AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
Japanese relations with the Soviet Union (Doc. 1628B) Japanese-German-Italian relations (Doc. 4011) Japanese Constitution and government. (Doc. 6902) See also 26-2 Ex.2209-2281. Japanese government (12 items)
application/pdf
Document Eo. 1623B Fage one Extract from: Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers RESEARCH HE.: CRT Eo. 131 Date. 1 Dec. 45 JAPAN'S DECISIOH TO FIGHT - page 7 (e) Policy toward the S9VIE2 UBIOJT. The strength of SOVIET forces on the SOVIET-MAlICHJTuOAE "herder is formidable. / The UI'ION OE SOCIAMSTIC SOVIET REPUBLICS is maintaining a (vigilant alert, awaiting develspments. However, if the Empire 'does not attack the SOVIET UNIOE, it is "believed that the SOVIET UImIOIv will not commence hostilities.Doc. No, 4011 , 1 - o F,:rcfx-pt from the Record of the conversation of the C-erian : i imstcr of foreign Affairs with the DLTCE in the presence of Count CI/.NO and Ambassador von MACXENSEN on 22 September 194-0 at tVc Palazzo Vencziaa „ 0 ..The German Foreign Minister made known his intention to invite .SERRANO .SUNEB. to be a guest at tbe ratification, and likewise to invito representatives of the countries on f r i e n d l y torus with the Lxis, such as Hungary, Bulgaria and .Rumania• Count C.IAN0 at first expressed doubts as to whetrer by the presence of a Spanish delegate, because of the known anti-Solshevi.K attitude of tre Spanish Government, the. Three Power Pact witv Ja'pan would not s^ow ' a too strongly mti-Bussian tendency, but dropped these doubts again, as the DUCE declared tre presence of SERRANO SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasised solidarity of Spain with the three signatories® 0 ® Rome, 22 September 1940 SCFMIDT *"• v no. nO'Jl Page 2 I . (Origo in Doc. Rm,) AFFIDAVIT I , GJCRAPJ) F1CFAEFLL, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say; 1 . That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel- Nurnbor&! Germanyand as oncb rave possession, custody and ^control of th e orlg inai cap'; ur ~d enemy document 'numbered iSojf-l'B by sa id Doeumentac ion Dtvxsion« 2o That s? id >; bovc referred to original document was capturcd and obtain.? by military forces under the command of the Supreme CermcndvV", Allied Sripediticnary Forces, from German Foreign Of:ice > Aom ' and / rc > i esa 3c Thez s?id original captured enemy document after its seizure and caetcr- was del: verod to, fil- d with, numbered and pi-f̂ ei-sod by cW Dc-'.umon'atien '01/ir.Xci of said Office of the"lin:;ted States C'hier of Counsel ao Ivu.-ribcrg? Germany in the manner set fort'-1 and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dried the l?th of April 1946 and captioned <, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents::, and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference* 4C That t ve document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of s^id original capturcd enemy document above described and referred tOo 5,. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by mc for possible use in' connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal* v and that a photostatic copy of said original 'is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailablei.ty of said original document for the reasons above set forthc /2.ZJlcr?rd.J?o^aefer Gerard bc'-aefer SUBSCRIBED AND clWCBN to before me t M s 3rd day of May 1946« ,/s/ Smith W_,_Broo}:har:t, Jr^Lt .Co? Sii:;i'F w. HIGGIC-ART; JK . , IGD LT COLONEL. IGD 0 -508524Document -#6902 JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT PART II In the preceding discussion, there has been depicted for the Tribunal, in some detail, the chief organs and the salient features of the Japanese governmental system. To stop the analysis at this point would be to leave the picture half painted and given an incomplete view of the incidence of responsibility for governmental function and action in the Japanese state. Particularly we would be likely to fail to grasp the basic responsibility of the defendants, or of the great majority of them, for the crimes with which they stand charged in the indictment. In order to fix responsibility for governmental function and action in the Japanese state and in order to fully comprehend the responsibility of the defendants for the crimes charged against them, it is not sufficient to outline the structure of the various constitutional organs and to analyze their respective functions. A most cursory examination of the Japanese Constitu- tion and the documents with respect to the several govern- mental organs established thereunder, as well as the analysis already made, discloses that there exists in the Japanese governmental setup (1) areas of divided jurisdiction, (2) areas of jurisdiction which have not been assigned to Document #6902 any constitutional organ whatsoever and (j; areas of con- flicting ana overlapping jurisdiction. To meet the neeas occasioned by these problems, it becumc necessary for the Japanese government to n w e us or certain e^tra-constitutionu-i. anu extra le&al bouies to fix! the &aps and to coordinate the activities of the several, organs having jurisdiction over the whole or part of t^e Sa^e sphere of bovernmental activity. xt is, therefore, necessary in order to fix governmental responsibility -na to obtain some idea of t^e governmental mechanism in operation, to ascertain ti.e areas Ox division, &ap and conflict, and to examine t^e extra- constitutional bodies cre^teu to meet t4.e problems en^enuered thereby. 1• The_nr&as of ^ivi^eu Responsibility, conflicts of_vuris- diction, and ^d:s in ^urisuiction and kechanism i'or the purpose of properxj clarifying the issues involved, this problem will be consiaereu separately with respect to two of the main functions of government, namely the legislative and the executive. The Legislative Conflicts 1. The nature of the Japanese legisxative function. The allocation of legislative powers in the oapanese government is to be found in .articles iV to X inclusive, and articles *»nd j*aaiV of the constitution Uvempo; which proviae as follows; Document #6902 article IV. The emperor is the uKaC of the Lmpirc, combining in himself tux, ri^htr of sovereignty, and exereises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution. article V« The ,-mpcror exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial wiet„ article Vx. The Lmperor gives sanction to laws anu oruers ti.e..! to be promulgated and executed. /article Vxi. The emperor co^vones the Imperial ^iet, opens, closes and prorogues it, and dissolves the i.ouse of representatives. article VIII. The ~mperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public Safety or to avert public Calamities, issues, when tue Imperial Diet is not sitting, imperial Oruiaances in the place of law. Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the imperial ^iet at its next session, and when the Liet does not approve the Said Ordinances, the uovernment shall declare them to be invalid for the future. article I a. The Lmperor issues or Causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the Carrying out of the laws, or for tiie maintenance of the public peace and order, ana for the pro- motion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws. xu-ticle The Lmperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the Same, inceptions especially provided for in the present constitution or other laws shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon^. Document -#6902 article ^iXVII. i,very law requires the consent of the Imperial Jiet. article xaAA.IV, No modification of the imperial xiOuse i-u-'i shall be rcHui.red to be suomitted to the deliberation of the Imperial ~iet. î 'rom these provisions of tue constitution, the following general principles may be decuced with respect to legislative responsibility una division of function. The legislative power is vestea in the hmperor subject to the assent of the ~iet with respect to t..e enactment of laws. (B; ./hen ti,e «iet is not in session, the Lm-eror, or ru.ti.er his ministers as his Uuvisors, may exercise the legislative power by Imperial Ordinance. If these Ordin- ances are later disapproved of by the ^iet, t^ey -rt invalid for t„e future, ^owever, the Ordinances and all actions t^ken thereunder are completely Valid for the period between their promulgation and t^e d^tc of dis^p^rov«l the Jiet. juch legislation may ~nu -.oes alter existinb law. CO; r'he ~iet has no relation whatsoever to the Imperial household ^ w . By the constitution, Imperial household affairs are placeu beyond the re<a.ch of the i>iet, and a separation is drawn between the affairs of the Court and those of the .state, «owever, within the prerogatives over the imperial household are incluuea matters which are not strictly internal matters of the v.ourt but of vital concern to the people ^nd to the stcxte us well, such as Document -.#>902 those relating to the succession to the throne, the institution of regency and to the Imperial household ^aw, iith respect to these matters which belong to the general affairs of state, the cabinet -ay be consultcu, but the Liet has no means of questioning responsibility for the cabinet's advice. The ministers of -tate have always refused to answer interpellations in the i>iet on Imperial household affairs, maintaining, they have no responsibility for sucn matters. (D) Even as to matters within the competence of the ^iet, the exorcise of its functions are limited by the controls set up for its re^ui^tion wherein the power to open, close and prorogue both houses of the ^iet, or to dissolve the ^ouse of ..epresentatives is vested in t^e Emperor , or in other organs delegatea by him. (E; By reason of the general ordinance powers reserved to the Imperial Throne by articles xA ana « of the Constitution, the jiet is excluded from participation in many matters which are strictly within tx.e legislative sphere in all v/estem countries, i'hus the imperial Ministers as agents for the Emperor alone may establish the entire administrative hierarcj.y, an_ it is significant to note that the documents which will be produced in evidence establishing the various organs ana departments of government are witx..out exception Imperial Ordinances and Rescripts and not enactments of the ~iet. .t/itii respect to the Ordinance power reserves to the ^m^eror under Document -#6902 article 1a9 with the exception of"oruinances necessary for the Carrying out of the laws", which may be termed administrative, the remaining power, namely that of issuin ordinances for the maintenance of the public peace and order and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects involves matters which are purely le&isjiative in content and are customarily left to the legislature for enactment into law. Mowever, vnder the Japanese system they are retained in the hands of the emperor and exercised by the Ministers. In addition to the limitations mentionea before the jiet is precluded from any participation with respect to certain other matters customarily considered part of the legislative function, The organization of the army and navy is determined by the Lmperor article All/. The Emperor declares war, makes pe^ce and concludes treaties (article XIII;. In these functions neither house of the ~iet plays any direct role. ..'hile the legislative power in all its ramifications is vested in the Lmperor, ne, or rather his Ministers, exercises this power not directly but thnou&h delegation to other organs of the government, it is there- fore necessary to examine the legislative powers of e^ch of these organs with respect to euc,. other and to the ~iet. 2. The area of Conflict between the Cabinet and the «iet c Before we can adequately assess the lebislative function of the ~iet, we must first understand: Document #6902 U ) The pssiitm &i tfee OaM&efc in ifee Japanese Constitutional »y£t©ffl» Although the C&blaet li t&e ehi#f tive organ of the government, there is no gpegifie reference to the Cabinet in the Constitution. If included at &11, it is only by implication. The only Article which may be said to have application to that body is Article LV which provides; "The respective Ministers of dtate shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it. nil laws, imperial Ordin- ances and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the State, require the counter-signature of a Minister of State." i , . Yet notwithstanding these facts, the Cabinet exists as a collective body composed of departmental ministers under the presidency of a minister president for the purpose of initiating, directing and carrying out the general pol- icies of the government and to serve as a channel through which the imperial prerogative over general affairs is placed in operation. This body owes its origin to the Imperial Rescript on Functions of the Cabinet of December 22, 1885 establishing a cabinet system, and its composition powers, duties and functions are set forth in that instrument and in the Imperial Ordinance Relating to General Rules Con- cerning the Organization of the Ministries of 1893 and not in the Constitution itself. Article I of the Imperial Rescript on the Functions of the Cabinet states: "The Cabinet is composed of the various Ministers of State." -7- Document jp6902 According to Article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet Ministers, or hiuiste?s of otate, are responsible for the advice which they fcive to the Emperor. The Con- stitution, however? as Prince Ito in his Commentaries explains, is silent about the person or persons to whom they are responsible and for what they are responsible, and the nature of the responsibility. .) Person to whom responsible. There is unanimity among the con- stitutional jurists that in legal principle, the ministers of state are primarily directly responsible to the hmperor and that no other or;-an of the State may question their le^al responsibility or remove them from office. although the responsibility of the Cabinet is thus agreed to be due primarily to the emperor, the Diet has certain le,;;al powers of control over the Cabinet. 3y means of parliamentary interpellations or asking ques- tions, the passage of resolutions, the presentation of resolutions to the Throne (article XLIa), the voting approval of emergency imperial ordinances (article V l l i ) and by its budgetary power (Article IXIV and LAV) the Diet is able to have some measure of control over the Cabinet., On occasion, the Cabinet has adopted the parliamentary device of resign:'n-/ or dissolving the House and having the matter decided by the electorate upon a resolution of lack of confidence being voted in the Lower House. -8- Document -#6902 (2) Matters for which the Cabinet is responsible. Since under the Japanese Constitution, the Emperor is inviolable and has no responsibility for his acts and since he exercises his prerogatives only upon the responsible advice of organs of the State, and since it is only upon the advice of a minister of state that the imperial prerogative over general affairs of state may be exercised, the scope of ministerial responsibility is as broad as the imperial prerogative over state affairs. This primary responsibility to the Emperor is inescapable as to matters of state, even though the Emperor has sought out the advice of other constitutional and extra-constitutional bodies. (3) The nature of the responsibility. While there has been some dispute as to whether cabinet responsibility is an individual responsibility or a collective one, and the majority of experts have tended to regard the responsibility as that of the individual minister of state, in practice the Caoinet has usually assumed collective responsibility under the leadership of the Premier. (B) The Legislative Powers of the Cabinet The Cabinet as the chief administrative organ with respect to general affairs of state has wide legislative powers, a portion of which is exercised in conjunction with other governmental bodies. Under the provisions of Article LV of the Constitution, the Cabinet -9- Document jp6902 exercises the legislative powers of the Lmperor under Articles V, VII, VIII, IX, and X of that instrument. (1) Legislative Powers exercised by the Cabinet together with the Diet. Article XXXVIII of the Constitution provides that "Both houses shall vote upon projects of lav; submitted to it by the Government, and may respect- ively initiate projects of law." The Imperial Rescript on the Functions of the Cabinet of December 22, 1885, contains the following provisions with respect to the legislative function of the Cabinet. "Article IV. All laws and all Imperial Ordinances affecting the administra- tion as a whole, shall bear the countersignature of the Minister President as well as that of the Minister from whose department they directly emanate. All Imperial Ordinances affecting a Special Department only shall be countersigned by the Minister of the Department alone." * "Article V. The following matters shall be submitted for deliberation by the Cabinet. 1. Draft of laws, financial estimates, and settled accounts. 2. Treaties with foreign countries and all national questions of importance. 3. Ordinances relating to Administration, or to the carrying out of regulations and laws." It is clear from an examination of the foregoing provisions that the Cabinet exercises the legis- lative power conferred upon the Diet together with the Die -10- Document #6902 in one of the following manners: 1. Through initiation of legislation. Since the elimination of political parties, initiation by the Cabinet has been the sole method used for the introduction of legislation. 2. Through the exercise of the power to approve or disapprove legislation introduced by a member of the Diet. In addition the Cabinet exercises control over the legislative power of the Diet by the provisions of the Constitution wherein the Diet is denied the power to convene of its own accord and wherein the Diet may be pro- rogued, or in the case of the house of Representatives, dis- solved by the Cabinet. (2) Legislative Power Exercised by the Cabinet by itself or in Conjunction with Governmental Organs other than the Diet. When the Diet is not in session, the Cabinet exercises the legislative power through the issuance of imperial ordinances as provided in article VIII of the Constitution. This power is an extensive one and is shared in part with the Privy Council, AS the Diet session ordin- arily does not exceed three months in length (Const. Article XLII), the Cabinet exercises the legislative power without Diet concurrence for the greater part of the year. Although the Diet has the power of disapproval of Imperial Ordinances, the power has been rarely exercised, and even if exercised can be obviated by the reissuance of the - 1 1 - Document }6902 disapproved ordinance immediately after the adjournment of the Diet. In addition the Cabinet has legislative powers over and above those of the Diet in the treaty making power, which is in no way shared with the Diet, and through the general ordinance power. (C) The Respective Financial Powers of the Cabinet and the Diet. The Constitution contains the following provisions with respect to governmental finances: "Article luill. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one; shall be determined by law. However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of c omp e n s a tion shall not fall within the category of the above clause. The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the cha.rge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the cud^et, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet." "Article LxIVi The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget. Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet." "Article LAY. The Budget shall be first laid before the house of representatives.11 -12" Document #6902 "Article LXVI. The expenditures of the Imperial house shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found ne c c s s: ry.1,1 "Article LXVII. Those already fixed expend- itures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Lmperor, and such expendi- tures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced V,r the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the government," "Article LXVIII. In order to meet special requirements, the Government may as^the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years." "Article LXIA. In order to supply defi- ciencies, which are unavoidable, in the .Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Reserve Fund shall be provided in the Budget." "Article LXX. When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for che maintenance of public safety, the government may take all necessary financial measures by r.eans of an Imperial Ordinance." "In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto." "Article LXX I. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the uoverniinnt shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year." "Article LXXII. The final account of the expenditures and revenue of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government., to the Imperial .viet, together with the report of verification of the said Board." -13- Document #6902 An examination of the foregoing provisions will disclose that while generally the Diet has legislative power with respect to finances, that of the Cabinet is much broader. The following important conclusions can be drawn; (a) The Diet, except in the case of an increase, cannot touch the funds allotted to the Imperial household. (b) The Cabinet can prevent the D'J.et from reducing or rejecting any of the following items: (i) Expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the .emperor. (ii) expenditures us may have ri^en by the effect of law such as treaty obligations. (iii) Expenditures i;hat appertain to the legal obligations of the Government. . (c) The Cabinet has wide financial powers not subject to prohibitory control of the Diet in the following instances. (i) The use of a Continuing expenditure Fund which may be set up by a friendly juie,t for use in adverse times. (ii) A reserve fund whic.i the Diet must mandatorily provide. (iii) The right to make expenditures in excess of the Budget subject to the subsequent approbation of the Diet, which is of little value afte.* an expenditure has been made. (iv) The right to issue an Imperial ordin- ance for all financial measures in the event the i/iet is -14- Document #6902 not in session and cannot be convoked subject only to subsequent approval by the Diet which is of little value in the case of a fait accomplis. (v) The right to always use the Budget and appropriations of the previous year regardless of the decision of the Diet. 3. The Overlapping Sphere of the Cabinet and the Privy Council. By Article VI of the Imperial Ordinance Creating and Regulating the Privy Council as amended (Imperial Ordinance No. 22,1888 as amended by Imperial Ordinance No. 216,1890) the Privy Council is granted the following powers i "Upon His Majesty's submission for advice, the Privy Council shall hold delib- erations and report its opinions upon the following matters 1 1. Matters which are under its jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Constitution and laws and ordinances supplementary thereto, 2. Drafts of laws and doubtful points relating to the provisions of the Constitution and laws and ordinances supplementary thereto. 3 . Proclamation of martial law under Article XIV and the Imperial Ordinances to be issued under Articles VIII and LaA of the Constitution, as well as all other imperial ordinances having penal provisions. 4. International treaties and agreements. 5. Matters relating to the amendment of the organization of the Privy Council and to the rules for the conduct of its business. 6. Matters specially submitted to its delib- eration for advice, in addition to those above mentioned. -15- Document ,#>902 Under the foregoing enumeration of powers, the Privy Council shares with the Cabinet a vast part of the legislative power. On the one hand it has in conjunc- tion with the Cabinet the powers exercisable when the Diet is not in session, including the approval of imperial ordinances under articles VIII and LAA of the Constitution5 and on the other hard exercises the legislative powers, exercisable irrespective of the sitting of the Diet, including international treaties and agreements, declara- tions of martial law, and imperial ordinances having penal provisions. In addition, every project of law (bill) introduced into the Diet by the Cabinet is previously submitted to the Privy Council for its approval. While the Council has no power to initiate legislation it has a wide veto and amending power. On bills which have been introduced by a Diet member and have passed the Diet it can only recommend approval or disapproval in toto. On the other hand, with respect to projects of law submitted to it by the Cabinet before intro- duction in the Diet, it may not only veto but freely exercise its amending power. Since the members of the Cabinet are all ex-officio members of the Privy Council, the realm of dis- agreement between the two bodies, as a matter of practice in the period covered by the indictment, has been small. B. The Executive Gaps and Conflicts Like the legislative branch of the government, - 1 6 - Document #6902 the executive department of the Japanese government is not a single agency. Basically, all executive power is vested in the Emperor. It is exercised, in fact, by the Cabinet and its agencies, the composite of the military and naval agencies known as the "Supreme Command" and the p Privy Council. Conflicts of jurisdiction exist within and between these bodies. 1. Area of Conflict Within the Cabinet While the Cabinet exercises the chief governmental functions of formulating general policy, determining the modes of the exercise of the authority vested in the throne, formulating the legislative program and by leading the Diet, its effectiveness as the chief governing organ of Japan is severely limited by its dual nature. This "duality" of the Cabinet is due to two factors: (1) the pecurliar position held by the ministers of war and navy within the Cabinet; and (2) the nature of the personnel holding the ministries of war and navy. The ministers of war and navy possess the important right of iaku .joso or the right of direct access to the Throne. In this respect it should be noted that all Cabinet Ministers have the right of access to the Throne. However, the right of the war and navy ministers to approach the Throne is greater than that of other ministers and is coequal with that of the Prime minister. -17- Document -#6902 tThile the other ministers of state are responsible in every way to the cabinet for the carrying out of their duties and for advice given to the Throne, the Cabinet does not have such complete control over the war and navy ministers since they have the right of access to the Throne on matters which are kept secret from the other members of the Cabinet except the premier. This superior right is recognized in Article VII of the Imperial Ordinance on The functions of the Cabinet which provides: "Such matters as concern military secrets and military orders and are reported to the Lmperor, unless referred to the Cabinet by the Lmperor, shall be reported to the Prime Minister by the Minister of ;ar and the Minister of the Navy." The importance of the right is further intensi- fied by the fact that the premier is limited by lav/ in the choice of qualified personnel in the filling of these positions. By Imperial Ordinance 193 of -̂ ay 9, 1900, the war minister must be a general or lieutenant general and the navy minister must oe an admiral or vice-admiral in active service. On June 13, 1913? Admiral Yamamoto succeeded in widening the qualification to include those on the reserve lists, but since the administration of Premier hirota in 1936 the qualifications have been limited to those in active service. Because of the require- ment of active service, the army and navy have control of the appointment of the respective persons to the war and navy ministries. This power is exercised for the army by - 1 8 - Document -#6902 a triumvirate consisting of the outgoing becretary of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Director General of Military Education; and for the navy by a similar group holding the correlative offices in that branch of the service. The results of this duality of organization have been as follows; 1. By failing to appoint a war minister or a navy minister, either the army or navy may prevent the formation of a cabinet or control the naming of the personnel thereof. 2. By compelling the war or navy ministers, subject to the orders of the high command because of their active service status, to resign, either the army or the navy can bring about the resignation of the Cabinet. 3 . Through the use of the right of direct access to the Throne, the war and navy ministers have been able to obtain the establishment of policy which is contrary to the opinions of the premier and the other members of his cabinet or which is kept entirely secret from them. 2. Area of Conflict Between the Cabinet and the High Command. The conflict between the military members of the cabinet and the other members of that body is but one phase of the divided and overlapping authority between the cabinet and the high command. According to the Constitution the Emperor has the following powers with respect to the -19- Document -#6902 armed services: Article X I . The lmperor has the supreme commane cf the Army and Wavy. Article XII. The Lmperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army. Based sn these two articles the imperial preroga- tive over military affairs has in practice been divided into the prerogative over the supreme command and the prerogative over the administration of the armed forces. The former covers the power of using the armed forces for the protection of the state from attack from both without and within, and other powers directly relating to military operations. The latter includes the organization of divi- sions and of fleets, and all matters relating to military districts and sub-districts, to the storing up and distri- bution of arms, to education, inspections, discipline, modes of salute, uniforms, guards, fortifications, naval defenses, preparation for expeditions and fixing the annual number of recruits. This division has been constantly maintained since the cabinet system was started in 1885. In the exercise of the former power, that of the supreme command, the : mperor does not exercise it through the cabinet but through the minister of war, the minister of the navy, the chiefs cf the general staff and the chief aide-de-camp to the Lmperor, all of whom have direct access to the lmperor and who are directly responsible to him. The Lmperor is thus assisted in the exercise of the - 2 0 - Document -#6902 prerogative of the Supreme Command by organs which are separate from, and independent of, those which advise the Throne over general affairs of state. In practice, the line of demarcation between matters of general affairs of state and supreme command has not been clear, intrusted with the defense of the nation, the supreme command has challenged the power of the cabinet over many matters on the ground that they were matters of national defense. They have thus claimed and exercised the right to advise the Emperor and to formulate policy on matters relating to the declaration of war, foreign relations, treaty negotiation and rati- fication and many internal matters because of their relation, actual or supposed, to the subject of national defense. In fact, in the field of foreign relations the Supreme Command has autnority to play an independent role. Eor example, Article 10 of the Imperial Ordinance relating to the organization of the Naval General staff uffice specificai provides j "There shall instituted, at the Japanese Lnbas.:::; v=- and Legations abroad, Combatant Jffi.ee ::-<;• ac embassy and Legation Naval Attaches • -,d Assistant Naval Attaches, ex 6 the Chief shall control them." Document #6902 There exists as a result of this separation of the supreme command from the other organs of government, a sphere of divided responsibility and overlapping function with respect to the major governmental powers in the Japanese Constitutional System. In addition to the conflicts pointed out, there are gaps in the constitutional executive setup. One is the administration of the Imperial Household, oince, as pointed out before, the Diet is precluded from passing on questions relating to the Imperial Household and since the Ministers of State, even though they may be and are con- sulted with respect to matters of the riousehold, have no responsibility for such matters, and since no other con- stitutional provision is applicable to the governance of the Imperial Household, a gap exists which has been filled by the creation of extra-constitutional offices and bodies. Likewise a similar situation has existed with respect to the organization of which is known as the Supreme Command. -22- Document #6902 II. The Extra-Constitutional Organs and Offices. A. The Military Offices and Boards. 1. The Chiefs of otaff The "supreme command" function, while resting as all other governmental functions in Japan do, in the Emperor, is in fact exercised by the Chiefs of otaff of the Army and Navy. Their power is grave and extensive. Under the second provision of the Regulation of the General Staff Office, the powers of the ^rmy ohief of Staff are defined; "A general or a lieutenant-general is appointed by the Emperor to the post of the Chief of the General Staff, and is placed under the dircct command of the emperor, attends the war council, takes charge of the formation of plans for national defense and strategy and supervises the General Staff Office." Using somewhat different language, articles I, 2 and 3 of the Imperial Ordinance relating to the organization of the Naval General Staff office states the powers of that office as follows: Article 1. The Naval General Staff Office shall take charge of matters concerning national defense and the use of armed strength. Article 2. There shall be the Chief of the Naval General Staff Office, lie shall be personally appointed -23- Document #6902 by the Emperor. The Chief shall be directly subordinate to the Emperor, take part in the confidential affairs of the Emperor's headquarters and control the Naval General Staff Office. Article 3. The Chief shall take charge of plans for national defense and for the use of armed strength, and shall transmit matters concerning the use of armed strength. Tĥ . powers outlined for both Chiefs of Staff, while differing in wording, assigns them the duty which has been aptly described in the Ordinance of Daihonei (Imperial General headquarters) as taking "part in the highest momentous affairs" of the nation. 2. The Boards. In addition to the primary offices of the Chief of Staff, there are several military boards which play a part in the exercise of the supreme command. (a) The Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals (Gensuifu). This Board was originally created in 1 8 9 8 , and its membership is limited to field marshals and fleet admirals. Theoretically this body is supposed to be the highest advisory body to the Throne on army and navy matters but it is in fact purely an honorary body with little or no power. -24- Document #6902 (B) Supreme »/ar Council (Gunji Sangiin) This Council was created by Imperial Ordinance lo* 294 of 1903. Its membership consists of the members of the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Minister of War and Navy, the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs and other generals and admirals nominated by the Emperor. Its function is to advise on all military and naval policy generally and to coordinate all administrative and tactical organizations. It plays no part with respect to tactics and strategy. It is organized into two divisions - the Army Councillor's Conference and the Navy Councillor's Conference. (C) Imperial General Headquarters (Daihonei) This organization exists only at the time of war or at the time of an incident resembling war. For present purposes it was set up on November 20, 1937, and existed throughout the remainder of the period. It is headed by the Emperor, and its members consisted of the two chiefs of staff, the vice criefs of staff, and the heads of all staff bureaus, the ministers of war and navy, the vice ministers and certain bureau chiefs from those ministries, the inspector-gcnerals of military training and the Inspector-General of army Aviation. -25- Document jp6902 This organization was divided into two sections - the army section and the navy section - and met both separately in sections and jointly. Its function is best described in the Ordinance of Daihonei (Imperial General headquarters) as follows: "....to take part in the highest momentous affairs, to make plan of operations and considering last object, to arrange the cooperation and the united action of Army and Navy." 3. The Chief Aide-de-camp to the Emperor. While this officer, a full general, has no connection with the Supreme Command, he has full access to it. All military memorials and requests for audiences with the Throne are submitted through him and all Imperial orders for the army and navy are transmitted by him. B. The Imperial Household Offices. The offices set up for the administration of the Imperial Court are divided into two categories; the Outer Court and the Inner Court 1. The Outer Court - The Minister of the Imperial Household (Kunai Daijin). This office was established by the same ordinance under which the Cabinet was created and this official has the duty of administering the household affairs and the properties of the Imperial household. For the purposes of this trial this office is of no consequence. -26- Document #6902 2. The Inner Court. (A) The Grand Chamberlin (Jijucho) This official is in a sense the Emperor's adjutant. He is a civil official with no visible connection with the civil government or the supreme command. Appointments for audiences with the emperor are arranged through his office and he is in charge of all ceremonial matters. (B) Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal (Naidaijin) Under Article II of the Regulations for the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal the duty of the Lord Keeper is to assist and advise the Emperor in admin- istering the affairs of state, constantly attending upon him. All bills and petitions go through his office for imperial sanction. He is the custodian of the imperial seals and the great state seals which must be affixed to all documents for purposes of promulgation. his most important function in late years has been that of recommending to the Emperor a suc- cessor premier upon the resignation of a Cabinet. In prior years, his sole function in this regard was to transmit the decision of the hlder Statesmen or Genro to the Emperor. In 1935, as Prince Saionji grew older, upon the resignation of the Hayashi Cabinet, the Lord Keeper himself was asked to and did himself make the recommendation after consultation with Seionji. This -27- Document -#6902 precedent was followed until January, 1940, when the Dord Keeper first determined upon the successor premier after consultation with the individual ex-premiers and thereafter obtained Saionji's views, U^on the establish- ment of the Third ho no ye Cabinet, the Dord jxeeper held a conference with the ex-premiers and president of the Privy Council, they acting as advisors to him, and himself made the recommendation. This latter procedure was used at all times thereafter. There exists one other body with respect to the governance of the Imperial household. 3 . The Imperial Family Council The members of this group consist of the male members of the Imperial Family who have reached the age of majorityj the Dord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the President of the Privy Council, the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Minister of State for justice and the President of the Court of Cassation. (Article DV of the Imperial House Daw). By Article IX of the Imperial House"Law this Council and the Privy Council, when the Imperial heir is suffering from an incurable disease of mind or body, or when any other weighty cause exists, may change the order of succession. It also in the same way participates in the appointment of a regency and may change the order of regency (Articles XIX and XXV) appoint or remove an Imperial Governor for the education and bringing up of Document -#6902 a minor Emperor, if none has been appointed by the pre- ceding Emperor (Article XXVII). The Council likewise acts on matters of disciplinary punishment of members of the Imperial Family and preservation of their property (Articles LII, LIII, LIV). C. The Extra-legal Bodies* 1. The Genro The body of elder statesmen called the Genro was an extra-constitutional and extra-legal insti- tution. This body was more or less informally constituted from among the councillors and leaders of the keiji Restoration and had no status within the constitution, laws or ordinances. However, there gradually developed the custom that those statesmen who played leading roles in the Restoration of 1868 and in the early period of the Constitutional history of Japan were to be consulted on matters of paramount importance in domestic and foreign matters including the naming of a new cabinet, war declarations, conclusion of peace and negotiation of treaties and international agreements of importance. For many years one or another from among the Genro occupied the important governmental positions of Prime minister, President of Privy Council or Lord weeper of the Privy Seal. Beginning informally, the group began to be recognized as a governmental institution and finally in December 1926, when Prince Saionji was appointed a Genro, the institution was formally recognized by an Document -#6902 Imperial Rescript making the appointment. The group met and functioned on direct order from the Emperor that they should meet and advise on the solution of the question submitted. While they advised on grave matters of state such as the declaration of war, conclusion of peace and matters involving international relations, their most important function was in serving as the medium through which a new cabinet was named, thus filling up one of the major gaps in the Japanese Constitu- tional system occasioned by the fact that as a matter of legal principle the cabinet is responsible only to the Emperor. Upon the death of Prince Srionji in 1940, the Genro disappeared as an institution. 2. Jushin With the passing of the function of advising the Emperor on the matter of the selection of a new cabinet from the Genro to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Keeper instituted the practice of consulting individually with the ex-pre...iers and the President of the Privy Council. This group of elder statesmen came to be known as the Jushin. In July of 194-0, this body was officially formalized by being convoked and meeting as a group to advise the Lord Keeper on the selection of a new premier. While the conference of ex-premiers has the primary function of advising on the selection of a premier, on occasion it has been summoned to advise the Emperor on matters of state of grave importance. -30- Do cur.;ent #6902 D. The Liaison Bodies 1, Renraku jiaigi - Liaison conference. With the intensification of the situation following the outbreak of the China War in 1937? the need for a device to coordinate the activities of the ministers of state and the high command in their overlapping spheres of authority became readily apparentc Several devices were set up to meet this need. First the "Four Minister" meeting of the premier, war, navy and foreign ministers was established. Later the finance minister was added to this group making a "Five Minister" Conference. In these meetings the views of the Supreme Command were transmitted through the war and navy ministers, nowever, the situation developed in such a manner that the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that this method of working through the war and navy ministers was unsatisfactory end the liaison conference plan was adopted to adjust the difference between the civil ££ o vsrriixi ent and the high command. This group which met more or less regularly, consisted of the premier,, foreign minister, war minister, navy minister, home minister, chiefs of staff, vice chiefs of staff and the directors of the military affairs and naval affairs bureaus. In addition at times, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board and the Chief Cabinet -31- Document -#6902 Secretary attended. Inasmuch as the personnel of these meetings was, with the exception of the emperor, prac- tically identical with the personnel of the Conference before the Throne discussed later, and since liaison conferences always preceded Conferences before the Throne, the decisions reached in the liaison conference were of the utmost importance in relation to the decisions of the more formal conference* 2* Saiko Shido Aaigi - Conference for the Supreme Direction of the War. This body ca^e into existence during the Koiso Cabinet during the war, and was in fact the old liaison conference under a new name. 3. D^i nonei i>aigi - imperial headquarters Conference. When, during the course of the war, the Diaison Conference and the Conference for the oupreme Direction of the War failed to adequately meet the prob- lems involved, the premier began attending meetings of Imperial Headquarters but without participating in strategic or tactical matters. These meetings were known as Imperial Headquarters Conferences. 4. Gozen haigi - Conferences before the Throne. Although no authority can be found in the Constitution laws or ordinances for the Gosen naigi -32- Document #6902 or Conference before the Throne., it has existed as an institution in the Japanese Government for hundreds of years. It has continued to function as the organ for reconciling the conflicts arising from the division of authority in various spheres,. As a body it meets only under the gravest of conditions to determine u-atters of gravest policy* The membership of the conference in addition to the Emperor has varied both in size and in the nature of the membership.. During 194-0 and 1941, when five such conferences were held, the membership consisted of the Premier, the President of the Privy Council, the .Wavy Minister, the V/ar Minister, the Foreign minister, the Finance Minister, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the navy General Staff and the Directors of the military Affairs section of the at>:.y and the Naval Affairs Section. Occasionally other cabinet ministers attended. Such conferences did not meet at regular intervals but only at times of grave national importance. Some meetings were publicized and others have been kept secret. During the year preceding the outbreak of war on Dc cc-mber 7? 1941, the conference met on petition for such meeting from the liaison conference. The interested parties would agree on a subject and plan which was -33- Document -#6902 # presented to the liaison conference, which would in turn request a Conference before the Throne. Ordinarily, in practice, no formal decision was ...ade at the time of the conference but the consensus of the conference is ..iade the formal decision of the cabinet. This discussion, together with the pre- ceding one and the evidence now to be introduced, has been presented for the purpose of explaining the framework of the c'ap nese govern...ental syste ,, to serve as a guide for assaying the actions of the defendants in the light of the evidence which will be presented. The operation of these offices and bodies will be repeatedly demonstrated throughout the course of these proceedings. -34-Doc, No. 6^6 A /) ?"ge 1 Riku Man Mitsu / '.xray Manchuria Secret/ Master Diary (13th year /of Show / No. 7). D-c. No. 646 •Page 2 ' 3? 1 321, Intendancc Section. Tr:nsfor of Secret Funds from the M-.nchurian Incident Expenditure Account I3.4.I3 /13 April 13th year of SHOV/A/ 13th year /of SHD.7A/ / e.g. 13 April l?3n / Man Mitsu /Manchuria Secret/ /Stamp/ 413 'far Dept. I3.4.3 Intend-nee Section | CJ T3 I O a © ' © 1 M © P h. G a £ VS O © ' o o +> w ' X O © T3 W fn C. Fh O O •P -P ca TJ -H d © ci o -P -H •H CI Jg w ©to 4-•H -p © <]> O O O O © -H P h'D > rH (j © j g Ifr .f-I I • I - -1 \ ' 1 I * o -p in ; © ^ <H • rS O • ftj touting to Parliament.-ry Vice Minist er and -5arlia- m . ntcry Counc illor. •̂ ccci at No. Rcceiv d by 7ar Dept. Before or after decision /5 A aril 13th year of SED.7A/ i 5 April, 193? f" . _.]A Riku Kan Kifisu Ju / \.rmy Manchuria fccrct Receipt/ No, 413 Names of sections -conocrncd (Mil it a ry A f fa irs) / ccc. 1/ Name of originating bureau (section) rmy _ Names of scction to which routed after action taken (or decision made) /far/ Minister d elegrted Transfer of fecret Funds from Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account Secretary "?arr£c5ehtary" [ ~?arTTamentary Vice-J^inister Councillor Minister i Senior adjutant O^SHIHJCHi; /seal/ -cting Chief of Competent Bureau (f^IE^siS) Chief of Cojsoatent j Seet ion(eTJRI!l.sil> Intendancc. .Taction 'forking draft writer ompeten 1 ' Bureau ana jv/ Section Minister1 .a, Recievedi Presented: Ku Mitsu /'secret account/ No. 37 ' f /bureau and Section/ Concerned Received: secretariat! Finished 5 April 12 April Routing sub- sequent to :.ction( decision) Comoetent Ad jutant fASmVAlfc /Seal/ Indendance officer for . seer etari ;;.t (jCT0> / seal / . Member of Comaetent Section OZpLI^) / seal/ Chief of Bureau fteolj Chief of Bureau (tonai ) /seal/ Chief of '.cct?pn Acting{WI£l!5"JRA) /seal/ Chief of Section i "1 Doc. Ho. 6lj6 Page 3 Drr.ft of Notification to the Chief of the Extraordinary Array InSendance Section in Tokyo nRiku Man Mitsu" /Military Manchuria Secret/. Secret funds from the Manchurian Incident Expenditure Account shall be transferred upon disbursement as follows:- Items: To TOJO, Hideki, the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army : ¥ 700,000, To EXIAN0, Eenso, the Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army: ¥ 20,000, To UI.E30, Yoshijiro, Vice-Minister of Sari ¥ 77.,800 Riku Man Mitsu To.. 134. /Army Manchuria Secret/ 6 April Shows 13 /I938/ fgJGATA j/seal/ KASHmT] /seal/ A PERIOD OF PRESERVATION io Ysars DIRECTED TO THE DECISION Vice-Ivlinister DIRECTION TO EXECUTE ..teyinvzL - WAR MINISTRY 'jREC'D NO.! RECEIVED RIKUMAUMHSU Rec'd No. 1i63 Name of Source (Section) of Origin THE ACCOUNT SECTION I S I : tua \ KO I " 3 y NAME OF SUBJECT .i. . — — — — — t re Delivery of Secret Service Funds of the Manchurian Incident Expenses • I i MINISTER fEntrustedf PARLIA- MENTARY ! VICE- MINISTER PARLIA- MENTARY COUNCILLOR 1 SECRETARY I 1 1 1 VlCfe^^S MINISTER (KOISO) SENIOR \ iJDMUJIS- 1 TRiJTIVE STAFF ADMMISTRA- TIVE STAFF IN CHARGE CKu^'mJRL) j | 1 1 1 j j BUREAU DIRECTOR IN CHARGE JajRIH/iSHl} (Substi- tuted) SECTION CHIEF IN CHAR_GE QoffilHASKl) STAFF OF SECTION IN CHARGE <KMURA) BUREAU SECTION IN CHARGE NO. (KSEIITSU NO*38 ! j BUREAU 1 DIRECTOR RELATES J j '̂ MtBAYM'LTu 1 ! SECTION CHIEF 1 1 DATS i REC'D j DATE | SUBMIT- TED ! I ! i ! SECRE- TARIATE OF MINISTRY | 1 1 RSC'D j August 2 FIN- i -tSHED j August 12 WITH j 1 ' 1 ... . . . — .... tj ^ o S Hi y CP y i-3 H § p f> H H} P < t-" O O <D »- H" p a p CD H- Di to c+ c+ O h j P P a Ctj M H* O p O H § P 0 c-t- H- P M M H• <<: 0 4 i WAR MINISTRY \ j August 11,1932 \ACCOUNT SSCION • Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 The Draft cf Announcement tc the Chief ,f the Accounts Section in the Intendance Department. (Secret) O'armitsu) Deliver Secret Service Funds as fellows frcn the Manchurian Affairs Expenses. Y85,000 to TORANOSUKE HASHIMOTO, the Chief cf Staff tc the Kv/antung A m y „ 15., 000 to KADOYA ICIEUCHI, the Chief of Staff to the Japanese A m y in China. Y20,000 to T01:00 KODAMA, the Chief cf Staff tc the A m y in Chosen. Y10,000 to JINZABUHO IIAZAKI, the Assistant Chief cf General Staff. ^ — Y18,500 to KUNIAKI ICO""" the Vice-Minister of '.Var. Yl,000 to YOSHISHIGE SHII.IIZU, the Chief of Staff tc the A m y in Taiwan. Yl,500 tc SHINJI HATA, the Provost Marshal General. Y5,000 to TAKENOSHKE OGINE, the Chief of the Military Police despatched tc Shanghai, C — c. 2y07 Page 3 C E R T I F I C A T E •T.D.C. No. I.P.S. Nc. 2907 3.t;ltej ent_j.f Source and Authenticity I, Kanec Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected rath the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody < f the document hereto attached consisting cf 2 pages, dated Aug. 2, 1932. and described as fellows: Matter Concerning the Granting cf Secret Service Funds for the Manchurian Incident. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part cf the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any ether official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives cr files): War Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day cf Jan, 1947. Witness: /s/ Shinu.ji Kcbayashi /s/ Kanec Ishibashi * Seal Signature of Official Non-regular of the Archives and Documents Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau " Official Capacity Statement of Official procurement I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher 0-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters cf the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official cf the Japanese Government in the conduct cf my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day cf Jan., 194-7 /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt,AUSMI NAME witness:/s/ J. A. Curtis Investigator, I.P.S. "2d Lt. M.I. Official Capacity Doc. No. 4043-0 & ' Page 1 128 9/5 Tokjo, S May. - Domei Radio presents sn ITAGAKI-KCI30 interview. ,in ini'.n i iniw* War Minister JQLuGMJ declared it tc be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe. Itagaki ascribed the confusion cf the European situation to the lack of equilibrium between old and new arising Pc-geis, i>sked whether the possibility existed that Jaj an mi«ht enter the Italo-German Military Alliance, Itagaki declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deeply rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it .as not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers. (continuation on page 2) 135926 /Printed on top of page 2/ Raw Material - Pgr personal information only ••*i"Eaou;g edit,ori.alTuarast~~ No^ 128 ilm 1333- j 25 Page_2 (continuation from page 'J' Minister of Colonies K0JS0 stated that apparently negotiations directed toward the conclusion aT~a mili- • tar;- alliance among the three hxis powers were being conducted. As a private observation Koiso stateJ: "Whether such negotiations lard to the goal or not depends entirely upon whether Gentians ^nd Italy understand Japan's- point of view and power in Seaft Asia af their tirr, tinn "jn F.n-pgyA n ge stated further that it would be suitable for Japan to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the execution of her policies, while it would not only not be suitable but downright dangerous for Germany and Italy to attempt to carry out their policies vis-a-vi3 the encirclement measureo of their opponents without tin? closest cooperation witn Japan, th,.̂ strongest in teat Th^ dJ£fi(giii±A8&£ES constantly causinc the jĵ fi ffderstandinA. explained Koiso further. Therefore it lay in Japan"s interest, as -veil as Italy's and Germanyfs for_Ge nanny and Italj; to understand not only their owiji p. osi- tlon but also that of Jgpfiq and her point of view in "the Tar East. Nearly ".11 Japanese had more knowledge of Germany and German affairs th£̂ _J;hc. "Tormans cf J span and Japanese affairs. Japan was convinced, r̂ita/'i',U.r"sxc'I error for Koiso?/ emphasized, of the "necessity of further strengthening of the Anti-Pact'1 in view of Japan's earlier experiences and present position in order to be able to face the international situation from "Japan's ov;n standpoint." for the Doc. No, 4043-G Page 2 Boose^^^Jylesa^ce. Urita. declared, that this was a dual-purpose action, namely, first as a domestic political gesture and second as a measure to infinite world public against Germany and Itr-ly. Finally having been directed to the China conflict, ..rtite emphasized that Japan's historic and racial mission lay in the establishment of a New Oracr in East i.sia in closest cooperation with Ghina and Manchoukuo, although third powers were trying tc bring into discredit Japan's military actions in C'hina. (DNB Representative) 135927 Doc, No. 4043-G Page 3 AFFIDAVIT I, P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That I am an Attache of the United ^tetea Department of State on the Staff of the United States political ^dviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the ̂ erlin Documents G.nter, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives 7/ere captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Go:rm..ny, and vjero later moved by authorized personnel of srid -Hied forces to said central documents center, f.Mve referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I wss assigned to said document tenter at Marburg, Germany, on -ugust 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Gerfflanyi an(j that thereafter the same have continued in 115' possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives• and which came into mj possession and custcdy and under my control in the manner cbovo 3et fcrth. 5• That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held end retained by me in order that it ma3r be examined end inspected >jy various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is herelry furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. 1 /;:/ J U P. cumminfr .7." P. CUvMING roc. ITc. Page 4 Subscribed end sworn tc before me this 23rd day of April 1946. /s/ G. H„ >rlo Ge H. GiJ'DE Lt. Colonel, .iGD i.eting "djutant General Offic? of Military C-overr.Jiont for Geim-ny (U. S.) i 7 J ^ C C . T " i E E T on EAECE 17th. 19^0. (taken from NINO'?, ;s OF CO 1 TTTEE ! S T I N G S OF THE HOUSE OF ilEP?iE3ENTATIVE3, 75th IKP3RIAL D M SESSION, ACCOGEv'S, PETITIONS, PROPOSALS OFFICIAL EESID..ECE OF TiiE PMIMH MINISTER, iiACATA-CHO, KOJIIIACHI-ILTJ, TOKYO CITY.) CO: E? ITTEE-EAN FUKUDA:-/T.N. in part/ For instance, as regards DAVAO in the PHILIPPINES, the population has not decreased so much although approximately over 35 years have elapsed till the present day. Business is reported as flourishing, and the people here are presently engaged in the cultivation of hemp. Moreover it is said +hat fertilizer has never been used for the past thirty years. For instance, in the LANS TO ."IDAHO /PHONETIC/ re. ion in CELEBES, ^here rice has been harvested three tiiii.es annually for more than ten years, it is said that fertilizer, if used even for once, would spoil everything. There are such places as these which are indeed inconceivable from the agricultural viewpoint of the Japanese. Then, hor about going ahead and seizing these places'" Of course, ve cahnofiio so? nevertheless', the develop- ment of the -OUTII..;EN REGIONS rill not necessarily be an impossibility, if we shall be prepared to suffer such hardships as' in dealing with : ANCHUKPA or RUSSIA, or if we possess an ecual amount of determination, effort and financial po*-er as required in overcoming the difficulties of the NuETH CEIEA Incident. Such bein..; the case, we believe that JAPAN will be confronted with considerable difficulties unless the MINISTER OF 3 TATE /i\ ••;. AO ISO/ will carry out a drastic reform in cur future national policy in such a way as to make some twc-iold policy,--one phase bein.f- for defence, and the other for advance. No*", as for TAIE.F /T.N. FOE- C 8 A/ or the SOUTH SEA I SLA. IDS GOVERN EN I OFFICE, /T.N. ''NANYU-CHP'/ they were able to become independent shortly after its occupation or its inauguration of government. As regards CHOSEN and : ANCHUEIA — though . ANCH'OEJA is an independent nation, JAPAN is at present obliged to defray encrmous sum of money in accordance with armament and other agreements. This may possibly last for scores of years to come. CEOS 'I, was the first to be annexed to JAPAN, but she is still unable to become independent, and enormous s-.bsiiies have to be -ranted to her. Such are the conditions . /en in so nice a place like CHOSEN. I wish to state that it is all the more unnatural to se.id farmers -- constituting JAPAN'S hi her-class labours — to. NORTH PAECHURIA where even coolies and L'OEEANS are unable to go. The policy that they must Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 be sent over is all very fine, but, as this unnaturalness is very hard to overcome, I wish you will kindly ^ive your con- sideration to this point. Our future national policy should be such that we shall have to endure preseverance no matter what difficulties it may lead us to, .ust as we have in continuing many years of devotion after having initiated the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of today. Therefore, if we have that determination to go through hardships, we shall find a real treasure chest in the Southern Pacific, where deposits of coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum will probably amount to 20C times more than those found in the 400 or so provinces in China. If JAPAN will be in possession of such resources, she shall 110 Ion er have to suffer from her present pli ht of being unable to wage a war as she would like just because of the scarcity of resources. Therefore, we must, for the sake of establishing the national policy of the Stare, have a chan.e made, at this juncture, in the principles of the traditional national policy of the past. r!e are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister of State ICO ISO has, at Cabinet meetings and the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line, or dwelled upon the policy in that line. So, although things may not go so easily as I say — although it would be splendid if they did -- things will be difficult. Nevertheless, even if we are to sacrifice a great deal of our national power, what will follow shall not be comparable to the results of the efforts in : ANCKIkUA or CHINA. " This is what we have been thinking about. Ifpeace is restored now, it is needless to say that Japan will suffer from over-population. As you have just mentioned, most of our farmers have only five tans of land /T.N. approximately 1.2 acres/. As they own only that much of land, -- let us say five children are born to a farmer, — four of them, either male or female, must leave the family to get jobs outside, according to the family system among the farming class. The eldest son is left to take over while the rest must be abandoned as unnecessary. The Japanese nation is unable to . . make a living-. This is the phenomenon among the farming class .,..; of present day Japan. This fact alone, I believe, will make Vr you- realize that we sh^i'i sufier iTOM over-population when peace is restored. TTftrt should we do about it? It is quite clear that we shall feed on each other and fall together if we stick to the five Tan farming. 'Te must establish a great national policy right now. Herein, lies the basis for our discussion. Therefore, we have been trying to send people over to Manchuria — we have heard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 families over there -- but its realization has been very difficult. Much money is spent with no results. Moreover, people are not interested in going inspite of our encouragement to go. I would like to inform you that unless you take into consideration, when establishing our national policy, some places viiere people ^ill by all means go even if they are told*not to go, rather than places where people will go and return, the great task of reviving Japan, of constructing Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 Japan will never be accomplished. In this respect, the military,, so far, has been concentrating too much upon the North. I wonder if this is not slightly mistaken? '".Tien I say mistaken, I mean mistaken as Japan's national policy. I do not know what you would say from the viewpoint of national defence, but this is, I think, a little mistaken when we consider the great task of truly reviving Japan, of constructing Japan. Therefore, our policy must be to advance both to the North and to the South, putting great efforts in our Southern advance, "re must establish policies which will enable us to overcome the difficulties involved in this task . Chairman AOFI; "Mr. FUICUDA, please state the gist of your opinion as we have no more time." Committeeman FUI.UDA: "I hope the State minister will study further into that direction -- Me have become members of the Accounts Committee, and have studied the Ministry for Overseas Affairs' enormous budget for the coming year. As it will be difficult to get any result-, if you put your efforts to things that will not possil., y have any effect, we shall have to take a neutral stand on this point; and I believe I shall have to ask you to put your efforts on the true attainment of an object, even in the execution of this budget. As regards such matters, however, I believe the Ministry for Overseas Affairs has great under- standing as to the South5 and great efforts have been afforded both the Formosan and the South Seas Governments from which we expect developments in economics and various other fields. Have you any opinion in this line? "e shall be most obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs would inform us with his opinions regarding these national polices. Minister of State ICQ ISO; - "I fully agree with Mr. FUEUDA's remarks regarding the construction of"both the NOaTH and the SOUTH. The OVERSEA AFFAIRS Ministry is also advocating the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SrUTH. There is, however, a slight difference in vlo^s in regard zo the path to be followed and its substance. I shall give you very roughly the important points of the orinions of the OVI/iSSA AFFAIRS Ministry which will carry out the idea o? constructing both the NORTH and. the SOUTH. As towards the CONTINENT* we must enforce the movement of population, which must naturally bo accompanicd by economic development, and as towards the SOUTH, we must enforce economic Doc. No. 2954 Pa so 4 expansion, rhich must by all moans to accompanied by the movement of population. This is our ray of thinking. Therefore, as regards CONTINENTAL Expansion, \ire consider movement of population as of primary importance, and economic expansion of secondary importance; vher ias, as for SOUTHERN Expansion, re ccnsidc-r economic expansion as of primary importance and the movement of population of secondary importance. rihis is the idea on rhich re arc proceeding along. Please note, therefore, that as regards the idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH, v/c are entirely of the same opinion vith nr. FUFUDA." Loc. No. 2954 C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. No. I.F.S. No. i:/:i Statement of Source end Authenticity I, SATO, Terr~ , hereby certify that I cm officially connectwith the Jrt mese Government in the following c a city: Secretary of the Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attc.ched consisting of pages, dated. , 19 * end described as follows : •f s of the î .-ount.? Committee of the House of Representatives- 75th Diet I further certify that the attached record and document is rn official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation-, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files'1.: Cabinet Secretariat Signed at Tokyo on this ^rd day of Jen. , 1947 /s/ T. Satow Signature of Official SEAL vT it nes s: /s/ J. i-.. Hurt is Secret c ry of the Cabinet 2nd Lt. E.I. Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, J. A. Or.: tis , hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Foi.ers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed' official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Jan. , 1947 /s/ • J, A, Ourt:;s 2nd. Lt. LI li it nes 3: Investigator TPS Official Capacity Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 Berlin, 28 m y 1939 Diplogerma Tokyo No. 174 Telegram in cipher (Secret Cipher Processing) •Exclusively for the Ambassador personally. Re your telegrams No. 213 nne 217. 1. The formal communication made to you 20 liny rt the request of ">r Minister, General Mriiri, th°t the Foreign Minister there ^-ould have us informed at the latest on Sunday, 21 May of the positive ne*' decision of the Japanese Cabinet Conferone hrs proved to be without effect. The local Japanese Embassy has up tc today not been in a position to make any official communication at all regarding the state of affairs. 2. Oshima reported the following in yesterday's strictly confidential and unofficial conversation; He h- s received a telegram, froi:. Arit", according to "hich the Japanese Govern- ment wishes to reserve entrance into a state of w"r in case of European conflict. In a very energetic telo»:ram to Arita. Oshima has refused to pass this point or vi^f p" t.n. t.ho ftt'^nan Servernr.ent • t -11. Thereupon the ,Tar Minister requested CFsKlna "by "wire to hold, off until later against Arita in ord r not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Arry is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly -\nd even at risk of a cabinet overthrow. 3. I request you without making use of the aforementioned confidential communications of Oshiia's to m-ke it clear to your authorities that the absence of the communication formally announced to you "s well as of every other cor: unicaf on has produced great astonishment in us *nd in the Italians. It is unavoidable th°t "s a result of this silence the Japanese a11itudr is norT beginning to be regarded with distrust.., "Can ho longer understand here what can be going on in Tokyo • nd for what rc-asonsth.. Japanese Gcv. rm • at - t. this advanced stage of the negotiations is still evading a clear-cut attitude. Our local skepticism ±f of course still further heightened by the attitud. of the Japanese delegation at the ' 'or Id Postal Congress in Buenos Aires. P, TT r " Lr . i. .. . /German Foreign I inister/ /Frame Ncs. 135951-?./ Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 AFFIDAVIT I, "7. P. Cunning, being first duly s n o n on oath, depose nnd say: 1. That I - an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I an a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). Th-t in ry capacity as above set forth, I have in i.y possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Docurcnts Center, Berlin, Gen/any, the original captured German Foreign Office files «nd archives. 2. Th~t said original Foreign Office files and archives vcre captured and obtained by military forces under the cozmmti. of the Supreme Commander, Allied Fxpedit: onary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture rero first assembled by said military forces ~t a I Hit'ry Document Center at Warburg, Gerr,any, ^nd rorc later roved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and knovm as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. Tint I r~s assigned to s^id document center at i.arburg, Germany, on August 15, 194-55 "nd said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first .ame into ny possession and control r/hile I rras stationed at I.arburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in ry possession and custody and under my control. 4. That the document to T"rhich this affidavit is attached is true and correct photostatic copy of an original Gen an Foreign Office document vThich ras captured fror: said Ger. an Foreign Office files and archives, .and "hich came into ny possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth. 5. That said original document, of rhich the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and re- tained by me in order tlvt it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photo- static copy cf said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth. /s/ vr. P. Gumming P. CUT TUG Subscribed aid svrorn to before no this 23rd day of April 19 /s/ G. H, Ga.rdc G. H. GARDE i 0FF1CJ: OF MILITARY Lt. Colonel, AGD |G0V;;RN LNT FOR CER*.ANY (U.S.) Acting Ad.iuta.1t General AFFIDAVIT I, W. P. Cumming, "being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say: 1. That $ iMa an Atta.che of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U,5.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in ray possession, custody, ana control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the orig nal captured German Foreign Office files and archives. 2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center. 3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same jia.ve continued in my possession and. custody and under my control. 4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from sa.id German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set ferth. 5. That said original document, of which the attached is a. phdtop.tatic copy, i3 being held a.nd retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, f> photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of sa.id original for the reasons above set forth. /a/ W. P. Cumming ¥. F. CUMMING Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1S46. /s/ G. H. Garde G. E. GAHDE Lt. Colonel, AGD Acting Adjutant General OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVEHHMEHT FOB GEHMA1IY (U.S.) D.oc. No. 4095 ~ Iten 2 Page 1 Heme, 2 September 1939 FOREIGN BERLIN ITo. 404 of 2 September Tel. Snc ipher ed Secret Cipher Process (good) Quite secret For German Foreign Minister Japanese Ambassador visited me today to inforn na, ̂ Iir,t he had nô - received his expected recall. Expects to depart in about throe-weeks would particularly welcome /opportunity/ to have detailed tall: with German Foreign Minister on homeward trip which he mry take via Moscow. He seemed to be of the opinion that wit .1 a new Japanese Cabinet there was a well- founded chance for succossful continuation of the stalled further rapprochement with the Axis Powers. For this very purpose of being able personally to work more effectively than was pos- sible from Rome he was going to Tokyo. Ambassador mentioned further that opinion was growing in Japan for a certain settle- 7hich« ment with Russia Tec o nom; if carried thronph in s l.p̂ tas fflfl. Via"" "li'glit^ventuate in a non-aggression_ I'uu, Of ^Onsidera*oIe' significance, for a Japan freed from a Rugs inn tbrr.pt yas in p ppsition to reduce" a possible tendency of the United States to intervene in Muro'ppt Ambassador remarked 'finally that the ill feeling against us .after conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Argression Pact had irproved considers 'ith the Cabinet change. Sig. Hackensen /Frame No. 302389/ Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 .- r'/Er. 3(ome, 4 September 191 -gtrcrcTT" Note Aite-r previous appointment by telephone I visited the local Japanese Ambassador today. After .T.̂ t S7"1ir.ntnn'. referring to his conversation v;ith the Ambassador on 2 September, had told me why he wished to speak to mo, he UTTred " a m — c o u r s e oi tli e conversation -- which lasted a good half hour -- approximately the following: As is known to me, the conclusion of the Gerr.an-Russinn Non-Agression Pact came as & S e v e r e ^ p n £ensaxlon in J.^AiUJ T116 friends of Germany had since then been laboring to counteract this effect. He himself, who belongs to this circle, had been trying ever ao long to, induce the Japanese Government^ td ^ohcluHe an alliance with U5~~Cahd' pros'].;: ::bly glspglth' Italy). This w-.s the aim of'his office here. Since this aim was not attained, he requested recall and w- s now returning to Japan, for he believes he can be of more use in the aforesaid direction there than here. Mr. Shiratori wont on to say /these words crossed through in original/ the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop proposed to him during his (Shiratori7 s) presence in Berlin jpn the occasion o.f. the Fuehrer's birthday, that ..Japan should erdicr into a closer alliance relationship, with ...Germany. H c sent this proposal on to Tokyo at "the time without, however, receiving a reply from therec Mhen he again saw the German ^Foreign Minister. 16 June, the latter told hiri Germany would inny- r».r»nr>lnr]n o n O ft - ^ g r CSSl O n pact with Russia , T rrWTTypan Iliad not a.^repd to our proposals. He reported this to Tokyo, toe.The Japanese Ambassador m Berlin, Oshima, VTho as a military nan understands naught_ nf f.hn.gn •̂°ttr.r.q1 reportpri to Japan at the time that it was out of the question that Germany would conclude a pact with Russia. The Tokyo Government believed the German Foreign Minister /von Ribbentrop crossed through/ had only "bluffed". It had also spread this around Tokyo r-ith the addition that he (Shiratori) and Oshima had been led around by the nose. Two months had passed without • Tokyo's answering him (Shiratori) and finally T"e had concluded the pact with Russia. Thereupon the Japanese Government had resigned and he had put in four times for recall until it was finally accepted. As for the supposed Japanese protest against the German- Russian Non-Aggression Pact, Mr. Shiratori told me Oshima had doubtless received instructions to protest. He (Shiratori) p N O . 4095 - Item 3 Pace 3 had been informed thereof at the same time. He had then got in touch with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin by telephone in order to stop the protest action if possible. Some official -- the embassy counselor, if I am not mistaken -- told him that Oshima had already gone to the Foreign Office. State Secretary von Meizsacker did not accept the protest there. On his return to the Embassy Oshima found the news of his (Shiratori's) telephone call and then reported to Tokyo that he considered a protest inopportune. In spite of this he received instructions from Tokyo to carry out the step. This has, however, not yc-t taken place. Concerning the present state of Japanese-Russian relations (hero I come tc the most important part of the conversation) Mr. Shiratori informed me the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow had received instructions a*Tbw days ago to make the following proposals to the Russian Government: 1. To settle by diplomatic means the dispute on the border between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, where for a considerable time a regular battle has been in progress; 2. To appoint a commission for the settlement of the border problems there in general; 3. To conclude a trade treaty. If in the course of the discussions of the trade treaty Russia should make known her desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan, Asbr^ssador Topo should enquire first whether Russia -ere disposed to deny help to CTIang kai _ori£iL». He (Shiratori) does not consider these instructions to the Ambassador in Moscow fortunate, .even /deems them/ dangerous. Russia, indeed, had never of her own accord proposed a non- aggression pact. The propose 1 £ng._the Prerqan-Rusgian Non- AftgressiQ" ton, haft originated with usT in his opinion, the only way to secure a non-aggression pact with Russia — which he also considered hirh.lv desirable -- was with Germany's mediation. He had therefore proposed to General Oshima, on his own, without instructions from Tokyo, to request Germany's good offices. All this had taken place a few days earlier. General Oshima had not yet been able to see the German Foreign Minister, since .he /GFi / had h"d no time to receive him before his departure for the front -'here he had gone vlth the Fuehrer. The. Fuehrer had rep.eivpd tonpwl ngMns t^fnre his departure, but that was only a matter of a very short visit during, .which the Fuehrer declared Gen any wished to maintain the old, friendly relations 1 -ith Japan, but during which Oshima had no opportunity Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 to broach the question of German mediation between Japan and Russia. He (Oshima) wished to attempt to speak to the German Foreign Minister after his return to Berlin, Regarding these latest developments Berlin was not yet officially informed. He (Shiratori) wanted to keep us -.u cour-nt here and considered it appropriate that i-e inform Berlin. To a remark from me that he had, so far as I understood it, the i-'ish to speak to the German Foreign Minister on his return trip to Japan I,?r. Shiratori replied that his travel plans mere net yet definite. Ho mould presumably return to Japan via Scandinavia and America and mould of course be happy tn talk to the German Foreign Minister in case the latter wished it. I got the impression thr.t Mr. Shiratori did not wish to ask for a conference on his own initiative, so to speak, prob- ably out of regard for General Oshima. He expressed the vie* that the letter "fas to be found in Berlin. In the course cf the conversation Ambassador Shiratori mentioned that in connection "ith the Anti-Comintern Pact a secret accord was concluded between Germany and Japan to the effect that the tvrc countries were not to conclude a non- aggression p~ct with Russia. The whole situation had since then completely altered through the developments in Europe and no one could demand from any country thnt it commit suicide for a treaty1s sake. At the time in question Russia appeared the chief enez:v to us as well as to Japan. For "both countries, however, (as a further development a ft n y th <•- Tientsin inc id cut) England had now become the chief .enemy, who absolutely has to be beaten. The advantage> to 'is also , of a cleansing or an amelioration of Russian-7aDanese relatione was self-evident, for America would in this case decide with ranch renter difficulty to intervene in the present conflict. xhe •;cal of Japanese policy in China remains, now as then, the establishing of a new order there, with which was linked the expulsion of England from China. In order to attain this goal Japan was hoping for financial help from America. ~>e then came to speak of the present conflict. Mr. Shir-tori believed that --fWr the overpowering of Poland the opportunity fcf an understanding :1th France and England might present itself. Per:• any -nd Italy were nctfrt" prese^JLlQ^i^Gsiticn, and France -nH HVyylpiyl rr-vr- get nKrmc;'^ T.fl fVTcrp n yrrr cn a truly large scale, LLJLt ..ghouid come to .e .general conflict into which Italy, the United States, Russia and Japan would then necessarily be drawn, it ^euld simply be a catastrophe whose extent could not be conceived/ ' Doc. No. 4095 - Item 3 Page 5 In reply to a question of I'r. Shiratori's as to Italy's attitude, I strongly emphasized that Italy was proceeding in closest accord '"ith us and that her attitude corresponded to our intentions in every respect. /sig./ Piessen C E R T I F I C A T E I, ARTHUR A. SAITDU3JT, hereby certify: 1. That I an Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such h~.ve possession, cu.£ tody, and control of orig- inal or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section. 2. That IPS Document No. 4095? consisting of sixteen photostatic pages, was received by the Inter- national Prosecution Section from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nurenbrrg v'~r Crimes Trials. /s/ Arthur A. Sandusky. ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY Tokyo, 31 December 1946. Docr No. 2925 Page 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THF FAR EAST THE UNITED STATES OF AFRICA, et al - against - ARAKI, Sadao, et al, ' , , <7 A F F I D A V I T ' A v / ^ 7 I, Shlnichi TANAXA, make oath and say as follows: Q Were you once Chief of the First Section <,Operations) of the General Staff of the Japanese Imperial Arr A Yes, I was such from October 12, 1940 to l/ucember, 1942, Q 'That was you:.* rank when you assumed office for the first time? A I was Major general but was promoted to Lieutenant General in October, I°41„ Q Do you know the defendant Akira MUTO? A Yes, When I was Chief of the First Sect"5 an (Operations) under .General SUGlYAHA," Genaial Ml'TO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. He was one of the liaison r?en who did most of the work between the 7ar Ministry and the Army General Staff Q kz liaison man what was the nature of h:ts work? A At the General Staff office the work wa^ mostly paper work concerning mobilization) organization, operations, strategy and tactics. The Army General Staff ti& ' nothing to do with matters involving politics, foreign re] it ions and finance. Q In the decision to undertake operation." on Indo-China in 1941, what had the War Ministry to do ''1th that decision? A In matters like that, military policies ?o to the General Staff from the v'ar Ministry, but it d - not rean that the War 'Ministry makes' the" decision, Firrt of all the Drime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of War, the Minister of ? avy and the Cnief of the A"my General Staff and the Chief of the Navy General Staff, hold a preliminary meeting and arrive at a decision of h-ifional policies. The decision of the Cabinet is handed, d.alia to the War Ministry which in turn contacts the General Staff on matters which concern the General Staff such as military operations, Q Who is sent down to the Army General Staff from the War Ministry in order to convey the policy laid down or the decision made? A In such important natters as the national policy regard- ing Indo-China, the War Minis ter would go directly to the Chief of Staff, but in minor details the War Minister approaches the Chief of~the "Military Affairs Bureau and he in turn will make connections with the General Staff,. Q Who would follow up the order or the decision arrived at a"1: the conference which is handed down to the War Minister and which is passed on to the General Staff? A The Chief of the General Staff'will carry out that part of national policy as far as operations are concerned. The Chief of General Staff integrates the national policy into operations and strategy. Doc r No. 2925 Page 2 Q In what way does he carry out the order? A The Chief of the General Staff had been already included in the preliminary meeting so he knows in general the over-all policies and operations. For this reason, it is easier for him to integrate the policies into the operations. After he comes bac'1 to the General Staff office, he calls in the Vice Chi/u' of Staff and the four main assistants and he requests the various assistants, after revealing hisulans and policies, to bring in various details to conform tohis plans. Ifter such materials are gathered the Chief of General Staff gives out the order for the actual Carrying out of the operation Q Your section is in charge of operations and strategy? A Yesc # Q As the Chief of the General Staff attends the conference that makes the decision why is the need for the War Minister to go over to the Chief of Staff and hand him the orders? 4 The decisions arrived at the preliminary meetings must be aporoved by the Cabinet in order to make them legal and binding, bj.nce the Chief of General Staff does not. know the decision of the Cabinet, +he "Mar Minister contacts the Chief of General Staffs Q Once you have prepared the plans for operation, to whom do you submit them? A 4fter the operational Plans are completed, they are presented to the Vice Chief of Staff.. He makes the necessary correction- and in turn delivers them to uhe Chief of the General Staff* Q Once it is rece-ived bv him, what does the Chief of the General Staff do about it? A He makes the necessary corrections and important matters are discussed wit': the War Minister<• It is shown to the War Ministry and if approved the Chief of the General Staff,will give out the orders anc If they are important orders, they are first shewn to the War Minister, who will sign it if he approvesr Q Following, the Imperial Conference of 2 July 194-1 do you recall if you were,d1 rueted" by General PIGIYAMA to make operational study on a campaign against Malaya, Java, Borneo, Bismarck-,— Match Fast Indie? and "Milipnines? A Yes, ' Q following the Imperial Conference of 6 .September 1941 do you r emember if you -'/ere directed by General SUGIYAMA to begin preparations for operations against those countries? 4 Yes, I was ordered to do so following the Imperial conference which was a t t e n M b v KONOYE, TOJO, OIMAWA, SUGIYAMA, 70Y0DA and NAGANO„ . „ •» Q Can you tell us if Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MUTO had knowledge of these instructions b~- General SUGIYAMA to you in" September 1941? A Yes, for by the very nature of the rules an"! practices govern- ing the relationship between the Mar Ministry, and the General Staff at the time, Generals TOJO, KIMURA and MTT0 had to know and did know of those instructions. As I stated before, the paper work for 4he preparation of the operation is done by the General Staff, however, the actual preparation such as supply and' strength, etc., was carried on by the War MinistryP Since General 0 v.-as- Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 of the Far Ministry explanations for the preparation of the operation had to be made to him by the General Staff. He was well informed, especially on supply and money matters. Q Was it the duty of the General Staff to alert the field commanders about the imminence of hostilities? A If recessary, the fj eld commanders were alerted by the General Staff, It wasn't the duty'of my Section, it was more the duty of the Intelligence Section. 0 Foilowinr the .imperial Conference on 1 December 1941 were you flr-r .• • c^.TjI nemt day by General SUGIYAMA to draft an alov .r̂ c-r to all commanding generals of troops in th'5 Po joa? Areas mv with the United States, E^IahU__ahg Fdlland was imminent and warning them that hostilities sncu Ld. commenc-.-' onEE-Day? A I v/as direc ted by Gen<: rai SC'tlYAHA to write the order to the field cor.miar.ders in the South Seas so that in case war should break oii? they would be ready. Actually, SUGIYAMA Issued the order because his signature was necessary to make the order valid and effective; but be- fore the order could.be wired to the various commanders )in the South Pacific it also had to have the signatures of approval of Generals TOJO, KIMPRA and MUTO in their respective capacities as"War Minister, Vice Minister of War and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. It was the customary rule In our office to obtain the signatures of the War Minister, the Vice War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs on those important, orders before they could be sent out. {J When w.:;"3 you so directed? A I am not. su^e, thought I think it was December 2nd or 1st when I was directed by General SUGIYAMA to write and issue the order in his name. « Q Was the alert order sent by^wire to the commanding general of all troops of the South Seas areas? A Yes, they were sent that day after it had been signed by General fcl aYAMA, Q Did General SUGIYAMA tell you what day was X-Day? A Yes, about 2 7 t h or 28th November 1°41 he told me that X-Day would be December 8, 1941. J s J Shi nichi TANAKA Shinichi TANAKA Sworn to and subscribed before me at Tokyo, Japan this ??nd day of 1946. Tr D, White, Caat. , AUS-02640Q3 C E R T I F I C A T E I, ^gjta, Yoshiakl , hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I truly and correctly translated from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English the oath administered to TANAKA, Shi ni chi. the nature and purpose cf which oath was fully understood by the said affiant. /s/ 0-ita, Y o s M a M Ogita, Yoshiakl Dec* No- l6A P?g-e- 1 I 0 w GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF A.I.LIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION NOTE: Translation requested by Legal Section. Military °olice Report No. 352 Report on the Matter Concerning the Investigation of the American Airmen Who Raided the Japanese Homeland, FROM: Military Police Commander NAKAMURA, Akito TO: Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA, Gen. 26 May 1942. Attached is the report of the investigation of the eight officers and men of tha American Planes who took part in the raid on JApAN proper on l p April and were forced down at NANCHANG and TOT^G P'O in CENTRAL CHINA. FORWARD TO: Minister of Mar, Vice-Minister of 'Mr, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Chief of Military Affa'rs Bureau, Chief of Home Defence. (3). — f Chief of General Staff, Vice-Chief of General Staff, Chief of 1st (Administration) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of General Affairs Bureau, (3) Chief of Naval General S+.aff, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff, Chief of 1st (Admin:'str at ion) Section, Chief of 2nd (Intelligence) Section, Chief of 5th Bureau. Navy Minister, Vice-Minister of Navy, Chief of Bureau of Naval' Affairs (3) and the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Defense. Doc * Nor 16A e Page 2 C E R T I F I C A T E I certify that the original document, of which ATIS Document No* 67^9 is a translation, was used in the Doolittle fliers case, tried in Shanghai and appears in extract form as Defense Transcript Exhibit No. 14 in Volume IV, of the record of trial» /s/ Charles A. Reinhard CHARLES A. REINHARD, F^jor, F. Chief, CRD Doc. He. 2534-A ^ , ^ x J G "x tract fror The Tokyo Nichi Nichi dated Tuesday, July 1, 1941, CONF'RT MCE IS HELD BY \R.IY ME SIRS OF S W T COUNCIL TOJO FX°La INS " 7 Candid Views nv<- Exchanged Regarding Fast-Moving Situation The \rry called a conference of A m y rcrbers cf the Su- preme Mar Ceuneil_en June 30 at l:fO p„n. at the War Minister's official residence,, ^ — Mar Minister Lieut. General Tc.lo and relat-d officials -xplained in detail th<- present fast-chmglng international situation, after which cmaia views were exchanged regarding the attitude to be taken by Nippon in the future„ Th- -rry nr r.bers of the Suurmr Mar Council who attended the confer once were I. 1, H. Marshal Prince Man-in, General Prince Asaka, and G-n'ral Prince Higashi-Kuni; General Count Hislichi T-rauchi, G n-ral Kehji Doihar'a G ncral Yasuji Okanurac. Representing the Arry organs were War Minister Tcjo; General Gen Gugiyara, Chief of the General staff; General Otozo Yarndoj Tnrpc61W-»Gk.• fiera 1 cf the. "rr.y Education; ''/arHTic~-Ilin- istrr Kinura, Vice-Chief Tsukata cf the Go-cral'Staff, 'and"other officials ccnccrncdp Drc. Nc . 2908 Page 1 Picture Ott, German Ambassador Handing the Decoration to Sugiyama, Chief of General Staff. f t AWARDING OF LECORATIO:JbTO GMERAL SUGIYAMA A M OTHERS PRO'' FUEHRER HITLER." CEREMONY HELD AT T" BASC TODA "Answering to the deer rations which were conferred by His Majesty the Emperor upon military and civil officials of "Axis nations residing in Japan on the anniversary of the con- clusion cf the . Tr 1 part.i tp. Prn.t,: the ceremony of a war ling decorations conferred by Fuehrer Hitler upon Japanese officials was held at the German Embassy, NAGATACIlO~KOJIL'ACHI KU TOKYO at 12,30, 1st Oct bcro SUGIYAMA, Chief cf r-enernl staffT DOHIHARA, Army Air Tnsp^flr.of r - 0 " 0 " ^ IMOURA, Vice War Minimi', SA'l'U, u m e f cf Military Affairs H^ydaul, NINOriY.-W' Secretary tr one Prime >;i"nistor proceeded to the EmbScsy in dignified official military unTTorm". Ai'.basVfdor OTT, after handing the ''Grand Cross of the German"Eagle11 t: General SUOIYAMA and DOHIHARA and Lieutenant General KinJHA- "Order For Merit with Star" to" Major General O H and" "First Class Order Per Merit" to Colonel NINOEIYA, stated as follows: "We acknowledge your meTTE's in having by your efforts wen glorious victories in the joint execution of the War." Representing the others General SUGJJAFri^stated as follows: "We pledge that we will march steadTIy towards the final victory with a firmer belief in the victory of the Axis in order tU respond to the hen ur given by the FUEHRER today." The decorations conferred by the .FUEHRER, today are all newly issued war time decorations with swords attached to them. After the ceremony was ever, all the attendance drank a toast, They had dinner with friendly conversation and atmospher and the meeting was closed at 2 P.M, Dcc. Nc. 2908 Page 2 A3AHI SHIKBUN TOKYO I Jan. 9, 1947 I, Yoshiji Nishijima, certify that I an employed by The Asahi Shinbun in the capacity of Chief cf Investigation Department and that the attached photograph is an exact and true copy cf the article entitled "General Sugiyama and ethers cited by Hitler", which appeared in The Asahi Shimbun cf 2 Oct. 194-2. Chief cf Investigation Department /s/ Yoshl.ji Nishi.jima Yoshiji Nishijima Sworn and subscribed tc befcre me this 9th day cf January, 194-7. /s/ Eric vl, Fleisher Eric VT. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUSIII Jt -c, No, 1532E it en 162 ? ;e 1 To To Minister /initialled/ Vice Minister /initialled/ Chief of America Bureau /initialled/ (General #36413, #36412) Head of Telegraph Section /seal by Kp.neyama/ Despatched from Washington Nov. 26, Received by Ministry Nov. 27, 1941 1941 A .M* P.M. SECRET Top Secret Superintendent's Code To Fcrcign_ITinist.ex Togo No, 1180 From Nomura, Kurusu T V Jcry^o V I / - As /stated/ in our frequent cables, there is no hope to get acceptance for the whole of B plan, while we- have not much time left. If the condition does not change we must give up the negotiation though it is not desirable at all. We arc deeply humiliated at our lack of influence. In this case the only way to bridge over this difficulty is to let President Roosevelt cable to Fis Irjesty first of the hope of Japan and America's cooperation to maintain peacc in the Pacific, (we will try our best to do so, if we can get your permission) and in return, to ask Fis Majesty tc answer this message, clearing the air. At the same time, if we can get a little time more, it is possible to take the initative in proposing t vc establishment of neutral countries including French Indo-China, Netherland East Indies and Siam, considering that England and America may start protective occupancy (as you knew. President Roosevelt suggested to make t ve Netherlands East Indies and Siam neutral countries in September of tvis year). Though there is an opinion that the rupture of this negotiation does not decidedly pean the outbreak of war, after tve breakdown of the negotiations, it is possible for t ven to occupy Netherlands Last Indies, as I stated previously and the_conflict will inevitably start by our attacke But it is very doubtful whether Germany will take action in accordance with Article Three of the (Tri-Partite) treaty, and the solution of the China incident must be carried over at least to the end of this World War. .As this telegrar. may become the last one .of my ens, I wish you to svow this at least to tve Lord Keeper of the * rivy Seal KIDO and answer us by return telegram. (END) Doc. No. 4095 - It en 3 Page 4 5 1 2 1 1 1 I C A T S W. D. C. Ho. I. P. S. STo. 1532 E Statement of Source and Authenticity I, EAYASHI Xaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Oct. 26, 1941 and described as follows: Ic* 1180 d3spatched Oct. 26 1941, "by Ambassador Honiara to Foreign Minister Togo . I further certify tliat the attached j'eccrd and document is an official document of the Japanese G-ovoi-ro' nt, arid that it is part of the official archives and filec of the following namid ministry or department (specify- ing also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of January, IS47 /a/ Eayashi Signature of Official SEAL Witness: /s/ I. Sato Chief. Archives Section Official Capacity Statement of Official Procurement I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the abovd signed official of the Japanese Government iz. the conouct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 14th day of Jan, 1947 /s/ Henry Shimo.iima MAKE Witness: Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt. AUS, MI Investigator IPS Official Capacity Document No. 2155-C Page 1. ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHINA. INCIDENT PPTNTED IN THE "EDUCATION MINISTRY REVIEW" DATED JULY 1, 1938. Baron A.RAKI, Sadao Minister of Education One year has passed since the outbreak of this Incident which was started by the violent firing of Chinese armed force at the Marco Polo Bridge and the day of July 7 which is never to be forgotten by the Japanase people has come around again. Upon the outbraak of the Incident, strenuous and patient efforts were exerted by our side not to extend the trouble, aiming at an early solution on the scot. Thus reconsideration of the Chinese Government was sought for the maintenance of the peace of the Orient. (T.N. This attitude of Japan), however, was answered by an insulting oppression over her subjects in China. Besides (T.N. the Chinese Government) infringed upon international justice by going hand in hand with communists and arrogant challenges were made on us. Such being the case, the Imperial Japan took the decisive steps in returning the fire in order to sweep away the enemy of peace from the territories of East Asia. For the last one year, Chiang Kai-shek has given free play to tyranny for the maintenance of his influential power, sacrificing the welfare of the people, while the war has spread to whole China and the main points of strategic advantages have fallen to the hand of Japanese troops. It has become clear that Page 2. the fall of Hankow, the second caottol so to speak, is a question of time. Yet Chiang's bigoted thought has not shown any sympton of changes and his unspeakable acts of tyranny can never be stopped before he comes to the end of his devil's luck. Our Imperial Japan, who is entrusted by God, took the arm and stood up for justice and humanity, will, of course, inflict chastening blows persistently against CHIANG'S Regime and it is our policy that we will not lag down arms until anti-Japanese China is completely crushed to the extent that they can not stand up again. As we announced many times previously the Chinese people are not the enemy of our Imperial Japan. Furthermore, the peoples under the Chiang Kai-shek's regime hars suffered for many years from the misgovernment and they are still wandering on the brink of starvation. For the Chinese people of four hundred thousand are now under the Protection of Japanese Army and they are receiving our Army's warm sympathy. In the area of North and Central China the lively look has appeared already, promising the reconstruction of the China of tomorrow. Originally, China, as the senior nation of East Asia has long been in close relations with Japan throughout her history, and this relationship should not be changed forever. Consequently the mission on the part of Japan is to expel from Chinese Document No. 2155-C Page 1. territory the Communistic devils, the enemy of humanity, as well 9.s the Chiang Government persisting in their anti-Japanese policies, and save China from the present conflicts and poverty, at the same time speaking her cooperation for the establishment of co-prosperity and the eternal friendship of the two nations. We are now in the situation that the. closer cooperation between f. Japan and China, which is the impelling -force for the security of the East Asia, is about to be realised with the growth of the two regimes -- the Temporal Government and the Renovation Government. The development of this new tendency reveals that Japanese Empire holds the actual power as the real leader of East Asia, and that the existence of China, as a power in East Asia, will fall into a delicate situation without the assistance of our country. And furthermore, this fact proves here clearly that our country takes consistently action with the actual intention to contribute to the establishment of peace relations in East Asia or all over the world and to the promotion of the welfare of mankind. I believe that every country in the world, facing this stern and fixed fact, will be obliged to recognize tiie Spirit of Japan and its true value. However, as the trend of the international political situations will be intricate and delicate owing to the influence of the Incident, direct or in- direct, so we must be prepared for many difficulties in the future in the way of our Empire, Document No. 2155-C Page 1. We, the people of Japan therefore, must not be puffed up with victories in the past and must not halloo till we are out of the wood. We must make UP our minds to overcome all the difficulties which we may face and not to stop till our object is completely achieved, sacrificing ourselves for the sake of the country. So in this sense, the spiritual mobilization of the nation should be strongly advocated and understood by all. With the outbreak of the Incident last summer, the self- awakening of the nation wis realized and the aspiration and enthusiasm for surmounting the national crises were pervaded to the whole country, which brought about the solid unification of the people. This awakening and enthusiasm of the people have bean embodied as meritorious service in battlefield and as heroic deeds on the home front. This is the true picture of Japan and it is due to the virtuous merits of successive emperors and to the earnestness i v of loyalty and patriotism, which runs through the bloodvessels of our people that Japan has won her present prosperity by having surmounted her critical moments in her long history and by protecting infinite national structure. The spiritual mobilization of the nation was realized by the power of inevitability and the work i r Document No. 2155-C Page 1. steadily bearing fruits under the complete unification of the one hundred million fellow-countrymen. It is a matter of reassuring that the situation is showing the unmcvable perfection by cherishing the iron wall on the home front, ks the situation will become mora serious with the development of the war, it is beyond the question whether the substance of the system of this movement has to be perfected further or not. We the people even though we shall engage in various V occupations according to our divine duties — such as cultivation of rice-fields, wood-cutting in the forests, fishing along the coasts, beating hammerj in the factories, teaching on the plat- forms, or keeping the homes, we must -- keeping in mind that each of us is one of the elements of the strong motive power in this spiritual movement -- show our sincerity of loyalty and patriotisi assist and encourage each o t h e r , old or young and men or women, fill up the storehouses with products by making industries prosperous, endeavor to strengthen finance and economy by per- forming thrift and savings and. moreover, we must be preaared for the aggrandizement of national strength required to wage long-period war. With deep understanding of the national thought, we should clarify the absolute superiority of our national constitution and the thought of HA.KX0 TCHIF or the unification of the world under one roof should be pervaded to the whole world. r Document No. 2155-C Page 1. National Mobilization must be achieved both in the material and spiritual sense, which will promote the conspicuous evar- progressing prosperity of the nation, who must not be left as a power in East Asia only but must be promoted to the world's Japan as the leader of the new era and the proper magnanimity and full vigour of her peonle should be cultivated so that the mission given to her may be thoroughly fulfilled, Educators and others who are in the leading position of this movement must take special care to keep this point in their mind, and must set good examples of themselves to 'the people of the nation. In this sense, the Imperial Rescript on Education should be observed before everything as the fundamental creed of daily life and the rath that should be followed by loyal subjects. The great spirit of the Imperial Way which is free from mistakes throughout all ages and countries is the light shining all over the world forever. In facing the great turning point of the world history and when the cultivation of the nation which will work as impellent force for fulfilling the mission of Japan is in an urgent necessity, the strenuous efforts of the educators and othar leaders of cultural fields ara strongly aspired. On the day of the first anniversary of the China Incident, I have stated parts of my opinion demanding the firm resolution of the nation and at the same time, I like to express my heartiest gratitude to the membars of the Imperial armed forces in the front who are fighting persistently by overcoming all difficulties and also to those who sacrificed their livas for the ideals of our nation. C E R T I F I C A T E W.D.C. Wo. I.P.S. No. 2155-C Statement of Source and Authenticity Cbikara Tsu.iita, hereby certify that I am offic- ially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Director of the Investigation Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 1 July. 1938. and described as fo11ows: The first anniversary of the China Incident speech by ARA.KI, Sadao. Minister of" Education.. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Ministry of Education. Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Jan.. 1947 /s/ Chikara Tsu.iita Signature of Official SEAL Director of the Investigation Bi:reau Witness: /s/ Isao /Vmagi Official CapaciLy Statement of Official Procurement I) 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher. 0-935000. hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo, Jaoan on this 23rd day of Jan., 1947. /s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt., AITS. MI M M K Investigator, IPS Witness: /s/ Douglas L. W-Mrorf Official Capacity Chief, Inv. Div., IPS.
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Japanese relations with the Soviet Union (Doc. 1628B), Japanese-German-Italian relations (Doc. 4011), Japanese Constitution and government. (Doc. 6902) & Ex.2209-2281. Japanese government
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