily based on their alignment with American interests rather than merit. From the presidency to ministerial and parliamentary appointments, the United States exerted significant influence over these selections, shaping Afghanistan’s leadership to serve its strategic goals. In many ways, this mirrored the dynamics of the Great Game, a historical period in which foreign powers sought control over the region. While the U.S. publicly framed its mission as one of peacebuilding and state development, covert support for the Taliban continued, further perpetuating conflict. This dual strategy allowed the Taliban to escalate their terrorist activities, including bombings and suicide attacks, thereby deepening the instability in Afghanistan. After 20 years of involvement, with billions spent and 53 thousands of Afghan lives lost, the U.S. ultimately decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. This withdrawal was presented as a necessary step toward peace and culminated in the Doha peace negotiations. However, these negotiations were cleverly manipulated to convey a commitment to peace while subtly absolving the Taliban of accountability for the devastation they had inflicted on the country. On August 15, 2021, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan, marking a significant and tragic turning point for the nation. The rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power underscored the long-standing complexities of foreign intervention, particularly the inconsistent policies that contributed to the continued instability in the region. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden stated in a press conference that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan had ultimately failed. In his address, Biden shifted some blame onto the Afghan government and people, stating that "we provided everything to them, but they proved unworthy of this opportunity." His remarks raised questions about how a powerful country like the United States could fail in its efforts to defeat a relatively small group like the Taliban. However, this failure should not be seen solely in terms of military defeat. In reality, the U.S. may have completed one mission while initiating another. The withdrawal marked the end of direct military engagement but also opened the door to shifting U.S. geopolitical strategies in the region. Rather than fully disengaging, the U.S. may now focus on maintaining influence through diplomatic, economic, and intelligence channels, adjusting its approach to managing its long-term interests in Afghanistan and the broader region. All of this history leads up to the present moment, wherein education for women and girls in Afghanistan is banned under the Taliban regime. It is important to note that when the Taliban first 54 took control of Afghanistan, many of their members were not well-educated. They primarily emerged from Deobandi madrasas and came from rural areas with limited access to education. As a result, they may not have fully understood the importance of knowledge, particularly for women. However, the current Taliban leadership, especially those in higher positions such as Abbas Stanikzai, are far more educated and well aware of the value of education. Many of these leaders have had their daughters’ study and graduate from European universities. Despite this, the ban on girls' education persists, which suggests that the closure of schools is more closely tied to the Taliban’s political objectives rather than a lack of awareness about the significance of education. As previously discussed, the Taliban government is oppressive, and such regimes often implement strict policies to consolidate their power. By banning girls from attending schools and universities, the Taliban can expand the establishment of madrasas, which has been a key part of their strategy. These religious schools attract large numbers of both boys and girls, providing the Taliban with an opportunity to control the educational narrative. This also enables them to influence young minds, potentially fostering extremist ideologies and recruiting students for military service. Furthermore, some analysts suggest that the U.S. might have geopolitical interests in the region, potentially involving the perpetuation of fundamentalism in Afghanistan's neighboring areas. This perspective may also shed light on the Taliban's strategy of keeping certain populations vulnerable to radicalization by restricting educational opportunities and promoting religious schooling. An educated woman is less likely to support or permit her son or husband to engage in fundamentalist activities, as education tends to promote critical thinking and awareness of the broader implications of extremism. 55 In recent years, China has begun investing in Afghanistan to extract natural resources, with the primary benefits of these investments flowing back to China. This situation is further complicated by an agreement between the U.S. and China, wherein the U.S. consented to Chinese investments in Afghanistan's natural resources as a way to repay debts owed to China. China’s investments in Afghanistan, particularly in the extraction of valuable resources like lithium, copper, and rare earth elements, have largely benefited Chinese industries while contributing little to Afghanistan’s economic development. Meanwhile, the Taliban's restrictive policies, including the closure of educational institutions and the perpetuation of poverty, contribute to maintaining a population that is more easily controlled. By limiting educational access, particularly for women, the Taliban hinders the development of a more informed and empowered society capable of resisting both internal repression and foreign exploitation. Consequently, this intersection of foreign economic interests and domestic oppression creates conditions where Afghanistan’s resources continue to be extracted without significant opposition from the local population. The Doha Agreement, signed in February 2020 between the United States and the Taliban, has significantly contributed to the disregard for women's rights, particularly their right to education. Hidarbar, the Deputy Director of the Women's Rights Division at Human Rights Watch, has deemed this agreement as neither "transparent nor inclusive," emphasizing that women were marginalized in the negotiation process. She points out that this marginalization contradicts the commitments outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and exemplifies the neglect of women's rights for the sake of political expediency. Additionally, Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, has faced criticism for overlooking women's rights in this agreement. This agreement facilitated the Taliban's return to power, leading to systematic violations of women's rights in Afghanistan and the deprivation of millions of girls 56 from their right to education. Hidarbar notes that the signing of this agreement has pushed women's human rights to the sidelines, enabling the Taliban to easily implement policies that restrict women's access to education and other fundamental rights. In this context, Thomas Nicolson, the European Union's Special Representative, has emphasized the necessity for national dialogues and innovative solutions to ensure women's rights, highlighting the urgent need to create space for women's participation in Afghanistan's political and social future. 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Thesis/Dissertation
eng
Asian Studies
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Ahmed, Rumee
Women’s education under Taliban rule in Afghanistan : a political and socio-cultural analysis
Text