AtoM
David Conde fonds
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Prosecution documents and exhibits
Conde, David W.
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DOC. No. 1144-C P°ge 1 "Details R'i-j.^.rding lovenents of airAtist .Boclics in Co.i lcction ”ith Chan^g of Government. (.T.N. Cabinet chanses.)" 「丨議门 广广,_ Bcc^usc there •广re natters in the present political situation r;liicb differ frcm ny beliefs, I took steps for presenting r.iv rns-i .-n^tio i vcs^crd^v. the 22nd, There .-re snia to be soiac people 1 -ho sn.y tlir\t ： 'r a TIA 1 '^DA ‘ s speech is the cause of rr-t cgj'S Ji-̂ v? n：-.; core to p» slnje, but th°t is not the re-son. rt ill. It is bcc父usつ I ascertained the fr.ct th っ t the vie-> -s on the / T . p r e sent/ situation by the pnrty vhich h<?s some montiers sitting r.s c^binct Members for tho purpose of ccoporrti.ig r T ith the execution of the policy of the present c^binct, differ fund.。raent>:lly，"ith o u r s . This is clcn.r i，i vle^i of the declaration c d e at their pnrty prior to the opening of the Diet session, tho speech of the party loader, .thu sp-jcch of the party r’•チpresentっtivc し.，.i the iirst d^.y vhe.:.i the Diet rscoaveled ni'tcr the rocoss, tho atmosphere in tho K p u s e . 、.tc. I think ., . . フ I I II J—'Sillmilmiiiii»||.1 nr IIImilmil…-n—[-r*J,ft- マ ' 1 M " "r " *"•., ,. it is "utter丄y lrapossible to tice over one present situation by temporizing under coiapromise bct-X'Gn those ”ho fund”.一 nontftlly vr.ry in their ccg -"I tion cf t.hc present sitantion. In short, uador such circuust,prices, I believe it to be ,absolutely irしpossible to carorcc rn 11 it^rv disciu 1 ine. the completion of nrtiqn.^l d o f c n c c , -n r.l丄一out ndifliaistrrtivo reform, etc., "to ”liich エ hnv3 ox..rtcd utnost e71"orr;s sinoc ^I took office。 This is vhy エ hrvc hiiLibly tendered ^y resignひtion / T . M. to His jesty/, Pep.cc Bcction, Police Burer.u, Ilono "Uniatry " "'1 '" 1 山 I ht n I I I n iniifTi'nCTmriii<8il>iy April 1 9 3 7 . (b) Public-tioa of ‘'r.r '"inistcr MiTしTCIII^s Talk Doo, No. 1144-B Page 1 Taken from V』 Y SECRET Di:T^TL3 REGARDING I 07, J T N T S OF RIGHTIST BODIES IH CON CAI . 人 . flTII CHANGE OF GOVrS¥: ENT /T,N APRIL 1937 pr^nn ；wm:、へ …、r丨丁卩：：卩rrm」 HOI'E niJisjsr. ViG.T s o-jpreoscd lj.>Vi：raiv r—v.uhoriti.ss Cm^r； ” oT p i s F T ™ W ' T ^ r n \H3l Under the provoiling atmospherfc it is nbsclutely impossible to discuss フ ny qll-cut idiiiiaistrntive reform with the present- dny politic "'.I The politic?.! Dirties nr.ke it their sole business to attack tRe m n f^rv nit^nnl^fps a n th^ ri^ie ヮifliou^k reiTecxing o n their orn conductT. r>nl 1 ti on/ np]y'-"^g ^-rc advocatinr-: rn つ]1-out •-d^i-i-gtrntivo reform, bv.t thoy do not possess :ny coacrcce plans, Theニ.;^..pXc^S. t h e y e nro 』ニ . ^ y i , ,』： - w , i j ^ l i ^ d. to the . 嘆 乙 o i 七he status quo, • A n っ丄J.-oirt ハ.dministrntivc reform to creatc a Jonservativc CHsti'o^r^ssjve) J^pan runs ccmplotelj'' counter to the loud cry for nil-cut administrative reform that ？.rose imciedig>i^elv ri'tor the ^GDru.i.rv g^rEFi rnmc^ent. Sucti a rei'orm is T U c e c r v m g w m n , ハ 11 へれノ y-'^P.c^r. and our 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ots cannot be sr.Lisfit.'i Lh o^^ic, s net e posi t ivc v-'ho 1 c £ rx ； • dtiJ al. y ； - V し’ Or\L ai; ^Aid 巡 P C J乡 i〇 l包 丄 a ニ i l , - . : 边 . A M M / . . 芟 … — 山 . 丄 メ ， th后.stabii^in^ por;. ” cf ..AST ASIA, a丄w.iys been the very cry oi ^ir 100.000.(yjfi cov^r.-Liiio-tai W^ffi noi: Ihc A 6 A m P M u h i o丄 n： m m m m t 'r cramced xid rri Gcuia W e thsre；/., over t'tTTT ど ) ザ ビ 於 . . 』ol1 c. • : *. iply h(:.i‘T; crrapod up , T lthin 111,31.1.1. >.r Jp.pnri? 一 thsre,A eve-^ f^TTTn Thr. '^n^-nvn^i^ JPi^mn qt' tho YA1 AT0 !; iaco? v . T e .ngree indeed to。. positive all-out pdmin- ^ i v c rcioiTji as the ccnerpl rrill of the_4:.aQ,ElG. but ロe cannot ^groe to a てler^.tivc nil-out o.dministrnti.ve reform. Ought - c not to 过 v^g of 边 ふ ぶ 如 鄉 t st^e,.. of, J ^ r l i a m e n t uh- .t s hithr rto ：•; vo - i '： 3 If in： to p-^rty i:it, rest 「nd r「rty poll tic3 - j. ；-:ior'"d n..tion 丄レ'、-、crて::;ts w d th • T '.'clf ̂ ro of the Doorre, /er-iivn to 丄 l a f e ' e i ^ n f y politics conforming to i^R? Constitution.^^.a, h a n c T T n E F M , cln.rirv tho"r/.tion.^.X polity, d:?vcT6p Inciust?'^ con^letc； n^tiO'i-nl dofonce. stabilize tho livin：; oi tho pcoolo,ひ’1J s__t'';nd2j!j:—JIl̂ £S5i£lSr:...il̂ i2r.!;'’jjfe questions?" -IIM.しり. 11 y (Jlbcctijd. to coir.e ho.s /T，K. finrlly/“ conc; tna.t is, tho collir.ion bet^oen the / T . N ^ ndvoc.^tes of the/ status 辺:ュ /£,“•. ..î n ぶ , r / ..thfc. ds^ェ丄'wc.tip。 oi tM str.jus qjip. jAFAN stハンids noマ nt th(. turning-point '"here sho should rop.lize a positive all-out。.dni:iistrntive policy in order to cvercone the nr^sft-if, difficulties ^.nd tide over the existing lntornp.Eion^T c r i s i s . D o c . N o , 1144-A ' Page 1 V'' Declaration issued by the s3^IYIJKAI Party M a s s Meeting (.°0th of Jpnun.ry" l ^ V i • • ' J m l Excerpt fi'Oin P a g e s》 8 of "Retails Re (yarding Movements of Rightist Bodies T n conr^.^M^fi ハデ Goyernment" Published by Ponce Section, Police Bureau "Some M i n i s t r y , April 1 9 3 7 . いJ O v d n g to the multiplicity of the G o v e r n m e n t 1 s diplo p o l i c y , it is not るl,‘r、セいじ rojpcnsxcilitics rest. ”orcover. the Government fin.s persistently n.aherjd. to sccrot diplomacy, originating in nucp.- 3 tic se 1 f-compl^ceney, thereby T?TiIMg tし carry out 丄 diplom。,CY char-?.ct—eristic of a Modern Str.tc. The p u r p o H of tho 加 ！ V ] P.^ct d s defence ngainst, the flnr.ri nt.r.rn. t-;h '.ch desires to destroy our Sta^e organization through 6oniiminisir. But the Government bungled the matter so .̂s to cause othr>r Potdps t.9 fjmspfiet the forms— tinn nf n r) f;hti ？jit パ i ゥ+•つれ;"O ar.r,t.P. The Government can never be. n.bsolved fro:a r, sponsibility for d^.plcm^tic failure as to procedure, tii,e and method in concluding the Pact. Our Pr.rty is very p.nxious about the nr'tter, and h e r e i n lies the reason rrhy vie r.re going to seek thorough ci^.rifiction of the matter at the D i e t . y^lf ^^^-^'nPnt. f y ^ n l t̂.Pri m.^nv nl^ns dOgEint.tc.-lly con- cluding t h n t。 s c K i - ^ r ^ i m o orr-niy.^tion is n^ns.qnrv. If those pirns, h o n o v e r , ^^.sgoii-aるe industrial develbuiaont nnd result in a m c e to ii" tionr-l litelilEaad，. the nation ”ill turn frcn its pros :nt attitude to grud,;c and re sentiment r.g-^.inst the GovernaiGrit, • nd lixitv of . . . し . s p i i - i j : r;ill be caused thereby. Our p.^.rty "TT^aeterrjinod Y o s u b ' e c F Governruent pl°ns、 to strict examin-tion in the D i e t , r.nd rectify their demerits relentlessly. T;he present Cabinet co.l^s the §tato control of elcctria- I ,. 丄〔 .丄 o • - .J , “ * ニ;.- ] ’. Of Ill-out ' :].pia str で し r c — O u r Fマぐ is へ . 」 」 t o agree to the Governmen-c 1 s claiis in principle. But pure burerui— nrnt.in rnntrnl of rでnnnnv is h^.rnfui without being useruT xn any w.-y. Anto:iouo-:s control should be v./lUi bl/ay conlrcl exercisoS t ion n e c e s s a r y . Only tirus may free progress promo ted. It. hns Ion.て bce:i our desire to elevnte the Gd-uco.tional level of the n a t i o n . r Jhich is more u r g e n t , h o w e v e r , the exten- sion of the period or the repletion of tLe substance? ‘ oreovcr, necessity of s^eopirg reforrs 5 the educational system h"S for many ye^.rs been the public opinion of the n).t;ion。 If the Governrent disrec^rds it -at this tiire, it "i.il bring discredit on aivil idninistr-tion. Measures adopted by tho present Doc. No. 1144-A Page 2 Cabinet are not generally based on the n^tica-f but .っre in- fluenced by the doeni^.tic proiudices of the bureaucrats and f h T n i l i t a ^ The burcaucr^ts rrc vedded to sclf-conpl^ccncy. ...Jhe Kilitrrv.....QYrirflQV 1 Bg S B B i p i ^ i t y ^ n m p ] r AncL they. て…：it tc i:itcrfcrc ia every jj^cre. of ,£t?to fu.i?t:.on. If this evil ^ro^'s the rill of tlie people rill be prevented, from free realization, constit^-t-ional jovci-amcjit becone nominal, and oligarchic tyranny i.itroducea. This, ”e I'oar, is contrary to the fundn.r;e;it^l r)r1rinip1p q Q f - 7 ..r hlでh つ丨yp. b ^ S G d r V ^ f ^ o on the Fholo u p o n tho national ^-11 c-? in nee, to tho •^nb^vr'A^ ^HM HHI.MA^ nrfno. i dI ft thr.t t^e cIvii nna ijillitary. ^crvicos should keep to thoir respective duties, U r e lierenith intend to live up to the spirit of tho Constitution, strengthen par 1 ianent.qry politics rith solemn determination， to devise (T.一 ncマ departure for our F.' rtv tr fort^ nhend to regcnfir.atiQH, find to make strenuous efforts d.".y and iigli"t, tuereoy to requite Imperial favour and to serve the St-^.te. V;.v "“"卿"""《»•»«• I 丨丨_丨1丨___»丨_丨‘ Z.GC. No. 2954 Page 1 jJCTilACTS FRO?：. ： ；INUTE^JSHO.^TIIAJD . OF S^COKD JOINT CF S: 1 .ニTIO:ぃIS I、11^ III and IV of the jC- "'''：' O：- /OCl UNTS of the HOUSE OF REPIi^Si^TATIV.-jS, ごよし _ょ」：―.• c-C t>e. I： PORTAL DILIT on ^lAlHGK .l7.th_2i.4-0. マ 0 (taken from ンエバUT:バS OF CO.TITTii：^ U T I N G S OF T K ^ HOUSE OF U.PRrloy^TATIV^S, 75th IH?]ilIAL DI^T SESSION, ACCOUNTS, PLTI'TIO丨 1 S, PROPOSALS 0 j ' m A L X'^ID.^：^ OF K 。 K x l ! ^ ^ T N T ^ ™ , . . FOJIIIACHI-EDj, TGir/O C I T Y j CO,:/.?ITTKtii-r:AlJ FUrJDA:-/T.N. in part/ —_•丨 For instance, as regards DaVAO in thg PHILIPPINES, the population, has not decreased al'€FougK' a ^ o x i m a t e l y over 35 years have elapsed till the present d a y . Business is reported as tMourishing, and the people here are presently engaged in the cultivation of h e m p . Moreover it is said that fertilizer has never been used for the past thirty y e a r s . For instance, in tue LAIC}：； TOiDANC /PHONETIC/ region in C^L.'BJS, v h e r e rice, lias been tiarvested three ti^es annually for more than ten years, it is said that fertilizer, if used even fo£_ once, ^-culd. "spoil every thin；,. There are such places as these la^Sd,‘ i.-ic.Qaceivatl,e from the agricultural viewpoint hf., T. hpn .] hQJ； about .^ing. ahead and seizing these l^lacgs- Of coui!.^ Caj^fl的 <3,9 n p v p r t h p 1 … - • derelou- ^ n t Of the ii;;GT9叩 r i l l not, necessarily a n i m p o s s i b i U t v , if we shall be tn-epareri to suffer such hard snips nsiri""a^al：./!•' -ith . iL.dl:/i or ；tuSSIA, or if possess an ecoial i m o u A t cf aetermln.atign, effort and financial po^^r reaui-eG' in overcoming the difficulties of the Nu:aTh .^.IfiA ノ i n a r c r ^ r r S u c h beln- tlie '6ase,- hp K^l 1 ̂ vr l ^ a t JSPaM r i l l be ^ 遍 す で 證 代 』 j f 溫 ， ふ 盟 ^ 盟 耍 • 丨 ffitu?e Tlati'ohal "policy in such a ^ay as to nake some trc-fo丄a i . o l i c v . - - ^ for dei'er.ce, and てhe. other .for advance. rio-, as xor TAI ^ /T.>J. FOR'- 03A/ or the HOTTTH a],.A ISLAVIDS vere ap.ije. "to "bee 心v-⑶吓ザt nfWTJ"" /T.i J . " H M I Y U - C L P 1 / they - l le W !)etoiiie independent:, jfeprtl^ after its. occupation。r its^inauguration o f > / o v e r a v . e ^ As regards CUOS.^: and " though . ：ANCIimiA is an independent n a t i o n , JAPlrTls ai: present QDliried ; to defray_ enormous su:n of money in accordaxice with. axmamfcijT^ a H O l L e r " p yreemenls. T E i s ^^y nnssi fTTv l a s ~ o r scores 01 years to c o m e . c; T 03. ras the firs_t to be annexed .to .JAPA：：, but sKe is sLill vnabio to become inclependeat, a ad e lormous g 1 ふdハ•fpq V M M fo ^pntftd to hfii-. ouch G.re the ccnJitiニ，s even in so nice a place like C H 0 3： ® .ヤ v n . ^ f.6 t^aiTTt is^aXr-'the nBre/unnafuril—玩 seaa'Tarn-ors -- c o n s t i t u t i - J A P A ^ s hi, her-class labours — tQi ： A/CilU^IA vhere even. cooTies frnS m . 唸 Ire^lmStle to “0. The policy that tliey must Doc. Mo. 2954 Page 2 be sent over is all very fine, but, as this unnaturalness is very hard to overcome, I v;ish you will kindly £ive your con- sideration to this point. Our future national policy should be such that 紀e shall have to endure preseverance no matter what difficulties it may lead us tc, ；ust as we have in continuing many years of devotion after having initiated the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of tcday. Therefore, if w e have that determination to go through hardships, ";e snail . find a real treasure chest in the Southern Paciijc, where deposits of coal, gold, silver, iron and petroleum v,ill probably amount to 20C times more than those found in the 400 or so provinces in China. If JAPAM Hill be in possession of such resources, she shall no Ion er have to suffer from her present pli ht of being unable to wage a v'ar e.s she v;ould like just because of the scarcity of resources. Therefore, v. r e must- for the sake of establishing the national policy of the State, have a chan e m a d e , at this .juncture, in the principles of the traditional national policy or the past. 1; i T e are extremely pleased at the fact that Minister of State KO130 h a s , at Cabinet meetings and. the like, expressed his opinion several times fairly strongly in that line, or duelled u p o n the policy in that line. So, althougn things may not go so easily as I say -- although it would "be oplenaid if they did -- things w i l l be difficult. Nevertheless, even if v;e are to sacrifice a great deal of our national poでer, what will follow shall not be comparable to the results of the efforts in ：• iANCHU,.1IA or CHINA." This is w h a t re have been thinking,about. Jf^ peace is restore! jiot/, it is need丄ess to say that Japan vill suffer from over-population. As you have just m e n t i o n e d , most of our farmers have only five tans of land /T.EL approximately 1.2 acres/. As they cm.i only that much of l a u d , -- let us say five children are born to a far.-ier, — rour of them, cither male or female, must leave tne family to ビet jobs outside, according to the faicily system among the farming class. The eldest son is left to take over "hile the rest must be abandoned as u n n e c e s s a r y . The Japanese nr.tion is unable to make a living. This is the phenolorion araoiig the fariiiin^ class of present day J a p a n . This fact alon'..， I believe, ，"ill make you. realize that ’厂e shall suffer from over-popalation rlien peace is restored. liHipt should ve do about it? It is quo.te clear that we shall fe^d on each other and fall together if v.，e stick to the five Tan farm!n^. ''o must establish a £rort national policy right ro?j-. H e r o i n , lies the Dasis for our discussion. Therefore, re have been trying to send people over to Manchuria -- v/e have hoard about your ideals of sending 200,000 or 1,000,000 familjbs over there but its realization has been very d i f f i c u l t . Much money is spent ^. 7 ith no results, m o r e o v e r , people are not interested in going inspite of our encouragcmunt to go, I v;ould 丄 i k e to inform you that unless you take into consideration,，':hen establifh:nj our national policy, some places 町here people? ，"il丄レフ all maans even if tliey are told not to go, .vather than piac, s -"here people i/xll go and return, the ^ruat task of revivin;: Japan,つで ccnstructin^ Z.GC. No. 2954 Page 3 State j..,mister rill study that direction -- Committeeman FUICUDA： "I hope further V c have) become members of tho Accounts C c棚 i t t e e , and have studied the Ministry for Overseas Affairs 1 (mormons budget for the coming y e a r . As it Till be difficuニt to get any resxilfe if you put your efforts to things that r :ill not possit.. y have any cffect, ve shall have to take a neutral stand on this point, and I believe エ shall have‘to ask you to put your 'efforts on the true attainment of an object, even in the exGcution of this budget. As regards such m a t t e r s , however I believe the Ministry for Overseas Affairs has great under- standing as to the South5 and great efforts have been afforded both the Formosan and the South Seas Govc.:rnments from vhich t;c cxpoct developments in economics and varicAis o^hor fields. HavG you any opinion in. this line? ‘'e shall be most obliged if the Minister for Overseas Affairs rould inform us 1 r ith his opinions regarding these national polices. Minister of State KOISO：- "I fully agroo vith . FUIIUDa ' s remarks regarding tho construction of "both the NCi ; ITH and the SOUTH. The OVERSEA AFFAIてIS ministry is also advocating the idoa of constructing both the NORTH and tho S： UTII. There is, ho'/cvor, a slight difference in vieヮs in. regard to the path to be foilovod and its substance. I shall give you very roughly the important points of the opinions of the OVISS； k AFFAIRS Ministry v.iiich rdll carry out th& idea of constructing both the NORTH and the SOUTH. As towards the CONTINEi-IT, we must enforce the movement of population, w h i c h must naturally be accompanied by economic development, and as torards tho SOUTH, 1 マe irast cnforce economic Japan rill never be accomplished. In this r e s p e c t , the m i l i t a r y , so f a r , has been concentrating too m u c h upon the N o r t h . I wonder if this is not slightly mistaken? 'Then I say m i s t a k e n ,エ mean mistaken as J a p a n 1 s national policy. I do not k n o w v/hat you rould say x'rora the viewpoint 01' national defence, but this is, I think, a little mistaken i hen ve consider the groat task of truly .rovivinr; Japan, of constructing Japan. Therefore, our policy must' be to advance both to the Nortli an<J to the South, putting great efforts in our Southern adva.'ico. vr e must establish policies which will enable us to overcome the difl'iculties involved in this task . Chairman AOFI: "1 丨.r. F.UICUDA, ploaso stcto the gist of your opinion as v-c have no more time." the into Z.GC. No. 2954 Page 4 ox^ansion, rhich i-.r；. ；t. by all means be accompanied by the movement of population. T、i白 is our way of t h i n k i n g . Thoroforc, as regards COl-TTINENTAL Expansion, re ccnsidor movement of population as of primary importance, and economic expansion of secondary importance 5 T:hor ;as, as for SOUTH上.;RI..I Expansion, consider Gccnomic expansion as of primary importance anベ.the movement of population of secondary Importance. Tuis is the idea on vhich vc arc proceeding alcn^. Please note, therefore, that as regards tho idea of constructing both the KOHTH and the SOUTH, v;e are entirely of tlio same opinion with レ:1、 F W U D A . " IJCC. No. 2954 5 I ? 1 I ；_ I C A T r W.D.C, No, ！ [ . P . s . No. L9り t̂r/bcT'icnt of Sourcc r.nd Authenticit^ I, SJJIO, Tom5 , hereby certify thct エ cm officirlly connected with the Jrp.-nc^e Government in the following c c.city： Socretrry of the Oeb inet — end thct cs such officir.l ， iic.ve custody of the document hereto r.ttcLched cons 1stiiig of 一 ，pc^es. dcted ， 19 , and described cs follows: '‘ inutcs of Vat 人countF. 〇f the House of Representatives, 75th Diet エ further certify the.t the ettacheu. record and docuitDsnt is rn official document of the Japanese Government, end thr.t it is pert .of the offiei&l erchides m d files of the foliowir^ named ministry or deprrtment (specifying also the file nuniber or c 5 tat ion, if any, or any other official designction of the regular location of the document in the archives or files、： 一Cabinet f:'e^ret:Tiet ^ Signed et Tokyo on this 3rd day of Jen, ’ 1947 /s/ T’ Satov: Signature of Official SEAL . Witness: /s/ J.ム 6 Curtis— Secretrry of the Cab inet 2nd Lt. E.I. Official Cape Stat,-merit of Official Procurement I, J••ム• Curtis _ , hereby certify that エ am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Coinme^nder for the Allied Powers» and that the at.o マ e certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct ハf my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this _J.rd day of Jan, , 1%7 /c/ Jo L, 3urt3.s 2nd. I,t • 1U. Witness: _ _ _ Investigator TP'S. Official Capacity Doc. Fo. PA27 Pa^e 1 c o m n n ^ i A L III. KAZS THI>S SKIFD^S ”AH SrIIEATORI Toshio, Former ？orei^n Office adviser and Am"bassador to Italy, in Magazine of -Today (G'skoAI) 1 Jime 1942 S.ecbion 1. Talcing a general view of the present war situation, vre can not- onl：/ sav that the Greater Asia. w r a,r is progressing most satisfactorily,"but also that tho European "' T ar is ôiiif： very well for the ixis nations. It is now .aîLL；/"" a, .juat te.r of jbinie "before 七 he malign infliiRnce of the ^Jnited States and G-reat Britain will "be expelled from the territories of Greater Sast Asia, an己 Chungking, now ,-aspine: licr last "breath, Kill no dou*bt capltulatc soon. On tho other side of the vorld, the Axis armies of 3-crmany and Italy c^n. "be oxpectnd to_achiove supremacy in Europe this 7/ear. 7von the ins.?tia,"blr： British S ^ p i r m u s t oxpoct lior inevitable doom within the following year at the latest. The so-called "Old Powers" of the world vrill in all pro"ba,"bility_ floe to the ムnrrioan continent^ whiCil-tl^y- i^lan to use as a "base for tlicir final roBistanc£U Mop.nwhilc Amcrica, rich, in resources, protoctrd "by the Atlantic and the "Pacific， is desperately oxoanding her a.rT!m.nents. Thus if arc to "bring her completely to lior lcncos, mo will need a consicT-r^.'blr^ amount of time. It ip for this rnasoi?. that evrryone predicts p. long i ゾ L o n g war though it nay be, vith tlzr. fall of Britpin p.rr,ed hostilitios will wano and "become chiefly series of delaying actions, sulDs^quentl:/ dovoloping into economic and idpological wrrfrrp # Thcrr^forn tlio question "becomcs: How mticli forcr： the -J.liod ！ 7 at ions "briiif to "b^ar "apon the /jcis? In otiior vrords, how rr-^at is Ar.orica 1 s i-.tcrnal atr^n^th? On the answer to this will depend tho ontcono of a lonv • In studying tho w.,.r from this -point of view, one can only concludo thr.t t;:.o iucis enjoys 包 docidod advantage：• intcr:i?,l striicturo of G-crmany and Itp.ly， plrr?.d.y tested through nairr j'oars, is sounder than over C びIfiDiLTr:UX Doc, N o . 2427 ブ KFI ム I2‘?TLJL page 2 although the strength of these tTO nations has been sapped in many respects by the par, their successes have given them more than enough in the way of resources. This means that the remainder of their stru^^le should be considerably easier, l.s for Japan, her internal unity and the morale of' her people are, needless to say, unmatched by any other nation in the v. or Id • Furthermore t in the matter of resources • she has the vast and rich territories of Greater East Asia at her disposal• If she progressively develops this source, she need have 110 concern on this score regardless of how long the war may l^st. Japan 1 s might will become ever greater, her morale ever higher. In contrast, what ijvill te the future developiTients in America 1 internal conditions? If we study her present trends we see that /inerice • as has ever been the c a s e ,ヒユ ri^ti^ri fハ】つハ n - r - r ^ o p n n f f e •o〇licy« a r^X^nn harglv np.-nHjir； hr ^ 11 ̂ r^ ニニg十パ。” i, in the true sense of "the rare.• T r) + imfrS of peace and nrvrrrT»f_|iP/r p ^ o p ^ rtf/ content, but under the Qixress of modern 7.ar tutlr strength for resistance is feeble Today, ニirxrica，s—finances are actually on the verge of baniLr ru^i^-. Not even the cleverest manipulation by the most able financial experts can ex"fcri^te her from this condition^. Even should the iTar end today, no malrcchll 1 t"inB&£"ures couIq be devised 计 レ 即 v a >if.r fron::』an^rimtcv• Tハ put it n.ildly, v.ith her budget rafigir3g into astronomical figures, the burden on her reople can only increase • bf.r. debt grow larger, pn^ h^r fit.RTir'pr^ of 11ving hrr.r^ r>orr^spondirtglv 丄oj： !̂̂ In a situation rhere America has both of her oceans blockaded, ajidjfinds _herself eut o f f ^ Tザ L h e I'e^Cof the 10rid v ith her supply, ol' critical niitcrials gi^a^ally diminishing, her J.caccrc v.ill be proric_ to -.ose vvhatever c^r.fidence they have in their ability to continue jtla^-^aiLj'or iengthy poriod— There is no longer any doutt whatsoever that ai^^terna^l collapse is ineYitablレ In this light, even should t h e _ "old powers" of the v. or Id establish themselves behir.d the walls of ijneric^, tITeir power to resist d]丄 hA , The Axi5 nations have only to continue their steady appj.icction of pressure, and calnily '.ait for i-irerica to bring about her ovu destruction. ThuSt altiiough the concensus of opinion tends to favor a long war* the above factors just ify tれe belief thg t the yi^r vill. not last t̂ vo さo取• If the present v.ar were anything like r.ars in the past — merely a clesh of iiiaterial interests -- peace negotiations could be comriencecl immediately upon the enemy 1 s capitulation, and with this ell armed hostilities should cease. But this wcr is "rriankind 1 s last i»ar” — a war to end all wars --. ^ s e objective is the complete eradication n f the old ；.nglc-American ^orld policy, and the establishment of en idealistic uorld based on a new policy.厶ny makeshift varic of peace is unthinkable, J'oreover, between the old order the Lxis, there are no grounds upon which a compromise coulュ be considered• F。r these reasens, the v;ar to establish v.orld order and peace will inevitably require ぬ considerable amount of t ime 9 COI^ILI.OTL'L cc. N o . 2427 COKFTLEMTI/JL. page 3 Sectdon 2 The immediate objective is to repulse and destroy the enemy and to gain the final victory. Victory alone, hov;ever, does not insure the v;ar f s end. Only when we have completely realized all our new undertakings along vjith victory can vce rejoice in triumph• Every citizen accepts the brilliant successes and the heroic efforts of the Imperial armed forces with gratitude and praise f We need not harbor any fear of our armed forces letting us fiov/iu Before us, v;ho shoulder the responsibility of exploitation, still lies the important portion of the task. It will demand from us the utmost in effort. We cannot forget that, aside from the important duty of producing and supply- ing, directly or indirectly, the materials necessary to war, have the heavy responsibility of establishing the New Torld Order. Though the words "New World Order" have been heard frequently enough, it scenes th£ t their exact meaning has yet to be author it at i ve ly explained • Up to nov; it has been generally chorused thet the Ne^ World Order based on totalitarianism must be introduced in the place of the An^io-AiDerican individualism, but the outbreak of the Greater last Asia Yibt has made this inadequate• The ne\： Italo-German Order in place of the old Anglo- xjnerican Order explains only the character of the Wer in lurope. That エてalo一Gennan political principles and economic systems are far superior to those of ムnglo-American and are extremely close to Japan 1 s Nationalism, we T/ill for the moment agree • Yet to make this wer the vrsr to end all v;ars, the エtalo-German totalitarien ideals in themselves do not provide an ad equate f oundat ion • With vast economic spheres in Europe, the Ameritc.n and Greater East Asia existing and opposing each other in the future world, can a permanent peace en this earth be guaranteed? Even though this is a great step forw&rd when compared to the v;orld of the past, r;e must conclude that tliot is still far from perfect. There is an order in all things• First to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere• then to strive for its co-prosperity with the European-Amorican economic sphere, is certainly a logical procedure• If there is no other way out, this set-up can be considered temporerily satisfactory. Howeveri an ideal situation will require even more than this. Section スー ムt,this point muct re-examine our national polity. KOKITTAT MEIdHO (Clarificetion of Japanese National Polity) is e phrase that has been quoted in relation only to Japan proper, and used in a very limited sense. The MEIJI Restoration, which overthrew the T O K T O m Shogunate, ^as introduced, as to be expected, by KOEUlソ.1 laiCIIO. The present members of the faction supportir; M K0KI.Tr'；..I MEICHO" reason that, since in the Japan of today there exists l kind of force quite similar to the TOKIIL:W‘ ShogunateI such a frrce must be erediceted by the olarificction of national polity. C O m W I N T U L Ioc f NOif 2lj.27 page k COI^ILElvTI.'.i If such a force does exist within Japan, it must be predicated. However, in the SIIOV^ Restoration, this force does not ezist 7;ithin the nation. It comes from the outside, The American-；.nglo Jewish Influence is this force. To preach renaissance at this time v;ill only invite public cencure, since it is evident the.t those v.ho preeoh it do not fully understand the national structure of Japan. If the Ancient Chronicle (KOJB:I) and the Nippon 厶脈Is (NIPPON SHOKI) ere correctly interpreted anu understood, you •will probably be able to realize th'.t the rule of tue ;:.un Godde££ ； 1 7 T . T E / . S U OFHUT'I was not restricted to the narrow island£ of the J^penese Archipelcgo. Her direct descendants t the Imperore, who are the incarnation of God, extended their /.ugust Virtues not only to the Jepcnese nction and the Jcpaiuesc people but t ： tht anivurse. The Imperor ic ceeply concerned about the world for the sake of hutnanity. He said in his Impericl Rescript at the conclusion of the Axis AgreernEnt, "The v;orld shall be united w , ond again, "Lach nation shall have its place in the £un and all human beings shall live in peace. w ^e nust thoroughly clarify the origin of Japan, the true r.ieaning of the descent tn earth of the descendents of the £un-Goddess, and the true nature of the Emperor, the incarnation of God» Imperor JB/MJ^ prior to his departure on a expedition to subjugate Eastern Japan# said, "Since the descent of Prince NINIGI sbcut 1,7$2>470 years ago, we heve unobtrusively lived in Western Japan, and have there, developed our culture and promoted justice, etc". Since then, for a period of 2>600 years, the history of Japan sho\T£ thet she has unobtrusively developed her culture and promoted justice only v ithin the last Asia Sphere• In keeping v;ith divine policy, the authority of the Emperor hos been restrained while japan has fully absorbed foreign culture• Throughout this tine, she has been earnestly av:aiting the fulfillment of her destiny. If a philosophic view is taken of world conditions today, it i£ evident that the t: me for that fulfillment has come» This Holy can be saia to be something greater than the Eastern Ixpeoition of Imperor JM.OJ, that is, this is the prelude to the opening of the Rock Ccve• (TN: The opening of the Rg-.;K： "eve is on allusion tcken from Japanese mythology^ ； . c c o r d i n g to the legeiAcry account, the fun Godc".ess hid in a cave after being insulted by her brother. This plunged the whole world into dcrkness and the evil deities became active, "'hen she y:ss エ^!ally persuaded to come out cf the cave by the good deities the universe again enliglitened. The m o d e m anelogy is that the v. or Id is 8gcin in darkness 9 and Japan's mission is to bring light once inore to a rorld overcone v.lth evil.) If the Japanese polity is fully interpreted, this is the only possible conclusion. COWIDLNT 1.1 Doc. No # 2427 COLIFIDEMTL'.I page 5 Today t foi* this reason• our nctional polity should be clerifiec3 and shov.n to the v/orld» I firmly believe that t he time has come to advocate peraanent v.orld peace and world co-prosperity. This i£ the real pur rose of the present 〜..Gr —一 the bssic idea behind the establishment of the Nev; Order. It is the mission of the Japanese people. KOKXt[•ブ•エ H I O H O today is the ir.otivating force of World Restoration, With this stupendous task confronting the Japanese people 9 it should be clear to you hov; you must be prepared to meet any internal or external emergency. It is undoubtedly necei'£ary to undertake a complete reform of our national polity. However, the foreign materialistic reforrs of the past cannot accon: x rlish this purpose„ R&ther, they tend to obscure the national polity、 Section k In the past,エ have resided in foreign countries for a long time and have aceociated Vvith all clashes of people -- intelligentsiat proletariat, students 1 etc. and エ have found the Japanese tc b e superior to all foreigners^ Physical characteristics such as flat nose and yellow skin inatter little, since these are due to the influences of v.eether, custom andfood. They naturally cennot be taken as standards• The value of man lies in his soul• The soul is invisible 9 but it is in evidence v;henever a crisis occurs. On the battle field, v;here risk of life is great« the ezittence of the soul is especially evident. In this v;ar, the Japanese spirit has been thoroughly displayed ever^here• Through numerous praiseworthy deeds end miracles on the field of battle and the home front the Japanese people heve adnirably proven they are a superior race unequalled in this v;orld. If the Japanese oonfonii to their inherent nature, they inevitobly rill be endov.od t. ith the divine blessing of Providence• Tho^e 切ho do not believe in Providence are not true Japanese• /nd if we do not receive the divine blessing, it is bec&use v;e are acting contrary to the national polity. K0KUT...I KEI.OHO 011 the home front is very important. The duty of the Japanese on the home front is primeriiy to clarify the national polity• Lately, there have been niany v;ho fc.マor using the Diet to assist the Lroperor f a^d cdvocate assistsnce to Imperiel Rule. Regrettably, there are still some who do not comprehend the true significance of Imperial Rule, エ.t is Imperial Rule v;hen the Irr-nercr graciously presides over the government • I11 * ir.erica f where 'Rooseve.lt cseuiriec the reins of goverriment, it is simply politics• The tv;0 forms of government differ in essence and signinc&nce. There is a basic difference between the essence of foreign goverimonts and the significance of the ェ i m p e r i a l Rule of Jepan. COKFIDIJ\TTIi.L Loc # No, 2れ27 GCXNFIELNTLM psge 6 The benevolent rule of His ¥:e jesty, The Emperor, is not only bestowed upon J&pan itself, but extends to all mankind. This is the reason why it is defined as "The Divine rission". Ycu ere to assist in this Tivine Lixsion w ; so, as Japanese v you must Iisvc a superior F.ental attitude» If you ere to employ a foreign politicし 1 ideology to afcist this "Divine Ki.ssion, n it v;ill be merely ail exercise of the privilege of suffrage• The basic principle of Inperi&l Rule is that it be extended over the earth. Therefore, since you are to assist in this, it must tc.ke on a deeper significenoea Not comprehcTiding its essence there ere sore who have lost their interest in aseistirg the Imperial Rule. The present G-reatcr la^st Asia War is the Divine Vi-ill of God. The tine has cone new to open the Rock Cave on this e£rth» Jap8n 9 during this v.cjt , is able to nurture her strength end spirit, \.hiie lTBter ialictic foreign countries: \re faced with Jaclinec That is natural since, from 8 materielistic viev,poin"'; f v/ar exhausts a n&tion's strength• Therefore, the loiter the v;ai' is,prolonged? the greater will he the difference betueen the strength of cur country end that of foreign countriec, until finally the stage Trill probably be reached v.here their only hope rill be to respectfully request the sovereignty^ of HiG Vc jecty, The rmperor, the Incaraation of Godv V e Japanese must not vie^ this Vvcr r^.tericlictically ̂ This Holy Vvbr is not a vcr cf inen and. matericls• 丁f this \T£r ie fought on a basis of :vanpov:er end m£.terial strength alone > the ettrition of v.cr will exhaust friend and foe alike^ end eyentualiy ell menkind x ill be ^rostrcte. But if there should, be e race of people vhe hove a true God presiding rvcr the:;., arjd v/ho are fighting a holy v;ar in his nane • these ncble people r.ill inevitebly be bestov.ed -with the Divine 31ess±ng of Providence,. Therefore, there v.ill be a ni-rked difference in the national strength of countries which are guided by God end those which ere not • The race which is fighting under the guidance of God must be Japan. Otherrise, there would be no justification for the i:anctification of the Japanese national polity. In this light our national polity should be thoroughly understood by ail Japanese^ •‘ hen Lmperor JIM/iU went on a punitive expedition to ；.da！ the rebel resistance was strong. roreover, inany of his soldiers fell ill, and Prince v;ac pathetically killed in action. Iven the lmperor him^olf Decani sick and ふ:,“ 1 erv.ent terrible hrrdships. Lt this point he solemnly offered supp.lication to the Sods of Heaven and Earth, end as g result lie Vvas able to successfully conclude the expedition against ^-da without heving io depend on COKFILriTTI；.! Doc. No. 2427 C0NIIDZI7TKL page 7 In order to conclude the war successfully, r;e must first follow the historical example of Emperor riMMTJ end ofi>r supplication. The Ein： eror- is the incarnation of God a and is the personification of the Sun Goddess, iJv'nm.£U O Y H . Therefore, if the Jepenese people worship their Imperor, they are, in re&.li*ty, worshipping God. If prefer state of mind is developed to perfection, the ‘ spir" tual °nd nirteriaiistic aspects of the will take care of thera- selves; the ir-ternil structure ハf '^apan will be strengthened and the Ne"w World Or-.er 耵ill be firmly established. Fach nation will have its place under the sun, end for the first time a permanent peace and security will be assured all nankind. C-Ol^IDUJLZLl Doc, No. 2427 C E R T I F I C A T E page W.D.C. N o . U . S . No. 2127 Statement of Source and Authenticity ェ ， 一 K ^ e a b u r o , hereby certify that エ am official]^ connected with the. Japanese Government in the following capacity: 2nd Class Secretary of Komejyy-nisjtrx and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 272 pages, dated June » 194?» and described as follows: "GENLAL"— Magazine一 エ further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government 5 and that it is part of the official archives arji files of the following named ministry or depart-nBTiv (specifying als^ the file nuniber or citation, 11 any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the ar 3hives or files) ： Home Ministry Signed at .JTokyo on this 7 day of Jaiu , 1947 • /s/ Kosaburo Shibata Signature of Official SIA1 Witness: I2J’._Jo A ? Curtis 2nd Class Secretary of Home Ministry 2d, Lt. Official Capacity ^xatement of Official Prqcurement I, 一 む A。一 Qy^i旦^ , hereby certify- that エ am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, andthat the above certification was obtaineu by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduefc of my official busiiness. Signed at Tr»lcyつ on this JZ day of , 1947 /s/ J , A . Curtis Lt. MI, imiE Witness: /s/ B , E . Lareh Invest igator IPS Official Capacity DI： C U ^ I O N OF THE ja^AN-C?-'. n m T A r kxir ？ , Toehio ダ Special advisor to the Foreign Ministry- Nazi Series Publishers B S v ( . c. ‘ ‘ ^ luriT /9'uo Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, Preface I am prerontfng to my friends these various lectures I have given all over the country and which have a^peered in newspapers and magazines r ince my return to JA^AK last autumn. They are here organized under one cover for publicat.ion c \ - Seen in todr; 7 r light, they consti^iTte o^ini.oris which might :ell be revised and since in the lirht of later f^ots there こ:re several cheaters that ere デ a 丄 s e , エ should perhaps he ashamed to o^fer this to the public as it stands. However, it required considerable "courage" for me to offer them at the てlme I returned in &n atmc phere :.rj which such ideae were being ridiculed by certain groups saying n Is it not like making a landirv。in the face of the enemv? tl Feen from such an historical viewpoint, this may sti 1 1 have soドe reference value, However, now th?:t the Tripartite -•llien.ce has become a reality, fg should, of course not wander aimlessly over particulars of the The Forldwi.de significance of this Alliance, Vc rticulp.rly as regards the new vie巧 of the world and the New Order which is to govern human society in the future, requires profound e^lan： t 5 o n I t is hoped the t through such eftorts "by competent persons those results will one after another be achieved in the world. エ shall be ha”py if this book results in presenting a s服.11 beginning to that end in the future• FHI^ATORI, T o s M o November 1940 Document No. 1616 "DI.Gir.SION CF TIIE J7•？ムトGF •：. WY-ITi)丁ご JlHi TEE I The Nece?f.ity of ‘ T .':1'T-ITAIY “ TJI'NCE (December 1939) Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, Doforo ‘ e d.i ？cur：-: present f'ore: gra policies, re raust firstly know the fcxt that t:.e world ic nor on the eve of a great -r. The last world wf-r vas not four ht as the result of o^riosf.ticr ^ etFeen new po ers ard old ones, bit countries of siraiL r chf rt cter determired their attitude tô r- rd the wcr according to old ideas about the.ir respective c5.rci"!metwees s.rd 5nt. rec-ts. Therefore, countries that were "basically un c ble to ooor-jrate f.ou二ht on tl.ie ScJ-e side. A conspicuous cxam'ole is that Japan and Italy took sides with the old powers irclnding the IJNITFD ST/TES, and Ho. ever, the Versailles Treaty revvrsed the coiirse of history ？nd returned the order of the v/orld to the.t of on3 or t^o cei?turies : 5 o, thus ？tirnulating tbe rise of new powers • s launching tror hrr continerts.l Policies, £ rd ITi v lY'p しr.'d ;T ! s completion of their tct^Jitc.rian systems cre videnco of this, it fir^t the-?G new ハ o m s could not トe said to hevc awakened to their commcn mission, but，as the old "oovers, from the irst^ net of sclf-preservt'.tJ-on, showed a tGnder'cy to combination and este % 0iehracnt • of l united front, the n ^o^'-rs were ir«c‘vl十.ヒ"hiて, r compe]led to cooperate Fith each other * Such is the •orc?er't situat?' or) of the world. Hitherto, th se two sddcs hc.vc been d^.stirf ul.sbca n s have rk to oris ar.'d he ve-nct nzt: oris • This .1 s quite right, for 'iioet of tho rising rct^ons h.ve poor resources with living spheres confired to too narrow £ rrc c： rd ltq greatly diss, tisfied vdth condition?. • However, ？' t x,he dcて：Ire? of these countries ^erc for ̂ mere i'nrirovemc nt o.t? their economic oc' iditions, tb re \vculd he no d:! fforerce bet^eer?. the eyo stir.g struggle f.i’d ”しst irt- rnctioral stru.'•こIGS for ru^rcmtcy. However, I think WC can find higher efigr-ificar.cc in the present odハosition .ir the - ,r orld. •Tor ell our Dcople know thc.t JA" : 'AF T s advcrce in the continent if, not the of a desire for ^cr^ nu- t c r n d gain, hut airas ど.t the rcr？.5zet.ion r “ the ĉ； arioso r)oorjlc r s rrci-1 5.dei： 1 oeti shed , t the timr. o:「 the foiiDdu ti m of our iictic.ru Th5 s is clesrly pho^^r r the phre se Ti the new order in A c 11 n . i.s is knovn, the concopt of the nr. tior: 1 str-icturos of IT/IY f.nd GSRiUへ-lies so-ncthirg in cornmoD with tho b,.sic principle 0 1 the f oundr t5 on of our - mviro. It is ne ocllees to sej tht t tho vier T s of vb-t iri brief m.,7 bo c: ？ 3 ed t-otr 13 t^ric n iu t.5.ors rcgcrding the um.vcvsc と• nd the Ft. te form ど.？!.;.：. rp cor trr. st to those of so-c.. H o d dcmocrrtic ne十.ions, rhosc kejmctc is irdividuf lism. When ve cxc -:dne the present sit”ムtior of tho ドつrid divided j.rjto わ.げ0 povers, the; now c.nd tho old, ^e must focus our 1: tt. ntj 011 on the co:ぐ. f "\ict of thceo idc-. s. Fo—， prob- bly the most cortrovLrsial ”roblcm is the attitude of S07IET : .!J5 ： IA, ConMunism 1 s vi ev of the universe is on the se:re pl^nc thc.t of d e m o c r a c y and is utterly 5nconsistcrt with the totality vii-.m vie,5 of ：tho yつrid, Therefore, ttg ' car scj that the. f o n tion of the so-eall cd Document Kb. 1616 'r§e No. 5 povulur front res nature 1. If the TTIO^, ho^cv^r, stick? to tho Mc rxie.r. :.rirci^ o, closc coovorr t.̂ o bet'^ e ̂ "t rnd the totelj t. rian co\irtrios m 1 1 be very difficult to . GE ふ;.iY and tho S0\.r[ET •P r \r-' h> vc co?- eluded し sort of fil 1 5r ncc r.nd formed a united frort g a i n s t ；the- old ''O-• pf. If this coo^or. tion £ ime ‘:t dし c trrction of the old po • cr? out o f co ”or interests,レo cし：rnot flrd -nuch signifj c.，co 5r it from the v 5 . 二 0 广 rorld hietory. Very i^irortc.rt it ie, hoヮしv、?r, if it n^ivs or th . cor tr£ rj the SCVIEI TJi.j.OI、.] r abしndoiamcザt of h:r fornu r design rpr、::ウ：'1 ぐ rcvplutfoi? throufh co;で uri:.em, r.nd a .oeificrtion of her ideology ^hich v- ould Ic^.d to hu r- g.rr,ciur 1 trc ns.for^c tior 'nto r t^t ̂ 1 it, rd^m f t r . t c . ^ H h 1 structure si^r l^r to th:: t of GJ «： nd ト ” , e •nurt，-しtch ^uture d. vclopnu. : ritr j^ost cc:rc;fu~" ""y. ，，、 ？tud：- tho ur.tt-r .fro’，t、.c. v’、.マ:：)cr.rt of wo;-Id hlstciy, ^c can t-t t̂ c； frCL-rc time c Iso vicv it fro i し.di"'f :rc.r:t -iLglc, ^hcuph it 5 s reL: ted to the foregoing. The : 7roim life of humc.n bcirgs sho^c r. corristcnt trend to brosdc n its scô -r； f:r du：: lly. It If. t . oof.rd zod thrt thj' r i? due r.icJnJ.y to ccovomi.c uoccc^itj'j on tho ot:K;r hi.rd tl\. tote：.lite vie-- of life rutursl.l:, must stimulr tc th^ £ t. nekney. J.•、.了. ！ s intention o^ "crying an/eccr.ouii^ bloc of JAP人ら il'； K C H U R H , urd CHI”/.，G^A;T r s demand for lehc.j-'streiun, r.d ITAIY f e idail of crtc ''v J.rh- ng grc. t e-vriro on the i-icditorrr-loc.n F w ell he at '..ribv.ted to the bl^c c-.urc. As if 1 -ell kror'n, 3 r lIT/.r: T gcv^ up h. r tr cation/ 1 pri:rcir>l；- of fro二 trade :rd r.t a Drc cedcnt of bloc しcor>o,:_y ’"hu n cortractcd t; c O T ^ v^ Agro, .-'ort. T "c c- n rcg;- rd bcr, the found, r oi, tb.o ^rirci-^ e of froc. trc do, c.̂ hrv^ng ^ cr- cc pe? ] cd b; r ccoro r :t5 c rcccssj ty to dopt in n: rt the , cti.u" 1 つrirci_nlo of tot..l^ ^？^：-i'ni. The fr ct tht t rhA 1 e the ”rir»c5_ple of r o±iJ srlf-dctcrv.iinction upon JV7..”，m： ard I T 我 PHI•でIf? hcrrc];? ？ obviously it ir h r r-^.tior:.! stn”tuごc ”irl'es bor •porj.tiar c x t r d l y ”crk. If B^IT：!^ F^ICA, FPJ:. G}' 9 c,nd others virh to 叩 . . t h e i r i ̂r iGHso t;.:cor-c.:ij.c s-olirrc 'wlii cS xa^y them ど":v ,.t "orcs^rt しnjcr、，irg, is pot. ；-roprr for then ip. .十 i i v c qま a d t、： ^mcvior. r..cc, rp luf-? r?.or to th. ， should hold r r cつ：on,-:c rph,;rc of_.th-； z^.o d c Tlic "hurt!: of a r.cy v or Id carrot ト、r； p 1.: ?,vd ^.thout this. This, T iovc, is the. immediate t)roblo r a cor f rortirg the ""orld. To b:rirg forth this world, ruch idc^.s l c tur:.l rights of mzr, r:.c::J rolf- detcrrainと.tion, a^d sov. rcigr vi^.l-ts of n《.十 ions must bo co2:side^rbly reformed し t the p-. .at ti^e the so-ci lied h：. vc n. toors sh?uld ho m-coi r'd to sccrif5cc thご:てc].ve, c . • To : t •ハ1 ニ t h e world hi十hr;rto •r.c.s be. r •''.ivj.dcd irto some sixty odd r,i tiors, c. ch r?gj ptir.£^ unon tho abgolytonose of her roversifn n p F t g ^ wbicFlii s 155 a!D tho obrt.rnction of the growth i re 1 , dove 3 ô nic n.t of h n w d society ^orc to Roughly, the Do cunv nt No. 1 ら 16 6 T . 0 G c c v . . しin、 o r totr.litc ri: n countri . s c； .n be. a.id to lie in the rrmcdyirg of thir i rrc.tionc. lity. Ir other —ord?, their v-Ilu ic to divide the 「orld "-.r:to co:••つ rcitivdy fcr groups or blocc rrゼ T "ith?r> their ror^octivc rrh： rer to cr：. 1 ？ o c... ch rr.ee to l e d h. m o t i o n s 1 ̂ f c： of cor 十.rt、:nt し:nd で'ぐ c c'. • In the old cor-c'. D"t of t-hoTipht, "thir ir r dr： c r voTutior . .rd r rli' ^F it c: nrot h,し r：- ̂ 'zed thout rr t ctrif: • oxtcrrivc 广.r h. s 、、てソrc•しd TB'"7. ̂ ’ for theて.c t\ o und し乙.If デコ rr, -hjl,. in ... grc:.::.t conflict hi.e co'io into cxirtcrco betWCD the nc y - end the old oorcr?し-rd it ir mor-t likely to ircrc. rc its irtensitマ end pccJc. Ho* rr cvur, r Euro^ccr union hi ? 1:しon rdvoc/ ted c-.monf： the bcJ?-i?。、rent co^ntri< c of ETJ、て.巧、and in the Oti CRT っIPO there ir は nd for ニD V C T U A' DC.RR T5.on or 1 つ.oc. Thus, bcliしvc, future - orlc 1 hirtor：/ r i 1 1 n cc rs-. ri?y -nrocccd along 十he bovo- rr^mtior.ed coursc.. Ir tho，ight of the ^.forc^cntion^. d p.(.クiir。r s a rhoL、、I f-r cl there if ro ,ncjjd„ for hocitr tion in dc tしriiring J.' T T! s ::uturc forrifr policy. In i： ct, ever sincc JAF/.i r cmb. rkc-d on her covtin..rt' 1 r>oJ.icy v?* th the ；:.r}churi;..n Incident, h<_r forcigr】 ^oli-.cy k s ^ -c.n rt..Mirhed /;.r?d to K ck out of or sp..rw from it nor ir- not つ、、ridf , Still, the pi\: r しr?cし of t*"o di ̂ ^crcr.t ovirAor^ 5n J.' T ’ T tod: 7 end th、 fi ct th. t thv： "orotic rrc he sit: tir-g bct-c en then ？.r tvvly し v-ondcr of this v.orld. Ho' ever, this Is c trしrritory Dhしnomcnon • The i nし v l tし i t y of birtoiy crnnot be： altered by humr.n ；00.'cr. In the lonp run, th t j'hich bound to- ̂ .T ^ ^T - 1 *! 1 1 - prob. bly k.-open. Ho: over, the do'iiG +ic しnd .foroifr r: tu. tiers :.t -prc.r^nt ^ i" 1 ! *x)ot 、”llo ン he sit tion :rd. ind. cision ハ or long • r。-:-， 1 t ur rurr)o:-e th t j - ̂ rji.ll cucc. . d ’*n hしr rc-し iifnv rt j:ith trcrd of jniftoiy, :;nd confid r thu っ y rhich J,:.，.:.ド 1 f デ"u十urし for' ign pol icy should follov- . Then, there should o:" r.ovv^i "*、c no chaiif.G in her forしigr policy T^hich c imr rt thし crt.: b"' iv^hn rt of 十he nc- order ir Fi.st /•厂エ广. Ho r ov r, it poos? without rrying thr t the m i i ^ t to eこriy thir out r. cnir, ̂ ^r 〔 vig-or ::.nd rlrc rity. ri The plrrしso fI thc rev order ir> Er ft ‘ ：-1: v vie，•んd from the etf rd^oint of the Tiber： 1 clcmcntr- in the m.tior i s i?一ducd e. trouble ?o c He rc し，thev xrv to :.voicT thir ox-Turr^ or し p much vs rx>pgib3 e • Foreign ”cr crp of the old order t* r： ( vviy o^rorturity to cr^ticizc c nd ortr* cizc n thc ncv: order in C了了エ•パ !t . rnd^ r prcv^, rt dom- —tic circus^ti rcc e, it ie quito "oo c :rib]し th： t this for-.igr nd do.’、.广tic m? cchicf-making …i，l ru.ee. d. ^c vc rtholcrF, hirtory ir r .1 じntl.てrly ”roc.て dirg* 〕.tぐ o r r fi xcc 1 conrrc. 、 The coopcr： tion トサて、.n Jy 'GER : T.Y,し nd IT/.IY, ch farmed to hc.vc m, t_^ith c hi.tch .tiSnor—ril^ ： 1 cxirts L.r 1. rolc.mn f c t ir the v orld of tode'v, ro m； .tt,r ' hcth；.r it h t r ..r t-'ken tho for ! of ごn :.]li: ncc or r?ot. The ."Ivsro-G. r /.i .n p t ct did rot T'cc.ker. thir t >>ut, or the cortr:.ry, Document No. 1616 Page No. 7 helped strengthen rrd Je^oan^ e interne.tioral poc ? tion har become aore secure. It is l:.r'o，.：n th:, J the iec ,tion of JAPf.N once rumored abroad and vhich Japanese peop] themrelves ： ere concerned about 可f.s after all nothiDg but the result of ar iniper:̂ ect gre.cv of the l&rr of history t.rd a Tac> of confidence. Therefore, rot on 1 2 r て it i necesrarv for J "AN to chanre any of her program for estt.blish:' vs the nev order ？ m E&pt ' TIA 7 hut row she need not he?: tc'te in expc ndinf： completing thorn, The ne.F order of Es.rt ズベ : IA ic lir'.ed Fith the nev： order of the T orld. The. ner order cannot be realised *.n thj 3 Dart of the -orld alone, if the .nart of the vo^ld adherer to the. id order, or goes hack ir. the op-oofite direction. It びら”f tb,, t JA P AF Is p o i， t o v^ithdra^ utterly from the problems of FT:.:‘.;IY: ahi 丨ブ）e effo-t-' to ret十,le the C rT Jl. Ir.cidert. Unable to understand e.r.d ex lain corrcctly the r]e rT phenomena，:Mch cron up one after another throughout EiHOPI., she di; '::n.rcod then ^itb the ri.pfle coniment "Complicated e.rd inco] rchensi•卜、le r • Thi? amountF to ncthir^ more then seeking refuge ir the iciu-lc r but co nmon r-oli 07 of devoting herself i." the future entirely to the ”robleni of C- JTJ、. • Ho T T ovor, the preFer-t sr•十"ir.tion of the vorld does 1 ot permit ruch ar evasion, Problems of - 、 e IA are inevitc*. blv tho?e of FU.iOPE and AJ;' RICA. A bold ar/Fbrave foreigr policy for ne於 J/PAN shou3d fco entaol]•でhed in a dignified marijier end should dispicy unders--te.nd.irg of the torrrtiori£.l politi ccl sitiu tior rhich ic now rニt a turrtinf:-poi.rt ir \ orld 1 tory. Document No. 1616 Page Nc. L, II THE EUROPE" M m.R ard The ；-ttn tudc of JI-̂ l.V In udclreFs in Ncvwiub r, 1939 DocTUicnt No. 1616 Page No, 9 Before I ” er't to I r : ； LY, every one in J7:.P/.N tu^' cd of tote J itcriani^m crci of r.r crti-co-idrt' rn r.xir •耽ひry neonle thought thと t the re- let: onship anorg J/，/.て.,G.飞？T Lr.d IT'VI d:d not erd ir the i nti-Co' irter：' Pact, but th; t thir tcL'tionph^ id t;ou.1cI bo further rtrcrgthcnod. One of tho v a sor c ir probably thr. t the Decrp丄e themrelver keenly felt, in the l?ght of prcrcrt int rn〔 tior丄.1 rc 1' t^ onr, tht.t tho settlcnent of the CHII.U. Incidcrt • onn.d o, 'c much to GIRVll： ar.d IT/ JY. Before I て cr.t rfcrOc d, T obrcrv( d し r： thcr ' d o r p r c a d feeling anorg the pcodIc thc.t it rov]d, the r for'.， be ,人]]i:" this しnti-Co•パricrn r o L tior^hir ".ore further developed ？.r:to し t?.ilit,.ry t H i t r.ce. I s rogrrdr the concl-upior of し generally uncorc^ t5or/1 milit. r^ r： ̂ 1 larce of •了人?/: ， •：. IT, ar.d IT/LY, i t d , f?ritcTy recogDizcd the t J h e people j r- general dor ire d ai ir.rco,the type of c.llic.r.ce beirg a sccond- ry ^cXttr. Thereupon,エ le^'t for IT/.LY with the thought of d。'ir.g my huuifclc bc rt ir this m： ttL.r. J. F, ho. ever, ^cc^od to ĉ- ;or the ^ttl o^icrt o•マ tho CHJ^V Incidcr-t by coopcr, tirg ”ith BRj T 7' r . Such、(^ g the attitude of JilPAK, C T R ,； PY i.rd IT； T Y beg^n to mi?trust J - o n thir Point und, If irx：!!̂ >ivinp ur_Ji，/、• cnt しs fc.r r,r the で:'S〇-门：吃幻 1 Mor-/ ggrersion ^c ct. s there is not err .̂ h time tn cxvlcir ir detail the cir-cunirferxes.i^hich led th、” よ辽 thiに T r t y - :.nd r.r Hふl〔o一 r :( sonpi^hat inr)rov>. r to r-nlcc the > c.,11 frankly ェじ•. to omit t hっ r ^ r U Ho-"ever, I ccn ci p firrn hcr^ the irdirouti blc f ; ct th. t J; - 、.” T -as rcrhc ̂ s roeporsiblc c.r.d choul d ir.dulpo in intros'occtior for the coirr?e vhich led to corclurior of the フU c S0-C-E?.iひ.i T rcrrior. ^ ct, It isxcrorc.].;y corfiid.md th^t G? ； ; Y bctr:.jcd Qrd is, troLciiorouc, but in ny oがnion y neither K t r ^ y e d J'^'N nor T'c'.s gu lty of trc^chcry. Considering the circumrt, rccs locding to her c.ction, - ,c ci.nnot ？ rc Ce ll FY tror cherouc. Vorcov； r , Gcrrne.ny allied herself —itli t.hc ..IET 两0:.，ミor:ti,こry—HJ^u卫irit of the Ixiti-Gouiir.tcrr F ct • hich turc ] ly roc. ncd nituclly . dvaritagcou? to both JAP/F und herself. Furthcraorc, rircc thip c step ncrrcr to an tl" 1 i, rcc しrd not c. nu-ru non-c.£^rc6sion trer.ty, it see^r pc-nriblc thc.t G.::2i'ri rt s fuelir.f tcr , rd J P. '. T -ill h e c ^ cool. Kovevor, the truth ir quite the ot> o-:ite," 1 c. n rtr tc r? an i,"?：- olute fret th“t Q.丁:./ KL, ir rpite of he r clli^rce ”ith tb三JJン:. ： 广リ is rou still off- ring J; her fricrdrhip c? prol'ound •：. s ever. Of cour.^o ITALY hz.s no rcc ton to chこ:ngG her feeling to r i rdr" JA- ' She ？till fcolr z.€ oxcecdir.gly friendly r:.s ev： r , Horoovcr, the. r- 1; tion bLt T . ecn IT'JI crd Q-'E ̂ ？' irj:Qt」t 1 vc ted thi? ^hn-' ggrc： r rion Pe ct. The feet ir th t I'7J-Y preferred a Grベ.•厂MJ•ひ.• r;.pproch^i.nt, and Document No. 1616 No. 10 had hitherto beer- reco-^ending it to GERMANY. The J A P / 4 F - G J 1 ; :「に.. A x i s , therefore, has not really undergone a change even today. However, JAP/T seem? to think GFTT'iAN^ in son?e rev betrayed her, and tb:t the IrtterVs alliance with the 50VIFT TUT：OH is suspect. In viev r of the 5rternato" onal「tuation in wh^ ch J•ハ？AN stands today, and fro .a practical nece巧ity, it is de^ir^ble tir.t, JAPAN cooperate r.ith GJiJfeiK? and also go hand in hand rith ITブ Ty. Horever, tbe general sentiment of JAPAN seems to be that she cannot ag&in Dut . out her once-rejected hand to Gn.J.FY. Neverthelew^s, the biaa of JAPAN, is such thtt the relationship between JAPAN ? G E P i S M an^ ITAI.Y can be brought back again to the past not orJy •>r» form but ir fact. The .R. ？act, coi:eluded in this way, is rot due to i]l vrii 1 against JAPAN and GE* W / alone must not be denounced for a betrayer. Then, I ャeel 9'e mift corsidfr cooly vhetber the conclusion of this RU^SO-Gi'RMAN Pact is advantageous to JAPAN or not. The first fruit of the GL .丄NY-TJ•？ •〔‘•て Pact is the current B^ITIPH- F 肥、!GH War against GF^MAPY. If the fE^ANY-U.f .r： .R, Pact he A not been oor.cluded, C’r:戰コ 7 Y would probably not teve adopted such a strong policy. It may he said thc t the GEFM/ Pact 巧:. s a direct :'.r?centive to this var . エ do not "blindニ；7 consider the present rar in EUROPF c.s being a divine tempest or pro^rldential hel'f for JAPAN. However, I fir^ily b.e 1 ieve thc.t the fact the.t("this wer has broker out cag. be developed in favour of Ji、で/..N according to her aims ar-d Dolic?ue£ • Further, it vt s federally he!loved that rith the conclusion of the RITSSO-C^'./^.N Pact, the U."L.糧”し〔1 be able to turn all her energies towards the F'R EA-T since she voxxld feel secure in the ^est, and, consequently, rould be more sub;]ected to her pre?sure^ However, we find the fs'cts to be thr contrc.ry. The U . r , '1. at present desires to adjust the relrtnotiw^hiD bet^^een herself J'^P/y. In fe.ct, the NOMOKHAN Ceaso-Fire ‘‘greê ient has already been concluded. It see^s that on sueト matter? as the deli-nVtction of the border, or b. no T "" commercial treaty, or the problem of concessions, the ne^ otia"6Ion£ aro progressing steadily. In one or another, re can recognize the fact that the sentiment of the U バ i s becorr*ng favourable torerds J ； Pi H. In all likelihood, they i.ve ever ready- to corcTucte a nOn—aggress ion treaty, if Jf.?l：^ wishes to do so. It is r.17 strong be J ief thrt she is even prepared to stop her assi, c tance to CHINA and the C H U G KM-^KF- regime. * 'It present, they cre trying to Docuiaent 1616 ?t\ge No, 11 separeito the National Party &nd the； CHI^EfE Communist Party. It soems to -ne thr t tho .R. lost hope in CHL/^ T G Kf I- r:EEY and her effort to feparr.tc them is for the purpose of preventing the CHJfTEcE Communist Pcrty from becomir.-g inv lved ？ n the ctenger of a co'imon ruin with the National Pt.rty, If it be true, hero arises the importart fact that，c.s e. result of the conclusion of the nTJSSO-'E'^^F Pc,ct, the relations betrcon J'APAN and the U.^ •" .R. h^ve been improved. From thi s point of view, エ feel the conclusion of the OJGSO-GKR丁':iF Pact is definitely not dis- advantr. eons to J/ P /1 T . Furthermore,エ thinkタ various a^wirtcges will probrbl.y accrue to J/ from this rclf.it ion shir?. For Tr^-ferce, £s a rosvJ.t of the r betreen Qm^rN：, and BRIT； IF' and IT丨/.?:CE，due to the conclusion of tho HTTSSO-CERMAN fTOlv-Aggression P'ict, BRITAIN todcy ccnnot support CIIIAKG KAI- C HEK and exert pressure on JjTJ}：^. In short, the disappearance of the U.-S-： .R. ! s pressure tes grcc.tly relieved jAフ/N. Tnc position of JI.VI-N has boco^.e stable. Consequertly, re can say that BRITAIN is at hor wit^s end. The sしp!e thing iay be scid about /W1RICA，I think. /r-ERIC A ; is nou very anxious c bout JAPAN'vS rapprochemcnt Fith the U. c .S.'"l^ With BRITAIN,,腿:EC;, elwajrs hopes for deterioration oハ rolrtiqns. This is because she fears JA^LlVs Dositioi)‘ in the FIR E；5'T v:ill be strengthened. If J/J^IJ were to fight with the U . c . f . she v r ould he.vo to relax her cortrol of construction in C T T I ^ / T h e y "Tiope that JilP/ N villi find It nccessar：/ to give up GFIド/• The Possibility ！ of r： coiimropiisc between J/. p f'N r?.nd the FOVIFT U W Q N is truly armoying to them. The rcc.son ブ..ハEさIGA suddenly rccognizod the U.?. after sixteen ycc.rs ? rcfiisol is this: After the outbreak of the. Incident, JAPiiN vrould not listen to AMERIC/ in every matter, and， moreover, / i 'M'x 1ICA can do hf.rd3.j anything to J/^/N, The is the only country rithin roc..ch of JA^AN. Therefore, AME3IC/ adopted a policj- of lending money, supplying materials, and furnishing technical exports to the U.F.f.S, in order to make her powerful so that I^miG： could o wess J7.?AF. The cbove "oolicy has worked successfully, c.nd the tels. tion betvecn Ji PAN and the U.S^S.R. has boon aggravated until todry. °ince JAPAN, has ur) to noY； been exhausting her n:- tional strength in the CHJ ?,T A Incident ard her re丄こti石ns with the SuVIET UNION are strained. v r £.r may come at c.nj tirne_. BlilKII^s attitude to7.「rrds JAPAN is as firm c.s ever. If, in addition, ^ ’ : ‘ : エ 0 ? , should press it is thought thr.t JT^AH would be entirely dcferteci. It \ms due to such ideas thf.t /.MERJ.GA abandoned the Commercial Treaty• Document I'o» Iblb P^go Fo c 丄 Ho" ever, if J.\.?AIT sccuro in h： r :*cL^tions v:ith the U.S.S.E., even the abanctonricnt of the Commercial Treaty rould not cruse her to the slightest heed. /^FIJCA must regret rov* thc.t hg-r trick proved disamointing^ Therefore, she is greatly concerned rbout the Doesibi^ity of conclusion of a non-r.ggrcssion trし:,ty betv. T ecn J.APAN r.nd the IT. :； . c , when their rclr.tionshir) improves, and she desires to prevent it one r;ry or こr:othcr. /1 present, as the public opinion of JJ.-fni is not yr.t perfectly unitod in thrt respect, AMEBIC/ thinks the t hj; tc.I-Ing こ..rc thcr firm' stcnd 9 JA^-N may pive up her rclcti onship lith th^TJ.f .jS.l.., .so. -SRJC.?. will prob hlj follor the t course. Thereafter, .^ERIC/ rill contiruo to show such an attitude for a wha丄• i'n the C o i m i r r c i c t y e.nd ir. the CPU TV. Incid .nt. Hovcvr.r, -e nvu^t not thoughtlessly bo taken in by thrt; rh^t：:vcr こttit”dc thc; r majr take, vc need -ot fr;c,v. r: c sh^-uld crrry nut our ハo丄:icy Irdo^ r)dcni:ly # Thus, JAPAN 1 s present dip]oiル.tic 'oosition in the T*orld ir being r h o U y i^roved^ no anxi.‘:ty if felt t orGScrt in rcpr rd to the U.S.S.U., r.nd the pressure fro,a 3'U^TF" and the tTHTED ' r T. r TF? is diminishing• In し-'ord,マc ove this to the BJJSSO-GFmil^ Treaty. For l.3.1 thct, there prevail expressions and fecllnf-e among J,.Pf.K"" r E people to the effect thr t GE^. i;.NY is susDcct for shewing hards with the TJ, • • I. ̂ thrt G..̂ 7- 1 ! is being dragged しroiind —"by the V .todc-y t nd thi't should the T :C.r be i^rolonpod, GFI&LM v:ould be beaten for l£,ck of.rn -ncy. I think this rjuet bo qrite disagreeable to G'P^l'M. At any rato ; such a‘ vaj of thinking hes dr r k m e d the pこth JI Pi{ ̂ should U.ke in the future. It is bece.usc thejr r.re thus b: sicrlly wrong in their thinking, thし t they do not kno^ 7 irhr.t to do. In the first vlo.co, ivgcrding the events lending to the conclusion of the "UĴfO-GL；パ.ふ.【了 r act, ”.c must not only take mcny of the, conditions . of G"". int•• consideration, but from the w i n t of vicr of - T orld history, the coopcr:.. tion b:わ”eon cvd the U.へ. C V':“ ne-ccsr:: ry < nd this would he ve boun eimil^..r]y c.chicvcd, I thi nk, even if cry allii rce among J/P/ F, GマU v. NY and T U U hr.d been concludcd. JL r 'AN, cs ：. c r ； r o u l d hrvc done so., Fur th- m o r e , this is not : n i so step, for aft. r concluding a Jî /J'T一GE'̂ M/NY-IT.ハJ.Y Allir.ncc, could further cooper tc rith the U. - .S.R. I believe it proper thc t 飞-.c confront the ？ >"'VI：' T rith the- r>o:”，cr of three c our trie? rr)d go op urate v̂ i th h. .r under udvantcgcons conditions for Ji':へ”し i.nd ITA1Y, rospoctivoly. . Jit the beginning of JuTy^ 1939リエ definitely submitted the above opinion to tho Govcrnnicnt • Docuiacnt Ncu l6lo , ^c.go No. 13 In Pl^r 4 , It is no :..，dcr th/..t the RUSSO-Cmi:丁 ^>act tで.s corcludod, vo ••-.nist not blr ̂：； fcr thf..t. As I hしvc just mentioiiGd, it tes rorked to greet c.dv/nttpc for JI.^LtL Therefore, JAPAN has no rorsori to feel diss; tisficd uith G F H I think ro コust not forge t the good rill rho^rj to J；？;K by G E ^ V N Y and othors during the OKI 7. Incident. Of coiirsc. "under pr:tcnt intern?：-1^'om 1 rolatlnr.sbips, the J,卩’产？丁ESE •people； nust r>ot "bい so rr.ivc as to be vainly sTTiyud by sentiment. I l not r nsipting th:..t just boc^usc and ITALY ucrc nicc t? us dnving the CHJ"7. Incident, should he deeply moved by it end rcocy 'i:i'icm ho v :rVv-.r d?•で，dvLrt^gcoup it •’ight be to J'.^M. Forever, tmdor the iorr-scrt inte rnしtj on.ど.1 condi tioriF, if such totr litarian countries ニ？ © : IVY^ IT;i,Y ; ご丨nd others aro tryir.g to crush th^""oldT^orld "rdcr _ i.'d て,.oiretract a r\ev one, i.erc defeated by th(. doTnocr;vtic countries of Bも丁！ 1?:，jU?て!.CA， ard FR" ！: 7 CE T:hich tvyir^ to'-i£,intt.in t, 0 present corditioD of the r。rld， r :h'- t て:ou，.d ト cっne of J； r AN? I rant you "t'、consider this point •”•:、 would heてのui if J/^AF ！r d ^lrvcd for the so.ko. of the dc noCr. tic countri^r to destroy the totalit. rir.r. n-: tiors, c.nd if the ! old r>0' crs of dj ocr.-.cy hr d. conu to do^iin-'te the v r orld c To the eye? of EHTT?r:, the UT1TED T K , ard others, Ji'^N, today, is a ^rcpod n^t i{；viov tハ ar.d ITALY, and is considered c.s c.n j^ggros^or, thf.^vin the result will not bo cs ‘ simple i.s .th-.t,of t!:o li.^t C c n f c r c n c c .エ耻 sure thc.t they -ould (force J/TxJ T to ^ithdrar hc.r rrrry from CH丁巧，to r e t u r n ' H d , fvrihormTi^ W rot out of WhiilA arid . 1 JUjiss： ^'ould probo.blv oven insict thrt bcT surk off 0とEIゆ lFlr.nd； Such i * ? 一 - — . “ .rd jrt V V つ . 又 c \ Ho- uvcr, if OE :i/lA?IY really ir ”rr.blc to defし&t B ^ I T；. a n d FPu FCE, it if need]しps "to sr.y thr.t JAPAN muet think tho ri'.t^er over acct)iy. It 'Oi.-ild be urf'irtunr.tt；, but irre cannot support those rho arc destined "lEo be aci'jc.xoa. He .:v(..r，as for my forocrrt on th-i f ---r r, I cmn.ot bc;liovG thrt G V 猶 I T Fill be bcr ten .-.rain this tine. In the first pL.cc，て111 Gf +.V/.FY continue this rr.r by h•，rclf to the lest? No, TT/TI prill join tho_v/；. r, f.nd, I c.r’i quite rare, on the side of GI 7 :.ご.ハ：. Bt.sides, her relations T.i.th the U.5.S. U r.rc not es v;c-..k and unccrtr.in as people thirlc, ai)d th SOVIET doubtlc.FP rill in pn.ct.ico f>ivc -.-orttehijk rfsistc-rsce ta...hor, over. ‘ i'thput cl*.clc.rirr. vrc.r. In tho preeont situation, such rrutral countraf;8 n.e the .rl.Il nrc-fcr to tc.kc jthe side of GF'iM/.NZ after all. Might not others such £:S Tin/EI, cocrccd 沪 tho Joint forces of GEKiifn, ITALI end the U丨•？：i. Ic 6sir- nged f'ror：： fentil^ end P ^ W f i ^ S?/IN Fill c.1fo side rith GERMAN； I Document No. 1616 ニレg:.: ！：っ• 1 ’ 1 ‘ I.T r ニ L-.t. r3 I believe. In short, quite cor)trニrj尸 to ‘ . . - - .r. : r,つr. v scy th こ t no countiy rill bo r-n ally -f E ill'： 11： ai.d x'••し:• ^ Q £ I M people r.ro quick c.t bus^ncs£ > tliq s m l l countries in Ml fTE L.TQ very sensitive to the povcr of "L.rgし UF^OPR" corintrios or to tho tones こrd ::iovci!icnts of the big po^ orr, so thr»t thr.ir cttitud^s cf.v be the hi romc-tor of the reel .ト” U 5 び of B ' F , /"GEp C N Y and I T / J Y : The ^orc； f-ct thr丄 ' r u.ll F :、CP?AIT cつ！:ntricr arc ハbsurvir)色 ci rtrict neutrality, contrary "I つ t.lx ti e- of the. laft rar, i"1 lurtrc.tcr th c diecAvi rtc^c of BRITAIN F X " GE. /•oreovcr, tbir tine contrary to the pr-. vious ti-ic, is .：voiding exl^.u^ion c.s nuch as t)ossiblor It ir i，", three months f5.hcg the ^utbi'rrjc of tho vjcr, and she has not ^et or• gaged in ^hat night bo callGd じ t:cr of attrition. This ic dul t^ the SJSGPRIED Line. Shutting thens: lvcs up in thct fortress, the Gcr；^ ns have pn clt.stic DGv°ition; thこ.t is , vhonuvrr tho hi ttle is pr.ハ“iising， th'y emerge, but if not, they oor-frort tholr .^neny fron their fortrces grrris^n ”ithout usir.g up c.ny nvt<. rials, no irttcr hor nonths and ycr. rs it nay t£.ke# Lででしowr, the： b. ck routes of food ruirjJy arc quite un- rcrtrict d todr^y, thrt I f , the bしckyr rd bes boon cnlcrgod, B« sides, tho matv.r:： Is vrof-^rvLd by ^ thir tine c.rc quitし c. groc.t deal . . ^ I L . r i ^ — • A i U i ^ time,. She also hes a good stock ^ munitions She is not t oukened こ.rd she has nany more ？uoply routes the n tino. Ill the -c thj ngs r.rc rdvmtr.ecous to her • / .Ifo , h'::で political and conr^r.ilc ？ti^ucturc； つost puit.こb】c to a prolonp'cd rc-r, She is quite ^•-•rfident ハf victory whether it be in a rTar of nerver or of ordurancc. Ir r.dditijr. to all these, thハ gror t development of her air forces し rい - . r c r t r i o t r the action of tho BRITISH nav•し 1 dot-or. ^o'rcrr of subtle rint.s - rc also grcc tly inprovod • It ”rust be ^oi ntcd nut thc.t the old nc.vy jb no more irvinciblo 3 n pre sort-day EU 'OPE. If IT.^TY then ^T'/..I!7 should join the i:ar, it ド/ould be a serious affrir for B a?/JT, There vould bo gra:.t d.こ”ngcr nf her ciefcc.t not onHy in tho ^orc cndnr::.rcc. c ^''.to^t, but alro in tl' c actual y:ct• Under such circunrt^ncos, C M J ^ ? todcy T/ill never b o defeated^ cvc.r. \md:.r the '"^r^tjnos^iblo conditions. Thcrcfo"rr, ^c rccich the conclusion the t th、:r..j vili ro g.ro〔 t danger, if today, docs phぐ、’-:good-;vill to GJ":ぶ...:and fights or hor siac：. Furthormoro, if the couniTiog frr.r are trying to c\ c Lr..blish £； now order in KUHハPE should not b-. able tq_vdn, it y'ould be impossible for the J / . H E P E people to construct a nし!？ order ir.厶&エ厶，Generally ？poakirg, the old ^rder in H F ; r.nd AriA is rcprc^or.tod by B.lTTiJN end ？3J VCE. I f the countries Dcciincnt Nc, I 6 l 6 Pago No. 15 that r.re ordcc.vourir.g to naintc.in thir old ord"-r carnot be dcfcr.tod f し o r d - r c - n n r t fco ert: ,blidi;d either ^r. tho Occidcrt or in the Orient. J/め/了 7 , GF1 7NY ard IT:"Y arc e.ll countric? v:ho?c m f ? i o n it is to build in cocpcra.tion the hot; rorld order. Even without cor：eluding a treaty, the a in of the three r>rr''..,rs is one«. The used to say, uBy no ncuns d 。 ; c ask for J I^ IV to co îie ard help us ir. >J T R(PE. She： has her or:n mission to cariy out # Her ofcligr.tion t。と• trot ty vculd be d? pchargcd û j deftroy-'rg tho old ord . r and ostr.bHshing a nov; or.o in t'TA. ^urging Br: tirh r)0'"«. r fro r n ' c IA by r.ny is actually rh..t ”，e -ould cxpoct fron J:\PI.V. as her duty in thir Treaty. Wc require rothin^ aorc： thar that . " Le lorf i.e t-'i. F carrics out ihc.t obligr ti^.n, thr.ro ip r 、 で r o need IV'r an aTn.aij(jt i ^ l T o lilo a T H e F ^ r to fight solely for the crtr.n .istacnt of こ nc广 ^rder in !\ c IA and rruf? on tor/crdf： tho rct-Gloracrt of thc、CTTIf,',: Incident ^ith a firの r^rolvc rover to coupr•'や】isc vith the old po: r .ere or rarjikc c^nccssior-s to thcrし Document No. l6l6 Page l6„ This is to 7/it, the oosition of JAPAN and the duty of JAPA.N whether or net GEE T T ANY and JkPMi conclude an allisncs. 'We need not involve ourselves in the war in E U R O P E . J a p a n 1 s pushing for- ward. to 3 solution in the true sense of the word of the CHINA Incident w i l l result in her helping GERM久NY。 Purthermors, what QEJHkNY is doing at present will in effect aid in the se.t^iecenモ of the CM TIC Tncideni:。 At present no one in J^PAF h。s any ob.iso- tlcnコ to the establishment of 3 new crder in ^ 1ST んSI/し Thorefo て be Licv?-ヒ[-の only ne csssnry and adoqi^n ta policy Is for J/IP.'J? to exert hsr utmost to carry it out successfully by embracing it and insisting upon it c However h,?.rd she raay exert herself for the establishment of new order in CHII^, there is a limit ta. I 1 P M ' s p.c®er. She has engnged in a war of attrition in the CHIN/V Incident for more than two years now. J1P4N must avnlrt as 抓…れ cossiblft the waging \ of an even ^ r g e r smle. w a r , in ordsr to consarve h~-r national S» resources an- 1 - to make. provisions f'cr the great efforts to coir,3, J Furthermore, I think that only in a war witB' the"SOVIET tTMION wil.3 J/IPA.N be liable to a wpr of at^ritioru Moreover, the F.S .S .R. wants to compromise with and \va3n her hands of the F夂R EASTc T益ere is an oD^ortunitY for her ag-ain to tfike pi.rt .ia.EUS.QPE- A chance nas coma for tier 乇 o play an active pnrt to the w e s t and sot. of EUROPE. Under these circ-"u啦tances 5 it is ridiculous for har tc be hostile with and keep lar.ge £oiiaes. in the F.\R 5 A S T . She hopes, therefore ? to conclude imiredlately a non-aggression Treaty or the like, and withdraw^ For JAP.!VN, ii: is m excellent foreign policy which should be begun first of a l l . To set the U.S.S.R, at easg in the F/iH E/VST w i l l be a great factor, I believe, to make the EUROPEAN W a r more active. T:ie T. T . S . S . Ii „ . ”'ith the fores to be •；ithdr^v/n from the F lR E\GT, v̂ .'if emerge in the NEAR .EAST or the E E H 3 T O ' GULF, g^obafely G^H 7 IkWI expects it and the U 4 S . 3 h o p e s , for it. lurtherinore^ it would 一‘ I. In such a case, G'^MAWii! would ! e e l ie a great menace t a B£ITaIN. secure and IT\LY might .join the war earlier than we expected at first. Thas the w^r ？:oiild become a reRi one. However, as the sittiation stands now, when nsither (F:R:‘:ANY nor the U.3.S.R. can exert thsinselves sufficiently in EUROPE, IT;\LY w i l l remain neutral for the time b e i n g . A.nd some d a y , if 1 and when finds out tla.it. th® claa«ce&, of winrxing are pgainst Ixar， sKe might rirobably propose Da^c,^,. to tfiie present d a y 2 hns always "beモn prc-pnre互—for such^a , ""JhlTig", '.f&ey, if 七 h e war sfiould n.:.t continue to the last, ana if it slir.uld end in recv.nf»n T lation« _an international conference w o u l d , be sure to ne held. J1F.O would ta"ke cnrFT.!! I'D., and the CITS Document Wo. l6l6 P?.gs 17. vmiild^-tCLQ^. If in JilPAN' s policy to^ird GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED T..\T?]S, she neither compromises nor cooperates, and in her policy toward GEFJ7VNY, ITALY and the IT.S.S .R., she does not make concessions,マnd \f she follows the so-cnlled independent no! icy m d makes no friends, J^.PiN" will be" completely 1 sola ted in \nis peace conference. Although we do not know w h s n such peace will come, there is jiojg^r without reconciliation. W a l s o do not know whether peace w i l l come early or late, bjat it may come soqn,er than we expect. It unjr end in a draw without srrrender on either .g.ide. In that case, if J,\P\N isolated, the problems of ths East w i l l be sacrificed and the settlement of problems of other are^s will be ^Uispmpli shed in the sacrij-ice of .\SIL. Therefore, I think that today we should not affirm the" autonomous policy of JfiPAN' s diplomacy or press forward in the CHINA Incident, but should first of all readjust relations w i t h G H K Y and IT.1LY and build friendl. ralations_v^ith the U.S.S.B. Moreover, there is neither dnngsr nor ^3s"eHTfity for JfVP\N by so doing. It is my firm ronvictlon that by thir,セhe rood to achisveirent of our mission of establishing the new order in "SiVST /ISL\ will be opened. There are many things which confirm my conclusion, but hav- ing no time to explain them in detail, I shall omit them. In fine, the SOVTET-G^PJ'^IN coalition his been -chieved. Accordingly, since the European War has broken out, it is certain that JAPilN' s international position h? s be coma very advantageous, nnd it would improve increasingly if only the government does not p.dont wrong policy. It is necessnry to utilize thase favourable circumstances, make them better, and establish here on a solid foundation a great and far-sighted policy for the Fir E a s t . It is unthinkable thnt the people do not know whnt to do, although it is the rarest of oDPortunities. ‘Vbove a l l else, tile -unification of rv^t.inrinl viotjs is a pressing need, "'ith that only can jAFTNSSE diplomacy return to its original course. Taking the most of J t \P4N f s presant fnvorable situp.tion, I think we should exert our utmost for the nation to establish s permnnant foundation. Document No. l6l6 Page l18„ 3 〇 V I E T ， ( B m C O A L TION PLOBLEM :U丁D G E R W N P O W E R ( L E C T T T V S G I V E N 4T T H E I^IPEEIAi U M I V S R S I T Y I L m i K I 側 O C T C /C \KUSHI-K;1I/ I N I S B R U A R Y 1 Q 4 0 _ _ .、 /SHO^i 15/). The recent dioloraacv of before I w e n t abroad, was b-.sed on the .\nti-Ccmintern A x i s ,巧 h i c h the government constantly loroclaimed "ind v/hich all of the people balisved. H o w e v e r , i s the CEIW.i Incident g n d n a l l y progressed, tlis people in genar".! renli.zad thnt Gerrrr.n nnd Italian rid to J'.PAN 'ms extremely sffectiva so that tha opinion caroe to be expressed thnt a further step should be taken to mnks it into a militTry llll-'.noe. I think th，‘t ths feeling of irnny people In J:\P:iN was in '^gres^snt vzith this. \t any r - t s , I left J.\P:UT "rhan praises for the Gsrtnnn-Ital-.in ^nti-Comintarn axis were being sung the loudes - ! T left for IT^LY ”'ith ths feeling thnt I w.-anted to render some service in tha matter by doing ir : y hv.nble best from abroad. The rel-tionship betw33n the othsr parties, GEF(マ^NY and ITiLY, has gr^.d'u.nlly asstimed importance in EUROPE r.nd they h'ivs co^e to recognize the gra.it im"oort")ncs of tying tir> ，..7ith J 二 i n the Orient. Of course, GEP*^NY nnd ITALY also hnd セ h e same, or strongar, feeling ns J〜PAN to strengthen ths J.\PAN-GEB"：ANY-ITALY ^oalition. Sines boch sides hnd the snme foeling, I, too, had the hooa of suece3ding without much difficulty in tha natter of a J A ,P;\N-GEB'^NY-IT\LY military allinnce. However, T sensed upon my nrrivnl that there s considerable discrenancj^ bstvsen GEP^*\MY 、nd TT入LY wanted, nnd what JL?>\11 raquirsd. Th?t is, thsrs \vhs っ vsry widespread fdbTin? to shake hands へ‘nd compromisa with BE U N ？, nd ^ M t i W l i desoits their intsrf srenca^itli JiP.M in the • ' H m Incid-nt. Tin., only .point uoori 'vrhich n a t i o n a l opinion -vos agnaad •,ts ttat n.f ralntionR フith SOVIET FTVS3I.V. In r3gird to _ FiFS8I:\ T 0 grng t m a n y p a o p l o o u a n l Y s^ id t f e t _she w?. s J^P.IN' s e n a m y . .\ccordingly, th:：" l i ^ i t to whicti J a p a n e s e ^ b m a t d e c is 10115 could"ngr ‘: wns 、 J1P.12-GSEI'112C».II 1LI military alliance nlme3 chieflv at tho U.S.S.H. Doc i. 'Cut TTo. I6l6 Page 19. H o w a v a r , upon going to GSR 1,T iNY and IT;iLY,エ found their viaw? as regards this aim of th tre&ty were slightl：/ differ~nt. For example, h 1 d no cT-ish of interests w i t h RUSSIt\,っ.nd, more- ov-jr, sine a G^Ti^^WY ’ s pol i fv v/ ̂ s to comuromise with BRITAIN a n d’ ？ R A N C E In tho west and. to ti^rn eyoFi?.^vqiv to the east at a time w h e n tbe J . \ P . \ N - G I F \ n t i - C o m i i ' i t a r n Pact Lmd b 5-n' conclraedj QSHMaHYVs eastern policy w n s gr°dually making hs^V/oy. C D I 1 rrnde with /VUSTF.Ii，disniGniber 3d CZECH0oL0V ( \LI l naxt, and then w h e n trying to s e t t l e the Polish q.-aastion, hor path wns at this point obstructed by BRrT:\IN ^nd S h o l l w百 c.nll it d^Siiny or txaditinnal troubla. tin it not vntil nftajr W3stsriL vrob 1 oms are solved, c^.n GSBI-^KY 1 s o?.stnm policy bo settlsd? マis -.g-in confrcntad with this fact. Thc-rjfor.3, GEKLUKY mnj 3ither cotnbini ^itti JA.P ; \N to. attack, tiie S0YI3T UNION or alse 'i~r starn policy of eliriimting "-.he Roviot obstacle v/ill suffer .’ serious sst-b^.clL, Accordingly, the der.idGratvm of a Garman- エt‘飞 15..in co'Uiticn with J.'vPlN is noi to attack the U . S . S . E . but to nse us in dealing with BKIT4IN and FFiMCE who reprasont tho. old European povror.s. It is in this regnrd thnt they desire ths co- operation of J.〜P/W. S t n n o , on -ne J.\?aN dssiras to compro- miss with_BRITAIN nnd K3ANCE一to. rr^vent Soviit aggression in the Orient, there vras considerable difference in fc-eling between them. Of course, in event of the outbreak of war botviresn JAP'iN and RtTS'SI.A., b o t h GI.RI.A:':.,—• nnd IT^LY Dlnn to aid J\P/\N, .but this vns not th- ir chiof つ in. T J.s fnr^nm^nt.^l fHffQrsnn、_ T think, is the reason ths ；LY allinnco could not t ^ n bi concludec It ennnot ba dsnisd thnt in the CIIIHA qjiestion J\P.\N—一 e m dually bec?.m2 clsnrlv pitted a g aナ‘ ^V'TTATN^ Thg nnti-British m o v ^ - n t s throughout tiia. country r..l\tiv_ to tho TIbJTSIW question f^^nyOy 弋>y;s r Particularly ゥ.t that tlmp 1t wns- J'\?: n ,N' s disDo-ition to aim sxciiisivQly a t tho SOVIET IIHIQR^ but hovld. no七 J:\P.'iN olt^r thnt iciar. in the course of tlie CHIN.\ ques- tion? Jn visw of th3 inevitability of a clash be two en J'.P^N and BRITaIN -nd the af orsTrsntion-d - ctitudc of GSR:,:.たNY and I felt thnt s hor Id -Itc-r c'islc:,ll7 forrr^r nttitudo H o w e v e r , JiVEAI^s foelinj w^js still dc-termined to qim nt the TT.^.R.'P. Sine3 it was tria tctan of inr丄fenfTul auortars to compro- mi い wi th 丽 r m i-r Dossiblo ind in certnin cases to be friendly viith が.丑BICへ,I thought thnt it would ba oxtremely difficult to pux ny ideas into tiractics. In short, Gorm.illJ^- uril i^r;.-.,TA?AW, h ^ Britain nnd_Jr-inc^ JIS th^^T chi3f objects inst3Mcl of 卩 ム ？ 丄 . I could havo nss^rtad that nlthoiTgh G ••rmnnv would fighi:て!ig T T . S . S . R . if nbsclutoly nacss sary..拳 sha took tha old powers of d s n i o o r a c y t h e gr - : ",tost ilindranci^ But sine:.〕 the circumstancos the country w a r n s I have tDantionod b o f o r s , I submitted to ttie Govornmerrt my opinion Document No. l6l6 Page l20„ tint Germany jao.uld in2vit?.bly_ 'illy w i t h tha IJ.S.S.R., only if JAPAIi-bssltntod to contract this a l l i a a c f . Hov/evor, a n ition-y;ld2 anti-British mcvsnvv. 1 : b r o ^ mrh wfth r-^^pp^t to tiia.-TT'^TJT.STN pr )bTam^ And ns I sr«v that this wns suprtprted. b y the whol3 nnti gn- I tliou^ht h^t it was no time to hesitate and in onrly_July I notified the "ovornmant twice in dotails ns follows: "Garnnny and. Itnlv ar3 not cont^inDl^ting a wp.r against the^ U S明. If the Govornroant is going to conc丄utfe a T r e a w on thp> ngq^mpti nn th/ii.__rn-r will b^ T ^ , ^ ljjaa- h.?.d b丘tti^r be givsR u p ^ I believe the intantion of G；-rm-.nv It o >lv is to dr.H,/ I : ;"us:.5一iっ to thsir Fido nftar con- r n 1 角:n。ng g R P T . ^ ^ and l^KLY. fn order to sst^blish n now orc^r in CI.IN；, tod;iy, -73 wust drive • out from Ca'CNi t:io ol i or vhicii is r.cpr3S ̂ ntad by B r i t a i n ^ Therefore ? I believe tint Ja り.nn shonld concl-uds a tr en ty. 3 s soon - s nos^'ble th Gorir-.n：,'' nnd Itnl v ' in opposition to B r i t a i n rr.-i ！ゲnnee. 1 r_5 furth -ruiors., for her to confront the ITSSE with tho combined powors of JaP/iNj Germany and 丄tolyj w i t h the aid of ^MEsi"： wash thair hands off of the Er.st^ to hova USSR s、od the id to CLI: V G Xai-siiak t .and to I1-Y2 USSR wlthdra)/ th- r forcos from tha WiNCIIIT1\11M-Sov 1 et b o r d e r , and grcidually effect the solutic.i of the pending, PXoblenis favorabl,y, I boliovo that this policy is bost siii七c.d to the ocr-iPion for JaPlN. x A t this noTPjnt if wo do not ^nnfin^A 卯 fj] 1 i-gnoR w i t h Gayman;, ’ 、？md ItTl v T RrtnaHV w i l l r nhnhly 1 pie w 1 t n U S S R . M。r 斯 Qfr-‘ it is clrwin幺 no"：]：. It not tha tiras for nasit^xion. II: JiP^N tri-d to solve th..〕 n r o bl;?m bctwo3n har and USSR 一 ， , £ 1 ; s r . tlie alii广ncc- ''lotwaGii Gork' n,y a n d USSR bas bs^n conclpded, - 聊 1如 1 1 thi.: s bG^QTra iirr TVor^.bl/5 for J'.PAN r>s the sitii?.ti01 I w i l l h-ivj. c h u jsd by ttion?" Bv.t the Gcvarnn:ant__ c 4 cor.rss vras anr\blo to from tha beginnin' givこ thought to my ooinion, bec^uss they hnd in vi^w a treaty fox. fighting w i t h U S S R , w h e r ^ s エ w p s in f-^vor of a treaty for making po.ncc with har -- nn id a a vory dif'‘ ;r3it fron the original on 3. Moraovor, it was in ch.? r dst of il" t^iat hoatcd puTr.i- opinion of the whole m t l o n QF^iT BP IT'.IN on tha ocrnsi.cn of the TIENTSIN Incident the Anglo-Japgnaso Conf^rGnco at Tokvo was ha Id. And, strnngj to sny, ^(E'' T B H I T i l N made conconsion to In tho vicinitv of TIENTSIN, ilQiilishmon ware su'b;.3ct3d to groal _ insults in full vior- of thi w.oi “ 1 ^. Tho o M ？i”mi〕r C F ^ ^ ^ P L a T H "ilso rrndo a r ^ m r k rat tho Fnrli;.ro^nt to the 2l"foct thot his bloOff" w-r,. bo- - ling w U h indign? o ^ n . Th-s^-rcry n^xt m o r m t GREAT BB.tT\ITT ‘ 1 do gro^.t concession, ^h? t is ttつr〔メ, it came to the knowledge of the German Foreign Nfinistjr ps つ report, from 3 reliable source that tho JnTD-nose GovGrn^ont OTomisod to C m \ T E R I T M N th-t they Document No. l6l6 Page l21„ would under no circumstancos g a n e n l i z e the Tripartite T r e a t y , on c o n d i t i o n t h n t she s h o u l d m o k e a c o n c e s s i o n t o J/IPA.N in CHINzl。 Now GUi'VJH： and ITA.LY were of tho oDinion that the rjclicy " d o p t o d b y J \ P \ N o n 1;hs c o m . i n - it s i n c e the Mar丄？hurian I n c i d e n t hid for its object the destruction of the old order in the EVST and ths establishment of a now ordor in its pl.ice ； in other words, that it was JaPfiU T s rontinc-ntTl policy to overthrow first in tha EAST the status enつo of the world, established by ths VERSAILLES Trsnty -- VERSAILLES ordar which in一tiio E]st is ixprossod n s _ tho W A S H I N G T O N O r d 3r JLs w h n t J-iP,\N is t r y i n g t o o v e r t h r o w . T h o y / baliovo th-.t tho ^nnchurian Incident, tha renunciation of the DisnrmmGrrc Pict^ the aa-taDlis^raont of 3 new order in CHINA. \ now in question ars all directed to tli,?セ object. T h o r a f o r e , I n o t h i n g s e e m e d to t h e m to b e m o r a n a t u r a l that~J/lPA.N, G E R M A W Y a n d IT'xLY s h o u l d antc-r i n t o a n n l l l a n c e t o o v a r t h r o w t h e old o r d e r of the world in concort. Thay littla dreamsd of difficulty in t,hg r‘ eotin t i o n . "H'a.iy l o o k i d lu.on thr.t tr.-.nty ？. s ill too m t i - T i l r.nd r. nnttor of rovxso, ?n.t th.) n.:)gotiat5_ons clrnggod on, u n t i l at I： 1 st in Jims- t h o y C 3 m e into n c s - o s s i o n of a r e p o r t t h a t JiiPAN w i s g o i n g to ranks t-.rms w i t h G R E A T B R I T A I N , h e r c-nsmy n a t i o n , g r o ^ t l y to their astonishm^nt. B^sidas, this situation wns brought about i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r n a t i o n - w i d e a n t i - B r i t i s h m o v e m e n t . I s u p p o s e t h a t J ^ P L F ' s a c t i o n s a n d h a r m t i o m l f e3丄ings. m u s i h a v e s t r u c k them n s strange and. complcx. Such b2in;3 the caso, an impression grew with the Gormans thn.t thoy cou.ld jjcpoct little . su.D"ort from JiPlN, th-,t they could not expect J.lPi'iN' s*"heiD in sotting up agninst GREAT BRITAIN and. FHaNCE. On the othar hind, in connection with ths DANZIG problem, tho En.ropGan situation grew so acute thn t the ro lit ions between G S K T m N Y and GRE4T BEIT<\IM and Pli^NCE wore strained to the breaking p o i n t . Aとth。t_ tim,〕_—ilEEi r J： BfilTAIK a n d F R A N C E t r i e d to w i n .DSSIL ov^r to thair^sirln by- sending lhair_r つ pre sent a 11.VQ P tn -iilD^nDW-. Jio. n e e o t i n t o f o r a t r m t y of a l l i n n c s . It is n o w o n d e r t h n t n t t h e .^I^ht of th〕s-: n - ^ o t i ^ t l o n s , IT:VLY f. It r o s t l ^ s s , I T \ L Y has a clos.) t r 3 p t y of a l l i a n c o w i t h G E R I ^ N X . i f GEIIM^NY c o u l d n o t j o i n hnfi3s w i t h J^PATf, a n d U S S R s h o u l d b o s n i n o d o v o x b y GES/iT.-BEITilK ajid FR'l- T CE, hor enemies, ITALY would have to struggle batween - onimiGS on both sldos. It w n s n a t u n l t h a t ITA.IT s h o u l d f d o l n l n r m e d , w h o s h a r e s tha Xato__with „GEF;' A N Y - I think it w。.s not imnatririi oven if I T \ L Y hid p r o D o s e d to G E R R \ N Y - n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the a l l i a n c o of GRS.1T B R I T A I N -,rid F R 4 N C S a n d TJSSR. If GER?. T ANY is b o u n d b y t h s p r o m i s e mnele w i t h JA.P/IN, t h a t i s , tha p r o m i s e t h n t tho t w o n a t i o n s wust not coneluds nnv non-'iggrossion pact ivith. tho SOVIET UNION, nnd clarify her isol"ted position by mcroly looking on the current Document N o . l6l6 Euro pa in .situa tion 3 s tr -in<?a. (tur only ‘ G E P U f f obtnined informntion th r <t J/VPAN was intending to shaka w i t h GEK' ^ N Y ' s onamies, it is only proti -.r thnt she should -.ttemot to nnke a speedy comnromis^ w i t a F S S R . H o r e o v o r , _GERK;\.KY saams t.a think thnt although ；TAPAN frequantiy snonks of tba U S S E , that which m s roally obstructing tha m t h of JAP&N in tha SAST ^as not TJSSR, but GEE,\T BRIT^IN^ W e assume th-t CJERUNY may hnve thought thnt if G^k^iFY should now conclude a non-aggression trenty with ths USSR, then tho rasult w i l l bs thnt BRITAIN'S position in tho EAST w i l l brw^nltensd which J灸？AN would ov^ntu^.lly realize. S u c h being the ense, hence， the R u s s o - G o r m n Non-Aggros si on F.?cf _ concludod nt tho ond of A-ugust. This Uon-lg^ression P?.ct, h o w e v e r t was not nnd3 in ？ d^Yj 'A.s 〕nrly 19^8, Fuehrer HITLER and others bっg。n to rofr^in from using malicious l ^ . n g u n i n sp3iking of ttis USSR -- n thirig v/iiich struck me as strr.n^Oa. T h o r a f o r e , the inner sido of th.3 USSR b;>gan to コ口つ. r o。c h nnd ITALY, thnt is to S3V, th.?t tii9_T T SSH begnn to hold out hor hnnd to thG ^nti-Comintsrn T o ^ r d s Upril this ya'ir, Foreign Minis tor PIBBSNTIiOP positively daclnrod to us that if JlPiN would not enter into nlliancj w i t h GSH Tr :,NY, thiy must combino with tha US S B ;っ nd thst, if J 〜 w o u l d 。lly, thoy could offar 100ダ cooperntion, w h i l e , if n o t , thnt sh3 conld offsr 50% cooperntion. Of courso, this t a l a g n D h o d to tho Go'/arnmant, b u t , in JAPA.N, it w i s s.nid that we h^vo baon thra^tenad by GEEM/INY. Such bains the c^.so, th..3 RTJSSO-aERMA.N Trenty wns concludod list, /̂ t thnt time tho Gormnn authorities s~;id that thoy folt dasply r3grコttnblG nnd thnt thoy should h:.'.ve had JfiP^F's understanc ing'bofor^hand, but if thoy hnd s-^id such thing to J'iP.IN, it w o u l i s-ur3]v Tpp^nr in all the- pnpor^ of the world 'vithin 48 h o u r s A Sin( such cTsas Ir.ve一”bosn axjBor_l§ac.ed_ numbor of times in ths p?.st, thoy wsre unable^ to notify JA_PAN ba fore hand.. Ttioy u n t r e a t e d us not tlQ_ think ill of this action. Thjy violnt^d the p^ct b3c?us2 thoy adhorod to Isgnlitios nnd formnlitios. Thoy nl-v^od us. not to say., that it マr。s n. branch of fnith. In the pressing situation, it n^icassity that .r-ompolled tH5m., so do not think 5.11 of them. Thc-y asstirod'us thっt their f20lings towards J.IP^N todっy hnvo not change tho least. Th^y still hold Gxpectntions of bringing about intimac of thハ rsIntions batween the two m t i o n s . Thsy havo often and rapsnt^dly si?^g2st3d to J;\P:\N to corprornise w i t h tho USSRナ nnd if J/1PAN is in th^.t m o o d , thoy w i l l off jr t'noir sarvicas ns modiator. In short, os I h^ve stated in tha boginning this trny be enough to confirm the supoosod intontion th-t GEKr^\NY tins no thought of fighting the USSR -nd whan tha JfiPiN-GEFJ'^NY-IT.\LY .lllianco is found, G U N Y h-.id in mind to attract tho USSB into this camp. . 一 I (1ル w i t h folded つ r m s , it would mean th-it sh.3 would, 'lly IT\LY from h..rs „lf. Purthorrnurj, since S o o n aftsr the Riisso-German Trj^.ty wis concluded, ITALY also graatly WGlcoirod this traat-/, st-ting t h n t , b y this no vnr w i l l Document No. l6l6 P-“タっつ。 brc-3k out in EUROPE, nnd that hors^ftor Russo-JnpnnasG relations w i l l improve and things v/ill turn out vory favornbls to JAPilM. During my stny there, I could not concoive anything in imprassion that TT.\LY wn<? dis^iDprovjd. of the Russo-Gornran rapprochement or that she holds enmity tgainst the U S S R . たt any rite, it can be snid thnt, in spite of ths fact thnt th3 Pnsso-G:rmnn Treaty had b a o n concluded, even t o d a y , GERド ANY ind ITaLY still attach grent importnnce to the concort w i t h JA.PAN. Tod^y, tho raintions betweson JfiPA.N and. GERr'^NY nnd ITA.LY つre "•.pmrently the snms ns bsfora the conclusion of tho Russo-Garrann Non-!\ggrassion P a c t . The only thing is thnt the feelings of the J。.p'mese people ？ire so maw hat vn gue. Thay hnva a feeling that they wore soraewhnt betrayed by GERMANY. One of its reasons is as I h-ive just statod thnt, on the one hand, lnck of nccurats knovjledge on the pnrt of the people in regnrd to tho distribution of tho Tripartita T r e n t y ,つ n d , on the othsr hand, of the virions forcos both internal nnd 3xtern-ilい thnt; havo brought the treaty to a fnilrire, w^. m a s ^ admit thtat tiiose various forces disfavoring the nllinncG 3xerc!.»^d the suporfluous power which succesded in. break- ing off tl^Q J IP A1 T -(1SRM NY- ITHLI alliance, further maneuvorod to excite antipathy towards GEB T "ATT/. W3' should not forgot thnt dis- pntches from foroign countries today PTO chiefly from such sourcos r '1 nd. th-i.t they aro desporat-jly trying to impo'l Jtidthsso public opinion moro towards that direction. There nr3 some psoplo w h o stato thit if the J/VP/VN—G3RHNY， IT~LY /lllinncs hnd been formed, would not JA.PAM have baon involvac^ in tho vnr in EUROPE? It is lucky thnt the a 11 isnc3 ted noz b s a n ' formed, for th.3 bnra thought imtes thorn shudder. However, I thinly th マ t this is fund a man traiy 0. misconcc つ tioru If the J^P/VN-GEMTANY- ITiLY A.lli-'.ncG hnd taken shnpe, the currGnt w:?.r might hot have brokon out. GRE^T BRITfilN nnd FRANCE rould mnks 3 gradual Jinlomntic retr^-t ベnd thus en-blc J^PA.N in CKI：^ ?.nd . and IT:\LY in STROP'S,, to solve thoir pending questions in つ d ftil m-nnir. GSFJ'^NY and ITALY hnvo sr.id from the beginning that tho to-\1 of this tra^ty w a s for peac。ム nnd thnt slns^ Jt\?tWx ___ GTJR-'AMY and IT-'tLY nre o r i g i n , d e s t i n e d to shoro thr； sニrr: fnto, thoy wou.i.cl "b.3 bonton, if dividedj_b\it could nev:ir bo bent :n IT the ware u n i t a d . Thjy fur'tn^r said "tint sinco the alliance wns of a SDirit"ur_l m turc-, ^.nd thnt -nlt'iongh it sho\.ildn' t ba snid which nation w i l l b-nofit mostly by it, it is nocsssary to display to ths miblic tho re«l of feet of 乇 he Alliance, and so they wonld bogj b y assisting J1PAN now nctnnlly fighting in CHIIil so as to bring the C H I M Incident to a speedy conclusion. Thoy snid ttint w i t h this shall th3y demonstrate the true vnlu3 and power of th:i .Mliance to tho g e n a m l public. Dハc. No. I6l6 page 2k エ believe, therefore, that had the JATAN-GLIil ムNY-T1 厶IA Alliance b§;en realized by about April this ye^r, the results would h&ve been ^ery favourable to JAPAN. Of course, s u c ^ s the N01"CITHM£ I： îr cnt w uL". net have taken place, nor could have GREAT 1 BRITAIN -バー マ ‘“ 1、 ：' ‘ • ni concerning the DANZIG problem. Even if GUil&NY should attempt a speedy solution of her problems in 腿 O F E , and should she go to war against GEEAT BEITムIN and HlzJ^CE, it would have been possible for JAPAN to obtain QIEl.'i f s consent to her neutrality, in case her immediate entry into the current war was inconvenient e It had been arrangea that in the ev nt a Triple Alliance is formed, the foreign Finieters of the three powers tvould. simultaneously meet together to discuss the diplomatic politics of the three powers. "Probably t 011 that occasion, they would have discussed the U S K , CHINA, D/NZIG arxd POLillD problems, and L U N could have had a great voice in connection \vith the German . and Italian iiplonrtic politics. ^hould they undertake to v;ar against GKELT B R m U N T and 恥 J J C I , JiPAN could have declared that they could not offer efficifnt support soon after the CHJN/ふ Incident, and that they can go ahead with it if they are confident of it. There are examples of IT丄IT maintaining neutrality et present in spite of her military alliance v.ith G I H / A M . エ believe that it cannot always be said that if the JiJ-i..N--GERIv'Am r <mLY Alliance had been formed, J.J'JT must have entered into the war, v.hethcr she had been willing or not, Fort than that, it should be more probable that, as previously seated, if the 'Triple i.lliance had been formed f the v;ar "between S i U R E“T 3RTT厶IN and HU-NCE would not have broken out at (that time 0 } GlMrjJTf and ITJZY still have much to prepare for from ViipioiTiatic, economic, finanjial, and militaiy paiuts of y i e ^ In the firqt place, since it was necessary for JムP』to hâ re some rest. . r一 s e t t l i ^ the CHILL', Incident, tb.e war would hay.e been postponed as mw-Ia-. as possib.lj；• The various povvers would hsve decided upon v*ar after oomplete military armaments had been provided efter diploratic relations have ooexi bettered,, エ am inclined to say that it is an unfounded ？pinion t^ s^ate that if triple Alliance had b&en formed, v;e would have been compelled to fight GREi'.T BRITAIN and ER/JIQE amidst all the aifficulties now confrontin^ us. In rcgervl to the conclusion of the Busso-German Non-^gres f - “ fiicn Fact, there ere not much for the German authorities to be blamed• LE I have already mentioned, it been rather for Jl^i.N to retrospects Then, therefore, as the res.ult of the conclusion of the Russo-Gerinan i.lliance, I think v;e must also give considera- tion as to the influence received of this elliancc e Of course, the general public opined that if GERT7..NY combined vith the U湖， the latter v;ill lively concentrate all of her armed forces in the EJR L-ST and v;hich JaJFu-N must extremely suffer, トら，also, feared tliis^ Ho;vever, 111 actuality, it was on the contrary, for we Document No. l6l6 Page l25„ bc-liGV2 th" t USSR's foslings towards JA.PAN have turnad fnvoraJDla, Tho Cc3S2-Fir2 t \greGnont at NO TT OMI-\?^ wns rowdily ooncludod ns if thoy h^d been nwaittng the proposnliT In rognrd to our nogotinti' c o n c o m i n g the Border Deliriting Conrnittcio, Conmorcial Trsnty, °.nd othor problems, tiiey ire vviilin^ly taking tills up with JA.PA.K Moreover, in ray opinion, she is thinking of concluding a non- -•ggrGssion pact w i t h JXPkll. This, in n?y opinion, is th^.t tiisy hay3 hitherto besn stmt out fron E U R O P E , B u t no?/ a Non-Iggrossic ?Tct hns b3v^n concluded w i t h GSH^TJY nrid I look "t this Fon- figgrGs si on P^ct is somG thing of a rolationship to an nllinnca. /is 7 result of this concort with G3R:,ANY, it bo c a mo so thnt t'noy c^n newv return to tho W S S T . They cm no"J r2turn to ths B\LTIC r In other w o r d s , this is not tho tim.3 for thorn to gin re •antagonis- tically with the daring Jap-moss in tho F/IE E:\ST. ‘ They onn now return to the- YEST nnd SOUTH of EUROPE v/hcra they, nlso ns a n c c _ h^d charished to 50 for many yonrs. Moraovor, thay wish to com- promise with and be roliGved of their arcci.-.ties in tha F'YFi E'vST. Th^.t is thair desire. From this point of view, it had bscorae so that one cf tho grant fTctors v/hich hid obstructed JaPAN' s settlement of the CKirtl problems by rendering support to CHIANG Kai-shok could be romcvod imnediつt?ly depending on JAP/UP s detorrnirn tion. N o x t l y , as n result; of tho R u s s o - G e r m n P n c t , GSE'liNY °.ttc-nptGd spoady solution of tho POIAND problem which cnu33d the outbr3?.k of th3 European W a r , b u t , I think thTt wg cannot say it, unconditionally, tlant this war \ir s a provident in 1 help, or "Divine Wind" for J A P O . If <L\PAN ocgnizos accvirnt.'ly the new nnd old forces in EURCPE thinking of it in tsrms ? relating it to har fundnpsrrtっ.1 policy of ostablishtng a New Ordar in C H I M , and thus s h m a . her policies, I think tno very war in SUI;0PE scan fror s standpoint is a provident in 1 holp. Seeing from this poin of view, I think tho result of ths Husso-Germnn Tranty wマs favor- able to u s . A n d } although indirectly the.ro is no denying thnt tr R u s s o - G a m n rapDrochcmGnt inroroved gro^tly, JdP.\N ! s nosition in hsr rol^tions w i t h GRE'iT BRITAIN, or w i t h Hitharto, not only havo the UNITHID STATES always been antagonistic towards J.IP.IN on thつ CHINA, problom, but also want sc f^r ns to tnka positive mossut'es, such ns the cabrog? tion of the CoiDpiGrcinl Treaty bc-twoen ths TJS;l Tnd J1PAN. Ths r3TSon, if skod, is that thsy suspoct2d something exists b9hind tho ん n t i — Conintつrn A.xis, and tiiaT； J/iPA.W was not isolated. Negotiations for tb.3 Tripio ^llinncs wns not succGssfnl and tho subs 0 quo nt Russo-Girmnn rapprochement complatoly isol°.tod JAPAN. J^P.-iN, fi^htinj CIIINtl is being airoady exhaustad. JaPilN, fighting in Pngs C E m . h-s no ons wh?tsoavor “/ith GER^^NY nnd IT.ILY. She i< isolつ.tod, 一.nd ths Russo-J-Tn^nese ralotions wor3 str^inad to tho ^re-kin^ point. Tha l T I T ITED STATES th、t n oush noヮ would coropr to ^ithdrow hor hnnds frcn CHINa. B u t , -s n co?isoquoncG of th-2 R-usso-Gsrmn Tro-.ty, tho USSR bog?n to withdraw hor n-nds fro tho F\T, E \ S T , and owing to tha European マ'’r, GHS1T B r IT.\IN nlso u s forcod to v;ithdnw hor trends 5 too, and th-rc tho VS\ niorxa imd to d:3nl with J:\PaN. W h n t is w o r e , it is nrobVble th。t the USSR r°-7 q.cttnlly lo?ruo 'vith. JkPX^. This roans th?t tho TOTTED 3T,\TE hつd to should iv フ gvjr.t burden, The UFI r a ED ST.1TE3 n。y h-.vo thou f i thct sho oould shoaldor such n burden in view of J1?,1IT f s oxh-usted st^.ts, bu。tne Rv.sso-Gernnn Troo.ty ”/hich she countod would ba inst J k T M V s intsrost, dsvslonod in JA.?:\IT' s fnvor,. T T oroover, the attitude which the UNITED STATES h-̂ cl hitherto tiksn ng'iinst the? G〕rmnn-lt っ li。no ?ns similar to those of C-RE ご.T B? IT A IN っ.nd F F . \ N d The question of the UNITED STATES ontrr into tho ^urono,?n ¥-.T rry bo doubtful ? but thora is iliv ndy s-affieien^ DI-OV oT its danger, Considaring rhG^vorst, tho" USA. rr-.y bs forcad to fight such powerful EnrcDc^n powors ns GSR* 7 ：!^ -nd ITiLY。 The UNITED STATES, which possess such feqr^, cnimot v-ntura to bring pressure vnon J a P ^ N ^ Iて.is oxtio^oly d?Jig8rQr.s, I think ‘ ？ the UNITED STATES today is r a ^ n t i ^ g hor acts of notification on 一 tha abrogation of tii3 Jnnnnose ConinGrcinl T r a n t y , It is tho 卜 r ) T ) 3 。 n e of one ヮho is -t ？ loss in disposing of th3 fist he tns n i s o d , This I てhink is tho sffoct of the Bus^o-Gorr^n Trer.ty Then, if thnt is oho ease, I think it world bo incohorc-nt for J1?A_N to complain of the Eusso- GGrir/in Tra^.ty, Should the Jip^nese Dooplo h->ve sOK?tiling of つ vnsruo fsoling towards C-ERKdY backus3 of thnt T r e a t y ; should thjy not enst つside such fooling? N a y ,エ think thnt thoy shor.id be- thnnkful LO I K B ^ N Y . There not a singles cnus.3 for rasantriGrit^ Tlrvc is whnt I w i s h to sr.y. H o ^ o v o r , is nov; ^t v.'Tr. Tharo ^.ra sorio 巧ho s?v th-.t if GE1-； : I ? Y」 U 1 1 b , d e f - t e d c o c n "s p r o p - g ^ i d i z o d b y B M T .r：, t ヒ TTT-'vTES. ？ n d T K ^ I ^ i t 腳 ト ニ - dハ n g マr。”s to. b 2 _ q n intin-to,, tjyrrs th n-̂ rf \ W . 11 though it is an unDl3".s-?nt w ^ v of spying things T I do nnt. n i v n h ^ ^ t to ir ^ b J W M w o r e》 o 1t f ^ould not D3 iつ oni int-r^st to friunis w i t h Jiax. Hc'^ajarv I—.jar, ..sm-a .GST；"l^H...Till not b a b.aat.、iru Thora nro sorrs of those who rororb-T tho 1 マ st , *vlio st^ite th°t if the r/nr bo p r o t n e t a d , GlFiiiAKY w i l l siiro bo dof an tod econonicr.lly. Bi〕t thoy s'l.v it boc°us3 t m y do not cons id or fully the rcnl DO'.vor of OTGScnt d.nv GER T ".\HI r . Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 27 Some in Japan s。y th-.t it is only ^ix years since EITLiiR came into porer. Thoy say that tho economic porrer and military preparations -re still fr.r f r o m being sufficient, but GE.R' A.:、JY today greatly differ from v;hat these people wade ont of GŜ I••；ANY. GERMANY of today possess several times in power compp.rGd ”ith 1914-. In economics and Eilitr.r. preparations, she possossos several times of those compared to 1914. As a マiiole, in the last European ”ハr, not only GI]R;.:ANY but BRITAIN and FRANCE also suffered blo^s, BRITAIN'S por.-er ”/as for the most pprt wealth accumulated i the past, n.nd that had been. gre^vLly dir.r* nished by the ivr.r. The extant cf the dnmnge may be seen, frora the fact thr.t i勹 is s—: 11 rot being componsntGd until tod”.y, GILRJ-UANY' s P C - R E R , hc-ever, 1 “.es in her people. The damages received ’VCITC； chiofly her human lives. This H N S B O E N completely restored during the l.ist t^onty years. In tli?t マar, not � bit of German territory, not mentio'iing hor to'-ais and cities, ”'ere being ravaged. Only cort \n limits ，ブere imposed:, such "s tho limitation of her ar. ed forces to IOC,000 men by the VERSAILLES Treaty, nnd t.hし possession of subnprinos bei^g ob jectionable, etc, chile thnt of r c h a M l i t r t i c n steadily progressed from the following day of tho T""uce. Although auourvt in reparations almost reached astronomical figvu?GS, I reiperibtT thr-1 ”h。t G-EHKANY actually paid w'.s a little more thin 30C million yen in money rad goods. l oroover, BRITAIN and the U^TT^J) STATES, especially, loaned silm pfter sum of money to GER. ANY so r.s to keep GERl'ANY from collapsing. The UNTTLD STATES alone loaned GSRI'ANY 400 to 500 million dollars. In results, it seencd q.s if GERTANY rcceivod reparations '\niOu:itiag to 400-500 million dollars instead of p^y.5 ag. Ago in, some say thご t Gj^'A^Y hn.d beon reduccd to a state of cmptino.:s by the マell-kno，:n inflation. It is true tho inflation dealt a heavy b l c on the German middle classes and brought about a very bad offect on the general soci-1 life; b u t , it ”as not nil adversity, for all the German joint stock companies h^d their lobts cnncelloa because of that ixiflation. Th^.t is r.hy the Gorman companies h?d up-to-date machines installed pftor the 竹たr. Ooasoque.atly, post-••マar German industrial power became such that ERITAIK and FRANCE could not rival. L- e to that industrial po”'.r, German rchabili- ta'-ion sn，" strikiag progress, pnd the merchant r;^.rine th t ”つ.s con.px. 'tely uiped out by the T -/ar, sudde.ily found itsc—lf to possess 4 - 5 million to is, •.しlmost sruue in tonnage .̂s JAPAN. Aside from this, tho farming villages rohrbilitatod rc-ranrkr:"bly• '7hcn HITLER took the reigns of g o v e r n m o a t G U M Y had -lre.-dy c o n p l G t c l y r e s t o r e d its nntioiirl p o T r o r . O n l y f r c m the p c i n t of formality iras she bound b: the Vぶ;ISAILLES Treaty. As HITLii? crime for T \'p.rd, he severed one by one tha yoke of this Treaty. T ¥ith the severance of each bond, G.ERrANY's replenished po-er leaped upwards, and oventuclly extricating itself of all restraints enabled her to display her full nosers. This is the GEH::AJ>1Y of today. Doc. No. 1616 Pnge 28 "'e i:rus+: P.r ̂ forgot th'it Gc^uinu ;.5torや tion rn.s not the Ir ‘ of 1 I j ,11 : 3 s.. , • rule 3 buL tho yerrs • ̂ .nd ::，。iths ex j . riu ing 20 .rj ゲし丄lo tho rro.r. Fnrthorrnorc, it vrp.s thought th?.t expulsion cf the Jc'ヮs froEi tho country UP.S ^.scribcd to his nこtioncilism x'/hich dGBinnded racial p u r i t y . W o did disapprove such extremity in the expulsion of alien rroc, but, the g o n c m l opinion of the Germans wore that tho defeat ia the Inst Gret t. V/、r ””,.s due to the Jews. The Jews disturbed the home fr nt. ？hey sn~y th.°t unless this parasitic evil is removed completely from the country, they cannot fight. In other rrords, tho expulsion of Jev/s rmist bo seen ns thoir preparation for r n r , Nor.、looking at this today, ve find the German home front to be jrently strengthened because of tho.t, a ad m o r e o v e r , the O-c-riQan Dcoplc have pli h a r b o u r e d , should rc 3ay, retaliatory/ spirit a-ainst GK ,1T BHITAIK and FRAr丨CE, and ‘ so n deep dissatisfaction towards the VERSAILLrS Treaty. She m s much .ridiculcd by nerly-born petty noightor-stp.tes find, F R A N C E , loading these small nations oncirclcd and oppressed GSRI'fAWY. With the advent of H I ^ L E l , this dissatisfaction rms totally romovod. rhe i、.、r.丄ings c. L the ^-hole popuineo tom.rds HITLHR is n.mazing, Ever： great scuolars believe him to be a God- sent saviour of the Gorman people. Agn.in, sowc people say that GERMANY is dost：' tutr of resources and th^.t tho livelihood of the people is m i s o r c b l e . That ilt may be so, since huge ^rmnEcnts hav. been, conpl -.tod in n short space of timo, and pressure on. national life is heavy r.nd 、-〕ntrol exhrustivo, Ko，了ever, liveli- hood of tho people todr,y gi or.tly differ from r :hit is being told by outsiders. It h。s been grently ameliorated r /hen compared to those prior to the Nazi R e g i m e , It can never be s^.id that they arc d e s t i t u t e . Into.^'ially, all are in good order. Even in uiihoard of and na; '.elcs^ touns, there are forests of chimneys protruding vrhich し;;MI.c briskly COILILUIS of black smoke. In rural railray strt:' ons find surprisingly mn.nv locomotives and freight cn.rs. Unless one actually seos it v'ith his own eyes, the German real po^cr is beyond ccinprohension. Tho intcm.?.l state of affairs in GERMANY arc as sセntcxi. Her foreign rcintions nlso stnnd roraarkr.bly favourable to h o r . For example, the USSR is nor: in a state of alliance r;ith GEIH A N Y . During the Inst ”r.r GSRブANY allotted tuo million of her force against RUSSIA for throe years. F o r o o v o r , nsido from fighting rniTAIN and F R A N C E , she uad to fight ITALY, SLTtBIA, ..{0UHA.WIA -nd others. But today, she is able to concentrate her entire jtrc igth on p single front in the \.ost. F u r t h e r m o r e , GliiRI"ANY h ‘ 3 her Siegfried Liic here raid it is inpciic-tratable. If she defends herself by this l i a o , she can relieve hor foars however long the '-rnr ra-̂.y prolong. In this section, &ER：：'IANY is not raging any ^7ar of attrition. If necossary, sho can coatiauG fighting at this i-.̂ .te fcr nny lc... -th of time, ^hr.t sin： lv\d Doc. No. 1616 P".go 29 stocked from the outset no，•’ rcnchos sevorr.l times of those of tho list V/ar. No”, she can rc-coive supplies freely from the USSR and from the BALKANS nnd SCANDINAVIA. The extent of attrition could be properlv adjusted. This is quite favour- able for GLRI.A T Y. GISIANY is' taking utmost caution in this W a r , sr.ying thrt the time has nor; arrived for her to fight decisively in this currcat v;ar for the suprorcney of EUROPE against BillTAIW mid FRANCE. GERMANY should have fought a short tern マar during the last VJ e.r； thrt is, she should h广.vc bcaton FRANCE by r-.n inpetuous attack ？.nd ”ith tho，"ithdrp.”，n s'-;ord, attack R U S S I A . In the lr.st 'var, no ワ广 11 scpr.rntcd FRANCE from GER?^ANY. GERJ' r AMY v;rts forced to T 7rgc n t ブnr of attrition soon after tho cormencc- mcnt of hostilities. Even today if the Siegfried Line did not exist, G E R 卿 Y ’ "ill be forccd to fight fncing a vast force of British and French troops. If it beenme thus, ITALY, her ally, v;ould not bo able to look on v'ith folded. n.rKS. A l.?.rgo-sc?ilG Tvnr rould imriediately follor. But no，•’ th-̂ .t there is the Siegfried. Line, G:.i.て ADTT is in no haste. Sho is slowly making preparations as she fights. Consequently, she docs net ask for I T A L Y 1 s assistrmce. This is v-hy ITALY is observing neutrality. To begin ”ith the totalitarian system of G.^RIIANY and ITALY is, to then, the representation of tho nptural progress of history,ワhilc' tho system of liberalistic individualism of the British and French should perish. It v , ill porish even if it is loft untouched. I bGlievo tliey are of tho vi丨ァ thn.t mere confrontation by the powerful Gorman-Italinn Neu Order against the declining likrp.listic order of GHLAT BRITAIN and FRANCE マill c?use BRITAIN and F^A^CE to lose faith. It seens that GEK.Ai^Y r;ill take stand ia the Siegfried Line and bent to oxhnust the nerves of BRITAIN and FRANCE, r;hilc on the other hand, she will aim to deal a finishing blot: on then マith her p.ir forccs nnd submarines. Of coursc, in practice natters ••ill not bo so simple, but I hold th.nt a coiifi-ontation of the old pgainst nc，’' forces today 广ill give sufficient chances to the nev; powers to -•-in this v n r . Of c our so, if the USSR, ITALY o.nd JAPAN side r T ith the British っnd French, it rill be cf grave consoquence to G]]HI"ANY; but today, such things マill not happen. As to ITALY, the people sr.y thnt she is r.gain sitting on tho fencc, She h.-d to side ”ith GRI.AT BIIITAU\T in 1914 because of her various -.'oaknosscs, HOTマever, ^ITH tho result cf ':^oS0LIWI'S rise, things have assumed � aspect. Today ITALY poeaossos enough po'"er thfit BRITAIN nnd FRANCE cc-imot onnily s Tr '\y her. The situation h^.s changed so that ITALY of today is not 'ii^t she had been in the l。.st T .7hon she forcod to run to the Allies by BRITAIN and FRANCE. ITALY mnae full developments in her political powers under 17 years of Fascist rule. For further devolopinents, there remains but territorial expo.:asion. As TUSSOLINI puts it, Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 30 ITALY rust expand or explode. There is no first-class por/er so destitute of resources r.s ITALY. Her population sho'-'s a yearly increase of 450,000. She must e-ither expand or explode. The surroundings of the ] :editcrranean Soa, hor-evor, are costly spheres of influence under BRITAIN and F R A N C E . Con- sequently, ITALY'S expansion will oust the British and French influence the J T oditerrrLiiean S e - . There is no alternative but to achieve this aiu. at tho sacrifice of the British つ.：id F r e n c h . ITALY enn ntver think of riding th BRITAIN r.nd FRANCE unless given a sufficient rcrcrc 1 . V/hen t，ie ticie arrives, I cxpc-ct ITALY to enter into the War jji accordance r 'ith her treaty rath G:::]R:![ANY. ITALY's entry into the 1 ヤr ”ill be very favourable to GERI'[ANY, bc.c.use BRITAIN imports 20 percent of her resources by the Mediterranean route. This inportntion ”ぐill be completely stopped. F R A N C E , also,レ -ill bo cut off from AFRICA. It ロill bo a iaatter of grave concern to BlilTAIN and "RA'TCE. If ITALY join h^nds r 'ith the USSR and participate i:i the ri 'ar r'hile GERMANY is holding her ground against GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE using the Siegfried Line as a shield, it rill be a mp.tter of grave c one c m to BRITAIN, Most Japanese r.re of the simple opinion thnt tho deciding factor in is the N a v y . Not so in EUROPE of today. To BRITAIN, the loss of her N?.vy means tho instant collapse . of her entire EITIHE. The N'ivy, therefore, is an absolute necessity to h e r . Consequently, hc-r K:,vy is not much effective ns a combat weapon in event of a '.Var against GERMANY and ITALY. GE.:CANY can exist without a Navy nnd therefore, she can dispense vrith it freely.- Hor N.たvy is lighter thハ.!！ that of GREAT B R I T A I N . The treasured British Fleet cannot nove rctively i'i too free a manner in the nr.rrcr I-uropen.n Theater. It vrculd be too risky for h e r . BRITAIN dares not expose her to such dniger bocr.use its loss ’.'ill effect the very existence of the nation. For instance, the British ^avy is at n. disadvantage in the Mediterranenn S c . ITALY posse. 3S aircraft carriers thp.t i マ:ill never sink. The snail islp.nds dotting the Sen are those carriers. I,:oreover, she h”.s over ICO submarines at her disposal. It is n gre^.t menace to the British N^.vy in a place so snail as a lake.- GREAT BRITAIN cannot be too optimistic of the current . This is indeed a dangc-rous. Then nhy is it that she started this war? It is because thr.t BRITAIN of today although being a democratic nation is in reality under an rligarchy. Among the British statesraen of today, there r.re ^aixy of Jarrish descent, r h i c h i n c l u d e s C a b i n e t noiiilDers. A n t i p a t h y a g a i n s t H I T L J S v r ho rejected the Jor;s is cxtreniely intense. The present attitude of BRITAIN scorns much under cmctional influence. Hatred against HITLER soenis to be the C。USG of her bringing '-nr recklessly Doc. No. I6l6 Page 31 against G U A I f Z . In ndclition, there seems to be a misunder- standing on hor pr.rt on the p.ctur.l Gernan strength and the p.ttitude of RUSSIA. In the present st-te, GREAT B3ITAIW may not resolve to fight it out to the last as some think here in J A P A N . Locking pt the British diplomacy since the ETHIOPIAN W a r , ve do not knov- trhen they change. It goes without spying that if she succeeds in isolating G:CRKANY, GRSAT BRITAIN will fight it out to the l”.st. The most inport^nt is the Russo-German relations, rind * e must ncknoT.rleige that G.:JK;_ T AKY-USSR relation is ruuch closer th^n expected. Seeing that GERTANY is desirous O F adjusting R U F S O - Japanese relations, GlCRi'fAKY seens to feel at e?.se about tho U S S R . If JAPAN and the USSR compromise and tho.t there is no fc”.r whatsoever for the USSR to exert its full porer on the EUROPEAN Theater, it could be said thnt G j U T i " places a gre^.t deal cf faith in the U S S R . The GER”AN attempt to relieve USSR in the PAR KA3T may be ncccunted fcr by iier desire to hp.ve Russian po”er directed t o ^ r d s the SOUTH of S J ^ O P E . Some say that Russian and ITALIAN i n t o e s t s '•-ill clash in the BALL'ANS, but if the USSR advance to the IIRM j;.A3T instead of to the BALKANS。 I do net pgree '.'ith theso' vho clr.im thrt duo to ITALY 1 s active denunciation of USSR, the friendship between GIwirAIIY r.nd ITALY must h-VG coo].ed. Tbe relations of G E T :AWY o.iid ITALY are the relations cf HITLER へ.nd 1,丨:.丨了SSOLIiH, and thr.t heroes, -rhothcr they are in the EAST or the WlDST, arc the same、 They do net easily become friends or enemies。 Then エ think it , r culd not be so easy for the BHITISH to sever USSR and ITALY from GER 7 ,ANY. •e ”ere sent on n uiss ion to EUROPE r.nd ’”Q did. •！iint ve T , ere able to forci the Triple A l l i a n c e , Since n a allianco is。.n 土K..port'?nt nffair affecti-ig the fate cf a S t a t e , � e did ell our best to investigate pnd study fully their conditions u As a result, T , e arrived nt the conclusion p.s v .’e h^ve explained ".bove on the actual strength - , .nd attitude of the povrors involved. As JAPAN did not jcia the Alliance ->.nd, on the contr.n^, the irvusso-Gornan rapprochement has been brought nbout, thus leading to the outbreak of tho ^'ar, the European situation Liay h^ve norc or less chnaged si ace my return heme。 I ,r ill not decidedly oiHrui th^t nil future devolopnents ハill becomc as ,_r hnt I h。ve stated. Wh°.t I c^.n sny ,T it.h confidence tcday is tli-̂ t ，,'h,.t JAPAN is doing in the EAST GERMANY and ITALY are trying to do i;i EUROPE bear rs^criblancc on the point thn.t both possess the gre.-.t historic mis si on to establish n ner, order in the EAST i-iiich is r. m t i c nこ 1 conviction in ccnnoction , r ith the CHINA Incident,; vill help r.uch, in n larger sense, G m i Y nnd ITALY arc trying to do in 腿 O P E , Consequontly, should JAP/iN ccnpromise rith the old forces because of her considorntion fcr rescurces r.:.id ethers, the spiritual bier's that ""ill r.ffect the ne-" rising po , T or of EUROPE such as GERMANY and ITALY r;ill be indeed g r e n t . Furtherncre, it may tend to weaken thoir detcnainntion. As p.bove explained, it is true that the Rus so-German Pact the current hostilities Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 32 hr.vc relieved JAPAN's internrtional position for the time being. Hov;ever, to ent or tn in the idea thr t J A P A N should n e i t h e r side vith GIB:'ANY and ITALY, nor bind itself，"ith BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but utilize the present easy position and go on settling the CHINA Iicide-rt '"ith the so-called principle of Independence nnd Self-Reliance マ‘ill be opportune if they actually go on fighting forever, but tiierし is no such m r that has 110 end. There is ひl，.，ays pence t/ith xr^r. JAPAN '-ill surely be osked to participate in that Po?.ce Conference. In such a case, JAPAN 1 s principle of Indepandcnce and Sclf-Belianco; that is, siding vrith neither r'ill m o a n isolation and ritnout assistance at the con- ference meeting. JAPAN should be most careful th^t the T了hite people should 101 form a united front and ntter:pt solution of their problems at the sacrifice of the EAST. Should they suddenly arake and find thnt it is futile to fight n.nong therasclves in EIROPE； p.nd renlizo r:hichever side mr.y ワin, resources r.re short in EUROPE. Fortua-tcly, there。.re nuch resources in the HAST, and that the p e o p l e r.re r'cr.lc. J A P A N is just b u t n f l e d g l i n g stntc. If it bee ones such that they cone to .巧 ree upon op.rrying cut ハ joint e x p l o i t a t i o n of the E A S T , r-here B R I T A I N h a s u n t i l n c r m<。de it hor domain rejecting other countries nnd herself not fully utilizing it, nnd th- t before JAPAN-s po rr cr could be naint?.inGd, JAPぶW munt confront an .indeed difficult situation. The reason ^hy v:e ハ.dv^.nced the forcing of an rlliance rith the far-a^ay powers of G}.IiレANY p.nd ITALY is because v e gave thought tc this question. I believe th-̂ .t this should bo the fund^in^nt^l policy of JAPAN 1 s diplomacy. In practice, our seniors hnve also t,.}'.en up such policy. The pecplo r.nd government aay have been unconscious of this fact, but for exanples, the Anglo-Jr.panesc Alliance ^.s a r e s u l t of t h ^ t - - i n other w o r d s , the r r hite innn' s w o r l d r, T as d i v i d e d into tv;o nnd T -c h-^.ve b o u n d o u r s e l v o s ，-ith one of t h e n , T h e r e is no reason "hy r :o should let then IDocerne o n e . IndepeadGiice :,.nd s o l f - r o l i a n c c is a q u e s t i o n thr.t should be c o n s i d G r o d a f t e r J A P A N ' S pc; T .jr hns b e e n f u l l y d e v e l o p e d . To J A P A N of tcd.?y, nc a - ir 1 pi i c 01 i 0 n s to cither cf thera s e e m s , at n gl.nnce, m o s t snfe b u t , in. fつ.ct, it is a n c s t d a n g e r o u s p o l i c y . N e v e r h n s JAPAN s u o c o c d e d u n a i d e d at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e cf rrhito pecplo. It r ;r.s enly ^hevi she hつ.d allies thnt her assertions v ;ent heeded. Take the present CHINA probien, JAPAN can never settle it by sogrcgp.t.ixig it .is a CHINA problcn in itself. JAPAN can never p.tt-^.in a satisfactory solution, unless the ulterior situation devolcps in J A P A K 1 s favour. Unless the ulterior situntion is settled, nothing cculd really be decided no m t t e r 「hr.t JAPAN decided uith CHINA. It ’ァill surely be u p s e t . There nre the bitter ordeals r-hich our seniors hr.d tine to tine experienced. Such r. r as the cn.se n.t tho tiDo cf tho Si.iXTTr'.pr.nese 7nr -".nd the R u s so - J n p i n e se '^nr. It ’ •.'へ s the snme d u r i n g the lr.st '"orld Wai T '*hat h- n d been in our custcdy once r :ill be tnVeii b"ck. The current CHINA Incidont rill た Iso never 1 nil or' u s to bo off our guard. WG shall NGP.in h- V G to suffer Eisery if ’:'e pursue the policy '-c h^d been pursuing. If re don't, it is pieへsnnt, but エ d e n 1 t think t h a t this is ever a prera-turc ”orry of r.y cドn. Doc. Fo. 1616 T - マ IT .UHT TSEKD OF TET; GKTmI WAS (DL-M01D Marazine, June 1940) The Trond of the Great War. "；0 七oldL th?t the Gr.rr.ipn which invadocl 37ILGIUM .?.nd HOLL/ll'D crushed tho Allied Armies i^ith irr^Bisbi"blr forcc and has already omoTrr r \ at tlî IS^LISH Rcflcctin^ on this, it socms th^.t the Allied forccs imTinoring u-owrrd^ of one million on tho Front will not Tdc ^"ble to cscへpc anniliil^tion,ハnd thn final issuo i3 alro^clj* certain. Hov- v--.r, youlci thr G^rr^r. . .r^y, miich hn.n over^helno^. BTuLGIM anc -Bsunocl control if t'.\c STILxIC'S of DOT^R make rn rttr.ck on thこ.British noJ.nland without othnr •‘ rcp-r^tinn? G-crnany vrould pro"b?i"bly think onriously へbout tho rAv'r.tavr. of cronsin^ the ！C07ZS. Straits without diBoosing of tho l^.rge ？rcnch “rny. Sho ^ul^.- •oro'b^ljr do t广 turn to thr South .̂nd. plan to conquor : r CT firot 'by joining forcc s ，-rith ITALY. Jnd^i^r from thr ro^.ilta u- ir the ^rrsort tho c c l i r - h i m n t of this ohjnct nu^t "be rcgarごInこへn inv^lvi：!^ nn difficulty. conquorin^: in p, Phort while .t:で ono:.̂ - cciL-itrios in ]!30?コ stへrtixi/? vith , T 0EHY and thon HOLLASD, ITILJIUM， :.nd in ^uccosni i^, ni^-.t ”ハt OEUM/^IY "by oet-"bliGhinr a continrntrl v lcc in co-o-ov^ration with ITALY clolivor in easy fashion a fatal "blow to Vc who rrr net military spoci^ligts5 cr,nnot cay definitely that ITUGLuiT cnr. "bo coiiqurroトy tho-^-rTny. Howovrr, it is :ir t at へ 11 difficult for t、G rp.^.tly Rtipnri^r J c r r m rdrforce to deliver sovoru o.tt^cks on M5L/JID t .- , :.ich lies on thr- f气r shorn of a nr,rro\-; striつ of wr.ter. Koroovcr, even the British cr.nnot liî .o itP^lf "behind ICBLnlTD, aloof from the ^Ji^or to hor hつnnl”r:1,'り；.c" 1 must therefore fr.co the G-orrn^n r.irforce no ratter wtrt the risk i:,. t M s critical nonont whrin tlin cotmtry nr.y strmd or fp 11. In such c^ar, よj/，in,: frつr. *n”A七 oxpoTio.ncc, thn ？ritish Ikvy w : f?oon suffer 1ohsp3 ブ 1 T̂ c rer,?.rka"bl；- i . で ' M o r c o v n r , with 七 1 “icv prrticiprtion of ITALY in tho w。r, hor airforcc 巧nd GU"brir.rinos? c。n "bo used to join tlio attack on E1TGLA1ID. Tliore- fore, it c-^n "̂ r IFGrLilED 1 s chrziccs of defo^t in tho navnl "battle ••rc ttc^t. ？c that r.n it nny, thn hope of thr>. British and. Fronch to conquor G。rnar-y IT^LX mist con^iclerod entirely ITへザ the q^ucsti ̂ n is will 3Hl7Air； 'fit 1 *, p.n oyo t) such r dofcp.t imodiatcly propose pop.ee with ( i r ? ,ハハ c : will G ^ l O i T oncl ITaIY r c c o t this? T ' r o Stated tho follo^rinc 、ハIf n-iniつ 11 ir. the oarly stairs of tho w^r: ITOffiEB. HITLER clp.imod ho h/̂ - no i-tor.tinn of roir to war against BFwITixIIT and I^iJTCE; that it wp.s Dへ c • 1 二、 1616 not nrccRBarilr correct, ir. criitr of his proposals for po^.co, to view thrt ns s tmo o>>joct: that it ハ,rvnoprs to hp.vo "boon his policy to try to shift 七、o rn8^onpji*bility for wr.r to the 3ritish "by proposin厂 pcac^; and that 3彐ITニIU is FT) to 跃，cr,k falling into his trn- • S.'、mo -:GO"1O M ICORC^ at THLR for "boin,^ R. naive viciw of d i 一 - " o v r c v e r , wr firmly belirvoc. thr.t si:".c.、 the two hcrors, HITLSP.へr.cl MUSSOLIITI, ostr^lishcd tlio (TT^IAIT — IILJTf axir ^ni ^c^r.r. th- rn—乃uil及in§ of ^!UHOPS f thご wcuir ^o nrtisfiorl morol：" with rv trivial rocovory of lost territories ^r c3c;--?Jif3ion of their territories. r-IITLm sへ. t o his ハmy nn^o tir^c ago, "ニ to "loci^o th? clostii^y cf tlio G-cr::ian racn for n thous-^nd in the future ĥ .s "be'Tin. ,f A er^okes- r-二ぶ for MUSSCニIITI saicl -lno, “ T.xc' tinic to c 1 o c i 3 x ; d e s t i n y of EUEOPI! for thxco liun-ircd yc-^rs in thn future has come. tT ITr^n thiB it is o^.sy to inrでir:.e \rhr,t ^oth c-tmt-ioa, SL3I/JTf ITALY, r.ro thinking of. ム厂 r result of this i? it r.ct "roトa/hln ttin.t a cruol, rrvthor ĥas-ul：/ "TGP.t liquicV.ti^:-. tr^kc ^l^cr? Fov; t3\c quenti r. is: will ERITAIH .̂r". ？HiMTCE, vrhich h-vo "bno:.i banking ir. the. fpvors of tho world for countless conturios -erst,スぐ p ̂ raittne. to n i i t へg -rrc^t ^owors or not? i\irthorrioro, can tho former ^nurf. sittv.tim whoroirx tlir ？3mall conntri.^B of î IIROPE hold p^soluto Bovorci'tir/：/ m c . F5tp.n<l in tlic vry ^f the "bie rowers continuo or not? I ！f 七.“O vo-r^nti^r.Ofl rovoluti^r. olaoull "ho carrioc 1 . out in EIIROPニ， it is unr.voic1a"blo trr.t it >dll hnvo a influence or. ASLa as a natter cf cotirsr. >~ow ^o'olc 1 . t>.c colonics of BPJTAI1T ancT 〜"CI], nncl those of HoLi^-lT) Ion dij?r->orcd of? This is n question of ；grort si^nificar.co fron s standpoint. Tha rlostiiiy of soyern.1 hur.clrod r.illion Asiatic ccrnr.triot^ is now ？.t a fTo.^t trjirniニマ pーoin七. マrule" 1 , it "ho t^tov^t for this ^rcab --rô lcr.i t' ^o :' n rcidGd in t'lc ，-.rosoncc へf J.-PAiT without listening to J«AP/J: T ? t Gi、::r.ificnnc、 c,.o.,s now order i:i Enut cor.tain, rjicl T^iat si -ni- ficraco ，honlfl it hr.マr? Our ^rn-lc nu3t this tino c^rcfully conni;Vr this つoir.t r?,nov/. - / Siacr- t3".c ト o f thハ socond I^iroj o^n war Jî P-JT has ,?/lo;otod a p J.icy of :?.oil--- -rticipation hrif? s”,i("l will nrosr, oxclusivoly for the nolntior. nf t、,一 Cスエ丄I. ci'lort* >• o w v n r , this is n point of vicv "Iiich ..iniv。..， tl'.o tro".:T of wcrlrl liietory. Inasnuch as tho ."^r^rjcan T ••へr is i vj.̂ r、、tvor，,. prir.ci-nlcs, it nust "hr consic.crcd a ^rc^t nist^kr for JilTAl了， which launchorl り rrc^t imdrrt^kir.^ in ASIA to dostroy tho ol， or dor ^NTR^lish P. one, to think NHE CAN stay out of tho ruropc.?;i t-̂ v̂ .r irry 3へirl of this, J,。JJi is n.ctunlly involT^d the Znro-; or 3 ：" 1 . 'Mr. S“r̂ :irvニ c マ or. no rc "briofly f it is not too nuch to 七hat tho fuse of tho T: rr first ^ttachod the CHIlIil Incident. Tfco m:\son is thハt thx war "brtwnc.n tho Unst anc， t、。"fost contorcr 广'n thn.t conmo：- tar, •七• Tlio f^rcoB which st^nd i:*i tho WA.T* of 芦：,でw or尺.へr in Sant ASIム tim onomics へf (JZT•一：]•ニ’.7 ancl ITALY ore these not the •nowrs of t. v .c c:l'?. order in th。worlrl? Our aclv^cacy of the ？Jlirncc ？ 〜 K . 1 6 マ5 トotwcor. JAP.J?, K ^ K A I T and ITユY ト广ヌ'basc^ upor一 thio -ooint of Moreover for this ronton also tlic assertion in nn.cle that in npitc of the fn.ct thr.t an ^llirnco rss not v c o n c^ncl 11 "d r.nd apprt fron the question of R trぐ•へ七マ，J.:JVJ"， OCSU'H,ハ:,，.ITaLY st”,ndl ir rjiz ir.sop^r^*blo relationship. ？-r this rcr so::, ir. ")rrticnlar w .î .v-- ^nor. cr^ir.^ lonclly that we nur>t r.ot vr^jrcl the lur-operii "vnr vrith iiidiffor 、cc, 七]!̂ t JAPiii-っust not lot GTTHK^TY IOSG. Tho INGCPR.T^'BLO R E L A T I O N N H I P IDOTVIOEN J ^ I ? , GKEiM/JT -ncl ITALY is historic?'ハlly ••lthr'u广:h it looks outwr.rdly as if JiiPilvf, nis'miclod "by the inflnnnco of た cor tain -?r .u” in the country, ir> inclined tovrard ITITL.nr r.n^ the T J. S. A . ,rr.thor than tov-rd &HR:仏Fi" rxd ITュxLY,七ho path of world political tronir> cannot V/ this "he chan^of， nvon JA?AT, in s^itc of the： opinion of forcc^ if the old or，i.、r r \t L'.TIG, is a -rroat cor.trilmtion to GISimY， ^hic-h io i” oxtronoly aclvantri^oous poGitioia, in tho letter，n，rognciition of the wnr. Ho on。dou v ta that the. Eusso-G-ornr.n Pr.ct wつ,s n, prino requisite for thin war. However, the fact that nn.de the SOVIET IllflO^ BÎ ICO with hor olcl o-.cmy, CrICHArr, so easily is 七lie -xistance of the J - i T ^ l了一 — ITALY へxis, p.lthough the progress of negotiations for the three pov/^r ,へllirvncc is the r^An reason. PortherniGrG, it canr.ot "bご denied tlir.t rnnainir.” noutrp.l for eight months contrary to pre-war ox^octr.tion nnrl h.~r wr.。r,，lin" with JAPA1T over the Incident hns mado lv、r Tiiir,"hlo to ；)prticip-^to ir. the Purつpc^n . Therefore, rJtliou^h wc tニlk a^ont r.^h-^articipp.ti'n, Jニ?ブJ? p.cturdly plr-yocl a rrcr.t role in the Jjuropc^n Wrr r\nd it "bo B^id tĥ -t GiT^IA: 7 ! owes JiiP.JT r, gro&t r.owrv,nr, policy r^thor ，)。en inclir.o.* 1 . t^vrr^s ？IITLIiT and the U . S .ム. ^ i d if the' Gori^.n invasion cf ^LGIU!I -r.d HOLLllD Bhculd トe a little c i c j i n y eこ ,丁 woulc，"be in ？i popition to est^^liGh ar： irrevoca"Mc rclati^5iship vith BIlITAIi^ If so, GTSMAHT woul'" 1 . rハ t "bo r^.lc J :o exr;prens hor -^rrtituclc to J^ill", over, if she no desiroi. ""ho ha? ^rnu>ht JilPAiT to this unfavorable position in which nho will incur ill vill oven while rnnrl^rin^ /rroat scrvicco? The victory of the forcng of tho now ot^.cv in the wr^r^oliticp.1 situation coulcl pro'bp.^lv in due.3 the total retreat of tho forcos of the old ordor in JiiPAlT willy-nilly. There is no nltorn^tivc "but that uho io>ni— f^ll of li、or*ilisn r̂jp.C. cn二italism in JAPAF will l")o inovitn/bl:/ hastonccl. In addition, C'AIC to tho three yearf? } duration of tho CHIIJLA IncicTont, this situation hp.G ^ecn r o ^ r a r a g inovitp. v ,lo , --ut thnt which has "hn/roly supportec". tho old order on tho thrrnhol'1 of collr.pso Ŵ .B the conr.cction with, forcos of the olf. or Cy'v a'broncl. A rr jority of the peoiDl^ firmly T^oliovc tr iro n democratic forcn in the 1 で.ck--，rounrl of the br.IHA Incident, "but wc must s^y thc,t tho ole": powors ir tho co^ir.try lir.vc triocl to conprorxiso an?- speak 8T-7eotly with enoqy foreign powers, lir.ve "boon supported トy 8chemes of nssistanco fron foreign pewors, anc 1 hrvo "b^.rolr kor)t alive. 厶s a result of the Sec on- Iniroponj： "irr, thi s sup一へ rt is even mow withdrawn. For this reason wo rust nry that the rocont prorreos of tho y^r in tlio :Jbst lzrA in cxtroncly inroorta3.it offoct v^horo Japan, is concnrnor，. 丄i w . tm^orstpjic-. foroi.-;n donostic proMc^ns in this way, it is clear at ひ lanco たlorx广 courso ir. tho future JARAIPs funrTamont.^l diplomatic policy mist "be n̂iiclocl. Mcroovor, as an r-ntccc^ont condition, thご rolmildinfr of h.cr d o m s t i c orrrニ:tizntion in roq[uircd. 1616 、：… Y. T ~ 1177:J OT,mii IH m o r s JTD J二：^了, g POLITICS- 丄•lkTOFJ Tonhio , . ̂ m o r iunV.sp^dor ?lc：:p^i-ontir,ry to Itr.ly; FOKUSA Shi.-.orr.i, Chiof of thr Invontira.tinn S.‘ctiへn, Spiritual Mo^ili^r.ticn Hc^clq^rtcrg ； ICOILUTふSンI &oro, Pr.-pi^.ont of tlio l^.tional rUrvinw 二 c-て rtor. (July, 1940) 1. J m T t B SrlFJTlLlX AS?IS : I^-"Cr： TO d . T �� i n KOrilYAS：-1 • エ c llnd on y^ti t o ^ -r-c/^nso I vish to listen to へ 11 of your opinions concornin:，thr： intornnti^nrl predion. SHISAT0HI: Until now, I hryn dor:で wiant エ coul/. for tho renovation of Jr»j)r.ncso ciplon^cy, ^pc 1-. ir. the： vjtI:. siturvtion, whr.t vro h^ivc n.clvocatr:l in tho p^st li?.vo ^cnorall^ ^oconc factual. -wovor, sine, the situation in Luropo hn.vc chaivcoc 1 . with such r^i^.ity, vro cannot norcly "bor.st of our far — sifhtcdL views• Uhnt vo nust firstly consi^Tor is whether Gnrnn.ny air 1 . Italy who h^vc w n r. -rcrt victory nay chrj^c； tlicir r.ttitu-.c. This would tc a certain dc^roo, •onr.voida'ble. Tho end of tho wc.r is now in si^ht, ancl I dooply foel that the ^ronent ia inclo^d tcr lr,tc for JV^oan,ドlio hr.s ^c^n rreatl3 r li”it<?こ in tho of rivin,マ r.sBifjt^nco, :C03AYASHI一一nitu*\tion しつタ"becomo oxrotly rs you have naintainecl for a lon^ ti^.c, 、ut vrhr.t n^out the future situation? SHIIl^TOrj ： でJhat I havo always? srid to otliorc is that the wr,r で;ill surrly roncli tho conclusion as wc hr-A aJiticipa/tc。, ^nd. p, situation wi丄丄 develop in which wc cp.n cay," Dirln T t we trll 70U so", the situation vrould thon l̂ o too late, -？こへ Japan will 、G pl-^ccd in an awkwarr prndicanmt. — cvor, I an not at rll pcssinistic, ^ecr.uso Gornojiy, Itrl.7, rncl Japan vdll csonti^.lly Gt.?.nd on conrnor. ̂ rotLr.cl even in the future wrlcl. 5morp.lly speaking, duo to the fact tl,iit tlir. noliticr 1 .! lea lor s of J 一：nan hrvo mis— constrviec: tho ir.evit?.T>lo course of world historj、it i曰 ro.vrott^le that Japan has sorcT^.t doviatod from this coursc. Irro^arcllo^s of whr.t one nay sny， thn c-iirso which Jrrrp.n has followed sinco the China Incid.-nt coulcl not "bo c o n t r o l l e d � � r ar^ll nuriber of pr.oplo^ Wo oucht to follow znc course which vc nust follow. An Ion,-： as Jnr.an follows this courno, sli3, as a nr.tion, nust r.p.coss.irily join tho course follox^oc 1 Germany .̂ nd Italy. IPnr inst^iicc, for t:ie rors.")ri thp.t th^.t rLlliarco waB not osta'blishcr 1 . Jrv^an, of ccTirsG, hr.s r.o o^li^ation to ？ S c r n a n y Italy. ITotvithstr-nc^.iiy： 七hn 'fr.ct t-hr.t tlie (JoTprnnrnt hp.s v^ctually Qtat̂ c*. its policy of 110n- intorfor^nco, ^irt J〒？n is doinc is トccmir.-:: of rrcp.t help to Germany pviic 3 . Ital：/. • t tho^ r >rrnted of Jnp^ri in tho rユliハnco "botwocn Jrmr^n, Gornnny, rnd Itr.ly rzr.inly that Ja^an weaken British rnd ^rrnch positions in tho Orient a::.d to chcck tlio United Str.tc a and altho-i was not - n ,sked to do thir, she has, in fact, Aonc so. cvor. if tho United Strtes Doc. rv、 1616 37 wishes to ipartici^r'.tc iニ. tho she cn,n二ot d.o so. th?sc nir.a months, they, "heinぐ：checkrd ^y Japan, have nselected Ii>ixrope.ムItlvni巧h diplona.tically, they spe^.k ill of G-crnsny, ar.A へre ,'oro or les c ai己inご Jiln^land and ！Franco niateriall; r , their actual power concentratec 1 . in tho ？s,cific, "Tor &crnaj.i^ r , this is a ^reat help. Before the war, it wr-.s ^ n c r a l l y said that iunorica, i-roulcl -Darticipa,te in the earl;- gta^ea of this ^e.x, "hut if that wer^ trtie the United StatoB vrould hp.ve furaished フnどland a:id with ；nlp.nes. Although. has ^rndoninant -avy powcr ? it s ^ m s t^.at her forcrs is still insufficient. If the ^.morican ITavy hac cooperated with th?.t of Grrat Britain, it would pro^a^ly havr. >>een very acra-ita^eoub for r-n^laiad ana Prance. Eirstly， it would have "been a ビrea七 spiritual -encoura^enent to Tln.cland and. France. Such, a country a^ Italy wouldl have hesitated to enter the war. If thr， Ub^ited States Fa,v?/ レ-,.1 oiperate? together with that of Sugland ar.d Frarce i”. tho MeditcTr?.:-ean Sea, Italy wつulfl not havn ^ecn ？-Me to make any moves. If viewed in this :.;anner, the situation would pro^.^ly have "b。er_ considerably different from t-hc つresent. 7CT one tiling, America, hff.d •，rc&tly under-rate'-" ^rTnar-.y7s stror.^th. She had thought tha七.^rrope was り afe if out rusted to 3r.^land n,nd ？ranee. Slio for.lin.? th^.t chec]:inj： Japan wa.s her chief mission, is now conoontratins: her roal powrr in the Pacific Ocean. If viewed "by Japan it is extremely "bothersome, l?at if vieweci "by Germany, it is an extreme "blessing. It is B, ̂ rreat role tha.t J a,pan has played for the sake of Germany. '-ow^vnr since tho fact thr.t tho con.centTO.tion of the main power of the U. S. in tlic Pacific was painful to thr political loaders of Japan, in try in.：- to ir.iprove rcL-.i:io:is i:i some vra:/, ar.d to rosch ar. economical understaxi-diii^, they have followed a. course whicii is contraiy to G-crinany 1 s intnntions^ Consequently, althou マ 1: Gernaxiy im s r.o "'.on^er an^r n a s on to ト《 thankful tc Japan, actually, Japan has rondcred services compara'ble to that extended "by Italy. 2- THS Oircsil 13 EUEOPS ^ r T:】OPPCSITIOr 0T;: T:一::5 U. S. By the above fact, it can seen 七hat lookin/r from tho standpoint that the position of Japan, Germany, a.nd Itrly lies in e mission aiming at 七he esta^lishmoiit of a new order in the Spft ？:o.c tho '•ost, wb.p.t each nan ion is doin^? se-Darate^ is concoutraged to耽？ris achieving tho goal. でlat OP.ch does independently "beeつmos in effect mu七UP丄 s i s ロ i s 七 I think that the rcl .tionship "botvrcjen the tlirce nations lies in such P： fMnd3mente.l relationship. Viowed from tliat standpoint， it is t V t , G-ermany, 'nd Italy can continue to cooperate, and even if Germany shoulv. oxf.-oll Snglish. and ？rench influences from Suropo, it does not Tnoni that from thrt rev�/ monent, a new order in jHurope cp.n "bo esta_つlisheiU ^ tl\? factors ^elon^in^ to old order in Throve will î .Bser.̂ lo in thp, An.^rican continent. Kio ベold;, "bullion, wliich is most typical of the old ord^r, has r.lrcady '̂ eeii quickly ccncrntrated in thr United Strt^s. Of courso tlm JP^S, who ネrp thr frrat^st rncny of thp. ",evr order, have ali-ead^ the intention of novinr* to thで Uni七nd States, all the ousted ruline: classes of Enごlan及！France f vi 13. alro ニ-o to tho United State、" . Sirxc thoep rl，ments h^vn formprlv fcllowrd. individualistic and liVeralistic philosophies, they ca.nnot a^solut^iv rcnain in ？".iropo ru丄odl under toto.lita.rianism. "^enccforth, thny will novo in croitof? to thr United States P.B the Puritpji did in oldoti timrs. As F r^ r, ult of this, ell tho old Doc. Fo, 1616 ^are 38 elements of the world will ^e conce.ntrr.tod in thr United States, i-mrica, vhich has "been ce.llr.d_ tho new worlc 1 . will ^comc old world, rnd liuropo of thr old world vrill >cconG thr new world, p,rA this st^te of opposition will continue for a considerable period of time. Until tl:r old olenentB in America are finallv drivrn out, thr stru^lr will contirue. On tho onr> li^nd, if tho national system of Jrpan is atruptly convrrt'd to tho nov ordor, and procoods rp.pidly towards tliハ - nt of th- new order in Sast 丄sin, it would natural ly "be for hor to collr>orr.t ハ coop orate with Suropc' g nnw order. On t'm other h^.nd, in th.^ Pacific, she will ha.vn to sta.̂ .d 111 opposition with ricr T g old order, ."ookin^ at it from its rou.-?h outline, it irry じ'-said tlî b P.^tcr all, th^ coalition of Jar an, G-o rmrny, ancl. Ital? r and rrlp.t.io , of rnu七？.id a^d comir.unicp.tion will continue. 3. ニ】 C 0 M 5 I K T D FOvHR 01 ：• ...GLPJTD, ̂ laJTCH, U17ITID STAT7-S kTD THE 碰 EAST, 1 丁OMUTiA:— Generally I t:iink that your -orcdiction that the old clcneizts of tho worl-L woula all "bo concoiitrr.tcd in 七lio Tnitod States is an interesting o"bs3rTab?.on. Sincc the outbreak of this war, I could not "beliovc that thn 户xistinr -oov/er of En^lrvnd and France could suppress the newly formed Italo—Gerirrji Axis. In s^ite of that, tho rulin广 clashes oi j^n^land and ^r^nc? themselves have ？. Gtron^ feolinr cf firfitinr p,,，ai:st Germany and Italy. Vinwod from this respect, I h^.d the feolin^ that it was tho influence of the Jews, who aro thn rulinc； class of Ei/.cland end. ？r?nce, vho provoked this hcroelrss war, aiminr only at thn dnaling of even a little トlow against .inti Jewish countries liko G-er^ipny and Italy "by sacrificing ^n.^land and Prance, In the c our so of later dovclo^ments, howovor, the situation is likely to move tcwr rds such ？.. dircctior. ITor instanco, tho capital of Ib^land a.nc.マranee will flo^- to thr Unitrcl Strtos. The Gov r n ^ n t would also pro"HaT)ly sonk shelter in iiir'erica. rrsidos, r)ro"baトly, Jrwish li"bcra.lists will also <:o• In such a cace, whr.t will "bnccne of thr world? Tho re >rill contirari, for r, cor-ieidpra^lo ^^riofi of tiiiir, e stru^cle hrtwecn the newly arisen influence in ！ r , n d thr old inf]ji.a?icn centrred in the United States. This t imp,でs.st Asip. will "be the sconr of 七、e conflict. In all cases, ：•で a . n c ' Tr ra nco ^ill he.v - to maintain .Impnrialistic domination of thoir colonien in thr> Crior.t, erd. the- Unitod States which is w^lcoirin^ and providinci： shcltrr to Sn厂land and ^rar.ee, also ca:. u disregard Ar.^lo- American domination of these colonies. Thus, all 二relish and Trench fleets which escapnd damage wi* ! 1 assem"bl^ in the Pacific. If the 丁Jni七f.c， Statra find-- it futile to s^.vo •.ユrope, aho will concontrp.te her entire forces in thr. ../r.c-ric ard vdll cl^frnd ii.ustr-lia, French Ir^do China, or British India. Sli-、will also invadr Chin?. It is u n m i s t a b l e that t-?e United States will tekc. such pn action. Since thp situatio?ユ would "bn such that the forces of Italy and thr Soviot Union and American forccs which was unitnd to those of ^m^land â .c 1 . ？rancp will nvnr.tually clash in. the ？ar Ifest, thr ""ra ::]ast wi丄丄わご forcea into the つ,?mo -po 七ion as the modern ~rlfe..ne. In such a case no one cp,n tell in vrhrit v/.:-y the United States, w M c h is suppressing Japan with a ilrn attitude for thn m a s o n that what has "hoen done 、y Japan since the Manchurian Iiicidcnt and the China Incident, namely tho establishment of the P'oc. H 1616. Pae-e 39 nrv order in Z?.st Asia., is contrary to America 1 s prir.ci-oles f will pltrr her ^ar Eastern policy accordinr to the situation ^t the crucial momenta In oth<=r words, sh.', mp.y cha-n^o to a, policy in which she intends to return Japan to the status of a, wrtchclog a.s at th/* time. o: f f thpi An^lo-Japanese Alliance ?:od to use Japaji as »dx r ancod prarri troops for the dnnocratic countries in the .last in the spr/? ĉ r as Poland p:id. ハ lit七 entente conn.tries. Ir. such a case there sef rr;s to oxist particr.lrr da:i<ccor that tho ru] ing clrss of Japan Trould "be influenced "by t^n simplicity of the p m s m t sitr^.tion Biio. evr-ntu?lly ^ocomo ？o inclined. In tho ond, thr United St^t^s will super—icially chp-n.^e hrr policy in sue•ユ a manner as to formally apT)ruvo what hps clone "by Jap‘、n sinco tiip China Incidont. In ？^.swrr to thi3, Jppan would 色lso c-ianre her virw rr.l^.tinr to tho United Stato?: s.nd act in concert vritli the TJ. S. Actually, thnro exists a drnfor that a policy wil? adopted thpt >ro'ald 】n?ke' Japan a tool. If such f sit^r.tiorn. drvolo-os, thp actual novpir^nt in ruro-.oe and Japan r ̂ movonnnt in East Api?. arr a.T the prest-nt s u v s t t i a l l y a.iT.cJ, ？.t t:,ハ esti5?iunnnt of t!v n^w world order. ヶ f r o m 七广omenl;， ̂ oth parties ^ i l l � � contrao.ict jry to tho mov^mont, aad it is fnarod that Japan vould suvooふ、t tho maintenance of. the old order. Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 40 4 . ENGL/.ND AFTIK DEFEAT A N D TFL CRISIS IN TPE UNITID S T A T L S SFIKAT01.J: If the present political rulers of Jrpr.n continue to be in control of Jrpfn' s ?dninistrr>tion, whrt vcu hr.ve just sr.id noy o c c u r . Tre United ^xntcs is now taking a v e r y lenient attitude tov/crds JV.prru Pp.rticulrrly, the ruling clnss of Joprn Is r.rJcntly ^opinr f-r t>c free inperモation of Ancricrn goods ? or the cstrblisfecnt of credit rnd is trying to ccncluJe p new trpde t r e r t y . AltT-cugh there is a tendency omong then to cccpcr?te with the United S"CP tcs with con pic tc disregrrd of tトe D r s t , in p.ccrrdr.nce witr the sentincnt expressed by tトe grent nrjcrity of the people of todry, t> is should not be a l l o w e d . I crnnct possibly inrginc t v ?.t Jrprn will reverse t^c coursc cf world h i s t o r y , c^eck the progress of civilization， end check her ov;n development by clisrcgnrding YCT present nission in the Asirtic continent rnd tie role s!hc m u s t trke in the vast A sir.tic sphere. In this rcspcct, wc need not be so pessinistic but r.s you ト p v e s pid, Englr.nd end Frrncc wbn hrvc been expelled frcm Europe, by cooperating witト tVe United S t a t e s , w i l l rinkc u p in ム s i ? , whp.t they lost in E u r o p e . It is cert?in thnt the NctVcrlrnd Indies, Frcnch I n d o - C M n ? rnd BritisV I n d i a , v&lcY t v c y VitV^rto friled to develop and utilize sufficiently u n d e r their spheres of influence, w i l l bococc nore precious to then thrn b e f o r e . Cnnsequenxly, there is likely tc exist dnnger tVat they will ccncentratc t^cir influences tVere. But I think tYrt it v:ill be P long tir.c before ijnglr.nd d F r a n c e , if tl-cy rrc expelled fron E u r o p e , will be?r tVi& silently rnd F. bend on her return to E u r o p e . Lven though the ruling clrss itself should cvrcurte. to t^e United Ste.tcs with gold b u l l i o n s . w a r s M p s ？nd mcrc^r-nt skips, there would still remain in Inglr.nd 4-5,000,000 people. There wc'ulcl else rennin in Frrncc 40,000,000 people. It is inpossiblt for then to trkc ti en r.ll ^ith then。 They will leave xiifb great reluctance. For inst-ncc, who w i l l support the populr-tion of 45,000,000 r-cr.irining in Englrnd? Thcrt is only tVrte or four m n t V s 1 supply of f o o d , Fitlcr hss no ^bligpticn tr support t>cn with nrtcrirls in Continental E u r o p e . Furthernnrc,ト^; is u n ^ M e t̂ - do s o . TVey cpnnot live unless tVey depend 「 n t]，c C< ntincnt of ^.ncricr.. In any ense, the people in Englrncl r.mst depend on the Anoricp.n c o n t i n e n t . Even if t^c snr 11 n m b t r of people vYo hrd o b m d o n e d €rvx,ryt T 、ing' nnd Yv.d ncvod to Cpnoda should cc operate with the United States to nrnagc the colonics in the Orient, nuch cr.nnot be cxpcctcd of t h e n . T^c novemcnt for restoring Europe v/ill be c< nsiderpblo ？nd vigorous for t v c next five or ten y e r r s . During t>r.t p e r i o d , they wculd not be able to exert their power in tYa O r i e n t , During that tine, V'c nrvrl power r f Gcrr.r.ny rnd Itcly will increr.se rrpiclly. Docc No, 1616 Psge 41 Then tYL continent of A n c T i c 1 v i l l be in ？ defensive pcsition« W h a t e v e r one nr,y s"y 5 t^c p'-pulrtion of Luropc is increasing, rnd one c r n n o t supix.rt h i m s e l f n Gcrnr.ny rnd I t a l y v;ill d e v o t e trcr.sclvcs s o l e l y in e x p l o i t i n g A f r i c n。 B u t e v e n in thr.t ense. it is n<^t probable t v f:t tトc.y '!rcvc no ccnnectirn Vvity tVe A n c r i c p n c o n t i n r n t l y i n g r.cross the よ t l r n t i c Occpru T h e i r i n n t d i ^ t c o b j e c t is S o u t h Aricric?., w ^ i c h is r br-pnc^ of E u r o p e e Hrcinlly sper.king,ウside frori the n r t i v t s , only S p a n i s h , Gcrri^ns and I t ^ i i ^ n s r r c t h e r“ Th e r e ？ r c o n l y p fov； Anflo~S*^xrns« T > o s c porplc do n: t l i k e the U n i t e d St? tea.- Trc. v.'orld hrs been u n d e r r b s c l u t e A n g l o - S ? x m deninntion up to nov; s c-nc. beer use of this, t'rey VCTC controlled ty ilnitcd States r/ith reluctances "however, if the T/orld siturtion should suddenly o( cone such tYr.t tVc ^ n g l o - S a x o n s r r c d t f c r t c d , t)’cy 耵raild r r t v c r f r v c r E u r o p e , /.ncricp \;311 be in m c x t r t r c l y d e f e n s i v e p c s i t i ^ n ^ The v e r y f m i n d r t i o n of the l:(hnrne Dc ctrinc w i l l crurblcマ。 TVc s i t u r t i c n v i l l "bcconc v e r y grr.vc f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s , S i n c c trc U«.E S h e r s e l f ト r s r i c h c s in e x c e s s r f h e r n e e d s , she. will net be furt-'rer tenpted by t>x nrtcri?ls of ムsir 0 If a n ？.fitntion should brt--k cvt in S^ut'r ム r i c r i c r , v;Mc'h is so closc b y fron trc s t ^ n d p r i n t of s c l f - d c f e n s e . v n u l d not t M s be cf cxtrci e dUm?しr t^ the U . , herself? Therefore ？t tVis r.oncnt it crnnot be inrgined that the United Strte.s r;lrno vr'Uld incrcpsc hor pov;cr in t>x O r i e n t rs y o U V r v c rr-て,srid c ムlti^nig尸 Onrd'- Yvs p. population of only 10,000^000, people v/h- csc?ped fron England will grpclt^lly grt'^cr t > c r c 0 Since O n r d r rlonc is not copr.blt cf r-^intr ining t^e pr”,cr cf r. grcrt npticn, England ? T'hr Yr.s cscnpcd fr^n Eurc pc , r i l l c。nsidcr India, Austrrlin . New Z t r l s n d , ttc,, ” s bcct-ning へf grcr tcr v「luc e Fcv;cver, it is que sti^nrblt rs to v:Vether t.トc Britisト Ir pirc, hr?s lost Lnglrncl r.nd > r s n^ved tr C^nr.dr , c-n n'ハ intrin the srnc po\7cr sre Y^s Veld before 0 ム 1thへugl" there is pn cxtrexic view t^rt E-titlmd Proper, sr. tc spcrk, is like t>~e site of office fcr t v c British Lr'piro, no nrttしr v.'^at cnc m i g h t spy, it hr.s been tl̂ t' -'.otive power, rnd the ccntincnt vv.s ccrtrolled frrn t h c r c 0 エ tトink tYc-.t tYc surviving inflTicnco of the Britisr Enpiro, w v 'ic]° Yrs icst her frot hold in Eurrpc r.nd v; v icb ^ps tscr.ped fr.へn Englp.nd Pr... p e r , should nrt bt ft.^red by us., h t r ny r?.tc, t v c dispute bctr/ccn the new influcncc in Europe rnd tYc • lei influcncts vj^ich cscrpcd t^ /-ncricp フill bo in n ficrcc struggle for trc next five or ten y e n r s . During t、rt tine：, rt l e r s t ? f-cy probnbly will be 'unr.bic t exert nucト pressure in fbc P a c i f i c A r c r , TV is p e r i o d cf fr"r.i f i v e t" ten y e a r s is v e r y prccicus fc r c asir tic r^cc c If t、is period is idled ？v/ry, it is c l c n t h r t o p p r e s s i o n of vr.rious n r t u r c w i l l be inflictcc 1 . u p e n t v c n e A f t e r r.ll, L u r ^ p c ^lsc rrust depend on /.si? 1 . Tトしy rrc dcsir'us ^f nrtcrirls fr -n AsiPo Doc. No. 1616 P?ge 42 Sineし tレc British Lnipirc , F r m c t . , ?nd Lnglrnd In. rstlf, vルo rrc depend,nt upon American continent, Fill ？ftri all cndcrvor to rnncx A sir. to the old infTutnct ? it is ncccsspry for J?prn during tレis period to utilize to t^e utmost degree tT-c extra time given Vcr« T v i s must be c grcrt subjcct for tVc: J-"prncsc p e o p l e 8 I t M n k t v rt t h . reason t^c Jrprnc sg people hod scmcwlrt felt t v r t \ r n. had renewed the critical turning point is due to F ccrtrin kind of intuition concerning this grcrt significance. 5 . T^T POSITION OF TT t L PRO-BKITISF FACTION IN OUB COUNTRY . • ' " “ 1 - - “ ― * — “ “ ‘ - ‘ 1 " ’ " 1 “ 1 1 • • • • " • • • • • • 瞧 I•画1 ‘ — KOBAYAS^I； No one in t>c political rnd business 只orld。 and rlso Imptrirl University professors in tトし rcadermic w o r l d , seems to u n d e r s t m d rnytトing in t v r t sense。 Still, their views rrc opposite. F i r s t , the opinion t v n t Gcrmeny ？'ould be dcfcrtcd S ^encro.lly prevalent until recently, but new it seens t--rt Gcnnrny is likely to w i n t't-c t;fr. Wc crnnot fig>t reality, TV-cy rrc sr.ying tトrt victory in wrr is unimportrnt； t h P t victory over militnry power is unimportant:; rnd that it is r.n enemy of civilizetion c TVcir words imply—t>rt justice still exists in t v c dcmocrr.cy of Frrncc nnd Englrnd。 A c t u f l l y , the discrse is too f^r ？ d v r n c c d for remedy。 TVしy rrc r group ト should go to t v c Continent of A n c r i c n . Fron Jcp- n S r If l AT0KI: T h r c arc rir.ny persons v: h o should r-lso lcrve J?prn e NOMURA: TVc point tYct tYc nrtional feeling v/ould not ptri.it Jr.pan to trkt p cotrsc contrary to enrrしnt Vistory of you spcrk is r mpttcr of coursc, tut as M r 0 K0BAYAS^ T I トrs just strted ；, sincc t^crc rrc some peoplc v/ v o vie〜7 the progress of history from the opposite point of vicv?, SFIKATORI: しvcr 5 it crnnot be conccivca thr.t suc>" people will govern Jrp?n f o r e v e r . It should not be p.llov^cd. K0BAYAS T T Is T v t y ?t)pcr.r to be possessed vith such idcr.s. S T T I M I O h I : No m?ttcr v/hrt you sr.y ? t v c y rrc people: t/Vo have bcc.n thoroughly imbued wit:ト tT°c mr.rrov? of tones vitト tradition, in br.d sense prejudicc trrdition, oi to mat it more strongly., vith prejudice, is vtry difficult to s v r.ke off« Under such r 研orld t'~cy rre nfint^ining their present positien。 The c>rngc of suc"h r，.7orld inimc.dirtcly nxr.ns the loss of tVcir position. If t^rt sitiiFtion develops, t M s would bt "sclf-prcscrvr tion u “ T>~てr、. is ？ pro-Britis^ fret ion in Jr:prn» エ think the pro-Britis ト feeling rill rcmrin even if Ejigla.nd is e m s h e d 6 The pro-Britis>~' feeling is one v; v icV expresses self-love,, It is onし tVrt syovis love for one s self» Dcc. N'、I6l6 P r g c 43 K O B A Y A S F I : T K . b u s i n e s s w o r l d is g e n e r a l l y l i k e t v r t . ST T Ilv/,TOI.I: It is n o t o n l y the busint ss Y;orld. F i t h c r t o t h r y h r v c b e e n inbuc.d i n t h p t n m n e r , Ti _ cy a r c ハsし h r v c tr.Ufe"ht tトis s c n t i n c n t to o t h e r s r.nd tl^osc v&o Ye.vc T/rittcn b"c;ks ^ n tトis s u b j e c t i n cr0.cr tハ s r f c - g u r r d tVicir p o s i t i o n s . If the pre sent w o r l d c c l l r p s c s f " c i r p o s i t i o n v:ill "bt lcst« K0BAYAS7TI: T h r t is t r u e . /.It^r.ugh v;c. i n c l u d i n g S T T IKAT0hエタ rrrc l o c k e d u p o n r.s the. pro--Gv:rnr:n f a c t i o n b y t>"c p r ^ - B r i t i s r f r c t i o n , I do n e t t h i n k t ^ r t n-ur grc "up is p r r t i c n l - r l y p r o - G c m m . S F I I ^ T O B I : S i n c o v,c c r l l t V e n the i r c - B r i t i s b F r c t i o n , t h e y p r o b r b l y c.。ll u s the P r ^ - G c r n ~ n g r c u p o KOB/.YムS TT I: Acc-rcling t V c n rltV'oug.V' l i s t e n i n g to tYc pro-Ge.rnrn f a c t i o n is v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g , -:&r,t tl^cy ト c r . r f r o n o t r c t u r l l y t r u e , N O M U L A : T h e y zpy t v r t v;-; r.re t a k i n g ? c o u r s c in t v c e p p r s i t e d i r e c t i o n fror. c i v i l i z n t i c n c K O B A Y A S F I : / . f t c r「 1 1 , t ^ o s'urec cf the p r e s e n t e x t e n t of G c r n r n y ' s nig?"t l i e s in ト t r p o s i t i v e p o s s e s s i o n of n e w culture， n e w i d c r s , n c v ^ c r l d -^utlock, KOI.ttJIii 1 -.：エ厂noring n e w d c v c l o p n c n t s in p r e s e n t d r y G c r n r n y , t h e y r.re r f t c r ?11 , t r y i n g tc j u d g e G e r n p n y PCcarding to t v o piinciiDlt rf "/light n r k e s M g l - t " of t ^ e M i d d l e A g e s . ェ fc.lt j u s t rs the C r t V r l i c s did c t tVc t i n e ^f t^c K t r i r i s s m c c , ^s f h e y v i e w e d the p r o g r e s s i v e e l e m e n t s whハ？dnircd t^c r r t s ‘nd l i t e r ? t u r o of Grc.ecし r.nd R ^ n c , w i f h n f e e l i n g t>r.t r. grcr.t h e r e s y K".c； r.risen, b c c r u s c . r l t > o u g h the u c r l d vr.s n o w p r o g r t s s i n g tcv;rrds tYc cc-untry c f G o d , tトcrt o D p c r r e d hen the r s v'tTt t r y i n g t‘. wr r s > i p t v c s n v r g c g o d s cf Grcx.cc. I think thrt it is sinilrr tr t M s . KOB/.yAS T T I； T ^ o r c f T c , tトc s i t u a t i o n v;ill n e t be clcr.r u n t i l t i n e cltapsc s® S i T n丄 T O R I : f r c n t're. M s t o r y cf n p n k i n d , the Ecnrissr.nce is r- r e v i v r l of t"K e u l t u r e of G r e e c e ， w M c h is t^c o r i g i n of dcnocrr.cyj Wr V ;cver, tYc n e w v'crld o u t l o r k of Gc.rnrny rnd I t a l y is n n e v e n e n t v&icY e n d e n r s t ^ go b r c k to t^c p r t - G r c c i m c r n c i-lsc i n J n p n n 5 R c s t o r r t i c n r l u ^ y s nc'へns.r r e v i v a l , T T ot T cvcr it g e e s f u r t h e r br.ck tc tYc n y t ^ c l o g i c r l f.gc 0 Totrlitrrir.nisn. t h c r c f c r c . is P. r e t u r n to t h i n g s funclr.ricntr.l r.nd csscnti'-i v i e w e d f r ^ n c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y cf r-rnkind. TYc e u l t u r e t c t h e y r e f e r is n e t r c r l l y c u l t u r o . T h e y n u s t be spcr.king a b o u t supcrci^-1 c i v i l i z r t i - n or s c n c t M n g of tYrt nr t u r c . I s n ' t Dcc. Nc. u 1616 P?g( 44 th?.t vnrifus r;T.n-nr.do institutions or supcrcial civilizfitirn thrt -nly greets t"hc eye, The G c m m por-plc nrkc a distinction betv/ecn eulture こ civilizr t i o n . /ccrrding to tトlinglisト 5 /rcricr.n and J^pr.ncsc per pic, it is t M s supcrficirl civilizp- tion t^pt Gcrr^rny will rlxlisl-‘ fr^n t M s cr.rtv if she v.ins t v c w n r . Culture： w i l l not perish; cn the contrary it でill flourishe Up t: ncTv ? ，マ>Tt Jrprn rr s been tclcl as being nest vr.lur.ble v;r.s tドis V/cstern civilization brsc.d on libcrr.lisr.i 0 6 , OKIGIN OF LUIxOPLilN CIVILIZATION NOMURA: Concerning t^vt p ^ i n t ,エ oncc wrote r short article in t>c "Ncticnr.l K c v i c v / , I t can gcncrrlly be sr.id thnt n o a e r n luroptr.n civi丄iz?ticn originated in F c l l c n i s n a T T n^tvcrj He丄lenisn is r. ncv; civilization v; v icl" originr.ttc； in a Grccirn colony fit tトc_ tine v;Vcn the Aryans entered the Greek Fcninsulr , rcr cVcd the 'M&diueroncon Sea, rnc! erne in ccntr.ct uitド z v c "！c^r.nic civilizr.tiru of tl-c M c d i t c r r n e r n . For tT~c A r y r n s , it v.t.s r foreign civilizrtion t is the culturc cf tlx I.:ccitcrr.nc8n? The pirates of the Pcrsir.n Gulf v&o entered the r c C i t c r r a n c m ？nd r.ssinil?tcd v;itT^ t?e Phocnicirns established one cf the nctrc p o l i t m civiliza- tions» Is n^t its origin in tlK crrnvr.n civilization cf t^c L r r b i r n desertつ. T'fc cf.rrv^.ns nsclo tl-'c.ir living by ^ccr.sicnplly Icrving tトし ir brrrcn lr.nd rnd robbing r.nd chcr tine t v c ferncrs f、f fertile M c s c p o t r n i p . These per pie Irtcr c:stハblisトレd t^c corincrcirl enpirc crllcd Bnbylcnie cnc: r i s e , tvc nilitrristic crur.tr：' Lssyriv., In either cr sc 5 t^cy nr.de tトしir living ne t "by producing anything thensclves, tut by exploiting t'^o frrncrs w^Fc v;crc producers- The religion t>-r t developed 尸 t r c XIP S B^bylcnirn r.nd /.ssyii^n n^nrthtis："', rnd tトrt r/p.s developed intc； Judoisri w v icト in turn, be.cmt _ Christianity。 WhT.t is v e r y intc resting rb^ut J'uclrisn rnd Christianity is thrt r contract of f I t Y is nrclc bctv/cen Gnd r.nd nnnkinclo Tトis idor ハf r r.utur 1 rncl rc.ciprccrl contrr.ct Y.TS inhcritccl by Europe t v r o u g > t>c Fcllcn.irn 。nc1 ^cbrcvisn t>rt I just ricnticnccl. These nrc t>~c nedern thcrics sccirl crntrrct rnd t^e cntrrct cf srverciとnty B In such r socicty, either c ^ m c r c c or spclip.ti,-n exists, m d in sucV ？ v;r,y, tv^csc tv;c f r n s rapper.r in ecrnr.nics* A n d , in t v e c ns true tion of sr cicty sincc the powers r.re in o p p o s i t i m , it t?.kcs the fc m of r dcr.ircmcy if the prvjers opposing c?.c v ctYf-i ^.rc in b r l n n c c . Few ever, if tVis brl^ncc is destroyed rnd one of tトcsu p r \/crs beccncs very pc Tjcrful, r n cxtrしne cUsprtisn v,'ill d e v e l o p . The se tcndcncics hr.vc r.Dpcp.rcd in GrccC L end Kcr.x. Fur七}-em广rc., even in intcr- nr ti'^nrl s' cicty, tVcrc will develop such unstable inter- nrticnrlisn r.nd ppcifisn rs rrned ptnee cr t"he L c p f u c。 f Nrtions 'r sue? principles cf Fggrcssi^n rricl idcp.s cf tT-.e n广Tlcl r.s rnc nrtir.n r.s it die； in Urccd^nin rnd K o n c . D o . Nc. 1616 Page 45 Mc clcrn Luropc. is ハ.v/crld representing conflicting principles in w ト r . l l of these principles ？rc： n i x e d a A s r result, p l t V c u g h ecnnor.icr.llj'' it is crllccl c n p i t r l i s n , it is a r e f i n e d fr、;m r ' c nncrci^lisn,, A f t e r t v i s cririn.<:rcir.lisri ？ exi.iloitcd い.,.し stic rgricxilturrl districts tc t v o l m i t it will t 1 'cn utilize; tc the utnest trc rgriculturrl districts of sueト c v e r s c p s c o u n t r i e s p.s IncIir nnd A u s t r a l i a S i n c e . that woulc: not Tdc sufficient, it ，,.'ill oxplr.it Mrnchurip. rnd China. TV is is tト c s r -called エ npi rir-lism, Sincc Ii.iptrir'listic c s untrics ct^t r thr.n Fnglmci r.rc appcrring here t v crt , disputes rnd ri^trgonn sn v;ill elf v elep c- nccrning t v c prf blt.r.i へf colonics. T c situr vion w i l l be prss?blf as leng rs ？'.rncc； per.ee is r.rintnincC, tut senner r r l?.tcr, r siturtion will develop in wrich trcse countries will clr.sh in rn ir.ipcrirlistic v. 7 .̂r struggle f r vr v;rrld d o n i n r t i o n , T ? i s is t u c substr.ncc cf t ^ c Eur^ncsnfii v;rr B SucV nanncr いf l i v i n g , w r y rf existcnee, or ferr53 nf c i v i l i z c t i c n r r c r.tmcrnp.litics that d c v u c p c c l in u n s u i t a b l e crcr.s such r s in deserts rnd scr s w M c h , in esse ncc 5 crnnot intciin hunr'n life by Inbcr" The • odcrn wc.rld is a product •"f the rcr:r.rkrtlc d t v e l o p n e n t c f t h i s p " b nり m l c i v i l i z a t i o n ？nc! t v e. rtttr.pt t,:. return tc. t>is rbn'jrnr 1 civilization is t v e downfrll of V o Occident,, EnliK'htcnritnt crrncs fron the E a s t . Nrzisn, in r. ccrtrin sense , is return t门 t>*c Orient •°nci t v c restoration of pgricultural civilizr.tir'ru F'or i n s t a n c e e v e n tトc Nr：zi nr.tionrl l^-nd p i r n hr.s r tondcncy- t^vjr.rd Jpp^nisn rnd is # r.ftc'r r l l , tryinf： t门 return t「 the s p c c i r l c f T.rr'ctcr mc 1 ： nr.turc c f hur.r.n l i f e scd o n tYc s o i l . 7 . J A P A N ' S L L B L K S U 1 U M A N D ^ K B L O C T T T O K Y S^ILAl'Oi.I: Indcc•こj it r.mst be s o . In thr c n v c r s i o n of て广(.present T/crld it mist be s( » In short, it is not nrtur.° 1 to しstrblis.卜？n er.pire pci^ss f"C seven scrs 0 I t'^ink t v r t the ^uturc world T/ill ncccssr.rily be divided into lrrgc spheres. Generally, t>csc zones- rrust "be c^nnt.ctcd tc ；. cfhor b,y iruiこ。 Jr.prn nust slso crnsiccr- herself as conncctcd by lrnc t^ t v c Asiatic continent instepc； of considering v c r s c l f as r scr-bound c c u n t r y , On n a p , t^c Jr pr n-IJr nc Pulmc - C^ inn b l o c s y s t e m t h p t Jrpr.n is n o w o p c r r t i n g . is indeed v/idesprend^ But I think that the sj^crc riry be a littlt. snnllo If the ど ut'卜 Scr, s e.rce. is r.dced to t V i s , it uill bec r 'nc こ splendid Icbf •nsrrm • I tVinL that t M s is net a n c c o m i c enpire dul r splcnaiJ lebensrrtin conncctcd by rnd v;Vich トp.s t v c ferns rf t:卜e tFccry ハェ""T̂ c. "bloc s y s t e m of tl-c ncv/ w「rlcl 0 エ t y i n k t h a t v.'c rrust c o n s i d e r the 1 cb ens rr. Tin of the A sir tics or t h ostrblis'rncnt c. f r. b l o c f r o n t v is T h t e x i s t i n g cへnncrciplisn n u s t , o n t M s occr siorij be conplett•丄y liquidrtcd« It sccns tc nc thr.t .r.ctivitics br.scd o n t V c s c i l , such r s p r i m i t i v e inclustiriしs， v;ill b c c i i c fundr.ncntclo If tトis is n c c r n p l i s h c d , the tcr. p t r t i o n of u r g i n g T »v?r w i l l be grc r.tly clccrcrsoc]. In t> is sense, t v c intcrvitvr given to t^e Ancricrn press by Fitlcr is very inttrtstingo Fc denrnded fhrt sincc . , P?g£ 4-6 r-c. N o . 1616 he does net infringe on tVc sp>"crし nf cxistencc cf utlners, others rrust net. int erf crc rity- M s own Itbi. nsrFur.. F o r this purrv.se, vc rrust gcncrrlly V r.ve： t v c essentials frr scli、一sufficl'-.ncy, Trc Uritしrl Stc.tv.s rdvc crtcs the Monroe doctrine 5 t'" ンsで：is zri t f c Unite .f. States is n'、t desirous of being invpdeel by tro old u ^ r l d . Fc snid tVrt it \7culd tt tclc;rf>t(d if the United Strtes e n f i n e d herself to this drctrinc, but he rcprinrndocl the United St&tcs ps bcinf unrcf s' nr.blc in intcrf crinp in c v c r y t v i n g thrruch- cut the u( rid t KOB/.YASPI•• T?t.is:fc.r.c， unless J.^ppn's strtcsr.cn either folic，,, En£l?.nU rnd t'he U , S 5 cr else r b c l i s v this c、.ursc, she crnnot rcccrnplisJi nnyてトinc -n ？. l^rgc scrle. A grort nrticn-T/iclt plrn conccntrrtccl ハn nrticnr.l defense, in t>c f u t u r e , nust fi 11 or: sueト r c u r s c , SKLHATOLI: Wc r.vust frllci: sueト r c ursc even th ugh it is ひgr.inst cur "/ill ] 1 ust f O I I C T t v r t c r ursc. r p p i d l y . 8» CP/JムCTEE OF GIL:ふ.人N l.\CE N O M U M : I rnly t^ink t^rt nctv;ithstrncling t^o fr.ct tトpt t^c； situr.ticn is pcturlly so ? t^crc rrc r grcrt nr.ny per pic Who trkc r-n opposite view。 it rrust be trken frr grrntcd thrt intcrtsts crusc tトcr: tc t, o ke this enpnsite vic?r 9 But r.f tcr - 1 1 , ur nincls, wMcl" arc new ccntrelied "by pp st t'^caights pnd idcr-.s, r.rc influenced in this w r y , T" crc is r-lso the rise' nccpt5.rn tVrt world civilizrtion '-'ri厂inrted in Grcccc ^ncl Hone rnc tlr.t nodcrn civilizoti n wr5 pcrfc ctcd in France r ncl E n g l a n d , r.ncl thrt sincc t^is m.s saia to "be of tVc hi.L^cst leve], r.ny ir..pr>- v e n e n t in t ト is direction is c nsidcrcd nr-'grc ss. f tcr rll ? t 1- is ac.cs n.:、t differ f 11110:rncnte 11 y '"it、 t v c intcrprctrti' n r f Vistr ry by H f r x . In t M s i m n c r , Europe is ccnsidcrcd rs the ccntcr of rll T"istc:iy. ^c/zcvcr, r l t v Jp pnn sparks of r rxcw ordt r in Erst , s^c Vrs not cnntcrplr.tc d rt rll rs to the nature of the v i s t ^ r i c ? l brsis on v;>-ic>" t^c ncv order strnds. T M s is n>: t only r ^rcblcn r.f M s t ^ r y o T v c clcl world cutlcck pt.rncp.tes tVc field, of philos^p 1 - y . rnd politics, econf;riics. Ipv;, mr； society. A s 1'つnど rs things r.rc viewed with such‘r w r l c ontlrrk, t) (.了 w i l l be 〔listハrtccl c It sccns to nc t v s t ？ f t c r rll ? p nev; cnlturrl n^vcricnt is e.bs olutcly nc c C s SP r y . x^lty-cugh the Nrzis in Gcrnr.ny hrvc r fine new ？rorld cutic^k, it t。r die 1 , net rppcnr siKldenly "but nrosc in Gcrnrriy rftc r the rrcし rnd str.tc v-crc u n i f i e d . For c x n n p l c , ^ c tl v'crし V l culture 1 struggle cf Bisnr.rk hrs r deep pr.liticrl significance, rnd sucV things ps Doc. No. 1616 Page 4-7 ^t-gclirnicm in t v e pトilosopトicsl f i e l d , movement of romantic Irr tトinking from the standpoint of litcrrry thought. t v c histori vr1 s c v o o l of economics, end proponents of ancient Gcrmcn lrv； 一 11 t>~e legal school. Therefore, it is so id t>? t tht movement 土 , o r t v e estptlisVirent of the new culturc, w^ioh is brsed on p. v . r v wiac scope rnd 'wVicV 5 would give t^c Nr:zi' s w o r l d or clooi' s foundrtion, arose； in Germpny from c nine tec lit - !' ccntury e Since, t f. t inoveincnt ciicJ not fully rttain s u c c e s s , it VTs defertcd by democracy or liberalism r.t V't tir g of t v c Irst v:orld w s r 0 Fowしvcr 5 t> is time, under N r z i dor.in?tion, tVis movement Vr s completely floviis^cd, On c o n t r a r y , ID C C P U S G of tVc cxistcnce of sueト r cultural f o u n d r t i o n , tVc ' s clominr .ion tcc^nc f i r m . TVr.t is a y line of 1 ' thought- S^IRATORI: The >"cynott of tVf chrrecter of tT-e Gcrmm rpce varic a grert? y f』ir t ト r.t of t'e A n g l o - S a x o n s . I t^ink + v r t principr-lly, their rrcirl cVf.rrctcristic has r v e r y strong totplitari- n tend'、icy. A t the spmc tine, sineし t v c y ^ o v e pccomplifVed sueト ogrtss in scitricc t v t y V p v c . of c o u r s e , ? rtspcct for tl-c.ir individuality 。s on« of their strong p o i n t s e F o w c v o r , totっlitnrirn is whrt m?kc s up t v i s foundrtion. TT-cr,. fore , tトt DrrlirEicntPry govcrnnitnt of tVt Anglo-Srxons c^ not possibly trkc root on t v a t p o i n t . I believe t v - 1 Jrprn is similar on tYet point. I rm inclined to believe t^r.t t'^c v^-olesoriic instinct of rix t^e rrccs ？re princiDFlly totrlitrrir.n. エ tトink V'pt t> is vブe. s distorted rnd beepme v;>-£t it is t o c r y . ム-rn differs frorパ pnimrls on tl'c point thrt m ? n overcomes nr t u r c , end p. 1 though God diffcrcntir-ttd between ト u m r n Icings ？nd rnimr 1 s by giving m r n cxccllcnt cri-orbili'oics, V^.stcrn civilizrtj.on, in order to ovcrcork. npturt•， rtrlizcd ont ti'iunipy rf tcr rnot> e r in scitncc, r.nd in its process fell victim to ttirptrtion, T ト pt field vr s grc? tly ovcr-c r:.p v e sized rnd ovcr-rr ted. At tVt present, t v i o evil ？dvc-ncca to t v c pcint rt it hr s destroyed the collectivc livelihood of prnkirid ? and エ btlicvt. tV?t it is t v c ncv; "world outlook of G c m r n y rnd Itely tト？t < :即” sized the originrl colic ctivc instincts of mrnkind to countcrpct tトis evil。 It is r rrlrtivcly s 1 ort tine since t> c individurlistic tendtney vr s ir.trociiiccd in J r p r n . Therefore, it is not so difficult for Jrp'。n, vYosc rrci^l r?ctcristic s originrlly br std on tVc fr.r'ily systcnx rnd totPlitarirnism, to return to nrtionrl polity in its e n t i r e t y . Consequently, I believe t^rt t^c ?.\"?kcning of Jrp?n in the period of tト广 presort world evolution wi]1 be very rppidi },0:TTA i Unle ss t 、 / T . N , ne tionr.l/ orgrniz? tion is con.pic.ti d by t v c time of chc awakening K O B A Y A S F I : It must bf- completed PS soon ？s possible. W V p t do you think ？"bout tvis m a t t e r , conccrning t v c treatment of tVis problem? Doc. --c. I6l6 P a 3 e 紅 8 9 , National Organization cレ i ^rincs IC0N0Y2. ShJiurOnis ； f o r the problem of t.̂ .e reorgani ' on of the net ion, I think th-t it' must; bo fund 0 mentally ： thought Diovenent rliicli aims at r:turning to t.::e V ,:ic priacipls of Japan's nrtional structure. If vio aro e:i‘rossed only in the problem of the forn of government, it Till result in ハ distortion. Formerly, divino inspiration nnd the li v 3 rcis scorned by tlie intellisentsin, so XJQ must cons idor methods of persuasion stifficlant to gain the assent c? the in- telligDiitsi?.. Ho'.'evrjr, t] -3 imlearnod "./ill not reqairo such methods» They ri.!! understand at once if ne merely sa; r that re shovld do our best to serve the Smperor. If v:e, tho ttIioIg / p . 115 / soventy millions of bhe nation ? begin by writing to offer our all to His i^hjostjr, since TO o"?e it ill to him, and actually practice SHIi i.IEJDO ./ l IKi*： tho rrny of 1 subjict/, then the questions of govern- ment, econoiijy, euuoation, and leadership of 3^-ouns men v;ill nat- urally teles the proper course r % Zl is also unnecess-r3 r to em- phasize tiiafc vjlieri everyone rilarns to that frame of mind, existing p olit人cians, r.rd partisans 钌ill be out. l7eryone nill hr.ve th:,t frame cf nind ai}d 011 such o bごsis, tae govarrcnent r i l l get along. • -ccordingly, Japan's socio.1, economic, educational, and all otbsr struci^”es will be reformed e Then, "Vestorn individunl- istic or libera^.istic and capitalistic structures Trill, ns a mcittor of course, be completely regulated. Thc.t will be fnyorable. If things are den^ th'-1 vay, since ^e are all o'aildren of His Majesty th- Impercr, should not be blr-med so severely for フhat v/e ma：" h:マ3 thought, said, r.nd done before. Let us forget the p antirely tc at her g.3t on v;ith ？. move ment of service to the Sinpsrcr. Let u?? establish an crganization in keeping viih this. For this all can ngr^e it ^ill be entirely natural to hrve Irince K0N0Y3, \jh_o is of the noblest family of the 3&v2nty millions cf the nntion, lead and direct tlie movomentc, looking。.t / p , lib/ it vtic.t vry， ther.- is 110 one vrho can take Irince KOi-iOYTC 9 s pl^ce. In ability, Irnorladse, nd psrsonr.lity there rzey bo many among the seventy millions T:bo surpass him. However, r/hen consider the nen movoment ? or its organ^ation, T7hich aims to unite all sub- jects in a return to offering th3ir services to His Unjcsty the ‘ Enpsror, PrincG KDNOYE, b:，tha very position his family holds in Japご',ese history, is the one v;e nrレst hovs to lead it. T say this chiefly because we should build a ne^r Jcjp--n by demanding upon Prince 丄』 ^ 3， XO^'-Yi'SHI: Then, in short, you mean he is the i^epresantatiT-e of the r:hole nation? ぃiCU“GRIj エ mean reprosentcitiTe or flaf, ;an. Later, all the poople ワill follor -iim. KOB ムYiSHIi "ith th°.t in mind, existing political parities or former politicians- if such groups then truly perceive their neT7 mission nnd abandon thejr for ior p3 ̂ .tforms, n :urally thc.t will be goodc Page 49 10% Ixfethcds cf Reform and ths National Structure, 3HEEUJT0HI: It be unreasonable for us to require that of all of them. It also "be unreasona-ble fcr the rhole seventy m: 11 ions of the nation to demand it at onee. Since ve aim at establishing a nev: organization and effecting a noTement of ssrrice to the E m p t o r rhich rrili embracs all cf the peo Is, it rill probably be v;ell to incept for the time being those who venture to join it« I thii'i 1 ' r:e should not be so critical as tc say that this or that person 13 objectionable bocnuse of his past connsctions^ It is, houevsr, another question てし should plaj^ the 1 ？ad in the nev organization and，了 rrhom in t".3 future the n。u policies should be made. Thsre have Ixen seme peopls, of course.： studying de-votedly a3oag this line, so th-^sa people, I th.;.nV v ：リビU oo have the Icadcr^iiip^ r . n he p.?‘r丄：て：as an era of vain s t r I x i c h has been d:lsci!ssed among the members of existing bureaucratic political parties. Therefore, wouldn't it ba r/ell if in th3 future every- one could become /p# 118/ of congenial sp;rit f fianicly delve into the matter, and cooperate as a "body, start in 3 from a nerr founda- tion? A nation-マide organization v7ill be useless, if re leave out political parties^ After all vre must build a firm organiza- tion like t-ベ:-’ of the Nazis and Fascists. Such arguments 耵ill probably ari. As for the formation of the cr^ani^ation, in all probability those which have been v/orkad out by Gerir.any and Italy should te tal*en into consideration. After many failures, great sacrifices, and much hard v/crk, these have at last shovel good re- sults. I think that Jai：an, hov;ever, will be able to mal:e use of their • ocd features viii !x>ut paying that price. Althoush there is no need to reject tliem because they are of *3Stern natura, the spirit of Japan,s national structure must be based fun dar； on tally and permanently on the view of the world ^rhich has been traditional in Japan from time itmnemorial. Take the problem uf economic reorganisation for instance, ve should of course avoid Marxism, but T7e should also avoid the Fascist economic theory as far as possible• 'By dint of th。，attributes deriving from the ba3:; .〕principle undeiOying Japan's national structured think xre shall be able to shake oご:？ all the evils of capitalism and libera-lAoin, In the ex torn a" form by T7hich the reform can be car- ried out, it is protaLlo th广re 口ill be things resembling /p # 119/ those dona by CroviLPi^ and ニ N e v e r t h e l e s s , I believe the fundamental concept vill he different, NOIviUHA: Among the arguments vaiich are in vosue these days f \7hile their egression takes tbe form of constant references to the CIDKOICU /TO; founding of the country/ spirit and the basic principles of natiordl otructra^i their content seems still to contain a great many feature of the old order. For instance, though they speak of the gove ment cf linperial Japan and eiiphasize such expressions as. Imper:3... Pule assistance, actually there are a great many arguments in 耵hich democratic features are advocated. Moreover, Doc. No, I6l6 r a S e 50 they claim it is necessary to liquidate things feudalist ic so as to pave the way for assistance to the Imperial Rule. They brand as feudalistic things which rather ought to be in essence Ja- ancse, and thus reject them. In the final analysis, there is a tendency uhicli se。�s to lean toward things '/estern. 3Eu-iiiTCHI： I also believa that there are terns 5 ailing; those old slogans and expressions, v;hich need scrutiny. For exainple, there are many people T/ho, by ignoring the Errperor, interpret such phrases as IKKUJ B ^ IvIIN ̂ TNi the Trhole /p. 120/ nation under one sovereign/ to mean the Ani-^rican idea of natural rights of man and the equality of all men, Iroreover, theiohrase EAI.IH0Y0KJJ /TN; assistance of the て. r bole nation/ is liable to be interpreted as majority rule» Sucli things must not be. 11# Shortcoming of the Reform Faction in Our Country. SHIRATORI: �'!e must criticize such t'.ings closely. Those ^rho advocate clari- fication of the national structure lsy great stress on ideological aspects . They have empiiasiz^d only the national structure of Japan and have had little concern for tho actual and the economic life of the people. It has been said that the so-called advocates of national structure, have no interest in economy, Thラ group which lays so much stress on the irrjr.ediate evils of Western capi- talism tries to correct this by economic theory borrowed chiefly from Europe• This group calls the advocates of national structure unscientific and the latter call the former left-wing or red, so that they reject one another. Actually, hovrevsr f in order to clarify" the national structure , the spiritual and material aspects are correlative ̂ and an economy and a government which are 121/ based on the main principle of rule b：- the Ifcperor must be realized - In economics, furthermore, those who advocate socialism, completely fargst the national structure and say let us have ail economic re- organization by relying exclusively on .'estern theory and by re- ferring to Western precedents. I can not admit either of them« These tr;o must be reconciled,エ thinlc, if ve would lay the founda- tions of Japan in the proper place^ So-called reform factions and pov/ers for reform should be united, provided that they are sincere* On this ground 5 I think the right path of Japan's government, diplomacy, and economy coulcl "becDine clear. Fundamentally, the emphasis should not be laid only on the material side, nor only on the spiritual side. Hitual hostility ancl strife among those who aim similarly at reform, I think, is one of the causes that have allov/ed the s o - c a l l a d v o c a t e s of the status quo to survive until r .w. It is because they offset each other that their strength is nullified. Seeへrrbly, nauy 7;ho belisve in Japanism have be^un to advocate sornd ling called Imperial VJay Sconoiny. It is a good tendency. ” ,/n/ fage 51 toe. No, 1616 KOK^YASIII: It is extremely difficult to secure their reconciliation c」て’ them over, but /p. 122/ vie must arrange it without del ay • As has been previously discussed it will be possible for U3 to dc t is v/hen！ in a broad sense, the national reorganization is carried, outr For this, as you say, KCNOYE is very important» V/e v:ish him to malce the great decision himself• SEEUTORI: E0N0Y-2 is himself determined, I think. If he does participate this time, he is intelligent enough not to say thet he vill resolve this vain strife. Since he ought to know v/hat is r;ater and t:hat is oil, he probably won't venture to unite the tuo. 1 d o n 1 1 believe he wil l come out vith any superficial determination^ ICOBAY^SHI: Upon KONOIJL • s coming cut in such a right direction to organize th^ nation, the present so-called politicians uould join him. I11 such; a ce^e^ will mean vq urost give consider 七le thought as to their intentions• 12® The Objectives and Form of the NST/ Government. /p ュ 23/ 3HIBATC)HIs "hen the politicians join, I do not know what sort of position they v U l be givenv but, after a l l , the irnportant thing is touard T7hat objectives vrill the new govsrrrnent advance and viiat sort of things will it undertake. If these are male perfectly clear, it て,ill oe all right to accept those who come with that knowledge• Hen of old beliefs ps^haps wil l lack new ideas and will be unable to work out nev; ones. Men of the old order perhaps can not cope てith told policies of reform. エ think, at any rate, so-called nev/ elements may be anticipated. It viould be well if those who have formerly aimed for reform in Japan でould assist sincerely this movement regardless of newspaper reports, etc*, and unanimously participate in it so as to alio町 Prince KONOYE to discharge fully and irithout ' any error the duties that will be his. Furthermore, affiliation by all is the way, I "think, for the new organization to achieve the desired results• KCB/iYiiSHI^ This differs greatly from the new party movement as traditionally thought of, doesn ! t it? SHXRATOHI: The ner party movement seems to have undergone a • great change compared i/ith the time when Prince KONOYE organized his last cabi- 、 nst. T.7hon h e u n d e r t o o k the formation of his last cabinet f it uas , I thinlc, / p 0 l 2 4 / uith the prime object of resolving all vain strife and I believe he thought the emerGency could o n l y bs weathered thro ugh national unity. In an effort to achieve this, he organized a cabinet f and since fortunately or urtfortunately the China Incident occurred, national unity was for the time being realized. However, in the duration of war for one year or more, national unity reached its utmost limit- Thus th© fueling came about that a national re- ゾ、 N o . I6l6 Page 52 organization in a new sense had to be made# The first thought might have been to unite political parties. However, this TOuld make the cleavage between the new and the old all the greater. He knev/ that would not be feasible^ He might have resigned in order to v. r ithdraw and organize his ideas. For this, I think many people criticized him saying that he shunned responsibility for solution cf the Incident and that he had resigned v:ithout any reason, I suppose the reason "crhy Primce KDNOYE retired Has that if lie had gone 0x1 as before, the national reorganization could net possibly have been achieved, ulspecially, being in a position of authority in the government and hard-pressed with various daily affairs, he could not organize his ideas, and I think he decided tc withdraw and wait until circumstances became favorable* As a dix-ect and indirect effect of the uar, there arose ズp^ 125/ in ti.3 いつ:rid a situation in rrhich this was no longer feasible. Foreigi a:•ニ European situations have undergone sudden changes, and a power- ful impulse has daily been given this• He might have, I think, made up his mind because he may perhaps beジ successful this time. KOBiffASHI: Such men as ^HB^A and Mrv KAZJiMI, vho are nov devoting them- selves to this "by K0W0Y2 s side, should apprehend the meaning clearly,エ fctdnkc SIHUTORI: ム3 for that ? 1 reo2 ly don't knovr to what extent It. KiTAMI acts in Prince Iv^U^TS's "behalf, but I doubt that their ideas are in con>- plebe agreement<•ごo r でhat those persons say perhaps can not be said to be exactly rhat Ir in ce KONCYiS intends. The most sincere el01̂ .6x1 ts cf the so-called reform faction are what JTince KONOYE now d e s i r e s most of all# Probably w h a t he i^ants most of all is for such elements, even in small numbers, to unite and put themselves at his disposal. It vould. be well at this time for those uho are confident to make themselves known. ICOB^YiiSHIs /p 0 126/ CSKIRiiTORI: NC:皿 A: 3EIIUT0RI: K0BAYi^3HI: Sven if numbers are required, by no means If there are too maqy they i;ill not agree, I think* If many persons irho differ totally in vie?jpoint come together and agree only superficially, it w 丄 b e of no value. After all, if the greatest ccrinon msasnre is not called for - - - - Iii a parliamentary body, only the supporters f after all, aちtend meetings, It will b^ very coninxjiiplace and Immaterial whether we have it or not. The smaller the number f the better the quality. Tc speak in the extreme, one is the tas•“ ^a for scholars, as previously discusssd, v/hen we look for them ainong the Imperial universriles all ご:T3 of no value, and, conse- quently, if v/e examine them too carefully - - - - xjocc No* l6l6 Pag户 53 SEIKATORI: ^ven if we examine a great many, it 钌ill avail nothing as far as the old system of national unity is concerned. 2T0I/HHA: At the beginning of the last European，,ar no one in G-erraary was opposed to the T/ar for the time being. At any rate, all were united in support of,the war. However, the phenomenon appeared that they all differed as to the reason for the war. んュゲ丄TOR丄： Uhen the uar て. 1 as prolonged for so long a time and the situation turned unfavorable f general strikes took place• 13o Conversion of the Foreign Policy of Our Country• KOBiCfiiSIiIs If �:e do not rebuild the interior of our country, a trouble is imminent«. According tc the papers, Great Britain and America seeiii to support Lutch East Indies and Stench Indo-Ouina# How about the information you received? SlilRATOHIi NOMURA.: /p, 128/ SEUUTORIJ trance as 〜73*11 as Great Britain can not afford to attend 十he prob.1 era,3 of Dutch East Indies and French Ic.do-China. America alsp can not afford to do bo, 31ther, for tins baing. Their minds are full of aDxiety of hov to combat Hitler r s menace. I heard that German/ 1 s reply concerning Dutch East Indies had raised a serious issue. T̂iat was that? Genrany is not intenastsd in Dutch East Indies• But she rouldn 1 t like it if Japan, Great Hri^ein, America, and Stance should play intc each other's hg.ad on Datca East Indies. If T /e shcu3.3. consult a，joirb Dutch Sast Indies, Gsnnany would like to "be first informed • I tLnik it is q.uite naturals ZOBi^ASHIi sn:R ムTORI; Indeed,エ can noi soon as Dcssible. help thinking that ue must make up our ndnd as though Japaa's foreign policy must be converted thoroughly， 180- dejree turning round can not be made under the present ayjtem, and it ought not to be made under the present government system, can nofc tolerafev for the grace of c\xr Srriperor 1 s righteous diplo- macy , t h a t tb.3 present G-oVermont adopt a strong policy without c hanging its const it ution,, It is Dot right that v;e take Dutch 3ast Indies by taking advaritage of the bustle simply because Germany won victory フhen adopt our righfcecms policy arising from a rexicvated constitution, it is natural that 了apan should collaborate v:ith Germany arrl Italy, so that Japan may, by the negotiations with themi/p, 129/ settle the probieirs of the colonies in Asia . ^-fter all it is a question of a renovation of governmental system of Japan, or of the intenlor reconstruction. 3. No. 1616 Page 54 SlxIRATCHIs That must be the premise. Editor： マ/hat 耵ill be the extent of A m e r i c a ^ supply of resources to Great Britain and France? SWii^rORI: I thin：: it can not be done sufficiently under the present circam- stances, itaerican T/ar industry is spoken about quit9 in e^a-^gera- tioiu However t the scale of industry v;hich has been deve丄opod naturally by dint of activities based upon pursuit of individual profits in the society of capitalism, is not large enough as is supposed, judging from the present day standard• Take the produc- tion capacity, for instance„ of airplanes or of tanks, Amarica is considerably inferior to .Sermany. And, America is now rapic.丄y enlarging her armamentsf' having the "budget passed in the Congress, But t that only because America fears for her own safety. The main object is to defend herself 9 There is not big enough surplus to supply to Great Britain and 'France. America seeans tc have sent old-fashioned uoapons v:hich v:ere used in the last war. は any raje, she can not cope v>rith the urgent necessity. EDBAYiiSHI: Cur F c r e i g n Office lias changed quite /p.130/ bit. Once there irere those vho said that o a j H u ^ R I ワas misleading the country. SHLIATCRI: Eyen at ths present time, there are those vrlio say that king of tiling, A man can not convert his thought so suddenly partly be- causs cf his feeling- He can hardly sey that his prospect was TTTong but inclines to think up some pretext or other• He c'oes not uant to confeGs pi inly that he v:as v^rong. KOBAYiCHIs The situation is getting on as extractly as foretold by Mr， S :孤 iTC3I。 oHtRATCRI: Since October last , I have teen saying that the British Si^ire was 011 the eve of doTmfall* Peapls at th© Foreign Ministry マere astonished by my prophecy. �!Jhat deep blind fai•じ!！ (in Britain) they have J KOBAYii^HIi Yovn^or people, however, seem to be changing in their thougnt• NGLIRA: "./hat do you think of Ambassador s opinion? Old-fashioned, isn^t it? Editor: In tlie event of Germany 1 s victory, I think our people in general lirill teccme much でore interested /p• 131/ in Crermany and come to believe in downfall of democracy. SIHRATORI: That ¥ill spur the interior renovation of Japan. N C m : In the same sense as the Soviet revolution once had great influence on us. Doc. Koi l6l6 Pago 55 SIIIR.^TL'^I: The Ccrcmunist revolution of Russia has changed g r e a f y in. cualit^% After all, it lias been proved that "iiat "arx "fc Ci "U3 JJH— possible in practice. But, that revolution as well as the French Hevolution, had undoubtedly great influence on human society. Both 3-ermany and Italy were drastically affected by it, Japan "vvas also inf If v/e v/ish to sup lores s it, ve can do so as tb Tdshc 二 ：，after all, it is an achieマGment of Marxism that it hns ointed out its ovaa illogicality and defects, and at the same t m e it is a fact that capitalism itself has become impossible That Bolshevik revolution took place as a direct result of the nar， Eut the real cause of the revolution was the deadlock of capital ism So t any other country cc”la not escape from this influence• It accords uith the fundrmental characters cf Japan,and it means to create a to tally new character of state. If such a science and systematic thought should ba born general public て’ill come to understand sraiu.ally, lepving the intelligentsia behind. oHIRi^TOHIj For instance, the saying of Bolshevism that one vbo does not TOrk should not eat v does not apply to the conditions of our country. The Japanese people being equally His Majesty the Em- peror l s children，none of them should starve* _'e must not have even one person, has been torn as a subject of "lis Majesty, starved. must p.ake every one live. エ do not necessarily mean that every one should eat equally. /p.132/ KCDAYiiSHI: ZOB-VYiiSHIs 3KIRAT0RI: One hundred million people are the same, dividual ism that \:e live in* Not materialistic in- % cpinion is that man does not live to eat. But, vie eat to ful- fill the duty as a subject of His Majesty. His life jesty enabl ss us to eat and livs. Some people think they liye by their OY;II ability, hut /p. 133/ that is \7rong, and that is the cause of old evil. Since even those i:ho can net serve His Majesty are supplied て:ith necessity，we can be carefree for living. ,e cfo not like such a 3old-hearted saying as n 0ne who does not work shoiilu not eatノ ICOBAY^SKI: j^ven in Soviet Russia, some sort of spiritualism must bo added to their principle. Otherwise, Soviet rill cone to a deadlock* IKilURAi On a rrhole, KarxiJm is an abstract argument thought out with contemplation of capitalistic society purei than England and with a'kind of ccnceptional process. Th at is, I也rxism is a theory thought out て:ith presumption that almost all portion of the nation would become proletariat. And it uas clear at the very beginning that, if such ons uere a)plied to agricultural • country lil'e Russia, certainly unreasonableness will be caused. In other r;crds f as there フere no settlement of agricultural problem / p . 134/ should Marxism be applied in accordance with the formula, Leninism found a different thought in connection Doc. No. I6l6 Page 56 with the farmers. This is quite an unnatural theory that the farmers are considered as the ally of tho proletarians. Furthermore, Marxism can not solve racial problems^ Soviet Republic was harassed by these 9 but a more difficult problem ras tbat she could not make such leaders as engineers and clerks her frienrls； and consequently she could not utilize their teclmics tc the full extent• T .'/hen she tried to put the five years plan into practice in order to. enlarge her productive poorer, she iras harass 3d with shortage of engineers and she could do nothing unless he brought engineers from Oermaiiy, These points will "be gradually rec fcified in the face cf realitjr, and coasequently its class theory v/ill failn Relations Between Hdkr:o-ichi-u vthe ideal rhich lets all nations live peaceably unde：' one roof) and Sphere of Livelihood. As to Living sphere to T^nich ycu referred a moment ago, some people say, for exauplo, that although the aim of this holy rrar is said to te Hakko—iclii一u, they can not understand it well be- cause it is so abstract and covered /p« 135/ ^'ith mystic cloud. On the other hand, seme people regard it a3 Imperialism. On the contrary, the Germaias hare a clear insistence of "Living Sphere,“ so it is easy to unders七andU Sometimes people say that we had better have clearer aims of this holy vor• V/hat are the rela- .tions bexween Hal:ko-iahi-u and Li vi ng Sphere? SHIRiiTOIO：: I understand "that Hal:ko-icb.i_u stands for the ultimate object that the benevolence of the ！liiiperial rule blesses all the nations alika. This is because His ?-.Tajesty, great father of Japanese people as ヮell as great father of all mankind* It resembles "ISiiversal Brotherhood 11 of Christian creed in form, but it is different in principle. I think it right to deal with China • vrith this ultimate object. It does not mean affiliation of China to Japan nor territorial annex of China to Japan. Halcko-ichi-u has been advocated to make a clear distinction between our ideal and T?estem imperialism or aggressive policy. The so-called Japan--anchnkuo -Oiiina Bloc is ? I thin 1 ：., of the same nature Trith /po 136/ Hitler's w Lebeiisraum n ‘> That is, Japan, Fanchoukuo and China are to liaye tha coiraion "Living Sphere“. This is not the capital1stic exploitation which has been committed by western 、 people. At the base lies the idea of Hakko-ichi-u, the spirit of the foundation of Japan« The naw order of the Orient must te of this kind, ”hat kind of new order could be established T7ith the old T;estern-typ e treaties bet re en China irith the TJestern- type prsronative right, Manclioukuo rrith the same prerogative right, and 3'apan? The old ideas and the old methods bring nothing nev. These three nations must be united with a new idea でith v/hich the existing international law can not deal* 14- Edi tor: No, 1616 Page 57 As a matter of fact, Japan and tdanchoukuo recognize each other's indeperdenee in the light of international lasr, but there .exist some special relations between tiiem which can not be explained by intevxiationa] la\/7 t This fur/damental principle should te applied to OhIna rt 7'his scope i^rj he exbei〕dft(i to aDy degree- The .iue«tion of tho concrete relatio:as between China and Japan, we may stuoy in vx-ious i>i future and .decide the matters gradually also wi'';h concent o:? t ic- /p^ 13^/ Otlr.iese people. 工七 is not necessary to felloe tile exaq^las ol Manshoukuo in e'rery rsspect. There may bs la^cb. to be amejjdeo. in the case of Manchouicuo• The only tiling "r:a have to do is to clear off che old order es- tab?i&Iisd by we0tarn countries in China as a preamble to build tip the order. This must ba done at any cost. If this was sac.-ss.?.! 11LI7 done, the New East Asia Order will be ^rt^.biished octanes. This does not- mean only to s^eop away sg^>?essive a:.cJ. '-:q\!oitative syste/ii of ^eaior:a nations out of Giiina- 'Phe clci order is not jn;-furred cnl/ しo the materialistic corx.itio:.t3 9 but alao to the spiritual, conditions• It m^it also be a prea-i^lf5 to the crd^r tnat western icoas be cleaned up out of ths Ohi^e^e mind > But it should "oe necessary to syjsu: or^ay •丨,he o:la ideas first froin. the Japanese mind-. On accG.jr-i: of 'I'hssc： L say that new order of China Fill not be established -unless and until the interior constitution of our c c n ' y is re^uilu. Dcc. Nc. 1616 Page 58 1 5 . Foroc^st of the World 7。r. Editor: You will ple-sc tell us ycur forecast of the '.Yorld \- t ?r i:i the neo.r future. SHrRATORI: As I h-ive given nn outline n. moment "go, Frr.nce 巧ould be disposed of in the very nonr future. As for Grer.t Britain, she フould bo subdued shortly if Gernany should succeod in her landing operrtions. There nre ’ aany difficulties involved in landing operations. If it should be tcc dangerous to c.-irry o u t , it ”Gi.;ld net bG necGssハ.ry for Gernany to attack by her land forces. Suppose that Gernmiy should control the sca-coast ranging from Nor^/p.y to Spain, -".nd establish the bases f o r ？.ir f o r c e s ind subr-°.rinGS r.long t h e sにid c c ^ s t and should effect continuous 厂.ir raids on Grer.t Britain on ？ large scr.le. All the harbour facilities and the Liuniticn factories r.'culd becone targets. As Gernany has excellent air fcrcos the result ”ill be very effective. Itnly, 1 suppose, '.'ill h^ve the coEr」prid of the M^diterraninn p.nd she rill, in cooperation r 'ith Germany, attack h^r encji^y '7ith submarines in the Ai丄sntie， especially ”t; the rcuths of harbours T .,here sub; q.rlne ^tt^ck is conparatively easy。 Thus Grent Britain，"culd be actually bloc^adcd, Being confronted rith these, G:.e。.t Britain ^jould necessarily be stiroped. By landing opom.ticns, tho eng^gorient "ill cone to en ond by August, P.S Hn.tlyr s?id. In rmy r ;r..y, Great Britain, r-ould. not be r>ble to be-̂ .r her suffer ings till the Gild cf this yer.r. The r *orst conditions on the p-°.rt of Geriiiany "ill be thnt, if Great B r i t a i n should rap-e decisive resolution to held out her resistance つ.t the cost of her ”hole Navy, the term of resistance Trill be prclcnged. But in spite of this, Grant Eritnin. "ill be h o p e l e s s . The questjen is vhother Great Britain r'ould subrnt on cruel conditions rrliich rill bo proposed by Gernany or 广Guld go cn fighting ".ftor having dra^a br,ck tc O - n a d n , In the l-'tter c.se, hor/ever, she T */ill bo unable to resist ‘ ithout the cooporaticn ’”ith Aiierica, With France destroyed first nnd --ith Great Britain in a narrcv escape to ••-culd Anerica still venture- to declare r.frr u p o n Gernany? In cr.se America should not aid Groat Britain tho l^.ttor rculd gradually be corupeiled to boo.r her unfortunntu d e c l i n e . If so, I think, Gernany, Itr.ly r.nd U.S.S.R. ^ould renain -.3 the three big nations in E u r o p e , ^hilc Grcr.t Britain ごnd France would necessnrily De compelled to fall do，’'n to the second and third clnss nations u i t h culturc ^ad c. No. 1616 Pr- ge 59 poaco but ’マithcut .nny arnaneats. In ハ 11 eve : ^ . - . Great Britain possesses sc nany colcnies in e-vcri c o m e r of the ucrld, she rrill keep on resisting for a long poriod find exter:icilly the state of '”ar ”ill ::.、t tc.rninっ tc at once. But even if she should vish to ..い.'-p いri rcsist?i..ice, it is beyond imagination that cnl2 r the Government and. the governing class v r ith stratp.gen and geld bullion should desert the rorlm cf England leaving the forty five millions of people behind. Her colonies in Africa rill be taken fimy 0 id. in the future India rill become independent frcn Great Britain and these facts v . T ill nake her quite powerless. Canada is not rich in resources, pind is supposed to becone naturally a part of the United States. But r.s this \;culd be unbearr-ble tc English people, it is nore probable thnt they ^ould koop resisting br.rvoly to heroic death in defence of their country. In any ” n y i t uill be inevitable that, cn';ing to the nnrked inferiority in military strength, Grer.t Britain T r ill finally subnit. The situation, however, T ill becoiiie cler.rcr '"ithin next cno cr t r :o veel-s. Suppose Go m a n y should venture landing operations, the rar r.iay cone to an end eririier thnn expected. Some nilitary experts r.re in the cpinion thnt there is little possibility of l-indin^ operatic 113. But G e m a n y herself s^.ys thnt she '/ill crrry cut it without fail. NOKUHA: Tha forecasts cf nilit^.ry experts have often fr.ilcd. The North European opernticn. had not been imagined. The parachute troops had not been expoctod to be used till thoy n-ore enplcyed in Holland nnd Belgium, r.nd r:ilit-\ry experts still sny th^t the c pern tion ^as unsuccessful even after the operation took pln.ee in Holland.- M i t e r： People sp.y the sp.me things in America. NOIfURA: They s?.y that parachute troops ”ere all captured and annibil^tcd. SHIRATORI ： Tho pr\r。chute troops achieved a ccnsidorable success in Holland. It is in this，.r thnt the forecasts of -lilitnry experts ^re net reliable. Doc. Nc. 1616 p- r c f-c V I . Gonncrrt on Jrprn's Non-intcrfcrcncc. (TT-c Greater /‘Sエム Ifegpzinc, June 1939 V / i t M n ten drys sincc t"bc invasion of G c m m troops into Bcl^iuri r.nc! Follr.nd, they obtr incd t v c senc results rs in t v c first cnc ncnth or tv 广 cf the F i r s t European Yirr-. T v c fnll c f ？rris rnd tVc c?pturo 广.f tvc scp.ccr.st cf Dcvcr r.rc nonr r.t h? na, r.nd it is c ens id crccl likely t^'rt GcrrT.n trへods r.r.y p.lso proceed to t>c British エslcs t Tトis is, literrlly, v;r:rld-shr.king« To tbc observers, Yovicvtr, v/V- hrvc v/itncsscd tjht Gernnnts incessant effrrts the Xcst y^ycrrs^p.nc； x&o properly epprccir.te trc c^err.cteristics ハf t^c G c m m pcop丄c m a trc principles rnd structure rf tトc politics rnd eccnony cf their totrlitrrir.n rcginc, t"hc present st?ntc cf pffrirs is. in fret., only y^rt v;a^ tc be pxpectcdo. It is tT%rc:f‘ rc only natural trrt trose v^c rnvc ricrerto btcn regr.rdmg libcralisn nnc! d c n r c r r c y e.s the pinnr.clc of hurp.n culturc r.nd believe in tYc ind^riitetaL:. pr^cr cf Englencl or the An^lo-Srxon rr co .^rvc cnric t: clcalit their cv;n obscrvrticns. Lnflmcl rnd Frrncc hrvt conpulsorily c v r.llcngccl G o m a n y t。. fipht 3 Wトy t，’ey heve done so? Wc nr.y, in short 5 sr.Y trr.T trc rcr son for it is T ^ N T T H E Y ト P V C undcrcstinrted tho rc.^.l strcrgtv ^f Nr.ziist Gcrnr.ny 0 T"hey thought tY'Pt Gernsny n r y be hclc". d^vm r,t rrcsent, but nr.y bee one t-^o nuch for their powers t'、do sc if they let her grcv; unnoticcd scvcrrl ycr.rs longer。 B u t , rlrsi It vj?s r.lrcrdy fben toe letc for then, rs the strength of Gcrnrny hrcl rl redely be conc tに.o rra.ch to be vr.nquis^ccl. Net only Lnplrnd rnd F r r n c c , but rise t>c U,SJ'-.^ in t^e sr.rx w r y , hr.cl been wrongly unCcrcstinr.ting the strcngfb 广f the Gcrrtrn ?nd Itrlir.n totrlitrrinn Axis countries by believing thr-1 tve nen^gc- rcnt of rll r.rttt.rs t v r t concerned Europe n i g h t , in general, bt cmductecl vrcll if entrusted rnly to Lngl^ncl rnd F r r n c e 5 っs it rppcarcd to her thrt Itr.ly rnd Gcrnrny would surely be defcf:tec in the cnc, rnd rer cv.'n clirty wr.s to try? with rll her effrrts, to suppress J ^ p r n . the agorcsscr, totr-litrri?n str.tc in tl-c Orient. In t^c first plr.ee, t u t rnc v,'̂ - YcC r.ost v;ished for rn outbrcnk (f r in turope is Roosevelt hinself e It is net m exsggerr.tion thr.t, u p to t^c. "bしfinning cf t>c U r r , the efforts of tvc U . S . , as sトov/n by the Gerr pn "White Prpcr" v;£rt' directed towrrこs preveking r lurcpenn YJC.TC ^o^'evtr5 ニ'トcn tYc wrr rcturlly broke (、ut, tVc gしncrr丄 opinion of tVc U, S« turned out in f>v?oir of nrn-intcrfertneo. She did not rcこify トcr policy of cr s> settler cnt of tr-dc br.lmcc cnC� cf not lending her vessels to m y belli£crcn u powers, rltVoug}" Vor vcrmient hr.d revised the Ncutrnlity L r u , sc tv?t t卜c degree of A n c r i c p 1 s PiC tc Lngl^nd rnd Frrncc s very luktwr.rn, w v icト grve rise t^ rn rtncsphere of considerable じ i seen tent in t トし sr.icl two countries. It hpppcnccl t'RR.t, rs R WPT Fith-ut fighting lasted for oig^t n c n t ^ s , not only Inglrnd anC Frr.nco, but rlso て尸c U e S , wcrし unp.wp.re: of t v c rpprcrching d r n g c r . V/c "believe thr.t D o c . N o . I6l6 Ppgc 61 the it c a n , however, be said that/North European W a r finally- served to open their e y e s , and only "by the r e c e n t collapse of t v e Western Front did t^ey ? for the first time ? become fully awakened» It a p p e a r s } n e v e r t h e l e s s , as trough t — e y a r e still possessed of an optimistic view regarding tVe future。 As until n o w , they seem to still have hopes of success in leading r : a fcters to s protracted war by anticipating that the battlr-front will fall into a state of stalemate . due to tVe sirc/ening of t v e German A m y 1 s offensive, as was Fitnessed in the First European War. B u t , nov; that tトe stronghold of the Kiaginot Line w>ich took four years to construct.hos been penetrated In no time, no one } not even an amateur， could hardly think of the possibility of s deadlock in t^e front lines by resulting in mere trench w a r f a r e。 T)~e o n l y �ay ouc cf the d i f f i c u l t y f o r E n g l a n d and France would te to decide upon a large-scale counter- attack, which, rowever, would no longer seem to be possible inasErucト as there appears to be a marked difference between the respective Air- Forces end Mechanized Troops * N o w , as for tl-e U . S . , she would by no means be able to render effective military assistance even if s v e should promptly participate in the Via r t o d a y A s Goering used to alwsys ssy ? there would be no spot for tトe landing . of the U«S, soldiers even if tトe U.S. were to participate in tVe present W a r . Fis saying seems to have turned out true. Tbe "best that could be done by the U . S . would seem to be the granting of an unlimited credit to England and France, t v e offering of hsr vessels for tVe trensporting of munitions 5 end to also s v ip a large number of no.ro superior planes tVan in t v e p ? s t , T^e withdrawal of tie U . S . fleet from t>e Pacific and despatching same to tVeir aid would possibly be fairly effective, but it may te impossible for t v e U S « at the present juncture w.ドen her relations wit.卜 J ? pa n have tec ore so aggravated. If Soviet Russia 5 a neutral power, sVould suddenly turn around to c, v e aid of England sr.d F re nee and attack Germeny from behind in full force, there iriig>"t possibly be e c o m p l e t e c V ^ n g e in t、e w a r s l t u a t i o n ? But tレis is absolutely inconceivable, Not only must it be considered that t v e r e m u s t be some sort of u n d e r s t e n d i n g b e t w e e n S o v i e t Russia and Gerneny so as to make Genrany feel perfectly e a s y 5 but G e r m a n y v/ould cr:rteinly not V a v e w i t h d r a w n ！her mechanized troops entirely fror Poland in order to }°url her entire strength into tlhe W e s t e r n Front unless Gc-rm?ny had f e l t p o s i t i v e l y safe in doing so。 It E-:.ist be e x t r e m e l y reassuring to Germany to tレink of t.^e millions of Itrlipn soldiers w> o are sufficiently prepared to rise up et a moment' notice。 Doc. No. I6l6 PogC 62 A s for t v e future outlook of tVe present w ? r , astounding developments will doubtlessly have been made by the time t v i s article apnears in print， F u r t h e r m o r e , not much actual benefit migrt be derived from purposely trying to predict tre future outcome, however 5 we m a y nevertheless safely assert that t^e present war is destined to bring about a sort of solution unprecedentedly cruel and almost incredibly complete. FeuV-rer hitler a few days ago declared t'^rt t^e fete of t^e German rr.ee for a thousand years to con:e 'things upon t M s w a r , v/>ile it is warned in Italy tVat the destiny of Europe for three hundred years to ccr ; :e is ？.bout to be decided t o d a y . A t p.ny m t e 5 it Is apparent t’-pt there is no longer r.ny room left for doubt th?.t what hitler end Mussolini rre planning is the fundamentp.1 reconstruction of Europe.- W h e n a. tendency o'f defeat on one side of the belligerent countries fcecr.me cleer in ?ny previous w e r , it was custor.?.ry for s?me to te brought to an end by peace negotiations defined t”e ceding of some territory and ppyment of reparptions 0 Hovifever, it cannot be imagined t v a t f-e present wft w i l l be terminrted in such c simple n r n n e r。 In fact there even seems to be the possi- bility of Greet Powers wトo V?ve been borsting of their glory for several centuries past coming to e. sudden c o l l r p s e , It is rlso extrer.ely doubtful es to wトet^er tVe minor Fowers in Europe： m<?y be r 11 owed to rem?.in r,s independent states possessing absolute sovereignty rights, T M s must be ssid to be ell t>~e more so with tVe colonies of t'he minor Powers«, W e >rve been rdvocrting since the very beginning of tl"£ present wer tト？t the world is just on the eve of a gigantic trpnsformption in tv-e Old Order b^sed upon Democratic O.pitr.lism will be d o o m e d , in lieu wV-ereof ti"e New Order brsed upon Totplxtarirnism m u s t "be set u p . As Jnprn hrs , ever since t•ドc 1：pnclhurian Incident, been r.ssurging the leading role in cst?blisM.ng tトe New Order f-roug^out t>~e CVina Incident ? t^e J^ppncsc people should rcr.lize t^e New Order r.na ret in close concert wit 1 " the Axis Powers vs Germany and エtrly^ T v c supporters of t?e Old. Order in Jrpan have been reluctant in rer'lizing the true s i g n i f i c m c e of t^is gigantic world-wide tr?nsformption, and in fsct tbe conclu,sion of the Triple. A l l i a n c e .totween J a p ? n , Germany and Italy finally fell through duo to tトe Old Order elenent to both pt >ome p.nd r b r o r d , F o w c v e r ? no "human power can do anything against tl-e inevi—r.ble carrcnt of ^orld ト i s t o r y . T v e way for Jep?,n to pursue Yas plrcpdy been decided on» In f a c t , Japan has plrepdy been trod ding along the sr. id path for nearly ten years» T^ose Jpprnese w^o d、o not know wcl} whcie t^eir wey is leading to pre looking on tトc. p r e s e n t war in Europe witr utter indifference F.nd wrongly tレink t^at 计 び c?n estpblis.^ tYe. New Order in Eastern Asia by merely continuing to ?ct in a conciliatory mrnncr v/ith Doc. No. 1616 Prgt 63 those powers est?blis]'ed upon f-e Old Order, They m a y be likened to persons v;トo ere nncwere. of a fire in w>ic> tVcy sre si reedy jn t ト cr midst 0 They in.aginc they cen keep tv em- selves free from the world-wide g i g m t i c trpnsform?tion so long ss fhey p.re declaring t v e i r non-interfcrencc policy. Sonic of t"he other Jr.psnese r.re ricking similar m i s t a k e s . For nstancc, thov ^^ink tT"?t Jr.pan will not be drr ̂ ged into t^e Y.‘フr as sre did not conclude the Triple Alliance wit：} Gcrmrnv &nd Italy., These persons do not Know trc f a c t t v r t Jr.prn contric-ated raucV t o w a r d s the; p t t e i n - m c n t s rnede M t h c r ^ o by G e r m r n v . B u t f o r t ^ e A l l i a n c e t c t w e e n Qcrmrny and Sovit. . Russia, Geimeny would ^robpbly net V?ve トニen able to make ap her' mind to start t v i s war; r n d i n me!,' Soviet Bus sir Jric "；dly tov/erds Germany, the presence of Jappn in the East end tlhfc fair progress of the negotia- tions for concluding en Allir.ncc "between tt^c Axis countries at T o k y o , Berlin and Rome arc factors w'^icV hr.ve contributed considerably. If the I -3. "rad participated in tYc Wrr at its eorly stage, not only night it -oossibly encouraged tYc morale of British pnd French forces, but tVx-ir figトting power might nlso ^rvc beccmc ?ctu?lly enh?ncodf. Germany too, might not Vr.ve baen p.t)lし to sccuire > er absolute- supremacy in tVx a i r , rnd it :.s likely t^rt 'the pttitude of Italy might &lsc v： v c been grectly r.ffccttd. Is it net Jrprn tl-at fastened tトr U C S . down to the Pp.eif 丄c? T'^e U.S«, hrs not ？.s yet been nble to assume e decisive rttitude. Is not tre prescncc of Jrprn pro.cticnl丄y t^c m r i n reason for t v i s ? Gcrmnny owt s e mint of gratitude to J p p f n . In defiance of tVis closc relation betweon Joprn and Germrny, r certain group of J^prnesc 'h~:vc sought a ccrtrin kind of understrnding wltY Britain &t th Tokyo Pr.rley ffte-r the Tientsin A f f a i r . is f?ct v;rs promptly reported to Germany. Of course Jrpnn's attitude too ト s doubtlessly become clearly understood recently in Bcxlirir Under such circiimstances,トcw can we expect Germany to be grrteful towards Jppan? The Jn厂:•.nes疒 nonle should not forget the fp.ct th?t the J'； p?ncs:; diplomacy トss done sc.iretMng that docs not pr.y for Jrp-^n, it res done muc'r for Gcrmfny nnd yet lets itstlf oT.en to incur her wio.tY. If t v e v o r l d ' £ m a p Ye.s to be c.r?v;n r n e w e s r r e s u l t t European W r r , if 十 . e N t t h t r l m d s , for ins b?nce 5 should becomc merged as r ：^rman territory, t) c Dutch Indies w o u l d , r.s ？. m? uter of coarsc, btcorue rdcled to Gemir.n territory. If J?pan continues to behave as s^c has in c prst, Gcrm?ny will be pieced under no oblig? tion wyiatso'av T er to Jr pan jn giving tYi question of .トe tv.tc.ト Indies Ver special consider?- t i o n . It trust be remeniDercd > however, the.t t^e Souレ’ Sc?s has become Jrp?n's Life Line econonicrlly nnd strrtcgicrlly. W e , in establishing the N.w O r d e r , do not raer.n to confine Doc. No. 1616 prge 64 Its r.rea onl.' to C u inp» Jeppn cannot renir in idle ？s an c i 7 _ooker in event of P wVoltsrle cVrnge of territory taking place in tトe soutl cf st of Asia, o If t ？prn sVoulc devute herself exclusively to the solutici, c,f C^ina Problem by &d>~ering merely to "ber non-; nt ricr nee policy, matters vrill doubtlessly be come settled v/it • in p s v o r t pc riod, f.nd subsequent to this Europee.n V/nr, the Dutch Indies rs well rs the colonics of Enfl&nd ?nd Frrnce will T-PVC t v eir oアnc.rsトit) decided ” T it.h J?p?n looking on ps a mere spectator. Therefore, ？t t M s important junct^iro, Jppan s v ciild realise the ultimpte si^nificrnce cf t>i? gigpjitic wc ^d-^/idc reform rnd should not Te 11 to engage in active pn.cicipaモion tVxreiru Docunient Vo0 1616 ^agc Nc：. 65 V I I Cへ:^elusion of JA^AN-GE^ATT-TTiJ Y IJ ' i;XCE. (/ eahi Shimbun Sc:pt‘:mhcr 29，1939 ) 1 • Ev^ rlasti ng Mutual Ik:丄 1 こirce The Fignif icmcc of the JA^A^-GE^tT-ITilY T'-J^/RTITE T.そEATI concluded last September 27 is extremely important hvt tho cortcntF arc simple and olear ard do not require ranch expli：.ration. 0rdinari3y, a protocol is* att^vched to the treaty but しVGH this is not rcqvlred in this c. re. As stiDulc ted in the ハrov?•？iorF, dcte—ls conccrring the oxo cut ion of the tro-r t^ r.rc to be dc cidod b ' a ccnrnittoe rhich is to be f-rmcd xatcr. Sincc the trccty not drrvm up by srDt,cialists, it? ctyle diffrs onrs: dv r-.bly fr'、つ the iisiic.1 f^rui. Viered from the ？ terdpoint of trecty spccic.li ら ts , it :ic.y cor tain nc.ny pe.F sages that strike thorn ar strange • I f cnal;/zod in dotri Is legally, it may give ri sc to v〔.ri、us contcrtionc but ?ir.'cc the contcnt? of this treaty is unprcccdortod in hi story end bluntly, since the ^cllo^ nations, JAPAN, and ITALY pledged the coalition r ith their b i r d, it is -only nしtur&l thと--,t tho ^'ordir-g is simple c.:;d Dlain. I f a detailed irterprctr.tion is atti chcd beforehand legally or i f t psycholofdcr.l hold-ov.r exists in regard to mutuご]rights ar-d dutior, tho value へf the trcc.ty v*ill be dcsrtr/ycd. Ir short ,エ think it ultibic.tcly depends or the single phrr so "autucl rcli...rcc". Therefore, in r^gcrd to tho treaty itrclf , the gener さ::]ST tuition ir clr ri.ficd b：； the Gov rmuo:-t rroclcu.k.tion しrd there is nothir.f v:uch th: t Tould r.ccd adding. In the future f due to thip, tho probloni of T'hc.t effects T;ill it five rise to or hiT will the treaty itrclf' be carried out cr hor 7'ill its c h m cturics be developed cし：n only be judged しr time progresses. Wh&t エ an going to ,cay in the fcl]ハring is ertircly v.ithir! the limits of ny personal opinion ar.d. obferv? tions» It must be rcnG”fbc,r〔.d th, t I こrn not rcvcc.lirg ？pcci rd 5 rfor y n:ti^n r gt.rding any agr .i nert aroorg tho three co-untric? nor ド v c I any relation rhatrocvcT in the Japc'.ncro Crovcrnricnt'e intentions rnd policice. 2 . Treaty of the 1•ハ"UD O W R . This treaty is foraallv callod the "TRI-^/ TITE TFcE/TY" but in general, it sしり！is t*, be C e l l e d tho T . m : : ITE /‘フエびCE. Fron tho nrovisions in Article 3 of tho troe.tjy it c m be said that it is genuinely a defensive allic r-cc and may be called, a "Security /J.liし.NCC" OR A niV/utir .l AesiL-TER.co Alli\;R.con. ID S，•ハrt， it cz.r bo メ > # Doouniont No. 1616 No. 66 intcrprotGd a? havir-g its aim in pruvcr.tirg further cxror.nrion di the v:E-r in P'U ard .へSli... Defending upor the transition of inturnc tional noliticc.l conditions borc^ftcr, this Articlc 3 will be a l l i e d , Tliurcforc, this crticlc r:iay be consiDC^rcd in CO IE CC.SCE to be the substaroo of the tref-,ty but it is iy desire t、Suck the c.^strucxaon of the nctr order as the chcractcristic of this trccty inctci.d. Historians of th し future gene rat?, --ns, I think, will proN b ^ ' call it the Treaty of Kev^ World Order • T!;e trecty drrwr up in tlio closing yctrs rf the liberclisui era considered, rt thct time！ to be a neマ treaty that broke t.̂ o bonds of tradition. But this New Order Tra.ty is no los-s inferior than tlicir treaty from tho standpoint of breaking thu bonds of convention. Similar to the anti-v;ar trcf.ty Phich tr^i.ty specialist? felt it 5 r-cludcd mi\nj points thしt Trcrc very ambiguous, the Ncr Order Treaty is also very untcchnic^l, Ir the first rlc..co, tho definition of Vcv! Order is not oxplaired. There is rハ provision c^pcornirig the area in Grcc.t.^r Fast Asia £:nd KITtO^E て,.he.re tho Kgv Order phall be c^tab" 1 i s h o d .エ believe thこ t tho^o mrttsrp Fill grt Am J. ly be cl?. rifled r ？ ti•、：c goes ’ n but from the development of affairs up to the pro sent, it is rot difficult to PCPX rally surniice froつ-co r̂-'H pcnsc the signifies'ncc of the Ncr Order being pi?..rred by the throe com?tries cr.d しID the area aimed ct Tr/ the ro^cctivc countries. The PO-G£,llcd NCT t Order is not norcly a passive e.^voot tn overthrow the status qno ‘ but is suppov^cd to in elude a porltivc progrr.-- of hou xhc ncr ^orld should bc # The poDular use of the rtirt.se 11 new order" seems to hc'.vo N'.gun ini th the dでつclamrtiつr conc rnlng the "Construction of the New Order ir； E st ハ?I/ TT by the Firrt K O W E Cabinet. But beginning ri th HITLF"' ir.d 广:thor WムZI loadc-rs of G r u y , they have tnken a fc.ncy t、 tho use of this phri.se pircc lorg - go. As far e.s I knov:,エ do not think a 、rsiKlc cocciしn.. t•レ、r hes boon nude in J ; -/IT as to rhc.t tho im^つrt 。f the Fo- Order in Fごてt , r I A should bc # The F'.F Order advoc^tcd by Gur v ir.ny ？eojig 5 r.lro t.r, prr.du^? ly c h m g e rith the transition of Eur,.、じar •oolitical ennd? tions . 3 . .• GCor;i T >lirh^c.r ! t '?f the Thr ; . Countries 1 Idr^ls. Sincc the Nov： Order rioturod ir： thしハinds of the rcspcctivo countries, Jap:.n, Gc r ir.ny and エ , re such, it cannot rocL ?s: rily bo VE id that thoy ere undcrrtood by OLcb '^th.r clcr rl：/. Hへでevしr, is it rot cxtrcncly important tc d^f-' rite]y cl-： rlfy this poiiot? Of coLirsc, l s a trerty it マill donE.rcc.te oc ch otlK r 1 s sphurし of irfl ucr.cc end the 4 . . - / • 彳 停 . fc マ ； 繁 迓 f . Docurnort No. 1616 ^e No. 67 recognition of c. free—he nd ^ithin thct sphere is in i t?c l f , a snr'，土 iciort sigr.ificr rce but thi? Fill h. vo a tarte of a uery old era. I do not xiish tc rcgr.rd the pr^Font v.orld hostilitj' as 'icrdy a contort for For Id supromi.cy or a cor test f«r spheres of iiflucr.cc an^ng the big poFurs# It is insipid if the rising countries, Japan, Gcm^ny , Italy- end pcrhcips U.T struggle fnr povor c^xiii-st the old VOVCTS, Grcrt Britain, /mc.Tica. ard Frrnce• It is also t:、o si )plし-：1Andごd to n gc.rd. it as � rr cial feud botrocn the ‘ nglo-Sc.xons arid the. Teutons' or betveen the yc 1 lor r^.ce' r m the Fhitc r?:.co. In bric^, L.ltb ugh this is a hackney, d exnrcpsior ,エ believe it p/ust bo regarded i\.? e culturevl Frrfc.ro 、rd a brttlc of ideology. In a word, it is a struggle votrcc n do ::ncrr.cy r..nd tot.:-li tarir,r»ism but viewing it ！ o D D o s i t i o n ；f ideology c,r.d 、f cultu?"c, i t 5：j-gni^ios' c� grcc t revolution unprece-dcrtcd in tho history of r:if.:nkird. Tho ideology of nar r "ird ^ron tho ftし：ndf)つixt of cultur- 1 h?.story in the past ecvrrr.l thousand ycors hc,s s ven chr nges but 'rinco the Gr< cir.r era ur> to the present, the- fund? ロcmtr.l idea of the Occidcn-o nas alre.ys bcun hi sod m Tndividu£.lisr.i. Tho t^felitc .rio.n ider.トr.s bcor« r sleep for ai long tine during th^t period. Sirco such v•しs tho cr-ee of the rir.n ^ovcグunt strrtcd in Gcmicry £.ncl I taly , it di tes b' ck pri r to the G- •‘ •‘'て.’.d r,r t J-:、..：： ， it can be sr.id thnt 1 て is a r: v. rsion t^ tho fur.dcvmentc.l しnd hoc.lthy ideology of or-rlj?-' mankind whr'ch hi.s beer) pru served c.rd f ostorcd th irtcgrity si ncc the founding ハf Jc-j)c.n. It ie f。r this vu s r th£'t the t。talitcri:iris巧。f Gor^f..ny nd Itcly ircluciG nuch th:vt is Japr;EOFe. In ©.dvocating the cstc-bl.ishricnt of the Now Ordc-r ir: tho Fcv Ec st thr :ugh the China Incidcrt, J �-.vr.r. is strongly c-iph£Lsizir.g the ideuls of CHnT,0•にU/T•厂• founding of tbo country/ spirit と.rid It ^KO エCJHIU anc! for this reason, it cr.n "b.リ stid thr t ふt follows the pr.つe line of tho Ncr Ord^ r ^ovcrncrt in Gcrmny c.nd Itcly. In E'urcpo it is で リ c t i v c , to dcys before tho Grecicn と..nd in Jap^n, it is retrospective t'、tho K; ego of GOCIF/； Therefore,エ thirk it c:.r be sしid thrt the I T び，Order ^-vc^crt in the Ec.st ごrd 7 y st iv c a n,")VGncrt t) restore tho funckî しrt.じ 1 cbr.rr ct'.T of p.cinkind• For t!;is rc-asor^ British へnd /^cricc-n quarters arc rot altogether wrorg in identi ぐ‘yin.g Japan, Gv.rMany end エtnly under tho stnc C£itv.g?rj r m d cr I 1 ing thcr."> t^t:litc..ri: .r countries alike. Tho co^-l' b^rr.ti - n c n こ l i t ] ' o f the three co-untri os is only rr turcl when seer from such a furjclr/ncntal c.nd idoolへ'f〕• stic 十こrdpnint. For;, returning to tho roclistic つrつ“blしns, c。r:cr(jtcly, Fh-.t kind of nor cultu、c アill Dccuncnt Fo. 1616 ^age 6S Gem,： rsy c.rd Itr ly fvi:f\c in E u m ^ c ? 'Vhet rill Japan dへ in tho Grcrter Er.st “siこ〔.roし？ Furthornorc, in the int^ rrr.l orgenize t5.on of the three cvurtrics； r U l they c.]l tし:kc c sラ,：i].‘: r type 广.f で、1’:ticじ 1 こrd cc T'^iiccJ th? Is it cpr>cr.rc ever tn the, general m b l 5 c end ごlso c.s ir rep,:rds t JV.prn, tbcpc r.re i v -iinc-nt problc.ns of vltrl importcncc, Recently in Jcnr.r, the fTcr Ordor v "nvc :iじnt if boc-nj r.g quitし r.otj.c.orblc but todc^r, it is the Djri^n ^f しvrry^r.c tl: r t the CrOKOI^U s^ii'jt rh. uld bo rcrtorud c.r.d thc-t th,:. unc?crlj r ir:£ 尸rirciplc if the ric ti ？tmctur, sh^ulrl、。clr.ri r i.cd tハ.pr'、/o: rし the structuro f 一.：r IVK'广ir-Y门ンIIP/. . T n o p u l ： r つjv'rt r.rrirtrrcc/. Furthcraorc, the pr.ぐolen is ，hrt 、 し f ? b ' uld be u?cd tr, actually cc.rマ,7 on.t the rしつhニrisrns of politics c.nd tc -nony，-.-hich ne nifest the prirci^lc cf natiore 1 structure. The Order thrt Gレr、、£.ny r.rA It<;lv Is tiying t へ i n Eur “：-oc do-;... p r、;rt iv: elude irly G x n v r.nd Itr.lv but the し ctiu.l problen of the greatest 1 \port-: ncc ？ s t t.. d ' ̂ .th the pollticc.l ard ccハr.へ、-:icこ 1 ctrncturc ，f t，:c other Biir'po:r c^untric?. In r̂ . to thir, it i? ho 1 icvod th/t todry pi rs c-nsj dcr^.bly definite hこvし"HCG” drこスur, by Ccri\.rj たrd ItcJ.y, On the oth:..r hr.nd, rhrt f，rn ^f Ncv; Ord^r ip Japニつ g^ir^ to construct ir the Grortv r I tlr?nk v. ol^. r , rd dレ f う rite pIL r rvgc.rdJng tho diF^fj.ti^r: "f tト0 ^cv Ord^r ir� rh* ch if t) be the v ckbr^no of tl c Ncr Order in Grzz t r “ ？iし.，''".m t ^Mrrt be est blirhed. Rc?、r •.しtion ？f t，:-.c N r ^ r r . l Structure• Nor, if tトc. id、.ご f .rd rtrvctiTr^ ^f tlic old - rdcr, '-Mch rし：./-ins crc ど.till /inch -jn evidorevj in Jar)c.n, ".rt t be left ; rtc ct, cr.n the Ncr Ord.、.r ir. Greater Ac:a ov^r be c stc.bliFhcrl? Assuni.rg th: t it re.r rncslhlし，cc:: sr.ch r Fcr Order G r a t r �'ic. ret ir. conccrt ”.ith tbc Euro^ccn Nc'；: Order つf Gご..r r レ.;ny c.rd Itclj r ? I h:.vc been :.dv;>c. ting th : t tho c -nvc rsi f foreign p^lic; r and the Fr.ti'n r.l Tcr 0 d, r crc inr、,p r.'blo, I thc ref ̂ rc Drcdict th t ur.dc r the Dr. rrrt corr-iti cne, J ^ . f c广ご.1:3 ti'.、r 〜ith G rnc'r.y .rd エ + 〔.]y is . It i? ny dc 5 ire th, t the pcTolx give., thi p cr reful enn- sidcrLti -̂ n. Ir -y っ:：o r 5っr” the c- urc Tvhich votive ted tlj.o crro:\t -nrld c^n- Vv rsi. li t- c) i fl: r in t、し rtf.lcn，'..tc of liVr- liv e tic c.c、r.つ.”-3、 I h: vo v.o nr r t i m l c r rc rpoct f、:r the bist^riccl m： tしridisn of K.'"\XI. r ;•ン but I thirk t ] t ir： mしny cこf•し f , the nocev??i"ciof of cc^roiric livclih^^d hc.vc b-.cn th c u?o ハf r〔 volutins ？t. hun;.r r^c? cty. /•£ 1 m f the ct pit' listic oxt)1-? tc.ti--r cc^r.T-iy f the /rglo-S .x r. t ^ c is renpant D广cuncnt T 了つ• 1616 69 cr.d as lor.g r s th-。bハ”ncp-、ss r.ccurml「ti.'〉n :、.f 1•；丄 1th is p fitted to fc 11 into th, Irnds ^f this n . l l ntimb.：r of 1 ndividuc*. Is, this じ、rth rill ？ti] 1 be t .0 sni'ニ 11 ； vor if , r-lご rpx.d five tines つr ever tor. tinier. To n.'- kc e. lonf- st ごで;7 sh ハ rt,と rrc?.. -f f irty rnd .^iTty million p<。T)lc c \rtrol へ rn-f .””tii 、f the rld T r torritnry c.r.d. pc,、，lcs r rd r^r the benefit of 厂 p r ' - u p ハf rjlntocr- ts, they ：. rc ト：.ir.g exploited and t. 1 " v'«5.tl： e.r un-^ rfjrornd rcr urcc-c ore lyirig r:r ご.tc, nv vented fron bcii g utiliZv..-d by ">th. • T Jnd/r ？uch c-ncHt: or.r, it is irovit. bl: , tiu t ^^Vc. rty pre v - 1 s t,、d;二7 i” the •マ t( ri•广- tic living str.ndc rd nf mc.nkind. T。rectify this irr t̂ ' -rr^lity in the Eirrつpcしn and Grc^.tor ゾ Gia こ r い.！？ 、、！he tbj rrii ci'olc contort?'、尸 tho T : ow Order nicnt? oned ir. the Trioどrtito r v c t , But iぐ puch is tho c?.£rc, the rcnuiriti'-ns ハf the NしTT C:ぐ,r Treaty fc;, th.、 three ^owcrr o^rcorncd riuet Tx. first, t ) uoh Id the t ylrJ.it-,.Ti r :.r< , ,、rld idee. f cr/l Fecund, hi 5:od ハr. this idoc., t：) r..rouncc the rjF.ten �,rxrO/、i十ん ti、n 一-.f the stronge r vrcyirg upor. tho ”' へ.r• If •匕hし iyrc.rry ^f Or • t 5rラぐ,.in, A v 'ioricr r rd Fr r-co is ド horrcid and. oven if they しre ovcrthrT'n, it ，l丄丄 degenera te t、th hor«. tofore "battle f^r p ^ c r " cmc! rrii:. not contrihutc to the： civili3£.ti.*)n ^f rie.nkir.d if the throe c'、urtr:レ f arc £ n ing t^ succccd th(x\ ir. d irg the rc::ic thiri£. If th't "-ir th .ノ cr r.o} a pcr r .k r ncrt r-^rld p'、:. cc、 can r?cvcr be gained c 5. Significr.nce 'of 画 r す s Declaration. 心ccntly，Cor r it：ny 1 s Economic Mirdptc.r FU?' r strtcd th. t as in r'ZI 「 e n . n y , the gold rt&nd-.rd r ̂ t bo used hcrcr.ft;r in the net* Europe • ‘ This is ^nly n t rly し fつ•rc.nciGl and eoroniic^.l '"T^blcn ハf てhe ncv r Europe but £:s boirg iridicctivc ハf the ch r: ctcr f the Fcv : Order iteclf, I think it POFS^FBGS: a sigrific: rice of cxtrcnc i -iportmcc. If inc c-.r-Ei dcvF import: r.t r. r、lo gold c. t.ブ 1 t.、 exploit t.ho renk -Ir. the v、rld heretofore, ore cr.r,not つ enph： ?izc thu ir.”つrtrrcしへで Mr. FUNP* ! c docl: rしti、r. . ‘ I ‘ If the Nov: Order plcnr-cd by r しrd Itr.ly "^'mld p^rscss such cho.ractcris.ti ce, J-,IC Old Ordし:r r,O r 'cr5, ci。]]了 FÔ r fr'、 r 】 the E'tc-rcl^rint cf the clor.iir'.tir̂ clc-s; r -, Fill kn'” r cla-vlj ： t f. pi. rcc str广iチ：c n opnoriti^r t、tしlit ri： nis r n is. N*^:, ' ith tl c，rcluri.)n nf thし Tripr.i'titc :、ct by Jc.p?. n, rhc ir rctually rtc rdirrj rt the cr^svvn：. dr '、ナ c h ^ f irg -.nc vc.vty 一r thu thcr. Sjncc the ？^ FCHUn- F Ir?cicl( nt, in vicr • f the pol > cy. Jr.p:n hr-s Bocumcnt No, 1616 Pr.go N-. 70 rc*hT)t、.d m d norcovcr, 。nt of r..gしrd f-.r rg〔..dvncしted the high iclot.Is nf blirhirg the Grcc tor /• sia Now Ordrr, actually Javcn should ht,vo n- thing to c^uso her t’ be i t 1 へ！？？ a? tつ h::.r c^iorsc of r.ction. But it see ̂ s thrt ^nvti - ̂ ’ f the で c'丫〕lc rc^s:. to consider the problem i n thf t 3if;ht. With th-, cor elusion of the ドc.v T OrdLr Trc&ty, is it ！r、t rcccssary for the rmncnt end the pecnlc to r'-.r!マ tli« ir fcelir^s in rr f, rd t • r:orlrl pribl.. ̂ s? Doc# No. l6l6 ^cge No. 71 C E R T I F J C A T E W.D^C. No. I . F . S . No. l6l6 Statement cf £ource and Authenticity ェ ， と ? i i b e . t a ， S o s e b u r o , hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capo city • Second Secretary, Home Ministry .nd that as such ofi icicl I have custody of tho document hereto cttcched consisting of lo8 p .诉 s , dated ITo\r , "^d doscrilDcd as follows： Dircussi-n of 1 4 he Jcpan - G e r m y - Itcly Aris I further certify that the Gutached rccord aid document is cn • f f i c i a l document of tho J .jjanese Govcrnnent ? and that it is prrt of the official archives emd files of the following, ncmcd ministry or depcrtment (specifying also tho file nucibcr or citrtion, if r.ny or any other officir.l designrtion of the re^ulrr location of the documont in the CT ch ives or files ) ： Honie Ministry _ £ igned at Tokyo 011 this 、 third dcy of January, 1947 /s / _Shibr :tQ | Kosr:buro Signしtiure of Official FEAL Witness： /sノ Kishichi Cnuna Jrpcncse Ch? rr.cters) ‘ O f f i c i a l Capacity Statement of Officir.l "Prcurcnont ェ》Bic^.crd !：< Jc,rsh » hereby certify that エ cm associated with the Gonercl Headqucrtcrs of ,thc Supreme Commander for tho Alliod Powers, end thct the above c^rtificrtion was obtained by me ro丄.1 the r.bove 3igned officicl of the Japr.nece n-ovornment in the o nduct of my ©if icicl businose 0 t Signed rt Tokyo ov tk..s 3rd day of Jan. ’ 1947 /s/ Bjchrrd E. Lrreh Witness： / s / Douglr J L c V Idorf Chief, I m . D iv . IP£ Invosti^c.tor v IR ; Off icial Capacity
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Ex.2208A-2234. Japanese foreign policy
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