Arts, Faculty of
English, Department of
DSpace
UBCV
Areifiz, Afeed
Master of Arts - MA
University of British Columbia
The thesis seeks to identify the rhetorical purpose of three key terms used by ISIS – martyr, Caliphate, and paradise –, extracted from the records of ISIS recruitment propaganda. At the outset, the thesis frames the discussion of these terms in the context of existing literature in order to evaluate the efficacy of contemporary counterterrorist measures. The material reveals the limitations of counterterrorist efforts that solely employ suppressive and militaristic resistance against extremists, while also revealing the effectiveness of narratives that promote community and empower the individual to shape and contribute to their surroundings. The thesis then presents a rhetorical analysis of the prevailing “war on terror” narrative, asserting that it promotes the very conditions of divisiveness and fear that ISIS capitalizes upon for its recruitment, which in turn impedes counterterrorist initiatives. The subsequent analysis of the ISIS terms martyr, Caliphate, and paradise reveal the ways in which the words tap into feelings of helplessness and isolation, offer the idea of community, belonging and purpose, and promise would-be recruits the ability to become part of the constitutive narratives that shape the identity of ISIS. In light of the limitations of the prevailing “war on terror” narrative and the efficacy of ISIS’s dialogue in manipulating vulnerable targets, the thesis asserts the need for counterterror measures that study and demystify ISIS’s recruitment rhetoric by engaging and subverting the ideological bases for the terms, and by offering moderate alternatives that appeal to at-risk targets..
Invocation of the Word: Identifying Influences of Terminology Across Extremist Rhetoric by Afeed Areifiz B.A.., The University of British Columbia, 2020 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES (English) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) May 2020 © Afeed Areifiz, 2020 ii The following individuals certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies for acceptance, the thesis entitled: Invocation of the Word: Identifying Influences of Terminology Across Extremist Rhetoric submitted by Afeed Areifiz in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in English Examining Committee: Ian Hill, English Language and Literatures Supervisor Y-Dang Troeung, English Language and Literatures iii Abstract The thesis seeks to identify the rhetorical purpose of three key terms used by ISIS – martyr, Caliphate, and paradise –, extracted from the records of ISIS recruitment propaganda. At the outset, the thesis frames the discussion of these terms in the context of existing literature in order to evaluate the efficacy of contemporary counterterrorist measures. The material reveals the limitations of counterterrorist efforts that solely employ suppressive and militaristic resistance against extremists, while also revealing the effectiveness of narratives that promote community and empower the individual to shape and contribute to their surroundings. The thesis then presents a rhetorical analysis of the prevailing “war on terror” narrative, asserting that it promotes the very conditions of divisiveness and fear that ISIS capitalizes upon for its recruitment, which in turn impedes counterterrorist initiatives. The subsequent analysis of the ISIS terms martyr, Caliphate, and paradise reveal the ways in which the words tap into feelings of helplessness and isolation, offer the idea of community, belonging and purpose, and promise would-be recruits the ability to become part of the constitutive narratives that shape the identity of ISIS. In light of the limitations of the prevailing “war on terror” narrative and the efficacy of ISIS’s dialogue in manipulating vulnerable targets, the thesis asserts the need for counterterror measures that study and demystify ISIS’s recruitment rhetoric by engaging and subverting the ideological bases for the terms, and by offering moderate alternatives that appeal to at-risk targets.. iv Lay Summary The thesis extracts three terms from the propaganda material utilized by ISIS to identify how each of the terms appeal to potential recruits targeted by the organization. The three chosen terms are martyr, Caliphate, and paradise, and their analysis revealed how each of them present promises of belonging, community, and the ability to become part of the narrative history of ISIS and an example that future recruits will look to and try to emulate. The thesis contrasts the roles these words perform with existing counterterrorist measures, and specifically against the “war on terror” narrative that is a guiding principle for many counterterrorist initiatives. The contrast reveals that effective measures aimed at impeding ISIS’s recruitment strategies must involve analysis of the roles their terminologies perform and how they appeal to recruits. These measures will refute the terms, while encouraging ways to open community and belonging for those vulnerable to recruitment. v Preface This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, A. Areifiz vi Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iii Lay Summary ............................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................ v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... vii Dedication ................................................................................................................................... viii Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 – Methods of National Counterterrorism ................................................................. 5 Authoritative Counterterrorism .................................................................................................. 6 Moderate-Based Counterterrorism ........................................................................................... 12 On Symbolic Action among Extremists ..................................................................................... 19 Chapter 2 – Global Measures and the “War on Terror” ........................................................ 23 Development as Counterterrorism ............................................................................................ 24 Digital Counterterrorism and ISIS’s Online Front ................................................................... 28 The War on Terror .................................................................................................................... 33 Terror ..................................................................................................................................... 34 On .......................................................................................................................................... 36 War ........................................................................................................................................ 37 Chapter 3 – The Narratives of ISIS........................................................................................... 41 Martyr – The Narrative of the Individual.................................................................................. 43 Caliphate – The Narrative of the State...................................................................................... 47 Paradise – The Narrative of Promise ....................................................................................... 52 Words of Power ......................................................................................................................... 56 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 58 Works Cited ................................................................................................................................. 61 vii Acknowledgments I am deeply grateful for my educators and peers at UBC, all of whom have shaped me as a learner and writer, inspired me to improve, and have allowed me to find a kind of home away from home in Canada. I am also thankful for the guidance of Dr. Ian Hill throughout the writing process, and his especial patience and support during the trying times in which this thesis was composed. To my family, both the ones back home who have offered me their unconditional and enduring support throughout the years, and the friends who have become such in my years in Canada, I owe an immense debt of gratitude. viii Dedication For my family, in all its forms 1 Introduction September 11th, 2001 seized and molded the world consciousness, and continues now to shape social, political, and cultural identities. The day saw coordinated suicide attacks by Al-Qaeda against key locations across the United States, including the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, and a failed attempt thwarted by resisting passengers. Those events birthed the metaphor of the "War on Terror." Though coined by the Bush Administration, and rhetorically opposed by President Obama in his inaugural address ("Talking Terror"), the term has found life and criticism in international discourse. The phrase speaks out what it is – an enunciation of counterterrorism, and in that utterance, it embodies its paradoxically aggressive nature: it embodies the fear, anger, indignation, and the maelstrom of directionless emotion that desperately yearns for an outlet; those feelings translate into the dialogue of violence, prejudice, otherness, and alienation – the dialogue of war. This war of/on "terror," specifically, invokes the diction of justice and goodness; to fight terror means that the war on terror is a just war. It is an exercise of righteous violence, necessitated by the use of violence. It announces itself yet another war to end further war. Terrorism is deeply rooted in the manipulation of psychology. More specifically, it manipulates ideology, both within the ranks of extremists, and in those of the victims. In other words, “terrorism has fundamental psychological aspects…it rests on its own subjective nationality…and is anchored in terrorists’ ideologically based beliefs about its utility and ethical justifiability” (Kruglanski 98). This assertion, however, is not an unlikely description for the compulsions prompted by the dialogue of a “war on terror.” The hyper-patriotization of the United States following the 9/11 attacks, directing fear and anger towards minority groups that seemingly inherited radical categorizations of “other”, despite also being American citizens 2 demarcated the growing trend towards ethical justifiability and subjective nationalism. In looking to define terrorism from counterterrorism, one of the more distinct differences is the pre-established, institutional nature of counterterrorism, which plays the “defensive” role against the offensive, counter-institutional insurgent force. These counter-institutional forces, in employing indiscriminate violence and intimidation, seek to establish their own validity, often at the weakening or complete disestablishment of the existing authority. Terrorism uses violence and intimidation to accentuate flaws and delegitimize the governing institution, while counterterrorism replies through attempts to reify the value and power of governments. The interaction between insurgents and state is a competition for ideological legitimacy. Though the means for one side may appear to be more accessible and acceptable than that of the other, both groups compete for political control over “territories” that they mark out. Whatever name this struggle takes, integral to the resolution of the conflict is, I contend, an informed understanding of the motivations and grievances of the oppositional group: one gained not by stripping away or dismissing the rhetoric – however vehement – employed by the sides, but rather by unearthing the multiplicity of connotative and denotative meanings cultivated within key rhetorical terms. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to take three key terms used in the rhetoric of ISIS – Caliphate, martyr, and paradise – to explore the purposes for their use in recruitment rhetoric, what mindsets they target, and how they help form the cultural and political identity of the organization. At the outset, I cover existing scholarship on the abatement of extremism and insurgency on the national and global scales, outlining the efficacy and limitations of each. The review of the existing literature culminates in the rhetorical analysis of the “war on terror” narrative, which has been a governing mindset for many existing counterterrorist initiatives. The 3 examination of the narrative stands in contrast to analyses of the three terms in question – Caliphate, martyr, and paradise – revealing the impact of the respective counterterror and terror narratives on victims and would-be recruits. Over the course of this thesis, I argue that the development of effective and sustainable responses to ISIS recruitment rhetoric must involve the in-depth examination of consistently used terminology, in order to reveal concepts that appeal to vulnerable groups prone to recruitment, which counterterrorist forces may then co-opt to subvert extremist rhetoric. The first chapter of the exploration begins with literature reviews of Pokalova and Chowdhury and Krebs to evaluate counter-insurgency methods on a national scale. The former provides a framework for evaluating suppressive and authoritative methods of counterterrorism, often involving armed resistance and the violent repression of insurgent ideology. The latter offers a contrasting, moderate-based, counterinsurgency method that demonstrates the efficacy of engaging with and learning about the motivations behind the rhetoric of counter-institutional movements. This first chapter lays the groundwork for the usefulness of grassroots support and the importance of communal identity in combatting insurgencies on a national scale. The second chapter moves on to a discussion of more global approaches towards counterterrorism. The chapter ultimately aims to outline the rhetorical function of the “war on terror” slogan, which has long been a guiding principle of contemporary approaches to counterterrorism. I first engage in a literature review that presents alternative approaches to combatting international extremism. Savun and Tirone outline the first of these methods, which is international intervention by democratic nations to install democratic governments in at-risk states, aimed towards improving stakeholdership and community-involvement, which reduce the chances of radical and counter-institutional unrest. The second of these methods is based in the 4 digital sphere of counterterrorism, outlining the efficacy of suppression, diversion, and counter-messaging against radical content online, with a specific focus on ISIS “digital caliphate” and the rhetoric they employ through social media to entice vulnerable targets. Both these reviews further illuminate viable alternatives for international counter-recruitment rhetoric to the prevailing “war on terror” adage. The piece-by-piece rhetorical analysis of the adage reveals how it encourages an ideology entrenched in an aggressive and suppressive discourse that perpetuates the very conditions ISIS capitalizes upon for its recruitment. The third and final chapter engages directly with the words taken from ISIS's rhetoric, performing a similar rhetorical analysis on Caliphate, martyr, and paradise to determine the extent to which each tap into constructed, co-opted or modified cultural mythologies to offer empowerment to their potential recruits. The language of the martyr encourages the transformation of the body into the rhetorical substance that constitutes the ISIS cultural identity. The language of the Caliphate asserts the organization as monolithic but democratic system. The language of paradise offers a spectacle that eludes counterterrorist narratives and subtly promotes the previous two languages. In revealing the mechanisms of each of these words, the discussion concludes with possible counteractive methods and the further potential of rhetorical criticism in contributing to counterterrorist methodology. I conclude with a review of the findings, then go on to briefly offer suggestions on further steps given the findings in the thesis. In extracting the rhetorical potency of each of the terms – martyr, Caliphate, and paradise – I hope to contribute to the establishment of counter-recruitment rhetoric that takes into account the specific methods that terrorist recruiters exploit in order to win over at-risk individuals. 5 Chapter 1 – Methods of National Counterterrorism The discussion begins, in earnest, with an evaluation of existing research built upon the efforts of disparate regions and governments to contain and defuse localized extremist groups. Granted that this paper seeks to address and deconstruct the international efficacy of ISIS, exploring the efficacy of local counterterrorist and anti-recruitment methods nonetheless offers a substantial framework from which we may work from "the ground-up." In this vein of thought, while the exploration is concerned with the international scope of ISIS’s recruitment methodology, the impacts of recruitment are decidedly regional. Though the second chapter concerns the treatments of ISIS recruitment in a regional scope, pertinent at this juncture is the fact that, in order to pierce the nebulous monolithic conception of Islamic extremism, observing the effects of their propaganda on a smaller, national or regional, scale is necessary. The chapter centres on the works by Pokalova, and Chowdhury and Krebs. First in focus is the work of Pokalova, who outlines the failings of suppressive, authoritative approaches to counterterrorism. The exploration is framed within the assertion that suppressive methods, conducted both by authoritative governments and democracies, are born out of a visceral, emotive reaction to the harms done by insurgent groups. Counterterrorism forms the basis of a renewed cultural identity formed in opposition to insurgent identity, but this often leads to a “no-negotiation” approach that further polarizes the nation and forges divisive ideology that my, in turn, fuel and motivate insurgent forces. As an alternative to the suppressive methods outlined by Pokalova, the discussion shifts to that of Chowdhury and Krebs, who propose a more democratic, discursive approach involving the mobilization of grassroots, moderate support that mediates the discontentment of insurgent groups but disavows the violent methods they pursue. Both works eventually reveal the need for counterterrorist dialogue that connects with the 6 discourse of insurgents. Rather than outright suppressing insurgent ideology where it appears, counterterror forces would benefit from garnering an understanding of the core motivations that manifest in expressions of violence, tending to those grievances, and inhibiting the allure of insurgencies over the state. Authoritative Counterterrorism The nature of extremism may seem to naturally lend itself to the visceral and the heavy-handed. Given the tendency towards violence, a “fight fire with fire” response, especially in considering the civilian casualties that often form the vanguard of terrorist targets, is a compelling avenue. Such has been the case with the United States’ “War on Terror” rhetoric. Kruglanski offers that the fundamental guiding force behind this approach to extremism is rooted in the very development and perpetuation of radical ideology. He notes that “terrorism-justifying ideology…articulated by a charismatic leader, provides a sense-making device” for fundamentalist organization members, and in these leaders “identifying an external cause for members’ frustration and alienation”, members develop an ‘us versus them’ social psychology” (Kruglanski 112). The development of group dynamics centred on ideology create two distinct referential points on the ideological spectrum – an "us versus them" mindset to be sure, but in the utterance of a "them", the "them" themselves are forcibly brought into being. In this way, fundamentalists control much of the rhetoric that instantiates conflicting groups. In other words, envisioned on a line, the fundamentalists might place themselves far at one end, segment off their space, and declare all other spaces as "them." Driven by this separatist ideology, a “them” that might have once been disparate ideologies spread out along the line concentrate and collate as one, to oppose the separatist space. This coalition reifies extremist justification in radical and 7 terroristic activities by configuring all others along the line as the target to whom the responsibility of the extremists’ are attributed (Kruglanski). This reification can further, cyclically, drive non-separatist and governmental forces to more fervently defend against extremist ideals and reassert institutional frameworks, resulting in blowback where insurgent identities must similarly gather to resist the intensification of institutional countermeasures. Extremists are built as much from what they oppose – as they are an oppositional force to allegedly unfavourable institutions – as they are from ideology independence from the institution – an identity built from a "collective grievance" (Kruglanski 112). While the grievances are rooted in the government, the cultures that tend to spring up around most extremist groups often take on identities in their own right. acting as a unifying agent in its own right. Kruglanski posits that this independent culture can manifest in nationalist-separatist groups who take on "generational dynamics" where members "are carrying on the mission of their parents' generation” and become entrenched in "a set of wider cultural values" (112). The use of heavy-handed, authoritarian retaliation is born out of an inability to distinguish the extremists from those who are not. Authoritarian measures arise as the most compelling response because of their ideological simplicity – a militarized problem presents itself as a distinct ideological and national group, and force will solve that problem. I would also contest, however, that the appeal of militarized and armed counterterrorism – which has proven, undoubtedly, to be a viable method of counterterrorism – is in the potential for forming a collated counterculture to insurgents: reasserting the institutions legitimacy as a governing body as well as reifying the notion of popular support for the government. A U.S. “War on Terror” reifies the U.S. as legitimate and rallies the patriotic force of the country against a discernable 8 threat. This is not to say that the U.S. engages in authoritarian measures, but rather that militarized counterterrorism can become an emotive, impassioned, nationalistic response resulting in a visible and potent show of legitimacy through force. Elena Pokalova outlines the measures and shortcomings of centralized, authoritarian governments, with a focus on China in its curtailing of proclaimed “Uyghur” extremism. It will become readily apparent that while iron-fisted suppression of insurgency may produce positive short-term results, repeated exercises of single-party power further exacerbate the conditions for breeding insurgencies. Furthermore, active emplacements of counter-insurgency, whether in physical presences as militarized troupes or in political presences as instituted policy changes, reaffirms the presence of material and psychic battlegrounds upon which diametrically opposed governmental and counter-governmental face off. This bifurcation reifies the necessity of terror, as it becomes a weapon for both sides in the conflict while tamping down the potential for peaceful resolution. Pokalova outsets her discussion with the measures taken by the Algerian government against the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), including the use of “numerous violations of human rights…thousands of ‘disappeared’ people, the employment of ‘dirty war’ tactics through terrorizing Islamist supporters and keeping rigid control over the media” (Pokalova 279). The “dirty war”, of course, references the conflict between the dictatorship of Argentina and U.S.-backed insurgency forces, during which time state-sanctioned death-squads would quash most forms of political and ideological opposition. Pokalova resigns that there is limited modern scholarship on the efficacy of either democratic or authoritarian governments in quelling insurgencies, in large part because of the dearth of major, nationally-ensconced, terror organization affecting either style of government. She notes that certain authoritarian-measure 9 employing governments, such as those of Argentina against the Montoneros and leftists, or the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers, have been successful in their counter-insurgency attempts. Conversely, others, such as Pinochet in Chile against the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), or Franco in Spain against the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or Russia against Chechen terrorism, have failed in counter their respective dissident threats. In the debate between the efficacies of democracies or dictatorships, Pokalova highlights existing sentiments concerning the potential benefits of authoritarian regimes in the specific category of inhibiting insurgencies. Stringent control of media, including the means of communication, impede potential extremists from organizing. Inhibition on civil liberties such as those of freely assembling or protesting similarly inhibit potential insurgent recruiters. For instance, Pokalova notes the deep-seated presence of several al-Qaeda-related websites hosted within the United States itself due to the United States’ stance on online surveillance. Unbeholden to an electorate or to the general populace at large, authoritarian regimes are unrestricted in their employment of surveillance, coercion or repression methods. All this is keeping in mind the reality that, while authoritarian regimes are theoretically single-minded, consolidated units of governance, it is not uncommon to find deep-seated corruption among the ranks of officials (Miles), nor is it ostensibly always reliable to attribute accurate counter-insurgency reporting to these regimes. As Pokalova notes, reports of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and North Korea are uncharacteristically low when reviewed against the Global Terrorism Database. At the time of Pokalova’s publication (2013) of her text, the case of the Uyghur insurgency in China was one of the decided ineffectuality of the regime. Uyghur grievances have only ever been exacerbated by China’s nationalistic response, taking the form of raids on 10 “illegal” religious schools – specifically Muslim madrasahs, anti-Muslim and anti-Uyghur ethnic protests, and direct government intervention against the populace. Prior to the September 11 attacks, these interventions were under the guise of combatting a distinctly national threat; subsequent to the attacks, the Uyghur populace became inextricably tied to international Islamist terrorism in the rhetoric of China’s government. Uyghur extremism only peaked after state intervention exacerbated in the late 1990s, but the image of the Uyghurs as separatists quickly changed to those of terrorists following the international clamour after 9/11. China's control over the media superimposed connections between Uyghurs and the East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) – another extremist group who had notably carried out a handful of attacks in Western China near the Uyghur homes in Xinjiang. It was only after 9/11 that China’s monolithic control over its media impressed the notion of ETIM’s connection to the Uyghur, and their collated financial links to Al-Qaeda, that the ETIM began forging links with international Islamist groups (specifically Al-Qaeda). It should be noted that neither group had claimed such affiliations to each other, and the ETIM only took a theocratic bent towards “launch[ing] a holy war with the aim of setting up an…Islam[ic] state in Xinjiang” (Pokalova 289). All this within the reality that the bulk of Uyghur civilians were caught in between these increasingly more terror-bent establishments. China, in suppressing any voice outside that of their own, inadvertently spoke into reality the terrorist threats it envisioned. Physical military presences, as well as media-based conditioning, eradicated the middle-ground of civil discourse that would have availed for a moderate, more even-keeled approach. The rigid adherence to the Uyghurs as separatists, and lumping them together with the ETIM, essentially provided no alternatives other than to redouble militarized, anti-governmental efforts. In mind, 11 media and matter, an authoritative Chinese government generated the conditions for their own terrorist threat. The ETIM have launched sporadic attacks on China and certain embassies abroad but many of the Uyghur people, who largely have no connection to the purported ETIM threat, find themselves trapped within "re-education" camps. These practices are in-line with the human rights violations of authoritarian regimes and they demonstrate a key failing of these sorts of governments on top of their exacerbation of extremist ideology. This is that extremism is, fundamentally, founded within the conditions of dissatisfaction with existing power structures ("Talking Terror"; Miles; Deflam). Disagreements, once inflamed and radicalized, become the crux of extremist ideology, and while goals and motivations may certainly warp beyond their original nature, extremism necessarily pursues change. The nature of unbending authority, as was the case in China, is the double-bind of neither acknowledging the need for change, nor acknowledging the voices that demand it. At their core, each utterance from voices that decry a flaw in the government is a threat to the validity and power of the authoritarian government, and only through misrepresenting those voices, or by refusing to acknowledge their presence at all, can these governments continue to maintain their power. The vestiture of "separatist" was not willingly taken on by the Uyghur, but it was certainly adopted by a small number within the population once that moniker was repeatedly thrust onto them; the only other alternative would have been invisibility in the eyes of authority. Thus, authoritarian regimes stunt themselves a priori, since their disposition may breed extremism. After that fact, they further fail at the first step of counterterrorism: the recognition of the threat and their demands, valid or otherwise. 12 Moderate-Based Counterterrorism Moving forward from the authoritarian approach, we can glean the merits of, at the very least, confronting the legitimate threat that an insurgent or extremist group poses. Still working within considerations of a national scale, another proposed route towards containing insurgency has been the development and establishment of moderate political groups. Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald Krebs promote this group as a middle ground that offers a voice to the concerns espoused by extremist groups while simultaneously decrying the violent measures used to enact such change. As may be readily evident, this middle-ground is a precarious position to inhabit. To even allow for such a group to exist requires an equally substantial middle-ground civilian populace who are dissatisfied both with existing institutional structures and with the methods employed by counter-institutional forces. A further difficulty is in maintaining viable, substantial and practical middle-ground values that reconcile the national interests of sometimes conflicting governmental and civilian opinions. This is to say nothing for the difficulty of actually instantiating this middle-ground force. There are two prevailing methods for doing this. The first involves a progressive grassroots development of moderates that slowly work their way up to a national scale, or a governmentally sanctioned endeavour to collate and organize moderates ("Moderates"). Even in the case of the former means of instantiation, a government motivated to organize moderates might offer support to propel grassroots movements. With this method, in particular, a further difficulty arises in keeping the moderate group independent in association from the government, lest the two inadvertently become associated, shifting the perception of the moderate group from a viable political alternative to that of "puppet" party aimed to conjure the illusion of choice for the people. 13 In this vein, a national government must subtly rally these moderates, while simultaneously infusing them with the practical means to contest the very institution that helped bring them into being. In the circumstances that such a balance has been reached, moderates both “undermine the legitimacy of political violence” and “open [a] space for the pursuit of less violent…legitimate, communal politics” (“Talking Terror” 126). In essence, the instantiation of a middle-group group is in itself a recognition and legitimation of the grievances that bred the discontent borne by extremists and civilian moderates alike. Moderate-based counterterrorism also moves towards achieving the goal of this current examination to curtail the further recruitment of extremists. Chowdhury and Krebs outline several other avenues of counterterrorism, though each of them fall short both in their estimation and mine. Methods involve the use of heavy-handed, overwhelming force similar to those of authoritarian regimes, or the use of calculated and discriminate force with the intent of minimizing civilian casualties, or the employment of substantial policy concessions to the end of governments relinquishing their power. Though these methods have seen (at best) limited success throughout history, none quite perform the task of amplifying the distance between extremists and potential recruits. As Chowdhury and Krebs point out, moderates do this by providing a reasonable, non-violent alternative in the "battle of ideas" ("Moderates" 376) that take place between supporters and critics of authority, such that the extreme dichotomy of radical insurgency and rigid institutional adherence comes undone. Moderate civilians find a group that reasonably voices their concerns, and in return will be heard by the government, without resorting to violent measures. Thus, moderates actively strip away all but the most diehard radicals from extremist organizations and collate them within a more measured, discursive, political alternative. This is especially true in the case of grassroots moderates, whose "ties to the 14 community…are strong [enough to] reintegrate the populace into the political system", depriving extremist organizations of grassroots support and legitimation, ultimately whittling down manpower to the point where they are forced to the negotiating table (“Moderates”). To outline the potential of moderates in defusing terrorist or extremist threats, Chowdhury and Krebs demonstrate the cases of the Akali Dal Sikh moderates in India, and the PNV Basque moderate nationalists in Spain. There is a specific focus on the rhetorical strategies of both state and moderate group, and how these strategies changed the dynamics surrounding the application of force among all parties. While moderate-based counterterrorism offers one of the most robust means of undercutting extremist support and creating conditions under which further insurgencies are hard-spent to rise, the method is also one of the most difficult to enact and most precarious to maintain. Furthermore, the efficacy of a moderate group lies in their essential separation from institutions and information disseminated by ruling governments. The unknowability of moderate motivations and methods can make them something of a "wild card" element, and good faith in their intentions is sometimes the only guarantee of their counterterrorist potential. In India, the Akali Dal shifted between positions of centrists and extremists. Their pursuit for “religious legitimacy” and for “maintaining Sikh places of worship” (“Moderates” 385) brought them into cooperation with Sikh extremists. Often accused early on of being secessionists, the Akali Dal maintained strong ties with extremist members subsequent to the death of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale – leader of the Sikh extremists. Even while they maintained strong ties with this extremist group during Bhindranwale’s leadership, the Akali Dal also represented Sikh interests and lobbied for their goals with the Indian Congress. Through these ventures, they would eventually build up notable national and state supporters and 15 networks, even though these institutional connections would draw ire from Bhindranwale and his extremists, who accused the Akali Dal of working as “‘agents of the Congress’” (“Moderates” 386). In a manner that extremism compels, the first responses to Sikh extremism were militarized and violent endeavours, culminating in the infamous 1984 Amritsar Massacre. In retaliation, extremists orchestrated the assassination of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which in turn prompted Congressional riots against the Sikh community. As Pokalova revealed, heavy-handed counterterrorism responses, especially on a national scale, exacerbate a perpetuating cycle of violent retaliations. In light of such realizations, the new Congressional leader Rajiv Gandhi instead promoted Sikh moderates and catered to the demands of the Sikh community. Sikh leaders that supported these measures were accused of being "sellouts" and stooges to the government, having too enthusiastically supported measures by a Congress that had enacted such extreme violence against their people. These moderate-hopefuls criticized the Akali Dal’s connection with extremists, yet in doing so had the “unintended…and ultimately salutary consequence [of] boost[ing] the Akali’s local legitimacy and thus helped produce Sikh moderate brokers” (Moderates 388). The Akali Dal generated a grassroots-following, standing alongside the Sikh community in decrying state-sanctioned violence and in criticizing the centre for their out-of-touch support for the Congress. In similar grassroots and popular support, the Akali Dal also co-opted the rhetoric of the failed Congressional centrists to criticize the “wanton terrorist violence” and “disruptive force” (Moderates 389) of the extremists. Most significantly, the Akali Dal engaged in rhetoric that defused, demystified and deescalated the extremist façade. In the face of Congressional whispers of the Sikh extremists serving as pawns of Pakistani attempts at 16 destabilization, the Akali’s recognition and simultaneous condemnation of extremist groups in their oath to pursue the demands of the Sikh people (at the time, for Sikh independence from India) within non-violent and democratic means reaffirmed the viability of existing institutions, acknowledged the need for institutional change, and delegitimized the violently rigid disposition of the Sikh extremists. In addressing the Sikh extremists, the Akalis also employed "infantilizing rhetoric" that labelled the extremists not as a force of international interest, but rather as "misguided youth" whose "admirable enthusiasm needed to be channeled more effectively", in contrast to the "adult…moderates" ("Moderates" 379). I would contend that this process of delegitimizing is an extremely potent method of counteracting insurgencies. Its shortcoming and limited use, however, is in the difficulty of achieving that fickle medium from which the delegitimation may originate. The efficacy of this method is rooted in the rhetorical, formative nature of the instantiation of terrorism. As previously mentioned, Kruglanski points to the communicative and communal structure of insurgencies – the goal is not wanton destruction, but destruction that is warped to serve a purpose, and that purpose serves to justify further iterations of terrorism. Insurgencies form under the banner of collective grievance (Kruglanski), but insurgencies and extremists truly take on those names when they engage in the radical communication of those grievances. These actions are aimed at enforcing recognition of their grievances, and ultimately legitimation of their cause. The warped rationale of extremists reconciles resistance to their cause as legitimation as well, since this resistance is in itself a recognition of the threat insurgents pose to institutional legitimacy. 17 In this sense, the subsistence of extremist organizations is rooted in the reactionary basis of counterterrorist – that to counter is to act in opposition, rather than to exist in independence of prevailing forces. The very rhetorical basis of the term urges anticipation, and in that anticipation blooms the “collective fear [aimed at] exercising pressure on power holders, who must respond to the disruptive and destabilizing effects of the violence” (Frank 93). In this instance, legitimation is guaranteed for extremists, as governments have no choice but to acknowledge the aftermath of attacks. The infantilization and delegitimation of Sikh extremism undercut the responsive approach to counterterrorism. This is not to say that responsive counterterrorism is unnecessary. Often it is the only viable response excepting more efficacious future responses. By at once changing the field of combat – from armed to rhetorical – and subsequently taking to the offense, the Akali Dal rent at the legitimacy the extremists so sought. All this granted that the Akali Dal were also able to find support among moderates in the nation, particularly those that had long since tired of extremist violence. This moderate, grassroots base, offered a stable platform upon which to launch their dismantling rhetoric, and in being able to exercise that rhetoric, in turn, demonstrated the large supporter base that had departed from the extremist camp. The Akali's delegitimation of extremism was a non-recognition of the threat they posed. It was recognition that stripped away legitimacy, rather than vested the insurgency with it. Chowdhury and Krebs demonstrate the tenuous position moderates inhabit in their account of the Basque PNV, whose ties with the ETA – the Basque nationalist insurgency – were considerably more robust and persistently more aligned with extremists rather than the centre. The PNV, like the Akali Dal, eventually mobilized to critique and delegitimize the ETA, adopting infantilizing rhetoric that performed a similar non-recognition that vested their concerns 18 about the country with legitimacy while simultaneously admonishing their methods. All this, however, only came about after the weakening of the PNV and its supporter base, and even then, the group garnered suspicion for establishing covert ties to other politically radical nationalist groups. The PNV’s reluctance to speak out against the ETA alienated them from the Spanish government: a reluctance motivated by the PNV’s desire to remain in a comparatively more moderate light, and so a more appealing option, for former supporters of the ETA (“Moderates”). While the Akali Dal were often accused of being governmental "stooges", partially because some of their members had overtly supported governmental over Sikh interests, the PNV had no such concerns. Not only did their own legitimacy and political identity rest on the existence of the ETA, but much of their ideological fundamentals were shared with the Basque extremists. Part-and-parcel of the moderate experience is this level of unpredictability and unknowability, which greatly impacts the reliability of moderates in maintaining the national status quo in the face of insurgent threats. If anything, the greatest flaw in the moderate setup, once established, is the partial delegitimizing of the ruling government, which may eventually lead to the eventual undoing of the original institution that opposed the extremists. While this may bring to light deeper structural issues within the ruling institution's policies, long-term stability might be more difficult to bring about, and threats to the ruling government's political legitimacy might cause them to rally their own agenda against previous moderate allies in counter-insurgency. In the cases of both the Akali Dal and the PNV, while both are prominent voices for their respective communities, on a national scale they represent a very small portion of the elected officials. Overall, while the moderate solution might be effective in rallying against a common, extremist threat, who operate under a distinct “all-or-nothing” mindset in direct opposition to the 19 existing government, it is at once difficult to instantiate, unknowable and unpredictable in nature, and might cause continuing issues after the disestablishment of the extremist threat. It is, however, useful to observe the reasons for which moderate mobilization is effective in undercutting extremism. What moderates achieve is a grasp over the irreducible essence of extremist rhetoric. Where authoritarian regimes shut off and outcast as “other” any and all dissident ideology, moderate interaction with insurgencies allow them to understand the root of their grievances. On Symbolic Action among Extremists Actions aimed at forcing recognition are essentially all symbolic actions since they are physical manifestations of ideological, group, identity. In understanding this through Burke, “symbolic action is…the articulation of consciousness through the medium of symbols”, in which “the speaker…names the situation…to project an attitude towards it…formalizes the situation by rooting it in some principle…of behaviour; and aggrandizes the situation by complicating the relations among the elements of the situation, thereby rendering the symbolic attitudinizing comprehensible and eloquent” (Durham 355). In the context of extremist action, the speaker names the act of terror as an act of revolution, rooting it in the principle that they have been the subject of unfair persecution, and transforms the situation into one of armed conflict rather than political navigation. In other words, extremists “aggrandize” the situation as a matter of human right, complicating individual acts of injustice as components of a greater, systematic injustice. Complication, in this sense, is not necessarily hyperbolizing; in the case of the Sikh extremists there were indeed systematic issues in place against them. This process, however, can alienate victims and counterterrorists, who are recipients of the final, aggrandized 20 product, conveyed through symbolic action. The root of “‘what is really there’” is lost on us through the complication of the situation. As Durham notes, the essence of the true grievances – the “substance” – is a function of vocabulary – wholly linguistic, culturally derived forms of interpretation” and “substantiation, consciousness of reality, occurs at the point of contact between finite (vocabulary) and the infinite (the world around)” (Durham 355). What counterterrorists lack is this overlapping vocabulary, as they instead arrive at this point of contact with their own culturally derived consciousness towards reality. Again, this is not necessarily saying that counterterrorists must somehow “get in touch” with terrorists on a personal level, or that counterterrorists are simply “out of touch.” Often, as Kruglanski points out, greater “ideological themes…of religious or ethno-nationalist are ubiquitous in terrorists' narratives” even though “personal traumas and frustrations may create the emotions push to ‘buy into’ these ideologies’” (99). While these individual ideas may exist, they are nigh on impossible to perceive once they transform into zealous or hyper-nationalistic ideology. What is easiest to adopt is not the language of sympathy and commiseration, but the language of aggression and retaliation. Disparate “consciousnesses of reality” form when this vocabulary is brought to bear on the state of the world, post-terrorist attack. The “infinite”, or the world around, is changed by terrorist attacks, which in turn may make it seem necessary to adopt languages of retaliation. Reactive counterterrorism is stunted by this fact, as they can only ever come into their own after the act terror. This reactivity also makes it far more difficult to address the concerns that cause rises to extremism since the vocabulary to engage in discourse is irrevocably modified post-terror. What the case of moderates demonstrate is the necessity in undercutting the conditions for terror by interceding the step between personal grievance and zealotry – rush to confront personal grievances, pre-terror, and pre-monolithic 21 ideology, in the language that extremist organizations may use to lure the vulnerable. For counter-terror organizations, it is nigh on impossible to address every potential threat, and so we must take another page from moderate mobilization and introduce grassroots and communal support, much in the same way that the Akali Dal rose from the ranks of their community and gave genuine voice to their concerns. This manner of counterterrorism becomes ever more necessary when confronting that fact that international terrorism conducted by ISIS still relies on national agents but is otherwise exempt from any globally united policing or governmental force. This prevents global policy changes and the mobilization of a distinct, political, moderate group to help delegitimize Islamist terrorists. The case of the Chinese government, outlined by Pokalova, demonstrates that suppressive counterterrorist measures that perpetuate the dichotomy of state and insurgent, solely enact violent retaliation against counter-institutional forces, and perpetuate oppositional discourse reify the conditions under which extremist and insurgent groups may prosper. Often, the violent measures carried out by extremists in bids to attract attention and legitimacy to their cause compel an equally violent state response. Cyclical sequences of violence ramp up oppositional narratives that further alienate states and insurgencies, exacerbating the conditions wherein negotiations are an impossibility, fueling further armed resistance. A more effective and democratic, albeit far more difficult to instantiate, method of counterinsurgency is the mobilization of moderate groups, outlined by Chowdhury and Krebs. This involves striking a delicate medium between state and insurgencies, wherein the moderates are positioned as a more reasonable, nonviolent representative of the grievances levelled by radical insurgencies. Brought up with grassroots support, this method is more effective because it is able to peer behind the aggrandized rhetoric of insurgent members and directly address concerns at the base level. 22 Moderates model the process off engaging with the vocabulary and ideologies of radicals without succumbing to their methods, and are therefore able to enact legitimate, empathetic change. While moderates are difficult to rally, they demonstrate how demystifying and familiarizing counterinsurgencies with the rhetoric of radical groups helps diffuse violent situations and subvert the discursive power of persuasive extremist figures. Further discussion in this vein continues in the subsequent chapter, observing existing rhetorical responses to international Islamist terrorism, and the limitations and success of these measures. 23 Chapter 2 – Global Measures and the “War on Terror” Moving on from discussions of the strictly national, this chapter focuses on outlining existing literature that tackles terroristic recruitment and abatement on a global scale. Though the chapter begins with a review of various literature on the subject, the focal point of the chapter is the latter half, which performs a rhetorical analysis of the oft-used “war on terror” narrative. The analysis demonstrates how the rhetoric encourages violent, aggressive, and suppressive methods, locks victims inside a narrative of constant anxiety about the next terrorist attack, and promulgates a divisive, "us versus them" mindset which, in turn, amplifies the feelings of isolation, helplessness, and frustration that radical recruiters look for in their targets. Other transnational methods of combatting recruitment rhetoric form the build-up to this rhetorical analysis, as each demonstrate a possible, more beneficial, alternative to this otherwise major, influential governing narrative of war. The discussion begins with an exploration of a nations deploying development and democratization as a means of improving the civil liberties of an at-risk nation, which is often one with lower levels of involvement in government by the citizenry and limited choice in elected officials. This often creates conditions where citizens feel powerless in shaping their nation, isolated from the positions of power. Those on the fringes of a community, both physically and socially, feel growing discontent over their position in society. An exploration of the work by Savun and Tirone establish the usefulness of the participatory culture encouraged by democratic establishments, while also drawing parallels between the stakeholder narratives and the allegedly “democratic” and grassroots structure encouraged in Islamist narratives. The approach by Savun and Tirone mirror that of Chowdhury and Krebs, albeit in the case of an 24 outside nation intervening to promote moderates that have the ability to both criticize and reshape national institutions. The subsequent section on digital counterterrorism takes account of ISIS’s digital presence, using it as a backdrop to outline the methods of suppression, diversion, and counter-messaging to combat recruitment rhetoric. The diversion method stands out as the most effective as, unlike the narrative of a “war on terror”, it does not involve divisive rhetoric. Instead it eliminates the image of the “oppressive” West, instead offering refutations and otherwise directly subverting the rhetoric of extremist recruiters. Both this and democratic mobilization stand as alternatives, then, to contrast the hawkish narrative of war, whose primacy as a persistent counterterrorist principle necessitated a deeper look at the impacts of words, individually and working in tandem with the others. Development as Counterterrorism The rhetoric of establishing democracy within at-risk nations as protective measure is not unfamiliar in the counterterrorist landscape, though in a fair few instances the guise democracy has been used as rationale for extensive, oftentimes violent, intervention in international political affairs. Under these circumstances, the establishment of such a “democracy” has caused further civil strife and indeed bred the discontentment that rallied some among the populaces to join insurgent groups. The U.S. intervention in Iran is one such example (Helmus). However, in the case of genuine democratic intervention, beckoned by the at-risk nations, there have been noted improvements in communal support for institutions, reduced civil discontentment, and a proportional decrease in terrorist attacks (Savun and Tirone). 25 The basis for democratic initiatives is the understanding that the nations which restrict essential civil liberties maintain an inherently fragile grip over state power, and any sufficiently capable dissenting position would be enough to quickly delegitimize such an authoritative government. Furthermore, non-democratic processes often lead to marginalization and feelings of being trapped, secluded, or discriminated against (Savun and Tirone; Kruglanski; Helmus), which in turn may be transformed by radical ideology into extremism. In contrast, democratization not only allows, but encourages participation. Democracies are capable of addressing the same issues of isolation and helplessness that extremists exploit, but towards the end of supporting governing institutions rather than overthrowing them. As Kruglanski points out, extremists take individual grievances and promise to rectify wrongs through a process of collectivization. Radical recruitment uses the rhetoric of community to engage in successful recruitment. Democratization, in a similar way, encourages the "ability to participate in local governance…enhances communication between…the citizens and the government…increase[s] trust in state institutions [and] makes citizens stakeholders in the regime" (Savun and Tirone 1612). This latter aspect especially notable, as extremist ideology, particularly that of ISIS, motivates an individual towards what they allege is a "greater" cause, where the needs and demands on the individual are nonetheless paramount in the "success" of their “jihad.” This stakeholder narrative is promoted through the discreet and rigid outlines of ISIS’s ideology. An example of these are manifest in the work of Mahood and Rane, whose exploration of ISIS propaganda magazine Dabiq outline five essential tenets that the group relies on as motivation for the magazine: tawhid, or belief in the one, true God; Manhaj, or the means of reaching the truth of Islam; Hijrah, the migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Makkah to 26 Medina; jihad, defined both as struggle against sin, and as holy war; and Jama’ah ¸or congregation (21). The clear outline for these tenets offers, to those who feel lost or isolated, not only concepts to adhere to but distinct, concrete terms to utter and reaffirm to themselves. As Salazar notes, the shahada, or “proclamation”, is eminent in Islam (3), and so the proclamation of these terms is in itself at least a partial instantiation and legitimation of the ideologies invested within. The rhetorical potency of these proclamations quickly allows identities to build up around extremist Islamist ideology. Returning to Savun and Tirone, investing individuals, and particularly the youth, with a sense of stakeholder-ship performs a similar development of identities, though one that is bound to the local community and to their nationality, rather than religious identity. Savun and Tirone demonstrate the effectiveness of long-term democratization, with civil unrest and conflicts decreasing markedly within democratic establishments, and the number of terrorist attacks dropping accordingly. Despite these findings, the challenge of democracy is a substantial one when confronting radical Islamist rhetoric, as in the case of the latter the recitation and interpretation of religious analogies can, unto themselves, become realizations of actual, legal, practices (Salazar). Of course, “legal” is a loosely rooted term when it comes to terrorist rationalizations of violence, but in this case, it means that a certain interpretation of a religious analogy is the basis for radical practice. In contrast, democratic means, while communal, are slow to enact and prove their effectiveness. This is to say that while the recitation of Islamist rhetoric is enough, for radical groups, to cyclically prove the legitimacy of Islamist rhetoric, democracy cannot prove itself as quickly and easily. The silver lining, however, is in finding the potential rhetorical equivalency of democratic and extremist means of building community. Both seek to address individual 27 grievances by building a public forum, composed of others who may share similar grievances. The language of this collectivization is important, and much of the current rhetorical constructions of democracy express the tenants of “freedom”, “truth”, “ethics”, “safety” and “stability”, evidenced in the addresses presented by various world leaders after terrorist attacks on their soil. These terms are also implied in the tenants of Islamist narratives. The ability to engage with the same terminology as terrorist forces, but turning the discourse away from one of violence, demonstrates the potential, and indeed the existing practice, of counterterrorist organizations to co-opt and subvert the dialogue of terrorist recruiters. The mobilization of democracy is not without its drawbacks. Sandler points out that the overhaul and establishment of a new governmental format can add to the instability of a region during the lengthy change-over process. Furthermore, instatement of a democratic government, and the subsequent potential moderate groups that come about as a result, can have discontent rallied against them under the rationale that they are "stooges" of an international, invasive, power. In the case of international Islamist terrorism, encouraging democracy is not always possible as the nations already have an existing democratic government in place. Direct, forceful establishment of intervention is seen warily considering previous such “interventions” in the Middle East by the United States. The dilemma of democratization is that it is a single-use measure in most applicable cases, that those cases are few as is, and that true democratic fairness may bring about elections that bring insurgent groups into power (Sandler). Despite these limitations, democratic deployment does exemplify the effective underlying philosophy of collectivization, and the role of peer and civilian groups in shaping individual identity, much in the same way that ISIS’s rhetoric is meant to inspire notions of communal identity and belonging. 28 Digital Counterterrorism and ISIS’s Online Front We finally move, at this juncture, further afield to the concern of transnational terrorism in earnest. The discussion until now has featured the national forum heavily, in large part because a strong national counterterrorist base offers the most potential for a durable, international, response. I do not mean to insist upon some sort of international counterterrorism police force, as such a measure is fraught with the issues discussed up to this point – the balance of power between national interest and international intervention and the validity of interventions viewed from the national perspective, among others. A further reason for the national focus is because any response to international terrorism must begin with the nation in mind – a cohesive and transparent population with a strong but informed relationship with the government. Though imaging such a reality is nice, such is not necessarily the case with even some of the most progressive nations. It is exactly such breaches in the road to such a nation that extremists may exploit, working through more subtle backchannels, in defiance of more organized warfare on political and institutional levels. Barring the establishment of this quality of nation, approaches to co-opting and regulating these channels are necessary – counterterrorism of an informal, but strategic, nature. It is doubtless that the rationale employed by ISIS is, at best, draconic. The misguided nostalgia of the resurrection of a long-lost Caliph (Salazar; Bures) is enough to render them as backdated, out-of-touch, uninformed rabble. However, a minority of the current rhetoric surrounding ISIS's methods discusses their striking tech-savvy, and the means by which they employ recruitment methods digitally. This inattention does not necessarily correlate to a lack of knowledge regarding these practices, but the rhetoric of conflict does not often seem suited to the digital space. The metaphor of the “War” on terror – a just war against “the ideology of 29 oppression, violence, and hate” (Kruglanski 102), and promises of international peace and prosperity, are not so glamorous when envisioning targeting and suppressing 250-character tweets or reporting extremist-motivated videos to the YouTube filtering algorithm. ISIS sports a sizeable social media presence, and though accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have more recently come under scrutiny, the sheer expansive depth of the internet does little to help the discovery and subsequent countering of extremist content. ISIS often uses social media to target vulnerable and isolated groups of youth, enticed by much of the same promises of ideological unity and camaraderie. Online gatherings, more so than physical collectivization, are more practical and effective entryways into these extremist connections, as communication is seamless and, for each newer generation, more natural (Ozeren et al.) Online forms, group chats, and virtual hangouts are all potential places of digital collectivization; the latter of these are more difficult to track given considerations of user privacy upheld by social media and messaging platforms (Greenberg). ISIS employs its social media accounts as more accessible sites for propaganda, re-emphasizing the in/out-group philosophy, engaging in readily quotable nuggets of “wisdom” for followers that redouble the “truth” of their narratives. Quotes range from proclamations of the victory to be found in the new caliphate, to the beauty of martyrdom serving Islam, and the tragedy of dying outside caliphate lands. Social media sites are also often a platform to spread fabricated stories about violence done against Muslims, promoting the narrative of the “subjugated” Muslim and rationalizing violence against the “unfaithful” (Ozeren et al.). These narratives reinforce the cohesiveness of the follower group as they collate into an echo chamber, reifying each other’s radical beliefs in the process. In light of the threat posed by this self-proclaimed “Islamic State Electronic Army”, Greenberg outlines three broad categories of counterterrorist mobilization: disruption, diversion, 30 and counter-messaging. The first of these concerns the most outright, though most reactive, of methods, and finds physical analogy in the methods outlined by Pokalova, though to a more measured degree in the digital sphere. Disruption concerns suppressing radical content as it is encountered, reporting the content and suspending the accounts. Like with outright suppression in real-life, this “tends to enhance a game of cat and mouse, of who can outplay the other in terms of avoiding detection" (Greenberg 168). This approach necessitates that counterterrorist forces are on the back foot, as they must first find already generated radical content to then take action upon. The suppression of content is also a delicate topic for social media platforms, which are "global communities…engaged in a constant process of determining community norms as the use of the platform evolves" (Greenberg 168). One wrongful suppression can stir up a whirlwind of controversy regarding the authenticity of a site's user privacy claims. Though suppression is thus limited in its overall efficacy and proactiveness, it does have the benefit of steadily driving ISIS off of more accessible sites on the internet, thus reducing the ease with which they may communicate. While Greenberg does note the usefulness of driving ISIS to the deeper corners of the web, a potential threat is in amplifying out-group mentalities among at-risk peoples as they dig into deeper, more inaccessible sites for a sense of belonging. Thus, these disruption and suppression techniques are often more effective in tandem with diversion and counter-messaging methods. Diversion methods, simply put, redirect search results to counter-messaging sites that subvert the ideologies sought after in the original search. Counter-radicalization material and narratives that argue against the discourse of extremism from reliable sources, as well as local community organizations to offer a sense of belonging to the vulnerable target populations, may all crop up instead of extremist dialogue (Greenberg). Rather than being framed as outright 31 censorship, diversion programs delegitimize extremist rhetoric by portraying moderate and counter-radical alternatives as more readily available and accepting. Though it is reductive to attempt to encapsulate under a handful of descriptors the range of people that seek out radical content, it is fair to say that there are some who are driven to such content from a perceived lack of other options – desperation and naiveté. While suppression pushes the narrative of further isolation and deprivation for these seekers, diversions are meant to offer a response to their search. Counter-messaging methods once more take up a more direct, and sometimes nearly as heavy-handed, approach as outright suppression. One approach within the method encourages moderate Muslim community leaders to dispute radical interpretations of religious texts and history. The efficacy of this moderate-based approach has been noted previously in this discussion, though the limitation is not so much the inability to rally such moderates as it is the ability to reach those who feel isolated from their religious communities, who are the most prone to radicalization. A second approach within the method involves dissolving the idealization of life serving under ISIS, utilizing testimonies from those fleeing life under the organization alongside assertions of life being better outside of ISIS rather than within. Most often, these took the form of video series from the U.S. Global Engagement Centre, the British Prevent counterterrorist organization, and the Arab Centre for Scientific Research and Humane Studies (Greenberg), to name a few. As many of these methods are government sanctioned and openly hosted on government sites, their legitimacy is often brought into question in much the same way that the government-sanctioned moderates are. The exclusion of Muslims from the dialogue, as well as the othering rhetoric of the current U.S. political leaders against Muslims, have undermined the authenticity of Western counter-messaging, exacerbating issues of isolation by 32 making out the refutations of ISIS legitimacy to be motivated by a fear of Muslims as a whole, regardless of the distinctions between moderates or radicals (Greenberg). Overall, the digital is a major front against the encroachment of extremist rhetoric. While the discourse of a “war” on terror is difficult to map onto the slower, less visible precautions taken against ISIS, it is increasingly more important to develop robust and sustainable online counterterrorist efforts. Given that the internet lends itself to communal identity development – a persistent rhetorical strategy across radical narratives – methods of decreasing the availability of and access to extremist content would be ideal, though the actual ability to carry through with such measures are questionable. Of Greenberg’s three noted strategies, the process of diversion is superior in that it is able to impress counterterrorist narratives while being relatively free and detached from traditional, national institutions, thus making it more difficult for would-be recruits to attach a particular governmental agenda to the method. Furthermore, the legitimacy of non-radical alternatives heightens their proactivity, which undercuts the discursive power of proclamation by subverting its utterance before it has come to pass. The proactivity is useful in that it is shaky grounds upon which to assert the “subjugation” of the Muslim faith on the part of ISIS, as in this method counterterror initiatives are not presented as such. On the surface, it appears that moderate philosophy is simply more accessible, not by the mandates of a repressive government, but because of the inherent accessibility and communality of moderate philosophy. 33 The War on Terror One, if not the, most recognizable of adages in counterterrorism is that of the “War on Terror.” Coined following the 9/11 attacks by the Bush administration, this narrative has since come under fire over the decades for its rhetoric of violence and fear, essentially reasserting the “truth” in extremist narratives of oppressive, Western, non-Muslim organizations (Salazar). As has already been noted previously in the discussion, the use of armed resistance, nor the sentiment of outrage and vengeance, are unprecedented, and the former has seen some successful use in a handful of scenarios. These successes are often in the broader context of larger failures of belligerent counterterrorism, but through a review of these failures we may yet arrive at potential, alternative, and effective rhetorical means of framing the conflict. It might seem redundant that a War on Terror favours a combative approach, yet there are implications beyond the obvious: war, as a responsive method of counterterrorism, is limited in its effectiveness. The persistence of the phrase “war on terror” can be attributed to rhetorical potency of each individual word, and of the relative succinctness of the phrase in effectively encapsulating the sentiments that surround the confrontation with “terror.” The complex interaction between the words is such that the process of extracting the meaning vested within each, independent of the others, is a laborious, though worthwhile, process. I should note that the following section is a necessary departure from a discussion of countering terrorist recruitment, as “war on terror” rhetoric does not allow for a narrative of dissolving recruitment. The narrative creates an “us versus them” mentality (not unlike those of extremist groups), which does not allow for a middle-ground moderate, and is one of the barriers towards approaching moderate Muslims openly in Western counterterrorist initiatives (Helmus; Jackson; “Moderates”). This reality aside, the rhetoric is extremely isolating and exclusive, breeding an anxiety that 34 extremists forces often exploit and point to as validation for their methods. One such practice is the sweeping inclusion of “terrorists” across different ethnic groups in the Middle East following 9/11, which al Qaeda at the time pointed to as an instance of the U.S. outright targeting Islam in its retributive wrath (Helmus). Never more than now has divisive commentary reaped rewards for those that engage in it, vis a vis Donald Trump, the current American president, so countering recruitment has taken a backseat to the exercises of military power and nationalist sentiment. At least in part, the roots of this present are found in the rhetorical construction of a “war on terror.” Terror Terror is ephemeral and monolithic, and thus overwhelming and insurmountable. Terror cannot be grasped, nor struck, nor destroyed, and so in turning to the phrase “war on terror” we find the root of persistence of the rhetoric of war. Fundamentally, terror is involuntary and experiential. Thus, terror is internal, but it is forced unto victims, and in experiencing terror one experiences the agency of a violent and radical other, deeply and internally. In response, war is the enaction of physical actions: external agency brought to bear on the physically and ideologically external (i.e. foreign nations, foreign peoples). So, while the war on terror might be acted out in armed conflict, it is also as much a conflict to wrest agency of the self back from this ephemeral terror, wielded by terrorists in this conflict. The insurmountable paradox here is in the disconnect between the impulse to purge the internal through external practice. War exists because terror exists, and because war is there to counteract terror, war in itself must be one of two things: either ephemeral and thus intangible to those who perpetrate it, or physical but incapable of striking down the mercurial force of “terror.” Violent extremists or the innocuous Muslim family next door, both are merely relational substitutes to “terror,” because terror cannot 35 manifest anywhere except deeply within the hearts of civilians at home. The war on terror as we may see it played out in the Middle East is an approximation of an unattainable goal, as to attain this sought out victory of over the terror is a proxy for the attempts to wrest terror out of the self. Burkean theory offers elucidation on this particular enactment in the notion of substantiating as forming, wherein the smallest unit of substance, or symbolic action, is “human body in conscious and purposive action”, and “motive” embodies all “one can know of the field, [and is] the key to the form of, that action” (Durham 358-9). Within this theoretical framework, terror is the motive by which substance – symbolic action – is rationalized, and integral to the form of that war on terror is, fundamentally, the terror of victims. While this assertion may seem self-evident, the consequence of this relation is in the rhetorical proposition that “the operation of one motive necessarily implies the operation of its opposite” (Durham 359), where in this case the operation of terror in the self is the perceived motivation for war, then it must be so that the operation of terror in the thing furthest from the self is the simultaneous contrary that motivates war. In other words, the adage of a war on terror is perennial because it involves wresting terror out of the internal and private sphere at home, and also from the hands of those in the external, public, and alien sphere. Further within this interplay of motives is the exigent desire for an inversion of roles: war strips terror from those at home, returning agency, while simultaneously stripping terror from those aggressive and abroad, seizing their agency. The transfer of helplessness from victim to terrorist is the intoxicating implication of the concept: that one could, through force of arms, shift the onus of fear onto its once-perpetrators. A less vindictive reason for why the “war on terror” has become so addicting in the discourse of counterterrorism is because the phrase empowers individuals against the helplessness of terror within and without by reasserting that there is a way out of terror. To say 36 “we are engaged in a war on terror” is to also build community with those in a similar struggle, and this comfort of herd solidarity forms another bulwark against the encroachment of terror. However, these motivations do not dilute the aggressive nature of the phrase. A “war on terror” grounds and simplifies a complex interplay between external and internal action, in much the way that a metaphor tends to function (Kruglanski). Metaphors “structure thought in application to particular events…constitute ways of simplifying complex realities…and…induce a sense of familiarity and comprehension” (Kurglanski 98). The essential reality of the war against terrorism “as it is” intrinsically and fundamentally is as ephemeral as the terror, since neither the criteria for victory, nor the antagonizing ideology, nor even the entity that embodies “terror” are static or achievable. As will become apparent further on, this war is paradoxical, because while the metaphor invokes “war” as the medium of resistance, it is war devoid of any of its precepts. It is war that, in occupying manifold purposes, ceases to be a concrete and practicable action. On The use of even this preposition is significant. Working backwards from terror, the preposition mediates the interaction between war and terror. Most notably, it distinguishes from “a war against terror.” “Against” implies a conflict of equality, but “on” implies the superiority of one over the other. To use “on” is to evoke subordination of terror in the very moment of the phrase’s utterance, as repetitions of the phrase “a war on terror” suggests that this is not a war of equals, but that terror and those are relegated to the realm of terror are necessarily lesser to those who stand on the opposite end of the conflict. The spatial invocation is also meant to reassert the agency of those afflicted by terror, reifying a reassuring narrative that terror is subordinate to war and so eventually dissoluble. 37 The placement of “on” also verbally counteracts the affliction of terror, as typically the enforcement of terror is a method of subjugation in its own right. Terror is inflicted onto victims, so that implication of war on terror is that war is being forced onto terrorists in the same way. The application of the word is also complicit in the persistence of the “war on terror” because it serves a double-edged purpose in forcing counterterror and civilian agents to work within the “terministic screen” (“Screens” 45) of extremist agents. Proposed by Burke, the notion of terministic screens is that different contexts necessarily draw attention, in different ways, to the same subject of observation. To attempt to work within the same screen is, simply put, to enter into the context of extremist agents. In terms of “on”, it is a psychological crutch upon which to assert one’s safety in the enactment of war against terror (thus countering extremists), in the same breath the word also reasserts the success of terrorist forces in inflicting terror. While navigating the terministic screens of terrorists is key to subverting their intended goals – that is, to create terror and “engender fear beyond the bounds of the immediate context of their violent acts” (Frank 93) – in conjunction with the other two words of the phrase, the shared screen has failed to bring effective results. This is because terror means relying on the “intrusion of the past into the present” (Frank 94) to persist. Such a state, paradoxically, is perpetuated by this very narrative aimed at ending the threat of radical extremists. War War is the most problematic of the three words. It is the governing phrase that outlines the agentic response of the West against extremism. War is what “we” do in response to what “they” do, and so war is more than the sum total of its denotations: war is couched in self-38 identity. Through the construction of enough identities, war becomes an impetus for collective action, and then the basis of national identity (Prewitt et al.). Given the country-of-origin for the phrase, the assertion is yet more believable. The United States’ global war on terror is an extension of its involvement in the Second World War, the cold War, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, and even Vietnam (Kurglanski). When I say that the war on terror is without end, it is because the United States has long portrayed itself as a force against “injustice” and “terror”, if not in these recent conflicts then in its role in the “emancipation” of the Philippines from the Spanish, or further back in its “defense” of South America from European debt. Even still, if to say the United States has defined itself through armed resistance is unfair, then I will at least tentatively assert this: the United States has continually affirmed itself as a beacon of “democracy…freedom…and even civilization itself” (Kruglanski 100). Even if war is not an ideal, the defense of those tenants is, and the September 11th attacks were construed as such. Terror is future-oriented, both in that it attempts to instill long-lasting fear, and as a perennial weapon to be wielded by terrorist forces. However, it is also ephemeral. As noted, war is mobilized to match and subjugate terror, but to do so war itself must be conceived through the same terministic screens, as without a war that is also future-oriented, terror will simply outlast the efforts of the “good” and “just” to stop it. The war against terror fundamentally cannot have static goals, methods, or even actors, because it must keep apace. At the same time, the rhetoric has grounded certain perennial ideologies in the approach towards terror. One is the inextricable frame of the Middle East as a location for terrorist activity, wherein the perception of the place as always riddled with war feeds into idea of the war on terror as an inter-generational and persistent conflict. War simply “is”, and in that the U.S. becomes steeped in the anxiety of wartime. This has never been more readily apparent than in the rise of hyper-nationalistic and 39 right-wing sentiment in the West, and the election of Donald Trump despite (read: because) of his divisive rhetoric, which preyed on decades-long anxieties. Pyszczynski notes the need for culture to “serve as a shield against the deeply rooted anxiety that results from…awareness of the inevitability of death” (Prewitt et al. 1139), yet when that selfsame shield is war, then a culture obsessed with that inevitability, caught in the paradox of fighting anxiety with anxiety – of willing sacrifice demanded by the government (Kruglanski) against unwilling sacrifice enforced by terroristic regimes – is going to turn to those who outright embrace a hawkish narrative. Consequences of a Narrative The rhetoric of war has held a central place in counterterrorism, coming under scrutiny just as much as it has found use as a practiced method. However, the narrative overall does more harm than good to those that apply it: despite the occasional efficacy of armed resistance, following the hawkish path locks the population in state of anxiety, orienting them towards terror in much the way terrorist methods do. War is also positioned as an oppositional mirror to terror in the narrative, transforming the act of war into an ideological identity, advocating for its practice in the public sphere to divest victims of a sensation that strikes deeply and privately. The narrative isolates those who do not fit into familiar groups, arming radical recruiters with a population of the disenfranchised, isolated, and helpless, while also setting apart viable targets that ISIS may point to as indicators of an oppressive and prejudicial West. Alternatives, however, exist to this approach, as exemplified in the works by Savun and Tirone, or that of Greenberg and Ozeren et al. Mobilizing fair, democratic processes tap into the same group that terrorist recruiters target and turn them towards more positive communal identities. Similarly, online diversionary tactics remove the easily targetable opposition from Islamist narratives, 40 instead subverting radical ideology by presenting readily accessible, reputable alternatives. I also assert that my analysis has revealed a key demand of any counterterrorist work that taps into vulnerable groups as a recruitment pool: that of accessing and demystifying the rhetorical functions performed by the words both terror and counterterror forces employ in their guiding narratives. As with the “war on terror”, individual words perform multiple functions, and utterances instantiate realities that might not be visible at first glance. 41 Chapter 3 – The Narratives of ISIS Based on the literature detailing the range of methods aimed at impeding terrorist recruitment, the crux of the ensuing analysis is based on the assertions that: outright suppression, whether in physical or digital space, cannot be the sole method for impeding recruitment; people seek out reasonable alternatives when they perceive failings in their institutions; communal, grassroots work based on shared identity is effective in impeding extremist narratives; counterterrorism must be proactive rather than reactive, particularly in dealing with vulnerable targeted groups; and the rhetorical frames used to guide counterterror initiatives must be carefully considered and controlled. This final point is to ensure that counterterrorist rhetoric neither unwittingly reifies terrorist ideologies, nor alienates those in vulnerable groups who find themselves drawn to extremist sentiment as anchors for community. This chapter isolates three key terms – martyr, Caliphate, and paradise – that are consistently used across different ISIS media to understand their rhetorical potency in drawing recruits to ISIS. While it is true that ISIS rhetoric is a phenomenon more complex than a few constituent words, the purpose of this rhetorical extraction is not to offer "the key" to refuting all of their assertions. Rather, it is to demystify salient terms that have been reiterated both in terrorist and counterterrorist media. Oftentimes public portrayals and reports exoticize or parrot back the very terminology that terrorist forces use in their own discourse (Salazar). When news reports repeat even something as now inextricably tied to discussions of ISIS – “Allah” – they reify their radical (and false) assertions of adherence to the Muslim faith (Salazar). Simultaneously, while targets of terror look to the machinations of radicals as eerily alien, they attempt, through repetitions and reports of extremist phrases to formulate an understanding of such radical actions. These acts of repetition, however, perform function of proclamation and 42 reassert the method of verbal instantiation the Caliph – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – utilizes in its own rhetoric. Targeting ISIS’s commonly used terminology engages a specific mode of rhetorical comprehension: that of sharing the terministic screen of recruiters and would-be recruits. This is done, however, by criticizing the phrases at length even as they are uttered, rather than simply “reporting” the terms. The chosen terms are taken from translations of messages broadcast over social media, videos on ISIS’s sites, and publications in their various written sources. Admittedly the terms are mundane, but I attest that the key to demystifying the unbending and self-assured rhetoric of ISIS involves such meticulous looks at the given terms of their speech. The “buzzwords” they invoke, exoticized in italics across literature and media, often refer to specific material within Islam. These are often used “as-is” in the sense that what they refer are exactly those artifacts. For example, “nasheed” – religious hymns – refers to that act of recitation, and while the act itself might be symbolically potent, the invocation of the term itself is not as replete with meaning. Similarly, “hadith” – prophetic traditions – refer to a set of guidelines whose interpretations through extremist philosophy might lead to dangerous ideologies. While the reference to the hadith might be appealing as they offer form and structure to the practice of the Islamic faith (the warped iterations of ISIS, that is), the term itself is not vested with ambiguity, or the interpretive space between the utterance of the recruiter and the reception by the would-be recruit where meaning may be constructed. Each of the three chosen terms perform a rhetorical function, both independently and in conjunction with one other. Certainly, there are more terms in the rhetoric of recruitment, but these number among the most prominent. The rhetoric of the martyr inspires reassertions of self-efficacy and asserts a place for all martyrs in the defining narratives of ISIS. The rhetoric of the 43 Caliphate asserts a place of community in a revived empire built on a mythological past. The rhetoric of paradise performs the role of spectacle, drawing recruits to the previous to terms and holding attention until the previous two terms become more dominantly influencing. As with the discussion on the "war on terror", each of the terms doubtlessly interacts and feed into one another, and so a discussion of one will necessarily refer back to the others. However, their individual potencies are outlined as best as possible from here on out. Each tap into a kind of mythology, either constructed by Islamist radicals, or as revivals of long-gone cultural identity, to project the image of an elevated, grandiose cause. Delegitimation of the organization demands the disempowerment of these terms and the narratives they uphold. Martyr – The Narrative of the Individual At the outset, it would important to outline the link between the mental states of those who find themselves targeted for recruitment, and the motivations behind martyrdom. As noted, the allure of a community founded on collective grievance is often what draws recruits to fundamentalist circles, after which that grievance is molded to fit the terroristic ideology. Thus, on the very surface of the term, martyrdom is compelling because one becomes a martyr by sacrificing themselves towards the “cause”, compelled by the belief that their actions will go on to support the vitality of the terrorist organization. There is more to this rationalization, however. Feelings of loneliness, helplessness, and powerlessness are common among those targeted, and for these, martyrdom appears to offer empowerment and significance in the organization. This empowerment is realized at the moment of sacrifice – of martyrdom – because even while the community may offer a reprieve from loneliness, it is only through the promise of reclaiming oneself from incapacity that the recruited continue to invest themselves in the narrative. 44 The moment of sacrifice is important because it marks not the moment of the completion of ritual, but the beginning of it. This is most notably visible in acts of unwilling sacrifice, carried out against prisoners of ISIS. Both in conventional instances of Islam, and in the warped faith of extremists, rituals are sites of discursive power because they necessitate both a kind of preamble – specifically denoting the sacrifice as one to Allah – as well as a subsequent exhortation. These, of course, take different forms in legitimate and illegitimate executions of faith, and in the case of the latter the most famous of these “preambles” is the infamous “Allahu Akbar”: “God is great.” In the cases of the unwilling sacrifice, this preamble is performed by prisoners’ expiations, after which is their “sacrifice”, and after that is the discourse among the executioners pointing to the sacrifice as a cautionary tale for those that defy the Caliphate. For those who sacrifice willingly, the preamble is only ever in that momentary seconds before sacrifice, such as in the case of suicide bombers, after which the exhortation is conducted by others in the terror organization. The allure of the willing act of sacrifice is in how the act of ritualistic destruction creates a temporal and physical site of rhetorical potency. That ritual is the interface of, or the bridge by which, apodictic truths – that "God is great" and the "greatness/necessity of the Caliphate" are brought together. The ritual of destruction bridges those cornerstone moments of proclamation through an un-ignorable and radical act of dedication, drawing the attention of both victims and terrorists to those apodictic truths. As noted, proclamation reifies truth in Islam, and in this vein, the sacrifice reifies the position of those truths as simultaneous speech acts. In the act of bridging, the sacrificed is also raised to the level of apodictic truth (in the minds of the terrorists), being a figure of mythic potency that stands as an example of the future violent actions to be performed by future recruits. That ritual thus creates, as Perry and Long posit, a "transhistorical 45 figure" attached to a "primordial, mythical time made present" in each instance that the sacrifice is recalled as an example (5). Abu Jafr, in planning his own suicide attack, echoes the proclamation of previous attacker Rabi bin Amir: “paradise for him who dies fighting…and victory for him who survives” (Perry & Long 11). Thus, the sacrificed themselves become a speech act whose naming performs the act of exhortation to violent action. This act of becoming a speech act is a further part of the appeal of the martyr, entrenching oneself in the meaning-making processes of the faith as it is portrayed in radical circles. When one recalls passages from the Quran, they recall stories of martyrdom, which stand as the fundaments of radical organizations. Like these fundaments, the act of martyrdom is reiterated and retold, with each retelling essentially becoming an instantiation of the martyr in present day. The bodies of the deceased attackers themselves stand as examples reifying the words of al-Baghdadi: that the Caliphate was “built from the limbs of the martyrs and irrigated with their blood” (Perry & Long 13). More so than simply an example, the narrative of martyrs is embodied manifold in future recruits as they speak of the moment of sacrifice. This draw towards embodiment is also insisted upon in constructions of a martyr. One who is a martyr is a “heroic witness” (Salazar 115). Furthermore, a martyr is an embodiment of warrior virtue because he has thrown himself into the “battleground” and emerged intimately scathed, marred and brutalized. They are contrasted against the distanced, disembodied methods of war in drone and missile strikes, carried out by counterterrorist powers. Powerlessness and isolation breed the mindset for the radicalized to prize the "here-ness" of the moment of sacrifice, experienced viscerally in connection with the earth. For example, one prized martyr of ISIS Abu Jafr, in his final testament, declared “my feet are in the dust, but my head is in the stars”, and again that he intends to “strike with the spear or be honoured in death” 46 (as quoted in Perry and Long 11). In contrast to the feeling of otherness and separation from community experienced by would-be targets, those who are recruited are drawn to the moment of absolute, conscious, physical embodiment – specifically an embodiment of the body as a tool and weapon, possessed of the agentic capacity for change. This process is not to ground one’s choices in the material, however, but is rather a further act of expiation by fully inhabiting and then detaching from the inhibitions of the material. The approach to and subsequent relinquishment of radical physical awareness reasserts the permanence of a rhetorical presence, mythologized in the discourse of war. In summation, the rhetoric of martyrdom appeals to the vulnerable because it assures their place as foundational members in communal, rhetorical, space. This transhistorical, mythologized presence integrates the martyr in future discussions of sacrifice. The self is elevated to the level of apodictic truth, alongside fervent and foundational proclamations of faith, thus reaffirming belief in their own efficacy and importance to the group’s functioning. While martyrdom means the sacrifices only realize this belief at the moment of ritual consumption, the mythologizing that happens afterwards and is mediated by leaders of the organization (actions that the sacrificed would have seen prior to their death) transubstantiates the sacrifice’s existence into one that will always have a purpose. For those who feel powerless to effect change against injustices done unto them, this alleged martyrdom gives them the chance to relinquish negative emotions and become a perpetual force of change. Just as the prepositional “on” linked “terror” and “war” in counterterrorist rhetoric, so too does “martyr” perform a connecting role between the domains of the ascendant spiritual and the spiritual as it is seen on earth. These two domains are represented by the term “paradise” and the 47 term “Caliphate,” respectively, and will fall under rhetorical scrutiny in the following sections, beginning with “Caliphate.” Caliphate – The Narrative of the State Whereas paradise is promised to martyrs, this access to paradise is only achievable when mediated by the dedication to the Caliphate. The Caliphate refers to a pan-Islamic empire, which would allegedly hold authority over all Muslims as an international governing body. A somewhat more welcoming term to refer this empire has been “Ummah”, meaning community, though that word is less common than the authoritative invocation of the Caliphate. The term has also found frequent use in the online sphere, as the “digital Caliphate.” The efficacy of the term in the recruitment of those who feel ousted from their local communities is fairly self-evident: a monolithic, imposing, global expanse contrasted by what may appear to be an unjust, fractious local community. The use of the article, “the”, to modify “Caliphate” elevates the importance, making it out to be all the more formidable. The appeal of the Caliphate, as with most other common terms invoked in recruitment rhetoric, is that its existence is reaffirmed with each mention, doubly so when media sources acknowledge the naming of the Caliphate, as that vests the term with legitimacy as a notable threat. Another major draw is the communal constitution of the empire, allegedly built on the dedication and faith of its members, insisting upon a pseudo-democratic system. Each of these aspects are interwoven with each other, and with the concepts of “martyrdom” and “paradise”, creating a convoluted, albeit compelling, rhetorical web. The distinction between a Caliphate and the Caliphate is also noteworthy in the transhistorical role the invocation of the concept performs. While ISIS’s goals are aimed at taking swathes of territory as a physical restoration of the old Muslim empire, the simple act of 48 the empire’s resurrection was carried out by the proclamation of a new Caliphate by al-Baghdadi’s speech act in Mosul. The moniker, in turn, found legitimation from the West even if the name was invoked for no other reason than as a referential title. The carelessness of reiterating dialogue mobilized by ISIS fuels the legitimation of the Caliphate narrative: news reported “as fact” reifies the Caliphate “as fact” (Salazar; Frank). Thus, even before the rhetorical processes of the organization come into play, the imposing terror of the Caliphate is realized and further amplified in the very information channels of the victims of the organization. The failings of media reporting are tied to the mythological basis of the Caliphate. A Muslim empire did indeed exist until the 13th century, but the contemporary “Caliphate” asserted by ISIS only captures that past in name and mythology, and asserts such a Caliphate into existence by invoking that mythical past, and grounding it in the actions of mythical figures vis-à-vis terrorist martyrs. The martyrs, however, are only partially tied to the conception of this Caliphate: another significant facet is the marker of the Caliphate as a bastion against the “end times”, of which the conflicts in Syria and Iraq were meant to be indications (Mahood & Rane). Bound within the notions of a mythical past, and mythical transhistorical figures who hail the repetition of a “glorious” past in contemporary acts of violence, the Caliphate becomes framed as an earthly mirror to the spiritual paradise. Acts of violence, meant to inspire “salutary fear”, become acts that impel vision towards both the physical and metaphysical Caliphate, and are intended to drive capitulation to the state. Just as those of the Caliphate look “above” for their passage into paradise, so too do they attempt to inspire a “looking above” through their actions in victims. For those who have “realized” the greatness of the Caliphate, may aim for paradise. For those still residing in apostacy, the Caliphate itself is the ideal to which they are meant to aspire. 49 In short, the Caliphate is framed as a myth by attaching it to an imagined and idealized mythical past, which in turn elevates the modern, visible, real territorial gains of ISIS as a realization of myth. Acts of terror aim at “’revealing” this mythical realization. Though it may seem a crude rationale, the visibility of such a state would compel those who feel disenfranchised and rendered invisible in their communities to band together under their banner. Since the retaking of the final bastion of ISIS territory in Baghuz in March of 2019, the mystique of the territory would have certainly taken a hit, but the organization’s mythos persists. The Caliphate is, after all, not necessarily bound to a physical place – the “digital caliphate” moniker for ISIS’s online efforts is only one such example of this. The “essence” of the Caliphate – the “authority” it extols possession of, over all Muslims across the world – persists beyond materiality. The Caliphate came into existence asserting that it held a priori authority over Muslims, branding those outside its ranks as apostates. It is its own appeal to authority, establishing itself as the concentrated, vocal “familiar” to which all other Muslim establishments are “other.” Those among ISIS’s ranks may refer to the Caliphate as “al-dawlat”, or “the state” (Salazar 33), affirming apodictic truth in utterance. Thus, it creates the enthymeme of the states of apostasy from those Muslims who have not rallied to their cause. Working within the frame of a mythical past, coupled with this seized authority, the state attempts to trigger “radical reflection” in a greater Muslim “political community” (Campbell 351). In positioning itself as “Muslim authority”, it preys on act of prejudice carried out against followers of the faith, radical and moderate alike. They then point to these acts as validation for its own existence, allegedly standing as a pillar of the faith against those rallied against it. That it inspires terror under the banner of “Islam” is, of course, an intentional strategy to further alienate Muslims from their community and give rise to acts of Islamophobic prejudice. 50 In pointing to these acts of prejudice, and then back to itself as a “haven” for Muslims replete with community, camaraderie and inclusiveness (a veritable “paradise” on earth), the Caliphate constructs itself as a reservoir for Muslim culture. Thus, it takes up the right to define cultural memory, which it readily exploits to create mythic pasts and presents. According to Campbell’s interpretation of McGee regarding how linguistic change is carried out rhetorically among cultures, language “as an event in consciousness and constitutive identity” shapes the political consciousness of a people and drives them forward to reinterpret themselves culturally. This process of shaping occurs during a point of “radical reflection”, which is triggered by “a moment of danger”, but the change is shaped by “an individual” looking into the “magazine of cultural memory” to bring forth a fragment of the past around which a new identity forms. This creates a future political identity based on values of the past, where “previous self-interpretations…affirm…present self-definition” (Campbell 352). The Caliphate as a name draws on the once-crystallized position and authority of previous caliphates and drives itself forward as the individual who reaches into cultural memory to extract once-truths to redefine the present state of all Muslims. There is no one moment of radical reflection, but rather several moments of danger that the state will highlight in the West and in the physical “lands” of the Caliphate: the aforementioned conflicts in the Middle East being among them. The Caliphate draws on history to entrench itself as apodictic, speaking with the voice of Islam in its exigent call to resurrect materially what it has pulled from the dead cultural memory of the pan-Islamic state. That no modern, moderate, institution speaks with the voice of that pan-Islamic state now only reifies the authority of the state. As with martyrs, the state creates anew, based on an extinct past, and the past is retroactively shaped to support the new – to support the Caliphate. The state places itself at the centre of a self-conceived rallying 51 call, whose centrality and authority offer yet another appeal for those pushed to the fringes, away from their respective cultural and communal centre. Despite authoritatively asserting itself into existence, the Caliphate often advertises itself as a community built by the everyman. The communal constitution of the Caliphate implies a participatory, stakeholder culture that encourages grassroots support, going so far as to integrate the everyman into the very mythos of the Caliphate. ISIS propaganda frequently frames its jihadists as people taken from the rank-and-file of society. These are people who are shown as having hobbies, families, and even a stable and supportive community, similar to “any other soldier in any other army” (Mahood & Rane 29). The normalcy suggested by these followers of ISIS reduce self-critical judgment of potential recruits who may have been swayed by counterterrorist rhetoric, or simply hesitant because of the culture of violence within the Caliphate. The everyman narrative also fosters the idea of inclusivity, despite the very clear contrasting narratives of exclusivity that condemn those that refuse to follow the state. They will reconcile these narratives by positing the personal experiences of those who join, outlining their feeling of dissatisfaction with their countries of origin, constructing victim narratives to elicit sympathy and pointing to the cases of warlike rhetoric in the West as indicators of Islam’s subjugation. This means the Caliphate, paradoxically, is able to straddle the narratives of greatness and humbleness, generally by positioning its efforts as a righteous struggle against oppressive Western or apostate regimes (Zekulin; Mahood; Salazar). In summation, the rhetoric of the Caliphate is one that dovetails with the martyr in their mythic and transhistorical foundations. The rhetoric often positions the authority of the state as a priori, insisting command over Muslims globally. The Caliphate also bases itself as the mediator 52 of cultural memory, first positioning itself as the reclamation of an idealized past, retroactively fitting that past onto Muslim communities worldwide, and then urging a reorientation of a "pan-Islamic" culture. Finally, the Caliphate also advocates a grassroots support structure, where the everyman can be raised to the level of the mythic through martyrdom. The allure of this term is in the potential of every contributor to be regarded at an elevated level, dispelling feelings of helplessness and isolation, instead turning recruits into creators of, and adherents to, purportedly global cultural change. Narratives of inclusivity also form part of the enticement, while victim narratives position the Caliphate as a global need mobilized in response to conflicts initiated by apostacy. Overall, the Caliphate draws in victims because it promises constitutive importance to even the most recent recruit, allowing access into the mythos. The only step beyond the Caliphate, having achieved mythical martyrdom, is the promise of paradise. Paradise – The Narrative of Promise The speeches and parables of ISIS are often replete with the notion of “paradise”: the ultimate reward of a service pledged to the Caliphate. It is the extension and ultimate aim of the Caliphate. In many ways the appeal of the paradise is in the balance it strikes between linearity and sacrifice. It seems an almost overly simplistic pathway to achieving paradise – from joining the Caliphate, to martyrdom, to heaven. Of course, the attainment necessitates self-destruction, and because the suicide is expressly forbidden in the mandates of the Quran, the promise of paradise must doubly appeal against both the survival impulse, and the religious doctrines upon which ISIS attests its foundation. The efficacy of paradise is tied to the motivations for martyrdom, so much of the rationale for paradise are the same as those for willing sacrifice. I attest, however, that paradise, 53 practically, cannot be the “endgame” for ISIS, since for all the talk of heavenly delights, the organization configures its followers as soldiers. These feet on the ground are paramount for its practical territorial expansion. At the same time, martyrdom already enmeshes the individual in the greater rhetoric of the Caliphate, so paradise, in that regard, is located not in the divine outlined above, but in the constitutive discourse and proclamations of the state. Furthermore, paradise cannot be construed as a self-interested goal, as that would violate the spirit of communality that ISIS promotes. So, what then is the allure of a paradise? Rather than reward, I would instead locate the rhetoric of paradise in the realm of rhetorical spectacle, on par with the spectacles of mutilation and killings that ISIS propagates in its media. Despite the dialogue of relinquishing earthly belongings and ascending into Heaven, the actual invocations of paradise often place it (in metaphorical) space beside the Caliphate, if not firmly grounded in the physical than hovering only a few inches away from it. A telling quote from Abu Jafr, in one of ISIS’s video propaganda pieces, has a final cutaway scene as he stands next to a van brimming with explosives. When one of the interviewers asks him if he intends on selling the car, Jafr jokes back “sell it? Why would anyone sell paradise?” (as quoted in Perry & Long 11). Another mention of paradise is taken from an interaction between ISIS operative Rabi bin Amir and a Persian commander named Rustam, wherein bin Amir asserts that the promise of God to all ISIS operatives is “paradise for him who dies while fighting…and victory for him who survives” (as quoted in Perry & Long 5). In addition to these claims, Jafr also referenced back to his namesake in the Quran, who, as he flung into battle, cried, “how wonderful is Paradise as it draws near! How pleasant and cool is its drink! Punishment for the Byzantines is not far away!” (Perry & Long 4). 54 Before I analyze the rhetoric of ISIS paradise, I would also like to draw attention to the traditional narratives of paradise in Islam. Paradise is a place that accentuates pleasure beyond consummation. This means that there is no sense of “fulfillment” in paradise in terms of being “done” with feeling pleasure: it is continuous, uninterrupted, and heighted to inconceivable proportions to create a “sense of spectacular unreality” (Al-Azmeh 225). For example, one reading of the reception at the gates of paradise posits that “a procession of the blessed, led by Adam…and [all] prophets…in the flash of an eyelid, traverse the span of a silver castle that length of 1000 years’ march” (Al-Azmeh 228). Thus, pleasure in paradise, and indeed essential states of being, are warped and dizzying. Pleasure is not towards an end, but simply “is”, as a spectacle of possibility. Therein lies problem of paradise as it is found in traditional interpretations of the scripture. Paradise is spectacular, radical, continuous, and inconceivable, and while this may be compelling for those who have come to the point of accepting “martyrdom”, as a rhetoric tool levied towards potential recruits it cannot encapsulate paradise while still retaining its immeasurability. Paradise must be couched both in the spectacle and in the physical: too many in the former and the words become vague, nondescript hyperbole; too much of the latter and its mystique is lost. Paradise must be a graspable, practical thing insofar as it fits into the simplistic, alluring linearity of the Caliphate, as that drives the action-oriented, brutally offensive nature of their conquests. Figures of martyrdom are always moving forward, “surging” (Salazar 181) forward, and their rhetoric must reflect that physical momentum. To that end, paradise cannot be a mercurial, exclusive concept, as that would counteract recruitment methods. So, when Jafr conflates the explosive-laden van with paradise, or when sanctuary in paradise is equated to victory on the field, the ephemeral and fantastical are being made physical and achievable. The 55 Caliphate is concerned with looking forward, just as it sees itself as the “forward” to which apostate nations look (prompted by salutary violence), so too must its recruits look forward to examples of enacted faith, and then, in turn, carry out those same actions. Martyrdom is concrete in that the body is transformed into efficacious, rhetorical substance, and so there is a “forward” progression from the graspable body to the tangible, nearly agentic rhetoric of martyrdom example. The attainment of paradise must similarly depart from the abstract and create grounded results, or at least be conceivable in relation to familiar substance. Paradise and victory, for example, are equated despite the contrasting states of death and life each must respectively adhere to. This is because of the forward-looking linearity of the state, as involvement in the war supersedes the outcome of the individual soldier. The grounding of sensation, where paradise is evoked synesthetically as a cool drink, is again to ground the impossibly abstract potential of religious paradise into a palatable metaphor. It provides a tenably graspable sensation that approximates Heaven, and rhetorically approaches heaven while still remaining comprehensible. The allure of paradise is not to Quranic paradise, but rather to an approximation of it that is just elevated enough to appear mythical and fantastical, but grounded enough in the mythos of ISIS martyrs that they compel one to join the community and ranks. It is less a reward and more the asserted natural destination, moving forward from the Caliphate. To those who are fed the narrative prior to their joining, the rhetoric points back to the Caliphate even as it promises Heaven, and so reifies the notion of the state as a mirror of paradise. To those already among the ranks, paradise resides alongside martyrdom, as one naturally comes about after the other. In summation, the state of paradise is misleading as a narrative of reward. While the boon of paradise is indeed a potential draw for those within the state, the term is more notably used as 56 a controlled spectacle, encapsulating a fragment of the impossible abstract of paradise in traditional literature and doling it out as rhetorical “bait” that is tangible in the immediate moment, and also leaves a lingering taste of the promise of more. The forward-oriented linearity towards paradise is also part of the allure, as it compels movement to the Caliphate, and martyrdom that more practically benefit the rhetorical constitution and legitimacy of the state. Over time, the notion paradise shifts to one of a positive, happy consequence of the true acts of radical devotion to the Caliphate. Words of Power The terminology of martyrdom, the Caliphate, and paradise come together to shape some of the key rhetorical strategies of ISIS. All the terms appeal to vulnerable groups suffering from isolation, loneliness, feelings of disenfranchisement, and segregation from the local communities. To take advantage of these sentiments, the aforementioned terms tap into different mythologies that construct the apodictic truths of the Caliphate. Through martyrdom come promises of self-efficacy and an echoing influence in future recruitment, as the individual is transformed into a mythical, transhistorical figure. At the same time, martyrdom, as it memorializes violence, dissolves past negative sentiments, and the moment of ritual consumption becomes engraved in the narrative body of the Caliphate. The Caliphate, itself, is based on the revival of a mythologized past, enforcing a priori authority over all Muslims, and attempting to tap into an idealized, past self-identity to reconstruct the modern political identity of all Muslims in a pan-Islamic state. In its advocacy of a grassroots, stakeholder system, it is able to paint the narrative of an inclusive, even victimized, state, rallied against the conflicts of the world and the oppressiveness of apostasy. Finally, the notion of paradise, while far more 57 compelling and salient in the representations of terrorist rhetoric, performs a far more mechanical role than the term would suggest. Paradise is reduced to palatable, encapsulated metaphors that ground victims enough that they can grasp their purpose and directionality towards the Caliphate, while still holding onto a fragment of the abstract of paradise. Once they join the rank-and-file of the state, the allure of martyrdom takes over, as it promises the transformation of the moment of bodily destruction into permanent rhetorical substance. 58 Conclusion This thesis has reviewed existing literature in the field of counterterrorism, detailed the consequences of the “war on terror” narrative, and sought to reveal how each of ISIS's terms – martyr, Caliphate, and paradise tap into an exigent desire among potential targets to have the agentic power to shape, and contribute to, their surroundings and community. What ISIS offers above all else is a chance at becoming a part of the dialogue that shapes cultural identity, and it is developed potent terminology that is has to penetrate to the heart of this desire. However, as monolithic as they may appear, the terms are not insurmountable. The exploration has asserted several times over the detriments of suppressive and singularly aggressive methods of approaching counterterrorism. Such methods are more likely to promote divisive thinking, setting the state and its supporters in opposition to a manufactured counter-institutional force, and in the case of violent insurgencies, this method exacerbates the conditions under which the insurgency may feel prompted to use armed resistance. Suppressive methods offer a clear target for extremist ideology to point to and oppose. In contrast, the mobilization of groups and discourse that disrupt dichotomous and oppositional relations are able to more effectively subvert the supporter base of extremist and insurgent groups, offering measured and non-violent approaches that delegitimize armed resistance. Extrapolated to the international scope of counteracting ISIS in their recruitment, suppressive ideologies, such as those prompted by the rhetoric of a “war on terror”, breed ideal conditions for the isolation of cultural and religious groups, pushing vulnerable peoples to the fringes of society, and easing the task of extremist recruiters. Moreover, suppressive and violent identities clearly present the idea of oppressive western and “apostate” states, against which ISIS defines itself. In contrast, discursive methods that scrutinize the terminology of ISIS and the 59 efficacy of the terminology in appealing to vulnerable peoples offer a productive foundation upon which to base counter-recruitment rhetoric. These methods may reveal the flaws in their argumentation, such as in their mythological reinterpretations and manipulations of cultural history. These flaws, in turn, open up diversionary or counter-messaging approaches to specifically target those argumentative weaknesses and subvert the extremist dialogue. In considering methods applicable to the three words analyzed in chapter three, tentative approaches involve the demystification of ISIS’s narratives. In the case of the martyrdom, whose crux is the elevation of the self to the level of notable, mythologized figures, one approach would be to provide content that grounds such figures in the mundane. Humanizing the victims of terror attacks by detailing their names and faces, whenever possible, and ascribing the terrorist figure to anonymity is one possible avenue. In the case of the Caliphate, the involvement of moderate Islamic scholarship would help ground the mythology in the actual history of previous Muslim empires, outlining both their success and their eventual failures outside of simplistic and reductive narratives of “apostate” states. Moderate Muslim scholarship would also help in the case of paradise by contrasting the simplistic, cause-and-effect interpretation of heavenly attainment in ISIS’s narratives with the mercurial abstracts of certain traditional interpretations, such as the notion of a “silver castle the length of a 1000 years’ march.” Given ISIS’s tenacity in the face of multiple defeats, and their more recent efforts to amass followings online, these larger-scale counter-recruitment measures might not be viable across all aggregates of community. Since one of ISIS’s most alluring promises is that of community and belonging, grassroots practices of building local community and encouraging participatory culture would be a more viable small-scale step. While the mystified image of ISIS as an expansive, brutally militaristic, and overwhelming force might pervade media depictions, 60 their methods are entirely knowable and grounded in conceivable rationale. 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Thesis/Dissertation
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English
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Graduate
Invocation of the word : identifying influences of terminology across extremist rhetoric
Text